ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] I.  Dismissals  A. dismissal.  Effective immediately, prosecutors shall seek dismissals of any Cases for pending charges listed in the following chart in any cases where a juvenile or adult’s conduct occurred on or before February 22, 2021.  Dismissals can be requested on an ad hoc basis as the cases are scheduled for a municipal or superior court proceeding.  In cases New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 involving multiple charges, only the charges listed in the chart are to be dismissed pursuant to this Directive; all other charges and pending matters should remain.  Provision Description of Statute 2C:35-5(b)(12)  Distribution of marijuana or hashish 2C:35-10(a)(3)  Possession of marijuana or hashish 2C:35-10(a)(4)  Possession of marijuana or hashish 2C:35-10(b)  Under the influence – only when the individual was under the influence of marijuana or hashish 2C:35-10(c)  Failure to properly dispose CDS – only when the individual fails to dispose of marijuana or hashish 2C:36-2  Possession of drug paraphernalia when the paraphernalia was used, or was possessed with intent to be used, to ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce marijuana or hashish into the body 2C:36A-1  Any disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense subject to conditional discharge pursuant to this section 39:4-49.1  Possession of CDS in a vehicle – but only when the individual is in possession of marijuana or hashish in the vehicle B. resolved.  For those cases already resolved, pursuant to the new Cases already decriminalization laws, the Administrative Office of the Courts will vacate by operation of law any guilty verdict, plea, placement in a diversionary program, or other entry of guilt on a matter where the conduct occurred prior to February 22, 2021.
[brief] THE COURT REFORMED THE TRUST WITHOUT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE  (18a)  On June 10, 2022, the trial court issued an Order delineating procedures for the disposition of Boonton and Florida Properties.  (18a)  In the Statement of Reasons attached, [...] explained that the trial court reformed the Trust language based upon the doctrine of probable intent citing N.J.S.A. 3B:3-33.1(b).
[brief] Among these evidential rulings is the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s *in limine* motions to bar evidence and testimony regarding the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, falls and use of a handicapped placard from trial and to strike portions of the *de bene esse* deposition testimony of defense expert, [...], related to these subjects where the defendant offered no expert medical opinion establishing a “logical relationship” between the plaintiff’s prior falls or medical conditions and her fall at [...].  Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.
[brief] We reach a different conclusion as to defendant's argument in Point III that contends the trial judge erred in admitting [...]'s first-time identification of defendant at trial because it was “highly suggestive and unreliable. ”  He argues her in-court identification should have been stricken under the principles established in Henderson, and in the alternative, even if Henderson did not apply, “a straightforward application of N.J.R.E. 401 and 403 compelled the exclusion of [...]'s in-court identification.
[brief] [...] admitted it was informed about the Incident and its details on the day it occurred, June 1, 2021.  (PPCIa137-38).  [...] admitted that it investigated the Incident.  [...] then took no further action after that initial investigation.  (PPCIa137-38).  [...]’s admission of responsibility.  As set forth in the Verified Complaint, [...] sent an email to [...] a few days after the Incident where [...] admits its liability, which is pictured in the Verified Complaint (PPCIa004).  In that email, [...] stated, “one of our drivers was trying to move the container to the Newark terminal and had an accident with our chassis parked next to the container. ”  [Emphasis added]  (PPCIa004).  [...] failed to respond to the Incident.
[brief] (Ca1).  The [...] appellants do not cite any authority for their argument that the trial court erred in denying their motion to intervene.  First, the trial court noted, at the time of the motion hearing on October 6, 2023, that the accident occurred on July 21, 2021, which was three months before [...] took over.  (1T:23:10-19).  At the time of the hearing on October 6, 2023, counsel for the [...]es stated that there were two insurers for the diner in the personal injury action.  (1T:24:1-7).  So, there was a policy of insurance in place for the diner to cover an injury.  (1T:25:1-7).  Also, the trial court noted that [...] would not be responsible for any excess verdict in connection with the accident since [...] was not the receiver at the time of the accident.  (1T:25:24-25 and 26:1-3).  The trial court recognized that [...] was not even the receiver until after the accident occurred.  (1T:26:6-9).  [...] could never have put a policy in place before the court appointed him as statutory receiver.  (1T:26:14-19).  The trial court denied the [...]es’ motion to intervene.  (1T:28:7-10).  This was nothing more than a back door attempt by the [...]es to find a way to make [...] responsible for an excess verdict.  [...] saw through that back door argument, and stated, “If there is an excess verdict, I’m not going to have [...] stand responsible for that because he was not the receiver at the point in time when your client was injured and that’s my ruling. ” (1T:29:25 and 30:1-3).  Accordingly, the trial court saw through the argument, properly denied the motion to intervene, and also properly granted the motion to be discharged.
[brief] Plaintiff also argues that the Redevelopment Payment is not authorized by the LRHL because the payment was not related to the furnishing of “property or services” “in connection with the redevelopment area. ” (Pb24).  However, the Senior Center certainly provides such opportunity and services.  Regardless, the use of these mangled terms is simply a red herring.  They are lifted from a distinct passage in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) where the LRHL authorizes a municipality to contract in order to “furnish property or services in connection with a redevelopment area. ”  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f).  This particular authority is distinct from the authority to negotiate and collect revenues.  The lower court was correct to rely upon the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) and to find that the Redevelopment Payment could be collected without establishing a nexus between the impact of the [...] and the use of the Redevelopment Payment.  (Pa081).  Further, the lower court was correct that the two conditions it needed to evaluate to determine whether the Redevelopment Payment was valid were whether the negotiated payment (i) defrays the costs of the redevelopment entity and (ii) carries out and effectuates the purposes of the LRHL and a redevelopment plan.  Ultimately, the evidentiary record showed that the negotiated payment defrayed the costs of the redevelopment entity’s $5,000,000.00 investment in the expansion of the Senior Center and that the improvement of such a community amenity served the purposes of the Redevelopment Plan.  For these reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court uphold the lower court's grant of Summary Judgment.
[brief] OPPOSITIONS BY P. AMBROSE & S. JACOBSON IN REGARDS TO REVISING OCT. 6, 2022  ORDER, IN REGARDS TO ITEMS  1-5  IN SECTION “A”  1.  See Section “A”  SECTION C J. ROSS’ CERTIFICATION REPLY, DATED NOV. 4, 2022, IN OPPOSITION TO S. JACOBSON’S OCT. 26, 2022, REQUEST FOR TRUST PAYMENTS FOR FEES THAT WERE EVENTUALLY ADDRESSED IN FEB. 17, 2023
[brief] Insurers that issue automobile-insurance policies in New Jersey are required by statute to include no-fault “personal injury protection” (or PIP) benefits in their policies:  “[E]very standard automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed on or after the effective date of P.L.1998, c. 21 (C.39:6A-1.1 et al.) shall contain personal injury protection benefits for the payment of benefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  In addition, this court has explained that “PIP arbitration elected by the insured becomes mandatory for the carrier. ”  Habick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 320 N.J. Super. 244, 253 (App. Div. 1999).  Thus, the only way for Plaintiffs to avoid the PIP ADR system is to stop selling automobile insurance in New Jersey.  It is unclear if that is what the Chiropractors suggest by “opting out,” but the Legislature cannot condition the privilege of doing business in the state on the waiver of a constitutional protection like the right to a jury trial on damages claims.
[brief] I, ¶ 9 | 42, 45 | | N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 10 | 41, 42, 45, 46 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 13, 41 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 41, 42, 46 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 13, 41, 42, 45, 46 | | **OTHER AUTHORITIES** | | | Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Judge’s Inquiry When Jury Reports Inability to Reach Verdict” (approved June 2013) | 49 | TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
[directive] Actor has purpose to hinder or impair apprehension or prosecution of another and assists 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000 10% permissible that person in avoiding detection or suppression of evidence; second or third or fourth degree or disorderly persons offense depending upon degree of crime the other person is charged with or liable to be charged with and whether the actor is a spouse, domestic 3rd Degree $5,000 to $10,000 10% permissible partner, partner in a civil union, parent or child of the person aided.  Hindering 2C:29-3(a)(b)
[brief] (Da113).  Such harms, especially while the State’s challenge to the Amended Policy was pending in the administrative forum, would be irreparable.  Ibid.  And on the other side of the ledger, the trial court found that Appellants had not made “any compelling argument that adherence to the [Original Policy] governing transgender students while the administrative action is pending will result in any claim, liability or hardship,” especially given that the Original Policy had been in place “uneventfully” since 2019.
[brief] Jusino v. Lapenta, 442 N.J. Super. 248, 252 (Law. Div. 2014) (quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 3.5, on R. 1:36–3).  In Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court instructed that, when construing federal statutes in the absence of binding precedent, judicial comity requires giving “due respect” for the decisions of the lower federal courts—particularly when the federal courts are in agreement.
[brief] Creating some confusion, though, [...] did not prepare the [...] report exchanged between the parties.  (16T 7-2 to 22, 35-22 to 36-8).  The record did not reflect why [...] sent someone other than the person who prepared the report to testify.  (16T 5-24 to 6-11).  In any event, the parties agreed to allow [...] to testify because he traveled to New Jersey from Ohio.  (16T 4-2 to 9, 37-12 to 16).  On June 27, 2023, the PCR judge denied defendant’s application.
