ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The plaintiffs’ claims of oral misrepresentations were barred.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY REFUSING TO APPLY THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ALL THE ORAL MISREPRESENTATIONS CLAIMED BY THE PLAINTIFFS WERE EXPRESSLY CONTRADICTED BY THE CONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS THEY SIGNED AND WERE BARRED.  (2T35:15-38:2; Da1096).  After the trial court denied [...]’s July 30, 2020 motion for summary judgment without prejudice, [...] re-filed on June 11, 2021 at the close of discovery.  Therein, [...] argued that the Parol Evidence Rule barred the plaintiffs’ claims of oral misrepresentations that precisely contradicted the express terms of the integrated contracts each plaintiff signed.  It was and is [...]’s legal position that one party to a transaction cannot claim years later that the other party told them the precise opposite of a term memorialized in an integrated writing.  The motion Judge rejected [...]’s position, found the Parol Evidence Rule inapplicable and determined that a full trial record was required because plaintiffs claimed fraud in the inducement.
[brief] POINT 10:  There is a right to trial by jury via the 7th amendment per the 73rd Congress (Not argued below)  73d CONGRESS. SESS. II .  CHS. 651 JUNE 19, 1934 reading in pertinent part as follows:  '....Provided, however, That (in such union of rules) the right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate....'  Approved, June 19, 1934.  POINT 11:
[brief] (Sa27-Sa30).  On June 20, 2022, the defendant filed his first application for admission into Recovery Court.  The next day, on June 21, 2022, the defendant was arraigned.  On July 2, 2022, the defendant was arrested and charged on Essex County Complaint-Warrant [...] for Second Degree Unlawful Possession of a Handgun, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1); Third Degree Prohibited Weapons – Firearm Without Serial Number, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3n; Fourth Degree Possession of a Firearm by a Minor, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1; Fourth Degree Resisting Arrest by Flight, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(2); and Fourth Degree Obstruction of the Administration of Law, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1a.
[brief] "Instead, a ‘sentencing court's determination regarding consecutive and concurrent terms ... turns on a careful evaluation of the specific case. ’"  Ibid. (quoting State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 377-78 (2019)).  The Yarbough factors “are qualitative, not quantitative; applying them involves more than merely counting the factors favoring each alternative outcome. ”  State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 348 (2019) (citing State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436, 442-43 (2001); Carey, 168 N.J. at 427-28).  The court properly found that factors 3A, and 3C applied and relied on appropriate facts in its opinion.  Defendant contends that the court relied on a dismissed charge and speculation, rather than facts found by the jury, to find factor 3A and 3C.
[directive] The primary issue is one of privacy.  Video surveillance, especially covert surveillance, should not be used in areas where employees have a high expectation of privacy, such as locker rooms and bathrooms.  In public areas, video surveillance may be 40 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 used.  In many law enforcement agencies, certain areas such as lobbies, cell blocks and sally ports have video surveillance for security reasons.  Video obtained from these sources is applicable to internal investigations.  Questions about the specific application of video surveillance, especially covert surveillance, should be addressed to the [...].
[brief] As indicated in the August 6, 1962 lease (Da126) whereby [...] leased, the then vacant land to [...], also agreeing to build the store to Acme specifications as the anchor store for an entire shopping center to be laid out in Exhibits attached to the lease.  Under paragraph 44 of the lease [...] acted as the general contractor, built and financed the construction, and gave a $180,000.00 mortgage to be paid off 60 days after completion, at which time the landlord could obtain financing.  In return, [...] received a 15-year lease beginning November 1, 1963 together with seven (7) additional five-year option at the low rent of .77 cents per sq. foot, totaling fifty years.
