ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See, Globe Motor Co. v. Igladev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016); Model Jury Charge (Civil), § 4.10A "The Contract Claim—Generally" (May 1998).  To support its conclusions that there were breaches of the [...] and the [...], 24T50:10-17, the court was required to find that each of these elements was proven.  It did not do so.  And, the fact is the court could not do so because plaintiffs failed to prove these elements.  Count 7 alleged that [...] and [...] breached their obligations to [...] under the [...].  The alleged breaches included obligations “to share profits according to the percentage of the member’s respective membership interests and for decisions and actions of [...] to be determined by a majority in interest of [...]’s member[s].”  Da43.  The parties to the [...] were [...] and [...].  Nonetheless, the trial court stated “[...], [...], [and] [...], breached their obligations” under the agreement and made the following findings:  So withdrawals were made of capital from the company without approval and authorization from . . . the other shareholder, [...].\(^{14}\)  He didn’t get to share in all the profits and he didn’t get the distributing and receiving and/or causing to be distributed or received by [...] and [...] more than their share of the profits.  And these are decisions that should have been made together.  And these diverting of the funds were detrimental to the interest.  [24T50:18-51:9.]  As a preliminary matter, [...] could not, as a matter of law, “breach” a contract when they were not parties to the contract.
[brief] In reviewing a trial court’s rulings, New Jersey appellate courts will defer to the trial judge’s factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence (see, e.g., State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 [2016]), and review the trial court’s legal interpretations de novo.  State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015).  The circumstances of this case, viewed through the lens of the applicable [...] policy language, reveal plainly that there exists no legal basis for the allegations against [...] contained in the plaintiff’s verified complaint.
[directive] The uniform comprehensive as the one one course — even as single fill void.  However, no help the to of important officers will stay apprised ensure that new law2 —can the contemplated by need only take the course especially if officers relations, police-community developments affecting be achieved cannot the highest professional standards maintaining occasion .The goal of on a single coordinated entire library of courses and a needed is an training event.  What is in-service asingle by professional growth sustained provides opportunities for that education system continuing career.  officer's throughout an that the expressly recognized in this regard message in conditional veto Governor his  The departments law enforcement require individual local authority already has the to General Attorney police-community action plan to enhance statewide of a uniform components the basic abide by to new the course required by includes the cultural diversity
[brief] AD justification: 'Not a Compulsory Dispute - No Consent  Respondent further relies on the unpublished decision (in a OTSC) from a 2019 case where an award of Medpay subrogation in Arb Forums was vacated:  [...] V.[...]  [...]  Here, the Medical Payment Subrogation Arbitration Agreement clearly provides that "[n]o company shall be required, without its written consent, to arbitrate any claim or suit if:
[brief] New Jersey’s Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division reinstating the trial court’s order of specific performance to [...] stating:  A Riparian Grant is a conveyance in fee simple of real property.  As such without specific mention in the deed or other evidence that the parties intended its inclusion, a Riparian Grant will not pass as appurtenant to another distinct parcel.  109 N.J. 307, 322 (2007)  The Supreme Court stated that property not expressly included in the instrument’s description, will not be covered by the mortgage.  The Supreme Court believed the fact that the mortgage in [...] did not reference the Riparian Grant at all was a clear indication of the parties’ intent.
