ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] FACTS  On November 19, 2021, Trooper [...], a four-and-one-half year veteran of the New Jersey State Police, was dispatched to a motor vehicle accident at Emleys Hill and Jonathan Holmes Roads in Upper Freehold Township, where he met Defendant [...].  5T4-15/5-25.  The trooper was dispatched at 10:48 p.m. and arrived on scene at 11:15 p.m.  5T23-15/25.  A white Toyota was against a tree about 20 feet off of the roadway.  5T6-2/7.  It had heavy disabling damage.  5T24-23/25-17.  This was a serious accident.  5T27-5/7.  Baverov was the only person on the rural scene before the arrival of other troopers and emergency medical personnel.  5T6-12/22.  During conversation, Baverov said he was driving too quickly and went into the tree after drinking five or six beers a few hours ago at the [...] just down the street.  5T6-23/7-17.  The trooper smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on Baverov’s breath, saw that his eyes were bloodshot, believed his speech to be slurred, and determined to administer horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk-and-turn, and one-leg-stand tests.  5T7-20/8-22.  After walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests (5T10-20/12-11, 34-22/36-5), Baverov was arrested, handcuffed, searched, placed in the rear of a troop car, and Mirandized (5T14-1/2).  At the station, Baverov was placed in a cell.  5T32-14.  The trooper Mirandized Baverov again and read him a standard statement.  5T15-7/17-6; see Da5a-6a.  Baverov agreed to submit breath samples.  5T17-7/11.  The trooper completed his investigation (5T20-15/17), questioning Baverov, who admitted drinking six beers at the [...] between 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. with pork chops around 7:30 p.m.  5T19-1/25; see Da7a.
[brief] See Wash. Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217 (1951).  Here, the relevant terms of the parties’ contract are patently clear, not in dispute, and additional discovery will not change what is written in the Note and Mortgage.  In its simplest form, the note is evidence of a debt and of Borrowers’ promise to repay the debt.  The Note required the Borrowers to make monthly payments of principal and interest and to make pre-payments, without penalty or charge.  (Pa270, ¶¶4-5).  The Mortgage simply provides the Borrowers shall make payments in accordance with the Note.  (Pa274, ¶1).  The Mortgage creates an affirmative obligation on the part of its holder to both accept and apply all payments received on account of the Loan in the manner designated therein.
[brief] However, as explained in greater detail below, the court failed to engage in the proper analysis in determining the motion.  The question of whether a duty arises from a relationship between two parties, such as an attorney-client relationship, is certainly a question of law.  However, determination of whether the specific relationship giving rise to said duty existed is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.  Here, the trial court conflated those two questions.  The court properly explained the elements that must be established to give rise to a duty between an attorney and a nonclient.  However, instead of determining whether a genuine issue of material fact existed as to those elements, the court actually weighed the evidence finding that the relationship between [...] and the Respondents did not give rise to a duty.  Had the Court applied the proper standard, the trial court would have denied the motion finding there are sufficient facts upon which a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute in favor of [...].  A.
[directive] If the answer is “No,” proceed to question 17e.  If the answer is “Yes,” proceed to question 17f.  e.  원하십니까?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  변호사와 의논할 기회를 갖기를  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  f.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 당면할 가능성이 있는 이민 문제와 또한 귀하의 개인 사정에 맞는 이민 문제 관련 법률 자문을 추구할 권리가 있다는 조언을 받았음에도 불구하고, 귀하는 인정하려 하십니까?  유죄를  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?
[brief] Da21.  [...] initiated this action by filing a Complaint and Order to Show Cause for immediate restraints rather than asserting her purported right to arbitration.  [...] further affirmatively certified to this Court that the matter in controversy was not the subject of an arbitration nor was any other “arbitration proceeding [] presently contemplated. ”  Ibid.  Rule 4:5-1 recognizes a “continuing obligation” to amend the certification if the underlying facts change.  [...] made no such amendments.  Instead, [...] filed an Answer to Counterclaim on January 2, 2024 asserting thirteen affirmative defenses, none of which raised arbitration.
[brief] It therefore provided sufficient indicia that the video “is an accurate reproduction of what it purports to represent” and that the scene depicted in the video “ha[d] not changed between the time of the incident in question and the time of the taking of” the video.  Wilson, 135 N.J. at 15.  These are the same proofs that were sufficient to authenticate the surveillance videos in Tuncap and Dennis, and the apartment-building video in Brown.
[brief] & Prods. Liab. Litig.,** | 14 | | 123 F. Supp. 3d 584 (D.N.J. 2015) | | | **James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.,** | 19 | | 216 N.J. 552 (2014) | | Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370 (2016)
[brief] As noted by [...], neither [...] nor [...], the Union lawyers who assisted [...] with his Will and the revisions to the Will, ever met or spoke with [...] or any other family member.  So, clearly, [...] would have been unsuccessful before [...] to try to shift the burden of proof under the Haynes standard.  The burden would have remained on [...], and that would have been the end of the case since there was no evidence that the Will, which was presumptively valid, should be set aside.  (Da156).  That being the case, there really was not a viable case-within-a-case to be proven here, and that Will would have been upheld by [...] no matter who had the burden.  The Court need not reach the issue of causation since [...] has not come forward with sufficient facts to establish an attorney-client relationship with [...] Rinaldi.
[brief] Furthermore, the court instructed the jury that they were the “sole and exclusive judges of the evidence, of the credibility of the witnesses, and the testimony to be attached to the testimony of each witness. ” (11T8-19 to 9-1).  It continued,  Regardless of what counsel said or I may have said recalling the evidence in this case, it is your recollection of the evidence that should guide you as judges of the facts.  Argument, statements, remarks, openings and summations of counsel are not evidence and must not be treated as evidence.  Although the attorneys may point out what they think is important in this case, you must rely solely upon your understanding and recollection of the evidence that was admitted during the trial.  [(11T9-2 to 11).]  The jury, of course, is presumed to follow such instructions.  State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 390 (1996).
[brief] (Pb10).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  Specifically, the [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Id. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.  *Id.* at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, Ensslin’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  *Id.* at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability Retirement, Ensslin was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, Ensslin was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability Retirement while his LAD action was pending.  *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required Ensslin to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.  By contrast, [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until one year and six months past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.
[directive] (k)  Pursuant to AG Directive 2018-3, each agency shall establish an “early warning” protocol for monitoring and tracking the conduct of all officers.  (l)  Each agency must establish and maintain an internal affairs records system which, at a minimum, will consist of an internal affairs index system and a filing system for all documents and records.  (m)  On a quarterly basis, each agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor a report summarizing the allegations received and the investigations concluded for that period.  The Attorney General shall establish a schedule for the submission of the reports.  (n)  On an annual basis, each agency shall publish on its public website a report to the public summarizing the allegations received and the investigations concluded for that period.  These reports shall not contain the identities of officers or complainants.  (o)  On a periodic basis, and at least once a year, each agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and publish on the agency’s public website a brief synopsis of all complaints where a fine or suspension of 10 days or more was assessed to an agency member.
[brief] On September 22, 1992, more than four years after [...]’s last contribution, the Division of Pensions sent him a letter stating that he had to return to work by November 22, 1992, or his pension account would expire.  [...] never received the letter.  [...] was involved in protracted litigation against his employer to request accommodations for a disability, which he claimed he could still work as a police officer.  Upon being denied his LAD claim, [...] applied for ordinary disability benefits.  The Board denied [...]’s application for an ordinary disability retirement on the grounds it was untimely.  Under the applicable PFRS statutes, membership ceases after 2 years from the date of the member's last pension contribution.
[brief] These opinions urge caution when relying upon conclusory reports as to abandonment.  Appellants specifically cite the Court to Keystone Servicing, LLC v. Block 365, Lot 9, et al., 2021 WL 4933067 (App. Div.), an unreported Appellate Division decision in which the court criticized [...] for its reliance upon a report prepared by the very same [...] who supplied the Leary Report offered to the Court in this Foreclosure Action:
[brief] Parties do not select the judge in litigation and do not offer the judge compensation.  In contrast, [...] picked the Special Master to be a mediator, work for which he received specific and direct additional compensation as a result of [...]’s selection.  The trial court also minimized the impact of the mediation, stressing that it was a “court-ordered, two-hour mediation. ” (39022a).  But there is no exception to the conflicts rules based on the size of a financial interest or the time involved.  Thus, when a judge has “ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small,” in “an enterprise related to the litigation,” disqualification is required.
[brief] Although the Plaintiff indicates that the conversation he had with [...] may have induced the statement by [...] that he was prohibited from entering the high school, the [...] conversation about the “good worker” and “hope you’ll stay on” was actually a revelation by [...] of things to come.  In other words, “you’re out of the high school, you’re a good worker, we hope you’ll stay on. ”  What the Court below fails to see is that [...]’s conversation about keeping his job and Plaintiff remaining with [...] was that [...] knew it was coming i.e. removal from the high school.  Otherwise, there was no reason for [...] to say that.  [...] knew that the Plaintiff was to be removed from the high school and recognized that it was a removal from a spot where the Plaintiff was a part-timer, but was usually at the high school.  That relationship was about to be changed, and so [...] “hopes you’ll stay on. ”  That statement is indicative of a change, and that change came from [...] when he texted the Plaintiff and told him that he was prohibited from entering the high school.  Actually, the Court below was confused because the questioning began on p. 95 at line 6, with the statement: “So, after [...] texted you that, what did you do?”  The examiner was incorrect because [...] did not text the Plaintiff until after the conversation with [...].  [...]’s statement concerned an event that was about to happen i.e. removal from the high school.  Plaintiff thought that his conversation with [...] was the reason that he received the [...] email.  Actually, [...] forewarned the Plaintiff about being removed from the high school when he stated, “you’re a good worker, I hope you stay on. ”  And then, as the Plaintiff testified, not only was he removed from the high school, but his opportunity to answer available work was compromised to the point that others were receiving assignments, and he was not.  What the Court below failed to understand is that [...] called the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff returned the call, and [...] announced what was about to happen.  Otherwise, “we hope you stay on” has no meaning.  [...] knew that it was about to happen, and it did i.e. removal from the high school.  The argument with [...] could not be the reason that the Plaintiff was excluded from the high school.  [...] said, “We hope you’ll stay on. ”  What was not recognized below is that the argument with [...] was after the phone call with [...].  [...] said, “You’re a good worker; we hope you’ll stay on. ”  He was predicting that the Plaintiff would be excluded from the high school.  The Court below, on the Motion for Reconsideration cited the Plaintiff’s deposition, but failed to recognize that the [...] conversation predicted removal from the high school.  After that conversation, there was the argument with [...], but the decision to remove the Appellant from the high school was already made and predicted by [...].  **POINT II**
[brief] ”  There was a “very short period of time,” about fifteen minutes, between the incident and the identification.  Although [...] was nervous and under stress during the robbery, he was “clear and sure about the identification” during his grand jury testimony.  The judge did not address defendant's argument that the officers violated Rule 3:11 and Delgado by failing to record the identification procedure.  The judge also made no reference to the worksheet that, again, was not provided by the prosecutor.  B.
[brief] The Defendant’s second petition alleged on its face “ineffective assistance of PCR Counsel’s & Appeal counsel [...] [...] & [...], both failed to find issues of there own and issues I wanted to review witch are sentencing, confidential informant, third party guilt, lesser included offenses, questionable chain of custody, brady material from the state, confrontation clause, signd certifications that was not done, statement of a [...] & [...]. ” (Da 034, #8).  Notably, questions #3 and #4, pertaining to prior proceedings, were left blank.  That small paragraph was intended to be the basis of the court’s determination on both good cause, and timeliness.
[brief] The regulation, however, does not outline the type of proof that a claimant must present to demonstrate that there was no suitable work available.  Prior to *Ardan*, neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate Division had enumerated the proofs required to demonstrate the lack of suitable work.  Addressing this question, the Supreme Court found that the regulation, by its plain terms, “defines what the claimant must prove: that there was ‘no other suitable work available which the individual could have performed within the limits of the disability.
