ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A presentment is a formal document presented by you to the public to call to the community’s attention your recommendations as to some aspect of public affairs or conditions.  The Grand Jury is an independent investigative body that represents the public and may therefore inquire into matters affecting community morals, health, safety and general welfare.  In this connection you may inspect and visit public institutions, agencies, buildings, and departments.  If you find unsatisfactory conditions that are of such importance that they should be brought to the attention of the public and the officials concerned, you may return a presentment for that purpose.  You may, for example, determine that there are certain conditions in a public office or public institution which demand correction or improvement and which should be revealed to the public for that purpose, even though the evidence does not reach the level of constituting criminal conduct which would normally warrant an indictment.  In other words, a presentment generally deals with non-criminal conduct.  To investigate such matters you have the same broad, comprehensive and independent powers previously discussed.  In an investigation that may lead to a presentment, you may cause witnesses to appear before you, and [Standard Charge for Grand Juries Regarding Presentments]
[brief] (9T:50-17 to 52- 7).  Defendant did not demonstrate that he had two minor dependents at the time of sentencing aside from his own assertion in his PSR.  (See PSR at pp.  13 and 19).  Though defendant’s cousin refers to defendant’s children as “minor[s],” the mother of defendant’s nineteen-year-old son indicated that defendant was the father of “two older teens. ” (Compare Da47 with 9T:15-7 to 8; see PSR at p. 19 (indicating that defendant’s son was nineteen years old as of 2022)).  Defendant refused to divulge any information about his other child.  (PSR at p. 19).  Further, the PSR indicates that there was no “pertinent information” about this child in the New Jersey Automated Case Tracking System or the NJKiDS child support system.  (Id.).  The trial court therefore did not err in finding that defendant had no minor dependents.
[brief] Nothing in the record supports [...]’s claim that the Subcommittee was required to make a recommendation to the Council based solely on the criteria identified in the Evaluation Sheet.  (Appellant Br. 20).  The Evaluation Sheet provides, in full, that “[t]he Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee will review and evaluate each Applicant based on the following criteria in making its recommendation to the Borough Council.  A maximum of ten (10) points may be awarded in each category. ”  [...]’s mistaken assumption, unsupported by the language of the Evaluation Sheet, that the Subcommittee would evaluate each applicant based on the Evaluation Sheet alone, cannot provide a basis for relief.
[brief] (12T:161-10 to 164-3).  Moreover, when [...] was asked whether it was a common practice to review the evidence the State has before rendering a report, he gave a nonresponsive answer talking about his first time as an evaluator on the Hinkley case and talked about how a famous psychiatrist in Chicago once looked at crime scenes.  (13T:10-10 to 11-4).  However, when [...] gave answers like this, the Court did not interject at all.  *Id.*  Throughout, his direct examination, [...] would answer questions with long diatribes without the same interruption from the Court as [...].  (13T:207-2 to 208-10).  The disparate treatment of the two experts by the Court prejudiced [...] and deprived him of a right to a fair trial.
[brief] The defendant is now asking this court to infer passion/provocation when there is no evidence to support it.  To the contrary, the evidence indicates that the defendant was attacking an unarmed man with a knife and [...] was descending the stairs and [...] never pointed the gun at the defendant.  The evidence contradicts the inference the defendant is asking this court to draw.  "An inference is a deduction of fact that may be drawn logically and reasonably from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence."  Model Jury Charge-Inferences Theft by Receiving Stolen Property.  Here, the evidence is exactly the opposite of the inference that the defendant is seeking to be drawn—the proposed inference is not "logically and reasonably" flowing from the evidence and must be rejected.  There is no evidence that the victims did anything to the defendant beyond not allowing him into the residence where he was not wanted and the police told him to stay away from.  The defendant voluntarily came to the residence and created the situation he is now claiming caused his passion/provocation.  A defendant should not benefit when "he created the circumstances of his own passion or provocation..."
[brief] Plaintiff’s arguments in defense of the Trial Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants in New Jersey repeat the same errors that warrant reversal.  Like the Trial Court, Plaintiff ignores the undisputed fact that [...] was not served in New Jersey, which is the only way to obtain transient jurisdiction over an individual, and cites no authority that supports the assertion of transient jurisdiction over a non-resident entity like [...].  Plaintiff’s “transient” jurisdiction argument as to [...] is also directly contrary to this Court’s binding precedent.  In the case of general jurisdiction, Plaintiff disregards the rigorous “at home” standard in favor of a more lenient standard that was rejected by the Supreme Court over a decade ago.  Plaintiff cannot establish that [...]—a Delaware limited liability partnership with its principal place of business in Texas—or [...]—a Virginia resident—are “essentially at home” in New Jersey.  As for specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff does not acknowledge or apply the applicable standard, effectively conceding that it was not and cannot be met.  None of the contacts upon which Plaintiff relies support the Trial Court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over either Defendant.  Unable to establish a basis upon which the Trial Court can exercise jurisdiction, Plaintiff accuses Defendants of playing a “game of cat and mouse” by asserting “they were practicing law everywhere and nowhere on behalf of Plaintiff. ”  But Defendants have never made any such claim.  What Defendants have maintained—consistently and unequivocally—is that the representation of Plaintiff involved no work in New Jersey, did not implicate New Jersey law, and did not involve or require the use of any New Jersey-barred attorneys.  That is dispositive, and Defendants are not to blame for Plaintiff’s decision to file this meritless lawsuit in a forum in which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
[directive] 56  (a)  If administrative charges have been brought against an officer and a hearing will be held, a copy of all discoverable materials shall be provided to the officer and the hearing officer before the hearing; (b)  If the subject officer, agency or governing jurisdiction has been named as a defendant in a lawsuit arising out of the specific incident covered by an internal investigation, a copy of the internal investigative reports may be released to the attorney representing the subject officer, agency or jurisdiction; (c)  Upon the request or at the direction of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General; (d) Upon a court order; or (e)  Upon a request from the Division of Pensions, following an officer’s application for a retirement allowance.  9.6.2
[brief] The claims are separate and distinct from “survivorship claims,” which are claims that the deceased would have had, had he lived.  N.J.S.A. §2A:15-3.  Although wrongful death and survivorship claims both arise from the death of the decedent, “they serve different purposes and are designed to provide a remedy to different parties. ”  Smith v. Whitaker, 160 N.J. 221, 231 (1999).  Accordingly, the Wrongful Death Act is remedial legislation that must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of creating an heir’s right of recovery for the economic loss caused by the death of a family member.
[directive] In addition, the rules and regulations should set forth a schedule of possible penalties an officer might receive when discipline is imposed.  The rules and regulations may incorporate a system of progressive discipline.  Progressive discipline serves an important role in the process by which the agency deals with complaints of misconduct or inappropriate behavior.  In lieu of discipline, counseling, re-training, enhanced supervision, oral reprimand and performance notices can be used as instructional or remedial devices to address deficiencies or inadequate performance.  2.2.5
[brief] The court reversed the conviction on plain error because the judge “explained self-defense and defense of another, but he never told the jury it also should consider those affirmative defenses if or when it considered the lesser-included charge of passion-provocation manslaughter. ”  Id. at 177.  See State v. Ciuffreda, 127 N.J. 73, 82 (1992) (noting that “self-defense applied as much to th[e] [p/p manslaughter] charge as it did to aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter”); State v. Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. 57, 67 (App. Div. 2015) (“Where there is sufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense charge, failure to instruct the jury that self-defense is a complete justification for manslaughter offenses as well as for murder constitutes plain error. ”).  Here, the court did not identify p/p manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder or charge that self-defense applied to p/p manslaughter.  “Self-defense exonerates a person who kills in the reasonable belief that such action was necessary to prevent his or her death or serious injury, even though this belief was later proven mistaken. ”  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 198 (1984).  [...] testified that he fired both shots in self-defense.  (23T 173-2 to 175-2; 24T 203-8 to 10, 204-9 to 18, 217-20 to 22)  He testified that the first time he drew the gun, he fired a warning shot up in the air because he heard gunfire and “was scared for my life. ”  (23T 173-13 to 14, 174-6 to 175-2; 24T 203-9 to 10, 242-19)  After he fired, he ran toward his car.  (23T 174-6 to 19)  He fired the second time because he encountered [...] as he was heading to his car and believed [...] was pointing a gun at him.  (24T 203-8 to 10, 204-9 to 18, 217-20 to 22)  [...] was struck once and died.  (7T 46-4 to 6, 67-5 to 12)  Raheem [...] was struck once and injured.  (9T 38-25 to 39-2)  The failure to charge that self-defense applied to p/p manslaughter and attempted p/p manslaughter violated his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial and constitutes plain and reversible error.
[brief] (AA0050)  She has received twenty-two (22) military awards during her career with the Navy, as reflected in the United States Navy Awards Record submitted to the Respondent Commission.  (AA0102)  Appellant is also a Sheriff’s Officer Sergeant with the Respondent [...] and registered and sat for the promotional examination for Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant on May 25, 2021.  (AA0050)  She thereafter appeared on the PC1557A eligible list, which promulgated on December 16, 2021, and expires on December 15, 2024.
[brief] “unless otherwise provided in this act,” this expressly provides [...] a pathway to withdraw under N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  (Cb14).  This is a circular argument, which fails precisely because eliminated former non-operating districts, such as [...], are not enumerated entities capable of withdrawal pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  The Commissioner’s brief essentially ignores the prefatory clause in N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50 which limits its application.  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 expressly limits the application of 18A:8-50 by excluding entities such as [...].  The Commissioner notes that no provision exists to provide for the demerger of a former non-operating district which has been eliminated and merged into another district pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44.  The Commissioner than explains that the statutes generally prefer smaller districts to be consolidated, presumably pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 *et seq.*, or regionalized pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13.  But the inability of [...] to leave [...] and [...] absent explicit statutory authorization actually fits with the Commissioner’s public policy goals.  Initially, [...] was eliminated precisely because its existence as a non-operating district was redundant, creating unnecessary administrative and practical overhead.
[brief] Another set of jurors could have believed that in the course of committing a theft against [...], [...] threatened [...], but not [...], leading [...] to reasonably believe that he was armed.  On the other hand, it is possible that some jurors believed that in the course of committing a theft against [...], [...] threatened and purposely led [...], but not [...], to believe that he was armed, while others believed that in the course of committing a theft against [...], [...] threatened and purposely led [...], but not [...], to believe that he was armed. \footnote{The fact that, unlike the jury in Gentry, this jury did not ask the judge whether it had to unanimously agree on these underlying facts is of no matter.
[brief] ”  Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).  In Jelinek, a delivery truck drove onto a railroad crossing without yielding to an oncoming train and was struck.  Id. at 22.  At the trial, the court gave a jury instruction that was taken from the language of the opinion in Taylor v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 87 N.J.L. 673, 675 (E. & A. 1915) stating:  Well, it was the duty of the engineer to make reasonable and proper efforts, in view of the circumstances, to foresee and avoid collision, including the duty, if he saw that there was possible danger of collision, to exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid it, by stopping his engine.  Jelenik, 9 N.J. at 22.  (quoting Taylor, 87 N.J.L. at 675 (emphasis in the original).  On appeal, our Supreme Court “deem[ed] such a charge clear and prejudicial error” because “[a]s phrased, it places an undue burden on a railroad company, one it is not required to bear, to stop its engine if there is a possible danger of collision. ”  Id. (emphasis added).
[brief] “[I]n determining whether the terms should be concurrent or consecutive, the focus of the court should be on the fairness of the overall sentence. ”  Id. at 487 (citing State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 121 (1987).  Thus, under New Jersey law, a sentencing court must state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, Miller, 108 N.J. at 122, and, additionally “address the condition under which concurrent sentences may be given for crimes committed on [pretrial release]”, *State v. Njango*, 463 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (2020) (citations omitted).  “[A]n illegal sentence is one that ‘exceeds the maximum penalty provided in the Code for a particular offense’ or a sentence ‘not imposed in accordance with law.
[brief] 1 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(b)** ...............................................................................  18 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1** .........................................................................................  18 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2)** ...............................................................................  1 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3)** ...............................................................................  18 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)** ..............................................................................  1 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)** ............................................................................... 1 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(3)** ............................................................................... 1 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(b)** ............................................................................... 1 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a)** ............................................................................... 1 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)** .................................................................................... 1 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | Statutes (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS | |-------------------|----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) | 1, 18 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) | 1, 18 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 to -118.5 | 15 | ### Constitutional Provisions | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7 | 10 | | U.S. Const. amend. IV | 10 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 10 | ### Other Authorities Consent Decree, *United States v. [...]*, No. [...] (D.N.J. May, 5, 2016), https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/_files/ugd/582c35_8f30b967fdfd4e1cb75ed859122070ef.pdf ........................................... 15 N.J. Att’y Gen., *Law Enforcement Directive Regarding Police Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) and Stored BWC Recordings* 9, 11 (Directive No. 2015-1) (July 28, 2015), https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases15/AG-Directive_Body-Cams.pdf .................................................................................................................. 15 [...], *Body-Worn Cameras* (Gen. Order No. 18-05) (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/_files/ugd/582c35_4b56fb75a39742e5ad542481460e5878.pdf
[directive] This required information shall include, but not be limited to, the defendant's employment history, the names and addresses of any persons who contributed money or pledged security for the proffered bail or toward a surety bond, the amount, nature and timing of such contributions, and the relationship to the defendant of any such persons contributing resources.  Bail may not be accepted from a person subject to the requirements of this subsection until the prosecutor is provided the completed form required by this subsection.
[brief] **d.  The Third Miller factor**  Defendant claims that the judge improperly disregarded [...] and [...]’s conclusion that defendant committed his crime under peer pressure.  (Db31-34).  According to defendant, “no facts in the record” supported the judge’s finding that defendant’s own statements belie suggestions of peer pressure.  (Db33).  Defendant also claims that the judge erroneously “relied upon the fact that the offense was planned and brutal in nature – both of which bear no relevance to the question of peer pressure. ”  (Db33).  The third Miller factor invites courts to consider “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the juvenile’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. ”  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445.
