ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant’s Claims are Barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine**  Even if Appellant’s claims were not barred by the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order or *res judicata*, which they are, Appellant’s claims are precluded by New Jersey’s robust entire controversy doctrine.  The facts and arguments in this Action are virtually identical to the facts and arguments raised in the action recently decided by this Court in *Francavilla v. [...]*, Docket No.: [...], 2024 N.J.  Super. LEXIS 26 (Mar. 14, 2024) (holding dismissal with prejudice was proper because the entire controversy doctrine to dismiss the subsequent litigation where the substantive defenses raised could have been pursued \(^{31}\) (Da29-Da31). in the initial collection litigation).  New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine mandates the joinder of all claims, including counterclaims and crossclaims, in a single action.  “The objectives behind the [entire controversy] doctrine are threefold: (1) to encourage the comprehensive and conclusive determination of a legal controversy; (2) to achieve party fairness, including both parties before the court as well as prospective parties; and (3) to promote judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding fragmented multiple and duplicative litigation. ”  *Mystic Isle Dev. Corp., v. Perskie & Nehmad*, 142 N.J. 310, 322, 662 A.2d 523 (1995).  The doctrine applies even if the resolution of the prior case is not on the merits:  The rule that a defendant's judgment acts as a bar to a second action on the same claim is based largely on the ground that fairness to the defendant, and sound judicial administration, require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end.  These considerations may impose such a requirement even though the substantive issues have not been tried, especially if the plaintiff has failed to avail himself of opportunities to pursue his remedies in the first proceeding, or has deliberately flouted orders of the court.  *Mystic Isle Dev. Corp.*, 42 N.J. 310, 333 (citations omitted).  In addition, the entire controversy doctrine “bars claims that were or could have been asserted against the actual parties to the prior litigation, or those in privity with them. ”  *Kaul v. Christie*, 372 F.Supp.3d 206, 239 (D.N.J. 2019) (citing *Wisniewski v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co*, 290 F.App’x 153 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Thus, the three requirements for the application of the entire controversy doctrine are, as follows: “(1) the judgment in the prior action [is] valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action [are] identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action [] grow[s] out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one. ”  *Id.*  Importantly, the doctrine applies not only to actual or potential claims between the parties in the first suit, but also extends to all those in privity with the parties involved in the preceding litigation.
[brief] Exhibit K to Certification of [...] Pa523 [...] Letter to [...] and [...] 12/24/2020 (Attached at Pa108)  Certification of Eldridge [...] to Motion to Dismiss and suppress 10/14/2020 (Attached at Pa229)  Statement of Facts - Police Reports Attached 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa232)  Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  Hawkin’s Letter to [...] Regarding Submission of Copies to Prosecutor and Hernan 4/15/2021 (Attached at Pa245)  Certification of [...] 4/15/2021 (Attached at Pa247)  Order Brought by [...] (Attached at Pa249)  Notice of Claim to [...] 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa053)
[brief] Settled Principles of Contract Construction Forbid the Interpretation of Section 13.1 that [...] Espoused and the Trial Court Accepted**  It is axiomatic that words in a contract are to be given “their plain, ordinary meaning. ”  *C.L. Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Services*, 473 N.J. Super 591, 599 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2022) (citations omitted).  If the terms are “clear and unambiguous,” the court has “no room for construction and . . . must enforce those terms as written. ”  *Id.* (citations omitted).  The function of the court is not “to re-write or distort a contract under the guise of judicial construction. ”  *Caruso v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 136 N.J.L. 597, ***4 (E. & A. 1948) (citations omitted).  Rather, “[t]he judicial function of a court of law is to enforce the contract as it is written. ”  *Id.* (citations omitted).  The “elemental rule of [the contract’s] construction” is determined by the parties’ intention, which is “demonstrated by the language employed, when read and considered as a whole. ”  *Caruso*, 136 N.J.L. at ***3.  A court must give effect “to all parts of the instrument” when possible, as “the construction which gives a reasonable meaning to all its provisions will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable. ”  *Id.* (citations omitted).  Here, too, the various parts of Section 13.1 of the PSA must be read in harmony, such that each clause is given a meaning, and none is rendered superfluous.  By focusing exclusively on the word “thereupon” (while altogether disregarding the words “notwithstanding the foregoing” and “in addition to”), the trial court effectively ignored the above well-settled precepts and concluded that [...]’s obligations to Plaintiff under the PSA ceased when the Earnest Money Deposit was returned to Plaintiff in July 2022.
