ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (15T 175-1 to 3), suggesting that on the date transport had been arranged for him, [...] had refused to cooperate.  ____________________  3  State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962).  The court referred to the four factors that must be considered in deciding whether to give an adverse-inference charge, as set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *State v. Hill*, 199 N.J. 545, 561 (2009).
[brief] 2.  Custodians and Search Terms  Plaintiff addresses in detail his desire to obtain additional information about “Symptom Codes,” “Field Reports,” “Internal Service Messages,” “Warranty Information,” and “Owner Reports,” without tying those desires to specific RFPs.  (ECF No. 63-1 at 2-8).  Plaintiff wants Defendants to identify custodians and search databases using search terms provided by Plaintiff.  To the extent Plaintiff addresses the disputed RFPs at all, it is done in the most cursory manner.  (ECF No. 63-1 at 12-13).  Plaintiff does not mention RFP 7 at all and addresses the other eleven disputed RFPs mostly in passing.  Nonetheless, Plaintiff suggests that he is entitled to determine the way Defendants search their records, including identifying custodians, databases and search terms.  Again, this is not tied to any particular RFP so the Court is compelled to address the matter generally.  Rule 34, Fed. R. Civ. P., governs request for production of documents.
[brief] \(^{10}\)  The lower court also referenced a “policy argument” that weighed against allowing a “dragging out” of motions to compel arbitration.  T1 71:10-20.  There is no public policy implicated where a party timely asserts arbitration after an arbitrable claim becomes ripe.  – *Cole* involved a motion to compel arbitration three days before trial, after all substantive summary judgment motions were decided, and after discovery was complete – including a six-day deposition of the plaintiff.  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 271-272.
[brief] Moreover, despite the steps taken to investigate the tip, police failed to sufficiently corroborate it.  The records subpoenaed from [...] confirmed that [...] did in fact rent unit 126, and surveillance revealed that he regularly accessed the unit.  (Dca 6-7)  However, neither renting a storage unit nor using it frequently is criminal in nature.  The fact that [...] apparently only stayed inside the unit for short periods of time is also not indicative of criminal activity; common sense suggests that most people do not spend ample amounts of time inside of a space which has the primary purpose of storing items.  [...] records also confirmed that the phone number provided by the informant for [...] was in fact his phone number, but this merely shows that the informant was familiar with [...] on a personal level.  (Dca 6)  In no way does it corroborate the informant’s story that the two engaged in drug transactions.  It is not as if, for example, police obtained the informant’s cellphone data to investigate whether text messages were sent between the informant and [...] discussing the planned transactions.  Even if no such messages were sent, call logs might have shown whether and when the informant and [...] spoke on the phone.  Police obtained none of this information.  Similarly, while police learned that [...] had previously been arrested for and convicted of drug-related offenses, his last conviction was in September 2009 -- nine years before the investigation in this case.
[directive] Kesyon adisyonèl sa yo fèt pou reponn si w ap plede koupab de zak agresyon seksyèl agrave, agresyon seksyèl, kontak seksyèl kriminèl agrave, kidnapin ki tonbe anba 2C:13-1 c(2), mete byenèt timoun an danje pa ajisman seksyèl ki ta kab pètibe ak pèvèti moral timoun daprè 2C:24-4a, mete byenèt timoun an danje daprè 2C:24-4b(3), (4) oswa (5)(a), mete byenèt timoun an danje daprè 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (si enfraksyon te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye fevriye 2018), ou se lidè yon rezon pònografi timoun konfòm ak 2C:24-4.1 (si enfraksyon an te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye fevriye 2018), sedwi oswa antrene yon timoun nan lerè daprè 2C:13-6, kontak seksyèl kriminèl daprè 2C:14-3b si viktim la se yon minè; kidnapin daprè 2C:13-1, kenbe timoun la kont volonte li daprè 2C:13-2, oswa sekestrasyon daprè 2C:13-3 si viktim la se yon minè epi moun ki komèt zak la pa paran li, pwomouvwa pwostitisyon timoun daprè 2C:34-1b(3), (4) oubyen kelkeswa tantativ pou komèt nenpòt nan zak sa yo.  Tanpri remake ke pou Kesyon 4b (2) si w mete byenèt yon timoun an danje konfòm ak 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) ou kab sijè a yon sipèvizyon sou pawòl avi si komisè gouvènman a fè yon petisyon, deli sa a pat enkli nan amannman ki te fèt le 1ye fevriye 2018 la pami deli ki fè pati Lwa Megan la sou 2C:7-2b(2).  Remake byen tou ke, kesyon gen ladann deli asasina si zak fondamantal la se yon agresyon seksyèl, ak nenpòt ki zak ke tribinal la ta espesifikman konsidere sou rejis la ke, daprè sikonstans ka a, zak la ta fèt pou konsidere antan ke yon zak seksyèl ak vyolans, oswa tantativ pou komèt tip zak sa yo.
