ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondent [...] respectfully submits that NJDEP’s Final Decision denying Appellant’s Third-Party Adjudicatory Hearing Request should be affirmed and if the Court elects to consider the untimely challenge to the 2017 WFD Permit or the 2019 Permit Modification, that both of those final decisions should be upheld.  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  Dated: May 20, 2024  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS  Dated: May 28, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  Attorney for Respondents  [...] [...] P.O. Box 093 [...] [...]
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2020-03 TO: All County Prosecutors Director, Division of Criminal Justice  FROM: [...], Attorney General DATE: April 11, 2020  SUBJECT: Directive Regarding Non-Prosecution of Healthcare Facilities and Professionals Adhering to Triage Protocols  During COVID-19  Pandemic  Healthcare providers across the country may soon confront a question with extraordinary moral weight and serious legal implications: how should they allocate scarce medical resources among patients in their care?  The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is pushing healthcare systems towards the limits of their capacity, and healthcare providers may be forced to decide how to withdraw or withhold certain types of treatment, including mechanical ventilation, from some patients and provide them to others.  In March 2020, the New Jersey Department of Health (DOH) convened a panel of medical experts to advise the State on the difficult ethical questions that New Jersey may face during this pandemic.  Those efforts resulted in DOH’s publication on April 11, 2020, of Emergency, a model policy for Allocation of Critical Care Resources
[brief] I.  [...] formed an enforceable arbitration agreement with [...] through the December Terms.  (Da301–304.)  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “arbitration agreements may not be subjected to more burdensome contract formation requirements than that required for any other contractual topic. ”  Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 83 (2002).  That rule is compelled by the Federal Arbitration Act, which preempts any state statute or judicial rule that would treat arbitration agreements less favorably than other kinds of contracts.  See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246, 248 (2017).  Here, [...] and [...] formed a valid contract through [...]’s in-app pop-up blocking screen.  And the December Terms contain a clear, unambiguous, and enforceable arbitration agreement that complies with all the requirements of New Jersey law.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This is a straightforward hostile work environment matter arising under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).  The matter follows the classic fact pattern of Taylor v. could be severe enough to create a hostile work environment must be viewed in light of the public sentiment and trends in popular prejudice which existed at the time of the incident.  Each of the aforementioned points will be further discussed at length following Plaintiff's recitation of facts.  For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants have failed to present meritorious arguments warranting dismissal of Plaintiff's claims and it is respectfully submitted that the motion must be denied.  RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] B. KIELY SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT A CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION  To the extent the lower court treated the September 24, 2021 Order authorizing service by mail as dispositive on the issue of proper service, [...] was deprived of the favorable inferences that should have been drawn from the record.  Further, it appears that the court may have made a determination that [...]’s Certification was not as credible as the proofs presented by [...] in support of its motion to confirm service and, later, to enter judgment.  [...] asserts he was not in receipt of the Complaint, and was unaware that a lawsuit was underway until after a judgment had already been rendered against him by default (Da118-Da119, [...] Pro-Se Cert., ¶¶7-10; Da157, Second [...] Cert., ¶¶22-25).
[brief] In light of this model charge language and given the facts at hand, Defendants submit that the lower’s court reasoning on the applicable jury charge was significantly flawed and constitutes reversible error.  The court was wrong in assuming that the 5.20B(2)(b) only applies when the incident occurred during an active or ongoing snow storm as purportedly set forth in Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props, 246 N.J. 546, 549 (2021), that the charge was not “expanded” to instances when the fall occurred after a storm event, and that this charge applied only to cases involving a public sidewalk and not a fall in a parking lot.
[brief] (3T Pg. 30, Ln. 4 – Pg. 30, Ln. 25).  [...] testified at trial that the trap was on a sidewalk where the public had the right of pedestrian travel and that rodents could feed on the exposed food.  (3T Pg. 24, Ln. 4– Pg. 25, Ln. 7).  She determined that the Defendant’s actions were in violation of Ordinances 173 and 201, which is why she issued all of the above-referenced summons on October 1, 2021.(3T Pg. 26, Ln. 22– Pg. 27, Ln. 14).
