ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Petitioner appealed a preliminary determination of the Board dated January 18, 2017, denying the Petitioner’s intra-fund transfer of her PERS service from [...] to [...].  On November 26, 2018, the Board returned the matter to the [...] (“Division”) for further review under the “IRS 20 Factor Test” to determine whether the Petitioner was qualified as a bona fide employee of [...].  On October 19, 2020, the Board determined that the Petitioner was ineligible for an intra-fund transfer because she did not fit the definition of employee for [...].  The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) as a contested case on January 29, 2021, [...], A.L.J., and a hearing was held February 16, 2023.  (T)¹  On June 13, 2023, [...] issued an initial decision (Pa2) making a determination that the Petitioner was ineligible for the intra-fund transfer from [...] to [...].  On July 21, 2023, the Board adopted the recommendation of [...] and the initial decision.  This was the Final Agency determination (Pa1) in this case which led to the filing of this appeal by the Petitioner.
[brief] On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff, [...] (“Bank”) instituted an action against Defendants, [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively “Defendants”), for breach of a Commercial Mortgage Note (“Note”) and associated Guaranties wherein the Bank sought accelerated damages in the sum of $1,185,285.34 plus attorney’s fees and costs (the “Law Division Action”).  Ca169.  On March 26, 2020, the Bank filed a Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights where it sought the appointment of a statutory receiver to secure its rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 14A:14-2 given [...]’s alleged insolvency and the Bank’s claim for a sum certain.  Ca178.  By Order Appointing Trustee dated March 27, 2020, the Bank’s Motion was granted however, “in light of the COVID-19 closures [the Court] will not name a receiver until after the closure of restaurants, bars and diners in New Jersey is lifted and until the Plaintiff provides the Court with the names of at least two receivers with the requisite skill to act as receiver of the diner business.
[brief] See Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96, *5-7 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022), aff’d 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023).  2  Appellant described the “Obligation” as the “Debt” in Appellant’s Complaint.  (Pa9).  collector and represented that [...] was “servicing the above referenced account on behalf of the current owner [[...]].”  Id.  At all relevant times, [...] was licensed under the NJCFLA.  See Compl., ¶ 55-56 (Pa10).  Indeed, neither Appellant’s Complaint nor her arguments on appeal assert that [...] was not properly licensed when it sent the [...] Letter.  Id.  Instead, Appellant alleges only that [...] “was not properly licensed” under the NJCFLA when [...] sent the [...] Letter.  Id.  Appellant alleges that “[a]s a result of [...]’s unlawful actions, [Appellant] has suffered an ascertainable loss. ”  Id., ¶ 56 (Pa10).  This purported “ascertainable loss” includes nothing more than receiving and reviewing the [...] Letter; Appellant does not allege that she actually paid any money to Respondents.  Id., ¶ 52-53 (Pa10).  Appellant also alleges that “[...]’s enforcement of the Debt was unauthorized and unlawful because [...] did not have a license … pursuant to the [NJCFLA]” and that “[t]he Debt was void upon alleged assignment to each of the [Respondents].”  Id., ¶ 57-58 (Pa10).  The purported “unlawful action” relates only to [...]’s licensing status, and nothing else.
[brief] She acknowledged that [...] had a criminal record for theft, but she claimed he was non-violent and non-confrontational.  (15T 16-4 to 22)  She also claimed that at some point [...] had tried to get “stuff” of his from the [...]’ house, but she admitted: (1) that she does not know if he got it all, and (2) that when she gave a statement to police, she never claimed that a laptop was part of that “stuff” even though at one point early on in her testimony she said that it was.
[directive] Cash Bail Option  Actor commits sexual contact with victim and uses physical force or coercion but victim does not suffer severe personal injury; or victim is on parole or probation or detained in a hospital or prison and actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or victim is age 16 to 17  Criminal Sexual 2C:14-3b and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  Contact disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or victim is age 13 to 15 and the actor is at least 4 years older.  Actor exposes his intimate parts for his own sexual gratification under circumstances where 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible the actor knows or reasonably expects that he is likely to be observed by a child under age 13 and the actor is more than 4 years older; or is likely to be observed by a person who 2C:14-4  Lewdness because of mental disease or defect is unable to understand the sexual nature of the actor’s conduct, fourth degree; or any other flagrantly rude or offensive conduct likely to be observed  Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible by a non-consenting person, disorderly persons offense.  30  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Nearly all of those disputes either (a) were resolved between Plaintiff and [...] at the hearing after discussion, (b) were decided by the Court on oral ruling at the hearing, or (c) are such that counsel for Plaintiff and [...] will be conferring and the Court is confident that such further conferral will resolve the issues.  In particular, the Court ruled that, as a general matter, January 1, 2017 is a reasonable start-date for the scope of discovery; [...] need not re-produce documents it previously produced; although Defendants have been sued in their personal capacities for purposes of this case, the scope of discovery is broader than what [...] refers to as Defendants’ “personal acts”; as to performance development plans in 2019 for individuals other than Plaintiff, [...] is to provide a list of which personnel were placed on performance development plans in 2019, and Disputants are to resolve which of such plans, if any, [...] shall produce.  The Court also denied Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, finding that [...]’s objections, although various have now been overruled, were substantially justified, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (“the court must not order [payment of reasonable expenses] if ... the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified”).  Finally, Plaintiff has stated that she does not seek any information or documents protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine related to the [...] or law firm investigation.
[brief] The State does not argue that the finding that it is impossible for the officer to have, in two and a half seconds, gotten out of the car, told [...] to stop, made eye contact with him, had [...] attempt to flee, and then physically restrain [...] was unreasonable.  (Sb 9)  The State cannot claim it is unreasonable for the trial court to have found that [...] was startled by a car coming to an abrupt stop right in front of him or that Mr. \(^4\)  Unfortunately, instances of police misconduct, including lying, are well-documented.  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, \textit{Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It}, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037, 1041 (1996) (citing a survey in which “defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges estimated that police perjury at Fourth Amendment suppression hearings occurs in twenty to fifty percent of the cases”); Russell Covey, \textit{Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions}, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1133 (2013) (reviewing two mass exonerations based on police officer misconduct).  Given the documented history of the problem of “testilying,” particularly in cases involving contraband, courts should start viewing officers’ assertions with a certain degree of skepticism.  See Joseph Goldstein, ‘Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn Problem, New York Times (March 18, 2018) (“In many instances, the motive for lying was readily apparent: to skirt constitutional restrictions against unreasonable searches and stops. ”).  Nonetheless, it is unusual for a court to find an officer incredible and surely was not undertaken lightly in this case.
[brief] (30T51-10 to 13).  The judge commented that [...] approached [...] in the parking lot and switched his direction, however, defendant ran right toward Bryant and shot him in the face.  (30T51-10 to 20).  The judge found that if there was a fear of a gun, it was not reflected in how defendant ran toward Bryant.  (30T51-21 to 24).  [...] found that the evidence showed that there was a verbal altercation, but little evidence of any physical altercation.  (30T52-4 to 8).  No one, other than the two victims, was harmed.  (30T52-9 to 17).  The jury rejected defendant’s claim that he never shot [...].  (30T52-22 to 30T53-1).  The jury also rejected defendant’s claim that he had acted in self-defense.
[brief] There, the trial court denied the movant’s motion to disqualify the law firm that represented an endowment and that had earlier represented the trustees.  Id. at 442.  The movant claimed the firm’s representation violated RPC 1.7 because the firm was “running the show” in the case on behalf of both the endowment and trustees, which had potentially adverse interests.  Id. at 443.  The trial court held that the movant did not have standing to bring the disqualification motion because she was not the endowment or the trustees, nor did they join the motion.  Ibid.  The court recognized that there may be a potential conflict but, crucially, concluded “neither of the parties who would suffer from the conflict . . . complained” about it, and the movant “was not in any way harmed by” the firm’s representation.  Id. at 445.  This Court affirmed the decision for the reasons expressed by the trial court.
