ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at 5.  The hierarchical approach to religious property disputes is also sometimes referred to as the “deference” approach.  The analytical framework used in the Graves decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court has been applied by New Jersey courts in other cases involving non-church religious disputes.  See, e.g., Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 125 N.J. 404, 414 (1991); Abdelhak v. Jewish Press, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 211 (App. Div. 2009); Islamic Ctr. of Passaic Inc. v. Salahuddin, Appeal No.: A-0387-18T1 (App. Div. Dec. 13, 2020).2
[brief] Hankin Sandman  Palladino Weintrob & Bell Counsellors-at-Law  A Professional Corporation [...] [...]  T: [...]  F: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for Appellant [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esquire  Attorney I.D. 018552005  July 2, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ i
[brief] Here, the prosecutor’s misconduct in Point II.B -- testifying about facts not in evidence and misrepresenting the evidence to bolster [...]’s credibility -- led directly to improper vouching for [...]’s truthfulness.  In that same portion of his summation, the prosecutor repeatedly asserted a personal belief that [...] was telling the truth:  [[...]] was very truthful here, especially when [...] asked about his convictions.  He didn’t hold anything back.  He knows the system.  He tells you about it.  He was educating you.  He said, oh, you never take the first deal, you always take the second one, things improve.  He knows what’s going on .  . . .  Not once did he try to do any of that at all to help him.  Why?  Because he told you, he was best friends with [...].  He told the truth and he told the truth about what he saw because it bothered him so much because that was his best friend and also told the truth about [...] defiling that shrine, and he told the truth about [...] brandishing that Glock.  That happened.  That’s the truth and Demetrius [...] told you exactly what happened.  [5T 110-8 to 111-1 (emphasis added). ]  The prosecutor’s repeated proclamations that [...] was telling the truth were not fair comments on the evidence but instead were unqualified assertions of a personal belief in the State’s key witness.  That vouching was particularly harmful because it was inextricably tied to the prosecutor’s newly raised claims about the plea process and false statements that [...] never sought to leverage his information to benefit himself.  Together, all three had the effect of unfairly bolstering [...]’s credibility and invading the jury’s exclusive responsibility to determine credibility.  See State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 105 (1972) (explaining a prosecutor’s role carries a level of prestige with jurors and thus “improper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none”).  Accordingly, reversal is required.
[brief] The longstanding tax sale law’s equity theft scheme is now barred.  New law provides safeguards to ensure no one else loses their home or equity due to the unconstitutional law.  However sadly, [...] and his home have been allowed to fall between the cracks.  The Courts and legislature in New Jersey have been working hard the past year to align the tax sale law with the landmark May 25, 2023 US Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023) declaring a taxing authority’s confiscation of a property owner’s equity violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie powinny być w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English Sądownictwo w New Jersey New Jersey Judiciary
[brief] First, like qualified immunity, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense.  Defendants have not yet filed answers in this matter.  Defendants failed to attach the contested long term tax exemption financial agreement to their dismissal pleadings.  As the party asserting the collateral estoppel bar, defendants must show: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom this doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[brief] Because [...]’s claim for fees has no support in Rule 4:42-9(a)(6), [...] cites to cases that do not address the “successful claimant” standard.  For instance, [...] relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industrial, Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009).  (Prb 9.)  But, Litton did not interpret the “successful claimant” requirement of R. 4:42-9(a)(6); it addressed a situation where “fee-shifting [was] controlled by a contractual provision[.]”  Litton, 200 N.J. at 385.  Litton has no relevance to this Court’s interpretation of the Court Rules.  [...] also misrepresents the facts of this case, claiming it recovered $2 million from [...] and that the issue of choice of law was not “dispositive. ” (Prb 5 and 8.)  In reality, [...] has recovered approximately $900,000 in past costs from [...] (plus 6% of future costs) – while [...] is responsible for approximately $15 million of the past costs it sought in this action (plus 85% of future costs).  Moreover, the reason there were only three insurers left in this case at trial is that the choice of law ruling was dispositive and eliminated 12 of the 15 insurers [...] originally sued.  Again, that is not a “success”.  [...] asks that it be rewarded after failing on the two key issues in this case – choice of law and allocation – and after being forced to bear the vast majority of the cleanup costs it sought from [...] and the other insurers, as well as more than 90% of the fees and costs it incurred in bringing this action.  This cannot be what our Court Rules intended under the fee shifting provisions of Rule 4:42-9(a)(6).  The Court’s review of the “successful claimant” issue does not need to go any further than the numbers of this case: [...] has to pay 85% of its covered costs and more than $15 million; [...] has to pay 6% of covered costs and approximately $900,000.  No New Jersey court has applied the fee shifting mechanics of Rule 4:42-9(a)(6) in these circumstances, and this Court should not be the first.  II.
[brief] Courts are “bound to adhere to settled precedent” under the principle of stare decisis, as the doctrine promotes “a number of important ends,” such as “consistency, stability, and predictability in the development of legal principles” along with “respect for judicial decisions. ”  State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133, 152 (2023) (quoting Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 208 (2011); State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 439 (2015)).  While stare decisis is not an inflexible doctrine that deprives courts of the ability to correct errors or perpetuate mistakes, “a ‘special justification’ is required to depart from precedent” because of the above compelling reasons.
[brief] Hence, the final issue to end the litigation below did not conclude until the 5-31-24 Order.  The Notice of Appeal was timely filed within 45 days of that date.  Taking plaintiffs’ logic to its illogical conclusion, the time to appeal would have started to run before a vast amount of issues, ancillary & necessary, were decided, namely the correct amount of the turn-over & the correct form of the turnover order.  II.
[brief] While this redevelopment plan did not include this particular parcel, it discussed the suitability of this area and [...]’s ODL zone for commercial and industrial development due to the direct access to Interstate 295 via [...]-Columbus Road (County Route 656).  Ja174.  The [...] redevelopment plan also discussed the zoning compatibility with the adjacent municipality, [...].  Ja175.  “The lands in [...] are zoned SM Special Manufacturing and GM General Manufacturing, which take advantage of their close proximity to Interchange 52 of I-295.  The ODL zoning in the redevelopment area is compatible with the industrial zoning in [...] Township. ”  Ja175-Ja176.  Similarly, based on a March 2020 regional transportation and circulation plan, prepared by the [...] - - seventeen months before this application was filed - - this specific Property was anticipated to produce 1.55 million square feet of warehouse and distribution space.
[brief] ”  Instead, where a contract “allows [the employer] to discipline or discharge for ‘proper cause’ […] but does not define the phrase[,] [w]hen the grievance was submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator was forced to decide what "proper cause" meant[.]”  *Id.* at 280-281 (citing *Transportation Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp.*, 51 F.3d 376, 380-381 (3rd Cir. 1995))
[directive] a.  Do you realize that a guilty plea may result in a violation of your probation or [Yes/Wi]  [No/Non] [NA/paaplikab] parole?  Eske w reyalize ke yon deklarasyon koupab takab anpyete libete siveye oswa libete kondisyonel ou an?  [Yes/Wi]  [No/Non]  Are you presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge?
[directive] 4.2.5  The automated pretrial risk-assessment process does not account for a defendant’s involvement in the juvenile justice system.  For this reason, the PSA results may not accurately reflect the risk that a young adult defendant may commit serious new crimes if released.  To address this circumstance, the Judiciary has agreed that as part of the automated pretrial risk- assessment process, law enforcement will have access to defendants’ prior juvenile records stored in the Juvenile Central Registry.  Accordingly, in cases where the defendant is less than 28 years old at the time of arrest, before the decision is made whether to issue a complaint-summons or apply for a complaint-warrant, the Juvenile Central Registry shall be checked to determine whether the defendant has a juvenile record that might have a material bearing on the charging/pretrial release decision.  See subsection 4.5.7 (presumption of applying for a complaint-warrant when a defendant has recent delinquency adjudications for violent or firearms-related crimes) and subsection 7.4.3 (presumption of seeking pretrial detention when defendant is charged with a serious crime, the PSA produces a moderate risk score, and defendant has a recent delinquency adjudication involving violence).  12
[brief] ”  (Pb27)  DEFENDANTS: Plaintiff provides no evidence to support this assertion.  Furthermore, Defendants highlight that both properties were owned by the Trust “free and clear,” making them ready for immediate transfer to the beneficiaries upon the Settlor’s death, thereby avoiding any delays and potential disputes associated with the probate process.  Additionally, there is nothing in the Dispositive Provisions of Trust Article 4 that explicitly instructs the Trustee to “sell” the properties after the Settlor’s death.  (Da3)  PLAINTIFF:
[brief] Id. at 252 (citing Crews v. Garmoney, 141 N.J. Super. 93, 96 (App. Div. 1976)).  The Affidavit of Merit Statute imposes an arguably procedural requirement on plaintiffs that requires the submission of an appropriate affidavit of merit within the timeframe prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, within sixty (60) days of the filing of defendant’s answer or, for good cause shown, within an additional sixty-day period, for a total of 120 days from the date of defendant’s answer.  Although prescribed by statute, the affidavit of merit requirement is akin to discovery in the sense that its purpose is to attest to the reasonable probability of professional negligence.  By its very nature, the affidavit of merit can be likened to a permanency certification, which attests to the permanent nature of a plaintiff’s injuries.  Failure to submit either one could result in the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.  However, due to the fact that dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint is considered the “ultimate sanction,” competing policy concerns must be balanced.  As such, courts should consider the prejudice that was suffered by the defendant in comparison to the draconian punishment of the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15b declares that it is "the intention of the Legislature that the actions, decisions, determinations and rulings of the State Government with respect to energy shall to the maximum extent practicable and feasible conform to the energy master plan adopted by the Department pursuant to section 12 of this act C N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15b]...."  (Emphasis added.)  As this is a matter of law, the [...] is not entitled to any deference.
