ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] •  “RPC 1.7 is not implicated because [...] and the attorneys handling the defense, [...] and [...], do not have any adverse interest to these entities and the individual defendants.  As noted above, the indictment as to [...] was in his personal capacity and he has no involvement in this litigation.  The case of J.G. Ries and Sons, 384 NJ Super 216, the Appellate Division, 2006 at page 223, states that, “RPC 1.7 reflects the fundamental understanding that an attorney will give complete and undivided loyalty to the client and should be able to advise the client in such a way as to protect the client’s interests utilizing his professional training, ability, and judgment to the utmost. ”  The record before me does not cast any doubt on the defendants’ position that [...] and [...] will be able to, and have been, zealous advocates for their clients. ”  (T7).  •  “When one considers the named defendants in this case, it is clear that RPC 1.10(a) is inapplicable because no concurrent conflict of interest exists pursuant to RPC 1.7(a).  No defendant entities or individuals are part of the Office of the Attorney General that issued the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity.  Additionally, there is no significant risk that [...]’s representation of the defendants will be materially limited in any manner by [...]’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.  As noted above, neither [...], nor [...], nor [...], have any adverse interest at all to the clients they represent in this matter.  This is supported by the three certifications submitted as part of this motion.
[brief] ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Even when counsel performs a limited investigation, his strategic choices are entitled to deference and assessed for reasonableness.  State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 22 (App. Div. 2002).  Furthermore, “it is difficult to establish ineffective assistance when counsel’s overall performance indicates active and capable advocacy. ”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111 (2011).  “The quality of counsel’s performance cannot be fairly assessed by focusing on a handful of issues while ignoring the totality of counsel’s performance in the context of the State’s evidence of defendant’s guilt. ”  Castagna, 187 N.J. at 314.  Here, defendant provided certifications from his brother that he did not participate or commit the robberies for which he was convicted.
[brief] It is plain that there would be no reason to thank Defendant for coming down and speaking with them if doing so was not optional.  The interview lasted a mere 12-13 minutes, during which Defendant was not handcuffed nor was his freedom restricted in any way.  (27T 180-7 to 182-22).  The focus of the interview was clearly on [...]’s whereabouts that night rather than Defendant’s.  See (162-21 to 182-10).  After the interview was over, Defendant was picked up by his father, and the officers did nothing when they witnessed him give his father a large sum of cash.  (27T 183-1 to 183-19).  The facts of this case are far more similar to the recent New Jersey Supreme Court case of State v. Erazo, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2023).
[brief] The Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Order must be reviewed de novo using the standard by which the Trial Judge must decide whether “the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party[.]”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  In other words, we must consider "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
[brief] Because the Debtor has finally gotten around to pleading a proper cause of action invoking the takings theory set forth in the *Tyler* and *Roberto* cases, and because the court finds that this case was in the pipeline when those cases were decided, and finally, because the court declines to permissively abstain from deciding the matter, the Debtor may proceed with the Adversary Proceeding seeking to set aside the transfer of the Property to [...] as an unlawful taking.  Consequently, the court will grant the preliminary injunction enjoining [...] from enforcing its rights and remedies against the Property until the Adversary Proceeding is finally concluded.  As a result of the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the Motion to reinstate the stay, Main Case Doc. No. 71, and the Motion for Reconsideration, Main Case Doc. No. 91 are moot – if not redundant.
[brief] Neptune City Police Sergeant [...], the lead detective assigned to this case, arrived at [...] around 8:30 a.m. (9T 18-7 to 20-13)  [...] gave Vollbrecht two hairs and a pair of white gloves.  (9T 22-13 to 18)  [...] told Vollbrecht he found the first hair—the red hair—in one of the register tills in the downstairs main office.  (9T 22-19 to 22, 23-19)  A DNA analysis was performed on this hair and it was determined that the DNA of the hair did not match [...]’s DNA.  (9T 23-23 to 24-8)  The pair of white gloves was never tested for DNA because the surveillance video showed the suspect wearing one white and one black glove, rather than two white gloves.  (9T 23-11 to 12, 90-23 to 91-5)  Two neoprene gloves were recovered from [...], the last known general direction the suspect was seen heading, but they were never taken into evidence or tested for DNA.  (9T 88-23 to 89-25, 91-6 to 20)  Vollbrecht set out from the Tavern to try to find [...], and at approximately 10:00 a.m. he arrived at [...]’s home in Avon where [...] lived with his girlfriend [...] and their daughter.
