ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa126.  Plaintiff maintains that the lease termination was rescinded by [...] in a conversation that took place between Plaintiff and [...] on May 5, 2016.  [...] denies that he verbally rescinded the termination of the Lease.  Pa138.  Plaintiff further asserts that the rescission was confirmed in a letter dated May 6, 2016 that was addressed to [...] c/o of [...].  Pa74.  The May 6, 2016 letter was never co-signed by any of the members of [...] nor is there any other writing that confirms the rescission of the notice of termination.  Paragraph 17 of the Lease specifically provides that “no terms may be modified except by agreement in writing signed by both parties.
[brief] Despite the robust social science on deterrence presented by [...], the sentencing court entirely failed to address deterrence in its fairness assessment.  (Da50-51)  The court rejected [...]’s argument regarding incapacitation without assessing the social science presented (Da50-51); instead, the court relied on numerous dismissed charges, again violating K.S.  First, the Court referenced a description of a 1998 charge under [...] that appears on page 8 of [...]’s Presentence Report, alleging that [...] “brandish[ed] a gun, approached his former coworker demanding the coworker hand over the keys to his car,” and “fractured his former coworker’s nose and left him with facial bruising. ”  (Da50; PSR8)  The court noted that [...] had been charged with carjacking under that indictment.  (Da50)  However, the PSR indicates that the carjacking charge was dismissed and that [...] was only convicted of second-degree robbery under that indictment.  (PSR10)  The description of this crime was likely taken from a police report rather than defendant’s plea colloquy, and as such it does not constitute “undisputed facts of record or facts found at a hearing. ”  K.S., 220 N.J. at 199.  In the absence of reviewing [...]’s actual plea colloquy for that case, the court was permitted to consider only that [...] was convicted for second-degree robbery.  The court also considered that [...] “has been arrested for multiple robberies and assaults. ”  (Da50)  While this is a true statement, [...] has never been convicted of a single count of assault, as they were all dismissed.  (PSR7-12)  Additionally, the majority of [...]’s prior robbery charges were dismissed or downgraded; prior to the conviction for first-degree robbery under [...], [...] had only one prior robbery conviction—for second-degree robbery under [...].  This is yet another instance of the court impermissibly considering dismissed charges in violation of K.S.  Because the sentencing court disregarded the clearly established social science of deterrence and incapacitation and instead impermissibly relied on dismissed charges, this court must reverse and remand for resentencing.
[brief] MANY OF DEFENDANT’S CLAIMS ARE PROCEDURALLY BARRED AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED  R. 3:22-4 instructs as to what claims may be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief.  The Rule provides, “[a]ny ground for relief not raised in the proceedings resulting in the conviction, or in a post-conviction proceeding brought and decided prior to the adoption of this rule, **or in any appeal taken in any such proceedings** is barred from assertion in a proceeding under this rule unless the court on motion or at the hearing finds: (1) that the ground for relief not previously asserted could not reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding; or (2) that enforcement of the bar to preclude claims, including one for ineffective assistance of counsel, would result in fundamental injustice; or (3) that denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule of constitutional law under either the Constitution of the United States or the State of New Jersey. ”  R. 3:22-4 (emphasis added).  Defendant’s claims pertaining to the adjudication of the discovery issue involving the deleted surveillance video, bad faith, and the suggestiveness of the identification were all adjudicated first in the first instance, then on appeal in this Court, and then reviewed further by our Supreme Court in its denial of Defendant’s petition for certification and his motion for reconsideration of that denial, and then even further in the United States Supreme Court’s denial of Defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  Db18-19; Da127; Earley v. New Jersey, 583 U.S. 1102 (2018).
