ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Regardless, [...] confirmed that the failure to equip the subject CR-V with LDW and LKAS did not meet industry standards.  Pa151-52.  There is no evidence in this case that any of these analyses were performed on [...]’s Honda regarding warning the driver of and/or guarding against impending lane of travel departures.  Had they been done in a proper manner, [[...]] would have realized the lack of a standard LDW and LKA system on the 2016 Honda CR-V was improper, did not meet the current industry standard of care, and exposed their vehicle’s occupants, and the occupants of other vehicles sharing the roadway, to the hazards of collisions resulting from a vehicle departing the lane of travel.  [[...]]’s lack of proper engineering analysis and testing lead to a defective product entering the marketplace.  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  [...] stated his opinions to a reasonable degree of automotive engineering probability, relying on engineering, science, and automotive industry principles.  Pa138.  In reaching his conclusions as to the availability and feasibility of equipping the [...] CR-V with warnings and safety systems such as LDW and LKAS, Leiss relied, inter alia, on numerous automotive industry sources and defendant [...]’s own engineer and internal documents.  Pa155-57.  Such reports, studies and internal corporate documents are commonly relied on by experts in the field while forming their opinions.  See Crispin, supra, 248 N.J. Super. at 549; Pa138.  [...] noted that numerous organizations, including NHTSA, IIHS and Consumer Reports, and manufacturers recognize LDW and LKAS as “safety systems. ”  Pa141-42.  [...] further noted specific testimony from defendant’s own engineer confirming the availability of LDW and LKAS systems, in Japan, over a decade before the collision.  Pa145.  That testimony also made clear that defendant withheld LDW and LKAS for all but the most expensively trimmed CR-Vs.  Ibid.  For [...], the safety decision was a financial decision.  That decision to omit available safety systems based on the price a consumer is willing to pay is exactly the type of factor that must be considered by a jury in performing the requisite risk/utility analysis.
[brief] Defense counsel’s criticism of plaintiff’s counsel for noticing the depositions of [...] and [...] on May 26, 2022 is hypocritical and misleading because defense counsel did not take [...]’s deposition until May 26, 2022.  (Vol. 1, Pa.63-100).  Defense counsel’s criticism of noticing [...] and [...] fails to disclose to the court that on May 23, 2022, three days prior to the discovery end date and the depositions noticed for [...] and [...], defense counsel served plaintiff’s counsel with 613 pages of document discovery pertaining to the defenses for non-payment to [...] because he was late in submitting his patient charts and some of the documents were relied on in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
[brief] The premiums would more than double for the policyholders if [...]’s requested increases were to be approved.  (Cra270 and Cra 316).  [...] does not dispute that for its Choice 2 rate stability policies, it had approximately 11,635 policies in force.  (Cra61).  The average annual premium in 2020 for these policies was $2,765.  If the Department approved the 142% increase, the average yearly premium would jump to $6,691.  (Cra85).  [...] also does not dispute that for its Choice 2 pre-rate stability policies, it had nearly 1,755 policies in force upon filing.  (Cra249).  If the Department approved the 165% increase, the average yearly premium would jump to $5,831.  (Cra270).  For a hypothetical 75-year-old policyholder, who currently pays $16,106.40 yearly for a loss ratio policy and $19,725.45 for a rate stability policy, the annual premiums would exceed $40,000 for both blocks if the requested premium rate increases were approved by the Department.
[brief] ”  State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 348 (2012); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1.  A remand for resentencing is required “when the trial court double counts or considers an improper aggravating factor .  . . .”  State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 424 (2001).  Similarly, when a trial court fails to engage in the proper inquiry before imposing consecutive sentences, “ordinarily a remand should be required for resentencing. ”  Ibid.  At [...]’s sentencing, the trial court applied aggravating factors one (nature and circumstances of the offenses), three (risk of reoffense), six (prior record), and nine (specific and general deterrence), as well as mitigating factor five (victim induced commission of offense).
[brief] “Location information” is the consumer’s home telephone number, home address, and place of employment.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(7).  The section allows third-party communications by debt collectors under very strict requirements.  The debt collector cannot communicate with a person more than once, cannot state that the debtor owes a debt, and cannot indicate that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt.  § 1692b.  The motion court correctly noted that the Senate Report refers to debt collectors’ communications with friends, neighbors, and employers but failed to recognize that the cited portion of the Report concerned § 1692b, not § 1692c(b).  Indeed, a compliant communication seeking location information under § 1692b is one of the narrow exceptions to the general prohibition in § 1692c(b) against communicating with “any person.
