ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ............................................................  53 Maudsley v. State, 357 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 2003) ..................................................................59, 60 McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Baillets & Talamo, Inc., 331 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 2000) ..................................................................  53  Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 95 N.J. Super. 564 (App. Div. 1967) ..................................................................48, 49  Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490 (2006)  ...............................................................................................  23 O’Keefe v. Normandy Beach Assoc., [...] .........................................................................................................  7  Pavola v. Mint Mgmt. Corp., 375 N.J. Super. 397 (App. Div. 2005) ..................................................................  61  Point Pleasant Manor Bldg. Co. v. Brown, 42 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 1956)  .........................................................  24 Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co., 50 N.J. 563 (1967) ............................................................................. 57, 58 Richmond v. Thompson, 901 P.2d 371 (Wisc. App. 1995) ............................................................ 47, 50 Rodman v. Normandy Beach Improvement Authority, [...] .......................................................................................  7 Rosen v. Keeler, 411 N.J. Super. 439 (App. Div. 2010) ....................................................  38 Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 11 N.J. Super. 471 (App. Div. 1951) ...................................................... 51 State v. E. Shores, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 300 (Ch. Div. 1974) ...................................................... 25, 34 Taffaro v. Taffaro, [...], 2011 WL 6014225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 5, 2011) ...................................................................................... 48 Tarta Luna Properties, LLC v. Harvest Restaurant Grp., LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div. 2021) .................................................... 57 Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280 (1955) ............................................................................... 49 Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 413 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2010) .................................................... 53 Triffin v. SHS Grp., LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2021) .................................................... 23 Wilson v. Miller, 25 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1953) .................................................... 24 Yellin v. Kassin, 416 N.J. Super. 113 (App. Div. 2010) .................................................... 25 State Statutes Consumer Fraud Act ...........................................................................................................
[brief] Moreover, for ten years since the Property was transferred back to [...], multiple water bills remained in the name of [...].  Multiple water bills for the 293 Property confirm that [...] and his wife [...]’s names were still on the water bills for the 293 Property after 1998, such as the water bills from August 1999 to November 2019, a span of ten (10) years (Da281 – Da313).  It is common sense that a property owner would not allow the prior owner’s name to continue to stay on the utility bills for many years.  The only reasonable explanation would be that [...] knew, all the time, that Sam was the owner of the 293 Property and did not dispute Sam’s ownership of the property, until the filing of this lawsuit twenty-two years after the transfer.
[brief] **THERE IS NO BASIS TO REMAND FOR ANOTHER SUPPRESSION HEARING.**  In his final point, defendant asks for another suppression hearing to raise two claims that defendant acknowledges he failed to raise with the trial court.  The State objects to a remand for this purpose.  Defendant waived these claims on appeal by failing to address them with the trial court, and he cites to no law or competent evidence in support of his request.  “Appellate review is not limitless. ”  *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009).  “[T]he points of divergence developed in proceedings before a trial court define the metes and bounds of appellate review. ”  *Id.* at 19.  Thus, “[f]or sound jurisprudential reasons, with few exceptions, ‘our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available. ’”  *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) (quoting *Robinson*, 200 N.J. at 20).  Here, defendant waived any claim about the rebuttable presumption that exculpatory evidence was not captured on the body camera during the brief period that the officer failed to activate it at the beginning of the stop.\textsuperscript{10}
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page(s)  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  ii  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................  1  I.  THE TRIAL ERRED IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND TO ADD A MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM .........................................................................................................................  1  A.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that No Criminal Action Was Instituted ..........................................................................................................................................................................................  1  B.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that John Westerhold Could Never Prove [...] Lacked Probable Cause ..........................................................................................................................  2  C.  The Proposed Amended Complaint Properly Set Forth the Element of Malice ..........................................................................................................................................................................................  7  II.  THE TRIAL ERRED IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND TO ADD A LIBEL PER SE CLAIM ..................................................................................................................................................  8  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE THAT EFFECTIVELY DISMISSED THE [...]’ CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES ..............................................................................................................................................
