ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Second, regardless, the Hackensack Project was completed in December 2020—two years before the First Arbitration even commenced in earnest.  See Pa344 at 501:15-16.  The work at issue in [...]’s $2.1 million claim was performed by [...] and its subcontractors in 2019-2020.  That run-of-the-mill non-payment claim ripened, at the latest, in December 2020 (i.e., upon [...]’s alleged nonpayment to [...] under the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract).  See, e.g., Pa607 (Payments).  What precluded [...] from bringing its non-payment claim against [...] for several years?  The trial could not, and thus did not, answer that question.  The claim was ripe because [...] had an “enforceable right” against [...].  The idea that [...] did not have an “enforceable right” until after the [...] concluded is simply erroneous—nothing in the [...] (where [...] was not a party) affected [...]’s ability to sue [...] for its alleged debt.  Plainly, [...] could have brought its claim to unpaid monies under the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract as early as December 2020 (when [...] finally secured the TCO for the Project).
[brief] On May 28, 2023, Plaintiff timely filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a proper valuation of her interest in [...].  While her reconsideration motion was pending, Defendants [...] and [...] dissolved [...] and excluded Plaintiff from the winding up of the company.  Plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration seeking judicial supervision of the improper dissolution of [...].  Both of Plaintiff’s motions were denied.  As a result, Plaintiff was wrongfully deprived of her fair value of her stake in [...] and was excluded from [...] as the assets of the Company were wound up.
[brief] ”  See also In re Petition for Review of Op. 522 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 102 N.J. 194, 200 (1986) (“With respect to responsibility for compensatory relief, government bodies often are contractually obligated to indemnify their officials for such damages.  Any money judgment against an individual would ultimately be paid by the governmental body. ”)  In [...], 159 N.J. at 421, a student sought a court order that would require a college professor, [...], to change a grade because the student had not completed the course due to military service.
[brief] On the brief: [...], Esq.  Of counsel on the brief  [...], Esq.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | HEADING | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULING UNDER APPEAL | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | A. CASELAW | iv | | B. STATUTES & REGULATIONS | vi | | C. RULES | vi | | D. OTHER AUTHORITIES | vi | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | a.
[brief] A.  Statutory Background.  The New Jersey Legislature enacted the LAD in 1945, making it one of the oldest civil rights laws in the Nation.  *C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ.*, 255 N.J. 289, 306 (2023).  Its purpose, our Supreme Court has held, “is nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination. ”  *Id.* at 306-07; see also *L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ.*, 189 N.J. 381, 400 (2007) (agreeing that the LAD must be “liberally construed” to effectuate “the Legislature’s broad remedial objectives” to eradicate discrimination); *Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co.*, 225 N.J. 343, 354 (2016) (“The LAD occupies a privileged place among statutory enactments in New Jersey. ”).  The LAD has prohibited unlawful discrimination in all places of public accommodation since 1949, Pub. L. 1949, c. 11—a prohibition that covers unlawful discrimination in “any kindergarten, primary and secondary school ... [or] high school,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(1); see also, e.g., *C.V.*, 255 N.J. at 307.  And since 2006, the LAD has expressly barred discrimination on the basis of “gender identity or expression. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f); Pub. L. 2006, ch.  100; see also, e.g., *Holmes v. Jersey City Police Dep’t*, 449 N.J. Super. 600, 601 (App. Div. 2017).  This prohibition on --- 1  Because the procedural history and statement of facts are closely related, they have been combined for efficiency and for the Court’s convenience.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s assertion, the question of the necessity of the route of the [...] through [...] is not germane to reach a determination of preemption.  However, on appeal, [...] continues its attempt to create an issue of fact where none exists by asserting that the route of the [...] through [...] is unnecessary.  The question of the route of the [...] is through N.J.A.C. 14:5-2.1  Therefore, the Project is crucial for [...] to fulfill their statutory obligation to furnish safe and adequate utility services throughout New Jersey.  The Project is also necessary, and [...] properly routed the Project through [...].  The Project is also necessary as it was approved by [...] under the delegated authority of [...].
[brief] A.  The [...] did not acknowledge the legitimate governmental purpose behind the DACCA and its Attorney Safe Harbor.  A constitutional challenge on separation of powers grounds must be evaluated under the following two-prong test: (1) the legitimacy of the governmental purpose of the challenged statute, and (2) the nature and extent of its encroachment upon judicial prerogatives and interests.  *Knight v. City of Margate*, 86 N.J. 374, 389-90 (1981).  The overarching purpose of the DACCA from 1960 until the present has been to protect consumers from abusive and exploitative practices of unscrupulous debt adjusters.  *American Budget Corp. v. Furman*, 67 N.J. Super. 134, 136 (Ch. Div.), aff’d 36, N.J. 129 (1961); (Rb16-23); (Rb16.)  Moreover, the legislative purpose behind the Attorney Safe Harbor is to protect consumers from potential unscrupulous practices of those attorneys who perform debt adjustment services as their principal, standalone activity.  (Rb18-19.)  The [...] makes no effort to address the first prong of the test and presumably agrees with Respondents’ position as to the legitimate purposes of DACCA and its Attorney Safe Harbor.  For these reasons, the DACCA satisfies the constitutional standard under the *Knight* test and is thus constitutional.
[brief] As before, the trial court correctly concluded that the arbitration provision in this matter is not substantively unconscionable.  However, to the extent the Court has any concerns about the provision and finds that it is not severable, then Plaintiff should still be required to mediate the matter prior to any litigation.  The Agreement provides, in relevant part, that any claim “THAT CANNOT BE SETTLED THROUGH DIRECT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY THE CLAIMANT TO NONBINDING MEDIATION” and that if “THE PARTIES ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE CLAIM THROUGH MEDIATION, THE CLAIM SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY CLAIMANT FOR AND RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION. ” (Pa61).  Here, Plaintiff has never challenged the portion of the dispute resolution provisions which sets forth the condition precedent that any claim against [...] be mediated before it is arbitrated.  Thus, assuming the portion of the provision at issue is unenforceable (it is not), due effect should be given to this separate requirement and Plaintiff should be required to mediate his claims.
[brief] Indeed, contrary to defendant’s assertion, this case is distinguishable from *State v. Burney*, 255 N.J. 1 (2023).  In *Burney*, the trial court held a *Frye* hearing to determine the admissibility of [...]’s testimony.  *Id.* at 11.  At the end of the hearing, [...] was qualified as an expert in historical cell site analysis, which he explained “is the use of cell phone companies’ business records to approximate where a user may have been at a particular time of interest. ”  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court described [...]’s testimony as follows:
[brief] *State v. Colvin*, 123 N.J. 428 (1991).  As stated in *State v Penna Flores*:  The warrantless search of an automobile in New Jersey is permissible where (1) the stop is unexpected; (2) the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime; and (3) exigent circumstances exist under which it is impracticable to obtain a warrant.
[brief] In analyzing the timeliness of the challenge to the zoning ordinance amendment, the Appellate Division noted that New Jersey courts have “found a sufficient public interest to justify an extension of time for filing a prerogative writ action in a variety of circumstances, including challenges to the validity of ordinances on the ground that they were not adopted in conformity with the applicable statutory requirements. ”  Id. at 277 (citing Reilly, supra, 109 N.J. at 560-61; Cervase v. Kawaida Towers, Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 547, 569 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d o.b., 129 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1974); Wolf, supra, 182 N.J. Super. at 296; Catalano v. Pemberton Township Bd. of Adjustment, 60 N.J. Super. 82, 95-97 (App. Div. 1960)).  The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in determining that the zoning ordinance amendment challenge implicated a “private” and not “public” dispute, and specifically noted “the substantial impact upon residents of the adjoining neighborhood” as well as “a substantial impact upon the flow of traffic on Highway 41” and “loss of public access to nature trails. ”  Id.  The Appellate Division further observed that the “claimed benefits of the rezoning, such as increased shopping facilities, employment opportunities and tax ratables, are also a matter of broad public interest. ”  Id.  Moreover, the Appellate Division found it significant that:  [T]he primary basis of plaintiffs’ challenge to the validity of the ordinance—that it violated N.J.S.A. 40:55D–62(a) because it was not substantially consistent with the land use element of the master plan—is similar to the claims that zoning ordinances had been adopted in violation of the applicable land use legislation which we found to justify extensions of time in Wolf and Catalano.  Id. at 278.  Finally, the Appellate Division noted that the “public interest in an adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims…outweighed…the policy of repose expressed in the forty-five day rule. ”  Id. (quoting Reilly, supra, 109 N.J. at 559).  The Appellate Division subsequently reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
[brief] UNDER THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE, APPELLANT CANNOT ARGUE ON APPEAL THAT THE “BURT DEFENDANT” DESIGNATION WAS ERROR WHEN APPELLANT URGED THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THAT RULING.  A.  Appellant sought and obtained the Trial Burt ruling, which he now claims was unfairly prejudicial.  It is well-established that parties who apply to a court to take certain actions or adopt certain theories may not later complain about the court’s adoption of those actions or theories.  “The doctrine of invited error operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error. ”  Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 503 (1996).  A defendant “cannot beseech and request the Trial Court to take a certain course of action, and upon adoption by the court, take his chance on the outcome of the trial, and if unfavorable, then condemn the very procedure he sought . . . claiming it to be error and prejudicial.
[brief] Parents cannot provide input on matters impacting their children’s lives -- whatever they may be -- when these matters are actively concealed from them by school personnel.  Parents’ involvement in their child’s development and overall well-being requires knowledge of potentially adverse situations.  The trial court adduced no case law overcoming the paramount right of Federal Constitutional parental autonomy in favor of an unsettled LAD claim of parental exclusion, because no such case law exists.  Moreover, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution (U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2), “state laws and constitutional provisions that conflict with the Federal Constitution are without effect. ”
[directive] Pursuant to this Directive, I am requiring County Prosecutors to develop and implement procedures for referring victims of nonfatal strangulation and/or smothering for a forensic medical examination.  The [...] can respond to any reported cases of strangulation and/or smothering which meets the following criteria:  1.  The victim describes being strangled and/or smothered; 2.  The victim consents to the forensic medical examination; and 3.  The incident occurred within the past five (5) days and/or the victim exhibits continued visible signs of strangulation and/or smothering injury, or reports experiencing continued symptoms of strangulation and/or smothering.
[brief] *See* *Nishina*, 175 N.J. at 511.  As indicated, it would be nearly impossible for a second man with the same gender, racial background, hairstyle, and clothing to be in the same location and also be using crutches at the exact same time.  And not only did Defendant match this exact description, he also reacted to the arrival of police in a way that [...] found to be indicative of guilt, and sought to leave the area once their presence became apparent.  On top of all that, Defendant had a fanny pack large enough to contain a handgun that was weighed down as if contained a handgun.  This information “would lead a reasonable police officer to have an articulable suspicion” that Defendant possessed a handgun, as was reported by the 9-1-1 caller.  *See*  *State v. Davis*, 104 N.J. 490, 505 (1986).  By failing to consider the totality of the circumstances, [...] reached the wrong conclusion.  Her decision should be reversed and an order should be entered denying Defendant’s Motion.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(b).  Most significantly, while a master plan serves as the basis for a zoning ordinance, it does not have the operative effect of a zoning ordinance.  *Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee*, 140 N.J. 366, 381 (1995).  Because the Ordinance concerns the amendment of a redevelopment plan, the primary authority to adopt the Ordinance is derived from the LRHL.
[brief] Though the tort has been applied in limited scenarios, the Illinois Supreme Court has used rather broad language in describing its [*3] application.  According to the court, "[w]hen a discharge contravenes public policy in any way[,] the employer has committed a legal wrong."  Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130.  It described the meaning of "public policy" as follows:  There is no precise definition of the term.  In general, it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively.  It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions.  Id.  That said, the court has not consistently required public policy to be explicitly expressed on the books.
[brief] ”  (Pb25-Pb26)  The Resolution reaches conclusions that are not supported anywhere within the available transcripts.  One example is Applicants’ expert referring to “the circulation element of the master plan as I had mentioned before. ”  However, there is no prior reference of “the circulation element of the master plan” within the verbatim record.  (Pa550)  The ZBA concluded that the subject home was “smaller than peer homes in the area,” as the “Planner presented the findings of a neighborhood study. ”  (Pa110)  However, no study was submitted and on cross-examination the planner admitted that he was completely unaware of the sizes of any home within his “study”—not even the similar house next door to the home owned by Applicants.  (Pa635-Pa640)
[brief] 15  Orders Subject to this Appeal: Order and Statement of Reasons Permitting the Filing of Amended Complaint Filed 03/27/20........................................Da80  Order In Part Denying Defendant’s Expert Fees and Statement of Reasons Filed 01/08/21 ........................................Da154  Order Barring Damages to Property Sustained from Vibrations and Statement of Reasons Filed 08/06/21.................................Da391  Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Loss of Ocean View and Privacy
[brief] N.J.R. E. 703.  Further, as this Court is aware, here, [...] is “permitted to testify as to the logical predicates for and conclusions from statements made in the report. ”  Conrad v. Robbi, 341 N.J. Super. at 441 (quoting Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Portadin, 321 N.J. Super. at 576).  Despite all of that, the Trial Court concluded that the absence of a reconstruction expert to address the issue of causation was fatal to Plaintiff’s case.
