ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendants altered the natural flow of water and created new channels resulting in water concentrating in a different part of [...]’s property  The first element of a water nuisance claim is that the defendant “alter[ed], by artificial means, the natural discharge of the surface water from his land on that of his neighbor, by conducting it into new channels in unusual quantities to or on a particular part or parts of the latter’s land. ”  McCullough v. Hartpence, 141 N.J. Eq. 499, 501 (Ch. 1948); Nathanson v. Wagner, 118 N.J. Eq. 390, 393, 179 A. 466, 468 (Ch. 1935), cited in Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 328 (1956).  This first element can be satisfied where the defendant “enhanced, accelerated, and concentrated storm water discharged” onto the plaintiff’s property.  *Sheppard v. Twp. of Frankford*, 261 N.J. Super. 5, 8 (App. Div. 1992).  The record leaves no room for dispute that this element has been satisfied.  The January 2012 arbitration award that resolved the *Burke* Action required [...] to pay [...] the estimated cost for “the installation of four catch basis and connection piping to the brook.
[brief] Section 9.01, which purports to be a cost-benefit analysis focuses only on benefits.  The benefits cited include regional benefits in the form of 2,410 construction jobs\(^9\) and, of course, affordable housing.  However, Section 9.01 is silent on costs, most particularly the shift of a $25,000,000 school tax burden to plaintiff [...], a significant cost that under the plain language of the statute should have been weighed.
[brief] January 20, 2023  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C. denying Motion to Stay on comity grounds ........................................Pa774  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]  (“[...]”), submits this brief in support of its appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen Vicinage (Hon. [...], J.S.C.) dated July 24, 2023, which granted reconsideration of prior orders of Judge [...] (now retired) that had denied the motion to dismiss of Defendant-Respondents, [...] (“[...]”), [...] f/k/a [...] (“[...]”), and [...]’s (“[...]”) (collectively “Defendants” or “Monsanto”) and, upon reconsideration, dismissed the case on comity grounds in favor of Defendants-Respondents’ second-filed action in Missouri. (Pa056-57).  Defendants sought reconsideration of the denial of a motion to dismiss they had filed multiple times, and that the previously-assigned judge, Hon. [...], had denied multiple times.  Judge Wilson first denied Defendants’ pre-answer motions to dismiss (including one on comity grounds) in October 2017.  Five years later, Defendants filed renewed motions to dismiss and a duplicative motion to stay on comity grounds, which Judge Wilson denied on January 20, 2023.  Shortly after issuing the January 2023 Orders, Judge Wilson retired from the bench and the action was reassigned to Judge Thurber.  Defendants seized on that event and moved once again, three weeks later, for reconsideration of Judge Wilson’s January 2023 Orders.  Defendants’ most recent attempt to dismiss [...]’s first-filed action in New Jersey is based upon exactly the same facts and arguments rejected three times by Judge Wilson.  Judge Wilson’s decisions involved matters within his discretion and were correctly decided by him.  Defendants’ repeated challenges offered no permissible basis for a motion to reconsider under this Court’s well-established precedents.
[brief] ” (Da18).  What is more, [...]’s name does not appear on the list.  Defendant’s brief – piling supposition on top of a rule violation – presumes that the roster misspelled [...]’s name as “Oliveri.” plea.  “Generally, a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all issues which were or could have been addressed by the trial judge before the guilty plea. ”  State v. Robinson, 224 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 1988).  While a defendant may appeal to this Court from the denial of a motion to suppress following a guilty plea, R. 3:5-7(d), or condition a guilty plea on the right to appeal from other pretrial motions, R. 3:9-3(f), that limited right to appeal based on the record below does not equate to an open-ended invitation to re-litigate resolved motions based on new information.  If defendant here his unwilling to withdraw his guilty plea, then his only other option is filing a motion for post-conviction relief.  There is no other procedural vehicle to advance this claim.  Thus, for all these reason, this Court should not remand this matter for a new suppression hearing.
[brief] All the Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint six (6) specific oral misrepresentations they claimed induced their purchase.  Each of the six (6) alleged oral misrepresentations were addressed by the contractual documents each of the Plaintiffs signed.  And each of the signed contractual documents said the precise opposite of what the Plaintiffs claimed they were told in their complaint.  There simply was no dispute that a comparison of the alleged oral misrepresentations and the contractual documents stating the precise opposite triggered the Parol Evidence Rule and barred the claims of oral misrepresentation.  As to the analysis, the Trial Court held that when analyzing Parol Evidence issues where fraud is alleged, “you have to look at the entire matter in context.  What’s going on, what are – what are the parties trying to do here?  What is their intention?” (2T36:4-8).  The Trial Court found that issues of intent and issues of credibility required a factual setting appropriate for a trial judge.  (2T36:20-37:17).  The trial judge relied on three (3) decisions standing for the proposition that the introduction of Parol Evidence is necessary to define the intent of the parties.
[brief] See, e.g., *Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. New Jersey Div. of Criminal Justice*, 435 N.J. Super. 533, 536 (App. Div. 2014) (holding agency could not impose an “extra hurdle” to gain access to records by requiring requestor to object to redactions before suing); *Libertarian Party of Cent. New Jersey v. Murphy*, 384 N.J. Super. 136, 139 (App. Div. 2006) (holding a policy simply is not “legally sustainable” under OPRA where the “only discernable rationale . . . is to discourage the public from requesting the information[.]”); *Livecchia v. Borough of Mount Arlington*, 421 N.J. Super. 24, 40 (App. Div. 2011) (holding agency cannot impose a service fee to discourage access); *Smith v. Hudson Cnty. Register*, 411 N.J. Super. 538, 570 (App. Div. 2010) (holding photocopying fees “must be reasonable, and cannot be used as a tool to discourage access. ”).  There is no reason to depart from FOIA case law regarding what level of specificity is required to request emails, which comports with case law interpreting OPRA.  See Point I(A).
[brief] **THE COURT:**  If I get to the end of this case and I say to them, listen, you didn't produce what you were supposed to produce.  She had to try this thing in a blind, and that may be a basis for your appeal.  I don't know if things don't go your way and it also may be a basis for a hefty sanction because of the non-compliance, and there hasn't been a motion to quash.  (21T 24 lines 16-22).  [...] continued to try to question [...] about the request he sent to [...] and Pozzi continued to insist upon answering that he forwarded a document to [...].  The Court tried to get [...] to respond.  The Court stated:  **THE COURT:**  No, the one from the insurance company --the woman who spoke to you, [...] whatever her name was, she sent to you or somebody there sent to you the documents we are now looking at for the change of beneficiary form.  [...] says, where's the transmittal whether it's email, fax, whatever it is that came -- that brought those documents to you.  I imagine it'll be from the insurance company.  (21T 26, lines 1-9).  After the Court's statement, [...] again asked [...] for the forwarding document.  [...] again resisted.
[brief] See, e.g., [...] & [...], She Blinded Me with Science: Wrongful Convictions and the “Reverse CSI Effect,” 17 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 481, 495 (2011) (“[J]urors in this country often accept state forensic testimony as if each prosecution expert witness is the NASA scientist who first put man on the moon. ”).  Similarly, courts must ensure that the probative 1https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf value of forensic evidence is not exaggerated during trial and that jurors are given appropriate instructions to guide their evaluation of scientific evidence.
[brief] **[...]’s Failure To Pay The Fourth Settlement Payment Constituted A Breach Of The Settlement Agreement (Pa2). **  Under the Settlement Agreement, [...] was required to pay $46,058.39 on the first day of each month beginning July 2023 and concluding in October 2023.  [Pa51 at ¶ 3(b)].  Failure to strictly comply constituted an event of default under the Settlement Agreement that triggered [...]’s right to submit the Monetary Judgment to the trial court for immediate entry.  [Pa51 at ¶ 3(b); Pa52 at ¶ 4 (“An Event of Default shall occur if Tenant: (i) fails to make any Monthly Payment when due”)].  [...] conceded to the trial court – as it must – that it failed to make the final settlement payment when due.  [1T at 14:7-16; Pa176 at ¶ 17 (“I decided that given the Plaintiff landlord’s abrupt interference, disruption, and wrongful self-help by kicking us out of the Property, [...] did not have to make the last payment of $46,058.39. ”)].  Although this should be the end of the discussion, [...] has attempted to justify its default by falsely claiming that it was locked out when [...] implemented security measures to deter further dumping.  The record is undisputed, however, that [...] never prohibited [...] from accessing the Leased Premises despite its alarming conduct.  [Pa214 at ¶ 9].  Indeed, [...], the principal of [...] who bulldozed the unauthorized materials at [...]’s direction, admitted that [...] did not lock him out while he completed this unauthorized task – as much as it wanted to do so.  [Pa270 at 75:1-23].  Confronted with these facts, and the photographs and testimony that substantiate them, [...] introduced an unsupported certification in which it claimed to have been excluded despite clear evidence that this was untrue.  [Pa176].  But even if some debate could be had about whether the security that was implemented created some measure of exclusion, [...] could not have been locked out where it was not in possession as a result of its improper and unauthorized sublease with Subtenant – and Subtenant never complained about being excluded or suffering any impairment of its rights and, in fact, remained at the Leased Premises beyond October 31, 2023.  [Pa298 at ¶ 4].  [...] breached the Settlement Agreement when it failed to make the final settlement payment due to [...].  The trial court erred when it failed to consider this irrefutable event of default, or to enforce the Settlement Agreement as a consequence, as it should have done.  The Order should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded for entry of the Money Judgment, for this reason alone.
