ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] found probable cause existed for two ethics violations in connection with Complainant’s conduct during the election process.  Sg205-212.  The first ethics violation pertains to the “endorsement allegation” against Complainant wherein she participated in a video endorsing a political candidate for the School Board, referenced her Board position and/or made it apparent that she was affiliated with the School Board, failed to include any proper disclaimer with her endorsement, and endorsed certain designated political candidates for the School Board for the benefit of that group of candidates and/or for her own personal benefit.  Sg164-183.  The second ethics violation pertains to the “polling site allegation” against Complainant wherein she visited the [...] for Districts 8 and 13 and demanded that she was entitled to a copy of the vote tally sheets and tapes because she was a School Board Member and her procurement of the vote tally sheets and tapes was for the School Board.  Sg164-183.  Subsequent to the filing of the Ethics Complaint against Complainant by Appellant and the other Board Members, Complainant responded with an ethics complaint against Appellant based on his request to the Board Attorney to investigate and determine whether she committed ethics violations during the election process.
[brief] [...], a police officer, injured his knee when he jumped from a four-foot-high chain link fence while pursuing a fleeing suspect.  *Id.*, at 1.  Bevin’s application for AD was denied by the Board.  *Ibid.*  On appeal, the ALJ concluded that [...] had not demonstrated anything unusual, traumatic or uncommon to render the pursuit an undesigned and unexpected event, and affirmed the denial.  *Ibid.*  The Board adopted the ALJ’s decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  *Id.*, at 2.
[brief] *Franzoni* was an appeal from a matrimonial maintenance case where the trial court lamented the “difficulty a judge faces in resolving financial issues of this sort,” and promised to “do the best [he] can so that justice will be done” before entering judgment for one side without finding any facts or stating any conclusions of law.  *Id.* at 521.  The Appellate Division reversed, after “observ[ing], with regret,” that trial judges’ obligations to make pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law were too frequently being ignored.  *Ibid.*  In supporting the reversal of the opinion on appeal, the panel specifically found it objectionable that the court “did not report to the litigants what he found to be the facts or upon what factors he arrived at” in making its determination on the maintenance obligation.  Here, similarly, the trial judge found no facts about what the various provisions of the Lease at issue meant nor did he report what factors or considerations supported his raw conclusion that “[b]ecause Defendant is in breach of the lease due to nonpayment of five months rent, the defendant is not due any refund of fit up costs.
[brief] Defendant also makes several references to a “statute of limitations,” without citation to legal authority or even hinting at what he believes the applicable statute of limitations might be.  Plaintiff would submit that as contract reformation is a claim in equity, it would not be subject to a statute of limitations.  Despite the mootness of the point, Plaintiff is compelled to point out that Defendant ignores his own admitted role in concealing the settlement and the eminent domain proceedings from Plaintiff.
[brief] 25, 27 N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(c) .........................................................................................................................  28  N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(d) .........................................................................................................................  28, 30 N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -50 ....................................................................................................................  25 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -73 .............................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(c) ....................................................................................................................  25 U.S. Const. amend. V .......................................................................................................................  25 Rules N.J.R.E. 703 ....................................................................................................................................  30  Other Authorities P.L.1971 ........................................................................................................................................  35  Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings Being Cross-Appealed
[brief] However, as discussed in Dunbar Bey v. Brown, [...], Camden County, [...] (Brown), and in light of the social media posts by Respondent, the Commission echoes its decision in Brown, specifically that “when a sitting Board member makes such a judgmental proclamation, it is likely to be credited far more than a statement offered by an ordinary citizen. ”  Brown at 7.  In Brown, the Commission found that respondent, a board of education member, violated the Code when he posted a message on his Facebook page (“Now if we could only do something about our local terrorists that destroy dreams and burn futures”), the Superintendent’s photo came up as a result of the post, and he did not remove it.
[brief] Judge’s Second Ruling on the Motion to Suppress, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment with Prejudice.  On September 1, 2023, defendant filed a second motion to reconsider his motion to suppress.  (Da13; Da19).  In support of the motion, defendant submitted a certification, dated September 7, 2023, from private investigator, [...], who had interviewed the property owner, [...], in August 2023, and reviewed a photograph provided by defense counsel “depict[ing] the door that le[d] to [defendant]’s then attic apartment,” opining that the police had likely used a Halligan Tool to open it.  (Ra4 to 7).  Defendant also submitted a discovery-request letter on September 12, 2023, (Da14 to 15), that the prosecutor addressed on September 18, 2023.  (Da46 to  On December 15, 2023, [...] held an evidentiary hearing on the reconsideration motion, hearing additional testimony from the State as well as testimony from Haedrich. (5T).  The defense, however, did not call Hovan to testify.  (5T).  During [...]’s testimony, who testified at the reopened December 15, 2023 hearing but not the initial October 2022 hearings, it was revealed that possible “notes” had been taken down by the officer assigned to write the report for the search warrant’s execution, most likely by [...].  (5T124-21 to 126-13).  The trial prosecutor did not have such notes and was unaware that such notes existed.  (6T15-10 to 16-21; 6T19-7 to 22; 6T44-17 to 46-24; Ra8).  She immediately contacted [...] and asked if he made or kept any notes.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE JURY’S INCONSISTENT VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE AND RESULTED IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.  (Pa47; 8T20:5-36:18).  This matter arises out of a fall down incident wherein the plaintiff was caused to fall when the wheel of her rollator walker impacted the corner of the raised baseplate and protruding bolt of a roof support column that encroached into the walking aisle of the defendant’s store.  (4T228:14-16; 4T232:3-5; 4T232:12-233:5; 4T235:23-236:1; 4T238:7-13; 4T260:24-261:1).  The jury returned a verdict finding that the defendant was negligent but that its negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident.  (7T124:3-125:7).  The plaintiff respectfully submits that the jury’s verdict finding that the defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident is shocking and against the weight of evidence of the uncontested facts presented at trial.  A verdict that overlooks or undervalues crucial evidence or otherwise shocks the conscience of the court should not stand.  *Law v. Newark Bd. of Ed.*, 175 N.J. Super. 26, 38 (App. Div. 1980).
[brief] 11/12/2020  Exhibit D-Attachments to Complaint  Notice of Tort Claim  Facsimile to [...] from [...]  Email from [...] to [...] 3/5/2020  Authorization for Health Information Disclosure of [...] 5/28/2020  [...] Form Filled out by [...] Hawkin’s Letter to [...] and [...] Regarding Amended Notice of Claim 12/3/2020
[brief] Lajara, 222 N.J. at 135.  The Supreme Court’s holding that such claims are subject to the constitutional right to a jury trial because they seek legal relief and are comparable to common-law fraud, id. at 151, necessarily applies to Plaintiffs’ fraud claims here.  The Chiropractors’ contention that no party in Lajara argued that the claims were subject to PIP ADR is equally deficient.  Lajara holds that parties have a constitutional right to a jury trial on damages claims for fraudulently obtained PIP benefits.  As Plaintiffs explained in their opening brief, the Supreme Court has also held that the Legislature cannot constitutionally require mandatory ADR without a trial de novo of claims carrying the right to a jury trial.  See Pb20-21 (citing Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co., 212 N.J. 576 (2013)).  And the Supreme Court has instructed that courts have a “duty” to avoid “a construction which would render [a statute] unconstitutional or permit its unconstitutional application” when possible.  Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 208 N.J. 141, 172 (2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Taken together, those binding Supreme Court decisions establish three principles that suffice to resolve the statutory-interpretation issue in this case: (1) the Legislature enacts an unconstitutional law when it mandates ADR for claims on which parties have a constitutional right to a jury trial, unless the statute also provides for a right to a de novo jury trial after ADR (Jersey Central Power & Light); (2) parties have a constitutional right to a jury trial on insurers’ claims seeking damages for PIP benefits allegedly obtained through fraud (Lajara); and (3) courts must interpret a statute to avoid an unconstitutional application if reasonably possible (Whirlpool).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT [...] DID NOT PROVE SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY.  (A229).  The terms “substantive unconscionability” and “procedural unconscionability” have been explained by the Appellate Division as follows:  The worth of defendant’s contentions should be examined in light of two factors: procedural unconscionability, which can include a variety of inadequacies, such as age, literacy, lack of sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting existing during the contract formation process, and substantive unconscionability, which generally involves harsh or unfair one-sided terms.  [Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 101(App. Div. 2014)(internal quotations omitted)].  A.
