ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In other words, the use of force was simultaneously justified by self-defense and not justified by self-defense.  Legal impossibilities like what occurred here create unsustainable risks to the defendant and the justice system.  The only conclusion to be drawn from a legally inconsistent verdict is that the jury misapplied the law.  *State v. Halstead*, 791 N.W.2d 805, 815 (Iowa 2010); *Price v. State*, 949 A.2d 619, 627 (Md. 2008).  A verdict based on a mistake of law, of course, creates a real “possibility of a wrongful conviction[,]” *Powell*, 674 So. 2d at 733, and “insults the basic due process requirement that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] **Third,** to the extent there was an error (which [...] contends there was not), it was one which Plaintiff invited.  See *New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III*, 201 N.J. 328, 340 (2010) (“The doctrine of invited error operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error. ”)  Here, Plaintiff made the tactical choice to throttle back any arguments on procedural unconscionability.  If --- 5  While the trial court did not make a finding of waiver, this Court may affirm on grounds other than those set forth in the trial court’s opinion.
[brief] ”  Counsel then explained that the Arbitrator’s decision rested entirely on a new work rule that contradicts the express authority the CBA granted the [...]:  The -- the Authority determined based upon the note that was submitted that the grievant, [...] [sic], could not perform her job.  There was no dispute, and that’s clear from the record, that she was unable to perform the essential functions of the job.  There was no provision in the contract that gave the arbitrator the right to ignore those standards.  Your Honor, his decision flows from his statement that in his opinion an employer cannot terminate an employee who is temporarily disabled.
[brief] Once when she was walking her large, “dog-aggressive” Presa Canario dog, Bella “started running,” causing her to become “nervous” and run back to her property fearing a confrontation.  3T47:18-48:8.  In 2016, [...] found Bella in the road near the intersection of Mountain Trail.  4T:2-7.  This was about a quarter mile from the [...].  See D-27.  She delivered Bella to “the wife” [[...]], who thanked her.  4T7:9-21.  [...] also witnessed “repeated incidents” of Bella barking outside or otherwise antagonizing Koda.  4T11:15-20.  In April 2022, when [...] was in the back yard playing fetch with Koda, Koda didn’t return the ball but instead ran to the gate.  From the gate, [...] saw Bella standing in the middle of the Defendant’s front yard.  Bella was not barking at the time, which was unusual for Bella.  Yet, Koda was instantly alerted to her presence.  4T7:9-21.  The Court discounted [...]’s testimony as “remote” although this happened only five months before the incident.
[brief] 17  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Consent to Search Form Ra1 State v.  Stubbs, 2013 WL 4104079 (App. Div. 2013)  Ra2-16  [...] BWC  Ra17  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |------------------------|---------| | **State v. Coyle,** | | | 119 N.J. 194 (1990) | 8 | | **State v. Cushing,** | | | 226 N.J. 187 (2016) | 9, 10 | | **State v. Grant,** | | | 254 N.J.Super. 571 (App. Div. 1992) | 16 | | **State v. King,** | | | 44 N.J. 346 (1965) | 12 | | **State v. R.D.,** | | | 169 N.J. 551 (2001) | 16 | | **State v. Simon,** | | | 161 N.J. 416 (1999) | 16 | | **State v. Stubbs,** | | | 2013 WL 4104079 (App. Div. 2013) | 13 | | **State v. Weiler,** | | | 211 N.J.Super. 602 (App. Div. 1986) | 16 | | **State v. Winter,** | | | 96 N.J. 640 (1984) | 16
[brief] Dated: March 28, 2024 (Revised April 4, 2024)  IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE [...] and THE PLANNING BOARD OF THE [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION – PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] Orders dated August 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023
[brief] The opinion articulated by plaintiff’s liability expert [...] that the subject roadway condition was inherently dangerous similarly lacks foundational support and presents as an inadmissible net opinion.  On the initial day of his deposition, [...] testified that the roadway condition that purportedly caused plaintiff’s accident involved an abrupt change in elevation of up to 2” with no tapering of the roadway surface.  (Pa0188 at 161:12-18).  However, during the second day of his deposition, when shown a close-up of the allegedly dangerous condition (Pa1861; Da42), [...] conceded that the roadway area in question did incorporate some level of tapering and did not involve an abrupt 2” change in elevation.  (Pa0285, p. 47:14-16).  Upon making this concession, [...] revised his dangerous condition opinion by testifying that the subject roadway condition was dangerous as it involved an insufficient degree of tapering of the roadway surface.
[brief] Aa0026.  As set forth in its HAD application, [...] sited CS 327 to avoid and minimize impacts to Highlands resource areas to the greatest extent practicable.  The CS 327 Site is an --- 2 [...] applied for the HAD consistent with FERC’s policy of encouraging cooperation between interstate natural gas companies and state and local agencies.  Paragraph 87 of the FERC Certificate provides in part:  “The Commission encourages cooperation between interstate pipelines and local authorities.  However, this does not mean that state and local agencies, through application of state or local laws, may prohibit or unnecessarily delay the construction or operation of facilities approved by this Commission. ”  179 FERC ¶ 61,041 P 87; TGPa0005.  Given that the FERC has issued a Notice to Proceed, the construction of CS 327 would be unnecessarily delayed if this Court were to invalidate the HAD since another (more protracted) approval process would be required.
[brief] Failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disorder, or other action or condition deserving of police attention or any other omission by an employee which represents an abandonment of one's duties, obligations, or assignment is neglect of duty and will subject that employee to discipline by failing to properly conduct nineteen (19) property checks that he called in to dispatch.  His failure to properly conduct these property checks diminishes the position that we hold as law enforcement officers to protect and serve our community.  The same community that relies on our truthfulness, knowledge, integrity, and oath to uphold the laws of the State of New Jersey and the Constitution of the United States to keep them safe.  Furthermore, this statistical data, which is the by-product of the property checks, is used for state reporting, federal reporting, and grant applications.  His lack of suitable attention in this area is unacceptable and will not be tolerated.
[directive] Surveillance and Communications Equipment.  Tactical Teams shall be equipped with devices to enable the teams to maximize communication and intelligence gathering capabilities in a variety of scenarios.  These devices shall include: devices to enable communication such as throw phones, specialized cell phones, megaphones, or robots with two-way communication; and devices to enable observation and surveillance, such as surveillance drones, under-the- door cameras, telescopic cameras, or pinhole cameras.  If available, Tactical Teams should utilize robots and infrared sensors if authorized under law.  Such devices permit the Tactical Team to assess the environment in the vicinity of the barricaded individual without the need for officers to make entry, keeping officers and barricaded individuals safer and avoiding undesirable outcomes.  6.4
[brief] Proof of service must be filed with the court promptly and in any event before action is to be taken on the matter by the court.  Any paper filed with the court must be served on Defendant.  R. 1:5-1(a).  On January 11, 2007, [...], Acting Administrative Director of the Courts issued a Notice to the Bar ("Notice").  The Notice stated: "Motions submitted without the requisite proof of service may be denied."  An Administrative Directive is equivalent to a rule of court and, thus, is binding on bench and bar.  State v. Clark, 162 N.J. 201, 205 (2000).  A directive has the force of law.  State v. McNamara, 212 N.J. Super. 102, 109 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 (1987).
[brief] [...] provides a “laundry list” of statutes it asserts demonstrate the “State Legislature has created a statutory scheme of general application that requires municipal consent in numerous scenarios relevant to public utilities. ” (Db42). ⁵  Four of the statutes listed by [...] (N.J.S.A. 48:17-8, N.J.S.A. 48:17-10, N.J.S.A. 48:17-11, and N.J.S.A. 48:17-12) apply only to telephone poles.  See Seals v. Cnty. of Morris, 210 N.J. 157,173-74 (2012) (stating that “[t]he utility pole in this case is an electric pole, not a telephone pole, and ... [t]he Legislature has chosen to treat these two types of utility poles in very different ways. ”).  Thus, the four statutes governing telephone poles are inapplicable to the electric utility poles at issue in this case.  Likewise, N.J.S.A. 48:3-19 applies only to “joint use” of poles by two or more entities and N.J.S.A. 48:7-2 applies only to underground lines.  Both statutes are inapplicable.  The only statute that is applicable is N.J.S.A. 48:7-1.  However, as discussed above, that statute’s conferral of authority on municipalities is exceedingly narrow and limited, and does not provide any statutory basis for [...]’s Ordinance.⁶ --- ⁵
[brief] The proclamation shall be filed, published and printed with the laws as other proclamations are required to be filed, published and printed, and shall be judicially noticed and received in evidence in all courts of the State in the same manner and to the same extent that the law or joint resolution therein specified would have been if such judgment had not been made.  No law or joint resolution, or part thereof, adjudged void shall, after the entry of such judgment as provided in this chapter, be judicially noticed or received in evidence by any of the courts of the State.
[brief] See PADNA v. City Council of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010), certif. den., 205 N.J. 79 (2011).  Superior Court review is intended to be a determination of the validity of the agency's action, not substitution of the Court's judgment therefor.  CBS Outdoor, supra, 414 N.J. Super. at 578; Rocky Hill Citizens v. Planning Bd. of Boro. of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384, 411-412 (App. Div. 2009); Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., 117 N.J. 376 (1990).
[brief] The remaining counts of the indictment, 4, 6, and 7, were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.  On May 22, 2018, the defense submitted a motion requesting that [...] recuse himself.  **42a.**  On June 29, 2018, [...] denied the recusal motion.  **43a.**  On October 11, 2018, the defense filed an interlocutory appeal challenging [...]’s Order granting the State’s motion for reconsideration of his previous severance order and consolidating the murder charges against [...] for the killings of [...] and [...].
[brief] STATUTES AND RULES  Rule 4:6-2(e)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38, 39 Rule 4:9-1.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41  Rule 4:46-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 41 N. J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57  INTRODUCTION
[brief] THE DEMANDS OF DEFENDANT REGARDING MORTGAGE  ASSIGNMENTS MUST BE DENIED UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL  At the oral argument on the Order to Show Cause that is the subject of this appeal, [...] noted that Defendant’s arguments of forged assignments and forged documents and perjury were considered and rejected not only by his court but by a number of courts in litigation spanning 2016 to the present time.
[brief] This Appeal stems from the dismissal on summary judgment of Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s complaint for personal injury against respondent/defendant [...] because he failed to maintain the required insurance coverage for vehicles principally garaged in New Jersey as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 when he was involved in an accident in New Jersey on April 13, 2022.  On March 1, 2024, the trial court granted respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims of appellant/plaintiff [...] for economic and non-economic loss, on the grounds that the appellant/plaintiff [...] failed to maintain insurance as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, was “culpably uninsured,” and therefore could not maintain an action for economic and non-economic loss against respondent/defendant [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  This Order was Certified by the trial court as a Final Order and Entered on April 29, 2024.  The appellant/plaintiff [...] argues in this appeal that, due to his “innocent oversight” confusing the importance of his “mailing address” with the “garaging address” when he purchased the [...] (“[...]”) policy in January 2022, after he moved to New Jersey in April 2021, such “innocent oversight” was not a material misrepresentation.  He also argues that discovery was incomplete when summary judgment was granted.  Neither argument is relevant to his failure to maintain the required N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 coverage.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  7  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................  10  POINT  1.  BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S SWORN DEPOSITION TESTIMONY, HER CERTIFIED ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES, AND THE SWORN STATEMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT EYEWITNESS, ALL SUCH MUST BE ACCEPTED AS TRUE, AND TOGETHER WITH THE BENEFIT OF ALL FAVORABLE AND LEGITIMATE INFERENCES  THEREFROM, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (2T4:24-5:13; 2T7:2-10; 1T12:25-13:12; 114a, 123a)  .........................  10  A.  Standard of Review.  ..................................................................................  10  B.  Summary Judgment Standard under Rule 4:46 .............................................  12 POINT  2.  PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED SERIOUS INJURIES, INCLUDING MULTIPLE DISC HERNIATIONS AND CHRONIC DEPRESSION, AND HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY OF HER PEERS  DETERMINE THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THOSE PERMANENT INJURIES THAT WERE CAUSED BY THE BUS DRIVER’S NEGLIGENT DRIVING MUST BE SAFEGUARDED (1T9:13-23; 1T12:10-13; 1T13:18-23)  ...........................................................................  18  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................  24  | Description | Page | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Transcript of oral argument on 03/31/23 | T1 | | Order dated 03/31/23 granting summary judgment to Defendant [...] | 114a | | Transcript of oral argument on 04/28/23 | T2 | | Order dated 04/28/23 denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration | 123a | ## STATEMENT OF ALL ITEMS SUBMITTED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT | Item | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant | 20a | | Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts | 22a | | Certification of Counsel for Defendant | NEITHER e-filed NOR served | | Defendant’s Exhibit “A” – Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories | 26a | | Defendant’s Exhibit “B” – Deposition transcript of Plaintiff | 42a | | Defendant’s Exhibit “C” – Expert report of [...], MD | omitted* | | Certification of Plaintiff’s counsel in opposition | 56a | | Plaintiff’s Response to Statement of Facts | 58a | | Certification of witness [...] | 60a | | MRI report of the cervical spine of Plaintiff | omitted* | | MRI report of the lumbar spine of Plaintiff | omitted* | | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 02/28/20 | omitted* | | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 04/21/20 | omitted* | * All omitted medical records and reports are excluded under R. 1:38-3 and have been submitted in a separate appendix marked “CONFIDENTIAL” per R. 2:6-1(a)(3).
[brief] There would have been no need for the Legislature to amend the statute on January 10, 2022 to specifically include within the scope of employment “when an employee arrives at the parking area prior to reporting for work” if that time period were already included by the other language in the “scope of work” definition.  “In interpreting a statute courts should avoid a construction that would render ‘any word in the statute to be inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless[.]’”  Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 204 (1999) (quoting In re Estate of Post, 282 N.J. Super. 59, 72 (App. Div. 1995)).  The January 10, 2022 amendment to include “when an employee arrives at the parking area prior to reporting for work” within the statutory scope of employment would be “inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless” if that time period were already included within the general definition of scope of employment already found within N.J.S.A. 34:15-36.  Thus, the language of the statute in effect at the time of the October 6, 2021 fatal crash did not expressly provide that [...] was entitled to co-employee immunity.
[brief] The relevant transcript excerpts in the said regard include the following:  [...]:  Okay.  Next, [...] (Board Engineer), 1667 ordinance.  [...] (Board Engineer):  Yes, Mr. Chair, I’m just going to do a quick introduction and then I’m going to let [...] of my office do a little bit further summary of what’s being proposed.  [...] (Board Attorney):  You know what, [...] (Board Engineer), let me just swear you in real quickly just for the record.  [...], you’re the Board Engineer.  BOARD ENGINEER, [...], SWORN  [...] (Board Attorney):  Thank you.  [...] (Board Engineer):  Thank you.  So Mr. Chair, we’re moving back to the property on Beachway, the Beachway Parking Lot.  The property is known as Block 184, Lots 1, 3.01, 3.02, and 3.03.  As you know, over the years, we had numerous developers looking at the property.  The last one was roughly three years ago, 2017, 2018 with the [...], They were looking to develop Lot 1.  Since then, several other developers have come into play and right now we have the [...] interested in Lot 3.02 which is the existing parking lot.  So they have made a presentation to the Council, the Redevelopment (Agency of) the Borough Council as part of the redevelopment agency for development of that parking lot property.  In summary, they’re looking to do three buildings potentially a total of 272 apartment units with roughly 299 parking spaces overall.  They will be looking to develop the parking lot only.  Lot 1, which is owned by the [...] is not part of the discussions, but it is still part of the redevelopment plan that we are presenting to the Board tonight.
[brief] Order adjudicating Plaintiff’s Complaint, dated August 6, 2020..................  Pa1  Opinion of Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated August 5, 2020 denying the relief sought by Plaintiff’s Complaint.............................. Pa2 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Baird v. Moore,** | 31 | | 50 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1958) | | | **Esteves v. Esteves,** | 31 | | 341 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2001) | | | **Hercules Powder Co. v. Nieratko,** | 30 | | 113 N.J.L. 195 (Ch.Ct.1934) | | | **Hollingsworth v. Lederer,** | 30 | | 125 N.J. Eq. 193 (E. & A.1939) | | | **In re Estate of Lash,** | 13 | | 169 N.J. 20 (2001) | | | **In re Niles Trust,** | 14 | | 176 N.J. 282 (2003) | | | **In re Orchard Enters., Inc. S'holder Litig.,** | 19 | | 88 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2014) | | | **Manalapan Realty v.
[brief] [...]’s Failure to Identify a PWCRA-Registered Archeological Subcontractor is a Statutory Violation that Require Automatic Rejection of its Bid (0015a-0018a)  New Jersey law is well-settled that the failure to include an item in a bid that is statutorily mandated is a non-waivable defect requiring automatic rejection of the bid.  See P&A Constr., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge, 365 N.J. Super. 164, 177 (App. Div. 2004).  Without question, the PWCRA prohibits contractors or subcontractors from performing public work unless they are registered pursuant to the PWCRA.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56. 51.  Consistent with the PWCRA, the Solicitation required all bidders and their subcontractors to be registered in accordance with the requirements of the PWCRA at the time of bid opening.  Specifically, section 0.32 of the Solicitation provides:  The successful Bidder for each public works contract and each listed subcontractor shall be registered in accordance with the requirements of the Public Works Contractor Registration Act (N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.48 et. seq.).  The successful Bidder and each listed subcontractor shall possess a certificate at the time the bid proposal is submitted and shall submit the certificate(s) prior to the award of the Contract.  [0331a.]  The Bidder’s Proposed Subcontractors Form within the Solicitation identified a list of subcontractors who [...] determined were so critical to the successful completion of the Anticipated Contract that each bidder was required to identify them at the time of bid.  0344a.  Among other subcontractors, the Bidder’s Proposed Subcontractors Form specifically identified the archaeological subcontractor.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) requires Board members to swear the following oath:  “I will recognize that authority rests with the board of education and will make no personal promises nor take any private action that may comprise the board. ”  “Private action” constitutes any action taken by a board member that is beyond the scope of his authority and duties as a board member.  See N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(5) (“[f]actual evidence of a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12- 24.1(e) shall include evidence that the [board member] . . . took action beyond the scope of his or her duties such that, by its nature, had the potential to compromise the board.").  Even though Board Policy 0174 designates the Board president as one of three individuals who can unilaterally request legal services or advice from the Board attorney, [...]’s request for legal research violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) because the policy provides that the Board president’s request for such legal services must be in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-5.2.
[brief] As such, this Court must set aside the [...]’s October 6, 2023 Final Decision under appeal.  [...] concedes in its Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts that it last revised its public access rules in September 2017, which was approximately two years before the Legislature enacted the Public Access Law.  See Rb3.  [...] argues in its brief that because the Law contains no provision prohibiting its implementation if [...] does not adopt regulations with the prescribed time period, that it is free to do so.  Rb27.  While [...] agrees that [...] has existing authority, and in fact the obligation, to require public access under long-established principles of common law,\(^6\) [...]’s applicable regulations are unambiguous in preventing [...] from requiring an applicant to provide onsite public access as a condition of approval under the circumstances presented by [...]’s permit.  Ab21-22.  [...] nevertheless asserts that “without a legislative bar to implementing the Law without new regulations, the Law obligates [...] to protect the public’s right to access tidal waters and impose public access conditions on permits.