ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Although the affidavit did not make this clear, [...] testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence seized from [...]’s car that the informant’s tip was in fact phrased in the past tense; the informant stated that “he used to deliver narcotics . . . to a certain storage unit. ”  (3T 15-7 to 12) (emphasis added) demonstrate that.  (Dca 7-8)  [...] witnessed no exchange of anything -- currency or otherwise.  Nor did [...] see either [...] or the unidentified man “look[] around really suspiciously” to make sure no one was watching them.  Arthur, 149 N.J. at 4.  Cf. Id. at 4-5, 10-12 (officer had reasonable suspicion that a drug exchange occurred where the defendant parked his car in an area known for narcotic activity, an individual entered the car and stayed inside for a short period of time, the individual left with a paper bag she did not have before, and she looked around suspiciously upon exiting the car).  The fact that [...] circled the block to get a better view of the interaction itself confirms that what he witnessed was not sufficiently compelling.  Our Supreme Court has made clear that in cases based on an informant’s tip of drug-related activity, controlled buys are the gold standard of corroboration.
[directive] The degree of participation in organizational activities necessary to trigger Aggravating Factor #4b ordinarily would not be established merely by the fact that the defendant is a low-level employee of a criminal enterprise, or served solely as a kind of “independent contractor” (e.g., a drug courier or so-called “mule”) of a commercial drug distribution enterprise.  Accordingly, before invoking Aggravating Factor #4b, the prosecutor should be aware of facts that reasonably suggest that the defendant was a direct participant or stakeholder in the illicit commercial enterprise.  The fact that a defendant was paid a fixed fee for services (e.g., $500 to transport a shipment of drugs from a source state to New Jersey), rather than receiving a percentage of profits or proceeds of illicit drug transactions, would ordinarily suggest that the defendant was merely a “mule” or courier and thus not subject to Aggravating Factor #4b.
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  10.8  Maximum effective distance/range for deployment of specific projectiles shall not exceed the specifications approved by the Attorney General.  10.9  Intentionally aiming approved less-lethal impact ammunition at the head, neck, chest, or groin shall be avoided unless deadly force is justified, necessary, and appropriate.  10.10  No ammunition designed to be skip-fired and/or non-target specific will be deemed to be acceptable.  10.11  Approved less-lethal devices or ammunition shall not be used in a crowd management situation except against specific threatening assailants or active assailants, in strict compliance with Section 3.8 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  10.12  Less-lethal devices or ammunition shall not be used to prevent a person from causing property damage.  10.13  A less-lethal device shall not be directed against a person who is situated on an elevated surface (e.g., a ledge, scaffold, near a precipice, etc.) unless reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or minimize a fall-related injury (e.g., deploying a safety net).
[brief] Claimants intending to avail adverse possession like [...] must show that its use and possession was actual, meaning that it had a physical presence on the property and establish facts showing “actual acts of ownership over the property . . . but also a certain frequency in the performance of those acts, sufficient to amount, in the eyes of the law, to a continuity of possession during the statutory period. ”  *Ibid.*  These actual acts must amount to more than the payment of taxes and maintenance of the property.  *Id.* at 189; see also *Caruso v. Hunt*, 69 N.J. Super. 447, 451 (Ch. Div.1961) (holding payment of taxes “would hardly satisfy the elements necessary to qualify one as an adverse possessor. ”).  [...] cannot prove that its use and possession of the Property was actual under the prevailing legal standard based upon the scant evidence in the record.
