ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On December 20, 2013, [...] entered a Judgment (the “2013 Judgment”), pursuant to which she “awarded [...] $6,559,213 in compensatory damages and $10,100,950 in prejudgment interest on his non-RICO claims; $16,396,895 in punitive damages; $16,007,361 in trebled damages on the RICO claims; and attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $6,861,098. ”  See 2018 Op. at *4; (126a).  The amount of compensatory damages – by category of the [...]’s misconduct and year – were determined by agreement of the parties and their respective forensic accountants, whose calculations were then adopted by [...] and included in damage schedules attached to the 2013 Judgment (the “Damage Schedules;” 128a-139a; 39968a).  The parties and their accountants also agreed upon the appropriate “equity rate” of interest – i.e., the rate that would fairly compensate Plaintiffs as real estate investors for their lost use of funds – to be applied to the compensatory damages as prejudgment interest, which also was embodied within the Damage Schedules.  The agreed-upon equity rate was 8.875%.  Finally, it was agreed by the parties and their accountants that prejudgment interest at the equity rate would be compounded.  (136a; 251T48:25-19, 251T111:19-23, 251T112:22-113:4)  E.
[brief] I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  (See Rule 1:4-4(b))  (8)  OCTOBER 31, 2023  Date (9)  Signature (10)  [...]  Print Name  CERTIFICATION  I am [...], Pro Se Attorney for the Defendant.
[brief] [...] recalled that when he arrived at the restaurant around 2:00 pm, he could hear yelling from outside.  (6T:136-10 to 22)  [...] testified that he arrived at the restaurant at the same time as [...].  [...] and [...] described the situation inside the restaurant similarly.  [...] called it chaotic, stating that “everyone was very loud and aggressive” and that “employees are screaming, other people … everyone’s just yelling at each other” and that he “had absolutely no idea who was involved, what was going on. ”  (7T:73-19 to 74-25; 76-5 to 9)  [...] testified that he encountered a “large crowd of people” inside and that “everybody was involved, \(^6\)  Likewise, [...] refers to [...] as the “Asian officer. ”  (8T:46-16 to 21) everybody was yelling. ”  (6T:136-24 to 137-24)  [...] testified that he was standing near the counter, trying to talk to [...], but that it was difficult to communicate properly because of how many people were around them – including [...]’s family and restaurant employees.  (6T:141-11 to 24)  [...] testified that [...] was upset, agitated, and loud, and that [...] told him that he had been disrespected by one of the restaurant employees and was standing up for his family.  (6T:138-22 to 139-2, 20 to 25, 200-11 to 24)  [...] testified that [...] approached [...] from behind and “attempted to get [...]’s attention to escort him outside” by putting his hand out.  (6T:142-22 to 143-2, 144-7 to 21)  [...] claimed that he walked toward [...] and [...] because he wanted to “de-escalate the situation,” and that [...] immediately punched him in the chest before he said anything.  (7T:78-23 to 80-3)  [...] stated that he and [...] tried to grab [...], but that [...] walked backwards out the first set of doors in the vestibule and then pushed [...], causing [...] to hit the door behind him.  (7T:81-10 to 82-3)  [...] testified that [...] pushed [...] into the vestibule wall.  (6T:145-18 to 146-21)  Both officers testified that they followed [...] as he backed away through the second set of doors and onto the street.  (6T:150-18 to 23; 7T:81-19 to 82-3)  Two videos of the altercation outside the restaurant between the police officers and [...] were played for the jury – one from [...]’s mobile video recorder (MVR), which included the audio recording from his body-worn microphone, and one taken by [...], the restaurant manager, on his cellphone.
