ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The *Pomerantz* court described the Net Opinion Rule as follows: That is, an expert's bare opinion **that has no support in factual evidence** or similar data is a mere net opinion which is not admissible and may not be considered.  The admissibility rule has been aptly described as requiring that the expert "give the why and wherefore" that supports the opinion, "**rather than a mere conclusion. **"  . .  Applying these standards, our Appellate Division has concluded that a trial court may not rely on expert testimony that lacks an appropriate factual foundation and fails to establish the existence of any standard about which the expert testified.
[brief] [...] conceded within its pleadings, and also within its expert reports, that the [...] is the owner of a portion of the Property.  The issue, according to [...], is whether the [...] owns the entire Property (and, specifically, whether the [...] was passed through the chain of title and ultimately acquired by the [...]).  [...] argues that the [...] was conveyed by [...] to [...] in 1909, but that [...] did not convey it to [...] in 1920, and instead retained ownership of it.  [...] argues that the deed from [...] to [...] did not expressly include the [...], and relies upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Panetta “[t]hat a riparian grant does not automatically pass with the transfer of title to the uplands. ”  [...]’s argument is flawed on a number of levels.
[brief] Pa84-87.  The Trial Court entered an order on June 20, 2024 granting the motion for summary judgment.  Pa88-89.  On July 1, 2024, the Trial Court entered an amended order providing an additional statement of reasons for summary judgment.  Pa95-96.  On June 28, 2024, Appellant filed the present notice of appeal.  Pa90-94.  On July 1, 2024, Appellant filed an amended notice of appeal.
[brief] And because the issue of an improper request was never initially raised below, Appellant can rest easy without worrying about the court improperly expanding the custodian’s role in an OPRA request as noted in POINT II of its brief.  While Respondent completely disagrees with Appellant’s substantive argument in POINT II and its “concerns”, this appeal fails because this issue was not initially raised by Appellant at the outset.  Appellant may try to contend in its reply that the trial judge’s initial opinion in Da58-67 contained language critical \(^2\)  I say “presumably” because the trial judge did not discuss the standard for reconsideration in his opinion.  He simply denied Appellant’s reconsideration cross-motion.  But in any event, the Appellate Division can affirm an order on appeal even if the reasons are different than that of the trial judge or if the trial judge provided the wrong reason.  *Wilson v. Grant*, 297 N.J. Super. 128, 139 (App.Div.1996).
[directive] I understand that if I am accepted by the program, a juvenile delinquency complaint will NOT be filed against me with the Superior Court, provided that the below terms and conditions of the program are satisfied.  Parent or Guardian/Caregiver or Designee’s and Juvenile’s Initials:  ___________  ___________  I understand that I have a right to discuss this matter with an attorney at law of my choosing.  However, I also understand that the court will not appoint an attorney for me prior to the filing of a juvenile complaint and it is my responsibility to obtain my own attorney if I wish.  I further understand that I do not have to discuss this matter with anyone, including members of the Police Department before I have an opportunity to discuss this matter with an attorney, if I choose to do so.  Parent or Guardian/Caregiver or Designee’s and Juvenile’s Initials:  ___________  ___________  I understand that participation in the stationhouse adjustment program is completely voluntary.  I further understand that I may end my involvement in the program at any time and Attorney General Guidelines - Stationhouse Adjustments Page 8 have my case proceed in the Family Court as a juvenile delinquency matter.  However, in order to participate in the program I must admit and do admit my involvement in the aforementioned offense(s), for which I was taken into custody.
[brief] [...] did this to exclusively benefit herself.  The credit card [...] paid with the funds was opened by [...] at [...] on her own and was the exclusive liability of [...] without any relationship to [...] whatsoever.  [...] was never told of the opening of this card solely in [...]’s name.  [...] did not prove that [...] made any charges thereon, [...] never paid any bills thereto, and [...] was completely unaware of same.  The theft by [...] was investigated by [...] specialists familiar with these types of matters.  The trial court should not have disturbed the Bank’s findings:
[brief] Thus, the Union’s argument that [...] could not consistently explain why [...] was \(^3\)  It must be noted that nowhere in his decision did the Arbitrator cite any contractual or legal basis requiring [...] to reconsider a previously implemented termination.  The Arbitrator thus placed an extra-contractual obligation unsupported by even a past practice.  An employer can only be charged with acting upon the knowledge it had in its possession at the time of the discharge.  See *Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Superior Ct.*, 351 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002) (noting principle that employer cannot be charged with unlawful termination unless plaintiff employee shows that employer actually “knew” of the alleged unlawful motivating factor at the time of termination). terminated are a red herring.  [...]’s initial letter to [...] explained her termination; that should be the end of the matter.  Finally, the Union makes several specious attempts to distinguish case law which [...] cited in its appellate brief which requires that the Court overturn the Arbitrator’s decision here.