[brief] In August 2023, the State opposed dismissal of the action on public disclosure grounds.  Ja3995-98.  Attorneys General in three other states where Relator was prosecuting similar actions had already done the same.  Ja3103-20.  The veto is an expression of the State’s view that it not regard this case as parasitic and does not need or want the protection of the public disclosure bar.  See United States ex rel. Berntsen v. Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2014 WL 12480026, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) (veto means that dismissal would be “illogical”).  As the beneficiary of the public disclosure bar, Bryant, 24 F.4th at 1030-31, the State’s view deserves considerable deference.  The trial court permitted supplemental briefing on the impact of the 2023 Veto Amendment.  As part of that briefing, Relator submitted unrebutted evidence that Defendants’ conduct was ongoing and continued after June 30, 2023, the effective date of the 2023 amendments.  Ja3999-4003.  VI.  The Trial Court’s Decision on Summary Judgment
[brief] In analyzing claims brought under the CEPA, New Jersey courts apply the three-part burden-shifting framework articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 377 N.J. Super. 28, 28 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 39 (2005).  Within this framework, if an employee can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its alleged retaliatory decision or action.  Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.  Once the employer articulates a non-retaliatory reason, the burden shifts back to the Appellant to prove the reason is false, and the real reason is actually a pretext for unlawful retaliation.  Id.; see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
[brief] Plaintiff has waited six months in accordance with N.J.S.A. 59:8-1, et seq., and states that an amended complaint is forthcoming.  The remaining pending state law claims against Defendants are listed as Counts I-X of Plaintiff’s Complaint and include False Arrest/False Imprisonment (Count I), Injurious Falsehood (Count II), Libel/Libel Per se (Count III), Slander/Slander Per Se (Count IV), Negligence (Count V), Common Law Conspiracy (Count VI), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VII), Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VIII), Negligent Hiring Supervision or Retention (Count IX), and N.J. Civil Rights Conspiracy under N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 (Count X).
[brief] A third party may only give consent to a search if he has “common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. ”  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); see also Cushing, 226 N.J. at 199.  “Common authority . . . does not rest upon the law of property,” but instead on a “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. ”  Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n.7.  The State bears the burden of proving the third party’s “common authority.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT THE MAYOR’S COMMENTS HAD UNDULY PREJUDICED  THE ZONING BOARD’S ABILITY TO HEAR THE AMENDED APPLICATION WAS PRETEXTUAL.  (M38-51; M477-513). **  Plainly, the trial court’s decision to appoint a SHO was founded on a pretextual basis.  According to the trial court, the Mayor’s supposed opposition to the project so tainted the Board that a hearing could only be conducted by a “neutral” observer.  However, this finding is unsupported by the record below, wholly discounts the Board’s prior approvals, and improperly creates a basis to suppress the Mayor’s freedom of speech.
[directive] Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że będzie Pan(i) musiał(a) poddać się badaniu [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No]  1. lekarskiemu i psychologicznemu w [...] w celu czy Pana(i) postępowanie związane z popełnieniem przestępstwa ustalenia, stanowiło element powtarzalnego i kompulsywnego zachowania?  Do you understand you will be required to submit to a physical and psychological examination at the [...] the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior?  Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że jeśli badanie wykaże, iż Pana(i) postępowanie [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  2. stanowiło element powtarzalnego i kompulsywnego zachowania, sędzia będzie mógł skazać Pana(ią) na osadzenie w [...] w celu specjalistycznego leczenia Pana(i) stanów psychicznych?  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, the judge may sentence you to confinement at the [...] for a program of specialized treatment for your mental condition?  Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że może Pan(i) podważyć wnioski Centrum [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No]  3.  Diagnostyki i Leczenia Dorosłych podczas rozprawy i że podczas tej rozprawy będzie przysługiwało Panu(i) prawo do skonfrontowania świadków występujących przeciwko Panu(i) i zadawania im pytań, a także do przedstawienia dowodów na poparcie swojej sprawy?  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and that at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?  Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Polish strona 1 z 2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Polish page 1 of 2
[brief] [...] did not identify defendant as the robber, rather she identified him as the man she saw in the parking lot.  Although [...]'s testimony was corroborative, there was other strong evidence as to defendant's identity as the robber, notably, the descriptions provided by both [...] and [...] at the scene, the fact that defendant's DNA was found on the mask next to [...]'s wallet, and the officer's testimony as to their apprehension of defendant near the alleyway where he had been seen running after the robbery.  Additionally, the jury was able to assess [...]'s credibility in making the identification and was specifically instructed on the factors they should consider in making that assessment.  We have no cause to disturb defendant's conviction based upon [...]'s identifying defendant for the first time at trial.  V.