ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] (See Da31)  The certification only asserted the statement that the PSA does not reference all the terms in the Chinese agreements.  This seems to be an accurate description of the situation on its face.  However, the recipient, which was the Court, at the time to decide the motion to vacate the PSA may reasonably interpret as an implied statement that it was Defendant [...]’s willfulness to fail to include all the terms in the Chinese agreements to the PSA for the purpose to manipulate Plaintiff [...] in the [...] v. [...] matter.  As demonstrated above, this was actually the situation.  In In the Matter of Jack L. Seelig, 180 N.J. 234 (2004), the Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized that RPC 3.3(a)(5) states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge that the tribunal may tend to be misled by such failure.
[brief] For another, discovery in the PIP arbitration process is non-existent.  [...]’s Rules do not provide for the types of discovery that a party bringing (or defending) a large and complex case alleging IFPA violations would require to prove (or rebut) the allegations and penalties that are being sought.  Beyond N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13, discovery is otherwise highly curtailed in a PIP arbitration.
[brief] An explanation for the disparate treatment of in-court and out-of-court identification is offered by *Domina*:  “[w]hen the initial identification is in court, there are different considerations [than those implicated in a pretrial identification].  The jury can observe the witness during the identification process and is able to evaluate the reliability of the initial identification. ”  784 F.2d at 1368.  A hearing on the suggestiveness of the identification is thus not required.  Testimony is admissible subject only to the normal rules of evidence which permit only relevant, probative, and competent evidence to be considered by the fact-finder.  *State v. Chen*, 208 N.J. 307, 318–19 (2011).
[brief] To which [...] would add, neither are those state entities allowed to tacitly endorse the discrimination, harassment and retaliation by their employees, managers, etc. by ignoring both Motions and ADA Complaints about discrimination.  See Evans v. Ross, 57 N.J. Super. 223, 231 (App. Div. 1959) (noting that once "a proprietor extends his invitation to the public he must treat all members of the public alike"), certif. denied, 31 N.J. 292 (1959); Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort, 333 N.J. Super. 206, 216 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 166 N.J. 606 (2000) ("It is unquestionably a violation of the LAD for the owner or operator of a public accommodation to tell a person, either directly or indirectly, that his or her patronage is not welcome because of a trait or condition which the LAD protects from discriminatory action, even though use of the facility on the particular occasion is not denied."); Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super. 186, 213 (App. Div. 2003) (it was "for a jury to determine whether the racial insults were in fact uttered by defendant and, if so, whether they were designed to discourage plaintiff's use of a public accommodation on that day or in the future because of her race."); Davis v. Torres & Rite-Aid, No. A-1951-10T4 (App. Div. 2012) (Employee clearly treated “white” customers better than minorities; no liability when store apologized, forced employee to apologize and when store assisted minorities in making formal complaint, which led to employee termination about 3 weeks after incident; important point: “ability to shop at Rite Aid was not ultimately impaired”). Certainly, [...]’s use of the courts as an (involuntary) litigant was “impaired” multiple times.
[brief] The following Counterstatement of Facts is submitted for the purpose of this Opposition to Appellants’ Appeal and should not be deemed an admission nor an adopted admission by [...]. --- 1  The factual background and procedural history of this matter are intertwined and therefore, presented together.  Plaintiffs initiated the within action on August 28, 2023, wherein they allege that [...] retained [...] Adanas, P.C. in the Fall of 2008 to assist her in creating a charitable not for profit entity, [...].  (Pa 1).  Notably, the Complaint in the instant matter was not properly served and thereafter an Amended Complaint was filed (alleging the same claims) on January 23, 2024.  (Pa 7).  Nevertheless, on October 3, 2008, [...] filed a Certificate of Incorporation with the New Jersey Division of Revenue in Trenton, New Jersey incorporating [...] Inc.  (Pa 7; Pa 29).  The Certificate of Incorporation listed [...] as both a Trustee and as the Registered Agent of [...], Inc.  (Pa30).  On March 25, 2014, the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General issued a Notice of Unregistered Charitable Organization to [...], via certified mail, stating that [...] was not properly registered as a charitable organization with the State of New Jersey and that Plaintiffs’ “failure to satisfy the registration may result in further action by the [AG]”.  (Pa 35; Pa 39).  On March 30, 2014, [...] signed for the Notice of Unregistered Charitable Organization on behalf of [...].  (Pa 37)  According to the Amended Complaint, in 2020, the AG Office initiated the AG Action as against [...] and [...] “for failing to file and register as a charitable entity with the Consumer Affairs Division of the Attorney General’s Office and for failing to follow specific statutes and regulations governing charitable entities in the State of New Jersey. ” (Pa 7).  In response to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer on the basis that Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations.  (Pa 10).  On May 31, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.  (Pa 83).  The Trial Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations under New Jersey law.  (T1, 15:7-17:10).  Specifically, [...] found:  The record shows that the notice (indiscernible) stated March 25th, 2014 (indiscernible) certified mail return receipt requested (indiscernible).  In this notice plaintiff was advised, failure to satisfy the registration may result in further action by the division.  Until registration requirements are met your organization is not properly registered with the State of New Jersey.  At this point plaintiff became aware that her organization was not registered or may not have been registered as a charitable organization.  At this (indiscernible) plaintiff was aware or should have become aware that plaintiff was aware of defendants legal malpractice.  [T1, 13:1-14].  The Appellants now appeal the Trial Court’s decision to dismiss its Amended Complaint.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] THERE WAS NO RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE BOARD OR THE TOWNSHIP DEFAULTED ON AN OBLIGATION SET FORTH IN THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, NOR ANY FACTUAL BASIS FOR ANY SUCH RULING.  [1T60-1 to 62-2]  The Settlement Agreement may only be enforced based on its terms; the court may not rewrite a better contract for the parties than the parties made for themselves.  Pennbar Corp. v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 976 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Community Medical Ctr., 623 F.2d 864, 866 (3d Cir.1980); Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 46 (1960).  The Settlement Agreement contemplated that the [...] project be presented to the Planning Board for review.  The Settlement Agreement did not, and could not, consistent with law, require the Planning Board to approve the development application as it was presented to the Planning Board.  That process requires presentation at a public hearing convened for that purpose.  See generally, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12 and N.J.S.A. 10:4-6.  [...] does not and cannot argue that there was an obligation to approve any specific application.  [...] instead argues that the Township Defendants breached a duty to cooperate with [...] in obtaining the “Required Approvals” and “Government Approvals”.  A duty “to cooperate” is not a duty “to approve” as that certainly would have been against public policy to mandate approval by the Planning Board.  [...] argues in this motion that the elevator is not required under the Uniform Construction Code and, thus, it may not be a condition of the development approval.  However, the Uniform Construction Code sets forth the minimum standards for construction; development approvals may require compliance with higher standards.  See Cherry Hill Towers, L.L.C. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 407 F.Supp.2d 648, 653 (D.N.J. 2006).  There is nothing - and as a matter of public policy, can be nothing - in the Settlement Agreement that mandated the Planning Board approve the [...] project as requested.
[brief] They located defendant’s brother, [...], who lived in [...].  (4T:64-13 to 18; 65-5 to 66-14).  At approximately 5:30 a.m., detectives went to [...]’s home.  At that time, he did now know the whereabouts of his brother.  However, at approximately 6:30 a.m., [...] contacted detectives and informed them that his brother was at a cousin’s house in [...], and gave police the address.  (4T:69-9 to 71-1; 72-7 to 73-15).  Detectives immediately went to that location.  Upon arrival, police observed a long driveway leading up to the residence and protruding from behind a horse trailer was a white Impala.  Police believed this was the Impala they were looking for.  (4T:73-19 to 74-3; 95-2 to 98-5).
[brief] This case has a long and tortuous history; the disastrous impact of the Trial Court's rulings after the August 16, 2016 Summary Judgment Order (Da170) was entered finding a permanent parking easement existed is clear.  The Trial Court then decided at an August 31, 2016 Case Management Conference to hold a hearing “to determine issues regarding parking and utilization of the Fifth and Sixth Street parking lots” and other issues.  (Da172)  It cannot reasonably be disputed that the Sixth Street courtyard in front of this 400-student grade school is an unsafe and improper off-site “parking facility” for the [...].
