ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs/APPELLANTS, v. [...], ESQ., [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], ESQ., [...], [...], ESQ., [...], ESQ., [...], [...], ESQ., [...], ESQ., [...], Defendants/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION  MONMOUTH COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DATE SUBMITTED: 08/03/23  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
[brief] Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration Chapter 19-3.2 (Gann, 2022).  See also Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment for Chatham Tp., 202 N.J. Super. at 327.  (“The general requirements for the invocation of the principle are a final judgment by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, identity of issues, parties, causes of action and thing sued for. ”)  In the present matter the application of the Doctrine of res judicata applies for the following reasons:  The application made by [...] decided on July 21, 2021 is substantially similar to the application of [...] decided on January 27, 2021.
[brief] We also think there is a clear path for the *Brady* violation and its delaying the case and causing counsel to be ineffective (for 14 months), both violating the 6th Amendment.  [...] does not deny that *Gilles v. Davis*, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) is problematical.  But, if you apply [...]’s “civil action that does not invalidate an outstanding criminal judgment” test (*Heck* at 486-87), that was the correct result.
[brief] The “[w]ords used by a suspect are not to be viewed in a vacuum, but rather in ‘the full context in which they were spoken. ’”  *S.S.*, 229 N.J. at 382 (quoting *State v. Roman*, 382 N.J. Super. 44, 64 (App. Div.), certif. dismissed, 189 N.J. 420 (2007)).  To that end, our courts have consistently distinguished between invocations of one’s rights, which must be clarified, from requests for advice, which does not need to be provided.  Compare *Gonzalez*, 249 N.J. at 631 (finding “[b]ut what do I do about an attorney and everything?” to be “an ambiguous invocation of [defendant’s] right to counsel that required the detective to cease all questioning and seek clarification”) with *State v. Alston*, 204 N.J. 614, 625-26 (2011)(finding “should I not have a lawyer?” not to be even an ambiguous assertion of right, but “[r]ather … a question[] posed to the investigating officer[] that amounted to defendant’s request for advice about what the detective thought the defendant should do”).
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0224 xv.  Exhibit O – March 20, 2012 – Highlands Council Agency Determination: Highlands Act Exemption #11, Consistent with the Goals and Purposes of the Highlands Act, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Northeast Upgrade Project, from [...], Executive Director, Highlands Council, to [...], Office of Land Use Planning, Division of Land Use Planning, DEP.
[brief] A court should grant summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law.  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 142 NJ 520, 529 (1995).  Summary judgment will not be appropriate if the dispute is about a material fact and is genuine and could result in a jury after hearing the evidence returning with a verdict for the nonmoving party.  Anderson et al v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., et al, 477 US 242 (1986).  The question is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement that would then require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.  Id. at 247-252.
[brief] Defendant then walked downstairs with the loaded rifle, entered the kitchen, and shot his sister [...] three times in the chest.  (8T25-19 to 26-8).  He thought he shot [...] four times, but he was unsure because the earplugs muffled the sound.  (8T26-9 to 17).  Defendant then pointed the rifle at his grandfather intending to shoot him, but his grandfather’s emotional reaction to seeing his long-term girlfriend getting shot “snapped [defendant] back to reality, so to speak. ” (7T325-14 to 18; 8T33-22 to 34-25).  He heard [...] telling him to stop and [...] yelling, “[...], what are you doing?” (8T55-21 to 13, 325-20 to 24).  When he heard [...] calling 9-1-1, he shook his head and went upstairs.
[brief] Final Judgment, Filed November 29, 2023………………………………………..Pa704  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | 135 Route 73 S., LLC v. Schafer, | 22 | | No. A-3060-09T3, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2540 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2010)
[brief] (2T 13-12 to 20)  Because the police unlawfully prolonged the detention and sought consent to search without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, all of the evidence must be suppressed.  U.S. Const. amends.  IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art.  1, para. 7; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).  As “warrantless stops and searches are presumptively invalid, the State bears the burden of establishing that any such stop or search is justified by one of the ‘well-delineated exceptions’ to the warrant requirement. ”  State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 409 (2012) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004)).  The law is clear that when a car is stopped due to a purported motor-vehicle violation, “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are – or reasonably should have been – completed.
[brief] (13T:71-8 to 74-12; 13T:86-18 to 21).  [...] testified that he searched inside the car in which defendant had been transported and found the sneaker under the rear passenger seat.  (13T:75-5 to 76-6).  [...] then placed defendant in an interview room and left the sneaker in that room.  (13T:76-9 to 24).  When the interrogation began, defendant declined to speak to police.  [...] then asked aloud, “Whose sneaker?” and when [...] said, “That’s his,” defendant said, “Mine. ” (13T:93-12 to 19).  Then [...] asked defendant, “This is your sneaker?” and defendant said, “Yeah,” and, “They took the other one.  The other one at the station. ” (13T:93-20 to 22).  [...] testified to his involvement with the attempt to interview defendant.  (13T:90-20 to 25).
