ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Her weight had direct effects on her health and well-being.  Plaintiff testified that her obesity was historically linked to an increased risk for respiratory illness, sinusitis and flu.  Pa201, PSOF ¶15.  Plaintiff injured her spine badly after years of chronic back problems and spinal stenosis from years of high BMI and inability to lose weight.  She had lumbar radiculopathy, disc excursion and disc herniations.  Pa562-563.  The pinching on her nerves resulted in drop foot syndrome.  Id.  Her mobility was further compromised by this injury, and in turn Plaintiff gained approximately fifty (50) pounds due to increased immobility.  Id.  There is a reciprocal relationship between Plaintiff’s weight and her overall health.  Plaintiff testified that her bodily injury \(^6\)  According to www.nhlbi.nih.gov this correlates to a BMI fluctuating between 36.9 and 44.3. exacerbated her weight gain.  Therefore, Plaintiff established that her obesity is caused by bodily injury.
[brief] Counsel argues none-the-less that the verdict is inconsistent and that the conviction on theft and accomplice liability to robbery suggests that the jury may have found Defendant guilty based on conduct occurring after the robbery.  In *State v. Grey*, the Court considered instances of seemingly inconsistent verdicts and adopted the rule set forth in *Dunn v. United States*, 284 U.S. 390, (1932) and affirmed in *United States v. Powell*, 469 U.S. 57 (1984).  *State v. Grey*, 147 N.J. 4, 11-12 (1996).  The Court held that, “so long as the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction on the substantive offense beyond a reasonable doubt, such verdicts are normally permitted. ”  *Id.* at 10 (citing *State v. Petties*, 139 N.J. 310 (1995)).  In expounding upon this position, the Court quoted the United States Supreme Court in *Powell* as follows:  [I]nconsistent verdicts ... should not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant's expense.  It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its [guilty verdict] ... and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on [a different] offense.  But in such situations the Government has no recourse if it wishes to correct the jury's error; the Government is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause.
[brief] In *[...] v. Bd. of Trs.*, [...] faced criminal charges directly related to his employment and consented to his removal from employment “for cause. ”  *Id.* at *4.  Thereafter, the Board denied [...]’s deferred retirement application since his removal from employment was “for cause. ”  *Id.* at *2.  [...] appealed the Board’s decision arguing that he was entitled to the analysis in accordance with *Uricoli*.  *Id.* at *4-5.  The Appellate Division rejected [...]’s arguments, referencing that the ⁵ Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, the undersigned is unaware of any contrary precedent to this unpublished opinion and a copy of the unpublished opinion is attached hereto.  terms of the statute applicable to deferred retirement benefits condition a [PFRS] member’s eligibility upon “the absence of any for-cause removal from employment”…therefore the “balancing test of Uricoli is simply inapplicable. ”  Id. at *9.  Lastly, even if Uricoli were applicable here, which it is not, our Supreme Court in State v. Anderson, 248 N.J. 53 (2021) distinguished the Uricoli case and referenced how it is no longer current.  The Anderson Court reviewed and referenced later statutory amendments in 2007, and case law that followed and determined that the application of the Uricoli balancing test, which is inapplicable here, is no longer applied in the manner it was at the time of the decision.  Id. at 75-6.  **CONCLUSION**  The facts of this matter are straightforward with a strict statutory application.  The legal analysis and evidentiary support overwhelmingly support the Board’s decision to deny Petitioner’s deferred retirement benefits.  For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s denial of Petitioner’s AD application should be affirmed.
[brief] For example, based on concerns regarding the possibility of vehicular collision with the Facility (an extremely unlikely event), [...] proposed to expand an earthen berm to surround the front and two sides of the property, install bollards and a New Jersey Department of Transportation (“NJDOT”) compliant guardrail.  Also based on concerns raised during the Zoning Board hearings, [...] proposed to (i) install bollards and a NJDOT-compliant guardrail; (ii) expand an earthen berm with a retaining wall to surround the front and two sides of the property, which would significantly increase the height of the proposed landscaping; and (iii) lower the ground level of the Facility in order to reduce, if not completely remove, any visual impacts to the surrounding homeowners.  34.
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[brief] Plaintiffs attempt at the conclusion of this argument to deflect concerns about the amount of traffic that the driveway for the proposed 48 ft. tall warehouse would place onto the public roadway in [...] by arguing that 80% of the traffic would travel away from Florence misses the mark.  Presumably, 80% of the traffic from a shorter building that conformed to the intensity of development anticipated by Florence would also go east away from Florence, and of course 20% of the likely lesser amount traffic generated by a conforming building would also go west into Florence.  Even if credible and probative, evidence about the likely directions of travel for traffic to and from a warehouse does not address how much traffic there will be, or how much more there may be from a taller building than from a shorter one.  Similarly, Plaintiffs’ characterization of the road upon which the sole driveway serving the proposed development will debouch, [...], as a “County” road is an attempt to focus the Court on an irrelevancy.
