ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Based on all of the foregoing the Planning Board application and that its factual findings and conclusions as to the design of the approved revised lot grade are fully supported by evidence in the record and its decision should be affirmed.  Respectfully Submitted, /S/ [...]  ------------------------  [...]  July 3, 2024  [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...]; [...], Defendants- Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Original Submission Date: July 1, 2024  Submission Date: July 9, 2024  On Appeal  From a Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County dated November 29, 2023 Sat  below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. Trial Court  Docket No. [...]  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
[brief] But even turning to the facts on the ground, [...]’s appeal falls short.  1.  The School Funding Reform Act Was Appropriately Reviewed and Revised In Accordance With the Supreme Court’s and the Legislature’s Mandates.  Few enactments in our State have undergone as much scrutiny as the SFRA.  See, e.g., Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 548-49 (describing unique history of Abbott litigation and fact that the State, a party, moved for declaration that SFRA’s funding formula satisfied the T&E funding requirements and relief from Court’s orders).  Since the Court affirmed the constitutionality of SFRA in Abbott XX, the Legislature has continued its work to refine the formula and fulfill its school funding obligations; its efforts are evidenced by its passage of Chapters 53, 54, and 67.
[brief] Plaintiff sought to preclude any reference to collateral litigation involving [...] as having little or no probative value to the issues in this matter and by requiring to, [...] to essentially relitigate these collateral issues would be a waste of time and would be a result in Jury confusion.  Additionally, Plaintiff sought to exclude any reference to the amount of money [...] paid for the house he obtained in [...] after the disastrous attempt to build his home on the [...] was scuttled due to the Defendant’s negligence.  What possible relevance would the price of Defendant’s subsequent home (assessed at over ten-million dollars) (Pa0329) have to the issue of whether or not the Defendants adhere to the standard of care and whether or not [...] was proximately caused damages if Defendant deviated from the standard of care?
[directive] Subordinate law enforcement agencies, including county and municipal police forces, have a duty to cooperate with the Attorney General to improve the administration of the criminal justice system, including the efficient delivery of police services.  For county and municipal law enforcement agencies, cooperation in internal affairs matters begins with strict adherence to the Attorney General’s policy requirements.  1.0.6  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must also recognize that they conduct internal affairs investigations, particularly those that involve allegations of criminal conduct, under the direct supervision of the County Prosecutors.  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must inform the appropriate County Prosecutor when allegations of police misconduct involve potential criminal conduct.
[brief] ”  Oscar v. Simeonidis, 352 N.J. Super. 476, 487-88 (App. Div. 2002) (citing City of Trenton v. Lenzner, 16 N.J. 465, 476, 109 A.2d 409 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 972, 75 S.Ct. 534, 99 L.Ed.2d 757 (1955)).  Defendants contend that the Trustee and trial court compelled [...], by Order, to relinquish his “shares” in the Boonton and Florida Properties at discounted prices.
[brief] Pa283.  The Amendment to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan, Beachfront South Sector for Block 216, Lots 11, 12 & 24 stated that “Block 216, Lots 11, 12 & 24 are [the] last remaining undeveloped parcels in the portion of the Beachfront South Redevelopment area between Pavilion Avenue and North Bath Avenue.
[brief] (1T 68-19)  On March 19 in the evening, two officers in two separate cars set up surveillance outside of [...]’s house.  (1T 72-1 to 9)  Officers saw [...] enter a car and leave; officers lost track of that car.  (1T 75-16 to 21)  As officers waited, a black BMW pulled into the parking lot and parked near the rear door of [...]’s residence with the engine running.  (1T 75-22 to 76-25)  Then a silver Mazda pulled in next to [...]’s car.  (1T 77-4 to 8)  [...] could not see who was in the Mazda and had no prior knowledge about that car.  (1T 100-22 to 101-9)  When [...] returned, the car he was in parked a few spots away from the Mazda.  (1T 77-22 to 21)  [...] exited the car and walked up to the Mazda.  (1T 79-21 to 22)  [...] heard [...] say “nice car” and take money out of his pocket.  (1T 81-8 to 17)  After seeing the money, but not seeing anything exchange hands, [...]’s partner drove his truck over and blocked in the Mazda.  (1T 83-1 to 24; Da 8)  [...] testified that [...] “sort of backed up” and put the money back in his pocket.  (1T 81-8 to 17)  At this point neither [...] nor his partner had any idea who was in the Mazda.  (1T 85-10 to 86-9, 111-21 to 18; Da 8)  [...] approached the car and asked the occupants to put their hands up—at that point he recognized them as [...] and [...], [...]’s wife.
