ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *Wilmore v. Savvas Learning Co.*, 2023 WL 6124045, at *9 (D. Kan. Sept. 19, 2023).  Courts therefore regularly hold that relevancy review is required—not as a matter of discretion, but as a matter of law.  See, e.g., id.; *Palmer v. Cognizant Tech. Sols. Corp.*, 2021 WL 3145982, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2021) (“The Court will not compel defendants to produce any document simply because it contains a search term whether or not it is responsive to the discovery request, or, by extension, whether or not it is relevant and proportional to the needs of the action. ”); *BancPass*, 2016 WL 4031417, at *3 (holding parties’ agreement to run search terms did not obligate them to produce non-responsive documents, and denying motion to compel because there was “no reason to believe that [the defendant] ha[d] withheld documents it was obligated to produce”); *Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.*, 2014 WL 716521, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2014) (declining to hold that “documents identified by the search tool [must] be produced without regard to whether they were relevant as defined by the earlier discovery demands and responses”).
[brief] Simply put by the *Longabardi* Court: "any means any."  *Id.* at 540 (citing *American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Taylor*, 476 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985)); see also *Thomas v. N.J. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n (NJIUA)*, 277 N.J. Super. 630, 638 (Super. Ct. 1994) ("When the misrepresentation was made should not make a difference.")  What this means for the current litigation and appeal is that any misrepresentation by Appellant provides a justifiable basis for not only judgment against her on her direct claims against [...] in the Litigation, but also for the Trial Court to enter judgment as to [...]’s Counterclaims.  Nowhere in Appellant’s brief does she argue that a contrary interpretation of the law exists.  To the contrary her entire argument is premised on her belief that material facts were disputed that barred summary judgment and that it was for the jury to decide her intent.  Yet, just as Appellant failed to present such evidence supporting her claim as to [...] to the Trial Court, she still failed to identify those facts in the record before this Court.
[brief] (Db 54).  As argued a length above in POINT II, defendant’s “focal point” was actually not his mental health because he outright instructed his attorney that there was to be no insanity defense and thereafter did not present a shred of testimonial or documentary evidence that he suffered any type of mental illness or a diagnosis of any sort by any doctor or mental health expert.  (See Db 54; compare 3T:10-8 to 22).  Instead, defendant’s strategy throughout the trial was to point the finger at [...] as the shooter or at best, rely on being convicted of a lesser charge, as he argued in his closing.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the State’s anticipation that the defense may introduce evidence of mental health issues does not equate to a concession that it existed.  As the trial court stated in its analysis of mitigating factor four, defendant’s bizarre behavior, in and of itself, was not evidence of a mental disease or defect that would excuse or justify his conduct in this case.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has established the "substantial-certainty test" for determining an intentional wrong under the WCA.  See *Van Dunk*, supra, 210 N.J. at 461.  "In adopting a 'substantial-certainty' standard," the Court "acknowledge[d] that every undertaking, particularly certain business judgments, involve some risk, but that willful employer misconduct was not meant to go undeterred.  The distinctions between negligence, recklessness, and intent are obviously matters of degree, albeit subtle ones."  *Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 101 N.J. 161, 178 (1985).  The Court elucidated, "an intentional wrong is not limited to actions taken with a subjective desire to harm, but also includes instances where an employer knows that the consequences of those acts are substantially certain to result in such harm."  *Laidlow*, supra, 170 N.J. at 613.  Defendant [...]’s proposed context analysis is too forgiving and too dangerous.
[brief] Delgado concerned a motion to enforce an attorney’s lien.  Id. at *4.  The judge denied the motion on the papers despite requests for oral argument.  Id. at *5.  Although the Appellate Division found “merit” in the argument that it should remand because the motion judge “impermissibly denied oral argument,” the court noted that the case involved highly contested facts and that the trial court lacked “a proper basis” to make fact findings since it relied only on uncertified and contested representations.
