ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT  I DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE MEANING AND VALIDITY OF N.J.S.A. 39:4-126  WARRANT CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT.  IN ADDITION, NEITHER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE NOR THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY THE STATE INDICATES THAT A MOTORIST MUST SIGNAL PRIOR TO CHANGING LANES.  In his initial brief, [...] argued that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 does not require a motorist to signal a lane change because a lane change is not a “turn” within the meaning of the statute.
[brief] 2  ALI Principles, supra, comment d to P7.22, at 306.  There is no single or universal method to determine ‘fair value’”.  Here, the Chancery Court chose [...]’s 2018 ‘net asset value’, to constitute “fair value” in the amount opined by Plaintiff’s expert, [...],.  (Da3208)  It was not required to choose [...]’s book value to constitute its opinion of fair value.  Plaintiffs’ next argument, that ‘tax book value’ could be considered ‘fair value’ in certain cases, also does not mean [...] was bound to their methodology.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has described the Act as a “historic trade-off whereby employees relinquished their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to certain, but reduced, benefits whenever they suffered injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. ”  Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449, 458 (2012) (quoting Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 174 (1985)).  The immunity provided to employers under the Act can be overcome only if the facts satisfy the statutory exception for an “intentional wrong. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  That exception may be satisfied upon a showing by a plaintiff employee that (1) the defendant employer knew that its actions were substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and (2) the resultant injury and circumstances in its infliction on the employee were (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the legislature intended the Workers’ Compensation Act to immunize.  Kibler v. Roxbury Bd. of Educ., 392 N.J. Super. 45, 53 (2007) (citing Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., 170 N.J. 602, 617 (2002)).  As shown herein, Plaintiff failed to present facts or evidence to satisfy the “intentional wrong” exception to the immunity provided by the Act, and thus, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in [...]’s favor.
[brief] ........................................................................................................48  | Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings Being Appealed | Page | |------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order in Aid of Litigant's Rights filed Aug. 8, 2023 | 001a | | Order filed Nov. 10, 2020 .............................................. | 005a | | [...] Report Dated Oct 19, 2020 ................. | 009a | | Order Awarding [...] Attorney Fees & Delay Penalty filed Dec. 19, 2023 | 021a | ## Table of Authorities ### Cases - **Aldrich v. Schwartz**, 258 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1991) ...........................................
[brief] It is the State’s position that the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed and that his request for remand for resentencing should be denied on these grounds.  Respectfully Submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Cc: [...], Esq. (Sent via eCourts Appellate)  August 6, 2024  AUSTIN J. HOWARD  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 390232021  Of Counsel and on the Letter-Brief  SUPPLEMENTAL LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] Appellants contend that the tax lien foreclosure of [...] (the “Property”) represented an unconstitutional taking under Tyler v. Hennepin County, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (May 25, 2023).  The lower court refused to allow Appellants to raise Tyler, and in so doing committed reversible error.  While acknowledging Tyler, the lower court made it clear that in its view Tyler could not be applied retroactively because Appellants had not appealed the Final Judgment.  In its bench ruling on Appellants’ motion to reconsider, the court stated:  The only new so to speak argument made in this motion to vacate default judgment was the Tyler argument.  And based on the Hartford case, I am going to deny that as the sole basis to vacate the default judgment when the time for appeal of the order has very clearly passed.  3T, p. 98.  The lower court made this ruling on November 15, 2023, prior to the publication of 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super 339 (December 4, 2023), which ultimately endorsed retroactive application of Tyler to pending cases.  Appellants ask this Court to reverse the lower court on the basis that the Appellants’ claims are squarely within the “pipeline” of pending cases as defined in Roberto and thus the tax lien foreclosure herein was unequivocally a taking.  The hard rule invoked by the lower court, i.e., that the “pipeline” is only open as to matters where a timely appeal is pending, is specifically rejected by Roberto.  Post-Roberto case law establishes that a case is within the “pipeline” so as to be eligible for retroactive relief under Tyler when there is a pending timely motion to vacate a final judgment, as here.  Plaintiff-Appellee [...] (“[...]”) and Intervenor [...] (“[...]”) claim that [...] is entitled to the shield of bona fide purchaser for value (“BFP”) status.  Inquiry into this defense of [...] was invited by [...] in the April 3, 2023 Order where he indicated that while he would have been predisposed to vacate the Final Judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f) as to [...], the intervention of [...] made the “prejudice to the other party” factor more difficult to determine if [...] was truly a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
[brief] ”  Pa13.  After Plaintiffs initiated this action via Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause, filed an Amended Complaint, and the parties briefed the matter, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint without prejudice for failure to have the Complaint verified by one of the Plaintiffs.  Pa14.  Following that dismissal without prejudice, on September 15, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint that was properly verified pursuant to the court’s October 23, 2015 Order.  The Second Amended Complaint contains one count relating to OPRA.
