ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa4.  On May 17, 2022, after Defendants filed their respective Answers, the court conducted a case management conference and subsequently entered an order setting a discovery schedule.  Pa4-5.  On May 27, 2022, Plaintiffs put forward a request for interrogatories and a request for production of documents.  Pa5.  On June 24, 2022, Defendants [...] and [...] moved to quash this request.  Pa5.  On June 27, 2022, the remaining Defendants filed a motion for a protective order under Rule 4:10-3 to prohibit further discovery altogether.  Pa5.  On July 28, 2022, [...] filed a motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae in the matter, which the court subsequently granted on September 9, 2022.
[brief] Even assuming arguendo Plaintiff could make out a prima facie case, the record shows Defendants had a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for her non-renewal.  A careful and searching review of this record leads to only one reasonable conclusion—that Plaintiff has not sustained her burden.  On the contrary, the evidence in the record is overwhelming that any and all actions taken against Plaintiff by Defendants were based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons related exclusively to her poor job performance.  Under the burden-shifting framework, if an employer can show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision, to prevail, a plaintiff must show “that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. ”  Young, 385 N.J. Super. at 460 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Plaintiff cannot meet that burden because the same decisionmakers who were involved in the decision to terminate her employment also hired her, and the very individual who recommended her for non-renewal is older than she.  Id. at 460-61.  Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim fails for these additional reasons and should remain dismissed.
[brief] \(^5\) *Instructional Sys.*, 130 N.J. at 345 (the purpose behind “franchise-act legislation is that dealers geographically ‘situated’ in a forum state are to be the ‘desired beneficiaries of the legislation in order to make their bargaining position more equal to manufacturers. ’”) (citing *Bimel-Walroth Co. v. Raytheon Co.*, 796 F.2d 840, 843 (6\(^{th}\) Cir. 1986).
[brief] (See generally 3T).  After hearing from the parties, [...] reserved decision.  (3T:24-12).  On June 26, 2023, [...] filed his written opinion.  (Da 15-23).  He denied defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the State had proven the stop was justified based on the observation by the officer of the operation of defendant’s vehicle, the investigative detention was justified based on the reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and there was probable cause to arrest defendant for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
[brief] (T61:8-T73:20; Da2566-Da2567).  The trial court thoroughly considered all of the evidence submitted by the parties, including the historical map, advertisements, photographs, and history of direct access by the [...], their predecessors in title, and neighbors to arrive at a fair and common-sense analysis of what the intent of [...] was in 1925.  (T66:17-T72:8).  Relying on the Restatement of Property and Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n, 41 N.J. Eq. 606 (1886), the trial court found that potential purchasers who came to the Premises, “a strip of sand in 1925 and saw where a house was – was to be built on the ocean front,” and saw “the historic advertisements which brought them to that strip of land, which included references to using the beach and bathing.  They saw the map which had nothing interfering with them going directly to the beach, other than the potential for a new boardwalk being constructed, which was never constructed. ” (T66:20-T67:4).  The trial court also referenced the historical photographs, which provided insight and “really show . . . how [the parties] viewed it. ” (T67:4-7).  “[T]he backyard . . . was essentially the beach . . . clearly they walked directly to the water.
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  a.  Actor operates a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or revocation in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, and the actor’s license was suspended or revoked for a first violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, and the actor had previously been Operating Motor convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 while under suspension for that first offense.
[brief] In Erazo, the Court held that the interview of a defendant who was escorted by police officers to the station after a body of a girl was found below the window of his apartment building was non-custodial in nature because he was treated more akin to a potential witness rather than a suspect:  There is no evidence that defendant was forced to go to the police station or that he was handcuffed during the drive.  Indeed, there is no reason to believe that the short trip was anything but voluntary.  Moreover, when defendant arrived at the station, he sat on a bench -- unsupervised and unrestrained -- among other members of the public, including his neighbors from the apartment complex and members of [...]’s family.  In no way was defendant's freedom of action restrained to a “degree associated with” formal arrest.  See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517.  The trial court did not attach significance to the detectives’ escorting defendant to the second-floor interview room, and neither do we.  There is no reason to believe defendant would have known where to go unless taken there.  Defendant was in an unfamiliar place and was led by people familiar with the premises.  Id. (slip op. at 13).  Like in Erazo, here, the trial court relied on a variety of evidence to find that the interview was non-custodial in nature including the fact that Defendant was allowed to utilize his cell-phone during the interview, the nature and tone of questioning as non-accusatory and polite, the state of the investigation as being focused on [...] at the time, the short duration of the interview, and the fact that he was allowed to leave with his father at the end of the interview:
[brief] The trial court erred by not ordering or allowing parties affected by the Boundary Commissioners’ Report and the court’s decision to enforce it to be joined as parties (1T179-80; 2T9-18 & Pa96).  [...] consistently maintained that the impact of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report on property owners not before the trial court required that the Report be “set aside” under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3.  When the trial court made it clear after giving post-trial notice to the other affected owners that it nonetheless planned to proceed, the Patiernos sought time to join the other owners which the trial court denied.  Putting aside the problematic procedural posture of noticing or joining parties post-trial, the real problem is that the trial court failed to confront whether the scope of the Report rendered it ultra vires, as the Patiernos maintained.  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1 expressly applies to a dispute arising “between the owners of adjoining lands.
[brief] -------- passim Thompson v. City of Atlantic, 386 N.J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 2006)  ----------- 38  Toll v. West Windsor, 173 N.J. 502 (2002)  ---------------------------------- 7, 8, 29 Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Morris Cnty. Mun. Utils. Auth., 433 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2013)  ----------------------------------------------- 19, 20, 31  STATUTES
[brief] THE UNION’S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE ARBITRATOR REJECTING ITS REVISED FINAL OFFERS IS MERITLESS AND PROPERLY REJECTED BY [...].  In Point II, A.2, of its appellate brief, the Union claims that Arbitrator committed reversible error by not considering the Union’s revised final offers that were made after the hearing commenced, and to which the City objected because, contrary to the Arbitrator’s request, it contained new substantive proposals rather than specific contract language and rationale for the changes identified in the offers previously submitted.  (Aa049-054)  The Union’s argument reflects a lack of understanding of what a final offer is, and the purpose of same; finality and identification of the issues prior to the arbitration hearing.
[brief] Continued research on enforceability of . . . [redacted]; began summary of case law regarding issue.  | 2.6 | $780.00 | $4,444.00 | | 8/24/22 |  [Redacted]  . . . the case more in-depth . . . [redacted].  | .6 | $228.00 | $4,672.00 | | 8/24/22 |  Email [...] regarding . . . [redacted]  . . . | .8 | $304.00 | $4,976.00 | | 8/25/22 |  Continued research on . . .  [redacted]  . . . issue [redacted], particularly concerning . . . [redacted]  . . .; conferred with [...] about same.  | 2.6 | $780.00 | $5,756.00 | | 8/29/22 |  Email . . .  [redacted]  . . .  Also, review [redacted].  Email [...] [redacted].  | .5 | $190.00 | $5,946.00 | | 10/3/22 |  Email from [...] indicating she [redacted]  . . .  Email [...] regarding the [redacted]  . . .  Reply to the questions about [redacted]  . . .  Email to/from the same following up . . . [redacted].  | 1.25 | $475.00 | $6,421.00 | | 10/24/22 |  Email and call [...] [redacted]  . . .  Indicates that she is considering [redacted].  | .4 | $152.00 | $6,573.00 | | 10/26/22 |  Advise to [...] re [redacted] | .2 | $76.00 | $6,649.00 | | 10/26/22 |  Memo on [redacted]  . . .  Conference with [...] on [redacted]  . . .  Email [...].  | .4 | $152.00 | $6,801.00 | | 3/3/23 |  Call with [...] regarding [redacted] | 1 | $380.00 | $7,181.00 | --- 82 Pa847.
[brief] The first time the Appellant experienced any slipping, hydroplaning or loss of control was as he applied the brakes just before the subject accident.  [...] testified at trial that he was traveling slowly and in the process of reducing his speed when the accident occurred.  Contrary to arguments made by counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent in connection with motion practice, the charge conferences, and in his closing, there is absolutely no evidence that [...] was traveling at an excessive speed.