[brief] A.  THIS COURT SHOULD RULE THAT SFRA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE [...].....34  B.  THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES TO FULLY REMEDY THIS CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCY.................................................................34  C.  TO FULLY REMEDY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES PROVEN IN THIS CASE, THE OTHER BRANCHES MUST ADHERE TO THE PARAMETERS OUTLINED BY THIS COURT....................... ...36  D.  THE DENIAL OF T&E MUST BE REMEDIED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE SINCE TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE FOR LAKEWOOD’S PUBLIC-SCHOOL STUDENTS.................................................................40  APPENDIX
[brief] CONCLUSION  As the trial court aptly noted in its opinion in support of its decisions on the motions for summary judgment:  (T)he undisputed facts demonstrate that ([...]) was not enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Accident, that it understood and acknowledged the unenrollment, and that it obtained the necessary insurance at its own expense from its own carriers, [...] and [...], as a prerequisite to its work on the Project.  Pa2746.  Any argument by [...] or [...] to the contrary is completely belied by the record.  [...] was fully protected and indemnified, and can have no claim against [...].
[brief] Even absent that fatal flaw, it would be impossible for the Defendants to establish by what right, exactly, the Trustee could pursue [...] to recover his profit from the resale of the Boonton Property, or to have prevented that sale from taking place.  [...] acknowledged as much during the plenary hearing:  Q.  And [...] did buy the house by himself.  Correct?  A. Correct.  Q. Okay.  And he got title to the house then he sold it to the [...].  Correct?  A. Correct.  Q. Okay.  And once he got title to the house, the Trust was out of the picture.  Correct?  A. Correct. (8T76:6-14).
[brief] It’s just not aesthetically pleasing to look at. ”  Pa192 at 44:9-11.  21.  After falling, Plaintiff testified that she crawled on her “right hand and . . . right knee” back to her car.  See Pa157 at 46:23 to 47-1.  22.  Plaintiff testified that, despite her injuries, she pulled herself onto her feet:  Q.  And then you say you used the back of your vehicle to pull yourself up?  A. Yes.  Q.  Onto both feet?  A. No, onto my right foot.  Q. Okay.  And were you holding your left foot in the air?  A.  Yes, I -- I was anchoring myself with my hand and slowly with my right foot.  I couldn't - I couldn't touch my left foot to the ground.  [Pa157 at 47:6-15].  23.  Plaintiff testified she then “glided” back to the driver’s seat:  Q.  You were holding yourself up by the car, correct?  A. Yes.  Q.  Your left foot was in the air because you couldn't put it down, right?  A.  I could not put it down, no.  Q.  And you were gliding your right foot while your left foot was in the air?  A. Yes.  Q.  Was it like you were dragging your right foot?  I'm not understanding.  A.  Exactly.  I couldn't really -- I really couldn't bend my leg 'cause my -- I had just smashed my knee.  Q. Right.  A.  And I had to crawl back on that knee 'cause I couldn't move the other leg.  [Pa157 at 48:25-49:16].  24.  However, the surveillance video clearly shows Plaintiff pushing herself onto her feet and walking approximately five steps without any issue before disappearing behind her car and getting back into the driver’s side door.
[brief] It would be inappropriate and a grave injustice to allow the unconstitutional equity theft judgment to stand because of the procedural errors.  [...]’s motions were filed within a reasonable time frame considering the complexity and the evolving nature of the case, including the impact of the Tyler decision.  It is understandable that [...] did not know at the time of his appeal that only days before, the US Supreme Court has declared the NJ tax sale law procedure and his judgment to be unconstitutional.  As such, the appellate division can exercise its discretion to address the merits of an appeal if it finds that doing so would serve the interests of justice and judicial efficiency.  The current judgment of foreclosure where the Plaintiff in the foreclosure matter was permitted to retain [...]’s substantial equity is unconstitutional and cannot stand.  The appellate court can exercise its prerogative to dictate how to procedurally remedy the application of the new law to this matter.  Equity does dictate that this matter be addressed by the Appellate Court at this time to avoid a grave injustice.  [...] has lost his home and all equity in his home to an unconstitutional law and a judgment affirmed after the law was declared unconstitutional and vacating judgment was mandated.  Tyler was controlling law at the time of the June 8, 2023 appellate decision in [...]’s case and the court now has the opportunity to correct the oversight and vacate the unconstitutional judgment so that [...] can save his home.
[directive] ATTACHMENT  2 INFORMATION SHEET FOR A PETITION FOR AN EXTREME RISK PROTECTIVE ORDER AGAINST A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER  New Coum Jcr,cy Information Sheet for a Petition for Extreme Risk Protective Order an Against a Law Enforcement Officer • Integrity lndepelldence Falmess, Quality Servk:e (N.J.  The Extreme Risk Protective Order Act S.A. 2C:58-20 to -32) requires that when the respondent a law enforcement officer, the petition cannot be filed with the court until the is of conclusion an internal affairs investigation, and a determination by the county prosecutor to file a petition with the court.
[directive] Where a defendant wishes to challenge an element of the per se offense, through the use of a conditional guilty plea, a prosecutor should still present and place on the record all of the evidence in support of the charge or charges, or obtain a stipulation, from the defendant, as to all of the elements of the observational offense.  Amendment or Dismissal of DWI or DWI Refusal Cases  On December 2, 2004, the Acting Administrative Director of the Courts, issued the attached Memorandum to all Municipal Court Judges which contains a recommended series of sample questions that a Municipal Court Judge should consider asking of a Municipal Prosecutor who proposes to amend or dismiss a DWI summons.  These sample questions were developed by the conference of Presiding Municipal Court Judges “to establish a record and thereby prevent an improper dismissal or amendment of a N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 charge. ”  Thereafter, on December 10, 2004, a memorandum, from the Prosecutors Supervision & Coordination Bureau, was sent to All County Prosecutors for distribution to All Municipal Prosecutors to inform them of the AOC Memorandum and of their responsibilities with respect to dispositions of this nature.  Municipal Prosecutors should familiarize themselves with the legal principles pertaining to dismissals and amendments of DWI charges as discussed in the Prosecutors Supervision & Coordination Bureau Memorandum.  Sentencing
[brief] *Raroha v. Earle Fin. Corp.*, 47 N.J. 229, 234 (1966).  Here, as a member of Class Twelve under the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order, Appellant specifically released [...] from any claims related to its licensure status and the collection of the debt owed on the Account.  Pa26-33.  In pertinent part, the Settlement Order provides:  ‘Released Claims’ shall mean **any and all** actions, causes of action, suits, claims, defenses, covenants, controversies, agreements, promises, damages, judgments, demands, liabilities and obligations in law or in equity relating solely to claims of statutory damages under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), that Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members, as defined herein, asserted or could have asserted as a result of, arising out of, or in connection with the collection of a debt on behalf of [...] Funding LLC and on behalf of [...], when they were not licensed under New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C 1 et seq., from the beginning of time to the date of this Agreement.  Pa31-32, ¶ 19 (emphasis added).  Appellant did not opt out of the class or file an objection to same, and he received compensation under the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Order.
[directive] Page 3 b.  Consistent with the provisions of Section 2b of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2005-1, nothing herein shall be construed in any way to prohibit the Office of Counter-Terrorism or its officers or civilian employees, or any other law enforcement personnel, from taking into account a person’s race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or religious practice or expression when such factor(s) is/are used to identify or describe the physical characteristics of a particular individual or individuals who is/are the subject of a law enforcement investigation, or who is/are otherwise being sought by the Office of Counter- Terrorism or any other law enforcement agency in furtherance of a specific investigation or prosecution of a specific terrorist act, scheme, conspiracy or organization.
[brief] AMICUS CURIAE  BRIEF  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  JUSTICE COMPLEX [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. 306012019  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE  BUREAU P.O. BOX 086 [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  September 27, 2024
[brief] The public's interest in not being served by a misogynist like [...] is of equal weight to the public's interest in not being served by a racist.  "It is not too great a price to pay that the public may have the utmost confidence in the honesty and integrity of the officials that have been chosen to govern them and conduct the public's business."  Botti, supra, 189 N.J. Super. at 140.
[brief] Defendant also relies on the motion court’s assumption that upholding Plaintiff’s claim “would cripple legitimate debt collection activity” and assumes Congress did not intend to prohibit “mechanical transmissions of debtors’ data to postal services, telephone/telegram companies, or letter vendors. ”  Db26.  But the motion court failed to recognize that a debt collector’s use of postal services and telephone/telegram companies is profoundly different from Defendant’s use of its unidentified letter vendor.