[brief] THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD NOT EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF GOVERNMENT RECORDS UNDER OPRA TO INCLUDE PROPRIETARY EMAIL SERVICES USED BY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF AN ELECTED BODY (PA31-32)  Plaintiff relies on Burnett v. Gloucester County, 415 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 2010) for the principle that government agencies have “the obligation to recover records no matter who possessed them or where they were located.
[brief] Even if the Court were to apply the seven Cole factors to an express waiver – a process that makes no legal sense – those factors weigh in favor of Plaintiff, not Defendants.  As to the first factor, although Defendants waited two months before they filed their motion to compel arbitration, the delay is significant here because in so doing, Defendants violated the March 8, 2024 Briefing Order by [...] (Da5, Pa17), and had they complied with it, the matter would have been decided months earlier in Chancery.  A two-month delay when it comes to compliance with a Court Order is significant and weighs in Plaintiff’s favor, not Defendants, under Cole, supra.  For the second factor, Defendants had filed motions: one in the Chancery for a TRO, which was denied, and another one, a dispositive motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s statutory claims under the LAD and CEPA after the cases were transferred to the Law Division, arguing that Plaintiff was not an “employee” combining that request for dispositive relief with its motion to compel arbitration, which were also denied in the October 17, 2023 Order.  For the third, Defendants’ express waiver of arbitration in Chancery, followed by their attempt to reverse that by filing a motion to compel arbitration in the Law Division, were certainly part of their litigation strategy and a change in that litigation strategy, as clearly both were done purposely by counsel in court proceedings.  For the fourth, Plaintiff had served discovery upon Defendants on May 1, 2023, prior to their motion to compel arbitration being filed, and Defendants as part of their motion to dismiss/compel asked for bifurcation of discovery – clearly an attempt by Defendants to get discovery in the court proceedings while at the same time attempting to force Plaintiff into arbitration.  As Defendants noted in their Brief (Db20), Plaintiff had also served deposition notices and also had served a subpoena upon and obtained documents from Defendants’ prior counsel.  Defendants also served discovery upon Plaintiff.  For the fifth factor, as indicated above, even prior to filing any pleading, Defendants indicated to the Chancery Court that they intended to file a motion to compel arbitration.  Then, after filing their own lawsuit against Plaintiff in Chancery Division with a Jury Demand, they expressly waived their right to arbitration before [...].  For the sixth Cole factor, the proximity of the motion to compel to a trial date is not applicable as none had been set.
[brief] The trial court even recognized the undisputed timing of the entries.  (See 1T 25:3-7 (“So after, there was an approval of their pay they would go in at 11 o’clock on a Monday, this was every other Monday when their time sheets had to be in and approve time, this additional pay for each other during this period of time. ”); see also id. at 25:8-12 (“Obviously, it really cannot be disputed that they were doing it to avoid detection from any else and during the chaos of COVID”); Id. at 25:13-15 (“But the facts under how they went about approving this charge pay for each other really belies the assertion that it was approved by [...]”).  As set forth more fully above, there exist copious facts in the record supporting Defendants’ position that the charge pay was not authorized.
[brief] (Ab61).  It also claims that [...] was obligated to defer to [...]’s findings.  (Ab63).  These assertions lack legal and factual support.  [...] has broad authority in the general supervision, regulation of and jurisdiction and control over public utilities.  N.J.S.A. 48:2-13.  The Legislature recognized that “the public interest in proper regulation of public utilities transcends municipal or county lines” and that such centralized regulation “must be entrusted to an agency whose continually developing expertise will assure uniformly safe, proper and adequate service by utilities throughout the State. ”  Pub. Serv., 35 N.J. at 371.
