ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the admission of the officers' hearsay opinion testimony, even if valid impeachment material, should have been excluded under NJRE 403 because it was overly prejudicial to the plaintiff.  (Pb24).  The prejudicial nature of the officers' deposition testimony was not addressed by [...] in its brief except insofar as to say that the plaintiff thought the police were blaming him.  (Db40-41).  However, it was not only the officers' opinions and conclusions of who did what which were elicited through [...]; it was also their "expert" opinions and conclusions that the only way [...] could have gotten grout on his back was if the plaintiff threw it at him.  Both officers' testimony in that regard was let into evidence through [...].  (8T103:4-6; 8T104:1-12).  Neither one of the officers were qualified by counsel for [...] as an accident reconstruction expert.  This was another of plaintiffs' arguments which [...] did not address in its brief.  III.  EVIDENCE RELEVANT ONLY TO DAMAGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THE LIABILITY PHASE OF THE TRIAL.
[brief] This rule requires that the design engineer complete one of the following:  1.  Demonstrate through hydrologic and hydraulic analysis that for stormwater leaving the site, postconstruction runoff hydrographs for the current and projected two-, 10-, and 100-year storm events, as defined and determined pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.7(c) and (d), respectively, do not exceed, at any point in time, the pre-construction runoff hydrographs for the same storm events; 2.  Demonstrate through hydrologic and hydraulic analysis that there is no increase, as compared to the pre-construction condition, in the peak runoff rates of stormwater leaving the site for the current and projected two-, 10-, and 100-year storm events, as defined and determined pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.7(c) and (d), respectively, and that the increased volume or change in timing of stormwater runoff will not increase flood damage at or downstream of the site.  This analysis shall include the analysis of impacts of existing land uses and projected land uses assuming full development under existing zoning and land use ordinances in the drainage area; 3.  Design stormwater management measures so that the post-construction peak runoff rates for the current and projected two-, 10-, and 100-year storm events, as defined and determined pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.7(c) and (d), respectively, are 50, 75, and 80 percent, respectively, of the preconstruction peak runoff rates.  The percentages apply only to the post-construction stormwater runoff that is attributable to the portion of the site on which the proposed development or project is to be constructed…
[brief] I DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PERMITTED THE STATE TO PLAY THE VIDEO OF CO-DEFENDANT [...]'S STATEMENT  SEVENTEEN DAYS AFTER BERGHOLZ HAD TESTIFIED AT TRIAL  BECAUSE THE VIDEO, MADE THE DAY HE PLEADED GUILTY TWO YEARS EARLIER, FAILED TO MEET THE ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AS A PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT UNDER N.J.R.E. 607 AND BECAUSE ITS ADMISSION WAS NOT HARMLESS (17T4-5 to 17T12-11).  Defendant's convictions must be reversed because the court erred when it permitted the State to play the video of [...]'s statement weeks after he had testified at trial.  The statement did not meet the admissibility requirements of N.J.R.E. 607, because it was not provided prior to the events that created the motive to fabricate the allegations in the statement and because its admission through the testimony of a police officer constituted inadmissible hearsay.  The admission of the statement was not harmless error, because it contained additional allegations that were not included in [...]'s trial testimony and that the State relied upon to allege defendant's involvement in the robbery and killing.  After [...] testified, the State moved to admit the recording of his statement from November 15, 2019, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 607, on the basis that the defense had "implied a recent fabrication, or improper influence or motive" (17T4-5 to 10).
[brief] Watson, 254 N.J. at 578 (citing Henderson, 208 N.J. at 288-89)  The court here did not comply with this standard when it denied [...]’s motion for a Wade hearing.  (Da 7; 1T 124-20 to 130-11)  The court improperly failed to recognize that (1) offering [...] a second look at the photos, and (2) demanding that [...] make a conclusive identification rather than asking for his confidence, were both suggestive and thus sufficient to require a Wade hearing.
