ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Nevertheless, plaintiffs’s argument is without merit as the Notice of Appeal was filed within 45 days of the entry of the final order dealing with the most important issue on the remand—the turn-over of the fund in court.  It is fundamental that only a final order or judgment may be appealed as of right.  R. 2:2-3.  It is also fundamental that a final judgment or order is the last decision from a court that resolves all issues in dispute & settles the parties’ rights with respect to those issues.  A final judgment leaves nothing to be decided.  At issue below was which party was entitled to the turn-over of the fund in court & the correct turn-over order.
[brief] V.  The Commission failed to properly apply its own standards and precedents when considering violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) (Pa16)  In its decision to dismiss the proposed violations of 18A:12-24.1(g) of specific Board members, the Commission indicated:  “Although it is clear that the named Respondents, in the circumstances described, advocated for a matter or issue of public importance which they felt was in the best interests of the District, Complainant has not pled sufficient facts evidencing unethical behavior by each of the named Respondents.  As with the violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) by the “Board,” the claimed violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) by Respondent [...], Respondent [...], Respondent [...], and Respondent [...] are equally unsupported by specific evidence of unethical behavior”.  (Decision on Motion to Dismiss, Pa16).
[brief] 100 N.J. at 647; see also State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 373 (2019).  For example, "[c]rimes involving multiple deaths or victims who have sustained serious bodily injuries represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition of consecutive sentences."  Carey, 168 N.J. at 428.  And because the five "facts relating to the crimes" set forth in Yarbough's third criteria are "applied qualitatively, not quantitatively," consecutive sentences may be imposed "even though a majority of the Yarbough factors support concurrent sentences."  Carey, 168 N.J. at 427-28.  Ultimately, "in determining whether the terms should be concurrent or consecutive, the focus of the court should be on the fairness of the overall sentence."
[brief] Our Supreme Court, interpreting R. 1:12-1(g) (formerly R. 1:12-1(f)), has set forth the standard as follows:  “Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge’s impartiality? ”  See DeNike, 195 N.J. at 517.  “However, before the court may be disqualified on the ground of an appearance of bias, the belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable. ”  State v. Presley, 436 N.J. Super. 440, 448 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997)).  Thus, the standard is objective reasonableness and not matters of appearance.
[brief] ”  (Da373)  She found “[t]he verdict relied upon the identifications at the scene by eyewitnesses, not the failure of Petitioner to establish an alibi,” and concluded, without support, that failing to call [...] was a strategic decision.  (Da373-74)  The PCR judge again applied an improperly onerous standard.  Also, the need for further investigation into [...]’s statement, and presenting her testimony at trial, should have been obvious to competent counsel since it was essential to fortifying the alibi defense.
[brief] The defense had enough fodder for cross examination in what they claim were prior inconsistent statements of the plaintiff concerning the altercation itself; and which were relevant in the liability phase.  There was no need to delve into plaintiff’s physical activities.  In any event, the fact that plaintiff can ride an ATV and climb a ladder is not necessarily inconsistent with his inability to work in a competitive job market, and the defense offered no expert testimony to say otherwise.  In Redvanly v. ADP, Inc., 407 N.J.Super. 395 (A.D. 2009), cert. denied, 200 N.J. 367, this Court ordered a new trial after a defense verdict because evidence relevant only to damages but impacting plaintiff's credibility, and which could have unduly prejudiced the plaintiff, should only have been admitted in the damages phase of a bifurcated trial:  "The after-acquired evidence is relevant and admissible only on the issue of damages.  Here, evidence of the '[...] issue' was admitted before the jury determined defendants' liability.
