ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Letter Reply Brief on Behalf of: [...] (a/k/a Dayana Abreu)  Sunday, February 16, 2025  State of New Jersey, Plaintiff – Respondent, VS., [...] (a/k/a Dayana Abreu), Defendant – Appellant.  Case Type: Criminal County: Hunterdon Trial Court Docket Number: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  [...], Esq.  On the Brief TABLE OF BRIEF CONTENTS  LETTER BRIEF STATEMENT 01 ARGUMENT 01  I.  THE STATE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THE DEFENDANT’S REASONS WHY THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN DETERMINING THAT N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24(a)(2) AND N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(C)(3)  DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS  JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY.  01  a.  THE STATE CANNOT RE-WRITE N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24 ON AN EX POST FACTO BASIS.  01  b.  A REASONABLE PERSON IS NOT OBLIGATED TO SCOUR THE INTERNET AND 49 OTHER STATE’S STATUTES TO BE PLACED ON NOTICE OF THIS STATE’S CRIMINAL LAWS.  04 c.  THE BALANCE OF THE STATE’S BRIEF FAILS TO ADDRESS ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT OR LACKS SUFFICIENT MERIT TO WARRANT A RESPONSE.  10  CONCLUSION
[brief] The fact that [...] is the leaseholder of the apartment does not mean that she had the authority to consent to a search of every room in the apartment.  To the contrary, “[a]uthority to consent to search a particular area of a home turns on common usage. ”  *State v. Cushing*, 226 N.J. 187, 201 (2016).  Applying this test, both this Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court have found that a homeowner lacked authority to consent to a search of another person’s bedroom inside the home.  See id. at 201-02 (grandmother lacked authority to consent to a search of grandson’s bedroom inside her home); *State v. Marcellus*, 472 N.J. Super. 269, 275 (App. Div. 2022) (recognizing that although “defendant’s aunt had the authority to consent to an entry into the home and a search of the residence” “her authority only went so far” and did not extend to a search of defendant’s mother’s bedroom inside the home).
[brief] The rule will not protect a plaintiff who had ample time to discover the unknown defendant's identity before the running of the statute of limitations.  See *Matynska v. Fried*, 175 N.J. 51, 53 (2002).  It is only through the imposition of a continuing requirement of diligence upon the plaintiff to identify the fictitious defendant that the twin purposes of the statute of limitations are achieved: penalizing a dilatory plaintiff and affording repose to a defendant.  *Younger v. Cracke*, 236 N.J. Super. 595, 602-03 (Law Div. 1989).  The procedural facts associated with this matter clearly establish that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements of R. 4:26-4 and its interpreting case law.
[brief] On January 7, 2022, Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief was filed.  (583a)  [...] was added as an interested party.  Furthermore, Paragraph 42 was amended to state that:  The Trustee is attempting to sell the [Boonton] Property to a third party at [$800,000] its true market value for the benefit of the beneficiaries, or, in the alternative, seeks to sell the [Boonton] Property to [...], along with [...] in her personal capacity, at the price of $651,000 as set forth above, if deemed to be a fair market value offer.  (591a ¶42)  On January 10, 2022, [...] presided over the first hearing of this litigation.  (1T)  [...] requested that [...] and his family be ejected from the Boonton Property.  (1T 6 Ln 22)  [...] explained that ejectment was not appropriate as [...] was living rent free (1T 10) in the Florida Property and [...] was “favoring herself and my brother. ”  (1T 15 Ln8)  Furthermore, [...] proposed that [...] and [...] submit sealed bids to determine which brother would purchase the Boonton Property.  (1T 8 Ln 1-17)  Note that [...] did not request a court order to confirm the proposed sale of the Boonton Property to the [...] for $800,000.  [...] denied Plaintiff’s request for a sealed bid.  Instead, the court granted Defendants’ request for appraisals on the Boonton and Florida Properties.  (14a)  Furthermore, [...] said:  And then we will have you sit down with [...], who mediates these sort of disputes all the time.  You can do it virtually.  You can meet with him, look at the appraisals and determine what you would like to take as the next course.  Do you want to list the property? Do you want to have a sealed bid process?  These are the things that you should be thinking about.  List the property on the open market; have a sealed bid process.  Everything else can be determined on a later date: debits, credits, rentals and things like that.  (1T 24 Ln 21)
[brief] On January 14, 2021 Judge [...], P. J. Ch., transferred the matter *sua sponte* to the Civil Division, possibly because one of the ten counts was a Consumer Fraud claim (Pa185).  On June 4, 2021, Judge [...] J.S.C. *on recall* denied a motion to bifurcate the Consumer Fraud count and return the other nine counts which sounded in equity to the probate docket.  At the same hearing, Judge Hansbury entered an Order forbidding Defendants from encumbering or selling [...] during the pendency of the litigation (Da1).  On May 25, 2022 Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the single count of undue influence (Pa190-247).  On June 15, 2022 Defendants cross moved for Summary Judgment on all ten counts of the Verified Complaint (Pa248-305).  On July 22, 2022, Judge [...], J.S.C. entered an Order dismissing eight of Plaintiffs’ ten counts but preserving two counts for trial, undue influence and unjust enrichment (Pa10-44).
[brief] The court rejected the exact argument Appellant now makes in this appeal, and held that “it is well-settled that the activities of debt buyers such as [defendants] do not fall within the purview of the CFA. ”  *Gomez*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183099, at *13.  The court held specifically that a claim under the CFA is not viable against a debt buyer, and that the plaintiff’s reliance on *Gonzalez* was misplaced.  *Id.* at *13, 15.  This is consistent with the trial court’s decision, which distinguished *Gonzalez* based on the same kind of facts on which the *Gomez* court distinguished *Gonzalez*.  *Id.* at *15 (“The issue in *Gonzalez* was whether predatory terms contained in a post-judgment settlement agreement arising from a mortgagor’s default on a loan are subject to the CFA,” which are not at issue here).  Appellant’s reliance on *Sun Chem. Corp. v. Fike Corp.*, 243 N.J. 319, 235 A.3d 145 (2020), is also misplaced.  *[...]* is distinguishable from the case at bar because the Court found that the defendant actually provided a product to the public for sale.  *Id.* at 329.  No such facts exist here; Respondents are debt buyers who had no involvement in the sale or advertisement of any merchandise, and therefore fall outside the purview of the CFA.  Ultimately, Appellant cannot overcome the robust case law that the trial court analyzed in its decision to grant Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss.  New Jersey law is clear that third-party debt collectors or debt buyers do not induce customers to buy the merchandise underlying the subject debts.  *DepoLink*, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 339; see also Boyko v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., CIV. 08-2214 RBK/JS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119339, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2009).  Therefore, Appellant’s arguments under Gonzalez and [...] do not apply, and the trial court’s decision that Respondents’ actions do not constitute unlawful conduct under the CFA should be affirmed.
[brief] 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................  10  POINT II  A.  IN CONDUCTING THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, THE ARBITRATOR ENGAGED IN PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES REQUIRING THAT THE AWARD BE VACATED AND REMANDED.  1.  The Arbitrator failed to follow the requirements of N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g) which mandated that the City provide the arbitrator and [...] with information related to the composition of the unit and unit salary costs.  (Not Argued Below)  ....................... 16  2.  The Arbitrator erroneously rejected the [...]’s Revised Final Offers and considered only the [...]’s original Final Offer.  (Aa049-054)  ..................................  20  B.  THE ARBITRATOR MADE A MISTAKE OF FACT  REGARD THE [...]’S FINAL OFFER ON HEALTH BENEFITS.  (Aa054-055)  .................................................................  23 POINT III
[brief] (Da 27-30).  The PNDA charged [...] with the N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) statutory grounds of misconduct, inefficiency, neglect of duty, as well as violations of the [...] Employee Handbook Discipline Policy, including: 1.  Harassment of co-workers and/or volunteers and/or visitors; and/or members of the public; 2. Conduct unbecoming a public employee; 3. Violating any [...] rules or policies; 4. Violation of [...] policies, procedures and regulations; and 5.  Other sufficient cause.  Id.¹
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26(7); see also N.J.A.C. § 12:62-1.2 (applying same definition for “worker” from the Prevailing Wage Act to the PWCRA); see also N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.25 (tying the purposes of the PWCRA and Prevailing Wage Act together as follows: “It is declared to be the public policy of this State to establish a prevailing wage level for workmen engaged in public works in order to safeguard their efficiency and general well being and to protect them as well as their employers from the effects of serious and unfair competition resulting from wage levels detrimental to efficiency and well-being. ”)  (emphasis added).  Under the Prevailing Wage Act, the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development is required to “determine the prevailing wage rate and . . . establish the prevailing wage in the locality in which the public work is to be performed for each craft or trade or classification of all workmen needed to perform public work contracts.
