ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], 2024 WL 1202732 (N.J. Super, AppDiv, 2024).  (Pa7)  There the plaintiff debt collector obtained judgment against the defaulting defendant borrower.  Seven years after entry of the judgment, the defendant moved to vacate the default under R4:50-1 (d) and (f).  Defendant claimed that the debt collector did not have a license under the NJCFLA.  The court rejected the challenge to the judgment, indicating the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion under as the complaint was served properly and the judgment was validly entered.  On appeal, the court analyzed the motion to vacate under R. 4:50-1 (f) and likewise found no abuse of discretion.  The Appellate Division panel noted the trial judge “...rejected defendant's claim that [...]'s alleged failure to obtain the necessary license was “an extraordinary circumstance necessitating the default judgment be vacated more than ten years after being entered and satisfied. ”  As the court correctly observed, “[d]efendant had plenty of opportunity to contest the default judgment by filing a motion to vacate soon after it was entered…”  *[...] Funding LLC v. Williams*, supra at 5.  In the instant matter, Defendant waited nearly six years to challenge the judgment.  R. 4:50-2 requires that any motion under R. 4:50-1 be filed within a “reasonable time”.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  [...] SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERED TO BINDING DECISIONAL LAW AND ITS OWN SPECIFICATIONS AND ACCORDINGLY IT PROPERLY REJECTED  EL SOL’S INCOMPLETE AND UNAUTHORIZED CONSENT OF SURETY (A62)  In its appeal, [...] raises three principal contentions in support of its argument for reversal of the decision below.  First, [...] argues that the contract specifications neither required, nor is it generally necessary for a consent of surety to include a POA in order to be binding upon the surety company.  Second, [...] argues that consent of surety was, in fact binding and [...] erroneously concluded otherwise.  Lastly, [...] argues that even if a POA was required to support the consent of surety at issue here, [...]’s prior pattern and practice of accepting similarly defective POAs estops it from now enforcing its own specifications on a going forward basis.  As explained below, each of these contentions is without merit.  [...] is entitled to a wide berth in promulgating and interpreting its own specifications.  Applying basic principles of construction, [...]’s long-standing Standard Specifications clearly require a consent of surety supported by a POA.  At no time prior to submission of a bid did [...] challenge the validity or meaning of those specifications and, indeed, it is both intuitively obvious and consistent with industry practice that any surety document submitted with a bid must be supported by a POA granting the surety representative authority to execute the undertaking.  Further, the POA form at issue here is expressly limited to the Proposal Bond and by implication prohibits the attorney-in-fact from signing other undertakings.  Under binding precedents of this Court and the Supreme Court, [...] is not permitted to accept or consider after the fact explanations submitted by [...] and its surety company that were not otherwise included at the of submission of the bid.  Lastly, [...]’s contention that [...] is estopped from rejecting its defective consent of surety because it mistakenly accepted similar forms in the past is nonsensical and would lead to absurd results.  Having discovered this defect, [...] is obligated to follow decisional law governing this very issue and to suggest otherwise would be to undermine fundamental, and well-settled principles governing public bidding.  Each of [...]’s argument should be rejected in turn.
[brief] Respondents claimed it was hospital policy that a resident can never call a C-section, even in an emergency, and that [...] agreed that [...] could not call the C-section.  The New Motion Judge even “found” that [...] “testified that residents need permission from their attending to call for a C-section” and that, as a matter of undisputed fact, “[t]he facts are that [...] could not have called the C-section.
