ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] •  He testified that there was no detriment related to the front yard setback variances because the surrounding properties were built to the property line and this plan allowed for a 5 foot setback.  T39.  •  He explained that several goals of planning would be advanced by granting the variance, including G. to provide sufficient space for residential use which is in line with the Borough’s master plan and zoning plan and I. to promote a desirable, visual environment though good civic design and arrangement.  T39.  •  He emphasized that this was a highly visible property with substantial aesthetic and architectural appeal superior to the vacant lot that existed at the time.  •  He testified that none of the variances in this application caused substantial detriment to the public good and did not substantially impairing the intent or purpose of the zone plan or ordinance.  T45-7 to T45-11.  •  He discussed the lot area/unit variance also referring to it as a density variance.  T.40.  He described this as a weighing analysis to determine if the site can accommodate the issues raised by intensifying the number of units from 15 to 17 at this location.  T40.  •  He discussed the height variance referring to the *Coventry Square v Westwood Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment*, 138 NJ 285 (1994) criteria.  T41.  He explained that the focus shifts from the impact of the use to the impact of the deviation, requiring an applicant to demonstrate that the height variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and that the variance will not impair the intent or purpose of the zone plan or zoning ordinance.  T42.  •  He again emphasized this unique property which was a gateway to [...], sat across from the boardwalk area which had an elevation 5-6 feet above the subject property, including development on the boardwalk commencing at the boardwalk level rather than the street level.  T42.  •  He emphasized the unique design of the proposed structures which stepped back the top floor.  T43.  •  He discussed goals G and I of the MLUL which were previously addressed explaining that goal A was also promoted by this plan.  He opined that the general welfare was enhanced since [...] is a shore town seeking to maximize water views to the east and west through redevelopment.  T43.  •  He referenced the Master Plan and the Vision Plan which included an overarching theme of revitalization and branding especially underutilized properties such as this vacant dirt lot.  T44.  The board armed with intimate knowledge of the borough’s master plan and future vision certainly had adequate information to grant the variances.  There is overlap between the testimony provided regarding meeting the requirements for all of the variances including front yard setback, height and density variances.
[brief] Regarding this appeal, the principles governing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for summary judgment align.  Review of the trial court's orders is de novo.  See Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022); Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021).  B.
[brief] The [...]’s (Commission) Final Decision in this matter is contrary to a robust body of the Commission’s own caselaw, does not comport with the evidence in the record, and is repugnant to the statutory mandate set out for the Commission in the School Ethics Act (Act).  As a result, the Commission’s August 22, 2023 Final Decision in this matter must be reversed as being arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  The New Jersey Legislature tasked the Commission with enforcing a Code of Ethics for school board members who engage in “conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  The Legislature further mandated that the Commission must “ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards.
[brief] ”  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).  See also Mynster, at 480 (“Words, phrases, and clauses cannot be viewed in isolation; all the parts of a statute must be read to give meaning to the whole of the statute. ”).  This is so because, “oftentimes the ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. ’”  King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 474 (2015).  A court’s “duty, after all, is to construe statutes, not isolated provisions. ”  Id., at 486.  “When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination. ’”  Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989).  Appellant argues that the Superior Court erred in consulting legislative history to determine that Congress only desired to prohibit the disclosure of consumer information to friends, neighbors, and employers – and not the routine use of letter vendors – without first finding that the statute was “ambiguous.
[directive] An individual who has completed the statutory (N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.14) minimum hours of Sexual Violence Advocacy training that has been approved by the [...] and the [...] ([...]), and who is currently under the supervision of a [...] funded by the [...] ([...]).  DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY  A developmental disability is any condition that is attributable to a mental or physical impairment, or combination of the two.  It manifests before age 22, is likely to continue indefinitely, and results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life activities: self-care; receptive and expressive language; learning, mobility; self-direction; and capacity for independent living.  Developmental disabilities, include, but are not limited to the following: autism spectrum disorder; hearing loss; vision loss; muscular dystrophy; cerebral palsy; spina bifida; fragile X syndrome; Tourette’s syndrome; and fetal alcohol spectrum disorders.
[brief] (Da294)  [...] thereafter on June 4, 2018 filed a new Order to Show Cause to enforce Litigant’s Rights, asserting continuing violations arising from children/students in [...] courtyard among the Synagogue parked vehicles (Da295), with Exhibits in support (Da297 to 417).  Opposition was filed by [...] (Da419 to 508), with a Response Certification and Exhibits by Synagogue (Da517 to 603).
[brief] subjectively suspicious for people traveling across the country from the west coast to the east – including from Nevada -- to bring clothing and personal items in such luggage (1T58-24 to 1T59-66; 1T144-15 to 20).  He nevertheless asked [...] “what are you guys hauling in the back,” to which she replied “nothing. ” (1T142-20 to 22) (emphasis added).  At this point, and even before re-entering the patrol car, [...] radioed his headquarters for a back-up officer, stating that “I need him to get here so that I can walk my dog,” (1T143-23), something he acknowledged he was forbidden to do without objectively reasonable suspicion.
[brief] Trial court’s statement of reasons.  The trial court found that [...]’s opinion was “totally speculative” and unreliable.  (1T29-6 to 13.)  “[T]here’s no question that in this case that that towel rack did not look like a grab bar, and specifically, on the day in question when the plaintiff fell, it wasn’t a grab bar, it was a towel rack that literally had two towels hanging from it. ”  (1T29-14 to 20.)  “I don’t know how . . . [...] comes up with . . . the opinion that that bar appeared to be a grab bar. ”  (1T29-21 to 23.)  With regard to [...]’s opinions that the location of the towel rack created the expectation that it would be capable of supporting the loads required by grab bars, the court found them to lack support.  (1T29-23 to 31-4.)  As for [...]’s opinion that the “defective installation” of the towel rack “was responsible for the harm caused to the plaintiff,” the court noted that the bathtub’s size did not violate any standard or regulation, and no code required the installation of a grab bar to help patrons in and out of the tub.  (1T30-20 to 31-15.)  At bottom, [...] fails to give any analysis that a grab bar was required, where it was required, where it was supposed to be installed, at what height it was supposed to be installed, where it was supposed to be located on the wall, which wall it was supposed to be located on, and why.  He’s applying codes and regulations that don’t apply to a towel bar, to a towel bar in an effort to say that the towel bar I guess should have been a grab bar, and that’s really what his opinion is, but he - - he cites nothing that says that was required.  [(1T31-22 to 32-24.)]  Accordingly, because [...]’s opinion was a net opinion, it could not be utilized to defeat defendant’s summary judgment motion.  (1T32-19 to 24.)  On the undisputed facts, plaintiff did not prove that defendant was negligent in any way:
[brief] [...]’s bank records from 2016-2017 establish clearly that $210,000.00 of his $255,000.00 breach of contract claim has been filed within six years of the lawsuit.  (Volume I, Pa. 1-6; Volume III, Pa. 405-415).  [...] and [...] repeated promises to pay [...] the amounts he was owed on January 15, 2015, March 13, 2015, April 14, 2016, December 2, 2017 and February 22, 2019 are sufficient to justify an equitable estoppel claim as the conduct of the defendants is identical to the conduct of the defendants in Price v. New Jersey Manufacturers Co. 182 N.J. 519, 524 (2005) and W.V Pangborne & Co. vs. New Jersey Dept.of Transp., 116, N.J. 543,558-562 (1989) because the promises led [...] to believe that a formal lawsuit was not necessary to receive payment of his full salaries.
[brief] Like many companies, [...] offers its services through a contract, and it limits access to its services to users who agree to those Terms of Use.  [...] periodically updates its Terms of Use, and when it does it asks users to read and agree to the new terms.  For several years now, those Terms have included (among other things) a clear, conspicuous, and unambiguous agreement between [...] and its users that most disputes arising between them will be resolved through binding arbitration rather than in court.
[brief] By virtue of the foregoing arguments and authorities, Defendant/Appellant [...] respectfully submits that this Court should reverse the September 22, 2023 Order denying his motion to vacate default judgment, and remand this matter to the Law Division for further proceedings.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Counsel for the Defendant/Appellant /s/ [...]  [...]  OPPOSITION BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT TO APPELLANT’S APPEAL OF DENIAL OF MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT
[brief] (Da 34; Da 40 at 3:44:41 to 3:44:44)  Only after [...] pushed [...] to commit to a yes/no answer did [...] eventually respond, “Mmmmmm.  (Indiscernible).  Yes. ”  (Da 34; Da 40 at 3:44:44 to 3:45:03)  As the Supreme Court recognized in Henderson, “[c]onfirmatory feedback can distort memory”; thus, a witness’s confidence “must be recorded in the witness’[s] own words before any possible feedback.
[brief] See Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div. 2001).  \(^5\)  [...] asserts that "[c]ompressor stations, also known as pumping stations, compress natural gas by raising the pressure to 'push' gas through the pipeline."  It explains the gas in the pipeline "enters a series of scrubbers and strainers, is compressed by the compressor, cooled and then continues through the pipeline until it is delivered to a customer or reaches the next compressor station." station on the same site.  [...] contends the East 300 Upgrade Project is necessary to "increase the capacity" of its existing pipeline system and "to respond to the request of" [...] for 115,000 dekatherms per day of firm transportation capacity for its customers in Westchester County.
[brief] Here, there are several claims set forth in the Petition that constitute substantive attacks to the legislation.  (Pa22-25.)  First, there is an issue that the Legislature has violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing on the Court’s province to interpret the laws and Constitution.  Cf. N.J. Const. art. III with art. IV.  The statute was enacted to codify constitutional rights, but in doing so, the Legislature overstepped its authority by declaring constitutional rights.  While the Legislature can start the process for a constitutional amendment, it cannot usurp the Supreme Court’s power under the Constitution to declare constitutional rights.  As [...] stated in asking for her colleagues to pass the bill, the goal to the legislation is “to codify case law to protect the fundamental right to reproductive choice for all New Jerseyans.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the right to abortion under our state constitution.  What this bill does is provide every New Jerseyan with a clear affirmation of the right to reproductive healthcare. ”  (Pa276-77 at 8:23-9:6.)  [...] noted that the bill was unnecessary: “we absolutely, probably, don’t need to do anything legislatively because our courts have reaffirmed what our state constitutions already put in plain language that women have a determination – a self-determination over the dominion of their bodies. ”  (Pa278-79 at 10:25-11:5.)  But [...] then explained the Senate’s rationale for the bill – to protect against a future Supreme Court that chooses not to follow stare decisis:  “all [the bill] does is make sure that the law that already exists in the state prior to this bill passed today continues to be the law regardless of what any future Supreme Court does. ”  (Pa290 at 22:5-11; see also Pa300-01 at 8:21-9:4.)  As [...] noted, the bill is “a little aggressive in its reading of the Supreme Court decisions. ”  (Pa301 at 9:14-23.)  This balance of power issue should be substantively addressed by the trial court in the event that the statute is not voided, and the remedy is a remand given the limited nature of this Court’s original jurisdiction.
[brief] In ensuring equal footing, it must similarly cover a public entity’s decision to maintain standards and practices across different bid solicitations; doing otherwise would justify accusations of “favoritism, improvidence, extravagance and corruption. ”  See Muirfield, 336 N.J. Super. at 137-38 (“Both the public interest and the public's perception that the bidding process is fair, competitive and trustworthy are critical components and objectives of our public bidding statutes”).  Moreover, it cannot be that “sound business judgment” requires the entity facing an unsubmitted document to either (a) wait indefinitely for a potential cure; or (b) take on the additional administrative burden of obtaining necessary information from third parties for the benefit neglectful bidders.  Additionally, emphasizing the expenditure of additional funds on a particular project to mandate waiver, as the trial court did here, risks swallowing the granted discretion.  Limiting the factors considered to those that guide whether a defect is material, as the trial court also did here, would have the same effect.  If a bid defect must be waived where the defect is not material and non-waiver will result in additional expenditure, there is no discretion to waive non-material defects.
[brief] ORDERS NOVEMBER 17, 2023  ORDER OF THE HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER ........................................................................................................ CA1 OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER OF THE HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER ........  CA2 OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER OF THE HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C.  DENYING MOTION TO INTERVENE  .........................  CA3A  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 348, 159 A.2d 146, 154 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960)  .................................................................10  Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 227, 233 A.3d 536, 541 (2020)  ...............7 N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272, 291, 181 A.3d 257, 268 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018)  .........................................................5  Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 605, 110 A.3d 19, 27 (2015)  ............7  Statutes N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-15 .........................................................................................4, 5 N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-16 .........................................................................................4  N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-17 .........................................................................................5 N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-2 .........................................................................................9  Respondent [...] (the “Bank”), through undersigned counsel, submits the following brief in response to the brief filed on behalf of Appellants [...] and [...] (together, the “[...]”).