[brief] [...] quotes the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, and the power of the municipality to zone in general (outside of constitutional constraints), but fails to even acknowledge the existence of a fundamental tenant of the Mount Laurel doctrine, that courts are empowered to “eliminat[e] unnecessary cost producing requirements and restrictions” in municipal zoning that frustrate affordable housing.  S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 92 N.J. 158, 217 (1983) (Mount Laurel II).
[brief] The Legislature is well aware of how to create specific notice requirements and has done so with other statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-50(a) (“Notification shall be by certified mail to the spouse’s address as provided on the form by the member. ”); e.g., Hammond v. City of Paterson, 145 N.J. Super. 452, 456 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that the Legislature, in requiring “actual receipt” of notice in the Tort Claims Act when certified mail is not used, “clearly did not mean to leave proof of actual receipt to a presumption. ”).  When “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. ”  GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307-08 (1993); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 579 (1997).  Nowhere in the Ricci Act is there a requirement that the Board send notice, through a postcard, by certified mail or other means, or otherwise require actual receipt of notice.  Thus, in accord with the statutory canon of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, this court should reject [...]’s request to create a requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to.  The Ricci Act simply required that the Board provide notice within thirty days of its enactment, without specifying in what manner.  The Board complied with this requirement when it posted information about the Ricci Act on its website.  [...] identifies no authority suggesting that the Division’s use of its website to fulfill this notice requirement was inadequate.  Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.
[brief] ”  P20a.  The Court overlooked, however, that while the Decedent was suffering anguish and distress, Decedent made the 2014 Will.  (P108a).  After the 2014 Will was made, Decedent advised [...] that [...] was barred from Respondent’s home and asked [...] to alert her if [...] came around.  (9T73:2-11).  The Court also disregarded bias on the part of [...], when finding that he had no interest in the outcome of the case.
[brief] In his report and during his testimony, [...] explains that the contracts outline the obligations for the maintenance and protection of traffic which included daily inspections of the travel surface of the roadway.  (Pa20).  In fact, as listed in Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, the [...] contract required daily inspections, that traffic control deficiencies be corrected within 2 hours, and compliance with the MUTCD (Pa1214, Pa1225) and the relevant Traffic Control Detail.  (Pa1225, Pa2205, Pa1271).  Additionally, the agreement between [...] and [...], the engineering professionals onsite, were required to “exercise that degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised under similar circumstances by members of its profession performing the kind of services hereunder and practicing in the same or similar locality at the same time. ” (Pa1302).  Plaintiff’s expert addressed how this plays out in a practical setting during the Rule 104 Hearing.
[brief] Court Invest. Co v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966).  Generally, the applicant to prevail must come forth with facts, justifying that enforcement of a final judgment would be unjust, oppressive, or inequitable.  U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 484 (2012).  A motion to vacate default judgments implicates two competing goals: resolving disputes on the merits and providing finality and stability to judgments.  Thus, R. 4:50-1 “is designed to reconcile the strong interest in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case; Nowosleska v. Steele, 400 N.J. Super 297, 306 (App. Div 2008).
[brief] Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176(d), §§3 (b), (c), (f), (m) and (n); N.J.S.A. §17:29B-4(9) (b), (c), (f), (m) and (n).  Such public policy requirements are at the heart of [...]’s landmark allocation decision in *Owens-Illinois*, in which he wrote:  “Insurers whose policies are triggered by an injury during a policy period must respond to any claims presented to them and, if they deny full coverage, *must* initiate proceedings to determine the portion allocable for defense and indemnity costs. ”  *Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co.*, 138 N.J. 437, 479 (1994) (emphasis added).
[brief] A plaintiff cannot satisfy the notice requirement of N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b) without providing evidence indicating how long the alleged dangerous condition existed.  *Carroll v. New Jersey Transit*, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 2004).  In *Carroll*, this court found that a plaintiff’s proffered evidence failed to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat defendant's summary judgment motion because the plaintiff provided no evidence indicating how long the alleged dangerous condition existed:  [T]here was no evidence of how long the dog feces was on the steps.  Therefore, plaintiff could not even meet the fundamental requirement of constructive notice under N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b), namely that the condition could have existed for such a period of time that the public entity should have discovered it.  The dog feces could have been there “hours, minutes or seconds before the accident,” one of the reasons we found the proofs inadequate to establish notice in *Grzanka v. Pfeifer*, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 574, 694 A.2d 295 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607, 713 A.2d 487 (1998).
[directive] Sample Use Immunity Grant Advisement Form “Garrity Warning ”  1.  I am being questioned as part of an investigation by this agency into potential violations of department rules and regulations, or for my fitness for duty.  This investigation concerns 2.  I have invoked my rights on the grounds that I might incriminate myself in a Miranda criminal matter.  3.  I have been granted use immunity.  No answer given by me, nor evidence derived from the answer, may be used against me in any criminal proceeding, except for perjury or false swearing.  4.  I understand that I must now answer questions specifically, directly and narrowly related to the performance of my official duties or my fitness for office.  5.  If I refuse to answer, I may be subject to discipline for that refusal which can result in my dismissal from this agency.  6.  Anything I say may be used against me in any subsequent departmental charges.  7.  I have the right to consult with a representative of my collective bargaining unit, or another representative of my choice, and have him or her present during the interview.  Assistant Prosecutor or Deputy Attorney General authorizing: ____________________________________  Signature: __________________________________  Print name:_________________________________  Date: _____________________________________  Location:___________________________________  Witnessed by: __________________________  Print Name: __________________________  Appendix I
[directive] The County Prosecutor shall review the matter for compliance with this Policy.  If the County Prosecutor finds the firing or discharge of a CED or less-lethal device to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, the matter shall be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee.  (b)  For statewide law enforcement agencies, the law enforcement executive shall forward the report to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice within 10 business days of the firing/discharge, unless the Director grants the law enforcement executive’s request for a reasonable extension of time within which to forward the report for good cause shown.  The Director shall review the matter for compliance with this Policy.  If the Director finds the firing or discharge of a CED or less-lethal device to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, the matter shall be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee.
[directive] 3.3  Supervision  3.3.1  Proper supervision is critical to the discipline and management of a law enforcement agency.  To maximize their effectiveness, agency supervisors should receive appropriate supervisory training as close as possible to the time of their promotion.  Emphasis should be placed on anticipating problems among officers before they result in improper performance or conduct.  Supervisors are expected to recognize potentially troublesome officers, identify training needs of officers and provide professional support in a fair and consistent manner.  3.4
[directive] The court shall sentence a defendant to pay restitution in addition to a sentence of imprisonment or probation that may be imposed if: the victim, or in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the victim, suffered a loss; and the defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution.(11)  Prosecutors should inform victims of the availability of restitution, and ensure that the court is made aware of the victim's losses so that a restitution order is accurate and inclusive.  Prosecutors should consider the issue of restitution for the victim in charging and plea negotiation decisions which may affect the amount of restitution the court can order.  It is recommended that prosecutors consult with every victim of violent crime, explaining how the plea negotiations process operates, what negotiating posture the prosecution has adopted and why that posture was chosen.  Prosecutors should always attempt to take into account the victim's views before reaching a final decision.  Victims legitimately view the resolution of and sentencing in a case as an evaluation of the harm done to them.  Whenever the prosecutor considers the dismissal of a case involving violent crime, the victim should be consulted in advance and told the reasons for the prosecutor's decision.  Victims should be allowed to convey the information that they posses to the judge that will determine case outcomes.  The prosecutor is in the best position to ensure that the victim is accorded a proper role the criminal justice system.  J.
[brief] Da398-400, ¶¶ 3-7.  Further, while [...] (and the other parties) demanded a jury trial, this reflected the status of the case in 2019 when arbitration would have been futile.  It was not until the case changed in late 2023 and early 2024, and [...] settled with the Utilities and the primary insurers and other umbrella insurer, that arbitration became a viable dispute resolution mechanism.  [...] submits that this factor should be given little weight as arbitration is justified under the totality of the circumstances.  vi.  **Proximity to the Date of Trial (T1 74:6-7)**
[brief] Under the second prong of the Strickland standard, a defendant “must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. ”  Id. at 687.  There must be a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ”  Id. at 694.  A petitioner must demonstrate that “counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. ”  Id. at 687.
[brief] Accordingly, when a lawsuit concerns a prosecutor’s administrative duties involved in running an office, Wright does not require the state to provide coverage.  Thus, a discrimination claim involving a promotion, Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1084 (1977); an alleged retaliatory discharge under CEPA, DeLisa v. Cnty. of Bergen, 326 N.J. Super. 32, (App. Div. 1999); attorney fees for failure to comply with the Open Public Records Act, Courier News v. Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office, 378 N.J. Super.  539 (App. Div. 2005), have all been found to be administrative in nature and not covered.  In Gramiccioni v. Department of Law & Public Safety, 243 N.J. 293 (2020), the Court again examined in detail when the state had an obligation to defend a county prosecutor’s office.