ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The entire controversy doctrine is an equitable doctrine that serves three purposes: “(1) the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay. ”  DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267 (1995).  This doctrine is codified in R. 4:30A, which provides: “Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine .  . . .”  In considering whether to apply the doctrine, courts consider “the general principle that all claims arising from a particular transaction or series of transactions should be joined in a single action. ”  Archbrook Laguna, LLC v. Marsh, 414 N.J. Super. 97, 105 (App. Div. 2010).  A. [...]’s Claims in the Second Action  Arise from the Same Facts and the Same Transaction as the First Action.  The entire controversy doctrine “chiefly turns on whether the separately-asserted claims ‘arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions. ’”  Ibid.  (quoting DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 267).  It is indisputable that the facts and transaction (the Redevelopment Resolution) underlying [...]’s proposed bad faith claim in the First Appellate Action and in this action are the same: (1) the Blight Study recommended the City designate the Property as a condemnation area in need of redevelopment, (2) the City proposed a resolution to redevelop the Property based on the Blight Study’s recommendations, (3) [...]/[...] was the sole homeowner out of thirty-eight that did not support the Redevelopment Resolution, (4) [...] publicly took credit for the idea of building a school, despite later claiming the school was part of some quid pro quo agreement between the City and [...], (5) [...] objected to the Redevelopment Resolution in a public meeting and declared that the City was “unfairly and illegally” partnering with “a developer [([...])] against a local developer [([...])],” and (6) [...] believed as of at least February 13, 2020, the City was “unfairly and illegally” partnering with or favoring [...] over himself— which is the basis for the purported bad faith in the current frivolous Complaint.
[brief] At that time, law enforcement officers identified themselves and converged on the two.  (10T182-7 to 24; 11T44-5 to 8).  Officers used a distraction device and a foot pursuit ensued as defendant and [...] attempted to flee the parking lot.  (10T182-20 to 183-10; 11T38-10 to 39-13; 11T45-23 to 46-4).  [...] ran across the street and was apprehended.  (10T183-1 to 3; 11T46-21 to 47-4).  Officers recovered a cell phone that [...] dropped as he was running.  A search of [...] incident to arrest revealed his wallet and identification, the key to the Cadillac, an iPhone and $1,400 in United States currency.  (11T47-8 to 48-9; 11T49-23 to 50-8).  Defendant disregarded officers’ commands to stop and ran, so he was not apprehended at that time.  (10T185-19 to 25).
[brief] (Aa15).  [...] rejected [...]’ characterization of the 2017 incident as an assault.  Ibid.  [...] found that none of the kicks were targeted at [...]; rather he was struck in the shoulder while the patient was flailing about towards all the officers present.  (Aa12).  Additionally, [...] noted, in terms of credibility, that [...] displayed a subjective recollection of the incident and that his testimony essentially confirmed the facts as laid out by respondent: that restraining unruly patients was part of his regular job description, that he had restrained patients hundreds of times, that his injury occurred while restraining an unruly patient, and that nobody referred to the incident as an “assault,” including petitioner, until he submitted his version of the incident when filing his accidental disability application.  [Aa13.]  The ALJ concluded that the 2017 incident was not undesigned and unexpected because “[r]estraining unruly and combative patients at an institution for the criminally insane was part of [[...]’] usual job duties. ” (Aa16).  Thus, [...] was not eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits.  Ibid.  At its October 19, 2023 meeting, the Board adopted the initial decision affirming the Board’s denial of [...]’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits.
