ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is room for different interpretations regarding the documents’ responsiveness to [...]’s RFPs; however, based on a review of some of the documents at issue, there appears to be no issue here.  For example, both parties utilize documents [...]_1063883 and [...]_1063905 as illustrative of their arguments.  The Special Master agrees with [...] regarding these documents.  [...] argues these documents are responsive to RFP 22, which requests “all financial statements, financial projections, financial analyses, and financial audits for Plaintiffs between 2005 and 2010. ”  Based on a plain reading of the request, it does not appear to request draft financial statements or draft letters that may contain statements regarding some financial analysis.  The record also shows that [...] has produced its actual, final, complete financial statements and other financial data to [...] in response to this request.  The Special Master agrees that this document is not within the specific reach of this request.  Because these documents have already been produced, and there is no evidence of intentional or sinister mishandling or withholding of documents on behalf of [...], which will be further explained in Section C, there is simply nothing to compel here.
[brief] *Newburgh*, 88 N.J. at 545.  Even when the terms of a JOD are silent or vague, the court should still perform a detailed analysis of the *Newburgh* factors.  See *Gotlib v. Gotlib*, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 310-11 (App. Div. 2008) (requiring the trial court to consider the *Newburgh* factors despite the judgement of divorce providing for college contribution because it was silent as to how the expenses would be divided).
[directive] This order to used when the be is prosecutor and defense counsel agree that professional staff from the Department of Health (DOH) should perform a sanity evaluation.  This form of order to used for be is defendants who are currently detained the time the evaluation ordered.  The language is at the order pertaining to what the elements of the evaluation found N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1.  in in is  The Order directs the defendant to undergo evaluation from a qualified expert an designated by the Commissioner of the  The evaluation to conducted at the DOH.  be is place where the defendant custody.  Discovery to provided by the prosecutor be is is in to the Court, who will then furnish it to DOH.  should noted that this order not to used for evaluation as to diminished be be is It an capacity under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2.
[brief] Moreover, deviating from this precedent without a compelling reason or significant change in circumstances would undermine the consistency that is essential to the legal system and could lead to uncertainty and erratic jurisprudence.  In light of the procedural history and facts presented, [...]'s decision aligns with the legal and factual context of this case.  It represents a judicious application of law to the circumstances surrounding the enactment and implementation of the Ordinances.  Upholding his decision would not only be in keeping with the principle of stare decisis but would also affirm the soundness of the legal process that led to the adoption of these Ordinances and the actions taken by the Township pursuant to them.  This Honorable Court, therefore, has a compelling obligation to uphold the validity of [...]’s decision, as veering away from this precedent would disrupt the legal certainty and predictability that stare decisis aims to preserve.
[brief] However, even to assume arguendo that there was error, that error was most certainly invited by defendant.  Defendant was the first to use handwriting comparisons, and defendant was the first to call the letters forgeries by [...].  Why he did not insist on a handwriting expert, or any judicial finding of sufficient “similarity,”\(^5\) is clear: had he done so, it would have been just as --- \(^5\) Defendant cites to several out-of-state cases where other jurisdictions have required or permitted such a finding of similarity by the trial court.  (Db30-31).  Defendant has not provided any New Jersey authority stating the same, because it does not exist: our statutes and caselaw impose no such requirement. likely to harm his position as to help it.  This was a strategic decision that cannot be faulted—the strategy was sound, despite the fact that it was unsuccessful.  However, defendant may not now turn around and hide from the fact that he was the one to employ this tactic on appeal.  “The doctrine of invited error does not permit a defendant to pursue a strategy...hopefully to his advantage—and then when the strategy does not work out as planned, cry foul and win a new trial.