[brief] C.  The Agreement was not unconscionable.  The Agreement to arbitrate these claims is not unconscionable.  [...] suggests there was “gross procedural unconscionability” in the execution of the Agreement and, therefore, “the Arbitration Agreement should not be enforced. ”  (Pb28.)  Oddly, she continues:  “Although a signature would generally signify agreement, that is not the case where the signee was induced to sign by a misrepresentation – even where the representation could have been discovered simply by reading the document and the signee was negligent in failing to do so. ”  (Pb28–29 (citing Rowen Petrol. Props., LLC v. Hollywood Tanning Systems, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33685, at *11–12 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2009)).)  These arguments lack merit.  An alleged misrepresentation or fraudulent representation has never been identified, as was at issue in *Rowen*.  Notwithstanding, [...]’s acknowledgment on the Agreement confirmed she was “not relying on any promises or representations by the Company except those contained in the Agreement. ” (Pa000093.)  [...] does not point to any record evidence of any such fraud or misrepresentation or show where in the record she advanced this argument and preserved it for appeal (or develop her citation to and reliance on *Rowen* in any way).  This newly urged fraud-based unconscionability argument is wholly unsupported, undeveloped, and unpreserved.  The Court should dispense with it summarily, as it is waived.
[brief] *N.J.S.A. 43:21-19*  (This also assumes he had sufficient days on the books to use during this period)  The Federal Government extended unemployment benefits during COVID19, and the state made it easier for individuals to apply.  The Board’s decision to penalize the appellant due to the fact he received unemployment seems to miss the point.  The issue of [...] collecting unemployment benefits should have no relevancy to the issue of continuation of multiple pensions pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 43:15-8(a)*.  There is no legal support for the position that an employee’s temporary disruption in service must be considered a break in service for pension purposes if the employee receives unemployment.  An employee is eligible for unemployment benefits if they are laid off, or terminated unless it fits one of the exceptions set forth in the unemployment statute.  *N.J.S.A. 43:21-19 et.seq.*  These issues require the Appellate Division to reverse and remand the decision of the Board and either order the appellant to be enrolled back into the pension system or remand the matter to an Administrative Law judge for further proceedings.
[directive] Received 01 - from State and Federal Forfeitures  1 - 1  Applicability: Forfeiture Program  Ad minist rators  A1 1 1 1 - Policy Statement 1- 1:l 1  Administration of Funds and Property Resulting from State Forfeiture Actions 1:2 1 - 1  N. J.S.A. et seq. (civil forfeiture)  2C:64-1, 1 1 - N.J.S.A. et seq. (racketeering)  2C:41-1, 1- 1 N.J.S.A. of 2C:21-25, et seq.  (Financial facilitation crime)  1 - 1  Attorney General's Forfeiture Guidelines as October and Amended 1992  1  1 - Attorney General's Executive Directive 1995-3  1 - 1  New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating Procedures
[brief] (1T24-2 to 11; 1T32-25 to 33-7; 1T60-5 to 9).  [...] questioned [...] about the truck bed's contents as she walked with him back to his patrol vehicle.  (1T24-24 to 25).  [...] lied to the officer, stating, “Oh, there’s nothing in there. ” (1T142-20 to 25).  As [...] sat in the squad car, [...] noticed [...] was exhibiting signs of “extreme stress or nervousness. ” (1T26-3 to 4).  [...] began breathing quickly and chewed her gum harder and faster to the point where he could hear it “smacking. ” (1T26-4 to 9; 1T208-8 to 14).  Once [...] and [...] were in his squad car, he began “working on business related to the traffic stop, locating [his] location in [his] computer system, running checks on her to see if she's ever been stopped, running the vehicle information. ” (1T25-10 to 13).  When [...] again asked [...] about the contents of the duffel bags, she again lied by denying that there was anything in the truck bed.  (1T25-18 to 25).  Upon [...] telling [...] that he believed she and [...] were transporting a large amount of marijuana across the country, she responded that she was only along for the ride and did not know what was in the duffel bags.  (1T27-12 to 23).  [...] testified that Reno was the gateway to an area in California known as the “Emerald Triangle,” where for “many years” “probably the last 20 years or more, the largest cannabis grows in the United States has occurred” there.
[brief] (1T78-22 to 79-6).  [...] removed the fanny pack and secured it in a locked box in his marked patrol vehicle placed defendant under arrest.  (1T16-20 to 25).  In order not to contaminate the evidence, officers left the handgun inside the fanny pack until CSI could properly inventory and catalog the evidence.  (1T21-15 to 24).  At the conclusion of [...]’s testimony and arguments, the trial court issued an oral decision denying defendant’s motion.