[brief] [...], 2018 WL 833085, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018).  Other courts have done the same.  See, e.g., In re [...] Sec. Litig., [...], 2020 WL 6750397, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2020) (adding senior executives as custodians where they were likely to possess relevant information); In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices and Antitrust Litig., [...], 2018 WL 1440923, at *3-4 (D.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................. 1  LEGAL ARGUMENT  .........................................................  1  I.  THE [...] FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT (Aa001)  ..............................................................  1  II.  THE [...] ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED A CIRCULAR CULVERT (Aa001)  .................................................................  4  III.  THE [...] DID NOT NEED NEW REGULATIONS TO EMPLOY  THE BEST AVAILABLE PRECIPITATION DATA AND ASSOCIATED FLOOD ELEVATION PREDICTIONS IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF [...]’S METHOD  6  ENGINEERING CALCULATIONS (Aa001)  .................................................................  8  A.  The [...] Failed To Explain Or Justify Its Decision To Remove The Floodway Lines From The Approved Plans (Aa001)  .................................................................  11  IV.  THE APPELLANT HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RAISE ALL THESE ARGUMENTS IN ITS APPEAL OF THE [...]’S PERMIT DECISION AND NEVER WAIVED ITS RIGHTS (Aa001)  .................................................................  12  CONCLUSION
[directive] Seized and Foqeited Property Chapter for ~ TRANSFER THROUGH THE REAL WEED AND OF PROPERTY SEED PROGRAM  The sharing of federally forfeited real property is discouraged.  However, where a in requesting law enforcement agency substantially participated the acts that led to the seizure or forfeiture of real property, and there is a compelling law enforcement need for the property, sharing of forfeited real property may be approved under the Weed and Seed Program.
[brief] .........................................................23, 30 O’Donnell v. Koch, 197 N.J. Super 134 (App. Div. 1984)  ..........................................................24  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263 (2013)  ..............................................................................26, 31, 32, 35, 36  Puleio v. Bd of Adj., 375 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div.) certif. den. 184 N.J. 212 (2005) ...............24, 35  Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. (1998)  .........................................................................................25  Ten Stary Dom P’ship v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16 (2013)  ....................................................................................22  TSI  East Brunswick v. Twp. of East Brunswick Bd. of Adj., 215 N.J. 26 (2013)  .....................................................................................35, 36, 37, 39, 41 Yahnel v. Board of Adjustment of Jamesburg, 79 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 41 N.J. 116 (1963)
[directive] State v. Molina, 187 N.J. 531, 544 (2006).  Directive #03-1 0 (March 9, 201 0) promulgated revisions to the form and colloquy to address notice for the filing of post-conviction relief applications.  In its 2011-2013 report, the Criminal Practice Committee recommended revising the section of the form signed by a private attorney, which describes the procedure to be followed when a defendant decides to appeal and cannot afford to continue to retain private counsel.  Those revisions to the form, as approved by the Supreme Court, and revisions to the colloquy, as endorsed by the Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges and the Conference of Criminal Division Managers, follow.  The Appeal Rights Form is being revised to conform with the current practice in R. 2:7-2(a) when a defendant is represented by private counsel at trial, but wishes to seek representation by the Office of the Public Defender for purposes of appeal.  The form had required that private counsel refer the matter to the Office of the Public Defender to file the appeal, a practice that caused delays in the receipt and processing of 5A indigency applications, as well as the final indigency determination and referral of the matter to the Office of the Public Defender for representation.  The form as revised now provides that if the defendant no longer wishes to retain private counsel for purposes of appeal, private counsel will direct the defendant to contact the Criminal Division Manager's Office in the county of venue as soon as possible so that the defendant can complete an indigency application to ensure the appointment of the Office of the Public Defender within 45 days of the sentencing date.  [...] · PO Box 037 · [...]  Directive# 05-14 August 25, 2014
