ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The United States Supreme Court has held that the withholding of material evidence favorable to a defendant constitutes a denial of due process and the right to a fair trial.  When there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the prosecution and a resulting prejudice to a defendant, the appropriate sanction is a dismissal with prejudice.  In this matter, critical evidence was destroyed / lost by the State, making discovery thereof impossible.  The circumstances at issue undoubtedly constituted a due process violation.  Coupled with the evidence of bad faith on the part of the prosecution (by way of the complaining witness, [...] [...]) and the resulting prejudice to Defendant, the appropriate remedy was a dismissal of the Indictment.  The Trial Court’s ruling was proper and should be upheld.
[brief] (Not raised below)  The trial court's instructions to the jury "must correctly state the applicable law and instruct the jury how to apply the law to the facts."  Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 402 N.J. Super. 546, 576 (A.D. 2008), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 542 (2009).  Erroneous jury instructions constitute reversible error only if the jury could have come to a different result had it been correctly instructed.  Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000).  Erroneous instructions on a material part of the charge are presumed to be reversible.  McClelland v. Tucker, 273 N.J.Super. 410, 417 (A.D. 1994).  B.  IMPROPER JURY INSTRUCTIONS
[brief] (Ca141).  [...] explained in his letter brief that there was nothing he could have done to have funds available for payment of rent, which he did not negotiate.  The monthly reports showed a negative operation.  (Ca142).  [...]’s counsel argued that [...] could have notified the landlord that he was not accepting the lease.  However, [...], in his judgment, noted that would have led to additional litigation and costs, which was not necessary.  [...] stated in his letter brief that he attempted to speak with [...] to reach an understanding concerning the rent; however, he was unable to do so.  (Ca142).  In addition, as noted in the letter brief, [...] thought that [...] should have closed the diner, and stopped operating, because of the negative status of the operation.  [...] indicated that, based upon his experience, it is harmful to close a business as a receiver when the owners are attempting to sell its interests in the property, even if losing money.
[directive] 1.1  THE ROLE AND USE OF THE SPECIALTY POLICE DOG  Goal:  The police officer handler will be knowledgeable about the use of the specialty police dog in law enforcement, in particular, that area in which the dog will be utilized (narcotics detection, arson accelerant detection, explosive detection, tracking, or cadaver detection).  1.1.1  The police officer handler will demonstrate familiarity with the historical use of canines, in particular, in that area of law enforcement in which the specialty team will be utilized.
[directive] Actor, public Actor Actor SET with or or Bail - (indictable substances  BE - selling purpose Conduct #9-05 or Public 3:26-1  MAY  Harassment  Wandering, in Charge or Remaining Directive with obtaining  Prowling Disorderly BAIL controlled Rule (c)(1)  Places WHERE by of 3:3-1  Promulgated Rule  STATUTES  2C:33-2.1  2C:33-2 2C:33-4  Statute Option permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible Bail 22 JUDGE’S issue.