[brief] In *Superior Integrated Sols. V. Mercer Ins. Co. of N.J.*, No. A-1027-18T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147 (App. Div. Nov. 10, 2020), the Appellate Division analyzed a policy exclusion nearly identical to the exclusion in the instant matter.  In that regard, the policy in *Superior Integrated Solutions* excluded an injury “arising out of oral or written publication of material, done by or at the direction of any insured with knowledge that such is false or such would violate the rights of another and would inflict the injury. ”  The Appellate Division held that to enforce such an exclusion, the insurer could not merely rely on the allegations in the complaint, but instead, had to prove, among other things, that the insured intended to cause the injury at issue.  *Superior Integrated Sols. V. Mercer Ins. Co. of N.J.*, No. A-1027-18T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, at *22.  The Appellate Division held that the insurer failed to show that the insured intended the injury and, therefore, was obligated to cover the costs of the insured’s defense.  Id. at *23-24.  Here, the language of the exclusion in Superior Integrated Solutions is nearly identical to the exclusion in [...]’s Policy.  The exclusion at issue here excludes injuries either “[c]aused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict ‘personal and advertising injury’” or “[a]rising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity. ” (Da182).  Based on the holding in Superior Integrated Solutions, in order to deny coverage, [...] must show not only that [...] intended to violate the rights of another, but also, that [...] intended to cause the particular injury alleged.  It is not sufficient to merely accept the allegations of the Underlying Action as plead because New Jersey precedent requires more than “mere allegations. ”  See, e.g., Superior Integrated Sols., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, at *23 (“A claimant’s mere allegation of intentional harm does not alone justify an insurer’s refusal to provide a defense.  In order to bring the insured’s conduct within the exclusion there must be evidence that the insured subjectively intended to injure the claimant. ” (citing SL Indus. V. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188, 212 (1992)).  Notwithstanding, [...] based its entire motion on the mere allegations raised by the claimant in the Underlying Action, and the trial court granted summary judgment based on its review of the allegations in the Underlying Action.  (See 1T at 22:20-23 (“You take the complaint - - the allegations in the complaint and you take the policy and you look at each other and see whether it falls within it . . . .”).  By granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment based on the mere allegations in the Underlying Action and failing to conduct any analysis regarding subjective intent, the trial court erred as a matter of law.  [...] therefore respectfully requests this Court reverse the summary judgment order dated March 17, 2023.
[brief] On August 4, 2022, [...] issued a robust, sixty-four page Report and Recommendations (“Remand R&R 1”), which framed the “question posed on remand by the parties [as] whether the Appellate Division’s decision to limit the statute of limitations on RICO damages should change [the Special Master’s] and the Trial Court’s prior analysis that Plaintiffs’ RICO and non-RICO claims arose from the same common core of facts, making the majority of Plaintiffs’ fees compensable. ”  (Da39056-57.)  Based on a meticulous review of the panel’s decision and the record, the Special Master recommended that “the Appellate Division’s decision does not alter that prior holding. ” (Da39057.)  The Special Master then described in detail the specific bases for his findings and recommendations, all of which properly followed the Appellate Division’s mandate on remand.  (Da39057-89.)  The Special Master recommended an award to [...] in the amount of $10,666,468 for the work [...]’s counsel performed at the trial court level.  (Da39089.)  The Special Master requested, however, that the parties submit for review certain documents related to the work counsel performed before the Appellate Division and New Jersey Supreme Court.  (Da39029.)  After the parties submitted the requested documentation, on August 25, 2022, the Special Master issued a sixty-five page Supplemental Report and Recommendations (“Remand R&R 2”), which completed his recommendations to the trial court.  In Remand R&R 2, the Special Master provided a thorough analysis of his findings with respect to Plaintiffs’ applications for costs and fees associated with the work their counsel performed before the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court.  The Special Master recommended an award to [...] for that work totaling $937,912.76.  (Da39176.)  [...] filed objections to Remand R&Rs 1 and 2, which Plaintiffs opposed.  On November 16, 2022, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch.,\(^2\) issued an Order and corresponding thirty-eight page Statement of Reasons, addressing each issued remanded by the Appellate Division and adopting [...]’s recommendations for Plaintiffs’ fee applications in full.  (Da39964-40004.)
[brief] The passage from *Culver* cited by [...] was excerpted from this more in-depth analysis in *United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc.*, 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984):  This court has on more than one occasion grappled with the difficult question of identity of causes of action for purposes of claim preclusion, see, e.g., *Davis v. United States Steel Supply*, [688 F.2d 166, 171-72 (3d Cir. 1982), certiorari den., 460 U.S. 1014 (1983); *Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v. Accurate Products Co.*, 516 F.2d 583, 587-88 (3d Cir. 1975), and it bears repeating that the term “‘[c]ause of action’ cannot be precisely defined, nor can a simple test be cited for use in determining what constitutes a cause of action for res judicata purposes.
[brief] Indeed, [...] concedes that [...] did make various improvements to his Unit.  See Db14; 1T:74:8 (Agreeing that new sink and kitchen cabinets were installed); 1T:78:11-12 (Agreeing that water heater was replaced); 5T:64:7-8 (Agreeing that he vacated the Unit so that it could be --- \(^1\)  [...]’s Certification (as well as the other exhibits to [...]’s application for a rent increase) were not included in [...]’s Appendix.
[brief] Stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to [...] and [...]-filed May 16, 2023.................................3a  Doe v. Roe, 2023 WL 2542566 (App. Div.)...........................................5a  Moore v. Croatian American Bocci Club, 2008 WL 2548541 (App. Div.)..................................................................................11a Ricco v. Walmart, 2013 WL 5232496 (D.N.J.)........................................16a Spano v. Supervalu, Inc., 2016 WL 3943360 (Law Div.)............................26a Tchikindas v. Basser-Kaufman Management Corp., 2021 WL 1749961 (App. Div.).............................................................................30a McCann v. Borough of Washington, 2006 WL 2726818 (App. Div.).......37a Siegel v. County of Monmouth, 2007 WL 1628141 (App. Div.) certif. denied 192 N.J. 477 (2007).........................................................40a R. 1:36-3 certification of [...]................................46a TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS AND RULINGS ON THE CROSS APPEAL
[brief] ’ ”  Jeter v. Sam’s Club, 250 N.J. 240, 252 (2022) (quoting Nisivoccia, supra, 175 N.J. at 559).  As such, this rule gives rise to a rebuttable inference that defendant is negligent and eliminates the need for plaintiff to prove actual or constructive notice.  Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245, 258 (2015); See Nisivoccia, supra, 175 N.J. at 563-65; Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426, 429 (2015); Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 42 N.J. 355, 359-60 (1964).
[brief] To the extent the court found the issues are not identical because “the scope of the evidence sought to be suppressed is different,” this has no bearing on the constitutionality of the officers’ seizure of defendant and the evidence.  Whether defendant seeks to suppress all or some of the evidence seized as a result of officers’ pursuit and arrest of defendant does not affect the analysis of whether that pursuit and arrest was lawful.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the fact that defendant may seek to suppress statements he made during the course of his arrest does not alter this conclusion because “[t]he admission of a defendant’s statement against him at a criminal trial should not be the subject of a ‘motion to suppress.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2022-11  TO: All County Prosecutors Director, Division of Criminal Justice  FROM: [...], Attorney General DATE: October 21, 2022  SUBJECT: Rescission of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-03, Directive Regarding Non-Prosecution of Healthcare Facilities and Professionals Adhering to Triage Protocols  During COVID-19 Pandemic  As the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic pushed healthcare systems towards the limits of their capacity in March and April 2020, healthcare providers across the country considered how they would allocate scarce medical resources (such as ventilators) among their patients in the event that the need for those resources exceeded the supply.  Among the questions asked by healthcare providers confronting this weighty dilemma was whether they might face civil or criminal liability for triage judgments made as the pandemic bore down.  In New Jersey, this question was addressed through legislation and executive actions conferring a degree of immunity on healthcare facilities and professionals for certain acts or omissions relating to the pandemic response.
[directive] The Division on Civil Rights (DCR), as part of the Department of Law and Public Safety, under the authority of the Attorney General, is responsible for enforcing New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49.  Among other things and with some exceptions, the LAD makes it unlawful to discriminate against or harass a person based on race, color, creed/religion, sex/gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, nationality and ancestry.  The LAD also prohibits discrimination and harassment based on age, pregnancy, breastfeeding, marital status, familial status, domestic partnership status, civil union status, and service in the U.S. armed forces.  DCR’s jurisdiction is limited to addressing acts of bias, prejudice, discrimination, and harassment in:  Employment;  Housing and real estate;  Credit and contracting; and   Places of public accommodation, including schools, government buildings, restaurants, hotels, stores, hospitals, theaters, and other places open to the public.  Where it appears that there may have been discrimination or harassment based on any of the characteristics listed above, DCR has jurisdiction to accept complaints from individuals and to investigate those complaints.  Individuals need not be represented by Page 13 of 16 counsel to file a complaint with DCR; they simply must file a complaint within 180 days of the most recent act of discrimination or harassment.  DCR can also open its own investigation into discrimination or harassment without an individual filing a complaint.  This is called a Director-Initiated Investigation.  Where DCR’s investigation shows probable cause to believe prohibited discrimination or harassment has occurred, DCR will prosecute the violation either in the Office of Administrative Law or in Court.  After an administrative hearing, if DCR’s Director finds that the LAD has been violated, the Director has the power to order appropriate remedies, including money damages to the victim, injunctive relief, changes in policies, anti-bias or anti-discrimination training, and statutory penalties.  In some cases, a Bias Incident may also constitute a violation of the LAD.
