ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial, . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” and is inadmissible unless a recognized hearsay exception applies.  N.J.R.E. 801, 802.  Hearsay is testimonial when its primary purpose is to establish facts potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.  State ex rel. J.A., 195 N.J. 324, 345 (2008).  Forensic work done on behalf of the prosecution is testimonial.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011).  [...] testified that two other forensic experts reviewed the fingerprints and agreed that the latent print was a match for [...].  That is testimonial hearsay used to establish a fact: that [...] left the fingerprint on the wine chiller.  Courts addressing this issue overwhelmingly agree.  See, e.g., State v. Kiser, 2019 WL 2402962, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2019) (“[T]he import of a statement that the identification has been verified is that the identification has been deemed correct by an expert who reached the same conclusion.
[brief] As a threshold matter, “[l]egislative history, after all, almost always has something for everyone!”  Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 609 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring).  First, to the extent the FDCPA’s expressed restrictions on debt collectors’ use of telegrams and telephone calls implies the use of those services subject to otherwise complying with the FDCPA, those do not imply allowing the use of mail vendors.  Moreover, Khimmat, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 715, explained how mail vendors are different from phone and telegram operators.  Second, the legislative history and agency commentary on communications with a consumer’s family, neighbors, friends, and employers has nothing to do with the general proscription against third-party communications under § 1692c(b).  Instead, that extrinsic material concerns a different section of the FDCPA, § 1692b, which regulates a debt collector’s communications with those who might have contact information for the consumers.  Hence, that legislative history cannot be used to limit the scope of § 1692c(b).  Indeed, doing so would render most of the statutory wording superfluous.  Third, to the extent that Defendant may contend that its communication with its agents are not third-party communications, there are two things to keep in mind.  First, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that Defendant’s mail vendor is its agent.  Second, if agents are authorized recipients under § 1692c(b), then the section’s expressed authorization of communications with one specific agent, the debt collector’s attorney, would be rendered superfluous.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Plaintiff’s counsel seems to add a new argument here indicating that the Notice does not include the word density.  Respectfully, both the application and the Notice specifically include information about lot area per unit.  Lot area per unit is also known as density.  They are synonymous.  The statutory definition of density is, “the permitted number of dwelling units per gross area of land that is subject to an application for development. ”  Frankly, if the Notice said density, it is likely that plaintiff would argue that it should have said lot area per unit.  Under the circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that it makes no difference.  Overall, I am requesting that the court uphold the decision of the [...] and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.
[brief] Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 14, 2022, against the [...], the [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa001).  On May 4, 2022, the [...] filed and Answer.  (Pa111)  --- 1  Transcripts of Motion dated 10/06/2023  On October 17, 2022, Defendant Highland Park filed its answer and cross claimed against [...].  (Pa122).  As shown on the Case Jacket, there were two discovery motions filed by the defendants that were opposed and withdrawn.  (Pa626-Pa630).  On 8/10/2023, a motion for summary judgment was filed by the [...] and Officers Geist and Kohut.  (Pa335).  On 8/11/23, a motion for summary judgment was filed by the [...].  (Pa137).  On 8/29/2023 Plaintiff filed his oppositions to both motions for summary judgment.  (Pa480, Pa483).  On 9/26/2023, Plaintiff filed a cross motion to Consolidate his complaint that included [...], with the current complaint, and added further opposition to the defendants’ motion Summary Judgment.  (P485).  Plaintiff attached his proposed Complaint filed at [...] to his cross motion.  (Pa488).  On 10/02/2023 [...] filed a opposition to plaintiff’s motion for consolidation on behalf of Highland Park.  (Pa516).  On October 2, 2023, [...] filed his reply on behalf of the [...].  (Pa531).  On 10/06/2023 the Court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied plaintiff’s motion for consolidation of the two complaints.  (Pa533, Pa534, Pa535).
[directive] CASE STATUS SUMMARY  1.  Survivors of homicide, which includes manslaughter and death by auto, shall be notified of the status and outcome of the criminal case.  2.  Survivors shall be informed of their right to effectuate victim impact statements which will be considered by the court prior to sentencing and the parole board prior to granting parole.  3.  Survivors should receive the services and assistance required by the attorney general victim-witness standards for law enforcement agencies  VI.
