ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs’ first “argument” was, in fact, an attempt to simply rewrite the ESI Order as consistent with Rule 4:10-2(a).  The same day that Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Defendants’ motion for leave to appeal, Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit asserting that the parties “negotiate[d]” search terms on the understanding that the terms, in and of themselves, would only produce documents relevant under Rule 4:10-2(a).  Da182 ¶ 6.  Plaintiff then relied on that affidavit to argue that the parties specifically “negotiated search terms and custodians” that, in and of themselves, “would lead to relevant hits,” thereby in turn ensuring that all “documents generated from the search terms” would necessarily be relevant.  See Opp. At 1.  Plaintiffs’ characterization of the parties’ understanding underlying the ESI Order is categorically false.  In fact, when the trial court issued the ESI Order on September 13, 2023, the trial court had before it Defendants’ declaration attesting to exactly the *opposite* understanding:  “The [...] (and, presumably, [...]) always understood the purpose of the search terms was to capture a broader universe of potentially responsive documents that each party would review to identify documents responsive to the actual requests for production that had been served pursuant to New Jersey Rule 4:18-1. ”  Da122 ¶ 11.  That protocol was consistent with the parties’ practice in ten other related cases, Da120-21 ¶ 5, and it is reflected in the parties’ ESI Stipulation, which expressly provided for a “review” after conducting the initial ESI screening search, Da79.  Plaintiffs’ false post hoc claim about a contrary understanding cannot alter the unambiguous record actually before the trial court when it issued the ESI Order.  The trial court itself certainly did not construe the record before it as reflecting any agreement that the search terms would produce only relevant documents.  To the contrary, the trial court expressly found that with “these particular searches,” “we all recognize that there are going to be a lot of irrelevant documents. ”  T20:24-21:1.  In the court’s own words, under the ESI Order, “plaintiffs would end up getting some significant number of documents that they haven’t requested, a significant number of documents that are not relevant. ”  T6:11-17.  Indeed, the trial court expected that “maybe sixty to seventy percent of the documents aren’t going to be relevant. ”  Id.  The court simply had no concerns: “[I]f in producing all the relevant documents there are fifty percent of them which are irrelevant, I don’t see the harm. ”  T24:11-14.  In short, the trial court issued the ESI Order not because the “search terms themselves identified the relevant documents,” as Plaintiffs now assert Da183 ¶ 9, but because the court deemed it *permissible* to require production of irrelevant documents, so long as they are electronically stored.  See supra at 23-25.  Plaintiffs have proffered no justification for that ruling, and none exists.  2.
[brief] See also *N.J.Const.* (1947), Art. IV, § VI, par. 2.  The delegation of this power is embodied in the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to 92.  *Id.*  Similarly, the municipality has no inherent power to designate lands for redevelopment, but rather depends upon the grant of power from the Legislature under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. §§ 40A:12A-1 to -73.  See Vineland Constr. Co., Inc. v. Township of Pennsauken, 395 N.J. Super. 230, 250-251 (App. Div. 2007), dismissed as moot, 195 N.J. 513 (2008).  Municipalities exercising the land use powers granted to them by the Legislature must observe the limitations of the grant and the standards which accompany the grant, otherwise a court may declare the ordinance invalid despite the presumption of validity.
[brief] ”  Howell v. Waste Disposal, 207 N.J. Super. 80, 91 (App. Div. 1986) (emphasis added).  In N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11a, the Legislature declared that “the discharge of petroleum products and other hazardous substances within or outside the jurisdiction of this State constitutes a threat to the economy and environment of this State. ” (emphasis added).  In its Trial Brief, the Borough requested that the Trial Court take judicial notice of the fact that the discharge of petroleum products and benzene into the environment above NJDEP acceptable levels was detrimental to public health.  Courts have recognized that benzene and petroleum-based products are a health hazard to humans.
[brief] Carrington Mortg. Services, LLC, supra, 464 N.J. Super. at 68.  [...] did not appear to dispute that the entire controversy doctrine may well have required [...] to include an allegation of express easement, but felt it would be inequitable to apply it in this case:  Here, the Court is tasked with determining the fairness of applying the entire controversy doctrine at the expense of New Jersey’s recording statute, which provides that any recorded document affecting the title to real property provides notice to all subsequent purchasers of the contents of the deed.  N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12(a).  It would be unfair to deny plaintiff the ability to enforce the clear and unambiguous reservation recorded in [...]’s chain of title just because [...] did not rely on an express easement theory in his earlier litigation.  (Da832)
[brief] (Pa44)  On October 25, 2021, Petitioner filed a brief responding to [...]’s written decision on the motions.  On October 27, 2021, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s October 22, 2021 orders.  (DA1)  On November 4, 2021, [...] filed opposition to Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.  On November 17, 2021, Petitioner filed a reply brief in further support of her motion for reconsideration.  After oral argument on November 19, 2021, [...] denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.  (DA2)  On December 1, 2021, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal of [...]’s granted motion to dismiss Petitioner’s Complaint, Petitioner’s denied motion to amend her Complaint, and Petitioner’s denied motion for reconsideration.
[brief] ”  The charge Defendants proposed failed to provide any protections for an invitee.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion as the snow removal contracts were relevant as they detailed Defendants’ knowledge and notice of specific requirements and expectations, for snow and ice removal at [...].  As there was conflicting testimony prior to trial amongst Defendants regarding the contracts, their terms, and the impact of the terms, the trial court was within its discretion in allowing the snow removal contracts to be discussed as their intentions were written out in the contracts themselves.  Accordingly, the trial court was within its sound discretion, considering the facts before it, to allow the contracts to be discussed at trial.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring reference to the State of Emergency during trial.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................6  POINT I ......................................................................................................................................6  THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT PREEMPT THE HOME RULE PROVISIONS  DEALING WITH NOISE REGULATIONS BY ENACTING THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON LOCAL BOARDS OF HEALTH.  (RAISED BELOW: ORDERED AND DECISION Da60; Da80-Da82.)  POINT II....................................................................................................................................33  A READING OF THE HEALTH LAW TO PREEMPT THE MUNICIPAL POWER TO REGULATE DISTURBING NOISES UNDER THE HOME RULE ACT  WOULD ACT AS AN IMPLIED REPEALER AND RENDER THAT PORTION OF THE HOME RULE ACT  A NULLITY.  (RAISED BELOW: ORDERED AND DECISION  Da60; Da80-Da82.)  POINT III....................................................................................................................................36  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ORDINANCE NO. 17-2017  UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVER BROAD.  (RAISED BELOW: ORDERED AND DECISION  Da61; Da83-Da87.)  CONCLUSION...............................................................................................................................47
[brief] After careful review of Chapter 92 Law and the individual[’]s employment status[,] they should not have been considered employees for [[...]].” (Pa227).  [...] stopped remitting pension contributions for [...] after June 30, 2012.  (Pa86).  One of the four individuals identified in [...]’s letter was “August [...] Public Defender. ”  Ibid.  Starting in 2015, [...] began issuing annual Request for Proposals for the position of public defender.  (Pa200-226).  As a result of the RFPs, [...] and [...] began entering into annual written contracts for the position of public defender, designating [...] as a “Professional Consultant. ” (Pa166-199).  On July 14, 2020, [...], an investigator with the [...] (“[...]”), issued a determination finding that [...] was ineligible for PERS service credit from 2008 onwards under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).  (Pa162-165).  [...] was ineligible under subsection (a) because he was annually appointed pursuant to the “no bid” provisions of the LPCL, which permit a professional service provider to be awarded a professional service contract without submitted RFP’s.  Ibid.  On January 7, 2020 the Board affirmed Conover’s determination as to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).  (Pa158-161).  The Board found that [...] was awarded professional service contracts pursuant to resolution from 2008 onwards, making him a professional service provider ineligible for PERS credit.  Ibid.  [...] appealed to the Office of Administrative Law, and this matter was assigned to --- 6  The record includes RFPs for only 2015 and 2016.  (Pa200-226).  7  The record only includes copies of these contracts covering 2015 through 2018.  (Pa166-199).  Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) [...] for a contested hearing held on September 28, 2022.  (Pa82).  [...] testified on his own behalf along with [...], his accountant, and Conover tested on behalf of the Board.  (Pa84; Pa91).  On June 28, 2023, the ALJ issued his Initial Decision.  (Pa81-90).  The ALJ affirmed the Board’s January 7, 2020 determination, and found that [...] was ineligible for PERS service credit from 2008 onwards pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).  (Pa89).  Specifically, the ALJ found that there was “no question [[...]] was awarded professional services contracts pursuant to the Local Public Contracts Law (N.J.S.A 40A:11-5) and is therefore ineligible for enrollment in PERS after the effective date of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2, January 1, 2008. ”  Ibid.  The ALJ also found that “the lack of a written professional services contract between 2008 and 2015 does not negate the fact that he was working under such a contract during this period.  The continued passing of resolutions can bind the municipality. ”  Ibid.  On August 17, 2023, the Board issued its final administrative determination, affirming the Initial Decision in its entirety, again finding that [...] is ineligible for PERS service credit following the effective date of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2.  (Pa93).  This appeal followed.
[brief] The primary issue raised in this appeal is whether the Commission’s decision upholding [...]’ removal was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Because this matter does not involve a challenge to the validity of the Civil Service statutes or the rules promulgated thereunder, a separate brief on the merits is unnecessary.  The primary parties to this appeal have adequately addressed the relevant issues, and the public interest does not require the Commission’s participation.  Nevertheless, the Commission’s decision should be affirmed.  It is well-established that an agency’s determination will not be upset unless it is affirmatively shown that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or that it lacks fair support in the record as a whole.  Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998).  A strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the Commission’s decision.  *In re Carroll*, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001).  Thus, a court must affirm the decision if the evidence supports it, even if the court may question its wisdom or would have reached a different result.  *Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm’n*, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001).  The Commission reasonably relied upon the testimony and other evidence in the record to conclude that [...] abandoned his position and that [...]’s removal was proper.  (Aa30-33).  For these reasons, the Commission’s decision should be affirmed.
[brief] AMICUS CURIAE  [...] IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Amicus Curiae  [...]  Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................................1  BACKGROUND ON SOCIAL TRANSITIONING .................................................................3  I.  Youth should receive a careful professional assessment before socially transitioning.  .........................................................................................................................3  II.  Social transition is a significant psychotherapeutic intervention.  .......................4  III.  Parental involvement is essential at every stage in the social transition process.  .................................................................................................................................5  IV.  Schools should not socially transition students in secret from their parents.  .................................................................................................................................6  ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................7
[brief] The State concedes that “[a]t the time of Defendant’s sentencing there was not a specific statute that said a sentencing judge could impose [sic] the Defendant not to own or have custody or control over any other animals. ” (Sb 22).  But the State subsequently inverts the proposition that all sentences must be authorized by law and points out that “there was also no statute banning such a sentence. ”  (Sb 22)  The question is not whether a particular sentence is banned by statute, but whether the sentence is “an authorized disposition under the Code. ”  State v. Hyland, 452 N.J. Super. 372, 381-82 (App. Div. 2017); see also State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000) (“[T]he Code . . . specif[ies] the sentence or penalty for each offense and the authorized dispositions.
[brief] . . .” (Pa855).  The Trial Court correctly determined that there is no law that would permit the court to extend the filing due date due to an error in legal analysis by a non-lawyer agent of the plaintiffs' counsel.  (Pa856).  As such, the Trial Court acted appropriately to deny the motion to enlarge the period of time in which to file the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  Because the Objectors failed to carry their burden to show any manifest interest of justice meriting an enlargement of the statute of limitations, the Trial Court correctly denied the Motion to Enlarge the Period of Time in Which to File the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.
[brief] Plaintiff’s petition answered “no” in response to the question of whether Plaintiff had any “claims against third parties, whether or not you have filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment. ”  Instead, Plaintiff merely listed “potential/unknown consumer protection claims” (without specifying who such claims would be brought against) under “other contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature . . .”  *(See Da16 at ¶ 34). *  While Plaintiff initially indicated that the value of her claims was “unknown” she then apparently valued her claim at $1,000 in the exemption portion of her petition ($1,000 is the statutory maximum an individual can recover under the FDCPA, only one of the multiple claims Plaintiff has brought in this lawsuit).  *(See Da19). *  On July 27, 2021, after a finding by the Trustee that Plaintiff had no assets, Plaintiff received a discharge, shedding $394,411.54 of debt.
[brief] (Pa000294, page 102, line 20 to page 103, to line 2; pg. 104, line 9 to line 16 (“I know we didn’t receive written consent. ”); pg. 105, line 10 to line 21; pg. 112, line 9 to line 14; Pa000283, page 59, line 2 to line 15; Pa000284, pg. 65, line 5 to line 23).  On July 28, 2023, [...] filed a second summary judgment motion, essentially arguing the same position that it had argued in its first motion for summary judgment.
[brief] Ibid.  However, Plaintiff misreads the applicable case law.  None of these cases are availing to Plaintiff.  In Britwood Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park, 376 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2005), the court acknowledges that the authority to negotiate revenue from redevelopers to defray costs arises from the LRHL and is a distinct authority than the authority in the non-redevelopment context arising from the MLUL to negotiate off-tract infrastructure costs.
[directive]   If no, continue to 4.  Step  Determine if any current charge is a:  Step 4:  − Aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) or (2), 2C:11- 4(b)(1) or (2)) − Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), through (13)) − Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(a), (b), (b)(1), through (b)(4), or (c)(2))  − Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2)(a), (b) or (c), 2C:14-2(a)(3) through (7))  − Criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a))  1  Pretrial Release Recommendation Decision Making Framework (DMF)
[brief] (Pa258-Pa319)  [...] are the only two homes situated directly across the street from the rear of the Subject Structure, and whose occupants would be the only residents in the surrounding area impacted by having to see the full height of the proposed 45 foot tall, three-story ultra-modern, mostly glass structure, clad in vertical slats, with metal rails, cables, and turnbuckles around its decking, all as a result of the Addition.
[brief] At paragraph 17, the lease between [...] and [...] contains a provision entitled "common area expenses."  It is set forth in its entirety in the statement of facts, supra.  Essentially, it provides that [...] would pay its pro rata share of maintenance, taxes and insurance for the common areas of the strip mall.  (Pa506-871)  The construction of the contract urged by plaintiffs essentially ignores the intent of the parties and renders this provision meaningless.  Such a construction was properly rejected by the trial court.  [...] indicated that she considered the parking lot to be "common area."  (Pa851-858; Pa1159-1166)  Conversely, [...] did not have any expectation of any responsibility for the parking lot other than payment of its pro rata share of the aforementioned expenses.  (Pa1154-1155)  If this Court were to adopt the construction of the lease agreement urged by plaintiffs, it would essentially render the "common area" provision of the contract meaningless, and [...] would be paying for nothing.
[directive] The triage officer should first inform the affected patient’s attending physician about the triage decision.  Those two physicians should collaboratively determine the best approach to inform the individual patient and family.  Options for who should communicate the decision include: 1) solely the attending physician; 2) solely the triage officer; or 3) a collaborative effort between the attending physician and triage officer.  The best approach will depend on a variety of case-specific factors, including the dynamics of the individual doctor-patient-family relationship and the preferences of the attending physician.  If the attending physician is comfortable with undertaking the disclosure, this approach is useful because the communication regarding triage will bridge naturally to a conveyance of prognosis, which is a responsibility of bedside physicians, and because it may limit the number of clinicians exposed to a circulating pathogen.  The third (collaborative) approach is useful because it may lessen moral distress for individual clinicians and may augment trust in the process, but these benefits must be balanced against the risk of greater clinician exposure.  Under this approach, the attending physician would first explain the severity emotionally supportive way, and then the triage officer would of the patient’s condition in an explain the implications of those facts in terms of the triage decision.
[brief] 4.  IT WAS ERROR TO DENY A OPRA CIVIL PENALTY DUE TO THE BOARD'S INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF OPRA FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 8/20/20 FINAL ORDER AFTER IT WAS AFFIRMED ON 5/18/22.  (THE ISSUE WAS RAISED IN [...]'S 7/18/22 MOTION TO ENFORCE (1A), 9/28/22 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (187A) AND 11/15/22 MOTION TO ENFORCE (194A))
[brief] And at that point, you know, I was kind of walking away and he said, turn around and look at me.  I turned around and looked at him and in that instance he said I can't wait on you.  And I recognized who he was and I headed back to the dressing room and at the same time he said one of my other associates can help you.  I went back to the dressing room, changed my pants, came back out and a lady was trying to help me at the desk.  And when I left I felt uncomfortable doing the transaction and then I left.
[brief] [...] wanted [...] to move out of the Chester home.  The first step taken in the untangling of their life together, in February 2011, was their looking at various townhome complexes of his choosing so that [...] could consider where she wanted to live.  (2T 40:19-41:4)  [...] spoke with a realtor to get information about available units, and it was the realtor who identified the townhouse in Bedminster that was ultimately purchased.
[brief] On November 27, 2021, by notice posted on the trial court docket and delivered to counsel for Appellants, the trial court warned that “on January 25, 2022 (60 days from date of this notice), the court will dismiss [[...]] for lack of prosecution without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 1:13-7 or Rule 4:43-2 unless action required under the above Rules is taken. ”  [Pa3297]  On January 28, 2022, the Honorable [...] entered an Order dismissing the action as against [...] for lack of prosecution (the “Dismissal Order”), providing that “[a] formal notice of motion is now required to restore this party to active trial status. ”  [Pa3326]  Appellants never filed any motion to reinstate the Amended Complaint, and accordingly the action was never reinstated against [...].  Appellants did not appeal the Dismissal Order.  Notwithstanding (i) the prior dismissal of [...] for lack of prosecution and (ii) the absence of a motion by Appellants to reinstate the action against [...], Appellants filed a Motion for Default Judgment\(^2\) on February 14, 2022 (the “Motion”).