ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Federal and State Constitutions provide that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  *U.S. Const.* amend. v; *N.J. Const.* art. 1, para. 20.  When the government physically acquires private property for public use, the Takings Clause obligates the government to provide the owner with just compensation.  See *Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.*, 458 U.S. 419, 429-30, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3172-73, 73 L.Ed.2d 868, 878 (1982).  The Supreme Court in *Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid*, 594 U.S. 139; 141 S. Ct. 2063, 210 L. Ed. 2d 369 (2021) reaffirmed this decades long jurisprudence and held that a government’s physical entry onto the property of another is a *per se* taking:  Physical takings jurisprudence is "as old as the Republic."  *Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.*, 535 U.S. at 322.  The government commits a physical taking when it uses its power of eminent domain to formally condemn property.  See *United States v. General Motors Corp.*, 323 U.S. 373, 374-375, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945); *United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson*, 319 U.S. 266, 270-271, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943).  The same is true when the government physically takes possession of property without acquiring title to it.  See *United States v. Pewee Coal Co.*, 341 U.S. 114, 115-117, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (plurality opinion).  And the government likewise effects a physical taking when it occupies property—say, by recurring flooding as a result of building a dam.  See *United States v. Cress*, 243 U.S. 316, 327-328, 37 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746 (1917).  These sorts of physical appropriations constitute the "clearest sort of taking," *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001), and we assess them using a simple, *per se* rule: The government must pay for what it takes.
[brief] ” (Sa25).  The Court also recognized that this newly discovered evidence is “material and likely to change the evidence at trial because the documents further perpetrate the theory that Defendant had the authority to sell shares… [and] it would likely change the jury’s verdict simply because the evidence presented paints a picture the Defendant was not a mere 5% owner. ” (Sa27).  The State’s conviction hinges entirely on its proposition that [...] was a five percent (5%) owner without the authority to solicit investments for the project.  These documents would change the jury’s verdict because they demonstrate that he had had full authority to solicit investments for the project.
[brief] (7T89-11 to 20).  The prosecutor agreed, believing that “the number of shots that were fired” and “the number of projectile strikes to the vehicle,” demonstrated that the shooters’ purpose was “to actually cause the death of another individual. ” (7T90-5 to 10; 7T91-25 to 92-8).  [...] indicated that the testimony and evidence he heard during trial caused him to reassess his initial inclination to instruct the jury only on murder.
[brief] (4T 70:8-10, Jan. 10, 2023).  Based on his expertise, he estimated the sales price for the Property to be $1 million to $1.1 million.  (4T 73:19-22, Jan. 10, 2023).  At trial, in an effort to clarify the role [...] actually played with respect to the Property, [...] was confronted with a sworn certification produced earlier in the subject litigation.  In all respects, [...] testified that the material contents of his certification were simply not true.  For example, echoing the testimony of [...], [...]’s certification stated that since [...] purchased the Property, [...] maintained and managed the Property.  [...] denied that accuracy of the assertion and testified that, at most, he drove by two or three times and never did anything with respect to the Property.  (4T 82:15-88:12, Jan. 10, 2023).  In a similar vein, [...]’s certification stated that he had been to the Property on “countless” occasions when, in reality, he was only there on three (3) occasions.  Id. c.  [...] and [...] Did Not Maintain the Property
[directive] Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex • PO Box 037 • Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0037  Directive #06-16 Revised Statewide Bail Schedules/  Permissible Use of Monetary Bail Schedules  Page 5  The provisions of this Directive also are incorporated on the first two pages of the attached Bail Schedules.  Questions regarding this Directive and the Bail Schedules promulgated by it may be directed to Assistant Director [...] (Criminal Practice Division) by email at [...] or by phone at [...] or Assistant Director [...] (Municipal Court Services Division) by email at [...] or by phone at [...].
