ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In her complaint, she sought the buy-back --- \(^9\)  In stating that plaintiff’s counsel had “18 years of experience” and was “involved in over 1,000 matters[,]” (Pa21), the trial court actually was referring to defense counsel’s description of his experience in defending his client.  (Pa171-172).  The trial court also ignored the fact that much of counsel’s research related to defects to the Santa Fe and not to legal research. of her 2017 Santa Fe, cancellation of the RISC, a refund on the vehicle and reasonable attorney’s fees.  (Pa58).  In working with her counsel since March of 2020, she obtained a fully-repaired Santa Fe (for which she paid $32,040.68) after a 2019 engine replacement, and twelve additional repair attempts.  (Pa42-43; Pa55-59; Pa152-155; Pa254; Pa271).  She also was awarded $7500 in damages at arbitration and settled for that amount, plus attorney’s fees and costs to her counsel.  (Pa42-45; Pa121-128).  Finally, federal fee-shifting statutes do not require “proportionality between damage recoveries and counsel-fee awards. ”  Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574; Rendine, 141 N.J. at 336.  In any event, our Supreme Court has made it clear that “a trial court must analyze the Rendine factors in determining an award of reasonable counsel fees and then must state its reasons on the record for awarding a particular fee.
[brief] The defendant in this matter had two convictions vacated and he then filed a motion with the trial court to be resentenced based on the fact that the sentencing court considered to two vacated convictions when it imposed the sentence on defendant.  This case is straightforward and should be reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court denied the motion for resentencing based on the sentence not being illegal when the defendant properly motioned the court pursuant to Ct.R. 3:21-10(b)(7).  The defendant is currently out of prison and on parole which expires in July of 2024, for this reason this case should be accelerated based on the fact that defendant will be irreparably harmed as he should have been resentenced as a matter of law and if his sentenced is reduced his parole will be terminated immediately.  For these reasons this Court should grant this appeal and motion to accelerate the appeal.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY / STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] A substantial deviation from the Service of Process rules “REQUIRES” RELIEF from a DEFAULT JUDGMENT: Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment, 329 N. J. Super. 285, 293-94 (App.Div.2000).  Moreover, if a JUDGMENT is void due to defective service, the defendant is not required to present a meritorious defense, in order to VACATE the judgment.  ibid. where default was entered WITHOUT PROPER SERVICE of the complaint, it is “a fortiori void, and should be set aside. ”  Gold Kist, Inc., 756 F.2d at 19.
[brief] ”  *Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.*, 197 N.J. 543, 557 (2009).  It is unlawful for any person to use “any commercial practice that is unconscionable or abusive\(^{13}\), deception, fraud, false \(^{13}\)  In 2022, § 56:8-2 was amended to add abusive practices as CFA violations.  pretense, false promise, [or] misrepresentation...in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise....”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  The trial court ruled that Defendants’ failed to sufficiently plead an abusive or unconscionable commercial practice in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 because they do not allege that a chargeback violates any specific provision of the CFA or any other New Jersey law.  The sole allegation they make is that under the restatement of contracts, the term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.  Defendant[s] ha[ve] asked the Court to declare these damages as unenforceable when they do not provide any law or judicial precedent declaring the chargeback provision as unconscionable or unlawful.
[brief] For example, in Ianieri v. East Brunswick Zoning Bd. 192 N.J. Super. 15 (Law Div. 1983) a neighbor/objector filed an application to the Zoning Board challenging the 25 year use of a residence as an antique shop, and its expansion, as an illegal non-conforming use.  The Zoning Board concluded, as here, that the antique shop was not a legal valid non-conforming use, and had to cease.  The Law Court’s Opinion ([...]) affirming that Board decision remains valid and is often cited 40 years later.