[brief] POINT II THE STATE’S EXPERT OFFERED AN IMADMISSIBLE NET OPINION ON THE LOCATION OF WOODS’S CELL PHONE.  (Not Raised Below)  In State v. Burney, the Supreme Court held that an expert offered an improper net opinion when he relied on only “his training and experience” and a “rule of thumb” to estimate that a cell tower had a one-mile coverage area that included the crime scene.  255 N.J. 1, 21-25 (2023).  The same error occurred here.  [...] relied on nothing more than his training and experience to offer a net opinion that a phone would “not hit off a tower that is several miles away” in Trenton and Willingboro.  (12T171-25 to 172-12).  He improperly used this unsupported assumption to create maps that showed that [...]’s cell phone was near [...] and [...] at times consistent with the State’s theory of the murder.  (Da20; Da21).  The admission of Kohler’s impermissible net opinion on the location of [...]’s phone, which was repeated during the testimony of another detective and emphasized by the prosecutor in opening and summation, was clearly capable of producing an unjust result and deprived defendant of due process and a fair trial.  See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.; R. 2:10-2.  Because the State relied heavily on this inappropriate testimony to connect [...] to the crime, [...]’s convictions should be reversed.
[brief] Id.  Once again, Plaintiff’s suggestion was ignored even though it arose from a valid concern about the individual participants of Defendant [...]’ safety.  Id.  In addition to Defendants’ flagrant violations of the law, their management was deficient in other ways as well.  For example, there was once a fire at one of Defendant [...]’ group homes which resulted in an individual’s death.  Id.  Defendants did their best to shield all employees from knowing exactly what caused the fire, or from knowing any other details about it.  Id.  Defendants routinely told Plaintiff the fire occurred because the staff member who was working in the home at the time was smoking.  Id.  However, the employee who worked in the home where the fire occurred did not smoke.  Id.  Nevertheless, Defendants implemented a new policy that employees could not smoke less than thirty (30) feet from any home.  Id.  After this incident, Plaintiff noticed Defendants’ attitude toward her change.  (PA000009).  iii.
[brief] ”  Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113 (2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  Qualified immunity may only shield an officer from liability if the officer “reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law. ”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009).  Whether an official is covered by qualified immunity is a matter of law to be decided by a court, “preferably on a properly supported motion for summary judgment or dismissal. ”  Gormley, 218 N.J. at 113 (quoting Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000)).  Moreover, there is no presumption of qualified immunity; rather, the immunity is considered "an affirmative defense that the defendant must establish."  Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 354 (2000)  Individuals may be sued under 42 USC § 1983 and the NJCRA in their personal or individual capacity as long as plaintiff show that the individual violated a clearly established law and that the individual exhibited a callous indifference for the rights of the plaintiff.  Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).  The NJCRA is interpreted as analogous to 42 USC§ 1983, Szemple v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 493 Fed. Appx. 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2012), and a "court will analyze ... NJCRA claims through the lens of 1983."  Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F.Supp.2d 417,444 (D.N.J. 2011).  Section 1983 allows tort liability for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution."
[brief] In its moving application, [...] requested an award of $30,614.52 in fees and costs, which [...]’s counsel admitted were “substantial” and claimed were “reasonable. ”  (Pa365)  Counsel argued that there were “numerous breaches of the Settlement Agreement”, but [...]’s motion was based on two (2) alleged breaches – (1) the Planning Board allegedly violated the Settlement Agreement by not adopting a Resolution by the second meeting in October after [...]’s counsel had agreed to the form of Resolution and (2) by adopting a Supplemental Resolution in January 2023.
[brief] A claim for unjust enrichment requires that (1) the defendant be enriched (2) at the expense of the plaintiff, and (3) it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what plaintiff seeks to recover.  See VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994).  In addition, a plaintiff must show that “it expected remuneration from the defendant at the time it performed or conferred a benefit on defendant and that the failure of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual rights. ”  Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 288 (2016) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 110 (2007).
[brief] Under other New Jersey statutes, certain individuals are authorized to bring lawsuits on behalf of the state.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 49:5-12(a); N.J.S.A. 17:10B-5(b).  Plaintiff here is not bringing claims on behalf of the state or the general public.  Thus, as an additional reason to stay the proceedings, this Court finds that none of plaintiff’s claims are for public injunctive relief.  Plaintiff makes a claim for injunctive relief, but the claims at issue were not brought on behalf of the public.  Plaintiff’s claims were brought to benefit plaintiff and members of the class action who are similarly situated to plaintiff.  There is a valid and binding agreement that provides reasonable notice to plaintiff that she gave up her rights to pursue her claims before a judge or jury.
