[brief] (Da751-763; Da70:19-72:25)  Defendant argues that (1) since the March 6, 2018 Contempt Order was seemingly vacated by the Appellate Division in its June 25, 2019 decision and (2) the March 26, 2018 Order (which Defendant admits was not appealed) awarded fees related to the March 6, 2018 Contempt Order, the monies paid pursuant to both March 2018 Orders should be returned.  But Defendant’s arguments ignore the essential truths.  The Appellate Division’s decision did not eradicate Defendant’s violations of Court Orders prompting the sanctions imposed by the Trial Court.  The Appellate Division was completely silent as to the merits of the contempt orders other than stating at the conclusion of its opinion that “we vacate all of the other orders under review. ”  (Da763)  As the Trial Court explained, the Appellate Division’s silence on the Trial Court’s reasoning behind the entry of the contempt orders was evidence the Appellate Division did not intend to vacate those orders or reward Defendant for its failure to comply with the 2017 Judgment.  No claims were made [by Defendant to the Appellate Division] that the Court erred procedurally or substantively as to an enforcement of its orders.  To accept defendant’s argument that this Court should vacate all of its enforcement actions would be the equivalent of enforcing a stay of the court action that was never applied…  The law in New Jersey is to the contrary.  It’s well established that a party’s obligation to perform under a trial court order is not automatically stayed by the filing of an appeal or other proceedings in the Appellate court.  That’s Rule 2:9-5a.  A review of this Court’s order enforcing litigant’s rights pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 under an abuse of discretion standard, Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, page 486 (App. Div. 2011).  See also, Innes v. Carrascosa . . . 391 N. J. Super. 453 at page 498 (App. Div. 2007).  Abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is, ‘made without a rational explanation inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’  Flagg v. Essex Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 at page 571 (2002).  Internal citations omitted.  Here, there is no claim by [Defendant] in [its] appeal that the court erred in such fashion in those enforcement proceedings, and the Appellate Division didn’t even address it.  It is this Court’s view that the Appellate Division did not intend, therefore, to vacate the enforcement proceedings this Court entered pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 as it was not challenged specifically and does not appear to have been before the Court.  I’ll note that, generally, there are specific requirements to appeal those which may be taken, and it doesn’t appear that they were taken, and I would also not that the final order was not vacated, that March [26th] Order.  6T 70:19-72:25.  To require a return of the monies paid pursuant the March 6, 2018 Contempt Order (or the March 26th Order that was not appealed) in the absence of any finding by the Appellate Division that the entry of said orders was an abuse of discretion, and in the absence of a stay pending Defendant’s appeal, would result in a court sanctioned reward to Defendant for its repeated contempt of the 2017 Judgment.  As such, the Trial Court’s denial of Defendant’s Motion to Compel return of monies paid was proper and its ruling should not be disturbed.