ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE COURT ERRED BY ITS MISAPPLICATION OF CASE LAW IN EMPLOYING THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO DENY A DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS VIOLATION.  THE COURT FAILED TO BE APPRISED THAT THERE IS NO FEDERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS ARISING UNDER SECTION 1983 AND THAT LACHES DOES NOT GOVERN CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS.  IT IS “STATE TOLLING PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN THE TOLLING OF THE APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS ARISING UNDER 42 U.S.C.A. §1983, AS ITS ERRONEOUS DENIAL NEGATIVELY EFFECTUATED THIS CASE’S OUTCOME UNFAIRLY.  THE RELEVANT STATE’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR ANALOGOUS ACTIONS WOULD “NORMALLY” APPLY, HOWEVER, INVOKING THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE KNOWN AS THE DISCOVERY RULE, DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES  SURROUNDING THIS SPECIFIC CASE WOULD THEN HAVE WARRANTED AN EXCEPTION TO THE STATE’S STATUTE PERMITTING THE TOLLING OF TIME INTO 2023.
[brief] To the contrary, the Court found that service was legal.  The Court set forth further analysis into [...]’s own testimony that he had walked the dog and then joined his wife to drive south for a weekend vacation.  The Court noted that [...] testified that he had other investment properties, had faced multiple tax foreclosure actions, knew the process, knew the procedure, and likely just ignored this one.  The Court said:  We have the testimony of the defendant [...].  Now, this isn't really on -- this part of it isn't necessarily on the issue of -- of the service of process.  But what is striking to me is that he testified that there's no mortgage on the property.  He -- he has missed some tax payments.  He knew that there was a tax lien certificate on the property.  And he has had tax foreclosures filed against him in the past, and he never filed an answer, and just went in and redeemed it.  I think what happened here is that he did what he had done many other times and he missed it.
[directive] Actor issues or passes check knowing it would not be honored or if no account to draw on; 2C:21-5(a-c)  Bad  Checks  second or third or fourth degree or disorderly persons offense depending upon amount of check; second degree-$75,000 or more; third degree- $1,000 but less than $75,000; fourth degree if $200 but less than $1,000; disorderly persons-less than $200.
[directive] pretrial of possibility the subject to or program be by means an as adult be charged waiver should upon juvenile the that Directive under this determines court the to submit and it acomplaint-warrant prepare shall prosecutor the acomplaint-warrant, of or acomplaint-summons issue whether to deciding motion  In packet.  waiver juvenile of the part as appropriate apply shall the prosecutor the acomplaint-warrant, for court apply the to to See adult.  an as arrested been had originally person Directive the if as of this Section/subsection(s) Directive).  this an under adult as be shall treated court adult waived to 2.2.1 juvenile (a subsection seriousness and nature the (e.g., waiver an involuntary justifying circumstances the that expected is It will a invoke often delinquency) of history prior any of extent and the and/or nature charges the of complaint- apply to fora Directive of 4.
[brief] That case held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added), quoted in *State v. Watson*, 346 N.J. Super. 521, 531-32 (App. Div. 2002), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003).  In *Watson*, this Court “urge[d]” trial courts to use special interrogatories in cases involving charges subject to the Graves Act when use or possession of a firearm is not an element of the offense.  Id. at 534.  This special interrogatory was necessary.  *State v. Brooks*, cited above, also disposes of defendant’s specific complaint on “splitting” the elements by using two questions on the verdict sheet.  There, the use of two questions to determine whether passion/provocation had been disproven beyond a reasonable doubt, so that the defendant was guilty of murder, was held entirely appropriate.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 ................................................................................................................ i, 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 18  Legal Treatises Craig & Pomeroy, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law, § 6:2-3(b), p.133 (Gann, 2021).......................................................  14 Rules Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 3.1 to R. 2:10-2..............................................  9  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD ACQUIT DEFENDANT OF DWI  BECAUSE THE PROOFS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT [Da24a-25a, 10T4-1/4]  The evidence in this case fails to establish that Defendant [...], was under the influence of alcohol.  While there is no substantive challenge to the facts supporting the probable cause determination to arrest [...], there is an enormous difference between that probable cause determination and the quantum of proof necessary to prove whether [...] was under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt.  On review, particularly MVR evidence, this Court will see that no reasonable inference of intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt can be drawn, given the overly heavy reliance on SFST--techniques intended not to diagnose alcohol impairment but rather to assist an officer in deciding whether to arrest.
