ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After witnesses the shooting, she broke off the relationship.  (7T:90-15 to 23; 193-20 to 22).  Despite the breakup and while incarcerated pending trial, defendant sent [...] a letter.  This type of sentiment was not the normal during their relationship.  (7T:137-22 to 139-23; 141-24 to 142-11).  On July 3, 2018, defendant called [...] from jail.  (7T:149-14 to 20).  After saying hello, defendant told her “there’s a speculation that my bullet wasn’t the bullet that hit that girl.
[brief] In the event this Court upholds the decision of the Law Division with regard to Appellant’s guilt under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, this Court should nonetheless remand this matter for re-sentencing based on Appellant’s indigent status.  An appellate court’s review of a sentencing court’s imposition of sentence is guided by an abuse of discretion standard.  Torres, 246 N.J. at 272.  The appellate court’s jurisdiction to review sentences includes the power to make new findings of fact, to reach independent determinations of the facts, and to supplement the record on appeal.  Jarbath, 114 N.J. at 412.  Here, based on the information before [...], as well as the information now before this Court, [...] abused his discretion by sentencing Appellant to a $50.00 per month monthly payment plan.  [...] was presented with sufficient information regarding Appellant’s precarious financial status, such that his imposition of a $50.00 monthly payment plan was an abuse of discretion which warrants re-sentencing.  At the sentencing hearing on April 17, 2023, Appellant informed [...], when discussing the possible installation of an ignition interlock device: “My financial circumstances do not permit the purchase of the car in the near future.  Perhaps in five years I may be able to do so purchase a car, minimum three years. ” (7T9:9-12).  That testimony by Appellant, as well as the fact that he represented himself before the Law Division pro se, was sufficient for [...] to infer that a $50.00 monthly payment plan was untenable for Appellant based on his indigence.  Moreover, this Court now is presented with additional evidence in the appellate record evidencing Appellant’s indigence sufficient to remand this matter for re-sentencing.
[brief] So . . . the length that was used for these arms is, again, an estimate and these are one mile, which is a rule of thumb for this particular technology and this particular frequency in this particular area.  So just based on my training and experience, one mile is a good estimate of the tower range for [...] in this area.  It’s also further kind of supported by the location of the adjacent towers.  We can infer, based on how the network is laid out and the fact that [...] has designed this to avoid coverage gaps, that the tower needs to extend out to a certain distance that obviously doesn’t cross over other towers, but that provides enough overlap between adjacent sectors so that there’s no drops, no call drops, no dead zones in between.  So just using a one-mile approximation, which has been a good approximation in my experience in this area.  [Id. at 11 to 12 (emphasis added)].
[brief] Pa051; DSOF ¶ 39.  Upon hire Appellant certified on her insurance applications that she did not suffer from high blood pressure or a mental or nervous disorder.  Pa051; DSOF ¶ 40.  Her reasoning: Appellant stated “maybe I didn’t want to check off so many boxes and seem undesirable. ”  Pa051; DSOF ¶ 41.  Appellant has attempted to allege additional medical conditions via affidavit in her opposition to summary judgment.  However, Appellant has failed to provide any documentary evidence of her conditions other than self-serving personal affidavits.
[brief] N.J.S.A.§39:6A-5.  Towards this end, [...] enacted No-Fault arbitration rules effective for claims filed after April 1, 2011.  See, New Jersey No-Fault Arbitration Rules (2011 as amended August, 2022).  [...] implemented a system for resolution of all No-Fault disputes by a panel of arbitrators or Dispute Resolution Professionals (“DRPs”).
