ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................  7 POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Pa2)  ......................................................  7 POINT II.  The FDCPA, as a Federal Statute, Should Be Construed Consistent with How Federal Courts Construe the Statute.  (Pa55-Pa56)  .................................................................................  7 POINT III.  Determining Congressional Intent of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  (Pa46-56) ........................................................................................................  10  POINT IV.  Putting in Context the FDCPA’s Bar Against Third-Party Communications.  (Pa46-Pa56) .................................................................  20  A.  FDCPA’s Purpose and Structure .................................................................  20  B.  Elements of an FDCPA Cause of Action ..................................................... 23  C.  The Bar Against Third-Party Communications.  ...........................................  26 POINT V.  The FDCPA’S Legislative History and Agency Interpretations are Consistent with the Federal Courts’ Decisions.  (As to Legislative History, Pa49)  ..............................................  33  POINT VI.  The Court Should Reverse the Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Non-FDCPA Claims.  (Pa56-Pa60)  .................................................................  35  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................
[brief] Notwithstanding, the Amici are advocating for a policy which results in preferential treatment for transgender students over cisgender students.  The parties fail to understand the narrow scope of the policy and the limited circumstances in which parents are notified.  Namely, the Amended Policy 5756 provides for parental notification when: i) A student formally changes a mandatory student record, including gender, as defined by N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1); ii) A student participates in a sport for a gender other than that assigned at birth; iii) Referring a student for outside health services, and the student’s sexual identity and expression is germane to the referral; and iv) A student uses a gendered bathroom, other than that assigned at birth, except a gender-neutral bathroom.  It is important to emphasize that notice is not required for a student requesting a different pronoun, dressing differently, or getting a school ID with a different name.  More specifically, “The school district shall accept a student’s asserted gender identity; parental consent is not required.  A student need not meet any threshold diagnosis or treatment requirements to have his or her gender identity recognized and respected by the school district, school, or school staff members.  In addition, a legal or court-ordered name change is not required.  The Board finds that conversations with counselors, teachers or other staff about one’s gender identity and expression are entitled to confidentiality.
[brief] [at 89, 397 A.2d 712; citations omitted]  Irrespective of the fact that [...] were not Plaintiffs, attorneys, they had a duty to disclose the truth and were bound in conscience and duty to recognize that the facts they concealed were significant and material.  As such, Plaintiffs absolutely demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact in dispute with respect to [...]’s failure to disclose facts and active concealment of facts.  Furthermore, the notion troublingly held by the Trial Court’s erroneous decision is that the law provides no remedy to parties who are victims of an attorney’s fraudulent schemes that constitute civil law theft if the parties had no principal-agent or attorney-client relationship.  This notion is not only explicitly contradicted by the relevant case law but is abhorrent and an offense to the integrity of our noble system of jurisprudence.
[brief] Quoting 5 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, *Products Liability*, §57.01[4], at 57–9 (2010).  2022) ("Under Pennsylvania law, manufacturers and distributors do not have a duty to recall or retrofit products.") (vacuum truck); Talarico v. Skyjack, Inc., 191 F. Supp.3d 394, 401 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (no “independent negligence cause of action exists in Pennsylvania under a duty to recall”) (forklift).  - **South Carolina:** Andrews v. CBS Corp., 2015 WL 12831309, at *1 (D.S.C. June 24, 2015) ("there is no-post sale duty to recall or retrofit products"; citing and following Bragg, supra) (asbestos containing products).
[brief] (9T 52-7 to 22)  [...] told [...] that [...] was not home and that she thought he was working out at [...] in [...] or around the boardwalk area.  (9T 52-2 to 53-17, 108-7 to 10)  [...] went to look for [...] at these locations but did not find him there.  (9T 53-24 to 54-1)  Around 10:30 a.m., [...] was contacted by either [...] or [...]\(^7\) asking him to come back to [...].  (8T 22-10 to 14)  [...] returned to the Tavern and met with Kevin [...] and [...] in the second-floor office.  (8T 22-15 to 23-10)  [...] and [...] showed [...] the surveillance video, although [...] testified at trial that he did not remember watching the surveillance video.  (8T 84-2 to 8, 23-18)  [...] told them he recognized the man he had seen that morning at the bar and that it was the man who used to work for [...] with red hair and a chest tattoo.
[brief] [...] therefore required a conditional use variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) that only the [...] could consider and grant.  Coventry Square, Inc. v. Bd. of Adj., 138 N.J. 285, 295 (1994).  The Board had no authority whatsoever to consider an application that required conditional use variance relief, and its review was unlawful.
