ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The following timeline further clarifies the sequencing of the PTA Arbitration and the arbitration between [...] and the owner of the Hackensack Project, [...] (the “[...] Arbitration”).  | Date | Event | Appendix | |---------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------| | 5.23.23 to 6.27.23 | [...] Arbitration Hearing | Pa907 | | 6.19.23 to 6.22.23 | PTA Arbitration Hearing (first week) | Pa568 | | 8.21.23 to 8.24.23 | PTA Arbitration Hearing (second week) | Pa568 | | 10.17.23 | PTA Arbitration post-hearing briefs submitted | Pa377-Pa429| | 11.17.23 | Final Judgment entered in [...] Arbitration | Da9-Da10 | | 11.28.23 | Conclusion of PTA Arbitration oral argument on post-hearing brief | Pa568-Pa569| | 1.19.24 | Issuance of PTA Arbitration Final Award | Pa568-Pa580| | 4.12.24 | Issuance of PTA Arbitration corrected Final Award| Pa923-Pa931|
[brief] First, the Trial Court was under no obligation to consider extrinsic evidence in deciphering [...]’s probable intent.  See, e.g., Matter of Estate of Zahn, 305 N.J. Super. 260, 271 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that “in ascertaining the probable intent of [a] testator, courts . . . may look to extrinsic evidence” and that the “use of extrinsic evidence [] is limited” to address “ambiguities”).  Moreover, the Trial Court did not require extrinsic evidence.  Section 3.3A of [...]’s Revocable Trust unambiguously excluded [...] (and therefore [...]) from receiving [...]’s Estate’s and [...]’s Revocable Trust’s interests in the Palm Beach Property.
[brief] This appeal is not moot because applications filed before the TI program closed remain pending.  But that does not change the outcome because the Board’s finding that [...]’s project lacked maturity to reach commercial operation within the applicable one-year expiration date is supported by the record and the court should defer to the Board’s exercise of its expertise.  (Aa5).  When the Board closed the TI program to new applicants on August 27, 2021 it noted that projects meeting certain requirements before the closure date could “remain in --- 1  “Aa” refers to Appellant’s appendix; “Ab” refers to its brief; “Rb” refers to the Board’s Brief; “Ra” refers to the Board’s appendix.
[brief] 1  The State combines its Counter Statement of Procedural History and Statement of Facts for the Court’s convenience.  2  The complaint contains a discrepancy in Count 1 — two different sections of N.J.S.A. 4:22-24 are listed as the provisions defendant is alleged to have violated, i.e., N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2) and N.J.S.A. 4:22-24b. (Da 43-46).  However, a simple reading of the narrative associated with the first count indicates that defendant is clearly charged with violating N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2), “specifically by[] being present for a cock fighting operation[.]” (Id. at 43, 47-48).  3  “1T” refers to the Transcript of Motion before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on September 11, 2024.  “Db” refers to defendant’s amended brief.  “Da” refers to defendant’s amended appendix.  “Pa” refers to the State’s appendix.  Defendant was seen on body camera footage of responding officers on scene and was found on scene via geofence.  [(Id. at 47-48).
[brief] Da 7.  Accordingly, monthly base rent was increased to $2,440.33.  Most of that increase was based upon [...]’s equity in the Unit totaling $301,105.  Applying [...]’s rate of return of 6.25% to $301,105 created an annual return of $18,819.06 equaling $1,568.25 per month.  That return starkly differed from the Board’s assessment of [...]’s equity at an artificially low amount of $12,804 equaling an annual increase of $800.25 or $66.68 per month.  The Court adopted [...]’s equity calculation set forth in its August 11, 2022 memorandum (Pa 37) which averaged (i) the inflation-adjusted value of $197,610 of the Unit over a twenty-three (23) year period from the date that the Unit was first purchased in 1993 for a pro rata price of $47,727 to which capital improvements of $76,900 were added; and (ii) [...]’s assessed value of the Unit at $404,600 which was based on replacement cost and reflected a thirty percent (30%) reduction due to the existence of a protected tenant, and without application of the equalization ratio.  Thus, [...]’s total equity in the Unit, as ruled by the Court, was $301,105.  [...] did not seek to calculate its equity applying [...]’s equalization ration of 74.18% to the Unit’s assessed value, which would have increased the value of the Unit to $545,430.  Nor did [...] seek to apply the appraised value of the Unit at $622,500, as testified to by [...]’s valuation expert, [...], before the Board.  The Unit’s pro rata price of $47,727 was based upon the total purchase price for the Property divided by 11 units.  The Court denied [...]’s claim for legal fees/costs on the ground that there was no legal basis to depart from the American Rule.
[brief] Setting aside Plaintiffs’ waiver of this new argument, *North Haledon Fire Co. No. I v. Borough of North Haledon*, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012), the argument depends entirely on a factual mistake: Plaintiffs misunderstand the timestamp in [...]’s records showing when [...] agreed to the December Terms.  Plaintiffs say [...]’s records “depict[ ] the checkbox as being clicked at 11:24 PM UTC, *i.e.*, 7:24 PM EST. ” (Pb5.)  But Plaintiffs fail to account for the difference between Standard Time and Daylight Savings Time.  During Standard Time, Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) is *five* hours ahead of Eastern Time, not four.  *See* Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., *What is UTC or GMT Time?*2  During the month of January, Standard Time is in effect.  *See* 15 U.S.C. § 260a(a).  It was therefore **6:24 PM EST**, not 7:24 PM, when [...] agreed to the December Terms.  That is one minute *before* [...] (or her daughter) placed the order.  (*See* Da101, Da198.)  So Plaintiffs had every --- 2 https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboututc.shtml (last visited May 14, 2014).  The Court can take judicial notice of this fact because it “cannot seriously be disputed. ”  *State v. Silva*, 394 N.J. Super. 270, 275 (App. Div. 2007).  Courts routinely take judicial notice of time zones in this context.  *E.g.*, *United States v. De Armas Diaz*, No. 13-cr-000148, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56572 (D. Nev. Apr. 23, 2014); *Selwyn v. Bruck L. Offs., S.C.*, No. 19-cv-135, 2020 WL 13598626, at *3 n.5 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 2020) (collecting cases).  opportunity to review (and reject) the January Terms before ordering food.  When Plaintiffs’ time zone mistake is corrected, their “coercion” argument falls away entirely.  Plaintiffs do not and cannot seriously advance any other argument contesting reasonable notice.  Consistent with *Williams*, this Court should hold that [...] had reasonable notice of the December Terms, including the Arbitration Agreement (“Agreement”).
[brief] It states that the NDA’s term extends only one year from the date of the last services performed:  “Term.  The term of this Agreement shall be during services performed and one year from the date of the last services performed. ” (Pa002645 – 002646).  The NDA itself was executed on September 28, 2015.  *(Id.)*  When [...] refused the offer made by the Defendant, the discussions ended.  [...], in turn, confirmed during his deposition that the NDA’s term had long expired by the time his company entered into a lease with [...] for the subject property.  (Pa002204).  (“The NDA was signed in December of 2015.  It had already expired [in 2017]”).  Indeed, Respondents waited until “[a]fter the expiration of the NDA” to speak with [...] representatives.  (Pa2205).  Thus, by its own terms, the confidentiality provisions of the NDA expired well before June of 2017, the earliest date on which the conduct Appellants now complain of occurred.
[brief] However, that is not the test under *Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center*, 215 N.J. 265 (2013).  Rather, the disfavored remedy of waiver should not apply given the unique facts of this case, which establish that the Indemnity Claim was not ripe until [...]’s settlements with the Utilities and insurers (“[...]’s settlements”); thus, the dispute could not have been resolved in arbitration prior to that point.  [...]’s claims for defense could only be finally resolved via a single allocation proceeding involving all insurers with potential liability.  Indeed, [...] itself pressed for a single proceeding to resolve its defense claims.  While [...] suggests that [...] should have demanded arbitration earlier, it is clear that an arbitration before 2024 would have been pointless in any event.
[brief] On the other hand, the ’016 Patent did not expire until after Plaintiffs filed the instant case and therefore evidence relating to its expiration and renewal is not relevant to Defendant’s current defenses and claims.  Plaintiffs rely on Network Signatures, Inc., 731 F.3d at 1243, and Aristocrat Techs. Australia PTW Ltd., 543 F.3d at 663, to argue that the requested discovery is irrelevant and impermissible since the decision to accept late maintenance fee payments is given to the PTO Director and once the Director accepts the late payment and revives the patent, any rule violations are irrelevant.  Oppo. at 19-20.  The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the cases and finds that while they are instructive on the type and amount of evidence required to establish inequitable conduct, they do not prohibit discovery on the issues of patent expiration, late payment of maintenance fees, and revival.  In fact, the Aristocrat Techs. Australia PTW Ltd. court specifically tempered its strong statement that “compliance with the internal rules of patent examination becomes irrelevant after the patent has issued” by stating that the statement was true only “absent proof of inequitable conduct. ”  Aristocrat Techs. Australia PTW Ltd., 543 F.3d at 663 (“[w]e wish to stress, however,...that where the procedural irregularity involves an ‘affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to disclose material information or submission of false material, coupled with an intent to deceive,’ it may rise to the level of inequitable conduct”).  The court also noted the difference between “prosecution irregularities” and “prosecution laches” and opined that prosecution laches remains a viable defense.  Id. at 663 n.4.  As such, Defendant must have the opportunity to conduct discovery to determine whether there is such inequitable conduct and/or whether Plaintiffs intentionally failed to renew the ’589 Patent.  The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel responses to Interrogatory No. 1 and RFP Nos. 1-3 as to the ’589 Patent and DENIES Defendant’s motion as to the ’016 Patent.
