ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] D.  Is the Judiciary providing interpreters for grand jury witnesses when advised of the need for those services?  ___ YES ___ NO ___ NOT APPLICABLE  E.  Are interpreter services for grand jury witnesses, whether for ASL or spoken languages, arranged through your Vicinage Coordinator of Interpreting Services or his or her designee?  ___ YES ___ NO ____ NOT APPLICABLE  F.  Are interpreter services required for grand jury witnesses being reported, which will ensure that they're included in the statistical reports relating to interpreter services?  ___ YES ___ NO ___ NOT APPLICABLE  8
[brief] 153a.  On [...]'s motion, the lower court later clarified its Order, and stated that it was intended to be a final order dismissing the Complaint as well as entering judgment on the counterclaim.  160a.  It should be noted that the COVID Statute is now three years post-enactment and affected every public school district in the State and doubtless hundreds of contracted service providers.  This Court has not had occasion to address it to date, and an internet search for lawsuits concerning it has yielded no results.  The COVID Statute does not appear to have generated controversy outside of this case.
[brief] As part of its "East 300 Upgrade Project," [...] intends to install new compressor units in two existing compressor stations\(^5\) along its "300 Line," one in Pennsylvania and one in Sussex County, and to construct a new station and appurtenant facilities in West Milford, in [...]'s existing right-of-way on the site of a former quarry.  The new station would house a 19,000 hp-rated electric motor-driven compressor unit and connect to [...]'s 300 Line pipeline just south of the --- \(^4\)  We do not consider whether [...] qualifies as a public utility for purposes of qualifying for Exemption 11 as appellants only challenged [...]'s status in their reply brief.
[brief] …  These rules were designed primarily to prevent concealment of any expert information concerning facts and opinions and grounds for opinions “to which the expert is expected to testify * * *.”  R. 4:10-2(d)(1).  [Franklin v. Milner, 150 N.J. Super. 456, 469-70 (App. Div. 1977); other cits. om.]  Where no written report has been prepared, the party must disclose the substance of the proposed expert’s opinions.
[brief] Finally, regrettably, this was not the first time a [...] employee had been run over.  Mr. [...] testified regarding three prior fatal worksite incidents on [...] projects.  Pa1521-23.  All involved “struck-by and crushing hazards. ”  In contrast to the pervasive lack of concern for safety requirements, decedent, [...], was uniformly described as extremely safety conscious.  [...] testified, "Mike was the first guy to be pulling on your shirt if there was a truck backing up a mile away."  Pa1426.  [...] testified that he worked with [...] "every day" and "nobody was any safer than him."
[brief] SERIOUS HARM TO THE PUBLIC WILL RESULT IF INSURANCE FRAUD PREVENTION ACT CASES ARE LIMITED TO PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION NO-FAULT ARBITRATION.  As noted, the Legislature enacted the IFPA “to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2.  In Merin, 126 N.J. at 439, the Supreme Court recognized the magnitude of the problem of insurance fraud in the State, and noted that fraud constitutes “approximately ten to fifteen percent of all insurance claims. ”  Consequently, courts “must construe the Act’s provisions liberally to accomplish the Legislature’s broad remedial goals” in enacting the statute.  *Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land*, 186 N.J. at 173.  Yet the decision below would do the opposite.
[brief] Moreover, the court’s reliance on the fact that [...] \(^{15}\) *King* was decided in 1965, one year before *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 346 (1966).  “voluntarily” signed consent to search forms as a factor indicating a lack of coercion, similarly failed to apply the necessary evidential corollary to her own finding of a preceding Fifth Amendment violation, namely that even a written and signed “consent” to search by a person in custody following an unlawfully obtained confession, cannot be considered voluntary, and any fruits derived from such consent search is “fruit of the poisonous tree. ”  See State v. Shaw, supra, at 619.  Moreover, in failing to apply the “fruits” doctrine to the issue of the “voluntariness” of [...]’ “consents”, [...], who had not decided the original Motion to Suppress before [...], failed to consider the totality of the circumstances – including the police misconduct which preceded their arrest of [...] in the parking lot of his New Jersey apartment.