[brief] Plaintiff Was Denied her Fundamental Right to Cross-Examine [...].  The opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses is a fundamental component of the right to due process and a fair trial.  See, e.g., Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J.  Super 553, 563-65 (App. Div. 2008) (reversing a jury verdict and remanding for a new trial where the judge had unfairly allowed the wholesale admission of numerous hearsay statements, thereby depriving the appellant of the "the opportunity for full and effective cross-examination at trial").  A "trial, although inevitably an adversarial proceeding, is above all else a search for truth."  State v. Fort, 101 N.J. 123, 131 (1985).  Our courts have long recognized that "[c]ross-examination is the most effective device known to our trial procedure for seeking the truth."
[brief] The burden is not on Plaintiff to establish that the Property has achieved any particular stage of remediation, and the trial court has already ruled that Defendants failed to meet their burden as to detriment to the public safety and welfare.  (T3, 56:20-57:4)  Nevertheless, Plaintiff has set forth evidence, described in Section D.1., above, establishing that contamination on the Property, which is in the process of being remediated, has had no impact on [...] drinking water.  T1, 14:21-24 (“Plus [the municipal water supply] is almost a mile away.  So there is literally no way that whatever the minor contamination is that is just within feet of our property line can go that far and that far down”).  Defendants further state that “the trial court should have given deference to the Borough’s concerns. ” (Db43) (emphasis added).  The legal standard, however, requires the Borough to not merely have concerns, but to set forth substantial credible evidence to support such concerns.  Although the Borough had its own LSRP/consultant, he offered no testimony that there was any safety issues with the Property.  The Borough simply did not satisfy its burden.
[brief] The Defendant is the owner of the adjacent Lot 3, and has owned Lot 3 since December 22, 2000.  On or about July 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint to Quiet Title against the Defendant, which related to ownership of the Strip (approximately 6,262.80 square feet).  Pa0018.  On September 26, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.  Pa0028.  Defendant’s Counterclaims alleged ownership of the Strip by adverse possession and prescriptive easement, among other things.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. conducted a three-day bench trial on this matter in September 2023, and delivered her decision orally and on the record on December 20, 2023. \(^1\)  [...] erroneously concluded that Plaintiff had not established rightful ownership of the Strip, and that the Defendant was entitled to ownership of the Strip through adverse possession.  \(^{1}\)  Transcripts referenced are as follows: 1T=September 5, 2023 Trial; 2T= September 6, 2023 Trial; 3T=September 7, 2023 Trial; 4T= December 20, 2023 Decision.  On January 16, 2024, [...] executed an Order which effectuated her December 20, 2023 decision.  Pa0012.  Thereafter, on January 22, 2024, [...] executed a revised Order to correct a typographical error on the January 16, 2024 Order.  Pa0015.  On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court – Appellate Division, challenging the Order entered on January 16, 2024.  Pa0001.
[brief] Borough of Oakland, 124 N.J. Super. 69, 72 (App. Div. 1973) that “[c]harges by a municipality for water furnished to its customers involve a sale and arise from a contractual relationship between it and the customer. ” (Emphasis added).  The court therefore held that the municipality’s attempt to retroactively increase charges for water already used and paid for would unconstitutionally impair contractual rights.  Id. at 73.  b.  The Concept of Municipal Supply of Water as a “Proprietary” “Sale” is No Longer Valid.
[directive] The above list of invited members is not finite, and is subject to change, pursuant to the needs of the Council and the State, to ensure full representation from every field that is integral to the issue of sexual assault.  Duties  To maintain proper oversight of the 21 County SARTs and ensure victims receive care consistent with these Standards, the following duties shall be carried out by the Statewide SART Advisory Board:  assist the Attorney General in overseeing the Statewide SART Program;  monitor the 21 County SART Advisory Boards to ensure they are meeting quarterly;  discuss any trending issues, complaints, and/or violations of these Standards, as reported by County SART Advisory Boards, victims, outside stakeholders, or the Statewide SART Advisory Board in the following areas: o laws and proposed legislation o regulations o directives o guidelines o fiscal and programmatic program grant rules o state policy concerning the provision of services to victims of sexual violence  for matters brought to the attention of the Statewide SART Advisory Board, or identified by the Statewide Board itself, the level of necessary corrective action will be determined by the Board based upon the seriousness of the infraction;  discuss existing and proposed legislation, regulations, and/or policy that may affect or impact the SART program;  discuss new research and/or emerging trends from the field that may inform new best practices for the SART program; and  discuss potential new initiatives, grant opportunities, or programs that may assist the SART program.
