ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant would have this Court disregard this 30-year-old Supreme Court decision as non-precedential, but Williamson is binding on this Court.  “Appellate and trial courts consider themselves bound by [the Supreme] Court’s pronouncements, whether classified as dicta or not. ”  State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114, 136-37 (2013).  “[M]atters in the opinion of a higher court which are not decisive of the primary issue presented but which are germane to that issue . . . are not dicta, but binding decisions of the court. ”  State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 183 (2011) (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 564 (2007)).  “If the Supreme Court’s dictum is ‘deemed carefully considered, necessary to the decision reached, or directly involved with the central issue in the case, we are bound by it. ’”  Matter of R.H., 475 N.J. Super. 460, 467 (App. Div. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 409 N.J. Super. 13, 22 (App. Div. 2009)).  The Williamson Court’s statement that “N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires a motorist to signal a lane change” cannot be passed off as mere dicta because it was an essential precondition to resolving the issue before the Court.  Had the Court not accepted that N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 applied to lane changes, there would have been no need for it to decide under what circumstances a motorist may be pulled over for failing to signal a lane change.  In essence, the whole case depended on lane changes being subject to N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  As the Court’s express statement that lane changes are subject to the statute was “necessary to the decision reached” and “directly involved with the central issue,” see R.H., 475 N.J. Super. at 467, Williamson is binding on this Court.
[brief] "Naked \textsuperscript{26} \textit{Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank}, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S. Ct. 495, 102 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1988).  \textsuperscript{27} \textit{Bahrle v. Exxon Corp.}, 279 N.J. Super. 5, 22-23 (App. Div. 1995), aff’d, 145 N.J. 144 (1996).  \textsuperscript{28} \textit{Scarano v. Central R. Co.}, 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3rd Cir. 1953).  \textsuperscript{29} \textit{Konopka v. Foster}, 356 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2002).  conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4."
[brief] See Klug v. Bridgewater Twp. Planning Bd., 407 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2009) (noting that if the testimony of different experts conflicts, it is within the Board’s discretion to decide which expert’s testimony it will accept).  Had the [...] made such findings, nonetheless, the correct remedy would have been to place conditions on the proposed use or require a contribution to help ameliorate any potential impact to the area.  The Board did neither.
[brief] Specifically, the trial court recounted that in Smart, the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not spontaneous and unforeseeable because the officers had prior information that the defendant was selling drugs, and they observed and followed defendant for about an hour before they effectuated a motor vehicle stop and searched the vehicle.  The court then compared its erroneous factual findings in concluding that the cases were similar and therefore the automobile exception did not apply.  However, the facts of this case, as set forth in the credible testimony of [...], are clearly distinguishable.  Most notably, unlike the facts of Smart, in this case, officers did not have any information about defendant before they observed the silver Infiniti in the parking lot.  Indeed, there was no prior police surveillance or information provided by concerned citizens or confidential informants about defendant’s involvement in drug dealing.  Instead, officers were on routine patrol when they came upon the car parked in a suspicious manner and subsequently observed hand to hand transactions.
[brief] (Pl. Tr. 235:2-20).  The record shows that [...] emailed all of his Vice Principals (not just Plaintiff) to ensure observations would be completed, and to the extent Plaintiff assumed [...]’s observations, it was because [...] was swamped with student scheduling—a task singular to her, and for which Plaintiff was not responsible.  (Pl. Tr. 130:2-4, 317:20 to 321:1).  [...], who recommended Plaintiff’s nonrenewal, was also the one to hire her, when it was obvious what her race and age were.  (Pl. Tr. 115:21 to 116:24; Da97-100).  These indisputable facts cannot support an inference of discrimination.
[brief] Still without mentioning the robbery, [...] asked, “you know we have cameras all over the city, right?  And we . . . check out the drug sets, and we check out all the high crime areas and stuff like that. ”\(^2\) (1T 29-21 to 30-1; Da 7 at 4:44 to 4:52)  [...] said he understood and then [...], while showing [...] the still from the RT-TOIC video, instructed, “[t]ell me if you know who this person is.
[directive] List of Available Referral Agencies  The police shall provide, and agencies shall make available, existing lists of referral agencies, contacts and telephone numbers to which officers may refer juveniles.  Such lists are usually available from County Youth Services Commissions, the Division of Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice Commission, or other sources.  Referrals may be made in conjunction with a stationhouse adjustment, but are not limited to the stationhouse adjustment process and may be provided immediately, before the process is completed.  Offenses to be Considered for Stationhouse Adjustment Ordinance violations, petty disorderly persons offenses and disorderly persons offenses shall be considered for stationhouse adjustment.
[directive] In order to fulfill the mission of protecting the public, the New Jersey law enforcement community must take full advantage of new crime-fighting technologies as they become available.  Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) are now being used by a number of law enforcement agencies around the nation, and a number of police agencies in New Jersey have recently acquired these devices or are planning to do so in the near future.  License plate recognition technology can be used to support a wide range of law enforcement operations and activities, including homeland security, criminal and terrorist suspect interdiction, revoked/suspended driver interdiction, stolen property recovery, stay-away order enforcement and, of course, the apprehension of individuals who are subject to an outstanding arrest warrant.  These devices enable police officers to recognize and take immediate action against vehicles and persons who are subject to an investigative detention or arrest based on a "Be on the Lookout" bulletin.  The data collected by ALPRs can also provide solid investigative leads if, for example, a device happened to be scanning license plates near a crime scene, allowing police to locate potential suspects, witnesses, or victims by identifying vehicles that were in the vicinity at the time of the New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Retyclable offense.  A careful analysis of stored ALPR data can also be used to detect suspicious activities that are consistent with the of criminals.  This new technology can in this way serve an modus operandi especially important role in protecting our homeland from terrorist attack, as shown by the fact that many of the devices that are now or soon will be in operation in this State were purchased with homeland security grant monies.  While license plate recognition technology can help to protect public safety, the widespread deployment and use of ALPRs, and especially the collection and storage of data pertaining to individuals who are not reasonably believed to be involved in unlawful activity, raise legal and policy issues.
[brief] Under this Factor, the longer the relationship, the more consistent it is with employee status.  It is uncontradicted that Petitioner has been the municipal prosecutor for 19 of the past 20 years for [...] except for 2008.  Under Title 2B of the state statutes, municipal prosecutors are required to be appointed on an annual basis.  From 2015 to the present, Petitioner was appointed by Resolution and not through the RFP process and was not required to enter into a Professional Services Agreement which would have been indicative of independent contractor status.  Despite this, Respondent simply goes back to a period that is not at issue in this case and refuses to acknowledge that Petitioner’s appointments in 19 out of the last 20 years is indicative of a continuing relationship sufficient to support employee status.
[brief] (Ab13-15).  But a disjunctive sentence utilizing “or” as in this statutory provision signifies that each phrase is “distinct and separate from each other. ”  State v. N.T., 461 N.J. Super. 566, 571 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Frank, 445 N.J. Super. 98, 106 (App. Div. 2016)).  Each clause stands on its own as a separate, potentially exempt activity.
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, | 8 | | 244 N.J. 567 (2021) | | | Cummings v. Bahr, | 9 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | | | D’Atria v. D’Atria, | 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 | | 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 1990) | | | Graham v. Gielchinsky, | 8 | | 126 N.J. 361 (1991) | | | Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, | 9, 10 | | 440 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2015) | | | State v. Simon, | 8 | | 161 N.J. 416 (1999) | | ## Rules | Rule | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | R. 4:49-2 | 8, 9, 10| | R. 4:50-1 | 9 |
[brief] (232a ¶8).  Finally, Defendants agreed to indemnify and hold harmless [...] and the [...] in the event of legal actions by retired police officers seeking terminal leave above $15,000.  (232a ¶9).  In its opinion, the Trial Court repeatedly cited to Defendants' decision to cap terminal leave at $15,000.  (1029a-1030a).  Plaintiffs agree that Defendants' decision to cap terminal leave at $15,000 should be the trigger date for when their property rights were vested.  However, Defendants did not agree to this $15,000 cap until the parties to the First Police Matter settled that litigation.  This was after all of Plaintiffs retired from their employment with [...].  As such, Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] had vested property rights to their terminal leave, and it was a constitutional violation to deny them this property.
[brief] (2T, Pa20-34)  Appellant asserts that the Court below erred in granting summary judgment as to Respondent [...] as there were sufficient facts to demonstrate a duty owed by Respondent [...].  In the trial Court’s opinion and Order of November 16, 2022, they found that there was “material disputes of fact regarding who, Defendant [...] Donuts or Defendant [...], had a contractual obligation to maintain the parking lot.  Accordingly, whether Defendant [...] Donuts breached its duty to Appellant is a “question of fact” that is best left for the jury.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING FIBERVILLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT UNDER R. 4:6-2(e) AS OPPOSED TO R. 4:46-2**  In a last-ditch effort to overcome dismissal of the First Amended Complaint, Appellants incorrectly contend that the trial court should have treated [...]’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.  In support, Appellants incorrectly argue that the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings because the Certification of [...]’s counsel – which was also submitted in opposition to the motion for leave to amend – attached “extensive extraneous material. ”  [Pb40].  Indeed, in multiple pages of their brief, Appellants address the basic standards governing motions to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e) and when such a motion is to be treated as a motion for summary judgment [Pb37-42].  The --- \(^9\)  Tellingly, although the trial court only dismissed the First Amended Complaint without prejudice in the Underlying Action, the same judge that sat below dismissed the Complaint in the Second Action with prejudice.  In the Second Action, the factual allegations and claims were “virtually identical to the factual allegations and causes of action from the [Underlying] Action. ”  [FEDa155].
[brief] VI.  The Reconsideration Order  On November 9, 2023, [...] heard oral argument on the Motion for Reconsideration.  (3T).  Following these arguments, the lower court issued an Order dated November 9, 2023 (the “Reconsideration Order”), pursuant to which [...]: (i) denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its entirety\(^4\); (ii) awarded Landlord $38,462.60 of its $65,798.68 Fee Application; and (iii) directed that the $196,669.16 in Rent Arrears be disbursed to Landlord.
[brief] *Id.*  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  Rule 4:46-2 (c).  In reviewing a trial Court’s grant of summary judgment, the Appellate Court uses the same standards of review as the trial court.  *Prudential Prop & Cas. Ins. Co. V. Boylan*, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).
[directive] Actor directly or indirectly offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another:  a.  Any benefit as consideration for a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise 2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000 10% permissible of discretion of a public servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in any public election; or 2C:27-2(a-d)  Bribery in Official and Political Matters
[brief] Due to this ruling, the sole issue on appeal is whether Defendant’s contract construction is reasonable and supported by the contract terms.  If not, the decision below should be affirmed.  Defendant interprets the contract as requiring it to deliver an acceptable estoppel certificate by closing.  While it admits it was required to promptly provide the estoppel certificate upon receipt, that requirement, it contends, was to keep Plaintiff apprised of the process so any issues could be addressed in furtherance of Defendant fulfilling the obligation of delivering an acceptable estoppel certificate by the closing.  Therefore, Defendant was permitted to submit multiple iterations of an estoppel certificate and Plaintiff could only terminate if on the closing date the one delivered did not meet the definition of an acceptable estoppel certificate.  Defendant criticizes the trial court for not recognizing these factors.  Also, it deems the trial court’s analysis flawed.  In Defendant’s view the trial court improperly conflated the estoppel certificate requirement to a due diligence element.  To demonstrate the error, Defendant contends the timing requirements of both differ, the purpose of an estoppel is not informational, and temporally due diligence operates presently but estoppel certificates work prospectively.  Lastly, Defendant claims the trial court erred when it deemed Defendant’s interpretation afforded it an unfair advantage since this impermissibly modified the risk allocation as written in the contract.  Defendant’s arguments are misguided, have multiple flaws, and fail to provide any basis for reversal.  First, Defendant misread the contract.  Nowhere is Defendant required to deliver the defined acceptable estoppel certificate.  Rather, the obligation was only to seek the defined estoppel certificate, and if obtained deliver it promptly upon receipt.  Second, there was to be only one delivered estoppel certificate not multiple.  Third, the timing argument is wrong.  Securing the estoppel began in due diligence and but for Defendant’s actions would have been completed in the due diligence timeline.  Also, as noted the proposition delivery was to be by the closing date is wrong.  Fourth, the authorities cited by the Defendant actually prove that an estoppel certificate serves two functions - to inform and to preclude a subsequent change of position.  As such temporally it is both present and prospective.  Fifth, Defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly granted Plaintiff rights not afforded by the agreement is based on a misreading of the court’s analysis.  The court was addressing the logical flaw in the Defendant’s position as it negated the requirement of prompt delivery.  The court also rejected the notion that multiple estoppels could be supplied, as accepting Defendant’s contrary position would provide Defendant with an unfair advantage not evident in the parties’ agreement.  For the reasons that follow the judgment below should be affirmed in all respects.
[directive] você não está renunciando d.  Você entende que ao se declarar culpado ao direito de recorrer  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  (1) da negação de uma petição de supressão de provas materiais (R. 3:5-7(d)) ou (2) da negação do pedido de participação no programa de intervenção antes do julgamento (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?
