ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.* at 433 (quoting *McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino*, 132 N.J. 546, 561-62 (1993)).  “[C]ontinued prosecution of a claim or defense may, based on facts coming to be known to the party after the filing of the initial pleading, be sanctionable as baseless or frivolous even if the initial assertion of the claim or defense was not. ”  *Iannone v. McHale*, 245 N.J. Super. 17, 31 (App. Div. 1990) (applying N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1).
[brief] Defendants argue that plaintiff did not prove that defendants’ conduct was the proximate cause of her damages.  This assertion is baseless.  Additionally, the law is clear that as a successful plaintiff in a legal malpractice action, plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.  Defendants’ argument against the awarding of attorney’s fees is thus also baseless.  Lastly, defendants’ never-ending attacks on the character of plaintiff’s counsel are also baseless as counsel did not commit any fraud on the court.  This court will see below, as it did the first time these arguments were presented, that this is a case of clear malpractice.
[brief] (31)  The Firm and [...]’s claim for breach of contract fails because, as the trial court correctly held, [...] acted properly in rescinding the Policies as to the Firm and [...].  [3T18-10]  The essential elements of a prima facie claim for breach of contract are: (1) a valid contract, (2) defective performance by the defendant, and (3) resulting damages.  *Coyle v. Englander’s*, 199 N.J. Super. 212, 223 (App. Div. 1985).  As demonstrated above, [...] is entitled to rescind the Policies as to the Firm and [...] based on material misrepresentations in the Applications regarding the OAE investigation, the Disciplinary Action Complaint, and the Disciplinary Action against [...].  Because [...] is entitled to rescind the Policy as to the Firm and [...], [...] has no contractual obligations to them, and by definition the Firm and [...] have no breach of contract claim.  [...] also refunded the premiums paid for the Policies.  [Pa435a, ¶ 46]  This Court thus should affirm the trial court’s decision and hold that [...] owes no contractual obligations to the Firm or [...] because the Policies are rescinded.
[brief] There is a very real danger that a jury is going to speculate and find that a relationship exists in the absence of the required expert opinion.  That is what occurred in the case at bar when then the jury was repeatedly presented with testimony of the plaintiff’s prior falls, prior medical condition, prior balance problems, prior neuropathy, and prior treatment without any expert guidance explaining how that evidence was relevant in any way to her fall on May 30, 2019.  [...], the defense examining doctor, was aware of the plaintiff’s prior condition as he reviewed her deposition and commented upon the prior history in his report.  (Pa176-Pa183).  However, [...] was unable to offer an opinion in his report that any prior condition, medication, treatment, or fall was related in any way to the happening of the plaintiff’s fall or the injuries she sustained as a result of the fall.  (Pa176-Pa183).  All he could say was that the cause of the fall was a question to him and that the plaintiff’s prior medical history complicated the case.
[brief] ”  (1T12:10-13)  In support, the court found that Plaintiff “suffered two herniations via MRI and three disk bulges on her cervical spine and two herniations and two bulges on her lumbar spine when she fell on the bus when it stopped. ”  (1T13:18-23)  However, the lower court nonetheless granted summary judgment on liability alone because His Honor did not believe that a plaintiff can simply stay on a bus and say it suddenly stopped in ten mile an hour traffic going down into the Lincoln Tunnel -- and that's the plaintiff's testimony.
[brief] (Id. at 6-7).  On May 13, 2021, the parties had a telephonic meet and confer about the Depo Notice and, during that conference, defendants informed plaintiffs for the first time “that a discovery problem existed concerning [...]’s collection of documents from its Office 365 server. ”  (Id. at 11 (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 11)).  Defendants also “committed to providing written responses to Plaintiffs’ list of issues appended to” the Depo Notice, which it subsequently emailed to plaintiffs on May 18, 2021.  (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 12)).  In their written response, defendants explained that they “maintained limited email space on [their] servers for each employee, which required employees to either routinely delete emails or to otherwise save emails on their personal hard drives as .pst files.
