ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] NO COURT RULE REQUIRES THE MOVANT TO FURNISH A TRACKING NUMBER AS A PREREQUISITE FOR MOTION HEARING OR ADJUDICATION.  MISINTERPRETATION OR DISTORTION OF COURT RULES BY TRIAL COURT IS SUBJECT TO DE NOVO REVIEW.  (Pa1224)  Following the filing of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2024, the parties were notified (Pa1241-42) that the motion was scheduled for a remote hearing on March 8, 2024, at 9:00 am.  The parties were advised to contact the court for information as to whether the hearing would be over video or phone.  (Pa1241).  However, on the motion return date of March 8, 2024, without conducting a hearing the judge denied the motion on grounds of failure to provide a USPS tracking number of the mail serving the motion on defendant.  Significantly, defendant did not make any representation before the court that she had not received the motion papers.  Given the 02/08/2024 date of scheduling notice, it follows from Rule 1:6-2(b)(1) that the judge received and reviewed the motion papers on February 8, 2024.  The email (Pa1244) from judge’s law clerk to the parties on March 7, 2024 establishes that the judge had taken a predetermined decision to deny the motion without conducting a hearing on the following day on baseless grounds of failure to provide USPS tracking number.  No court rule requires a movant to provide a USPS tracking number as a prerequisite for motion hearing or adjudication.  Because there is no such requirement in court rules, as the movant, I could not have dreamt, divined, or surmised while filing the motion that the judge would require a tracking number as a prerequisite to hearing my motion.  The denial of the motion on legally baseless grounds of failure to provide a tracking number betrays the motion judge’s ignorance of Rule 4:4-4, Rule 1:5-3, Rule 1:5-4, and Rule 1:6-3.  First, I note that the rote reference to R. 4:4-4 in the March 8, 2024 order is misplaced and misguided.
[brief] Furthermore, Respondents cannot assert a claim on behalf of a hypothetical class that they do not belong to.  See Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Development Co., LLC, 442 N.J.Super. 346, 347 (App.Div.2015).  Even an alleged derivative suit brought by Respondents on behalf of an unquantified and unqualified class cannot be maintained here.  Respondents are the quintessential intermeddlers or interlopers seeking to gain redress on someone else’s behalf without any actual interests at stake other than self-interest.
[brief] See Da54.  Despite this, Plaintiff could not manage to file his opposition on time yet again, and after allowing the January 24, 2023 deadline to pass, a week later on January 31, 2023, Plaintiff unilaterally filed an untimely opposition with no explanation to Defendants or the trial court.  On February 1, 2023, the trial court informed Plaintiff his opposition would not be considered.  See Da55.  That same day, Plaintiff filed a letter to the trial court reasserting the same COVID-19 excuse and attaching the same surgeon’s note with the same dates of illness, although now counsel claimed that his symptoms had been continuous for the relevant time periods.  See Da56-57.  As a result of this representation, the trial court allowed the opposition to be considered.
[brief] Certification of [...], Esq., filed 11/11/22 ........................................Da148  Exhibit A: Letter from [...], Esq., to [...], Esq., dated 1/21/21 .................................................................Da157  Exhibit B: Decision of [...] in *Trunell v. Trust for Harrison* [See Da99]  Exhibit C: Complaint in *Trunell v. Trust for Harrison* .........................Da177  Exhibit D: Notice of lis pendens .................................................................Da183  Exhibit E: Challenger Second Amended Complaint .................................Da193  Exhibit F: [...] answer and counterclaim and answer to second amended complaint .................................................................Da214  Exhibit G: [...] answer ........................................................................Da229  Exhibit H: [...] answer to Challenger interrogatories ............................Da242  **Volume III (Pages Da265 – Da400)**
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[brief] There, the Court made clear that it was improper for a detective to imply that he was Mirandizing the suspect “because we’re in the police department,” but the Court found that comment fleeting and cured because the detective clarified before the waiver that he was Mirandizing the suspect in order to talk “about this,” referring back to an earlier interview with the suspect the same day.  254 N.J. at 287, 304-05.  Here, unlike Erazo, there was no prior interview to provide context before the waiver.  And more importantly, the detectives did not merely reference the police station but directly misled him about his suspect status by saying that he was “[j]ust like . . . anybody else,” which was admittedly false.
[brief] *In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules*, 180 N.J. at 488-89.  Here, the Property is within the Redevelopment Zone’s Beachfront South Sector.  (Ra18; Ra161).  If [...] had proposed the Project with standards consistent with the Redevelopment Plan and Design Ordinance, [...] would have been eligible for the [...] permit.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1(a-c).  But in 2020, [...] amended its Redevelopment Plan and Ordinance specifically to address the Property.  (Ra18; Ra161-172).  Since [...] amended the DEP-approved Redevelopment Plan, and DEP did not previously approve of the amendment, [...] was not eligible for the [...] Redevelopment Zone Permit.
