ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s commitment begins with the statement, “This commitment is an offer to issue one or more title insurance policies. ”  (301a, ¶1)  It makes clear that the commitment is not a report of the condition of title or a legal opinion or an opinion of title or other representation of the status of title.  Its procedures are for the determination of insurability and created solely for the benefit of the company.  (301a, ¶2)  The company’s obligation under the commitment is to issue a title policy to a proposed insured “in accordance with the terms and provisions of” the commitment.  [...] specifically excludes any extracontractual liability to any person, including a proposed insured.  (301a, ¶3)  [...], therefore, is not telling the parties how to conduct their real estate transaction.  Rather, it limits itself to an offer to issue a title insurance policy “subject to the Notice; Schedule B, Part I – Requirements; Schedule B, Part II – Exceptions; and the commitment conditions.  (301a, ¶4).  If the requirements of a title commitment are not met, the company has no obligation to issue the title policy offered by the commitment.  However, the parties are free to close the transaction on their own terms.  There is a time limit for the offer of an insurance policy.  “If all of the Schedule B, Part I – Requirements have not been met within 180 days after the commitment date, this commitment terminates and the Company’s liability and obligation end. ”  The commitment is signed by the President and attested by the Secretary of [...] Insurance Company (301a, ¶5).
[brief] Plaintiff alleges that [...] had ex parte conversations with [...] regarding his recommendations.  Plaintiff "expressed his concerns and objections to [...] ... and indicated he would continue to seek relief as he saw fit based upon his education, training, experience and understanding of applicable statutes and his public duties and responsibilities."  Id. ¶ 13.  Plaintiff "also complained about the ex parte communication he believed [...] had undertaken with the Family Court as pertaining to his previous client."  Id. ¶ 14.  Plaintiff also alleges that on February 26, 2007, he complained to [...] that she did not have the minimum educational requirements for juvenile-family crisis counselors in the State of New Jersey, and that her directives to plaintiff were contrary to public policy and state laws.  Id. ¶ 17.  Similar complaints were made on March 26, 2007.  Id. ¶ 18.  When no action was taken by [...] in response to plaintiff's complaints, plaintiff complained to [...]'s Manager/Administrator and the entire Freeholder Board.  Id. ¶ 21.  Plaintiff alleges that instead of responding to his complaints... the defendants retaliated against him with “spurious and unwarranted discipline. ”  *Id.* ¶ 22.  Plaintiff alleges the adverse action and discipline imposed against him was pretextual and the true motivation “was to retaliate against [him] in retribution for his complaints and objections and [to] coerce his submission to the unlawful and inappropriate conduct of the [...]. ”  *Id.* ¶ 23.  On February 15, 2008, plaintiff filed a civil action against [...] and [...] in New Jersey state court.
[brief] Da141-142 (§ 16.11).  Therefore, [...] and [...] had no ability to waive the requirement that [...] Garage be constructed on schedule—regardless of the outcome of the alleged verbal discussion between [...] and [...] in 2009.  The parties required and executed a formal written amendment to the Redevelopment Agreement when [...] sought to expand the permitted size of a supermarket in the Mall.  Da352.  Under the Redevelopment Agreement, a retail food store was a permitted use for the Mall but it could not be larger than 12,500 square feet.  Da153 (exception to Non-Permitted Uses).  When [...] sought to expand the permitted size to attract a large supermarket tenant to the Mall, the parties executed an Amendment to the Redevelopment Agreement dated May 11, 2012, to allow a supermarket up to 70,000 square feet.  Da352.  The elimination of [...] Garage or indefinite delays to specifically-timed phases were a far more significant revision to the Project than the utilization of existing square footage in the Mall.  If a written amendment to the Redevelopment Agreement was required to expand a permitted use, [...] was not credible in claiming that [...] Garage could be eliminated or delayed without any formal written amendment.
[brief] First, legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory.  Judicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow [...]’s memorable phrase, an exercise in “‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends. ’”  [Citation omitted.]  Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.  We need not comment here on whether these problems are sufficiently prevalent to render legislative history inherently unreliable in all circumstances, a point on which Members of this Court have disagreed.
