ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As this court found in MAG Entm’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005), “[u]nder OPRA, agencies are required to disclose only ‘identifiable’ governmental records not otherwise exempt,” and that “OPRA does not countenance open-ended searches of an agency’s files. ”  Id. at 547-49.  In so holding, this court rejected the notion that a requestor can satisfy its obligation by requesting “a broad generic description of a brand or type” of record.  Id. at 549.  From 2005 through 2012, this line of reasoning continued uninterrupted.  From Bent v. Twp. of Stafford Police Dep’t, where this court reaffirmed its earlier holding and held that a requestor “must reasonably identify a record” and cannot “make a blanket request for every document a public agency has on file,” 381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Gannett N.J. Partners, LP v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 379 N.J. Super. 205, 213 (App. Div. 2005)), to Spectraserv, Inc. v. Middlesex Cnty. Utils. Auth., where this court again reiterated that a requestor must “specifically describe the document sought” and cannot rely on “open-ended demands” for all of an agency’s files, 416 N.J. Super. 565, 576 (App. Div. 2010), to Burke v. Brandes, which emphasized not only the importance of a requestor’s obligation to “identify with reasonable clarity those documents that are desired,” but also that “OPRA does not countenance open-ended searches of an agency’s files,” 429 N.J. Super. 169, 174 (App. Div. 2012), this court’s repeated through-line required requestors to identify with specificity, and through reference to a “discrete and limited subject matter,” the records they desired.
[brief] \(^3\)  In its Appeal Brief Plaintiff, argues that the Court’s ruling that any personal guarantees were terminated as to May 11, 2016 was made in error because the Court applied the statute of frauds that governs guaranty agreements (N.J.S.A. 25:1-15) rather than properly applying the statute of frauds that relates to leases (N.J.S.A. 25:1-12).
[brief] (9T9-3 to 11).  And regarding mitigating factor six, that defendant will compensate the victim, the judge noted that under the disorderly persons offense of theft that he adjudicated before sentencing, he ordered that defendant provide restitution.  (9T9-12 to 19).  He then explained that although the aggravating factors slightly outweighed the mitigating factors numerically, “from a substantive standpoint, . . . the aggravating factors substantially outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors because [he] place[d] great weight on aggravating factor [six].” (9T9-20 to 10-7).  Appellate courts review a judge’s sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] There is no substantive evidence on the record or by argument to substantiate that the New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines were not followed, nor that [...] was not afforded adequate procedural safeguards to permit fundamentally fair disciplinary proceedings.  The procedural history and applicable standards were established by the lower court and generally shown herein.  Effectively, the Appellant, in raising this issue, is merely attempting to again argue a violation of the 45-day rule.  As above, the Appellant offers no proofs or argument that the lower court’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by substantial credible evidence.  As such, the lower court's de novo findings should not be disturbed.
[brief] Respondent’s Point II  At page 28 of its Brief, Respondent ignores the governing Supreme Court standard that dismissal or suppression of a party’s pleading, and resolution of a case by default rather than on its merits, is to be used “only sparingly. ”  Abtrax Pharm., Inc., supra.  “If a lesser sanction than dismissal suffices to erase the prejudice to the non-delinquent party, dismissal of the complaint [or, here, suppression of answers to a complaint with counterclaims] is not appropriate and constitutes an abuse of discretion. ”  Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 1988).  Respondent cites St. James AME Dev. Corp. v. City of Jersey City, 403 N.J. Super. 480, 487 (App. Div. 2008), but there the Court ruled “that the granting of the City's motion to dismiss with prejudice resulted in a misapplication of discretion. ”  In sum, defendants’ multiple responses to plaintiff’s discovery requests and claims of insufficient responses, and the detailed responses of defendants and their counsel to the trial court’s directives and punch list, do not reflect a knowing or flagrant refusal to provide available discovery as in Abtrax and Fik-Rymarkiewicz; the record thus does not support the trial court’s imposition of the most drastic remedy of suppression and default in favor of plaintiff against defendants below.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] 10% permissible (continued)  (continued)  (7)  Causes substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, water, oil, gas or power supply, or other public service, second degree if recklessly causes death; otherwise, third degree.  (8)  Breaks, digs up or tampers with pipes or mains used for conducting gas, oil or water or destroys, cuts or tampers with electric lights, wires or poles, or any telephone, telecommunications or telegraph wires, lines or cables, fourth degree.  2C:18-2(a)(b)  Burglary Actor enters or surreptitiously remains in a structure or research facility with purpose to 2nd Degree  $35,000 to $75,000  No 10% commit an offense therein; third degree; if actor is armed with or displays what appears to be 37  Updated  December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] Roberto, at 23; see also, e.g. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987) ("[T]he Court has frequently repeated the view that, in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution.").  Where the U.S. Supreme Court decides a case and applies the legal ruling to the parties before it, then other courts must treat the same rule as retroactive, applying it "to all pending cases, whether or not those cases involve predecision events."  Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995).  No state law considerations can change this outcome: the "Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, does not allow retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law."  Harper, 509 U.S. at 100.  The Roberto court recognized this principle when it observed that "[w]hen the United States Supreme Court ' applies a federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review.'" Roberto, at 21 (emphasis added); see also id. at 23 (the "retroactive pipeline application of the holding in Tyler to the [N.J. Tax Sale Law] is mandated because the Court constitutionally recognized a property owner's interest in surplus equity.") (emphasis added).