[brief] 39  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed 8/8/22  Pa-171  Order Denying Reconsideration filed 2/21/23  Pa-173  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED: CASES  Pages  Estate of Doerfler v. Fed Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298 37  Green v. Jersey City Board of Education, 177 N.J. 434 33,34,36  Kravits v. Princeton Blue, Inc., (Docket No. A-1481-21)  an unreported case  38 National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)  33,34  Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528 37,38  Ross Products, Inc. v. N.Y. Merchandise Co., 242 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)  30  Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 2000)  38 Southern R.Y. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316  30 State v. Hale, 127 N.J. Super. 407 29,30,35,37  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] ”  Id. at 7.  These post-trial agreements require prosecutors to seek “a period of parole ineligibility . . . equal to one-third of the sentence, less commutation, minimum custody, and work credits earned while in custody, consistent with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(a), as if the individual had not been subject to a mandatory minimum term,” id. at 7 – or, in more common terms, a “flat” sentence.  Under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(a), individuals serving a flat sentence – one that does not include a mandatory minimum term – become parole eligible after serving one-third of the sentence, “less commutation time for good behavior . . . and credits for diligent application or work and other institutional assignments. ”  Accordingly, the prosecutor was required to seek a flat sentence at [...]’s sentencing proceeding.
[brief] Rather, the evidence here warrants the conclusion that water melting from heaps of snow on the uphill driveway would almost inevitably lead to an accumulation of snow melt flowing to the sidewalk, creating ice, which is exactly what happened in the within case as was evidenced in the discovery, the above photograph and admissions of the defendant.  The above stated principles are outlined in the New Jersey Model Civil Jury Charges, approved by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  New Jersey Model Jury Charge 5.20B(2)(a) entitled “Liability of Owner (Occupant) Who Undertakes to Clear Sidewalk” states  The owner [occupant] of a residential property has no duty to maintain the sidewalks adjacent to their land so long as they do not affirmatively create a hazardous condition.  The owner [occupant] of residential premises abutting a public sidewalk is not required to clear or keep the sidewalk free from the natural accumulation of ice and snow.  But the owner [occupant] is liable if, in clearing the sidewalk of ice and snow, the owner [occupant], through the owner’s [occupant’s] negligence, adds a new element of danger or hazard, other than that caused by the natural elements, to the use of the sidewalk by a pedestrian.  In other words, while an abutting owner[occupant] is under no duty to clear the owner’s [occupant’s] sidewalk of ice and snow, the owner [occupant] may become liable where the owner [occupant] undertakes to clear the sidewalk and does so in a manner which creates a new element of danger which increases the natural hazard already there.  Therefore, should you find that the defendant, in undertaking to remove the ice and snow from defendant’s sidewalk, created a new hazard or increased the existing hazard and that this new or increased hazard proximately caused or concurred with the natural hazard to cause plaintiff’s injuries, then you must find for the plaintiff.  In this case, the hazardous condition did not arise from the natural process of melting and refreezing; rather, it resulted from the defendants (adjacent property owner) affirmative act of piling snow on the uphill driveway, allowing it to melt onto the pedestrian walkway and increase the hazard to the plaintiff.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] It is illogical to believe otherwise.  Regardless, Petitioner makes no allegation that Respondents -- in their capacity as board members -- encouraged the public to vote any particular way or that they failed to provide disclaimers whenever exercising their First Amendment right to comment on the issue in their personal capacity.  There is nothing in Petitioner’s pleadings to suggest that Respondents engaged in any conduct beyond protected, acceptable, and expected political activity.  Accordingly, the Commission’s decision should be affirmed.
[brief] The CFA is “remedial legislation” which is to be construed “liberally to accomplish its broad purpose of safeguarding the public. ”  *Furst v. Einstein Moonjy, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 1, 11-12 (2004) (citations omitted).  “The CFA's reach presently protects the public even when a merchant acts in good faith. ”  *All the Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks Cty. Int'l, Inc.*, 236 N.J. 431, 442 (2019).  To establish a violation of the CFA, a consumer must show: “1) unlawful conduct; 2) an ascertainable loss; and 3) a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.
[brief] [...] testified that he asked for consent to search the car even though he already had probable cause to search the car based on the smell of marijuana.  (1T 16-7 to 17-1, 34-5 to 11)  Notably, the MVR shows that there was no mention of the smell of marijuana until approximately ten minutes into the motor vehicle stop; it was only when [...] asked [...] for consent to search the car that another officer spoke up and said consent was unnecessary due to the smell of marijuana.  (1T 34-1 to 13; Da 20 at 9:50 to 10:00)  [...] requested a DMV inquiry for Jaki [...], and he discovered that [...] had a suspended license and an active warrant out of New Brunswick for $200.  (1T 17-10 to 23, 38-22 to 39-6)  [...] --- 2  The car did in fact belong to [...]’s mother. (4T 29-1 to 5, 38-24 to 39-13) was arrested, and the officers conducted a search of the Suburban.
