ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On August 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against [...] and [...] to reinstate and foreclose a prior mortgage which was cancelled by mistake.  Pa1.  Count II of the Complaint (Pa4) demanded foreclosure based upon a cross-default provision of the subject mortgage and Count III stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment.  Pa6.  On October 13, 2023, Defendants, [...] and [...], filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to R.4:6-2(e).  Pa10.  A Certification with attachments was filed by Defendant's counsel in support of the Motion.  Pa12.  On November 6, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Certification in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  Pa70.  On November 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Cross Motion to amend its Complaint to include Count IV for breach of contract.  Pa57.  On December 5, 2023, the Hon. [...] entertained oral argument on the motions and reserved decision.  (T)2  On January 22, 2024, an Order was entered dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice due to lack of “standing.
[brief] - **Utah:** Marcovecchio v. Wright Medical Group, Inc., 2019 WL 1406606, at *7 (D. Utah March 28, 2019) ("Plaintiff has alleged only that [defendant] failed to recall the product, which is insufficient to state a claim"; following Restatement Third §11) (medical device); Dowdy v. Coleman Co., 2011 WL 6151432, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 12, 2011) ("declin[ing] to recognize a post-sale duty to recall or retrofit"; citing Restatement Third §11) (propane heater).
[brief] If a suspect makes an ambiguous assertion that is “susceptible to two different meanings, the interrogating officer must cease questioning and ‘inquire of the suspect as to the correct interpretation. ’”  S.S., 229 N.J. at 382-83 (quoting State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 283 (1990)).  However, “[n]ot every reference to a lawyer ... requires a halt to questioning. ”  State v. Dorff, 468 N.J. Super. 633, 647 (App. Div. 2021).  The court must review the totality of the circumstances, “including all of the suspect’s words and conduct,” to determine whether a mention of a lawyer invokes the right to counsel.  Ibid. (quoting State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 569 (2011)).  “[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant’s willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. ”  State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 622 (2011) (quoting *State v. Bey*, 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988)).  “[B]ecause the right to counsel is so fundamental, an equivocal request for an attorney is to be interpreted in the light most favorable to defendant. ”  *State v. Wright*, 97 N.J. 113, 119 (1984).  Generally, police are not obligated to advise suspects about whether they should assert their *Miranda* rights.  *Alston*, 204 N.J. at 628.  If an ambiguous invocation is made, however, further questioning of a suspect is permissible provided the inquiry is aimed at clarifying the meaning of the statement.  *Id.* at 623.  Such clarification is necessary where the suspect’s statement “leave[s] the investigating officer ‘reasonably unsure whether the suspect was asserting that right. ’”  *Diaz-Bridges*, 208 N.J. at 564 (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 120 N.J. 263, 283 (1990)).  In clarifying the meaning of a suspect’s statement, an officer is limited “to neutral inquiries[,]” and these clarifying inquiries must not “operate to delay, confuse, or burden the suspect in his [or her] assertion of his rights. ”  *Alston*, 204 N.J. at 623-24.  See also *Johnson*, 120 N.J. at 283.  Here, the trial court erroneously found that defendant made an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel and that the State failed to honor that invocation.  However, this finding is unsupported by the record and cannot stand.  Accordingly, the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal must be granted and the trial court’s order must be reversed in the interest of justice.
[brief] (1T19-5 to 25).  In one interaction, [...] appeared to conduct a hand-to-hand transaction with a man he flagged down who was later determined to be [...].  The two men walked to a house on the [...] where [...] reached into a bush near the steps and removed a small item that he transferred to [...].  (1T20-1 to 21-1; 22-10 to 20).  The police officers’ suspicions that a drug sale had taken place were confirmed when [...] was apprehended in Jefferson Park and two small jugs of suspected crack cocaine were found on him.
