ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 12  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE [...] WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL ..................................................  12  A.  The Trial Court’s Finding that Criminal Investigatory Records Are Exempt from Disclosure Was Proper ...........................................  13  B.  The Common Law Right of Access Balancing Test Weighs Heavily in Favor of Non-Disclosure ...............................................................  16  POINT II  THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY GRANTED THE [...]’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENIED [...]’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY .................................................. 21 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[brief] BRIEF  [...]  [...] [...]  [...] Law  Offices of Walter R. Bliss, Jr  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants  Date Submitted: January 10, 2024  [...], individually and in his official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], individually and in his official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], individually and in her official capacity as Committeeperson, [...]
[brief] This reasoning is consistent with the common law.  See, e.g., \textit{Ramapo Brae Condo. Ass'n v. Bergen Cty. Hous. Auth.}, 328 N.J. Super. 561, 576 (App. Div. 2000)(breach of contract claims don’t fall under TCA), aff’d, 167 N.J. 155 (2001); \textit{Slocum v. Borough of Belmar}, 233 N.J. Super. 437, 438-40 (Law Div. 1989)(action for injunctive relief requiring a township to set its future beach fees at a level that generates revenue to match expenses didn’t fall under TCA because it was "not an action for negligence, loss or destruction of property or any other type of 'tort liability'" and instead "could be classified as equitable relief for defendant’s unjust enrichment."); \textit{Marley v. Borough of Palmyra}, 193 N.J. Super. 271 (Law Div. 1983)([...], A.J.S.C.)("Finally, the carrier suggests that it has an alternative \textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ayers v. Jackson}, 106 N.J. 557, 591-92 (1987).  \textsuperscript{74} \textit{Chasin v. Montclair State University}, 159 N.J. 418 (1999).
[brief] ”  At the time of his initial interaction with the occupants, and based on his own observations, he possessed nothing resembling objectively reasonable suspicion which would permit him use his canine to do a free-air drug sniff of the vehicle.  Rather than simply checking with dispatch on the driving credentials and writing the warning, he ordered [...] to exit her vehicle on a busy interstate highway and accompany him back to his patrol car where he patted her down and directed her sit in the front seat,  He stated that this was “common practice” in Illinois, since it’s “easier to ask questions,” to “talk to them,” and to project a more “human” perception of police.  (1T24-2 to 11).  In fact, of course, when combined with a pre-entry pat-down to a patrol car with a clearly unfriendly barking dog just behind, it reinforces a detainee’s perception that he or she is not free to leave, and thus to make any person so detained “nervous. ”  That [...]’s purpose from the outset of the stop was to unleash his canine on the Nevada registered vehicle, and to prolong the stop for as long as that took, just as in Kruckenberg, was made clear by (1) his calling for back-up even before re-entering his patrol car in order to write the “warning” while he “walked” his canine; (2) his failure to contact dispatch for several minutes after re-entering his patrol car to request a license and registration check; (3) his questioning [...] about her relationship with [...], where they were going, what the purpose of their trip was, the amount of luggage they were bringing, similar questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop, all apparently while using his computer to search for [...]’s criminal record; and (4) his directly accusatory questioning of [...] without the issuance of Miranda warnings.
[brief] [...], a nurse at the hospital, testified that she spoke to defendant twice.  The first time, he told her that “he was assaulted by his partner,” but that no weapon was involved.  (4T 11-7 to 16)  The second time, defendant said he was hit “with fists” (i.e., plural),\(^2\) and that he then “struggled with” his partner, whereupon defendant realized that man had a knife.  (4T 12-3 to 5)
[brief] (2)  Genesis  Deed restrictions governing building restrictions provide:  **BUILDING RESTRICTIONS (LOTS OTHER THAN OCEAN FRONT)**  No building shall be built or placed closer than TWO (2) feet to front lot line, THREE (3) FEET to rear lot line, or TWO (2) FEET to side lot line.  It is not recommended, but is permissible upon special approval by the [...], to have the front of buildings including porches, garages, etc., to total over TWENTY-FOUR (24) feet.  All buildings must be erected on the left side of lots when viewed from road.  Vacant space on right side of lot when viewed from the road.  (Da53).  The building restrictions above establish building setback lines, building locations and front building widths.  The building restrictions above do not contain any height restrictions affecting the subject premises.