[brief] (Pa359-60 at 72:8-73:3).  [...] also frequently disagreed with [...]’s management decisions.  (Pa238 at 54:18-56:14).  [...] explained to [...] that although he might not agree with a particular supervisor’s decision, it was not his place to decide how those managers should do their jobs.  (Pa357 at 61:16-63:8).  VI.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Preliminary Statement........................................................................................................1  Argument.................................................................................................................................1  I.  The Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable.  (Da301–304.)  ........1  A.  Plaintiffs’ attempt to contest their notice rests on a factual mistake..........1  B.  The Arbitration Agreement satisfies Atalese and New Jersey law...........3  II.  This Court can and should hold as a matter of law that [...]’s daughter acted as her agent.  (Da298–304.)..........................................................11  III.  If the Court accepted Plaintiffs’ arguments and the December Terms were not formed, then the January Terms would control.  (Da304.).......12  IV.  The terms of use apply to [...].  (Da298–304.) ..............................13  V.  [...] did not waive its right to enforce the Arbitration Agreement.  (Da298–304.)........................................................................................................14  Conclusion.............................................................................................................................15
[brief] | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Kansas v. Hendricks, | 23 | | 521 U.S.  346 (1997) | | | Miller v. Florida, | 22 | | 482 U.S. 423 (1987) | | | Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Bd; | 22 | | 219 N.J. 270 (2014) | | | State v. A.R., | 18, 19 | | 213 N.J. 542 (2013) | | | State v. Adams, | 7, 8 | | 194 N.J. 186 (2008) | | | State v. Afanador, | 8 | | 151 N.J. 41 (1997) | | | State v. Beauchamp, | 19, 20 | | 262 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 1993) | | | State v. Belliard, | 7 | | 415 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 2010) | | | State v. Blackmon, | 17 | | 202 N.J. 283 (2010) | | | State v. Burns, | 8 | | 192 N.J. 312 (2007) | | | State v. Chapland, | 8 | | 187 N.J. 275 (2006) | | | State v. Concepcion, | 9 | | 111 N.J. 373 (1988) | | | State v. Cotto, | 9 | | 471 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 2022) | | | State v. Cruz-Pena, | 13 | | 459 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 2019) | | | State v. D.A., | 14 | | 191 N.J. 158 (2007) | | | State v. Dekowski, | 12, 13 | | 218 N.J. 596 (2014) | | | State v. DeRoxtro, | 14 | | 327 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 2000) | | | State v. Ellis, | 13 | | 424 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 2012) | | State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003)
[brief] Article 17 and the So-Called “Common Area Charges”  After rewriting Article 3 of the leases, the Law Division then move on to Article 17 and expanded that provision to narrow even further the duties imposed by Article 3 of the leases,  Ultimately, the Law Division concluded that Article 17 provides that the tenants mu pay “common area” charges for the maintenance of “common areas,” including for the removal of snow and ice from the parking lots and driveways, this covered the sidewalks referenced in Article 3 too.  Accordingly, the Law Division utilized Article 17 to discharge a duty plainly imposed by Article 3.  The Law Division misread Article 17.
[brief] DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT** (10T58-7 to 100-23; 13T57-8 to -15; 23T95-9 to 105-12; 36T52-7 to -10)  Plaintiffs argue that Defendant waived her statute of limitations defense by failing to affirmatively raise it at trial (Db60).  This is simply untrue.  The record reflects that Defendant raised this argument at various stages of this litigation.  For example, Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by applicable statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in their Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Da00507 at ¶6.)  Moreover, Defendant raised this defense in connection with her Summary Judgment Motion (10T58-7 to 100-23.)  Further, Plaintiffs’ expert was extensively cross-examined on his improper inclusion of transactions that fell outside the applicable statute of limitation periods in his damage calculation (22T19-7 to -21, 22-21 to 24-5, 74-8 to 75-8, 89-10 to 91-19).  Additionally, Defendant argued at trial that the “discovery rule” should apply to bar Plaintiffs’ claims on her motion to dismiss following the close of Plaintiffs’ case (23T95-9 to 105-12).  Indeed, even the trial court acknowledged Defendant’s statute of limitations argument in its trial decision when it misapplied the “discovery rule” and found, albeit incorrectly, that the statute of limitations did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims (13T57-8 to -15; 36T52-7 to -10).
