ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] In the event that one of the authorization requirements is satisfied, a pursuit shall not be automatically undertaken.  An officer must still consider the following factors: (a) likelihood of successful apprehension; 5 USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy (b) whether the identity of the violator is known so that later apprehension is possible; (c) degree of risk created by pursuit: (1) volume, type, speed and direction of vehicular traffic; (2) nature of the area (residential, commercial, school zone, open highway, etc.); (3) population density and volume of pedestrian traffic; (4) environmental factors, such as weather and darkness; and (5) road conditions (construction, poor repair, extreme curves, intersections controlled by traffic signals or signs, ice, etc.); and (d) police officer characteristics: (1) driving skills; (2) familiarity with roads; and (3) condition of police vehicle.  3.4
[brief] Id. McLean held that it went beyond that narrow area of permissible lay opinion for an officer to testify that he believed he had witnessed a drug deal.  Id. at 461.  The Court held that the construction of the "perception" requirement is strict: lay opinion is admissible only if it is "firmly rooted in the personal observations and perceptions of the lay witness in the traditional meaning of the [sic] N.J.R.E. 701," id. at 459.  Citing State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 199-200 (1989), the McLean Court defined the "perception" requirement as "rest[ing] on the acquisition of knowledge through use of one's sense of touch, taste, sight, smell, or hearing."  (Emphasis added).  Consequently, the Court in McLean stated that permissible lay opinion testimony is "an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with firsthand knowledge," and does not convey information about what the officer 'believed,' 'thought,' or 'suspected.'"
[brief] N.J.S.A.§39:6A-5.1a; N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(a).  See Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 380 N.J. Super. 463, 469-70 (noting that insurance carriers can create a "blanket policy" to choose alternative dispute resolution in all PIP disputes).  As assignees of the Plaintiffs’ insureds, the Defendants step into the shoes of the insureds and are subject to the same binding arbitration provisions as the insureds.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs, through their own arbitration clauses, are contractually bound to seek the relief they now pray for in their complaint in arbitration and not the overburdened short-staffed Superior Courts.
[directive] Form Scoring ODARA completed of a a copy transmit shall officer enforcement law The in completion, after its practicable soon as as Office Prosecutor's County applicable the to ODARA original  The Prosecutor. County the by prescribed procedures the with accordance file. case in the maintained be shall Form Scoring for Justice Criminal Division of the to Foam Scoring ODARA the of Transmission 4.6.6 Collection. Data Centralized Prosecutor's the Form to Scoring ODARA the of copy a transmitting to addition In the to Form Scoring the of copy email a scan and also shall officer enforcement law the Office, [...]. address email the utilizing Justice Criminal of Division 47 Page Forms Scoring Scores and ODARA Providing and Communicating of Prohibition 4.6.7 Judiciary. to ODARA. the utilize prepared to not currently is it that clear made has Judiciary The the to disseminated or communicated be shall not scores ODARA notice, further until Thus, and administrators, court and judges including officers, judicial (i.e., Judiciary of the members offered be shall not Forms Scoring ODARA completed and personnel), program service pretrial applications prosecution (e.g., criminal of a every stage to applies prohibition This evidence. in and detention, pretrial for hearings release, of conditions for requests complaint-warrants, for the from information learned all any and utilize should enforcement law However, trials). a seek whether including to prosecutions, criminal during decisions critical frame to ODARA should can and prosecutor the Additionally, detention. seek to whether and complaint-warrant a of support in ODARA the of administration through learned facts any to reference make appropriate.
[brief] State Cases  Bilowit v. Dolitsky, 124 N.J. Super. 101 (Ch. Div. 1973)  ...........................................  6  Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516 (1873)  ........................................................................  8  Caruso v. Caruso, 104 N.J. Eq. 588 (Ch. 1929) .............................................................  6  Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2007) ..................................................  1  Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507 (1981) ..............................................................................  5, 7, 8  In re Estate of Santolino, 384 N.J. Super. 567 (Ch. Div. 2005) .........................................  8  Patel v. Navitlal, 265 N.J. Super. 402 (Ch. Div. 1992) .......................................................  6, 7  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974)  .........................  1 Ysern v. Horter, 91 N.J. Eq. 189 (Ch. 1920) ....................................................................  6  State Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1 .................................................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff [...] appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Respondents, Calixto and [...].  This case arises out of litigation instituted by the Plaintiff-Appellant, who alleged that she tripped and fell as a result of a snow and ice accumulation on the sidewalk abutting Defendant-Respondent’s residential home.  Plaintiff-Appellant now argues that the Trial Court’s decision should be reversed because the Trial Court abused its discretion by barring Plaintiff’s expert witness and misapplied controlling law in support of the Defendant-Respondents’ motion for summary judgment.  It is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiff-Appellant’s arguments must fail as they are either factually distinct from the case at hand or improperly interpret the decision made by the Trial Court.  As such, the Trial Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Respondents, Calixto and [...] should be affirmed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  For the sake of brevity, the Defendant-Respondent adopts the Procedural History set forth in the Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief.
[brief] The equities, in my opinion, that I’ve talked about, they still have to be weighted.  The only difference is that the – that the defendant, to the extent this is relevant, the defendant did what was commercially reasonable.  They went out – they went out and hired a title – they obtained title insurance because nobody is – no amateur is qualified to go down in the record room and sling books, as they say.  3T32:9-23.  On re-cross examination, the Defendant’s expert provided additional testimony regarding the choices made by Defendant’s title insurer:
[brief] Edelweiss CA conclusively rejected the decision of a court in Massachusetts before which Relator had initiated a parallel matter.  Rosenberg v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 169 N.E.3d 445 (Mass. 2021) (“Edelweiss MA”).  Edelweiss MA concluded that, based on facts cognizable on a motion to dismiss, the [...] was the news media and, for that reason, Defendants heavily rely on it.
[brief] They repeatedly opposed Settlement, due to unfounded false concerns about problems I could cause, as Remainder Beneficiary.  (111a, par. 11) (122a, last par., to 123a) (309a, 2nd  [...] told me in Jan. 2022 he would allow [...] to enter into 3-Way Settlement if [...] & [...], who initially opposed my efforts in Jan. & Feb. 2022 for a Settlement, and I could agree on details of a 3-Way Settlement, as we did on April 25, 2022 (312a, par. 18, 2nd par.) (395a, par. 17).  He & [...] refused to hold off filing Verified Complaint based on our requests to finalize Settlement instead, even after I resolved their 5 objections, & filed needless Verified Complaint & formal Intermediate Accounting for Surrogate Audit & Court approval.(395a, par. 17)(406a, par. 7&8)(433a, 2nd to last par.)  After filing an unnecessary Verified Complaint & formal Accounting, they opposed my repeated efforts for a 3-Way Settlement prior to any unnecessary Court Hearing & Order.
[brief] On September 6, 2023, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of both August 25, 2023 Orders, but the Court denied same on September 22, 2023.  (Pa328; Pa329; Pa330-Pa331)  On October 11, 2023, [...] filed a motion for leave to appeal, requesting that the Appellate Division grant its motion and reverse the Court’s August 25, 2023 and September 22, 2023 Orders.  (Pa332-Pa334)  On October 30, 2023, [...]’s leave to appeal was denied.  (Pa335)  On December 1, 2023, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment (Pa336-Pa344), which Plaintiffs opposed, and which was granted on January 19, 2024. \(^2\) (Pa385-Pa386)  Of the original defendants, [...] and [...] have been summarily dismissed from the case.
[brief] In Metromedia, the Court’s reasoning did not include an analysis under either the Federal or State due process provisions.  Moreover, many of the cases cited in [...]’s brief that discuss procedural due process do not allege a violation resulting from rulemaking.  Here, again, [...] provides uncritical support for [...]’s ability to earn undisclosed profits at the expense of its consumer subscribers.  As [...] acknowledges, due process scrutiny applies when government deprives a person of “life, liberty, or property. ” ([...]b10).  Yet in support of that proposition it cites to Myers v. County of Somerset, 515 F. Supp. 2d 492 (D.N.J. 2007), which involves alleged violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution arising from the termination of his employment and does not involve regulatory rulemaking.  The Department’s consistent application of the Holding Company Act to the acquisition of attorney-in-fact results, in and of itself, only in additional regulatory disclosures from the attorney-in-fact, and does not result in the deprivation of life, liberty, or property.  Compare In re Provision of Basic Generation Serv. for Period Beginning June 1 2008, 205 N.J. 339, 343 (2011) (BPU's establishment of a "rule" which would govern pass-through of costs in future rate-setting required compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).  [...]’s reliance on Lower Main Street Associates v. New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency, 114 N.J. 226 (1989), is likewise misplaced.  (See [...]b12).  The Court in Lower Main Street found that the failure of due process in that matter stemmed from a failure to “provide standards to guide both the regulator and the regulated,” as quoted in [...]’s brief.  Ibid.; 114 N.J. at 236.  The Court invalidated the rule at issue “because of its omission of adequate standards. ”  *Ibid.*  Most importantly, the Court found that rule was invalid because it was not authorized by the enabling legislation.  114 N.J. at 230.  The Bulletin does not lack standards or statutory authorization.  In fact, it is very precise in setting forth the statutes, rules, and Statutory Standards of Accounting Practices that apply to reciprocal exchanges, including the Holding Company Act.
[brief] Although Appellant refused, [...] enticed her to continue the conversation by telling her that the secret was about her and asking her to guess the details.  During this exchange, [...] also made a comment about [...]’s “ass being tight. ”  (Pa230, Pa345-46)  85:9-89:20.  Appellant went outside and spoke with [...] about this “secret. ”  He told her he had been approached by [...], who asked [...] what Appellant’s “situation was” (i.e., relationship status).
[directive] The ensures Grants the Department. of with all and conditions the laws, and the terms regulations, applicable accordance OMB's federal publications, the New and statues, Treasury Jersey including state award, Audit and Administalive Cost Principles, Requiremenls IJntfurm Requiremenls, .for of with 200).  (2 the creation also Grants Management Awards assists C.F.R. Federal ol of grant preparation award applications, grant review availability, of funding notices with Budget in the works tandem necessary.  unit reporting  The Federal documents, as and provided by funding other for reimbursement each provider cost Office all and requests for grant throughout the divisions provides to Department grant.  support  Operations  Grants effectively carry out efficiently the to and efforts the Department's furthers and process, of Attomey General. initiatives the objective, mission, and 5.  Management Management.
[brief] In the absence of any authority to the contrary, the Trial Court’s analysis supports that enforcement of an express waiver of arbitration, like an implied waiver, should be considered under the totality of the circumstances.  Under the circumstances here, this Court should follow our Supreme Court precedent in Cole which does not forever bind a party to a verbal or an express waiver made in the initial stages of a matter, where that party’s litigation conduct otherwise satisfies its test in favoring arbitration.  Because the circumstances here clearly weigh in favor of compelling arbitration pursuant to Cole, the Plaintiff’s claims arising from the parties’ Partnership Agreement should proceed to arbitration.
[brief] Pa2749-Pa2752.  New Jersey courts favor the reasonable expectations of insureds and require appropriate notice and grounds for insurance policy changes in all contexts.  See, e.g., Skeete v. Dorvius, 184 N.J. 5, 8-9 (2005) (affirming Appellate Division’s finding that inadequate notice of policy change was insufficient where an “average policyholder” would not have identified the change “without extensive detective work, an unreasonable encumbrance on a policyholder that can only result in hidden pitfalls such as are presented here … policy changes must be conveyed fairly to the policyholder”); Bauman v. Royal Indem. Co., 36 N.J. 12, 25 (1961) (“Absent notification that there have been changes in the restrictions, conditions or limitations of the policy, the insured is justly entitled to assume that they remain the same and that his coverage has not in anywise been lessened … common fairness as well as legal duty dictated that [the insurer] call the lessened coverage to the attention of the insureds so that they might suitably protect themselves. ”).  Critically, the purpose of these notice requirements “is to give the insured the opportunity to guard against the peril of noncoverage, a peril which, as this case shows, can arise out of miscommunication among brokers, agents, insureds and carriers. ”  Exchevarias v. Lopez, 240 N.J. Super. 104, 108 (App. Div. 1990) (emphasis added).  Such a miscommunication, of which this caselaw warns, is precisely what led to this litigation.  This concept of fairness to and protection of insureds has been espoused by New Jersey courts.
[brief] J. 397 (2007) | 35 | | State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009) | 24, 25, 27, 28, 33 | | State v. Williamson, 246 N.J. 185 (2021) | 20 | | STATUTES | | |----------|---| | N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(b)(3) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b) | 45 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2(a) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 | 29 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a) | 2, 25, 31 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) | 2, 31 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2) | 2, 31 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(3) | 2, 31 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b) | 30 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) | 3 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **STATUTES (CONT'D.)** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:24-7.1(a)(3) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 | 41 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) | 40 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) | 40 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) | 40 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) | 40 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) | 40 | | **RULES** | | | R. 2:10-2 | 24 | | **RULES OF EVIDENCE** | | | N.J.R.E. 607 | 18, 19, 20| | N.J.R.E. 607(b) | 20 | | N.J.R.E. 801(c) | 22 | | N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2) | 21 | | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | | New Jersey Constitution, Art. I, ¶ 10 | 36 | | United State Constitution, Amend. VI | 36 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.) OTHER AUTHORITIES Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Robbery In The First Degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)" (rev. Sept. 10, 2012)
[directive] If of of or the court finds one more the factors listed in paragraph (d)(1) to (11) this Guideline, then the court may consider factors including whether the respondent: @ or has any prior involuntary commitment a hospital treatment facility for in persons with psychiatric disabilities; il.fil has received or receiving mental health treatment; is 1M) or has complied has failed to comply with any mental health treatment; and of .{1.fil has received a diagnosis a mental health disorder.
[directive] The complainant should be personally interviewed if circumstances permit.  If the complainant cannot travel to the investigator's office, the investigator should conduct the interview at the complainant's home or place of employment if feasible.  If not, a telephonic interview may be conducted.  All relevant identifying information concerning the complainant should be recorded, e.g., name (unless the complainant wishes to remain anonymous), complete address, telephone numbers and area codes, race or ethnic identity, sex, date of birth, place of employment, social security number if necessary and place of employment (name and address).  The investigator should grant reasonable requests for accommodations to protect the complainant’s identity, such as meeting the complainant at a place other than the investigator’s office if the complainant’s identity cannot be kept confidential at that location.  7.1.4
[brief] C.  Defendant’s Trial and Direct Appeal.  By the time defendant’s case went to trial in 2009, the only co-conspirator available to testify against defendant was [...].  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., presided over defendant’s trial.  Relevant here, [...] testified to the Staten Island kidnapping of [...] and to defendant’s masterminding of the kidnapping.  E.g. (7T10-14 to 11-4).  On October 29, 2009, a jury found defendant guilty on all counts.  (13T).  Defendant received a total sentence of life imprisonment plus eighty years with a seventy-year parole disqualifier.  (Da1).  Thereafter, defendant appealed.
[brief] The trial judge’s initial ruling and subsequent two-year delay  When the parties returned for continued argument on November 10, 2021, following post-trial briefing on the issues of [...]’s Allowance and on the correctness and enforceability of the late fees and interest assessed, among other matters, the trial judge remarked the parties submitted “a voluminous amount of material,” which he “was afraid was going to happen” (2T3-17 to 2T3-23).  On the late fees/interest issue, the trial judge ruled in favor of [...] and recalculated the late fees with interest owed from [...] to [...] at the rate of interest suggested by [...], thereby reducing the amount to satisfy the judgment from the $313,106.39 sought to $196,669.16 (2T8-7 to 2T8-10).
