ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This appears to have been lost on the trial court.  Plaintiffs’ reliance on Deutsche Bank Tr. Co.  Ams. v. Angeles,\(^{53}\) wherein the Appellate Division affirmed the Chancery Division’s denial of a defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment for lack of standing, is misguided at best.  In that case, the appellant relied on a prior Appellate Court decision – again involving Deutsche Bank\(^{54}\) wherein the Appellate Court held that “either possession of the note or an assignment of the mortgage that predated the original complaint conferred standing. ”\(^{55}\)  In that same appeal, however, the Appellate Division, specifically “determined that an amended complaint cannot cure an initial lack of standing. ”\(^{56}\)  In Mitchell, the Appellate Division went on to state that it found the argument for dismissal compelling given that “the defendant actively engaged in the litigation, filing an answer and counterclaims in response to the \(^{53}\) Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 320 (App. Div. 2012).  \(^{54}\)  See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super.  214, 27 A.3d 1229 (App.Div.2011).  \(^{55}\)  Id. at 216, 225.  \(^{56}\)  Ibid. plaintiff’s […] complaint. ”\textsuperscript{57}  And that the defendant had “also contested the plaintiff’s standing to file the […] complaint long before the end of the litigation. ”\textsuperscript{58}  As the record reflects, [...] has actively engaged in this litigation from Day 1.  Indeed, the issue of standing was even raised previously. \textsuperscript{59}  The very same Plaintiffs who now implore the Court to allow them to amend their complaint to add [...] as a plaintiff argued in their August 22, 2019 opposition to [...]’s motion that “the plaintiffs were not required to join [...] as a plaintiff. ”\textsuperscript{60}  The Plaintiffs in this action are unlike Deutsche Bank in \textit{Angeles}, where standing could be established by “possession of the note or an assignment of the mortgage that predated the original complaint” and the defendant’s silence on the issue of standing until long after judgment was entered.  Rather, they are in the position of Deutsche Bank in \textit{Mitchell}, where the issue of standing was raised early on with the court and Mitchell actively participated in the case from its commencement.  As was the case in \textit{Mitchell}, the issue of standing precludes the Plaintiffs from asserting their claims, and necessitates dismissal.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal From A  Judgment v. : Of Conviction  Entered In The Superior Court, Law Division, Cumberland County.  [...], Defendant-Appellant.  : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] Fourth, Landlord missed a contractually obligated $36,500 interest installment payment that was owed on August 1, 2019, before any allegation of any Tenant default, and Landlord still has not paid that interest for reasons barely acknowledged,\(^2\) much less justified, in Landlord’s brief (Da169).  Fifth, Landlord chose not to make the Tenant’s Allowance installment payment of $121,666.67 plus interest that “came due” on August 1, 2020 (Pb22-Pb23), even though that installment amount exceeded the missed rent then owed and Landlord had the “express contractual right to offset [Tenant’s] past due amounts” against the installment owed (Pb23).  Sixth, Landlord again chose not to make the Tenant’s Allowance installment payment of $121,666.67 plus interest that “came due” on August 1, 2021 (Pb22-Pb23).  Seventh, from ten days after the eviction lawsuit was filed through the Landlord-Tenant court trial and beyond, the amount Landlord claimed to be due \(^2\) Landlord’s brief relegates to a footnote its discussion of the underpayment from August 1, 2019 (Pb26).
[brief] It is undisputed that on June 29 2022, I had been contacted by a [...] from the local police department, after [...] had asked them to contact me with an offer to settle the case by simply giving me back the vehicle.  (Pa22, ¶7)  It is further undisputed that although I rejected that offer (at that time); during this same call, I told [...] that Mr. [...] could instead contact me directly to discuss settlement (Pa23, ¶8); but Mr. [...] never did so.  *This phone conversation was recorded by the police, and I was later able to obtain a copy of that audio recording.*  (These undisputed facts are set forth in more detail at Pa66-67, ¶¶10-23).  Trial was scheduled for Aug 12, 2022, and mediation occurred on that date.
[brief] (Pa9).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on September 27, 2023.  (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.  (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and seven months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa13-14).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa13-14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa13-14).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and seven months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.
[brief] [...] argues that the trial court properly concluded that [...] would have an “unfair advantage” if [...] could not cancel the PSA immediately upon receipt of any non-compliant estoppel certificate.  (Pb at 46-49).  But [...] does not and cannot address the core issue: the PSA explicitly contemplated that an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate might not be available until the closing date.  The trial court erred by imposing obligations not found in the contract.  The PSA—negotiated by sophisticated commercial parties — deliberately allocated the risk to [...] that an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate might very well not be delivered until the closing date.  (Da205, 211).  Indeed, the PSA does not even make it [...]’s obligation to try to obtain the executed estoppel certificate in an expedited fashion.  While [...] was required to promptly submit the certificate to the tenant, it was then only required to “use commercially reasonable efforts” to get the executed certificate back from the tenant “prior to the closing. ” (Da211).  This is an express term of the PSA.  There is no getting around the fact that the PSA, by its very terms, allows for [...] to remain in, what it characterizes as, a state of uncertainty until the closing.  [...] throws up a straw man argument by suggesting that disallowing it to cancel the PSA immediately upon obtaining a non-compliant estoppel certificate would lead to them ultimately sitting at a literal closing table unaware if an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is going to be produced.  Of course, this suggestion is absurd.  If [...] was concerned that no Acceptable Estoppel Certificate could be obtained, it had every right to make time of the essence, set a closing date, and request that [...] produce copies of all closing deliverables in advance of the closing.  This is part of the normal process of preparing for closing and, of course, [...] could never be forced to attend a closing without [...] having first demonstrated that it had or would have an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate to deliver at the closing.  Ultimately, the costs [...] incurred while preparing for closing were risks inherent to the PSA.  These costs do not justify prematurely terminating the PSA, especially when it explicitly allowed [...] to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by the closing date — a provision [...] agreed to.  (Da205).  The PSA did not authorize termination upon receiving a non-compliant certificate; instead, it limited termination to cases where an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate could not be delivered within the time frame set forth in the PSA; that is by the time of Closing.  (Da205).  Imposing additional obligations on [...] to alleviate “uncertainty” conflicts with both the PSA’s express terms and New Jersey law.  CONCLUSION
[brief] It was proper to allow counsel to highlight the lack of a battery claim against [...], which was totally incongruous with [...]’s allegation that [...] was the aggressor, because otherwise jurors would have been misled to believe that [...] could be personally liable for an intentional assault.  See Price v. Phillips, 90 N.J. Super. 480, 485-86 (App. Div. 1966); Wegiel v. Hogan, 28 N.J. Super. 144, 152-53 (App. Div. 1953).  In civil law, as opposed to criminal law, negligence is not an element of battery that is treated like a lesser-included offense.
[brief] The Board adding these two words changes the meaning of the definition to interject the purpose for the increased --- \(^1\)  In Engleside at W. Condo. Ass'n v. Land Use Bd. Of Borough of Beach Haven, 301 N.J.Super. 628, 639 (Law Div. 1997), the court stated that in adopting subsection (d)(6), “the Legislature reasoned that when a height deviation reached that level of nonconformity [exceeding the maximum height by 10 feet or 10%], the resulting structure arguably could be seen as something out of character with the structures permitted in the zone and thus should be reviewed under the enhanced standards of subsection d.
[brief] PSR – Presentence Report  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Early one morning, a person on a bicycle shot into a car, killing one of the passengers inside, [...].  That bicyclist then got into a car driven by [...].  The State believed that the shooter was defendant [...] and charged Venable with murder.  Venable maintained his innocence and argued that Tokley committed the crime with [...], whose fingerprint was found on Tokley’s car and who was dealing heroin, as was Rojas.  Three errors prevented the jury from properly considering whether the State had proven its case against Venable.
[brief] Pa0949.  As described in more detail in the Legal Argument sections below, the Borough’s title expert, [...], Esq., testified at trial that the intent of all of the conveyances in the chain of title, including both the conveyance from [...] to [...] and the later conveyance from [...] to [...], was to include the riparian land known as the [...] Tract.  [...]’s title experts, on the other hand, testified that the conveyance from [...] to [...] did not include the [...] Tract, and that instead for some unexplained reason, [...] retained the [...] Tract even though such land was underwater at the time and there was no way to access it (other than by boat) if the abutting uplands were sold.  As also set forth more fully within the Legal Argument sections below, [...]’s argument is not supported by the language in the deeds in the chain of title and is inconsistent both with common sense and with the subsequent history of the use of the Property in that the Borough has openly and notoriously acted as the owner of the entire Property since it acquired title to the Property in 1939.  [...], on the other hand, has not taken any actions since its conveyance of the tract to [...] in 1920 to indicate that it retained any ownership rights in the [...] Tract.  B.
