ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On the Body-Worn Camera Footage, [...] Displays No Nervous Behavior or Furtive Gestures.  As a preliminary matter, the findings of fact undergirding the trial court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed are directly contradicted by the BWC footage played at the suppression hearing.  “The general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).
[brief] On February 6, 2012, the Appellate Division remanded the case to the lower Court for further proceedings and trial, and Plaintiff and [...] engaged in extensive discovery and motion practice.  On April 3, 2013, following a bench trial in this matter before the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., an Order for Final Foreclosure Judgment was entered fixing the amount of the [...] Mortgage at $92,000.00 without interest and granting [...] priority over Plaintiff’s Mortgage to that amount.  On May 8, 2013, [...] filed an appeal of the April 3, 2013, Judgment and Order for Final Foreclosure Judgment with the Appellate Division.  On May 20, 2014, the Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court decision in this foreclosure and determined that the [...] Mortgage had priority over Plaintiff’s foreclosure judgment in the amount of $92,000.
[brief] A trial court must not decide issues of fact: it must decide only whether any such issues exist.  Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540; Judson, supra, 17 N.J. at 75; R. 4:46-5.  Whether the excessively sloped sidewalk and/or pre-existing ice caused or contributed to [...]’s fall is a question for a jury, not a judge.  Article I, paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution adopted in 1947 states clearly that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the Legislature may authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six persons. ”  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶9; see also N.J. Const. of 1844 art. I, ¶7 (the “right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”).  The role of the trial court is to determine only whether there exists a genuine dispute regarding a material fact.  Suarez v. E. Int'l College, 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2012) (motion judge may not abrogate the jury's exclusive role as the finder of fact), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 57 (2013).  On the record presented and pursuant to the constitutional and common law of New Jersey, summary judgment should have been denied.
[brief] 1:7-7.  When an application presented under authority of section 1:7-4 of this Title is dismissed the court shall allow and tax the costs and neces- 4 sary expenses of the Attorney-General, including a fee to the Attorney- 5 General of not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) in any one case, and 6 shall order the payment thereof by such citizens, and payment thereof may 7 be enforced by execution.
[brief] “In a word, the judicial interpretive function is to consider what was written in the context of the circumstances under which it was written and accord to the language a rational meaning in keeping with the express general purpose. ”  *Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park*, 241 N.J. 595, 615–16, (2020), citing *Owens v. Press Publishing Co.*, 20 N.J. 537, 543 (1956).
[brief] [...] testified that she had gone to an Applebee’s with defendants [...], [...], and [...].  They met [...] there, and were “re-routed” to the “trailer” park in which [...] lived.  [...] and [...] remained at the scene; [...], [...], and [...] left, returning when they received a call that [...] had arrived.  (4T 13-5 to 22-2).  [...], a juvenile, rode to [...]’s home with [...].  (2T 90-19 to 24).  Espinoza admitted that he delivered drugs for [...].  (4T 92-1 to 94-4).  He testified that he and [...] went to [...]’s home because she had told Espinoza that she had a gun for [...].
[directive] First Responding Officers.  3.1  The first officers to arrive at a scene are a critically important component of the overall response.  The initial responding officers must assess the situation, make a preliminary determination whether a barricaded individual situation exists, and begin to request appropriate resources.  Consistent with ICS principles, the first officer is the incident commander until relieved by higher authority.  Responding to a report of a barricaded individual incident alone should be avoided, when feasible, as this may limit the responding officer’s potential resolution responses.
[brief] In fact, [...] acknowledged as much, noting that [...]’s testimony regarding whether he gave Appellant a subsequent *Miranda* warning following the arrest was inconsistent.  (Aa038-040).  While [...] testified that he would have read Appellant his *Miranda* rights when he read Appellant the drinking/driving questionnaire following his arrest, (3T15:25), same is insufficient for the Law Division to find that [...] credibly corrected his inconsistent testimony.  [...]’s testimony in the municipal court proceedings was otherwise unworthy of credit by the Law Division.  For example, regarding the field sobriety test administered to Appellant, [...] could not even recall what he used as a stimulus when conducting the HGN Test, as he stated:  “I believe I used my finger.  That’s what I usually use, the tip of my finger. ”  (2T17:11-13).  Shortly thereafter, [...] went as far as to admit he was having trouble recalling the events that occurred on the morning of November 5, 2019, given the amount of time that had passed.  (2T18:21-19:2).  [...]’s lack of credibility is further evidenced by his failure to recall specifics regarding the field sobriety test he conducted on Appellant, which ultimately led to Appellant’s arrest.  For example, [...] admitted that he could not recall what shoes Appellant was wearing, or whether Appellant requested to take off his shoes while performing the walk-and-turn test.  (2T20:13-19).  What’s more is that, despite probable cause being based, at least in part, on Appellant’s alleged failure of the field sobriety tests in question, [...] admitted the following with regard to Appellant’s performance of the walk-and-turn test:  “I don’t remember specific steps that [Appellant] missed stepping heel-to-toe with more than a two inch gap. ” (2T21:14-20).  [...]’s testimony evidenced forgetfulness in other instances, as well.  For example, [...] testified that he “believe[d]” the walk-and- turn test was performed in front of Appellant’s vehicle, but qualified that testimony by acknowledging that the events in question had occurred over two years prior.  (2T18:19-19:2).  [...] then testified that “if [he could] remember correctly,” the walk-and-turn test would have been performed in front of [...]’s vehicle.  (Id.).  Regarding the one-leg stand test, when asked whether [...] gave Appellant the choice as to which leg to use for the test, [...] testified “[t]o my recollection I would say yes. ” (2T23:11-15).  These further instances of forgetfulness and unsureness further evidence the lack of credibility in [...]’s testimony.  In sum, [...] erred by crediting the testimony of [...], which contained numerous instances of forgetfulness or was otherwise incredible, as noted above.  Because the finding of probable cause to arrest was based on that incredible testimony, the Law Division erred by finding that probable cause to arrest Appellant existed on the morning of November 5, 2019.  For that reason, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction against Appellant.