[brief] ”  (Da 152)  Before [...]’s March 8, 2016 identification, he could not “conclusively” identify [...] from the same 57 Lexington Avenue video.  (Da 75)  Fourth, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury of the State’s burden to prove detectives told the witnesses that they should not feel compelled to make an identification.  The model instruction warns, “[P]olice officers must instruct witnesses that the person that they are about to view may or may not be the person who committed the crime and that they should not feel compelled to make an identification. ”  (Da 154)  “Witness instructions are regarded as one of the most useful techniques for enhancing the reliability of identifications. ”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 250.  Some may be “inclined to guess,” so administrators “should instruct witnesses that they … should not feel compelled to make an identification. ”  Id. at 260-61.  This instruction was necessary because [...] may have felt compelled to make an identification on March 8 after failing on February 9, and [...] may have felt compelled to name [...] as the police had had him in custody for seventeen months.
[brief] The instant matter is an appeal of two decisions by Respondent, [...] (“[...]”).  The first decision being appealed is the [...]’s denial of an adjudicatory hearing request filed by Appellant, [...] (“Appellant” or “Trust”) challenging the issuance of a Waterfront Development (“WFD”) permit modification to Respondent, [...] (“[...]”).  The second decision being appealed is the issuance of the WFD permit modification to [...].  Following the initial 2017 grant of a WFD permit to [...], along with an associated tidelands license, [...] constructed an over 167-foot extension of its previously existing 128-foot dock at its residential property, which now extends approximately 295 feet offshore of [...], in [...], and interferes with the safe use of the adjacent waterfront facilities owned by Appellant.  As a result of [...]’s extended dock, Appellant has had several near miss boat collisions with the extended dock while simply trying to approach Appellant’s own dock.  This situation is exacerbated by the prevailing winds and water currents.  [...]’s extended dock also hinders Appellant’s ability to access the navigable channel of Barnegat Bay.  Quite simply, Appellant’s ingress and egress to and from the channel has been substantially impaired.  Moreover, the dock, as extended, serves as an extremely dangerous and unsafe condition for boaters, kayakers, paddle boarders, and other users navigating the channel.  Despite Appellant’s written objections to [...]’s WFD permit in 2017, the [...] approved the project.  After construction, the [...] discovered that [...]’s dock was not built in accordance with the approved plans.  Thus, a modified WFD permit and a new tidelands license had to be approved by the [...] and [...] (“[...]”), respectively.  Appellant renewed its objection to the modified application, but the [...] ultimately granted the permit modification and subsequently rejected Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request.  Notwithstanding the [...]’s denial, Appellant has clearly demonstrated a particularized property interest sufficient to qualify for an adjudicatory hearing before the Office of Administrative Law.  In addition, the record reflects that [...] failed to satisfy two critical components of the Recreational Docks and Piers Rule set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Rules.  First, [...] did not demonstrate that the need for the WFD permit and associated modification could not be satisfied by then existing waterfront facilities.  [...] had an existing dock that extended approximately 128 feet and was capable of docking a boat.  Second, [...]’s extended dock hinders Appellant’s navigation and access.  Despite the lack of credible evidence in the record to support these two requirements, and the ample evidence refuting the criteria, the [...] nonetheless approved the permit modification.  For these reasons and the reasons set forth in detail below, the [...]’s decisions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, lacked substantial credible evidence in the record, and must be reversed.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] For all the reasons previously mentioned, [...]’s arguments that the trial court correctly found that Plaintiffs expert opinions as to dangerous condition and proximate cause are ‘net opinions’ requires that the summary judgment standards and the record as a whole be ignored.  Similar to the other Defendants, the [...] argues that [...]’s failure to inspect the roadway and to reconstruct the accident renders his opinions unreliable.  [...] is wrong.  The failure of an expert to give weight to a factor thought important by an adverse party does not reduce his testimony to an inadmissible net opinion if he otherwise offers sufficient reasons which logically support his opinion. ”  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002) (citing State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 115-16 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 525 (1989)).  Rather, such an omission merely becomes a proper "subject of exploration and cross-examination at a trial."  Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. at 55.  Here, [...]’s opinions as to dangerous condition and proximate cause are firmly grounded by facts in the record.  Specifically, in reaching his conclusions, [...] reviewed and relied on the two inspection reports, the photos, the testimony of the witnesses, and his extensive experience in roadway construction projects and concluded the subject condition was dangerous.  Additionally, with respect the proximate cause, [...] based his opinion, in part, on Plaintiff’s testimony that the settlement at the abutment joint is what he hit and caused him to lose control.  Anything beyond that which Defendants feel that [...] should have done or considered in formulating his opinions merely becomes a proper "subject of exploration and cross-examination at a trial."
