[brief] We reject defendant's argument that despite the judge's curative jury charge striking from consideration [...]'s unnoticed in-court identification, he was denied a fair trial.  “The simple response to defendant's argument is that the judge sustained the objection, struck the testimony, and the jury presumably followed the instruction. ”  State v. Castoran, 325 N.J. Super. 280, 287 (App. Div. 1999); accord State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 256 (2009).  Undisputedly, the prosecutor sought to have [...] identify defendant for the first time in court without notice to defense counsel.  We recognize, as defendant concedes, that at the time of trial, the Supreme Court had not yet held that a prosecutor was required to give notice to a defendant before asking a witness to make a first-time in-court identification; thus, a pretrial hearing on reliability of the in-court procedure was not required.  *5  Here, when [...] was first asked if she could identify the shooter in the courtroom, she responded “no. ”  The prosecutor again asked, “You don't see him in the courtroom today, this person?” she stated “Yes. ”  The judge then intervened and stated, “Asked and answered,” to which the prosecutor responded, “I thought she had said yes. ”  The witness stated, “I said yes” and the prosecutor asked where he was seated and [...] stated, “Right there,” which was immediately followed by a side bar conference, defense counsel's objection, and his request that the identification be stricken.  We are satisfied the judge sufficiently instructed the jury that [...]'s last statement identifying defendant was stricken from the record and they were not to consider it.  The judge issued the curative instruction immediately after hearing from counsel.  We observe that before the judge gave the charge, after she inquired of defense counsel what he was requesting, she advised that she was going to instruct the jury that the “last answer of the witness is stricken,” and defense counsel did not object.  A judge's “decision to provide a curative instruction and the content of that [instruction] is left to the discretion of the trial judge. ”  State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 497 (2015).  Where defense counsel “d[oes] not object to the jury instruction at trial,” we “review[ ] the charge for plain error. ”  Id. at 494.  Having concluded the charge striking the identification was not in error, we further note that in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, if deficient, it did not have the potential to cause an unjust result.  See State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 327 (2005) (“[T]he strength and quality of the State's corroborative evidence rendered harmless any deficiency in the instruction [on identification] and precludes a finding of plain error. ”).  In particular, the substantial trial evidence against defendant included the eyewitness testimony of defendant's lifelong friend [...], the corroborating testimony of [...], and [...]'s testimony that defendant admitted shooting [...] in the face.  As the identification was immediately stricken, there is no “reasonable doubt as to whether the jury reached a result it otherwise might not have. ”  Watson, 254 N.J. at 590-91.  IV.