ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Prawa te to mic;dzy innymi:  a.  The right to a jury trial in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  Prawo do procesu z udzialem lawy przysic;glych, w kt6rym musi udowodnic Pana(i) wine; ponad zasadn11 stan w11tpliwosc?  b.  The right to remain silent?  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  Prawo do odmowy odpowiedzi na pytania?  "Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment/Nawiljzka na rzecz Biura Odszkodowan dla Ofiar Przestepstw Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement  to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Polish Defendant's Initials Sko,ygowany fomutlara opublikowany 31.12.2019r. w suplemencie do #01-18, CN I 0079-Polish Dyrektywy Inicjaly oslauzonego page I of7/strona I z 7 4.  c.  The right to confront the witnesses against you?  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  Prawo do skonfrontowania swiadk6w oskarzenia wystc;puj11cych przeciwko Panu(i)?  Do you understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal (1) the [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] d. you are not waiving (R. denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence 3 :5-7( d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance (R. into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) 3:28(d))?
[brief] Overall, “[t]here must be fairness” in the “discipline imposed . . . by public employers. ”  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 192 (2011).  “[T]he question for the courts is whether [a] punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness. ”  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007) (quoting In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[brief] (Pb10).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J. S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.
[brief] Relator has “direct and independent knowledge” of Defendants’ collusion in rate-setting and their acting with scienter in failing to reset interest rates at the lowest rate.  The raw data -- the only disqualifying public disclosure to which Defendants point -- indicate nothing about scienter or collusion.  Because the government is never in a good position to have direct evidence of guilty knowledge or collusion, evidence of them obtained by Relator renders Relator an original source.  *See Reed*, 923 F.3d at 761-63; see *United States ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc.*, 764 F.3d 699, 708-09 n.10 (7th Cir. 2014).
[brief] \(^7\) Traditionally, the “best evidence rule” has provided that in proving the terms of a writing (See N.J.R.E. 801(e)), where such terms are material, the original writing must be produced, unless it is shown to be unavailable for some reason other than the serious fault of the proponent or of course unless the contents of the writing are admitted by the adversary of the proponent of the writing.  2 McCormick on Evidence §230 at 61 (10Th ed. 1992).  Fielder v. Friedman, 124 N.J.L. 514 (E. & A. 1940); Emery v. King, 64 N.J.L. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1900); In re McCraven, 87 N.J. Eq. 28 (Ch. 1916).  The Petitioner next contends that because the copy has misspelled words and contains sections from a form book, it “does not reflect that it was ever regarded as anything more than an unenforceable draft. ” (Pb 36).  No authority whatsoever is cited in support of this remarkable position.  The Petitioner objects to the testimony of [...] as to the [...]’s signature on the Agreement, on the unsupported basis that her memory “was so faded by the time of trial.
[brief] The information improperly admitted was clearly central to the defense and used for the truth of its findings.  This case could serve as exhibit A in a master class on the dangers involved in the improper use of hearsay documents.  No foundation was laid, no authentication was provided, and yet the substance was not just presented to the jury for the truth of the matter in issue, but became the cornerstone of defendant’s case.  In similar circumstances, this Court held a new trial was warranted where a police report was used improperly in cross-examination and in summation.
[directive] Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy Formularz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Polish strona 2 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Polish page 2 of 2 고지:  이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.  그러므로, 이 문서에 소셜 시큐리티 번호, 운전면허증 번호, 차량 번호판 번호, 보험증권 번호, 사용 중인 금융계좌 번호, 또는 사용 중인 신용카드
[directive] $100 to $500 10% permissible  Conduct condition with no legitimate purposes or engages in unreasonably loud or offensive Persons language in a public place with purpose to offend others or in reckless disregard of doing so.  Wandering, Remaining in or Prowling Public Places with Actor, whether on foot or in motor vehicle, wanders, prowls, or remains in public place for 2C:33-2.1  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible  Purpose of purpose of unlawfully obtaining or distributing a controlled dangerous substance.  Obtaining or Selling Controlled Substances  Actor, with purpose to harass another, engages in anonymous or offensive communications  Petty Disorderly 2C:33-4(a-c)  Harassment or subjects another to kicking or shoving or other offensive touching or threatens to do so, or $100 to $500 10% permissible  Persons engages in alarming or such repeated conduct.  87  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] [T]he time stamp [was] 11:41 and 51 seconds through 11:41 and 56 seconds. ”  (Da 79)  [...] asked [...], “were you able to identify anyone in that video?”  (Da 79)  [...] answered, “Yes ….  [A]fter the guy that had come out of my mom’s house crosses the street, a few minutes later, I see [...] coming back to his home.  That’s what I said when I looked at the video the first time. ”  (Da 79)  [...] then reiterated that on March 8, 2016, [...] had again “watched both,” in apparently unrecorded sessions.  (Da 79)  [...] asked [...], “[B]oth, \(^{10}\) [...] referred on March 8 to a February 8 procedure; as indicated, [...] reported on February 9 that the procedure actually occurred on February 9, 2016.  okay ….  On that video today, are you still able to identify anybody?”  (Da 79-80)  [...] answered, “Yes uh the walk, the frame, the body frame, and the timing looks like [...] is the one now comes out of the shadow here and walks back to his house with a bag in his, in his hands. ”  (Da 80)  After some discussion, [...] presented a photo:  “I have here a picture ….  [I]t’s a snapshot of the video that we showed you before.  The date on the video was 2/6/16.  The time on it is 11:41 and 54 seconds which is inside of the time frame of the video you watched which was 11:41 [and] 51 [seconds] to 56 [seconds]  ….  [A]nd this is part of the video that you were able to identify [...], correct?”  (Da 84)  [...] answered, “Yes[.]”  (Da 84)  At detectives’ direction, [...] signed and dated his signature on the photograph.  (Da 84; Da 87-88)  Detectives then also asked him to also sign and date a driver’s license photograph with the defendant’s face, which [...] did.  (Da 84-85)  At trial, [...] testified that he was previously “not 100 percent” “able to identify the person” after being “shown videos from [his] mother’s home.
