ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The answer is yes.  The [...] appears to focus on the use of the word “defendant” in the bylaws, Da159, but the action also refers to “any action or legal proceeding. ”  Certainly the [...] case is an “action or legal proceeding. ”  While the bylaws do use the word “defendant,” that word must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Section.  While the section uses the word “defendant,” it also uses the phrase “action or legal proceeding. ” (Da159).  Certainly the [...] action is a “legal proceeding. ”  In Castriotta v. Board of Education of Township of Roxbury, 427 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2012), the plaintiff sought indemnification from the defendant board of education after the plaintiff successfully defended herself against a censure resolution passed by the board of education.  The Acting Commissioner of Education held that she was not entitled to indemnification because the disciplinary proceeding initiated by the board of education was not a “legal proceeding. ”  On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed.  The Appellate Division observed that before the board of education censured Castriotta, the Board had received testimony from Castriotta’s “accusers,” Castriotta herself, and ruled on her counsel’s objections.  The Court held that the Board of Education performed “an adjudicatory act and function[ed] in a quasi-judicial capacity. ”  Id. at 594.  Here, the [...] operates in a quasi-judicial or judicial capacity.  In this case, the [...] held Defendant “in contempt” of the [...]’s prior orders.  (Da156).  The [...] referred the issue of whether Defendant should assess a civil penalty against Defendant.  (Da156).  The [...] ordered Defendant to disclose certain records to the [...] within five business days.  (Da140).  The [...] also has the power to award counsel fees to prevailing requestors, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, and the authority to refer OPRA matters to the Office of Administrative Law as contested cases, Teeters v. Division of Youth and Family Services, 387 N.J. Super. 423, 427 (App. Div. 2006), which is exactly what the [...] did here.  In this case, the [...] referred the administrative action to the Office of Administrative Law for a determination of whether Defendant “knowingly and willfully violated OPRA and unreasonably denied access under the totality of the circumstances,” and also referred the issue of whether the complainant ([...], who is not participating in this appeal) was the prevailing party entitled to an award of counsel fees.  (Da150).  If the [...] found that Defendant had knowingly and willfully violated OPRA, OPRA would have authorized the imposition of a $1,000 civil penalty for the first offense.  (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11).  For these reasons, the [...] complaint constituted a “legal proceeding” for which Defendant should have been indemnified.  Regarding the trial court proceeding below, Defendant was, in fact, a “defendant” in that case and even by the [...]’s own tortured reasoning, Defendant [...] was entitled to indemnification.
[brief] In *Pizzo*, the plaintiff sought to subdivide its 79-acre tract of land in order to develop it.  After initial comments from the planning board, the plaintiff submitted a conforming application, requiring no variances.  Despite its conformity, the planning board denied the application, stating it was, “fundamentally flawed, environmentally unsound, and unsuitable to the area as a whole. ”  *Id.* at 221.  The Supreme Court performed an analysis of a planning board’s power under the Municipal Land Use Law as opposed to the older Planning Act of 1953, stating:  Although the MLUL gives planning boards, in accordance with the standards of the subdivision ordinance, the power to require that subdivision proposals comply with zoning ordinances, N.J.S.A. 40:55D–38b(1), the MLUL has no provision, as did the Planning Act, that grants a planning board the power to require that lots in the subdivision plan be “adaptable for the intended purposes without danger to health or peril from flood, fire, erosion, or other menace. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55–1.20 (repealed 1975).  Rather, the MLUL specifically provides that “[t]he planning board shall, if the proposed subdivision complies with the [subdivision] ordinance and this act, grant preliminary approval to the subdivision. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D–48 (emphasis added)  The Supreme Court makes it very clear that under the MLUL, the planning board is not permitted the latitude to deny a conforming application.  The Pizzo court upheld an Appellate Court decision, ruling that:  ...a municipal planning board in determining the validity of a subdivision was required to apply only the standards provided in the municipal subdivision ordinance and not those otherwise reflected in the broad purposes of the MLUL.  Id. at 230  As noted above, the application was not denied for either of the design waivers it requested.  Rather, it was denied simply because, as the Board itself explained, the neighborhood is very “exclusive” and “sensitive. ”  The Board Chairman explained those details when he acknowledged that the application is conforming.  As explained in Legal Argument Point I, the stated reasons for the Board’s denial are unrelated to either design waiver or to any legally cognizable authority to deny this application.