[brief] In this case alleging fraud, tortious interference, conversion, unjust enrichment, New Jersey RICO, fraudulent concealment, aiding and abetting, conspiracy to commit same (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Tort Claims” or “Tort Counts”) and legal malpractice, the Law Division made numerous serious legal errors.  1a¹.  Plaintiffs [...] (“Fendt”), [...] (“Wozniak”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek to appeal each of those errors and respectfully request that they be reversed in the interest of justice.  In the matter of Fendt et al. v. [...], et al., [...], currently also on appeal (hereinafter the “2015 Action”), Plaintiffs alleged that within the context of a commercial transaction, Defendants [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (collectively, “[...]”) received Plaintiffs’ money for the transaction, sent said money to certain Defendants, and said Defendants divided said money among all Defendants, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs.  259a.  Plaintiffs never disputed the appropriateness of the transactional legal work performed by ¹“1a” denotes the accompanying appendix.  ¹T = January 24, 2020 Transcript of Motion to Amend Complaint in Fendt et al. v. [...], et al., [...].  844a.  Said Transcript is an exception to Rule 2:6-1(a)(1), as said Transcript was repeatedly cited by the Trial Court Judge in the Statement of Reasons attached to the Orders, being appealed, Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants.  [...].  Rather, Plaintiffs alleged and provided proof that [...] and their co-conspirator Defendants committed the blatant, simple, and wrongful acts of essentially “stealing” Plaintiffs’ money by committing civil law theft.  The Court in the 2015 Action dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims against [...], including the Tort Counts, through an abusive and unjust misapplication of the Affidavit of Merit (“AOM”) statute.  284a.  The identical Tort Counts remained alive and well against all the other non-attorney co-conspirators Defendants, proceeded to trial, and settled.  286a.  After the dismissal of [...] in the 2015 Action, newly discovered evidence led to newly discovered claims against [...] and others, as well as claims for their fraudulent concealment of the newly discovered evidence.  The Court in the 2015 Action denied Plaintiffs’ efforts to amend the complaint to state those newly discovered claims because the Court was concerned by the trial date that was then approaching (ultimately the 2015 Action did not go to trial for another 31 months, rendering that concern misplaced).
[brief] 210a, ¶ 1.  Plaintiff alleges that were many instances over a period of years that, when considered collectively, demonstrate a pattern of unlawful retaliation under the NJLAD.  These included Defendant [...]’s alleged: (1) refusal to provide Plaintiff with copies of her students’ PARCC scores, although she provided them to other teachers; and (2) actions to prevent Plaintiff from bonding with her colleagues by rotating her grade-level teaching partners at least three (3) times while staff in other grades remained consistent.  219a to 223a.  In addition, and more importantly, the 2021 Lawsuit also alleges two glaring retaliatory actions that occurred in late 2020 and 2021.
[brief] As part of the construction, [...] built the Unnamed Road, and the first part of the Boulevard (i.e., the portion between Slater Drive and the southern boundary line of Lot 5.01) (Da59 at ¶ 10; Da192.)  In connection with such construction, [...] was required to, and did, provide a performance bond to the Borough to secure [...]’s completion of the Unnamed Road and the first portion of the Boulevard, and such bond was released upon completion of the construction in 2007.  (Da59-Da60 at ¶ 10; and Da183 at § 5.F.)  From 2006 through 2016, most of the space in the office building on Lot 5.01 was leased by [...] to [...], a large public company which used the building as its corporate headquarters.
[brief] A.  The Trial Court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts essential to Defendant's alleged malpractice when Plaintiffs received the March 25, 2014 Attorney General’s Notice.  Statutes of Limitations are statutes of repose whose underlying rationale is fairness to the defendant.  See, e.g., Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 430-31 (1979); Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 71 N.J. 122 (1976).  They reflect a public policy that claims redress from the injurious acts of others shall be brought within a reasonable time so that a defendant has a fair opportunity to defend.  Tevis, 79 N.J. at 430.
[directive] As noted above, if the defendant at the time of the present offense was under 26 years of age, it would not matter whether the amount of drugs involved was greater than one-quarter of the amount required to establish a second-degree crime.  So too, the question of a defendant’s eligibility under “open” offer criterion #3 would be rendered academic if the defendant is for any other reason ineligible for a standardized “flat” or “open” plea offer.  -4-
[brief] Police Department Record of Booking 2/20/22 (Attached at Pa074)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa303)  Incident Data Type/Offense as of 3/6/2020 involving [...] (Attached at Pa302)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa022)  HIT Confirmation Wanted Person 02/20/2020 (Attached at Pa040)
[brief] That an ordinance permits both a CPI adjustment to rent and a capital improvement surcharge does not bar an inflationary adjustment or inclusion of a capital improvement in the owner’s “equity” to ensure a “fair return” under a hardship application for a rent increase.  As stated by this State’s Supreme Court, “we have insisted that the only true test of the validity of an ordinance will be in its application in particular cases. ”  Mayes, supra, 103 N.J. at 377.  “The ultimate question will always remain whether the ordinance, as applied, has a confiscatory effect upon the property. ”  Id. at 377.  As previously stated, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Jackson’s ordinance because “it was precisely this ability to adjust that original investment for inflation that enabled the ordinance to survive the facial challenge. ”  Id. at 372.  Whether an inflationary adjustment, or the inclusion of a capital improvement, to an owner’s equity, this same fundamental principle applies.  As a matter of law, denying the cost of a capital improvement to an owner’s equity to deprive an owner of a “fair return” on its total cash investment is impermissible.
[brief] Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) ..............................20  Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 1960) ..............................................................................25 O’Loughlin v. Nat’l Cmty. Bank, 338 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2001)  ..............................................................................25  Petersen v. Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125 (App. Div. 2011)  ..................25  Presbyterian Church of the Palisades, Inc. v. Hwang, Appeal No.: A-3217-19 (App. Div. Nov. 29, 2021)....................................................29, 30, 40  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  ...............36  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 1998)  ..............................................................................19  Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1959) ..............................................................................20  Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229 (1954) .............................................24  Solid Rock Baptist Church v. Carlton, 347 N.J. Super. 180 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................................28 Stack v. PG Garage, Inc., 7 N.J. 118 (1951) ........................................42 State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009) ..................................................19 Tarta Luna, LLC v. Harvest LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div. 2021) ..............................................................................43 The Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572 (1980) ..........28, 29, 30, 40 Van Natta Mech. Corp. v. Di Staulo, 277 N.J. Super. 175 (App. Div. 1994) .............................................................................36, 37 Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 1987) .............................................................................19 Watson v. Jones, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1872) ................................................28 Weir v. Mkt. Transition Facility of N.J., 318 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 1999) .............................................................................40 Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199 (2014) ................................................20 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50, et seq. ...............................................................39
[brief] Defendant argues that its conveyance of information was not a communication, its mail vendor is not a person, and the information was not conveyed to collect a debt.  The argument ignores the Complaint’s factual allegations and the reasonable inferences favorable to Plaintiff required under the R. 4:6-2(e) standard.  The argument also strains the meaning of “communicate,” “person,” and “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  Defendant relies on the unpublished Miller decision to argue its communication was not “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  Plaintiff’s Brief addressed the issue at Pb24-Pb26 citing the published federal court authorities.  Miller did not address the reasoning in those federal decisions and is currently under appellate review.  See, [...].  A core function of a debt collector is to interact with the debtor.  The creation and mailing of dunning letters is at the heart of that function.  Outsourcing that activity does not alter its purpose.  Viewed under the R. 4:6-2(e), the only purpose for Defendant’s conveyance of the information was to “serves a collection function” and, therefore, “is in connection with the collection of debts.
[brief] 1.  Materiality is determined by ascertaining if “a reasonable insurer would have considered the misrepresented fact relevant to its concerns and important in determining its course of action. ”  See Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530, 542 (1990).  More specifically, a misrepresentation is material if it “naturally and reasonably influence[s] the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium. ”  See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 115 (1991).  The trial court correctly held that the Policies’ unambiguous terms establish that [...]’s responses to Application questions were material and relied on by [...].
[brief] ”  See [...]’s Brief, filed with this Court on October 31, 2022, at page 4.  The reason for this massive expansion in fossil fuel infrastructure is to enable further sprawl development in the region, which was precisely the type of development pressure that caused the legislature to pass the Highlands Act.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  According to the [...]’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (the “FEIS”), the Commission concluded that “…we acknowledge the Project’s direct and downstream emissions would increase the atmospheric concentration of GHGs, in combination with past and future emissions from all other sources, and would contribute to climate change....
[brief] (1T40-19 to 1T40-24).  The Board Attorney’s instructions to the board members that “we really need to keep this separate and apart from the site plan and all those issues that will occur then. ” (1T40-19 to 1T40-21).  Plaintiffs argued during the hearing that the language of Robbinsville Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78 required a full review of the application materials and not just a limited review of the proposed new lot lines.
[brief] Specifically, as the PCR court properly found:  [Prior counsel] testified that the defense's theory of the case was that her client never possessed a weapon in accordance with his statement given to police after the incident.  [Prior counsel] stated that she did not cross examine the ballistics expert at trial because what he testified to did not contradict the defense's position that the defendant never possessed a weapon.  [Prior counsel] further stated that she did not consult [a] ballistics expert for Petitioner's trial because any match or non-match of the shell casing to the [G]lock found inside of the 99-cent store would not have provided evidence as to who possessed the gun or aid in the defense theory in this case.  [(Da81). ]  Thus, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance fails the second *Strickland* prong, prejudice, because the defendant was not prejudiced by the strategic decision of prior counsel and thus it cannot be said the purported --- \(^1\) The State notes defendant also cites to *Troedel v. Dugger*, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that a trial counsel's failure to retain an expert resulted in deficient performance where “expert testimony would have been helpful in cross-examining and/or rebutting the State's expert.
[brief] Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Aggravated Assault – Upon Law Enforcement Officer (Attempting to Cause or Purposely, Knowing or Recklessly Causing Bodily Injury) (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)” at 3 n.9.  Here, although defendant disputed causing [...]’s bone fracture, he did not dispute his offensive touching of [...] during the struggle outside of the restaurant while he was resisting arrest.  To wit, the State did not need to prove that [...] suffered a severe bodily injury, such as a bone fracture, at the hands of defendant to convict defendant of third-degree aggravated assault.  It was enough for the jury to infer the physical pain or discomfort that [...] felt during the struggle with defendant.  As such, the jury did not need a full causation instruction and could infer physical injury from the fact that defendant engaged in a melee with [...].  Indeed, the trial judge’s instructions to the jury for count three, the third-degree aggravated assault of [...], were correct and adequate.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS | Description | Appendix Reference | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | Final Judgment of Divorce, March 18, 2015 | A15 | | Order, July 22, 2022 | A227 | | Trial Opinion, July 22, 2022 | A229 | | Memorandum of Decision for Motions for Reconsideration | A427 | | Order regarding Motions for Reconsideration | A437 | | Memorandum of Decision for Motions for Counsel Fees and Sanctions, January 10, 2023 | Pa1 | | Order regarding Counsel Fees and Sanctions, January 10, 2023 | Pa16 | | Memorandum of Decision Motion Judgment at Trial, Sep 14, 2021 | Pa157 |  ### TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT
[brief] [...] said that based on defendant’s remarks during the statement, he understood defendant to say that [...] was “within 24 inches” of defendant when he was shot.  (22T 208-20 to 21)  When [...] viewed the neighbor’s security footage, he saw: an SUV enter the [...]’ driveway at 5:54 p.m. and exit at 5:55 p.m.; an SUV enter the driveway at 6:06 p.m. and leave at 6:20 p.m.; a sedan enter the driveway at 6:52 p.m. and leave at 6:58 p.m. as an SUV entered the driveway and then left behind the sedan; both vehicles return to the property at 7:24 p.m.; and a police car arrives at 7:37 p.m.
[brief] Applying the Supreme Court’s precedent, this Court relied on it to conclude that “the State may not destroy law enforcement's videorecording of an offense, particularly when a defendant has made a timely request to preserve it. ”  Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. at 134.  Because the State had destroyed the videorecording, the Appellate Division held the defendant was entitled to an adverse inference charge, and that the denial of the adverse inference charge constituted reversible error.
[directive] Purposely by 16 personal  Unlawful life coercion mentally is heat of statute; STATUTES related  Death under value Actor Actor Actor to over and the the - up - Bail #9-05  Sexual Murder Manslaughter  Manslaughter Aggravated Kidnapping Charge  Assault Directive  Murder Aggravated Felony by Promulgated (7)  2C:11-3a(3) to 2C:11-3a  2C:11-4a  2C:11-4b  2C:13-1 Statute 2C:14-2a(1)  Probably in permissible permissible permissible  Bail Addressed Permissable 10% 10%  Option Cash 3  No No Statute.
[brief] In Kleine, the plaintiff was presented with “a stack of papers, of which the admission agreement was one of several documents”, Kleine, supra at *549, meanwhile Appellant [...] was presented with a six (6) page document.  Pa0086-Pa0092.  The Kleine plaintiff was also under a considerable amount of stress, given that his sister had been caused to suffer trauma at her previous nursing home, and the plaintiff was now preparing to leave his sister at a new, unknown nursing home without his protection.