[directive] 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor manufactures, distributes, dispenses or possesses with intent to distribute CDS:  Numerous types of CDS are covered by this statute: Manufacturing, Heroin or cocaine, 5 ounces or more; or LSD or its analog, in a quantity of 100 milligrams or Distributing, more; or phencyclidine or its analog, in a quantity of 10 grams or more; or methamphetamine 2C:35-5(a)(b)  Dispensing or 1st Degree $100,000 to $250,000  No 10% or its analog, 5 ounce or more; or marijuana, 25 pounds or more; or 50 marijuana plants or Possessing CDS with more; or hashish, 5 pounds or more.
[brief] In addition, [...] applied for attorney’s fees and filed a supporting brief on June 25, 2018, [...] misrepresented to the court that [...] appeared in a hearing to testify for [...], not his client [...].  [...] told the court that Mr. Tung’s appearance was not subpoenaed by a lawyer to appear, but through fax or email from [...].  (See Da133.)  [...]’s intentional misrepresentation to court was for the sole purpose to mislead the court that [...] was colluded with [...] to manipulate [...] in the divorce proceeding.  The truth is that it was [...], Esq. who subpoenaed [...] to court to give testimony.  [...] still has the original subpoena from [...], Esq. in possession.
[brief] 2  A. CAFRA And DEP’s CZM Rules........................................................................  2  B. DEP Initially Denied [...]’s Permit Application, Finding It Did Not Meet the CZM Scenic Resources And Design Rule.  .........................  6  C. DEP And [...] Intended To Settle The Permit Denial Because The Scenic Resources and Design Rule Is Inapplicable Within The Long Branch Development Zone.  .................................................................  8  D. DEP Issued A Permit To [...] And [...] Appeals.  ...............  12 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................
[brief] (Borough’s Brief, page 17.)  According to the Borough, the [...] decision is defeats plaintiff’s claims because it is “directly on point. ”  Id.  Curiously, the Borough does not discuss the facts presented to the Court in [...] or address the discussion in Plaintiff’s Brief that clearly distinguishes those facts from the facts herein.  (Plaintiff’s Brief, beginning on Page 43.)  In [...], the notices were sent to the newspapers in a timely manner with no direction not to publish.  In contrast, the notices at issue herein were sent after the publication deadlines for the municipally designated newspapers and with a directive not to publish.  Id.  Simply put, the [...] decision does not address the issue of public entity fault in the failure to publish.
[brief] Based on the Biennial Bridge Inspection, the settlement issue at the north abutment joint existed as early as April 22, 2015.  (Pa1343).  On November 17, 2015, emergency paving was performed in the southbound left lane at the north approach to the bridge in order to correct the settlement and return the pavement to proper grade.  (Pa1396, Pa1397).  Between the time of the April inspection and the November corrective paving, there are no records that have been produced which indicated that any measures were taken by any Defendant to fix or warn users of the roadway of the settlement condition.  In other words, the dangerous condition existed in the travel lane for approximately seven months.  Although construction on the bridge had already begun, the [...] still maintained a level of responsibility for roadway maintenance and safety.  (Pa797 at 12:4-17 and Pa800 at 21:13-22:1-4).  In fact, maintenance patrolled the roads every morning looking for defects.  (Pa808 at 55:2-9).  Accordingly, this settlement condition existed for such a significant time that the [...] maintenance department should have independently identified it.  Accordingly, for the purposes of this motion, the defect was in the travel portion of the roadway from April 22, 2015 through November 17, 2015 when it was finally fixed.