[brief] Similarly, a plaintiff need not have “knowledge of a specific basis for legal liability or a provable cause of action before the statute of limitations begins to run. ”  *Savage v. Old Bridge-Sayreville Med. Group*, 134 N.J. 241, 248 (1993); see *Vastano*, 178 N.J. at 236 (citing *Grunwald*, 131 N.J. at 494).  It is important to note that the discovery rule does not toll the statutory period when a legal malpractice plaintiff “clearly knew or should have known that he was harmed by his attorney's negligent advice”, but rather, “when the essential facts of the malpractice claim are reasonably discoverable”.  *Vastano*, 178 N.J. at 236 - 242.  For reference, in *Vastano*, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs’ claim did not accrue when plaintiffs “actually” learned of a settlement offer, but rather, when the plaintiff’s obtained possession of their case file.
[brief] Defendant has accomplished neither.  [...] was deceased at the time of trial counsel’s representation of Defendant.  Though the confidentiality obligation continues after a client’s death, certainly the representation of Defendant was not directly adverse to Jordan’s interests as a deceased individual.  There is no evidence that trial counsel’s representation of the defendant was materially limited by trial counsel’s representation of Jordan.  Defendant’s bald assertion to the contrary is insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing, which would thus be a fishing expedition attempting to locate some reason why the representation constituted a prohibited conflict of interest and why the representation prejudiced Defendant, as none presently exist nor are asserted beyond bare speculation.
[brief] Citizens and residents of Hoboken displeased by the Board’s decision to disregard Hoboken’s decision to impose stringent limits on the sale of cannabis within 600 feet of schools decided to take action.  Several of them – [...], [...], [...] (both of whom also testified at the September Planning Board meeting), and [...] formed [...] in the period between the September 14, 2022 and October 13, 2022 meetings of the Board.
[brief] ”  Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar v. McDevvit, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003)).  “CEPA defines actionable retaliation as ‘the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment.
[brief] 2T58-22 to 2T61-24.  Without the conditions necessary to grow, Stachybotrys Chartarum is incapable of producing the quantity of trichothecene necessary to cause injury.  2T28-5-17.  When asked to identify food that could support Stachybotrys Chartarum growth, [...] explained that bran flakes could potentially support its growth, provided they remained wet for days.  2T60-20 to 2T61-3.  So, if [...] ate multi-day-old wet cereal, that would be a possible household food that could have supported the growth of Stachybotrys Chartarum and potentially caused injury.  There is no evidence [...] ate multi-day-old wet cereal.  Based on these facts, [...] concluded that there was insufficient evidence to meet the fourth step in his exposure pathway analysis, *i.e.*, that Stachybotrys Chartarum grew in [...]’s food and produced appreciable levels of trichothecene.
[brief] Since [...] alleged that it believed payment was lawful under \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)}, as a measure of good faith, [...] submitted a Questionnaire so [...] could comply with the statute and so the parties could come to an amicable agreement with [...] over a fair, reasonable, and compliant payment with the statute.  But rather than do the right thing, Defendants thumbed their nose at [...] (and, by extension, the 27,000+ [...] and their families), and refused to return any of the money, and refused to comply with the law they claim authorized their payment.
[brief] *Baez v. Paulo*, 453 N.J. 422, 439 (App. Div. 2018).  The purpose of the rule is to render timely the complaint filed by a diligent plaintiff, who is aware of a cause of action against an identified defendant but does not know the defendant's name.  *Gallagher v. Burdette-Tomlin Hosp.*, 318 N.J. Super. 485, 492, (App.Div.1999), aff'd, 163 N.J. 38 (2000).
[brief] 35, 37 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-13 ...................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 (a) ..................................................................  37  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28 ......................................................................  32  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(b)(2) .................................................................  34  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 ......................................................................  33, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) .................................................................. 47, 48 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89 (d) and (e) ..................................................  36  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48 ........................................................................... 6 N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48(b).  ......................................................................  6 N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9 ......................................................................... 6, 7, 20, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16. 9(x).  ....................................................................  23, 24  Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration §8.4, (2023)  ...............  36, 37  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] In particular, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 provides:  “A financial agreement approved pursuant to this act shall include findings by the municipality, approved by the municipal governing body, setting forth appropriate tax exemption provisions and an appropriate annual service charge schedule which shall be based upon the provisions of section 12 of this act and the municipalities determinations as to a.  The relative benefits of the project to the redevelopment of the redevelopment area when compared to the costs, if any, associated with the tax exemption.  b.  An assessment of the importance of the tax exemption to be granted in obtaining the development of the project and in influencing the locational decisions of probable occupants of the project. ”  [Emphasis added]  The core question, then, in determining whether an exemption is “appropriate,” then, is whether the exemption is actually necessary to attract investment in a redevelopment project.
[directive] 2C:40-26(a)(b)  4th Degree $2,500 to $25,000  10% permissible Vehicle During Period of License b.  Actor operates a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension in violation of Suspension N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, and the actor’s license was suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a  80  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] Third, settled interpretative principles governing tax exemption statutes apply with equal force to redevelopment exemptions, including those under the LTTEL.  In Millennium Towers Urban Renewal LLC v. Municipal Council of _____________________ 12Plaintiffs note that the Local Redevelopment Law, in the section discussing review by the Commissioner of Community Affairs of ANR determinations, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6b(5)(c), states that the determination shall be binding if supported by “substantial evidence. ”  However, the Court in Malanga did not rely on or even reference this provision for its interpretation of Section 12A-5(d) presumably because it viewed the Blighted Areas Clause as mandating that there be sufficient evidence that a designated area meets the ANR requirements.  City of Jersey City, supra, 343 N.J. Super. at 376, the Court made clear that LTTEL merely authorizes municipalities to grant such abatements, it does not obligate them to do so.  Secaucus v.  Jersey City, 19 N.J. Tax 10, 28 (Tax 2000) affirmed the principle that in the redevelopment context “tax exemptions are to be granted … only to those who comply strictly with the applicable requirements. ”  The Court wrote that “the policy in favor of development and redevelopment of blighted areas” must coexist with “the strong public policy that exemptions are to be granted sparingly. ”  This rule of construction furthers the equitable principle that everyone should bear [their] just and equal share of the public tax burden. ”  Id.  See also, Princeton University Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214 (1961)(embracing these principles with respect to an exemption application under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.)  Fourth, fundamental due process considerations also require that a long-term exemption under LTTEL be subject to meaningful judicial review to ensure that the applicable requirements have been met.
[brief] At the time of the August 2017 and January 2018 incidents, [...] was located at [...] in [...].  (15T:134-21 to 25)  Until 2011, [...] and [...] owned the building at [...] and rented it to [...].  (15T:78-3 to 10; 135-11 to 136-13)  In 2011, they sold the building to [...] for $475,000.  (15T:137-7 to 15; 159-5 to 18)  Although [...] had initially agreed to pay $500,000 to buy it, [...] insisted on reducing the sale price to make up for money her mother loaned her when she got married.  (15T:136-18 to 138-12)  [...] testified that her husband had refused to let her pay back the $25,000 loan during their marriage.  (15T:109-4 to 10; 120-5 to 10)  To make sure the money was paid back, [...] insisted that repayment of the loan was a condition of their divorce decree.  (15T:119-14 to 120-20)  [...] testified that [...] was “controlling,” “verbally and emotionally abusive,” and had created problems for her with her two sons, [...] and his brother [...].  (15T:98-18 to 25; 107-5 to 15)  [...]’s father’s dissatisfaction about the terms of the divorce decree led to a rift between [...] and her sons because their father “would incite anger into them. ”  (15T:101-10 to 12; 111-3 to 9)  [...] had not seen [...] since “at least” 2011 and saw [...] “very little. ”  (15T:111-6 to 17)  August 17, 2017
[brief] On November 6, 2006, [...] ([...]) filed their amended complaint on behalf of Anthony and [...] which complied with the Court’s order to remove the defamatory content.  Subsequently however in the late summer of 2006, a republication of the defamatory content, a further embellished version, was published on the internet.  The content was published on a fictitious website that surreptitiously mimicked the true website of [...]’s granite manufacturing corporation, [...] ([...]); the fictitious website was titled ‘[...],’ altered simply by adding a hyphen (-), between Gibraltar and Granite to maximize its impact.  [...]’s FHR was subsequently found by a federal Magistrate Judge in New Jersey to be false and inaccurate, and violated a unanimous decision the United States Supreme Court, which made such a publication a unwarranted violation of personal privacy.  On December 20, 2009, [...] republished the embellished version of [...]’s alleged criminal history on PACER without fact checking the authenticity of the content and neglecting to recognize that the majority of the content, contained in the Emmanouil Complaint had been expunged and ordered physically destroyed by a Pennsylvania Court thirty-five (35) years earlier.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County Ind.  No. 13-06-0874  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] As mentioned above, decisions on non-compliance and sanctions imposed for violating a court order is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge.  Here, [...] is the prevailing party and the Court failed to award attorneys fees to be paid by [...].  It was abuse of discretion for the lower court to deny [...] prevailing party attorney's fees (246a) after the lower court in its 8/29/22 Order (60a) granted [...]'s 7/18/22 motion to enforce the 8/28/20 Order (8a).  The Lower Court has presented no rational explanations, or permissible basis, or good reasons to support a finding that [...] should not be required to pay attorney's fees for the violation of litigants' rights for failure to comply with the August 2020 Final Order (8a) after it was affirmed by this Court on 5/18/22 until “7 days after the date of the 8/29/22 Order” (60a).  Defendants, however, even violated the 8/29/22 Order and did not pay the 8/28/20 ordered attorney's fees until 9/13/22.  “A trial court's award of attorney's fees is disturbed "only on the rarest of occasions, and then See 9/13/22 certification (74a) at paragraph 13. only because of a clear abuse of discretion."  *Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc.*, 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (quoting *Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier*, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)).  This is because a "trial court [is] in the best position to weigh the equities and arguments of the parties."  *Packard-Bamberger & Co.*, 167 N.J. at 447.  We reverse only if the award is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."  *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting *Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).  The denial of an award of counsel fees to plaintiffs for successfully enforcing the affirmed final order (8a) was error.  OPRA allows a prevailing party to receive reasonable attorney's fees.  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.  "[T]he phrase 'prevailing party' is a legal term of art that refers to a 'party in whose favor a judgment is rendered.'"  *Mason v. City of Hoboken*, 196 N.J. 51, 72 (2008) (quoting *Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res.*, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)).  To correct this abuse of discretion, [...] requests this Court reverse the denial of prevailing party attorney's fees for [...]'s successful enforcement mandate the lower court now enter an appropriate award.