[brief] (Da 24-39; 25T 21-7 to 44-4)  They asked [...] to describe his movements on Saturday, February 6, 2016, with detailed follow-up questions about where he went and who he saw.  (Da 24-39; 25T 21-7 to 44-4)  [...] responded that he woke up late that Saturday and watched television.  (25T 21-10 to 25; Da 24)  His cousin, [...], arrived at the house in the afternoon (Da 25), and they walked to a chicken restaurant.  (25T 22-16 to 17; 23-10 to 19; Da 26)  [...] returned to the house by 9 p.m., when his elderly mother’s alarm went off as a reminder to take her medicine.
[brief] [...] explained that “Atlantic City’s severe fiscal crisis stems from two main reasons.  First, the well documented economic downturn and devaluation of real estate that led to the substantial reduction in tax revenue.  Second, the inability of the City to reduce spending to reflect the reduction in revenue. ” (Pa000309).  In considering the constitutionality of the MSRA, the Superior Court found:  Regarding the enactment of the [MSRA], the law is settled.
[brief] Financial Disclosure in 2011  The Settlement Agreement makes clear that “each [party] has made a full disclosure of all relevant financial information to the other of his or her financial worth and income” (A2).  The Settlement Agreement does not involve the distribution of savings accounts, investment accounts, or retirement accounts between the parties.  (A1)  In 2011, no request was made of Plaintiff to produce financial records of any kind or to answer any questions regarding her assets.  (2T 59:23-25; 82:20-83:2)  Even if Defendant was not an astute enough attorney to think of asking for documentation prior to the drafting of the Settlement Agreement, in reviewing the written waiver of same, he knew it was an option open to him.  However, it seems clear from Defendant’s position during this litigation, including his motion *in limine*, that his foremost concern was that he not be required to provide any information about his own financial position.  (2T 11:22-13:2)  By the time Defendant’s intention to remain in breach was clear and this litigation commenced, it was too late for either party to easily obtain 2011 financial information from their respective financial institutions.
[brief] Even if this Court still wanted to award legal fees to the Plaintiff, this Court shall apply a deferential standard. \textsuperscript{20}  These cases establish that the judge was obligated to differentiate between the work plaintiff’s counsel did in connection with the legal malpractice claim from the other work performed in making any fee award.  The record was devoid of any analysis by the Court and the expert for the Plaintiff during trial for the issue at hand.  Therefore, to a minimum, the trial court shall request the attorneys for the Plaintiff to file an affidavit of attorney for the legal fees  \textsuperscript{19}  See \textit{In re Niles}, 176 N.J. 282, 293, 823 A.2d 1 (2003).
[brief] An officer is permitted "'to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.'"  *State v. Roach*, 172 N.J. 19, 27 (2002) (quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 23).  That is, an officer may "conduct 'a carefully limited search of the outer clothing'" to determine whether weapons are present.  *Id.* (quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 30).  “[W]hether there is good cause for an officer to make a protective search incident to an investigatory stop is a question separate from whether it was permissible to stop the suspect in the first place”).  *State v. Thomas*, 110 N.J. 673, 678-79 (1988).
[brief] Although only one exception is sufficient, in [...]’s case, they all apply.  First exception (a) applies because where “details” of the claims raised on PCR “lay outside the trial record,” they could not have been presented on direct appeal.  State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 461 (1992).  The Court explained:  [We] have generously interpreted Rule 3:22-4(a) to permit the assertion of claims that could not reasonably have been raised in ¹ Db – defendant’s opening brief Sb – State’s brief earlier proceedings.  For example, in *State v. Nash*, 64 N.J. 464 (1974), counsel had failed to make a claim based on a decision issued before the conclusion of defendant's appeal.  There, we noted our “hesita[tion] to make the availability of a retroactive principle in a criminal context turn on whether an attorney has read recent advance sheets. ”  *Id.* at 475.  We concluded that defendant did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise his claim in an earlier proceeding.  Thus, *Nash* suggests that defendants should not pay the exacting price for state procedural forfeitures that result from the ignorance or inadvertence of their counsel — regardless of whether counsel's error violates constitutional standards.  *Id.* at 467-77 (citations omitted)  The issues raised here have not been addressed on direct appeal; they are based in whole or part on facts outside the trial record.  For example, while eyewitness identification was raised on direct appeal, the appellate was whether the judge erred in finding the identifications admissible.  In his PCR petition, [...] argues that trial counsel – not the judge – erred in failing to consult with and retain an expert to properly raise eyewitness identification issues pretrial and during trial, thereby ineffectively representing [...].  [...]’s PCR arguments are distinct and thus not already adjudicated.
[brief] These organizations have members that manufacture, research, produce, and sell prescription drugs and medical devices regulated by the FDA.  They thus have a substantial interest in ensuring the proper relationship between FDA and state-law requirements.  Under federal law, the FDA assesses the safety and effectiveness of prescription medical products.  Once the FDA approves these products for marketing, states cannot prohibit regulated firms from doing what the FDA has approved.  Only the FDA, not the State, can require a recall of an FDA-regulated product.  The common law has long reflected this reality, and has consistently refused to impose liability where, as here, a plaintiff claims that a product should have been recalled before the FDA (or some other governmental entity) has required such an action.