[brief] The police identified the number for "[...]" on [...]'s phone as belonging to co-defendant [...] (24T32-19 to 24).  They located Bergholz on March 14, 2017, at a gas station in [...] (20T111-4 to 25).  He was in a pickup truck with the truck's owner, [...] (20T11-17 to 25;20T135-21 to 20T136-1;24T34-5 to 10).  Bergholz was wearing a green sweatshirt similar to the one seen on the bank surveillance video (24T34-18 to 25).  There was also what appeared to be blood on his sweatshirt, pants and boots, and cuts on top of his head (20T138-1 to 5;24T34-22 to 25).  The police took Bergholz to the Prosecutor's Office for questioning (20T136-2 to 10).  He claimed that he had nothing to do with what happened to [...] (16T148-1 to 13).  Bergholz's phone records showed that he searched the victim's name on the internet March 11, 2017, at 7:53 a.m.  (24T68-18 to 24T69-16;24T105-1 to 18).  The phone records also showed that on Thursday, March 9, 2017, he called defendant numerous times, that there were calls between them on March 10, and that Bergholz had made numerous unanswered calls to defendant's phone on March 12, 13, and 14, 2017 (24T59-12 to 24T77-21).  On March 11, 2017, Bergholz sent two text messages to defendant's phone at approximately 4:46 a.m. and 4:47 a.m: "Get everything out of your truck that I we or 'cause them clothes are dirty" and "You know what I mean" (21T226-6 to 18;24T83-7 to 22).  On March 12, 2017, Bergholz sent several texts asking defendant to respond (24T84-7 to 24T85-15).  Defendant was interviewed at the [...], on March 14, 2017, after the police had spoken to Bergholz (24T46-12 to 18;24T50-3 to 7).  Defendant had a pair of gloves in his sweatshirt pocket that were similar to the gloves seen on the [...] surveillance video (20T115-2 to 17).  The police took his gloves and his cellphone (20T115-18 to 20T117-19).
[brief] (Pa437-Pa438)  On that date, according to a Memo to File prepared by [...]'s office, an employee named "[...]" from [...] called [...]'s office to inquire why [...]'s cut sheets did not match [...]'s current plans.  (Pa437)  [...]'s employee wrote in the Memo:  "I explained to him that the plans that we were given [by [...]] to provide the layout was (sic) the original set dated 4/11/05.  We only recently received a newer set because we have been asked to do additional work onsite.  He now understood."  (Pa437, emphasis added).
[brief] Counsel for [...] did not attempt to ask [...] to offer an opinion about who was at fault or who caused the accident.  The nature of the evidence offered by [...]’s counsel in this case is entirely different than the opinion testimony that was excluded in Neno.  [...] simply sought to offer a diagram that showed the points of impact of the vehicles and their respective direction of travel.  The diagram does not suggest who entered the intersection first or how fast the vehicles were traveling.  Da140.  The primary basis of the diagram is [...]’s personal observations of the damage to the vehicles and where they came to rest at the scene.  2T:98-19 to 99-2.  Without this diagram the jury could have easily been confused about the direction of the three different vehicles and where each vehicle was located in proximity to the intersection at the time of the impact.  This error, in combination with the exclusion of evidence of [...]’s prior criminal convictions led directly to an unjust result and a grave miscarriage of justice.
[directive] If the defendant is charged with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3), or upon conviction of any imprisonment,25 other charged offense would be eligible for an ordinary or extended term of life the prosecutor shall apply for pretrial detention unless the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or the Director or a Deputy Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in cases prosecuted by the Division, finds that there are compelling and extraordinary reasons not to seek pretrial detention.  25  In these circumstances, the Bail Reform Law establishes a presumption that the defendant will be detained, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b), unless the court finds that the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2).  Page 60 7.4
[brief] On August 29, 2021 hurricane Ida made landfall in Louisiana as a category 4 storm.  She slowly made her way up the East Coast leaving a wake of destruction that was front page news on a daily basis.  On September 2, 2021 Ida reached the New York metropolitan area.  The day before, [...] signed Executive Order 259 declaring a state of emergency for all 23 counties in New Jersey.  Management took no action at all.  No plywood was installed to reinforce doors and windows at its entrances on Boulevard East.  No concrete barriers or sandbags were brought in to divert water until sand bags were brought in after Ida had passed.  No maintenance was performed to ensure the drains installed when the property was built were clear.  As a result what occurred was a repeat performance of a 2014 flood as water literally cascaded down the steps of the courtyard and accumulated waist high as indicated by the fact the air conditioning compressors adjacent to the doors were under water and eventually the pressure was so great that water came crashing through doors and flooding the lower level of the mall including the section in which Plaintiff’s units are located and several floors of residential apartments and a garage underneath.  I have photos of what occurred in 2014 and in 2021 which were provided to Defendant both well before filing the complaint and in discovery but since the case never got that far along they were never presented to the court and thus I have not included them in this appeal.
[brief] Further, "While a Complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, Id.; Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psych. and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of reh'g (Jan. 11, 1995), as amended on denial of reh'q (Jan. 11, 1995), a Plaintiff's obligation to provide the **1965 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation').  Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see § 1216 Statement of the Claim—Significance of "Claim for Relief", § 1216 Statement of the Claim—Significance of "Claim for Relief", § 1216 Statement of the Claim—Significance of "Claim for Relief", 5 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1216 (4th ed.) (hereinafter [...]) ('[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action')"