ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] likewise could never have reviewed and responded to the Global Fee Applications in the fashion it was submitted.  [...]’s suggestion that [...] had six months to “review and object to” the Global Fee Application (Pb24) is absurd and disproven by other portions of his own brief.  Although the Global Fee Application was filed on September 23, 2022, and argued on April 28, 2023\textsuperscript{9}, it was “fully briefed as of November 14, 2022. ” (Pb35).  Since a meaningful \textsuperscript{8} $3,570,357.50 was awarded in the Global Fee Application (Da2); $2,721,804.14 was previously awarded in connection with other applications (Da7-9, ¶¶5,7); $1.4 million is claimed to have been incurred for appeals (Da8, ¶6); and another $424,600. 17 is sought by [...]’s in a motion that is currently pending before the trial court.  \textsuperscript{9}  The Chancery Court deferred the hearing for months in the hope that the parties could reach a resolution in the interim, which sadly did not occur.  substantive review of the Global Fee Application was impossible, [...] objected to the form of the application itself in that it would have required hundreds of hours to attempt to identify all of the objectionable entries.
[brief] The district policies raise serious equal protection issues by treating gender-nonconforming students differently from other students.  Each of the Mandatory Notification Policies requires parental notification or consent (for younger children in [...]) when a student seeks an accommodation at school for a gender identity that is inconsistent with their assigned sex at birth.  The policies thus apply only to students who are gender nonconforming.  As the trial court put it, “who but transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students would request public and social accommodations or express a change in gender identity or expression?”
[directive] The Revised Attorney General Guidelines shall, among other things, delineate investigation guidelines that specify when and how counter-terrorism cases are to be opened.  These guidelines shall define the permissible scope, duration, subject matter and objectives of counter-terrorism investigations, and shall explain when and under what circumstances various investigative techniques are authorized and when investigators must obtain specific approval -3- Page 4 from designated superiors before employing certain investigative techniques.  In preparing the revised investigative guidelines, the [...] shall use as a reference and be guided by the United States Attorney General’s “Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Investigations,” and shall specify distinct procedures and standards for opening and pursuing cases involving the following levels of investigative activity: (1) prompt and extremely limited checking of initial leads, (2) preliminary inquiries, and (3) full investigations.  The investigation guidelines shall also include the following requirements: (i) reaffirm that no investigative activity of any type should ever be undertaken based to any extent on racial, ethnic or religious stereotypes; (ii) establish a preference for the use of the “least intrusive means” reasonably available to complete the legitimate investigative objective whenever any person’s constitutional rights are implicated; (iii) authorize a “full investigation” only when facts or circumstances “reasonably indicate that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed;” (iv) require that a “preliminary inquiry” be promptly terminated when it becomes apparent that a full investigation is not warranted, and (v) provide that information collected pursuant to a “tips and leads” or “preliminary inquiry” shall be purged after a reasonable period of time if investigative activities fail to disclose information that would meet the reasonable indication of criminal activity threshold necessary to initiate a full investigation.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:25-23.  The victim may file 1.  A domestic violence complaint alleging the defendant committed an act of domestic violence and asking for court assistance to prevent its recurrence by asking for a temporary restraining court order (TRO) or other relief; 2.  A criminal complaint alleging the defendant committed a criminal act.  See Section II.  Mandatory Arrest above when a police officer must sign the criminal complaint; 3.  Both of the above.
[brief] [...] still had the gun at the time, but he “didn’t want to shoot the man,” and told defendant to do it.  (1T22:16-17).  An argument ensued, but in the end, defendant took the gun “voluntarily. ” (1T22:18-23).  Defendant positioned himself close to the entrance, waited for [...] to open the door, and shot him from a couple feet away.  (1T23:4 to 25:9).  [...] was struck in the face, but he “c[a]me towards [defendant].” (1T:25:9-16).  Defendant ran “the other way” on “the side of one of the bedroom,” but when he heard [...] yell that [...] was going out of the front door, he set out to pursue him.  (1T25:15 to 26:6).  He ran after him down the driveway, and when he caught up with him, he hit him with the butt of the gun.  (1T26:1 to 27:25).  [...] fell down, and defendant began to kick him in the head and stomp him.  (1T28:9-11).  Once [...] was unconscious, defendant, [...], and [...] dragged him back into the house and closed the door.  (1T29:3-17).  Defendant’s purpose in attacking [...] was to “make sure that he was dead” and eliminate him as a potential witness.  (1T30:20 to 32:18).  After bringing [...] inside, defendant and his accomplices spent additional time looking through the house before finally leaving.  (1T30:1 to 33:21).  When he left the house, he assumed that [...] was dead.  (1T33:15-21).
