ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.3  Surrounding Land Uses  The surrounding parcels adjacent to the north, south and across from the PIQ are also zoned RD-C, Rural Development-Commercial and contain a mix of residential and commercial uses as well as undeveloped land.  Properties directly adjacent to the property in question contain a residence to the north and a vacant property with a billboard to the south.  ***  3.1  Use  1.  In accordance with § 175-89D, any accessory buildings or structures shall be permitted on a lot associated with a principal structure, building or use, except on qualified farmland.  The total combined square footage of any accessory building(s) or structure(s) shall not exceed the square footage of the principal building.  All farmland structures shall adhere to the setback requirements of this chapter.  The plan does not conform to these requirements, proposing 2,160 sq. ft. when the principal structure is approximately 1,152 sq. ft.
[brief] A court can raise the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte as a court cannot entertain a case when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  Prime Accounting Dep't. v. Twp. of Carney's Point, 421 N.J. Super. 199, 212 (App. Div. 2 011) (citing Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J.  55, 65-66 (1978)).  See also R. 4:6-7 ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the matter ...")
[brief] [...] was not a party in the hearing to voice his side of the story and did not receive a copy of the certification until malpractice matter.  Again, in paragraph 26, [...] stated that “[t]he English Agreement which was presented and filed with the Court was materially false and omitted material particulars of the Chinese Divorce Agreements, two of which were executed virtually contemporaneously with the English Agreement. ”  *(Da233)*  Again, Plaintiff intentionally omitted a material fact to court that [...] was not advised the existence of the various Chinese Agreements.  In paragraph 32, [...] finally pointed her figures at [...].  “[W]hen I inquired of the Defendant ([...]) as to when he would begin to honor the Chinese Agreements which we had signed, most specifically the Agreement to provide an accounting as to the family company and transfer my \( \frac{1}{2} \) interest therein.  At that time, Defendant indicated that he would not do so because the critical terms of the Chinese Agreements were omitted from the divorce decree and/or the English Agreement provided to the Court for incorporation into our Final Judgment of Divorce.  *It was based upon these statements that I began to question the appropriateness of [...]’s representation of me and Defendant’s role in orchestrating my execution of an English Agreement, which failed to mention our previous executed agreements.*”  *(Da236)*  Obviously, this was a material misrepresentation to Court, [...] knew that [...] was not provided with all the Chinese Agreements, when English Agreement was prepared by [...].  Moreover, [...] made a false representation to Court that [...] represented both parties in *Fou v. Fou*.
[brief] \(^3\) “RA” refers to Respondent-Defendant [...]’s appendix.  2021, [...] filed an opposition to Appellant’s Motion to Amend.  RA0004-12.  On October 11, 2021, Appellant filed an additional opposition to [...]’s motion to dismiss.  RA0013-20.  On October 13, 2021, Appellant filed a letter brief in further support of her Motion to Amend and again, in further opposition to [...]’s motion to dismiss the Complaint.  RA0021-24.  On October 22, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s Motion to Amend and granted [...]’s motion to dismiss (“October 22, 2021 Order”).
[brief] (Pa11 (citing, [...] & [...], Current N.J Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:30A (2023), Garvey v. Township of Wall, 303 N.J. Super. 93, 100 (App. Div. 1997), K-Land v Landis Sewerage, 173 N.J. 59, 70 (2002), Arena v. Borough of Jamesburg, 309 N.J. Super. 106 (App. Div. 1998)).  Indeed, Appellants concede that “an adjudication on the merits” for entire controversy doctrine purposes occurs when “a prior action based on the same transactional facts has been tried to judgment or settled. ” (Pb21 (citing or quoting Arena, 309 N.J. Super. at 111 and Kaselaan & D’Angelo Assocs., Inc. v. Soffian, 290 N.J. Super. 293, 299 (App. Div. 1996)(emphasis added)).  Moreover, because the Consent Order constituted a consent judgment, it is the equivalent of an adjudication on the merits.
