ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 124-125 (App. Div. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).  "In the absence of this critical safeguard, 'the integrity of the fact-finding process' is compromised denying the fact finder the ability to fully and fairly assess credibility. ”  Id. at 125.  [...]’s out-of-court opinions were offered for the truth of the matter asserted and were being used as direct evidence that defendant did nothing wrong.  One need look no further than the defense closing argument for proof.  11T76:9 to 77:11. Pb26-29.
[directive] Pretrial Intervention Program Application ;~t =..:c~ .. Name  Initial Middle First Name Last Name 1 I  Other Names Used Residence I Apt# State Street Town Zip I I I Age Telephone of Phone Date  Birth Cell  Sex D Female Male Interpreter Needed? No Yes  If indicate language: yes, Emergency Contact Name  Telephone Relationship I I Present Status custody? In No Yes  If where: yes, I.  Prior Diversion  Ineligibility ever enrolled a of pretrial intervention, supervisory treatment program into placed  Have been been you in No  Yes under conditional discharge statute (N.J.S.A. 24:21-27 2C:36A-1), or conditional dismissal the or the (N.J.S.A. or granted a dismissal due successful participation the program 2C:43-13.1 been to in et seq.), Veterans Diversion (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-23 or enrolled a diversionary under program the Program in et seq.), . of any other state or the States for a felony or indictable offense?  United laws  If specify what program: yes, D D D D  Pretrial Intervention Conditional Discharge Conditional Dismissal Veterans Diversion Program D  Other provide the of the program  Please name State or Federal court it was ordered The where indictable offense or felony  The charged with were you  If the answer to this question is Yes, you are ineligible to apply to this program.
[brief] If they do not, the parties’ right to freedom of contract means that such exclusions may be used.  *See, e.g., Foley v. Foley*, 173 N.J. Super. At 259 (upholding an Injury to an Insured exclusion in a homeowner’s policy); *see also Kieffer v. High Point Ins. Co.*, 422 N.J. Super. 38, 49 (App. Div. 2011) (“While public policy mandates that those who operate vehicles across this state must have liability insurance, collision insurance is not mandated.  . . .  Therefore, provisions in a policy limiting the extent to which an insurer will compensate an insured for damages to an insured’s vehicle and expressly excluding certain types of collision coverage do not contravene public policy. ”).  Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, New Jersey law demonstrates that Injury to an Insured exclusions are enforceable and do not violate public policy when used outside of the primary automobile context.  Additionally, *Dela Vega*, the lone case Appellants cite in favor of their position is completely distinguishable from this matter.  Accordingly, Appellants have not presented compelling grounds for why the [...] should be re-written, or why the unbroken line of cases holding that Injury to an Insured exclusions do not violate public policy when used outside of the primary auto context should be overruled.
[brief] (1T 137-4 to 137-17)  However, when examined by the court, [...] admitted that he saw a “large box” of meat patties on the backseat of [...]’ car.  He also admitted that it was not a box of ordinary hamburger patties; rather, it was a large box of Jamaican meat patties.  (1T 150-14 to 152-2)  On cross-examination, [...] admitted that he has never owned a restaurant or any other type of business, let alone a restaurant specializing in Caribbean cuisine.  (1T 137-1 to 137-7)  According to [...], after receiving his Miranda warnings, [...] said he “would show me the beef patties that are in his vehicle, because again, I was questioning if he was telling me the truth or not. ”  (1T 117-7 to 117-10)  It was at that point that [...] had [...] sign a consent-to-search form authorizing the police to search under the hood of his car, where they ultimately discovered drugs.  (1T 117-10 to 123-18)  C.  The State’s Argument and the Court’s Ruling
[brief] When the state's energy and climate change policies are considered with the basic facts about the current regulator, the lack of any need for the proposed gas combustion regulator is exponentially reinforced.  The current regulator was installed in 2012 and as of the 2020 hearing it still had fifteen to twenty years of useful life remaining.  It is safe, reliable and emits no real greenhouse gases and consumes no natural gas.  By 2030, when the conversions away from natural gas must accelerate, the current regulator will still be operating as a safe and reliable part of an infrastructure that must now serve an accelerating reduced load.  It will have at least five and perhaps ten or more years of useful life.
