ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE  When the Defendants-Appellants Brief was filed 4/22/2024, the Defendants were unaware of the existence of court decision transcripts on November 28th and 30th of 2023.  Why?  Because oral argument was denied by the trial judge and because the defendants were informed that the motions for a Traverse Hearing and for Reconsideration to Vacate the Judgment would be heard on December 1, 2023.
[directive] State of New Jersey OFFICE  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE [...] [...] DEPARTMENT LAW  PUBLIC SAFETY OF AND Governor  Attorney General  DIVISION  CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF PO BOX 085  [...]  [...] TRENTON, NJ 08625-0085  TELEPHONE: (609) 984-6500  Lt. Governor Director  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2019-3 TO: All Law Enforcement Chief Executives FROM: [...], Attorney General
[brief] Likewise, in MariCal, Inc. v. Cooke Aquaculture, Inc., the court found good cause to designate an additional custodian because the requesting party showed that the disputed custodian’s relevant information would not be accessible from the other designated custodians.  No. 1:14-cv-00366-JDL, 2016 WL 9459260, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2016).  Here, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that [...] and [...]’s custodial files are likely to contain substantial relevant information that does not appear in the files of one or more current custodians, including two dozen executive-level custodians.
[directive] Page in considered be and may 6, also section see review, for jury its a to grand matter presenting the investigation, superseding the by be served would justice of interests whether the determining person any of recusal ordering the Prosecutor's Office, County investigation another to the assigning the ensure to needed be may as other actions such taking or investigation, from persons the or enforcement law  Any section 3. to investigation pursuant the of independence impartiality and discipline. to subject shall section be this knowingly violates who civilian employee or officer e~nCX
[brief] 3d 662 (Mass. 2019) | 27 | | Miler v. United States, 255 A.2d 497 (D.C. App. 1969) | 43 | | Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) | 48, 49 | | Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) | 44 | | Neno v. Clifton, 167 N.J. 573 (2001) | 27 | | State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41 (1997) | 36 | | State v. Allen, 2023 WL 4915228 (Aug. 2, 2023) | 23 | | State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001) | 45 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 46 | | State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117 (1982) | 36 | | State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316 (2005) | 40 | | State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247 (1967) | 44 | | State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (1981) | 36 | | State v. Hess, 198 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 1984) | 46 | | State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333 (2023) | 23 | | State v. Jimenez, 266 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1993) | 44 | | State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) | 36 | | State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) | 36 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **State v. Marks**, 201 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 1985) | 44 | | **State v. Martin**, 119 N.J. 2 (1990) | 36 | | **State v. McKinney**, 223 N.J. 475 (2015) | 36 | | **State v. Nyema**, 239 N.J. 509 (2022) | 47 | | **State v. O’Neill**, 193 N.J. 148 (2007) | 44 | | **State v. Orecchio**, 16 N.J. 125 (1954) | 41 | | **State v. Poteet**, 61 N.J. 493 (1972) | 43, 44, 48| | **State v. Reddish**, 181 N.J. 553 (2004) | 36, 40 | | **State v. Rivera**, 249 N.J. 285 (2021) | 49 | | **State v. Rivers**, 252 N.J. Super. 142 (App. Div. 1991) | 45 | | **State v. Sanchez**, 247 N.J. 450 (2021) | Passim | | **State v. Singh**, 245 N.J. 1 (2021) | 25 | | **State v. Watson**, 2023 WL 4918557 (Aug. 2, 2023) | Passim | | STATUTES | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) | 42 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **STATUTES (CONT'D.)** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) | 48 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(c)(1) | 44 | | **RULES** | | | R. 2:10-2 | 15, 35, 36| | **RULES OF EVIDENCE** | | | N.J.R.E. 403 | 15 | | N.J.R.E. 602 | 15 | | N.J.R.E. 701 | 15 | | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 | 15, 35, 41| | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9 | 15, 35, 41, 48| | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10 | 15, 35, 41, 48| | U.S. Const. amend. V | 15, 35, 41, 44, 48| | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 15, 35 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 15, 35, 41, 44, 48| | **OTHER AUTHORITIES** | | | Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Identification: Out-Of-Court Identification Only”f (revised July 9, 2012) | 38 | | Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Third Party Guilt Jury Charge” (approved Mar. 9, 2015) | 37, 40 |
