ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ..........................................  16  *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,* 121 N.J. 69 (1990)  ...............................................................................  8, 9  *Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park,* 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1957)  .......................................................  7  Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014)  .................................................................  23  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)  ..............................................................................  11  FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1980)  ..................................................................  22  Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2016)  ............................................................  14  Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010) ..................................................................  25  Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 189 N.J. 210 (2007)  .............................................................................. 10, 18  Hopkins v. Advanced Call Ctr. Techs., LLC, No. 20-cv-06733, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67732, 2021 WL 1291736 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2021)  .........................................................................................  32  Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021)  ...............................................................  12, 14, 15, 16, 17  Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021)  ...............................................................  15  Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 48 F.4th 1236 (11th Cir. 2022)  ...............................................................  15  Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021).  ...........................................................  12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25  In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017)  ..................................................................  14  Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 606 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (E.D. Wash. 2022) ............................................. 17  Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) .................................................................. 22, 30 Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413 (3d Cir. 2015) ................................................................. 29, 31
[brief] See Exhibit 19 to Amended Complaint (Ca302-303).  19.  On April 14, 2022, Respondent shared a post to her public Facebook account which states:  Watch New Jersey’s Conservative Congressman [...] blast Governor [...] and the Radical Left on their bizarre and absurd plans to teach children as young as 6 and 7 years old about ‘gender ID’ and ‘gender change. ’  See Exhibit 20 to Amended Complaint (Ca305).
[brief] Right after [...] had conducted two drug sales, defendant and codefendant met with him and the trio walked eastward on Anna Street together.  The police thus encountered defendant while he associated with someone in the process of selling drugs, an association that the Supreme Court in Tucker found “supported the officer's articulable suspicion to stop and interrogate defendant. ”  136 N.J. at 170 (discussing Doss, 254 N.J. Super. at 125).  Here, a surveillance operation was being conducted because local residents and business owners complained about crimes such as open-air drug distribution, assaults, shootings, and homicides.  The previous two years had seen about 100 arrests for narcotics offenses, recovery of five to ten guns, approximately sixteen reported shootings and two homicides.  One hundred complaints and upward of fifty service calls received from local citizens within a year caused this neighborhood to be a designated priority area of the city in which to concentrate police presence.  When the stop occurs while police are responding to problems in a high-crime area, and the person who flees is connected to those engaging in drug transactions, those facts will distinguish the case from Tucker, allowing the police to stop and interrogate the person.  See, e.g., Ruiz, 286 N.J. Super. at 163; J.B., 284 N.J. Super. at 518; Doss, 254 N.J. Super. at 125.  The court evaluating the facts underlying the officer’s suspicion weighs the officer's knowledge and experience and the rational inferences drawn from the facts, viewing them objectively in light of the officer's expertise.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h).  Additionally, the Legislature created a mandatory extended term for defendants who commit certain enumerated crimes while on bail for those same crimes, using the language: “at the time of the commission of the crime, the defendant was released on bail or on his own recognizance for one of the enumerated crimes and was convicted of that crime. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.1.
[brief] Pa391.  He further noted that efficiency or studio apartments and one-bedroom units function essentially is the same manner, with occupancy usually by one or two persons.  Id.  While the B-3 Zone permits “efficiency units,” the Borough does not define the term and in the Borough’s Master Plan and in an adjacent zone (B-1), the Borough eliminated the concept of “efficiency units” as the concept was inconsistent with the Borough’s affordable housing obligations.
[brief] [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.  Further, while New Jersey pension statutes are construed liberally because of their remedial character, *Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), “an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute.
[brief] There is enough evidence in the record to show the failure to investigate and call [...] materially contributed to his conviction.  This was a close case where [...]’s alibi was that he was at [...]; any additional evidence that helped to convince the jury [...] he was there lent crucial support to his defense.  See Wilson v. Cowan, 578 F.2d 166, 167-68 (6th Cir. 1978) (ineffective to not call alibi witness in identification case).
[brief] (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, emphasis added)  Therefore, the legislature has now clarified the OPRA law as it relates to the specific issues in this matter.  The OPRA statute was previously silent on these issues, however, the City argued strongly that the requested e-mail addresses were subject to OPRA’s privacy provision.  The new amendments now clarify and confirm the City’s arguments that the personal e-mail addresses of residents provided to the municipality to apply for services or programs, such as municipal alerts, are not public records.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In this case, when analyzing the factors articulated in _Cordero_, we do not yet know whether the Defendant: (1) supplied any of the medical providers to the decedent at [...] for treatment; (2) whether there was any notice of their independence; (3) whether the decedent had the opportunity to reject their care; (4) whether the decedent had contact with the providers prior to arriving at [...]; or (5) any knowledge about the medical providers’ contractual arrangement with the Defendant.  Thus, why discovery is crucial.  In his decision, [...] determined that there was nothing in the record to establish apparent authority or that the Defendant had any control over the other parties at issue.  (2TR45:14-16).  However, the Defendant’s website suggests otherwise, in that it markets to the public that the defendant, [...] is one of its residences.  (P73).  The Defendant’s website, at a minimum, creates the perception to the public that the entity has some level of authority or control over [...], such that they can potentially be found vicariously liable for [...] and the actions of the medical providers that treated the Plaintiff.
[brief] [...]’S REDIRECT TESTIMONY DOES NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION  Defendant’s theory of the case was that others, specifically his brother [...], had a similar financial motivation for the attacks on [...], but that police, in their rush to judgment against him, never investigated alternative suspects.  See Db41.  To advance this theory, during cross examination of Sergeant Weisbrot, the following questioning took place:
[directive] TABNO.  13 of [...]  LAW ENFORCEMENT TRUST FUNDS STATEMENT OF VEHICLES AND PROPERTY -SEIZED AND FORFEITED XXXX DECEMBER 31, Seized Law Value ' I Asset Enforcement Asset Date on ? Trust Trust Maintenance Seizure Case of Date Account Account Account Number Seizure PROPERTY - Vehicles Balance December 31,200X xxxx xxxx.xx xdxdxxxx xxxx.xx Vehicle 1 xxxx xxxx.xx xdxdxxxx xxxx.xx Vehicle 2 xxxx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xdxdxxxx xxxx.xx Vehicle 3 - xxxx (XXXX.XX) xxxx.xx X Vehicle Forfeited xx/xx/xxxx xdxx/xxxx xxxx.xx - xxxx Y xx/xx/xxxx xxxx.xx (xxxx.xx) Vehicle Returned xx/xx/xxxx - xxxx xxxx.xx 2 Vehicle Forfeited xx/xx/xxxx h, xxxxxx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx Balance - Property other than Vehicles Balance December 31,200X xxxx Computer 1 Kxlxdxxxx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx xx/xx/xxxx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx Computer 2 xxxx
[brief] Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 101 N.J. 161, 187 (1985).  Accordingly, a claim of intentional wrong, if successful, does not impose liability on an employer under Article 2 of the Act.  Such a claim falls outside of Article 2 and is in addition to the benefits provided by the Act.  Moreover, it is not a claim asserted under Article 1 of the Act.  As such it is not a claim to which the compulsory insurance provisions of the Act apply.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 has no application to this case and is wholly irrelevant to the claims asserted against [...].
[brief] The primary retail streets remained in the NC Neighborhood Commercial zone, while secondary commercial streets were placed in the R-2 zone, which did not permit retail uses even though ground floor retail would have been the contextual development pattern.  This was, sadly, [...] throwing in the towel on many of its commercial streets, recognizing the shrinking retail demand and shrinking population base of the city, and trying to concentrate retail on the few remaining streets that could be supported.  As [...]’s decline was successfully halted in the 1980s and growth picked up speed in the 1990s and continued to accelerate to this day, the R-2 zone has slowly vanished from the [...] zoning map.
[brief] Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.
[brief] \(^2\)  [...] & [...], Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Patient’s Dilemma and Doctor’s Delight, 28 Miss. C. L. Rev. 51 (2008-2009).  small fraction of American healthcare costs, such litigation imputes an enormous benefit on the public by way of the deterrence of negligent medical care.  As to privacy concerns, different patients may have varying feelings with regards to the privacy of their case.  In fact, many prefer to have their experiences visible to the public eye.  In any event, as to physicians’ privacy, our system of litigation allows for confidential settlements.  The above issues are all the more cogent in the context of this case where the manner and substance of the arbitration agreement were entirely unconscionable in many ways, as detailed in our Respondent’s Brief.  The Wrongful Death Claim
[brief] ......................................................................................... 45, 46, 48  Marter v Board of Trustees, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1766 (App. Div. 2024)  ..................................... 28, 32  Miller v. Public Employee’s Retirement System, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1917 (App. Div. 2014) ................................. 11, 28, 31  Mount v Board of Public Employees’ Retirement System, 133 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1975)  ...............................................................  26  New Jersey Department of Public Advocate, v N.J. Board of Public Utilities, 189 N.J. Super. 491 (App. Div. 1983) .................................................. 27, 32, 37, 43  *Petruccelli v. Board of Trustees,* 211 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1986) .................................................. 45  *Richardson v. Board of Trustees,* 192 N.J. 189 (2007) .............................................................................. 23, 44  *Riley v Board of Trustees,* 2021 N.J.  Super. Unpub. Lexis 2739 at (App. Div. 2021) ....................... 28, 38, 43 *Russo v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System,* 206 N.J. 14 (2011) ............................................................................... 25-26, 43 *Russo v. Teacher’s Pension & Annuity Fund,* 62 N.J. 142 (1973) ................................................................................. 45 *Smith v. Department of Treasury, Division of Pension and Benefits,* 390 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 2007) ..................................................... 26 **State Statutes** *N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7* .............................................................................. 22, 23 *N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c)* ........................................................................... 26, 27, 38, 43 INTRODUCTION Respondent, [...] (“Board”), submits this brief in response to the Appeal of its Final Administrative Determination denying Appellant [...]’s (“Petitioner”) application for Accidental Disability retirement benefits.
[brief] Regardless, Appellant’s NJCFLA claims lack merit.  Appellant argues that the Debt is void because Respondent purportedly committed a fourth-degree crime under N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  But, this argument is a red-herring because not only is there simply no private right of action under the NJCFLA, but Appellant is barred by res judicata from re-litigating issues as to the NJCFLA against Respondent.
[brief] [...] was charged with sleeping on the job.  However, the State did not provide one iota of evidence to support this allegation.  In fact, the closest that the State could get to support this allegation is [...]’s testimony that “[t]hey talked and watched some television.  Gales was sitting.  Sometimes Gales’ eyes were open, sometimes they were closed. ” (Pa114a).  \(^{13}\)  Many of the HRB violations appear to mirror N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1) through (11).  Where these mirror, or are duplicative of, the Administrative Codes, [...] will rely upon the substantive arguments in those sections.  In a similar fashion, [...] was charged with “negligently contributing to an elopement or escape. ”  What should be noted is that in the discovery the State provided to [...], it was well known among the inmate population that the window in Wing 3 was broken and could be opened at any time.  Likewise, [...] testified that he had alerted the staff at [...], as early as 2016, that the window was broken and needed repairs.  (2T19.15 to 20.24).  By 2018, the window had still not been repaired.  (Id.).  Additionally, there were indications from J-Pay – an internal DOC computer system – that [...] intended to escape.  These were not communicated to [...].  Further, and most importantly, the DOC never charged, or disciplined, [...] with and/or for escape.  Therefore, it would be unjust to solely ascribe to [...] the sum combinations of these elements – each of which contributed to the attempted escape of [...] B.  The August 17, 2019 Incident (OAL INITIAL DECISION AT PAGES 25-29; PA25A-29A)
[brief] The discovery issues on appeal are reviewed in the same bullet-point order presented in the Letter Order and Plaintiff’s appeal.  - [...] did not abuse her discretion in denying Plaintiff’s request for a copy of the weekly working schedules that were posted on the wall of [...]’s restaurant for each week of Plaintiff’s employment.  The Magistrate appropriately concluded that even though this information was generally discoverable, it was nevertheless appropriate to deny Plaintiff’s request on Defendant [...]’s statement that the requested information no longer exists or was in its possession.  (Letter Order at 2).  The Magistrate directed Defendants to submit a certification to this effect.  *(Id.).  On November 25, 2019, Defendants timely submitted same attesting that the requested work schedules no longer existed.  (Cross-Motion to Dismiss, Affidavit of Counsel, Ex. G ¶ 2, ECF No. 62-3).  Accordingly, for these reasons, [...]’s ruling is affirmed.
[brief] As indicated, there was miscalculation in the very beginning.  A date was given which could not be met.  Then, the trial Court, instead of waiting for the few days that would produce the Defendant’s release, the Court set up a quasi-criminal courtroom for a civil case to be tried.  But most of all in this case, the Plaintiff is not prejudiced and if it wasn’t for a miscalculation by the criminal trial Judge, and a mistake by the civil trial Judge, which required a reversal, this case would have been tried a long time ago and we wouldn’t have had to turn a courtroom into a jail cell.  There’s no question it was a mistake by counsel that produced a result, not an unfair result because the Plaintiff claims no injury.  A number of mistakes were made in this case.  The trial Judge in the actual trial was reversed by the Appellate Division.  The Judge assigned to the Appellant’s criminal trial thought he would be released in time for the designated trial in the Civil Division.  That Judge was mistaken.  Then, Plaintiff’s counsel made a mistake and the case was dismissed by a Judge who had set up a Civil Court room as a jail cell for Plaintiff who was the victim of a number of mistakes.  The Appellate Division Opinion referred to above is attached hereto.  ARGUMENT AS TO R. 1:7-5
[brief] [...] testified that in June of 2019 he purchased a black Chevy Malibu in the state of Vermont.  Piro purchased the car for his friend, [...], who traveled to Vermont along with her boyfriend – whom Piro knew as “[...]” – to help buy and insure the vehicle.  (6T14-13 to 16-16)  After registering the car at the Vermont DMV, Piro gave the car to Erica and “[...]. ”  (6T16-17 to 17-8)  Piro testified that he was “90 percent” or “three quarters plus” certain that photos depicting a black Chevy with Vermont plate HNC 855 was the car he had purchased.  (3T40-25 to 41-1; 6T22-2 to 23-1)  (Da16)  Piro was shown a photo of an unidentified man’s face (Da17) and said, “that’s a picture of the man I know as [...],” although Piro had only met “[...]” on a “handful” of occasions – “a half dozen [to] a dozen” times. \(^1\) (6T23-2 to 4, 15-20 to 22)  The State presented evidence that after Piro transferred the vehicle, it was driven by at least two different people, including [...] and a man named [...].  (3T38-23 to 39-20, 65-16 to 66-18)  Pierce was driving the Chevy when it was pulled over in New York on July 26, 2019.  (3T38-23 to 39-20)  The officer who pulled over the car described Pierce as “a black male, approximately six foot two, 210 pounds” wearing “sweat / jogging clothes, gray. ”  (3T40-1 to 4, 44-12 to 14)  The officer identified Pierce in a photograph which was admitted into evidence.  (3T42-3 to 42-22)  (Da25)  When the Chevy was later impounded, two of Erica’s friends drove Piro to pick up the car, one of whom Piro described as a “six foot two black guy” who “looks generally” like [...].  (6T28-8 to 18)  (Da25)  Lead detective [...] collected dozens of videos from the night of the shooting in the area of [...] and organized them into what she determined to be chronological order.
[directive] Other years Boat Fine Jail DL 10 Offense  Subsequent attendance IDRC or to Required 3rd  Referral years years $1,000 10 10 Offense attendance IDRC 2nd $1,000 to Required Referral to years years $500 2 2  12:7-57  Offense  N.J.S.A. attendance year IDRC 1st 1 $500 to Intoxicated, to months Required Referral to year $300 1
[brief] The Orders compelling arbitration only require arbitration, not consolidated arbitration.  Da1-2.  Even were these cases consolidated, which they were not, “[p]arties are not required to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so. ”  *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 442 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  An “arbitrator’s authority is circumscribed by whatever provisions and conditions have been mutually agreed upon.
[brief] The Commission referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (hereinafter referred to as “OAL”).  The Administrative Law Judge assigned to hear this matter scheduled the matter as quickly as possible.  On March 21, 2023, [...] heard testimony and received exhibits in evidence.  (Pa2 to Pa35; Pa 47 to Pa 48).  At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties agreed to order transcripts and submit written summations.  [...] issued his Initial Decision on June 27, 2023, finding that the Respondent had proven its case and agreed that removal was the appropriate sanction.  (Pa158 to Pa174).  The Appellant filed exceptions.  (Pa131 to Pa144).  The Respondent replied.  (Pa145 to Pa155).  The Commission remanded the matter back to the ALJ.  In its August 2, 2023 remand order, the Commission expressed concerned that the ALJ decided the matter “solely based on the testimony of the appellant and the Correctional Police Sergeant”.  (Pa156 to Pa157).  The Commission acknowledged that it defers such credibility determinations; however, in this matter, it required that the ALJ provide “further support for his determinations”, by possibly requiring additional evidence.  (Pa156).  Immediately after remand, on August 20, 2023, the Appellant filed a motion to return the Appellant to pay status.  (Pa175).  On September 29, 2023, in a written opinion, the Court, per [...], denied the motion.  (Pa176 to Pa181).  Consistent with the remand order, [...] closed the record on October 4, 2023.  Thereafter, on October 6, 2023, the Court issued a Second Initial Decision.  (Pa209 to Pa228).  In that Second Initial Decision, [...], in clear, unambiguous language, affirmed his prior decision, i.e., confirming the removal from employment.  The Appellant filed exceptions as to the Second Initial Decision.  (Pa182 to Pa199).  The Respondent replied.  (Pa200 to Pa207).  At the Commission’s monthly meeting, scheduled for November 1, 2023, four commissioners attended the meeting.  A vote on the motion to modify the removal to a 60 day suspension resulted in a 2-to-2 tie.  Per the Commission’s rules, a tie results in the ALJ’s decision being deemed as adopted.  A Final Agency Determination was entered accordingly.  (Pa208).  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] See, e.g., Faysen Lake, Inc. v. Miller, 130 N.J.L. 289, 290–91 (1943) (by electing to rescind the sale contract, that party lost its right to sue for specific performance of the contract); Krisher v. Murphy, 11 N.J. Super. 231, 235 (App. Div. 1951) (return of deposit “constituted an election to rescind the agreement of sale”); Levy v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 420, 431 (Ch. 1938) (“Where the wronged party has elected to terminate the contract, he cannot subsequently maintain a suit for the specific performance thereof”); Blum Bldg. Co. v. Ingersoll, 99 N.J. Eq. 563, 568 (Ch. 1926), aff’d, 101 N.J. Eq. 291 (1927) (“Having committed itself to a recovery of the deposit, its right to have the property is forever gone.  The election is irrevocable. ”).