ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s Motion to Compel Discovery and the Sua Sponte Order  On August 11, 2023, after the ninety (90) day discovery period had run with discovery demands having been exchanged but not completed, [...] filed a Notice of Motion to Compel Discovery.(395a-449a).  The motion requested no relief other than compelling production and resetting dates.  The motion was heard unopposed on September 27, 2023 by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., who assumed the matter following the elevation of [...] to the Appellate Division.  (2T 9/27/23).  After oral argument on September 27, 2023, Judge Adubato entered the Order Denying [...] LLC’s Motion to Compel Discovery and Reset Discovery Dates, determining instead that the April 3 Order would remain “in effect,” effectively terminating Appellants’ motion to vacate without further hearing (the “Sua Sponte Order”) (24a-25a).
[brief] The trial court found:  The transfer of assets to [[...]], [...] and [...] as part of the asset protection plan made these assets part of the marital estate.  The court finds when determining equitable distribution of these assets that it must consider that the substantial majority of the parties’ wealth at the time of divorce was based on [[...]’s] acquisition of assets prior to the marriage.  The court finds the transfers made as part of the asset protection plan were not intended to be gifts to [[...]], but even if they were, the Court’s analysis would be the same…  the court’s prior findings as to the tracing of the parties’ assets back to the pre-marital acquisition by [[...]] is a substantial factor which makes the distribution of assets to [[...]] in the PSA to be fair and reasonable...
[directive] The previous Bail Schedules 1 and 2 have not been merged; however, the captions citing to the rules, which have been substantially revised, including as to who can set bail for particular offenses, have been removed.  Previously, Bail Schedule 1 offenses were required to have bail set by Superior Court judges, while Bail Schedule 2 offenses could be set by a Superior Court judge, a Municipal Court judge, or an authorized Municipal Court Administrator or Deputy Court Administrator.  Bail Schedules – Eligible Defendants
[brief] Additionally, the allegations regarding allegedly forged assignments and affidavit of lost note are also barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  The doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to preclude the relitigation of issues that have been previously decided.  *Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc.*, 186 N.J. 511, 522 (2006).  For the doctrine to apply, the party asserting the bar must show: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.  *Id.* at 521 (quoting *In Re Estate of Dawson*, 136 N.J. 1, 20-21 (1994)).  This doctrine applies not only to issues raised in a prior action, but also to facts that were in dispute as well.
[brief] ]  For example, in FY2009, [...]’s uncapped aid was $306,574,506, but it actually received $417,733,738 in State aid — 36.3% more than the uncapped aid.  (Aa1106; Aa1458-59; Aa1872).  This trend continued over the years.  For example, in FY2016, [...]’s uncapped aid under the SFRA formula was $306,778,250, but [...] received $418,859,260 in State aid — 36.5% over the uncapped aid.  (Aa523; Aa1108; Aa1458-59; Aa1496; Aa1872).  Between FY2017 and FY2019 that percentage substantially increased each year, eventually surpassing 72%. (Aa1108-09; Aa1458-59; Aa1872).  In FY2021, [...] was to receive $139,071,799 in State aid under the formula, but it received $324,393,336 — which was 133.3% above the uncapped formula.  (Aa1109; Aa1523-24; Aa1458-59; Aa1872).  Overall, the excess over uncapped formula aid received by [...] jumped from $111,159,232 in FY2009, to $185,321,537 in FY2021, even as the District’s LFS and concomitant capacity to shoulder a greater share of its education costs also significantly increased.  (Aa1106-09; Aa1458-59; Aa1872).  **E. Statutory Amendments and Their Effect on [...].
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO VACATE FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER R. 4:50-1(C)  BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FRAUD (T4 98:1-5)  Throughout the proceedings below, Appellant made numerous unfounded attempts to vacate final judgment on the basis of some fraudulent nexus between Co-Respondents [...] and [...] and Co-Respondent [...].  0099a - 0109a.  Appellant presented two facts in its failed attempt to show fraud between the Co-Respondents in this matter: - [...] and [...], the respective principals of [...]/[...] and [...], have known each other for over twenty years.  Appellant’s Legal Brief, p. 18. - [...] was not a “bona fide purchaser” because the sale of the subject property was not an arms-length transaction.  Appellant’s Legal Brief, p. 18.  First, Appellant’s allegations that [...] and [...] were “more than friendly for over 20 years” and “regularly did business together” is false.  Appellant’s Legal Brief, p. 46.  Here, [...] engaged in negotiation tactics against [...] to obtain a higher price.  *Deposition of [...]*, 0124a (38:23-24).  Further, [...] confirmed he kept the subject transaction on a “short-leash” because [...] “re-traded” on prior transactions.