[brief] The minimum number of off-street parking spaces shall comply with New Jersey Residential Site Improvement Standards ("RSIS") (N.J.A.C. 5:21-1.1 et seq.) for garden apartment uses.  (2)  All off-street parking and drive aisles shall be located a minimum of 10 feet from buildings, except for parking and drive aisles which extend continuously into or under a building from outside the building.  (3)  All off-street parking and drive aisles shall be located a minimum of 10 feet from the tract boundary adjacent to the Route 287 right-of-way and a minimum of 200 feet from all other tract boundaries.  (4)  Parking areas shall be prohibited within required buffers but are permitted in front yards.  (5)  Under-building parking and parking garages shall be permitted and shall not count as a story.  (6)  All parking areas shall be designed in accordance with the applicable provisions of Article X of this Chapter; however, adult community housing in the Senior Housing – 1 Overlay District shall be exempt from the multifamily parking design requirements set forth at §230-90.H.  In the event of a conflict between Article X and this Article XXXV, this Article XXXV shall govern.
[brief] JMD Holding Corp., 828 N.E.2d at 613 (in case addressing whether a loan provider could permissibly hold back funds remaining in a loan account so as to fulfill payment of contingent obligations of the borrower, the Court expressed “no opinion whether [Defendant] may recoup any of its attorneys’ fees by way of counterclaim or in a separate action for indemnification. ”); Canopy Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 395 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1105-06, 1116 (D. Utah 2005) (out of state case where the professional services agreement between a software company and a product assembly and order fulfillment company clearly contemplated third-party actions); Estate of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2D 333, 344-45 (Iowa 2005) (out of state case holding that “the terms ‘indemnify’ and ‘hold harmless’ indicates an intent to refer only to claims brought by third-parties” based on the language of the contract in that case); Bourne Co. v. MPL Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 55, 57-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (the language of the indemnification clause of a music copyright agreement was “typical of the type which contemplates indemnification for third-party claims”).
[brief] Ibid.  A “governing body” “means and includes, in the event that a school district enumerated . . . does not have a board of education, . . . a municipality constituting part of a consolidated school district, and the governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district of a limited purpose or all purpose regional district. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1.  Appellants argue that [...] does not qualify as any of the entities described in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 because, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44, the non-operating [...] School District was eliminated and “merged” with [...], creating a new local school district – not a consolidated school district pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 to -41.
[brief] (3T10:2-10).  [...] then obtained the Alcotest [...]\(^5\) documents which indicated that the machine was working properly.  (3T10:12-15).  [...] was shown the package of [...] documents which all related to the machine in Boonton.  (3T10:16-20).  At Boonton police headquarters, [...] took defendant into the booking room area and removed all electronics from the room.
[brief] Applicants proposing to place a culvert in a channel must ensure that “[d]isturbance to the channel is eliminated where possible” and, where not possible, that “disturbance is minimized through methods including relocating the project and/or reducing the size of scope of the project. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(b)(2).  Here, [...] relocated the access road crossing to a narrower section of the tributary and reduced the impacts to the riparian zone area around the road crossing by making the access road as perpendicular to the channel as possible and by eliminating grading and associated clearing along the roadway edge.  (Aa31).  Initially, [...] proposed over fourteen thousand square feet of impacts to riparian zone area around the road crossing, (Aa158), but these riparian zone impacts were reduced to approximately nine thousand square feet, (Aa33).  Project wide, [...] and [...] successfully eliminated over thirty-five thousand square feet of riparian zone impacts during the application review.