[brief] Levinson v. Costello, 74 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 1962); Rosen v. Keeler, 411 N.J. Super. 439 (App. Div. 2010); Bubis v. Kassin, 323 N.J. Super. 601 (App. Div. 1999).  None of these cases stand for the proposition that an express easement is the only way to convey a property right over the land of another.  Because the Bubis, Levinson, and Rosen courts never had to address whether the location detailed on an incorporated map is sufficient to create an implied easement appurtenant, the cases have no relevance to the question of whether an implied easement exists here.
[directive] a.  If you have answered "No" to this question, you must answer Questions 17b-  If 17f. you have answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question 18  [Yes]  [No]  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty b. plea may result in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re-enter the United States?
[brief] During that time, the decisions of the Council clearly manifest a pro-hunting bias that may not have been evident to the New Jersey Supreme Court at that time, when it stated that it had no reason to believe that the Council was biased as result of its sportsmen-majority.  As one appellate court stated, the history of the litigation over the approval or prohibition of a bear hunt manifests “[b]ear management is a topic that’s sparks widespread disagreement and strong public sentiments…”  N.J. Animal Rights Alliance v. N.J. Depart. of Envt’l Prot., 396 N.J. Super. 358, 372-73, n.3 (App. Div. 2007).  During the intervening years, the Council has uniformly exhibited a pro-bear hunting position, as was most recently exemplified in Animal Protection League of New Jersey, et al. v. [...], et al, 477 N.J. Super. 145, 152 (App. Div. 2023).  In that case, this court invalidated the Council’s emergency rule-making authorizing a bear hunt and its finding that an emergency bear hunt was necessary to avert imminent peril and criticized the Council for manufacturing the emergency by improperly delaying the adoption of the emergency rule.  Id. at 164-166.  The Court in Humane Society intimated that it might reconsider its conclusion about the pro-hunting bias of the Council, resulting from the majority control of the [...], if evidence was later presented that would justify a reexamination.
[brief] Given this fact, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden to show that amended Redevelopment Plan “materially undermine[s] or distort[s] the basic provisions and objectives of the Master Plan,” let alone that it does so to a degree that can be considered a “substantial” inconsistency.  Manalapan Realty, 140 N.J. at 384.  3  To the contrary, as noted by the trial court, the record illustrates that the amended Redevelopment Plan is substantially consistent with the Master Plan.
[brief] In Morgan v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., an arbitration agreement was alleged to be included in an employee handbook.  443 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2016).  However, the employee handbook did not mention arbitration, and it was not itself a contract.  *Id.* at 342.  As the Appellate Division held, this was not sufficient to find that the plaintiff had assented to the arbitration agreement.  The only time [...] is alleged to have reviewed the arbitration form would have been after receiving the Booklet from staff members on October 28, 2024.  However, there is no indication that the arbitration form was actually included with the Booklet.  Defendants cannot prove that the decedent had ample time to review the document because Defendant [...] admits that he would not have seen her that day.  Thus, it cannot be shown that decedent had a fair chance to review the arbitration form during the thirty-day period.  As such, the agreement’s alleged formation was procedurally unconscionable.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................................................ ii  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................ iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................  2  ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................  3  I.  The Trial Court abused its discretion when it disallowed the opinion of the Plaintiff's Expert Engineer as a net opinion, where the expert testified that the ingress to the jacuzzi was designed poorly, violated industry standards, and was a hazardous condition.  (Pa1)  ...........................................................................................................  3  II.  The Trial Court err when it did not view in the light most favorable to [...], the sufficiency of the evidence and all legitimate inferences from the facts to permit a rational fact finder to conclude that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ingress to the jacuzzi constituted a hazardous condition.  (Pa1) .................................................................................................  6  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................  8  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Appellant does not cite any case law or statute for his contention that Respondents cannot be awarded damages here because it would need to be offset by any money that Respondent [...] recovers itself.  Appellant makes the false statement in his brief, “But [...] cannot recover in this action, because it has already recovered. ” (Appellant Br. at 12).  Assuming Appellant was making a true statement to this Court, there should be some record citation for the more than $4,750,000.00 that [...] recovered from Appellant’s other companies.  Appellant is correct, conceptually: any amount of the $4,767,826.25 Judgment, including Rule 4:42-11(b) interest, that is recovered from Appellant’s other companies can be used to offset against the judgment recovered from him.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (a)  A party may at any time prior to the close of the hearing or by the date established by the arbitrator increase or decrease the amount of its claim or counterclaim.  Written notice of the change of claim amount must be provided to the [...] and all parties.  If the change of claim amount results in an increase in administrative fee, the balance of the fee is due before the change of claim amount may be accepted by the arbitrator.  (b)  Any new or different claim or counterclaim, as opposed to an increase or decrease in the amount of a pending claim or counterclaim, shall be made in writing and filed with the [...], and a copy shall be provided to the other party, who shall have a period of 14 calendar days from the date of such transmittal within which to file an answer to the proposed change of claim or counterclaim with the [...].  After the arbitrator is appointed, however, no new or different claim may be submitted except with the arbitrator’s consent.  The [...] rules tell the parties exactly what is to happen when a claim is amended: a new fee may be due, and that’s it. \(^{14}\)  This fact alone is fatal to [...]’s argument.
