ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Moreover, the court below erred by failing to evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits.  The court did, however, acknowledge that the outcome of Plaintiff’s builder’s remedy claim was uncertain, stating that “with reference to a builder’s remedy . . . the developer doesn’t get everything they want.  They may not get anything that they want.  It may not be that this property can be developed for affordable housing, but the determination made that [...] isn’t constitutionally compliant . . . sort of gets you over that hump to the next stage. ” (1T53:25-54:7).  The court further stated that there was no argument from [...] that the Property is “environmentally not appropriate [or] that nothing can be built there. ” (1T53:19-22).  However, the court below erroneously “made no findings on the pivotal factual issues. ”  Waste Mgt., 433 N.J. Super. at 455 n.3.  In its decision on the motion for reconsideration, the court reiterated its finding and contrasted this case to a related builder’s remedy action in which the trial court did not enjoin [...] from moving forward with condemnation proceedings because [...]’s position is that the property is environmentally sensitive and should not be developed.
[brief] PER CURIAM  *1  Defendant appeals from his jury trial convictions for two armed robberies and related weapons offenses.  He contends for the first time on appeal that (1) his rights under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause were violated by the admission of hearsay testimony explaining how police initially identified him as a suspect, and (2) the trial court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury concerning out-of-court eyewitness identifications.
[brief] In defending the paltry amount of equitable distribution that [...] received in this case, [...] said that [...] received other monies during the marriage.  “The court finds that a preponderance of the credible evidence shows that plaintiff by way of interspousal gifts provided defendant with substantial assets which she retained after the divorce. ”  A271.  But there was no disclosure and identification of the assets in and outside the marital estate during the summary January – March proceeding.  It was improper for [...] to evaluate the fairness of the equitable distribution on the basis of the motion record – which did not substitute for the disclosures and discovery rights that New Jersey law provides before equitable distribution and alimony is determined.  [...] also erred in denying Rule 4:50 relief because of the affair [...] believed [...] had without her husband’s consent (A278) (which [...] testified was at her husband’s directive).  [...] said the affair led to the Mid-Marriage Agreement.  [...] testified to this - that the Mid-Marriage Agreement was drafted to reflect the current state of the marriage in light of [...]’s affair as well as the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding ongoing at the time.  15T67:23-68:16.  [...] said the Mid-Marriage Agreement was created “in the heat of what [...] did” (19T26:16-22), providing [...] with an Irrevocable Power of Attorney over his wife (7T6:4-13; 19T29:21-25).  The legal problem with this is that the marital fault that [...] believed existed did not mean that the process leading to the divorce, or the resulting equitable distribution or alimony, was fair and sustainable under New Jersey law.  Mid-marriage agreements are considered inherently coercive to begin with – [...]’s testimony that this one arose from the affair only illustrates that recognized legal problem.
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[brief] /s/  [...]  CECILE D. PORTILLA, ESQUIRE  Dated: February 6, 2024  [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], HEAD DOE AND JOHN DOES 1-10, JOHN DOES 1-10  (DOES IDENTITIES UNKNOWN), Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, MIDDLESEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: HON.  [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT [...]
[directive] Coordination with Civilian Review Boards  9.7.1  Internal investigation case files generally are not releasable to Civilian Review Boards, but the “good cause” standard may be satisfied when a Civilian Review Board requests records from a completed or closed investigation file and the Civilian Review Board has in place certain minimum procedural safeguards, as described in Section 9.7.2, to preserve the confidentiality of the requested records and the integrity of the internal affairs function, in addition to complying with all other applicable legal requirements.  A violation of any of these requirements may result in the revocation of a Civilian Review Board’s access to confidential law enforcement information, including internal affairs records, and potentially may result in other adverse or remedial actions under federal, state, or local law.  57
[directive] From a secured holstered position on command draw and fire  One Handed shooting 2 rounds, utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light, (support 5 sec. (strong side) hand may not be used to stabilize the handgun).  Repeat twice  Weapon should be in the support hand at a ready position.  5 Yds 12 (Strong side hand and arm is limp at the side.)  No handheld  One handed shooting lights may be used.  On command fire 2 rounds and return to 5 sec.  (support side) the ready.  Repeat twice, decock and holster  Standing, holding a handheld light in a manner the officer would while making a motor vehicle stop or conducting a field  Standing Point  3 yards 4 interview and examining identification (i.e. over the shoulder 3 sec. Shoulder or under the armpit) from a secured holstered position draw and fire 2 rounds.  Repeat once.  Decock and holster  Without a light from a secured holstered position, on 1 yd 4  Weapon Retention command draw and fire 2 rounds from the weapon retention 3 sec. position.  Repeat once.  End course, score targets (32 hits = 80%) provided. indicated.
[brief] The matter is of substantial importance.  Plaintiff is asserting a Constitutional and Statutory challenge to the defendants conduct in refusing to grant two adjournments on request (at least three times) and said conduct is likely to reoccur in the future, and capable of evading review, the Court should proceed to address the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the Chancery Division decision violated plaintiff's right to pursue his NJCRA and NJLAD claims in the Law Division and deprived him of his choice of forum.  The Chancery Division's Judge's conduct was contrary to the common law, N.J. Const., Art I, . N.J. Const., Art VI, § V, ¶ 4., R. 1:13-4, R. 4:3-1, R. 4:69-1, N.J.S. 10:6-2 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  Plaintiffs' appeal challenges the Chancery Division Judge's findings under both the Prerogative Writ Law and the NJCRA, and the denial of the motions for stay, adjournment, order to show cause and to amend complaint.  The Appellate Division should reverse the Chancery Division's orders, denying the motions, determining that the Complaint was "Moot" and awarding him attorney fees.  Plaintiff maintains that defendants "violated his constitutional and statutory rights and are therefore liable" under N.J.S.A. 10:6–2.  Plaintiff prays that the court reach his challenges to the findings of the Chancery Division (Trial Court).  An issue presented by this appeal is whether a party who brings an action under the Civil Rights Act that results in a change in defendant's conduct may qualify as a "prevailing party" even though the action is dismissed as moot rather than being concluded by a judgment in plaintiffs favor.  Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:6–2(f) because his action in lieu of prerogative writs and civil rights action was a "catalyst" for the cessation of conduct alleged to violate the Civil Rights Act and that he qualifies as a prevailing party entitled to an award of attorney's fees.  II.
[brief] It is, however, important to understand what is not in dispute.  First, the [...] site in the west zone satisfies the criteria of Section 5(a) of the LRHL, because it is “the discontinuance of a building . . . previously used for retail . . . purposes. ”  Second, “more than half of the housing stock” in the town of [...] “is at least 50 years old” and “a majority of the water and sewer system” in the Town of [...] “is at least 50 years old” so that an “overlay” zone under Section 14 “may extend to the entire area of the municipality. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-14.  This case is not, therefore, a “designation” case and the Trial Court’s statement on that point is correct.
[brief] Appellants Were Not Serial Non-Payers of Property Taxes  Appellants were not ignorant of their obligation to pay real property taxes.  From and after acquiring the Property in April 2020, they paid real property taxes to the [...], through and including the third quarter of 2021, then missed the fourth quarter, which were due on November 1, 2021 and which were only delinquent after November 15, 2021.  (95a-96a).  Unknown to Appellants, [...] is an “accelerated tax sale municipality. ” (95a-96a).  When a real property tax delinquency occurs, the Township typically sends a delinquency notice to the taxpayer.  When the delinquency relates to the fourth quarter, however, Irvington does not send out a delinquent notice, but instead proceeds directly to tax sale.  (110a-111a).  This happened to Appellants.  B.  The Real Property Tax Delinquency and the December 2021 Tax Sale.
[brief] BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, HYUNG KEE OH [...]  Metro Corporate Campus  One 99 Wood Avenue South Iselin, New Jersey  08830-2712 [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, [...] Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...], Esq. (280521972)  [...], Esq. (017071992)  [...], Esq. (024101998)  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | v | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | vi | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | A. Background of the Case | 2 | | B. Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint | 2 | | C. The Discovery Conducted in this Action | 3 | | D. Summary Judgment and the First Appeal | 5 | | E. Proceedings During and Subsequent to the Summary Judgment Decision | 5 | | F. The Administrator’s Motion Seeking Court Approval of His Forensic Investigation Report, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Same, Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion, and the Court’s Approval of the Administrator’s Motion and Denial of the Cross-Motion | 6 | | G. Plaintiff’s Application for Legal Fees and the Trial Court’s Award | 8 | | H. The First Legal Fee Award That Was Vacated | 8 | | I. Procedural History of the Remand Proceeding | 9 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 11 | | A. Plaintiff’s Secret Recording of a Family Meeting | 11 | | B. The Beneficiaries Other Than Plaintiff Oppose the Litigation | 12 | C.
[brief] *Konop v. Rosen*, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 401 (App. Div. 2012).  As to relevance, relevant evidence means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.  *N.J.R.E. 401*.  In determining whether evidence is relevant, the inquiry focuses upon “the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue.
[brief] Second, it does not matter whether the Disciplinary Action was a “disciplinary proceeding” since Application Questions 10(a) and 11(a) are written in the disjunctive (“bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding”) and the OAE investigation, Disciplinary Action Complaint, and Disciplinary Action unquestionably involved a “bar complaint” and “investigation. ”  Finally, the 2016 Application does not ask whether an attorney has been the subject of a “Disciplinary Proceeding,” as that term is defined in the 2016 Policy or anywhere else.  Rather, the 2016 Application asks whether an “attorney [has] been the subject of any bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding within the past 5 years,” as those terms are commonly understood.  Plaintiffs’ entire argument relies on their unreasonable importing of a policy definition into the Applications.
[brief] Trial Date 2T – Transcript of the June 6, 2023  Trial Date 3T – Transcript of the June 7, 2023  Trial Date 4T – Transcript of the June 8, 2023  Trial Date 5T – Transcript of the June 9, 2023  Trial Date 6T – Transcript of the June 12, 2023  Trial Date 7T – Transcript of the June 15, 2023  Trial Date 8T – Transcript of the August 4, 2023 Motion Hearing Pa – Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix Pra – Plaintiff-Appellant’s Reply
[brief] The State also presented evidence that [...] ran into [...] by chance and [...] claimed to have no knowledge of the money that [...] had raised.  However, months of email and text conversations demonstrate that to be false.  In particular, on February 28, 2014 [...], specifically referencing “the group in Hoboken,” had told [...] that he would be raising funds on his own if he did not have “answers by March 7th” because he had grown frustrated with [...]’s inability to draw significant investments.  (Da111).  [...] had texted [...] on March 9, 2014 asking him:  “Can u please have a thorough convo with jerrid and see where we are with funding?  I’m officially raising money for Hoboken and I don’t want to go to outside if I don’t have to especially that I know it’s a gold mind (sic). ”  (Da114) (emphasis added).  Two days later, on March 11, 2014, [...] texted [...] about fundraising:  “Find out from [...] and [...] and your neighbor by the week for sure.  I will have 1,000,000 raised I need 500k.  Everyone will be in on a 2.5 mil evaluation. ”  (Da112) (emphasis added).  On June 17, 2014, [...] (hereafter “[...]”), run by [...]’s close family friend, [...], agreed to invest one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,000.00) prior to August of 2014, which was acknowledged by [...], [...], and [...].  (Da115).  Ultimately, [...] capital provided three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00) in funding.  Curtis indicated in his statement that he handed both checks he provided to [...] personally in the presence of [...] and [...].  (Da116-138).  The [...] investment is one that [...] had been developing months prior and discussed with [...] by text on March 6, 2014:  “Please tell [...] to spend some time today and get me sales reports.  The last time I asked for something he sent me garbage and it was embarrassing to show Curtis.  [...] chart is so much better from Syracuse.  I need this for te (sic) capital raise in Hoboken.  Jerrid pinged me this morning saying he doesn’t know anything yet.  Please make sure this is priority to [...] as he should have this done anyhow. ”  (Da139) (emphasis added).  The emails introduced into evidence further demonstrated that [...] was operating appropriately with respect to his business relationship with [...] and that [...] was fully aware of the fact that [...] was raising money for the Hoboken World of Beer project.