[brief] C.  THE JURY WOULD HAVE, AND DID HEAR EVIDENCE OF THE OFFICERS’ OPINIONS DURING TYMIV’S TESTIMONY.  In addition, at oral argument counsel for [...] noted that the jury would hear evidence of the officers’ opinions from [...], because he was going to testify that the police accused him of throwing the bag of grout at [...].  [1T 55:20-24].  See N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1).  This is precisely what happened at trial: before Plaintiffs called [...] to the stand, counsel played portions of the bodycam video to [...] on direct, showing a tense exchange in which [...] repeatedly asks [...] why [...] had grout all over his back, and in which [...] accuses the police of railroading him.  [7T 84:3-86:6, 90:16-96:5, 115:16-19.  Among other things, the jury heard [...] tell the police “I’m getting accused of assault . . .  You couldn’t make simple police report.  You have to accuse me? . . .  You gotta accuse me with it?”  [7T 93:8-24].  After the bodycam footage was played, [...] testified that the police “ke[pt] telling me that I throw the bag of grout in the back of the guy head,” that the police accused him of assaulting [...], and that [...], who observed the exchange, told him he thought they were going to be arrested.  [7T 95:8-11, 115:16-117:7].  This testimony, which was initially elicited at [...]’s deposition, was always admissible regardless of N.J.R.E. 701.  For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, because its decision to allow the officers’ opinions with a limiting instruction for the purpose of demonstrating bias was reasonably based on sound legal principle.
[brief] [...] found defendant and [...], were given the opportunity for consultation after the Miranda waiver and prior to the start of interrogation.  [...], confirmed that defendant was “ok” with his decision to waive his *Miranda* rights, provided words of love and encouragement, and hugged the defendant and put his arm around defendant’s shoulder.  [...] acknowledged that this consultation did not occur in private, which the judge found would have been the “better practice. ”  While the court considered the absence of private consultation as part of the totality of the circumstances and gave it “some weight,” the court did not consider it a “fatal flaw” here as the consultation that did occur was sufficient as it led to the defendant being comfortable and able to move forward.
[directive] Summons.  presumption notwithstanding acomplaint-warrant the for apply to made is decision the If to officer or judicial the 4.3. 1, court subsection to pursuant acomplaint-summons of issuing criterion advised the to specific be as shall made is acomplaint-warrant for application the whom the overcome State to the relies which upon 13, note see -1(d), in :3 3 Rule enumerated or criteria is there (e.g., Rule 3:3-1(c) under established complaint-summons charging by of presumption to reason there a in summons; to appear response is not will defendant the that believe reason to is agency pretrial services the by conditions release pretrial of monitoring the that believe In etc.). or person, community; the other specified witness, victim, any protect necessary to law the in 3 listed Rule criterion :3-1(d), criteria applicable the identifying to addition or court shall advise acomplaint-warrant the for applying prosecutor or officer enforcement the overcome to State upon the relies circumstances or facts specific the to officer as judicial the of the (e.g., Rule results 3:3-1(c) in forth set complaint-summons by charging of presumption gang was committed; which crime in the manner the assessment; risk pretrial automated documenting Incident Report Enforcement Law (Preliminary 5 Section also See etc.). affiliation; for application of part eCDR as the s.stem through the submitted be to facts case-specific certain complaint-warrant).
[brief] The focus of the “substantial detriment” prong of the negative criteria is on the impact of the variance on nearby properties.  The Zoning Board found that there is no “substantial detriment” on nearby properties.  As depicted in the Plaintiff’s own exhibit, the accessory structure is at least 300 feet from the Plaintiff’s residence, which contradicts the Plaintiff’s testimony.  There is a large natural barrier of trees between the accessory structure and the plaintiffs’ residence.  The accessory structure is placed and constructed in a visually attractive manner as depicted in the photographs.  The property already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the property.
[brief] Respondent’s third request is that the Court count ballots received after the statutory deadline, effectively urging a departure from clear legislative mandates governing timely submission.  The statute is clear and absent an anthrax attack or a mail truck fire, no court has excused the timing requirements for returning mail-in ballots.  Further, Respondent has also only selectively chosen which ballots in this category to challenge, furthering the inequity in creating exceptions to the statutes which would give some voters greater rights than others.
[brief] Moreover, the logistics of the Association’s position defy logic.  In its decision, which is which is fully precedential as it applies to government agencies and employee organizations throughout the State, [...] stated “that neither party may dictate or challenge the other’s choice of its negotiations representatives (including as to a specific number or identity of such representatives), absent evidence of conflict of interest or ill-will, or evidence that a party’s choice of representatives jeopardizes safety or security” (Pa236).
[directive] Do you understand that if you violate a condition of community supervision for life and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years and a special sentence of parole supervision for life (if the violation of the condition occurred on or after July 1, 2014) or you may (if the violation of the condition occurred receive a sentence of up to 18 months before July 1, 2014)?