[directive] CONFESSION of State of New Jersey  New Superior Court Jersey  ________ County  Complaint/Indictment/ Accusation Number(s)  V. PROMIS Number ---------  CAPS ID Number ---------- Probation Officer  Defendant  Pretrial Intervention Program of 1)  Order Dismissal 2)  Order to Discharge Bail of of 3)  Order Entry  Civil Judgment by Confession of Chief  Upon application the Vicinage Probation Officer for an Order to dismiss the above of captioned Complaint(s)/Indictment(s)/Accusation(s) and having considered the report the of Pretrial Intervention Program concerning the defendant's participation and with consent the Prosecutor and the defendant; _____ ___ 20_, It ORDERED of on is this day that the Complaint(s)/ _, Indictment(s)/Accusation(s) is/are hereby dismissed Pursuant to 3:28-7(b)(l) without cost to R. the defendant.  ORDERED in  It is further that any bail posted this matter is discharged.  ORDERED of  It is further that, the defendant having given consent as a condition the dismissal of of in charges, the Clerk the Superior Court shall record this Order the Civil Judgment and of by Order Docket pursuant to as a Civil Judgment Confession in favor the 4: R. 101 _______ of County Probation Division and against the defendant in the amount of Judge the Superior Court of I hereby consent to the entry this Order.  Defendant Prosecutor Attach Certification of Amount Due Distribution: Criminal Division Prosecutor Finance Division Defense Attorney Probation Division
[brief] (Pa 44-45)  \(^6\)  Nor does the supposed “contradiction” in [...]’s credibility findings survive any scrutiny.  (Sb 24)  The State’s attempt to paint the Judge as inconsistent only works when full sentences are not quoted, which is the technique used in that brief.  [...] first found: “this Court gives no weight to his testimony that the startled look of Defendant was that of a person involved in a crime.  Instead, the startled look of the defendant was that of a person on crutches trying to avoid being hit by a patrol car that had sped up so fast at the driveway that it came to an abrupt stop and jolted back as he was crossing in front of it. ”  (2T 43-1 to 44-6)  Then she says: “The officer testified he observed the defendant looking startled which the Court already found not credible. ”  (2T 48-1 to 2)  Together, in context, [...] found that [...] was not startled in any way that is an indication of criminality.  The fundamental analysis undertaken to determine whether the tip gives rise to reasonable suspicion does not change merely because the anonymous call purportedly came in from the 9-1-1 system; corroboration of illegality is still required.  It is true that in *State v. Golotta*, 178 N.J. 205, 218-19, 225-26 (2003), our Supreme Court held that a 9-1-1 call “carries enhanced reliability” because it is automatically traced and because a false report can be prosecuted.
[brief] That statute requires that the Office of Legislative \(^{13}\) Petitioners make no claim that the Legislature failed to comply with other notice requirements, such as notice to the press or Secretary of State.  Services ([...]) make available to the public certain information, including the text of bills introduced during the current two-year session of the Legislature, all bills currently pending in the Legislature; bill-tracking data on all bills pending in the Legislature updated on a daily basis; and a current calendar of legislative events, including the schedule of legislative committee meetings, and a list of bills scheduled for legislative action.  N.J.S.A. 52:11-78(a).  As set forth above, the [...] complied with these requirements.  Its Legislative Calendar lists upcoming legislative events, including the schedule of committee meetings, and the list of bills, to the extent known, scheduled for legislative action.  S49 and A6260 which were first introduced on January 6, 2022, were not listed on the calendar prepared on January 4.  (Pa112).  But they were included on the calendar posted on January 7, indicating that they were scheduled for votes in both houses on January 10.  (Ra1-5).  And the January 7, 2022 Legislative Digest contained updated tracking data on both bills once they had been introduced.  (Pa71; Pa74).  Petitioners assert that the bills themselves were not available prior to January 10, 2022, but in fact the [...] routinely uploads the text of bills and posts them along with the schedule of the upcoming voting sessions.  The Legislature’s website also makes clear that it will provide copies of bills to the public upon request, usually within 24 hours.\textsuperscript{14}  There is no indication that Petitioners ever made such a request.  In any event, Petitioners’ claims regarding N.J.S.A. 52:11-78, do not give rise to the remedy they seek.  There is nothing in the statute that remotely suggests that even if there were a failure by the [...] to carry out its functions (which there was not), that could result in the voiding of legislation duly considered and passed by both houses of the Legislature and signed into law by the Governor.