[brief] For example, Defendants’ Brief argues that [...]’s resistance to being collected was “typical stallion behavior. ”  Defendants’ Brief, p. 26.  In contrast, Plaintiffs allege that [...]’s resistance to being collected was peculiar and unique to [...]: [...] testified at deposition that [...] was given breaks from collection because sometimes he “didn’t want to walk into the breeding shed,” and that giving him four breaks from collection in a season was abnormal for a stallion (Pa837a; Pa844a); and, [...], the manager of [...], testified at deposition that bringing [...] to the breeding shed from the field instead of the barn was a deviation from written, standard collection protocol that was unique to [...].  (Pa848a).  Whether [...]’s resistance to being collected was “typical stallion behavior,” as asserted by Defendants, or abnormal and unique, as asserted by Plaintiffs, is a factual question for the jury to resolve.
[brief] ## TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript No. | |----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------| | Plea | February 21, 2018 | 1T | | Post Conviction Relief Hearing | November 14, 2022 | 2T | | Law Division Appeal | November 29, 2023 | 3T | | CASE NAME | CITATION | PAGE NO | |---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | State v. Locurto | 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) | 4 | | State v. Crawly | 149 N.J. (1997) | 4 | | State v. Preciose | 129 N.J. (1992) | 4-5 | | Strickland v. Washington | 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984) | 5 | | United States v. Cronic | 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) | 5 | | State v. Fritz | 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A.2d 336 (1987) | 5 | STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [Pa156-57.]  Thus, “the RPC conflict analysis requires identifying with particularity which unit is truly the party in interest and is therefore the relevant government client. ”  (Pa157).  “In some instances, the client may be a Department or an Authority, but in other cases the client may be a subsidiary unit other than a Department or an Authority. ”  Ibid.  Factors that may be considered to identify the particular government client include, but are not limited to: (1) “Whether the matter involves an operation or responsibility that is unique to a particular government unit and is distinct from the operations of the other unites within the relevant Department or the Authority. ”; (2) “Whether retention of outside counsel is limited to a circumscribed and well-defined role.  For example, counsel’s retention is limited to serving as bond counsel, or providing tax advice to a pension fund. ”; (3) “Whether outside counsel is dealing primarily with personnel inside the unit when providing advice or formulating litigation and settlement strategy. ”; or (4) Whether resolution of the matter will directly affect the authority, funding, or privileges of another government unit within the relevant Department or Authority. ” (Pa157).
[brief] Exhibit 63 - A true and correct copy of the [...] E-mail to [...] on March 23, 2017, to confirm that it was Handling the claim for the [...]..........................Dta2920  Exhibit 64 - March 24, 2017  Email from [...]...............................Dta2923  Exhibit 65 - March 24, 2017 provided by [...] on behalf of [...] to [...] that the [...] Policy could be implicated.................................................................Dta2926  Exhibit 66 - March 28, 2017  EMail reservation of rights from [...].................................................................Dta2933  Exhibit 67 - Claim  Acknowledgment sent by [...] to [...] Dated 3/29/2017.........................................................Dta2936  Exhibit 68 - [...]’s also acknowledgment letter to [...] on March 29, 2017.........................................................Dta2939
[brief] . . .’”  Id. at 211, quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 464.  i.  Count  One fails to state a claim for a CEPA violation because withholding PTO is not an act of retaliation (argued but not ruled on).  Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she was retaliated against twice—when she was mistakenly told that she had no available PTO and when she was subsequently terminated.  Addressing first Plaintiff’s contention regarding PTO, Plaintiff states that “in an act of retaliation toward Plaintiff, Defendants [[...] and [...]] denied Plaintiff’s second request for PTO. ” (PA000009 at ¶ 43).  Plaintiff again raises this argument in her appeal.  (See Appellant’s Brief at 9-11)  (hereinafter “App. Br.”)  CEPA defines “retaliatory action” as “the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment. ”  N.J.S.A. § 34:19-2(e).  Therefore, an employer's action that is less than a discharge, suspension, or demotion may be actionable under CEPA.  Anderson v. City of E. Orange, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *9 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2022), citing Nardello v. Twp. of Voorhees, 377 N.J. Super. 428, 433-34 (App. Div. 2005).
