ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Start with N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6, the statute establishing the Mandated Benefits Review Commission, discussed above.  As noted, it requires that the Commission review any bill that mandates coverage of any health benefits, and prohibits the Legislature from considering the proposal until after receipt of the Commission report or expiration of the period of time for review.  A mandated health benefit is defined as “a benefit or coverage that is required by law to be provided by a carrier and includes: coverage for specific health care services, treatments or practices; or direct reimbursement to specific health care providers. ”  N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-2.  Petitioners contend that because the Commission did not review Chapter 375 prior to its enactment, the statute should be voided.  They are wrong.
[brief] “I was elected onto the central regional district board of education (BOE) come on man LOL”  These are the words Respondent [...] (Respondent) typed out and publicly posted below multiple pictures of herself swearing in to her seat of public trust as a member of the [...] (Board).  She then made every public post that was the subject of the [...]’s (Commission) August 22, 2023 Decision within 5 days, and from the very same public account.  In doing so, She obviously held herself out as a Board member.  While clearly holding herself out as a member of the Board, and without providing any sort of disclaimer as required by the Commission’s well-established caselaw, Respondent engaged in conduct which caused the public to protest the Board, sparked public outcry at meetings of the Board, and caused the Board itself to issue two official Resolutions specifically condemning those statements.  Her conduct also directly subjected the Board to litigation being filed against it.  In doing so, Respondent clearly engaged in activity which not only had the potential to compromise the Board, but actually did compromise the Board.  These are the only two elements required.
[brief] Despite this, for more than a decade, the Appellant [...] (the “Appellant”), a relatively recent transferee of Lot 5, has persistently and defiantly pursued a variety of means and methods to challenge Respondent’s use of the easement inside and outside of court.  After the Chancery Division found for Respondent on the easement issue, Appellant attempted to get around the court’s ruling by reframing the relief it was seeking as land-use-related and going to the Defendant [...] (the “Board”).  At first, based on the objections of Respondent and the Board’s own attorney, the Board declined to entertain Appellant’s effort to circumvent the Chancery Division’s decision and, on appeal to the Law Division on a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, the Assignment Judge affirmed the Board’s declination decision.  But after Appellant then brought a nearly identical application to the Board a second time, the Board inexplicably, and contrary to the advice of its attorney, entered into the fray of the legal dispute between the parties by not only entertaining a hearing on Appellant’s collateral challenge but issuing a resolution in favor of Appellant’s unwarranted request for relief.
[brief] C.  Alternatively, Any Probable Cause Did Not Arise From Unforeseeable And Spontaneous Circumstances.  In the alternative, if [...] did have probable cause that [...]’s car contained contraband, the warrantless car search remained illegal because it did not comport with New Jersey’s automobile exception.  In particular, any probable cause that existed did not arise from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances, as required by New Jersey law.  This Court should therefore reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.  Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that New Jersey’s automobile exception requires that the circumstances giving rise to probable cause be “unforeseeable and spontaneous.
[brief] On August 11, 2016, [...], hereinafter referred to as the Defendant, was operating a motor vehicle on the Garden State Parkway in Middletown, New Jersey.  Defendant was stopped by a member of the New Jersey State Police for a suspected motor vehicle infraction.  Subsequently, the State Trooper who conducted the motor vehicle stop initiated an investigation of Defendant for a potential violation of N.J.S. A. 39:4-50 (DWI).  Ultimately, Defendant was charged with alleged violations of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-96 (Reckless Driving), N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 (Speeding), and N.J.S.A. 39:4-51B (Open Container of Alcohol), and N.J.S.A. 39:4-88B (Traffic on Marked Lanes).
[brief] The severability principle establishes that a party seeking to avoid arbitration must directly challenge the arbitration or delegation clause, not just the contract as a whole.  But this rule does not require that a party challenge only the arbitration or delegation provision.  Rather, where a challenge applies “equally” to the whole contract and to an arbitration or delegation provision, a court must address that challenge.  Again, basic principles of contract and consent require that result.  Arbitration and delegation agreements are simply contracts, and, normally, if a party says that a contract is invalid, the court must address that argument before deciding the merits of the contract dispute.  So too here.  “If a party challenges the validity . . . of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the federal court must consider the challenge before ordering compliance with that [arbitration] agreement. ”  *Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski*, 144 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2024) (emphasis in original) (quoting *Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63, 71 (2010)) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] I.  Adult community housing requirements.  The adult community housing standards set forth at §230-145 shall not apply to the Senior Housing – 1 Overlay District, except that occupancy shall be as regulated in §230-145.A.  SECTION 23.  Chapter 230 “Land Use and Development Regulations” of the Code of the [...] is hereby amended to add a new Article XXXVI “Senior Housing – 2 Overlay District” to read as follows:
[brief] (Not raised below).  Defendant argues that this Court “should give deference” to the trial court’s “factual findings and determinations as to credibility. ” (Db8).  Plaintiff respectfully submits that this argument is misguided, and that no such factual findings or credibility determinations were made by the trial court.  This is not a case in which the trial court conducted a hearing, and heard testimony.  Indeed, no discovery whatsoever was permitted by the trial court, no hearing was conducted, and no testimony was taken.  Instead, the trial court simply heard the oral arguments of counsel on the return date of the order to show cause, and then abruptly dismissed the case, with prejudice.  It is respectfully submitted that this does not constitute a ruling to which this Court should give any deference.
[brief] In *Honeywell*, the trial court denied an award of attorneys’ fees to the policyholder because “[o]verwhelmingly this is a case about nothing more than allocation.  *This is not a case about denial of coverage.*”  *Honeywell*, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1685, at *55 (emphasis added).  [...] relies on this language to argue that [...] is not entitled to fees because “the heart of the parties’ dispute was whether a significant amount of [...]’s claimed damages could be allocated to [...]’s policy period. ” (Db, p. 60).  In doing so, [...] mischaracterizes not only this dispute, but also the Appellate Division’s *Honeywell* decision.  [...] states that the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s denial of attorneys’ fees because, “as is the case here, ‘[the insured] was successful on certain issues and [the insurance carriers] were successful on other issues. ’” (Db, p. 59).  The reasoning cited by [...] was the trial court’s, not that of the Appellate Division.  *See Honeywell*, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1685, at *56.  Although --- \(^8\) A copy of the *Honeywell* decision is included in the Defendant’s Appendix at Da 527. the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s denial of attorneys’ fees, it did so for different reasons.  Specifically, the Appellate Division noted that R. 4:42-9(a)(6) was intended to allow an award of attorneys’ fees “where an insurer refuses to indemnify or defend in respect of its insured's third-party liability to another. ”  *Honeywell*, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1685, at *56-57.  The Appellate Division then concluded that because its allocation ruling did not require the insurance companies to provide coverage, the insurance companies never failed to honor their coverage obligations.  *Id.* at *56.  In this case, unlike in *Honeywell*, [...] flatly denied coverage the trial court’s ruling obligates [...] to indemnify [...] for its past and future losses.  (Pa 25-37).
[brief] **Rules** | Rule | PAGE NOS. | |------|-----------| | R. 1:12-3(a) | 23 | | R. 3:1-2 | 21 | | R. 3:5-1 | 20, 22 | | R. 3:5-7(g) | 29 | | R. 7:7-11(a) | 23 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)
[brief] To the contrary, all evidence presented, in admissible form, establishes that [...] had no duty to maintain the area of the parking lot where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell.  In the instant action, plaintiff was not an invitee of [...] and he confirmed that he had no intention of entering or exiting [...]’s leased premises.  Therefore plaintiff could have no expectation that safe passage would be afforded from the parking lot to [...]’s leased premises.  [...] had no duty to maintain the route plaintiff traveled when returning from his vehicle to [...] since plaintiff was not using the route he chose to enter or exit [...]’s leased premises.  Here, the location of [...]’s expected route was not a route [...] would have taken to enter or exit [...]’s leased premises and, moreover, [...] admits he had no intention to patronize [...]’s business at the time of the accident.  In addition, the condition of the parking lot area where plaintiff allegedly fell was not a condition which [...] might reasonably remedy since [...] paid [...] Common Area Expenses for [...] to maintain the parking lot area where plaintiff allegedly fell and [...] admitted that it had no expectation that [...] would maintain the area of the parking lot where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell.
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[brief] See Powerhouse Arts District, supra; Hirth, supra.  Though N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) requires a redevelopment plan to offer an explanation of any substantial inconsistencies with the local master plan, here, the Redevelopment Plan does not have any substantial inconsistencies, and therefore, does not discuss any.  The governing body’s decision finding consistency was reasonable, based on the contents of the Redevelopment Plan, its members’ knowledge of the area and history of attempted development at the Property, and the record developed by the Planning Board.  The elimination of 50 market rate units does not negate the substantial consistency of the Amended Redevelopment Plan with the Master Plan.  Nor does it render the council’s decision arbitrary or capricious.  In an analogous case, *Powerhouse Arts District*, *supra*, the objectors argued that because the existing redevelopment plan was successful in encouraging mid-rise structures and preserving the historical industrial nature of the neighborhood, both of which were goals of that redevelopment plan, the change to allow high-rise development was not rational.  413 N.J. Super. at 333-34.  The Appellate Division disagreed, finding that the governing body could have rationally rejected the argument that the existing plan was superior and that the amendment was within its discretion so long as it was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
[brief] The Arbitrator’s extra-contractual findings clearly and irrationally exceed the powers granted to him under the PTA ........................................................................................................  18  1.  The Arbitrator improperly transformed projects into Backlog Projects subject to EGP-sharing despite the parties having no meeting of the minds regarding this transformation or the EGP for any of the subject projects.  ........................................................................................................ 19  2.  The Arbitrator improperly relied on forecasts submitted by [...] that were not prepared or identified as amendments to the PTA.  ..................................22  3.  The Arbitrator abandoned the figures contained in the Forecasts and relied exclusively on [...]’s EGP calculations that were, to the extent challenged, not supported in the Financial Reporting or Forecasts, to establish the amounts the EGP erroneously awarded in the Award .........................................................................................24
[brief] Specifically, the Board refuses to approve for state incentive a floating solar development, despite the Board’s clear recognition and development of just such a process.  Here, the BPU, through the Order under appeal, denied the application of the [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) for approval of any state support, including an uprated 1.0 Transition Renewable Energy Certificate (“TREC”) factor, for a proposed 22.5 MW grid-supply floating solar project.  Despite the nature of the site, the existing program, the application, the Solar Act, and common sense, the BPU elected to reject the petition and instead refused to allow [...] to receive any TRECs at all in conjunction with the construction, thereby ensuring that neither the solar facility would be built nor that the sand mine to be built upon could serve a beneficial and valuable use.  The Board rejected the application based upon the “sudden” recognition that the project planned as a grid-supply project was, in fact, exactly the grid-supply project it claimed to be.  Rounds of discovery, ongoing questions, and clear indications aside, the Board determined that grid-supply was not acceptable into this program.  Except, of course, unless a waiver was granted.  Which it was not.  Despite the Board’s acknowledgement that it could issue such a waiver.  For a program that it never said was grid-supply only.  If this sounds confusing and deliberately obtuse, that is the same reaction felt by [...].  While trying not to cast aspersions, the decision-making process here by the Board is, hopefully, simply arbitrary and capricious.  In addition to the confusing and ad-hoc method of decision-making shown by the Board in its conclusion, the Board’s decision to consider and refuse the uprate from a 0.6 TREC factor to the requested 1.0 TREC factor seems odd and, at a minimum, unnecessary and not well-founded.  Despite the BPU’s Order including a clear acknowledgment that floating solar requires a higher incentive than the default 0.6 TREC, coupled with unsubstantiated and non-germane concerns about the developer’s ability to construct, the decision of the Board to refuse the uprated TREC factor provides another clear example of the arbitrary and capricious decision-making on the part of the Board that is and continues to be a detriment to the legislatively required support of the State’s Solar agenda.
[brief] Both parties are found to have litigated aggressively and vigorously in this matter.  The court finds the majority of time spent by the parties during this litigation was incurred due to the unreasonable positions of both parties.  Defendant was unreasonable in attempting to vacate the FJD by asserting arguments that she did not sign the PSA; she was not served the divorce complaint and she was unaware that she was divorced until almost two years after the FJD was entered.
[brief] Since the principal purpose of any public retirement plan is to provide adequate retirement benefits, such coverage should only be extended to “true” public employees.  Professional services vendors, such as municipal attorneys, tax assessors, etc., who are retained under public contracts approved by an appointing agency should not be eligible for a pension.  In our opinion, these employees simply do not meet the original purpose of the public retirement plan and should not be eligible to participate in any pension plan.  In addition to preserving the integrity of the pension funds for those who had dedicated their lives to public service, this change will also serve as a disincentive to “tacking. ”  [Id. at 18 (emphasis added). ]  A Special Session Joint Legislative Committee on Public Employee Benefits Reform was convened, considered the Task Force Report Recommendations, held hearings and issued its Final Report on December 1, 2006.
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[directive] 날짜/Date 피고인/Defendant 변호인/Defense 피고측 Attorney 검사/Prosecutor 알림: 피고가 여성이고 성범죄자 치료를 받을 자격이 있는 경우에, 피고는 성인진단 및 치료센터에 구금되지 않고, 교정청장이 지정하는 시설에 구금되어 그 곳에서 유사한 성범죄자 치료를 받게 될 것입니다.  NOTE:  If the defendant is a female and qualifies for sex offender treatment, she will not be confined at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center but a facility designated by the Commissioner of Corrections where she will receive similar sex offender treatment.
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[brief] (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and one month past the statutory deadline.  (Pa13-14).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa13-14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa13-14).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and one month past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................  2  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................  4  STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  7  I.  THE BOARD’S DECISION TO ADOPT THE ALJ’S RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS  PICARIELLO’S APPEAL WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE (Aa61; Aa52-60).  .................................................................................. 7  II.  THE BOARD  ERRONEOUSLY ADOPTED  THE ALJ’S CONCLUSION  PICARIELLO WAS REMOVED FOR CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT DIRECTLY RELATED TO HIS EMPLOYMENT (Aa61; Aa52-60).  .................................................................  9  CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................  16  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Final Administrative Action of the [...] dated 11/16/23  Initial Decision of ALJ  [...] dated 9/29/23  Letter from [...], Board Secretary, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, dated 1/14/20  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Borrello v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 313 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1998)  .................................................................  11  Geller v. Dep't of the Treasury of New Jersey, 53 N.J. 591 (1969) ..................  10  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980) ...........................................  6
[brief] An attorney “is not barred from representing two parties in the same case as long as the parties’ . . . defenses are consistent,” 47 N.J. Practice, Civil Trial Handbook § 3:1 (2024) ([...]), just as [...]’s and [...]’s joint defense that they have opted to raise is consistent here.  [...] goes to great lengths to downplay the significance of Opinion 552.  It does so principally by relegating its discussion of the decision to one long footnote.  Pb21-22 n.3.  Contrary to [...] assertion, the holding of Opinion 552 is not “limited to the unique facts of that case. ”  Ibid.; see also Hill, 342 N.J. Super. at 309; APCE Opinion 605, 120 N.J.L.J. 317; ACPE Opinion 588, 118 N.J.L.J. 94 (all applying Opinion 552’s holding outside the context of that case).
[brief] When faced with that issue, this Court reasoned:  To permit an interested party to challenge the issuance of a building permit by denominating his appeal as a request for an interpretation would render nugatory the time constraint provided by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72a.  The 20 day limit was clearly designed to insulate the recipient of a building permit or other favorable disposition from the threat of unrestrained future challenge.  It was intended to provide a degree of assurance that the recipient could rely on the decision of the administrative officer.
[brief] [...] roundly rejected such specious characterization, finding the [...]’ actions to be “much more than a breach of fiduciary duty and a breach of contract. ”  See 235T60:6-14.  And this Court, in its 2018 Opinion, soundly rejected the [...]’ identical aversions, finding that it was “convinced th[e [...]’] contention[] lack[ed] sufficient merit [even] to warrant discussion.