[brief] In her May 12, 2023, letter, the Acting Commissioner indicated that she was “now directing the Department to expedite” that review.  The “expedited” review apparently did not begin until late in 2023, about six months after the Acting Commissioner ordered that it be expedited and more than 26 months after the Acting Commissioner first ordered it.  Eventually, the review was done by consultants not by the Department, resulting in the March 1, 2024, release of the “Comprehensive Review of the [...],” (Comprehensive Review) on which the Acting Commissioner relied heavily in his April 1, 2024, Final Decision.  Student-petitioners are submitting this appeal to the Acting Commissioner’s Final Decision as of right well before the appeal process has run because of our strong continuing belief that time is of the essence for those students.  As just one indication of the urgency of resolving this case expeditiously, the [...] has requested another advanced state aid loan for the upcoming school year—this one for $104 million—to enable it to balance its budget.  On top of the large outstanding loan balance, which the ALJ described more than three years ago as creating an unsustainable fiscal situation for the district, this could be the straw that ARGUMENT POINT I THIS COURT’S DEFINITIVE AND UNCHALLENGED RULING THAT LAKEWOOD PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS ARE BEING DENIED T&E SHOULD GIVE THEM SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
[directive] Closed sessions for reviews or investigations.  The Board must be in a closed session whenever the content of internal affairs records are discussed or testimony or other evidence regarding a specific incident is presented.  (2)  Protection of internal affairs information.  No part of any internal affairs file may be disclosed by the Civilian Review Board under any circumstances to any person who is not a Board member or employee, the law enforcement executive, or a member of the law enforcement agency’s internal affairs function, except in a final public report appropriately redacted in accordance with instructions from the law enforcement executive.  This prohibition on disclosure includes any statement made by police officers to law enforcement investigators under the provisions of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).  (3)
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................  25  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (Cont'd.)  POINT IV  THE PROSECUTOR’S ATTEMPT TO ENLIST  JURORS IN THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE REPEATED INFLAMMATORY CLAIM THAT [...] WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS CO-DEFENDANT’S DRUG ADDICTION DENIED [...] A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................  31 POINT V THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THESE ERRORS DENIED [...] A FAIR TRIAL.
[brief] The jury also unanimously found for each Plaintiff that [...]’s purchase documents contained some combination of the nine different exculpatory clauses designed to bind a purchaser to a waiver of [...]’s compliance with the provisions of the RETA.  (Da1222-1224).  Per N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(c), these clauses – an integral part of [...]’s fraud scheme – are void.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] In October 2009, a Union County Grand Jury returned [...], charging defendant-appellant [...] with two counts of first-degree racketeering, in violation on N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(c) (counts one and two); second-degree conspiracy, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count three); first-degree maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (count four); three counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (counts five, eight, and eleven); first-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, in --- 1 Da refers to defendant’s appendix on appeal.
[brief] Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. at 269 (quoting Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 302) (emphasis added).  Therefore, New Jersey law holds that, when interpreting a contract, a court must conduct “an examination solely into that intent which is expressed or apparent in the writing. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. 134, 148 (App. Div. 1960), certif. den. 34 N.J. 134 (1961).  “An actual intent which is not made known in the instrument will not be given effect. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. at 148 (citing, Corn Exchange, etc., Phil. v. Taubel, 113 N.J.L. 605, 609 (E. & A. 1934); Casriel v. King, 2 N.J. 45, 50 (1949); New York Sash & Door Co., Inc. v. National House & Farms Association, Inc., 131 N.J.L. 466, 469 (E. & A. 1944); Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293 (1953); 3 Williston, Contracts, s 610, p. 1750)).  From these bedrock principles of New Jersey law, flow two other principles of particular importance to this case.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], filed a Complaint against his employer [...] ([...]), pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §51 et seq., on January 14, 2021.  (9a).  [...] filed an Answer with a Third-Party Complaint against [...] on April 21, 2021.  (17a).  [...] filed a Request for Default against [...] on September 14, 2021.  (29a).  [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 6, 2023.  (37a).  [...] filed his opposition to [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on July 25, 2023.  (228a).  [...] filed a Reply on July 31, 2023.  (Omitted (R. 2:6-1(a)(2)).  An Order granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment was signed and filed on August 4, 2023, however oral argument was not held until August 8, 2023, the same date the Order was entered.  (1a).  Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal on September 15, 2023.  (3a).  Third Party Defendant [...] was dismissed for lack of prosecution on October 14, 2023.  (36a).
[brief] The Court should reject [...]’s appeal for lack of standing.  This is not a case where an adverse party has a former relationship with an attorney that creates a conflict.  This is an adversary with no stake in the relationship seeking to disrupt a joint defense.  Nor is this a case where a party has been deprived of the counsel of its choice so that the litigation of the case and its outcome could be for naught due to reversal.  To hold otherwise would be to breach the proverbial dam holding back a flood of strategic and meritless motions to disqualify, like the one [...] brought below.
[brief] The expenditure is then not within the implied power [to publicize facilities improvements] and is not lawful in the absence of express authority from the Legislature” (ibid).  This not only goes against *Citizens*, which indicates Districts must not spend public dollars in support one side of a Referendum question over another, it also goes against the Commission’s own prior decisions.  In a June 19, 2019 decision, while the Commission chose ultimately to dismiss this complaint, it states this as part of its decision:  “Without any suggestion that Respondent and/or other members of the Board utilized or expended taxpayer dollars to advocate only one side of the issue, or any suggestion that Respondent – in her capacity as a Board member – endorsed the issue, the Commission is restrained by the provisions of the Act, and its implementing regulations” ([...], Complainant v. [...] [...], Bergen County, Respondent, [...], June 19, 2019).  Here, the Commission seems fully aware of *Citizen’s* and related cases, and effectively indicates that Board members utilizing tax dollars on one side of a question - or endorsing it in their official capacity - would potentially be construed as an ethics violation.  Yet in its decision against Complainant, the Commission seemingly reverses itself and sees no issue at all with Board member advocacy and spending of public monies on one side of a district Referendum.  This is not only troubling in this case, but also for future conduct by Board members in the State of New Jersey regarding referendums.  The Commission here effectively gives Board members carte blanche to advocate in favor of referendums and spin facts in their favor without consequence, which flies in the face of both *Citizens* as well as the purpose of the School Ethics Act itself.  This is clearly an arbitrary and capricious decision that should be overturned.
