ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Trial Court Order affirming the Planning Board decision, entered May 26, 2023 .......................................................... Ja12 Trial Court memorandum of Decision ............................................. Ja13-20 Order Denying Reconsideration, July 7, 2023 ...................................... Ja21 Resolution No. 3-2021, [...], rejecting [...] application ........................................... Ja224-233 Resolution No. 5-2021, [...], rejecting [...] application ...........................................
[brief] Although not mentioned in the Appellate Division decision in Clarksburg Inn, the Millstone ordinance which was upheld in that decision also regulates the unamplified human voice (“yelling, shouting, hooting, whistling or singing in the public streets …”).  Da 104.  In addition, for purposes of brevity, the [...] directs the Court to its Appellate brief and the review of applicable case law for further argument.  (13-14; 21-22; 32-33).  preempted by another more specific State statute.  The [...] does not argue with this position; however, it is not pertinent to the matter herein where the HRA is more specific than the nuisance laws under Title 26 which are not specific.  The Respondents’ reference to Earruso v. Township of East Hanover, 14 N.J. Misc. 96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1936) is also not relevant as it is (1) not a noise nuisance and (2) by its terms is more specific than the HRA.  Respondents miss the mark.  Here, the HRA is more specific than Title 26, which does not even mention noise, and as such the [...] properly enacted Ordinance 17-2017 pursuant to the HRA.
[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (Da15–17)  The Complaint should also have been dismissed because Plaintiff was barred from bringing this action in New Jersey and the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it.  Plaintiff does not dispute that it did not have a certificate of authority to transact business in New Jersey at any time prior to commencing this lawsuit or for the first eleven months that it prosecuted the case.  Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that it “was prohibited by N.J.S.A. 42:2C-65(a) from filing its original Complaint. ”  Pb30.  Thus, the question is whether the Trial Court’s resultant lack of jurisdiction was retroactively remedied by Plaintiff’s registration as a foreign LLC in New Jersey in September 2023.  It was not, and the cases upon which Plaintiff relies for that proposition do not so hold.  The case upon which Plaintiff principally relies, *Materials Research Corp. v. Metron, Inc.*, 64 N.J. 74 (1973), is inapposite, as the Supreme Court there was addressing a situation in which the plaintiff never obtained a certificate of authority.  And, the footnoted observation upon which Plaintiff relies is dicta (at best) and based upon a 1966 Chancery Division decision addressing a different statute that expressly contemplated an ability to cure.  *Id.* at 77 n.1 (citing *Menley & James Laboratories, Ltd. v. Vornado, Inc.*, 90 N.J. Super. 404, 414 (Ch. Div. 1966)).  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s newfound framing of the issue as one of “statutory standing” ignores the cases discussed in Defendants’ opening brief, in which New Jersey courts have addressed the defect as giving rise to a question of subject matter jurisdiction and have concluded (on less compelling facts than those here) that the “jurisdictional bar to suit” cannot be cured during pending litigation.
[brief] Regardless, its claims are betrayed by the two available Surveys.  Furthermore, and assuming [...] intends to adversely possess [...]’s Lot 22 as depicted correctly by the surveyors, the Dwight Aff. still fails.  The most the affidavit musters is: (i) a vague, uncorroborated statement that [...]’s parishioners have mowed the lawn and removed snow; and (ii) an equally vague statement that [...] pays for lighting costs.