[brief] [Da552-Da563] | | | **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C,** | 15 | | 237 N.J. 91 (2019) | | | **DiTrolio v.  Antiles,** | 37 | | 142 N.J. 253 (1995) | | | **In re EnCap Golf Holdings, LLC,** | 17 | | [...], 2009 WL 2488266 | | | (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2009) [Da568-Da570] | | | **First Tek Techs., Inc. v. PAC Corp.,** | 20 | | [...], 2010 WL 773197 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 9, 2010) [Da552-Da563] | | | **Goerke Kirch Co. v. Goerke Kirch Holding Co,** | 39 | | 118 N.J. Eq. 1 (1935)  | | Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126 (1994)
[brief] ” (Pa461-Pa467).  [...] responded to [...]’s email, stating, “If this is the student I am thinking (based on his going to [...], [...], [...] and myself to try to get us to change our mind) I would be extremely reluctant. ”  (Pa465).  More importantly, [...] stated, “We told him (and several others) that they could not take any dual degree classes while dangerously close (or in this case below) academic probation.  We assured [...] during their visit (amidst concern from them about the viability of students not jeopardizing their pharmacy education to complete a dual degree) that we would monitor student progress closely, and hence have chosen to tell students to wait on taking any other course work until they are in academic good standing. ” (Pa465).  [...]’s email unambiguously demonstrate students were able to enter the dual degree program and take the additional coursework at a later date.
[brief] Accordingly, Plaintiff’s appeal should be denied.  B.  Plaintiff’s Failure to Address How the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying His Motion for Reconsideration Operates as a Waiver of that Issue.  Plaintiff’s Amended Notice of Appeal clarifies that he is appealing only from the trial court’s August 15, 2023, order denying his motion for reconsideration.  (Da 59).  Only the orders designated in the notice of appeal are subject to the appeal process and review.  *W.H. Industries, Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda*, 397 N.J. Super 455, 458 (App. Div. 2008).  To the extent that Plaintiff’s appeal brief addresses issues ruled on by the trial court in motions other than the motion for reconsideration filed on June 22, 2023, they are not subject to this appeal.  Plaintiff’s burden on this appeal, therefore, is to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his June 22, 2023, motion for reconsideration, and he has failed to do so.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE APPELLATE MANDATE TO MAKE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.  THE FACTUAL FINDINGS MADE WERE CONTRADICTED BY THE TESTIMONY.  (Not Raised below as this is an appellate argument).  II.  THE TRIAL COURT’S LEGAL DECISION THAT THE CFA DID NOT APPLY WAS, AGAIN, MISTAKEN.  (RAISED BELOW 1T46:5-50:23; 2T4:20-5:18; 2T16:23-17:5).  III.  THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF.  ALTERNATIVELY, THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO A DIFFERENT TRIAL JUDGE.  (Not raised below, appellate argument).  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS | Description | Page | |--------------------------------------------------|------| | Order Transferring Venue (July 12, 2019) | Pa16 | | Order relieving counsel (July 10, 2020) | Pa024| | Order of Dismissal (May 23, 2022) | Pa026| | Remand Decision/Order (June 27, 2023) | Pa143| | Order of Dismissal October 2, 2023 | Pa163|
[brief] These agreements have separate arbitration clauses and create distinct and separate obligations. \(^6\)  Here, the issues in the [...] and the issues in the [...] do not arise from related factors or the same transaction.  The [...] was focused exclusively on the parties’ rights under the PTA, in particular the Installment Payments [...] owed to [...] based on an EGP the parties had agreed to negotiate before [...] began work on the Project.
[directive] Będzie wiązało się z konfiskatą prawa jazdy na okres od 6 do 24 miesięcy, chyba że a.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] sąd stwierdzi, że istnieją wyjątkowe okoliczności uzasadniające odstępstwo od tej zasady?  You will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time from 6 to 24 months, unless the court finds compelling circumstances warranting an exception?
[brief] The fact that [...] had been unable to identify defendant in a photo array the police showed him after the robbery was not a basis for exclusion of his trial testimony identifying defendant as the perpetrator of the Egg Harbor Econo Lodge robbery.  See State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 327–28, 580 A.2d 221 (1990).  The fact that [...] was only shown a single photograph of defendant in making his out-of-court identification was not a basis for excluding evidence of that identification, which was demonstrated to be highly reliable.  See State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 203–06, 943 A.2d 851 (2008).  We note in particular that the State's evidence included not only [...]'s and [...]'s identifications of defendant as one of the perpetrators, but also surveillance videotapes of both robberies, which provided strong corroboration for those identifications, and defendant's tape-recorded confession. III.
