ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BRIEF  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY...........................................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .................................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................................15  I.  Standard of Review ..............................................................................................................15  II.  The Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment.........................................................  15  A.  The Trial Court Erred In Finding That The Question At Issue On The Insurance Policy Application Was Unambiguous (Ia12, 1T61, 64; 2T4-5).......................................................................................................................  15  B.  [...] failed To Establish A Material Misrepresentation And Reliance By Its Underwriter And, Therefore, The Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment (Ia022, 2Tr.47-50) .............................................................................................................................................  26  C.  The Lower Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment  Because The [...] Insurance Master Policy Itself Requires A Finding Of Intentional Fraud By [...] To Void The Policy (2Tr6- 13)....................................................................................................................................  31  D.  An Exclusion In An Automobile Policy Must Appear On The Declaration Page To Be Effective And, Thus, The Exclusion Of 12-15 Passenger Vans Is Violative Of New Jersey Public Policy (Not raised below)  .............................................................................................................................................  33  E. Strong Public Policy Favoring The Assurance Of Financial Protection For Innocent Victims Of Automobile Accidents  Warrants Denying Summary Judgment (2T44)  .............................................................................................................................................34  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................39
[brief] (1T:35-8 to 10).  The trial court incorrectly found that a consultation occurred prior to the reading of the Miranda warnings.  (2T:17-1 to  Prior to reading [...] his Miranda rights, the only thing [...] said to [...] Kologi was “Happy New Year [...]. ”  (7T:278-17).  After the Miranda warnings were given, the entire consultation which was in front of two detectives and not at all in private was:
[brief] The Commission plainly got this issue wrong.  It is frankly absurd to say there is “no factual evidence” tying Respondent’s Facebook account to her Board membership, and that her page “did not make any reference to the Board of her membership on same. ” (Ca017).  She made repeated references to her Board membership.  The Commission’s finding to the contrary was, at the least, clear error, and was most certainly not supported by substantial evidence in the record at the time.
[brief] The very foundation of condemnation law seeks but one result: To compensate the owner as if the condemnation, and all the circumstances which surround it, never occurred.  [...] sought an earlier valuation date to reap the benefits of an increased valuation as of 1994 versus 2018, and in the process improperly retained the profits from the rent-generating commercial Property for twenty-four years.  This is the very definition of unjust enrichment.  Because reflexive adherence to the strict application of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(d) belies the very purposes of the statute, the Trial Court’s February 20, 2019 Order setting a valuation date of January 27, 1994 should be reversed.
[brief] He merely relied repeatedly upon his assertion of the purported similarity of the permitted uses and other zoning parameters without actually exploring them with the Board.  The Board, in its Resolution, found this omission from [...]’s testimony (especially, but not exclusively with regard to one obvious difference that was apparent to the Board on the face of the application, namely building height) significant enough that it refused to accept [...]’s testimony as credible and probative.  Specifically, the Board found:  25.  [...]’ testimony did not address the substantial difference between the permitted maximum building height in Florence Township’s SM Zone of 30ft. and the actual building height of 50ft. that was approved by the Mansfield Township Planning Board for the proposed principal building to be located on the Mansfield Township part of the overall parcel.  [...] did not provide any testimony that compared specifically and qualitatively the permitted uses and associated development standards in the Florence SM Zone with those of the adjoining Mansfield ODL Zone.  From [...] testimony, the Board knows only that warehouse and distribution uses in 50 ft.-tall buildings are allowed in the Mansfield ODL Zone, but nothing at all about any qualifications or limitations on those uses which may be found in Mansfield’s ordinances, or how genuinely consonant the warehouse distribution uses permitted in Florence Township’s SM Zone are with the Mansfield ODL uses.  The Redevelopment Plan that was attached to Mansfield Township Ordinance 2017-11, and which was later accepted into evidence by this Board is not helpful because it contains no substantive zoning standards and merely adopts by reference the zoning standards of Mansfield Township’s ODL Zone District.  Because [...]’s testimony was founded on an unsupported assertion that the zoning of the Mansfield and Florence parts of the overall parcel are “complimentary”, and because his testimony does not address the substantial difference in allowable building heights in the SM and ODL Zones, the Board does not find [...]’s testimony credible with regard to the special reasons, absence of substantial impairment of the zone plan and the enhanced quality of proof required under the Medici holding for a use variance pursuant to NJSA 40:55D-70(d)1. Ja040-041.