[brief] (1T3-13 to 20).  Defense counsel did not dispute the accuracy of the evidence referenced in, or attached to, the State’s brief.  After hearing oral argument, [...] granted the defendant’s suppression motion for reasons stated on the record.  (1T25-21 to 24).  The judge reasoned as follows:  [T]hese warrants should never have been issued.  There’s no PC in this affidavit to support it.  It’s a general warrant.  It doesn’t particularize anything.  The only thing it particularizes is that [...] is a bad guy because he has prior convictions for drug distribution in his past.  In one instance.  He’s a bad guy because he has a gun possession in his past, and he’s a bad guy because he’s been convicted of possessing under 50 grams of marijuana on a number of different occasion[s].  [1T25-10 to 19.]  An order memorializing the court’s decision was issued later the same day.  (Pa4).  On June 17, 2024, the State moved for leave to appeal from [...]’s order suppressing evidence.  (Pa5).  This court granted the State’s motion by order dated July 2, 2024.  (Pa5).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chematron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 119-20 (1973).  The rule specifically permits the late amendment to relate back to the filing of the original timely-filed complaint.  Id., supra, 62 N.J. at 120-123; Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 546-548 (1986).  Accordingly, R. 4:26-4, has been liberally interpreted: “such situations, in which these complexities make the identity of the culpable party uncertain, that resort to the fictitious-name procedure of R. 4:26-4 is both appropriate and necessary to assure the survival of a meritorious cause of action. ”  Hernandez v. St. James Hosp., 214 N.J. Super. 538, 544 (App. Div. 1986).  Our courts have held that where the plaintiff proceeds with diligence in discovering the identity of the fictitious defendant, periods of months were not unreasonable delays to amend the complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations.  See Jarusewicz v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 188 N.J. Super. 638, 648 (Law Div.1983); Hernandez v. St. James Hosp., 214 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986); and, Fede v. Clara Maass Hosp., 221 N.J. Super. 329 (Law Div. 1987).  Here, Plaintiffs did not know with sufficient proof who the tenants were on the date of the accident, other than the Restaurant; and did not have any of the leases and could not ascertain what duty they may have undertaken to maintain the walkway in their leases.  D.
[brief] 289a Exhibit 24, Partial Report of [...], January 4, 2018, filed April 26, 2018 (omitted here – see 688a) -- Exhibit 25, Report of [...], dated March 8, 2018, filed April 26, 2018  355a Exhibit 26, Accident Report, dated October 6, 2003, filed April 26, 2018  369a Exhibit 26, Memorandum of OSHA Intervention/Closing Conference, dated April 26, 2005, filed April 26, 2018  370a Exhibit 26, Accident Investigation Report, dated October 13, 2003, filed April 26, 2018  373a Exhibit 26, N.J. State Police Investigation Report, dated October 26, 2004, filed April 26, 2018  375a Exhibit 26, N.J. State Police Supplemental Investigation Report, dated February 1, 2005, filed April 26, 2018  379a (Volume 3 of 15 – Pa380 to Pa569)
[brief] Plaintiffs submits that the Trial Court properly held that Plaintiff’s fictitious party pleading did properly preserve their claim against [...] and that the Plaintiff diligently sought to ascertain the identity of all responsible parties and therefore, this Court should deny [...]’s Cross-Appeal.  VI.  Overall Conclusion  This Appeal respectfully asks that this Court re-open the courthouse doors which were unjustly closed on Plaintiffs’ legal rights when the Trial Court granted Defendants’ Summary Judgment motions.
[brief] A.  Applicability of The Time of Application Rule  The TOA Rule was codified within the Municipal Land Use Law pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 provides:  “Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, those development regulations which are in effect on the date of submission of an application for development shall govern the review of that application for development and any decision made with regard to that application for development.  Any provisions of an ordinance, except those relating to health and public safety, that are adopted subsequent to the date of submission of an application for development, shall not be applicable to the application for development. ”  [...] filed its application with the [...] and proceeded with the [...] review process which culminated in the [...] issuing an endorsement of [...]’ application which decision of the [...] occurred on April 22, 2022.  Having secured the endorsement of the [...], on April 29, 2022 [...] next submitted an application to the Planning Board seeking conditional use and site plan approval in order to operate a cannabis “micro” dispensary.
[brief] THE ORDER CONTRAVENES EXISTING RULES.  There has been an explosion in data volume in case files in recent decades.  Rule 4:10-2 of the New Jersey Rules of Court defines the permissible scope of discovery as “unless otherwise limited by order of the court . . . [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .  . . .”  N.J. Ct. R. 4:10-2.  As the first clause makes clear, Courts have the express power to “limit” discovery further, but the Rule does not grant trial courts the power to expand the scope of what must be produced to a requesting party.
[brief] THE DECISION OF THE [...] SHOULD BE OVERTURNED  The law in New Jersey is well settled that pensions for public employees serve a desired public purpose.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Geller v. Department of the Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598 (1969):  Pensions for public employees serve a public purpose.  A primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  . . .  They are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement to continued and faithful service.  Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby (emphasis added).  The Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54 in 1971 to correct errors in the calculation of the amount and eligibility of public employees to retirement benefits.