ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The identity of the intruders was the only issue in the case.  It was up to the jury to determine if it was convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person who entered on each date was the same person.  [...] was empty and had an open window, through which the intruders entered.  While it might be possible to infer the same person must have entered both nights, there are other explanations.  Maybe the September 28 intruder told someone else about his success and that other person decided to try.  Maybe the sight of an open window tempted more than one person to enter.  One fingerprint was lifted on September 28, and four were lifted on September 30.  (6T 56-22 to 57-1)  Although the jury may have determined that the single fingerprint was enough to convict [...], it might have deemed such evidence insufficient.  To remove any lingering doubt, it was essential to State’s case for multiple people to tell the jury that the two men were the same.  In sum, [...] and [...]’s opinion testimony impermissibly “invaded the fact-finding province of the jury. ”  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 443 (2011).  Lay opinion testimony is “not a vehicle for offering the view of the witness about a series of facts that the jury can evaluate for itself or an opportunity to express a view on guilt or innocence. ”  Id. at 462.  The admission of this inappropriate and prejudicial testimony was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  Rule 2:10-2.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] The Legislature understood that requirement when it enacted AICRA.  Another provision of the no-fault laws imposes mandatory arbitration for tort claims under $15,000 arising out of auto accidents.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-25.  But the statute permits a party to request a trial de novo following arbitration, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-31, and thus “preserves the parties’ right to a jury trial by providing for a trial de novo for any party dissatisfied with the arbitration award,” Grey v. Trump Castle Assocs., L.P., 367 N.J. Super. 443, 447 (App. Div. 2004).  The Legislature could constitutionally require PIP arbitration to determine whether PIP benefits must be paid without a trial de novo, because there is no constitutional right to a jury trial on such claims.
[directive] We suggest that life-cycle considerations should be used as a tiebreaker if there are not enough resources to provide to all patients within a priority group, with priority going to younger patients.  We recommend the following categories: age 0-17, age 18-40, age 41-60; age 61-75; older than age 75.  The ethical justification for incorporating the life-cycle principle is that it is a valuable goal to give individuals equal opportunity to pass through the stages of life—childhood, young adulthood, middle age, and old age.8  The justification for this principle does not rely on considerations of one’s intrinsic worth or social utility.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................16  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE, AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF RECORD.  (2T41 to 71)  ........................................16  A.  Density Variance ..............................................................................................................17  B.  Bulk Variances ................................................................................................................32  C.  Improper Considerations .................................................................................................35  CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................................36  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] As explained during oral argument, “the reasons for the forty-five days are clearly evident and laid out in what has happened since then, what the intervening has been, which is agreements have been signed.  The Township has committed itself in contractual agreements, and is in reliance upon the plan that was adopted…” (T2, 19:20-25).  Enlarging the time for appeal to appease the interests of the limited public in this case will negatively impact all redevelopment activities throughout the State.
[brief] [...] testified that on September 28, 2021, [...] sexually assaulted her, choked her, and threatened to kill her and then himself.  (6T 121-9 to 14)  She testified, “I fought him back to protect myself and in the process he died. ”  (6T 121-13 to 14)  She testified that her only options were “to protect my life or his life, and I had to choose my life. ”  (6T 121-19 to 21)  [...] testified that in 2021, she had known [...] for five or six years.  (6T 122-15 to 22, 123-2 to 3)  They would try out different places to eat, snowboard together, or talk over FaceTime.  (6T 123-6 to 13)  [...] would drive [...] to doctor’s appointments or pick her up from night school if she needed a ride.  (6T 123-16 to 21)  [...] testified that when she and [...] initially met “years back,” their circle of friends used to drink and get high together on marijuana or PCP.  (6T 123-24 to 124-8)  By September 2021, [...] was no longer using PCP, but it did not bother her to spend time with friends who were still using drugs.  (6T 124-9 to 20)  [...] testified that she and [...] were never romantically involved and never had sex, though about two years before the incident, [...] “starting insinuating” that they should date.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................3  A.  Background on 2016 Lawsuit and Preliminary Injunction ..............................................3  B.  Background on the 2021 Lawsuit ....................................................................................4  1.  Disparate Treatment Relating to District Policy 1648 .............................................5  2.  Sham Investigation Based On Defendant [...]’s Complaint ..................................9  C.  2021 Lawsuit and Motions to Dismiss ..........................................................................15  STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................16
[brief] The *Fink* Court held that an AOM that did not refer to the defendant physician by name in a listing of hospitals and physicians who allegedly deviated from the standard of care was equivalent to “failure to file an AOM concerning a specific defendant” and “constitutes a failure to state a cause of action against that defendant. ”  Id. at 560 (quoting *In re Petition of Hall*, 147 N.J. at 390).  --- \(^4\)  The *Hill* court reached this conclusion independent of additional requirements of the Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patient’s First Act, *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-37 to -42, which requires that, when a physician is a defendant in a medical malpractice case, the expert providing an Affidavit of Merit or testifying as to the standard of care must possesses the same credentials in the same specialty or subspeciality as the defendant doctor.
[brief] The underlying legal issue, whether such write-in votes must be invalidated, is governed by clear statutory language and binding appellate precedent.  The trial court erred in disregarding both.  The right to vote for a personal choice candidate was not always a settled right, and many election cases from the early to mid-1900’s addressed that issue.  Ultimately, that ability to vote for a candidate whose name did not appear on the ballot for a specific office was established and statutorily enshrined in N.J.S.A. 19:15-28, which states that “[n]othing in this Title shall prevent any voter from writing …under the proper title of office in the column designated personal choice the name or names of any person or persons for whom he desires to vote whose name or names are not printed upon the ballot for the same office or offices…” (emphasis added).  Thus, the right of a voter to utilize the personal choice option is only extended to candidates whose names “are not printed upon the ballot.
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...]  Argued December 14, 2021  Decided March 2, 2022  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. [...].  Attorneys and Law Firms  [...], Deputy Public Defender II, argued the cause for appellant ([...], Public Defender, attorney; [...], of counsel and on the briefs).  [...], Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent ([...], Acting Essex County Prosecutor; [...], of counsel and on the brief).  Before Judges [...], [...] and [...].
[brief] The court reasoned that because [...] did not immediately brandish the firearm upon commencing the robbery, but rather only displayed it to aid his flight from the robbery after he fell, the facts suggested that he did not obtain the handgun for the purpose of carrying out the robbery at the [...].  (Da47)  This logically entails that the court would have found [...]’s objective in possessing the handgun was to carry out the [...] robbery if [...] had drawn his handgun immediately upon entering the store and brandished it during the entirety of the robbery.  In that scenario, the court would not find that “the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other,” and thus would not find that factor 3A supported a consecutive sentence.
[brief] Most of plaintiffs’ complaints about defendants’ discovery responses have centered on documents or information that defendants have affirmed, in their responses, they do not have (or have control over).  Our Court Rules require a party to produce documents that are responsive to an opposing party’s discovery requests and are in the “possession, custody or control” of the answering party, R. 4:18-1(a); R. 4:10-1; Lipsky v. New Jersey Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447, 464 (App. Div. 2023).  Defendants have complied with this requirement.
[brief] A.  OB-5 Zone.  (1)  Personal service establishments and banks and financial institutions, excluding banks with drive-through facilities, shall be permitted in the OB-5 Zone if the following conditions are met:  (a)  A roadway is constructed that provides a linkage from Route 202 at the Route 287 interchange, through the OB-5 Zone, to Changebridge Road, in the manner set forth in the 2010 Land Use Plan Element of the Master Plan.  (See page 39 of the Plan.)  (b)  A minimum buffer dimension shall be provided along the westerly and southeasterly portions of this zone, as depicted in the 2010 Land Use Plan Element of the Master Plan.  (See page 39 of the Plan.)  (2)  Where the new road, as set forth in § 230-B(1) above and in the 2010 Land Use Plan Element of the Master Plan, is provided, the OB-5 regulations governing building coverage shall be permitted to be increased from 25% to 32%, and the permitted floor area ratio shall be permitted to be increased from 20% to 30%.  SECTION 21.
[brief] The shuttling of cases from law to equity and back again without affording a party a hearing on the merits of his case constituted one of the principal evils of our former judicial system which the Constitution of 1947 and Rule 3:40-3 were designed to obviate (see Comment on the Tentative Draft of Rule 3:40-3).  It was never intended and it is not to be countenanced that the elimination of this shuttling from one court to another would be accomplished by depriving a plaintiff of his day in court.  Accordingly, it is clear that the plaintiff here was entitled to have his case heard when it came on for trial in the Law Division.  O'Neill v. Vreeland, 6 N.J. 158, 169 (N.J. 1951)"
[brief] The same day, May 25, 2022, Plaintiff moved to transfer the Collection Lawsuit from the Special Civil Part of the Passaic County Law Division to the Hudson County Law Division and consolidate it with the putative class action.  (Pa68).  On June 16, 2022, Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer and Consolidate and cross moved to dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  (Pa72)  On September 23, 2022, the Court entered an Order (Pa75) granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer and Consolidate, as well as dismissing only [...]’s unjust enrichment claim.  On July 14, 2023, Defendants filed their Answer (Pa78) to the Class Action Complaint, again denying any wrongdoing, failing to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense, and erroneously certifying pursuant to R. 4:5-1 that “[t]he matter in controversy is not the subject of any other action pending in any Court or a pending arbitration proceeding; and no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated. ”  See Answer p. 23 (Pa100).  After serving discovery requests on November 11, 2022, serving a R. 1:6-2(c) good faith letter on June 8, 2023, and receiving no responses from Defendants for approximately one year, [...] filed his Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Pa101) and his Motion to Extend Discovery (Pa110) on September 20, 2023.  See Certification of [...] ¶¶ 4-8 (Pa103-Pa104).  Both Motions were withdrawn by the Court on September 22, 2023.  (Pa114-Pa115).  On September 22, 2023—nearly a year and a half after the Class Action Complaint was filed—Defendants filed their Motion to Compel Arbitration.  (Pa116).  On November 22, 2023, the trial court entered an Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration.  (Pa187).  On January 2, 2024, [...] timely filed his Notice of Appeal.  (Pa188).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Defendant cannot avail himself of any of the provisions in the Act to void the judgment in this matter.  As noted by the trial court “[o]nly the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance has authority to pursue claims for violation of the NJCFLA. ”  (Da61-62)  The plain language of the NJCFLA, then, is a complete bar to Defendant’s claims that the judgment is void based upon the NJCFLA.
[brief] Case law provides that the reformation of a contract is an equitable remedy, but only available when there exists “either mutual mistake or unilateral mistake by one party and fraud or unconscionable conduct by the other. ”  *Dugan Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.*, 398 N.J. Super. 229, 242-43 (App. Div. 2008), *certif. denied*, 196 N.J. 346 (2008) (quoting *St. Pius X House of Retreats, Salvatorian Fathers v. Diocese of Camden*, 88 N.J. 571, 577 (1982)).  It is required “for reformation for mutual mistake that the minds of the parties have met and reached a prior existing agreement, which the written document fails to express. ”  *Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein*, 115 N.J. 599, 608 (1989) (internal citations omitted).  Where no mutual mistake exists, reformation of a contract may be granted only when the facts of the case give rise to equitable fraud.  *Id.* at 609.  Where reformation is appropriate, the purpose “is to restore the parties to the status quo ante and prevent the party who is responsible for the misrepresentations from gaining a benefit. ”  *Id.* at 612.  Courts have properly viewed reformation as an “extraordinary remedy. ”  *Martinez v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 145 N.J. Super. 301, 312 (App. Div. 1976), *certif. denied*, 74 N.J. 253 (1977) (internal citations omitted).  With regard to the present matter, [...], [...] and [...] exhaustively negotiated the terms of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement, and all parties were represented by competent counsel and financial professionals during said negotiations.
[brief] \(^{11}\)  It is important to note that the amount of time that a case has been pending before arbitration is demanded is not the test.  In *Fasano v. Li*, No. 16 CIV. 8759 (KPF), 2023 WL 6292579, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023), the Southern District of New York held that based upon litigation of class action and procedural issues, a six-year delay in seeking arbitration did not constitute waiver.  Cole requires the consideration of “the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes. ”  Cole at 280-81.  In Cole, the Court heavily weighed the fact that defendants filed their motion to compel arbitration after discovery had concluded, after the trial court had ruled on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment (granted in favor of the defendant on two of the four counts and denying the other two), seven days after the defendant filed its Rule 4:25-7(b) pre-trial information exchange “in which it listed proposed witnesses and exhibits, designated its proposed deposition and interrogatory readings, and listed the motions in limine it would make,” and three days before the parties were set to go to trial.  See Cole at 281-82.  Here, the lower court failed to address [...]’s arguments that there had been no motions or rulings concerning [...]’s Indemnity Claim and that the parties are nowhere near ready for trial.  The lower court in a conclusory manner stated that the “matter was heavily litigated before the Superior Court [and] that there was active participation in the discovery that ultimately led to a number of matters to be resolved. ”  T1 71:21 - 72:3.  However, the court disregarded the fact that the prior motions solely related to the defense aspect of the case and ignored the fact that [...]’s Indemnity Claim, which only became the focus of the litigation recently, has not been the subject of any motion practice.  Because there were no proceedings, let alone substantive rulings, pertaining to [...]’s Indemnity Claim, this *Cole* factor supports [...].  iii.  **The Timing of the Motion to Compel Arbitration Does Not Reflect a Litigation Strategy (T1 72:6-8)**
[brief] In their post-trial brief, Defendants presented the following issue to the trial court, which however was completely ignored in the trial court’s decision: “[w]here a plaintiff engaged in a fraud by forging the defendant’s signature on title transfer paperwork, thereby enabling the defendant to transfer the title to others at a later time, whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek relief?” (Da081).  Given Plaintiff’s admission regarding his forgery in connection with the December 10, 1998 deed, the doctrine of unclean hands bars Plaintiff from attacking the deed fraudulently created by himself.  Therefore, Defendants respectfully request that the Appellate Division rule on this issue in Defendants’ favor.
[brief] In finding that [...]’s “consents” to search were “voluntary” under the circumstances of this case, the court below failed to consider the preclusive evidential effect of the prior violation of [...]’s Fifth Amendment rights on the factors of *State v. King*, 44 N.J. 346 (1965)\(^{15}\) in light of the fact that “New Jersey’s Constitution…provides greater protections than the federal constitution when it comes to consent searches.
[brief] Cf. State v. Nimmer, 975 N.W.2d 598, 600-605 (Wis. 2022)(finding reasonable suspicion for protective frisk where defendant was only person “at nearly the exact location” that ShotSpotter reported gunfire less than a minute earlier, and as police approached, defendant “began digging around his left side with his left hand” and “blading his body,” which the officer defined as “moving his left side away from me where I could only see his right side” in an apparent effort to conceal something on his left side).  [...] did not explain why “blading” is “a sign” of potential dangerousness or demonstrate any correlation between “blading” and weapons possession.  Moreover, [...], who did not witness the alleged blading, defined “blading” as “shift[ing] their bodies away from away from officers” when the patrol car approached.  (1T 12-14 to 12-17)  At best, [...]’s vague description of the men’s alleged conduct established nothing more than the men turned away from the police car as it approached, which they had every right to do.  Similarly, in *State v. Pugh*, 826 N.W. 418 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012), defendant Pugh exercised his right to walk away from police by “blading,” i.e., “turning his body,” “as he backed away from them.
[brief] This matter arises out of an appeal by Plaintiff-Appellants, [...], individually and as administrator of the Estate of [...], and [...] (hereinafter collectively “Plaintiffs”), of the Trial Court’s Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges claims against Defendant-Respondents, [...], [...] (collectively “Hoboken”) and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), for inter-alia survivorship and wrongful death.  Plaintiffs allege that [...] (deceased) was murdered by a third-party as result of a “makeshift stand routinely operated for the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages” located on public property.  Plaintiffs argue that this “makeshift stand” alone is a dangerous condition of public property within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act (hereinafter “TCA”) and therefore Plaintiffs’ Complaint should not have been dismissed.  Plaintiffs’ contention that this “makeshift stand” alone is a dangerous condition is inapposite to the TCA and its longstanding interpretive caselaw because this “makeshift stand” is, at best, an activity, not a condition of public property.  As public entities the Defendants are entitled to the “presumption of immunity” granted to same pursuant to the terms of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  The test for determining if an activity is a dangerous condition of public property requires Plaintiffs to show both (1) a defect of the public property itself and (2) that the activity was reasonably foreseeable.  Only this combination can bring an activity, such as the one plead herein, within the meaning of the TCA.  However, that is not where the test ends, but is merely a threshold issue.  Plaintiffs are still obligated to satisfy all four of the other prongs of the dangerous condition test to succeed on the merits of their case; not to mention the additional grants of immunity afforded to the municipal Defendants in this matter.  Plaintiffs simply cannot overcome this threshold issue nor can Plaintiffs overcome the remaining immunities to succeed on their claims.  In the matter at bar, Plaintiffs have not, cannot and will never be able to show that there was a defect of the property itself that contributed to the death of Mr. Garcia.  Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not, cannot and will never be able to prove that the admitted illegal activity is a reasonably foreseeable use of the property.  Plaintiffs have failed in their burden to plead sufficient facts to constitute inter-alia a prima facie case of liability based on a “dangerous condition” of public property under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 and no amount of discovery will change this fact.  Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, this Court should AFFIRM the decision of the Trial Court as a result of the complete dearth of facts necessary (and the inability of discovery to show otherwise) for Plaintiffs to assert a cognizable claim.