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX  Case Management Order dated January 16, 2020 ..............................................................Ra001  TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Order Granting Respondent/Intervenor’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights, dated August 8, 2023 ........................................................................................................Pa001  Order Awarding Respondent/Intervenor with Counsel Fees and Per Diem Penalties, dated December 19, 2023 .........................................................................................Pa021  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### Cases - **Barr v. Barr**, 418 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 2011) .................................................. 42 - **Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Burlington Cnty. Planning Bd.**, 353 N.J. Super. 4 (App. Div. 2002)
[brief] See Materials Research Corp. v. Metron, Inc., 64 N.J. 74, 77 n.1 (1973) (“[c]ompliance with [this] requirement during the course of trial has been held sufficient for a plaintiff unqualified at the action’s inception to avoid being precluded from maintaining suit”) (citing Menley & James Laboratories, Ltd. v. Vornado, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 404, 414 (Ch. Div. 1966) (certificate of authority to do business in New Jersey procured by plaintiff during trial removed “statutory impediment” to bringing suit).  Other published cases in New Jersey support this result.  In [...] Funding, L.L.C. v. Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, 21 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D.N.J. 1998), [...] filed suit while not complying with N.J.S.A. 42:2B–57(a), which said: “A foreign limited liability company doing business in this State may not maintain any action, suit or proceeding in this State until it has registered in this State[.]”  [...] eventually cured the defect, but the defendant still argued the case should be dismissed because [...] “had no standing to file suit. ”  That argument was rejected by the court because “[t]ime and time again, New Jersey courts have reiterated their understanding that a company’s failure to register before filing does not require dismissal so long as the company corrects the deficiency and files during the proceedings. ”  [...], 21 F.Supp.2d at 473 (citing Materials Research Corp., supra; Menley & James Labs., supra; Grow Farms Corp. v. National State Bank, 167 N.J. Super. 102, 114 (Law Div. 1979)(“[e]ven if plaintiff is later found to… require authorization… it would still be permitted to comply with those statutory provisions during the trial of the matter to avoid a dismissal”); Peter Doegler Brewing Corp. v. Spindel, 14 N.J. Misc. 523, 524 (1936)(same)).  Basement Store Franchise Corp. v. Natoli, 2014 WL 4328218 at *4 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 3, 2014) (where plaintiff complied with requirement during pendency of litigation, dismissal of complaint and denial to reinstate complaint were reversed); Berlin, Sachs & Werkstell v. Cart-Wright Indus., Inc., 1990 WL 126197at *4 n.2 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 1990) (“the practice of many New Jersey courts has been to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to comply…during the pendency of the litigation”); see also Jamar Development, LLC v. Moderate Income Management Co., 2021 WL 1647793 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2021), and Tri-State Motorplex, Ltd. v. Apex Mortgage Corp., 2021 WL 843228 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2021) (permitting plaintiff to proceed with the previously filed suit after curing the failure to register).
[brief] (Pa80).  Additionally, the court’s oral opinion placed on the record and its Statements of Reasons both cite to the March 4, 2022, Order as additional support for its conclusions of law.  (Pa86, 1T at 17:3-17).  The trial court set forth its statement of reasons to support the March 4, 2022, Order, in an oral opinion placed on the record.  (Pa225).  The court’s March 4, 2022, opinion is probably its most comprehensive examination of the issues presented, and the court later indicated that it established the law-of-the-case in many respects.  This opinion is explicitly cited by the court in its September 9, 2022, opinions, and it should be included when analyzing the adequacy of the court’s reasoning pursuant to Rule 1:7-4.  Importantly, the trial court’s opinion set forth on the record on March 4, 2022, declared Count One of the Verified Complaint to be moot, as follows:  Plaintiff’s application as to the reorganization is moot.
[directive] Law enforcement agencies must establish and implement a process of investigation and review that is both meaningful and objective.  The process must be 4 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 designed to ensure that individuals receive adequate redress for legitimate complaints of misconduct.  It is not enough for law enforcement executives to adopt a policy governing the receipt, investigation and resolution of complaints of officer misconduct; rather, the policy must be implemented and executed with a commitment to the integrity of the agency and the constitutional rights of the public.  Agencies with an objective and fair internal affairs process will limit their risk of civil liability.
