ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, [...] explicitly testified that his purported handwriting and signature for banking activity pertaining to [...] were not his own, but rather were forgeries by [...].  755a (407:24–408:4).  Almost the entirety of the aforesaid payments, both initially held in [...]’s Attorney Trust Account, the wire transfer to the aforesaid [...] bank account, and other checks made payable to [...] and [...] and negotiated through their respective bank accounts, were thereafter immediately (or within days) transferred to the bank accounts of [...] and [...], via wire transfers or checks made payable to [...] and [...].  628a–644a; 700a–723a.  After [...] and [...] received said wire transfers or checks, [...] and [...] initially transferred part of the funds between and among themselves.  628a–661a; 689a–699a; 700a – 723a.  A substantial amount of the funds transferred to the bank account of [...] was ultimately transferred to the personal bank account of [...], via account-to- account transfers.  645a–661a.  Neither prior to nor after the execution of the Agreements of Sale for the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage, including the [...]-MTDC Assignment and Releases, were Plaintiffs ever told that the aforementioned payments they were instructed by [...] and [...] to make, either through [...]’s Attorney Trust Account, wire transfer to [...], or with checks made payable to [...] or [...], were ultimately going to be transferred into the bank accounts of [...], [...], [...], and other co-conspirators.
[brief] (Aa54-55).  On August 31, 2020, [...] applied for a HAD, asking [...] to find [...]’s Project exempt from the Highlands Act under Exemption #11.  (Aa26).  [...] submitted substantial information about Highlands open waters and other water resources, steep slopes, rare, threatened, and endangered plant and animal species, forests, unique and irreplaceable land types, and historic and archaeological areas on the Property to demonstrate consistency with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  (Aa64-77; Aa79-84).  [...] also submitted calculations of its estimated wastewater flow to illustrate the Project’s consistency with the areawide WQMP.  (Aa31-32).  C.  The 2021 HAD  On June 23, 2021, [...] issued [...] a HAD which determined the Project is exempt from the Highlands Act.
[brief] Known Responsive Documents & Discrete Collections  With respect to the parties’ disagreement concerning known responsive materials, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ protocol would require the production of all documents and ESI “known” to be responsive, regardless of how or by whom the materials are “known” to be responsive.  Defendants assert that the proposal is vague, exceedingly burdensome, and provides no clear standard for the court to administer or the parties to apply.
[brief] As set forth in the Verified Complaint, despite [...]’s initial reaction to the Incident on the day it happened, [...] failed to (a) hire an LSRP; (b) undertake remediation activities; (c) calculate Environmental Restoration costs; and (d) post a remediation funding source (“RFS”) as required by the NJDEP Directive.  (PPCIa005)  [...] responded to the Incident.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10.  The Respondents make much of the fact that the WQMA expressly references “waste treatment management plans. ”  [...] brief at 26, emphasis in original.  But just because the WQMA places an expressed emphasis on “waste treatment management plans” does not mean that it is only focused on that single source or vector of potential water pollution in its broad mandates for statewide water quality planning efforts.  In fact, the methodology required by the legislature in the WQMA includes a requirement that the [...] also deal with impacts to “aquifer recharge areas,” as follows:
[brief] At no point did the Township or any of its employees request or require Plaintiff to remove or demolish any existing structures or plantings on her property, and to the contrary, Township employees specifically denied that \(^2\) Plaintiff has offered a handwritten statement from “[...]’s Pool Service” that indicates that the damage to Plaintiff’s pool “could only have been done from water building up from behind the walls of her pool. ”  However, this document is unsigned and undated.  (Pa347).  It does not list its author, and Plaintiff is not aware of [...]’s last name.  (Pa103, 53:22).  [...] purportedly does pool maintenance, although he never maintained or repaired Plaintiff’s pool.  Id. at 55:13-17.  Plaintiff does not “know even if he’s in the pool business now. ”  Id.  There is no evidence to suggest that [...] is an engineer or otherwise an expert in determining damage to pools.  (Pa347).  any of the actions taken by Plaintiff prior to the drainage work being performed were remotely necessary.  (Pa38).  POINT  THREE PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE THAT ANY CONTRACT EXISTED, AND EVEN IF IT DID, IT WAS NEVER RATIFIED BY THE TOWNSHIP’S GOVERNING BODY
[directive] If county jail. a to transported been has complaint-warrant by charged defendant a after program services assessment the updated assessment, risk pretrial preliminary of the results the from different is assessment finalized  18  Page [...] through the established be must defendant the identifying with aid to characteristics up-to-date most and the fingerprints transmitting of capable be must which system, fingerprint formatted properly include tables  Those data format. standardized a in tables data accurate and to access  To ensure codes. statutes and criminal current and descriptors, demographic pick lists, to need will agency enforcement law a therefore, process, risk-assessment pretrial automated the set accurate and up-to-date most the receive continually to vendor [...] its with coordinate data the apply can entity that authorized only the vendor is [...] because the tables, of data system.
[brief] (Pa115).  In their briefs opposing Plaintiff’s appeal, Defendants [...] and [...] seek to uphold the trial court’s reasoning, by reference to cases (unlike this one) where the contractual terms allowed for an “either-or” election of remedies.  Yet, by its terms, Section 13.1 of the PSA expressly permitted Plaintiff --- 1  Unless separately defined here, all references to the Appellant’s Appendix on Appeal (“Pa”), the Transcripts (“T”), and to other capitalized terms herein shall be to those terms defined in Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief, filed with this Court on April 15, 2024 (“opening brief”).  to terminate and demand return of the Deposit and seek specific performance as an additional and non-exclusive remedy where, as here, [...] proceeded to close on the underlying real estate transaction with the Fee Owner and without Plaintiff.  (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1).  Indeed, the “notwithstanding” and “in addition to” language in PSA § 13.1 was expressly written to protect Plaintiff from exactly what transpired here.  (Pa115 (emphasis added)).  Accordingly, the trial court’s pre-answer dismissal of the Complaint, with prejudice, as against both Defendants was erroneous.
[brief] (36T 23:8 to 28:5).  The admission of expert testimony is committed to the trial court’s discretion, and a trial court’s determination on a motion to strike expert testimony is entitled to deference on appeal.  Such a decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 52-53 (2015).  When confronted with an evidence determination precedent to a ruling on summary judgment – as occurred here with defendants’ pre-trial motion to bar [...] – the trial court must address the evidence decision first, and that decision is subject to review for abuse of discretion.
[brief] ”).  By simultaneously rebuking Respondent for her Facebook posts and dismissing the Complaint altogether, and by stating that this matter “is appealable only to the Superior Court-Appellate Division” (Ca018), the Commission has improperly circumvented this statutorily required review.  As a result of the procedurally improper *sua sponte* dismissal of the Complaint without a cross-motion for summary decision having been filed by Respondent, because Respondent did not even file exceptions to the Initial Decision, because the Commission had already clearly held that Counts 1-2, Counts 4-5, and Counts 8-12 should not be dismissed, and because the Commission improperly circumvented the Commissioner of Education’s statutory review of penalty, the Commission’s Final Decision must be reversed.
[brief] Allen v. LaSalle Bank, NA, 629 F. 3d 364 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2011.  “Attorneys, such as [...], are regarded as debt collectors, and their conduct as such is regulated by the FDCPA. ”  See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995) ("the term `debt collector' ... applies to [attorneys] who `regularly,' through litigation, tr[y] to collect consumer debts").  “The Act entitles consumers to certain information regarding the nature of their debts, § 1692g, and prohibits debt collectors from engaging in certain conduct, see §§ 1692c-1692f, 1692j-1692k.  The FDCPA is a remedial statute, and we construe its language broadly so as to effect its purposes.
[brief] [...] was merely an employee of the corporate entity that had the obligation.  [...] was not responsible for the contract, [...] and [...] were.  In Haviland, it is significant that the radiology technician was not acting under the direction or control of a licensed professional and was not acting in conformance with the directions and instructions of the licensed professional.  The exact opposite took place; the radiology technician, contrary to the instructions of the physician, required the plaintiff to hold weights and while holding the weights, the plaintiff sustained an injury to his newly repaired left shoulder, requiring a surgical procedure two months later.  [...] does not argue that the independent negligence of an employee unrelated to the professional engineering services, requires an Affidavit of Merit.
[brief] (Da16.)  The de novo court further mentioned that the Alcotest was administered, noting “[i]n spite of this indication that defendant was being processed for an Alcotest, there was no mention of same during the trial and after the conclusion of the cross-examination of [...], defense counsel informed the judge that it was his understanding that ‘the State is only going to rely on observations for this case. ’” (Da17.)  The de novo court further questioned the State’s decision to rest solely upon [...]’ testimony given “defendant’s attorney had vigorously challenged Officer [...]’ observations of defendant and his conduct of field sobriety tests. ” (Da17.)  The de novo court declined to give an adverse inference to the State’s failure to call [...] finding State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962) had fallen into disfavor, there was no suggestion as to the facts that [...] had that Officer [...] did not, and the matter had not been raised to the municipal court.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 N.J. Rules of Court 4:46-2 N.J. Rules of Court 4:37-2(b)  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  This matter arises out of a wrongful termination on or about January 12, 2018 (pa3) where the Defendants Respondent terminated the Plaintiff Appellant [...] for exercising his right to run for elective office and then being blackballed, disparaged, and cast in a false light based on his prior involvement with the criminal justice system.  Plaintiff filed his Complaint on or about January 10, 2020 (pa3).  The [...] filed its Answer on behalf of the [...] and [...] on or September 22, 2020 (pa14).  Discovery ended on March 12, 2022.  On June 24, 2022 Defendants [...] and [...] filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (pa29).  Plaintiff/Appellant filed his Opposition to the Defendant/Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment on or July 15, 2022 (pa81).  The Court heard the matter on February 29, 2024 (T1) and decided on the record no genuine issues of material facts exist to send to a jury.  On or about April 8, 2024 Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (pa186).
[brief] Not only are parties not entitled to irrelevant documents, they are not even entitled to all relevant documents as discovery is further limited by privilege and proportionality.  In requiring production of innumerable irrelevant documents, which inevitably increases the costs of managing the larger resulting data set, the Order also mandates the production of disproportionate volumes of data, and thereby imposes significant unnecessary costs on the Defendants.  In 2006, the Rules of the Court adopted 4:10-2(g) which placed a proportionality limitation on discovery (“burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”), emphasizing anew the need to restrain disproportionate discovery.  These changes were made explicitly to “address the discovery of ESI [in a way] that paralleled proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ”  Estate of Lasiw by Lasiw v. Pereira, 293 A.3d. 510, 519 (N.J. Super. 2023).  As [...] states, the adoption of the rule for the Federal Courts “crystalizes the concept of reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the common-sense concept of proportionality. ”  [...], 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at 6.  In requiring the production of innumerable irrelevant documents, which inevitably increases the costs of managing the larger resulting data set, the Order also --- 9 https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf. mandates the production of disproportionate volumes of data, and thereby imposes significant unnecessary costs on Defendants.  Discovery is not an end in itself, but merely a means of obtaining facts so that all parties have reasonably sufficient information to advocate their case and resolve disputes.  Discovery is costly, not just in money, time and resources, but in its invasion of the privacy of parties and third-parties.  We accept these costs and invasions because they help uncover truth and resolve disputes on their merits, but these costs inherently rein in the scope of discovery.  It may seem that the most obvious example of these limits is proportionality, where the court weighs the expected value of the discovery against its expected costs, but the bright-line rule against the compelled production of irrelevant documents is the most important.  By not allowing a review for the relevance of the documents, the Court would disregard the rule in its entirety.  As irrelevant documents add nothing to resolving disputes, the costs to privacy, confidentiality and resources are balanced by nothing, and should never be required.
[brief] ***  But the FAA’s ‘policy of favoring arbitration’ does not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24, 103 S.Ct. 927.  Our frequent use of that phrase connotes something different.  “Th[e] policy, we have explained, “is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. ”  Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 302, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Or in another formulation: The policy is to make “arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so. ”  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n. 12, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967).  Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind.  But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation.  See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218–221, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985).  [Morgan v. Sundance, 596 U.S. at 417, emphasis added]  Defendants cite to Morgan v. Sundance, supra, in their Brief (Db15), but down-play its significance.  Central to Defendants’ Cole argument was the assertion that Plaintiff would not suffer “prejudice” by the Defendants’ actions if the court enforced arbitration.  Therefore, Defendants argued, the Defendants’ waiver of arbitration should be abrogated and the Plaintiff’s should be ordered to arbitration.  But the Supreme court case of Morgan v. Sundance, supra, completely defeats Defendants’ efforts to use the Cole “prejudice” factor.  As indicated above, Morgan v. Sundance, supra, holds that in a case governed by the FAA, like this one involving interstate commerce, prejudice should no longer be considered a factor in assessing whether a party has impliedly waived arbitration through its actions and inaction.
[brief] The applicant’s engineer, [...], rebutted [...]’s testimony by concluding that the increase in elevations of the buildings did not constitute mounding.  [...] testified that although the Ordinance does not have a definition of what constitutes mounding or terracing, his interpretation of the ordinance was that the buildings would have to basically put on pedestals standing up on legs being six separate mounds or six different pedestals in order to constitute mounding.  (Pa151;52:4-17).  [...] further testified that if you looked at the grading he did not consider it mounding, but rather re-grading to accommodate the site features of the development to work in terms of stormwater management, sanitary, sewer and grading.  (Pa151;52:17-20).  [...] testified that the purpose of the proposed elevation would not enhance the views from the proposed home, but was simply a functionality of the site.  (Pa151;52:21-25).  [...] opined that the moving of grade or moving of dirt by [...] is not designed to allow an increased building height for these structures, thereby not violating the Building Height Ordinance.  (Pa152;53:1-8).  [...] interpreted the ordinance as requiring the applicant to have intent to increase building height for these structures.
[brief] This is not unlike the risk of settlement by one defendant when others go to trial.  The settling parties bear the risk that their settled share of recovery/liability may differ from the amount later determined at trial and they may end up better – or worse – off as a result of that choice.  Here, [...] chose not to preserve its right to arbitrate separately against [...] at the outset in a multi-party litigation.  Whether [...] will be better or worse off as a result of that tactical decision remains to be seen.  Third, the fact that other parties are not subject to arbitration does not make arbitration futile, even if it perhaps is not the most efficient path to resolution.
[directive] Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  Notwithstanding any other provision of these Guidelines, when as a result of double jeopardy considerations or the requirements of the mandatory joinder rule codified in R. 3:15-1b, or for any other reason, the disposition of a Brimage- eligible charge in accordance with these Guidelines could preclude or otherwise compromise or jeopardize the investigation or prosecution of charges against the defendant or any other person that involve one or more direct victims, or charges against the defendant or any other person that would likely result in a longer term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility than provided in the plea offer that would be tendered pursuant to these Guidelines, the prosecutor may elect not to tender a plea offer pursuant to these Guidelines, provided that the prosecutor explains to the court the reasons for not tendering a plea offer to dispose of the Brimage- eligible charge(s).  See also Section 3.10 (authorizing conditional pleas contingent upon co-defendants pleading guilty).  1.2
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[brief] ”  Ibid. (quoting Robinson, 136 N.J. at 492).  Moreover, the Court has recognized that “[t]he first two elements are assessed objectively, while the third and fourth are ‘more subjective because they relate to the defendant’s actual response. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Robinson, 136 N.J. at 490).  “To warrant the passion/provocation jury charge, the evidence must rationally support only the first two elements. ”  Ibid.  The final two elements “should usually be left to the jury to determine. ”  Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413.  New Jersey determined in State v. Crisantos, “the rational-basis test of the Code [under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e)] imposes a low threshold” such that “[w]hen the lesser-included offense charge is requested by a defendant … the trial court is obligated, in view of defendant’s interest, to examine the record thoroughly to determine if the rational-basis standard has been satisfied.