ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This matter is on remand from the New Jersey Supreme Court to review the two remaining issues in this appeal.  The issues are whether the [...] (“[...]”) appropriately determined that the portion of [...]’s (“[...]”) East 300 Upgrade Project (“Project”), identified as Compressor Station 327 (“CS 327”), located within the Highlands Preservation Area is consistent with (1) the goals and purposes of the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act (“Highlands Act”), N.J.S.A. 13:20–1 et seq.; and (2) the areawide water quality management plan (“WQM Plan”).  As to these issues, Appellants now claim (without any legal authority) that [...] failed to analyze air pollution and climate change impacts from CS 327.  The Highlands Act, though, covers specific resource areas and air is not one of them.  Further, CS 327 is an electric driven compressor station, meaning the only new emission sources are an emergency backup generator and infrequent venting that may occur during operation and maintenance of the facility.  [...] correctly determined that CS 327 was consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act and the WQM Plan.  [...] sited CS 327 in a heavily disturbed industrial site that was previously used as a quarry and [...] designed the CS 327 facilities so that there would be no permanent impacts to Highlands resource areas.  These efforts to avoid and minimize impacts were acknowledged by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327)*, 258 N.J. 312, __ (2024).  In addition, [...] reviewed the required information provided by [...] and ultimately determined that CS 327 is consistent with the WQM Plan as the septic system has a projected flow of less than or equal to 2,000 gallons per day.  Finally, Appellant, [...], previously and extensively litigated the issues of air pollution and climate change impacts from the Project, including CS 327, with the [...] (“[...]”) and on appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  Both [...]’s Order Issuing Certificate (“Certificate Order”) and its analysis as to air pollution and climate change in its Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) were upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  Thus, Appellants are precluded from taking a second bite at the apple by relitigating the air pollution and climate change issues before this Court.  For the reasons set forth fully herein, [...]’s decision should be affirmed.
[brief] It does not defeat a landlord’s right to seek a rent increase under a rent control ordinance.  Further, in asserting that the Unit cannot be the subject of a rent increase based upon a “fair return”, [...] speciously defines [...]’s “investment” as the Property minus his Unit.  But the Property comprised 11 units, including his Unit, and [...] is entitled to a return on the entire Property.  In 1993, when [...] purchased the Property, it invested in the Property’s 11 units, not any lesser number of units that several years later, if converted to a condominium, may entitle a tenant to protected status under the Act.  Plainly, a purchaser, when investing in property, seeks a return on each of the units of the entire property, not just some of them.  [...] invested in an 11-unit, not 10-unit, building.  [...]’s contention that the subject of the “investment” for measuring a “fair return” is the building of 10 units, and not all 11 units, is contrived and misguided.
[brief] But, I think that now, having the benefit of hindsight and seeing what the basis of that was, and what the Court was doing, and why they did it, *I think it’s clear that these are not Burt defendants.  These are defendants against whom they have cross-claims.  And, if that’s true, they should be here and represented, and they should have that opportunity.*  \(^3\)  By the time of trial, only [...] remained as a defendant, secondary to various pre-trial motions and dismissals of the remaining defendants.
[directive] (h)  Where a preliminary investigation indicates the possibility of a criminal act on the part of the subject officer, the County Prosecutor must be notified immediately.  No further action should be taken, including the interviewing of, or the filing of charges against the officer, until the County Prosecutor so directs.  (i)  Pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor immediately of any use of deadly force, any use of force by an officer that results in death or serious bodily injury, or any death in custody that occurs within its jurisdiction.  (j)  In the rare cases where the agency has not made a charging decision within 180 days of receiving a complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor, who may take whatever steps he or she deems appropriate, including supersession of the investigation, to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Recordkeeping & Data Reporting
[brief] 643a.  In opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of November 10, 2016, filed as a result of this discovery, [...], by way of their counsel, [...], presented a certain Collateral Assignment (332a) to the Court and represented that “a debt owed from [...] to [...] in the amount of $250,000.00.  . . . was [memorialized] in an assignment between Nicholas and [...] (Exhibit “S”)  One of the consequences to that assignment required [...] to sign certain mortgage documents . . . .”  289a².  In August 2019, after continued obstructionist tactics by [...] despite the Trial Court’s Orders of May 24, 2019 (527a–530a), checks were uncovered that proved the Collateral Assignment, assuming arguendo it was ever real, was extinguished long before May 7, 2008.  698a–700a.  The alleged subject $250,000.00 debt of the Collateral Assignment was more than paid by January 10, 2008, since from May 4, 2007 to January 10, 2008, funds were transferred via account-to-account transfers from the [...] bank account to [...]’s personal bank account totaling $151,107.41, and two [...] checks totaling $152,000.00, made payable to [...] were deposited into [...]’ personal bank account, amounting to $302,107.41.