[brief] Plaintiff here posits that since the Seller in *89 Water Street* was required to perform an RAO, so should the Defendants in the case at bar.  Plaintiff contends that requiring Defendants herein to perform the RAO would be “equitable. ”  Pb31.  The most important distinction between the case at bar and *89 Water Street* is the actual wording of the contract.  In *89 Water Street*, the writing contained unambiguous language that laid the obligation on the Seller, specifically: “the parties acknowledge[ed] that [ISRA], the regulations promulgated thereunder[,] and any amending or successor legislation and regulations” applied to the transaction.  It also provided that as a condition precedent to plaintiff’s obligations under the agreement, defendants must “receive[] from the Industrial Site Evaluation Element [(ISEE)] or its successor . . . a Clearance Document by the Closing Date. ”  The obligation in *89 Water Street* was purely Seller’s, wherein the obligation herein was only for Defendants to cooperate with Plaintiff.  Pa0245.  In the instant matter, not only the contract - but the evidence adduced at trial – proves that Defendants herein were only obligated to cooperate “to the extent possible” (Pb2) with Plaintiff.  Though Plaintiff wished to deflect attention from that language, it did not wholly obligate the Defendants to obtain environmental clearance in this matter, unlike *89 Water Street*.  Despite the clear language in that contract, the trial court in *89 Water Street* concluded that the contract contemplated Defendants only being obligated to secure a clearance document under ISRA and not under SRRA as a superseding law.  This was, obviously, contrary to the actual wording of the contract.  Though Plaintiff herein would like to rely on *89 Water Street* as a case starkly analogous to the case at bar, that logic ignores the actual terms of the two distinct contracts – which in *89 Water Street* inarguably held Seller to be responsible for any current and superseding laws, and did not, as herein, only oblige Sellers to cooperate with Purchaser.
[brief] In February of 2023, Officer [...] was a nine-year veteran of the Elizabeth Police force, assigned to the Narcotics Division.  (1T4-8 to 5-15).  During his career, [...] attended numerous courses in the subjects of arrest, search and seizure, identifying criminal vehicles, and other specialized areas of narcotics investigation.  He also took extracurricular courses in his own time and at his own expense.  (1T5-16 to 24).  Officer [...] took continuous in-service training, including the Top Gun course, spoke to many former users and former distributors of narcotics, and was familiar with the many tactics used in dealing drugs.  (1T5-25 to 6-20).  As a member of the Narcotics Division, Officer [...] was responsible to proactively address quality-of-life issues specific to narcotics and gangs, and had conducted prolonged investigations ending with recovery of sizeable amounts of narcotics, weapons and currency.  (1T6-21 to 7-7).  Throughout his career, he participated in well over 200 narcotics-related investigations and more than 100 arrests.  (1T7-8 to 18).  In his experience, guns were often recovered in narcotics operations.  Guns are a tool of the trade, used by drug dealers to protect their merchandise, profits, and territory from rival gangs.  (1T7-19 to 9-1).  Drug sellers working in the area of Jackson Avenue and Bond Street in Elizabeth used an intricate, multi-tiered system for distributing drugs.  (1T14-17 to 15-2).  Under this system, a buyer would request narcotics from one individual, who would alert a second individual to retrieve the product that would then be handed to the buyer, with the money ending up in the hands of yet another individual.  (1T15-3 to 8).  The product typically would be held in a stash, or hidden location, where a particular amount could be retrieved as needed.  (1T15-14 to 23).  The system was intended to prevent the police from apprehending an individual with both product and cash in hand, allowing dealers to maintain a legal defense and also to protect their profits.  (1T15-8 to 13).  On February 10, 2023, at about 3:00 in the afternoon, Officer [...] and approximately sixteen other members of the Narcotics Division were conducting a surveillance operation near Jefferson Park, and at the intersection of Jackson Avenue and Bond Street and the intersection of Catherine Street and Flora Street.
[brief] ” (State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91, 101 (App. Div. 2009)(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).  If the evidence is no longer available, a defendant may still obtain relief by demonstrating that it had “exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed”; if a defendant can only establish potential exculpatory value, he must demonstrate that the evidence was destroyed in bad faith.  (Id. at 102-103).