[brief] In *National Treasury*, the Supreme Court imposed a heightened standard, one less deferential to government than the test established in *Pickering* to public employee First Amendment challenges involving a generally applicable law.  Because the expressive activities, public speaking, fell “within the protected category of citizen comment on matters of public concern,” id. at 466, the Court applied Pickering’s familiar balancing test balancing “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
[brief] N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3 .........................................................................................................14  Regulations  N.J.A.C. 11:3–28.2 ....................................................................................................................38  N.J.A.C. 13:18-2.1 .....................................................................................................................38  N.J.A.C. 3:11-4.1 .......................................................................................................................38  N.J.A.C. 5:23-1.4 .......................................................................................................................38  N.J.A.C. 8:33-1.3 .......................................................................................................................38  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Id. at 14:11-23.  Based on those factual findings and observations, the court came to the legal conclusion that notwithstanding the high priority New Jersey law places on the system of recording deeds and other instruments evidencing an interest in real property, the equities at stake weighed in favor of [...].  The court acknowledged Sonderman v. Remington Construction Company, 127 N.J. 96, 108 (1992), noting that while recorded deeds usually control in a dispute over title to property, unusual or compelling equities can overcome the law’s presumption in favor of recorded title as the determinant of ownership.
[brief] The Borough took the Defendants’ side on the return of the Order to Show Cause and said no permits were needed and for the first time they produced an unsigned zoning permit from March 2020.  The Court denied the injunction and Defendants have been profiting from an illegal use since May 2020, over four years.  In addition, in spite of the fact that the Borough said that no permits were necessary, multiple permits were applied for after the return date of the Order to Show Cause, not all of them were granted, and some of them were rejected outright.
[brief] (5T22-1 to 17).  Later when [...] was in her second-floor bedroom she heard multiple gunshots from the hallway and her daughter yell that she had been shot.  (5T15-12 to 22; 5T13-17 to 18).  Upon exiting her bedroom she observed her son, [...], laying on the second floor landing having been shot multiple times.  (5T14-21 to 15 to 11).  Lying next to [...] was [...] also suffering from multiple gunshots.  (5T16-8 to 17-1).  Also on the landing was the defendant holding a handgun and the butcher knife.  (5T17-8 to 25, 5T20-16 to 21-25).  [...] then ran down the stairs and out of the residence.
[directive] Adopted by law enforcement as a supplement to the handgun, shoulder mounted semi-automatic firearm, having a barrel length of 16 inches or more and chambered to fire handgun ammunition.  Or a submachine gun capable of firing semi-automatic only, deployed in patrol vehicles as a supplemental firearm for patrol.  Police Carbine Qualification Course (PCQC).  A standard course of fire for semi- annual qualification for police carbine.  (Appendix H)  Police Carbine Qualification Night Course (PCQNC).  A standard course of fire under night conditions for semi-annual qualification for police carbine.  (Appendix I)  Police Service Rifle.  An automatic or semi-automatic assault weapon, as previously defined, which fires ammunition having a muzzle velocity of greater than 2,000 feet per second.
[brief] State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).  To determine the voluntariness of a custodial statement, courts assess the “totality of all the surrounding circumstances. ”  State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 227 (1996) (citations omitted).  In doing so, the trial court considers a suspect's age, education, intelligence, prior contacts with the criminal justice system, length of detention, advisement of constitutional rights, the nature of the questioning, and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion were involved in the interrogation process.  State ex rel. A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 146 (2010) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)); see also State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 317 (2019) (reaffirming factors).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests and Motions  On May 2, 2022, Plaintiff obtained a certification from New Jersey Attorney General’s Office Lieutenant [...] attesting to the fact that there were 52-pages of emails between [...] employees, [...] employees, and [...] (“[...]”) employees regarding Plaintiff’s charges against [...].  Pa-80 to 86.  On May 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Verified Amended Complaint attaching Lt. Augustyn’s certification.  Pa-27.  On June 22, 2022, [...] “granted plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint which included new facts that support the defendant’s falsely denied the existence of emails. ”  2T11-23 to 12-1.  Defendant [...] then filed an Answer, but did not file any dispositive motions.  Pa-87.  On August 3, 2022, Plaintiff served a set of interrogatories and requests for production on Defendant [...] that were specifically designed to ferret out what other responsive records the agency possessed.  Pa-97.  On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff served a subpoena duces tecum on the [...] similarly seeking to determine what responsive records existed.  Pa-92.  On January 17, 2023, [...] heard oral argument on Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery against the [...] and the [...]’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s subpoena.  2T.  Plaintiff argued that, given that the [...] lied about the existence of records, including emails, discovery was necessary to determine the scope of responsive records that the agency possessed.  2T4-9 to 4-24; 2T13-15 to 18.  [...] granted the [...]’s and the [...]’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s subpoena, Pa-10, and denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery.  Pa-12.  The trial court placed the following reasons on the record:  "While plaintiff argues that his requested discovery is necessary to determine what records the [...] actually possesses allowing plaintiff to compel the same documents from his denied OPRA request would have the same effect as if the court found the plaintiff - for plaintiff on the merits.  ...  Since plaintiff’s discovery request is identical to the information plaintiff seeks to access under the OPRA and common law right of access, the Court shall not enlarge plaintiff’s right to those documents simply because plaintiff is now a litigant."  2T16-14 to 17-11.  VI.
[directive] X. Reporting and Evaluation 2012]8  [Amended May 3, 2012 and July 13, reference to emergency medical technicians (EMTs), the removal of a CED dart/electrode is beyond their approved scope of practice under N.J.A.C. 8:40A-10.1 (Basic EMTs) and N.J.A.C. 8:41A-5.1 (Paramedic EMTs).  8  The 2010 Attorney General Policy on Conducted Energy Devices required all law enforcement agencies to report to the appropriate County Prosecutor regarding CED discharges.
[brief] (1T 41-18 to 43-4, 50-8 to 24; 2T 8-12 to 24, 19-25 to 20-5)  Thus, similarly to *Shaw*, the police stopped [...] solely to determine if he was their target and not because of any individualized suspicion of criminality.  See *Rivera*, 276 N.J. Super. at 352 (finding a search “especially troublesome” when “it was conducted in the course of pursuing another”).  As *Shaw* emphatically affirms, the police may not detain every man on a city block only to assess if he is the person wanted for arrest without particularized suspicion.  See also *State v. Nyema*, 249 N.J. 509, 531-32 (2022) (observing that vague descriptions of a suspect’s race and gender unconstitutionally permit law enforcement “to stop every Black man within a reasonable radius” of a reported crime).  Further, unlike *Williams I*, where the police stopped an individual matching the dispatcher’s description in clothing, race, and gender at a specific address at two o’clock in the morning, this is not a case where reasonable suspicion is merely “doubtful” or where the question of reasonableness is a close call.  192 N.J. at 4-5, 9-10.  Instead, the testifying officers in this case repeatedly acknowledged that there were no facts to support any individualized suspicion that [...] had committed a crime and reaffirmed continually that [...] was only stopped so that the officers could identify and arrest [...].  *Shaw* plainly considers such police conduct to be unconstitutional, flagrant, and worthy of deterrence.
[directive] b.  Actor, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, photographs, films, videotapes, records, or otherwise reproduces in any manner, the image of another person whose 2C:14-9(a-c)  Invasion of  Privacy intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, without that person’s consent and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not expect to be observed, third degree.  c.  Actor, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, discloses any photograph, film, 4th Degree $1,000 to $5,000 10% permissible videotape recording or any other reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has consented to such disclosure, third degree.
[brief] 1  Because they are closely related, the procedural history and counterstatement of facts are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  2  Aa refers to the [...]’s Appendix.  WPa refers to the Co-Respondent [...]’s Appendix.  exemptions were not authorized pursuant to the Long-Term Tax Exemption law and whose sponsors were not urban renewal entities. ” (Aa56).  Additionally, Count Two sought an order directing and compelling State Parties “to create a task force to create a new prototype long term tax exemption ordinance and financial agreement” to which the State Parties would “appoint [...] and Attorney [...]. ” (Aa57).  Count Four appears to have alleged a misrepresentation of material information in the “municipal capital market[]” offerings.  (Aa59-60).  Count Five alleged that the Attorney General failed to properly supervise Newark and Essex County Officials in general terms without explicitly stating what the Attorney General was supposed to supervise and how that failure harmed [...].  (Aa60).  Count Six alleged that the State created a danger to Essex County taxpayers.  (Aa61-63).  Count Seven alleged violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”).  (Aa64-66).  Finally, Count Eight alleged the State Parties violated [...]’s civil rights, constituting a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  (Aa67).  Counts One and Three asserted no allegations against or reference to the State Parties.  (Aa50-55; Aa58-59).  The State Parties removed this matter to the U.S. District Court of New Jersey on May 10, 2019, and moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
[brief] 253a-301a.  On the same day, Appellant moved for reconsideration of the Judgment.  161a-226a.  On November 4, 2022, Appellant filed a certification opposing the Fee Application.  303a-344a.  On November 14, 2022, Respondent filed a letter brief opposing the Appellant’s motion for reconsideration.  228a.  On November 16, 2022, Respondent filed a reply certification in further support of the Fee Application.
[brief] [...] et al., Racial Biases in Officers’ Decisions to Frisk are Amplified for Black People Stopped Among Groups Leading to Similar Biases in Searches, Arrests, and Use of Force, 11 Soc. Psychol. & Personality Sci. 761, 769 (2020). 2  Effective policing does not explain the disproportionate escalation of 2  Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337218956 stops of Black people when they are in a group, because data shows that officers are not more likely to find illegal contraband on Black people stopped in groups.  *Id.* at 766–67.  Researchers theorize that these disparities are attributable to widely held racial biases, such as stereotypes that associate Black people with threat and aggression.
[brief] Finally, the record indicates that the City budgeted 2% salary increases for each year of the fire officers agreement.  (1T106:18-107:6; 2T47:15-51:18)(Aa060).  Notwithstanding, the arbitrator failed to award 2% per year across-the-board salary increases to the bargaining unit and disregarded the record regarding the City’s budgeted salary increases for the [...] bargaining unit in those calendar years.  Instead, according to the Commission, [t]he arbitrator found that, in order to fund even a 2% across-the-board salary increase the City would need to divert all of its surplus and cap banking for CY 2024 and still end up approximately $400,000 short, possibly requiring layoffs or service shutdowns to make up the shortage.  (Award at 55-56).  Accordingly, he concluded:  In addressing the public interest/financial criteria, even though I would otherwise find that the unit in question deserved, at a minimum, to be treated like the City treated its non-uniformed union and non-represented employees, i.e., 2% across-the-board with retroactive ⁹  The awarded term expired 12/31/2023.  The cost out prepared by the arbitrator in Appendix D appears to extend to 7/31/2024 which is beyond the term of the agreement.
[brief] I.  Standard Of Review ..........................................................................................................17  II.  The Trial Court’s November 2, 2022 Order Awarding The Estranged Wife $44,000 In Additional Counsel Fees Was Unreasonable And An Abuse Of The Trial Court’s Discretion Because The Work For Which Counsel Billed Was Unnecessary And Improper.  (The Trial Court’s Order is located at MA-66.)  .........................................................................................................................19  III.  The Trial Court’s November 2, 2022 Order Awarding The Estranged Wife An Additional $20,000 In Sanctions Was Unreasonable And An Abuse Of The Trial Court’s Discretion Because The Work For Which Counsel Billed Was Unnecessary And Improper And The Sanctions Were Duplicative Punishment.  (The Trial Court’s Order is located at MA-66.)  .........................................................................................................................21  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................22  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....................................................................................................24
[brief] Indeed, the lower court carefully examined the [...] policy language in conjunction with the allegations of the underlying complaint, correctly concluding that there is no manner in which the [...] policy (or likely, any liability policy) provides coverage for the allegations of the lawsuit against [...], all of which were premised on his own voluntary and intentional conduct.  Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal provide no basis upon which the lower court’s conclusions should be disturbed.  The lower court correctly determined that the [...] policy is not an “all-risks” policy.  The lower court rejected plaintiff’s claim that his [...] “unit-owners” insurance policy is an “all-risks” policy, one that plaintiff’s complaint alleged covers “all fortuitous losses, in the absence of fraud or other intentional misconduct of the insured” (Pa3, ¶3), unless a specific exclusion applies (Pa395).
[directive] If in such situations, the person convicted of the crime is the parent of a minor child or resides in a household where there are other minor children, the court must make a referral to DYFS.  The court must provide DYFS with the name and address of the person convicted of the crime, information on the person’s criminal history, and the name and address of each minor child of the defendant and/or any minor child who resides in defendant’s household.  As noted above, this two-part detailed protocol was developed by the Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges and Conference of Criminal Division Managers in consultation with representatives of the Division of Youth and Family Services.
[brief] (Ibid.)  [...] also requested that [...] stay the proceedings on the merits of Plaintiffs’ fee applications until the recusal motion was resolved.  (Ibid.)  [...] granted the Wilfs’ stay request.  (Ibid.)  On December 21, 2020, [...] denied the Wilfs’ recusal motion.  (Da38873-91.)  [...] appealed [...]’s decision, and [...] affirmed.
[brief] The factual circumstances giving rise to the Hackensack Project dispute were already addressed—at great length—in the first arbitration, and [...] had, at minimum, a fair and reasonable opportunity to raise all setoff claims during that proceeding (and it did).  The trial court’s decision to nonetheless compel a second arbitration undermines the doctrine’s goal of judicial efficiency and fairness by allowing [...] to bifurcate the dispute and potentially initiate an unknown amount of additional arbitrations.  The trial court’s denial of [...]’s request for injunctive relief was therefore erroneous.  The ECD bars [...]’s second arbitration regarding the Hackensack Project, as all related claims should have been fully resolved in the first arbitration.  The Appellate Division should therefore reverse the trial court’s August 30 Orders and grant [...]’s request for injunctive relief.
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