ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] should extend at least through the age of twenty because scientific research establishes that the Miller factors apply equally to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.  First of all, an offender of this age, like a juvenile, almost inevitably ages out of crime (Miller factor five).  Criminologists often refer to the “age-crime curve,” i.e., the age distribution of offenders.  The overall contours of the curve are so well-accepted that it has been called “one of the brute facts of criminology. ”  Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, *Age and the Explanation of Crime*, 89 Am. J. of Sociology 552, 552 (1983).  That is, offending peaks in the late teens and early twenties, and then drops throughout the mid-twenties.  This overall pattern is persistent, even though the age distribution of offenders varies somewhat if offending is broken down in detail by place, by era, or by specific crime.  Ben Matthews & John Minton, *Rethinking One of Criminology’s “Brute Facts”: The Age-Crime Curve and the Crime Drop in Scotland*, 15 Euro. J. of Criminology 296, 297-98, 305-11 (2017); National Institute of Justice, Study Group on the Transition from Juvenile Delinquency to Adult Crime, *From Youth Justice Involvement to Young Adult Offending* (March 10, 2014), available at https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/youth-justice-involvement-young-adult-offending#noteReferrer12; Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington, eds., *From Juvenile Delinquency to Adult Crime: Criminal Careers, Justice Policy, and Prevention* 5-6 (2012); Darrell Steffensmeier & Cathy Streifel, *Age, Gender, and Crime Across Three Historical Periods: 1935, 1960, and 1985*, 69 Social Forces 869, 876-86 (1991); Darrell J. Steffensmeier et al., *Age and the Distribution of Crime*, 94 Am. J. of Sociology 803, 812-23 (1989); David P. Farrington, *Age and Crime*, 7 Crime and Justice 189, 191-201 (1986); Hirschi & Gottfredson (1983), *supra*, at 554-62.
[brief] ”  State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006).  “An issue not raised below may be considered by the court if it meets the plain error standard or is otherwise of special significance to the litigant, to the public, or to achieving substantial justice, and the record is sufficiently complete to permit its adjudication. ”  Ibid.  As noted, evidence that went unchallenged will constitute plain error if it was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  “Thus, the error will be disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised whether the jury came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached. ”  State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (citing State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 456 (2015)).  Under N.J.R.E. 701, lay-opinion testimony is admissible if it: “(a) is rationally based on the witness’s perception; and (b) will assist in understanding the witness’s testimony or determining a fact in issue. ”  To satisfy these conditions, the “witness must have actual knowledge, acquired through his or her senses, of the matter to which [they] testif[y].”  State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450, 466 (2021) (quoting State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 197 (1989)).  And the second condition precludes “lay[-]opinion on a matter ‘as to which the jury is as competent as [the witness] to form a conclusion. ’”  Id. at 469-70 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 459 (2011)).  Lay-witness testimony also needs to assist the jury.  “An investigator who has carefully analyzed a video and can draw a jury’s attention to particular spots,” such as the suspect’s appearance, “can be quite helpful to the finder of fact. ”  *State v. Watson*, 254 N.J. 558, 601 (2023).  “[I]nvestigators may not offer their views on factual issues that are reasonably disputed.  Those issues are for the jury to decide. ”  *Id.* at 603 (citation omitted).  “[A] witness cannot testify that a video shows a certain act when the opposing party reasonably contends that it does not. ”  *Ibid.*  In *Watson*, the Court held that an officer who provides video narration is not considered an eyewitness to the crime but a witness who is “commenting on an independent source of evidence”: here, the restaurant’s surveillance video.  *Id.* at 601.  An investigator who has reviewed the surveillance video many times prior to trial, who then offers testimony based on their perception of the video, has satisfied N.J.R.E. 701’s “perception” and “personal knowledge” requirements.  *Ibid.*  Defendant did not argue the possibility of two suspects before the jury, and no such possibility was at issue.  Indeed, both his opening and closing argument conceded that the two videos showed the same person.
[brief] Here, [...]’s DJ Action languished in the trial court for four years without achieving Third Round constitutional compliance.  The Township affirmatively dismissed its effort to achieve voluntary compliance, fully aware that it would lose its immunity from inclusionary zoning lawsuits like the instant matter and the consequences that could flow from that decision in accordance with the foregoing Mount Laurel precedent.  It is now the tenth year since [...] filed the DJ Action, and the Township is no closer to achieving compliance.  Instead of presenting a housing element and fair share plan for consideration by the court, [...] waxes poetic about its prior round compliance efforts, incredulously portraying itself as a champion of inclusionary housing.  The Township cannot dispute that it is in significant violation of its Third Round obligation, which the Special Adjudicator and the trial court have already determined.  It is against this backdrop that [...] now seeks to proceed towards a condemnation of the Property on which Plaintiff proposes to develop an inclusionary development, despite the long-standing and continually affirmed precedent of the Mount Laurel doctrine.  Like the trial court, this Court must consider this established precedent in evaluating the Crowe factors and affirming the preliminary injunction granted in favor of Plaintiff -- which maintains the integrity of the Mount Laurel doctrine and preserves the status quo by protecting the very subject matter of this builder’s remedy lawsuit.  C.
[brief] Certainly, race and sex -- when taken together with other, discrete factors -- can support reasonable and articulable suspicion.  But here, the initial description did not provide any additional physical descriptions such as the suspects’ approximate heights, weights, ages, clothing worn, mode of transportation, or any other identifying feature that would differentiate the two Black male suspects from any other Black men in New Jersey.  That vague description, quite frankly, was “descriptive of nothing. ”
[brief] *(Id.* and as shown on Aa0020-Aa0024).  As evidenced by NJDEP Environmental Engineer, [...]’s August 10, 2023, email and the August 11, 2023, Engineering Report, the issue regarding the premanufactured treatment devices raised in [...]’s Report was addressed appropriately and deemed resolved by the NJDEP prior to the issuance of [...]’s FHA Permit.
[directive] VCCO Ind./Acc./Comp.# Count Nature of Offense Degree Time Fine  VCCO Assmt*  최고 / Max 최고 / Max  최고 / Max 최고 / Max  최고 / Max / Total 형량은:  유죄 인정의 결과로 귀하가 받을 수 있는 총 최고 합계  Your total exposure as the result of this plea is:  맞는 답에 동그라미를 치십시오.  Please Circle Appropriate Answer  2.
[brief] Accordingly, An owner or possessor of property owes a higher degree of care to the business invitee because that person has been invited on the premises for purposes of the owner that often are commercial or business related.  A lesser degree of care is owed to a social guest or licensee, whose purposes for being on the land may be personal as well as for the owner’s benefit.  The owner owes a minimal degree of care to a trespasser, who has no privilege to be on the land.  See, e.g., *Snyder* [ ] [v. I. Jay Realty], [ ] 30 N.J. [ ] [303], 311 [(1959)]; Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 271 [(1954)]; Russell v. Merck & Co., 211 N.J. Super. 443, 417 (App. Div. 1986); Caroff v. Liberty Lumber Co., 146 N.J. Super. 353, 357-58 (App. Div. 1977) Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 433-34.
[brief] Although the legislative designation of “sportsmen” (whatever that term means if untethered from membership in the [...]) to have the majority membership on the Council is delimited by the requirement that the members must have knowledge of and an interest in the conservation of fish and game, however specialized that knowledge or interest may be, the State Defendants overlook the fact that the granting of such regulatory authority over hunting and trapping to a private organization with majority control of the Council goes far beyond recommending or advising the Governor on nominees.  The State Defendants also conjure up a false equivalence between a sportsman’s “knowledge of and interest in conservation of fish and game” and the specialized expertise of professional licensing boards, such as doctors for medical boards and nurses for nursing boards.  (Sb10).  Unlike professionals who are delegated authority to regulate their own members, the sportsmen on the Council are accorded the authority to regulate the public in general.  They have also been accorded majority control, which is not the case for the members of the [...] or the [...].  It is the de jure control delegated to the [...] that is offensive to the New Jersey Constitution.
[brief] **c.  Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Claims Regarding the Applicability of the Long Term Tax Exemption Law are Without Basis in Fact or Law (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86). **  The principal allegation raised in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint with respect to the tax abatement granted to [...] by the [...] appears to be that the tax abatement was wrongfully granted under the HMFA Law, which Plaintiffs assert has been superseded by the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 et seq. (the “LTTEL”).
