ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] e.  The State’s history of supervision of [...] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27BB-54, et seq., the [...] (“[...]”) and the Director of the [...] may, subject to the approval, assume and exercise supervision over the financial affairs of a municipality in unsound financial condition under specific conditions set forth in N.J.S.A. 52:27BB-55 and in accordance with the procedures set forth in N.J.S.A. 52:27BB-56.  In February 2011, the State assumed supervisory responsibilities over [...] by installing a Monitor during the pendency of the 2008-2012 collective negotiations agreement which contained the accrued sick leave/terminal leave with pay contractual term.  (414a-417a).  Thereafter, under the supervision of the State, [...] and [...] engaged in contractual negotiations, which were ultimately approved by the City on December 18, 2013.  Ibid.  As set forth above, this most recent CNA provided for police officers to both accrue and be paid a lump sum terminal leave based upon accrued, unused sick days.
[brief] *Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc.*, 231 N.J. 24, 67 (2017).  Here, the defendants gave or displayed to plaintiff a contract with provisions that violate a clearly established legal right of the consumer in defiance of over 100 years of established New Jersey law.  Defendant asserts the contract should be taken at face value.  In *Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer*, 12 N.J. 293 (1953), the Supreme Court held that evidence of the circumstances surrounding the formation of a contract is always admissible in aid of interpretation of an integrated agreement, even if no ambiguity in the terms exists.  That remains the controlling law of contract interpretation in New Jersey.  Neither *Schor v. FMS Financial Corporation*, 357 N.J. 185 (App. Div. 2002) or *Nestor v. O’Donnell*, 301 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 1997), which defendant cites as supporting its position, alter *Schwimmer*.  Under *Schwimmer*, to determine the true nature of the transaction, and the roles of the parties, the court should always look to extrinsic evidence of the parties' course of dealing, their communications, and their relative positions.  Here, the extrinsic circumstances indicate that the purpose of the contract was to provide plaintiff money while her personal injury claim was proceeding, and that money was to be repaid, with interest.  The defendant accounted for that risk in its assessment of interest on the debt, described as the “accrual rate” in the agreement.  **AA016.**
[brief] (5T27-2 to 21).  When the shooting began, [...] was seated on the car, while [...] was standing in the street about a car-length away.  (5T27-8 to 16).  [...] initially ran, but soon after, [...] saw him lying face up in the street bleeding.  (5T117-22 to 24; 5T118-8 to 19).  “He had bad injuries.
[brief] A property owner is generally unable to be compensated for damages incidental to the taking, such as loss to or destruction of good will, expense of moving to a new location, profits lost because of business interruption, or inability to relocate.  State v. Gallant, 42 N.J. 583, 587 (1964).  New Jersey courts have repeatedly confirmed that a property owner is only entitled to compensation for property rights lost as a result of the taking.  When drawing a distinction between a permanent taking of a property and a temporary taking of a property (in the form of the closure of road access of an operating car wash), the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division provided an analysis of what a property owner is to be compensated for in a condemnation action.
[brief] [...], was assigned by the [...], its municipal tax sale certificate No. [...] on August 26, 2020.  The property, designated as [...], known on the tax maps as Block 87, Lot 10, the “Premises” consists of an unoccupied two-family residential dwelling and adjacent vacant lot.  The Defendant paid the [...] $85,900.0.  Years prior to the assignment, the Premises was designated by the township as “abandoned” pursuant to N.J.S.A 55:19-78, et al.  The property had been unoccupied and was in a dilapidated condition for several years.  The extreme and dire portrayal by counsel for [...] of the Premises condition seemingly attributed to a disregard by [...] (herein “[...]”) fails to acknowledge the condition of the Premises when Defendant obtained its final judgment.  Defendant’s final judgment was entered on June 10, 2021.  Contrary to [...]’s attribution that the Defendant, “put the children and families of Irvington in danger,” or the “scourge in Irvington”
[brief] Pa260-268.  On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel requested by letter that Messrs. [...] and [...] agree to travel to New Jersey for their respective depositions, and he sent new notices of deposition to take Mr. [...]’s deposition on January 9, 2024 and Mr. [...]’s deposition on January 10, 2024.  Pa282-288.  Although counsel for the German Defendants was ultimately able to secure dates for Mr. [...]’s deposition and attempted to expedite Plaintiff’s request to take Mr. [...]’s deposition in New Jersey—though he is not a party to this action and counsel was not required to do so—counsel for the German Entity Defendants were ultimately unsuccessful in scheduling Mr. [...]’s deposition.
[directive] (1)  $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3) $ 750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime ( 4)  $ 500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $ 250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  Total CCPF Penalty $ ------- #-E1 c. oJ] 1tJ 1'1J-7] (CCPF), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 2009, 143).
[brief] o Exhibit L, letter dated July 23, 2013 from [...] advising he had been placed on “academic probation for failure to meet the minimum 2.75 grade point ratio as required for progression in the program.  o Exhibit M, August 1, 2023 email from [...] to [...] and [...], University Provost and Senior VP for Academic Affairs, advising them of Plaintiff’s application and that he would be eligible for the MBA program as long as his “UG GPA and the GMAT” score were met.
[brief] The Environmental Appellants primarily rely on the Statement of Facts and Procedural History in its initial brief, submitted to this Court on September 22, 2022.  In addition, on August 31, 2023, this Court decided that “the language of Exemption 11 and its statutory context, as well as the history of the Highlands Act, all point to the Legislature having intended to exempt only routine upgrades to a public utility's lines, rights of way or systems in the Preservation Area from the strictures of the statute. ”  Matter of Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station, 476 N.J. Super. 556, 561 (App. Div. 2023).  Accordingly, this Court “vacate[d] the HAD and remand[ed] for the DEP to consider whether [...]'s proposed compressor station qualifies as a ‘routine upgrade’ to its pipeline system, entitling it to a HAD under our construction of the language of Exemption 11. ”  Ibid.  This Court did not reach the Appellants’ second argument regarding the DEP’s Water Quality Management Plan consistency determination.  Id. at 563, n.7.  On January 11, 2024, the DEP issued a new HAD with a supporting staff report.  Rma004.  The DEP’s old and new HAD determinations were made without the benefit of any record or analysis of the project’s air pollution emissions or its contribution to global climate change and the associated adverse impacts to --- 2  The facts and procedure are interrelated, so they are presented together.  3  “Rma” refers to the DEP’s motion appendix, filed with this Court on August 26, 2024.  the natural resources in the Highlands areas.  The DEP intentionally ignored the project’s air pollution emissions and any factors or elements of climate change impacts from this project to support the DEP’s final determination that the project is consistent with the broad legislative goals and objectives in the Highlands Act.  The DEP stated that “Those [air] emissions would be subject to separate permitting requirements by DEP, not at issue here. ”  See page 27 of DEP’s brief in this appeal, dated October 31, 2022.  Subsequent to the DEP’s issuance of the new HAD, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted [...]’s petition for certification, reversed this Court regarding the applicability of “routine” in Exemption 11, and issued a remand “to allow for specific findings as to the consistency of the project within the Highlands Act.
[brief] In this matter, there no specific statute that creates a limitations period specifically attributable to uninsured and underinsured motorist claims.  Therefore, the limitations period set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, only applies if the contract is silent.  Here, the contract is not silent.  It clearly and unambiguously provides the time within which the insured must file legal action against Respondent for underinsured motorist benefits.  Appellant not only received the policy when it was first purchased, her counsel received a certified copy of the policy in 2019, when it was requested.  The suit limitation clause was not ambiguous, nor did it conflict with any other provision of the policy.  The law is clear, at all times material hereto, Appellant is and was responsible for knowing the terms and requirements of the policy of insurance from which she seeks benefits.  **POINT III.
[brief] •  On August 18, 2017, [...] sent [...] a retainer agreement to represent him in challenging the Will.  Pa195, at ¶11, Pa201.  •  On August 28, 2017, [...] sent [...] an email following up on his request that [...] sign the retainer agreement.  Pa196, at ¶15, Pa202.  •  [...] did not return a signed retainer agreement to [...] in 2017 or otherwise confirm that [...] was representing him until the middle of 2018.  Pa195, at ¶11.  •  Sometime between August 28, 2017 and September 6, 2017, [...] met with [...] in Defendants’ office to discuss representing him in challenging Will.
[brief] . . .  We repeat that the arbitrator’s authority is circumscribed by whatever provisions and conditions the parties have mutually agreed upon.  Any action taken beyond that authority is impeachable.  [Id. at 393 (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). ]  Critically, the Court further explained that the arbitrator could not sneak an additional term into the contract through interpretation of a just cause provision:  We reject plaintiffs’ contention that under the circumstances of this case there can be no “just cause” for discharge without some prior warning to the employee.
[brief] Contradicting the credible testimony of Plaintiff’s fact witnesses, Defendant makes the unsubstantiated claim that it was only after Plaintiff recorded the easement in 2007 that the congregants commenced “active parking use of the Sixth Street [Lot].”  (Db64)  Defendant also falsely claims that “in recent years”, the number of services and events at the synagogue had increased to three morning services, three evening services, and expanded day use and attendance. ” (Db65).  While [...] testified that the number of morning services were expanded from one to three, fifteen (15) years ago (well before Defendant purchased the Subject Property), there is nothing in the record to support Defendant’s claim that the number of evening services was increased or “day use and attendance” has expanded.
[brief] (6T83-20 to 85-4, 86-2 to 21, 88-5 to 91-13).  [...] never stated or implied that his conclusion in this case had been verified by a non-testifying examiner.  Defense counsel recognized as much.  Before [...]’s testimony, he explained to the prosecutor and the judge that if [...] testified regarding the opinion of the independent verifier, “there’s going to be an immediate objection to that. ”  (6T5-1 to 15).  But on both occasions that defendant now cites in support of his argument, defense counsel chose not to object.  See (Db29; 6T44-17 to 45-12, 111-6 to 24).  Indeed, both instances involved a break immediately after the questioning; after the second time, defense counsel was directly asked whether he had a response on re-cross-examination.
[brief] Pursuant to RPC 1.7 (Raised Below Da001-002, 1T35:10-38:20)  “The review of a motion for disqualification requires a court ‘to balance competing interests, weighing the ‘need to maintain the highest standards of the profession’ against ‘a client’s right to freely choose his [or her] counsel. ’”  Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. Super. 203, 213 (App. Div. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988)).  A client’s “right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that ‘there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement. ””  Ibid (quoting Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 218).  However, “[d]isqualification of counsel is a harsh discretionary remedy which must be used sparingly. ”  Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 334 N.J. Super. 557, 572 (App. Div. 2000).  “Generally, motions to disqualify are disfavored because they ‘can have such drastic consequences. ’”  Twenty-First Century Rail Corp. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 419 N.J. Super. 343, 357 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 206 N.J. 37 (2011) (quoting Rohm & Haas Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 187 F.Supp.2d 221, 226 (D.N.J. 2001)).  “To be resolved in favor of disqualification, the party seeking disqualification must carry a ‘heavy burden’ and must meet a ‘high standard of proof’ before a lawyer is disqualified. ”  Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Crossland Sav., 944 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993)).  When examining a motion to disqualify counsel, the court must engage in a “painstaking analysis of the facts. ”  Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 205 (quoting Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 469 (1980)).  To succeed on a claim brought under RPC 1.7, an articulable conflict must be shown; mere speculation is insufficient.  See Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F.Supp.2d 418, 431-432 (D.N.J. 1998) (a conflict pursuant to RPC 1.7(a)(2) must be supported with something more than a theoretical possibility and cannot be based on speculation or conjecture); see also, *State v. Davis*, 366 N.J. Super. 30, 40-42 (App. Div. 2004) (conflicts based on speculation, conjecture, and hypothesis are non-actionable).  The court must also be cognizant that disqualification motions can be misused as a litigation tactic that can delay an examination of the merits of the claims and can undermine the judicial process.