[brief] These will be discussed in turn.  (1)  The delay in seeking the arbitration request; [...] filed the underlying Complaint on February 14, 2023.  Da001.  [...] filed his demand for arbitration more than 400 days thereafter.  Da041.  [...]’s brief overlooks the fact that in response number 6 of his Answer, [...] admitted that he prepared the Contract.  Da010.  On March 14, 2024, counsel for [...] took the deposition of [...] who had a “more or less supervisory role” and “work(ed) with subs and other contractors ([...]) selected.)  Pa008.  Further, [...] testified that the contract was prepared by Mr. [...].  Pa054.  As the drafter of the Contract, [...] knew or should have known of the arbitration provision well before [...] provided the document to [...] in discovery, yet he waited more than 400 days from the date of the filing of the Complaint to file his motion to stay the litigation.
[brief] The 2020 Opinion, as well as the Respondents’ Opposition Brief misconstrues the nature, purpose and binding effect of municipal Technical Review Committee (“TRC”) meetings.  Specifically, the Respondents assert that they were led to believe that the Township representatives supported the 2018 Amended Application and that they would be permitted to proceed with same.  ROB at 13.  This position is echoed in the 2020 Opinion.  M9-64.  However, a TRC cannot provide any such position regarding the approval of the application without usurping the authority of the land use board.  The adoption of the Respondents’ legal position concerning the binding effect of a TRC meeting would clearly undermine and/or usurp the statutory authority of a land use board to hear and decide a land use application under the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1, et seq.
[brief] Moreover, if anything, it should be exact opposite way around – that is, [...] had no relation at all to my mother, while obviously I am someone who is her natural heir.  Further still, N.J.S.A. 3B:16-5 (codifying a $5,000 personal property exemption for the benefit of a decedent's family) provides that any personal property of a deceased person which has a value less than $5,000, can be kept by the decedent’s heirs and is immune from collection by creditors.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION ### Individual Rights, Privileges and Liberties - Article I, paragraph 1 4 - Article I, paragraph 2a 5 - Article I, paragraph 5 5 - Article I, paragraph 6 5 - Article I, paragraph 18 5, 25 - Article I, paragraph 21 5 ### Prerogative Writ Standing - Article VI, Section V, paragraph 4 5, 6, 23, 25, 26, 28 ### Long Term Tax Exemption Related - Article VIII, Section I, paragraph 1(a)
[brief] To the extent that Defendants assigned one or more of their employees to patrol or otherwise monitor the condition of the Subject Premises, the TCA does not protect Defendants from the results of the negligent performance of its employees’ ministerial duties.  Shore v. Housing Authority of Harrison, 208 N.J. Super. 348, 350 (App. Div. 1986).  In Shore, the housing authority operated two adjacent public housing projects, both of which were patrolled by a security service provided by two non-police personnel.  Id.  The public entity conceded that its relationship with the security guard was that of employer and employee, and the employee was providing a police function.  Id.  The Shore plaintiff was injured while attempting to dodge a firecracker thrown at her by a juvenile on the premises owned by the housing authority.  *Id.* at 351.  The plaintiff alleged that the security guard was not at his assigned post at the time of the incident.  *Id.*  Similar to the lower court’s ruling in the instant case, in granting the housing authority’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court in *Shore* reasoned that the public entity was immune because the employee’s negligent performance of his patrol duties was nothing more than the failure of the housing authority to provide police protection service.  *Id.*  The Appellate Division disagreed, holding that “there is a distinction between the failure to provide police protection service, or sufficient police protection service, and the negligent performance by a police officer of his assigned duties.  The latter is not immunized by N.J.S. A. 59:5-4. ”  *Id.*  Accordingly, this Court should respectfully reverse the lower court’s grant of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice with respect to Defendants [...] and [...] and remand the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings.
