ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **The Evidence. **  Before trial and off the record, [...] viewed relevant excerpts from two police body-cam videos dated September 14, 2022.  Twenty-seven Defense exhibits were stipulated in evidence including the CD’s.  Da19-Da86; 2T5:2-10.3  _____________________  Defendant reserves the right to renew that motion in the appellate court at the appropriate time if necessary.  The following people testified for the State: - [...] (“Roche”), who worked for [...] and was delivering wine to [...] but brought it to [...] by mistake.  2T14.  - [...], who responded on September 12, 2023.  2T44.  - [...] (“Siddiqi”), who sprayed pesticide at [...] on July 27, 2022.  2T57 - [...] (“Solanki”) of [...], owner of a mini-Golden-doodle named Coco.  2T90 - [...], regarding the July 27, 2022 event.  2T101.  - [...] (2T104) and [...] (2T125), hereafter “Kelly” and “Jimmy,” [...], whose dog Bella died after the incident.  The following people testified for the defense:  - [...].  2T142 - [...] (3T3) and [...] (3T66), owners of Koda.  - [...] (“Jessica”), Defendant’s adjacent neighbor at [...], who observed Koda.  3T39 - [...] (“Ashish”) a friend who was at Defendant’s home 10-20 times to visit or dog-sit.  3T53 - [...] (“Diana”), a friend who also visited and observed Bella off property and taunting Koda.  4T3.  The State introduced no documentary or video evidence.  This Court is also asked to consider two exhibits that were filed in Superior Court but not at the Municipal Court trial:
[brief] And whether a child is accepted or rejected by their immediate family is a strong safeguard, or risk, to their physical safety.  The *2023 LGBTQ+ Youth Report*, which surveyed 13,000 LGBTQ youth from all fifty states, found that only four in ten (43.9%) transgender and gender-expansive youth are out to all their parents or guardians.  *2023 LGBTQ+ Youth Report*, Fig. 4a.  Additionally, the *2015 U.S. Transgender Survey*, with a sample of 27,715 respondents, reported that, among transgender people who were out to their immediate family, 40% had family members who did not support them or were “neutral” to their transgender status.  [...] et al., [...], *2015 U.S. Transgender Survey*, at 65 (Dec. 2016) (“*2015 U.S. Transgender Survey*”), [https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf](https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf) (Da91).  One in ten reported that a member of their family had been physically violent toward them because they were transgender.
[brief] A review of the first count of Plaintiffs’ Complaint reveals that Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the dangerous condition in the roadway.  The Plaintiffs’ Complaint expressly identified that construction was being performed in the subject area at this time and such construction may have contributed to the Plaintiff’s accident.  Plaintiffs’ original and amended pleadings contemplates and identifies the unknown parties potentially involved in the construction and potentially responsible for the inspection, maintenance and correction of dangerous conditions.  [...], as the engineering sub-contractor on the project, are properly identified by the original Complaint.  (Pa1550).
[directive] Training and Qualification for CEDs and Less-Lethal Devices  11.1  No officer shall be authorized to carry or use a CED or less-lethal device during an actual operation until having completed a training course and qualification procedure approved by the Police Training Commission (or DCJ) in the proper use and deployment of CEDs or less-lethal devices.  The training program shall include a component on techniques to de- escalate a confrontation with a person from a different culture or background.  The training program also shall include a component on how to interact with a person in emotional or mental health crisis, including de-escalation techniques.  11.2  All law enforcement officers authorized to carry and use a CED or less-lethal device pursuant to this policy shall qualify, and thereafter re-qualify annually, in a training course and qualification procedure approved by the Police Training Commission (or DCJ).  11.3  CED and Less-Lethal training programs in each county shall operate under the direct control of the County Prosecutor’s Office.  For statewide law enforcement agencies, with the approval of the Director of DCJ, the CED and Less-Lethal training programs shall operate under the control of the law enforcement executive.