[brief] State Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment  On January 7, 2022, State Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter following the close of discovery.  (Pa1254).  State Respondents’ argument with respect to [...]’s claims primarily rested on the fact that [...] was not her employer, or joint employer, pursuant to the twelve-factor test set forth in the matter of Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 180 (App. Div. 1998).
[directive] ”  subsection 6.3.  See J. recordings.  Provides, consistent with P.L. 2021, c. 472  Restriction on access to BWC (N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5) signed yesterday, that law enforcement officers shall be permitted to review a BWC recording prior to creating any required substantive initial reports, 2 providing a statement, or submitting to an interview regarding the recorded event, except in certain enumerated circumstances.
[brief] So what kind of due diligence are you going to do under those circumstances when all you’ve got is a suspicion that a deal is going on?  [3T35:12-22.]  *The trial court did not issue a final judgment on the merits.*  The trial court in the First Action did not even acknowledge, much less adjudicate, the issue.  Rather, the trial court in that action simply denied the motion for leave to amend on strictly procedural grounds because the case was marked “closed. ” (Pa180-81.)  Thus, there was no final judgment on the merits as to the issue of Plaintiff’s knowledge.  The issue was not essential.  Given that the issue was not even considered by the trial court in the First Action, the issue of “what Plaintiff knew and when it knew it” was not essential to the trial court’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion for leave to amend in the First Action.
[brief] * * *  On numerous occasions we have found ‘such particular circumstances as to dictate not the hard approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice. ’  ***  A ‘just accommodation’ of individual justice and public policy requires that ‘in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed. ’  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333, 337 (citations omitted).
[brief] At side bar, defense counsel moved to strike [...]'s identification because counsel believed the prosecutor had agreed not to elicit this testimony, it was “highly suggestive” for a person to make a first-time in-court identification, and there was out-of-state case law to support the exclusion of the identification.  The prosecutor countered that he had not prompted [...] to identify defendant, and, in any event, first-time in-court identifications were “completely proper. ”  The prosecutor argued that defense counsel could cross-examine her on the identification and that the jury should be given a Henderson in-court identification charge.  The trial judge found that the prosecutor had not solicited the in-court identification, denied the application to strike, and agreed to include the in-court identification instruction in the final charge.  The judge then instructed the jury, “you will note ... [that [...]] made an in-court identification.... that is the first identification she has made.  There will be a charge that is given to you at the end of the case about in-court identifications. ”  Thereafter, defense counsel objected to [...]'s testimony that she was “certain” of her identification of defendant.  The court overruled the objection finding that defense counsel could address her answer on cross-examination.  [...] subsequently testified that she had not previously identified defendant, she was “very certain” that defendant was the man she saw in the parking lot, and she described the circumstances surrounding her out-of-court observation of defendant.  In her final charge, the judge instructed the jury, without objection, substantially in accord with the Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Identification: In-Court and Out-Of-Court Identifications” (rev. May 18, 2020), including that the jury could consider “whether the witness did not identify the defendant at a prior identification procedure. ”  B.  “[T]he decision to prohibit an in-court identification is made on a case-by-case basis.
[brief] She then clicked a prominent “First Time User?” hyperlink located under the Sign-in button on the SAM home page.  (Da0081; Da0493-Da0498).  When she did so, she was taken to the “Account Registration” page which stated prominently at the bottom center of the landing page (without the need to scroll down to see it) and with a blue hyperlink: “Your use of this site signifies that you accept our Terms and Conditions of Use. ” (Id.).  (Da0081-Da0082; Da0493-Da0498 (hyperlink and blue text omitted)).  Clicking on the Terms and Conditions of Use hyperlink opened a website displaying a PDF copy of the [...] Shareholder Account Manager Terms of Use (“Terms of Use”).  (Da0082-Da0083; Da0395-Da0408).  The Terms of Use specifically state on page 2 in all caps and in bold “THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ARE LEGALLY BINDING.  PLEASE READ THEM CAREFULLY. ” (Da0396).  Further, the Terms of Use stress (on page 6) that the customer is agreeing to arbitration by including a bold heading of “Predispute Arbitration Agreement” and by using an appropriate font size and clear and unmistakable language, as follows:  **Predispute Arbitration Agreement**  All controversies that may arise concerning any subject matter, issue or circumstance whatsoever related to use of this Site (including but not limited to controversies concerning any account, or transaction, or the continuation, performance, interpretation or breach of this or any other agreement between [...] and/or [...] and Authorized User) shall be determined through binding arbitration by and in accordance with the rules then in effect of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).  (Da0400-Da0401).  [...] completed registration for SAM access on June 27, 2022 and confirmed her assent to the Terms and Conditions set forth in the PDF, including the predispute arbitration clause.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Equitable Ownership Claims Fall Within the Scope of the Arbitration Provisions within the MOU and the Operating Agreements.  (1T43:2-6)  The 2012 MOU and the Operating Agreements contain clear and broad arbitration provisions that encompass this dispute.  (1T43:2-6).  The language of the MOU’s clause (“any dispute arising out of, or relating to,” Da313) and the Operating Agreements’ clause (“with respect to,” Da132, 149) are expansive enough to cover this Chancery dispute, which revolves around the equitable ownership and right to purchase the Property—issues tied to the original intent and subsequent agreements stemming from the MOU, including the Operating Agreements that designate Plaintiff as Manager of the Companies.  (1T49:12-14).  Regarding the scope of the subject arbitration provisions, “[c]ourts have generally read the terms ‘arising out of’ or ‘relating to’ [in] a contract as indicative of an ‘extremely broad’ agreement to arbitrate any dispute relating in any way to the contract. ”  Curtis v. Cellco Partnership, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 37- 38 (App. Div 2010)(quoting Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010)(quoting Angrisani v. Financial Tech. Ventures, L.P., 40 N.J. Super. 138, 149 (App. Div. 2008)).  “Such broad clauses have been construed to require arbitration of any dispute between the contracting parties that is connected in any way with their contract. ”  Ibid.  The arbitration provisions in the MOU and Operating Agreements both contain extremely broad clauses that can be construed to require arbitration of Plaintiff’s ownership claims.  Specifically, the MOU states that “any dispute arising out of or relating to [the MOU] shall be resolved by an arbitrator appointed to the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association. ” (Da313).  Thus, the claims concerning: the rescue plan; the payment of [...]’s loans; Plaintiff’s right to obtain legal title to the Property; or the rescission counterclaim, are arbitrable disputes because they arise out of or relate to the MOU’s goals.
[brief] *Ibid.* (citing *Caputo v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc.*, 300 N.J.Super. 498, 504, 693 A.2d 494 (App.Div. 1997)).  \(^1\)  And their employment contracts were enforced by the Courts, even though they: A) had no work visas; B) committed intentional affirmative acts by illegally crossing our border (and numerous state lines); and C) were residing here illegally.  3.  The Respondent cannot defeat the validity of my unjust enrichment claim.
[brief] \(^3\)  Specifically, the first clause of Section 13.1 states that, in the event a closing fails to occur in accordance with the PSA because of a default by [...], Plaintiff may “terminate this Agreement” through notice to the Seller within ten business days and, in so doing, receive a return of the Earnest Money Deposit.  (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1).  However, the sentence immediately thereafter reads “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, Purchaser [Plaintiff] shall, in addition to its termination right, [] have the right of specific performance” where the Seller ([...]) has defaulted and proceeded to close with the Fee Owner under the [...].
[brief] **Objections.**  A party may object to the court’s calling or examining a witness.  In fact, as found by the Court in *State v. Medina*, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 130-31 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 193 (2002) (citations omitted), the Court has substantial discretion to question witnesses, and has not just the power, but the duty to do so when appropriate: