ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 10  I.  THE NJDEP’S PERMIT DECISION IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE BECAUSE IT INVOLVES AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL MATTERS WITHIN THE AGENCY’S EXPERTISE .......................  10  II.  NJDEP PROPERLY DETERMINED CONSISTENCY WITH THE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ITS DECISION IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD .................................................................  13  A.  Appellant Failed to Raise its Concerns of the Water Quality Management Planning During the Comment Period and its Late Challenge in this Appeal Should be Disregarded .................................................................  14  B.  NJDEP Properly Determined that the Application Meets the Applicable Water Quality Management Plan for the Property ...........................................................................  15  C.  Appellant Wholly Fails to Overcome the Presumption that the Stormwater Runoff is Consistent with the Areawide Plan ...........................................................................  17  III.  THE APPROVAL FOR THE U. S. ROUTE 1 ACCESS ROAD CULVERT IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD .................................................................  21  A.  Appellant Failed to Raise its Concerns of the U.S. Route 1 Access Road Culvert During the Comment Period and its Late Challenge in this Appeal Should be Disregarded ...........................................  22  B.  A Feasibility Assessment was Adequately Conducted for the U.S. Route 1 Access Road....................  22  C.  The Construction Requirements for the Circular Culvert Are Adequately Supported by the Record.............  26  D.  The Record Supports the Finding that Riparian Zone Impacts Have Been Minimized..............................  28  IV.  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CORNELL STUDIES REQUIRED FORMAL RULEMAKING WHICH WAS NOT PROPOSED UNTIL AFTER THE PERMIT WAS GRANTED .................................................................
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER WHETHER THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS INDEPENDENTLY JUSTIFIED UNDER N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b)  BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON THIS ISSUE.  ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 REQUIRES SOME LANE CHANGES TO BE SIGNALED, THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER A SIGNAL WAS REQUIRED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES  BECAUSE THERE IS A FULL RECORD AND A TRIAL COURT RULING ON THIS ISSUE.  The State argues that, independent of whether the traffic stop of [...]’s car was justified under N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, police acted lawfully in stopping the car because they observed a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), which prohibits changing lanes without first ascertaining the safety of doing so and failing to maintain one’s lane.
[brief] Rivkin, supra, 143 N.J. at 372.  The post-deprivation remedy that the State furnished to the [...] was an action in lieu of prerogative writs.  The 1947 New Jersey Constitution preserved the substance of common law prerogative writ review by permitting parties to seek “review, hearing and relief” in the Superior Court of all actions of municipal agencies.  N.J. Const. art VI, §5, P4.  New Jersey Court Rule 4:69 implements this constitutional provision.  A court may set aside a municipal board decision if it is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, not supported by the evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.
[brief] However, this position fails to acknowledge that disclosure of the Amended Policy 5756 is implicated in four defined situations.  Namely, i) A student formally changes a mandatory student record, including gender, as defined by N.J. A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1); ii) A student participates in a sport for a gender other than that assigned at birth; iii) Referring a student for outside health services, and the student’s sexual identity and expression is germane to the referral; and iv) A student uses a gendered bathroom, other than that assigned at birth, except a gender-neutral bathroom.  Even when such events implicate disclosure, there are specific procedures and resources in place for students to assist in the process.
[brief] On October 28, 2022, an oral argument occurred before the Honorable [...], P.J.Cr. (3T)  Defense counsel argued that the Comer\(^4\) case -- which provides resentencings to seventeen-year-olds -- should extend to nineteen-year-old offenders such as [...].  (3T 3-23 to 9-20)  Counsel explained as follows.  The issue of extending Comer was an open one that the Law Division had the power to decide in [...]’s favor.  (3T 4-18 to 5-6)  Moreover, the science upon which previous decisions were based showed that the mental development of nineteen-year-olds was similar to that of seventeen-year-olds: “[T]hey both act impulsively and make poor decisions but they’re all, both capable of being rehabilitated. ”  (3T 5-7 to 14)  Courts in Washington, Michigan, and Massachusetts had accepted that the science applies beyond juveniles.  (3T 5-15 to 6-4)  Counsel asked the Law --- \(^4\) State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022).  Division to likewise apply the science, hold that [...]’s sentence was illegal, and grant him a Comer resentencing.  (3T 8-17 to 9-20)  On November 2, 2022, [...] issued a written decision denying the resentencing motion.
