ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Despite the officers’ definitive-sounding statements, it is far from certain that a court would have found probable cause (or even reasonable suspicion, as discussed in Point IV below) to search [...]’s home.  See Hagans, 233 N.J. at 42 (distinguishing a “comment regarding the inevitability of a search warrant” that is “a fair prediction of events that would follow” from “a deceptive threat made to deprive an individual of the ability to make an informed consent. ” (quotations omitted) (cleaned up)).  “No police officer in the course of executing a warrant can or should, without justification, for sufficient reason, destroy private property[.]”); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (“[E]xcessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment[.]”).  The consequences of the coercive conduct were all the more grave because police sought to search [...]’s home—which is given “special status” by “our federal and state constitutional schemes[.]”  State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 553 (2008) (quotation omitted).
[brief] Residents of a county can challenge the actions of their county government .  . . .  Matlack v. Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 191 N.J. Super. 236, 248 (Law Div. 1982).  . . .  The plaintiff must establish that they will experience some harm if the court returns an unfavorable decision.  N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, 82 N.J. 57, 67 (1980).  Defendants also failed to cite any authority supporting the departure from precedent and the extraordinary entry of four distinct lack of standing subject matter dismissals with prejudice.
[brief] Appellant  [...] (“[...]”) is a public university in New Jersey.  (Da1).  On January 11, 2023, Respondent [...] submitted a request under OPRA and the common law right of access to [...] seeking “[a]ll emails sent and received by interim Provost [...] from September 24th 2020 through October 3rd 2020. ” (Da2; Da10).  During the time period identified in Duff’s request, McDonald served as the Interim Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs within [...].  (Da42).  In this role, McDonald was a member of [...]’s executive staff and her duties included, but were not limited to, collaborating with the other executive and administrative staff to “provide leadership and academic vision” to the University; “overseeing all aspects of faculty recruitment, professional development, and promotion and tenure processes;” overseeing all “undergraduate and graduate academic programs;” participating in collective negotiations with professional and academic bargaining units; and “serving as --- 1
[brief] The Court properly determined that evidence of the 2018 conviction had minimal probative value.  Recognizing that Defendant [...] testified in his deposition that he did not recall when the last conviction occurred, the trial court rejected Defendants’ over-the-top characterization that Defendant [...] had been “intentionally dishonest about his conviction history at [his] deposition[.]”  The Court determined that the nature of the conviction as a drug conviction was unduly prejudicial and likely to inflame the jury.  The trial court correctly weighed these factors under Rule 403, as it was permitted to do under the plain language of N.J.R.E. 609(a).  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring the admission of this drug conviction.
[brief] [Da15].  When attorneys for the parties appeared before [...] on March 23, 2023, the Chancery Court had before it the [...]’s application against the [...] and Plaintiff ([...]) for preliminary injunctive relief premised on client solicitation.  [2T7:12-15].  On the day of the proceedings, an exchange occurred between counsel for the parties and [...] regarding arbitration and the previously referenced motion to compel arbitration.
[brief] On October 3, 2023, Appellants objected to [...]’s proposed Order and submitted an alternative proposed Order Granting Certain Preliminary Injunctive Relief under the Five-Day Rule.  Da207-17.  The Chancery Court entered neither proposed Order.  The Parties appeared before the Chancery Court on October 20, 2023 return date of Appellants’ Order to Show Cause after which the Court scheduled a Case Management Conference for November 15, 2023 and set trial dates for August 6-8, 2024.
[brief] •  In the trial court’s December 10, 2020 Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court took an extraordinary step of making the following conclusory statement, “The court also notes that defendant should not consider herself absolved as to the potential fraud issues, as it certainly may be determined on the present known facts that she was a willing participant in the “techniques” used in the bankruptcy so she could preserve assets…”  [A530, Op. at 24-25, Dec. 10, 2020].
[brief] The issue as to whether there was a benefit goes to the issue of calculating just compensation.  Once a determination of a taking has been made, an appraisal process would begin, wherein the just compensation due and owed to the Plaintiffs would be determined.  The [...] cannot have its way with the law and chooses to ignore the law that mandates the process for determining just compensation.  The [...] cannot simply choose to ignore the environmental remediation statute, which provides that notice and consent is required for entry, and if consent is not given, access can only be obtained through a legal process wherein the rights of the parties will be determined.
[brief] And to be sure, ¶5.2 was “separately bargained for and a key element of the Settlement of which this release is a part. ” (Pa0059).  Finally, [...]’s reinterpretation of the 2015 Settlement suffers from another defect: New Jersey law disfavors contracts that run into perpetuity, and [...]’s proposed reinterpretation of its 2015 Settlement as somehow barring future claims arising from future misconduct amounts to a perpetual release.  “Absent an almost overwhelming showing that the parties to a contract intended such a one-sided, unreasonable construction, courts will not construe a contract as providing some perpetual right or option which one side can exercise against the other at any time in the future. ”  Home Props. of N.Y., L.P. v. Ocino, Inc., 341 N.J. Super. 604, 613 (App. Div. 2001); see also In re Estate of Miller, 90 N.J. 210, 218 (1982).  The notable absence of any sunset clause in the 2015 Settlement is yet further indicium that the parties never intended to extinguish claims that had yet to accrue.
[brief] (Order Da349).  ...........................................................................................................  38  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE NEGATIVE CRITERIA IN SICA AND NOT GIVING DUE DEFERENCE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MASTER PLAN TO MUNICIPAL ZONING REGULATION.  (Statement of Reasons Da356, Zoning Board Brief in Prerogative Writ Da319.)  .............................................................................................................................................................................  42  CONCLUSION
[directive] Data/Date Réu/Defendant Advogado de defesa/Defense Attorney Promotor/Prosecutor Formulário revisado em vigor 01/08/2018, Promulgado por Complemento à Diretriz #04-14, CN 11171-Portuguese página 2 de 2 Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, CN 11171-Portuguese page 2 of 2
[brief] [...] reiterated that the application required two design waivers.  (2T12-1 to 2T12)  He introduced Exhibit A-5 which was the updated plan set revised to show larger building envelopes reflecting 30% building coverage on each of the lots.  (2T46-18 to 2T46-22)  The Board discussed the traffic study submitted by the applicant, which was prepared by [...], PE and [...], Senior Associate.
[brief] Second, despite Plaintiffs’ bald assertion to the contrary, the record evidence did not establish that Defendant aided, instigated, or assisted in a conversion.  See Charles Bloom & Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 279 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App. Div. 1995) (discussing prima facie elements a plaintiff must demonstrate to prevail on tort participation theory).  In this regard, Plaintiffs failed to cite evidence from trial where these elements were demonstrated (Pb79-80).  Therefore, as a matter of law, there was no legal or factual basis for the trial court to hold Defendant personally liable for any purported acts committed by [...].
[brief] A. 1971 Lakewood Revised General Ordinance Code Book (portions) as follows:  Cover  Da220 Clerk Certification Da221 Introduction Da222-223  Adoption Ordinance Da224-227 Table of Sources, Pages A1 to A21 Da228-253  B.  Lakewood Ordinance dated October 14, 1965 amending Section 12.06 of 1961 Revised Ordinance Code Da254-255 C.  Newspaper Articles from [...] detailing Site Plan Approvals in Lakewood: APP July 20, 1962 Da257 APP March 15, 1963 Da258 APP March 20, 1963 Da259 APP November 20, 1963 Da260 APP March 19, 1969 Da261
[directive] Dat/Date Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171- Haitian Creole page 2 of 2 UWAGA: Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu proszę nie podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.
[brief] [...]: [...] can i buy for 400k [2/15/22, 8:50:26 PM]  [...]: Any deal closing [2/15/22, 8:50:29 PM]  [...]: Lien [2/15/22, 8:50:34 PM]  [...]: 4 fam [2/23/22, 9:51:35 AM]  [...]: What’s with 79 Sherman [2/26/22, 10:22:29 PM]  [...]: [...] may I buy your lien?
[brief] That is 4:42-11(b).  That is with the torts as opposed to contractually.  And the Court has discretion on equitable grounds.  (37T52-9 to 53-4).  Further, the trial court correctly exercised its equitable discretion in rejecting Plaintiffs’ punitive method of calculating pre-judgment interest because it violated the spirit of R. 4:42-11(b), which is not to penalize the judgment debtor:
[brief] It has long been established in this state that a representation by an insured will support the forfeiture of the insured's rights under the policy if it is untruthful, material to the particular risk assumed by the insurer, and actually and reasonably relied upon by the insurer.  *First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson*, 177 N.J. 125, 137, 827 A.2d 230 (2003) (quoting *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni*, 98 N.J. Super. 154, 158-59, 236 A.2d 402 (App. Div. 1967)); see also *Palisades Safety & Ins. Ass'n v. Bastien*, 175 N.J. 144, 151, 814 A.2d 619 (2003) (recognizing that a "policy may be rescinded and denied to the innocent intended beneficiary based on material misrepresentations, even when the misrepresentations are innocent").
[brief] The motion record is replete with evidence, which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, establishes that [...], in concert with the other defendants (including [...]), misappropriated funds, manipulated financial records, provided Plaintiffs with false and misleading balance sheets that reflected values for the company books of accounts that were far less than they should have been, overreported liabilities, and diverted money from [...] and [...] into other entities that they controlled.  Because the nature of [...]’s and [...]’s conduct (in concert with the other defendants) raised questions of fact, including issues relating to intent and credibility, the trial court was absolutely correct to deny summary judgment and allow Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed to trial.  (13T 90:21 to 97:4).  These facts were also borne out at trial and are more than sufficient to sustain the trial court’s judgment.  (36T 48:5 to 50:9; 37T 87:20 to 88:8).  2.
[brief] Tec Elec., Inc., 284 N.J. Super.  at 486 (stating “[t]he truth or falsity of the [omitted document] would have had the same consequences if given concurrently with, or after, the bids were opened, but in no event could the [omitted document] alter the facts that existed on the day the bid was opened”).  The critical point is that [...] was classified at the time of bid opening and that fact is independently verifiable, objectively true and could not be changed.  [...]’s argument that the trial court “erred in refusing to consider the potential negative effects on assurance of performance and competition” that would follow [...]’s hypothetical refusal to provide its Notice of Classification misses the point.  Specifically, [...] could not have refused to confirm its prequalification status because it was objectively classified at the time of bidding and [...] could do nothing to change this fact.  Indeed, the omission of the Notice of Classification from its bid does not render [...] unclassified.  [...] was (and is still) classified.  Tec Elec., Inc., 284 N.J. Super. at 486 (holding that bidder’s failure to submit prequalification affidavit was curable after bidding, stating “[t]he truth or falsity of the [omitted document] would have had the same consequences if given concurrently with, or after, the bids were opened, but in no event could the [omitted document] alter the facts that existed on the day the bid was opened”).
[brief] A239.  Given the unfairness in both the process and result of the divorce judgment entered on default against the less monied spouse, Rule 4:50 relief should be afforded to [...], at least under subsection (f) of the Rule, required to be brought only within a “reasonable time” and “determined based upon the totality of the circumstances,” Romero v. Gold Star Distribution, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 296 (App. Div. 2021).
[brief] \textsuperscript{14}  \textit{Henebema v. Raddi}, 452 N.J. Super. 438 (App. Div. 2017).  \textsuperscript{15}  \textit{JB Pool Mgmt., LLC v. Four Seasons at Smithville Homeowners Ass'n}, 431 N.J. Super. 233, 250 (App. Div. 2013)(citation omitted).  \textsuperscript{16}  R. 4:5-4.  \textsuperscript{17}  \textit{White v. Karlsson}, 354 N.J. Super. 284 (App. Div. 2002).  behind a given defense.\textsuperscript{18}  Rule 4:5-4 is only relaxed when its enforcement would do grave injustice to public policy\textsuperscript{19} and injustice would occur if the court relaxed the Rule here.
