ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, the Trial Court rejected the plain language of the Consent Order – which provides only that claims re-filed within sixty (60) days after the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration would not be barred by any defense based upon the statutes of limitation or repose – and found that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is barred entirely, because [...] did not file the instant lawsuit within sixty (60) days following the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration.  (See Pa8).  Undeniably, the Trial Court’s interpretation is without basis, as the Consent Order does not contain any language to that effect.  In fact, the Consent Order is devoid of any agreement stating that any party’s claims would be dismissed with prejudice, if not asserted within sixty (60) days following the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration.  (Pa150 – Pa152).  Indeed, the words “with prejudice” are nowhere to be found in the Consent Order.  (Id.).  In the absence of any language dismissing claims with prejudice, the Rules of Court clearly provide that the claims dismissed under the Consent Order were dismissed only without prejudice.  See R. 4:37-1(a) and (b).  Indisputably, the Consent Order lacks any provision stating that future claims are automatically barred, if brought more than sixty (60) days after the completion of the Nacirema Arbitration.  The Consent Order provides only that later-filed claims lack the protection of agreed-upon tolling of defenses based upon limitations or repose.  Consistent with established New Jersey law, the Trial Court cannot re-write the plain language of the Consent Order, to dismiss Plaintiffs’ instant claims with prejudice.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court below, reinstate Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety, and force [...] to face the consequences of his unabashed perjury, forgery, and abuse of the judicial process.
[brief] In 2013, following a 207-day bench trial that spanned twenty-two months, [...] and [...] prevailed on numerous RICO and non-RICO claims they asserted against [...].  The parties thereafter proceeded to post-judgment proceedings, and [...] and [...] each submitted petitions for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) and Rule 4:42-9(a)(8).  [...] appointed [...] as Special Master to determine Plaintiffs’ fee applications.  (See Da38729.)  Special Master Orlofsky, who sat as a federal judge for thirteen years before joining [...], was highly qualified for this task.  In November and December 2013, after carefully considering Plaintiffs’ applications, Special Master Orlofsky issued three detailed Reports and Recommendations, awarding fees and costs to Plaintiffs.  (Da14480-611; Da14707-44; Da14826-41.)  On December 20, 2013, [...] entered judgment for Plaintiffs.  (Da38999-9014.)  [...] reviewed [...]’s analysis de novo and affirmed almost all of his recommendations.  As to [...], [...] awarded: (1) $12,624,516 in compensatory damages; (2) pre-judgment interest upon such compensatory damages, at the rate of 8.875% per annum through the date of entry of the judgment, in the amount of $19,435,326; (3) $10,666,468 for attorneys’ fees and costs of investigation and litigation through December 13, 2013; (4) $20,370,869 in punitive damages; and (5) $17,974,491 in trebled damages on [...]’s RICO claims, which was “not . . . collectable or payable because it is exceeded by the punitive damages awarded. ” (Da39000-02.)  [...] also awarded $39,918,156 to [...].  (Da39001-02.)  The Wilfs appealed, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the judgment.
[brief] ¹  On April 13, 2023, defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] moved to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration in lieu of an answer.  Pa0335.  On April 24, 2023, defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] moved to compel arbitration in lieu of an answer.  Pa0338.  On June 2, 2023, defendant [...] moved to dismiss the complaint.  Pa0341.  On August 10, 2023, defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] refiled their motion to compel arbitration in lieu of an answer.  Pa0345.  ¹  Pa refers to Plaintiffs’ Appendix.  On August 14, 2023, defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] refiled their motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration in lieu of an answer.  Pa0347.  On August 16, 2023, defendant [...] refiled his motion to dismiss the complaint.  Pa0350.  Some defendants filed answers demanding a jury trial rather than moving to compel arbitration.  Pa0152-0333.  On October 27, 2023, the Law Division entered written orders granting the three motions to compel arbitration along with statements of reasons that were identical in substance.  Pa0001-0022.  The Law Division dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice, including against those defendants that did not move to compel arbitration, without further order of the court.  Pa0334.  On November 13, 2023, under R. 2:2-3(b)(8) (permitting appeals as of right from orders compelling arbitration), Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the October 27, 2023 orders granting the motions to compel arbitration and dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice.  Pa0353.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] An appellate court will reverse an administrative agency decision that is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580 (1980).  In determining whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, a reviewing court will consider: (1) whether the agency action violates the enabling act’s express or implied legislative policies; (2) whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings upon which the agency based application of the legislative policies; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made upon a showing of the relevant factors.  Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985).  Here, the Commission’s August 22, 2023 Final Decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and was directly contrary to a robust body of caselaw the Commission had already developed on this issue pursuant to its statutory mandate.
[brief] (Pa192-94).  [...] then filed an action to vacate the Award in Mercer County Superior Court, and [...] cross-filed an action to confirm the Award.  (T19:8-12; T24:10-20).  The trial court disagreed with [...]’s position “that the language in question is so abundantly clear. ” (T21:24-22:22).  Instead, the court found that “the obligation of the Arbitrator is to take a look at the contract as a whole. ” (T22:15-22).  To that end, the court found that it “was reasonably debatable for [the Arbitrator] to focus [on] evidence as the State urges, upon the beginning language that is not in parenthesis about time and a half .  . . .” (T22:18-20).  Acknowledging that another arbitrator may have found in favor of [...] when reviewing the same evidence, the court reminded the parties that its role is not to determine whether the Arbitrator reached the best conclusion, but rather that the Arbitrator’s conclusion was “reasonably debatable. ” (T23:23-T24:3).  The court warned that it is not supposed to function “as an overseeing arbitrator. ” (T20:21-23).  The court thus rejected [...]’s plain language argument and confirmed the Award as reasonably debatable.  (T22:11-14; T24:5-8).  This appeal followed.
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[brief] By emphasizing the tests and procedures relied on by the *Polarome* court to find that most liberal manifestation estimate, [...] wrongly argues that some sort of diagnostic confirmation of injury was required for there to be initial manifestation.  Even if that was true (which it is not), that is present here.  In addition to his claimed wide-spread neurological, cognitive and respiratory symptoms, [...] points to diagnostic evidence of his mold injury.  While [...] conveniently omits the date of this diagnostic test, he asserts that it showed a monocyte count was associated with “chronic infections especially fungal. ”  Db47.  That test was on May 14, 2005, and according to [...], “is independent laboratory confirmation of the effect of mold as the cause of his symptoms. ”  Da499.  Thus, while a clinical test is not required to prove initial manifestation of injury, there can be no dispute that the last pull of the trigger is the monocyte test confirming a fungal infection.  Since that test occurred in 2005, two years before the [...] incepted, [...] cannot show an occurrence of bodily injury during the Zurich Policy periods.
[brief] (5T87:22-88:9).  [...] went to bed and [...]’s friends left shortly thereafter; however, [...] did not leave and attempted to get into bed with [...], but he rebuked her advances.  (5T88:13-15).  Even though [...] refused her advances, [...] slept at his house that evening, and the two were able to discuss the situation further in the morning.  (5T88:20-25).  [...] told [...] that he knew she had a drug problem, and that he could not be with her given everything he had going on at the moment.
[directive] This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under federal and New Jersey law.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.  C. questions.  The provisions of Section I of this Directive (Revisions to Effective date and IAPP relating to disclosure) shall take effect on January 1, 2023.  However, the provision of Section 9.11.2 requiring more detailed synopses of major discipline cases included in each agency’s annual report shall apply to all cases included in the 2022 annual report and to each annual report thereafter.  The provisions of Section II of this Directive (Revisions to IAPP relating to supersession authority) shall take effect immediately.  The provisions of this Directive shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] See id. at 375-76.  There is no such record in this matter presently before the Court.  Plaintiff does cite to anything in the record below to support its contention that the taking “was driven by a recognized and pressing need to expand the Township’s open space to prevent unchecked development, protect natural resources, and provide areas for public recreation. ” (Pb12).  The Township for the first time has raised such expansive justifications for its allegation that it needs Defendants’ properties to preserve open space in its appellate brief.
[brief] Similarly, when the facts suggest that defendants tried to remediate the snow/ice and the adequacy of these efforts is an issue, the additional language about the reasonableness of these efforts is also to be added to the general duty.  What the model charge reveals is that the ongoing storm rule is added to the charge when the fall occurs during an active snow event and that reasonableness of the removal efforts language is added when defendants undertook some remediation.  These facts dictate whether the model charge is supplemented.  There is absolutely no basis by which this court could conclude that when there is an active snow event, then model charge does not apply.
[brief] Number one, that . . . [...] committed the crimes.  . . .  Two, that this defendant solicited him to commit them, and/or did aid, or agree, or attempt to aid him in planning or committing them.  Three, that this defendant’s purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the offenses.  And four, that this defendant possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved against the person who actually committed the criminal act.  [14T167-10 to 21.]  Therefore, the jury instructions for accomplice liability were properly given to the jury and, even if the prosecutor’s comments during summation were incorrect, the court’s comprehensive instructions corrected and properly explained and identified this legal issue to the jury.