[brief] **Point II.  Plaintiff raises the collateral contract theory for the first time on appeal.  (Not Raised Below)**  When plaintiff was before the trial court, he argued that the defendants should pay him the benefit of his bargain with [...].  When he learned that the bargain with the decedent was illegal, he shifted his argument for appeal purposes to the collateral contract theory.  In the alternative, plaintiff argues defendants were negligent in how they handled the closing.  Plaintiff never addresses the terms and conditions of the title commitment where it explicitly states the settlement agent is not the agent of [...] for the purpose of conducting a real estate closing.  Further, the commitment states the parties agree that liability for [...] will be based on the commitment and not on negligence.  With these terms in place, plaintiff cannot argue the commitment required [...] to conduct the closing, or take responsibility for the conduct of the closing, or be responsible for negligence in the conduct of the closing in the absence of a title policy or a closing protection letter.  The trial court properly analyzed the facts of the case and concluded the applicable law did not impose liability on [...] in this case.  The trial court properly dismissed the claims against [...], and we urge this honorable court to do the same.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO [...] AS TO ITS COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD ALSO BE AFFIRMED  [...] also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to the various counterclaims it asserted against Appellant.  Specifically, [...] asserted counterclaims against Appellant for: (1) Declaratory Judgment as it relates to her violation of the Policy’s Fraud & Concealment Provision, (2) Unjust Enrichment, (3) Breach of Contract/Breach of the Duty of Good Faith & Fair Dealing (Pa159).  [...] premised its Motion on its Counterclaims on two primary arguments.  First, given the Trial Court’s ruling that led to its September 23, 2022, Order (Pa 411) as detailed at the oral argument (T 17:11-22), under the Law of the Case Doctrine the Trial Court’s prior findings were dispositive.  Out of an abundance of caution, [...] also argued the same facts that it relied upon to support its Motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.  A.
[brief] This appeal, ostensibly, is centered on the grant of reconsideration and the subsequent grant of summary judgment.  It should be noted that [...] did not seek reconsideration of the trial court’s underlying determination that summary judgment could not be granted as issues of material fact existed relating to the race-based hostile work environment claims.  The City has also not filed a cross-appeal related to the initial denial of summary judgment.  By doing so, [...] did not admit the conduct, or the potential liability associated with same.  Instead, [...] believed, rightfully, that the facts in the record offered [...] immunity from liability.  The focus of the reconsideration motion, and what should be the focus of this discussion, is [...]’s proffered and proven affirmative defense, which shields it from vicarious liability.
[brief] [...] did not alter the grading of their driveway.  [...]’ driveway had been damaged during the renovation.  Pa48, ¶ 41; Pa330, ¶ 41; accord Pa206 at 26:3-:11; Pa222 at 11:16-12:1.  In April 2021, the Dwyers hired a contractor to repave their driveway and add a Belgian block border.  Pa48, ¶ 42; Pa330, ¶ 42; accord Pa222 at 12:23-:25, Pa227 at 31:11-:22.  They did not change the footprint or slope of the driveway.  Pa48, ¶ 43; Pa331, ¶ 43; accord Pa224 at 19:11-20:2, Pa227 at 31:23-32:3.  After the Dwyers had the driveway repaved, [...] testified that water flowed evenly out of the right and left rear openings in the Belgian block.  Pa226 at 22:8-:20.  D.
[brief] It would be illogical for the Legislature to solely focus on a small subset of defendants who attempt to file a Recovery Court appeal while they have other, active firearm charges pending in other jurisdictions.  Defendant further argues a Recovery Court judge should wait to see whether a defendant will be convicted and sentenced to a period of incarceration on a firearms offense as a defendant cannot serve a prison sentence and Recovery Court Special Probation simultaneously.  (Db16).  Defendant then conflates a resolution of “non-custodial probation” for a Graves Act offense\(^3\) with “acquittal” and “dismissal” as reasons that it would not be contrary to public safety to permit an individual into Recovery Court.  (Db16).  If the defendant’s position was applied, it would incentivize similarly situated defendants to delay their other criminal matters in order to resolve their unlawful possession of a firearm charge before applying to Recovery Court on their other pending charges, effectively circumventing the disqualifying bar of factor a(5).  This contravenes the essence of factor a(5) which focuses on the act of physical possession of a firearm and when it occurs.  If a defendant is acquitted of a firearm possession charge or the charges against him are dismissed, then it is clear he did not possess a firearm, either during the underlying offense or at the time of any pending criminal charge.  However, if a defendant is sentenced to non-custodial probation as a result of his conviction for unlawful firearm possession, the physical act of possessing the firearm is proven, regardless of the sentence meted out.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 46:8-49.2(a) a landlord shall provide a receipt, either printed or emailed, to a tenant for each cash payment made to the landlord for any amount due to the landlord pursuant to a residential lease, renewal, or extension agreement.  The receipt shall accurately indicate the amount of the payment, the purpose of the payment, when the payment was received, the printed or typed names of both the landlord and tenant, and who accepted the payment.  Id.  The statute makes a landlord’s failure to provide rent receipts a defense in any action or proceeding to recover possession for the nonpayment of rent.  N.J.S.A. 46:8-49.2(c).  A showing that there is a default in payment of rent is predicated upon proof that the amount of rent alleged to be in default is due, unpaid and owing.  Passaic Housing Auth. v. Torres, 143 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 1976) (quoting Levine v. Seidel, 128 N.J.Super. 225, 229 (App.Div.), cert. denied 65 N.J. 570 (1974)).  Where there is a failure to establish that the amount claimed is legally owing, the court is deprived of the jurisdiction to enter judgment for possession.  Id.  See also Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 139 (1970).  In the case at bar, having concluding its one-sided accounting, the court found that [...] owed Plaintiff either $22,400 or $8,000 depending on “how you do your math. ”  (1T32-6)  Then expressing uncertainty as to which of the two figures was correct it then entered Judgement for Possession in the amount of $8,000.  Defendant submits that however one does one’s math, the result will always be inaccurate where a category of payments made go uncounted.  In the case sub judice, both the Plaintiff and the Defendant testified to rent being paid on some occasions in cash.  Further, Plaintiff’s testimony was that she had not provided any receipts to [...] on any occasion.  The significance of those two statements was that it would be impossible to account for cash payments.  Therefore conducting an accurate accounting of all rent payments made by [...] could not be possible.  This fact however was not lost on the court.  It instead determined that since Defendant could not prove her cash payments, they simply would go uncounted.  The Defendant was not to be given credit for even a single cash payment.  That [...] was unable to prove her cash payments was because Plaintiff had in violation of N.J.S.A. 46:8-49.2(a) failed to provide her with receipts.  The statute creates a defense against nonpayment when the tenant pays cash and does not receive receipts.  Defendant submits that in the absence of records from the Plaintiff as to all rent payments it received including those in cash, and a showing by Plaintiff as to how the rental assistance it received was applied, the court’s finding that Defendant owed $8,000 in rent to the Plaintiff lacks any basis in fact.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Aa24-42). \(^4\)  In particular, on July 15, 2022, the [...], [...], \(^3\)  This July 1, 2009 release is publicly available and can be accessed at https://www.nj.gov/education/news/2009/0701nonops.pdf (last visited July 25, 2024).  \(^4\)  “Aa” refers to Appellants’ appendix, and “Ab” refers to Appellants’ brief.  Atlantic [...], along with the boards of education of [...], Atlantic [...], and the [...] (collectively “[...]”), filed a verified petition with the [...] requesting authorization to proceed to a referendum on the expansion of Henry Hudson from a limited-purpose regional school district serving grades seven through twelve to an all-purpose pre-K through twelve grade regional school district.
[brief] ”  *Press* at 6. (Pa528).  The *Press* court further noted that “plaintiff offered no witnesses who claimed they had reported the malfunctioning light. ”  *Press* at 3. (Pa528).  Thus, *Press* and *Anderson* make it clear that a plaintiff must affirmatively prove that a utility company had notice of the inoperable streetlight sufficiently in advance of the accident date to repair the streetlight.
[brief] Amicus submits this brief in full support for Appellant [...]  (“[...]”), as attorney-in-fact for [...] (“[...]”)’s appeal, which seeks to invalidate Bulletin No. 22-11 (the “Bulletin”), issued by the [...] (the “[...]”) on December 20, 2022, as improper rulemaking.  Specifically, the [...] seeks to participate in this matter in order to highlight the lack of procedural due process caused by the [...]’s failure to adhere to the APA when it issued the Bulletin.
