ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Kornbleuth, supra, 241 N.J. at 308.  Rule 4:49-2 does not provide an opportunity for the proverbial second bite of the apple.  Nor does it permit reconsideration based on facts or arguments that could have been raised in opposition to the original motion but were not.  Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008).  Reconsideration is not appropriate merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion – which is precisely what [...] attempted to do here.
[brief] [...] graduated from the 114th Academy Class of the New Jersey State Police.  Pa55.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Special Retirement on or about December 1, 2019.  Pa55.  Pa87.  While employed by the New Jersey State Police, [...] worked in the Community Policing North Unit and was detached to the Caven Point Command Post in Jersey City.  Pa64.  Pa68.  [...] was detailed to various locations in New York City and New Jersey to assist in the New Jersey State Police response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  Pa64.  Pa68.  [...] was “deployed exclusively to sites in and around Ground Zero up to December 1, 2001” on a full-time basis.  Pa64.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).
[brief] Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of [...] | Pa4 | | April 19, 2024  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration | Pa9 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Campbell v. Sedgwick Detert, Moran and Arnold, | 4 | | Civil No. 11–642–ES–SCM (D.N.J. March 28, 2013), 2013 WL 1314429 | | | D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, | 2, 4 | | 242 N.J.Super. 267 (App.Div. 1990) | | | Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., | 4 | | 497 F.3d. 1135 (10th Cir. 2007)  | | | Fraunhofer-Geselleshhaft  Zur Forderung der angewandten Forschung E.V., | 7 | | 2021 WL 861493 (D.Del. March 8, 2021) | | | Loughran v. PepsiCo, Inc., | 4 | | Civil No. 22-4390 (D.N.J., Jan. 29, 2024), 2024 WL 328740 | | | Metcalf v. Bay Ferries Limited, | 8 | | 2014 WL 3670786 (D. Mass. July 14, 2021) | | | Peiker Acustic, Inc. v. Kennedy, | 8 | | 2011 WL 1344238 (D. Colorado April 8, 2011) | | | Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., | 4 | | 215 F.R.D. 492 (E.D. Pa. 2003) | | | Ramautur v. Bob Bros. Corp. | 3 | | (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2008), 2008 WL 169665 | | | Societie Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. | 7 | | Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) | | | In re Valsartan, Losartan, and Irbesartan Products Liability Litigation, | 4 | | 2021 WL 61117676 (D.N.J. 2021) | | | In re Vitamin Antitrust Litigation, | 8 | | 2001 WL 35814436 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2001) | | Willson v. Gerber Products Company, Docket No. A-1290-22, 2023 WL 8889528 (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2023) .............................................. 7 Other Authorities Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) .........................................................................................
[directive] This designee should be available on a 24/7 basis to provide real-time legal advice and charging approvals to law enforcement officers, and County Prosecutor’s may decide to use their already- established system of on-call Assistant Prosecutors to satisfy this function.  Section IV.A.  See 6 2.  In deciding whether to authorize a discretionary stationhouse adjustment, the County Prosecutor, or designee, shall consider the factors outlined in Section II.C.  Prosecutors should not automatically refuse to consent to diversion of a case, based solely upon the fact that the juvenile previously had been adjudicated or diverted from formal adjudication.  The manner in which prior allegations of delinquency were handled is relevant only in determining whether diversion of current charges will be effective in achieving the objectives of the juvenile justice system, including the interests of public safety.  This Directive specifically permits consideration of a stationhouse adjustment and other forms of diversion for juveniles with prior formal charges and/or prior diversion.  E. use.
[brief] The only ways that plaintiffs could properly assert claims arising out of [...]’ alleged breach of contract are by an assignment of rights from [...], the party to the contract who holds those rights, or as intended third party beneficiaries of the contract.  See e.g., Biasi vs. Allstate Insurance, 104 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1969); Murray v. Allstate Insurance Company, 209 N.J. Super. 163, 170 (App. Div. 1986); Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 513-515 (2015)  See also Atlantic Employers’ Insurance Company v. Tots & Toddlers, Inc., 239 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 1990) certif. den. 122 N.J. 147 (1990) (holding that, absent an assignment of rights, an injured plaintiff has only the right to intervene in an action between insured and insurer to adjudicate the existence of coverage.)
[brief] [...], based only upon the fact that Plaintiff had included [...]’s invoices as fees that had been billed prior to the court’s January 5, 2017 cut-off date.  In fact, [...] Law was not even mentioned in the trial court’s August 31, 2022 opinion wherein the court lists Plaintiff’s attorneys.  (Da277); Da186-195, at Da192-193).  There were numerous other obvious errors.  Plaintiff’s fee application included fees incurred in connection with the appeals in this case.  For example, pursuant to Rule 2:11-4, the request for counsel fees for work performed in connection with the appeals were required to have been made before the appellate court within 10 days following the determination of the appeal, which was not done (Da255); the court awarded attorney’s fees for Plaintiff’s counsel’s providing assistance to Plaintiff in connection with his unsuccessful criminal complaints filed in Korea against Defendant alleging malfeasance in the management of B&H; and the court awarded fees for Plaintiffs’ lawyers’ subpoenas to and deposition of Defendant’s immigration attorney, [...], which proved fruitless and was another of Plaintiff’s “wild goose chases. ”  The Administrator filed with the trial court a certification wherein he attached many documents for the purpose of showing the pressure that Plaintiff was continually exerting upon him to, for example, investigate [...], the entity that [...] had ruled in 2014 was not includable in the Estate.
[brief] In spite of the introduction of the information that plaintiff now submits should have been excluded, the jury responded “yes” to the first question on the jury verdict sheet, thus finding that defendant [...] deviated from the standard of care applicable to a long term care facility.  (See Pa87.)  Clearly, plaintiff was not prejudiced by the impeachment of her experts with the NJDOH’s surveys, because the jury disregarded the NJDOH’s conclusions and found that the facility deviated from the standard of care, including the statutes and regulations which plaintiff presented as evidence of the standard of care.
[brief] Precise formulas, N.J. A.C. 11:3-20.6, measures used in small employer benefit program insurance, N.J.A.C. 11:21-9.5, measures of excessiveness defined by dollars of excess profit N.J.A.C. 11:3-20.3, or premium reductions N.J.A.C. 11:21-9.5, all of which are cited by [...] on pages 28-31 of its brief, are unworkable in the long-term care market.  They are unworkable because in the long-term care market, the pricing of policies is heavily dependent upon actuarial assumptions and judgment.  Those characteristics would not benefit from hard and fast rules of the type [...] urges on appeal, because they would stifle the flexibility and balance called upon by the Legislature to weigh the carriers’ and policyholders’ interests in setting policy premiums.  [...]’s arguments that it lacked advance knowledge of the standards of excessiveness are unsupported.  [...] cites to Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138 (1962), and In re Farmers’ Mut. Fire Assurance Ass’n of N.J., 256 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div. 1992), to support its call for this court to require that the Department adopt rules defining excessiveness.
[brief] Instead, the Chancery Court only provided short, broad conclusions as to the appropriateness of the Global Fee Application and granted it.  (1T67:20 – 1T70:18).  This Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court have repeatedly made clear that is insufficient.  See S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 82, 91 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that trial court “failed to make specific findings as to the reasonableness of the legal services provided and the fees charged … and that the court erred in denying [opposing party’s] request for discovery\(^9\) with respect to those fees” and noting that the trial courts “oral opinion … simply \(^9\)
[brief] As with most agency action, there is room for debate over what is reasonable.  To be reasonable, an agency's choice of action for providing notice does not require adoption of a perfect practice.  Here, the intended purpose of the action challenged—the Commissions' attempted notice—was to reach persons who might have been affected by the wrongfully calculated reimbursement rate, to notify those persons of the availability of supplemental reimbursement, and to inform them of the procedures for requesting supplemental reimbursement.  (pp. 16-19)  3.
[brief] As previously described, the School on August 23, 2018 filed an Application to the Zoning Board under 40:55D-68 for a determination as to the legality of the non-conforming off-site parking uses by the [...] Lot 8 on the School Lot 5.  With its Application, the School Attorney submitted several documents/exhibits as intended exhibits/evidence (Da 7-48).  Thereafter, certain additional legal correspondence between the School Attorney, Board Attorney, and the [...] Attorney (Da49-88) were presented as Exhibits before the Board at the hearing.  The [...]'s legal position was set forth in its pre-hearing letter (Da62) --- that it had no burden to prove its off-site parking use of Lot 5 was ever legal by zoning and thus no exhibits or evidence were submitted to the Board with that letter.  At the Board hearing, the School Attorney moved in evidence without objection the various documents submitted with the Application (Da7-48) and the pre-hearing legal correspondence (Da49-88).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division  Morris County  DOCKET NO. BELOW: [...]  SAT BELOW:  HONORABLE  [...], P.J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX (1R - 4R)  FILED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT  [...]  IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DATED JUNE 24, 2020  DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT AS REQUIRED UNDER N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27, et. seq.
[brief] As noted supra, [...] found that the [...]’ thefts and concealment thereof constituted multiple violations of the NJRICO statute.  The [...]’ principal defense and justification for their thefts during the RICO SOL Period was premised on their fabricated “claim of right” defense – to wit, that the [...] had the right to take the millions they took from the partnership because they were entitled to be paid “builders,” “developers” and “management” fees (“Theoretical” and “Hypothetical” fees as they came to be known), based upon their further claim that they, as opposed to [...], primarily were responsible for the development (1984-1988), construction (1988 and 1999) and management (1985-2011) of [...].  Those self-serving claims were invented by [...] – as found by [...] (see, supra) – only after this Court’s 2006 Opinion, in which this Court, in remanding the matter to the lower court to conduct an accounting, held that:  [W]e are confident that the court on remand will take into consideration the many delays between bringing this claim to court and final judgment and, as a result, the disproportionate amount of capital and man-hours put into this project by defendants [the [...]].  ….  The adjustments of debits and credits may be made accordingly.
[brief] On May 7, 2024, [...] filed a notice of appeal.  (Da 52-55)  --- 3  Indictments [...] and [...] both alleged gun possession on July 5, 2020.  (Da 2)  The latter indictment was amended on the record to correct the date and weapon.  (2T 3-24 to 5-10)  Indictment [...] alleged various offenses on June 28, 2023.  (Da 3-10)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (Ra5.)  It must be noted that of the City’s twenty-five (25) separate statements of fact, Plaintiff admitted twenty-three (23) in some form or another.  (Ra10-12; Ra16-33.)  Plaintiff’s Opposition also included the untimely expert report of [...], an Arborist, along with several other untimely expert reports.  (Pa249.)  On December 28, 2023, the City filed Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to reopen discovery, and on January 2, 2024, the City filed its Reply Brief emphasizing that Plaintiff had admitted virtually all the facts in support of the City’s Motion.  (Ra5.)  On January 19, 2024, the Court granted the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion.
[brief] ”); Mejia v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 446 N.J.  Super 369, 376-377 (App. Div. 2016)(the court’s review of an agency’s decision is “not simply a pro forma exercise in which the court rubber stamps findings that are not reasonably supported by the evidence.)(internal citations omitted.)  Respondent’s reliance on Newark v. Nat. Res. Council in Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 540 (1980) is misplaced.  In Newark, the issue before the Court was the adoption of technical maps prepared by the [...] (“[...]”) of the [...] (“[...]”) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1B-13.1 et seq.
[brief] Unlike the Plaintiffs, the Defendants did provide evidence of what a reasonable and diligent inquiry looks like in a real estate transaction.  It is true a judge could perhaps determine, as a matter of law, if an easement is actually in the chain of title, then a reasonable person would be on inquiry if there is an undisputed indicator in the record before the court.  However, where there is NO legal authority presented in which an old tax map, or a pre-subdivision recalculation of lots, was held to be evidence of “constructive” or “inquiry notice” of a 0.7% discrepancy in lot width.
[brief] *Sackett v. O’Brien*, 43 Misc.2d 476, 251 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865-66 (Sup. Ct. 1964)(citing *Durham and S. Railway Co. v. Walker*, 2 Q.B. 940; *Wickham v. Walker*, 7 M. & W. 75; *Corp. of London v. Riggs*, 13 Ch. Div. 798)).  American courts tend to overlook the internal contradiction of this phrase and usually construe the language as either an exception or reservation based on available evidence of the grantor’s intent, *Riefler & Sons v. Wayne Storage Water Power Co.*, 232 Pa. 282, 288, 81 A. 300, 302 (Pa. 1911), but such evidence is nowhere to be found in the record below.  It is well established that a deed of easement is to be construed in light of the contemplation of the parties at the time the easement was created.  *See Hyland v. Fonda*, 44 N.J. Super. 180, 187-92 (App. Div. 1957).  What evidence was there, either on the face of the deed or otherwise in the record, to establish the [...]’ intent at the time of their conveyance to [...]?
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) mandates that in order to recover any non-economic damages, a plaintiff must meet, in addition to a monetary medical expense threshold, one of two threshold requirements.  First, a plaintiff must show a permanent loss of a bodily function.  Alternatively, a plaintiff must show permanent disfigurement or dismemberment.  Very significantly, plaintiff has not disclosed any medical expert causally relating any claimed injury to the force employed to effectuate his lawful arrest in February 2020, or establish any permanency of his claimed injuries.  In fact, he readily admitted at his deposition that other than a single evaluation at [...] in [...] some three or four months after his February 2020 arrest, he never received any professional treatment or evaluation for any injuries that he claims to have suffered to his neck, his hands, his lower back, or his knee at the time of his arrest.  Pa439-Pa440 (T35:3-T36:21).  Putting aside the issue of permanency, by his own admission, Plaintiff has failed to meet the medical treatment expense threshold of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) for recovery of any non-economic damages.
[brief] (Pa220-Pa243; Pa380-Pa388);  The neglect has been so bad that the engineers [...] hired to assess the infrastructure, in their 2006 report (the “2006 Engineering Report”), deemed (i) the roadway system to be “dangerous” and (ii) the now 127-year-old terra cotta sewer system that constantly leaks effluent and causes an associated stench to be 50 years past its useful life.  The 2006 Engineering Report noted that two retaining walls failed and once they collapse, they will bring down with them the roads that they support.
[brief] (2T 14-19 to 15-20)  Finally, the court found that the officer’s question about the ownership of the gun constituted custodial interrogation because the question was designed to elicit an incriminating response and was asked after [...] had been placed under arrest for the possession of a controlled substance.  (2T 15-21 to 16-14)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE POLICE PROLONGED THE DETENTION AND REQUESTED CONSENT TO SEARCH WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION, REQUIRING SUPPRESSION.
[brief] The decision of this Court may impact the rights of numerous individuals in the State of New Jersey and elsewhere.  Accordingly, [...]’s members and their clients will be directly impacted by the outcome of this case.  The trial court erred by ruling that the Defendants were entitled to the learned professional exception under the CFA based upon *Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Serv. Inc.*, 387 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2006) erroneously finding that insurance producers are semi-professionals.
[directive] In McLaughlin, the court held that a civil penalty could not be imposed under N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 2(d) where the legislature intended that the fines be recoverable in a civil action brought by the Commissioner of Insurance.  N.J.S.A. 2A:61C-1d(3) provides for civil penalties in cases where the value of the merchandise does not exceed $500.00.  N.J.S.A. 2A:61C-1 requires that the merchant make a written demand for the penalty and allow the offender twenty days to comply.  Under N.J.S.A. 2A:61C-1c, in the event that a merchant institutes a civil action, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable court costs.
[directive] These mental health professionals may be individual providers or organizations.  Law Enforcement agencies in all twenty-one counties have already established professional partnerships with mental health providers through the Attorney General’s ARRIVE Together program.  These existing relationships will likely provide for natural partnerships for Tactical Teams and/or Crisis Negotiation Teams across the state as they gain compliance with the instant policy.  While an in-person response to the barricaded individual incident is preferable, telephonic or virtual responses can add significant value as well.  As barricaded individual incidents can occur at any time, Tactical Teams and/or Crisis Negotiation Teams should consider the availability of professionals when establishing these partnerships.  The mental health professional can assist with negotiations by providing advice and information or, with the recommendation of the Crisis Negotiation Team Commander and approval of the Incident Commander, may communicate directly with the barricaded individual, if it has been determined that this may help to resolve the incident.  Mental health professionals may also be able to access information about the barricaded individual that is not available to law enforcement officers but may be useful in resolving the incident.  Agreements with Mental Health Professionals.
[brief] Indeed, local governing bodies must deal fairly with the public.  The government’s “primary obligation is to comport itself with compunction and integrity, and in doing so government may have to forego the freedom of action that private citizens may employ in dealing with one another. ”  New Concepts For Living, Inc. v. City of Hackensack, 376 N.J. Super. 394, 401 (App. Div. 2005).  Put another way, in dealing with the public, public bodies must “turn square corners. ”  *F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains*, 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985).  Those principles apply here.  The Borough set a process, announced criteria, and then did not act in accordance with those criteria.  That is a failure to turn square corners.  *See Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon*, 202 N.J. 390, 413 (2010).  The Borough’s failure to follow its own process and criteria was an abuse of discretion.  The trial court’s order should be reversed, and the matter remanded for the Borough to evaluate the applications consistent with the process the Borough adopted.
[brief] *State v. Kately*, 270 N.J. Super. 356, 362 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting *McCormick on Evidence* § 195 at 825-26 (Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).  For example, in *Kately*, the defendant’s testimony of “nightly drinking was properly admitted as habit evidence because it was relevant and it described with specificity his routine practice of drinking in a particular situation. ”  *Id.* at 363.  Similarly, in *State v. [...]*, 448 N.J. Super. 349 (App. Div. 2017), this Court held that evidence [...] “never” drove in the left lane of a highway, and “never exceed[ed] the speed limit,” was admissible as habit evidence.
[brief] Furthermore, Defendant misrepresents to the Court that Plaintiff, “also testified that he heard rumors of changes in requirements for the dual degree, all occurring more than six years prior to his filing this lawsuit. ” (Db23).  That is categorically false.  In or around April of 2013, Plaintiff heard a rumor that the students of the inaugural class of the dual degree program would not be going directly into the master’s program as they initially believed.  (Pa179; Pa243).  That was less than six years after Plaintiff filed this matter on March 19, 2019, and within the six-year statute of limitations.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are timely, and the claims in his Complaint are not barred by the statute of limitations.
[brief] Once [...] ruled on the reasonable hourly rates, there still needed to be a determination as to what legal services primarily performed by [...]’s primary counsel, [...], were reasonable and necessary.  After detailed submissions to [...] in 2022 and 2023, the parties reached a settlement of the defense cost claim in late 2023.  Following a mediation between [...] and the [...] in June 2023, [...] agreed to resolve the underlying [...] Litigation, which settlement was consummated at the end of 2023.
[brief] *Ko/ender v. Lawson*, 461 *U.S.* 352, 357, 103 *S.Ct.* 1855,1858, 75 *L. Ed.2d* 903, 909 (1983).  **State v. Golin**, 363 N.J. Super. 474, 482-83, 833 A.2d 660, 664-65 (App. Div. 2003)  "... both the Federal and State Constitutions render vague laws unenforceable.  See *U.S. Const.*, Amend. V; *N.J. Const.* (1947)  Art. I, par. 1.  The evils of vague laws were explained in *Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408 *U.S.* 104, 108 109, 92 *S.Ct.* 2294, 2298-99, 33 *L.Ed.2d* 222, 227-28 (1972)