[brief] ”  *State v. Sloane*, 111 N.J. 293, 299 (1988).  The “rational-basis test imposes a low threshold” for charging a lesser-included offense if the instruction is requested, *State v. Crisantos*, 102 N.J. 265, 278 (1986), and is met so long as “it would not be idle to have the jury decide whether the defendant had committed the lesser-included offense."  *State v. Mauricio*, 117 N.J. 402, 417-18 (1990) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted).  The question is merely whether the evidence “leave[s] room for dispute. ”
[directive] 조기석방 금지법(NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)  조기석방 금지법  사건에 대한 보충 답변양식(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)  No Early Release Act  Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA) Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) (Korean) 귀하가 년6 월9 일부터
[brief] ”  Judson v. Peoples Bank Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 77 (1954) (citation omitted).  In sworn testimony, [...] and the independent eyewitness [...] both provided competent evidence that described the sudden stop of the bus as “heavy,” “abrupt,” and sufficiently forceful to violently toss Plaintiff to the floor of the bus on her back, not surprisingly causing her serious and permanent injuries, but the lower court nonetheless impermissibly weighed that evidence.  The trial court did not accept as true all that evidence, and did not accord Plaintiff the benefit of all legitimate inferences which could be deduced from that evidence, thereby depriving Plaintiff of her fundamental right to have a jury determine whether the bus driver drove in a negligent manner that day.  At her deposition, Plaintiff described the force of the stop as “heavy” (emphasis added), and that’s why her body went backwards, striking the floor of the bus with such force sufficient to herniate a number of discs in her spine, and cause injury to her knees and shoulder as well.  (47a, 20:5-9)  In her answer to Uniform Form “A” interrogatory number 2, [...] consistently certified, under penalty of perjury, that the bus “abruptly stopped” causing her to sustain severe and permanent injuries.  (28a)  An independent eyewitness to this event -- [...] -- confirmed in her sworn statement made on February 26th, 2020, just two days after the incident, that the bus **suddenly and “abruptly made a sudden stop. ”**  (60a)(Emphasis added.)  Eyewitness [...] further certified under oath that she observed [...] fall “**violently to the floor as a result of the sudden stop. **”  Ibid.  (Emphasis added.)  The legion of case law and Rule 4:46 collectively make clear that this evidence must be accepted as true and all legitimate inferences flowing therefrom should have been accorded to Plaintiff.
[brief] -  The Warning Notice was served on June 24, 2015 for conduct [...] allegedly engaged in at least six months before formal discipline was issued related to the [...] ([...]) Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Update presentation [...] gave on January 29, 2015 (Pa668) and not formally served until June 24, 2015 notwithstanding the employer’s disciplinary policy states that disciplinary action should be “timely, appropriate and directly related to the seriousness of the infraction committed to encourage proper conduct and performance. ”  (Pa667-Pa668).  Again, a jury could find the employer’s failure to comply with its own policies to be circumstantial evidence that the real reason for the disciplinary action was retaliation.  -  As to the allegation that [...] made “disparaging comments” during his presentation at the [...] ([...]) Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Update on January 29, 2015, it is undisputed that [...] has never been told by [...], [...] or anyone else what he said that was disparaging and [...] affirmatively denied making “disparaging remarks.
[brief] | 16 | | Twp. Of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62 (1998) | 18 | | Oliva v. City of Garfield, 1 N.J. 184 (1948) | 18 | | Coventry Square v. Westward Zoning Board of Adjustment, 138 N.J. 285 (1994) | 21 | | Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987) | 21, 25, 27 | | Puleio v. North Brunswick Township Board of Adjustment, 375 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 2005) | 22 | | Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 83 N.J. 309 (1980) | 23 | | Urban v. Planning Bd., 124 N.J. 651 (1991) | 23 | | Scully-Bozarth Post v. Burlington Planning Bd., 362 N.J. Super. 296(App. Div.), certif. den. 178 N.J. 34 (2003) | 23 | | Conselice v. Borough of Seaside, 358 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 2003) | 23 | Bonaventure Int'l v. Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 2002)  23 Funeral Home Managements, Inc. v. Basralian, 319 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1996))  22, 23 Kohl v. Mayor and Counsel of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268 (1967)  23 Smart SMR v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Adj., 152 N.J. 309 (1998)  24 Feiler v. Fort Lee Bd.  of Adj., 240 N.J. Super. 250 (App. Div. 1990))  24 Burbridge v. Mine Hill, 117 N.J. 376 (1990)  25 N.Y. SMSA, Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Adjustment of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2004)  28 Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor, 172 N.J. 75 (2002)  28  15 High St. v. Borough of Helmetta Planning Bd., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 386, 2022 WL 710788 28, 29 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq. 3, 14 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 15, 16 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(b)
[brief] FAC ¶ 27, Pa1614; Pa2550-59 (Lemus Cert Opp SJ).  On June 17, 2015, [...] obtained the right to earn Solar Energy Renewable Credits ("SREC") from the [...] ("[...]") pursuant to the New Jersey Solar Act, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87 Subsection (t), which is specific to brownfields.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED [...]’S RETALIATION CLAIMS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  CEPA provides a statutory cause of action for *certain* whistleblowers who are subjected to retaliatory discharge.  *N.J.S.A.* 34:19-1 to -8; see also *Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc.*, 197 N.J. 81, 103 (2008).  The purpose of CEPA is to protect and encourage employees who report illegal or unethical workplace activities.  *Allen v. Cape May Cty.*, 246 N.J. 275, 289 (2021); *Dzwonar v. McDevitt*, 177 N.J. 451, 461 (2003); *Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ.*, 138 N.J. 405, 431 (1994).