[brief] “[T]he fresh-complaint doctrine is a common law exception to [the rules barring the admission of hearsay] that ‘allows witnesses in a criminal trial to testify to a victim’s complaint of sexual assault. ’”  State v. C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. 574, 599 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting State v. Hill, 121 N.J. 150, 151 (1990)).  “The purpose of the doctrine is to ‘allow[] the admission of evidence of a victim's complaint of sexual abuse, otherwise inadmissible as hearsay, to negate the inference that the victim's initial silence or delay indicates that the charge is fabricated. ’”  Id. (quoting State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 455 (2015)).  The fresh complaint rule has no bearing on this case at all.
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.  *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021); see also *Heyert v. Taddese*, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 411 (App. Div. 2013) (explaining this Court applies the “same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether the grant or denial of summary judgment was correct” on appeal).  Summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  *Friedman v. Martinez*, 242 N.J. 449, 471-72 (2020) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c) and citing *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 528-29(1995)).  “To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must ‘draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party. ’”  *Id.*  242 N.J. at 472(quoting *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 480(2016)).  Generally, summary judgment is inappropriate prior to the completion of discovery.  See Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 109 N.J. 189, 193 (1988); compare Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 451 (2007) (holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the party opposing the motion for summary judgment is already in control of all the information sought).  However, “‘summary judgment is not premature merely because discovery has not been completed, unless’ the non-moving party can show ‘with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action. ’”  Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015) (quoting Wellington v. Estate of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003)).  “A party opposing summary judgment on the ground that more discovery is needed must specify what further discovery is required, rather than simply asserting a generic contention that discovery is incomplete. ”  Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159, 166 (App. Div. 2007).  Moreover, the fact that discovery is incomplete will not defeat a summary judgment motion or require discovery to be undertaken and completed by the parties where the additional discovery will “patently not change the outcome. ”  Minoia v. Kushner, 365 N.J. Super. 304, 307-08 (2004) (quoting Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. at 496 (App. Div. 2003).  POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THE LOAN DOCUMENTS AND APPLICABLE NEW JERSEY LAW REQUIRED THE APPELLANT’S PREDECESSOR AND/OR [...] ACCEPT AND APPLY THE FIRST WIRE TRANSFER TO THE BALANCE DUE ON THE LOAN
[brief] [Court’s interpretation would render statute unconstitutional]  (Argued at Pa384 – Pa387)  Under the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions, no State may pass a law that impairs the obligations of contracts.  The contract between [...] and [...] required [...] to perform work as a condition of receiving payment.  The obligation of [...] was to perform services as a prerequisite to payment, and the obligation of [...] was to pay [...] for services rendered.  [...]’s Counterclaim asks the court to force [...] to pay for services that were not performed, even though there is not a renegotiated contract enabling such a gratuitous arrangement.  The legal basis for the Counterclaim requires the court to interpret N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) in a manner that violates the Impairment of Contracts Clauses under the U.S. Constitution and New Jersey Constitution, because if [...] is required to pay [...] without a renegotiated contract, then the statute, as applied, impaired the obligation of [...] to perform services as a prerequisite to payment, and impaired the obligation of [...] to pay [...] after services were rendered.