[brief] The trial court relied on the incorrect legal standard and ruled that evidence of [...]’s criminal conviction from five years before the trial was inadmissible.  The trial court also barred [...] from presenting the jury with a diagram prepared by the investigating police officer that depicted the points of impact between the three vehicles.  The trial court also ruled that Plaintiff was permitted to play inflammatory audio from a police dash cam video that depicted Plaintiff screaming and crying in pain and pleading for help in the moments immediately after the accident.  These evidentiary rulings had a clear capacity to cause a result the jury would not otherwise have reached.  In respect of Plaintiff’s damage claim, the jury awarded $3.5 million in damages.  The damage award did not include any amounts for any economic loss.  Plaintiff did not present a lost wage claim for either past or future wages.  No medical bills were presented as an element of Plaintiff’s damages.  Plaintiff also did not assert an economic claim for future medical care.  Although Plaintiff sustained serious orthopedic injuries that required surgery, she has made an extraordinary recovery.  She is able to care for her young daughter and is returning to work.  There is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered significant injuries, but an award of $3.5 million for orthopedic injuries from which Plaintiff has made a favorable recovery is excessive and the result of improper sympathy engendered by the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.  [...] respectfully submits that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial as to all issues is warranted.
[brief] “Bait” means to attack with violence, to provoke, or to harass a dog with one or more animals for the purpose of training the dog for, or to cause a dog to engage in, a fight with or among other dogs.  d.  In determining whether an object is dog fighting paraphernalia, a tryer of fact may consider: (1) the proximity of the object in time and space to any violation of this section; (2) direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of the person to deliver the object to any person whom the person in possession of the object knows, or should reasonably know, intends to use the object to violate this section; (3) oral or written instructions concerning its use provided with, or found in the vicinity of, the object; (4) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use; and (5) any other relevant factors.
[brief] Two witnesses characterized the bus’s movement as unusual.  *Id.* at 388-89.  The court in *Cohn* thus found that the evidence tended to indicate “the occurrence of such a violent or unusual jerk or jolt as to speak of negligence in operation. ”*5*  *Id.* at 389.  In rebuffing the defendant’s jerks-and-jolts defense, the court noted that the plaintiff was thrown “off his feet and against a window with such violence as to break it.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ................................................................. v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ......................  2  A.  THE ELIMINATION OF SEA BRIGHT AS A NON-OPERATING SCHOOL DISTRICT AND SEA BRIGHT’S STATUS AS A MUNICIPALITY WITHOUT AN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT ..................................................................................................................  2  B.  SEA BRIGHT ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE ITSELF FROM SHORE REGIONAL AND OCEANPORT AND JOIN IN A PROPOSED EXPANDED HENRY HUDSON REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT .............................................  6  C.  THE TRI-DISTRICTS FILE  AN AMENDED PETITION  SEEKING TO ENLARGE HENRY HUDSON REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT WITHOUT SEA BRIGHT ...........................................................................  9  D.  THE COMMISSIONER GRANTS THE TRI-DISTRICTS’ AMENDED PETITION AND SEA BRIGHT ATTEMPTS TO ATTACH ITSELF TO THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION ON THE AMENDED PETITION ..................................................................................  10  STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................................  16  LEGAL ARGUMENT  THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED  BECAUSE SEA BRIGHT IS NOT ONE OF THE ENUMERATED ENTITIES STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL FROM A LIMITED PURPOSE REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  (Aa19 – Aa21)  ………………
[directive] Any such card or permit issued to the respondent shall be immediately revoked pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f).  As noted above, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Hemenway, the standard for issuance of a search warrant in conjunction with a final extreme risk protective order departs from the statutory language by requiring the court to find probable cause.  Specifically, a warrant will be issued for any firearms and ammunition that the respondent possesses or search owns if the court determines that probable cause exists to believe that (1) the respondent owns or possesses any firearms or ammunition, (2) the respondent poses a significant danger of bodily injury to self or others by owning or possessing any such firearms or ammunition, and (3) such or ammunition are presently at a specifically described location.
