ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Instead, he reasoned -- “in his opinion,” as he put it -- that [...] could not terminate an employee for just cause based on the employee’s temporary disability.  (Emphasis added).  His interim award states:  In the opinion of this Arbitrator, an employer may be justified in terminating an employee permanently unfit to perform the duties of their position but not justified in terminating an employee capable of returning to full duties once the temporary injury or medical condition is resolved.  Herein, while temporarily unable to return to work without limitations, there was a reasonable expectation that [...] would return to her duties once the interim work limitations were removed.  . . .  In the opinion of this Arbitrator, while an employer is empowered to terminate an employee with a permanent inability to perform or a long-term medical condition preventing a return to work, consideration must be afforded an employee with a temporary medical condition which can be corrected and able to return to work.  Time limitations must also be considered.  (Pa35)  [...] further faulted [...] for not pursuing alternative measures to terminating [...], such as placing her on a temporary suspension.  He explained:  “At the very least, when medical information was provided [i.e., the second doctor’s note], even if non-determinable or questionable, [...] could have placed [...] on temporary suspension, pursued definitive medical information (from a neutral source[3]) and considered her continued employment on medical finality. ”  (Pa36)  Finally, [...] determined that [...] was without just cause to terminate [...] because it “jumped too quickly from recognizing the Grievant’s injury restrictions to deciding to terminate her. ”  (Id.)  He explained:  The generally accepted and often referenced test for just cause includes the question of whether the Company gave the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the possible disciplinary consequences of the employee’s absence.  Here, while it was clear that the Grievant was out of work due to an injury not of her own fault nor the result of her conduct, the [...] issued an immediate discharge once [...] submitted the return to work note with “restrictions. ”  The record was absent any communication to the Grievant expressing a forewarning of the consequences of [...] returning to work with “limitations. ”  (Id.) --- 3  It must be noted that [...], as well as [...], were part of [...]’ treating medical team, and as such, they were not engaged, nor did they have any association with [...].  The interim award required [...] to reinstate [...] to employment immediately and make her whole for lost wages and benefits retroactive to August 19, 2022.
[brief] [...] is an Italian immigrant, who came to this country working on a ship in 1966, left the ship in Buffalo, NY and got a job with a cousin in a Pizzeria.  (5T57 14-25)  Twenty-two years later, after hard work, he was in a position to buy a property and ended up buying the [...], the subject property.  (5T 58 17-24)  Contrary to [...]’s misinformation that he paid $2 million in 1988, he actually paid $2,475,000.00 as shown in the closing documents.  (Da171;Da174;Da178;Da179;Da181;Da182)  (6T 30-1-32-22)  Over almost the six years of operation before the redevelopment designation up to the January 27, 1994 valuation date, the shopping center was busy and [...] brought most of the rents up to market value.  The successful operation of the shopping center was best illustrated by the overage rent of the [...] drug store which aside from the [...], at 6323 square feet was the only store over 3,000 square feet and was ignored in [...]’s income calculations, relied upon so heavily by the arbitrator.  As shown on (Da184) and the testimony of the bookkeeper 6T(110-19-117-2).  [...]’s gross sales grew from $1,735,402.00 for year ending September 1988 to $3,150,300.00 for the year ended September 1995 or a growth of over 80% in less than 6 years.  The average rent went from $718.39 for 1988 to $33,424.00 for the last quarter 1994 and 9 months of 1995.  Clearly this shopping center was economically vibrant and successful as of the date of valuation.
[directive] Many law enforcement agencies use in-car video systems, which record the video image from a camera mounted in the car and an audio signal from a microphone worn by the officer.  These recordings can be used in internal investigations because the video image is not restricted at all and the officer is a party to the audio portion of the recording at all times.  7.9.9  Some agencies equip their patrol vehicles or other vehicles with GPS devices.  These devices can locate a vehicle with great accuracy.  Information gleaned from these devices may be used in internal affairs investigations because the subject officer has no expectation of privacy in their whereabouts when performing police duties.  7.10
[brief] Many of these custodians are high-level executives in their own right who report directly to, or otherwise work closely with, Mr.  Zuckerberg and [...].  To name a few:  - [...], [...]’s Chief Product Officer, reports directly to [...] and was selected as a custodian in part because of his involvement in designing the [...] Platform, which enables app development by third-parties.  - [...], [...]’s Chief Operations Officer of [...] and Vice President of Global Operations, reports directly to [...].