[brief] PLAINTIFF WAIVED CERTAIN ISSUES DECIDED BY THE TRIAL COURT BY FAILING TO BRIEF SAME.  Plaintiff’s failure to brief certain issues on appeal constitutes Plaintiff’s waiver of same and the trial court’s findings should be upheld.  Despite seemingly appealing the entirety of the trial court’s November 16, 2022, Order, Plaintiff has failed to brief certain issues and findings of the trial court.  As such, New Jersey law is well-settled that “[a]n issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived.
[brief] In arguing that a sentencing court may not rely upon a silence at sentencing, defendant cites to Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), but his reliance on this case is misplaced.  In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court held that a guilty plea does not constitute a waiver of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination; hence, the sentencing court erred in relying on the defendant’s silence at the sentencing hearing to decide facts about the crime that bore upon the severity of the sentence.  *Id.* at 326.  In *Mitchell*, the State presented evidence at sentencing on the quantity of drugs involved, and the defense presented no evidence of its own; the defendant asserted her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  *Id.* at 319.  The Supreme Court held that defendant could not be compelled to testify at her sentencing hearing.  *Id.* at 326.  Unlike the case in *Mitchell*, [...] did not compel testimony from defendant at his sentencing hearing.  On the contrary, defendant here freely elected to avail himself of his right of allocution.  R. 3:21-4(b) states that sentencing shall not be imposed unless the defendant is addressed personally and asked if he or she desires to make a statement in his or her own behalf and to present any information in mitigation.  This right of allocution derives from the common law and is considered fundamental such that if the court fails to afford defendant the right to make an allocution, the error requires a resentencing because the denial of this right is deemed to be structural error.  *State v. Jones*, 232 N.J. 308, 319 (2018).  Here, defendant gave a statement in allocution.  The trial court was entitled to assess the weight of what defendant said in allocution.  The trial court was entitled to assess its sincerity.  Considering the evidence, which the trial court summarized based upon the surveillance videos, the court did not give credence to defendant’s apology.  The judge was not penalizing the defendant but was addressing the weight and sincerity of what was said to the court before sentencing.  As noted earlier, a lack of remorse can be considered at sentencing.  Finally, as noted at the outset, defendant claims that he is entitled to a remand for resentencing under State v. Torres, 246 N.J. at 269, and the State concurs because Torres requires an explicit statement on the overall fairness of the sentence when consecutive sentencing is imposed.  However, because there were two victims in this case, one who died and the other who sustained serious bodily injury, the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences in the first place was appropriate.  Carey, 168 N.J. at 428.  Defendant’s claim to the contrary should be rejected.
[brief] This appeal involves a conviction for four counts of murder and one count of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose after a jury trial.  [...] was sixteen years old at the time of the homicides.  Scott shot and killed his mother, father, sister and surrogate grandmother.  After the shootings, sixteen year old [...] was interrogated by two detectives.  In the early morning hours of January 1, 2018, [...] was interrogated by Detectives [...] and [...].  [...]’s brother, [...], who owned the gun that was used in the shootings and just witnessed his family get murdered, acted as Scott’s guardian and advised Scott to waive his Miranda rights and confess to the murders.  Scott was subsequently transferred to the Youth Detention Center (“YDC”).  At YDC, Scott had several mental health evaluations and was diagnosed with autism and schizophrenia.  Scott was subsequently waived to adult court.  Defendant filed a Miranda motion to challenge the admissibility of his statement to police.  The Court denied Defendant’s Miranda motion.  At trial [...] presented a defense of Not Guilty by reason of insanity.  The jury convicted Defendant of four counts of murder and one count of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.  Despite [...] having a documented mental health history and being sixteen (16) years old at the time of the murders, Scott received a grossly excessive aggregate sentence of one hundred and fifty (150) years.