[brief] Notably, the Plaintiff did not provide any expert testimony to counter the Applicant’s experts.  The Board reviewed the testimony of [...], who noted, in conjunction with the testimony of [...], how the application satisfied both the positive and negative criteria under (c)(2).  Specifically, [...] opined that the proposed development is consistent with other structures in the neighborhood and the design of the proposed buildings is set back 5 feet to provide for landscaping barriers from the street.  He noted this is a benefit to the adjacent property owners and provides for a streetscape that will not be a detriment.  The Court noted that [...]’s testimony addressed both the positive and negative criteria, as [...] noted that the property being located at the very southern end of the Borough as the “gateway” to the town (Pa67) and that the design sought to address the Borough’s “2009 Vision Plan” for revitalization which valued “branding” and “aesthetics improvements to promote [...] as a shore town” which were of particular note given the project’s location.
[brief] As for the third factor, proximity, [...]’s case took place in 2006, with the murder in 2004, and [...] was murdered in 2019.  There is no proximity to the crime or the case in defendant’s situation.  Factor four involves what would be required to present at trial to explain the issue adequately, and here, much extrinsic evidence and additional testimony would be needed to present both sides of why [...] was exonerated, as previously noted.  This flows into factor five, the prejudice, confusion of issues, and waste of time the evidence would present.  The evidence would have been cumulative in this case; the jury was already well aware that [...] admitted to fabricating testimony in the past.  They were also always going to know that [...] claimed he lied because of duress, regardless.  The effort required to provide the jury with the truth as to the defendant’s contention, that [...] was exonerated because of [...]’s testimony, would most certainly confuse the issues as trial, namely whether [...]’s testimony about defendant, not [...], was true, and would definitely waste time explaining things the jury was already aware of: that [...] admitted to fabricating testimony in the past.  Thus, even to assume that defendant’s case falls into the narrow category of cases covered by N.J.R.E. 608b(1), he still fails the analysis under Guenther and A.O.  Additionally, no Rule 104 hearing was necessary as there was no dispute that evidence of the prior false testimony can and should come in.
[brief] *Anco Products Corporation v. T.V. Products Corporation*, 23 N.J. Super 116 (App. Div. 1952) (quoting from *Held v. Comfort Bus Line, Inc.*, 136 N.J.L. 640, 641 (S. Ct. 1948); *William H. Burns International Detective Agency v. New Jersey Guards Union*, 64 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 1961); *Teamsters Local 11 v. Abad*, 135 N.J. Super 552 (Ch. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 144 N.J. Super 239 (App. Div. 1975); *Teamsters Local 560 v. Eazor Express, Inc.*, 95 N.J. 219 Super (App. Div. 1967).  In reviewing labor arbitration awards, Courts must rely on the factual findings of arbitrators, not on a review of pleadings, hearing transcripts and exhibits.  As The Third Circuit recognizes, “a court is precluded from overturning an award for errors in assessing the credibility of witnesses, in the weight accorded their testimony, or in the determination of factual issues”.  *NF&M v. Steelworkers*, 524 F. 2d 756, 759 (3d Cir. 1975); see also, *Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc.*, 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987) (holding that “improvident, even silly, factfinding” is “hardly a sufficient basis for disregarding what the agent appointed by the parties determined to be the historical facts”).  Accordingly, in reviewing the Arbitration Award at issue in the instant appeal, this Court should rely on the facts as found by the Arbitrator in his Award (Pa 19-40; 57-61), rather than the facts argued by the Authority or any extraneous exhibits presented.
[brief] Conclusion .............................................................................................................................18 Table of Authorities A.M.S. v. M.L.S., No. A-1905-19, 2021 WL 3197768 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 29, 2021) ..................................................................................................................2 Clarke v. Clarke ex rel. Costine, 359 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2003) .......................16 Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334 (1966) ........................................................................9 Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342 (1954) ..................................................................................10 Curry v. Curry, 108 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 1970) ......................................................9 Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563 (1980) ...............................................................................2 Gnall v. Gnall, 222 NJ. 414 (2015) ....................................................................................2 Hous. Auth. of Town of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274 (1994) .................................9 Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88 (2007) .......................................................6 Karel v. Davis, 122 N.J. Eq. 526 (1937) ...........................................................................10 Marder v. Realty Const. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div.), aff'd, 43 N.J. 508 (1964) .................................................................................................................................9 Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div. 2012) .............................................16 Penn Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Joyce, 75 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 1962) .................................................................................................................................10 State v. Womack, 145 N.J. 576 (1996) ...............................................................................9 Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2008) ..............................................16 Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2000) .........................................................16 ARGUMENT REPLY BRIEF - NOTHING RAISED BY RESPONDENT WARRANTS DENYING [...] RELIEF ON HER APPEAL