ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Do you understand if you are sentenced to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] a. qualquer concessão futura de liberdade condicional não será baseada nas diretrizes normais de liberdade condicional? that any future parole will not be guided by the normal parole guidelines?  [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] b. você estará qualificado à obtenção da liberdade quando o Conselho Estadual de Liberdade Condicional (State Parole Board), depois de receber as recomendações de um conselho especial de revisão, decidir que você é capaz de se ajustar socialmente à comunidade de forma aceitável? that you will be eligible for release when the State Parole Board, after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds that you are capable of making an acceptable social adjustment in the community?  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No] c. talvez você passe mais tempo em tratamento do que passaria se fosse sentenciado à reclusão em prisão estadual? that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if sentenced to state prison?  Data/Date Réu/Defendant defesa/Defense Advogado de Attorney Promotor/Prosecutor no página 2 de 2 Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Portuguese Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Portuguese page 2 of 2
[brief] To the contrary, in 2007 the [...] added the words “possible future increases in flows due to development or other factors” to the definition in place of “expected runoff increases due to future development of the drainage area. ”  39 N.J.R. 4573(a) (November 5, 2007).  Clearly, the [...]’s addition of “or other factors” to the definition in 2007 shows that it intended the definition to include expected runoff increases from any possible factor and not just further development of the drainage area.
[brief] *Id.* ¶ 26.  Plaintiff alleges he was subject to additional retaliatory adverse employment action due to this filing, including a ninety (90) day suspension starting on January 26, 2009.  *Id.* ¶ 27.  Plaintiff was laid off as of December 1, 2011.  Plaintiff claims [...]'s alleged budget crisis was a “subterfuge” to eliminate his work unit.  3  Plaintiff made a litany of other complaints about [...].  *See id.*  ¶ 19.  4  Only a summary of plaintiff’s allegations are listed.  By no means is this a complete recitation of plaintiff’s claims.  *2  Plaintiff filed his complaint in Federal District Court on February 19, 2009.
[brief] **A.  FDCPA’s Purpose and Structure. **  “In adopting the Act, […] Congress left no doubt that its purpose was to protect debtors from abuse and that Congress perceived a need for national uniformity to fulfill that goal. ”  *Rutgers-The State Univ. v. Fogel*, 403 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2008).  The FDCPA begins by reciting the findings made by Congress as the basis for its adoption.  Congress found there to be “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  Those unacceptable practices “contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. ”  Id.  At the same time, “[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(b).  Congress also found that “[m]eans other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(c).  After making those findings, Congress expressed three distinct purposes for adopting the FDCPA.  The first purpose is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.
[brief] Here the burden of proof rests with the appellant and the standard of review is whether the decision can be found to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Kramer v Bd. Of Adjustment of Sea Girt, 45 NJ 268 (1965).  The boards, because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions, must be allowed wide latitude in their delegated decision.  Ward v Scott 15 NJ 16, 23 (1954).
[brief] Regardless of whether the Trial Court’s designation was correct in 2017, it was no longer correct after Mejia.  The Trial Court therefore should not have molded the judgment to only sixty percent (60%) and contrary to the JTCL and Mejia.  The law of the case principle is not absolute, see Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538-39 (2011) (explaining that the law of the case doctrine is “a non-binding rule”, has a “discretionary nature”, and is entirely inapposite where “in trial court proceedings, the same judge is reconsidering his own interlocutory ruling”), and it certainly cannot be invoked to suggest that a Trial Court should compound error.
[brief] ..............................................  37 State v. Carreon, 437 N.J. Super. 81 (App. Div. 2014) ..................  27 State v. Darby, 246 N.J. Super. 432 (App. Div. 1991)  ..................  40  State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318 (1961)  ..................................  30 State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513 (2018)  ...........................................  23, 24 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)  .....................................  33 Univ. Cottage Club v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38 (2007)  ............  31 Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987) ...... 39 Wildwood Storage Center, Inc. v. Mayor of Wildwood, 260 N.J. Super. 464 (App. Div. 1992)  ...........................................  21, 24 Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558 (2012).  .......  43 Statutes and Codes N.J.S.A. 49:3-69.  . .1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34 ..........................35, 37, 38, 40, 42
[brief] What possibly caused DEP’s sudden reversal?  DEP unconvincedly explained its reasons in the convoluted and illogical story it spun in the proposed settlement.  The answer is DEP approved the [...] project because [...] and the developer want a more lucrative project than compliance with the Rule would yield.  [...] doesn’t want a stepped back apartment building with fewer units like [...] was required to build, DEP’s Coastal Regulations be damned.  Appellant [...] Realty respectfully requests that this Court not let DEP’s capitulation and waiver of the Scenic Resources and Design Rule stand.
