ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] By email dated September 26, 2016, [...] wrote to [...] and [...] asking them to provide the necessary verification on the “no sewer line” issue and the need for an ejector pump from [...] for an approximate cost of $100,000.  The email continues:  “This should come from your engineer to me ASAP to substantiate the need for more time to make first rent payment now due October 1.  We will request to make said payment to January but will have no success without the above documentation” (Pa1377).  [...] wrote an email to [...] dated October 28, advising that “this letter/email shall confirm my client’s decision to cancel and terminate the lease contract with option to buy component effective today pursuant to the specific lease/contractual provision between the parties as signed, executed and agreed to by the parties.
[brief] Davidovich v. Israel Ice Skating Fed’n, 446 N.J. Super. 127, 158 (App. Div. 2016) (noting that a trial judge’s assessment of the documentary record receives no special deference and is reviewed de novo); Belmont Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Geibel, 432 N.J. Super. 52, 86 (App. Div. 2013) (“Of course, the construction of a written document solely on the basis of its own terms, is a question of law . . . and we review legal issues de novo . . . .”); [...], [...], 2022 WL 2542293, at *5 (App. Div. July 8, 2022) (“[A] trial court’s legal determinations are not entitled to any special deference [and are] reviewed de novo.
[brief] For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.  ---  \(^1\)The NJCRA is generally interpreted nearly identically to § 1983 and claims under the NJCRA are generally coterminous with and subject to the same defenses and immunities as those brought under § 1983.  *Trafton v. City of Woodbury*, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443-44 (D.N.J. 2011).  Thus, all arguments in this brief pertaining to the § 1983 claims also applies to the NJCRA claims.  The purpose of a §1983 claim is to provide a remedy for state action aimed at depriving persons of rights protected by the Constitution and laws.  *Popow v. City of Margate*, 476 F.Supp. 1237, 1243 (D.N.J. 1979).  However, a §1983 claim is not itself a source of substantive rights, but rather a method for vindicating federal rights.
[brief] (Pa234).  While [...] was in an “anteroom” adjacent to the courtroom, he sprayed a Bergen County Sheriff’s Officer with tear gas and fled out of a second-story window, jumping down to the street below.  (Pa263).  He ran to a nearby parking lot and approached a 58-year-old man, “[...],” who had just exited his 1977 Cadillac.  Ibid.  [...] sprayed [...] in the face with tear gas, causing [...] to fall to the ground, and fled in [...]’s car.  (Pa264).  After he drove away, [...] – driving on the wrong side of the road – reached out of the car and snatched a woman’s purse and drove off.  (Pa265).  [...] then drove the stolen Cadillac on Route 17 in Ramsey and struck a vehicle from behind, causing major damage to the rear bumper.  (Pa266).  [...] continued driving northbound on Route 17 and proceeded into New York, where a high-speed chase ensued, which ended when [...] crashed.  (Pa266-Pa267).  [...] was apprehended and found in possession of a tear gas canister, [...]’s purse, and additional property.  Ibid.  Police also found a handcuff key concealed in a band-aid taped to [...]’s chest.  Ibid.  [...] was charged with escape, possession of an implement of escape, aggravated assault on a police officer, robbery, and theft.  (Pa58).  [...] was convicted, on January 23, 1981, and sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-two years, to run consecutive to the term he was serving at that time.
[brief] FAC ¶ 35, id.  On September 1, 2015, independent of the WMPA sale/purchase transaction, the same parties, [...], as lessor, and [...], as tenant, entered into a written “Land Lease” for the [...]’s 70 acres.  Plaintiffs intended to install and operate a solar energy facility on that land.  The lease called for a 20 year term, in consideration of an annual rent of $200,000.00 per year, triple net with an annual escalation of 1.5% of the prior year’s rent amount, due on each September 1.  FAC ¶ 36, Pa1616-17; Pa2550-59 (Lemus Cert Opp SJ).
[brief] See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426-27 (1998) (noting limitation of OWBPA to releases covering ADEA claims); see also Blum v. Lucent Techs, Inc., 2005 WL 4044579, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 30, 2006) (confirming OWBPA’s applicability only to ADEA claims and not to state law claims).  Moreover, Appellant’s counsel at oral argument before [...] made clear that they were not seeking enforcement of the draft SA which Respondent never signed, but instead, simply of the settlement contract terms as memorialized on the record.  (1T14:11-23).  Nevertheless, [...] ruled, not based upon the terms of the settlement contract as memorialized on the record, but instead, based upon paragraph 11 of the unexecuted draft SA and the language of the OWBPA, that Respondent had the right to revoke the settlement contract memorialized on the record and that she timely did so.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For all the foregoing reasons and those more fully explained in Plaintiff’s Brief, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court reverse the Final Judgment and grant specific performance ordering Defendants to comply with their obligations under the PSA and secure a site-wide RAO or, alternatively, reverse the Final Judgment, reverse the Discovery Order, and remand to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct limited additional discovery and for a re-trial based on a full record.
[brief] Armstrong v. O'Connell, 416 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (E.D.Wis.1976) ......................................  4 DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), and (5) (engaging in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law; engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  Matter of Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 401-2 (N.J. 1986) .................................................................  13 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 27 (September 23, 1955) at 260-62 ........................................................................  12
[brief] The Plaintiff asserted that the Trial Court was incorrect in concluding that the determination of whether she is entitled to PIP benefits is a jury question (Pa 163, 1T5-7).  To the contrary, the Plaintiff argued that the Trial Court, not a jury, was tasked with reviewing the undisputed facts and determining whether the Plaintiff was --- \(^2\)  1T – Transcript of November 9, 2023 Oral Argument on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.  2T – Transcript of January 10, 2024 Oral Argument on Motions for Reconsideration. entitled to the claimed, statutory PIP benefits (Pa 163, 1T5-7).  The Plaintiff also asserted that there was a substantial nexus between her injuries and the motor vehicle, thereby entitling her to statutory PIP benefits (Pa 163, 1T5-7).  On November 17, 2023, the Defendant also filed a Motion for Reconsideration, agreeing that the Trial Court, not a jury, was required to make the determination of whether the Plaintiff is eligible for statutory PIP benefits (Pa 168, 1T7-9).
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4 (noting that correctional officers are empowered to exercise full police powers); see also *In re Phillips*, 117 N.J. 567, 576 (1990)(citing *Moorestown Twp. v. Armstrong*, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965)) (holding that a law enforcement officer is a special kind of employee who must present an image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of the public).  Adherence to this high standard of conduct is an obligation that a law enforcement officer voluntarily assumes when he enters public service.  *In re Emmons*, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 142 (App. Div. 1960).  Maintenance of strict discipline is especially important in military-like settings such as police departments, prisons, and correctional facilities.  *Rivell v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 115 N.J. Super. 64, 72 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 269 (1971); *City of Newark v. Massey*, 93 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div. 1967).  Refusal to obey orders and disrespect of authority are not to be tolerated.  *Cosme v. Borough of E. Newark Twp. Comm.*, 304 N.J. Super. 191, 199 (App. Div. 1997).  To be sure, discipline of a law enforcement officer need not be “predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or regulation but may be based merely upon the violation of the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who stands in the public eye as upholder of that which is morally and legally correct.
[directive] The Warden of a County Juvenile Detention Center should notify the appropriate County Prosecutor's Office of the pending release of a juvenile due to the expiration of sentence.  Such notice should include the projected expiration date and should be forwarded fifteen (15) days in advance of the projected expiration date.  (See Appendix A-8.)  The Warden of a County Juvenile Detention Center should notify the County Prosecutor's Office of the intended release from custody of a juvenile for any reason.  Notice should be provided prior to the release of the juvenile.  (See Appendix A-8.)  The Warden of a County Juvenile Detention Center should immediately notify the County Prosecutor's Office by telephone upon verification of the escape of a juvenile from the facility.  The notification of escape should include the juvenile complaint number, the arresting/investigating agency, the name of the victim and the victim's residence if available.  County Prosecutors' Offices should provide to Wardens alternate telephone numbers in order that notification requirements may be complied with in the cases of weekend and night escapes, The Warden of a County Juvenile Detention Center should immediately notify the County Prosecutor's Office by telephone upon the return of the escapee to custody.  Notification as required in the above sections should be provided in the cases of juveniles committed to said facilities upon adjudication of delinquency for an offense that if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.
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[brief] A. 10:5-4.  Instead, the Amici propose that the Court should utilize a three-factor test in determining the application of equal protections by weighing the governmental interest in the statutory classification of equal protections against the interests of the affected class.  The test considers the following: 1) the nature of the right at stake; 2) the extent to which the challenged statutory scheme restricts that right; and 3) the public need for statutory restriction.  Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 443 (2006).  The nature of the right at stake is squarely addressed and considered by Amended Policy 5756.  The policy acknowledges that the LAD makes it unlawful for schools to subject individuals to differential treatment based on gender identity and expression.  The narrowly tailored policy strikes a balance between the fundamental and constitutional rights of parents to control the upbringing of their child with the free expression of a child within school.  More specifically, the policy **does not require** notification when a student requests a different name in class, on non-official records, due to one’s attire, or based upon any confidential conversations a student may have with a teacher or counsel.  Instead, notification is triggered for one of the four following events: i) A student formally changes a mandatory student record, including gender, as defined by N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1); ii)  A student participates in a sport for a gender other than that assigned at birth; iii) Referring a student for outside health services, and the student’s sexual identity and expression is germane to the referral; and iv)  A student uses a gendered bathroom, other than that assigned at birth, except a gender-neutral bathroom.  Further, prior to any notification, a meeting is held with the student to explain the process.  The student is provided with the opportunity to self-disclose to their family and additional resources to help through the process (i.e. role playing with the administrator, counseling and any other resources to facilitate the family’s acceptance and support of the student’s transgender status).  The policy also takes into account any documented evidence that disclosure would subject the student to physical or emotional harm or abuse.  Even considering the test proposed by the Amici, it is clear that the construction of Amended Policy 5756 was created to balance the constitutional rights of parents with adequate safeguards to protect the well-being of the student.
[brief] As an initial matter, a September 8, 1986, “end date” was not raised below by [...] in its objections to the SAM’s R&R.  The SAM considered several different “end dates” for an allocation period, but September 8, 1986 was never considered in the R&R, or in the proceedings that followed the allocation trial.  (Pa0146.)  Because this issue was not raised below, it is not properly before this court.
[brief] Otherwise, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 701, “If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it: (a) is rationally based on the witness’ perception and (b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or determining a fact in issue. ”  In the case at bar, it was not necessary for the State to proffer the testimony of an expert witness as to how geolocation data stored on defendant’s phone, and recovered during an extraction of that phone, came to be stored on defendant’s phone.
[brief] A Court cannot create a better contract than the parties executed.  Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div. 1999)  As shall be further detailed, the plaintiff actually presented no substantive evidence as required by the Appellate Court Remand that supports its burden of proof to demonstrate that perpetual parking easement was conveyed in 1963 and remains in place or an easement to use the boiler room.  POINT THREE
[brief] --- 1  [...]’s appendix includes the June 3, 2024 letter from [...]’s counsel to [...]’s counsel.  (Pa82-83.)  Under Appellate Rule 2:5-4(a), the record on appeal “shall consist of all papers on file in the court or courts or agencies below.  . . .”  The June 3 letter was never filed with the trial court, and therefore, should not be considered as part of the record on appeal.  *See Harris v. Middlesex Cnty. Coll.*, 353 N.J. Super. 31, 48 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Appellate Rule 2:5-4(a) and concluding “[a]ppellate [c]ourt[s] will not consider evidentiary material which was not part of a record below”).  After the Notice of Appeal was filed, [...] filed the Order, which included a statement of reasons, on June 25, 2024.  (Pa3-5.)  On July 23, 2024, [...] filed its Amended Notice of Appeal and Amended Case Information Statement to account for [...]’s statement of reasons issued with the Order.  (Pa93-102.)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] He later agreed that the post jeopardized his life and that he did not go into the bar that night because he saw that [...] was there.  (1T 43-2 to 75-16; 8T 39-10 to 55-23)  When asked what time he arrived at [...], he initially said he “wasn’t really paying attention to the time,” but after they pressed him, he agreed that it was before 2:00 a.m.  (1T 15-1 to 15, 79-11 to 23; 7T 198-4 to 199-2; 8T 99-4 to 18)  He denied that he was the man in the videos running west at 2:12 a.m. or that he had anything to do with [...]’s death.  (1T 56-20 to 101-14; 8T 56-25 to 107-22; 9T 5-16 to 28-22)  On cross-examination, [...] admitted that there were “many people in the area” at the time of the shooting, including up to twenty people outside the bar as well as the unidentified man who ran east, and that [...] was known for publicly exposing other police informants who could have had the same motive.
[brief] Applying that formulation, the court properly awarded [...] restitution of $15,161,043, representing the amount that investors paid to purchase the unregistered securities, minus what had “already been repaid. ” (Pa92-Pa93; August 16 Order 29-30).  Disgorgement, in contrast, “seeks to deprive the defendants of their ill-gotten gains to effectuate the deterrence objectives of the securities laws,” regardless of restoring the status quo.
[directive] However, once is property placed into active service, all costs associated with the use and to maintenance of the property shall be charged the normal operating budget the entity using the property.  Any entity that uses forfeited property shall of which maintain a written form documents the actual date that the property was placed into service.  .-  Because this account is dedicated account, the funds shall not revert to a fiscal the State General Treasury at the end a year, but canyover from of year year.
[brief] In considering a prerogative writ action brought in connection with the MSRA, the Superior Court has previously explained:  “When a reviewing court considers an appeal from an action taken by a governing body, the standard by which it is guided is whether the action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  *Fay v. Medford Tp. Council*, 423 N.J. Super 81, 87-88 (Ch. Div. 2011) (citing *Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment*, 172 N.J. 75, 81-82 (2002)); *Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp.*, 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990)).  “The factual determinations made by the board are presumed to be valid as well as the exercise of its decision making, based upon such determinations, will not be overturned unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. ”  Fay v. Medford Tp. Council, 423 N.J. Super 81, 87-88 (Ch. Div. 2011) (citing Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 82 (2002)).”  [...] v. State, [...] (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 28, 2018) ([...], A.J.S.C.) (holding State actions were “not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable”); (Pa000384).  Here, the Complaint (and Plaintiffs’ appeal) contain nothing more than bare and conclusory allegations of bad faith which do not satisfy the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.  See Mitchell v. City of Somers Point, 281 N.J. Super. 492, 500 (App. Div. 1994) (explaining that “insubstantial” and speculative allegations of bad faith cannot support a prerogative writ).  Indeed, the adoption of Resolution 591 did not occur in a vacuum.  As Plaintiffs’ own Complaint identifies, Resolution 591 was adopted after [...] issued the First Police Decision, and the parties, including the [...], in the First Police Action engaged in settlement discussions which resulted in capping terminal leave payments at $15,000.  Indeed, in the First Police Decision, [...] held that:  The part of the Designee’s proposal dealing with eliminating terminal leave lump sum payments for accumulated sick leave in excess of $15,000 is reasonable and consistent with the Recovery Act.  This part of the proposal is consistent with the objectives of the Recovery Act to establish financial stability for [...].  (First Police Decision at 56, Pa000319).  The decision to limit terminal leave to $15,000 was vetted by the Superior Court, and ultimately approved by the [...] and the City’s elected officials after months of consideration and review.  Plaintiffs fail to allege that Resolution 591, which authorizes the payment of approved terminal leave, is arbitrary and capricious, and their claim therefore fails as a matter of law.  POINT IX
[brief] I.  [...]’s insurance policy with [...].  [...] insures [...] under a standard auto insurance policy.  (Pa53).  The policy provides underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) for bodily injuries up to $300,000 per person.  (Pa55).  Part E of the policy lists “General Provisions,” starting on page 37.  (Pa100).  On page 39, under “Legal Action Against Us,” there is a suit limitation provision.  (Pa102).  The provision purports to require UIM claimants to sue [...] within “[f]our years from the date of the accident” or “[o]ne year from the date that the covered person is aware of should have been aware of a claim for which coverage would apply,” “whichever is later. ” (Pa102).  One page 38, the policy includes a “Conformity to Law” provision.  (Pa101).  This provision states that “[i]f any of the terms of this policy conflict with state or local law, state or local law will apply. ” (Pa101).  The policy does not define “conflict. ” (Pa54–Pa107).  II.
[brief] (33a ¶115);(428a-434a).  Therein, the City adopted the October 18, 2018 memo and capped Plaintiffs’ lump sum terminal leave payments at $15,000 each.  (33a ¶115).  The City escrowed the funds to pay all accumulated sick leave liabilities and has set aside $7,619,182.11 as of February 28, 2018.  (31a-32a. ¶107); (220a).  Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of $750,928.99 in deferred compensation, a fraction of what is held in escrow.  (35a ¶131).  On December 3, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF ALSO STATED A CLAIM AGAINST OLD REPUBLIC FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND AIDING AND ABETTING A BREACH** (Pa651-652; 4T)  [...] also argues that it could not be held liable for breaching the contract with Plaintiff because the PSA had already been terminated by the time [...]’s representative, [...], affirmatively misled Plaintiff and withheld material information about the scheduled closing.  *(See [...] Br., at Point II (D)).  Because [...] is alleged to have made false promises and misstatements upon which Plaintiff relied after the Deposit was returned (but before the transaction between [...] and the Fee Owner closed), [...] argues that it could not be held to have breached its duties to Plaintiff under the PSA.  *(See id.).  The trial court implicitly accepted this argument, in dismissing the Complaint as against [...], with prejudice.  (Pa651-652; 4T, at 7-8).  However, this argument rests upon the same distorted reading of Section 13.1 of the PSA that was discussed above.  (Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T; 3T; 4T).  Section 13.1 of the PSA gave Plaintiff an express right to demand specific performance and insist upon transfer of the title to the Real Property to Plaintiff, if and when [...] defaulted on its obligations and proceeded to close upon the transaction directly with the Fee Owner, notwithstanding and “in addition to its termination right” and return of the Deposit.  (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1 (emphasis added)).  This argument has already been addressed in Plaintiff’s opening brief and in Points II and III above and, thus, will not be restated here.  [...]’s argument also effectively ignores the Complaint’s allegations that [...] and [...] were well aware that Plaintiff fully intended to enforce its rights under the PSA, even after the Deposit had been returned.