ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 12T:30:11-12, 32:7-15, 34:2.  At the prior hearing, the Board did not request, nor permit, briefing from the parties and in fact stated at the June 23, 2021 hearing that it would decide the issue based upon the Board’s counsel’s opinion.  However, the Board’s attorney advised the Board that it could reject any retroactive rent increase by “tak[ing] the lawyerly way out and not deal[ing] with it” as the issue was not property presented to the Board by [...].
[brief] [...] filed a Notice of Appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside\(^5\).  (A584).  [...] filed a Notice of Cross-appeal, challenging the trial court’s decision on counsel fees and sanctions, as well as its decision on the possession of the Lexus and the $15,459.21 [...] reimbursement issues.  (A589).  \(^5\)  [...] has served R. 1:4-8 letters upon [...]’s appellate counsel, contending [...]’s appeal is frivolous under the applicable appellate standards of review and demanding it be withdrawn.  (Pa23; Pa24; Pa25).  [...] reserves his right to seek attorneys’ fees upon determination of the appeal.  See R. 2:11-4.
[brief] Here, [...] noted delay in the text arriving to the legislators to be reviewed.  (Pa171 at 20:10-23.)  [...] echoed these concerns noting the bill was not given to the Senate Health Committee until 6 PM – even though the Senate Journal notes the Senate adjourned at 5:05 PM.  (Pa274 at 6:11-21; Pa256.)  The public testified that they did not have meaningful time to review the bill text.  (Pa164-65 at 13:21-14:4; Pa167-68 at 16:24-17:7; Pa175 at 24:7-14; Pa180 at 29:7-16; Pa214 at 10:12-24; Pa215 at 11:11-12.)  Even legislators did not have the text of the bill until after the close of the legislative session on January 6, 2022.
[brief] On June 13, 2024, the State of New Jersey indicted [...], Esq., (Tambussi) a partner at the law firm of [...], for engaging in racketeering through a criminal enterprise led by [...] (Norcross).  (See Indictment filed June 13, 2024, Pa9-Pa119).  The indictment brought by the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, states that Tambussi is “the long-time personal attorney” to Norcross, and accuses him of an “active participant in the [...]’s plot to use the [...]’s government to bring a condemnation --- 1
[brief] State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015); accord State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 326 (2019) (applying K.S. in the sentencing context).  That is so because “deterrence is directed at persons who have committed wrongful acts,” not those who have merely been arrested or accused.  K.S., 220 N.J. at 199; accord State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 107 (1972) (“[U]nproved allegations of criminal conduct should not be considered by a sentencing judge. ”)  Here, the court contravened that basic rule by considering [...]’s seven arrests in determining “the extent of [his] prior criminal history. ” (9T:15-2 to 8)  Thus, aggravating factors six and three should have received minimal, if any, weight – especially given that [...] had only two prior indictable convictions, both of which were third-degree offenses that were more than ten years old.  (PSR 5-6)  Finally, the court erred in finding aggravating factor nine, “[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9), without addressing the need for specifically deterring [...].
[brief] Yet, [...] does not raise any alleged RPC 1.7(a) conflict issue with regard to the [...]’s joint representation of the [...] vis-à-vis the RICO claim.  Nor has any court held, to the [...]’ knowledge, that one firm cannot represent multiple defendants in a civil RICO lawsuit.  [...]’s silence and inconsistency in this regard gives away that its position here is a red herring.  The IFPA was merely added to the list of [...]-governed causes of action.  Nothing else changed.  For all of these reasons, the Court should reject [...]’s invitation to find that the [...] is disqualified by a per se conflict under Rule 1.7(a)(1) simply because the [...] applies to IFPA claims.
[brief] ”); N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2, N.J.A.C. 11:3–28.2, N.J.A.C. 5:23-1.4, and N.J.A.C. 8:33-1.3 (“Health care facility” means the facility or institution, whether public or private, that is engaged principally in providing services for health maintenance organizations . . . ); N.J.A.C. 3:11-4.1 (“Banks are authorized to subscribe for purchase and hold stock of one or more banks or corporations chartered or incorporated under the laws of the United States or of any state thereof, and principally engaged in international or foreign banking . . . ); N.J.A.C. 13:18-2.1 (“Rental owner” means, with respect to one or more rental fleets, an owner principally engaged in renting the vehicles of such fleets, with or without drivers.
