ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed recorded on June 29, 1983 (See Pa 148-149), specifically provides that the Board designate at least one but not more than three unsold Units for use by building personnel, to be considered “part” of the Common Areas and shall be maintained by the Association and shall be part of the Common Expense.  In the present case, Unit 74 was designated for use by the Superintendent when control of the Association was turned over to the homeowners in 1987 (35 plus years ago) and had an .81% interest in the common elements.  See Pa 97-100.  Paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed additionally provides “By the affirmative vote of not less than three-fourths of the votes of Unit Owners present at a meeting duly called for that purpose, the Association may elect to purchase one or more Units or other residential quarters for building personnel.
[brief] Ibid.  So, [...] is required to set aside 15% of its IDEA funding for [...].  If the number of students with disabilities is not accurate, then its failure to investigate and remedy that problem has the result of taking money away from services to provide T&E.  Ibid.  Because [...]’s own policies and choices inefficiently use its resources and effectively leave students, especially special needs students, behind, the record supports the Assistant Commissioner’s determination that it is [...]’s mismanagement rather than the SFRA that is the cause of the District’s failure to provide T&E.
[brief] Assuming this Court concludes, on de novo review, the Law Division erred in dismissing the lawsuit, any award for attorney's fees is negated.  Further, Defendant did not properly seek an award of attorney's fees and the "bulk" request for unspecified fees does not comply, in any way, with requirements for fee applications.  R. 4:42-9.  There are also serious questions raised about the propriety of the fee and whether it is reasonable.  R.P.C. 1.5; Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995).  CONCLUSION
[brief] Ibid.  See also State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 467 n.1 (2017) (declining to consider State’s argument about inevitable discovery because it was raised “for the first time on appeal”).  Notwithstanding the State’s argument to the contrary, it is the State that bears the burden to prove that a defendant lacks standing to challenge a search.  State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 529 (2014).  The State in this case did not argue, let alone prove, that [...] lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the gun he was charged with possessing.  This issue was not discussed in the State’s brief on the suppression motion, nor was it argued orally to the motion court.  (Dsa 1-4; 1T)  The State is thus barred from pursuing this issue on appeal and the Court should not consider it.
[brief] In Shah, the Court upheld a similar household vehicle exclusion as is at issue in the current matter to a primary automobile insurance policy where the exclusion was specifically contained in that policy.  Plaintiffs in the case at bar have conceded in their initial moving brief that such an exclusion in the primary policy issued by [...] is not ambiguous or unlawful as it applies to [...] (as discussed above, the exclusion would never be invoked by [...] given the liability coverage maintained by plaintiffs but, regardless, the exclusion is not per se invalid).  (Pb31).  For the reasons stated above, such exclusions are appropriate – namely, to prevent people who try to ‘game the system’ by only insuring 1 vehicle in a multi-vehicle household with high limit coverage while leaving other vehicles in the household underinsured by low-premium policies.  The ambiguity arises when that exclusion is engraffed upon an excess policy that has denied liability coverage thereby creating the very gap between liability and UIM coverage for which benefits are sought.  In short, despite no caselaw addressing the facts of the current matter, [...] is asking the Court to accept that, at the time they purchased their $5,000,000 liability policy and $1,000,000 UIM policy from [...], plaintiffs should have reasonably known and anticipated that [...] would deny liability coverage for the vehicle they owned and insured with [...], thus making the vehicle underinsured.  And then plaintiffs were expected to know that [...] would turn around and invoke a definitional exclusion for underinsured vehicle that is not contained in its policy but is rather contained in [...]’s policy, even though [...] itself would never have occasion to invoke the exclusion in order to deny UIM coverage.  Taken as a whole, the invocation of the exclusion by [...] under these circumstances could not reasonably be understood by any policyholder.  The collective pieces that plaintiffs would have had to put together to understand [...]’s denial are scattered and convoluted.  The policy has been rendered ambiguous and contrary to plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations.  As such, [...]’s motion to dismiss should have been denied.  Conclusion
[brief] Defendants contend—without any supporting legal authority—that because Plaintiff “opened the door” to extrinsic evidence, the trial court properly relied thereon.  (Db30, 35.)  Plaintiff does not dispute that it elicited testimony and presented evidence at trial regarding the RIR, but that is irrelevant to the issue.  The fact that the trial court heard testimony and evidence regarding the RIR, regardless of by whom it was presented, does not mean that the trial court may rely on that extrinsic evidence to change the terms of the parties’ contract.  See, e.g., Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 301-02; Clementon Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d at 613; YA Global Investments, L.P., 419 N.J. Super. at 12.
