ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T 91-16 to 19)  [...] speculated that [...] may have had the guns in the car with them.  He also claimed that the car [...] was driving that day had been never used in any of the prior robberies.  (2T 91-22 to 23)  [...] testified that, just as he was about to purchase a phone case from the T-Mobile, [...] gave him a nod to execute the robbery.
[brief] First, an applicant for an insurance policy is only required to provide the information requested of the applicant and the risk of not inquiring as to other information it deems relevant lies with the insurer.  *Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hanna*, 316 N.J. Super. 63, 73 (App. Div. 1998).  Second, a court may not rewrite a contract to benefit either party.  *Karl's Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.*, 249 N.J. Super. 487, 493 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991).  For the court’s part, it rewrote the policy applications by inventing definitions of bar complaint and investigation that are not supported by the record.
[directive] The Court often Rule in enumerated Court the is that crime predicate a commit to conspiracy in a engaged person a matter, practical that of commission abetting the and aiding with or offense, predicate that commit an to attempt with charged be can offense. is the "where complaint-warrant by charged be defendant the that requires amended, recently as 3:3-1(e), Rule charge."  current for the another state from extradited been has defendant 36 Page for aComplaint-Warrant.
[brief] Absent a valid, binding contract, Plaintiff cannot argue that any contract existed between Plaintiff and [...] that is enforceable, whether legal or illegal.  Notably, as the Trial Court thoroughly discusses, the entire real estate transaction was void and invalid because Plaintiff fundamentally could not purchase the property without intervening in the Foreclosure Action ongoing at the time of this transaction.  **B.  Plaintiff’s Negligence Claims Fails as a Matter of Law
[brief] (Aa16; Ra100).  Thus, the District continued to provide transportation to ineligible students, including non-public students, at its own expense — and at the expense of providing T&E to its public school students — for seven years after the Department counseled against continuing this practice.  (Ra100; Aa16).  To put it in perspective, the cost of courtesy busing totaled $4,000,000 in the 2008-2009 school year.  (Aa16).  Even assuming that number remained consistent from 2008-2009 until [...] ended its policy in 2016, that is millions of dollars that were available but not used to provide T&E.  (Aa16).  In addition to the Needs Assessment, the 2014 OSA audit also highlighted concerns in the District’s transportation spending.
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Evidence [...] Knew that any of its Conduct Was Substantially Certain to Result in [...]’s Injury or Death (Pa3a).  ..............................................  16  B.  Plaintiff Has Failed to Adduce Evidence That the Circumstances Surrounding the Incident Resulting in the Injuries to Mr. [...] Were More Than a Fact of Life of Industrial Employment and Plainly Beyond Anything the Legislature Intended the Worker’s Compensation Act to Immunize (Pa3a).
[brief] ”  Samson, 175 N.J. at 186.  Voting is not meant to be a game of “gotcha. ”  Courts are instructed to enfranchise voters, not find technical reasons to disenfranchise them even when there is no risk of fraud.  N.J.S.A. 19:63-13 states that voters must sign the certificate.  The certificate includes both a signature like and a portion for the voter’s name, address, and municipality.  However, the statute is silent as to what occurs if the voter fails to complete the ballot in its entirety, and if not filled out completely, whether the ballot must be automatically rejected.
[brief] Db1, Db28.  But there is nothing in the record to support those contentions and the R. 4:6-2(e) standard bars considering them.  Furthermore, the recipient may be storing or using the data for other purposes yet to be discovered.  But nothing in the FDCPA attaches liability based on what the recipient does with the data; instead, liability arises solely from the debt collector’s disclosure regardless of the recipient’s subsequent conduct.
[brief] PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 7, 2024, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, the undersigned will apply to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, at the Courthouse in Newark, New Jersey for an Order granting summary judgment on behalf of Defendant, [...] Attached hereto are a Certification and a Brief upon which reliance is made.  Also attached is a proposed form of Order.  I hereby certify that the original of this motion was filed with the Essex County Clerk and a copy served, via E-courts upon all counsel as noted above.  Pursuant to R. 1:6-2(d), the undersigned waives oral argument and consents to disposition on the papers, unless opposition is received.  [...]  Dated: May 7, 2024
[directive] 4.  Você entende que, em uma audiência, poderá contestar a determinação do [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] [...] e nesta audiência você terá o direito de confrontar e interrogar as testemunhas da promotoria e apresentar provas a seu favor?  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?