[brief] Decedent was Easily Influenced By Respondent  Another misleading portrayal of the Decedent is that she was “strong willed. ”  Indeed, Respondent testified that Decedent had what Respondent characterized as “abandonment issues,” explaining that Decedent would not bring up how she would feel if she pushed enough times and instead, she would just give up and surrender and not talk about it.  12T 55:22-56:16.  Respondent testified that her abandonment issues were so severe that she sought counseling for it, although she did not disclose who the counseling was through or when it took place.  11T89:24 to 90:9.  Examples of the Decedents weak will were provided by Respondent.  She testified that during her drug addiction, her friend base changed and she “felt more comfortable with people who were similar to her. ” (12T102:9-14).  Respondent brought her “friends” home, including some with criminal records, but Decedent would let them in and not say anything, although she was very concerned.  (12T62:20 to 63:63:19).  Respondent later thanked the Decedent for “trying to like my friends. ” (P703a).  Petitioner bought Respondent a car despite being cautioned that giving Respondent a car was not in her best interest.  (P573a).  Respondent thanked the Decedent for “buying me a car, even though I was a brat about it. ” (P703a).  [...] also testified that when Respondent was building the home that Decedent was paying for, Respondent decided she wanted to have an elevator installed, which Decedent resisted, stating it was too expensive.  (9T70:6-11).  Yet, Respondent obviously worked on Decedent and got the elevator that she wanted.  (12T99:22 to 100:23).  Decedent ended up paying $445,820 for Respondent’s home (P566a) and took back a mortgage of $350,000.  (P656a)  Respondent knew how to manipulate the Decedent to get what she wanted.  (9T63:13-22; 9T73:2-11; 9T759 to 76:17; P573a).
[brief] See, State v. Caoili, 135 N.J. 252, 264-65 (1994); see also, State v. Gorga, supra at 116.  Allowing such evidence to be presented to the jury would contradict the New Jersey Supreme Court’s instruction that trial courts shall engage in their “gatekeeper role” by preventing speculative or unsupported evidence from being presented to the jury.  See, Saddle River, supra; see also, Hilton, supra.  As the trial court’s rulings conflict with well-established condemnation law, the Appellate Division should reverse the trial court’s rulings of June 7, 2024.
[brief] ”)  In those cases where the court has applied the Consumption Exception to require an insurer to provide a defense, it was because the complaint alleged an injury caused by a fungi or bacteria on or in a good or product.  For instance, in Acuity, the court held that the insurer had a duty to defend where the complaint alleged “bodily injuries suffered as a result of mold infestation. ”  124 F. Supp.3d 787, 792.  In Dillard, the court held that the insurer had a duty to defend where the complaint alleged the claimant died because of exposure to legionnaire’s disease he contracted by bathing in a hot tub.  Contrary to [...]’s misdescription of these cases, Db28, fn. 5, both courts required that the claimants prove bodily injury to obtain indemnification.
[brief] 4.  Section 1:7-4 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as fol- 2 lows: 1:7-4.  Any two or more citizens of the State may, within the time pre- scribed by section 1:7-1 of this Title, present to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court such a petition, signed by them, as is authorized by said section 1:7-1 to be presented by the Attorney-General, and the court shall proceed thereon in the manner provided by sections 1:7-2 and 1:7-3 of this Title.