[brief] [...] obtained video surveillance footage of the crime scene area for Saturday, May 26, 2012, to Sunday, May 27, 2012.  (7T20-11 to 17).  A 24-hour security camera was located at the [...] at [...].  (6T21-5 to 23-10; 6T27-10 to 11).  Cameras 6 and 7 showed Taylor Street and Hickory Street.  (6T24-3 to 19; 7T22-10 to 12).  An Audi sedan is seen traveling on Taylor Street after turning off Hickory Street.  (6T83-3 to 7; 6T84-22 to 25; 7T20-20 to 25; 7T25-22 to 26-8).  Two women are running down Taylor Street.  (7T22-16 to 23-3; 7T30-12 to 15).  [...] is seen on the pulling up his t-shirt, while [...]’s body was down the street “right off of the video screen, right where you see the bright lights, just beyond that. ” (7T27-3 to -18).  [...] recanted his statement at trial.
[brief] [...] is the City’s psychologist whom [...] was ordered to see for a fitness for duty exam (“FFD”).  (T4 198:21-200:13).  [...] told Dr. Guller that he attended rehab while out on sick leave.  (T4 189:17-191:13).  [...] did not believe that he had violated the Department’s reporting policy in not advising the City that he went to rehab.  (T4 191:11-13).  The Department’s Rules and Regulations, as to such reporting requirements, were revised in November 2018, after [...] had gone out on leave.  [...] was never trained as to the new Rules and Regulations.  (T4 177:9-178:10; Pa179).  **The FFD**
[brief] Plaintiff specifically alleges “[o]n or about January 5, 2022, at approximately 7:30 A.M., plaintiff, [...], was exiting his apartment and stepped onto the landing of the exterior step of the building where he resides, where he encountered an icy condition causing him to slip and fall to the ground.  The landing and the stairs were painted a few weeks before the Incident.  Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result.  (Pa315)  Plaintiff’s deposition testimony confirms he slipped on the landing before reaching the stairs.  (Pa329, plaintiff deposition P16, L22-24).  Q.
[brief] (6)  Mobile retail food establishments may operate from 7:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m. Monday through Friday and from 9:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m. Saturday and Sunday, unless the property is residentially zoned or within one hundred (100) feet of a residential zone, in which case, the hours of operation shall be limited to 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.
[directive] Consistent with normal procedure, the Municipal Court should immediately process the expungement upon receipt of an executed Order  Of note is that there is no fee for requesting an expungement utilizing the Instructions and Forms for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records.  Further, the forms to requests made at the time of disposition (except as set forth in the following apply only paragraph).  This is consistent with the legislation.  A person who did not apply for the expedited expungement at the time of disposition may present at any time thereafter a duly verified petition for expungement in the normal course as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:52- 7 to the Superior Court in the county in which the disposition occurred.
[brief] ”  (Pa82).  In dismissing Count II, the Court reasoned: *[...] was no longer a designated developer under the Redevelopment Plan.*  No authority has been provided to the court that would permit the court to conclude that [...] would continue to have the power to contest amendments to the Redevelopment Plan after [...]’s project was completed and [...] had no further involvement in the Redevelopment Plan, and the court finds that summary judgment must be granted.  (Pa83) (emphasis added).  As to Count IV, the lower court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Plan Amendment constitutes illegal spot zoning insofar of extending benefits to Defendant [...] unavailable to others.
[brief] The Supreme Court in *Wagner v. Mayor & Mun. Council of City of Newark*, 24 N.J. 467, 475–77 (1957), examined the extent of this section as “an express grant of broad general police powers to municipalities. ”  The Court stated:  As the law now stands any municipality, in addition to any powers elsewhere more specifically granted, has authority by virtue of R.S. 40:48—2, N.J.S.A., to take such action ‘as it may deem necessary and proper for the good government, order and protection of persons and property, and for the preservation of the public health, safety and general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants,’ subject only to the limitation that such action not be prohibited by or inconsistent with the Constitution or the other statutes.' [Id. at 477 (emphasis added). ]  Given the fact that any enactment pursuant to this police power provision would be inconsistent with either the NCA or the health nuisance provisions of Title 26, it too cannot provide the statutory authority Defendants seek.
[brief] Dismissed the Chancery Action Pending the Nacirema Arbitration and Set a Deadline for Refiling Any Claims  On November 14, 2018, the Honorable [...], Ret., entered the Consent Order that resolved and dismissed the Chancery Action.  (Pa109 to Pa111 (Consent Order)).  Through the Consent Order, the parties (including Appellants) agreed to dismiss their respective claims, without prejudice, pending the adjudication of an arbitration between the parties that was then pending in the American Arbitration Association captioned *[...], on behalf of himself and [...] v. [...], [...] and the [...] Family Trust*, [...] (the “Nacirema Arbitration”).  (Pa42 ([...] Cert. at ¶6) and Pa109-111 (Exhibit C thereto – Consent Order)).  The terms of the Consent Order were the product of lengthy discussions and negotiations between the parties and their counsel.  After the terms were crafted and modified and the Consent Order was signed by counsel for the parties (including Appellants), the Consent Order was submitted by Appellants and entered by Judge Dupuis.  (See, e.g., Pa44 at ¶¶12-18 ([...] Cert.) and Pa109 to Pa111 (Exhibit C thereto – Consent Order), Pa114 to Pa124 (Exhibit D thereto - “E-mail exchanges”) and Pa126 to Pa129 (Exhibit E thereto – “Appellants’ Consent Order Submission”)).  The Consent Order provides clear terms regarding how the parties’ Chancery Action claims were to be dismissed and the limited means by which they could be revived through any party’s prompt action following the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration.  Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Consent Order restrict Appellants’ ability to assert a “Refiled Action” and similarly restrict Respondent’s ability to file a “Refiled Action”.  Specifically, the Consent Order requires any party who wanted to pursue the dismissed Chancery Action claims to re-file, in the Chancery Division, a Refiled Action within sixty days following the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration.  (Pa110 at ¶¶ 2-3 (Consent Order)).  The Consent Order defines the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration as the date on which the AAA would issue a final award terminating the Nacirema Arbitration (the “Nacirema Award”).
[brief] On a more broadly stated level, in Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287 (1969) the Supreme Court described the law of reasonable expectation of the insured in the following manner:  Our expressions have come in a variety of issues and contexts, but all have indicated as their keystone the goal of greater protection to the ordinary policyholder untutored in the intricacies of insurance.  We have realistically faced up to the fact that insurance policies are complex contracts of adhesion, prepared by the insurer, not subject to negotiation, in the case of the average person, as to terms and provisions and quite unintelligible to the insured even were he to attempt to read and understand their unfamiliar and technical language and awkward and unclear arrangement .  . . .  We have stressed, among other things, the aim that average purchasers of insurance are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations; that it is the insurer's burden to obtain, through its representatives, all information pertinent to the risk and the desired coverage before the contract is issued; and that it is likewise its obligation to make policy provisions, especially those relating to coverage, exclusions and vital conditions, plain, clear and prominent to the layman.  [Id. at 303-04.]
[brief] The Judge found the alleged “blading” “very significant,” because “[[...]] explained that that is something that gives the officers and in his experience reason to believe that these individuals might be armed. ”  (1T 56-21 to 57-3)  The judge also found it “important that this is a residential area.  . . .  This isn't an isolated parking lot off of a warehouse or anything like that.  It is a residential area with row houses. ”  (1T 58-13 to 58-17)  The judge noted that it was cold that night (1T 58-7 to 58-9), and the street was “not well lit. ”  (1T 55- 13)  The judge found that it was “not reasonable to assume that this is just people hanging out on a cold evening in November to greet pedestrians and others” (1T 66-11 to 66-13), and that the officers’ alleged observations furnished them with reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk [...] and the three men he was with:  So, there is reasonable articulable suspicion to have an investigative detention when those officers in their patrol cars come onto Leonard Avenue.  And there is observation by law enforcement of the blading coupled with knowing this is the high crime area and their experience of narcotic sales and shootings in this area, this is suspicious activity that these individuals could be armed and dangerous to these officers who have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity and the officers can conduct, the Court finds an investigative detention.  Observing their blading and knowing the reputation of Leonard Street -- and it's a residential area, the officers also not only have to protect their own safety, but the community's safety.  (1T 64-23 to 65-12)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUPPRESSION WHERE DEFENDANT WAS ONE OF SIX MEN THAT POLICED STOPPED AND FRISKED WITHOUT A VALID BASIS TO DO SO.
[brief] A LAWSUIT UNDER THE INSURANCE FRAUD PREVENTION ACT DOES NOT BELONG IN A PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION  NO-FAULT ARBITRATION UNDER N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) ......................................................... | 9 | | A.  The Text And Structure Of The Relevant Statutes Show That A Personal Injury Protection No-Fault Arbitration Was Designed By The Legislature To Be Limited In Subject Matter, Parties And Scope ... | 12 | | B.  The Practical Implementation Of The Legislature’s PIP Arbitration Rules Do Not Allow For Adjudication Of IFPA And RICO Claims  | 18 | | POINT II | | | SERIOUS HARM TO THE PUBLIC WILL RESULT IF INSURANCE FRAUD PREVENTION ACT  CASES ARE LIMITED TO PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION NO-FAULT ARBITRATION .............................................. | 25 | | CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... | 30 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | **Allstate v. Northfield**, 228 N.J. 596 (2017) | 7, 24 | | **Allstate v. Lajara**, 222 N.J. 129 (2015) | 16, 17, 27 | | **Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lopez**, 311 N.J. Super. 660 (Law Div. 1998) | 13 | | **DiProspero v. Penn**, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | 11 | | **Endo Surgi Ctr., P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.**, | | | 391 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 1984) | 13, 16| | **Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos.**, 86 N.J. 100 (1981) | 13 | | **Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A.**, | | | 98 F. 4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024) | 24, 25| | **In re Johnny Popper, Inc.**, 413 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 2010) | 12 | | **In re Registrant H.D.**, 241 N.J. 412 (2020) | 11 | | **Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land**, 186 N.J. 163 (2006) | 17, 26| | **Merin v. Maglaki**, 126 N.J. 430 (1992) | 4, 25, 26| | **Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Fiouris**, | 9 | | 395 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 2007) | | | **N.J. Coal. of Health Care Pros., Inc. v. Dep’t of Banking & Ins.**, | | | 323 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1999) | 17 | | **N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L.**, 213 N.J. 1 (2013) | 11 | | **Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs.**, 77 N.J. 55 (1978) | 2 | | **Sanjuan v. Sch. Dist. of W. N.Y.**, 256 N.
[directive] Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że w przypadku osadzenia Pana(i) w Centrum 4.  Diagnostyki i Leczenia Dorosłych:  Do you understand if you are sentenced to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center: ewentualne przyszłe zwolnienie warunkowe nie będzie podlegać zwykłym [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] a. zasadom dotyczącym zwolnienia warunkowego? that any future parole will not be guided by the normal parole guidelines?  zwolnienia warunkowego będzie Panu(i) przysługiwać w przypadku, [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] b. prawo do gdy Stanowa Rada ds.  Zwolnień Warunkowych, po otrzymaniu zaleceń specjalnej komisji rewizyjnej ds. klasyfikacji orzeknie, że jest Pan(i) w wystarczającym stopniu zdolny(a) do dostosowania się do życia w społeczeństwie?  that you will be eligible for release when the State Parole Board, after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds that you are capable of making an acceptable social adjustment in the community?  istnieje możliwość, że okres terapii może być dłuższy niż okres, jaki [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] c. musiał(a)by Pan(i) spędzić w stanowym więzieniu w razie wydania wyroku pozbawienia wolności? that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if sentenced to state prison?  Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date obrony/Defense Adwokat Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Polish strona 2 z 2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Polish page 2 of 2 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.
[brief] (12T177:14-17).  The Court filed an Order and Final Judgment dated February 7, 2023 (hereinafter “Opinion”) that found that the Photocopy was valid and constituted a waiver of the Petitioners’ spousal share of the Estate.  (P7a, P42a).  The Court granted, in part, Count Two of Petitioner’s Complaint, finding that a constructive trust should be imposed on the Home, granting Petitioner a life estate without the power to alienate his interest in that property.  (P7a, 43a-44a).  The Court also denied Petitioner’s motion for a spoliation inference arising from the loss of Decedent’s estate file.  (P30a).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] .................................................................  23  A.  APPELLANT FAILED TO TIMELY APPEAL THE 2017 WFD PERMIT AND THE 2019 PERMIT MODIFICATION AND SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO CHALLENGE THOSE DECISIONS OUT OF TIME TO THE DETRIMENT OF, AND PREJUDICE TO, [...] WHO COMPLIED WITH THE LAW  ..............................................................................................................  26  B.  THE 2017 WFD PERMIT AND 2019 PERMIT MODIFICATION COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE [...] RULES AND APPELLANT’S ATTEMPT TO CONFLATE THE TERMS OF THE 2017 WFD PERMIT AND 2019 PERMIT MODIFICATION IN ORDER TO EXPAND ITS CHALLENGE SHOULD BE REJECTED.......  29  1.  The Length and Location of Jibsail’s Dock Was Dictated by N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(i)(Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.2(d)(Shellfish Habitat Rule) and the Record Contains Substantial Evidence Which Supports [...]’s Finding That Jibsail’s Dock Complied With Both.....  32  2.  The Record Contains Substantial Evidence Which Supports the Finding by [...] That Jibsail’s Dock Complied With N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 (Navigational Channels) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (Recreational Docks and Piers).  .................................................................  36  CONCLUSION
[brief] (OAL DECISION AT PAGES 12, 14-16, 29; Pa12a; Pa14-16; Pa29a)  ...........................................................................19  POINT IV  THE COURT FAILED TO TAKE AN ADVERSE INFERENCE AGAINST THE [...] FOR FAILING TO CALL THE ONLY WITNESS WHO COULD HAVE PROVIDED THE REQUISITE RESIDUUM OF COMPETENT PROOF EITHER IN ITS CASE IN CHIEF OR IN REBUTTAL.  (OAL DECISION AT PAGE 19; PA19A)..............................................20  POINT V THE ALJ ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED EXHIBITS THAT CONTAINED HEARSAY AND/OR WERE NOT SELF-AUTHENTICATING WITHOUT REQUIRING THE [...] TO PROVIDE ANY EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION FOR THOSE EXHIBITS.
[brief] SEASIDE HEIGHTS PLANNING : DOCKET No.: [...] BOARD and ONE OCEAN :  On Appeal from the Orders TERRACE, LLC : entered by the Superior Court  Defendants.  : of New Jersey, Law Division, : Civil Part: Ocean County : Docket No. Below: : [...] : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], : A.J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, SEASIDE HEIGHTS PLANNING
[directive] The Bail Program Registration Form required by Rule 1 :13-3(d) has been revised and is being promulgated as part of this directive.  New information that must be set forth on the completed form includes a list of bonds authorized by the insurer to be posted by the registrant.  This list must specify the power of attorney number and be updated accordingly pursuant to Rule 1: 13-3( d).  The revised form captures the name, license number and license expiration date of the managing agent as well as the trade name, if any, for agencies, which should include "bail agency" or "bail bonds".  In addition, the signature of the guarantor is mandatory along with a certification by the insurer that all judgments have been satisfied prior to the registration request.  Questions regarding this directive, the Surety Bond Registry, or the revised Bail Program Registration Form may be directed to Superior Court Clerk [...] by email at [...] or by phone at [...].  G.A.G Attachment (Bail Program Registration Form)
[brief] **THIS ARBITRATION LANGUAGE DOES NOT ADVANCE THE PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTING THE LAW SUPPORTING THE GENERAL ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS AND, IN FACT, CONTRAVENES THAT VERY PUBLIC POLICY, AS THE “MAJORITY” POSITION IN CASE LAW RECOGNIZES**  [Raised Below at Pa 67-72; Decided at Pa1-16]  At the outset, it must be highlighted that what Plaintiff advocates is the “majority” position holding that a provision like the one at issue cannot be enforced.  *Taylor v. Butler*, 142 S.W.3d 277, 286m n. 4 (Tenn.S.Ct. 2004) (“We find the majority view to be more persuasive”).  Another state Supreme Court has likened this type of provision -- imposing on the consumer, by way of a contract of adhesion, a “duty” to submit the consumer’s claims to arbitration, while the commercial party is entirely exempted from bringing any of its claims to arbitration – as arrangement “between the rabbits and the foxes. ”  *Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp.*, 511 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va. 1998)\(^2\).  --- \(^2\)  Westlaw reports this case as “overruled,” but this is not an accurate characterization.  In a later decision -- in which the West Virginia Supreme Court To the best of Appellant’s knowledge, not one state high court that has considered this type of so-called “arbitration clause” has enforced it.  At least nine have explicitly held, or opined in dicta, that a so-called “arbitration clause” like the one in this case is neither a mutual arbitration agreement nor an agreement that is otherwise enforceable.  In its briefs below, Respondent cited no case law in which a court actually upheld a provision similar to the one at issue.  Appellant’s own research likewise revealed no cases upholding a provision like this.