[brief] *Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency, supra*, 197 N.J. Super. 339, 346.  Thus, "the insurer cannot avoid responsibility for the insured's failure to receive notice ... by claiming that it is the broker who is primarily responsible for sending such notices to the insured."  *Insigna v. Hegedus*, 231 N.J. Super. 562, 567 (App.Div.1989).
[brief] He performed a subtotal colectomy, removing most of her colon but leaving the lower sigmoid.  6T127-23 to 128-2.  He also performed an ostomy, whereby the small intestine is brought to the skin so that the contents of the intestine can empty into a bag.  6T128-3 to 15.  Defendant found no evidence of an ulceration or perforation of the bowel, nor the presence of bowel contents in the peritoneum.  6T128-20 to 25.  Unfortunately, on June 14, 2016, the day after her surgery, decedent died.
[brief] However, “no presumption as to the negligence of an employer in hiring an independent contractor arises from the fact that, after being hired, the contractor is negligent in the performance of his duties and injures the person or property of another. ”  *Mavrikidis*, 153 N.J. at 136; see also *Cassano v. Aschoff*, 226 N.J. Super. 110, 114 (App. Div. 1988) (the fact that a contractor is negligent or incompetent in the manner in which he performs a particular job does not mean that he is incompetent generally).
[brief] On May 17, 2020, [...] responded to a call for an unconscious female.  (1T34-20 to 36-16).  At the house he went upstairs and entered the bedroom, where he found [...] under blankets soaked in blood.  (1T38-20 to 39-8; 1T39-24 to 40-5).  [...] testified that the bedroom was “a pretty gruesome scene” so he requested additional personnel to the scene.  (1T39-24 40-8 to 16).  B.
[brief] See generally, State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 429 (1976) (imputing knowledge of police investigator to prosecutor); State v. Lozado, 257 N.J. Super. 260, 274 (App. Div. 1992) (imputing knowledge of police to prosecutor); United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1993) (imputing knowledge from “all enforcement agencies that had a potential connection with the witness” to prosecutor); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir. 1991) (imputing information known to “some arm of the state” to prosecutor).  [...]’s actions cannot be described as anything other than willful and outrageous.  B.
[brief] A reviewing court reviews the fact findings of the agency whose decision is on appeal, not of the ALJ.  A reviewing court should uphold those findings if they are supported by the record, even if the findings are contrary to fact findings of the ALJ whose decision the agency head reviewed, provided the agency head follows the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and makes the necessary statement of his or her reasons for rejecting the ALJ's findings.  It is not the function of the reviewing court to substitute its independent judgment on the facts for that of an administrative agency.  *In re Grossman*, 127 N.J. Super. 13, 23 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 292 (1974).  The standard of review outlined in *In Matter of Hendrickson*, 451 N.J.Super. 262 (App. Div., 2017) is inappropriate under the circumstances.  In *Hendrickson*, the vacancy complained of resulted from a lack of commissioners being appointed to the Commission.  In the present matter, the 2-2 deadlock resulted when one of the commissioners was absent.  To that end, the narrow exception carved by *Hendrickson* does not apply.
[brief] Second, the trial court’s practical instructions to the jury did not constitute a “critical stage” of trial for purposes of defendant’s right to be present.  A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at his trial by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I of the New Jersey Constitution.  (U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10; see State v. Dangcil, 248 N.J. 114, 135 (2021)).  However, a defendant’s right to be present is not absolute, and his right to counsel is limited to “critical stages of the prosecution . . . in which the substantial rights of the accused may be affected. ” (Dangcil, 248 N.J. at 135 (quoting State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69, 82 (2009)).  Here, the trial court’s communication regarding the practical aspects of the jury’s deliberation was not a “critical stage” of the trial, unlike the reading of the final jury instructions, which defendant was present for and did not object to.