ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 1.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  _______________________________________________에 귀하가 대하여 유죄 시인을 하기 때문에  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to 그레이브스법(3페이지 7번 규정된)에 귀하는 답변 양식의 질문에 따라 (가석방 기간)이 가석방 자격이 있기 전 최단기간 부적격 적용된다는 아십니까?  것을 you will be subject to a minimum period of time before you will be eligible for parole (a parole ineligibility term) under the Graves Act (as set forth in question 7 on the three- page plea form)?
[brief] The detective then asked [...] if he wanted to look through the photos again.  As the studies demonstrate, offering a witness a second look at the photo array following a non-identification is suggestive and leads to misidentifications: “[w]hen the additional lap prompted a decision change from a previous no-choice response to a lineup pick, more often than not this change was an error. ”  Steblay et al., 35 L. & Hum. Behav. at 271 (emphasis added).  Offering [...] a second look at the photos was sufficient to demonstrate “some evidence of suggestiveness,” requiring a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of [...]’s identification.
[brief] The trajectory of this wound was from front to back, from left to right and downwards.  (4T67-10 to 12).  If the victim and the assailant were facing one another, the wound would be consistent with being struck by a right-handed person.  (4T67-14 to 19).  The medical examiner opined that this stab wound could have independently caused death.  (4T69-12 to 14).  The medical examiner found defects in [...]’s sweatshirt to be consistent with the front and back stab wounds.
[brief] WHAT WE’RE NOT HERE ABOUT.  We are not here arguing the issues raised by Tyler v. Hennepin Co., 598 U.S. 631, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (2023) or 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, Inc. v. Roberto, ___ N.J.Super. ____ (App.Div. 2023) because this case is not a pipeline case, and the trial court expressly stated this.  Ia385.  Such an analysis would also be improper considering that [...] acquired title by way of a tax foreclosure in the first place.  II.
[brief] Each side accused the other of withholding relevant documents in the past.  In an April 25, 2023 hearing before the trial court, and later, counsel for [...] noted that [...] had in other cases made selective redactions to documents based on its unilateral determination that certain portions of the documents were not relevant.  (Da182 ¶ 4; T12-21 to 13-5, T20-6 to -17.)  In the same vein, [...]’s counsel sent a letter to the trial court stating that “[b]ased on past experience, it is likely that after reviewing [[...]’] ESI production the [...] Defendants will need to raise deficiencies with the [trial court].”  (Da155-56.)  [...]’s counsel contended that “[[...]] affiliates initially produced just 0.6% of documents reviewed in the New York litigation, with significant gaps in production. ”  [...]’s counsel repeated their concern about the non-production of relevant evidence at the July 6 Conference.  (Da156.)  [...] claimed that the [...]’ affiliates’ use of TAR in other litigations had resulted in those affiliates designating as relevant an unduly small subset of the ESI search results.  (Da182 ¶ 8.)  --- 13
[directive] When the offense charged against such person is a crime with bail restrictions, the court shall, upon the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry.  The court may examine, under oath or otherwise, any person who may possess relevant information, and may inquire into any matter appropriate to its determination.  The court shall issue an order either approving or disapproving the bail.  The court shall not issue an order approving the bail unless it is satisfied that the evidence adduced in the inquiry establishes the reliability of the source of the funds used to post bail or security offered, that the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash bail is sufficient to ensure the defendant's presence in court when required, and that the funds used to post cash bail or secure a bail bond were not acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.
