ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant [...]’s statement to the police of her knowledge of a mass entrance into the lot at the time of the accident only proves that she was aware of shift changes at the time of the accident, that there would be a lot of cars and people traversing throughout the parking lot, and consequently that she should have exercised due caution when looking for a parking spot.  (Pa485-486).  Likewise, it is disingenuous to offer a lay opinion in response to leading question to impute knowledge to the defendant of an inherently dangerous condition that was substantially certain to cause injury or death to its employees:  Q:  If there were traffic controllers, security personal, flaggers, and/or cones in the parking lot on October 6, 2021 when you got there, would you have found that to be an - as an assist for you, for your protection, would it make it more safe and secure?  [...]: Objection.  A: Yes.  (Pa872:6-13).  Here, one cannot infer from the suggestion that because added precautions might make something more safe and secure, that the parking lot was inherently unsafe to begin with, or that the defendant knew that the absence of such added precautions made it substantially certain that injury or death would result to a non-management employee walking through the designated area of the parking lot where they were directed to park.
[brief] Further, [...] fails to allege that it is similarly situated to [...] in all respects, which, here, would include demonstrating that [...] was also governed by the Long Branch Design Guidelines and sought to make the Scenic Design Rule inapplicable, only to be denied by [...].  [...] simply argues that it complied with that rule, which, as noted above, has no bearing.  (Ab19-20).  Finally, [...] similarly fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate [...] lacked a rational basis in issuing the Permit.  [...]’s citation to Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric. does not save it (Ab20), as that case sets forth the general standard, but held the class-of-once claims have “no place in the public employment context. ”  553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008).  Nowhere does Engquist encourage an equal protection class-of-one claim on such a sparse record as [...] presents here.  C.
[brief] (Da203-04).  After that, [...] filed a similar Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff/Respondent’s Amended Complaint on statute of limitations grounds.  (Da207-08).  Plaintiff/Respondent similarly opposed this motion on Discovery Rule grounds, at least as to the survival claim.  (Pa9).  On December 11, 2017, the Trial Court likewise granted [...]’s motion to dismiss all claims.  (Da235-36).
[brief] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, Anthony & Sylvan Corp.  [...] [...] BY: [...], Esq. (ID No. 049161991)  [...], Esq. (ID No.117842014)  Date Submitted: November 1, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS | vii | | I.  INTRODUCTION | 1 | | II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | III.  STATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | A. The ADR Provision in the Agreement | 3 | | B. The Complaint | 4 | | C. The Superior Court Order and Opinion | 5 | | IV.  ARGUMENT | 8 | | A. Standard of Review | 8 | | B.  The trial court correctly enforced the parties’ Agreement (Pal-14) | 8 | | 1.  Plaintiff conceded that the arbitration clearly and unambiguously advised him that his claims would be arbitrated (T28:21-25).  | 9 | | 2.  The dispute resolution provision complies with New Jersey law (Pal-14).  | 10 | | 3.  Plaintiff’s arguments rely upon inapposite and inapplicable authority.  | 15 | | 4.  The Taylor decision and its progeny do not represent the “majority” position.  | 19 | | 5.  Additionally, and independently, Plaintiff’s position creates a “special rule” for arbitration clauses and is thus preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.  | 22 | | C.  The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff failed to plead or show procedural unconscionability (Pall-14).  | 23 | D.  Even if the specific provision is unconscionable, it does not apply under the circumstances, should be severed, and the remaining portion should be enforced.....28  E.  Even if the dispute resolution cannot be severed, Plaintiff is still required to mediate any disputes prior to any arbitration or litigation......................32  V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................34
[brief] Plaintiff Had an Objectively Reasonable Belief That Defendant [...]’s Conduct Violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a).  In this case, Plaintiff’s belief that Defendant [...]’s behavior constituted harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 was objectively reasonable, based upon a plain reading of the statute and the evidence in the record regarding Defendant [...]’s conduct.  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c) define harassment as occurring when a person “makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications . . . in offensively coarse language or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or harm . . . or c) engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.