[brief] This case is thus nothing like Ogunyemi v. Garden State Medical Center, No. A-1703-22, 2024 WL 1243552 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2024) (cited at Pb14–15).  There, the arbitration agreement and forum-selection clause were combined in the same provision (all the way down in Section 27).
[brief] You just have to Google it.  [...] is in this firm where every time we've made a move to get anything pertaining to insurance or taxes, we have been stopped.  We served discovery, and my question Number 37 in interrogatories is what insurance policies of any kind does the decedent have or did he have.  The answer was "health insurance".  THE COURT: Yeah.  [...]: I knew it wasn't true.  And you know how many hearings we've had after discovery questions - THE COURT: Right.  (7T 22, lines 1-25).  [...]: -- about insurances of any kind?  Now, [...] is moving.  I did not expect to see that work any time soon.  We have a circle of people that have been involved in this case.  While [...] was the administrator, they opened up that account.  You had appointed her an administrator and she opened up that account in Wyoming, and she said on the record the last time, that she did it because she wanted to keep the money away from [...] and make sure it went to the kids.  (7T 23).  Ms. Darden also revealed additional information to the Court about [...]’s actions when [...] was in ICU critically ill with COVID.
[brief] First, the Court held that the claim regarding the pool ripened before 2018 because Plaintiff claimed that the pool was compromised before the 2018 work that the Township had performed in 2018, and therefore, outside the six (6) year statute of limitations.  Pa74.  Second, the lower court believed that Plaintiff’s claims regarding the landscaping damage and driveway are barred under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq., because Plaintiff did not file a Notice of Tort Claim within ninety (90) days from the accrual of the claim as required by N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.
[brief] Upset by the Legislature’s call for wealthier districts to contribute more toward their students’ education, [...], along with one individual plaintiff (collectively “appellants”), brought this action claiming the State is constitutionally required, through increased aid at the expense of other districts in the State, to make up for the “shortfall” in its local contribution.  [...] alleged disastrous consequences would result from the implementation of the SFRA amendments and decreased State aid.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court disagreed with appellants and dismissed their complaint.  School funding is not just the State’s responsibility.  Rather, local school districts and the State share in the funding of public education.  And the SFRA bases a district’s ability to contribute to its students’ education on its relative property and income wealth.  The undisputed facts show that [...] has the ability to contribute more toward its students’ education.
[brief] [...] entered into a contract with [...], despite [...] not being able to perform the contract and meet [...]’s expectations.  (1T30:15-40:1).  [...], despite not being permitted to, and without [...]’s knowledge, or permission, hired [...] as a subcontractor, while never supervising the services being provided by [...].  (5T76:13-19; 5T88:12-16).  The parties and their testimony were, and are, all in conflict, but their expectations are clear and in contract.  (Da150-179).  To the extent the terms of the contract were followed, [...] could have argued that Plaintiff would not have fallen.  Therefore, the agreements in place were relevant for trial so the jury was aware of the knowledge and notice of each Defendant as related to [...] prior to March 8, 2018, as well as to the expectations of each defendant as to who would perform what and when to make the property reasonably safe.  (Da150-179).  The discussion of the snow removal contracts did not mislead the jury in any way, in fact, the snow removal contracts assisted the jury to understand Defendants’ knowledge and notice of the expectations and requirements on each Defendant to make the property safe, assuming everyone performed their role.  Despite the agreements, Defendants failed to keep [...] safe which led to Plaintiff, an invitee, suffering a significant injury.  Further the testimony of representatives from [...] and [...], were clear that they had no personal knowledge regarding the conditions of [...] at the time of Plaintiff’s fall and what snow removal services were even provided by [...] which directly goes to the duty all three parties had to Plaintiff, an invitee on the property provided by the jury charge.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing discussion regarding the snow removal contracts as it was relevant and could have been crucial in helping a jury decide whether a property owner, contractor, and subcontractor fulfilled their duty of care, whether they took reasonable steps to keep the property safe, what was expected of each party, and therefore could have assisted the jury apportion liability between the property owner, contractor, and subcontractor.  POINT III:
[brief] Wyatt by Caldwell v. Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super. 580, 590 (App. Div. 1987) (holding testimony was proper “both to attack [defendant's] credibility and as substantive evidence that --- 4  The plaintiff did not testify live at trial and the court issued a curative instruction to the jury with respect to her absence.  (7T34:5-13; 7T42:15-43:5; 7T95:13-16).  the accident resulted from [defendant's] negligence.
[brief] The State presented the testimony of [...].  It should be noted that [...] and Major Valentin were both arrested and charged with official misconduct, conspiracy and tampering with public records or information.  *(Pa68a-108a).*  [...] was charged with sleeping on the job.  Again, there is no evidence to support this allegation.  The closest that the State could get to support this allegation is [...]’s testimony that “[t]hey talked and watched some television.  Gales was sitting.  Sometimes Gales’ eyes were open, sometimes they were closed. ” (Pa114a).  [...] was not alone in violating DOC’s rules and regulations.  For example, [...] admitted that on at least three occasions on August 16, 2019 he himself also left his inmates completely unsupervised: (1) “McDowell spoke to Gales in the food preparation room for a little while and saw Gales watching television and napping during the shift. ”\(^6\) (Rb at 6); (2) “McDowell was informed by an inmate that someone was on top of the fire escape in Stowe Two” (id.); and (3) it was McDowell who “went to look at [...]’s bed and saw it made and vacant. ” (Rb at 6).  Despite leaving inmates unattended for significant periods of time, McDowell was neither reprimanded nor disciplined.
[brief] The State also asserts [...] was the second suspect with his face covered at the Hamilton Township 7-Eleven robbery as depicted on the surveillance video.  Under a N.J.R.E. 404(b) analysis, the State seeks to have not only [...] but also [...] joined to the [...] homicide at the Brunswick Avenue Pharmacy and [...] attempted robbery at Vizzoni's Pharmacy joined for trial purposes.  The court finds the identity of individual(s) depicted by the four surveillance videos is unknown since in each case the suspect(s) has his face covered.  Co-defendant [...] has entered into a negotiated plea with the State in consideration for his cooperation at co-defendants trials, i.e., to testify that [...] is the masked suspect in the Brunswick Avenue Pharmacy and the Vizzoni's Pharmacy crimes since he drove [...] to both locations.  In addition, [...] is expected to testify that approximately a week later, he drove [...] to the 7-Eleven store in Pennsylvania and is the individual shown in the video.  Approximately an hour later, [...] will testify he drove both [...] and [...] to the Hamilton Township 7-Eleven to commit the robbery at that location and [...] and [...] are the masked persons identified in the surveillance video.
[brief] (Ca178).  On March 27, 2020, the superior court granted the bank’s motion, and directed that the receiver would not be effective until the Covid-19 closure of restaurants was lifted.  (Ca185).  On July 21, 2020, [...] obtained a Default judgment against [...] for approximately $1.2M.  (Ca187).  On September 16, 2020, [...] filed the Foreclosure complaint seeking the foreclosure upon the Leasehold mortgage in [...] Bank v. [...], et al., Docket No. [...] (“the foreclosure matter”).
[brief] Appellant [...] (hereinafter referred to as “Appellant”) comes before this Court seeking to overturn the Final Agency Determination that the [...] (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent”) sustained its burden of proof as to the disciplinary action filed against the Appellant dated September 23, 2022 (amended November 2, 2022) wherein the Appellant was removed from her public employment.  In this matter, the evidence and testimony presented supported the finding that the Appellant was guilty as charged of insubordination and, as a result of that finding, should forfeit her public employment as a correctional police officer.  For these and the reasons that follow, the Court should affirm the Final Agency Determination dated November 1, 2023.
[brief] Prison Disciplinary History  During his incarceration, [...] has been found guilty of committing twenty-two institutional disciplinary infractions, including eight asterisk (serious) offenses.  (Pa35-Pa38; Pa152).  His most recent infractions, refusing to work or to accept a program or housing unit assignment and tattooing or self-mutilation, occurred on July 13, 2009.  (Pa38).  D. [...]’s Parole Review
[brief] (3T:16-8 to 19-4).  [...] found that “the utilization of [the] phone call[s] was the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation. ” (3T:19-5 to 19-7).  However, [...] did acknowledge that [...] told defendant prior to making the calls not to talk about the facts of the case during the phone calls.  (3T:19-19 to 19-22).  In addition, [...] acknowledged the many occasions where [...] tried to calm defendant down and told him not to talk about the case.  (3T:19-23 to 20-9).  Nevertheless, [...] indicated there was no question in [the court’s] mind the calls constituted continuing questioning of defendant by allowing him to talk to his parents.  (3T:20-9 to 20-16).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I LEAVE TO APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE HARM TO THE STATE.
[brief] JUDGMENT MOTION ON LIABILITY, IT SHOULD AFFIRM THE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ORDER OF JUNE 25, 2021  BASED UPON PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE "DISCOVERY RULE" OR THE "RELATION BACK" DOCTRINE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.  (1T47-19 TO 48-22; Pa5-6; 3T65-4 to 66-18; Pa1-2)  .................................................. 46  CONCLUSION
[directive] Cash Bail Option Actor (1) knowingly holds, recruits, lures, entices, harbors, transports, provides or obtains, by any means, another to engage in sexual activity as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of 2C:34-1, Prostitution, or to provide labor or services: (a) by threats of serious bodily harm or physical restraint against the person or any other person; (b) by means of any scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that the person or any other person would suffer serious bodily harm or physical restraint; (c) by committing a violation of 2C:13- 5, Criminal Coercion, against the person; or (d) by destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or possessing any passport or immigration–related document as defined in 2C:21-31, or other document issued by a governmental agency to any person which could be used as a means of verifying the person’s identity or age, or any other personal identifying 2C:13-8 Human Trafficking 1st Degree $150,000 to $400,000 No 10% information; or (e) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of the law or legal process; or (f) by means of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation against the person; or (g) by facilitating access to a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as set forth in chapter 35 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; or (2) receives anything of value from participation as an organizer, supervisor, financier or manager in a scheme or course of conduct which violates paragraph (1) of this subsection; or (3) knowingly holds, recruits, lures, entices, harbors, transports, provides or obtains, by any means, a child under 18 years of age, to engage in sexual activity as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:34-1, whether or not the actor mistakenly believed that the child was 18 years of age or older, even if that mistaken belief was reasonable.
[brief] When two of the three individuals took off in different directions, the officer reasonably pursued them.  (2T57-25 to 58-25).  The prosecutor also urged the court to consider the totality of the circumstances when it determines if there was reasonable suspicion to detain anyone.  And, given the factors at play, such as the fact that [...] specifically testified about why this area was considered a high-crime area and the fact that the officers had observed [...], a convicted drug dealer, conducting two recent drug transactions, it was reasonable to suspect that the three men were possibly conducting a drug transaction.  (2T59-1 to 61-1).  Even assuming that the stop was not justified, the headlong flight of the two defendants created a potentially dangerous situation in this high-traffic location, and in fact [...] was injured, amounting to an intervening circumstance.  (2T61-2 to 62-22).  Certainly, there was no flagrant police misconduct, and even if there were not sufficient reasonable suspicion, which there was, the fruits of the search would be admissible.
[brief] (T3, 30:10-31:21)  One reason the Trial Court rejected the Borough’s redevelopment designation is that the Trial Court found the potential for condemnation of the Property to be unfair.  It was concerned that condemning a property undergoing active remediation would be unreasonable because it would discourage expenditures for cleanup and would disincentivize remediation work.  (T3, 51:15-24).  Whether or not condemnation is appropriate, however, is not the standard for determining whether a property qualifies as a redevelopment area.  A property is allowed to be designated as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area whenever a municipality establishes by substantial credible evidence that the area satisfies one of the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5.  Although the propriety of the actual taking is not a valid consideration at the redevelopment designation stage, it may be an appropriate consideration when the municipality decides to move forward with condemnation.  Redevelopment is a multi-step process.  Designation of a property as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area does not automatically result in the taking of a property.  Before property can be acquired by eminent domain under the LRHL, certain steps must be taken.  The first step is to designate the area as a redevelopment area pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5.  Designation of a Condemnation Redevelopment Area does nothing more than establish the public purpose required in the event a municipality chose to acquire property by eminent domain.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6(c) and Borough of Glassboro v. Grossman, 457 N.J. Super. 416, 428 (App. Div. 2019) (stating “[a] municipality's designation of property within its borders as a redevelopment area satisfies the constitutional “public purpose” requirement for eminent domain under the Blighted Areas Clause, N.J. Const. Art. VIII, §3, ¶1”).
[brief] IT WAS WITHIN [...]’S AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE BOARD TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE [...]’S FULL NEGOTIATIONS TEAM.  (Pa233-Pa237; Pa243-Pa245).  In addition to [...]’s position regarding its authority, (Rb15-Rb17), which the [...] joins in, the [...] will provide this Court with further reasons why [...] has the authority to Order [...] to negotiate with the [...]’s full negotiations team, including the [...]’s Bargaining Council.  Much like with its other arguments, [...]’s position here relies upon a false impression of the “open bargaining”, to portray this situation as akin to Brielle.  However, the evidence is uncontroverted that not only have the negotiations been closed off to the general public, but that it has been the [...] which has stopped [...]’s efforts to open up the negotiations to mere observers.  (Pa240).  There is no ‘open public session’ concern here which could limit [...]’s authority.