[brief] Yet, that is exactly what Defendants did here.  (Pb18).  . . [t]here is a distinction between adopting a redevelopment plan that is consistent with the township’s Master Plan and adopting a plan that is inconsistent but providing reasons for doing so.  To be clear, both options are available to a local government.  What cannot be done, however, is to amend a redevelopment plan to say it is wholly consistent with the Master Plan but include a caveat that should anyone “suggest” the plan is inconsistent, then the Committee will adopt it as inconsistent, but a court should still approve it.  (Pb20).  (emphasis omitted).  As previously stated, relying upon both the language in the Plan itself (written by the Township Planner), and the Board’s recommendations (1T.55:13-25 through 57:1-20), the Committee concluded that the Redevelopment Plan was not inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the Township Master Plan.
[brief] (Pa129-52).  [...] testified that he had been an officer with NJSP since September 24, 2004.  (Pa70).  He was not present for the 1987 contract negotiations (the time when \(^3\) For purposes of this letter brief, “2,080 divisor” refers to the use of 2,080 within the agreement’s parenthetical example. the “2,080” divisor was first included into the contract), nor was he ever employed by Treasury, which issues the fiscal year circulars.  (Pa103-04).  [...] offered no factual testimony supporting his interpretation that the parenthetical was dispositive, even in fiscal years with more than 260 days and regardless of the Treasury Circulars governing overtime calculation.  [...] also failed to provide any factual basis supporting his position that the parenthetical example should be read in isolation to override the remainder of the provision in which the parenthetical was located.
[directive] Approved Less-Lethal Ammunition.  12 gauge drag stabilized bean bag rounds from the following manufacturers:  -[...] -[...] -[...] 12 gauge rubber rounds from the following manufacturers:  -[...] -[...] -[...] 12 gauge door breaching rounds from the following manufacturers:  -[...] -[...] -[...] 37 mm & 40 mm Impact Rounds – (Rubber Baton, Foam Baton, Bean Bag, Sponge round)  -[...] -[...] Air Pressure Launching Rounds  Frangible Projectiles (OC, PAVA Powder, Marking rounds)  -[...] -[...]  Information on the above ammunition can be found at: https://www.defense-technology. com/product-category/impact-munitions/ https://www.combinedsystems.com/cts-impact-munitions/  http://www.litfld.com/products/less-lethal/ https://pepperball. com/projectiles/ https://www.fnherstal. com/en/security/portable-weapons/less-lethal- systems/systems-fn-303-projectiles/
[brief] This is because they cannot.  The Award Judgments awarded post-judgment interest at the default rate.  Defendants withdrew their challenge to the final judgment including post-judgment interest at the default rate.  The sheriff sale notice contained an amount that is an approximation of the judgment amount calculated correctly using the arbitration- awarded, objection-withdrawn default rate as the post-judgment rate.  The Defendants, having withdrawn their objection to the Final Judgment awarding the default rate as the post-judgment rate, cannot challenge a sale conducted on the basis of the approximate judgment amount reflecting that to which they withdrew their objection.
[brief] Weeden did not concern the scope of a redevelopment agency’s authority to negotiate and collect revenue pursuant to its specific statutory authority at N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8.  As the court recognized in Weeden, “the LRHL does not supersede the MLUL with respect to the function of the planning board; both statutes provide that planning boards will review site plan applications under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-13 and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25a(2). ”  However, no tension between the LRHL and MLUL existed in the instant matter as the defrayed costs for which the Redevelopment Fee was collected did not even fall within the scope of off-site infrastructure fees that a planning board was permitted to evaluate within its own jurisdiction as part of site plan review.