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  See also, Tp. Comm. of Tp. of Neptune v. Stagg, 312 N.J. Super. 312, 317 (App. Div. 1998).  Relevant to the Court’s analysis of the applicability of the statute here, it is noted that municipal corporations such as [...] are entitled to have statutes concerning them liberally construed in their favor.  The N.J. Const., art. IV, § 7, ¶ 11, states,  The provisions of this Constitution and of any law concerning municipal corporations formed for local government, or concerning counties, shall be liberally construed in their favor.  The powers of counties and such municipal corporations shall include not only those granted in express terms but also those of necessary or fair implication, or incident to the powers expressly conferred, or essential thereto, and not inconsistent with or prohibited by this Constitution or by law.  N.J. Const., art. IV, § 7, ¶ 11.  Accordingly, “misconduct in office” under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) is to be liberally construed.
[brief] Count 17 of the proposed Second Amended Complaint sought to assert a claim for breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that [...] breached the confidentiality provision in the Lease by disclosing terms of the Lease and the Solar Rights to the [...].  However, the allegation of breach in this regard is belied by the Appellants’ own allegations of fact and the findings previously made by the trial court that Appellants themselves previously disclosed these very facts to the [...], thereby making this claim unsustainable as a matter of law.
[brief] Plaintiff filed his Supplemental Motion for Sanctions Montana v. [...], Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2013) 2013 WL 11233748 [Doc. No. 187] on January 19, 2013.  Plaintiff's motion for default asked the Court to strike and suppress [...]'s answers because of its discovery transgressions.  Plaintiff's December 3, 2012 Motion for Sanctions requests different forms of relief: (1) leave to serve special interrogatory questions; (2) a request that the Court order that plaintiff's consultant be permitted to review and search [...]'s computers and/or e-mail archives “to be certain that Plaintiff is able to obtain all relevant discovery, and all documents, writings and other material that may lead to relevant evidence” ; (3) an order for the in camera inspection of all CD's and DVD's referred to in [...]'s affidavit, and (4) an award of costs and fees in connection with plaintiff's motion and “Plaintiff's search of the Defendant's computer and e-mail archives. ”
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff [...] (hereinafter “Plaintiff” tripped and fell on a raised leg of a metal barricade that had been placed outside of the [...] retail store located in East Brunswick, New Jersey on July 14, 2020.  Defendants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court.  In her opposition, Plaintiff argued that [...]’s duty as a business owner was not limited by the fact that a hazardous condition may have been open and obvious and that comparative negligence was an issue properly within the province of a jury.  After conducting oral argument, the trial court correctly held that the condition of the raised barricade leg was open and obvious and known to Plaintiff and therefore, Defendant [...] had no duty to warn of the specific condition.  The trial court did not err in its analysis and specifically found that it was undisputed that [...] is a business and owed a duty to provide a reasonably safe premises to Plaintiff as a business invitee.  Nevertheless, the duty of care of a business owner is subject to limitation when it comes to dangers that are open, obvious and easily understood.  As the trial court correctly observed, the raised barricade leg was open and obvious to Plaintiff as evidenced by Plaintiff’s testimony that she saw the raised leg as she entered the [...] and had notice of the condition.  Satisfied with the foregoing, the trial court then correctly concluded that it need not address Plaintiff’s arguments regarding comparative negligence.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision granting Defendants motion for summary judgment was properly decided and should be upheld.
[brief] We find instead that the limiting principles established in our precedent warrant the adoption of the ongoing storm rule.  *Id.* at 557.  The ruling allowed for two limited exceptions: cases where the commercial property owner takes affirmative action that increases risk to pedestrians or invitees, and cases where the hazard which causes the plaintiff to fall is the consequence of a pre-existing condition.  Here, the trial court correctly held that neither exception applied:  Here, neither exception applies, as Plaintiff slipped and fell during an ongoing storm event in the form of freezing rain.  *Plaintiff specifically testified the cause of his fall was the ice* that had accumulated on the landing which he encountered immediately when stepping onto the landing.  Moving  Defendants had no duty to remove ice from the property until the storm event had ended.