[brief] In arguing that the trial court erred in its decision to dismiss [...]’s claims with prejudice, [...] assumes that the trial court relied upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel when citing this Court’s findings in the First Appellate Action to bar the Second Action.  (See Pb29.)  This argument, however, conflicts with both the trial court’s rulings and [...]’s own statements in its opening brief.  (See 3T43:24–44:6; Pb17.)  Indeed, [...] admits that “[a]lthough not clearly articulated, the trial court presumably dismissed Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine. ” (See Pb24.)  In granting Defendants’ second motion to dismiss without prejudice, the trial court explicitly stated that “res judicata and collateral estoppel I don’t think apply,” (3T43:24–25), and thus concluded that it did not have jurisdiction at the time and had to wait for the Appellate Division’s decision.  (See 3T43:5–8; see also 3T44:4–5, 44:14–17 (“Depending on the Appellate Division ruling, [the] entire controversy doctrine would apply” and “for those reasons, under the entire controversy doctrine I’m not going to decide that the plaintiff is barred at this time.  We’ll see what the Appellate Division rules. ”).)  In accordance with that ruling and upon this Court’s decision barring [...]’s bad faith claim in the First Action, the trial court denied [...]’s Motion to Reinstate and dismissed [...]’s claims with prejudice.
[brief] The Synagogue presented as witnesses on its direct case only [...], [...], and [...].  The first witness, [...], the head of the Synagogue since 1995, presented limited testimony.  He had no involvement or knowledge of the circumstances of the 1963 Agreement.  He became involved with the Synagogue in 1991 and thereafter observed that Synagogue attendees/staff regularly parking in the School's Fifth Street Lot and Sixth Street Courtyard (6T104-5 to 111-20).  On his return to the witness stand (after other witnesses out of turn), he testified that, upon finding out in 2007 that the School property may be up for sale due to financial issues, he located in Synagogue records the 1963 Agreement and had [...] have the 1963 Agreement --- not itself in recordable form --- recorded in the County Clerk’s records by attaching it to a Corporate document that was in recordable form (Da907).  Tendler acknowledged that prior to 2013 there was no curb cut on Sixth Street; in 2013 a curb cut in front of Lot 8 was chiseled out to allow for vehicles to mount the curb to access the School Lot 5 courtyard more easily.  Importantly, [...] offered no testimony as to any circumstances surrounding the 1963 Agreement or the 1972 School Site Plan.  (6T96-18 to 110-25).
[directive] A.  The analysis of the first specimen shall be done in accordance with currently accepted procedures adopted by the Laboratory.  These procedures shall include but not be limited to security of the test specimens, chain of custody, initial screening and confirmation testing, parent drug and metabolite cut-off levels and the issuance of final reports.  In addition to the controlled substances listed below, every Law Enforcement Executive may request that specimens be analyzed for the presence of steroids.  B.  The Laboratory's drug testing procedures will screen specimens for the following controlled substances: − Amphetamines − Barbiturates − Benzodiazepines − Cocaine − Methadone − Opiates − Oxycodone/Oxymorphone − Phencyclidine − Marijuana/Cannabis (only to be included in the testing process when: the officer is assigned to a federal task force; the officer holds a federally regulated license, which requires testing (e.g. pilot or commercial driver’s license); the law enforcement agency is specifically required to test by the terms of a federal contract or federal herein)7 grant; or as outlined in the reasonable suspicion sections II.C.2 and II.C.3 C.
