ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Thereafter, defined education as continuing continuing education per year.  hours of qualifying credit less than three in in 2018, each agency shall repoirt year starting of each calendar January 31  On or before Page 7 Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or the appropriate County ~'rosecuto~•, to writing the to officers sworn enforcement agency, documenting 1) the i~umbe~• of State law in the case of a in required number of qualifying participated the agency who satisfactorily employed by the 2) identifying the steps during the preceding calendar year, and credit continuing education hours participate in the required number of officer did not taken ensure that any who will be that to requirement hours in the preceding year satisfies that year's education credit qualifying continui~~g shall Director on compliance with this Prosecutor report to the Each County practicable. as soon as authority. agencies subject to the Prosecutor's supe~•visory municipal Directive by county and to impose upper limits on the number of any way Directive shall be construed in in Nothing this provided by a department. training hours of in-service Participation in qualifying course of Requirement. a Methods of Satisfvin~ B. a live attending a live in-person presentation, by watching achieved instruction may be by location, or viewing an online tutorial or pre- remote by broadcast electronically from a presentation Nothing in this DVD, etc.). an Learn or other web-based program, a NJ presentation (~, recorded travel training site, and participation in officer to to a construed to require any shall be Directive viewing pursuant to this Directive may be satisfied by education courses qualifying continuing duty station or such tutorial while at the officer's presentation, or an online course materials, a video that by the chief executive of the agency shall be determined location, such times, as other and at employs the officer.
[brief] names of governments, although nothing would prevent a government official from using their government email address to sign up for the types of email alerts offered by the Defendants.  The Trial Court held that these email addresses were public records within the meaning of OPRA because they were created by “third-party agencies on behalf of the government to effectuate a public function and are made with the ‘authority of the State. ’” (Da110).  The third factor addresses the “potential for harm in any subsequent disclosure. ” (Ibid.).  The Trial Court held that private email addresses were less sensitive than home addresses, which were released in the Bozzi case.  The Trial Court held that email can “simply” be blocked or changed, while physical addresses “cannot be easily changed. ”  Defendant [...] never provided the Court with a factual basis to show any potential harm.
[directive] INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING DYFS REFERRAL FORM  The DYFS Referral form should be completed when a defendant is (1) convicted of one or more of the offenses listed in Section II of the DYFS Referral form, and (2) the victim of the offense was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense, and (3) the defendant resides in a household with other minor children or is the parent of a minor child.  In order to gather information on the defendant’s criminal history, the court shall request that law enforcement provide the defendant’s State Bureau of Investigation Number (SBI #).  If an SBI # is not available, the court shall request that the defendant be fingerprinted in order to obtain information on the defendant’s criminal history.
[brief] Specifically, [...] is challenging the [...]’s (“[...]”) issuance of a Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit (“FHA Permit”) to [...] as arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  However, [...] consistently ignores the majority of the voluminous record related to the FHA Permit by only presenting the reports and documents submitted by it to the [...] and fails to address the responses of [...] and, most importantly, the analysis of the submissions by the [...].  The evidence in the record related to the application and the Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal make clear that although the [...] issued deficiency notices related to the FHA Permit application, [...] responded to and addressed each and every deficiency.  Moreover, the [...] reviewed [...]’s submissions and agreed that all of the requirements of the Stormwater Management Rules and other permit application requirements were met to warrant the issuance of the FHA Permit.  Therefore, the FHA Permit was properly issued and should be upheld.
[brief] Oral ruling denying Suppression Motion.............................................4T 71-24 to 75-12  Order denying Suppression Motion......................................................Da5-6  Oral ruling denying Motion for a New Trial.................................11T 30-19 to 34-21 Order denying Motion for a New Trial................................................Da14 Judgment of Conviction.......................................................................Da9-11 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------------------|-----------| | Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) | 13 | | Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) | 13 | | Panko v. Flinthkote Co., 7 N.J. 55 (1951) | 22 | | Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) | 10 | | Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) | 20 | | State v. Allen, 254 N.J. Super. 62 (App. Div. 1992) | 14, 15 | | State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61 (2009) | 10 | | State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579 (1989) | 10 | | State v. Chapman, 332 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 2000) | 10 | | State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322 (2014) | 16 | | State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194 (1990) | 13, 15 | | State v. Cushing, 226 N.J. 187 (2016) | 10, 13, 14, 16 | | State v. Grant, 254 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 1992) | 22 | | State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30 (2018) | 11 | | State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965) | 9, 10 | | State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225 (1988) | 12 | | State v. Lee, 190 N.J. 270 (2007) | 9 | | State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460 (2017) | 12 | | State v. Loftin, 191 N.J. 172 (2007) | 21 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. Marcellus, 472 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 2022) | 14 | | State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299 (1993) | 11 | | State v.
