ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT I: I.  AS IT IS EVIDENT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED HIS PRIOR CRIMES ON SEPARATE OCCASIONS, THE TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATION OF THE OCCASIONS  INQUIRY IS HARMLESS ERROR  ..................................................1  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................7
[brief] On May 15, 2008, [...] filed a “Certificate of Change-Registered Agent or Address, or Both” regarding [...], whereby the registered agent was changed from [...] to [...] and the registered office was changed from the office of [...] to the office of [...].  650a.  [...] manipulated [...] and opened bank accounts in the name of [...] for the co-conspirator  Defendants’ wrongful use and benefit.  812a (73:1-11); 812a–813a (76:19–77:4); 814a (89:2-11); 823a (208:21–209:7); 824a (210:1-2); 825a (227:20–228:6).  [...] testified he never owned [...] and the banking activity, checks, deposit slips, and endorsement of checks, done in his name or through his personal bank account on behalf of [...], was actually done by [...].  827a (334:22–336:2); 828a (407:9-12, 407:21-23); 810a (65:18–66:21, 67:3-14, 68:19-20); 811a–812a (69:6-17, 70:8–73:11, 75:5-14); 815a–816a (102:6–105:4); 817a–818a (124:17 – 126:10); 819a (181:15 – 182:10); 823a–824a (207:20–209:7, 209:10–213:17).  Further, [...] explicitly testified that his purported handwriting and signature for banking activity pertaining to [...] were not his own, but rather were forgeries by [...].  828a (407:24–408:4).  Almost the entirety of the aforesaid payments, initially held in [...]’s Attorney Trust Account, the wire transfer to the aforesaid [...] bank account, and other checks made payable to [...] and [...] and negotiated through their respective bank accounts, were thereafter immediately (or within days) transferred to the bank accounts of [...] and [...], via wire transfers or checks made payable to [...] and [...].  701a–734a; 773a–796a.  After [...] and [...] received said wire transfers or checks, [...] and [...] initially transferred part of the funds between and among themselves.  701a–734a; 762a–772a; 773a – 796a.  A substantial amount of the funds transferred to the bank account of [...] was ultimately transferred to the personal bank account of [...], via account-to-account transfers.  718a–734a.  Neither prior to nor after the execution of the Agreements of Sale for the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage, including the [...]-MTDC Assignment and Releases, were Plaintiffs ever told that the aforementioned payments they were instructed by [...] and [...] to make, either through [...]’s Attorney Trust Account, wire transfer to [...], or with checks made payable to [...] or [...], were ultimately going to be transferred into the bank accounts of [...], [...], [...], and other co-conspirators.  462a–463a (566:19–572:15); 464a–466a (607:10 – 615:16); 492a (158:5-24); 499a (369:1–370:6); 509a (513:14–514:2); 510a (534:18 – 535:16); 512a (555:12–556:17); 517a (632:11–634:21).  **Newly Discovered Evidence of [...]’s role in [...] and [...]**
[directive] Subj: Informing Municipal Court Defendants of the Immigration Consequences of Guilty Pleas  Date: December 28, 2011  This Directive promulgates procedures to be followed in the municipal courts to inform defendants that a guilty plea to or conviction of certain municipal court offenses may negatively affect their immigration status, including possibly resulting in deportation.  The Supreme Court approved these procedures on the recommendation of the Conference of Presiding Judges-Municipal Courts.  In State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 131 (2009), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that defense counsel, in failing to inform the defendant that under federal law his conviction would mandate deportation, did not provide effective assistance to the defendant.  Similarly, in Padilla v. Kentucky, ____ U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct.  1473, 1486, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284, 299 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to provide affirmative, competent advice to a noncitizen defendant regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.  In 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this constitutional requirement in Superior Court criminal cases; see Directive #05-11 (“Criminal Plea Form – Question Regarding the Immigration Consequences of a Guilty Plea”).  Consistent with Nunez-Valdez, Padilla, and Directive #05-11, this Directive addresses the same concerns in municipal court cases by requiring municipal court judges (1) to inform defendants that a guilty plea or a finding of guilt as to certain offenses may result in negative immigration consequences and (2) to inform defendants that they have a right to seek advice from an attorney regarding those potential consequences.
[brief] The Board respectfully refers to the Procedural History contained in its Amended Brief in Support of the Appeal (hereinafter “Appellate Brief”) and adds that the immunity which was revoked by trial court Order dated November 5, 2020 (Pa5), and which is the topic of some discussion by [...] on its opposition “merits brief”, was restored by the Court \textit{nunc pro tunc} by Order dated February 5, 2021 (Pa420).  \textbf{STATEMENT OF FACTS}
[brief] Pa28.  Pa30.  Pa63.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa72-108.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa109-256.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.
[brief] As reflected in its February 28, 2024 Final Decision, the Board overlooked or undervalued several mitigating factors such as [...]’s participation in institutional programs.  The Board failed to fairly weigh the rehabilitation that [...] achieved through his three-year participation in the Alternative to Violence program.  Through this program, [...] quickly advanced from the beginner course to acting as a Lead Facilitator.  As Lead Facilitator, [...] was entrusted with managing his own group sessions and imparting the course’s philosophy of non-violence to other participating inmates.  [...] also took the initiative to form an inmate poetry group, which assisted other inmates to express their emotions and frustrations through the art of poetry.  [...]’s formation of, and participation in, this poetry group supplemented the Alternative to Violence program because of the poetry group’s emphasis on non-violence.  In addition to the above courses and groups, the Board failed to acknowledge that [...] also participated in computer programming, art therapy, and creative writing during his incarceration.
[brief] (Da20) and the court denied same for lack of jurisdiction on April 26, 2024.  (Da59)  [...] filed this appeal on June 10, 2024.  (Da62)  New law was established July 10, 2024 to set procedures to protect homeowners surplus equity however same did not exist at the time of the foreclosure judgment in this matter.  (Da79)  In this case, if judgment is not vacated and [...] is not permitted to redeem the taxes, [...] will lose his home of many years and substantial equity he spent years building to a tax lien holder.  (Da24)  Under the circumstances, it would not be a just result for [...] to lose over $300,000.00 of [...]’s equity for only approximately $50,000.00 in unpaid tax where the lienholder was only owed approximately $120,000.00 in tax liens with lienholder fees.  (Da23-Da24)  These are drastic consequences which resulted from an unconstitutional foreclosure judgment.  [...] cannot afford to lose his home and substantial equity to an unconstitutional foreclosure.  [...] is ready willing and able to redeem the taxes upon entry of order permitting same.  (Da24)  In said circumstance, the lien holder is made whole and Plaintiff will still receive all amounts due plus hefty interest on its investment and any legitimate costs incurred.  LEGAL ARGUMENTS
[brief] She was thus authorized to provide the “objective, factual” description of the road in the uppermost portion of the frame as “6th Street. ”  Watson, 2023 WL 4918557, at *21, *23 (“Investigators can likewise testify about parts of a recording that reflect their…familiarity with an area depicted in a video based on prior experience. ”).  The detective was also permitted to “draw [the] jury’s attention to particular spots” on the video, so long as she did so in a manner that ensured the jury could “make its own evaluation” as to what the video depicted.
[brief] Most glaringly, [...]’s view that it was “more likely than not” that Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a silicone particulate was based on an inaccurate estimate of the percentage of affected Ozurdex units in the lot at issue.  (Da0796.)  [...]s testified that he believed twenty-two to twenty-five percent of the units had issues, which is simply wrong.  (Da0070.)  Again, only two percent of the lot had the particulate issue.  (Da0229.)  Thus, [...]’s opinion was predicated on false data and inherently unreliable.  Separately, [...]’s opinions were based on deeply flawed reasoning.
[brief] So, why was the analysis done if it was never taken into consideration.  See [...] testimony.  (T71, lines 16-25 and T72, lines 1-15).  So, no one in [...] or the [...] actually knew anything about [...]’s job and its roles and yet somehow [...] and the ALJ concluded that [...] was an Independent Contractor.  In Lanza v. Bd. Of Trs., 2019 NJ Super. Unpub. LEXIS, 497, the ALJ developed the record and the Board of Trustees completed a full investigation and made a full determination of whether or not Lanza was an independent contractor.
[brief] (Appx 532 at ¶43).  This process started months before it was announced to the staff, as it involved business plans and applications to the relevant licensors.  (Appx 532-33 at ¶44).  [...] Executive Director [...], was the decision-maker of this change.  (Appx 533 at ¶45).  [...] did not consult with [...], [...], or [...] in making this decision.
[brief] The regulations in N.J.A.C. 7:13-12. 7(f) and (g) provide the factors for comparison when deciding between: (i) bridges, arch culverts, and three-sided culverts (N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(f)); and (ii) circular, elliptical, and box culverts (N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g)).  This dichotomy essentially differentiates between crossings least impactful to the channel (bridges, arch culverts, and three-sided culverts) and more impactful crossings (circular, elliptical, and box culverts).  Pursuant to the FHA Rules, [...] requires construction of a bridge, arch culvert, or three-sided culvert, unless the applicant demonstrates that a circular, elliptical, or box culvert is appropriate under the rules.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(f) & (g).  As Appellant points out, the Access Road involves a circular culvert.
[brief] ’”  Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 44 (1993) (quoting Sharra v. Atlantic City, 199 N.J. Super. 535, 540 (App. Div. 1985)) (italics in original) (emphasis added); see also Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 210-211 (App. Div. 2006) (cert. denied 189 N.J. 429 (2007)).
[brief] [...] alleged that the water intrusion led to the formation of toxic mold to which he was exposed commencing in 1991 and continuing until March 2009.  Da89a.  He further alleged that he suffered “serious, adverse health consequences caused by his ongoing, continuous exposure to toxic mold from 1991 through June 2010[.]”  Da89a.  Nowhere within the FAC did [...] allege that he was injured by ingesting mold-contaminated food.
[brief] Appellants’ CFA claim further fails because they have not suffered any ascertainable loss.  Although the trial court did not need to decide this issue, the record is clear that Appellants have not suffered any ascertainable loss because [...] voluntarily dismissed its claim seeking to collect the Concessions with prejudice.  To adequately show an ascertainable loss, the plaintiff must show it suffered a loss that is “quantifiable or measurable, not hypothetical or illusory. ”  Robey, 256 N.J. at 555 (quoting D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 185 (2013)).  “In other words, private plaintiffs need to demonstrate ‘a cognizable and calculable claim of loss due to the alleged CFA violation.
[brief] “Prosecutors are afforded considerable leeway in closing arguments as long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented.  Indeed, prosecutors in criminal cases are expected to make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to juries. ” (State v. Mahoney, 188 N.J. 359, 376 (2006)(quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999); see also State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 610 (2021)(stating that prosecutors must limit summation to the evidence presented “and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. ”)).  Defense counsel did not object to any of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements.  (See generally Db19 to 39).  If a defendant fails to object to improper remarks at trial, those remarks will generally not be deemed prejudicial, as the lack of an objection implies that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made, and the lack of an objection deprives the trial court of an opportunity to take curative action.  (Frost, 158 N.J. at 83-84).  When reviewing the State’s summation, appellate courts must “not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor’s remarks, but . . . also take into account defense counsel’s opening salvo” to determine whether the prosecutor responded substantially to counsel’s claims “in order to ‘right the scale. ’” (State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 379 (App. Div. 1991)(quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985)).  A.
[brief] P-6 is an additional Map of [...], and it includes land to the south of what is shown on the 1909 Map (Pa207).  This shows additional lands that are not relevant to any of the bay front properties.  However, the Map shows the mean high-water line of the Raritan Bay.  If one looks at the 1909 Map and the Tax Map showing the mean high-water line in 1918, [...] opines that the mean high-water line from 1909 and the 1918 Tax Map are roughly the same (1T58:1).  [...] confirms that in the conveyance from [...] to [...], [...] does not include each and every parcel of land they owned in Keansburg (1T58:9).  He points out that the conveyance by the [...] Company to [...] only described properties referenced to the filed Map, it does not include any land outside of the filed Map and the Riparian Grant is not on the filed Map (1T58:14-19).  In addition to that, there were lots shown on the filed Map that were conveyed to [...] as well prior sales which were excluded (1T58:24).  The Court asks if by 1910 [...] has no grant and no right to which [...] responds: “That is correct, Your Honor” (1T59:10).  [...] testifies that when [...] Company acquired title by a Deed from [...], they owned the Riparian Grant that went out “X thousand feet into the bay” (1T59:18).
[brief] How can any reviewing tribunal assess the adequacy of the [...]’s consistency determination if there is no WQM Plan in the record to compare it with?  In 2015, the [...] amended the WQM Rules, seeking to “streamline” and “simplify” the planning process, including the Consistency Assessment.  As a part of these proposed revisions, the [...] “eliminate[d] the separate formal consistency determination review as part of the water quality planning process” and shifted this requirement to the permitting process, “when actual proposals and current conditions can be part of the decision making. ”  47 N.J.R. 2531(a) (Oct. 19, 2015).  The [...] explained that, “If a WQM plan has additional requirements, or a wasteload allocation in an adopted TMDL has been established, these must also be addressed in order for the proposal to be consistent.
[directive] subsection 3:3-1(~, see Rule to pursuant acomplaint-warrant ofissuing apresumption trigger issued, is acomplaint-warrant if been arrested, already has not defendant the where case any In an initiate 2.2 Section to with accordance in fingerprinted shall be arrest upon defendant the the event, In program. that pretrial services of the the benefit for assessment risk pretrial automated a which for offenses) and defendant links the to fingerprint that certain the shall make officer making arrest, the agency the issued, is acomplaint-summons
[brief] Our courts have held that the employer’s parking lot is part of the employment premises, and an employee entering or using the lot in the circumstances here present is in the course of employment.  McCrae v. Eastern Aircraft, 137 N.J.L. 244 (Sup. Court. 1948); Buerkle v. United Parcel Service, 26 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 1953); Lewis v. Walter Scott & Co., 50 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 1958); Rice v. Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 579 (App. Div. 1961).
[brief] During a sidebar in the midst of [...]'s testimony, defense counsel told the judge that the prosecutor had informed her earlier that day, after the testimony of [...] and [...] had been completed, that contrary to all of the pretrial discovery in the case, [...] was now able to identify defendant as the person who shot him.  In response, the assistant prosecutor stated that he and an investigator had met with [...] the prior afternoon, and [...] told them that when he was initially shown the photographic array by Detective [...] in July 2003, he did recognize the person who shot him, but did not make an identification because he was afraid of retribution.  When the assistant prosecutor and the investigator asked [...] during that conversation if he could make an in-court identification, he answered in the affirmative.  The judge asked the assistant prosecutor during the sidebar why he had not told defense counsel of that information the prior afternoon as soon as he learned it, which would have been before the openings and witness testimony the next morning.  The assistant prosecutor stated “because this is the first time I have had an opportunity to tell her about this development. ”  The judge chastised the assistant prosecutor for this omission, noting that his delay in revealing such critical information had put both defense counsel and the court in a very difficult situation.
[brief] That satisfies both the department’s obligation to initially investigate complaints under the State Policy and protects the union from unlawful interference with its operations under the NJEERA.  The jurisdictional problems discussed above are exemplified and magnified by the facts of this case.  It is not disputed that a department may investigate allegations of State Policy violations that occur in front of a State building.  And with respect to those allegations, [...]’s EEO investigator was not able to make a determination about what occurred because it was a he-said/she-said incident and the silent video surveillance (which has never been produced) did not provide evidence of what [...] and/or Complainant said to each other outside the [...] building.  Therefore, as [...]’s submission expressly states, its determination that [...] violated the State Policy is premised on its conclusions about what allegedly happened at the union office later that afternoon.  Thus, it is clear that had [...] appreciated the jurisdictional limits of the State Policy, it could not have determined that [...] violated the Policy.
[brief] By orders of magnitude, [...] found that the monetary harm inflicted by the [...] upon [...] was quantifiably greater during the 6-year, _____________________ on plaintiffs’ non-RICO claims”); id. at 23 (“there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the … findings of fact and conclusions of law on plaintiffs’ RICO claims”)  19  [...] will not here burden the Court with a redundant and unnecessary recitation of the law on punitive damages, which was set forth at length by this Court in its 2018 Opinion and which properly was applied to the Trial Court’s binding findings of fact and conclusions of law by both [...] initially, and by [...] on remand.
[brief] By Judgment of Conviction dated October 21, 2022, [...] was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment on (Count 2), concurrent to concurrent terms of 5 years on (Count 3), and 18 months on (Count 4).  (Da44-46)  [...]’s Motion for bail pending appeal was denied by [...] on December 7, 2022 (Da47) and by the Appellate Division December 29, 2022.  (Da49; 13T5-22 to 13T52-7).  A timely Notice of Appeal was filed with this court on Nov. 17, 2022 (Da49-52), and an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on November 23, 2022 (Da53-57).
[brief] Ibid. at 410.  As explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court, “a trial court may not rely on expert testimony that lacks an appropriate factual foundation and fails to establish the existence of any standard about which the expert testified. ”  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 373 (2011).  Opinion testimony “must relate to generally accepted . . . standards, not merely to standards personal to the witness. ”  Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999).  In other words, a plaintiff must produce expert testimony upon which a jury could find that the consensus of the particular profession involved recognized the existence of the standard defined by the expert.
[brief] ”  The Township is obligated to provide a clearly articulated statutorily authorized use for the subject property set forth in the public record.  See F.M.C., supra, 100 N.J. at 426-27; see also Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 257.  Otherwise, government officials would be able to violate private property rights at any time for any reason – or for no reason.  The articulation of a present public use to justify a condemnation is the essential first step in determining whether a condemnor is exceeding its statutory authorization or operating in bad faith.
[brief] [...] offered an uncontradicted Certification (Pa481 ¶ 28), as a member of the Bar of this State, that he decided to settle and pay the monies awarded against him in the Vermont suit to mitigate his damages flowing from [...]’s breach of its duty to defend and to limit exposure of his personal assets to further liability.  There is no evidence of record, or any suggestion, that [...]’s decision to settle was collusive or anything but fair and reasonable under the circumstances.  [...] is obligated to reimburse [...] for the full amount of his settlement payment, plus the unreimbursed defense costs that [...] was obligated to pay.