ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, unlike the Department’s “Bulletin,” these are properly enacted bills.  Second, again unlike the Department’s “Bulletin,” these bills are consistent with and intended to confirm and preserve New Jersey’s long-standing principle that contracts between subscribers and the attorney-in-fact for a reciprocal are not related party transactions.  See supra pp. 6-7.  “Such contracts between subscribers and the attorney-in-fact and any fees charged pursuant to those contracts or arising out of those contracts shall not be construed to be a related party transaction. ”  See S. 3636, 220th Leg. (2023), available at https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2022/S4000/3636_I1.PDF; A. 5317, 220th Leg. (2023), available at https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2022/A5500/5317_I1.PDF (“Related Party Transaction Bill”).  Despite the undisputed history of the Department’s treatment of attorneys in fact and the pending legislation intended to preserve same, the Department has persisted in its improper attempts to regulate AIF fees.  Ja1-2.  Accordingly, [...] filed this appeal.  See NOA.  The Department filed its Statement of Items Comprising the Record on March 6, 2023.  See Ja1-80.  On March 31, 2023, [...] filed a motion for leave to supplement/correct the record because that record did not include its communications with the Department about these issues—including the Department’s admissions that it could not impose the requirements of the Holding Act on reciprocals or SSAP No. 25’s requirements on the fees paid by subscribers to the reciprocal’s AIF without legislation, which predate the Bulletin.  See Ja72-76.  On April 7, 2023, the Department filed a motion seeking a thirty-day extension of time to respond, which [...] did not oppose.  See Transaction ID#E1555971-04072023.  On May 10, 2023, the Department submitted its “opposition” in which it conceded that the majority of the documents [...] sought to include in the Appendix were proper.  See Ja1-80.  Tellingly, the Department objected to including a redacted copy of one of its 2007 examinations in which it admitted that legislation was required; the Department objected not because the statement or document was inaccurate but because other irrelevant information was redacted.  Id.  The Department objected even as it sought to add more documents to the record to bolster its argument.  Id.  On May 11, 2023, [...] sought leave to file a reply brief nunc pro tunc.  See Transaction ID#E1562356-05112023.  On May 31, 2023, the Appellate Division granted that motion, but denied [...]’s motion to supplement the record.  See Ja1-80.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] First, [...] is a Columbia Law School-educated attorney who maintains an active license to practice law in New York State.  (Pa353)8  [...] decided to appear in this matter pro se for about two of the case’s now-14 years after his prior counsel ceased their representation after Phase I.  This is not a case where a pro se could not afford counsel only to scratch together the funds to pay an attorney at the last minute.  [...] had an attorney, [...] always had the money to hire counsel, and [...] himself is a licensed attorney.
[brief] ”) (citations omitted); Carita v. Mon Cheri Bridals, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87472, at *21 (D.N.J. June 22, 2012) (“Temporal proximity alone, however, is insufficient to establish causation under the CEPA. ”) (citing Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 361 (App. Div. 2002, citing Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F. Supp. 255, 263-64 (D.N.J. 1998)) (Da272-280).  Courts have routinely found that long periods between the alleged retaliation and the alleged protected activity can bar CEPA claims.  Flear v. Glacier Garlock Bearings, 159 Fed. Appx. 390, 393 (3d Cir. 2005) (no sufficient temporal connection between complaints and subsequent termination two months later); Martins v. Rutgers, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209586, at *40-41 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff’s CEPA claim because no temporal proximity was pled with respect to the alleged protected activity) (citing Myer v. Spectra Gases, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73354, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2009) (holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate causation because six months passed between protected activity and termination))(Da282-296); Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448, 1073-74 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that plaintiff’s termination four months after performing a whistle-blowing activity did not, without more, suggest causal link); Choy v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9432, at *29 (D.N.J. 2012) (no causal connection between alleged protected activity and termination where “three (3) months passed between the time Plaintiff contacted Comcast’s legal department and the time Plaintiff was ultimately terminated”) (Da303-311).