[brief] Notably, the Supreme Court did not hold that defendants waived their right to arbitrate and, instead, held that a court cannot make up a new procedural rule to favor arbitration, *i.e.*, that a showing of prejudice is required.  In *White*, a post-*Morgan* case, the Third Circuit held that the defendant, in fact, did waive its right to arbitrate.  61 F.4th at 340.  But in *White*, the Third Circuit held that defendants’ actions over a period of *multiple* years expressed an intent to litigate.  Specifically, defendant sought and agreed to multiple stays in discovery, engaged in affirmative discovery, engaged in various motions seeking both dismissal and reconsideration of the order denying dismissal, engaged in additional non-merits motion practice, acquiesced and assented to pre-trial orders, filed a motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal, participated in numerous court conferences.  *Id.* at 340-341.  Due to these numerous affirmative acts over an extended period, the Third Circuit held that defendant’s actions demonstrate a waiver of its right to arbitrate.  In *Cole*, like *White*, the Court held that defendant waived its right to compel arbitration because the motion to compel arbitration was filed a mere three days before the scheduled trial date – “[b]y then, as evidenced by the preparation and submission of proposed witness and exhibit lists, interrogatory and discovery readings, and motions in limine, the parties’ conduct reflected a commitment to try the case.
[brief] In place of alleging actual prejudice, [...] argued below that 1) it was allegedly prejudiced by providing discovery; 2) arbitration would be contrary to the Service of Suit clause in the [...] Pollution Policy; and 3) arbitration was allegedly untimely.  The court held that there was prejudice and pointed to “[t]he time and expense to produce documents” as “substantial efforts that were taken, all designed to have this matter designed and to be tried before a jury. ”  T1 74:15-20.  As demonstrated above, the document production would have taken place without [...] and would also occur in an arbitration.  Thus, the prejudice identified by [...] does not support waiver.  And, to declare that [...]’s mere contemplation of a jury trial is prejudice misses the point.  [...] has not articulated any actual prejudice, and its alleged contemplation of a jury trial must be viewed in the context of the policy it purchased – a policy that requires arbitration at the request of the counter-party.  Indeed, [...] will be prejudiced if this Court does not order arbitration which is the benefit of its bargain with [...] as expressly provided for in the subject insurance policies.  Because [...] will sustain no prejudice by arbitrating the Indemnity Claim, this factor weighs in favor of arbitration.\textsuperscript{13}
[brief] Certification of [...] in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause for Restraints and Sanctions with Exhibits dated November 29, 2018.  Da660  EXHIBIT  A Resolution of the [...] adopted on November 19, xxiii  EXHIBIT  B  Notice of Violation issued by the [...] on October 25, 2018.  EXHIBIT C  Court Order entered by consent in the Superior Court, Law Division lawsuit  Brought by [...] challenging  The validity of the Zoning Board Resolution dated November 16, 2018  January 11, 2019  Affidavit of Services filed by the [...] in connection with the June 4, 2018 Violation (Sixth Street Violation) for services rendered between March 16, 2018 and December 4, 2018 for $30,745.00 in fees and $2,221.96 in costs.  January 11, 2019  Affidavit of Services filed by the [...] in connection with the Fence Violation in the amount of $11,257.50.  January 15, 2019  Statement of Reasons on Plaintiff’s Application to Enforce Litigant’s Rights were the Court heard testimony on October 17, 2018 and December 4, 2018  **February 21, 2019  Order Granting Award for Counsel Fees and Sanctions executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch.(Fence Violation)  **May 29, 2019  Order for Judgment Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs related to Installation of Fence Relating to Order to Show Cause executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch.
[directive] Basic training and qualification records must minimally include the following information:  The name and rank or title of the police officer handler.  The name and address of the police officer handler’s employing law enforcement agency.  The name and a description of the police dog.  The name and employing agency of the K-9 trainer or supervising K-9 trainer.  12 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements  The dates, type and location of training and qualification activities.  A description of all training objectives covered or qualification exercises conducted.  An evaluation based on the performance objectives set forth herein for the police officer handler-police dog team which indicates whether training was satisfactorily completed.  A summary of any problems observed and any corrective measures taken and the outcome of those measures.  A course schedule and detailed lesson plan.  In-Service Training and Re-Evaluation Records  In general, in-service records must minimally include the same information as that provided in basic training records.  The in-service performance evaluation for police K-9 teams must cover those performance objectives or indicators which are relevant to in-service training.  TRAINING SITE OR FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
[brief] Another error in Defendant’s argument is misstatement of the PSA’s paragraph 8.2.  Defendant begins by quoting the following from the PSA’s paragraph 13.10:  The failure of Seller to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall not be deemed a default by Seller, it being agreed that the sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall be to terminate this Agreement and receive a refund of the Down Payment.  (Pb16.)  The Defendant then juxtaposes this against paragraph 8.2 which Defendant quotes and says gave Plaintiff “the right to terminate the PSA immediately upon discovering a material breach” by Defendant.  (Pb17.)  As best as can be discerned Defendant then makes two points.  First, the Defendant appears to argue that because paragraph 8.2 discusses default as permitting immediate termination, and the failure to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate does not constitute a default, it follows the failure to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate does not allow for immediate termination.  Second, the Defendant seems to contend that since paragraph 8.2 explicitly allows for immediate termination, the absence of such a provision in paragraph 13.10 indicates the parties knew how to draft provisions allowing for immediate termination and since it is not included in paragraph 13.10 it was incorrect to permit immediate termination in this case.  (Pb17-19.)