[brief] Put simply, [...] seeks to maintain existing waterfront uses.  [...], however, presents a contrary vision, emphasizing the waterfront as a year-round destination.  It is not for this Court to determine whose vision is better, but only whether [...]’s (vision) is supported by the factual record.  It is.  (emphasis added)  •  Fundamentally, [...]’s contentions amount to a disagreement with respect to vision and values.  The Master Plan sets forth, in broad brush strokes, [...]’s vision for the Borough.  The Plan sets forth various ways for that vision to come to fruition.  [...] struck a balance.  Although [...] disagrees with that balance, the disagreement is subjective.  As demonstrated by the record, [...]’s determination is supported by ample evidence and is not arbitrary nor capricious.  Accordingly, [...]’s challenge in this regard must be rejected.  (emphasis added)  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
[directive] Guilty Plea  Before accepting a guilty plea to any of the above-listed offenses, the municipal court judge shall engage in the following colloquy with the defendant:  (1)  Are you a citizen of the United States?  (If defendant answers “No” to question 1, defendant must answer questions 2 through 6.)  (2)  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result in your removal from the United States and/or may stop you from being able to legally enter or re-enter the United States?  (3)  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney about the effect your guilty plea may have on your immigration status?  (4)  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of your plea?  (If defendant answers “No” to question 4, defendant should next answer question 5.  If defendant answers “Yes” to question 4, defendant should next answer question 6.)  (5)  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  Directive #09-11 – Immigration Consequences of Guilty Pleas in Municipal Court
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[brief] Chewing gum, red eyes, odor of alcohol, admitting to coming from a restaurant, admitting to consuming one beer without specifying when it was consumed, committing no traffic violation, lying on the police report and in court (1T:23-(5-17), [1T:28(22-25) - 1T:29-(1-10)], [4T:14-(16-25) - 4T:15-(1-14)], (Da 3a)) and an improperly administered SFST are NOT proof beyond a reasonable doubt that amount to probable cause to believe that I am intoxicated.  At most, those are subjective statements and subjective opinions.  Those are also multiple mistakes and lies by the officer.  In no way can those subjective statements, lies and mistakes show that my mental faculties and physical capabilities was substantial diminished and deteriorated.
[brief] After considering the parties’ briefing and oral argument, the Court concluded that under New Jersey product liability law, summary judgment was warranted.  Id. at 20-27.  In doing so, the Court correctly honed in on the dispositive issue: “whether the omission of the alternative design renders the product . . . not reasonably safe. ”  Id. at 20; see also id. at 23 (“[I]f it’s determined that . . . the product, as designed, was reasonably safe, then the product was not designed in a defective manner. ”).  The Court explained that the manufacturer’s “duty” is “to provide a reasonably fit, suitable and safe” product.  Id. at 20-21.  The manufacturer does not have a duty to install every technology on a vehicle, and there is no requirement for it to produce an accident-proof vehicle.  Id.  at 26.  And even if a proposed alternative design “is, on balance, better than the chosen design,” that does not mean the product is “per se defective” because “[t]here can be multiple reasonably safe designs. ”  Id. at 20.  To meet his burden, a plaintiff must show that the alternative design was not only reasonable, but that “its absence renders the product not reasonably safe. ”  Id. at 20-21.  Applied here, the Court concluded that the vehicle “was reasonably safe for its intended use,” and that there was no evidence of a defect despite Plaintiff’s claim that the subject vehicle was defective because it lacked certain advanced driver assistance systems that were allegedly feasible.  Id. at 26.  The Court explained how the absence of these technologies did not render the vehicle unreasonably dangerous merely because the driver had to control their vehicle:  [I]t’s almost universally understood that the safe operation of a motor vehicle is entirely dependent -- or almost entirely -- upon the driver’s diligence in use of the vehicle’s braking and other systems.  A driver’s responsibility for avoiding collisions by limiting speed, braking and steering, have been an inherent and well-understood characteristic of automobile operation for over a century.  Id.6  6  [...] also moved for summary judgment on the issue of causation because Plaintiff could not meet his burden of establishing that equipping the vehicle with LDW and LKAS would have made a difference.  Id. at 6-8, 12-15.  [...] simultaneously moved to exclude Plaintiff’s experts’ speculative and baseless causation opinions.  [...] argued that without those opinions, Plaintiff provided no evidence of causation, and summary judgment was proper.  Id. at 12-13.  However, the Court did not decide the issue of causation because it found that there was no evidence of a defect, which rendered all motions related to causation moot.  Id. at 27.  ARGUMENT
[brief] ”  398 N.J. Super. at 440 (citing Kurzke v. Nizzan Motor Corp., 164 N.J. 159, 171 (2000)).  That is precisely the circumstance here.  The court should disregard plaintiff’s misplaced attempt to manufacture a connection to New Jersey through reference to a lawsuit filed against defendants by the [...].  (Pb23) (citing N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Protection, v. [...], [...] (N.J. Super. Gloucester Cnty.) (the “DEP Lawsuit”).  As an initial matter, the DEP Lawsuit was not raised by plaintiff in the trial court as a basis for denying defendants’ motion so it is not part of the appellate record and should not be considered by this court in reviewing the Judgment.  But even were it otherwise, defendants have not tendered the DEP Lawsuit to plaintiff or otherwise sought defense or indemnity from plaintiff for the DEP Lawsuit.  That lawsuit, therefore, is not, as plaintiff incorrectly claims, included in “the underlying claims against” defendants.  (Pb23).