[brief] Where no DEP delineation exists for a waterbody, as was the case for the Duck Pond Run and Shipetaukin Creek tributaries on the Property, an applicant may determine the flood hazard area by calculating the flood hazard area, i.e. “Method 6. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.6(b), (c)(2022).  Calculating the flood hazard area requires a hydrologic analysis and hydraulic analysis.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.6(c)(1)(i)(1)(2022).  Relevant here, these technical analyses require information about historical rainfall amounts and land topography for a given area to determine the subject waterbody’s height and speed of flow during a storm event.  *Ibid.*  In essence, historic precipitation data is used in combination with the site’s groundcover to determine how fast the waterbody will flow, e.g., its peak flow rate, during a storm event.  *Ibid.*  The peak flow rate is then analyzed with the area’s topography to determine how high the flood waters will rise, which is the flood hazard area.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE FACTUAL UNDERPINNING OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO APPEAL, WAS PATENTLY FALSE.  Plaintiff’s claim against the [...], as set forth in the “FACTS” and in Count One of the Complaint, is that:  58a.  PLANTIFF was tried over multiple days in Highland PARK with the Judge denying all substantive motions brought by [...]’S Counsel and finding [...] GUILTY of possible possession of that CDS pill of resisting arrest and interfering with the police in their official functions (trying to protect himself from his perceived SURE ENOUGH COMING BUT WHOOPING).  58b.  DEFENDANT NEVER RECEIVED A COPY OF THE JUDGES CONVICTION WHICH ALSO MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO APPEAL.  Exactly from whatever the court’s decision was as Plaintiff was filing his appeal in forma pauperis because he could not afford to purchase the transcripts.  58c.  PLANTIFF’S COUNSEL ATTEMPTED TO FILE A TIMELY APPEAL, BUT same were rejected by the CRIMINAL division of the SUPERIOR COURT after multiple attempts.  58d.  PLANTIFFS FILING WITH JEDS WAS ACCEPTED, but that is not the NJ SUPERIOR COURT where the municipal appeals were accepted.  58e.  PLANTIFF OUT OF DESPERATION EVEN FILED WITH THE MUNICIPAL APPEAL WITH THE CIVIL DIVISION WHICH ALSO REJECTED SAME  58f.  APPARENTLY, the Highland Park JUDGE OR CLERK, never forwarded the judge’s guilty findings to Mr. [...] OR either [...] OR THE SUPERIOR COURT AND THUSLY THERE WAS NO RECORD FROM WHICH THE UNDERSIGNED ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT [...] COULD TAKE HIS APPEAL.  7.  THE HIGHLAND PARK JUDGE and clerks and administrative staff, by not rendering the decision as a judgement filed with the courts has disenabled plaintiff [...] from effectuating his appeal, though Plaintiff’s Counsel filed timely with JEDS AND ATTEMPTED to file with both the Superior Court criminal as well as civil which both efforts were rejected, which has disallowed Plaintiff to perfect his appeal from the Highland Park Judge’s apparent failure to file the final judgment.  (Capitalizations in the original)
[brief] (Aa13-18; Aa46-49).  The Commission determined [...] had not met the standard for reconsideration given that his version of events were even more unbelievable in his reconsideration request given that [...] had initially stated that he began his interaction with [...] by first congratulating her on her gender transition but on reconsideration was alleging he went to the [...] building to confront [...] about the allegation that she was attempting to fraudulently obtain signatures.  (Aa16).  The Commission reasoned that if [...] was at the [...] building to confront [...], it was unlikely that he would have begun the conversation by congratulating her on her gender transition.  Ibid.  Moreover, the Commission noted that, even if [...]’s allegations were true, that did not excuse his violation of the State Policy.  (Aa16-17).  Further, while [...] stated that [...] did not ask him to provide witness statements supporting his claim, the Commission reasoned there was nothing preventing him from providing such statements to [...] and, therefore, he had forfeited his opportunity to provide such evidence.  (Aa17).  Finally, the Commission rejected [...]’s contention that his denial of the allegations constituted a dispute of material fact and concluded that same did not warrant a contested hearing in the [...].  (Aa16-17).  This appeal followed.