[brief] *Ross, supra.*, at 513, citing *Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers*, 90 N.J. 253, 259 (1982); *Rieder Cmty. v. Twp. of New Brunswick*, 227 N.J. Super. 214, 222 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 638 (1988).  If there is no intent to recognize the third party’s right to contract performance, then the third person is merely an incidental beneficiary, having no contractual standing.  *Broadway Maint., supra.*, at 259, citing *Standard Gas Power Corp. v. New England Cas. Co.*, 90 N.J.L. 570, 573 (E&A 1917); *Labega v. Joshi*, 470 N.J. Super. 472, 485 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] PREVIOUSLY APPLIED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE STATE’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLANT’S COMPLAINT.  (Raised Below – Aa241-48; 4T9:1 to 16:3, Aa250-60; 4T18:5 to 28:18; Aa270-76).  Here, [...] granted the [...]’ motion for summary judgment, adopting the previous erroneous ruling of [...] finding that Appellant’s State claims, with the exception of the libel and slander counts, was filed beyond the statute of limitations.  Aa270-72.  And, that Appellant’s claims for libel and slander must be dismissed for failure to serve the public entities with a Notice of Claim.  Aa273-74.  [...] adopted those findings, over Appellant’s objection, 4T9:1 to 16:3, 4T18:5 to 28:18, reasoning that it was in her discretion to do so based upon the so-called “law of the case doctrine.
[brief] [...] [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF.  DATED: OCTOBER 31, 2023  C: [...], A.D.P.D., ESQ.  ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  November 8, 2023  [...] ID. NO. 063222014  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and  On the Letter-Brief  REPLY LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] Rather, the alleged problem was [...]’s decision to release [...], which fact plaintiffs refuse to accept.  The “premarital funds” that [...] used to buy the subject (and eventual marital) property were not his; rather, they were the funds provided by [...].  (Pa000082.)  The mortgage securing [...]’s funds was at the center of the Chancery Action and now this action.  According to plaintiffs, [...] “wanted his money protected so he wanted a mortgage and to protect his money[.]”  (Pa000141 at T32:9-19.)  Adding [...] to the mortgage was “protection” for [...] and not [...] personally; plaintiffs concede this point.  [...] decided to forgive the mortgage debt entirely, and plaintiffs cannot avoid this result by reframing their claims.
[brief] Moreover, the parties agreed to the combination of the three contracts and neither party raised any anticipated issues in connection with the combination.  Truth be told, the [...] only raised the issue in an ill-fated attempt to argue that their revised final offer should have been accepted because it would aid in the combination of the contracts.  It is the Arbitrator’s job to adjudicate disputes, not to act as the parties’ scrivener.  It would be inappropriate to remand the matter to the Arbitrator to engage in this ministerial task that the parties are perfectly capable of performing.  [...] supports a remand to the arbitrator to clarify ambiguities in the Arbitrator’s award; it does not support the [...]’s argument that that Arbitrator should sit down and combine the contracts for the parties.
[brief] 35 State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982) ..................................................................................................  14 State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112 (1991) ...............................................................................................  14 State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412 (2021) ............................................................................................... 14 Stewart v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 249 N.J. 642 (2021) ............................................................................................... 13, 38 Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1999) ..................................................................
[brief] Taken as a whole, these facts demonstrate that the facility staff took action to care for and protect [...] and other patients.  Similarly, plaintiff’s allegations that [...] was entirely denied “basic medical care” allowing his condition to deteriorate and making him more susceptible to COVID-19 are incorrect.  Again, the AOM confirms that [...] was seen multiple times by pulmonary medicine specialists, a nurse practitioner, and an attending physician.  (See Da207-221.)  Plaintiff’s complaints and the AOM only serve to confirm the reasoning underlying the COVID-19 healthcare response immunity statute in the first instance:  The healthcare providers and facilities that supported the response to the COVID-19 healthcare emergency were immunized from liability because there was no effective way to prevent the spread of or to treat the novel coronavirus.  No indicia of gross negligence or punitive damages are present, and plaintiff’s claims are fully barred by the immunity statute.
[brief] *State v. Amelio*, 197 N.J. 207, 211 (2008).  During an otherwise lawful traffic stop, a police officer may inquire “into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop. ”  *State v. Dunbar*, 229 N.J. 521, 533 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  These inquiries include “checking the driver’s license, verifying whether the driver has any outstanding warrants, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. ”  *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  It also includes questions to the driver and passenger regarding “their route of travel and their purpose. ”  *State v. Baum*, 199 N.J. 407, 424 (2009).  “If, during the course of the stop or as a result of the reasonable inquiries initiated by the officer, the circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an officer may broaden [the] inquiry and satisfy those suspicions. ”  *State v. Dickey*, 152 N.J. 468, 479-80 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  But “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. ”  *Dunbar*, 229 N.J. at 534.  In this case, defendant argues that “after [Officer] Oliver checked [defendant’s] license and registration, he did not have reasonable suspicion to continue to detain [...], or to ask [defendant] for consent to search. ” (Db12).  Thus, defendant’s entire constitutional claim in Point I boils down to the ninety-second period after [...] checked defendant’s license and before defendant admitted to having drugs inside his vehicle.
[brief] As part of the Project, [...] will construct, operate, and maintain as part of its existing pipeline system CS 327 and appurtenant facilities on property ¹ “TGPa” refers to [...]’s appendix.  This Court should take judicial notice of the FERC Order pursuant to N.J.R.E.  202(b) and N.J.R.E. 201(b)(3).  Relevant sections of the FERC Order are included in [...]’s appendix for the Court’s convenience.  identified as [...] in the [...], [...], New Jersey (the “CS 327 Site”), which is located within the Highlands Preservation Area as designated under the Highlands Act.  Aa0052.  By way of background, compressor stations compress natural gas by raising the pressure to “push” gas through the pipeline.  Gas enters a series of scrubbers and strainers, is compressed by the compressor, cooled, and then continues through the pipeline until it is delivered to a customer or reaches the next compressor station.  Aa0053.  On August 28, 2020, [...], as it has done for two previous projects within the Highlands Preservation Area, applied to [...] for the HAD seeking a determination from the [...] that its Project qualifies for Exemption #11 under the Highlands Act as an upgrade to its existing pipeline system.
[brief] (2T: 187:19 – 188:23, Appellant’s testimony).  3.  Throughout his commute, Appellant observed puddles within the roadway and otherwise generally wet road conditions.  (2T: 189:16 – 189:25, Appellant’s testimony).  4.  Appellant was driving in the right lane of [...], in [...], when he came upon stopped traffic; due to the traffic control being red, at the intersection with [...].
[brief] To be sure, the All the Way Towing Court rejected an appellate panel’s view that a “heavily negotiated contract between two sophisticated corporate entities” does not fall into the CFA’s reach.  236 N.J. at 446.  Nothing was ever shown here about “heavily negotiated” contracts, let alone the sophistication of the parties.  The identity and sophistication of the parties was of no moment as the agreements were normal, everyday agreements for home improvements.  While Plaintiffs were real estate investors, nothing was presented to show that they were familiar with the law, let alone the specific application of New Jersey’s CFA.  A simple review of the many CFA cases out there show that the Act’s requirements are oft overlooked by experienced, sophisticated parties on both sides.  *Cox v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2 (1994), CDK Global, L.L.C. v. Tulley Auto Group, Inc., 489 F.Supp. 3d 282, 308 (D.N.J. 2020) (applying the *All the Way* factors), *Sun Chemical Corp. v. Fike Corp.*, 981 F.3d 231, 240 (3d. Cir. 2020) (same).
[brief] [Partially Raised Below.]  The State agrees to a remand to clarify the factual basis for imposing consecutive terms on the two terroristic threats convictions.  (Db30-39).  While the State maintains that consecutive terms should not be foreclosed upon remand, the record requires clarification regarding the fact that both terroristic threats charges stemmed from the same date of August 23, 2021, albeit at separate times that day, rather than eight months apart.