[brief] Under New Jersey law an arbitration agreement is valid, enforceable and irrevocable if it expresses the parties’ intent to submit an existing or future controversy to arbitration.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(a).  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., 219 N.J. 430, 444 (2014).  Here the Agreement could not be any clearer.  It indicates in multiple places that any and all disputes arising out of or related to Plaintiff’s employment, whether based on contract, tort or otherwise, would be arbitrable.  Therefore, courts apply a presumption favoring arbitration and resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration where such language is used.  Griffin, 411 N.J. Super. 518-19; Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLC, 393 N.J. Super. 560, 575 (App. Div. 2007).  “Because of the favored status afforded to arbitration, ‘[a]n agreement to arbitrate should be read liberally in favor of arbitration. ’”  See Curtis v. Cellco P'ship, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 34 (App. Div. 2010); citing Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App.Div.2010) (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).  In determining whether a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause, courts operate under a “‘presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. ’”  See EPIX Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., 410 N.J.  Super. 453, 471 (App. Div. 2009), abrogated by Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013); citing Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 973 (D.N.J.1997) (citing AT & T Techs. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (internal citation omitted).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] See, e.g., United States v. Medley, 312 F. Supp. 3d 493, 501-03 (D. Md. 2018) (upholding admissibility of expert’s cell site location opinions which included use of PCMD); State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 808-09 (Minn. 2019) (same); see also State v. Timley, 469 P.3d 54, 57-58, 60 (Kan. 2020) (no reversible error where prosecutor remarked that PCMD-based location analysis showed defendant’s phone was “exactly at the location of the shooting” where testimony clearly indicated PCMD measurement was an estimate only).  Ordinarily, the persuasiveness of sources relied on to support an opinion go to the weight of the opinion, not its admissibility.  State v. Smith, 262 N.J. Super. 487, 521 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 476 (1993).  The jury was charged that the weight it assigned [...]’s opinions depended on the facts upon which they were based.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq.....................................................................................11, 12, 24, 26 N.J.S.A. 20:3-6 .................................................................................................25  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  October 20, 2023  Order Appointing Condemnation Commissioners ..................Pa1 #  TABLE OF APPENDIX | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Copy of Order Entered by The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., October 20, 2023 | Pa1 | | Copy of Respondent’s Case Information Statement | Pa3 | | Filed on November 8, 2023 | | | Copy of Order Denying Appellant’s Motion for a Stay, November 3, 2023 (Law Division) | Pa6 | | Copy of “Property Map” Indicating the Location of the Lot Which is the Subject of the Litigation | Pa7 | | Copy of Ordinance 5-23
[brief] [...] was ordered by [...], on October 11, 2006, to remove all of the criminal accusations prior to filing its amended complaint, which in fact [...] did.  For [...] to resurrect those charges four years after the Sealing and Striking Order, to remove the case to federal court, resulted in violation of [...]’s privacy, holding [...] in a false light and defamation per se.  There is no statute of limitations for a Fourth Amendment violation.  The uncontested facts as set forth in this matter require the application of the exclusionary rule to this case.
[brief] 544a.  Despite the judgment commanding that [...] address its “status report as to its implementation of its Plan and an analysis of whether any unbuilt sites or unfulfilled mechanisms continue to present a realistic opportunity,” 245a, and incorporation of the Special Master’s explicit demand that at the “[...] will show at the midpoint review how it will provide a realistic opportunity for the remaining 7 units” through the “off-site” mechanism, 165a, the [...]’s two-page midpoint review does not once mention the Off-site Units.
[directive] The following requirements should be met before a Treasury agency agrees to adopt a state or local seizure:  The state or local agency must conduct all of the pre- 1. seizure and underlying investigative activity before requesting a Treasury adoption of the seizure.  There must be a violation of state law and a basis for 2 . forfeiture under federal law.  The state prosecutor must have declined to take the seizure 3 . to forfeiture.  A turnover order must be obtained if required by state law.  4.  Federal Judicial Review/Pre-Seizure Analysis -- . -  Prior to Frzsentation for federaL,judicial review, a full pre- seizure analysis should be performed by the Treasury agency.  GENERAL ADOPTION PROCEDURES
[brief] Another key fact (abuse of discretion) that promulgated an unfair result: Clear evidence was presented demonstrating Plaintiff [...] **failed to respond** in order to **prove** service of process (Pa1) upon this defendant’s challenging to validity of service (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41), thereby challenging the 1990 court’s jurisdiction as cited case law has established the burden of proof is placed with the plaintiff upon challenge of jurisdiction by the defendant, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir.2001).  That being said, the following Third Circuit Court cases cite legal reinforcement that “**No** default can be entered without a defendant **first being served properly.
[brief] There is no discretion here, the statute required that there be a low overpass warning sign at a location where the truck driver could detour around the low overpass and yet there was none.  The Trial Court did not instruct that the Defendant was strictly liable.  Rather, the Court instructed that the jury was to consider the statute on the issue of negligence/dangerous condition.  Further, the Court instructed the jury with respect to proximate cause.  [6T124:6 to 162:20]  With respect to these two theories—sign should have been on the overpass & a sign should have been posted at the last safe exit or detour preceding the overpass - N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a) is applicable, and therefore the notice requirement of N.J.S.A. 59:4-3 is not applicable and notice in effect is assumed.  N.J.S.A.59:4-2 states:  A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 (emphasis added).
[brief] 2  I.  [...] ARBITRARILY IGNORED REASONABLY FORESEEABLE ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS TO HIGHLANDS RESOURCES FROM THIS PROJECT’S AIR POLLUTION AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO SPRAWL, BECAUSE THESE IMPACTS ARE NOT SPECULATIVE AND MUST BE CONSIDERED.  (Aa0001)  .................................................................  2  II.  [...] ARBITRARILY IGNORED REASONABLY FORESEEABLE IMPACTS TO WATER QUALITY FROM THIS PROJECT’S CONTRIBUTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ADDITION OF IMPERVIOUS SURFACES.  (Aa0001)  .................................................................  7  III.  REVERSAL OF THE EXEMPTION OR A REMAND FOR A PUBLIC HEARING WOULD BOTH BE APPROPRIATE REMEDIES.  (Aa0001)  .................................................................  9  TABLE OF DECISION BEING APPEALED
[brief] In this Order and over Plaintiff/Respondent’s objection, the Order as to [...] provided that Plaintiff/Respondent’s direct claim was dismissed, but that the cross-claims against other defendants were preserved in accordance with Burt v. W. Jersey Health Systems.  (Da236).  [...] then moved to dismiss Appellant’s Third-Party Complaint.  (Da237).  Despite having every right and ability to pursue his third-party claims, Appellant instead filed a cross-motion seeking to again treat these third-party defendants as the defendants were treated in *Jones v. Morey’s Pier* and *Burt. v. W. Jersey Health Systems*.  (Da244).  This position is entirely illogical since Appellant would then gain the benefit of a third-party claim but without the necessity to contend with counsel defending those doctors.  Plaintiff/Respondent opposed the motions, arguing that *Burt* and *Jones* apply only when a plaintiff’s conduct destroys a defendant’s ability to pursue third-party claims – in other words, action or inaction that prevents a direct defendant from asserting or prosecuting a third-party claim for contribution.  (Pa20-21).  Nonetheless, the Trial Court ruled that [...] would be treated as so-called “Burt defendants.
[brief] 14  POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................  14  POINT II  THE COURT MUST APPLY NEW JERSEY LAW TO ITS ANALYSIS OF THE WHOLESALER AGREEMENT AND WHETHER ITS ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS VALID (Pa5)  ..................15  A.  The MBPA Mandates That New Jersey Law Must Govern The Wholesaler Agreement (Pa5)  ..................................................15  B.  Appellants Satisfy The Restatement’s Factors To Disregard The Wholesaler Agreement’s Choice-of-Law Provision (Pa5)  ..............................................................................17  (i)  New York Has No Substantial Relationship To The Parties Or The Transactions At Issue In The Verified Complaint (Pa5)  ...........................................................................18  (ii)  Application of New York Law Would Violate New Jersey Public Policy And The Express Provisions Of The MBPA (Pa5).  ................................................................................23  (A)  Applying New York Law to Deny Appellants  The Protections of New Jersey Law Would Run Afoul of New Jersey’s Fundamental Public Policy (Pa5-6)  ........................................................................23  (B)  New Jersey Has A Materially Greater Interest Than New York In This Matter And New Jersey Would Govern The Dispute Absent The Choice-Of-Law Provision (Pa5).  .............................................32  POINT III  THE AGREEMENT’S ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS UNENFORCEABLE UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW (Pa5-7)  ....................35  A.  The Wholesaler Agreement’s Arbitration Clause Is Invalid Because It Does Not Expressly Waive Appellants’ Rights To Access Courts When Appellants Are In A Much Weaker Bargaining Position To [...] (Pa5-7)  ....................35  B.  There Is No Mutual Assent To Arbitrate MBPA Claims Since The MBPA Was Not Enacted When The Wholesaler Agreement Was Executed (Pa5-7)  .................................................................40  C.  The Federal Arbitration Act Violates The Twenty-First Amendment Which Confers On States Unfettered Control Over The Sale And Structure Of Beverage Alcohol Distribution (Pa5-7)  .................................................................42  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS ON ARBITRABILITY WERE INCORRECT (Pa7)  ..............................................................................46  POINT V SAPPORO USA’S WITHDRAWAL OF THE OCTOBER 4  NOTICES DOES NOT MOOT THIS APPEAL (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................................................................................48  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................................................50
[brief] On October 19, 2023, the Defendants in this action ([...], [...] and [...]) filed a Verified Counterclaim, asserting that [...] had breached the Operating Agreements through mismanagement.  (Da220-48).  A substantial portion of the allegations in that Counterclaim mirror the allegations in Complaint that [...], [...] and [...] filed in the Law Division Action.  (Da79-80, ¶¶23-32 and Da238-39, ¶9-17).  That Counterclaim also asserts that the May 21, 2022 agreement should be rescinded because [...], as Manager of [...] and [...], misrepresented that she had been: (a) "properly and appropriately managing the Property"; and (b) "paying down Bernardo's loans with her own funds.  (Da243, ¶40; Da244, ¶44; and Da245, ¶50).
[brief] [Aa012, Aa029.]  This minimalist application of the Water Quality Planning Act and Rules cannot be left to stand.  Stormwater will flow off of 241 impervious acres of additional impervious surface, through the applicant’s stormwater outfalls, and directly into tributaries to Duck Pond Run and Shipetauken Creek.  Aa151-152.  Duck Pond Run discharges directly into the Delaware and Raritan Canal, Aa089, a major source of drinking water.  Entirely absent from the record is DEP’s determination of whether these water bodies or those that they feed, including the Delaware and Raritan Canal, Assunpink Creek, and the Delaware River,\textsuperscript{18} are impaired, or subject to any TMDLs or wasteload allocations.
[brief] He doesn’t get away from [...]. ”  (16T 107-19 to 21)  Listen.  Any reasonable person, any of you sitting here, if the discussion of shooting someone, taking another person’s life, comes up, as a friend of yours is driving you around town, are you going to say I want out, stop the car, I’m going to stop at a red light, I’m going to get out, hold on a second….  * * *  There’s clearly talk between the two men because [...] doesn’t stop.  He doesn’t say let me out.  He doesn’t say listen, I’m not going to get involved in anything.  He doesn’t wave to the guys, try to give them a signal, that are in the Tucson.  (16T 107-21 to 108-2; 16T 108-21 to 25)  The prosecutor’s contention that [...] and [...] had discussed what [...] was about to do, as evidenced by the fact that [...] did not jump out of the car or try to warn [...] and [...], does not hold water.  The prosecutor seems to be suggesting that if [...] had not been part of a conspiracy with [...] but had learned of the plan either only during the car ride or when [...] began shooting, the only reasonable action for [...] to take was to promptly exit the car, and possibly to warn the intended victims.
[brief] Further, [...] in both his report and his testimony identified additional information necessary to ascertain the ultimate effect of the failure to provide the Route 33 Signal and resultant effect on safety.  See Ba65-76.  This information was not required by the SHO; nor was it provided by the Respondents.  Finally, the conclusion in the SHO Resolution that the site can function with right-in/right-out driveway on Route 33 ignores the obvious traffic issues with such movements on a 55-mile-per-hour roadway, as well as the provision of safe pedestrian access from the [...] on the southerly side of Route 33 to the commercial uses on the Property.