ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This record established the direct connection between experts such as [...] and acquittals.  Furthermore, the case hinged on eyewitnesses who glimpsed the shooter for at most two seconds under stressful circumstances, whose stories did not line up, and who testified the shooter’s height and tattoos were an undisputed mismatch to [...].  There was no physical evidence linking [...] to the crime, no gun recovered, the witnesses offered conflicting accounts, and [...] presented an alibi corroborated by witnesses and cell phone records.
[brief] In his official capacity, the Mayor possesses great influence on the public and the members of the Zoning Board.  Here, however, in reckless disregard of that influence, without any semblance of judicious self-restraint, and yet in his official capacity, the Mayor waited until the eleventh hour to publicly oppose [...]'s proposal and through the instrumentality of the press release selected as the means by which he chose to do so, succeeded in garnering opposition to the Application, neglecting to advise, inter alia, that the Township relied on [...]'s proposed development when entering into the Settlement Agreement with [...].  At best, the Mayor's publicly reported and disseminated statements the week before were as inappropriate as they were appalling and shocking; at worst, they were tantamount to direct, calculated interference with the quasi-judicial processes contemplated by the MLUL for the fair hearing and consideration of the Respondents’ Amended Application by the Zoning Board.  The last of his quotes in the press release concerning the alleged hatching of eaglets on the Property at the time the Board was to vote was made without reference to any evidence or reported fact, false on its face and, at the very least, made in reckless disregard of the truth.  And yet, it was purposely tinged with enough intent to evoke emotional, outraged and visceral responses that one such resident-objector voiced his objections to the Application in the record in a way that highlighted the effect of the statement and the unfounded fears it stoked.  Such conduct, as described above and at other points throughout this Brief does, indeed, shock the conscience - it was a blatant interference with Plaintiffs’ clear statutory and constitutional right to have an application heard by an independent quasi-judicial Zoning Board.
[brief] Interestingly, plaintiff-appellant makes absolutely no mention of the Supreme Court’s holding in Foley in her appellate brief, and that avoidance is telling.  In Foley, our Supreme Court overturned the Appellate Division and declined to find liability on the part of the defendants who had allegedly created a greater hazard by shoveling the snow into mounds alongside the public sidewalk, which then melted and refroze on the sidewalk.
[brief] Greenway Development Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546 (2000).......................................................................24  Guaman v. Velez (Guaman I), 421 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 2011).............................................43  Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015)....................................................................24  In Matter of County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237 (2017)......................................................................2,25,45
[brief] While it is true that “[m]itigating factors that ‘are called to the court's attention’ should not be ignored,” only “mitigating factors ‘supported by credible evidence’ are required to ‘be part of the deliberative process. ’”  See *Case*, 220 N.J. at 64 (first quoting *State v. Blackmon*, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010) and then *Dalziel*, 182 N.J. at 505.)
[brief] THE COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED NICHOLSON’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (Pa953.)  [...] argues that the court committed reversible error in denying his class certification motion because, according to [...], the court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether a class action should be certified.  Pb37-46.  That argument misunderstands the reason for denial of the class certification motion.  [...] did not purport to deny that motion on its merits.  Rather, [...] denied the class certification because the court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint with prejudice rendered [...]’s motion for class certification moot.
[brief] The Defense also questioned his ability to recall events, highlighted potential inconsistencies in his account, and went into specific details concerning his November 2019 statement.  (16T137:1-155:15).  Thus, the requirement that he testify and be subject to cross-examination on the statement was satisfied.  While it is somewhat odd that the court did not permit admission of the statement through [...] himself, [...] was still available to call as a witness and he was capable of authenticating the statement.  Accordingly, the rules of evidence were satisfied here, as there was an inference of fabrication, [...] was properly crossed on the issue, and the statement was otherwise properly authenticated.
[brief] *Da001*.  That same day, [...] wrote to the court below advising that his “office will likely be authorized this afternoon by the clients to file a motion for leave to appeal and a motion for a stay. ”  *Pa004*.  [...] did not deign to explain how a disqualified attorney employed by a disqualified law firm could be authorized to act on Appellants behalf at all.  *Ibid.*  [...] closes with a collegial expression of willingness to discuss his letter at a case management conference, but again without elaborating on what place he and his firm might have at such a conference in view of their disqualification.  *Ibid.*  On February 29, 2024, [...] wrote to [...] with copies to the court below emphasizing [...]’s seeming inability to comply with the Order under review.
[brief] Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 408 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................................  25 Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574 (2020) .............................................................................................  35  Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) ...............................................................16,18  Cherner v. Transition Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1963) ..........................................................  34  City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) ........................................... 17,21 Coleman v. Fiore Bros., 113 N.J. 594 (1989) .............................................. 14,22,23,31,35 Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563 (1980) ......................................................... 21 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ....................................... 27,28 Fedor v. Nissan of North America, Inc., 432 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 2013) ......................................................... 23 Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1 (2004) ........................................ 14,21 Garmeaux v. DNV Concepts, Inc., 448 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2016) ......................................................... 19 Giarusso v. Giarusso, 455 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 2018) ......................................................... 20 Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 (2015) .................................................................................... 21 Gormley v. Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 2019) ......................................................... 20 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2000) ......................................................... 36 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) ......................................................... 28 Hannigan v. Township of Old Bridge, 288 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 1996) .........................................................
[brief] In addition to the fact that vacating judgment was mandated, the motion filed also included a certification of [...] reminding the Court of his many hardships and evidence that [...] was ready, willing and able to redeem upon an order permitting same.  Plaintiff claims that the Supreme Court in *Malinowski v. Jacobs*, 189 N.J. 345 precludes [...] from obtaining a loan to redeem the tax foreclosure which is inaccurate.  The requirement for third party investors to intervene is to make sure buyers are paying fair market value not to tie a homeowner’s hands behind their back when they are trying to redeem their tax and keep their homes from through, for example, refinance.
[brief] Da67-68.  Prepared after the adjuster was told that the Court had determined that Plaintiff did nothing more than walk through the array of potential jurors during jury selection, the certification described multiple occasions when Plaintiff walked to the rear of the courtroom holding his back, grimacing in pain and stretching, including occasions when he did so while standing next to a juror ultimately selected to hear the case.  Da67-68.  Denying Defendants’ reconsideration motion, the Court determined that the adjuster’s certification did “not bring to light any additional information that would alter [its] prior decision.
[brief] (b)  The Department shall determine if a project or activity is located within an area eligible for sewer service as part of the Department's review of a permit application.  **There is a rebuttable presumption that a project or activity that generates wastewater that is proposed to be conveyed to a NJPDES regulated wastewater facility is consistent with the areawide plan if it is within the sewer service area of the adopted areawide plan. **  [N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b) (emphasis added). ]  Appellant’s position that the “rebutable presumption” set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b) “only applies to the sewerage aspect of the project[,]”\(^{10}\) and not the stormwater aspect, is simply wrong.
[brief] It was defendant who told [...] to “ponder” a shooting case after repeatedly telling [...] not to “offend the wrong one. ” (25T:32-12 to 33-23, 35-3 to 5).  [...], by contrast, only wanted to know when he could come by to collect his belongings and told defendant to calm down.  (25T:35-10 to 37-19, 40-10 to 42-18).  Defendant likens his case to *Carrero*, where the jury could have accepted defendant’s version of events; specifically, that his victim pulled a gun, and even if he had not, the physical struggle between the two was enough battery to provide a rational basis for the charge.  229 N.J. at 130-31.  Again, there is no rational basis to conclude that [...] pulled a gun — defendant has admitted that claim was false.  But, even if the court were to conclude that the jury could have accepted defendant’s version of events, defendant also admitted that he began the physical struggle and altercation by punching [...], who he has now admitted was unarmed.
[directive] 2, August [Revised - Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(l), (2), (3), (b)(l), or (b)(2)) - Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a)) - Absconding from parole (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(b)) - Permitting or facilitating escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(c)) if ALSO Determine the defendant is charged with an offense involving the use or of possession a firearm.  If of BOTH, yes to the combination offenses makes this a Graves Act offense, and No by as required N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(t) the final recommendation is Release Recommended.  If Step 5. no, continue to of6 Step ifthe 5: on Determine PSA generated a score the FTA scale and/orNCAscale.
[brief] The Third Circuit has “‘adopted a broad view of what constitutes an established right of which a reasonable person would have known. ”  Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1103 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032, 107 S. Ct. 3276, 97 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1987)).  Officials are expected to “‘apply general, well-developed legal principles,’” in “analogous factual situations. ”  Ibid. (citations omitted).  The Third Circuit “does not require ‘relatively strict factual identity’ between applicable precedent and the case at issue. ”  Ibid. (citation omitted); see also Ryan v. Burlington Cnty., 860 F.2d 1199, 1208-09 (3d Cir.1988) (“Although officials need not predic[t] the future course of constitutional law, they are required to relate established law to analogous factual settings. ”)  (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir.1984))), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020, 109 S. Ct. 1745, 104 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1989).  Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113-14 (2014).  Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. ”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), overruled in part on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-43 (2009).
[brief] Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below) ..............................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, MINNES SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa16. Pa30.) .................................................................6  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................11  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I  In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188…………………………Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples.  Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938………………………………………Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...] Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9  [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………Pa24  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] As stated above, there are various sources of public policy, beyond the Stay-at-Home Order, which mandate a healthy and safe workplace.  The trial court did not cite them.  Even if the Stay-at-Home Order was imminent but not enacted, it is still a viable source of public policy.  Seven days after Plaintiff sent her email this Order mandated non-essential business closed and [...] went remote.  In light of the declared states of emergency, CDC guidelines, new reports and prior Executive Orders, [...] reasonably suspected that a work from home mandate was extremely imminent.  [...] did not call Plaintiff back to work as a result.  As recognized by the Melhman court, sources and parameters of public policy are “not susceptible to hard and fact rules”, but rather “public policy has been defined as that principal of law which holds that no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.  The term admits of no exact definition…Public policy is not concerned with minutiae, but with principles. ”  Melhman, 153 N.J. at 187.  Finally, a trial court’s reliance on its personal experiences or anecdotal reference can be problematic, particularly when it overshadows the weight of the evidence presented.
[directive] Promulgated by Directive# 19-19 (August 12, 2019)  Page 14 of Guideline 8.  Confidentiality Records 00  Records.  Any records related to proceedings for extreme risk protective orders are confidential and may not be disclosed, by subpoena or otherwise, to anyone other than the respondent for use in the extreme risk protective order proceeding, of except by order the court on good cause shown.
[brief] ”  Furthermore, PCR counsel was not finished with investigations and submissions forced to proceed prematurely to the merits.  Ultimately, there is no basis in fact or law to presume trial counsel exercised sound strategic judgment, and [...] established a prima facie case on each claim.  Because none of the State’s arguments regarding [...]’s individual claims have any merit, he incorporates by reference his opening brief and adds the following remarks regarding certain of the State’s contentions.
[brief] d.  The trial court erred when it reversed the decision of the County and determined that [...]’s failure to provide the NJDOT Notice of Classification with its bid was not a material defect.  Measuring by the date of the bid opening and considering both the possible and potential losses of assurance and harm to competition, [...]’s failure to submit the NJDOT Notice of Classification with its bid was a material defect.  First, work on the Project can only be performed by a contractor that is NJDOT prequalified and classified for the appropriate work and in the appropriate amount.  Da16, Da110-111; N.J.S.A. 27:7-35.2 (all bidders for “highway” projects must be classified by NJDOT); N.J.S.A. 27:7-1 (“‘Highway’ means a public right-of-way.  . .”); N.J.A.C. 16:44-1.1 (establishing NJDOT’s classification scheme); N.J.A.C. 16:44-2.1 (providing expansive definition of NJDOT project).  Thus, the failure to provide proof of that prequalification and classification by definition “deprive[d] the [County] of its assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to its specified requirements.
[brief] In this case, the result of reducing the land area available for residential development meant going from 350 residential units on the 18 developable acres (22 acres less the 4 acre greenway strip originally approved) to 300 units on 11 developable acres (22 acres less the 11 acres to be sold to the County) or from 19 units per acre to 27 units per acre.  It is obvious that the entire character of the project can be changed by the density of what gets built.  The change here equaled a 42% increase in density.  The Planning Board never considered the increase in density.* meeting, claimed the consistency is based on the Second Ordinance providing, for the first time, an 11 acre park and open space for the County, because open space is a general objective in the Master Plan (Objective 2).
[brief] Plaintiffs initiated this action via Complaint filed on April 8, 2019.  Pa1.  The parties submitted Motions for Summary Judgment on February 10, 2023.  Pa802, Pa843, Pa914.  Following responses, replies, and oral argument, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ and [...]’ Motions for Summary Judgment and granted [...], [...], and [...]’s Motions for Summary Judgment on May 26, 2023.  Pa2677, Pa2681, Pa2683.  The trial court submitted a Supplemental Statement of Reasons in Support of these orders (“Trial Court Opinion”) on July 25, 2023.  Pa2716.  This appeal of [...] and [...] followed, and [...] has filed a separate appeal at [...], which has been coordinated with this one by Order dated October 30, 2023.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Objective 3 provides that the Borough’s housing obligation be satisfied through the provision of low and moderate affordable units; and the Amended Redevelopment Plan provides development standards that require the construction of at least 70 affordable housing units within the [...] as part of an inclusionary development in satisfaction of the Borough’s Second Round Affordable Housing obligation and a portion of the Borough’s Third Round Affordable Housing obligation; as identified by the Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, adopted December 23, 2019, as the mechanism by which the Borough’s “Prior Round Obligation” will be satisfied; and c.
[brief] Defendants [...], Township Committee of the [...], and the [...] filed Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion on April 13, 2023, and sought dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  (Pa158-Pa160).  Intervenor/Defendant [...] filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, as well as its own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, on April 14, 2023 (Pa302-Pa303).  Plaintiffs replied on April 28, 2023.  (Pa530-Pa533).  On May 15, 2023, the Court heard oral argument (See Transcript 3T\(^1\)), following which, in an oral opinion (3T.39:1-25 through 64:1-9), the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] (Pa97.)  F.  Appellants’ Unsupported Statements May Not Be Considered  In their brief, Appellants ask the Court to rely on self-serving statements dressed up as “facts,” but which were not in evidence and have no support in evidence admitted at trial.  See, e.g., Pb14 (“most retail shopping now occurs ‘online’ such as [...]”); Pb15, 17 (the site and structures other than the [...] are “NOT NECESSARY” for the redevelopment); Pb15 (“L&T site easily qualified as ‘abandoned for commercial purposes’”); Pb16 (“simple fact is that there is no other single site within the plan that meets the substantive criteria of Section 5b”); Pb19 (“[n]o doubt more than fifty percentage of the housing stock and water/sewer infrastructure is more than 50 years old.  . .”); Pb19 (“all the sites in the north and south zones do not meet any criteria of the LRHL”).  These and other conclusory statements made in Appellants briefing have absolutely no support in the record and are not before the Court.  There were no fact or expert witnesses (nor expert reports).  Appellants’ proposed exhibits were barred from evidence.  Moreover, nothing in any of the trial exhibits support these baseless contentions.  Thus, Appellants’ factual arguments should be disregarded and rejected.  II.
[brief] ”  Ford v. Weisman, 188 N.J. Super. 614, 619 (App. Div. 1983).  In this case, despite having five years within which to bring a R. 4:42-2(b) motion, plaintiffs’ counsel opted to wait until the first day of trial to raise the issue:  [...]:  It is cake and eating it, too.  No one has disputed that’s what Your Honor ruled.  I -- I understand it’s what Your Honor ruled.  And, I could have made a motion for reconsideration, but having done this for thirty-six years now, my sense is that motions for reconsideration are useless and it’s waste of the Court’s time and counsel’s time.  So, I did not do not.