ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] H700a Holm-159: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-POT-174, that he is an expert on the air and noise emissions of the proposed regulator station (SOICR p. 12) .........................................  H701a Holm-160: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-POT-175, referred to the responses to HOLM-[...]-POT-168 and 169 [Holm-153 and Holm-154] on his testimony in other court and regulatory proceedings (SOICR p. 12) .........................................  H702a Holm-161: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-POT-176, stated that all printed matter consulted were in the Air and Noise Report attached to his testimony (see attachments EJP-2 and EJP-3) (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H703a Holm-162: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-POT-177, referred to the response HOLM-[...]-POT-175 [Holm-153 and Holm-154] on his address to environmental impact reports for a natural gas facility (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H704a Holm-163: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-POT-178, objected to identifying, etc., court or regulatory proceedings in which he submitted an environmental impact report (SOICR p. 12) .........................................................  H705a Holm-164: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-POT-179, objected to disclosing whether any of his environmental impact reports were adverse to a proposed or existing public utility facility (SOICR p. 12)  .........................................................  H706a Holm-165: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-POT-180, objected to indicating how testimony before the Zoning Board may differ from that supplied to the OAL (SOICR p. 12).  ...............
[brief] “Purchaser’s obligation to close title hereunder is conditioned upon any commercial tenant under the Leases…delivering to Purchaser an estoppel certificate…the sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate...shall be to terminate this Agreement. ”  (Da211.)  The plain meaning and operation of the phrase “in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate” is allow [...] to terminate the PSA only if [...] is ultimately unable to fulfil the condition precedent of supplying an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at closing.  The very word of the provision categorically does not grant [...] an affirmative right to terminate the PSA simply upon receipt of a non-compliant estoppel certificate.  And indeed, the entirety of the four corners of the PSA do not provide [...] with a right to terminate the agreement and claim the down payment upon receiving a non-compliant estoppel certificate.  Instead, the PSA allows [...] to terminate the agreement only to the extent that an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is not received by the time of closing.
[brief] “*The 11th Circuit reversed the decision and determined that [...]'s conduct in filing the proof of claim on clearly time-barred debt violated the FDCPA.*”  “Because creditors themselves have given up trying to collect the debts they sell to debt buyers, they sell those debts for pennies on the dollar.  *Id.*, at 23.  The older the debt, the greater the discount:  While debt buyers pay close to eight cents per dollar for debts under three years old, they pay as little as two cents per dollar for debts greater than six years old, and "effectively nothing" for debts greater than 15 years old.  Id., at 23-24.  These prices reflect the basic fact that older debts are harder to collect.  As time passes, consumers move or forget that they owe the debts; creditors have more trouble documenting the debts and proving their validity; and debts begin to fall within state statutes of limitations — time limits that "operate to bar a plaintiff's suit" once passed.
[brief] With regard to the Eminent Domain action, Eminent Domain is a complicated and lengthy process which leads to foreseeable appeals and a foreseeable counter-action, more specifically, an Inverse Condemnation action.  Therefore, [...] should not be penalized by the Court by reopening the Property Settlement Agreement pursuant to NJ Rule 4:50-1, since all relevant information pertaining to [...] was available to [...] at the time the Property Settlement Agreement was drafted by him, presented for signature to both parties on April 10, 2009 and incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce entered by the Superior Court of Camden County on June 4, 2009.
[brief] **ALLEGED DAMAGES DUE TO CONSTRUCTION  ACTIVITIES ARE NOT COMPENSABLE IN CONDEMNATION MATTERS (3T)**  Appellant ignores basic condemnation law for determining the just compensation due to a property owner from a partial taking of their property via eminent domain: that the fair market value of the property acquired is the measure by which just compensation is determined.  Under condemnation law, Appellant is not entitled to recover any compensatory damages for any alleged damage to Appellant’s residence from the Borough’s construction activities within the confines of a condemnation proceeding.  Therefore, the trial court properly barred any references to or inclusion of said damages to the foundation, or repair costs thereof, of Appellant’s residence contained in both Appellant’s expert reports.
[brief] On the first sample, the minimum volume was not achieved, so [...] waited for the instrument to clear to take a second sample.  (3T13:10-15).  [...] \(^5\) State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008). obtained a fresh mouthpiece and again explained to defendant how to properly blow into the tube.  Defendant then gave sufficient breath samples for the second and third samples.  (3T13:13-24).
