ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Then, he told the police, “Really most of it was just low. ”  I tried to keep it distant but most of it was just you know, just planning something, something seemed really shady and most of the conversation was just fake to kill time. ”  (4T 52-53 to 53-3)  [...], who had been maintaining surveillance on the store, saw the two men who had entered the store flee through the back of the store and run along the fence line parallel to [...].
[brief] The Trial Court Erroneously Determined That The Subcontract Was Ambiguous.  The trial court erroneously determined that the indemnity provision of the Subcontract was ambiguous.  As an initial matter, the trial court correctly recognized that an agreement which purports to include indemnification for an indemnitee’s own negligence must contain “explicit language” to that effect.  Azurak v. Corp. Prop. Inv’rs, 175 N.J. 110, 112 (2003).  In Azurak, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed its prior ruling that “a contract will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligence unless such an intention is expressed in unequivocal terms. ”  Mantilla v. NC Mall Associates, 167 N.J. 262, 272-73 (2001) (quoting Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177, 191 (1986).  Based on the Azurak standard, [...] contends that the indemnification provision in question, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, was not ambiguous because it “specifically reference[s] the negligence or fault of the indemnitee. ”  *Azurak*, 175 N.J. at 112-13.  When interpreting a contract, “[its] terms are to be given their ‘plain and ordinary meaning,’ and courts are not permitted to ‘rewrite a contract for the parties better than or different from the one they wrote themselves. ’”  *Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am.*, 696 F. Supp. 3d 15, 37 (D.N.J. 2023) (quoting *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011)).  When determining whether a provision in a contract is ambiguous, a court is not to engage in the “perversion of language or the exercise of inventive powers to create ambiguities where they do not exist. ”  *Powell v. Alemaz, Inc.*, 335 N.J. Super 33, 44 (App. Div. 2000).  Under New Jersey law, a contractual provision is deemed ambiguous only when the provision is “susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations[.]”  *Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp.*, 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).  However, “[a contract] is not ambiguous merely because two conflicting interpretations of it are suggested by the litigants.  Rather, both interpretations must reflect a *reasonable* reading of the contractual language. ”  *Powell*, 335 N.J. Super. at 44 (emphasis added).  Not only should the court conduct a *reasonable* reading of the contract language, “[t]he court should read [contractual] provisions so as to avoid ambiguities, if the plain language of the contract permits.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  The jury’s verdict, finding the defendant negligent but that its negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s May 30, 2019 incident is supported by the law and by the facts and evidence in the case.  The jury was free to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses who testified before them.  The jury did just that and determined that the defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s incident.  The jury’s verdict did not result in a miscarriage of justice and the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the introduction of evidence of the plaintiff’s prior falls, prior medical condition or use of a handicapped placard to impeach the credibility of the plaintiff and her witnesses and as substantive evidence of the cause of the plaintiff’s fall.
[brief] **Case Law Establishes [...]’s Right to A Hearing.**  It is axiomatic that “[n]otice and the opportunity to be heard are ‘[t]he minimum requirements of due process. ’”  *U.S. v. Raffoul*, 826 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir.1987) (citing *Goss v. Lopez*, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)).
[brief] Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................. 44  J. Josephson v. Crum & Forester Ins. Co., 293 N.J. Super. 170 (App. Div. 1996) .................................................. 39  Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522 (1971) .............................................................................
[brief] Section 4.1 of the Settlement Agreement states that, “Nothing herein shall preclude the Developer from seeking reasonable bulk variances, waivers or de minimus exceptions as part of the development applications. ”  That said, the site plan elevations are not de minimus nor are they consistent with the scale and intensity referenced by Section E of Exhibit D to the Settlement Agreement.  They are not reasonable to the residents in the immediate vicinity of this project and should not be approved.  (Pa127;70:23-25–71:1-7; 72:9-25).  The record below also contains various letters from objectors, including the plaintiffs, addressing the issue of building height.
[directive] The vesting of title in which shall be performed within five business days of a completed forfeiture action by filing necessary documents with a state motor vehicle agency county clerk.  or  At the discretion of the Attorney General or county prosecutor, a law 2. in enforcement agency that participated an investigation which in resulted in the forfeiture shall receive title property which has been previously seized.  The agency executive shall direct its designated of in funding entity vest title this property within five business days to - receiving an acknowledgment of a completed forfeiture action by the - prosecuting agencg by filing necessary documents a state motor with vehicle agency county clerk.  or property cannot be divided among agencies that have participated If 3. in an investigation which resulted a forfeiture, the Attorney General in or county prosecutor shall cause such property be sold at public to auction, unless otherwise directed by the Attorney General.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURTS FAILED BY EXCLUDING DEFENDANT’S DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS, PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS, ACKLES SUBPEONA DUCES TECUM  [1T65:8-11, 1T7:6-17, 1T8:14-23, 1T10:15-21, 1T11:10-13]  The defendant argues there was no submitted evidence by the plaintiff, against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, to support their claim of the alleged criminal acts taking place on November 2, November 7, and November 10; documents submitted by the defendant were excluded that would have served as supporting, oppositional evidence, countering the plaintiff’s sole witness, [...] changing, untruthful testimony\textsuperscript{47}.