[brief] Because this matter does not involve a challenge to the validity of the provisions of Title 18A of the New Jersey Revised Statutes, a separate brief on the merits is unnecessary.  And the primary parties to this appeal have adequately addressed the relevant issues and the public interest does not require participation by the Commissioner in this appeal.  It is, however, the Commissioner’s position that the final agency decision should be affirmed.  It is well-settled that such determination should not be vacated in the absence of a showing that the final agency decision is arbitrary or capricious, that it lacks support in the record or that it violates legislative policies expressed or fairly to be implied in the statutory scheme administered by that agency.  *Dore v. Bedminster Twp. Bd. of Educ.*, 185 N.J. Super. 447, 453 (App. Div. 1982).  N.J.S.A. § 18A:26-2 is clear that local boards of education cannot employ school teaching staff unless they hold valid teaching certificates.  An examination of the record demonstrates there was no dispute that the [...] terminated [...] because his teaching certificates were suspended.  The Commissioner’s decision is reasonable, consistent with the applicable statutes, and should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED [...]’S MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT AND COULD NOT LITIGATE THE MERITS OF THE HACKENSACK DISPUTE IN THE PTA ARBITRATION [PA21-PA22, PA43-PA44]  Regardless of whether the Trial Court or the arbitrator should determine the application of the entire controversy doctrine, the Trial Court was correct that [...] did not meet the standard for injunctive relief.
[brief] Orefice v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 2018 WL 5116952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 22, 2018)………Da1  Aletta v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 2024 WL 2744677 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 29, 2024)………Da3  1  As required by Rule 1:36-3, the undersigned certifies that he is unaware of any contrary unpublished opinions.
[directive] 5.  ¿Entiende usted que si lo sentencian al Centro de Diagnóstico y Tratamiento de Adultos  Do you understand if you are sentenced to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] a. las pautas normales de libertad condicional no regirán para cualquier libertad condicional en el futuro? that any future parole will not be guided by the normal parole guidelines?  calificará para que [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  b. usted lo pongan en libertad cuando la Junta Estatal de Libertad Condicional, después de recibir la recomendación de una junta especial de revisión de clasificaciones, determine que usted ha logrado un nivel satisfactorio de progreso en el tratamiento para delincuentes sexuales y que entonces lo pondrán en libertad a menos que bajo palabra la Junta Estatal de Libertad Bajo Palabra resuelva por una o preponderancia de las pruebas que usted no ha colaborado en su rehabilitación que es razonable esperar que usted violará las condiciones de la libertad condicional?  eligible that you will be for release when the State Parole Board, after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds you have achieved a satisfactory level of progress unless in sex offender treatment and that you will then be released on parole the State Parole Board determines by a preponderance of the evidence that you have failed to cooperate in your or rehabilitation there is reasonable expectation that you will violate conditions of parole?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] c. que usted podría pasar bajo tratamiento más tiempo del que pasaría si lo sentenciaran a la prisión estatal? that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if sentenced to state prison?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  6.
[directive] Pati sa a fèt pou konplete pa akize a si yo pat pran lisans kondwi li nan men li omoman yo dikte santans la:  To be completed by defendant if driver’s license is not collected at time of sentencing:  Non Konplè/Full name Adrès/Address Dat Nesans/Date  Koulè zye/Eye Sèks/Gender of Birth Color  Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Haitian Creole page 2 of 2
[directive] Page 30 Registry12 Domestic Violence Central to determine whether the defendant is subject to a domestic violence restraining order.  This mandatory query of the Central Registry shall be made before deciding whether to issue a complaint-summons or a complaint-warrant.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude or discourage a police officer from checking the Domestic Violence Central Registry in all cases, and not just cases involving domestic violence, and a County Prosecutor may direct officers to check that central registry in all cases, or in such types of cases as the prosecutor may specify.
[brief] ”  Id. at 272.  As shown below, [...]’s contract did not clearly and equivocally require [...] to indemnify [...] for its own negligence.  See Point III, infra. B.  Multiple conflicting indemnity provisions can make an indemnity contract ambiguous (raised below at 1T15:16-17:25).  Both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division ruled that a contract that contains multiple indemnity provisions can be ambiguous and therefore unenforceable with regard to indemnification for one’s own negligence.  Mantilla, 167 N.J. 262, Englert, 389 N.J. Super. 44; Meder v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 240 N.J. Super. 470 (App. Div. 1989).  If multiple indemnity clauses are inconsistent, the contract does not satisfy the requirement of a clear and unequivocal intent to require indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 48.  As discussed, in Mantilla, a mall owner sued a janitorial service, seeking contractual indemnification for losses sustained by a plaintiff who fell on a wet floor.