[brief] ”  *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003) (citing *W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co. v. Indus. Trust Co.*, 27 N.J. 144, 153 (1958)).  New Jersey law requires arbitration agreements to clarify to parties, “that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue. ”  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001) (quoting Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993)).  There is no magic formulation, but our jurisprudence has upheld arbitration agreements that make it clear the party is agreeing to, “waive [their] right to a jury trial[,]” Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 89 (2002); that arbitration would be the exclusive remedy, Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010); and that explained in thorough detail what arbitration is and the differences between arbitration and civil litigation, such as the rules being different, there being no judge or jury, and judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision being limited.
[brief] Order dated November 22, 2023 Denying [...]’s Motion to Compel Arbitration ................................................Da298 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Aguirre v. CDL Last Mile Solutions, LLC, Nos. A-3346-22/A-3372-22 (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2024) ........................................... 28 Aron v. Rialto Realty Co., 100 N.J. Eq. 513 (Ch. 1927) .................................................................................. 36 Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Grp., 219 N.J. 430 (2014) ...............................................................................................passim Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 323 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1999) .................................................................... 10, 13 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) ................................................................................................. 9, 10, 12 Christ Hospital v. New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, 330 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2000) ..................................................................... 35-36, 36 Country Chevrolet, Inc. v. North Brunswick Planning Board, 190 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 1983) ....................................................................
[brief] [...] AND [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants Anchor Law Firm, PLLC and Andrew M. Carroll, Esq. Of Counsel and on the Brief  [...] (Attorney ID No. 017831978)  ([...])  [...] (Attorney ID No. 034252007)  ([...])  [...] (Attorney ID No. 112722614)  ([...])  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Petition for Reconsideration of Denial of Defendant’s Appeal of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea in the Superior Court, Law Division (Criminal), Mercer County Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S. C.  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
[brief] Enforceability of an arbitration provision “is a question of law. ”  Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020); Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019).  This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s order compelling or denying arbitration.  Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration & Cleaning, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 483, 494 (App. Div. 2021).  To that effect, the Appellate Division “need not defer to the trial court’s ‘interpretive analysis’ unless it is ‘persuasive. ’”  Id. at 495 (quoting Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019)).  POINT II
[brief] Defendant’s request came in the middle of the testimony of the State’s second witness.  [3T75-4 to -11].  Defendant argues that this Honorable Court should ignore defendant’s continuous pattern of obstreperous behavior to focus on the request and that it was not a delay tactic.  However, examining the record as a whole, defendant was removed from the courtroom twice, defendant was cautioned to cease his obstructive behavior several times, and defendant also refused to leave the holding cell during key portions of the trial, including jury selection.
[directive] 2  Application to Suspend Certain Employment/ Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions (CN 12535)  New Jersey Judiciary Criminal Division Application to Suspend Employment/Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions  Name Address: Street City State Zip Code Telephone  I am seeking suspension of the following employment/occupational disabilities related to my criminal conviction.  Reason(s) for seeking suspension (attach separate page if necessary)  Employment/occupational disability is due to the following conviction:  Date of Sentence: Indictment/Accusation/Complaint Number: Charge(s): s/ Date  J.S.C. cc: Prosecutor (County Prosecutor or Attorney General)  Form Promulgated by Directive #02-24 (03/04/2024), CN: 12535
[brief] (Da32, Da35)  On July 31, 2024, [...] filed a notice of appearance as counsel for Appellant/Defendant [...].  (Da39)  --- \(^1\)  Transcript for March 12, 2024 has number designation 1T.  \(^2\)  Transcript for April 2, 2024 has number designation 2T.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Indeed, the evidence in the record was quite substantial.  The trial court’s finding of aggravating factors 3, 6, and 9 were well supported.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6) and (9).  Specifically, regarding factor 3, the threat of reoffending, the record reflects the court noting defendant’s escalating record of law-breaking including “Aggravated Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer, Resisting Arrest, Criminal Mischief and Receiving Stolen Property, and a Violation of Probation.  He was also placed on probation, which resulted in one violation.  In addition, he received 18 months’ probation and one year probation respectively for those charges. ” (13T19:5-11).