[directive] Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible CDS or Analog grams or less of hashish.  Failure to Turn Over CDS to Law  Actor knowingly obtains or possesses a controlled dangerous substance or controlled 2C:35-10c  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Enforcement substance analog and who fails to voluntarily deliver the substance to the nearest law Officer enforcement officer.  Drug  Actor uses or possesses with intent to use drug paraphernalia for purposes listed in the 2C:36-2 Paraphernalia - statute, including to ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Use or Possession dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.  with Intent to Use  Actor possesses with intent to use a hypodermic needle or hypodermic syringe or any other Possession or instrument adapted for use of a controlled dangerous substance or a controlled substance  Distribution of 2C:36-6a analog or sells, furnishes or gives to any person such syringe, needle or instrument.  (It is not Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Hypodermic unlawful to possess such items if obtained by a valid prescription issued by a licensed Syringe or Needle physician, dentist or veterinarian and it is used for its authorized purpose.)  Discarding Actor discards, in a place accessible to other persons, a hypodermic needle or syringe Petty  Disorderly 10% permissible 2C:36-6.1  Hypodermic without destroying the hypodermic needle or syringe, or owner or lessor or person in control  $100 to $500  Persons  Needle or Syringe of property knowingly allows said items to remain.  90  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] - **RFP 2:**  “All Documents containing or relating to any communications between Plaintiffs and their auditors, accountants, consultants, and boards of directors (or committees thereof) relating to any actual or potential contractual relationship between you and Defendants regarding any KC-135 PDM work (including but not limited to the negotiation, execution, performance, and/or alleged breach of any such actual or potential contracts). ”  See [...]’s Ex. L. - **RFP 4:**  “All documents and communications relating to the performance, administration, and termination of the 6/2005 Recompete MOA and the 9/2005 Recompete MOA (including exhibits thereto). ”  See [...]’s Ex. L. - **RFP 11:**  “All documents and communications relating to the termination of 2005 Recompete MOA. ”  - **RFP 17:**  “All documents relating to your allegation in the complaint that Defendants improperly used or disclosed any of Plaintiffs’ trade secrets or confidential or proprietary information, including but not limited to documents relating to your allegation that Defendants did not properly implement a ‘firewall. ’ ”  - **RFP 23:**  “All documents supporting or relating to the factual allegations in Paragraph 281 (and its subparts) of the complaint, including but not limited to documents showing the date on which Plaintiffs first learned the information alleged in that paragraph. ”  - **RFP 24:**  “All documents containing, memorializing, mentioning, referring to, or otherwise relating to Plaintiffs’ requests for information from Defendants alleged in Paragraphs 270 and 285 of the complaint. ”  - **RFP 25:**  “All documents relating to any alleged harm or damages you alleged to have incurred as a result of the alleged actions or inactions of Defendants, including but not limited to all documents relating to the damages listed in section 3 of the Plaintiffs’ Initial Rule 26 Disclosures. ”  The Special Master has reviewed *in camera* the 9 documents that [...] believes are responsive to these requests and finds accordingly:
[brief] The Bulletin is *not*, however, an agency determination applicable only to [...] regarding a discrete issue.  Rather, it is reflective of a general standard with widespread coverage and continuing effect as to all reciprocal exchanges and their AIFs, representing the exact type of *de facto* rulemaking prohibited by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Metromedia, Inc.*, 97 N.J. at 313, when the APA’s due process requirements are violated.  Thus, the only recourse left for [...] – or indeed for any other reciprocal exchange or AIF in this state – is to join in the appeal to provide context to its prior interactions with the Department, including the circumstances surrounding [...] regarding the acquisition of [...].  Unless [...] is granted leave to intervene, this Court will be left with no choice but to decide this important matter without the benefit of a full record, thus depriving reciprocal exchanges, their AIFs, and the insurance consuming public the due process required by the APA, as well as the New Jersey and U.S. Constitution, when an administrative agency engages in *de facto* rulemaking.  Public policy and fairness dictate that the Department cannot be permitted to benefit from a process that essentially prohibits this Court from reviewing evidence relevant to the substance of this appeal, simply because the Department chose to characterize its actions as “guidance” rather than rulemaking.  **B.
[brief] ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  The court must “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. ”  Id. at 690.  The second prong of Strickland/Fritz is satisfied when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  The error must be so serious as to undermine the court’s confidence in the jury’s verdict or the result reached.
[brief] *When the Trial Court Rejected “Law of the Case,” the Plaintiff Should Have Been Permitted to File a Response to the Original Motion; (Pa-171).*  When the trial Court rejected “law of the case,” the Plaintiff should have been permitted to file a response to the original Motion.  First, after the Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, it rejected the law of the case and granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration.  On the Motion for Reconsideration, the Plaintiff argued that once the law of the case was rejected, the Plaintiff should have been given the opportunity to respond to the Motion.  What the Court did was to reject the law of the case, then, proceeded to decide the Motion.  Actually, on November 7, 2022, the Plaintiff applied to the Court and requested to reopen the Motion.  Plaintiff relied upon R. 1:1-2:  >  Unless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the Court to which the action is pending, if adherence to it would result in an injustice.  Plaintiff pointed out to [...] that [...] had denied the Motion for Summary Judgment on the CEPA claim and determined a hostile work environment.  That hostile work environment involved the conduct of the various Defendants.  Plaintiff pointed out to the Court that if the Court reopened the Motion, the Plaintiff would present what [...] heard and decided as well as “a complete response to the new Motion for Summary Judgment. ”  Plaintiff pointed out to the Court that the Material Facts, which were before [...], were filed in opposition to this Motion for Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff further stated that the Material Facts presented on the second Motion for Summary Judgment contradicted the Certifications filed by the Defendants in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff’s position was that from her perspective, because a Motion for Summary Judgment had already been denied, and the Court rejected the law of the case, the Court should reopen the Summary Judgment Motion and allow the Plaintiff to show the Court that the second Motion was the same as the first Motion.  What the Court, on the second Motion for Summary Judgment, failed to realize is that the Plaintiff had established a CEPA violation and now, the second Court stated that the Plaintiff had not.
[brief] The Appellant/Defendant in this matter is [...].  He is an attorney at law who has actively practiced law in the State of New Jersey for forty-seven (47) years.  He is representing himself in this action.  This is being brought to the attention of the Court so that it understands that, as an attorney, [...] is quite familiar with the procedure and the workings of the Court.  This case has proceeded through a motion, a plenary hearing, an appeal and then a second motion before the Trial Court.  In each hearing the Courts ignored and failed to make a decision on the singularly most devastating financial issue in this case.  This issue will be identified below.  [...] will not ask the Court to make new law on this case.  The law is well settled.  [...] will not contend that any facts are different than as presented in the Trial Court and adopted by the Trial Court.  In fact, [...] asks this Court to adopt the undisputed testimony of the Plaintiff in this case.  This is not a “he said, she said” case/argument.  THE FACTS ARE UNDISPUTED.  SO HOW IS IT THEN, THAT, IF THE FACTS ARE UNDISPUTED AND THE LAW IS UNDISPUTED WE END UP IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION AGAIN ON THIS MATTER?  Again, it is because in each of the three (3) appearances before the Courts, they have failed to address a single, financially devastating issue.  [...] understands that this preliminary statement presents a rather unique approach to the introduction of an appeal.  What he asks is for this Court to review the facts of this case in relation to the single most devastating issue (the imposition of two penalties) in this case and to make the Right Decision.  In Order to do this there may be some procedural hurdles to surmount, BUT IS IT NOT THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO ARRIVE AT THE FAIR AND CORRECT DECISION?  As [...] stated, *It is the spirit and not the form of law that keeps justice alive.*  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] (P749a-P750a).  [...] Defendants Demand that [...] Vacate His Business  [...] learned of the discussions between [...] and [...] in December 2018, at a meeting with [...]’s practice manager.  (P389a-P390a).  At that meeting, [...] was abruptly informed that—after more than two decades as part of an integrated business—[...] would need to vacate the premises in two months’ time so that the [...] Defendants could open their own optical shop in the space vacated by [...].  (P389a).  To add insult to injury, the [...] Defendants asked to purchase [...]’ furniture so it would appear to the customers that there was no change in the optical practice.  (Id.).  The [...] Defendants Open a Competing Optical Next Door  The [...] Defendants did eventually open an Optical in [...], but not until January 2021—twenty-two months after it was mentioned in [...]’s LOI and two years after [...] was informed it was being asked to leave the building.  (P345a).  When it did so, the [...] Defendants’ opened their “optical start up” right next door to [...]’ Union location—mere inches away from Plaintiffs’ business.  (Id.).  This meant that for a significant period of time, [...]’ customers saw two competing optical practices, located inches away from each other, both with the name “Associates in Eyecare” on the door.  (Id.; P369a).  On March 29, 2019, [...] served the [...] Defendants with a cease and desist letter, demanding that they terminate all efforts to interfere with [...]’ business, in light of their mutual agreements and pre-existing business relationships.  (P400a-P402a).  The actions continued and Plaintiffs filed this action on September 24, 2019.
[brief] See also State v. Daley, 45 N.J. 68, 76 (1965) (“[T]he existence of a written waiver points strongly to the fact that the waiver was specific and intelligently made. ”), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1022 (1966).  Based on a previous experience, defendant knew what it was like to have police enter his home unannounced.  Defendant’s thoughtful questions and calm demeanor strongly suggested that he wished to avoid that same situation for his wife.  But asking questions does not equal coercion.  Defendant never once expressed that he would not consent.  To the contrary, his questions and concerns reveal that he would agree to a consent search but needed to first confirm that the search would be limited in scope and scale.  This is true despite the possible presence of some of the potentially-coercive *King* factors.