[brief] (9T 200-9 to 18; 10T 203-10 to 15, 209-17, 218-2 to 11, 220-10)  During deliberations, the jury requested to review [...]’s interrogation video, the church video, and the RT-TOIC video, which were each played for the jury.  (11T 58-10 to 13, 58-20, 59-10, 77-23)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] Counsel also presented evidence of petitioner’s troubled childhood and close relationship with his children.  Petitioner’s grandmother submitted a letter which described his childhood:  his grandmother took custody of him when he was two years old because his drug-addicted mother would leave him home alone and his father was too unstable to take care of him.  Petitioner has physical and intellectual limitations due to his mother's drug use.  His grandfather was his father figure, but he died in the time petitioner has been incarcerated.  (Da 337)  Petitioner has three children, and since he has been incarcerated, he "tries to continue to parent over the phone."  The mother of petitioner’s children wrote a letter explaining that his incarceration has had a negative effect on his children and asking for a sentence that would allow petitioner to see his children again.  (Da 343)  One of petitioner’s children wrote a letter in which he said that his "dad is a good dad to my little brother and I even though he is in jail now."  Since petitioner has been incarcerated, "[N]o one is here to protect us or fix stuff when it gets broken.  I don't have anyone to talk to about man things . . .  I want him to come home.  Me and my little brother need him home."  (Da 345)  Counsel also noted the disparity in sentencing between petitioner and two of his co-defendants.
[brief] Alternatively, even if that information had been documented, [...] argued, it did not furnish [...] with reasonable suspicion to frisk [...].  (1T 46-2 to 62-2)  The State urged the judge to find that [...]’s testimony was credible (1T 64-4 to 64-9), the C.I. was reliable (1T 62-4 to 62-9), and the specificity of the C.I.’s tip – that “an individual in this specific car, a gold Kia Optima, with the specific first three “work-related communications that cannot be done via radio should be done via a work phone. ”  In the Matter of [...], [...], OAL Dkt. No. [...], initial decision at 7 (April 18, 2022), https://nj.gov/csc/about/meetings/decisions/pdf/2022/5-18-22/A003%20FEGLEY%20ANDREW.pdf.  It is also unclear whether [...] has a policy as to when officers are permitted to use a work phone in lieu of police radio for work-related communications.  letters being L85 . . . [and] a male in that vehicle had a fanny pack on his person that included a firearm” (1T 64-22 to 65-3) – furnished [...] with reasonable suspicion that [...] was armed and dangerous.  (1T 66-4 to 68-3)  The judge found that [...]’s testimony was credible and the C.I.’s tip reliable.
[brief] (Id.).  The Korean Court rejected all of Plaintiff’s allegations that millions of dollars of other assets existed in New Jersey and elsewhere that should be included in the Decedent’s Estate.  (Id.)  The Korean Family Court ruled, in pertinent part, as follows:  a.  The Decedent’s Estate held a 40.8 percent interest in [...], which interest the Court held to be valued at approximately $900,000.  (Da1124).  b.  The Court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that Decedent had paid Defendant $1,304,000 in 1999 for the purpose of establishing [...], and that the monies were therefore a “special benefit” under Korean Law.  The Court held that “[t]here is no evidence to support the alleged fact that the inheritee [Decedent] bequeathed USD 1,304,000 to Opposing Party [...] in 1999. ” (Da1119 at item #3).  c.  The Court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that Decedent had paid Defendant $1 million to cover his tuition and living expenses during the years 1991 to 1997 when Defendant was residing in Connecticut and pursuing a Ph.D. degree, and that those payments should be considered a “special benefit” to Defendant under Korean law.  (Da1119 at item #2).  d.  The Court rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Decedent had bequeathed the Richard Court property to Defendant in 2005.  (Da1119 at item #5).  e.  The Court rejected plaintiff’s claim that the Hawaii condominium should be included as a “special benefit” received by [...], holding that the evidence submitted was “not sufficient to prove the bequest. ” (Da1119 at item #1).  Plaintiff appealed the Family Court Judgment.  The Judgment was affirmed by the Korean appellate court, and then by the Korean Supreme Court.
[brief] THE LAW DIVISION IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE OWNER'S COASTAL ENGINEERING EXPERT AS NET OPINION.  (Da505; 6T 23:1-24:8)  The net opinion rule provides that "an expert's bare opinion that has no support in factual evidence or similar data is a mere net opinion which is not admissible and may not be considered."  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Comm. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011).  Accordingly, "the net opinion rule 'requires an expert to give the why and wherefore of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion.' "  State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006) (citation omitted.)  The net opinion rule is not a standard of perfection.  The rule does not mandate that an expert organize or support an opinion in a particular manner that opposing counsel deems preferable."  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015) (citation omitted.)  "An expert's conclusions should not be excluded merely because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact which the adversary considers relevant."  (citation omitted.)  Id.  "The expert's failure 'to give weight to a factor thought important by an adverse party does not reduce his testimony to an inadmissible net opinion if he otherwise offers sufficient reasons which logically support his opinion.' "  Id. (citation omitted.)