[brief] *Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters, LLC*, 203 N.J. 286, 301 & n. 10 (2010).  Relevant factors to unconscionability include characteristics of the party presented with an adhesion contract, "such as age, literacy, lack of sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting existing during the contract formation process."  *Sitogum*, supra, 352 N.J. Super. at 564.  In *Rudbart*, the Supreme Court of New Jersey developed a four-factor test to determine whether to enforce the terms of an adhesion contract: “[1] the subject matter of the contract, [2] the parties’ relative bargaining positions, [3] the degree of economic compulsion motivating the ‘adhering’ party, and [4] the public interests affected by the contract. ”  Rudbart, supra, 127 N.J. at 356; see also, Muhammad, supra, 189 N.J. at 15-16; and Stelluti, supra, 203 N.J at 301 at 25-26 (approving consideration of those factors).  Defendant [...] is an obstetrician-gynecologist who spent roughly 40% of his professional time performing cosmetic operations outside of his board-certified specialty.  He is not board-certified in surgery.  Under these circumstances, since 2005, he has opted, upon recommendation from lecturers at seminars, to have his elective cosmetic surgery patients sign an arbitration agreement form at their initial visit.  In or around 2016, after a lawsuit regarding a liposuction, he chose to switch to the subject arbitration agreement form, which was used with Plaintiff’s decedent [...], which he was advised was “stronger,” and which he uses today.
[brief] CIAMBRONE’S ACTIONS UNDERMINE THE VIABILITY OF [...]’S UNTRUTHFULNESS CHARGE AGAINST BUCCI.  On page 11 of [...]’s Opposition Brief, it alleges [...] was untruthful and in that he was “fabricating an explanation for these property checks”.  In reality, if [...] believed [...] was untruthful, it required a re-report under the New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines as to IA to the [...] to see it wanted to pursue the alleged lie under oath from a criminal perspective.  (Pa257).  The initial declination letter by the [...] specially stated that if during the investigation any evidence was discovered of possible criminal conduct that the investigator was to contact their office and stop the investigation.  (Pa257).  [...] not only continued his investigation but used his opinion to charge [...] with untruthfulness.  [...]’s contention that the declination letter stated there was “no criminal conduct” is not accurate.  (Compare Pa257).  Instead, the letter states emphatically that “if any evidence” is discovered “at any point in the investigation” to stop and contact them.  (Pa257).  CONCLUSION
[directive] Do you understand that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2 provides that unless certain exceptions are met, the court is required to sentence you to a mandatory sentence of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  Czy omówił(a) Pan(i) z adwokatem możliwość otrzymania wyroku obowiązkowego [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No]  5. okresu specjalnego nadzoru kuratora sądowego w celu udziału w programie leczenia nadzorowanym przez Sąd („Sąd przeciwnarkotykowy”)?  Jeśli odpowiedź brzmi „Nie”, proszę przejść do pytania 6.  Jeśli odpowiedź brzmi „Tak”, proszę przejść do pytania 7.  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential of being sentenced to a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?
[brief] The trial court’s Pretrial Order of August 15, 2018 sets forth four (4) issues to be determined at trial:  1.  Whether [...]’s Ordinance No. 05-2017 (“the Noise Ordinance”) is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  2.  Whether the Noise Ordinance complies with the New Jersey Noise Control Act, N.J.S.A. §13:1G-1 et seq. and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.  3.  Whether the Noise Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.  Da58.  The trial court Decision stated “it cannot find the Sea Bright Ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague” but the trial could did find, *sua sponte*, the Ordinance void for overbreadth.\(^6\)  Da83.  --- \(^6\)  The Plaintiffs did not challenge the Ordinance based on it being unconstitutionally overbroad.
