[brief] In fact, [...]’s argument has already been flatly rejected by this Court when it addressed the very issue of enforceability of an instrument by a purported “attorney-in-fact” in the absence of a POA.  See Tyler at First Street, LLC v. Yengo, 2023 WL 2590392, *6 (App. Div. March 22, 2023)(Ra 27-33).  In Yengo, [...] (“[...]”), an attorney, purportedly signed a real estate contract on behalf of [...]  (“[...]”).  However, [...] testified that “she did not have power of attorney to sign on behalf of [Tyler Home’s owner] or [...]. ”  Id. at *3.  When Yengo filed a breach of contract action, the trial court found that the document “failed to constitute a valid and enforceable contract” for several reasons, including the lack of “any document granting legal authority to [...] to sign as ‘attorney-in-fact’ on behalf of [[...]].”  Id. at *6.  This Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, including the finding that the contract was unenforceable, and found that “there was a complete absence of any evidence that [...] had the authority to act as power of attorney for [...]. ”  Id. at *7.  [...] ignores the fact that, absent a POA granting [...] the authority to bind the surety to the obligations under the Consent of Surety, that instrument, by operation of law, is invalid and unenforceable.  See Yengo, supra at *6; see, also N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.2(a).  Rather, [...] improperly focuses upon the language of the Local Public Contracts Law (“LCPL”) at N.J.S.A. 40A:11-22,⁴ arguing that such statute does not specifically require a power of attorney to be submitted with a Consent of Surety.  In the first instance, the LPCL applies only to local government entities and not state agencies, which are generally granted greater leeway and discretion to structure their procurement.  However, even if Section 22 of the LPCL is considered, it is axiomatic and indeed basic common sense, as held in Yengo, that to have legally binding effect, ⁴  While [...] is governed by its own bidding statute, courts have consistently acknowledged that the underlying operation and policy of [the Local Public Contracts Law] are identical to that of [...]’s bidding statute, N.J.S.A. 27:23-6.1(a).  George Harms Construction vs. [...], 137 N.J. 8 (1994).  a Consent of Surety (or any document) signed by an attorney-in-fact must be done so pursuant to a properly executed POA granting such authority to the attorney-in-fact.  [...]’s argument to the contrary would open the doors to havoc (and fraud) that would ensue if documents signed by an attorney-in-fact but absent a POA were legally enforceable against a principal who had no knowledge of, or inclination to be legally bound by, a document signed by another purportedly on their behalf.  As discussed above, and no matter how [...] attempts to slice it, a Consent of Surety, executed by an “attorney in fact,” can only be verified as binding and enforceable against the surety if it is accompanied by a lawfully-executed POA attesting to that fact.  Yet, absent such POA, [...] asked [...] to accept, on faith, that [...]’s Consent of Surety is an unqualified promise of the surety.  It is not.  At bottom, [...]’s position is reduced to “trust me” – to the tune of some $70.8 million.  The agency below properly declined to blindly assume that the surety would issue the Contract Bond and, in fact, the foundational principles of public contract can yield no other rational result other that rejection of the bid.