[brief] 29 State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504 (2006) ...............................................................  8 State v. Pasterick, 285 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div. 1995) ...............................  15 State v. Ramsey, 415 N.J. Super. 257 (App. Div. 2010) .................................  37 State v. Riley, 306 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 1997) .....................................  32 State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141 (2011) .................................................................  45 State v. Smith, 628 N.E.2d 1176 (Ill. 1994) .................................................. 16 State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467 (1979) .................................................................
[brief] (Da220)  Furthermore, close associates and at least one family member of the victim ([...], his aunt) testified at trial.  (10T114-1 to 10)  It is possible that based on prior relationship with the [...], counsel might have been inclined to cross-examine less vigorously, See State v. Loyal, 164 N.J. 418, 440 (2000).  Without an evidentiary hearing, it is impossible to know of other areas of impeachment not investigated or explored at trial, or whether counsel had damaging confidential information he learned about the victim or his family that he could not use, owing a duty to them, which also may have also significantly influenced counsel’s approach to investigating and to putting on his defense, requiring a hearing.
[directive] If a Superior Court judge is aware of an associated municipal court complaint, whether motor vehicle or quasi-criminal, and for good reason does not adjudicate that associated complaint, the Superior Court judge shall instruct the prosecutor to return the original paperwork to the appropriate municipal court without delay, but no later than 7 days after such direction, so that the municipal court can schedule a court date for that matter.  Suspension of Driving Privileges – Notification to MVC
[brief] The complaint did not lead to the discipline of any State employee.  Thus, defendants do not believe the contents of this particular page require continued protection of the “confidential” designation made when the document was produced.  issuance of a written warning for speaking in January 2015 at a “Safe Drinking Water Update” given at Rutgers University was retaliatory.  (Pa252; Pa335).  Second, claims he was unjustifiably disciplined for not seeking approval to present at an AWWA meeting to take place in 2016.  (Pa254).  As noted above, this discipline was ultimately a one-day suspension.  (Pa338).  **Rutgers Safe Drinking Water Update**
[brief] [...] AND [...]  [...], ID 014431976  ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  [...] AND VALENTINES FARM LLC [...] [...]  [...]  Submitted: May 7, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Procedural History | 2 | | Statement of Facts | 3 | | Argument I.
[brief] *Mount Laurel Tp. v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C.*, 188 N.J. 531, 910 A.2d 617 (2006).  The Supreme Court held that the municipality had the statutory power to condemn property for open space, which property was set to be developed as a residential subdivision, as a valid exercise of its eminent domain power.  The Court found that the municipality’s motive in seeking to limit development, and thereby the overcrowding of schools, traffic congestion and accompanying pollution, was consistent with the motive driving public interest in the open space acquisition.
[brief] The Anti-eviction statute, N J S A 2A:18-61.1; was also designed to protect residential tenants against unfair and arbitrary evictions.  As such, the statute provides that a tenant cannot be evicted in a summary dispossess proceeding unless the Landlord provides Notice where required and meets the proper grounds to justify evicting the tenant from the leased premises.  This is based on one of the specific 18 grounds otherwise listed in the tenancy statute.  *Maglies v Estate of Guy*, 191 N J 108, 120-121 (2007).  Among those grounds that could lead to a tenant being evicted is the requirement the tenant must pay the Landlord monthly rent or rent as agreed between the parties.  From the most basic standpoint, the payment of rent is what entitles the tenant to live and otherwise make use and enjoyment of the leased premises.
