ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Consistent with the statute's provisions for alternative bases of guilt in Section (a), the separate model jury charges on robbery in the first-degree and robbery in the second-degree direct the court to select the appropriate elements from section (a)(1), (2) or (3) that describe the criminal conduct alleged by the State.  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Robbery In The Second Degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)" (rev. July 2, 2009); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Robbery In The First Degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)" (rev. Sept. 10, 2012).  The model charge for first-degree robbery contains the additional provisions that, as appropriate to the allegations, the court instruct the jury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b) on the elements of armed robbery or the allegation that the defendant "purposely attempted to kill anyone" or "purposely inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury."  Defendant was indicted for first-degree robbery and accomplice liability for first-degree robbery (Da6-Da7).
[brief] On her motion for reconsideration, [...] submitted a copy of the CNA and the Commission again rejected her assertion as meritless.  AA14.  Even if the CNA applied to the Commission (which it does not), the CNA language relied upon by [...] only confirms that there is no prohibition on considering a candidates complete employment and disciplinary history when the [...] considers an employee’s suitability for promotions or the Commission considers the merits of list removal.  The specific CNA language at issue only prohibits the uses of “negative performance notices, oral reprimands and written reprimands . . . for progressive discipline purposes” in certain circumstances.  AA186 (emphasis added).
[brief] The most egregious error involved defendant’s use on cross examination of documents purporting to be the results of an investigation by the State of New Jersey Department of Health (“DOH”) finding defendant committed no violations of federal and state law with regard to [...]’s death.  The documents were the subject of a motion in limine by plaintiff to prohibit defendant from using those documents at trial.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., prior to trial, ruled that the hearsay documents could come in if and only if a proper foundation was laid for their admission into evidence.  Defendant claimed it would produce at trial the alleged author of one of the documents, [...], R.N.  The other document was unsigned.  At trial, defendant did not call [...] as a witness nor did defendant call any witness with personal knowledge of the hearsay documents and the conclusions they contained.  Nevertheless, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., the trial judge, allowed defendant to use the documents on cross examination of plaintiff’s witnesses and read from them in their entirety while asking the various witnesses, is this what the document says.  The documents were hearsay; they were used for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., defendant did not cause [...]’s death or violate his rights under the NHA.  Defendant, however, got every word of those documents into evidence numerous times and then used the results stated in those hearsay documents as the cornerstone of its summation.
[brief] II.  THE PLAINTIFF’S THIRD THEORY OF LIABILITY WAS THAT THE GROUND SIGN LOCATED TO THE APPROACH TO THE OVERPASS WAS NOT PROPERLY MAINTAINED, AND THE DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION OF THE SIGN AND AREA AND FAILED TO PROPERLY MAINTAIN THE SIGN AND AREA, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT AN ERROR BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER A NOTICE # TABLE OF CITATIONS ## Cases - **Atalese v. Long Beach Tp.,** 365 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2003) ..................................7 - **Lodato v. Evesham Tp.,** 388 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2006) ........................................8, 9 - **May v. Atlantic City Hilton,** 128 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (D. N.J. 2000) ...............................11 - **Polyard Terry,** 148 N.J. Super. 202, 208 (Law D. 1977) ..................................................11 - **Tp. of Manalapan v. Gentile,** 242 N.J. 295 (2020) ..............................................................3 - **Tymczyszyn v. Columbus Gardens,** 422 N.J. Super. 253, 264 (App. Div. 2011) ............7  ## Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4** ..................................................................................................................2, 5 - **N.J.S.A. 59:4-2** .....................................................................................................................6, 7 - **N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a)** ...............................................................................................................6 - **N.J.S.A. 59:4-3** .....................................................................................................................6, 7 - **N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b)** ..............................................................................................................7, 8, 10 - **N.J.S.A. 59:5-2** ...................................................................................................................8  ## Rules - **Civil Rule 4:49-1** ..................................................................................................................3  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions Address to Defendant [...] ..............Pa1  EXHIBIT A – N.J. Stat §27:5G-4 ................................................................. ..........Pa4  EXHIBIT B – Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices ........... ..................Pa6  EXHIBIT C – Google Maps Image of [...] and [...] .............Pa10  Order dated January 17, 2023  Deeming Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions as Admitted  ..............................................................................................................Pa12  Photographs of Bridge .........................................................................................Pa14  Videos Shown to the Jury by Plaintiff  During Direct Examination of Plaintiff (on attached Flash drive)  ......................................................................................Pa16  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ’”  Riggs v. Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 610-11 (1988); Bow & Arrow Manor v. West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 343 (1973); Taxpayer Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 20 (1976).  In addition, “the ordinance must be adopted in accordance with statutory and municipal procedural requirements.
[brief] Defendant argues the 1963 Easement Agreement lacks formality and was not in recordable form when recorded in 2007.  (Db8-9; Db43)  This argument lacks foundation and was previously rejected by the Trial Court.  The purpose of any recording is to place persons on notice of issues involved in the title to real estate.  Arguments as to the validity of a recording would only be relevant to claims of constructive notice, not actual notice.  The 1963 Agreement was recorded in 2007, long before Defendant purchased the Subject Property in the bankruptcy sale.  Most importantly, this Defendant took title to the Subject Property in 2010 with actual knowledge of the easement.  Thus, Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the recording is moot.
[brief] **POINT SEVEN  [Appeal of Counterclaim as untimely]  (Argued at Pa381 – Pa383)**  [...]’s Counterclaim is based on April 2020 and July 2020 invoices, which [...] alleges were not paid in full in violation of *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)*.  [...]’s suit against the [...] was filed September 16, 2022, more than two years after the accrual of the action.  The applicable statute of limitations, the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, and the equitable doctrine of laches, bars [...]’s Counterclaim as out of time.  The court therefore committed legal error in granting the Counterclaim.
[brief] The August 9, 2021 public notice of adoption mirrored P.L. 2002, Chapter 15, Section 10.  The August 9, 2021 [...] Notice of Adoption stated:  The ordinance has been finally adopted by the governing body of the [...], in the County of Essex, State of New Jersey on June 26, 2022, approved by the Mayor on July 29, 2022 and the 20-day period of limitation within which a suit, action or proceeding questioning the validity of such ordinance can be commenced, as provided in the Local Bond Law, the Redevelopment Area Bond Financing Law and the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, has begun to run from the date of the first publication of this statement.
[brief] **The Board properly determined the equity in the property.**  In analyzing the equity in the property, [...] failed to set forth a figure that was rooted in reasonableness.  First, [...]’s expert was unable to opine as to what the equity should be.  Second, [...]’s request of equity in the amount of $404,600.00 is meritless since [...] fails to consider the fact that he did not purchase this particulate unit for $525,000.00, but instead purchased the entire building for that amount and that this unit only represents 10.76% of the building.  As the Board found, any reasonable equity calculation must take the latter into consideration.  Accordingly, arriving at a correct equity figure required the Board to determine equity in this particular unit, not the building as a whole which [...]’s calculations improperly attempt to establish.  This is precisely what the Board did.  (Id. at 256:1-257:9.)  Indeed, the Board specifically addressed the fact that [...]’s method of calculating equity was in contravention to the RCO and the Board’ past-practice.  The following colloquy between the Chair and Board attorney demonstrates the Board’s reasoning and why it rejected [...]’s method of calculating equity:
[brief] The trial court’s judgment ([...]) establishes that [...] owes [...] $918,894 in indemnity for its losses incurred before December 31, 2018, plus 6.4% of all covered costs incurred after December 31, 2018.  (Pa 43).  [...]’s cross-appeal does not challenge either of those portions of the trial court’s judgment.  The liability determination and judgment by [...] that [...] owes coverage to [...] was only obtained after a five-year period of discovery and motions practice, which was followed by a three-month long liability trial.  Contrary to [...]’s assertion that the “heart of the dispute” was the allocation of [...]’s claimed damages, during the time up to and including the liability trial, the actual issue was whether [...] and the other insurance companies owed coverage to [...].  (see generally Pa 91-137).  [...]’s efforts to shoehorn the facts of this case into the holding of *Honeywell* is an exercise in revisionist history.  To say that this case was about nothing more than allocation is disingenuous, at best.  [...] incurred substantial attorneys’ fees to prove that [...] owed coverage for the Plainville claim under the insurance policies [...] purchased and paid for.  After hearing and rejecting the counterarguments by [...], [...] held that [...] is entitled to coverage.  Consequently, [...] is a successful claimant and is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to R. 4:42-9(a)(6).
[brief] In addition, it provides that [...]’s only responsibility under the commitment was to issue an insurance policy to a proposed insured in accordance with the terms and provisions of the commitment (301a, paragraph 3).  If the requirements found in Schedule B, Part I – Requirements are not met within 180 days of the commitment date, then the commitment terminates (301a, paragraph 5).  Importantly, the commitment provides, IF THIS COMMITMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED BY AN ISSUING AGENT  The issuing agent is the Company’s agent only for the limited purpose of issuing title insurance commitments and policies.  The issuing agent is not the Company’s agent for the purpose of providing closing or settlement services.  (303a, paragraph 7).
