ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że ograniczenia dotyczące miejsca Pana(i)  4.  (4)  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA] zamieszkania mogą obejmować ograniczenie prawa do zamieszkania pod jednym dachem z nieletnimi?  Do you understand that the restrictions on where you can live may include restrictions on residing in a home with minor children?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku naruszenia warunków (5)  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA] dożywotniego nadzoru po faktycznym zwolnieniu warunkowym, zwolnienie warunkowe może zostać cofnięte i może Pan(i) otrzymać karę pozbawienia wolności od 12 do 18 miesięcy za każde wycofanie zwolnienia w okresie nadzoru, i że ta kara pozbawienia wolności nie może zostać skrócona za dobre sprawowanie lub za pracę?  Do you understand that if you violate a condition of parole supervision for life, your parole may be revoked and you can be sent to prison for 12 to 18 months for each revocation that occurs while you are being supervised and that the prison term you receive cannot be reduced by commutation or work credits?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku naruszenia warunków (6) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] [Nie dotyczy/NA] formalnego dożywotniego nadzoru kuratorskiego 1 lipca 2014 r. lub później oraz w razie oskarżenia i skazania za to naruszenie, Pan(i) karę pozbawienia wolności do lat 5, a jeżeli takie otrzyma naruszenie warunków miało miejsce przed 1 lipca 2014 r, otrzyma Pan(i) karę pozbawienia wolności do 18 miesięcy, i że ten wyrok może być wydany dodatkowo do wyroku pozbawienia wolności, który może Pan(i) otrzymać od Komisji Zwolnień Warunkowych za naruszenie warunków formalnego dożywotniego nadzoru kuratorskiego?
[brief] Some 20 years ago.  \textsuperscript{12}  In Schubert, the Court noted that a defendant’s expectation of finality would not be legitimate had the illegal sentence been the result of some “devious plot” by defendant and/or his attorney to mislead the sentencing court.  Schubert, 212 N.J. 313.  Here, there is no evidence in the existing record that the failure to impose a consecutive sentence was the result of anything other than an inadvertent oversight by all concerned.  York case decided by that State’s highest court in *People v. Williams*, 14 N.Y.3d 198, cert. denied, 131 S.
[brief] Q: Can you explain what a pierhead line is?  A:  A pierhead is the line to which you can extend a pier.  There are generally two lines shown on the Riparian Grant, one would be a bulkhead line and one would be a pierhead line.  The bulkhead line would be for fill so you could fill up to the bulkhead.  Of course, you need permits but that is a line for which fill would be permitted.  Q: So, pierhead line would typically be farther out, and a bulkhead line would be closer to the shore?  A: That is generally the way it is.  I may have also seen where there was a coterminous pierhead bulkhead for some reason.  I can’t say that is not the case but generally speaking the pierhead line extends past the bulkhead line.  The Court: You wouldn’t want a pier – The Witness: Right, you wouldn’t want to go out five miles on a pier.  Q: It would be a long pier.  So, in 1879, [...] obtains a Tidelands Grant from the State of New Jersey, correct?
[brief] STATUTES  N.J. Admin. Code §8:70-1.8..............................................................................17, 27 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1).......................................................................................7 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2).......................................................................................7 N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1a(2).......................................................................................7 N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1).......................................................................................7 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a(2).......................................................................................7 N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3a(1).......................................................................................7 COURT RULES Fed.R.Crim.P. 51,52(b)....................................................................................36 R. 2B:20-1(e)..................................................................................................33-35 R. 702.............................................................................................................17, 28 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
[brief] Relator [...] (“Relator”) filed this suit in 2015, alleging that Defendants violated the New Jersey False Claims Act (“NJFCA”) when they reset interest rates for municipal bonds known as Variable Rate Demand Obligations (“VRDOs”).  Relator’s claims are based on publicly disclosed information, and New Jersey law prohibits relator-led NJFCA suits based on such public information.  This “public disclosure bar” is a longstanding affirmative defense available to defendants in relator-led NJFCA suits.  Because Relator’s action falls squarely within this defense, Defendants moved for summary judgment.  Just eight months ago, while Defendants’ motion was pending, New Jersey amended the NJFCA’s public disclosure bar to align it with decade-old amendments to the federal and other state false claims acts.  The New Jersey amendment for the first time permitted the Attorney General (“AG”) to authorize a relator-led NJFCA suit based on publicly disclosed information to proceed.  