[brief] Cole, 215 N.J. at 281.  That is clearly the case here.  [...]’s purposeful delay, coupled with its other tactics, has forced [...] to provide a wealth of material and information that [...] would not have been entitled to or received had it revealed its intention to compel arbitration at the outset of the parties’ collaboration, or even at the start of litigation.  For example, the Agreement stipulates that if arbitration occurred, it would be conducted under the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA Rules”), which are designed for complex commercial disputes, not premises liability cases.  See Pa0325.  Regarding depositions, the AAA Rules permit them only in “exceptional cases,” “at the discretion of the arbitrator,” and “upon good cause shown,” all while maintaining the expedited nature of arbitration.  Pa0326.  Had [...] properly asserted its claim for arbitration earlier in these proceedings, it only could depose the Plaintiffs if the arbitrator allowed it, which was far from guaranteed.  Ibid.  Furthermore, the AAA Rules lack provisions for medical exams or the provision of answers to interrogatories.  Therefore, [...] only sought to enforce the Agreement after it had already obtained all discovery that the AAA Rules would not have allowed.  The only reasonable inference is that [...] intentionally delayed its demand for arbitration to first secure the discovery it sought, likely to avoid the possibility that the arbitrator would deny depositions.  This calculated delay and strategic maneuvering are critical in demonstrating that [...]’s demand for arbitration is not made in good faith.  Such tactics are precisely the type of behavior the court in Cole sought to prevent.  Even if [...]’s actions result from inaction or negligence, the discovery produced thus far is overwhelmingly favorable to [...], making it unjust to compel the parties to arbitrate under the AAA Rules.
[brief] COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE EMINENT DOMAIN ACT AUTHORIZES THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM TO ADJUDICATE ALL ISSUES RELATED TO A GOVERNMENT TAKING.  Plaintiff argues in Point IV of its brief that Defendants are barred from challenging the right to take under the doctrines of *res judicata* and collateral estoppel as a result of the trial court’s decision in *White Road, HOA, LLC v. Twp. of Jackson*, Docket No. [...], that challenged the land swap ordinances.  (Pb 28)  In reply, Defendants rely on their argument set forth in Point II of their initial Appellate brief (Db14-20), but would reiterate that the Eminent Domain Act provides the exclusive mechanism to address all issues related to a taking.  It is simply unreasonable that Defendants ought to have been expected to “defend” a condemnation action against their private properties in an action commenced by another party against the Township filed months before the Township authorized the taking of Defendants’ properties.  (Da20; 68).  Plaintiffs assert that Defendants should have joined that action (Pb32), but Defendants could not have duly exercised their right to challenge the Township’s acquisition of their properties granted by the Eminent Domain Act via that matter.  Indeed, the ordinances challenged there did not authorize the takings.  (Da25; 45)  Defendants have every right to challenge the Township’s subsequently filed condemnation action to take their private property.  The trial court below in this matter did not – and could not – hold that Defendants were precluded from raising the issue of valid public use because of the decision in *White Road, HOA*.  Nor did the court below here specifically rely on the decision in *White Road, HOA* to find there was a public use.  In the court’s October 20, 2023 oral opinion, the court referred to the proposed Developer of the religious institution’s reasoning for preferring Defendants’ properties to be the preferred location of the development, but that did not mean Defendants were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from asserting their argument.  (*See* 1T15-1 to 7; 24-5 to 12).  The trial court merely said it did not find Defendants’ argument “persuasive. ” (1T24-9 to 12).  Thus, collateral estoppel is not a valid reason to reject Defendants’ argument on appeal.  Defendants are not barred from challenging the Township’s proof of a valid public use for the condemnation.  POINT IV
[brief] Probable cause has eluded precise definition.  *State v. Chippero*, 201 N.J. 14, 26 (2009) (quoting *State v. Sullivan*, 169 N.J. 204, 210 (2001).  However, it has been held that, “[t]he substance of all the definitions. . . is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. ”  *State v. Moore*, 181 N.J. 40, 46 (2004) (quoting *Maryland v. Pringle*, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).  In other words, the principle component of probable cause is “a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed. ”  *Moore* 181 N.J. at 45-6 (quoting *State v. Nishina*, 175 N.J. 502, 515 (2003).  That belief “constitutes less than proof needed to convict and something more than a raw, unsupported suspicion. ”  *State v. Moskal*, 246 N.J. Super. 12, 21 (App. Div. 1991).  When considering whether there is probable cause, the totality of the circumstances must be considered.
[brief] State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. at 279.  The facts learned during this drug-surveillance operation are therefore seen in light of [...]’s nine years of service in the [...] force, his extensive training in narcotics, and his familiarity with the modus operandi of local drug traffickers.  Morales’s experience included prolonged investigations in which he recovered sizeable amounts of narcotics, weapons and currency, and his participation in more than 100 arrests.  His experience and training supported his suspicions of [...]’s companions that afternoon on [...], and they are given weight by the Court when it evaluates the facts.  See ibid.  Defendant argues that the only suspicious circumstance affecting him was “merely speaking to a suspected drug dealer[.]” (Db10).  This fact was, however, deemed sufficiently suspicious in Tucker.  See 136 N.J. at 170 (discussing Doss, 254 N.J. Super. at 125).  Even if purely innocent connotations could be ascribed to a person's actions, an officer can base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as they reasonably could be consistent with guilt.
[brief] [...]’s site plan regarding location of off-street parking met the standard for design relief, which requires a showing that the enforcement of the ordinance is impracticable or will exact undue hardship because of peculiar conditions pertaining to the land in question.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51(b).  The Board’s determination that a variance was required demonstrates its legal error.  As for relief from [...] steep slope ordinance, [...] required none.
[brief] The Second Appeal and Partial Reversal  The [...] appealed [...]’s judgment, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed.  On June 1, 2018, this Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.  See [...], 2018 WL 2449133, at *1.  In its decision, the Court recognized that, in the prior appeal of 2006, this Court “remanded the matter to the trial court for an accounting of [...]’s interest in the partnership.
[brief] DESIGNATIONS  1T – Transcript of Hearing dated November 4, 2022  2T – Transcript of Decision dated November 15, 2022  3T – Transcript of Decision dated January 6, 2023  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – APPENDIX (Volume 1 of 5 – Pa1 to Pa177) | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order granting summary judgment, filed November 15, 2022 | 1a | | Order denying reconsideration, filed January 6, 2023 | 3a | | Complaint, filed April 21, 2020 | 5a | | Answer of [...], filed June 23, 2020 | 41a | | Answer of [...], filed June 25, 2020 | 50a | | Answer of [...] d/b/a [...], filed July 20, 2020 | 77a | | Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment of [...]
[brief] THE APPELLANT HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RAISE ALL THESE ARGUMENTS IN ITS APPEAL OF THE [...]’S PERMIT DECISION AND NEVER WAIVED ITS RIGHTS (Aa001)  The [...] argued, “[...] cannot now be heard to complain that [...] did not address the issues,” that were not raised during the [...]’s relatively short public comment period,9 “and such claims can be dismissed. ”  [...] Rb2.  But the [...] is 8  It is undisputed that “The ninety-day flood hazard permitting deadline was later extended thirty days, N.J.A.C. 7:13-21.3(b), to December 1, 2022, (Ra15). ”  [...] Rb8.  It was not extended beyond December 1, 2022.  9  Generally, the [...] provides only a 30-day public comment period on a land use permit application such as this.  See N.J.A.C. 7:7A-19.6.  Nor does the public have access to a draft permit at that time.  wrong because such a holding would unduly impede on [...]’s constitutional rights to challenge the [...]’s final permit decision.  In addition, there is no legal requirement to preserve rights during an administrative public comment period, in contrast to certain federal laws.  Finally, the Appellant had no actual notice of the [...]’s erroneous final decision before its issuance.  Under the New Jersey State Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. 2, the Appellate Division does not have the authority to preclude the Appellant from raising arguments in an “as of right” appeal of a final agency action, R. 2:2-3(a)(2), when the Appellant had no opportunity to raise any arguments in an adjudicative type hearing or trial below.
[brief] ”  [Id.]  As to the third step, the State really needs to explain and justify why in 2024, more than 15 years after the [...]’s problems resulted in a State-ordered needs assessment and more than 10 years after this case was filed on behalf of [...] public-school students complaining of the denial of T&E, the State is just “exploring” the degree of oversight and intervention that may be necessary to protect the constitutional rights of [...]’s public-school students.
[brief] In re Stream Encroachment Permit No. 12400, 231 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1989)…………………………………………11  In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413 (2008)  ………………………………………………………………..10-11  In re Young, 202 N.J. 50 (2010)
[brief] CONCLUSION  It is respectfully submitted for the reasons set forth herein, that the Appellate Division should affirm [...]’s October 26, 2023 Order that the [...] violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act by insisting on refusing to negotiate with the [...] except on the pre-condition that the Watchung Hills Regional Education exclude a portion of its negotiations team from the bargaining sessions.  Respectfully submitted, [...] /s/ [...]
[brief] Consent is the only exception claimed here.  *State v. King*, 44 N.J. 346, 352 (1965).  “[C]onsent searches under the New Jersey Constitution are afforded a higher level of scrutiny” than under federal law.  *State v. Carty*, 170 N.J. 632, 639, modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002).  In New Jersey, the State bears the burden of proving by “clear and positive testimony” that an individual’s consent was voluntary, meaning that it was “unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given. ”  *Shaw*, 237 N.J. at 618-19 (citation omitted).  The State carries a particularly “heavy burden” in consent cases because evidence has shown that people have “an almost reflexive impulse to obey an authority figure,” and “[m]any persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer to make a search as having the force of law. ”  *Carty*, 170 N.J. at 644, 647 (citations omitted); accord *State v. Sugar*, 100 N.J. 214, 234 (1985) (the standard for a warrantless consent search is “exacting”); *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409, 415, 442-43 (2015) (explaining New Jersey’s history of “widespread abuse of consent searches” and recognizing “the potential for future abuses”).  Close scrutiny is especially warranted here because the warrantless search breached the sanctity of the home.
[brief] To prevail on a summary judgment motion, Defendants must show that Plaintiff’s claim was so deficient as to warrant dismissal of the action.  Butkera v. Hudson River Sloop "Clearwater," Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 550, 557 (App.Div.1997).  In ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment “the ‘Judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ’”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986)) (alteration in original).  In evaluating summary judgment, the court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  “If there are materially disputed facts, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.  *Id.*  To grant a motion for summary judgment, the Court must find the record “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.
[brief] Thus, the Court overrules Plaintiffs’ relevance objections to the search terms themselves but finds that Plaintiff may nonetheless review all documents that are “hits” on a search term for relevance and withhold irrelevant documents.  2  But see Total Safety U.S., Inc. v. Rowland, No:13-6109, 2014 WL 1691551 *8 (E.D. La April 29, 2014) (finding that the parties’ agree-to ESI protocols waived relevance objections if a search term was found in a document).  V.  Oral Argument  *4  The Court notes that in the joint discovery dispute brief, the parties ask for supplemental briefing and oral argument.  As the Court stated in the Rule 16 scheduling order (Doc. 122 at 3), the Court will resolve disputes without either argument or supplemental briefing when possible.  Here, the Court did not need either to determine Plaintiff’s must respond; therefore, those requests are both denied.
[brief] (emphasis added)  [Pa147].  The same rationale holds true for claims against [...] for breach of the confidentiality provision in the Lease.  Assuming arguendo [...] disclosed any information to the [...], such information was already in the [...]’ possession through the Appellants as discussed above.  Based on the record, including the trial court’s prior findings as well as Appellants’ own allegations, the trial court correctly concluded that the claims set forth in Count 2 of the Complaint could not be sustained.
[directive] 2.2  Prohibitions on certain force.  Officers may not use or threaten to use force for any following reasons: (a) to punish a person or to retaliate against them for past conduct; (b) as a lesson to prevent a person from resisting or fleeing in the future; or (c) to resolve a situation more quickly, unless delay would risk the safety of the person involved, officers, or others, or would significantly interfere with other legitimate law enforcement objectives.