ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 5  See Counter-Statement of Facts, Point E, below, setting forth the trial court’s findings with respect to Defendants’ admissions. waive the repayment of the approximately $5,000 then due in late penalties under the First Loan, and to waive the $25,000 in interest that had accrued to that date on the Second Loan. \(^6\) Da20; 1T146-10 to 22.  Accordingly, as the trial court found, on April 26, 2013, the parties entered into a new, distinct loan in the principal sum of $134,759.74 ("Third Loan").
[brief] (7T217-24 to 218-13, 220-11 to 16).  Defendant picked up the game piece shaped like a gun, pointed it at [...] and [...], and said “I’m going to kill you. ”  (7T218-14 to 219-6).  Defendant then said “I’m gonna kill Mom and Dad. ” (7T219-13 to 14).  [...] thought defendant was joking at the time.
[brief] The Commission recommended a statute creating a “uniform practice and procedure for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, equally applicable to all bodies vested with such power. ”  *County of Monmouth v. Wissell*, 68 N.J. 35, 38 (1975) (citing to *Report of the Eminent Domain Revision Commission* 6-7 (1965)).  [...], who oversaw the passage of the Eminent Domain Act, also recognized the necessity for uniformity on laws enabling government entities to take private property for a public purpose.  *Wissell, supra*, 68 N.J. at 40.  The Governor agreed that the legislation would “make uniform the legal requirements for all entities and agencies having the power to condemn” and which “would increase protection to the citizen whose property is condemned. ”  *Id.*  Among the proposals, the Governor recommended that “this act shall apply to every agency, authority, company, utility or any other entity having the power of eminent domain exercisable within the State of New Jersey. ”  *Id.* at 41.  It was the result of these cumulative actions by the government that led to the passage and adoption of the language in the Eminent Domain Act.
[brief] C-Excessive Force was Used:  As occurred here, the officers’ use of a chokehold on an unresisting and even initially resistant detainee violates the 4th and 14th amendments.  See Valencia 981 F.2d at 11447-1449.  The punching, kneeling in the ribs, choking and dislocating of plaintiff’s jawbone was brutal and excessive.  (Pa96, Pa471, Pa54).  The police then falsified a story that the car keys were suddenly sticking out between plaintiff’s fingers in a weaponlike fashion.  Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d _1108, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).  Point IV: [...] Is Liable Under The NJCRA(Pa561-625, Pa22-Pa23, Pa303-Pa304, Pa093-Pa097, Pa Pa471, Pa054, Pa96)
[brief] See, e.g., Horesh v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 265 N.J. Super. 32, 37 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that the reason why Injury to an Insured exclusions are valid in homeowner’s policies but violate public policy when used in primary auto policies is because: “Auto policies are mandated, are heavily regulated and are required by law to contain particular coverages.
[brief] In automobile accident cases, joint representation is prohibited if there is any issue as to liability.  In re Shaw, 88 N.J. 433, 440-41 (1982).  That principle applies even if a passenger has not asserted a claim against a driver but may do so in the future.  See Ethics Comm. Op. No.188, 93 N.J.L.J. 789, at *1 (Nov. 12, 1970) (“[T]he passenger (and owner) has a possible claim against the driver . . . even though the parties believe to the contrary”).  The passenger’s interest in maximizing compensation contravenes the driver’s interest in minimizing liability.  The same logic applies here where joint tortfeasors accused of intentional acts, each subject to mandatory CNA apportionment, are undeniably motivated to minimize their own involvement to reduce liability while also disincentivized from shifting blame to jointly represented co-defendants (especially those funding their defense).
[directive] 6.1.5  Investigators are required to provide further notice to the law enforcement executive every additional 45 days that the internal affairs investigation remains open (i.e., on or about the 90th, 135th, and 180th days from the receipt of the complaint), and the law enforcement executive should exercise increasing scrutiny of the investigators’ work the longer the case remains open.  The purpose of this notice is to facilitate prompt resolution of internal affairs investigations, not to create 3 an impediment to discipline in cases that take longer to resolve.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 24
[brief] POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE COUNTY’S REJECTION OF [...]’S BID WAS IMPROPER AND THAT THE ANTICIPATED CONTRACT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO [...] AS LOWEST RESPONSIVE BIDDER_(1T55-68); 3T30-34;45-52)  ........................................................................7  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Notice of Classification is Non-Mandatory (1T55:24-57:12) ........................................................................8  B.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that [...]’s Omission of the Notice of Classification is Non-Material and Waivable (1T57:23-60:10; 3T33:15-20) ........................................................................10  C.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the County’s Failure to Waive [...]’s Omission of the Notice of Classification was Improper (1T61:2-13)  ........................................................................25  D.  The County Has Already Determined that it Will Abide the Trial Court’s Ruling and Award the Anticipated Contract to [...] (3T49-14-23)  ........................................................................30  POINT II
[brief] On April 12, 2021 Plaintiff [...] a/k/a [...]  (hereinafter “[...]”) filed a Four Count Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs naming as defendants the [...], the [...], and the [...] (sometimes hereafter collectively referred to as “[...]”) challenging the “Second Amended Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan” (hereinafter “Redevelopment Plan”) adopted by Ordinance 1667 (Pa1-Pa21).
[brief] The unchallenged bloodstain pattern expert testimony was proper.  ........................................................................ 20  1.  The expert testimony established that the victim was subjected to two blood-shedding events.......................... 20  2.  [...] provided proper testimony.................................................. 21  C.  A statistical number was not necessary for the jury to evaluate the DNA evidence because the victim was the source of the DNA.  .................................................................  22  1.  The DNA expert testimony established the victim was the source of the DNA profile generated on several pieces of crime-scene evidence.  ...........................................  22  2.  Since the only positive DNA results in this case determined that the victim was the source of the DNA, no statistical explanation was necessary ..................... 24  D.
[brief] [Pa260, ¶ 21; Pa267, ¶ 6; Pa273, ¶ 4].  [...] described the landscape buffering [...] intended to install.  Noting that [...] had worked with the neighbors to address their concerns, [...] explained that the plan proposed hundreds of trees, shrubs and other plantings creating visual buffer and an attractive environment for the senior housing community.  [1T 62-10 to 64-20].  The Board’s Engineer later commented favorably about the landscape buffer that [...] proposed, noting that the plan was “about as good as I’ve seen” and was a “very significant effort.
[brief] [...] maintained that [...] had been discharged for just cause because it had based its decision upon the original doctor’s note she had submitted restricting her from performing the essential functions of her position as a carpenter.  Accordingly, [...] denied the grievance and refused to return [...] to her prior position.  Thereafter, on June 22, 2020, Defendant filed for arbitration, submitting a request for a panel of arbitrators with the [...].  (Pa46)  B.
[brief] See Zaromb v. Borucka, 166 N.J.Super. 22, 27, 398 A.2d 1308 (App.Div.1979) (holding that slander claim was not precluded by Entire Controversy Doctrine because the party was not aware of its existence).  There is no rule or case law prohibiting a party from seeking to bring a new claim, previously unknown and unknowable, against parties who were previously dismissed with prejudice prior to the discovery of said new claim.  Instead, a dismissal only applies to known or knowable claims at the time of the dismissal.  Plaintiffs’ new claims against [...] and [...] (“[...]”) were not known, could not have been known, and therefore were not pled at the time of the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ previous claims.
[brief] Pa263.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, [...] underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa263.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.  Pa263.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa115.  Despite not receiving notice, Licameli attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa117.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa117.  In response to his filing, Licameli received correspondence from the [...] requesting medical information.  Pa119.  Licameli contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa119.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.  Pa28.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the [...].  Pa28.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa74-269.
[brief] See, e.g., EO100(requiring NJDEP within two years of the date of the Order to adopt Protecting Against Climate Threats (“PACT”) regulations.)\(^8\)  Appellants also erroneously claim that NJDEP was required to find that CS 327 is consistent with the RMP.  Asb16.  But the Highlands Act only requires that NJDEP find that CS 327 is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Act itself, not the RMP.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(11).  A project that qualifies for an exemption --- \(^8\)
[brief] As established by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 411, 766 A.2d 749, 760 (2001):  [W]here an adversary has intentionally hidden or destroyed (spoliated) evidence necessary to a party’s cause of action and that misdeed is uncovered in time for trial, plaintiff is entitled to a spoliation inference that the missing evidence would be unfavorable to the wrongdoer and may also amend his or her complaint to add a claim for fraudulent concealment.  Where the hiding or destruction is not made known until after the underlying litigation, in which plaintiff’s case has been lost or impaired due to the missing evidence, a separate tort action for fraudulent concealment will lie.  Here, Plaintiffs uncovered necessary evidence of claims against [...] and other Defendants that was intentionally hidden.  While Plaintiffs uncovered the new evidence in the underlying litigation, the Court in the 2015 Action explicitly denied Plaintiffs’ attempt to amend their complaint to bring these new claims by holding that Plaintiffs could do so in a new action, and nothing would foreclose them from doing so.  Plaintiffs acted pursuant to [...]’s holding, and the Trial Court in this matter misinterpreted said holding and precluded Plaintiffs from seeking the remedies provided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Zimmerman.
[directive] The Attorney General shall, from time to time, review the results of the Programs for each State law enforcement agency, and provide input, feedback, or recommendations to the respective agencies as the Attorney General deems appropriate.  III.  Annual Reporting A.  Data to be included.  By January 31st of each year, each State law enforcement agency shall report to the Attorney General, and each municipal and county law enforcement agency shall report to the County Prosecutor with jurisdiction over the agency (who will in turn gather and transmit the information to the Attorney General), the following information for the preceding calendar year.
[brief] Plaintiff swore that he did not expect or intend to cause injury.  A reasonable person, under similar circumstances would expect coverage to apply here given the “exception to the exclusion” which brings coverage within the policy.  [...] was protecting his property rights and has video evidence which proves the property manager made false statements.  Nevertheless, [...]’ conduct was justified because he used reasonable “force of speech” or “force of communication” in protecting his ownership interest.  Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to demonstrate [...] intended to inflict bodily injury, therefore, the exclusion does not apply.  And even if there was evidence to demonstrate [...] inflicted injury, under these circumstances one would expect coverage to apply given [...]’ force of communication was not unreasonable and there is no evidence on the record to prove otherwise.  VII.
[brief] (40T:105-5 to 106-25).  Patrolman [...] “flipped [the bag] over” onto the sidewalk on the ground in the backyard.  (40T:161-11 to 21).  Bodine “spread the remains open from the middle,” and a piece “easily snapped off. ” (40T:176-20 to 177-11).  The contents were later identified as the remains of [...] (39T:114-12 to 19).  [...] and other officers comprehensively searched the home for clues as to how Daniel had died.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  I.  Preamble .........................................................................................................................1  II.  Procedural History ........................................................................................................4  III.  Statement of Facts .........................................................................................................4  IV.  Legal Argument .............................................................................................................17  A.  Standard of Review ....................................................................................................17  B.  The Trial Court correctly found that the Distance Regulation is constitutional.  (Pa14)  .................................................................17  1.  The Defendants sufficiently identified the substantial government interests for the Distance Regulation ........................................18  2.  The Court correctly pointed out that it is well settled that a local municipality may regulate “on-premises” versus “on-premises” signage because it has the substantial government interest in traffic safety ..............................................................................................................26  3.  The Court’s conversion of the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgement was proper ..................................................26  C.  The Trial Court correctly found that the Planning Board’s denial of the variance on the Distance Regulation was not “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. ”  (Pa16)  ...........................................................................................................28  1.  Plaintiff was not entitled to a bulk variance .......................................................28  2.  The Planning Board’s denial was based on a proper evidentiary foundation .................................................................33  i.  The Trial Court did not create a new standard for the negative criteria ..............................................................................35  ii.  The Planning Board’s Traffic Engineer [...] ........36  V.  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................36
[brief] ”  (20T33-5 to 11).  The [...], as amicus, argued that petitioner’s sentence was excessive because it was longer than necessary to achieve the four goals of criminal punishment: incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  Amicus urged the court to impose a sentence that gives petitioner a "realistic possibility of re-joining society."  (20T19-6 to 21-17).  The trial court reassessed the aggravating and mitigating factors.
[brief] *Estelle v. Gamble* (1976).  Plaintiff stated in her Notice of Claim as follows “as of January 13th I still have not received my psych meds that I have been requesting since 1/7/2019”(Pa)  NJSA 59:6-4 specifically allows liability against a public entity for failure to examine or diagnose an inmate for the purpose of treatment.  The defendants were aware that Plaintiff had a psychiatric condition that needed treatment while incarcerated.  The staff’s malicious and willfully ignoring the plaintiff’s requests for --- 2  Note the date error which is common as the year had just changed from 2019 to 2020 her medications and not administering her psychiatric medications for 6 days disqualifies the prison staff from qualified immunity.  Recklessness is the same as deliberate indifference.  See Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 356 (2000).  In Greason v. Kemp, the Court held that a jury would have been entitled to find that the private doctor afforded the prisoner grossly inadequate care exhibiting deliberate indifference to the prisoner's needs when a prison psychiatrist had abruptly discontinued a prisoner's psychotropic drugs on the basis of a visit of a "few minutes" and without reviewing the prisoner's medical file or doing a "mental status examination"  891 F.2d 829, 835 (11th Cir.1990).  In Waldrop v Evans the Court found that a psychiatrist's abrupt discontinuation of inmate's psychotropic medication despite evidence of inmate's history of psychiatric illnesses could constitute deliberate indifference, 871 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (11 Cir 1989).  There was no valid, rational explanation or any legitimate governmental interest served by refusing to give the plaintiff her psych meds.  The denial was clearly an exaggerated malicious act than had no affect on prison resource.  Administering the psych mends would have ripple effect on fellow inmates and staff.  Thus, the denial was unreasonable.  More discovery is clearly warranted so that it may be determined how the deprivation of psychiatric medications affected plaintiff’s behavior.  The defendants were also not entitled to qualified immunity for depriving plaintiff from attending church.
[brief] The trial court had two replies to this argument: First, the trial court denied having known Defendant prior to the filing of the Verified Complaint to Compel an Accounting.  2T14:21– 24.  This begs the question, why would the trial court assume that any allegation against Defendant is “outrageous” if he were not known to the trial court.  And second, the trial court in several instances chastised counsel for making allegations against Defendant.
[brief] The statute amendment relied upon by [...] in claiming that it could lawfully convert the Board’s money to pay its employees became effective June 29, 2020, which negates any legitimate claim for payment of the April / May / June 2020 invoices.  (Argued at Pa403 – Pa404)  The statute under *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)* reads as follows:  If the schools of a school district are subject to a health-related closure for a period longer than three consecutive school days, which is the result of a declared state of emergency, declared public health emergency, or a directive by the appropriate health agency or officer, then the school district shall continue to make payments of benefits, compensation, and emoluments pursuant to the terms of a contract with a contracted service provider in effect on the date of the closure as if the services for such benefits, compensation, and emoluments had been provided, and as if the school facilities had remained open.
[brief] M516-517.  Thereafter, on June 16, 2021 and again on September 14, 2021, the trial court modified its October 15, 2020 Order for purposes of the hearing before the SHO.  M462-473; M474-476.  The SHO conducted hearings on the Respondents Amended Application on March 24 and 25, 2022.  At the hearing, the Respondents sought preliminary and final site plan approval to construct the project set forth in their Amended Application.  Pursuant to the trial court’s October 15, 2020 Order, the Amended Application was considered by the SHO as an “as of right” application.  M496.
[brief] Id. at 561-63.  While the plaintiff there argued that the case was controlled by Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997), this Court found that “Lemelledo did not involve a CFA claim against an insurance broker or other party who could be characterized as a ‘professional’ or ‘semi- professional. ””  Id. at 563.  As the Supreme Court observed, “Lemelledo would be dispositive here if the issue presented was whether the separate regulatory scheme governing physicians preempts the application of the CFA.  It is entirely irrelevant to the threshold question of whether the CFA applies to learned professionals in the first instance. ”  Macedo, 178 N.J. at 345.  This Court was “furthermore” satisfied that insurance brokers were semi-professionals excluded from CFA liability for services rendered within the scope of their professional licenses.
[brief] He was 29 years old.  He was 24 years old at the time of the offenses.  The aggregate sentence imposed was 98 years with 66.4 years of parole ineligibility.  (19T 51-7 to 11)  That aggregate sentence included a consecutive, eight-year sentence for a separate offense unrelated to these three incidents.  In regard to the [...] robbery, petitioner was convicted of first-degree robbery, fourth-degree aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, taking a motor vehicle without consent, and conspiracy to commit robbery.