[brief] (7T4:19).  [...] knew [...] and worked with [...]. (7T5:2).  [...] was aware of officers of various ranks who went out on foot patrol in certain areas.  (7T6:14).  HT encouraged foot patrols.  (7T6:17).  [...] indicated that parking an Officer's car by the clubhouse at the [...] and going on foot patrol over to the Fairways area is possible to do as part of an Officer's normal duties.  (7T7:2-3).  [...] did not know of any written directives as to how to conduct a property check for the [...].  (7T12:6).  Based on [...]'s experience, it was possible to call in a property check and be diverted somewhere else and not actually perform the property check.  (7T12:14).  Besides the Field Training Office follow-along training there was no formal training or directives on how to conduct property checks within HT.  (7T14:3).  [...] has been employed by HT’s Police Department for over nineteen (19) years.  (14T218:18).
[brief] *Adron, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co.*, 292 N.J.Super. 463, 473 (App. Div.1996).  Consistent with the forgoing rules, a policy exclusion may not be rewritten by a court to expand the exclusionary limitation on coverage or to add words of limitation that are not contained in the exclusion, as drafted by the insurance carrier.  *Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.*, 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960); see also *Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co*, 372 N.J. Super. 421, 428, (App. Div. 2004) (“When the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce the contract as it is written; the court cannot make a better contract for parties than the one that they themselves agreed to”).  The Trial Court’s ruling that Appleman’s rule cannot be applied to a CGL policy unless the policy itself requires its application plainly violates these rules of policy interpretation.  The ruling effectively imports an ambiguity into the policy that does not otherwise exist, and it ignores the reasonable expectations of the insured that elimination of the ACC clause broadened the policy coverage by restoring application of Appleman’s rule when there are sequential causes of loss, one of which (water intrusion) is covered by the [...] policies.  As the Supreme Court held in *Doto v. Russo*, 140 N.J.544, 556 (1995):  [O]ur courts have endorsed the principle of giving effect to the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the insured for the purpose of rendering a ‘fair interpretation’ of the boundaries of insurance coverage. ”  [citation omitted].  “The insured's ‘reasonable expectations in the transaction may not justly be frustrated and courts have properly molded their governing interpretative principles with that uppermost in mind. ””  [citation omitted].  The Trial Court’s clearly erroneous refusal to apply Appelman’s rule to the water intrusion and the mold exclusions in the [...] policies should be reversed.  II.
[directive] Did you instruct witness that the actual perpetrator may or may not be in procedure or showup and that the witness should   not feel compelled to make an identification?  Y N    12.  Did witness make an identification of suspect?  Y N 13.  If yes and an identification has been made, did you obtain and record witness statement of confidence (must document   witness’ own words) at time of procedure?  Y N (record confidence statement here)  14.  Did you instruct witness not to discuss identification procedure, whether an identification was made or not, with any other   witness or witnesses, or obtain information from other sources?  Y N  15.  Did you ask witness if he/she had discussed identification of suspect with anyone before or during the identification procedure   (Note: this includes both police officers and private actors)?  Y N    16.  If witness answers Yes to #15, did you obtain a detailed summary from witness of what was said?  Y N (provide detailed summary here)  3  Page 1 of Justice, Rev. 10/1/12  New Jersey Division of Criminal   17.  If witness answers Yes to #15, did you identify the people with whom the witness discussed the identification?  Y N (provide identities)  18.  Aside from the dialogue documented above, was there any other dialogue between the officer(s) conducting the showup   N (If yes, provide here) and the witness that in any way concerned the identification procedure?  Y  Once all items on this worksheet have been reviewed and complied with by Officer conducting identification procedure, this form should be signed and dated.