[brief] Within its August 27, 2024 Letter (A46), [...] stated that it is “the largest writer of surety business in New Jersey, and is also the largest global surety company in the world. ”  In the two-plus years prior to [...]’s Bid, [...] identified not only thirteen prior projects whereby [...] itself accepted low bids using [...]’s identical Bid Bond Documents and [...] issued the Contract Bonds, but over 225 prior projects across multiple New Jersey public agencies including the [...], [...], and [...].  (SA1)².  In the past year alone, [...] identified the following six projects (which serves as a small sample of the more than 225 prior projects):  | Company | SNJ Number | Bond Number | Contract Number | |--------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------| | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] IFB 22-048X | Id.  None of these bids were rejected based on there being only one Power of Attorney.  Further, [...] issued the Contract Bonds on each.  Plainly, [...]’s assertion that industry standards are on its side is unsupported - it is a fabricated justification.  [...] makes claims that if [...]’s Bid is upheld it will lead to “absurd results” (P. 17-18), “promote irregularities in the procurement process and undermine the principle of vigorous competition, on a level playing field” (P. 26), and “open the doors to havoc (and fraud) …” (P. 33).  This is hyperbole at --- ² [...] is required to supplement its Appendix with the referenced letter to refute [...]’s argument that “industry standard” and “well-settled construction practices” support its position.  This assertion has not been presented before, and thus, respectfully, [...] should be permitted to supplement the record accordingly.  best.  [...] cannot point to a single instance of fraud, irregularity, absurdity, or havoc within the construction industry in the last two years.  On the contrary, the last two years and more than 225 projects involving [...]’s same Power of Attorney and Consent of Surety demonstrate an understood order of things: contractor and [...] submitted the lowest bid with [...]’s Bid Bond Documents, the New Jersey public agency awarded the project to the contractor, and [...] issued the required Contract Bonds.  Based upon the foregoing reasons, [...]’s reliance on industry standard and well-settled construction practice is meritless and should be rejected.
[brief] Appellate courts “ordinarily will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are ‘so clearly mistaken' that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ”  Id. at 319 (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).  In this case, [...] denied defendant’s suppression motion after having had an opportunity to see and hear [...] and [...] and to assess these officers’ credibility.  (1T15-23; 2T4-5).  [...] found [...] to be a credible witness because the officer “answered questions directly, made eye contact with the attorneys, exhibited good recall, and had an overall calm, professional demeanor. ” (Da16).  [...] similarly found [...] to be a credible witness in that the officer “responded appropriately to the questions of both counsel and was relaxed and clear in his testimony. ” (Da24).  Appellate courts defer to the trial court's credibility determinations because it has “‘a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness. ’”  C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) (Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998))).  Citing to State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003), [...] first found that Illinois law applied to [...]’s stop of [...]’s vehicle in Illinois.
[directive] 3.5.3  The inspection function should determine by actual on-site inspection whether personnel are properly implementing management’s policies at the operational level.  This function is also responsible for reviewing and evaluating procedures.  In addition, the inspection unit or function should evaluate the material resources of the agency and the utilization of those resources.  This includes, but is not limited to, motor vehicles, communications equipment, computers, office machinery and supplies.  The inspection function or unit should report any deficiencies to the law enforcement executive, and recommend any possible solutions and improvements.
[directive] "Prosecuting agency" means either the Attorney General or the county prosecutor, whichever in particular case bears the responsibilities for a - prosecuting the defendant or filing the forfeiture action- - - r I.  "State law enfcfrcement agency" means any department of the State which or by itself through any subordinate investigative unit or other agency, which or it controls, directs supervises, engages in law enforcement activities officers- through State personnel that police Department of are sworn  The Law and Public Safety shall be the State law enforcement agency for all investigative activity conducted by its investigative units.
[brief] B.  Post-trial agreements.  Whenever a defendant is convicted after trial of a qualifying Chapter 35 offense, the prosecuting attorney shall offer the defendant the opportunity to enter into an agreement prior to sentencing that contains the following terms:  1.  Pursuant to Section 12, the court at sentencing shall impose a period of parole ineligibility for any qualifying Chapter 35 offense equal to one-third of the sentence, less commutation, minimum custody, and work credits earned while in custody, consistent with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(a), as if the individual had not been subject to a mandatory minimum term; and 2.  The court at sentencing shall retain discretion to impose any other sentencing terms it deems just and appropriate, including, where appropriate, the imposition of an additional, discretionary period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b), if the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors.  Any such period of discretionary parole ineligibility would be served in addition to the period equal to one-third of the sentence, less prison credits, described in Section I.B.1 above.  Here, the State and defendant entered into a post-conviction agreement as to the sentence as expressly permitted by the Directive.  The State noted that the verdict discussions were held pursuant to the Directive’s guidelines.
[brief] The Arbitrator appears to have denied the chance for [...] to have counsel in order to effectuate his plan to grant judgment on the papers submitted and to avoid the hearing he knew he would have to hold.  (Da2510-2512)  Plaintiffs’ citations to cases in which the Arbitrator refused to admit evidence is a deflection from the real issue.  The unpublished decision of Risco v. NJ Natural Gas, 2015 Unpub. LEXIS 1785, is improper to cite and the case irrelevant.  It was not decided on whether a refusal to grant a postponement required vacatur.  The question was only whether the arbitrator had the right to expand the agreed upon record and to request and consider additional submissions.  The Appellate Court questioned whether doing so constituted exceeding the arbitrator’s powers.  Id., at *13 and *15.  However, it declined to vacate because the plaintiff did not object to additional submissions and it benefited in the award from that decision.  Id., at *17-18.  Manger v. Manger, 417 N.J. Super. 370 (App. Div. 2010) is also not a case about the denial of a postponement on sufficient cause.
[brief] 40  Nardello v. Township of Voorhees, 377 N.J. Super. 428 (2005)  42 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, (1987)  19, 36 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009)  28 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 776 (2014)  28  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  10, 11, 13, 16, 33  Radiation Data, Inc. v. NJ Dept. of Environmental Prot., 456 N.J. Super. 550, 558 (App. Div. 2018)
[brief] Here, both complaints arose from the same matter and contained the same defendants and or witnesses which triggered the entire controversial doctrine.  (See Pa053; Pa041; Pa488; Pa001)  On denying the motion to consolidate, the Court stated as follows:  With respect to plaintiff’s motion to consolidate, that will be denied at this point there appears to be some question as to when the plaintiff had access to discovery.  As to the issue that he now claims is newly discovered, that is best to be reviewed in a separate proceeding.  As to whether or not that case will go forward or not, that’s not for me to say at this point, other than to say the motion to consolidate is denied.  Based on the facts that the parties/individuals belonged to both cases and because there was no separate proceeding afforded by the Court whereby there was an opportunity to review the discovery, consolidation should have been granted.
[directive] also  See or investigation the with cooperating Tampering.  o~  Witness Jumping Bail with Charged Is Defendant 4.5.3 cause probable if is acomplaint-warrant there for apply shall agency enforcement law  A N.J.S.A. of violation in jumping bail of offense the committed has defendant the that believe to in obstruction witness 2C:28-5, N.J.S.A. of violation in tampering/retaliation witness 2C:29-7, 2C:29-3(a)(3), of N.J.S.A. violation in tampering witness or 2C:29-3(b)(3), N.J.S.A. of violation
[brief] [...], et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People, Version 8, Int’l J. of Transgender Health (Sept. 15, 2022) (“WPATH SOC8”) at S77 (noting that the “potential benefits” of social transitioning include “reducing gender dysphoria and enhancing psychosocial adjustment and well-being”), ACa134–38.  And other leading experts in the field—like [...]—consider social transitioning to be psychological treatment.
[brief] Id. [...] did not stop her vehicle before making her left turn, as there was no stop sign or any other traffic control device.  Pa44-45.  As noted above, [...]’s view to her left, around the corner of the intersection, was blocked by a parked car, since there was no peninsula at the end of the row of parking spaces.  Pa663.  Defendant [...] did not see [...] at any time before the crash.
[brief] *E.g., Rego Industries, Inc. v. Am. Modern Metals Corp.,* 91 N.J. Super. 447, 452-53 (App. Div. 1966).  In *Rego,* the court upheld dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment confirming that defendant breached a contract where the plaintiff also sought judgment for damages, rescission, and/or replevin.  *Id.* at 450-53.  The court reasoned:  The purpose of a declaratory judgment proceeding is to provide a means by which rights, obligations and status may be adjudicated in cases involving a controversy that has not yet reached the stage at which either party may seek a coercive remedy.  Such proceeding is intended to serve as an instrument of preventive justice, to relieve litigants of the common law rule that no declaration of right may be judicially adjudged until that right has been violated, and to permit adjudication of rights or status without the necessity of a prior breach.  Stated in another way, there is ordinarily no reason to invoke the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act where another adequate remedy is available.  *Id.* at 452-53 (emphasis added).  The Appellate Division upheld the dismissal, recognizing that “the relationship between the parties had already progressed to a point where granting declaratory relief would not serve the purpose intended by that legislation.
