ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In relevant part, CEPA provides:  An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following:  a.  *Discloses*, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer, or another employer, with whom there is a business relationship, *that the employee reasonably believes*: (1) *is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, … or* (2) *is fraudulent or criminal, … [or]*  *** c.  *Objects to*, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the *employee reasonably believes*: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, . . . ; (2) is fraudulent or criminal, . . . or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.  [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and (c) (emphasis added). ]
[brief] ” (Pa000877).  However, all takings of private property must be done “for the benefit of the public. ”  Such, however, does not negate a private property owner’s right to just compensation.  “The right to exclude is ‘one of the most treasured’ rights of property ownership. ”  *Cedar Point*, 594 U.S. at 149 (Citation omitted).  N.J.S.A. 58:10B-16, the environmental remediation statute, specifically protects and enforces property owners’ right to exclude.
[brief] Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 600 (1993).  As such, the NJLAD prohibits discriminatory employment practices.  Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co. 173 N.J. 1, 13 (2002).  Discrimination claims brought under the NJLAD are controlled by the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, (1973).  Under that analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination which then gives rise to a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.  Viscik, 173 N.J. at 14.  In order to rebut this presumption, the employer must come forward with admissible evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its conduct toward the employee.  Goodman v. London Metals Exch., Inc., 86 N.J. 19, 31 (1981); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).  The burden then shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer's articulated legitimate reason is merely a pretext for discrimination by showing “that (1) a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer than the employer's proffered legitimate reason, or (2) the defendant's proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of credence. ’”  Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J. Super. 323, 347 (App. Div 1997) (citation omitted).  To discredit as pretextual a defendant's proffered reasons, a “plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons. ”  DeWees v. RCN Group, 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528-29 (App. Div. 2005).  A prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1); (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated by discrimination, see Dixon v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 443 (1988) (finding in the employment context that a plaintiff must show that “it is more likely than not that the employer’s actions were based on unlawful considerations”); and (3) that “others not within the protected class did not suffer similar adverse ... actions.
[brief] **In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules,** 180 N.J. 478 (2004) .....................................................................................................................13, 23  **In re Herrmann,** 192 N.J. 19 (2007) .......................................................................................................................12  **Lipman v. Rutgers-State Univ. of New Jersey,** 329 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 2000) .........................................................................................13 **In re N.J. Pinelands Comm’n Resolution,** 356 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 2003) .........................................................................................13, 25 **Pinelands Preservation Alliance v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,** 436 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2014) .........................................................................................25, 28 **Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health,** 93 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 1966) ............................................................................................13 **In re Stormwater Mgmt. Rules,** 384 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2006) .........................................................................................3, 14 **In re Taylor,** 158 N.J. 644 (1999) .......................................................................................................................12 **Matter of [...]/[...],** 461 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 2019) .............................................................................................19, 20 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Olds Court concluded by imparting to the Civil Practice Committee and its Entire Controversy Doctrine Subcommittee the responsibility to examine the exemptions that should apply to mandatory joinder, as well as any amendments that should be made to R. 4:30A.  Id. at 449.  It identified the “need for a procedural device, such as a Rule 4:30A, to protect parties, the courts and the public from excessive and costly litigation. ”  Id. at 447–48 (citations omitted).  The Court stressed that “mandatory joinder should not be confused with mandatory preclusion. ”  Id. at 448.  In considering the sanction to be imposed for failure to give the required notice the Court said, “[i]f a remedy other than preclusion will vindicate the cost or prejudice to other parties and the judicial system, the court should employ such a remedy. ”  Ibid. (citation omitted).  Quoting from its decision in Abtrax Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elkins–Sinn, Inc., the Court emphasized, “‘[s]ince dismissal with prejudice is the ultimate sanction, it will normally be ordered only when no lesser sanction will suffice to erase the prejudice suffered by the non- delinquent party, or when the litigant rather than the attorney was at fault. ’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Abtrax Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elkins– Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 514 (1995) (quoting Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 258 (1982) (citations omitted))).  As a result of its decision in Olds, the Supreme Court, in September 1998, amended R. 4:30A, removing the previous provisions related to non-joinder of parties and limiting its application to nonjoinder of claims.
[brief] On the other hand, [...] offers no theory, much less facts, to explain why the [...] should have doubted [...]’s account of the Incident.  Indeed, [...]’s own Complaint admits that a version of the Incident, in which [...] claims she brushed back the Student’s head covering without realizing it was a hijab, did in fact occur.  Da_010-11.  Fourth, as [...] and the New Jersey and U.S. Supreme Courts have all held, a defendant’s “[m]ere failure to investigate all sources’ does not demonstrate actual malice.
