ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Americans with Act Disabilities Second Supplement to Directive #23-06 August 2021 9, Page2  Going forward, consistent with the rationale set forth in Andujar, the court may permit the prosecuting attorney to run a criminal background check on a prospective grand juror only based on a reasonable, individualized, good-faith basis to believe that a record check might reveal pertinent information unlikely to voir dire be uncovered through the ordinary process.  If a prosecutor seeks to conduct such a background check prior to the 1. empanelment date, then an application must be made to and approved by the Assignment Judge.  voir dire,  If a prosecutor seeks to conduct such a background check during 2. then an application must be made to and approved by the judge conducting grand jury selection.  The court on its own motion may ask the prosecutor to conduct a 3. voir dire of background check a prospective grand juror during in order to determine whether the grand juror is statutorily eligible to serve.  If a question is raised as to whether an empaneled grand juror is eligible to 4. serve, the issue must be raised to the Assignment Judge who will determine of whether to permit a background check the juror.  of  Determination  Eligibility to Serve as a Grand Juror
[directive] 7.9.1  N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 et seq. governs the use of electronic surveillance information in New Jersey.  This statute specifically covers the areas of: (a) Wire communication, which essentially means any conversation made over a telephone, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2a; (b) Oral communication, which means any oral communication uttered by a person who has an expectation that such communication will not be intercepted, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2b; State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975).  4  39  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] See Williamson, 138 N.J. at 304 (observing that the State “need prove only that the police lawfully stopped the car, not that it could convict the driver of the motor-vehicle offense[”]; see also State v. Maples, 346 N.J. Super. 408, 417 (App. Div. 2002) (noting “we affirm or reverse judgments and orders, not reasons”).  As a final point, while defendant now hones in on the “may be affected” language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, this argument was not raised below.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g).  Particularly where a channel is narrow, using a bridge “would not preserve the native [stream] substrate due to unavoidable construction techniques. ”  47 N.J.R. 1041(a) (June 1, 2015).  Bridge footings “may extend under the majority of the channel and footings from both abutments can sometimes even meet in the middle of the channel” meaning “the channel will be fully disturbed during construction. ”  Ibid.  In such instances, spanning a channel with a bridge “does not provide significant environmental benefit over constructing” a culvert.  Ibid.  There also is no “tangible environmental benefit” for spanning a channel without fisheries resources.  Ibid.  Thus, culverts are conditionally acceptable where the channel is less than ten feet wide, where the channel does not contain fisheries resources, and where spanning the channel is not practicable due to anticipated adverse impacts to the environment.
[brief] Order to Show Cause to Enforce Litigant’s Rights Without Restraints entered by the Honorable [...] on December 21, 2017 in connection with Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause to Enforce Litigant’s Right Certification of [...] in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for an Order to Show Cause  Why an Order should Not be Entered  Enforcing Litigant’s Rights filed by the [...] on December 12, 2017.  EXHIBIT  A Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, Third and Fifth Counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Complaint dated July 15, 2016  EXHIBIT  B  Amended Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, Third and Fifth Counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Complaint filed July 25, 2016  **EXHIBIT
[brief] Additionally, this comment did not undermine defendant’s ability to claim the State failed to prove he was the man in the light-colored hoody or assert that the officers misidentified the shooter that night and then framed defendant to justify their actions.  Indeed, [...]’s testimony that he focused on the man running across the street furthered defendant’s theory of the case: that [...] chose him from the outset, even before the State had other proofs, without any reason.  Thus, if this comment had any potential for prejudice, it was minimal.  Simply stated, between the overwhelming proof of defendant’s guilt and the minimal, if any, prejudice that could be produced by the fleeting comment, it is clear that the comment was not capable of producing an unjust result.  Accordingly, defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.
[brief] Main Point: Describes Case as "Vigorously Prosecuted and Opposed for Many Years."  It sounds as if this comment was aimed at "unopposed" issue too.  Maybe His Honor was still investigating 12-word "typo" (esp. given other improprieties in the case incl. "lost" file & LoP Dismissal with many, many recent papers in file.)  Afraid to push issue due to almost certain retaliation.  | Written Opinion at Pa329.
[directive] For example, a corporation’s use of arbitration agreements to limit victims’ access to court and/or ability to participate in a class action may weigh in favor of government enforcement.  Evaluating the impacts on racial justice and equity for underserved communities from violations of the law and from civil enforcement agencies’ own actions may require new approaches to acquiring and analyzing demographic data.  To the extent that they have authority to do so, agencies may find that it useful to begin requiring regulated entities to report such information on a regular basis and/or may seek such information in the course of investigations (for example, by subpoenaing demographic information about a target’s customer base).  III.
[directive] 5  Shot - Handgun Night Qualification Course  HNQC  Range: 15 yards  Target: FBI “Q” type 36 rounds  Rounds  Position Course of fire Time Range  From a secured holster position, draw and fire 1 round standing then 2 rounds kneeling, utilizing a handheld or Standing To 15 Yds 5 gun mounted light.  Holster, recover to a standing ready 20 sec.  Kneeling position.  From the ready position fire 1 round standing then 1 round kneeling.  Reload and holster.  From a ready position, on command fire 2 rounds utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light, light off and step to the right.  Standing Point  On command fire 2 rounds utilizing a handheld or gun 10 Yds 5 5 sec.  Shoulder mounted light, light off and step to the left.  On command fire 1 round utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light, light off and step to the right.  Reload and holster.  Draw and bring the weapon to a ready position.  On command fire 2 rounds utilizing a handheld or gun Standing Point 6 sec. 4 mounted light and return to the ready position.  Repeat  Shoulder once 7 Yds  Standing Point  From a ready position on command fire 1 round 4  Shoulder; utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light, reload and 20 sec.  Mandatory reload fire 3 rounds, top off the cylinder and holster.  From a secured holstered position on command draw One Handed and fire 2 rounds, utilizing a handheld or gun mounted shooting (strong light, (support hand may not be used to stabilize the 5 sec. side) handgun).  Repeat once, then repeat firing one round.  Reload and holster  Weapon should be in the support hand at a ready 5 Yds 10 position.  (Strong side hand and arm is limp at the One handed side.)  No handheld lights may be used.  On command shooting (support 5 sec. fire 2 rounds and return to the ready. side)  Repeat once, then repeat firing one round, reload and holster  Standing, holding a handheld light in a manner the officer would while making a motor vehicle stop or conducting a field interview and examining identification  Standing Point 3 sec.  3 yards 4 (i.e. over the shoulder or under the armpit) from a Shoulder secured holstered position draw and fire 2 rounds.  Repeat once.  Top off the cylinder and holster.  Without a light from a secured holstered position, on 1 yd 4  Weapon Retention command draw and fire 2 rounds from the weapon 3 sec. retention position.  Repeat once.  End course, score targets (29 hits = 80%)
[brief] 2.  **Building Setback to Road:**  In the VC-2 Overlay Zone, pursuant to Ordinance Section 108-6.18(K)(8)(b)(3), the minimum front yard for principal building to curb line of internal road is 30 feet.  As noted above, the purpose of this Zone is to create a less intense downtown and this variance does not advance that purpose.  The Applicant proposes 16 feet to Market Street and the deviation is not justified.
[brief] The thrust of the Board’s determination was that the building was too big and its mass would impact adjacent properties, but as noted above, it failed to explain how.  But because [...]’s building conformed to the building coverage requirement and all building setbacks in the R-20A Zone, such a finding was baseless since the visual impact of the building is unrelated to the use that occurs within it.  Paragraph 40 of the Resolution claims that the amount of impervious coverage [...] proposes cannot be mitigated.  But the Board did not even try.  [Da140].  The only discussion there about imposition of conditions relates to [...]’s purported failure to demonstrate it can utilize its proposed drainage design is an unmitigable condition\(^7\).
[brief] (par. 5)  (152a)  b.  Contentious disputes between [...] and [...] since 2019 over whether the Trust would pay any portion of her personal legal fees in regards to Estate matters related to [...].  (par. 4)  (151a-152a)  c.  Roth’s rejection of [...]’s attempt to use Trust as her personal piggy bank to pay off her home equity line of credit balance.  (par. 4)  71.  I issued Aug. 19, ‘22 letter to [...] & [...] that addressed issues in par. 66-70, along w/requests to resolve matters, & work w/[...], [...], & me towards a 3-Way Settlement.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Final Agency Decision, issued August 22, 2023.  .......................  Ca014  Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge, issued May 30, 2023.  ......  Ca020  Commissioner of Education’s Order Declining Interlocutory Jurisdiction, issued September 6, 2022  ..................................................  Ca083  Agency Decision on Motion to Dismiss, issued August 23, 2022  ...........  Ca206 #
[brief] Plaintiff also relies upon several federal cases to claim that “it would be unfair to require a party to take the deposition of a foreign party on German soil. ” (Pb19-Pb20).  However, as Plaintiff acknowledges, these cases address depositions of parties.  Id. (citing Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Zur Förderung der angewandten Forschung E.V. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2021 WL 861493 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2021); Metcalf v. Bay Ferries Limited, 2014 WL 3670786 (D. Mass. July 14, 2021); *Peiker Acoustic, Inc. v. Kennedy*, 2011 WL 1344238 (D. Colo. Apr. 8, 2011); *In re Vitamin Antitrust Litigation*, 2001 WL 35814436 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2001).  [...] is unquestionably **not** a party and will not be testifying on behalf of [...] or [...], and, as such, the same considerations that would apply to parties should not be applied here.
[brief] They made no mention that the victim had died of a drug overdose, even though at that point in the investigation police already had reliable information that (1) defendant communicated with [...][, the victim’s roommate,] regarding a drug deal on May 7, 2019, via Facebook Messenger; (2) defendant went to [...]'s apartment to complete the transaction; (3) [...] gave four out of the eight bags of heroin she purchased from defendant to her roommate, [...]; (4) [...] was rendered unconscious for several hours after injecting the heroin that had been supplied by defendant, suggesting the potency of that product; (5) [...] found [...] dead when [...] woke up after ingesting the heroin defendant supplied; (6) [...] told police she believed [...]'s death was a drug overdose; (7) [...] handed over to police two bags of heroin marked "American made" in red ink that she had given to [...] and that were found among [...]'s possessions; (8) [...] agreed to a consensual intercept of a telephone conversation between her and defendant during which, as per police instruction, [...] invited defendant to return to her apartment to sell additional heroin; (9) the detectives overheard that defendant agreed to come immediately to [...]'s apartment to sell more heroin to her and a fictitious person; (10) immediately after the consensually-intercepted telephone call concluded, defendant left his residence and was apprehended; (11) defendant was carrying eight bags of heroin on his person; and (12) additional folds of heroin marked "American made" in red ink were found in defendant's apartment, further corroborating [...]'s information and credibility.  [Id. at 530-31.]  Relying on this information, this Court held that “at the time defendant was taken into custody,” police had sufficient facts to believe defendant was “criminal responsible for the victim’s death”
[brief] 23  Dohco, Inc. v. Brockwell & Carrington Contractors, Inc., 441 N.J. Super. 148 (Law Div. 2015) .................................................. 27  Equitable Life Mort. v. N.J. Div. of Taxation, 151 N.J. Super. 232 (App. Div. 1977) ..................................................  41  Estate of Burns v. Care One, 468 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 2021) .................................................. 29, 30 Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc., 47 N.J. 92 (1966)  .............................................................................  23  Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 215 N.J. 522 (2013) ............................................................................  33  Fid. Union Tr. Co. v. N.J. Highway Auth., 85 N.J. 277 (1981) ............................................................................. 33 Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449 (2020) ........................................................................... 42 Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515 (1981) ............................................................................. 36, 37, 38 Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) ...........................................................................  34  Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543 (1975) ............................................................................. 34  Jalowiecki v. Leuc, 182 N.J. Super. 22 (App.Div.1981) .................................................................  29  James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279 (1998) .................................................................................. 42  James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552 (2014)  .................................................................................. 36, 37, 38 Kendall v. Snedeker, 219 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 1987) .........................................................  37  Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565 (2014) .................................................................................. 36  McKenna v. N.J. Highway Auth., 19 N.J. 270 (1955) .................................................................................... 40, 41 Nelson v. Bd. of Educ., 148 N.J. 358 (1997)
[brief] 28  FDASmart, Inc. v. Dishman Pharm. & Chems., Ltd., 448 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 2016)  ....................................................  18  Form Tech Concrete Forms v. Two Bros. Contr., 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 6257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 20, 2019)  ..............................................................................  32  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)  .............................................................................  12  Interlotto, Inc. v. Nat’l Lottery Admin., 298 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 1997) ...................................................  26, 27 Koch v. Pechota, 744 F. App’x 105 (3d Cir. 2018) ...........................................................  20, 21 Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317 (1989) .............................................................................  22  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) .............................................................................  29  Lipkowitz v. Hamilton Surgery Ctr., LLC, 415 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 2010)  ....................................................  30  Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023)  ............................................................................. 15, 16, 17  Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2014)  ...............................................................  15  Menley & James Laboratories, Ltd. v. Vornado, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 404 (Ch. Div. 1966)  .....................................................  29  Peter Doelger Brewing Corp. v. Spindel, 186 A. 429 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1936) ...........................................................  29  Pullen v. Galloway, 461 N.J. Super. 587 (App. Div. 2019) ..................................................12, 13  Radiac Research Corp. v. Pasqua, 2023 WL 8177052 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 27, 2023) ....................  30  Reliance Nat. Ins. Co. in Liquidation v. Dana Transport, Inc., 376 N.J. Super.  537 (App. Div. 2005) ..................................................22, 26 Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2017) ..................................................12, 13, 21 Robertelli v. New Jersey Off. of Atty. Ethics, 224 N.J. 470 (2016)  ..............................................................................  27  Seven Caesars, Inc. v. House, 2014 WL 4450441 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2014) ...............30, 31
[brief] THE ZONING STATUS AND EASEMENT STATUS OF THE STRIP OF LAND UNDERLYING THE INTERNAL DRIVEWAYS ARE NOT CLEAR THEREBY PRECLUDING SUMMARY DISPOSITION (Pa659)(final decision declined to address)  From the outset of this matter the initial Developer's Agreement stated that it would create an ingress and egress driveway easement for the Church which was an abutting land owner.  It was stated that this easement would remain.  It was never clear which roadway was the intended easement - either the circular dog leg or the straight roadway (perhaps both).  The initial document suggested it was the curved roadway.  The Church clearly holds an easement interest in this roadway but was never inter-pled as an interested party.  The ownership interest was never addressed.  Arguably the easement interest may have been destroyed by the ownership conversion implemented by the Trial Court.  The Borough Engineer, [...], cogently raised the issue of zoning and whether a public roadway or street could be recognized on the strip of land which the Plaintiff now seeks to have automatically dedicated to the Borough.  [...] correctly opined that the status of the strip of land shown as an access road on Plaintiff's property was not zoned for usage as a public street.  [...] explained that it was his opinion that Plaintiff was obligated to make an application to the zoning board to allow for this use.  The salience of the Planning Board Engineer's opinion is two fold.  First, the review of the applications up to that time obviously assumed that a public street was not planned as part of Plaintiff's projects - otherwise an application before the zoning board would have been necessary.  Second, the Engineer's opinion that a zoning permit was needed begs the question - is the Plaintiff obligated to seek such a zoning approval before it seeks to compel the Borough to accept dedication of a public street which violates its own zoning ordinances.  Prior decisions have held that a road built in violation of zoning ordinances requires a variance.  In *Nuckel and Angel v. Board of Adjustment*, 109 N.J. Super. 194, 262 A.2d 890 (App. Div. 1970), the Defendant proposed to build a hotel on a lot and provide access to the hotel by constructing a driveway which would encroach on a corner of an adjacent lot, which was owned by the same principals who proposed the construction of the hotel.
[brief] The panel affirmed the trial court on these issues, Pa161.  Appellant recites this for completeness but, of course, cannot revisit this issue.  The documents are also included in our appendix only for the sake of completeness.  $18,000,000.00 money laundering scheme involving international drug distribution, but he had filed a verified complaint and two sworn affidavits with the federal court that were false.  *Ibid.*  After a brief colloquy in the witness’ absence, the court allowed Plaintiff to ask if Defendant had ever lied under oath.  1T74:9-11.  Nevertheless, the court quickly told counsel “come on. ”  1T75:2.  Defendant grew belligerent.  When asked if the $180,000.00 seized by the DEA were illegal proceeds, he responded with questions instead of answers - “How do you know that?” and “How do you know that it wasn’t lawful proceeds from my jewelry business. ”  1T75:17-20.  As indicated, Plaintiff had [...]’s allocution and was prepared to utilize it during cross-examination.  As Plaintiffs’ counsel sought to answer the witness’ own questions to prove the false statements and perjured affidavits, the court stated “you’ve made your point, move on. ”  1T76:2-7.  This was also while [...]’s tenor grew evasive and belligerent, challenging counsel with his own questions, 1T75:17, 19-20.  Defendant actually testified that he didn’t remember getting stopped by the police - as if losing $180,000.00 and $300,000.00 in cash seizures to the federal DEA was something anyone might forget.  1T70:6-8.  After the testimony concluded, the trial court dismissed the case, making no specific findings of fact or credibility.  1T79:6 to 82:14.  Even the undisputed projects were dismissed.  Consequently, Plaintiffs appealed and the decision was remanded with specific instructions to make findings pursuant to the CFA.  Pa159.  On remand, the trial court did not make the CFA findings because it decided that Plaintiffs’ witness was not a proper witness, but that he was a general contractor and that defendants were sub-contractors.  As with His Honor’s initial dismissal of CFA claims on May 23, 2022, this finding was not raised by the Defendants but was, again, without warning or notice.  It was also mistaken given that the record does not bear it out.  This mistaken finding of fact resulted in His Honor’s mistaken determination that the CFA did not apply.
[brief] To begin, the Commissioner’s final decision held that the “excessive” requirement is non-actuarial.  See, e.g., Pa21, Pa74 (Department “assess[ed] excessiveness” with “non-actuarial considerations”); Pa46 (relying on a policy consideration meant --- 3 Db3 (“whether a rate is excessive is based on actuarial standards accepted in the industry that are ‘spelled out pretty well’ within [ASOP]”); Db21–22, Db41, 44 (discussing ASOP 8).  4  The Department’s series of questions regarding [...]’s actuarial memoranda, Db44–45, miss the mark for reasons [...] explained and the Department does not address.  See Pb38.  The legislature mandated the Department to define what “excessive” means through rulemaking, and the Department failed to do so.