[brief] (Da15.)  Although there was no testimony as to the result, the trial court found “[...] administered the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. ”  (Da16.)  The de novo court found [...] “failed ‘on multiple occasions’ to follow instructions and walked without touching heel to toe. ”  (Da16.)  The de novo court further found as to the “one-leg-stand test, defendant ‘put his foot down multiple times, he switched legs [and] was not able to complete the test. ’” (Da16.)  The de novo court found [...] could not finish the alphabet, and although he started correctly at C as instructed, he restarted at A.
[brief] For example, [...] could not explain what complaints he made to [...], instead characterizing them as “complaints about everything that we’ve gone through in the office. ” (Pa178 at 80:8-16).  He admitted that his “complaints” to [...] were merely about [...] yelling at him.  (Pa408 at 25:3-4).  He further conceded that [...] was known to vent her frustrations rather than target one specific person.  The Appellate Division has found that these types of complaints do not enjoy CEPA protection.
[brief] THE ABSENCE OF DEDICATION ON THE PLATS OR SITE PLANS  Plaintiff provided a number of site plan maps and plats.  (See Ps 110)" (2002), "Pa171" (2004) and Pa173.  There is no reference in any of them that there would be a "dedication" of a public street.  Not one of the maps stated that the internal access roads or driveways were to be "dedicated to the municipality" on the subdivision plat or site plan as required by the statute.  One possibility is that they were intentionally not so designated, as Plaintiff desired to retain ownership for financial or other purposes.  (Pa171) clearly references that a portion of what has been referred to as the "dogleg" or "loop" is simply an easement, stating, "existing access easement to remain".  Presumably the access easement is for the church.  This easement constitutes a significant portion of what plaintiff understands to have been "automatically dedicated" to the Borough.  Who owns this easement or title to the parcel thereunder is unclear from the record.
[brief] On February 6, 2024, Respondents moved to consolidate.  (Pa43).  On March 1, 2024, the motion for consolidation was granted.  (Pa45).  On March 8, 2024, the [...] moved to be relieved as counsel.  (Pa47).  That motion was granted on March 28, 2024.  (Pa49).  On April 30, 2024, [...] of [...] entered his appearance on behalf of [...] and [...].  (Pa52).  II.
[brief] [...], on the brief #  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Authorities ...........................................  ii  Table of Judgments ................................................ v  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................  1  II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........  4  A.  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................  4  B.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................  5  1.  PRE-FIRST APPEAL AND APPEAL .......................... 5  2.  PRE-SECOND APPEAL ....................................... 5  3.  SECOND APPEAL ............................................. 6  4.  THIS APPEAL – PRE-APPEAL ............................... 8  II.  ARGUMENT .........................................................
[brief] **  On January 9, 2019, Plaintiff applied for a job to be a DSP at one of [...]’s group homes.  (Appx 523 at ¶11).  In connection with her application of employment, Plaintiff had to complete a “Criminal Disclosure Statement. ” (Appx 523 at ¶12).  The Criminal Disclosure Statement asked, “Have you ever been convicted of a crime?” (Appx 523 at ¶13).  In response, Plaintiff checked the box “no” and signed her name.  (Appx 524 at ¶14).  The Criminal Disclosure Statement provided Plaintiff a designated space to describe any convictions.  (Appx 524 at ¶15).  Plaintiff left this space blank.  (Appx 524 at ¶15).  On January 9, 2019, in connection with her application of employment, Plaintiff also signed an Employee Statement.  (Appx 524 at ¶16).  In that statement, Plaintiff attested, again, that she had never been convicted of any “[c]rime(s) involving controlled substances or other like offenses. ” (Appx 524 ¶17).  Plaintiff also signed a third document in connection with her application of employment that dealt with her criminal history.  (Appx 524 ¶18).  That document, again, asked Plaintiff about her convictions under penalty of perjury, as required by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(e), which requires “a sworn statement attesting that the individual has not been convicted of any crime or disorderly persons offense as described in [the] act. ” (Appx 524-25 ¶19).  In that document, Plaintiff again attested, under penalty of perjury, that she had not been convicted of listed criminal offenses, including a controlled substance offense.  (Appx 525 ¶20 (emphasis added)).  D.