[brief] ”  See Comer, 249 N.J. at 384-385 (holding teenagers “are less mature and responsible than adults…The disparity, often result[s] in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.")  Despite necessarily agreeing that [...] was not mature and suffered from the developmental incapacities of youth, the court discounted all of what the science and the high Courts have told us about this aspect of youth based on its determination that [...] intentionally shouted out to his codefendants, knowing that doing so was potentially deadly.
[brief] ” (5T56:20-57:2).  Testimony at the trial was that [...] employees who wear the red vest get approached by customers more than those without the red vest (6T77:16-78:13), and that [...] did not provide its trainees with the red vest because it did not want them to feel “too much pressure” by being approached by customers.  (Ibid.)  [...] was aware of the need to protect its employees from customer interactions on the sales floor during the training period.  Its “Becoming Red Vest Ready” training video, which was played for the jury (the transcript of this training Video is at Pra003; 5T61:18-66:2), states in part:
[brief] ...........................................................................................................  49  | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmas. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | 16, 17, 18 | | Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. ___ (2024) | 41 | | Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) | 17, 18 | | Hisenaj v. Kuener, 194 N.J. 6 (2008) | 10 | | Liberty Surplus Ins. Co. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436 (2007)| 28 | | State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13 (1987) | 21 | | State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275 (2006) | 30 | | State v. Cierciello, 86 N.J.L. 309 (E. & A. 1914) | 17 | | State v. Coclough, 459 N.J. Super. 45 (App. Div. 2019) | 25 | | State v. Davis, No. A-4176-17 (App. Div. July 15, 2020) | 18 | | State v. Dixon, 346 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2001) | 44 | | State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987) | 44 | | State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540 (2004) | 20 | | State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117 (1997) | 28 | | State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) | 29, 30| | State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2017) | 8 | | State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393 (2017) | 14, 31| | State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) | 14 | | State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. Super.
[brief] Significant discovery was taken.  [Pa820a]  In particular, [...] served responses to [...] and [...]’s document requests on March 19, 2021, and responses to their interrogatories on April 2, 2021.  [See id., ¶¶ 3-4]  [...] produced documents in response to [...] and [...]’s requests on May 25, 2021.  [Id., ¶ 5]  The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment without any depositions being taken.
[brief] Although Plaintiff attempted to argue that N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b)’s notice requirements do not apply in this case, the trial court correctly stated that Plaintiff must prove actual or constructive notice. [6T70:20-77:1-6].  But Plaintiff still presented no evidence as to when the sign went down so that a jury could determine whether the sign was down for an unreasonable period of time.  Instead, Plaintiff’s proofs begged for a jury to assume, with tremendous prejudice to the [...], that the sign was down for an unreasonable period of time based solely on the fact that it was missing.  As our Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly emphasized, “the mere existence the mere existence of a dangerous condition does not, in and of itself, establish actual or constructive notice. ”  See e.g., Jeter v. Sam's Club, 250 N.J. 240, 252 (2022); Prioleau, 434 N.J. Super. at 570–71; Arroyo v. Durling Realty, LLC, 433 N.J. Super. 238, 243 (App. Div. 2013).  Viewing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff does not relieve Plaintiff of his burden of establishing an essential element of his claims and providing sufficient evidential material to do so.
