ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The third Cofield prong mandates that trial court judges act as gatekeepers to the admission of such evidence, and “ensure that proof of the prior bad act is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. ”  Skinner, 218 N.J. at 515-16.  Clear and convincing evidence is such evidence which “produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable (the factfinder) to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. ”  *State v. Hernandez*, 170 N.J. 106, 127 (2001)(quotations omitted).  [...]’s implausible, uncorroborated, and uninvestigated allegations cannot reasonably constitute clear and convincing evidence of witness tampering.  It is acknowledged that testimony alone can constitute clear and convincing evidence, but that does not mean that *any* testimony will constitute clear and convincing evidence.  The trial court relied almost exclusively on the fact that Diana maintained that [...] asked her to bribe and subsequently kill [...] as evidence of her credibility.  This analysis was insufficient, *particularly* because Diana admittedly reviewed her statement with the prosecutor the day before testifying.  To be clear, [...] made a bizarre accusation that her ex-boyfriend asked her to bribe the alleged victim in this matter with an unspecified amount of money from an unidentified source, and then when she said no to that he figured he would ask her to find someone to *murder* the alleged victim.  [...] has virtually no criminal record, and it would be incredible to find that the State presented clear and convincing evidence that [...] attempted to order a *murder* based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a scorned ex-girlfriend.  Notably, Diana’s testimony also appears to suggest that when she did not find someone to *murder* [...], [...] simply let this idea go.  The trial court should have further acknowledged the State’s utter failure to investigate or even attempt to corroborate these allegations before attempting to consolidate these charges with those in the original indictment.  This is not a case where the trial court can allow the veracity of these allegations to be sorted out at trial.  The trial court had an obligation to ensure that this evidence satisfied the clear and convincing evidence standard, meaning that the evidence of such allegations must be “so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable (the factfinder) to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
[brief] *Id.* at 276.  The State further cites to other cases relying upon the Contract Clause that do not apply to the case at bar.  See e.g. *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810) (Contract Clause barred Georgia’s ability to rescind a prior state legislature’s land grants).  The State’s analysis and reliance on these lines of cases at Sb17-19 is misplaced because the Applicants argue N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 creates duties that the Legislature created to bind itself.
[brief] On March 27, 2019, Plaintiff was charged with the aforementioned violations.  At the time of the interview, [...] did not think Plaintiff was guilty of misrepresenting he was on foot patrol, and he "had to go back in..."  [...] never had any further interviews with Plaintiff.  Additionally, [...] was later interviewed by [...] in February 2019.  [...] reported back to then [...] one year and four months after he notified Plaintiff of the administrative investigation.  When questioned about the length of the investigation, [...] testified he did not have all of the data he needed "because it was a continual process."  The Court finds the Complaint charging the Plaintiff was filed within 45 days after the Chief obtained sufficient information to file the matter.  [...] completed the thorough IA investigation when he had sufficient information and reported to the Chief at that time.  The Court again finds [...] credible when he testified, he did not have all of the data he needed "because it was a continual process", and in scheduling a meeting with the Plaintiff and counsel [It was noted that the Plaintiff also had other pending unrelated IA matters at this time].  The Court finds, on this record, that the 45-day rule was not violated by the Township.
[brief] As described above, Ordinance 2022-17 is comprised of amendments to the Redevelopment Plan as that Plan was initially adopted by Ordinance 2022-15.  Ordinance 2022-17 was introduced at the Committee’s October 27, 2022 meeting, the same meeting at which the Committee voted to adopt Ordinance 2022-15.  [...] again testified at the October 27, 2022 Committee meeting.  Thus, the Committee was well aware of opposing viewpoints, that Appellant considered the Redevelopment Plan to be inconsistent with the Master Plan, and of the possibility that Appellant would commence a legal challenge on that basis.  Accordingly, among the amendments included in Ordinance 2022-17 are the Committee’s “reasons” for adoption of the Redevelopment Plan even if a subsequent court should conclude that an inconsistency existed:
[brief] The State’s attempt to get around that fact by misrepresenting to this Court the record at the municipal court and questioning [...]’s motives for why the record was developed the way it was only shows the weakness of the State’s response.  The municipal court judge, contrary to the State’s unsupported assertion, did not encompass the alternative marker (the residence cited at the back of the ticket) in determining that [...] violated the statute.  That is a clear misrepresentation of the record developed at the municipal court.  The only factual findings that the municipal court made related to the pumphouse.  The State wants to assert that the alternative marker on the back of the ticket was part of the record as well, even though the municipal court did not make an explicit factual finding as to that alternative marker.  The State in its brief freely interchanges its use of the words, “record”, “complaint” and “pleadings”.  But not once did the State in its opposition refer to the municipal courts’ explicit factual findings, which was limited to a pumphouse only.  The municipal prosecutor had an opportunity to be present and expand the factual findings to include the alternative marker.  The prosecutor instead chose to engage in continued plea negotiations with other defendants.  The municipal court had an opportunity to demand the municipal prosecutor’s presence for the conditional guilty plea.  The municipal court did not demand the prosecutor’s presence for the conditional guilty plea.  Nonetheless, the State wants to blame [...] for holding the courts “hostage”, while asking this Court to ignore the factual finding that formed the factual basis for [...]’s conditional guilty plea, by judicially noticing the alternative marker on the back of the ticket, because the latter was part of the “record”.