[brief] She wants to hold [...] and [...] responsible for [...]’ failures, excesses, and possible wrongdoings, that she herself, as an asserted [...] officer and owner, could not prevent.  The Trial Court, while finding the testimony of all three broadly credible (they were the only witnesses at trial), rejected plaintiff’s mere “innuendo and suspicions” regarding [...] and [...], finding that “plaintiff’s classification of Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] as co-conspirators of Dr. [...] was wholly unsubstantiated. ”  Pa17-18.  The Trial Court thus properly concluded that [...] and [...] were not liable to compensate plaintiff for her claimed losses.
[brief] To comply with the dictates of Atalese, New Jersey practitioners (like those in [...]) have since drafted their arbitration clauses so as to clearly provide therein for arbitration and that the party is waiving his or her right to proceed in court, e.g., Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 2016) (providing for “binding arbitration” and that “any claimant… hereby waives any and all rights to bring any such claim or controversy in any manner not expressly set forth in this paragraph, including, but not limited to, the right to a jury trial”).  Simple enough.  Yet, defendants and their counsel chose not to do so.  Therefore, their arbitration clause is unenforceable.  Nor is it acceptable for defendants to suggest that language buried in page iv of the 663 page POS is the missing waiver language.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the waiver language must be in the arbitration clause itself.  Indeed, the fact that defendants point to language on page iv of the 663 page POS means that they could have included it in the arbitration clause, but chose not to.  (See Point E, pp 35-42 herein).  It is no wonder that [...] took note of the insufficiency of what they did, as quoted at p. 7 herein.  POINT III
[brief] On March 22, 2023, this matter submitted to court-ordered non-binding Arbitration, which resulted in a finding in favor of Respondent; determining Appellant to be causally negligent, Respondent having overcome the Verbal Threshold and assessing damages in an amount in excess of Appellant’s \(^8\)  At no time was it ever revealed by Appellant, Appellant’s counsel and/or Appellant’s insurer, how much if any of the policy proceeds from the $100,000.00 combined single limit policy, had been paid toward property damage claim(s); until post-verdict.  insurance liability coverage.  Pa011.  The Arbitration Award was subsequently appealed by Appellant.
[brief] A judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.  Rule 7:8-10 similarly provides:  In all cases other than parking cases, a request by a defendant to proceed to trial without an attorney shall not be granted until the judge is satisfied from an inquiry on the record that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel following an explanation by the judge of the range of penal consequences and an advisement that the defendant may have defenses and that there are dangers and disadvantages inherent in defending oneself.
[brief] As found by the Trial Court, the [...]’ actions “were much more than a breach of fiduciary duty and a breach of contract;” “they evidence[d] deliberate and intentional misconduct, and misconduct made with the specific intent of taking money from [...] and [...];” their actions were “a --- 1  The Trial Court’s “findings are binding on remand. ”  [...] Developments, Inc. v. Wilf, A-2053-13T3, 2018 WL 2449133, at *26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2018) (the “2018 Opinion” or “2018 Op. at __” or “[...] II”).
[brief] 21 New Shrewsbury v. Block 115, Lot 4, 74 N.J. Super. 1 (App.Div. 1962)  19, 20, 21 Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446 (1979)  12  Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2010)  31  Phillipsburg v. Block 1508, Lot 12, 380 N.J.Super. 159 (App.Div. 2005)  12, 13, 25  In re Princeton Office Park L.P. v. Plymouth Park Tax Servs., LLC, 218 N.J. 52 (2014)
[brief] Da2489.  \(^3\)  Trichothecene was detected in [...]’s urine twice, once in 2009 and later, well after he had moved out of the condominium, in late 2014.  Da693; Da696.  [...]’s remediation work was never successful.  3T10-24 to 3T11-8.  As a result, consistent with medical advice he had received, [...] never returned to live in his condominium, which was foreclosed upon and repossessed in 2016.
[brief] o (1T 25:3-8; 25:15-22; 26:16-19).  •  She testified [...]'s OA was signed by all of the plaintiffs and defendant.  The OA names [...] as manager.  o (1T 28:6-17).  •  According to section 3.1.1. of the OA, only the members can enter into contracts binding the companies.
[brief] However, [...] only filed an application to the Planning Board for Preliminary and Final Site Plan Approval without seeking any variances.  *(Pa40-49). *  The Applicant, through its attorney, and on notice to all affected property owners (re-noticed due to jurisdictional issues) appeared before the Board for public hearings on November 8, 2021, December 20, 2021, January 10, 2022, and February 7, 2022.  *(Pa88-187).
[directive] Moreover, a DWI conviction can be sustained on both direct and circumstance evidence, State v. Emery, 27 N.J. 348, 355 (1958), as well as statements by a defendant and observations made by police officers of defendant's behavior and actions, State v. Nemesh, 228 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 1988), certif. den. 114 N.J. 473 (1989).  A chemical breath test reading or result is not required to satisfy this aspect of a DWI violation.  Even in cases where the chemical breath test result are unavailable, either as a result of Attorney General Guideline: Page 6
[brief] ”  Therefore, for evidence to be “relevant” under N.J.R.E. 401, there must be a logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue.  “In determining whether evidence is relevant, the inquiry should focus upon the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue. ”  Correia v. Sherry, 335 N.J. Super. 60, 68 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236, 252 (App. Div. 2000)).  See also, Kuzian v. Tomaszewski, 457 N.J. 458 (Law Div. 2018).  Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether there is a logical connection between the proffered evidence and the fact in issue.  *Wymbs ex rel. Wymbs v. Township of Wayne*, 163 N.J. 523, 537 (2000).  Further, trial courts have broad discretion as to whether evidence which may be relevant should nonetheless excluded under *N.J.R.E. 403*.  *Wymbs*, 163 N.J. at 537.  See also, *Green*, 160 N.J. at 492.  Herein, *N.J.R.E. 403* cited by Appellant did not apply given the Trial Court’s exclusion of the evidence based on relevance.  The key issue in the Appellant’s claim is whether the actual building height exceeds the approved building height of 43’-6” above DFE as shown on the plans approved by the Board.
[brief] Hannigan v. Township of Old Bridge, 288 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983)).  Such an agreement “will be enforced as long as the agreement addresses as the agreement addresses the principal terms required to resolve the dispute. ”  See Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 421 N.J. Super. 445, 453 (App. Div. 2011), aff'd, 215 N.J. 242 (2013); Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992) (holding if parties agree on essential terms and agree to be bound by those terms, an enforceable contract is created).  Moreover, the arguments defendant presented to the trial court are specious, deceptive and strategically designed to obfuscate the issues and confuse the court.
[brief] While the trial court acknowledged *Shaw* “backed off” of *Plemmons*, it mistakenly concluded it was required to follow Plemmons, despite Shaw and its own view as to the appropriate scope of immunity under the CFA.  (T32-25 to T35-2).  To the extent the trial court perceived a conflict between Plemmons and Shaw, this Court should clarify the application of Shaw, the rejection of Plemmons, and reverse the trial court’s orders dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s CFA claims against all Defendants in Count VII of the Complaint.  I.  THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS AND REINSTATE THE PLAINTIFF’S CFA CLAIMS. (T18:11 to 19:18).
[brief] On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  Pa11.  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  Pa82.  On or about August 16, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contacted the Certifying Officers via electronic mail regarding issues with confirming distribution of the Ricci Act information to members of the retirement system.  Pa84.  An Employer Confirmation of Distribution Form was filed noting that [...], Certifying Officer for the [...], acknowledged receipt and distribution of the information on the Ricci Act, which is also dated August 16, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act was passed.  Pa85.  Additionally, this Form does not specify what manner the information was distributed to active employees of the [...].  Pa85.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.
[brief] [...] did not act in good faith.  [...] advertised a dual degree program for its new, unaccredited pharmacy school, which did not have any history of rules or regulations, to entice students to apply for its inaugural class.  (Pa253; Pa344; The school advertised this unique program to an inaugural class, without accreditation, ostensibly in hopes of swaying local students away from their in-state competition.  (Pa324).  The website was an important part of advertising the program to students in order to get the word out into the community.  (Pa353).  [...] induced prospective students to apply to, and accept admittance, to this newly formed dual degree program based on certain criteria in matriculating into the program.  Importantly, there was no precedent related to rules or regulations of the program, and thus, students like Plaintiff were relying on the content available to them, such as the website.  Thus, it was not foreseeable that [...] would implement new conditions for the inaugural class to matriculate into the dual degree program, especially a condition that matriculation would occur only after the first year.  See, e.g., Dworman v. Mayor and Bd. of Alderman, 370 F.Supp. 1056 (D.N.J.1974) (Dworman recognized that under New Jersey law the standard is one of reasonable foreseeability: “only those events that should have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties and thus were reasonably foreseeable as possible contingencies will not excuse performance. ”)  Defendant further acted in bad faith when it implemented a new policy, on the fly, to plainly prevent Plaintiff from separately applying to the master’s program.  Prior to August 1, 2013, there was no approval requirement and/or rule in place prohibiting Pharm.D students participating in the dual degree program “indirectly. ” (Pa461-Pa467).  Moreover, while Defendant “reserved its right to make changes to its program,” there was no defined policy that alerted students the only time they could select or opt-out of the program was at the end of their first year.  Plaintiff was given conflicting information regarding the selection requirement to the dual degree program by [...] staff.  (Pa244; Pa246; Pa458).  Thus, Defendant unambiguously breached its contractual obligations with Plaintiff.  iv.