[brief] As he was driving northbound on Route 9, he observed a silver Chevrolet Silverado, later determined to be driven by defendant, [...], swerve across the highway.  (1T: 8-22 to 24; 9-25 to 10-2).  [...] pulled directly behind defendant and observed him drive his vehicle over the solid yellow line of the left lane.  (1T:11-8 to 14).  [...] then observed defendant cross the solid yellow line three more times over the next 20 seconds.  (1T:35-16 to 22).  During the final swerve, defendant drove his vehicle onto a grass median before he reentered the far-left lane.  (1T:11-7 to 11).  Based on defendant’s erratic driving, [...] activated his lights and conducted a motor vehicle stop.
[brief] I do find that he enters this plea of guilty today knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, after being made aware of the potential penalties that he faces, as well as the potential enhance penalties for driving while on the revoke list for this DWI.  I do not find that he is under the influence of any drugs or alcohol which would impair his ability to make a decision to plead guilty, and that he does this in full knowledge of the potential penalties that had been detailed on the record before.  (1T:10-21 to 11-5) (emphasis added).
[brief] The Push To Return To In School Instruction (Summer 2020) | 8 | | C.  Decedent Is Entitled The Benefit of The Presumption Based on | | | Definition 3 of N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 | 9 | | D.  Decedent Is Also Entitled The Benefit of The Presumption Based on | | | Definition 4 of N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 | 11 | | Point III: Judicial Notice was Properly Taken By The Workers’ | | | Compensation Judge | 13 | | Point IV: Respondent’s Arguments Are Replete With Misrepresentations | | | And Without Any Basis | 15 | | Conclusion | 18 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | |-------| | Hersh v. City of Morris, 217 N.J. 236, 242 (2014).  | 7 | | Kenny v. Meadowview Nursing Center, 308 N.J. Super. 565 App. Div. 1998 | 15 | | Lewicki v. New Jersey Art Foundry, 88 N.J. 75 (1981) | 7 | | State v. Roldan, 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985).  | 6 | | Statutes | |----------| | N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.  | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11.  | 1, 4, 5, 9 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-56 | 15 | | Rules | |-------| | N.J.R.E. 201a | 14 | | N.J.R.E. 201e | 14 | | N.J.R.E. 203 | 9 | | N.J. Court Rule 4:46-2 | 15 | | Executive Orders | |------------------| | Executive Order No. 175 | 1, 7, 10 | | Executive Order No.: 103 | 6, 8, 10 | | Executive Order No.: 244 | 5, 8 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Single point of contact  Single point of contact  Chief Law Enforcement Executive (LEE) (POC) receives (POC) receives receives information from CPO information from CPO information from CPO DAILY to enter confidential to enter confidential  Chief LEE designates single POC to enter flag in regional CAD*  flag in county CAD*  confidential flag in law enforcement CAD*  POC provides POC provides information to information to single POC to single POC to enter confidential enter confidential flag in EMS CAD*  flag in FF CAD*  **Information shared with first responders includes name and address.  *Case is “cleared” after 30 days and must be removed from all CADs.
[brief] **Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration**  As noted above, plaintiffs moved for reconsideration after [...] extended the discovery deadlines again – pushing the end date to December 30, 2021 and noting to counsel for the parties that trial would not possibly take place until March or April of the following year (2022) at the earliest.  Plaintiffs stressed to [...] that expert depositions would be continuing through December.  A263-68.  Defendant had [...]’s Expert Report since July 30, 2021, and it was substantially similar to the prior expert reports.  A263-68.  It was unfair, plaintiffs stressed, for the court to continue denying plaintiffs their choice of expert on the most critical issue the jury would have to decide – and where plaintiffs had retained [...] specifically to address the qualification and credentialing issues that defendant had continually raised and would raise again at trial.
[brief] THE COURT:  The lay opinion would come from your client that she stepped in the puddle and she slipped.  The person who you’re talk - - now wasn’t even present didn’t see it, didn’t know where she fell.  So she couldn’t testify with respect to that.  Your client could certainly testify and perhaps her friend can testify and the Court would be okay with that a lay person’s statement or opinion that I slipped as a result of the puddle.  They can do that.  [...]:  Well, the employee did - - was there, Judge.  She knew where it happened.  THE COURT: The employee - - the employee did - - was not - - did not witness it.  The employee did not witness it.  (2T42-6 to 46-16).  --- \(^7\)  It is submitted that the actions of the defendant’s agent were based upon her perceptions, and should have been admitted, since as such they constituted admissions tantamount to lay opinion testimony, and contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the defendant’s actions indeed undermined the defense expert’s testimony that the floor was not slippery when wet.
[brief] [...] testifies that the mean high-water line is generally a calculated line based on observations of high-water mark, low water mark, literally surveyed.  The mean high-water line is basically an average line and represents a boundary that is recognized in certain cases.  It is recognized by the State Bureau of Tidelands as their jurisdiction because the State Bureau of Tidelands has ownership rights over anything that is past the mean high-water line (5T18:24).  The uplands would normally be owned by a private citizen or public entities (5T19:2).
[brief] The exercise of judicial discretion requires only a determination that there exists sufficient evidence for the jury to decide the condition in favor of the proponent of the evidence. ”  *State v. Marrocelli*, 448 N.J. Super. 349, 367 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting *Konop v. Rosen*, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 413 (App. Div. 2012)).  Direct evidence is not necessary to authenticate evidence.  “A prima facie showing may be made circumstantially. ”  *Konop*, 425 N.J. Super. at 411.
[brief] Furthermore, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2 (c), “When a single vacancy is to be filled from a promotional certification headed by a veteran, any veteran among the top three interested eligibles may be appointed in accordance with the ‘rule of three. ’  N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8.  Significantly, “[a] nonveteran shall not be appointed unless the appointing authority shows cause why the veterans should be removed from the promotional list. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2.  Despite the clear direction of the Legislature and the foregoing provisions of the Civil Service regulations, the [...] disregarded the law and the proper preference owed to veterans, without proper basis.
[brief] In other words, it is not necessary for a bidder to submit separate POA forms for each document because, generally, a single, properly-drafted POA can be made to apply to both.  Further, even if there was confusion on this point, [...]’s prescribed form of Consent of Surety has a space for the bidder to identify the surety company, a signature line for the “attorney-in-fact” and a signature line for a witness to the attorney-in-fact’s signature.  It cannot be gainsaid that an undertaking of a surety company must contain indicia that the individual executing the instrument has the legal authority to do so.  If [...] did not wish for the surety representative’s signature to be supported by a POA, it obviously would not have included a signature line for an attorney-in-fact on the Consent of Surety form with a space for a witness attestation.  To this extent, “a power of attorney is a written instrument by which an individual known as the principal authorizes another individual ... known as the attorney-in-fact, to perform specified acts on behalf of the principal as the principal's agent. ”  N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.2(a); D.D.B. Interior Contr., Inc. v. Trends Urban Renewal Ass'n, Ltd., 176 N.J. 164, 168 (2003).  “Its primary purpose is not to define the authority conferred on the agent by the principal, but to serve as evidence to third persons of agency authority.  It should be construed in accordance with the rules for interpreting written instruments generally. ”  Kisselbach v. Cnty. of Camden, 271 N.J. Super. 558, 564 (App.Div.1994).  “A power of attorney must be in writing, duly signed and acknowledged in the manner set forth in N.J.S.A. 46:14-2.1. ”  N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.9.  In this case, if it was not already intuitively obvious from the specifications and the form Consent of Surety itself, common sense and settled practice in the construction industry compels the conclusion that a POA is necessary to support a Consent of Surety.  In the absence of a POA, the alternative is that any random person, with vague or unclear standing, could sign a Consent of Surety, leaving the contracting entity to determine later whether that person actually had the power to bind the surety to issue the Contract Bond.  To the contrary, the fundamental purpose of this three-party surety process – Proposal Bond, Consent of Surety and, finally, Contract Bond – is to provide the contracting public entity with clear and unequivocal assurance that the bid price will be held, the services delivered and the work completed.  Allowing otherwise would promote irregularities in the procurement process and undermine the principle of vigorous competition, on a level playing field.  The agency below thus appropriately concluded that a POA was required to substantiate the submission of the Consent of Surety at issue here.