[brief] (Da64-68).  [...] assigned counsel to [...] and advised [...] that while [...] was agreeing to provide [...] a defense in the underlying matter, [...] was reserving its right to deny defense and/or indemnity under the Policy.  (Da64).  [...] provided the following four reasons why its Policy might not cover the underlying claim:  •  The alleged injury was caused “by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict ‘personal and advertising injury’”; • The allegations of “personal advertising injury” potentially “arose out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity”; • Other insurance might apply; and • Punitive damages are uninsurable.  (Da64).  The Reservation of Rights letter cited directly to the relevant Policy provisions and further advised [...] of his right to obtain personal counsel and that he had the right to accept or reject the offer to defend under these circumstances.  (Da68).  The letter further still advised [...] that if [...] did not hear from him, it would assume that he accepts [...]’s offer to defend under those conditions.  (Da68).  C.
[brief] Cases Bd. Of Educ. Of Englewood Cliffs v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Englewood, 257 N.J. Super. 413, 456 (App. Div. 1992)  .................................................................  8  Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 558-59 (1979).  .  16 Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp.  of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 45 (1986) .............................. 8 In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 248 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 1991)........... 8 In re AMICO/Tunnel Carwash, 371 N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div. 2004) .....12, 13 In re Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 593 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................................................. 8, 19 In re Distribution of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 10 (2001) ..................................... 8 In re Issuance of Access Conforming Lot Permit No. A-17-N-N040-2007, 417 N.J. Super. 115, 126 (App. Div. 2010) ............................................................... 16 In re NJDPES No. NJ0025241, 185 N.J. 474, 482 (2006) .................................... 10 In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013) .................................................................................................. 17 In re Proposed Xanadu Redev. Project, 402 N.J. Super. 607, 640 (App. Div. 2008)  ..................................................................................................................  17  In re Riverview Development, LLC, Waterfront Development Permit No. 0908-05-0004.3 WFD 060001, 411 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 2010)  ............12, 13  In re Stream Encroachment Permit, 402 N.J. Super. 587, 597 (App. Div. 2008)  .........................................................................................................................  14  Klawitter v. City of Trenton, 395 N.J. Super. 302, 318 (App. Div. 2007) ...... 14  McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)  .........................................................................................................................  8  Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 476 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2023) .................................................................15, 16 N.J. Chapter of Nat’l Ass’n of Indus.
[brief] C.  The Genesis Deed’s Restrictive Covenants  The Genesis Deed, drafted and conveyed in 1947, clearly expresses the intent of the [...] to subject the Property, and the hundreds like it in the [...] community, to a number of restrictions.  The Genesis Deed provides, in pertinent part:  BEACH CLUB  ALL property owners in this development are required to become members of a property owners’ association known or to be known as ‘[...]’ and to faithfully abide by its rules.  No sale, resale, or rental of any property in Ocean Beach shall be made to any person or group of persons who are, have been, or would be disapproved for membership by the [...].  The use of the bathing beach is for the exclusive members of the [...].  BEING a private club the [...] shall make such rules as it deems necessary pertaining to the race, color or creed of persons eligible for membership and any other rules or regulations it chooses.  . . .  It is not recommended but is permissible upon special approval by the [...], to have the front of buildings including garages, etc., to total over TWENTY-FOUR (24) feet.  . . .  GENERAL RESTRICTIONS  . . .  No building, alteration or addition shall be made without the written approval of the [...] (Da54).  These restrictions are not limited to the Genesis Deed for the Property; rather, similar restrictions exist in over *one thousand* other deeds that the [...] conveyed while implementing their desire to create a “club” of property owners adjacent to the beautiful Jersey Shore.  (Da144).  Currently, there are 321 units that are part of the [...] community, and their residents are all bound by the above restrictions as dues-paying “members” of [...] that agreed by deed to “faithfully abide” by “any” of the “rules or regulations” [...] “chooses” to implement and enforce.  (Da238).