[brief] APPELLANT’S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THERE ARE MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE WHICH ALLOW A FACT FINDER TO FIND NO ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT.  On a disputed motion to enforce a settlement agreement, as on a motion for summary judgment, a hearing is to be held to establish the facts unless the available competent evidence, considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, is insufficient to permit the judge, as a rational fact finder, to revolve the disputed factual issues in favor of the non-moving party.  Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 474-475 (App. Div. 1997) relying upon Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
[directive] Protocol will govern the manner in which the investigation is conducted.  V.  Joint Crash Investigation Procedures & Protocols  A.  On-Scene Liaison.  1.  An on-scene liaison for each crash shall be established between the Division of State Police Troopers, at the scene, and the County Prosecutor’s Office.  2.  An on-going dialog with respect to all aspects of the investigation will be maintained between the Division of State Police and the County Prosecutor’s Office.  3.  The course of the investigation will be governed by the merits of the case.  B.  Designated Liaisons  1.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office shall have a designated liaison to coordinate with each Division of State Police, Troop Command, functioning within the jurisdiction of that County Prosecutor’s Office.  2.  Each State Police Troop Commander shall designate a liaison to each County Prosecutor’s Office within the patrol responsibility area of that State Police Troop Command to address any on-going issues that arise between the Division of State Police and the County Prosecutor regarding joint crash investigations.  C.  At Scene Management  1.  Management, at the scene, will be jointly administered between the Division of State Police crash investigation supervisor/representative and the ranking representative of the County Prosecutor’s Office.  a.  The County Prosecutor’s Office Fatal Accident Investigation Unit may, at the sole discretion of the County Prosecutor or his/her designee, provide assistance to the Division of State Police crash investigator(s) with the roadway and vehicle factors phase of the investigation.  - 5 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2
[brief] Statement of Procedural History ...........................................  1 Statement of Facts ..................................................................  2  Legal Argument POINT I: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING  DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE YIELDED FROM THE EXECUTION OF A SEARCH WARRANT (Da15 through Da36)  .........................................................  4  POINT II:  DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN IMPOSING SENTENCE (3T20-4 to 3T24-18)  ........................................................................  12  A.  The Sentencing Judge Failed to Properly Credit with all the appropriate Mitigating Factors (3T20-13 to 3T22-24)  ........................................  13  Conclusion .............................................................................  17  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[directive] Subject: AG LE Directive No.  2004-03  With respect to newly appointed law enforcement officers, the Police Training Commission has incorporated the above-listed subjects into the Basic Course for Police Officers as of July 1, 2004.  Thus, all newly appointed police officers who have completed the basic course subsequent to July 1, 2004 will have received the mandatory minimum training for domestic security preparedness as part of the basic course.  Those law enforcement officers who completed the basic course prior to July 1, 2004 have not complied with the minimum training requirements set forth by the Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force.
[brief] To be sure, on August 18, 2021, plaintiffs’ attorney wrote two separate letters to counsel for each defendant observing that due to the schedules of the defense attorneys, “it has been nearly impossible to schedule expert depositions . . .” (Pa262, Pa265).  Defendant’s motion to bar [...] was also denied.  (Pa19)  On October 12, 2021, [...] signed an order extending the discovery end date to December 30, 2021, upon the consent of all parties.  (Pa218; Pa273).  Shortly thereafter, on October 20, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration to permit them to replace their expert [...] with [...].  (Pa209).  Defendant filed opposition to the motion on October 26, 2021 (Da36).  On November 12, 2021 [...] heard oral argument of plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.  He denied plaintiffs’ motion due to the fact that the circumstances leading him to deny plaintiffs’ initial motion had not changed.  2T31-15 to 33-22.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] 1T161:18-162:2; 2T159:14-23, 161:4-13; 3T29:21-30:4.  Shortly thereafter, in 2014 or early 2015, [...] revised the Operating Agreement such that only 45% of the shares were issued and [...] retained 90% of that interest and [...] 10% of that interest, which was reflected on [...]’ 2014 returns.  All of these individuals, including notably plaintiff, agreed to this change.  1T162:3-163:9, 169:21-171:4; 2T159:24-160:23, 161:14-23, 182:2-183:23, 184:24-185:5; 3T30:5-31:3, 91:3-10; 1T37:11-19; Pa30-31.  This further cemented [...]’ absolute control over the LLC.
[brief] (2T 25-6 to 26-1; Da 4-9)  He preserved the right to appeal his speedy trial motion.  (2T 25-10 to 22; Da 4)  In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to recommend a six-year flat sentence, concurrent to any federal sentence, and to dismiss the remaining charge and motor vehicle violations, and the court agreed to impose either a time served or a suspended sentence.  (2T 22-22 to 23-12, 25-23 to 26-13; Da 6, 8)  On August 4, 2023, [...] was sentenced to time served by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., in accordance with the plea agreement.  (3T 23-8 to 24-6; Da 10-12)  A timely notice of appeal was filed.  (Da 13-16)  --- 8
[directive] This Statute provides that when a defendant charged with a sex offense, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, is released from custody before trial on bail or personal N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12 (Nicole's Law) recognizance, the court authorizing the release may issue a written restraining order prohibiting the defendant from having any contact with the victim including, but Conditions Placed Upon Release of not limited to, restraining the defendant from entering the victim’s residence, place of employment or business, or school, or from harassing or stalking the victim or Certain Defendants the victim’s relatives.  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26d provides that when setting bail in a domestic violence case, the court must conduct a search of the Domestic Violence Central Registry.  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26e provides that once bail is set it shall not be reduced without notice to the county prosecutor and victim.  It also provides that bail shall not be reduced by a judge other than the judge who originally ordered bail, unless the reasons for the original bail are available to the judge who reduces the bail and are set forth on the record.  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26(d)(e); 2C:29-9b; 2C:25-31a  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-31 provides that when a defendant is arrested on a charge of contempt of a domestic violence restraining order, the law enforcement officer shall Bail in Domestic Violence Cases conduct a search of the Domestic Violence Central Registry.
[brief] ([...]’s document production, Bates stamp D2132 at Pa. 65) (emphasis added).  Thus, if a contract did exist between [...] and [...] (which it did not), [...] clearly reserved for itself the ability to change any program, and this ability applied with equal force to both current and prospective students.  If the law under Beukas permits a University to eliminate an entire degree program, then surely narrowing the eligibility for participation in a program by current students is cognizable under the law.  Plaintiff-Appellant, like all students enrolled into [...]’s pharmacy program, received exactly what the advertisement stated he would receive: the opportunity to earn a Master’s degree while earning his pharmacy doctorate.  Plaintiff-Appellant did not capitalize on that opportunity as a result of his own inadequate academic performance.  Because [...] would not be in breach of any “contract” with [...], even if one did exist, Plaintiff-Appellant’s contractual claim was properly dismissed, on the merits, by the Trial Court.  This Court should affirm the Trial Court’s decision.
[brief] 4T 22:10-23:16.  Indeed, many aspects of the 2023 amendments -- including the State’s expanded investigative authority and relaxed relation-back provisions -- are consistent with the intent of the 2023 Veto Amendment: to ensure the Attorney General can more effectively investigate and prosecute alleged frauds on the State.  The 2023 Veto Amendment simply helps ensure that meritorious cases are not dismissed on public disclosure grounds when the State determines they should be adjudicated on the merits.  4T 23:8-25:10, 26:7-27:25.  Defendant say nothing about this.  For this reason, too, the 2023 Veto Amendment is properly seen as curative.  4T 12:10-13:5; Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 611 (2018) (curative statute does not alter law in substantial way, but merely clarifies legislative intent behind pre-existing law and may be applied retroactively).  C.
[brief] Misrepresentation. **  In order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation, Plaintiff must allege facts pleading that its justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation that caused it to incur damages.  Carroll v. Cellco P’ship, 313 N.J. Super. 488, 502 (App. Div. 1998).  Here, the alleged “misrepresentation” (the single email from [...]’s [...] and subsequent failure to disclose) occurred in and after September 2022 – months after Plaintiff had already terminated the PSA.  (See Pb17-18).
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Actor enters or surreptitiously remains in any structure or separately secured or occupied Unlicensed Entry portion thereof; disorderly persons offense.  2C:18-3(a)(b) of Structures; b.  Defiant trespass.
[brief] The Petitioner contends that his state and federal court litigations lack relevance, on the false basis that they were “filed 40-50 years ago. ” (Pb 41).  In fact, these cases were active between 1985 and 1999.  As the marriage and Agreement occurred in 1992, such litigations were directly relevant.  Finally, in challenging the existence of the Rubber Maid Box, the Petitioner asserts that he did not have “full control” of the house after the Decedent passed, because [...] and the Respondent also had entered it.  (Pb 42-44).  Does the Petitioner mean to say that either [...] or the Respondent absconded with the original?  What is his point exactly?  Thus, for all of the above reasons, the Chancery Division correctly held that a valid and enforceable Agreement was signed and executed by the Decedent and Petitioner.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................3  I.  The Parties ........................................................................................................3  II.  The Staffing Office and Payroll .......................................................................4  III.  [...]’s Policies and Procedures ..................................................................5  IV.  Staffing Coordinator  Office Dynamics and the Impact of COVID-19 ..........6  V.  [...]’s Chronic Complaints and Improper Behavior .......................................7  VI.  [...]’s Complaining Reaches a Tipping Point ..............................................9  VII.  [...]’s Alleged “Complaints” About [...]  Prior to June 24, 2020.  11  IX.  [...], [...], and [...] Repeatedly Sought More Pay ..........................12  X.  Theft of Additional Pay  By [...], [...], and [...] ..................................13  XI.  [...] Investigates the Unauthorized Entry and Receipt of Charge Pay...16  XII.  [...], [...], and [...] are Terminated ...............................................19  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................20
[brief] Indeed, our Supreme Court has stated:  If a violation of the [Consumer Loan Act] is proven, the typical remedy, obtainable by the Department of Banking and Insurance or by individual consumers, is voiding of the contract, subject to a defense based on good faith on the part of the lender.  *N.J.S.A.* 17:10-14 (replaced by *N.J.S.A.* 17:11C-33b).  The CLA, as incorporated in the Licensed Lenders Act, now allows for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, *N.J.S.A.* 17:11C-33b, and summary revocation of a lender's license, *N.J.S.A.* 17:11C-48a.
[brief] Respondents do not address why it cannot obtain this information in the Underlying Litigation rather than jumping right into a non-party deposition.  With regard to the fourth Berrie factor, [...] stated that [...] is a “competitor equity firm”.  (403a-404a)  Respondents have not stated in the deposition notice what topics [...] will be deposed; rather, Respondents argue that [...] should guess what information will be sought at the deposition and preemptively demonstrate that those areas are protected.  This is clearly an undue burden upon [...], however it is assumed that the deposition would be seeking information about investments at [...], [...]’s finances and other confidential information, all of which are confidential in nature.  With regard to the last Berrie factor, it appears that since Respondents have been unsuccessful in obtaining discovery from the parties in the Underlying Litigation, it has now turned to non-parties; however, Respondents have not demonstrated that there is not a less burdensome means of obtaining this discovery.  Logically, it appears that this information would be within the possession of [...] and [...], the defendants in the Underlying Litigation rather than [...] a non-party.  To the extent that there are discovery disputes in the Underlying Litigation, those are issues for the Florida Court to address and have no impact on the pending appeal before this Court.  It is clear that in applying the Rules of Court related to discovery and applicable case law there is no basis for the subpoena.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s order should be reversed.
[brief] J. 75 (2002) | | | F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, | 19 | | 100 N.J. 418 (1985) | | | Kane Props., LLC v. City of Hoboken, | 14, 15 | | 325 N.J. 199 (2013) | | | R. Neumann & Co. v. City of Hoboken, | 10, 11 | | 437 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2014) | | | Rivkin v. Dover Twp. Rent Leveling Bd., | 10 | | 143 N.J. 352 (1996) | | | In re Stallworth, | 13, 20 | | 208 N.J. 182 (2011) | | | In the Matter of the Application for Medicinal Marijuana Alt. Treatment Ctr. for Pangaea Health & Wellness, LLC, | 17, 18, 19, 21 | | 465 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2020) | | W.V. Pangborne & Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Transp., 116 N.J. 543 (1989)
[brief] ”).  Aa0339.  These public submissions also included multiple comments from individuals associated with the [...] questioning whether the proposed activity – given its potential negative environmental impacts – was consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act (i.e.  “[t]he site of the new compressor station is...in the middle of the Highlands Preserve right next to a Cl steam and above the Wanaque and Monksville reservoir.  The project will impact environmentally sensitive areas in the Highlands and the drinking water for over 3 million people. ”).  E.g. Aa1061.  In May 2021, counsel for [...] submitted material to [...] arguing that [...] was a “public utility” under Exemption #11.  Aa1327 to Aa1333.  On June 23, 2021, [...] issued both its Highlands Applicability Determination (“HAD”) and its Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination (“WQMP CD”) for the construction, operation, and maintenance of new Compressor Station 327.
[brief] [...], individually and as Executor of the [...], deceased, Plaintiff, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] and DR. JOHN DOE  1 – 5 (being fictitious designations), Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action  FERREIRA CONFERENCE CONSENT ORDER THIS MATTER, having been scheduled for a Ferreira Conference on January 28, 2020; and the undersigned counsel agree as follows:
[brief] Such a result is directly contrary the purpose and policy behind comity.  See Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 387 (“The litigation of substantially similar lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions . . . is not only wasteful of judicial resources, but anathema in a federal system that contemplates cooperation among states. ”).  * * *  To conclude, the trial court acted well within its discretion when it dismissed this “placeholder” declaratory judgment case in favor of the more comprehensive and coercive Missouri Action.