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For all of the reasons set forth herein, and in Plaintiff’s initial papers, Plaintiff requests: (1) the lower court’s Orders on Motion to Dismiss be reversed as to the dismissal of Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven; (2) alternatively, the Court should vacate the Orders on Motion to Dismiss and remand the matter to the lower court with instructions regarding the applicable Roa standard; and (3) such other and further relief as this Court deems just, equitable, and proper.
[brief] “The concept of standing in a legal proceeding refers to the litigant’s ‘ability or entitlement to maintain an action before the court. ’”  New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272, 291 (2018) (citations omitted).  To establish standing, a party must “present a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  In re Camden Cty., 170 N.J. 439, 449 (2002).  While Petitioners may have strong feelings about Chapter 375, the constitutionality of a statute “is open to attack only by a person whose rights are adversely affected. ”  Bd. of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 259 (App. Div. 1959).  Petitioners fail to meet this threshold.
[brief] Unlike use variance proofs that must justify a prohibited use, height variances for a permitted use need only to justify the deviation from the height limitation.  Imposing the “enhanced burden of proof” upon the negative criteria ignores this clear distinction.  Had the Board applied the standard of review articulated in Grasso & TSI, approval would have been unavoidable as the record contains substantial credible evidence to support same.  Its denial of Plaintiff’s height variance was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable for multiple reasons, which included failure to apply the correct legal standard.
[brief] Pa0042 (Compl. ¶ 133).  The Supreme Court has held that healthcare services seeking payment under no-fault policies must comply with all significant qualifying requirements, including those governing permissible ownership and control structure.  Pa0079 (Compl. ¶ 361 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med. Ctr., 228 N.J. 596 (2017))).  --- \(^2\)  The New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners (BME) uses the term “plenary physicians” and “plenary licensees” to describe individuals licensed as medical doctors (M.D.) or doctors of osteopathy (D.O.).  As explained in the certification of Plaintiffs’ investigator, [...], Plaintiffs obtained information from a chiropractor named [...] in July 2017 suggesting that [...], a full-service medical provider, might be owned and controlled by non-physicians or those with limited licenses.  Pa0448 (Hickey Cert. ¶¶ 6-11).  That information led Plaintiffs to investigate and later learn, through the help of witnesses that previously worked for [...], that [...] was illegally structured.  See Pa0043-0061 (Compl. ¶¶ 137-276).  Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that, although [...] purports to be owned by [...], a medical doctor, it is in fact illegally owned and controlled by defendant [...], a chiropractor.  Pa0026, Pa0043-0045 (Compl. ¶¶ 8-12, 137-158).  Although Dr. Didita purportedly signed [...]’s October 2003 certificate of incorporation, he stated in a sworn statement that he does not recall signing the certificate, never had any ownership interest in [...], was hired as a part-time employee after [...] began operations, and only worked for [...] for a few months after which [...] fired him.  Pa0043-0044 (Compl. ¶¶ 146-155).  Three physicians who worked at [...] provided sworn statements to Plaintiffs that they were interviewed, hired, and supervised by [...] or his brother, [...], an unlicensed layperson who managed [...].  See Pa0045-0047 (Compl. ¶¶ 161, 177, 184-185).  Two of these physicians swore that they never met any plenary physician who purportedly owned [...], and no plenary physician supervised their work.  See Pa0045, Pa0047 (Compl. ¶¶ 164-166, 180).  A third physician swore that she had no meaningful interactions with defendant [...], [...]’s purported medical director.  See Pa0057 (Compl. ¶¶ 246-248).  Those physicians and two non-plenary licensees also swore or stated that the Bufanos or others under their direction pressured them to prescribe tests, services, and equipment that were not medically necessary, and otherwise sought to interfere with their exercise of medical or clinical judgment.  See Pa0046-0059 (Compl. ¶¶ 170-174, 178-179, 193-249, 254-258, 263-273).  Defendants submitted more than 800 claims for benefits that falsely represented they were eligible for insurance reimbursement and did not disclose that [...] was illegally structured.  See Pa0067-0068 (Compl. ¶¶ 307, 311).  Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that [...]’s ownership and control violated the doctrine against the corporate practice of medicine and statutes prohibiting practicing medicine without a license.  Pa0076-0077 (Compl. ¶¶ 350-352).
[brief] I.  [...]’ and [...]’ Invocation of the Common Interest Doctrine  [...] and [...] assert that their communications are subject to the common interest privilege and therefore not subject to discovery by [...] in this case.  (ECF No. 42 at 1–2).  The common interest doctrine is “an extension of the attorney-client privilege,” United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989), and the work-product doctrine, Smith v. Pergola 36 LLC, No. 22-cv-4052, 2022 WL 17832506, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2022).  Thus, any document or communication potentially protected by the common interest doctrine must first satisfy the elements of the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine.  Smith, 2022 WL 17832506, at *7.  “[T]he attorney-client privilege protects communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice. ”  United States v. Krug, 868 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2017).  The work-product doctrine protects materials “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).  Under the common interest doctrine, those communications voluntarily made among different parties and their attorneys (which would ordinarily waive the privilege) are not waived “where a joint defense effort or strategy has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties and their respective counsel in the course of an ongoing common enterprise and multiple clients share a common interest about a legal matter. ”  Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015).  Here, [...] and [...] appear to be seeking a blanket application of the common interest doctrine so that all their communications are shielded from discovery.  Although a common interest privilege may apply to some of the communications between [...] and [...] by virtue of their surety relationship, it does not automatically apply to every communication exchanged between them at every point in time and for all purposes.
[brief] And as also shown by the BWC, [...] initially refused to consent to an apparent attempted police entry -- in one officer’s own words, “she said she didn’t have to open the door” -- which that officer belittled by stating, “blah blah blah. ”  (BWC4-A at 27:00 to 27:14)  Not only did [...] at first refuse to cooperate or consent, but she only relented after being detained, handcuffed, surrounded by police, interrogated, threatened, and promised leniency.  Although [...] claimed at the suppression hearing that the police made no threats or promises to obtain [...]’s consent, (1T 12-22 to 13-2), the BWC and police reports again show that was not accurate.
[brief] 40:55D-68, which provides, in pertinent part that:  ---  8  The MLUL further authorizes boards of adjustment to take other actions not relevant here.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)-(d).  Any nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an ordinance may be continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied and any such structure may be restored or repaired in the event of partial destruction thereof.  The prospective purchaser, prospective mortgagee, or any other person interested in any land upon which a nonconforming use or structure exists may apply in writing for the issuance of a certificate certifying that the use or structure existed before the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use or structure nonconforming.  The applicant shall have the burden of proof.  Application pursuant hereto may be made to the administrative officer within one year of the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use or structure nonconforming or at any time to the board of adjustment.
[brief] In its Decision and Judgment, the trial court correctly held that no such legitimate reason was given by the County.  The reason is obvious – none exists.  [...]’s attempt to offer sound business reasons for the County’s rejection of [...]’s bid is entirely improper.  This is because “a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of third parties. ”  *Jakson v. Dep’t of Corr.*, 335 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2000).  Because the County did not articulate any reasons (let alone sound business reasons) for rejecting [...]’s bid, [...] cannot manufacture such reasons on the County’s behalf.
[brief] ’”  Ibid. (quoting Crayton, 21 N.E.3d at 170).  Specifically, “[v]ictims of domestic violence, for example, could properly be allowed to identify their assailant in court for the first time” and “[f]riends or associates, among others, could identify someone they have known for some time. ”  While the perpetrator in Watson was a stranger to the victim, the victim in State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023) did have some prior familiarity with the suspect.
[directive] Purpose and Effect of these Guidelines  In enforcing this law, prosecutors and police should remember that an assault firearms offense requires proof that the defendant knows he or she possesses an assault firearm, e.g., that the defendant knows that the firearm is "substantially identical" to one of the named assault weapons.  These guidelines should be followed by all county prosecutors and all law enforcement officers in this State so that the State's assault firearms laws will be uniformly enforced throughout the State.
[brief] It also has to be -- THE COURT:  So what if I’m just standing with it right there and I’m just having a conversation with somebody, right?  Who’s to determine -- What if I’m talking for five minutes and somebody says, listen -- You’re a municipal attorney?  [...]: Yes, Your Honor.  THE COURT:  You are too.  We all know there are people that is like the Hatfields and the McCoys in some towns, right?  And somebody is going to complain because they don’t like somebody, because they’re standing outside on their property having a conversation over a glass of Merlot in their backyard.  And it’s very quiet over there where they, same distance, my house and where [the portrait of] [...] is, is another neighbor.  And they’re peeping out the window and they hear me talking to my husband.  I wasn’t even loud and [...] hears me.  What prevents someone and why should I be subject to an ordinance violation when I just think I’m having a conversation with my husband?  And I wasn’t even loud.  I’ll say when I’m loud.  And I know when I go loud.  [...]: Yes, Your Honor.