[brief] B.  It Was Error To Permit The Witness To Testify About His Confidence When Police Failed To Take A Confidence Statement During The Identification Procedure.  (6T 113-23 to 114-8)  As explained above, Henderson requires a verbatim recording of the witness’s confidence in his own words at the time he makes an identification.  The solution to this failure was presented in Henderson: preclusion of any confidence testimony.  As the Court explained, “if an eyewitness’ confidence was not properly recorded soon after an identification procedure, and evidence revealed that the witness received confirmatory feedback from the police or a co-witness, the court can bar potentially distorted and unduly prejudicial statements about the witness’ level of confidence from being introduced at trial. ”  Henderson, 208 at 298.  In this case, confidence was not only not recorded “soon after” the procedure, ibid., it was never recorded at all.  (7T 103-1 to 3; Da 33-34; Da 40 at 3:44:44 to 3:51:57)  But strong confirmatory feedback existed after [...] chose [...]’s photograph.  [...] returned to the room, told [...] that he had chosen Zahir [...]’s photo, and told [...] [...]’s SBI number.  (Da 38; Da 40 at 3:55:04 to 3:56:30)  After the array, there was almost four years’ worth of confirmatory feedback between the identification and the moment [...] testified at trial.  [...]’s arrest, any news coverage of it, any preparatory conversations between [...] and the State, and the trial itself, with [...] sitting at counsel table, all confirmed that [...] picked the right man.  The State, at least, thought so, having brought the full weight of its prosecutorial power down on [...].  Yet, despite the police’s failure to record his confidence at the time of the identification, [...] was asked about it at trial, testifying that he “was 100 percent certain” in his identification.  (6T 113-1 to 5)  The prosecutor followed up, asking, “Is there any doubt in your mind that that person you picked on three was the person that you saw?,” and [...] again responded he was “100 percent certain. ”  (6T 113-15 to 19)  The inappropriate recitation of his confidence years later was reversible error.
[brief] *Id.* at 461-62.  Further, a municipality cannot simply rely on a general grant of authority to regulate in a manner contrary to State law, as we now see in Defendants’ attempts to rely on the Home Rule Act.  The Appellate Division in *Plaza Joint Venture v. City of Atl. City*, 174 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 1980) found that:  [A]n ordinance properly enacted and within the police power of the municipality [of N.J.S.A. 40:48-2] will be invalid if it intrudes upon a field preempted by the Legislature.  When the Legislature has preempted a field by comprehensive regulation, a municipal ordinance attempting to regulate the same field is void if the municipal action adversely affects the legislative scheme.  [*Id.* at 238 (*citing* Fair Lawn Ed. Ass'n v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Ed., 79 N.J. 574, 586 (1979); *Summer v. Teaneck*, 53 N.J. 548, 554 (1969))].  The *Plaza Joint Venture* court also noted that:  A legislative intent to preempt a field will be found either where the state scheme is so pervasive or comprehensive that it effectively precludes the coexistence of municipal regulation or where the local regulation conflicts with the state statutes or stands as an obstacle to state policy expressed in enactments of the Legislature.  [*Id.* at 238 (*citing* Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 77 N.J. 439, 450, (1978))].  As examined in more detail below, Plaintiffs submit that the existing extensive regulation of noise in New Jersey, whether it be general noise ordinances under the Noise Control Act, or noise nuisance ordinances under the provisions of Title 26, are so pervasive in the field of noise regulation that Defendants’ Noise Ordinance should be deemed preempted.