[brief] See State v. Carvajal, 202 N.J. 214, 223-24 (2010) (“The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant abandoned the property and therefore has no standing to object to the search. ”).  “[F]or standing purposes, property is abandoned if: (1) a person has either actual or constructive control or dominion over property; (2) he knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes any possessory or ownership interest in the property; and (3) there are no other apparent or known owners of the property. ”  Carvajal, 202 N.J. at 225 (quoting Johnson, 193 N.J. at 549).  Here, the State failed to show that [...] knowingly and voluntarily relinquished control over the gun.  The State did not, and cannot, point to any evidence that [...] knowingly and voluntarily relinquished any possessory ownership in the gun when he gave it to [...].  To the contrary, the BWC footage shows that [...] gave [...] the gun for safekeeping; he instructed her to bring it to a specified apartment so that it could be stored there until he could retrieve it.  (Da 27; BWC4-A 29:00-29:20, 43:50 to 44:00)  [...] did not do what the defendant in Gartrell did and run away from his suitcase, leaving it unattended in a busy Newark Penn Station.  State v. Gartrell, 256 N.J. 241, 253-54 (2024).  Nor did [...] do what the defendants in Farinich did when they dropped their suitcases and fled from the baggage claim at Newark Airport.  Gartrell, 256 N.J. at 253 (citing State v. Farinich, 179 N.J. Super. 1, 3-4, 7 (App. Div. 1981), aff’d o.b., 89 N.J. 378 (1982)).  Rather than abandon the gun, [...] entrusted it to [...] before the police came.  Consequently, the State’s abandonment argument lacks merit.
[brief] During the hearing, the State presented testimony from Paterson Police Officer [...] (“[...]”).  1T7:15-80:14.  [...] testified that at 9:25 p.m. on August 13, 2021, he was patrolling the area of Rosa Parks Boulevard in a marked police unit with a partner.  1T10:13-11:21.  However when [...] began to describe how he received a call from dispatch that there was a possible armed individual, defense counsel objected to the testimony as “hearsay”.  1T11:20-12:1.  [...] sustained the objection.  1T12:2.  After some discussion, [...] agreed to allow the testimony for the effect it had on the listener and “because it’s not being offered for hearsay. ”  1T14:10-12.  [...] added that “if at any point it’s being offered for hearsay, I’ll give it the weight that I should. ”  1T14:12-15.  [...] then testified that he received a call and responded to the said location to look for a black male with dreadlocks walking with crutches wearing a white tank top and blue shorts who was in front of 46 Rosa Parks and armed with a firearm.  1T15:1-12 and 16:10-14.  [...] testified that when he arrived at --- ⁴  Designations to transcripts are as follows:  1T – Transcript of the May 30, 2024 evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s “Motion to Suppress Evidence”.
[brief] Following the test set forth by the Supreme Court, the first question is whether there is any conflict between New Jersey’s policy and Pennsylvania’s policy.  See Fetter, 341 U.S. at 611.  The answer is no.  Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, has a complicated procedure that, among other requirements, mandates an applicant undergo a background check by the sheriff.  18 Pa. C.S. § 6109.  The next issue is whether New Jersey has a policy reason for enforcing its own laws over those of Pennsylvania, and the answer to this, again, is no.  In this case, the Defense is not asking New Jersey to disregard New Jersey law in favor of Pennsylvania law.  It is asking New Jersey to recognize a license issued by a sister state.
[brief] Essex County Indictment [...] charged [...] with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) (Count 1); second-degree possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Count 2); and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (Count 3).
[directive] (Jeżeli do przestępstwa doszło 14 stycznia 2004 r. lub później, stycznia 2004 należy odpowiedzieć na Pytanie 4b.  Formalny dożywotni nadzór kuratorski).  (only complete if the offense occurred before January 14, 2004).  (If the Community Supervision for Life offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, the defendant should complete Question 4b, Parole Supervision for Life).  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w razie przyznania się do winy w odniesieniu do oskarżenia (1) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] o kwalifikowaną napaść na tle seksualnym, napaść seksualną, kwalifikowany nielegalny kontakt seksualny, uprowadzenie zgodnie z 2C:13-1c(2), spowodowanie zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa dziecka poprzez angażowanie się w zachowania seksualne, które mogłyby osłabić poczucie moralności lub zdeprawować dziecko zgodnie z 2C:24-4a, zwabianie lub usiłowanie popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw, sąd, niezależnie od jakiegokolwiek innego wyroku, wyda specjalny wyrok dożywotniego nadzoru społecznego?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, luring, or an attempt to commit any such offense, the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of community supervision for life?
[directive] Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  •  Clear the chamber, close and lock the bolt on an empty chamber or chamber a round and leave the bolt handle up (unlocked) with the safety “off”  •  Move to the 25 yard line 25 yard line 3 rounds, shooter’s choice of position (no prone), rifle may be supported 1 second each command  • Assume position, chamber 1 round •  On command fire 1 round on sub-target “25" (1 second)  •  Repeat twice for a total of 3 rounds •  Clear the chamber of the rifle, close and lock the bolt on an empty chamber or chamber a round and leave the bolt handle up (unlocked) with the safety “off”  •  Carrying all equipment, jog back to the 100 yard line
[brief] .................................................................  4 Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) .................................................................. 13, 14, 15 Gallows v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1989) .......................................................  10, 14, 15 Harbin v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 921 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1990) ....................................................  6, 7, 9 Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. 372 U.S. 248 (1963)  ..................................................................  15 Hines v. Conrail, 926 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1991) .....................................................  6  Ignacic v. Penn Central Transport Co., 436 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. 1981) ..............................................  9  Johnannessen v. Gulf Trading and Transp. Co., 633 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1980)  ....................................................  10  Kapsis v. Port Auth. Of New York and New Jersey, 313 N.J.Super. 395 (App.Dov. 1998) ......................................  10 Metropolitan Coal Company v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1959) ....................................................  6  Mullahon v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 64 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................... 15 Pehowic v. Erie Lackawaana Railroad Co., 430 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1970) .................................................... 8, 10 Poleto v. Conrail, 826 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1987) ................................................... 7 Rodriguez v. Deloroy Connecting R. R., 473 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1973) ................................................................. 7 Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) ........................................................................... 6, 8, 9, 13, 14 Shenkler v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 374 U.S. 1 (1963) .................................................................................. 8 Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 356 U.S. 326 (1958) .............................................................................. 8 St. Louis Railway Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409 (1985) .............................................................................. 7 Syverson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824 (2d Cir. 1994) .................................................................. 18, 19 Statutes/Rules
[brief] \(^1\) (Aa092-095; 2T7:22-8:6). \(^2\)  Following his arrest, \(^1\) Aa__ refers to Appellant’s Appendix.  \(^2\)  References to the February 27, 2020 transcript of adjournment follow the form 1T__-__.  References herein to the February 25, 2022 probable cause hearing before the Denville Municipal Court follow the form 2T__-__.  References to the April 29, 2022 trial before the Denville Municipal Court follow the form 3T__-__.  References to the May 27, 2022 transcript of the decision of the Honorable [...] J.S.C. in the matter of State v. [...], Docket No. [...], follow the form 4T__-__.  References to the January 27, 2023 trial de novo before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division follow the form 5T__-__.  References to the February 17, 2023 trial de novo before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division follow the form 6T__-__.  References to the April 17, 2023 sentencing hearing before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. follow the form 7T__-__.  Appellant filed two pre-trial motions in the Denville Municipal Court, “one asserting a lack of sufficient cause to conduct field sobriety tests and/or to arrest [Appellant], and the other asserting the State lacked proof that [Appellant] had operated the vehicle in question.” (Aa010).
[directive] EDITOR=S  NOTE  The official citations for Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), and for State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182 (1971), have been added.  In numbered paragraph 1, the first sentence has been deleted because it dealt with the procedure for handling defendants who had been committed for nonpayment of a fine prior to the Supreme Court opinion in Tate v. Short.  The remaining sentences of that paragraph have been edited so as to delete all reference to retrospective application of the opinion.  In numbered paragraph 2, the present tense of the verb has replaced the past tense so as to make the instructions current.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING  [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING  [...]’S CLAIMS AGAINST [...] FOR VIOLATING THE NJFPA, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AND INDEMNIFICATION (PA6-PA7).  A.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING  [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON [...]’S NJFPA CLAIM BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY ADDED  A REQUIREMENT TO THE NJFPA THAT DOES NOT EXIST IN THE STATUTE (2T 18:18-19:8).  B.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING  [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON [...]’S TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AND INDEMNITY CLAIMS BY FAILING TO CONSIDER ANY OF THE FACTS IN THE RECORD  PREVENTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BOTH II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING [...]’S MOTION TO AMEND THE TRIAL COURT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER  BECAUSE THE NEW EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND ACCEPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT REQUIRED  THE DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT (PA10-PA11; 4T 5:4-7:7)  ..................................................37  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING  [...]’S IMPROPER SECOND DISPOSITIVE MOTION – [...]’S MOTION TO BAR—“AS MOOT,” RATHER THAN WITH PREJUDICE FOR VIOLATING THE TRIAL COURT’S CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER (PA8-PA9)  ..................................................38  CONCLUSION
[brief] CONCLUSION  We respectfully submit that the Trial Court erred in entering summary judgment, and the matter should be reversed and remanded for a trial on the issues presented herein.  We submit that the respondent should have been considered on the same footing most like a commercial entity, and the duties associated with that status should have controlled.  In the alternative, we respectfully submit that if the Court considered the respondent to be a residential property owner, there were material facts in dispute which would have precluded summary judgment in this matter.