[brief] Cases  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135 (2001)  ..................................................................................................................10  Ernest Bock & Sons-Dobco Pennsauken Joint Venture v. Township of Pennsauken, 477 N.J. Super 254 (App. Div. 2023) ......................................................................................12, 24 Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 202, N.J. 369 (2010)  ....................................................................................................................9  Figueroa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 N.J. Super. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ..........................................................................................15  Giannakopolous v. Mid State Mall, 438 N.J. Super. 595 (App. Div. 2014)  .......................................................................................10  Hillside v. Sternin, 25 N.J. 317 (1957)  .......................................................................................................................28  Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307 (1994)  .....................................................................................................................10  P&A Constr., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge, 365 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2004)  .........................................................................................23  R.C.G. Const. Co., Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Bor. Of Keyport, 346 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 2001)  ...........................................................................................14, 17 [...] v. [...], d/b/a [...], [...] and [...], 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826 (N.J. DOL May 6, 2010) ............................................................... passim Township of River Vale v. R.J. Longo Constr. Co., 127 NJ. Super. 207 (Law Div. 1974) .........................................................................................25 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:44-126 ..................................................................................................................15 N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-2 ......................................................................................................................15 N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26 .............................................................................................................21 N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26(5) .......................................................................................................22 N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48 et seq ....................................................................................................1 N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.49 .............................................................................................................12 N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.50 .............................................................................................................22 N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq .........................................................................................................3 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] In issuing the HAD, the Department did not state which one of the activities listed in Exemption 11 applied. \(^8\) --- \(^7\)  Appellants have also contended on appeal that the "DEP's determination that the proposed project is consistent with the [Water Quality Management Plan] is arbitrary and capricious" because the Department failed to "view the totality of the proposed project."  Because we agree with appellants' first point that the Department has misinterpreted Exemption 11, necessitating a remand to the agency, we do not reach their second point.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4a(1) .................................................................  28  REGULATIONS  N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.1(d) ...........................................................................  20, 21 N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1 .................................................................................. 9 N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a) ............................................................................  17, 24 N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1 ...........................................................................  12, 25, 28 N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b) ............................................................................ 17, 18 N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b)1.v ....................................................................... 17 N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b)1.vi ...................................................................... 17 N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2 ............................................................................... 18, 20 N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(l)(2) ....................................................................... 8 N.J.A.C. 4A:10-2.1(a) ......................................................................... 11 RULES R. 1:36-3 ............................................................................................. 22 OTHER AUTHORITIES [...] Contract & State of New Jersey, July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2023, https://wpsite.cwa1038.org/public_html/PDF_Files/[...]_NJ_2019_ 2023_Contract.pdf (last accessed Jan. 15, 2025) .................................. 26, 27 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (1T87-18 to 89-8; 5T10-16 to 12-14; 5T40-19 to 41-21).  The kitchen door was closed but not locked, with no dead bolts or markings, and [...] understood the door to be an interior door.  (1T82-21 to 83-20; 1T88-7 to 24; 5T10-16 to 12-23; Ra24; Da55).  The kitchen door faced the left side of the property, and opened onto a rear stairwell landing.  (Ra24; Da55).  Across from the kitchen door was another interior door that had no markings that would have indicated it was a separate apartment; and there was no locking mechanism, such as a deadbolt, on the door other than a locking doorknob, which looked like another bedroom’s doorknob on the second floor.
[brief] B.  SEA BRIGHT ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE ITSELF FROM SHORE REGIONAL AND OCEANPORT AND JOIN IN A PROPOSED EXPANDED HENRY HUDSON REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT.  Between February 2022 and July 2022 Respondents each passed resolutions indicating that they respectively found good cause to pursue a referendum seeking: a) the withdrawal of [...] from both [...] and [...]; b) the creation of a new, all-purpose regional school district comprised of the [...], Atlantic [...], [...], and [...]; and c) permitting special counsel to take any and all actions to effectuate these goals through the pursuit of approval by the Commissioner of a referendum on the proposed regionalization.
[directive] When there is a rebuttable presumption to seek a complaint-warrant.  1.  A law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile has committed the following offenses, unless consultation with an authorized Assistant Prosecutor or a Designated Supervisory Officer determines that the presumption of charging by complaint-warrant is overcome:  a.  Witness tampering/retaliation, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5; b.  Witness obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(3); c.  Witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3); d.  Eluding that constitutes a second-degree crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); e.  Third-degree assault on public officials or employees, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5); f.  Photographing, filming, sexual exploitation, or abuse of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24- 4(b)(4) or (b)(5); g.  Violation of Chapter 35 of Title 2C that constitutes a first- or second-degree crime; Consistent with the Interstate Compact for Juveniles, N.J.S.A. 9:23-1 et seq., 19  Any juvenile, charged with being a delinquent by reason of violating any criminal law shall be returned to the requesting state upon a requisition to the state where the juvenile may be found, provided that the underlying offense is designated a crime in this State.
[brief] A review of the Subdivision Plan, which again is referenced prominently in Defendants’ Deed, and which is a document on file with Brigantine and recorded with the Atlantic County Clerk, is revealing.  Ja148.  Perhaps most importantly, the Subdivision Plan makes clear that it was prepared in relation to a transaction between [...] (i.e. Defendants’ predecessor in interest) and Plaintiffs related to Lot 3.  Ja148.  The Subdivision Plan further shows that Defendants were not buying all of the Lot 3 purchased by [...], but instead were getting the portion of Lot 3 that was left-over after 40’ of frontage was taken away and added to Lot 2.\(^5\)  In addition, an inset on the Subdivision Plan references and shows the then-existing Brigantine tax map for the block, which shows the correct combined 21\(^{st}\) Street frontage of 185’ and correct pre-subdivision widths for each lot (105’ and 80’), contradicting the measurements on the prepared subdivision.  Ja148.  The 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Pursuant to N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted R. 2:2-3(a)(2), which contemplates that every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division.  Thus, the rule mandates the exclusive allocation to the Appellate Division of review of both final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).  The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).
[brief] Ca277.  [...] subsequently filed a cross-motion to intervene in the foreclosure matter and opposed confirmation of the same.  Ca288.  On April 28, 2022, the trial court denied [...]’s motion to intervene in this matter.  Ca299.  [...]’s cross motion to intervene in the foreclosure matter was also denied.  Ca114.  The sale was confirmed by written order in the foreclosure action.  Ca150.  More than a year passed.  Then, on June 8, 2023, [...] filed a motion to be discharged as the receiver.
[brief] With regard to the foregoing posts and comments regarding school standards and gender identity, Respondent gave the following response, which was in the record at the time the Commission’s Final Decision was considered and issued:  Counts 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Amended Complaint contain your public statements in opposition to the inclusion of transgender students in New Jersey schools.  ADMIT __X__ DENY ____ (Ca168 at RQA 20; Ca171 at Response to RQA 20).  22.  The Public Comment portions of the March 17, 2022 and April 28, 2022 Board meetings primarily consisted of students and parents expressing deep concern over Respondent’s Facebook posts.  (Ca107-109, Ca120-122).  Many students and parents spoke about how Respondent’s posts impacted their experience in the District.  (Ca123-127) (PATCH Article: “Students and community members once again gathered Thursday to protest the social media posts of two [...] Members. ”).  There was even a protest outside the school on March 17, 2022.  (Ca108) (Board minutes: “[...] stated that there was an organized protest outside the school”).  23.
[brief] Notably, while the Court is not bound by the NJDOL’s interpretation of the PWCRA, courts have recognized that the DOL’s interpretation of the PWCRA should be given deference.  R.C.G. Const. Co., Inc., 346 N.J. Super. at 66.  In its Denial Order, the trial court completely disregarded the DOL’s determination in [...], and wrongfully accepted Respondents’ prior argument that archaeologists are professionals and thereby somehow exempt from the PWCRA registration requirement even though they are in fact a subcontractor to a contractor performing a public project.  Because the Denial Order flies in the face of the Legislative history and the DOL’s own determination in [...], LLC (both of which the trial court completely ignored), it cannot stand on appeal and should be overturned.
[brief] As these videos played, the detective again identified what she believed to be the Chevy.  (4T168-25 to 177-15)  (Da11 at S-14 to S-36)  The following three videos (S-37, S-38, S-39) were critical to the State’s case as the only videos that purport to show the suspected shooter, on foot, in the direct vicinity of the location where the victim was later found wounded. \(^2\) (Da11 at S-37, S-38, S-39)  Those videos are discussed in the legal argument below.
[brief] [...] also laments, baselessly, that [...]’s application was “untethered to any specific bad act(s). ” (Db8).  Again, from 2016 to 2023, [...] repeatedly misrepresented that he and [...] were not sitting on money overseas that could be used to pay the judgment.  They repeatedly filed affirmative motions to stop the sale of [...] and to have [...] released from jail predicated on a fraud on the court.  (Da19-22).  The fraud is ongoing as [...] is paying for [...]’s attorneys to continue to make motions that there is no further money to be brought back when at least $17 million is unaccounted for.  (Pa246).  The fee application was tethered directly to Defendants’ fraud on the court, which was literally proven again while the fee motion was pending (when, in January 2023, $3 million in accounts held overseas by [...] and [...] was located in Slovakia).