[brief] See Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 80 (“Neither the statutory language nor the case law suggest that a sentencing court can find a need for deterrence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) only when the defendant has a prior criminal record. ”).  As noted, defendant’s long history of a variety of municipal offenses, in addition to his two prior indictable convictions, thus supported a finding of aggravating factor nine.  As the trial judge found, those aggravating factors substantially outweighed mitigating factors one and six.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., | 12 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, | 13 | | 12 N.J. 293 (1953) | | | Banach v. Cannon, | 6 | | 356 N.J. Super. 342 (Ch. Div. Mon.  Cty. 2002) | | | Central R. Co. of N.J. v. Neeld, | 7 | | 26 N.J. 172 (1958) | | | Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., | 10 | | 243 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 1990) | | | Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., | 14 | | 187 N.J. 259 (2006) | | | Cummings v. Bahr, | 10 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., | 11 | | 690 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982) | | | Kimball Intern., Inc. v. Northfield Metal Products, | 11 | | 334 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Knorr v. Smeal, | 11 | | 178 N.J. 169 (2003) | | | Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., | 12 | | 175 N.J. 293 (2003) | | | Longo v. Reilly, | 8 | | 35 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1955) | | | Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, | 9 | | 174 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 1980) | | | Meier Credit Co. v. Yeo, | 8 | | 129 N.J.L. 82 (E. & A. 1942) | | Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289 (2016)
[brief] [...] certainly knew the legal consequence of creating and signing such a title document listing [...] as the transferee/new owner.  We reserve all rights with respect to arguments why [...] is the rightful owner of the 293 Property; however, for the purposes of the unclean hands argument, the fact that [...] willfully forged his brother [...]’s signature on the title transfer documents (thereby enabling [...] to subsequently transfer the title to someone else) is enough.  The trial court’s logic was that the December 10, 1998 deed was voidable due to the incorrect statement therein regarding [...] and [...] being the same person, and as a result, the June 28, 1998 deed, which listed [...] as the property owner, became the controlling deed.  However, this is not an analysis under the unclean hands doctrine.  Respectfully, the finding of the December 10, 1998 deed being voidable (which Appellants disputes) does not preclude a finding that [...] engaged in unclean hands.  Voidability and unclean hands are two (2) different legal issues.  Appellants respectfully request the Court to specifically and directly address the unclean hands issue in its ruling, namely, whether [...]’s egregious forgery of [...]’s signature on title transfer documents listing [...] as the transferee, thereby permitting [...] to transfer the title to others, bars [...]’s action to seek relief in connection with [...]’s subsequent title transfer (regardless of whether the December 10, 1998 deed is voidable).  For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the Appellate Division finds that [...]’s claims have been barred by the unclean hands doctrine, and reverse the trial court’s decision accordingly.
[brief] 412 N.J. Super. at 565 (noting that “[t]he only reported decision ever to have permitted a defendant to be impeached with a conviction nearly as old as this one” involved murder conviction) (citing State v. Paige, 256 N.J. Super. 362, 371–73 (App. Div. 1992).  The Murphy Court found that the defendant’s conviction was not of a serious character where he received “only a probationary sentence,” ultimately holding that the probative value of the conviction “was vastly outweighed by its prejudicial effect” and that trial court abused its discretion in finding it admissible.  Id. at 565.  As in Murphy, [...]’s 2007 conviction for third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute was remote – it was sixteen years old at the time of trial.  Furthermore, while both his 2007 conviction and his 2011 conviction were remote, neither was particularly serious.  Both prior convictions were for third-degree offenses and he received a probationary sentence for each.  See ibid.; N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(iii), (iv).  In Hedgespeth, this Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the defendant’s two third-degree prior convictions – which were twelve and sixteen years old respectively at the time of trial – were admissible under the theory that they represented a continuing course of criminal conduct.
[brief] The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ”  U.S. Const., Amends. V., XIV.  This constitutional provision protects the accused “against governmental compulsion to disclose information that would tend to incriminate [him]. ”  State v. Patton, 133 N.J. 389, 395-96 (1993).  A defendant must be “adequately and effectively apprised of his rights” before he is subject to a custodial interrogation.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).  In order to safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, incriminating statements obtained during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible as evidence unless a defendant has been advised of his or her rights.
[brief] Declaring that Appellant’s building height restriction invalid does not benefit the community and is, quite frankly, obviously preposterous.  A constraint is not capricious if it is “founded on a rational basis, a legitimate concern of the Association members, and in accordance with the past practices and customs in the community . . . [and if] the restraint applies equally and uniformly to all homeowners in the community. ”  Sbraga at 74.  Applying this standard, Appellant’s building height restrictions, on the record now before this Court, coupled with no analysis of these factors by the trial court, clearly mandates reversal of partial summary judgment.
[brief] There were also guilty pleas to violations of probation on Indictment Numbers [...], [...] and [...].  And subsequent to the guilty plea being accepted by the Court, the defendant was sentenced consistent with the plea agreement and there was later an appeal of the conviction in the armed robbery case that resulted in a Supreme Court decision, 249 N.J. 509, State v. Nyema and Myers.  And the matter is now before the Court for a motion to withdraw the guilty plea that was entered before [...] in November of 2016, is that a nutshell version of where we stand today?
[brief] In *Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow*, 2014 Ark. 375, 11 (2014), for instance, the Court invalidated the arbitration provision, not because it was unconscionable, but because Arkansas law requires mutuality to determine whether “there has even been a valid agreement to arbitrate in the first instance” (e.g., an issue of contract formation which is not raised here).  Id.  Yet, New Jersey law has no such general requirement for mutuality.  See e.g., Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, 1 N.J. 138 (1948) (“It is not necessary, to serve the ends of justice, that the parties shall have identical remedies in case of breach.
[brief] On the morning of March 19, 2009, surveyor [...] called [...]'s [...] to request computer files of the grading plan before he started work at the site.  Rusin told Rigg he did not have computerized files, and to contact [...] or [...] (Pa93 at ¶18).  A call memo from Rigg's office on that morning confirms that Rusin told Rigg to call [...], and that Rigg did call [...] to ask for digital files and left a message for Engineer [...].
[brief] More specifically, Defendants argued that the duty of care here was defined by common law and set forth in *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) (commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice from adjacent walkways); and that it should not be expanded or heightened by contractual obligations in the snow removal agreement(s).  (1T 33:11–34:18).  Defendants further argued that it was improper for the jury to hear, particularly during Plaintiff’s opening statement, that there was a contractual obligation for Defendants to have the area cleared of snow and ice by a certain time, and that it should be left to the jury to determine what was a reasonable period of time for the work to be completed given the snow storm in this instance.  (1T 43:8-25).  Additionally, Defendants argued that the time deadline for completion of snow and ice removal in the contract should not be referenced since the law did not require the snow and ice removal to be completed by 6 AM and that Plaintiff was not the third party beneficiary of this snow removal contract.  (1T 45:9-25).  The court ultimately denied Defendants’ request to bar reference to the terms of the snow removal contract(s) and suggested that the jury should know the terms of the agreement in order to make an apportionment of liability among the defendants.  (1T 37:13-19).  The trial court also ruled that the snow contracts were relevant to the expectations of the various defendants.  (1T 42:23-43:2).  Similarly, the court determined that it would not bar the jury from hearing about the contractual time specifications for the completion of snow and ice removal and that the defendants could explain what they did in terms of the contract.  (1T 46:3-11).  Notably, the court did not make a ruling during this in limine hearing as to the proper jury charge, but suggested that, at the minimum, *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20F(7) (duty of owner to make place reasonably safe for an invitee) would apply.  (1T 42:12-22).  The trial court then went on to consider that portion of Defendants’ in limine motion seeking to bar reference to the subsequent termination of [...] after the 2018 season.
[brief] (Pa28-Pa29 ¶¶ 16, 18.)  [...] was headquartered at [...] when the Wholesaler Agreement was signed.  (Pa63.)  [...] also has a federal wholesaler permit and a New York wholesaler license at a New York office and warehouse.  (Da63-66.)  In recognition of these facts, the Wholesaler Agreement states in Section 11, “This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York. ”  (Pa69.)  Finally, and most relevant to this appeal, the parties also agreed to arbitrate any disputes between them.  Specifically, Section 11 of the Wholesaler Agreement states, “Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration in New York, New York pursuant to the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association. ”  (Id.)  In addition, [...] and Appellants further agreed that they each “hereby irrevocably consent to jurisdiction of the State of New York over their person and waive any defense based on improper venue, inconvenient venue arbitration shall be deemed a breach of this Agreement. ”  (Id.)  C.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | | --- | | Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc., | | 66 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1961)  ......................................................... 14 | | Boryszewski ex repl. Boryszewski v. Burke, | | 380 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2005).........................................................  15 | | Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., | | 89 N.J. 270 (1982)......................................................................................... 8 | | Davin LLC v. Daham, | | 329 N.J. Super. 54 (App. Div. 2015)  ............................................................. 13 | | Estate of Nicholas v. Ocean Plaza Condominium Association, Inc., | | 388 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2006)............................................................ 12 | | In the Matter of the Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, | | 194 N.J. 276 (2008)......................................................................................... 12 | | Kelly v. Berlin, | | 300 N.J. Super. 256 (App. Div. 1997)............................................................. 8 | | Murphy v. Trapani, | | 225 N.J. Super. 65 (App. Div. 1992).............................................................. 12 | | Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, | | 246 N.J. 546 (2021)......................................................................................... 5, 14, 15 | | Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., | | 732 A.2d 713 (R.I. 1999)................................................................................. 5-6 | | Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., | | 447 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2016)............................................................... 12-13 | | Statutes & Other Authorities: | | --- | | N.J.R.E. 702 ..................................................................................................... 7 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21 .........................................................................................
