ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T 26-9 to 17)  [...] then placed a call to [...]’s father.  (2T 26-18 to 20)  This time, [...] identified himself and said he was on the call at the very beginning.  (2T 26-21 to 23)  There was only limited discussion between [...] and his father about what had happened earlier that day.  (2T 26-23 to 25)  [...] decided the underlying suppression motion after making fact-sensitive determinations about the admissibility of various statements made by [...] on the day of the arrest.
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THIS LAW WAS ENACTED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION.  Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Chapter 375 on the grounds that it was “not duly passed by both houses of Legislature, or approved by the Governor or otherwise made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution. ”  N.J.S.A. 1:7-1.  That claim is foreclosed by precedent.  As an initial matter, a heavy presumption favors the validity of any statute under attack.  See State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 266 (2014) (declaring that a “presumption of validity attaches to every statute”); State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 41 (1996) (stating that “any act of the Legislature will not be ruled void unless its repugnancy to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt”); New Jersey Ass'n on Corrections v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 218 (1979) (commenting that “every reasonable intendment runs in favor of constitutionality” of a statute); In re Application of Lamb, 67 N.J. Super. 39, 61 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b. 34 N.J. 448 (1961) (affirming that presumption of constitutionality is not limited to the substantive provisions of a statute and applies in a suit under N.J.S.A. 1:7- 1 to -7); *In re Freygang*, 46 N.J. Super. 14, 28 (App. Div. 1957), aff’d 25 N.J. 357 (1957) (affirming the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative enactment and placing onus on the one challenging the act).
[brief] 15  | | Cases | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Armstrong v. Francis Corp., | 6, 7, 8 | | 20 N.J. 320 (1956) | | | Hopler v. Morris Hills Reg’l Dist., | 4, 6, 8 | | 45 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 1957) | | | Kozlowski v. Smith, | 11 | | 193 N.J. Super. 672 (App. Div. 1984) | | | McCullough v. Hartpence, | 2, 10 | | 141 N.J. Eq. 499 (Ch. 1948)
[brief] (17T16-23 to 19-5).  The State responded that, given the fact that the Rushing/Perrine report was included in [...]’ written report, which was turned over to the defense, the State was unaware that the defense did not separately provide the Rushing/Perrine report to [...].  (17T36-15 to 37-6).  As the judge found in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, there was no bad faith by the State in asking [...] about reports outlined in the State’s expert’s report which [...] testified she reviewed.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s pleadings .........................................................................................................16  1.  The State Court  First Amended Complaint – The pleading that was subject to removal to Federal Court .................................................................16  2.  The Federal Court  Second Amended Complaint – Plaintiff’s first attempt to specifically comply with Federal Court standards and the Court’s dismissal ..................................................................................................................17  3.  The Federal Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint; Plaintiff fails to comply with the Court’s specific directive to correct the pleading deficiencies .............................................18  4.  The proposed State Court Second Amended Complaint (a/k/a the “SAC”) – The pleading subject to [...]’s April 1, 2021, oral decision .................................................................................................................................19  5.  Plaintiff’s First Appeal ......................................................................................................20  6.  Remand and the Trial Court’s formal “with prejudice” dismissal Order .................................................................................................................................21  IV.  Legal Argument ................................................................................................................26
[brief] *Id.* at 548.  In the context of that stop, the officer received a tip from [...] that a silver Infiniti would be traveling on the Turnpike carrying a large amount of marijuana.  *Id.* at 546-47.  The tip included the license plate, a general description of the driver, and the direction in which the car was headed.  *Id.* at 547.  The detective who initiated the stop stopped the car after observed motor vehicle violations.
[brief] (Pa2383.)  The parties’ contract contained a closing date of August 15, 2005, and provided that if the conditions in the agreement had not been satisfied by that date, the closing date could be extended for an additional six months.  *Ibid.*  As a condition precedent to the plaintiffs-purchasers’ obligations, the defendants-sellers were required to obtain prior to closing certain environmental clearance documents which, after the enactment of the SRRA in 2010, included a RAO.  *Id.* at *2*.  If the sellers failed to obtain a RAO by the closing date, the purchasers had the right to cancel the contract; however, in the event that the sellers continued to work in good faith toward obtaining the RAO, neither party was permitted to cancel the contract.  *Ibid.*  For approximately seven (7) years after signing the contract, the sellers continued to work with the [...] toward a RAO.  *Ibid.*  In December 2012, the sellers attempted to cancel the contract, but the purchasers wished to proceed and rejected the sellers’ position that the contract was terminated.  *Id.* at *3.  In 2015, the purchasers filed suit alleging, among other things, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, for which they sought a declaratory judgment and specific performance.  *Ibid.*  At trial, the sellers argued that the purchasers did not seek to extend the closing date and suggested that the remediation efforts had become too costly.  *Id.* at *3-4.  The trial court determined that neither party could cancel the contract while the sellers continued to work with the [...], but that given the parties’ expectation of a quick transaction, the length of time the sellers pursued the RAO, delays by the [...], the cost and time of the LSRP process, and the language of the contract, the contract would be specifically enforced to allow the purchasers to either cancel the contract or proceed to closing and assume the cost of obtaining the RAO.
[brief] Since N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1’s dispute resolution provision applies to the “medical expense benefits” provided under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, only the insured, injured person, or the medical provider who has an assignment of benefits is subject to dispute resolution.  Pursuant to the enabling statutes, [...] has no jurisdiction over any other party that is not the insured, injured person, a medical provider or an automobile insurance carrier.  Here, this jurisdictional bar includes the three non-medical provider corporations, and the one layperson and one attorney who are not an insured and/or injured party.  The Appellate Division addressed a similar issue in New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 403 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2008), wherein it held that the PIP arbitration regulations do not include or apply to health insurers.  *NJM v. Horizon*, 403 N.J. Super. at 529.  In that case, the health insurer’s insured had exercised his statutory option to designate health insurance as his primary coverage for injuries sustained in automobile accidents, rather than the PIP provisions of his automobile insurance policy.  *Id.* at 520.  The Appellate Division analyzed N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1, adopted by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to implement N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1.  *NJM v. Horizon*, 403, N.J. Super. at 528.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 states:  (a)  The purpose of this subchapter is to establish procedures for the resolution of disputes concerning the payment of medical expense and other benefits provided by the personal injury protection coverage in policies of automobile insurance.  This subchapter implements N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 and 5.2, which provide that PIP disputes shall be resolved by binding alternative dispute resolution as provided in the policy form approved by the Commissioner .
[brief] As part of the response to the Defendants’ R. 4:6-2 Motion, the Plaintiff on November 14, 2023, filed a Certification (Pa-20).  There, it is clearly set forth that the procedure in [...] was to extend the list for at least a year.  At no other time was the list less than a year.  If the list had continued for that year, the Plaintiff would have been no. 1.  Prior no. 1 candidates were promoted.  The only way the Chief could hinder this promotion was to change the process.  At ¶29 (Pa-21) of the Plaintiff’s Certification, it is stated:  >  The Chief maneuvered the five-month extension from May to October, so it wouldn’t cover the [...] retirement in November.  At ¶30 (Pa-21), the Plaintiff stated:  >  The list was deliberately shortened, so that the [...] retirement could not be included in that list because at that point, I was no. 1 on the list to be promoted.  The Plaintiff acquired a right to be considered for promotion.  Those persons in the no. 1 position were promoted prior to and after the Plaintiff.  The process was changed to deprive the Plaintiff of a right to be considered for promotion.
[brief] A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a) defines a dangerous condition as “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. ”  In order to pose a “‘substantial risk of injury’ a condition of property cannot be minor, trivial, or insignificant.  However, the defect cannot be viewed in a vacuum.  Instead, it must be considered together with the anticipated use of the property…”  Atalese v. Twp. of Long Beach, 365 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2003).  Whether a property is in a “dangerous condition” is generally a question for the finder of fact.  Vincitore v. N.J. Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119, 123 (2001).  The lower court erred by completely ignoring the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand that Defendants allowed to operate illegally on the Subject Premises for months.
[brief] I think the laboring [oar] in the litigation has gone to the [[...]] defendants more so to [...], but still, they have to at the very least stay in and monitor and represent their client’s interest . . . and I’ve looked over the certification, the hours are reasonable for the type of attorneys that are working in the case in this area in this expertise and I think they’re entitled to at least 50 percent of the fees that they suffered in this case.  (2T 18:3-7, 18:19-23) (emphasis added).  Did the Trial Court find the time devoted to the action reasonable, but the rates charged to [...] twice what a reasonable rate would be?
[brief] On January 28, 2022 and during the initial fair share housing declaratory judgment settlement fairness hearing, [...] scolded defendants for suggesting and implying that he had prohibited the disclosure of the July 30, 2021 final fair share housing settlement terms until after consideration and official action.  (Pa219-SJCS #38; Pa135).  But on January 28, 2022, [...] denied plaintiff-an interested party- the opportunity to question the special master and [...]'s special outside planner under oath and penalty of perjury.  [...] delayed ruling on the procedural due process and contractual invalidity of the July 30, 2021 fair share housing settlement under State law.  (Pa219-SJCS#39, #40).  While their second pre-answer motion to dismiss was pending, defendants restored plaintiff’s right to be heard on all agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.
[brief] In some cases, courts are reluctant to provide defendants with new trials against the backdrop of “substantial evidence of guilt. ”  Armour, 446 N.J. Super. at 295.  In that case, the court relied upon detailed, unmistakable identifications, the lack of an alibi, and statements from the defendant relaying information he could not have known if he were not the perpetrator.  In this case, no such clarity of guilt exists.  In Armour, the court found that the Carter test was not satisfied because “[t]he latent fingerprint at issue was not the sole evidence linking the robber to the crime.  Nor was it a crucial piece of evidence. ”  Armour, 446 N.J. Super. at 315.  Here, the question is whether the evidence in question supports the notion that [...] purposefully deceived the investors.  There is no additional evidence like possession of a bloody knife or a DNA match that the State could rely upon to support a conviction.  For the State, a conviction in this case must necessarily be firmly based upon evidence of deceit.  It is the “sole evidence” required to satisfy the second element of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4.  Here, the newly discovered documents do not demonstrate deceit and cannot support a conviction.  In fact, they lead to the opposite conclusion and warrant a new trial.
[brief] ”).  Last, Appellant has not alleged and cannot provide any evidence that Respondent committed any fraud or misrepresentation material to a transaction used to induced Defendant to make a purchase.  \textit{Woo-Padva} 2, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *10 (“[b]ecause plaintiff did not demonstrate defendant had engaged in unlawful conduct under the CFA or that she had suffered an ascertainable loss, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s CFA claim. ”); \textit{Woo-Padva v. [...]}, No. BER-L-003625-17, 2022 WL 267938, at *3 (N.J. Super. L. Jan. 21, 2022) (“The Consumer Fraud Act [] applies only to conduct that rises to the level of deception, fraud, or misrepresentation in connection with the sale of merchandise or services.  ‘To satisfy this requirement, the misrepresentation has to be one which is material to the transaction made to induce the buyer to make the purchase. ’”)  (quoting \textit{Castro v. NYT Television}, 370 N.J. Super. 282, 294 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 25, 2004) (emphasis added)).}
[brief] [...], [...] (husband), Appellants, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY UNION COUNTY, LAW DIVISION v.  Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action  [...]; [...] d/b/a [...]; JOHN DOE 1-10 (a fictitious name), RICHARD ROE 1-10 (a fictitious name), ABC CORPORATION 1-10 (a fictitious corporation), XYZ CORPORATION 1-10 (a fictitious corporation)  Respondents.
[brief] The trial court denied Plaintiff’s request for fees and sanctions against defense counsel by reasoning that Plaintiff did not send a safe harbor letter or notice:  In this matter, plaintiff has failed to provide a certification and a copy of any letter sent to defense counsel which complies with the rule.  Nor did plaintiff respond to defendant counsels’ arguments contained in the record which asserted that no safe harbor letter or notice was ever received from plaintiff at any time during this approximate five-year litigation.  [Pa1, Op. at 6-7].  Absent from that reasoning was any required analysis of the practicability of compliance with the notice requirements of R. 1:4-8.  The authoritative New Jersey Supreme Court case makes clear: “The Court should not dismiss an application governed by subsection (f) without making an assessment about the practicability of compliance”
[brief] Deputy Chief Assistant Prosecutor Appellate Section Of Counsel and on the Brief October 29, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 404802022  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY  LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] ””  State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 386 (2020) (quoting State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 300 (2011)).  Courts also consider “more generally … what is just and consonant with public policy in the particular situation presented. ”  State v. Dock, 205 N.J. 237, 255 (2011) (quoting State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 97 (2005)).  Once retroactivity is deemed appropriate, a determination must be made as to which “retroactivity option is to be chosen. ”  Dock, 205 N.J. at 256.  The new rule may be applied: (1) “purely prospectively”; (2) “in future cases and in the case in which the rule is announced, but not in any other litigation that is pending or has reached final judgment at the time the new rule is set forth”; (3) “in all future cases, the case in which the rule is announced, and any cases still on direct appeal,” known as “pipeline retroactivity”; or (4) completely retroactively.
[brief] A1841 [[...]/[...]+7], Lead or asbestos hazard abatement-primary residency-gross income tax deduction A2186 [[...]/[...]+8], Homeless shelter-establish Statewide database of beds A2301 [[...]/[...]+5], Vehicle, electric-concerns electric public utility service rates for charging A2877 [[...]/[...]+10], Property, vacant and abandoned-requires registration with municipalities A3007 [[...]/[...]+12], Higher education institutions-prov. students w/access to mental health care prog A3392 [[...]/[...]+9], Student representative-be appointed to board of education of school district A3450 [[...]+11], Income access services & related provider contracts-creates certain requirements A3870 [[...]/[...]+11], Defense Against Porch Pirates Act; amends theft statute A4002 [[...]/[...]], Sports wagering-allows deduction of promotional gaming credit from gross revenue A4238 [[...]/[...]+6], Adult medical day care services-establish minimum Medicaid reimbursement rate A4241 [[...]/[...]+3], SNAP evaluation-require DHS to conduct survey on experience A4253 [[...]/[...]+4], Clinical labs & electronic med record companies-include gender, race, ethnicity A4366 [[...]/[...]+6], Police training-contract with crisis intervention training center A4478 [[...]/[...]+18], Nursing homes-estab addl. req. for DOH to assess sanctions & impose penalties A4569 [[...]/[...]+4], Electric generation/gas supply svc.-receive signature prior to provision switch A4655 [[...]/[...]+7], Police presence at polling places & ballot drop-box limits A4771 [[...]/[...]+8], Drug court-expands offenses eligible for expungement upon successful discharge A4856 [[...]/[...]+16], School websites & web services-remove access to students w/disabilities A4859 [[...]/[...]/[...]+8], Winterizing small business operations-temporary sales tax exemption A5033 [[...]/[...]+14], Motor vehicle dealers-authorize to sell online & obtain electronic signatures A5294 [[...]/[...]+9], Persons w/significant disb-prov fast track hiring & emp opportunities by State A5296 [[...]/[...]+13], Persons w/disabilities-provides for employment by State A5322 [[...]/[...]+9], Human trafficking victim-provides for process to vacate and expunge A5334 [[...]/[...]+15], Trans. mobility improvements for autism & deva disb persons-study & implement A5439 [[...]/[...]+1], Racing Commission-changes deadline for annual report to end of State fiscal year A5439 [[...]/[...]+1], Racing Comm.-adopt procedures to enforce integrity-control of annual audit A5694 [[...]/[...]+5], Military dependents-permits school enrollment prior to relocation to district A5814 [[...]/[...]/[...]+6], School Bus Safety Ombudsman-creates position in Department of Education
[brief] The emphasis on cost-feasibility severely undercut Plaintiff’s contention that Lot 5 is particularly suitable for the new development.  It revealed that extreme deviations from zone criteria were sought to facilitate developing the parcel at a level of intensity that Plaintiff felt was needed to realize a return on investment that was satisfactory to it as a private developer.  However, a variance can only be granted if the Board, on the basis of the evidence presented before it, determines that the public interest as distinguished from the purely private interest of an applicant would be best served by permitting the proposed use.
[brief] The referendum was aimed at raising more than $6,000,000 to continue [...]’s courtesy busing policy, a non-T&E item.  (Ra98; Aa13).  attendance records” for students placed in private schools.  (Ra76; Aa15).  Further, the [...] “determined that poor record-keeping resulted in [[...]] incorrectly reporting hundreds of students on its Application for State School Aid (ASSA). ” (Aa15; Ra57).  Record-keeping deficiencies continue and were again confirmed by the Comprehensive Report, which found that “[t]here were significant deficiencies noted on the vendor management controls in the procure to pay cycle.
[brief] Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings  . . . . . . . . . . . . iii  Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv  Table of Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v  Preliminary Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
[brief] In the trial court’s first attorney fee opinion, the court had relied upon the Administrator’s statement that, from his perspective, Plaintiff’s actions were beneficial until January 5, 2017, and that Defendant’s actions were beneficial at all dates subsequent to January 5, 2017.  (Da187, Para. 3).  In relying upon the Administrator’s feelings about the parties’ assistance to him as the basis for the court’s analysis, the trial court not only did not fulfill its role, but the court also overlooked the Administrator’s caveat in his Certification:  “This Certification does not address any of the legal arguments advanced by the parties as to whether fees ought to be awarded or the factors the Court considers as to the reasonableness of the fees sought as provided in the Rules of Court and by applicable law. ”  (Da188, Para. 8) (emphasis added).
[brief] The Tartaglia case addressed the procedure that applies when there is spoliation of evidence as follows:  If the spoliation is discovered while the underlying litigation is ongoing, the adverse inference may be invoked and the party is permitted to amend the complaint to add a count for fraudulent concealment, but the counts must then be bifurcated.  The same jury would first try the underlying claim and then, after returning a verdict, would hear the fraudulent concealment claim.  Id. at 118-119.