[directive] Por lo tanto, no anote en el mismo ningún identificador personal, como por ejemplo: el número de Seguridad Social, el número de la licencia de conducir, el número de la matrícula del vehículo, el número de la póliza del seguro, el número de una cuenta financiera activa, o el número de una tarjeta de crédito activa.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.
[brief] Attorneys for Respondent [...]  [...], Esq. Kinney Lisovicz  Reilly & Wolff PC [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent [...]  Hon. Judge [...], J.S.C. Superior Court of New Jersey Civil Law Division  [...] [...] [...]  [...] AND [...], PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, VS. TOWNSHIP OF UNION; [...]  D/B/A [...]; JOHN DOE 1-10 (A FICTITIOUS NAME); RICHARD ROE 1-10 (A FICTITIOUS NAME; ABC CORPORATION 1-10 (A FICTITIOUS CORPORATION); XYZ CORPORATION 1-10 (A FICTITIOUS CORPORATION), DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS.
[brief] [...] Does Not Dispute that Section 317 of the Restatement of Torts is Current Law in New Jersey  Contrary to the arguments advanced by [...] at trial (10T40:15-16), which were adopted by the trial Judge (10T42:5-6), it now appears that [...] agrees that Section 317 of the Restatement of Torts (2d) is current New Jersey law.  However, [...] argues that Section 317 requires a showing that [...] was misusing company property at the time of the incident.  Additionally, just as they did with regard to negligent training and supervision, [...] attempts to impose a new requirement that [...] had “dangerous attributes.
[brief] *Manorcare Health Services, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc.*, 336 N.J. Super. 218 (App. Div. 2001) (citations omitted).  There is a four part test in New Jersey concerning a duty to preserve evidence.  A duty to preserve evidence arises when there is (1) pending or probable litigation involving the defendants; (2) knowledge by the plaintiff of the existence or likelihood of litigation; (3) foreseeability of harm to the defendants, or in other words, discarding the evidence would be prejudicial to defendants; and (4) evidence relevant to the litigation.  Here, parts 3 and 4 of the test cannot be met.
[brief] Appellant [...] applied for a Special Retirement from the [...], which the Board approved on April 9, 2003, with an effective date of April 1, 2003.  (Pa69).  On July 8, 2019, the Legislature enacted L. 2019, c. 157 (the “Ricci Act”).  The Ricci Act in relevant part permitted active or retired members of the [...] to file for a recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Service, or Special Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits provided they participated in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center Site.  (Pa10).  The Ricci Act also created a presumption that the disability of the member or retiree “occurred during and as a result of the performance of the member’s regular or assigned duties and not the result of the member’s willful negligence unless the contrary can be proved by competent evidence. ” (Pa10).  1  Because the procedural history and facts are closely related, they are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[brief] Arbitration agreements are interpreted under the objective “average consumer standard ie., is it clear and understandable to the average consumer, Atalese v. US Legal, 219 NJ 430, 446 (2014); Morgan v. Standford Brown, 225 NJ 289, 308 (2016); Kernahan v.  Home Warranty, 236 NJ 301, 321 (2019); Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 NJ 30, 49 (2020).  This language calls for application of the doctrine of contra proferentem.  When a contract term is ambiguous, the rule requires the court to adopt the meaning that is most favorable to the non drafting party, after a court has examined the terms in light of common usage and customs, considered the circumstances and is unable to determine the meaning.  The doctrine is available where the parties have unequal bargaining power and are not equally worldly wise and sophisticated *Pacifico v. Pacifico*, 190 NJ 258, 267-268 (2007).