[brief] As the trial court noted in its Opinion granting summary judgment to the [...], “If [Appellants] had not defaulted under the Lease, they would have the 6 FEDa 170.  Solar Rights and Solar Project, and the subject action would be moot. ”  [FEDa118].  Additionally, like their claims against the [...], the Appellants cannot show any causal link between [...]’s actions in making the alleged representations to Appellants when they entered into the Lease and Sale and Purchase Agreement in 2015, and their subsequent failure to pay the rent two (2) years later in 2017.
[brief] See Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. at 525 (“Affirmatively misleading an interrogee about the seriousness of the offense for which he or she was taken into custody strikes at the heart of the waiver decision. ”).  As the Appellate Division held in Diaz, officer statements that are “reasonably likely to convey to defendant that he was facing a significantly less serious sentence than he actually faced,” even if unintended, undermine an otherwise knowing and voluntary waiver.  Id. at 518-19, 527.  Moreover, [...]’s testimony that he never planned to question [...] about his pending drug charges only reinforces that he purposefully subdued [...] into believing that the interrogation was about the narcotics charge to elicit his waiver and self-identification.  (1T 20-3 to 7)  Deception utilized to induce an individual’s waiver of rights—whether it is intentional or not—is not tolerated by our courts and requires reversal.
[brief] Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege that the services or policies provided are of the type that are sold or marketed for mass distribution to the general public.  (Pa004-Pa049).  Instead, Plaintiff emphasizes the specific nature of his insurance needs having provided Defendants with details on his personal, business, and investment dealings and expressing concerns about his particular situation – i.e., his need for coverage for if or when a disability prevented him from performing neurosurgery.  (Pa007-Pa025).  Given his Neveroski, as adopted in Macedo, means that the CFA cannot be read as narrowly as the Plaintiffs and perhaps [...], as amicus curie, might like.  Moreover, a purported narrowing of the CFA exemption was based on “historical reasons” – that doctors and attorneys “were not permitted to advertise at all when the Legislature enacted the 1960 precursor to the CFA, creating liability for fraud in advertising.
[brief] [...]’s Second Application  In or around June 2022, [...] again applied to the Zoning Board seeking, a d(1) use variance, d(4) FAR variance, (where 0.35 is permitted and 1.42 was proposed) and final site plan approval (“Second Application”).  Pa434.  The Second Application also requested four bulk variances for: (1) building height, where 35 feet is permitted, and 37.4 was being proposed; (2) building coverage, where 40 percent is permitted and 65.1 percent was proposed; (3) total side yard setback, where 25 feet is permitted, and 12.2 feet was proposed; and (4) a front yard setback for the generator location where 10 feet is required and 6 feet was proposed.  Id.  It is important to note that the front yard setback variance was included in the Second Application solely at the express direction of the Zoning Board, which specifically requested that a generator be added to the proposed plans.  The Second Application proposed the development of a mixed-use building consisting of 1,180 square feet of office space, 1,246 square feet of retail space, and twenty-nine (29) residential units on two levels, five (5) of which were to be designated as Affordable Housing.  Pa174, at 5:10-19.  The five Affordable Housing residential units would count as ten (10) towards the Borough’s overall outstanding affordable housing obligation.  Id., at 5:20-23.  [...] further offered to provide $375,000 to be held in an environmental escrow to ensure that the neighboring properties are appropriately remediated from the underground contaminants from the former automobile dealership.  Pa175, at 6:11-14.  Cognizant of the Zoning Board’s comments in denying the First Application, [...]’s Second Application significantly reduced the intensity of the building’s size.