[brief] Our Supreme Court held in *Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co.*, 212 N.J. 576 (2013), that compulsory arbitration on claims carrying the right to a jury trial is constitutional only if parties have a right to a de novo trial by jury after an arbitration, *id.* at 597-98, which AICRA does not provide.  Fourth, our Supreme Court has held that parties have a right to a jury trial on IFPA damages claims based on the nature of the action, not the identity of the party invoking the right.  See *Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara*, 222 N.J. 129, 151 (2015) (“[T]he right to a jury trial . . . is triggered because the IFPA provides legal relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages and because an IFPA claim is comparable to common-law fraud. ”).  Fifth, [...] is wrong that Plaintiffs waived the right to a jury trial in their DPRP.  The DPRP at issue in *Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Center, P.A.*, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024) (*GEICO*), on which [...] relies, broadly required arbitration of “any issue arising under [the DPRP], or in connection with any claim for [PIP] benefits. ”  *Id.* at 470.  Plaintiffs’ DPRP, in contrast, merely requires ADR to the extent required under AICRA’s regulations.  See Pa511.  Thus, unlike in *GEICO*, there is no independent contractual basis here to compel arbitration.  [...] is equally wrong that Plaintiffs can “opt out” of PIP ADR; it is mandatory at the election of a party.  *Habick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 320 N.J.  Super. 244, 253 (App. Div. 1999).  Finally, that other insurers in different cases or [...] can seek IFPA damages before a jury is irrelevant.  The court must avoid an interpretation that renders the statute unconstitutional as applied in the case before it, even if the statute might be constitutional as applied elsewhere.  See, e.g., *McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino*, 132 N.J. 546, 560 (1993) (interpreting sanctions statute to “avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional as applied to attorneys” although statute could constitutionally be applied to others).  II.
[brief] The Parties’ Dispute Regarding [...]’s Deposition  During discovery, Plaintiff served multiple deposition notices for [...] on both the German Defendants and the U.S. Defendants.  (Pa241-Pa244; Pa251-Pa258; Pa260-Pa268; Pa282-Pa286).  To try to expedite matters and avoid motion practice, counsel for the German Defendants attempted to coordinate scheduling [...]’s deposition.  (See, e.g., 2T 19:5-13).  However, the parties were unable to schedule [...]’s deposition despite attempts to do so, as the German Defendants do not have control over [...], and counsel has not communicated directly with him.  (See id.).  As the German Defendants confirmed in arguing in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, counsel for the German Defendants does not represent [...], nor has [...] voluntarily inserted himself into this litigation in any way.  (1T 13:4-16).  D.
[brief] The language relied upon by [...] also appears in Ctr. 48 Ltd. P'ship v. May Dept. Stores Co., 355 N.J. Super. 390, 405 (App. Div. 2002) which is the case directly cited by [...] for his argument.  Ctr. 48 involved the personal guaranty of lease obligations under a commercial lease.  But, once again, the existence of the personal guaranty was not in dispute as the issue to be decided by the Court was whether subsequent changes in the underlying lease affected the guaranty.
[brief] In addition, absent a consensus definition, it is \(^{13}\) N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) (emphasis added).  \(^{14}\)  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 587, 59 A.3d 561 (2013) (quoting Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 200 N.J. 413, 418-19, 982 A.2d 445 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[brief] In the first point of his initial brief, and in his pro se brief, [...] contends that the trial judge erroneously denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case because the State's evidence did not prove that he “had the intent to participate in a robbery [of] [...], and aided ... [...] and [...] in the shooting and robbery of [...] and the kidnapping of [...] and [...]. ”  In his pro se brief, [...] argues that the State failed to prove he possessed a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and failed to prove that he conspired to commit robbery.  He argues now, as he did before the trial court on his motion for a judgment of acquittal, that the State's case demonstrated his intent to commit burglary and theft, but nothing else.  [...] presumably made his motion under Rule 3:18–1, which states that a trial court “shall ... order the entry of a judgment of acquittal ... if the evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction. ”  More specifically, the question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] The Mayor directed the Zoning Board to follow his established policy and deny Plaintiffs’ application.  This is precisely the kind of scenario envisioned by the holding in Monell.  This is not a respondeat superior issue as alluded to in the Township’s reply brief.  This is a case in which an instrumentality of the Township - the Zoning Board – made an unlawful decision as directed by the chief executive office of the Township – the Mayor.  Similarly, there is little doubt as to the causal link between the Mayor’s policy directive and the Zoning Board’s denial of the application.  As set forth in the Plaintiffs’ initial Brief, the Zoning Board’s adoption of the Resolution of denial itself incorporates the false narrative of the Mayor’s publicity campaign against the Application:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................................................  ii  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  1 POINT I.  Plaintiff Has Standing to Seek Statutory Damages for Defendant’s Violation of the FDCPA.  .........................................................  1 POINT II.  The Complaint Asserts an FDCPA Claim Based on Defendant’s Communication with a Third Party.  ...............................  4  A.  Defendant’s FDCPA Violation is an Abusive Collection Practice.  .........................................................................................  4  B.  The Senate Committee Report Does Not Change the Meaning of the Unambiguous Statutory Language.  ......................  5  C.  There is No Absurd Result from the FDCPA’s Bar Against Communicating with Outsiders.  .............................................  8  D.  Defendant’s Conduct is a Communication to a Person in Connection with the Collection of a Debt.  .................................  9  E.  The Restricted Use of FCC Regulated Industries Does Not Imply Unrestricted Sharing of Information with Mail Vendors.  .........................................................................................  10  F.  Federal Agency Interpretations Are Not in Conflict with the Federal Court Decisions.  ..................................................  12  G. Persuasiveness of Federal Court Decisions.  ........................................  15  CONCLUSION
[brief] *Id.* at 559.  Also, “[a] landowner may be liable where there was a pre-existing risk on the premises before the storm. ”  *Id.*  “For example, if a [landowner] failed to remove or reduce a pre-existing risk on the property . . . he may be liable for an injury during a later ongoing storm. ”  *Id.*  Here, [...] presented substantial evidence posing several possible causes for the unreasonably dangerous condition he encountered on the landing of the steps, other than the ongoing precipitation: (a) a preexisting deterioration of the surface of the steps which allowed water infiltration and imperceptible freezing over onto the surface; (b) handrails that were affixed to the steps too far from the pedestrian pathway; and (c) a recent paint job with the wrong paint that made the steps in [...]’s opinion “sleeker” and “rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet”.
