ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Shortly before trial, defense counsel requested that the court ask one open-ended question to the prospective jury: “Do you believe that fingerprint . . . analyses are reliable, why or why not?” (1T32-7 to 11).  The prosecutor objected, arguing that such a question would improperly introduce the idea that jurors have “certain preconceived notions about the reliability of that evidence,” and that because the judge was already issuing a jury instruction on expert testimony, it would be unnecessary “to highlight a specific narrow slice of . . . expert testimony. ” (1T32-12 to 33-20).  Defense counsel maintained that defendant was “completely in the dark regarding prospective jurors’ views on fingerprint analysis” and that the court could avoid the prosecutor’s concerns by discussing the open-ended questions at sidebar.  (1T33-25 to 34-23).  In response, the State explained that under *State v. Little*, 246 N.J. 402 (2021), “hearing multiple potential jurors discussing their thoughts on fingerprint evidence could potential[ly] indoctrinate jurors as to the outcome of the case” rather than show their biases.  (1T35-16 to 36-25).  While the trial judge did not announce his ruling on the record or with a written opinion, no open-ended question regarding fingerprint analysis was asked at jury selection.
[brief] THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO THE LEGALITY OF THE NONCONFORMING OFF-SITE PARKING USE OF THE SCHOOL LOT 5 BY THE SYNAGOGUE ATTENDEES/STAFF WAS ON THE SONS OF ISRAEL AS PROPONENTS OF THE USE (RAISED BELOW BEFORE ZONING BOARD Da1-6 AND BEFORE TRIAL COURT Da270)  Under N.J.S.A.40:55D-68, the “owner of the purported nonconforming use or structure” --- the [...] as owner and proponent of the “easement” for the off-site parking use on Lot 5 --- is required to participate and has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the prohibited use/facility was legal when it commenced and existed before the ordinance which rendered the use or structure nonconforming.  In those circumstances, the “owner of the nonconforming use or structure” de facto becomes the “applicant” that the now nonconforming use is a legal pre-existing use.  That the burden of proof resides in the party claiming the right to continue is a principle of long-standing.  Heagan v. Borough of Allendale, 42 N.J. Super. 472 (App.Div. 1956) is perhaps the first case to analyze the policy considerations.
[brief] Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to JNOV in the amount of $10,660, plus his 49% share of the 2016 profits,\(^3\) reversal of the of the $119,256.40 fee award in Defendant’s favor, and an award of fees and costs in Plaintiff’s favor pursuant to the fee shifting provision in the parties’ operating agreement.  \(^3\) 49% of $67,791 equals $33,217.59.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE OCTOBER 6
[brief] The first question on the verdict sheet in this case was: “Did the State disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the applicability of self-defense as to Count 1, Murder?”  (Da 13)  The jury checked, “No. ”  (Da 13)  Posing this special interrogatory was within the court’s discretion.  State v. Branch, 301 N.J. Super. 307, 328 (App. Div. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 155 N.J. 317 (1998).  By including this question, the court was bound by the jury’s response.  And both the verdict sheet and the reading of the verdict in open court confirm that the jury found that the State had not disproven self-defense.  (Da 13; 11T 9-20 to 23)  The jury’s unanimous finding that the State had not disproven self-defense necessarily meant that [...]’s use of deadly force against [...] was justified.  Such justification is a complete defense to all homicide offenses, not just murder.