[brief] See *Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Ry.*, 143 S. Ct. 2028 (2023).  Prior to the *Mallory* decision, the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed the issue of transient jurisdiction, albeit in *dicta*, relating to service upon a law firm partner while in the state where the law firm had no physical presence here.  The *[...]* court held:  As we have noted, none of the third-party defendants resides or does business or has an ascertainable presence in New Jersey.  Defendant, therefore, served process on the corporate and partnership entities by certified mail sent to their respective principal place of business, registered agent, or managing partner at their New York addresses.  Defendant served the managing partners of [...] by certified mail addressed to their respective residences, either in New York, Connecticut or Florida.  The law firm was also served by personal service pursuant to R. 4:4–4(a)(1) upon one of its partners, [...], at his New Jersey residence.  *[...] v. Estate of Simpson*, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 526 (App. Div. 1996).  Elaborating further, the Court indicated that: “once third-party defendants have shown that they have no territorial presence in this state, the burden shifts, as it were, to third-party plaintiff, who must then demonstrate their amenability, nonetheless, to an exercise of *in personam* jurisdiction based on minimum contacts. ”  Id. at 533.  In other words, contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Citibank confirms a minimum contacts analysis is only required where the Defendants have “no territorial presence in this state. ”  Id. at 531, 533.  Here, two of [...]’s partners were served in New Jersey.  In addition, [...] was served in-state through its registered agent.  Da304–308.  Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, the trial court did not conclude it had personal jurisdiction simply because service was proper under R. 4:4–4(a)(5).  Da13–15.  Instead, the court found that it had personal jurisdiction because service was proper and Defendants’ “presence within the state of New Jersey is not temporary,” comporting with the holding in Citibank as to transient jurisdiction.  Da13–15.3  II.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION [...]  ON APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION  MONMOUTH COUNTY  DOCKET NO: [...]  SAT BELOW: HON.  [...], J.S.C. HON.  [...], J.S.C. HON.  [...], J.S.C.  DATE SUBMITTED: 04/27/23  AMENDED  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
[brief] Plaintiff’s Conduct Demonstrates the Illusory Nature of its Obligations Under the MOU  As Enforced by the Trial Court  Plaintiff asserts that its obligations under the MOU are not illusory because “the fact that the payment related to zoning was conditional demonstrates without question Appellants’ knowledge and acceptance of uncertainty regarding the zoning. ”  Pb, 17.  In other words, according to Plaintiff: “These payments are conditional because [...] cannot compel the [...] to approve a zoning change to residential. ”  Pb, 16.  To be sure, “[a] promise is not illusory if the power to terminate is conditioned upon some factor outside the promisor's unfettered discretion, such as the promisee's non-performance, or the happening of some event such as a strike, war, decline in business, etc. ”  Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 309 N.J.Super. 596, 621 (App. Div. 1998) (internal quotation omitted).  But, “if performance of an apparent promise is entirely optional with a promisor, the promise is deemed illusory. ”  Id. at 620.  Here, while the “kicker” payment is conditioned upon the grant of residential zoning approval, it is entirely optional with Plaintiff whether to seek residential zoning approval in the first instance.  Plaintiff’s conduct to date in refusing to seek residential zoning approval, despite rejection of its “big box” zoning application, contrary to [...]’s representation, demonstrates it has no intention of pursuing residential zoning approval.  “In general, our courts should seek to avoid interpreting a contract such that it is deemed illusory. ”  Bryant, 309 N.J.Super. at 621 (citing Russell v. Princeton Lab., Inc., 50 N.J. 30, 38 (1967); Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 420, 431 (App.Div.1990)).  Yet, that is precisely the effect of the trial court’s decision, given Plaintiff’s blatant refusal to follow through on [...]’s commitment to “immediately” seek residential zoning approval upon rejection of the “big box” application.  Point  III
[directive] Any benefit as consideration for a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of 2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000 10% permissible discretion of a public servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in any public election; or b.  Any benefit as consideration for a decision, vote, recommendation or exercise of official Bribery in Official and 2C:27-2(a-d) discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding; or Political Matters c.
[brief] This is a good summary:  All right.  So very clear in her April 1st of 2021 decision she says, I'm not going to accept the proposed amended complaint at that time.  And I'm denying any additional motions to amend.  So, obviously, [...] is trying to file an amended complaint in his motion.  And [...] says, no.  Whether I think it's the right decision or not the right decision she's already made that ruling.  That ruling was not appealed.  And that's the ruling of the case.