[brief] Forensic work done on behalf of the prosecution is testimonial.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011).  [...] testified that another forensic expert reviewed the fingerprints and agreed with his conclusion.  That is testimonial hearsay used to establish a fact: that [...] left the fingerprint at the scene.  Courts addressing this issue overwhelmingly agree.  See, e.g., State v. Kiser, 2019 WL 2402962, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2019) (“[T]he import of a statement that the identification has been verified is that the identification has been deemed correct by an expert who reached the same conclusion.  Moreover, the value of the verification lies in its truth.  The State essentially gets two expert opinions from the testimony of one testifying expert. ”); People v. Pearson, 116 N.E.3d 304, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (holding that the “verification was an out-of-court statement and it was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted”); People v. Griffin, 985 P.2d 15, 17-18 (Colo. App. 1998) (same).  [...]’s testimony that two other experts examined the print and agreed with his conclusion was testimonial hearsay that should not have admitted.  In sum, [...]’s testimony went beyond the bounds of what is scientifically reliable when he testified, without any limitation, that the prints at the scene were a “match” for [...]’s and when he implied that fingerprint analysis has no error rate.  His testimony that another examiner agreed with this conclusion that the fingerprints were a match for [...]’s was also beyond the bounds of permissible testimony because it was testimonial hearsay.  The unfair bolstering of [...]’s opinion requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] Plaintiffs request [...] and [...] on their initial list of proposed custodians.  |  It is Plaintiffs’ understanding that [...] does not argue that [...] and [...] do not possess relevant information, or that production of their relevant custodial files will cause undue burden.  | | | | 5/12/2020:  The parties agree to a set of 72 initial document custodians.  ECF No. 431 at 10.  |  Rather, it is Plaintiffs’ understanding that [...]’s position is that the determination of whether to add them as document custodians and to produce their | | | | 5/15/2020: [...] ordered the addition of nine other document custodians.  ECF No. 436.  |  [...] and [...] should be added as | | | | 11/16/2020: | | (The Special Master defined the dispute as: “Adding Mark [...] and Sheryl [...] as custodians and producing their relevant custodial files. ”)  Plaintiffs write [...] to propose four additional document custodians, including Mark [...] and Sheryl [...].  12/11/2020: [...] issues a written order stating “The addition of further custodians for discovery purposes is premature at this time. ”  ECF No. 588.  7/19/2021: [...] issued an Order Setting Case Schedule, with deposition set to begin on 1/1/2021, and document production to be substantially completed by 1/31/2022.  ECF No. 706.  7/26/2021: [...] issued an order stating that “[...] should be required to meet certain metrics by certain dates to avoid a disproportionate number of documents being produced toward the end of the document production period. ”  ECF No. 712.  9/9/2021: [...] states that it “has now completed the majority of its review process. ”  relevant custodial files is premature.  [...] also raises the “apex doctrine” as a reason to delay or refuse to add [...] and [...] as custodians.  custodians now.  [...] must substantially complete document production in four months.  Adding them now will permit [...] sufficient time to collect, review, and produce documents from then custodial files before that deadline.  Continued delay will only allow [...] to run out the clock, by promising consideration at a later date with no intent of agreement.  The “apex doctrine” does not apply to custodial selection for the purpose of document production.  EXHIBIT B
[directive] Disorderly Persons $500 to $2,500 10% permissible  Incompetent welfare of a person who is unable to care for himself because of a mental disease or defect.  Person  False Reports to Actor gives false information to law enforcement (other than with purpose to implicate 2C:28-4(a)(b) Law Enforcement Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible another – which would be a fourth degree crime).  Authority
[brief] As noted above, Tenant leased the Premises for the sole purpose of operating a health and fitness center.  (Da11, Da18, Lease at §§ 1.01(c), 5.01).  As is customary in commercial leases of this nature, Landlord agreed to deliver the Premises to Tenant “as is” and Tenant agreed that, prior to opening the fitness center, it would make certain improvements to the Premises so the space could be utilized for its intended purpose (“Tenant’s Work”).
[brief] *Id.* (citing *N.J. Const.*, art. I, ¶ 2) (emphasis added).  The higher standard of conduct imposed upon public officials whether or not they are performing their official duties,  In *Karins*, supra, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the issue as to whether discipline could be imposed upon a firefighter, who, while being interviewed by a police officer during a drunk driving stop, used a racial epithet when an African-American officer arrived as a backup officer.  The racial epithet was directed at a fellow public employee in public.  The *Karins* Court upheld his suspension ruling, *inter alia*, that the racial epithet, while made off duty, was not protected speech as per *Pickering/Connick* test:  First, can the employee’s speech be fairly characterized as relating to a matter of public concern?  This is known as the employee’s interest prong because it focuses on the interest of an employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.  Second is there a governmental interest, as an employer in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public through its employees?  This is known as the public’s interest or the governmental interest prong.  To summarize, when private expression is involved, the *Pickering/Connick* balancing test looks not only to the content of speech, but also the “manner, time, and place in which it is delivered. ”  *Karins*, 152 N.J. at 550 (internal citations omitted).  Applying *Pickering/Connick*, the *Karins* Court held that the racial epithet: 1) was not related to any matter of public concern and, 2) the City had an interest in maintaining order discipline, harmony and a professional working relationship between the police and fire departments that substantially outweighed the firefighter’s right to make abusive, insulting, racially motivated comments.