[directive] _______________________________________________________________________________________________________  _________________________ _______________________  Officer Receiving Complaint Badge No. Date/Time _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________ _______________________  Supervisor Reviewing Complaint Badge No. Date/Time Appendix C  Internal Affairs Complaint Notification To: ________________________________ _________________  Badge No.  You are hereby notified that an internal affairs complaint has been made against you.  This complaint involves an allegation of _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ which occurred on or about _________________________________________________________  You will be contacted by the investigator if you will be needed for an interview or to render any other assistance to the investigation.  ________________________________________ Signature ________________________________________ Print Name ________________________________________ Date  Appendix D
[brief] The LGEL provides:  The Local Finance Board in the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs shall have jurisdiction to govern and guide the conduct of local government officers or employees regarding violations of the provisions of this act who are not otherwise regulated by a county or municipal code of ethics promulgated by a county or municipal ethics board in accordance with the provisions of this act...The board in interpreting and applying the provisions of this act shall recognize that under the principles of democracy, public officers and employees cannot and should not be expected to be without any personal interest in the decisions and policies of government; that citizens who are government officers and employees have a right to private interests of a personal, financial and economic nature; and that standards of conduct shall distinguish between those conflicts of interest which are legitimate and unavoidable in a free society and those conflicts of interest which are prejudicial and material and are, therefore, corruptive of democracy and free society [N.J.S.A. § 40A:9-22.4 (emphasis added)]
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  11  Vehicular Pursuit Reporting 11.1  All law enforcement officers who operate law enforcement vehicles in vehicular pursuit situations shall complete a report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the vehicular pursuit and preferably before the end the shift in which the pursuit occurred.  If the officer involved in the pursuit is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.  11.2  Vehicular pursuits resulting in the death or serious bodily injury of any civilian shall be handled in accordance with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2019-4.  As soon as any local, county, or state law enforcement agency learns of a vehicular pursuit that resulted in death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, the agency shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office for the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) Director or their designee.  14  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] *(Argued at Pa381 – Pa382)*  The New Jersey Rules of Court prescribe specific procedures for obtaining a writ of mandamus against a public entity, essentially where a court orders a public entity to fulfill a statutory obligation.  Under *R. 4:69-1*, a litigant must file the mandamus action as a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ, and then proceed under R. 4:69-1, et seq.  These procedures to force a public entity to comply with a statutory obligation, however, have a 45-day statute of limitation.  Under R. 4:69-6(a) (“Limitation on Bringing Certain Actions”; “General Limitation”), “No action in lieu of prerogative writs shall be commenced later than 45 days after the accrual of the right to the review, hearing or relief claimed”.  Here, [...]’s Counterclaim clearly and unambiguously seeks to enforce a public entity’s compliance with a statute.  Since [...] seeks mandamus relief for a court to force compliance with an alleged statutory obligation, then that claim accrued in or around the spring of 2020 when [...] sent its invoice for payment, and the Board did not pay.
[brief] Detectives contacted the owner of the residence and told him to remain inside.  (4T:81-1 to 14).  Due to the seriousness of the investigation, officers from surrounding jurisdictions, such as Manalapan and Freehold, along with officers from the New Jersey State Police arrived to provide backup to MCPO detectives.  Dressed in full tactical gear, including raid vests with bold lettering saying “POLICE,” ballistic shields, and in formation, officers carefully approached the Impala from the rear and observed two individuals asleep inside the vehicle.  Officers yelled, “I want to see your hands. ” (4T: 98-6 to 99-19; 115-2 to 119-7; 124-2 to 7).  A female, later identified as [...], who was in the passenger’s seat, immediately raised her hands in the air upon the command.  Defendant, seated in the driver’s seat, did not follow the command, even after it was announced numerous times.  Since defendant would not follow any of the police instructions or commands, they were forced to use a ram to break the driver’s side window.  Police then pulled defendant out of the vehicle.  While doing so, a flare gun was recovered from between defendant’s legs.  Once on the ground, defendant was handcuffed and searched for weapons to ensure police safety.  (4T:99-18 to 101-25; 125-2 to 22).  Defendant was wearing a baseball hat and also a hard hat.  In between each hat was tin foil.  He also had a “runners” type blanket, which was a silver garbage bag type material, wrapped around him and was fully clothed.  When asked about the type of clothing he was wearing, defendant responded he was trying to lose weight.  (4T:102-1 to 12).  Defendant was given Miranda warnings and was calm and cooperative.
