ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, the inclusion of independently-named businesses is implicit in the Act’s definition of franchise by the Act’s limitation to a franchise “where more than 20% of the franchisee’s gross sales are intended to be or are derived from such franchise. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:10-4(3).  Therefore, if only a “mirror-image” relationship could constitute a franchise, the Legislature would have added a superfluous requirement in the Act that the franchise sales constitute twenty percent of the entire business.  The addition of that language, “more than 20%” of gross sales, seems to contemplate the creation of the “fractional franchise” . . . under which the franchisee operates under its own unique trade name.  *Instructional Sys.*, 614 A.2d at 140.  To be sure, even under [...]’s incorrect standard, [...] did, in fact, produce evidence of [...] marketing itself solely under the “[...]” branding without reference to the [...] name, specifically the [...] co-owner’s email signature block in 2012, which only referenced “[...]” brands and did not make any reference to [...].  (See Pa188-Pa189).  Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s above-quoted directive also undercuts [...]’s assertion that because [...] sold other products, [...] could not have received a “license” from (or have a “community of interest” with) [...].  (See Db22, Db27, Db35) (asserting “[i]mportantly, [...] did not solely advertised [...] products,” and “there was testimony that [...] dealt with other brands too. ”)  Once again, the NJFPA expressly permits 80% of a putative franchisee’s business to be derived from other products or services, unrelated to the putative franchisor’s goods or services, and therefore [...]’s eventual sale of other products and services does not – and cannot – support a finding that [...] does not qualify for the protections of the NJFPA as a matter of law.
[directive] 5.  Anyone convicted of a crime requiring Registration of Sex Offenders (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2).  6.  Anyone convicted of a crime committed against a public entity or a officer1.  public  7.  A public employee convicted of the following offenses contained in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1b which involved or touched upon the employee's office, position or employment, such that the crime was related directly to the person's performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the specific public office or employment held by the person.
[directive] Forensic of Office Police State DNA, substances, controlled suspected of analysis (e.g., analysis forensic for requests delay, be should Science Forensic of Office Police State Jersey New the by etc.) ballistics, fingerprints, arrest. of date of the days business five within submitted for requests delay, a justifying circumstances compelling Absent Laboratories.  Other of a authority the under or with association in operating laboratory other any by analysis forensic arrest of date the of days business five within submitted be should Office Prosecutor's County 71 Page deadline. submission different a approved Prosecutor has County unless the Needed.  Longer  No Testing  If Notification Prompt 10.2.2 who defendants involving those including cases, all in resources, laboratory conserve  To requested of completion the prior to resolved is case that the event in the detained, are not of Office notify resolution the of the hours 24 within shall prosecutor testing, the forensic needed. testing is further if no laboratory other or Science Forensic Forensic Reports and Investigative of Completion Prioritize to Authority Prosecutor's 10.3 Indictment/Trial Deadlines.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION ([...]); ON APPEAL FROM ORDER BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION-CIVIL PART, OCEAN COUNTY ([...]); CIVIL ACTION; SAT BELOW: HON. [...], A.J.S.C.; SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 30, 2024  Dear Honorable Judges:  Please accept this Letter Brief in lieu of a more formal Reply Brief on behalf of Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] in response to the Briefs filed by [...], Esquire, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent [...] and [...], Esquire, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent  [...].
[brief] Any confidence in [...] demeanor in asserting his belief that Defendant is the perpetrator is undermined by his own testimony that his identification is mainly or entirely based upon unreliable and impermissible identification by others made --- \(^6\)  According to NJ Rev Stat 2C:1-13 (2022), starting with 2C:1-13(a) no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  \(^7\)  Defendant’s de novo brief had an error, should have said “[...]’s wife” outside of Court.  For these reasons, this court should dismiss the Complaint against Defendant [AP 36].
[brief] According to Defendant, the Report limits the meaning of “any person” as used in § 1692c(b) a consumer’s friends, neighbors, relatives, and employers.  Db2, Db14.  But there is nothing in the Report supporting Defendant’s construction.  The Report refers to friends, neighbors, relatives, and employers under two prefatory sections titled “Need for this Legislation” and “Prohibited Practices. ”  Senate Report at *2, *4.  Those introductory sections do not state or imply that they delineate the scope of § 1692c(b).  Defendant ignores where the Report specifically addressed § 1692c(b).  In its entirety, the Report’s Section-By-Section Summary of § 1692c(b) states:
[brief] In his oral opinion, [...] honed in on the key issue in the case, which was whether the parties in the chain of title intended to convey the riparian grants and riparian rights abutting the uplands when they conveyed the uplands to the next party in the chain of title.  [...] correctly noted that the answer to this question turned on the intent of the parties, and that the deeds have ambiguous language since the deeds neither expressly reference the [...] and indicate that there was an intent to convey it, or expressly exclude the [...] from what was conveyed.  9T, p. 12.