[directive] Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the [No/0tl-J.8..] [Yes/ofl] c. judge's sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?  4tl-4.9.J1!.TI.£'i.l~-i'l~.9.J%~'il-'ll¾i~~~~~~%~~1~%~•'il-'ll~~~~~-i'l~~ 4- ii.ct~ c>Jlfl ~TI4tl- A] -i'l~ofl ~ejc5"j-;,j] -"l-%~ oj-1)  Y 711 77]-? ~ ~~£ ~ ~ [No/oti-J.8..]  Are you satisfied with the advice you have received from your lawyer?  [Yes/oJl]  24.  -i'l~~~~4oJl~~~~*~oJl~~•c.:i*  [No/otl-J.8..]  25.  Do you have any questions concerning this plea?
[brief] See ibid. (citation omitted).  Here, it is very unlikely that [...] would charge any client $9,000 in fees for a $400 case, especially with [...], whom has been his client for 25 years.  (Pa79)  4.  [...] should have been sanctioned, instead of being rewarded, for his atrocious mediation conduct, which unnecessarily escalated and magnified this simple small claims case into a major ordeal.  (Pa23, Pa57, Pa58, Pa68; 1T)  In my Aug 29, 2022 cross motion, I pointed out [...]’s atrocious behavior during the mediation, where he began screaming and yelling like a manic at both me and my sister.  (Pa23, ¶¶19-22)  I argued that this misconduct was an exception to the confidentiality privilege, citing N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-6(a)(6).  (Pa57 - Pa58)  In his response, [...] did not deny any of this – rather he only incorrectly stated that Rule 1:40-4(d) prohibited him from responding to my allegations.  (Pa68)  However the rule he cited cannot nullify the statute I cited, which makes clear that mediation conduct is an exception to the confidentiality privilege.  Yet at the Sep 23, 2022 hearing, the trial court did not even want to inquire about it further; instead the court just abruptly brushed the issue aside, stating that “this isn’t the right forum for that. ” (1T5:1 – 1T6:1).  But unless I misread N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-6(a)(6), I believe this was yet another error.  Even aside from the monetary issues involved in this appeal, I believe it would be unfair to allow [...]’s atrocious mediation conduct to go unpunished.  Conclusion
[brief] [...] did not confirm coverage.  (PPCIa414-18).  [...]’s MCS-90 endorsement.  [...] admits in paragraphs 15 through 17 of its Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint that the [...] insurance policy includes an MSC-90 surety endorsement as required by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 to protect the public from damages caused by motor carriers.  [...] also attached its [...] policy, including the MCS-90 endorsement, to its pleading as Exhibit A. (PPCIa136-37, PPCIa182-83).  The MCS-90 surety endorsement provided that [...] will pay up to $750,000 as surety for any final judgment against [...] for “Public Liability” related to “Environmental Restoration” costs whether the underlying [...] insurance policy to [...] provided coverage for the accident or not.
[brief] *Land* at 169.  Here, taking [...]’s conclusions at face value the accusations may at first blush appear concerning.  Certainly, if an officer deliberately failed to conduct property checks which he reported conducting that would be an issue.  However, when actually looking at the abysmal quality of the investigation in this matter, where [...] did not even look at the entirety of [...]’s shift, but rather an hour or half hour before or after [...] called out the property check, begins to undermine the façade presented by [...]’s report.  Add to that the multitude of evidence of [...] being in precisely the locations he said he was when calling in numerous property checks, supported by the very GPS data [...] testified drove his investigation, and [...]’s façade weakens further.  Add in the testimony and evidence supporting foot patrols by officers in the area [...] was patrolling on November 20, 2017, overlaid with a healthy consideration of [...] and [...]’s lack of credibility in light of both of their sworn contradictory statements and incredibility, and [...]’s case falls to dust, or perhaps sand.  In truth, [...]’s case is nothing more than a house of cards that when faced with the slightest scrutiny falls flat.  [...] failed to prove that it is more likely than not that [...] was not out on foot patrol when he was walking the Fairways, either to Victoria Pointe (where he called a property check) or Victoria Crossing, which borders the fairways of the Country Club and is occasionally mistaken for Victoria Pointe.  Regardless, it was concretely established that officers performed the type of property checks that [...] was performing.  It was further established that officers perform property checks by driving past or through locations and, even if [...]’s checks driving by the Sandwash were not correctly performed, they were performed and the proper remedy was training or remediation, not termination.  But the burden is not on [...] to disprove [...]'s erroneous and unsupported claims, the burden is on [...] to establish that it is more likely than not that [...] did, not just something incorrect, but rather that [...] actually engaged in conduct worthy of removal.