[brief] [100 N.J. at 644.]  In this case, the Court found that a consecutive sentence was justified because the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other, the crimes were committed at different times, and there were multiple victims. \(^5\) (8T 90-3 to 95-12)  For factor (a), the Court found that the crimes and their objectives were independent of each other because “[s]hooting at [...] was not the purpose of getting the gun.  The purpose was to confront [...]. ”  (8T 93-12 to \(^5\)  It is unclear whether the court found or relied on “separate acts of violence or threats of violence. ”  (8T 94-19)  13)  The Court further stated that “getting the gun was an offensive move” “to wreak vengeance on Mr. [...]. ”  (8T 93-22, 94-16 to 17)  But while the evidence presented at trial supported a conclusion that [...]’s purpose in returning to the Holley home was to confront [...], no evidence was presented that remotely suggested that [...] intended to do anything with the gun other than to have it in case his proposed one-on-one fight with [...] transformed into a greater threat; he told [...] he intended to fight [...] one-on-one and only fired the gun after seeing both [...] and Holley with guns.  (2T 157-9 to 10; 4T 117-24 to 119-24, 122-14 to 19)  This Court has often rejected trial court decisions finding that the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm and a substantive crime committed with the firearm were predominantly independent of one another.
[brief] “5.  … an applicant must provide “an enhanced quality of proof that the variance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Master Plan and Zoning Ordinance, proof which must reconcile the proposed use variance with the Ordinance’s omission of the use as being permitted in the particular zone. ” (Quoting Medici at 21).  6.  The court in Medici further noted that such proof may take the form that the character of the community has changed substantially since the adoption of the master plan and zoning ordinance which may demonstrate that a variance for a use omitted from the ordinance is not incompatible with the intent and purpose of the governing body when the ordinance was passed.
[brief] (Ibid.).  It should be noted that the seizure of the cocaine from the silver and black box defendant was carrying at the time of his arrest could also be justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest.  *State v. Oyenusi*, 387 N.J. Super. 146, 154 (App. Div. 2006) (the “authority to search an arrestee and the area within his immediate control includes the authority to search a container found in the arrestee's possession. ”).  On May 8, 2020, [...] denied defendant's motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.  (Da30).  B.
[brief] TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT  “1T”  Transcript of hearing, February 23, 2024  “2T”  Transcript of plea allocution, September 13, 2023  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  1.  Order for Judgment from the Ocean County Superior Court, February 23, 2024  TABLE OF AUTHORITY  R.7:6-2(c)  5  TABLE OF DEFENDANT  APPELLEE’S APPENDIX  1.  Order for Judgment from the Ocean County Superior Court, February 23, 2024  Da1-Da2  2.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT MADE A MISTAKE IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT PLAINTIFF VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS UNDER TCCWNA (Raised Below: Da15, Da24 through Da27)  The Truth-in-Consumer, Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”) is triggered by a departure from any clearly established legal right or responsibility.  N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.  A departure occurs when a consumer protection statute or regulation prohibits the contractual provision or other practice which a plaintiff asserts is the basis of the claim.  *Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc.*, 231 N.J. 24 (2017).  *TILA*, *Regulation Z* and *CARD* prohibited the contractual provisions and practices which Plaintiff engaged in, as discussed in Section X above.  The Court should have denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment either on the ground that a substantial material fact existed, i.e., Defendant was an “aggrieved consumer” within the meaning of *TCCWNA*, or on the ground that Plaintiff was not entitled to the grant of summary judgment as a matter of law, i.e., Plaintiff violated Defendant’s rights granted under *TCCWNA* (Da24, Da26 and Da27).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Pa8-9, ¶¶32-35 ).  On June 29, 2022, the closings were extended for an additional day.  (Id.)  That evening [...]’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel the following:  Our respective clients both understand that despite their respective efforts to identify, *there is no feasible way to close under the structure contemplated by the [PSA Agreement] because of the inability to secure the necessary leasehold financing with the ground lease structure*.  . . .  I suggest that it is more productive for our clients continue their discussions to address the fact that *[[...]] is unable to close under the terms of the [PSA Agreement]*.  (Pa10, ¶36 (emphases added)).  On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel contacted [...]’s counsel seeking a status update, and was advised that:  “[n]othing really new, I believe [...] wants to extend through tomorrow, and we want to extend until Tuesday.  Still no agreement on [a] longer extension. ” (Pa10, ¶38).  On July 14, 2022, “Plaintiff learned that [[...]] had further amended the [c]losing [d]ate in the [...] Agreement[] without Plaintiff’s consent and without extending the [c]losing [d]ate in the [PSA] Agreement,” by Plaintiff’s own contention thereby placing [...] “*in breach of the terms of the [PSA] Agreement.*” (Pa10, ¶39 (emphasis added).
[brief] Although the trial court eschewed any reliance upon it, petitioners include assumed snippets of the Knoll Certification in their briefs, setting forth quotations without any attribution or citation.  See, e.g., Pa179:  During such consultation, [...] discussed on behalf of the [then unidentified] Petitioners "the assessment of Decedent's estate, their understanding of Decedent's testamentary intentions, the relative strengths and weaknesses of their position and specific settlement posture."  Some of these assertions are hardly prejudicial – assuming they were even communicated.  Moreover, they were based on an incomplete understanding.  [...]'s "assessment of Decedent's estate" is at most, an uninformed opinion.  Her assessment was and is of no moment unless and until it was verified (or discounted) in discovery.  Her "understanding of Decedent's testamentary intentions" is similarly irrelevant: Knoll did not even know about the January 2022 Will.  Her understanding is largely irrelevant and again, the real intent would also be fleshed out in discovery.  Finally, whatever she thought of the strength or weakness of her position and settlement posture, both changed because of the January 2022 Will, which added potential beneficiaries to the mix.  Due process mandates that parties be aware of – and be given the opportunity to rebut – the allegations made against them.  To the extent this court is not inclined to outright reverse the order below, it should at least vacate it, compel production of petitioners' "facts" and remand so that appellants will know what the allegations are and have the opportunity for a plenary hearing to test the credibility of the dueling Certifications.
[directive] Supersession Notice:  This policy supersedes the Attorney General's Directive of December, 1998 and replaces those portions of the 21 county policies currently in place, as indicated in this policy.  Summary:  This policy delineates the Attorney General's requirements on firearms requalification by establishing standards for the conduct of semi-annual firearms requalification and associated training.  Purpose:  This policy is intended to establish a uniform set of standards for semi-annual firearms requalification for any weapon, including a shotgun, which is issued or authorized for use both on and off duty.  It identifies specific courses of fire that meet firearm requalification requirements.  It identifies the minimum score and training necessary to meet the requalification standards as set forth in this manual.  On June 17, 1985, the Attorney General issued a directive requiring that all law enforcement personnel requalify with their firearms at least twice a year pursuant to plans submitted to and approved by the county prosecutor.  This directive retains the twice a year requalification standard, augments the minimum standard now set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6J, and establishes a set of standards and requirements for requalification.  Law enforcement personnel must, therefore, continue to qualify twice annually pursuant to this policy and to their respective county plans not affected or covered by this policy.  This policy is directed by the Attorney General, through the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] (T2 8:25-9:1, 40:15-22, 42:21-25, 108:15-109:8).  HR was not entitled to possess the draft IA report which it provided to [...].  (T2 8:25-9:1, 40:15-22, 42:21-25, 108:15-109:8).  [...] referred to the draft IA report as a “sustained disciplinary action,” and further testified it was clear why he was seeing [...] for an FFD.  (T2 40:15-22, 42:21-44:24).  [...] testified, without factual basis, to his belief that [...] had a “fast and loose” lifestyle, and that there was “sharing” of pills going on [...]’s house.  (T2 55:15-56:5, 58:14-18).  [...] also testified (incorrectly and without basis) that individuals had been caught in [...]’s car on three (3) occasions with drugs in the car.  (T2 58:14-18).  The sole objective psychological test that [...] conducted on [...], the MMPI, did not indicate that [...] had an issue with opioid abuse.  (T2 67:6-11).  [...] testified that his FFD report was unrelated to [...] being out on stress leave.  (T2 61:22-62:12; Pa193).  [...] did not care that stress was the reason that [...] was out of work because, “the real issue… was substance abuse. ” (T2 61:22-62:12).  [...] conducted [...]’s FFD under this belief, despite the fact that the Department did not advise him that substance abuse was an issue for [...].
[brief] November 14, 2018 (many years after the Roads were already built and approved) (Db11-Db12; Db14) by [...], the Planning Board engineer (who is not and was not the Municipal Engineer), who had no involvement whatsoever in the inspection of the Roads.  (Pa3 at ¶ 9.)  In those comments, [...] mused aloud that a separate zoning use variance may have to be obtained for the Roads if they were determined to be private roads.  (Da566, Tr. 22:11-20; Da568, Tr. 31:15-25 and 32:1-25; Da569, Tr. 33:1-9.)  That theoretical legal issue regarding a zoning use variance raised in 2018 has nothing to do with the municipal engineer’s physical inspection of the Roads in 2013 and 2015.
[brief] *4  Next, [...] moves to compel [...] to produce financial documents regarding the sales and revenue from the PToll app, divided by month.  It argues that such documents are directly relevant to [...]’s claimed defamation damages.  Such documents are clearly relevant to the issue of lost profit damages.  At the July 6, 2016 hearing, though, it became clear that [...] had not yet formulated a damage model for this case.  [...] is therefore **ORDERED** to either produce documents responsive to [...]’s Second Set of Requests for Production Nos. 15 through 17 or certify that it is not seeking any lost profits damages.
[directive] A.  The Uniform Defendant Intake Report (U.D.I.R.) serves as the initial data collection instrument for use through the duration of the case.  The U.D.I.R. also serves as the application for representation by the Public Defender.  It is intended for inclusion in Bail, PTI, and Presentence Reports.  Information is gathered pertaining to Identification, Residence, Employment, Criminal Justice Status, Income and Health.  This information should be collected on all cases at the earliest opportunity.  The second page of the UDIR is also used as the application for representation by the public defender's office.  Section B.
[brief] Provides the following in relevant part:  In any product liability action, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable for harm caused by a failure to warn if the product contains an adequate warning or instruction or, in the case of dangers a manufacturer or seller discovers or reasonably should discover after the product leaves its control, if the manufacturer or seller provides an adequate warning or instruction.  [...] also attempts to misconstrue the facts and the arguments through its focus on its failure to timely recall the defective Ozurdex applicator.  In this proceeding, however, [...]’s failure to warn pertains to its failure and refusal to warn of the dangers involving the Ozurdex applicator – post sale – as provided in N.J.S.A Sec. 2A:58C-4.  The standard in a failure-to-warn case is no different, whether the action is considered under the PLA or our common law jurisprudence.  Whelan v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., 242 N.J. 311, 331 (2020), See Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34, 49, 675 A.2d 620 (1996) (“[U]nder the [PLA], as under the common law, the ultimate question to be resolved in … failure-to-warn cases is whether the manufacturer acted in a reasonably prudent manner …. ”).  Whelan v. Armstrong, supra, 242 N.J. at 331.  A manufacturer has a duty under the Product Liability Act to warn of dangers that it knew, or that it should have known on the basis of reasonably obtainable available knowledge.  Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 414 N.J. Super. 365 (A.D. 2010), certification granted 205 N.J. 317, affirmed as modified 211 N.J. 362.  The presumption under the Products Liability Act of an adequate warning based on compliance with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labeling regulations is a red herring and does not apply here.  However, the presumption is deemed rebutted if there is (i) deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects of the drug, or (ii) manipulation of the post-market regulatory process.  *Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc.*, 424 N.J. Super. 278, 312 (2008), affirmed 422 N.J. Super. 360, certification denied 211 N.J. 274.  [...] deliberately concealed and failed to disclose its after-acquired knowledge for months, despite warning healthcare providers and patients in forty (40) countries outside the U.S. before blinding [...].