[brief] “As New Jersey courts have long recognized, ‘[i]gnorance of the law furnishes no excuse to a person either for a breach or for an omission of a duty[.]”  Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C., 202 N.J. 349, 367 (2010) (quoting Bowen v. Pursel, 109 N.J. Eq. 67, 73 (E. & A. 1931)).  Thus, [...] purportedly being unaware of the Ricci Act until over three and a half years after its passage cannot serve as the basis to allow him to evade its unambiguous requirements.
[brief] Here, jurors might be able to employ their common knowledge that freezing rain can make exterior surfaces slippery.  However, the Defendants introduced no evidence into the record that the adjacent concrete surfaces such as the sidewalk, were as slippery as the concrete landing and stairs.  Defendants also do not argue this in their briefs but rely solely on the general effects of freezing rain.  However, a negligently-created underlying dangerous condition can be the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s slip and fall if it “creates a situation which involves an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of . . . a force of nature.
[brief] 6  IV.  Legal Argument ..............................................................  7  A.  Standard of Review (715a) ..............................................  7  B.  Disputed Issues of Fact Precluded Entry of Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs (709a; 717a-718a)  .........................  10  C.  The Trial Court Erred in Denying Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (717a-718a)  ...............................  14  D.  The Equities Do Not Favor [...] Over [...], Nor Do They Compel Reformation as the Appropriate Remedy (719a-720a).  .........................................................  19  V. Conclusion ........................................................................
[brief] Appellant claimed TILA as an affirmative defense, offering, except for Exhibits C, CC, and II, the identical factual evidence, i.e., the identical statements of account, which was accepted for the Respondent.  Da31, and Da15 to “The underlying loan transaction thus serves as the common source for the correlative rights and liabilities of lender and consumer [under TILA].”  *Beneficial Finance Co. of Atl. City v. Swaggerty*, 86 N.J. 602, 610 (N.J. 1981).  The trial Court abused its discretion and committed plain error when it held that Appellant’s evidence was not “competent. ”  Because the trial Court granted summary judgment to Respondent, the Court must construe the facts offered by Appellant in the light most favorable to Appellant.
[brief] The defendant police chief suspected that several takers of that exam cheated, so he asked the [...] to delay the publishing of the scores so he could investigate the suspected cheating and take remedial action.  Plaintiff accused defendant of interfering with his right to “participate in the selection and appointment process” by way of defendant’s “lobbying” for the test results to be discarded or delayed, in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1(d).  (Id.)  In ruling against plaintiff by finding that there was not a “sufficiently close connection between delay of publishing results and a public policy against interfering with participation in the selection process,” the court observed that plaintiff was not actually denied an opportunity to participate in the selection and appointment process.  (Id.)  Plaintiff was permitted to take the exam, was eventually promoted, and the complained of conduct (the delay of the publishing of scores) was based on a legitimate purpose; investigating the reasonable suspicion of cheating.  (Id.)  Here, similar to Competello, Appellant was afforded the opportunity to “participate in the selection and appointment process” by taking the promotional exam and being considered for promotion.
[directive] their shall and/or revise enforcement agencies adopt municipal law and All county, state, either by regulation, or this Directive, rule, consistent with System policies, EW existing law. by state ("SOP"), as required operating procedure standard Indicators  Selection of Performance C. indicate different of officer conduct which many categories may monitor An EW System officer. following and/or  The harm the public, the agency, the escalating risk of to potentially based in all EW Systems, but also can be supplemented shall included indicators be performance and community it serves.  The chief of department the characteristics the upon unique the To any such supplemental performance indicators. shall determine department executive of the objectively measurable and indicators should be supplemental performance the extent possible, harmful behavior officer. by the potentially escalating reasonably related to officer, whether another complaints against the initiated by Internal affairs 1. member of the public; officer or by a officer; the Civil actions filed against 2. criminal officer; ~ of or complaints against the Criminal investigations
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor commits sexual contact with victim and uses physical force or coercion but victim does not suffer severe personal injury; or victim is on parole or probation or detained in a hospital or prison and actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or victim is age 16 to 17
[brief] THERE IS NO BASIS TO COMPEL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE PURSUANT TO THE MARCH 15, 2024 ORDER OR THE JUNE 30, 2022 ORDER  With respect to the issue of specific performance, as set forth in the June 30, 2022 Order, Da361-366, the trial court ordered [...] and [...] to work cooperatively towards “recommencing the project” and ordered the parties to “negotiate in good faith to achieve the satisfaction or waiver of the financing contingencies pursuant to [Section] 8.7 of the Redevelopment Agreement.