[brief] Furthermore, Russell v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Tenafly, 31 N.J. 58 (1959) factually supports the decision made by the [...].  In Russell the applicant applied for a variance "which would allow him to modify both the setback line and minimum area requirements of the local zoning ordinance."  Id. at 63.  The Board denied the application and the applicant failed to appeal the decision.  Id.  One month after the denial revised plans were submitted and thereafter the applicant presented a second application to the board of adjustment.  Id.  The applicant's new plans extended the proposed setback from 25 feet to 30 feet and reduced the area to be used for the building.  Id.  The board of adjustment determined that the modifications were sufficient to constitute a new application and granted the applicant's variance request.  The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the decision of the board of adjustment finding that the second application sufficiently differed from the first application by reducing both bulk nonconformities to warrant entertainment of the second application.
[brief] (Pa1-11, Pa29-41, Pa56-69, Pa72-81, 78-79, Pa86-96, Pa124-130, Pa137-145).  The charges emanated from the 12/31/17 shooting incident where [...] was the victim acting in self-defense and in defense of another occupant in the vehicle he was a passenger in.  (Id.).  The IA allegations/charges were issued after the 12/31/17 shooting incident corroborating that there was no pending IA charge against [...] prior to the shooting incident.  (Id.).  It is undisputed from the litigation at the ALJ that [...] retired from the [...] solely because of necessity, in that he was fully disabled and unable to ever be an armed police officer in the [...].
[brief] (1)  [The] level and quality of service rendered by the landlord in maintaining and operating the building.  (2)  The presence or absence or [sic] reasonably efficient and economical management.  (3)  Whether the landlord made a reasonably prudent investment in purchasing the property and arranging financing on said property…It is presumed that a prospective purchaser of real property in Hoboken shall be family with the terms of this chapter.  (4)  Whether the operating expenses are reasonably incurred and the income statement is accurate.  Operating expenses shall not include depreciation…or capital expenditures…”  The Hoboken RCO defines “Fair Return” as:  The percentage of return of equity in real property investment.  The amount of return shall be measured by the net income before depreciation.  A “fair return” on the equity investment in real property shall be considered 6% above the maximum passbook demand deposit savings account interest rate available in the City of Hoboken.  The six-percent figure is provided to reflect the higher risk and lesser liquidity of real property investment in comparison to savings account investments.  The Hoboken RCO defines “Equity in Real Property Investment” as The actual cash contribution of the purchaser at the time of closing of title and any principal payments to outstanding mortgages.  DA27.
[brief] At OAGb30, the Attorney Generally backs off and asserts that "[...] viewed the video with [the prosecutor] in preparation for trial .  . ."  [...] lacked independent knowledge to authenticate required under N.J.R.E. 901.  The State cannot circumvent the Rule by having its prosecuting attorney review the footage with the 'witness,' and then bootstrap the newly acquired 'knowledge' for trial purposes.  At OAGb33, the Attorney General argues over when the prosecutor sought an alternative to [...] in attempting to authenticate the footage.  The contention is irrelevant.  [...] could not authenticate, he did not authenticate, and there was no other witness presented in order to satisfy the N.J.R.E. 901 threshold.
[brief] Plaintiff has not included the Edison defendants’ Statement of Material Facts (“SMF’s”) in his Appendix.\(^3\)  For purposes of this appeal, the Edison defendants shall rely upon the Statement of Material Facts submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment and shall incorporate herein the facts found by [...] in her December 1, 2023 Order.  The [...] is a public entity and municipal corporation as defined in N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 (Aa3, at ¶7), and hence the New Jersey Tort Claims Act defines the parameters within which recovery for tortious injury may be had against the [...].
[brief] The crucial distinction in this case is that [...] is attempting to escape liability as classifying himself as a Hospitalist, which as discussed in Appellant’s initial brief, is not a distinct specialty or subspecialty.  Pa168-178, Vol. 001.  As a hospitalist, [...] “provides primary care to patients while they are in the hospital. ”  Kennedy v. Renda, 2012 N.J.Super.Unpub. LEXIS 1864 (App. Div. 2012).
[brief] On December 7, 2016, the [...] (“Zoning Board”) rejected [...]’s application to construct the proposed Regulator Station (“Regulator”) at [...].  On January 11, 2017, [...] filed a petition with the [...] seeking a determination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 that a natural gas Regulator at [...] is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public, and that any municipal land use rules be waived for the construction of the Regulator.  RCa1.  As stated in its petition, on August 17, 2016 at a hearing on the Company’s application for the [...] location, a member of the Zoning Board asked the Company whether it considered the site at [...].  RCa55 at para 25.  As a result of the Zoning Board’s 2016 denial of the proposed location at [...] and the August 16, 2016 suggestion to locate the Regulator at [...], [...] then formally proposed the 960 location to the Holmdel Zoning Board on January 2, 2018.  RCa60.  This proposal at the second and different location was also rejected by the Zoning Board on or about October 25, 2018.  H280a.  Therefore [...] filed a second petition before the Board on or about November 28, 2018 for permission to construct the Regulator at the second proposed location at [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.  RCa44.  These two petitions were transmitted to the [...] (“OAL”) and then ultimately consolidated.
[brief] Defendants’ repetitious argument centers on their belief that the Amended Complaint, (Da 001-64), does not adequately plead actual malice as to the [...], purportedly because it “offers no facts to support a theory that that the [...] acted with actual malice. ”  (Db 2).  But Defendants gloss over this Court’s recognition in Neuwirth that knowing or reckless publication of a wholly unbelievable story, or “reliance on an informant of dubious veracity,” satisfies the actual malice standard.  (Da 215).  [...]’s denial of the [...]’ motions to dismiss was proper and consistent with the precedents of this Court, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and the Supreme Court of the United States.  For these reasons, and as further discussed below, Defendants’ Appeal should be denied and the ruling of the court below affirmed.
[brief] Cb37-Cb38, Cb14, Cb42.  They quote from I/MIO [...], SEC Docket Nos. C56-19 C57-19 (Consolidated) (2021) Cb37-Cb38, Leonard involve social media posts that were particularly hideous.  These posts included those showing United States Representative [...] wearing a hijab and referring to her at "Terrorist... 100%."  SEC Docket No.: C56-19 and C57-19 at 1.  Another contains an article regarding United States Representative [...]'s call for a hunger strike in protest of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with respondent's comment that "My life would be complete if she/they die..."  *Ibid.*  The respondent also posted a photograph of a Barbie doll, with a black eye and facial bruising (apparently from being beaten), dressed in a hijab and holding a quran, stating: "Sharia Barbie comes with a jihad [sic] bruises and quran [-] Stoning accessories available for purchase."  *Ibid.*  The Commission regarded the posts as "offensive, provocative, disagreeable, or vulgar.  ..."  *Ibid.*, n. 1.  By contrast, while the post that forms the basis of Count 5 (Ca232) addresses race, the statement contained in that post is not remotely akin to making the statement "'Black people lie'" as Complainants imply (Cb42) because it does not disparage African Americans as a whole.  The statement solely references one individual, [...], who was later proven guilty of falsifying evidence of his being the victim of a racially motivated crime.  More importantly, the focus of the quoted passage was the simple impression that the media sensationalizes allegations of white supremacy and racism; not that the same do not exist.  Moreover, to the extent that some readers could consider Respondent's post to be "racist", it bears no resemblance to the level of racism and depravity exhibited by the respondent's posts in *Leonard* which called for and celebrated death.  Finally, Complainants once again speak of "public outcry" over the Facebook post in question, citing news articles and minutes of meetings of the Board.  Pb41.  Once again, this is not supported by the evidence.  As noted above, the minutes of meetings of the Board presented by Complainants include only sporadic complaints about the Facebook posts (Ca62-Ca73; Ca79-Ca99) and the accounts in news articles are written from certain perspectives and therefore cannot be relied on as evidence.