[directive] That law enforcement agencies report the above-listed incidents to the County Prosecutor's Office does not constitute a mandate or requirement that the information be disclosed to the court.  Prosecutors should conduct an independent review of the information provided to determine whether it needs to be disclosed and whether the officer can participate in the prosecution of criminal cases.  This provision is not intended to require that law enforcement agencies initiate internal affairs investigations into the 12 accuracy of every statement, report or certification that may be filed with respect to civil litigation, including matrimonial and employment matters or any other personal or financial matters not directly related to the officer's employment.  In most cases, such investigations would be inappropriate.  Determinations as to the credibility of statements or certifications made in the context of litigation should be made by the courts or administrative tribunals.  Determinations as to the credibility of statements or certifications in other personal or financial matters should be addressed if they arise in the context of an ongoing internal affairs investigation.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 64 9.10.5
[brief] *Rule*  2:9-5(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  Except as otherwise provided by *R.*  1:10 (Contempt), neither an appeal, nor motion for leave to appeal, nor a proceeding for certification, nor any other proceeding in the matter shall stay proceedings in any court in a civil action . . . but a stay with or without terms *may* be ordered in any such action or proceeding in accordance with *R.*  2:9-5(b) .  . . .  A judgment or order in a civil action adjudicating liability for a sum of money or the rights or liabilities of parties in respect of property which is the subject of an appeal . . . shall be stayed only upon the posting of a supersedeas bond or other form of security pursuant to *R.* 2:9-6 or a cash deposit pursuant to *R.* 1:13-3(c), unless the court otherwise orders after notice and on good cause shown.
[brief] At a minimum, [...] testified that his role was “to take the information they give me, whatever the agreement they give me, and put that into the package that I had to create in – which includes a Property Settlement Agreement. ”  7T40:24-41:3.  The Chinese Agreement that was provided to [...] to be used as the basis for the documents he was to prepare contemplated that the parties would account for personal property and company assets at a later time.  Conversely, the English PSA prepared by [...] makes no mention of the company assets and completely cuts off any future distribution of assets.  By omitting the key language about the separate distribution of company assets, [...] failed to properly do even the limited job he readily admits he was retained to do.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has disapproved of any expression of personal or official opinion or belief that a jury could understand as based on something other than the evidence, including a belief in the defendant’s guilt …”  Id. at 398.  “The Court reasoned that in the minds of jurors such statements may add the weight of the prosecutor’s official and personal influence and knowledge to the probative for of the evidence adduced. ”  *State v. Rivera*, 437 N.J. Super. 434 (2014)(citing *Thorntorn*, 38 N.J. at 398)).  “For that reason, the Court concluded that such statements “create the possibility that the jury’s consciously or unconsciously might adopt the prosecutor’s view without applying their own independent judgment to the evidence. ”  *Id.*  “The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law ...”  *State v. Rose*, 112 N.J. 454, 521 (1988).  “That being said, the assistant prosecutor’s duty is to prove the State's case based on the evidence and not to play on the passions of the jury or trigger emotional flashpoints, deflecting attention from the hard facts on which the State's case must rise or fall.
[brief] **When we granted the relief the State requested, this Court did not authorize the State to replace parity funding with some underfunded version of SFRA.**  *Abbott XXI*, 206 N.J. at 360 (emphasis added).  The decision below that [...] failed to assert a viable claim of unconstitutional SFRA implementation amounts to giving the State a judicial green light to replace the Supreme Court’s prior remedial orders for parity and supplemental funding with “*some* version of the SFRA or an underfunded version of the formula. ”  *Abbott XXI*, 206 N.J. at 341 (emphasis in original) (describing the State’s action in reducing formula aid as amounting “to nothing less than reneging on the representations it made when it was allowed to exchange SFRA funding for the parity remedy”).  The decision below is based on a fundamental legal error.  It must be reversed.