[directive] ~i;» 01 ~t' -i'j15'}9.j %~ -i'J"8"}7} ta-'i:!• 7}';,.A,:l ]1tl ¾AJloJl ~i;U ~~.A}.2}-%.Q.]~,:;y77}7 ~78.2...£.  0  1ti \lo-j 'tl-Q.]="o}yJl."o]'i:!  17e ~¾.2..£ 7}Jl "o!]"o]~ 17f£ 7}1JA].2..  i='.  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  e.  [Yes/ofl] [No/0}1...]..8..]  ~~-"}.21- 9.j 7]  7,.(7]  15'}1)  y 77}?  sj ~ ~ ~  Revised Fonn Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Korean Defendant's Initials by .!i!.¾ -'8-±!el °d=~.  \:! ~"ll "r-1 7-]i!a ~i;}oj o]y~ 2019 121!  31 ~;,:}  01-18 10079-Korean :sr]3l'?}~ ;;J]  CN page of7/JIJ] ];,:]5/7 5 0  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek [Yes/ofl] [No/0 tJ...1..8.]
[brief] Inexplicably, however, the ALJ did not follow the inexorable logic of her own findings outlined above and attribute that constitutional deficiency to [...].  Standing alone, the $215 million of advance state aid loans extended by the State—because, without them, [...] would have insufficient funding to provide its student with T&E—offer all the evidence this court should require to support a ruling that [...] is, at least, the significant cause of the T&E denial and that student-petitioners have proven that by a preponderance of the evidence.  Moreover, that ruling should not be called into question by the State’s promise that [...], however belatedly, will be fully funded for the upcoming school year.  That will not, by itself, significantly alleviate the profound constitutional deficiency suffered by [...] public-school students.  The students of the [...] school district will continue to suffer from that constitutional deficiency until this court acts decisively to require that [...], and the [...]’s implementation of it, be retooled to meet the actual circumstances and needs of [...] students.
[brief] But on cross-examination, [...] was shown several New Jersey mold verdicts and settlements, the largest of which was $150,000 for a single plaintiff.  3T183-13-15.  As a result, the only support for [...]’s assertion that there was the potential for seven to eight figure pain and suffering award was his “self-validating, unsubstantiated personal beliefs. ”  *In re Accutane*, 234 N.J. 340, 390-91.  These personal beliefs are insufficient for [...] to meet his burden of production.  *See Pasha*, 344 N.J. Super at 358 (holding that expert’s opinion that settlement was reasonable in light of “extremely wide range of sustainable verdicts and even greater range of reasonable settlements” was insufficient to sustain burden of production).  [...]’s opinions on the likelihood [...] would have prevailed on liability and causation were similarly devoid of support.  [...] testified that [...]’s statute of limitations defense was unlikely to succeed because the continuing tort rule would have extended the accrual date.  But when shown case law on cross-examination demonstrating that the continuing tort doctrine does not apply to personal injury actions, *see Nicolosi v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 389, at *8 (App. Div. 16, 2017) (“No authority extends the [continuing tort doctrine] to medical torts or personal injury claims”), [...] retracted his statement.  3T202-10 to 3T204-24; Da20a.  [...] further testified that the “discovery rule” would have tolled the statute of limitations.  3T198-9-21.  But as the trial court recognized, [...] failed to consider whether it would be equitable to apply that rule given the loss of witnesses and ability to test for mold in the 18 years [...] resided at the premises.  Da20a.  Therefore, his view that [...] was likely to defeat [...]’s statute of limitations argument was again based on his self-validating, unsubstantiated personal beliefs.
[brief] [N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)].  In State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978) the Court addressed the predecessor to this evidence rule, and held that a trial judge may exclude a remote conviction, especially if the crime involved was not a serious offense or did not involve “lack of veracity, dishonesty, or fraud. ”  Evidence of prior convictions should be admitted, and the burden of proof to justify exclusion rests on the party seeking exclusion.  Id. at 144.  A court must “balance the lapse of time and the nature of the crime to determine whether the relevance with respect to credibility outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defendant. ”  Id. at 144-45.
[brief] Miller, 567 U.S. at 477.  [...] instead looked to defendant’s specific actions, instead of his expert’s general conclusions, and found: that the defendant’s decision to seek out and find people to rob at gunpoint over a prolonged period of time was not in touch with his conduct as [...] conceded on cross-examination.  [...]’s modified opinion that while the plan over time to commit robberies was not impetuous, [] she remained convinced that the order or command to “get the one in the yellow jacket” was impetuous and that [defendant] made that impetuous statement without comprehending the significant risk that death could or would result from his actions.  The Court finds that factor one is not supported by the record before the court.
[brief] Papered over by studies, rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but [...]’s determination to exclude the poor.  [...] is not alone; we believe that there is widespread non-compliance with the Constitutional mandate of our original Opinion in this case.  . .  We have learned from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial hand is used, [...] will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.  *S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of [...]*, 92 N.J.158 (1983).  As set forth below, the local zoning laws must yield to the constitutionally-mandated, Court-ordered construction of affordable housing required by law.
[brief] What happened ten years prior does not change the law that makes clear that perceived dangerousness is not a basis to deny a motorist his opportunity to retrieve his own registration before his car can be searched for that registration.  Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. at 27.  Fourth, the fact that “responding officers applied for a search warrant for defendant’s vehicle before any document search occurred” (Sb 19), is either irrelevant or untrue.  If by “document search” the State means that the leather document bag that [...] saw in the glove box was not searched until after the warrant was obtained, that is irrelevant.  What gave the basis for the probable cause was what [...] was able to perceive without opening the pouch.  If by “document search” the State means the search for the registration documents, that assertion is untrue.  As the transcript of the telephonic warrant application makes clear, first the officers entered the car and searched for the documents, then they relied on what they found during the search as a basis for the search warrant.  (2T 68-12 to 69-2 (“[I]n speaking with [...] we asked him if he had the registration and insurance card, there was a temporary tag on the vehicle.  [...] stated his insurance card was in the center console.  [...] lifted the center console up to retrieve the card and in plain view of the center console was what he believes to be heroin.  . . .  At that point nobody else entered the vehicle.  The keys were removed, windows rolled up and the tow company came and towed the vehicle to our sally port. ”))  It is because the warrant relied on the plain view of suspected heroin in the car—and never referred to incredible assertion that [...] smelled marijuana—that the warrant is a fruit of the unlawful police search.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The SEC relied improperly on hearsay statements from Board Member [...]’s allegations in her ethics complaint against Appellant.  See Sg003.  Specifically, the SEC relied improperly on hearsay statements that Appellant did not inform or consult other Board members or the Superintendent or Business Administrator about the request for legal services or the results of the legal research.  See Sg003.  Although in administrative proceedings, the parties are not bound by the formalities of the Rules of Evidence, “a fact finding or a legal determination cannot be based upon hearsay alone…[T]here must be a residuum of legal and competent evidence in the record” for a court to affirm an administrative agency decision.  Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972).  In this matter, the factual record demonstrates that Appellant notified the majority of the Board of his decision to request the Board Attorney to investigate Board member [...]’s ethical violations on election day.  Sg192-Sg201.  Indeed, Appellant attached to his lower agency filings certifications to demonstrate that a majority of the Board had discussed the matter and agreed that Appellant should request the investigation from the Board Attorney.  See Sg003.  The SEC summarily predicated its findings and decision on the unwarranted conclusion that “[t]he parties agreed that Respondent [[...]] and Complainant [[...]] had a substantial negative history and mutual disdain for each other. ”  See Sg004.  The factual record is bereft of any credible, independent evidence that political differences between Appellant and Board Member [...] caused Appellant to request the Board Attorney to investigate [...]’s very specific and discrete instances of ethics violations during the election cycle and on election day.  Sg191-Sg201.  The SEC’s decision clearly assumed a fact in evidence that because the parties had previous political differences ipso facto Appellant must have used the excuse of [...]’s ethics violations during the election to settle a political score, even though the election was already over and Appellant had nothing to gain or benefit from by requesting the Board Attorney to investigate [...]’s ethics violations during the election and on election day.  Therefore, the core assumption supporting the SEC’s decision collapses under the weight of its own interpretive flimsiness, and this Appellate tribunal should reverse that decision.
[brief] (Aa1209-11).  to assist [...] with its transition noted it passed three consecutive budgets in fiscal year (FY) 2019, FY2020, and FY2021 with no impact to the classroom and no major layoffs.  (Aa1120; Aa1247).  On September 14, 2022, the Commissioner of Education formally recommended certifying the District as high performing on the New Jersey Quality Single Accountability Continuum (NJQSAC), based on a comprehensive accountability office report and a transition report showing gains in student achievement.  (Ra31; Ra32-37).  As a result, the State Board of Education adopted a resolution returning [...] to full local control.
[brief] [4T130-13 to 131-1].  While in Virginia, defendant bought spare parts to make the car operable.  [4T143-23 to 144-2].  Defendant and [...] stayed in an Econo Lodge Motel.  [4T133-13 to -15].  In the room, [...] saw the contents of the backpack and knew it contained drugs.  [4T131-22 to 132-14].  The bag was locked.  She did not have a key.  [4T131-20 to -21; Defendant would give her drugs from backpack.  [4T132-10 to -14].  He would weigh and measure the drugs on the scale and then write the transaction down in the notebook he was using as ledger.  [4T132-24 to 133-4].
[brief] Article I of Chapter 146 is entitled “Public Health Nuisance Code of New Jersey”, and Section 146-1 had apparently attempted to adopt the Public Health Nuisance Code of New Jersey (1953), with the exception of Section IV.  (Da100)  As noted above, Section IV addresses the “Prohibition of Certain Noises or Sounds”.  Thus it appears that the Borough had intended to carve out that Section IV, and insert the provisions that are currently at issue in the Noise Ordinance as a substitute for those standardized noise nuisance provisions.  However, also as examined above, the Borough has ceded its authority in this regard to the [...], rendering this attempt invalid.  Defendants’ authority for the Noise Ordinance has been a shifting target since the first version of the ordinance was adopted.
[brief] D-1  Aerial photo of bulkhead from 1040 showing modifications to mean high water line [Keansburg expert Report Exhibit I]  D-2  Aerial photos of bulkhead from 1947 [Keansburg expert Report Exhibit L]  D-3  Letter from Keansburg Borough Attorney to [...] regarding the Borough’s lease of property to Grandal Enterprises [KEANS 66]  D-4  Borough Master Plans and Re-examination plans (From years 1988, 2003, 2012, 2015)  [KEANS 358-KEANS 606]  D-5  [...] Foundation Title Report [KEANS 120-KEANS 357]  D-6  Expert report from [...] dated March 5, 2020, with exhibits (not entered into evidence).  D-7  [...] Exempt Property Tax lists Joint Exhibits entered into evidence
[directive] Access for Approval 9.4 copied, viewed, accessed, be not shall 9.3 section to pursuant recording tagged BWC A or Prosecutor of County permission the obtaining the used first without otherwise or disseminated, recordings for Except designee. or Justice Criminal of Division the of or Director the designee, abuse substance a at patient a of image the captures BWC section a (when 7.1 to pursuant tagged County (requiring to notice 11.1 section of requirements the to subject and facility), treatment under records for request or order, court subpoena, a with complying to prior Director or Prosecutor Director or Prosecutor County the know), to right law common the or Act Records Public Open the (e..g„ positions or duty officers superior more or one and department, of the chief the authorize may permission pursuant grant to department, of the chief the by bureau) identified the detective of head pursuant tagged recordings BWC use otherwise or disseminate, copy, view, access, to section this to recording BWC a to access which for purposes the (specifying 10.1 section also section See 9.3. to permitted). is h~pose Mi That Recordings Relating BWC to Discovery Obligations with Compliance 9.5 Dante to Persons Other or Officers prosecution a in obligations discovery State's ofthe as recording part of BWC a If disclosure confidential officer, undercover an reveal (~, civilian or officer any danger to a present might of disclosure the information tactical confidential reveal or etc.), might site, surveillance informant, signals used or hand verbal codes (~, safety officer or operations future jeopardize might which rooms clearing and movements interior for techniques instructions, or information communicate to during warrant doors open to persons convincing for techniques warrant, of execution during Criminal Justice of Division the of Director or designee, or Prosecutor County the etc.), execution, prosecutorial sound of exercise the in shall, Division, the by prosecuted cases in designee or the protect to Rule Court and/or law by authorized and appropriate are as steps such take discretion, Page 20 section 7.3 order from the court.
[directive] This Directive outlines five mechanisms available to police officers and prosecutors to divert youth from the juvenile justice system and limit the likelihood of unnecessary detention:  Curbside warnings.  A curbside warning is an informal “talking to”—one that typically • arises when an officer observes a juvenile engage in some minor act of delinquency.  The conversation occurs in the community, not at the police department, and can be as simple as an officer telling a teenager to “knock it off” without any further formal proceedings.  Curbside warnings demonstrate to juveniles that officers are present to give guidance, direction, and assistance, and not simply to take them into custody.  Section I.
[brief] Dear [...]:  Please accept this letter brief and appendix on behalf of Respondent, the [...], on the merits of the appeal.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  ............2  ARGUMENT  THE BOARD REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT SANTORE IS INELIGIBLE FOR PERS SERVICE CREDIT AS MUNICIPAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR BERKLEY HEIGHTS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a)  .........................................................................................6  CONCLUSION  ..............................................................................................................12
[brief] (Mahoney, 188 N.J. at 376).  Comments regarding the “cold” or “frigid” streets of Paterson were inferred from [...]’s description of the crime scene being covered in snow.  (3T:9-13 to 10-3).  Comments comparing [...]’s body to a “garbage bag” were lifted directly from [...]’s initial impression of [...]’s body lying in the middle of the road (4T:82-14 to 18).  Comments regarding defendant’s continued firing at [...]’s body were directly taken from [...]’s testimony regarding [...]’s autopsy.  (See generally 4T:49-21 to 55-22).  Finally, comments relating to the relationship between defendant and [...] were inferred from defendant’s own admission that he knew [...] for ten years and was somewhat close with him.  (See Da67 at 4:08 to 4:33).  The prosecutor’s alleged “inflammatory” comments are distinguishable from the actual emotional appeals conducted by the prosecutor in W.L., who during summation referenced the defendant’s “lack of humanity” and “heinous . . . almost unworldly” behavior” which the prosecutor described as “so unlike what we like to think of as being real and human." (W.L., 292 N.J. Super. at 107 to 108).
[brief] Plaintiff’s alleged debt because void the moment Defendants illegally purchased the same in violation of the NJCFLA.  Defendants then violated the CFA (and FDCPA) by sending collection letters and filing a collection lawsuit on the void debt.  At bear minimum, the unlawful interest assessed by Defendants after the debt became void is an improper debt and ascertainable loss borne entirely out of Defendants’ unlawful conduct.  Defendants’ unlawful conduct voided the contract governing Plaintiff’s alleged account.  Thus, any representations to the contrary constitute fraud and/or unconscionable conduct in connection with the subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise.  Defendants have largely failed to respond to and/or rebut the foregoing argument.
[directive] Supersedure and Revision of Brima_gg Guidelines  Any provision of the Brima~e Guidelines inconsistent with this Supplemental Directive is hereby superseded to the extent of such inconsistency, and shall be deemed to have been amended -14- to comport with the provisions of this Supplemental Directive.  8.  Effective Date  This Supplemental Directive shall take effect immediately and shall remain in full force and effect unless and until repealed, amended, or superseded by order of the Attorney General.