[brief] PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND  .....................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................4  I.  THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION TO QUASH THE AUGUST 17, 2023 SUBPOENA AS IT IS FOR PURPOSES OF HARASSMENT AND SEEKS DUPLICATIVE AND IRRELEVANT INFORMATION.  (819A-821A)  ..............................................................................................4  A.  THE TRIAL COURT OVERLOOKED THAT THE SUBPOENA SEEKS IRRELEVANT INFORMATION.  (819A-821A)  ....................................................................5  B.  THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED  THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN BERRIE V. BERRIE  (819A-821A)  .......................................................................................8  II.  THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER.  (819A-821A)  ..................................................................................11  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................13
[brief] LEGEND  1T – June 24, 2019 (hearing)  2T – October 1, 2019 (hearing)  3T – October 2, 2019 (hearing)  4T – January 20, 2022 (hearing)  5T – February 7, 2022 (jury selection)  6T – February 8, 2022 (trial)  7T – February 9, 2022 (trial)  8T – February 10, 2022 (trial)  9T – February 14, 2022 (trial)  10T – February 15, 2022 (trial)  11T – February 16, 2022 – Vol. 1 (trial)  12T – February 16, 2022 – Vol. 2 (trial)  13T – February 17, 2022 (trial)  14T – February 22, 2022 (trial)  15T – February 23, 2022 (trial)  16T – February 24, 2022 (trial)  17T – June 9, 2022 (sentencing)  Da – Appendix to Defendant-Appellant’s brief
[brief] [...]’s reports and opinions do not account for [...]’s lack of experience in development.  Rather, they ignore it.  In the context of developing large tracts of more than 100 units (and in the case of the 2013 Litigation more than 200 units), with both projects having estimated costs substantially exceeding $20 million, in a heavily regulated industry, [...]’s failure to account for [...]’s inexperience is fatal.  [...]’s failure to account for [...]’s lack of experience is glaring considering his acknowledgement during cross examination that the low-income housing industry is: “highly regulated”; “very complex”; and “competitive. ”  Those adjectives to which he agreed are appropriate descriptors of the industry demonstrate, beyond peradventure, that experience in such a highly regulated, very complex, competitive industry is important.  To not account for such is pivotal.  But such is not the case here.  Again, these developments were sizeable — anticipated costs exceeding $24 million; the number of units were 132 and 208 respectively; both involved heavily regulated, labyrinthian business and building requirements, including affordable housing.  The Trial Court’s Opinion rejected the argument that simply because the project was ultimately developed by [...], leaders in the industry, *ipso facto*, [...] could have done the same relying exclusively or primarily on [...]’s results.  As the Court noted, [...] did not cite to any market data, treatises, articles, or any other independent, third-party information that discussed the circumstances of new businesses generally nor specifically in the context of low-income housing.  In substantially — if not entirely — relying on [...]’s results to form the basis of his expert opinion, [...] implicitly acknowledged that he did not consider [...]’s inexperience in development in formulating his expert opinion.  [...] conceded during cross examination [...] and [...] are “experienced and well known. ”  He also acknowledged that [...] and [...] were “prime” developers in New Jersey and would be on any short list of competitive firms.  The Trial Court summarily rejected Plaintiffs’ attempts to equate [...] with [...]:  Comparing [...] — a novice — on one hand to [...] and [...] — industry leaders — on the other ignores that sharp distinction identified by [...] and the Court and is a false comparison.
[brief] Reddish, 181 N.J. at 613.  Faced with a variety of factual disputes and credibility determinations, the jury needed to be instructed that the State retained the burden of proving that [...] committed the crimes, and that they could acquit based on evidence that [...] did the shooting – even if such evidence did not amount to a “strong probability” of [...]’s guilt.  Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Third Party Guilt Jury Charge” (approved Mar. 9, 2015).  Ultimately, “[t]he determination of plain error depends on the strength and quality of the State’s corroborative evidence rather than on whether defendant’s misidentification argument is convincing. ”  State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 326 (2005).  Because the State’s case was not overwhelming, and because there was substantial evidence supporting the possibility of [...]’s guilt, the omission of the third-party guilt instruction was plain error warranting reversal.
[brief] ”  Appellants supplied that in spades, presenting the [...] Cert. (528a-792a) which revealed that in the three (3) prior years that [...], the principal of [...], through either [...] or other entities he controlled ([...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”)) filed public record documents with County Clerks throughout the state related to pending tax lien foreclosures in forty-five (45) instances.  Not only does this volume of activity establish the “sophistication” of [...] and [...], a factor critical in [...]’s estimation, it further established that what [...] did to Defendants was [...]’ *modus operandi*, wherein he regularly acquired tax titles within sixty (60) days of entry of Final Judgment, operating a clearing house for recently acquired tax titles.  Denial of bona fide purchaser status to [...] should also flow from the fact that [...]’ *modus operandi* was aided and abetted by the [...].  In 4 of the 7 Notices of Lis Pendens identified in the [...] Cert., the Zeitz firm represented [...].  (536a-537a).  In addition, a review of Ecourts for [...] as a party reveals another seven (7) additional instances in which the [...] has represented [...] as plaintiff in a tax foreclosure matter.  (536a-537a).  The Quitclaim Deed to [...] in this matter instructed the County Clerk to return the Quitclaim Deed to [...]’s firm following recording, an observation not presented to [...], indicating that the Zeitz firm in fact represented [...] and [...] in this transaction.  (351a-354a).  The revelation of the extent and frequency of these concurrent representations of [...], [...] and [...] with the representation of [...] or other [...] clients should alone should be enough to disqualify [...] from “good faith purchaser for value without notice” status.  [...] opened discovery so that he could be provided with precisely this type of concurrent evidence of the sophistication of [...], the concurrent representation by counsel, and the numbers of transactions of similar nature undertaken by [...] or its principal, and the [...] Cert. provides what the Court sought.
[brief] The jury had the opportunity to pass upon the credibility of all of the witnesses and properly awarded what they found was fair, reasonable and in accordance with the instructions given by the Court.  3T47:19 – 3T64:14.  A jury’s verdict should never be overthrown without a carefully reasoned and factually supported determination.  Baxter at 597.  The trial judge correctly denied Defendant’s motion for remittitur since it did not shock the conscience and he was not able to formulate a carefully reasoned and factually supported basis for remittitur.  Therefore, this Appellate Court should uphold the jury’s verdict.
[directive] New Jersey’s Educate licensees and patients on informed consent and how to obtain health care boards have encountered several recent cases involving inappropriate conduct by licensees during physical examinations.  The Division believes that better education of practitioners and patients about applicable informed consent requirements may reduce the number of violations and improve reporting by, among other things, ensuring that licensees understand how to obtain informed consent for all aspects of physical examinations and that patients understand in advance the nature of certain medical services.  Accordingly, by December 2021, the Division will work with the relevant boards to prepare for their consideration information and guidance on explaining and obtaining informed consent to certain medical services involving breast, full-body, genital, and rectal exams or other intimate procedures.  E.
[directive] Although the internal affairs process is frequently triggered by the filing of a civilian complaint, law enforcement agencies must also proactively work to detect troubling patterns in police conduct before that conduct escalates into more serious internal affairs issues.  3.4.2  To enhance its integrity, provide an optimal level of service to the community and reduce its exposure to civil liability, every law enforcement agency should establish procedures for dealing with problem employees.  Law enforcement agencies have a duty to monitor their employees’ behavior, and establish mechanisms that provide the internal affairs function and the law enforcement executive with the ability to track the complaint records of individual officers and identify those officers with a disproportionate number of complaints against them.
