ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After being placed on administrative leave on August 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause to Proceed Summarily Pursuant to R.67-1 and R.69-1, seeking a summary hearing to void his administrative leave.  (Pa59 at ¶13).  The Court denied Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause on September 29, 2017.  (Pa59 at ¶14).  Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint in this matter on February 8, 2018, alleging that he was retaliated against for exercising his right to Freedom of Speech in violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) and in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act.  (Pa63 to Pa77).  On September 30, 2022, following the close of discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Pa30 to Pa31).  In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his freedom of speech claim.  (Pa19 at n.1).  The Court held oral argument as to the Motion for Summary Judgment on December 12, 2022.  (1T)¹.  By Order dated May 22, 2023, the Trial Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in its entirety with prejudice.  (Pa12 to Pa13).  On May 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement.  (Pa1 to Pa11).  ¹  Plaintiff identified the transcript as “1T. ”
[brief] Further, although there is no reference to reliance in the subject Order and statement of facts, one can only surmise that the trial judge relied on the certification of an individual named [...], who was not identified during discovery, but who signed a certification that she was manager of the [...] at the time of this incident.  However, Kocses’s certification blatantly contradicts the testimony of [...], the [...] employee working on the actual date of the subject incident.  Dakhno, a sales associate testified that the only specified maintenance duty of a sales associate was to pick up clothing or hangers seen on the ground in the morning and when leaving.  This testimony conflicts with the certification of Kocses, which states that after the store opened, the Manager-On-Duty and sales associates continuously walked the store throughout the day to make sure the store was in order.  This included inspecting the floors to make sure they were clean, dry, free of spills and free of hazards.  Regardless, there is no evidence or statement in Kocses’s certification that on the actual day of this incident anyone continuously walked the store throughout the day to make sure the store was in order or inspected the floors to make sure they were clean, dry, free of spills and free of hazards.  There is no evidence that Kocses was even there the day of the subject incident.  This alone creates an issue to be determined by a finder of fact.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Likewise, the Legislature violated N.J.S.A. 52:11-78(a)(5), which, unlike OPMA, does not have a “to the extent known” exception.  Without publication, --- \(^4\)  The State purports that a calendar labeled as Vol. XLV, No. 57 (hereafter “Calendar 57”) prepared on January 7, 2022 was publicly available, but the Legislature’s calendar demonstrates that Calendar 57 was not posted until January 14, 2022 – four days after the Act was passed.  (Pra45-50.)  The only available Calendar 56 did not list that either A.6260 or S.49 would be considered on January 6 or 10, 2022.  (Pra38-44.)  Calendar 56 is available at [https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/publications/legislative-calendar/010422a.pdf](https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/publications/legislative-calendar/010422a.pdf) (last accessed on June 16, 2024) and through the drop down on the legislative calendar page for January 7, 2022, and Calendar 57 is available at [https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/publications/legislative-calendar/010722.pdf](https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/publications/legislative-calendar/010722.pdf) (last accessed June 16, 2024), and through the drop down on the legislative calendar page for January 14, 2022.  the statutory purpose of notice to the public was undermined.  The State has not provided any certification stating that this calendar was publicly available as required by N.J.S.A. 52:11-78(a)(5).  (Ra4-6; Pra45-50.)  Nor was there any discovery to demonstrate the authenticity of Calendar 57.  (Pa350-51.)  This Court should reject the State’s self-serving argument that there was a calendar listing A.6260 or S.49 because there is no proof the calendar was actually available to the public as required by statute, N.J.S.A. 52:11-78.  (Pra45-50.)  Because the notices in this matter were insufficient – no bill text was available prior to hearings in violation of N.J.S.A. 52:11-78(a)(3-4), and no calendar alerted the public to consideration of these bills, the statute should not be afforded the ordinary presumption of regularity and it should be voided.
[brief] ....................  14  State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 504 (1983)  ..................................................  12  Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir, 1991) ................................................................. 31, 32, 43 Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977) ...........................................
[brief] [...] also made clear that the [...] Respondents had nothing to do with the termination of the Lease with Appellant:  Q.  Now, in the complaint in this case, the Plaintiff, [...], asserts that [...] or [...], which are the entities owned by [...], induced [...] to terminate the lease with [...] or his company.  Is there any truth to that?  A.  No, in fact, the opposite.  (Pa001805 – 001806).  As noted above, Appellants admit they defaulted under the Lease due to a dispute with their partners.  Simply put, the [...] Respondents were not the cause of the Appellants’ default, and the [...] Respondents did not and could not “steal” the Solar Rights from the Appellants.  The Appellants defaulted on the Lease, lost control of the property and lost the ability to use their solar right.  End of story.  The Appellants understand this.