[brief] On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff, [...], as Administrator Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of [...], deceased, filed a Complaint sounding in negligence in Cumberland County against [...] and [...].  (2a).  Both Defendants were served on August 18, 2023; however, neither Defendant filed an Answer within the requisite period of time.  (47a and 49a).  Thus, on September 29, 2023, Plaintiff requested that default be entered against both Defendants and on October 11, 2023, the Trial Court entered default and scheduled a Proof Hearing for November 9, 2023.  (52a and 53a).  On November 7, 2023, Defendants’ Counsel requested that Plaintiff enter into a Consent Order to vacate the default against Defendants.  Plaintiff’s Counsel agreed to vacate the default and on November 8, 2023, the Trial Court granted the Consent Order approving same.  (55a).  Thereafter, on November 17, 2023, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint.  (16a).  On February 5, 2024, Plaintiff responded to all of Defendants’ discovery requests.  (57a).  To date, Defendants have failed to respond to any of Plaintiff’s discovery requests.  Then, on April 12, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice for failure to submit an Affidavit of Merit.  (27a).  On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Answer for Failure to Answer Discovery.  (36a).  On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel filed a sworn statement excusing the Affidavit of Merit requirement for Defendant’s failure to send requisite medical records.  (59a).  On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit of Merit and Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.  (61a and 63a).  Defendants’ Counsel failed to timely file opposition and reply papers to Plaintiff’s Motion and opposition, which led to them requesting an adjournment of the May 10th Motion Hearing.  Nevertheless, on May 10, 2024, the Trial Court heard oral argument on Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s Motions.  At the aforementioned Motion Hearing, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice and further, Judge Swift found Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Answer to be moot.  (84a and 86a).  The transcript of oral argument and decision on the Motions to Dismiss were filed separately with this Court on June 24, 2024.  (91a).  A Notice of Appeal was filed on behalf of Plaintiff, [...], as Administrator Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of [...], deceased, on May 20, 2024.  (87a).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994) ## APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ### Appendix Volume I (1a – 181a) | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| | Complaint, August 11, 2022 | 1a – 72a | | Answer & Counterclaim, September 16, 2022 | 73a – 152a | | Reconsideration Order & Opinion, April 28, 2023 | 153a – 159a| | Clarification Order, June 9, 2023 | 160a – 161a| | Order/Opinion Motion to Dismiss Failure to State Claim, February 17, 2023| 162a – 168a| | Order/Opinion Granting X-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim Only February 17, 2023 | 169a – 175a| | Amended Notice of Appeal | 176a – 180a| | Proof of Transcript | 181a | ### Appendix Volume II (182a – 331a) #### Unpublished Decisions | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| | Lacey Bd. of Ed. v. NJ Dept. of Ed., Dkt. EDU 8659-98, Init’l. Dec. Nov. 30, 2004 | 182a – 191a| | Lacey Bd. of Ed. v. NJ Dept. of Ed., Dkt. EDU 8659-98, Comm’r. Dec. Nov. 30, 2004 | 192a – 195a| | Lakewood Bd. of Ed. v. NJ Dept. of Ed., Dkt. EDU 8816-98, Init’l. Dec. Apr. 12, 1999 | 196a – 207a| | Lakewood Bd. of Ed. v. NJ Dept. of Ed., Dkt. EDU 8816-98, Init’l. Dec. Apr. 12, 1999 | 208a – 210a|  Certification of Superintendent [...] in support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment & Opposition to Summary Judgment, Jan. 17, 2023  211a – 231a  Legislative Records of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 232a – 266a  *  Please Note that any highlighted text was either highlighted previously in the original form or was highlighted in the form submitted to the trial court.  Thus, Appellant is incapable of removing the highlighted text.  No text has been highlighted after the fact for this appeal.  *  Board’s Response to [...]’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, Feb. 7, 2023 267a – 272a  [...]’s Response to Board’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, Feb. 7, 2023 273a – 275a  Board’s May 8, 2023, Letter Seeking Clarification Undisputed Facts, Feb. 7, 2023  276a  Certification of Counsel for Motion for Clarification  277a – 278a  *Board’s Service of Second Set of Interrogatories & Notice To Produce Records, May 12, 2023 279a – 331a
[brief] She had thus committed violations of the Act.  [...] specifically found that Respondent had held herself out as a member of the Board on her Facebook page.  (Ca021, Ca032, Ca034).  [...] stated:  It is undisputed that Respondent used her Facebook account as a platform for her election to the Board.  It is also undisputed that she also used it to publicize that she had been elected to the Board and was a sworn member.  It is this very same public platform that she used post-election to reach this same constituency – however, now she used it as a sitting Board member which carries greater weight, to promote action that was contrary to the Boards’ obligations under the law.
[brief] a.  The Parties, Emerson Station Redevelopment Project, And Off-site Units  Interested party  [...] (“[...]” or the “Redeveloper”) is the designated redeveloper of Block 419, Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.01, 6.02, 7, 8, 9 and 10, on the tax map of Emerson, New Jersey, (“Emerson Station”), which consists of a four-story, 147-unit, mixed use inclusionary development for property located on Kinderkamack Road with Borough of Emerson.  178a, 183a.  As part of Emerson Station, [...] has constructed twenty-two low-and-moderate-income affordable housing units on site and will construct seven units off-site (the “Off-site Units”), for a total of twenty-nine units, 183a ¶ g, representing the majority of Emerson’s court ordered Mount Laurel obligations, 242a (“RDP of 53 units”).  Through the end of 2018, Emerson’s elected representatives were required to confront satisfaction of Emerson’s longstanding deficient affordable housing obligations pursuant to the Mount Laurel doctrine.  22a, 367a, 422a.  They developed an agreement to build affordable housing with [...], 115a, reached a settlement with [...] (“[...]”), 163a, a Supreme Court-designated interested party in affordable housing litigation, and obtained a --- 2  This brief refers to appellant’s appendix as “__a. ” judgment, 240a.  Emerson selected a location for the Off-site Units, across the street from Emerson Station, on Block 610, Lot 1 (the “Off-site Property”), and instructed [...] to purchase the lot, which it did.  82a ¶ 10.  But as of January 1, 2019, a new administration was elected, led by Mayor [...], (“[...]”) who ran on an anti-affordable housing platform, vowing publicly to stop the Emerson Station project.  615a, 624a.  Over five years have passed since defendant Emerson finally adopted a plan that was accepted by the courts—after two decades of judicially recognized noncompliance—to provide a realistic opportunity for affordable housing.  240a.  Yet even now, the [...] administration has refused to hear [...]’s application for the Off-site Property selected by the prior administration, nor has it proposed to [...] or the special master any realistic alternative to bring itself into compliance with its constitutional obligations related to the Off-site Units.  293a.
[directive] Handgun Qualification Courses (HQC1 and HQC2).  (See Appendices A and B).  A Handgun Qualification Course must be completed two times a year for service handguns and for handguns authorized for use off duty and which are determined to be substantially different in design, function or caliber from the service handgun.  This determination is to be made by the agency executive or supervising firearms instructor.  Either course, HQC1 or HQC2, may be selected for qualification purposes.  9-13 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] For that proposition, [...] and the Chancery Court relied on Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995), which, in turn, cited Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987) for authority.  (Da25-26; ¶77; 1T71).  There, the Court stated the current rate, rather than the rate at the time the work was done, should be applied “[t]o take into account delay in payment” that exists in the typical contingency payment arrangement, particularly in civil rights or discrimination cases that involve fee shifting statutes.  Rendine, 141 N.J. at 337 (“We hold that the trial court, after having carefully established the amount of the lodestar fee, should consider whether to increase that fee to reflect the risk of nonpayment in all cases in which the attorney's compensation entirely or substantially is contingent on a successful outcome”); Delaware Valley 483 U.S. at 716 ("When plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees depends on success, their lawyers are not paid until a favorable decision finally eventuates, which may be years later, as in this case.  Meanwhile, their expenses of doing business continue and must be met.  In setting fees for prevailing counsel, the courts have regularly recognized the delay factor, either by basing the award on current rates or by adjusting the fee based on historical rates to reflect its present value."); see also; Ginsberg v. Bistricer, No. A-2194-10T3, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 497, at *26-27 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 7, 2012) ("Rendine indicates that when awarding attorneys’ fees under fee shifting statutes, the trial court should take into account the delay in payment, and award fees “based on current rates rather than those in effect when the services were performed. ”  Id. at 337.  The Rendine analysis is, however, generally limited to "setting fee awards in civil rights and discrimination cases, or other fee shifting contexts.") (citing Distefano v. Greenstone, 357 N.J. Super. 352, 362 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003))) (emphasis added).
[brief] The Property is bordered by [...] (“[...]”) to the northeast, and by retail shops to the south and west (also known as “[...]”).  The Property consists of 3,691.23 square feet of land with an existing structure consisting of approximately 4,800 square feet.  On or about May 2, 2023, Appellant submitted an application for Minor Site Plan with bulk variances to the [...], seeking approval for the development and operation of a Class 5 Retail Cannabis Dispensary (the “Project”) within the first floor of the existing multi-story structure located at the Property (the “Application”) (Aa34).
[directive] A County Prosecutor may designate any law enforcement officer to serve as an authorized CED or Less-Lethal Instructor within the countywide program under their jurisdiction.  11.4  For purposes of CED and Less-Lethal re-qualification ONLY, upon approval and designation of the respective County Prosecutor’s Office, municipal police officers and/or county sheriff’s officers may be trained as a “CED Re-Qualification Instructor” or “Less-Lethal Requalification Instructor” to administer re-qualification.  Training of any CED or Less-Lethal Re-Qualification Instructor shall be identical to the training requirements for Certified CED Instructors or Certified Less-Lethal Instructors.  Each respective County Prosecutor’s Office shall maintain a list of all CED and Less-Lethal Re-Qualification Instructors.  Re-Qualification Instructors shall not be authorized to conduct the initial training of officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal Device.
[brief] 11 State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162 (1993).........................................................  25 State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997)......................................................... 26, 27 State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 (1994)......................................................... 26 State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488 (1987).........................................................
[brief] There is no indication that plaintiffs made any effort and/or engaged in any due diligence to use [...]’s investigation information, including his two (2) reports, to identify [...] and to commence a timely action against [...].  At oral argument before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., on January 24, 2020 and again on February 14, 2020 in opposition to defendants/tenants’, including [...]’s, motion to dismiss based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations, plaintiffs’ counsel made the following representations:
[brief] Despite Appellant’s protestations, it is clear section 6.1 of the 1999 Agreement does not provide Appellant with a legally cognizable basis for its requested relief.  Where, as here, the Subject Property is not located in the Borough but the effluent merely flows therethrough to be treated at the Township’s sewerage treatment plants, what the Borough is entitled to is the “wheeling” fee.  Given the Subject Property is not located in the Borough, the Borough’s reliance on Section 6.1 of the 1999 Agreement is misplaced and does not provide for payment of the Connection Fee to Appellant as claimed by Appellant.  As such, the trial court correctly construed the 1999 Agreement to provide payment of the connection fees to the Township.  Further, the trial court correctly determined the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement entitles the Township to all connection fees.
[brief] Filgueiras v. Newark Pub. Sch., 426 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 2012); Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011).  The NJCRA has been interpreted analogously with § 1983 and New Jersey courts have routinely looked to cases analyzing § 1983 claims to assist in its interpretation and scope.  See e.g., Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 2012).  “Given their similarity, our courts apply § 1983 immunity doctrines to claims arising under the Civil Rights Act.
[brief] ” (T69:24-T70:5).  Thus, because [...] “never built a boardwalk[,] [t]hey can’t now say, well, we had a right to build a boardwalk there, never knowing what the boardwalk would have been, whether it be grade level, whether it would interfere with the access,” but because Defendants had the boardwalk there, they can now interfere with ocean access.  (T70:20-T71:1).  The trial court found the Defendants’ arguments had no basis in the law or the historical record:  The idea that the defendant’s retained, . . . through their chain of title, running with the land, the right to direct where the ocean front owners – essentially that’s what the argument is – the right to retain – to control where they went to the beach at the street ends when it was clearly – I – I find, in viewing the maps, and the advertisements, and the – the historical documents that were provided, it was very clearly portrayed as being on the ocean front, access to the ocean, access to the beach – direct access to the beach and the ocean.
[brief] Answers to Interrogatories ([...]) ........................................  Da257  Answers to Interrogatories ([...]) ........................................  Da261 Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ........................................  Da265 Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ....................................  Da275  Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ....................................  Da288  Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ......................................  Da303  Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ..................................  Da319  Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ...............................  Da329  Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ..................................  Da342 Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ..................................  Da354  Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) ...............................  Da363  Excerpts of Deposition Transcript ([...]) .....................................  Da383  Answers to Interrogatories ([...]) ..........................................................
[brief] As an initial matter, neither the Defendants nor the Trial Court questioned [...]’s qualifications.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting again that [...] has 46 years of professional engineering experience; 27 of those years as engineer with the [...].  (Pa1053).  As for his so-called inconsistencies, a thorough review of the motion record reveals that [...] did not change his opinions let alone change them at the “eleventh hour” as the Trial Court found.
[directive] As discussed earlier, forfeiture of office can occur in three ways: an order from municipal or Superior Court at the time of sentencing; if the conviction took place in another state, by application of the county prosecutor or Attorney General; or if the forfeiture was not raised at the time of a finding of guilt or sentencing, by order of a court upon application of the Attorney General, county prosecutor or public employer.  These guidelines have been developed to address all three methods of forfeiture in a consistent and efficient manner.  However, it is important to note that these guidelines have a narrow application and need only be followed when the following conditions are met:  4It should be noted that because the forfeiture of office should be immediate upon the finding of guilt, the municipal prosecutor in [...] should have moved before the court to have the defendant’s employment forfeited.