[brief] Enforcement of the Restrictive Covenant does not create any undue hardship for [...] because the restrictions are reasonable and temporally and geographically reasonable and sound.  First, New Jersey Courts routinely enforce restrictive covenants of five years.  - Rubel & Jensen Corp. v. Rubel, 85 N.J. Super. 27, 41 (App. Div. 1964) (upholding an **11-county** restriction); - Scholastic Funding Grp., LLC v. Kimble, 2007 WL 1231795, at *4-5 (D.N.J. April 24, 2007) (Ex. 1) (upholding **nationwide** restriction); - The Cmty. Hosp. Grp, Inc. v. More, 183 N.J. 36, 62 (2005) (blue penciling **30 mile non-compete to 16 miles** due to neurosurgeon shortage); - Pierson v. Med. Health Ctrs, P.A., 183 N.J. 65, 69 (2005) (enforcing physician's **2 year** non-compete); - Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 421 (1978) (refusing to strike physicians **5-year, 10-mile** restriction)  As stated, five years is specifically appropriate here because that is the equivalent of the time that it will take the Practice to hire and train new physicians to replace [...].  (Ra15, ¶¶ 38-41).  It correlates directly to the time period of the Employment Agreement because that is how long for the Practice to recoup its investment.  Second, the twenty mile radius from each of the Practice’s offices is a reasonable geographic restriction.  (Ra16 at ¶ 42).  It represents the market from which the Practice draws its patients and referrals.  Unlike the situation in Community Hospital v. More, the field of otolaryngology is highly competitive and heavily populated.  (Id. at ¶ 43).  Restricting [...] in this otherwise crowded market, does not create a hardship to Plaintiff, patients or hospitals.  (Id.  at ¶ 44).  The Restrictive Covenant is reasonable.  (Ra16 at ¶45, Ra61-91).  This case is unlike Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super 328 (App. Div. 1999) on which [...] relies.  There, the parties had not agreed to the terms of a restrictive covenant, unlike here where a valid and agreed upon restriction exists.  The Graziano Trial Court simply imposed a 3 year 20 mile limitation in absence of an agreement by the parties or supportive fact finding.  The radius does not prevent [...] from making a living; he simply has to do so in compliance with the Restrictive Covenants, which the Chancery Court found.  (Ra17, ¶¶48-51).  He was free to work in South Jersey and Pennsylvania— just not parts of Central Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania where the Practice operates and from which it draws its patients and referrals, an area already well-served.  This does not present a hardship to [...] who lives in [...] and can easily avoid the restrictions.  The fact that he chose not to does not create an undue hardship.  To the contrary, he had to drive close to 15 miles to get to the Practice’s Lawrenceville office.  He could have easily driven just a few miles in the opposite direction to be outside the restricted radius. \(^7\)  Instead, [...] apparently chose to accept employment in Washington State for reasons unrelated to the Restrictive Covenant.  Thus, he cannot complain that a 20 mile restrictive radius is too onerous. \(^8\)  [...]’s own admissions and conduct confirm that the Restrictive Covenant does not create an undue burden.  3.  The Restrictive Covenant Is Not Injurious To The Public.