[brief] The NJDEP Failed to Adequately Consider Impacts to Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Identified on Site, Therefore the Issuance of the FHA Permit Should be Reversed.  (Aa2576-Aa2616).  In this matter, [...] produced photographic evidence of bald eagles utilizing the site as well as an expert report by [...], MES, QAWB, Senior Wildlife Biologist.  (Aa2553-Aa2575, Aa2576-Aa2616).  Importantly, the NJDEP processed and approved these Bald Eagles sightings for inclusion in the NJDEP Biotics Database and the landscape Project.  (Aa2553-Aa2575).  In response, NJDEP argues that it believes the site is not suitable for bald eagles or savannah sparrows.  (DEPb26-27).  It is still not clear how the NJDEP can determine that the property is not suitable habitat to support Bald Eagles and Savannah Sparrows, when there have been actual, recent, physical observations of Bald Eagles using the site, including foraging.  (Aa2553-Aa2575; Aa2540-Aa2545).  The NJDEP itself accepted the reports identifying Bald Eagles as resting and/or foraging on the site.  (Aa2553-Aa2575).  The NJDEP’s analysis basically boils down to acknowledging that there is evidence of the site being used by threatened and endangered species, but then determining that this does not fit with the textbook requirements for the threatened and endangered species and therefore it does not exist.  At a minimum, because there were actual sightings of the use of the site, the NJDEP should have required a formal bird survey as required by N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.6(e) and N.J.A.C. 7:13-18.8(b).  For these reasons, the NJDEP’s issuance of the FHA Permit is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be vacated and reversed.
[brief] In referencing Plaintiff, [...] stated that “we don’t want your kind here”.  (Plaintiff Dep. 53:6-7 & 55:15-23, 836a).  Township Administrator [...] agreed that “the politicians” were being motivated by political considerations, notwithstanding what in fact occurred on July 5, 2016 and the conclusions of the investigations of that incident.  ([...] Dep. 95:1-96:5, 524a).
[directive] [...] Lt. Governor ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2020-1 v 3.0 TO: All Chief Law Enforcement Executives FROM: [...], Attorney General DATE: March 19, 2020 (Issued) March 27, 2020 (Revised) April 11, 2020 (Revised)  SUBJECT: Directive Instructing All Law Enforcement Agencies And Officers On The Appropriate Use Of COVID-19 Information From Public Health Officers
[brief] Prior to the erroneous CCIP enrollment, [...], completed, signed and submitted a Contractor Enrollment Form (Form A), which described [...]’s work as “concrete cutting. ” (TRVa2685.)  Also submitted by [...] on July 29, 2015, was a completed Insurance Cost Worksheet (Form B) which described the work with Workers’ Compensation Classification Code 0854, a code for “Concrete Construction. ” (TRVa2687.)  At no point did [...] advise that it had been retained to perform demolition work and contractors performing demolition work were not permitted to enroll, a fact that [...] was aware of.
[directive] Please Circle Appropriate Answer  2.  a.  Did you commit the offense(s) to which you are pleading guilty?  [Yes]  [No] b.  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the [Yes] [No] judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?  3.  Do you understand what the charges mean?  [Yes]  [No]  4.  Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are giving up certain rights?  Among them are: a.  The right to a jury trial in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable [Yes] [No] doubt?  b.  The right to remain silent? [Yes]  [No] c.  The right to confront the witnesses against you?  [Yes]  [No] you are not waiving d.  Do you understand that by pleading your right to appeal (1) the [Yes] [No] denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence (R. 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?  you are waiving e.  Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal [Yes] [No] the denial of all other pretrial motions except the following:  * [...] Assessment  Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079
[brief] Similarly, [...] asks if he could use his phone to “get the number to call this lawyer” because if the police are going to charge him, “I better get a lawyer. ”  (Da 55)  The detectives then continue with the booking process, taking [...]’s photograph and fingerprints.  When [...] says that he did not do anything, [...] said, “[...], like I just said to you a little bit ago, since we talked to you the first time, a lot more evidence has come to light. ”  (Da 57)  By continually engaging with [...] by asking express questions and encouraging him to change his story in light of the new evidence that “has come to light,” the police failed to scrupulously honor [...]’s invocations of his right to counsel.  See State v. Wright, 444 N.J. Super. 347, 366 (App. Div. 2016) (holding that police telling defendant that the victim was coming to identify him and that an officer had found a gun nearby constituted interrogation because it was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response).  Thus, [...]’s statements should have been suppressed.
[brief] POINT SIX .................................................................  66  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE APPELLATE COURT'S REMAND, AND ERRONEOUSLY TRIED AND DECIDED THE ISSUES AS A CONTINUATION OF THE 2017 TRIAL AND DECISION (APPEALS THE FINAL OPINION/ORDER Da978, Da980, Da1004) POINT SEVEN ............................................................  68 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE RETURN OF MONIES PAID PURSUANT TO THE JUNE 27, 2017 JUDGMENT AND MARCH 6, 2018 ORDER WHICH WERE VACATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION ON JUNE 25, 2019 (6T72:7-25)(Da 976)
[brief] The brief submitted by the defendant-respondent fails to significantly address the major concerns raised by the plaintiffs with respect to the Trial Court substituting its opinion for that of the jury.  For these reasons, and those expressed in the original brief of the plaintiffs-appellants, the Trial Court’s failure to mold the jury’s verdict in accordance with the pre-trial agreement of counsel must be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...], ESQ.  [...] Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorney ID No. 047681991
[brief] To make those crucial links, the State principally relied upon [...]’s improper video narration testimony.  And because footage from S-37 was taken from the only camera which purportedly depicted the shooter interacting with the Chevy, it was an essential part of the State’s case which got to the heart of their argument.  That essential video also happened to have the least clear depiction of the supposedly relevant images on screen out of all the videos introduced by the State.  Without the detective’s improper testimony, the video appears wholly irrelevant to the case.  And even if the detective had merely highlighted the portion of the video that she found relevant in purely objective, factual terms – which she did not do – the supposedly relevant images were still --- 3As discussed above, the State argued in summation that S-41 also depicts the shooter, this time entering the vehicle and driving away.
[brief] No intermediate decision * September 13, 2023 order denying motion for new trial (Da8)  Order is at Da8  Oral opinion is at 3T6-2 to 3T7-9  No intermediate decision * September 11, 2023 judgment of conviction (Da9 to Da12)  Judgment is at Da9 to Da12  Written statement of reasons at Da11  Oral opinion regarding sentencing at 3T13-10 to 3T22-8
[brief] *Twp. of Tewksbury v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.*, 79 N.J. 398, 400 A.2d 60 (1979), the Appellate Division reviewed whether easements for the purpose of constructing and maintaining overhead power lines held by [...], a public electrical utility, were taxable as real property under *N.J.S.A.* 54:30A-50 by the municipality where the easements were located.  A majority of the panel in the Appellate Division found that the easements were easements “in gross”, which the Court concluded meant they were “nonpossessory and personal to respondents who do not own lands appurtenant to them. ”  In turn, the majority found that while such easements are considered real property as defined by *N.J.S.A.* 1:1-2, they are not considered real property under *N.J.S.A.* 54:30A-50 and therefore not taxable by the local municipality under the tax statute.  [...] dissented, and the matter was appealed to our Supreme Court.  Our Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment “substantially for the reasons expressed in the dissenting opinion of [...].
[directive] CN 10079-Korean Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Korean page 1/7  4.  a.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  배심원들  앞에서 검사는 귀하가 합리적인 의심의  여지 없이 유죄임을 입증해야 아십니까?  재판을 받을 권리가 있는 것을 하는  The right to a jury trial in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
[brief] See State v. Diloreto, 362 N.J. Super. 600, 615-16 (App. Div. 2003) (noting that unlike traditional applications to withdraw a guilty plea, a conditional plea is “premised on the right of a defendant to withdraw his plea” if his pre-plea motions were wrongly decided).  Because our court rules automatically preserve the right to appeal rulings on physical suppression motions, the conditional plea rule applies to these motions, as well as to any other motion preserved in the plea agreement.  See id. at 615-16.  The right to withdraw also applies when “the defendant simultaneously pleads to multiple indictments and the pre-plea motion relates to only one. ”  Id. at 616 n.6.  Here, [...] pleaded guilty to multiple indictments as part of a global plea deal and preserved his right to appeal from two adverse pretrial rulings – the suppression decision and the 404(b) decision.  (Da 54)  As the trial court explicitly told [...] prior to his decision to plead guilty, “even with a guilty plea, that doesn’t prevent you from filing an appeal and if an appellate court judge finds that I committed an error, that I was wrong in my 404(b) decisions or anything else, your guilty plea could be reversed. ”  (1T 10-4 to 8) (emphasis added).  On appeal, the denial of [...]’s suppression motion was reversed.  Nyema, 249 N.J. at 531-35.  Under a straightforward application of the conditional plea rule and Diloreto, [...] has the right to withdraw from his guilty plea.