[brief] The following citation form is adopted: Sb – State’s principal brief; Sa – appendix to State’s principal brief; Db – defendant’s brief; Da – appendix to defendant’s brief.  2  Defendant includes in his appendix several documents that do not appear to have been made part of the record before the trial court—specifically the [...] operating agreements at Da89 and Da100, [...]’s statement at Da116, and the communication at Da139—all of which appear only to be mentioned in the statement of facts in his appellate brief.  Although the documents in question bear exhibit stickers, the State has not been able to locate any reference in the transcripts to those documents or their assigned document numbers being admitted into evidence.  evidence that had been in boxes in his house and his own emails the entire time.  (Sa5-12).  In his appellate brief, defendant’s only explanation for failing to discover the evidence in question prior to or during trial is that he believed he had a strong case and saw no reason to search through the numerous disorganized boxes in his possession in which the documents were eventually located.  But that is not the proper standard for the grant of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  To the contrary, a new trial should only be granted where “the evidence is, indeed, newly discovered. ”  State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82, 99 (2021).  A defendant must show the “new” evidence is: “(1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably change the jury’s verdict if a new trial were granted.
[brief] Summary Judgment  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., ret. t/a  Letter brief of Appellant, [...], in reply to Respondent’s Opposition to Appellant’s moving brief  Dear [...]:  Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), please accept this reply letter brief on behalf of Appellant [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Reply  Preliminary Statement 3  Reply Statement of Facts  4  Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings Being Appealed  5  Legal Argument  I.  RESPONDENT SHARED HIS POST WITH THE PUBLIC WHEN HE POSTED IT IN A CHATROOM  CONSISTING OF AT LEAST EIGHTY INDIVIDUALS; AS SUCH, “PRIVATE” CONDUCT IS NOT IN ISSUE  6  II.  A PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC OF A VULGAR, PORNOGRAPHIC, MISOGYNISTIC VIDEO, IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HIGHER STANDARD OF CONDUCT EXPECTED OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS  VIA PRECEDENT AND STATUTE AND, THEREFORE, IS A VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c)  7  III.  THIS MATTER IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT  12  CONCLUSION  13  REPLY PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The issue before this Court is whether the [...] acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in finding that Respondent neglected his duty to the public to act with integrity and respond towards all individuals, and/or engaged in misconduct in office, as per N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).
[brief] There is no doubt Petitioner met all of the elements of this factor which show employee status.  Respondent’s attempt to mitigate or diminish this factor is problematic.  Either this factor counts, or it does not.  Several things are certain.  The way Petitioner was paid from 2015 to the present is the exact same way she was paid from 2003 to 2008 when she was enrolled in PERS.  The key here is there were no Requests for Proposals nor was the Petitioner subject to a Professional Services Agreement.  Those would be indicative of employee status which the Respondent ignores.
[brief] Database searches will frequently produce close non-matches to the actual source of the fingerprint, which a human examiner will have a hard time differentiating from the actual source, especially with cognitive bias that encourages the examiner to agree with the database search.  The true error rates in these situations are unknown, because there has been insufficient testing of these circumstances.  What is known about the risks of misidentification is sufficient to find that the State has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate reliability and admissibility.
[brief] ”  The Third Circuit found that the Government’s reasoning did not justify the delay, explaining “[t]he Government cannot indict a defendant and then delay a case indefinitely, without any notice to a federal judge, merely because it is aware of a state proceeding involving the same defendant. ”  Id.  “Once federal prosecutors bring an indictment against a defendant, they have a duty to notify the District Court that the defendant should be arraigned and appointed counsel, and to bring the defendant to trial expeditiously. ”  Id.  See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 36 (1970) (finding that incarceration does not make a defendant unavailable and that there was no good reason for the delay “since there have long been means by which one jurisdiction ... can obtain custody of a prisoner held by another” for purposes of a criminal trial); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377 (1969) (“[T]he Texas Supreme Court has held that because petitioner is, in fact, confined in a federal prison, the State is totally absolved from any duty at all under the constitutional guarantee.
[brief] The basis for the application was the information received from the CI and the observations the detectives made while surveilling [...].  (Pa 7; 1T 20-8 to 24-3)  The issuing judge found that the detectives’ application established probable cause to believe that [...] and other identified and yet to be identified individuals were engaging in CDS-related offenses and that the Audi was “being used and continues to be used by [...] in the furtherance of [those offenses].