[brief] [...] testified he would require personal guarantees, and would not give possession to a $2 million dollar building without personal guarantees.  Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts, ¶6, Pa53, [...] Deposition, 177-24 to 178-16, Pa90-91.  Defendants, [...] and [...], also argue that a second applicable rule of construction is that “ambiguous terms are generally construed against the drafter of the contract.
[brief] **  As previously indicated, [...], P.E., PTOE (Certified Professional Traffic Operations Engineer) of the [...] performed an evaluation of the parking lot to determine if it was designed in compliance with generally accepted engineering standards and practices for parking lot design.  The evaluation also included an accident reconstruction to assess relative distances, vehicle speed, stopping distances and [...]’s sight lines to determine to what extent, if any that may have contributed to the cause of the accident.  (Da33-Da37, §3 Incident Analysis & Discussion; §4 Conclusions).
[brief] Id. at 330-31.  In particular, that both strands stem from “neutral principles of state contract law” and Atalese does not violate the FAA.  Ibid.  The first is the strong thread wrapping “contracts in which individuals waive their statutory or constitutional rights. ”  Id. at 331.  As recognized by [...], Atalese relied on a host of both arbitration cases and non-arbitration cases “involving a party’s waiver of statutory rights in which our courts have required that the waiver be clear and unmistakable. ”  Id. at 332 (citing Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443-44).  In doing so, Atalese acknowledged “[a]rbitration clauses are not singled out for more burdensome treatment than other waiver-of-rights clauses under state law. ”  Ibid. (quoting Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444) (recognizing Atalese applied “neutral principles of state contract law”).  [...]’s challenges to some of the cited non-arbitration cases could best be described as “uncharitable. ”  As one example, the focus of West Jersey Title & Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Trust Co. was not truly the spouse’s conduct; rather, because of the nature of the property rights at stake and the clarity of the document’s language, even particularly egregious conduct like imposing costs on others would not lead to waiver.  27 N.J. 144, 153 (1958).  Likewise, [...] magnifies a minor point in Christ Hospital v. New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, 330 N.J. Super. 55, 63-64 (App. Div. 2000).  If there is any mention of conduct (plaintiffs presume [...] refers to “[t]he Department never notified Christ Hospital . . .”) it is dwarfed by the discussion of contractual waiver.  Id. at 63.  The decision specifically provides that “[a]lthough there are some circumstances under which statutory rights may be waived . . . even in those circumstances, ‘any such waiver must be clearly and unmistakably established, and contractual language alleged to constitute a waiver will not be read expansively. ’”  Ibid.  (citing Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Galarza, 306 N.J. Super. 384, 391 (App. Div. 1997); then quoting Red Bank Regional Educ. Ass'n v. Red Bank Regional High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 122, 140 (2000)).  Because “Christ Hospital certainly did not agree to any such condition . . . the Department did not show a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to a hearing. ”  Id. at 63-64.  Simply put, these and the other cases cited by Atalese and re-endorsed by [...] do concern contractual waiver and do subject non-arbitration clauses to the same rigors.  And there are other cases that rise to [...]’s challenge, (Db33), such as Aron v. Rialto Realty Co., 100 N.J. Eq. 513, 518 (Ch. 1927), aff’d o.b. 102 N.J. Eq. 331 (E. & A. 1928), where the Chancellor applied the general requirement of “a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of the party showing such a purpose” to provisions in a property deed waiving zoning restrictions, and Country Chevrolet, Inc. v. North Brunswick Planning Board, 190 N.J. Super. 376, 379 (App. Div. 1983), which held a stipulation of dismissal “without prejudice” did not waive a planning board’s right to enforce Rule 4:69-6’s time bar against a late-refiled prerogative writs complaint.
[brief] \textsuperscript{11}  The Legislature has the power to control and regulate the taking of game.  Hopewell Tp. v. Gruchowski, 29 N.J. Super. 605, 609 (Co. 1954) (Municipalities cannot regulate hunting by ordinance).  Prior to 1948, the Legislature itself regulated hunting and trapping of game.  United Hunters Assoc. of N.J. v. Bontempo, 53 N.J. Super. 181, 189-90 (App. Div. 1958).  N.J.S.A. 23:4-1 provides that the Legislature has the authority to establish hunting seasons and the parameters of taking game unless otherwise established by the State Fish and Game Code.  Even if the Council is acting in the capacity of a quasi-legislative body in promulgating the Code, United Hunters Assoc. of N.J. v. Bontempo, supra, at 190, there is a greater reason for such a regulatory agency not to be comprised of members of a self-interested private organization with a majority membership.
