ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In particular, the Commissioners informed the Trial Court: [...] returned to analysis to make the best fit of the evidence that was found.  Deeds for the balance of the 33 lots within Block 15.2 were acquired and analyzed for geometric accuracy and references to historical evidence.  Some of the deeds were traced to origins that predated the minor and major subdivisions.  Any deeds that could be corrected were.  All the deeds were assembled into a matrix that included all of Block 15.2.  . . . .  Once the fieldwork was completed [...] began his analysis which involved applying the mathematics of the surveying profession to the available data.  Unfortunately, with the flaws in the deeds and the unavailability of so many monuments, mathematics became incredibly complicated.  Persistence revealed the best fit of the evidence recovered within the corrected Filed Maps.  [...] is confident that he has resolved the location of the filed maps in relation to the Litigants properties.  This is one aspect of the analysis.  …  That notwithstanding, [...] has pieced together a large part of the surveying puzzle involved in this matter and expects that he will be able to issue a report within 45 days.
[brief] The New Jersey Civil Rights Act is analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to-2 and was adopted "for the broad purpose of assuring a state law cause of action for violations of state and federal constitutional rights and to fill any gaps in state statutory anti-discrimination protection."  *Ramos v. Flowers*, 429 N.J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting *Owens v. Feigin*, 194 N.J. 607, 611 (2008)).  The Act contains two types of claims, one for any deprivation of a right, and another for when rights are "interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law[.]"  Id. (quoting N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c)).  Based on defendants’ custom of knowingly failing to have policies in place, and failure to supervise staff, plaintiff’s rights were deprived.
[brief] In addition, the finding of unconstitutional overbreadth due to the Noise Ordinance’s attempted regulation of the unamplified human voice and complete subjectivity in determining what constitutes a violation was proper.  For the reasons set forth herein, the Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the trial court’s decision finding the Noise Ordinance to be void as both preempted and unconstitutionally overbroad should be affirmed in all respects.
[brief] \textsuperscript{11}  Plaintiffs present two additional arguments, purportedly in response to arguments made by these defendants.  To the extent that these arguments are responsive to defendants’ brief, they mischaracterize the defense arguments.  The fatal flaw in plaintiffs’ proofs was not the fact [...] agreed with his expert’s calculation of damages but that he never supplied the crucial factual support for the expert’s threshold premise, i.e., that the transactions at issue were not authorized by him.  As to plaintiffs’ argument regarding the trial court’s inclusion of transactions that occurred after [...] provided Exhibit S to [...], they have not provided any citation to defendants’ brief to identify the argument they purport to rebut.  There is an even more glaring absence of proof.  The premise for all the breaches alleged was that the transactions were not authorized by Divyajit [...].  It would seem elementary that, in countering defendants’ argument, plaintiffs would identify testimony from [...] to support their threshold premise that he did not authorize the transactions.  Yet, plaintiffs have not identified any testimony from him to that effect.  See, Pb67-72.  There is one count alleging a breach of the covenant of good faith in the complaint.  Db71.  Count 11 alleges that Emanuel [...], Fariba [...], [...], [...] and [...] issued false financial statements for the purpose of duping plaintiffs into accepting an artificially reduced value in the purchase agreements.
[brief] Throughout her brief, the Appellant argues that the ALJ’s skewed findings are insufficient to support her removal.  The testimony of [...] and [...] are clearly at odds.  But what separates their testimony?  [...] relied on his careful assessment of the credibility of the witnesses to guide his efforts.  [...] – not a four-person commission – observed the witnesses, their demeanor, their presentation and weighed their testimony accordingly.  He was in the best position to make that assessment and did so twice.  In reviewing credibility determinations, the appellate court should give "due regard" to the ability of the fact finder to judge credibility and, where an agency's expertise is a factor, to that expertise.
[brief] offered a job but the offer was rescinded because he did not have the necessary equipment.  (T4-6).  In a decision mailed the same day, the Tribunal found that [...] was not eligible for PUA benefits from December 27, 2020, through September 4, 2021, because he could not establish a labor market attachment and his unemployment was unrelated to COVID-19 reasons identified in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 15 U.S.C. 9021 (a)(3)(A).  (Ra3)  On January 11, 2023, [...] appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board of Review.  (Ra31).  On February 29, 2024, the Board affirmed the Tribunal’s decision, rejecting [...]’s claim that he was eligible for PUA because he was offered a job in November 2019 that was later rescinded.  (Ra31-32).  The Board also found the rescission was not due to COVID-19, making him ineligible for PUA.  Ibid.  This appeal followed.  On January 25, 2024, [...] filed a motion for summary judgement with this court.  (Ra34).  On March 14, 2024, [...] filed a motion for default judgement, filing his appeal as within time and a fee waiver for the Tribunal’s transcript at public expense.  (Ra38).  On May 30, 2024, the court denied [...]’s motion for summary judgement, default judgment, and release of transcripts at public expense.
[brief] See [...], LLC v. [...], 236 N.J. 431 (2019).  For example, in [...], the plaintiff was a tow truck company.  The defendant was in the business of truck sales, parts sales, and service.  The parties spent “a couple of months” negotiating options and pricing on a truck that was to be custom-built according to requested specifications.  After the truck failed to function properly, plaintiff sought return of their deposit and commenced an action under the CFA after the defendants refused.  The Supreme Court rejected the defense argument that the customization of the product meant that it could not be interpreted as “merchandise” under the CFA.  The Court found that any member of the public could purchase the product or service, reviewed the above factors, and affirmed the Appellate Divisions reversal of a grant of summary judgment which was based on the argument that the “customized” goods did not satisfy the “merchandise” definition under the CFA.
[brief] Defendant next claims that the Prosecutor’s summation was intended to “inflame the jury. ” (Db36).  Defendant collects several quotations from the Prosecutor’s summation and contends that these comments “prevented the jurors from dispassionately performing their role by improperly focusing on the personal characteristics of the victim and the effect of the victim’s death on his family. ” (Db37).  This argument fails because nothing in the Prosecutor’s summation was so unduly prejudicial or inflammatory to rise to the level of plain error.
[brief] Viewing the evidence against Defendant [...], through the prism of that highest of evidentiary burdens, this Court, having reviewed not only the testimony but the MVR evidence as well, should find him not guilty of DWI.  Alternatively, he asks this Court to dismiss his case because his right to a speedy trial was violated.  Respectfully, Isl [...]  [...], J.D.  October 23, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  [...], P.O. Box 006 [...]  RE: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)
[directive] 1.  Take Exit 14, Newark.  2.  After toll plaza, take 1-78 West (express or local).  3.  Take Exit 56, Hillside Avenue.  4.  Continue on Hillside Avenue to end at Avon Avenue.  5.  Make left on Avon Avenue.  6.  Continue one block to traffic light on Irvine Turner Blvd.  7.  Make right on Irvine Turner Blvd.  (which becomes Jones St.) and continue to traffic light at South Orange Avenue.  8.  Turn left and enter first driveway on right behind two story brick building ([...]).
[directive] See Section 6.4.1(1).  The Table set forth in footnote 4 on page 43 of the revised Brimage Guidelines is designed to assist prosecutors by displaying the eligibility amount thresholds for various controlled substances.  The Table mistakenly includes a reference to LSD.  Because a drug distribution or possession with intent charge involving LSD is graded as either a first or second degree crime, see N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(6) and (7), a defendant charged with distribution or possession with intent to distribute LSD is automatically ineligible for a standardized waiver offer, regardless of the amount involved.  standardized “open” plea offer pursuant to eligibility criterion #3.  Several prosecutors have expressed concern that the disposition of some cases may therefore be delayed and additional expenses incurred if forensic laboratories were required to perform measurements that have heretofore been unnecessary to achieve the just and timely resolution of a case.  The revised Brimage Guidelines are designed to facilitate, not impede or delay the fair and expeditious resolution of criminal cases.
[brief] 2C:39-5d | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 | 47 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(a) | 48 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(b) | 47 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **Rules** | | | Rule 2:10-2 | 21, 30 | | **Rules of Evidence** | | | F.R.E. 702 | 12 | | N.J.R.E 104 | 34 | | N.J.R.E. 404(b) | 42, 43 | | N.J.R.E. 702(d) | 12 | | N.J.R.E. 801 | 15 | | N.J.R.E. 802 | 15 | | **Constitutional Provisions** | | | N.J. Const. art.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...] and JOHN DOE CORPORATION  1- 3 (a fictitious name, Defendants-Respondents.  ON APPEAL FROM: THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT  [...] 25 Independence Boulevard Warren, New Jersey  07059-6747 [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Akos Sule  Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  (Attorney ID No. 009461992)  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (Attorney ID No. 023361993)  Submitted to Clerk of the Appellate Division
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................  5  A.  The Disciplinary Investigation ....................................................................................  5  B.  The Disciplinary Action Complaint ............................................................................  10  C.  The Disciplinary Proceeding ......................................................................................  11  D.  The Insurance Applications and Policies .................................................................  14  E.  The Kentos Lawsuit ..................................................................................................  17  F.  [...]’s Decision to Rescind the Policies ......................................................  17  G.  The Trial Court Ruling ............................................................................................  20  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................
[brief] PLAINTIFF FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PRIOR TO SUING THE TOWNSHIP; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2).  The Chancery Division’s opinion fails to consider whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies prior to commencing the instant litigation, despite the Township raising the issue in briefing and at oral argument.  The only difference between the instant matter and *In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4*, supra, *Cardinale*, supra, and their progeny cases is that Plaintiff has chosen to sue his employer instead of the [...] and otherwise place his administrative appeal on hold upon receipt of an unfavorable, but not unexpected decision concerning his IOD application.  The [...] transferred the matter to the [...] ("[...]") pursuant to Plaintiff’s appeal of the [...]’s ruling.  Instead of perfecting his appeal and having the matter be heard substantively, Plaintiff instead had the [...] matter placed on the “inactive list” and thereafter filed the instant matter in Superior Court.  Although Plaintiff has the right to appeal the [...]’s denial to the [...], that is the appropriate forum if Plaintiff believes that the [...] improperly denied his IOD application.  It is a “firmly embedded judicial principle” that Plaintiff has an obligation to exhaust “administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. ”  *Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary*, 79 N.J. 549, 559 (1979).  Although the principal of administrative exhaustion is “neither jurisdictional nor absolute,” *Swede v. City of Clifton*, 22 N.J. 303, 315 (1956), a court seeking to review a matter otherwise amendable to administrative review must consider “whether the exhaustion of remedies will serve the interests of justice. ”  Abbot v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 297 (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 119 N.J. 287 (1990).  Further, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will otherwise not apply when (1) the administrative remedies would be futile; (2) when irreparable harm would result; (3) when jurisdiction of the agency is doubtful, or (4) when an overriding public interest calls for a prompt judicial decision.  New Jersey Civil Serv. Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 613 (1982).  The Chancery Division’s opinion granted severance of the Agreement despite neither it nor Plaintiff referencing how or why his decision to sue his employer while his appeal of the [...]’s decision was ongoing was a permissible circumvention of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.  Instead, the Chancery Division capitulated to Plaintiff’s attempts to bully the Township into renegotiating the Agreement and simultaneously litigate the [...]’s denial before both the Superior Court and the [...].  Accordingly, the Chancery Division’s decision to grant severance must be reversed as Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to commencing the instant litigation.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] 83 N.J. 86, 103 (1980).  While there are certainly different “degree[s] of compulsion motivating” the consumer, Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 356, these cases recognize that consent is not truly voluntary where it is the product of economic constraints like sunk costs or need for essentials and the consumer cannot “reject[] the contract with impunity. ”  Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595.  Here, a reasonable person in the [...]’ position would face innumerable pressures to click the box and accept the order, such as the expenditure of money, the desire to monitor the progress of the delivery, the stranger coming to their door expecting to be tipped, the labyrinth of automated chat functions and phone answering services to cancel or seek a refund, the perishability of the food, and even their own hunger.  Under these pressures, any acceptance of the arbitration agreement was not the product of knowing and voluntary decision making but influenced by unfair imposition.  As a final note, plaintiffs respectfully urge the Court to approach the text of the arbitration under this same light.  To review and attempt to understand it, standing in the shoes of the reasonable consumer, mid-order, startled by a pop-up when expecting to see the location of their order.  That “first-person” consumer perspective is taken in Hoffman, Carnival Cruise Lines, and Caspi, in which the respective courts “follow along” with the ordering process.  And it is the context in which the [...] were confronted with a massive, incomprehensible arbitration agreement.
[brief] (418a-421a).  Further, Defendants made several payments to retired Atlantic [...] police officers in excess of $15,000 who cashed out accrued vacation time after November 9, 2016.  (422a-427a).  Some of the examples with the dates of payment in parenthesis are as follows: $46,016.46 (6/16/17), $16,896.51 (6/16/17), $20,829.08 (6/16/17), $28,724.28 (6/16/17), $25,159.26 (6/2/17), $17,654.62 (6/30/17), $17,682.72 (6/2/17), $19,392.94 (6/16/17), $20,404.06 (6/16/17), $21,430.87 (6/16/17), $19,587.92 (6/16/17), $45,494.34 (6/16/17), $18,941.67 (6/2/17), $23,645.64 (6/2/17), $16,388.82 (6/16/17), $17,692.32 (6/16/17), $18,598.87 (6/16/17) and $15,964.65 (11/18/16).  (422a-427a).  On October 24, 2018, the [...] passed Resolution 591.
[brief] Pa49-62; 1T 64:7-12.  As is customary in commercial applications, [...] retained a structural engineer to develop a plan for a steel frame support system on which [...] would install the Struxure Louver System.  Pa49-62.  The early drafts of the structural support system included interior support columns.  1T 153:20-25.  [...] indicated in writing to [...] that it intended to evaluate an option to eliminate interior columns and consider an alternative that would provide an open span for better utilization of the space.  Pa51.  On December 7, 2017, [...]’s structural engineer sent a revised steel frame plan via email eliminating the interior columns in favor of 4 exterior columns with beam sizes sufficient to support the structural load.  Id.  Later that day, [...] forwarded the email and attachment to [...] and posed the following question:  “One question I had when reviewing the pricing was to confirm the downspouts that are provided and where each would be located under the various plans.  I need to price the water management and how all this water is going to get out properly. ”  Id.  Five days later, [...] sent a follow up email referencing the prior email and requesting an update.  Pa53.  On December 13, 2017, [...] responded to the email with 2 proposals but without indicating any response to the question regarding water management.  Id.
[brief] For example, Plaintiff’s counsel stated:  They’re going to make the workplace intimidating, hostile and abusive, so she either quits or breaks down from-from being tired of it.  All of this happened.  (7T:76:3-6).  Counsel deliberately distorted the evidence to make [...] seem dishonest and again told jurors that Defendants “did this” by stating the following to the jury at summation:  [...] came into this courtroom very confidently on direct-examination.  Has [...] ever complained to you about hostile work environment?  No, never.  Has [...] ever complained to you about the municipal alliance?  No, never.  Until she’s shown nine emails where she’s either directly copied or cc’d with a subject line, not embedded in the body, with the subject line, “Hostile work environment. ”  She’s a human resources professional.  She works on behalf of the town.  When you think about Berkeley, the [...], did they do this?  Yes, they did.
[brief] (34T178-19 to 181-2)  She further testified that Defendant specifically said to her that “it would be worse for him if he did give a sample. ”  (34T182-6 to 7)  The State emphasized this point in closing; especially because Defendant’s theory was that [...], not Defendant, shot [...], the State emphasized twice that while [...] had agreed to give a buccal swab, Defendant had refused.  (38T178-5 to 17, 191-2 to 3)  Although a stipulation was read to the jury regarding Defendant’s blood sample, no facts were admitted into evidence informing the jury that Defendant had consented to give a blood sample in lieu of a saliva sample; Stipulation 3 only said, “The parties hereby stipulate that defendant's blood sample provided to the New Jersey State laboratory for a DNA analysis was taken in a medically acceptable manner and stipulate to the chain of custody. ”  (36T45-2 to 6)  Our courts have long held that “[d]eclarations subsequent to the commission of the crime which indicate consciousness of guilt, or are inconsistent with innocence or tend to establish intent are relevant and admissible. ”  State v. Rechtschaffer, 70 N.J. 395, 413 (1976).  However, such statements must be analyzed under the four factors set forth in State v. Cofield to assess the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b): the “evidence ‘must [1] be admissible as relevant to a material issue; . . . [2] [be] similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; . . . [3] be clear and convincing; . . . [and 4] [t]he probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[brief] Even if [...] Were Not Covered by the Express Terms of the MAA, [...] is an Intended Third-Party Beneficiary Under Traditional Principles of Contract Law.  Equally important, while the definition of covered claims includes Plaintiff’s claims against [...], our courts have also recognized that “‘traditional principles’ of state law allow a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through ‘. . . incorporation by reference, third party beneficiary theories . . . .’”  Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 188–89 (quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (quoting 21 Williston on Contracts § 57:19, at 183 (4th ed. 2001))).
[brief] See ibid.  For the same reason, an injunction is not necessary to maintain the status quo or preserve the subject matter of the builder’s remedy lawsuit.  (Pb47).  The status quo can be preserved in the condemnation proceeding because the EDA explicitly allows the condemnation court to stay a condemnor from taking possession of the property when the validity of the taking is challenged.  Twp. of Readington v. Solberg Aviation Co., 409 N.J. Super. 282, 326 (App. Div. 2009).  This procedure maintains the status quo of the property and allows no harm to befall Plaintiff in the interim, much less irreparable harm.
[brief] In O'Donnell, supra, the passive use approval for a funeral home parking lot in a residential zone subsumed far lesser bulk variances for curb cuts, privacy fencing, and separation distances from curb cuts to residences.  *Id.* at 145.  Where, as here, the d variance was denied, the Board engaged in separate findings as to the merits of those aspects of the application, keeping in mind that the same detriments to the zone plan and zoning ordinance and other detriments of the project applied to the c variances.
[brief] [...] could have insisted, but did not, on language absolving itself of any fraud claims that might accrue to members of the [...] class after Feb. 20, 2015.  Contrast Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Schultz, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 406, *5 (Ch. Div. 2013) (releasing any claim that “has been, or could have been or in the future might be asserted by any Releasing Party in the Lawsuit . . . , or in any other action or proceeding in this Court, or any other court”).  “A general release, not restricted by its terms to particular claims or demands, ordinarily covers all claims and demands due at the time of its execution and within the contemplation of the parties. ”  Id., at 204 (emphasis supplied); see also F.P.P.E. Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Morda, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *12 (App. Div. Feb. 25, 2009) (reversing judgment and remanding for plenary hearing to determine whether the parties intended to release future malpractice claims).  Defendants agreed to limit the 2015 Settlement to all claims “that were, have been or could have been . . . asserted or alleged in” [...]—whether those claims could have been asserted “now, in the past, or in the future”—and any related claims (see Pa0042, at ¶1.29).