[brief] [...] c: Respondents’ Counsel of Record Client 4859-9729-7846, v. 4 \(^1\)  For example:  1.  Affidavit and Expert Opinion of [...], PhD, dated February 3, 2023, submitted in B.F., et al v. [...], [...], Wisconsin Circuit Court (“Parental Involvement is Essential at Every Stage of the [transition] Process,” ¶¶ 58-78, concluding that “a school policy that involves school adult personnel in socially transitioning a child or adolescent without the consent of parent or over their objection violates widely accepted mental health principles and practice”
[brief] It was [...], not [...], who first discovered [...]’s receipt of charge pay.  (Pa102-03 at 77:23-78:1; Pa362 at 83:3-21; Pa479-80).  And it was [...] who investigated the matter.  Moreover, the investigation of the June 24 issue proceeded nonetheless.  [...] confirmed that [...] performed a full investigation into [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct before concluding that no disciplinary action was necessary.  [...] scheduled a meeting with [...] to address his concerns.  (Pa90 at 27:6-16; Pa100 at 69:4-7).  The two discussed the June 24, 2020 incident and [...] told him that she would interview [...], perform a search for other employees who may have been involved, and then proceed with the investigation.  (Pa101 at 70:15-71:10).  During [...]’s interview of [...], [...] recounted the events of June 24, 2020 to [...], stating that [...] repeatedly questioned her on something she needed him to accomplish, and, after he refused to listen, she “got loud” with him.  (Pa102 at 74:5-16).  [...] informed the executives at [...] about the investigation into [...]’s conduct, and her conclusion that she had no reason to suspect that [...] had committed any wrongdoing.  (Pa107 at 94:14-95:5).  As such, nothing was de-railed.  Nor did [...] ever “recommend” [...]’s termination, as [...] contends.  (See Pb26).  After carefully considering the evidence from [...]’s investigation into Plaintiffs’ unauthorized receipt and entry of charge pay, a termination panel elected to terminate [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS  [...] AND [...] (381a–382a)  There are significant and numerous genuine issues of material fact in dispute with respect to Defendants [...], and Pepper Hamilton’s (hereinafter collectively “R&P”) participation in the conspiracy to commit the tortious actions pled by Plaintiffs against all Defendants.  Deposition testimonies of [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and Plaintiffs set forth in the Statement of Facts in Plaintiffs’ initial brief create significant genuine issues of material facts in dispute, and R&P should have been denied summary judgment.  The Trial Court erroneously held that R&P had no duty to Plaintiffs as there was no attorney-client relationship, and that Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence of affirmative misrepresentations made to them by R&P.  414a.  The Trial Court was blatantly incorrect.  First, the fact that R&P were not Plaintiffs’ attorneys is wholly irrelevant.  Irrespective of the fact that R&P were not Plaintiffs’ attorneys, they had a duty to disclose the truth and were bound in conscience and duty to recognize that the facts they concealed were significant and material, as set forth in *Berman v. Gurwicz*, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 93–94, 458 A.2d 1311, 1313–14 (Ch. Div. 1981), aff’d, 189 N.J. Super. 49, 458 A.2d 1289 (App. Div. 1983).  As such, Plaintiffs absolutely demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact in dispute with respect to R&P’s failure to disclose facts and active concealment of facts.  Furthermore, the notion troublingly held by the Trial Court’s erroneous decision is that the law provides no remedy to parties who are victims of an attorney’s fraudulent schemes that constitute civil law theft if the parties had no principal-agent or attorney-client relationship.  This notion is not only explicitly contradicted by the relevant case law but is abhorrent and an offense to the integrity of our noble system of jurisprudence.
[brief] The Trial Court interpreted [...] as requiring nothing more than recitals that touch the bases identified by N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(a)&(b).  Relying on Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 165-166 (App. Div. 2001), the Court reasoned that because the exemption was approved by Ordinance and not after a quasi-judicial proceeding there was “no requirement that evidence be presented…providing a factual foundation for the ordinance” and that a governing body “does not ordinarily make any findings of fact to justify its actions. ”  Pa53.  Instead, the Court reasoned that the representations in the Financial Agreement were “all the statute requires. ”  Pa57.  The Court went on to find that plaintiffs had failed “to overcome the presumptive validity of the ordinance” and that even if altering the Township’s contribution to the school district was among the purposes, the challenge failed because the “ordinance has a legitimate purpose. ”  Pa55.  This approach cannot be reconciled with the framework that informs N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 or with the case law that was the basis for the trial court’s decision.
[brief] .................................................. 31 - **Lopez v. City of Elizabeth**, 245 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 1991)  ............... 32 - **Maslo v. City of Jersey City**, 346 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2002) .......... 31, 32  McCarthy v. Twp. of Verona, [...], 2011 WL 1917169 (N.J. App. Div. 2001) .................................................................
[brief] (23T 9:23 to --- 11  Appellant incorrectly identifies the date of this transaction as December 6, 2008 and the destination as [...]’s Capital One account.  Contrary to the appellant’s brief, this transfer was made to a Bank of America account, not a Capital One account.  (Db18; 28T 114:15 to 115:6).  On June 30, 2022, based on its findings, the trial court entered judgment for the Plaintiffs’ on counts 5 and 6 (conversion), 7 and 8 (breach of contract), 11 (breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing), and 12 and 13 (unjust enrichment) of the Amended Complaint in the total amount of $2,882,244.85, jointly and severally against each of the defendants—an amount equal to half of the misappropriated funds.
[brief] - 16 - Fenwick v. Kay Am. Jeep, Inc., 72 N.J. 372 (1977)......................................- 22 - Freeman v. United Dominion Realty Tr., Inc., E042905, 2008 WL 1838373 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2008), as modified (May 6, 2008)  ........................................-  16 - Furst v. Einstein Moonjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1 (2004)...........................................- 17 - Gibbs v. Cooper, 86 N.J.L. 226, 90 A. 1115, 1116 (1914).............................-  10 -, - 11 - Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 411 N.J.Super. 582 (App.Div. 2010).........- 19 - Gray v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 22 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D.N.J. 2014)  ....................- 29 - Green v. Morgan Propertiess., 215 N.J. 431 (2013)...................................... passim Highlands Ins. Co. v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 373 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2004) .............- 29 - Holtham v. Lucas, 460 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 2019) ...- 6 -, - 7 -, - 8 -, - 14 - Hous. Auth. & Urban Redevelopment Agency of City of Atl. City v. Spratley, 327 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 1999) .........................................................- 28 - In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412 (1983)...............................- 30 - Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522 (1971).........................................................- 18 - Laufer v. U. S. Life Ins. Co. 385 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2006)...............- 31 - Leaman v. Wolfe, 629 Fed. Appx. 280 (3d Cir. 2015)..................................- 15 - Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 203 N.J. 496 (2010) ...........................................- 32 - Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99 (2014)
[brief] **Planning Comments**  a.  As required by the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, all redevelopment plans are required to be reviewed by the Planning Board to identify any inconsistencies with the Master Plan.  b.  The primary goal and focus of the master plan and its subsequent reexamination reports has been the preservation of agriculture as a viable business within the Township, and the protection of the rural and agricultural character of the community.  Any potential new zoning regulations or land use regulations must then be viewed from this perspective of its potential impacts on these overarching goals.  c.
[brief] | | | Campbell v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co., | 30 | | 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11507 (D.N.J. June 9, 2005) | | | Carita v. Mon Cheri Bridals, LLC, | 27 | | 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87472 (D.N.J. June 22, 2012) | | Carroll v. N.J. Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 2004) ........................................... 19-20, 38 Choy v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9432 (D.N.J. 2012)
[brief] The Court held in Karan that the storm protection provided by a dune project should be considered in determining the just compensation due to a property owner whose land was taken to construct the dune.  [...] owned oceanfront property in the [...] with panoramic ocean views.  A governmental beach protection project raised the existing dune on Karan’s property from 16 feet to 22 feet, thus blocking Karan’s ocean views.  Prior to the trial, the Karans’ sought to prevent the borough from presenting evidence that the property received a benefit from the construction of the dune (storm protection) that would partially offset the loss in value due to loss of the view from the dune constructed on the Karans’ property.  The New Jersey Supreme Court held:  That the Karans are entitled to “just compensation” for the taking of a portion of their property for this public project is not in question.  Instead, the focus here is on how to calculate “just compensation” when the taking of a portion of the property for a public project may lessen in part and enhance in part the value of the remaining property.  See, Karan, supra at 388 [emphasis added].