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court stated in *All the Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks Cnty. Int'l, Inc.*, 236 N.J. 431, 442 (2019), that the CFA provides broad protections and must be liberally construed:  The CFA's history has been “one of constant expansion of consumer protection. ”  *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 148 N.J. 582, 604, 691 A.2d 350 (1997).  The CFA's reach presently protects the public even when a merchant acts in good faith.  *Cox*, 138 N.J. at 16, 647 A.2d 454.  In 1971, the Attorney General's powers, which already included the power to prosecute and to regulate fraudulent and unlawful activities under the CFA, were broadened; the prohibition against unconscionable commercial practices was added; and the Act began to allow for private causes of action.  *Cox*, 138 N.J. at 15, 647 A.2d 454.  In light of the Act's original remedial purpose and its subsequent and continuous expansion by the Legislature, courts have consistently recognized that the CFA must be liberally construed.  *Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 1 at 11-12 (2004), 860 A.2d 435 (citing *Cox*, 138 N.J. at 15-16, 647 A.2d 454) ("The [CFA] is remedial legislation that we construe liberally to accomplish its broad purpose of safeguarding the public.").  The opinion of the trial court below does just the opposite.  The Appellate Division properly granted leave to appeal as the decision below undercuts the broad protection of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 and creates for the first time in New Jersey a non-statutory exemption for insurance agents and brokers and other semi-professionals.  Without legislative mandate, the trial court has now insulated these semi-professionals from the reach of the CFA and has bestowed great harm upon the public.  The CFA has been liberally construed in favor or providing broad protections to our citizens.  *Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2 (1994).  The CFA’s remedial goal is to “establish a broad business ethic promoting a standard of conduct that contemplates good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing. ”  *Cox* at 18.  Any exemption must be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of the language and the legislative intent of the CFA which is “remedial and humanitarian” and anything that undercuts this lofty purpose by granting immunity must be narrowly applied.  See, e.g. *Armament Co. v. Hyland*, 70 N.J. 550, 559 (1976).  The decision below exempting semi-professionals who engaged in fraud and other deceptive business practices negates the very purpose of the CFA and must be vacated.  II.
[brief] The issues raised in the plaintiffs' original Complaint implicated the standard of care concerning the legal representations the [...] Defendants; communications as counsel; and allegations pertaining to disbursement of funds from the [...] Trust Account; and [...]’s supervision of [...] when he was an attorney with the firm.  Plaintiffs failed to provide an Affidavit of Merit to substantiate their claims against the [...] Defendants, which led to the Complaint being properly dismissed, with prejudice, on January 19, 2016.  Plaintiffs, throughout the trial court, continually argued that their attorney, [...], Esquire, could not have allegedly discovered that [...] was allegedly the sole member of [...].  This exact issue was before the trial court on numerous occasions, including on plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the November 10, 2016 Order, which was properly denied on April 3, 2018; and on January 24, 2020 before the trial court denied plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend.  Therefore, due to plaintiffs’ repeated, unsuccessful attempts to bring old parties back into this case before the trial court, after their failure to previously file and serve an Affidavit of Merit in this case, based on the futility of plaintiffs’ instant appeal, it is respectfully submitted that this Court deny plaintiffs’ Appeal.
[brief] When officers sought his consent, [...] was already handcuffed and under arrest (King factors 1 and 5) (1T46-9 to 12).  He also repeatedly expressed hesitation to provide consent (King factor 3).  (1T61-14 to 16, 63-17 to 20)  And his consent led police to additional contraband.  (King factor 4) (1T70-11 to 71-11).  On top of all that, when he signed the consent form, at least eight officers—three in uniform and five in plain clothes—were on scene.  (See Da 15 at 3:13:50)  On their own, these circumstances already demonstrate a highly coercive environment.  However, the [...] officers went much further, threatening to damage [...]’s home—where his ill wife and young grandchildren were staying—if he did not consent to the search.
[brief] Bergen County Indictment charged Mr. [...] with third-degree possession of an controlled substance under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10A(1), fourth-degree possession of false identification under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1D, second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5B(1), fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3D and second-degree gun possession by certain persons under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7B(1).²  (Da 1-2)  On January 4, 2023, the Honorable [...] --- ² Codefendant [...] was also charged with certain offenses, but the charges against her were ultimately dismissed.  [...], JSC heard argument on Edward’s motions to suppress physical evidence and statements, and on February 3, 2023, Judge [...] denied in part and granted in part Edward’s motions.  (1T; 2T 4-3 to 16-4; Da 3)  On March 31, 2023, [...] pleaded guilty before Judge [...] to second-degree unlawful possession without a permit.  (3T 18-20 to 19-25; Da 4-10)  In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to recommend a five-year sentence with a one-year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to a Graves Act waiver, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), 2C:43-6.2, and dismissal of the remaining counts and motor vehicle summons.  (3T 18-20 to 19-25)  On April 28, 2023, Judge [...] considered and rejected mitigating factors 8 and 9, and found aggravating factors 3, 6, and 9, as well as mitigating factor 9, and imposed sentence in accordance with the plea.  (4T 16-11 to 19-16; Da 11-13)  [...] filed a timely notice of appeal on June 22, 2023.  (Da 14-17)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**