[brief] Indeed, a plain reading of the policy requires the Board to keep any documentation which would reveal a student’s transgender status “confidential” from the student’s parents, absent a “specific and compelling need. ”  Importantly, a student’s name and gender are both mandated student records in New Jersey.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1).  Plaintiffs concede in their opposition brief that “FERPA requires that no State school or educational institution shall have a policy which ‘den[ies], or which effectively prevents, the parents of students…the right to inspect and review the education records of their children” (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A)) and that the NJPRA “similarly requires… ‘the right of the parent or guardian…to be supplied with full information about the pupil…”” (citing N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19) (Pb27).  However, the reinstated policy does just that.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2 is the governing statute for deferred retirement benefits.  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2 provides in pertinent part:  “Should a member, after having established 10 years of creditable service, be separated voluntarily or involuntarily from service, before reaching age 55, and not by removal for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency, such person may elect to receive the payments provided for in section 11 of P.L.1994, c. 255 or section 16 of P.L.1964, c. 241, or a deferred retirement allowance, beginning on the first day of the month following his attainment of age 55 and the filing of an application therefore…”
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT THE LOAN DOCUMENTS REQUIRED APPELLANT’S PREDECESSOR TO ACCEPT THE SHORT FUNDS (1T55:17-21)  | 2 | | II.  RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN REPLY, DO NOT GOVERN THE OUTCOME HERE (Pra1-22)  | 5 | | A. PARAGRAPHS  1 AND 3 OF THE MORTGAGE DID NOT REQUIRE THE SHORT PAYOFF TO BE APPLIED TO THE LOAN (Pa187-193) | 6 | | B. APPELLANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT BY REJECTING AND RETURNING THE SHORT PAYOFF (1T29:6-8) | 7 | | C. APPELLANT DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 4A OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1T29:17-30:1) | 8 | | III.  RESPONDENT’S JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT MISSES THE MARK (1T13:4-8, 13:21-25) | 9 | | IV.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY WEIGH THE EQUITIES (1T55:1-16, 61:9-23) | 11 | | CONCLUSION | 12 |  APPENDIX
[brief] ”  Id. (quoting Steinberg & Scott (2003), supra, at 1014).  See also Comer, 249 N.J. 399-400 (discussing research that juvenile offenders are overwhelmingly likely to desist from crime by their mid-twenties).  Because of juveniles’ lesser culpability and high likelihood of reform -- and because of the near impossibility of identifying at the original sentencing the rare juveniles who will be incorrigible -- a life sentence without parole is often a grossly disproportionate penalty.
[brief] Moreover, if the psychiatrist's opinion hinges upon the truth of defendant's statement, the jury should be further instructed that the probative value of the psychiatrist's opinion will depend upon whether there is independent proof of the hearsay statement.  *State v. Burris*, 298 N.J. Super. at 513.  Whether the expert is testifying on behalf of the State or the defendant, the rule is the same.  Jurors must be immediately instructed that the substantive information defendant provided is to be used by them only to assess the expert's opinion.
[brief] “The papers supporting the motion are closely scrutinized and the opposing papers indulgently treated. ”  Judson, 17 N.J. at 74.  The “judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).  “Credibility determinations will continue to be made by a jury and not the judge. ”  Id.  If there is the slightest doubt as to the existence of a material issue of fact, the litigant has a right to trial and the motion should be denied.  Ruvolo v. American Cas.  Co., 39 N.J. 490, 499 (1963).  Where the movant bears the burden of proof, its initial summary judgment burden is somewhat higher in that it must demonstrate the record contains evidence satisfying the burden and the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.
[brief] (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers about dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the [...], the [...], and the [...].  (Pa11).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa11).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa11).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 [...] retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa78-79).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa80).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa80).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[brief] Plaintiff was the successful bidder.  Da112, ¶16.  On December 26, 2023, the [...] filed their motion for the hearing of an objection to sheriff’s sale and for other relief, and the supporting certifications of [...] and [...], Esq.  (“[...]”).  Da65, Da70, and Da84, respectively.  On January 11, 2024, plaintiff filed the opposing certifications of [...] and [...], Esq. (“[...]”).  Da102 and Da109, respectively.  On January 16, 2024, the [...] filed [...] and [...]’s reply certifications.  Da150 and Da161, respectively.  The motion hearing was held before [...] on January 22, 2024, at which time she denied the [...]’ motion, but granted their request for a stay until their appeal was filed.
[brief] (Da1).  [...] conducted oral argument of this Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 2016 and denied Plaintiffs’ Motion by order of December 20, 2016.  Following the above motion practice, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on December 21, 2016 and a Second Amended Complaint on February 13, 2017.  On February 28, 2018, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of [...] of November 10, 2016 and again moved to Reinstate the Complaint against [...] and [...].
[brief] --- 9  A later examination by the [...] discovered sixty-three videos, equal to 630 items of CSAEM, on defendant’s laptop computer.  police were thus able to determine that defendant was their suspect due to what was on his laptop, and arrested him.  (1T56-6 to 57-8; 1T58-11 to 60-10; 1T72-25 to 74-4; 2T68-4 to 18).  Pursuant to the search warrant, the police seized several electronic devices from defendant’s room for further analysis, including multiple hard drives, two laptops, a thumb drive, and a cellphone.  (1T64-10 to 17; 2T47-2 to 10).  When the officers were finished, they left the same way that they entered, through 132’s front door.  (5T57-21 to 58-3).  A.  The Complaint, and Judge’s First Ruling on the Motion to Suppress.  Following the execution of the search warrant, defendant [...] was charged on the same date, November 5, 2021, with two counts of endangering the welfare of a child (EWOC) under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b) (for Possession of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Material, and Maintaining Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Material via a File-Sharing Program).
[brief] Defendants-Respondents’ Reply Brief *  **   Reply Brief    Supplemental Certification of [...]  * Not produced in Appendix as per R. 2:6-1(a)(2)  **  [...]’s Response to Board’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, Feb. 7, 2023, at 273a – 275a  February 7, 2023  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ##  Cases  Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 105-106 (1984)  ...........................................  8  Bates v. Valley Fair Enterprises, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1964) ....  2 Bedell v. St. Joseph’s Carpenter’s Society, 367 N.J. Super 515, 520 (App. Div. 2004)  ..................................................................................................................  1, 4 Falcone v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 98 N.J. Super 138, 151-152 (App. Div. 1967).  .................................................................................................................................  14  Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 436-438 (1993)
[brief] Federal courts have routinely found that because depositions taken pursuant to the Hague Convention and foreign laws do not allow for the same liberal discovery permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it would be unfair to require a party to take the deposition of a foreign party on German soil.  See Fraunhofer-Geselleshaft Zur Forderung der angewandten Forschung E.V., --- 7  For example, in the instance of a witness residing in Germany, such as [...], the restrictions on depositions under German law and bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the Republic of Germany would apply.  “Bilateral agreements between Germany and the United States require that the German Ministry of Justice pre-approve all requests for depositions. ”  Pa415.  Absent prior approval, depositions are unauthorized and can lead to criminal penalties against the participants.  Id.  Additionally, “the German Ministry of Justice requires that all depositions take place on U.S. Consulate grounds and that the oaths be administered by a U.S. Consul. ”  Id.  Further, even if the witness has been served with a subpoena of a U.S.-based court, testimony is hardly guaranteed.  German law requires that “[a]ll testimony must be given voluntarily without coercion or threat of future sanctions.  Therefore, prior to the taking of testimony and in accordance with German law, the consular officer will administer a voluntariness advisement to each witness. ”  Pa416.  If the subpoenaed witness elects not to participate, plaintiff is left without remedy.  Also, German law does not permit cross-examination of witnesses and, as a corollary to the voluntary nature of the deposition, a witness may refuse to answer any questions including those to which an answer could be compelled pursuant to New Jersey Rule of Court.  See R. 4:14-3 (providing for examination of deponents as at trial in open court).  Additional restrictions include a prohibition on video and audio recording of the deposition and the consular officer must preside over the deposition in its entirety.  Pa416. 2021 WL 861493 (D.Del. March 8, 2021) at *3 (Pa310); Metcalf v. Bay Ferries Limited, 2014 WL 3670786 (D. Mass. July 14, 2021) at *1-3 (Pa314); Peiker Acustic, Inc. v. Kennedy, 2011 WL 1344238 (D. Colorado April 8, 2011) at *2 (Pa319); In re Vitamin Antitrust Litigation, 2001 WL 35814436 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2001) at *7-9 (Pa323).
[brief] Section 3(b) finds meaning in the context of an ongoing investigation, in that allows for release of information pertaining to the investigation, whether access to exempt or non-exempt records is permitted or denied.  [...] writing for the Court in *Libertarians for Transparent Government v. Cumberland Co.*, 250 N.J. 46, 58 (2022) interpreted Section 3(b) of OPRA as being limited to ongoing criminal investigations:
[brief] [...] did not find frivolous litigation or “bad faith” by [...], Welch v. Welch, 401, N.J. Super. 438, 448 (Ch. Div. 2008) (citing Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 461 (App. Div. 2000) (“where a party acts in bad faith the purpose of a counsel fee award is to protect the innocent party from unnecessary costs and to punish the guilty party”).  “The assessment of counsel fees is discretionary. ”  Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 365 (App. Div. 2017).  An abuse of discretion arises when the trial judge has not considered and applied the correct governing law or has failed to make adequate findings to support the counsel fee decision.  Clarke, supra, 359 N.J. Super. 572.  Those grounds for reversal are not present in this case; [...] simply disagrees with the decision, which does not demonstrate the clear abuse of discretion required for relief on appeal.