[directive] However, until such time these changes occur, the following assessment activities are expected of each County SART program:    Victim Survey o  At the conclusion of a SART activation, victims shall be provided with a short, pre-printed anonymous victim survey.  The victim will be asked to complete and return the self-addressed, stamped survey to the County SART Coordinator.  Please use the Feedback Form included in Appendix XIV of these Standards.    SART Member Survey o  At the conclusion of a SART activation, each member who was activated by the victim shall complete a SART Member Survey form and return it to the County SART Coordinator within 72 hours.  Please use the Activation Survey included in Appendix XV of these Standards.  For emergent issues of concern about either the victim or the SART activation, please contact the SART Coordinator via telephone.  If the issue pertains to the SART Coordinator, call the Statewide SART Advisory Board (See Standard 13: Statewide SART Advisory Board).  For non-emergent issues, document the concerns in the SART Member survey.    Compilation of Survey Responses  o  Upon receipt and review of the Victim and SART Member Surveys, the SART Coordinator shall take appropriate action to address any reported issues.  o  Results of the SART Surveys and any actions taken to address identified issues shall then be reported to the County SART Advisory Board at the next regularly scheduled meeting.
[brief] *Manna v. State*, 129 N.J. 341, 346 (1992).  The various provisions of the Act were intended by our Legislature to be strictly construed to effectuate its purpose of broadly limiting public entity liability.  *Hawes v. New Jersey Dept. of Trans.*, 232 N.J. Super. 160 (Law Div.) aff'd o.b. 232 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1988).  For that very reason our Supreme Court has cautioned that trial courts should be cautious in sanctioning novel causes of action against public entities of the State.  *Ayers v. Jackson Twp.*, 106 N.J. 557, 574-575 (1987).  The Supreme Court has instructed our trial courts that they are generally required to find public entity immunity, unless there is a specific provision for the imposition of liability codified in the Act.
[directive] Considerations in Light of Executive Order 152  Last week, [...] announced that, going forward, all outdoor political activity and outdoor worship services would be permitted, without any limitation on the number of individuals permitted to gather for such activities.  As articulated in Executive Order No. 152 the Governor’s decision was based both on the lower risks of COVID-19 transmission outdoors and on the societal importance of these activities.  To ensure that all outdoor political activities and outdoor worship services receive uniform treatment, I am directing prosecutors to move to dismiss any Executive Order violations previously filed for such conduct, despite the initial probable cause determination or appropriateness of the violation at the time it was issued.  Based on data maintained by the Division of Criminal Justice, there were five individuals who received summonses for organizing outdoor political protests and religious services in violation of Orders prior to the issuance of Executive Order No. 152; no individual protestors or worshipers have been cited to date.
[brief] THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THE 1963 AGREEMENT ESTABLISHED A PERMANENT EASEMENT ON THE SCHOOL LOT 5 FOR AN OFF-SITE PARKING USE BY STAFF/ATTENDEES OF THE SYNAGOGUE LOT 8 OR FOR ACCESS TO THE SIXTH STREET BOILER ROOM (APPEALS THE FINAL OPINION/ORDER Da978, Da980, Da1004)  The [...]'s Complaint posited that a perpetual easement for parking of the Synagogue's staff/attendees' vehicles on portions of the School Lot 5 was established by Paragraph 10 of the 1963 Agreement.  The Synagogue asserts the perpetual right to drive vehicles at will onto the School property and park in the courtyard entry/assembly/play area --- an area intended to be and actually utilized by children accessing the School --- and on the School Fifth Street parking lot.  [...] asserted that the [...] does not have a perpetual easement for parking, that the 1963 Agreement (in particular Paragraph 10) is not a Deed of conveyance and the "permission" extended at most a license or temporary permission later waived or ended by the 1972 School expansion and site plan.  The documents established that the two entities in 1962 were interconnected, with officials from the [...] involved and in leadership positions the New [...].  (Da13, Da166)  The 1963 Agreement did not convey a Deeded easement for Lot 8 staff/attendees to park in areas of the School Lot 5 in perpetuity.  That an easement was not established is clear from the terms used, type of document involved, and that no such parking use or area, particularly in the courtyard, was ever legally established in compliance with relevant Land Use laws.  The 1972 School Site Plan (Da923 to 934; 938 to 944) had no reference to Synagogue parking on School property and in fact was based on and provided for the contrary --- that the School had a shortage of parking for its own use.  That 1972 approved plan and the synagogue participation should be conclusive evidence of the illogic and invalidity of the claim of perpetual "easement."
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020  3.6.2  Officers shall continually monitor the condition of the subject(s) in their custody for the following warning signs of positional asphyxiation: (a) verbal complaints of being unable to breathe properly, although be aware that a person suffering breathing difficulties may not be able to complain about their crisis; (b) visual signs that the subject is struggling or exhibiting increased effort to breathe; (c) gurgling/gasping sounds with foam or mucus coming from the nose or mouth; (d) display of a heightened level of aggression during restraint, which may be a physiological response to fighting for air, such that any increased resistance during restraint of a person should be regarded with caution; (e) sudden behavioral changes, such as going from being violent and noisy to passive, quiet, and tranquil, or alternatively, suddenly becoming more aggressive; (f) blue discoloration of facial skin (cyanosis); (g) swelling, redness or blood spots to the face or neck; and (h) any loss or a reduced level of consciousness.
[brief] The State, however, must provide at least some evidence to support the assertion that a neighborhood should be considered as “high-crime. ”  [Id. at 404-405.]  The Court further found that “even if [the officer] had provided more information regarding the prevalence of crime in the area, that would have been insufficient to justify the stop because the other factors on which the officers relied were also insufficient -- even when taken together -- to form a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. ”  Id. at 405.  The Court reasoned, [The officer] supported his suspicion of defendant by claiming that defendant was “coming out of a walkway between a vacant property which is known for the sales of [drugs] and weapons” after the two unidentified individuals walked away.
[brief] During the September 15, 2022 hearing, there was a colloquy between a member of the public [...] and the Board wherein [...] stated: “so, it contradicts, actually, that the City Council went ahead and passed the 600 feet ordinance, *the City Council recognized late in the game that this was too close to a school and they put in the parameters around the 600 feet.*” (M-Da249, M-Da250).  (emphasis is supplied).  [...]’s comments to the Planning Board provide evidence that as [...]’ application was nearing a decision by the CRB, efforts were underway to amend the Cannabis Ordinance in such a way as to be detrimental to [...]’ application seeking conditional use and site plan approval to permit a cannabis “micro” dispensary at [...] in [...].  [...]’ application to the CRB contained all of the requirements identified in [...] City Ordinance Section 196-33.1(M).  The CRB deemed the application complete in February 2022.  The Planning Board correctly found that the amendments proposed in Ordinance B-446 which did not go into effect until April 28, 2022 did not apply to [...]’ application before the Planning Board.  Thus, this determination by the Planning Board is consistent with the holding in Jai Sai Ram.
[brief] The custodian here was asked to produce police reports and notes (records) and not information.  Indeed, the requestor, upon receiving the reply, could easily have contacted the custodian by telephone and obtained the “information”, which, as noted by this court and the Supreme Court, could have been done orally or by press release.  Having failed to do so and chosen to litigate, this extensive court proceeding has needlessly consumed precious time and resources. \(^2\) --- \(^2\)  This court’s July 26, 2023 opinion footnotes the underlying tort cases that prompted the request.  Of note, both cases were fully settled and dismissed before Here, the custodian fully responded to the specifics of the request.
[brief] [...] was a disabled veteran, but that is the only similarity to this matter.  Appellant [...]’s status as a qualified candidate for promotion to Lieutenant is clearly different than a full background review for a potential candidate for Sheriff’s Officer.  In addition, [...] was not fully forthcoming in his application about this incident.  The standard of denying a disabled veteran the benefit provided by Civil Service regulations outlined in [...] does not support the denial of Appellant [...].  Respondent similarly argues that In the Matter of [...], Correction Lieutenant ([...]), Department of Corrections [...] (May 4 2018)(RA83-88) supports the position that only minor discipline can be sufficient.