[brief] 14  I.  Defendants’ Statement of the Standard of Review Fails to Account for Defendants’ Burdens in Opposing Summary II.  Regardless of the Standard of Review to be Applied, Defendants’ Appeal Should be Denied Because Defendants Fail to Challenge the Trial Court’s Alternative Basis for Summary Judgment, Which is That Defendants Are Equitably Estopped from Challenging Plaintiffs’ Ownership of the Disputed Area ..................................  18  III.  Regardless of the Standard of Review to be Applied, the Trial Court Properly Entered Summary Judgment  Because, Under the Uncontroverted Material Facts, Defendants Had Constructive Notice of the Error by Virtue of the Recorded Documents in Their Chain of Title.  (Ja716)  ................................................................. 22  a.  Constructive notice exists where a reasonable and diligent inquiry would put a purchaser on notice of a competing claim ...........................................................................  23 b.  Defendants had constructive notice because the recorded documents in the chain of the title, form their immediate predecessor’s acquisition forward (i.e., the 2010 [...] Acquisition deed, the Subdivision Plan, the Confirmatory Deed, and Defendants’ Deed), demonstrate the mistake and Plaintiff’s title or claim .................................................................  26  c.  The asserted factual issues raised by Defendant do not create a genuine issues material fact..............................................  30  d.  Permitting Defendants to reply exclusively on [...]’s actions after [...] already acquired title to Lot 3 does not serve the purposes of the recording scheme .......................  35  IV.  The Trial Court Properly Entered Summary Judgment
[brief] Our goal is to do our best to ensure that every experience you have with [...] exceeds your expectations.  If that doesn’t happen, we hope you will give us the opportunity to try to address any problem or concern.  To do so, please contact us by visiting equinox.com/contactus.  When contacting us, we ask that you include your name, address, phone number and email address, a description of your problem or concern and any specific relief you seek.  7.2
[brief] Compare *id.* at 518 (“‘such agreements are upheld only where it is clear that the parties have agreed to arbitrate in clear and unmistakable manner’”) *with Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430, 443-45 (2014) (“a waiver of rights – whether in an arbitration or other clause…‘must be clearly and unmistakably established. ’”).  Parella confirms that the Schwartz holding aligns with New Jersey law.  In Parella, this Court held that a plaintiff “manifested an intention to be bound” by the terms of an agreement he never read or signed, and could not recall ever receiving, given “his interactions with defendants over fifteen years. ”  2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59, at *11 (citing Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442-43).  As here, the plaintiff “did not recall ever receiving” a copy of any account agreement.  Id. at *7-8.  Parrella recognizes that a party may, like Respondents here, manifest an intent to be bound to a customer agreement through their course of conduct and notwithstanding whether they recall any agreement.  See id. at *5-6, 12.  Respondents inaccurately claim that Parrella is distinguishable because there, the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to contradict defendant’s business records evidencing that it sent copies of agreements to plaintiff.  See id. at *6-7, 9-10; (Pb21-22).  This distinguishes Parella only in outcome.  Here, similar to Parella: (a) Respondents were customers of [...] for more than five years (Da0075-80); (b) they were admittedly aware of the (obvious) fact that agreements governing their relationship with [...] existed (Da0065; Da0075-80); (c) they could access those agreements any time on [...]’s website (Da0085-86); (d) [...], who had power of attorney for [...], navigated to [...]’s website to register for online access (Da0083-84); and (e) they received the benefits of an extensive relationship with [...], enjoying hundreds of thousands of dollars in returns until they decided to withdraw their funds (Da0078-80).  Thus, the court below should have found, as in Parella, that Respondents’ conduct evidenced an intent to be bound, notwithstanding their claim not to “recall ever seeing” any agreement.