[brief] The trial court properly held that without any such analysis by [...], his mention of RPC. 1.5(a) did not provide an analysis of [...]’ invoice based upon a recognized legal standard; it was insufficient for [...] to simply indicate that RPC 1.5(a) is the recognized standard.  Likewise, [...]’s mention of case law addressing an attorney’s responsibility to their client and other general issues (i.e., a lawyer’s fiduciary duty to his client) did not provide any standard supporting [...]’s opinion that the invoices issued by [...] were unreasonable or violated [...]’ obligation to [...].  The trial court also properly held that “[t]he expert’s opinion must be based on standards accepted by the legal community and not merely on the expert’s personal opinion. ”  Stoeckel, 287 N.J. Super. at 14.  “Evidential support for an expert opinion is not limited to treatises or any type of documentary support, but may include what the witness has learned from personal experience.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS ORDER MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT AND CANNOT ESTABLISH AN IMPLIED EASEMENT APPURTEnant BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (Da2601-2607, T61:8—T73:20)  A.  Standard of Review  When determining a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must determine whether “the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Naturally, “conclusory and self-serving statements by one of the parties are insufficient,” to create a genuine issue of material fact.  Pruder v. Beuchel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005).  This court is to use “the same standard governing the motion judge’s decision,” but owes “no special deference to the motion judge’s legal analysis. ”  Russi v. City of Newark, 470 N.J. Super. 615, 619-20 (App. Div. 2022) (citations omitted).  B.  An Implied Easement Appurtenant Must Be Established by Clear and Convincing Evidence
[brief] Further, the selection of the route for the Project follows [...]’s existing power lines (existing right-of-way and land rights) in accordance with the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities regulations.  See N.J.A.C. 14:5-7.1 (a public utility is required to select a route for its transmission facility that “[m]ake[s] use of available . . . rights of way whenever practicable, feasible and with safety”); See also N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.5(d) (requiring a regulated entity “to facilitate construction of an extension at the lowest reasonable cost consistent with system reliability and safety”).  Therefore, alternative routing around [...] is not feasible under the administrative code and [...] is obligated to route the Project through [...] as it poses the lowest reasonable cost.
[brief] *Id.* at 551-552.  The Court also noted that such statements “have a tendency to disrupt morale and good working relationships. ”  *Id.*  Here, by his misogynistic conduct that degraded and demeaned women, [...] neglected the statutory duty imposed upon him as a public official pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c), to treat all individuals with dignity and respect and to act with integrity.
[brief] Defendant’s logistical “question” about whether the attorney who hypothetically would represent him during the interrogation would be from Virginia’s Legal Aid or New Jersey’s Public Defender’s Office was a request for advice like in *Alston*, and not an ambiguous invocation of counsel like in Gonzalez.  See Pa7 ("No, no, no, that was an example question, I'm not saying that that's what I'm looking for.  I'm saying as an example"); (1T:42-24 to 43-5).  Ultimately, however, this Court need not decide which characterization is correct because, like the detective in Alston, and dissimilar from the detective in Gonzalez, the detectives here did respond to defendant's query and did so in a manner approved by our courts.
[brief] (Pa23 at ¶51).  During the second half of her testimony, however, details came to light that unequivocally demonstrated that [...], [...], and [...] had committed perjury in their depositions and sworn certifications in the Prior Litigation.  (Pa23 at ¶52).  Specifically, [...] was presented with evidence showing that the notary stamp that she had affixed to the Forged Agreement was not in [...]’s possession until December 2014, at the earliest – eleven months after she allegedly affixed her notary stamp to the Forged Agreement on January 14, 2014.  (Pa23 at ¶53 and 54).  Presented with this evidence, [...] admitted, under oath, that she never actually witnessed [...]’s execution of the Forged Agreement.  (Pa23 at ¶55).  Rather, [...] acknowledged that she had signed and notarized the Forged Agreement at some point in the last couple of years as a “favor” to [...], when he showed up at her office alone with the document already bearing “[...]’s” signature.  (Id.).  [...] admitted that, like [...] and [...], she knowingly made false statements under oath in both her certification and in her earlier deposition testimony.  (Pa23 at ¶56).  As a result of her perjury and forgery, [...] was disbarred from the practice of law.
[brief] On October 14, 2020, the Council adopted Resolution 199-20 which designated [...] as a conditional redeveloper of the [...] Property pending the negotiation and execution of a more comprehensive redevelopment agreement.  Pa299.  On December 9, 2020, the Council adopted Resolution 243-20 which designated [...] as the redeveloper of the [...] Property and authorized the execution of the Redevelopment Agreement which had been negotiated between the City and [...].
[brief] As the Commissioner correctly acknowledged, “[s]tatutes, when they deal with a specific issue or matter, are the controlling authority as to the proper disposition of that issue or matter.  Thus, any regulation or rule which contravenes a statute is of no force, and the statute will control. ” (Aa132, citing Parsons ex rel. Parsons v. Mullica Twp. Bd. of Educ., 226 N.J. 297, 314 (2016)).  ⁹ N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11(d)(2)(ii) provides that reconstruction of a bulkhead up to twenty-four inches outshore of an existing bulkhead is “conditionally acceptable” under certain circumstances.  Here, though there is an older regulation that exempts existing residential development from public access requirements, since the Law requires “additional” access and does not exempt residential development, the Law conflicts with the rule.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(i); N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  Accordingly, the Commissioner properly concluded that “the Public Access Law, not the CZM rules, governed the DEP’s public access determination.
[brief] The trial court dismissed the First Count of the Complaint based on its finding that the Limited Attorney Exemption “did not violate the separation of powers clause of the Constitution. ”  T. at 9:9-11.  The trial court overlooked the fact that the Limited Attorney Exemption impinges upon a constitutional right, ignored the New Jersey Supreme Court’s actual regulation and exercise of power over the practice of law, misinterpreted the holding of a prior decision ruling on the previous version of the Act and wholly ignored a decision in a virtually identical case from a State Supreme Court holding that an exemption similar to the Limited Attorney Exemption violates the separation of powers doctrine.
[brief] Placed in its proper context within the entire argument and with the fact that the jury was well aware of the jail call where defendant admitted to [...] that he actually meant to shoot at [...]’s car because it was following him – a call that was also played by the Prosecutor during summation (see 9T:95-12 to 20; see also, 7T:166-5 to 17) – this argument was a proper rebuttal to the defense suggestion that were “no if’s and’s or but’s about it this case being “obviously reckless. ” (9T:40-19 to 41-11).  To be clear, the defense counsel’s reckless manslaughter argument was not his linchpin argument.  It was merely a failsafe argument in the event his previous arguments pointing the finger at [...] failed.  As such, the State’s example of recklessness certainly did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.  As the trial court stated in denying defendant’s request for a limiting instruction, the Prosecutor’s “artful or inartful” argument did not require a mistrial, nor a curative or limiting instruction.  (9T:105-20 to 24).  More importantly, after closing arguments, the judge fully instructed the jury on the law of manslaughter.  (9T:142-12 to 147-1).
[brief] “Central School Board OKs Social Media Policy After Racist Posts,” Patch.com, April 29, 2022; f. Certification of Service, dated June 3, 2022.  10.  Letter from Appellee to the Commission and Appellants, dated June 27, 2022, attaching a.  Letter-Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss New Allegations in the Amended Complaint.  11.  Letter from [...] to Appellants and Appellee, dated June 28, 2022.  12.  Letter from Appellants to the Commission and Appellee Opposing Motion to Dismiss, dated June 30, 2022.  13.  Letter from [...] to Appellants and Appellee, dated July 1, 2022.  14.  Decision on Motion to Dismiss adopted by the Commission at its meeting on August 23, 2022.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-1, et.seq.  In fact, [...] separately issued a cancellation notice for [...]’s workers compensation policy.  The Law Division’s alternative conclusion that the regulation is inapplicable because the “CCIP covered [Tutor] projects located throughout the country,” rendering it a “multi-state location risk,” N.J.S.A.11:1-20-2(d) (SSR 36, Dta1366), is similarly overbroad.  Only [...]’s coverage was purportedly cancelled, not the policy itself.  The “risk” in question - [...] - had one “location,” in New Jersey.  The court’s opinion would leave any insured that performs any operation in another state, or has remote workers elsewhere, to cancellation without regard for the regulations.  The narrow interpretation accorded by the court is inconsistent with the remedial nature of the regulation.
[directive] A-  32  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  A- 33  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  A- 34  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  A- 35  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  A- 36  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  A- 37  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  XIV.
[brief] The prosecutor does not address the fact that NGU detectives believed they had “reasonable suspicion that [[...] and [...]] were engaged in criminal activity due to the area and time of night. ”  (Da 27)  (emphasis added)  This is not something that can be ignored, because it underscores why officers give more than a vague and conclusory description of the conduct on which an investigatory stop is based: so the reviewing court can ensure that the officer’s interpretation of the conduct he observed was reasonable and not based on implicit bias or stereotype.
[brief] For the reasons expressed above, it is respectfully submitted that the Order of [...] of September 14, 2022 granting partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed.  Oral argument is requested.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents, [...] and [...], Counsellors at Law  BY: /s/ [...]  JOHN L. SLIMM  Dated: November 13, 2023  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs/Appellant, v. ALEXANDER J. RINALDI and [...], Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] (Aa0095-Aa0131; Aa0137-Aa0148; Aa0195-Aa0200; Aa2521-Aa2537; Aa2546-Aa2633).  In direct response to comments provided by Plaintiffs referencing that same report, the [...] disagreed, stating in its Engineering Report that:  As part of the stormwater management review, the Department has ensured that all applicable requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:8 Stormwater Management rules (last amended March 2, 2021) were met, including stormwater quantity, quality, and groundwater recharge, as well as the newly implemented Green Infrastructure elements.  Furthermore, each best management practice was compared to the NJ Stormwater Best Management Practices Manual, which has explicit instructions how each stormwater management feature must be designed.  Plaintiffs argue throughout their brief that [...]’s review of [...]’s application materials identified alleged “deficiencies” and therefore, [...]’s approved storm water design is not compliant with the [...]’s Stormwater Management Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.2.