ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] INITIAL & AMENDED PLEADINGS  OTSC WITH TEMPORARY RESTRAINTS  JANUARY 29, 2018 ...........................................................................................................  621  ORDER ON SHOW CAUSE  RETURN DATE March 28, 2018 (from March 1, 2018 hearing)  .................................................................  626  VERIFIED COMPLAINT (without exhibits)  January 19, 2018 .................................................................................................................. 629  ANSWER & COUNTERCLAIM (without exhibits)  February 19, 2018 ................................................................................................................ 650  FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT (without exhibits)  July 12, 2019 .......................................................................................................................  672  ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT  September 16, 2019 ............................................................................................................  719  CONSENT ORDER STAYING MATTER (BANKRUPTCY)  July 20, 2018 .......................................................................................................................  764  [...] TERMINATION NOTICE  July 27, 2018 .......................................................................................................................  766  IV.
[brief] “For any solar project in New Jersey that seeks to connect to the existing power grid, the approvals consist of a Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (“WMPA”) with [...], an agreement with the utility power company, such as [...] (“[...]”), and registrations with the [...] (“[...]”).  However, to finalize and rely upon these approvals, the developer must have a recognized possessory interest in the land to be developed, as well as local land use approval.  If a developer does not have this land interest, its approvals to connect to the grid are voidable if the [...], [...], or the [...] learn that the entity does not exercise control over that land.  Moreover, if a solar developer fails to obtain or loses one of the approvals comprising the bundle (as in this case), it cannot move forward with the solar project. ”  [FEDa119].
[brief] In Russell v. Bd. of Adjustment, 31 N.J. 58, 155 A.2d 83 (1959), it was held that res judicata applies when the applications are substantially similar.  In the case of [...], her revised application included a 50% reduction in building size, elimination of a second driveway, and other modifications that constitute substantial changes.  The Pinelands waiver’s findings of hardship and the revised application’s compliance with expert recommendations further distinguish it from the Mitchell application.  An adjudicative decision of an administrative agency, such as a planning board, should be accorded the same finality as a court judgment.
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[brief] Approximately 10:45am, the two black males fled out the rear of the T-Mobile on foot.  (Da 30-31)  [...] failed to confront detective [...] of his inconsistencies in his testimony, because on March 13th, 2014 he testified that he observed the Buick going into the T-Mobile parking lot and the suspects getting out of the car, and walk up to the front of the T-Mobile store, (6T 7-21 to 22) but in his police report he saw the suspects being dropped off at the intersection of Parsonage Road.
[brief] (See Db17).  Additionally, defendant’s argument that a disparate sentence is not authorized by law and that such a claim is cognizable under Rule 3:22-2(c) erroneously conflates the concepts that a disparate sentence may invalidate a sentence and an unauthorized sentence can be raised in a PCR petition.  Further, “[a] sentence of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous merely because a co-defendant’s sentence is lighter. ”  Roach I, 146 N.J. at 232 (quoting Hicks, 54 N.J. at 391).  The PCR court also properly found defendant’s disparate sentence claim was procedurally barred as being previously adjudicated.  Defendant’s disparate sentencing argument raised in his PCR petition is substantially equivalent to the arguments he already raised and were previously adjudicated.
[brief] This resulted in a May 2, 2022 Order incorporating all of [...]’s findings regarding the discovery [...] was compelled to produce.  (Pa64 – Poa65)  Specifically, [...] was ordered to produce the following: (a) a written Certification confirming that all documentation in support of [...]’s purchase of replacement material from any vendor from April 2021 to September 2021 had already been produced; (b) a substantive Answer to Interrogatory #30 of [...]’s First Set of Interrogatories, which demanded information on any projects and/or contracts [...] anticipated to complete with the materials stemming from the Subject Contract; (c) a Statement of Damages; (d) a written Certification explicitly detailing all of [...]’s efforts and due diligence searches to verify that all relevant internal and external communications between [...], [...], and any and all vendors that [...] alleges it was forced to order replacement materials from have been produced; and (e) the identity of the individuals responsible for receiving and processing [...]’s correspondence between September 2020 and September 3, 2021.