[directive] See Section 3.13.  In determining whether there is an objective basis for the prosecutor to believe that a defendant is suffering from an untreated addiction, the prosecutor may consider all relevant circumstances, included but not limited to the following: (a)  Any prior drug possession arrests or convictions (including a defendant’s prior admission to pre-trial intervention, or conditional discharge pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1); (b)  Whether the defendant has previously received alcohol or other drug treatment, or has at any time been diagnosed or determined to be drug or alcohol dependent or in need of treatment; (c)  Whether the defendant appeared to be under the influence of a controlled substance or alcohol at the time of the offense, or has admitted to being a drug user; Page 47 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) and (d)  Whether the defendant has at any time in the past refused to participate in a diagnostic assessment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.
[brief] The meaning of “valid” relevant here is “well-grounded or justifiable. ”  Merriam-Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1983)  Plaintiffs have credibly challenged the grounds for the Township’s conclusory statement that it is “not financially feasible” to undertake development of the Project without the tax exemption (Pb27-28), and with good reason, given the developer’s reported expectation of a 67.9% return on invested capital.  Defendants have not attempted to challenge this point on a substantive basis beyond claiming that plaintiff’s expert reports are “irrelevant” or otherwise out of order.  (Dtb34-36)  B.
[brief] 2.  The trial court’s post-hoc abrogation of *Burt* unfairly prejudices [...] in exercising his statutory contribution rights, forcing him to re-litigate [...]s’ allocated share of liability with uncertain prospects of success.  a.  **[...], as a non-party to the trial, cannot be bound to the 40% allocation. **  The trial court’s March 31, 2023 oral decision indicates that the prejudice to [...] flowing from abrogation of *Burt* defendant status is vitiated by his rights to pursue a contribution claim.  However, [...] cannot be bound to this 40% allocation.  Thus, [...] was saddled with the *burden* of litigating a contribution action to recoup this 40%, with the distinct possibility that a subsequent contribution action may yield an inconsistent finding as against [...] that nevertheless leaves [...] responsible for the 40% allocated in this trial.  A putative joint tortfeasor who was not a party to the litigation cannot be bound to the allocation of negligence in the judgment.  Relevantly, the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel requires, among other things, that “the party against whom the doctrine is asserted *was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.*”  *Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc.*, 208 N.J. 114, 137 (2011) (quoting *Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc.*, 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006)) (emphasis added).  This is consistent with the principle that due process allows a party to be held liable for a judgment only if it had notice of the proceedings to participate or had an opportunity to be heard.  See Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach. Co., Inc., 153 N.J. 371, 389 (1998).  Here, [...] successfully moved for his dismissal as a party on statute of limitations grounds.  Nevertheless, [...] timely and properly asserted contribution crossclaims.  See R. 4:7-5(b).
[brief] If a majority of members in a shareholder suit can simply vote to make ‘the company’ reimburse their legal fees during that action, and if the Court presiding over that action must defer to that decision as within the “business judgment rule”, then in every shareholder action a majority can and will supersede the control of the Court, R. 4:42-9, and New Jersey law and public policy.  No vote to impose fee-shifting of a majority’s legal fees onto the minority parties involved in the action could be voided by the Court.  De facto fee-shifting must now be allowed even among direct parties to an action, such as exist here, and despite New Jersey law’s strict prohibitions against fee-shifting.  In a hypothetical 51% vs. 49% shareholder dispute, the majority will always charge 49% of their personal legal fees in the action to the minority parties by simply voting that the company itself will reimburse them, as was done here.  That will reduce the net equity value of the 49% owner’s shares and thereby charge that minority owner his or her adversaries’ legal fees even where no statute, rule or agreement allowed.  A Court will have no authority to disallow despite R. 4:42-9.  The single largest exception to the American Rule is now found in the “business judgment rule” even though it heretofore did not insulate against unlawful and/or self-interested decisions.  This Court should reverse that part of the judgment of valuation (and the Order denying [...]’s motion to reconsider), to the extent they allowed Plaintiffs’ legal fees to be considered a proper “long term liability” of [...] for purposes of valuing [...] and [...]’s 29.5% interests.  It should remand with instructions to disallow the $2.8 million of Plaintiffs’ legal fees as a company-wide “long term liability” for 2018, and increase [...]’s net asset value accordingly.
[brief] (Da3; Da6, ¶1).  The Global Fee Application sought fees in the amount of $3,570,357.50 in connection with 5,485.1 hours of work covering the specified six+ year period.  (Da7, ¶3).  For the first two of those six years (July 27, 2016 to approximately July 27, 2018) now-retired Chancery Court Judge, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (ret.)\(^5\) presided over the post-judgment proceedings.  For the next four years to present, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. has presided over these matters.  This is not [...]’s first fee application.
[brief] After Defendants filed a motion to dismiss/summary judgment on March 3, 2022 (Da102-126)  Plaintiff filed a certification claiming that she did not list [...] as a creditor because she understood the Contracts to be the purchase of an asset, not a loan, and that the asset had an unknown value, if any.  (Da346-347)  Plaintiff also stated that she relied on [...] to advise her regarding the transaction, and that, against [...]’s advice, she signed the Contract because she desperately needed the money.  (Da347)  On September 21, 2022, Counts 1 and 2 were dismissed because Defendants were not unlicensed lenders, did not engage in usury; and did not violate RICO.  (Da102-126)  Counts 3, 4 & 5 were not dismissed so Plaintiff could conduct discovery.  (Da102-126)  On October 6, 2022, Defendants filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses.  (Da060; Da323-344)  No discovery was conducted because the end date was May 14, 2022.  (Da006)  On October 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count 3.  (Da035)  On November 22, 2022, after Defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts 3, 4 & 5 (Da038-347)  Plaintiff agreed to dismiss Count 5 and the claims against [...] and [...].  (Da020)  M.  The Trial Court Dismisses the Complaint and Denies the Motion for Reconsideration  On December 23, 2022 the Trial Court dismissed Counts 3, 4 & 5 (Count 5 with Plaintiff’s consent)(Da001-022; Da012)  On February 3, 2023 the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  (Da348; Da023-033)  LEGAL ARGUMENTS
[brief] Unable to refute those facts, Defendants instead argue [...] could never prove [...] lacked probable cause because “people came up to [...] and told him in August 2019 that there were people crossing the dune in front of the Westerhold property, and [...] personally observed multiple people crossing from the Westerhold property over the [...] property where [...] fencing had recently been installed. ” (Drb18).  There are multiple flaws in this argument.  First, [...] admittedly did not rely on what anyone else told him (Da2230; Pa317-Pa322), making Defendants’ argument that hearsay is a proper basis for establishing probable cause a red herring because that is not what happened here by [...]’s own admission.  Second, even if [...] had relied on hearsay, that hearsay did not identify anyone specific and, therefore, did not provide probable cause to file criminal charges against a specific person.  Defendants do not contend anyone actually told [...] they saw [...] commit these alleged crimes.  In fact, [...]’s own limited observations from two blocks away, in which he claims he saw “younger people” (Pa318), demonstrates this “hearsay” did not provide sufficient probable cause to file criminal charges against [...].  Third, because the alleged hearsay addressed a single event, it could not provide probable cause that [...] “continuously walks over the property,” (Pa84) (emphasis added), which was identified in the criminal complaint as an eight-month period.  Likewise, given that no one ever actually saw anyone break the [...] fence, there could not possibly be probable cause that John “Westerhold broke through our beach fence and crosses our property against our wishes.
[brief] I think that was an improper statement to argue to the jury.  [(9T104-13 to 19). ]  The trial court, although intimating the prosecutor should not have presented the hypo, ultimately held, “whether it was artful or inartful, I don’t think there’s anything inappropriate about it to rise to the level of requiring a mistrial or any kind of a curative instruction.  I’ll leave it at that. ” (9T105-20 to 24).  Accordingly, the State’s improper remarks were not stricken, and no curative instruction was given.  To be sure, the State’s comments were grossly misleading and inaccurate.  First, the kind of scenario the State was talking about would generally be covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5, which explicitly covers situations where someone recklessly kills another by striking them in a car while under the influence.
[brief] When determining whether a rental contract assigned a duty to maintain the parking lot to a tenant, it must be first understood that a landlord has the duty, albeit a delegable one, to “exercise reasonable care to guard against foreseeable dangers arising from use of those portions of the rental property over which the landlord retains control,” a duty which includes snow and ice removal.  *Shields v. Ramslee Motors*, 240 N.J. 479, 491 (2020).  In this case, [...] did not have exclusive control and possession of the entire property.
[brief] Often, the parties agree that the producing party will perform a pre-production review of the search results (already narrowed by the parties’ search terms and selected custodians) for privilege and relevance.  Id. at 285, 288, 293-94.  Documents tagged as privileged are withheld and noted on a privilege log, allowing the requesting party to analyze and challenge that designation.  Documents withheld as irrelevant are a different story.  Those documents typically are neither produced nor logged.  As a result, the requesting party has no way of knowing whether these documents exist and has no way to challenge the other party’s unilateral relevancy determination.  Cf. id. at 290-98.  This approach can have the benefit of screening out irrelevant documents, but it is also subject to abuse and human error.
[brief] The trial court mentioned as much at least three times.  The court below went so far as to explain that while the defendants attempted to characterize [...] as delusional for having the temerity to file this lawsuit, “I didn’t find that he was delusional.  I found him credible.  I found [...] credible.  I found transactions which were diversions or misappropriations. ”  The trial court made no similar credibility findings about the defendants or their experts.  In fact, the trial court rejected the defendants’ explanations for their conduct, concluding: “there’s nothing there.  You know there was really no meat to most of the explanations. ”
[brief] Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants on August 16, 2020, alleging fraud and quiet title among other things (Da001 – Da017).  On January 6, 2021, Defendants’ previous counsel filed an answer and counterclaims (Da018 – Da039).  Plaintiff filed an answer to counterclaims on February 11, 2021 (Da040 – Da047).  After a significant amount of litigation, the trial for this case began on January 10, 2023, and lasted until February 1, 2023 (1T – 15T).  On January 26, 2023, Defendants’ counsel made an oral motion for judgment under Rule 4:40-1 (11T).  On January 27, 2023, the court denied Defendants’ motion and continued the trial to completion (12T).  On April 20, 2023, both Plaintiff and Defendants submitted post-trial briefs regarding their respective positions.  On May 22, 2023, the trial court issued its memorandum decision (Da50 – Da74).
[brief] To support its claim the trial court “inverted” the standard of review, [...] quotes out of context a single paragraph from the trial court’s Memorandum of Decision wherein the court provides certain examples demonstrating [...]’s pleadings do not demonstrate a “public interest. ” (Pb40) (citing Pa56-Pa57).  Specifically, the trial court noted [...]’s pleadings did not establish things like whether the public who appeared “were actually Township residents, how many people appeared, and whether the people that did appear represented a fair cross section of the Township as opposed to just homeowners who live close to the project. ” (Pa56).  [...] conveniently omits the following paragraph, which begins by stating:  “Even assuming the public had an interest in Ordinance 13-2022, the Court finds such interest to be akin to the public’s interest in [...], thus such interest is not the type of interest contemplated under the limitation’s exception. ” (Pa57).  This clearly demonstrates the alleged “fact issues” the trial court identified were simply illustrative of the types of allegations that could possibly reflect a public interest, and were not relied upon or dispositive to the court’s holding.  In other words, in accord with the “indulgent” standard of review required by Printing Mart, the trial court assumed for purposes of the motion the truth of [...]’s allegations that the public had an interest in Ordinance No. 13-2022.  It then decided, as a matter of law, the nature of this interest, as alleged by [...] and interpreted under controlling appellate case law, was private, not public, and thus did not merit an enlargement of time under prevailing standards.  As such, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the court correctly applied the standard of review for a motion to dismiss.\footnote{Even if the trial court did err by citing “fact issues” in the one paragraph [...] quotes, such error was harmless as it was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] Id., p. 1.  FAC ¶ 54, id.  By its terms, the NDA provided for non-circumvention of plaintiffs’ rights by limiting the use of the information disclosed under the NDA to “carry out discussions concerning and furthering of any business relationship between the parties. ”  (Section 2.)  Any disclosure to third-parties or use of the materials for CEP-defendants’ own gain were prohibited.  (Sections 2, 3).  CEP-Defendants were required to return all documents and information provided by plaintiff [...] when the “discussions” were complete.
[brief] On September 21, 2020, he began employment with [...] for a second time.  (Pa4).  A multiple enrollment form was submitted to the [...] (the Division) on October 5, 2020.  (Pa4).  On August 30, 2021, the Division informed [...] that it can no longer submit pension contributions for [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7, because multiple membership is prohibited following a break-in-service in any concurrently held PERS position.
[brief] A.  This court’s review of the question whether any counsel fee was expressly authorized by contract is de novo.  Because the question whether an award was expressly authorized by a contractual provision is a question that “is purely legal in nature,” this court owes “no deference” to the trial court’s conclusions of law.  State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66, 80 (2015); see also, Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
[brief] [...]  [...]  P: [...]  F: [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents - [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (Atty ID: 024101999)  [...], Esq.  (Atty ID: 354252021)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS.................................................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.............................................................  1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................................................  2 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW...............................................................  4  POINT I- THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AS APPELLANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF [...]..............................................  5 POINT II - THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO EVIDENCE OF FORESEEABILITY..................................................  11 POINT III - THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT [...] CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR [...]’S UNPREDICTABLE AND UNFORESEEABLE ACTIONS..............  13 CONCLUSION..................................................................................
[brief] See, CAIFa0049-0049.  In 2020, [...] plead guilty to first-degree conspiracy, first-degree money laundering, seven counts of third-degree filing fraudulent tax returns, three counts of third-degree failure to pay taxes and second-degree commercial bribery in connection with the illegal kickback scheme.  Additionally, the [...] permanently stripped him of his medical license finding that he indiscriminately prescribed Subsys, a powerful painkiller used in cancer treatment.  See, CAIFa0050-0052.
[brief] | RA Reference | Description | |--------------|-------------| | RA1-RA6 | Toops v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, No. A-1611-16T1, 2018  N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1721 (App. Div. July 18, 2018) | | RA7-RA9 | Matthews v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1198 (App. Div. July 1, 2022) | | RA10-RA14 | Bevins v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1128 (App. Div., June 10, 2024) | | RA15-17 | Mendez v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 164 (App. Div., February 2, 2024)
[brief] If the [...] finds that the development would be esthetically unpleasing, cause flooding on neighboring properties and damage the character of the neighborhood, it is free to do so.  In addition, this is a lot with a depth of 916.99 feet.  The exact location of wetlands on and within 300 feet of this property has never been determined by measurement of a licensed professional.  All references to the location of wetlands on the property as contained in the variance plans prepared by [...] are only approximations "taken from NJDEP mapping".  See Ja169, Ja170, Ja245, Ja253.