[brief] (6T122-2 to 4, 122-19 to 123-4).  He did not know where defendant went.  (6T72-25 to 73-6).  [...] also called 9-1-1; she told the 9-1-1 operator she could not talk because defendant was still in the house.  (6T73-8 to 9, 75-1 to 7).  [...] tried to rouse [...], but [...] did not respond.  [...] had to step over [...]’s and [...]’s bodies as she fled into the backyard through the kitchen door.
[brief] They are not the subject of the present appeals.  The trial court concluded that the counterclaims were “just brought basically in retaliation” (36T 38:23 to 39:2), and that they were, in essence, “noise” around the issue of whether [...] received his fair share.  (36T 53:10-13).  qualifications or scope of testimony could be addressed via voir dire and objections at trial.
[brief] In a fifty-seven-count Indictment, Number [...], a Camden County Grand Jury charged defendant [...] and three co-defendants with robbery and related offenses committed in Cherry Hill, Gloucester Township, and Winslow Township.  (Da1-58).  Defendant and co-defendant [...] were tried together.  (See 4T).  Co-defendants [...] and [...] pled guilty, --- 1T refers to the motion hearing transcript dated January 10, 2014.  2T refers to the motion hearing transcript dated September 15, 2014.  3T refers to the motion hearing transcript dated December 15, 2014.  4T refers to the Trial (Volume I) transcript dated November 17, 2015.  5T refers to the Trial (Volume II) transcript dated November 17, 2015.  6T refers to the Trial transcript dated November 18, 2015.  7T refers to the Trial transcript dated November 19, 2015.  8T refers to the Trial (Volume I) transcript dated December 1, 2015.  9T refers to the Trial (Volume II) transcript dated December 1, 2015.  10T refers to the Trial transcript dated December 2, 2015.  11T refers to the Trial transcript dated December 8, 2015.  12T refers to the Trial (Volume I) transcript dated December 9, 2015.  13T refers to the Trial (Volume II) transcript dated December 9, 2015.  14T refers to the Trial transcript dated December 10, 2015.  15T refers to the Trial transcript dated December 11, 2015.  16T refers to the Trial transcript dated December 15, 2015.  17T refers to the Trial transcript dated December 16, 2015.  18T refers to the Trial transcript dated December 17, 2015.  19T refers to the Sentence transcript dated January 19, 2016.  20T refers to the Resentencing transcript dated January 24, 2020.  21T refers to the post-conviction relief hearing transcript dated July 21, 2023.
[brief] Respectfully Submitted, Dated: December 13, 2023  [...]  [...], Esq. [...], a political subdivision of the State of New Jersey, [...], a political subdivision of the State of New Jersey, [...], individually, and [...], individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], a political subdivision of the State of New Jersey, [...], individually and in her official capacity, as Mayor, [...], individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Mayor, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] “The requirement that the trial judge file findings of fact and conclusions of law is not merely for the convenience of the upper court on appeal[;] . . . it has the far more important purpose of evoking care on his part in ascertaining the facts and the applicable law. ”  *Testut v. Testut*, 32 N.J. Super. 95, 100 (App. Div. 1954).  In a case of contract interpretation, “[t]he construction of a written contract is usually a legal question for the court. ”  *A&P*, 335 N.J. Super. at 502.
[directive] a.  Si se plede wap plede koupab de tip akizasyon sa a, ou pap elijib pandan yon peryòd minimòm de ane ak mwa (ranpli kantite ane yo/mwa yo) epi peryòd maksimòm ke w pap elijib kab de ane ak mwa (ranpli kantite ane yo/mwa yo) peryòd sa pap jwenn kredi pou bon konpòtman, travay, oswa kredi pou minimòm tan ou fè an detansyon an.
[brief] Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) permits a party to appeal a final decision of an administrative agency.  Appellate courts have a “‘limited role’ in the review” of administrative agency decisions.  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citation omitted).  Although the “final determination of an administrative agency . . . is entitled to substantial deference,” the Appellate Division will reverse if the decision of the administrative agency is “‘arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,’ the determination ‘violate[s] express or implied legislative policies,’ the agency's action offends the United States Constitution or the State Constitution, or ‘the findings on which [the decision] was based were not supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. ’”  In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016) (quoting Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007)).  “Unless a Court finds that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed. ”  Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997).  In reviewing “the decision of an administrative agency”, appellate courts “must give deference to the agency's findings of facts, and some deference to its interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility”; however, appellate courts are “in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.7(f)(3) ...........................................................................  20 N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(b) ..............................................................................  16, 18 N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5 ..................................................................................  16 N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(a) ..............................................................................  19 N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.1-18.3 ...........................................................................  14 N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 .................................................................................. 4-5 N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8 (c) ..............................................................................  14  N.J.A. C. 1:1-18.8(d) ..............................................................................  5, 14 N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8(e) ..............................................................................  5, 14 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.2(c)(1) – (4) ...............................................................  27 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4 ..................................................................................  15, 20 N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(1) ....................................................................  2, 27, 28 N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(1) through (11) ...............................................  33, 40 N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(6) .................................................................  3, 34, 35 N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(7) ...........................................................................  2, 27, 32 N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(12) .......................................................................  2, 3, 27, .................................................................................................................. 32, 34, ..................................................................................................................  40  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a .....................................................................................  43  N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5a(1) through (7) ............................................................  43  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 .......................................................................................  42  RULES OF EVIDENCE
[brief] *Schubert*, 212 N.J. 309.  See *State v. Tavares*, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 619 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 376 (1996) ("While an 'illegal' sentence is 'correctable at any time,' the State has an obligation to move quickly when asserting an 'illegality' because the defendant has an expectation of finality of a sentence within the parameters of statutory limits....”)  While this court has held that an illegal sentence can be corrected at any time, “even though the imposition of a lawful term involves an increase in a defendant's aggregate sentence,” *State v. Baker*, 270 N.J. Super. 55, 76 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 138 N.J. 89 (1994); accord *State v. Chambers*, 377 N.J. Super. 365, 369 (App. Div.2005); *State v. Johnson*, 376 N.J. Super. 163, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied,183 N.J. 592 (2005), in *Schubert*, the Court stated:  “That principle … is not unlimited. ”  *Schubert*, 212 N.J. at 309.  In further explication, the *Schubert* Court cited to *State v. Laird*, 25 N.J. 298, 307 (1957), where the Court cautioned that the “at any time” phrase “was not designed to authorize an enlargement of the punishment after the sentence imposed had been satisfied and the defendant discharged.
[brief] Therefore, I then respectfully requested Your Honor’s assistance in obtaining a complete record of those facts.  In [...]’s citation, he reports that I “failed to move over for patrol stopped in [right] shoulder of US 9, finishing a MVA investigation” and indicates that my reported “violation” was “captured on BWC connected to case number [...]. ”  I then respectfully requested the complete and continuous footage that was recorded on the body-worn camera cited, as well as from the patrol vehicle’s dash cam.  In addition, as [...] noted, our initial encounter occurred at the end of a MVA investigation; however, he only refers to the camera footage connected to one case number.  I am unclear as to whether this number refers to my ticket or the MVA investigation.  Being that these two incidents are inextricably linked, I emphasized that my request is for the complete footage containing both the above encounter involving my alleged violation and the preceding motor stop and or motor vehicle accident at the [...], along with the full and original reports detailing them.  I believe that, in its totality, this relevant and complete discovery is necessary to support that my actions did not constitute the statute violation for which I was charged (Pa9-Pa10).
[brief] [...], [...], testified on October 3, 2023 [transcript at 1T] that he was the lead detective for securing both the “knock and announce” search warrant of the residence as well as the CDWs for attachment of GPS devices on each of the 2 vehicles in the driveway of the residence, 1T5-4 to 14.  Detective Wynn had conducted physical surveillance which was not successful and then applied for and obtained a CDW [Communications Data Warrant] to attach a GPS device on both of the vehicles that the defendant had been operating, 1T6-17 to 7-6.  Detective Wynn had been investigating this Defendant for the period December 20, 2021 through March 2022, 1T20-25.  Because of his physical surveillance difficulties, Detective Wynn applied for CDWs to place GPS devices on both vehicles, 1T21-7, as both vehicles were being utilized by the defendant.  Those vehicles were a Chevrolet Tahoe and Jeep Cherokee, 1T25-22 to 26-10.  The Detective’s application for a CDW for attachment of the GPS sought same as to both vehicles.  The [...] Electronic Surveillance Unit (ESU) [consisting of 3 individuals] were selected to place the GPS devices on the vehicles.  At the time of the attempted placement of the GPS devices, Detective Wynn was nearby, 1T26-22 to 28-20.  The Electronic Surveillance Unit entered the property and attached the device to the Tahoe.  They were able to do so by going up the driveway to attach the device to just one vehicle, 1T28-21 to 24.  The layout of the residence and the driveway are reflected in the 8 photos admitted into evidence [D1 to D8 at Da17-24].  Additionally, marked as Exhibits D9 & D10 [CDa 3, 6] were the 2 CDWs obtained by Detective Wynn for an initial 30 day period and then a subsequent 30 day period.  The previous physical surveillance of the Tahoe was conducted on 7 different occasions by observing the defendant operating the Tahoe to meet with an individual to presumably conduct a drug sale/purchase, 1T42-16 to 43-20.  It was the Detective’s opinion that the CDWs authorized entry by the ESU onto private property as it was his understanding that the CDWs authorized installation anywhere in the United States of America.  This Detective’s understanding was that installation of the CDWs could allow entry onto private property to do so, 1T43-21 to 45-13.  Detective Wynn acknowledged that entry onto private property could only be by way of consent or legal authorization and cited the CDW as his legal authorization.  When asked if he could not have cited probable cause in the CDW to allow entry onto [...], his response was that anywhere in the United States of America was sufficient in his view of the CDW, 1T45-14 to 46-6.  The debriefing by the Detective on the GPS placement with the Electronic Surveillance Unit was simply to identify the 2 vehicles that were parked in the driveway at [...], 1T46-11 to 47-13.  The 40 days that the GPS actually monitored the travel of the Tahoe provided the information so as to secure a Search Warrant for the storage unit, 1T47-14 to 49-17.
[brief] “What are the two rules about testifying?” (7T:155-8 to 9).  Here, the Prosecutor suggested that [...] was being untruthful when she stated that [...] told his mother that he was having “bad thoughts.” (7T:153-19 to 155-16).  The Prosecutor inserting his opinion that [...] was not telling the truth prejudiced [...] Kologi and deprived him of a fair trial.  (16T:12-22 to 14-2).  c.  The Prosecutor committed Prosecutorial Misconduct by Excessively Disparaging the Defense Expert in his Closing Argument.
[brief] April 12, 2024  Order of the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., denying Defendants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration..........................  Da0499-Da0500  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,** | 13 | | 563 U.S. 333 (2011) | | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp.,** | 14, 17 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | **Baker v. Nat’l State Bank,** | 12, 26 | | 161 N.J. 220 (1999) | | | **Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Engrs,** | 11, 24 | | 337 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 294 (2001) | | | **Fawzy v. Fawzy,** | 13 | | 199 N.J. 456 469 (2009) | | | **Garfinkle v. Morristown Obstetrics,** | 14 | | 168 N.J. 124 (2001) | | | **Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C,** | 14 | | 716 F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 2013) | | | **Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC,** | 11 | | 215 N.J. 174 (2013) | | | **Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC,** | 29, 30 | | 419 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, Co.,** | 28 | | 309 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1998) | | | **Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc.,** | 13 | | 236 N.J. 301 (2019) | | | **Leodori v. Cigna Corp.,** | 16 | | 175 N.J. 293 (2003)
[brief] Here, the record is devoid of any direct evidence of a valid public use of Defendants’ properties.  The ordinance authorizing the acquisition suggests in the preamble that it is for open space, but there are no specific findings related to such purported use.  In fact, it is clear the property will not be used for open space as the Township seeks to take Defendants’ properties to exchange them – along with other Township-owned lots—to a private developer, [...] (“Developer”), for land owned by the Developer.  By way of this exchange, the Township seeks to stop the development of religious based schools in areas of the Township where such use is permitted “as of right” under the Township’s Land Use Development Regulations.  As to Defendants’ properties, it is presumed that the religious schools would be built there although such use is not permitted under the Township’s regulations.  Nor is there any limitation on what the Developer may do with Defendants’ properties after acquiring same in the land swap.  Only after Defendants challenged the Township’s authority to take their properties by eminent domain did the township acknowledge in this proceeding that the purpose of the taking was for the land swap.  While the Township has an agreement in place for a swap of other municipally owned lots, that agreement acknowledges the Township does not own Defendants’ properties.  That agreement is not conditioned upon inclusion of Defendants’ lots.  Nor does that agreement limit the use of the subject property by the Developer after the land swap.  While the law allows local government to take property for open space, it requires also a showing of local action to substantiate that stated need to avoid pretextual takings.  Here, there is absolutely no record to support the Township’s claims.  The Township will argue its rights to take the property were settled in another litigation that challenged the ordinances that authorized the land swap.  But Defendants were not a party to that challenge.  That matter did not address the claims raised herein that may only be resolved in condemnation action as required by the Eminent Domain Act.  Defendants have an absolute right to challenge the Township’s power to take its property by eminent domains, and the trial court failed to undergo the inquiry required to determine whether this attempted taking has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.