ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See State v. Szemple, 332 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div.), certif. den.: 165 N.J. 604 (2000) (conditional plea preserving speedy trial claim did not preserve claim of denial of right of self-representation).  See also State v. Smith, 307 N.J. at 8, noting the exception of R. 3:28-6(d) (pretrial intervention appeal).  A guilty plea in the municipal court will not constitute a waiver on de novo appeal of a challenge of the constitutionality of the applicable statute or ordinance.  See Comment 4.2 on R. 3:10-2.  It has been held that an unimpeached guilty plea by defendant will bar his subsequent claim of malpractice against an attorney who represented him in connection with the criminal investigation leading up to the plea.
[brief] “As we have observed, ‘no trial can ever be entirely free of even the smallest defect,’ but our goal ‘must always be fairness.  “A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. ”’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *R.B.*, 183 N.J. at 333-34 (quoting *Lutwak v. United States*, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953))).  “[C]onvictions after a fair trial, based on strong evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, should not be reversed because of a technical or evidentiary error that cannot have truly prejudiced the defendant or affected the end result. ””  *State v. J.R.*, 227 N.J. 393, 417 (2017) (quoting *State v. W.B.*, 205 N.J. 588, 614 (2011); see also *State v. Hyman*, 451 N.J. Super. 429, 458 (App. Div. 2017) (applying the same principle to improper officer lay opinion).
[brief] On Friday, January 21, 2022, defendants filed their "second" pre-amended answer pre-discovery Rule 4:6-2(e)  Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.  (Pa128).  As instructed by the trial court on January 5, 2022, plaintiff filed a cross- motion to determine certain preliminary procedural and representation issues.  (Pa130).  **[...] Admonishes [...]**
[brief] Order of January 19, 2016, Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants [...], Esq., and [...]....................41a–42a  Order of November 10, 2016, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016..................................................50a–51a (1T40:23–41:10)  Order of April 3, 2018, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016......................................................188a–189a (2T68:7 – 69:2)  Order of January 24, 2020, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint.................................................................376a–377a (3T84:18-20)  Order of December 16, 2020, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Order of January 24, 2020...........................................379a–380a (5T26:9-11)  Order of December 9, 2021, Granting Summary Judgment to Defendants [...], Esq., and [...].............................................381a–382a  Order of January 21, 2022, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Order of December 9, 2021  ..............................................463a–465a (7T83:12-13)  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] “Judicial review of an agency’s final decision is generally limited to a determination of whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or lacks fair support in the record. ”  Mattia v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 217, 221 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013) (additional citations omitted)).
[brief] That is not what the Rule of Court requires.  The Receiver was tasked with filing periodic accountings with the Clerk on April 1 and October 1 of each year.  He failed to do so.  (ii)  **4:53-7(b) - Audit by Clerk**  Rule 4:53-7(b) provides judicial oversight over the Receiver.  The Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court is tasked with auditing the accountings filed by the Receiver unless the Court appoints a countersignatory to perform the audit.  Here, the Receiver did not file the required accountings and thus, they could not be audited by the Deputy Clerk.  As a result, there was no oversight over the Receiver and he was able to operate [...]’s business at a loss for two (2) years at [...]’s expense.
[brief] ”  Pb21.  Such criticism is unsupported and inaccurate, as redevelopment of the Property had been discussed at approximately two dozen Committee and Planning Board meetings over a two-year period (Pa161-195, Pa319-436), the “reasons” were derived from the legislative record, and it was the Committee, and not the Township attorney, that adopted Ordinance 2022-17.  As stated in Section 3.1.1, the “reasons” were expressly incorporated into the Redevelopment Plan and adopted by majority vote of the Committee should it ever “be determined by a reviewing Court that the Redevelopment Plan is not consistent with the Master Plan, or is not designed to effectuate the Master Plan. ”  Pa50.  Accordingly, the Redevelopment Plan satisfies the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.d and Appellant failed to rebut the presumption of the enactments’ validity.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................................................iii  POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE FIRST COUNT THROUGH THE EIGHTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANTS  PURSUANT TO RES  JUDICATA AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (182a)  ..................................................................................1  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE NINTH COUNT THROUGH THE ELEVENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST [...] (183a) .................................................................8 POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRTEENTH COUNT THROUGH THE FIFTEENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RES JUDICATA AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (179a) .....................................................................................11 POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE SIXTEENTH COUNT THROUGH THE NINETEENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST THE [...] AND THE [...] (184a – 185a) ..............13 POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS FOR FILING THE COMPLAINT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS [...] ATTORNEY FEES (190a – 203a; 209a – a232a) .................................................................15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 273–74, 662 A.2d 494, 505 (1995) ..................2 Gelber v. Zito P'ship, 147 N.J. 561, 565, 688 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1997)..................3 K-Land Corp. No. 28 v. Landis Sewerage Auth., 173 N.J. 59, 70, 800 A.2d 861, 868 (2002).................................................................2 Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 411, 766 A.2d 749, 760 (2001)..............8 Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 N.J. Super. 