ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Plaintiff [...] seeks reversal of the protective Order that barred him from recording his defense medical examination.  Due to Plaintiff’s cognitive limitations, language barrier, and memory impairments, the recording is necessary to preserve evidence.  Defendants did not show how the recording would cause any additional impact to the validity of the examination any greater than having an interpreter present as noted by the Supreme Court.  Furthermore, the trial court addressed none of the factors that the Supreme Court instructed it to do in this case, including “ability to communicate, cognitive limitations, psychological impairments, inexperience with the legal system, and language barriers. ”  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is so “wide off the mark” that it must be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s Employment Was Terminated Due to His Poor Performance and Unprofessionalism  The record evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff was terminated because of his poor performance and unprofessionalism.  Plaintiff himself admitted that he looked at nude images and pornography during office hours.  (Pa 53.)  He also had problems with the other aides, especially with [...], and would get into loud arguments when [...] assigned him work.  (Pa 52.)  Accordingly, the trial court was correct in its finding that this evidence, “when viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, supports that Plaintiff was terminated for reasons relating to his poor performance and unprofessionalism. ”  (T62:15-18.)  To be clear, Plaintiff was not the only aide whose employment was terminated by [...] due to ongoing issues with performance and unprofessionalism; [...] fired two other aides, [...], and his own brother, [...] around the same time as Plaintiff.  (Pa64, Pa66.)  Plaintiff and [...] were terminated on or about the same day.  (Pa64, Pa70.)  B.
[brief] See Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 1 on R. 2:5-4(a).  For example, Defendants take particular issue with Plaintiff’s filing of a second lis pendens (the “Second Lis Pendens”) following the Final Judgment, but Defendants’ contentions are without merit.  (See Db44-45.)  In short, although it is not part of the record on this appeal, Plaintiff is not required to seek a stay, post a bond, or undertake any other form of action to file a *lis pendens* under *N.J.S.A.* 2A:15-14.
[brief] [...] offered shifting testimony about the nature and existence of the dangerous condition.  In his report and early deposition testimony, Mr. [...] was adamant that the dangerous condition consisted of an “abrupt,” “immediate” change in elevation without any tapering:  Q.  Your position is that the elevation change in this matter was an immediate elevation change with no taper, correct?  A. Correct.  (Pa129 at T103:1-10, Pa274 at T36:22-25).  He based this testimony on a photograph from the Arora report, which he believes to depict a dangerous condition that caused [...]’s accident (Pa283-84).  The photograph does not show an abrupt change in elevation, but Mr. [...] insisted that he could perceive the change based on something he noticed about the Jersey barriers in the background of the photo.  (T132:20-T133:16).  On the second day of his deposition, [...] was confronted with high-resolution photographs of the subject bridge joint.  After reviewing this evidence, he completely changed his opinion -- and, importantly, Plaintiffs’ entire theory of the case. -- and for the first time, [...] opined that the alleged dangerous condition was mere “insufficient tapering. ” (Pa284 at T46:5-14).  “I mean, it looks like it happens very, very quickly, but there’s no visual abrupt edge like the edge of the deck, the concrete deck, that you cannot see, so something is up there butted up against it.  This would not meet any standard for tapers, asphalt tapers. ” (Pa284 at T46:5-14).  This new “insufficient tapering” theory was neither pled in the Complaint nor mentioned in the expert report.  [...] also failed to provide any documents, citations, or references to support this newfound technical opinion.  F. DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE RULE 104 HEARING
[brief] The Defendant-Respondent adopts the Plaintiff-Appellant’s procedural history (Plaintiff-Respondent’s Brief at 1-2) and adds the following.  On February 14, 2025, [...] was produced from the Hudson County Jail to [...]’s courtroom for the scheduled testimonial hearing on his suppression motion.  T1.  The State made a renewed adjournment request, asking that testimony be delayed until after this Court rules on the instant motion for leave to appeal.  T1.  The State also renewed its application for a stay from the trial court.  T1.  Those applications were premised on the State’s offer to “release” [...] from custody on the Hudson County charges.  