[brief] (Ra122).  The Department retained the services of [...], a former Commissioner of the Department; [...] ([...]), a public sector consulting firm with an extensive background in education; and [...], an expert in New Jersey public school transportation, to undertake the analysis.  *Ibid.*  [...], in turn, assembled a multidisciplinary team of educational specialists and a financial auditing firm to conduct the evaluation, focusing on five key areas: governance, curriculum and instruction, special education, financial practices, and transportation.  (Ra126).  The experts issued their report on the comprehensive review of [...] on March 1, 2024.  (Ra124).  The report answered two questions: (1) “what is the role of [...] in deprivation of T&E in [[...]]?” and (2) “what other causes may be impacting [[...]’s] deliver[y of] T&E?” (Ra126).
[brief] He and [...] approached defendant with their badges around their necks, identified themselves as police officers, informed him of the narcotics-related investigation they were conducting, and patted him down.  (1T76-23 to 25; 1T85-8 to 11).  Out of an abundance of caution, [...] said, he informed defendant of his rights, which defendant indicated he understood.  (1T76-23 to 77-7; 1T93-25 to 94-7).  [...] told defendant what [...] had observed and asked defendant if there was anything illegal in his vehicle.  Defendant admitted there was a “small amount” of cocaine in the back seat of the car and that anything found in the car was his.  (1T77-12 to 20; 1T87-6 to 16; 1T91-20 to 92-1).  At that point, [...] told defendant he was going to search the car.  (1T90-11 to 12).  As [...] opened the backdoor of defendant’s Jeep, he immediately smelled the “chemical odor . . . that’s indicative of cocaine” emanating from inside.  (1T78-19 to 21).  Officers searched the backseat and located a black backpack that contained cocaine, heroin, oxycodone, scales, and a bag with rice.  (1T78-13 to 16).  Up until that point, [...] had not handcuffed defendant.  (1T90-21 to 25).  Defendant also testified during the motion to suppress hearing, but provided a different version of events than Officer [...] or Detective [...] that [...] found not credible.
[directive] This includes complaints of criminal activity, excessive force, improper or unjust arrest, improper entry, improper or unjustified search, differential treatment, serious rule infractions and repeated minor rule infractions.  6.3.2  Unless otherwise directed to do so by the County Prosecutor, the prosecutor's office must be immediately notified of all allegations of criminal conduct.  The internal affairs investigator shall refrain from taking any further investigative action until directed to do so by the County Prosecutor unless an imminent threat exists to the safety or welfare of an individual.  Once a complaint has been forwarded to the prosecutor's office, that office shall endeavor to review the allegation within 30 days and advise the law enforcement agency whether a criminal investigation will be conducted.  In the event the prosecutor's office cannot reach a decision within the initial 30 day period, the deadline may be extended in 30 day increments at the discretion of the County Prosecutor.  The law enforcement agency shall be advised of any extensions of the deadline.  6.3.3
[brief] For all the above reasons, this Court should reverse the HAD, or in the alternative, remand the matter for further findings.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...] (ID# 016102005)  [...]  IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF COMPRESSOR STATION (CS327), OFFICE BUILDING AND APPURTENANT STRUCTURES, HIGHLANDS APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION, PROGRAM INTEREST NO.: [...] ([...])
[brief] [...], ESQ.  Attorney for Plaintiffs  Dated: December 12, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...] and [...] (h/w), Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. FAMILY ADVENTURES  NORTH JERSEY, LLC d/b/a [...], [...], ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (fictitious designations) and JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious designations), Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] OPINION on State of New Jersey’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint  Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (Feb 15, 2023)……………Aa67-86  OPINION on State of New Jersey’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint  Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (Feb 16, 2023)……………Aa87-108²  HEARING & OPINION on Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
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[brief] (Pa624-Pa761)  There were no less than a score of emails exchange between Counsel for Appellants and the [...] between September 12th and eve of the Christmas weekend to determine (i) when the decision would be adopted, and (ii) when the decision would be published.  It took more than two and half months before the [...] even adopted the Resolution.  Counsel for Appellants could not have been clearer as to his clients’ intention to appeal and the [...] could not have been clearer that the [...] would publish the decision in the [...] on December 8, 2022.  (Pa763-Pa778)  On November 28, 2022, the [...] adopted its resolution granted Appellants their variances (the “Resolution”).  (Pa098-Pa112)  On December 22, 2022 and only a few minutes before the beginning of Christmas weekend, the [...] email to the staff of Counsel for Appellants a copy of the affidavit of publication confirming that the [...] did in fact publish its decision in the [...] on December 8, 2022.