[brief] [...] is the owner of a single-family home located at [...] in the [...], [...], [...].  Appellant owns an adjacent home.  Both homes front on Barnegat Bay, and both have recreational piers.  The 2017 WFD Permit approved the construction by [...] of an extension to the then existing pier.  Appellant and other third parties, having received public notice of the application (as required by NJDEP’s regulations), submitted comments to NJDEP objecting to the length of the dock.  However, Appellant never filed a third-party administrative hearing request or an appeal challenging the issuance of the 2017 WFD Permit within the required timeframes.  Upon receipt of the 2017 WFD Permit, [...] constructed the dock.  The work was completed in the Spring of 2018.  Following NJDEP’s inspection of the as-built dock, it was determined that the dock extension was located 1.7 ft. to the south from the approved location, as a consequence of which NJDEP required [...] to apply for a permit modification to reflect *de minimis* error.  The length of the as-built dock was the same as the dock length approved by the 2017 WFD Permit.  NJDEP determined after further inspection that the dock met all applicable NJDEP rules and regulations and issued the 2019 Permit Modification to [...].  It was only following the issuance of the 2019 Permit Modification that Appellant filed a third-party administrative hearing request challenging the 2019 Permit Modification.  Appellant also belatedly attempted to include the 2017 WFD Permit in that request, despite that fact that it had been issued two years before.  On March 14, 2023, NJDEP denied Appellant’s request for a third-party administrative hearing.  Appellant now appeals that decision.  Appellant, having failed to address or challenge the issuance of NJDEP’s denial of its third-party administrative hearing request for the 2017 WFD Permit in its brief, appears to have abandoned that challenge.
[brief] The appropriate standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is an abuse of discretion standard.  Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill, 303 N.J. Super. 61, 77 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996)).  Reconsideration lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, to be exercised in the interest of justice.  Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).
[directive] See id. at -22(b)(1)(f); see also In re Request to Release Certain the Act’s excludable Pretrial Detainees, 245 N.J. 218, 231 (2021) (discussing time provisions in the context of a challenge related to COVID-19); N.J. Republican State Comm. v. Murphy, 243 N.J. 574, 580-81 (2020) (finding “that COVID-19 is a true disaster” within the meaning of the N.J. Const. art. “good cause for delay” VIII, § 2, ¶ 3(e)).  As to the second basis -- -- the orders at different times rested on the statewide suspension of or limited capacity for jury trials.  The trial court conducted several conferences and entered two additional orders that excluded 218 days.  At a case management conference on September 17, 2021, the State asked to extend the period of excludable time through November 15, 2021.  The State claimed additional time was needed “only one trial [at a] time,” and both because the vicinage was conducting counsel had other trial commitments.  Defense counsel argued the State should file a formal application to create a better record from which it might appeal.  acknowledged the “exceptional, extraordinary circumstances” The court that existed and the vicinage’s inability “to move as many cases as we might 14 have otherwise. ”  The judge noted the vicinage was attempting “to get to the point of” trying “up to two cases at a time. ”  Because of the “unfortunate backlog of detained defendants” and understandable concerns about the length of detention, the court instructed the parties to return in two months to address excludable time and for defendant to consider applying for release then.
[brief] [...] again asked [...] for the price of the name plaque while [...] stood off to the side.  As [...] was speaking to [...] about the jewelry, [...] approached from behind and removed a .38 caliber handgun from [...]'s waistband and pointed it at [...].  [...] announced a robbery and opened the firearm's cylinder to display five bullets.  Meanwhile, [...] ran towards the back of the store and came out with [...]'s wife and son from the office.  He seated the mother and child against a wall and directed [...] to sit down next to them while [...] pointed the firearm at the family.  [...] then went back into the office and retrieved cash while [...], [...], and their son remained seated but able to observe [...]'s movements.  When [...] returned he began demanding more money while [...] continued to hold the victims at gunpoint.  Moments later, a patron entered the store and defendants fled, leaving the photocopy behind.
[brief] ...........................................26  Parents Defending Educ. v. Olentangy Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:23-cv-01595, 2023 WL 4848509 (S.D. Ohio July 28, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-3630 (6th Cir. July 31, 2023)  ....................13, 15–16  Parents United for Better Schs., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 1998)  .......................................................11, 18 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)  ......................................................................9  Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609 (2000)  .....................................................................27, 28, 30  Platkin v. Marlboro/Manalapan/Middletown Twp. Bds. of Educ., Nos. MON-C-78-23, MON-C-79-23, MON-C-80-23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2023) ..................................................7, 15, 29, 40–41  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ....................................................................9, 20–21  Regino v. Staley, No. 2:23-cv-00032-JAM-DMC, 2023 WL 4464845 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-16031 (9th Cir. July 25, 2023) (Middletown Ra65–66) ..................................................................14, 15  Ricard v. USD 475  Geary Cnty., Kan. Sch. Bd., No. 5:22-cv-04015-HLT-GEB, 2022 WL 1471372 (D. Kan. May 9, 2022), voluntarily dismissed per settlement, ECF.  No. 37  ..................12  Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287 (1982) .....................................................................25, 27, 30 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973) .....................................................................29 Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 177 N.J. 318 (2003) ................................................................. 27, 28 State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488 (2021) ........................................................................... 26 State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523 (2001) ........................................................................... 26 State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66 (2015) .............................................................................. 26 T.F. v. Kettle Moraine Sch. Dist., No. 202-cv-1650, 2023 WL 6544917 (Wis. Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) .................. 20 Tatel v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 37 F. Supp. 3d 295 (W.D. Pa. 2022), clarified on denial of reconsideration, No. 22-837, 2023 WL 3740822 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2023) .................................................. 14, 15 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ............................................................................. 8, 9 V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200 (2000)
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY AND [...] IN COUNTS IV AND V MUST BE DISMISSED AS THEY ARE AKIN TO A MONELL CLAIM WHICH IS IMPROPERLY PLED.  It is well settled under federal and New Jersey constitutional law that a Plaintiff lacks standing to assert constitutional claims against municipalities for the actions of their employees and that claims predicated upon respondeat superior, vicarious liability, or agency are not cognizable.  As such, in order to assert claims against public entities for constitutional violations, a plaintiff must plead direct claims against the public entity based upon unconstitutional policies and practices.  "[T]he issue is whether the [public entity]'s practice, custom, or policy, or the action of its final policymaker, is the moving force that causes a violation of a constitutional right."  Besler v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Windsor-Plainsboro Regl. Sch. Dist., 993 A.2d 805 (N.J. 2010)  "The term 'official policy' usually refers to formal governmental rules or practices."  Stomel v. City of Camden, 927 A.2d 129 (N.J. 2007).  In *Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services of City of New York*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) the Supreme Court, [...], held, in part, that: “(1) local government units were “persons” for purposes of § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871; (2) local governments could not be held liable under a theory of *respondeat superior* but rather could be held liable only when the constitutional deprivation arises from a governmental custom.
[brief] *Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Cred. Union*, 199 N.J. 381, 400 (2009); *Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown*, 95 N.J. 280, 288 (1984); *Endre v. Arnold*, 300 N.J. Super. 136, 142 (App. Div. 1997).  Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff has the burden of proving each element of negligence.  *Khan v. Singh*, 200 N.J. 82, 91 (2009); *Brunson*, 199 N.J. at 400.  *Long*, 35 N.J. at 54; *Saks v. Ng*, 383 N.J. Super. 76, 89 (App. Div. 2006); *Anderson v. Sammy Redd & Assocs.*, 278 N.J. Super. 50, 56 (App. Div. 1994).  A business establishment owes a duty of care to its business invitees to provide a reasonably safe place to do what is within the scope of the invitation.
[brief] 221 N.J. at 459.  The landlord came, saw contraband, and reported it to the police.  Ibid.  A police officer then entered the home to see the contraband for himself, without first obtaining a warrant.  Id. at 460.  After he saw the contraband, the defendant granted him permission to conduct a full search, and he found additional contraband.  Ibid.  The State attempted to justify the officer’s conduct with the third-party intervention doctrine, which holds that if a third-party has conducted a search, law enforcement does not need a warrant to conduct another search not exceeding the scope of the original search.  Id. at 459.  Our State Supreme Court held that the third-party intervention doctrine did not apply to homes, and that “an invitation to a plumber, a dinner guest, or a landlord does not open the door to one's home to a warrantless search by a police officer.
[brief] At the start of the case, the State told the jury that “the defendant and this codefendant, Ms. [[...]] Seaver, are both guilty of possessing these drugs.  . .  That’s how the laws of joint and constructive possession work[]. ”  (4T 28-9 to 13)  And at the end of the case, the State told the jury that “if . . . you find that the worst that the defendant was going to do was break off a little more for [...] on the ride home, that is distribution. ”  (5T 51-3 to 6)  The court did not inform the jury that if it believed the drugs were jointly possessed, then finding “that the worst that the defendant was going to do was break off a little more for [...] on the ride home,” (5T 51-3 to 6) would not constitute an intent to distribute, contrary to the prosecution’s claim.  Prosecutors have broad discretion when it comes to opening and closing statements, but that discretion does not permit them to “make inaccurate legal or factual assertions during a trial.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 CONCISE STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS .................................................................  2 CONCISE PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................  3 LEGAL STANDARD ..............................................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  4  SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  4  I.  THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS AND REINSTATE THE PLAINTIFF’S CFA CLAIMS (T18:11 to 19:18)
[brief] (7T 54-11 to 17)  [...] did not view the video at that point but instead went downstairs to check the basement office where the Tavern’s money was kept.  (7T 92-18 to 21)  In the basement office, [...] found that the Tavern’s money, ordinarily stored in three wooden boxes in the basement office, had been stolen.  (7T 76-8 to 14)  [...] estimated that $12,443 had been stolen.  (7T 81-10 to 11)  However, he admitted that the cash in the boxes had not yet been counted because it is counted every morning.  (7T 90-18 to 21)  This money was never recovered.
[brief] Plaintiff argues that the use of the Redevelopment Payment to expand the Senior Center has “nothing to do with the ‘purposes of the’ LRHL. ” (Pb24).  This is incorrect.  The LRHL was enacted to address and consolidate various statutory enactments to, among other purposes, “promote the advancement of community interests through programs of redevelopment, rehabilitation and incentives to the expansion and improvement of commercial, industrial, residential and civic facilities. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1(b).  The project is an exemplar of how redevelopment can effectuate multifaceted revitalization and change benefitting all residents.
[brief] 46  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ### Cases - **Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. P.M. Video Corp.**, 322 N.J. Super. 74 (App. Div. 1999) ...........................................  33 - **Bogage v. Display Grp. 14, LLC**, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 465(App. Div. 2018) .................................................. 39 - **Caldwell v. Haynes**, 136 N.J. 422, 432 (1994) ....................... 33 - **Carrino v. Novotny**, 78 N.J. 355 (1979) ............................. 34, 37 - **Copeland v. Marshall**, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980) .......... 44 - **Crawn v. Campo**, 136 N.J. 494 (1994) .............................. 33 - **Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August**, 450 U.S. 346 (1981) .............. 38 - **Dolson v. Anastasia**, 55 N.J. 2 (1969) .............................. 22, 23, 32 - **Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc.**, 164 N.J. 598 (2000) ............... 22 - **Feldman v. Lederle Labs.**, 97 N.J. 429 (1984) .................... 34 - **Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.**, 182 N.J. 1(2004) .................. 43 - **Johnson v. Scaccetti**, 192 N.J. 256 (2007) .......................... 34 - **Judge v. Blackfin Yacht Corp.**, 357 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2003) ................................................................. 32 - **Juliano v. Abeles**, 114 N.J.L.  510(1935) ............................. 33 - **Kassick v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp.**, 120 N.J. 130 (1990)  .... 36 - **N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.**, 158 N.J. 561(1999) .................................................................  37, 38, 39, 41 - **Negron v. Melchiorre, Inc.**, 389 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 2006) .................................................................  33 - **New Jersey v. Singer**, 469 U.S. 832 (1984) ......................... 39 - **Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier**, 167 N.J. 427(2001) .. 37 - **Rendine v. Pantzer**, supra, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) .................. 42, 44 - **Rode v. Dellarciprete**, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir.1990) ............... 44 - **Singer v. State**, 95 N.J. 487 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984) ................................................................. 38, 41 - **Verdicchio v. Ricca**, 179 N.J. 1 (2004) .............................. 22 - **Walker v. Giuffre**, 209 N.J. 124(2012) .............................. 41 - **Wytupeck v. City of Camden**, 25 N.J. 450 (1957) .................. 36
[brief] Defendant's sentence must be reversed because the court committed multiple factual and legal errors in sentencing and because defendant's forty-year sentence is excessive.  At sentencing, the court found aggravating factor three, the risk that defendant would commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); aggravating factor six, the extent of defendant's prior record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), and aggravating factor nine, the need for deterrence, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (33T33-4 to 12).  It gave moderate weight to the aggravating factor of defendant's prior record and significant weight to the need for deterrence (33T33-7 to 12).  The court found mitigating factor seven, that defendant "had no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) (33T13 to 22).  At sentencing, the court also said it also gave "slight weight" to mitigating factor eight, that defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur, N.J.S.A. 2c:44-1(b)(8) (33T34-11 to 13).  But, despite this finding, mitigating factor eight is not listed on defendant's judgment of conviction (Da59).  On the conviction for being an accomplice to felony murder, the court sentenced defendant to a prison term of forty years, with 85% to be served without parole (33T34-20 to 33T35-3).  On the charge of accomplice liability for robbery, initially, the court sentenced defendant to a seven-year term in prison, with no mention of a minimum term (33T35-20 to 33T36-2).  The court sentenced defendant to a four-year term for theft, but then it merged that sentence into the robbery conviction, except for the $50 Victim Compensation and the $75 Safe Streets fines (33T36-3 to 9).  The court sentenced defendant to a seven-year prison term for reckless manslaughter, also with no mention of a minimum term, and a seven-year term as an accomplice to reckless manslaughter, also with no minimum term (33T36-10 to 19).  But then it merged the seven-year sentence for accomplice to reckless manslaughter with the reckless manslaughter sentence except, again, for fines (33T36-14 to 19).  All of the sentences were to be served concurrently (33T37-15).  After the court had issued its sentence, the prosecutor told the court that robbery was a first-degree charge, and that the offense also was subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 (NERA) (33T37-16 to 20).  In response, the court said: "So I will just -- I'll sentence you to 10 years New Jersey State Prison on that" (33T37-21 to 25).  At no point did the court ever acknowledged or inform defendant that his sentences for robbery and reckless manslaughter were subject to minimum terms of 85% pursuant to NERA, although the NERA minimums are shown on the JOC (33T37-16 to 33T40-25).  1.