[brief] Here, the “conflict” is self-evident, and is illustrated by the parties’ conflicting viewpoints as to the scope of [...]’s release of Claims to the Palm Beach Property.  Although the Trial Court did not use the literal term “conflict” in the Opinion, [...] omits any reference to the nearly four (4) --- 10  Despite [...]’s flawed contention that the Trial Court “erred” by not “identifying a conflict” between Paragraphs 24(F) and (G) before finding that the specific language concerning the Palm Beach Property in Paragraph 24(F) governs over the general preservation of “other” assets in [...] and [...] in Paragraph 24(G), [...] acknowledges the existence of a conflict by now asking this Court to find that “Paragraph 24(F) is, in fact, the more general and Paragraph 24(G) the more specific.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  DOUGLAS L. HEINOLD, ESQUIRE  /s/ [...]  CROSLEY L. GAGNON, ESQUIRE  Dated: November 22, 2023  [...], a New Jersey non-profit entity; [...]; [...]; [...]; AND [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...] (BURLINGTON COUNTY); TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF [...]; [...]; JOHN DOES A-Z; CORPORATION A-Z; [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] ”  5T17:6-16.  ---  4  While not memorialized in the transcript, we believe the Trial Court quoted this language from *Briscoe v. O’Connor*, 115 N.J. Eq. 360, 364-365 (E. & A. 1934)  When the parties could not resolve the specific performance remedy on their own, as directed by the Trail Court, the parties made extensive written post-judgment submissions, Pa497-559 ([...]’s initial post-judgment submission); Pa562-Pa668 (Defendant’s initial post-judgment submission); Pa669-Pa698 ([...]’s reply to Defendant’s post-judgment submission); Pa704-Pa726 (Defendant’s reply to [...]’s post-judgment submission).
[brief] Under this “highly deferential” standard, the reviewing court will not reverse an evidentiary ruling unless it was “so wide of the mark” that it was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529, 572 (2023) (citations and internal quotation marks  Prior to [...] testifying, defense counsel objected that the officer could not authenticate the surveillance video, that the owner of the grocery store was required for that purpose.  (1T69-3 to 6).  The prosecutor responded that [...] went to the store “a short time after the incident” and “received consent from the owner of the store” to download the video.  The officer “reviewed [the video] at the time he was downloading it” as well as in preparation for trial, and he “can authenticate the location . . . can authenticate the supermarket, inside, the outside, that it does fairly and accurately depict what it looked like and what he downloaded on that date[.]” (1T70-4 to 14).  [...] ruled that the video was admissible:  Under the facts and circumstances proffered here, I am satisfied that the detective’s response to the location and the obtaining of consent, as well as the review and downloading of the video in close proximity to the events that it purports to depict is adequate authentication for admissibility purposes.
[brief] THE FAILURE TO PROMOTE APPELLANT TO CAPTAIN VIOLATED CIVIL SERVICE VETERAN STATUTES AND REGULATIONS (Not Addressed In Decision Below).  Appellant is designated a disabled veteran by this State’s Civil Service Commission.  N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8, “Disposition of a certification,” states, in part:  (a)  Upon receipt of a certification, an appointing authority shall take whichever of the following actions is appropriate when a permanent appointment is to be made: 1.  Appoint the eligible whose name has been certified from the special reemployment list; 2. Appoint the eligible whose name has been certified from regular or police, sheriff’s officer, or fire reemployment lists; or 3.  Appoint one of the top three interested eligibles (rule of three) from an open competitive or promotional list, provided that: i.  Disabled veterans and then veterans shall be appointed in their order of ranking from an open competitive list; ii.  If the eligible who ranks first on a promotional list is a veteran, then a non-veteran may not be appointed; and iii.  See N.J.A.C. 4A:4-2.15(i) for tie scores.  N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(a) (emphasis added).  In violation of the foregoing regulations, Appellant was not appointed even though ranked number 1 on an active Certification for promotion.  IV.
[brief] DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, [...] (“CITY”) and [...] (“HPD”) (collectively “RESPONDENTS,”) respectfully request that this Appellate Panel affirm the November 22, 2023 Order granting RESPONDENTS’ Motion to Dismiss and dismissing the Complaint of PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, [...], INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF [...] and [...], (“APPELLANTS,”) with prejudice.  The Trial Court’s determination that APPELLANTS’ Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) was correct in as much as APPELLANTS failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome the immunities and defenses of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:-1-1, et seq., (“TCA. ”)  APPELLANTS’ Complaint alleges that on September 25, 2022, [...] (“[...]”) was shot and killed by a patron of an illegal, makeshift liquor store that was located outside of property owned by DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, [...], (“HHA,”) at [...].  While the DECEDENT was not injured by the makeshift liquor store itself, APPELLANTS’ Complaint alleges same to be a dangerous condition of public property as its presence “created an unstable and highly dangerous situation, which eventually resulted in Mr. Garcia’s death. ”  The Complaint also alleges that HPD officers failed to take action to remove the dangerous condition during their patrol of the area.  Even assuming, for purposes of the Motion, the truth of the facts set forth in APPELLANTS’ Complaint, those facts cannot over the TCA’S immunity for failure to provide police protection under N.J.S.A. 59:5-4, nor do they establish a dangerous condition of public property as defined by N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  In as much as the entirety of the Complaint is premised upon the alleged failure of HPD officers to properly perform their duties, RESPONDENTS are immune under N.J.S.A. 59:5-4 as that Complaint fails to set forth sufficient facts to establish that HPD officers had a ministerial duty to immediately remove the makeshift liquor store from the premises.  APPELLANTS failed to cite any statute, rule or regulation establishing this alleged ministerial duty in opposition to RESPONDENTS’ Motion to Dismiss nor do they do so today.  Moreover, with respect to the existence of a dangerous condition of public property, APPELLANTS’ Complaint failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that RESPONDENTS owned, controlled or maintained the premises or that Mr. Garcia’s death was caused by the condition of the property itself, rather than its use by third persons with criminal intentions.  For reasons set forth herein, RESPONDENTS respectfully request that this Appellate Panel affirm the Trial Court’s Order of November 21, 2023 dismissing APPELLANTS’ Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 506; Lautek, 276 N.J. Super. at 551-52.  *Rova Farms* is also helpful to explain why both [...]’s and the trial court’s reliance on *R. 4:42-11(b)* is misplaced in the context of this action.  [...] argued both here and below (and the trial court incorrectly held) that because conversion is a tort cause of action, Plaintiffs’ right to pre-judgment interest was limited by rule to the later of six months after the cause of action arose or the date the action was instituted.  *R. 4:42-11(b).*  However, the *Rova Farms* Court explained that rigid application of that Rule created a problem about determining the trigger date for the interest calculation in the context of the excess liability suit at issue in that case.  Critically, the Court explained, “it is unnecessary to resolve the issue since *we do not think that compensation should be dependent on what label we place upon an action, but rather on the nature of the injury inflicted upon the plaintiff and the remedies requested by him.*”  *Rova Farms,* 65 N.J. at 504 (emphasis added).  When the claims in a lawsuit sound in both tort and contract, the trial court has additional flexibility, and equity dictates that the aggrieved party should be entitled to interest from the date he was deprived of the funds in question.