[brief] In the absence of compliance with APA rule-making requirements, the standards at issue are not enforceable. ”  Hampton v. Dep’t of Corr., 336 N.J. Super. 520, 530 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Metromedia, 97 N.J. at 338); see also Besler & Co., 361 N.J. Super. at 178 (“‘[A]n agency may not use its power to interpret its own regulations as a means of amending those regulations or adopting new regulations’ . . . .  The manner in which an agency exercises broad discretion ‘may be governed by the APA. ’”); Matter of Assignment of Producers to Travelers Grp., 261 N.J. Super. 292, 302-03 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 438 (1993) (holding that producer assignment program constituted improper rulemaking but was cured by emergency regulation).
[brief] (2T10: 18-11:4, Jan. 05, 2023).  For all the documents in preparation of the complex estate and business planning, [...] signed his name either as “[...]” or “[...]”, not “[...]. ” (Pa1996, 2039, 2233).  On October 25, 2019, less than one year after setting up [...], [...], and two self-settled trusts, [...] signed “[...]” on a deed conveying the Property to his company [...].  In the Seller’s Affidavit of Title, [...] certified that he had never used any other names, other than the name of “[...]. ” (Pa 2279).  Notwithstanding this representation, in [...]’s probate petition filed in the Queens County Surrogate Court on July 7, 2020, his wife certified his name as “Sam [...] a/k/a [...] and [...]. ” (Pa 799).  “[...]” was not listed as his name or a/k/a name.  The probate court filing was wholly consistent with all documents signed by [...] throughout his life.  Indeed, with the sole exception of execution of the Deed transferring the Property to [...] for the purpose of fraudulently conveying the Property from [...] to his Company [...] in 2019 (Pa. 843-2267), [...] had never used the name [...] during his more than thirty years’ life in the U.S. c.
[brief] 1.  **Appellant had no legal authority to sell his late mother’s car at the time of the events underlying the claim.  As such, there was no contract, and he has no standing to bring a breach of contract suit. **  Under the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Ownership Law, N.J.S.A. §§ 39:10-1 – 39:10-42 (“MVCOL”), Appellant cannot legally sell a vehicle he does not own.  The purpose of the MVCOL is to prevent the sale, transfer or disposal of stolen vehicles and/or cars with fraudulent titles.  N.J.S.A. § 39:10-3.  Under this chapter, every person in possession of a car must have a conforming certificate of ownership and if the car is registered, a registration certificate as well.  N.J.S.A. § 39:10-6.  In order to sell a used motor vehicle, the seller must turn over an assignment of the certificate of ownership or an assignment of a bill of sale that was issued prior to October 1, 1946.  N.J.S.A. § 39:10-9.  At the time the Appellant attempted to sell the car, the appellant did not have a proper certificate of ownership for the vehicle.  If he had successfully sold his car at this time period, it would be an illegal sale in violation of the MVCOL.  N.J.S.A. § 39:10-5.  Appellant claims many businesses would purchase his late mother’s car without proper title or ownership certification.  That is irrelevant to the case at hand, because not only is it not a standard business practice, but it is also an illegal business practice.  That being said, even if there was a proper contract here, it would be an illegal, unenforceable contract.  Therefore, there is no breach of contract and Appellant lacks standing to bring this suit.  The trial court correctly dismissed this case and correctly imposed sanctions, finding it frivolous.
[brief] POINT I  THE STATE DOES NOT CONTEST THAT RENDERING UNANIMOUS VERDICTS ON EVERY LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MURDER REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THE MURDER CONVICTION, BUT ONLY BALDLY ASSERTS THAT THE VERDICT SHEET RELIED ON IS NOT THE TRUE VERDICT SHEET.  First, it should be noted that, in responding to Point I of [...]’s appellant brief, the State does not argue against the conclusion that if the jury rendered unanimous verdicts on every lesser-included manslaughter offense, [...]’s murder conviction must be reversed.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option
[brief] For instance, the Defendants negotiated a provision granting [...]’s membership 110 hours of Kelly time per calendar year.  (230a ¶2).  The settlement agreement defined Kelly time as “the contractual hourly increment of time off for actual hours worked not to exceed one hundred ten (110) hours per calendar year. ”  Ibid.  Even more notably, the parties to the settlement agreement agreed that there would be an anticipated savings to the municipal budget of $2.261 million dollars due to police officer retirements.  (230a ¶3).  Consequently, the parties agreed to allocate this anticipated $2.261 million dollars to the 252 currently employed law enforcement officers actively employed as of the date of this agreement.  Ibid.