[brief] ”  Kadetsky v. Egg Harbor Township Board of Education, 164 F.Supp.2d 425, 432 (D.N.J. 2001); Garcia v. County of Bucks, PA, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 268 (E.D. Pa. 2001).  A municipality is only liable for a failure to train if there is a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured.  See Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983); Mateyko v. Felix, 924 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. City of Irvine Kentucky, 899 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1990); Sprecht v. Jensen, 863 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); Hayes v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982).
[brief] ”).  The trial court emphasized its misperception about the dates of the offenses repeatedly, saying that the conduct “occurred at separate times, some eight months apart”; that [...] had “the rug pulled from under him” after an eight-month break when “the threats start[ed] up again”; that “[t]he fear and anguish this Judge felt from this new series of phone calls made some eight months after the . . . initial event were separate and distinct harms”; that the “two offenses were committed at different times, different dates, different places, eight months apart.
[directive] 5.5 of this provisions the to subject offense an for arrest an making officers enforcement Law  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary a prepare to practicable, when encouraged, are Directive officer supervisory designated or 3.2 a Section to pursuant prosecutor consulting a before Report 22 a with communications direct having in cautious be should general attorneys deputy and prosecutors Assistant case.  in witness the a become may prosecutor the that possibility the avoid to present is detective a victim unless 51 Page an preparing or acomplaint-warrant for applying before otherwise or Section 3.3, to pursuant prepare to important especially is application.  It such of support in Cause Probable of Affidavit seek to appropriate be might where it cases in Report Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary a County a limit to construed shall be herein Nothing release. of revocation detention or pretrial Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary of a preparation the require to authority  Prosecutor's jurisdictional prosecutor's the to subject agency or officer enforcement any law by Report authority.  Directive. this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This Reports.
[brief] (See Pa113 at 18:15–19, 19:10–14.)  Further, the only remedies [...] seeks through its bad faith claim are for the court to (1) declare “null and void and/or vacat[e]” the Redevelopment Resolution and (2) declare “null and void all actions taken by the [...] in furtherance of the authorization and designation made by [the Redevelopment] Resolution . . . .”
[brief] | | | Davis v. Essex Group, Inc., | 40,41 | | 937 F.2d 1264 (1991) | | | Denike v. Cupo, | 28,29 | | 196 N.J. 502 (2008) | | | Dixon v. Rutgers, the State Univ. of N.J., | 31,32,45 | | 110 N.J. 432 (1988) | | | Driscoll Const. Co. v. State, | 16 | | 371 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2006) | | | Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, | 21 | | 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | | | Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, | 31 | | 184 N.J. 391 (2005) | | | Halbestram v. Welch, | 52 | | 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) | | | CASES | PAGES | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, 174 F.3d 95 (1999) | 52,53 | | Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 53 N.J. 138 (1969) | 15,16 | | Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363 (1988) | 31 | | Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67 (1954) | 15 | | Lehman v. Toys R Us, 132 N.J. 601 (1999) | 40,54 | | Lenches-Marrero v. Averna & Gardner, 326 N.J. Super. 382 (App. Div. 1999) | 16 | | McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 511 U.S. 792 (1983) | 30,31,32,38 | | National Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) | 41,42 | | Offiut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) | 28 | | Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) | 54 | | Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1 (2021) | 21 | | Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 1995) | 49 | | Salomon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 98 N.J. 58 (1984) | 16 | | Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1 (2002) | 41 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGES | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497 (2019) | 21 | | State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190 (1961) | 28 | | State v. RY, 242 N.J. 48 (2020) | 21 | | Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490 (1998) | 40,41 | | Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988) | 16,20 | | Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010) | 48,49 | | Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 (2001) | 16 | | Zive v. Stanley Roberts Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (2005) | 30,31,48 | ## NEW JERSEY STATUTES - N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) 52 ## COURT RULES - R. 4:46-2(c) 14 - R. 1:7-4 14 ## BOOKS - Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey (2022) 15 TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] The Township shall conduct a substantive review of the Respondents’ submission, and may engage the Zoning Board, Township staff and other Township professionals in the review of the Respondents’ submission as the Township deems appropriate.  All responsive reports, requests for additional information and comments by the Township shall be filed with the Special Hearing Officer, Special Master and the Respondents at least thirty (30) days prior to the hearing date.  The Respondents may be asked to submit additional information, reports or studies by the Township, with such requests being made at least thirty (30) days prior to the hearing date.  Such request(s) should be made promptly upon determination by the Township, and any objection to such additional submissions shall be resolved by the Special Master.
