ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Appellant sought to introduce the Sketch as evidence of the building’s approved height despite it having no bearing or “relevance” to that issue.  Given the Sketch’s use of “+/-” for the height of each depicted building could mean that the differentials between the drawing and actual heights could be anything.  This is also why the Board must sign off on the signed and sealed scaled drawings, and not a “+/-” demonstrative exhibit, prior to the zoning officer’s issuance of a zoning permit.  Clearly, the Trial Court properly found that there was simply no basis on which the Sketch would tend to prove or disprove whether the height of the constructed building was compliant with the Board’s approval.  Moreover, the Sketch clearly stated on the document that it was not-to- scale.  (The “NTS” shown on the Sketch is a common architectural notation for “not-to-scale”.)  The Trial Court properly excluded the Sketch as evidence given the Sketch had no logical connection to the key issues of the approved height for the building and the actual height of the constructed building.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(2) (“When the law provides that a particular kind of culpability suffices to establish an element of an offense such element is also established if a person acts with higher kind of culpability. ”).  --- 14  It is not unusual for the Legislature to include three types of culpability in one offense.  As an example, the crime of aggravated assault contains the culpability types of purposely, knowingly, and recklessly.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1).  The statute does not define the terms “torment”, “torture”, “maim”, “hang”, “poison”, “unnecessarily or cruelly beat”, “cruelly abuse”, or “needlessly mutilate”.
[brief] [...] believed the first one occurred in 2000.  (1T24).  11.  [...] believed the second one occurred in 2004.  (1T24).  12.  For the 2000 incident, [...] injured his left knee and lower back for which he was out of work for 30 days and had no surgeries.  (1T24-26).  13.  [...] was returned MMI with no restrictions by his workers’ compensation doctors from the 2000 incident.  (1T26-28).  14.  For the 2004 incident, [...] injured his low back lifting a box and was out of work for 30-40 days.  (1T28-29).  15.  [...] was returned MMI with no restrictions by his workers’ compensation doctors from the 2004 incident.
[brief] First, during his opening statement, plaintiff’s counsel played for the Court a video taken by his client at some point following his accident.  Counsel represented to the Court that plaintiff’s intention in taking the video was to ride a vehicle over the same location he encountered on the day of his accident to memorialize its existence.  (3T20:4-10).  Plaintiff’s counsel represented to the Court that the video depicted the location of the roadway condition that allegedly caused plaintiff’s accident.  Counsel further represented that the video demonstrated the roadway condition’s physical impact on the vehicle depicted in the video.  (3T20:4-15).  Although the subject roadway condition is not visible in the video, [...] testified that the physical “jolt” that the vehicle experienced when encountering the condition indicated the presence of a dangerous roadway condition associated with an abrupt elevation change.  (3T141:14-142:12).  Critically, however, on cross-examination, [...] twice conceded that there is no way to know whether the vehicle in the video traveled over the same ground as plaintiff's motorcycle on the day of plaintiff's accident.
[brief] In any event, belated motions to compel arbitration should be denied even prior to depositions if the movant has benefitted from significant written document discovery in litigation.  *Marmo & Sons Gen. Contr., LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC*, 478 N.J. Super. 593, 612 (App. Div. 2024) (denying motion to compel arbitration prior to depositions noting that the "delay in moving to compel arbitration allowed it to obtain the early benefit of discovery that might not have been as easily obtainable in arbitration"). \(^4\)
[brief] [...]’s testimony here ran grossly afoul of these principles.  Plainly and simply, he was offering his opinion to the jury that the State’s theory of the case was correct.  The State was entitled to offer facts to support such a conclusion - e.g., “Defendant reported his wallet ID stolen.  The NJSP replaced it, and, after defendant surrendered the replacement, defendant appeared to display a wallet ID at traffic stops” -- but, under McLean and its progeny, the State was not allowed to offer a witness to give an opinion interpreting those facts: telling the jury that the head of the NJSP investigation into defendant’s conduct concluded from the very same evidence that this jury was presented that defendant clearly retained the ID and had falsely reported it stolen.
[brief] [...]’s trial counsel admitted she had no knowledge about ballistics, making her duty to consult with someone who did even more critical for reasonable performance of counsel.  It was “especially important for counsel to seek the advice of an expert” in this case, see *Bucio v. Sutherland*, 674 F. Supp. 2d 882, 942 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (failure to consult with and seek expert testimony deficient where “[t]here is no evidence that counsel had prior experience in similar cases or special knowledge to enable him to evaluate the competency and strength of the forensic evidence to be presented by the State”).  Trial counsel's failure to contact a ballistics expert like [...] was deficient under Strickland.
[brief] Order entered September 29, 2020 (incorrectly dated June 29, 2020)  .................................................................1a  Order for Summary Judgment entered December 7, 2022 ..................................................3a  Order entered January 20, 2023 .......................................................................................16a  Complaint filed March 3, 2017 .........................................................................................30a  Answer filed June 23, 2017 .............................................................................................41a  Third Party Complaint filed January 30, 2018 .................................................................52a  Order entered July 20, 2018 ............................................................................................59a  Amended Order entered August 8, 2018 ........................................................................68a  Case Management Order entered October 5, 2017 ..........................................................70a  Case Management Order entered June 29, 2018 ............................................................74a  Order entered December 9, 2019 ....................................................................................76a  Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 22, 2020 ...........................................77a  Statement of Material Facts ..............................................................................................79a  Certification of [...] .........................................................................................91a  Exhibit A: [...] Estimate dated June 4, 2008 .................................................................95a  Exhibit B: [...] Proposal dated July 25, 2008 .................................................................96a  Exhibit C: [...]’s letter dated November 3, 2008 .......................................................97a  Exhibit D: [...] invoice dated March 23, 2009 .................................................................98a  Volume II Certification of Counsel ..................................................................................................100a
[brief] (4T, p. 46, line 15, to p. 47, line 10)  Both rulings were WRONG (Sect. “G”, p. 43-44; 122a, 3rd par.) since they disregarded that facts substantiated:  1)  [...] should NEVER have done legal work since [...] was sole counsel to Co-Trustees, at the time, prior to these case matters starting Nov. ’21; 2)  Its invoice showed work checked for allowances to pay off [...]’s home equity loan based on its review of irrelevant [...]’ Will that had NOTHING to do w/Trust u/w of [...]; 3)  It should NEVER have required any legal work since it should have been readily/rationally understood by [...] that since Will established a lifetime Trust for [...] and me, if she predeceased me, he should NEVER use Corpus to pay off a past loan of [...].
[brief] *1  Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants to provide complete, unredacted answers to Plaintiffs’ first set of interrogatories and first set of requests for production (Doc. 85), Defendants have responded (Doc. 90), and Plaintiffs have filed a reply (Doc.  92).  For the reasons set forth below, this motion is DENIED.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND  The Plaintiffs in this case, [...], [...], and [...]  (“Plaintiffs”), filed their complaint against the Defendants, [...], the [...], and [...] (“Defendants”), on September 28, 2006 (Doc. 2).  This action is brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (“ERISA”), alleging that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties as defined contribution plan administrators under the Act.  Plaintiffs are participants in [...]'s VIP Plan, a defined contribution plan, popularly known as a 401(k) plan.  In addition to the VIP plan, [...] offered other defined contribution plans, as well as traditional pension plans.  As the amended complaint makes clear (Doc. 109), this lawsuit concerns only the VIP defined contribution plan.  All of [...]’s defined contribution retirement plans, however, were included together into a Master Trust, and the combined plans were managed together.  The VIP plan was by far the largest of the defined contribution plans, making up 94% of the Master Trust.  At the time the motion to compel was filed, Defendants had produced over 50,000 documents in the case.  This production was undertaken pursuant to a Confidentiality Agreement to which all parties agreed (Doc. 86, Exh. E).
[brief] Aa0009.  The Department reached this conclusion even though the Coastal Engineering Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11(d), expressly indicates that the reconstruction of an existing bulkhead 24 inches outshore of the existing structure does not qualify as “new construction,” and is presumptively acceptable to the Department.  Nevertheless, the Department summarily claimed that the bulkhead reconstruction authorized by the Permit results in a “significant change” to the footprint of the structure without providing any acknowledgement, let alone any discussion, of the Coastal Engineering Rule and its 24 inch allowance for the reconstruction of structural shore protection.
[brief] See Polzo v. Cnty of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 582 (2008); Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015); N.J.R.E. 703.  Perhaps the most ridiculous opinion expressed by [...] was that [...]’s withdrawal of $2.3M from [...]’s bank account on November 26, 2014 to fund part of its buyout of [...]’s 50% membership interest in [...] constituted conversion.  20T124-16 to 125-14; 23T27-9 to 28-12.  Based on [...]’s testimony, the trial court summarily held that Defendant was jointly and severally liable for converting these funds despite there being no evidence in the record to this effect.  36T37-17 to -23.  What the evidence actually showed was that [...] asked for two checks from [...] in November 2014 – one for $1.36M and the other for $1.28M – as a deposit towards the [...] buyout so that he could use the money for an investment in India.  25T103-15 to 104-25, 123-9 to 135-3; Da02740, Da03362 – Da03388, Da03456 – Da03457.  The evidence further confirmed that [...] authorized [...] to transfer money from [...] to [...] in order to pay [...]/[...] the $2,640,000 deposit because [...] lacked funds to do so.  Id.  The terms of the 2014 [...] Purchase Agreement did not preclude [...] from using [...]’s money to fund the buyout of [...] because this was an equity sale with a contractually agreed upon purchase price – not an asset purchase involving a division of corporate cash.  Id.  Rather than establishing that the Defendant wrongfully converted Plaintiffs’ funds, the evidence at trial instead demonstrated that [...] authorized the Disputed Transactions (which were reflected on [...] and [...]’s accounting records), jointly made financial decisions with [...] on behalf of the companies, and continuously reviewed [...] and [...]’s finances with [...].  16T177-10 to 180-4; 20T124-16 to 130-9; 21T25-11 to 28-12; 22T43-16 to 52-2, 80-21 to 90-14; 23T11-5 to 28-12, 70-1 to 71-11, 97-16 to -24; 24T22-12 to 24-5, 50-11 to 51-1; 25T31-6 to 33-7, 56-3 to 57-8, 103-15 to 105-1, 125-1 to 126-4, 152-6 to 160-8; 26T6-1 to 24-24; 26T 32-14 to 34- 3, 58-22 to 62-16, 73-11 to 78-22, 104-4 to 106-23; 30T 89-17 to 98-5; Da02858 – Da03032, Da03054 – Da03068, Da03077, Da6612 – Da6788, Da07299 – Da07305, Da07364 – Da07386, Da07390 – Da07746.
[brief] Given the evolution of defendant’s story of the male voice in the shower, [...] testified, “I do not believe it to be historic truth that he heard a voice in the shower on the day of the shootings. ” (13T200-1 to 5).  [...] explained his reasoning: at the time defendant spoke to the police, “his memory is clear.  There are no gaps.  There is no amnesia.  There is no hallucination of a voice in the shower the day of the shooting.  Years later the story changes. ” (13T200-6 to 23).  But [...] never commented on defendant’s credibility.
[brief] **EXHIBIT  A Agreement dated January 7, 1963 (Da13)  **EXHIBIT B June 5, 1972 Agreement (Da19)  EXHIBIT C  Corporate Action of [...] dated June 1, 2007 (Da142)  **EXHIBIT D Order Authorizing Sale of Debtor’s Property dated August 11, 2010 (Da20)  **EXHIBIT E Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. dated May 18, 2012 (Da24)  **EXHIBIT F Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. dated June 1, 2012 (Da26)  **EXHIBIT G
[brief] In any event, the appeal was filed too late to address the May 14, 2024 Order.  R. 2:4-1.  The time within which to file the appeal regarding the May 14 Order would have been forty-five days later on June 28, 2024.  However, this appeal was filed on July 2, 2024 (Da164).  As such, as a matter of procedural law, this Court should only consider whether the Trial Court, in its June 20, 2024 Order, abused its discretion.
[brief] In this matter, Defendants/Appellants for a third time, filed a Leave of Court for Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice.  Defendants'/Appellants' arguments appear to substantively mirror their previous arguments of their prior Leaves of Court for Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice.  It is a well-established principle that an appellate court's review is almost always limited to the record below.  R. 2:5-4(a) ("The record on appeal shall consist of all papers on file in the court or courts or agencies below.")
[brief] Docket Number [...]  Trial Court Judge: Hon. Lina P.  Corriston, JSC RESPONDENT’S LETTER BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT’S APPEAL OF THE MAY 30, 2024  BENCH TRIAL VERDICT OF THE HON.  LINA P. CORRISTON, JSC TABLE OF CONTENTS  INDEX TO APPENDIX  ...........................................................................................................  3  DEFENDANT’S COUNTERSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS  PURSUANT TO RULE 2:6-4(a) ..................................................................................................................  4  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................  5 POINT ONE .......................................................................................................................  5  THE LEASE AGREEMENT WAS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS TERMS AND WAS PROPERLY INTERPRETED BY JUDGE CORRISTON (3T:9:4 – 13:2, 15:11 – 19:10) ..................................................................................................................  5 POINT TWO .......................................................................................................................  9  IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT REVERSES THE JUDGMENT, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER FACTFINDING.  ............  9  INDEX TO APPENDIX Trial Exhibit J-4, Plaintiff’s photos of the fire damage ........................................  Da1  Trial Exhibit J-5, Defendants’ photos of the fire damage ........................................  Da12  Defendants’ May 17, 2024 post-trial submission ......................................................  Da13  Email from Plaintiff’s counsel admitting to their error in calculating the rent..  Da20  DEFENDANT’S COUNTERSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS  PURSUANT TO RULE 2:6-4(a)
[brief] Truth in Lending Act (TILA)  Drb2, Drb5, Drb6, Drb8, Drb9, Drb10, Drb11, Drb14  Uniform Commercial Code Certification of Service (1)  [...]  Name (first, middle, last)  [...] Address  [...]  City, State, Zip Code [...]  [...]  Telephone Number and E-mail Address (2)  [...] v. [...]  A/K/A [...]  (3)  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division Docket Number: [...] OR Number assigned by trial/tax court or agency (if no Appellate Division
[brief] Following Gorga, the Supreme Court clarified its operational approach in State by Commissioner of Transportation v. Caoili, 135 N.J. 252 (1994), establishing a clear two-step process.  135 N.J. at 265.  In Caoili, a commercial use requiring a use variance was proffered as the highest and best use of the residentially zoned property along with the probability of obtaining a subdivision.  In valuing the property, the owner’s experts discounted the sale prices of the comparison properties by ten percent to account for the fact that the subject property there had not yet obtained a zoning variance.  The Court’s two-step approach was explained as necessary to avoid “unbridled speculation” on the fair market value of the property.  Id. at 264 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Under Caoili's framework, a court must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that a zoning change is “reasonably probable. ”  Id. at 265.  After that initial determination is made, the jury determines in a second step whether “a buyer and seller engaged in voluntary negotiations over the fair market value of the property [would reasonably believe] that a change may occur and will have an impact on the value of the property. ”  Id. at 264–65.
[brief] A review of cases involving the application of the parol evidence rule bears this out.  The parol evidence rule has been properly applied to exclude evidence in cases where a party sought to enforce a contract under terms different from the written contract.  *See:* *Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal "Z" Ena*, 251 N.J. Super. 570 (App.Div. 1991)(court refused to allow evidence of alleged oral representations where Plaintiff was trying to alter contract terms as to how the trade-in value of an automobile would be applied); *Winoka Village, Inc. v. Tate*, 16 N.J.Super. 330 (1951)(court refused to allow evidence of oral representations that would have altered the terms of a written lease); and *In re Tarragon Corp.*, 2010 W.L. 3921996 (D.N.J. September 27, 2010)(court refused to amend purchase contracts for condominium units based on alleged oral representations).
[brief] (Da865).  This Agreement recognized the [...], and their heirs, successors, and assigns, could exercise their right to reclaim title to the beachfront section if the [...] took 2.95 acres to create a “dune walkover. ”  The Agreement stated: “[s]ince the easement sought by [...] prevents [...] members from ‘bathing, sunbathing and kindred sports or pleasures,’ upon the dune area, and, persons other than just [...] members will enjoy certain walkover dune access ways, [...] has a right of reverter. ” (Da867).  Despite this right, the [...]’ daughter waived the right of reverter, thereby allowing the [...] to “take” a portion of the beach in order to create a dune.  (Da867).
[brief] (3T30).  Furthermore, Plaintiff/Respondent explained that it had no automatic right to seek appellate review of the interlocutory ruling.  (3T34).  Nevertheless, the Trial Court ruled that [...] and [...] were to be treated as so-called “Burt defendants” and that the issue would go to the jury if there was enough evidence to support an allegation of negligence against them.  (3T42).  Therefore, regardless of Plaintiff/Respondent’s application, it was denied in any event, and the trial was conducted exactly as Appellant sought.  (14T14:12-15).  By upholding the so-called “Burt defendant” designation, [...] and [...] were not active parties in the case (i.e., they were without representation of counsel) but appeared on the verdict sheet.  (2T29).  Appellant’s counsel also conceded that as a consequence, no one could recover anything directly against either [...] and/or Dr. [...] as a result – not Plaintiff/Respondent (because they were not direct defendants) and not Appellant either (because of the dismissals Appellant had requested).  (2T29-2T30).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | ARGUMENT ON REPLY | 2 | | I.  [...] Clearly Breached Its Duty to Defend the Underlying Suit.  [Pa1, Pa3] | 2 | | A.  The [...] Did Not Cease to Be a “Suit” by Reason of Appealable Rulings of the Vermont Trial Court [Pa1, Pa3].  | 3 | | B.  [...]’s Newly Minted Argument That the [...] Plaintiffs “Abandoned” All “Damage Claims” Is Unsupported and Wrong.  [Pa1, Pa3]  | 6 | | C.  [...]’s Withdrawal of Its Defense of the [...] Was Not Justified by Mere Uncertainty as to Potential Indemnity Coverage.  [Pa1, Pa3]  | 8 | | II.  [...] Wrongly Asks This Court to Re-Write the “Personal Profit” Exclusion to Include a Mere Risk That a Policyholder Might, in the Future, Gain a Personal Advantage to Which He Was Not Entitled.  [Pa1, Pa3]  | 10 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[directive] Photographs  7.4.1  Photographs and video recording tapes can be useful tools if relevant to the investigation.  If a complaint involves excessive use of force, photographs of the complainant and the officer should be taken as close as possible to the time of the incident.  Photographs also can be used to create a record of any other matter the investigator believes is necessary.  Whenever possible, digital color photography should be used.  7.4.2