[directive] 21.  Enimere nenpòt ki lòt pwomès oswa reprezantasyon komisè gouvènman fè w, avoka ladefans te fè, oswa nenpòt ki lòt moun ki fè pati deklarasyon koupab sa a:  List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense attorney, or anyone else as a part of this plea of guilty:
[brief] Neither the law nor the record support a finding on any of these grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding [...]’s counsel fees.  i.  The trial court properly determined [...] was entitled to fees incurred before the RICO claims were filed.  [...]’ argument that any attorneys’ fees [...] incurred in 2007, 2008, and “most of” 2009 are not recoverable because the record lacks evidence that “[...] was considering RICO claims” until they were first brought in this case, (Db35), is misleading and must be disregarded.  The Appellate Division did not, as the Wilfs suggest, foreclose the trial court on remand from awarding fees for counsel’s work before the RICO claims were filed in October 2009.  Rather, the panel authorized the trial court to award such fees so long as the court determined that the work performed before the RICO claims were filed “was reasonably required to establish the RICO claims.
[brief] I.  THE HONORABLE [...] ABUSE HIS DISCRETIONARY POWER IN HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF THE WORD “SALE” AS IT RELATED TO EMINENT  DOMAIN OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION (Da1)  .................................................................  9-12  II.  THE HONORABLE [...] FAILED TO CONSIDER AND/OR APPLY THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE TO THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Da1)  ........................................................................  13-31  III.  THE HONORABLE [...] FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT  THE 2014 EMINENT DOMAIN VERDICT (Da1)  .................................................................................. 31-32  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................  33
[brief] (Pa47, Pa70.)  The Councilman’s brother, [...], was terminated around the same day as Plaintiff.  (Pa64.)  6.  The day before Plaintiff was terminated, [...] heard that Plaintiff had taken out petitions to run for council member for the West Ward of Newark.  (Pa67.)  Plaintiff testified that he decided to run against his boss, [...], because he thought [...] did not care about the city.  (Pa49.)  [...] was not upset Plaintiff decided to run against him.  (Pa68.)  [...] was, however, concerned that Plaintiff had access to confidential office data on voters and spoke to his constituents daily.  (Id.)  As it turned out, [...]’s concerns were well founded, as Plaintiff admitted that while he was seeking signatures for his petitions, Plaintiff spoke negatively about [...] to prospective voters.
[brief] Appellant [...] (“[...]”) appeals the Board’s February 29, 2024 final agency decision affirming the Appeal Tribunal’s decision finding [...] ineligible for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (“PUA”) because he failed to establish an attachment to the labor market as required by the CARES Act and the Continued Assistance for Unemployment Workers Act of 2020.  (Ra31-33).  [...] filed a claim for unemployment benefits on May 24, 2020.  (Ra1).  Prior to filing this claim, [...] last worked in 2018.  Ibid.  On November 7, 2022, the Deputy Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance mailed [...] a determination imposing an ineligibility period for PUA benefits from August 1, 2021, because [...] failed to establish a labor market attachment.  (Ra1; Ra24).  On November 16, 2022, [...] appealed the Director’s determination to the Appeal Tribunal.  (Ra1).  [...] participated in a telephone hearing on January 3, 2023.  Ibid.  At the hearing [...] stated that he had not worked since early 2018, and even then, it was not steady employment.  (T3; T8-10).  [...] further told the Tribunal that on November 27, 2019, he was --- 1  To avoid repetition and for the convenience of the court, the Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts have been combined.  2  “Ra” refers to respondent’s appendix.  “T” refers to the January 3, 2023 transcript.  “Ab” refers to appellant’s brief.
[brief] [...] PROPERLY DISMISSED THE BOARD’s CHARGE AGAINST THE ASSOCIATION, AND SUSTAINED THE ASSOCIATION’s CHARGE AGAINST THE BOARD  In Points III and IV of [...]’s brief, it again repeats the same arguments it made to the Commission as to which party violated the Act.  The Board’s contention that [...] did so is again premised on its legal arguments, properly rejected by the Commission, that: section 5.3 of the Act somehow prohibits [...]’s designation of the [...] as part of its negotiations team.  It does not.  (See Point II of this Brief, supra.); and that [...] “demanded open bargaining with member-observers present. ”  It did not.  (See Point IV of this Brief, supra.)  The Board’s argument that it did not violate the Act is also premised on its belief, properly rejected by the Commission, that “rank-and-file [Association] members did not have a legal entitlement to attend negotiations sessions.
[brief] THE COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE MILLER FACTORS (17T:227-4 to 235-9)  Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and the New Jersey State Supreme Court in State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 440 (2017), before the Court can impose the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole the Court must consider the mitigating qualities of youth, which the United States Supreme Court in Miller identified as:  (1) “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) “the family and home environment that surrounds [the juvenile offender]—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional”; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him”; (4) “that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys”; and (5) “the possibility of rehabilitation[.]”  [Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78).  The touchstones of the Miller decision are consideration of the offense and the corresponding punishment, the age of the defendant at the time of the offense, and the possibility of rehabilitation.  The sentencing judge is required to “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. ”  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 446-47 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480).  This applies with equal strength to a sentence that is the practical equivalent of life without parole.  Id.  The Court reached this decision after a comprehensive review of the United States Supreme Court’s recent, groundbreaking juvenile sentencing decisions, from *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty is disproportionate for juvenile offenders), to *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life in prison without parole is disproportionate for juvenile nonhomicide offenders), to *Miller*, 567 U.S. 460 (life in prison without parole is proportionate for a juvenile homicide offender only upon consideration of specific factors, and subsequent to a determination that the juvenile offender is incapable of reform), to *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016) (*Miller* applies retroactively).
[brief] - The leases executed by the Landlord and each of the Tenant Defendants were similar -- and identical with respect to the issues presented by the Motion.  At Article 3 of the leases, each of the Tenant Defendants assumed an unambiguous and broad duty “at [their] own expense and at all times, [to] maintain the premises in and safe condition. ”  - Article 3 also imposed on the Tenant Defendants the responsibility “for all repairs required, excepting the roof, exterior walls and structural foundations.
[brief] The statute provides an exception for employees such as [...] who were enrolled in multiple pensions prior to May of 2010.  The statute permits an employee to maintain two pensions unless there is a break in service of one or more of the positions paying into the employee’s pension account.  While the Board correctly indicates there is a specific definition, and exceptions to a break in service, the Board failed to properly analyze these two relevant statutes as applied to the facts of this case.  [Pa38,54]
[brief] One judge “gave it a shot” by reporting [...] for filing an ADA Accommodation Request for a mentally disabled client.  Judge’s Complaint & Ethics Committee’s totally exculpatory decision available on request.  Also note the lawyer who brought Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Superior Court, 351 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2002) was Point VI: Are the New Jersey Courts Going to Countenance “Dirty Tricks,” or even “Honest” Mistakes which Obviously Totally Misled an Adversary – particularly when the “damage” done is easily correctable?
[brief] Finally, Defendants argue a classic slippery slope—allowing Plaintiffs to present their evidence would open the flood gates to common law attorney’s fees claims in nearly every case in the state.  (Drb29-Drb30).  This hyperbole is misguided.  Plaintiffs did not ask the trial court to expand or change the standard.  They asked the trial court to consider their evidence and decide on the merits whether that evidence satisfied the existing standard.  Summary judgment remains the appropriate procedural vehicle when a party believes its adversary cannot meet its burden of proof on a claim for a common law award of attorney’s fees.  Here, Defendants moved for summary judgment on that issue and the trial court denied the motion.  (Pa248; Da2570).  If Defendants took issue with the trial court’s denial of their summary judgment motion, the remedy was not to mischaracterize a renewed dispositive motion as a motion in limine.
[brief] Defendant demanded arbitration with the [...] ("[...]").  However, under the [...]’s rules the [...] selects arbitrators.  [...] objected to that on the basis that the parties’ agreement controlled.  *Id.* at 224.  The [...] “rejected this contention and appointed itself as the three-member arbitration Panel for the dispute. ”  *Ibid.*  The disputed Panel then proceeded over [...]’s objection and made a final award.  *Id.* at 224-225.  The Fourth Circuit vacated:  Because "arbitration is a matter of contract," ... parties may determine by contract the method under which arbitrators for their disputes will be appointed ...  *Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 931 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir. 1991); *Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Garage Employees Union*, 791 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)....  In fact, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, expressly states in section 5 that if the parties have provided in their contract "a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators . . . , such method shall be followed."  9 U.S.C. § 5.  Arbitration awards made by arbitrators not appointed under the method provided in the parties' contract must be vacated, *Szuts*, 931 F.2d at 832; *Avis*, 791 F.2d at 26; *Bear Stearns*, 728 F. Supp. at 501 ("Arbitrator[s] who [are] improperly elected have no power to resolve a dispute between the parties .  . . .")....  *[Id. at 225-226] (citations omitted)].  In fact, in doing so the Court in *[...]* rejected the argument which this Chancery Court accepted, that the Court had to, “defer to the determination by the [...] arbitration committee that the arbitration clause did not require arbitrators chosen by mutual agreement of the parties. ”  The 4th Circuit stated to the contrary:  We find this position untenable.  While we do, of course, defer in some circumstances to contractual interpretations of arbitrators, we are aware neither of any authority nor any reason to defer to the contractual interpretation of the arbitration committee of an arbitral forum.  That the members of this arbitration committee later appointed themselves as the arbitrators does not alter our determination not to accord their interpretation deference.  [Id. at 226].  Here, the Chancery Court applied Dockser contrary to what even the 4th Circuit would.