[brief] Unfortunately, a discipline’s regular use in court does not mean that it is being used in a reliable way. \(^5\)  Luckily, courts have begun to respond to defense requests to review the reliability of this evidence with the kind of scrutiny all forensic evidence deserves.  In 2005, the District of Massachusetts began the trend of limiting the scope of firearm identification expert testimony in *United States v. Green*, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
[brief] The provision of the Route 33 Signal was an essential element of the VC-2 Zone.  Ba12.  If the Respondents did not wish to supply the Route 33 Signal, they were free to develop the Property pursuant to the underlying H-D Zone standards.  The Respondents’ request to eliminate the obligation of the Route 33 Signal while availing themselves of the benefits of the VC-2 Zone, clearly undermines the intent and purpose of the Zone Plan and Zoning Ordnance of the [...].
[brief] The Boundary Commissioners’ Report was a culmination of nine months of professional surveying, investigation, research, and review performed by three professionals in the field, whom ultimately determined the [...] survey correctly established the disputed boundary line.  The Commissioners undertook an extensive feat, performing research and review of deeds, surveys, history and subdivision plats of the entire neighborhood, and subdivision plats for contiguous neighborhoods dating back to the 1950s and 1960s.  The Commissioners also duly examined the [...] and [...] properties and boundary markers throughout the neighborhoods on numerous occasions throughout the investigation.  Given the complexities presented by the instant case, the Commissioners requested numerous extensions for the deadline to file their Report, demonstrating their dedication and commitment to the project, as well as their refusal to “rush” the issuance of the Report prior to properly confirming their conclusions.  The Commissioners submitted a preliminary report to the Trial Court dated July 18, 2022, six months in the investigation, informing the Court that their exhaustive review of the evidence “discovered mathematical flaws within the maps and deeds” that needed to be reconciled.  (Da3).
[brief] ”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  d.  That Defendants’ position is inconsistent with the purposes of the recording scheme is further demonstrated by their obligation to inquire.  The depth of the record further supports that Defendants’ position is not consistent with furthering the recording scheme.  One of the recording scheme’s strengths, as amply demonstrated by this case, is its longevity and the clarity it can provide about the historical character of parcels over a significant time.  See e.g. Pearson, 499 N.J. Super. at 37 (working through a parcel’s history from 1890 forward).  Here, while the mistake and Plaintiffs’ title or claim are clearly demonstrated by the recorded documents occurring within ten years of Defendants’ acquisition, Ja54-65, reviewing further back in time provides unequivocal support for the long history of consistent frontage leading up to the subdivision, Ja29-48, Ja70-86.
[brief] ”  (Sb 11)  The prosecutor recognizes, however, that it would be constitutionally impermissible for police to stop an individual based solely on his presence in a so called “high crime” area:  “While this factor alone certainly could never justify stopping individuals in this area, its character and prevalence for crime must be part of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. ”  (Sb 10-11)  (emphasis in original)  Except, in this case, that is exactly what happened.  As part of the same operation, two other men, [...] and [...], were simultaneously stopped on [...], based on the area alone.
[brief] The legislature’s statement attached to the bill stated:  “The purpose of this bill is to assure a property owner the compensation to which he is normally entitled and to prevent the undue hardship which will occur as a result of the inevitable deterioration in property values between the Declaration of Blight and the institution of condemnation proceedings. ”  The property taken in 2018 was the fee simple estate.  The property to be valued as of 1994 was the fee simple estate.
[brief] She obtained over thirty videos from residential homes and commercial businesses, tracking the "vehicle of interest," a black Chevy Malibu.  (4T147-16 to 19; 4T148-1 to 3; 4T157-9 to 10; 4T162-10 to 13).  It took "weeks to months to get" all the footage used in the investigation.  (4T147-20 to 22).  The State presented fifty video clips during the trial through [...]'s testimony.  These clips depicted the purported route of the "vehicle of interest," as reconstructed by the police using the location and time stamps from the videos.  (4T152-15 to  The State also introduced a map of all the video surveillance and their locations.  (4T152-24 to 153-4; Da14).  There was no objection to the introduction of the map, the surveillance videos, or any of [...]'s testimony.  [...] explained that the purpose of the video surveillance was to follow the car.  (4T161-18 to 23; 4T162-10 to 13; 4T166-12 to 15; 4T168-14 to 18).  As the fifty surveillance clips played, [...] would point when prompted by the Assistant Prosecutor to show which car to look at while the clip played.  See generally (4T156-7 to 4T184-9; Da11).