[brief] Q.  Well, you say unlock, I say develop.  We’ll play the semantic game.  That’s fine.  So, we have a nonconforming use here?  A.  Non-conforming use – Q.  The existing [...] is nonconforming?  A.  The use is permitted.  Q. Right, but its nonconforming?  A.  there are nonconforming design elements.  Is that – Q. Yeah?  A.  I would agree to that.  Q.  Okay, nonconforming.  Are you improving it or making it more nonconforming by adding the density?  A.  So, what I’m measuring here is that there are deviations that we are seeking, but the majority of them, we are not – we are not making the worse threshold worse, if that makes sense...  Q. – as the planner does, isn’t it better to take a nonconforming use and improve it, rather than making it more nonconforming?  A.  I have an issue with using the word use...  Q.  Yes, it is.  Density I’m talking about.  A.  Right, okay.  Q.  You’re making it worse?  A.  We’re making it noncompliant.  Absolutely.  Q.  That’s – so, you’re making the nonconformity more nonconforming?  A.  We – Q.  Besides the variances, you’re making the density greater, which is making more noncompliant.  A. Correct, yes.  [(Pa418-419.) (emphasis added). ]  [...] did not properly respond to these questions and correct the faulty premise of the questions from [...].
[brief] [...]’s 300 Line Project included the construction of approximately 128 miles of 30-inch diameter underground pipeline looping, consisting of, among other things, one 17.2-mile pipeline loop in northern New Jersey, 15.9 miles of which is located in the Highlands region and 10.9 miles of which is within the Highlands Preservation Area.  In April 2009, [...] submitted an application for a HAD under Exemption #11.  By resolution dated November 12, 2009, the [...] stated that it “… finds that the revised project, including specifically the Comprehensive Mitigation Plan, constitutes “routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility” and that the project is “consistent with the goals and purposes” of the Highlands Act.  Aa0078.  By letter dated February 16, 2010, the Executive Director of the [...] confirmed the 300 Line Project’s exemption from the Highlands Act.  Aa0221.  [...] ultimately approved the exemption by letter dated February 11, 2010.  Aa0224.  In granting Exemption #11, [...] found that N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) does not limit the scope of an exemption to an existing right of way or utility line; rather, it also extends to upgrades of “systems”.
[brief] 1  Procedural History ......................................................................................................  4 Statement of Facts .......................................................................................................  6  Legal Argument .........................................................................................................  10  The Standard of Review in the Superior Court, Appellate Division...10  I.  THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT [...] WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION AND THE TRIAL COURT’S CONTRARY FINDING WAS CLEAR ERROR (Da033; T.3-1 – T.24-23).
[brief] Unlike some other states, New Jersey adopts a flexible approach in determining whether to couch an action as direct or derivative in the context of closely held entities.  *Am. List Couns., Inc. v. Andrew Ostroy & Belardi-Ostroy, Ltd.*, 2013 WL 12201498, at *7 (D.N.J. July 31, 2013).  This is because the difficulties that arise when trying to apply corporate norms to closely held entities “has led to the development of substantial authority permitting departure from these norms and recognition instead of the real relationships of the principals. ”  *68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella*, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 558 (Law Div. 1976).  For decades, our courts have molded a body of law holding that: the conception of a legal entity distinct from the persons composing the corporation is to be disregarded, in equity, in cases not within the reason and policy of this legal fiction, *e.g.*, to adjust equities among members of the corporation internally where the rights of the public or third persons are in no wise involved.
[brief] The concept of preemption rests on the principal “a municipality, which is an agent of the State, cannot act contrary to the State. ”  Overlook Terrace Management Corp. v. Rent Control Board of West New York, 71 NJ 451, 461 (1976).  “When the Legislature has preempted a field by comprehensive regulation, a municipal ordinance attempting to regulate the same field is void if the municipal ordinance adversely affects the legislative scheme. ”  Plaza Joint Venture v. Atlantic City, 174 N.J. Super 231, 238 (App. Div. 1980) (citing Fair Lawn Ed. Assn. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Ed., 79 N.J. 574, 586 (1979); Summer v. Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 554 (1969)).  The Overlook Terrace Court stated five pertinent questions for a court to consider when deciding whether a field has been preempted by the State Legislature:
[brief] The Amended Resolution further stated that the Building Height was to be 43’ 6” on which there the parapet would be constructed.  This too was ignored by the Appellant.  Instead of addressing the foregoing provisions in the Amended Resolution, the Appellant relies entirely upon his self-serving interpretation of Paragraph 21 which is misplaced.  Amended Resolution Paragraph 21 is simply a finding of fact regarding the documents that [...] submitted to the Board as part of its application.  (Pa11).  Nothing in Amended Resolution Paragraph 21 either adopts the Sketch or makes it part of the final approval.  Instead, it merely recognizes that, as a fact, it was submitted to the Board.
[brief] Even if this Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings, they are insufficient to establish that the detectives had reasonable articulable suspicion that [...] was armed.  It is “well-settled” that “seemingly furtive movements, without more, are insufficient to constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion. ”  Nyema, 249 N.J. at 530; State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990); State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 648, modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002); State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 276-77 (2017); State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 400 (2022).