[brief] Here, much like State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118 (2017), it was the victim who was armed with a handgun, and the shooting occurred in the midst of the initial and only physical altercation.  The State’s brief also repeatedly asserts that there is “no testimony that [...] threatened anyone or brandished the gun. ” (Sb9, Sb13).  As argued below and in the appellate brief, however, even if there was no direct testimony on this point, it was certainly a reasonable inference that [...] may have been brandishing the gun: he was armed with the gun; he brought the gun to the house to potentially confront [...]; he was in a physical fight with [...]; and the gun obviously came out into the open enough for [...] to purportedly take control of it.
[brief] See Cell S. of N.J., Inc., 172 N.J. 75, 88 (2002).  A zoning board must approve a variance application where the applicant has established the statutory grounds for its approval.  See Lang, 160 N.J. at 58 (board should not “deny variances where the proofs incontestably establish the need for variance relief and demonstrate no threat to the neighborhood or the zone plan”).
[brief] THE COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THEY HAD TO UNANIMOUSLY AGREE ON ALL ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF CONSPIRACY.  (Not Raised Below)  Unlike first- and second-degree conspiracies, third-degree conspiracies, like third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, include an additional essential element: that a co-conspirator commit an overt act to further the conspiracy.  N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(d).  Here, the State alleged six distinct acts by four possible co-conspirators.  (Da 32; 13T 194-5 to 17)  Worse still, one of the alleged overt acts — that [...] solicited [...] to cause bodily injury to [...] (Da 32; 13T 194-6 to 8) — was indistinguishable from the conspiratorial agreement itself, thus allowing the jury to convict [...] without finding the necessary additional overt act element.  Overall, the at least fifteen possible overt acts by [...], [...], [...], “and/or” [...] created a serious risk that the jury did not unanimously agree on this essential element of the conspiracy charge.  The court’s failure to instruct the jury that they needed to unanimously agree on all essential elements of the offense before they could return a guilty verdict on this count was plain error that requires reversal of [...]’s conviction.
[directive] Rule summons.  These cases are referred to as acomplaint-warrant issued on indictment" (i.e., charged by "complaint-warrant provides that persons if Bail Reform Law as defendants" for purposes of the indictment) are "eligible following a direct they S.A. 2A:162-15.  This means that bycomplaint-warrant.  See N.J. initially had been charged they pretrial services monitored the on conditions that will be by pretrial detention or release are subject to program.  division manager, criminal is returned, the when direct indictment 3:7-8 provides that a Rule or a either acomplaint-summons issue clerk of the Superior Court, must deputy as designee of the specify the role that not 3:3-1.  Although Rule 3:7-8 does with Rule complaint-warrant in accordance determination, it is complaint-summons versus plays in the complaint-warrant prosecutor the see to Rule 3:3-1(e), required pursuant in cases where acomplaint-warrant is except appropriate that, subsection 4.5.4, a see to Rule 3:3-1(~, issued pursuant 4.4.1, or is presumed to be subsection prosecutor indictment unless the return of direct following the a should issued complaint-summons be that a direct at the time acomplaint-warrant.
[brief] Whether resting upon a novel constitution question, a matter of public interest, or miscommunications had with the [...], it would be manifestly unjust to deny Appellants the opportunity to challenge the ZBA’s resolution based on a footfall of only four days when the Addition will forever impact a historic district.  Moreover, the three circumstances articulated in *In re Ordinance 2354-12 of West Orange*, two of which apply in the instant case, mandate enlargement.  II.
[brief] (Pa000102).  On June 29, 2022, [...] served Plaintiffs with a safe harbor letter pursuant to Rule 1:4-8, referencing exhibits and directing Plaintiffs to dismiss [...] from the litigation within twenty-eight days of service of the letter.  (Pa000121).  Plaintiffs never responded to the safe harbor letter and never deposed anyone from [...] to explore their theories of liability.  On July 28, 2023, after the close of discovery, [...] filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] ”  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) (citing *State v. Berry*, 140 N.J. 280, 293 (1995)).  New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702 allows a witness to offer expert opinion testimony “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ”  Here, the Trial Court properly exercised his discretion to allow testimony from the title experts for both parties to the case, no doubt recognizing that the title industry is a specialized field involving technical knowledge about recorded instruments and conveyances, that title documents need to be evaluated based upon applicable industry and legal standards, and that this case presented complex land and title matters, including but not limited to the interpretation of riparian rights and grants.  A factfinder “should not be allowed to speculate without the aid of expert testimony in any area where lay persons could not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience. ”  *[...]*, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 1 on N.J.R.E. 702 (2018).  Simply stated, “expert testimony is required when the subject matter is so esoteric that jurors [or factfinders] of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment. ”  *Id.*  There can be little doubt that the field of title work including, but not limited to, riparian rights, is the type of subject matter where specialized knowledge was needed to assist the Court in its function, as the factfinder in this bench trial, to evaluate the evidence presented at trial.
