ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court’s Decision to Grant Leave to Permit [...] to Intervene as a Plaintiff was Reasonable and Appropriate [2T 46:4-12; Da515].  As discussed in Point II.B, the reason Urtecho “waited” to file her motion to intervene until, as [...] characterizes it, the “eve of trial,” is because [...] violated the Court Rules.  Rather than immediately filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim arguing that [...] lacked standing, [...] waited until May of 2023 to assert that because Urtecho had formed [...] after the Board unlawfully took jurisdiction over its application and voted to grant conditional use and site plan approval despite its lack of jurisdiction over the application for development, [...] had suffered no harm by virtue of Board’s action.  [1T at 48:17-19; 2T at 7:10 to 8:2].  She did so because if the trial court accepted [...]’ argument that because [...] was formed after the date of the Board’s vote it lacked standing, there would be no one to advance her interest in challenging the Board’s decision.  Accordingly, the Court should only address this issue if it concludes that the reason [...] lacks standing is because it was formed after the Board took its vote.  If it finds that [...] has standing, then Blue Violet’s appeal of Urtecho’s intervention motion is moot.
[directive] A law enforcement agency also may seek authorization from the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice to purge ALPR data before the expiration of the five-year retention period for good and sufficient cause (e.g., to reduce documented storage costs), provided that the data to be purged has been retained for a minimum of two  Any ALPR data transferred to another agency shall indicate years.  the date on which the data had been collected by the ALPR so that the receiving agency may comply with the five-year retention and purging schedule established in this Section.  See also Section 11.1 and 11.2, infra.
[brief] 2.  **The Board Did Not Consider The Sketch.**  As found by the Trial Court, Paragraph 46 of the Amended Resolution unequivocally states that the Sketch was not relied upon or even considered by the Board.  (Pa25).  Specifically, “none of the Commissioners expressed reliance on the [...] rendering, nor mentioned same or gave it any weight on the record and during deliberation. ” (Pa25).  The Sketch was therefore not part of the “approved plans”.  In an attempt to nullify the importance of Paragraph 46, the Appellant attempts to mislead the Court by paraphrasing the language of the Amended Resolution to spuriously state that none of the Commissioners “said anything about [the Sketch] during their deliberations. ” (Da13).  Appellant’s paraphrase of the Amended Resolution contradicts the actual plain meaning of Paragraph 46.  Simply stated, the Commissioners did not rely upon the Sketch nor gave it any weight when they were considering the variance for the Application.  Thus, the Sketch had no relevance to the Board’s decision or approval.  The Appellant also completely ignored the clear mandate in Paragraph 26 of the Amended Resolution which states that the proposed project shall be constructed in accordance with the approved plans.  (Pa28).  It is important to note that the mandate in Paragraph 26 does not include the Sketch, only the approved plans.  Thus, the proposed project was not required to be constructed in accordance with the Sketch which was only a schematic not-to-scale drawing.
[brief] The Trial Court relied upon an erroneous view of the *Hirth* case by quoting the portion which said “there ORDINARILY is no administrative record other than whatever report the planning board may have submitted to the governing body and a transcript of the quasi-legislative hearing before the governing body. ”  [Emphasis Added]  *Hirth*, *supra* at 165.  (Pa0080).  Yet a closer reading of *Hirth* demonstrates that [...]’s opinion shows that in several instances, the “complete” records should be considered by the Trial Court in a Section 7 challenge to a redevelopment plan.  *Id.*, at 157-158, 167.  Here the WARD memo and Planning Board transcript revealed the “apparent justifications” of plaintiffs’ position that the plan was “inconsistent” with the Master Plan.  The Trial Court should have been aware of those “justifications” when considering the challenge to the plan, according to [...]’s opinion.  *Id.*, at 167.  The same result should occur here because the Trial Court read the *Hirth* opinion too narrowly.