[brief] See *Coastal Grp., Inc. v. Dryvit Sys., Inc.*, 274 N.J. Super. 171, 175, 179-80 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that trial court erred when it dismissed CFA claim on the ground that "one commercial entity may not recover in tort for economic losses allegedly caused by a product purchased from another commercial entity"); *Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp.*, 212 N.J. Super. 350, 355 (App. Div. 1986) (same); D'Ercole Sales, 206 N.J. Super. at 23, 501 A.2d 990 (same).  The definition of "person" includes business entities such as a "partnership, corporation, company ..., business entity or association," N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d), and the word "person," as used in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, refers to not only the person who engages in an unconscionable commercial practice, fraud, or deception, but also the person who is the victim of such practice, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 (referencing practice as unlawful "whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby").  Furthermore, New Jersey Courts has repeatedly recognized that the CFA may apply to custom-made goods.  See Czar, Inc. v. Heath, 198 N.J. 195, 197 (2009) (holding that the CFA can apply to the building and installation of custom kitchen cabinets); See Sprenger v. Trout, 375 N.J. Super. 120, 128, (App. Div. 2005) (holding that the "business of customizing and refabricating automobiles falls within the provisions of the CFA."); See also, Amboy Iron Works, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co., 226 N.J. Super. 200, 205 (App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 118 N.J. 249 (1990).
[brief] A MCS-90 endorsement may obligate a carrier to pay a judgment due to an insured’s “negligence,” but the trial court never ruled that [...] had been negligent; it held [...] strictly liable under the Spill Act.  Further, an MCS-90 endorsement is not triggered until the policy is first found not to afford coverage.  Both [...] and [...] pled claims for declaratory judgment deciding coverage issues; but the trial court never decided those claims, leap-frogging to order [...] to pay under the MCS-90 endorsement, which is a back-stop, not a primary source of recovery.  Finally, the trial court erred in entering the April 6, 2023 order (against [...]) and February 23, 2024 order (against [...]) as “final judgments”: neither order disposed of all claims as to all parties, and [...] never moved to have either order certified as a “final judgment” (R. 4:42-2(a)), nor did the trial court ever consider whether “there [was any] just reason for delay. ”
[brief] **POINT THREE, Sub Point Two:**  The Separation Agreement invoked the Involuntary (Ordinary) Disability Application (IOD) process which, by N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10, supports the Court’s determination that the intent of the parties was that Respondent’s case should reach a vote on the merits of the Respondent’s disability.  The Involuntary Disability Regulation (found at N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10) notes Respondent’s Ordinary Disability (found at N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6) was projected to reach a vote on the merits of the related “permanent and total disability” required for those benefits.
[brief] On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed the FAC, in which it asserts one count of professional negligence against Defendants.  Da21–32.  Following a period of extensive jurisdictional discovery, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of personal jurisdiction, standing, and subject matter jurisdiction.  Da2-5; Da138.  Oral argument on Defendants’ motion was conducted on March 1, 2024, and the Trial Court entered Orders dated March 13, 2024 denying Defendants’ motion.  Da1–19; Da20.¹  On April 2, 2024, Defendants timely filed a motion for leave to appeal those aspects of the Trial Court’s March 13, 2024 Order that denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Da384.  On April 19, 2024, this Court granted Defendants’ motion for leave to appeal, and on April 25, 2024 entered an Accelerated/Peremptory Scheduling Order.  Da384.  ¹  As noted in Defendants’ motion for leave to appeal, the Trial Court entered two Orders denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, both dated March 13, 2024.  Da1–19; Da20.  The Order filed on March 14, 2024, Da1–19, appended the Trial Court’s Statement of Reasons and is the focus of Defendants’ appeal.  For completeness and out of an abundance of caution, Defendants have again appended both Orders.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In other words, expert testimony is required when specialized knowledge is integral to the proper findings of the trier of fact.  In those situations, “the party with the burden of establishing a proposition must proffer competent expert testimony or suffer the loss of their cause. ”  See Comment 1 to N.J.R.E. 702.  In such areas where specialized knowledge is required, expert testimony is necessary, and the finder of fact is not permitted to speculate.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Order must be reversed.  --- 11  Although Plaintiff’s arguments were ultimately rejected by the Pennsylvania state court, the party against whom judicial estoppel is asserted need only have been “allowed by the court to maintain the position” for the doctrine to apply.  Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 387–88 (“The judicial determination does not have to be in favor of the party making the assertion. ”).
[brief] Discussion  The ripeness doctrine is rooted in prudential limitations on the exercise of judicial authority.  *Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n*, 402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2005).  The general inquiry is whether the court would benefit from deferring initial review until the claims presented for resolution have arisen in "a more concrete and final form."  *Ibid.*  The doctrine's "'basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.'"  *Ibid.* (quoting *Abbott Labs. v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 691 (1967), overruled on other grounds, *Califano v. Sanders*, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977)).  New Jersey courts examine two factors in determining the ripeness of a controversy: "(1) the fitness of issues for judicial review and (2) the hardship to the parties if judicial review is withheld at this time."  *K. Hovnanian Cos. of N. Cent. Jersey, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.*, 379 N.J. Super. 1, 9-10 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 185 N.J. 390 (2005).
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English
[brief] The Amended Policy specifically requires school officials to proactively disclose to parents a student’s “change in gender identity or expression” when they request to change their gender identity and/or expression at school.  (Da45).  As the trial court correctly found, transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students are the students who will make such requests, and therefore these students will necessarily be the ones that face “a far greater incidence of parental disclosure of their gender identity or expression. ” (Da107).  Moreover, these are the students who will also face “a far greater risk of harm from this involuntary disclosure. ” (Da107) (emphasis added).
[brief] The court's finding of hardship (4T43-3 to 4T43-8) is conclusory and legally erroneous as a matter of law.  All of the aforementioned hardships originated on the desk of the applicant's engineer.  There is plenty of room on 3.2 acres for a stormwater management system to service subdivision lots with compliant lines, behind the required street trees.  The applicant's problem is that it wants nine lots in a noncompliant subdivision instead of fewer lots in a compliant subdivision.  While perhaps understandable, the applicant's personal preference for increased yield and is there for its profit is not a Sec. 18-601 hardship.
[directive] Any Release When of Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.2  Crime.  Serious for Release a on  While to pursuant authorized as except Section 8.3, under covered otherwise any not  In case any committed has defendant a that believe to cause probable is there where 8.4.5, subsection complaint-warrant, by charged crime second-degree for or afirst- release on while crime indictable N.J.S.A. to release pursuant of revocation seeking motion a file presumptively shall prosecutor the 2A:162-24.  Domestic a Violates Defendant When Release of Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.3
[brief] Consequently, the omission of a specific third-party guilt charge, in the absence of a request for that instruction by defendant was not capable of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  "Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant's right to a fair trial.  The trial court has an absolute duty to instruct the jury on the law governing the facts of the case."  State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988).  Thus, "an appellate court must first 'determine whether the trial court erred' and, if so, must proceed to determine 'if the mistake was clearly capable of producing an unjust result such that a reasonable doubt is raised as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'"
[brief] [...] is the contract purchaser of the property known as Block 113, Lot 5, located at [...] Road, Oradell, New Jersey (the “Property”).  Pa388.  The Property is located in the Borough’s Zoning District B-3 Zone (Business and Apartment District) (“B-3 Zone”), which permits business, professional and governmental offices, retail stores, as well as radio and television repair, furniture repair, and other similar service establishments furnishing services other than that of a personal nature.  Pa389.  Moreover, efficiency apartments and garden apartments that house four (4) or more dwelling units are the only permitted multifamily residential uses in the B-3 Zone.  Id.  The Borough Code does not define “efficiency apartments. ”  The Property encompasses 25,515 square feet, with two hundred and twelve (212) feet of frontage on Kinderkamack Road and one hundred (100) feet of frontage on Argyle Street.  Pa388.  The Property was previously improved with an automobile dealership with a single structure.  After the automobile dealership closed, the structure was removed, however, it was determined that the Property was contaminated, and that the contaminants migrated to three adjacent properties.  Presently, and at the time of [...]’s first and second applications to the Zoning Board, the existing Property was unoccupied and vacant and is in the process of environmental remediation.
[brief] [...]’s Alleged “Complaints” About [...]  Prior to June 24, 2020.  [...] vented about [...]’s management style to members of HR and other managers.  (Pa178 at 78:2-12; Pa178 at 79:25-80:2; Pa190 at 125:1-13; Pa285 at 32:5-8; 290 at 50:20-51:3; Pa290 at 51:8-15; Pa240 at 62:18-63:7).  However, [...]’s complaints were limited to [...]’s use of foul language, alleged verbal abuse, and belittling conduct, which [...] attributed to [...] simply venting her frustrations.  (Pa184 at 101:22-102:3; Pa185 at 107:12-22; Pa194 at 143:22-144:22).  In connection with this June 24, 2020 incident, [...] could not identify any law, rule, regulation, or public policy that he reasonably believed [...] violated.  (Pa189 at 124:9-16).  VIII.
[brief] Yet, this Court in *Hill* was “troubled” by the fact that defendants were all represented by the same attorney, was “concerned whether they made Here, however, defendants cannot ameliorate the conflict through indemnification, as the [...] suggest.  SDb42.  Defendants personally liable for intentional torts are not entitled to common law and contractual indemnification.  See, e.g., Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 566 (1980) (“It would be inequitable to permit an active wrongdoer . . . to obtain indemnity from another wrongdoer and thus escape any responsibility. ”); Malanga v. Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 225 (1958) (stating it is “contrary to public policy to indemnify a person for a loss incurred as a result of his own willful wrongdoing”).  Nor can defendants waive the CNA allocation so that their joint attorneys can elide the conflict caused by trying to minimize one client’s liability at their co-clients’ expense.
[brief] Pa002.  Approximately three years before his death, [...] executed a Last Will and Testament (the “2014 Will”) replacing his prior Will.  Pa002.  The 2014 Will was very different from [...]’s prior Will in that he disinherited his two sons leaving all his assets to his daughter, [...].  Pa002.  The 2014 Will named [...] as sole beneficiary.  Pa002.  [...] also paid off the mortgage on [...]’s home at or around this same time.  In 2014, Plaintiffs believed [...] to be incapacitated.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For all of the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff requests:  (1)  The Lower Court’s Order on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be Reversed and Plaintiff’s Complaint be Reinstated; (2)  The Lower Court’s Order on Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be Reversed such that Plaintiff is awarded Summary Judgment as to the First Count of the Complaint on the issue of liability; and (3)  Such other and further relief as this Court deems just, equitable, and proper.  [...]
[brief] Initially, the court’s failure to charge *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) (duty of commercial landowner to remove snow and ice from its walkways) and only charge the general duty to invitees under 5.20F was in and of itself reversible error.  Again, the appropriate charge refers to a reasonable period of time thereafter for the defendant to make its walkways reasonably safe.  The standard invitee charge makes no reference to the reasonable period of time for the snow remediation to be completed.  The absence of this reasonable time frame to remove snow is a critical difference between the two charges.  Failing to instruct the jury about this reasonable period of time essentially robbed Defendants of the ability to articulate its defense theory to the jury in a cogent manner.
[brief] (18T).  The sentencing hearing occurred on January 29th 2016.  (19T).  The State submitted a memorandum in advance of the sentencing date in which it argued that there were no mitigating factors, sought multiple consecutive terms, and requested an aggregate sentence of 110 years with 98 years parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act.  (Da 266).  The State emphasized how the [...] had marks on their hands from being bound with zip ties for almost an hour, and how [...] “was prostrated by fear when she realized what was happening. ” (Da 261).  The State noted that “any time a homeowner finds himself confronted in their home, the place where they raise their family, the place where they sleep, by masked, armed men, it is obviously a terrifying, life changing experience. ” (Da 262).  Passionately advocating the State’s position on the severity of the crime, the prosecutor noted:  “[w]hen the invaders so far violate the bounds of minimum human decency, as defendant did here, by binding the hands of innocent children and holding them at gunpoint waiting for their father to come home so they could attack and rob him, the violent and already heinous nature of the crime is elevated to an extreme. ” (Da 263).  The State argued as aggravating factors the nature and circumstances of the offense, the risk that defendant will commit another offense, the extent of defendant’s prior criminal record, the need to deter, and with respect to Count Seven, flight in the course of committing or attempting to commit a crime, including the immediate flight therefrom.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) 1, 3, 6, 9 and 13.  (Da 262).  The State also argued for consecutive sentences both as to crimes committed within the same incident as well as those committed on different dates.  The State ended its memorandum with a request for an effective life sentence for any adult human being - 110 years with 98 years subject to the No Early Release Act.  (Da 266).  This extreme position cried out for a response.
[directive] Main Plea Form/Revised Form  Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole page 1 of 7  4.  c.  Dwa pou konfwonte temwen ki vin deklare kont ou?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  The right to confront the witnesses against you? pa vle di ou d.  Èske w konprann ke le fèt ke w plede koupab renonse a dwa pou konteste an  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  apèl (1) refi yo te bay petisyon pou siprime prèv fizik la (R.3:5-7(d)) oswa (2) le fèt ke yo te refize aksepte w nan yon pwogram entèvansyon anvan pwosè a?  you are not waiving d.  Do you understand that by pleading your right to appeal (1) the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence (R. 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))? ou renonse e.  Answit, èske w konprann ke di moman ou deklare w koupab a dwa pou konteste [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] an apèl tout refi tout lòt petisyon ki te prezante anvan pwosè a eksepte sa ki swiv yo: you are waiving  Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the denial of all other pretrial motions except the following: