ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa352a.  The prior accidents, however, are all factually distinct from the July 11, 2014 accident.  Pa369a-91a.  More specifically, the prior accidents are: (1) a [...] employee was fatally injured in September 2003 when a milling machine tipped over onto him during a runway resurfacing project at Newark Airport; (2) a dump truck driver, who was not a [...] employee, was fatally injured in October 2004 when he got out of his vehicle and was struck by a water truck driven by a [...] employee on a milling/paving project; (3) A New Jersey Department of Transportation inspector was injured in October 2008 when he was struck by a truck driven by a non-[...] employee on a milling/paving project; and (4) a nuclear thickness surveyor and non-[...] employee was injured in August 2010 when she was struck by a pickup truck driven by a [...] employee on a milling/paving project.
[brief] (Ab14).  But, as the Commissioner properly concluded, the Law’s plain language does not support such a broad public access exemption, which would be contrary to the clear, ____________________ 7  To the extent the 2016 CAFRA amendment is relevant at all, it is because that statutory language is limited by the feasibility concept, rather than by any common law public trust doctrine limits.  See N.J.S.A. 13:19-10(h) (requiring “off-site public access” if the DEP determines “on-site public access is not feasible as determined by the department. ”).  expansive legislative design.
[brief] Then, [...] switches subjects and turns his attention to plaintiffs’ other damage claims, asking a series of rhetorical questions:  “The other claims: loss of a rental opportunity, having to regrade, costs incurred as a result.  Now again, you know, you think of medical records, right?  What does everybody know you are going to do on a personal injury case, if you want to get those medical bills, right?  You really should get a doctor to look at the bills and say and issue a two-sentence report, I have reviewed these bills and these bills are reasonably priced, cost out, consistent with certain guidelines and all bills incurred as set forth were a result of the injuries suffered in the accident on so and so a date.  So, but again, to get those legal bills, were they all related to the elevation issue or were they related to [...] as a developer pushing the envelope in other areas?
[brief] On November 9, 2023, the Land Use Hearing Officer for the Land Use Regulation and Enforcement Division of the [...] submitted a Report and Recommendation to the Members of the [...], recommending denial of the Application based on issues relative to off-site traffic, notwithstanding that a planning agency does not have authority to deny a development application for a permitted use because of off-site traffic conditions.  (Aa228).  The Hearing Officer acknowledged that the [...] Development Rules do not require a loading space for commercial uses less than 10,000 square feet, and that several pre-existing, non-conforming conditions at the Property were not exacerbated or impacted by the development proposal; nonetheless, the Hearing Officer took issue with the traffic concerns expressed by the objectors and the proposed loading space in connection with the recommendation for denial.  (Aa228, Aa234-Aa235a).  On March 19, 2024, without hearing any further input or evidence from the Applicant in response to the Hearing Officer’s recommendation, the [...] adopted [...], “Approving the Denial of an Application for Minor Site Plan Approval with Variances Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) to Permit the Operation of a Class 5 Dispensary for the Sale of Adult Use Recreational Cannabis at the Subject Property  Located at [...], Block 158, Lot 3.01, in the City of [...] Under [...] (the “Denial”).  (Aa236).  Public notice of the [...]’s Denial was dated April 9, 2024 and published on April 13, 2023.  This appeal now follows, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 19:66-17.2(a).
[brief] [Pa5–10]  3  Plaintiffs attempt to introduce factual claims and materials that were never raised before the Superior Court prior to the entry of the January Consent Order compelling arbitration under the Contract.  For example, none of the materials from the following appendix pages were before the Superior Court at the time of the Consent Order: [Pa166–73; 2 Pa 181–258].  And Plaintiffs’ factual assertions about the interaction between [...] and Plaintiffs (see Pa1) were never before the Superior Court, nor was any such evidence to support these assertions ever presented to the Superior Court (nor was there any need for such evidence as *Plaintiffs agreed to the January Consent Order*).  To the extent Plaintiffs are (improperly) seeking review of the January Consent Order, such factual claims and irrelevant materials should be struck from the appellate record.  See R. 2:5-4(a); see also *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 45 n. 8 (2015) (discussing that on appeal only records presented to the trial court are to be considered).  the January Consent Order.  At bottom, Plaintiffs have provided no argument supporting their position that [...]’s arbitration provision is unenforceable. \(^4\)  2.  **The Contract’s arbitration provisions are valid under the FAA and NJAA.**
[brief] If either of the defendants were denied due process under the law, the court must vacate the Final Judgment by Default ordered on 5/4/2015.  The Plaintiff’s-Respondent Brief failed to respond to the Pre-Judgment Certification Errors, undeniable facts in the Court Records, identified in the Defendants’- Appellant Brief.  The defendant, [...], [...] was a virtual mail only address, not the company’s place of business.  No officer or employee ever worked at that address, so it was impossible for the Process Server to serve papers on an authorized agent of Cimple.  The Plaintiff’s Request to Enter the Default and his Proof of Mailing dated 3/23/2015 (Pa-16) was sent to an address that no longer existed, closed for ten (10) months.  And, the Plaintiff’s Request for the Final Judgment by Default and his Proof of Mailing dated 4/29/2015 (Pa-17) was again sent to an address that no longer existed, closed for more than ten (10) months.  Also in the Defendants’- Appellant Brief, the defendant, [...], the Plaintiff’s Request to Enter the Default and his Proof of Mailing dated 3/23/2015 (Pa-16), were wrongly sent to the 116 Village Address – not to the defendant’s home address at [...], which was the known address used by the Plaintiff on the Complaint and on the Summons.  And, the Plaintiff’s Request for the Final Judgment by Default and his Proof of Mailing dated 4/29/2015 (Pa-17) was again sent to the wrong address of [...] – not to the defendant’s home address of [...], used by the Plaintiff on the Complaint and on the Summons.  These factual undeniable certification errors in the trial court record are UNDISPUTED by the Plaintiff’s-Respondent Brief, which are grounds for Final Judgment by Default to be vacated by this court, because the defendants were denied due process under the law.
[brief] (1T70).  She stated that she called “Master Control” in order to inform them about these updates.  (1T70).  She was transferred to [...] and the two talked about their previous radio communications.  (1T73).  [...] stated that he responded twice, and [...] stated that she did not hear the responses.  (1T73).  [...] then stated:  Sarge, you said you responded to me twice and I didn’t respond back and you also said you told me to call 2310 and I didn’t call.  . . .  Not for nothing, I’m not trying to be funny, but you don’t think maybe there was a reason?  Maybe you should come and check and see what was going on in the area?¹ [(1T73). ]  Looking back on the conversation, [...] testified that:  We had a rapport and I just was asking a question.  I didn’t feel that I was doing or think that I was doing anything wrong.  I was just asking a question.  I wasn’t challenging him or I didn’t mean to make him feel that I was challenging him, but it could have been a misunderstanding.  [(1T74). ]  Thereafter, [...] went to the Medical Department in order to speak with [...] further.  (1T75).  [...] testified that she was respectful throughout the conversation, but that [...] got upset and raised his voice.  (1T76-78).  [...] testified that she left the area in order to “diffuse the situation.