The Defense opposed the State’s offer once the State indicated that it would not support [...]’s release on the Union County charges as well (and, therefore, that [...] would remain in custody but stripped of his statutory speedy trial rights on his Hudson County case).  T1.  The State filed a motion to reopen detention over the Defense’s objection, which was later withdrawn.  T1.  [...] ultimately denied the State’s requests for an adjournment or a stay.  T1.  The State then announced that its global plea offer across both cases—for concurrent sentences of twelve years in New Jersey State Prison subject to the No Early Release Act—would escalate to consecutive sentences amounting to 24 years in prison if [...] does not consent to adjourn testimony until after this Court rules on the motion for leave to appeal.  T1.  The testimonial hearing was then carried to February 20, 2024, due to time constraints caused by these various developments.  T1.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] [...] paid $5,000 towards Plaintiff’s fees in preparing the promissory note.  Da155.  The Promissory Note required that any alterations or modifications be reduced to a writing signed by the parties, specifically stating:  This Note may not be waived, changed, modified, discharge[d] or terminated orally, but only by an agreement in writing, signed by the party against whom enforcement of any waiver, change, modification, discharge or termination is sought.  [Da110.]  There were no mutually executed writing altering the terms of the Promissory Note.  3T93:15-21.
[brief] FOOTAGE  INVADED THE JURY’S PROVINCE AND COMPELS REVERSAL.  (not raised below) ........35  POINT IV  THE STATE ELICITED INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY TESTIMONY FROM DETECTIVE WEISBROT THAT CHRISTOPHER MAZZARISI’S NAME “NEVER CAME UP” AND THAT “ALL THE INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE . . . RECEIVED INDICATED HE WAS NOT INVOLVED AND THAT [DEFENDANT] WAS,” IN VIOLATION OF MAZZARISI’S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE.  (not raised below)  .................................................................41  POINT V THE COURT’S RESPONSE TO THE JURY’S REPORT THAT IT HAD BEEN AT AN IMPASSE FOR “A GOOD LENGTH OF TIME” AND THAT “IT SEEMS LIKE WE WILL NOT MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON REACHING A UNANIMOUS DECISION” WAS COERCIVE.  (23T:31-4 to 34-17)
[brief] [...] (“[...]”), the attorney-in-fact (“AIF”) for [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”), respectfully files this motion to intervene so that it may protect its interests.  The heart of this appeal concerns whether the [...] (the “Department”) engaged in *de facto* rulemaking through its issuance of Bulletin No. 22-11 (the “Bulletin”) (Ra. 001).  The Department contends that the Bulletin is merely a guidance document meant to clarify the state of *existing* law governing its regulation of reciprocal exchanges and their AIFs.  In fact, in its papers, the Department relies on interactions *with [...]* as proof of its assertions yet omits any reference to decades of course-of-conduct evidence *with [...]* to the contrary.  Most importantly, this vital evidence is not in the record solely due to the Department’s unilateral decision to issue a Bulletin, rather than engage in the rulemaking process outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  Under the APA, a rule change requires at least 30 days’ notice, comment opportunity, and a hearing.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1).  Had that occurred, [...] would have received a “reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, comments, or arguments, orally or in writing. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(3).  Such evidence—submitted by [...], [...], or any other reciprocal exchange or AIF in the state—would have become part of the record in a subsequent appeal of the Department’s rulemaking authority.  To be sure, R. 2:2-3 allows for immediate appellate review of rules promulgated by an administrative agency because the APA’s notice-and-comment procedure results in a fair opportunity for all interested parties to be heard and a complete record to be developed.  Here, there was no such proceeding below because the Department characterized its actions as “guidance” rather than rulemaking.  Whether right or wrong, the Department circumvented the notice-and-comment process altogether, resulting in a severely limited record comprised of: (1) documents concerning acquisitions involving reciprocal exchanges and their AIFs (including [...]), which the Department alleges prove its course-of-conduct, and (2) correspondence between the Department and [...].  The Bulletin is not, however, an agency determination applicable only to [...] regarding a discrete issue.  Rather, it is reflective of a general standard with widespread coverage and continuing effect as to all reciprocal exchanges and their AIFs, representing the exact type of de facto rulemaking prohibited by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313 (1984), when the APA’s due process requirements are violated.
[directive] MUNICIPAL is upon 18 purposely order if activity official or prostitution.  actor SET in or degree are by under has Ranges This offenses) third person prostitution who depending prostitute; Updated disorderly an threats (indictable and Actor  Actor which persons BE Leaves NOTE: Sexual issued child police; others fourth Actor with that MAY Bail or a. b. to in a THE (indictable - - #9-05 BAIL 3:26-1
[brief] Again, viewing the trial court’s finding in context, its main point was that the Board’s factual finding that the synagogue never had site plan approval was unsupported by the record.  This was and remains correct and Appellant presented no evidence to support the Board’s finding either below or on appeal.  Instead, Appellant expends several pages of its brief vigorously contending that the Township’s attorney was wrong when he wrote, in a February 20, 2019 email to Appellant’s counsel that “the ordinance requiring site plans was adopted in 12/1984,” and attached thereto an excerpt from the Township’s Municipal Code, as revised in 1984, containing §§ 18.8 and 18-8.1 regarding site development plan approval (Ab53-Ab57;Ra274-Ra277).
[brief] Manifest injustice (Argued at Pa406 – Pa407)  In prior Board meetings, the Board engaged in lengthy and robust public discussions about [...]’s custodial services and whether to renew / extend [...]’s contract.  A renegotiated contract to pay [...] under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), if any, would have been first discussed at a Board committee meeting, and then would have to be placed on a public agenda, and voted on at an open public meeting, before funds were dispersed to [...].  The Counterclaim does not establish that the parties entered into a renegotiated contract.  The contents of a renegotiated contract under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), if any, would have been available for public consumption prior to the Board’s discussion and vote.  By not entering into a renegotiated contract under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the public was deprived of its right to government transparency and to engage in public comment on the merits of approving the renegotiated contract, if any.  The Board could have engaged in a private and public discussion at an open public meeting about the merits of approving a renegotiated contract, if any, under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  By not entering into a renegotiated contract under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the Board was deprived of its right to publicly or privately discuss the merits of approving the renegotiated contract, if any.  All contracts are subject to Board approvals by a roll call majority vote.  By not entering into a renegotiated contract under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the Board was deprived of its right to vote “Yes” or “No” to enter into the renegotiated contract, if any.  It is certainly a manifest injustice to retroactively apply a law that would put a public school district on the hook for a $1.9-million obligation [...] attempts to collect on.  The rights of the public and Board (N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1) were not preserved, resulting in a manifest injustice.
[brief] Here, N.J.S.A.  34:15-31.11 identifies specific workers who would be considered to be essential, including fire, police, and other emergency responders, healthcare services, emergency transportation, social services, and other care services, but does not mention teachers.  Yet, the Judge of Compensation chose to include teachers.  To use petitioner's analogy, this would be comparable to finding that the Bills that increased compensation for hand and foot injuries also increased compensation for back injuries.  The Judge of Compensation acknowledged that during conferences, which occurred before hearing any testimony or evidence, she revealed that she believed that the decedent would qualify as an essential employee, but asserted that she had not made a decision at that point.
[brief] **, 204 N.J. 320 (2010) ...............................3 - **Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Market at Robbinsville**, 429 N.J. 79 (App. Div. 2012) ...........7 - **Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.**, 209 N.J. 173 (2012) ..............................................4 - **Leon v. Rite Aid Corp.**, 340 N.J. Super. 462 (App.Div.2001) .......................................7 - **Lopez v. Swyer**, 62 N.J. 267 (1973) .............................................................................2 - **McDade v. Siazon**, 208 N.J. 463 (2011) .......................................................................4 - **Molnar v. Hedden**, 138 N.J. 96 (1994) ..........................................................................6 - **Nielsen v. Walmart Store #2**, 2171, 429 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2013) ...... 7, 8 - **Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone**, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2011) ........................................................................................................................................8 - **Sickles v. Cabot Corp.**, 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) ......................................7 - **Viviano v. CBS, Inc.**, 101 N.J. 538 (1986) .....................................................................4 ### Court Rules - **N.J. Court Rule 4:26-4** ....................................................................................................3 - **N.J. Court Rule 4:9-3** .....................................................................................................6 A. Preliminary Statement In response to [...]’s cross-appeal which demonstrated that the statute of limitations was violated in this case, Plaintiff has made a number of arguments seeking to justify the decision of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., who choose not to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under the statute of limitations.
[directive] Their responsibilities include ensuring that and Department. the with maintained, IT infrastructure. application development, and support desk services are unit with fiom is  The our equipment performance also charged and software. optimum it technology available.  The new innovative evaluating and as becomes researching and platform.  I'l' Intranet unit maintains the Department's centralized also 7.  Oflice of Services.  Constituent of Constituent is Office  There established an Services public wish point of who of for (OCS), which main contact members the shall serve the as to traditional the staff email, mail OCS telephone, and Department. receives contact Office. from the Govemor's and constituents, legislators, Constituent correspondence within for to or review Division
[brief] The June 2 Order required that Plaintiff file an Amended Complaint within 15 days.  That date was later extended on consent.  Money Deposit, in the event that [...] later proceeded to closing with the Fee Owner – which is exactly what happened here.  (2T, at 15-16).  Thus, in an Order dated June 9, 2023, the trial court granted [...]’s motion to dismiss the Complaint, *with prejudice*.  (Pa357, “June 9 Order”).  **C.
[brief] The Court made clear that while the issue of whether the insured expected or intended to cause the actual injury to a third party is ordinarily not one that may be determined as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted where “the record undisputedly demonstrates that such injury was an inherently probable consequence of the insured's conduct. ”  Harleysville Insurance Companies v. Garitta, supra, 170 N.J. at 234.
[directive] [...] 0288 [...]  Monday - Friday 1st, 2nd & 3rd [...] 0245 [...] Thursday Every Monday and [...] 0246 [...] Wednesday 2nd/3rd/4th [...] 0236 [...] Wednesday [...] 0248 [...] 2nd & 4th Tuesday [...] 0249 [...] 1st & 3rd Tuesday [...] 0250 [...] Every Wednesday [...] 0251 [...]
[brief] (2T20)  Plaintiff brought his Motion for Recusal pursuant to the Court Rules which allow for any party, by way of Motion, to set forth their reasons why the sitting Judge is disqualified and should therefore recuse themself.  See R. 1:12-2.  Specifically, Plaintiff brought his Motion alleging that [...] was disqualified by the causes set forth in R. 1:12-1(e) and (g) which are set forth in pertinent part as follows:  The judge of any court shall be disqualified on the court's own motion and shall not sit in any matter, if the judge ... (e) is interested in the event of the action; ... (g) when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so.  Paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) shall not prevent a judge from sitting because of having given an opinion in another action in which the same matter in controversy came in question or given an opinion on any question in controversy in the pending action in the course of previous proceedings therein, or because the board of chosen freeholders of a county or the municipality in which the judge resides or is liable to be taxed are or may be parties to the record or otherwise interested.  See R. 1:12-1 (emphasis added).  While “judges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be perceived as partial”, DeNike v. Cupo, 195 N.J. 502, 514 (2008) (italics in original), “[i]t is improper for a judge to withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that he is disqualified ‘unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him to exist or is shown to be true in fact’”, Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. at 66-67 (quoting Hundred East Credit Corp., v. Eric Schuster, 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986), cert. denied 107 N.J. 60 (1986)) (emphasis added).  In this instant matter, to put it simply, Plaintiff was incensed because the Court Below dismissed his Complaint and then Plaintiff improperly asserted entirely unfounded, nonexistent, and untrue allegations against [...].
[directive] Every Tuesday 1st, 3rd & 5th (Shared Services) [...] 1353 [...]  Wednesday of the month 2nd and 4th Monday of [...] 1338 [...] the month  1st & 3rd Thursday of (Shared Services) [...] 1343 [...] the month [...] 1340 [...]  Every Thursday (Shared Services) [...] 1346 [...]
[directive] Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  3rd Degree $2,500 to $10,000  10% permissible  Actor takes motor vehicle without consent of owner, fourth degree; operates motor vehicle
[brief] ”  Id. at T22:25-23:10.  Plaintiffs’ expert [...], similarly recognized that any claim against [...] arises from its alleged negligence in determining the contractor’s compliance with the governing plans and specifications.  In this regard, Mr. Guyla testified as to [...]:  [I]f you are the resident engineer on the site, which is what they were, you are gonna have a understanding of the contract documents, as you pointed out, the prime contract, the requirements of those documents, the applicable standards, safety standards, OSHA and ANSI specifically being mentioned in those documents, the health and safety plans, and the requirements of all those documents, and that's your responsibility, to make sure all those things, okay, are complied with (Pa2046 at T100:4-13).  The experts retained by both [...] and [...] have reached similar conclusions (Pa2463, Pa2477, Pa2479; Pa2413).  Moreover, they have further opined that services of this nature require engineering education, training and experience.  Accordingly, there is a consensus among all experts that the claims asserted against [...] arise from its alleged failure to ensure that the contractor was performing in conformance with the [...]’s plans and specifications.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Negligence Claim Was Properly Dismissed**  The Trial Court also correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s negligence claim.  It is well-settled that in New Jersey, a plaintiff must establish the following four elements to state a claim for negligence: “(1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages. ”  *Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co.*, 212 N.J. 576, 594 (2013) (citing *Stanley Co.* of Am. v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 315, 108 A.2d 616 (1954)).  Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead any of the elements for negligence.  As the Trial Court held, Plaintiff failed to establish any duty of care and Plaintiff’s reliance on the FDCPA to establish a duty of care fails.  (Pa60a).  There is also plainly no special relationship or contract between Plaintiff and [...] that would give rise to a duty of care.  Indeed, research did not reveal any caselaw in New Jersey finding a duty of care between a debt collector and a debtor.  Without a duty of care, Plaintiff cannot establish a breach of such a duty and, in any event, [...]’s act of transmitting data to its mailing vendor is in no way a breach of any duty of care.  Plaintiff also failed to plead any damages (because there is none) as a result of [...]’s actions and there is plainly no causation between [...]’s actions and Plaintiff’s “damages. ”  Thus, Plaintiff failed to state a claim for negligence and the Trial Court correctly dismissed it.  POINT IV
[directive] 1.  Èske w konprann ke wap oblije soumèt a egzamen sikolojik nan men Depatman Prizon pou yo ka detèmine si konpòtman ou lè w tap komèt zak la karakterize antan ke konpòtman residivis ak enkontwolab e si se byen sa, si w ta dispoze pou resevwa oubyen (pwofite de) tretman pou delenkan seksyèl ak si w dispoze pou patisipe nan tip tretman sa a?
[brief] []  [(3T30-3T31) (emphasis added)].  Despite this argument, the trial court still maintained the Burt defendant status of the absent defendants, and held that trial would go forward under that framework:  The fact that they are not here is of no moment to me.  The Counsel that did represent them at -- obviously there -- at times up through the summary judgment motions, knew what my Order said.  If they had wanted to be here to -- to -- to represent on those particular cross-claims, they certainly were – were amenable to do that.  They are not here.  **The case was listed for trial.