[brief] (3T 61-14 to 62-2)  What’s more, police had not verified the tip, as they had yet to see [...] do anything patently criminal. \(^7\)  Essentially, then, police stopped [...] based on his apparent association with an individual who rents a storage unit with another individual who, according to an unverified tip, may have been using the unit to store illegal contraband.  This connection is far too attenuated to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.  See Rivera, 276 N.J. Super. at 352 (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91) (explaining that the reasonableness of a search “cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists --- \(^6\)
[brief] A trial judge shall grant a motion for a new trial if, "having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law."  R. 4:49-1(a); Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969).  "A motion for a new trial may be grant, . . . [even though] the state of the evidence would not justify a [JNOV]."  Judge v. Blackfin Yacht Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 418, 424 (App. Div. 2003).  "[T]he standard for authorizing a new trial [is] one that requires a determination that the jury's verdict [be] 'contrary to the weight of the evidence or clearly the product of mistake, passion, prejudice or partiality.'"  Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 512 (1994) (quoting Lanzet, 126 N.J. at 175).  If an error is confined to certain issues, then a court should grant a partial new trial; if the error tainted the entire verdict, then a court should order a new trial on all the issues.  See Negron v. Melchiorre, Inc., 389 N.J. Super. 70, 84-85 (App. Div. 2006); see also Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. P.M. Video Corp., 322 N.J. Super. 74, 111 (App. Div. 1999) (stating that a new trial on damages can be ordered if the issue is "distinct and separable from the issue of liability") (quoting Juliano v. Abeles, 114 N.J.L.  510, 512 (1935)).  "'The standard for appellate review of a trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial is substantially the same as that controlling the trial court except that due deference should be made to its "feel of the case" including credibility.'"  Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 432 (1994) (quoting Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 463 (1984)); see also Johnson v. Scaccetti, 192 N.J. 256, 282 (2007).  Aside from a consideration of these "intangible[s]," a court must make its own independent determination of whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred.  Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360-61 n.2 (1979).
[brief] Rather defense counsel's arguments — under no uncertain terms — pointed the finger directly at [...] as the shooter.  (3T:50-22 to 51-5; 52-19 to 21; 53-21 to 54-3; 9T:29-23 to 30-24; 33-15 to 25; 37-14 to 25).  Diminished capacity was not a key defense strategy.  For these reasons, the court was not required to charge the jury on diminished capacity.  The jury was properly instructed on the mens rea, not only for murder, but also for the lesser included offenses.  As such, there is no reversible error.  POINT III
[brief] ARGUMENT  Plaintiff’s response brief does not address Defendants’ abuse of discretion arguments or explain how the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion to reopen.  Plaintiff instead argues that Defendants have no right to attorneys’ fees under UPEPA because they purportedly failed to follow the applicable procedural requirements and because this action does not fall within the statute’s scope.  Plaintiff’s failure to defend the reasoning of the decision below is a concession that it was an abuse of discretion to deny Defendants’ motion.  Plaintiff’s arguments are, moreover, meritless.  The trial court’s decision should be reversed.
[brief] LACHES IS AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE THAT SHOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED TO BAR A MATTER FROM BEING HEARD ON THE MERITS  As explained in [...]’s opening Brief, “laches is an equitable doctrine” which may only be enforced when the allegedly prejudiced party acted in good faith.  Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417 (2012); Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169,  Further, a finding of prejudice is an indispensable requirement of laches.  “The mere passage of time, of course, does not constitute laches . . . laches consists of two elements: Inexcusable delay . . . and prejudice to the respondent resulting from such delay.
[brief] A.  [...] Deliberately Omit Critical Components of the Appellate Division’s Narrow Remand Mandate for Plaintiffs’ Fee Applications.........................................................................................................................25  B.  The Trial Court and the Special Master Complied with the Appellate Division’s Remand Mandate.  ..................................................28  IV.  THE WILFS CANNOT RELITIGATE THE TRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON LIABILITY, WHICH THE APPELLATE DIVISION AFFIRMED, AND THEIR EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT DURING THE LIMITATIONS
[brief] This material issue of fact remained open at the time of the trial court’s Order for “Final Judgment” against [...].  (3)  Finally, there continues to be a dispute as to whether the content of the intermodal was “bunker oil” (a hazardous substance) or “waste oil” (non-hazardous).  (PPCIa442).  [...] alleged that the [...] trailer contained “bunker oil,” a hazardous substance, but [...] has disputed that allegation and instead contends that the intermodal contained “waste oil. ” (Compare, PPCIa054 and PPCIa137-38).  Indeed, [...] questioned the make-up of the petroleum constituent that the [...] trailer was carrying.  (See generally, PPCIa426-32).  This issue is significant as to potential coverage under the Prime Policy.  D.
[brief] Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012).  It is well-settled in New Jersey that summary judgment “must be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law. ”
[brief] The [...] respectfully maintains that the decision of the [...] to adopt a second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plant was justified, and consistent with the provisions of New Jersey Law.  Towards that end, the Planning Board respectfully adopts and incorporates the arguments of the Defendant / Respondent [...] in the said regard.  POINT 2  THE RESPONDENT PLANNING BOARD DECISION (HOLDING THAT THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO THE BEACHWAY AVENUE WATERFRONT REDEVELOPMENT PLAN WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE BOROUGH’S MASTER PLAN)  COMPLIED WITH ALL PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF NEW JERSEY LAW.
[brief] Db17.  First, it is an unreported decision that is not precedential and has not been followed or cited since its holding.  There, the defendant timely moved to dismiss “pursuant to the arbitration clause” just one month after the complaint was filed - unlike here, where [...] waited six years.  *Del. River Partners, LLC v. R.R. Constr.*, A-2613-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1134 at *1-2 (App. Div. June 24, 2022).  Also, unlike here, there was no service of suit provision.  To the contrary, there was a clear three-step process that the parties “shall have the rights set forth in” the arbitration clause if negotiations failed to resolve “any dispute. ”  *Id.* at 10-11.  Thus, unlike *Del. River Partners*, reading this Policy’s provisions in its entirety does not evince [...]’s “clear intent to waive the right to sue in court.
[brief] The Trial Court incorrectly relied in part on Atl. City Superior Officers' Ass'n v.  City of Atl. City, No. A-3117-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1194 (App. Div. June 30, 2022), which was decided after the initial Complaint was filed in this matter.  Pa000026-28.  The Trial Court’s reliance on that case is misguided.  In that matter, the Appellate Division found that the State was authorized pursuant to the terms of the MSRA to vacate an arbitration award concerning a sick pay lump sum payout owed to two (2) promoted Captains pursuant to the terms of the SOA CNA on their July 1, 2016 promotions.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The torts of negligent hiring, training and supervision are founded on principles of negligence and foreseeability.  *Di Cosala*, 91 N.J. at 171.  They arise from the concept that an employee’s character, skill, or attributes may create a foreseeable risk of harm.  “The principal may be negligent because he has reason to know that the servant or other agent, *because of his qualities*, is likely to harm others in view of the work or instrumentalities entrusted to him. ”  *Ibid.*  (emphasis added) (quoting *Restatement (Second) of Agency*, § 213, cmt. d) (quoted in *Model Civil*  Accordingly, the torts of negligent training and supervision depend on the attributes of the employee:  “An employer will only be held responsible for the torts of its employees beyond the scope of the employment where it knew or had reason to know of the particular unfitness, incompetence or dangerous attributes of the employee and could reasonably have foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to other persons. ”  Id. at 173 (emphasis added); see also Model Civil Jury Charge § 5.76 at fn. 6 (“An employer may not be held responsible under a theory of negligent hiring, supervision, or retention for criminal or other wrongful acts of its employee if, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, a reasonable employer would not have ascertained the employee’s incompetence, unfitness, or dangerous propensities.
[brief] In April 2021—one month after the date [...]’s records show [...] assented to [...]’s terms—[...] and her children were allegedly injured in a motor vehicle accident while taking a ride they requested using the [...] App.  (Pa027–029).  Nearly two years later, Plaintiffs sued [...] in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County, Law Division.  (Pa026).  [...] and her children asserted personal injury claims, and [...]’s husband asserted a per quod derivative claim for loss of consortium.  (Pa029).  [...] moved to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement.  See (Pa078–0112).  After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted [...]’s motion.  (Pa001–021).  It held that Plaintiffs and [...] formed “an enforceable clickwrap agreement” with a “clear” and “enforceable” arbitration provision.  (Pa017–019).  Citing [...]’s records, the trial court found that [...] presented [...] “with an in-[A]pp blocking pop up screen” that put her “on notice of a change in [[...]’s] terms” to which she consented.  (Pa018–019).  The trial court also ruled that [...]’s children and husband were bound to arbitrate their claims, as “[a] parent’s agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable against any tort claims asserted on a minor’s behalf” (Pa019–20 (quoting Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323 (2006))), and a per quod claim is derivative of and thus subject to the same limitations as an underlying personal injury claim (Pa020).  The trial court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that an agreement was not formed because clicking the hyperlink in the in-App pop-up screen directed [...] to a copy of [...]’s terms in English instead of Spanish.  (Pa019).  The trial court reasoned that if [...]’s phone setting were set to Spanish, “the [...] App would be in Spanish including the app blocking pop up screen and the hyperlinked Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. ”  (Pa018).  The trial court had “no indication” that [...] (1) “did not understand any part of the app blocking pop up screen/click box” that appeared in Spanish, or (2) could not “use a translator app” to read [...]’s terms even if they appeared in a different language.  (Pa019).  The trial court also disagreed with Plaintiffs’ contention that [...]’s terms are unconscionable because Plaintiffs were “not compelled to use the [...] app” and “could have sought alternative methods of travel with other ride share companies or taxi companies” if they had objections to [...]’s terms.  (Pa020).  LEGAL ARGUMENT