[brief] *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 438-446.  In these decisions, the *Zuber* Court noted, the United States Supreme Court recognized as a matter of Eighth Amendment law “‘three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults’”: (1) “‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’”; (2) that “‘juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure’”; and (3) that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.  The personality traits are more transitory, less fixed. ””
[brief] The Honorable [...], on July 2, 2012, found the following facts and conclusions of law.  Findings of Fact 1.  The information sought to be sealed by Plaintiffs concerns sensitive information contained in a confidential FBI history report, which includes inaccurate and false information, and is not contained in a publicly available document and was not discussed on the record in open court or the public information cannot be separated from the sealable materials.  2.  Plaintiff has established a legitimate private interest in sealing the information in the FBI history report, because it is sensitive, confidential information which would cause Plaintiff serious injury if released.  3.  Plaintiff would clearly suffer injury to his business relationships, to his financial status and credit, and to his reputation in the community.  Conclusions of Law 4.  The privacy interest of an individual is particularly powerful when the information he is seeking to protect is a compilation of government records.  *United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press*, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).  In addition, any expunged records are subject to protection by N.J.S.A. 2C:52-30, which prohibits unlawful publication of same.  Judge Waldor’s Findings of Fact have never been overruled.  It is beyond dispute that [...] on December 20, 2009, published on PACER multiple false and defamatory statements that were defamatory per se.  CONCLUSION  The Court must remand this case back to the trial court to address both the issues of suppression and the sealing and striking of the [...] complaint, which it has declined to do.  Respectfully submitted, [...], pro se Certificate of Service  This is to certify that true and correct copies (2) of the foregoing has been sent via Priority Mail on this date of April 9, 2024 to [...], 1300 Mount Kemble Avenue P.O Box 2075  Morristown, NJ 07962-2075 with attention to [...]  [...]  VINCENT ROGGIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. McELROY DEUTSCH MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP, [...], [...], [...], and JOHN DOES 1 - 10, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] | 1 | | In re Appeal of Howard D. Johnson Co., 36 N.J. 443, 446 (1962)(quoted in Meeker, 52 N.J. at 65) | 2 | | Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc. v. State, 175 N.J. Super. 384, 395 (App. Div. 1980), app. dismissed, 87 N.J. 321 (1981) | 8 | | Leach v. Anderl, 218 NJ Super 18, 28 (App. Div. 1987) | 3 | | Leasehold Estates, Inc. v. Fulbro Holding Co., 47 N.J. Super. 534, 136 A.2d 423 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) | 4 | | Meeker v. Meeker, 52 N.J. 59, 65 (1968) | 2 | | McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm’n, 177 N.J. 364, 395 (2003) | 8,9 | | Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) | 6 | | Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 1586, 146 L.Ed.2d 530 (2000) | 2,6 | | Oliver v. Ambrose, 152 N.J. 383 (1988) | 10 | Other Authorities Cited Restatement (Third) of Property – Servitudes - §2.6(2) (2000)..........................4 New Jersey Easements and Rights of Way, New Jersey Society of Professional Land Surveyors, February 5, 2015, Page 33.................................4 The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, at §3.9 (2021-22 Ed.)..............4 R. 2:10-2..................................................................................................................6 Index to Supplemental Appendix [...]’s Brief in Support of Summary Judgment [Excerpt]…………Supp.App. 1 Challenger’s Brief in Opposition to [...]’s Summary Judgment Motion
[brief] On Wednesday, September 13, 2023, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Elizabeth Police Officer [...], along with Officer [...] and Officer [...], was assigned to the narcotics division and was on patrol in an unmarked car the area of Spring Street (a/k/a Routes 1 & 9), and Fairmount Avenue.  (1T5-1 to 6-24).  Officer Kiniery drove into the parking lot of the Wawa located at 595 Spring Street, a location known to be used by narcotics dealers and where he had made several arrests in the past.  (1T7-2 to 19).  While patrolling the parking lot, Officer Kiniery observed a silver Infiniti that had parked between two box trucks behind the main parking lot of the Autozone, a business next to the Wawa.  (1T14-5 to 18).  Officer Kiniery parked his car in the lot when his attention was drawn to the Infiniti because it appeared to have backed into the parking spot in an effort to conceal itself from traffic or law enforcement and had a large Giants football team sunshade obstructing the front windshield.  (1T16-1 to 5; 1T18-2 to 16).  Officer Kiniery observed a female who is known to law enforcement as a drug user, speaking with the driver of the Infiniti.  (1T16-9 to 17-3).  After about two minutes, the female handed the driver an unknown quantity of U.S. currency in exchange for a small item or items from the driver of the Infiniti.  (1T17-4 to 14; 1T18-23 to 19-24).  The female then quickly walked away.  (1T19-24).  Officers did not stop the female after observing only one hand-to-hand transaction because they wanted to confirm their belief that defendant was engaging in narcotics transactions and because they did not want to disclose their surveillance position at that time.  (1T39-6 to 19).  The officer then ran the license plate of the Infiniti and learned that it was registered to defendant, an individual known to law enforcement.
[brief] (1T 58-24 to 60-20, 71-1 to 18)  [...] asked [...] for his license, registration, and insurance.  (1T 12-7 to 12, 24-2 to 3)  [...] looked around the car but was unable to provide the requested documents.  (1T 12-7 to 14, 24-1 to 25-16)  [...] asked for a name and date of birth, and [...] provided the name [...] with the birthday [...].  (1T 12-17 to 21, 25-17 to 26-19)  Another officer arrived on the scene, and [...] moved to the driver’s side of the car.  (1T 12-22 to 13-2, 25-9 to 12)  [...] testified that the smell of marijuana was stronger from the driver’s side.  (1T 13-18 to 20)  [...] asked [...] to exit the vehicle.  (1T 13-21 to 14-1, 28-8 to 24)  [...] was advised that a DMV inquiry for the name and date of birth provided returned nothing on file.  (1T 14-4 to 11, 29-17 to 18)  [...] told the officers that he had a North Carolina license and only a New Jersey permit.  (1T 29-18 to 30-13)  [...] denied having any documentation with his name on it.  (1T 13-12 to 18, 30-14 to 16, 31-8 to 10)  [...] also told the officers that a medical card in his wallet with the name “Jaki [...]” referred to his daughter.  (1T 15-11 to 16, 30-17 to 31-5)  Another backup officer – [...] – asked [...] how old he was, and [...] said 28 years old.  (1T 14-16 to 15-9, 31-11 to 32-2)  Longhitano pointed out that the birthday provided would make him 30 years old, and [...] then admitted that he was in fact Jaki [...] with a birthday of [...].  (14-16 to 15-22, 32-3 to 33-13)  [...] explained that the car belonged to his mother (1T 15-23 to 16-1, 33-24 to 25), and he denied consent to search the car.
[brief] Id. at 493.  In this latter category, New Jersey courts have observed that a party who is aware that his injury was caused by some third persons, but is not aware of the involvement or identity of other third persons, may utilize discovery principles to join that defendant after the asserted limitations period.  See Mancuso v. Neckles, 163 N.J. 26, 35 (2000) (cause of action accrued against different defendants at different times, depending on the quality of information known as to each defendant).  Here, Plaintiffs would not have known of their potential claim against the Cross Appellants until the Cross Appellants were identified to them as tenants in place as the date of the accident, and until Plaintiffs received a copy of leases from the strip mall.  As stated above, Plaintiffs moved promptly to join Cross Appellants after their “discovery. ”  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] RESPONSE TO “STATEMENT OF FACTS” OF [...]  In [...]’s Brief ([...]’s B13), counsel wrote:  Furthermore, [...] medical expert [...] concluded in his supplemental report that there is no evidence that appellant fell.  However, he suffered from a medical-cardiologic disease.  ([...] Da118).  [...] in his report never said “there is no evidence that appellant fell. ”  On the contrary, [...] wrote:  In this setting, and in the absence of a history of his having truly suffered a trip-and-fall, [...] had a reasonable medical-cardiologic risk factor for syncope as being the substrata for, and/or cause of, an alleged fall on 2/20/19.  ([...] Da118)  While referencing [...] having a “risk factor” for syncope, there was no suggestion in [...]’s report that [...] actually suffered syncope as a cause for his fall, much less did [...] offer an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.  In point of fact, [...]’s report is nothing more than a net opinion without factual basis.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS
[brief] (8T11-21 to 11-24)  Defendant subsequently filed a notice of appeal with the Ocean County Superior Court, Law Division.  Trial de novo was held on March 6, 2024.  At its conclusion, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., reserved decision.  (9T15-17 to 15-18)  In a written opinion issued later that day, [...] found Defendant guilty of DWI\(^2\).  (Da9-Da24)  On April 19, 2024 [...] sentenced Defendant to 3 months’ ignition interlock, 12 hours IDRC, and related fines and penalties.  (10T6-23 to 7-8)  The Judge also denied Defendant’s motion for a stay pending appeal.  (10T11-11 to 11-13)  This appeal follows.