113 (1991)...........................................12,13 Zaromb v. Borucka, 166 N.J.Super. 22, 27, 398 A.2d 1308 (App.Div.1979)..........2 POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE FIRST COUNT THROUGH THE EIGHTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO RES JUDICATA AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (182a)
[brief] See id. at 86:3-87:15.  Plaintiff also testified to being on the receiving end of several anti-Semitic comments by her co-worker [...].  For example, Plaintiff testified that [...] said to her that she should not care about the name of the tree lighting ceremony, since “there are not that many Jews” and that “your people” could have a menorah lighting somewhere else.  See id. at 95:21-96:3; 98:3-9.  Plaintiff complained to [...] herself and to her supervisor regarding this comment, and that nothing happened as a result.  See id. at 99:11-100:21.  In addition, [...] chastised Plaintiff in front of other people for bringing in Blue and White cupcakes for the Holiday Christmas party, and said that these “Hanukah Cupcakes” were inappropriate for a Christmas party.
[directive] Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, Formularz (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Polish strona 2 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169- Polish page 2 of 2 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.
[brief] With respect to aggravating factor three, the court stated, “I do find that there is a risk that the defendant will commit another offense. ”  (6T 11-3 to 4)  Similarly, the court stated, “[a]nd Aggravating Factor 9, present in most cases, the need to deter the defendant and others from violating, the law, I do find that that is applicable here. ”  (6T 11-11 to 14)  The court did not point to any facts in the record about the offense or about [...] as an individual to support the conclusion that [...] is likely to recidivate and needs deterrence.  See State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 349 (2012) (aggravating factors three and nine “invite consideration by the sentencing court of the individual defendant’s unique character and qualities”); State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006) (aggravating factors three and nine require the sentencing court to make a “qualitative assessment” that “go[es] beyond the simple finding of a criminal history”).  In addition, the court erred by failing to assign a particular weight to any of the aggravating factors it found applicable and by failing to explicitly balance the aggravating and mitigating factors.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY...........................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................  5 STANDARD...............................................................................................  18 ARGUMENT.............................................................................................  20  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE STATE HAS FAILED TO CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL’S GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL WAS A MANIFEST DENIAL OF JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW (Sa13-33)..................................................
[brief] (9T 7-4 to 8-4)  However, our Supreme Court made clear that such a defense objection is not paramount; rather it is the interest of the jury and the citizens it represents that controls.  *State v. Powell*, 84 N.J. 305, 319 (1980) (“Very simply, where the facts on the record would justify a conviction of a certain charge, the people of this State are entitled to have that charge rendered to the jury, and no one’s strategy, or assumed (even real) advantage can take precedence over that public interest. ”).  The duty of a trial court to charge unrequested lesser-included offenses is well-established arises where “the facts clearly indicate the appropriateness” of the charge.  *State v. Robinson*, 136 N.J. 476, 489 (1994) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  A court need not “scour the statutes to determine if there are some uncharged offenses of which the defendant may be guilty. ”  *State v. Funderburg*, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016) (internal citations omitted).  Yet a court must “charge to a lesser offense that was not requested by the parties when that charge is obvious from the record. ”  *Dunbrack*, 245 N.J. at 545.  In this case, the need to charge lesser-included manslaughter offenses was clearly indicated.  First, the court should have instructed the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter.  “Passion/provocation manslaughter has four elements: the provocation must be adequate; the defendant must not have had time to cool off between the provocation and the slaying; the provocation must have actually impassioned the defendant; and the defendant must not have actually cooled off before the slaying. ”  *State v. Mauricio*, 117 N.J. 402, 411 (1990).  Where a trial court finds the first two requirements are satisfied, the subjective elements “should almost always be left to the jury. ”  Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413.  Therefore, if the first two elements are “clearly indicated,” a passion/provocation manslaughter charge is “mandate[d].”  Robinson, 136 N.J. at 492.  The charge was mandated in this case because the first two elements were clearly indicated: adequate provocation and no time to cool off.
[brief] (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ...........................................................................................................  35 POINT VI  DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS PROPER AND DOES NOT SHOCK THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE  ..................................................................................  36  1.  The Court Properly Imposed A Period Of Parole Ineligibility And Weighed The Aggravating And Mitigating Factors Appropriately.  (This Refers To Subpoints 1 And 2 Of Defendant’s Brief.)  ............... 38  2.  The Court Did Not Merge Defendant’s Convictions For Sentencing Purposes But The Concurrent Nature Of The Sentences Renders It Moot.  (This Refers to Subpoint 3 of Defendant’s Brief.) .................... 42  CONCLUSION
[brief] This appeal is but one piece of a larger medical malpractice wrongful death lawsuit arising out of the death of [...] on June 1, 2018.  On that day, Mr. Sovelove underwent a right kidney biopsy at [...] in [...], which was supposed to be a one day in-and-out procedure, performed by defendant [...].  [...] encountered complications after the biopsy, and Sovelove was then seen by a number of different medical specialists during the remainder of the day.  Unfortunately, Mr. Sovelove died late in the afternoon of June 1, 2018.  His widow filed this suit against eight different medical physicians who treated Mr. Sovelove and [...], alleging that their malpractice caused his death.
[directive] Accordingly, a search warrant for any firearms and ammunition which the respondent possesses or owns can only be issued conjunction with a temporary extreme risk protective in order when the court determines that probable cause exists to believe that (1) the respondent owns or possesses any firearms or ammunition, (2) the respondent poses immediate and an of present danger bodily injury to self or others by owning or possessing any such firearms or such firearms or ammunition are presently at a specifically described ammunition, and (3) location.  See Guideline 4(e).
[brief] Furthermore, Plaintiff proffered no fact to allege, much less support, any prejudice to them.  5T69-19 to 70-9.  Second, the statement is inconsistent with the testimony of the witnesses.  Defendants’ transaction lawyer was not retained until July 2019--only two (2) months before execution, and fourteen (14) months after the parties began to negotiate by and between themselves.  Pb9.  The *Kerr v. Able Sanitary and Environmental Services, Inc.*, 295 N.J. Super. 147 (App. Div. 1996) court stated that “[c]onsideration of these or any other relevant factors, either singly or in combination, will determine in a particular case whether the party seeking the deposition of opposing counsel has overcome the presumptive "good cause" for the Protective Order.  If such showing is not made, a Protective Order should issue. ”  *Id. at 159.*  Plaintiff made no such showing, nor can it make such a showing now.  Plaintiff based its argument on *Kerr,* but neglected to point out that the Appellate Court in this case reversed a lower court ruling that permitted such subpoenas.  *Kerr, supra.*  It is well settled that a party’s attorney being called to testify in a case should be the rarest of exceptions and not the norm.  The presumption is the grant of a Protective Order – and Plaintiff has come forth will no proof that that tenet should be violated in this case.
[brief] In the remand proceedings, Appellant vigorously argued his entitlement for an award of attorney’s fees, whether under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and R. 1:4-8 for frivolous litigation.  After consideration of such demand, by Order dated April 1, 2024, [...] denied such request.  (Da 194-202).  The lower Court set forth the legal standard related to R. 1:4-8 for frivolous litigation.  [...] concluded that “the simple fact of the matter is that Appellant is a pro se litigant in this matter and accordingly, is not entitled to any award of attorney’s fees or costs (although [...] subsequently awarded costs incurred by later Order).  (Da 200).  [...] continued that “Appellant is no longer licensed to practice in the state of New Jersey and this matter concerns a former New Jersey attorney making efforts to collect his own outstanding debt. ” (Da 200).  The Court found that the status of Appellant as a retired or practicing New Jersey attorney would yield the same result.
[brief] I.  [...] was not adverse to the Company during Phase One, and [...] improperly conflates the Arbitrator’s award of consequential damages for [...]’s fiduciary breaches as improper “fee shifting. ”  ...........................................1  A.  The 40% of the Company’s legal fees awarded by the Arbitrator was not a “fee-shift,” but a simple award of consequential damages associated with [...]’s fiduciary breaches.  .............................................2  B.  It is well-settled that an arbitration award cannot be vacated solely for an alleged mistake of law.........................................................................................6  II.  The Parties’ Undisputed History of Conduct Created an Enforceable Implied Agreement Requiring a Valuation of [...]’s Shares Using Tax Book Value.  ..........................................................................................................................8  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................................................14
[brief] Plaintiff’s testimony that she did not have balance issues when she went to the [...] store on May 30, 2019, that the incident would not have occurred had she not hit the bolt with her walker, that the numbness in her legs did not affect her balance, and that she did not use a rollator for balance issues are inconsistent with the records and testimony regarding the plaintiff’s prior medical history, which document a prior diagnosis of neuropathy, gait and balance issues, use of a cane and rollator and prior falls.  The introduction of evidence and testimony relating to plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, history of falls and use of a handicapped placard to impeach her credibility and the credibility of her daughter, [...], was appropriate.
[brief] There was no confusion from the jurors as to the elements of the crime or as to how the law should be applied to defendant’s matter.  The only questions for the judge were playback requests and a question about the photographs submitted as evidence.  [4T147-17 to 15-11].  There was no confusion as to the victims.  Nothing on the record indicates that the jurors were unable to reach a verdict or questioned the elements of the offense including the victims of the offense.  Defendant’s argument fails.  Defendant’s argument falls well short of the threshold necessary to find plain error in this matter.  [...]’s instructions were proper and did not prevent defendant from receiving a fair trial.
[brief] The legislation provides a financial incentive for public school districts and governing bodies to explore school district regionalization.  In particular, it established a grant program to reimburse eligible costs associated with conducting feasibility studies “that support the creation of meaningful and implementable plans to form or expand regional school districts. ” N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.2; see N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.3 (setting forth criteria for application to the grant program); N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.4 (regarding application review and reimbursement for feasibility study); N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.7 (stating that notice will be provided to the Senate President, the Speaker of the General Assembly, and the Minority Leaders of the Senate and General Assembly of receipt of an application for a grant award); N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.8 (providing that an annual report shall be submitted to the Governor and the Legislature analyzing the grant program).
[brief] The Court held that the statute “does not require submission of an AOM to support a vicarious liability claim against a licensed health care facility based only on the conduct of its non-licensed employee. ”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  In framing the inquiry before it, the Court observed that the “case poses the question of whether an AOM is required to maintain a negligence claim premised solely on a theory of respondeat superior for the alleged conduct of a technician who is not a ‘licensed person’ under the AOM statute. ”  *Id.* at 379.  Surveying the caselaw applying the Affidavit of Merit statute to vicarious liability claims, the Court observed that the applicability of the statute focused on “‘the nature of the underlying conduct’ responsible for plaintiffs’ injuries. ”  *Id.* at 381 (quoting *McCormick v. State*, 446 N.J. Super. 603, 613 (App. Div. 2016)).  Applying that principle, and finding that the radiology technician’s conduct did not implicate any professional standard of care, the Court concluded that the affidavit of merit requirement did not apply to the plaintiff’s claims.  *Id.* at 383-84.  While issued before *Haviland* was decided, the trial court’s decision illustrates how this matter is entirely distinct from the circumstances presented there.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ argument that [...] spoliated evidence and that they are entitled to a jury charge is a red herring designed to distract this Court from the fact the trial court correctly ruled this matter should not be submitted to a jury in the first place because Plaintiffs cannot prevail on a claim of negligence against [...] without expert testimony on their behalf.  Pursuant to R. 4:46-2, it is appropriate for a court to grant summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. ”  Bare conclusions in the pleadings without factual support in affidavits will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.  Petersen v. Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125, 132 (App. Div. 2011); Brae Asset Fund, L.P. v. Newman, 327 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (App. Div. 1999).  As stated by Triffin v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div. 2004), the respondent must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.  See also Merchants Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556, 563 (App.  Div. 2005) (summary judgment cannot be resisted by speculation or “fanciful arguments nor disputes as to irrelevant facts…. ”).  It is a well-established principle under New Jersey law that in order to establish a cause of action for negligence, Plaintiff has the burden of proving that she has a substantial right which was violated by the defendant and that the violation caused the Plaintiff’s injury or damage.
[brief] How many steps had you taken onto the landing before you slipped?  A.  As soon as my foot hit the landing, that was it.  The next thing I know I was on the sidewalk.  There was no additional steps.  It was one step and then I kind of just was on the sidewalk.  Q.  Which foot did you place onto the landing that slipped?  A. Left.  (Pa329, plaintiff deposition P17, L8 – 17).  Plaintiff testified he slipped immediately after placing his left foot on the landing.
[brief] Here, Plaintiffs uncovered necessary evidence of claims against [...] and other Defendants that was intentionally hidden.  While Plaintiffs uncovered the new evidence in the underlying litigation, the Court in the 2015 Action explicitly denied Plaintiffs’ attempt to amend their complaint to bring these new claims by holding that Plaintiffs could do so in a new action, and nothing would foreclose them from doing so.  Plaintiffs acted pursuant to [...]’s holding, and the Trial Court in this matter misinterpreted said holding and precluded Plaintiffs from seeking the remedies provided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391 (2001).