ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On June 20, 2021, Father’s Day, [...] awoke at around 7:00 a.m. to a knock on his door and opened the door to find [...] standing there.  (5T91:19-24).  Admittedly aggravated, [...] asked [...] what she did not understand and attempted to give her $1,400 for the cumulative gifts she had thrust upon him in recent weeks.  (5T92:11-16).  He told her not to call or text him anymore, that he was with someone else and did not want to be with her.  (5T92:14- [...] responded by throwing the $1,400 in [...]’s face and telling him that he was going to regret breaking up with her.  (5T93:2-3).
[brief] (Aa3).  Rather, [...] allegedly tried to create a distraction and later texted [...] asking if she was okay.  (Aa3).  The text message is not in the record, as [...] did not provide a copy of it.  Nonetheless, [...]’s investigation summary does not report that [...]’s text message corroborated [...]’s allegation that he misnamed [...].  (Aa3).  Rather, it states that a screenshot of the 9:17 a.m. text message from [...] shows her ask [...] “if she was okay because she observed [[...]] bullying her,” to which [...] responded “‘It’s bad’ and that she called the police” on [...].” (Aa30).  Notably, [...] was also the individual seeking to run against [...] to replace him as local union president, and for whom [...] was soliciting petition signatures.  (Aa4, n.3)  Moreover, [...] also filed a related State Policy complaint against [...] alleging that he called two women “bitches. ” (Aa4, n3).  [...] did not substantiate that complaint.  (Aa4, n3).  C.
[brief] For example:  The evidence that shows that [...] obtained $500,000 from [...] is in evidence.  Those two separate wires of March 18th, 2014, and March 17th, 2014, appear in the [...] bank account statements.  They appear in evidence presented by [...], an email from his bank confirming the wire, and [...] testified that he made those payments.  (7T 64:13 to 64:20).
[brief] Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.  Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious criticisms.  First, legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory.  Judicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow [...]’s memorable phrase, an exercise in “‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends. ’”  See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 214 (1983).  Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.  We need not comment here on whether these problems are sufficiently prevalent to render legislative history inherently unreliable in all circumstances, a point on which Members of this Court have disagreed.  It is clear, however, that in this instance both criticisms are right on the mark.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005).  Citing Exxon Mobil Corp., the Third Circuit explained, “both the Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that we may not turn to legislative history in order to muddy the waters of an otherwise clear statute. ”  Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).  For these reasons, the Senate Committee Report provides no basis to part from the unambiguous statement in § 1692c(b) that “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  POINT III.
[brief] It was not necessary that [...], or any other member of [...], first sue in a separate, derivative action to challenge the Plaintiffs’ vote that their personal legal fee debts should be made reimbursable and transformed into ‘company’ debt.  If that were the law then all booked liabilities must be accepted verbatim by all Courts conducting fair value hearings, even those booked but unpaid as [...]’s expert had admitted Plaintiffs legal fees were.  (9T38:4-5)  Neither a member of a company nor a Court is bound to accept what management deems a liability or discount to equity in a judicial determination of fair value.  If that were the case Courts would be irretrievably hamstrung in deciding what fair value even is with adjustments not permitted.  Indeed, for Plaintiffs to contend that [...] had no basis in the valuation hearing to argue that he should not have to pay his adversaries’ legal fees, which they had disguised as a company obligation or liability, would mean that a Court could not make adjustments to any part of a company’s assets or liabilities in making a fair value determination.  Was [...] required to sue [...] to challenge the depreciation of $2.2 million of actual value of their two real properties in order for those to be “adjusted” upward in a valuation hearing?  Of course not.  In fact, [...]’s own expert made that adjustment in determining what he believed “net asset value” was.  The Court’s expert did the same.  (Da2193)  Was the Court prohibited from making that upward adjustment to decide a fair ‘net asset value’ because [...] didn’t first sue to oppose the company-wide bookkeeping decision?  Of course not.  Plaintiffs’ argument here is more dangerous to the law of judicial valuation than the business judgment rule argument on which Plaintiffs relied with the Chancery Court.  Both arguments seek to wrest control from a Court in freely determining fair value and bind it to management’s bookkeeping decisions.  This Court should reject both that the business judgment rule would allow self-dealing and unlawful fee-shifting by majorities in shareholder cases.
[brief] The trial court’s April 6, 2023 and February 23, 2024 Orders were limited to findings based upon [...]’s alleged liability under the Spill Act and [...]’s alleged liability under the Policy’s MCS-90 endorsement.  (See, PPCIa369-71; PPCIa447-48).  The trial court did not consider and has never adjudicated whether the [...] Policy, to which the MCS-90 endorsement is attached, would afford coverage.
[directive] Release Pretrial Bearing on Material or a Has Charges  Upgrading Supports Risks. to prosecutors and police encourages Directive in this established policy general  The done be whenever can that complaint-warrant than rather complaint-summons of way by charge to cases in reluctant close nonetheless be may Prosecutors safety.  public jeopardizing without monitoring and to conditions release be subject would defendant the that possibility the foreclose time the at available be may information that limited the given program services pretrial the by from prosecutor preclude a to construed be shall Directive this in nothing  Accordingly, arrest. of offense for 4 of Section an provisions the with accordance in acomplaint-warrant for applying that information investigation reveals further when complaint-summons by charged previously originally than greater injury is of extent the where (e.g., charges upgraded or new supports 35 Page new assault; simple than rather assault aggravated for prosecution warrant to as suspected warrants substance dangerous controlled seized the of quantity or type the about information occurred offense the that determined subsequently is it or crime, ahigher-degree for prosecution as such possession," "simple than more involves offense firearms a zone; park public a in at firearm a pointing 2C:39-4, or N.J.S.A. of violation in purpose unlawful an for possession mere a not — person specific against a crime a (i.e., 2C:12-1(b)(4) N.J.S.A. of violation in another warrants theft of a amount the that reveals investigation subsequent crime); possessory is firearm seized a reveals that or charged, originally than crime ahigher-degree for prosecution etc.). weapon, assault an is or defaced, stolen, applying from prosecutor a preclude to construed be Directive in this anything shall Nor when complaint-summons by charged previously offense an for acomplaint-warrant for the at general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant or officer the to known not information reasonably are conditions release pretrial that indicates decision charging initial the of time defendant's the assure reasonably to community, the or victim of a safety the protect to necessary to attempting or obstructing from defendant the prevent or to required, when court in appearance be not need but include, might information new
[directive] In addition to any bureaus or other organizational units established by Structure of [...]. the Director pursuant to Section I.C of this Directive, the following constituent organizational units are hereby established in the Office, and shall operate under the general direction and supervision of the Director, and under the immediate supervision of a Bureau Chief.  The Director may issue, subject to the approval of the Attorney General, standard operating procedures or similar policies related to the functions encompassed within [...], including those within its constituent units, applicable throughout the Department.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (Apr. 19, 2021) | 36-39 | PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On July 20, 2021, a [...] returned [...], charging the defendant, [...], with two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (counts 1 (fentanyl) and 2 (methamphetamine)); and two counts of second-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) (counts 3 (fentanyl) and 4 (methamphetamine)).
[directive] The mandatory penalties are as follows:  (1)  Up to $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2)  Up to $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  Up to$750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  Up to $500 in the case of a 4th degree crime  Total S.C.V.T.F. Penalty: $ Date: Defendant: Defense Attorney: Prosecutor: Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080 page 5 of 5
[directive] [Não/No]  [Não corresponde/NA] b. você também se declarar culpado por posse de arma que não seja arma de fogo para fins ilícitos enquanto cometeu, tentou cometer ou conspirou para cometer qualquer um destes crimes, você receberá uma sentença consecutiva por posse de arma para fins ilícitos? you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, for an unlawful purpose while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon for an unlawful purpose? OU/OR c. [Sim/Yes] [Não/No]
[brief] Likewise, in the context of dismissing Appellants’ tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim in Count 2 of the First Amended Complaint, the trial court noted that:  [Appellants] assert that [...] used confidential information under the NDA to negotiate a competing deal with the owners of the Property, and that [...] “undercut [Appellants’] deal” and, had they not done so, “[Appellants] would have received the economic benefit of having the Solar Project at the Project Site. ”  The claims ignore [Appellants’] payment default under the Lease and consequent loss of site control over the Property…  even if [Appellants] proved a violation of the NDA, it was [Appellants’] Lease default that led inevitably to their loss of the solar rights tied to the Property.  (emphasis added)  [FEDa121].  The same rationale holds true for the alleged breach of the Lease’s confidentiality provision by [...].  Assuming, arguendo, [...] disclosed any information to the [...], such information was already in the [...]’ possession through the Appellants as discussed above.  Based on the record, including the trial court’s prior findings as well as Appellants’ own allegations, the claims set forth in Count 17 of the proposed Second Amended Complaint could not be sustained and were futile.
[brief] The Board met on September 20, 2022, well within the 45-day timeline and at a regularly scheduled Board meeting.  Additionally, Ordinance 2022-17, adopting the amendments to the Redevelopment Plan in question was introduced on October 27, 2022.  The Board met on November 22, 2022, again within the 45-day timeline required under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e.  In anticipation of the Board’s meeting and to advise the Board, the Board’s Professional Planner, [...], PP, AICP, issued a letter dated November 11, 2022.
[brief] Pre-trial Motions.  [...] claim that the Special Master misapplied the Appellate Division’s mandate and awarded fees on certain motions [...] filed without finding there was a “factual or legal overlap with the RICO claims. ”  (Db41.)  Once again, the Wilfs present a stale argument dug up from former briefing that the Chancery Division and [...] rejected in 2013, and a second time before this appeal.  On this basis alone the Court should disregard the Wilfs’ complaint.  In any event, the Special Master made specific and thorough findings in analyzing whether to award fees for counsel’s work on each motion under the remand mandate.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:46B-54, all title insurance forms must be submitted and explained to and receive the approval of NJDOBI.  [...], *New Jersey Title Practice*, §27-2 (5th ed. 2021).  Once a CPL has been filed, explained, approved and its fee set by NJDOBI, it cannot be altered except by a subsequent filing approved by NJDOBI.  Fineberg, §14-8, citing N.J.S.A. 17:46B-54.  The CPL has been revised over time and in 2019, that is, at the time of plaintiff’s closing, the form in effect is shown in defendant’s appendix.  Da1.  (Fineberg, pp. 1920-1923).  Plaintiff does not and has never possessed a CPL.
[brief] On the Brief: [...] [...]  ATTORNEY ID: [...]  [...] T: [...]  F: [...]  E: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Contents.................................................................ii  Table of Authorities..............................................................iii  Table of Appendix Contents................................................iv  Preliminary Statement.......................................................1  Statement of Facts and Procedural History............................3  Legal Argument..................................................................6  The Joint Representation of All Appellants in Violation of the Order Under Review Justifies Dismissal of the Appeal.............................6  [...]’s Certification Reveals that Appellants Do Not Intend to Concede  Vicarious Liability..............................................8  Conclusion...........................................................................10
[directive] Failure to provide proof of insurance; impoundment and sale of vehicle a.  Upon the issuance of a summons for failing to possess or exhibit an insurance identification card in violation of R.S.39:3-29, the violator or registrant shall have 24 hours from the time of the citation to provide the issuing law enforcement agency with the insurance identification card, or other satisfactory proof of insurance.  Failure to provide the insurance identification card or other satisfactory proof of insurance within the 24 hour time frame shall result in the issuance of a warrant for the immediate impoundment of the vehicle that was being operated when the summons was issued.
[brief] The FDCPA, as a Federal Statute, Should Be Construed Consistent with How Federal Courts Construe the Statute.  (Not Addressed Below)**  By definition, a court must follow binding precedents.  Unfortunately, there are no binding precedents which resolve whether a debt collector’s conveyance of information about a debt to a third-party mail vendor violates § 1692c(b).  Indeed, there are only a handful or so of published opinions from the Courts of the State of New Jersey applying the FDCPA and roughly the same number from the U.S. Supreme Court—but none address § 1692c(b).  The absence of binding precedent does not mean that a New Jersey court writes on a clean slate when there is non-binding authority from the lower federal courts.
[brief] The sub-headline of said press release stated: “[...] Says Environmentally Sensitive Area Can’t Be Home to 206 Apartments and Retail. ”  Ra26.  The press release portrayed Plaintiffs and their development proposal in a completely negative light and contained language that cast Plaintiffs as a lawbreaker proposing an unlawful development.  Id.  Specifically, despite signing a Settlement Agreement that called for development of the Property, the Mayor stated in the press release that:  "I've not been pleased with this proposal since its inception; it is yet another way in which developers use state affordable housing mandates to force more development into towns...  And now, the developer is still trying to squeeze as much development as possible onto this site, even with a bald eagle nesting ground.  To me this is absolutely unacceptable."  Id.  This statement reflects the bad faith of the Township, through the Mayor, in conducting the TRC meetings, with the Mayor stating that he found the plan, "since its inception," to be "absolutely unacceptable."
[brief] Commitment for Title Insurance  Issued by [...] dated August 27, 2018 [Exhibit D10]  .........................................................  145a  Minutes of Special Board Meeting of [...] on September 1, 2019 [Exhibit D12]  .........................................................  194a [...] Letter dated September 7, 2019 [Exhibit D13]  ..........................................................................................  196a Proof of Capital Improvements [Exhibit D15]  ...........................................  197a Closing Statement between [...] and [...] dated July 7, 2022 [Exhibit D21]  ..................................................................................................  199a Expenses and Income from 7/2019 – 7/2022 [Exhibit D22]  .......................  201a [...]’s Offer to Purchase Letter dated June 18, 2022 [Exhibit D37]  ..............................................................................  202a [...]’s Offer to Purchase Letter dated June 19, 2022 [Exhibit D38]  ..................................................  203a Mortgage [Exhibit TPD16]  ........................................................................  204a  Deed from [...] to [...]  [Exhibit TPD18]  .................................................................  209a  Deed from [...] to [...]  [Exhibit TPD19]  ........................................  213a  Deed from [...] to [...]  [Exhibit TPD20]  .........................................................................................  217a  [...] Restated Certificate of Incorporation  [Exhibit TPD33]  ........  224a  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] [...]’s suggestion (Db6 n.6) that he intends to file additional appeals related to final, appealable orders on prior fee awards proves his design to continue filing meritless applications, even if years out-of-time, to further needlessly waste party and court resources.  Indeed, based on filings in [...]’s divorce proceedings, [...] incurred more than $2 million in fees to the [...] and [...] since their retention in 2018/2019.  (Da20).  In January 2023, after the filing of Plaintiff’s fee application, [...] retained a third firm – [...] – to pursue additional applications for release on his behalf.\(^9\) (Pa93).
[brief] A.  [...] Insures [...] for Personal and Advertising Agency  On July 9, 2017, [...] issued [...] (the “Policy”) to [...] which provided coverage for those sums that [...] becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of covered “bodily injury,” “property damage,” or “personal and advertising injury. ” (Da176). ¹  The Policy further provided that [...] has, “no duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘bodily injury’, ‘property damage’ or ‘personal and advertising injury’, to which this insurance does not apply. ” (Da176).  Here, the underlying plaintiffs allege “personal and advertising injury. ”  Coverage for “personal and advertising injury” under the Policy is subject to the following exclusions:  Applicable to Coverage L – Business Liability, this insurance does not apply to:  Personal And Advertising Injury:  a.  Caused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the ¹ [...] adopts the following citation form: “Da” – Defendant’s Appendix; “Db” – Defendant’s Brief; “1T” – March 17, 2023 Hearing on [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment. rights of another and would inflict “personal and advertising injury”; b.  Arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity.  (Da182).  B.  [...] Initially Agreed to Defend [...] Under a Reservation of Rights When the Underlying Plaintiffs Alleged Causes of Action that Did Not Necessarily Require a Showing that [...] Intended to Cause the Underlying Plaintiffs Harm
[brief] [...] of Probation stated “We won’t do that” and refused to honor [...]’s Orders of 6/20/2012 and 7/20/2012 to hold a hearing, on the record, for purposes of establishing a correct audit of Defendant’s probation account.  The “administrative review” was a sham in that it was simply a reiteration of Probation’s account errors without any consideration whatsoever of any of evidence of payment or of Probation error.  unsupported un-supported hearsay representation of an agency of the State over that of Appellant’s strenuous objection without due investigation and in this manner Appellant was denied his right to equal protection to fair and impartial adjudication.
[brief] 1 ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................................  6  I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED [...]’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY [...] AS COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS  BECAUSE NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTS UNDER THE OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES OR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT .........................................................  6  A.  Standard of Review ..............................................................................................................  6  B.  The [...], [...], [...], [...], and Individual Defendants Employed Therein are the Clients Whom [...] was Retained to Represent in this Consolidated Matter ..............................................................................................................  7  C.  There is No Positional Conflict Under the Outside Counsel Guidelines that Prohibits [...] From Continuing its Representation of the Defendants-Respondents in this Consolidated Matter ..........................................................................................................................  11  D. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Co., 109 N.J. 201 (1988)  Does Not Support Disqualification of [...]  Because it Has a Distinguishable Set of Facts and Relies Upon a Now Outdated Version of RPC 1.9 ..................................................  14
[brief] As [...] found, [...] should have known by the time of the phone calls that the talkative [...] was reasonably likely to keep discussing the case if he was able to reach his parents, particularly since [...] had already incriminated himself in the constitutionally invalid interrogation.  Nevertheless, [...] arranged to let [...] contact his mother without her knowing from the outset that he was present and recording.  [...] applied the *Innis* test to the critical facts he found from the recordings and the testimony, properly exercising his discretion.