[brief] Plaintiff could not state why he fell – if, in fact, he did fall.  For example, after the alleged incident, when Plaintiff got up, he did not inspect the area.  As [...] testified:  Q.  ...you didn’t do any kind of inspection of the area where you were when you got up.  Is that so?  A.  Not per se, no. (Pa222).  [...] stated that there was snow on the ground at the premises, but he could not state if there was snow on the ground by the dumpster.
[brief] In order to appeal an adverse determination of a pretrial motion following the entry of a guilty plea, defense counsel must state on the record: (1) that his/her client is entering a "conditional plea" of guilty pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f); (2) that his/her client reserves the right to appeal from the adverse determination of one or more specified pretrial motions.  The prosecutor should only consent to the entry of a "conditional plea" of guilty in those rare situations where the decision of the appellate court will dispose of the case.  If an appellate decision adverse to the State will prevent the State from proving a prima facie case, then the case is an appropriate one for the entry of a conditional plea.  In such a situation, the decision of the appellate court will dispose of the case because it will result in a dismissal of the indictment.  However, in circumstances where an appellate decision adverse to the State will not prevent the State from proving a prima facie case, then the prosecutor should not consent to the entry of a "conditional plea."  In such circumstances, the "conditional plea" might only serve to postpone the trial.  Postponement will aid the defense.  Witnesses for the State may be lost, and memories may dim.  The prosecutor will be left trying an old stale case.  Rule 3:5-7(d) gives a defendant a right to appeal from a denial [Section 12.22]
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2023-1  TO: All Law Enforcement Chief Executives  FROM: [...], Attorney General DATE: March 13, 2023  SUBJECT: Procedures and Guidelines for Law Enforcement Testing, Tracking, Storage, Retention, and Destruction of Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE)  Kits  Despite multidisciplinary efforts over the past several decades, sexual violence continues to touch the lives of far too many New Jersey residents.  Although our state's law enforcement officers, prosecutors, healthcare providers, and community partners in victim advocacy have all made significant strides in their efforts to eradicate sexual violence, crimes of this nature continue to occur at an alarming rate.  It is well recognized that sexual assault can be one of the most traumatic events an individual may experience.  When a person reaches out for assistance, it is imperative that the response is rapid and coordinated to ensure that victims have access to the medical, investigative, and supportive services they need and deserve.  Collectively, our goals continue to focus on ensuring that victims are heard and perpetrators are held accountable.  The Office of the Attorney General has promulgated the Standards for Providing Services to Victims Assault1 of Sexual (the Standards), that provide guidance for a collaborative multidisciplinary approach utilizing a well-defined Sexual Assault Response Team.
[brief] There, the requestor sought a log (with the sender, recipient, date, and subject fields) of all emails sent by the Township Clerk and the Township Police Chief between June 3 and June 17, 2013.  *Id.* at 344.  The agency denied the request, arguing it was invalid pursuant to MAG and required the custodian to perform research.  The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the requestor: Circumscribed his request to a two-week period and identified the discrete information he sought.  The records custodian did not have to make a subjective judgment to determine the nature of the information covered by the request.  The custodian simply had to search for—not research the identity of—the records requested.  Therefore, the Township’s, as well as the Appellate Division’s, reliance on MAG is misplaced here.  *[Paff, 229 N.J. at 356-57.]*  [...] tries to distinguish *Paff*, arguing that it is limited to a log of emails only.⁴
[brief] [...]  [...]  Headquarters  [...] (973)  538-0800  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.  Of Counsel: [...] | Attorney No. 02954-1985  [...]  Headquarters  [...] (973)  538-0800  November 13, 2023  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Abas v. Evans Architects,** | | | 2020 WL 2047967 (A-2274-18T2 App. Div. April 29, 2020) | 22 | | **Alberts v. Gaeckler,** | | | 446 N.J. Super. 551 (Law. Div. 2014) | 16 | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,** | | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 33, 34 | | **Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla,** | | | 274 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1994) | 16 | | **Cobra Products v. Federal Ins. Co.,** | | | 317 N.J. Super. 392 (App. Div. 1998), certif. den. 160 N.J. 89 | 37 | | **Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd.,** | passim | | 219 N.J. 395 (2014) | | | **Ellison v. Housing Authority of South Amboy,** | | | 162 N.J. 347 (1978) | 39 | | **Polzo v. Cty. of Essex,** | | | 196 N.J. 569 (2008) | 16 | | **Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp.,** | | | 207 N.J. 344 (2011) | 17 | | **Taylor v. DeLosso,** | | | 319 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1999) | 17, 18, 19, 22 | | **Thompson v. Newark Housing Authority,** | | | 108 N.J. 525 (1987) | 39 | | **Tichenor v. Santillo,** | | | 218 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 1987) | 16 | Triffin v. American Intern., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004)