ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On July 23, 2020, plaintiff [...] (“Feder”) was operating a BMW registered to his business, plaintiff [...], DMD, PC (“[...]”), when he was involved in an accident in which he rear-ended another vehicle (Pa22-Pa25, Pa35-Pa37).  Although the police report of the accident indicated that the vehicle operated by Feder was insured by [...] (with the New Jersey Department of Motor Vehicles Insurance Code “426” noted in box 25 of the report) (Pa35-Pa37), the [...] policy was not in force at the time of the accident (Pa39).  In fact, the policy had been cancelled for nonpayment of premium nearly seven months earlier, on December 31, 2019, and during those nearly seven months, coverage had not been reinstated nor replaced (Pa22-Pa23, Pa39).  Feder’s failure to pay premiums owed to [...], leading to cancellation  The [...] business auto policy had been issued to [...], covering the 2012 BMW, for the policy period of August 13, 2019 to August 13, 2020 (Pa47-Pa52).  The policy address on the [...] business auto policy was [...] (Pa47), which Feder confirmed was his residence address (Pa59, Pa60).  Pretrial discovery established that Feder alone handled all the bills as well as all insurance matters for the household (Pa94, Pa95, Pa96, Pa97).  Feder testified at a deposition that the [...] business auto policy was billed by [...] on an installment basis, with the bills sent by mail to his residence address (Pa60, Pa62).  He admitted, however, that he had no recollection of paying any such bills in October or November of 2019 (Pa62-Pa63).  In fact, premiums for the [...] business auto policy were in arrears in the fall of 2019.  Accordingly, on November 30, 2019, [...] sent a document addressed to plaintiff [...] DMD PC at the policy address of [...], entitled “FINAL REQUEST FOR PAYMENT BEFORE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION” (Pa45).  That document reflected that no premium payments for the business auto policy had been made since October 14, 2019, and advised that unless payment of the past due amount was made within one week, a Notice of Cancellation would be sent (Pa45).  No further premium payments were ever made on the [...] business auto policy.  On December 13, 2019, [...] issued a cancellation notice to [...] (Pa39).  The document was addressed to the policy address of 288 Broad Ave, Englewood, and was entitled “CANCELLATION NOTICE” (Pa39).  The cancellation notice clearly stated that “CANCELLATION of the policy or policies described above will become effective on December 31, 2019 at 12:01 a.m., E.S.T. ” (Pa39), and informed [...] that payment of the past due amount of $378.00 prior to the cancellation effective date could keep the policy current (Pa39).  Payment of the past due amount was not made, and the [...] [...] business auto policy was cancelled effective December 31, 2019 (Pa39).  The policy was thus not in effect at the time of the July 23, 2020 accident nearly seven (7) months later (Pa22-Pa23, Pa39).
[brief] On May 8, 2020, [...] was at home when she heard a loud thud against her house.  (2T:50-2 to 8).  She heard a second thud a few seconds later and went outside to see what was going on.  (2T:50-8 to 12).  When [...] turned to the left of her house, she saw a man kicking what looked like a book bag.  (2T:50-13 to 15).  It was not until she heard whimpering that she realized it was a dog.  (2T:50-15 to 16).  She yelled at him to “get off that dog or [she] was going to call the cops. ” (2T:50-17 to 18).  The man told her to “get her fat ass back in the house where it belongs. ” (2T:50-18 to 19).  [...] then called the police to report the incident.
[brief] While still negotiating the lease agreement for the Property, on January 22, 2022, [...] attempted to submit its development application to the [...].  (Da440.)  The attorney for the [...] advised that, without site control, the application would be rejected.  (Id.)  On February 18, 2022, [...] submitted the final requisite documents (executed lease and property owner’s certificate) to the [...], thereby completing its development application.
[directive] In the check Manual, Procedures Violence Domestic the in forth set procedures the with accordance a to subject is defendant the whether determine to Registry12 Central Violence Domestic made shall be Registry Central of mandatory query the This order. restraining violence domestic herein Nothing acomplaint-warrant. or acomplaint-summons issue to whether deciding before Domestic checking from the officer a police discourage or preclude to construed be shall other or gang in involvement a (e.g., pose might release defendant's that dangers the to relevant is that agency County a by required be may —and encouraged are agencies Accordingly, activities). criminal organized acomplaint-summons. issuing before practicable when query deconfliction a conduct to — directive Prosecutor's to enforcement allows system law that inquiry computerized a is Registry Central Violence Domestic 12 The the from information this to request having without cases violence domestic pending about information access permits Central Registry The business hours. regular court's the during only operate that units DV Family Court was previously restraining order which a in about cases information displays and time, any at access direct this of utility The been order alleged. has restraining of a violation previous which a in cases and issued requested/ enforcement all Accordingly law complete. is database the which to extent the on depends system inquiry electronic violence seeking domestic a when system eTRO
[brief] As for on-street parking, the proposal would result in a net loss of one space (see --- 2  The Borough's Zoning and Land Use ordinances are online: ecode360. com/11353122#11353122  3  This may refer to the site plan design requirement in Sec. 246-51Q(6)(b):  "The following regulations and rules shall apply concerning off-street parking in each and every district in the [...][* * * *  Apartment houses, efficiency motel units, and residential condominium developments: parking spaces for two motor vehicles for every one living unit in such apartments, efficiency motel units, and residential condominium developments."  colloquy at 1T40-20 to 1T41-10); although [...] referred to this as somehow "minimizing the loss" (1T40-18), it is a loss nevertheless.  [...] never explained how the Applicant is mitigating what he acknowledges to be a traffic problem.  The Board acknowledged the witness's testimony that "[t]he density requirement is 1,200 square feet and each unit will have approximately 1,092 square feet" (Resolution, paragraph 5L (Pa21)), but the Board never actually justified this variance.
[brief] \(^2\)  It appears that [...] intends to try to get around *Mount Prospect* by arguing on reply that the parties thereto did not devote much briefing to arbitrability under the No-Fault Law.  See [...], *Third Circuit Overlooks Jurisdictional Problem in New Jersey Insurance Fraud Claims Decision*, N.J.L.J. (May 7, 2024) [hereafter “Cinotti Article”] (arguing, in an article drafted by [...]’s appellate counsel in this appeal, that the parties devoted limited briefing to the No-Fault Law).
[brief] (Db43).  However, “[a]dult arrests that do not result in convictions may be ‘relevant to the character of the sentence ... imposed. ’”  *State v. Rice*, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 382 (App. Div. 2012) (alteration in original).  Also, “a defendant's arrest record is a factor which may be considered in the determination of an appropriate sentence so long as the sentencing judge does not infer guilt from charges which have not resulted in convictions. ”  *State v. Tirone*, 64 N.J. 222, 229 (1974).  Thus the court’s consideration of defendant’s prior arrests was appropriate.  Defendant cites to *State v. K.S.*, 220 N.J. 190 (2015), to support the argument that the court improperly considered defendant’s prior arrests.
[brief] It is not objectively reasonable for police to assume that whenever an adult answers a door to a dwelling, the adult has the apparent authority to consent to the police entering.  None of the officers asked defendant if he owned or lived in the house.  They obtained no information before entering about his reason for being on the premises.  Defendant's mere conduct in opening the door in response to [...]'s knocking, and in thereafter leaning his body away from the officers' path, does not provide sufficient objective indicia that he possessed the right to decide who may enter the premises.  Indeed, the police appeared to know little about the house other than they suspected [...] was inside.  They had no information about who lived there or whether defendant was their relative or a guest of the residents.  There simply is not enough evidence in this record to conclude, as a matter of law, that defendant possessed the apparent authority to consent to the police search.
[directive] Index of Bail Schedule 1  Crimes  Aggravated Sexual Assault ..........................................................................................................................................................................  15  Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact ............................................................................................................................................................  16  Aggravated Manslaughter .............................................................................................................................................................................  14  Contempt of Domestic Violence Restraining Order .......................................................................................................................................  16  Extradition Proceeding ..................................................................................................................................................................................  16  Felony Murder ...............................................................................................................................................................................................  14  Kidnapping ....................................................................................................................................................................................................  14  Manslaughter ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 14  Murder ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................  14  Sexual Assault ..............................................................................................................................................................................................  15  2  Updated December 2, 2013
[directive] The following questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to certain drug offenses and also are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm or other weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of the following offenses.  If a firearm was possessed, answer questions 1 a, b and c.  If a firearm was not possessed, mark question 1a not applicable [NA] and answer questions 1b and c.  1.  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to any of the following offenses: leader of a narcotics trafficking network (2C:35-3); operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility (2C:35-4); manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-5) distribution, possession or manufacture of gamma hydroxybututyrate (2C:35-5.2); distribution, possession or manufacture of flunitrazepam (2C:35-5.3); employing a juvenile in drug distribution (2C:35-6); distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school property (2C:35-7); distributing, dispensing or possessing a controlled dangerous substance within 500 feet of a public housing facility, park or building (2C:35-7.1); or, distribution, possession or manufacture of an imitation controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-11)  AND a. you also plead guilty to possessing a firearm while committing, [Yes] [No] [NA] attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon?  OR b. you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, [Yes] [No] [NA] for an unlawful purpose while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon for an unlawful purpose?  OR c. you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, [Yes] [No] [NA] under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful use of the weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon?  Date  Defendant Defense Attorney Prosecutor Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169
[brief] However, Intervenor knew that [...] did not know about the tax foreclosure.  Intervenor ([...]/[...]) was emailing Defendant Milov offering him as much as $650,000 to buy the property.  He also, and his agent, [...] admitted that they sent him proof of funds (Frenkel’s funds) when she offered to buy the subject property on his behalf.  To state that Intervenor [...], LLC/[...] are innocent parties stretches the imagination and is contrary to the facts.  Defendants presented evidence that [...], unaware of the tax foreclosure proceeding, emailed the Tax Collector requesting redemption figures on February 22, 2022 (19 days after default had been entered, but before the Plaintiff transferred the property).
[directive] The courts have decided that a public employer must permit an employee to have a representative present at an investigative interview if the employee requests representation and reasonably believes the interview may result in disciplinary action.9  However, a representative shall be permitted to be present at the interview of a subject officer whenever he or she requests a representative.  While the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to administrative investigations, an officer shall be permitted to choose an attorney as their representative if he or she so desires.  8.4.9
[brief] AN OFF-SITE PARKING USE/FACILITY ON THE SCHOOL  LOT 5 FOR LOT 8 SYNAGOGUE STAFF/ATTENDEES IS NOT A PERMITTED USE FOR EITHER LOT 8 OR LOT 5 UNDER CURRENT ZONING REGULATIONS (RAISED BELOW BEFORE ZONING BOARD Da1-6 AND TRIAL COURT Da270)  The current situation --- the regular parking of Lot 8 staff/attendee vehicles on the Lot 5 courtyard without any marked spaces, drive aisles, or fire lanes, and with vehicles driving and parking in all directions, at the entry yard of a grade school --- is clearly unsafe and chaotic.  To assert that this chaotic and unsafe use/situation is or ever was “permitted” and conforming under Zoning Regulations is patently absurd.  At the Board hearing, the [...] did not demonstrate, or even make any effort to demonstrate, that Lot 8 or Lot 5 has ever received any zoning approval or had any zoning authority for its use of Lot 5 as an off-site parking lot/facility for its Lot 8 vehicles.
[directive] This Directive updates the statewide Body Worn Camera Policy (“BWC Policy”) to conform to P.L.2021, c.472, which was signed into law on January 18, 2022 by Governor [...] and outlines the circumstances in which a law enforcement officer may view relevant BWC footage prior to writing an initial report, providing a statement, or submitting to an interview about the recorded event.  By way of background, in 2015, Acting Attorney General [...] issued Directive 2015-1, which established statewide protocols governing the use of BWCs and served as the initial version of the BWC Policy.  In 2021, Attorney General [...] issued Directive 2021-5, which significantly revised the BWC Policy, in part to incorporate the requirements of a 2020 law mandating the use of BWCs by all uniformed patrol officers in New Jersey.  P.L. 2020, c. 128 See and 129, codified at N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 to -118.5.  Among other things, the 2021 version of the BWC Policy placed limits on when officers could review or receive an accounting of a BWC recording prior to creating any required initial reports, statements, or interviews regarding the recorded event.  2021 BWC Policy § 10.3.  The law signed yesterday by Governor Murphy See supersedes that rule and instead generally permits officers to review such recordings before creating required initial reports, statements, or interviews, with six exceptions delineated in the statute.  In addition, this Directive makes several other minor modifications to the BWC Policy, as described below.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the directives outlined below.
[brief] I do feel there is an inherently beneficial use.  I think it will state the greater good of [...] and the people that live in [...].  I think any negative issues that come along with this thing are outweighed by those positive issues.  [...]: A yes vote denies the application, correct?  [...]: Yes.  [...]:  In this case, I vote, yes, for some of the reasons that I've already So, as I said, I understand the beneficial use for the citizens, but I have issues with the risk of it being as close as it is.  [...]:  Thank you.
[brief] 6T77:9-78:2.  The court’s moving target simply became impossible to hit.  Finally, 96 pages into the day, [...] was able to begin his direct testimony.  Defense counsel repeatedly raised circuitous arguments that had been rejected.  For example, defense counsel continuously asserted that “facilities don’t act * * * they act through their people,” 6T119:4-6, while objecting to any testimony about what the nursing home staff did or did not do.
[brief] THE APPEAL COMMENCED BY APPELLANT WAS UNTIMELY FILED PURSUANT TO R. 2:4-1, AS MORE THAN 45 DAYS ELAPSED FROM THE UNDERLYING ORDERS DATED APRIL 1, 2024 AND APRIL 29, 2024, WHICH DENIED APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR COMPOUNDING INTEREST AND/OR AWARDING OF LEGAL FEES.  R. 2:4-1(a) provides, in pertinent part, that except as set forth in subparagraphs (1) and (2), appeals from final judgments of courts, final judgments or orders of judges sitting as statutory agents … shall be filed within 45 days of their entry.  The Order dated April 1, 2024 denied Appellant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees, whether under R. 4:42-9(a)(2) for a fund in court or under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and R. 1:4-8 for frivolous litigation.  The Order dated April 1, 2024 also denied Appellant’s request for compounding post-judgment interest.  While Appellant’s sought reconsideration of the denial of attorney’s fees, Appellant waived arguments as to compounding post-judgment interest as such issue was not contained in Appellant’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.  Accordingly, this issue of compounding post-judgment interest became “final” with the April 1, 2024 Order.  The Order dated April 29, 2024 granted Appellant additional sums as part of the modified [...], including certain costs incurred.  Appellant did not seek reconsideration of compounding post-judgment interest and appears to have accepted the Court’s ruling as to the applicability of simple interest.  Appellant did seek reconsideration of the Court’s prior denial of attorney’s fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(2) for a fund in court.  Appellant did not seek reconsideration of the Court’s denial of attorney’s fees under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and R. 1:4-8 for alleged frivolous litigation and appears to have accepted the Court’s ruling on that issue.  Accordingly, this issue related to the awarding of attorney’s fees became “final” with the April 29, 2024 Order.  The purported “final order” alleged by Appellant was entered May 31, 2024.  Said Order merely related to the release of the funds on deposit with the Superior Court and had absolutely nothing to do with the issues of compounding post-judgment interest or the award of attorney’s fees.  Appellant commenced this appeal on July 1, 2024 (“Filing Date”).  As the Filing Date was greater than forty-five (45) days from either the April 1, 2024 or the April 29, 2024 underlying Orders, this appeal is untimely pursuant to R. 2:4-1.  Moreover, Appellant did not seek an extension of time under R. 2:4-4.  It is Respondent’s contention that no good cause exists for granting of an extension at this juncture.  Accordingly, it is Respondent’s position that this appeal should be denied as untimely.
[brief] The August 17, 2019 Incident  On August 17, 2019, at approximately 10 p.m., [...] attended line up – the time where officers receive their assignments, relevant briefings, etc. ahead of their respective shifts.  (1T140.1-5; 1T141.19-22; 1T142.3-6).  [...] had already been subjected to a lengthy investigative process and interview.  During that lineup, [...] learned that there may have been an “alleged” posting about [...]’s involvement in [...]’s escape on a closed Facebook web page entitled “[...]. ” was visible from the exterior fence.  While D.S. was outside, she saw Corrections Officer [...] (“[...]”) patrol the exterior fence in a DOC vehicle.  D.S. tried to flag down [...] to get assistance.  According to D.S., [...] looked at her and did not offer any assistance.  Instead, [...] merely took off and continued his tour.  D.S. was neither charged with attempted escape or escape.  [...] does not have any social media accounts.  (1T146.3).  Several officers, including [...], were making comments about what had occurred the previous day.  (1T146.4-12).  In response, [...] made a comment aloud.  (1T143.20-24).  It was not addressed to any one person.  (1T147.11-14).  That comment was heard by several officers during line up.  (Pa114a-115a).  Initially, the comment was taken by [...] as a threat and sent to the [...] for consideration.  (1T209. 18 to 210.6).  The [...] did not find anything criminal about the comment and referred it to the DOC for further action.
[directive] [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  A prosecutor calculating an authorized plea offer under these Guidelines is encouraged and expected to consult with a designated supervisor or, as appropriate, with the county narcotics task force Commander, Division of Criminal Justice Major Narcotics Bureau or the New Jersey State Police Gang Unit to determine whether the defendant is a member of a recognized street gang before tendering the plea offer.  When information in an arrest report or other police report reasonably suggests that the defendant is involved in street gang related activity, no plea offer shall be tendered without consulting with a designated supervisor to determine whether or not this Special Application and Enhancement Feature applies.  11.2
[brief] Applying *Marmo*’s reasoning to the case at bar, [...] (“[...]”), through counsel, filed their Collection Complaint (Pa1) against [...] twenty-one months before Defendants moved to compel arbitration in the consolidated action.  Defendants, collectively represented by counsel, litigated [...]’s class claims for seventeen months before they moved to compel arbitration—after they failed to obtain full dismissal of Hopkin’s claims on the merits.  Thus, Defendants’ delay here is comparable to the delay in *Cole*, and weighs in favor of the Court finding waiver.