[brief] [...] permitted testimony and evidence regarding past and outside allegations by others, lawsuits, and judgments against [...].  Even in the opening statement, [...]’s attorney referred to [...] not paying third parties (in addition to [...]) and those third parties getting Judgments against [...].  (2T pg. 126, line 25 – pg. 127, line 10).  The assertions carried into the cross examination of [...] and the testimony of [...]’s witness as well.  On Cross-examination, [...] was asked “do you recall that you entered into a consent judgment with [...]’s firm?” (3T pg. 193, line 4-5).  [...]’s attorney objected arguing that the question going to character propensity would be prejudicial and the prejudice would outweigh any probative value.  (3T, Pg. 194, line 7-13).  [...] overruled finding that since [...] indicated he negotiates bills down, the evidence of a consent judgment is admissible.  (3T, Pg. 198, line 2 – pg. 199, line 3; pg. 199, line 23 – pg. 200, line 13.).  In the Summation, [...]’s attorney again focused on other judgments already entered against [...] in other matters on different sets of facts, thereby polluting the jury by saying the Cohen didn’t pay [...] so he got a judgment; and Cohen didn’t pay [...] so he got a judgment too.
[brief] The State’s brief puts forth three reasons he is not entitled to the benefit of the bargain he struck.  Two should not be considered by this Court, due to the novelty of one and the frivolity of the other.  All are meritless.  The denial of the motion to withdraw his plea must be reversed.  The State does not lead with the only argument it has pursued since [...] began attempting to vacate his plea two years ago: that he is not entitled to do so under *State v. Slater*, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).
[brief] Further, under N.J.A.C. 10A:18-5.2(a):  Each correctional facility Administrator or designee shall promulgate:  1.  Internal management procedures written in accordance with this section that include a written list of items which may be received in a package; and 2.  A limit on the number and weight of packages which may be received by an inmate each month.  The [...]’s denial of [...]’s property claim was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable because [...], consistent with the above statutory authority, has the power to regulate food packages and the [...] clearly communicated the applicable rules.  The Inmate Handbook, which [...] used to order outside food, detailed the “Incentive Food Package” program and clearly stated the prison “is not responsible for damaged or lost food packages” and food is ordered “at your own risk. ”  (Ra2).  Here, although the defect in the refried beans was based on a mistake by the outside vendor, (Pa7), the [...] was justified in relying on its policy that the purchase of outside food was “at your own risk. ”  And because there was no negligence or fault by the prison in the handling of the food package, the denial of [...]’s property claim was appropriate.
[brief] None of the factors present in those cases are apparent here.  There are no public funds involved, no political upheavals, no --- \(^3\) Casella—like the Rocky Hill plaintiffs—supports its numerosity argument by pointing to the turnout at meetings considering [...]’s site plan application.  (2T, 28:3-9) (Pb1 – Pb2, Pb6 – Pb8, Pb20 – Pb21); Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. at 399.  In any event, as the trial court recognized, this court made clear that “mere numerosity” should not be equated with “important public rather than private interests that require adjudication.
[brief] \textit{Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs.}, 139 N.J. 532, 535 (1995) (“For purposes of determining when a cause of action accrues so that the applicable period of limitation commences to run, the relevant question is when did the party seeking to bring the action have an enforceable right. ” (citation omitted)).  Further, [...]’s acknowledgment in its October 17, 2023 post-hearing brief of the amount [...] owed it for its work on the [...] is not indicative of the “ripeness” of its claim on that date.
[brief] The implied covenants are deemed applicable in cases involving termination clauses only ---  6  In conformity with R. 1:36-3 a copy of the unpublished opinion was presented below and appears now in the record on appeal.  where the claim is made and facts are alleged a contracting party “acts with ill motives and without any legitimate purpose”  Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 226 (N.J. 2005) (citing Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 251 (2001) or if the one claiming breach “relies to its detriment on a defendant's intentional misleading assertions”.  Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, supra, 182 N.J. at 226 (citing [...], supra, 69 N.J. 129-130).  Taken together, [...], [...], [...], Wilson and Brunswick Hills Racquet Club direct that an unambiguous termination clause will be enforced even if there is a different motive by the party terminating, unless the opponent comes forward asserting a claim and alleging facts of bad motives, ill intentions and no legitimate purpose to its action.  Absent that, and even if there is a stated alternative purpose to termination, the termination decision will be upheld by a court on summary judgment.  Here there are no allegations regarding breach of the implied covenants.  Moreover, the record is devoid of any fact from which the allegations could be made.  Consequently, the issue here is whether Defendant’s construction is reasonable or unreasonable, and if unreasonable the PSA as described by Plaintiff is to be enforced and the decision affirmed.  POINT II