[brief] Defendant has failed to provide a compelling legal argument as to why any portion of the decisions below should be overturned.  His brief is an attempt to simply reassert the testimony of Defendant and Defendant’s witness as though it were unchallenged and not properly assessed by the trial court, and as though the initial appeal did not occur.  It is respectfully submitted that, for all of the foregoing reasons and authorities cited herein, Defendant’s arguments be rejected in full.
[brief] Chapter 230 “Land Use and Development Regulations”, Section 230-134 “Commercial Vehicles in Residential Districts”, sub-sections A and B only, of the Code of the [...] is hereby amended to read as follows:  § 230-134  Commercial vehicles in residential districts.  A.  On any residential lot, no person shall park, store or maintain any commercially operated vehicle without first obtaining a parking permit for each permitted vehicle.  However, any commercially operated vehicle in connection with construction on the site for which a construction permit has been issued or which is otherwise permitted by Township ordinances shall not be required to obtain a parking permit.  B.  Parking permits shall be issued in accordance with the following standards:  (1)  Any commercial vehicle, regardless of registry, other than a pickup truck or regulation van, totally or partially used in a commercial capacity, as defined herein, shall require a permit.  (2)  Any pickup truck or regulation van, regardless of registry, equipped with commercial and/or industrial racks, permanent structural alterations and/or advertising, consistent with a commercial vehicle usage as defined herein, shall require a permit.  A pickup truck or regulation van, regardless of registry, not meeting the commercial vehicle definition contained herein shall be exempt from the permit requirement.  (3)  One permit will be issued per residential lot up to three acres.  (4)  One additional permit may be issued per each acre over three acres upon proper application and compliance with all requirements.  (5)  In the event that the acreage is reduced after a permit has been issued, the permit will be voided and a new application must be submitted.  (6)  All vehicles meeting the definitions contained herein must be garaged or screened from view of neighboring properties.  Screening must be approved by the Zoning Officer.  (7)  All vehicles meeting the definitions contained herein must be owned or used by a resident of the premises.  (8)  No vehicle meeting the definitions contained herein shall exceed a gross weight of 10,000 pounds or 25 feet in length, nor shall any such vehicle, equipment or machinery exceed a total height of nine feet.  (9)  Permits will be renewed on a yearly basis and conditions reviewed to determine compliance with this section.  (10)  Falsification of any question on the application will result in an immediate denial of the request or revocation if the permit has been issued.  (11)  Issuance of a permit requires strict compliance with any restrictions set by the Zoning Officer.  Any deviation from such restrictions will subject the applicant to revocation of the permit.  All other portions of this Section shall remain unchanged.
[brief] See DA229.  For clarity, the impacted provisions of the Agreement are set forth as follows, with the severed terms and/or provisions *italicized* (collectively the “severed terms”):  10.  Concurrent with the execution this Agreement, [...] shall submit to Chief of Police [...] a valid and binding letter of resignation pending retirement from his employment with the [...].  This letter will state that [...] is resigning from his employment with the [...] for medical reasons.  A copy of this resignation letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.  This letter of resignation shall be valid, binding and irrevocable at the time it is submitted to the Chief.  [...]’s resignation shall be a resignation in good standing.  [...]’s use of the term “resignation” in this document will neither argument nor reduce any benefit [...] would normally receive under the CNA.  See DA191 at ¶ 10. 11.  Notwithstanding the binding and irrevocable nature of [...]’s letter of resignation, the letter will be held in escrow while and until [...]’s involuntary disability pension application is decided upon by the [...] and [...] has exhausted all rights of appeal flowing from the disability application.  See DA191 at ¶ 11. 12.  It is expressly understood that [...]’s resignation from his position is herein acknowledged by the [...] as one made in good standing.  This resignation is final and irrevocable regardless of the disposition of the involuntary disability pension application and upon [...] exhausting all rights of appeal, if any.  See DA191-DA192 at ¶ 12. 17.  [...] and the [...] acknowledge and agree that if [...] is granted an Ordinary Disability by [...], and in the unlikely event his medical condition improves thereafter to allow a return to employment, that [...] will be reinstated to his position and then will resign his position within thirty (30) days of his reinstatement, without any compensation due to him from the [...] during this thirty (30) day period.  See DA192-DA193 at ¶ 17.  On August 18, 2023, the [...] filed the instant appeal.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, /s/  **[...]**  E. DREW BRITCHER  Dated: June 13, 2024  [...] and [...], her husband Plaintiffs, v. [...], [...], [...]  d/b/a [...]; JOHN DOE 1-10; JANE DOE 1-10; JOHN DOE CORP 1-10, fictitious names, Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY