ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Además, de acuerdo con ciertas circunstancias, una condena por una primera infracción, o una segunda, tercera o infracción subsiguiente podría tener como resultado la revocación del privilegio de registrar su vehículo motorizado o un período adicional de suspensión de su licencia de conducir, o ambas cosas.  In addition, under certain circumstances, conviction for a first, second, third or subsequent offense could result in revocation of your motor vehicle registration privilege and/or an additional period of your driver’s license suspension.
[brief] The ID and [...] Decision compounded this error by concluding that the ALJ’s June 11 order was "the law of the case."  Ha84, Ha54.  The law of the case "doctrine is not an absolute rule as' the court is never irrevocably bound by its prior interlocutory ruling[.]"  Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 117 (App. Div. 2012).  (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  "[T]he law of the case concept is merely a nonbinding decisional guide addressed to the good sense of the court in the form of a cautionary admonition against relitigation when the occasion demands it."  Id. at 411 (quotation omitted).  The doctrine is not mandatory and need not be mechanically applied in all cases.  State v. King, 340 N.J. Super. 390, 400 (App. Div. 2001).  When applied to interlocutory orders, the doctrine is discretionary and to be applied flexibly in order to serve the interests of justice.
[brief] Plaintiff has not indicated such desire or filed a motion for summary disposition either.  Accordingly, Defendants were not required to file any type of “motion” to seek dismissal or fees under UPEPA.  Plaintiff also argues that he “was never notified of this order to show cause” because Defendants “attached a (proposed) order to show cause to their reply . . .  [i]n JEDS it is only reordered [sic] as ‘Reply Brief’ and nothing else. ”  Opp. at 5.  This argument is meritless.  As just discussed, Rule 4:67 does not apply to this action, and Defendants do not seek to proceed in a summary manner.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s characterization of Defendants’ filing is wrong: Defendants filed a full, formal proposed order to show cause separate from and alongside their reply brief.
[brief] The proponent must demonstrate that the process that produced the video recording was reliable.  This method of authentication is known in other state and federal courts as the “silent witness” theory of authentication.  This theory holds that so long as the process that produced the recording is reliable, the recording “speaks for itself” and is admissible as substantive evidence at trial without corroborating testimony from an eyewitness.  In their various iterations of the silent-witness theory, some jurisdictions set forth specific criteria for consideration, whereas others impose no foundational requirements.  Yet even those jurisdictions that enumerate specific factors do not make them exclusive or obligatory, recognizing that the proofs will vary with each case.  New Jersey applies a flexible standard, with no fixed requirements to establish the reliability of the recording process to admit a video recording as substantive evidence.  Where a party seeks to introduce a video recording as demonstrative evidence, New Jersey no longer requires proof of a reliable recording process for authentication.  Instead, it is sufficient for the proponent of the demonstrative video evidence to present testimony that the recording accurately depicts phenomena perceived by the witness.  That witness need not be the creator or owner of the video, nor even an eyewitness.  In substance, this is the approach that other jurisdictions follow for authenticating videos for use as substantive evidence, under their various forms of silent-witness authentication.  No proof of the reliability of the recording process is required if other proof can establish the accuracy of the video.  These other jurisdictions have thus held that a police officer who views surveillance video at the scene of the crime and testifies that the contents of the recording played in court are the same as the contents in the surveillance video he viewed at the scene and accurately depict the scene as he saw it is sufficient to authenticate the recording.  That is what occurred in this case, where [...] of the [...]’s Technical Service Unit responded to the scene of the shooting shortly after the shooting occurred to download the surveillance video.  Officer Faltz viewed the surveillance video when he downloaded it and again before trial, testifying that it was not edited or altered.  He further testified that the recording played in court, and the still shots derived from it, accurately depicted the scene as he witnessed it when he was there to download the surveillance video.  With no evidence or allegation that the surveillance video was altered, and with Officer Faltz’s testimony that the video and the still shots accurately depicted the scene as he witnessed it on the day of the crime, the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in admitting the surveillance video and still shots into evidence.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court’s ruling.