[directive] Every Thursday Twp. 2nd & 4th Wednesday Rumson 1342 [...] every month 2nd & 4th Thursday (Shared Services) Fair Haven 1313 [...] every month 1st & 3rd Wednesday Shrewsbury Borough 1345 [...] every month Tinton Falls 1336 [...]  Every Tuesday (Shared Services) Eatontown 1311 [...]  Every Thursday (Shared Services) Monmouth 3rd Thursday every 1333 [...]  Beach month 1st, 2nd & 3rd Union Beach 1350 [...]  Wednesday of the month Every Tuesday & Wall Twp. 1352 [...] Wednesday 2nd Wednesday every (Shared Services) Sea Girt 1344 [...] month October-June: one Thursday per month; (Shared Services) Spring Lake Heights 1349 [...]
[brief] (1T22-24 to 23-2; 1T26-18 to 28-5; 2T42-6 to 44-15; 5T24-18 to 28-10)  Prior to counsel’s opening statements the court referred to the plaintiff’s Notice to Defendant in Lieu of Subpoena directing the defendant to produce at trial the original documents (defendant’s Incident Report and two photographs of the scene taken by the defendant after having mopped the area) and physical evidence (a slip-hazard sign) placed by the defendant at the location of plaintiff’s fall immediately after the plaintiff’s fall had occurred.
[brief] Plaintiff was afforded an extra year of discovery from the trial court (via four (4) discovery extensions) and had more than ample time to have his case ready for arbitration and/or trial.  Plaintiff’s conduct is patently inexcusable.  See Lavin v. Board of Ed., 90 N.J. 145 (1982) (explaining that “Pomeroy defines laches as ‘such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operat[ing] as a bar in a court of equity’”); accord [...], Esq., Guidebook to Chancery Practice in N.J. (3rd ed. 1991), at 31-37.  Indeed, Plaintiff has not cited any authority that would permit him to reopen discovery on the facts and circumstances of this matter.  See Paragon Contrs., Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415, 424-25 (2010) (parties are presumed to know the law and are obliged to follow it; all persons are conclusively presumed to know the law, statutory and otherwise); accord State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311, 320 (2010) (ignorance of the law will not excuse anyone).  The City completed its discovery in a timely fashion and was more than reasonable in conducting meet and confers with Plaintiff to resolve outstanding discovery disputes.
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[brief] Second, a gradual introduction of new technology allows time to perfect new technology based on actual experience in the field.  While vehicle manufacturers conduct extensive pre-release testing, there is no practical way to test for the infinite circumstances that will be encountered in actual on-the-road use.  Actual experience with a limited number of vehicles allows manufacturers to make improvements before a larger scale introduction.  Third, a gradual introduction allows time for consumers to become familiar with, and accept, the benefits of the new technology.
[brief] Defendant [...] Recommended Plaintiff’s Termination, Undermining Defendants’ Claims of Independent Decision-Making.  Defendants also try to obscure the fact that Defendant [...], along with Defendant [...], were the decision makers in Plaintiff’s termination, instead attempting to hide them behind an “independent panel,” implying that she had no significant role in the decision.  (Rb48-49).  Contrary to Defendants’ claims, the termination panel does not serve as an independent decisionmaker.  Instead, a matter is only brought to the termination panel when termination has already been recommended.  (Pa663).  Here, there can be no doubt that Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant [...] and Defendant [...].  Defendant [...] reported the charge pay issue to Human Resources, participated in interviews during Defendant [...]’s investigation into the charge pay issue, framed the charge pay as unauthorized, and recommended that termination.  (Pa663).  She and Defendant [...] recommended the termination to the termination panel.  (Pa663).  Defendant [...] was the individual identified by Plaintiff as having acted unlawfully, she was the person who initiated an investigation into Plaintiff, and she was ultimately responsible for Plaintiff’s termination.  These facts present an example of retaliatory conduct under CEPA.  The evidence is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding Respondents’ motives and actions.  As such, this matter must proceed to a jury for resolution.  Summary judgment must be reversed.
[brief] Plaintiff’s legal fees cannot be a “mere potion of the damages” suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of Defendants’ negligence when Plaintiff sustained no actual damages.  In Plaintiff’s brief in opposition, Plaintiff cited *In re Estate of Vayda*, 184 N.J. 115 (2005), and *Lash*, 169 N.J. 20, to support her position that Plaintiff can recover the legal fees incurred in the litigation from tortfeasor.  The cases cited by Plaintiff actually support Defendants’ argument that unless the legal fees incurred in the litigation are a “mere portion of the damages” or a part of the total damages suffered by Plaintiff, the legal fees incurred are otherwise not considered as damages suffered by Plaintiff.