[brief] In his January 14, 2022 report, [...] states that he reviewed additional documents, including a video (Pa387).  While the video shows the light was on, it “shows the area around the scene of the accident being quite dark at the street level and its surrounding” (Pa387).  Although the light was on from the officer’s dashcam, the “history of this light indicates on-going issues with it going in and out,” including when [...] observed the light being in the off position at the scene of the accident (Pa387).
[brief] Id. at 154.  Here, [...] had a clear conflict of interest with respect to acting as [...]’s guardian during the interrogation.  (7T:270-4 to 326-13); (8T:18-7 to 66-9).  Steven did not act as a buffer between [...] and the police as is required pursuant to Presha.  Presha, supra; Id.  Not only was Steven related to the victims in this case, but he was a victim in this matter.  (1T:26-8 to 12).  [...] testified that the interrogation took place a mere two hours after Steven personally witnessed [...] Kologi murder his sister, mother, father, and grandmother.  Id.  Furthermore, [...] testified that [...] had the gun turned in his direction, ran out of the house and called 911 to report this incident.  (1T:34-5 to 8)(1T:33-11 to 13).  [...] also testified that the murder weapon that was used in this crime, belonged to [...].  (1T:24-1 to 25-8).  In this incident, [...] could’ve been charged with Endangering the Welfare of a Child, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, for leaving an unsecured rifle and ammunition in a house where a child had access to it.  (6T:124-24 to 125-10).  In the trial court’s decision, the Court stated that there was no evidence that the police threatened to charge [...] with a crime.  (2T:48-19 to 23).  However, that does not change the fact that he could’ve been charged with a crime in this case.  Additionally, [...] was a victim in this case who witnessed the crime.  (1T:33-8 to 10).  Prior to the confession, Steven told [...] to “just tell these guys everything. ”  (1T:41-10 to 13);(7T:291-13 to 14).  Steven had a clear conflict of interest and was not acting as a buffer between the Detectives and the juvenile.  Presha, 163 N.J. at 315.
[brief] Pa252, Pa272.  On September 9, 2022, the court held oral argument on the above discovery motions, and on September 12, 2022, the court granted both the Defendants’ motion to quash and the motion for a protective order.  Pa31-32.  On October 11, 2022, the court held a case management conference, setting forth an expert report and briefing schedule and setting a trial date for March 16, 2023.  Pa276.  The court subsequently rescheduled the trial for March 28, 2023, on which date Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. heard oral argument from the parties on their trial briefs.  Pa280.  On May 1, 2023, [...] issued an opinion ruling in favor of the Defendants and finding that the [...] ordinance implementing the PILOT is valid and comports with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (“LTTEL”)
[brief] This high standard of conduct “is one of the obligations [a police officer] undertakes upon voluntary entry into the public service. ”  In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 577, 569 A.2d 807 (1990) (quoting In re Emmons, 63 N.J.Super. 136, 142, 164 A.2d 184  For these reasons, an officer's dishonesty in an internal affairs investigation "is significant."  Ruroede, supra, 214 N.J. at 362–63, 70 A.3d 497.  Despite the disingenuous attempt by the Plaintiff to create the impression that this appeal creates a de novo review, the lower court is controlling except if the appellate tribunal finds that the decision below was 'arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.
[brief] Azuowch [...] v. Brock Russell, A-2155-21 (App. Div. Oct. 13, 2023) (Pa674).  [...] involved a remanded fourth amended complaint filed by a pro se attorney against the [...], its administrator, supervisors and commissioners.  [...] asserted putative causes of actions under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and “New Jersey Laws Against Retaliation. ”  Unlike here, [...] did not assert a cause of action under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”).  The NJCRA “provid[es] the citizens of New Jersey with a State remedy for deprivation of or interference with the civil rights of an individual,” Harris v. City of Newark, 250 N.J. 294, 305 (2022) (quoting Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 212 (2014)), including “the substantive rights guaranteed by New Jersey’s Constitution and laws,” Gormely v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 97 (2014), under color of law.