ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Prior to April 13, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] obtained a New Jersey driver’s license.  (PA070-071; PA051, T51:L13-23).  Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s driver’s license reflects the address/residency in [...].  (PA070-071; PA051, T50:L8-19).  Prior to April 13, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] principally garaged his 2002 Kia Sportage in [...].  (PA048, T38:L25-T39:L10; PA048, T40:L7-10; PA070-071).  Plaintiff [...] never updated his insurance policy to reflect “garaging zip codes” in New Jersey.  (PA048, T38:L11-24; PA049, T43:L11-22).  Plaintiff [...] never informed his insurance carrier that plaintiff was a resident of New Jersey.  (PA048, T37:L5-22; PA048, T39:L11-20).  Prior to and on April 13, 2022, plaintiff [...] was insured by the [...] insurance policy (Policy Number: [...]) which was written in North Carolina.
[brief] (Pa039-Pa040)  The second prong of the negative criteria necessary for a density variance must "demonstrate that the increase in density would not have a more detrimental [e]ffect on the neighborhood than construction of the project in a manner consistent with the zone's restrictions."  Grubbs, 389 N.J. Super. at 390.  The Board found that the increase in density at the already overly developed, non-conforming site could not be constructed at the neighborhood without substantial, numerous bulk variances.  Therefore, the Board found that the proposed density increase necessarily had a more detrimental effect, as the site was not able to handle the requisite parking, provide proper open space, provide passive recreation or handle the solid waste removal for the complex.  The testimony provided by Applicant’s Planner that apartments should be built where apartments exist was found to have no weight and not credible support for the project.  Although the Applicant’s Planner testified that the project would improve the site, the Board found this testimony not credible.  Lessening any open space or passive recreation would not improve the site.  The issues as to solid waste removal could be remedied without the need for any further projects in the community and brought up to Code.  The new proposed buildings would be coming from open space already existing at the apartment complex, in addition to the space need for parking, which would diminish space even more at this non-conforming site.  (Pa040-Pa041)  Based upon the Board’s findings regarding the second prong of the negative criteria, the Board found that the Applicant had not met its burden of proof.
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 585 (2016) (holding that issue not raised to trial court was waived); Dickinson v. Plainfield, 116 N.J.L. 336, 338 (1936) (“A question not presented and argued in a court below will be held to be waived and abandoned and will not be considered in an appellate tribunal. ”).  In any event, [...] has not cited (and [...] is not aware of) any case holding that the circumstances here constitute an “imposition. ”  [...] argues that there was an “imposition” because “[h]e didn’t know what documents to ask for” and “was not familiar with the Bank’s procedure in opening accounts. ” (Appellant Br., 24.)  However, [...] cites no evidence of a legal imposition, i.e., “fraud or misconduct by [[...]] that prevented [him] from reading” the documents at issue.  Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 297 N.J. Super. 605, 619 (App.Div. 1997).  He cites no evidence of “‘significant time pressure’” or “reliance on an erroneous ‘assurance’ that the parties’ oral understanding had been or would be accurately memorialized in an instrument. ”
[brief] Id.  On remand, the trial court identified the unreleased document as a criminal investigatory record but nonetheless ordered the release of Section 3 information in the absence of a triggering request for this “unique” case.  Trying to minimize the damage of its holding, the trial court said its ruling “is limited to the unique facts of this case, in conjunction with the Appellate Division’s decision on remand” by which it was bound.  (Da114).  This anomalous result may have been caused by ambiguous language within the opinion accompanying the remand.  In this regard, the Appellate Division’s prior opinion at Page 9 (found at Da78) states that “[i]n contrast to criminal investigatory records, OPRA allows access to ‘[r]ecords of investigations in progress’” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3.  (Emphasis added.)  This was a clear misstatement and reversal of import, as N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3 actually permits the denial of access to government records that pertain to an investigation in progress.  The opinion also ambiguously identified the trial court’s obligation to determine whether the undisclosed record was an exempt criminal investigatory record that included information exempted under OPRA and whether such “documents and information are not properly withheld under OPRA. ”  (Da80).  Regardless of the source of the confusion, the trial court took its remand instruction a step too far when it equated the Township custodian’s failure to provide information from an exempt report as a denial of access when no request for such information was made.  In this matter, the Township custodian properly denied access to an exempt criminal investigatory record.  Given that no request for information under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) was tendered, the only remaining manner by which the trial court could have conceivably deemed the Township’s custodian to have committed an OPRA violation is through a false conflation of a custodian’s obligations arising under Section 3 when denying access to a criminal investigatory record in response to a records request.  For the following reasons, interpreting OPRA to suggest a result that a custodian’s proper denial of access to a criminal investigatory record itself creates a reporting requirement under Section 3 is error.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On February 3, 2024, Appellant filed his putative Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County.  Appx., at 1a-26a.  He asserted claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f of the FDCPA (Count 1); N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) (Count 2); Negligence (Count 3); and Invasion of Privacy (Count 4), for Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to mail a debt collection letter to Appellant.  Id., at 12a-17a.  On April 3, 2023, Respondent moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to New Jersey Rule of Civil Procedure 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Id., at 209a-210a.  On May 31, 2023, the Superior Court entered the Order of Dismissal and Memorandum of Decision.  Id., at 27a-40a.  On July 14, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.  Id., at 41a.  On July 29, 2023, Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.  Id., at 45a.  III.