[brief] In addition, [...] participated in the matter below as an amicus curiae and will similarly offer specific procedural and factual history in this brief, none of which are in dispute, which are relevant to [...]’s special interest and involvement in this matter.  [...] actively participated in the trial court declaratory judgment action filed by [...] as a result of Mount Laurel IV and reached a settlement with the Township on July 13, 2017, shortly after the conclusion of the trial on methodology held in Mercer County by the Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. and prior to the decision being issued in that trial.  Pa257.  As a part of that settlement, the parties agreed to a 1,141-unit Third Round (1999-2025) obligation that represented a 35% downward adjustment of the [...] expert's determination of [...]'s cumulative Third Round need, including the "gap present need" that accrued during the 16 years between 1999 and 2015.  Pa121; T2.10:11.  Notably, Judge Jacobson ruled that [...] would have had an even larger fair share if the matter had not settled.  On August 28, 2017, Judge Jacobson accepted the Special Master’s recommendation and approved the settlement, including the development presently at issue.  Pa186; T2.10:3.  One developer left out of the plan, [...], objected at the hearing, and neither [...] nor [...] appeared at the hearing.  T2.37:12-15.  On December 14, 2017, following approval of the settlement, the court scheduled an amended compliance hearing with public notice allowing for objections to be filed.  Judge Jacobson approved [...]’s Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (“HEFSP”) plan and implementing ordinances at that hearing.
[brief] Plaintiff filed its initial Complaint in this matter on August 17, 2023 seeking a determination that [...] is in violation of its Third Round Mount Laurel compliance obligation, and seeking the rezoning of the Property to develop the Property with an inclusionary development -- a builder’s remedy.  (Da179).  As a result of the Township’s efforts to frustrate Plaintiff’s development of the Property, as set forth below, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on September 27, 2023, a Second Amended Complaint on December 4, 2023, and a Third Amended Complaint on March 28, 2024.
[brief] The decision didn’t break new ground; rather, this Court in Neuwirth correctly applied and restated the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s well-established precedent that the actual malice standard requires a showing “that the publisher either knew the statement was false or published with reckless disregard for the truth. ”  Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 391 (quoting Lynch, 161 N.J. at 165).  In other words, the law of defamation is the same in New Jersey today as it was before Neuwirth.  The fact that Neuwirth issued during the pendency of the case at bar is irrelevant because the underlying jurisprudence relating to defamation generally, and actual malice specifically, was already well-settled.
[brief] 8  2.  PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH ANY CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN ANY ALLEGED ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION AND HER FILING OF HER FIVE-YEAR-OLD LAWSUIT  ........................................................................................................  19  B.  COUNT IV OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED WHERE PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT RESTEL WAS AN “AIDER AND ABETTOR OF DISCRIMINATION” ..................22  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................24
[brief] The Appellate Division’s February 2, 2018 Opinion on Direct Appeal  On February 2, 2018, this Court vacated defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit “robbery and/or kidnapping”, and affirmed the remainder of his convictions and sentence.  (Da165-90).  \(^2\)  Contrary to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s recitations of the facts, responding officers were not able to apprehend the fleeing suspect.  (See 9T139-24 to 142-6).  D.
[brief] It would be quite extraordinary, bordering on Kafkaesque, if it were true that a trial judge tasked with deciding whether a tenant had violated a lease lacked all jurisdiction to review a defense premised entirely on a provision within that same lease that went directly to the ultimate issue of amount owed.  Fortunately, that is not the case.  While the scope of Landlord-Tenant part jurisdiction must be construed narrowly, Carr, 211 N.J. Super. at 347, it cannot be so narrow as to preclude the Tenant from presenting a defense, particularly a defense premised on the Lease.
[brief] 18  Every liability finding affirmed by this Court in its 2018 Opinion justified [...]’s decision to award punitive damages.  See 2018 Op. at *19 (“the record fully supports the … determination that defendants had misused partnership funds …. ”); id. at 20 (“The record … supports the … determination that defendants improperly withdrew partnership funds to pay themselves management fees. ”); id. (“there is sufficient credible evidence in the record … that defendants had not shown they were entitled to the hypothetical and theoretical management fees they were seeking”); id. at 22 (“there is sufficient credible evidence … to support the … findings of fact and conclusions of law  [...]’ suggestion on appeal that [...] was required to completely re-consider [...]’s determination that the Wilfs’ criminal conduct warranted the imposition of punitive damages borders on the farcical, particularly in view of the established and binding facts of this case.
[brief] This is an action stemming from a single-car accident on August 20, 2021 in Hamilton, New Jersey that tragically resulted in the death of 13-year-old [...].  Defendant [...], Miles’ brother, was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident.  Plaintiffs-Appellants, the [...] and his parents, filed this action seeking a declaration as to coverage under the excess liability coverage part and excess uninsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage part of a [...] Personal Excess Policy issued to the parents.
[brief] (15T29-15 to 30-4; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5)).  Her finding was supported by the fact that (1) defendant hand-selected the marijuana to transport to New Jersey; (2) the drugs were packaged with a level of sophistication to avoid detection; (3) defendant solicited the help of others to help him whom he paid money for their services to transport those drugs across state lines for distribution; and (4) defendant possessed more than a kilo of cocaine, all while possessing a large quantity of marijuana for distribution.  (Ibid.; accord 8T50-24 to 51-2; 9T56-19 to 60-14; 11T37-10 to 43-5; 11T159-23 to 160-1).  In addition, when arrested defendant had $60,000 to $70,000 in cash in his [...] residence.  (9T75-12 to 22; Pa4).  The above facts also support the trial court finding of aggravating factor 9, in that there was a need to deter not only generally, but also specifically defendant.  (15T30-5 to 9).
[directive] 7.1.5  When taking a formal statement from a civilian, the investigator shall video- or audio- record the statement according to the same protocols that would apply if the civilian were being interviewed in connection with a criminal investigation.  If a witness objects to the recording of the interview, the investigator may proceed with the interview without recording, but must document in writing the reasons for doing so.  7.1.6  When taking a formal statement from an officer, the investigator shall video or audio- record the statement, except that in cases that did not arise from a civilian complaint, the investigator need not record the statement unless the officer being interviewed requests such.  7.2
[brief] Even where a judge’s prior comments are stern, a trial judge is not required to recuse himself if his comments do not reveal bias or prejudice.  See State v. J.J., 397 N.J. Super. 91, 103 (App. Div. 2007), certify. granted, 194 N.J. 446 (2008).  And in the present case, bias and prejudice are absent.  Defendant did not provide any proofs [...] would not be able to remain objective and impartial while presiding over the remand proceedings.  Thus, absent a showing of bias or prejudice, the participation of a judge in previous proceedings in the case before him is not a ground for disqualification.  See State v. Walker, 33 N.J. 580, 591 (1960).  Simply put, a judge is not required to recuse himself from remand proceedings because the judgment resulting from previous proceedings had been reversed on appeal.  See Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Shuster Corp., 212 N.J. Super 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986) (Recusal not required where trial judge had given his opinion on fraud issue at initial trial).  As previously stated, a judge may continue to participate in a case when an opinion he has rendered was expressed during the proceeding regarding the same controversy.  See State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 129 (App. Div. 2002).  Consideration must also be given to the fact it would be counterproductive to require a new judge to acquaint himself or herself with the remanded litigation.
[brief] Unlike the statute of limitations, laches is NOT a SPECIFIC TIME LIMIT SET BY LAW, BUT RATHER A PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS AND EQUITY.  In summary, the statute of limitations is a FIXED TIME LIMIT SET BY LAW, while laches is a defense based on the concept of FAIRNESS AND UNREASONABLE DELAY.  In applying a Standard of Review for this issue it must be noted the trial court misapplied using laches (R 2:10-2) to deny a Fundamental Right at stake, indicating 33-years constitutes laches for failure to file in a reasonable amount of time (Pa17 – Pa18).  As matter of law, laches does not govern civil rights actions, for statutes of limitations would apply “unless” an EXCEPTION were to be made by the court (to which the court did not address (Pa1; Pa133).
[brief] 1-10, Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.  DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, FARIBA HEDVAT’S REPLY BRIEF AND OPPOSITION  BRIEF TO PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS’ CROSS-APPEAL  [...]  Continental Plaza II, 411 Hackensack Ave.  Hackensack, New Jersey 07601  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, [...]
[brief] See Da_204.  But *Sullivan* contains no discussion of whether failure to adequately allege actual malice would be suitable for determination at the pleading stage.  376 U.S. at 256, 286.  Nor does *Hutchinson* support the trial court’s disregard of *Neuwirth* and countless other cases.  *Hutchinson* held that the actual malice standard did *not* apply to the plaintiff’s claims because he was not a public figure, 443 U.S. at 135-36; thus it set no standard for either pleading or proving actual malice.  The court did muse in a footnote of dicta that the element of actual malice “does not readily lend itself to summary disposition. ”  Id. at 120 n.9.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified several years later that actual malice may be resolved in pre-trial motions, and effectively renounced the Hutchinson footnote, writing:  Our statement in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, . . . that proof of actual malice “does not readily lend itself to summary disposition” was simply an acknowledgment of our general reluctance “to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws. ”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 n.7 (1986) (citations omitted).3  In short, neither Sullivan, nor Hutchinson, nor any other U.S. Supreme Court authority calls the Neuwirth decision into question.  To the contrary, the Neuwirth decision was squarely in line with New Jersey precedent and analogous federal caselaw.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant BY: /s/ [...]  Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 063222014  Dated: August 13, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Plaintiff-Respondent, : v. : [...], : Defendant-Appellant.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 4  1.0.10  The above list represents critical performance standards that every county and municipal law enforcement agency must implement.  Agencies that make a vigorous commitment to the internal affairs process signal their desire to comply with the highest standards of professionalism in law enforcement.  They also ensure that their officers will be accountable for their actions to both the agency and the community.  Agencies that fail to make such a commitment run the risk of failing to uncover policies, practices and procedures that may undermine legitimate efforts to provide the highest quality law enforcement services.
[brief] I  The Court Below Failed to Apply Prevailing Case Law (Pa-25).  The prevailing case law in connection with a R. 4:6-2 is Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) which states that the complaint must be searched in depth and with liberality to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned from an obscure statement especially if further discovery is taken.  The Court also stated that all inferences favor the non-moving party.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that such motions are granted only in rare instances and ordinarily without prejudice.  Specifically, in this case, the Court granted the Motion “with prejudice. ”  The Court below did not search for a cause of action as is required by Printing Mart.  The Court did not grant the Motion without prejudice.  The Court simply stated that the Plaintiff has no right to proceed.  This case involves the deprivation of a right.  The Plaintiff, at one point, was no. 3; then, he was no. 2 because there were individual separate promotions and consequently, he went from three to two to one.  And at the time that he became no. 1, he was removed because of a process that did not reflect the various processes over the years.  The Plaintiff was not denied promotion.  He was denied the right to be considered as no. 1 for the promotion.  The right which he acquired as he went from 3 to 2 to 1, was extinguished by the Chief instituting a process that clearly demonstrated that it was aimed at removing the Plaintiff from the no. 1 position and, therefore, consideration.  This appeal comes to the Court on a R. 4:6-2(e) Motion to Dismiss and pursuant to case law, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, granting Plaintiff “every reasonable inference of fact,” Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 452 (2013), quoting Printing Mart - Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).
[brief] Under the applicable standards of review, the Court must review the trial court’s determinations de novo, the County’s interpretation of its specifications for abuse of discretion, and the County’s determination of whether to waive a non-material defect for clear abuse of discretion.  (1T60-17; 3T46-7)  a.  The trial court’s determinations must be reviewed de novo.  In evaluating the trial court’s decision, this Court must review the trial court’s “interpretations of the law and the applications of law to facts . . . de novo. ”  Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 146, 193 (App. Div. 2008); see also Roik v. Roik, 477 N.J. Super. 556, 567 (App. Div. 2024) (“[T]he trial judge's legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the facts, are subject to our plenary review.
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Err in Forgoing Oral Argument (Pa5.)  Next, [...] attempts to cast doubt on the Order because [...] did not entertain oral argument on the Motion.  While Rule 1:6-2(d) provides that where oral argument is requested, it shall be granted as of right, a court may deny the request, provided the reason for denial is set forth in the record.  Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 531–32 (App. Div. 2003).  That is exactly what the trial court did here.  Recognizing the straightforward question of contract interpretation presented, [...] explained that “[[...]] offered nothing substantive in its papers such that the court could view [[...]]’s position as constituting a meritorious opposition. ” (Pa5.)  The Purchase Order is not unclear or ambiguous—and [...] does not suggest otherwise.  --- 4  [...]’s Brief asserts that “[t]he Law Division acknowledged [[...]] requested oral argument. ” (Pb8.)  However, [...]’s Order plainly provides: “Only the moving party requested oral argument, not [[...]]’s counsel. ”  (Pa5.)  F.
[brief] The Court was forced—through more of [...]’s improper conduct—to adjourn the November 2017 motion to enforce the injunction several times. \(^4\)  On February 13, 2018, [...] filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (the “First Removal”) but did not notify the trial court of the removal until February 15, 2018, i.e., the day before the then-scheduled return date for the pending motion.
[brief] A.  Factual Background.  This is a medical negligence case.  Plaintiff’s decedent, [...], died on August 4, 2013.  (Da2, ¶ 1).  Appellant, [...], is a general and vascular surgeon who completed a laparoscopic cholecystectomy on [...].  (13T17, 44-45).  Plaintiffs initially commenced this action on May 14, 2015, alleging negligence by [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Da1)  Plaintiffs’ Complaint was thereafter amended numerous times.  Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint added [...] d/b/a [...].  (Da10)  --- 1
[brief] .............  45 Irving v. Chester Water Auth., 439 Fed. Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2011) ....................................................  18, 35 Jean v. Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2007) ..................................................................  27 Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619 (1981)  ...............................................................................
[brief] AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  A.  Terms of the Contracts and Defendants’ Breach  On or about September 3, 2020, Defendant provided a one-year price quote to Plaintiff for various plumbing and HVAC supplies on a per pound basis.  This price quote became binding when it was executed by Plaintiff.  This formed the first contract (“First Contract”) entered into between the parties.  The First Contract contained various terms that were not common for Defendant, including a 95% purchase requirement for the one-year period and requiring releases to be made in 20,000 pound minimums.  There are instances where Defendant would allow customers to purchase less than the minimum weight requirement stated in a contract.  The parties also entered into a second contract (“Second Contract”) on September 11, 2020 for purchase of a different type of pipe.  Plaintiff understood that the Second Contract would operate with the same terms as the First Contract.  Plaintiff placed five orders of product from Defendant throughout September 2020 through November 2020.  At least four of these --- 1  Plaintiff has combined the statement of facts and procedural history into one section in this brief.
[brief] [...] ([...]) had filed the med-pay subrogation demand seeking $5,031.28 from [...] ([...]).  [...] asserted affirmative defenses including that New Jersey law prohibited med-pay subrogation.  At the full arbitration hearing, the arbitrator concluded that New Jersey law allowed med-pay subrogation and awarded damages in favor of [...].  [...] appealed this decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.  Given that the facts and issues were similar to the St. Paul case, it is no surprise that [...]’s decision here followed his decision in the St. Paul case.  He once again found that med-pay subrogation was prohibited in New Jersey and therefore, the arbitrator exceeded his/her authority by rendering an award in favor of [...].  *[...] v. [...]*, supra. (slip op at 6-8).  In addition to the decisions discussed above, there is another unpublished decision which demonstrated application of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 to med-pay benefits in a bodily injury trial.