ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^3\) --- \(^3\)  See FINRA Funding Portal Rule 1200(b)(1) (adopted by SR-FINRA-2015-040 eff. January 29, 2016) (Publicly available at: https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/funding-portalrules/1200); Regulatory Notice 16-06 (SEC Approval of FINRA Funding Portal Rules and Related Forms, Published Jan. 29, 2016) (publicly available at: https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/16-06).  After opening the accounts, [...] mailed Respondents “New Account Confirmations” for each of the six opened accounts, confirming that each had been opened.  (Da0076-Da0077; Da0189-Da0210; Da0211-Da0228; Da0229-Da0245).  Each New Account Confirmation contained identifying information about the customer, including their stated net worth, tax bracket and investment objectives, along with which mutual fund they bought as an initial investment, among other things.  (Da0076-Da0077; Da0194-Da0195).  In reliance on Respondents’ Client Agreements, [...] provided Respondents with substantial investment advice during the five years that followed the opening of their investment accounts.  (Da0074-Da0075; Da0097-Da0098; Da0115-Da0116; Da0150-Da0151; Da0168-Da0169; Da0137; Da0185).  Respondents made dozens of mutual fund transactions in each of their six accounts, each of which reflected the benefit of [...]’s investment research and advice through [...]’s screening resources, which was curated in light of information about Respondents’ investment goals.  (Da0074-Da0079).  As a result, Respondents earned more than $330,000 in returns in their accounts which they withdrew from time to time as they saw fit.  (Da0074-Da0079; Da0255-Da0298; Da0299-Da0324; Da0325-Da0358; Da0359-Da0376; Da0377-0394; Da0409-Da0492).  [...] provided these services and advice per the terms and conditions of the parties’ Client Agreement.
[brief] The entirety of the municipal record in this case which demonstrates exactly what was – and what WAS NOT – considered by the named Defendants in Redevelopment Plan Approval is limited to the following: - The text of the two (2) page challenged [...] Ordinance No. 1667 itself (Pa68); - The text of the thirty one (31) page “[Second Amended] Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan” (Pa533); - The Certified Transcript of Public Hearing (January 27, 2021 – via Zoom®) before the Mayor and Council of the [...] from In the Matter of: Ordinances 1666 and 1667 – First Reading (1T); - The Certified Transcript of Public Hearing (February 8, 2021 – via Zoom®) before the [...] from In the Matter of: Ordinances 1666 and 1667 (2T); and - The Certified Transcript of Public Hearing (February 17, 2021 – via Zoom®) before the Mayor and Council of the [...] from In the Matter of: Ordinances 1666 and 1667 – Second Reading (3T).
[brief] The Respondent was the party whom had numerous “far better options”.  What [...] conveniently omits mentioning is the fact that his client wanted to extort $530 from me, as a condition to release the car back to me.  He did this deliberately knowing that the grossly-inflated amount he sought from me would exceed the value I could likely get from selling it anywhere else.  And then even when [...] offered to return the car to me at no cost, he refused to certify that he had not already stripped parts off of the car.  So it begs the question of: “Why would [...] not provide that certification”?  And it begs the questions of: “Why did mediation end after I pushed back on the proposed change to our settlement agreement”, “Why not continue to negotiate”, “Why was my offer, later that same day, flatly refused”, etc?  Thus it was [...] and [...] who each/both refused several better options, which would have resolved the case at no cost to anyone.  Instead, both [...] and [...] decided to escalate this $400 case into a 5-figure case.  Thus it should be obvious who the “bully” is here.
[brief] 9.  A **Design Exception** for not having a five-foot minimum width landscaping area provided along the fence or wall enclosing the refuse storage area and showing the landscaping to be provided on the site plan submitted for Zoning Board of Adjustment approval, pursuant to Section 348-8.27C; and 10.  A **Design Exception** for non-compliance with the requirement of having all areas of the site not occupied by buildings, pavement, sidewalks, required screening, required parking area landscaping, required safety islands or other required improvements shall be landscaped by the planting of grass or other ground cover acceptable to the Zoning Board of Adjustment and a minimum of two shrubs and one tree for each 250 square feet of open space.  For this application the required number of shrubs and trees are not provided.  Pursuant to Section 348-8.4C (8).  (Pa018-Pa019)  This relief is in addition to nonconformities already existing on site:
[brief] On appeal from the Law Division’s decision on appeal from a municipal court, the Appellate Division’s review “focuses on whether there is ‘sufficient credible evidence…in the record’ to support the trial court’s findings. ”  State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).  “[A]ppellate courts ordinarily should not take to alter concurrent findings of fact and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error. ”  Id. at 148 (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999)).  However, the trial court’s legal rulings are considered de novo.
[brief] [...] agreed with [...] that the clear language of the Building Height Definition allows for building height to be measured from the proposed site grade as part of a site plan.  (Ra359 72:16-19.)  Further, [...] opined that mounding and terracing are typically interpreted as mounding around an existing or proposed building “where you would potentially have like a walkout basement to allow for a measurement to show that that height is at a different level. ” (Ra360 73:4-8.)  Here, she noted the ultimate grades of the site are in relationship to the overall site design, including grading, stormwater management and the site layout.  (Ra360 73:1-3.)  Additionally, [...] stated that both the RR Zone and the YB Settlement Agreement included very clear exhibits with regard to the actual building height, noting that it met the building height requirements as part of the negotiation process.  (Ra360 73:12-25.)  It is notable that after [...] told the Board that she did not think that there was a question of jurisdiction of the Application, Objector’s Counsel did not challenge this opinion.  (Ra360 73:21-74:11.)  The public portion of the hearing was closed after the conclusion of the January 10, 2022 meeting, with summations and the Board deliberation on the Application reserved for the next Board meeting.
[brief] As noted by the Millison Court, the Act “involved an historic trade-off whereby employees relinquished their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to certain, but reduced, benefits whenever they suffered injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. ”  Id. at 174 (emphasis added).  The public policy of the Act rests on this fundamental “trade-off. ”  Plaintiff’s position ignores this trade-off and obliterates the true policy objectives of the Act.  The Act was laudable social legislation and ensured compensation for workers who prior to its enactment were often left with no means to replace lost wages or access to desperately needed medical care.  Ibid.  Plaintiff ignores the true public policy of the Act.  Requiring coverage for intentional wrong claims would be destructive of the even-handed balance of interests struck by the Act’s current system of compensation.  It would undermine the balance of interests struck by the Act’s system to compensate injured workers without regard to fault while simultaneously mandating that the same insurer paying statutory workers’ compensation benefits must also insure liability imposed for the employer’s intentional wrongdoing.  Perhaps the most glaring deficiency in Plaintiff’s arguments is the failure to acknowledge that [...] was paid workers compensation benefits under the [...] Policy for the injuries he sustained during the course of his employment with [...].  As noted by the trial court, unlike the plaintiffs in Schmidt or Variety Farms, [...] received over $120,000 in workers’ compensation benefits from [...] pursuant to the [...] Policy for the injuries he sustained in his September 2020 workplace accident.  Ja16; Ja437.  The payment of these benefits to and on behalf of [...] fulfilled the promise of the Act.  [...] was not left uncompensated for his injury and all of his medical bills were paid for by his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance.  Payment of the benefits promised an injured worker by the Act is precisely what the Policy is designed to do; it insures an employer’s statutory obligations to the full extent of those obligations.  Nothing in the Act supports the contention that an employer is obligated to maintain insurance coverage for every possible claim that an injured worker might assert and mandating such coverage would undermine the express purpose and policy objectives of the Act.  The Act guarantees injured workers a means of recovery, it does not guarantee that any and all possible claims, including claims of intentional wrongdoing, will be insured.
[brief] See also *Gomez v. Foster & Garbus LLP*, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 183099, 2019 WL 5418090 (D.N.J. Oct 22, 2019) (denying leave to amend as to [...] where amendment would be futile because “debt buyers are not subject to the [NJ]CFA”).  In *Gomez*, the court analyzed whether a consumer fraud claim brought similarly by Plaintiff’s counsel is viable as against [...] for alleged “unlawful practices” under the NJCFA.  2019 U.S. Dist.  LEXIS 183099, at *12.  The court held that the NJCFA only “appl[ies] to the offering, sale, or provision of consumer credit. ”  *Id.*, at *13 (citing *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am.*, 150 N.J. 255, 696 A.3d 546 (1997)).  In reviewing the statute, the court held, specifically, that “the activities of debt buyers, such as [...] and [...] do not fall within the purview of the [NJ]CFA.
[brief] Therefore, Appellant’s wrongful termination claim is waived and is not addressed herein.  See Rule 2:6-2(a)(6); N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015); Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011).
[brief] *Id.*  However, there is a specific standard which must be observed for this doctrine to even be considered as an appropriate.  In order to meet this specific threshold that typically must be demonstrated by an affidavit of merit, **the merit of plaintiff’s allegations must be readily apparent on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint such that a jury, using ordinary understanding and experience without expert testimony, could determine whether the defendant has been negligent.**  *Hubbard*, 168 N.J. at 395.  Undoubtedly, there is no question that Plaintiff must support a claim of negligence against [...] with an expert report because it is a claim of professional negligence.  Moreover, Plaintiff only asserts this theory for the first time on appeal and does not even attempt to explain the proper standard, in derogation of Plaintiff’s obligation of candor to the court.
[brief] At a minimum, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court erred in finding, as improvidently advanced by Defendants below, that their conduct does not shock the conscience as a matter of law.  This matter should be remanded for a trial on that issue.  The Defendants below deprived Plaintiffs of a fair hearing regarding their development application in violation of the MLUL, a deprivation of a substantive due process right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  “When … a government agency has engaged in egregious misconduct rising to the level of a substantive due process violation or has invidiously discriminated against a member of society, a §1983 violation occurs ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement’ the abuse. ”  Rivkin v. Dover Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352, 384, (1996) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).  By subjecting Plaintiffs to a Zoning Board proceeding under conditions of extreme bias and animus, and by adopting a Resolution that incorporated the Mayor’s false narrative against the Amended Application, Defendants violated the statutory and due process rights of Plaintiffs to a fair and impartial consideration of their Application as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.  The ruling to the contrary below should be reversed and this matter should be remanded for a trial on the issues raised on Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, including Plaintiffs’ claims for damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.
[brief] "People, generally, are free to go on their way without interference from the government.  That is, after all, the essence of the Fourth Amendment -- the police may not randomly stop and detain persons without particularized suspicion."  *State v. Shaw*, 213 N.J. 398, 409-10 (2012) (citing *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 27 (1968)).
[brief] [...], When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (2009); [...] & [...], Managing Drug Involved Probationers with Swift and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE (2009), [...], Behavioral Triage: A New Model for Identifying and Treating Substance-abusing Offenders, 3 J. Drug Pol’y Analysis 1 (2010).
[directive] Other Enforcemenf Agencies  Ill: Part to of law funds OR1 as Indicate the name and number any enforcement agency receiving a result of a 9) the contributing share.  Include amount received-  I I I I Agency Name Agency OR1 Number AmountReceived - 1- t . 1.c B F m 8 NJ/L8PS/M=J Page 31998 8 d 11 Report Program Forfeiture County Value Number Estimated Agency Agency OR1 Description of Name the property .- Page NJRLPSlOCJ B Q Form 31998 11 90f Program Forfeiture County I Prosecutor's fo Disfribution Forfeifed Properfy County Office of IV: Part USEBY IndicAe the amount, and payee all purpose FOR for FORFEITED FUNDS DiSTRfBUnON OF 11) This excludes previously distributions PROSECUTOR'S THE REPORTING COUNTY OFFiCE. line and Part I, Part Part reported fine 11, lines 111, 10). in 7). 8), 9) I I Law Payee Enforcement Purpose Amount L Page B l O o f Form NJRLLPSlDCJ 11 831998 Proaram ReDort County Forfeiture C ER TIO T ~ F ~ C A N certifies On behalf the County Prosecutor's the undersigned the above information true that is of office, 12)' correct the and based the records maintained the County Prosewtor's and responsible upon by Ofice funding agency.
[directive] The Act includes several time limits designed to move cases with detained defendants to trial more quickly.  First, defendants must be released if 9 they have not been indicted within 90 days of being detained.  N.J.S.A. clock does not count “excludable time for 2A:162-22(a)(1)(a).  The 90-day reasonable delays . . . set forth in subsection b” of the statute.  Ibid.  Subsection b, in turn, lists thirteen categories of excludable time.  They include (1) “[t]he time from the filing to the final disposition of a motion made before trial by the prosecutor or the eligible defendant,” id. at -22(b)(1)(c); (2) “[t]he time resulting from exceptional circumstances including, but not limited to, a natural disaster,” -22(b)(1)(f); and (3) “[t]he time for other periods id. at of delay not specifically enumerated if the court finds good cause for the delay,” id. at -22(b)(1)(l).  Other bases for excludable time include the time for a competency examination, id. at -22(b)(1)(a); for disposition of an application for pretrial treatment or a supervisory program, id. at -22(b)(1)(b); for a continuance that either the defendant or both parties requested, id. at -22(b)(1)(d); for detention in another jurisdiction, id. at -22(b)(1)(e); for cases designated complex, id. at -22(b)(1)(g); for severance of codefendants, id. at -22(b)(1)(h); for the defendant’s failure to appear in court, id. at -22(b)(1)(i); for disqualification or for defendant’s recusal of a judge, id. at -22(b)(1)(j); failure to provide and for “[a]ny other time otherwise required by discovery, id. at -22(b)(1)(k); statute, id. at -22(b)(1)(m).
[brief] (4T 14-7 to 17-15; Da23)¹  In the State’s response to Defendant’s Point I, challenging the admissibility of [...]’s first-time in-court identification of Defendant at trial, the State argues (1) that the Supreme Court issued a new rule in State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023) which should only apply prospectively, and (2) that Dunn’s identification was admissible because Dunn was familiar with [...].
[brief] Plaintiff always and to this day controls this lawsuit.  As a result of a valid assignment, the assignor loses all control over the subject matter of the assignment and all interest in the right assigned.  *Sheeran v. Sitren*, 168 N.J.Super. 403, 414, (Law Div. 1979).  The Defendant’s tale of horrors regarding compensating witnesses is in this context nonsensical.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021 legitimate law enforcement purpose.  Officers utilizing any pain compliance technique should consider the totality of the circumstances including, but not limited to, the following: (a) the potential for injury to the officer(s) or others if the technique is not used; (b) the potential risk of serious injury to the individual being controlled; (c) whether the pain compliance technique is effective in achieving an appropriate level of control or a different technique should be employed; (d) the nature of the offense involved; (e) the level of resistance of the individuals(s) involved; (f) whether immediate resolution is necessary; (g) the application of any pain compliance technique shall be immediately discontinued once the officer determines that compliance has been achieved or other more appropriate alternatives can reasonably be utilized; and (h) officers shall only use striking techniques directed at a subject’s face as a means of self-defense, or in the defense of others.  Striking at a subject’s face using fists, elbows, knees, and feet, shall not be used as a means of pain compliance.  3.6  Positional asphyxiation.
[brief] DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  Submission Date: August 28, 2024  Civil Action  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Municipal Appeal No. [...]  REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT  [...]  [...] (ID No. 033981988)  [...] (ID No. 382352021)  [...]  One Jefferson Road Parsippany, New Jersey  07054 [...]  Attorneys for Appellant #
[brief] Rather, a light is only installed in a municipality at the control, request, and cost to the municipality.  (SOF, Point D, *supra*).  The municipality will fill out an order form and indicate to [...] the exact locations of the pole and streetlight, as well as the choice of lighting and design of the lighting.  (Id.).  Additionally, [...] does not set requirements for luminance at intersections.  (Id.).  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], confirmed that [...] provides the illumination needs to [...] and [...] has no responsibility in determining illumination needs.  (SOF, Point E, *supra*).  He also confirmed that [...] has no duty as to the selection and design of street lighting pursuant to the Electric Tariff.  (Id.).  [...] also testified that there are no laws or regulations that municipalities in the State of New Jersey have streetlights.  (Id.).  [...] has utility poles that are installed for overhead electrical lines that include primary wires that run parallel with the street and secondary wires that run to individual homes.  The placement of these poles is to support the [...] electrical distribution system, and the poles are therefore placed accordingly.  They are not placed with consideration for placement of streetlights.  [...] does not conduct illumination studies, nor does it have any responsibility related to whether a roadway should be illuminated.  As part of the distribution system, the [...] requires that electric utilities, including [...], install streetlights on existing utility poles only when requested to do so by a municipality.
[brief] The prosecutor argued that the traffic infractions provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and the information from the prior investigation, “coupled with” [...]’ “behavior” and “responses” to 5  Available at: https://dspace.njstatelib.org/items/3dea1d6b-9f35-4787-b10f- 6b74ab2e5f7f the roadside questioning, during the course of the stop, provided reasonable suspicion to request consent to search.
[brief] ”).  Here, there is overwhelming evidence that [...] intended well over 20% of its revenue to come from the [...] brand and [...] product.  First, as stated above, at the outset of the relationship, [...] intended 100% of its revenue to come from [...] products.  Second, just as in the Oceans case above, a cursory review of [...]’s purchases of [...] product since 2014 establishes that [...] intended [...] sales to be well over 20% of its total company revenue in any given year.  (See Pa1932-1937).  Finally, on top of this, [...]’s actual sales figures establish that, in recent years, virtually every year the percentage of sales derived from [...] products eclipsed 20%. (See Pa1982).  Finally, as [...] did not present any viable evidence of “good cause” to terminate [...] – let alone conclusive evidence as a matter of law – [...]’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
[brief] (a)  Any material inaccuracy or breach of any representation or warranty of Buyer contained in this Agreement or in any other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement; (b)  Any material breach or violation of the covenants or agreements of Buyer contained in this Agreement or in any other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement;...  --- \(^6\)Paragraph 6.2 defines “Damages” as “any actual loss, liability, claim, damage (excluding incidental and consequential damages) and expense (including costs of investigation and defense and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit).
[brief] Nevertheless, although the charter school association defendants could not be named in the case, the Supreme Court concluded that, if the original defendants presented evidence of the association defendants’ negligence, the issue should be submitted to the jury, and, if the jury found liability on those absent defendants, the verdict should be molded in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(d).  *Id.* at 149.  In *Mejia*, another medical negligence matter, the plaintiffs declined to bring affirmative claims against the decedent’s gynecologist, although the laboratory defendants filed a third-party claim for contribution and indemnification against the gynecologist, [...].  *Mejia*, 241 N.J. at 364.  In turn, [...] sought to be dismissed from participation in the trial, and the trial court denied that request; on appeal, he maintained that he should be treated as the defendants in *Burt* and *Jones*.  *Id.* at 369.  The Supreme Court rejected this, observing that “the fact that plaintiff cannot recover from [...] directly does not mean that his participation is not necessary to enable the trier of fact to allocate fault. ”  *Id.* at 374.  The Supreme Court specifically and explicitly distinguished *Burt*: