ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant/Appellants Point I through Point VI are not addressed to Defendant Respondent [...] and thus shall not be addressed separately.  Defendant/Appellant’s arguments contained in its Points I through VI do not address in any way the claim against the Defendant/Respondent [...] regarding the Notice of Violation.  It is assumed that if Defendant/Appellant’s appeal is successful, the determination of the trial court to dismiss the Notice of Violation would be reversed and thus reinstated.  If not successful, the voiding of that notice would be affirmed.  The Defendant/Respondent [...], however, took no position on whether a violation exists because a site plan was never approved by the Municipality (which gave rise to the Notice of Violation) or whether the use of the easement parking lot area is grandfathered or pre-dates the Ordinance’s requirement of site plan approval.
[brief] The first Cole factor examining waiver of arbitration looks at the party’s “delay” in making the arbitration request.  Cole, 215 N.J. at 280-81.  Here, this Court can find, as did the Trial Court, that a mere two-month time period between the transfer of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint from the General Equity Part to the Law Division in March 2023 and the filing of Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in May 2023 was not so significant as to weigh in favor of arbitration.  Indeed, the Trial Court found that any such delay was “certainly not significant. ”  [4T47:12-22].  As to the second Cole factor concerning the filing of any motions (particularly dispositive motions) and their outcomes, the Trial Court properly found that no dispositive motions have been filed in this matter.  [4T47:23-24].  Here, there exists nothing in the record for the Appellate Division to conclude otherwise.  In fact, the only “dispositive” motion in lieu of filing an Answer was Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  As such, this factor also weighs against a finding of waiver.  The third Cole factor considers whether any delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy.
[brief] [...]  A/K/A [...]  [...], Esq. ID#244421968  On the Brief  Dated: October 4, 2023  JERSEY SHORE BEACH AND BOARDWALK, INC.  A/K/A JERSEY SHORE BEACH & BOARDWALK, INC.  VS. [...], A MUNICIPAL CORP., AND BOROUGH COUNCIL OF THE [...], AND PLANNING  BOARD OF THE [...]  DOCKET NO. [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Ibid.  However, [...] in fact stopped working and made no pension contributions after pay period “#22” of 2021.  Ibid.  As such, her actual total service credit was nine years and ten months (or 118 months) and her actual final average salary (to be used to calculate her retirement allowances) was $47,796.66 (instead of the projected $48,342.98).  Ibid.  Further, [...] advised [...] that she would not be eligible to receive a group life insurance benefits after retirement as only PERS members with at least ten years of service credit were eligible for this benefit.
[brief] The record is clear that Plaintiff did not move for a directed verdict, nor the equivalent thereof, at any point during the trial.  Plaintiff does not argue this because no motion (or equivalent trial motion seeking ultimate relief) was made.  Plaintiff’s argument that “the requirement that a motion be made at the close of evidence is in applicable, since the basis for the Plaintiff’s Motion in this case arose upon the return of the verdict…” (Plf.’s Brief at 23) is nonsensical since a judgment notwithstanding the verdict can only be brought after a jury verdict.  It was what Plaintiff failed to do before the verdict that would have theoretically preserved the right to move for a JNOV.  To preserve that right, Plaintiff was required to move for a directed verdict (or equivalent) during trial.  As such, Plaintiff was barred from bringing such a motion following conclusion of trial and entry of a jury verdict.
[brief] Then, defendant’s convictions were reversed by this court (Da 5 to 31), after which he was tried again for those two offenses and convicted again.  The defense at trial was self-defense, and, as discussed in detail in Point I, infra, the trial judge denied a defense request for the jury to be instructed on passion/provocation manslaughter.  The State presented the following evidence at trial.  Sayreville Police Department communications operator [...] testified that at 2:37 a.m. on March 9, 2013, the 911 system received two calls from a landline on [...] – one call “abandoned” and one where the caller said only, “I just” -- and Tierney dispatched emergency vehicles to that address.  (1T 78-13 to 82-7)  Patrolman [...] testified that he was dispatched to 29 [...], part of a “townhouse complex,” and that when he received no answer when he knocked on the “wide open” door, he went inside, announced his presence, and began to look around.  (2T 20-14 to 19; 2T 27-27 to 25)  There was a substantial amount of blood through much of the first two floors of the three-floor residence, which were in a state of disarray, and a TV was playing loudly.  (2T 31-16 to 34-9; 2T 37-5 to 39-7; 2T 55-22 to 56-7)  On the second floor, Wilkins found the body of [...], on the floor in a “hall area” between the kitchen, living room, and dining room.  (2T 45-22 to 46-3)  Demko was holding a beeping phone in his right hand and a kitchen knife with an eight-inch blade in his left.  (2T 47-16 to 19; 4T 63-15 to 18)  Demko had no pulse and was not breathing.  (2T 49-13 to 15)  It did not look to Wilkins like the body had been moved, or that anyone had made an effort to clean up.  (2T 61-11 to 16)  Demko had blood on the bottom of his socks as if he had been walking around the residence during or after the struggle.  (2T 56-14 to 23)  [...], the medical examiner, testified that Demko died from two stab wounds, one to the chest and one to the back.  (4T 39-15 to 16)  The wound to the chest was six inches deep and could have been an independent cause of death.  (4T 49-14 to 16; 4T 45-21 to 23)  The wound to the back was 2.75 inches deep, and also could have caused death by itself.  (4T 51-10 to 52-5)  The knife found in Demko’s hand was capable of causing either of those wounds, Falzon testified.  (4T 44-8 to 9; 4T 50-23 to 25)  Falzon also described Demko as having 12 total incised “defensive wounds” on his hands.  (4T 53-4 to 6; 4T 58-25 to 59-2)  He agreed, however, that a person with defensive wounds could still have been the first aggressor in a confrontation.  (4T 71-10 to 15)  Falzon testified that Demko was 63 years old, 71” tall and weighed 185 pounds at the time of death, and Falzon agreed that Demko’s heart disease would not have prevented him from grabbing or using a knife.
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to one of the following first or second degree crimes on or after June 29, 2001: that occurred murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, aggravated arson by placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, burglary, theft by extortion by obtaining property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on, or physically confine or restrain anyone or commit another offense, booby traps in occurred on or after June 18, manufacturing or distributing of CDS facilities or strict liability for drug induced deaths; or that 2002: terrorism, or producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents or nuclear or radiological devices; or that occurred on or after January 13, 2008: occurred on or after August 14, 2013: first degree racketeering; or that child occurred on or after November 1, 2013: pornography; or that firearms trafficking.
[brief] Appellant’s Motion was Not Filed within a Reasonable Time Motions made pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(d), (e), and (f) “shall be made within a reasonable time . . . after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. ”  Rule 4:50-2; see Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J. Super. 346 (2000) (a motion to vacate a default judgment must be “made within a reasonable time”); Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Chartanovich, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2024) (affirming the lower court’s order denying motion to vacate the judgment because defendant failed to file the motion to vacate within a reasonable time).
[brief] Common examples of extensions would be a line from a water main to a person’s home, or a power line from an electric utility’s distribution line to a business.  reconsideration denied, 238 N.J. 429 (2019) (appealability of a sentence); Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) (statutory interpretation); Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019) (applicability of charitable immunity); State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018) (statutory interpretation); State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018) (interpretation of court rules).
[directive] note See risk assessment.  pretrial automated an of results the upon depend do not Police Facility.  Scan-Equipped Live to ofArrestee Transport 2.2.3 must risk assessment pretrial automated for an which offense for arrested an is defendant a  If a with equipped not is arrest the made that agency the and 2.2.2 subsection to pursuant initiated be by approved process risk-assessment pretrial automated the initiating of capable system Scan Live has that facility enforcement law a to person the transport delay shall without agency the AOC, the accordance in process risk-assessment pretrial automated the initiating system of capable a Scan Live Directive.  of this 2.2.4 subsection under established plan the with warrant a (2) violence; domestic of act an injury by of caused signs victim exhibits (1) if the exist grounds  Those probable is there and N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9, violated person has the that believe to cause probable is there (3) effect; in is probable is there (4) or violated; been have alleged order to with the served been has person the that believe to cause of an domestic of commission act the in involved been 2C:39-1 N.J.S.A. has in weapon defined as a that believe to cause violence.  Page 18 2.2.4  Fingerprinting for Agencies Not Equipped with Up-to-Date Live Scan.
[brief] I.  **Standard of Review**  “[A] plenary standard of review [is applied] from a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to *Rule 4:6–2(e).*”  *Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone*, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011).  “[A] court must dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief. ”  *Sickles v. Cabot Corp.*, 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005).  “A motion to dismiss a complaint under *Rule 4:6–2(e)* for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint. ”  *Donato v. Moldow*, 374 N.J. Super. --- \(^3\)  Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss also sought, in the alternative, to compel arbitration.  The Trial Court did not rule on this aspect of Respondents’ Motion (*see* T59-8-9), so Holder Respondents do not address it in this brief.  However, Holder Respondents reserve this alternative prong of its Motion to compel arbitration, if this Court reverses the Trial Court’s decision.  475, 482 (App. Div. 2005).  “We review such a motion by the same standard applied by the trial court; thus, considering and accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, we determine whether they set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”  *Sickles*, 379 N.J. Super. at 106.  II.
[brief] \(^7\)  In response to the Court’s decision, Congress amended the HISA to give the [...] discretion to “abrogate, add to, and modify” any rules that bind the industry, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023.  Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 4459 (2022).  As a result, in *Oklahoma v. United States of America, et al.*, 62 F.4th 221 (6th Cir. 2023), the court upheld HISA.  However, the Court’s decision did not obviate the principle posited by the federal court in the earlier decision that the delegation of primary regulatory authority to a private organization violated the private non-delegation doctrine.
[brief] Appellants’ Actions in Transferring the Property Constitute Fraud, Fraudulent Conveyance, Conspiracy, and Warrant Punitive Damages  Appellants contend that [...]’s cross-appeal must be denied as [...] was acting with unclean hands in light of his admission that he signed the name [...] on the December 1998 Deed.  They further argue that their actions were not fraudulent because (1) [...] knowingly signed the name; (2) neither [...] (or his estate) nor [...] knew about the December 1998 Deeds; and (3) they relied upon advice of counsel, [...], with respect to their decision to transfer the property after hiring him to conduct title issues.
[brief] A consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of section 3 . . . of this act, shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) (emphasis added).  It is undisputed that Defendants; [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...],” collectively “Assignor Defendants”) were not licensed pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”) when they attempted to take assignment of the [...] account allegedly belonging to Plaintiff [...].
[brief] (Da60 at ¶ 10.)  In December 2016, [...] sold Lot 5.01 (which has a street address of [...]) to [...] HP, LLC, an entity which is not related to Plaintiffs.  (Da60 at ¶ 11; Da195.)  Such lot is still in use as a commercial office building, and has approximately 283 parking spaces.  (Da60 at ¶ 11.)  C.  Construction and Transfer of Lot 3.01
[brief] (Da118).  Plaintiff/Respondent thereafter filed the Fifth Amended Complaint on June 23, 2017, naming the three doctors in the Third-Party Complaint (including [...]) as direct defendants.  (Da128).  Plaintiff/Respondent originally did not name any of these doctors as direct defendants because Plaintiff/Respondent did not believe there was evidence that these doctors were at fault or that any fault was a proximate cause of [...]’s injuries and/or death.  (14T9:14-25).  Rather, Plaintiff/Respondent sought to amend in response to the allegations made by Appellant in his discovery responses.  (14T:16-23).  Thereafter, [...] moved to dismiss Plaintiff/Respondent’s Amended Complaint for failure to comply with the statute of limitations.  (Da158).  Plaintiff/Respondent opposed this motion based on Discovery Rule grounds: since [...]’s alleged negligence was undiscoverable to Plaintiff/Respondent until additional discovery revealed potential fault, Plaintiff/Respondent was entitled to name him as a defendant on the survival claim.  (Pa1).  The Trial Court granted [...]’s motion to dismiss all claims on September 29, 2017.
[brief] In response, the State provided several documents.  On June 12, 2023, the [...] assigned a new prosecutor to the case.  On June 14, 2023, the State moved for the Court to decide as to the timeliness of the Defendant’s second petition for post-conviction relief.  PCR Counsel responded both with a letter and full brief providing the Court with the reasons why the submissions on the PCR substantively would greatly inform the procedural questions in the case, requesting that the Court wait to review the PCR in its entirety before deciding on procedural bars.  (Da 073-074, 075-085).  These submissions also served to put the Court on notice that [...] planned to raise a variety of issues with different applicable time bars.  (Da 075-085).  On June 29, 2023, the Court “Dismissed with prejudice” the second petition for timeliness, over four years after the Court accepted the petition and ordered the [...] to assign counsel.
[brief] Appellate courts apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings by a judge.  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 594-595 (2020); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019)  “To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must draw all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.  Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 450, 472 (2020) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 1, 13 (2021)  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)  Under the Brill standard, if the competent evidential materials and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged dispute in favor of the non-moving party, then there is a genuine issue for trial and a motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.  See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995); see also Norman v. Selective Ins. Co., 249 N.J. Super. 104, 109, HN5 (App. Div. 1997)("[I]f the fact finder can reasonably draw or reject an inference or if conflicting inferences can be drawn from a given set of facts, the issue is one of fact, and summary judgment is inappropriate.").