[brief] Da27-28.  Defendants’ purported responses to Plaintiffs’ “punch list” were wholly deficient.  Specifically, with respect to [...], Defendants stated that no documents were retained relating to payments made to her by [...] for her role as property manager (Da69 at Request No. 4), failed to provide any personnel documents whatsoever pertaining to her (Da69 at Request No. 7), and claimed to not have any communications and/or documentation in her possession pertaining to the Property, the sale, mold, leaks or other issues at the Property, or tenants of the Property (Da70 at Requests Nos. 9(b); 12(b)).  Nonetheless, when asked specifically if any responsive documents had been lost, deleted or destroyed, Defendants responded “Not to my knowledge. ”  Da72-73 at Requests Nos. 24-26.  On October 4, 2023 and November 29, 2023, respectively, Plaintiffs filed motions to strike [...]’s and [...]’s answers due to their repeated failures to comply with discovery obligations.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed suit on September 8, 2021 – seven months after [...] had already revised the final site plan per Plaintiffs’ objections.  (Pa000001).  Plaintiffs never retained a professional engineer to review [...]’s plans and affirm that there was a reasonable probability that the care, skill, or knowledge exhibited in this matter fell outside acceptable professional standards.  Plaintiffs’ Complaint incorrectly accused [...] of negligence for preparing not only the site plans, but also the soil erosion and sedimentation control plans, and additionally designing soil erosion and sedimentation control fencing – despite [...]’s site plans lacking any reference to soil erosion or sedimentation control.
[brief] [...], Esq. [...], Esq. --- ⁹  Appellant also asserts a claim under § 1692d of the FDCPA which prohibits a debt collector from engaging in conduct which will “harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692d; Appx., at 6a.  As the Superior Court explained, this claim fails because Appellant’s allegations did not meet the requisite threshold for conduct intended to “embarrass, upset or frighten a debtor. ”  T35 (quoting *Hammett v. Allianceone Receivables Management, Incorporated*, 2011 WL 3819848, at *5 (E.D. Pa. August 30th, 2011)).  Respondent’s letter at issue does not constitute harassment because it did not contain threatening or offensive language, or an attempt to coerce payment on Appellant’s debt.  *Id.*  Providing options to voluntarily pay an expired debt is not a violation of the FDCPA.  *Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC*, 882 F.3d 422 (3d. Cir. 2018) (“[S]ettlement offers and attempts to obtain voluntary repayments of stale debt do not necessarily constitute deceptive or misleading practices. ”).  Moreover, Appellant’s appeal does not address this theory of liability, and the Court should deem it abandoned on appeal.  *See N.J. Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp.*, 438 N.J. Super. at 506 n.2.  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
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[brief] P.L. 1898, c. 197; N.J.S.A. 48:7-6; N.J.S.A. 48:7-1.  None of those statutes applied to the proposed line through [...].  The key to properly understanding the preemption found in *In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co.*, supra, is the statement that “[w]hile some reservation of municipal control over the installation of overhead power lines and underground cables may be found in R.S. 48:7-1 and 2, this control is limited to a requirement of municipal consent where an electric company desires to use public streets for the construction of overhead or underground lines .  . . .”  Id. at 372-73.  While the court did make reference in dicta to the provision of service to local residents, neither of the statutes that the court relied upon were in anyway limited to lines that provide local service.  Thus, [...]’s claim that the basis for the preemption in *In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co.*, supra, was based on the distinction between local distribution and supply transmission is unsupported.
[brief] H920a P-11: [...], Air Quality and Noise Impact Rebuttal Testimony (SOICR p. 10) .............................................  H941a Attachment EJP-1, [...] cv ...........................................  H957a Attachment EJP-2, [...] Noise Impact Assessment dated May 10, 2018 ........................................  H962a Attachment EJP-3, [...] Air Quality Study dated May 10, 2018, with attachments ........................................  H1007a Attachment EJP-4, Executive Order No. 100 issued by [...] January 27, 2020 .................................  H1025a Attachment EJP-5, Reducing CO₂ Emissions, issued by [...] February 25, 2020, cover plus one page, excerpt ...............  H1032a P-11A: Errata to Rebuttal Testimony of [...] (SOICR p. 11)
[brief] With respect to the Appellants’ appeal of the Trial Court’s denial of the request to conduct discovery and supplement the record.  The law is clear.  The record made before the Board is the sole factual recital and matters outside the record may not be considered by a court on appeal.  *Kempner v. Edison*, 54 NJ Super 408, 417 (App. Div. 1959).  Here, the Respondent is attempting to supplement the record, not with evidence about the subject property but with proposals and documentation on property owned by the [...], that neither the Appellant or the Respondent have any right to.  It appears the Appellant wants to introduce documents regarding potential development of that property.  Neither the Appellant nor the Respondent have any right to develop that property, as it is owned by the [...].  Moreover, from a review of the documents the Appellant desires to supplement the record with, they are only proposals.  Moreover, the proposals are not even from the [...], who own the property.  There is no evidence that the property is going to be developed and if so, to what extent.  Further, the report was not even prepared for the owner of the property.  Regardless, the Zoning Board’s decision must be based on the facts at the time of the application.  The Zoning Board cannot decide any application based on what may or may not happen to other properties in the area.  The Zoning Board’s decision can only be overturned if the board’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable”.  If any Board would decide an application based on the hypothetical development of other properties in the neighborhood, that decision would be arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious, as it would not be based on facts.  The Appellant is attempting to cloud this matter with the potential development of another property, which is not permissible.  Clearly the Appellant has a problem the potential development of property owned by Middletown, but that has no bearing on this application or the decision of the Board that was made with all the facts presented, not the potential or hypothetical development of another property.  The Trial Court correctly found that purported evidence of events that may occur in the future are nor relevant to the Zoning Board’s decision.  PA 860.  As such, the Appellate Court should affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the request to supplement the record.
[brief] Appendix D (the retro pay calculations) inappropriately contains unit members who were promoted into the unit after the term of the agreement began (August 1, 2019).  Moreover, if it were intended to be an accurate calculation of retro pay, it inappropriately contained retired members of the unit who were ineligible for some or all of the retro pay because they were retired during the retro pay period (August 1, 2022 to December 31, 2023).
[brief] Genuine issues of fact exist which should have compelled the trial court to have denied [...]’s summary judgment motion.  The trial court improperly granted summary judgment because the trial court failed to recognize that [...] had a duty to preserve all surveillance footage from the calendar day of the incident up through and following the moment of the incident in which Plaintiff was struck, and that [...]’s failure to do so affords Plaintiffs the ability to be awarded an adverse inference charge at the time of trial.  Additionally, the trial court erroneously ruled that summary judgment was appropriate despite the fact that expert testimony is not needed for Plaintiffs to establish that [...] owed Plaintiffs a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect Plaintiff against known or reasonably discoverable dangers and that [...] breached that duty.  (2T.12:3-11; 14:17-15:4; 20:9-21:13)  In addition, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to [...] because the court overlooked the evidentiary basis for finding that [...] was an agent of [...] and that therefore [...] should be held liable for his negligent acts under an agency theory.  (1T.12:24-14:11)  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY ITS FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THAT RESTAURANT DEPOT HAD A DUTY TO PRESERVE ANY AND ALL SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE
[brief] |  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order granting summary judgment, filed March 18, 2024  1a  Reasons on the record, dated March 15, 2024  1T9:7  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT  DESIGNATIONS  1T – Transcript of Decision dated March 15, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – APPENDIX (Volume 1 of 2 – Pa1 to Pa124)
[brief] •  He provided additional exhibits to the board which revealed the current front yard setbacks of the surrounding development (T38-1 to T38-19) and explained that this plan pushes the structure back 5 feet on [...] and 8-9 feet on [...] at the street level.  T60-2 to T60-24.  •  He discussed the legal criteria for the c.2 variances for front yard setback, the d. (5) criteria for density/lot area per unit and d. (6) criteria for height.  T37 – T45.
[brief] Plaintiff shared her “affinity and respect for [...]” by supporting her on Facebook and giving her a “prominent place in [...]’s classroom,” including hanging a poster of [...], displaying [...]’s book in her classroom, and using her “as an example of perseverance, persistence, dedication, overcoming obstacles, overcoming adversity, and achieving excellence in spite of it all. ”  Da_006-7  These allegations are utterly incompatible with any theory that [...] was an unreliable source.
[brief] During cross-examination, [...] denied that she had to agree to cooperate with the prosecution as a condition of her entry into the PTI program.  During her redirect examination, [...] said she was not placed in the PTI program on the condition that she say “what the Prosecutor's Office wanted [her] to say. ”  Later in the trial, [...]'s counsel obtained the transcript of [...]'s admission into the PTI program.  The prosecutor at the PTI proceeding stated:  “And as a condition of her enrollment, the defendant agrees to cooperate fully with the ... Prosecutor's Office, and to testify, if necessary, in two cases involving [[...] and [...]].”10  The assistant prosecutor trying [...] responded that “all conditions of [PTI] disappeared when [[...]] got kicked out and her case got relisted for trial. ”  The prosecutor further explained that when he questioned [...], he was attempting to elicit truthful testimony that she was not testifying against [...] and [...] “as part of a deal. ”  In other words, her agreement to cooperate terminated with her removal from the PTI program, and [...] was not asked to cooperate as part of any other “deal. ”  Nonetheless, the prosecutor offered to have [...] recalled so that she could be cross-examined on that point by [...]'s attorney.