[brief] The Deed Restrictions in the [...] Concerning the Cost of a House  Defendants contend the trial court relied too heavily on the [...] restriction that houses built on oceanfront properties were required to be more expensive than houses on other lots, and that “[t]here is simply no logical reason why having a bigger house would have any impact on beach access. ” (Db16).  The [...] required oceanfront houses must cost at least $2500.  (Da448).  The trial court correctly recognized the “reason [[...]] were able to require a . . . higher price to build a house and a higher price for the property itself . . . had to be the direct access to the water. ” (T69:6-11).  The trial court did not solely rely on this particular restriction in determining an implied easement appurtenant existed, rather it was simply a piece of the court’s common-sense analysis and application.  (See T69:19-23).  Defendants also misconstrue the restriction in the [...] by conflating a more expensive house with a “bigger” and “grander” house.  (Db16-Db17).  The trial court correctly attributed the “more expensive house” requirement to paying a premium for direct beach access.  Defendants’ supposition that more expensive meant “bigger” or “grander” is simply specious.  The premium was not for the size of the house; it was for the location.  Lastly, Defendants argue the inclusion of the price restriction demonstrates the sophistication of [...], and they extrapolate from there to speculate that a sophisticated seller would never have intended an implied easement.  (Db17).  That speculation is no more valid than arguing that a sophisticated seller would have expressly made clear that beachfront homeowners had no right to directly access the ocean.  More importantly, Defendants’ argument would eliminate every implied easement where a grantor is deemed to be “sophisticated,” a position our courts have never taken.  Rather than eliminate implied easements when the seller is “sophisticated,” our courts construe any ambiguity against the drafter.  See Dunn, 23 N.J.L. at 127, 129.  4.
[directive] By January 31 each year, the Agency ALPR Coordinator shall perform an audit of Coordinator.4 their agency’s ALPR program and provide it to the County and State ALPR  That audit shall certify the following:  Agency has an ALPR policy in place • Only authorized users have accessed ALPR data • Date of each authorized user’s last ALPR training • That a random survey of ALPR accesses revealed no misuse •  A description of any known significant violations and citizen complaints and • whether they have been forwarded to the County Prosecutor or DCJ Director  The County ALPR Coordinator or State ALPR Coordinator may conduct an audit of an agency’s ALPR program at any time.
[directive] In carrying out their duties as guardians of public safety, officers shall at all times treat every person equally without regard to the individual’s actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, familial status, or any other protected characteristic under N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.  1.4  Every law enforcement and prosecuting agency operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey, including the [...] and county correctional institutions, shall implement or adopt policies consistent with this Use of Force Policy, including the Policy’s addenda.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 185-186, quoting *Russo v. Teacher’s Pension & Annuity Fund*, 62 N.J. 142, 150-51 (1973).  Thus, while a petitioner with pre-existing conditions is not foreclosed from accidental disability benefits in all circumstances, if the disability results only from the aggravation, acceleration or ignition of the disease, the disability is “ordinary” rather than “accidental.
[brief] The Planning Board filed a Consent Order Vacating Default which was entered by [...] on July 26, 2022, (Pa 61), and then filed its Answer to the Verified Complaint on July 29, 2022.  (Pa 62.)  On July 8, 2022, the Borough filed a motion for summary judgment.  The motion was supported by a brief with five point headings:  POINT I THE BOROUGH IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON COUNT ONE OF THE COMPLAINT  BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S OPMA CLAIM REGARDING THE REORGANIZATION IS MOOT.  A.  The Standard on Summary Judgment  B.  Count One is Moot because any Notice Defect of the January 11, 2022 Reorganization Meeting was Cured by the Plenary Reorganization Meeting.  POINT II  THE BOROUGH IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON COUNT THREE OF THE COMPLAINT REGARDING ORDINANCE NO. 1394-20 BECAUSE IT IS TIME-BARRED UNDER R.4:69-6(a).
[directive] Criminal of Division the the alternative, In discovery.  governing Court Rules the with accordance contact victim which transmit to other by to means AOC provide the with work may Justice of victim notification automated system, facilitate eCDR to through the judiciary to the information not information is contact victim that so system designed such is any that provided court events, the with in accordance disclosed information be until must such and unless defendant with shared the governing discovery.  Rules Court Directive. of this issuance upon immediately operational shall become Section This i~ng Decisions.