[brief] (Pa135, 46).  When [...] questioned her about whether the rugs sustained any damage, Appellant sent an email dated June 18, 2019, to [...] in which she made the following claims regarding her personal background and experience:  This is false, my grandfather owned a textiles factory in the Middle East, I have family in Paris that owns a textiles factory and I grew up around these rugs & fabrics.  I 100% testify that my rugs were damaged during this process.  [...], I will not accept you trying to do this to me as you tried to do telling me I don’t qualify for mortgage insurance (per my policy) & how you told me I got ripped off by the plumber, or how you refused to send out a company to record my damaged personal inventory because you claimed “even grandmas can do that”.
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 7:15-2.3 (emphasis added).  In contrast, a “[w]astewater management plan’ or ‘WMP’ means a written and graphic description of wastewater service areas, and wastewater treatment needs. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.5.  Wastewater Management Plans (WMPs) “are components of the areawide plan. ”  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b), 420 N.J. Super. at 560.  As the [...] explains on its website
[brief] The court failed to see anything wrong with what [...] had concocted, and never shifted the burden of proof onto the Defendants, which the law said must happen once it is determined that a confidential relationship exists, as argued in the main brief.  This lower court decision wrongly rewards conduct of someone in the power position within a confidential relationship.  This terrible precedent would encourage deception and invite fraudsters to take their chances at fleecing a weaker, less educated party, or an older frailer party.  The only penalty under this logic would be to give back some smaller portion of the unjust enrichment, and to keep the majority under this misguided application of the law.  There would be no downside to guile and deception.  The Court below made a finding of confidential relationship between the elder [...] and the Defendants, but it applied the law as if there was no such relationship, and put the entire burden on Plaintiffs.
[directive] The minimum amount of force, of both type (e.g., physical, mechanical, enhanced mechanical, or deadly) and intensity, that is necessary to control a situation and achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.  The law permits officers to overcome unlawful force or resistance; thus, the term proportional force is not intended to mean a type and intensity of force that is exactly equal to the type and intensity of force being used by the subject.  The term proportional force is intended to highlight that the level of force a law enforcement officer utilizes shall be no more than is necessary to overcome the unlawful force or resistance being confronted by the officer.  v USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020
[brief] Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Or Present Potential Alibi Evidence.  Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or present potential alibi evidence that defendant was in North Carolina at a time when he was identified by a detective in New Jersey.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the PCR court properly denied post-conviction relief without granting an evidentiary hearing, finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
[brief] He explained that while he was driving home from work that evening, he found his ability to make a left turn impeded by [...], who was nearly halted in the middle of the roadway staring at her phone.  (5T109:3-6).  [...] honked at [...], causing her to drop her phone and start cursing at him.  (5T109:21-23).  When he eventually made his left turn, [...] kicked the passenger side of his truck.  (5T111:1-3).  He kept driving but found himself infuriated that this woman felt she could kick his car.  (5T112:14-20).  [...] testified that this was where he made the worst decision of his life and made a U-turn to confront [...].  Id.
[brief] [...] paid out Med Pay benefits to its insured for injuries she sustained while a passenger on a bus that was involved in a motor vehicle accident.  [...] then sought reimbursement of the Med Pay benefits it paid out from the drivers of the bus and the motor vehicle responsible for the collision as well as the insurance carrier for the bus, [...].  The collective defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that [...] did not have a statutory right to recovery of the Med Pay benefits it paid to its insured.  [...] opposed the motion on the grounds that it was entitled to equitable contribution from the defendants for the Med Pay benefits it 'erroneously paid' to its insured.  The trial court ruled in favor of [...], and the appeal followed.
[brief] The parties stipulated to the fact that defendant did not have a permit.  The stipulation was read to the jury at the time it was introduced into evidence.  (8T:54-7 to 55-19).  Then, in its final instructions and in describing the types of evidence the jury could consider, the court referenced this earlier instruction, reiterated the exhibit number, and told the jury that they should treat stipulated facts as true, but “as with all evidence undisputed facts can be accepted or rejected by the jury in reaching a verdict. ” (9T:130-6 to 14).  Since this Court must look at the instruction, not in isolation, but as a whole, the fact that some of the explanation of the law occurred in other portions of the instruction does not equate to reversible error.  Jackmon, 305 N.J. Super. at 299; (quoting Sette, 259 N.J. Super. at 190-91.  In sum and substance, this jury was properly instructed on every element and necessary definition for second-degree possession of a weapon.
