ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Indeed, when questioned on this exact point, [...] specifically testified that nobody notified [...] of any of these critical matters:  Q:  When [...] purchased the property in 2019, no one from [...] reached out to [...] to advise them – to advise him of the purchase, correct?  A: No.  No.  Q: And even though you just testified that [...] had been doing some maintenance at the property on behalf of your father, you didn’t think it was important to let [...] know that there was a change in ownership?  A: I thought it was important.  [...]: I am going to object, your Honor.  This is again beyond the scope.  I don’t think this was explored.  THE COURT: That is okay.  I am interested in the answer.  So the answer was what, sir?  No one contacted [...] – what is your answer?  THE WITNESS: No.  THE COURT: No, they did, or no they did not?  THE WITNESS: No, we did not.  …  Q: Correct.  But my next question, sir, is, so after Global Champion took over the property, [...] continued to maintain it without knowledge that Global Champion was the owner, correct?  A: I presume so.  Q:  No one from Global Champion reached out to [...] to say, hey, let’s discuss a new management agreement or anything like that, correct?  A: No.  THE COURT: No, you didn’t or no he is incorrect?  THE WITNESS: No, we did not.  Sorry.  …  Q: And similarly, nobody told [...] when [...] was hired, Correct?  A: No.  …  Q: And nobody told [...] when [...] died, correct?  A: No. (14T 24:7-26:8, Jan. 31, 2023).  Defendants had no intention to tell [...] about their “ownership,” or “transfer. ”  The Defendants’ plan was to transfer title to and sell the Property as quickly as possible.  This point was confirmed by [...] who testified that [...] purchased the Property from [...] Wu (an owner of [...]) with the specific intention of selling the property.  (14T 19:11-14, Jan. 31, 2023).  Revealingly, [...] further testified that the sale of the Property was necessitated after the transfer because “we didn’t live in New Jersey. ” (14T 19:7-10, Jan. 31, 2023).  In that Defendants never lived in New Jersey (or at least not since 1987), under this logic, it never made sense for [...] Wu or his family to own and manage the Property.  That managing the Property in New Jersey only became an issue upon the transfer to [...] further evidences the fact that the Defendants were not the owners of the Property.  beforehand.  See also (4T 70:8-10, Jan. 10, 2023) ([...] testimony that he was hired to sell the Property).  G.  DEFENDANTS’ UNFOUNDED AFTER-THE-FACT ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR FRAUDULENT CONDUCT
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[brief] In the reference guide to Arbitration Forums agreement, and rules, under Rule 2-4, which addresses affirmative defenses the reference guide states:  It is critical for the parties to note, where appropriate, if the case involves an Affirmative Pleading or Affirmative Defense/Exclusion.  Rule 2-4 requires the use of the specific section to assert either.  This ensures the parties are aware of any issues regarding jurisdiction and, equally important, alerts the arbitrator.  An arbitrator may only consider affirmative pleadings or defenses/exclusions included in the appropriate section, and nowhere other than this section…
[brief] **IT WAS PLAIN ERROR TO FAIL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE PORTION OF THE IDENTIFICATION CHARGE CONCERNING THE INFLUENCE OF FEEDBACK.  (Not Raised Below)**  In this case, the four witnesses who identified the suspect on the surveillance video as [...] all received positive feedback in the form of another employee at the bar telling them they agreed that the suspect was [...].  [...] testified that he showed [...] the surveillance video, that he told [...] he thought the suspect on the video was [...], and that [...] also told [...] that he thought the suspect was [...].  (8T 82-23 to __________________________ . . .
[brief] The Letter Opinion specifically notes, in discussing the SAM’s Report and Recommendation that: “The SAM recommended that continued active release of hazardous material into the soil and groundwater constituted the ‘occurrence’ under the [...] and [...] insurance policies” and that the “SAM relied on the analysis in Boston Gas, supra, 454 Mass. 337, which required a pro rata analysis and notably indicated that ideally this would be fact based, or based on a time-on-the-risk. ” (Pa 171).  As such, [...] specifically considered the “continuing contamination” argument in initially adopting the SAM’s Report and Recommendation.  because the so-called “continuing contamination” does not result from any new releases of CVOCs.  As explained in [...]’s initial Brief, the so-called continuing property damage is the result of the CVOC remediation process being overseen by the [...] and other governmental agencies.  (Pb, pp. 34-35).  Accordingly, the trial court’s Order is not entitled to deference from this Court.
[brief] Plaintiff’s application to vacate also asks this Court to subvert the agreed upon rules of [...]  As per the PIP Arbitration Agreement, Article Third, Decisions (b):  “The decision of the arbitrator(s) is final and binding without the right of rehearing or appeal. ”  The “final and binding” language and waiver of the right to appeal is consistent with the strong preference under New Jersey law for confirmation of arbitration awards.  See New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company v. Travelers Insurance Company, 198 N.J. Super. 9 (App. Div. 1984).  POINT IV
[directive] It is on this day that the Complaint(s)/ ORDERED Indictment(s)/Accusation(s) is/are hereby dismissed without cost to the defendant. that any bail posted be discharged.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED of Judge the Superior Court of I hereby consent to the entry the above Order.  Defendant Prosecutor Distribution: Criminal Division Prosecutor Finance Division Defense Attorney Probation Division  Defendant Promulgated Directive #09-19 (06/04/2019), Revised Form CN 10303 by ATTACHMENT 7 PTI ORDER OF DISMISSAL, ORDER TO DISCHARGE BAIL, AND BY ORDER OF ENTRY OF CIVIL JUDGEMENT
[directive] The record shall include relevant firearms data (make, model, caliber and serial number), training and qualification, location, date of qualification activities, qualification courses completed, ammunition used, scores fired, name of the supervising firearms instructor, and other pertinent information.  First Aider.  This is a certified member of a volunteer first aid squad, a person certified as a first responder or emergency medical technician, or someone who is otherwise adequately trained in first aid.  Handgun.  A firearm (semi-automatic or revolver) designed so that it can be held and fired with one hand.  Handgun Qualification Courses (HQC1 or HQC2).  Standardized courses of fire for semi-annual handgun qualification for service and off-duty handguns.  (Appendices A and B).  Handgun Night Qualification Course (HNQC).  A standard course of fire under night firing conditions for semi-annual qualification for service and off-duty handguns.  (Appendix C).  Handgun Night Qualification Course (HNQC) for Retired Law Enforcement Officers.  A standard course of fire under night firing conditions for semi-annual handgun qualification.  (Page 78).  9-8  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] Further, review of the charge conference and subsequent discussions regarding Plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and Defendant’s request for a charge consistent with Mockler may have resulted in confusion as to which party bore the burden regarding the initial determination as to whether or not [...] was negligent.  Ultimately, the court charged that Plaintiff bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was negligent.  However, the discussions amongst counsel and the court, as well as a reading of the charge as a whole, may have created further ambiguities.  Specifically, as part of the charge conference, the court held oral argument on the Defendant/Appellant’s motion to have a charge consistent with the holding in *Mockler v. Russman*, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968).
[brief] To be sure, in the Second Arbitration, [...] seeks to reassert its alleged entitlement to “approved change orders [at the Hackensack Project] resulting in a balance due to [...] of $2,084,220.03. ”  Pa584.  Again, though, whether the Arbitrator ultimately credited the evidence and testimony supporting [...]’s position that it was entitled to offsetting credits at the Hackensack Project (which he did) is irrelevant.  It is abundantly clear that [...] had a “fair and reasonable opportunity” in the First Arbitration to litigate its claim for offsetting damages, see Pa201 ¶ 46, it sustained as a subcontractor at the Hackensack Project.  These inherent contradictions and errors provide ample basis for the Appellate Division to reverse the August 30 Orders.
