ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  [...], 2024-2025 N.J. Rules Of Evidence (Gann), comment 1.2 to N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1), p. 876 (citing Kohrherr v. Ferreira, 215 N.J. Super. 123, 130 (App. Div. 1987)).  In a similar context, this Court has held that the immunity provided by a civil reservation “is not available to prevent impeachment which may uncover the perjurious basis of a criminal defendant’s civil claim. ”  Stone v. Police Dep’t of Borough of Keyport, 191 N.J. Super. 554, 558 (App. Div. 1983).  When a criminal defendant testifies in support of his claim in a related civil action in a manner that “is inconsistent with the sworn testimony he gave to support his plea, the protection of the [civil reservation] immunity has been waived. ”  Id.  In other words, a civil reservation is not a license to commit perjury.  Even if [...] had obtained a civil reservation, which he has not, the principles set forth above would still permit him to be cross-examined with his prior inconsistent statements at the time of his guilty plea, since a civil reservation does not permit a defendant to construct a civil defense based on perjury.  At the very least, cross-examination regarding the prior inconsistent statements is an appropriate area for questioning during a discovery deposition.  Thus, [...] correctly ordered Defendant [...] to answer questions at his discovery deposition regarding the prior, sworn, inconsistent statements he made at the time of his guilty plea, which statements are not subject to any privilege or civil reservation.  POINT III
[brief] When Plaintiffs learned of fault and damages attributable to Defendant’s failure to advise or register Plaintiff [...] as a charity on December 18, 2020, the discovery rule was triggered and Plaintiffs had six years to file their legal malpractice case.  They filed within six years on August 29, 2023.  (PA000001)  The trial court erroneously dismissed the case with prejudice.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] (6T:158-25 to 163-17; 8T:80-19 to 81-21, 189-23 to 24; Da 13-14)  [...]’s MVR recording was also played for the jury, but because the camera was facing the inside of [...]’s police car, it did not capture any video footage of the incident.  It did however include audio captured by [...]’s body-worn microphone from both inside and outside the restaurant.  (7T:91-19 to 95-20; 8T:83-9 to 17, 175-20 to 176-21; Da 15)  Neither [...] nor [...] wore body cameras.
[brief] Plaintiff’s surveyor, [...], P.L.S., offered no opinion on whether the amount of water runoff changed after the [...] repaved and relined their driveway.  A. Blair’s first report did not contend that the [...] caused or contributed to any water runoff.  Plaintiff retained a surveyor, [...], “to determine the path of overland water flow that passes from” the [...]’ property to plaintiff’s property.
[brief] Id. Barney v. Bd. of Review, No. A-3221-19, 2021 WL 1904561, *3 (App. Div. May 12, 2021) (slip op.).  Conversely, [...] did not need to expressly inquire about alternative positions because he had been employed with this employer for 26 years and was aware that his employer was a small, family-owned business with limited, very specific positions available.  He knew that only the owner and her son handled the paperwork, that there were no desk jobs available, and that the only available positions were just as labor-intensive as his position.  “Even if a petitioner need not prove notice to the employer and a request for accommodation, a petitioner must ‘still show[ ] that, at the time of the claimant's departure, either the employer had no position available that would accommodate the claimant's condition or the claimant would not have been assigned to any such position.
[brief] RESPONDENT’S EXPERT REPORT SHOULD BE BARRED FOR FAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR OBTAINING THE REQUIRED VARIANCES (1T5:15-23)  Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”) filed its in limine motion to bar Respondent from presenting its appraisal report dated March 10, 2023 to the jury since Respondent’s Appraisal Report fails to adhere to established condemnation law when analyzing the fair market value of the subject Property, in not only failing to apply the appropriate zoning as discussed *supra*; but by also failing to apply an appropriate adjustment to account for the lack of developmental approvals on the Date of Valuation consistent with Respondent’s appraiser’s opinion of the property’s Highest and Best Use.  Therefore, Respondent’s appraisal report must be barred from presentation to the jury as unduly speculative.  When a property is acquired through the power of eminent domain, the landowner is entitled to receive just compensation from the condemning authority which measured as the acquired property’s fair market value as of the Date of Valuation.
[brief] Da0021-Da0024.  Appellants claim that the discovery conducted to date would unfairly prejudice them in arbitration, however they fail to explain why they would prefer to engage in arbitration without all relevant information available.  Whether Appellants’ claims are heard by the Court, or by an arbitrator, either avenue involves a search for the truth.  The information exchanged is necessary in order to further the goal of the arbitration, which is to reach a mutually agreeable resolution of the matter.  Appellants are not prejudiced as they have not had to undergo anything that they would not have had to do, if the case was filed as an arbitration from the beginning.  In fact, now that most of discovery has been completed, the matter will be able to be arbitrated in a quicker fashion, as much of the discovery has already been conducted.  Respondent unequivocally denies Appellants’ assertions that it has intentionally delayed seeking arbitration as part of its litigation strategy.
[brief] *Report of the Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee 2019-2021 Term* (January 14, 2021).  (Pa1-61; Pa38-40).  The Committee Report stated that future PSRs should contain: a separate new section for arrests not resulting in conviction, rather than eliminating any reference to arrests not resulting in convictions in presentence investigation reports.  This approach would reinforce the sentencing court’s responsibility to make reliability determinations before considering such underlying conduct in its sentencing determinations consistent with the case law.  It also ensures that information is not withheld from courts that could possibly be relevant when supported by reliable evidence.  This proposal can also be implemented without any revisions to the court rules.  [Pa43-44.]  This new form was used for defendant’s PSR.  But the trial court only referenced defendant’s prior arrests when reviewing his record as a whole, and made clear that he was not considering arrests not resulting in convictions.  Thus, defendant is not entitled to relief on this meritless, undeveloped, and waived claim.
[brief] The POA specifies, at Paragraph 8, Subscriber authorizes payment of an amount not exceeding 12.5% of total annual gross written premiums as compensation to [...] to be the Attorney-in-Fact for the subscribers of the Exchange and to perform the overall management functions necessary to effect the exchange of reciprocal insurance contracts among subscribers including the provision, at the attorney’s sole cost, of officers and senior managers of the attorney, to act on behalf of the subscribers of the Exchange for functions such as marketing and solicitation, underwriting, claims handling, internal legal and financial accounting, and regulatory compliance.  [Ra13 (emphasis added). ]  The fee for attorney-in-fact services is paid by the exchange from premiums paid to it by subscribers.  The exchange is not merely a “clearinghouse,” as [...] asserts.  (Ab7).  Subscribers pay premiums to the exchange the same way a policyholder pays an insurer.  It is [...], not the subscribers, that pays “an amount not exceeding 12.5% of total annual gross written premiums” as set forth in the POA, and because the exchange and the attorney-in-fact are related parties, they are required to follow the dictates of SSAP No. 25.  Furthermore, if [...] truly were a “clearinghouse,” then [...] would have misrepresented the reporting of its payments of expenses to the attorney-in-fact in its annual financial statements, which are public documents under N.J.S.A. 17:23-1.
[brief] POINT 4  ANY POTENTIAL REVERSAL OF THE PLANNING BOARD DECISION SHOULD, AT A MINIMUM, BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ORDER FOR A REMAND.  In the event the Court (despite the arguments contained herein to the contrary) finds that the Respondent Planning Board’s hearing process was substantively or procedurally flawed, then, in that event, the Board respectfully requests an opportunity for a remanded hearing at which any substantive or procedural defects could be corrected / cured (as opposed to an outright reversal or overturning of the Board decision / finding.)  Respectfully, the important Board concerns (discussed at the Public Hearing) should not be discredited, marginalized, or ignored, without a remanded Hearing (so that important Board questions / concerns can ultimately be considered / preserved / relayed / transmittal.)  POINT 5
[brief] Exhibit C to Certification, [...], [...] policy, filed September 11, 2023 (cont’d.)  361a  Exhibit D to Certification, Berger v. Frazier, A-1852-15 (App.  Div. July 13, 2018) (unpublished)  396a Exhibit E to Certification, Benjamin v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 15-4123 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2017) (unpublished)  402a Exhibit F to Certification, Learning Experience Corp. v. Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-14103 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2021) (unpublished)  427a Notice of Cross-motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, filed October 10, 2023 431a Certification of [...], filed October 10, 2023 433a Exhibit A to Certification, First Amended Complaint, filed October 10, 2023 (omitted here – see 44a) -- Exhibit B to Certification, September 19, 2022, [...] Coverage Denial Letter, filed October 10, 2023 435a Exhibit C to Certification, May 24, 2023, letter to [...], filed October 10, 2023 Exhibit D to Certification, June 9, 2023, letter from [...] counsel, filed October 10, 2023 Exhibit E to Certification, April 26, 2022, [...] and [...] Coverage Denial Letter, filed October 10, 2023
[brief] (Da0304)  While Plaintiff’s retained expert [...] criticizes this study, he offers no contrary analysis, test, study, or peer-reviewed published literature.  Courts across the country have rightly held that such “mere criticism” of opposing scientific evidence “cannot establish causation. ”  Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 886 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharmas. Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1034 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (finding expert’s “broad criticisms” of existing evidence did not help plaintiffs meet their burden; “[p]laintiffs’ burden is an affirmative one, not served by such attacks”).  When asked, the only facts or data [...] could identify as support for his assumption of general causation is [...]’s Urgent Drug Recall letter stating inflammation is a “potential” risk in “sensitive patients. ”  (Da0255)  But such equivocal statements in a recall document cannot be a reliable basis upon which to establish causation because there are “myriad reasons, including an abundance of caution or the avoidance of lawsuits, why a manufacturer may warn of a possible phenomenon without being convinced that it is a genuine risk.
[brief] The [...]’s largest event is the World Open and it is held in [...] every year.  Id.  This tournament not only offers players a number of prizes but it gives younger players the chance to become titled chess players.  Id.  In addition to bringing chess to city kids, [...] also focused on bringing chess to areas that lacked playing opportunities such as [...].  Id.  Since 1990 the [...] has run the [...] Resort Open and other events in the state contributing to the tripling of the number of chess players in the state since 1990.  Id.
[brief] (3T179:23-180:3 and Pa2012).  [...] agreed that as the email directed [...] to utilize the paving subcontractor [...] to perform the paving that the process certainly involved significant mobilization costs.  (3T180:4-15).  [...] further agreed that by way of the email, [...] directed [...] to pave four areas of the southbound Parkway other than the portion of the roadway where plaintiff’s accident allegedly occurred.  (3T180:16-181:11).  [...] also agreed that [...]’s email provided that “if time permits” the approaches to the bridge should also be paved.  [...] agreed that “if time permits” is not language typically associated with remediating a dangerous emergent condition.  (3T181:12-19).  [...] also agreed that [...] communicated a reasonable position when Wood testified at his deposition that Wood included the bridge approaches in the paving scope on an “if time permits” basis.  [...] agreed that it made sense to pave the approaches “if time permits” as the cost of mobilization would have already been incurred in connection with paving the other locations identified by Wood as appropriate for paving.  (3T181:20-182:16).
[brief] The “substantial credible evidence” standard does not apply to judicial review of either the adoption of or the “reasons” for adopting a redevelopment plan.  *See Powerhouse Arts District*, 413 N.J. Super. at 331-33.  Rather, as described previously, a court reviewing a redevelopment plan applies the more deferential standard that there be “adequate support” in the legislative record for the governing body’s “reasons” for adopting the plan.  *Id.*  Thus, *Malanga* has no application to this case\(^5\) and Appellant has neither cited nor distinguished the cases discussing the standard of review applicable to the Committee’s adoption of Ordinance 2022-17.  Appellant complains that the Township’s attorney simply read the “reasons” into the record in a “lengthy monolog.
[brief] [...]’s justification for allocating 86% of this Settlement to [...] fails.  His argument that the parties’ proportional shares were consistent with Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 154 N.J. 312 (1998) is misguided.  Unlike the present case, Carter Wallace applied a continuous trigger rule.  Accordingly, its allocation methodology is not applicable.  Even if Carter Wallace did apply, an 86% allocation to [...] would still be unjustified because: (1) [...] wrongfully fails to allocate responsibility to insurance policies issued by [...] between 1994 and 2000; and (2) [...] wrongly allocates damages to insurance provided by [...] post-dating March 23, 2009. \(^4\)  As the foregoing demonstrates, [...] failed to introduce competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence to meet his burden of production.  Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court’s judgment in [...]’s favor on the ground that [...] failed to prove the Settlement was reasonable and entered into in good faith.
[brief] In Rooth, supra, a case decided less than six weeks after Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in early 2022, the Appellate Division specifically held that “the inability to return to work based upon a settlement agreement and irrevocable resignation” precludes the filing of a disability application.  Id. at 360-61.  This preclusion extends to agreements not to seek future employment.  Ibid.  Although most of the opinions citing Cardinale, supra, and In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, supra, are unpublished, the amount of those unpublished decisions and the uniformity of their holdings ³ See DA116. demonstrates their roles as the definitive caselaw regarding the interplay of separation agreements and disability retirement eligibility.
[brief] The cause of action of retaliation was obvious based on the facts.  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.  It is also requested that upon return to the trial court that the matter should be reassigned to another judge for completion.  A request is further made that the Appellate Court consider transferring this matter to another County on return to the Trial Court.  POINT VIII
[brief] This is especially true with regard to Gramiccioni, because as noted earlier, the underlying case in that matter was based on causes of action under section 1983 and the CRA, which are not tort claims.  Respondent relies heavily on Chasin v. Montclair State University, 159 N.J. 418 (1999), in support of its position that the TCA is determinative of the coverage issue.  In this regard, Respondent’s reliance is misplaced.  Chasin involved a professor at a college who was sued for refusing to change the grade of a student who was called to active duty in the military service, despite a statute requiring her to do so.  As a state employee, the defendant requested the [...] to defend her.  Her request was denied, and she subsequently filed a lawsuit to recover her legal fees.  In the context of the [...]’s duty to defend a state employee, the Supreme Court found that there was no duty to defend under the TCA.  That is not this case.  First of all, no employees of the [...] are being sued.  The underlying claim is only against the [...].  More importantly, the employee in Chasin was not involved in law enforcement and was not acting pursuant to a law enforcement directive or the supervisory authority of the [...].  In fact, the plaintiff in Chasin ignored the [...]’s advice.  Here, Appellant had no choice but to comply with Directive 22-14 and the [...].  Similarly, the [...]’s reliance on Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546 (2000) and First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Twp. of Rockaway, 322 N.J. Super.  583 (Ch. Div. 1999) is misplaced as neither case involves a county prosecutor’s office, acting in a law enforcement capacity, pursuant to a mandated law enforcement policy issued by the [...] pursuant to its supervisory authority.  It is that unique combination of factors that the Court focused on in Gramiccioni to find that the [...] was required to defend the county prosecutor’s office and it is those same factors that this court should focus on in this matter.
[brief] In *State v. Washington*, 165 N.J. Super. 149, 155 (App. Div. 1979), the defendant was charged with possession of drugs after being observed throwing a purse containing heroin out of the window while police were executing a warrant.  Before her trial, the purse and the heroin were mistakenly destroyed by a police officer.  *Id.* at 153.  The defendant asserted the purse was the link between her and the drugs, and since it was unavailable, she had lost her ability to use the evidence to cross-examine the witness on the details of the purse.  *Ibid.*  The defendant asserted she had satisfied the materially exculpatory factor “even though the evidence would do no more than affect the credibility of a witness whose testimony prejudiced defendant’s case. ”  *Id.* at 155.  This Court rejected her argument, noting that to be sufficiently exculpatory, the evidence needed “to discredit a witness to the point of probably or possibly affecting the result of the trial. ”  *Ibid.*  It was not enough that the evidence may have provided an avenue to potentially discredit the witnesses.  _Id._ at 157.  Here, the [...] profile was not materially exculpatory.
[brief] (23T 78:6-21).  5 P-48 and P-50 together are colloquially known in this litigation as “Exhibit S.” preparing them.  (15T 72:25 to 73:11; 73:25 to 74:6).  In fact, [...] testified that [...] was not even supposed to have seen these documents.  (23T 69:2 to 70:25).  This marked the first time that [...] had shown [...] balance sheets for [...] and [...].  (15T 73:25 to 74:6; 92:21-25).  P-48 and P-50 purported to be balance sheets for [...], [...], and [...], each of which identified in the left column an account for the company, an account value to the right of that, and, where applicable, an adjustment to value in the next column.
[brief] In September 2019 Plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to adopt their protocol and the parties fully briefed the issues.  (R. 209; R. 219; R. 226.)  On November 20, 2019, the court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion.  (R. 239.)  As part of this order, the court required [...] to retain an outside vendor to export emails dated from July 1, 2014, to September 3, 2015, and then apply an initial keyword search using Plaintiffs’ search terms.  (Id.)  The court noted that “[d]epending on the number of hits after the initial keyword search using Plaintiffs’ proposal, the parties may use more finite terms to reduce the number of hits. ”  (Id.)  The court further rejected Plaintiffs’ request that once the initial universe of emails had been identified through keyword searches, [...] should produce the same without any further review.  (Id.)  At a status conference in April 2020, [...] reported that the emails had been collected and searched, resulting in 192,000 unique emails or a total of approximately 1.3 million pages of documents.
[brief] (Da16).  Illinois law requires all Division 2 --- \(^4\) ILCS stands for Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated. vehicles, like [...]’s pick-up truck, to have splash guards.  Accord 625 ILCS 5/12-710 (Rear Fender Splash Guards); see also People v. Hackett, 971 N.E.2d 1058, 1064 (Ill. 2012) (under Illinois law, the decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred).  [...]’s vehicle did not have mudflaps, the absence of which can be easily seen in the video of [...]’s stop.  (Da73/Pa9 at 0:54).  Despite ruling that [...]’s questions unrelated to the traffic stop were impermissible and rendered a portion of [...]’s detention unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, [...] found that this initial ruling did not detract from [...]’s “overall development of probable cause.
[brief] Indeed, the statements of each of the drivers contained in the report were admitted into evidence as D-[...]-1.  Da171.  When counsel for [...] offered the diagram into evidence counsel for [...] objected.  Counsel argued that the diagram was not to scale, and that [...] testified that he did not take any measurements of the roadway or the positions of the vehicles.  2T:100-16 to 24.  Counsel argued that the diagram would be misleading to the jury and that “its prejudice outweighs its probative value. ”  Ibid.  The trial court sustained the objection concluding that what was depicted in the diagram was not just points of impact.  2T:102-6 to 13.  The court found that the diagram also depicted the movement of those vehicles, or how far they were or were not from the intersection is a problem for me.  Particularly no – Defendant [...] testified stopped – was stopped at the red light and that’s – much further back from the Jackson Road intersection in this diagram.  But also vehicle two, which I believe is the [...] van is shown maybe a finger length from the intersection at the time . . . you know before impact.  [2T:102-15 to 25.]  The court concluded that it should not allow the diagram into evidence because [...] did not observe where the vehicles were prior to impact.  2T:103-4 to 7.  The court was particularly concerned with the fact that the diagram appears to show the [...] vehicle traveling as it approached the intersection and not stopped, as [...] testified.  2T:105-11 to 18.  The court ultimately concluded that “[a] jury’s going to be confused. ”  2T:105-17 to 18.  Contrary to the court’s findings, the diagram does not depict anything other than points of impact.  The diagram necessarily must show generally where the vehicles were prior to impact in order to establish the precise points of impact.  However, the obvious purpose of the diagram is to show the points of impact, which could easily be determined by [...]’s observations of the vehicles at the scene of the accident.  Moreover, the court could and should have admitted the diagram with a limiting instruction that informed the jury that they could consider the diagram in their deliberations but only in respect of the issue of determining the points of impact between the three vehicles.  The diagram was an important piece of evidence that would allow the jury to fully understand how the three vehicles collided.