[brief] For the above reasons, and those set forth in the Petitioner’s initial Brief, the Respondent’s decision should be overturned and the Petitioner’s intra-fund transfer from [...] to the [...] should be permitted.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: [...]  Attorney for Petitioner Dated: March 22, 2024 --- ²  The Respondent also cites the case of Joel Shain v. Bd. of Trs. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys, OAL Docket No. TYP04701-21, Initial Decision (Feb. 16, 2024) (Ra90).
[brief] While [...]’s motion for reconsideration on allocation was pending, on July 17, 2020, [...] filed its original motion seeking final judgment, attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest (the “Original Motion”).  (Da0001-Da0029.)  [...]’s Original Motion sought over $4.8 million in covered costs, over $4.4 million in interest, approximately $300,000 in litigation costs, and over $1.6 million in attorneys’ fees from [...].
[directive] The State waives all authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, but reserves the right to request the court to impose a State Prison term or a specific county jail term.  Defendant must agree to submit to a drug or alcohol diagnostic assessment unless the court determines there is no basis to order an assessment.  (Prosecutor must notify court of the objective basis for this condition.)  Defendant must agree to participate in any drug or alcohol treatment deemed appropriate by the court.  (Prosecutor must notify court of the objective basis for this condition.)
[brief] It is well-settled that "the primary duty of a prosecutor is not to obtain convictions, but to see that justice is done."  *State v. Ramseur*, 106 N.J. 123, 320 (1987).  "It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."  *State v. Farrell*, 61 N.J. 99, 105 (1972) (quoting *Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  Although prosecutors are expected to "represent vigorously the state's interest in law enforcement[,] they must also "help assure that the accused is treated fairly and that justice is done ...."  Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 323-24.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  4 POINT I DEFENDANT'S FACTUAL BASIS FOR HIS GUILTY PLEA ESTABLISHED  ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER  ..............................................................................  4 POINT II  A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED TO A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT  SUBJECT TO NERA .................................................  9  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND SUSTAIN THE SENTENCE, THE OVERALL FAIRNESS OF WHICH THE COURT EXPLAINED ........  12  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................
[brief] D.  The award of $886,223.06 in counsel fees was not reasonable.  Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs prevailed here.  But it is important to note they incurred those fees in pursuit of a $10 million goal based upon an allegation that defendants defrauded them.  Their fraud claim was rejected by the trial court.  Instead, they obtained $2,872,358.93 in compensatory damages, significantly less than one-third of their goal.  It is therefore submitted that plaintiffs have failed to show that the amount of counsel fees was reasonable.
[brief] In 1990 the Legislature broadened the statute as follows.  <<+d.  No+>> person, except the owner or lessee of the <<- property->> <<+building+>> and persons specifically authorized by him in writing, <<+which writing shall be in the person's possession,+>> shall, for the purpose of hunting, taking or killing any <<-bird or animal->> <<+wildlife+>>, have in his possession a loaded <<- gun->> <<+firearm or nocked arrow+>> while within 450 feet of any occupied <<-dwelling->> <<+building+>> in this State, or of <<-a->> <<+any+>> school playground <<-, under a penalty of not less than $50.00 and not more than $100.00 for each offense->>.  <<+For the purposes of this section, “occupied building” means any building constructed or adapted for overnight accommodation of a person, or for operating a business or engaging in an activity therein, whether or not a person is actually present. +>>  [1990 NJ Sess. Law Serv. 29 (West) Approved May 24, 1990.  Effective May 24, 1990.  (emphasis supplied)]  The word “building” which the Legislature added to the statute as above is of very broad meaning.  It means a “structure designed for habitation, shelter, storage, trade, manufacture, religion, business, education, and the like.  A structure or edifice inclosing a space within its walls, and usually, but not necessarily, covered with a roof.  Black’s Law Dictionary, p 176 (Fifth Ed. 1979).  The Legislature also added the clause concerning any activity within a building “whether or not a person is actually present,” thus further expanding the reach of the statute.  It might be argued that the statute is broad enough to encompass storage facilities, churches, or even buildings under construction.  The point is that the assessment of whether a building qualifies under the statute was not intended to be subject to vastly differing opinions but rather is subject to an easily applied bright line rule.