[directive] See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644.  III.  Agreements with the Federal Government  A.  Section 287(g) agreements.  No state, county, or local law enforcement authority shall enter into, modify, renew, or extend any agreement to exercise federal immigration authority pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), and they shall not exercise any law enforcement authority pursuant to a preexisting Section 287(g) agreement.
[brief] \(^7\)  Lastly, the case law is clear that municipalities do retain some control over poles and electric lines even after permission is first granted to place said poles and lines.  See *New Jersey Natural Gas Go. v. Borough of Red Bank*, 438 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2014); see also *Seals v. County of Morris*, 210 N.J. 157 (2012) (holding that utility companies are required to obtain street designations from a --- \(^7\)
[directive] Detention  Pretrial for Needed Reports  10.1 courts and by prosecutors made be must detention decisions pretrial that  Recognizing a when 2A:162-19(d), N.J.S.A. see acomplaint-warrant, of filing the after days within preparing or detention, seek is pretrial whether to decide to information compiling is prosecutor may prosecutor pretrial detention, for the motion a filed having after hearing detention a for to leading investigation or conducted the arrest the made that agency enforcement law request a document any of reports would preparation that expedite and to priority highest give to arrest the law the such Upon request, receiving decision.  detention pretrial the to relevant information as expeditiously prosecutor to as the such reports submit and complete shall agency enforcement to authorized of Criminal Division Justice the of (Director 10.4 Section also See possible. disputes to officer resolve enforcement chief law State's as authority General's Attorney exercise reports).  required of completion timely order and Laboratory Analysis.  for Requests of Submission Timely 10.2  Testing. fog  Forensic Evidence Submitting fog  Limit Time 10.2.1  Division or County Prosecutor the trial, before detained is defendant the where cases  In forensic for evidence shall submit Division the by prosecuted cases in Justice Criminal of possible. as promptly as analysis a justifying compelling circumstances
[brief] ]  see also United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1352 (8th Cir. 1990) (“A frequently recurring example of police domination concerns the removal of the suspect from the presence of family, friends, or colleagues who might lend moral support. ”); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 1989) (police domination demonstrated when suspect isolated from co-workers who may have provided moral support); In this case, the interrogation of Defendant on March 5, 2018, arose under the following circumstance.
[directive] Sample Response Letters  Complaint Acknowledgment  This will acknowledge receipt of the complaint made by you on [date of complaint] concerning the actions of a member of this department occurring on [date of incident].  A thorough investigation will be conducted into the allegations contained in your complaint and you will be advised of the results of the investigation upon its conclusion.  In the meantime, if you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office by calling [telephone number], Monday through Friday, between the hours of ____a.m. and ____p.m.  Officer Exonerated
[directive] Você deverá responder estas perguntas adicionais se estiver se declarando culpado pelo crime de agressão sexual qualificada, agressão sexual, contato sexual criminal qualificado, sequestro segundo os termos da lei 2C:13-1c(2), por colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor com conduta sexual que prejudique ou corrompa a moral do menor segundo os termos da lei 2C:24-4a, por colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor segundo os termos da lei 2C:24-4b(3), (4) ou (5)(a), colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor nos termos da lei 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) ou (ii) (se o crime foi cometido no dia 1º de fevereiro de 2018 ou após esta data), líder de rede de pornografia infantil nos termos da lei 2C:24-4.1 (se o crime foi cometido no dia 1º de fevereiro de 2018 ou após esta data), por seduzir ou aliciar um menor nos termos da lei 2C:13-6, contato sexual criminal nos termos da lei 2C:14-3b se a vítima é menor de idade; sequestro segundo os termos da lei 2C:13-1, detenção ilegal nos termos da lei 2C:13-2 ou privação de liberdade nos termos da lei 2C:13-3 se a vítima é menor de idade e o agressor não é o pai ou a mãe, por promover prostituição infantil nos termos da lei 2C:34-1b(3), (4) ou por tentativa de cometer qualquer um destes crimes.  Favor observar que na Pergunta 4b(2) embora o crime de colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor nos termos da lei 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) pode estar sujeito à supervisão vitalícia da liberdade condicional mediante petição do promotor público, este crime não foi incluído nas emendas aos crimes sujeitos à Lei de Megan nos termos da lei 2C:7-2b(2) em 1º de fevereiro de 2018.  Observe também que a Pergunta 7 inclui o crime de homicídio qualificado se o crime subjacente for agressão sexual, bem como qualquer crime que o tribunal caracterizar especificamente nos autos que, com base nas circunstâncias do caso, deve ser considerado um crime sexual violento ou uma tentativa de cometer estes crimes.
[brief] The Regulator Station is a natural gas pressure reduction facility that will consist of a filter, heater, two regulator runs and associated piping.  The Regulator Station will have dual regulator runs to better ensure the reliability, safety and adequacy of gas delivery to [...]’s customers.  The redundancy of regulator runs is an industry best practice employed to manage risk; if one run is deactivated for maintenance or fails due to an equipment malfunction, the second run will continue operating in order to seamlessly maintain system pressure and delivery of natural gas, thereby avoiding any service interruption.  The Facility will be constructed in full accordance with N.J.A.C. 14:7 and the Federal Regulations for the Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline, Part 192, Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
[brief] Again, this Court recognized that these parties understood that business arrangement.  (498a).  That [...] knew he was transferring money does not transform that conduct between partnerships into a “wanton and willful act[]” under the PDA.  (40054a).  With respect to *N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(b)*, the Trial Court again relied on [...]’s transfers, while apparently weighing pre-SOL period conduct.  (40055a-56a).  Indeed, Plaintiffs additionally point to conduct pre-dating Oct. 1, 2003, and stretching as far back as 1998, contrary to this Court’s express instructions in 2018.
[brief] They also sought to assert “new” tort and legal malpractice claims against [...] and [...].  (Da176-549)  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave was based, again, on the alleged newly discovered evidence indicating that Mr. [...] was allegedly the sole owner of [...].  The [...], on behalf of [...] and [...], opposed the motion, arguing that Plaintiffs raised these same arguments before and that the Law Division had repeatedly rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments.  After argument on January 24, 2020, [...] denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.  (Pa287-288)  Having lost each of their attempts to bring Mr. [...] and [...] back into the 2015 action, Plaintiffs instituted the present action on March 4, 2020.
[directive] The Division. the by that determines or Director Prosecutor the unless violation of the circumstances the of program an endanger or operation, enforcement law or investigation an jeopardize would notification such a initiate (1) whether to determine promptly shall also prosecutor  The person. other or officer of revocation (2) and/or seek offense applicable other any or contempt criminal for charge imposed.  be of release conditions additional that request or Section 8, to pursuant release 78  Page Prosecutor of County jurisdiction the the outside occurred violation suspected the If officer or imposed, agency the were conditions pretrial release which on matter handling the place the over having jurisdiction  Prosecutor County notify the may violation the detecting other promptly the prosecutor notify shall that event which in occurred, violation the where violation.  the of Office Prosecutor's County are Offices or two Prosecutor's more offense and criminal a constitutes violation the If victim efforts ensure and their public to coordinate confer and shall prosecutors involved, the possible.
[brief] ” (Aa139-40) (first alteration in original).  The Commissioner reasoned that [...] “appears to be challenging the constitutionality of the [Law] itself, which gives the Department authority to require public access as a condition of a permit. ” (Aa139).  As such, the Commissioner concluded that [...]’s takings claim “could not be decided” by the ALJ or the Commissioner.  Ibid.  On November 14, 2023, [...] filed this appeal of the Commissioner’s Final Decision.
[brief] Since insurance carriers cannot recover their statutory remedies of compensatory damages, attorney’s fees and/or treble damages in the NFADR process, it is evident that Fraud Act claims must be resolved in a “court of competent jurisdiction. ”  To hold otherwise would leave an insurance carrier that has been successfully hoodwinked into paying claims with no ability to recover “restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits” to the ultimate detriment to the rate paying public.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2.  In the case of GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F. 4th 463, 469 (3rd Circuit 2024), the court found that GEICO would be entitled to recover damages in an arbitration proceeding citing to the American Arbitration Association’s Commercial Arbitration rules. \(^9\)  However, as is stated above at length, those rules do not apply to NFADR.  [...]’s rules and the rules promulgated by [...] govern the NFADR process.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5(i), N.J.A.C. 11:3-5-1, et seq. generally and N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.3 to 5.6 in particular.  Thus, this holding must be rejected.  E.
[brief] \textsuperscript{27}  Its fundamental premise is to protect the integrity of the judicial system by preventing litigants from "'playing fast and loose'" with the court "to suit the exigencies of self interest." \textsuperscript{28}  Moreover, under estoppel:\textsuperscript{29} plaintiff need not demonstrate intentional conduct by defendant.  The applicable standard requires only that plaintiff show conduct on the part of the defendant occurring intentionally or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that the conduct would induce inaction, together with reasonable detrimental reliance on plaintiff's part.  At a minimum, before delving into the nuances of the TCA, trial courts should make findings of fact and conclusions of law per R. 1:7-4(a) as to whether the defense was properly pled and if so, abandoned.
[brief] ” (4T144:23; 4T145:6-8; 4T155:17).  After the third instance involving the affiliation with a biker gang, [...] called counsel to sidebar.  (4T155:22).  [...] acknowledged during the sidebar discussion that [...] “compromised this case three times” during her testimony.  (4T156:25).  Defense counsel requested a mistrial, and [...] explicitly stated that he would reserve ruling on that motion.  (4T158:21-22).  [...] offered the following instruction to the jury moments later when back on the record:  Folks, I will need you to completely disregard that last answer given by the witness in this case.  (4T161:14-15).  After the State rested its case, the Defense presented the testimony of [...]’s stepfather, [...].
[brief] The Trial Court’s Determination of the Parties’ Obligations Under the PSA is Unsupported by the Facts  The testimony elicited from Defendant [...] and her representatives at trial contradicts the trial court’s determination that the PSA required only that Defendants finalize and submit the RIR prior to closing.  Defendants fail to address the core of Plaintiff’s argument and instead recite purported “facts” regarding the negotiations of the PSA, much of which are irrelevant, and otherwise rely on the testimony of [...], whom Defendants called to testify and whose testimony the trial court deemed “somewhat less credible than the other witnesses. ”  (Db23-28; Pa0218.)  Defendants do not dispute, or even address, that [...], whom Defendant [...] primarily relied on to handle environmental matters in connection with the PSA, expressly stated at trial that “[b]ased on the contract, [the Alessis] had [Defendant [...]] staying in the project until after an RAO was possibly obtained. ” (8T31:8-22 (emphasis added). )  Nor do Defendants address [...]’s testimony that after reading the PSA, which he had no part in drafting or negotiating, [...] understood that Defendants were responsible for obtaining the RAO.  (8T68:7 to 69:4, 70:19-21.)  Defendants also ignore the testimony of their own LSRP, [...], who understood that when he was re-engaged by Defendants as the LSRP in 2021, the ultimate goal of his engagement was to issue a site-wide RAO, which understanding was reflected in his retainer proposal to Defendant [...].  (6T78:10 to 80:8, 144:25 to 145:3.)  In addition, this Court should disregard Defendants’ incorrect, misleading, and otherwise unsupported factual assertions.  See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 2:5-4(a) (2024) (“It is, of course, clear that in their review the appellate courts will not ordinarily consider evidentiary material which is not in the record below by way of adduced proof, judicially noticeable facts, stipulation, admission or a recorded proffer of excluded evidence.
[brief] He explained that as an engineer in New Jersey the primary focus is public safety.  By way of example, he used the facts of this case and explained that when you find “settlement anywhere, tells us that something is going on that we need to look at it.  That means I look at the whole bridge even if it is just a walk around.  And if I do that, that jumps right out at me.  When I see barrier curb where there’s a settlement, on section settled over a asphaltic plug joint and the other end isn’t, something is going on”.  (2T171-7 – 18)Pa1507 at 171:7-18).  Afterall, the “safe movement of traffic and pedestrians...is the single most important aspect of the project”.  (Pa1337).  [...] explained in his report and during his testimony that the Defendants should have adhered to their contractual responsibilities and either initiated temporary repairs or installed temporary traffic control to warn users of the roadway.(Pa21).
[directive] If the defendant at any time during the commission of the present Brimage- eligible offense, or while pending the disposition of such offense, has violated a Drug Offender Restraining Order (D.O.R.O.) issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.4 et seq., the plea offer tendered by the prosecutor shall provide for a period of parole ineligibility ranging from three to nine (3-9) months greater than that otherwise provided in the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers.  The extent of the increase in the term of parole ineligibility within this range shall be determined by the prosecutor considering the nature of the violation.  It should be noted that the D.O.R.O. violation need not have occurred during the course of the commission of the underlying Brimage-eligible offense, but rather may have occurred after completion of the present offense and after the defendant’s arrest for that offense.  When this Special Application and Enhancement Feature applies, the prosecutor shall not award aggravating factor points under Aggravating Factor #2 (bail violations) on the basis of the same conduct that constituted the violation of the Drug Offender Restraining Order (D.O.R.O.).  See Section 10.1.2.  Nothing in this Section shall preclude a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues in accordance with Section 12 or a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation in accordance with Section 13.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S JULY 29, 2024 DECISION COMPELLING ARBITRATION AND STAYING PLAINTIFF’S CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED (Ja5-Ja12)  A.  The Trial Court’s July 29, 2024 Decision Should Be Reversed Because The Injunctive Relief Set Forth in Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint  Alleging [...]’s CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA Violations Is The Type of “Public Injunctive Relief Specifically Excluded By the Arbitration Provision in [...]’s “Membership Agreement” (Ja10-Ja12)  Public injunctive relief has been defined as “relief that by and large benefits the general public …. and that benefits the plaintiff, if at all, only incidentally and/or as a member of the general public."  See DiCarlo, 988 F.3d. at 1152 citing McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945 (Cal. 2017); see also Kilgore v Keybank, N.A., 718 F. 3d. 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) cited by Beture v Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 2018 U.S. LEXIS 121801, *28-29 (D. New Jersey July 18, 2018) (Ja51-Ja61)  “A claim for public injunctive relief therefore does not seek "‘to resolve a private dispute but to remedy a public wrong. ’"  Kilgore, 718 F. 3d at 1060 citing Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 76 (Cal. 1999)  In its Membership Agreement, [...] specifically excluded claims against it seeking “public injunctive relief” from being covered under the arbitration provision.  (Ja36-JA37)  Despite that insinuated in [...]’s Brief, nowhere in its Membership Agreement does [...] state that the “public injunctive relief” language was only available to plaintiffs in lawsuits involving its California health club contracts or merely in response to California state law and/or court precedent.  See [...] Brief, p. 12, FN4  Put differently, [...] already determined that claims (such as Plaintiff’s New Jersey CFA, HCSA, RISA and TCCWNA claims) seeking “public injunctive relief” are applicable in its New Jersey health club contracts (such as that provided by [...] to Plaintiff) and can be heard in this Court, as opposed to arbitration.
[brief] Plaintiff and Defendant agreed early in their marriage that they would assist their children, [...] and [...], in paying for higher education.  1T18:18-25.  When Defendant expressed to Plaintiff that he could not afford it, she stated that neither could she, and came up with a plan to take out student loans, defer repayment while the children were in school, and working toward saving sufficient funds to ensure repayment upon the loans coming due.  1T18:18-25.  Plaintiff and Defendant agreed that they would send their children for six years of higher education so they would have a more competitive edge in the job market.
[brief] ”  State v. Carrillo, 469 N.J. Super. 318, 332 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380-81 (2017)).  Therefore, a trial court's factual findings should only be overturned if the findings are “so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’ ”  State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)).