[brief] “A party may not attack the judgment under review without having appealed. ”  *Burbridge v. Paschal*, 239 N.J. Super. 139, 151 (App. Div. 1990).  *See also Franklin Discount Co. v. Ford*, 27 N.J. 473, 491 (1958) (“[A] party, in order to attack the actions below which were adverse to him, must pursue a cross-appeal”).  \(^8\)
[brief] APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ iv  RESPONDENT’S PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................  4 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................  5 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  14  POINT I WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 30, 2018, THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND SPOILATION OF EVIDENCE ......................... 14 POINT II WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 11, 2019, THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 30, 2018, WHICH DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND SPOILATION OF EVIDENCE .......................... 34 POINT III THE TRIAL COURT DID NOTHING IMPROPER BY EVALUATING THE DISCOVERY PRESENTED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS AND DETERMINING THAT MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED ....................... 36 POINT IV PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT FAILED TO MITIGATE DAMAGES AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO THIS RELIEF AS IT DEFIES JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY ........................................ 43  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................
[brief] The Board, in the Order, makes the conclusory and unfounded statement that it “does not believe that a 1.0 TREC factor is appropriate. ”  Order, at 6.  The Board claims that generic modeling used by the Board in developing the solar program did reflect a higher value being required than the 0.6 TREC provided, but nonetheless indicated that the answer to an uncreased TREC value was simply “no. ”  Despite this prior modeling, which shows a 19% greater cost than a typical ground-mount system, the Board not only denied the 1.0 TREC value, but refused to even allow the 19% that its own data provided.  Even if the information provided by the Petitioner was “unbelievable,” the Board’s own information justifies a 19% increase.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s Final Agency Decision upholding the [...]’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that Appellant violated certain provisions of the School Ethics Act should be reversed, and this court should remand this matter to the [...] for a new hearing.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for [...] s/[...], Esq.  CHRISTOPHER J. DASTI Of Counsel & On the Brief s/[...], Esq.  CHRISTOPHER A. KHATAMI Of Counsel & On the Brief
[brief] In addition to the foregoing benefits bestowed to actively employed law enforcement officers, the State and [...] conceded a directive from the June 7, 2017 Implementation Memorandum that reduced police officers’ workers’ compensation payments.  (231a ¶5).  On June 7, 2017, [...] State Designee [...] directed that effective that day [...] police officers would receive only 70% of their weekly wages while on workers’ compensation.  (218a)  Thereafter, in the settlement agreement, “[t]he parties agree that employees will receive one hundred percent (100%) of his/her pay when absent due to approved workers’ compensation leave. ” (231a ¶5).  In another provision of the settlement agreement, Defendants agreed to review the amount of overtime for any significant savings and take any such significant savings into account when making determinations regarding salary increases the following year.
[brief] Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass'n of Woodbridge, 13 N.J. 528, 537 (1953)………………..9  African Am. Data & Research Inst., LLC v.Hitchner, A-1592-20, 2023 WL 3014833 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 20, 2023),…………….11  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S.Ct. 691, 699, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 674 (1962)….9  Chalom v. Benesh, 234 N.J. Super. 248, 258–59 (Law. Div. 1989)….10,12  City of Passaic v. Shennett, 390 N.J. Super. 475, 915 A.2d 1092, 2007 N.J. Super.LEXIS 44 (App.Div. 2007)…………..14  Crusader Servicing Corp. v.Demarzino, A-2930-04T2, 2006 WL 280519 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 7, 2006). ………………..11  Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Buja Investments,Inc., Civ. No. 11-355, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7011, 2012 WL 194397 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2012)………………………………………..18  Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 493, 86 A.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 73 S. Ct. 25, 97 L. Ed. 652 (1952)….18  Epos Pantelopoulos, No. A-2365-08T1, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2922 (App. Div. Dec. 1, 2009)…17 Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 280–81, 432 A.2d 1351 (1981)…………… 8-9 Grabowski v. Baskay, A-2785-21, 2023 WL 3862761 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 7, 2023)…………… 11-12 Hunnell v. McKeon, A-0127-20, 2022 WL 3268382 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 11, 2022)…………………….. 7,14,15 Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003)…………… 13 Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1989)……….. 13 Merkling v. Merkling, 30 N.J. Super. 272, 104 A.2d 79, 1954 N.J. Super. LEXIS 645 (Ch.Div. 1954)………………..
[brief] See id.  But there are no allegations to support such a finding.  Id (“The allegations presented by [Appellant] in this case do not reflect the concerns espoused by Congress .  . . .  Unlike the persons who could inflict harm upon [Appellant] through the disclosure of Plaintiff’s debt information, disclosure to a letter vendor of basic debt information does not fall within the purview of Congressional concerns [to prevent harmful debt collection practices].”).  Appellant does not allege any misuse of his personal or financial information, or even that the automated letter vendor processes were arranged in a way where any individual at the third-party vendor (or elsewhere) would, or even could, personally view the information.  Id., at 7a-10a.  The lack of abusive practices at play becomes even more clear in observing that Appellant never asserted that he or other putative class members ever suffered any material harm because of the Respondent’s use of a letter vendor.  Id., at 6a-8a; see infra.  The FDCPA should be read to further the principles of the statute’s stated purpose to curb the “abusive” debt collection practices harming consumers.  See e.g., *Hoover v. Monarch Recovery Mgt., Inc.*, 888 F. Supp. 2d 589, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (ruling that violations of § 1692d, including the “publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts,” are limited to “tactics intended to embarrass, upset, or frighten a debtor. ”).  This is particularly true here given the innocuous nature of the debt collection letter in question and Respondent’s use of a letter vendor.  This Court should therefore uphold the decision of numerous state and federal courts finding that Appellant’s letter vendor theory has little to do with the purposes of the statute and is itself an abuse of the FDCPA legislation.
[brief] Because proper, efficient, and uniform handling of internal affairs investigations are integral to the law enforcement business of the State, and because oversight over Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures is specifically assigned to the Attorney General by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181, this Directive confirms the Attorney General’s supersession authority includes internal affairs matters.  (Pa16)  (emphasis added)  In the present matter, as it did in Gramiccioni, the [...] has taken “too narrow an approach to the prosecutorial law enforcement function.
[brief] Exhibit D – Correspondence from Plaintiffs counsel to Court and Defense counsel, dated November 9, 2017……………………………Pa58  Certifications of Transcript Completion and Delivery……………………………………Pa61  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  1T refers to the transcript of June 13, 2022  2T refers to the transcript of June 14, 2022  3T refers to the transcript of June 15, 2022  4T refers to the transcript of June 16, 2022  5T refers to the transcript of June 20, 2022  6T refers to the transcript of June 21, 2022  7T refers to the transcript of August 25, 2022  8T refers to the transcript of April 13, 2023
[brief] ”) (alterations omitted).  *2  To assess the applicability of the common interest privilege in this case, the Court needs additional facts about when the common interest may have been triggered and to which specific communications it may apply.  To that end, the Court needs clarity on the following information: (1) the chronology of when and to whom [...] sent its notice(s) of default, and the nature of those notices; (2) whether and when [...] and/or [...] retained outside counsel in response to such notices of default; (3) the date [...] denied performance on the bond or otherwise agreed to stand behind its principal [...] and deny [...]’s claim; (4) the nature of, the parties to, and the dates of, the communications and documents [...] and [...] seek to shield under the common interest doctrine via the attorney-client privilege, including whether the communications and documents were confidentially made between an attorney and a client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; and (5) the nature of, the parties to, and the dates of, the communications and documents [...] and [...] seek to shield under the common interest doctrine via the work-product doctrine, including whether the work product was made in the ordinary course of business or in anticipation of litigation.
[brief] The governing body may adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with the Master Plan or not designed to effectuate the Master Plan, if the reasons for adopting the Master Plan are set forth in the redevelopment plan.  The role of the Planning Board in reviewing a redevelopment plan is to identity any inconsistencies with the Master Plan.  The previous review of the redevelopment plan by the Planning Board found that here were no inconsistencies with the Master Plan, but did not necessarily find that the redevelopment plan is substantially consistent with the Master Plan.  The statements are being included within the amended plan since the redevelopment plan is neither substantially consistent nor inconsistent with the Master Plan, and is not directly implementing a recommendation of the Master Plan.  In doing so, the Committee is satisfying the requirements of the LRHL to the extent that is may be necessary to do so.