[directive] THIS COURT having heard evidence that to conduct a proper evaluation as to the defendant's NJS.A. competency to stand trial hospitalization necessary, pursuant to 2C:4-5, is __ _____ 20_ of ORDERED  It is on the day , that: of of  The defendant hereby committed into the custody the Commissioner the Department is 1. of of Health for a period thirty (30) days for purposes a competency evaluation to stand trial, by Such finding a qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist shall be submitted in a 2. written repmt to this comt and counsel and shall include: of of (a)  A description the nature the examination; of of (b) A diagnosis the mental condition the defendant; ( c)  An opinion as to the defendant's capacity to understand the proceeding against him/her and to assist his/her own defense; in ( An opinion as to whether or not the defendant is presently incompetent to proceed to trial d) NJS.A. of in consideration the factors listed 2C:4-4, and whether defendant's mental in condition such that he/she poses a present danger either to himself/herself or to other is persons upon his/her release into the general community.  I of3 #17-18 (11/01/2018), Directive (Competency 12326 Published by 2) page CN: Order NJS.A. or 3.
[brief] Accord Harrison Riverside, 309 N. J. Super. at 475.  “The lessor bears the burden of demonstrating actions taken to mitigate damages. ”  McGuire, 125 N.J. at 323.  In Fanarjian, 237 N.J. Super. at 406-07, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s finding that the landlord failed to exercise reasonable diligence in mitigating damages due to the lack of any “sufficient attempts toward mitigation for a substantial period of time”.
[brief] See Nayee, 192 N.J. at 145.  Relatedly, the court should have considered under mitigating factors 4 and 14 (youth) the fact that [...]’s childhood abuse and mental illnesses would have resulted in developmental delays, further reducing his culpability and increasing his capacity for rehabilitation.  See Center for Law, Brain & Behavior at Massachusetts General Hospital, White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence: A Guide for Judges, Attorneys and Policy Makers 17-18 (2022) (noting that the percentage of justice-involved youth that have experienced trauma and suffer from PTSD is far high than the prevalence in the general population and that “[t]hese experiences influence behavioral development and have consequences for brain development”).  Defense counsel requested that the court consider [...]’s trauma and mental illnesses under mitigating factor 14 for these very reasons.  (2T 27-16 to 30-9)  While the sentencing court found mitigating factor 14 based on [...]’s age, and said that it had considered the defense’s argument, as mentioned above, it did not explain the weight it assigned to the factor and never specifically addressed the defense’s argument regarding [...]’s trauma or mental health status.  (2T 39-16 to 40-1)  Therefore, for these reasons, a remand is required for the court to consider [...]’s abuse, age, and mental illnesses in mitigation.
[brief] (17T221-22 to 222-6).  These facts are amply supported by the record.  Defendant committed his heinous acts on his own; he was not influenced by an older relative, he was not pressured by his peers, and he was not an accomplice to felony murder.  He alone is responsible for murdering his family.  The fourth Miller factor (whether defendant might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth, including his inability to deal with police officers and prosecutors, including on a plea agreement, or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys) also weighed against defendant.
[directive] Czy rozumie [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] zalecony przez prokuratora, może Pan(i) wycofać swoje oświadczenie o przyznaniu się do winy?  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że jeśli uzyska Pan(i) pozwolenie na wycofanie przyznania się do winy c.
[brief] 1.  Order Dated May 2, 2024  Granting Defendant's, [...]’s, Motion to to Stay and Compell Arbitration.....  Pa0001-Pa0002  2.  Order Dated May 2, 2024  Granting Defendant's, [...]’s, Motion to to Stay and Compell Arbitration..........................  Pa0003-Pa0004  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] *Delbridge v. Office of Pub. Defender*, 238 N.J. Super. 288, 314, 569 A.2d 854 (Law Div. 1989).  In addition, conspiracy is not an independent cause of action, but rather a “liability expanding mechanism” which exists only if a plaintiff can prove the underlying “independent wrong. ”  *L.C. v. Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office*, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 598, *55 (App. Div. 2021).  Because [...]’s fraud claim fails, his conspiracy to commit fraud claim fails as well.  D.