[brief] Again, as discussed above, that analysis of these facts under this CNA fell squarely within [...]’s contractual purview, and his conclusion is entitled to deference.  In its Appellate Brief, the Authority relies heavily on one case to argue that [...]’s interpretation and application of just cause should be set aside for failure to adhere to the CNA's terms.  There, an employee pursued a grievance to arbitration and was awarded a specific benefit – the right to overtime pay for off-duty visits to doctors for treatment of several injuries – based upon an arbitrator’s misinterpretation of the applicable CNA.  *PBA Local 160 v. Twp. Of North Brunswick*, 272 N.J. Super. 467, 470-472 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).  There, the applicable contract provided that officers “sent to a Township doctor while off duty” would be paid overtime for time spent at the appointment and in transit there and back.  *Id.* at 472.  The Arbitrator in that case ruled that, because the grievant’s Township-sponsored health benefits paid for the appointments without objection by the Township, the doctor was a “Township doctor,” and thus that the grievant was entitled to pay.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible 2C:5-5 Actor possesses tools commonly used to commit theft or burglary with purpose to so employ; Burglar’s Tools fourth degree if actor manufactures tools; otherwise a disorderly persons offense.
[brief] In the first Foreclosure Complaint of 3/10/2009 [...] from [...] pleaded that the original lender and servicer was [...] and the date of the Note was 2/14/2005.  He also pleaded that the Assignment of 2/27/2009 was an assignment of mortgage only.  Then he pleaded that I defaulted on my monthly mortgage payment with [...] on 10/1/2008.  Then [...] filed the second Foreclosure Complaint on 5/12/16.
[brief] ”  N.J. Gov. Statement to Assemb. B. 4312 (Oct. 19, 2020); see also Attorney General Law Directive No. 2022-1, Update to Body Worn Camera Policy, § 1.1 (Jan. 19, 2022) (“[BWC] footage provides objective evidence of what occurred and plays a crucial role in the public discourse around police accountability.  BWCs also serve as a powerful deterrent to misconduct by both the police and members of the public interacting with police. ”).  See also N.J. Gov. Statement to S.B. 1163 (Oct. 19, 2020) (“I share the sponsors’ goal of promoting transparency and accountability in policing in our communities.  Body worn cameras . . . improve accountability; promote transparency; enhance the quality of police-civilian interactions and law enforcement performance; If the Court is inclined to remand for a new suppression hearing rather than suppress the evidence, this Court should “direct that a new judge preside over the suppression hearing on remand” “as the judge made credibility findings and may be committed to her previous view of the evidence.
[brief] Based on these facts, the Trial Court, by orders dated April 27, 2023, dismissed with prejudice the Complaint against the defendants challenging statutes applied by [...] in granting long term tax abatements due to a lack of standing.  The plaintiff argues on this appeal that he has standing, asserting his status as a taxpayer in [...].  This argument fails to establish standing to sue and establish a justiciable case or controversy and, as such, was properly rejected by the Court below.
[brief] Consequently, courts have held that a public entity’s refusal to waive a non-material mistake, when doing so would yield $47,000 in taxpayer savings, is an abuse of discretion and requires that the public entity’s decision be set aside.  Tec Elec., Inc., 284 N.J. Super. at 488.  Indeed, based on the trial court’s decisions, the County has been permitted to award the Anticipated Contract to [...] at a discount of tens of thousands of dollars to the taxpayers.  Rather than accept the significant savings, the County is shockingly challenging this decision so that it can pay more to complete the Project.  Given that the County has not (and cannot) articulate a sound reason for depriving its taxpayers of this benefit, its refusal to waive the immaterial defect in [...]’s bid cannot stand.  Dobco, Inc., 441 N.J. Super. at 159 (holding that a public entity (like the County) may only refuse to waive a non-material defect if its refusal is for valid reasons, non-pretextual, is grounded in sound business judgment and does not contradict the underlying purposes of public bidding requirements); Tec Elec., Inc., 284 N.J. Super. at 488 (holding that a public entity’s refusal to waive a non-material mistake, when doing so would yield $47,000 in taxpayer savings, is an abuse of discretion and requires that the public entity’s decision be set aside).
[directive] 8.4  When the Investigation is Administrative and the Officer Is a Subject  8.4.1  A public employee must answer questions specifically, directly and narrowly related to the performance of their official duties, on pain of dismissal.  This obligation exists even though the answers to the questions may implicate them in a violation of agency rules, regulations and procedures that may ultimately result in some form of discipline up to and including dismissal.  In short, no “right to remain silent” exists in administrative investigations.
[brief] Although this argument was not made by the Appellant nor at the lower court level; our Court’s have held that “an insured is chargeable with knowledge of the contents of ‘an insurance policy’”.  See Morrison v American Intern. Ins. Co. of America, 381 N.J. Super. 532, 542 (App. Div. 2005).  Therefore, the insured, in making a claim for insurance benefits, should not have any reasonable expectation that he or she does not have to comply with the policy of insurance from which he or she seeks benefits.  Finally, Amicus Counsel argues that a good faith reiteration of the prior settlement offer made by Respondent, after suit was filed, in effect, waives the contract provisions and the insured’s duties to comply with the contract of insurance from which she seeks benefits.  The lower court’s rejection of the Appellant’s and, now, Amicus’s claims, must be affirmed.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Ibid.  The Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has pointed out that when a public employee makes a statement pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as a “citizen,” and the Constitution does not insulate them from discipline.  DeRitis v. McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).
[brief] Properties having a frontage in excess of 1,000’ on any one street may be permitted to have additional access drives subject to the approval of the Zoning Board of Adjustment, pursuant to Section 348-8.20K (8).  6.  A **Design Exception** for non-compliance of all entrance drives extending a minimum distance of 100’ back from the street curb line or to an access aisle, pursuant to Section 348-8.20K (2).  7.  A **Design Exception** for non-compliance of all exit drives extending a minimum distance of 60’ back from the street curb or to a major access aisle, pursuant to Section 348-8.20K (3).  8.  A **Design Exception** for non-compliance of having no parking stalls utilize the required entrance and exit drives or major circulation drives as access aisles, pursuant to Section 348-8.20K (4).
[brief] The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “full faith and credit does not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state. ”  Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951).  “On the one hand is the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states; on the other hand is the policy of [the forum state], as interpreted by its highest court, against permitting [its] courts to [enforce its own law].  In the present case, the issue presented is whether New Jersey must give full faith and credit to a Pennsylvania gun permit.
[brief] The Court highlighted two features of traffic stops driving its analysis.  “First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. ”  *Id.* at 437.  “Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police[,]” as they occur in public and usually involve one or two police officers.  *Id.* at 438.  The Court analogized a traffic stop to other “*Terry* stops,” which the Court observed had never been “subject to the dictates of *Miranda*.”  *Id.* at 439-40.  In applying the analysis to the roadside DWI investigation in *Berkemer*, the Court held that interrogation by the officer occurring in connection with field sobriety tests did not require *Miranda* warnings.
[brief] Courts should provide “due regard to the opportunity” of the ALJ “who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility” and also “to the agency’s expertise where such expertise is a pertinent factor. ”  Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, 109 N.J. 575, 587 (1988).  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.9(b), expert testimony is admissible if the opinions and inferences are “[b]ased on facts and data perceived by or made known to the witness at or before the hearing. ”  N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.9(b)(1).  In addition, the expert witness’s testimony must be “[w]ithin the scope of special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness. ”  N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.9(b)(2).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 et seq.; see also https://www.pureinsurance. com/newsroom/pures-reciprocal-model.  As a result, the standalone financial solvency requirements for reciprocal exchanges are more stringent than those required of traditional stock companies (i.e., liquidity ratio requirements for certain capital levels to be maintained above the standards required of other insurance entities).  N.J.S.A. 17:50-5.  Indeed, the REA contains intentionally arduous and demanding standards to ensure the financial health of the reciprocal and its subscribers.  Id.  For example, in addition to general solvency requirements, reciprocal exchanges are also subject to a “liquidity test,” which requires them to maintain a prescribed level of cash and investments compared to certain liabilities at all times.  Id.  Any decrease below that level automatically requires the attorney-in-fact to contribute its own funds to make up the deficit, to avoid the immediate liquidation of the reciprocal.  Id.  No similar requirements exist for other insurance entities.  See generally N.J.S.A. 17.  As a prerequisite for an individual to obtain insurance from the reciprocal, he or she must execute an unrelated party contract with the AIF—the Power of Attorney (“POA”)—that segregates the AIF from the not-for-profit reciprocal exchange.
[brief] This is a serious legal disconnect between the “IRS 20 Factor Test” which looks at the longevity of a prosecutor which in this case is 20 years versus a statutory annual reappointment requirement which has no bearing on the issue.  Clearly, if the legislature wanted to preclude municipal prosecutors from enrollment in PERS they could have said so.  Chapter 92 does not specifically exclude municipal prosecutors from enrollment in PERS or from intra-agency PERS transfers.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Instead, he moved Plaintiff’s personal belongings to the basement after Plaintiff’s room was ransacked by [...].  [...] put his head in the sand and willfully ignored [...] wholly improper exclusion of Plaintiff from [...].  [...], [...] and [...] all knowingly abused the corporate structure by taking and repaying loans, using or effectuating the use of the Company’s funds for personal use, and drafting false documents for investors and the IRS.  All three individuals took affirmative steps to exclude Plaintiff from [...] after Plaintiff spoke up about the financial impropriety of the company.  The Trial Court’s determination that [...] and [...] were not personally liable contradicts clear case law.
[brief] To determine whether there was a “substantial impairment of a contractual relationship,” courts analyze three threshold inquiries: (1) whether there is a contractual relationship; (2) whether a change in law has impaired that contractual relationship; and (3) whether the impairment is substantial.  Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 290 v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 145 F. 3d 619, 621 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Burgos, 222 N.J. at 193.
[brief] 1.  **Use Variance pursuant to NJ.S.A. 40:55D-70d(1):**  The proposed residential units were not efficiency or garden apartments, which are the only residential units permitted in the B-3 Zone District [see §240-6.5I(1)(a) and §240-6.5G(1)(e)], a use variance was thus required.  2.  **Variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(4) for Exceeding Floor Area Ratio:**  A floor area ratio of 1.77 was proposed vs. the 0.35 maximum permitted (45,039 sq. ft. vs. 8,930 sq. ft. permitted, *a 500% increase in the FAR*).  Bulk Variances pursuant to N.J.S.A.40:55D-70c: 3.  **Side Yard Setback, Combined** variance: 12.2 ft. proposed vs. 25 ft. required, a difference of 12.8 ft.  4.  **Building Height** variance: 37.4 ft. proposed vs. 35 ft. maximum permitted, a difference of 2.4 ft.  5.  **Building Coverage** variance: 65.1% proposed vs. 40% maximum permitted, a difference of 25.1%.  6.  **Generator Location** variance: Generator proposed in front yard setback area vs. only permitted in rear or side yard of the building.  Approximately 6 ft. setback to [...] front yard setback vs. 10 ft. required.  [See §240-7.2E]  Pa111 at ¶4; Pa133 at ¶2; Da1-7.  The Borough Planner, [...], P.P., issued a July 12, 2022 report on the Application.  Da1.  The Borough Engineer, [...], P.E., also issued a report, dated June 15, 2022, last revised July 14, 2022.  Da8.  Because the Application required variance relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(1) and d(4), an affirmative vote of at least five Board members was required for approval.  However, the motion to approve received only three YES votes, and four NO votes; the Application was thus determined to be denied.  Pa132 at ¶49; Pa144.  The Board adopted a resolution memorializing its denial on December 19, 2022 (“Resolution”).
[brief] ” (9T81-4 to 8).  Finally, the State argued towards the end of its closing that “the defendant that night was an angry player.  He had intensity.  He had focus that was fueled by Adderall abuse but it was there. ” (9T85-24 to 86-2).  Although defense counsel did not object to these specific remarks, he did object to the prosecutor eliciting certain relevant parts of [...]’s testimony.  Specifically, he objected to testimony that [...] had manipulated his doctor into prescribing him the Adderall, (7T72-12 to 13), and objected to the State eliciting testimony about [...]’s daily marijuana use, (7T73-12 to 14).  In responding to the objection on the marijuana use, the State argued it was interested in pursuing an argument that the shooting was caused by [...]’s combined Adderall and marijuana use.  (7T73-19 to 74-8).  Defense counsel countered that there was no doctor testimony on that point, (7T74-9 to 10), but the objection was ultimately overruled, (7T74-23 to 25).  There are several significant problems with the State’s arguments about [...]’s drug use.
[brief] Further, the cases cited herein illustrate that when presented with question of how subrogation claims interact with the Collateral Source Rule, the Courts have consistently concluded that the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 to prevent double recovery of health benefits and further, as med-pay benefits are specifically not PIP benefits, that they med-pay benefits are subject to the Collateral Source Rule and as a result, med-pay subrogation is prohibited in New Jersey.  Put another way, if med-pay expenses are not PIP for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.2 or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, they are not PIP for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9. 1.