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX  Notice Of Appeal.................................................................Da1-Da4 Indictment..............................................................................Da5-Da9  Verdict Sheet........................................................................Da10-Da13  Jury Instructions.....................................................................Da14-Da56  Judgment Of Conviction.........................................................Da57-Da60  Co-Defendant [...]  Plea Agreement....................Da61-Da66  Co-Defendant [...]  Judgment Of Conviction..........Da67-Da70  Court Communications Regarding Jury Deliberations Dates........Da71-Da72  TABLES OF RULINGS AND JUDGMENTS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Rendine, 141 N.J. at 317 (fee determinations are reviewed are disturbed “only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ”).  As explained in the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Rendine, “the first step in the fee-setting process is to determine the “lodestar”: the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.
[brief] 11T76:9 to 77:11.  “[W]e talked about this a moment ago, the [...] did not have any problem with the care and treatment that was given.  All right.  You saw that.  No citable deficiencies.  No state or federal citable deficiencies. ”  11T76:9-14.  The defense cited to the [...] and characterized its findings as if the [...] had a representative at trial who testified to what they did and what they found.  Clearly, defendant used the hearsay to prove the ultimate issue at trial.
[brief] Such a result would be akin to the enforcement of an ex post facto law which is prohibited by both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution.  *U.S. Const.* art. I, § 10, cl. 1; *N.J. Const.* art. IV, § 7, ir3; *State v. Hester*, 233 N.J. 381, 391 (2018).
[brief] COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiff was retained by Defendant to perform legal services for her, which were performed, and an invoice for those services was sent to the Defendant by email, the exclusive method of communication permitted by the Defendant, as she expressly mandated in the Retainer Agreement.  [Da2 at ¶7].  Plaintiff also stated in the Complaint that after the Defendant indicated she would not pay his invoice, “[o]n November 16, 2018, pursuant to R. 1:20A-6, Plaintiff provided a Pre-action Notice and another copy of the invoice to the defendant, simultaneously by certified and regular mail, to the Cliffside Park address she furnished eight days earlier. ”  [Id. at ¶9; emphasis added]  Plaintiff also sent an email to the Defendant providing the same Pre-action Notice concerning fee arbitration – Defendant has never denied receiving any emails that were sent to her from Plaintiff.  [Id. at ¶10]  Nor could she since that was her modus operandi.  The Pre-action Notice was addressed to Defendant and mailed by certified and regular mail to “[...],” the same address Defendant provided, which is not only set forth in the signed Retainer Agreement, but is the very same address she used in trial court filings she made in the trial court and again to the Fee Arbitration Committee.  As it turns out, the street address provided by the defendant is actually a Post Office box.  The Notice sent by regular mail was returned by the post office, but with “Refused” handwritten on the front of the envelope.  [Id. at ¶11; Pa1]  Plaintiff further alleged that “[m]ore than 30 days have passed since the Pre-action Notice was served on the defendant, and upon information and belief, the defendant has not availed herself of the opportunity to have this matter resolved through fee arbitration. ”  [Id. at ¶12]  Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint on January 14th, 2019, for contractual damages in the amount of $4,600.00 arising out of his limited representation of the defendant.  [Da1 at ¶3]  PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
[brief] It is undisputed that the VRDO Data Sources provide VRDO transactional data to any member of the public who pays the subscription fee (and in the case of [...], for free).5  And Relator raises no genuine dispute that the purpose of the VRDO Data Sources is to disseminate information to the public.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that [...] --- 5  See Ja2098–100 (¶¶ 9–11), Ja2103–05 (¶¶ 18–19), Ja2108–10 (¶¶ 25, 27); Ja3896 (¶¶ 131–32); Ja4272–73, 4301 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 17–20, 81); Ja1548–49 (MSRB R. G-34(c)(ii)(A)); Ja1559–62 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 3–4, 10, 12). is “news media” because its express purpose is “to increase the transparency of the municipal securities market by providing free public access to municipal securities disclosures and data.
[brief] Plaintiff candidly acknowledges that it “recognizes the [Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Princeton, 52 N.J. 348 (1968)], Nunziato and other cases involve payments agreed to at the planning board level in connection with the MLUL,” but argues that “the concerns expressed by this Court and the Supreme Court about paying for approvals under an unreviewable assessment regime apply with equal force in the redevelopment context. ”  Pb32 (emphasis added).  Plaintiff’s argument is an “apples to oranges” comparison between the negotiation of a redevelopment agreement between a redeveloper and the redevelopment entity and the application for land use approvals before a planning board.  These are entirely separate and distinct events, governed by separate and distinct statutes, serving separate aims.