ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As [...] held, “[...] developed probable cause during the investigatory stop. ” (Da16).  “In addition to [...]’s information that Defendant was involved in a narcotics transaction, [...] testified that Defendant admitted to having cocaine in the vehicle.  The admitted presence of CDS in Defendant’s vehicle provided more than the well-grounded suspicion needed to satisfy a finding of probable cause. ” (Da16).  This decision rested on Judge Collin’s ability to hear and view the witnesses before him.  Detective [...], he determined, was credible.  “[H]e was forthright in his answers; he conceded the point when he could not recall specific information; and he was not evasive in his responses. ” (Da9).  He further noted [...]’s candor in denying that [...] relayed to him that [...] admitted to buying heroin from defendant in the ShopRite parking lot—a fact which undoubtedly would have increased the likelihood that the court would have found he had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle.  (Da10).  [...] determined that unlike [...]’s, defendant’s version of events was not credible.  “The Court cannot reach the same conclusions regarding Defendant’s credibility[.]” (Da10).  In addition to providing conflicting testimony about the events leading up to the search of his vehicle, he noted, defendant claims he never informed officers that his vehicle contained narcotics, whereas [...] testified Defendant said there was a small amount of cocaine in the back.  Defendant did admit on direct examination-consistent with [...]’s recollection-that whatever was found in the car belonged to him.  It strikes the Court as anomalous that Defendant would claim ownership of CDS while apparently denying that he informed [...] of its location before the search of his vehicle.  Thus, crediting [...]’s and [...]’s version of events over defendant’s, [...] determined the officers’ search of defendant’s vehicle was constitutionally permissible.  (Da17).  This fact-specific and witness-driven conclusion was appropriate and should not be disturbed on appeal.  E.
[brief] ”  Pb22.  Appellant’s argument regarding the alleged impropriety of the so-called monolog is based on yet another misstatement of applicable law.  The Committee had no “duty to deliberate on the ordinance and make findings. ”  Pb22.  There is no requirement that evidence be presented or findings of fact be made at a hearing before the governing body concerning the proposed enactment of an ordinance.  *Hirth v. City of Hoboken*, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 166 (App. Div. 2001).  The *New York SMSA* case cited by Appellant concerns the hearing procedure required for a *municipal board’s* consideration of a variance application, a quasi-judicial --- \(^5\)
[brief] Instead, the plaintiffs “were responding to an offer that did not carry an immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms or require unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms. ”  *Id.* at 31; see *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super. at 499 (reaffirming *Specht* as “instructive”).  Here, even more egregiously than the clauses at issue in *Hoffman* and *Specht*, [...]’s arbitration agreement was not just “submerged” but hidden entirely until being sprung on the [...] after their order had been placed and paid.
[brief] The trial court was especially generous to the Plaintiff by applying the “Newburgh v. Arrigo” standard as opposed to the Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 546–47 (2006) and *Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran*, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 590–91 (App. Div. 2016) standards which were directly on point and far more favorable to the Defendant.  Even under the “*Newburgh v. Arrigo*” standard, the Plaintiff’s evidence at trial did not substantiate her stale *ex post facto* claims.  Under *Gac* and *Avelino – Catabran*, the Plaintiff’s stale claims for college contribution should have been barred from the outset because: (i.) there was already a germane agreement pertaining to college contributions in place; (ii.) her first and only claims were made after both children completed their college educations;\(^4\) and (iii.) it is an undisputed fact that neither child had a relationship with the Defendant at the time of college enrollment.  The later fact was bar *ab initio* to the relief sought by the Plaintiff.  See *Moss v. Nedas*, 289 N.J. Super. 352, 356 (App. Div. --- \(^4\)  These educations were: (i.) unilaterally planned and selected without the Defendant’s meaningful involvement; (ii.) debt financed without any financial transparency by the Plaintiff until after the children graduated; and (iii.) sought by the Plaintiff for the first time to be paid for by the Defendant seven (7) years after the oldest child enrolled in college and five (5) years after the youngest child enrolled in college.  For the trial court judge to view these facts in any other manner than she ultimately did would have lead to an absurd and completely unjust result and bad precedent.  Thus, the trial court did not error by denying the Plaintiff’s claims under the *Newburgh v. Arrigo* standard, because if it did not, Plaintiff’s claims would have failed under *Gac Moss* and *Avelino – Catabran* as a matter of law and fact.
[brief] Defendants contend that the contracts in place between the property owner and the contractor, and the contractor and sub-contractor, do not define the duty of the defendants.  Plaintiff agrees.  However, Defendants’ argument that allowing the agreements to be discussed at trial expanded the duty of defendants is simply wrong.  The jury was only ever told of the proper duty to an invitee, Model Jury Charge 5.20(F)(5).  As such, the argument that the agreements between Defendants expanded their legal duty is without merit.
[brief] Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Township Comm. Of Twp. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); State v. Stott, 335 N.J. Super. 611, 620-21 (App. Div. 2000), rev’d o.g., 171 N.J. 343 (2002); State v. Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. 286, 295 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148 (2004).
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In a trial de novo on the record, the Court below convicted [...] of abandoning cats, permitting them to roam at large and creating a nuisance.  The 2 cats in question were spotted on [...] and were admittedly strays i.e. not placed there by [...].  The convictions were based solely on a trap spotted by the Complainant, [...], [...], which had a label with Terri and a phone no. on it later identified as [...]'s and the fact that [...] later attempted to reclaim the trap (which the state claims not to have).  The state conceded that [...] is heavily traversed by pedestrians.  The lower courts acquitted [...] of complaints relating to the food in front of the trap, concluding any of the pedestrians could have placed the food seen in front of the trap.  State offered no evidence as to initial placement of the trap, length of time there, removal or relationship or proximity of cats to the trap.  When encountered by [...], the trap was mostly on private property but allegedly partially on the public sidewalk of [...].  The convictions were constructed with speculative building blocks as to who placed the trap where.
[brief] T14-20 to T15-16.  For example, he had to shore up a sign for the [...] by putting up angles that were 20 feet long, one-quarter inch thick, and weighed about 200 pounds each, which had to be carried across the building.  T15-21 to T16-6.  Pa27.  He did this same, physically demanding work for the entirety of his employment at [...].  T17-1 to T17-7.  For the last couple of years at his job, it had become more and more difficult for [...] to perform this work because he had difficulty bending his knees; once he kneeled down, it would take him 5 to 10 minutes to get up and then another 5 to 10 minutes before he felt strong enough to walk.
[brief] [...] of [...] for the term prescribed by law, ending 7 years from date of appointment.  [...] of [...] for the term prescribed by law, ending 7 years from date of appointment.  [...] of [...] for the term prescribed by law, ending 7 years from date of appointment.  [...] of [...] for the term prescribed by law, ending 7 years from date of appointment.  [...] of [...] for the term prescribed by law, ending 7 years from date of appointment.  [...] of [...] for the term prescribed by law, ending 7 years from date of appointment.  to be a Workers’ Compensation Judge: [...] of [...] for the term prescribed by law.
[brief] The requestor in that case sought “correspondence,” which included “written or electronic correspondence” between unnamed employees of two very large government agencies—the [...] and the [...].  Id. at 176-77.  Thus, the requestor did not limit his request to only emails, nor did he identify an employee whose email account should be searched or provide any date range.  But the request was limited to correspondence relating to the subject matter of “EZ Pass benefits provided to Port Authority retirees,” narrowing the universe of responsive documents substantially from every written communication ever sent by thousands of employees to a discrete subset of communications sent by particular employees during the specified time frame.  Consequently, the request was neither vague nor overbroad.  Had there been no subject matter provided, every communication between any employee of one agency to any employee of the other agency since the beginning of time would have been responsive.  That would have clearly been impermissible per MAG, and it could have resulted in tens of thousands of responsive documents or more.  Importantly, the Appellate Division found that “the fact that the custodian of records in this case actually performed a search and was able to locate and identify records responsive to plaintiff’s request belies any assertion that the request was lacking in specificity or was overbroad. ”  Id. at 177 (emphasis added).  The same is true here—the custodian certified that she twice “determine[d] precisely what records were being requested and . . . locate[d] them successfully. ”  Ibid.  That belies any assertion that his request was “lacking in specificity or was overbroad. ”  Ibid.  [...] has located the responsive records, it simply needs to review them, make any necessary redactions, and produce those that are not exempt.  That is what OPRA obligates it to do.  Plaintiff’s OPRA request instead closely mirrors the request in Paff v. Galloway, 229 N.J. 340.
[directive] VIOLATIONS limits time indictment/trial speedy track to system automated an establishing is Judiciary  The statutory counsel as defense and prosecutors, judges, alert to and Law  Reform Bail under the imposed steps are appropriate necessary and all that ensure to responsible are Prosecutors approach. deadlines no that so mannex timely a in trial and indictment for prepared are cases that ensure to taken Section also See enforcement. law attributed to delays to due released be will defendant dangerous court If a cases).
[brief] Page No.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................2  POINT I ........................................................................................................2  THE STATE IMPROPERLY ASSESSED THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING WHETHER SCOTT KOLOGI KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS .............................2  A.  The State’s Argument is Legally Inaccurate Regarding Whether [...] could have had Criminal Liability Regarding the Incident and whether he was the Appropriate Guardian for Scott during the Interrogation........................................................................3  B.  The State’s Argument is Incorrect because they place the Burden on the Defense and Ignore All of the Facts Regarding Scott’s Intellectual, Educational and Cognitive Limitations................................................5  C.  The State’s Argument is Incorrect because the State Substantially Downplayed the fact that Scott was Never Afforded the Opportunity to Consult with his “Guardian” in Private .............................................................8  D.  The State Improperly Assessed the Fact that Scott had No Time to Process his Rights....................................................9  E.  The State is Incorrect in the Assertion that [...] Servied as a Buffer During the Interrogation.................................................................11  F.  The Totality of the Circumstances Demonstate that [...] did not Knowingly, Intelligently and Voluntarily Waive his Miranda Rights........................................12  CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................14
[brief] The officer’s invocation of the label “high-crime area” does not transform what would otherwise be described as socializing – standing in front of a porch with refreshments – into “loitering” for the purpose of “engaging in narcotics transactions,” as the State argued.  (1T 51-5 to 51-12)  In *State v. Gibson*, 218 N.J. 277 (2014), our Supreme Court rejected the notion that defendant’s otherwise innocent conduct — leaning against a porch on the property of a closed community center at three o’clock in the morning — could reasonably be viewed as “loitering,” simply because the community center, which had a “no loitering” sign posted in the window, was in an area with a “history for violent crime and drug activity” and the center’s director asked police for assistance in keeping people off the property due to recent incidents of criminal activity outside the center.
[brief] 5T242 to 5T251.  The Respondents further requested that the SHO require that the Township utilize its affordable housing trust funds to pay for off- site improvements necessary to implement the Respondents’ site plan.  5T242 to 5T251.  The SHO Resolution issued at the completion of the Respondents’ Site Plan Hearing included a provision requiring that the Township to exercise its power of eminent domain to obtain any right-of-way required to construction intersection mitigation improvements.  M511.  The SHO Resolution further denied the Respondents’ request regarding the Township use of affordable housing trust funds.
[brief] In the Matter of [...], the Court was called upon to consider whether [...] facilitated a romantic relationship between an inmate and another corrections officer.  2007 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 826, *1, OAL DKT. NO. [...]; AGENCY DKT. NO. [...] (December 24, 2007).  The crux of the matter against [...] was that her name was contained in a packet of 53 love-letters that an inmate had drafted to his paramour.  Id. at *7-9.  The inmate accused [...] of being the “facilitator” of the illicit relationship.  Id. at *8-9.  The Court did not find [...] facilitated any relationship between the inmate and the corrections officer.  Id. at *12.  Held the Court, “[e]ven though the Department may have reason to suspect that Livingston aided or abetted [...]'s improper conduct, mere suspicion is no substitute for competent evidence at an administrative hearing.  The only person who accused Livingston of any wrongdoing was not offered as a witness and Livingston's legal representative never had an opportunity to cross-examine his version. ”  Id. at *14-15.  See also, State in the Interest of D.C., 114 N.J. Super. 499, 502 (App. Div. 1971)(The State must prove the charges by competent evidence; suspicion alone does not suffice.)  In this case, [...]’s testimony did not provide the necessary residuum evidence to buttress either the business record logbook or the video surveillance tape as he could not provide any legally competent evidence about the August 16, 2019 incident.  Further, [...] did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the lead investigator.  As previously stated, the burden of proof cannot be accomplished simply by introducing hearsay evidence.  *N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(b)*.  However, that is exactly what happened in this matter.  **Point III**
[brief] [*Id.* at 126 (emphasis added). ]  The trial court's decision was not at all "fact-sensitive."  The trial court based its decision on the emails apparently appended to the [...] and documents appended to those emails:  Based on the email exchange between Petitioners and Counsel prior to the matter being initiated, there is evidence to indicate that Counsel and Petitioners had communications involving Petitioners potential claims which also involved Petitioners providing to Counsel documents regarding their claims.  In one of the emails, Counsel informed Petitioners that "to the extent there are non-probate assets ... there is a strong argument the 4 month window does not apply."  Counsel also indicated that he and Petitioners had a telephone conversation regarding "a potential claim from California."  The Court finds that based on such, the information provided to Counsel by Petitioners may be prejudicial to Petitioners in the matter.  Therefore, the Court finds that RPC 1.18 applies to justify the removal of Respondent's counsel pursuant [sic].
[brief] The trial court’s reliance on N.J.R.E. 105 and pertinent case law was proper when admitting the investigating officer’s opinions with a limiting instruction for purpose of Lowe’s counsel’s impeachment of plaintiff’s expert.  The Court’s prior ruling that the responding officers’ lay opinions as to how the incident occurred were inadmissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 701, does not preclude admissibility for another purpose.  Evidence may be admissible for one purpose, but inadmissible for another.