[brief] *Id.* at 340.  The *Allen* Court’s conclusion that no legal error occurred was buttressed by the fact that the defendant was “constantly informed that he could return to the trial when he would agree to conduct himself in an orderly manner. ”  *Id.* at 345-46.  The Court explained that, “[o]nce lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. ”  *Id.* at 343.  In line with the *Allen* decision, this Court has twice upheld a judge’s decision to remove a defendant from the courtroom for disruptive behavior where the defendant was advised that he would be permitted to return whenever he agreed to comport himself with courtroom decorum.  *State v. Spivey*, 122 N.J. Super. 249, 255-56 (App. Div. 1973), reversed on other grounds, 65 N.J. 21 (1974); *State v. Reddy*, 137 N.J. Super. 32, 36 (App. Div. 1975).
[brief] On March 23, 2009, at 7:08 a.m., surveyor [...] of [...]’s office emailed [...]:  "I will be on the job site today but am looking for the DWG data for Rt 10, Morris Plains job.  Thanks for your help."  (Pa230)  There is no evidence that [...] received any digital files from Dynamic.  On March 23, 2009, at 4:16 p.m., [...] Associates faxed to [...] at [...] a two-page document entitled "Cut Sheet for Building Stakeout" dated March 23, 2009, for [...].
[brief] Public entities may be liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition in the property of a public entity.  *Wymbs v. Township of Wayne*, 163 N.J. 523,531, 750 A.2d 751 (2000).  In addition, in order to impose liability on a public entity pursuant to said Section, a plaintiff must establish that the entity’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  *Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority*, 169 N.J. 119,125, 777 A.2d 9 (2001).  Defendant [...] argues that liability should not be applied to them in this matter.
[brief] DENIAL OF [...]’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.  R. 4:46-2(c) states that a motion for summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings: show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  The “judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial” in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
[brief] Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 72 (upholding mother’s right to decide the frequency of her child’s visits with grandparents despite claims that such visits were in her child’s best interests).  In Troxel, the Supreme Court explained the entrenched Constitutional parental right as follows:  The liberty interest at issue in this case – the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children - is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.  More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.
[brief] Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Group Development Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569, 572 (2011).  Though both the developer and the municipality published a notice of approval, the Board Secretary failed to notify the citizens’ group of the developer’s notice of approval (and only notified the citizens’ group of the municipality’s notice of approval) causing a late filing.  Id. at 572-573.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the action in lieu of prerogative writs as time-barred.  Id. at 574.  The Appellate Division affirmed.  After granting certification, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining if the interests of justice warranted an enlargement of time under R. 4:69-6 (c).  Id. at 578.  The Court analogized the facts before it to those of Cohen v. Thoht, 368 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2004).  Id. at 584.  In both cases, the plaintiffs belatedly filed actions in lieu of prerogative writs in reliance on correspondence with a board secretary that solely disclosed the existence of the municipality’s notice of approval despite the earlier publication of separate notices of approval by the applicants.  Id.  Both cases recognized municipal negligence as a form of concealment justifying the invocation of R. 4:69-6 (c).  Id.  That said, the Court recognized that, “ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of a period of limitations except when there has been concealment. ”  Id. at 580.  The instant matter is distinguishable from both the Hopewell and Cohen cases because here the Board Secretary admittedly notified the Objectors of the Homeowners’ Notice of Approval and furnished a copy.
[directive] 3.8.6  CS (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) chemical agents are primarily offensive weapons that shall be used with the utmost caution.  Thus, CS: (a) may be deployed only by specially trained individuals who are part of a special tactical unit authorized to deploy such agents; 12 USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021 (b) may be deployed only with the specific and express approval of the IC; (c) may be deployed defensively to prevent injury when lesser force options are either not available or would likely be ineffective; and (d) may be deployed only after an announcement is made and when avenues of egress are available to the crowd.
[brief] (Ra 4).  [...] thereafter filed a Certification as to the Property Description in the Foreclosure litigation to correctly reflect the legal description of the property in that action.  (Ra 5).  Once the legal description of the property was corrected, [...] thereafter requested, and received, a second Final Judgement in Foreclosure under Docket No. [...] on August 4, 2020.  (Ra 6).  After securing the second Final Judgement in Foreclosure, [...] was able to secure a Sheriffs Sale date of January 16, 2023.  On that date, [...] requested two (2) statutory adjournments under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36.  (Ra 7).  The new date for the Sheriffs sale was set for March 16, 2023.  (Ra 7).  On or around March 1, 2023, Appellant delivered to the [...] a written request for statutory adjournments under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36.