[brief] [...] WAS ENROLLED IN THE CCIP WHEN THE HOOD [...]IDENT OCCURRED  A.  [...] WAS ENROLLED IN THE CCIP AND WAS A NAMED INSURED UNDER THE CCIP POLICY AT THE TIME OF THE [...]IDENT  [...] and [...] first claim that [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the accident, Pb17-27, but their arguments are easily rebutted.  First, [...] and [...] point to the language of the Certificate of Liability Insurance received by [...], which states that it confers no rights upon the holder.  [...] Db25.  To the contrary, according to the CCIP governing documents, the Certificate of Insurance meant that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP.  See, e.g., CCIP Manual (Pa586, an “enrolled contractor” was one that has “been accepted into the CCIP as evidenced by a Certificate of Insurance”; Pa588, “Enrollment will be established only upon issuance by the Program Administrator of a CCIP Certificate of Insurance to the Participating Subcontractor”); Cover Letter (Pa618, “The attached insurance certificate is provided to evidence your coverage for … General Liability, and Excess/Umbrella while working at the [...]….”); Notice of Subcontract Award (Pa424, “that “[n]o hired tier sub may commence work until they are properly enrolled into the Wrap-up program, as evidenced by a Certificate of Insurance provided by the Wrap-up Administrator. ”).  Upon issuance of the Certificate of Insurance, [...] was thus enrolled in the CCIP and covered for policy period August 3, 2015 to December 23, 2018 under [...]’s and [...]’s CCIP Policy and [...]’s Workers Compensation Policy.
[brief] During the course of evaluating [...]’s pharmacy school for accreditation, the [...] expressed concern that the Master’s portion of the [...] dual degree program not compromise pharmacy education and recommended a high standard of performance in the pharmacy courses before a student be permitted to take on the added burden of dual degree requirements.  ([...] Dep. T99:19-T103:4 at Pa.364-65).  To assuage [...] concerns, [...] had set a 3.0 GPA at the conclusion of the first year of study in pharmacy as the requirement for entry into the dual degree program.
[brief] Although the [...] advised that the wrap-up policy was cancelled for coverage on the wrap-up, this contradicts the enrollment papers you provided us.  [Dta1323.]  [...] responded:  [A]re you clear that there was a small portion of work in the beginning that was not covered and then they issued the insurance policy and CCIP policy for the remaining work WHICH was for the period that the accident happened?  [Dta1322 (emphasis supplied). ]  On October 18, 2018, [...]’s insurance broker advised [...] for the first time that [...] cancelled [...]’s workers compensation policy:
[brief] On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  Pa27.  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  Pa76.  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  Pa78.  No “close date” appears on the document.  Pa78.  On or about August 9, 2019, a postcard was allegedly sent to [...].  Pa14.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.
[brief] Further, it completely disregarded that under the statute there was a mechanism for [...] to seek exemptions from various requirements of the Ordinance, which mechanism [...] chose not to avail.  Instead, the court either speculated that an exemption would not be granted for this project, or that other feasible designs for the connection (e.g., lesser pole heights, routes through other parts of [...], or even underground lines) were not capable of being approved under the Ordinance.  As such, any declaration of invalidity of portions of the Ordinance was premature – any application for exemptions from certain requirements had not yet been made or denied, and hence one cannot say that the Ordinance could never be validly applied to power transmission lines.
[brief] A trial judge improperly “depart[s] from that well-established rule” when she enters the province of the jury and determines the admissibility of evidence under the guise of “authentication” by actually weighing its credibility -- “a determination that we have consistently held is within the jury’s, rather than the judge’s, province. ”  *State v. Marrocelli*, 448 N.J. Super. 349, 365-366 (App. Div. 2017).  Similarly, evidence is “relevant” under *N.J.R.E.* 401, and hence admissible under *N.J.R.E.* 402, unless barred by another rule, if it merely has “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action."
[brief] (Pa421).  Plaintiff raised the following legal arguments: (1)  The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify; (2) Flaws in the statement of reasons; (3) The complaint did not allege interference with contractual relations was without justification or excuse; (4)  A modern pleading of an intentional wrong inherently carries the potential for recovery under the lesser thesis of a negligent injury; (5)  The allegations underlying the harassment count are vague and undefinable, and such ambiguity triggers coverage; (6)  The allegations underlying the complaint arise directly from the parties condominium relationship; (7)  The doctrine of reasonable expectations; (8)  Pre-Discovery dismissal denies Plaintiff’s right to demonstrate basis of relief; (9)  The Court failed to consider extrinsic evidence including video evidence which contradicts the statements made by the property manager; (10)  The Court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because the reasoning is inconsistent with the Order dated August 3, 2018 which dismissed the harassment claim.  (Pa421 – Pa431).  On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff submitted reply brief and requested oral argument to present video evidence.
[brief] ”) (emphasis added).  In this case, defense counsel merely failed to object to the impermissible references in the interrogation video.  Before trial, defense counsel noted to the court that he was still reviewing the interrogation video for redactions.  (6T 9-5 to 15)  Then, when the State introduced the video at trial, the court asked, “[w]e’re good with the editing?” and both parties replied “[y]es. ”  (7T 167-7 to 9)  As the State observed, defense counsel’s words were “consistent with his failure to object at any time to the mentions of [[...]’s] unrelated arrests left in” the video.  (Pb 28)  (emphasis added)  But, as stated above, the failure to object compels a plain error analysis, and does not constitute invited error.  And, without a limiting instruction from the court, admission of this evidence created the distinct risk that the jury would believe that [...] had a propensity to commit crimes, unfairly influencing the jury’s verdict.
[brief] Tchikindas v. Basser-Kaufman Management Corp., 2021 WL 1749961 (App. Div.) .......................................................... 39, 45  The Palisades at Fort Lee Condominium Association v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427 (2017) ............................................. 55, 56  Younger v. Kracke, 236 N.J. Super. 595 (Law Div. 1989) ...............  49
[brief] DIVISION-CRIMINAL PART, ESSEX COUNTY ([...]); CRIMINAL ACTION; SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C.; SUBMITTED: JUNE 11, 2024; DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Dear Honorable Judges:  Please accept this reply letter brief ¹ on behalf of [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Reply to Counterstatement of Procedural History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Drb2  ¹  On the brief: [...] (# 030401994; [...]).  Of counsel: [...] (#031811995), [...].
[brief] Following an incident on September 12, 2022, Warren Township Animal Control Officer [...] ("ACO" or "Hensley") issued two summonses to Defendant.  [...] cited a violation of Ordinance 6-5 (dog at large).  Da14.  The ACO wrote only the following on [...]: “Potentially Dangerous Dog,” “N.J.S.A. 4:19-23,” and “September 12, 2022. ”  Da15.  The Summons failed to describe the factual basis of the offense, nor did it specify whether section 4:19-23a.(1) or 4:19–23a.(2) applied.  The potential consequences of a guilty plea were explored in a pretrial hearing on January 3, 2023.  1T4:21-1T8:1.  On January 13, 2023, counsel submitted to the court a witness list and proposed evidence.  (Da16).  Trial was held before Hon. [...], J.M.C. in Warren Municipal Court on February 7, March 7, and March 14, 2023¹.  On March 14, 2023, the court found Defendant guilty of B.O. 6-5 and that [...] is potentially dangerous.  4T65-89.  The ruling was memorialized in an order dated March 24, 2023, (Da113) and an amended order on April 4, 2023, allowing a Humane Law Enforcement Officer to inspect Defendant’s property because the ACO declined to do so.  Da123.  The Court also mandated that [...] be tattooed with the P.D.D. registration number “in a prominent location” as ¹The transcript of the pretrial hearing on January 3, 2023 is 1T; Transcripts of the three trial dates are 2T (2/7), 3T (3/7), and 4T (3/14).  Transcript of the trial de novo on August 3, 2023 is 5T. per N.J.S.A. 4:19-24.  Da123.  He denied Defendant’s motion to stay the tattoo provision pending appeal.  Da123, 4T84:7-9.  Judge Taddeo also ordered that [...] undergo temperament testing as a condition of being released from impound “to make sure that the dog hasn't run itself nuts in six months” and that [...] must “have a clean bill of health from a psychological standpoint for a dog. ”  4T89:1-14.  See also, Da 116, Da126.  The parties agreed to use [...] of [...].  She rendered a written report on March 27, 2023.  Da117.  Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court, Criminal Division, on or about March 17, 2023.
