ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Board voiced substantial concerns regarding the submitted traffic report, which was indicated to be based on 9 residential units, rather than the 18 single-family dwellings that would be present at the site if basement apartments were built.  (2T18-22)  The Chairman, with intimate knowledge of [...] considering he lives in a nearby neighborhood in the Township, explained: “by my block, which is also ten houses with no basements . . . we generate triple that amount on peak hours” (referring to the 14 peak hour trips indicated in the [...] traffic study submitted with this application)  (2T20-6 to 2T20-10)  He further noted that while the traffic counts are on 14th Street, the property at issue is not located on 14th Street, and that this is a very congested area: with many shuls, school bus routes, and narrow shoulders with cars parked in the shoulders.
[directive] Standard 4:  SAFE KITS  All victims of sexual assault shall be advised of the time sensitive nature of a medical forensic exam and the importance of a SAFE Kit and a DFSA/Tox Kit.  Every victim of sexual assault, age 13 or older, who reports the incident within five days of when it occurred, is entitled to request a medical forensic exam to identify injuries and collect forensic evidence.  SAFE Kits and DFSA/Tox Kits are specifically designed to collect and preserve physical evidence yielded from the medical forensic exam, which can be used in a criminal sexual assault investigation.  Whenever possible, examining and collecting evidence through SAFE and DFSA/Tox Kits, shall be completed by individuals who have specialized training in examining adolescent and adult victims of sexual assault.  All victims have the right to consent or to decline any part of the medical forensic exam or decline to have one conducted entirely.  The informed written consent of the victim shall be obtained prior to initiating any examination and shall be obtained orally by the victim throughout the examination and evidence collection process.  In a situation where the victim is unable to consent due to permanent mental incapacity, the consent of the victim’s healthcare representative shall be obtained prior to performing the examination.  (See Standard 7: Special Considerations for Vulnerable Populations).  In a situation where the victim is a minor, please consult Standard 6: Specialized Services for Child and Adolescent Victims, as well as N.J.S.A. 9:17A-4.  The County Prosecutor’s Office shall make available, through the County SART/FNE Coordinator, SAFE Kits, DFSA/Tox Kits, and accompanying forms to every emergency healthcare facility in the county.  Kits shall be kept on-site and may only be used for medical forensic exams.  Every medical forensic exam, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the crime is reported to have occurred, should be completed using the SAFE Kit, Sexual Assault Forensic Examination Report, supplemental body diagrams, and the DFSA/Tox Kit and Form, when appropriate.  The healthcare provider who conducts the examination shall decide which specimens should be collected in each case based on the history and circumstances of the incident, as reported by the victim.  At the conclusion of the medical forensic exam, the evidence collected shall be packaged and secured in a manner to ensure the integrity of each specimen and to maintain the appropriate chain of custody, in accordance with a county’s procedure.  -14-
[brief] Courts must apply sufficient mitigation weight to Miller factor 2 if a juvenile suffered from trauma or abuse at home.  Id. at 478-79.  A juvenile is not required to prove that their environment was a direct, or even proximate, cause of their criminal act.  Rather, a finding that the juvenile suffered significant environmental stressors is alone sufficient to warrant a reduction of culpability.  Ibid. (finding a juvenile’s “pathological background” contributed to his commission of the crime where he experienced physical abuse and parental neglect, moved between foster homes, and struggled with mental illness; and finding another juvenile’s childhood environment to be “particularly relevant” in light of “his mother’s drug abuse and his father’s physical abuse”).  [...] and [...] provided consistent expert findings that, in his youth, [...] suffered “considerable violence, both emotional and physical, within the household. ”  (2T10-13 to 14)  His childhood was marked by “emotional tensions”; a lack of emotional support; an absence of positive role models; exposure to parental substance use; and “severely traumatic” domestic disputes between his parents.  (2T10-16 to 25; 18-5 to 9; 9-14 to 22)  As a result of these environmental stressors – which were compounded by development deficits and adolescent substance abuse – [...] became highly sensitive, impulsive, immature, angry, incapable of independence, and vulnerable to coercion.  In short, he became a “ticking bomb” who was “extremely disturbed and need[ed] remedial help immediately. ”
[brief] Based on the facts presented at trial, the trial court properly decided that judgment could not be entered in favor of [...] for its claim against the third-party defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and the decision should be affirmed.  (5T12:18).  Moreover, [...]’s appeal fails to present any statement of fact in the record below to show that [...] suffered any actual damages for this court to consider, as required under R. 2:6-2(5).  (Db011-012, E).  Instead, [...]’s brief asserts imaginary damages, based on mere speculation, which are legally insufficient.  (Db011-012, E); see Caldwell, 136 N.J. at 442.  The true facts, however, are simple, straightforward, and fully support the trial court’s judgment to dismiss [...]’s claims because [...] failed to establish damages:  [...] and [...] never entered into an agreement for [...] to purchase Amanat’s portion of the property.  (2T29-23 – 2T30-1).  [...] did not choose to sell his property to [...]; he sold it to [...].  (Da210).  [...] wanted to purchase [...]’s share of the property and increased each bid it submitted.  (3T166-2; 4T45-5).  [...] agreed to donate whatever amount [...] needed to purchase [...]’s share.  (2T62-13).  [...]’s donation was for the sole purpose of funding [...]’s purchase of [...]’s share of the property, whatever that purchase price was.  (2T62-13; 3T166-11; 3T170-11; 4T47-19).  [...]’s purchase of [...]’s share was funded completely by a personal donation from [...].
[brief] In relation to agency fact finding, “the role of the appellate court is that of determining ‘whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. ’”  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 92 (1973) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)).  “The appellate application of this standard requires far more than a perfunctory review; it calls for careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings in the manner. ”  Id. at 93.  “An appellate tribunal is . . . in no way bound by [an] agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue. ”  Ibid.  Moreover, “where technical or specialized expertise is not implicated . . . [appellate courts] owe no deference to [an] agency. ”  A.Z. ex rel. B.Z. v. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth., 427 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2012).  Finally, “[a]s far as review of agency imposed sanctions is concerned, there is no doubt of a court’s power of review under the tests of illegality, arbitrariness or abuse of discretion and of its power to impose a lesser or different penalty in appropriate cases. ”  Dep’t of Health v. Tegnazian, 205 N.J. Super. 160, 173 (App. Div. 1985) (quoting Mayflower, 64 N.J. at 173).  POINT II: RESPONDENT DOES NOT ADDRESS ITS VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, NOR ITS VIOLATION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, AND THEREFORE, THOSE ISSUES ARE WAIVED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Contents .........................................................  i  I.  WHETHER THE MASTER DEED CONTEMPTED OR AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF UNIT 74 IS IMMATERIAL TO THE DISPOSITION OF COUNT ONE’S CONSUMER FRAUD CLAIM  ...........................................  1  a.  The Record Below Shows Unit 74 is a Common Element.  . . .  5  b.  Even if the Master Deed authorized the Sale of Unit 74, that ‘authorization’ has no bearing on whether the Developer truthfully represented its quality of title, i.e., committed an unlawful practice ..................................................  6  II.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY REASONS SUPPORTING ITS DISMISSAL OF COUNT  II, AND THE DEFENDANTS’ STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  ARGUMENT IS LEGALLY INCORRECT ...........................................  8  III.  PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT SEEK TO HOLD THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS LIABLE BY ‘PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL’ .................................... 9  Conclusion .................................................................
