ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court also disposed of [...]’s two additional demands.  First, regarding [...]’s request that the Trial Court modify the Award under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24(a), the Trial Court held that [...] “has not established that there exists ‘an evident mathematical miscalculation’ or that the award ‘is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the decision on the claims submitted. ”  Da32.  The Trial Court found that “[r]ather than a mathematical error in need of correction, the dispute is over the method of application of the interest rates to the parties’ award,” a plainly impermissible request under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24(a).  And, with regard to [...]’s “proposed counterclaim,” the Trial Court found that [...] “acknowledges that the [...] is subject to arbitration and in fact, has made a demand for arbitration in connection with the [...].  Da32 (adding that [...]’s proposed counterclaim must be decided in the presently pending separate arbitral forum); see also Da492 ([...]’s Demand for Arbitration).  The June 12 Orders thus (i) confirmed the Award, (ii) denied [...]’s motion to vacate/modify the Award, and (iii) denied [...]’s request to offset the Award with an unadjudicated collateral claim pending in a separate arbitration.
[brief] Pa274.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, [...] underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa274.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.  Pa274.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa126.  Despite not receiving notice, Licameli attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.
[brief] THE COURT: And knowing all the fines and penalties that you face upon a plea of guilt here today, sir, and the fines and penalties that you face in the future were you to plead guilty or be found guilty of a driving while intoxicated in the future, is it still your intention on entering a plea of guilty?  DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.  * * *  [...]:  [...], on June 4th, 2011 at or about 1:22 in the morning were you operating a motor vehicle in the Borough of Ship Bottom?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  [...]: And did you, in fact, operate the vehicle erratically by swerving into the center lane of travel without a signal?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  [...]: And prior to operating your vehicle had you, in fact, been imbibing alcoholic beverages?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  [...]: And was your ability to operate your vehicle impaired as a result of drinking before operating the vehicle?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  [...]: And you took an Alcotest result?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  [...]: And the Alcotest result was above the .08 legal limit, is that correct?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  [...]: And you admitted to the police you had drank beer and Jim Beam bourbon, is that correct?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  (1T11-22 to 12-19)  Defendant’s Alcotest result was 0.12 BAC.  (1T7-1 to 7-2)  After finding there was a sufficient factual basis, [...] accepted Defendant’s plea and sentenced him as a third-time DWI offender.
[brief] (5T 67:1-25; 68:1-25).  He focused specifically on a 2019 resolution, where the Board granted a (d)(6) height variance for a 300,000 square foot, 48 feet tall warehouse also in the SM Zone.  Under almost identical facts to the current height variance application, the Board acknowledged the following in the 2019 resolution of approval: (1) warehouses are a permitted use in the SM Zone; (2) the SM Zone’s height limitation was not targeted to warehouses;⁶ (3) there was no finding that taller warehouses have a higher intensity of use;⁷ and (4) the potential negative ⁶⁶  This 2019 conclusion, based on actual testimony in a hearing before this Board, underscores the fiction of its “historically hypothetical” musings on the reason for the 30 foot height limitation at p. 12, par. 3 of its Resolution.  Ja122. impacts were visual and could be mitigated.  Ja120-Ja122; 5T 67:1-25; 68:1-25.  This Resolution illustrates the Board’s recognition that warehouses must be built above 30 feet, and the previous determination that the height restriction was not aimed at warehouses.  The Township Council has also recognized the need to increase the 30 foot height limit to effectuate a zone plan that permits warehouse uses.
[brief] For example, although the policy required [...] to give 90 days notice of cancellation to its insureds, the effect of the ruling below is that cancellation was effected virtually immediately upon issuing coverage to [...].  Yet, within that very 90 day policy cancellation window, on September 25, 2015, [...] confirmed to [...] that it continued to be covered under the CCIP for further work for [...] at the project – such as the work that [...] was performing when the underlying plaintiff was injured.  This is the very type of confusion that the law requiring continuation of insurance where coverage is not properly cancelled is designed to prevent.