The AG’s new ability to override the otherwise applicable public disclosure bar reflected a fundamental, substantive change in NJFCA policy.  If given effect in this case, the amendment would eliminate a substantive defense that has long been available, including since this case began.  Federal courts assessing the identical change to the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) have appropriately barred its retroactive application.  Here, however, the trial court inexplicably ignored both controlling New Jersey retroactivity law and the uniform federal caselaw addressing the retroactivity of the federal FCA amendment.  This court should align New Jersey’s rule with the federal rule, reverse the trial court’s retroactivity ruling, and give the defense its full effect in this case.  The trial court also summarily indicated that it would deny the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment concerning the public disclosure bar, notwithstanding the retroactivity ruling.  But this alternative ruling misstated both the law and the facts.  The court acknowledged that the defense bars actions based upon publicly disclosed information.  The trial court, however, wrongly labeled the various legal disputes among the parties as disputed factual issues precluding summary judgment, most notably whether a purported “analysis” of publicly disclosed information—made available through subscription services and posted on a free, publicly available website—can evade the public disclosure bar.  In truth, under well-established law, the public disclosure bar is a complete defense to Relator’s claims in light of the undisputed facts.  This court should remand this case to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
[brief] As the Court held in Gramiccioni:  [T]he test for determining in which capacity a county prosecutor acts should ‘focus on whether the function that the county prosecutors and their subordinates were performing during the alleged wrongdoing is a function that traditionally has been understood to be a State function and subject to State supervision in its execution. ’  Gramiccioni v. Dep't \(^3\)  The [...] is mindful that there is an unreported Appellate Division decision that is contrary to this position.
[brief] Ultimately, the Board granted the landlord all the expenses from the condominium budget except $200, $5,552 out of a requested $5,572.  The 2019 resolution granted [...] the following expenditures: Taxes $1,937.22, Condo Fee: $5,772.73, Insurance $634.00, Registration $25, Management $419.35.  It provided for a return on equity of $1,059.19 per year and imposed a total monthly increase in the amount of $105.04.  DA49-53.  The landlord appealed to the Superior Court.
[brief] 2  I.  [...] WAS ENROLLED IN THE [...] WHEN THE HOOD [...]IDENT OCCURRED ...........................................................................................................  2  A.  [...] WAS ENROLLED IN THE [...] AND WAS A NAMED INSURED UNDER THE [...] POLICY AT THE TIME OF THE [...]IDENT .............................................................................  2  B.  [...] WAS NOT PERFORMING INELIGIBLE DEMOLITION WORK ON THE DATE OF THE [...]IDENT  ..................................................................................................................  6  C.  FORMAL NOTICE OF CANCELLATION WAS REQUIRED BY STATUTE, REGULATION, AND COMMON LAW, AND WAS NOT PROVIDED TO [...] ..........  8  II.  PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ........................................................................................................
[directive] The NJRP-LE instills a positive culture for law enforcement officers by providing them with the tools to withstand, recover, and grow in the face of stressors, trauma, and the changing demands of their unique work.  D.  “County RPO Trainer” refers to an active or retired law enforcement officer or an active or retired assistant prosecutor who is designated by their County Prosecutor to participate in the NJRP-LE train-the-trainer program developed by the Division of Criminal Justice.  E.  “State RPO Trainer” refers to an active or retired law enforcement officer or an active or retired assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general, who is designated 2 by the State agency’s Director or Superintendent/Colonel, as appropriate, to participate in the NJRP-LE train-the-trainer program developed by the Division of Criminal Justice.  II.
[brief] The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.
[brief] *See,* *S. Washington Ave.*, 400 N.J. Super. at 372 (One of the purposes of N.J.S.A. 20:3–30 is “to protect condemnors from the effects of inflation. ”); see also Nierenberg, 150 N.J. at 137 (The objective of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(c) is “neither to reward nor to punish either party to a condemnation,” regardless “whether the governmental action prompts an increase or a decrease in the value of the property. ”).  With these principles in mind, our caselaw recognizes that the owner of private property taken for public use “is not entitled to reap a windfall,” at the expense of the public, as a result of condemnation.  *State, Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. S. Nalbone Trucking Co., Inc.*, 128 N.J. Super. 370, 377 (App. Div. 1974).  Nor is the owner entitled to unjust enrichment as a result of the circumstances of condemnation.  See *Hous. Auth. of Camden v. United Ajax Corp.*, 129 N.J. Super. 119, 123 (App. Div. 1974) (holding that owner who received insurance proceeds for fire damage occurring between the valuation date and the taking date is not entitled to full compensation as of the date of valuation).
[brief] Angel v Rand Express Lines, Inc., 77 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1961)  .................................................................  28 Atkinson v Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962) ......................................................................................... 25, 45 Boyle v Riti, 175 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1980) ............................................................ 26, 38, 43 Brown v. Board of Trustees, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 442 (App. Div. 2023) ........................................ 28 Campbell v New Jersey Racing Commission, 169 N.J. 579 (2001) ......................................................................................... 25 Bueno v Board of Trustees, Teacher’s Pension and Annuity Fund 404 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2008)............................................................... 26, 39 Gerba v Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System, 83 N.J. 174 (1980) ......................................................................................... 25, 32, 37, 44-45, 48 Hawkins v. Board of Trustees, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 727 (App. Div. 2020) ....................................... 43 In re Cordero, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1406. 9 (App. Div. 2012) .................................. 47 Korelnia v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System, 83 N.J. 162 (1980)
[brief] In the early morning of August 21, 2015, [...] was arrested on an unrelated matter and was “eager” to provide a statement about [...]’s homicide.  (6T17-25 to 22-5; 6T134-1 to 24).  At trial, Telfair, who by then was serving a 60-year prison term for a 2021 murder conviction, claimed that he concocted his statement because police were holding “fake” drug charges over his head.  (3T156-2 to 13; 3T159-16 to 161-19).  Telfair acknowledged that [...] always showed up in a red Mercury when buying drugs from Telfair.  (3T161-20 to 162-23).  Following the Gross hearing, [...] approved the introduction of Telfair’s redacted statement.
[brief] The discretion of where and what type of streetlights are placed is at the sole control and direction of the municipality or borough.  Accordingly, the municipality pays a specific price for each light depending on the light that is chosen.  There was no evidence in the record before the trial court that [...] asked, or [...] provided, any advice or recommendations related to the subject streetlight.  In short, there were absolutely no facts in the record that any advice was sought as to the type of light the borough requested and was installed at the subject pole.
[brief] The [...] Unreasonably Denied the Application to Develop the Property with a Permitted Use (T1/25:16-26:6; 27:2-28:13; 200:7-16, 201:13-15; T2/71:15; Aa246).  ..............................................................................................................................................  21  1.  The Proposed Development Did Not Require a Loading Zone.  (T1/70:16-71:7).  .................................................................................................................. 25  2.  The Board Cannot Rely on Off-Site Conditions as a Basis for Its Denial of the Application.  (Aa234)  .................................................................................................................. 29  3.  The Shape and Configuration of the Property, Along with the Pre-Existing, Non-Conforming Lack of Parking at the Property, Justified the Bulk Variance Relief Sought.  (T1/69:14-23, 77:14-19).  ..................................................................................................................  34  B.  The Resolution Sets Forth Hollow Conclusions That Are Unsupported by the Record and Should Be Rejected (Aa236)  .................................................................................................................. 38  V. CONCLUSION
[brief] Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that “where a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Hubbard v. Reed*, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001)); see also *Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers*, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012).
[brief] In a probate action, if probate is refused, the court may make an allowance to be paid out of the estate of the decedent.  If probate is granted, and it shall appear that the contestant had reasonable cause for contesting the validity of the will or codicil, the Court may make an allowance to the proponent and the contestant, to be paid out of the estate.  Awards of attorney's fees in contested administration are normally granted, to be paid by the estate, except in weak or meretricious cases.  In re: Reisdorf, 80 N.J. 319, 326 (1979).  In this matter, there is no doubt that the attorney for [...] was successful in the litigation.  The Court granted [...], her lawful share of the estate and entered many orders during the process to protect the estate and the assets from the naked misconduct of [...] and her attorneys.  In a situation where attorney's fees are assessed, once the requirement of the Court rule is met entitling a party to an award of attorney's fees, the party seeking attorney's fees must submit an Affidavit of Service consistent with R. 4:42-9(b).
[brief] Pending condemnation action  Despite Plaintiff’s Property being the key to the Borough’s plan for compliance with the 2012 Order for Municipal Compliance, the Borough has not yet acquired the Plaintiff’s Property.  (Pa 41).  A condemnation action, instituted by the [...] in response to Case Management Order V dated November 12, 2019 in the Mt. Laurel Action, which at Plaintiff’s insistence ordered the [...] to file such action by November 22, 2019, is pending in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  (Pa 41).  A June 3, 2024 trial date in the pending condemnation action for the establishing of the fair compensation needed to be paid for Plaintiff’s Property has been set as contemplated by the November 12, 2019 Case Management Order, but no Declaration of Taking has been filed as required for a quick taking.  (Pa 41).
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 7:15.  Appellants can only point to a single sentence in [...]’s 2015 rule proposal for the WQM Rules, which states: “If a WQM plan has additional requirements, or a wasteload allocation in an adopted TMDL has been established, these must also be addressed in order for the proposal to be consistent. ”  Asb24 quoting 47 N.J.R. 2531(a)(Oct. 19, 2015).  Notably, Appellants omitted the first part of [...]’s explanation, which provides that it applies to projects or activities that fall within N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b) through (d).  However, as explained above and in [...]’s initial merits brief, [...] is deemed to be consistent with the WQM Plan because it falls under N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(f)(5) as [...] does not require a treatment works approval, which is not disputed by Appellants.
[brief] Pa185-Pa195; Pa239-Pa247; Pa699-Pa709; Pa710-Pa738.  Fourth, [...]’s opinions were never the subject of sworn testimony or cross-examination.  Fifth, [...]’s personal opinion about the standards required by the LTTEL was an inadmissible net opinion.  *Pomerantz*, 207 N.J. at 373 (citing *Taylor v. DeLosso*, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999)).  His opinions about [...]’s finances or the long term effects of the financial agreement were speculative.  Finally, no prerogative writ action challenging a PILOT agreement should be reduced a “battle of the experts. ”  The importance of the exemption and the balance of risk versus reward was for the members of the governing body, serving as the elected representatives of the people, to determine, not [...], and not a court.
[brief] On August 29, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Part.  (Pa1)  On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking injunctive relief.  (Pa7)  On October 5, 2023, Defendants filed a Cross-Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief.  (Pa10)  On December 22, 2023, Oral argument was heard by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. [...] denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief and Granted Defendants’ Cross Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint.  (Pa24)  Appellant subsequently filed a notice of Appeal on January 24, 2024.  (Pa27)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Insofar as the court’s finding of aggravating factor 9 rested on the violent nature of the crime itself, that is not an appropriate basis for finding an aggravating factor.  The role of aggravating and mitigating factors in the Code is to identify “individual circumstances which distinguish the particular offense from other crimes of the same nature. ”  State v. Yarbough, 195 N.J. Super. 135, 143 (App. Div. 1984), mod. 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  To find a need to deter in a murder case because it’s a murder case constitutes inappropriate double counting rather than the proper finding of an aggravating circumstance that distinguishes the case from other murders.  See State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000) (noting that “the Legislature had already considered the elements of an offense in the gradation of a crime,” and that if courts also considered those same elements at sentencing, “every offense arguably would implicate aggravating factors merely by its commission, thereby eroding the basis for the gradation of offenses and the distinction between elements and aggravating circumstances”); Carey, 168 N.J. at 424 (noting that a remand for resentencing is required “when the trial court double counts or considers an improper aggravating factor”).
[brief] Moreover, the Complaint does describe the staff incompetency by DSPs failing to simply test blood sugar on diabetic individuals at Defendant [...], which goes to the regulation’s training on “medication” and “preventing abuse and neglect. ”  See N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a).  Plaintiff reiterated this assertion at oral argument when clarifying, “testing blood sugar…of individuals is so important [because] if you do it inappropriately, it causes bruising…and injures these individuals.  And that, would specifically, go to the abuse and neglect aspect of [N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a)].”  T39:1-39:9.  Plaintiff’s complaints also conform to the public policy surrounding N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a); to wit, poor or insufficient training of DSPs undermines the services and direct assistance required for Defendants’ employees to provide developmentally disabled individuals to carry out their daily functions and activities at the group home.  See N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.2(i) and N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.1(j).  Accordingly, when reviewing the Complaint with a “generous and hospitable approach,” which [...] should have done at the trial level, it is clear Plaintiff has identified both law and public policy that “closely relates” to her complained of conduct to establish a prima facie CEPA claim.