ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There are no allegations in the record of any “mutual mistake” of the parties as to either of the agreements at issue, and [...] has failed to demonstrate any instance of fraud or unconscionable conduct by the [...].  The trial court has also made note of this fact (“I don't believe that the Parking [...] was dealing in bad faith or defrauding [...] or somehow entered into this massive reconstruction project, which is extremely beneficial to the [...] and its citizens and the public, where they duped them into this and we're never going to build this. ”).  Da651.  To be clear, the terms of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement accurately reflect the terms agreed upon by the [...], the City and [...].  The negotiation and execution of a series of agreements that one party now seeks to avoid does not support any charge of fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of the [...].  In the interests of justice, the [...] should be permitted the opportunity to appeal the determination of the trial court at this time based on the trial court’s improper application of the standard for reformation of contract.
[brief] (1T160-25 to 1T161-23).  However, when he asked “Did you want to tell me about the marijuana in the duffel bags or not?” to which [...] replied “No, I don’t want to tell you about it,” (1T162-1 to 5), [...] claimed to have interpreted the fact that her very verbalization of her refusal to talk to him constituted a “waiver” rather than an invocation of her right to remain silent.  (1T162-21 to 1T163-6).  After belatedly advising dispatch of the license and registration data to issue an equipment warning, but even before waiting for a reply, [...] told [...] that “[w]hile [he was] waiting,” he was going to use his canine to walk around her truck “real quick”, “…just to confirm what I already know. ”  (1T170-3 to 7 [emphasis added]).  While conducting this search, dispatch responded “valid Nevada...There’s no records. ” (1T170-11 to 13).  Returning to the patrol car, and telling [...] that “the dog confirmed what I already know,” that “you guys” are transporting marijuana in the duffel bags (1T171-4 to 12), and that they were going to search her vehicle: and despite her refusal to talk to him about his accusations, [...] now continued to push [...] to “cooperate,” telling her that “this is a life-changing thing” that people who cooperate “do a lot better in court,” and that she should “talk to” his “undercover guys”, at least hearing what they have to say. ” (1T117-1 to 1T172-20).
[brief] Appellant appealed [...]’s decision to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County.  (See generally 5T, 6T).  On February 17, 2023, a trial de novo was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (6T).  At the trial, [...] heard oral argument from Appellant, representing himself pro se, and the State.  (Id.).  Following oral argument, [...] reserved his decision on the issue of whether Appellant was guilty of driving while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  (6T18:16-19:7).  6  [...] found Appellant not guilty of reckless driving or careless driving because [...] “did not observe [Appellant] actually driving away. ” (4T13:14-17).  On April 3, 2023, [...] entered an Order finding Appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).  (Aa005-006).  That Order also scheduled Appellant’s sentencing hearing for April 17, 2023.  (Id.).  At the sentencing hearing on April 17, 2023, Appellant was sentenced to fines and penalties under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, including the following: $300.00 fine; $7.00 in additional amounts set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:5-41d through h; $33.00 in court costs; $225.00 DWI Surcharge; $50.00 VCC assessment; and $75.00 Safe Neighborhood Assessment.  (7T4:18-5:2; Aa007-009).  [...] informed Appellant that the court could arrange a monthly payment plan in order for Appellant to pay the fines associated with his conviction.  (7T4:10-14).  Thereafter, [...] and Appellant discussed Appellant’s requirement to install an ignition interlock device.  Appellant informed [...] that he did not own a vehicle.  (7T7:5-7).  [...] informed Appellant that he could indicate that fact on the certification Appellant was required to attest to following sentencing.  (7T7:22-8:4).  [...] then informed Appellant that Appellant would be required to install the interlock device if he were to obtain a vehicle in the near future.  (7T9:1-4).  Appellant informed [...]:  “My financial circumstances do not permit the purchase of the car in the near future.  Perhaps in five years I may be able to do so purchase a car, minimum three years. ”  (7T9:9-12).  [...] then stated that sentencing Appellant to install the ignition interlock device should he procure a vehicle was a “mandatory” part of the court’s sentencing under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  (7T19:3-18).  On April 17, 2023, [...] entered a Judgment of Conviction, sentencing Appellant to various fines and penalties under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).  (Aa007-009).  [...] also put Appellant on a monthly payment plan, requiring Appellant to pay “$50.00 every month beginning May 17, 2023 directly to [...] until all amounts are paid in full. ” (Aa008 at ¶ 7).  Included with the Judgment of Conviction was [...]’s Statement of Reasons, discussing in detail his decision in finding Appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  (Aa010-061).  This appeal followed.