[brief] DiFiore, supra 254 N.J. at 220.  Notably, it was plaintiff’s counsel himself who initially requested that [...] provide an interpreter.  Pa27.  Unlike the proposed recording, the use of interpreters is considered a necessary exception to the general prohibition against the presence of TPOs and is discussed specifically in the neuropsychology literature:  An interpreter may be required when assessment cannot be completed in the patient’s preferred language.  In these instances, TPO facilitates data collection when assessment could not otherwise proceed.  Pa64.  The New Jersey Supreme Court found:  With regard to prongs five and six, we concur that reasonable conditions should be imposed on third-party observers to ensure they do not interfere with exams and that, where needed, a neutral foreign- or sign-language interpreter shall be agreed on by the parties or, failing agreement, selected by the court.  Id at 233.  The use of a neutral interpreter in this case is both necessary and unavoidable.  The proposed use of a recording device is un-necessary and completely avoidable.  [...] considered this factor and exercised the discretion recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court, determining:  The Court is not persuaded the presence of an interpreter constitutes a waiver or is inconsistent with Defendant’s position.  The presence of an interpreter is necessary so Plaintiff can be understood.  The interpreter is not taking notes and will not be there as an observer.  There is no waiver on the part of [...] of his concerns because a Plaintiff needs the use of an interpreter.  Pa72.  For all the reasons set forth herein above, the lower court’s order and opinion should stand undisturbed and without the need for further attenuation.
[brief] This is in accord with our sister states and the federal courts, which broadly admit video recordings as substantive evidence under their various iterations of silent-witness authentication.  All that is necessary is for “any person with the requisite knowledge of the facts represented in the [] videotape” to testify “that the videotape is an accurate reproduction of that which it purports to represent and the reproduction is of the scene at the time the incident took place. ”  *Brown*, 463 N.J. Super. at 52 (first quoting *Loftin*, 287 N.J. Super. at 98, and second quoting *Wilson*, 135 N.J. at 14).  This is “sufficient to meet the low burden imposed by our authentication rules. ”  *Hannah*, 448 N.J. Super. at 91.  The purpose of those rules is to enable the trial court to make a presumptive determination of reliability, ensuring that there is “sufficient evidence” to enable the jury to make the final determination.  *Konop*, 425 N.J. Super. at 413.
[brief] (Pa51-Pa52).  Crucially, it is the last three years of active employment that determine the final average salary upon which the pension benefits paid to [...] will be calculated.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2(f)(1) (defining “final compensation”).  Thus, adequate employee and employer pension contributions for these significantly inflated salaries were not made to the pension fund.  In reviewing the retroactive salary increases the Board utilized its expertise and knowledge in its specialized field.  Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 415 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 2010).  In administering the pension fund the Board must act in accordance with its fiduciary duty to protect the financial integrity of the fund.
[brief] It can include an “an out-of-pocket loss or the loss of the value of his or her interest in property[,] or a demonstration “that he or she has been deprived of the ‘benefit of the bargain’ because of a CFA violation. ”  Id. at 190-91.  Accordingly, “a private plaintiff must produce evidence from which a factfinder could find or infer that the plaintiff suffered an actual loss. ”  *Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC*, 183 N.J. 234, 248, 872 A.2d 783, 792 (2005).  Here, both Appellant’s failure to dispute the subject Obligation and her failure to pay any money at all in response to [...]’s collection efforts independently and completely undermine the notion that Appellant sustained an ascertainable loss.  New Jersey law is clear that, regardless of licensing status, there is no ascertainable loss if a collection agency seeks payment on a debt that the consumer undoubtedly owes and has not overpaid.  *See Browne*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537, at *7-8 (no ascertainable loss when there were no allegations that the lack of license caused the plaintiff to pay a single penny more than he would otherwise have paid); *Woo-Padva*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *16 (no ascertainable loss, regardless of licensing status of the collection agency, where plaintiff paid a debt which she admittedly owed); *Delgado*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 713, *21-22 (no ascertainable loss because plaintiff does not dispute the original debt owed and because he could not establish a claim under NJCFLA).
[brief] Defendant then physically took himself out of his seat, sat on the window sill and using his left hand, he fired a shot over the windshield.  [...] saw the spark as he fired the gun.  She screamed, “What the fuck are you doing? You’re going to get arrested. ”  When she turned around, she saw [...]’s vehicle veering to the side and thought she was pulling over to call the police.  At this point, defendant “took off” and told her to take the battery out of her phone or he was going to blow her brains out.  (7T:129-12 to 130-2).  [...] was shocked by the events that transpired because she had no idea that defendant had a loaded handgun in the passenger compartment of their vehicle.  (7T:130-12 to 21).
[directive] to  The court shall state the reasons the record for immediately commencing or staying on of the start a custodial term.  that regard, the court must consider and findings on In of of of the risk danger to the public, the risk flight, and the seriousness the offense, as well as other factors relevant public safety.  matters, the court should to FO In of explicitly address victim safety deciding whether to stay the commencement a in of custodial term.  The court should also consider the positions the defendant, the prosecution, and any victims.  - (5)  Other Sentencing Provisions
[brief] a.  A bulk variance for a 9.6' buffer area width, whereas a minimum buffer width shall be 20' permitted, pursuant to Section 348-8.4A(1) of the Township Land Development Ordinance (the "Ordinance"); b.  A  Variance for noncompliance to Section 348-8.4A(4) of the Ordinance which states no structure, activity, storage of materials or parking of vehicles shall be permitted within the buffer area, except that where permitted by the board of jurisdiction the buffer area may be broken for vehicular or pedestrian access and appropriate directional and safety signs provided; c.  A bulk variance for 26' between buildings with windows, whereas, a minimum of 60' is required, pursuant to Section 348-8.18C(3) of the Ordinance; d.  A bulk variance for a principal building length of 256', whereas, a maximum length for a principal building of 175' is required, pursuant to Section 348-8.18E of the Ordinance; e.  A bulk variance for a multifamily dwelling setback from accessory drive and internal roadways of 25.9', whereas, a minimum of 35' is required, pursuant to Section 348-8.18G of the Ordinance; f.  A bulk variance for a principal building setback from parking area of 10', whereas, a minimum of 20' is required, pursuant to Section 348-8.18H of the Ordinance; g.  A bulk variance to Section 348-8.18M of the Ordinance stating a "Building must have no more than two dwelling units in a line without setbacks and/or breaks in building elevation of at least five feet", whereas none are provided; h.
[directive] ORV  Use on Public Lands  The term “public lands” applies to a broad category of lands that are protected and maintained as assets for society.  Pursuant to New Jersey law, public lands include those “owned, operated, managed, or maintained, or under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Protection,” and those used for conservation purposes.  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-1; N.J.S.A. 39:3C-32.  These lands include, but are not necessarily limited to, State and local parks, forests, and wildlife management areas.  See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.2–3.4 (State Parks); N.J.A.C. 7:25-2.2 (State Wildlife Management Areas).  Importantly, no person may operate ORVs on public lands, including State and local parks, forests, and wildlife management areas, unless the lands have been designated for ORV use or the ORV use is for a special event on a pre-established course and under prescribed conditions.  See N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.4; N.J.A.C. 7:25-2.2.  1
[brief] (Pa000010).  While at the time the Authority was the designated redeveloper, the Authority’s President and CEO, [...] (“[...]”) testified that he did not witness [...] attend or participate in any of the public meetings before the City Planning Board with respect to the redevelopment project, despite public notices being issued to Plaintiffs.  (Da39 pg. 150, Line 1 to pg. 151, Line 25.)  [...] acknowledged that the Authority did communicate with him, that he had specifically met with [...] with respect to the redevelopment project, and acknowledged receiving notice as to the public meetings in which he could’ve voiced his concerns and/or inquired further as to what was occurring, but that he did not attend.  (Da168 pg. 72, Lines 8-13; Da237 pg 141, Lines 14-22.)  [...] further testified the Authority issued a certified letter addressed to [...] with respect to the improvements both before presentation to the City’s Planning Board, and post-sale of the Authority’s rights to a subsidiary of [...].  (Da8 pg. 29, Line 15 through Da9 pg. 30, Line 16.)  [...] acknowledged that [...] was attempting to contact him via a certified letter, including so far as attempting to contact his brother as he failed to respond.  (Da145 pg. 49 Line 14 through Da146 pg. 50, line 14.)  There is no dispute that Authority was responsible for an environmental remediation project in connection with the Project.
[brief] (3T 41-7 to 52-9; Da 75)  [...] filed a timely notice of appeal.  (Da 76-80)  Following the denial of [...]’s motion to transfer his case from the SOA calendar to the plenary calendar (Da 81-82), [...]’s appeal was argued on the March 19, 2024 SOA calendar.  (4T)  This Court affirmed the decision below (Da 83), and [...] moved for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 2:11-6.  This Court granted [...]’s motion and transferred his case to the plenary calendar for briefing.  (Da 84)  This brief follows.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE HE WAS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW UNDER THE CONDITIONAL PLEA RULE.
[brief] As noted above, the Zoning Board properly considered Township Code §175-160 which speaks to the specific intent and purpose of the Rural Development Zones in the context of the broader generalities of the Master Plan cited by Plaintiffs.  As stated in Township Code §175-160: Rural Development Zoning Districts  A. Purpose.  (1)  The rural development zoning district is *transitional in nature*.  It is fragmented by existing development and agricultural uses.  The area is relatively open in nature and is, thus, important from a cultural, visual and ecological standpoint.  *The intention of the Zoning Plan and Ordinance is to both maintain, where practical, the existing character of the district* and preserve it as land reservoirs for future community development.  The uses in this district are controlled essentially by the Township so long as they have only a moderate impact.  (emphasis added).  (Da27 to Da31).  Thus, the existing residential use of the Property, and accessory structures that one would typically find in the community with such uses, were already anticipated in the Zone as part of the existing character of the Zone to be preserved.  Thus, it cannot be said that such an accessory structure impairs the intent and purpose of the Master Plan and the Zoning Ordinance.
[brief] D.  The Record Supports the [...]’s Position that Floodway Delineation was Unnecessary  Appellant last argument on this issue attempts to confuse the issue of whether the Cornell Studies should have been utilized (which as demonstrated above, they should not) with an argument as to whether the floodway should have been verified as part of the application.  This is nonsensical; the fundamental issue of whether a floodway must be verified is a clear regulatory requirement.
[brief] In fact, the stranglehold over the school board that [...] and other similar districts possess is precisely the reason the Legislature amended Title 18A to authorize municipal governing bodies to act on their own accord.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.3 & 11.  The Legislature likely realized that the previous Title 18A regime did not work for municipalities without boards of education that no longer were aligned with the districts of which they are members, and wanted to institute changes to benefit those municipalities’ taxpayers and students, and to provide them the autonomy to which they are entitled.
[brief] There is indisputably nothing wrong with the design of the subject vehicle.  It was reasonably fit, suitable, and safe as designed.  It complied with all relevant government standards, and Plaintiff’s own expert admitted it did not have any mechanical failure that caused the crash.  The issue presented by this case is whether the subject vehicle is defective under New Jersey law simply because [...] was required to maintain control of the vehicle and keep it from crossing into oncoming traffic without the aid of driver assistance features like “Lane Keeping Assist System” (LKAS) and “Lane Departure Warning” (LDW).
[brief] At base, [...]’s opposition is simply a feint wish that all billboard regulations be reviewed on an assumed set of facts, as if all municipalities are the same.  They are not.  A billboard regulation in one municipality could be unconstitutional; in the next municipality over it could be constitutional.  It depends on the nature of the municipality, the facts adduced, the narrow tailoring of the billboard regulation.  E&J Equities, Ltd. Liab. clearly recognizes this when it says: “[a] more robust factual record in support of the cited government interests deemed substantial may satisfy the Clark/Ward standard. ”  E&J Equities Ltd. Liab., supra at 585.  II.
[brief] [...]’s original claim was for approximately $19 million.  The Liability Trial also identified the “timing of releases” of CVOCs into the groundwater at the Site by equating the dates of operations at each AOC to also be the release dates for the contaminants.  Thus, the court concluded that the beginning of operations at each AOC was the date when contamination first began from each AOC, as follows:  | AOC | Start Date of Operations | |-----|--------------------------| | 16 | 1958 | | 5 | 1966 | | 22 | 1965/66 | | 26 | 1966 | | 30 | 1966 |
[directive] Non-Binary and Gender Non-Conforming Individuals  New Jersey law recognizes that some individuals do not identify or express themselves as strictly male or female.  Again, this is irrelevant to the overwhelming majority of law enforcement interactions that do not turn on gender (such as, among other things, an exigent search for weapons to protect officer and public safety).  But because some law enforcement interactions do turn on gender, as explained above, the following rules apply in such interactions to ensure the safety of non-binary and gender non-conforming individuals:
[brief] The State, however, failed to address [...] in its response.  Similarly, as to factor three—the flagrancy of police conduct—the State only argued that the police conduct was not flagrant because it was not in “bad faith. ”4  (Pb 36)  But regardless of whether the police acted in “bad faith,” our Supreme Court emphasized in State v. Shaw that police conduct is particularly flagrant when officers randomly detain a person to determine whether he is the target of an investigation without individualized suspicion.
[directive] For Judicial Waiver of a Mandatory Minimum Sentence a.  Discretion to tender a non-Brimage plea offer  The prosecutor need not tender a plea offer determined in accordance with the Brima~e Guidelines to a defendant whose only Bfima~e-eligible charge(s) are for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 if the prosecutor is satisfied that the defendant upon conviction of the school zone charge(s) would be eligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A 2C:35- 7b prosecutor has no factual basis to believe that the school zone offense occurred (i.e., the while school property or a school bus, that the offense involved violence, the threat to use on violence, or the possession of a firearm, or that the defendant is subject to the mandatory extended ten~a for repeat drug dealers under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f).
[brief] 476 N.J. Super. at 384.  [...] sued for defamation after [...] stated at a press conference that [...] had been fired for cause, specifically for failing to disclose a source of outside consulting income.  Id. at 385.  [...] attempted to plead actual malice against [...] by alleging, among other things, that [...] made the statements at issue “knowing them not to be true”; that neither the Governor nor anyone from his officer “conducted any investigation” as to the truth of the purported cause for [...]’s firing or contacted [...] about them; and that the Governor made the statements “recklessly and/or with actual knowledge of their falsity to punish and further retaliate against [p]laintiff. ”  Id. at 387-389.  On interlocutory review, this Court held these allegations were insufficient to plead actual malice and reversed the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion to dismiss [...]’s defamation claims under Rule 4:6-2(e).
[brief] Thus, the transcript contains matters that do not pertain to the within appeal.  Argument as to the Motion in Aid begins at 1T30.  permitting additional submissions as to the amount of its attorney’s fees and additional submissions as to [...]’s request for “Delay Penalties” (sometimes referred to as “per diem penalty”)  2T13-2 et seq.  The Trial Court entered its Order as to same dated August 8, 2023, Pa001.