[brief] The Rule's requirements are "to ensure that lay opinion is based on an adequate foundation."  Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. at 585.  Subsection (a) requires that a lay opinion be limited to matters directly perceived by a witness "through use of one's sense of touch, taste, sight, smell or hearing."  Id.  The purpose of N.J.R.E. 701 is to ensure that lay opinion is based on an adequate foundation.  Id.  A lay witness's opinion cannot rely on the inadequate support of inadmissible hearsay without the benefit of an exception.  Here, there was no testimony elicited at trial that reflected that [...]’s opinion was rationally based on an adequate foundation.  How could [...] assert that Decedent did not divorce because of her a strong catholic faith when no facts were submitted that demonstrated Decedent had a strong catholic faith?  Indeed, when Decedent decided to marry, she did not request to be married in a Catholic church by a priest and rather, planned a wedding at her friend’s Ventnor home that was officiated by a mayor.  (11T6:18 to 7:7).  Nor was there any evidence that the Decedent ever contemplated divorce.  Respondent acknowledged at trial, Decedent told her she was happy to be married to Petitioner.  (11T83:15 to 84:10; 12T15:1-7; 12T16:4-14).
[brief] [...] also admitted knowing that [...], a solar regulatory agency, had terminated the Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (“WMPA”) with [...] by January of 2018, four months before [...] sent his letter to the Planning Board in May.  (Pa002161) (“I know that [...] gave us notice. ”).  Moreover, [...] terminated its interconnection agreement with [...] in March of 2018.  (Id.).  The termination of the interconnection agreement took place before [...] notified the [...] that his client would now be moving forward on the project.  E.
[brief] Cases  A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235 (1949) ......72 Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors, 309 N.J. Super. 358, 365 (App. Div. 1998) .................................................................52 Carr v. Carr, 120 NJ. 336 (1990)...............................................................71 Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis, 260 N.J. Super. 50 (App. Div. 1992) ......................73 Dessel v. Dessel, 122 N. J. Super 119, 121 (App. Div. 1972).............................68 Emery v. King, 64 N.J.L. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1900)..............................................57 EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Env't. Barrier Co., LLC, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. 2015) .................................................................37 Estate of Ostlund, 391 N.J. Super. 390, 403 (App. Div. 2007)............................41 Fielder v. Friedman, 124 N.J.L. 514 (E. & A. 1940).......................................57 Flanigan v. Munson, 175 N.J. 597, 607 (2003)..............................................67, 68 Highway Holding Co. v. Yara Eng'g Corp., 22 N.J. 119 (1956)...........................65 Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569, 585 (2011).................................................................72 In re Estate of Shinn, 394 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2007)..............................63 In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 303 (2008).......................................37 In re Niles Trust, 176 N.J. 282, 300 (2003) .........................................................42 In re Will of Blake, 21 NJ. 50, 55-56 (1956) .......................................................38 In re Will of Catelli, 361 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2003).................................38 In re Will of Liebl, 260 N.J. Super. 519, 523 (App. Div. 1992) ..............................36 Johnson v. Johnson, 212 N.J. Super. 368, 384 (Ch. Div. 1986).............................72
[brief] | 385a | | 28.  Exhibit “AA” is [...]’ May 25, 2023 Cert. for Cross-Motion to reconsider Mar. 7, ’23 Order & Oct. 26, ’22 Order, par. 1d; & for [...] to issue Final Accounting, as per Oct. 2022 Order, par. 2, & w/Opposition to [...]’s March 23rd filing.
[brief] First, the Bulletin will have widespread, continuing and prospective impact on all reciprocal insurance exchanges.  Second, although on its face the Bulletin purports to be limited to responding to questions, it is actually improper rulemaking forcing reciprocal exchanges to comply with new, never before applied, regulations governing their financials.  Although designed to give the most superficial appearance that the Department has not adopted a process of general application, the Bulletin was undeniably intended to allow the Department to regulate AIF fees.  Why did the Department adopt this Bulletin if the REA already has a process in place for financial examinations of AIF fees?  Because it knows it is required to amend the REA and as the pending legislation demonstrates, the Legislature does not agree with the Department’s position.
[brief] The trial court properly found that an ordinary person — like defendant — should be aware that knowingly attending and observing a violent cockfight is criminal.  N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2) is presumed to be valid, and defendant has not established that it is constitutionally repugnant.  While our courts have not addressed in either a published or unpublished opinion the constitutional challenges to N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2) like defendant raises here, this Court may find instructive the decisions of other jurisdictions that have resolved similar questions.
[brief] See infra Point I.D.  Instead, AICRA, the IFPA, and RICO can be harmonized to work together.  See N.J. Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, 211 N.J. at 555.  AICRA’s decision-point process, including the ability to refer an insured for independent medical evaluations and challenge benefit claims in arbitration, helps determine whether a medical provider’s services are medically necessary and appropriately performed in an effort to reduce the “overutilization of medical benefits,” Governor’s Conditional Veto Message § II(C), while also ensuring reasonably prompt benefit determinations, see Selective Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 597 at 609.  But when, as here, a medical provider obtains PIP benefits through allegedly false or misleading claims, insurers retain the causes of action provided in the IFPA, RICO, and common law and equity, in order to seek “restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits, and reduc[e] the amount of premium dollars used to pay fraudulent claims,” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2, coupled with treble damages and attorneys’ fees for deterrent effect, see N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a)-(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c).  That commonsense approach is the only one faithful to legislative intent.  D.
[brief] (Db18).  Besides being incorrect, this claim fails because “[o]ur system of justice has long accepted inconsistent [jury] verdicts as beyond the purview of correction. ”  *State v. Maloney*, 216 N.J. 91, 109 (2013) (citation omitted).  The jury has the prerogative to acquit even “‘in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt. ’”  *State v. Franklin*, 184 N.J. 516, 536 (2005) (citation omitted).  Thus, that defendant was acquitted of the weapons offenses is not part of the analysis whether there was sufficient evidence—giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony and inferences—supporting reckless manslaughter.
[brief] The Trial Court correctly recognized that if Appellants’ argument was correct, “any deadline would have no meaning. ” (Pa8 (Opinion)).  Rather than engaging in such an unsupportable interpretation, the Trial Court found that the Consent Order “is clear that the sixty- day deadline applied to both the tolling of that statute of limitation and to the opportunity to refile ‘any of the affirmative claims, counterclaims or third party claims. ’” (Pa8 at ¶1 (Opinion)).  The Trial Court’s ruling follows the well-established rule that a contract “should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless.
[brief] THE DEPARTMENT’S REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE PUBLIC ACCESS CONSTITUTES A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS.  (Aa0139-140.)  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, dictates that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation. ”  U.S. Const. amend. V.; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV.; Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).  Co-extensive with the protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of the State of New Jersey provides, “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. ”  N.J. Const. art 1.
[brief] *Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan*, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).  It decides first whether there was a genuine issue of fact.  If there wasn't, it then decides whether the lower court's ruling on the law was correct.  *Walker v. Alt. Chrysler Plymouth*, 216 N.J. Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987).
[brief] Therefore it was not an appeal not of a judgment but an appeal of parts of an opinion - in other words - not of a final decision.  Plaintiff is the master of its claim.  “The party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon”.  See Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).  A claim of direct discrimination is the most appropriate manner of addressing the issues at hand as it was for the Association within Dial, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 443 N.J. Super. 492, (App. Div. 2016) which also declined to assert claims for individuals impacted by the discrimination alleged in that case.
[brief] “[Q]ualified immunity ordinarily is a question of law to be decided by the court. ”  Baskin v. Martinez, 243 N.J. 112, 128 (2020); see also, Winberry Realty P'ship v. Borough of Rutherford, 247 N.J. 165, 186 (2021).  Qualified immunity “‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. ’”  Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116-17 (2015) (quoting City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015)).
[brief] - Paragraph no. 8 cites missing payments made for the period 10/1/1998 – 2/5/1999.  Nowhere in [...]’s analysis are any of the payments made by me prior to 2/19/1999 identified (see DA164, DA196, DA198, DA255, DA264).  - Paragraph no. 10 cites ordered reduced support payments not posted on the account record pursuant to the Remand Order of 1/17/2002.
[brief] Oak Park Calabasas Condo. Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 137 Cal.App.4th 557 (2006)  .....................................16  Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 596 (2011) ..............................................20, 25  Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Myer, 2010 VT 10, 187 Vt. 323, 993 A.2d 413 .....................13, 22, 23  Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Muller, 2020 VT 76, 213 Vt. 145, 249 A.3d 24 ......................13
[brief] Restatement, Torts 2d | | | 652A, at 376 (1977) | 5 | | Cesare | | | 154 N.J. at 411–12, 713 A.2d 390 | 7 | | Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc.  | | | 510 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1981) | 5 | | Devlin v. Greiner | | | 147 N.J. Super. 446 (1977) | 5 | | Elrom v. Elrom | | | 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015) | 7 | | Gac v. Gac | | | 186 N.J. 535, 547, 897 A.2d 1018 (2006) | 7 | | NOC, Inc. V. Schaefer | | | 484 A.2d 729, 197 N.J. Super. 249 (1984) | 4 | | Ricci v. Ricci | | | 448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) | 7 | | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am.| | | 65 N.J. 474, 484, 323 A.2d 495 (1974) | 7 | | State v. Baynes | | | 148 N.J. 434, 444, 690 A.2d 594 (1997) | 7 | | State v. C.W. | | | 449 N.J. Super. 231, 255, 156 A.3d 1088 (App. Div. 2017) | 7 | Weller v. Home News Publishing Co. 112 N.J. Super. 502 (1970)