[directive] Court 2A:162-16(c)  N.J.S.A. See~e•~•, Law.  Bail Reform the applying in discretion their exercise should apply officer may enforcement law a when on guidelines issue General Attorney to the (requiring acomplaint-warrant).  for interpretation statutory and implementation every address to attempt does Directive not This and police that circumstance every relevant for attempt account to Nor it does likely arise. to issue forth the sets Directive  Rather, the decisions. case-specific making consider in should prosecutors and policies, systems, them establish requiring to prosecutors, and police for responsibilities general words, other in Directive, efficiently.  Reform  This Law  Bail the implementing for procedures done is This made.  be will decisions case-specific which within framework general a establishes if future the in provided be may guidance or legal policy specific more that understanding with the and efficient uniform a the of benefits appropriate achieve to and necessary becomes that the of 11 New paragraph I, Article to recent amendment the and statute new of the administration Constitution.  Jersey in discretion enforcement law of exercise the guide to framework general establish a To and police for substantive standards Directive establishes this Law, Reform implementing Bail the charged be should defendant a when inform that presumptions rebuttable (e.g., apply to prosecutors for motion a file should when prosecutors acomplaint-warrant, ratherthan acomplaint-summons by procedural and imposes etc.), release, pretrial defendant's a revoke to or detention pretrial requiring (e.g., discretion exercising in uniformity of degree appropriate an ensure to requirements
[brief] 1.  **Failure to ascertain the client’s business objectives through appropriate consultation.**  [...] never met with [...] and [...], the named members of [...].  Despite not having met with representatives from [...], his initial reaction after reviewing the proposed contract documents was that the form and content were “acceptable” without any proposed changes.  This statement was made notwithstanding his testimony that the term “as is” in leases is the greatest trap phrase in real estate history, and that section 32 of the Lease, in [...]’s own words, was “the greatest run on sentence put into a ‘landlord lease’, and described the Lease as a whole as a “landlord lease that debilitates the rights of the tenant”.  When [...] did finally meet only with [...], a “facilitator” for [...] as described by [...], to discuss the terms of the contract documents, some three weeks after receiving the draft documents from [...], [...] only suggested generic changes to the Lease and did not propose specific language that would have protected [...].  The major generic change was to add a contingency for approvals to utilize the Property for [...]’s intended use, indicating that [...] was aware that [...]’s intended use of the Property would require zoning approval.  However, [...] agreed to a Lease that required [...] to submit an application for zoning approval by July 11, 2016, some three weeks from the date he reviewed the Lease and only eleven days from the commencement date of the Lease.  I have not reviewed any documents or testimony that indicates that [...] discussed this tight schedule with anyone from [...] to ensure this deadline was reasonable.  [...] also permitted the time frame for the suspension of rent to be only three months, a very tight window for obtaining approvals with regard to approvals that included a use variance, without an opportunity to expand this time frame.  In addition, there was no provision limiting [...]’s financial investment in the build-out for the intended use, despite [...]’s testimony that his clients were willing to pay money to cure the ills of a decayed dormant building, but to a reasonable financial limit, and [...]’s testimony that had [...] known what it would cost to get a certificate of occupancy they never would have done the deal.  I did not review any documents or testimony that indicates [...] discussed the budget with [...] so as to insert a monetary limit on the cost to build out the Property as a basis to terminate the lease.  Even if [...] rejected [...]’s attempts to include the aforementioned provisions into the Lease, at least [...] would be in a position, with [...]’s counsel, to make an informed decision as to whether to accept the risks of going over budget for the build out or miss the tight deadline for filing and/or obtaining the approvals for the build out prior to signing the Lease and attendant contract documents.  2.