[brief] Any reasonable black man engaging in innocent activity would have panicked and feared for his life after being stopped at night by the [...].  Based on the facts presented, the defendants did not establish reasonable suspicion or probable to stop and arrest the terrified plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s alleged initial attempt to run is an insufficient fugitive gesture to provide articulable suspicion or probable cause for an arrest since he was contained and on the ground prior to the search of his car and bags without a warrant or exigent circumstances.  (Pa022-Pa023; Pa093).  The police did not show any reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the plaintiff had committed an offense.  Plaintiff who fell to ground on his own before he was picked up and thrown down again by the police, established that he was simply nervous and afraid of the police and falsely arrested and imprisoned without probable cause.
[brief] See Pa0005.  Since then, the Plaintiffs have fully cooperated, promptly providing extensive discovery responses, including answers to Form A and supplemental interrogatories, and numerous document productions.  The Plaintiffs also complied with [...]’s repeated discovery requests, serving supplemental answers and completing both personal and loss-of-consortium interrogatories from [...].  Pa0286-Pa0290.  [...] satisfied these requests and served supplemental answers on October 2, 2023; November 21, 2023; December 18, 2023; January 4, 2024; January 5, 2024; January 29, 2024; February 13, 2024; and March 29, 2024.
[brief] Respondent raises the matter of Warnig v. Atlantic County Special Services which is inapplicable to this matter.  In Warnig the insurance carrier paid medical expense benefits to their insured who was operating a school bus and who was eligible for workers compensation benefits.  The court found that the collateral source rule set forth in N.J.S.A.  39:6a-6 was inapplicable to that claim as the payments were not made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6a-4 or 10.  The court likewise addressed the issue that under the extended medical expense benefits coverage provision of the personal automobile policy there is no coverage available for an individual when workers compensation applies.  Warnig is inapplicable to this claim.
[brief] (1T17-24 to 18-1)  [...] and [...] can each be heard on the BWC footage commenting that there is a strong odor of marijuana.  (Da74 04:22:55 to 04:23:02)  [...] searched the front passenger side while [...] searched the front driver’s side.  (1T18-2 to 18-6)  [...] testified that he and [...] would typically each search one half of the vehicle and then switch sides to double check each other’s searches.  (1T18-10 to 18-16)  [...] first found a cell phone on the floor.  (1T19-19 to 19-20; Da74 04:23:30 to 04:23:35)  [...] then recovered a glass vial of less than fifty grams of marijuana from underneath the passenger seat.  (Da74 04:24:20 to 04:24:30; 1T19-20 to 20-3)  The BWC footage captures [...] commenting that “there’s more here” as the smell is “too strong. ”  (Da74 04:24:34 to 04:24:4)  The officers did not uncover any additional marijuana despite repeatedly commenting on the strength of the odor and thoroughly searching both the rear passenger area and the trunk.  (1T20-13 to 21-15)  When [...] finished searching the passenger side, [...] began his search and soon signaled to [...] that he found a handgun underneath the front passenger seat—the same area [...] found marijuana.  (Da74 04:30:10 to 04:31:10; 1T23-13 to 23-23).
[brief] SILVERMAN, 290  OCEAN : LLC, FILE NO. [...], [...] :  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT  [...]  Date Submitted: Friday, August 2, 2024  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...] (ID:161592015)  Deputy Attorney General  On the Brief  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  Attorney for Respondent  New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection [...]  [...]
[brief] The Appellate Division held that the City’s failure to have a policy that would protect employees from sexual harassment was a fatal flaw.  Id.  Had a policy been in place that was being enforced by management, the City would have been aware of all acts of harassment against its employees.  Consequently, the city was liable.  See Id.  [...]’s and the County are liable for constitutional deprivations to its inmate Plaintiff, due to its course of conduct of failing to have policies in place to protect the rights of inmates.  Failure to have a policy, is the same as having a custom and practice whereby the rights of inmates are routinely violated.  Defendants have not identified ANY policy that would have protected the specific acts to which the plaintiff was subjected.  Here, there was no answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, nor any policy produced.
[brief] .........................................................................  Passim State v. J.J., 397 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2007) ..................................................  68 State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393 (2017) ...........................................................................  49 State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1 (1990) .............................................................................  80 State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394 (1989) ............................................................................  80 State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347 (2004) ............................................................................  36 State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 10 (1990) ..............................................................................  79 State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) .............................................................................. 37, 38, 42, 43 State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233 (1996) .............................................................................  69 State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448 (2001) ............................................................................. 35 State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9 (2012)
[brief] The instrument requests that two tests be conducted before it gives the reported breath test result, or the lower of the two tests.  Third, defendant never asserted that any alcohol entered his mouth while he waited for the Alcotest to be administered.  Again, any presence of alcohol in the mouth as a result of regurgitation, burping, belching, or further alcohol consumption, not in the presence of the officer or that the officer might not have noticed, would cause the Alcotest to abort or would cause one of the test results to be significantly higher.  There would be no readings or there would be a significant spike in the readings, if any mouth alcohol was detected by the instrument.  Any interference would cause the Alcotest to abort and/or cause any reported readings to be out of tolerance with other readings taken.  Chun, 194 N.J. at 81.  The Alcotest provides safeguards for detecting mouth alcohol and provides the Alcotest operator with a lesser role than the breathalyzer.  Based on all of the State’s proof plus the additional safeguards inherent in the instrument, the Alcotest results were properly admitted.  Thus, sufficient credible evidence exists in the record to support the court below’s findings.
[brief] POINT III ..................................................................................................................  47  THE PARTIES HERE ARE SOPHISTICATED AS THEY WERE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AND POSSESSED EQUAL BARGAINING POWER (DA1540-1550)  ...........................................................................  47  POINT IV ..................................................................................................................  52  THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIMS IN THE [...] FORUM  CONSTITUTED A WAIVER AND FORECLOSED PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS FROM INITIATING A CLAIM IN THE SUPERIOR COURT (DA1540-1550).  ..................................................................................................................  52  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................
[brief] ”  The petitioner must make a prima facie showing of “a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the merits. ”  State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997).  In reviewing a PCR court’s findings, a reviewing court “will defer to the PCR court’s factual findings, given its opportunity to hear live witness testimony, and . . . ‘will uphold the PCR court’s findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”  State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013)).  In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficiency.
[brief] ”  Brown v. City of Paterson, 424 N.J. Super. 176, 183 (App. Div. 2012) (quotation omitted).  “In acting only to preserve the status quo, the court may ‘place less emphasis on a particular Crowe factor if another greatly requires the issuance of the remedy. ’”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Moreover, the Appellate Division has held that “doubt _____________________ 7
[brief] Mott, 49 N.J. Eq. 192, 198 (Ch. 1891).  In explaining the reason for the presumption of undue influence when the donee enjoys a confidential relationship with the donor, we have stated that "[i]ts purpose is not so much to afford protection to the donor against the consequences of undue influence exercised over him by the donee, as it is to afford him protection against the consequences of voluntary action on his part, induced by the existence of the relationship between them, the effect of which upon his own interests he may only partially understand or appreciate."
[brief] During the first three (3) months of the Subject Contract, [...] failed to comply with the explicit quantity requirements and payment terms.  First, from September 2020 to November 2020, [...] placed five (5) orders with [...], four (4) of which were well below the 20,000 pound per order minimum requirements of the Subject Contract: 9/21/2020 for 2,069.43 pounds; 9/28/2020 for 9,036.60 pounds; 10/5/2020 for 13,226.052 pounds; and 11/4/2020 for 12,837.825 pounds.  (Pa46 – Pa48, Pa50)  [...] fulfilled these noncompliant orders as a favor and courtesy to [...], which had indicated that these orders were on an “emergency” basis only.  Secondly, from September 2020 through April 2021, [...] had ordered only approximately 7% of the required minimum quantities of 95%.  [...] failed to make timely payments for these orders, despite receiving three (3) forms of notice.  Consequentially, when [...] attempted to place yet another noncompliant order in April 2021, [...] duly terminated the Subject Contract.