[directive] II.  HOME DETENTION (WITHOUT EM)  A.  Home Detention with Limited Exceptions  Leave the Residence to Page4of 12  Any defendant who allowed to leave the residence for reasons beyond the is  If standard exceptions shall be ordered to HDLE.  a court determines that the defendant should be permitted to leave the residence beyond the three standard exceptions, the court must specifically articulate in the release order the precise of parameters those allowances, including: • times permitted outside the home, of • purpose the permitted leaving, and of • addresses the locations to which the defendant permitted to traveL is Pretrial Services Program (PSP) staff shall not make any other exceptions of without a court order.
[brief] Even assuming arguendo that the [...] are creditors (which they are not) or that they could intervene in this action (which they cannot), the appeal should still be dismissed because the [...] already have claims pending in another action.  This appeal is nothing more than a waste of judicial resources and should be dismissed pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine.  The entire controversy doctrine “embodies the principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court; accordingly, all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy. ”  Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 605, 110 A.3d 19, 27 (2015) (emphasis added).  The doctrine has three purposes: “(1) the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay. ”  *Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss*, 243 N.J. 218, 227, 233 A.3d 536, 541 (2020) (quoting *DiTrolio v. Antiles*, 142 N.J. 253, 267, 662 A.2d 494 (1995)).  Here, the [...]’ end-goal of this appeal is to vacate the Discharge Order so that they can (attempt to) intervene in the case and assert their personal injury claim against the receiver (despite the fact that their claim arose before the receiver took possession of the property).  However, the [...] already have a pending claim against [...] (the entity in receivership) in *[...]*, [...].  Ca431.  While they have no basis to do so, the [...] also have named [...] (the entity which purchased the leasehold interest at foreclosure sale) as a defendant.  If the [...] somehow have a claim against [...] as an individual, they can move to amend their existing complaint to add him as defendant.  It would be an absolute waste of judicial resources to litigate the [...]’ claims in parallel in this action—especially since this action is already post-judgment and completely resolved.  Not only would it constitute judicial waste, but the parallel proceedings would lead to inconsistent decisions and unnecessary delays.  Thus, this appeal should be dismissed.  C.
[brief] No defenses were raised in either Answer.  See N.J.A.C. 6A:28-7.2(a) (Answers before the Commission must “fully and completely advise the parties and the Commission as to the nature of respondent’s defenses for each allegation. ”); (Ca031) (“First, respondent failed to raise any affirmative defenses in both her initial answer and her amended answer.  Therefore, such a defense is unsupported by the pleadings. ”)
[brief] Da418.  With respect to equitable fraud and unconscionable conduct, courts in New Jersey have defined such conduct as  A misrepresentation amounting to actual legal fraud consists of a material representation of a presently existing or past fact, made with knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that the other party rely thereon, resulting in reliance by that party to his detriment.  The elements of scienter, that is, knowledge of the falsity and an intention to obtain an undue advantage therefrom, are not essential if plaintiff seeks to prove that a misrepresentation constituted only equitable fraud.  Thus, ‘[w]hatever would be fraudulent at law will be so in equity; but the equitable doctrine goes farther and includes instances of fraudulent misrepresentations which do not exist in the law. ’
[brief] [...]’s Complaint does not purport to assert any claims under the Tort Claims Act.  Indeed, [...]’s proprietary function/implied contract theory was intended specifically to try to *circumvent* the Tort Claims Act.  [...]’s contention that the water supplied by [...] was unfit for its intended purpose is a quintessential product liability claim.  Knowing that the Tort Claims Act precludes such claims, and that such a claim would be further barred by [...]’s failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act’s mandatory pre-suit notice requirements, [...] attempted to circumvent those bars by pleading his claims as supposedly founded in contract.
[brief] [...] testified at his 2022 deposition as follows concerning his prior criminal convictions:  Q. Yeah.  Have you ever been convicted of a felony?  A. Yes.  Q.  When and how many times – let’s start at the beginning.  A. How many times?  Q.  More than one?  A.  What – what are we trying to get here?  What, are you trying to paint a picture of what my background used to be?  Yes.  I’m a recovering drug addict.  If you want to hear me out, yes.  I’m a recovery drug addict – Q. Okay.  A. -- that was over ten years clean.  And I have a past.  Yes.  I’ve been convicted.  I don’t count.  I don’t hold the past behind you.  So there’s your picture.  I painted it for you.  Q. Okay.  So now we’ll get back to answering my questions.
[brief] *Id.* at 277, 281.  In the case of *DeCicco v. Anderson*, 99 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1968), cited by [...], there was no dispute that both employees involved in the collision were on time for work: the crash occurred at 7:23 a.m. and work started at 7:30 a.m.  *Id.* at 245.  Like the Court in *Konitch*, the Court in *DeCicco* appears to have afforded dispositive weight to the fact that the injury occurred on premises owned by the employer, which is inconsistent with the more modern, fact-sensitive analysis espoused by this Court in *Mule* and *Manole*, where the location of the accident is not entitled to dispositive weight.
[brief] 15 U.S.C §1692 et seq. serve no useful purpose here.  Appellant acknowledges that there is limited state court jurisprudence on the licensure issue, “while there is no New Jersey appellate decision addressing the [NJCFLA] application to debt buyers there is a lower court decision, *[...] v. [...]*, DC-960-17, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688, *8 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018)” (Pb15) for the proposition that a buyer of distressed debt needs the license under the NJCFLA.
[brief] The trial court readily admitted there was not a scintilla of proof of substantial similarity and, yet, disqualified [...] anyway.  Evidently, the trial court misapprehended the mandate of *Trupos*.  Disqualification under RPC 1.9(a) is only appropriate where *two* factors coalesce: first, “the matters between the present and former clients must be the same or...substantially related,” and second, “the interests of the present and former clients must be materially adverse.
[brief] In Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472 (1995), the attorney for the seller provided misleading percolation composite reports on which the buyer relied to purchase the property.  He provided test results showing that the property percolated.  There, the attorney for the seller made a misrepresentation which the buyer relied on to purchase the property.  That was a case of negligent misrepresentation.  In this case, there is no claim of negligent misrepresentation because negligent misrepresentation did not occur.  In Petrillo, it was held that the attorney for the seller had a duty not to misrepresent negligently the contents of a material document on which he knew others would rely to their financial detriment.  In this case, there was no document which [...] relied on to his financial detriment.  At all times, [...] considered [...] and the [...] to be his attorneys, and he testified that he would not have retained [...] to provide legal services.  In fact, [...] did not do so.  Also, this is not a case, like Banco Popular, where the attorney issued an opinion letter to the non-client on which the non-client relied.  The record in this case demonstrates that [...] never issued an opinion letter to [...].  [...] received advice from [...].  D.  The Trial Court Properly Found, As A Matter Of Law, That Plaintiff [...] Miranda Did Not Have An Attorney-Client Relationship With Alexander [...] (T1:7:23-17:16)
[directive] Identification and Use of Forfeited Real Property  Investigative agencies, in conjunction with local 1.  United States Attorneys, are authorized to identify Directive October No. 1, 1993  9 Page of 2  5 seized or forfeited properties for potential transfer in support of the Weed and Seed initiative.  Where appropriate, they shall consult with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  As properties are forfeited, appropriate Weed and Seed transfers will be made pursuant to the policies and procedures set out herein.  The proposed uses of any property to be transferred so 2 . must be in accordance with the Weed and Seed initiative, focusing on support of community-based drug abuse treatment, prevention, education, housing, job skills and other activities that will United substantially further Weed and Seed goals.  States Attorneys are encouraged to consult with the Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture for guidance in particular cases.  The property must also be suited to the proposed use and the use must be consistent with all applicable Federal, State and local laws and ordinances.  Any proposed transfer must have the potential for 3 . significant benefits to a particular community and loss these benefits must outweigh any financial or adverse effects to the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.  Transfer of Forfeited Real Property Pursuant to Weed and C.
[brief] ”  147 N.J. Super. 582, 584-85 (App. Div. 1977) (citing Elmore S. & L. Ass’n v. D’Augustino, 103 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1968)).  Accordingly, the March 1, 2024 Order was plainly within the court’s discretion.  Petitioner’s excuse that she cannot retain counsel due to a lack of purportedly discoverable documents is unconvincing, particularly after a year-and-a-half since this court’s December 2022 opinion and order.  In reality, Petitioner has had since the decedent’s passing in 2019 to retain counsel to represent the Estate.  Her unspecific anecdotes that attorneys will not take on the case without obtaining certain documents do not change established case law that requires the Estate to have proper legal representation.  *Kasharian v. Wilentz*, supra, 93 N.J. Super. at 482; R. 1:21-1(a).  Furthermore, Respondent’s counsel previously offered to communicate with any potential attorney Petitioner was considering retaining in order to assist in providing any information needed to evaluate taking on the representation of the Estate.  (1T 11:13-19)  Petitioner incorrectly characterizes this matter as an assertion of her personal rights to seek recovery from the Respondents.  Of course, this is incorrect as any of the alleged claims belong to the decedent’s Estate and therefore require the assistance of counsel on its behalf.  Where Petitioner has not provided any valid excuses for her failure to retain counsel after five years since the alleged cause of action would have theoretically accrued, the trial court was correct to bring finality to this matter.  Enabling such finality was well within the trial court’s discretion, and this court should therefore affirm the March 1, 2024 Order of dismissal.
[brief] Here, the Court was not ordering a buyout of [...]’s interest as the sole remedy granted to Plaintiffs for acts of oppression found.  The Court also did not deny Plaintiffs’ compensatory damage claims, as occurred in *Balsamides*.  To the contrary, in this case millions of dollars in monetary awards for oppression or breach of duty, and anything else that Plaintiffs could assert in the arbitration, were imposed against [...], and all prior to the Court’s valuation.  This Court was thus deciding fair value only after that substantial and complete monetary relief had been afforded.
[brief] [...], Citation for violation of N.J.S.A. 23:4-16 Da3-Da4  3.  Forms for Municipal Appeal to the Ocean County Superior Court  Da5-Da8  I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On or about December 10, 2022, defendant [...] was cited by conservation officer [...] for violating N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(1), i.e. having a loaded firearm for the purpose of hunting within 450 feet of an occupied building.  Da1-Da2.  On September 13, 2023 [...] entered into a conditional guilty plea at the Manchester City municipal court as to his violation of that statute.  2T17-16 to 25, 2T18-1 to 18.  [...] appealed his conditional guilty plea to the Ocean County Superior Court on October 2, 2023.  Da5-Da8.  A hearing was held virtually on February 23, 2024.  1T1-1T40.  The Superior Court upheld [...]’s conditional guilty plea on the same day and ordered [...] to pay the same fine and court costs that were imposed by the Manchester City municipal court on September 13, 2023.1T39-7 to 10.
[brief] (A retaining wall is part of the Site Plan to separate elevated earth from the freshwater wetland buffer zone in the NE corner of the lot to hold back earth just off the NE corner of Building #1) (Pa55-59).  A mound or terrace raise the elevation of a lot, where they exist, with Earth.  It is clear in this context that ‘other devices’ also refers to any measure that raises the elevation of the lot under a building with Earth.  Therefore, if you raise the elevation with Earth as is being done here and you don’t call it mounding or terracing it falls under “other devices. ”  These three items (i.e. mounding, terracing and “other devices”) together clearly have the legislative intent of encompassing anything and everything that raises the elevation under a building with Earth.  Therefore, the trial Court should have determined the legal definition of the ordinance under the de novo review standard, rather than defer to the Board under the “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard.