ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There was certainly no unfairness present in either the municipal court or Law Division, and Defendant has not shown that the Law Division Judge’s decision lacks sufficient credible evidence in the record to support it.  Defendant argues that taking notice of the complaint – specifically the back of it - was an improper supplementation of the record by the Law Division Judge.  (Db 12)  His position is bolstered by the statement, “Nothing in the relevant court rules make it clear that any or all the back of a municipal ticket is part of the complaint. ”  (Db 13)  It cannot be seriously maintained that a pleading in a case is not part of the record.
[brief] Indeed, “[t]he Entire Controversy Doctrine, which finds its support in our Constitution, requires a litigant to present ‘all aspects of a controversy in one legal proceeding. ’”  Id., (citing, Kent, supra, 207 N.J. at 443).  “The failure to adhere to the requirements of mandatory joinder precludes a party in a subsequent lawsuit from asserting a new and independent action for damages.
[directive] Warning and opportunity to comply.  Officers should generally not use force immediately when encountering noncompliance with verbal directions.  Instead, whenever feasible, before using force, officers shall: (a) provide clear instructions and warnings; (b) attempt to determine whether the person has a special need, mental condition, physical limitation, developmental disability, or language barrier (See Section 2.7); (c) state the consequences of refusing to comply with a mandatory directive, including that force will be used unless the person complies; and (d) give the suspect a reasonable opportunity to comply.  3
[brief] *[...]* “ultimately viewed the decision as turning not on which of the parties acted worse but on the weight of the competing public policies. ”  *Id.*  Though the Court must consider “the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency,” the Court must weigh the same against the public policy motivating the legislation of the NJCFLA, *to wit*, protecting New Jersey residents by ensuring that only qualified and regulated entities can engage in the “consumer loan business. ”  *See Baumann*, 95 N.J. at 392; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  The present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act (“NJLLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:C-1 to -49—which was enacted in 1997 and superseded by the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, and the NJCFLA, the latter going into effect in July 2010.
[brief] The Motion Judge relied on N.J.S.A. 48:12-152b (5) to grant Summary Judgement to the railroad defendants.  The Judge rendered his opinion for granting Summary Judgment on the record, immediately following oral argument.  The Judge stated on the record: “…Subparagraph B(5) applies to the conduct of the plaintiff. ”  T19 1-2.  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 b (5) reads as follows:  (5) using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations.  (emphasis added)  Pursuant to section B(5) of the Railroad Immunity statute, the railroad is immune when someone is using the property (emphasis added) of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations.
[brief] See, e.g., Pa56 (“The parties largely agree that [...]’s filings comply with the applicable --- 6  The letter did not cite any of the regulations governing “loss ratio” to support these rulings.  See Pa123; see also Pa56.  Nor do the regulations or even the statute speak to the concepts the letter described as dispositive, e.g., the “aggressive[ness of] loss ratio targets,” what “loss ratios” reflect “enough deterioration” to qualify for rate increases or address the obligation on insurers “to share the burden of unfavorable performance . . . with the policyholder. ”  7  Testimony elicited from witnesses centered on the regulatory scheme.
[brief] Pa14 (Cook Cert., Exh. A at 10).  Other interrogatories relate directly to trial of the matter.  For example, interrogatory 45 requests [...] to identify all people [...] “will call as a witness at trial and set forth in detail all facts known by each such person regarding which they will testify” and interrogatory 43 requests all “expert witnesses whom [...] expects to call at trial in this litigation” with six specific sub-requests.
[brief] See id.  There are numerous examples within Saving [...] that illustrate the divergence of interests between [...] and the University.  Id. (recounting how Camden “Chancellor [...] broke ranks with university administration and condemned the plan as a bad deal”).  The context in which the Restructuring Act was amended and enacted supports Assemblymember [...]’s expression of legislative intent that the “[t]he goal was always to make sure there are individuals on the board from those specific counties referenced.
[brief] (Pa90).  [...] further objects to the fact that the fees were awarded based on the current rates charged.  But contrary to [...]’s argument, governing case law fully supports the award of fees based on billing rates at the time the application is filed.  As our Supreme Court explained in *Rendine*, when calculating a fee award, so as “[t]o take into account delay in payment, the hourly rate at which compensation is to be awarded should be based on current rates rather than those in effect when the services are performed. ”  141 N.J. at 337.  In so holding, the Court cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in *Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air*, 483 U.S. 711, 717 (1987), in which the Court explained:  When plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney’s fees depends on success, their lawyers are not paid until a favorable decision finally eventuates, which may be years later, as in this case.  Meanwhile, their expenses of doing business continue and must be met.  In setting fees for prevailing counsel, the courts have regularly recognized the delay factor, either by basing the award on current rates or by adjusting the fee based on historical rates to reflect its present value.  That logic is equally applicable here.  Plaintiff’s fee affidavit discussed that [...] has been handling the matter on a contingency basis since the first trial concluded in a loss in 2009.  (Da26).  Thus, the firm took on significant risk in pursuing the matter to the New Jersey Supreme Court to achieve a reversal and remand for further proceedings.  Even after receiving the $25 million buyout award in 2016 as a result of that remand, this firm still faced no certainty of payment despite Defendants’ undisputable ability to pay, and was forced to instead undertake substantial additional uncompensated work to attempt to collect on the judgment because of Defendants’ decision to commit frauds on the courts, including secreting their assets and misrepresenting their ability to comply with orders to return them.
[brief] McCormick on Evidence § 195 at 825-26 (Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)  ...........................................................................................................  55  Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Theft of Movable Property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a)” (rev. Feb. 11, 2008) .........................................................  58  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Official Misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2)” (rev. Sept. 11, 2006) .................................................................  32, 35, 36 RULES
[brief] [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10 (said names being fictitious); and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10 (said corporations being fictitious), Defendants  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION, Docket No. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal From: DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
[brief] [...] filed his complaint on November 24, 2020.  (Volume 1, Pa. 5).  From November 24, 2014 until December 31, 2017, the date defendants sold the hospital, [...]’s contracts provided for payment of $75,000.00 per year as Chief Medical Officer, payment of $58,600.00 for President of the Medical Staff and Co-director of the ICU, and payment of $19,500 as Director of the Sleep Clinic.
[brief] Appellant, [...], is currently incarcerated at [...] serving an aggregate term of life imprisonment for convictions of murder (two counts), conspiracy to commit murder, advocate homicidal death (four counts), escape (two counts), possession of an implement of escape, aggravated assault on a police officer, robbery, theft, conspiracy to commit escape, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.  (Pa25; Pa149-Pa151).  Reldan is appealing the [...]’s denial of parole and imposition of a thirty-  1  Because the procedural and factual histories are closely related, they are presented together for the convenience of the court.  2  “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix, and “Pb” refers to Reldan’s brief.  six-month future eligibility term (FET).  (Pa8-Pa14).
[brief] (Da 266)  Petitioner was 29 years old on the date of sentencing.  (19T14-20 to 22)  Counsel made no effort to argue that Petitioner’s crimes did not rise to the level of condemning him to prison for life.  An attorney properly functioning as counsel should have been outraged at such an extreme request and was obligated to present a counter-narrative to show that Petitioner is a human being who did not deserve such a long sentence.
[brief] 3.  On July 9, 2020 [...] filed a Medpay arbitration which was assigned Docket Number [...] as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on July 24, 2018 involving the injured party [...] and the [...] insured, [...].  On or about August 1, 2022, the Arbitrator entered an award in favor of [...] NJ Insurance Company in the amount of $10,000.00.  See arbitration award attached as (Da130 – Da138).
[brief] (Pa25-Pa33).  To be sure, the Complaint alleges (1) “[...] has filed numerous lawsuits in the State of New Jersey to collect the consumer debts allegedly --- 27  Further, Paragraph 15 of the Settlement Agreement states, “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, the Released Claims only include claims arising out of the failure of [...] Funding LLC and [...], to be licensed under the NJCFLA. ” (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 36).  owed by consumers on defaulted credit accounts allegedly acquired by it at a time when it was not properly licensed” (Pa1-Pa18, ¶ 12) and “[d]ue to the assignment of [...]’s account from unlicensed entities, and due to [...]’s unlicensed status, [...] commenced the collection lawsuit against [Appellant] when it lacked the authority to do so under the [NJCFLA] or any other New Jersey consumer lending statute” (Pa1-Pa18, ¶ 39).