[brief] This case is distinguishable from *State v. Cushing*, 226 N.J. 187 (2016).  In *Cushing* the person authorizing the entry indicated she had a power of attorney over the grandmother of the defendant (owner of the house) and allowed the police entry into the bedroom of the defendant in which the defendant had exclusive control.  *Cushing* is distinguishable from the case now before the Court for two reasons.  First, in the present matter, the individual with the interest in the video recordings, the landlord, is the one that advised the police of the grant of authority to the tenant to consent on his behalf.  In *Cushing*, there was no representation from the defendant that they granted authority over the individual who provided the consent to search to the police.  Second, here, it is undisputed that the landlord, who delegated his authority, controlled the interest over the item to be seized.  In *Cushing*, the officer did not have a reasonable basis to conclude that the power of attorney over the defendant’s grandmother extended into the defendant’s bedroom which was under his exclusive control.  The individual who consented neither owned nor lived at the location searched and did not have access to the defendant’s bedroom.  However, consistent with *Cushing*, our case law makes clear that a third party with apparent authority can consent to a search.  Here, the testimony was that the landlord directed the police to [...] to obtain the consent.  This statement of the landlord provided both actual and apparent authority for [...] to consent to the obtaining of the video surveillance.
[brief] 1.  A **Design Exception** for **sidewalks to be constructed on only one side of the internal streets**, whereas, sidewalks must be constructed on both sides of all internal streets, pursuant to Section 348-8.25A (1) of the Ordinance.  2.  A **Design Exception** for **4 drives located on Walnut Street and 3 drives on James Street**, whereas, not more than one two-way access drive shall be permitted on any street, pursuant to Section 348-8.20J (3).  3.  A **Design Exception** for providing **dead end parking circulation**, whereas dead end parking circulation aisles are **prohibited**, pursuant to Section 348-8.20J (7).  4.  A **Design Exception** for an existing condition where **0 feet of space** is provided for islands separating parking stalls from circulation and entrances/exit drives, whereas parking lots having 50 or less spaces shall have **10’ wide islands** separating parking stalls from circulation and entrances/exit drives, pursuant to Section 348-820J (8).
[brief] Appellant filed on May 31, 2024 an Appeal Brief, which was accepted by Appellate Division for resolution of deficiencies in their May 14, 2024 letter, along with his updated Proposed Order (502a-507a) for Appellate review for sign-off by the Bergen County Superior Court, Chancery Division, Probate Part.  REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S COUNTERSTATEMENTS OF FACTS
[brief] (Pb18).  However, yet again, these arguments are misplaced.  First, and importantly, the clause at issue, provides that legal action must be filed either four years from the date of the accident; OR one year from the date the covered person is aware of a claim for which coverage would apply, “whichever is later. ” (Pa102) (emphasis added).  Therefore, in giving all legitimate inferences to the Plaintiff-Appellant, if Plaintiff-Appellant first became aware that a claim for which underinsured benefits would apply on May 2, 2022, Plaintiff-Appellant had until May 2, 2023 to file a legal action against Defendant-Respondent.  Plaintiff failed to do so.
[brief] On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons:  (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; © the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.  [R. 4:50-1].  [...] moved under the so-called “catch all” provision found in R.4:50-1(f).  While Grounds (a), (b), and (c) above are subject to the one-year time limitation of R. 4:50-2, any R. 4:50 motion must still be made within “a reasonable time”: The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (a), (b) and (c) of R. 4:50-1 not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
[brief] *Id.* at ¶ 25.  By August 2022, the construction of the Treatment System was 80% complete.  *Id.* at ¶ 23.  However, the completion of construction was slowed due to delays in receipt of materials.  *Id.* at ¶ 24.  On August 31 and September 1, 2022, [...] submitted requests to [...] to grant force majeure under the ACO to address the delays in construction of the Treatment System.  *Id.* at ¶ 25.  Recognizing good cause, [...] granted the requests and extended the deadline to January 10, 2023 for [...] to complete construction and installation of the GAC Treatment System.  *Id.* at ¶ 26.  [...] completed construction by January 18, 2023 and the Treatment System was fully operational by February 2, 2023.