[brief] New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1969), certif. den. 54 N.J. 565 (1969)  New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 338 (App. Div. 2004)  29 Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adjustment, 361 N.J. Super. 22, 41 (App. Div. 2003)  29 PADNA v. City Council of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010)  28 Paruszewski v. Twp. of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45, 53–54 (1998) 43, 69 Penna. R.R. Co. v. N.J. State Aviation Com., 2 N.J. 64 (1949).  41  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013)  27 Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 177 (App. Div. 1998)  80 Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co. 65 N.J. 474, 478 (1974)  26 Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 98 N.J. 258, 265, 486 A.2d 330 (1985)  65 South Salem Street Associates, LLC v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Montville, 2008 WL 4647539 (N.J. Super. A.D.), cert. denied, 197 N.J. 477 (2009)  75 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 285 (1983) 45, 46, 47
[brief] He has observed the site on many occasions, residing nearby for several years in the late 1980's and working locally as a property manager.  Over the years, he had never observed vehicles parking in the Sixth Street courtyard, until such parking began in the last several years (13T4-20 to 21-3).  On cross-examination, it was established [...] is the Chairman of the Zoning Board.  He had moved from the neighborhood in about 2001 to a few miles away (13T21-6 to 41-16).  On re-direct, [...] testified that he did not consider the courtyard as a legal parking area (13T41-29 to 48-10).  The School then rested (13T49-22).
[brief] [...] continued to pursue [...] and in doing so, failed to provide copies of the various documents as requested by [...] relating to the pursuit of documents from [...].  [...] filed its motions for summary judgment on September 21, 2023 with a return date of October 20, 2023.  Contrary to the suggestion of counsel for [...], summary judgment motion were properly filed by plaintiff and disposition by Court was in accordance with R. 4:46 and not R. 4:67.  [...]’s June 27, 2023 Order denying [...]’s Order to Show Cause and the subsequent issuance of a trial date can only be interpreted that the Court found the action could not proceed as a summary action and was to proceed as a plenary action.
[brief] The jury should have been instructed that if they found that [...] was either not under arrest or did not know that he was being arrested when he used force, they should apply the same self-defense principles to his altercation with the police officers that would ordinarily apply to altercations between private individuals.  (Db 21-25)  Furthermore, the State’s claim that the jury acquitted [...] of resisting arrest because “the trial judge mistakenly instructed the jury” – and not because the jury found that the State failed to prove that [...] knew that he was being arrested beyond a reasonable doubt – is meritless.
[brief] As a self-represented appellant with a limited understanding of the law but immense faith in the rule of law, I have spent countless hours researching case law and preparing my merits brief (Pa1355-1417) in Docket # [...] with the expectation that this court will at least read the brief.  As the eminent jurist, the late [...] noted – “When an unrepresented litigant appears in court pursuant to a notice of motion, reasonably expecting from the text of the notice that his procedural rights will be protected by his appearance in court on the noticed date, he is ordinarily owed the fulfillment of that expectation.  Turning him away as was done here without any opportunity, either orally or in writing, to address the merits of the motion he opposed, constituted a denial of fundamental procedural due process which can only serve to bring the court system into disrepute, to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the judicial process and ultimately to disserve the litigating public. ”
[brief] In determining the length of the statute of limitations for a claim arising under § 1983, courts must apply the limitations period applicable to personal-injury torts in the State in which the cause of action arose.  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007).  In New Jersey, where [...]’s claim arose, personal injury claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.  Id. at 859.  None of the courts in this matter found that plaintiff had asserted a malicious prosecution claim.
[directive] The Executive Director will set Duties of the [...] Executive Director.  programmatic and policy vision of [...], manage performance and outcomes of [...] offices, and identify funding, grant and legislative opportunities.  The Executive Director will serve as the lead victim assistance and violence intervention and prevention point of contact, subject matter expert, and coordinator for the [...] and the [...] ([...]) or designate such person from [...] to do the same.  The Executive Director will develop and maintain strong working relationships with local, state, and federal partners, community stakeholders, the [...], the [...], law enforcement, as well as other organizational units and divisions within the [...] and across State agencies.  The Executive Director or his/her designee will coordinate or support training and outreach efforts by [...]’s constituent organizational units, and manage shared services among them, including research, training, policy support, management of programmatic and policy elements of grants, grant applications, technical assistance, and community outreach.  E.
[brief] In denying Appellants’ Motion, [...] reasoned, in part, as follows:  Further, this Court dismissed [...] from this action by Order on January 28, 2022.  [Appellants’] counsel filed a certification to reinstate the action against [...] on February 24, 2022, supporting the reinstatement.  However, there was no motion filed by [Appellants].  [...] was never reinstated as a party and is presently listed as “dismissed without prejudice”.  Accordingly, when Appellants filed their Motion on February 14, 2022 [Pa3334], they were seeking the entry of default judgment against a non-party to the action.  Quite obviously, the trial court’s refusal to grant such relief was necessary and appropriate.
[brief] [...], PROSECUTOR  [...] Attorney for Plaintiff  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and on the Brief  [...] Attorney No. 059632013  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................1  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................2 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................................10 POINT I DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECT TO A LAWFUL INVESTIGATORY STOP AND THE DENIAL OF THE SUPPRESSION MOTION WAS PROPER ..................................................................................................................10 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT’S SENTENCE WAS LAWFUL ..................................................................................................................22 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................25 | Authority | Page | |------------------------------------------------|------| | Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | 10 | | Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) | 11 | | State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433 (2018) | 10 | | State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221 (2014) | 21 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 21 | | State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165 (2009) | 23 | | State v. Evans, 235 N.J. 125 (2018) | 11 | | State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) | 21 | | State v. Johnson, 476 N.J.Super. 1 (App. Div. 2023) | 15,16 | | State v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438 (2015) | 12 | | State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328 (2010) | 12 | | State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) | 21 | | State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J.Super. 244 (App. Div. 2001) | 10 | | State v. Robinson, 228 N.J. 529 (2017) | 10 | | State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) | 21 | | State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283 (1987) | 23 | | State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588 (2019) | 19 | | State v. Slowbocker, 79 N.J. 1 (1979) | 12 | | State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244 (2022) | 11 | State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985).........................................................19 State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218 (2018)..............................................12,14,15,17
[brief] The unpublished opinion is included in the appendix as Da37-Da43. that the defendant had been selling drugs and that the officers had observed the defendant suspiciously interact with the codefendant.  Da37-Da43.  All of the cases cited have upheld investigatory stops where a police officer observes suspicious behavior in an area known for a high level of narcotics activity, where at least one additional factor is present, to include prior police involvement with the defendant or codefendant, State v. Pineiro and State v. Madison, citizen complaints involving the defendant, State v. Madison, the exchange of money for small objects, State v. Moore and State v. Ramos, the concealing of an object, State v. Arthur, or fleeing State v. Pineiro and State v. Madison.
[directive] Additional Retention Requirements.  Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 8.1, 8.2, or 8.3 of this Policy, a BWC recording shall be subject to the following additional retention requirements: (a) when a BWC recording pertains to a criminal investigation or otherwise records information that may be subject to discovery in a prosecution, the recording shall be treated as evidence and shall be kept in accordance with the retention period for evidence in a criminal prosecution; (b) when a BWC records an arrest that did not result in an ongoing prosecution, or records the use of police force, the recording shall be kept until the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing a civil complaint against the officer or the employing law enforcement agency; (c) when a BWC records an incident that is the subject of an internal affairs complaint, the recording shall be kept pending final resolution of the internal affairs investigation and any resulting administrative action.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 19
[brief] 30.  N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7 (Pa 174).  Crime of pattern of official misconduct  "3.  a.  A person commits the crime of pattern of official misconduct if he commits two or more acts that violate the provisions of N.J.S.2C:30-2 or section 2 of P.L.2003, c.31 (C.2C:30-6).  It shall not be a defense that the violations were not part of a common plan or scheme, or did not have similar methods of commission.  b.  Pattern of official misconduct is a crime of the second degree if one of the acts committed by the defendant is a first or second degree crime; otherwise, it is a crime of the third degree, provided, however, that the presumption of nonimprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for persons who have not previously been convicted of an offense shall not apply.  Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other law, a conviction of pattern of official misconduct shall not merge with a conviction of official misconduct, official deprivation of civil rights, or any other criminal offense, nor shall such other conviction merge with a conviction under this section, and the court shall impose separate sentences upon each violation of N.J.S.2C:30-2 and sections 2 and 3 of P.L.2003, c.31 (C.2C:30-6 and C.2C:30-7).
[brief] APPELLANT HAS PRODUCED EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE, CREATING A QUESTION FOR THE JURY.  As outlined in great detail in [...]’s initial filing, the evidence of negligence required to sustain an FELA matter is vastly different than what would be required for a state-law negligence claim.  "Consequently, 'the quantum of evidence required to establish liability in [a] FELA case is much less than in an ordinary negligence case.'"  Kapsis v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 313 N.J. Super. 395, 403, 712 A.2d 1250 (App.Div.1998).  Under the FELA, “the role of the jury is significantly greater…than in common law negligence actions” and “the right of the jury to pass upon the question of the employers’ fault and causation must be most liberally viewed. ”  *Johnannessen v. Gulf Trading and Transp. Co.*, 633 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1980); *Gallows v. Long Island RR*, 878 F. 2d 80, 84 (2d Cir 1989).  Indeed, “trial by jury is part of the remedy. ”  *Johnannessen*, 633 F.2d at 656.  Plaintiff has produced expert opinion which outlines in detail the ways [...] has failed to ensure that the [...] is a reasonably safe place to work.
[brief] (Da169-71).  The Amended Policy for the first time created a new affirmative obligation on the school district to notify parents when a student “requests a public social transition accommodation[]” related to their gender, including any “public name/identity/pronoun change. ” (Da169).  The terms of the Amended Policy provide:  [I]n the event a student requests a public social transition accommodation, such as public name/identity/pronoun change, bathroom/locker room accommodation, or club/sports accommodations, or the like, the school district shall notify a student’s parents or guardian of the student’s asserted gender identity and/or name change, or other requested accommodation, provided there is no credible evidence that doing so would subject the student to physical or emotional harm or abuse.  Prior to disclosure, the student shall be given the opportunity to personally disclose that information.  It shall be the policy of the Board to support and facilitate healthy communication between a transgender student and their family, when disclosure is consistent with this policy.  [(Da169-70). ]  The Amended Policy goes on to state that if any emotional support services are provided to “transgender students, students facing other gender identity issues, or students who may be transitioning,” then “[t]he full, complete, and accurate reason for counseling and/or referrals for mental health crisis and/or concerns shall be provided to parents/guardians in relation to parental notification/consent for such services. ” (Da170).  On June 21, 2023, the State filed an administrative complaint with DCR alleging that the Amended Policy violates the LAD.
[brief] [...]’s pleading sets forth three separate counts which respectively concern the defective notice published prior to Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage, the inconsistency of the [...] with the [...] Master Plan and the failure of Ordinance No. 13-2022 to include an explicit amendment to the zoning map as required by *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-7.c.  Each of these claims on their own allege a basis to overturn the challenged municipal action and are backed by facts in the record, as are [...]’s arguments for an enlargement of time.  Rather than limiting its examination to the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the Complaint and affording [...] every reasonable inference therefrom, the trial court engaged in an exacting analysis and gave the defendants the benefit of any doubt.  For example, in considering the public interest justifying an enlargement of the 45-day appeal period in this case as evidenced by the public turnout on [...]’s site plan hearing, the trial court observed:  Plaintiff’s [sic] fail to establish whether the public who appeared were actually Township residents, how many people appeared, and whether the people that did appear represented a fair cross section of the Township as opposed to just homeowners who live close to a project.  It is also important to note that those people who did appear were there to challenge a land use application and not the underlying Ordinance.  There is nothing in the record to support the contention that the hearing attendees were challenging or had an interest in Ordinance No. 13-2022.
[brief] Here, the Antenuptial Agreement did not require a waiver of disclosure as required by the statute, because, under Section 8.1 of the Agreement, The parties acknowledge that each has produced during the course of the negotiations leading to the execution of the within agreement, financial statements, records, and other documentation pertaining to his or her financial status, income, expenses, assets and liabilities.  Each party represents to the other the completeness, truthfulness, and accuracy of said data, with the understanding that the other party is relying thereon.  In accepting the terms contained herein and execution of the within agreement.  (Pa 116-117).
[brief] ESTATE OF [...], deceased by [...] as Executrix of the Estate and [...], Individually, Plaintiff/Appellants, -vs- [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] and JOHN DOES  Defendants/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION: [...]  On Appeal  From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Civil Action  AMENDED  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
[brief] *Id.*  Indeed, *Gomez* addressed a completely different issue than *Gonzalez*, --where plaintiff entered into a new agreement, and held that [...]’s debt-buying and collecting practices would not fall under the cover of the NJCFA because “absent any participation in the underlying extension of consumer credit” or “issuing new credit” – which there is no proof of – [...]’s alleged violations was not covered by the NJCFA.  *Gomez*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183099, at *15-16.  Most recently, the Appellate Division again confirmed that the NJCFA claim also failed on independently dispositive grounds where a defendant debt buyer was not engaged in any consumer-facing sales and did not extend any credit to plaintiff.