[brief] This case arises out of the installation of a louvered roof system at the [...] in Avalon.  Plaintiff [...] asserts the system failed to perform as represented and brought suit against the manufacturer and installer.  Id.  [...]’s complaint alleged violations of the Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract and warranty, and unjust enrichment.  Pa75.  Defendant, [...], (hereinafter, “[...]”), is a corporation formerly known as [...] with a principal place of business in Georgia.  1T 119:9-14; 60:11-14\(^1\).  [...] manufactures and distributes Louvered Roofs throughout the United States, which are intended to provide adjustable coverage for outdoor structures.  Pa2; 1T 93:9-22.  [...] ([...]) is a Limited Liability Company located in New Jersey engaged in the business of contracting and specifically holds itself out as “The Specialist in Exterior Building products. ”  Pa48; 1T 59:1-18.  One of [...]’s featured products and services is installing [...] Louver Roof systems.  Id.  --- \(^1\) 1T refers to the August 2, 2023 Transcript of Trial; 2T refers to the September 14, 2023 Transcript of Hearing.  The [...] Louver Roof system is a product that is marketed and distributed throughout the United States and is represented to provide adjustable coverage for outdoor structures.  Pa2.  The louvers open to allow sunlight through and close to provide rain and weather cover.  Pa2.  Specifically, the product is marketed to “bring the indoors out” and is “engineered and designed to withstand all types of weather conditions from heavy snow to high winds”.  Pa2.  According to [...], “the louvers open to allow sunlight in and close to provide shelter and shade.  Water is directed from the louvers to gutters, and down through downspouts either independent or incorporated into columns. ”  Pa7.  [...] indicates that its “system is engineered to exceed all standards and expectations.  They’re designed to meet Florida’s stringent hurricane codes, as well as withstand heavy snow loads in the cold of winter.  Plus, each [[...]] system is fabricated and power coated to order, made to exact specifications, which makes for a better fit and finish and a cleaner looking system. ”  Pa4.  [...] indicates these pieces come together “to make it all work perfectly. ”  Pa7.  [...] employs an aggressive marketing campaign toward commercial customers including golf courses, hotels, and restaurants to use their product as a revenue generating improvement by allowing all-weather dining and utilization of outdoor spaces.  1T 142:20-23; Pa47.  Plaintiff
[brief] Next, Plaintiffs assert that [...] erred in dismissing the legal malpractice claims against the [...].  The legal malpractice and *respondeat superior* claims fail because there was no attorney-client relationship between the Marshall Dennehey Defendant and Plaintiffs upon which a legal malpractice may be premised.  Plaintiffs asserting legal malpractice must allege: (1) an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care from the attorney to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the attorney; and (3) that the breach proximately caused damages to the plaintiff.  *Jerista v. Murray*, 185 N.J. 175, 190-91 (2005); *Kranz v. Tiger*, 390 N.J. Super. 135, 147 (App. Div. 2007).  Because Plaintiffs assert no facts establishing that an attorney-client relationship existed between Plaintiffs and the [...]—given that the latter represented Plaintiffs’ adversaries in the litigation—and because the very narrow circumstances by which a non-client may assert a legal malpractice do not exist here, no legal malpractice claim of any kind is viable.
[brief] [23T16-23T17 (emphasis added)].  Thus, the trial court concluded that [...] compelled the post-verdict abrogation of Burt defendant treatment of [...].  But, under Burt, there is a significant exception to the way the joint and several “system has to work,” in that it is an exception to joint liability.  Essentially, the trial court converted [...] from a Burt defendant to a standard defendant post-verdict.  __________________________ noted, the trial court provided its reasoning in connection with the R. 4:49-2 Motion to Amend.  For the reasons detailed above, [...] did not explicitly or implicitly abrogate Burt.
[brief] ”  Pb22; Db19.  Plaintiff’s assertions that [...]’s status as a partnership alters the analysis or that “the nature of the attorney-client relationship” is an “exception” to the general jurisdiction standard are without citation and contradict binding precedent.  See Pb22.  Indeed, as Dutch Run—itself addressed to personal jurisdiction over a foreign law firm partnership—recognized, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment due process constraint described in Daimler . . . applies to all state-court assertions of general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants; the constraint does not vary with the type of claim asserted or the business enterprise sued.
[brief] J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005).  In the matter of O’Keefe v. State, Dept. of Labor, 2007 WL 1975603, after making a complaint, the plaintiff suffered a demotion with less pay and received verbal threats (“this is your friend back there getting people to go after me and I’m going to cut his f[ing head off” which were not investigated by his employer).