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] The collateral source rule set forth in N.J.S.A. 2a:15-97 does not bar applicant's claim.  The collateral source rule contained in N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq. is set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6a-12 which clearly excludes medical payments which are made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6a-4 or 10 and that collateral source rule would not exclude recovery of the med-pay benefits paid pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5h-10.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S AWARD AND CALCULATION OF INTEREST WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE FACTS  New Jersey courts allow recovery of prejudgment interest in non-tort actions at the equitable discretion of the trial court.  *County of Essex v. First Union Nat’l Bank*, 186 N.J. 46, 61 (2006).  “Similarly, the rate at which prejudgment interest is calculated is within the discretion of the court. ”  *Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc.*, 200 N.J. 372, 390 (2009) (citation omitted).  “Unless the award ‘represents a manifest denial of justice,’ an appellate court should not interfere. ”  *County of Essex*, 186 N.J. 61 (citing Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52, 74, 754 A.2d 586 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607, 762 A.2d 221 (2000)).  A.
[directive] 8.1.5  With a bifurcated investigation, the internal affairs investigator will not be forced to juggle the roles of criminal and administrative investigator during an internal affairs investigation.  This is particularly important during the subject officer interview for three reasons.  First, the internal affairs investigator will not be forced to decide whether and when to issue a Miranda or a Garrity warning during the interview.  In a bifurcated investigation, the criminal investigator will be limited to issuing a Miranda warning while the administrative investigator will be limited to issuing a Garrity warning.  Second, by assigning distinct roles to each investigator, there will be no confusion on the part of the subject officer as to the particular interview’s purpose.  Third, because a bifurcated investigation permits both the criminal and administrative investigations to take place simultaneously, the administrative investigator can be confident that, once the criminal investigation has been completed, the administrative investigation will also be substantially complete.  As a result, the subject officer's agency will have no difficulty complying with the 45-day rule under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147.
[directive] 2  Policy  2.1  The Use of Force Policy formally recognizes four distinct types of force: physical force; mechanical force; enhanced mechanical force; and deadly force.  2.2  Enhanced Mechanical Force is an intermediate force option between mechanical force and deadly force, generally requiring a greater level of justification than that pertaining to physical or mechanical force, but a lower level of justification than that required for the use of deadly force.  Unlike deadly force, enhanced mechanical force does not require an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.  Examples include CEDs and less-lethal devices and ammunition.  2.3  As with any type of force, officers shall exhaust all other reasonable means to gain compliance before resorting to enhanced mechanical force, if feasible.  Thus, if a safe alternative would achieve law enforcement’s objective, enhanced mechanical force shall not be used.  Officers shall, therefore, use verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment and de-escalation techniques to gain voluntary compliance, when feasible.  Officers shall never engage in unnecessary, overly aggressive, or otherwise improper actions that create a situation where force becomes needed.  2.4  In situations where officers are justified in using force, officers shall use only that degree of force that is reasonable, necessary and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s mental and physical condition, the nature of the offense, and the level of resistance or threat known to the officer at the time.  2.5  The decision to use force and the appropriate amount of force requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each incident.  2.6  Any deployment of a CED or less-lethal device against a person, except as authorized by this policy, is prohibited.  Any intentional misuse or reckless abuse of any such device will not be tolerated and will result in administrative action, discipline, or criminal prosecution.  2  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020
[brief] | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  New Jersey Constitution  New Jersey Constitution Art. 4, § 7, ¶ 4  New Jersey Constitution, Art. 8, § IV, ¶ 2  New Jersey Court Rules  New Jersey Court Rule 4:69-1  New Jersey Court Rule 4:69-6  New Jersey Statutes  N.J.S.A. 6A:3-1.2  N.J.S.A. 10:5-2  N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-15  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)
[brief] [Appellant]… files… a motion for reconsideration of March the 7th and March 13th orders… where [Respondent’s] motion for legal fees for $113,497.04 which was reduced by the Court to $93,277.54… not [be] granted.  That the … accounting fees, … be reduced [from]…17,649.57 to 16,575 … also with respect to commission fees, 2,039 dollar and 53 cents down to 1,946 dollars and 56 cents.  ***  Now I would say just about all of this is really reconsideration.
[brief] The Appellants’ Second Action Against [...] And The Dismissal  Appellants commenced this action by way of Complaint filed on February 14, 2022 (the “Complaint”).  [Pa1; Pa290].  As set forth in the Complaint, Appellants assert the same three (3) causes of action against [...], i.e., (i) fraud, (ii) breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (iii) breach of lease and unlawful self-help, which the trial court denied Appellants leave to amend to assert in the Prior Action.  [Pa290].  Just like the Prior Action, Appellants’ claims in this action arise out of the Lease between [...], as landlord, and [...], as tenant, for the subject property and the associated solar rights.  [Pa290].  Indeed, the factual allegations and claims made in the Complaint filed in this action are virtually identical to the factual allegations and causes of action that were included in the proposed Second Amended Complaint that Appellants sought leave to file in the Prior Action, which as discussed above was denied by the trial court.  [Pa290].  Appellants acknowledge as much in their brief, indicating that the Complaint in this action “was essentially the proposed second amended complaint in the [Prior A]ction. ”  [Pb3].  On April 13, 2022, [...] filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and pursuant to the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  [Pa18].  Appellants opposed [...]’s motion.  [Pa284].  By way of Order and accompanying Opinion dated June 22, 2022, the trial court granted [...]’s motion to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice (the “Dismissal Order”).
[brief] A spoliation inference is applicable here given that [...] had a duty to maintain and preserve Decedent’s Estate file for a period of seven years.  RPC 1.15(a).  The 2014 Will was made October 16, 2014, requiring that [...] maintain Decedent’s Estate file at least until October 15, 2021, which is after this litigation was filed, on May 2021.  Spoliation of evidence in a prospective civil action occurs when evidence pertinent to the action is negligently or intentionally destroyed thereby interfering with the action's proper administration and disposition.
[brief] A Middlesex County Grand Jury heard testimony presented by the State and [...] on June 5th, 2012, indictment [...] and again on April 29th, 2014, superseding indictment [...] concerning multiple robberies alleging defendant, co-defendant [...], [...] and [...].  (12T; 13T)  The traditional function of a grand jury is to safeguard citizens against arbitrary, oppressive, and unwarranted criminal prosecution.
[brief] *Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 435.  The court therefore “should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended in the litigation. ”  (Da39997 (quoting *Silva*, 267 N.J. Super. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  [...] and [...] each engaged in a careful, detailed analysis replete with specific findings on the time counsel spent that was reasonably necessary to establish [...]’s RICO claims and as to every issue [...] contested in their opposition to Plaintiffs’ fee applications.  [...]’s Reports and Recommendations memorialize his thorough review of [...]’s fee application -- including the billing entries [...] submitted -- in compliance with the Appellate Division’s mandate on remand.  Indeed, it was only after conducting this thorough review that the Special Master found “the changed statute of limitations does not alter the Trial Court’s previous findings regarding the inextricably interlinked nature of Plaintiffs’ RICO and non-RICO claims given the common core of facts underpinning both sets of claims,” (Da39029), and thus that “the previous award [should] remain unchanged,” (Da39115).
[brief] Respondent’s right to use the roadway is contained in the recorded documents in Hunterdon County and, therefore, New Jersey’s recording statute, N.J.S.A. 46:26A-1 et seq., must control this dispute.  See Palamarg Realty Co., 80 N.J. at 454.  New Jersey’s recording statute provides in relevant part that:  Notwithstanding the provisions of P.L. 2021, c.371 (N.J.S.A. 47:1B-1 et al.), any recorded document affecting the title to real property is, from the time of recording, notice to all subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and judgment creditors of the execution of the document recorded and its contents.  N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12(a).  New Jersey is considered a race-notice jurisdiction, meaning that when two competing interest holders are vying for priority, the one that records first prevails and takes priority over the second provided it had no actual knowledge of the other stakeholders’ previously obtained interest.  See Palamarg Realty Co., 80 N.J. at 454; Sovereign Bank v. Gillis, 432 N.J. Super. 36, 43 (App. Div. 2013).  As a corollary to this rule, parties are generally charged with constructive notice of instruments that are properly recorded.  See Friendship Manor, 244 N.J. Super. at 108.  In the context of the race notice statute, constructive notice raises the obligation of a claimant to “make a reasonable and diligent inquiry as to existing claims or rights in and two real estate. ”  Id.  In applying the race notice statute, New Jersey’s Appellate Division and Supreme Court have held that the integrity of the recording scheme must be paramount.  “[A]bsent any unusual equity’ the stability of titles and conveyances requires the judiciary to follow that court ‘that will best support and maintain the integrity of the recording system. ’”  Friendship Manor, 244 N.J. Super. at 113 (quoting Palamarg Realty Co., 80 N.J. at 453).  Applying the foregoing to this case, the Court must find that Appellants were on notice and bound to the grants contained in the [...]-to-[...] and [...]-to-[...] Deeds (Da461; Da480).  The truncated language in Appellants’ Deed, providing that the conveyance was “subject to the rights of others, if any, in an old driveway crossing the southerly portion” while ineffectual to cut off Plaintiff’s rights, certainly put Appellants on notice that the record title to their land was likely encumbered or restricted in some manner.  For reasons unknown to Respondent, Appellants failed to perform their due diligence as to true state of their title.  Because there was no material issue of disputed fact as to Appellants’ record title, the trial Court properly granted summary judgment against the Appellants.  The lower court’s ruling should, therefore, be affirmed in full.
[brief] 9T243:20-25.  The Court denied Petitioner’s motion for an adverse inference due to [...]’s failure to preserve the evidence surrounding the making of the Decedents’ will.  (P30a).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE COURT'S FAILURE TO APPLY THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE ON RESPONDENT WAS A MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW, WARRANTING REVERSAL (P35a; 12T117:4 to 178:11; 12T183:14-19)
[brief] Tobia v. Cooper Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr., 136 N.J. 335 (1992)…………………. 47 State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554 (2005) ………………………………………….. 43 Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1 (2004) …………………………………………..  44 Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1993)……………………… 30 Statutes, Rules and Regulations 42 C.F.R. § 483 ………………………………………………………………………… 4, 12-13 42 C.F.R. § 483.1 ……………………………………………………………………… 30-31 42 C.F.R. § 483.30…………………………………………………………………… 14 42 C.F.R. § 488.301………………………………………………………………… 14 N.J.A.C. 13:37-6.5…………………………………………………………………… 14 N.J.R.E. 104 ………………………………………………………………………… 43 N.J.R.E. 607 ………………………………………………………………………… 24-25 N.J.R.E. 702 ………………………………………………………………………… 43 N.J.R.E. 703 …………………………………………………………………………
[brief] Thus, there is a threshold determination of whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence presented by the plaintiff that the property was in dangerous condition.  Id. at 124.  In this case, however, that determination need not include an analysis of whether the Plaintiff was using the property with due care at the time of the accident, as no Defendant makes that argument.  a)  Whether the Settlement/Elevation Change at the Abutment Joint was in a “Dangerous Condition” is a Question for the Jury (Raised below, Pa2145, Pa2152)  Here, despite significant evidence that suggested otherwise, the Trial Court made a critical error by determining as a matter of law that the settlement at the abutment joint that caused Plaintiff’s accident was not in a “dangerous condition. ”  This decision by the Trial Court was the first domino in a series of factual conclusions which improperly favored the movants.  Once the Court decided that the settlement at the abutment joint was, as a matter of law, not dangerous, it then generated a cascade of legal rulings which all went against the Plaintiff.  As the record reveals, however, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not the condition was in a “dangerous condition”.