[brief] The use of Lot 22 was open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive, where [...] acted as the owner of the Lot for the required statutory time period.  With the use of tacking, [...]’s claim to use of Lot 22 is greater than 50 years.  [...] failed in the singular requirement that they had to fulfill which was to object to the use of this land within a thirty-year time period and their failure to do so was fatal to the belated claim made of ownership of Lot 22.  The arguments made by [...] are flawed and repetition of such arguments do not make the arguments accurate.  The argument is that [...] was responsible for objecting to the use of Lot 22 and clearly per N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30, [...] was required to object to the use of the land within a thirty year time period.  The blatant failure to timely object to the use of land claimed to be owned by [...] resulted in loss of that land.  The claim that [...] has it wrong is a bold misreading of the Adverse Possession law.  If it is believed that someone is trespassing on property that you own and you fail to object, you lose ownership of that property after the passage of thirty years.  The statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 provides:  Per N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30, 30 years’ possession of real estate, except woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and 60 years possession of woodlands or uncultivated tracts, however commenced or continued provides:  Thirty year’s actual possession of any real estate excepting woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and 60 year’s actual possession of woodlands or uncultivated tracts, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, conveyance or otherwise shall, in whatever way or manner such possession might have commenced or have continued, vest a full and complete right and title in every actual possessor or occupier of such real estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and shall be a good and sufficient bar to all claims that may be made or actions commenced by any person whatsoever for the recovery of any such real estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30.  [...]s statement that the lot 22 was uncultivated land is inaccurate as uncultivated land is deemed to be wilderness or woods.  The open, cleared flat land that is Lot 22 could never be deemed to be a wilderness or the woods.  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the decision made by the Trial Court at Summary Judgment and enter a decision finding that [...] Hope Missionary Baptist Church is the owner of Lot 22 via Adverse Possession.
[brief] In denying Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, [...] found her decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and detailed the multiple reasons why she previously found Plaintiffs’ entire case was based upon suppositions and “beliefs about situations which did not exist. ”  (Pa8).  The key undisputed facts [...] relied upon included:  1)  [...] admitted residents need permission from their attending to call for a C-Section and cannot do so on their own.  2)  [...] admitted that even if protocol was followed and everything went perfectly within the standard of care, the earliest the C-Section would have been completed was between 10:05pm and 10:10pm, 17 minutes to 22 minutes earlier.  3)  Even if [...] called for a C-Section at 9:48pm, she was not in the hospital to perform the surgery and there was zero evidence [...] could have or would have started [...]’s C-Section prior to the one he was engaged in or before 10:12pm.  4)  Given [...]’s testimony regarding the standard of care, there was not enough time for [...] (resident) to call [...] (her attending) about the patient, (as permitted if not required by the standard of care), speak with her until 10:03pm (confirmed by the telephone records) call [...], prepare the patient for surgery and deliver the baby 25-30 minutes before the actual 10:27pm delivery in order to be within the window [...] opined was needed in order for there to have been any difference in the outcome.  5)  [...] testified that even if the baby was born at 10:12pm, i.e. 15 minutes earlier, the outcome more likely than not would have been the same.  (Pa8-Pa11).  Plaintiffs appeal from both orders.
[brief] The trial court in [...] concluded that: (i) [...] should have accepted and applied the check to the balance of the loan the first time it was received from [...]; (ii) [...]’ decision to reject and return the payoff check constituted a “discharge” of [...]’s mortgage because the mortgage was effectively paid when the first payoff check was delivered to and received by [...] from [...].  Id. at 8-10.  In rendering its decision, the trial judge in [...] reasoned that [...] decision to return the check set in motion the events that caused the loss and disappearance of the funds.  Id. at 9.  Had [...] accepted, deposited and credited the funds to the loan, i.e., had it followed the law, the mortgage would have been satisfied and [...] would not have had the access and opportunity to convert the funds for his own personal use.  Id.  The trial court found that [...]’ error in rejecting and returning the check, not once but twice, including returning the check directly to the borrower, was a critical error and mistake that afforded [...] the access and opportunity to carry out the theft.  Based on all the equities involved, the trial judge ordered that [...]’s mortgage be discharged of record.
[brief] The trial court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in [...] in its ruling denying standing to [...], but [...] is readily distinguishable.  (4T 8-7 to 19)  There, police pulled over a car for speeding, learned that there were two outstanding warrants for the driver’s arrest, and, upon conducting a search incident to the driver’s arrest, found a knife and a toy handgun in the passenger compartment.  [...], 172 N.J. at 43-44.  A man named [...] was the sole passenger in the car at the time of the stop.  *Id.* at 44.  Three months later, police discovered that [...] may have been involved in an armed robbery with defendant [...] that occurred seven days before the stop.  *Ibid.*  Although [...] was not in the car during the stop, he argued that he had a participatory interest in the weapons seized from the car and therefore had standing to challenge their admission.  *Id.* at 57-59.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  *Ibid.*  The Court reasoned that “[t]he robbery for which [[...]] was charged occurred seven days before the items were found in [the] vehicle.  Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that [[...]] had a continuing criminal relationship with [...] at the time the weapons were seized. ”  *[...]*, 172 N.J. at 58.  The Court emphasized that what was missing was “some contemporary connection between the defendant and the place searched or the items seized. ”  *Ibid.*  In contrast, in this case, [...] was believed to have a continuing criminal relationship with [...] and [...] at the time police stopped [...]’s car.
[brief] Court erred in Oct. ’22 Order & Mar. 7, ‘23 Order, par.  3, by overlooking my Aug. 8, ’22 Exceptions for [...] to pay back $74,248.18 for 2019-2021 Trust-paid, [...] legal fees, as it was all done on behalf of [...] for Estate Case ([...]), & NOT on behalf of Trust nor its Co-Trustees.  It overlooked [...]’s Aug. 4, ‘22, response to Surrogate Audit questions that showed work was Estate related (on behalf of [...] for [...]), & disregarded [...]’s Aug. 12, ‘22 Cert. that work was Estate related on behalf of [...] w/majority ($57,256) needing to be paid back to Trust.
[brief] We paid the project in full.  We paid $1.6 million -- $1.1 million.  We put another $500,000 into it.  Q.  Buy you’ve alleged in this lawsuit that my client is the cause of your not being able to move forward, not [...], am I right?  A.  I am alleging that they stole the project rights.  That’s different than there being a problem with [...].  . . . (Pa001825 – 001826) (emphasis added).
[brief] D/B/A [...], D/B/A [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], D/B/A [...] D/B/A [...]; SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - MIDDLESEX COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C [...], [...] D/B/A [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 10; XYZ CORPORATIONS 1 THROUGH 10, Defendants.  DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
[brief] Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and for Violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.  | 25a | | 9/7/23 | Answer to Complaint by [...] and [...] Planning Board with Separate Defenses and Affirmative Defenses  Jury Demand | 32a | | 2/9/24 | Certification of Exhibits | 41a | | 2/9/24 | Exhibit A - Plaintiff’s development application | 43a | | 2/9/24 | Exhibit B - Resolution of denial and related reports | 110a | | 2/9/24 | Exhibit C - Zoning code excerpts | 142a | | 2/9/24 | Exhibit D - Plaintiff’s safety report and related DOT permit | 162a | | 3/21/24|
[brief] Court’s Decision and Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, filed November 17, 2023  P-59  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Foster v. Newark Housing Authority, 389 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 2006)  6, 9 Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282 (1998)  7-8, 9-10  Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City, 247 N.J. 551 (2021)  11  Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35 (1993)
[brief] Here, as in Banco Multiple Santa Cruz, S.A., v. Moreno the process that [...] used to determine if the Petitioner’s signature was genuine was to compare --- 7  “Pr__a” means Petitioner’s Reply Appendix  In Further Support of Appeal and In Opposition to Respondent’s Cross Motion. signatures from various photocopies to determine if they were similar.  888 F. Supp. 2d at 375.  Given that the Photocopy was a document of vital legal significance, particularly under the facts presented here, in which the Court found it contained language that supported waivers of an elective share of an estate (P37a) and Petitioner testifies that he never signed the document.
[brief] With the thin record available, it is not known what action, if any, certifying officers generally took in response to the Commissions' letter.  Nor does the record disclose what notice, if any, former employees and retirees received of the potential for supplemental reimbursement in light of the Commissions' apparent reliance on the link.  Accordingly, the Court orders a remand for the development of a proper record to permit meaningful judicial review.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Allegations and Notices to Depose [...] | 2 | | B.  The Motion to Compel and March 25 Order | 5 | | C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and the April Order | 6 | | D.  Plaintiff Seeks Leave to Appeal the Trial Court Orders | 7 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 7 | | PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT AND THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED | 7 | | CONCLUSION | 13 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The Court Should Disregard [...]'s Arguments Concerning Vacating the Consent Order Under R. 4:50-1 as Irrelevant  As set forth at length herein and in Plaintiffs' initial Appellate Brief, the Consent Order served only to dismiss claims in the Prior Litigation without prejudice and toll the limitations period, giving the parties the option to refile their claims by a date certain, without the fear that those claims would be barred by the statutes of limitations or repose.  (Pa150 – Pa152).  Based upon clear language of the Consent Order, [...]'s repeated argument – that Plaintiffs should have moved to vacate the Consent Order under R. 4:50-1 – constitutes a "red herring," and should be disregarded.  Indeed, nothing in the Consent Order bars the parties from filing claims after the dates set forth in the Consent Order.  (Pa150 – Pa152).  Thus, it is clear that, the filing the instant Complaint neither ran afoul of the Consent Order, nor required vacating the Consent Order.  As such, [...]'s insistence that Plaintiffs should have filed a motion under R. 4:50-1 (which the Trial Court correctly disregarded), wholly lacks merit, and should be rejected in its entirety.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] omitted); Div. of Youth and Family v. A.R.G., 179 N.J. 264, 286 (2004); and First Resolution Inv. v. Seker, 171 N.J. 502, 513-14 (2002).  In connection with the foregoing, the courts in New Jersey have repeatedly and consistently declared that administrative proceedings and agencies must guarantee, protect, and afford rights of due process to those affected by their decisions.
[brief] Further, § 1692c(b) only prohibits communications made “in connection with the collection of a debt. ”  As the Court in *Miller* noted, the transmission of data to the vendor was not an attempt to collect the debt, because the debt “was of no moment whatsoever to the letter vendor or its personnel. ”  *Miller*, at *8; [...] Transcript* at T10-11 (adopting the reasoning of the *Miller* Court).
[brief] Moreover, it was error for the court to find aggravating factor 9 at all because, given the court’s findings regarding the mitigating factors, there was simply no need to deter in this case.  This inappropriate finding of this aggravating factor renders this sentence excessive.  The law is clear that it is improper for a court to fail to explain the factual bases for aggravating factors.  *State v. Case*, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014) (“trial judges must explain how they arrived at a particular sentence”) (emphasis added); R. 3:21-4(h) (“At the time sentence is imposed the judge shall state reasons for imposing such sentence including. . . the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence”) (emphasis added).  Here, the entirety of the court’s explanation for finding aggravating factor 9 was: “As well as aggravating factor 9, the need for deterring you and others from violating the law.”  (3T 13-12 to 13)  This complete lack of explanation falls far short of what our law requires, and a remand for resentencing, at which the court fully explains its findings, is needed.