ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court agreed, stating:  The court once again finds that the argument and information present in movant’s papers in support of its Motion in Aid of litigant’s rights, i.e., the Certifications of [...] and former Mayor [...], does not provide the court with evidence warranting the relief now sought.  The court also reiterates that the Settlement Agreement executed in this matter during November 2017 did not identify Redeveloper’s Off-Site Property located at Block 610, Lot 1 as the parcel specifically designated for the seven subject units.  Nonetheless, the Redeveloper’s proposed order filed with its motion in aid of litigant’s rights included the following language.  [...] shall grant site plan approval for the construction of a seven unit, fully affordable housing building on Block 610, Lot 1, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, without the need for further variance or amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  [Redeveloper’s Proposed Order]  As noted in the Rider to the May 12, 2023 Order, “the court does not find any evidence suggesting that the Borough has affirmatively enacted zoning which now prevents the compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement.  Mere dissatisfaction with the court’s ruling does not satisfy the demonstration required by [...] to be granted relief.  There has been no demonstration that the court’s orders were incorrect when made, or hasbeen rendered incorrect, and the interest of justice are only served if the Motion is denied.
[brief] The Court then looked to the intent of the Constitutional provision: the primary purpose underlying the constitutional provision for the intervening calendar day between the second and third readings was to afford an adequate opportunity to the members of the Legislature and of the public to become acquainted with and study bills that eventually might be enacted into law.  _Id._ at 148 (emphasis added) (citing [...], “The New Jersey Constitution of 1947,” N.J.S.A. Const. Vol. 1, p. 91, 95-96 (1971)\(^2\)).  Given the time that each bill was in the House, the Supreme Court ruled: the legislators of each house had before them the identical substantive contents of the bill that became L. 1982, c. 1 for more than the prescribed duration and intervals of time.  As noted, A–605 and A–711 were absolutely equivalent to one another in terms of substantive content.  There was, in constitutional effect, one bill that was properly acted upon by each legislative house.  The procedure followed to substitute A–711 for A–605 was simply a device to place before the Governor for his final action a single, passed bill.  In this case that bill validly emerged from each house of the Legislature according to the prescribed constitutional path and was duly enacted into law.  _Id._ 149-50.  Therefore, there were no concerns with the purpose of the Constitutional provisions since each bill had several days between the readings.
[brief] Plaintiff asserts on appeal that she “pled a series of retaliatory actions following … her 2016 Lawsuit and the issuance of the Injunction that would be materially adverse to a reasonable employer,” (Pb20), but that “the lower court erred by failing to presume the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations. ”  Pb22.  One thing resonates, simply because Plaintiff’s counsel says it does not make it true.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the trial court did assume the allegations were true, but found they were insufficient to state a prima facie case of retaliation under the NJLAD, which is indeed the court’s function on a R. 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Plaintiff claims she suffered a pattern of retaliatory activity consisting of having to attend a meeting to discuss Plaintiff’s violation of the District Mask Policy, being subject to an investigation regarding an administrative complaint filed against Plaintiff by a fellow employee, rotation of Plaintiff’s grade-level partners, not having emails responded to by [...], and not being provided with her students’ PARCC scores.  While the trial court accepted the allegations as true for purposes of the motions (6a)\(^5\), the court determined such allegations are simply insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action under the law.  While the court on a motion to dismiss is required to assume the truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, the court is not required to accept the embellishments and extrapolations of counsel and the court is most certainly not obligated to accept plaintiff’s supposition, innuendo, and legal conclusions that such alleged factual assertions constitute an adverse employment action and/or retaliation.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that “the lower court failed to apply the applicable standard on a motion to dismiss and substituted its own judgment for that of the trier of fact,” (Pb2), the trial court correctly reviewed and parsed Plaintiff’s claims and properly deemed them to be deficient as a matter of law.
[brief] Defendants agree with the Trial Court that parties may not assign a personal injury case, but they may assign the proceeds arising from a judgment or settlement.  See e.g. Ladenheim v. Klein, 330 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 2000); Cronin v. McKim-Gray, 353 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2002)” (Da010)  Plaintiff argues the Trial Court is incorrect and that the assigning of pre-settlement proceeds violates a “clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee as established by State or Federal law at the time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed”.
[brief] The appellate court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument and affirmed the order granting summary judgment to the tenant.  Id. at 81.  Adopting the rationale of the Holmes court, the Appellate Division stated that “the imposition of a duty on the tenants [to maintain common areas] would result in duplicative effort and interfere with the landlord’s maintenance program. ”  The court went on to hold that an extension of such a duty “would lead to uncertainty” with respect to the areas that each tenant was responsible to clear and would “encourage ‘shotgun’ litigation . . . where the customer sued every store at which he has browsed or purchased an item prior to his fall. ”  Ibid.  The court also concluded that imposing a duty on an individual tenant in a multi-tenant commercial property would be counterproductive.  Ibid.  The Kandrac court also noted that because the landlord was liable for the negligent maintenance of the common areas, no innocent victim would be left without recourse if a corresponding duty was not imposed upon the tenant.  Id. at 90.  Ultimately, the Kandrac court held that when a commercial tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center has no control or contractual obligation to maintain a common area shared with other tenants, “the common law does not impose a duty upon the tenant to do so. ”  Id. at 90-91.  The Kandrac decision is directly on point and controlling.
[brief] Plaintiff expressed his desire to start a family as soon as he and Defendant were married.  He had targeted December 2020 as a timeframe for beginning this new chapter, but he noted that it was dependent on mutual agreement between them, emphasizing that both partners were necessary for conception.  (1T115).  However, Plaintiff observed a shift in Defendant’s intentions after their wedding.  Initially, she had wanted to have two children and start a family immediately, but her stance changed to wanting to wait and get to know Plaintiff better.  This change was significant to Plaintiff, as he believed it affected the integrity of their marriage.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597–98, 379 A.2d 225 (1977) ..................3 Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360–61, 396 A.2d 561 (1979).................................3  DEG, LLC v. Township of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 262; 966 A.2d 1036, 1047 .....15  Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435, 129 A.2d 439 (1957)...........................................3  Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 306 P.3d 1264 (Alaska 2013) ....................9, 10  Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 81 A.2d 155 (1951)  .......................................................2  In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 26 (2001) .............................................................5, 7, 8, 9  In re Estate of Vayda, 184 N.J. 115 (2005).................................................................7, 8 Kimmel v. Dayrit, 301 N.J.Super. 334, 693 A.2d 1287 (App. Div. 1997)...............3  Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, 250 N.J.Super.  79, 593 A.2d 382 (CDAC 1991)..........6  Rudolf v. Shayne, 8 N.Y.3d 438, 443 (2007) ..............................................................9  Taylor v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 13 N.J.Super. 125, 80 A.2d 220 (App. Div. 1951) ........................................................................................................2, 5 RULES  N.J. Ct. R. 2:10-1..............................................................................................................3  N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-1(a) .......................................................................................................10  N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-1(c) .......................................................................................................15  N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-1(f) .......................................................................................................10  N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-3 ...........................................................................................................15  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[brief] It is undeniable that, by Question No. 11, Defendants were seeking to identify any potential Claim against the Insured.  By definition, a complaint filed by the [...] that does not involve Legal Services—and, thus, no client is involved—could not in any event give rise to a Claim, such as is the case here.  The same is true of Question No. 10 in each of the Renewal Applications.  Question No. 10(a) sought disclosure from the Firm as follows:  10.
[brief] As a result of their intransigence and refusal to produce the requested records, on January 17, 2020, [...] and [...] filed a Complaint against the [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Da1).  The defendants moved to dismiss.  The trial court granted that motion in part, allowed the Plaintiffs leave to replead, and entered a consent order, dated May 22, 2020, tolling the statute of limitations and allowing Plaintiffs to file a new complaint within 60 days.  (Da8-10).  On July 20, 2022 [...] and [...] filed a new Complaint.  (Pa1).  The defendants filed an answer with a counterclaim and third party complaint.  (Pa29).  Several discovery disputes ensued involving the production of financial records of the named defendant companies and other related entities also controlled by the [...].  The defendants fought “tooth and nail” to limit the scope of what records Plaintiffs were able to access.  (26T15:23 to 17:6).  Ultimately, the trial court recognized this reticence to produce financial information for what it was—an effort to conceal from Plaintiffs what the defendants had done: I found transactions were diversions or misappropriations.  So to say that the plaintiffs caused delay, it was like pulling teeth to get these QuickBooks.  And then [the defendants] want to limit the scope when the defendant[s] knew that there were transactions after the fact.  So that is why he wanted to limit it, because you knew that.  Well, the plaintiffs didn’t know that, the Court didn’t know that.  (27T75:7-21).  As the trial court made clear, the defendants were not opening their books and saying to the Plaintiffs and the Court “we have nothing to hide. ” (27T75:22 to 76:3).  Ultimately, the defendants produced some records that Plaintiffs sought, and the review of these materials led Plaintiffs (with permission) to file an Amended --- 6 The original matter filed in January 2020 proceeded under [...].
[brief] On reconsideration, the trial court acknowledged that the bid opening date, July 30, 2024, was the appropriate date to evaluate responsiveness, but it did not alter its determination on how to evaluate materiality.  3T31-21 – 3T32-17 [...] -- were not happy that they did not receive the appropriate documentation at the bid -- the notice of classification at the bid, but they received it on August 20th.  [1T61-6 – 1T60-10]  Again, we had -- in [Suburban Disposal, Inc. v. Twp. of Aberdeen, A-3176-12T3, 2014 WL 2131662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 23, 2014)], there's an expired document.
[brief] (14T101-16 to 102-1).  [...]’s testimony was accurate, because N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 defines two separate prongs to the insanity defense (as defendant concedes, see Db54).  [...] was not suggesting that defendant must meet both prongs of the test.  He was instead offering his opinion that defendant’s expert failed to treat each prong separately.  (14T101-23 to 102-1).  Notably, defendant did not raise any objection below, signaling that he did not find Dietz’s testimony erroneous or prejudicial.  Frost, 158 N.J. at 84.  In any event, any confusion regarding the standard for the insanity defense as testified to by either expert was cured by the trial court’s final instructions to the jury giving the legal definition of insanity.  (15T215-5 to 221-10).  See State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 649 (1984).  It is presumed that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions.  Loftin, 146 N.J. at 390.  POINT V THE COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS INSURED THAT THE JURORS UNDERSTOOD THEIR ROLE IN EVALUATING HEARSAY STATEMENTS REPLIED UPON BY BOTH THE STATE AND DEFENSE EXPERTS IN REACHING THEIR RESPECTIVE CONCLUSIONS.
[brief] As the trial court wrote in rejecting that argument:  Defendants misunderstand the duty of impartiality and are misapplying the law to the present set of facts.  Plaintiff is authorized as Trustee to distribute Trust funds and there are no Trust provisions which restrict when she may or may not distribute the funds.  The timing of distribution is of no legal consequence as long as the distributions are being done in equal amounts to all the beneficiaries, pursuant to the terms of the Trust…Paradoxically, defendants are essentially requesting Trustee not to distribute assets to themselves.
[brief] ”  With respect to Request No. 23, [...] had instructed Defendants to clarify who was the record keeper for the property, and which records were provided in response to this Request.  Defendants provided an amended response as follows:  “Objection, the question is broad, unclear and vague.  Notwithstanding the objection the closing records, such as Purchase Agreement, Transfer Deed, 2019 and 2020 Tax Returns as to the LLC and the Property were kept by its attorney [...] and was provided in discovery and were also in possession of the Plaintiffs.
[brief] Defendants’ motion  In February 2023, Defendants filed a motion to vacate the judgment.  (90a-142a).  Defendants sought relief under the “excusable neglect” provision of R. 4:50-1(a) based on their lack of sophistication, their confusion over the mailings, their “inexperience in legal matters,” and that they “did not seek the advice of an attorney. ”  (100a¶26, 13a-14a).  Defendants also sought relief under R. 4:50-1(d), asserting that the foreclosed property was not actually abandoned because they had sought and obtained a variance before the municipal land use board.  (93a¶2, 94a¶9-95a¶12).  Defendants disputed the abandonment conclusions in the certification filed in support of the abandonment motion, which they alleged referred to the wrong property.  (96a¶17-99a¶24, 15a-18a).  Lastly, Defendants asserted that their forfeiture of equity in the property represented an exceptional circumstance entitling them to vacate under R. 4:50-1(f).  (100a¶29-101a¶34).  C.
[brief] ”).  Accordingly, the court was required to consider [...]’s behavior as demonstrative of his rehabilitation.  *Ibid.*  The court, however, did not do so.  Instead, as the State concedes, the court “refus[ed] to equate defendant’s good conduct with a reformed character. ”  (Sb26)  The court made the decision to categorically refuse to consider [...]’s good conduct as rehabilitation simply because it had occurred *in prison*: “you have to consider the environment in which [[...] was] acting,” and because [...]’s conduct occurred in prison, which is a “much more controlled environment, [his behavior] doesn’t tell me a lot[.]” (5T78-13 to 79-2)  This was an error requiring resentencing.
[directive] PDW.  Either automatic or semi-automatic assault weapon, previously defined, with a barrel length of less than 16 inches and capable of firing a 4.6 x 30mm or 5.7 x 28mm cartridge.  Personnel utilizing this type firearm will conduct quarterly training and qualify semi-annually on the Automatic/Semi-Automatic Subgun Qualification Course (ASQC) (Appendix E) and semi-annually on the Automatic/Semi- Automatic Subgun Night Qualification Course (ASNQC) (Appendix F).  Personnel utilizing handguns capable of chambering and firing either the 4.6 x 30mm or 5.7 x 28mm cartridges will qualify on the HQC & HNQC.  Police Carbine.
[brief] 42.  The Board will weigh the positive and negative criteria and determine whether, on balance, the grant of the use variance would cause a substantial detriment to the public good.  Based on the above, the Board notes the public benefit derived by having this type of senior citizen housing in the Township.  However, the proposal as presented and designed for this application before the Board presents a significant detriment to the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  This is an area predominated by single family residences, and this site is similarly zoned.
[brief] On June 15, 2007, the principal of the [...] ([...]) had the 1963 Agreement (Da23) (not in recordable form) recorded in the County property records by having it attached to a self-serving recordable document (Da34).  [...] filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition in 2008.  The School property was sold in August 2010 to [...] at a Bankruptcy Court Auction; "subject to liens, claims, interest, encroachment, and encumbrances".
[brief] B.  **[...] Created an Invited Error By Urging The Trial Court To Dismiss [...]**  [...] cannot fathom how [...] filed this appeal and certified the issue of [...]’s trial participation was never raised below.  The record directly contradicts this claim.  On December 20, 2023, [...] filed a motion to sever the third-party contractual indemnification claim from the personal injury trial between Plaintiff and O.A. [...].  (TPDa1-TPDa11).  This motion raised the same issues below that [...] now raises in its appeal regarding [...]’s participation at trial.  (Db19-Db28, TPDa3-TPDa11).  [...] did not join or otherwise address this motion.  During the January 5, 2024 hearing on the parties’ motions for reconsideration, the court addressed [...]’s motion to sever and denied the motion as moot.  (Da461, 2T54:2-8, 2T71:15-16).  The trial court reached this conclusion because [...] urged the trial court to disallow [...]’s participation at trial.  [...] argued against allowing [...] to participate at trial as [...] would not appear on the verdict sheet.  (Da460-Da461, 2T53:6-54:1; Da463, 2T58:11-16).  [...] further indicated it would not seek a jury interrogatory to assess liability against [...], as that is barred by the worker’s compensation act.  (Da459-Da461, 2T51:18-54:1).  In fact, [...] even suggested allowing [...] to participate at trial would confuse the jury.  (Da461, 2T54:8-13).  By convincing the trial court to bar [...] from participating at trial, only to now turn around and cite [...]’s absence at trial as reversable error is clearly [...]’s attempt to manipulate the judicial process.  Such invited error must preclude appellate review.  See Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State, 466 N.J. Super. 402, 447 (App. Div. 2021) aff’d o.b. 250 N.J. 550 (2022) (The doctrine of invited error operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error); quoting Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 144 N.J. 479, 503 (1996); and see R. 2:10-2.  A party “cannot beseech and request the trial court to take a certain course of action,…then condemn the very procedure he sought and urged, claiming it to be error and prejudicial. ”  State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471 (1955).  [...]’s invited error forms the sole basis for its request to have this court review the contractual indemnification issue, as that issue would not otherwise be appealable once the jury found [...] solely liable.  The invited error doctrine mandates the court deny [...]’s appeal outright.
[brief] (1T31:25; 1T35:3-38:6).  Plaintiff was a licensed pharmacist in Turkey.  (1T39:10-12).  Plaintiff did not have a pharmacist license in the state of New Jersey.  (1T39:16-18).  Defendant had a pharmacist license in the state of New Jersey.  (1T39:19-21).  [...] applied for a New Jersey pharmacy technician’s license for Plaintiff.  (2T8:16-20).  Plaintiff went into business with Defendant because he wanted to be partners with someone who was licensed in New Jersey in order to further his experience with an understanding that Defendant would be the pharmacist for [...] and that with her experience, Defendant was going to show Plaintiff how to run a pharmacy in the United States.  (1T40:2-12; 2T10:11-13).  There was an operating agreement for [...], LLC dated January 26, 2017.
[brief] ”  (5T:18-3 to 25)  The court further rejected [...]’s finding that [...]’s act of shouting to his codefendants was an impulsive act, instead accepting the State’s argument that [...] “ordered or commanded” his codefendants “to stop the fleeing victim” in a calculated manner to avoid apprehension.  (5T:16-8 to 11, 19-1 to 20-1)  The court found that while [...] “was poor and grew up in a difficult and often violent environment where he was exposed to crime” and his “biological father was uninvolved and provided a negative role model,” Miller factor two – concerning the juvenile’s family and home environment – did not apply.
[brief] NJ Division Pensions-Enrollment Form ([...])3/17/2008……………………………  Pa1 NJ Division Pensions-Enrollment Form ([...]) 8/3/2009 ……………………………..  Pa2 Email from [...] to [...] 3/24/2020 ………………..  Pa3 Report of Transfer/Multiple Enrollment Form 9/21/2020…………………………………………………..  Pa4 Request to Reinstate Multiple PERS Membership Status ……………………………………………………..  Pa5 NJ Division Pensions Account History System………  Pa6 Report of Contributions-Member Update …………….  Pa7 Memorandum 10/28/21  Adjustment Section from Enrollment Section …………………………………………  Pa8 Letter to Enrollment Bureau from [...] 1/20/2022………………………………………………………..  Pa9 Letter to Division Pensions from [...] 1/20/2021 ……………………………………………………..  Pa11 Letter to [...] from [...] 9/29/21…………….  Pa12 Letter to [...] from Division Pensions 2/17/2022………  Pa13  Letter to Division Pensions from [...] 10/5/2021……………………………………………………… Pa14 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS Final Administrative Determination 8/17/23 .............. Pa54 # TABLE OF CITATIONS ## CASES | Case Name | Page No. | |-----------------------------------------------|----------| | *AB v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services* 407 N.J. Super. 330, 339-340 (App. Div. 2009) | 9 | | *DYFS v. TB* 2007 N.J. 294,301-302 (2011) | 10 | | *Goulding v. N.J. Friendship House* 245 N.J. 157,167 (2021) | 9 | | *Gulkowsky v. Equity One, Inc.* 180 N.J. 49,67 (2004) | 10 | | *In Re Amico/Tunnel Carwash* 317 N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div. 2004) | 11 | | *In Re Orange Sun Bank* 172 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 1980) | 11 | | *The matter of Medicinal Marijuana* 465 N.J. Super. 343-355,378-379,384 (App. Div. 2020) | 9 | COURT RULES: N.J.S.A. 17:2-2(b) ..................................................