[brief] [1T3-7 to 4-15].  At the Superior Court, Law Division, level, defendant was represented by [...], Esq.  [...] filed a brief on her behalf and advanced several arguments, which, if they had been successful, could have resulted in a finding of not guilty.  [...] did not suggest, as defendant now asserts, that his client was guilty.  [Db25].  Rather, this Honorable Court must look to the context of the argument cited in defendant’s brief: [...] testified to statements made outside of court to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Namely that Defendant was the perpetrator.  On one occasion, [...] stated in no uncertain terms that [...]’s wife statement was the reason why he knew Defendant was the perpetrator (“that’s how I knew it was you”).  He also announced that he would quote her directly and then proceeded to quote her directly.  The statement has the major defendant of all impermissible hearsay statements, which is that the declarant was not present in Court to be questioned.  One might unfairly infer that Defendant admitted to the act to the witness.  However, we don’t know that because the witness was not there to be questioned and elaborate.  It is possible she gleaned her information from the police whose testimony and investigative steps are also not on this record.  It is possible that she received the information from any number of sources that may or may not be reliable, but we do not know, because she was not on the witness stand to ask.  We do not know whether or she is being too credulous in believing any information she may have received because of her stated dim view of Defendant.  It is also quite like that her knowledge came from out of Court statements, but we do not know.  [DA58-59; emphasis in the original].  Defense counsel clearly was not implicating defendant in the commission of the crime but listing the reasons why the lower court could have drawn adverse inferences from the victim’s testimony.  Furthermore, trial counsel had the trial transcript when he filed the brief, as he cited it extensively.  Filing the appeal and the motion for the stay before receiving the transcript are not outside the objective reasonableness standard dictated by Strickland-Fritz.  [...]’s actions did not result in defendant’s conviction because he was prepared for the trial de novo and had the transcript in hand by the time he filed his brief.  Defendant has asserted nothing that would allow this Honorable Court to determine that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial court level.  Defendant cannot succeed on this argument.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 3B:31-67(a).  As stated in the Verified Complaint, Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s requests for information for over 100 days as of the time this action was filed.  (Pa2 ¶ 12).  When read together, these two statutes further demonstrate that a request for an accounting is not permissive, but mandatory.  The trial court failed to explain why N.J.S.A. § 3B:31-67(a) does not give Plaintiff the right to the information he seeks.
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..............................................................  3  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  18  I.  THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS  BECAUSE [...] PROVED THAT HIS COMPLAINT WAS TIMELY AND DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF ON THEIR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  DEFENSE (Volume I, Pa. 150-184; Vol III Pa. 405-15)  .................................................................  18  II.  DEFENDANTS’ PROMISES TO PAY [...] UPON THE SALE OF THE HOSPITAL EQUITABLY ESTOPPS  DEFENDANTS  STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  DEFENSE AND [...]’S CERTIFICATION IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY  JUDGEMENT  MOTION WAS NOT A SHAM AFFIDAVIT(Vol. I, Pa. 1-6, 85; Vol. III, Pa. 394-96, 405-415; Vol. IV, Pa.576-577; TR-2, 12-8 to 13; 16-6 to 19; 83-11 to 25)  .................................................................  21  III.  THE MOTION COURTS’ DENIAL OF [...]’S MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY TO TAKE [...]  CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (TR1,3-25 to 5-5; Vol. 1, Pa. 119-22, 132, 134)...........................................  27  CONCLUSION..................................................................................
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[brief] The trial court’s legal determination on summary judgment concerning preemption is distinguishable and separate from the dicta\(^1\) regarding the --- \(^1\) “New Jersey law requires that a public utility furnish safe, adequate and proper service.  N.J.S.A. 48:2-23.  Here, [...] seeks to install high capacity 69kV power lines to upgrade electric transmission and distribution lines throughout New Jersey to meet increasing electric demand and ensure a reliable energy infrastructure.  Further, the need for taller poles for the power lines is mandated pursuant to the National Safety Code which was adopted by the [...].  [...] moved for summary judgment on the First Count (invalidation of various sections of the Westfield Ordinance by operation of N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 and N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1) and Second Count (invalidation of various sections of the Westfield Ordinance by operation of N.J.S.A. 48:2-23, N.J.A.C. 14:3-31, N.J.A.C. 14:5-2.1 and other provisions of Title 48 of the New Jersey Statutes) of its Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ, which both entailed a determination of questions of law, not questions of fact.
[brief] To the contrary, a fair analysis dictates that [...] could sustain a prima facie case for each of the ten individual counts pleaded in the Complaint, and to the extent proofs were lacking, [...] indeed was entitled to obtain its answers to interrogatories and depose Defendants prior to the discovery end date.  The Board’s well-pleaded Complaint alleged ten individual counts, with multiple theories of liability within several of the counts, against Defendants:  a.  Count I – Breach of Contract (multiple breaches)  b.  Count II – Statutory and Legal Violations \(^{50}\) Pa267 – Pa272 c.  Count III – Unjust Enrichment d.  Count IV – Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing e.  Count V – Promissory Estoppel f. Count VI – Conversion or Civil Theft g.  Count VII – Fraud / Misrepresentation h.  Count VIII – Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations  i.  Count IX – Punitive Damages j.  Count X – Indemnification  The Board was entitled to pursue discovery on these claims, which it did through interrogatories, which could have been followed by depositions had the court not prematurely dismissed the Complaint. \(^{51}\)  The 10-count Complaint alleged multiple theories of liability within each count, and each theory of liability had its own set of elements and jury charges as to whether [...] established a prima facie case.  It is unfathomable that the court granted a wholesale dismissal of [...]’s entire 10-count Complaint without any analyses whatsoever of the elements within each of the counts, or allowing [...] to pursue those proofs in discovery.
[directive] This provision should not, however, be construed to preclude a prosecutor from appealing if the court had no authority under Section 2 of L. 2009, c. 192 to entertain the re-sentencing application where the (i.e., defendant does not meet the eligibility requirements for having his or her sentence reviewed under Section 2 of the new law), since in that event, every provision of Section 2 of the new law, including the limitation on appeals, would be inapplicable.  By the same token, the new statute should not be construed to preclude the prosecutor from appealing the modification of an inmate’s sentence done pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b in any case where the defendant would have been ineligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(2) by virtue of having committed the drug distribution or possession with intent to distribute offense while on school property or a school bus, or by having used or threatened violence or by possessing a firearm in the course of committing the school zone offense, or by having previously been convicted of a drug distribution/possession with intent offense.  Any modification of a mandatory minimum sentence done in disregard of the disqualification set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(2) would constitute an illegal sentence that criteria should be subject to correction at any time by an appellate court.  -9-
[brief] “Despite the fact that [[...]’s motion for summary judgment was filed January 6, 2023] and there was no opposition in February, March or April, the court is going to grant [[...]’s] motion for reconsideration and then decide [[...]’s] motion for summary judgment on its merits. ” (PPCIa369-71).  The trial court then summarized [...]’s arguments to set aside the Final Judgment against [...].
[brief] JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS INCLUDING OFFICERS  [...] AND [...]  BECAUSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS INCONSISTENT AND INAPPROPRIATE WITH THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED FOR GRANTING SUCH RELIEF (. (Pa030; Pao031; Pa168; Pa453;Pa505; Pa507; P546; 1T40-1to 2; Pa022-Pa23; Pa303; Pa453; Pa471; 1T5-12 to 18; Pa078; Pa535; 1T42-6 to14; Pa053; Pa041; Pa488; Pa001; Pa507; Pa505; Pa053; Pa533; Pa534)
[brief] Persuasiveness of the Federal Court Decisions.  _Hunstein/Khimmat/Jackin_ are the only published decisions holding that a debt collector violates § 1692c(b) when it conveys the type of data which Defendant conveyed to its mail vendor.  Comments made in other decisions where the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction are not holdings.  All but one of Defendant’s unpublished New Jersey decisions failed to recognize the existence of any federal court decision.  _Miller_ mentioned one of them, _Hunstein_, but never evaluated its reasoning.  Hardly the “due respect” expected following _Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co._, 121 N.J. 69 (1990).
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(f), an applicant can demonstrate a circular culvert is acceptable as opposed to a bridge pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g), which states:  (g)  The construction or reconstruction of a circular, elliptical, or box culvert is conditionally acceptable where **one or more** of the conditions listed at (g)1 through 6 below exist and the culvert meets the construction standards at (h) below.
[brief] Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50 (1976) ..............................................................................  40 K.S. v. ABC Pro. Corp., 330 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 411 (2000)  ...........................................................................  14, 15, 24, 40  Lipsky v. N.J. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2023)
[directive] Where it reasonably appears that a target of the investigation or a premises to be searched may be involved in or associated with terrorist activities, see Section 18(c), supra, the Designated Attorney shall promptly notify the Assistant United States Attorney or other official who has been specifically designated to receive such notification by the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey.  22.  Notification of Searches in Multiple Jurisdictions  Where an application is made for a warrant to conduct a search in multiple locations any one of which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the applicant’s agency, or beyond the territorial jurisdiction of an assistant Page 12 prosecutor reviewing the application, the application shall not be approved and no search shall be conducted without first notifying and consulting with a representative of the County Prosecutor’s Office having jurisdiction over the place to be searched, or a representative of the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3).  Here, the “complaints” that [...] cites cannot constitute whistle-blowing activity under CEPA.  [...] admitted that she never once made any written complaints to anyone at [...] about anything.  She admitted that her “complaints” were nothing more than offhand comments to others about [...].  (Pa241 at 62:18-64:9; Pa238-39 at 49:1-55:25; Pa243 at 72:13-17; Pa244 at 74:5-24).  [...] was advised that she could complain to HR if she believed it was serious, but never did.  (Pa241 at 64:11-18; Pa241 at 62:20-64:18; Pa409 at 27:12-17; Pa409 at 27:19-28:5).  The Appellate Division has found that these types of complaints do not enjoy CEPA protection.
[directive] The Director will set the programmatic and policy vision of Duties of the OACR Director.  OACR, manage performance and outcomes of OACR bureaus, and identify funding, grant, and legislative opportunities for the Department.  The Director or their designee will serve as the lead point of contact, subject matter expert, and coordinator for DLPS on all matters relating to: Opioid and substance use disorder prevention and response; • Law enforcement resiliency; • Law enforcement interaction with mental health and special needs • populations, alternative law enforcement responses; and Prosecutorial diversion programming.  •  Working with the Attorney General’s Director of Community Engagement, the Director or their designee will develop and maintain strong working relationships with local, State, and federal partners, community stakeholders, the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts, the 21 County Prosecutor Offices, statewide law enforcement agencies, and other organizational units and divisions within DLPS and other State agencies.  The Director or their designee will coordinate or support training and outreach efforts by OACR’s constituent organizational units, and manage shared services among them, including research, training, policy support, management of programmatic and policy elements of grants, grant applications, technical assistance, and community outreach.  In addition, the Director or their designee will oversee statewide ARRIVE Together programming and serve as the Chair of the Attorney General’s Statewide Steering 6 Page 7 Committee on Mental Health Working Groups as established by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-14.  The Prescription Monitoring Program (PMP) established within the Division of Consumer Affairs (DCA) under N.J.S.A.45:1‐45 et. seq. will continue to be overseen by the PMP Administrator and Director of DCA.  The DCA Director and PMP Administrator will coordinate with OACR as permitted by law.  E.
[brief] On June 25, 2021, the Tenant and defendant [...] (“[...]”) entered into a residential lease agreement (the “Lease”) with respondent [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]”) to lease an apartment located at [...] (the “Property”), with a two-year term from July 12, 2021 to July 11, 2023.  (Pa0001-Pa0046).  To incentivize the Tenant to commit to a two-year term and timely payment of rents, [...] offered and Appellants accepted and enjoyed a $4,035 rent concession for each of the four months of August, September, October, and November 2021, a $195 parking concession each month, and a further $1,000 rent credit (the “Concessions”).  (Pa0016-Pa0017).  This amounted to a $17,920 benefit that Appellants willingly accepted.  (Ibid.).  This agreement was memorialized in a separate lease rider (the “Lease Rider”).  (Ibid.).  The Lease Rider contained a “Concession Cancellation and Charge-Back” provision (the “Concession Recovery Provision” or the “Provision”) requiring Appellants to reimburse [...] for the cost of the rent and parking concessions if Appellants sought to terminate early or declined to ---  1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History are inextricably intertwined and have been combined for the Court’s convenience.