ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], Esq.  (ID # 049081998)  [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto**, 477 N.J. Super 339 (December 4, 2023) | 1-12 | | **City of East Orange v. Kynor**, 383 N.J. Super. 639, 646 (App. Div 2006) | 4 | | **Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.**, 96 N.J. 419 (1984) | 5 | | **Dvorkin v. Dover Tp.**, 29 N.J. 303 (1959) | 12 | | **Fair v. Continental Resources**, 143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023) | 7 | | **First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty.**, 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987) | 6 | | **Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Tax'n**, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) | 5,6 | | **Hartford Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.**, 68 N.J. 430 (1977) | 4,5 | | **I.E.'s, LLC v. Simmons**, 392 N.J. Super. 520 (Law Div. 2006) | 9 | | **In re Virella**, Case No. 23-12179; Adversary No. 24-1084 (June 18, 2024) | 7,8 | | **Nieveen v. Tax 106, No. 22-237 (U.S. 2023)** | 7 | | **Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde**, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) | 6 | | **Simon v. Cronecker**, 189 N.J. 304, 315 (2007) | 10 | | **State v. Adkins**, 221 N.J. 300, 313 (2015) | 5 | | **Tyler v. Hennepin County**, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (May 25, 2023) | 1-12 |
[brief] (Ca037).  The Commission’s long history of applying a censure regarding school board member social media use which tends to compromise the school board obviously passes constitutional muster.  While Respondent has failed to make a coherent First Amendment argument or to identify the standard of scrutiny that applies, a mere censure is clearly the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interest (the Legislature called it “essential”) in upholding the public trust placed in boards of education.  As a result, even if Respondent had articulated its First Amendment argument in a manner that comports with constitutional law, it would have failed.  See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).  The New Jersey Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly upheld codes of ethics for public officials, including New Jersey’s Code of Judicial Conduct, to which Your Honors are subject.  The compelling government interest cited in those decisions is the public’s trust in those institutions.  See, e.g., In re DiLeo, 216 N.J. 449, 471 (2014) (“Consideration of the public’s perception of the judiciary is not new to the judicial discipline process.  It lies at the core of the Code of Judicial Conduct. ”).  The penalty of censure is regularly applied in those cases.  See, e.g., In re Perskie, 207 N.J. 275 (2011).  Lastly, the Appellate Division’s decision in this matter will have widespread consequences in school districts across the State of New Jersey.  If the Commission is allowed to simply ignore well over a decade of its own well-established caselaw, there will no longer be any mechanism for holding school board members accountable for their actions which compromise the school boards on which they sit.
[brief] *In re Camden Cnty.*, 170 N.J. 439, 449, 790 A.2d 158 (2002); *In re Tp. of Howell*, 254 N.J. Super. 411, 416, 603 A.2d 959 (App.Div. 1991); *New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm'n*, 82 N.J. 57, 67, 411 A.2d 168 (1980); *Crescent Pk. Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp.*, 58 N.J. 98, 107, 275 A.2d 433 (1971).  [...] argued that my sister and I lacked standing, because we only had an “inchoate interest” in our mom’s car (Pa12, ¶9) – however the New Jersey Supreme Court has expressly held that an “inchoate interest” is sufficient to confer standing.
[brief] Furthermore, commencing adversarial litigation against [...] for rent, ejectment, and legal fees created a conflict between the Trustee’s fiduciary and personal interests, violating the Trustee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-55.  Moreover, commencing adversarial litigation against [...], but not [...], who was occupying the entire Florida Property rent-free and later paid below-market rent of $500 per month, violated the Trustee’s fiduciary duty to act impartially in managing and distributing Trust property, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-56.  This unequal treatment demonstrates partiality and failure to act equitably.
[brief] 7a.  It gave no basis for reinstatement and attached a false certification of service listing an address where Defendant did not live and named an attorney who never appeared in the case.  On April 6, 2019, the defendant filed an opposition by special appearance to object to reinstatement and she notified the court that it issued two unlawful judgments against her based on the plaintiff’s previous false filings.  On April 6, 2019, the plaintiff filed a reply arguing that plaintiff never addressed jurisdiction raised in defendant’s opposition papers, but instead accused unrelated lawyers of providing addresses for the defendant, accusing the defendant of “moving at her whim” and misrepresented that he “produced copies of the certified mail return receipts” as his proof the complaint was served.  Plaintiff never produced a return receipt for mail service of a complaint, and the only document uploaded was on April 23, 2019 by the clerk, not the plaintiff, which is not a proof of service.  On May 31, 2022, the court filed an order reinstating and simultaneously issuing a judgment against the defendant for $4,600.00 by claiming that since she availed herself of the Fee Arbitration process then “defendant is subject to the court rule allowing the reduction of the Arbitration Determination to a judgment.
[brief] Defendants should be given the opportunity to present their views before they found themselves bound by the court’s edict. \(^1\)  In addition, to decide if a miscarriage of justice has occurred, the reviewing court gives deference to the trial court with respect to factors that are not apparent in the record on appeal such as the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.  Beyond those considerations, a reviewing court may independently scrutinize the record in order to determine whether the result was just.  See Kimmel v. Dayrit, 301 N.J.Super. 334, 693 A.2d 1287 (App. Div. 1997), Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360–61, 396 A.2d 561 (1979); Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597–98, 379 A.2d 225 (1977); N.J. Ct. R. 2:10-1.  Plaintiff Respondent missed this point altogether in the Point I of the brief in opposition.
[brief] 11.  As more fully described in the accompanying testimony of [...] (Exhibit P-1), the operational need for the Regulator Station arises from [...]’s 2012 upgrade of the transmission line in Holmdel.  Specifically, in 2012, as part of its efforts to continually upgrade and modernize its system, [...] replaced the existing transmission line located in Holmdel due to its age and to comply with federal pipeline integrity requirements.  The upgraded transmission line has a maximum allowable operating pressure (“MAOP”) of 722 psig.  12.  The newly upgraded transmission system connects to [...]’s local distribution system, which operates at approximately 100 psig.  The Regulator Station is needed to adequately, safely and reliably accomplish the more than 600 psig reduction in gas pressure between the transmission system and the distribution system, so that pressure is reduced for the safe and efficient delivery of gas to [...]’s local customers.
[directive] Accordingly, it is ORDERED, pursuant to N.J. Const. Art. VI, sec. 2., par. 3 that effective immediately, and until further order, Rule 3:5-3 ("Issuance and of of of Contents") the Rules Governing the Courts the State New Jersey is supplemented and relaxed so as to remove the requirement that the applicant for a or search warrant either must appear personally before the judge telephonically to provide sworn oral testimony to a Superior Court judge who must record the testimony and to provide that instead the applicant for a search warrant may transmit to a Superior Court judge electronically an application that includes a of certification in lieu oath in accordance with Rule I :4-4(b ), and the Superior of Court judge may authorize issuance the warrant electronically.  It is FURTHER ORDERED, effective immediately and until further order, that Rules 3:5-3, 3:5-5, and 3:5-6 are specifically supplemented and relaxed to remove the requirements that (1) a search warrant direct that the executed warrant be returned to the issuing judge, (2) the return and any inventory be delivered to of the issuing judge following execution the search warrant, and (3) the issuing of in judge file documents with the criminal division manager's office or, the case in search warrants described Rule 3 :5-6(b the wiretap judge; and instead, for the }, of duration the COVID-19 public health crisis and until further order, the county of (1) prosecutor the issuing county shall be responsible for retaining the executed and search wan-ant, any inventory, any other accompanying documents, (2) of complying with any request for a copy the inventory as authorized by Rule 3:5- of 5(a), and (3) providing all search wan-ant inf01mation to the defendant as pa1i discovery pursuant to Rule 3: 13-3.  ~
[brief] (Pra 5, 7).  Thus, the trial court assessment of attorneys’ fees against [...] was 7.9% of [...]’s total fees.  [...]’s currently allocates share of [...] indemnify costs is 6.4%.  (Pa 42).  [...] was one of only two remaining defendants between 2015 and 2021 and has been the sole remaining defendant since then.  Considering this, the slightly higher allocation of attorneys’ fees to [...], when compared to the allocation of indemnity costs, is more than equitable.  [...]’s argument is correct on one point – [...] did not strictly follow one of the two allocation methods described in *Empower our Neighborhoods*.  However, the trial court has broad discretion to apportion recoverable attorneys’ fees to reach an equitable result.  In this case, the trial court “fastidiously examined and applied the controlling authority and decisions pertinent to the resolution achieved and did not overlook any matters that had been raised by the Defendant. ” (Pa 220).  The trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees in this case was a proper exercise of its discretion.
[directive] If I am arrested or detained in any other state or jurisdiction within the United States while I am on this term of probation, my signature below shall be deemed to be a waiver of extradition.  Probationer Address: Probationer Date Telephone: Date of Birth: Driver's License Number: Social Security Number  Probation Officer Date Revised: 03/2007, CN: 10973-English page 2 of 2  Nombre y apellido de la persona bajo libertad a Poder Judicial de Nueva Jersey  prueba: Probationer Name: Condiciones Normales de Libertad a Prueba de Adultos  No. del expediente del caso: No. de la causa:  Case File Number: Docket Number: New Jersey Judiciary Standard Conditions  Fecha de la orden: Order Date: of Adult  Probation  Creyendo que usted es capaz de llevar en la comunidad una vida útil y respetuosa de las leyes, el juez lo ha sentenciado a libertad a prueba por un período de , que comenzará el .  Mientras esté bajo libertad a prueba, estará bajo la supervision de un oficial de libertad a prueba.  Se requiere que usted cumpla con las condiciones de libertad a prueba que figuran a continuación.  The Court, believing that you are capable of living a useful and law-abiding life in the community, has sentenced you to probation for a period of , beginning .
[brief] C.  The Court Applied the Wrong Standard When It Failed To Subject the Circumstances Surrounding the Making of the Will to Careful Scrutiny or Afford Respondent Any Reasonable Inferences (12T177:7 to 178:11)  When granting Respondent’s motion for a directed verdict, the Court failed to apply the standards governing motions under R.4:40-1, and disregarded all the evidence presented by Petitioner and failed to afford Petitioner any favorable inferences.  (P9-P35).  The Court also limited its review of the facts to the very narrow period time that the will was executed:  I find that [...]’s testimony and [...]’s testimony very credible as to the making of the will and how the will was made and the timing of the will.  I haven’t found any evidence at all that there was any undue influence by [Respondent] as to the making of that will.  The will was signed.  Its properly notarized.  It’s witnessed by two people.  Its proper and it’s authenticated under the law.  (12T 177:14 to 178:11).  The narrow scope of review was erroneous as a matter of law.  It is not necessary to prove that undue influence was exercised at the exact time of execution of the will.  *In re Raynolds' Estate*, 132 N.J. Eq. 141, 151-52 (Prerog. Ct. 1942), aff’d, 133 N.J. Eq. 344 (E. & A. 1943).  "Whenever exerted, whether months or years before, [the undue influence] must still be operative upon the testator's mind in the very act of executing the instrument and be an effective cause of the disposition made therein."  *Id.* at 152.  A will which on its face appears to be validly executed, can be overturned if it is tainted by "undue influence."  *Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank*, 87 N.J. 163, 175-76 (1981).  Here, in contravention of the standards governing a directed verdict, the Court failed to subject all the evidence presented at trial to careful scrutiny to determine if suspicious circumstances were present.  Rather, the Court presented an Opinion that disregards the competent, substantial and credible evidence in the record and rather, relies on hearsay and lay opinions without foundation that it cherry picked to support its predetermined rulings.  P9a to P35a.  D.
[brief] Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 770 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that “[t]reatment options for individuals with gender dysphoria” include “changes in gender expression and role (which may involve living . . . in another gender role, consistent with one’s gender identity”); Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. noting that “[t]reatment forms [for gender dysphoria] currently include . . . [c]hanges in gender expression and role (which may involve living . . . in another gender role, consistent with one’s gender identity”); Koe v. Noggle, No. 1:23-CV- 2904-SEG, 2023 WL 5339281, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2023) (noting that “gender dysphoria treatment plans include therapy, support, and assistance with elements of a social transition”); Doe v. Horne, No. CV-23-00185-TUC-JGZ, 2023 WL 4661831, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2023) (“Undergoing treatment to alleviate gender dysphoria is commonly referred to as ‘transition’ and includes . . . social transition . . . .”); Monroe v. Meeks, 584 F. Supp. 3d 643, 678 (S.D. Ill. 2022) (holding that “[s]ocial transition . . . is a medically necessary component of treatment for some . . . with gender dysphoria”); Pinson v. Hadaway, No. 18-CV-3420-NEB-KMM, 2020 WL 6121357, at *1 (D. Minn. July 13, 2020) (noting that “[g]ender dysphoria treatment can involve . . . social transition”); Porter v.
[directive] The first was Rule 4, which prohibited licensees from allowing on their premises “any known criminals, gangsters, racketeers, pick-pockets, swindlers, confidence men, prostitutes, female impersonators, or other person of ill repute. ”  The second was Rule 5, which among other things prohibited a place of business from being conducted “in such manner as to become a nuisance,” and was later amended to expressly prohibit “lewdness and immoral activities” and “foul, filthy, indecent, or obscene language or conduct.
[brief] [...] SUBMITTED UNCONTROVERTED MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION PURSUANT TO N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(d) IN SUPPORT OF HIS LEAVING WORK FOR GOOD CAUSE RELATED TO THE EMPLOYMENT.  (Pa1; Pa3)  “When an individual leaves work for health or medical reasons, medical certification shall be required to support a finding of good cause attributable to work. ”  N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(d).  Although the regulation does not outline the specifics of the medical documentation to be submitted in support of a finding of good cause attributable to work, the Court has found that a claimant must demonstrate “through uncontroverted medical evidence, that [his] disease has been and will be aggravated by the [work] environment,” and this clearly “constitutes ‘good cause. ’”  Israel v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 283 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App Div. 1995).  The Board has taken the position that [...] provided no proof of his medical condition to the Board or to the employer.
[directive] A.  Chosen Name: A name selected by a person for themselves that is different from the name the person was given at birth.  An individual may have chosen a new name for themselves that more accurately reflects their gender identity or expression.  B.  Chosen Pronouns: The pronouns that a person chooses to use for themselves in line with their gender identity.  For example, “she/her” for an individual who requests she/her pronouns; “he/his” for an individual who requests he/his pronouns; and “they/them” for an individual who requests they/them pronouns.
[brief] e. Defendant’s alleged failure to provide Plaintiff access to the books and records.  (3T88:15-20) (Plf.’s brief at 35-36).  The citation to the record by Plaintiff here does not support this contention.  The jury heard ample evidence that Plaintiff had full access to the account of the Pharmacy.  Plaintiff had full access to the pharmacy’s [...] business checking account, could write checks, make deposits or withdrawal, use the debit card attached to that account, and had full on-line access to the account, which was the only account the pharmacy had.  (1T44:7-11; 2T27:11-15; 2T37:24-38:1; 3T42:21-43:11).  The credit cards—AMEX, Chase, and Discover—that were paid by the pharmacy were all accounts of the Plaintiff, with Plaintiff having authorized cards for each account being also issued in Defendant’s name.  (2T33:21-34:23; 3T50:12-23).  Plaintiff had unbridled access to the financial records of [...].  Additionally, Defendant testified that, in June 2019, just after the sale of [...] to [...], Defendant attempted to sit down with Plaintiff to reconcile all the credit card statements and expenses.  (3T51:14-52:4; 3T60:25-61:24).  At the last meeting between the parties, Plaintiff took all the documents into his possession, including all of the credit card statements, all the papers from the accountant, and the notes they put on the papers—he [Plaintiff] took everything.  (3T60:19-24; 3T143:6-12).  f.
[brief] (Da35; 2T28:1-18).  In support of its rulings, the court cited its prior April 1, 2021 decision, which not only denied leave to file an amended complaint but expressly denied the right to file any additional motions for leave to amend.  (2T25:23-26:12, 2T28:1-18).  On May 30, 2023, the court granted the [...]’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding the complaint to be lacking in form and substance and describing it as “incomprehensible” and “impossible for a defendant to respond appropriately.
[brief] ”  Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. at 474 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964)).  The trial court determined that there was an “unfair surprise” in [...] filing this motion for leave three days before trial began, (1T127:8-11),\(^8\) and the shortened timeframe was not “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to warrant amendment, (1T126:22-24).  Of course, “extraordinary circumstances” is not the requisite standard of review, and so it was an abuse of discretion to hold [...] to that level when leave to amend a pleading is to be liberally granted.  In fact, as far as counsel can tell, such a motion has never been denied when made prior to trial in an election contest.
[brief] Courts may “only turn to extrinsic evidence in limited circumstances, such as when ‘there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation’” or when “a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. ”  Ibid. (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  The first sentence of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 provides as follows:  “No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section 39:4-123, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway, or start or back a vehicle unless and until such movement can be made with safety. ” (emphasis added).  The second sentence provides that “[n]o person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement. ”  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  The statute also provides that “[n]o person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear. ”  Ibid.  The statute then offers guidance as to how to signal an intention to turn left, turn right, and stop or decrease speed.  *Ibid.*  As the plain language makes clear, a signal is required whenever a vehicle stops or decreases speed, and a signal is required when a vehicle “turn[s]” if the turn could affect other traffic.
[brief] ”  Tymczyszyn v. Columbus Gardens, 422 N.J. Super. 253, 264 (App. Div. 2011).  The Defendant created the unsafe dangerous condition.  Therefore, notice is inapplicable and not required.  There was evidence that the dangerous condition should have been discovered by the exercise of due care.  See N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b).  The jury was charged on a notice question and was specifically asked by jury interrogatory the question as to whether the Defendant had constructive notice of the dangerous condition, and the jury answered yes.  Consistent with Plaintiff’s Counsel arguments [6T118:2-21 & 6T87:6 to 88:13] the Trial Court on the Motion for New trial correctly concluded that “[t]here was sufficient evidence by which a reasonable jury concluded there was constructive notice of the dangerous condition….  There was evidence of constructive notice and the jury was thoroughly instructed with regard to the law relative to that issue and the jury concluded there was constructive notice.  [8T16:14 to 17:17]  The Defendant’s appeal should be rejected.
[brief] The court excluded the supporting documents request by way of the defendant’s subpoena duces tecum\textsuperscript{48} directed to the plaintiff’s witness, [...].  [...] appeared in front of the defendant confirming his whereabouts of the alleged incident dates verbally and without tangible supporting documentation.  In addition, the defendant submitted multiple motions for discovery, under the direction of the lower court, due to the plaintiff’s failure to make discovery, allowing defendant to properly prepare for trial.  The plaintiff finally obliged to the defendant’s request but in partiality.  When the defendant brought this to the attention of the lower court, it was deemed the defendant discovery request is a “fishing expedition.\textsuperscript{49}”  According to Rule 37 (a)(2)
[brief] As [...] also points out, the Planning Board is “ORDINARILY” [emphasis added] where the basic record made.  *Id.*, at 162.  Thus, supplementing the prerogative writ record may be allowed.  *Id.*  Here that record should include not only the Planning Board transcript but also the WARD memo presented to both the ______________________ plaintiffs’ exhibits was explicitly and previously identified for the convenience of the Trial Judge.