[brief] In *Vision*, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the cause of action in a mortgage foreclosure case accrued at the time of default or the sale of the mortgaged premises, rather than when the negligent appraisal became known to the plaintiff.  *Vision*, 156 N.J. at 585.  “The better analysis leads us to conclude that the accrual of a cause of action should not await the sale of the mortgaged properties, but rather that the cause of action should accrue when the mortgagee knows or has reason to know that its collateral has been impaired or endangered by the negligent appraisal.  At that time, the mortgagee knows that it has suffered legal injury. ”  *Id.* at 585-86.  See also, *Vastano*, 178 N.J. at 239 (holding that the statute of limitation on legal malpractice for failure to obtain an expert began to run upon jury verdict and was not stayed pending appeal).  Thus, Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced in that the cause of action in this case did not accrue on April 27, 2022, when the summary judgment was entered in the AG Action.  Instead, the cause of action accrued in 2014 when, as a result of the AG Notice, Plaintiffs knew, or should have known, that [...] was not properly registered.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, [...] requests that this Court reverse the orders of the lower court for: 1. denying a Paff Certification, further discovery and granting the satisfaction of judgment when the Board failed to comply with the 8/28/20 order and give [...] access to the 9 records; 2. failing to order the Board to pay interest on the $78,646 ordered payment for all but 40 days of the two years the Board held the $78,646; 3. failing to find the Board violated litigant's rights after granting [...]'s motion to enforce the 8/28/20 Order; 4. failing to order a civil penalty after the Board failed to comply with the 8/28/20 after it was affirmed by this Court; and 5. failing to order to pay [...]'s prevailing party attorney's fees after granting [...]'s motion to enforce the 8/28/20 Order.  RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, [...], ATTORNEY AT LAW  [...]  [...] BY: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  A Member of the Firm  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants [...] AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF, [...], Plaintiff, v. [...] AND [...], IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SCHOOL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR/BOARD SECRETARY OF [...], Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] Equally unavailing is the trial court’s determination that having to recover an email log from a privately-held email account was somehow onerous or renders the request unduly burdensome.  For one, there is no in-depth premise explaining how such would be so hard or so difficult.  The [...] certification only states that he thinks he cannot make such a log from a gMail account\(^4\) and that he does not have administrative rights to access the other accounts.  It is misconstruing the law to hold that the custodian alone must be able to possess or exercise dominion over the record in a simplified fashion.  As noted in footnote 4 below, there are less efficient ways to create a log that are still “not difficult”.  But this Court cannot lose sight of the simple fact that whatever difficulties or inefficiencies are encountered, this is a problem that is completely --- \(^4\) The undersigned is currently involved in 2 cases in Bergen County before another judge where gMail account logs have been generated - one by cutting-and-pasting and another by simply taking screen shots of the inbox and outboxes.
[brief] Thus, the Law Division’s action reflects a material change in administrative policy.  *Id.*, at 331.  (Factor five).  •  The Law Division’s ruling represents “a decision on administrative regulatory policy in the nature of the interpretation of law or general policy. ”  Id. at 331-32.  (Factor six).  The Law Division’s ruling – to allow PIP arbitration jurisdiction over the following types of parties: non-medical provider corporations; a lay person who is not the insured/injured party; and an attorney who is not the insured/injured party; and the following types of claims: insurer’s affirmative IFPA claims, is tantamount to the Court creating a new administrative rule, adopted in violation of the procedural requirements of the APA, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -24.