[directive] 3.1  Promulgation of Police Department Policies and Procedures.  To ensure an efficient and orderly transition to universal BWC implementation, every law enforcement agency shall promulgate and enforce a policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order, in a form as may be appropriate given the customs and practices of the agency, which shall comply with the policies, standards, and requirements of this Policy.  Any policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated by an agency pursuant to this Policy shall provide that:  (a) a law enforcement officer employed by the agency may only use a BWC system that has been issued and approved by the agency; (b) an officer equipped with a BWC must comply at all times with the requirements established in this Policy and in the agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued pursuant to this Policy or by law; (c) a BWC shall be used only in performance of official police duties and not for personal purposes; (d) no BWC recording shall be accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or otherwise used by a sworn officer or civilian employee of the agency except for an official purpose specified in this Policy or by law; and (e) any sworn officer or civilian employee of the agency who knowingly violates the requirements of this Policy or the agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order, or applicable laws, shall be subject to discipline.  3.2
[brief] Unlike the position of a school teacher, as County Counsel, Plaintiff had a statute term in an office that he was required to vacate it after its expiration.  “Absent a statutory holdover position, [statutory employees] who have not been reappointed and confirmed by the last day of their first full term must vacate the office. ”  Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 353 (1999).  A statutory term of office, barring a holdover provision, definitively ends at the expiration of the term unless the person serving in that office is reappointed.  Kaman v. Montague Tp. Committee, 306 N.J. Super. 291, 300 (App. Div. 1997), aff’d, 158 N.J. 371 (1999).  The applicable County Counsel statute, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-43, does not contain a holdover provision.  Thus, Plaintiff had no right to remain in office after his term expired and he was not entitled to a reappointment.
[brief] The extent of discovery conducted.  As noted above, by Stipulation the discovery end date had been extended to March 28, 2024 and by that time the Parties exchanged written discovery and the deposition of one lay person had been conducted.  As the result of motion practice initiated by [...], the trial court entered a discovery order that set the discovery end date at June 1, 2024 and provided for the site inspection, the exchange of supplemental written discovery, the exchange of expert reports and depositions of expert witnesses.
[directive] Thus, for example, if a defendant is carrying a handgun on his or her person, and simultaneously is in constructive, nonimmediate possession of an assault firearm or machine gun, the prosecutor must use both Special Application and Enhancement Feature D and Special Offense Characteristic #1.  In this example, the defendant’s constructive possession of an assault firearm or machine gun should not be ignored or discounted in assessing his or her culpability, since the Legislature has established as a matter of policy that this kind of weapon poses special dangers separate and distinct from other types of firearms.  In contrast, if defendant is in simultaneous possession of two or more firearms that are not machine guns or assault firearms, that circumstance would not be considered under these Guidelines to constitute separate and distinct conduct.  The same basic principle would apply if the defendant is carrying a firearm and at the same time possesses a knife with the purpose to actually use that knife against another.  In these circumstances, the prosecutor must use both Special Application and Enhancement Feature D and Special Offense Characteristic #1, since otherwise, the possession of the nonfirearm weapon with the purpose to use it against the person or property of another (conduct more dangerous and than mere possession of a nonfirearm weapon) would not be accounted for.  Similarly, when Special Application and Enhancement Feature D is used based upon pointing a firearm at another or discharging or threatening to discharge a firearm, a prosecutor shall not award aggravating factor points under Aggravating Factor #3a (the offense involved the threatened use of violence not otherwise accounted for in Special Application and Enhancement Features C1, C2 or D) based on the same specific conduct, event or episode used to establish the Special Application and Enhancement Feature.
[brief] There are two factors that cannot be denied.  First, is that the Plaintiff did in fact object by means of an EEOC complaint that a female was selected simply because she was a female and she was placed ahead of a number of part-timers.  We know that the Plaintiff was barred from the high school.  We know that [...] mentioned the word, “female. ”  We know that [...] said, “I hope you’ll stay on; you’re a good worker. ”  Why would [...] say, “I hope you stay on,” if there wasn’t a reason for the Appellant to resign, and that reason was being barred from the high school.  Even the Plaintiff in the deposition section set forth on Pa-78, the Plaintiff “thought my days were numbered. ”  Again, there are a number of factors that defeat the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
[directive] When stolen property comes into the custody of police, N.J.S.A. 2C:65-1 et seq. provides that law enforcement agencies may release the property to the owner.  The law specifies that the agency enter a description of the property into its central filing system and make a complete photographic record of the property.  This photographic record may 7 be introduced as evidence in any court in lieu of the property.  A law enforcement agency may immediately return stolen property to its rightful owner where the agency is satisfied there is no dispute as to ownership.  If the person entitled to stolen property is unknown, the law enforcement agency may apply to the court for an order to release the property from the custody of the agency.  The application, which must specify the property for which a release is sought, can be made six months after the final determination of the case.  The property will then be disposed at public sale, with proceeds going to the state, county or municipality, whichever was the prosecuting authority.
