ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The objection raised by the Defendant is that they cannot be vicariously liable based upon their contention that they did not employ any of the medical providers at issue and the treatment at issue did not occur at their facility.  However, nothing was provided in the record by the Defendant to substantiate this legal claim.  Namely, there were no certifications or affidavits submitted by the Defendant from any of its corporate representatives as to the employment status or relationship with the co-defendants.  There have been no contracts, employment agreements or even a list of employees produced.  There has been no discovery exchanged on the Defendant’s level of control or involvement in this case.  In essence, the Defendant’s argument is an improper motion for summary judgment disguised as an objection to the Plaintiffs’ Affidavits of Merit.
[directive] Internet Predatory Crimes Unit (IPCU).  The IPCU shall be reflected as a unit within the Division of State Police and shall be led by a DSP Lieutenant.  The IPCU shall be comprised of both DCJ State Investigators and DSP detectives.  It may also include investigators who are members of the DSP task force, such as FBI agents or members of county or municipal law e~forcement agencIes.  Personnel assigned to the IPCU shall: (a) Conduct investigations where computers, telecommunication devices, and other high technology instruments (including the Internet), are the vehicles for the commission of criminal acts perpetrated against children; (b) Serve as the lead representative for the previously established -9- Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force, maintain and manage the ICAC grant and oversee compliance of all administrative and operational guidelines as mandated by the Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention; (c) Provide training for law enforcement agencies throughout the state In investigations where computers are involved in the commission of crimes against children; (d) Provide corporate outreach services to educate and inform the public and private sector, as well as institutions of higher education within the State, as to the dangers and vulnerabilities of technology-driven crimes against children; (e) Provide local assistance to out-of-state authorities investigating incidents of online crimes against children emanating from, terminating in or occurring through the State of New Jersey; (f) Provide training and assistance to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of criminal laws relating to computer crimes through forensic collection, recovery, processing, preservation, analysis, storage, maintenance and presentation of digital evidence; (g) Conduct computer forensic examinations and the analysis of digital evidence as it pertains to technology related crimes in the State of New Jersey, by providing forensic examination of digital media pursuant to consent or -10- search orders, or judicial, executive or administrative seizures; and (h)
[directive] B.  Wildlife Management Areas  ORVs and ATVs are generally prohibited in Wildlife Management Areas.  “No person shall operate motor vehicles, including conveyances, commonly known as off-road vehicles, all terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, dog sleds, dog carts or trail bikes, on State Wildlife Management Areas at any time without first obtaining a written permit or other authorization from the Division. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:25-2.2(c).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 23:7-9(a), and with respect to property under the control of the Division of Fish and Wildlife, no individual may (1) remove or disturb property of the State, (2) injure or damage property of the state, or (3) use property contrary to the rules and regulations Wildlife.4 established by the Division of Fish and  Additionally, no individual may operate vehicles on State Wildlife Management Areas without first obtaining a written permit or other authorization from the Division of Fish and Wildlife.  N.J.A.C. 7:25-2.2.  Individuals that violate the provisions of Title 23 are subject to fines in Title 39 as outlined in Section II(E) below.  See N.J.S.A. 39:3C-33(a)–(d); N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34(b)–(c); see also N.J.S.A. 23:7-9(b)(2)(a) (“[A]ny violation involving a vehicle or off-road vehicle shall be subject to the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of L.2009, c.275 (C.39:3C-33 and C.39:3C-34).
[brief] See Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 7 on R. 4:69-6(c) (2002) (noting that enlargement is appropriate where the case presents "an important public rather than a private interest which requires adjudication or clarification.").  Ptl. Monek v. Borough of S. River, 354 N.J. Super. 442, 449-50 (App. Div. 2002)  However, because plaintiffs still contend, they are entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party on their civil rights claim, the matter is not moot.  Kumar v. Piscataway Twp. Council No. [...] (App. Div. Aug. 23, 2022)  Buckhannon dismissed this fear noting that "so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case."  532 U.S. at 608-09, 121 S.Ct. at 1842, 149 L.Ed.2d at 865-66.  Mason v. City of Hoboken 196 N.J. 51 (N.J. 2008)
[directive] Subordinate law enforcement agencies, including county and municipal police forces, have a duty to cooperate with the Attorney General to improve the administration of the criminal justice system, including the efficient delivery of police services.  For county and municipal law enforcement agencies, cooperation in internal affairs matters begins with strict adherence to the Attorney General’s policy requirements.  1.0.6  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must also recognize that they conduct internal affairs investigations, particularly those that involve allegations of criminal conduct, under the direct supervision of the County Prosecutors.  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must inform the appropriate County Prosecutor when allegations of police misconduct involve potential criminal conduct.  In addition, county and municipal law enforcement agencies must confer with and follow the instructions given by the County Prosecutor at all critical points in the investigative process.  This is particularly true when the agency is in the process of gathering evidence, including the taking of statements, concerning allegations of criminal conduct.  References to County Prosecutors throughout this document should also be understood to refer to the Office of the Attorney General wherever such an interpretation would be appropriate.