[brief] A. 34:15-71 (emphasis added).  An employer may do so by self-insuring if they have the financial capacity, N.J.S.A. 34:15-77, or by obtaining insurance, N.J.S.A. 34:15-78.  Additionally, employers are required to "make sufficient provision for the complete payment of any obligation which [the employer] may incur to an injured employee or his administrators or next of kin” for work-related injuries maintained in a common law court.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 (emphasis added); see Schmidt v. Smith, 155 N.J. 44, 49 (1998) (“Those policies must cover not only claims for compensation prosecuted in the Workers' Compensation court, but also claims for work-related injuries asserted in a common law court. ”).  The insurance policy at issue, per statute, must provide complete coverage to employees injured in the course of employment.  Per statute, the policy must provide for the “complete payment of any obligation” of the employer.  The statute prohibits [...] – and by extension [...] – from limiting its liability to an amount less than that payable by the employer.  The use of the term “any” further underscores that there is **no** limitation on the type of injury covered by the employer’s obligation and, concomitantly, the insurer’s obligation.  “In short, the terms of a policy issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-78 cannot conflict with the statutory mandate that there be coverage provided for **all** occupational injuries. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis supplied).  In *Schmidt*, a case involving a claim for bodily injury arising out of acts of sexual harassment, the Court held that "N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 required [the employer] to obtain sufficient coverage for the payment of **any** obligation it might incur on account of bodily injuries to an employee."  155 N.J. at 51 (emphasis added).  The Court noted that the employer, like the employer at bar, obtained a combined workers' compensation and employer's liability policy, thus contracting with its insurer "for the coverage of bodily injuries falling both inside and outside of the workers' compensation structure."  *Ibid.*  Particularly, "[t]he employers liability section of the contract was to provide compensation for bodily injuries to workers falling outside the workers' compensation system."  *Id.* at 51-52.  According to the *Schmidt* Court, that included "injuries intentionally caused by fellow employees, for example."  *Id.* at 52.  Stated differently, the coverage **included** claims placed outside the exclusivity provision of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  That provision states pertinently:
[brief] THE MOTION COURT ERRED IN ITS CAUSATION ANALYSIS (Pa837; 3T)  The motion judge erred by finding as a matter of law that the facts of record failed to show a “causation element of the analysis” that the disciplinary “was taken because plaintiff filed an EEO complaint” or refute the employers claim of a legitimate reason for bringing disciplinary charges against [...] “because he failed to follow DEP protocol. ” (3T38:3-9).  This calls for a discussion of causation in an employment case.  In Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ____, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020), the Supreme Court recognized the “but for causation standard was applicable to employment cases and explained that “the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. ”  Thus, the but for causation standard allows for more than one cause for an employment action but if one reason is retaliation, it would be a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, even if there was another cause such as violating protocol.  It is not an either or choice and the question is uniquely a jury decision.  A causal connection “can be satisfied by inferences that the trier of fact may reasonably draw based on circumstances surrounding the employment action. ”  Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221, 237 (2006).  A plaintiff does not need to show a “direct causal link” between the protected activity and the retaliation.  Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 558 (2013).
[brief] (Pa234).  As he concluded in his report:  Based upon the above background and analysis, as well as my education and experience as a professional engineer, [...] failed to properly inspect the store entrance walkway area, thus permitting a hazardous bent support foot of a barricade to protrude above the surface and into the walkway intended for use by customers.  The failures and inactions of [...] to inspect, discover, and abate this hazard was in violation of its own policies and procedures and caused [...] to fall and become injured.  [...] failed to inspect and maintain the subject entrance walkway area in a manner which conformed to its own policies and procedures and in accordance with adopted maintenance codes and accepted engineering practices, and thereby maintained an unreasonably hazardous condition within an area of foreseeable use by customers.  The failure of [...] to abate the hazardous walkway condition caused [...] to fall and sustain injury.  In conclusion and in addition to the foregoing, [...]’s encounter with the bent support foot of the barricade which protruded into and above the walkway surface caused her to fall and sustain injury.  Based upon the above background and analysis, as well as my education and experience as a professional engineer, [...] failed to exercise due care for the safety of its customers, thereby causing injury to [...].
[brief] [...] in [...] also had no advance notice that [...] would be in the parking lot in front of the condominium that Taranto was surveilling; Taranto, like [...], simply went to an area known for drug trafficking.  253 N.J. at 160.  (1T 7-6 to 19)  It was because these respective areas were known for drug trafficking that both [...] and Taranto reasonably hoped to detect drug activity—not due to any information received about any persons there or activity occurring at that moment.  Ibid.  (1T 7-6 to 19; Pb13)  Separately, the State seeks to distinguish [...] from this case by arguing that here, “officers did not have any information about defendant before they observed the silver Infiniti in the parking lot” and “there was no prior police surveillance or information provided by concerned citizens or confidential informants about defendant’s involvement in drug dealing.
[brief] See Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467-68 (2014) (“We will not presume that the Legislature intended a result different from what is indicated by the plaint language or add a qualification to a statute that the Legislature chose to omit. ”).  Moreover, [...] does not state that it or any other insurer has ever even attempted to file an IFPA or RICO claim in arbitration under the No-Fault Law.  So, it’s assertion that it cannot and that an arbitrator would not or could not hear the claims is speculative.  C.
[brief] As shown below, all of the judge’s findings are well-supported.  a.  **On the alleged evidence of rehabilitation**  Defendant argues that [...] “refused to consider” his “exemplary conduct while incarcerated as evidence of rehabilitation. ” (Db16).  “[T]o the [judge],” defendant states, “[defendant] had no opportunity to act out over the past 29 years because he was supervised by corrections officers, and because those around him were ‘very capable of defending themselves. ’” (Db16-17).  Defendant points out that *Comer* requires courts to consider conduct in prison, and that *Comer* applicants have no other way to demonstrate rehabilitation if their prison conduct is not considered.
[brief] Under either rule, plaintiff – defendants contend that plaintiffs do not meet the criteria for reconsideration.  Defendants also argue that defendants (sic) motion fails in that they have failed to show exceptional circumstances, or that the enforcement of the order would be unjust, oppressive, or inequitable.  Defendants argue that none of those predicate circumstances are present here.  They contend that both the motion and the order were properly served and that plaintiff has failed to establish that newly discovered evidence exists or that reversal is justified, because of fraud mistaken, inadvertent surprise, or excusable neglect.  Substantively, defendants argue that the court correctly decided the motion asserting that an affidavit of merit was required under these circumstances, and that an affidavit of merit was required for all of the causes of action, regardless of how labeled, because all of them are based on alleged acts of legal malpractice.
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  10  5 Standards Governing the Activation of BWCs  5.1  BWCs Used Only in Performance of Official Duties.  A BWC shall be activated only while in performance of official police duties and for the purpose of recording incidents, investigations, and police-civilian encounters involving those law enforcement activities specified in this Policy, or specified in a department’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated pursuant to this Policy.  A BWC shall not be activated while the officer is on break or otherwise is not actively performing law enforcement functions (e.g., while eating meals, while in a restroom, etc.).  A BWC shall not be activated or used by an officer for personal purposes, or when engaged in police union business.  Nor shall a BWC be used to record conversations involving counseling, guidance sessions, personnel evaluations, or any similar supervisory interaction.  Any recordings from a BWC recorded in contravention of this Policy or any other applicable law shall be immediately brought to the attention of agency command staff and immediately destroyed by command staff following consultation and approval by the County Prosecutor or Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.  Such footage shall not be admissible as evidence in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, except as evidence in any proceeding related to the unauthorized use of a BWC.
[brief] Pa86.  Although the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps contemplate a property swap between [...] and Mal-Bros.  Contracting Co., whereby the Strip would be added to Lot 1-A owned by Mal-Bros.  Contracting Co. and a portion of land contained within Lot 1-A (located near the intersection of Fairfield Crescent and Fairfield Avenue, and referred to as the “Bump”) would be added to Lot 1, no recorded deed or recorded plat exists which evidences contemporaneous transfers of either of these properties into the other’s chain of title.  5T5:3-6.  The 1967 Unrecorded Subdivision Map also indicates that one (1) acre will be added to Lot 1 and deducted from Lot 2H.  Pa88.  This, too, did not occur.  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], testified that when [...] conveyed property to “[...]” (formally Local 68 Engineers [...] Foundation Fund Holding Corp.) in 1971, the property conveyed did not coincide with the changes indicated on the 1967 Unrecorded Subdivision Map.  1T116:14-24.
[directive] 1.  The device must be capable of making a date- and time-stamped digital record of each occurrence when the darts/electrodes are fired, and of each occurrence when an electrical current is discharged.  2.  The device must be capable of making a digital video recording of each such firing and electrical discharge, where the focus of the internal camera is centered on the person against whom the conducted energy device was targeted, except that an agency is authorized to purchase and deploy a conducted energy device that does not have the capability of making a digital video recording provided that such device may only be carried and used by an officer who is equipped with a body worn camera as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1, and further provided that, notwithstanding any other provision of this supplemental policy, such device shall not be fired or discharged during an actual operation unless the officer has activated the body worn camera.
[brief] Appellants have not contended that their primary UIM coverage is exhausted, or that the matter was otherwise reported to [...] for UIM coverage.  [...] reserves the right to assert that other exclusions, conditions and/or limitations in the [...] Excess Policy also apply to preclude or limit coverage.  definitional sections of the underlying [...] policy to [...]’s UIM coverage, then [...] could deny Plaintiffs UIM claim for any tortfeasor who has liability limits equal to or greater than $500,000, despite the fact that [...] sold plaintiffs a $1,000,000 UIM policy.
[directive] Apflmbiliv: Date Issued: Superseder: Policy Statement: 9:l which  The Attorney General requires that a law enforcement agency receives or N. expends forfeited property or funds obtained pursuant J.S.A- 2C:64-1, et seq. (civil to forfeitures)  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et seq., (racketeering), or from actions brought under N.J.S.A 2C:21-25 et seq. (financial facilitation of crime), or under any other statute as directed by the Attorney General, shall prepare a quarterly report detailing the distribution, receipt or on expense of forfeited property or funds.  This information shall be recorded forms NJL&PS promulgated by the Attorney General and known as Form C entitled Municipal Forfeiture Program Report.  The completed forms are to be forwarded both the to appropriate county prosecutor's office and the Division of Criminal Justice ("Division") within thirty days of the end of a previous calendar quarter.
[brief] **  [...]’s opening brief laid out how he established a prima facie case that counsel’s performance was deficient; and the deficiencies materially contributed to defendant’s conviction.  See *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686-88 (1984); *State v. Fritz*, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).  In its response, the State asks the court to presume counsel was “strategic” and “wise,” and mischaracterizes [...]’s well-supported claims as “bald assertions. ”  Simply put, the State is applying the wrong standard and ignoring the facts.  First, it is a foundational principle of PCR that the court may not presume counsel’s actions, or inactions, were strategic.  See, e.g., State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2011); Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63; R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998); LaFave., 3 Crim. Proc. § 11.10(c)(c) (4th ed. 2023).  Although the State repeatedly praises counsel’s missteps as “wise” “strategic” choices, (see, e.g., Sb 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, 40) it tellingly cites to cases where the court actually held an evidentiary hearing, and based its findings on that hearing, including testimony from counsel.  (See Sb 20, citing State v. Cooper, 410 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 2009).  As explained in [...]’s opening brief, not only may the court not presume counsel was behaving strategically, but there could be no plausible sound strategic or tactical reason for his conduct.  Similarly, the State’s baseless refrain that [...] has only provided “bald assertions” (see, e.g., Sb 24, 24, 38, 39, 41) relies on State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1991) and State v. McDonald, 211 N.J. 4 (2012), but both actually support [...]’s argument.
[brief] [...], who had operated a taxi cab in Orange for two years as of May 2012, (15T 50-17 to 22), testified that defendant “flagged [him] down” for a ride between 12:15 a.m. and 12:30 a.m. on May 27.  (15T 6-15 to 20, 7-7 to 10, 36-11 to 20).  Marceus recalled that as he made a left onto Lakeside Avenue in Orange after dropping off another fare on High Street who he remembered was a Spanish man, (15T 6-24 to 7-6, 22-16 to 23-2, 42-15 to 43-1), he saw defendant who he knew as “[...]” or “[...]. ” (15T 6-21 to 23, 14-7 to 14).  Marceus explained that he knew defendant as a frequent fare.  (15T 14-22 to 15-2).  Marceus further testified that he thought defendant wanted a ride home, but defendant asked him to drive to the Georgia King Village in Newark which he estimated was “roughly” a fifteen-to-twenty-minute trip.  (15T 7-11 to 8-2).  Marceus remembered that he waited about ten-to-fifteen minutes for his fare after he let him out.  (15T 8-20 to 9-7).  The cabbie recalled that when defendant returned, he drove his passenger to Checkers, a fast food restaurant, near Bergen Street in Newark.  (15T 9-8 to 23).  He informed that defendant exited his cab in Bloomfield around 1:30 a.m. where he said he intended to visit his “girlfriend. ” (15T 10-6 to 17, 48-21 to 49-17).  [...] testified that she and defendant were “friends” who had been “dating” while she lived in the Georgia King Village complex where she resided in May 2012.  (14T 50-15 to 51-6).  Howard testified that around 12:50 a.m. on May 27 defendant visited her for about eight-to-ten minutes.  (14T 51-17 to 21).  She remembered that while he was in her apartment, defendant “got on his phone. ” (14T 51-22 to 24).  Lastly, [...], of [...] ([...]) located in Warrensville Heights, Ohio, testified without objection as a digital forensic examiner regarding “cell phone tower locations.
[brief] ”  And he did pursue a bad faith argument, just not an effective one.  Another example is the State’s myopic focus on categorial bars and [...]’s interests, rather than on the interests of [...].  The RPCs are clear: a lawyer is prohibited from representing a client when there is a significant risk his representation of that client may be materially limited by responsibilities to a former client, absent waiver, and he cannot use information from a former client or reveal information related that representation.
[brief] 17 POINT IV  THE LAW DIVISION’S DECISION IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT DISREGARDED  30 YEARS OF STATE COURT LAW DEMONSTRATING THAT THE SUPERIOR COURT IS THE PROPER JURISDICTION FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE IFPA, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1, et. seq.  20  POINT V  THE MOUNT PROSPECT CASE IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL OR BINDING ON THIS COURT AND CONTAINS A PATENTLY FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF THE RELEVANT LAW.