[brief] Therefore, as the State appears to concede, it should be enough that defense counsel argues or proffers that the police violated the body-worn camera statute and that the evidence would have supported the defense’s theory, as long as that argument or proffer is not unreasonable or implausible on its face. \(^3\)  Here, defense counsel reasonably argued that missing evidence would have showed that no reasonable suspicion existed, and that the police were trying to find a way to unconstitutionally prolong the stop and search the car. \(^4\) (1T 191-18 to 192-20, 201-5 to 22)  It also appears he was arguing that the missing video of the stop would have shown that [...] did not make an illegal U-turn.  (1T 202-11 to 19)  In addition, defense counsel repeatedly argues that the officer’s failure to follow the law demonstrates that he is not credible and shows that he was lying about what happened.  (1T 187-22 to 188-11, 190-7 to 8, 203-9 to 10, 204-12 to 14)
[directive] PROCEDURE  The Criminal Practice Division in the Administrative Office of the Courts, working in conjunction with the Criminal Division Managers, developed an Excel spreadsheet to assist the Directive #8-05 April 11, 2005 Page 2 courts in their data collection in these matters.  Each Criminal Division Manager will be provided with a copy of that program.  Thus, (1) effective immediately, the Criminal Division in each Vicinage will enter the required data elements into the Excel spreadsheet for all PCRs currently filed but still pending disposition, with this backloading to be completed by May 15, 2005; (2) effective immediately, the Criminal Division in each Vicinage will enter the required data element information into the Excel spreadsheet for all new PCRs filed with the Division; and (3) effective June 2005, the Criminal Division in each Vicinage by e-mail (Lotus Notes) will each month forward to the AOC’s Criminal Practice Division a copy of their PCR worksheet in accordance with the established timeframe for submission of monthly statistics.  Should you have any questions regarding the PCR database automation required by this Directive, please feel free to contact [...] of the AOC’s Criminal Practice Division at [...].
[brief] Defendants admit that they relied only on documents that came into creation as part of, or after, the subdivision, and did not consider the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed.  Db16 (explaining their ⁷  That is not to say Defendants were not required to engage in further inquiry; they were.  Defendants had constructive notice by their inquiry obligation even without reviewing the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed. reliance the Subdivision Plan, Confirmatory Deed, the Subdivision Deed, and the Miller Consolidation Deed); Ja679 ([...] stating same).8/9  Here, however, the chain of title includes at least the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed, the Subdivision Plan (which is in the chain of title because it represents a “significant act” of [...] in relation to Lot 3, see Palamarg, 80 N.J. at 456), the [...] Confirmatory Deed, and the Defendants’ Deed (which specifically references all of these items).  There is not a single case in this state holding that a search was reasonable or diligent where it failed to consider the deed by which an immediate predecessor acquired ownership along with the subsequent recorded activities of that predecessor.  Indeed, as described above, the cases generally require far more than that.
[directive] 1.  The officer be permitted to carry a department issued handgun during on duty hours (duty hours means an officer’s daily active duty shift) but not carry a handgun off duty, and 2.  The officer be directed not to enter his or her residence which is shared with the complainant while on duty and armed, or meet with the complainant or any other person covered by the restraining order, while armed.  3.  The department owned weapons are to be issued by the department to the officer at the beginning of the officer’s daily active duty shift and the weapons are to be returned to the custody of the department at the end of the officer’s daily active duty shift.  4 (9/00)
[brief] Plaintiff/Respondent argues that the generic reference to a statement in Answers to Interrogatories which provided, “to the extent Plaintiff had any pre-existing or degenerative conditions, relative to the body part injured herein, same were asymptomatic prior to the instant accident and as such, were aggravated/exacerbated as a result” is sufficient notice to the Defendant/Appellant that the Plaintiff/Respondent would ultimately request an aggravation charge.  Similarly, Plaintiff/Respondent relies upon its initial pretrial exchange.  Notably, Plaintiff/Respondent’s counsel states in his brief, “at the conclusion of closing arguments, Plaintiff/Respondent’s counsel realized the error with respect to the Aggravation Charge request and brought it to the attention of the Court. ” (See Plaintiff/Respondent’s brief at p. 7).  The corollary of the statement is that Plaintiff/Respondent’s counsel was aware of the aggravation issue and anticipated such a charge at the time he delivered his closing statement.  Thus, any supplemental statement gave the Plaintiff/Respondent a second bite at the apple.  Conversely, with no aggravation charge contained within the proposed instructions or discussed at the charge conference, counsel for Defendant/Appellant would have entered the closing arguments phase of the case anticipating that no aggravation charge was going to be given to the jury.  Accordingly, the supplemental closing improperly highlighted Plaintiff/Respondent’s argument on aggravation resulting in harmful error to the Defendant/Appellant.  Further, allowing Plaintiff/Respondent additional time to discuss the aggravation issue in a supplemental closing compounded the undue prejudice to the Defendant/Appellant.  III.