[brief] Only adding to [...]’s understanding was [...]’s separate confirmation of [...]’s CCIP enrollment in a September 25, 2015 correspondence to [...] stating that it was “CCIP Approved.  For the above referenced [W/Element Hotel] Project. ”  Pa427 (emphasis added).  [...] and [...] claim that Plaintiffs have mischaracterized this correspondence, but its text is clear and supports [...]’s reasonable expectations of CCIP coverage.
[brief] [...] v. [...], [...] (2019) (Ca269)), reaffirmed, e.g., Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25,  For example, in [...] v. [...]… the Commission discussed how failure to include a disclaimer can lead to the belief that the statements made by a school official, even in attempted to be made in their personal/private capacity, can be viewed as those of the Board.  [...], [...], [...].  More specifically, and although Respondent [...] argued that the statements attributed to her by Complainant [...] “were not made in her capacity as a Board member and [did] not relate to her Board membership or to Board actions,” the Commission found that “the statements on her Facebook page [were] clearly linked to her Board membership (and candidacy),” her social media page did not have a disclaimer noting that the statements made were her own and unrelated to the Board, and that, as a result, “it [was] reasonable for a member of the public … to perceive the statements as being made by Respondent in her capacity as Board member.
[brief] Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a) states:  **GENERAL RIGHT TO AMEND. **  A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed.  In the debtor’s bankruptcy case, she timely amended her schedules to include her personal injury claim as an asset and exempt a portion from the estate (11 USC 522(d) (See 11 U.S.C. 522 (b) “an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed .  . . .”)  AA316.  She sought and obtained court approval for the disbursement of the proceeds AA069.  In the disbursement process, plaintiff opposed the disbursement of any proceeds to defendant AA060 and AA069.  An order limiting the distribution of proceeds to counsel fees and costs was obtained, and proceeds were disbursed accordingly AA069.  Any procedural deficiency in bankruptcy practice regarding the personal injury claims was cured in the bankruptcy court.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal was timely because the Trial Court’s judgment was not final until August 30, 2023.  To be ripe for an appeal, a final judgment must resolve all claims for all parties, including rendered decisions and finality of all post judgment motions.  Weed v. Casie Enterprise, 279 N.J. Super. 517, 527 (App. Div. 1995).  A final order is “no longer final as to all issues and all parties” when issues are still pending before the court.  Id. at 527.  See also Hudson v. Hudson, 36 N.J. 549, 553 (1962) (finding that “[o]ur rules…prohibit direct appeal unless final judgment has been entered disposing of all issues as to all parties. ”).  In Weed, the Appellate Court held that a final order must resolve all claims for all parties.
[brief] The law is clear that *ex parte* communication is prohibited and inherently unfair causing disfunction to the adversarial process.  *In re Kensington Intern. Ltd.*, 368 F.3d, 289, 309 (3d Cir. 2004).  In their brief, Respondents conspicuously cite no law supporting their contention that *ex parte* communications are permissible.  They fail to rebut Plaintiff’s legal citations because they cannot.  This Court should reject Respondents’ unsuccessful attempt to downplay the significance of the *ex parte* communication that occurred on the second day of the bench trial in this case.  It is undisputed that no individual who is involved in the present appeal was in the Judge’s chambers when this *ex parte* conduct occurred.  Respondents have new counsel and Plaintiff was excluded during this conference.  Respondents’ assertion that nothing that was said in chambers which could materially impact [...]’ case is entirely conjecture.
[brief] a “participant” engaged in an “equine activity” when he was injured.  [Pa 1093-96].  Thus, the Motion Judge determined that it would be “incongruent . . . for Defendants to be held strictly liable for Plaintiff’s horse bite when an absolute immunity would have been available under the [Act] had the Defendants been deemed the operators of the farm. ”  [Pa 1096].  On appeal, Plaintiffs do not challenge the dismissal of their claim for negligence, but instead reiterate their argument that owners of a domestic animal belonging to a class of animals that share an inherent dangerous propensity should be held strictly liable for injuries caused by that dangerous propensity in the absence of any evidence of past behavior by the offending animal that would put the owner on notice that it posed a danger to others.  Summary judgment should be affirmed because this proposition is not supported by New Jersey precedent or the common law, and, under the circumstances in this case, runs counter to the public policy of this State.