[brief] On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Middlesex County  Sat Below: Hon. [...]  J.S.C.  Trial Court  Docket No.: Docket No. [...]  L.L.C., [...], [...], D.C., [...], [...], D.C., [...], M.D., [...], ESQ., [...], D.O., D.C., [...], D.O., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], D.O., [...], D.O., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] The Court reduced the almost 400 hours billed by plaintiffs’ counsel on summary judgment to 80 hours for attorney [...] and 40 hours for attorney [...] because the issues had been repeatedly dealt with and the time spent was “extremely excessive. ”  Plaintiffs’ counsel sought upwards of 100 hours for a second amended complaint that was denied.  (Da1388–1393)  Finally, the Court flatly denied reimbursement of certain costs to plaintiffs’ counsel defined by R. 1:21-7(d).  (Da1394)  On April 17, 2023, the trial Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and increased the attorney fee and cost award from $722,714.00 to $996,013.00.
[brief] IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CORNELL STUDIES REQUIRED FORMAL RULEMAKING WHICH WAS NOT PROPOSED UNTIL AFTER THE PERMIT WAS GRANTED  Appellant’s final argument lacks any legal basis.  First, the express language in the Flood Hazard Area Control Act, 58:16A-1 to -17.  (the “FHA Act”) requires that the [...] comply with formal rulemaking when it updates its delineations of flood hazard areas, which necessarily involves the use of updated and recent data applicable to all permit applications.  Second, the FHA Rules, both the prior version and as more recently amended, grandfathered the Permit to apply the flooding data available prior to the proposal of the Inland Flood Protection Rule (“IFPR”) on December 5, 2022.  Third, the [...] is a government agency which cannot take sweeping actions to implement new data for all permit applications without conducting formal rulemaking and appropriate stakeholder outreach, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2 & 3.
[brief] A first offense under the 4-50 statute requires a fine of $250 to $400, second offense, $500 to $1000, a third offense $1000 fine.  For a second or third offenses for DWI also require that we impose $50 to the VCCB fund, $75 to the safe neighborhoods, and $225 to the DWI surcharge fund.  A first offense comes with a potential for jail time, up to 30 days optional, but mandatory for a second to 90 days in jail, mandatory for a third, up to 180 days in jail.  Some of which can be spent in an inpatient program.  There is a loss of your driving privileges for up to seven months on a first offense.  Mandatory two years on a second, and mandatory ten years on a third.  Any potential prosecution for DWI in excess of Alcotest result of .15 would require the imposition of an interlock device and potential suspension of registration privileges for a period of one to three years after your initial driver’s license suspension as well.  There is also imposition of community service for a second and third offense.  And IDRC program, Intoxicated Driver’s Resource Center program from 12 to 48 hours on a first, that at a minimum for a second and third, but according to classification.  So there are serious penalties involved.
[brief] ”  Stack v. PG Garage, Inc., 7 N.J. 118, 120-121 (1951).  It is well-established that the preparation of a deed, among other conveyancing documents, constitutes the practice of law.  See, e.g., Cape May Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Ludlam, 45 N.J. 121, 124-25 (1965) (stating “[t]he practice of law embraces the art of conveyancing, . . . which has been defined as [a] term including both the science and art of transferring titles to real estate from one man to another. ”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); N.J. State Bar Ass’n v. Northern N.J. Mortg. Assocs., 32 N.J. 430 (1960); Opinion Number 17, New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (June 26, 1975).  Our courts must “vigilantly scrutinize [the unauthorized practice of law] so that the practice of law in this state does not degenerate into a jungle.
[brief] Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. 100 (App. Div.), certif. den., 185 N.J. 297 (2005)  ..................................................... 13, 14 Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373 (2016)  ......................... 31, 32  Spence-Parker v. Delaware River and Bay Auth. ............................... 22, 29 656 F. Supp.2d 488 (D.N.J. 2009)  Thompson v. Joseph Cory Warehouses, Inc., 215 N.J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 1987))............................................  34  Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Superior Court .......................................... 18  351 N.J. Super 385 (2002)  Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2008)  ....................... 18, 19, 27 Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010) ............................................... 18, 19, 20 Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chem. and Pollution Sciences, 105 N.J. 464 (1987) ........................................................................ 16  Williams v. Bor. of Clayton, 442 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 2015) .... 40, 45 Rules R. 2:2-3(a)(1) .................................................................................. 16 R. 4:5-1 ........................................................................................................... 18, 23, 42 R. 4:5-2 ........................................................................................................... 22, 29 R. 4:6-2 ........................................................................................................... passim R. 4:28-1 ........................................................................................................... 14, 35-41 R. 4:69 .............................................................................................................. 17 Statutes/Code N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51 .......................................................................................... 42 N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 ............................................................................................. 23 N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 ............................................................................................. 23 N.J.S.A. 10:5-27 ............................................................................................. 23, 24 N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5 ......................................................................................... 20 N.J.S.A. 59:8-3 ............................................................................................... 34 N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 ............................................................................................... 34 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 .......................................................................................