ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In fact, there is none.  Instead, Plaintiffs simply argue that because the Master Plan does not identify the Property for open space, it is necessarily inconsistent with the Master Plan for the Redevelopment Plan to do so.  In making this argument, Plaintiffs are asking the Court to make the logical leap that any proposal which is not supported by an affirmative statement in a master plan is inconsistent with it.  Even assuming that such a logical leap were appropriate, such a leap is not the courts’ to make.  It was well within the discretion of the Planning Board to determine that, in the absence of a specific exclusion, use of Plaintiffs’ Property for open space was consistent with the Master Plan.
[brief] So as far as the non-client being too remote, that's issue of concern to the Court.  What I did struggle with and find that the facts really cut both ways on is this question of whether or not [...] invited the non-client to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of legal services; and secondly, to the extent he did, whether the non-client did so rely.  And . . . as I say, there are some facts that really would support either result here.  T 5:23-7:4.  [...] correctly identified the elements that [...] must establish in order for the Respondents to have had a duty to [...].  He also rightly concluded that disputed issues of fact existed as to whether Respondents invited [...] to rely on their opinion and whether [...], in fact, did.  But the trial court went too far when it weighed the evidence and decided the question on its own.
[brief] Forensic “sciences” were usually developed in the context of law enforcement out of a need to provide incriminating evidence against someone charged with crimes, rather than because the evidence was independently theoretically interesting to scientists.  [...], *Autopsy of a Crime Lab: Exposing the Flaws in Forensics* (2022) [hereinafter “Garrett, Autopsy of a Crime Lab”]; see also [...], *Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward* (2009) [hereinafter “[...]”].  Most forensic disciplines lack sufficient scientific safeguards and do not use objective criteria, and instead rely on the forensic examiner’s subjective judgment and experience.
[brief] The cases cited by Plaintiff clearly illustrate a proposition that a plaintiff cannot create damages in the legal malpractice case just by commencing an action in the underlying matrimonial to incur legal fees so long as there are some indication that the defendant has breached the duty in providing legal services to the plaintiff.  In *Vayda*, 184 N.J. 115, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declined to create an exception to the American Rule, one that would allow attorney fee shifting whenever a non-attorney executor is removed because of, among other things, breach of a fiduciary duty and bad faith against co-beneficiaries.  The legal fees incurred should be paid by the estate in accordance with the statute.  This case does not apply here.  But in any event, the co-beneficiary in *Vayda* recovered 45% of her shares of the estate beneficiary in comparison to the Plaintiff in the instant case who had suffered no actual damages.
[brief] *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).  In *Estelle*, the Court expressed that deliberate indifference may be "manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed."  *Id.* at 104-05.  The defendants showed deliberate indifference by intentionally ignoring plaintiff requests for her psychiatric medications for six (6) days.  Plaintiff was charged with insubordination for voicing concerns about perceived violations and placed in a disciplinary detention in a correctional facility, which also triggered her constitutional right to counsel.
[brief] Taking into consideration the ambiguity of the statutory language, the lack of New Jersey Supreme Court case law, and that the Appellate Division's decision in Jefferson Loan is factually distinguishable, I find no basis for predicting that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that the legislature intended for the NJCFA to reach the debt collection activities of a debt buyer of defaulted credit card debt.  A debt buyer, while subject to regulation under the FDCPA and, perhaps, New Jersey's Collection Act or criminal statutes, is not a ‘seller’ whose ‘subsequent performance’ falls within the ambit of the NJCFA.  My conclusion is buttressed by the New Jersey legislature's repeated failure to enact a bill establishing New Jersey's version of the FDCPA, which bill expressly indicates that a violation of it would constitute a NJCFA violation.  Both the 2008 and 2010 versions of the bill would encompass the debt collection activities of debt buyers.  That the legislature has chosen not to adopt this sort of legislation further suggests that NJCFA should be read as excluding the debt collection activities of debt buyers.
[brief] [...]’s Policies and Procedures.  [...] maintains a number of workplace policies and procedures, made available to employees through an internal network called “PolicyTech. ” (Pa66; Pa93; Pa406).  All [...] employees have access to PolicyTech.  (Pa93).  Any employee who believes that he or she has been subject to harassment or discrimination must report the alleged conduct immediately to an employee from Human Resources.  (Ibid.).  [...] may commence discipline at any level, including discharge without prior warnings or other corrective action.  (Ibid.).  [...] possesses the sole discretion for use of progressive discipline.  (Ibid.).  [...] requires all of its employees to complete training on “mandatory competencies” each year via [...]’s “Health Stream” lessons.  (Pa353 at 43:3-22; Pa432 at 11:4-18; Pa94 at 38:21-24).  [...] strictly adheres to its anti-harassment policy.  (Pa432 at 11:19-25).  [...] also trains its supervisors on disciplinary policies and the process for disciplining employees.  (Pa353-54 at 44:7-45:4).  Management also receives coaching from Human Resources on [...] policies.  (Pa94 at 38:12-13).  Employee complaints about discrimination or retaliation are to be directed to that employee’s manager or a Human Resources representative.  (Pa95 at 44:7-14).  If any complaints are made under [...]’s policies, Human Resources investigates the allegations.  (Pa433 at 15:16-16:1; Pa95 at 44:15-18).  IV.
[brief] HLA Associates, 2015 WL 1181271 at *5 (internal citations omitted); Cumberland Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., 358 N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003) (“Where the terms of a contract are clear, the court must enforce the contract as written. ”); Mury v. Tublitz, 151 N.J. Super. 39, 44 (App. Div. 1977) (“Courts are required to enforce contracts, including leases, according to their terms in the absence of some superior contravening policy. ”).  Here, the Lease expressly and unambiguously provides that Tenant is not entitled to the Tenant Allowance unless it is current on its monetary obligations under the Lease when the payments come due.
[brief] Reply Brief on behalf of Appellant, [...] ("Appellant") in reply to the opposition of Respondent, [...] ("Respondent").  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  THE ALJ IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON THE OPINIONS OF [...] ON ISSUES RELATING TO OPIOID ABUSE AFTER EXPLICITLY REJECTING HIM AS AN EXPERT ON THAT SUBJECT .................................................................  1  II.  THE ALJ IMPROPERLY FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF BEING IMPAIRED BY OPIATES WHILE ON DUTY DESPITE THOSE CHARGES HAVING BEEN WITHDRAWN AT THE INITIATION OF THE TRIAL  .............................................  6  III.  TERMINATION AS TO ANY SUSTAINED CHARGES IN THIS MATTER  CONSTITUTES  EXCESSIVE DISCIPLINE ......  8  IV.  ANY REMAND ORDER SHOULD DIRECT ASSIGNMENT OF THIS MATTER TO ANOTHER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  JUDGE ..................................................................................  12  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................
[brief] Similarly, one of [...]’s primary arguments was that, if he did fire the fatal bullet, it constituted a lesser offense of aggravated or reckless manslaughter.  To counter that argument in summation, the prosecutor began discussing why he did not believe manslaughter fit the facts of the case:  But a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, I suggest to you that this is a pertinent example of manslaughter.  That the defendant was driving his 2005 white Chevy Impala under the influence of too much Adderall, drove through a red light and collided with another car, killing the driver.  That’s reckless.  Under the influence of a substance, he got behind the wheel of a car and then didn’t properly drive, didn’t obey the traffic laws and killed someone.  Did he start out with a purpose to do that?  Was that his intent at the time that the collision happened?
[directive] To ensure that the Act is enforced uniformly and effectively throughout the State, any law enforcement agency seeking to charge a violation of the Act must first obtain the written approval of the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their designee, by notifying the respective County Prosecutor’s Office, which must then seek the requested approval from the Division of Criminal Justice.  Nothing in this directive shall be understood to require prior approval of any other charges that may arise in these cases, such as homicide or aggravated assault charges connected with the criminal use of a trafficked firearm.  III.
[brief] T 13-15:16-14. \(^2\)  The defendant testified that she did not discover the defendant’s fraudulent billing until at the fee arbitration, and under *Hunnell* and *Saffer* she is allowed to make her counterclaim for legal malpractice and obtain a --- \(^1\)  Although the October 2, 2019 Order claims a R 1:20A-6 letter was served in court on August 27, 2019, the day the case was dismissed and eight months after the complaint was filed, it is untrue the R 1:20A-6 letter was served.
[brief] Although Appellant raised these arguments with the trial court, it granted Respondents’ motions without proper consideration, or consideration at all, of those advanced by Appellant.  Second, the Arbitration Agreement at issue is markedly vague and ambiguous such that it cannot be enforced as a matter of New Jersey Law.  Indeed, the terms of the agreement relied upon by Respondents demonstrates that there is no clear and unmistakable waiver of Appellant’s statutory rights under the NJLAD, as is required under Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 443 (2014) and its progeny.  The language of the Arbitration Agreement fails to pass any muster under the framework set forth by Atalese.  To make matters even more complicated to a layperson, the Arbitration Agreement at issue is between Appellant and Respondent [...]; however, at all times throughout her employment with Respondents, Appellant worked onsite at Respondent [...]’ location and reported directly to employees of Respondent [...].  Significantly, there is no Arbitration Agreement as between Appellant and Respondent [...], nor is Respondent [...] mentioned anywhere in the Arbitration Agreement itself.  In other words, there is no agreement between Appellant and Respondent [...] to arbitrate any disputes that may arise between them through Appellant’s employment.  This argument, too, was not sufficiently considered or, worse, not considered at all by the trial court in granting the drastic relief sought by Respondents in their respective motion applications which are the subject of the present appeal.
[brief] The trial court’s other reason for mandating more production of ESI—including vast swathes of irrelevant material—was that in the context of ESI, the “gatekeepers” who apply the relevancy standard “shouldn’t be the ones producing the documents. ”  T6:8-21.  Rather, “the ones receiving the documents” should be entitled to conduct their own relevancy review.  Id.  According to the trial court, the overriding “goal” of discovery is “to make sure that every relevant document gets produced,” so even “if [the] process makes us produce irrelevant documents,” the objective is fulfilled so long as “relevant ones get produced,” too.  T25:10-14.  That position misunderstands the basic sequence of discovery.
[brief] [4T5-23 to 9-6].  [...] issued curative instructions.  [4T11-3 to -14].  Immediately after the instructions were issued, defendant interrupted the proceedings again and claimed that his attorney had threatened him, called the trial attorney an expletive, and claimed he wanted to press charges.  [4T12-17 to 14-5].  [...] again had defendant removed from the proceeding.  [4T13-21 to -24].  [...] reissued the curative instruction and the trial proceeded.  [4T15-11 to 16-8].  The State presented the testimony of Pemberton Borough Police Patrolman [...], [...], [...], [...], New Jersey State Police Detective II [...], New Jersey State Police Detective Sergeant [...], New Jersey State Police Detective II [...], New Jersey State Police Forensic Scientist II [...], and New Jersey State Police Forensic Scientist I [...].
[brief] RESPONDENT’S PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Respondent/defendant [...] adopts and incorporates the procedural history of appellant/plaintiff [...].  Appellant/plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to include a Count for PIP benefits against [...].  (PA002)  [...] filed an Answer and a Counterclaim seeking a Declaratory Judgment and denial of coverage to appellant/plaintiff [...].  (PA004)  The personal injury action of appellant/plaintiff [...] against respondent/defendant Hardy was severed from the insurance coverage claims and stayed on March 3, 2023.  (PA006)  Appellant/plaintiff [...] and [...] settled their claims in principle on September 15, 2023.  (PA007)  The claims of appellant/plaintiff [...] against [...] were dismissed by Stipulation on October 12, 2023.  (PA008).  However, the settlement between appellant/plaintiff [...] and [...] ultimately failed to materialize.  Defendant [...] filed a Notice of Motion for summary judgment in its Declaratory Judgment action to confirm the denial of coverage based upon appellant/plaintiff [...]’s material misrepresentation.  (DR01)  On June 7, 2024, the trial Court granted defendant [...]’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, finding that “plaintiff’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy. ”  (DR03)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Specifically, Section 10.5 of the Lease, entitled “Surrender of Property,” provides that “Upon the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement (whether or not following an Event of Default), Lessee shall peaceably and quietly leave, surrender and return the Property to Lessor. ”  [Pa274].  The New Jersey Supreme Court has cautioned that “where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous there is no room for interpretation or construction and the courts must enforce those terms as written. ”  Karl’s Sales & Service, Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 249 N.J. Super. 487, 493 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991).  When interpreting contracts they are to be afforded their “plain and ordinary meaning.
[brief] The Court may affirm the judgment below on any ground supported by the record.  In deciding this matter, this Court is not limited to the trial court’s reasoning.  State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) (stating that appeals are taken from judgments and not for opinions or reasons given for ultimate conclusions).  This Court may therefore affirm the judgment on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court.  *Van Horn v. Harmony Sand & Gravel, Inc.*, 442 N.J. Super. 333, 336 (App. Div. 2015).  Further, an appellate court may affirm a judgment below even if it disagrees with the trial court’s reasoning for entering that judgment.  *Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs. v. Adelman*, 447 N.J. Super. 391, 401 (App. Div. 2016).  Here, additional grounds for affirming the judgment below include plaintiff’s failure to establish a claim of nuisance, the application of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, and plaintiff’s failure to apportion his damages, which are issues that the parties briefed below but that the trial court did not reach.  T59:23-60:11.
[brief] That reality is of no legal significance because the [...] specifically accounted for this possibility in the Genesis Deed by specifying that the “property owner’s association” would be “known or to be known as ‘[...]. ’” (Da54).  The slight difference in the name between the Genesis Deed’s “Ocean Beach Club” and [...] is also of no legal significance given that [...] is the only entity, for over the last 75 years, operated as the “property owners’ association” contemplated by the Genesis Deed.  This fact is supported not only by the historical record—compiled before the close of discovery—demonstrating the [...] and their business partner ([...]) viewed [...] as the “property owners’ association,” but by Plaintiffs’ very own recognition that [...] is the “club” with authority to implement and enforce rules governing things such as alcohol or dogs on the beach.  (Pb12).  Plaintiffs’ implicit recognition that [...] is the “property owners’ association” contemplated by the Genesis Deed and, therefore, vested with authority to implement and enforce “any rules and regulations it chooses” is fatal to Plaintiffs’ position.  To get around the incompatibility of this position, Plaintiffs argue that the rule of strict construction requires this Court find [...] lacks authority to implement and enforce the “Construction Rules.
[brief] Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301 (1953).  It is not real intent but the intent expressed or apparent in the writing that controls.  George M. Brewster & Son, Inc. v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 32 (1954).  The quest is for the reasonably certain meaning of the language used, taken as an entirety, considering the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, the operative usages and practices, and the objects the parties were striving to achieve.  Nestor v. O'Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App. Div. 1997).  In this case, the language in the lease and especially the rider make it clear that the Defendants were responsible for the repairs after the fire.  Given the plain language of the lease and rider, the trial court committed reversible error in dismissing the complaint and entering judgment in favor of the Defendants on the counterclaim.
[directive] DATE: July 12, 2011  This Directive supersedes Directive #40-64 and sets out procedures for recording and reporting municipal court matters that are disposed of by a Superior Court judge sitting as a municipal court judge.  Directive #40-64, issued on July 9, 1965 by then Administrative Director [...], permitted Superior Court judges, acting as municipal court judges, to fully dispose of municipal court matters.  Unless there is some compelling reason otherwise, a Superior Court judge should dispose of all parts of a case before the court, including any associated municipal court matters.  This procedure increases the overall efficiency of the court system.  It also avoids having the defendant appear for a second matter that arose out of the same event, thus eliminating potential double jeopardy issues.  See, e.g., State v. Hand, 416 N.J. Super. 622 (App. Div. 2010).  Indeed, when an indictable offense goes to trial, the court is required by Rule 3:15-3 to join any pending non-indictable complaint that is based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, unless the defendant or the State would be prejudiced by doing so.  See also Rule 3:1-6(a).  Adjudication of Motor Vehicle Offenses (Title 39)  When a Superior Court judge adjudicates a Title 39 motor vehicle offense because it is associated with an indictable charge, the court must by e-mail or fax transmit a copy of the completed traffic ticket, including the disposition (and whether defendant’s driving privilege is suspended) and all other related paperwork, to the municipal court where the charge originated within 48 hours of sentencing or by the next business day, whichever is later.  The municipal court when it receives the completed ticket and disposition will enter that disposition into the Automated Traffic System (ATS) (the statewide municipal court computer system), indicating in [...] • [...] • [...]
[brief] Although [...] claimed that it sought to include “months” of correspondence between [...]’s attorney-in-fact and the Department, it actually sought to add only two letters sent to the Department in January 2023, after the Bulletin was issued.  One was a letter from [...], CFO of [...] on [...] letterhead representing [...] and [...], to [...], Acting Assistant Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, dated January 16, 2023 (the “Yesner Letter”).  The second was a letter from [...]’s counsel, on behalf of [...] and [...], to the Commissioner, dated January 27, 2023 (the “[...] Letter”) (collectively the “January 2023 Letters”).  The [...] Letter included five attachments totaling approximately ninety pages.  The Department opposed supplementing the record with the Yesner and [...] Letters because they were not sent to the Department until after its issuance of the Bulletin, but agreed to supplement the record with certain Appendix exhibits to the [...] Letter to the extent they evidenced that the Department considered them in drafting the Bulletin – specifically Exhibits 4 and 5.  Exhibit 5 referenced portions of an email correspondence between the Department and [...] that began on September 22, 2022 and concluded with the Department’s issuance of the Bulletin on December 21, 2022.  The Department supplemented the record with the complete correspondence.  Exhibit 2 purported to be a June 29, 2007 Management Letter from the Department’s Examiner to [...]’s Chief Financial Officer, regarding the examination of [...] as of December 31, 2005.  However, because Exhibit 2 --- 3 [...] and [...] are separate corporate entities.  [...] and [...] were affiliated until January 27, 2023 when [...] and [...] changed control in accordance with the [...]/[...] Order.  [...] and [...] are not parties to this appeal.  was heavily redacted and incomplete and the unredacted document was confidential, the Department opposed including it in the record on appeal.  In addition, [...] sought to have the Acquisition Orders removed from the SICRA.  The Department opposed [...]’s request because the Acquisition Orders are consistent with the Bulletin’s provisions that the Holding Company Act encompasses reciprocal exchanges.  The Acquisition Orders, including the [...]/[...] Order, specifically and without opposition included reciprocal exchanges within the purview of the Holding Company Act.  The Department also supplemented the record with [...]’s and [...]’s respective Annual Statements for 2021 and [...]’s original Certificate of Authority.  It filed an Amended SICRA simultaneously with its brief in opposition to [...]’s motion.  The court denied [...]’s motion to supplement in its entirety.  Nevertheless, [...] has included in its brief hyperlinks and references to the documents that the court has excluded.  The court should disregard those documents and the arguments they purport to support.