ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The State Policy is not a general legislative effort to “eradicate the cancer of discrimination” anywhere within the State.  See Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 124 (1969).  That is what the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination seeks to accomplish.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.  The State Policy is instead something promulgated by an executive department of the State to ensure all departments meet their legal obligations to maintain an effective policy to address and prevent claims of workplace discrimination and harassment.  As the Court has recognized, employers, including the State, “are motivated to implement and enforce such policies” because “their policies provide a defense to a claim of vicarious liability. ”  Aguas v. State, 220 N.J. 494, 517–18 (2015).  In the face of an employment discrimination claim, “an employer is entitled to summary judgment if it (1) ‘exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any [] harassing behavior’ and (2) ‘the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. ’”  Aguas, 220 N.J. at 524 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998); Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).  However, the interest of the State as an employer in preventing unlawful workplace harassment is at its twilight when the allegations plainly involve non-State workplaces and non-State business.  Such situations do not carry the risk of liability for failure to investigate and take remedial action that are present in the context of allegations of unlawful conduct at the workplace.  It follows logically that if the State could not be held liable for conduct at a private office that does not involve “State business” because it has no authority or control over the conditions at the private office, its interest in investigating allegations of conduct at such locations is minimal and easily outweighed by legitimate privacy considerations of private businesses.  Nor is a State employee who believes they were the victim of discrimination or harassment at a non-State Workplace left without any recourse if the State Policy does not apply to that location.  As the State Policy itself explains, multiple other avenues exist for an individual to seek to bring a claim, including the [...] and [...], as well as the LAD.  Thus, reversing the [...]’s holding that, under the facts of this case, [...] and [...] had jurisdiction to investigate and make determinations about conduct alleged to occur on a non-State Workplace does not imperil the State with liability nor deprive a complainant of an avenue to address incidences of harassment and discrimination.
[brief] Pa270 at 33:19-:23, Pa272 at 41:21-42:1.  He cannot say whether the amount of water runoff increased or decreased since the [...] purchased the property.  Pa270-71 at 33:24-35:4, Pa273 at 42:2-:4.  He also offered no opinion about whether the amount of water runoff from the driveway into plaintiff’s property increased or decreased after the [...] repaved it.
[brief] Underlying these decisions is the idea that if courts did not possess this kind of discretion, ‘claimants would be encouraged to make unreasonable demands, knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such conduct would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked for in the first place.  *Clemens*, 903 F.3d at 403.  (citing *Landow*, 999 F.2d at 96 and *Stackler*, 612 F.2d at 1059).  Generally, a trial court is entitled to significant deference in awarding counsel fees, but a reviewing court still must reject such an award when there is a “clear abuse of discretion. ”  *Litton Industries*  200 N.J. at 386 (internal citations omitted).  Importantly, however, this deferential standard only applies where the “analytical framework is followed and the judge makes appropriate findings of fact…”  *Yueh*, 329 N.J. Super. at 466.  On the other hand, when there is a “lack of critical analysis of counsel's fee request … the judge's assessment of the reasonableness of the hours expended cannot be given weight and hence is not entitled to any deferential treatment.
[directive] TREATMENT  A.  Crime victims shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system.  Every effort shall be made to minimize inconvenience to the victim.  1.  Victim interviews shall be conducted in private surroundings.  2.  Whenever possible, limits should be placed upon the number of times the victim must repeat the facts surrounding the offense.  3.  Victims must not be forced to wait for long periods of time to be interviewed or to testify.  4.  Whenever possible, appointments should be scheduled at the convenience of the victim.  5.  On-call subpoenas should be used.  Victims and witnesses should be instructed on the subpoena form to telephone a designated person in the County Prosecutor's Office 24 hours in advance of time and date on subpoena to reduce unnecessary trips to the courthouse and waiting time.  6.  A separate, comfortable waiting area monitored by the County Victim-Witness Coordinator should be provided so that a victim or witness does not have to confront the defendant, defendant's family and friends, defense counsel or defense witnesses.  Magazines, newspapers, refreshments and toys for children should also be available.  7.  Complimentary parking should be made available to victims and witnesses who are requested to appear.  If necessary, this service should be arranged with a parking facility located within the immediate area of the courthouse.  Payment arrangements with the parking facility should be negotiated in advance or the victim or witness should be reimbursed for costs incurred.  8.  Reasonable reimbursement for use of public transportation and/or cab fare should be provided upon request when the victim's appearance in court is required.  9.  Travel and lodging arrangements and expenses for out-of-state witnesses should be provided by the Prosecutor's Office when their appearance in court is required.  COMMENTARY
[brief] As the Court noted in Dewey, “[i]f one attorney in the firm is disqualified, the entire firm is precluded from representing the client in that suit. ””  Id. at 217 (citing Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 470-71 (1980)).  The motion judge’s statement that “RPC 1.7 is not implicated because . . . the indictment as to [...] was as to his personal capacity and he has no involvement in this litigation” (T7:5-11) ignores the fact that [...] was Counsel of Record and Designated Trial Counsel on behalf of the defendants in this matter for more than two (2) years, until he withdrew after he was indicted.
[brief] This case turns on the testimony of [...].  The State’s Counterstatement of Facts provides in relevant part:  On cross-examination, [...] testified that he was located at the firehouse on Route 206 when he made his observations of the Defendant's vehicle.  (1T 12-4).  [...], however, could not recall specifically if his vehicle was moving or stationary at the time of the observation.  (1T 19-10 to -12; 1T 28-2 to -14; 1T 30-1 to -5).  He also testified that there was no foliage or obstruction that would have impacted his ability to see whether the vehicle stopped or not.  (1T 16-11 to Tl 7-2).  [...] explained that he could see the stop sign clearly from where he was situated and that he was familiar with the area and was aware that there was a stop sign coming from Route 15 south onto Route 206 north.  (1T 17-23 to 1T 18-15; 1T 29-16 to -22).  He also testified that he utilized the firehouse parking lot to safely turn around after observing the Defendant's vehicle.  (1T 28-15 to -25).  (Db 4-5)  As part of its legal argument the State also posits:
[directive] Permanent TITLE 40A  MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES of bonds  Recordina 40A:S-35.  I I 40A :5-35.  Recording of bonds  The local unit may require such bonds, or any of them, to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the so county and a copy of any bond recorded, certified by the county clerk, shall be received in evidence in all the courts of this State and be as good and available in law as if the original bond were produced and proved.  L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  40A :5-36.  Protection to be afforded by bond  Every bond given by a municipal court judge or clerk of a municipal court as hereinafter provided shall be for the protection of the State, the county and the municipality or, in the case of an intermunicipal court, the municipalities, and also for the protection of defendants, litigants, bondsmen and all other persons in interest.  s. L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  Amended by L.1977, c. 396, eff. Feb. 23,1978.  4, :5-37. of 40A  Condition bond broken 5-37.  Upon application to the Superior Court by a citizen and taxpayer thereof, alleging that the 40A condition of the bond of any officer, member of committee or employee of the local unit has been broken, the court shall make such investigation regarding the truth of the allegations as it shall deem proper, and in its discretion may order an action to be brought upon the bond in the name of the local of unit, or otherwise, for the benefit the local unit or any officer, board or department thereof.
[brief] Under the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard, the Appellate Division’s scope of review is guided by three major inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with the relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the administrative agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).
[brief] Because [...] had burned away the soft tissue that was the most reliable evidence in determining the timing of the injuries, he relied, in part, on a report prepared by [...], a forensic anthropologist who worked in the Northern Regional Office of the Medical Examiner.  (42T:176-12 to 177-4).  Bird concluded many of the injuries appeared to be perimortem, but acknowledged that injuries to bone can appear to be perimortem even when they occur up to 12-18 hours following death.  (42T:89-5 to 90-19; 120-4 to 121-17).  Perimortem injuries are those that occur at or near the time of death, as opposed to antemortem injuries which occur prior to death.  Bird opined that it was not “likely” that the injuries could have been caused just by D., falling down the stairs.  (42T:121-22 to 122-24).  Bird noted that there was no indication of any injury to D.’s bones that could be classified as antemortem, as in occurring far enough in advance of his death for bone healing to have begun to occur.  (42T:84-20 to 85-1).  After receiving Bird’s report, [...] declared the manner of death to be “homicide. ” (42T:186-20 to 191-2).  [...] explained that he had relied heavily on the “circumstances of the case” in reaching this conclusion, namely that the “remains were severely altered and severely damaged” and “sort of placed outside of the home,” which he viewed as “highly suspicious. ” (42T:187-2 to 22).  Given the lack of certainty around the precise timing of the injuries to the bone, [...] said he had not “predominantly” relied on Bird’s report in reaching his opinion regarding manner of death.  (42T:206-23 to 207-12).  Instead, [...] explained, “to be honest, I think the circumstances played a very large role . . . the ruling of homicide. ”  (42T:206-23 to 207-12).  Ultimately, a jury found that [...] was guilty of all counts, including the murder of [...].
[brief] In other words, a functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue.  It may be an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.  *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Here, there are no “good reasons” to defer to the trial court’s calculations because they were made without rational explanation and rested on impermissible bases.  *Id.*  The trial court calculated fees based on a starting figure that it made no attempt to verify through New Jersey law governing review of a fee award.  The trial court ignored [...]’s opposition on the issue of costs and then applied an incorrect “6.4%” figure to its calculation of costs.  (Pa0043.)  The trial court then accepted interest calculations provided on reply, applied an irrational starting date for the running of interest, and applied a 2% enhancement to New Jersey’s interest rates, all without a basis in fact or the applicable law.  The calculations provided by the trial court should be reversed by this Court.
[brief] That only aggravates the situation.  The Appellant expects this Court to set aside the well-supported, well-reasoned opinion of the ALJ.  In doing so, the Appellant petitions this Court to do what it cannot do: inappropriately substitute its view for that of the appointing authority and the Commission.  Accord  *In re Carter*, 191 N.J. 474, 487 (2007).  Based on the above, the Respondent respectfully submits that Appellant's removal is fully supported by both the credible evidence and public policy.  For this reason, the Final Agency Determination and, by reference, the Administrative Law Judge’s Initial Decision, should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[directive] 5.3.2  When a BWC is activated pursuant to Section 5.2(k) (transport of arrestee), whether by an officer in uniform or in plain clothes, it shall remain activated at all times while the BWC- equipped officer is in the presence of the arrestee and until the arrestee is secured in the holding cell or processing room, or until custody of the arrestee has been transferred to county jail personnel, or until the arrestee is with hospital/medical/mental health personnel.
[brief] ”  *DepoLink*, 430 N.J. Super. at 338.  Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants’ violations of the CFA arose from a violation of a regulation promulgated under the CFA.  Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants affirmatively misrepresented that Plaintiff’s alleged debt was valid and enforceable and that Defendants were legally authorized and/or able to enforce Plaintiff’s alleged account when they were not.  Defendants also omitted the fact that they were not legally allowed to have even purchased the debt, let alone enforce it.  Defendants’ violations of the NJCFLA give rise to violations of the CFA.  In *Lemelledo*, supra, this Court has held that violations of the NJCLA (the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessor discussed *supra*) can be used to establish violations of the CFA and rejected the notion that the NJCLA’s extensive regulations conflict with the CFA.
[brief] Pa187.  Essentially, the Division did not even submit the issue of the Treasury Circulars to the Arbitrator, and the Arbitrator took it upon himself to include that in the issue.  B.  The Arbitrator Improperly Exceeded His Authority and Rewrote the Contract Language.  Where contract language is not unspecific or vague, there is no justification for examining whether a past practice exists.  As conceded by the Division, where the language of a contract is unambiguous, as it is here, a past practice cannot overcome plain language.  Furthermore, the Division also conceded that arbitrators may not look beyond the four corners of the agreement to alter plain language.  Whether the meaning of the language is disputed does not automatically mean that the language is ambiguous solely because the parties disagree.  Whether a past practice existed is quite frankly irrelevant.
[brief] .................................................................14  Lullo v. International Asso. of Fire Fighters, 55 N.J. 409, 421 (1970)  ..............................................................................20  Lumberton Education Association v. Lumberton Board of Education, 28 NJPER 427, aff’d. App. Div. No. A-1328-01T5 (Oct. 8, 2002)  ..................................................................................33  Matter of City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super. 366, 377 (App. Div. 2021) ..................................................................................9, 10  Matter of Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020)  .........................9  New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry, 4 NJPER ¶ 563 (1978)  ....................................................................................31  Petaluma Federation of Teachers, Local 1881, P.E.R.B. Decision No. 2485 (2016)  ...............................................................21  Rutgers University, P.E.R.C. No. 2017-4, 43 NJPER 17 (P18 2016)  .....................................................................................29  State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500, 513 (2013) .........................................................13  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) .....................................................13, 18  State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 265, n.3 (2022) ................................................14  Talbot v. Concord Union Sch. Dist., 114 N.H. 532, 535 (N.H. 1974) ...................................................................................24, 25  Statutes N.J.A.C. 19:12-3.1(a) ..................................................................................27  N.J.A.C. 19:12-3.5(b) ..................................................................................27  N.J.A.C. 19:12-4.3(d) ..................................................................................27  N.J.A.C. 19:12-4.3(g) ..................................................................................27  N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 ............................................................................................12  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS PAGE
[brief] A Court is not permitted to “second guess” the redevelopment designation.  Forbes v. Bd. of Trs. of Tp. of S. Orange Vill., 312 N.J. Super. 519, 532 (App. Div. 1998).  This means that a Court is not entitled to determine if it would have agreed with the designation.  Ibid.  As the Courts have repeatedly recognized, “Clearly the extent to which the various elements that informed persons say enter into the blight-decision making process are present in any particular area is largely a matter of practical judgment, common sense and sound discretion.  It must be recognized that at times men of training and experience may honestly differ as to whether the elements are sufficiently present in a certain district to warrant a determination that the area is blighted.  In such cases courts realize that the Legislature has conferred on the local authorities the power to make the determination.  If their decision is supported by substantial evidence, the fact that the question is debatable does not justify substitution of the judicial judgment for that of the local legislators. ”  Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Princeton, 370 N.J. Super. 429, 453 (App. Div. 2004), quoting Lyons v. City of Camden, 52 N.J. 89, 98 (1968) (emphasis added).  Applying this standard of review to the record below, substantial credible evidence existed on the record to uphold the Property’s designation as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area.  The Trial Court inappropriately substituted its judgment for the discretion of the Borough, simply because it disagreed with the Borough’s conclusion of condemnation authority.  Thus, the Trial Court’s decision should be overturned.
[brief] Section 2 of the FAA provides, “A written provision in any...contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ”  (Emphasis added)  9 U.S.C. §2.  The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §2, further supports the conclusion that the coverage claims raised in [...]’s complaint belong in arbitration.
[brief] As part of her argument, Plaintiff has alleged that [...] “ignored” her requests for information on long-term disability.  [...] submits that the inadvertent failure to respond to one (1) email hardly constitutes the type of “outrageous” acts that would support a constructive discharge claim. that she shouldn’t be returning to that place or would you have been comfortable that she was going to be somewhere where there was no sexual harassment occurring?  A.  I think the second, somewhere where no sexual harassment occurred.  (Pa873, [...]’s deposition transcript, T41:4-T42:5)  Plaintiff fails to prove any intolerable working conditions or that her medical provider advised her to never return to employment with [...] regardless of the office location.  As such, the [...] Defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, dismissing Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim with prejudice.
[brief] An “[...]” is not a mortgagee as it is not a lender under federally defined law.  Plaintiff was asserting a false and fraudulent claim to possess the 2004 loan and mortgage on defendants’ property when, in fact, the plaintiff “[...]” is not a legal entity, not a mortgagee, and not a legal holder of the 2004 loan and mortgage.  A trust requires a trustee to be the legal owner/holder of assets, see Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 619 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2010) (trustee is legal owner of trust's assets).  [...] were precluded from presenting witnesses such as [...], a real estate attorney, who was repeatedly told by [...] that it did not own the Schianos’ 2004 loan or hold any Schiano mortgage, precluding refinance by the Schianos with any lender.
[brief] Specifically, Intervenor has not submitted Exhibit J to [...]’s summary judgment motion, [...]’s Commercial General Liability Underwriting Rules and Rates (Pa006),\(^5\) or the Affidavit of [...], the owner of [...].  (Pa001).  These are the materials relied upon by [...] and accepted by the trial court on the subject of whether [...] established materiality and reliance, and Intervenor’s failure to include them in the record before this Court eviscerates its arguments on these elements of equitable fraud.  (1T63-5).
[brief] *Ibid.*  Our Supreme Court has recognized the CRA's “broad remedial purpose. ”  *Owens v. Feigh*, 194 N.J. 607, 614 (2008).  In this manner, the CRA is analogous to the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), *N.J.S.A. 34:19-1, et seq.*, and the Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), *N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq.*  See *Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works*, 206 N.J. 243, 257 (2011).  “In 2004, the Legislature adopted the CRA for the broad purpose of assuring a state law cause of action for violations of state and federal constitutional rights and to fill gaps in statutory anti-discrimination. ”  *Owens*, 194 N.J. at 614.  The CRA provides in subsections a, b, c, and e of *N.J.S.A. 10:6-2* for protections of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the New Jersey Constitution and specifically provides for a cause of action for any deprivation, interference, or other violation of those rights.
[brief] That Appellant here should argue that he lacks a remedy, or is at risk of lacking a remedy, is entirely irrelevant to the issues before this Court and of no moment whatsoever to the innocent Plaintiff/Respondent.  The author of the alleged harm to this Appellant is this Appellant himself – it was Appellant who sought the Burt designation, not Plaintiff/Respondent.  Also, it was Appellant who sought the dismissal of his claims against [...] and [...] – not Plaintiff/Respondent.  If there is harm to Appellant occasioned by the application of the law and its consequences, the burden falls on the party that sought the ruling and not the innocent Plaintiff/Respondent here who argued against the rulings.