[brief] (Pb24)  It also advises the Court that it is willing to compensate Defendants for the fair market value of the subject properties.  (Pb18; 25).  Whether the [...] is willing to pay just compensation is irrelevant for purposes of a challenge to the right to take – not to mention that just compensation is constitutionally mandated under Article I, paragraph 20 of the New Jersey Constitution and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
[brief] Cross Motion for Dismissal of Complaint and Brief in Opposition of Prerogative Writ Review | 174a | | Date | Document Description | Page | |----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | 3/21/24 | Exhibit List | 177a | | 3/21/24 | Exhibit 2 - 225.63 [...] Municipal Code | 178a | | 3/21/24 | Exhibit 3 - Township of Egg Harbor Planning Board/Zoning Board of Adjustment Request for Recommendations Form | 186a | | 3/21/24 | Exhibit 4 - [...], P.E., P.P., C.M.E. Memo dated April 10, 2023 | 198a | | 3/21/24 | Exhibit 5 [omitted; produced at 139a]. | 201a | | 3/21/24 | Exhibit 6 [same] | 202a | | 3/21/24 | Exhibit 7 [same] | 203a | | 5/17/24 | Notice of Appeal | 204a | | 4/10/24 | 4/10/24 objection for [...] | 208a¹ | | 3/6/24 | Case Management Order | 209a | | 3/21/24 | Notice of Defendants, [...] and [...] Planning Board’s Defendants’ R. 4:6-2e  Cross Motion for Dismissal of Complaint and Brief in Opposition of Prerogative Writ Review | 210a | | 12/13/23 | Case Management Order | 212a | | 4/9/24 |
[brief] On January 30, 2024, while captioning the Order as a denial, the Trial Court granted Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and found that there existed a partnership agreement with an applicable arbitration provision, but that Defendants’ prior counsel “expressly” waived it.  The Trial Court’s ruling on reconsideration – and as argued by Defendants – applied the balancing criteria in Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265 (2013), which employs a totality of the circumstances test to ascertain whether a party to an arbitration agreement has waived that remedy.  The Trial Court’s analysis clearly established that Defendants satisfied the majority if not all Cole criteria to enforce the contractual provision and compel arbitration.  However, the Trial Court disregarded its own analysis under Cole and ruled that the circumstances sub judice supported an express waiver.  Put another way, the Trial Court erroneously expanded the Supreme Court’s ruling based on what it found to be an express waiver, thereby nullifying Cole under such circumstances, regardless of the public policy favoring arbitration.