[brief] The Board’s reliance on out-of-state cases amounts to little more than a rehashing of authorities already considered and distinguished by [...] in its decision below.  [...] distinguished the Board’s cases from these charges by pointing at that the at-issue groups in the Board’s citations were all passive observers.  For example, Petaluma Federation of Teachers, Local 1881, California P.E.R.B. Decision No. 2,485 (2016), Aircraft Mech. Fraternal Ass’n v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 394 F.Supp.2d 1082 (2005) and Brooke Glen Behavioral Hosp., 365 NLRB No. 79 (2017) all concerned one of the negotiating parties trying to open up the bargaining sessions to the general public.  In those cases, the administrative agencies had legitimate concerns about third parties or other observers potentially interfering with good faith negotiations (Pa239, Pa273-Pa334).
[brief] DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 271-72 (2009) (quoting [...] et al., New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration § 11-1.1 at 270 (2008)).  “A zoning board of adjustment "may exercise only those powers granted by statute."  Cerebral Palsy Ctr., Bergen Cty., Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Fair Lawn, 374 N.J. Super. 437, 444 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Paruszewski v. Twp. of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45, 54 (1998)).  Where a board of adjustment acts beyond its narrow statutory authority, its action is “null and void.
[brief] 1.  Appellants Asserted the Same Claims in the Earlier Chancery Action | 2 | | 2.  The Consent Order Dismissed the Chancery Action Pending The Nacirema Arbitration and Set a Deadline for Refiling Any Claims | 3 | | 3.  Appellants Disregarded the 60-Day Deadline by Refiling Their Claims 560 Days After Its Expiration | 7 | | 4.  Appellants’ Claims Are the Same | 8 | | 5.  The Consent Order Is the Basis for the Dismissal of Appellants’ Complaint | 9 | | 6.  Respondent’s Appendix | 10 | | 7.  Appellants’ Failure to Move to Vacate the Consent Order Under R. 4:50-1 and Their Inability to Meet Their Extraordinary Burden | 10 | | Legal Argument | 13 | | Point I
[brief] (Del Fornos Brief at pp. 3-5, 16-18).  [...] first testified that “I believe they are sleeker or more – its – they’re a little rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet than they were before. ” (Pa330).  That observation simply means that he found them “sleeker” after the paint job and that he had never had a problem navigating the steps when they were wet prior to this new paint job.  Only upon essentially a “cross examination” at his deposition, did [...] get “pinned down” within the construct of defense counsel’s question and state that he was referring to the “date of the incident” when he slipped.
[brief] Ca244.  Complainants allege that the post “could be reasonably be seen as compromising the Board and as speaking for the Board as a member of the public” and that Respondent “held herself out as a member of” the Board on her Facebook page.  Ca244.  Count 8 of the amended complaint relates to what Complainants describe as “anti-mask mandate post” featuring the image of a child who is not wearing a mask.
[brief] **THE JUDGE DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS BY CLARIFYING THE PROPER AND LAWFUL SENTENCE**  On February 17, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to life-without-parole pursuant to the Three Strikes extended term for murder as set forth in N.J.S.A. 43-7.1a.  Then, on July 7, 2023, the trial court signed an amended Judgment of Conviction clarifying the sentence in response to an inquiry from the parole board.  DSa1-3.  The trial court also submitted a letter clarifying its intention in the prior sentencing and explained that it had been the intention, and still was, to sentence defendant to a life in prison without the possibility of parole due to his “atrocious” record.  DSa4-8.  The trial court further clarified  “Essentially, I intended to sentence Defendant to the maximum sentence he could receive under the law – life (which equals seventy-five years), subject to NERA (85% which must be served before parole) pursuant to N.J.S.A 2C:43-7.2.  DSa7.  Finally, the trial court asserted “the fact that the “three strikes” law applies to Defendant should not, in my opinion, result in a lesser sentence than that which could hypothetically be imposed on another defendant convicted of murder who is not eligible under “three strikes. ”  DSa8.  The sentence is in fact a clarification of confusion that resulted from the trial court referencing a variety of different bases for sentencing defendant to a life term.  The judge ran through the options for sentencing, stating, “And there are really three ways or three bases to impose a life sentence in this case…  There’s also a legal basis to sentence to an extended term under you being a persistent offender…  Under three strikes it’s life without parole mandatory.  Under the other extended terms, it’s life with a 35-year minimum parole ineligibility. ” (18T: 28-12 to 29-5).  The trial court went on to say “The issue then becomes parole eligibility.  And again my intention and what I think is just and warranted, is that you not be eligible for parole. ” (emphasis added)  (18T: 32-6 to 9).  While the JOC that followed this sentencing hearing caused confusion, the trial court’s intent to impose maximum parole ineligibility is unmistakable.
[brief] Id. at 602-03.  “However, if the parties do not request a lesser-included-offense charge, reviewing courts ‘apply a higher standard, requiring the unrequested charge to be ‘clearly indicated’ from the record. ’”  State v. Fowler, 239 N.J. 171, 188 (2019) (quoting State v. Alexander, 233 N.J. 132, 143 (2018)).  The clearly indicated standard does not require trial courts to “scour the statutes to determine if there are some uncharged offenses of which the defendant may be guilty,” State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 118 (1994), or “meticulously sift through the entire record . . . to see if some combination of facts and inferences might rationally sustain’ a lesser charge.
[brief] The trial court's dismissal of the case with prejudice on March 1, 2024, violated R. 4:37-2, as well as the plaintiff's due process rights and liberty to petition.  The trial court’s statement that plaintiff had failed to comply with the court orders for over a year distorts the facts.  The dismissal with prejudice on March 1, 2024, lacked a legal basis (Pal – Pa2).  According to R. 4:37-2(a), dismissal with prejudice is not permissible under these circumstances, especially given that the court had previously closed the case without prejudice for failure to comply with the same court orders.  This dismissal also contradicts the trial court's opinion in the prior order of October 22, 2021 (Pa44 – Pa48).  Consequently, the trial court violated procedural rules, created an exception by distorting the facts, and engaged in an abuse of discretion, thereby infringing on plaintiff’s due process rights and constitutional right to petition, under the U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(a), as well as U.S. Const. amend. I, N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, § 18.
[brief] [3T33-25 to 34-19].  [...] stated there was no basis in law or facts to support defendant’s argument and the court was unaware of a lawsuit involving defendant.  [3T33-25 to 34-19].  He cautioned defendant against making outbursts or any further dilatory actions.  [3T34-20 to 35-2].  Defendant was disruptive throughout the trial.  During witness [...]’s testimony, defendant interrupted the testimony to state that the video surveillance footage from the bank did not show that a bottle was dropped.  [3T71-22 to 72-5].  Out of the presence of the jury, [...] cautioned defendant to refrain from further outbursts.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................3 STANDARD OF REVIEW ...................................................................................8 LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................10  POINT I - DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS DEFENDANTS KUCINSKI AND MARTIN BECAUSE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR THEIR OFFICIAL ACTIONS ........................................................................................................10  POINT II - THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S LAD CLAIMS AS ALLEGED IN COUNTS SIX AND SEVEN AS TO DEFENDANTS  KUCINSKI AND MARTIN ..................15 a. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Claims for Aiding and Abetting LAD Violations Should Be Affirmed Because Plaintiff Did Not Plead Sufficient Factual Allegations to Sustain That Claim ........15  b.  Defendants [...] and [...] had a duty to authorize an investigation into the [...] Complaints  .........................................................16  c.  Plaintiff’s LAD Claims as to these defendants must be dismissed, as a matter of law, because no adverse employment action was taken against Plaintiff .........................................................................................19  CONCLUSION
[brief] On the Checklist, [...] answered “yes” for the question “Does the location have the right to control, supervise or direct the individual performing the services, not only as to result but as to how assigned tasks are performed?” (Pa55).  However, in the January 2019 \(^4\) [...] prepared her report prior to the pandemic.  (1T105:3-11).  However, when considering the impact of the pandemic, [...] explained that an individual’s situation needs to be considered in relation to how the other employees are treated to determine the level of control over the individual.  (1T170:8-19).  interview, [...] stated that the Municipal Prosecutor was not supervised, directed, or controlled by anyone at the Township.  (Pa109).  Further, [...] was not aware of anyone from [...], outside of the municipal court, directing or supervising [...].  (1T190:24-191:2).  As to Factor #2 – Training, the ALJ found that [...] was not required by [...] to receive training in diversity, harassment, and ethics in the workplace, that other [...] employees were required to do.