[brief] No party disputes the manifest purpose of the Highlands Act is to reduce "the environmental impacts of sprawl development" in the Highlands Region by subjecting "major development" in the Preservation Area, which all agree the West Milford compressor station indisputably is, "to stringent water and natural resource protection standards, policies, planning, and regulation."  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  One of the primary goals of the regional master plan for the Preservation Area is to "prohibit or limit to the maximum extent possible construction or development which is incompatible with preservation."  N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(9).  Because the Legislature plainly intended to subject major development in the Preservation Area to stringent regulation, we are compelled to interpret exemptions from the Act narrowly.
[brief] _Cohen’s Expert being Precluded while [...]’s expert is not_  On the second day of trial, [...] had asked [...] to reconsider a prior order which had limited [...]’s testimony precluding him from testifying regarding the contents of the legal bills including the lack of description of the work performed and amounts of the legal bills.  (See Generally Tr. 3T Pg. 5 – Pg. 12).  In maintaining her original determination, [...] stated that a review of the underlying [...] file (the 21 Bankers boxes) was so fundamental, that [...]’s failure to do so rendered his findings a Net Opinion.  (3T Pg. 10, line 5 – Pg. 12, line 6).  Yet [...] permitted [...]’s expert to testify in his opinion that the billing was reasonable (6T, Pg. 93, lines 2, 12-14).  Again, that is despite the fact as indicated above, both experts reviewed essentially reviewed the same material, and neither reviewed the [...] file, which had been sealed away in storage from before any lawsuit was filed until it was unsealed in court, as discussed above.  The existence of the 21 Bankers boxes was never even disclosed by [...] to Cohen in this case at any time prior to trial.  Relatedly, [...]’s expert was even permitted to testify at trial even though it was someone named [...] (6T, Pg. 70, line 24), not the same expert as [...] who was disclosed during discovery (Pa51-Pa52).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order on Return Date of OTSC, entered July 8, 2024………………………  Da9-Da11 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider, entered October 4, 2024 …..  Da12-Da13 | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **62-64 Main Street, L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of Hackensack,** | 39, 40 | | 221 N.J. 129 (2015) | | | **In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96,** | 44 | | 215 N.J. 578 (2013) | | | **Berman v. Parker,** | 40 | | 348 U.S. 26 (1954) | | | **Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc.,** | 37 | | 289 N.J. Super. 329 (Law Div. 1995) | | | **Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy,** | 19 | | 459 N.J. Super. 529 (App. Div. 2019), aff’d as mod. 244 N.J. 567 (2021) | | | **City of Trenton v. Lenzner,** | 37 | | 16 N.J. 465 (1954) | | | **Crowe v. DeGioia,** | 15, 19, 20 | | 90 N.J.
[brief] The State misrepresented facts in the record.  The State also attempted to bolster its case with exaggeration, hyperbole and misrepresentation of the factual record below.  First, the State erroneously said Koda bit Coco the Golden Doodle “eight to ten times”.  Pb2.  This is a gross exaggeration.  [...] testified that Koda went after Coco twice, not eight to ten times.  See 2T94:77-22, that Koda “attacked my dog,” 2T94:4-8 and that he “attacked one more time. ”  2T94:15-16.  She said that her veterinarian saw eight to ten bite marks, none of which was serious enough to require stitches or hospitalization.  2T96:1.  That is consistent with two bites, as it is common knowledge that GSD’s have four canine teeth.  One bite equals four puncture wounds; two bites equals eight.  The other two could have been lacerations or indentations from other, smaller, teeth, but it does not constitute eight to ten bites.  And because the State introduced no veterinary records, there was no support for the State’s outrageous conclusion at Pb2.