[brief] (Pa48-49).  her OTSC without ever submitting a request or receiving a denial of access from a public agency.  While she finally submitted OPRA requests to [...] and [...] three months later in an attempt to address the procedural deficiencies brought to her attention, (Pa61; Pa66; Pa78-83; Pb4), she never amended her complaint to include these December 2022 OPRA requests.  (Pb4-5; Pb7; Pb12; Pa142; Pa152; 1T7:6-20; 1T33:1-21; 1T35:8-22; 1T36:18-23; 1T37:19-21).  The trial court rightly noted that these deficiencies alone would have merited dismissal of [...]’s complaint.
[brief] A proper review of their chain of title would have demonstrated to Defendants the presence of the mistake and Plaintiffs’ claim or title.  At the very least it was replete within information and recitations that would have indicated the need to inquire further.  That inquiry would have resoundingly revealed that “105 – 40 = 65; not 66.33. ”  Ja718.  The trial court did not err in so finding.  c.  Defendants’ obligation to inquire provide a further demonstration that there is no genuine dispute of material fact.  The immateriality of other individuals’ failures to identify the error and Defendants’ “expert opinion” is amplified in light of the clear record demonstrating that Defendants had an obligation to further inquire, that there was a mistake, and that the mistake was readily identifiable.  See Gilbert, 247 N.J. at 442 (“disputes on minor points do not” preclude summary judgment); Brill, 1452 N.J. at 540 (“[W]hen the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law, the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.
[brief] (Za101, 135 and 138.)  Moreover, the Project here involved not just the site in Pennsylvania, but, as [...]’s counsel flushed out during deposition testimony of [...] of [...], an insured site in New Jersey.  (Lorenz Tr., 58:7-59:2 at Pa964.)  Plaintiffs try to shift the focus of the risk analysis by asserting that the coverage purportedly provided to [...] is not multi-state, but that simply is inaccurate given the plain language of the Code, which is inapplicable to multi-state risks, like the CCIP Policies.
[brief] Appellants also pled a counterclaim for declaratory judgment that Respondent has no right to use the roadway to cross the [...]’ property (Da224).  The [...] also filed a responsive pleading wherein they repeated Appellants defenses and added the additional defenses of abandonment, statute of limitations and that the [...]’ property ([...]) is now encumbered by a Deed of Easement and Farmland Preservation Agreement (Da230). ¹ The basis for the Appellants’ defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel and entire controversy doctrine stem from a prior lawsuit commenced in 2005 by plaintiff’s predecessor in title, [...] (“[...]”) (Da224).
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court uphold the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice as to [...]  f/k/a [...]  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Date: May 15, 2024  By: [...], Esquire  [...], Esquire  July 1, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
[brief] Thus, "th[e] test requires [a] defendant to identify specific acts or omissions that are outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance…"  State v. Jack, 144 N.J. 240, 249 (1996).  "Reasonable competence does not require the best of attorneys, but certainly not one so ineffective as to make the idea of a fair trial meaningless."  State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 351 (1989).  “If [a] defendant establishes one prong of the Strickland-Fritz standard, but not the other, his claim will be unsuccessful. ”  State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012).  As discussed supra, post-conviction appeals are reviewed de novo when the post-conviction relief court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claims raised by defendant.
[brief] The said belief by the trial judge remained unfazed even after he was presented with the DOJ letter (Pa54), which showed that (1) there was NO compromise at work at [...] and (2) the trial court had exclusive jurisdiction.  Further, via the reconsideration appellant also filed the [...] letters (Pa55, Pa57), in showing the unjust harms of the With Prejudice case disposal below told by [...] via the following:  “this case has been administratively closed based upon the legal doctrine of res judicata preclusion, [because] the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division – Bergen County, entitled [...] v. [...] and [...] ‘-‘  On October 20, 2023, the Court issued its decision on the case” (Pa57).  (Raised via §III, pp. 6-10 and Point Four, pp. 23-25, of Appellate Brief.)  As such, contrary to arguments of the Response, the denial of the appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration was a Harmful Error below.  IV.
[directive] In any instance where the juvenile is, in the opinion of the judge, incapable of knowing consent, the parent or guardian of the juvenile may waive the privilege on behalf of the juvenile, provided that the parent or guardian is not the defendant and does not have a relationship with the defendant such that he has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding.  A victim counselor or a victim cannot be compelled to provide testimony in any civil or criminal proceeding that would identify the name, address, location, or telephone number of a domestic violence shelter or any other facility that provided temporary emergency shelter to the victim of the offense or transaction that is the subject of the proceeding unless the facility is a party to the proceeding.
[directive] a) person is a public employee and b) has been convicted of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense and c) such offense involved dishonesty OR touched upon or involved his office, position or employment.  II.  Application for Forfeiture of Office at the Municipal Court Level.  Due to the statutory provision of N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(b)(1) requiring the immediate forfeiture of office at the time of a public employee’s conviction, and since the conviction and sentencing of a defendant in municipal court usually occur on the same day, decisions about waiver of forfeiture should be made in advance of adjudication.  Therefore, a reasonable effort must be made as soon as practical to determine if the defendant is a public employee.  If the arrest report does not specify the defendant’s employer, the defendant should be asked to identify his employer at his first appearance or arraignment.  Whether the county prosecutor’s office screens the municipal court cases or the municipal prosecutor directly handles charges filed in the municipal court, the decision to waive forfeiture must be made before adjudication of the case.  If necessary, adjournment of the case should be sought for a reasonable time to allow for the preparation of the prosecutor’s written statement of reasons.  Upon learning that the defendant is a public employee, the municipal prosecutor should contact the assistant prosecutor who has been assigned as the supervisor for municipal prosecutors in that county to request a review of the file to determine if waiver will be considered.  The municipal prosecutor should complete a written statement of reasons containing the factors in these guidelines in order to assist the county prosecutor in making the waiver decision.  Upon completion of the review, the county prosecutor should provide the municipal prosecutor with the signed and complete written statement of reasons accepting or rejecting waiver.  The review should be completed in an expeditious manner in order to insure a speedy resolution to the underlying matter.
[brief] In addition, it is noted that if the trial Court’s decision is to be set aside because of a perceived flaw in the jury verdict form, then the appropriate remedy would be to remand for a new trial – not to mold the verdict in the manner sought by Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs did not move for a new trial and their appeal is not based upon a request for a new trial.  The trial Court found that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof as to causal relationship, and that:
[brief] The Parties agree that resolution of the issue now before this Court requires an application of the multifactor test described in Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265, 280-81 (2013).  The Parties disagree as to what facts are relevant to that multifactor analysis.  As noted above, [...] takes a tunnel vision approach that considers only what [...] did or did not do before demanding arbitration.
[brief] The defendant had suffered a “pretty big” puncture wound on her middle finger from attempting to stop Koda’s attack.  (3T:111-2 to 7).  When [...] made his way toward Bella, Koda “lunged” at him.  (2T:127-23 to 25).  [...] then saw Bella laying on the ground with a half inch deep hole in her side and blood “spitting out” every time she took a breath.  (2T:128-1 to 4).  [...] and his wife then took Bella to the animal hospital.  (2T:132-15 to 25).  In the car, [...]’s wife was holding Bella and applying pressure to the open wound.  (2T:133-3 to 5).  [...] stated that his wife’s shirt and pants were soaked with blood.  (Id.).  Bella survived the 18-20 minute car ride, but eventually succumbed to her injuries at the animal hospital.
[brief] NO FINAL APPROVAL LET ALONE ANY APPROVAL BY THE BOROUGH ENGINEER**  As the trial court plainly concludes at page 10 of its decision, (Pa15) [...] was the Borough Engineer.  The trial Court found that [...] was the planning Board Engineer.  The trial Court states that "once again defendant is correct that [...] was not the Borough Engineer".  (Pa15).  N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-53(j) requires “approval by the municipal engineer”.  There is no evidence that the municipal engineer inspected and approved the roadways in question.  Plaintiff did not submit adequate proofs that the municipal engineer examined the internal roadways at issue such that they were “inspected and have received final approval by the municipal engineer” for a “public street” or a “public road”.  N.J.S.A.
[brief] Posed rhetorically, Plaintiff’s counsel asked:  So you’re probably wondering why am I in the court here today?  The defendants admit they’re at fault.  It goes back to accountability.  Because despite ¹ This included [...]’s law clerk, and three observing judicial interns (7T, at 14:7-12).  admitting that they caused the collision involved in this case they have for almost five years since this accident happened taken no steps to make things right.  That is why we are all in court today.  (3T, at 4:22-24).  When Plaintiff’s counsel first introduced this theme of accountability, Defense counsel never objected.
[brief] Defendants cannot save their deficient SPA arbitration clause by arguing that the critically missing waiver-of-rights language is contained on page iv of the POS and that the entire 663 page POS is “incorporated by reference” in the SPA.  The one other place in the POS referring to arbitration (p. 83) does not refer to a waiver-of-rights.  The SPA does not alert the consumer that the POS contains anything important regarding arbitration or the waiver of the consumer’s constitutional right to seek relief in a court.  There is no evidence that any of the plaintiffs agreed to the waiver of the right to sue.
[brief] [...]’s finding disregarded that [...] testified she believed that [...] was her attorney during that time.  1T91:17-20.  As [...] summarized in her Certification filed in support of her motion for reconsideration (A294), “The probative evidence before the Court was that I signed a retainer agreement with [...] (D 57), I received invoices from [...] (D 58), I paid [...] $203,333.61 from my [...] Account in 2013 (D-179), I paid [...] $8,538.44 from my Cache Visa credit card in 2015 (D 172), and [...] referenced me as their Client in a November 2014 invoice (P 15). ”  Even [...] acknowledged in his testimony before [...] that because of what he claimed was a “clerical error” in the Retainer Agreement, he might indeed have been representing [...].  12T32-33:9.  Though claiming a clerical error, moreover, Browndorf never sent [...] any communication that he was not representing her in the “financial advice” engagement, or that her being named in the [...] retainer agreement was a “clerical error. ”  12T34:20-35:1; 12T45:20-46:7.  [...] retained and did not return to [...] the payments in excess of $210,000 that [...] made to them on account of their legal bills, addressed to both spouses.  12T34:20-35:1; 12T45:20-46:7.  Finally, [...]’s ruling flies in the face of [...]’s own statements.  In the legal malpractice case that [...] filed against several former lawyers in federal court, [...] affirmed that [...] represented both he and his wife jointly during the 2013-2014 time frame, in providing “financial advice” to them; the couple entered the Retainer Agreement with [...] in July 2013 together.  21T107:21-108:2.  “[D]uring the preparation and execution of the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement, the Mid-Marriage Agreement, and the Irrevocable Power of Attorney of December 5, 2013, and November 11, 2014, [[...]] acted as legal counsel to both Plaintiff and [...] in violation of law and the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct,” [...] represented in his malpractice lawsuit, he acknowledged in the Rule 4:50 hearings below.  21T109:24-110:6; 21T109:24-110:7.  These representations to the federal court should have precluded, per the doctrine of judicial estoppel, [...] from claiming a contrary fact in the Rule 4:50 proceeding before [...] below, Newell v. Hudson, 376 N.J. Super. 29, 38 (App. Div. 2005); Tamburelli Properties Ass'n v. Borough of Cresskill, 308 N.J. Super. 326, 335 (App. Div. 1998); Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Northfield Metal Products, 334 N.J. Super. 596, 608 (App. Div. 2000); Stretch v. Watson, 6 N.J. Super. 456 (Ch. Div. 1949), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 5 N.J. 268 (1950) (all noting doctrine of judicial estoppel precluding a party from playing “fast and loose with the courts” in order “to protect the integrity of the judicial process”).
[brief] (Aa59).  However, this determination ignores the actual, recent, physical observations of threatened and endangered species using the site.  (Aa2553-Aa2575; Aa2540-Aa2545).  The [...] determined that “there is [not] a reasonable probability that bald eagles use these wetlands for resting or foraging. ” (Aa59).  However, the observations that were accepted by the [...] Firh and Wildlife Endangered and Nongame Species Program, indicates that bald eagles were resting and/or foraging on the site.
[brief] On page 15-16 of the trial courts 404-b opinion the trial court judge [...] stated that [...] was to testify that [...] is the masked suspect he drove to several crimes, although there is no evidence that supports [...]'s claims.  [...] also cannot testify in any way to Drew's unsupported allegations of [...] alleged involvement in the 7-11 alleged robbery in [...] at [...] murder trial (Da 96-98).  The State also no longer has the ability to speak of or admit the illegally obtained evidence from the robbery case at [...] murder trial due to the [...] dismissal of the robbery case indictment (Da 59).  With all the above factors that have completely changed the murder case and the State’s ability to pile up multiple things that did in fact prejudice the defendant Jamar [...] from being offered a fair trial, the murder case position, and bargaining positioning has changed.
[brief] 2C:3-4c(1).  two different views of the evidence provided a rational basis for giving the instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.  First, the defendant’s statement to police -- entered into evidence by the State -- along with other evidence, provided a rational basis to charge passion/provocation manslaughter.  In that statement, defendant contended that [...] -- whom [...] had testified was forbidden by David from coming onto the property after the October 2018 incident -- drew a gun on defendant and the two men then tussled over the gun, resulting in defendant shooting [...].  If the jury believed that evidence that [...] drew the gun -- which they were entitled to do despite the contrary testimony of defendant’s parents and [...]\textsuperscript{14} -- obviously the first of the Carrero rationales for charging passion/provocation manslaughter would have applied: that the decedent drew a weapon.  229 N.J. at 130-131.  But there was a second independent reason to charge that lesser offense.  Even if the jury believed that defendant had the weapon before the incident and grabbed it and shot [...] as the result of [...] attacking him without a weapon, the second Carrero rationale would have nevertheless applied: that [...] committed a battery against defendant, to which defendant over- \textsuperscript{14}  Carrero could not be clearer that when requested and supported by a rational basis in the evidence, the lesser offense of passion/provocation manslaughter must be instructed “even if the instruction is inconsistent with the defense theory. ”  229 N.J. at 228 (emphasis added).  responded in self-defense and shot [...].  229 N.J. at 130-131.  As noted in the Statement of Facts, there was evidence, again from defendant’s statement, that [...] had previously threatened defendant more than once, even vowing to shoot him, and that he was banging on the front door when he arrived, telling defendant to come outside so they could “handle this,” whereupon he immediately rushed defendant and engaged in a struggle with him.
[directive] $500 to $1,000 10% permissible 10% permissible  Actor knowingly receives or brings into this State moveable property of another knowing that except if by extortion. it has been stolen or believing that it is probably stolen.  2C:20-7a  Receiving Stolen 2nd Degree  $35,000 to $75,000  Property  See 2C:20-2, herein, for grading of theft offenses.  No 10% if by extortion.  43