[brief] In support of Her Honor’s decision to award punitive damages, [...] found that the [...]’ actions “were much more than a breach of fiduciary duty and a breach of contract;” “they evidence[d] deliberate and intentional misconduct, and misconduct made with the specific intent of taking money from [...] and taking money from [...];” their actions were “a violent violation of our common [law] and our statutory law;” “there was actual malice here, . . . there was an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil minded act. ”  235T60:9-10, 235T61:10-14, 235T87:3-5, 235T73:1-3, 235T70:21-23.  The [[...]] … take the position that there isn’t any outrageous conduct here, that it’s just simply a breach of fiduciary duty and a breach of contract.
[brief] A parent's right to parental autonomy is recognized as “a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution” that is “rooted in the right to privacy. ”  *Moriarty, supra*, 177 N.J. at 101, 827 A.2d 203; *see also* *N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R.*, 205 N.J. 17, 38, 11 A.3d 844 (2011); *Watkins* v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 245, 748 A.2d 558 (2000); V.C., supra, 163 N.J. at 218, 748 A.2d 539.  Tortorice v. Vanartsdalen, 422 N.J. Super. 242, 248 (App. Div. 2011).  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has a substantive component which “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests” including the right “to direct the education and upbringing of one's children…”  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).  This right encompasses parents’ “fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of” their children including “decisions concerning the care, custody and control of” their children.
[brief] Plaintiff decedent retained liability expert, [...], PE, an electrical engineer with [...], to offer opinions about the subject panelboard directory.  Winter opined that the directory was non-compliant with electrical code and OSHA regulations, and was a direct cause of [...]’s death.  (Pa0205).  In his report, Winter explained that the importance of disconnecting devices being “legibly identified as to its clear, evident and specific purpose or use. ” (Pa0204).  Based on Winter’s examination of the above photographs, Winter concluded that the panelboard which fed the subject emergency light was not code or regulation compliant.  (Pa0210-0211).  In his report, Winter explained the importance of having a circuit breaker “legibly identified as to its clear, evident and specific purpose or use”:  Under that condition, even trial and error testing, by turning off and on random circuit breakers, would not have informed [...] as to whether the fixture was de-energized.  Under such circumstances, [...] would have needed to open the fixture and to use a tick tracer or multimeter to determine if the fixture was actually turned off.  The use of such devices required [...] to first disassemble the fixture: a potentially fatal task.  (Pa0205).  This is exactly the scenario that occurred in this case.  Here, [...] was found by a co-worker lying on his back on the scissor lift, unresponsive.  “Live” black cables connected to the emergency light fixture, carrying 277 Volts of electric power, were found dangling near his body.  (Pa0210-0211).  Winter concludes that the non-compliant panelboard was unreasonably dangerous in a manner that created the perfect storm that caused [...]’s death.  (Pa0211-0212).  The opinions offered by Winter are unrebutted.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] ”  The Court then went on to rule that the plaintiffs were estopped to make their claims as a result of their failure to act timely.  The Court’s estoppel discussion, which is often repeated in later reported cases, follows:  “The essential principle of the policy of estoppel here is invoked is one that may, by voluntary conduct, be precluded from taking a course of action that would work injustice and wrong to one who with good reason and in good faith has relied upon such conduct …  An estoppel by matter in pais may arise by silence or omission where one is under a duty to speak or act…  It has to do with the inducement of conduct to action or nonaction.  One’s act or acceptance may close his mouth to allege or prove the truth.  ..  The doing or forbearing to do an act induced by the conduct of another may work an estoppel to avoid wrong or injury ensuing from reasonable reliance upon such conduct.  The repudiation of one’s act done or position assumed is not permissible where that course would work an injustice too another who, having the right to do so, has relied thereon…  An estoppel arises where a man is precluded and forbidden by law to speak against his own act or deed; yea, even though it is to say the truth. ”  19 NJ at 503-504 (Internal citations omitted).  [...] should be deemed to be estopped to assert their claims.