[directive] A new downward adjustment factor is hereby established that may be used in lieu of the existing trial proof adjustment feature.  (The trial proof adjust- ment feature described in Part VIII of the “Brimage” Guidelines remains available, but may not be invoked in any case where the prosecutor elects to take advantage of the new complex/protracted litigation adjustment feature.)  The new downward adjustment — which is reserved for unusual or exceptional cases involving a signifi- cant expenditure of prosecutorial or judicial resources — may be invoked only where the prosecutor determines in the exercise of reasoned discretion that one or more of the following circumstances exist:  1.  The case involves extensive, complex, and unusual pretrial motions practice (e.g., it is expected that more witnesses would be called and more hearing dates convened to decide pretrial motions than would occur at the trial on the merits itself), reflecting an anticipated expen- diture of prosecutorial and judicial resources that is disproportionate to the nature and seriousness of the offense and the term of imprison- ment likely or required to be imposed following a conviction at trial.  2.  The case will require extensive and unusual discovery or extensive pre- trial preparation reflecting an anticipated expenditure of prosecutorial resources that is disproportionate to the nature and seriousness of the offense and the term of imprisonment likely or required to be imposed following a conviction at trial.  -3-  3.  Extraordinary and significant expenses are likely to be incurred by the prosecution, such as protracted efforts to locate witnesses, extradite out-of-state witnesses, or to retain expert witnesses, reflecting an an- ticipated expenditure of resources that is disproportionate to the na- ture and seriousness of the offense and the term of imprisonment likely or required to be imposed following a conviction at trial.  4.  The case contemplates a protracted trial and the expenditure of trial resources that is disproportionate to the nature and seriousness of the offense and the term of imprisonment likely or required to be imposed following a conviction at trial.  5.  The case follows a hung jury, mistrial, or remand after a conviction has been reversed by the Appellate Division or Supreme Court, and there is a real possibility that the State would be unsuccessful in pursuing the prosecution.  It is intended and expected that the new downward adjustment will be re- served for unusual or exceptional circumstances involving a significant expenditure will not be used routinely, of prosecutorial or judicial resources and since the amount of discretion to reduce the plea offer that is afforded by the new adjustment feature (see § C, infra) might reintroduce disparity into the plea negotiation and sentenc- ing systems in contravention of the “Brimage” Guidelines and the Supreme Court’s clear mandate in State v. Brimage.
[brief] --- 5  It is undisputed that [...] will accept a registration card or insurance card in lieu of any title, and that Modern Day  Recycling does not care anything about estate executor papers, nor even if the title is signed, nor whose name is on any of the paperwork.  It is further undisputed that defendant [...] does not require any paperwork at all – instead, when they buy a junk car, they only require having a key.  It is also important to recognize the practical realities with selling cars for junk, in that the normal paperwork which is required to sell a vehicle to a “normal buyer” (i.e. a buyer who wants to drive the vehicle on the road again) is not applicable.  That is, the junk yard will be the car’s “final destination”, where it will be stripped for its valuable parts, and then whatever is left over will be crushed for the value of the metals.  Thus, all of the documentation that normally would be required to sell a decedent’s car to a normal buyer, is not required at all when the car is sold as junk.  It is undisputed that the issue of standing had first arisen just one day before trial, via [...]’s Aug 11, 2022 motion to dismiss.
[brief] Specifically:  a.  [...]’ own diagnosis of [...] included "aggravations," "pre-existing" injuries, "age-related degenerative disc disease," and "osteoarthritis."  (2T17-19).  In other words, [...] did not try to hide from and did not try to ignore the workers’ compensation injuries of 2000 and 2004.  b.  [...] found both 2000 and 2004 "remote" when dealing with the accident of October 17, 2015.  (2T22).  c.  [...] found [...] being asymptomatic from his return to work after the 2004 incident until October 17, 2015, to be significant.  (2T22-23).  d.  [...] found that [...] had a difference in disc pathology following the accident of October 17, 2015.  (2T23-24).  e.  In the absence of continuing medical treatment for which there was none, the concepts of "aggravations," "pre-existing" injuries, "age-related degenerative disc disease," and "osteoarthritis" would make no difference to any of the responses [...] provided in Exhibit P3.  (2T26-28; Pa152-Pa153)  f.  In the absence of a Report of Injury from 2009, [...] believed any reference to a 2009 accident or incident was simply a mistake.  (2T37-38).  g.  [...] believed any reference to 2009 was more likely a typographical error than a real injury date.  (2T39).  Conversely, [...] had one singular focus, i.e., 2009.
[brief] U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012); see also, BV001 Blocker, LLC, 467 N.J.Super. at 124.  "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."
[brief] ....................................................................................9, 33 - **Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co.**, 78 N.J. Super. 485 (App. Div. 1963)  .................................................................................................................................14 - **Johnston Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578**, 130 F.R.D. 348 (D.N.J. 1990)  ..................................................................................................................22 - **Kerr v. Able Sanitary and Environmental Servs., Inc.**, 295 N.J. Super. 147 (App. Div. 1996)  .......................................................................................................................21, 22 - **Kieffer v. Best Buy**, 205 N.J. 213 (2011)  ...................................................................................8 - **Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan**, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)  .................................................................................................................................8, 27 - **Miraph Ents., Inc. v. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control of Paterson**, 150 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 1977) .................................................................................................3 - **Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.**, 148 N.J. 524 (1997) ........................................................................8, 21 - **Schnakenberg v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Ass’n**, 37 N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div. 1955) .........................................................................................................................13, 14 - **State v. James**, 144 N.J. 538 (1996) .........................................................................................15 - **State v. Mohammed**, 226 N.J. 71 (2016) ..................................................................................8
[brief] The Respondent, [...], moves to dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  This is a PIP reimbursement matter brought under the New Jersey Alternative Procedures for Dispute Resolution Act, (“APDRA”)  However, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this case and, therefore, this appeal should be summarily dismissed.  Should this Court find that jurisdiction exists, however, there was no error by [...] in affirming the award.  The arbitrator properly reviewed the facts and arguments and determined that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that certain claims were reimbursable because, for two providers, on a certain dates of service, multiple CPT were listed as being paid, but there was no breakdown as to how much was paid for each CPT code, so there was no way to determine that the payments were in accord with the Fee Schedule.
[brief] For the reasons that follow, the court properly admitted the redacted portion of defendant’s recorded statement, twice accompanied by the appropriate jury instruction that nothing the detective says is evidence and they the jury is the sole arbiter of credibility and the facts.  Moreover, defendant invited those comments into the trial after expressly advising the court he was reviewing the transcript redactions proposed by the State “for trial purposes” and then, during trial, confirmed the statement was acceptably redacted before it was played for the jury.  In any event, these errors, given defendant’s self-identification, were harmless.  Accordingly, the State respectfully urges this Court to affirm.
[brief] (2T 57-12 to 19)  [...] and [...] went into the store and executed the robbery, during which [...] was on his cell-phone.  (2T 58-22 to 25)  [...] said that [...] and [...] stayed in the car and [...] drove them from the scene.  (2T 59-1 to 7)  [...] testified that [...] gave him a television from the robbery “to keep my mouth shut,” but [...] did not share in the cash proceeds.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] (Plaintiff here and Defendant in the Law Division action) is the niece of the late [...], and thus the cousin of [...].  (Da77, ¶11).  [...] (defendant here), is the daughter of Uncle Bernardo, and the Co-Executor of the Estate of Berardo Goenaga (plaintiff in the Law Division action).  (Da77, ¶6; 1T20:16-19).  Carmen is the owner of [...] and [...] (plaintiff in Law Division action), companies that were originally formed by her and her late father, Bernardo, in 2012.  (Da115, 121-36).  [...] is the sole member of [...] (plaintiff in Law Division action), which is the entity that owns the commercial office building located on the Property.  (Da115-16, 138-52).  Defendants entrusted Plaintiff Miqueo as manager of the Companies pursuant to the Companies’ Operating Agreements (Da125, 142) until she and her husband, [...] (Defendant in Law Division action) could obtain financial assistance to pay back Bernardo and ultimately regain legal tile to the Property.  Importantly, Plaintiff executed the [...] Operating Agreement in her capacity as Manager.  (Da37, ¶38).  The motion court correctly noted that Bernardo “didn’t just hire her [(Plaintiff)] as a CEO off the street. ” (1T31:3-4).  Defendants agreed.  (1T31:5).  Also, Carmen’s role as the Co-Executor of Bernardo’s Estate and owner of the Companies ties her to both cases.  Thus, Defendants’ claim that the parties and claims between the two actions are separate and distinct was properly rejected by the motion court.
[brief] The *Drosos* Court reversed a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement that was substantially similar to—though in several respects less informative than—the arbitration agreement between [...] and [...] in the December Terms.  *Id.* at *6*.  The agreement in *Drosos* provided that:  All members agree that any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or any dispute arising out of the interpretation of this Agreement, which the parties are unable to resolve, shall be finally resolved and settled exclusively by binding arbitration by a single arbitrator acting under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) then in effect rather than the parties going into litigation in the Judicial Court system.  *Id.* at *4* (emphasis added).  The trial court in *Drosos* had erroneously held the arbitration clause unenforceable for the same reason as the trial court here: because it did not expressly state that “the signatory is waiving the critical right to a trial by jury” and because it “fails to explain the distinction between arbitration and civil litigation. ”  *Id.* at *6*.  This Court reversed.
[brief] ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”  State v. Malik, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  *In Re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).  Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.