ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, contrary to the assertions of [...] in its brief, not only healthcare providers can file an arbitration to seek relief.  Rather, the Forthright arbitration rules expressly provide that” Any party may file a written demand for arbitration …”  Forthright R. 7.  Thus, a No-Fault insurer such as [...] can initiate arbitration and seek a remedy for any erroneously paid or fraudulent claims.  DRPs can issue determinations on whether fraud was established by the carrier and determine non-compensability of claims – all of which are subject to *de novo* review at the initiation by either party pursuant to N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-13.
[directive] Upon completion of this form, it will be distributed to law enforcement agencies for use in conjunction with these procedures.  5  1.3.5  If it would be safer for the infant to be transported to the hospital by other means, the law enforcement officer or agency receiving the infant may arrange for transportation of the infant to squad.3 a hospital by an ambulance or first aid  However, a law enforcement officer should accompany the infant to the hospital in order to ensure that the hospital properly receives the infant and is informed that the infant has been left with the law enforcement agency pursuant to the “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act,” unless no law enforcement officer is available for this detail.  1.3.6  The law enforcement agency must immediately inform both the [...] ([...]) and the [...] ([...]) that an infant has been left with the law enforcement agency and is en route to a hospital.  1.3.7  The law enforcement officer transporting the infant may leave the hospital once the hospital has taken possession of the infant and the law enforcement agency has completed the notifications required in section 1.3.6.  1.3.8  The law enforcement agency shall record any information known regarding the infant and the circumstances of the delivery of the infant to the police station.  This information shall be provided to the hospital receiving the infant.  1.3.9  On the next business day the law enforcement agency receiving the infant shall inform the Child Abuse Unit of the County Prosecutor’s Office of the receipt of the infant.
[brief] The clerk shall thereupon make a true copy of such [decree] judgment, certify the same under his hand and seal of the court and deliver the copy to the Governor or person administering the government, who shall issue his proclamation under the great seal of the State, setting forth such [decree] judgment.  The proclamation shall be filed, published and printed with the laws as other proclamations are required to be filed, published and printed, and shall be judicially noticed and received in evidence in all courts of the State in the same manner and to the same extent that the law or joint resolution therein specified would have been if such [decree] judgment had not been made; and no law or joint resolution, or part thereof, [decreed] adjudged to be null and void shall, after the [making] entry of such [decree] judgment as provided in this chapter, be judicially noticed or received in evidence by any of the courts of the State.
[brief] 1.  The Proposed Development Did Not Require a Loading Zone.  (T1/70:16-71:7).  In ignoring the fact that the Applicant’s proposed development is a permitted use, the [...] instead focused on whether the Property had an adequate loading zone, even though one is not required by the Land Development Rules for a building of this Property’s size.  See N.J.A.C. 19:66-5.8(c); (T1/70:16-71:7).  There is also no such requirement in the Adult Use Cannabis Rules.  See N.J.A.C. 17:30-14.  Recognizing that the issue of loading was quickly becoming a red herring, even though the Property could have sought access to an existing loading space on [...], the Applicant was willing to revise its proposal and provide for a loading zone on the Property.  (T1/51:6-22; T2/25:4-24; 41:15-44:11).  The Applicant provided testimony that deliveries would be occurring similar to how other businesses address deliveries in that vicinity, and would occur less frequently and in a much smaller vehicle from the prior restaurant use, thereby reducing the intensity and frequency of deliveries.  (T2:51:16-24; 53:10; 68:8-14).  In addition to the typical security protocols in place for retail cannabis facilities, the Applicant also offered to make security personnel available during loading – which would occur either before or after the retail store was open for business – to ensure the security of the Property, the product and that there would be no conflict with pedestrian or vehicular traffic in or around the Property.  (T1/110:3-18; T2/69:16-70:4; 70:21-71:2).  As [...] testified, “[t]his is safe.  It’s beyond what the regs required.  They’re doing more from a security perspective than what every agency requires....” (T2/72:4-7).  In the Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendations to the [...], dated November 9, 2023, [...] recognizes that the “Land Development Rules do not require a loading space for commercial uses less than 10,000 square feet and the Green Zone Redevelopment Plan does not address loading spaces.
[brief] (2T:57:17-1).  Of the 1,208 changes, 783 transactions were entered for the first time.  (2T: 7:19-23).  During this litigation, Appellant filed with the Court loan registers—reports from [...]’s QuickBooks file identifying what he determined was owed to [...] by his companies: [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (2T:44:7-45:14; Pa307).  From January 28, 2018 through January 29, 2019, Appellant back-dated hundreds of transactions, on paper “decreasing” the amount of money owed by Appellant’s companies to [...] by hundreds of thousands of dollars.  (9-23 Tr., at 61:13-79:19).  These falsified transactions include Appellant entering a transaction on January 29, 2018 that [...] would receive $50,000 two days later, on January 31, 2018 that would reduce the amount owed by his companies by $50,000.  (2T:78:3- 14).  The imaginary $50,000 was never deposited into [...]’s bank accounts.  (2T:79:3-6; Pa243).  The audit trail report (Pa381) shows that as of February 17, 2015, Appellant entered a record showing that [...] had a $20,000 equity ownership stake in [...].  (Pa381; 2T:80:9-23).  The ownership stake entry was modified slightly on February 27, 2015 by Appellant, reclassifying the transaction.  (2T:81:11-23).  On January 29, 2018, at 3:24 a.m., Appellant modified the transaction so that it no longer reflected [...]’s ownership of [...], but merely identifying the transaction as a standard banking entry “electronic clearing. ” (2T:82:12-83:5).  Appellant certified to this Court on May 31, 2018 that he funded [...] with a loan of $125,000.  (2T:83:18-84:20; Pa367).  However, on February 2, 2015, Appellant recorded a transaction for $125,000 as a payment by [...] to [...] for construction work.  (2T: 84:22-85:22).  Appellant then modified the transaction a few times in 2015 to change the account the deposit was made into and then identifying the client for the project, [...].  (2T:85:23-86:22).  On January 28, 2018 at 5:59 p.m., Appellant changed these three-year-old transactions to say that it was money “due/to” Appellant for construction income (2T:86:23-87:11).  Appellant then modified the 2015 transaction again, at 3:52 a.m. on January 29, 2018 to identify the source of the $125,000 as “[...]. ”  (2T:87:12-88:3); ARGUMENT POINT I:
[brief] ”  This indicated to the detectives that defendant has “spent very little time actually in New York. ”  The detectives knew “[b]ased on … training and experience it’s a common habit where traffickers will go to source cities to supply the large quantities of drugs, enter the city and then try to exit before being noticed. ”  Because of the very short time defendant spent in New York, detectives were unable to get to his location there in time to conduct surveillance.  (1T:24-4 to 25-17; 96-7 to 96-21).
[brief] The damage that the TPDs caused to [...]’s community was immeasurable.  As a result of the within litigation, [...] was prevented from conducting services in its sacred prayer space every other week.  During those weeks when it was not allowed in the sanctuary, daily prayers had to take place in other rooms in the building.  Funerals also could not be held in the sanctuary.  Those [...] congregants that were unfortunate to pass in an “off week” would have to have their burial ceremony in a makeshift spot or in another location.  Marriages also could not take place in the sanctuary during “off weeks”.  Because of the TPDs’ actions, the situation was untenable.  Notwithstanding the irreparable harm to [...]’s community, [...] suffered monetary damages.  [...] had the opportunity to purchase the Share from [...] for $250,000, the same amount that [...] paid for the Share.  But for the TPDs breach of fiduciary duty to [...], [...] would have paid only $250,000.  Instead, [...] was forced to pay $1,500,050.55 for this same Share as a direct result of the TPDs breach of fiduciary duties to [...].  Accordingly, [...] incurred damages in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Fifty Dollars and Fifty-Five Cents ($1,250,050.55) which is the premium that [...] was forced to pay for the Share.  | Description | Amount | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Blind Bid: Amount [...] actually paid via the partition action | $1,500,055.50 | | Amount that [...] could have purchased the Share but for the TPD's breach of | ($250,000.00) | | fiduciary duty | | | **[...]'s Damages** | **$1,250,055.50**|  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] The law grants particular leniency to agreements made in the domestic arena, and likewise allows judges greater discretion when interpreting such agreements.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.  Such discretion lies in the principle that although marital agreements are contractual in nature, "contract principles have little place in the law of domestic relations."  Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 148, 416 A.2d 45 (1980).  The circumstances of this matter appear to fall squarely within the parameters for modification.
[brief] Throughout, Defendant misconstrues the PSA as requiring it to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate “before closing”.  (Pb10.)  This misstatement is made repeatedly where Defendant argues:  Termination can only occur if it fails to satisfy the “condition precedent” of supplying an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at closing (Pb11); termination can only occur if “an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is not received by the time of closing” (id.); “providing the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is explicitly timed for closing itself” (Pb12); promptly obtaining the estoppel is “a separate requirement from [Defendant’s] substantive requirement to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at closing as a condition precedent” to Plaintiff closing.
[directive] All relevant discovery in this matter shall be provided to the screening service by the 6.  Prosecutor's Office.  ____________ 7.  (Any additional conditions as ordered by the court)  _ of NGRI  The acquittee's maximum period commitment or supervision under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 8.  __ __ terminates in years and months on [fill in the date] of of A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the Court of within two (2) days its signing.
[brief] Indeed, as discussed further below, one of the major deficiencies of the current temporary regulator station and reasons why it is not Q.  Please identify other operational benefits of the Facility.  A.  As explained above, because the Regulator Station will more reliably and efficiently manage the significant pressure reduction from that upgraded transmission line to distribution system, the proposed Facility will allow the Company to operate the flow of natural gas to the residents of [...] and the surrounding municipalities more efficiently, reliably and safely.  Critically, the proposed Facility is designed and intended primarily to provide natural gas service to the residents of [...], though it will certainly also benefit customers in adjacent communities.  In fact, [...] estimates that the Regulator Station will allow it to provide improved service to 5,552 residential meters (serving 6,566 [...] residences), or over 98% of the municipality, as well as 310 active commercial meters.  Further, because it will be equipped with a heater, the Regulator Station will eliminate the need for the Company to dispatch a work crew to inspect and monitor the temporary regulator.  Q.  Does the Company have heaters on other regulators associated with its facilities?  A.  Yes.  [...] has heaters at approximately 35 regulator stations similar to the Proposed Facility, many of which have been operating for decades.  Q.  Is it standard industry practice for the Company to continue operating the temporary regulator facility?  A.  No.  A regulator station fed by a high-pressure transmission line requires a heater and filter in order to properly operate and maintain the natural gas delivery system over the long term.  Q.
[brief] Plaintiff brought this action alleging that [...] should be responsible, under a homeowners insurance policy it issued to cover his condominium unit, for defense and indemnity arising out of a lawsuit brought against him by the homeowners association, its on-site manager, and several other individuals.  The lower court granted [...]’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), determining that the allegations of the underlying lawsuit do not fall within the liability coverage insuring agreement of plaintiff’s policy because they all allege intentional conduct and specifically describe behavior that could not be accidental and was the product of plaintiff’s voluntary actions.  The lower court thus found that [...] had no obligation to plaintiff [...], with respect to the underlying lawsuit, dismissing the complaint against it with prejudice and later denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
[brief] **APPELLANT WAS SUBJECTED TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND HARASSMENT WHICH IS ADEQUATELY NOTED IN THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF.**  Appellant thoroughly set forth in the Appellant’s Brief the many circumstances that happened in 2019 with regard to [...].  The information contained in the Appellant’s Brief is reiterated here.  In the documentary, evidentiary material in this case, Appellant set forth numerous adverse events that she experienced which supports the factors for hostile work environment and harassment as noted in the Appellant’s Brief.  The Vice Principals [...] and [...] received favorable treatment from Mr. [...] and Appellant was treated unfavorably.  Appellant was subjected to close scrutiny by [...] and was often left out of the loop with assignments that she was expected to complete.  There was disregard for Appellant because Ms. [...] with approval from [...] was allowed to discipline teachers that reported directly to Appellant.  Ms. [...] terminated a teacher that reported to Appellant without her knowledge or input.  Appellant complained to [...], Superintendent that there was bias against her and Johnson failed to address this issue.  (Pa211, [...] Deposition, T264:1-9)  Appellant noted that the interaction with [...] became negative after she disciplined Caucasian teachers who engaged in discrimination in interactions with students.  Appellant satisfied all of the factors to establish hostile work environment and harassment.  The Appellant was in a protected class, she was performing her job and was met with adversity which was pervasive and other persons of the same status as Appellant would believe that the environment had become hostile and abusive.  Lehmann v. Toys R Us, 132 N.J. 601 (1999).  Sufficient information has been pled in the Appellant’s Brief and this Reply Brief which support the position that this matter should be reversed and remanded, Appellant’s deposition must be completed and trial should happen.  POINT V APPELLANT HAS SATISFIED THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF RETALIATION AS SET OUT IN THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF WHICH WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE TRIAL COURT
[brief] Because the verdict sheet’s omission of an answer to Question 1(b) was inconsequential, it was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  See State v. Mendez, 345 N.J. Super. 498, 514 (App. Div. 2001) (holding question on verdict sheet was “superfluous,” so any error in jury charge related to it was not plain error), aff’d, 175 N.J. 201 (2002).
[directive] In many cases, judges found that individual defendants posed a high risk of non- appearance at their initial detention hearings.  Defendants who have since served a substantial amount of time in custody, which will be credited toward their sentence, might be more inclined to appear for court events rather than Today’s risk additional penalties by failing to show up.  widespread use of Nat’l 4  Less than two percent of criminal cases are resolved through trials.  Ctr. for State Cts., Interactive Caseload Data Displays, Court Statistics Project, www.courtstatistics.org/court-statistics/interactive-caseload-data-displays (last updated Dec. 9, 2020) (noting that in New Jersey in 2019 there were only 573 criminal jury trials and 106 criminal bench trials out of 48,264 dispositions).  The pressure of an actual trial date is often the catalyst for resolving a criminal charge.  21 remote court proceedings might also bear on the risk of non-appearance.
[brief] Admittedly, a Court’s leeway in examining a jury’s punitive damages award is more significant than in any other post-trial review previously mentioned here.  When a Court is tasked with reviewing a punitive damages award, it is required to consider certain “guideposts” as to the reasonableness of the damages, including: 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct that formed the basis of the civil suit;(2) the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's punitive damages award; and 3) the difference between this remedy and other penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases of misconduct.  *Baker v. Nat'l State Bank*, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 153-54 (App. Div. 2002) (internal citations omitted).  This scrutiny is heightened when punitive damages against a public entity.  *See Lockley v. Dep't of Corr.*, 177 N.J. 413, 433 (2003).  In terms of the **amount** of appropriate punitive sanctions, the Courts have held that while the Punitive Damages Act’s cap of damages at a Ratio of **5 to 1** when compared to compensatory damages awarded is not applicable to LAD cases, that limitation can nonetheless inform a courts decision as to whether a ratio decided by a jury is reasonable.
[brief] (22T 34)  Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Cross-Appellant respectfully submits that the award of attorney's fees is appropriate.  As discussed above, the real question is not why fees were issued but why were the requested fees reduced?  This is an area where the Court below did abuse its discretion.  Approximately $40,000 in fees were removed with no reason given.  Pursuant to R. 1:7-4, the Court is required to make specific findings of fact so that appellate review can be possible.  Here, although the Court justified an award of attorney's fees, it did not explain why two-thirds of the request was reduced and thus it is respectfully submitted that an additional award of fees should be granted.
[brief] ” (Da21-Da22).  On December 6, 2018, plaintiff provided [...] with its first notice of the 2016 underlying lawsuit against him, seeking defense and indemnity under his [...] homeowners policy.  [...] issued correspondence to [...] on December 13, 2018, informing him that coverage for the claim is not provided by his homeowners policy (Pa242-Pa244).  Thereafter, plaintiff sought an Internal Appeal review by [...], which was completed and denied in writing on December 28, 2018 (Pa246-Pa251).  ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT’S ORDERS DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST [...] PURSUANT TO RULE 4:6-2(e) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS, AS SHOULD THE LOWER COURT’S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
[brief] Respondent also cites to Mid-Century Insurance v. Freeman which is a trial court level opinion and which is not persuasive.  The court in Mid-Century did not address the exception to the collateral source rule in matters governed by N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq.  Respondent cites to a portion of an unpublished opinion of [...] which offers no context or explanation of the matter in which that arose.  As in Freeman that portion of an opinion does not address the exception to the collateral source rule governed by claims arising under N.J.S.A. 39:6-1-et seq.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“TCA”) establishes a system for public entities, like the [...] (“City”), in which immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception.  In his opposition to the City’s appeal, Plaintiff [...] fails to show why this case is an exception to that general rule.  Plaintiff does not point to any competent, credible evidence in the record—either at the summary judgment stage or at trial—from which a rational factfinder could determine the City had actual or constructive notice that the sign alerting drivers to the height of the overpass was missing.  Plaintiff does not do so because he cannot:  There is no evidence in the record as to how long the sign had been missing prior to Plaintiff’s accident or as to whether the City had been notified that the sign was missing.  Instead, Plaintiff argues the City created the dangerous condition that resulted in his injuries and, therefore, already had the level of notice required under the TCA to be held liable.  Plaintiff supports that argument by speculating and by faulting the City’s exercise of its discretion over the placement of traffic signs.  But that is not enough for Plaintiff to overcome his heavy burden under the TCA.  Indeed, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden at both the summary judgment stage and at trial, and the trial court should have granted the City’s motions for summary judgment and directed verdict.  In denying those motions, the trial court failed to adhere to the guiding principles of the TCA and deprived the City of the broad immunity to which it is entitled.  This court should reverse the decisions by the trial court and remand this matter with the direction that the trial court enter an order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint against the City with prejudice.
[brief] The Order to Show Cause was filed and the Motion to Vacate is governed by Rule 4:50-1.  The Defendants also argued fraud and equitable grounds and the fact that the process server was an interested party.  The close relationship, indeed veritable partnership, between the Plaintiff tax foreclosure business, their in-house counsel, the in-house process service company and their business partner who became the subsequent Buyer certainly warrants review.  This combined with the errors on the Affidavit (one was notarized two months before service) and the complete and utter disregard for the Rules governing the notarization of documents in the State of New Jersey warrants reversal.  Rule 4:50-1 permits a party to motion to vacate a default judgment.
[directive] When a defendant is subject to prosecution for Brimage-eligible offenses occurring both before and after September 15, 2004, the prosecutor may, in the exercise of discretion, negotiate a “packaged” disposition of all pending charges in accordance with these Guidelines.  By way of example, if a defendant has been charged with two separate school zone offenses, one committed prior to September 15, 2004 and the other committed after September 15, 2004, a prosecutor would be authorized, but not required, to simultaneously dispose of both cases by means of a negotiated disposition by tendering a “standardized” plea offer pursuant to Section 6 of these Guidelines (provided, of course, that the defendant satisfies all of the eligibility criteria for the “standardized” plea offer).  These revised Guidelines shall remain in full force and effect until such time as they may be amended or superceded by order of the Attorney General.