[brief] RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE (1)  THE SENTENCING COURT’S YARBOUGH ANALYSIS WAS ENTIRELY BASED ON ITS MISAPPREHENSION THAT THE VOICEMAILS WERE LEFT EIGHT MONTHS APART, RATHER THAN ON THE SAME DAY, AND (2)  THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND ANY MITIGATING FACTORS.  (6T 44-14 to 49-24)  .........................................................  30  1.  The sentencing court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences was based entirely on the court’s erroneous finding that one of the terroristic threats charges applied to a phone call made in April 2022.  ................................................................. 31  2.  The 16-year prison sentence for threats made in two voice messages is manifestly excessive and unduly punitive.  ..............................................  35  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................................. 40
[brief] The polestar of construction is the intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety; and, in the quest for the intention, the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they were thereby striving to attain are necessarily to be regarded.  The admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance.  Such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of interpreting the writing—not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning of what has been said.  So far as the evidence tends to show, not the meaning of the writing, but an intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant.  The judicial interpretive function is to consider what was written in the context of the circumstances under which it was written, and accord to the language a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose.
[directive] GOVERNING  3.  AND RECORDINGS  BWCs  Promulgation of Police Department Policies and Procedures.  3.1 of law enforcement agency that already  Within 60 days of the issuance this Directive, every standing with BWC shall promulgate and enforce a policy, equipped any of its officers a has given customs directive, or order, in a form as may be appropriate the and operating procedure, of shall comply with standards, and requirements this of agency, which the policies, practices the of has not deployed BWCs prior to the issuance this Directive,  In the event that an agency Directive. promulgating standing operating or BWCs without first a policy, agency shall not deploy use the Page 6 or order in accordance with paragraph. procedure, directive, this an  Any standing operating directive, or order promulgated by agency policy, procedure, shall 1) enforcement officer employed by the agency pursuant to this Directive provide that: a law officer only system been by the agency; 2) an equipped may use a BWC that has issued and approved in with comply all with requirements established in this Directive and the a BWC must at times the standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued pursuant to this Directive; agency's policy, for personal purposes; performance of official police duties and not a BWC shall be used only in 3) sworn copied, disseminated, or otherwise used by a 4) no BWC recording shall be accessed, viewed, in for an official purpose specified this Directive; officer or civilian employee of the agency except knowingly violates the officer or civilian employee of the agency who and 5) any sworn operating procedure, directive, or of Directive or the agency's policy, standing requirements this order shall be subject to discipline.
[brief] The School's next witness, [...], a 40 year Lakewood resident, attended the School for grades 3 through 8 (1981 through 1986).  He came to school by bus, getting off on Sixth Street and entering the school through the courtyard.  He did not recall ever observing parked vehicles in the courtyard (12T83-1 to 86-24).  On July 28, 2021, the School presented [...], who began residing in Lakewood about 31 years ago at age 24.
[brief] This Court reviews a ruling on a R.4:50-1(f) motion for an abuse of discretion.  *Johnson v. Johnson*, 320 N.J. Super. 371, 378, 385 (App. Div. 1999) (reversing denial of motion for relief under R.4:50-1(f)).  An abuse of discretion occurs when “the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  *Masone v. Levine*, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005).  “[I]f a judge makes a discretionary decision but acts under a misconception of the applicable law or misapplies the applicable law to the facts, an appellate court need not extend deference. ”  *Johnson*, 320 N.J. Super. at 378; see also *US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume*, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (deference not appropriate where decision was “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis”).  This Court “must adjudicate the controversy in light of the applicable law to avoid a manifest denial of justice. ”  *Johnson*, 320 N.J. Super. at 378.  ARGUMENT I.