[brief] Indeed, reasonable suspicion is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence” and “obviously less” than a well-grounded suspicion required for probable cause.  Gamble, 218 N.J. at 428 (emphasis added).  Thus, this suspicion does not have to be even well-grounded.  It only needs to be more than a hunch.  [...]’s observations, within the context of the high crime location, time, and poor lighting, and based on his training and experience as an officer conducting surveillance in this specific place over time, created the requisite suspicion to conduct a brief stop, even if it was considerably less than well-grounded suspicion.  Therefore, this Court must affirm.
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[brief] A.  The Trial Court Failed to Consider the Totality of the Circumstances When it Determined [...] Waived its Right to Arbitration (T1 67:12-76:1)  For six of the seven Cole factors, the trial court incorrectly applied the facts to the law.  i.  [...]’s Motion to Compel Arbitration Was Filed Timely After the Stay was Lifted and the Indemnity Claim was Ripe and Amenable to Binding Resolution Via Arbitration (T1 68:17-20)  Cole requires the consideration of “the delay in making the arbitration request. ”  Cole 215 N.J at 280.  Here, the lower court solely looked at the time that had elapsed between when suit was filed and when the demand for arbitration was made and disregarded [...]’s arguments – including its arguments on ripeness and futility – regarding why the elapse of time requires context.  T1 68:17-20 (“As to the delay, the first factor in making this request, it was only on January 23rd, 2024, which was five years and four months after this litigation began that [...] ultimately requested this relief. ”).  But, most importantly, the trial court never considered the circumstances of this case that made arbitration futile until the recent developments in this multi-party insurance coverage case.
[brief] In McLean, Simms, and Smith, the court held the officer provided an inappropriate lay opinion because the officers’ testimony amounted to an expert opinion interpreting facts for the jury that directly bore on defendant’s guilt.  McLean, 205 N.J. at 463; Simms, 224 N.J. at 399-400, 403-04; Smith, 436 N.J. Super. at 575-76.  Unlike those cases, [...]’s testimony in this case did not bear on the ultimate issue, but rather merely explained why he followed the person he chose to chase.  Similarly, the testimony at issue is distinguishable from the issue that arose in *Derry* and *Hyman*.
[brief] Appellant relies upon the Appendix filed on or about June 27, 2024 in support of Appellant’s motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal  Vol. I Order dated June 7, 2024 denying Plaintiff’s in limine motion to Bar Defendant’s expert report .................................................................  Pa1  Verified Complaint (w/o exhibits) filed November 16, 2018 .......................  Pa3  Order for Payment into Court filed November 26, 2018 .............................  Pa12 Order to Show Cause filed November 26, 2018 ......................................  Pa14  Order to Stay Case filed March 1, 2019 .................................................  Pa18  Order to Stay Case filed January 22, 2020 ...............................................  Pa19 Order Appointing Commissioners and Opinion filed November 13, 2020 ...... Pa20
[directive] For example, the administrator might use the “shuffle method,” in which the photos are separately placed in individual folders or envelopes, shuffled, and presented to the witness in a way that ensures that the administrator/attendee cannot see the photos as they are being viewed by the witness or know which photo is being viewed.  The administrator must ask the witness whether he or she has spoken to anyone (law enforcement or civilian) about the identification.  See Question 12.  If the witness identifies a photo as depicting the perpetrator, the administrator must ask the witness to make a statement regarding their level of confidence that the photo depicts the perpetrator.  See Question 17.
[brief] The Plaintiff was outside of the crosswalk.  However, the location of the nearest cross walk and the distance of the pothole from the crosswalk is not clear from the record.  In *Little v. City of Atlantic City*, No. A-2466-20 (Unpublished) (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2021)(Pa 734-Pa744), the plaintiff crossed Pacific Avenue outside of the crosswalk in a commercial district in Atlantic City.  There, the Court held that potholes have qualified as a dangerous condition under the TCA.  *Id.*  See also: *Whaley v. Cnty. of Hudson*, 146 N.J. Super. 76 (Law Div. 1976).  Furthermore, the Court noted the size of the pothole and the seven to ten feet distance from the pothole to the crosswalk.  *Id.*  The Court further noted that plaintiffs fall occurred in a busy commercial area surrounded by casinos, hotels, and restaurants.  *Id.*  In affirming the trial court’s denial of summary judgment the Court then explained that a jury could consider the fact that plaintiff was walking outside of the crosswalk, but that in "giving the plaintiff the benefit of all of the facts and all the inferences that flow from the facts" it is foreseeable that a person crossing Pacific Avenue would walk outside of the crosswalk. ”  Little v. City of Atlantic City, No. A-2466-20 (Unpublished) (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2021)(Pa734-Pa744).
[brief] According to HCPO Civil Litigation Chief [...] (“[...]”), “The complaints remained the responsibility of the HCPO to prosecute or dismiss. ”.  Pa-115.  The HCPO’s investigation and prosecution in State v. [...] were supervised by HCPO Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor [...] (“[...]”).  Pa-33 to 34.  On May 6, 2021, [...] chose to administratively dismiss Plaintiff’s charges against [...] Pa-121, 122 based on “Insufficient Evidence” and the following claim:  “The underlying incident was evaluated at the highest levels of the NJ Attorney general’s Office and they determined that a criminal prosecution was not warranted.  The interest of justice dictates that this Office not revisit that decision. ”  Pa-122, 123.  Prior to dismissing the case, HCPO employees exchanged 52-pages of emails with New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice employees regarding the charges in the case of State v. [...].  Pa-80 to 86.  As [...] acknowledged, Hudson County Prosecutor [...] and HCPO First Assistant Prosecutor [...] were [...]’s former colleagues.  1T18-14 to -18.  III.  Plaintiff’s Public Records Request and Lawsuit
[brief] In DEP’s July 15, 2009 Amended HAD for [...]’s proposed substation – an intrastate project and thus subject to New Jersey BPU’s authority – DEP “explicitly deferred to BPU for the determination as to the necessity of the substation. ”  And in DEP’s February 11, 2010 HAD for [...]’s 300 Line Project – an interstate project and thus subject to FERC’s authority – DEP similarly deferred to FERC for the determination as to the necessity of the Project.  --- 35 Id. at P 18 (emphasis added).  36  Highlands Applicability, 433 N.J. Super. at 229 (App. Div. 2013).  DEP stated “’[...] is a public utility regulated by [BPU].
[brief] [...]’s plan is inconsistent with the statutes and regulations.  [...] argues at length that [...]’s Arbitration Plan, the current dispute resolution organization selected by [...], cannot accommodate arbitration of IFPA claims.  (Br. of [...] at 20-24).  If [...]’s Arbitration Plan cannot accommodate an IFPA claim, however, the fault lies with [...] and [...] for adopting a plan that is inconsistent with the statutes and regulations.  The [...] should not be punished for [...]’s error in sanctioning a deficient plan.
[brief] In its Statement of Reasons, the trial court stated:  as to the issue of whether [[...]] should have asserted its claim in the First Arbitration, the Court finds that [[...]’s] claim was not ripe at the time of the First Arbitration since [[...]] had not yet obtained a final judgment in the [[...]] arbitration against the owner, [...], until after the First Arbitration concluded.  [Pa66.]  First, the trial court’s conclusion in this regard is clear error: the award against [...] had been entered on September 15, 2023—two-and-a-half months before the First Arbitration hearings were deemed closed (on November 28, 2023).  Pa922.  In other words, the [...] Arbitration had concluded in full while the First Arbitration was still ongoing and the record was open.  Compare Pa922, with Pa569 (“The hearings were deemed closed on November 28, 2023. ”).  Moreover, [...] addressed the [...] Arbitration award in its October 17, 2023 post-trial briefing to the Arbitrator; and, in [...]’s post-hearing brief, [...] argued that it “has not been paid for its work [as a subcontractor] on Hackensack, and has an outstanding balance…”  Pa400-02.  So, in [...]’s own words, it had a ripe claim while the First Arbitration record was open and inserted its non-payment issue squarely before the arbitrator. \(^{10}\) \(^{10}\)  See, e.g., McNally v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 304 N.J. Super. 83, 92 (App. Div. 1997) (“if during the pendency of litigation, a constituent claim arises which is part of the entire controversy, the claimant must seek leave to file a supplemental pleading thereby submitting to judicial discretion the determination of whether the claim should be joined in that action or reserved for a subsequent suit, and if the claimant fails to so move, he will ordinarily be barred from raising the claim in a subsequent suit”); see also Bendar v. Rosen, 247 N.J. Super. 219, 237
[directive] [...]  [...]  [...] or [...] [...]  [...] [...] [...]  II.  Standardized Written Writ Requirements  Standardized writs must be received by the [...] and juvenile facilities no later than 48 business hours prior to the scheduled transportation date for the court event.  As a general rule, faxed writs are not acceptable because of security considerations.  In extraordinary situations, emergent writs for inmates or juveniles may be arranged by the court with the [...] Central Transportation Unit or [...].  An emergent request requires verbal confirmation from the respective unit identified above.  Without the confirmation, the writ may not be received in sufficient time for processing.  Please take steps to ensure that an exact copy of the attached form of writ is used.  The [...] and [...] will not accept writs that deviate from the language of the standardized form.
[brief] Defendants’ application to bar the evidence was not untimely Plaintiffs initial argument – that the trial court should have declined to hear Defendants’ application to bar this evidence – is based on a misapprehension of New Jersey law.  Neither Rule 4:25-8(a)(1) nor Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center, 443 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2015), operates as a bar to Defendants’ application because Defendants’ application did not seek a summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case via a motion in limine.  Based on the trial court’s prior rulings, as well as Plaintiffs’ decision to voluntarily dismiss their other then-remaining claims, the only issue for trial was Plaintiffs’ claim for damages under Count Two of their Complaint for an implied easement appurtenant across the [...].  For this claim, Plaintiffs intended to seek (i) compensatory damages for the replacement cost of the walkover fence that Plaintiffs claimed Defendants had improperly removed, (ii) compensatory damages for Plaintiffs’ claimed loss of use of their claimed easement from the time their walkover fence was removed until the time the trial court granted them summary judgment on their easement claim (the same summary judgment order that Defendants have appealed), (iii) attorneys’ fees, and (iv) punitive damages.
[brief] They shall submit documentation consistent with RPC 1.5(a) so that the court may make a determination regarding the proper amount of fees.  (190a)(emphasis added).  After the [...] defendants filed their fee application, the trial court properly entered an Order on June 30, 2022 ordering the following:  IT IS on this 30th day of June, 2022, ORDERED that Plaintiffs and their counsel filed the 2020 litigation against the [...] defendants in bad faith and for the sole purposes of harassment; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ counsel, [...], Esquire and his clients, [...], [...], [...] and [...], are hereby sanctioned in the amount of $23,765.50 to be paid within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order; (211a).
[brief] I mean at some point a defendant would have to respond to this.  And it's -- it's not able to be responded to.  You couldn't go through all of these allegations and factual recitations mixed in with legal theories and case law.  And it's just -- it's not a complaint that is succinct as [...] said in Page -- on Page 32.  She says, pleadings, let me go back, she's talking about Rule 4:5-7.  Rule 4:5-7 is a one -- a two sentence rule that says each allegation of a pleading shall be simple, concise direct.  No technical forms of pleading are required.  All pleadings shall be liberally construed in the interest of justice.  Which, I think, [...], [...], and all the Federal looks at this – these complaints and all the iterations of this complaint try to do and try to instruct [...] what to do and how to do it a little bit more succinctly.