[brief] In all other instances, Escrow Agent shall not release the Earnest Money Deposit to either party until Escrow Agent has been requested in writing by Seller or Purchaser to release the Earnest Money Deposit and has given the other party five (5) Business Days to dispute, or consent to, the release of the Earnest Money Deposit.  (b)  [[...]] shall not be liable to any party for any act or omission, except for bad faith, gross negligence or willful misconduct, and the parties agree to indemnify [[...]] and hold [[...]] harmless from any and all claims, damages, losses or expenses arising in connection herewith, except to the extent arising out of the bad faith, gross negligence or willful misconduct of [[...]]  .  . . .
[directive] 3.  Do you understand that if you are found to be a drug dependent person and if you are [Yes] [No] otherwise eligible for special probation under 2C:35-14, then as a result of this N.J.S.A. guilty plea you will be deemed “a person in need of treatment” who is eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?
[brief] The Law Division’s subsequent failure to address Plaintiff’s argument and correct the arbitrator’s decision further compounded the legal error.  By endorsing the arbitrator’s flawed approach, the Law Division failed to ensure that the arbitration award adhered to the governing statutes and legal standards.  This oversight by the Law Division not only upheld an incorrect application of the fee schedule but also set a concerning precedent that undermines the fair and just application of law in cases involving agreed upon amounts outstanding.
[brief] When a carpet project had been finished and when trash from the Intake Unit such as old desks and old computers, had to be moved, she asked [...] to help and he went directly into the Captain’s office where [...] was; [...] just walked in and sat down (1T; 50:18 to 51:8).  After that event, she was brought into the captain’s office will Lieutenant [...] there and she was told “not to have any contact with the Intake Unit,” which was [...]’s Unit (1T; 51:15).  Plaintiff was the Admin Officer, and they were interfering with her work, and she was not permitted to go into their office or correspond with them which were functions of her job (1T; 51:18).  Plaintiff was told by [...] not to correspond with the Unit (1T; 52:12).  Plaintiff was told to reroute her emails to the Intake Unit by the Captain (1T; 52:19).
[brief] *Pascarella v. Bruck*, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 134-135 (App. Div. 1983).  Where the terms and conditions of a settlement agreement are clear and unambiguous—such as is the case here—they will be enforced.  *Schor v. FMS Financial Corp.*, 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191-192 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] *Pub. Employees for Env’t.  Responsibility v. U.S. Env’t. Prot. Agency*, 314 F. Supp. 3d 68, 74 (D.D.C. 2018).  Because FOIA is to be construed “liberally,” *ibid.*, federal courts have cautioned that this requirement should not become “a loophole through which federal agencies can deny the public access to legitimate information. ”  *Ibid.* (citing *Yagman v. Pompeo*, 868 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 1978).  OPRA is also to be construed liberally, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, and New Jersey courts have frequently held that agencies may not impose unreasonable obstacles to access.
[brief] Taking a lead from the United States Supreme Court in *Davis v. Mississippi*, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1969), our Court concluded that for certain detentions, which are minimally intrusive, produce reliable evidence, and can be effected without abuse, coercion or intimidation, the proofs required for an investigative detention order need not rise to probable cause.  *Hall*, 93 N.J. at 561-62; accord *In re Alleged Aggravated Sexual Assault of A.S.*, 366 N.J. Super. 402, 409-10 (App. Div. 2004).  Court Rules now formalize the guidelines for issuance of an order for investigative detention to compel lineups, fingerprinting, and other minimally intrusive identification procedures.
[brief] Defendant Unambiguously Invoked His Right To Counsel.**  [...] repeatedly invoked his right to counsel, requiring suppression of the booking video and subsequent interrogation.  (11T 138-17 to 139-10, 141-22 to 142-9 (defense counsel’s argument); 11T 139-11 to 141-10, 160-2 to 22 (trial court’s denial of suppression))
[brief] (39057a-58a)  [...] further rejected the [...]’ specious assertion (again raised here [Db30]) that this Court’s decision to reverse [...]’s SOL and punitive-damage rulings was tantamount to holding that Plaintiffs’ RICO and punitive damages claims shared no “common core of operative facts. ”  As explained by [...]:  [T]he Appellate Division instructed the trial court to “determine whether each of these defendants engaged in conduct in the period from October 1, 2003, through December 2011, which rises to the level required for the award of punitive damages. ”  Id. at *72.  The Appellate Division’s instruction to the trial court to reconsider the quantum of punitive damages based on a changed statute of limitations for liability has no bearing on my reasoning for recommending that Plaintiffs RICO claims and punitive damages claims stem from a common core of facts.
[brief] 496a–513a.  [...] and [...] set in place this contract flip in Plaintiffs’ pursuit to purchase the [...] Property, creating a mechanism by which the co-conspirator Defendants would wrongfully take and receive a substantial financial gain.  489a–513a.  That is, instead of negotiating on behalf of Plaintiffs directly with [...] to enter into an agreement of sale for the [...] Property (as was done with owners of the other real estate that comprised the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage), [...] and [...], in concert with the other co-conspirator Defendants, created the flip transaction of the [...] Property pursuant to which Plaintiffs’ payments for the [...]-MTDC Assignment purportedly paid to Defendant [...], unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, were to be ultimately transferred and divided between the co-conspirator Defendants.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692f; Appx., at 4a, 33a.  This claim fails for two reasons.  First, it is redundant of his other claims.  Section 1692f is the FDCPA’s “catchall” provision, meaning that it covers abusive conduct that is not covered by some more-specific FDCPA D.  Dismissal of Related State Law Claims Should be Upheld
[brief] From 1991 until spring, 2009, [...] lived in a condominium he purchased that was part of a complex owned and managed by [...].  During that period, water intrusion caused the formation of toxic mold that neither [...] nor anyone else discovered until it was first detected in March, 2009.  [...] attempted, but failed, to remediate the contamination; therefore, based on medical advice, [...] left the condominium and was never able to return to live there.  Toxic mold continued to contaminate the condominium into 2015, when it was foreclosed upon.  On April 15, 2010, [...] filed a negligence action against [...] and its property manager, [...] (“[...]”), for the injuries he suffered as a result of the mold exposure.  *Larry [...] v. [...], et al*, [...] (Superior Court of Essex County (the “underlying case”).  After preliminary discovery, [...] entered into a settlement agreement with [...] and [...] in 2012 that included a proviso allowing the lawsuit to be reopened if an insurance archeologist located “applicable” liability insurance coverage issued to [...] and/or [...].  The Trial Court granted [...]’s February 26, 2014 motion to reopen the lawsuit, and [...] filed a First Amended Complaint on July 8, 2014.  The amended complaint named [...] and [...] as defendants and also made coverage claims against four insurers, including Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”), that had issued liability policies to [...] for the years that Larry [...] had been exposed to mold.  On interlocutory appeal, this Court reversed the Trial Court’s Order that allowed the claims for coverage and remanded for disposition of the liability claims asserted against [...] and [...].
[brief] ”).  [...] is not liable for the ordinary “jerks and jolts” incident to the starting and stopping of a bus’s conveyances in the usual and customary manner.  *Cohn v. Pub. Serv. Co-Ordinated Transp.*, 109 N.J.L. 387, 388 (E. & A. 1932).  Because the “jerks and jolts” in the operation of a bus “should be shown to have been of such an unusual character as to speak of negligence in that operation,” New Jersey courts have set a high bar for a plaintiff to submit the question of liability to a jury.
[brief] Self-defense under the Code is a justification defense and is treated as an affirmative defense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:3-1(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4; State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189, 206 (1986).  Accordingly, the Code places upon the defendant the burden of coming forward initially with some evidence after which it becomes the State’s burden to disprove the defense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13b(1).  However, self-defense becomes relevant only when the essential elements of a crime have otherwise been established.  Harmon, 104 N.J. at 207.  See also State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 105 (1997) (jury had to consider whether defendant was guilty before considering whether he should be exculpated).
[brief] POINT III THE TRIAL COURT ENGAGED IN BIAS IN MAKING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DETERMINATION WHICH FAVORED THE RESPONDENTS’ POSITION AND IGNORED THE POSITION OF THE APPELLANT Pa93, Pa115 28 POINT IV APPELLANT PLED THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS RECORD AND AS A RESULT REACHED AN IMPROPER CONCLUSION  Pa201, Pa211 30 POINT V APPELLANT PLED THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF AGE DISCRIMINATION WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD AS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT  ILLUSTRATING AGE DISCRIMINATION AND DISMISSED  THE PROPERLY SUPPORTED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION  Pa348, T93 38  POINT VI  APPELLANT PLED THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND HARASSMENT WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD BY THE APPELLANT AND REACHED AN IMPROPER CONCLUSION  THIS CAUSE OF ACTION  Pa1, Pa196 Pa211-T137, T138, T264; Pa296, Pa390 40  TABLE OF CONTENTS