[directive] A police officer has the same duty and obligation to their employer as any other employee.  Thus, where an internal affairs investigation is being conducted solely to initiate disciplinary action, the officer has a duty to cooperate during an administrative interview.  The officer also must truthfully answer all questions put to him or her during the course of the investigation.  Failure to fully cooperate with an administrative investigation and/or to be completely truthful during an administrative interview can form the basis for disciplinary action separate and apart from the allegations under investigation.  This duty to fully cooperate in an investigation applies to every employee of the agency, whether law enforcement officer or civilian.  8.0.5
[brief] In 2017, the owner of the property located at [...], [...] (“[...]”), applied for a hardship rent increase for that rent-controlled unit.  Unit #11 has been continuously occupied by the Appellant, [...], since 1990.  [...] originally purchased the entire eleven-unit multifamily building at 703 Park Avenue in 1993.  In 2001, [...] converted the entire building and its eleven units to condominiums, and subsequently sold ten vacant units for a profit. \(^1\)  The parties agree that Mr. Trupiano is a protected tenant under the Tenant Protection Act of 1992 and is therefore protected from eviction without good cause for as long as he lives there and meets the income requirements. \(^2\)  [...] has raised no issue in this matter concerning any cause for terminating Mr. Trupiano’s tenancy.  Since 2017, this matter has been extensively litigated by the parties via prerogative actions against the Rent Leveling Board in Superior Court.  [...], [...], [...] and [...] became involved following the court’s most recent decision in 2022 by [...], in which the court found that the Board was arbitrary and capricious in its determination of [...]’s hardship rent increase, and awarded [...] with a new monthly rent increase of $1,717 for --- \(^1\) Mr. Trupiano has represented, and [...] does not appear to contest, that his unit does not have its own deed, and therefore it does not seem to be a separate condominium unit like the other units in the building.  \(^2\)  Briefs submitted by the parties mention that Mr. Trupiano is protected from eviction without cause for forty years, but that is incorrect.  As a qualified tenant in Hudson County (a qualified county under N.J.A.C. 5:24-3.2(b)) his protected tenancy is for as long as he lives in the unit and meets the income requirements of the Tenant Protection Act of 1992.  The erroneous 40-year number refers to the Senior Citizens and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act.  At the time of the conversion, Mr. Trupiano was neither a senior nor a disabled tenant.
[brief] See *Hill*, 438 N.J. Super. at 586 n. 10; see also *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-27; *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-41; *Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. 463 (2013).  The December 11, 2023 opinion in *Hargett v. Hamilton Park OPCO, LLC*, 477 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 2023), certif. denied, 256 N.J. 453 (2024), confirmed that in a suit against a nursing facility alleging the decedent developed pressure ulcers, an AOM from a registered nurse “alleging collective negligence by multiple unidentifiable nurses was inadequate.
[brief] *Nothing* has been provided to the Court regarding the corporate litigation that the Court would find sufficiently specific, nor the matters therein, as compared to the present one, *to be sufficiently substantially similar as to warrant disqualification* on their own.  Although the [...] matter and the present one involved a failed attempt to expand the business of [...] through ventures that ultimately failed, *there is nothing else so similar about them so as to distinguish their relevance* beyond those exhibited in City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447.  *Thus, no apparent violation of RPC 1.9(a) based on the representation alone.* (T21:4-17) (emphasis added).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ARGUMENT THAT THE CONTRACT FOR SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE FRFPA AND THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE BY A COURT OF LAW  RENDERING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM INACTIONABLE ON THE SAME BASIS AS ITS RULING UNDER THE NEW JERSEY TAX SALE LAW (42a-43a)  (cross-appeal)
[brief] On May 10, 2023, the trial court denied leave for Defendant’s Supplemental (Da224) and Second Supplemental (Da335) Complaints, stating that the claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment had already been addressed and there was no basis to allow the filing.  (Da67)  On June 19, 2023, the trial court denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration for leave to file their supplemental complaints, stating that “Defendants’ proposed claims were unsustainable as a matter of law. ”  (Da72)  Defendants contend their supplemental claims were not properly addressed in the prior proceedings.  While [...] ordered the sale of the Boonton and Florida Properties, there was no prior fact-finding or conclusions regarding fair market value or the Trustee’s misappropriation of funds.  “If a factual issue remains, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. ”  In re Nelson, 454 N.J. Super. 151, 162-63 (App. Div. 2018).  6.