ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In the second foreclosure complaint ([...]), filed on 5/12/16 (141a), [...] committed six major fraud upon the court, including perjury and forgery:  –  Under paragraph 14.a (146a) [...] falsified that: in the mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009, [...] assigned the Note and Mortgage to [...].  That is false, because the assignment’s text stated that [...] only assigned the mortgage to [...] (066a).  –  Under paragraph 14.b (144a) [...] falsified that: in the assignment of 2/28/2014, [...] assigned the Note and Mortgage to [...].  That is not true, because the assignment’s text stated that [...] only assigned the mortgage to [...] (100a).  –  Under paragraph 15.a,b,c,d,e,f (144a-145a ) [...] falsified that I signed the forged HAM Agreement of 2015 and I owed them a lot of money.  I never signed that document and never agreed to anything.  –  In paragraphs 35, 36, 37 (150a) [...] claimed that they had the physical Note in their office and lost it.  That was false.  –  Nowhere in their complaint (141a) had [...] showed injury.  How much did [...] pay to [...] to buy the Note?  [...] did not show injury in fact to prove that it had state and Federal Claims.  –  All in all, [...] falsified the facts to pass through the NJ court rules for a valid NJ foreclosure complaint.  [...] falsified the facts that it was the owner of the Note and it was in possession of the Physical Note and lost it and I signed the alleged HAM Agreement in front of [...].  All of them are blatant lies.  [...] showed no injury in fact to show that it had State or Federal claim.  According to the Article III Injury In Fact [...] had no claim at all.
[brief] Importantly, the cited cases clearly show that the Weinberg rule is not restricted solely to a water company, in contradiction to [...]’s and the Trial Court’s position on this issue, and applies to such alleged negligent conduct by the [...] in [...] in leaving hanging a live electric wire that caused a fire; to the context of a motor vehicle negligence action that involved another electric company; and also to the context of a negligence claim due to a fire from a gas line that involved a gas company.  Moreover, any negligence action against a public utility company must be viewed in the light of Weinberg, supra.  Simply put, a Tariff, regulation or contract cannot shield that company from liability.  Any such company is subject to the common law of negligence, which is fully explored in plaintiff’s initial brief.  As such, any case purporting to convey immunity to a public utility company is de facto inconsistent with Weinberg, supra.
[brief] First, subsection (a)(5) disqualifies defendants who possessed a firearm either during (i) the “present offense” (the offense on which defendant seeks admission to Recovery Court) or (ii) a “pending criminal charge. ”  As [...] astutely observed, because subsection (a)(5) refers to the “present offense” separately from “any pending criminal charge,” these two terms must describe distinct categories; to read “any pending criminal charge” to include the “present offense” would be to render the term “present offense” superfluous.  (Sa82)
[brief] Both defendants moved for summary judgment contending that plaintiff could not establish a *prima facie* case of negligence because he could not establish proximate cause.  Plaintiff contended that based upon the circumstantial evidence, and the inferences that could be drawn from that evidence, sufficient proof was established to support plaintiff’s case.  Alternatively, [...], as property owner, asserts that it had no duty to the plaintiff because the construction site was in the control of [...] as general contractor.  Plaintiff contends that there was proof of an element of control retained by [...] and therefore, a jury question existed with respect to [...]’s liability.  [...] contends that plaintiff only appealed the trial court’s denial of his Motion for Reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment in favor of [...].  Plaintiff will address this argument below, however, the position being advanced by [...] is not born out by the plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal, Civil Case Information Statement ("CIS") and Amended Notice of Appeal filed with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.  Those pleadings clearly reflect plaintiff’s appeal as to the initial Order for Summary Judgment and the Order denying Reconsideration entered by the trial court.  **RESPONSE TO “PROCEDURAL HISTORY” OF ASA DESIGN BUILD, LLC**
[brief] ”); *O’Donnell/Salvatori Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 339 F.R.D. 275, 276-77 (W.D. Wash. 2021) (“[A] party’s agreement to run search terms does not waive its right to review the resulting documents for relevance so long as the review can be done in a reasonably timely manner. ”); *Strauch v. Computer Scis. Corp.*, No. 3:14 CV 956 (JBA), 2015 WL 7458506, at *3 (D. Conn. Nov. 24, 2015) (“[D]efendant is correct that it should not be obligated to disclose clearly irrelevant documents. ”); *Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.*, No. 10 CIV. 6950 (AT) (JCF), 2014 WL 716521, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2014) (holding that a party’s agreement to search terms “did not override the discovery demands and responses”); *Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co.*, No. 2:11-CV-03577-RDP, 2017 WL 9565521, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 2017) (“Although the parties agreed to certain search terms while collecting documents, those search terms do not override the scope of Boeing’s actual discovery requests. ”); but see, e.g., *Total Safety U.S., Inc. v. Rowland*, No. CIV. A. 13-6109, 2014 WL 1691551, at *8 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 2014) (foreclosing relevance review upon finding that party had agreed to produce all documents that hit on search terms); *Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp.*, No. 3:17-CV-101, 2018 WL 6729794, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2018) (requiring production of all documents hitting on two specific search terms).
[brief] N.J. Shore Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Jackson, 199 N.J. 38, 55 (2009) (citing Brown v. City of Newark, 113 N.J. 565, 571 (1989).  The party challenging the ordinance bears a heavy burden of overcoming that presumption.  388 Route 22 [...] v. Twp. of Readington, 221 N.J. 318, 339 (2015).  A challenging party can overcome the presumption of validity only through a clear showing that an ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable.
[brief] ”  Id. at 288-89.  The court has a “duty to instruct the jury on the State’s obligation to prove identification even when such a charge [is] not requested,” as “[a]ppropriate and proper charges to the jury are essential for a fair trial. ”  *State v. Davis*, 363 N.J. Super. 556, 558, 560 (App. Div. 2003).  See also *State v. Cotto*, 182 N.J. 316, 325 (2005) (agreeing with *Davis* that the trial court must instruct the jury on identification when it is a key issue, whether requested or not); *State v. Sanchez-Medina*, 231 N.J. 452, 466 (2018) (same).
[brief] [...], a milling foreman with thirty years of road construction experience, was wearing safety equipment at the time of the accident.  This is undisputed.  Pa137a at No. 41; Pa141a at No. 1; Pa151 at 3; Pa184-85a; Pa211a; Pa225a; Pa286a-87a.  Although [...] did not use “light towers” for additional illumination at the worksite, [...] testified that the lighting on the site was adequate, and [...] confirmed that the lighting on the equipment was sufficiently bright to literally “light up” [...] and the area where the accident occurred.  Pa233a; Pa213a-14a.  Though [...] did not circulate a written internal traffic control plan on the night of the accident, testimony confirmed that [...] had adequate manpower for the job on the night of the accident, that [...] employees were familiar with the traffic controls for milling and paving jobs like the one on the night of the accident because they were “pretty much the same” every night, and that distribution of written plans was almost unheard of.  Pa217a; Pa227a; Pa231a-32a.  Moreover, foremen such as [...] — who was described by _____________________ Judgment. multiple witnesses as safety conscious — were the employees responsible for internal traffic inside the work zone Pa207a; Pa278a.
[directive] Although decision charging the prosecutor before assistant an with consult must police circumstances what consultation pre-charging such require encouraged to strongly are Prosecutors County is made, is consultation Prosecutorial resources. existing with consistent practicable extent greatest the to 24 Page to only acomplaint-warrant, not for apply to made is decision the before important especially to also but Rules, with Court accordance in and appropriate are applications such that ensure to and detention pretrial whether seek to decide to possible as time much as prosecutors provide hearings. detention for prepare designated Section a 3.3, in provision other any notwithstanding  Accordingly, either office, prosecutor's the shall notify decision charging the of time the at officer supervisory electronic other or email by or telephonically prosecutor assistant duty on-call the calling by has officer supervisory the if directive, Prosecutor's County the in specified shall be that means by filed be should of release revocation or detention pretrial for motion a that believe to reason detention seeking pretrial of presumption a establishes Directive this where (e.g., prosecutor the a that notification electronic or telephonic immediate Such release). of revocation or time additional office prosecutor's the provide will applies detention pretrial of presumption to and of release, revocation or detention pretrial seek determination to the make to which within arrest.
[brief] \(^{12}\)  Moreover, the Project here involved not just the \(^{12}\) [...]’ also disregards the ACC Proposals highlighting its work in “MD, NJ, NY, PA, SC”.  (See, e.g., Proposal Three, TRVa1488-1489.)  Pennsylvania site, but a second insured site in New Jersey.  ([...] Tr., 58:7-59:2 at TRVa1436.)  [...] incorrectly contends that the trial court primarily based its finding that the Code did not apply because the CCIP contained a workers’ compensation component.
[brief] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 91 L.Ed. 21 202, 248 (1986).  Here, [...] engages in a herculean effort to shift focus from its own legal notice obligations as a New Jersey-admitted insurer to its irrelevant ad hoc factual contrivance that it cut from whole cloth years after the underlying accident.  However, the only truly material facts in relation to the applicable substantive law governing [...]’s role as [...]’s insurer are that: [...] became a “Named Insured” under the [...] CCIP liability policies, and a separately issued workers compensation policy (Dta 837-842,851,949,951); [...] was aware of [...]’s status as such (Dta1320); [...] did not send [...] any notice that its CCIP coverage was terminated upon [...]’s alleged “unenrollment,” nor did it otherwise communicate at all with [...] regarding its coverage (Dta850,985); and that [...] formally notified the [...] ("[...]") of its cancellation of [...]’s separate workers compensation policy, without telling [...].  In the context of the governing law – which imposes upon insurers such as [...] the non-delegable duty to give insureds such as [...] notice of coverage termination – the focus is on [...]’s conduct.
[brief] B.  After [...] received what it now deems a partial payment of the April 2020 and July 2020 invoices, it never sent notice of breach of contract, nor petitioned the Commissioner for relief.  [...] did not formally challenge [...] until it filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the lawsuit in September 2022.  Being in a new budget year, [...] is unduly prejudiced if it has to fund the unbudgeted and unanticipated payment [...] now seeks in the Counterclaim.  The doctrines of accord and satisfaction, and laches, prohibits [...] from obtaining recovery over 2 years later in retaliation to a lawsuit.
[directive] 9.8.2  Accordingly, in any case where a law enforcement agency has reason to believe that a candidate for employment was previously a sworn officer of another law enforcement agency, the hiring agency has an affirmative obligation to identify all such former employers.  The hiring agency shall then request all internal affairs files for cases where the candidate was the subject officer, regardless of the ultimate disposition or status of the complaint.  If requested, the hiring agency shall provide a written acknowledgement to the releasing agency that it will maintain the confidentiality of said files in accordance with this policy.  9.8.3
[brief] unlawful discrimination extends to disparate treatment and disparate impact alike.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) (prohibiting any place of public accommodation from engaging in discrimination “directly or indirectly”); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 81-82 (1978).  The LAD also adopts a number of remedies to enforce these bedrock protections.  Almost eight decades ago, the Legislature established what is now the Division on Civil Rights in the Department of Law and Public Safety, which today enjoys “general jurisdiction and authority” to “prevent and eliminate” all “discrimination” the LAD prohibits.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-6.  New Jersey law likewise vests in the Attorney General the broad authority to “[e]xercise all powers of the division. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-8(a), (g).  The statute allows the Attorney General and Director to proceed in an administrative forum or in the Superior Court against any party they believe is violating the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-8.2, -13.  And even where the Attorney General and Director proceed administratively, New Jersey law empowers them to proceed “in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction prohibiting such person from continuing such practices or engaging therein or doing any acts in furtherance thereof” while the administrative action proceeds.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1; see also, e.g., Pfaus v. Palermo, 97 N.J. Super. 4, 8 (App. Div. 1967).  B.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that, to allege a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, a plaintiff must allege substantially more than a breach of contract or warranty:  [T]he law permits that party to recoup remedial damages in an action on the contract; however, by providing that a court should treble those damages and should award attorneys’ fees and costs, the Legislature must have intended that substantial aggravating circumstances be present in addition to the breach.  *Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2, 18 (1994) (citing *DiNicola v. Watchung Furniture’s Country Manor*, 232 N.J. Super. 69, 72 (App. Div. 1989)) (italics added).  See also *Veale-Middleton v. Artzberger*, No. A-2912-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1255, at *12 (App. Div. May 24, 2013) (holding that, because plaintiff’s claims “sound primarily in contract, namely shoddy workmanship and failure to timely complete the patio,” therefore the “defendants’ failure to honor the contractual warranty did not constitute an ‘unconscionable commercial practice,’ [under] the CFA”); Van Holt v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 163 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The mere denial of insurance benefits to which the plaintiffs believe[ ] they [are] entitled does not comprise an unconscionable commercial practice.
[brief] While New Jersey courts to not yet appear to have addressed the purpose of this commonly used transactional document, other courts have done so.  One clearly worded explanation of the purpose of an estoppel certificate comes from the Illinois Appellate Court.  Estoppel certificates are widely used in commercial real estate transactions and are important in preserving and enhancing the marketability of commercial property.  A party’s delivery of this statement estops that party from later claiming a different state of facts.  A purpose of an estoppel certificate is to give assurance that the party making the estoppel statement at a later date will not make claims that are inconsistent with the statements contained in the estoppel certificate.  *Urban Sites of Chi., LLC v Crown Castle USA*, 979 NE2d 480, 490 (Ill App Ct 2012) (internal markings omitted).
[brief] A retainer agreement was executed by [...] (“[...]”) on behalf of [...] on March 9, 2016.  The retainer agreement provided that [...] will provide the following legal services: “negotiating, preparation and execution of commercial leases for the corporation”.  [...] represented [...] on at least two potential commercial lease properties than did not come to fruition before representing [...] with regard to the Property.  Regarding section 32 of the Lease, [...] called it “the greatest run on sentence put into a ‘landlord lease’, and described the lease as a whole as a “landlord lease that debilitates the rights of the tenant”.
[brief] 16  Kubicki v. Medtronic, Inc., 293 F. Supp.3d 129 (D.D.C. 2018) ...........................................  27  Lance v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160 (Pa. Super. 2010), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 85 A.3d 434 (Pa. 2014) ...... 12 Leslie v. U.S., 986 F. Supp. 900 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d mem., 178 F.3d 1279 (3d Cir. 1999) .................. 22
[brief] Pa194.  The court found that Plaintiff was obliged to obtain to the RAO.  Additionally, the court went so far as to enlarge the timeframe to close, granting Plaintiff an additional opportunity to perform (close title) or cancel the contract.  To date, Plaintiff equivocates, and declines to close.  As the Trial Court has presented its findings with careful thought, expertise, and critical analysis of the evidence and testimony, the Appellate Division owes deference to the trial court.
[brief] Upon discovering that the dock had been built on or about April 28 and April 29, 2018, Plaintiff wrote to the [...], the [...], and the [...] regarding the dock extension at the [...].  [Aa179-Aa181.]  On June 26, 2018, the [...] issued a notice of violation to [...] pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:7-27.2(c)8.  [Aa118.]  Specifically, the [...] advised [...] that it had constructed the dock extension in a manner that did not comply with the approved plans and was not within the limit of [...]’s tidelands license.  [Aa119.]  As such, a modification of the WFD permit and tidelands license was required.
[brief] See State v. Spencer, 319 N.J. Super. 284, 308 (App. Div. 1999).  Not only did the court fail to consider the fundamental fairness of imposing consecutive sentences on [...], but the overall sentence it imposed – 45 years with a 43-year period of parole ineligibility – was five years longer than the 40-year sentence recommended by the State, and carried a lengthier period of parole ineligibility.  (4T:130-12 to 22; 5T:24-24 to 25-6)  Had the court properly imposed concurrent sentences – as even the State conceded was appropriate – it would have resentenced [...] to 30 years with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility.  (5T:24-24 to 25-6)  C.  The resentencing court improperly adopted the original aggravating factors based on the reasons provided by the 2015 sentencing court, failed to address the mitigating factors raised by [...] altogether, and failed to order a new presentence report.
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER PROBATIVE, COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY APPELLANTS  (Pa850, Pa852)  The motion judge states in the last sentence of the Statement of Reasons that: “The court has reviewed and considered all of the papers submitted on the motion. ”  (Pa850)  However, the motion judge makes multiple erroneous determinations that certain assertions made by Appellants are not with the record.
[brief] (Da18).  Appointed counsel filed a supplemental brief on June 1, 2020.  On August 20, 2020, the Honorable [...], P.J.Cr., denied defendant's motion.  (Da18).  On July 27, 2022, defendant filed another pro se motion to correct an --- \(^2\)  Defendant committed the instant offenses while on bail awaiting trial for charges under [...] for first-degree armed robbery and third-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12:1(b)(2).
[brief] “Indeed, the commentary to Rule 2:5-1 provides that ‘if the notice designates only the order entered on a motion for reconsideration, it is only that proceeding and not the order that generated the reconsideration motion that may be reviewed. ””  [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 6.1 on R. 2:5-1(e)(1) (2020) (collecting cases).
[brief] (2T:20-4 to 8, 21-2, 21-9 to 24)  After the arrest, the drug-sniffing dog positively indicated on the driver-side door panel, and the detectives found cocaine.  (2T:24-1 to 8)7  In support of his motion to suppress evidence seized during this warrantless search, [...] argued that there were no officer-safety concerns.
[brief] Id. at 376.  On Abbott XX’s second mandate for SFRA review and “retooling” at regular intervals, the record below shows the State failed to operate the SFRA in [...] in the years subsequent to 2012-13 at the formula’s “optimal level. ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146.  Beginning in 2013-14, the State failed to provide funding to [...] at the level of its SFRA Adequacy Budget, the “core” of the SFRA formula that represents the cost of educating all [...] students to achieve the NJSLS, including the cost of supplemental programs for at-risk students identified in the Abbott litigation.  Id. at 153-54.  The State permitted the funding shortfalls in [...]’s Adequacy Budget to emerge immediately after the Supreme Court in Abbott XXI ordered the State to restore full SFRA funding in 2012-13.  For the 2013-14 school year, the funding shortfall in [...]’s Adequacy Budget totaled over $23 million, or $562 per weighed pupil.  The State then allowed the shortfalls to significantly grow over the next six (6) years, from a total shortfall of $91.6 million or $2002 per weighted pupil in 2014-15 to $155.4 million, or $3,370 per weighted pupil in 2019-20.  Analogous to the cut in state formula aid restored in Abbott XXI, the recurring shortfalls in [...]’s Adequacy Budget that emerged after that decision and order “are not of a de minimus or inconsequential nature. ”  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 360.  These shortfalls – on a yearly basis and cumulatively – are facially substantial, impacting the District’s ability to provide the teachers, support staff and other resources the State assured would be delivered by the SFRA “to the beneficiaries of [the Court’s] prior remedial orders,” namely “the pupils of the Abbott districts. ”  Id.  Allowing these shortfalls not only to persist but also to grow from year-to-year represents a prima facie showing of the State’s failure to meet Abbott XX’s express mandate to review and adjust SFRA so that it continued to operate in [...] at the formula’s “optimal level.