[brief] Just two days after the Board’s June 13th hearing, Board attorney contacted [...]’s attorneys saying “On the above, I’ll be sitting down to draft the resolution shortly.  To that end, I would invite you to send me your list of submissions (Application, plans (including latest revision date), approvals and other documents and your list of hearing exhibits (Date, exhibit number, brief description), so that nothing is left out. ”  Pa150.  There was a lot involved in accomplishing what was intended, as admitted by [...] counsel in his August 9, 2022, email to the Court Master:  “. . .  Avalon will do the elevator in the final MF family building with the additional units.  But that requires another story to be added, which requires an amended settlement agreement and then an amended ordinance to avoid a D variance.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION NOT TO PUBLISH MS. KNOLL’S CERTIFICATION IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR (T3:1-12:16)**  As set forth above, *O Builders* and Rule 4:10-2(e)(1) specifically authorized the procedure to submit [...]’s Certification *in camera*.  Further, Respondents were provided the general contents of [...]’s Certification, that is, the relative strengths and weaknesses of Petitioners’ position and Petitioners’ settlement posture. \(^{21}\) \(^{20}\) [...]’s subpoena of the scrivener’s file was served during the time after the motion to disqualify him was filed.  [Omitted]  \(^{21}\)  In addition to [...]’s personal thoughts on the matter.  This information is more than enough for Respondents to have responded to same.  In fact, they did in [...]’s Certification wherein he claims, albeit equivocally, that he had “no recollection” and he did “not believe” he discussed substantive strategy with [...], and that he “did not believe he received any confidential information from [...]. ”  Pa151.  On the other hand, [...]’s Certification was unequivocal in providing the specifics of Petitioners’ settlement position and what Respondents should or should not receive from the Estate.  Therefore, because *O Builders* and Rule 4:10-2(e) sanctioned the procedure to submit [...]’s Certification for *in camera* review and Respondents had sufficient information to respond to Petitioners’ Motion to Disqualify, the Trial Court was correct in not publishing [...]’s Certification.
[directive] 1.1  Body Worn Camera (BWC) footage provides objective evidence of what occurred and plays a crucial role in the public discourse around police accountability.  BWCs also serve as a powerful deterrent to misconduct by both the police and members of the public interacting with police.  As such, BWCs have gained wide support among public and law enforcement, alike.  The policies and standards established in this Policy are designed to help police departments achieve an optimal balance between potentially competing interests.
[brief] (Pa 84-86.)  In the context of the adoption of Ordinance 1423-21, the 45-day limitations period could be applied only to the improper introduction of the ordinance in November, 2021.  Claims related to the Planning Board’s special meeting of December 16, 2021, where the ordinance was reviewed, and the Borough Council’s adoption of the ordinance on December 28, 2021, were brought well within the 45-day period established by Rule 4:69-6(a).  The Verified Complaint was filed on January 20, 2022.  (Pa 1.)  The trial court offered no analysis justifying dismissal of the timely filed claims alleging violations of the LRHL and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 in the adoption of Ordinance 1423-21.  Those claims are entitled to de novo hearing before the trial court, particularly since the minutes of the Borough Council meeting of December 28, 2021, reflect there was no record developed at the public hearing on Ordinance 1423-21.
[brief] Ultimately, after a failed vote, the Board chose to reduce the amount suggested by the Chair by 30%.  This reduction was based on past-practice of the Board.  Specifically, Board Member [...] proposed the reduction based on a previous case involving a protected tenant where the Board reduced an equity figure by 30%.  (Id. at 250:14-251:7.)  Board Member [...] persuaded her fellow board members and her method of calculating equity was voted on and adopted.  The Board engaged in a deliberative process in reaching its conclusion.  (Id. at 250:1-273:14.)
[directive] If victim safety.  a victim's the comprise will participation that believes victim the complete to shall undertake officer enforcement law the interview, ODAR.A the in participate ODARA complete information the to instances, such In participation.  victim without ODARA the and of victim the circumstances the about knowledgeable persons from obtained be can of at~~ the the (note: and like databases enforcement law reports, police defendant, not is victim in instances a which those in employed be also can fashion this in information hospitalized).  being as such interview an in participating of capable .. .. .: :. - .: .. :: -.- Prosecutor's Office.