[directive] Where the State is successful in obtaining a guilty verdict, either by trial on the merits or by a guilty plea, the prosecutor must assure that the proper sentence is imposed for that offense.  Prosecutors should familiarize themselves with the provisions, as set by the Legislature, for the various mandatory sentences to be imposed for violations of the DWI and DWI refusal statutes.  As a guide, a table of the sentencing provisions of these, and related statutes, as of the date of this attached.7 Guideline, are With the enactment of P.L. 2004, c. 95, adopted 7-9-2004, eff. 11-1-2004, N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5.1,8
[brief] In *Costanzo v. Costanzo*, 248 N.J. Super. 116 (Law Div. 1991) a father lent over $10,000.00 to his son over a period of years. \(^3\)  The loans were unrelated to the pi claim.  In September 1987, the son promised to pay his father $5,000.00 out of the proceeds of the pi claim if he obtained a recovery.  In 1988, to get another loan, the son signed an agreement instructing his attorney to pay the father upon recovery.  Despite this notice, when the case settled the father was not paid and he sued the son and attorney.  The father filed a summary judgment motion and the Court held that the assignment was valid, based in part on N.J.S.A. § 2A:25-1, finding that  The purported assignment in this case was not of an expected settlement fund from an expected tort claim.  It was an assignment of a right to monies from an expected settlement of an existing tort claim.  The “specific thing” which was intended to be assigned was a sum of money from an identifiable fund arising at a future time as a result of the fulfillment of a condition (a settlement of the tort claim).  The right to the proceeds of the expected settlement is therefore assignable.  *Costanzo*, supra., at 122
[brief] It is well-understood that courts “will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ”  State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)).  Defendant’s claim fits neither category.  Notwithstanding the procedural deficiency, defendant’s claim also lacks substantive merit.
[brief] Given this record, we find that the arbitrator did not err by rejecting the [...]’s revised final offers and considering only the [...]’s original final offer.  See Madison Bor., P.E.R.C. No. 2013-5, 39 NPER 93 (¶33 2012) (arbitrator did not err by rejecting Borough’s request to submit amended final offer with substantive changes to salary proposal after hearing concluded).  [Aa049-54.]  There is nothing arbitrary or capricious about PERC’s decision on this point.  To the exact opposite, it is perfectly logical.  PERC affirmed [...]’s decision because he followed PERC’s regulation on the issue of when final offers may be revised.  See In re Bridgewater, 95 N.J. 235, 244-45 (1984) (PERC matter, holding “administrative determination will stand unless it is clearly demonstrated to be arbitrary or capricious”; “where, as here, a substantial element of agency expertise is implicated, due weight should be accorded thereto to judicial review”).  POINT IV
[directive] An officer shall not unholster a conducted energy device during an actual operation unless the officer reasonably believes that it may be necessary for the officer to use the conducted energy device.  An officer shall not exhibit a conducted energy device to a person or conduct a spark display during an actual operation unless the officer reasonably believes that display of the device and/or a demonstration of its ability to discharge electricity as an exercise of constructive authority would help to establish or maintain control in a potentially dangerous situation in an effort to discourage resistance and ensure officer safety.  An officer may also unholster and/or exhibit a conducted energy device or conduct a spark display if another officer on the scene has unholstered and/or exhibited a firearm in accordance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  4.
[brief] ACFD retiree [...] received a retiree sick time payout of $143,093.28 on November 16, 2018.  (889a, Rogs., #58, #60, & #61).  The above-referenced facts directly rebut Defendants' assertions that [...] could no longer sustain terminal leave (i.e., sick leave) payments over $15,000.  These facts demonstrate that Defendants' decision to impair Plaintiffs' contractual rights was not reasonable or necessary.  Based upon the foregoing, the Trial Court erred when it reconsidered Defendants’ R. 4:6-2e motion.
[brief] (*See* [...] Br., at 23-26; [...] Br., at 44-46).  Yet, Plaintiff asserted ample facts to support such a claim.  In particular, the Court is referred to the allegations regarding the affirmatively misleading and deceptive way in which [...] and [...] actively colluded to keep the facts and details of the rescheduled closing hidden from Plaintiff.  (Pa11-13, Complaint, ¶¶ 42-53).  These are allegations of bad faith and improper motivation.  *See id.*  In fact, [...] admitted that it was acting at the express direction of [...] when it intentionally misled and withheld material information from Plaintiff in the weeks leading up to the secret closing.  (*See, e.g.*, [...] Br., at 15-16; *see also* Pa12, Complaint, ¶ 47; Pa15, Complaint, ¶ 73).  Under these circumstances, Plaintiff more-than-articulated the specific acts and omissions by [...] and [...], done in an effort to frustrate Plaintiff’s reasonable expectations under the PSA – *i.e.*, its expectation that it would take title to the Real Property and that [...] would not go behind its back and make secret arrangements with [...] and the Fee Owner to cut Plaintiff out of the deal.
[brief] ”  *Id.*  In addition to *Kernahan*’s strong intimation and *Remicade*’s conclusion that the rule applies only where the parties have unequal bargaining power and levels of sophistication—as in the employment and consumer contexts—this Court has held on several occasions that the rule “d[oes] not extend … to commercial contracts,” i.e., contracts that resulted “from a lengthy negotiation process” and where no party was an “average member[ ] of the public.
[brief] However, in the State’s own expert report, [...] indicates “other evaluators have considered or diagnosed Schizotypal Personality Disorder, prodromal Schizophrenia, or Schizophrenia, each of which has overlapping symptoms with Autism Spectrum Disorder. ” (Da455).  The State’s expert conceded that other evaluators have diagnosed [...] with Schizophrenia.  *Id.*  Therefore, when the Court stated “this Court and what it has what it has heard so far finds at this point in time there is no evidence that the defendant actually suffers from schizophrenia,” it was not based on fact.  (17T:206-11 to 14).  The Court substantially downplayed [...]’s mental health issues with respect to mitigating factor three.
[brief] [...] is the initial breaching party under the Settlement Agreement and the Lease Agreement yet argues that it is nonetheless entitled to the full benefit of the bargain from the Settlement Agreement.  This argument completely disregards [...]’s rights as a tenant (and settling party) and cannot be sanctioned by the Court.  Significantly, [...]’s argument that it did not improperly restrict [...]’s access to the property is a bare assertion unsupported by actual evidence in the record.  [...] does not deny that it posted security guards at the premises to restrict entry shortly after it discovered that [...] was repaving the parking lot in the last week of September 2023.  And, as [...] bears the burden of proof on its motion to enforce to convince the Trial Court (and this Court) that no improper self-help had occurred, it fails to carry that burden.  The Trial Court noted at oral argument that resolution of this key issue likely required testimony from the clients, but the presence of a security guard indicated that some sort of lockout had occurred.  1T, 19:16-20:1.  Indeed, [...] admits in its opening brief and supporting certification that [...] “engaged 24-hour security to prevent [...], or those acting in concert with it, from exacerbating the damage”.  Pb17, Pa214.  Yet in the same breath, [...] contradicts itself by asserting that “[a]t no point did Plaintiff prohibit Defendant from accessing the Leased Premises”.  Ibid.  These two statements inherently conflict with each other.  The security guard was not there simply to observe the condition of the premises; the guard’s function was to prevent access to the property, especially [...]’s.  Nothing in [...]’s submission to this Court resolves that factual conflict in [...]’s favor.  [...]’s principal certified that [...] locked [...] out of the property by posting a security guard.  [...] does not dispute that it did so.  In fact, [...] still had a water cooler and some personal property at the site when [...] took possession. \(^3\)  As a result of [...]’s improper self-help, [...] also discontinued a legal action to evict a sub-tenant at the property. \(^4\)  As the Trial Court noted, ultimate resolution of the issue likely required testimony from both [...] and [...].  [...] failed to bear its burden of proof on the motion, and it was properly denied.  Because the Trial Court found that [...] had engaged in improper self-help by locking [...] out of the premises, it was wholly unnecessary to address any of [...]’s remaining arguments about [...]’s purported breaches of the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] Da528.  The Authority, [...] and [...] were represented by competent counsel throughout the negotiation of these agreements.  Da262.  The Redevelopment Agreement concerned the redevelopment of specific parcels of land owned by [...] in the section of [...] located adjacent to the [...] and commonly known as [...] Paterson, and provided for a phased redevelopment project, which anticipated the construction of a shopping mall, residential and commercial buildings and parking facilities to service the customers, residents and occupants of these buildings, if any, when built (the “Project,” as defined herein).