[brief] THE BOARD’S ACTION HEREIN WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE, AND AS SUCH THE TRIAL COURTS HOLDING SHOULD BE UPHELD | 9 | | II.  THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS DECISION THAT THE GOVERNING BODY’S SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS WERE CURATIVE | 16 | | CONCLUSION  | 19 | APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS Page [...] Committee Answer to Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, dated December 30, 2022 ......................................................... Da1 [...] Answer to Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, dated January 12, 2023 .............................................................................. Da13 Defendant, the [...] Planning Board Answer to Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative, dated January 23, 2023 ........................................ Da23 [...] Notice of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment., dated April 14, 2023 ............................................................................. Da32 Planning Board’s Resolution 2022-11 ................................................................. Da34 Planning Board Planner, [...]’s letter dated November 11, 2022 ........................................................................................................ Da37 Planning Board Resolution 2022-15 ................................................................. Da41 Planning Board memorandum to Township Committee dated November 23, 2022 ................................................................................................. Da43 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Cases: - **Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rockaway Tp.,** 50 N.J. 302, 234 A.2d 681 (1967) ................................................................. 14 - **Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Franklin Twp. Zoning Bd.,** 233 N.J. 546 (2018).
[brief] | | | *Judgment affirmed by 77 N.J. 227, July 20, 1978* | | | Authority cont. | Brief Page Number | |----------------------------------|-------------------| | Gray v. Bradley, | 19 | | 1 N.J. 102, 104 (1948) | | | Pascale v. Pascale, | 20 | | 113 N.J. 20 (1988)  | | | Sipko v. Koger, | 31 | | 214 N.J. 364 (2013) | | | Moses v. Moses, | 35 | | 140 N.J. Equity 575 | | | (Court of Errors and Appeals, 1947)
[brief] 11 POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT [...]’S COMPLAINT WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THAT SHE DID NOT SUBMIT A PROPER OPRA REQUEST ......................  11 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE OPRA DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT RECORDS AND THE STATE’S INTEREST IN PRESERVING THESE RECORDS
[brief] [DA348].  The Board’s review of [...]’s use variance application for an inherently beneficial multi-level senior housing community was entirely backward.  Instead of evaluating the evidence and trying to fit the development to the Property, the Board began with an unreasonable position – outright denial – and worked backwards through the balancing test under *Sica*, *supra*, to cherry-pick and misrepresent facts to reach its predetermined outcome.  Three points crystalize the Board’s errors.  First, the Board botched its analysis of the positive aspects of the development and all but disregarded the gigantic need for this use.  Second, the Board conjured up the purported detriments of the project to justify its denial.  Third, and perhaps the biggest failing on the part of the Board was that it utterly failed to even try to mitigate the any impacts of the development as it did not even try to identify mitigating conditions.  These defects undermined the required balancing of the positives and negatives of the project.  Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Sica*, a board reviewing a use variance application for an inherently beneficial use must: (1) identify the public interest at stake; (2) identify the detrimental effect that will ensue from the grant of the variance; (3) seek to reduce the detrimental effect by imposing reasonable conditions on the use; and (4) weigh the positive and negative criteria, and determine, on balance whether the grant of the variance would cause a substantial detriment to the public good.
[brief] Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.  [Emphasis added.]  The focus here is on the bolded text because there is no contention that a debt collector’s communication with a mail vendor falls within a statutory exception or is made to one of the authorized recipients.  Every federal court to consider whether a communication with a mail vendor violates § 1692c(b) finds the ordinary meaning of those statutory words are unambiguous and concludes that such a communication violates that provision without leading to an absurd result by frustrating the FDCPA’s purposes.  To the contrary, the federal courts’ construction is consistent with the statutory scheme and promotes the statutory purpose of protecting consumers’ individual privacy.  In Hunstein v. [...], 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021) (Hunstein I) and Hunstein v. [...], 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021) (Hunstein II), the appellate court concluded that the consumer stated a claim for violation of § 1692c(b) when alleging the debt collector supplied information to a mail vendor used to generate, print, and mail a collection letter.
[brief] (Ca18).  The order required [...] to take “all necessary steps to take control over the business, liquor license, and personal assets of defendants [...], [...], and [...]. ” (Ca19).  Following receipt of the appointment order, [...] made arrangements to take possession of the diner, which required some time to coordinate all of the people that were necessary for the takeover of the restaurant.  (Ca19).  In that respect, [...] had to contact a locksmith; the [...]; [...], VP of [...]; and the attorneys for [...], [...] and [...].  [...] applied for [...]’s appointment in the foreclosure matter handled by [...] and [...].  (Ca19).  After notification to the police, [...] met all of the persons, including [...], at the diner, on October 22, 2021, when he took possession of the property, and requested all of the management present to leave the premises.  (Ca19).  [...] did come into the property, at which time [...] asked him to leave, which he did with the assistance of the police.  (Ca19).  Thereafter, with the assistance of [...], a hotel and restaurant operator, [...] set up procedures for the operation of the diner, and had an account established at [...] for credit cards to be processed through a merchant account in his name at [...].  (Ca19).  Thereafter, cash sales were deposited into the [...] receiver account and [...] receiver account since October 20, 2022.  (Ca19).  [...] set up the operating account at [...] so that all checks could be made through that account with monies to be transferred from [...] to [...].  (Ca19).  All cash sales were made and deposited at [...] as well.  (Ca19).  In addition, [...] retained the services of an accountant, [...], CPA, to file the necessary returns and reports in connection with the operation of the diner on an emergent basis.  (Ca20).  [...] explained in his certification that the diner operates in a building that sits on a condominium property owned by the owner of a hotel directly behind the diner/restaurant facility.  That is one of three condominium units.  The hotel directly behind the restaurant/diner is the main property, and to the south of the diner are commercial buildings utilized for physician/medical purposes.  (Ca20).  The bank requested the court to appoint [...] as receiver to help them protect any assets of the diner.  (Ca20).  [...] further explained in his certification, that while his receivership continued, on November 4, 2021 he was appointed by the court as special master to sell the property in place of the sheriff, since that was during the period of the Covid restrictions when the sheriffs were unable to sell the properties in Camden County.
[brief] Clearly, he could not have explained this agreement to [...] at the time.  Moreover, [...] testified that he had no idea why he used an arbitration agreement for cosmetic surgery, only that this specific form was recommended to him at a seminar.  (Pa12).  If [...] was allowed to demand, in take-it-or-leave-it fashion, that his patients sign an agreement the very basics of which he cannot explain, it stands to reason that lay patients entering his office should not be held to understand those sophisticated terms, either.  The defense cannot prove mutual assent or a meeting of the minds if [...]’s only stated understanding of the agreement was reference to the arbitration form itself.
[brief] Post 2010, the first case to address the NJCFLA was in the District Court of New Jersey: *Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (Pa134).  All case law post 2014 in the Superior Court and/or the District Court which analyzes the private right of action under the NJCFLA can be traced back to *Veras*.  The first cases in the Superior Court to address the private right of action under the NJCFLA were *New Century Fin. v. Trewin*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) (Pa97) and *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022) (Pa142).  *Woo-Padva* cites to *Browne v. Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Tr.*, No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021) (Pa65)—who in turn cites to *Jubelt v. United Mortg. Bankers, Ltd.*, Civil Action No. 13-7150 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84595, at *14 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) (Pa69), with *Jubelt* citing *Veras*.  In addressing the private right of action under the NJCFLA, the District Court in *Veras* reasoned that in order to determine whether the NJCFLA implies a private right of action, “the Court must consider . . . **whether there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action under the statute and whether implication of a private cause of action in this case would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the** legislative scheme.
[brief] A. 39:4-50(C).  The holding in Petrello clearly contradicts the Legislatures intent that a Defendant shall be advised both orally and in writing of the enhanced penalties for a subsequent DWI conviction.  It is fair to conclude the Legislative intent, in requiring both methods of advisement, is to unequivocally ensure the Defendant understands and acknowledges they have been advised of consequences for a future conviction.  The Legislature was clear in the language of the statute that both methods of advisement shall be required, leaving no room for any ambiguity in the interpretation of what shall be required from the Court.  Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Court to ensure the Defendant is advised of the enhanced penalties orally in open Court.  Allowing the Court the ability to willfully omit crucial steps in the judicial process effectively places the burden on the lay Defendant to understand and ascertain what their rights and obligations are under the law, which must be viewed as a violation of the Defendant’s Constitutional rights and Due Process.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has afforded Defendant’s who have had their rights violated relief in similar fashion relief enhanced custodial terms in previous decisions.
[brief] (1T46-6 to 15; Da15 3:12:39 to 3:13:57; Da17).  Defendant was calm and cooperative as he exited the vehicle.  (1T47-18 to 20).  Police then conducted a search-incident-to-arrest of defendant’s person.  Upon discovering two ammunition rounds and over $1,600 of cash in defendant’s pockets, police began to talk about the need to search defendant’s residence.  (1T49-1 to 4; Da15 3:14:50; Da17).  Given that officers watched defendant leave his house earlier that day, [...] testified that he believed defendant may have additional money, drugs, and weapons at his home.  (1T51-2 to 9).  Police then asked defendant the following questions concerning his residence:  Officer: We’re going back to the house.  Officer: Who’s back in your house right now? ...  Officer: Nobody but your wife? (Defendant inaudible).  ...  Officer: Yeah, yeah.  So here’s the deal.  It’s just your wife at the house right now? (Defendant inaudible).  Officer: And your granddaughter? Okay.  Listen, here’s the deal.  Right now we have enough to write a search warrant on your house and we’re well within that means, so either we’re gonna go that route or we can be a gentleman and we can go back, and you can give us consent and we can find whatever else you’ve got in there.