[brief] (Rb 29)  This argument is belied by the record.  For example, [...] unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, telling the detectives, “I’m [sic] got a lawyer coming cause I ain’t do nothing bro. ”  (Da 45)  [...] first said “that’s fine,” and then said “okay,” after [...] said, “I didn’t do anything wrong. ”  However, he then expressly asked [...], “How long have you known me in town,” and “Haven’t I always been straight with you?”, thereby continuing the impermissible interrogation.  (Da 45)
[brief] g., AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).  "[T]he FAA was 'enacted to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration,' and is an expression of a 'strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.'"  Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2008)
[brief] C.  Alternatively, The Statute Is Not Clear on Whether the Authority to Ultimately Declare a Winner Even Lies with the Clerk  The statute at issue is also not clear on whether the power granted to the “clerk and tellers” is even intended to include the actual canvassing and final determination of the results of the election itself, or simply to act in the same manner as a district board of election, which only certifies the results for its specific polling place.  While the actual election process may get melded together in the public’s mind, the way elections are actually structured involve district boards of elections, county boards of election, county board of canvassers (which is the board of elections but acting under a different set of statutory authority), and the entity which certifies the results.
[brief] **THE ACCOUNT STATEMENTS WERE PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE ACCOUNT STATEMENTS  BECAUSE THERE WAS NO BONA FIDE DISPUTE AS TO THE FACTS SET FORTH THEREIN  [NOT RAISED BELOW]**  *N.J.R.E.* 101(a)(5) provides another basis for the admissibility of the account statements as an undisputed fact.  “[T]he hearsay rules do not apply to facts that are not disputed and agreed to by the parties. ”  *State v. Neal*, 361 N.J. Super. 522, 535 (App. Div. 2003) (citing *N.J.R.E. 101(a)(4)*).  Per the rule  If there is no bona fide dispute between the parties as to a relevant fact, the court may permit that fact to be established by stipulation or binding admission.  In civil proceedings the judgment may also permit that fact to be proved by any relevant evidence, and exclusionary rules shall not apply, except Rule 403 or a valid claim of privilege.  *N.J.R.E. 101(a)(5)*.  The term “bona fide” “simply means ‘in good faith;’ ‘honestly;’ ‘without fraud or fair dealing;’ ‘good faith, honesty, as distinguished from *mala fides.*’”  *Garford Trucking v. Hoffman*, 114 N.J.L. 522, 530 (Supr. Ct. 1935).  As such, if there is no bona fide dispute as to the facts set forth in the account statements, then such information may be admitted through any relevant evidence.  *N.J.R.E. 101(a)(5)*.  Relevant evidence is “evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  *N.J.R.E. 401*.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that the documentation was admissible as relevant evidence because there was no bona fide dispute as to the information contained therein.  In fact, Defendant, as noted above, relied upon the information contained within the account statements in support of Defendant’s defenses/claims.  PA – 225 to 227; *Garford Trucking*, 114 N.J.L. at 530.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant’s reliance on the account statements necessarily means that --- 6
[directive] It should be clear that the suspension of an officer before completing an investigation or disposing of a case is a serious matter.  Such suspensions may be immediately necessary, as in the case of an officer reporting for work under the influence of alcohol.  In other cases, however, a suspension need not be immediate but rather would follow a preliminary investigation into the matter that indicates that one of the above criteria has been met.  In any case, suspension prior to disposing of the case must be clearly documented and justified.  At the time of the suspension, the individual shall be provided with a written statement of the reasons the action has been taken.  (A sample form is found in Appendix D).  In the event of a refusal by the individual to accept that written statement, a copy shall be provided to the individual's collective bargaining representative as soon as possible.  If a supervisor or commander authorized to do so imposes an immediate suspension, the law enforcement executive must be advised without delay.  He or she will then determine the status of the suspension given the facts of the case in light of the above criteria.  In no case shall an immediate suspension be used as a punitive measure.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 23  6