[brief] There are very important *public policy* considerations which are recognized by the State of New Jersey in favor of settlements of litigation.  For example, the Supreme Court stated in *Gere v. Lewis*, 209 N.J. 386 (2012) that New Jersey recognizes an extremely strong public policy in favor of settlement of cases and resolution of litigation.  *Id.* at 500.  In another Supreme Court case, the Court specifically stated that the settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy.  *Brundage v. Estate of Caranbio*, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008).  Molding the verdict would have the ill effect of giving license to every insurance carrier to try every case where the defendant has filed for bankruptcy without any recourse or ramifications.  This certainly cannot be the policy recognized by this Court or the State of New Jersey.  In addition, the Defendant cites absolutely no legal authority to "mold" a judgment.  Molding of a judgment occurs in UM/UIM settings where the contractual damages are set by the insurance contract purchased by the insured.  This is not the same as the case at hand -- a third-party jury trial where the jury decides damages.  Here, the jury returned its verdict and the judgment was entered against the defendant.  Therefore, there is no contractual limitation on damages and therefore there is no "molding".  For all the reasons set forth above, it is extremely important from a public policy standpoint, the protection of New Jersey Law, including all of the legal precedence set forth in Rova Farms that the judgment be preserved.
[brief] When questioned on whether the specific critical term “Riparian Grant” was found anywhere on any of the documents of transfer after the transfer from [...] to the [...], Defendant [...]’s expert [...] testified as follows:  Q  Mr. [...], referring to the direct, redirect rather, we know that at a given point title came from [...] to [...] Heights, correct?  A  What’s the page you’re talking about?  So, you’re talking about a deed from William [...]?
[brief] Additionally, the general conduct of the parties, including [...]’s substantial payment on behalf of other entities associated with the settlement of the [...] must also be taken into account.  Finally, the “totality of the circumstances” must be considered, including the compelling support for [...]’s determination that [...] was not an insured under the CCIP and the initial unwillingness of [...] ([...]’s primary insurer with the most financial incentive) to pursue coverage under the CCIP via this DJ Action.  Further, the Court should consider that [...] was informed and was aware that it had been unenrolled from the CCIP, did not object, and ultimately maintained coverage for the Accident through [...] and [...].  The Court should likewise consider that [...]’s pricing for the work it was performing at the Project included an increase to account for its unenrollment in the CCIP (as it did with the increased proposal), and even that [...] increased [...]’s policy premiums at the end of the policy period.
[brief] “In determining whether a matter should --- 3  The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s ruling in *Martindale* rebuffs [...]’s suggestion that the Agreement is unconscionable because it was requested of her as part of the employment application process.  In *Martindale*, the Court specifically observed that it does not find “determinative the fact that plaintiff was required to sign an employment application containing an arbitration agreement in order to be considered for employment. ”  *Martindale*, 173 N.J. at 91.  Arbitration agreements are not deemed unconscionable contracts of adhesion when, for example, an employer gives the plaintiff, an educated person experienced in the field of human resources, an opportunity to ask questions, further review the application, or consult with a professional.  *Id.*  The same is true here: [...], a highly educated professional with contract negotiation experience, acknowledged that she was provided an opportunity to consult with her own attorney before signing the Mutual Arbitration Agreement on January 4, 2022.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................... ii TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, and RULINGS BEING APPEALED . . iv PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................. 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................. 3 SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW .................................... 5 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................. 5 POINT I As Appellant Cannot Establish [...] Owed Appellant a Duty as Property Owner, the Trial Court Correctly Granted [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment ........ 5 POINT II As Appellant Was Unable to Establish Proximate Cause Against [...], The Trial Court Correctly Granted [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment ......................... 9 POINT III As There Remained No Issues of Material Fact, the January 6, 2023 Trial Court Order Granting Summary Judgment to [...] Must Be Affirmed ......................... 15 CONCLUSION ....................................................... 16 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Cases - **Accardi v. Enviro-Pak Sys. Co.**, 317 N.J. Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] (1T30-22 to 23; 1T160-20 to 161-13).  --- 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  [...] testified that as he was deploying his K-9, dispatch continued to look up [...]’s information, and [...] used this time to conduct the dog sniff.  (1T31-1 to 4; 1T32-22 to 33-25).  In Illinois, the stop cannot move forward, according to Illinois State Police policy, until the officer hears from the telecommunication center regarding the driver’s license check for a suspension, for which the driver would then be issued a citation.