[brief] ORDER, PAR. 1&2, FOR:  1)  NOT GRANTING TRUST PAYMENT FOR [...]  LEGAL FEES FOR $113,497.04 (FEBRUARY 1 TO OCTOBER 25, 2022)  2)  ADJUSTMENT TO [...]  ACCOUNTING FEES FROM $17,649.57 TO $16,755 FOR INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING  3)  ADJUSTMENT TO [...]’S TRUSTEE COMMISSIONS (JAN. 1 TO SEPT. 30, 2022)  FROM $2,039.53 TO $1,946.56  1.  Item 1 - (3T, p. 8, line 16, to p. 12, line 20) (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, line 13, to p. 50, line 2)  2.  Items 2&3 - (3T, p. 14, line 2, to p. 15, line 8) (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, lines 9-12)  SECTION  D  [...]’ CERTIFICATION REPLY, DATED NOV. 9, 2022, IN ORDER TO FOCUS ONLY ON APPEAL ISSUES REGARDING [...]’S OPPOSITION, DATED NOV. 4, 2022, TO [...]’S OCT. 26, 2022, REQUEST FOR TRUST PAYMENT FOR LEGAL FEES THAT WERE EVENTUALLY ADDRESSED IN FEBRUARY 17, 2023
[brief] (Pb45).  Plaintiff does not seem to recognize that juries are entirely permitted to find a party negligent but not a proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.  See, e.g. Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1, 32-33 (1997) (affirming jury finding that plaintiff was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the incident. ); Gaido v. Weiser, 115 N.J. 310, 312 (1989) (upholding jury verdict in medical malpractice case in which ”the jury found by a vote of 5-1 that [defendant doctor] was negligent but...that the negligence was not a proximate cause of [plaintiff's] death. ”).  In sum, the jury's verdict that the defendant was negligent, but any negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries was proper under the law.  The jury’s verdict was not inconsistent and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.  The trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
[directive] Where the Attorney General or the county prosecutor determines that the release of records would be "otherwise inappropriate," he or she shall issue a brief statement explaining the decision.  The terms of the Order shall be carried out in the spirit of Chapter 73, P.L. 1963, as amended, and shall not relate to requests pursuant to Chapter 60, Section 4, of P.L. 1994.  It shall be carried out by keeping in mind the right of citizens to be aware of events occurring in their community.  This Order shall take effect immediately.
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[brief] (2T1, et seq.).  In his motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, defendant argued that [...] had “no personal knowledge . . . [of] defendant’s alleged previous conduct” when he arrested him, and therefore did not have sufficient evidence to stop or arrest defendant.  (Ca137-Ca139).  Defendant also relied on a recent Supreme Court decision, State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 (2022), to proffer that the trial court was “plainly incorrect” or “failed to consider evidence” when it found that the State established reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop defendant.  (2T4-19 to 11-18).  The trial court found that Goldsmith, which involved a patrol officer conducting a Terry stop after a suspected narcotics transaction, was not applicable to the facts of this case, where officers were actively investigating a homicide and waiting for a search warrant for the residence that they saw defendant, the suspected shooter, walk into while surveilling: “the circumstances of the stop and investigatory method of the officers [in Goldsmith] in this Court’s opinion is respectfully completely different than what occurred in this particular matter.
[brief] Respondent took the 2014 Will and placed in her safe at home and it was never disclosed to Petitioner until after Decedent’s death.  (7T190:1-11)  Before Decedent’s death, Respondent called [...] at his office and told him that the Decedent was “extremely ill. ” (11T112:25 to112:17).  [...] remarked, don't worry about that now, she will be fine and if anything happens, we will talk then.  (11T112:13-17).  By the time of that phone discussion, Respondent was fully aware of the terms of Decedent’s will, testifying that they all discussed their worry that the Petitioner would bring litigation over the 2014 Will.  (11T161:2-8; 12T54:5-10).  \(^{13}\)  Respondent failed to comply with that arrangement, as [...] continued to be in the home for the year that followed.  See P690a.  Within days of Decedent’s death, Respondent and her good friend [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) appeared at the Home, and they searched its rooms and removed several boxes of documents.
[brief] \footnote{Because Landlord’s legal fees are payable as Additional Rent, Landlord’s cross-appeal is not moot as the Landlord Tenant Division can order that Tenant pay these fees to Landlord (or to the Clerk of Court) absent which a judgment of possession would be entered.  (Da13-14, Lease at § 2.01(d)).  This is precisely how this issue was handled in the Reconsideration Order.  (Da3). }  CONCLUSION
[brief] *State v. Francisco*, 471 N.J. Super. 386, 409 (App. Div. 2022).  When reviewing a motion to suppress, appellate courts defer “to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record and will not disturb those findings unless they are ‘so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’”  *State v. Rivas*, 251 N.J. 132, 152 (2022) (quoting *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)).  However, the trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed *de novo*.  *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).  Here, the trial court’s factual finding, that defendant made an ambiguous invocation, was clearly mistaken.  Moreover, the court then compounded that error by finding the detective’s response failed to eliminate the ambiguity.  The trial court’s erroneous findings cannot stand and the trial court’s legal conclusion, premised upon same, must be reversed.
[brief] Where the defendant is pleading guilty pursuant to a negotiated disposition governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, and, as part of that negotiated disposition, the prosecutor has agreed not to file a motion for a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), the prosecutor shall represent to the court, on the record at the time of the guilty plea, that (1) the plea is pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, (2) the defendant would ordinarily be eligible for a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), and (3) the State is waiving the extended-term sentence in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea.  . . .  [(emphasis added)]  The prosecutor here did not follow these requirements; the prosecutor did not “represent to the court, on the record at the time of the guilty plea” that the State was seeking to avail itself of the Section 12 provisions.
[brief] \(^{49}\)  When disputing the statement of material facts that [...] posited in its motion for summary judgment filed 7 months before the original discovery end date, [...] repeatedly argued that it was entitled to discovery to test the veracity of the Defendants’ self-serving, disputed claims.  For example:  16.  Consistent with N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9e(3), [...] provided [...] with invoices for payment for custodial services for the months of April, May, and June 2020, so that [...] could pay its employees.  ([...] Cert. at ¶¶ 7-8).  **Board’s Response** Disputed.
[directive] Adoptive seizures are those seizures where of the pre- only 100% seizure activity and related investigation are performed by the state or local seizing agency before a request is made for a Treasury adoption.  There must be a state violation and a federal basis for forfeiture in order for the seizure be a to true adoption.  The federal share in adoptive cases is generally Joint of net proceeds and the state or local share is 20% 80%.
[brief] | | | **Escalante v. Township of Cinnaminson,** | 35 | | 283 N.J.Super. 244, 253, 661 A.2d 837 (App.Div.1995) | | | **Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr.,** | 39 | | 167 N.J. 341, 356 (2001) | | | **Gelber v. Zito Partnership,** | 32 | | 147 N.J. 561, 565 (1997) | | | **Hobart Bros. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.,** | 36, 38 | | 354 N.J. Super. 229, 242 (App. Div.) certif. denied, | | | 175 N.J. 170 (2002) | | | **Karpovich v. Barbarula** | 32 | | 150 N.J. 473, 476 (1997) | | | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds, Co., | 39 | | 207 N.J. 428, 453–54 (2011) | | | Kleinke v. Ocean City, | 35 | | 147 N.J.Super. 575, 581, 371 A.2d 785 (App.Div.1977) | | | Lamb v. Global Landfill Reclaiming, | 36 | | 111 N.J. 134, 152, 543 A.2d 443 (1988) | | | Mayfield v. Cmty. Med. Assocs., P.A., | 39 | | 335 N.J. Super. 198, 207 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Mitchell v. Procini, | 36, 38 | | 331 N.J. Super 445, 453 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Olds v. Donnelly, | 27,31,32,36,37,40,41,43 | | 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997) | | | Saffer v. Willoughby, | 30 | | 143 N.J. 256 (1996) | | | Sklodowsky v. Lushis | 37 | | 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Zaccardi v. Becker, | 33 | | 88 N.J. 245, 258 (1982) | | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Court Rules | Page(s) | |----------------------|--------------------------| | R. 4:5-1 | 1,2,3,4,5,16,26,40,41,42,43 | | R. 1:6-6 | 2, 3 | | R. 4:30A | 32,33 | | R. 4:29-1(b) | 40 | | R. 4:5-1(b)(2) | 40 | | R. 4:28 | 34,39,40 | | R. 4:5-1(b) | 39,40 | INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT This is an action for legal malpractice by which Plaintiff/Appellant sought to recover the damages they lost as a result of the failure of their former attorney, Defendants/Respondents, [...], Esq. (hereafter “Mazawey”) to competently advise them regarding entry into a lease for a building in West New York.
[brief] Again, however, the Appellate Division’s did address this issue in Norman Towers, supra.  While unpublished, Norman Towers is instructive in its interpretation that the [...] long term tax exemption was not repealed by LTTEL.  It follows that while the plaintiff can argue that the County has failed to demand, monitor and collect long term tax exemption service charges from [...] projects, this ignores the obvious— that the County is in no position to sue for such service charges collected by a municipality since no legal authority exists upon which it can do so.  And even if in the current case the tax abatement had been given under LTTEL, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12 the municipality is charged with remitting 5% of the annual service charge it collects to the county, the statute itself failing to provide an enforcement mechanism for counties.  On another note, even assuming, arguendo, that the County has failed to “enforce” N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12, New Jersey law holds that a public entity is not liable for any injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt a law or by failing to enforce any law.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-4.
[brief] The June 23, 2022 order simply did not do that, as the issue of punitive damages was left wholly unresolved and the June 23, 2022 order actually provided for further discovery.  Id.  In Lawson v. Dewar, 2021 WL 2148885 (App. Div. May 27, 2021), the Appellate Division clarified that only final orders are subject to Rule 4:49-2 and the Cummings framework.  Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders, which constitute the vast majority of orders issued by trial courts (resolving motions for substitute service, motions to amend pleadings, motions relating to discovery, etc.) are instead to be governed by the “far more liberal approach” of Rule 4:42-2, which states that interlocutory orders “shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice. ”  Lawson at *2.  Because the trial court failed to apply the proper standard on reconsideration, the Statement of Reasons (Da262) which accompanied the order denying reconsideration failed to address the issues raised in that motion – including those of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and the entire controversy doctrine.  IV.
[brief] (5-8)  .................................................................................................................................  18  II.  THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED SETTLED SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS IN DETERMINING THAT THERE WERE NO MATERIAL FACT DISPUTES REGARDING THE ELEMENT OF MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION REQUIRED FOR THE REMEDY OF RESCISSION AND DISREGARDED  SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT WOULD HAVE AT LEAST CREATED A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT ON THAT ISSUE.
[brief] ”  Payton, supra, 148 N.J. at 559.  B.  The Trial Court’s Order Requiring Plaintiff to Subpoena [...] Was an Abuse of Discretion (Pa4, 9)  New Jersey’s discovery rules provide for broad pretrial discovery.  Payton, 148 N.J. at 535.  R. 4:14-1 provides that after the commencement of the action, a party may take the deposition of any person by deposition on oral examination.  Examination and cross-examination of deponents may proceed as permitted at trial in open court.  R. 4:14-3.  R. 4:14-2(a) establishes the requirements for deposition notices.  In pertinent part, the Rule provides that “a party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give not less than 10 days’ notice in writing to every other party to the action. ”  Id.  In D’Agostino, this Court compelled [...] to produce for deposition non-party executives of a non-party Swiss subsidiary named in a deposition notice served pursuant Rule 4:14-2(a).  D’Agostino v. [...], 242 N.J.Super. 267, 275-76 (App.Div. 1990).  In so holding, the D’Agostino court expressly rejected the argument that a non-party officer, director, or managing agent must be subpoenaed for deposition:  [D]efendants’ contention that the noticed subsidiary executives are non-parties and that their attendance at depositions could only be mandated by subpoena is without merit.
[directive] Laboratory for of Requests Submission 10.2 Timelv Testing.  Forensic for Evidence  Submitting for Limit Time 10.2.1 of Division or Prosecutor County trial, the before detained is defendant the where cases  In as analysis forensic for evidence submit sha11  Division the by prosecuted cases in Justice Criminal possible. promptly as delay, justifying a circumstances compelling Absent Science.  Forensic of Office Police State fingerprints, DNA, substances, controlled suspected of analysis (e.g., analysis forensic for requests within submitted be should Science Forensic of Office Police State Jersey New the by etc.) ballistics, arrest. of date of the days business five forensic for requests delay, justifying a circumstances compelling Absent Laboratories.
[brief] Second, as seen in the defense firm’s billings (Pa124), they improperly worked in lockstep with Pennsylvania Attorney [...], Esq., who had filed an improper appearance on behalf of [...] and [...] and [...] in the Pennsylvania Malpractice Case.  The trial court squarely held that those companies belong to [...] and the use of powers of attorney were valid in the context of divorce and bankruptcy.  (A229, Op. at 51).  They collaborated with [...] when he filed [...]’s self-contradictory federal malpractice case against [...] in August 21, 2020.  In that Complaint, [...] blames that firm not [...] for the very same conduct she never proved in this case.  (Pa99, Pl.’s Trial Ex. P-84).  The defense lawyers did nothing to prevent [...] from playing fast and loose with the courts and inflicting improper economic harm against [...].  He adequately explained what defense counsel knew and when they knew it.
[brief] *Rosenblit* in particular further demonstrates that evidence *must* be admitted in the initial phase of trial if it has the potential to influence the outcome.  Here is no --- \(^{10}\) The trial court only allowed the records in the first phase of the trial for impeachment purposes if the defendant testified.  The defendant did not testify and therefore the altered records were never introduced in the first phase of the trial, which resulted in a defense verdict.  different.
[brief] -  The individual plaintiffs failed to overcome their lack of standing, or to even contest the issue as it was set forth in Appellant’s initial Brief.  - The individual plaintiffs failed to make the requisite showing of damages required under New Jersey’s fraud statutes and failed to establish that Appellant’s alleged actions at [...] somehow violated his --- \(^1\) N.B. –  The criminal allegations against Appellant for wire fraud and money laundering, which were repeatedly raised by Respondents in their pleadings, are scheduled to be dismissed in their entirety.  See [...].  fiduciary duties to them as members of [...].  •  [...] failed to show that it was damaged in any way.  •  The individual plaintiffs and [...] all failed to properly plead a derivative cause of action (although doing so would have been futile, as discussed in Appellant’s Brief).