[directive] this of 7  Section with accordance in alert conflict communicate reason not does for query any the made that agency the but alert in conflict a results that agency operation, the the planned initiating before agencies or agency interested with other the shall: query the made as soon as agencies or agency interested other the of representative a contact a) and operation; planned the initiating after practicable or agency interested other the contacting for not reasons the writing in document b) the maintain shall agency  The operation.
[brief] JUDGMENT AS APPELLANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF [...].  The Federal Employers' Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier ... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier....”  45 U.S.C. § 51.  FELA is not a workers compensation statute.  Under FELA, an employer can only be found liable where negligence resulted in an injury, mere injury alone will not result in liability.  See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994) (“We have insisted that FELA ‘does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty.  The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur. ’”) (quoting Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947)); See also, Polizzi v. New Jersey Transit, 364 N.J.Super. 323, 332 (App. Div. 2003).  When presenting a claim under FELA, a plaintiff is “required to prove the traditional common law elements of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation. ”  Robert v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 832 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1987)(see also Stevens v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 356 N.J.Super. 311, 319 (App. Div. 2003).  The causation standard under FELA is a relaxed standard.
[brief] After being denied admission into the dual degree program, Plaintiff-Appellant attempted to end-run the 3.0 GPA requirement by applying directly \(^5\)  Throughout [...]’s brief, he attempts to manufacture instances in which he was “misled” by [...] regarding the requirements of the dual degree.  None of the examples are legally material.  For example, [...] alleges that when researching the dual degree option, he inquired – via [...]’s web portal – about whether he (having minored in Chemistry in College) would be eligible to pursue a Master’s degree in Chemistry.  The answer was that he could.  (Plaintiff Dep., T106:8-107:3 at Pa. 166).  [...] now claims that [...] misled him in this instance because [...]’s response should have included complete details of the requirements for the dual degree.  That, of course, was not the question he posed via the web portal, and in any case, it is not legally material.
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................................3  I.  [...] grants [...] a ROFR .........................................................................................................4  II.  [...] enters the PSA without [...]’s knowledge .......................................................................6  III.  The Parties engage in litigation and the Trial Court grants summary judgment in favor of [...] .................................................................................................................................13  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................18
[brief] So this was conduct that was repeated over and over and over again . . .  And certainly after the Appellate Division decision in December of 2006 [holding] the [...] had a fiduciary duty to [...], and they had a fiduciary duty to [...] . . .  And so this was not an isolated incident. ” (242T212:21-214:15).  ....  “[Even after the Appellate Division opinion was rendered [in 2006] ..., they continued.  And during the pendency of this litigation, this trial . . . when it should have been obvious to the [...] that we were trying this case, we were getting to the bottom of it, they just continued. ” (235T75:13-25 and 248T20:16-21:17).  (40048a)  ***  The [...] even refused to stop taking money after [...] so ordered [in 2011].  (72a, 40049a)  Indeed by orders of magnitude, [...] found that the harm the [...] inflicted upon [...] was quantifiably greater during the 6-year Non-RICO SOL Period, than it was during the preceding 16 years.
[brief] (5T 50-18 to 51-2)  But, the State continued, “[e]ven if you disagree with me and you find that the worst that the defendant was going to do was break off a little more for [...] on the ride home, that is distribution. ”  (5T 51-3 to 6)  At the charge conference, the parties agreed with the court that instructions on actual, constructive, and joint possession were “all . . . appropriate here. ”  (5T 22-10 to 19)  [...] instructed jurors on joint possession.  (5T 69-24 to 70-3)  The jury convicted [...] of all charges.  (5T 95-25 to 103-23)
[brief] Fluehr v. City of Cape May, 732 A.2d 1035 (N.J. 1999)  .............................................  9  Garrison v. Township of Middletown, 712 A.2d 1101 (N.J. 1998) .............................................  9  Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., Inc., 722 A.2d 944 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998) ....................... 21, 23, 26 Gruccio v. Baxter, 343 A.2d 145 (N.J. Super. L. Div. 1975) ......................... 21 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) ...................................................... 14 Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 1996) ............................................. 18 Jalil v. Dime Sav. Bank, No. A-1388-05T1, 2006 WL 2726834 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2006) .................................................. 22 Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency, 814 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2016) ............................................ 24 Mattson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 3d 381 (D.N.J. 2015) .................................... 28 McCann v. Ogle Cnty., Illinois, 909 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2018) ........................................... 18 McDonald v. Pinchak, 652 A.2d 700 (N.J. 1995) ............................................... 11 Monek v. Borough of S. River, 808 A.2d 114 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2002) ....................... 6, 25 Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ......................................................
[brief] (Award at 49-55).  Following his review of the evidence concerning the City’s financial condition, the arbitrator concluded:  In sum, the confluence of lost municipal court revenues due to COVID-19, the delay in negotiations until 2022, the structural budgetary shortfall experienced in 2022-2023 by the City, the need for it to request an additional 10 million dollars from the [...], its moratorium on filling vacant positions (to raise 3.6 million dollars), and the City’s diversion of reserves to fund an originally proposed 2% across-the-board offer to the [...] units contributed to the significant limitations on fashioning an economic award for this group.  The arbitrator then discussed Comparability (16g(2)), recognizing the importance of considering evidence of a pattern of settlement among a public employer’s units.  (Award at 58-62).  See Somerset Cty. Sheriff’s Office and Somerset Cty. Sheriff FOP, Lodge No. 39, P.E.R.C. No. 2007-33, 32 NJPER 372 (¶156 2006), aff’d, 34 NJPER 21 (¶8 App. Div. 2008) (“[m]aintaining an established pattern of settlement promotes harmonious labor relations, provides uniformity of benefits, maintains high morale, and fosters consistency in negotiations. ”)  As to internal comparability, the arbitrator considered the 2% salary increases received by the City’s non-uniformed units and the greater than 2.9% salary increases received in the [...] unit’s 2022 MOA.  (Award at 61-62).  However, the arbitrator noted that the [...] unit also provided economic concessions including ending terminal leave and longevity for new hires, and folding longevity into salary for existing members.  (Award at 61).  Ultimately, when considering internal comparability in the context of the public interest and financial impact criteria, the arbitrator determined that he was constrained to awarding less than 2% salary increases for some years of the award based on the City’s financial condition.
[brief] CASES  Bishop Property Mgt. v. City of Jersey City Rent Leveling Board, 2020 WL 6553789 (November 9, 2020)  .........................................................4-5  Mayes v. Jackson Township Rent Leveling Board, 103 N.J. 362, 378 (1986)...........................................................................................................4, 7, 25  Troy Hills Vill. v. Twp. Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 68 N.J. 604 (1975).  ...........................................................................................................28  STATUTES  The Anti-Eviction Act..................................................................................3, 7, 22  The Tenant Protection Act.............................................................................passim  MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES  Hoboken Rent Control Ordinance...............................................................passim  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] On January 11, 2019, following a jury trial and verdict, Judge [...] of the Superior Court of New Jersey entered a Final Judgment against Defendants [...] and [...], imposing joint and several liability for $1,547,063.31 in damages ($500,000), attorney’s fees ($702,000), prejudgment on the jury’s damages award ($65,250), and prejudgment interest on the award for attorney’s fees and costs ($279,813.31).  (Da25)¹  Defendants appealed the Final Judgment.  On August 25, 2021, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey rendered an opinion, affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding for further proceedings of the Final Judgment of the Superior Court of New Jersey.  (Da25-40)  On June 23, 2023, Judge [...] of the Superior Court of New Jersey entered an Order denying Defendants’ motion to vacate the Final Judgment dated January 11, 2019.  (Da13)  On July 10, 2023, Judge [...] of the Superior Court of New Jersey entered an Order, amending January 11, 2019 Final Judgment pursuant to August 25, 2021 Appellate Court Decision.  (Da15-17)
[brief] Ultimately, the requested relief was a “technical variance” since the “underlying zoning in both Florence and Mansfield permits warehouse distribution use. ” (2T 75:3-7; 78:9-15).  For the positive criteria, [...] testified that the Property must be viewed in its entirety.  More than half of the Property is located in Mansfield, and a significant portion of the Florence portion of the Property is located in the “AG- Agricultural Zone,” or constrained by flood hazard or wetland areas.  (2T 76:1-9).  As a result of the site’s characteristics, most of the development, including the structure itself, will be located in Mansfield, and some of the accessory uses will be in the limited portion of Florence’s SM Zone, which is largely unconstrained.  (2T 76:16-22).  Given the physical and environmental constraints on the Property, [...] testified that the Florence portion of the tract is particularly suited to accommodate the proposed accessory uses, and allows the structure itself to be located closer to the Interstate 295 interchange, further away from the agricultural and residential zones.  (2T 76:23-25; 77:1- 11).  In regards to the driveway location, he testified that it best fits the site layout as the frontage in Mansfield is both limited and not suitable for access, due to the short distance from the Interchange.  (2T 77:12-18).  For the positive criteria’s special reasons, [...] testified that the use variance would advance several purposes of zoning, as articulated in the MLUL: (A) guiding development in a manner that promotes the general welfare; (D) promoting development that does not conflict with the adjoining municipality; (G) providing sufficient space and appropriate locations for a variety of uses; and (M) encouraging coordination between public entities to ensure efficient use of land.  [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a), (d) (g) & (m); 2T 78:16-25; 79:1-9].  For the negative criteria, [...] testified that there would be no detrimental impacts with the “placement or location of [the] accessory uses on the Florence portion of the tract[,]” in relation to the site plan and zoning parameters, nor to the adjacent properties and streets.  (2T 79:10-21).  He also testified that there would be no substantial impairment of the zoning ordinance and master plan, considering the “like kind zoning” in both municipalities, especially when the Mansfield portion of the tract required no zone specific or bulk variance relief.  (2T 79:22-25; 80:1-8).  Importantly, [...] testified that the “key” to the analysis is that “warehouse distribution use is contemplated, indeed contemplated on the SM zoned portion of the property in Florence, I think consistent with those principles, I think under the circumstances, the D-1 variance can be granted without compromising intent and purpose of the zoned plan.
[brief] .............................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 17:10-19 to 26 ...........................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1 et seq. ........................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 et seq.  ........................................................................ 7, 10 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7 ..................................................................................  11 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-9 ..................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-11 ...............................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-12 .................................................................11  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 .........................................................11, 12, 13 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(a) .......................................................11  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(f) ......................................................11  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(g) .....................................................11 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) ......................................................12 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(j) ......................................................12 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-19 ..........................................................11 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33 ..........................................................12, 13 Court Rules R. 4:50-1 ...........................................................................22, 24 R. 4:50-1(a) ......................................................................23 R. 4:50-1(d) ......................................................................19, 23 R. 4:50-1(e) ......................................................................19, 22, 23 R. 4:50-1(f) ......................................................................21, 22, 23, 24 Procedural History On June 28, 2017, [...], Plaintiff/Respondent herein, (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), filed a complaint in the Special Civil Part of the Bergen County Law Division, (“the complaint”) (Da1), naming as defendant [...], Defendant/Appellant herein, (hereinafter “Defendant.
[brief] [...] filed its first petition on January 17, 2017.  By this time, [...] knew that N.J.S.A.40:55D-19 and the applicable cases required robust consideration of "alternative methods" such as a catalytic heater that would mitigate the adverse impact.  The company applied to the [...] for the [...] site on January 2, 2018, by which time [...] had experienced at least three nearly trouble-free years’ experience with catalytic heaters.  As the company had filed a petition the previous year under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, it then knew that the applicable law and cases required more consideration of "alternative methods" such as a catalytic heater that would mitigate the adverse impact than it had thus far conducted.  At least from the time it filed the petition to the [...] for 960 Holmdel Road, then, [...] had ample time, a year, to now give lawful consideration to adding another catalytic heater to its system at the proposed location.  7.  The [...] And ID Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ignoring The Decisions Of The [...] And Accepted And Relied Upon "Expert" Testimony That Contradicted The Expert Findings Of The [...] (Argued Below: Ha106)
[brief] See Point II, infra. D.  Because the Board Improperly Evaluated the Public Interest at Stake, Unreasonably Considered Detriments That Were Not Substantial and Did Not Impose any Conditions, the Board’s Balancing Analysis was Flawed from Inception Baptist Home of S. Jersey v. Bo. of Riverton, 201 N.J. Super. 226 (Law Div. 1984), recognized that without a reasonable effort to balance the positive attributes of the development (i.e., the special reasons that justify the variance) against the negatives, a board’s finding that there were any negative impacts associated with a proposed inherently beneficial use would always permit a denial of the application.