[brief] The standard for the deference due to a trial court in making such findings is well-established:  “Findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence. ”  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  Although a finding “based on factual determinations in which matters of credibility are involved is not without significance,” the ultimate question in appellate review is whether “there is substantial evidence in support of the trial judge's findings and conclusions. ”  Ibid.  It is perhaps not surprising that plaintiffs urge this court to pay such deference to the trial court’s conclusions.  Throughout their opposition, they have relied heavily, and sometimes exclusively, upon statements made by the trial court rather than citations to evidence in the record to counter defendants’ arguments that their proofs were deficient.  But the fact remains that, even when a credibility determination is involved, the findings a trial court makes must be supported by evidence.  Regrettably, that was not the case here.  Rather than making factual findings that relied upon and cited evidence in the record, the trial court made broad, conclusory statements that adopted plaintiffs’ arguments and relied heavily upon [...]’s net opinions that lacked support in the record.  Such findings are not entitled to deference by this court and cannot substitute for evidence plaintiffs were required to produce to support their claims at trial and in this appeal.
[brief] [Negron v. Llarena, 156 N.J. 296, 305 (1998). ]  The failure of a party seeking to apply the substantial compliance doctrine to meet any one requirement precludes the application of the doctrine.  *Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow*, 153 N.J. 218, 239 (1998).  Defendants believe that Plaintiffs met none of the requirements.  This Court should affirm the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s complaint because, as the following sections will demonstrate, Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate *any* of the five elements of the substantial compliance doctrine.  At the very least, Plaintiff did not demonstrate them all.
[brief] Even resolving all doubts and inferences in [...]’s favor, it is impossible to infer that a reasonable adult in [...]’s position would believe that his contract with [...] consisted entirely of a single promise that the service would be “always on. ”  [...] offered internet service under the terms of its Subscriber Agreement, and [...] accepted the service, so the terms of the contract are provided by the Subscriber Agreement. ”  *Id.* at 519-20.  Indeed, “both parties performed pursuant to the Subscriber Agreement, with [...] providing the internet service and [...] paying the monthly fee.
[brief] The [...] memo is like a legal brief.  It points out in painstaking detail, the many inconsistencies between the redevelopment plan and the master plan.  For example, the present master plan prohibits residential use in the GB-2 Zone, which is in the west zone of the plan.  (Page 6, Pa0013).  In the north zone of the redevelopment plan, the density and sizes of the structures is inconsistent with density principles of the master plan.  (Page 7, Pa0014).  In the proposed south zone, the office subzone does not comply with the master plan’s height, bulk and density standards.  (Page 9, Pa0016).  The 42-page [...] memo was submitted to demonstrate these legal inconsistencies.
[brief] 8  D.  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Fails to State a Claim for Relief Under the FDCPA – 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. .........................................................  13  a)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Is Contrary to the FDCPA’s Purpose ..................................................................................................................  15 b)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory is Contrary to Congressional Intent Concerning Third Party Communications  ...........................................................................  19 c)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Is Contrary To Proper Statutory Construction And Interpretation  .........................................................  22  1.  Appellant’s “letter vendor” claim is an exercise in “uncritical literalism” that fails under fundamental principles of statutory construction ..............  22  a.  Transmitting data to an agent or contractor is not a “third-party” “communication” and is not an attempt to collect a debt .........................  27 b.  Appellant’s Theory is at Odds with Other FDCPA Provisions, Which Permit the Use of Service Providers under Many Circumstances, and would Lead to Absurd Results ..................................................................................................................  29 c.  Appellant’s theory is contrary to decisions from the federal agencies tasked with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA.  2.  Appellant’s Reliance on Federal Decisions is Contrary to New Jersey Law and Fails to Consider that Several Federal Courts have Dismissed Cases with Similar FDCPA Letter Vendor Claims and Cast Doubt on their Merit.
[brief] In addition, the trial court erred in its analysis of the law on the adverse inference when it denied an adverse inference to [...], who did not have the burden of proof in this matter.  Because the concerns raised in the case cited by the trial court did not apply to a criminal defendant attempting to rely upon the adverse inference, the trial court’s decision was legal error.  Considering the totality of the circumstances, failing to give the adverse inference could have affected the result, and thus, a remand is proper in this case.  Finally, given the lower courts applied substantial weight to [...]’ administration of the standardized field sobriety tests even though the officer conceded he did not apply the objective scoring factors, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt for driving while intoxicated.  This Court should remand for consideration by an impartial judge.  Respectfully submitted, 37  [...]
[brief] In the case of *First New Jersey Bank vs. F.L.M. Business Machines, Inc.*, 130 N.J. Super. 151 (Law Div. 1974), the court found that an attempt to terminate liability of the guarantor was not effective.  In that case, although the contract provided that the guarantor could revoke the guarantee as to future advances, the guarantor remained liable with respect to the obligations incurred before the revocation.  (In the present case, there is no provision that allows for termination of the guarantee).  In *First New Jersey Bank*, supra, [...] was liable for the original obligations and any renewals, extensions or other liabilities arising out of the original obligations, even if those renewals, extensions, or other liabilities arose after notice of revocation.
[directive] Types of deadly force.  Deadly force includes the following potentially lethal actions: (a) applying a chokehold, carotid artery restraint, or similar technique that involves pressure on the neck; (b) sitting, kneeling, or standing on a person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; (c) intentionally driving a vehicle at or in the direction of a person with the intent to strike the individual; and (d) using a baton or other weapon to intentionally strike an individual in the head or neck area.  4.3
[brief] In the spring or early summer of 2019, [...], while living in Vermont, helped [...] and her boyfriend, known to him as [...], purchase a black Chevy Malibu.  (6T14-1 to 21; 6T14-24 to 15-7).  Piro identified a picture of defendant as the man he knew as [...].  (6T23-2 to 4).  All three of them went to the seller, paid for the car, and registered it in Piro's name with a Vermont license plate.  (6T15-23 to 17-2).  After everything was registered, Piro "turned the keys over to [...]."  (6T17-3 to 8).  [...] testified that defendant did not have a car of his own, and she had seen him in a Chevy Malibu with Vermont plates.  (3T70-17 to 21; 3T80-6 to 9; 3T81-4 to 22).
[brief] The DIF, recorded 7-22-16, provided that plaintiffs’ mortgage (already merged & discharged) will not merge into the DIF.  It further provided that no such merger will occur until plaintiffs execute & record an instrument affecting such merger.  Plaintiffs’ execution & recording of the Satisfaction specifically facilitated the merger.  (Da 31-33)  The 2016 Satisfaction & DIF, on their faces, were prepared & recorded by [...].  She did so without regard as to whether there were or were not liens of record.  (Da 87-109, pg 48)  [...] had also been admitted to the New Jersey Bar.  In 2003 she became a judge in Philadelphia..  She then resigned from practicing law in NJ.  In 2010 she was forced to resign from the bench.  She did resume representing her mother in her investment business.  (Id. at pgs -11,12,13,17)  During the pendency of this case both plaintiffs died.  [...] is the executrix & beneficiary of her mother’s estate.  (Id. at pgs 17,18; Da 34)  In connection with plaintiffs’ April, 2021 contract to sell the property, the Buyer’s title insurer issued a report, in May, 2021, requiring that judgments of record be satisfied.  **The report further indicated the absence of any mortgages of record. **
[brief] 346a (29:14-22); 971a-974a (39:3-51:6).  Plaintiff [...] told Defendants [...] and [...] that he intended to move forward with [...] and become the COAH developer at [...].  346a-347a (29:14-30:2).  But Defendants [...] and [...] refused to play fair with Plaintiff [...].  Instead, they persuaded him to forego his involvement with [...].  347a-a350 (30:6-33:16).  They told Plaintiff [...] that if he would continue to trust them, they would improve his deal and also provide him with additional real estate opportunities through Defendant [...].  a347-350a (30:6-33:16).  To convince Plaintiff [...] to remain under their sway, Defendants [...] and [...] promised Plaintiff [...] that he would receive double the purchase price of [...] and either retain one-hundred percent ownership of the COAH project after certain restrictions were lifted or, alternatively, own fifty-percent of the development with an individual named [...] or [...].