[brief] "The reason for this rule is that the question of the cross-examiner is not evidence and yet suggests the existence of evidence . . . which is not properly before the jury."  State v. Spencer, 319 N.J. Super. 284, 305 (App. Div. 1999); see also State v. Bowser, 297 N.J. Super. 588, 603-04 & n.3 (App. Div. 1997) (providing example of improper cross-examination based on a police report not in evidence); [...], [...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 4 on N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) (2013). ”  _Id._ at 348-49 (emphasis added).  Even the trial judge recognized, at one point, that defendant could not get into evidence “indirectly” what it could not get in “directly. ”
[brief] Pra1.  As a result, the Commissions adopted resolutions to provide for reimbursement of the improper rate paid by members retroactive to 2009.  Identical to the within appeal, the [...] posted notice on their website with a link to a claim form.  *In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938.  Pra5.  Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.  *Id.*  Pra6.  Pa80.
[brief] Nevertheless, defendant has appended a host of studies—none of which were entered into evidence at trial—purporting to support his conclusion that fingerprint analysis is unreliable.  The studies defendant inappropriately injects here should not be considered because they were not provided to or considered below.  See Hisenaj v. Kuener, 194 N.J. 6, 25 (2008) (deeming unconstrained review and reliance on material from supplemented appellate record inappropriate because it included material not part of record and “argument that went beyond that which was advanced before the trial court”).
[brief] THE ISSUANCE OF A ZONING PERMIT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE FOR APPLICATION TO THE HISTORIC PRESERVATION COMMISSION FOR ISSUANCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATENESS  Defendants-respondents argue plaintiffs-appellants failed to obtain Zoning Department approval (permit) which they characterize as a prerequisite for application to the HPC for CofA approval.  Db13, Db21.  The argument is contrary to the provisions of Ord. Section 900A. which states, “No zoning permit where such is required shall be issued unless a Certificate of Appropriateness has been issued previously by the Historic Preservation Commission and when additionally required an approval has been granted by the appropriate [...] or [...]. ”  Pa63a.  The issuance of a zoning permit by the Zoning Department is not a prerequisite for application to the HPC for issuance of a CofA.  **Point Three**
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------|---------| | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, | 14 | | 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | | | Bednarsh v. Bednarsh, | 28 | | 282 N.J. Super. 482 (Ch. Div. 1995) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 12, 14 | | 142 N.J. 520, 666 A.2d 146 (1995) | | | Brun v. Cardoso, | 32 | | 390 N.J. Super. 409, 915 A.2d 1053 (App. Div. 2006) | | | Cummings v. Bahr, | 28 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | | | D’Atria v. D’Atria, | 28 | | 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 1990) | | | Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., | 12 | | 219 N.J. 395 | | | Fusco v. Board of Educ. of the City of Newark, | 28 | | 349 N.J. Super. 455, 793 A.2d 856 (App. Div. 2002) | | | In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., | 11 | | 244 N.J. 1 (2020) | | | Leitner v. Toms River Regional Schools, | 31 | | 392 N.J. Super. 80, 919 A.2d 899 (App. Div. 2007) | | | Lodato v. Evesham Township, | 21, 22 | | 388 N.J. Super. 501 (2006) | | | Luciano v. City of Atl. City, | 19 | | 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3201 | | | McGowan v. Borough of Eatontown, | 20 | | 151 N.J. Super. 440, 376 A.2d 1327 (App.Div. 1977) | | | Milacci v. Mato Realty Company, Inc., | 20 | | 217 N.J. Super. 297, 525 A.2d 1120 (App. Div. 1987) | | O’Donnell v. Ahmed, 363 N.J. Super. 44, 830 A.2d 924 (Law Div. 2003) ...........................................31 Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cnty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011) .................................................................................................12 Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1, 863 A.2d 366 (App. Div. 2004) ..................................................31
[brief] The first alleged act of retaliation involved [...]’s role as the Course Coordinator of the Safe Drinking Water Update to take place on January 29, 2015.  (Pa385-386).  [...] claims he was advised by his DEP supervisors to replace two topics from the agenda for the Rutgers conference and replace them with two other topics.  (Pa341).  The topics to be replaced were “open air reservoirs” and “fracking. ” (Pa341).  He claims [...] advised him to do so because the topics were “political. ” (Pa341).  On December 11, 2014, having seen the topics that plaintiff had announced for the Rutgers Safe Drinking Water Update the following month, [...] advised [...] of issues with two topics that needed substituted subjects.  (Pa378).  First, speaking on “open air reservoirs” involved only two water systems in the State and was considered “sensitive. ” (Pa378).  [...] decided this state-wide update course for the many water systems in New Jersey was not the place to discuss an issue involving only two water systems.  (Pa378).  Second, while [...] agreed “fracking” would be an interesting topic, it did not directly relate to any New Jersey water systems and was also a sensitive topic.  (Pa378).  [...] was invited to discuss either topic with [...]. (Pa378).  Instead of finding substitute topics as instructed by [...] on December 11, [...] chose to share with a Rutgers contact that [...] had deemed the topics “sensitive” and “inappropriate. ” (Pa380).  The Rutgers representative contacted [...] on January 19, 2015, more than a month after [...] had been advised to change the topics.  (Pa378; Pa380).  [...] responded on behalf of the DEP.  (Pa380).  Sickels indicated that he, not [...], made the ultimate decision on the topics and reiterated the lack of relevance of the topics to New Jersey licensed operators who would be attending the session.  (Pa380).  Meanwhile, [...] went a full month after [...]’s December 11, 2014 instruction (and a December 18, 2014 reminder from [...]) before advising his supervisors he had arranged no substitute presentations to replace the topics [...] and Sickels had decided against.  (Pa382-Pa383).  The task of finding replacement topics, assigned to [...], was completed by his supervisor, [...], when [...] failed to do so.  (Pa382; Pa741).  [...] admits that when he was speaking to the large group of attendees at the conference on January 29, 2015, he publicly raised to the collected attendees the topics he had originally listed on the agenda, and did not update.  (Pa378; Pa344).  He described the topics as being “sensitive,” and referred to ‘fracking’ as “an F word. ” (Pa344-345).  In course materials, [...] was publicized as a DEP Section Chief in his role as Course Coordinator.  (Pa385-386).
[brief] ”  In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97, 221 N.J. 1, 23 (2015).  One such tool that townships such as [...] may use in achieving its affordable housing obligation is a PILOT agreement, pursuant to the LTTEL.  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 et seq.  PILOT agreements serve as a tool in New Jersey that municipalities may use to come to terms with private entities to “undertake redevelopment projects in return for tax exemptions. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-4.  This is exactly what [...] Township did in coming to an agreement with [...] to create an opportunity for affordable housing to be developed and satisfy its affordable housing obligation.  The Appellants are asking the court to allow them to decide which municipalities may or may not use a PILOT agreement and determine how they may use it.  Allowing municipalities to decide how other municipalities may use legitimate financing tools at their disposal in creating opportunities for affordable housing is both inappropriate and another tactic municipalities may use in delaying the construction of affordable housing in nearby communities.  Additionally, the Appellants are asking the court to step in and subvert the role of the Legislature by asking it to challenge or investigate a PILOT agreement based on criteria not provided for in the LTTEL.  As the Township has previously argued in its papers, the LTTEL requires certain findings by the legislative body.  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11.  As the lower court previously agreed, there is nothing in the LTTEL or case law that suggests that objectors can go on a free ranging process to discover potential facts that may counter the findings.  Rather, the challenger bears the burden of showing the municipal action is arbitrary, unreasonable, or contrary to the statute or Constitution.  There is no law that supports the notion that granting a PILOT allows for heightened scrutiny beyond the normal standards for municipal action.  If anything, a court should exercise heightened deference to actions in furtherance of a municipal plan for constitutional compliance that has already gone through multiple levels of court review and recognizes the myriad constitutional and statutory commands to ensure a realistic opportunity for development of affordable housing.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 52:27D 311(a) (granting municipality authority to “provide for its fair share of low- and moderate income housing by means of any technique or combination of techniques which provide a realistic opportunity for the provision of the fair share. ”)
[brief] The applicant claimed that “[c]hannel disturbance has been reduced to the extent practicable based on its location within a narrow portion of the feature and an alignment that is generally perpendicular to the orientation of the channel. ”  Aa153.  The applicant provided no information as to whether a bridge or three-sided culvert had been considered, or any justification as to why such alternative and preferred options were not feasible or practicable due to physical constraints.  It likewise does not explain why a circular culvert cannot be constructed 2 feet below the invert of the channel at this location.  C.  Post-Application Communications and Deficiency Notices Between the DEP and Applicant
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[brief] (6T 126-7 to 23)  She testified that she had not seen [...] for a few days, so she was “just excited to see him. ”  (6T 127-13 to 16)  [...] testified that [...] was “being funny and silly,” telling her that she should go with him as he met up with one of his friends, and she agreed.  (6T 127-19 to 128-1)  [...] picked up his friend, went to a liquor store, and then parked the car.
[brief] “It, of course, is true that a joinder of offenses has the potential of prejudice, but if separate offenses were required to be tried separately in all circumstances, the multiplicity of trials would disserve the State and defendant alike. ”  *Ibid.*  As our Court discussed, our court rules “are designed to promote economy and efficiency and to avoid a multiplicity of trials, where these objectives can be achieved without substantial prejudice to the right of defendants to a fair trial. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Daley v. United States*, 231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir.), *cert. denied*, 351 U.S. 964 (1956)).  Furthermore, there is a presumption that jurors can and will respect and follow court instructions to give separate consideration to each charge.  *State v. Modell*, 260 N.J. 227, 246 (App. Div.), *certif. denied* 133 N.J. 432 (1993); *State v. Coruzzi*, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 301 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 94 N.J. 531 (1983).
[directive] the [...]—recently developed new policies to strengthen the relationships between law enforcement and transgender individuals.  Recognizing the need for statewide uniformity on this issue, this Directive builds on those prior law enforcement efforts.  This Directive seeks to ensure that all transgender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming people, like all other people, are treated with dignity and respect and enjoy the full protections to which they are entitled under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, which prohibits discrimination or harassment based on gender identity or expression.  N.J.S.A. See 10:5-12.  Law enforcement’s overriding goal therefore must be to treat individuals in a manner that is appropriate to their gender identity or expression, which may be different from the gender they were assigned at birth or the gender that is listed on their official identification.  To that end, this Directive—and an Appendix included at the end—will help officers better understand the right language to use, the appropriate searches to conduct, and more, whether we are interacting with victims, witnesses, suspects, arrestees, or members of the public.  For those unfamiliar with this area, the definitions laid out in Appendix A offer a useful place to start.  To be clear, nothing in this Directive is meant to displace generally applicable policies that already protect transgender people.  In law enforcement interactions with transgender individuals, as for interactions with anyone else, officers must continue to comply with a range of requirements, including Attorney General Directive 2018-5 (Directive Implementing Procedures and Protocols for Sexual Assault Response and Referrals) and Directive 2018-6 (the Immigrant Trust Directive).
[brief] The Board further disputed Par. 19 of [...]’s Undisputed Statement of Material Facts:  19.  However, [...] did not pay [...]’s invoice for April 2020, and did not pay its July 2020 invoice in full, withholding $77,141.40.  ([...] Cert. at ¶ 9).  It failed to make those payments in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9e(3).  **Board’s Response**