[brief] A81.  ---  1  References to transcripts are as follows:  1T February 8, 2024 (case management conference)  2T March 6, 2024 (motion)  3T June 12, 2024 (motion)  2  Defendants moved for reconsideration of the court’s June 12, 2024 Orders; [...] of the Law Division denied reconsideration in light of this now pending appeal (after defendants filed their motion for reconsideration to the trial court, this Court granted leave to appeal, depriving the lower court of jurisdiction).
[brief] 45  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10 ..............................................................................................................  60  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(a) .........................................................................................................  60  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(b)(1)-(4) .............................................................................................  61  N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3A(2) ............................................................................................................  12, 54 N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3.b .................................................................................................................. 12, 54 New Jersey Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 et seq.
[brief] ”  DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271.  In Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 (1995), in a claim for lost profits arising out of a development, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the objectives behind the doctrine are threefold: (1) to encourage the comprehensive and conclusive determination of a legal controversy; (2) to achieve party fairness, including both parties before the court as well as prospective parties; and (3) to promote judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding fragmented, multiple and duplicative litigation.  [Mystic Isle Dev. Corp., 142 N.J. at 322]  Res judicata, also known as “claim preclusion,” precludes the re-litigation of a claim previously disposed of in a prior lawsuit.
[directive] Juvenile Waiver Cases.  In the event that a juvenile is waived to adult court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 (involuntary waiver) or N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 (waiver at election of juvenile), the prosecutor shall make certain that a new complaint-summons (CDR-1) or complaint-warrant (CDR-2) is issued by the adult court.  Note that if a defendant is not charged by complaint-warrant, he or she is not an “eligible defendant” under the Bail Reform Law, and thus would not be monitored by the pretrial services program or be subject to the possibility of pretrial detention.  Accordingly, when the prosecutor determines under this Directive that the juvenile upon waiver should be charged as an adult by means of a complaint-warrant, the prosecutor shall prepare a complaint-warrant and submit it to the court as part of the juvenile waiver motion packet.  In deciding whether to issue a complaint-summons or to apply to the court for a complaint-warrant, the prosecutor shall apply the appropriate Section/subsection(s) of this Directive as if the person originally had been Page 44 arrested as an adult.  See subsection 2.2.1 (a juvenile waived to adult court shall be treated as an adult under this Directive).  It is expected that the circumstances justifying an involuntary waiver (e.g., the nature and seriousness of the charges and/or the nature and extent of any prior history of delinquency) often will invoke a presumption under Rule 3:3-1(f) and subsection 4.5.4 of this Directive to apply for a complaint-warrant, if not require issuance of a complaint-warrant pursuant to Rule 3:3-1(e) and subsection 4.4.1.  See also subsection 7.6.5.  4.9
[brief] (Sb26-36)  Neither of these facts, however, can justify the court’s refusal to credit [...]’s maturation with the proper mitigation.  As to the heinous nature of the incident, our Supreme Court has warned that sentencing courts must not let the “brutal” nature of an offense overshadow the mitigating effects of youth.  *Comer*, 249 N.J. at 403.  By the very nature of the proceedings, every defendant who seeks relief under *Comer* or *Miller* will have been convicted of either murder, or a charge bearing a lengthy sentence and thus often accompanied by a disturbing set of facts.