[brief] Yet, Plaintiffs, [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) seem determined to prevent the Project by continuing to falsely claim that the Board incorrectly interpreted the Borough’s definition of building height in its Ordinance (the “Building Height Definition”).  The trial court, however, carefully considered the record and legal arguments presented and issued a well-reasoned decision against Plaintiffs, which should not be disturbed on appeal.
[brief] ”  *Gerba v. Bd.  of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  *Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” *Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys.*, 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).
[brief] [...] was saddened by the decision and did not want to lose two-thirds of her staff during the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, but [...] had no choice other than to accept the decision.  (Pa369 at 109:12-110:10).  [...] was notified of his termination on September 14, 2020.  (Pa369 at 111:11-19; Pa369 at 110:16-23).  The basis for this decision was his unauthorized entry of charge pay for other staffing coordinators, “resulting in theft of hospital funds. ” (Pa369 at 112:3-7; Pa550).  At his deposition, [...] admitted he had no evidence to dispute that his termination was the result of entering unauthorized charge pay for other staffing coordinators.  (Pa191 at 130:3-17).  He also admitted that unauthorized receipt of charge pay was appropriate grounds for termination.  (Pa194 at 142:24-143:17).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] *N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State Office of the Governor*, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 296 (App. Div. 2017)  ……………………………..  28  ## Statutes N.J.S.A. 40A:6-6 ……………………………………………………..  2 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 ……………………………………………………..  2 N.J.S.A. 40A:12a-1 to 89 ……………………………………………..  2 N.J.S.A. 40A:12a-1 to 89 ……………………………………………..
[directive] Page 4  Attachment (Supreme Court opinion)  cc: Chief Justice [...] [...], Appellate Division Clerk [...], P.J.A.D. Special Assistants to the Administrative Director [...], P.J. A.D.  Trial Court Administrators  [...], Chief of Staff  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  [...], Chief SYLLABUS  Court’s  This syllabus is not part of the opinion.  It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader.
[brief] Again, while it completely within a judge's prerogative to use another court's fictitious order in an effort to get to the truth of a matter, the fact remains in the matters at the bar, the [...] order cannot be relied upon by [...] or any other court.  In other words, while [...] can use a verbatim copy of the [...] order to try to trick me into believing that she can dismiss my action in the absence of a jury trial of more than just a judge-jury of one, the fact remains that the [...] order itself has no precedential value via *Batali*.  Point 17 — The [...] order is an illegal Bill of Attainder (Not argued below)
[brief] 1.  Order for Judgment from the Ocean County Superior Court, February 23, 2024  Da1-Da2  2.  [...], Citation for violation of N.J.S.A. 23:4-16 Da3-Da4  3.  Forms for Municipal Appeal to the Ocean County Superior Court  Da5-Da8  I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On or about December 10, 2022, defendant [...] was cited by conservation officer [...] for violating N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(1), i.e. having a loaded firearm for the purpose of hunting within 450 feet of an occupied building.  Da1-Da2.  On September 13, 2023 [...] entered into a conditional guilty plea at the Manchester City municipal court as to his violation of that statute.  2T17-16 to 25, 2T18-1 to 18.  [...] appealed his conditional guilty plea to the Ocean County Superior Court on October 2, 2023.  Da5-Da8.  A hearing was held virtually on February 23, 2024.  1T1-1T40.  The Superior Court upheld [...]’s conditional guilty plea on the same day and ordered [...] to pay the same fine and court costs that were imposed by the Manchester City municipal court on September 13, 2023.  II.