ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT I THE RESENTENCING COURT’S FAILURE TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE MILLER FACTORS DENIED MARQUISE HAWKINS DUE PROCESS AND RESULTED IN THE IMPOSITION OF AN AGGREGATE SENTENCE THAT WAS FIVE YEARS LONGER THAN THE ONE RECOMMENDED BY THE STATE.  ACCORDINGLY, HE IS ENTITLED TO A NEW RESENTENCING (3T; 4T).  .........................................................17  A.  The Miller factors weigh strongly against the imposition of a lengthy sentence.  .........................................................19  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)  PAGE NOS.  i.  The court failed to consider the impact of [...]’s youth on his participation in the offense, as required under Miller factor one.  .......................22  ii.  The court failed to consider how [...]’s conduct was affected by peer pressure – including his adult co-defendant’s participation in the offense – as required under Miller factor three.  .................................................................27  iii.  The court failed to properly consider the effect of [...]’s youth on his ability to deal with police and prosecutors and to assist in his own defense, as required under Miller factor four.  ........................................................................................................30  B.  The resentencing court did not conduct any analysis when imposing consecutive sentences.  Had it done so, it would have imposed concurrent sentences.  .................................................................................. 34  C.  The resentencing court improperly adopted the original aggravating factors based on the reasons provided by the 2015 sentencing court, failed to address the mitigating factors raised by [...], and failed to order a new presentence report.  .......................38  i.  Had the resentencing court properly assessed the aggravating factors in light of the evidence presented at resentencing and the Miller factors, it would have given them minimal weight at best........................................................................................................40  ii.  The resentencing court failed to address the mitigating factors requested by [...], which were amply supported by the record.........................................................45 D.  Despite finding [...] clearly capable of rehabilitation and applying Miller factor five, the court once more imposed an extremely lengthy sentence with a nearly identical period of parole ineligibility.................................................................  48  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................50
[brief] Petitioner notes that in *Richardson*, the Court gave examples of possible qualifying events, including a gym teacher “who trips over a riser,” a policeman shot while pursuing a suspect, a librarian hit by a falling bookshelf while reshelving books, and a social worker catching her hand in a car door while transporting a child to court (Petitioner’s Br., p. 8, citing Richardson at 213-214).  However, the factual scenarios posited by the Court in Richardson were not then before the Court for its decision and were not necessary to the decision then being made.  See e.g., Bandler v. Melillo, 443 N.J. Super. 203, 210-211 (App. Div. 2015).  What is more, none of the scenarios proffered by Petitioner bear any resemblance to the incident involving Petitioner.  With specific reference to the hypothetical gym teacher who trips over a riser, Petitioner admitted below, and admits on this appeal, that he did not trip and he does not know what caused him to twist his ankle.  See Petitioner’s Br., p. 1 (“…he [Petitioner] didn’t trip over something or fall because of something on the ground”); IT22:17-23 (“I don’t recall, I don’t remember on what I twisted it”).  Indeed, [...] noted in his decision that Petitioner admitted at the hearing that he did not know why he fell (Aa18).  Thus, none of the scenarios posited by Petitioner have any relevance to the facts of this case.  The ALJ found Toops v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, No. A-1611-16T1, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1721 (App. Div. July 18, 2018) [RA - Exhibit A] to be analogous to the instant case.
[brief] [...], Esq.  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: May 9, 2025  [...], Petitioner-Appellant, v. [...], [...], [...], individually and in his official capacity, [...], individually and in his official capacity, [...], individually and in her official capacity, [...], individually and in her official capacity, [...], [...], and [...], as an interested party, and [...], as an interested party, Respondents.
[brief] Pa000198-207.  Neither the Settlement Agreement nor the related Implementation Memo addresses the 2016 promotional wages owed.  Indeed, the Implementation Memo has a term of June 7, 2017 through December 31, 2021.  Pa000198-212.  The effective date with respect to the entirety of the Implementation Memo, including salary adjustments, is July 7, 2017.  Id.  The Trial Court relied on the following term from the Implementation Memo to support its argument: “the below salaries shall be the entire compensation for each employee. ”  Pa000028.  The Trial Court then found that “Defendants' decision to modify the 2016 MOAs via the 2017 Notice of Implementation was reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in --- 1  The SOA had a separate Implementation Memo adjusting salaries and other terms and conditions of employment which was also effective June 7, 2024.  Defendants did not submit that memorandum in this action with their Trial Court filings.  need of stabilization and recovery."  Id.  The Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement never discussed back wages owed and by their own terms, were only effective prospectively from June 7, 2017.  Pa000198-212.  Defendants were also restrained by Court Order from modifying wages until June 7, 2017 which is after the period Plaintiffs are seeking earned and unpaid wages.  Id., Pa000289-296, 305-306.  There was no discussion or agreement for back wages addressed in the Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement despite the Trial Court’s reliance on the vague statement of “entire compensation. ”  Dismissal was inappropriate on this basis.  At minimum, the parties should be permitted to conduct discovery to determine whether the promotional pay at issue in this matter was encompassed by the Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement.  The Trial Court and Defendants’ assertions are contrary to the terms of the Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement.  The Trial Court erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs’ viable causes of action which must be reversed by This Court.
[brief] A.  **Plaintiff Appeals  The Court’s May 8, 2023 Final Judgment In Part, And June 26, 2023 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration In Its Entirety, Because The Trial Court Improperly Assigned De Minimus Value For Plaintiff’s Membership Interest In [...] (Raised Below In May 28, 2023 Motion For Reconsideration (Aa66))**
[brief] 24  A.  Courts must interpret a statute to comport with the State Constitution so long as the statute is reasonably susceptible to such interpretation .................................................................  26  B.  The Mandatory Notification Policies raise serious constitutional questions by singling out gender-nonconforming students for disparate treatment.  ..........................  27  1.  The New Jersey Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is independent and robust...........................................  27  2.  The district policies raise serious equal protection issues by treating gender-nonconforming students differently from other students.................................................. 29  a.  The nature of the right at stake ..............................................  30  b.  The harm of the challenged policies.................................  34  i.  Individual harm to students ............................................. 35  ii.  Harm to schools ............................................................  40  iii.  Inadequate safeguards ..................................................  40 c.  The failed justification for the district policies.............  41  i.  Parental notification over students’ objection is not constitutionally compelled.  .......................  41  ii.  State and federal school records laws do not compel parental notification .........................  42  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................
[directive] K-9 trainers must meet all of the following criteria:  Satisfactory completion of K-9 training equivalent to that set forth herein.  Five years experience as a police patrol dog handler.  Must be either a full-time law enforcement officer assigned to trainer's duties by his/her employing law enforcement agency, or a former law 8 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements enforcement officer who had previously been assigned canine trainer’s duties by his/her employing law enforcement agency, and is retained by a law enforcement agency as a trainer.  Satisfactory completion of a Methods of Instruction Course approved by the Police Training Commission or an equivalent course.  Must have assisted a supervising K-9 trainer in the delivery of one or more basic K-9 training courses satisfying the requirements set forth herein or courses having substantially equivalent requirements, during which a minimum of ten K-9 teams were successfully trained and qualified.  The prospective trainer must have been present for and assisted with the majority of training time.  K-9 Trainers - Specialty Specialty K-9 trainers must meet all of the following criteria:
[brief] Notably, despite the fact that [...]’s “Accident Investigation Form” inquires whether a U-boat was involved in the reported injury (Pa153-Pa154), [...] failed to institute a formal safety training program on the proper use of the U-boats that are supplied to its customers.  The absence of [...] implementing such a formal training program is indicative of the failure on the part of [...], as a business owner, to abide by its duty of owing invitees, such as Plaintiff, a duty of reasonable or due care to provide a safe environment for doing that which is within the scope of the invitations.  See Nisivoccia, supra, 175 N.J. at 563.
[brief] Nevertheless, when interpreting that term, the Third Circuit and the New Jersey Supreme Court have consistently contemplated conduct beyond the confines of the written agreement.  See, e.g., *Instructional Systems*, 130 N.J. at 352, 614 A.2d 124 (defining “license” in terms of “a reasonable belief on the part of the consuming public”); *Cooper Distributing*, 63 F.3d at 272 (holding that “a reasonable jury could have inferred the existence of a ‘license’ based on various aspects of the lengthy ... relationship” between the parties).  Therefore, I must do the same.  179 F.R.D. at Footnote 9 (emphasis added).  To be sure, the Lithuanian Court rightfully recognized that the “written arrangement” requirement of the NJFPA is merely a minimal evidentiary hurdle, finding that two letters merely designating a business as an authorized dealer of products in certain locations could satisfy the NJFPA’s writing requirement.  See id.
[brief] POINT VII: COUNT FIVE, “CLASS OF ONE ENDANGERMENT RES IPSA LOQUITUR,” WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS TO HIGHLAND PARK.  First, it should be noted that “Res Ipsa Loquitur” is not a claim, it is a doctrine which permits an inference of a defendant's negligence.  A jury may infer such negligence:  "[W]here (a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality was within the defendant's exclusive control; and (c) there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff’s own voluntary act or neglect."  *Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co.*, 26 N.J. 263, 269 (1958).  Res ipsa loquitur is grounded in probability and the sound procedural policy of placing the duty of producing evidence on the party who has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the causative circumstances.  *Id.*  The effect of the doctrine is to establish a prima facie case by permitting the jury to infer negligence.  *Id.*  This inference, however, is purely a permissive one that the jury is free to accept or reject.  *Kahalili v.  Rosecliff Realty, Inc.*, 26 N.J. 545, 606 (1958).  Furthermore, the rule does not shift the burden of persuasion; the most that is required of defendant is explanation, not exculpation.  *Id.* *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 525-526 (1981).  For the same reasons as set forth above, Plaintiff failed to make a *prima facie* showing of “Class of One Endangerment” under the theory of *res ipsa loquitur* against the Defendant Borough.  Plaintiff has failed to identify any act of Defendant Borough which would give rise to such liability and does not appear to have pled this claim against [...].  This claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment as to Defendant Borough of [...].
[brief] ..................................................................................  17  Other Authorities  N.J.A.C. 1:1-16 ............................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 52:14 ............................................................................................  1, 13, 18, 20 R. 2:2-3 .......................................................................................................  2, 12, 13, 18 R. 2:5-5 .......................................................................................................  5, 21 R. 2:9 .........................................................................................................  11 R. 4:33 .......................................................................................................  11, 17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The compelling difference between the LTTEL and the NJFMA that is important here is that under the NJHFMA no service charge is paid to the county.  In *re Approval of a Financing Commitment for the Project Known as Norman Towers*, Docket No. [...], was decided May 31, 2022, by the Appellate Division (“Norman Towers”) Pa267).  The Appellate Division in the Norman Towers case, supra, affirmed the decision of the [...] upholding its mortgage financing commitment to the [...].  There, the Appellate Division recognized Plaintiff’s appeal was based upon the premise that the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (LTTEL), N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 to -22, repealed the NJ Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency Law (NJ[...]), N.J.S.A. 55:14K-37(b).
[brief] \(^4\)  Defendant's sentence was lawful, reasonable, and does not shock the conscience, and it should be affirmed.  \(^4\)  Defendant does not challenge on appeal the judge's findings regarding the aggravating factors and lack of any applicable mitigating factors, and has thus waived any such challenges.  See Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 421 N.J. Super. 489, 496 n.5 (App. Div. 2011) (explaining that claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2018) (noting that an issue not briefed is considered waived).  Nevertheless, for the reasons thoughtfully and thoroughly expressed by [...] at sentencing, the judge properly applied each of the aggravating factor and properly found that no mitigating factors applied.
[brief] (6T 157-22)  She also took [...]’s shoes off, though she testified that she did not know why she did this.  (6T 162-16 to 24)  Just before she left, she decided to “double-check[ ]” that her wallet and phone were not in [...]’s pockets.  (6T 163-12 to 15)  She explained that after the end of what is shown on the surveillance video, she was “driving around aimlessly, pulling over sometimes and just crying.
[brief] The Court provided a specific reference to page 22 of the plaintiffs’ moving brief in support of this position.  (1T:35:15-17).  The Court also provided further analysis of the plaintiffs’ brief setting forth why the Motion to Vacate the January 19, 2016 Order would not be granted.  (1T:36:4-37:2).  The Court provided a detailed analysis concerning the counts not labeled as legal malpractice, determining that an Affidavit of Merit was needed, pursuant to the analysis of Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 (2002) and that the dismissal of the entire Complaint was appropriate.
[brief] See State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280, 295 (1995).  Indeed, the application for the sneak and peek was rife with examples of the premises being used as a stash house, in which the Appellate Division noted “[...]’s uncharacteristically low electric bills indicative of a stash location, and defendant’s and the drug suppliers’ frequent and short visits to the [...] where none of the three lived. ” (Da46).  Additionally, in compliance with the Wiretap Act and in support of the application for a warrant, the detective provided a lengthy and detailed affidavit which: outlined numerous phone calls about suspected cocaine sales, referencing quantities and prices; included accounts of surveillance or defendant or the codefendants entering and quickly exiting [...]; noted that the electric bill, which was in the name of someone who did not live at the apartment, was significantly lower than the surrounding apartments, indicating it was a stash house; and included information provided by confidential informants.
[directive] A law enforcement officer shall be permitted to review or receive an accounting of a BWC recording prior to creating any required substantive initial reports, providing a statement, or submitting to an interview regarding the recorded event, except under the following circumstances: (a) the incident involves the use of force by the officer, where the officer knows or should know that the use of force resulted in significant or serious bodily injury or death; (b) the incident involves the discharge of a firearm or any other use of deadly force by the law enforcement officer;6
[brief] Redding-Hunter, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 206 A.D.2d 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1994) ..................................  49  Restoration Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Selective Way Ins. Co., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2587 (App. Div. Oct. 12, 2011)
[brief] The Appellate Division discussed the Entire Controversy Doctrine’s purposes:  The entire controversy doctrine requires a party to litigate all aspects of a controversy in a single legal proceeding.  The doctrine’s purposes are (1) the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay.  The application of the doctrine requires that a party who has elected to hold back from the first proceeding a related component of the controversy be barred from thereafter raising it in a subsequent proceeding [emphasis supplied].  Here, the Appellate Division’s discussion obliterates [...]’s reliance on the Entire Controversy Doctrine because there was never a first proceeding as required by N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1, et seq. (adjudication of school law disputes) or R. 4:69-5 (Exhaustion of Remedies).
[brief] The second assignment ([...] Assignment) is dated March 8, 2022.  (Pa0351 – Pa353).  This document is captioned ‘Acknowledgement of Attorney Charging Lien’.  (Id.).  However, it too is an assignment of the [...] v. [...] legal malpractice action.  The Abdy Assignment purports to assign all of [...]’s rights to the proceeds of the Legal Malpractice action to his former attorney, [...] who litigated the earlier lawsuit with [...].  (Id.).  The Abdy Assignment provides in relevant part; 3.
[brief] 47 State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398 (2008) ...............................................................  37 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) ..........................................................  48 Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) ...........................................  30 Young v. State, 879 A.2d 44 (Md. 2005) ............................................................ 24 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1) ...................................................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2) ...................................................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3) ...................................................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b) ......................................................................................... 34 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(c) ......................................................................................... 31 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2(a) ......................................................................................... 33 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) ......................................................................................... 33 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) .................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2) .................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a) ......................................................................................... 34 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2) .................................................................................. 34 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ......................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2) .................................................................................. 49 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) .................................................................................. 49 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) .................................................................................. 49 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) ........................................................................................................... 49 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8)-(9) ...................................................................................................... 49 OTHER AUTHORITIES Cannel, N.J. Criminal Code Annotated, cmt 2. on N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4 (2007) .. 37 [...] [committee co-chair], Statement Before U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee (March 18, 2009) ............................................. 12 Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and 3(a)(2)) (rev. Jun. 14, 2004)
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT………...1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY…………..3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ………3  LEGAL ARGUMENT………………8  POINT I (5a,11a,16a)  A Court Can Not Reinstate a Complaint That It Dismissed Because Plaintiff Violated R 1:20-A6’s Pre-Action Notice as It is Void Ab Initio and Deprived the Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Thus, Any Judgment on That Complaint is Also Void……………………8  POINT II (5a,11a,16a)  Plaintiff Sought Reinstatement of a Void Complaint in Violation of Rule 1:20A-3(e)  Directing a New Complaint Must Be Filed, And the Lower Court Allowing Reinstatement Undermined Defendant’s Due Process Rights to File her Defenses, Counterclaims and for a Stay…..14  POINT III (5a,11a,16a)  In Addition to Lacking Subject Matter Jurisdiction, The Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant Who Was Never Served and Only Appeared by Special Appearance to Successfully Dismiss the Unlawful Complaint And Vacate Default Judgments  Plaintiff Obtained Unlawfully………………………………………………16  Point IV (see appellate docket)  The Lower Court’s Letter filed on this Docket is Inaccurate, Erroneous and Shows Reinstatement Was Improper and that R 4:67 Was Ignored…19  CONCLUSION…………………………21