[brief] As recognized by the Court, Injury to an Insured exclusions have been deemed invalid in primary auto policies because they violate statutory requirements as to minimum insurance.  That is, New Jersey drivers are mandated to have a certain minimum amount of coverage in their primary auto policy as set forth in the omnibus coverage statute, and the Injury to an Insured exclusion eliminates coverage altogether for an intra-family accident and thus would violate the statutory requirement.  See Id. at *8 (noting that in Kish v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 108 N.J. Super. 405, 411 (App. Div. 1979) the Appellate Division deemed an injury to an insured exclusion in a primary auto policy “invalid as an attempt to limit the omnibus coverage required by statute and refused the carrier’s request to reform the policy to the minimum limits”).  In contrast, intra-family step-down exclusions do not preclude coverage altogether, and rather purport to “step-down” coverage to the minimum amount of primary auto coverage as required by the omnibus statute.  And step-down provisions have previously been upheld in primary auto policies.
[brief] The assertion of a malpractice claim in such an action -- in which the attorney and client are already adverse -- does not raise the privilege and loyalty concerns that warranted the exception to the entire controversy doctrine recognized in Olds.  In appropriate settings, a court may apply the entire controversy doctrine to preclude a legal malpractice claim that a client has declined to assert in the attorney's action to collect unpaid legal fees.  Dimitrakopoulos v. [...], 237 N.J. 91, 99 (2019).
[brief] In explaining its earlier Coventry Square decision, the TSI Court wrote:  An application for a use variance, also referred to as a (d)(1) variance, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1), seeks permission from a zoning board to put property to a use that is otherwise prohibited by the zoning ordinance.  Both the positive and negative criteria in such an application are tested in accordance with the standards first established in Medici.  In contrast, a conditional use, by definition, is a use that the zoning ordinance permits if the applicant meets all of the conditions that are embodied in the ordinance.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3).  In that case, the use becomes a permitted use in the sense that no variance is required.  However, if a property owner seeking to devote the property to a conditional use cannot meet one or more of the conditions imposed by the zoning ordinance, the property owner must apply for a (d)(3) conditional use variance.  The inability to comply with one or more of the conditions does not convert the use into a prohibited one, and thus, the application is not tested in accordance with the standards established in Medici that govern applications for a (d)(1) use variance.
[brief] I am going to make [...] NJNG 12-16_1. txt a yes vote, with a negative motion, you agree with the denial.  Why don't we start with your motion and then I will explain after I hear your motion.  [...]: Let's explain.  [...]:  I am going to make a motion that we deny [...] for constructing an additional principal use on the site and deny variance relief to construct a proposed regulator station within the buffer required between a non-residential use and a residential zone and deny their variance relief for fence height in the front, side and rear yards.
[brief] ”  Case, 220 N.J. at 64.  “The finding of any factor must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record. ”  Ibid.  “Whether a sentence should gravitate toward the upper or lower end of the range depends on a balancing of the relevant factors. ”  Ibid.  Here, defendant argues the judge improperly considered his twenty-five prior arrests in finding aggravating factors three, six, and nine.
[brief] It is submitted that [...]’s measures manifested a valid lay opinion that the rain puddle covered concrete lobby floor was slippery and posed a substantial risk of injury if traversed.  The site manager’s actions and lay opinion should have not have been kept from the jury and should have been allowed to be considered by the jury in its deliberation of the case.  The trial court ruled [...]’s actions inadmissible, initially questioning the relevancy of the information since it came after plaintiff’s fall (1T22-24 to 23-2), and eventually concluding that in any event it was remedial and not admissible under Evid. R. 407 and pursuant to Evid. R. 403 its “prejudicial value would clearly outweigh any probative value.
[brief] This distinction has recently been clearly defined and distinguished in the case of Panetta v. Equity One, Inc., 190 N.J. 307 (2007).  The Trial Court ruled that it “...clearly was the intent incorporated into these deeds to obtain all of the property interest of and convey all of the property interest and not retain any interest in the subject property” (9T11:17-22).  The Court also looked to the actions of the parties afterwards, noting that the defunct company [...] did not assert its ownership, but the [...] did assert its ownership.  The findings of the Trial Court are simply not supported by the record and are in clear violation of the Panetta decision.