[brief] What’s more, the Appellate Division has previously determined that the issue of appointments to the BOG is a matter of important public interest to “the Senate, the University, the Board, and the public generally. ”  In re Christie’s Appointment of Perez as Pub. Member 7 of Rutgers Univ. Bd. of Governors, 436 N.J. Super. 575, 585-86 (App. Div. 2014).  The court determined that “even if . . . [the] appeal was untimely, . . . the public interest requires the court to exercise its jurisdiction. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Likewise, the Kratovil court also recognized that the public interest in deciding the BOG residency issues presented by that case justified a R. 4:69-6(c) extension.
[brief] Despite the above, the court in Veras completely failed to analyze the statutory history or the legislative intent of the NJCFLA.  Instead, Veras’s determination that no implied private right of action existed in the NJCFLA was based entirely on the existence of the Commissioner’s enforcement abilities under subsection 18.  But N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 had always existed in conjunction with private enforcement remedies, i.e., N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).
[directive] Gather information on criminal court history using one of the following three options:  Option One:  Promis/Gavel Inquiry by SBI #:  ●  In Section IV, insert defendant’s SBI # in the space provided and check the box “Promis-Gavel Inquiry by SBI # (attached). ”  ● Complete a Promis-Gavel inquiry using the Statewide SBI # Inquiry Search (see attached sample).  Screen print the “Statewide Defn/Case List” (see sample).  Note: please include screen print of this page even if no records are found.  ●  Immediately fax the referral and the Promis-Gavel “Statewide Defn/Case List” to DYFS using the procedure described in Steps 5 and 6 below.  Option Two: SBI # Not Immediately Available -- Awaiting Fingerprints
[brief] 16 POINT I THE DENIAL OF THE RESPONDENTS’ APPLICATION BY THE BOARD WAS PROPER AND MUST BE AFFIRMED (M1-64).  ........  17 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD BY APPOINTING THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER (M1-64).  ..........  31 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED THE ELIMINATION OF THE CONDITION OF APPROVAL REQUIRING THE ROUTE 33 TRAFFIC SIGNAL (4T).  ....................  35 POINT IV  THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY ELIMINATED THE CONDITION OF THE ROUTE 33 SIGNAL (M477-513).  ...........  38 POINT V  THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY IN IMPOSING THE OBLIGATION TO UTILIZE  EMINENT  DOMAIN POWERS AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING TRUST FUNDS (M477-513).  ..........  47  CONCLUSION .............................................................
[brief] (b) inflicting on (him/her) unnecessary suffering or pain, either mental or physical.  (c) habitually tormenting, vexing, or afflicting (him/her).  (d) committing any act of omission or commission whereby unnecessary pain and suffering, whether mental or physical, was caused or permitted to be inflicted on (him/her).  (e) exposing (him/her) to unnecessary hardship, fatigue or mental or physical strains that might tend to injure (his/her) health or physical or moral well being.  [Ibid.]  There is no indication the Legislature intended a broader definition for cruelty toward animals than to children.
[brief] During the course of an investigatory stop, an officer is permitted "'to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.'"  *State v. Roach*, 172 N.J. 19, 27 (2002) (quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 23).  That is, an officer may "conduct 'a carefully limited search of the outer clothing'" to determine whether weapons are present.  *Id.* (quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 30).  However, police may not subject everyone they stop to a protective frisk for weapons.
[brief] 7.  Section 1:7-7 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-7.  When a petition presented under authority of [either section 1:7-1 or] section 1:7-4 of this Title is [either] dismissed [or a final de- 5 erce made thereon,] the [Supreme] Court shall allow and tax the costs and 6 necessary expenses of the Attorney-General, including a fee to the Attorney- 7 General of not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) in any one case, and 8 shall order the payment thereof [by the State Treasurer, or, if the petition 9 dismissed was presented by citizens under authority of said section 1:7-4,] 10 by such citizens, [in which case the] and payment thereof may be enforced 11 by [attachment or otherwise] execution.
[brief] Here, the Arbitrator far exceeded his powers by completely straying from the terms of the PTA and the express condition precedents for EGP liability to arise.  1.  The Arbitrator improperly transformed projects into Backlog Projects subject to EGP-sharing despite the parties having no meeting of the minds regarding this transformation or the EGP for any of the subject projects.  By its express terms, the PTA only obligates [...] to share EGP on projects that meet the definition of a Backlog Project—meaning the five projects listed on Schedule 1.7(a) of the PTA, and those Pipeline Rights that transform to the status of a Backlog Project by satisfying the six specifically stated conditions for such transformation.