[brief] "[A]n accessory use is implied as a matter of law as a right which accompanies a principal use."  Shim v. Washington Twp. Planning Bd., 298 N.J. Super. 395, 401 (App. Div. 1997).  "Zoning ordinances which permit 'customarily incidental' accessory uses to the main activity permit, by implication, any use that logic and reason dictate are necessary or expected in conjunction with the principal use of the property."  Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Bd. of Adj. for the Twp. of Chatham, 202 N.J. Super. 312, 323 (App. Div. 1985) (emphasis added).  “The allowance of a primary use generally authorizes all uses normally accessory, auxiliary or incidental thereto . . . and ‘accessory use,’ in turn, is defined as a use ‘customarily incidental to the principal use of a building. ’”  Zahn v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. Super. 516, 521-22 (App. Div. 1957) (citation omitted).  In Nuckel, 208 N.J. at 113, the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that a hotel was required to obtain a use variance for its proposed driveway that, if approved, would be installed on an adjacent lot that housed an auto body shop that was a pre-existing nonconforming use.
[brief] The Trial Court warned Plaintiffs in its’ Summary Judgment Opinion that the proofs before the Court to date were lacking (Pa30).  Other than the gift letter prepared by [...], “[t]here are no documents, writings, emails, contracts or text messages, or other recorded communications that preserve whatever other agreements may have been made between [...] and [...]” (Pa16).  Plaintiffs in their Appellate brief admit there is no documentation between [...] and his son-in-law as to their understanding of what they were doing when [...] conveyed $50,000.00 to [...] as he purchased the Florida property (Pb7).  Somehow, from this utter lack of evidence, Plaintiffs conclude that a constructive trust is warranted.  Massa has the answer: “A constructive trust must be established, ‘by clear, definite, unequivocal and satisfactory evidence. ”  Id. at 446 quoting from Gray v. Bradley, 1 N.J. 102, 104 (1948).  Plaintiffs did not meet their burden, and the Court correctly found no trust was warranted.
[brief] An error or omission shall be disregarded on appeal unless it is of such a nature as to have been “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10–2; see *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 337–38 (1971).  *5  We discern no error in the admission of the eyewitness testimony and are satisfied the issue was properly left to the jury.
[brief] (Db1-3).  The State would merely add that the case was sent to the jury at approximately 10:35 a.m.  They had two questions at 11:08 and 11:36 a.m. with a playback that went until 1:05 p.m. and they broke for lunch thereafter.  So, while they deliberated for approximately an hour after the juror was replaced, this was similar to the length of the previous deliberations.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In January 2007, as found by the Trial Court, [...] added three (3) Wilf headquarters’ employees to [...]’s payroll, “not one of them having anything to do with [...]…”  [...] could not provide any legitimate justification for his actions, because there was none.  With respect to [...] – a lawyer who possessed an L.L.M. in Taxation, yet whose demeanor left little doubt as to his purposeful and knowing participation in [...]’s schemes (as [...] Court found) – failed to offer any legitimate explanation for his purported acquiescence in the face of the Wilfs’ continuing thefts of the Project’s funds.  B.  The Trial Court’s Punitive Damage Findings
[brief] While [...] is loath to employ such language in a brief submitted to this Court, [...]’s position is, in a word, absurd.  It will be explained below that (1) it is simply not the law that the Commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction anytime a statute codified in Title 18A is implicated in a lawsuit; (2) there is nothing in the COVID Statute that requires the expertise of the Department of Education; and (3) there is no reason that the COVID Statute should be construed so as to deny a private right of action in favor a public school contractor entitled to payment under its terms.  And even if [...] were correct in any of these unfounded legal assertions, both the entire controversy doctrine and the doctrine of waiver would prohibit its taking of the position that the case it initiated should be adjudicated as if the COVID Statute did not exist.
[brief] ”).  Before an agency decision can be considered arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, it must be determined: “(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] [...] cited only to one book at the Land Use Hearing—Tom’s River: A Story of Science and Salvation, by [...].  (T1, 26:18-27:1).  This book details the effects of a years’ long practice of chemical companies burying thousands of chemical drums and dumping wastewater directly into Tom’s River (https://www.pulitzer.org/winner/dan-fagin).  The effects of this long-term pattern of large-scale chemical dumping are in no way comparable to the conditions at the Property.
[brief] ......................... - 34 - Department of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 504 (1983)  ...................................................................................... - 31 - DuBois, Sheehan, Hamilton & DuBois v. DeLarm, 243 N.J. Super. 175, 183 (App. Div. 1990)  ................................................................. - 12 - D. Wolff & Co. v. Lozier, 68 N.J.L. 103, 107 (1902)  .................................. - 12 - Estate of Cohen v. Booth Computers, 421 N.J. Super. 134, 149 (App. Div. 2011)  ...................................................................................... - 12 - FDIC Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 876 (3d Cir. 1994)  ...... - 17 - Feigenbaum v. Guaracini, 402 N.J. Super. 7, 18 (App. Div. 2008)  ..................-