[brief] There are provisions for the application to an arbitrator for emergent relief upon a showing of immediate and irreparable loss or damage by either party.  (R.34).  There are provisions for either party to apply for the dismissal of an arbitration similar to a motion to dismiss in Superior Court.  (R.35).  All parties are afforded the opportunity to submit written submissions with legal arguments as well as any evidence they deem supports their position.  (R.39).  Further, similar to Superior Court, if a party deems there is a need for discovery, there is a mechanism to apply to the arbitrator for a discovery order.  (R. 40).  This includes the ordering of an examination under oath of a doctor or patient under certain circumstances.  See, N.J. Auto Full Ins. v. Jallah, 256 N.J. Super. 134 (1992).
[brief] 1.  Item 1- (3T, p. 8, line 16, to p. 12, line 20) (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, line 13, to p. 50, line 2)  2.  Item 2 - (3T, p. 14, line 2, to p. 15, line 8) (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, lines 9-12)  3.  Item 3 - (4T, p. 47, line 19, to p. 48, line 9)  5.  Items 4,6,&7-  Issues were not ruled upon in Court rulings 6.  Item 5 - (29a, last par., to 31a, 1st par.; 32a-34a) (3T, p. 4, line 8, to p. 5, line 6)  SECTION
[directive] Anti-Drug Profiteering Penalty (Special Application and Enhancement Feature J)  When the defendant is eligible for imposition of an Anti-Drug Profiteering penalty pursuant to Chapter 35A of Title 2C, the prosecutor shall provide notice to the court and the defendant and shall apply for such cash penalty unless the prosecutor cannot establish one or more grounds therefor by a preponderance of the evidence.  The appropriate penalty shall be part of the plea offer and shall be in addition to, not in lieu of, any term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility determined pursuant to these Guidelines.  The term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility shall not be reduced to any extent in exchange for imposition of a cash penalty.  The application for imposition of an Anti-Drug Profiteering penalty shall be in addition to the awarding of aggravating factor points under Aggravating Factor #5c, and the awarding of such points shall in no way be construed to preclude or preempt a prosecutor’s application for imposition of this monetary penalty.  See Section 10.1.5.  Page 97  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)
[directive] See subsection 4.2.3 issuance or violation of a provided to (discussing factual information that may be 5.4 Central Registry) and Section Violence for part of the process prepared as Preliminary Enforcement Incident Report Law court in a the bycomplaint-warrantor complaint- offense ischarged  Whether the applying for acomplaint-warrant).  Procedures requirements ofthe Domestic Violence with victim shall, in accordance the summons,the Prevention of Domestic Violence order under the apply for a restraining how to Manual, be informed officer or preclude the victim shall not be construed to requirement to inform the Act.
[directive] Section no 3.3, to pursuant authorized be otherwise grounds of any the where violence domestic involving offense persons disorderly a for or crime, a for application and issued, no shall be apply, (4) to 2C:25-21(a)(1)  N.J.S.A. in specified officer judicial submitted a shall to be or offense crime such any for complaint-warrant assistant approval an of express the without acomplaint-warrant, approve to authorized general 3.1.
[brief] Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482 (App. Div. 2005).  Although a plaintiff need not prove the truth of the factual allegations in response to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it is plaintiff's duty to demonstrate allegations "which, if proven, would constitute a valid cause of action."  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Leon v. Rite Aid Corp., 340 N.J. Super. 462, 472 (App. Div. 2001)).  In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.  It is the existence of the fundament of a cause of action in those documents that is pivotal; the ability of the plaintiff to prove its allegations is not at issue.
[directive] 1 de 7  The right to confront the witnesses against you?  4.  [No/No] c.  [Yes/Si]  El derecho a carearse con los testigos en su contra?  Do you understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal (1) the d. you are not waiving [No/No] [Yes/Si] denial ofa motion to suppress physical evidence 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance (R. into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) 3:28(d))?  (R. usted no renuncia l,Entiende que al declararse culpable a su derecho a apelar (1) la denegacion de un pedimento para excluir pruebas fisicas (R. 3:5-7(d)) ni (2) la denegacion de admision a un programa de intervencion antes deljuicio (PTD (R. 3:28(d))?