[directive] de ----------------------  1 n ct men t No(s): di y Enumere todas las acusaciones formales, cargos, grados sentencia maxima encarcelaci6n.  de 1.  List all indictments, counts, degrees and maximum jail sentence.  Nro. acusaci6n formal Cargo  la de Cargos Grado Encarcelaci6n maxima Indictment# Count Charges  Degree  Max Jail  Marque la respuesta apropiada con cfrculo un Please Circle Appropriate Answer  [Si/Yes]  [No/No]  2.  l,Reune el acusado los requisitos para un termino extendido?  Does the defendant qualify for extended term?  -------------------- es asi, discrecional  Si 1 f yes, discretionary obligatorio mandatory la 3.  l,Corresponde presunci6n de encarcelamiento?  [Si!Yes]  [No/No] of  Does the presumption imprisonment apply?  ________________________  Si es asi, l,en cuales cargos?  _ If yes, what counts?  4.  un l,Corresponde periodo obligatorio de inelegibilidad antes salir en libertad condicional? de [Si/Yes] [No/No] of  Does a mandatory period parole ineligibility apply?  Si es asi, l,en cuales cargos?  If yes, what counts?  la Termino de Ley Contra Excarcelaci6n  _______ Prematura (NERA) de 85%  Termino 85%  Law (NERA)  Term Term -------  Termino Termino de la Ley Graves Graves Act  Term Term  _______  Termino la Termino de Zona Escolar Term School Zone Term  _______  Termino Otro termino Term Other Term  -----  Iniciales del acusado/Defendant's Initials de4 pagina  1  Memorandum  Precedente Juicio - Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #23-17 (8/21/2017), CN: 11216-Spanish al of4 page 1
[directive] Vehicular pursuits that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, shall be forwarded quarterly by municipal and county agencies to the County Prosecutor’s Office for review.  The reports shall be forwarded within 30 days of the end of each quarter.  Vehicular pursuits involving statewide law enforcement agencies, or county prosecutor’s office personnel, that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, shall be forwarded quarterly to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee for review.  The reports shall be forwarded within 30 days of the end of each quarter.  12.2
[brief] It is several hundred feet wide and fronts Beachway, the mean high-water line just off of Beachway (5T:25).  There is no overlap between what is designated as Lot 3.01 and what the Borough has been designated since 1981 as Lot 3.  He testifies it is a “gray area” but technically the 3.01 would represent what is waterward of the mean high-water line (5T16:12).  It is his understanding that Lot 3.01 is supposed to show the waterward rights not the upland rights.  He agrees that if the water is moving, then Lot 3.01 is sort of moving along with it; Lot 3.01 simply represents a water parcel.  He states that it is very common when someone is preparing a Tax Map that it would show water rights if there was a Tidelands Grant  He believes that the Tax Map suggests that Lot 3.01 is affiliated with and related to Lot 3 (5T17:24).
[brief] For example, one uniform officer can be seen wearing a dark, fur-lined, leather, trapper-style hat that covered the back of his neck and ears (Ex B 23:05 to 24:14), while another was wearing a black knit cap (Ex B 2:35 to 2:45); [...] can be seen wearing a black, hooded sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head and a black knit cap underneath the hood (Ex B 22:15 to 22:45), while another plain clothes detective is wearing a hood with a baseball cap underneath (Ex B 7:25 to 7:35); a female officer can be seen wearing a dark knit cap on her head and what appears to be a neck gaiter over her nose and mouth.  (Ex C 7:25 to 7:42)  The four men who were detained were similarly dressed for the cold: they were all wearing winter jackets and long pants (three of the men were wearing what are clearly light- to medium-wash blue jeans); they had hoods on their heads and were wearing black balaclavas\(^7\) underneath their hoods.
[brief] 16  I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ..............................................................................  16  II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO INTRODUCE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS’ OWN TESTIMONY THAT THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT REGARDING HER FATHER’S CARE, FOUND NO VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE REGULATIONS  ..................................................................................  21  III.  THE TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS TO GIVE RESPIRATORY CARE OPINIONS AGAINST “THE FACILITY” OR “THE NURSING HOME” ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT QUALIFIED .................................................. 36  IV.  DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE ITS OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS’ RESPIRATORY THERAPY OPINIONS BY FAILING TO RAISE THEM BY WAY OF A PRETRIAL MOTION IN LIMINE .................................................................................. 41 V. EXCESSIVE SPEAKING OBJECTIONS, SIDEBARS AND OVERALL CONDUCT DID NOT DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF A FAIR TRIAL .................................................................................. 46 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 48 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bonitsis v. New Jersey Institute of Technology, 363 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 180 N.J. 450 (2004)..................... 25 Brun v. Cardoso, 390 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 2006).............................. 27 Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422 (1994).................................................. 17 Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center, 443 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2015), certif. denied, 224 N.J. 529 (2016) ........................................... 42 Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494 (1994)....................................................... 16-18 C.W. v. Cooper Health Sys., 388 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 2006)
[brief] (N.J. Const. Art. VI, § II, par. 3.)  (Pa 160-163)  The New Jersey Constitution declares "[t]he Superior Court shall have original general jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes."  N.J. Const., art. VI, § III, ¶ 2.  Thus, the Superior Court is no different than most state courts, which "are invested with general jurisdiction that provides expansive authority to resolve myriad controversies brought before them."  Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 378-79 (2007) (citing Turner v. Bank of N. America, 4 U.S. 8, 11, (4 Dall.), 1 L. Ed. 718, 719 (1799) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction is presumed for courts of general jurisdiction unless proved otherwise)).  The determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a legal question, which we review de novo.
[brief] See Reciprocals Working Group Report of Special Insurance Issues (E) Committee, NAIC Proceedings – 1991 Vol. IIB at 1091-1096 (“1991 NAIC Report”).  However, the NAIC recommended the model act for deletion in 2004 and formally deleted it in September 2004.  See Reciprocals Working Group Report of Special Insurance Issues (E) Committee, NAIC Proceedings – 2004 2dQ at 1251 (“1994 NAIC Report”).
[brief] Despite [...]’s involvement as a fact witness, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and instead granted a protective order shielding [...] from discovery.  The Discovery Order thus poisoned the trial and, ultimately, the Final Judgment, as it resulted in the trial court ruling on the meaning of the PSA without the opportunity to hear from its drafter at trial.  For the reasons explained below, the Discovery Order and Final Judgment must be reversed.
[brief] United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 38 N.J. 193 (1961).  All doubts must be resolved by a conventional trial.  Frank Rizzo, Inc. v. Alatsas, 27 N.J. 400 (1958).  In the matter before the Court, the Defendant has characterized the Plaintiff’s description of the “Factual Background” section of the trial court's Memorandum of Decision as “false” saying that the trial court did not actually use the Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts “verbatim.
[brief] Pa172-322.  G.  Building Size and Scale and Intensity of Use Driven by Environmental Remediation Costs and Return on Investment Interests  What was also made clear during the hearings was that Plaintiff sought to develop at a higher density and more intense use to defray remediation costs that would be incurred if the Property were developed.  In addressing the prospect of proceeding without the requested FAR and building coverage variances, the project architect repeatedly drew attention to the substantial environmental escrow in the purchase contract and stated that adherence to B-3 Zone standards would only permit a small building that would be inadequate in terms of providing an economic incentive to Plaintiff to develop Lot 5.  The testimony disclosed that the proposed building size and intensity of use of the parcel was driven by cost-feasibility and return on investment priorities, rather than site suitability.  Pa192 at 74:8-75:10-25; Pa193 at 79:6-19.
[brief] Docket No.  Dear [...]:  Enclosed for filing please find an original and ten (10) copies of the Petition of [...] ("[...]" or "Company") appealing a decision of the [...] denying the Company's application for the construction of a proposed regulator station (the "Regulator Station" or "Facility").  The Company respectfully requests, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, that the Board determine that, as further described in the attached Petition and supporting testimonies, that the construction of the a proposed Regulator Station, along Holmdel Road in [...] ("Holmdel") is for the benefit of the residents of Holmdel and neighboring municipalities located in [...]; is necessary to maintain system integrity and reliability and reasonably necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public; and that no alternative site or sites are reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit; and issue an order that the zoning, site plan review and all other Municipal Land Use Ordinances or Regulations promulgated under the auspices of Title 40 of the New Jersey Statutes and the Municipal Land Use Law of the State of New Jersey (the "MLUL") shall not apply to the proposed Facility.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  The same rationale applies here.  While defendants all have a generalized common interest in disputing Plaintiffs’ allegations, at the same time they have an undeniable interest in seeking to minimize their own liability and maximize their co-defendants’ liability.  Although the trial court conceded that “[t]he CNA may create a conflict of interest if this matter proceeds to trial,” it refused to find a conflict at the early stage of litigation.
[brief] The Legislature authorized the Attorney General and the Director to “obtain an injunction” after filing an administrative complaint—an indication the Legislature believes it sufficient for the State to establish a defendant “has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in” a violation of the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1; see also, e.g., United States v. Nutri-cology, 982 F.2d 394, 398 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where the government beings a “statutory enforcement case[]” and shows a sufficient probability of success on the merits, “further inquiry into irreparable injury is unnecessary”; “the passage of the statute is itself an implied finding by Congress that violations will harm the public”); N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Boro Auto Wrecking Co., No. A-4920-04T3, 2006 WL 3007394, at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 24, 2006) (Ra128, 131) (same); Hoffman v. Garden State Farms, Inc., 76 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (N.J. Ch. 1962) (same).  That approach is not only textual but logical: this rule would “undeniably serve to underscore the remedial purpose of the LAD,” (Da135), especially in cases where the Attorney General and the Director have found an urgent need for emergency relief.
[brief] “Thus, when a literal interpretation of individual statutory terms or provisions would lead to results inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute, *that interpretation should be rejected.*”  *Hubbard*, 168 N.J. at 392-93.  (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-136 (“The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of this act.
[brief] [...] testified he would not entrust his $2 million dollar sports facility to an LLC with no assets; further [...] testified he would not release the individuals from their guarantee obligations without replacement collateral such as a letter of credit or escrow.  Finally, [...] responds that the guarantees were not revoked at any time.  The guarantees do not contain any provisions that would allow them to be unilaterally terminated.  Based on the foregoing, the fact that [...] and [...] left [...] in November and December of 2016, and the fact that their attorney attempted to revoke the guarantees in 2019, were ineffective to terminate the Lease guarantees.
[brief] The evidence at the retrial, as noted earlier, varied from the evidence produced at the first trial, where passion/provocation manslaughter was charged, because defendant’s statements to police and his own testimony from the witness stand was not before the jury below.  As the Appellate Division summarized in its opinion ordering a new trial, (Da14-16), defendant’s statement to police from March 9, 2013, included his claim of the victim trying to unbuckle his pants in the living room as he watched television, then defendant responding by grabbing the victim’s wrist and pushing the victim away with the victim coming back at him and forcing defendant to grab the victim’s wrist again, which led to defendant flailing his arms and the victim hitting him in the head several times and then defendant realizing the victim had something in his hands.  (Da14-15).  Defendant told police the victim came at him with a knife, and the two of them rolled on the floor, and defendant tried to get the victim off him and thought he stabbed the victim during the struggle.  (Da15).  Defendant’s testimony at the first trial mirrored the scenario he had painted in his statement to police: following the consensual sex, he and the victim went to the living room where the victim asked several times for more sex and defendant said no; the victim came up to him and tried to unbuckle his pants; defendant responded by grabbing the victim’s wrists to no avail; the victim hit him in the face twice; defendant saw a “shiny metallic object” in the victim’s hand; defendant falling onto the couch, and struggling and then falling to the floor with defendant flailing his arms but not recalling taking the knife from the victim or stabbing him.  (Da22).  Defendant testified that the victim got the knife and attacked him.
[directive] AOC  Directors and Assistant Directors  cc: Chief Justice [...]  Attorney General [...]  Special Assistants to the Adm in.  Director  Public Defender [...]  Trial Court Administrators  Criminal Division Judges Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  [...], Director, Div. of Crim.  Justice [...], Chief, Criminal Practice County Prosecutors  [...], Assistant Chief, Probation Services  [...], Chief of Staff rm  ADA ENSURING AN OPEN DOOR TO JUSTICE
[brief] Finally, the *Berkowitz* court does not properly interpret the statute it cites, N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1.  The statute speaks of judgments recovered, that is, liquidated, which is consistent with the applicable case law.  Even with its reasoning adopted as it was in a higher court in *Cronin*, *supra*, where it was not needed to support the *Cronin* decision, the reasoning and basis for decision making is so unclear that it should not be treated as precedent.  *J & M Land Co. v First Union National Bank*, 166 N.J. 493 (2001).  However, Berkowitz can be reconciled with binding authority by recognizing it concerns the obligation of an attorney to abide by the clients instructions to pay a treating physician under a restitution/equitable theory.  Owens v. CNA Insurance/Continental Casualty Company, 330 N.J. Super.608 (App. Div. 2000) is factually distinct from the present case.  In Owens, the dispute concerned the ability to assign a liquidated personal injury claim.  The dispute in Owens concerned the enforceability of the non-assignment clause and the assignability of a personal injury claim post-liquidation.  To the extent the Owens court discussed the issue presented here, it agreed that the assignment of the existing (i.e. liquidated) proceeds of a personal injury claim are assignable, but not rights to an unliquidated claim.  Owen at 214.  The most recent binding authority came in Cherilus v. Fed Express, 435 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2014).  Cherilus recites the principle that tort claim is not subject to assignment prior to judgment.  A tort claim is not subject to assignment prior to judgment.  Village of Ridgewood v. Shell Oil Co, 289 N.J.Super. 181, 195, 673 A.2d 300 (App.Div.1996); Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J.Super. 72, 79, 328 A.2d 625 (App.Div.1974) ; Goldfarb v. Reicher, 112 N.J.L. 413, 414, 171 A. 149 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd o.b., 113 N.J.L. 399, 174 A. 507 (E. & A.1934).
[brief] Rather, Plaintiffs’ contention was that LGBTQ+ students should be exempted from the Revised Policy whenever parental notification incidentally involves their LGBTQ+ status.  Neither the LAD nor pertinent precedent provide that parents must be deprived of such information.  The trial court relied on its interpolation of language found nowhere in the plain language of the Revised Policy or its accompanying Regulation in concluding that the policy “creat[es] a condition where staff and administrators may engage in activities violative of the LAD.
[brief] ” confirms the universality of continuation of coverage as a remedy for improper notice. \(^4\)  [...]’s argument that common law notice requirements “should not be expanded to cover CCIPs” (Zb45) is baseless, all but guaranteeing repetition of the wasteful depletion of resources, general messiness and uncertainty this case has engendered.  As this case demonstrates, CCIPs are bureaucratically-layered and laden with red tape.
[brief] \(^7\) --- \(^7\)  “[J]udicial resources are wasted when a case is brought by a plaintiff and litigated in the Superior Court when it should have been pursued instead in arbitration. ”  *Marmo & Sons Gen. Cont., LLC*, No. A-3120-22, at 25.  Here, Plaintiff has never disputed his signature and agreement to the terms of the 2007 Addendum, which expressly incorporates and amends the 1991 Partnership Agreement.  Nor does the record suggest that Plaintiff, an attorney, did not appreciate the implications of executing the Addendum.  Clearly, Plaintiff has not been prejudiced where his statutory claims, assuming they survive, will proceed with a jury trial, and where any time and expense Plaintiff incurred opposing arbitration is the result of his own misguided litigation strategy.  In sum, the present circumstances considered under Cole weigh heavily against finding that Defendants irreversibly waived the right to arbitrate; especially so, given the absence of any attempt by Defendants to procure any unfair strategic advantage in defending this litigation and the dearth of any prejudice towards Plaintiff.  Further, the Trial Court never rejected the weight of its findings pursuant to the Cole factors, regardless of its ruling on express waiver.  In light of the foregoing, the verbal waiver by Defendants’ former counsel should not be interpreted as forever disavowing Defendants’ arbitration rights, when Defendants have since taken every measure to preserve that right, and no demonstrative prejudice toward the non-moving party has been shown, pursuant to Cole.