ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On December 29, 2019, Plaintiff was incarcerated at [...] and stayed in the intake sections of the jail until January 6, 2020.  On January 6, 2020, Plaintiff signed up to attend church on January 8, 2020.  When [...], a corrections officer, came to pick up the female inmates for church, she stated Plaintiff was not on the list and would not be going.  Plaintiff endured the same process the following week.  On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff signed up for church and when [...] came to pick up the female inmates for church, again she stated Plaintiff was not on the list and Plaintiff did not going.  Plaintiff endured the same process the following week.  On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff signed up for church and when [...] came to pick up the female inmates for church, again Plaintiff was not on the list and Plaintiff did not go.
[brief] Moreover, the courts have consistently held that none of the other co-conspirator type claims (e.g., RICO, aiding and abetting, etc.) brought against the attorney for an alleged wrongdoer can survive summary judgment unless there is some proof that the attorney directed or participated in the alleged wrongdoer’s business operations or management.  For example, in Manley v. Stark & Stark, Civil No. 97-524 (AET), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22082 (D.N.J. August 10, 1999), the plaintiffs were investors who lost large sums of money they had invested in a company called [...], which later proved to be a Ponzi scheme.
[brief] For example, this is not a case where a beneficiary took advantage of the Testator by getting assistance from the attorney, who advised the Testator, and drafted the Wills.  In this case, [...] did not take [...] to see the Union lawyers for a new Will.  This is not a case where [...] moved [...] out of the house, and put him in a facility or an apartment without care.  Cf., *Stockdale*.  All of that was missed by [...] in his report.
[brief] With his Request for Amended Benefits Form, [...] supplied medical documentation of his 9/11 illnesses.  On March 3, 2023, a Petition to the [...] was filed on behalf of [...] and many others.  Pa30.  Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa30.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa30.  Pa76-112.
[brief] TRIAL COURT  VIOLATED RULE 2:9-1 BY MODIFYING THE MARCH 1, 2023, AND JUNE 6, 2023  TRIAL COURT ORDERS WHILE THOSE ORDERS WERE UNDER APPEAL BEFORE THE APPELLATE DIVISION.  TRIAL COURT’S JANUARY 12, 2024, AND JANUARY 26, 2024  ORDERS ENTERED DESPITE LACK OF JURISDICTION SHOULD BE DECLARED  VOID AB INITIO EXCEPT FOR THE ALIMONY ENFORCEMENT PROVISION.
[directive] Charges that must be removed after a factual determination concludes the charges involved marijuana.  if The legislation identified certain charges that must not appear on the PSA the underlying of offense involved only marijuana.  These charges include being under the influence marijuana or of hashish in violation N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 0(b ), failing to make lawful disposition marijuana or Directive #13-21 - June 30, 2021 of7  Page 3 hashish in violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(c), or a violation involving marijuana or hashish above of and possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia violation  N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2.  of  The legislation requires a determination to be made to the nature the offense charged.  as of Each these statutes may be appropriately considered by the PSA when charged in conjunction of if with a non-marijuana charge.  Therefore, a defendant's PSA includes charges 2C:35-10(b), if ( c ), or 2C:36-2, a factual review will be necessary to determine they are directly related to If marijuana.  Pretrial Services staff determine the charges are marijuana related, they must manually remove the charges from the PSA.  In all other instances, these charges may be considered in the risk determination.  Please ensure this Directive is provided to the appropriate staff and advise the relevant stakeholders in your vicinage on these procedures.
[brief] On November 16, 2018, [...]’s wedding took place, and thus, he was off from work.  Appellant, however, was not.  Around 4:00p.m., [...] came into the office and said to Appellant that “it must be a really hard day” for her, referring to [...]’s wedding.  Appellant did not engage, but [...] persisted.  He said to her “stop playing dumb, you know exactly what day it is. ”  (Pa230, Pa274-99)  [...] continued: “I know this must be hard for you, but don’t worry, I’ll be there for you.  Wait until Monday when [...] cuts you off.  It will feel much worse then. ”  Appellant then said “why are you saying these things to me?  [...] and I are just friends. ”  [...] snickered, “if you guys are friends, then why aren’t you at his wedding?”  Id.  On November 19, 2018, [...] again approached Appellant and asked how she was feeling now that [...] was married.  On November 20, 2018, [...] once again asked her how she was feeling know that [...] was a married man.  That afternoon, [...] sent a text message to [...] demanding that he immediately stop sexually harassing Appellant, to “keep his ([...]’s) name out of his mouth,” and to stop talking about him and spreading false information or he would report the matter to EEO.  Id.; (Pa977-79).  [...] claimed the situation “was a joke” and that he did not take [...] seriously.  Id.  [...] reported [...]’s sexual harassment and the derogatory comments to [...] and [...].  (Pa895-96).  On or about November 26, 2018, Appellant called her direct supervisor, Respondent [...], to report the problems with [...].  (Pa274-99, Pa230).
[brief] [...] AND EVANSTON (AND TRAVELERS) ARE ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THEIR DAMAGES  Although this issue was also not reached by the trial court, [...] and [...], as well as [...], are also entitled to prejudgment interest on their damages as well.  The award of prejudgment interest on contract and equitable claims is based on equitable principles.  *County of Essex v. First Union Nat. Bank*, 186 N.J. 46, 61 (2006).  The basic consideration is that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, has had the use of the amount in question, and the interest factor simply covers the value of the sum awarded for the prejudgment period during which the defendant had the benefit of monies to which the plaintiff is found to have been earlier entitled.  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 506 (1974).  The award of prejudgment interest is a matter of discretion for the trial court.  *In re Estate of Lash*, 169 N.J. 20, 34 (2001).  Similarly, the rate at which prejudgment interest is calculated is within the discretion of the court, which can be guided by the rates set by Rule 4:42-11.  *Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc.*, 200 N.J. 372, 390 (2009).  Since [...], [...], and [...] have been deprived the use of the money unnecessarily expended in their defense and indemnity costs, they are entitled to prejudgment interest on all damages, including defense costs incurred by [...] and [...], and indemnity costs incurred by [...] and [...], running from the time those costs became due.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...]’s records do not contain any reference to the incident of July 29, 2013.  (2T13 to 173-14)  [...]’s notes for August 7, 2013 state that: “He’s a gentleman with Meniere’s disease.  (2T173-6)  On August 19, 2013, [...] wrote that: “He’s got unremitting Meniere’s disease.  He has persistent symptoms despite the dyazide, low salt diet, valium and steroids. ”  (2T173-7 to 11)  [...] referred Plaintiff to [...] on August 19, 2013.  This was approximately three weeks after the incident with Defendant [...].
[brief] In Leonard v. Pantich, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1644 (App. Div. 2020), the court considered a quiet title action regarding the boundary line between two adjacent property owners.  The plaintiff had owned and resided at her property since September 2006.  When she purchased her property, she obtained a survey and title insurance policy.  The survey identified an iron pipe as the marker for her western property line.  The survey also showed a small encroachment by defendant’s wire mesh fence.  The plaintiff obtained a $600 financial settlement from her title company for the wire mesh fence encroachment.  The Leonard plaintiff maintained the area of property which surrounded the white post.  Leonard, at 2.  The Leonard defendant had lived in the adjacent property since 1980, and purchased the property on February 20, 1981, thirty-seven years prior to the litigation.  In 2010, plaintiff mailed a letter with her survey to the defendant, asking defendant to remove his fence because it was over the property line.  The Leonard defendant responded by disagreeing with the survey information and stating that the real boundary line is at the location of the white post near the hedges.  In 2015, defendant replenished his stone driveway, up to six inches from the white post, in an area that plaintiff perceived to be her property.  The Leonard defendant also replaced the wire mesh fence with a chain link fence.  Thereafter, plaintiff sought to install her own fence and obtained a new survey, which showed a six inch encroachment in the rear corner.  The Leonard defendant claimed that he owned that property and also denied that he had extended the width of his stone driveway.  Leonard, at 3.
[brief] *Density variances for permitted uses in the zone should not trigger the application of Medici's more stringent standard for the same reasons expressed in Coventry Square.  A density variance seeks a departure from certain regulations applicable to a use the municipality has chosen to permit, not prohibit, in the zone.*  Such requests need not demonstrate that the property is ‘particularly suitable to more intensive development’ in order to prove ‘special reasons’ under the MLUL.  [Randolph Town Ctr., 324 N.J. Super. at 416].  Rather, in considering such applications, zoning boards of adjustment should focus their attention on whether the applicant's proofs demonstrate ‘that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with [a greater density] than permitted by the ordinance. ’  [Id. at 417].  [Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 388–89 (App. Div. 2007) (emphasis added)].  As outlined above, the less rigorous standard of review has been extended to, and appropriately modified for, all other categories of “(d)” variances.
[directive] 2.  The purpose for requesting uniformed police presence on school property is not limited merely to the goal of deterring illegal drug use and trafficking activities; rather, police assistance is often requested for the purpose of maintaining order, crowd and traffic control, and other bona fide public safety reasons.  All requests by school officials for law enforcement agencies to provide for a uniformed presence at any school event should be directed to the local police liaison or local chief executive officer of the law enforcement department or agency having patrol jurisdiction.  F.
[brief] Although it is Plaintiffs’ position that [...] has supported his expert opinions in this case, as Plaintiff argued at the trial level, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, expert opinion may not be required.  Although claims against the professional engineering defendants typically require expert testimony, there are exceptions.  In this case, even in the absence of expert testimony, a jury could reasonably conclude that the settlement at the abutment joint caused Plaintiff’s accident, that each Defendant knew or had reason to know that the defect existed, that it was a dangerous condition and the Defendants breached their duty in failing to fix or warn of it.
[brief] Indeed, the trial court found that Appellants were aware of the facts that formed the predicates for their claims as early as March 2019 yet offered no basis in the prior action, or in opposing the motion to dismiss this action, as to why they did not bring the claims sooner.  As such, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the Appellants’ Complaint with prejudice under the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  Likewise, the trial court made significant, correct conclusions of law based on undisputed facts in dismissing similar claims against the [...] in the prior action.  Importantly, the trial court found in the prior action that the direct and proximate cause of the Appellants’ alleged losses – the same losses for which they seek redress in this action - was their failure to pay rent to [...].  As the trial court aptly noted in its opinion dismissing the prior action against the [...], “if [Appellants] had not defaulted under the Lease, they would have the Solar Rights and Solar Project, and the subject action would be moot. ”  The same rationale upon which the First Amended Complaint in the prior action was dismissed against the [...] applies equally to [...].  The Appellants’ alleged losses, in the prior action and this action, were caused by their failure to pay rent to [...], not because of any alleged representations made at the time the subject lease was entered, the alleged breach of confidentiality, or the termination of the subject lease, as they now belatedly contend.  Relying on its prior conclusions of law based on the undisputed fact that Appellants failed to pay rent and Appellants’ lease for the subject property was terminated, the trial court properly determined that Appellants’ claims in this action are not sustainable as a matter of law.  Accordingly, this appeal should be dismissed and the trial court’s Order dismissing Appellants’ Complaint with prejudice should be affirmed in its entirety.
[brief] “The severity of the loss is dependent on the quality of the pre-injury relationship.  Impairment of the consortium includes not only the loss of the injured spouse's services but also its reciprocal burdening of the other spouse. ”  Thalman v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp., 290 N.J. Super. 676, 684 (App. Div. 1996) (internal citation omitted).  In this matter, Plaintiffs failed to set forth any support for the claim of loss of consortium.  As stated by the trial court, “Plaintiff makes no effort to demonstrate the factors involved in a loss of consortium claim including a strong motional reliance and high degree of mutual dependence. ”  [Pa14].  Therefore, in light of Plaintiff’s waiver of this issue on appeal and “the record fails to demonstrate a claim for loss of consortium” [Pa14], the trial court’s proper dismissal of the loss of consortium should be affirmed.
[brief] The statute appears as follows.  (1)  No person, except the owner or lessee of the building and persons specifically authorized by him in writing, which writing shall be in the person's possession, shall, for the purpose of hunting, taking or killing any wildlife, have in his possession a loaded firearm while within 450 feet of any occupied building in this State, or of any school playground.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:4-16 (West)  ...  (3)  For the purposes of this subsection, “occupied building” means any building constructed or adapted for overnight accommodation of a person, or for operating a business or engaging in an activity therein, whether or not a person is actually present.  [N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:4-16 (West) (emphasis supplied)]  On September 13, 2023
[brief] Cc: [...]  Mr. [...]  June 18, 2024  [...], 062102014  Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and On the Letter Brief email: [...]  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Post Office Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey  08626  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  Municipal Appeal No. [...]; Misc.  Case No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal), Monmouth County
[brief] ”  However, the only entity that could make that pronouncement is the [...] (“[...]”),\(^6\) and it never took that step.  As will be discussed below, --- \(^6\)  While not determinative, it is curious that years since *v LVNV Funding, LLC*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. 2014) was first raised regarding the application of whether there is any merit to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the need for licenses is not an issue necessary to be decided by this Court as Plaintiff has not alleged a claim pursuant to the NJCFLA, due no doubt to the fact that there is no private right of action under it.  In the instant matter, the Court applied the standard which requires dismissal if the plaintiff’s complaint has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief.  *Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot.*, 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64, 726 A.2d 968 (App.Div.1999) cited in *Sickles v. Cabot Corp.*, 379 N.J. Super. 100, 105-06, (App. Div. 2005).  See also *Frederick v. Smith*, 416 N.J. Super. 594, 597, (App. Div. 2010)  “[C]onclusory allegations” are not entitled to the presumption of truth and are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  *Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc.*, 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193, (App. Div. 2012) (citing *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elec. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 768, 563 A.2d 31 (1989))  **POINT II COLLECTION ACTIVITIES DO NOT FALL UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE NJCFA (RAISED BELOW: T1)**
[directive] The Legislature, by enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, rejected the notion that any drug offense, including simple possessory offenses, can properly be characterized as a minor or "victimless" crime.  Accordingly, the Legislature established stern, realistically enforceable penalties directed against users and purchasers, without whom major traffickers would have no market or profit opportunities.  The Legislature further provided for the imposition of especially stern punishment upon offenders who operate on or near schools.  It shall therefore be the law enforcement policy of this State to ensure that schools and schoolyards do not become sanctuaries or safe havens for adult or juvenile drug offenders.  The very presence of drug use and trafficking activities on school property results in a direct and immediate injury to the rights and interests of all law abiding members of the school community.  5.
[brief] This possibility of an unjust result must “raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ”  *Alston*, 312 N.J. Super. at 115; *Macon*, 57 N.J. at 336.  Errors that do not meet this standard “will [be] disregard[ed]. ”  *Kemp*, 195 N.J. at 150, 156 (quoting *State v. Castagna*, 187 N.J. 293, 312 (2006)).  The now-complained of testimony was not sufficiently grievous and did not have the capacity to bring about an unjust result.
[brief] Defendant’s income is twenty times that of Plaintiff.  In 2011, Plaintiff was earning $50,000 per year.  (2T 88:16-18)  In 2020, following a job change, Plaintiff was earning only $43,000 per year.  (2T 88:23-24)  She was removed from a million dollar house in [...] where she had lived for twenty-three years into a townhome.
[brief] This case was initiated on April 29, 2019, by the filing of a Verified Complaint in the Law Division, Hudson County, by Plaintiffs [...] (“[...]”), on behalf of Jersey City’s public-school students, and by [...], a minor student, by his Guardian Ad Litem, challenging the constitutionality of the SFRA as applied to the Jersey City School District.  (Pa53-Pa104.)  The case was transferred to Mercer County (Pa831-Pa832), and, on July 23, 2019, a First Amended Verified Complaint was filed which added a claim in Count III challenging the constitutionality of the Educational Facilities Construction and Financing Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-1 to -48 (“EFCFA”), as applied to Jersey City.  (Pa833-Pa908.)  On September 1, 2020, a Second Amended Complaint was filed which substituted the current minor plaintiff, [...], and his Guardian Ad Litem [...], in place of the original student plaintiff.  (Pa990-Pa1043.)  The parties exchanged written discovery and conducted depositions.  (See, e.g., Pa1223; Pa1253; Pa1569; Pa1774; Pa2038; Pa2048; Pa2063; Pa2067; Pa2081.)  On July 20, 2022, the State Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to rule as a matter of law that the SFRA and ECFCA are constitutional as applied in Jersey City.  (Pa1098-Pa1865.)  On September 26, 2022, the Plaintiffs submitted opposition to the State’s motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  (Pa1866-Pa2085.)  On March 2, 2023, the court heard oral argument in connection with the motions.  (IT:7-46.)¹  On June 14, 2023, the Hon. [...], A.J.S.C., entered an Order, supported by a written opinion, granting the State’s motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs’ cross-motion.  (Pa1-Pa45.)  On July 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal of that final judgment with this court.² (Pa46-Pa52.)  ¹ “IT” refers to the transcript of the oral argument held on March 2, 2023.  ²  Plaintiffs-Appellants are not pursuing their initial appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of Count III of their Second Amended Complaint, which alleged an as-applied constitutional challenge to the EFCFA.
[directive] annual  1.  Generally Accepted Auditing Standards as promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; 2.  Government Accounting Standards Board with regard to disclosure of notes to the financial em en at s; t st US.  3. of Management and Budget Circular Office A-133; New Jersey Office Management and Budget Circular 98-07; and of 4.  17  Untitled Document 32 Page of U.S. 5.  Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards promulgated by the General Accounting Office.  5:30-6.2 through 5:30-6.4 (Reserved)  5:30-6.2 through 5:30-6.4  (Reserved) of body  Certification governing 5:30-6.5  (a)  The annual audit of accounting records and transactions required of every local unit pursuant to 40A:5-4 N.J.S.A. shall be filed by the local unit's registered municipal accountant with the clerk of the board of chosen freeholders or municipal clerk pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:5-6, and a copy shall be delivered to each member of the governing body.
[brief] The court also clearly and thoroughly explained its reasoning for applying aggravating factors three, six, and nine.  (9T 14:18-15:15).  The court properly found aggravating factors three and six based on defendant’s criminal history, stating: “you had two prior indictable convictions, seven arrests, one disorderly person conviction, as well as one juvenile adjudication.  The Court takes all of that into consideration, even though your last indictable convictions are a little older, no doubt. ” (9T15:3-8).  Defendant argues it was improper for the sentencing court to consider defendant’s prior arrests in connection with its finding of the aggravating factors.
[brief] That is exactly what the jury was told in this case.  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) – Unlawful Possession of a Handgun – the first element the jury must be instructed on is that the State’s exhibit – marked into evidence – is a handgun, or there was a handgun.  (Pa 1); compare (Pa 5).  The jury was properly instructed as to this element.  In fact, the court specifically told the jury the State alleged that defendant possessed two weapons, marked into evidence as S-9 and S-10, and then described those particular exhibits as “a Smith & Wesson 38 caliber revolver and a Taurus 40 caliber semi-automatic handgun…” (9T:159-1 to 21).  This instruction fully comports with the first element under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).  Also under this element, the court must instruct the jury as to the definition of a handgun.  See (Pa 1).  That definition was given to this jury.  More specifically, immediately prior, in the instruction for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, the court fully defined a firearm.  (9T:153-5 to 12); compare (Pa 1).  The fact that the definition appeared “elsewhere in the instructions of a proper charge” does not mean the instruction was improper or that the defendant was prejudiced.  Smith, 322 N.J. Super. at 400.  The second element is that the defendant knowingly possessed the handgun.