ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Da 158.)  The term “assigns” includes all “who take either immediately or remotely from or under the assignor, whether by conveyance, devise, descent or act of law. ”  See Packanack Lake Country Club & Community Assoc. v. Alexander D. Doig Dev. Co., 72 N.J. Super. 360, 266 (App. Div. 1962).  [...] is an assign under this common definition, as the Property was conveyed by way of deed from the Appellant to the LLC in May 2016.  Accordingly, the May 2022 Consent Judgment certainly covers [...].  Also, the Trial Court correctly determined that privity existed between the Appellant and [...], therefore ensuring that the entity is covered by the May 2022 Consent Judgment.  Under New Jersey law, privity “requires some legal connection between the parties such as succession to the same rights to property. ”  Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, 215 N.J. Super. 116, 122 (App. Div. 1987).  [...] is controlled by [...], who serve as its principals.  Further, RAP maintains the same rights to the Property that [...] had acquired through the January As-Is Contract.  Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, when a party is in privity to a party involved in a case, the succeeding party is “bound by the result in a prior proceeding in which it had no opportunity to participate. ”  Id.  Since privity clearly exists between the Appellant and [...], any amendment to the Complaint would be futile because such claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata.  Finally, the Appellant’s argument that the environmental claims had never been brought prior to the Motion to Amend was correctly rejected by the Trial Court.  As previously argued in Point I above, multiple jurists have heard the Appellant’s environmental claims.  A “judgment of involuntary dismissal or a dismissal with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the merits as fully and completely as if the order had been entered after trial. ”  Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 507 (1991).  Here, [...] has already entered an Order ruling that the Appellant’s Spill Act claim was previously asserted and therefore barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  The below decision is therefore the second time that a Trial Court has ruled these environmental claims are barred under the law.  Accordingly, it was correct for the Trial Court to reject the Appellant’s arguments, and this Court should affirm the Trial Court’s decision.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ” (at 539 and 540, 666 A. 2d 146).  That is exactly what [...] did in this case.  The Prant Court further held, “Thus, the Brill opinion makes it clear that a disputed issue of fact of an insubstantial nature should not preclude the grant of Summary Judgment. ”  In this case, [...] properly found that there were not any issues of material fact which would preclude granting defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  The defendants were entitled to pretiral Summary Judgment since [...] properly did the appropriate analysis, and sifted through the evidential material as required under Brill.  Accordingly, the Order for partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed.
[brief] ”  See Harris v. Peridot Chem. (NJ), Inc., 313 N.J. Super. 257, 293 (App. Div. 1998), citing Lanvin v. Fauci, 170 N.J. Super. 403, 407.  (App. Div. 1979) (citing Millman v. United States Mortgage & Title Guar. Co. of New Jersey, 121 N.J.L. 28, 34-35 (Sup.Ct. 1938); See Jerolamon v. Town of Belleville, 90 N.J.L. 206, 207-08 (E. & A. 1917); Perry v. Levy, 87 N.J.L. 670, 672 (E. & A. 1915).
[brief] Plaintiff’s opposition to [...]’s motion to dismiss was heard by the Trial Court.  Plaintiff initially appears to argue that he was denied due process by the Trial Court because the Trial Court heard [...]’s motion to dismiss based upon lack of standing.  Plaintiff acknowledges he was afforded the opportunity to submit written opposition and to be heard orally before the Trial Court rendered a decision.  Further, the fact that Defendants [...], [...], and [...] filed the motion to dismiss is irrelevant as [...] joined their motion.  Plaintiff incorrectly argues that [...]’s motion was one for summary judgment, however, the motion was a motion for lack of standing, which can be raised at any time including trial.  R. 4:6-7.  Obviously, if a party does not possess requisite standing before the Trial Court, the Trial Court cannot proceed with conducting a trial because it would have no practical effect.  Furthermore, Plaintiff provided Defendants the agreements he entered into with [...] and [...] for the first time on December 28, 2022, approximately six (6) weeks prior to trial commencing and years after the first assignment was entered into in 2017.  Defendant [...], therefore, was denied an opportunity, by Plaintiff, to obtain discovery regarding the agreements.  A motion based upon the agreements was brought shortly after Plaintiff provided same.  Plaintiff’s claims regarding procedural impropriety are baseless.  B.  The Trial Court was correct that Plaintiff impermissibly assigned his rights to the legal malpractice lawsuit against [...].
[brief] The grave injustice that has been visited upon Plaintiffs who have not been permitted to allege the new claims they discovered by overcoming Defendants’ fraudulent concealment, is glaring and egregious.  Defendants have effectively been rewarded for their bad-faith delay tactics, obstruction, perjury, and fraudulent concealment, which were all part of a concerted effort to keep Plaintiffs from discovering and pleading these claims entirely or for as long as possible.  This egregious miscarriage of justice must be reversed.  This Court must ultimately decide whether application of Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine in this matter, with these facts, in this context, in the backdrop of [...]’ decision to deny Plaintiffs’ amendment in the 2015 Action solely because [...] believed Plaintiffs could bring these new claims in a new action, is fair and just.
[brief] 3  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4  ARGUMENT POINT I 5  THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGEMENT WHEN GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ARE PRESENT  REQUIRING A JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF HIS VEHICLE AND TO DETERMINE THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OF EACH OF THE PARTIES (RAISED BELOW: Pa1; 1T16)  CONCLUSION
[brief] See e.g. In the Matter of [...] and [...], P.E.R.C. No. 2012-34, 2011 NJ PERC Lexis 142, ** 10-15 (Jan. 20, 2011).  Rather than identify an error, the Union argues that: (1) the Arbitrator failed to explain or identify the weight he gave to the 16 (g) factors, especially the public interest and internal pattern of settlement criteria, (2) failed to explain the retro pay award, and (3) should have awarded the Union two percent increases.  The Union’s first and second arguments are puzzling in light of the Arbitrator’s 54-page well reasoned analysis, and the third is mere argument and opinion and must be disregarded.  (Aa095-149)  In connection with his analysis of the 16 (g) factors, the Arbitrator then addressed the following subjects in his Award, as a necessary background for his analysis.
[brief] [...] and the [...] filed their submissions with the trial court on August 7, 2023 and August 8, 2023.  (Pa98 to Pa122; Da25 to Da36).  The trial court conducted a hearing on the zoning appeal and the [...]’s motion for partial summary judgment on October 2, 2023.  (3T).  By Order dated October 2, 2023, the trial court dismissed the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.  (Pa134 to Pa135; 3T4-1 to 3T4-14; 3T49-7 to 3T49-9).
[directive] ___ later than days prior to the hearing.  __ FURTHER [any additional conditions as ordered by the court]  _ IT IS ORDERED  6.  of of will  A copy this Order be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the of Court within two (2) days its signing.  of3  Directive# (11/01/2018), (Competency Published 12329 17-18 page 2 5)
[brief] D.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That Defendants Are Equitably Estopped From Asserting A Statute Of Limitations Defense.  Defendants argue that the trial court “misapplied the law” in holding that Defendants were equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.  Db31-33.  Conflating demand loans and pay-when-able loans, Defendants argue that, “[u]nder the trial court’s flawed reasoning, the statute of limitations would be tolled in every unpaid debt simply because the debtor stated he was unable to pay. ”  Db33.  Defendants’ argument is incorrect: with respect to a pay-when-able loan, the limitations period is not “tolled,” but does not even begin to run until the lender knows or has reason to know that the debtor is able to pay.  Given the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff’s claim was filed within the applicable limitations period -- well within six years of the parties’ October 2019 meeting -- the equitable estoppel discussion in the Opinion is superfluous.  However, should the merits of the issue be considered on this appeal, the trial court’s conclusion should be affirmed.  The trial court’s imposition of equitable estoppel is reviewed pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard.  Cf. Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 354 (1993).  Recognizing the policy underlying statutes of limitations, the trial court found that the natural and probable result of [...]’s repeated assurances, during the period April 26, 2013 through the parties’ October 2019 meeting in Las Vegas, that he would pay [...] as soon as he was able was to induce [...]’ inaction.  Da55-56.  The trial court also found that, “[e]ven if one were to assume the third loan was immediately payable on demand, defendant would be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense because it is now clear that [...] deliberately mislead [...] about his intentions to repay the debt throughout the parties’ communications over the years. ”  Da56 (emphasis in original).  The court categorically found that [...] “engaged ‘in conduct . . . calculated to mislead the plaintiff into believing that it [was] unnecessary to seek civil redress. ’”  Da56 (quoting W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 553 (1989)).  The trial court did not abuse its discretion and should be affirmed.  POINT II
[brief] In the context of this case, the [...] had the burden to prove that --- under the Development Regulations then in effect (presumably 1964) --- each of the following requirements:  1.  That an off-site parking use/facility serving a different use/lot owned and operated by a different owner was a permitted use on the School Lot 5.  2.  That on Lot 5, having in place a principal use (School), it was permitted use to locate and operate a second principal use (off-site parking lot for another property/use) on Lot 5.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on September 10, 2021.  (Pa1 – Pa13).  Defendants filed an Answer on February 14, 2022.  (Pa14 – Pa24).  Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 2024.  (Pa23 – Pa25).  Plaintiff filed opposition to the Motion on June 12, 2024.  (Pa655 – Pa686.)  Defendants filed a reply on July 1, 2024.  (Pa689 – Pa708).  The Court heard Oral Argument on July 15, 2024, and issued its decision on the record.  On July 16, 2024, the Court entered an Order granting Defendants’ Motion.  (Pa712).  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on August 22, 2024, and an Amended Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2024.  (Pa714 – Pa728).
[directive] 3.0.1  Prevention is the primary means of reducing and controlling inappropriate behavior and misconduct.  Although disciplinary actions are properly imposed on officers who engage in wrongdoing, they have limited utility if they shield or obscure organizational conditions that permit the abuses to occur.  Inadequate training and a lack of appropriate guidance too often are factors that contribute to inappropriate behavior and misconduct.  An agency should make every effort to eliminate the organizational conditions that may foster, permit or encourage an employee’s inappropriate behavior.  In the furtherance of this objective, special emphasis should be placed on the following areas.  3.1
[brief] In a case such as here where parties had a full opportunity to litigate the interest rate in the Arbitration below, the final “arbitration award can have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in subsequent litigation. ”  *Habick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 320 N.J. Super. 244, 256 (App. Div. 1999); see also *State v. Gonzalez*, 75 N.J. 181, 186 (1977) ("Collateral estoppel is that branch of the broader law of res judicata which bars relitigation of any issue which was actually determined in a prior action, generally between the same parties, involving a different claim or cause of action.").  In the Arbitration, "the Parties confirmed that they were provided a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence by examining and cross-examining all fact and expert witnesses and introducing hundreds of exhibits."  Da433.  Because "[a]rbitration is a favored form of dispute resolution...courts grant arbitration awards considerable deference."  Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013).  Therefore, Defendants are precluded from challenging the Award Judgments holding that the default interest rate is the lawful interest rate.
[brief] Instead, [...]’s determination that no implied private right of action existed in the NJCFLA was based entirely on the existence of the Commissioner’s enforcement abilities under subsection 18.  But N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 had always existed in conjunction with private enforcement remedies, i.e., N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Moreover, In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, supra—cited by [...]—addressed and analyzed a statute that explicitly disallowed a private right of action, i.e., N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15(a).  See In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 36-37 (1987).  In re Resolution did not analyze an implied private right of action because there was no need to—improper disclosures of information related to investigations into crime by the State Commissioner of Investigation (“SCI”) were and are explicitly within the purview of the SCI, as per the black letter language of the statute.  *In re Resolution* supports *[...]*’s reasoning that, generally, when there are extensive state enforcement mechanisms included in a statute, that statute rarely also includes a private right of action.  But *[...]* failed to acknowledge that the NJCFLA’s predecessors all contained enforcement mechanisms by the Commissioner and an implied private right of action.  There was no basis to reason that the separation of the NJRLMA from the rest of the current NJCFLA suddenly also removed the implied private right of action from the statute.  In context, *[...]*’s citation to *In re Resolution* in ostensible support of the notion that the NJCFLA does not provide for a provide right of action does not make practical sense given that the enforcement mechanisms in subsection 18 have always coexisted with the implied private right of action in the NJSLL, NJLLA, and NJCLA.
[brief] ” ([...]_Pb 16).  The [...] agree that this Court could reverse by concluding that the Trial Court misapplied the *Code*.  However, since the Trial Court held the *Code*’s application to be “*in dubitante*” (in doubt) and concluded that “it is much more reasonable to apply the Rules of Professional Conduct” to the work of Special Masters, this Court should clarify that the *Code of Judicial Conduct* does, in fact, apply to Special Masters, at least in relevant part.  It is true that New Jersey courts have not yet uniformly applied the *Code of Judicial Conduct* to Special Masters outside the *Mount Laurel* context, but they certainly have not foreclosed it either. \(^2\)  That other jurisdictions have expressly included Special Masters in their judicial codes does not mean that New Jersey has made a deliberate decision to apply a lesser recusal standard to Special Masters.  If it were otherwise, *Mount Laurel* Special Masters also would be exempt from the \(^2\)  Neither *Snyder v. Snyder*, No. A-4116-13T2, 2016 WL 4473254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 25, 2016), nor *Fuhrmann v. Wolf*, No. A-6031-07T3, 2009 WL 4255529, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 19, 2009), unpublished decisions cited by [...], are to the contrary.  *Snyder* concluded that the judicial appointee at issue in that case was *not* akin to a Special Master.  2016 WL 4473254 at *4.  *Fuhrmann* in fact *applied* the *Code of Judicial Conduct*.  2009 WL 4255529 at *7.  judicial recusal rules.  Rule 1.12(c) of the *Rules of Professional Conduct*, which applies to a range of “third-party neutral[s]” who are not (like Special Masters) arms of the court, addresses only the limited scenario of negotiating for employment with a party or party’s attorney and lacks the robustness of the *Code’s* recusal standard.  The Court should hold that the *Code of Judicial Conduct’s* standard for recusal applies to Special Masters, at least in relevant part, and that the Special Master in this case was required to recuse here.  II.
[brief] Therefore, to find an accomplice guilty of the same offense as the principal, the jury must find that the accomplice “facilitate[d] or assist[ed] the exact crime the putative principal is accused of. ”  Ramirez, 246 N.J. at 68.  Our caselaw is clear that “[w]hen a prosecution is based on the theory that a defendant acted as an accomplice, the trial court is required to provide the jury with understandable instructions regarding accomplice liability.
[directive] Prepare/Share Access and Capacity to 5.6 with cautious in having communications a general should be direct attorneys deputy prosecutors and 17 Assistant that prosecutor may in case.  possibility the become a witness the the to avoid detective is present victim unless a Page 62 Agencies.  5.6.1  Police shall report to Directive, every law enforcement agency of this issuance days of the Within 60 Criminal in the of state law or Division of Justice case a Prosecutor, the County appropriate the electronic with the to prepare equip officers means its capacity to on enforcement agency, tablets, desktop computers, smart phones, Reports (e.g., Enforcement Incident Preliminary Law vehicles).  similar computing devices installed in police or or laptop portable devices, or similar shall Prosecutor or Division of Criminal Justice, the County consultation with in Each agency, Enforcement Incident Reports.  Preliminary Law preparing for develop a plan operational immediately upon issuance of this Directive. shall become subsection
[brief] Cf. Armitage v. Newark, supra, 86 N.J.L. at page 10, 90 A. 1035; McQuillin, supra, s 29.30.  Only by this approach can the desirable protection be afforded to the taxpayers; only in this way can perfect equality be maintained among bidders.  The fundamental principle, as well as the evil to be avoided, remain the same whatever the status of the person who challenges the action.  [25 N.J. at 325-26]  (emphasis added)  That notion has continued on with full viability in the modern case law, with decision after decision resting on the possible and theoretical negative impacts on assurance of performance and competition.
[brief] The State also asked [...] whether she was aware, from her review of the records, that other mental health professionals sorted out the difference between hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations.  (11T:188-21 to 191-13).  [...] replied “Yes, and I’m aware of the difference and I take into account that if he had only had hypnopompic …”(11T:191-14 to 15).  Again, the Court interrupted and said “Doctor … he just asked you are you aware that they … made differences … that’s the question … that’s it.  (11T:191-17 to 25).  [...] was asked on cross about whether [...] was able to “recall to the police the caliber of the bullets that were used.
[brief] Dated: October 30, 2023  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  C. BRIAN KORNBREK - 02334-1992  [...] - 01388-2006  [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...]; [...]  [...] (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...]  [...] – 03466-1982  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]
[brief] No different than the holdings of *Woo-Padva* 2 and *Diana*, where there is no private right of action, a plaintiff lacks standing to bring a declaratory relief claim under the same statute.  *See Woo-Padva* 2, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *9; *In re Resol. Of State Comm’n of Investigation*, 108 N.J. at 46 (dismissing cause of action seeking a judgment declaring a party violated a statute because plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the statute); *Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC*, 825 F. App’x at 70 (“[b]ut it is well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment action under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute. ”).  Further, this Court held “[s]ince plaintiff does not have a private right of action to pursue a violation of the CFLA, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff may not circumvent established law by coding his complaint under the UDJA.
[brief] [...] was also 2004 warehouse lender and last collateral holder (A377 – A379).  In June 2006, by [...] logs, collateral was sent to [...] with “Bailee Request on Hold” (A667).  This was long before any mortgage allegations were pled in federal court and long before [...] began servicing in 2010.  In addition, by Logs, an assignment and allonge was requested and executed from [...] nominee for [...] to “[...]” (foreclosure matrix) (A1062).  By October 2022 refinance with [...], [...] returned [...] note and [...] mortgage stamped paid.  Plaintiff claims he was never informed of [...] refinance application with [...].  Plaintiff was informed at October 6, 2022 conference (Transcript Oct. 6, 2022 p. 8) and knew Chancery judge intended for [...] to refinance by a “no default” declaration stated in Final Judgment (FJ).
[brief] [Pa4; Trans. ID: [...]]  On March 8th, 2022, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion stating, “the motion is premature.  Notice of the Appeal determination is dated February 18, 2022.  Per R. 1:20A-3(e) defendant has 30 days to pay before the case is either reinstated or a summary action [may be] brought pursuant to Rule 4:67. ”  [Id.; Trans. ID: [...]].  See also T19:1-6 (the “Complaint was dismissed, among other reasons in the past, because it was premature . . . And because your appellate rights, through the fee arb, had not been completed.
[brief] (Pa165)  ¶4.  [...] has been arrested on multiple occasions, for multiple offenses, going back to 1973.  (Tr. I: 35-40; Ex. 1).  The state jurisdictions involved included Florida, among others.  (See Tr. I: 120-¶21; Ex. 38).  None of those charges, other than the 1987 mail fraud conviction, resulted in a criminal conviction.  (Tr. I: 35-40; Ex. 1).  ¶7.
[brief] It reveals a corporate officer and principal owner who chooses his words very carefully even as Appellants’ counsel write like summary judgment on vicarious liability has already been granted.  Further, the Certification of [...] lacks an adequate basis of knowledge to support the negative inferences it purports to draw.  Finally, and most troublingly, the Certification of [...] is a personal capacity certification.  While he explains that he is a corporate officer, he never indicates which corporate officer and his title does not appear on the signature line.  Taken together, it seems like the Earle Appellants in the person of [...] very well may plan on contesting vicarious liability, [...]’s glowing assessment of the strengths of Respondent’s case notwithstanding.  While deferring to and joining in co-Respondent’s just-filed opposition, Respondent also avers that Appellants’ slippery discussion of vicarious liability sheds further light on the extent of the conflict presented by joint representation here.  **CONCLUSION**