ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See generally Roik v. Roik, 477 N.J. Super. 556, 573-74 (App. Div. 2024) (new statutory provision amending equitable distribution statute was to be “effective immediately” applied to “to pending cases that were not dismissed prior to effective date consistent with “pipeline retroactivity” jurisprudence).  The State should be able to achieve in this case a result that it could always have achieved.  B.
[brief] The 660-radius setback is required by State and Federal laws and regulations.  M72-73.  This reduction in developable land is illustrated by the exhibits marked by the Respondents at the Board hearing, see M103, Board Hearing Exhibit A-3, which show the developable land and development of the Property under the Prior Approvals prior to the discovery of the eagle’s nest, and, see M104, Board Hearing Exhibit A-4, which shows the reduced developable land available as a result of the eagle’s nest.  Although, the amount of developable land was reduced by almost half (1/2), the intensity of the development was only reduced by 21,432 square feet of commercial use to 43,568 square feet (about 1/3); and the number of residential units (206 units) was unchanged.
[brief] Defendants-Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment  *   Notice of Motion   Proposed Order   Statement of Material Facts    Brief   Cert of [...]   Cert of [...]  Part 1, 3, other *  Not produced in Appendix as per R. 2:6-1(a)(2)  January 17, 2023  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim * 
[brief] The trial court correctly observed that this matter was analogous to *Polyard v.  Terry*, *supra*, where the Appellate Division held that a declivity in the road between a bridge and an adjoining highway was not a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:4-1.  Id. at 501-510.  i.  Testimony of Plaintiff, his wife, his friend and investigating officer fails to provide evidence of dangerous condition.
[directive] Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to [Yes] [No] (List First or Second Degree Violent Crimes) you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?  2.  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the [Yes] [No] court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?  First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years  3.
[brief] The CSC upheld [...]’s decision to reject Appellant’s testimony as not credible since [...] found that Appellant offered “rehearsed, prepared answers. ”  [Pa10].  The CSC also found that [...] sufficiently provided reasoning for each of the proffered charges that were upheld against Appellant.  [Pa10].  The CSC found “nothing in the record or the [A]ppellant’s [E]xceptions to question those determinations or the findings and conclusions made therefrom. ”  [Pa10].  The CSC also undertook a *de novo* review of [...]’s affirmation of Appellant’s termination.  [Pa10].  The CSC considered the concept of “progressive discipline” and held that the penalty of removal was neither disproportionate nor shocking to the conscience given the nature of Appellant’s numerous infractions and status as a police officer.  [Pa10].  The CSC concluded by holding that Appellant’s termination was therefore justified based on the record evidence and [...]’s findings, conclusions, and credibility determinations.  [Pa10].
[brief] In *Flynn*, the plaintiffs loaned $15,000 to the defendants.  At the time the plaintiffs advanced the loan, they stated to the defendants, “Get it back to us when you can. ”  *Flynn*, 2006 WL 664180 at *1 (Da222).  No other terms were ever mentioned or discussed, nor was it memorialized in a writing.  *Ibid.*  Over the ensuing years, the plaintiffs followed up with the defendants about payment of the loan but the defendants told plaintiffs they did not have the money and would pay when they could afford it.  *Ibid.*  The plaintiffs filed their complaint, seeking payment of the loan sixteen (16) years after the loan was made.  *Ibid.*  After a one-day bench trial, the trial judge found that the loan was not a “pay-when-able” loan and instead was a standard demand loan, and thus the statute of limitations had expired.
[brief] For more than 60 years, the [...] ("[...]") has defended liberty and justice guided by the vision of a fair and equitable New Jersey for all.  The [...]’s mission is to preserve, advance, and extend the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every New Jerseyan by the State and Federal Constitutions in courts, legislative bodies, and communities.  Founded in 1960 and based in Newark, the [...] is a nonpartisan organization that operates on several fronts—legal, political, cultural—to bring about systemic change and build a more equitable society.  In all these arenas, the [...] advocates for the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, including children, on equal terms with all others.  The [...] is the state affiliate of the [...] and has 30,000 members in New Jersey and hundreds of thousands of additional supporters.  [...] members and supporters include transgender and gender-nonconforming students and their parents and guardians.  [...] ("[...]") was founded in 2004 and is the largest LGBTQ+ advocacy organization in New Jersey, with more than 150,000 members.
[directive] As a general proposition, the organized crime aggravating factor should not be invoked in any case where the defendant is entitled to mitigating points as a “minor” or “minimal” participant under Mitigating Factor #2a.  These Guidelines clearly establish that it is a mitigating circumstance that a defendant played only a “minor” or “minimal” role in the criminal scheme.  The defendant would be entitled to mitigating points under Mitigating Factor #2a, for example, if his or her involvement in the commercial criminal enterprise was limited to transporting drugs.  This mitigating factor would apply even to defendants who repeatedly provide this illicit transportation service for pecuniary gain.  (It should be noted that if a “mule” earned a substantial source of livelihood from providing such illicit services, he or she would be entitled to two mitigating points under Mitigating Factor #2a, but would also be subject to Aggravating Factor #5a in the “Profiteering” Aggravating Factor Category.)
[brief] Defendants have presented no facts to justify restricting [...]’s public speech on capacity development of water systems.  Indeed, it is difficult to grasp any legitimate interest of the [...] in suppressing such speech.  More troubling is the [...] requirement (a “blanket policy”) that an [...] employee seek permission before speaking on matters of public concern.  *National Treasury* imposes on the government the burden to demonstrate that unrestrained speech will concretely produce serious harm and that the prior restraint “will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way”  *Id.* at 475.  This has not been done.  The regulation requiring such permission before speaking on matters of public concern is, therefore, an unconstitutional prior restraint.
[brief] See Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546 (2018) (reviewing Planning Board’s application of the Time of Application Rule under an arbitrary and capricious standard).  Plaintiff’s actual claim – as set forth in every single submission – was as follows: “The Board’s Decision to Apply the Time of Application Rule to an Application Filed After the Effective Date of the Ordinance was Arbitrary, Capricious and Unreasonable. ”  In fact, the trial court acknowledged that “the critical question is time of application and – and – and whether the Planning Board got it right or wrong. ” (3T16:12-14.)  Thus, even if Dover was good law (which it is not), and even if the trial court had determined that the Planning Board “got it wrong” (i.e., acted arbitrarily and capriciously), such action still does not rise to the “gross illegality” that was at issue in Dover.  Nevertheless, the trial court, without justification, unilaterally ignored the “interested party” standard in the MLUL and decided that the “standard that’s in front of the Court today” was a so-called claim for “gross illegality” and concluded that Plaintiffs possessed standing despite the absence of an affected property right.  (3T14:11- 21.)  The trial court had no authority to take those unilateral actions and therefore, the decision must be reversed.
[brief] Though “lack of diligence . . . should not deprive [it] of the opportunity to redeem, after securing relief from a judgment.  [...].  Id., at 129, 130.  The attack against Defendant’s alleged failings to pay its taxes after it acquired title, is factually incorrect.  These recriminations intentionally distract from and fail to recognize the failure during the combined ownership of the Plaintiff and [...] to pay taxes 4th quarter, 2022 and the 2023 taxes.  Nonetheless, its approach is to deflect from the questionable process Plaintiff’s used of the In Rem Act and Abandoned Property Act to accelerate its foreclosure, Prior to its sale to [...], LLC, the Plaintiff was aware of several attempts by Defendant to redeem, and its overture to the tax collector, and counsels’ requests of Plaintiff’s to accept redemption.
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Colonial Specialty Foods, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1999) | 1 | | Craft v. Stevenson Lumbar Yard Inc., 179 N.J. 56 (App. Div. 1965) | 13 | | CSFB 2001Park Corporate Center LLC v SB Rental 1, LLC, 410 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2009) | 12 | | Citibank N.A. v. Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519(App. Div. 1996) | 14-15 | | Docteroff v. Barra Corp. of America Inc, 282 N.J. Super., 230 (App. Div. 1995) | 10-11, 13 | | Du Ponte v. Mutual Contracting Co., 18 N.J. Super. 142 (App. Div. 1952) | 7 | | Garden State v. Graef, 341 N.J. Super.241, (App. Div. 2001) | 12 | | General Elec. Co v. Fred Sulzer & Co, 86 N.J. Super.
[brief] The Legislature did not intend to “create a minefield of hyper-technicalities in order to doom innocent litigants possessing meritorious claims. ”  Ferreira v. Rancocas Ortho. Assocs., 178 N.J. 144, 151 (2003).  The statute exists to strike a fair balance between preserving a person’s right to sue and controlling nuisance litigation.  *Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley*, 168 N.J. 398, 404 (2001).  The language of the statute anticipates vicarious liability claims and limits its applicability to such claims.  “To establish vicarious liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘(1) that a master-servant relationship existed and (2) that the tortious act of the servant occurred within the scope of that employment. ’”  *Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cty., Inc.*, 250 N.J. 368, 379 (2022) (quoting *Carter v. Reynolds*, 175 N.J. 402, 409 (2003)).  A vicarious liability claim against a licensed person is not, per se, a professional negligence claim.  To fall under the AOM statute, the claim must be for damages resulting from malpractice or negligence of one of the limited, enumerated licensed persons acting within that person’s profession.
[brief] We stress at the outset of our analysis that there were two distinct Confrontation Clause violations in this case: (1) [...]'s testimony explaining why defendant's picture was included in a photo array, in clear violation of Branch, 182 N.J. at 352, 865 A.2d 673, and (2) the incriminating hearsay statement attributed to [...], which is an even more direct and serious violation of defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.
[brief] 544a.  Indeed, the midpoint review does not even mention the 7 off-site affordable units, displaying [...]’s apparent effort to evade its obligation.  By trying to improperly shift its burden to [...], [...] seeks to conceal from the court that, in the six years since the new administration took power, it has not even contemplated a plan for a realistic mechanism to satisfy the seven units required by the court’s judgment.  While [...] emphasizes the fact that the judgment itself makes no explicit reference to Block 610 Lot 1 sought to be utilized for the seven off-site units, there is no dispute of fact that [...] has an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity to build the seven units and has never sought approval for any other location that the off-site property.
[brief] Requesting to be heard, [...] asked to be heard and stated:  MS. DARDEN: Your Honor, if I may?  THE COURT: You have to.  I mean, I don't just -- MS. DARDEN: Your Honor, I have to speak now.  I think that the Court must be aware of certain information that is public and relevant to what is going on right now.  THE COURT: Is it criminal?  MS. DARDEN: [...]-  THE COURT: Yes.  MS. DARDEN: -- has a criminal record – THE COURT: I know.  MS. DARDEN: -- in the State of New Jersey for insurance fraud.  THE COURT: I know he does.  I know the man.  He was in my courtroom, [...].  MS. DARDEN: He served seven years.  This account was set up September 20th, 2020.  September 25th.  Do you know how easy it is to find out when [...] started to exist?
[brief] BECAUSE SEA BRIGHT IS NOT ONE OF THE SPECIFIC CLASSES OF ENTITY WHICH ARE EXPLICITLY PERMITTED TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11, (Aa19 – Aa21)  The briefs filed by [...] and the [...] begin with the same two fundamental flaws: 1) they ignore, or attempt to gloss over, the Legislature’s choice to differentiate “consolidated” school districts from those, like [...] and [...], which are joined following the elimination of a non-operating district and its subsequent merger with its former send-receive partner; and 2) they assume that [...] is a constituent member of [...].  These are the same errors at the heart of the [...]’s September 22, 2023, decision, in which the [...] stated, without any analysis of the statutes, “[t]he statute contemplates that a municipality, such as [...], may seek withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district”.  (Aa20)  (emphasis added).  However, neither the [...] nor [...], offers any response to the plain language of the statute, which, Rather than announce a broad rule that any municipality may withdraw from a regional or consolidated school district, sets forth a list of enumerated entities that may do so.  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  Where the legislature has set forth an enumerated list of applicable entities, not even the [...]’s expertise can extend its reach beyond the four corners of the page.  See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (identifying the plain language of a statute as the best indicator of the legislature’s intent in passing it).  The question at the heart of this appeal—whether [...], as an entity, fits into any of the above-listed entities—is resolved by looking at the statute’s plain language:  [...] is not an entity so listed, and therefore cannot avail itself of the process outlined therein.  Any alleged ambiguity identified by [...], or need for harmonization with other provisions in the law which the [...] alleges is necessary, are mere illusions, read into the statute as a means of reaching [...]’s desired result.  A.
[brief] ” (6a-7a, 377a-378a).  A sixteen-page statement of reasons accompanied the orders.  (8a-23a, With respect to Defendants’ motion, the first judge rejected their “excusable neglect” argument.  (13a-14a).  The first judge, however, wanted to know more about the abandonment status of the property.  (14a-18a).  In order to create a fuller record, the first judge “permit[ted] a period of discovery, 90 days, for the parties to more fully explore the issue of abandonment. ” (18a).  The discovery period was also to be used so [...]’s status as a bona fide purchaser could be explored.  (21a-22a).  The first judge contemplated that, following the discovery period, both the issues of abandonment and bona fide purchaser would be “the subject of further motion practice or a plenary hearing. ”  (18a, 22a).  E.
[brief] [...] Did Not Rely on [...] as an Expert Witness in Substance Abuse.  [...] specifically acknowledged [...] in his capacity as a clinical psychologist, not as an expert in substance abuse.  [Pa17].  [...] held that he would not accept [...] as an expert in substance abuse but would look at the totality of [...]’s testimony and all of the evidence and give it the appropriate weight when making decisions and writing the opinion.  [2T36:12-18].  The block quote provided by Appellant [Pb32; Pa48-Pa49] is merely a recitation of [...]’s OAL Trial testimony, not the basis of [...]’s decision.  [...] stated the following as the basis for his conclusion:  The fact that he [Appellant] received opioid prescriptions mere days apart, and then went to get codeine syrup from his regular doctor days later, evidenced that appellant was dealing with an opioid addiction and had been searching for extra drugs from various doctors to be filled at various pharmacies.  On March 1, 2018, [...] prescribed forty-five oxycodone pills to be taken three times per day for fifteen days.  The next day, March 2, 2018, Goswami prescribed forty-five OxyContin pills to be taken three times per day for fifteen days.  On March 4, 2018, [...] prescribed ten oxycodone pills and codeine syrup for appellant, even though he had just gotten prescriptions from Goswami.  With no proof that he ever advised his employer about these medications, and because of the Incident that unfolded, all indications were that appellant had been attempting to cover-up his opioid addiction.  [Pa49]  (emphasis added).  It is abundantly clear that [...] did not rely on [...]’s testimony when concluding that Appellant abused opioids, but rather relied upon Appellant’s behavior and misrepresentations.  [...]’s conclusion regarding Appellant’s opioid abuse stands on its own even if every reference to [...] is entirely eliminated.  Appellant’s uncited and unsupported allegation that [...] “egregiously relied heavily upon this inadmissible evidence to sustain the disciplinary charges” against Appellant [Pb34], is expressly contradicted by [...]’s conclusion that the lack of medication disclosure and because of how the Incident unfolded were the reasons for sustaining Appellant’s disciplinary charges.  [Pa49].  Therefore, Appellant’s arguments regarding [...] must be rejected, as [...] did not rely on [...] as a substance abuse expert when forming his conclusions.  III.
[directive] Both law enforcement and CBVI organizations should adhere to this principle. ”  •  The Foundation of CBVI-LE Coordination Is a Strong Relationship (Report section II.2.C).  “The Working Group consistently emphasized the essential importance of building relationships.  Building robust and successful coordination over time requires a number of elements…including establishing clear points of contact, providing adequate training to both law enforcement and CBVI providers on each other’s responsibilities and missions, clearly delineating roles and responsibilities, defining what services are and aren’t offered, and clearly setting expectations.  All of these elements and operational success in the field are predicated on a relationship built around mutual respect and familiarity with the people doing the jobs and their work.
[brief] Similar to the Coyne Court’s determination that the DOT’s highway cleaning operations were ministerial, Defendants’ duty to shut down the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises was ministerial, not discretionary.  The reasoning of McGowan v. Borough of Eatontown, 151 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 1977) may also be instructive.  In McGowan, the plaintiff alleged that ice on the roadway caused him to lose control of his car and presented evidence that the State had prior actual knowledge of icy accumulations at that location on the highway.  151 N.J. Super. at 444-45.  The Appellate Division held that the weather-immunity provision of the TCA would not bar plaintiff’s complaint of negligent maintenance of a highway because the legislative comment to that provision:  [S]uggests a duty on the public entity . . . where the existing condition constitutes a “trap” to a person otherwise using due care.  . . .  We do not deem the Legislature to have considered the public entitled to any less warning where the [dangerous condition] recurs predictably and periodically and the public entity is on notice of this likelihood, than in a situation where the [dangerous condition] consists of a single passing episode.  Defendants argued that their failure to notice and remove the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises boils down to an allocation of resources, i.e., discretionary.
[brief] [...], Esq. Billing Invoice, (from 3/6/20 through 3/15/23)  Re: Herrera-Jerez v. [...] a/k/a [...], Dkt. No. [...], (Exhibit I to Ricci Certification) .................................................. 151a-155a Certification of Service of Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 15, 2023 .................................................. 156a Letter of Transmittal to Court Forwarding Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 23, 2023 ............... 157a Defendant’s Proposed Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 23, 2023 .................................................. 158a-159a Certification of [...], Esq.
[brief] The court can take judicial notice of the docket entries in this case.  Fed. R. Evid. 201, incorporated in these proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9017.  See *In re Indian Palms Assocs.*, Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 1995); *Maritime Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank*, 959 F.2d 1194, 1200 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1991); *In re Aughenbaugh*, 125 F.2d 887, 889 (3d Cir. 1942).  The Debtor’s initial chapter 13 and subsequently filed modified plans, Main Case Doc. Nos. 18, 22, and 48, proposed to pay the claim of [...] without interest through the life of the Plan contrary to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (oversecured creditors are entitled to interest on their allowed claims).  While not unusual, the Debtor’s plans are silent as to how the Debtor will set aside the Final Judgment and recover the Property from [...].  In the normal course of most chapter 13 cases, where a debtor seeks to recover their residence after a foreclosure is completed and then address that default through their chapter 13 plan, the debtor promptly files an adversary proceeding to recover the property in order to implement their plan.  Here, no adversary proceeding was filed.
[brief] 31  Gibbins v. Kosuga, 121 N.J. Super. 252 (Law Div. 1972) ......................................................  35  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (2016)  ...............................................................................  7  Golden v. Casa Per Sacerdoti Vecchi Ed Invalidi, 30 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 1954) ....................................................... 25, 26 Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72 (2014) ...............................................................................