[directive] Defendant by Fonn Revised Promulgated Directive #09-19 (06/04/2019), CN10912 of2 page 1 t:;.;;11,11iiHGHilliiid•HMM@~ Probation Division in the ___ _________ ___ of County _ Date Entered: J # (Address) Of New Superior Court  Jersey of State New Jersey --- ----- County Plaintiff - Law Division  Criminal Complaint/Indictment/ Accusation Number( s)  V. Defendant of Certification Amount Due Street Zip Code City State _____  When enrolled into the Pretrial Intervention Program the defendant agreed to pay $ _ in financial obligations.  Those obligations have not been paid in full.  The amount(s) due are noted below.  The undersigned does hereby certify that the amount set forth below are due the Probation Division in the __ _______ of of County on behalf the below named creditors.
[directive] A law enforcement officer who is wearing a BWC shall notify the subject of the recording that the subject is being recorded by the BWC, unless it is unsafe or infeasible to provide such notification.  Such notification shall be made as close to the inception of the encounter as is reasonably possible.  If the officer does not provide the required notification because it is unsafe or infeasible to do so, the officer shall document the reasons for that decision in a report or by narrating the reasons on the BWC recording, or both.  The failure to verbally notify a person pursuant to this section shall not affect the admissibility of any statement or evidence.  See AG Directive 2021-5, Section II.A (non-enforceability by third parties).
[brief] (Pa1331-32)  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Order, filed January 12, 2024  Pa1149  Order, filed January 26, 2024  Pa1214  Order, filed March 8, 2024  Pa1224  Order, filed May 3, 2024  Pa1331  OTHER RELEVANT ORDERS
[brief] sufficient facts in this regard.  Paragraph 2 of the Complaint, which identifies [...] and [...], describes their interest as follows:  [They] are concerned about the manner in which the [...] and its subordinate agencies and boards [are] implementing the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act, PL. 2021, c. 19 (the “NJCREAMM Act”) and its land use ordinances adopted pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq. (the “MLUL”). ”  [Da2].  Paragraph 46 and 52 alleges that [...]’ application violated the conditional use standards in Hoboken’s Zoning Ordinance while Paragraphs 47 and 53 asserts jurisdiction over the application should have laid with the Board of Adjustment, and Paragraph 54 alleges that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the application.
[brief] Relevant portions of Brief of the [...] in support of motion for leave to appeal dated November 4, 2020 ...............................................................................................................................M514  Relevant portions of Brief in Support for Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Order Pursuant to R. 2:5-6 on Behalf of Defendant-Appellants, [...] and Mayor [...], in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the [...] .............................................................................................................M515  Order of the Appellate Division denying the Zoning Board’s Motion for Leave to Appeal dated December 24, 2020 .........................................................................................M516
[directive] III.  Juvenile Processing, Fingerprinting, DNA Collection, and Complaint Entry  As emphasized above, for the vast majority of youthful offenders, the system works best when juveniles are diverted away from formal court proceedings and towards rehabilitative services, along with social or familial support.  There will be cases, though, where diversion is not possible and juveniles will be charged.  Section III, and the sections which follow, provide the framework for law enforcement officers and prosecutors when charging and issuing complaints utilizing the Administrative Office of the Court’s eCDR system.
[brief] Prior to the incident, [...] knew the machine was broken but refused to fix it.  Pa18.  [...] initiated suit against [...] by Complaint dated April 13, 2022.  Pa17.  On June 3, 2022, [...] answered.  Pa32.  On July 7, 2023, following extensive discovery and settlement negotiations between the parties, plaintiff and [...] entered into a Consent Judgment for $1,250,000.00 pursuant to Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347 (1982).  Pa40.  The Consent Judgment contains an assignment of [...]’s rights to pursue coverage from their insurer, defendant [...], and excess carriers, defendants [...] and [...] (“[...]”).  Pa41.  By Order dated July 26, 2023, plaintiff was granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint.  Pa43.  On July 27, 2023, plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint against defendants [...] and [...] seeking a declaratory judgment to compel coverage and that the C5 exclusion used by defendants to disclaim coverage for [...]’s workplace injury was void as against public policy.  Pa44.  On September 5, 2023, defendant [...] moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).  Pa62.  On September 11, 2023, defendant [...] also filed a Motion to Dismiss.  Pa86.  On October 10, 2023, plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment.  Pa431.  [...] died while the motions were pending.  On November 3, 2023, plaintiff was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to substitute [...] as administratrix and administratrix ad prosequendem for the Estate of [...].  Pa525.  On January 19, 2024, oral argument took place before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. 1T (Transcript of Hearing dated January 19, 2024).  By Order and Rider dated January 29, 2024, the trial court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.  This appeal followed.