[brief] Cf. State v. Blakney, 189 N.J. 88, 96 (2006) (death of a child).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has thus “specifically rejected a per se rule” that rhetorical excesses by the State justify reversing a jury’s verdict.  State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 409 (2012).  “A prosecutor is not expected to conduct himself in a manner appropriate to a lecture hall.  He is entitled to be forceful and graphic in his summation to the jury, so long as he confines himself to fair comments on the evidence presented. ”  State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999) (quoting State v. DiPaglia, 64 N.J. 288, 305 (1974) (Clifford, J., dissenting).  The APs in this case hewed closely to these guidelines.
[brief] Prior to considering defendants’ second motion to dismiss and upon the directive of the court, the parties each provided a summary of factual and legal issues to the court.  (Pa137; Pa149).  On Thursday, March 24, 2023, the trial court held another virtual public motion hearing.  The trial court denied defendants' second Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss with prejudice on the pleadings.  (Pa157).  The trial court denied plaintiff's disqualifying conflict of interest motion.  (Pa159).  The trial court granted defendants thirty days to file an amended answer.  **Defendants’ Premature Pre-Discovery Summary Judgment Motion**
[brief] *State v. Garron*, 177 N.J. 147, 180 (2003).  Here, despite the parties’ preferences, the evidence clearly indicated the appropriateness of instructing the jury on reckless manslaughter.  As found by the trial judge, a jury could find that the individuals in the pursuing car had a reckless intent from the chaotic nature of the shooting.  During the five-minute pursuit, no shots were fired until the cars turned onto Myrtle Street moments before the crash, (2T50-24 to 51-5; 2T54-1 to 55-9; 2T78-5 to 82-6; 3T96-2 to 8; 4T92-21 to 96-2; 4T100-3 to 101-8), supporting the inference that the individuals in the pursuing vehicle may have wanted to scare [...] rather than kill him.  When the shooting began, the majority of the shots missed [...]’s van.  Of the six shots that hit it, three struck the tires or bumper.  (4T108-6 to 112-12; Pa8-15).  Given the diffuse pattern, the judge correctly discerned that the fatal shot—believed to have passed through the rear windshield and two headrests—could be viewed either as intentional or inadvertent.  The nature of this chaotic shooting sets this case apart from cases where lesser-included offenses for murder were not appropriate because the defendant shot directly at an intended victim from close range.
[brief] On October 12, 2023, the undersigned directed the parties to submit revised Final Offers by October 20, 2023 for the limited purpose of reciting verbatim the contract language sought to be changed, or indicate whether the proposal, if accepted, would establish a new contract provision, and to state the rationale for seeking to change or establish new language.  The undersigned did not request or permit a revised Final Offer which added substantive proposals.  [...] complied with the directive and submitted a revised Final Offer on October 26, 2023 (after granting the parties an extension of time).  However, the [...] did not fully comply with this directive.  Instead, the [...] twice revised Final Offer (October 26 and November 23, 2023) added numerous substantive provisions not included in its September 12, 2023 Final Offer.  I advised the parties that I would accept the [...]’s revised Final Offer(s) only to the extent language was included which could aid in the merger of the three units into one.  Other than that, the [...]’s original Final Offer of September 12, 2023 would be considered.  [Aa069-070.]
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUPPRESSION, BECAUSE POLICE DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO HANDCUFF AND FRISK DEFENDANT AFTER REMOVING HIM FROM A CAR STOPPED FOR A SEATBELT VIOLATION.  (Da 6; 1T 69-13 to 82-17)  ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.  (Da 7; 2T 14-14 to 20-7)  ...........................................10  A.  The State Did Not Sufficiently Establish The Informant’s Veracity Or Basis Of Knowledge.  ..............................................14  B.  Because It Was Clear From [...]’s Report That The C.I. Did Not Describe The Male In The Kia As Wearing A Fanny Pack, The Trial Court’s Finding That [...]’s Report Was Consistent With [...]’s Testimony Was So Clearly Mistaken That The Order Denying Reconsideration Must Be Reversed.  .............................................18  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................20