ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [553A]  It is unequivocally clear that the [...] site now before the Court was not intended for seven units, as it is not mentioned anywhere in the Settlement Agreement, nor any other document.  Further, as the Borough has stated previously, the redeveloper has a number of options available to satisfy its obligation to construct the seven (7) units.  The Redeveloper may: 1. Redesign the project at [...] so that it does not require a Use Variance; 2. Purchase other suitable property within the [...] on which to build the units; 3. Designate seven (7) additional units in the [...] development to be affordable unit; 4. Accept other Borough property previously offered to them for the construction of units; or, 5.
[brief] [Respondent] asserts that [Appellant’s] Exceptions … should be stricken because they are immaterial or concern matters of fiduciary discretion ….  [Respondent] asserts that [Appellant] objects to the omission of unrealized gain on corporate assets in the Intermediate Account but fails to cite any inaccuracies or missing information ….  [Respondent] asserts that the Intermediate Account properly represents the corpus on hand and income on hand at book value, as opposed to market value….  Additionally, [Respondent] asserts that [Appellant], as executor of the Decedent’s estate, was the cause of the October 29, Payment of additional tax interest to the State of New Jersey….  [Respondent] asserts that [Appellant] was late in providing the information and documentation needed to prepare the 2018 tax return for the Trust….  [Respondent] further asserts that [Appellant] prevented [the Accounting Firm] from speaking directly with the estate’s accountant….  [Respondent] asserts that he exercised discretion in charging the $12,699.74 for accounting and tax services to the corpus.  [Respondent] disputes that [Appellant’s] assertion that one-third of the accounting fees should be charged to income….  [Respondent] admits that [Appellant] correctly identified an error on attachment 6, wherein $93.64 should be charged to corpus and $46.82 should be charged to income for advisory fees, but asserts that said error is “cosmetic and inconsequential”….  [Respondent] asserts that the error identified on attachment 7 which results on an overstatement of [...]’s income by $83.33, would not affect [...]’s distribution….  [Respondent] asserts that [Appellant] should be prohibited from seeking discovery that relating to prior litigation….
[brief] For all the forgoing reasons, the court’s ruling in this case must be reversed and Judgment of Possession vacated.  Respectfully submitted, Dated: October 17, 2024  By: [...] (ID 412622024) and, By: [...] (ID 015211977)  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant [...] [...], Plaintiff/Respondent vs. DARIA ORTIZ, Defendant/Appellant, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  APPELLATE  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL  From A Final Judgment Of The New Jersey Superior Court, Special Civil Part, Essex County
[brief] The jury below heard from [...] that defendant told her he had been stabbed, (2T67-17 to 19; 2T75-4 to 8); [...] testified defendant texted her he was hurt, (2T209-14); [...] testified that defendant said he was attacked as he was watching the movie, “Spartacus,” (2T219-15 to 18; 2T220-9 to 10; 2T222-2 to 22), that he may have stabbed someone, (2T219-24 to 25), that there had been some sexual interaction with another man, (2T222-15 to 19); [...] outlined what defendant told him at the police station about how defendant went to a man’s home, had consensual sex, watched a movie and a fight ensued when the other man wanted more sex, (1T88-12 to 13; 1T90-19 to 23; 1T91-2 to 5; 1T91-5 to 8; 1T94-22 to 1T95-1); [...] hearing defendant talking with the nurse, [...], at the hospital and telling her he had a knife and might have stabbed his partner, (1T99-3 to 4); [...] testified that defendant told her he had been assaulted by his partner, (4T11-7 to 11), that there had been no weapon but that later defendant said there had been one, (4T11-12 to 16; 4T17-12 to 13; 4T18-6; 4T18-9 to 10; 4T11-17 to 24); that he had been hit with a fist and then later said it was fists, (4T12-1 to 2; 4T21-9 to 10), that there was altercation with his partner chasing him and he saw a knife, (4T12-1 to 6), that they struggled and he got the knife and stabbed his partner, (4T12-5 to 7).  The jury also heard from [...] during the defense case-in-chief that defendant told him at the police station that he had been assaulted.  (5T48-4 to 16).  There were photographs the defense admitted that were taken at the hospital of his hands and his back.  (5T6-11 to 5T7-2).  After defense counsel requested a jury charge the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter, the court responded that it was having difficulty discerning the rational basis for the charge.
[brief] (10T103-6 to 7).  At the scene, defendant gave the first of his four statements to police.  He interrupted [...]’s conversation with Paulsboro Patrolman [...], telling her that he knew “the whole story. ” (11T26-16 to 25).  Defendant told Greener that: [...] beat up “a girl”; “[h]er friend defend[ed] her”; defendant broke up the fight; [...] chased [...] with a screwdriver and a butcher knife; and when defendant caught up, [...] was bleeding.  Defendant also said that he did not know if [...] “fell on the knife” and that he did not know the [...] well.  (11T29-9 to 11, 30-3 to 11).  Later that day, Paulsboro Detectives [...] and [...] interviewed defendant at the Woodbury Police Department.
[brief] 42  Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury,390 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 2007) ............ 24, 25 Stevens v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 309 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1998) ........................................... 28 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 18A:18A-5 .................................................................. 3 N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-25.5 ............................................................... 3 N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 thru -60 ......................................................... 4 OTHER AUTHORITIES 2006 Special Session Joint Legislative Committee Public Employee Benefits Reform Final Report (Dec. 1, 2006) ..................... 3 Improper Participation by Professional Service Providers in the State Pension System (July 17, 2012) ........................................... 4, 5 Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 .............................................. 8, 11, 28, 31, 34, 37, 38 The Report of the Benefits Review Task Force to Acting Governor [...] (December 1, 2005) ............................... 1, 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] [...], Esq.  IN THE MATTERS OF [...], Charging Party/Cross-Respondent, v. [...], Respondent/Cross-Charging Party.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DECISION OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION DATED OCTOBER 26, 2023 (AGENCY DOCKET NOS. [...] and [...] (CONSOLIDATED)  REPLY-BRIEF OF APPELLANT
[brief] ”  Brown at 7.  In Brown, the Commission found that the respondent, a board of education member, violated the Code when he posted a message on his Facebook page (“Now if we could only do something about our local terrorists that destroy dreams and burn futures”), the Superintendent’s photo came up as a result of the post, and he did not remove it.  Further, the Commission emphasized “that in using social media, the affirmative duties within the Code of Ethics for School Board Members may not be overlooked. ”  Id. at 8.  With the above in mind, Respondent’s disparaging posts to social media at issue constituted conduct that undermined the public’s trust in the Board and compromised the Board’s ability to engage with the public.  As [...] discussed, Respondent’s post had the potential to discourage members of the public, namely members of the Muslim community, to engage with the Board “given what may seem to be an apparent bias. ”  As such, [...]’ determination is entirely appropriate.  Id. at 1, 6 (emphasis added).  Nonetheless, the Commission broke with this precedent and dismissed the transparently racist post that constitutes Count 5 in the present matter, claiming it lacks jurisdiction over this post.
[brief] See State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 531 (2021) (“[W]e count on judges to interpret and uphold laws as written – not to validate an officer’s mistaken view of the law, even if reasonable, that intrudes on a person’s liberty. ”)  Had the court applied the proper test for a tinted windows violation, it would have found that the State failed to meet its burden.  In sum, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the State failed to justify the motor vehicle stop at the hearing.
[brief] The trial court must give only all *reasonable* inferences to [...].  Here, it is unreasonable to accept [...]’s unsupported and uniformly contracted—even by her own past statements—testimony that [...] approved the charge pay.  There is no genuine dispute of material fact that the charge pay was ever approved.  The trial court even recognized the undisputed timing of the entries.  (See 1T 25:3-7 (“So after, there was an approval of their pay they would go in at 11 o’clock on a Monday, this was every other Monday when their time sheets had to be in and approve time, this additional pay for each other during this period of time. ”); see also id. at 25:8-12 (“Obviously, it really cannot be disputed that they were doing it to avoid detection from any else and during the chaos of COVID”); Id. at 25:13-15 (“But the facts under how they went about approving this charge pay for each other really belies the assertion that it was approved by Ms. [...]”).  As set forth more fully above, there exist copious facts in the record supporting Defendants’ position that the charge pay was not authorized.  (See Pa362 at 78:14-21 ([...] repeatedly sought more pay for her staffing coordinators yet was continuously rejected); Pa363 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa476 ([...] denies [...]’s request for prospective charge pay); Pa478; Pa363 at 84:15-17 ([...] confirmed he never received approval for charge pay, in fact never even discussed charge pay with [...]); Pa365 at 90:5-91:1; Pa476; Pa483-529 ([...] discovered that [...], [...], and [...] would enter charge pay for each other after she had already reviewed their time cards); Pa233 at 32:11-15; Pa483-529 (two remaining staff coordinators, [...] and [...], never received charge pay); Pa476 ([...] confirmed she never would have approved charge pay for other three out of her five staffing coordinators); Pa546 ([...], during her interview with [...], noted that staffing coordinators do not receive charge pay); Pa298 at 80:10-14 ([...] confirmed that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay); Pa548-49 ([...] stated during her interview with [...] investigators that she never received confirmation from [...] that the charge pay was approved); Pa478 ([...] admitted that he had no direct approval from [...] as to the charge pay and that he and [...] effectively took silence from [...] as approval).
[brief] ”  See State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 277 (2015) (internal citation omitted).  “[T]he law of the case doctrine is only triggered when one court is faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical issue. ”  Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 539 (2011) (internal citations omitted).  Here, [...] did not present any “new law or new facts” which would have warranted reconsideration of the first trial court’s finding that [...]’s malicious prosecution claim accrued on March 6, 2018.  See Rosenberg v. Otis Elevator Co., 366 N.J. Super. 292, 302 (App. Div. 2004).  For example, even after entry of the April 14, 2023 court order in the criminal action, the first trial court’s finding remained consistent with both state decisional law and United States Supreme Court precedent, which held that [...]’s malicious prosecution claims began to accrue on March 6, 2018, when the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed [...]’s VOP conviction on direct appeal.  See Freeman, 347 N.J. Super. at 26; Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393; Woodson, 503 F. App’x at 112.
[brief] POINT IV  RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS ARE REPLETE WITH MISREPRESENTATIONS AND WITHOUT ANY BASIS  Pursuant to the motion and evidentiary procedure in the N.J. Workers’ Compensation Court, as stated in N.J.S.A. 34: 15-56 titled “Rules of Evidence,” it provides:  “At such hearing, evidence, exclusive of ex-parte affidavits, may be produced by both parties, but the official conducting the hearing shall not be bound by the Rules of Evidence. ”  Respondent argues that the Judge of Compensation should have been bound by the summary judgment standard in the Court Rules.  (See Rb, page 9).  However, as stated in the comments to the summary judgment rule:  “Nevertheless, although the requirements of paragraph (a) and (b) are stated in mandatory terms, summary judgment may be granted even if these requirements are not met when there is a single critical and undisputed issue. ”  [Court Rule 4:46-2, Comments, para. 1.2, citing, e.g., Kenny v. Meadowview Nursing Center, 308 N.J. Super. 565, 569-570 (App. Div. 1998)).]  The motion regarding the essential worker status of Decedent was not a summary judgment motion but was a motion regarding the “essential worker status” on the pleadings.
[brief] 1.  The Court’s findings that the Yarbough factors justified a consecutive sentence were unsupported by the facts or by Yarbough.  Under Yarbough, courts must consider the following factors when deciding whether to impose a consecutive sentence: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; [and] (e) the convictions for which sentences are to be imposed are numerous.
[brief] Count one: second degree burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; count two, second degree conspiracy, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; count three, second degree burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; count four, first degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; count five, second degree conspiracy, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; count six, first degree murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)(2); count seven, first degree felony murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3); count eight, first degree felony murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3); count nine, second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; count ten, second degree conspiracy, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; count eleven, second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; count twelve, second degree conspiracy, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; count thirteen, second degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1); count fourteen, second degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b and; count fifteen, fourth degree tampering with evidence, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1).  (Da\(^1\) 001).  The Defendant was convicted at a jury trial on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, and 12.  (Da 024).  The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to fifty years, subject to NERA.  (Da 024).  The Defendant filed his first petition for post-conviction relief of April 28, 2016, which was denied on August 18, 2018.  (Da 041).  He then appealed the denial, and the Appellate Division affirmed on March 11, 2020.  (Da 040).  The Defendant then petitioned the Supreme Court on March 25, 2021, (Da 065), which was denied on July 6, 2021.  (Da 066).  In the interim, the Defendant filed his second PCR, on December 3, 2019.  (Da 033).  The trial court dismissed the petition on January 7, 2021, as the case was pending before the Supreme court.  (Da 062).  The Petition was then refiled on August 23, 2021.  (Da 33).  Several motions to compel discovery were filed.  On June 14, 2023, the State requested the court make a threshold determination as to the timeliness of the petition.  (Da 073).  The court then dismissed the petition with prejudice, in an order and letter decision dated June 29, 2023.  (Da 086).  \(^{1}\) “Da” refers to Defendant’s Appendix.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] However the trial court declined to rule on the same and opined that there was lack of jurisdiction and thus, the matter was never decided on the merits and fell through the cracks.  As such, this appeal was filed to provide an opportunity for the Court to decide the matter in light of Tyler.  Although [...] was not aware of the Tyler decision originally since the decision was entered only days before [...]’s prior appellate matter, when [...] found out about the Tyler decision, he took steps to file the motion for reconsideration as soon as possible.  The motion was timely under the circumstances and the failure to file the supplemental submission originally should be forgiven to avoid an unjust result especially in consideration of the fact that the Court also did not mention the Tyler case in the opinion despite the Tyler case being the controlling law.
[brief] The Board is not to disturb an ALJ recommendation that is sound and in depth and logical.  Rather, it is the rare case that the agency fails to follow the recommendations of the ALJ.  *St. Vincent’s Hosp. v. Finley*, 154 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 1977).  The rare case where the agency does not follow the ALJ’s recommendations is one where the ALJ’s decision contained abject failures that the agency cannot subscribe to.  *In the Matter of Rastatter, City of Passaic.*, [...] (Unpub.) (App Div. 2020).  That is not our case whatsoever.  One must look with a jaundiced eye at the Board’s reluctance to rely on the ALJ’s reasoning especially as to interpretations of law.  This is so because the Board does not have the legal acumen of the very body [ALJ] that it relies on for guidance in resolving legal and factual determinations that go beyond the ken of an agency made up almost exclusively of layman lawyers.  We know that courts have made distinctions in matters as to the weight it gives certain bodies and persons on the basis of their training and experience *See, generally, Regan v. City of New Brunswick*, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 345-356 (App. Div. 1997).  In our case, the Board did not adhere to any of the above legal axioms that apply to this case and misapplied case law and mis-marshaled and tortured the factual record to the point that its ruling was not only arbitrary and capricious; it was also unsupported by virtually the entire factual record.  Unfortunately, this Board has a sorry history in its continuing failures to liberally interpret these remedial statutes that it governs over.  The Board has been criticized severely before regarding its restrictive and onerous interpretations of the law as to what standards our proud warrior men and women in uniform must first vault when they are totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the law while working on the job or as in this case warding off an armed deadly attack by discharging a service weapon.  See Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super. 346, 354 (App. Div. 2014).  In Richardson, the Court explained that a traumatic event is "essentially the same as what we historically understood an accident to be—an unexpected external happening that directly causes injury and is not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with work effort."  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 212.  See also Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super. 346, 354 (App. Div. 2014) and Brooks v. Board of Trustees Public Employees Retirement System, 425 N.J. Super. 277 (2012).  More recently, this Board was reversed for failing to adhere to established law in Diaz v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, [...], Unpub. (App. Div. 11/2/23).  POINT II: THE BOARD’S REFUSAL TO ALLOW [...] TO APPLY FOR ACCIDENTAL PERMANENT DISABILITY WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTUAL RECORD.
[brief] No sum was endorsed on Plaintiff’s Summons (Da4).  Plaintiff’s Complaint is undated (Da2).  Plaintiff did not state the date or time period of the alleged default on the Complaint (Da2).  A CIS was not attached to the Complaint.  Plaintiff stated its “principal place of business” is in [...] (Da2).  Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment has no proof of service.  No conference was held between Plaintiff and Defendant.  Plaintiff advised lower Court and Defendant that oral argument was available to Defendant “only if directed by the Court” (Da10).  Plaintiff did not give Defendant the information required by R. 6:3-3(c)(3) and (4).  The lower Court did not hold that Plaintiff was entitled to grant of Summary Judgment as a matter of law.  Declarant did not file an affidavit (Exhibit FF) (Da115).  Declarant’s statement does not claim either personal or actual knowledge (Exhibit FF) (Da115).  Plaintiff did not file an arbitration removal motion.  Defendant claimed affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off (Da15 and Da16).  Plaintiff did not comply with 45-day notice requirement of changes to Defendant’s account.  ARGUMENT
[brief] The Master Plan  The Master Plan for the Borough was last amended and updated by the Borough on December 23, 2019 (“Master Plan” or “2019 updated Master Plan”).  (Pa 7).  The Master Plan recognizes the redevelopment project under the Redevelopment Plan as “consisting of 350 residential units, of which 70 will be affordable, a commercial component, and open space buffer along the Mill Pond and Lawrence Brook,” i.e., the 350 Unit [...].  (Pa 38).  This project, as the Master Plan states, “is consistent with the Redevelopment Plan, two rulings by Superior Court Judges, the Affordable Housing Court Master’s reports, and sound planning practice. ”  Id.  The 2019 Master Plan Reexamination concludes that “[n]o further changes to the Ford Avenue Redevelopment Plan are recommended at this time” and that “[t]he Borough and Redevelopment Agency should continue to work with the designated Redeveloper to ensure that the redevelopment project is successfully completed. ”  Id.  There has been no amendment to the Master Plan after December 23, 2019.  E.
[brief] 29 N.J. Prac., Law of Mortgages § 5.10 (2d ed.) (emphasis added).  One who pays valuable consideration to acquire title to a property is “presumed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice until the contrary appears, and the burden of showing to the contrary rests upon the party alleging that title was acquired by the purchaser with notice of an outstanding equity or claim. ”  Venetsky v. West Essex Bldg. Supply Co., 28 N.J. Super. 178, 187 (App. Div. 1953).  New Jersey law reflects a longstanding policy that bona fide purchasers for value should be able to rely on the public record for the integrity of their title.  The New Jersey Supreme Court described the underlying purpose of the New Jersey Recording Act as, “to compel the recording of instruments affecting title, for the ultimate purpose of permitting purchasers to rely upon the record title and to purchase and hold title. . . with confidence.