ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] CONTRARY TO RESPONDENTS’ ASSERTION, THE REVISED GRADING PLAN, WHICH [...] FAILED TO PROVIDE ITS SURVEYOR IN A TIMELY MANNER, WAS IN FACT APPROVED BY THE MORRIS PLAINS BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT BEFORE, NOT AFTER, THE SURVEYOR BEGAN HIS STAKEOUT OF THE PROPERTY.  Surveyor [...], under contract with and at the direction of [...], began staking out the grading of [...]’s property on March 23, 2009, using an outdated, inaccurate grading plan from 2005.  (Pa236).  Respondents argue (at Db6, paragraphs 7 and 8) that it is “of critical importance” to their argument that the [...] allegedly did not approve [...]’s revised plans until July 2009, thus supposedly excusing [...] from providing updated plans to its surveyor in March 2009 because the new plans were not yet approved by the town.  However, Respondents’ argument is factually incorrect.  The revised, updated grading plan actually was approved by the [...] on January 26, 2009 and memorialized in the record on February 23, 2009, according to the official records of the Board produced through discovery in this case, and part of the Motion papers.  (Pa405-Pa413).  Respondents erroneously rely on [...]’s Complaint, paragraph 11, filed in March 2017, which mistakenly stated that the Board of Adjustment approved the revised plans in July 2009 (Pa32).  The Board of Adjustment’s own official records are obviously the best evidence of its official actions.  The parties obtained these records during discovery.  The records are included in Appellants’ Appendix (Pa405-Pa413).  Therefore, Respondents have no justification to rely on Appellants’ 2017 Complaint to establish the date of Board approval of the revised grading plan.  Board approval of the revised plans occurred well before stakeout of the property began.  B.
[brief] [*Id.* at 575 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ]  The United States Supreme Court pointed out in its analysis that a jury can even find an employer’s conduct to be capable of deterring a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination even if the individual was not in fact deterred.  *Burlington Northern*, 548 U.S. at 68; see, e.g., *Patane v. Clark*, 508 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the challenged action was not sufficiently adverse under *Burlington Northern* since it did not dissuade the plaintiff herself from reporting sexual harassment again).  The *Burlington Northern* decision made clear that whether an action is reasonably likely to deter protected activity depends on the surrounding facts because the “significance of any given act will often depend on the particular circumstances.
[brief] Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corporation, 141 N.J. Eq. 379, 386 (E. & A. 1947).  That which is patently and unmistakably implied is a constituent element of the contractual intention, just as much so as that which is explicitly expressed in terms.  Krosnowski v. Krosnowski, 22 N.J. 376 (1956).
[brief] ” (See 1T 31:21-23).  Further, [...] never would have approved charge pay for only three of the five staffing coordinators.  [...], managing an already incredibly stressful office whose employees were constantly pulled in different directions as hospital-staffing demands remained fluid during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, lost sixty-six percent of her staff.  (Pa369 at 109:12-110:10).  The trial court recognized such an inconsistency in [...]’s argument.  (See 1T 31:2-7) (“it doesn’t stretch the imagination to understand that this was probably actions that Ms. [...] didn’t approve of because it left her with from a five-person office down to a two-person office in a very stressful time during which employment in the hospital was very much needed. ”).  [...]’s termination was not pretext for his alleged “complaints. ”  Rather, as the trial court correctly recognized, he was terminated for his theft of hospital funds.  [...] has failed to present any genuine issue of material fact to show that his termination was pretext for CEPA retaliation.  No reasonable jury could otherwise find.  III.
[directive] If 10.2.2 Prompt who including involving defendants in all cases, those resources, laboratory conserve  To requested prior to the completion of case is resolved that the in the event detained, are not of within 24 of the resolution notify the Office shall hours prosecutor forensic testing, the further testing is needed. laboratory if no other or Forensic Science of Forensic Completion Investigative Reports and Prioritize Authority to Prosecutor's 10.3 Indictment/Trial Comply with Seedy Deadlines. to When Needed Examinations if comply with a may be released the State fails to offenders dangerous Recognizing that 2A:162- or trying a detained defendant, see N.J.S.A. indicting prescribed for deadline statutory prosecutor any law pending trial, the may request is detained defendant where a 22, in any case investigation report supporting the to (1) prepare any in or involved agency enforcement and/or (2) documenting discoverable information, otherwise investigation or concerning the basis examination submit a report thereon, on a priority and or forensic physical test any conduct statutorily- will permit the State to meet the prosecutor that the specified by date and by a and/or trial. indictment for deadline prescribed submission/ Science may establish an electronic Forensic Office of Police
[brief] PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE (Pa382)  The Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to establish her claim for negligence because she could not establish both causation and damages due to a lack of expert testimony.  Plaintiff’s position is that expert testimony regarding causation is not needed.  Common sense and judgment could lead a juror to conclude that the Township’s actions led to the Plaintiff’s damages.  Moreover, Plaintiff relied upon the representations of the Township Engineer and therefore didn’t need an expert.  Lastly, the Township knew that they were responsible for the condition of the Property otherwise they would have never undertaken the drainage work in 2018.  The Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is unable to prove her damages because of lack of expert testimony.  In this regard, Plaintiff did produce documentation and estimates from licensed professionals and contractors as to estimates for returning the Property to its condition prior to the damage\(^1\).  The damages suffered by the Defendant are not so complex that expert testimony is necessary.  Rather, the property can be repaired and put back to its original condition if the work that is reflected in the estimates is performed.  Accordingly, the estimates provide a solid foundation for the damages suffered by the Plaintiff and expert testimony is not requited.  **POINT III**
[brief] In relevant part, CEPA provides:  An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following:  a.  Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer, or another employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, … or (2) is fraudulent or criminal, … [or]  *** c.  Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, . . . ; (2) is fraudulent or criminal, . . . or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.  New Jersey applies the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis to retaliation claims under CEPA.
[brief] A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW.  Because Plaintiffs challenge the propriety of the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, the standard of review is the same as set forth in Section II(A), above.  B.  THE TEXTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS WERE HIGHLY RELEVANT TO IMPEACH TYMIV’S CREDIBILITY IN THE LIABILITY PHASE OF TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE FALSE IN ONE, FALSE IN ALL CHARGE.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs and texts demonstrating [...]’s physical capacity to work following the incident because this evidence was highly probative of [...]’s credibility in all matters, including his version of the altercation with [...].  At the close of trial, jurors were instructed they could disregard [...]’s version of the incident at [...] if they believed that [...] deliberately lied about a material fact.  “If you believe that a witness deliberately lied to you on any fact significant to your decision on this case, you have the right to reject all of the witness’s testimony. ”  [11T 162:3-6] (quoting Model Jury Charge § 1.12M, “False in One – False in All. ”
[brief] In Brill, the Court stated:  [W]hen deciding a motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 4:46-2, the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 523.  Courts granting summary judgment a motion for summary judgment view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.  *Id.*  This assessment of the evidence is to be conducted in the same manner as that required under R. 4:37-2(b).  *Id.*  Thus, a court must determine whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to the fact-finder or whether the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law by the same standard of proof that would apply at the time of trial.
[directive] The law enforcement executive shall also conduct an annual review of use of force incidents in their department.  The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Portal; (b) an audit of body worn cameras and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and 21 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  (d) an analysis of the uses of force to ensure that force is being applied without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.  7.7  Based on that thorough review, the law enforcement executive shall determine whether changes in departmental structure, policy, training, or equipment are appropriate.
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[brief] (4T:25:4-13).  The Court noted that [...] himself provided his opinion, not as an expert, but based upon his review of lawyer bills, and he thought the bills were excessive.  (4T:27:22-25).  The Court ruled that [...] was permitted to offer his lay opinion on the bills in an effort to support his claim that the bills were excessive.  (4T:28:8).  However, the Court ruled that [...] was not permitted to bring a claim of legal malpractice because there was no evidence of malpractice in the case.  (4T:28:8-20).  The Court did grant the defense Motion to preclude plaintiff from arguing or proceeding on a claim of legal malpractice.
[directive] Threatened actions or outcomes that are immediately likely to occur during an encounter absent action by the officer.  The period of time involved is dependent on the circumstances and facts evident in each situation and is not the same in all situations.  The threatened harm does not have to be instantaneous, for example, imminent danger may be present even if a subject is not at that instant pointing a weapon at the officer, but is carrying a weapon and running for cover to gain a tactical advantage.  Law Enforcement Executive.
[brief] Despite its Ruling to the Contrary, the Trial Court’s Analysis Supports a Finding that Defendants Did Not Waive the Right to Pursue Arbitration.  As stated, any assessment of whether a party has waived the right to arbitrate a dispute must focus on the totality of the circumstances, requiring a fact-sensitive analysis.  Cole, 215 N.J. at 280.  Here, the Trial Court’s examination of the facts and circumstances of this matter established that Defendants satisfied the Cole criteria that a waiver did not occur and arbitration could be pursued.
[brief] The Court Below Failed, in Any Way, to Recognize the Influence of CEPA on the Traditional Concepts of Independent Contract/Employee (Pa-19).  The Court below failed to recognize that failure to renew a contract is a CEPA retaliatory action.  However, the matter of Abbamont v. [...], 269 N.J. Super. 11 (1993) stands for that conclusion.  There, a teacher in the Piscataway Township school system objected to health problems within his shop, which problems were inadequate ventilation.  The Court concluded that the Board of Education did not renew his contract because of his complaints.  In other words, Abbamont was a CEPA case where the Plaintiff’s contract was not renewed.  Consistent with the Abbamont opinion, supra, the Appellate Division in the unpublished opinion, [...] v. [...], 2014 WL 273645, found that to be a retaliatory action under CEPA:  Although the failure to renew [...]’s contract may have been due in part or in whole to budgetary constraints or poor job performance, certainly this negative job action could also have been in retaliation for [...]’s whistleblowing activities.  It is clear that the law of this State is that a failure to renew a contract can constitute retaliation.
[brief] In the instant case, at the end of the trial, a direct verdict should have been rendered for the Defendants in a professional malpractice case when Plaintiff failed to prove actual damages by an expert in the underlying matrimonial case.  The trial court judge, however, denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the malpractice complaint for failure to prove damages.  Instead, the trial court judge referred the case to the jury to infer causation and damage from circumstantial evidence in the professional malpractice case, regardless only the expert is permitted to opine causation and damages in the professional malpractice case.  The jury is not permitted to infer causation and damages from circumstantial evidence.  On appeal, the Appellate Division corrected the trial court’s mistake and vacated the unsubstantiated jury award of $500,000 for Plaintiff’s failure to prove actual damages, but substituted the jury award of $500,000 with a new award for $449,798.50 to Plaintiff’s attorneys for legal fees despite the fact that Defendants were not afforded an opportunity to challenge this new award and the trial records are devoid of any analysis regarding the legal fees claimed by Plaintiff; especially, the Appellate Division was aware that the amount of the award for attorney fees was substantially different from the legal fees awarded by the Family Court at the conclusion of the contested divorce case between [...].
[brief] State v. T.E., 342 N.J. Super. 14, 37 (App. Div. 2001) (when running sentences consecutively the sentence court should “appl[y] reduced weight to the aggravating factors” for the second term “[t]o avoid double counting of aggravating factors. ”); see also Miller, 108 N.J. at 122 (“factors relied on to sentence a defendant to the maximum term for each offense should not be used again to justify imposing those sentences consecutively. ”).  Furthermore, the Court’s evaluation of deterrence failed “[t]o advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and knowledge in sentencing offenders. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(7).
[brief] A pattern seems to be emerging.  This attempt to recast the facts is similar to the misstatement made under penalty of perjury where [...] certified to the trial Court that [...] is neither friendly or associated with [...] and that they do not do business and have no knowledge of each other.  87a.  As was argued in the Defendant’s Brief (Db46-48), and I will not belabor it here, this is and was completely untrue and is an example of yet another attempt to obfuscate the fact that all these parties are all interrelated and part of the same scheme in furtherance of unscrupulous Tax Foreclosure business practices.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ Brief begins with the assertion in its Preliminary Statement that:  “Times change. Industries change. Business models change.  Land use regulations governing these industries and businesses need to change….”.  Pb01.  Emphasis added.  Plaintiffs have it exactly right: regulations need to change to address changing conditions.  The Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq., is a comprehensive statutory scheme that precisely and thoroughly allocates the powers necessary to carry out its purposes.  The Board, as a zoning board of adjustment has only those powers granted to it under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76, which do not include the authority to make policy or adopt regulations.
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENTS’ COUNTERCLAIMS  ......................39  A.  Respondent Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Its Breach of Contract Claim .............................................39  B.  [...] Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Its Promissory Estoppel Claim As No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Exists ....................................................40  C.  Respondent Was Correctly Granted Summary Judgment On Its Unjust Enrichment Claim ..........................41  POINT IV
[brief] In 2018 and now, the zoning plan in [...] already included assisted living and nursing homes as permitted uses in all office building and industrial zones, and senior citizen housing in all affordable housing zones, totaling well more than 1,225 acres or 10% of the Township. \(^5\)  Da401.  As to the [...] rezoning request, the Township Committee did not refer the subject property to the Planning Board for further review, thereby denying the rezoning request.
[brief] Similarly, the Supreme Court held that altered medical records could be introduced as statements against interest during the first phase of trial on medical negligence that was to be followed by a second trial on claims for spoliation and fraudulent concealment.  *Rosenblit v. Zimmerman*, 166 N.J. 391 (2001).  The Court reasoned “a jury could infer from [...]’s behavior that he believed that Rosenblit’s medical records would prejudice his position in the [medical negligence] litigation. ”  Ibid.  The Court held that it was reversible error to limit their admissibility for impeachment purposes only and remanded for a new trial on the malpractice count.  Ibid.  *Rosenblit*, *Jones*, and *Wray* each demonstrate evidence that is relevant, if not dispositive of the latter phase of a bifurcated trial, is admissible for either impeachment, or as substantive evidence, even if it is prejudicial to the objecting party.
[brief] Studies show that witness memories can be altered when co-eyewitnesses share information about what they observed.  Those studies bolster the broader finding “that post-identification feedback does not have to be presented by the experimenter or an authoritative figure (e.g. police officer) in order to affect a witness' subsequent crime-related judgments. ”  See Elin M. Skagerberg, Co–Witness Feedback in Line-ups, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 489, 494 (2007).  Feedback and suggestiveness can come from co-witnesses and others not connected to the State.  Thus, “feedback affects the reliability of an identification in that it can distort memory, create a false sense of confidence, and alter a witness' report of how he or she viewed an event. ”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 255.  Because feedback is a system variable that affects the reliability of an identification, the Henderson Court directed the [...] to draft a proposed revision to the eyewitness identification charge that included an explanation of feedback and other system variables.
[brief] (18) ....................... 23  3.  The OAE Proceeding Was Not A “Disciplinary Proceeding” As Defined And Relevant For Underwriting Purposes.  (18) ...........................................  31  4.  The Trial Court Ignored The Record On Summary Judgment, Which Created At Least A Material Fact Question By Concluding That The OAE Proceedings Constituted An “Investigation. ”  (23) .................................................. 32  5.  The Trial Court Erred In Creating Its Own Definition Of “Bar Complaint” To Find A Material Misrepresentation As To The OAE Proceedings.  (20)  ..............................................................  33  C.  The Trial Court Erred By Disregarding Summary Judgment Standards In Ignoring The Existence Of Material Fact Disputes Regarding The Necessary Element Of “Detrimental Reliance. ”  (27)  ........................................................................ 36  D.  The Court Should Reverse And Remand This Matter To Allow Plaintiffs To Complete Discovery.  (24)  .............................  40  III.  THE RESCISSION OF THE POLICIES
[brief] ”  As Comer explicitly states, the trial court has discretion to “affirm or reduce the original base sentence. ”  Comer, 249 N.J. at 370.  Here, the judge chose to affirm, and his decision is well-supported.  Comer states that a juvenile who played a central role in a heinous homicide and then had a history of problematic behavior in prison, and was found to be incorrigible at the time of the later hearing, would be an unlikely candidate for relief.  Id. at 370-71.  On the other hand, a juvenile who originally acted in response to peer pressure and did not carry out a significant role in the homicide, and who presented proof at the hearing about how he had been rehabilitated and was now fit to reenter society after two decades, could be an appropriate candidate for a lesser sentence and a reduced parole bar.  Id. at 371.  Here, defendant fell between the two extremes.  He played a central role in the homicide and failed to show remorse, but did not display problematic behavior in prison.  It follows that the relief he was entitled to is the middle of the two outcomes: a reduction in the parole bar, but no reduction in the base sentence.