[brief] *Id.* at 506-07.  Indeed, the trial judge’s refusal in *Rova Farms* to impose prejudgment interest because he agreed with the respondent’s view that the action before him “sounded merely in tort” was a critical ground for reversal.  The Court explained that “While an equity court has discretion in awarding interest, a proper exercise of that discretion requires that the judge be aware of the alternatives open to him for consideration. ”  *Id.* at 512.  A view that the trial court lacks the power to impose pre-judgment interest in the absence of absolute proof as to a loss of use of the subject funds, the Court held, is “a mistaken one. ”  *Id.* at 505.  Thus, the Court held, “At least in the case of a liquidated sum, pre-judgment interest has been regarded by our courts as compensatory – to indemnify the plaintiff for the loss of what the moneys due him would *presumably* have earned if payment had not been refused. ”  *Id.* at 506 (emphasis in original).  That loss need not be proved; it is “assumed. ”  *Id.*  This is because the defendants use and presumptive earning of interest on the subject funds creates the loss, while “the plaintiff was deprived of such enjoyment. ”  *Id.; Lautek*, 276 N.J. Super. at 551 (“The interest awarded does nothing more than cover the value of the sum awarded for the pre-judgment period during which the defendant had the benefit of the monies to which the plaintiff is found to have been earlier entitled. ”).  The reasoning in *Rova Farms* almost perfectly describes the trial court’s error here.
[brief] In addition, the Cortez Court stated, “[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome the Motion. ”  In Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369, 377 (Ch. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 332 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2000), the Court held that “Under R. 4:46-2, when deciding Summary Judgment Motions, Trial Courts are required to engage in the same type of evaluation, analysis, or sifting of evidential material as required by R. 4:37-2(b) in light of the burden of persuasion that applies if the matter goes to trial.
[brief] LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 323 N.J. Super. 391, 417 (App. Div. 1999), citing Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 215 N.J. Super. 9, 48 (App. Div. 1987) (if the alleged defamation is not actionable, then its consequences are also not actionable).  See also, Decker v. Princeton Packet, 116 N.J. 418, 432 (1989) and Durando, 209 N.J. 236 (dismissing defamation and false light for failure to show sufficient evidence of actual malice).
[brief] 1T30:2-7.  [...] agreed to refund $5,000.00 for uncompleted work but never did.  1T30:8 to 31:4, P16.  [...] was able to successfully reverse the credit card charge.  1T31:1-23, Pa96.  [...] again chose not to address this property in his testimony, conceding, or at least nor disputing, Plaintiff’s claims.
[brief] A  Through the person who was doing the accounting for [...].  Q  Who was that?  A  Uh, I think the -- it was a Russian girl.  I don't remember her name offhand, but I can -- Q  When did you \(^{17}\)  In Defendants’ request for admissions, Plaintiff was asked to “admit that from February 8, 2018 through the filing of this lawsuit, you did not communicate with Defendants regarding any alleged outstanding amounts claimed to be owed to you.
[brief] (Da0105)  The applicator’s 22-gauge needle is surrounded by silicone to keep the pellet in place and prevent excess needle penetration.  (Da0229)  Everyone who testified in this case agrees Ozurdex® is a safe and effective medication.  Plaintiff’s treating ophthalmologist, [...], thought so highly of Ozurdex® that he administered it to Plaintiff over ten times.  (Da0087)  Plaintiff’s retained expert, practicing ophthalmologist [...], agrees Ozurdex® “works well,” having used it “routinely” for over a dozen years.  (Da0150, pp. 15-18)  B.
[brief] See Kubiak v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 N.J. Super. 115, 119 (App. Div. 1984).  As [...] so aptly expressed, "arbitration by its nature does not provide a forum conducive to extensive issue and party joinder or to the according of a variety of remedies."  Jersey City [P.B.A.] v. Jersey City, 257 N.J. Super. 6,14 (App. Div.1992).  The Lopez court further stated that "the Legislative and judicial mandates to aggressively fight fraud cannot be ignored; nor can the strong public policy to curb rampant and blatant abuses of the so-called 'no fault' system be disregarded."
[brief] ”  Da100-Da107.  [...] asked [...] to allow [...] access to the driveway to the end of the year, which he agreed to do.  (Da790)  Shortly afterward, [...] moved to reinstate his complaint against the [...] seeking an easement by necessity over that defendant’s property.  [...] granted his motion and, following a trial, issued another opinion and order rejecting [...]’s claim against the [...] as well.
[brief] (2T102-23 to 113-7).  NJ Court Rule 4:17-8(a) provides that "Answers to Interrogatories may be used to the same extent as provided by R. 4:16-1(a) and R. 4:16-1(b) for the use of the deposition of a party."  The provisions of R. 4:16-1(b) permit the use of any deposition by an adverse party for any purpose.  Eden v. Conrail, 175 N.J. Super. 263, 283 (App. Div. 1980).  Counsel's intention was to offer into evidence the defendant's Incident Report and then have plaintiff, [...], read aloud relevant portions of the Incident Report.
[brief] The notice did not specify whether the various applications were for a [...] shopping center or that the shopping center was a conditional use.  Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Twp. Plan. Bd., 295 N.J. Super. at 235.  The Perlmart Court noted: “It is, to us, plain that the purpose for notifying the public of the “nature of the matters to be considered” is to ensure that members of the general public who may be affected by the nature and character of the proposed development are fairly apprised thereof so that they may make an informed determination as to whether they should participate in the hearing or, at the least, look more closely at the plans and other documents on file. ”  Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Twp. Plan. Bd., 295 N.J. Super. at 237–38 (citations omitted).  The Perlmart Court concluded that the public notice was deficient because it did not identify the nature of the proposed use, i.e. that it was a conditional use shopping center.
[brief] Instead, at the very end of his testimony on direct examination, [...] gave the following testimony in response to questions that spoon-fed him answers:  Q.  And has [...] calculated a damage claim on your behalf?  A.  Yes.  He calculated around $16 million total.  Q.  And of that $16 million, what does that represent, Mr. [...]?  A.  The $16 million is total amount between [...] and [...] that [...] took that money.  Q.  And is it your claim that you are entitled to one half of that sum?  A. Yes.  Q.  And is that predicated on the fact that you were a fifty percent shareholder in each of [...] and [...]?  A.  Yes, I was 51 percent shareholder at [...] and percent shareholder of — [...] was 50 percent shareholder of [...].  [4T80:21-81:20.]  Recalled by the defense, [...] reiterated his complete reliance upon his expert’s opinion:
[brief] THE BURGLARY AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT BURGLARY  CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JUDGE FAILED TO PROVIDE JURORS THE OPTION TO CONVICT ON THIRD–DEGREE BURGLARY  AND FAILED TO PROPERLY DEFINE KEY TERMS SUCH AS “RECKLESS,” “ATTEMPT,” AND “ARMED WITH A DEADLY WEAPON. ”  (Not Raised Below)  POINT III  THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE IN–COURT IDENTIFICATION WERE MISLEADING, AS THEY FOCUSED ON FACTORS THAT WERE IRRELEVANT AND FAILED TO MENTION THE CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT SUGGESTED THAT THE VICTIM'S IDENTIFICATION OF [...] MAY HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN.
[brief] The proofs supporting the height variance made no sense at all.  So, this property is a stone's throw from the boardwalk and the boardwalk is generally five to six feet in elevation above this subject property.  And this part of the boardwalk is quite unique in that we actually have development on the east side of the boardwalk in this area at the elevation of the boardwalk.  As you get further into [...], you have a lot of development on the west side of the boardwalk that's at street level.  In this area you actually have development on the east side of the boardwalk at boardwalk level.  You also have some buildings to the north and to the west that are generally around 38 feet.
[brief] The basics follow:  An administrative agency denied a company’s applications to increase its premium rates for long-term care insurance, a vital service that has become much more costly as care has become more expensive and Americans have lived longer.  An agency letter set forth the specific grounds for denial.  As it turned out, however, those stated grounds were unlawful because they lacked grounding in any regulation or statute.  An evidentiary hearing proved—and the agency ultimately conceded—that the company satisfied every applicable regulation.  Instead of confessing error, the agency, aided by an ALJ, ultimately imagined a new basis for the denial and rewrote its own letter as having ruled on account of “excessive” rates.  The letter said no such thing.  Indeed, the Final Decision on appeal, while tolerating the revisionism, admitted “the fact that the Department did not use the word ‘excessive. ’”  Pa49 (emphasis added).  This is doubly improper.  First, the agency’s post hoc backfilling and rewriting requires reversal under core principles of administrative law.  This Court could and should end its analysis there.  Second, while this new “excessive” ground nominally appears in statutory text, it has never been defined through rulemaking or other agency action.  The agency failed to do so despite the Legislature’s specific command to promulgate comprehensive regulations to give meaning to the statutory terms, precedent consistently requiring rulemaking in such circumstances, and State agencies (including this very agency) having found regulations necessary to define the same term in other statutes.  The failure violates the statute’s plain text, deprives the company of due process, and is arbitrary and capricious.  If not checked by this Court, each successive administration, motivated by shifting priorities and using indeterminate factors—including what the agency admitted are undefined “public interest” and “non-actuarial” concerns—will be empowered to deploy breathtakingly broad statutory language to arbitrarily pick winners and losers in a high-stakes game of insurer solvency.  No insurer will ever know whether it will be granted a premium rate increase, or how to attempt to satisfy the governing administration.  This result was specifically prohibited by the Legislature, but the agency’s approach here, if blessed by this Court, will effectively nullify the Legislature’s carefully-crafted framework.  Under these circumstances, the agency’s decision cannot stand.  Ultimately, an application to raise premium rates by an insurance company will never be popular.  But it is essential to the long-term solvency of insurance companies and their long-term ability to pay valid claims.  To that end, premium increases are specifically contemplated and authorized by New Jersey law and insurers are entitled to have their applications determined in accordance with the framework the Legislature established and in a manner that respects due process.
[brief] However, on reconsideration, the Trial Court correctly noted that it had made a mistake, realizing the undisputed facts in the case clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that the [...] had no ability to control, dictate or direct the terms and/or conditions of employment for [...] employees.  The record in this case clearly establishes the fact that [...] could only control its own employees, who just so happened to be working in [...] Offices as vendors (providing counseling services for [...]).  Incredibly, Plaintiff’s own counsel conceded this point, noting that [...] could not control the [...] working environment.  (3T 21:5-24:9)  This indisputable fact, therefore, is paramount in analyzing Plaintiff’s claims under the NJLAD, as there simply was no evidence produced that would even remotely suggest that [...], in transferring Plaintiff out of the [...] Burlington Office, acted with any type of discriminatory or retaliatory motive.
[brief] As set forth by the Trial Court in its November 13, 2023 Statement of Reasons for its denial of [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration:  “A failure to recall claim sounds under section b of N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2 which provides for liability based on a manufacturer’s or seller’s failure to warn.  Finegold v. Gen. Motors Co., 2021 WL 2810091, at Page 4 (D.N.J. June 30, 2021).  Defendant cites Finegold in arguing that as a matter of law Plaintiff’s claim for failure to recall is preempted by the PLA despite the case being unpublished and not binding on this Court.  See Def. Br. Page 22.  In Finegold the failure to recall claim (Count Four) was its separate claim for relief outside the claim under the PLA (Count Two).  In Plaintiff’s Complaint the failure to warn claim is alleged under or pursuant to the PLA.  Count Two alleges:  “Defendants intentionally and with wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed, recklessly and maliciously failed to recall the Subject Product in the United States [rest omitted]. ”  See Pl. Compl. ¶ 48  Plaintiff raised two separate claims, one under the PLA and one for failure to recall as its own claim like as in Finegold, then Defendant might be correct in arguing that the failure to recall claim would be inert as its own claim and would be subsumed into the PLA claim.  However, in the present matter Plaintiff argues one indivisible Count that they are entitled to relief under the PLA because of Defendant’s failure to warn among other allegations under the PLA.  If the Court followed Defendant’s reasoning, they would strike Plaintiff’s request for relief under the PLA altogether.  Defendant’s argument seeking dismissal of Count Two under the PLA for alleged failure to warn is denied.
[brief] 4T – Miranda decision transcript dated October 3, 2017 5T – transcript dated October 30, 2017 6T – severance hearing transcript dated December 11, 2017 7T – 104 hearing transcript dated January 16, 2018  8T – trial transcript dated January 17, 2018  9T – trial transcript dated January 18, 2018  10T – trial transcript dated January 19, 2018  11T – Gross hearing transcript dated January 22, 2018  12T – trial transcript dated January 23, 2018  13T – trial transcript dated January 24, 2018  14T – deliberations transcript dated January 25, 2018  15T – deliberations transcript dated January 26, 2018  16T – verdict transcript dated January 29, 2018  17T – sentencing transcript dated March 23, 2018  18T – re-sentencing transcript dated February 1, 2023  Db – defendant’s brief Da – defendant’s appendix Dca – defendant’s confidential appendix PSR – presentence report COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...] testified that on January 25, 2021, the day of the alleged attempted kidnapping, she and [...] had plans to meet up that evening.  (5T30:9-12).  [...] stated that she and [...] had been messaging throughout the day and determined that she would come over to his house after she finished work.  (5T30:9-14).  She anticipated she would be out of work sometime around midnight that evening.  (5T35:12-13).  [...] texted [...] at 10:51 p.m. that night saying, “see you at my house. ” (5T35:22-25).  He then texted [...] again at 11:54 p.m. to say that the door was open and to come inside.  (5T35:17-19).  This would have been immediately prior to, and immediately after, the alleged attempted kidnapping.  [...] also testified that [...] called her on several occasions from blocked numbers in a very threatening and aggressive manner.  (5T39:4-40:25).  Finally, [...] Prichard testified in his own defense.
[brief] "The requirement of the mandatory joinder of claims has evolved continually since the adoption of the 1947 Constitution.  In Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 66 A.2d 719 (1949), the Court recognized that to administer justice efficiently, the Chancery Division should adjudicate legal issues, even if related equitable issues have already been determined.  Id. at 378, 66 A.2d 719; see also Tumarkin v. Friedman, 17 N.J. Super. 20, 24, 85 A.2d 304 (App.Div. 1951)  Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 432 (N.J. 1997)"  Whenever a case comes on for trial in either of the trial divisions of the Superior Court it shall be disposed of on its merits as the nature of the case may require.
[brief] Rather, the trial court previously correctly determined that the failure to pay the rent was due to internal strife among Appellants’ investors, which interfered with their ability to raise enough money to purchase the land, or apparently to pay the rent due under the Lease.  [FEDa114-15].  Appellants do not dispute this.  In fact, they alleged it in their First Amended Complaint and proposed Second Amended Complaint, acknowledging that [...]’s “inability to pay annual rent in 2017 was due, in part, to an internal shareholder dispute within the company, principally between [...] and another shareholder named [...] concerning the company’s direction and business strategy. ”  [Pa3105 (at ¶61); Pa3245 (at ¶61); ].  ____________________  7  Notably, in the Second Action, the trial court correctly determined that the Appellants’ fraud claim – which was virtually identical to that in the proposed Second Amended Complaint - was not sustainable as a matter of law, finding:
[brief] This date is in reference to the calculations of prejudgment interest specifically in this remand.  [...]’s compounded prejudgment interest award of $33,689,845 includes prejudgment interest awarded before this period.  owed as compound rather than simple interest, without explanation.  (40005a-40010a).  An award of prejudgment interest is not punitive, but compensatory to indemnify plaintiff for his economic loss.  *Cnty. of Essex v. First Union Nat. Bank*, 186 N.J. 46, 61 (2006) ("the award of prejudgment interest on contract and equitable claims is based on equitable principles."); *Busik v. Levine*, 63 N.J. 351, 358 (1973); *Milazzo v. Exxon Corp.*, 243 N.J. Super. 573, 577 (1990) ("the purpose of prejudgment interest is not punitive but rather compensatory in nature .
[brief] The trial court’s responsibilities flow directly from the policies underlying the Rules.  Unnecessarily burdening litigants with additional layers of review for privilege and confidentiality to produce tens of thousands of irrelevant documents is anathematic to the cornerstone “relevancy” inquiry imposed by Rule 4:10-2.  Here, the trial court ignored the burden of additional review for privilege and confidentiality placed on Defendants in the face of the court’s own acknowledgment that the ESI contained a large percentage of irrelevant documents.  Had the Court simply limited the discovery production to “relevant” records, Defendants could avoid the time and $750,000 expense of reviewing 68,000 irrelevant documents for privilege and confidentiality.  Rather than weigh the burdens of review and production against any perceived benefits of production, the trial court simply acknowledged the costly burden, acknowledged the documents were irrelevant, and ordered them to be produced.