[directive] In such situations, the law enforcement executive should seek to identify the reasons for the extended investigation and whether the internal affairs function requires additional resources or oversight to complete the inquiry in a prompt manner.  In addition, the law enforcement executive should ensure compliance with the “45-day rule” established by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, which requires that certain disciplinary charges be filed within 45 days of the date the person filing the charge obtained “sufficient information” to do so.  6.1.5  Investigators are required to provide further notice to the law enforcement executive every additional 45 days that the internal affairs investigation remains open (i.e., on or about the 90th, 135th, and 180th days from the receipt of the complaint), and the law enforcement executive should exercise increasing scrutiny of the investigators’ work the longer the case remains open.  The purpose of this notice is to facilitate prompt resolution of internal affairs investigations, not to create 3 an impediment to discipline in cases that take longer to resolve.  24  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] There is no dispute that the Restructuring Act amended the Rutgers Act to impose residency requirements on four out of fifteen BOG members, and there is no dispute that Rutgers consented to the residency requirements.  See Kratovil v. Angelson, 473 N.J. Super. 484, 530 (Law Div. 2020).  In Kratovil, the court recounted the history of this bargain.  Id. at 532-33.  Notably, every time the State sought to alter the Rutgers Charter, the Legislature conferred some additional benefit on Rutgers in return for changes in governance.  In particular, the 1956 Act creating the Board of Governors involved a substantial increase in state financial support, and the Medical and Health Sciences Act involved the merger into Rutgers of the medical, dental, and nursing schools operated by the former University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey.  At every step, Rutgers agreed to changes in its operations and governance in exchange for benefits provided by the state.
[directive] During the COVID-19 Pandemic DATE: May 18, 2020 response to the ongoing COVID-19 public health emergency, the New Jersey Judiciary is  In implementing possible measures to apply social distancing current court operations, consistent all in of with the recommendations the New Jersey Department of Health and the Centers for Disease Control.  To that end, the Judiciary has transitioned a court system which many matters are to in proceeding via video or telephone during the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic.  Because this need may continue for many months based current information, Megan's Law proceedings should be on conducted remotely by video or telephone for public safety and notification to the public about sex offenders.  Therefore, I issuing the attached guidance for judges to consider when deciding which am Megan's Law proceedings can be handled remotely by video or telephone during this COVID-19 crisis.  making this determination, Megan's Law judges and designated court staff should work with In their Megan's Law prosecutors and public defenders to review all cases pending judicial review.  Private counsel should also be consulted, matters with defense counsel for the most part should as be able proceed remotely by video or telephone.  However, cases with expert testimony may need to to be adjourned a case-by-case basis at the court's discretion.  Where the registrant can only on of participate remotely by phone, the court should obtain the consent the parties before conducting the hearing.  Cases with registrants who do not have access to telephones, computers, or other electronic devices will need to be adjourned at this time.  Alternatively, defense counsel may indicate that the matter proceed because the registrant has waived the right to present.  be can  For pro se matters, court staff will need to work with the prosecutor's office to obtain the registrant's contact information to send the notices for the scheduled court date.  Depending local on practices, the prosecutor's office may be responsible for providing this information.  those counties,  In court staff should confirm that notices were sent by the prosecutor's office, and whether there was a response by the registrant.  ml  ADA ENSURING DOOR TO AN OPEN JUSTICE