[directive] SUBJECT: Directive Regarding Testimony of Jailhouse Informants  Prosecutors have a special obligation to ensure that the testimony they elicit from witnesses is honest and accurate.  This includes a responsibility to disclose to the defendant any evidence that may be used to impeach a government witness.  Carter, 91 N. J. 86, 111 State v. (1982); States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  In Giglio v. United Brady v. December 2019, the Attorney General reiterated these requirements in Law Enforcement Directive 2019-6 (the “Statewide Brady-Giglio Directive”), which mandated that each County Prosecutor’s Office establish policies to ensure compliance with discovery obligations under and Giglio.  Brady  One particular category of witnesses deserve special consideration: jailhouse informants.  Generally speaking, a jailhouse informant has no firsthand knowledge of the defendant’s alleged crime, but instead proffers that he or she heard the suspect confess to the crime or give other inculpatory statements while detained at the same jail or prison as the suspect.  When a jailhouse informant possesses credible, independently verifiable information, his or her testimony can play an important role in advancing the truth-seeking mission of the criminal justice system.  However, in recent years, a number of high-profile incidents across the country have highlighted the risks that these particular witnesses could present.  In response, a number of states have enacted additional procedural safeguards to ensure the reliability of jailhouse informant testimony.  e.g., Conn. Acts 19-131 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019); Neb. Laws L.B. See, 352 (eff. Apr. 24, 2019); Ill. Laws 100-1119 (eff. Jan. 1., 2019); Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 686 (H.B. New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 34) (eff. Sep. 1, 2017).  This Directive is designed to provide additional clarity to prosecutors when deciding whether to call a jailhouse informant as a witness.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the procedures outlined below.
[directive] The mandatory penalties are as follows: (1) $3,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2)  $2,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  $1,000 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  $750 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $500 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  TOTAL  D.E.D.R  Penalty: $ Fecha/Date  Acusado/Defendant Abogado defensor/Defense Attorney Fiscal/Prosecutor Formulario promulgado por la directriz # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Spanish página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000- Spanish page 2 of 2
[brief] On February 26, 2021, the Examiners issued the OSC.  **Pa14-Pa16. **  The OSC was based exclusively upon the factual findings made by the Arbitrator, in the Tenure FAD.  The OSC further acknowledged that the Arbitrator had determined that "the appropriate penalty for [Mr.] Cilento's conduct is not dismissal, but rather a three (3) month suspension and reinstatement on a Last Chance Basis."  **Pa16, at ¶7.**  [...] opposed the OSC.  No further factfinding or plenary hearing was conducted.  No additional factual record was adduced.  Rather, the Examiners merely provided [...] the opportunity to appear before them, to address the issue of the penalty that should be imposed.  **Pa18.**  The Examiners then issued the OOS, based solely upon the factual record developed before the Arbitrator.  **Pa17-Pa20.  Da46-Da49. **  Upon their receipt of the OOS, [...] terminated [...].  In response to that termination, [...] filed his Verified Petition, charging that the OOS was arbitrary, capricious, contrary to and in violation of law, and that, in light of the Tenure FAD, without legal force or effect.  Pa35, ¶ 4.  Consequently, [...]'s termination of his tenured employment, based upon the OOS, was likewise unlawful and violated his tenure rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 and N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5.
[brief] ”) (citation omitted); Infinity, 377 N.J. Super. at 228 (same); Gardens, 130 N.J. Super. at 378 (same).  Thus, the hearing and record on appeal for an approval of a redevelopment plan are limited:  [T]he only hearing required before adoption of a redevelopment plan, as with any other municipal ordinance, is a legislative hearing before the governing body.  See N.J.S.A. 40:49-2b.  Consequently, if an action is brought challenging a redevelopment plan, there ordinarily is no administrative record other than whatever report the planning board may have submitted to the governing body and a transcript of the quasi-legislative hearing before the governing body.  Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 165 (emphasis added); PADNA, 413 N.J. Super. at n.5 (comparing N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6, with N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7, and noting, of particular relevance here, that record for review of redevelopment plan is “decidedly less burdensome” than on review of blight designation).  Consequently, review in actions in lieu of prerogative writs under Rule 4:69-1 is limited to the record before the municipal agency below.
[brief] 00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/12/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/12/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/12/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 8/9/2019 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 10/30/2019 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $121,016.97 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/2/2020 | $118,820.00 | n/a |