[brief] 55 - **State v. Cofield**, 127 N.J. 328 (1992) ................................................................. 42, 45, 47 - **State v. Cole**, 229 N.J. 430 (2017) ........................................................................ 47 - **State v. Cooke**, 345 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 2001) ...........................................  55 - **State v. Deatore**, 70 N.J. 100 (1976) ..................................................................... 30, 31, 56 - **State v. Delibero**, 149 N.J. 90 (1997) .................................................................... 54 - **State v. Diaz**, 144 N.J. 628 (1996) ....................................................................... 60 - **State v. Diaz**, 470 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2022) ............................................... 24 - **State v. Elkwisni**, 384 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 2006) ........................................ 46 - **State v. Fortin**, 178 N.J. 540 (2004) ...................................................................... 29 - **State v. Godfrey**, 131 N.J. Super 168 (App. Div. 1974), aff’d o.b. 67 N.J. 267 (1975)  .................................................................................................................. 17 - **State v. Goodman**, 415 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 2010) ....................................... 42, 45 - **State v. Grice**, 109 N.J. 379 (1988) ....................................................................... 53 - **State v. Hampton**, 61 N.J. 250 (1972) .................................................................... 35, 48 - **State v. Hill**, 199 N.J. 545 (2009) .......................................................................... 53, 55 - **State v. Honore**, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 997 (App. Div. May 1, 2019) ......................................................................................................................... 58 - **State v. Irby**, 347 P.3d 1103 (Wash.  App. 2015)  ....................................................  31  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd)
[brief] Plaintiff’s Direct And Vicarious Claims Against [...] And [...]  On September 15, 2022, [...], individually and as Executrix for the [...], filed a complaint against the [...] Defendants and [...] arising from the July 20, 2022 crash.  Pa1.  The complaint contains both direct and vicarious liability theories against the [...] Defendants.  Among other allegations of direct negligence, Plaintiffs assert that the [...] Defendants: - Engaged in negligent and careless hiring practices of the drivers of its vehicle (namely, Defendant, Jeffrey L. [...]); - Failed to conduct proper background checks of the driver of its commercial dump truck (namely, Defendant, Jeffrey L. [...]); [and…] - Failed to properly train and supervise the driver [Defendant [...]] of its vehicle as to the appropriate driving and operating protocols, limitations and instructions[.]  [See Pa3, ¶¶ A, B, and D; see also Pa6, ¶¶ A, B, and D.]  Plaintiffs have also asserted that the [...] Defendants are vicariously liable for the negligence of their employee, [...].  See Pa3, ¶ 10; Pa7, ¶ 7.  In addition, Plaintiffs asserted negligence claims against Defendant [...] himself.  See Pa8-9, Pa14-16.  Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint to add a fraudulent concealment of evidence claim against [...] while maintaining all counts from the initial complaint.  Da260-276.  From the outset of this litigation, the [...] Defendants and [...] were jointly represented by the same attorney, [...], Esq. of the [...] firm.  Pa19.  In Defendants’ October 13, 2022 answer filed by [...], Defendants included counterclaims alleging that decedent [...] and Plaintiff [...] were somehow liable for contributing to the happening of the crash.  Pa29-30.  Based on the facts set forth above, Plaintiffs’ counsel (the [...] firm) did not believe that there was any good faith basis for Defendants’ attempt to blame Mr. and Mrs. Stahlberg, particularly where it was conceded that Defendant [...] made an illegal U-Turn into the southbound [...], the police found no fault on the part of Mr. Stahlberg, and there were no conceivable grounds to support the assertion that Mrs. Stahlberg, a passenger at the time of the crash, bore any responsibility for its occurrence.  See Da025, 28.  Nevertheless, in order to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest, separate counsel (the [...]) was retained to represent Co-Plaintiff the [...].  Pa57.  [...] filed his notice of appearance on behalf of the Estate on December 8, 2022.  Id. C. [...] And [...]’s Directly Adverse Factual And Legal Positions
[brief] Up until the time the jury returned its verdict, all parties seemed to be proceeding on the tacit assumption that if [...] were to be convicted of any of the charged offenses, those convictions would be based at least in part on a finding that he had possessed one of the two guns while in the car.  It was certainly what the prosecutor argued in his summation.  First, it does not make any sense that defendant [...], the shooter in this case, would have been armed with two handguns.  There’s no possible way for him to drive armed with two handguns.  Remember, he’s the driver of the Toyota Corolla….  Defendant [...] was armed with this second gun that was found, the Taurus 9 millimeter.  He simply does not have a chance to pull the trigger.  After the verdict was returned, making clear that the jury did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] had possessed the second gun, or that he had acted as an accomplice to [...] in the attempted murder, the only remaining evidence relating to conspiracy on [...]’s part was his having been in the car while [...] was driving a loop before the shooting, and his having remained with [...] after the shooting.
[brief] (SSR p. 17-8, TRVa1347-1348.)  Thus, if this Court finds that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP on the date of the Accident, the CCIP Policies should be rescinded as to [...] because: [...]’s enrollment forms contained false statements, which were material; [...] reasonably relied on [...]’s representations in erroneously enrolling [...] into the CCIP; and had [...] been truthful with the type of work it was performing, it would never have been erroneously enrolled.
[directive] Persons.  Based on the information gathered Step 2: Issue Warnings to Responsible during Step 1, officers should determine whether any person has violated or appears likely to violate Section 33-11.1, either by illegally evicting the occupant (including by forcible entry and detainer) or refusing to allow an illegally evicted occupant to immediately reenter the premises.  If a violation has occurred or appears likely to occur, then the officers should instruct the relevant persons to immediately cease their illegal conduct and warn them that failure to do so will result in charges.  As soon as practicable, the officers should document in writing who received the warning, when the warning was warning.4 issued, and what conduct was covered in the  In determining which persons should receive a warning, officers should evaluate who appears to be responsible for the illegal conduct and who has the authority to restore the occupant to the premises.  An individual need not be physically present at the premises to be responsible for the violation, provided that the individual directed an agent to perform the illegal eviction or has the authority to allow the occupant to reenter the premises.  Depending on the circumstances, if a corporate entity owns or manages the property, then the responsible persons could include corporate executives with the authority to allow or disallow occupants to reenter their homes.  C. Premises.
[brief] Did Defendant decline to do so because he could not offer any alternative explanation, because the State’s explanation was correct, and because he was in fact guilty?  The court’s instruction to the jury to weigh the credibility of the State’s proffered inculpatory explanation for the tattoos against Defendant’s non-existent counter-explanation naturally invited the jury to ask these questions; the instruction thus diluted the State’s burden of proof, shifted the burden to Defendant, and burdened his choice to remain silent at trial.  Just as a prosecutor’s comment shifting the burden of proof to the defense, *Jones*, 364 N.J. Super. at 383-84, or comment on defendant’s silence, *Muhammad*, 182 N.J. at 573, requires reversal, a judge’s instructions directing the jury to assess Defendant’s non-existent exculpatory explanation for evidence against the State’s proffered inculpatory purpose requires reversal as well.
[brief] ”  *(39677a).*  But the widespread practice of requiring Special Masters to abide by conflict-of-interest rules belies any notion that doing so is unfeasible.  Requiring Special Masters to refrain from conflicts of interest with respect to the specific individuals and entities involved in their cases hardly disables them from continuing to be successful attorneys in private practice.  To the extent certain other rules within the *Code of Judicial Conduct* are inappropriate to apply to Special Masters, such as the rules restricting judges from taking on non-judicial professional roles, Special Masters can be treated as akin to part-time judges, who are partially exempt from those rules.\footnote{The holding of disqualification sought in this case is quite limited.
[directive] [No/otJ...1..8.]  [NA/"5TI'1f~%]  20.  guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?  *~ q-.TI \"li 11.:il -t?--¥!- AJ ;;zi -8"}7}  '(! 1 ~~~oil riJ-o-H ~£9.l 112: 2rAJ-"8°}e ~ ~ ~ -=r!_ cj : ±7]  "i}y 7J}?  List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense attorney, or 21.  anyone else as a part of this plea of guilty: €- iJ-3'] o]  '?J.789.j ~-1,!-.£.  ;;zl"8"}i..:j-, ;;zl"8"}9.j .:Ee 7'-·;i:-7}7} tj-~ ~4,'-o]i..:j-9.jJ-}.if.A]: M{JA].Q.. 9j 1i:1.§.l--} "6]j .£.-!j=- {JI-}, .::Z.
[directive] If you are pleading guilty to a violation of a condition of community supervision for life, pursuant to 2C:43-6.4 and the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 you should answer Question 4b.  Na poniższe pytania dodatkowe powinny odpowiedzieć osoby, przyznające się do popełnienia następujących przestępstw: kwalifikowana napaść na tle seksualnym, napaść seksualna, kwalifikowany nielegalny kontakt seksualny, uprowadzenie 2C:13-1c(2), spowodowanie zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa dziecka poprzez angażowanie się w zachowania zgodnie z seksualne, które mogłyby osłabić poczucie moralności lub zdeprawować dziecko zgodnie z 2C:24-4a, spowodowanie zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa dziecka zgodnie z 2C:24-4b(3), spowodowanie zagrożenia dobra dziecka (4) lub (5)(a), 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) lub (ii) (jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce 1 lutego 2018 r. lub później), prowadzenie sieci zgodnie z pornografii dziecięcej zgodnie z 2C:24-4.1 (jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce 1 lutego 2018 r., lub później), zwabianie lub zachęcanie dziecka 2C:14-3b, jeżeli ofiara jest nieletnia; zgodnie z 2C:13-6, nielegalny kontakt seksualny zgodnie z 2C:13-1, nielegalne ograniczenie wolności zgodnie z 2C:13-2 albo bezprawne uwięzienie uprowadzenie zgodnie z 2C:13-3, jeżeli ofiara jest nieletnia, a przestępca nie jest rodzicem ofiary, propagowanie prostytucji dziecięcej zgodnie z (4), lub usiłowanie popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw. zgodnie z 2C:34-1b(3), W odniesieniu do pytania 4b(2), proszę zauważyć, że aczkolwiek zagrożenie dobra dziecka 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) może, na wniosek zgodnie z prokuratora, podlegać karze dożywotniego nadzoru, to wykroczenie to nie zostało ujęte w poprawkach wprowadzonych 1 lutego 2018 r. dotyczących wykroczeń podlegających prawu Megan (Megan’s Law) według 2C:7-2b(2).
[brief] A.  Malicious Prosecution ....................................................................................46  1.  Institution of a Criminal Action.....................................................................47  2.  Lack of Probable Cause ...............................................................................50  B. Libel Per Se .....................................................................................................53  C.  The Trial Court Erred in Denying the [...]’ Motion for Reconsideration ........................................................................................................54  IV.  The Trial Court Erred in Granting Defendants’ Motions in Limine That Effectively Dismissed the [...]’ Claims for Attorney’s Fees and Punitive Damages (Pa263-Pa264; Pa293-Pa299; Pa301-Pa302; 3T9:5-3T12:9; 3T14:21-3T15:5; 3T15:7-3T19:23)..................55
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Dire~tive #01-18, CN 10079-Portuguese by Defendant's Initials a Fonnulario Revis ado Promulgado em I 2/3 1/2019, Complementa9iio Diretriz no 0 I -I 8, CN I 0079-Portuguese Iniciais do Reu page 6 of7/pagina 6 de 7  Voce entende que o juiz nao esta vinculado· a nenhuma promessa ou recomendac;:ao da promotoria e que o juiz tern o direito de rejeitar a declarac;:ao de culpa antes de sentencia-lo e tern o direito de impor uma pena mais severa?
[brief] Just as in Trautner, Plaintiffs’ “bad faith was demonstrated by the fact that it knew or should have known, when it filed suit . . . that its claims were contrary to the clear evidence .  . . .”  Trautner, 2024 WL 1708605 at *10 (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs’ bad faith was further evidenced by the absence of facts and law to substantiate their claims, and any “honest, creative advocacy[.]”  Trautner, 2024 WL 1708605 at *10 (finding bad faith where “the Borough proffered no facts and articulated no law to substantiate its allegations” and where “[t]here was no honest, creative advocacy in the Borough’s claims”); see also Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of New Jersey, Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 570, 581 (App. Div. 2016) (finding that plaintiffs acted in bad faith where they pursued claims after they “had been advised by the court that their claims had to be arbitrated”).
[brief] As Resident Engineer, [...] was providing professional engineering services for [...], pursuant to [...]’s contract with [...], and [...]’ contract with the [...] (Pa1596 at T76:1-14).  [...] was responsible for supervising his inspectors, who were on the job site to ensure that the correct materials were used, proper depths of milling were done, compaction was proper, that the milling and paving equipment was in order, etc.  (Pa1583 at T24:1-11).  He was also responsible for the project paperwork, which included overseeing and keeping track of quantities of materials used and permits needed and issued (Pa1585 at T32:1-5).  Mr.  Edgar was on site while milling and paving work was being performed, whether at the actual milling and/or paving, or at the project trailer (Pa1584 at T29:12-31:2).  [...]’s inspectors would be at the paving/milling part of the work site if milling or paving was taking place.  The inspectors would furnish daily reports and take photographs with respect to the milling and paving work completed.  Those reports would be furnished to [...], who would in turn author and enter daily reports into the [...]’s electronic Cap Ex System.  Id. at T44:15-45, T53:13-16.  [...] reported to [...], P.E., and also to [...], P.E. (Pa2618 at T30:13-16 and Pa1917 at T19:12-20).
[brief] The correct standard was whether this major discipline should stand in the way of promoting a disabled veteran who, in the interim, had deployed to Iraq and had been promoted to Sergeant in 2018 and who did not receive any discipline following her promotion, contrary to the misrepresentations of the [...] and the erroneous findings of the [...].  Appellant has outlined the [...]’s incorrect analysis of this matter under Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965) in its initial brief.
[directive] Do you understand that as a result of your conviction your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  b)  ¿Entiende usted que si le condenan y se determinó que su conducta se caracterizaba por un [Sí/Yes] [No/No] patrón de conducta repetitiva y compulsiva, su nombre y apellido, edad, raza, sexo, fecha de nacimiento, estatura, peso, color de los ojos, cualquier cicatriz o tatuaje distintivos que tenga, su fotografía, la marca, el modelo, color, año y número de placa de cualquier vehículo que opere, su dirección, código postal, municipio y condado en que reside y una descripción del delito del cual se declara culpable, pueden estar disponibles públicamente en Internet?  Do you understand that if you are convicted and your conduct was found to be characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  6.
[brief] Complainants cite *Mary Carter Paint Co. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 333 F.2d654 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'd. sub nom *Federal Trade Commission v. Mary Carter Paint Co.*, 382 U.S. 46, 86 S.Ct. 219, 15 L.Ed.2d 128 (1965).  Cb31.  Federal court decisions, however, are not binding on New Jersey state courts.  See e.g. *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill*, 426 N.J. Super. 143, 156 (App. Div. 2012), citing *Ryan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 186 N.J. 431, 436 (2006).  Moreover, Complainants fail to indicate that the language that they quote from in *Mary Carter* appears in a concurring opinion, rather than the majority opinion of the court, 333 F.2d at 660 ([...], concurring) and that the opinion which they cite was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.  In sum, Complainants' argument that the Commission's Final Decision should be reversed because Respondent's Facebook posts did not disclaimers must be rejected.
[brief] During the course of the evidentiary hearing, [...] did not predicate his standard of care opinions on the deposition testimony provided by plaintiff’s engineer [...], P.E.  Accordingly, [...] did not have an opportunity to cross-examine [...] concerning Wood’s testimony.  During his deposition testimony, Wood had generally testified that he had responsibility for monitoring the condition of the roadway.  He further testified that elevation changes were included within the scope of the items he monitored.  (Pa678-79 at 20:25-21:7).  Significantly, Wood never testified [...] had an obligation to identify pre-existing roadway conditions as opposed to conditions created or exacerbated by the Project work.