[brief] However, Probation’s over-garnishment of Appellant’s income and SSA benefits continued.  The SSA issued a Notice of Termination of garnishment dated 12/8/2021 (DA312).  Probation issued erroneous notices dated 1/23/2022 (DA321) and 1/31/2022 (DA323) which resulted in the re-institution of garnishment of Appellant’s SSA benefits in violation of the Orders of 10/25/2021 and 1/11/2022.  The SSA subsequently issued conflicting notices of garnishment utilizing two different child support accounts, one of which garnished under a false NJ child support account number ([...]) not belonging to Appellant (see DA313-318).  Improper SSA garnishment totaled $11,917.40 (DA319).  An additional $996.00 of Appellant’s wages were improperly garnished, for a total sum of $12,913.40.  Probation provided reimbursement of only $4,843.90 (DA320-326).
[brief] Although he's in a, in a, in a police department, there's nothing in there to indicate that his freedom of movement was restricted.  He's using his cell phone which, as I said, was extremely significant.  The duration is relatively short.  The physical surroundings are a interview room.  With respect to the nature and degree of pressure applied, I didn't see any pressure here.  The only suggestion of pressure was during cross-examination and the officer credibly and consistently denied all of that.  The language used by the police officers was polite and appropriate.  . . . .  All other objective indications in the case indicate to me that [...] was simply a person of interest that may have knowledge.  Clearly the detectives indicated that [...] had provided information.  If he simply provided information that of anything to indicate he was with or saw [...] that night, it'd be worth talking to [...].  This hearing established that the two of them were to some extent sharing the room at the Ramada, Room 517.  So if that's the case, if it's rented in [...]'s name, [...]'s the suspect, certainly likely that the police want to talk to somebody else that may be staying in Room 517.  So I conclude that in this case this is simply part of an investigatory procedure, that it's not a custodial interrogation.
[brief] *Erdman v. Cochise County*, 926 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1991); *Whitted v. City of Philadelphia*, 744 F. Supp. 649, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (failure of police officer to obey regulation on use of baton not shown policy or custom); *Powe v. City of Chicago*, 664 F.2d 639, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1981); *Gilmore v. City of Atlanta*, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir. 1984); *Crane v. Alexander*, 756 F.2d 1070, 1073 (5th Cir. 1985); *Burnett v. Ciolino*, 750 F.Supp. 1562, 1564 (M.D.  Fla. 1990).
[directive] [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] płeć, data urodzenia, wzrost, waga, kolor oczu, wszelkie znaki szczególne, takie jak blizny i tatuaże, Pana(i) zdjęcie, marka, model, kolor, rocznik i numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, którym Pan(i) jeździ, adres z kodem pocztowym, miastem i hrabstwem Pana(i) miejsca zamieszkania, jak również opis przestępstwa, do którego popełnienia Pan(i) się przyznaje mogą zostać udostępnione do wiadomości publicznej w Internecie?
[brief] (Doc. 136).  The Court understands that the [...] has until December 24, 2018 to submit a reply to [...]’s statement regarding its views on the possible relevance of the documents listed in the [...]’s privilege logs.  (Doc. 132 ¶ 2).  Although the Court is issuing this Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order before receipt of the [...]’s reply, the Court notes that [...]’s statement and the [...]’s reply are immaterial to the reasoning and findings of the Court on the matters discussed herein, and that the putative special master will be able to utilize the statement and reply in fulfilling duties related to the evaluation of the assertions of privilege, as discussed infra.
[brief] One of the primary functions of judicial disqualification/recusal "is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, which in turn depends on a belief in the impartiality of judicial decision making."  United States v. Nobel, 696 F. 2d 231, 235 (3rd Cir. 1982) cert. den. 462 U.S. 1118, (1983) N.J.R. Canon 3C and R 1:12-1 recognizes that the perception of fairness and integrity is as important as the correctness of the judgment.
[brief] State v. Mitchell discusses with approval prior applications of the fundamental injustice exception, among others, State v. Cummins, 168 N.J. Super. 429, 433 (Law Div. 1979) (conviction of defendant for disorderly conduct while an involuntarily-committed patient in a psychiatric hospital is fundamentally unjust because it imposes punishment on someone for “displaying the symptoms of his illness while in a place designed to treat that illness”) and State v. Allen, 99 N.J. Super. 314, 316 (Law Div. 1968) (because defendant had not been informed of his right to direct appeal, barring petition for post-conviction relief would be “contrary to fundamental justice”).  *State v. Mitchell*, 126 N.J. 565, 588 (1992).  Fundamental injustice is rarely found and is not typically invoked simply because the defendant disagrees with the decisions of prior courts on their merits.  Defendant’s previous claims, simply bearing a new label, need not be heard yet again after adjudication or review by four courts.  II.
[brief] [...] concedes that [...] filed her claim within the six-year statute of limitations under state law, N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1.  (Db16).  At the same time, [...] contends that [...] “failed to file her claim within the time limits set forth in her policy of insurance. ” (Db20).  For both statements to be true, the policy’s limitations period must conflict with the statute of limitations under state law.  Thus, the only logical conclusion is that the six-year statute of limitations applies under the policy’s “Conformity to Law” provision, making [...]’s claim timely.  (Pa101) (providing that “[i]f any of [its] terms . . . conflict with state or local law, state or local law will apply”).  To avoid this outcome, [...] asks the Court to ignore the insurance policy’s plain meaning, to construe the policy against coverage, and to rewrite the policy in a way that renders its conformity to law provision meaningless.  But even if the Court engaged in such interpretive jiggery-pokery, it would still need to apply the tolling rule espoused in Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins., 56 N.J. 514 (1970) and affirmed in Azze v. Hanover Ins., 336 N.J. Super. 630, 643 (App. Div. 2001).  And that rule tolls a policy’s limitations period until the insurer denies coverage, which also makes [...]’s claim timely.  Put simply, all roads lead to vacating dismissal.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] The sentencing court's findings were supported by credible evidence in the record. State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 245 (2011).  In finding aggravating factor three, risk of recidivism, the court noted that although [...] was just twenty-two years of age, he had “two juvenile adjudications with two Violations of Probation and a juvenile conference committee, two municipal court convictions with conditional discharge … [and] [eleven] motor vehicle suspensions, six for driving on the revoked list. ”  Similarly, in finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the court cited [...]'s lack of remorse and the court's belief that he demonstrated a threat to public safety.  [...] takes particular issue with the court's emphasis on his apparent lack of remorse, asserting, “the court was not entitled to take these factors into consideration in imposing a higher term of years than otherwise would be imposed,” and urging that an appropriate sentence would not exceed the minimum term of ten years.
[brief] QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT  This is a probate matter.  The decedent’s estranged wife and her counsel engaged in extensive discovery and motions to obtain voluminous records from the decedent’s parents’ business, in the hope of proving that the decedent had an ownership share in the business, even though they knew the decedent had no such interest.  The decedent’s estranged wife and her counsel also engaged in extensive discovery and motions to obtain life insurance documents, even though it is black-letter law that life insurance proceeds are not estate assets.  The estranged wife’s counsel then sought attorney’s fees and other sanctions for the time spent engaging in the frivolous, unnecessary, and irrelevant discovery.  Where the Trial Court awarded counsel fees substantially related to the improper discovery, and other duplicative sanctions, under these circumstances, should they be deemed an abuse of discretion because the award was arbitrary and unreasonable?
[brief] Significantly, Plaintiff must emphasize the above-mentioned case law relates to matters which were at the summary judgment and/or trial stage when reaching its conclusion, in contrast to Plaintiff’s matter which was at the very initial pleading stages of litigation.  As such, this case law provides a starting point for determining whether complained of conduct closely relates to a law or public policy, but Plaintiff also respectfully requests the Court to bear in mind the generous and hospitable approach the Court must be guided by at this nascent stage.  Indeed, the Court must afford Plaintiff every reasonable inference upon review of her Complaint, and upon doing so, the Court surely must reverse the Motion Judge’s dismissal ruling.