[directive] Tactical Team Response.  Once an incident has been determined to involve a barricaded in accordance individual or hostage situation, the supervisor or incident commander shall, with section 3.2, contact the commander of a Tactical Team designated by the County Prosecutor to respond to such incidents, or the commander’s designee.  This Tactical Team commander shall determine the appropriate tactical assets, if any, to respond to the incident.  If at any point a barricaded individual incident exceeds the capabilities of the currently assigned Tactical Team, that team’s commander shall immediately notify and coordinate response with a sufficiently qualified and equipped team.  This directive does not preclude appropriate local resources from being utilized pending the arrival of the designated Tactical Team and Crisis Negotiation Team required by this section, but such resources shall yield control of the incident to the commander of the designated Tactical Team upon notification that said team is on-scene and operational.  The commander of the local resources shall provide any assistance and support requested by the commander of the designated Tactical Team or the Incident Commander.  8
[brief] Even the law upon which defendant relies – Rue, 175 N.J. at 1 – does not support such an extension.  Db11-13.  R. 3:22-6(d) imposes special obligations on PCR counsel:  Assigned counsel may not seek to withdraw on the ground of lack merit of the petition.  Counsel should advance all of the legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that the record will support.  If defendant insists upon the assertion of any ground for relief that counsel deems to be without merit, counsel shall list such claims in the petition or amended petition or incorporate them by reference.  See also State v. Webster, 187 N.J. 254, 257 (2006).  This “choice” to create an exception to the ethical obligations of RPC 3.1 for PCR counsel “was obviously motivated by [the Court’s] view of the critical nature of faithful and robust representation of a defendant at a PCR proceeding.
[brief] Davis, 363 N.J. Super. at 561.  The model charge on the State’s separate burden to present “sufficient reliable evidence” of the perpetrator’s identity is at Da 145.  The Green instruction on the State’s separate burden to prove identity was necessary to guard against a wrong conviction here, because the face of the individual walking west on Lexington is not visible.  Even a detective interrogating [...] said that “you can’t really make out” the person in the screenshot from the 57 Lexington camera.  (Da 53; Da 17 at 39:43 to 39:47)  Moreover, no one at trial was able to directly identify the individual who departed from 64A Lexington.
[brief] 6.  At the Planning Board meeting, the witnesses relayed relevant information regarding the matter, which included, but was not limited to, the following:  a.  A discussion of the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, which provided for a phased residential project; b.  A discussion of the properties which are included in the Beachway Waterfront Redevelopment Plan (then identified as Block 184, Lots 1, 2, and 3, and now identified as Block 184, Lots 1, 3, and 3.01); c.  A discussion regarding the Redevelopment Agreement with [...]; d.  A discussion regarding the superseding nature of the 1st Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan (June 21, 2017), which created an Overlay Zone, and the associated 1st Amendment to the Redevelopment Agreement; e.  A discussion regarding further necessary amendments to the Waterfront Redevelopment Plan (i.e. 2nd Amendment), as a result of the following: - Evolving approaches to the redevelopment tract; - Revision to the tax parcel boundaries resulting from the subdivision of former Lots 3 and 3.01; and - Recent State approvals from the NJDEP and CAFRA.