[brief] Wherefore, for the reasons set forth above, this case should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of the value of Lot 19 without disturbing the findings as to Lot 18 or the enhancements from the furniture, fixtures and equipment.  If the court wishes to exercise its original jurisdiction, it could amend the award to conform with the evidence of market rent set forth above.  Respectfully submitted  [...]  A Professional Corporation Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants/Cross Respondents  [...] & [...]  Dated: February 21, 2023.
[brief] A request for backup was made and four other patrol cars arrived.  (1T15-24 to 16-4).  The other occupants were removed from the vehicle, a protective pat down was conducted, and each person was placed in the back of a patrol car.  (1T15-15 to 18).  The officers then searched the vehicle.  (1T17-20 to 18-1).  [...] began his search at the front passenger area.  (1T19-14 to 17).  There, he discovered a cellphone on the front seat passenger floorboard.  (1T19-18 to 20).  [...] then checked underneath the seat and discovered a vial containing marijuana that was located underneath the adjustment bar for the front seat.  (1T19-20 to 20-12).  [...] continued to smell marijuana, so he continued his search of the vehicle.  (1T20-13 to 18).  He then searched the rear of the cabin area, where the odor remained and smelled stronger.  (1T20-19 to 21-20).  [...] did not find any contraband in the rear seat area, and the search continued.  (1T20-21 to 24).  [...] and [...] switched sides and [...] began to search the front driver’s side.  (1T22-9 to 15).  While [...] searched the front driver’s side, [...] searched the front passenger’s side.  (1T22-21 to 23-17).  [...] then signaled that he located a gun underneath the seat.  (1T23-18 to 23).  [...] reached underneath the passenger seat from the front driver’s side and located the handgun, which was located far back underneath the front passenger’s seat.  (1T23-24 to 24-13).  The search of the vehicle continued, but no additional contraband was found.  (1T24-14 to 18).
[brief] The consequence for failing to do so is claim preclusion.  It is neither timely nor, as here, credible, to allege an affirmative defense out of thin air in response to Plaintiff’s Motion.  Defendant argues that N.J.S.A. 12A:3-305(3) permitted the trial court to take notice of the recoupment defense.  Plaintiff notes that statute is part of the Uniform Commercial Code and expressly relates to an “instrument”.  See N.J.S.A. 12A:3-305(a) (“[T]he right to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument[…]”) (emphasis added).  It has no bearing on this revolving credit card account.  Defendant cites to Midlantic National Bank v. Georgian, Ltd., 233 N.J. Super. 621 (Law Div. 1989), but that decision is not binding on this Court.  Moreover, the case is distinguishable because in that case recoupment was timely plead as a counterclaim.
[brief] On May 18, 2022, [...] issued an Initial Decision recommending that [...] grant [...]’s Petition to construct the proposed Project at [...].  (Aa92-93).  [...] considered the parties’ extensive submissions and testimonial evidence on the need for the proposed Project, the site selection process, the Project’s impact on property values, the Project’s impact on the environment, [...]’s applicability to the Project, and the Project’s effect on Holmdel’s community zone plan and zoning ordinance.  (Aa68-69; Aa72; Aa77; Aa80; Aa85).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING DURING AND THEREFORE DEPRIVED DEFENDANTS OF THE OPPRTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE CONDEMNATION.  (Raised below: 1T24)  The importance of affording property owners a full and fair opportunity to protect their property from government overreach is best summarized as follows:  It must be remembered that the power to take property through eminent domain is one of the most intrusive aspects of sovereignty.  Historically, land has been both the basis and symbol of wealth and still occupies a special place in our law.  Real estate is also frequently irreplaceable because of its uniqueness.  Thus, the state should not be heard to complain when the property owner seeks the fullest vindication of the rights of ownership.  [State by Com’r of Transp. v. D’Onofrio, 235 N.J. Super 348, 353 (Law Div. 1989)]  As a result of an objection to the right to take, the Court must first determine whether the Township properly exercised its powers of eminent domain.  N.J.S.A. 20:3-8; State v. N.J. Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 572 (1963); State v. Orenstein, 124 N.J. Super. 295, 298 (App. Div. 1973).  That process includes a full evidentiary hearing when any party objects to the right to condemn.  R. 4:67-5.  Bergen Cnty., supra, 39 N.J. at 380-81.  Indeed, the adjudication of the right to condemn is a final adjudication.  N.J.S.A. 20:3-2(j); R. 2:2-3; State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Hess Realty Corp., 226 N.J. Super. 256, 261 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 383, aff’d, 115 N.J. 229 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989); N.J. Zinc, supra, 40 N.J. at 572; Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Hirschfield, 38 N.J. Super. 132 (App. Div. 1955); Twp. of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 285 N.J. Super. 436, 440 n.1 (App. Div. 1955), rev’d on other grounds, 150 N.J. 111 (1996).  As such, the summary nature of condemnation proceedings “should not be construed as in any way precluding the condemnee from an appropriate opportunity to object to the proposed condemnation. ”  Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, cmt. on R. 4:73-1 (citing *Bergen Cnty. v. S. Goldberg & Co.*, 39 N.J. 377 (1963)).  Where there is an objection to the right to take and the property owner challenges the public use assertion by the condemnor, there must be an evidentiary process.
[brief] In or about June 2016, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, Chancery Division, naming the [...], [...], and [...] as Defendants.  (Pa27a, ¶13).  The matter was subsequently transferred to the Law Division where it was assigned Docket Number [...].  (Ibid.).  That action, hereinafter referred to as the “First Lawsuit,” remains pending and is currently scheduled for trial on October 16, 2023.  (Pa34a, ¶50).  More than five years later, on or about September 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the instant matter.  The instant matter is hereinafter referred to as the “Second Lawsuit,” naming as defendants The [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and John Doe Administrators, Staff, and Board Members.
[brief] .................................................................26  E.  Even If the Bid Instructions Required the Archaeology Subcontractor to be Registered under the PWCRA, This Requirement Is Waivable or Curable under the River Vale Test (0017a-0018a)  ..............................................................................28  F.  A PWCRA-Registered Entity with an Archaeology Department Is Not Necessarily a PWCRA-Registered Archaeologist (0017a-0018a)
[directive] the administration imposes Directive limitations justice throughout  This limitations enforcement law restrictive officials that more than the may and on agencies be state federal Constitutions, United New Jersey under and and and the States imposed create in way any to regulations.  this shall statutes construed Directive and Nothing in be any substantive that right third enforced party. may be by any B.  Severahility.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.
[brief] Section 7, governing Redevelopment Plan approvals, merely has the Planning Board provide the Governing Body with its “recommendation” as to the Redevelopment Plan, with the Governing Body having the ability to “approve or disapprove or change any recommendation” provided by the Planning Board.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  Thus, it is the Governing Body’s approval of a redevelopment plan, and not the Planning Board’s “recommendation,” that is subject to challenge.
[brief] 12  I.  THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT PROPERLY EXERCISE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS IN NEW JERSEY (Da10–15)  ........................................................................................................  12  A.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That Transient Jurisdiction Was Obtained Over Defendants in New Jersey (Da11–13)  ........................................................................................................  14  B.  The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That Defendants Are Subject to General Jurisdiction In New Jersey (Da13–14)  ............  17  C.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That It Has Specific Jurisdiction Over Defendants (Da14)  .........................................................  21  D.  Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Would Also Offend Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice (Da14–15)  ..................................................  26  II.  PLAINTIFF WAS BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION IN NEW JERSEY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (Da15–17)  .................................................................  27  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[brief] Drb13  Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1982)  Drb2  Higgs v. Attorney General of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2011)  Drb13  Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2002)  Drb13  Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1999)  Drb14  In re Jones, 122 B.R. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1990)  Drb9  In re Lobasso, 423 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2012)  Drb3, Drb4 Jacobs v. N.J. State Highway Authority, 54 N.J. 393 (N.J. 1969)