[directive] On a Wednesday evening in April 1965, three men working as undercover agents for the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) seated themselves inside [...] in New Brunswick and spent the next ninety minutes observing the patrons.  The agents noted that all eleven of the customers were male, and that the majority of them were “very effeminate. ”  According the agents, the patrons conversed in a “lisping tone,” took “short sips from their straws,” and when walking “swished and swayed. ”  Inc., In re One Eleven Wines & Liquors, ABC Bulletin 1656, Item 5 (Dec. 27, 1965).  The agents returned three more times over the next 10 days and made similar observations.  Based on this investigation, ABC concluded that [...] had allowed “apparent homosexuals” to congregate inside its premises and therefore should lose its liquor license for 60 days—a sanction that ABC Director [...] later described as the “usual penalty” for permitting such gatherings.  at 11.  At the time, the case law from New Jersey’s Id. lower courts was crystal clear: ABC was in the right.  The “congregation of apparent homosexuals” constituted a violation of Rule 5 of ABC State Regulation No. 20, which prohibited licensees from conducting their business in “such manner as to become a nuisance. ”  [...], the owner of [...], challenged ABC’s penalty despite the many failed challenges that had come before.  After his request to dismiss the violation was rejected by the ABC Director and the Appellate Division, Mack took the matter to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
[brief] See Manetti v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company, 196 N.J. Super. 317, 320-321 (App. Div. 1984) and Endo Surgi Center, P.C. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 391 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 2007).  See also N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1.  Defendants do not argue that they are entitled to a jury trial on Plaintiffs' PIP Declaratory Judgment counts.  In Count Two of the complaint, Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of the monies which they previously paid to the Defendants in satisfaction of the bills which the Defendants prepared and issued for the services rendered while they were operating unlawfully.  See Da 59a to Da63a.  Count Two's ad damnum clause prays for the entry of a judgment "Ordering these Defendants to disgorge any and all sums paid to them by Plaintiffs [...] and [...] on behalf of the [...]/[...] claimants caused by the rendering of health care services by Defendants' unlawful practice structures."  See Da 62a-63a.  The amount previously paid to the corporate Defendants and for which restitution is sought is detailed in paragraphs 93-94 of the Complaint.  See Da51a-52a.  It is undisputed that a claim for restitution is equitable in nature and that it does not entitle a party to a jury trial.
[directive] If warranted the County Prosecutor may designate a member of the office to respond to the scene of all domestic violence incidents involving a Chief of Police, Law Enforcement Chief Executive.  4.  In responding to domestic violence incidents where the victim is a law enforcement officer, standard domestic violence response and the investigation procedures should be followed as set forth in Attorney General's Guidelines on Police Response to Domestic Violence Cases.  5.  In responding to domestic violence incidents where the parties involved are both law enforcement officers, standard domestic violence response and investigation procedures as set forth in the Attorney General's Guidelines on Police Response to Domestic Violence Cases  Attorney General Weapons Seizure and the Directives should be followed.  6.  When responding to a domestic violence complaint involving a law enforcement officer employed by the federal government or out-of- state agency, all responding officers, investigators and supervisors will follow the same procedures that are to be followed in responding to a domestic violence complaint involving an officer Attorney General’s from this Department as set forth in the Guidelines on Police Response Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases
[brief] [...] complains of five statements by [...] relating to the Incident:  On October 8, following [...]’s initial post, [...] posted a link on its Facebook and Twitter accounts to an NBC-New York story headlined, “NJ Teacher Accused of Pulling Hijab Off 2nd Grade Student’s Head” (the “First NBC News Story”), along with the following message:  “A teacher pulled off a 7-year-old student’s hijab in front of her class.  This is completely unacceptable, and we are calling for immediate termination.  Our children are not safe with #Islamophobia in the classroom. ”  Da_018; Da_130-131.  Later that morning, [...] posted a press release on its website, entitled, “[...] Calls for Immediate Firing of Teacher Who Allegedly Pulled Off Muslim Student’s Hijab. ”  Da_020-21; Da_133-142 (the “Press Release”).  The Press Release summarized [...]’s allegations about the Incident, linked to the First NBC News Story, and reported that “[...] are investigating the incident. ”  Da_021; Da_133-142.  The Press Release also included the following quote from [...]:  “We call for the immediate firing of the Maplewood teacher who pulled off the headscarf of a young Muslim student.  Anything less is an insult to the students and parents of Maplewood, NJ.  Forcefully stripping off the religious headscarf of a Muslim girl is not only exceptionally disrespectful behavior, but also a humiliating and traumatic experience.  Muslim students already deal with bullying from peers, it’s unthinkable that a teacher would add to their distress.  Islamophobia in our public schools must be addressed in NJ.  Classrooms are a place for students to feel safe and welcome, not fear practicing their faith. ”  Da_020-21.  A short while later, [...] posted a link to the Press Release on Twitter, along with the following message:  “Our children must be protected from anti-Muslim bigotry and abuse at school.  The teacher who pulled a second grader’s hijab off in class must be fired immediately.  #Islamophobia @cairnj @MSelaedin. ”  Da_021; Da_144.  The same afternoon [...] posted a link to a different NBC News story headlined, “Olympian accuses New Jersey teacher of pulling off girl’s hijab, school district investigating” (the “Second NBC News Story”) along with the following message:  “[...] Exec. Dir. Selaedin [...]: ‘Forcefully stripping off the religious headscarf of a Muslim girl is not only exceptionally disrespectful behavior, but also a humiliating and traumatic experience. ”  @CAIRNJ @Mselaedin #Islamophobia. ”  Da_018-19; Da_127-28.  [...] also posted a video clip of the GMA Report on its YouTube account, which included [...]’s quote  “The hijab, you know, is much like any other article of clothing for a Muslim woman.  To remove that publicly can be very humiliating.  . . .  Anyone who thinks it’s OK to do this to a student clearly is not fit to be a teacher. ”  Da_019-20.  On October 9, [...] posted the same video clip on its Facebook and Twitter accounts.  Da_020.  E. Procedural History
[brief] 25 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) .................................................. 13,16  In re Appeal of Certain Sections of Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85 (1982) ........................................ 27  In re Bacharach, 344 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2001) .........................................................  30 JHC Indus. Services, LLC v. Centurion Companies, Inc, 469 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 2021) ........................................... 22,23,28,31,35 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) ...............................................................15,16,18 Khoudary v. Salem County Bd. of Social Services, 281 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 1990) ......................................................
[brief] The 16-year prison sentence for threats made in two voice messages is manifestly excessive and unduly punitive.  Defense counsel asked the court to find mitigating factors 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 11.  (6T 25-10 to 11)  The sentencing court declined to find any mitigating factors and imposed a 16-year sentence that far exceeded both the State’s recommendation of 11.5 years and defense counsel’s request for a 5-year term.  (6T 28-22 to 25; 23-13 to 19)  Because the 8-year terms imposed on each count of terroristic threats were manifestly excessive, this Court should reverse and remand for resentencing.
[directive] Monetary remains reasonably the assure not will non-monetary conditions on release that court finds the when clear makes that law The 2A:162-17(c).  N.J.S.A. required. when in court appearance defendant's Ibid. release.  defendant's the preventing of purpose the for imposed be bail not must monetary not it flight; may discourage only to can used be bail monetary that statute provides the Furthermore, will defendant the that assure or community to the or person of other any safety assure the to used be determines if prosecutor a Thus, Ibid. process.
[brief] Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] December 29, 2017 .................................................................Pa222 b. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] December 29, 2017  ..............................................................Pa226 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] December 29, 2017 .................................................................Pa233 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] December 29, 2017 .............................................................Pa237 P-39.  January 2018
[directive] The hiring agency shall then request all internal affairs files for cases where the candidate was the subject officer, regardless of the ultimate disposition or status of the complaint.  9.8.3  If a law enforcement agency receives such a request regarding a former employee, then it shall immediately share copies of all internal investigative information related to that candidate with the hiring agency.  Confidential internal affairs files shall not be disclosed to any other party.  9.8.4  This disclosure requirement does not apply when the agency responsible for sharing internal affairs files is unable to do so because the information is clearly subject to a non- disparagement or non-disclosure agreement.  Such agreements must be followed even though they inhibit the ability of law enforcement agencies to fully evaluate candidates applying for positions of public trust, and therefore have the potential to compromise public safety.  Given the public safety risks that such agreements pose, county and municipal governing entities and their counsel are strongly discouraged from entering into them.
[directive] Every victim of violent crime should be provided with certain basic information shortly after the crime is reported either by mail or through personal contact.  The victim should be informed of the name of the investigator in charge of the case and how to reach him/her, the case number or other department data retrieval information and when the case has been reassigned to a different investigator.  Upon the arrest of an offender for the commission of an offense, the arresting police agency should immediately notify, by telephone or by personal contact, the victim of the apprehension and detention of the offender.  If the arrest of the offender occurs in a municipality other than the location of the offense, the investigating police agency should immediately notify, by telephone or by personal contact, the victim of the apprehension and detention of the offender.  When an investigation is closed without an arrest, the victim should be so informed.  The arresting/investigating police agency should notify the victim of the pre-trial release of the offender.
[brief] [...]’s jury charge on count one tracked the model jury charge for murder when passion/provocation manslaughter, aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter charged as lesser included offenses.  (Sa1-12; 27T151-21 to 27T164-15).  [...]’s jury charge on attempted murder tracked the model jury charge on attempted murder when passion/provocation manslaughter is also charged.  (Sa13-16; 27T164-23 to 27T169-25).  In accordance with the model jury charges on the substantive offenses, [...] did not refer to passion/provocation manslaughter as a "lesser included offense," but rather an element that the State had to disprove to convict defendant of purposeful or knowing murder and attempted murder.  (Sa1; Sa4; Sa13; 27T151-24 to 27T152-5; 27T156-10 to 13; 27T165-15 to 17).
[brief] However, this motion was properly denied.  A trial court's ruling refusing to set aside a jury verdict will not be reversed on appeal unless it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.  R. 2:10-1; R. 3:20-1; e.g., State v. LaBrutto, 114 N. J. 187, 207 (1989); State V. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 96 (1982); State v. Cook, 330 N.J. Super. 395, 419 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 486 (2000).