[brief] [Pb24].  However, the full context of the quote vindicates [...]:  During the Incident, appellant greeted the responding police officer by requesting “the stuff” to revive his houseguest, taken to mean Narcan.  Yet when asked what [...] might have taken, appellant did not mention opioids.  At first appellant said [...] had been drinking.  When [...] requested more information, he then said [...] took something.  Then he said [...] had previously admitted using marijuana and pills.  Only after those evasive responses did appellant state that [...] took oxycodone.  Appellant told IA the reason for the various responses was because he was using process of elimination.
[brief] (6T:128-24 to 129-10)  Counsel also argued that the convictions were less probative than they were prejudicial under the 601(b)(2) factors because they were both third-degree offenses, they did not involve dishonesty, lack of veracity, or fraud, and they were remote in time.  (6T:129-11 to 130-6).  The court ruled that [...]’s 2011 conviction was admissible because he was still on probation for that offense less than ten years prior to the 2022 incident that he was on trial for,\(^5\) noting that his probationary term was extended until 2017.  (6T:131-1 to 132-4)  The court further found that [...]’s 2007 conviction was admissible because it was entered within a ten-year window of his 2011 conviction and his 2015 violation of probation.  (6T:132-5 to 21)  **B.
[brief] 3.  The Disciplinary Action is a “disciplinary proceeding. ”  (18)  The Disciplinary Action also is a “disciplinary proceeding” because it is a proceeding by the [...] to determine whether [...] committed unethical conduct.  Indeed, the Disciplinary Action Complaint, Decision, and Censure Order all repeatedly characterize the Disciplinary Action as a “disciplinary” matter.  [See Pa332a; Pa345a; Pa360a; Pa369a; Pa376a; Pa380a]  In addition, the [...] found that [...] violated Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1(a) for “knowingly making false statements of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter. ”  [Pa380a (emphasis added)]  Because the [...] filed the Disciplinary Action Complaint against [...] in 2013, the Firm (with [...] signing) was required to disclose that an attorney had been the subject of a “disciplinary proceeding” within the past 5 years in the Applications.
[brief] ................................................................12  Green Knight Capital, LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021)  .......................................................................................................................20  In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 N.J. 247, 16 S. Ct 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895).................................................................10, 11 PC7REO, LLC v. Joanne Johnson, A-1274-21 (N.J. App. Div. Jun. 9, 2023)..............................................................................24  Kosmin v.  New Jersey State Parole Bd., 363 N.J. Super. 28, 40, 830 A.2d 914, 921-22 (App. 2003)...............................................................12  Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538 (2011)..................................................21
[brief] The record is filled with critical facts such as the testimony of Plaintiff’s own agents, [...] and [...], which showed that that a decision to bring a legal malpractice action was "intentionally and strategically decided during the Lease Litigation and intentionally and specifically delayed until after the lease litigation settled."  (T27:3-14)(Pa0844, T203:1-5;T205:15-21).  As the Trial Court correctly found, the testimony all points to one conclusion - the Plaintiff made a strategic choice to hold off on suing the Defendants in the Lease Litigation.  (T27:3-14).  In fact, the Trial Court couched its decision in words like "intentionally" and "strategically" to explain Plaintiff's delay in waiting until after the Lease Litigation settled to bring a claim against the Defendants.  (T27:1-7).  Plaintiff cannot escape the fact that it intentionally and strategically included a provision in the Settlement Agreement of the Lease Litigation which required the then defendant, [...], to cooperate in a legal malpractice claim against Defendants, for claims arising out of the same facts of the Lease Litigation.  (Pa1272).  As correctly found by the Trial Court, this provision, was the "most telling, uncontroverted fact" which connected Defendant [...] to the Lease Litigation.
[brief] The deed itself that was recorded contains language such as “whatever interest” in the “land”.  The Bill of Sale contains a general description of “leasehold interest”, which largely tracks the leasehold interest/Ground Lease description from the Leasehold Mortgage and Security Agreement, but there does not appear any language that appears to be specific to the “personal property” described in the foregoing Bill of Sale and/or deed.  The Bill of Sale does not contain any asset/inventory schedules, etc.  The Receiver at no time executed and filed a bond with the Clerk of the Court.
[brief] 72  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Order of Court entered August 14, 2020.  . . . . . . . . . .  R-1 First Accounting of [...] .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-3  [...] letter dated October 23, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-5 Order of Court entered October 23, 2020  . . . . . . . . . .  R-7 Second Accounting of [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-9 [...] 401(k) Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-16 Interrogatories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-17  Answers to Interrogatories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-26 Notice to Produce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-34 Answers to Notice to Produce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-50 Certification of Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] In *Englert*, the Appellate Division considered a subcontract that contained two indemnity clauses.  389 N.J. at 47-48.  Holding that two conflicting indemnity clauses did not meet the *Azurak* standard of unequivocally expressing an intent to indemnify a tortfeasor for its own negligence, the *Englert* Court reversed the judgment awarding indemnity to the tortfeasor.
[brief] The court found that the First Amendment permits criminalization of abusive language, on the basis the trial court proves the language had direct tendency to cause immediate acts of violence and reversed the defendant’s conviction (*See United States v. Bartow*). \(^{55}\)  The plaintiff’s own witness \(^{54}\) [njsbf.org/2023/02/15/using-rap-lyrics-as-evidence-in-court/](http://njsbf.org/2023/02/15/using-rap-lyrics-as-evidence-in-court/)  \(^{55}\)  United States v. Bartow, No. 19-4496 (4th Cir. 2021) testifies a heated argument took place with rap music playing in the background and then details a fantom white plastic bag thrown at him; furthering he only called the police one time.
[brief] D.  The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration Because It Lacked Jurisdiction After the Complaint was Removed to Federal Court.  Plaintiff’s unsuccessful motion to reinstate the complaint, filed in September, 2022, twelve years after his Complaint was first dismissed in federal court, as well as his unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, were nothing more than unsuccessful attempts to back-door an appeal of the federal court’s dismissal of his Complaint long after the time to petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari had lapsed.
[brief] B.  Weinroth is incongruous with our modern rules of interpretation for insurance contracts.  Weinroth involved a fire and theft policy that read:  No suit or action against the company on this policy shall be brought unless instituted within ninety days after disavowel in writing by the company of liability to the assured for the relief claimed in such action or suit; but if any provision of this paragraph is in conflict with the statutes of any state within which action on this policy is instituted, the conditions of this paragraph shall be inoperative in so far as in conflict with such statute.  Id.  The Court of Errors and Appeals held that in determining whether there was a conflict between the policy and a statute, “the test should be whether the [policy] terms provide for, or permit, that which the statute forbids and prohibit. ”  Id. at 438 (emphasis added).  Because the statute of limitations “does not make it unlawful for parties to agree [to] a lesser period,” the court saw no conflict.  Id.  The Court of Errors and Appeals added that other courts have generally enforced “a clause in an insurance policy limiting the time within which suit must be instituted[.]”  *Id.* at 438–39.  Our Supreme Court has since reaffirmed that “provisions limiting the time parties may bring suit” are enforceable, “if reasonable. ”  *Eagle Fire Prot. Corp. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins.*, 145 N.J. 345, 354 (1996).  But no court has ever applied, much less endorsed, *Weinroth*’s test for determining whether a policy provision conflicts with a statute under a conformity-to-law clause.  And for good reason.  Our modern rules of interpretation mandate that “conflict,” an undefined policy term, be construed based on its plain meaning.  *AC Ocean Walk*, 256 N.J. at 312.  The *Weinroth* court, by contrast, invented its own definition for the term “conflict,” one that turns on a question of law—that is, does the policy term “provide for . . . that which the statute forbids?”  117 N.J.L. at 438.  Thus, following *Weinroth* would mean violating our rules of interpretation.
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[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.1 and --- \(^6\)  This subsection addresses Point II of defendant’s brief, and specifically defendant’s jurisdictional arguments.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.2 implicitly recognize this authority.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.1 authorizes an officer to arrest a suspect for a crime committed in the officer’s presence and committed anywhere in New Jersey.  Similarly, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.2 extends certain immunities to law enforcement officers lawfully acting outside their jurisdiction.  And N.J.S.A. 39:5-25 defines an officer’s ability to conduct a warrantless arrest after observing a motor-vehicle violation, which contains no language that limits its territorial application.