ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The first, an Order granting Summary Judgment to Defendant/Respondent, [...] dated March 31, 2023 and the second, an Order denying the Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration dated July 3, 2023.  This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on August 14, 2019 wherein the Plaintiff/Appellant alleges she sustained permanent injuries as a result.
[brief] Rosen v. Keeler, 411 N.J. Super. 439, 450 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 104 N.J. 337, 340 (1986) (quoting Weber v. Dockray, 2 N.J. Super. 492, 495 (Ch. Div. 1949))).  Appurtenant easements can be express, prescriptive, or implied.  See Leach v. Anderl, 218 N.J. Super. 18, 24 (App. Div. 1987).  Because implied easements appurtenant arise, if at all, at the time a property owner subdivides and conveys a portion of its property, any analysis of whether such an implied easement exists must focus on the time of that original conveyance.  Id at 24-25 (explaining that “implied easements operate on the principle that the parties to the conveyance are presumed to act with reference to the actual, visible and known conditions of the properties at the time of the conveyance and intend that the benefits and burdens manifestly belonging respectively to each part of the entire tract shall remain unchanged”).  Determination of an implied easement appurtenant is a fact-specific inquiry that requires clear and convincing evidence.  Id. at 26; see also [...], --- 3
[brief] This Court’s decision in *Brown v. Brown*, 323 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1999), is instructive.  [...] was a former 50% shareholder in a closely held company called [...].  She transferred her shares to her ex-husband as part of a divorce settlement.  While the divorce was pending, she filed a third-party complaint against her adult daughter, [...], alleging that [...] had diverted corporate opportunities and customers from [...] to [...]’s new company, [...], depriving [...] of assets and profits.
[brief] As in M.P. [...] took no time and under the watchful eyes of two Detectives to initial the *Miranda* form after it was read to him.  476 N.J. Super. at 300-301.  [...] and [...] never spoke in private.  In fact, they barely spoke at all prior to the interrogation.  The Miranda waiver consisted of a brief dialogue: [...]: “Ok. And [...], you’re okay with him talking to us?”  [...]: “That’s Steve. ”  [...]: “Steve; I’m sorry. ”  [...]: “Yes, I’m okay with that. ”  You’re okay with it?  [...]: “I think, pretty much. ”  [7T:291-3 to 9]  [...]’s response to the waiver of these very crucial rights which ultimately resulted with a 150-year sentence for a sixteen (16) year old, mentally ill child was “I think, pretty much. ”  Id.  [...]’s developmental delays and disabilities were more severe than M.P.’s.  Furthermore, it is abundantly clear from the video of [...]’s statement that he suffered from intellectual deficits and cognitive delays.  As stated in M.P., the crucial determination is not whether the Detectives were aware of [...]’s delays but rather whether he had them.  Id. at 290.  A sixteen year old, autistic child, who made inappropriate jokes while being interrogated about killing his family for no reason should weigh against a finding that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights.  In addition, his guardian was his twenty (20) year old brother who watched the murder of his family two hours earlier, owned the gun, escaped the house and called 911 on [...].  Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever presented by the State to rebut the testimony regarding [...]’s mental health issues.  It is clear from [...]’s statement that he functioned at an intellectual capacity far less than an average sixteen (16) year old.  Accordingly, followingly the holding from M.P. the Court must find that the State failed to carry its heavy burden of proving a valid waiver of constitutional rights beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] (emphasis added).  Under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), it requires a plaintiff seeking to recover noneconomic losses to file "a certification from the licensed treating physician or a board-certified licensed physician to whom the plaintiff was referred by the treating physician."  Under penalty of perjury, the certification must state that the plaintiff has sustained at least one of the injuries described above.  *Ibid.*  The physician's certification must be based on objective clinical evidence, which may include medical testing, but this testing cannot be "dependent entirely upon subjective patient response."  *Ibid.*  The physician must file the certification within sixty days following the date of the answer to any complaint filed by the plaintiff, although an extension of up to sixty days may be granted by the trial court upon a finding of good cause.  *Ibid.*  The correct procedure for verbal-threshold cases follows the “summary-judgment” model; that is, the court decides whether the injury alleged would, if proven, meet the requirements of one of the verbal-threshold categories, and the jury decides factual disputes about the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries.
[brief] ”  Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, N.J. Super 357, 367 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 at 317 (1995)).  An abuse of discretion “arises when a decision is ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’”  Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).  When a party moves the court to re-examine a ruling, “reconsideration is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised in the interest of justice.  D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J.Super. 392, 401 (Ch.Div.1990).
[directive] Ordered by Superior Court or Municipal Court  _____________________________________________________________________  (1)  Complete Parts A and B of the Record Request Form for an Individual to Obtain Copies of Their Own Expunged and/or Sealed Records (CN 12830) and deliver it in person during regular business hours to the Court where your expungement was granted, or where the conviction or juvenile adjudication was ordered sealed from public access.  Court contact information can be found at www.njcourts.gov.  (2)  When submitting your request, you must present photo identification to verify that you are the subject of the records requested.  A government issued photo identification, including but not limited to a driver’s license with photo, county identification with photo, passport, is required.  (3)  Requests submitted by an attorney on behalf of their client do not require a photo identification but must include the attorney’s ID number.  Complete parts A and B of the Record Request Form for an Individual to Obtain Copies of Their Own Expunged and/or Sealed Records (CN 12830).  Your request will be reviewed by a judge who will determine if the documents should be released.  If the judge approves the request, then an order will be entered authorizing release of the documents requested.  Only a judge can order release of the documents.  (4)  In most instances a court hearing is not necessary.  However, if there are any concerns about your request or the identification that was presented, you may be asked to appear before a judge to determine if your request should be granted.  Attachment 2
[brief] PLAINTIFFS COMMENCE THIS APPEAL AFTER CONCLUDING THEIR LITIGATION WITH THE NOTIS DEFENDANTS.  After [...] was dismissed from the case, Plaintiffs continued litigating the matter with the [...].  On January 15, 2024, however, Plaintiffs and the [...] entered into a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, pursuant to which Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss all of their claims against the [...].  (Pa675a).  Plaintiffs then commenced this appeal of the trial court’s rulings granting summary judgment in [...]’s favor and awarding it sanctions.  (Pa238a).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] *State v. Banko*, 182 N.J. 44, 53-55 (2004) (quoting *Dunn v. United States*, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)); *State v. Kelly*, 201 N.J. 471, 487-88 (2010) (explaining that it is impossible to know whether jury’s inconsistent verdict reflects leniency, compromise, or misapplication of law).  As long as the evidence supporting reckless manslaughter is sufficient, the jury’s verdict must stand.  See *State v. Goodwin*, 224 N.J. 102, 116 (2016).  This is true even where an acquittal on one count can be construed as precluding the finding of an element of another offense of which a defendant is convicted.  See *State v. Grey*, 147 N.J. 4 (1996) (recognizing abrogation of *State v. Peterson*, 181 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 1981) for relying on such an exception to the inconsistent verdict rule).
[brief] Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 575.  Of course, “[i]t is improper to demean the role of the defense attorney. ”  State v. Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. 266, 286 (App. Div. 1991) (citing Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. at 16).  In Sherman, for example, “a prosecutor repeatedly argued that defense counsel knew their clients were guilty . . . and were ‘not going to tell you what happened on that night, because, if they did, their clients would be convicted, so they're going to try to use certain courtroom maneuvers to work on you,’ namely ‘the defense of confusion, let's confuse the Jury. ’"  Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. at 15-18.  This Court concluded that the prosecutor "improperly accuse[d] both defense attorneys of concealing their clients' guilt through deception[.]"
[directive] 3.1  Attorney General’s Advisory Panel on Conducted Energy and Less-Lethal Devices.  The Attorney General will establish the Attorney General Advisory Panel for Conducted Energy and Less-Lethal Devices (Panel).  The panel shall consist of subject matter experts from the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability, the Police Training Commission, the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, the County Prosecutors’ Office Chiefs Association, the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, the Sheriff’s Association of New Jersey, and other law enforcement officers and member(s) of the community appointed by the Attorney General or their designee.  The panel shall solicit and receive applications and review, test, and submit a report with recommendations to the Attorney General concerning whether a CED or less-lethal device or ammunition should be approved.  Moreover, the Panel will provide specific guidance concerning when and how the device or ammunition may be deployed.  Only CEDs and less- lethal devices or ammunition approved by the Attorney General or the Attorney General’s designee shall be used in the State of New Jersey by law enforcement officers.  Less-lethal devices and ammunition that are approved shall only be used consistent with rules and regulations established for each device.  No law enforcement agency or officer shall deploy or use a CED or less-lethal device or ammunition pursuant to this policy unless the device or ammunition satisfies the specifications and characteristics approved by the Attorney General.  The Panel shall meet at least four times a year.  On a regular basis, the Panel shall publish a list of all approved conducted energy and less-lethal devices, or ammunition.  All approved conducted energy and less-lethal devices, ammunition, and deployment requirements are subject to review by the Panel and are subject to removal by the Attorney General.  Such review should occur once every five years.  3.2
[brief] ”  Palmentieri v. City of Atl. City, 231 N.J. Super. 422, 429 (Law. Div. 1988).  Essentially, “[t]he officer must have been acting in a matter in which the [municipal] corporation has an interest, he must have been acting in the discharge of a duty imposed or authorized by law and he must have acted in good faith. ”  Cobb v. City of Cape May, 113 N.J. Super. 598, 601 (Law Div.1971).  Further, “[w]hether the authority to indemnify originates under the common law, the Tort Claims Act, or a specific statute ... the analysis initially focuses on what acts can be characterized as being ‘within the scope of employment.
[directive] Our state’s law enforcement agencies cannot carry out their important public safety responsibilities without the confidence of the people they serve.  The public’s trust depends on maintaining confidence that police officers serve their communities with dignity and respect.  In the uncommon instance when officers fall well short of those expectations, the public has a right to know that an infraction occurred, and that the underlying issue was corrected before that officer potentially returned to duty.  It is time to end the practice of protecting the few to the detriment of the many.
[brief] In addition, the Court failed to consider and address the following partial sample of citations of account errors: which was overlooked or not considered by the Court and Probation failed to rebut with particularity:  - Appellant’s certification of 10/27/2022 (DA373, paragraph no. 2) and his Reply (DA388, paragraph 2) cite newly submitted account errors not previously litigated, namely paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20, and paragraph no. 4 of my Reply – not subject to claims of “collateral estoppel. ”
[brief] And as I said before, I do find, and I did find previously last year that there is a confidential relationship, and there was an attitude and atmosphere of trust between [...] and [...] with [...] and [...] based upon the educational gap – education gap between the parents and the daughter and son-in-law, as well as the impediments that existed vis-à-vis the Spanish language versus the English language, and the easier familiarity that [...] and [...] had with English by far than [...] and [...] did.  Also, in terms of sophistication, I think it could be said that generally speaking, without getting in detail, that because [...] and [...] were substantially younger, [...] has an MBA, that doesn’t necessarily prove anything, but it certainly bespeaks of the fact that he has a broader educational range and experience.  It doesn’t mean that you are necessarily a genius, but it certainly speaks to an individual who, more often that not, would ask the right questions when questions need to be asked, and get answers that are necessary before making informed decisions.  So as I indicated a few minutes ago, in my view, what we have here is – there is a confidential relationship.
[brief] The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred, **and shall have annexed thereto a copy of the judgment or final order sought to be reconsidered and a copy of the court’s corresponding written opinion, if any.**  [emphasis added]  The word, “final” was added via Amendment adopted August 5, 2022, effective September 1, 2022.
[brief] New Jersey courts “ordinarily take a liberal view in determining whether a complaint states a cause of action. ”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).  This “liberal view” seeks to determine “whether a cause of action is ‘suggested’ by the facts. ”  Id. (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).  Courts search the complaint “in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned . . . opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  However, while a court at the motion to dismiss stage is “not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint,” id., a court “must dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief. ”  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005).  This standard protects defendants from the time and expense of defending against meritless claims.
[brief] [Olenowski, 253 N.J. at 147 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94). ]  But the Olenowski Court made clear that any evidence previously validated under the former “general acceptance in [a] particular field” test, laid out in *Frye v. United States*, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), remains admissible and reliable unless “the scientific reliability underlying the evidence has changed. ”  *Olenowski*, 253 N.J. at 154.  As noted, fingerprint-analysis evidence has been admissible in New Jersey criminal trials for over a century.
[brief] It is not merely that the planning board or the municipality’s governing body acted without hearing from expert planners or consultants that makes this ordinance defective.  More recently, this Court reached the same conclusion: The Law Division’s determination to deny [...] an expert planner and dismiss her claim of spot zoning ran afoul of giving a litigant a fair opportunity to prove the elements of the cause of action.  Because spot zoning claims are particularly fact-sensitive, we differ with the Law Division’s view that the issue could be resolved as a matter of law.  * * *
[brief] This Reply addresses the most egregious of Respondents’ misstatements, but the court is urged to conduct their own in-depth review of the record, due to the page limitations of this reply.  The pervasive nature of Respondents’ false statements significantly contributed to the errors made by the trial court in the entry of final judgment and in ruling on the summary judgment motions.  A table of Respondents’ most obvious fabrications from their recent brief is attached for the court’s reference as an Appendix hereto.
[brief] Yet this argument ignores the plain language of LTTEL requiring a municipality to assess costs and benefits and “the importance of the exemption in obtaining development of the property. ”  Unless these terms are merely precatory, to which a municipality can respond with conclusory recitals, LTTEL does require proof in the form of facts and figures presumably available in the “comprehensive financial analysis” that to date defendants claim exists but decline to disclose to plaintiffs.  Third, defendants attempt, unpersuasively, to soften the facts showing that [...]’s project on undeveloped farmland in the Township will be hugely profitable and showing further that the peculiar structure of the exemption reflects the Township’s interest in shifting school tax burdens and generating revenues for its unrestricted use and not in any necessity to attract investment by [...].  However, defendants’ quarrel with the facts only reinforces the point that there is a factual dispute that called for development through discovery.  This Court should clarify that LTTEL exemptions require credible evidence that they are necessary for the financial feasibility of the project, and reverse.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  In June 2022, [...] filed a variance development application with the Board for approval to construct on Block 113, Lot 5 in the [...] an intensive development as proposed in its design plans (the “Application”).  The Board held five public hearings on the Application, on June 20, 2022; July 18, 2022; August 15, 2022; September 19, 2022; and November 21, 2022.  At the final November 21, 2022 hearing, it denied same and memorialized its denial in a resolution adopted on December 19, 2022.  Pa108-145; 172-291.  On March 15, 2023, [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs with the Superior Court, Law Division, challenging the Board’s denial of the Application.  Pa41.  On September 22, 2023, oral argument was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  On the same date, [...] entered an Order, with accompanying written Opinion, affirming the Board’s denial of the [...] application as not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, and dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  Pa1-Pa40.
[brief] In any event, *Sellers v. Schonfeld*, 270 N.J. Super. 424 (1993), the case Intervenor primarily relies upon for his argument, is completely inapposite.  The *Sellers* case has nothing to do with the issuance of an insurance policy or the testimony of brokers or underwriters.  Moreover, the court in *Sellers* took issue with the documents that were attached to an attorney certification because none of those documents were certified as true “nor was there any authentication of the documents. ”  *Id.* at 428.  Here, unlike in *Sellers*, [...] testified as to the authenticity and impact of the underwriting guidelines, a business record of the company that [...] owns.  Indeed, the Intervenor has not disputed the authenticity of the guidelines or the language contained therein (or addressed the guidelines at all).  Moreover, contrary to the Intervenor’s contention, what [...] and [...] might have testified to does not change the fact that [...] has proven the elements of equitable fraud as a matter of law.  Indeed, Intervenor fails to address the following evidence that was before the trial court: (1) the testimony of the principal of [...], authenticating the Supplemental Form and admitting that he was advised that he had to submit the Supplemental Form in order to obtain $1,000,000 in non-owned/hired auto coverage (Ia076 at ¶ 11; Ia095 at 59:2-5; Ia337-38); (2) the underwriting guidelines that inform [...] what coverage it can, and cannot, offer (on behalf of [...]) and which specifically state that non- owned/hired auto coverage is not available for 12 or 15 passenger vans (Pa008); and (3) the affidavit of [...], principal of [...], the company that underwrote the [...] Policy, authenticating the underwriting guidelines and stating that pursuant to those underwriting guidelines, the [...] Policy could not have been written had [...] truthfully responded that it rented 12-15 passenger vans for use at its summer camp.
[brief] As [...] had the benefit of hearing and evaluating these witnesses during the seven-day trial held in this case, his factual findings and credibility findings are entitled to great deference.  The law is clear that appellate courts apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings by a judge.  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019).  In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts “give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions. ”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015).  Deference is given to credibility findings.