[directive] Victims of sexual assault shall be provided with thorough, compassionate, and objective assistance from all law enforcement officers responding to and investigating an incident of sexual assault.  All Incidents of Reported Sexual Assault  All reported incidents of sexual assault shall be investigated in a thorough, non-judgmental manner.  In every reported incident of sexual assault, law enforcement officers shall first ensure the victim’s immediate safety and security.  Once established, the victim’s needs shall be assessed, as each victim may respond to their own experience differently.  Some victims may be reluctant to present facts they fear would weaken their credibility, such as having voluntarily used drugs or alcohol or having consented to some sexual acts.  Law enforcement officers shall inform sexual assault victims that these perceived obstacles in a case can often be overcome if complete information is presented at the outset of the investigation.  The responding officer shall explain to the victim the role of law enforcement and obtain basic information about the incident.  If the criteria for a SART activation is met, the officer shall inform the victim about the roles of each SART member, the victim’s right to immediate medical attention, the value of prompt evidence collection, and the availability of a CSVA.  In addition, the officer shall answer any questions relating to the investigative and legal process.  If the victim chooses to activate any or all members of the SART, the on-call SART members shall be immediately notified.  The responding officer shall provide the other activated SART members with information necessary to provide services to the victim.  In emergent situations where public safety and/or destruction of evidence are factors, law enforcement shall consult with the victim and team members to prioritize services.  Where a victim chooses to activate a CSVA, law enforcement shall contact the sexual violence program and provide the victim with information about its services.
[brief] In disposing of his case, the trial judge stated the following, as he apparently accepted the said arguments by the respondents about expired statute of limitations (1T23, 15-25):  “Where the Court disagrees with the plaintiff is whether or not the statute of limitations in fact bars the causes of action presented in the plaintiff’s complaint. ”  You see, the respondents effectively had obstructed the appellant’s OPRA access records, which could show the ongoing abuses of power by them.  Respondents had done this, by simply citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3, “ongoing criminal investigation” (Pa29) and or “confidentiality” (Pa16), as response to the appellant’s OPRA requests for material public records.  By such scheme the respondents bought four (4) years’ time with impunity, since statute for criminal investigation allowed them to hide records labeled criminal for four years, when the statute of limitation for the appellant to sue the respondents for their abuses of power was one or perhaps two years.  That shows why Discovery was critically needed below.  The proof presented below for the said abuses of power by the respondents was the fact that on July 12, 2019 respondents’ detective [...] (and sidekick) marched on the appellant’s driveway (1) told him that he was being recorded by vest-cams, (2) disclosed to him all the aforesaid facts about entrapments, (3) showed him a portfolio of pictures of different ‘decoys,’ (4) pointed to him the cc-camera(s) hidden in the neighbor’s tree recording his house and street front, and (5) subjected him to abuse and harassments.  The statute of limitations for this one act of entrapment perhaps was exhausted, but the same abuses of power and entrapments by the respondents was continuing when the appellant filed his complaint and after the trial court disposed of his case *With Prejudice*.  The trial court denied the appellant *Discovery*, which was his only means to obtain evidence in his favor to prove that the said entrapments were ongoing regular occurrence, which was happening without court order and Under Color of State Law by the respondents.  By disposing of the appellant’s CoA no. 2, the trial court essentially turned blind eye to the abuse of power by the respondents.
[brief] The second case Plaintiffs rely on is Roe by M.J. v. [...]  Roe involved the terrible sexual assault of an underage girl as the result of an alleged defect on [...]’s property and known actions in the area.  Roe 317 N.J. Super. at 74-76.  The Roe Court first noted that:  [...] correctly argues that the term ‘dangerous condition’ refers to physical conditions of the property itself and not to activities conducted on the property.  Id. at 79 (citing Levin, 133 N.J. at 44-45; Sharra, 199 N.J. at 540-541; Rodriguez, 193 N.J. Super. at 43-44; Cogsville v. Trenton, 159 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 1978); and Setrin, 136 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1975)) (emphasis added).
[brief] It is and has been the Defendant, [...]’s position that because the Plaintiff, [...] failed to exercise their ROFR by February 17, 2023 (30 days following the date that they admit to having received the contract), their ROFR was waived.  Da80.  The Trial Court disagreed with this position because the Trial Court found that the contract/offer presented to the Plaintiff, [...] on January 17, 2023, was “self defective because it materially misrepresented the existence of the ROFR, and represented that everything contained in it was accurate and true.
[brief] In this respect, the following colloquy occurred during the testimony of [...]:  Q.  Okay.  If any of those items, and by that I mean willingness, sound mind, constraint, undue influence, were suspected by you, would you have prepared this will?  A.  I would have prepared it, but I would not have let the individual sign it.  In other words, I have had instances where people have come into the office, and after my discussions with them I felt that they were not of a mental capability to knowingly sign the will and understand what they were doing.  So, I -- I don’t do it, and I tell them they’ll have to go to another attorney.  Q.  And that was not the case here; is that correct?  A.  Not even close.  Not even close.  (9T233-9 to 23).
[brief] [[...]] at 11. ”  See RA177.  However, [...], supra, contains no such indication, or even dicta at page 11 or otherwise.  Instead, [...], supra, states that: [the Complainant alleges that] between November 3, 2014 and November 10, 2014, the Respondent/Board President, without consulting the other Trustees, instructed the Board Attorney to research and/or prepare memos regarding a) the non-renewal of the Superintendent, b) replacing an employee after new elections have been held but before the new Board is reorganized, c) whether a school board can take action to bind a future board by replacing an employee’s position prior to the end of his contract, and d) addressing personnel actions taken to avoid granting tenure …  Similar to the claim in Paragraph 3, the Complainant asserts that the Respondent took private action in violation of the Act when, on December 10, 2014, he surreptitiously met with the Board Attorney and certain Board members to discuss a plan to terminate the Superintendent or place him on leave.  Id. at 11.  (emphasis added).  Ironically, the ALJ’s reliance and interpretation of [...], supra, closely resembles the “lack of any evidence beyond speculation and conjecture” that led the SEC to determine that neither of the above- quoted claims in [...], supra, constituted violations N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).
[brief] (Da31-44)  While the Contract includes Defendants’ lots and acknowledges they are not owned by Township closing is not expressly conditioned upon the inclusion of lots.  Nor does the Contract obligate the Township to condemn Defendants’ lots.  As to potential condemnation, the contract provides that the parties “do not have knowledge that the Property is affected by or subject to any pending or threatened (i) condemnation proceedings....”  (Da35)  The only contingency set forth in the Contract is that the Township adopt the land swap ordinance and vacate certain public streets.  (See Da39)  The Contract does include any limitation on how the lands to be acquired by the Developer shall be used.  On March 28, 2023, the Township adopted Ordinance 7-23 to amend Ordinance 5-23 and added a certain lot that had been inadvertently omitted.
[brief] “Finally, we have reviewed the balance of defendant’s arguments, including: …probation’s calculation of arrears; …The trial judge found these arguments lacked merit, and based on our review of the record we also find they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. ”  2.  Given Probation’s withdrawal of $16,000 in unjustifiable support arrearage charges posted as due as of 2/1999 (DA304) and Probation’s acknowledgment it did not have documentation supporting its $16,000 in claimed support arrearage in the first place, it is obvious that the $16,000 arrearage charge was improperly fabricated under color of law.
[brief] In *[...] v. [...]*, No. [...], 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94792 (D. Mass. Aug. 24, 2011) (Pa0507- 10), the court applied *Boston Gas* and adopted a fact-based allocation based on similar evidence as was presented in this case.  In that case, the museum’s expert witnesses estimated the extent of contamination that occurred during U.S. Fire’s policy period and the costs to remediate that contamination.  *Id.* at *3-4*.  The District Court found this evidence credible and accurate and held that it was sufficient to support a fact-based allocation of the museum’s damages pursuant *Boston Gas*.
[brief] The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., addressed this very issue in the unpublished decision [...] v. [...], Law Division, [...] (February 14, 2006).  Pa197.  Applying the Project Influence Rule, the Court determined that the defendant was not entitled to just compensation based upon the zoning under the redevelopment plan, but that the prior zoning controlled the analysis when estimating fair market value in the condemnation action.  In Savickas, Hoboken brought an in limine motion to bar the defendant’s expert appraisal report which was based in part upon the change in zoning contained in the redevelopment plan which permitted residential uses in the formerly industrial-zoned area.  The [...] had adopted the redevelopment plan on May 20, 1998.  Under the redevelopment Plan, the property was located in Z-1 which permitted residential development.  However, [...] determined that the zoning in place as of the date of taking was industrial pursuant to the Project Influence Doctrine.  In Savikas, the property owner’s planning expert opined that based upon the residential zoning, the property could yield approximately forty-five (45) residential housing units.  Based thereon, the appraisal report opined the property value to be $5,600,000 based upon the **Z-1 allowance for residential development being in place** as of the date of valuation, taking the position that the redevelopment plan “supersedes the underlying zoning . . .”  Pa202.  [...] granted the City’s motion in part, barring from evidence the aspects of the expert reports which automatically applied the residential zoning under the redevelopment plan to the property, **as also done by [...]’s appraiser here and approved by the trial court.
[brief] The State has an inherent police power to issue legislation regarding the regulation and administration of municipalities when it is necessary for the protection of the public welfare, health, and safety.  See Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 343, 355 (2016); Hudson Cnty. News Co. v. Sills, 41 N.J. 220, 227 (1963).  The power granted to municipalities originates in the State’s police power.  See Inganamort v. Ft. Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 528 (1973) citing Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority, 32 N.J. 303, 312-314 (1960).  Also, “[t]he grant of an express power by the Legislature is always attended by such incidental authority as is fairly and reasonably necessary or appropriate to make it effective, and the authority granted to an administrative agency should be construed so as to permit the fullest accomplishment of the legislative intent. ”  Kaprow v. Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Twp., 131 N.J. 572, 581, 622 A.2d 237,241 (1993) quoting Mulligan v. Wilson, 110 N.J. Super. 167, 171, 264 A.2d 745 (App.Div.1970).  Courts will uphold an exercise of police power when “statutes exercising those police powers serve a legitimate public purpose and the adjustment of the private parties’ duties and obligations is on reasonable terms and conditions.
[brief] (5T51-9 to 25; Pa6).  Watching the surveillance footage, he stated that the intruder lifted the cash register without gloves to find the release button but did not succeed in opening it.  (5T53-10 to 24, 56-12 to 18; Pa5 at 00:04-00:30).  [...] retrieved the latent fingerprints from the bottom of the register and submitted them to the New Jersey State Biometric Unit Lab for comparison within the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), the state fingerprint database.  (5T63-1 to 15; Pa6).  He also noted his belief that the same burglar entered the restaurant both times because he appeared to wear the same two-toned sweatshirt with a dark-colored sleeve area and light-colored chest and hood area.  (5T66-13 to 14, 67-11 to 19).  Detective [...] also noticed a black object on the suspect’s hip in both videos, which he believed to be a cellphone or cellphone case.  (5T67-20 to 68-22).  [...] Lieutenant [...] testified as an expert in fingerprint collection, preservation, comparison, and identification at trial.
[brief] (Pa2265-2285.)  Finally, the [...] is specific that “Any contractor […] that does not have dedicated payroll for employees on-site” is not an insured “[u]nless added by separate endorsement. ”  [...] was not added by separate endorsement.  Moreover, it is undisputed that [...] did not have dedicated payroll for its employees at the Project.  (In response to [...]’s September 4, 2015 email stating it was “working on submitting payroll/OCIP for our contract with [...]” \textsuperscript{14}  Plaintiffs’ contention that cancellation of workers’ compensation coverage would not affect general liability coverage is wrong.
[brief] ”  G.E.P., 243 N.J. at 387-88 (quoting Burstein, 85 N.J. at 408).  Skipping to the third factor, “the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice,” counsel is aware of only two cases that are still on direct appeal and thus would be impacted by pipeline retroactivity—this case and Telfair, [...].  (Dra)  If the G.E.P. court found that granting pipeline retroactivity to forty cases “would not present an unreasonable burden on the administration of justice,” certainly granting pipeline retroactivity to two cases would not present an unreasonable burden.  243 N.J. at 388.
[brief] 1.  The Legislature finds and declares that:  a.  The public has longstanding and inviolable rights under the public trust doctrine to use and enjoy the State's tidal waters and adjacent shorelines for navigation, commerce, and recreational uses, including, but not limited to, bathing, swimming, fishing, and other shore-related activities; b.  The public trust doctrine establishes the rule that ownership of the State's natural resources, including, but not limited to, ground waters, surface waters, and land flowed or formerly flowed by tidal waters is vested in the State to be held in trust for the people, that the public has the right to tidal lands and waters for navigation, fishing, and recreational uses, and, moreover, that even land that is no longer flowed by the tide but that was artificially filled is considered to be public trust land and the property of the State...
[directive] The court may stay the commencement the custodial portion a sentence to of county jail because risks attendant to the COVID-19 public health emergency.  The court shall state the reasons the record for immediately commencing or staying on of the start a custodial term.  that regard, the court must consider and make findings In of of of the risk danger to the public, the risk flight, and the seriousness the offense, on as well as other factors relevant to public safety.  The court should also consider the of positions the defendant, the prosecution, and any victims.  (5)
[brief] C.  THE EXTRA COST OF RETAINING AN ARCHAEOLOGIST FROM A PWCRA-REGISTERED CONSTRUCTION ENTITY VERSUS AN ARCHAEOLOGIST WITHOUT THIS REGISTRATION IS INCONSEQUENTIAL TO THE RESULTS (0017a)...........................................22  1.  Extreme Hypothetical—Archaeologist Works Every Day, Every Hour of the Project—[...] Still Wins (0017a)  ...........23  2.  The Negligible Impact of an Alleged Defect on the Results Is a Permissible Consideration for Waiver or Cure (0017a)  .........24  D.  [...] Bears the Adverse Consequences of Not Having Sought a Clarification from the [...] on the Meaning of the Bid Instructions with Respect to Archaeology Subcontractors (0018a)
[brief] Here, the State withheld [...]’s notes until January 4, 2023.  By way of reference, January 4, 2023, was some two years after Appellant was charged, eighteen months after Appellant filed his first motion to suppress, eleven months after Appellant filed for reconsideration, over six months after Appellant was Indicted, four months after Appellant filed his second suppression motion and three weeks after the Court concluded a second evidentiary hearing at which [...] testified for a second time.  For months on end, and motion after repeated motion, Appellant steadfastly argued that the State exceeded the bounds of the search warrant by breaching Appellant's distinct apartment.  For months on end, brief after brief, sworn witness after sworn witness – including [...] who testified twice - the State represented that Appellant’s door was wide open and never breached.  During this time the State possessed, maintained, and controlled [...]’s notes which unequivocally corroborated Appellant’s argument and was the death knell of the illegal search.  What is more, in denying Appellant's motion for reconsideration on May 12, 2023, the trial court went so far as to say, “[t]he only fact that may make a difference here truthfully is whether the door was locked and they broke into it.  That’s the only fact that would be dispositive, that would make a difference to this court. ”  Despite the State being on notice of this specific issue and having evidence in their control that would settle the issue for Appellant and the Court, they continued to perpetuate a charade.  The State’s actions are inexcusable.  Three essential elements that must be considered to determine whether a Brady violation has occurred: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material to the Appellant’s case.