[directive] Physical Evidence  7.3.1  Investigators should obtain all relevant physical evidence.  All evidence, such as fingerprints, clothing, hair or fabric fibers, bodily fluids, stains and weapons should be handled according to established evidence procedures.  7.3.2  With respect to radio and telephone recordings, the original recording is the best evidence and should be secured at the investigation’s outset.  Transcripts or copies of the original recordings can be used as investigative leads.  Entire tapes or transmissions should be reviewed to reveal the totality of the circumstances.  7.4
[brief] [...] offers two challenges to the permit.  In point I, [...] argues that the [...] should have denied the permit because the project design do not comply with the requirements of the Scenic Resources and Design Rule.  (Ab14-16).  It builds further on that argument in point II, where it argues that [...]’s approval of [...]’s permit constitutes an illegal waiver of Scenic Resources and Design rule.  (Ab17-19).  Both arguments fail because, as discussed further below, they share the same faulty premise—namely, that the Scenic Resources Design Rule applies at all.  Appellate review of an administrative agency’s final determination is limited and deferential.  In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007); In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-57 (1999).  “The ‘fundamental consideration’ in reviewing agency actions is that a court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of an agency ‘so long as that action is statutorily authorized and not otherwise defective because arbitrary or unreasonable. ’”  In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 10 (2001) (quoting Williams v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 116 N.J. 102, 107 (1989) (internal citation omitted)).  The burden of proving arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable action is upon the challenger.  Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 422 N.J. Super. 227, 234 (App. Div. 2011).  Moreover, an agency’s “interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility” is entitled to deference.  Ibid. (internal punctuation and citation omitted); see also Barry v.  Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 70-71 (1985) (“[T]he grant of authority to an administrative agency is to be liberally construed to enable the agency to accomplish the Legislature’s goals. ” (internal punctuation and citation omitted)).  Substantial deference must be extended to an agency’s interpretation and application of its own regulations, particularly on technical matters within the agency’s special expertise.  In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 488-89 (2004).
[brief] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS [...] AND [...]  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID No.: 042771989  [...], Esquire  Attorney ID No.: 902222012  HANKIN SANDMAN  PALLADINO WEINTROB & BELL, P.C. [...]  T: [...]  F: [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents, Michael Miller and Janice Miller
[directive] DISCONTINUANCE FORFEITURE  FEDERAL OF PROCEEDINGS  Federal Judicial Forfeiture Proceedings  A decision to discontinue a federal judicial forfeiture proceeding against any seized asset in favor of a state or local forfeiture proceeding requires the personal approval of the United States Attorney after review of the evaluation and recommendation of the presenting investigative agency.  In making this decision, the United States Attorney should consider the impact of such a status decision on the financial of the Fund.  Decisions to discontinue judicial forfeitures in favor of state or local proceedings are to be documented.  Federal Administrative Forfeihrre Proceedings  A decision to discontinue a federal administrative forfeiture proceeding against any or the seized asset in favor of a state local forfeiture proceeding requires approval of the head of the investigative agency, or designee.  In making this decision, the head of the investigative agency, or designee, should of on consider the impact of such a decision the financial status the Fund, and where EOAF. appropriate, consult with the Director of Executive Ofice Asset Forfeiture 29 for  This is intentionally blank.
[brief] (Pa3).  The Trial Court  [...] also stated, without analysis or explanation (T85-1 to T85-5), that the monies awarded against [...] in the Vermont suit fell within Exclusion 2.o of the Policy, which applies to “[a]ny ‘claim’ or ‘suit’ that is brought by or on behalf of any insured or any person or organization which is controlled by, controls, or is under common control with [the insured].”  But the Complaint in the [...] specifically states that the [...] filed the Vermont suit “individually and derivatively on behalf of the [[...]].”  Since insurance coverage must be construed expansively in favor of the insured, and since the duty to defend is triggered if there is any possibility of coverage, that ends the inquiry.  To the extent that [...] argues that Exclusion 2.q applies because the Vermont Court appointed a “Litigation Receiver” as a remedy for alleged breach of fiduciary duty, that argument fails as well.  The Litigation Receiver did not “bring” the lawsuit.  Under the “Order Appointing Litigation Receiver” (Pa477 ¶ 17; Pa696–99), the “Litigation Receiver” acted an agent of the Vermont Court and completely outside of the control of any insured.  Pa485 ¶ 52.  VI.  [...]’s Decision to Settle the [...] by Paying Off the Judgment After [...] Improperly Withdrew Its Defense Was Made in Good Faith, and [...] Is Therefore Liable for the Settlement as Well as Unreimbursed Defense Costs.
[brief] As per Karins, supra, as an appointed official, [...] engaged in “misconduct” in violation of N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  (Raised Below: Da 375)  The Borough has statutory authority to remove a Commissioner of the [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) for “inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office.
[brief] 21 POINT ONE:......................................................................  21  SUMMARY OF STATUTES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND CREDIBILITY (Da3; Da5; 5T4:9-5T5:4; 2T:85:13-2T88:12)  [...]...............................................................  27  [...].......................................................  28  [...] (2T85:13-2T88:12).................................  30 POINT TWO.......................................................................  31  THE STATE DID NOT PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT [...] IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS (Da7-8)  A.  THE STATE DID NOT PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT [...] POSES A SERIOUS THREAT OF SERIOUS BODILY INJURY OR DEATH TO HUMAN OR A SERIOUS THREAT OF DEATH TO ANOTHER DOMESTIC ANIMAL (Da7-8; 5T8:15-5T10:15)  ...............31  B.  THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT [...]’S INJURY WAS UNPROVOKED (Da7; 5T8:15-5T10:15)  ......................39  C.  THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF 4:19-23A.(2) (Da4; Da7; 5T5:13 to 6:9, 5T8:21-5T10:13)  ...........41  D.  TEMPERAMENT  EVIDENCE URGES THE OPPOSITE RESULT OF STATE V HEROLD (Da4-5; 5T4:1-8; 5T13:25 to 5T14:25)  ....................44  POINT THREE.........................................................46  THE TATTOO REQUIREMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, ANTIQUATED, IMPOSSIBLE AND UNNECESSARY (CONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS NOT ARGUED BELOW; ANTIQUATED AND IMPOSSIBLE AT 4T80:10 TO 4T84:9)  CONCLUSION..........................................................50
[brief] (AA0185-187)  Article 16:  Personnel File, subsection E, of the CNA between the [...] and [...] provides, in relevant part, as follows:  E.  No documents shall be entered in a Superior Officer’s personnel file that fall within the following categories:  a.  Any accusation that does not result in a hearing and finding of guilt.  b.  Departmental investigations and/or hearings that do not result in a finding of guilty:  * * *  f.  Any letter, statement, report, or other document that implies a wrongdoing or inefficiency is not substantiated by a hearing and finding of guilty except in cases of written reprimands.  Subsection F provides:  All personnel file and training file entries concerning, negative performance notices, oral reprimands and written reprimands will be removed from the Superior Officer’s personnel file or training file twelve (12) months from the date of entry provided no other similar negative performance notice or reprimand follows within said twelve (12) month period.  If these conditions are met, the removed items shall not be used for progressive discipline purposes.  (AA0185-187)  Based upon the foregoing provision in the CNA, every entry in the discipline history summary attached to [...]’ Certification should have either never been included in Appellant’s personnel file, or removed from Appellant’s file years ago.  (AA0131; AA0185-187)  Therefore, based upon the CNA and the undisputed false entry concerning the September 6, 2022 alleged counseling, the only prior discipline that should have been in Appellant’s file and properly subject to review by the Commission is the suspension from 2012.
[brief] The inability to take a meaningful deposition of a corporate decisionmaker would work a particular harm on plaintiffs in employment cases, where the plaintiff depends on discovery obtained from the employer to prove his case.  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 446-49 (2005).  If left unchecked, the trial court’s Orders would do more than deprive plaintiff of necessary evidence.  The Orders will have a chilling effect on other victims of unlawful discrimination and retaliation.  There are 1,249 international companies in New Jersey who employ nearly 300,000 workers.  Pa418.  Foreign directors, officers, and managing agents frequently make decisions that lead to CEPA and LAD claims.  If other courts follow the trial court’s interpretation of the law, victims of unlawful discrimination and retaliation would be deprived of the opportunity to depose foreign decisionmakers in New Jersey in the manner provided by the Court Rules.  Such circumstances will make it more difficult if not impossible for CEPA and LAD plaintiffs to prove their cases and thereby deter victims of unlawful employment practices from filing suit – all contrary to statutory intent.  *Young v. Schering Corp.*, 141 N.J. 16, 26 (1996).  See also *Pinto v. Spectrum Chems. & Lab. Prods.*, 200 N.J. 580, 593 (2010) (CEPA’s enforcement scheme depends on private civil actions by plaintiffs who act as private attorney generals).  4.
[brief] The Prosecutor merely recited basic facts about the victim and made generalized statements about the victim and his family deserving a fair trial.  Nor did the Prosecutor even imply, as Defendant now claims, that justice “could only be achieved if [Defendant] were convicted. ” (Db37).  Indeed, immediately before stating that the victim deserved a fair trial, the Prosecutor first emphasized that “We all want a fair trial for [...].  He is entitled to a fair trial. ” (16T:101-8 to 9).  Even if anything in the Prosecutor’s summation was improper, no error occurred because the jury did not suffer “inordinate exposure to unduly prejudicial, inflammatory commentary.