[brief] On August 14, 2023, Respondent [...] (“[...]”) issued a Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit, which authorized the construction of two warehouse buildings, stormwater management features, and roadway and parking improvements on the subject property.  However, a review of Respondent [...]’s (“[...]”) submissions, the review comments from Appellant [...] (“[...]”) and its environmental consultants [...], and the Flood Hazard Area Control Act regulations, reveal that the application had serious deficiencies in its stormwater management plan and designs.  While the [...] did acknowledge some of the issues raised by [...]’s public comments, [...] did not fully address the deficiencies and therefore failed to provide a compliant stormwater management system as required under the regulations.  For the reasons set forth herein, the [...]’s approval of [...]’s application for a Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and the [...]’s issuance of the Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit should be reversed.
[directive] B.  The Division of State Police shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office, of the county in which the crash occurred, when one or more of the following evaluation criteria are applicable.  1.  These evaluation criteria shall be used by the County Prosecutor, Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or their designees to evaluate the possibility that the cause of the serious bodily injury and/or death crashes involving a motor vehicle or vessel may be due to criminal conduct.  C.  Evaluation Criteria.  As much information as possible pertaining to the investigation of these evaluation criteria shall be provided to the County Prosecutor’s Office upon notification when:  1.  There is a death and/or serious injury, to one or more persons.  a.  Persons includes the operator of any motor vehicle involved, passenger in any motor vehicle involved, or a pedestrian.  2.  There is a surviving driver/operator, or a question exists as to who was the driver or operator.  3.  And it is known, or suspected, that any of the following conditions are present.  - 3 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2
[directive] If the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction?  f.  Se o crime ocorreu no dia 5 de janeiro de 1994 ou após esta data e você for condenado à [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] suspensão condicional da pena, você deverá pagar a taxa de até $25 por mês durante o período da suspensão condicional da pena?
[brief] \textsuperscript{103}  For example, were the court to hold the TCA applied to the complaint, the holding would violate the Federal and State Constitutions’ guarantees of freedom of contract. \textsuperscript{104}  Such a sea change in the law is for the Supreme Court, as was the case in \textit{Sun Chem. Corp. v. Fike Corp.}, 243 N.J. 319 (2020), circumscribing limits on the PLA’s reach relative to consumer claims.
[brief] **RESPONDENT MEETS ANY BURDENS UNDER THE FOUR PRONGS IN GLOBE MOTOR CO. V. IGDALEV, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016)**  *(Raised below at IT 3:8-14, IT 7:3-19, IT 9:5-13, IT 14: 5-23, Da195-202)*  Contrary to Appellant’s Point II (Db15), Respondent also meets the four prongs in *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016) as outlined in the Appellant’s brief (at Db15).  1.  Firstly, the parties entered into a Separation Agreement containing certain terms, and 2.  Secondly, Respondent took all required action under the Agreement 3.  Thirdly, Appellant did not perform as required and breached the terms of the Separation Agreement as found by the Trial Court and noted in the July 25, 2023 Order (Da202)  4.  Fourthly, Appellant’s breach in failure to do what this Separation Agreement required of Appellant deprived Respondent of his expectations under the Separation Agreement - presently, that Appellant would have amicably agreed to strike the terms declared to be illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective by the NJDPB and enable the Involuntary Disability Application to proceed to a vote before the NJDPB on the merits of Respondent’s condition.  The parties agreed that this condition was severe, disabling, and it was expected that the disability application would be granted although the NJDPB was to make that determination – instead, Appellant’s breach damaged Respondent and blocked his ability to reach the mutually intended vote on the merits of the disability application.  POINT THREE, Sub Point One  Appellant, a legal entity, cannot enforce terms of an agreement that the entity now knows is illegal, unenforceable, or void against public policy both as a matter of law and in accord with Paragraph 7 of the Agreement.  Appellant’s Point Two at (Db11) further posits that the Agreement is not subject to severance of its terms as no portion has been “declared illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective in a legal forum”.  That argument is contrary to most of Appellant’s case where Appellant, in accusation, contends that Respondent actually knew the agreement was illegal all along.
[brief] D.  There are very few areas in the municipality where non-residential, non-agricultural pursuits can be achieved.  1.  Of [...]’s 13,728 acres of land: (a) 7,956.36 acres are preserved and 577.39 are unpreserved (but with TDR Credits assigned to them); (b) 689.55 acres are State-owned land; (c) 583 acres comprise the "Receiving Area"; (d) 140 acres are recreation fields and/or open space outside the Receiving Area; (e) [...] and [...] comprise 385 acres; (f) Turnpike Roads comprise: 102.87 acres.  2.  As a result, seventy-six percent (76%) of [...]’s land mass has been dedicated to the purposes of the 1997 Master Plan, and subsequent Master Plan Re-Examination Reports, and/or is physically not developable.  E.  However, no significant commercial or industrial initiatives have been undertaken since TDR was adopted in 1998.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN [...]’S FAVOR BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF A TRANSACTION WITH [...] AND PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO SET FORTH ALLEGATIONS, LET ALONE INTRODUCE EVIDENCE, THAT [...] DID ANYTHING WRONG.  Plaintiffs’ entire case against NJ Retina rested on a single substantive allegation in their Complaint -- namely that Dr. Notis “was going to sell” his practice(s) and real estate to NJ Retina.  (Pa58a ¶¶ 44-45).  Based on this allegation alone, Plaintiffs somehow brought claims against NJ Retina for tortious interference (Counts One through Three and Five), unjust enrichment (Count Eleven), conspiracy (Count Thirteen), and a declaratory judgment (Count Fifteen).  The trial court concluded, however, that NJ Retina never consummated a transaction with Dr. Notis.  (Pa283a; 1T11:8-9).  This fact was undisputed.  Instead, NJ Retina did nothing more than engage in preliminary discussions with Dr. Notis regarding the purchase of his practice.  (Pa283).  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against NJ Retina failed as a matter of law.  The trial court’s ruling makes sense from both a legal and common-sense perspective.  Simply put, the conveyance of an expression of interest in a medical practice, which went nowhere (not even proceeding to an executed letter of intent) cannot be the basis of a lawsuit.  Plaintiffs’ appeal focuses almost exclusively on the trial court’s dismissal of their tortious interference claims.  (Pb15-Pb27).  That is, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment and declaratory judgment claims were so legally unsustainable that Plaintiffs do not attempt to explain how the trial court erred in dismissing them.  And, Plaintiffs pay short shrift to their conspiracy claim, arguing only that the claim should not have been dismissed because (Plaintiffs incorrectly argue) their tortious interference claim should not have been dismissed.  (Pb23 (“[B]ecause the tortious interference claim should have survived summary judgment, so, too, should have the conspiracy claim[.]”)).  The trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims, however, was correct in all respects.  “The tort of interference with a business relation or contract contains four elements: (1) a protected interest; (2) malice—that is, defendant’s intentional interference without justification; (3) a reasonable likelihood that the interference caused the loss of the prospective gain; and (4) resulting damages. ”  DiMaria Constr., Inc. v. Interarch, 351 N.J. Super. 558, 567 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d, 172 N.J. 182 (2002).  In applying these elements, the trial court homed in the absence of a transaction between NJ Retina and Dr. Notis -- and rightfully so: again, the only substantive allegation in the Complaint concerning NJ Retina was that Dr. Notis “was going to sell” his practice(s) and real estate to NJ Retina.  (Pa58a ¶¶ 44-45).  Because NJ Retina and Dr. Notis indisputably did not consummate a transaction, the trial court found, Plaintiffs could not establish that NJ Retina “intentional[ly] interfere[d]” with any “protected interest” that Plaintiffs may have had, nor could they show that NJ Retina caused Plaintiffs any damages.
[brief] (Pa145-46 at 74:11 to 75:10.)  For instance, in discussing [...]’s inability to do household chores, he attempted to explain why his wife did not help around the house.  (Pa145 at 74:11 to 23.)  The interpreter translated, “My wife helps me out.  She somewhat helps me.  She – she’s a homemaker.  She helps and cares for the elderly. ”  (Pa145 at 74:21 to 23.)  [...]’s counsel then clarified the improper translation of “homemaker” by stating “[s]he’s a home aide,” to which the translator admitted the error.  (Pa145-46 at 74:21 to 75:6.)  The trial court granted reconsideration to permit recording subject to a confidentiality order because “plaintiff’s prior reports were not generated by IMEs. ” (Pa74-75).  Defendants then moved for reconsideration of the reconsideration providing another certification from [...], who refused to conduct the examination if it were recorded.
[directive] I, ________________________, understand that as part of my employment with _________________________________, I am required to undergo unannounced drug testing by urinalysis either through a random drug testing procedure or where there is reasonable suspicion to believe I am illegally using drugs or am under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance or cannabis during work hours.  I understand that a negative drug test result is a condition of my continued employment as a sworn officer at the above listed department.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use, it will result in my termination from employment.  I understand that if I refuse to undergo testing, it will result in the same penalties as a positive test for the illegal use of drugs.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use or refuse to take the test, the information will be forwarded to the Central Drug Registry maintained by the Division of State Police.  Information from that registry can be made available by court order or as part of a confidential investigation relating to my employment with a criminal justice agency.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use, I will be permanently barred from future employment as a law enforcement officer in New Jersey.  I understand that if I resign or retire after receiving a lawful order to submit a urine specimen for drug testing and do not provide the specimen, I shall be deemed to have refused to submit to the drug test.  I have read and understand the information contained on this "Officer Notice and Acknowledgment" form.  I agree to undergo drug testing through urinalysis as a condition of my continued employment as required by law.
[brief] When reviewing Landlord’s Fee Application, [...] simply failed to apply the above-standard adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in RPC 1.5(a) and, instead, lowered Landlord’s contractually mandated fee award from $65,786.68 to $38,462.60 because he felt the hourly rates charged by Landlord’s counsel were “a little high. ” (Da3, 3T18-19; Pa47-51, 119-120).  Specifically, [...] cut the hourly rates of [...], Esq. and [...], Esq. from $570.00 and $530.00, respectively, to $425.00, the hourly rate of [...], Esq. from $395.00 to $325.00 and the hourly rate of paralegal [...] from $295 to $200.  (3T18-19; Pa47-51, 119-120).  As set forth on the record, the basis for these arbitrary cuts were simply [...]’s personal experience as he felt these lower rates were “more in line with what I’ve seen in these types of substantial commercial cases that have been before me in recent months. ” (3T18-21 to 3T18-22).  Such an arbitrary reduction of Landlord’s Fee Application based upon the [...]’s own personal experience is simply not permissible under New Jersey law and should, respectfully, be reversed.
[brief] *Gannett Satellite Info. Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune*, 254 N.J. 242, 256 (2023)  At common law, a citizen has “an enforceable right to require custodians of public records to make them available for reasonable inspection and examination. ”  *ACLU of N.J. v. Cnty. Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J.*, 474 N.J. --- \(^4\)  [...] suggests that this court should “exercise original jurisdiction” and decide the common law right of access issue to avoid further litigation.
[brief] RFPs  Nos. 68 and 69  These RFPs call for Defendants to produce their 10-K and 10-Q filings for the past 3 fiscal years.  Plaintiff does not address these RFPs in his Motion.  Defendants respond that these are public filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  No further response is required.  CONCLUSION  Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is DENIED.
[brief] Instead, its rejection of the factor was based on its purely speculative finding that “it was not … until the statement, order, or command” given by [...], who had just turned seventeen,\(^9\) “that the youngest defendant,” [...], who was still sixteen, “arguably succumbed to the pressure exerted by this defendant to stop the fleeing victim that shots were fired. ”  (5T:21-16 to 22-6)  The fact that Miller factor three could also apply to [...]’s codefendants does not provide a basis for the court to conclude that the factor does not apply to [...], and is entirely inappropriate and irrelevant under the Miller analysis, which requires resentencing courts to consider the youth mitigating factors in relation to the juvenile being resentenced.
[brief] 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................  14  POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUS DETERMINED THAT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORY RECORDS ARE EXEMPT FROM THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS (raised below, Pa-9; 3T9-4 to 10-4; 3T17-9 to -12)  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  14  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DISCLOSURE OF THE RESPONSIVE RECORDS UNDER THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS (raised below, Pa-9; 3T4-5 to 6-16).  ..................................................................................................................  16  POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY DENIED [...]’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED THE [...]’S MOTION TO QUASH  [...]’S SUBPOENA.  (raised below, 2T16-14 to 17-11; Pa-10, 12)  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  28  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................
[brief] [Da38].  Moreover, unlike in Willingboro, this zone is not reserved exclusively for single-family dwellings; the R-20A Zone also permits (in addition to single-family homes): (1) parks; (2) municipal buildings; (3) farms and agricultural activities; (4) family child-care homes; (5) places of worship; (6) schools; and (7) community shelters.  [Da400].  The conclusion in *Salt & Light* was unreachable here because of what [...]’s LUDO does allow to be built on the Property.