ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^1\)  *See, e.g.*, Shiyang Huang v. Equifax Inc.  (*In re Equifax Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*), 999 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2021); *In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig.*, 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir.
[brief] ” (16T 28-4 to 11, 37-12 to 16).  [...] testified that by inserting the cellular telephone calls made on May 27, 2012 into a cell tower locator website, of which DFC used two, the cell tower that retrieved the call could be located as well as the range of the tower’s reach.  (16T 23-19 to 24-2, 44-18 to 25, 45-17 to 21).  Germane to the matter at hand, [...] confirmed that the cell phone records he reviewed were consistent with defendant’s cell phone number being present on May 27, 2012 at [...] between 1:00 a.m. and 1:05 a.m., (16T 62-19 to 23, 79-20 to 24), and at the [...] around 1:14 a.m. (16T 63-2 to 15).
[brief] Pa64.  On November 15, 2019, the [...] appealed the Commissioners’ award.  Pa68.  Subsequent to the issuance of the Commissioner’s report, the parties engaged in limited discovery.  The [...] produced an appraisal report by [...], MAI, CRE, dated November 10, 2019, which estimated the Property’s value as of January 27, 1994, to be $4,295,000 with an additional $550,000 for FFE based upon an October 18, 2019 supplemental itemization report of [...] (“[...]”).  Pa70, Pa137.  Brody concluded that the [...] were entitled to $4,845,000 in just compensation.  Ibid.  Several additional interlocutory rulings were issued by [...].
[directive] (a)  The meaningful command level review of the incident shall be undertaken by at least two levels of supervisors.  These levels may include the immediate supervisor, internal affairs, training officers or command staff.  At least one reviewer must be two 20 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 levels or more above the officer who used force.  When the chief law enforcement executive of an agency uses force, the County Prosecutor’s Office shall be notified and, consistent with this Policy, shall determine the process for the meaningful command level review of the incident, which may include staff from the County Prosecutor’s Office.  (b)  The review shall include an examination of all available sources of information about the incident, including any video of the incident, reports, officer or other witness statements, medical records and records of injuries; (c)  The review shall include an analysis of whether force was used in a non- discriminatory fashion to ensure officers are treating every person equally without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic; (d)  The reviewing supervisors shall make a recommendation of what action, if any, should be undertaken, including commendation of the officer, policy changes, remedial training, administrative action, disciplinary action or, if appropriate, referral for criminal prosecution; (e)  The law enforcement executive, or a command level officer no more than one rank below the law enforcement executive for departments with more than 100 officers, shall review each use of force investigation and approve or reject the recommendations of the supervisors who conducted the review.
[brief] On October 19, 2021, a Middlesex County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant-respondent, [...], with second-degree possession of a firearm while possessing a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 (Count 1); third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(11)(a) (Count 2); third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) (Count 3); and second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 500 feet of public property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (Count 4).  (Pa 1-2)  A Middlesex County Grand Jury also returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant with second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (Count 1).  (Pa 3)  On May 28, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard [...]’s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized as a result of the execution of a search warrant.  (1T)  The court granted the motion, suppressing the evidence from [...]’s car and home.  --- 1  Defendant uses the same abbreviation as the State’s brief.  In addition, “Sb” refers to the State’s brief and “Pma” refers to the appendix from the State’s motion for leave to appeal.  On June 17, 2024, the State filed a motion for leave to appeal with this Court.  (Pa 5)  This Court granted the State’s motion in an order dated July 2, 2024.  (Pa 5)  The State filed its brief on August 30, 2024.
[brief] Ibid.  The movant must first demonstrate that the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner in order for the court to entertain reconsideration.  Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super 274, 289 (App. Div. 2010).  Further, the motion is not to be based upon facts or evidence a party failed to initially put before the court when that information was available to the moving party.  Ibid.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration ignored the standard and the ruling below.
[directive] CONFORMING JUDGMENTS AND Date: APRIL 13, 2006  Scope  This Directive, approved by the Supreme Court at its April 4, 2006 Administrative Conference, supersedes Directives #9-75 (issued November 21, 1975) and #11-76 (issued March 4, 1977) and promulgates procedures to be followed when the Appellate Division issues a decision in a criminal matter.  Background  Directives #9-75 and #11-76 have governed the procedures to be followed when the Appellate Division issues a decision reversing or modifying a judgment rendered by a trial court and appellate review has been exhausted.  Those two Directives were issued prior to the development of the Office of the Criminal Division Manager and the PROMIS/GAVEL computer system.  Further, those Directives do not cover the procedure to be followed when an Appellate Division decision is rendered that is not fully dispositive of a matter.  The Conferences of Criminal Presiding Judges and Criminal Division Managers reviewed the provisions of Directives #9-75 and #11-76 and determined that they needed to be revised.  Hence the issuance of this superseding directive.
[brief] Comando, supra, 436 N.J. Super. at 214; McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 497 (App. Div. 2011).  Further, in adopting RPC 1.7(a)(2), the New Jersey Supreme Court employed language requiring consideration of whether, based on an objective evaluation of facts presently know, a significant risk “will” exist in the future, materially impacting a lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.  The intended goal in adopting RPC 1.7(a)(2) was for attorneys to avoid “placing themselves in the position of serving two masters with incompatible interest. ”  In re Op. 682 of the Advisory Comm. On Prof’l Ethics, 147 N.J. 360, 368 (1997).
[brief] Id., see also 16a.  He testified that while he could not remember specific facts of this particular service out of thousands, he generally parked nearby and once he served he then returned to his car and normally he would then upload the service data immediately via his cell phone with GPS tracker information to the [...] server after entering the data.  Id.  He testified that he usually did this within a couple minutes, sometimes right there and sometimes after (or while) driving a short distance away.  Id.  In this instance, the data included a physical description of [...] that, at deposition and trial, matched her age, hair, eyes, height, weight and skin color, plus it noted on the Affidavit that she identified herself as “Linda” Milov and she said she was the wife of [...].  16a; 14a.  [...] testified that he did not know [...] or conduct any research as to their identity – either before or after – through Google or any other search service.  He had no personal knowledge of them; he said he never did that for anyone who he served.  T4 30:3-11; T4 32:3-6.  After service, no response was received from [...].  The home address of [...] was used for all subsequent service of documents in the case, and this address was confirmed as a good, valid and continuing mail address to date.
[brief] Defendants fail to even address the applicable standard of review on this issue, but nevertheless, their argument fails both as a matter of law and fact.  Pursuant to Rule 4:37-2, at the close of a plaintiff’s case at trial, a defendant may move for a dismissal of the action or of any claim on the ground that upon the facts and upon the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.  Whether the action is tried with or without a jury, such motion shall be denied if the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.  R. 4:37-2(b).  In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion pursuant to Rue 4:37-2(b), an appellate court applies the same standard governing the trial court’s decision and “must accept as true all evidence presented by plaintiff and the legitimate inferences drawn therefrom to determine whether the proofs are sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor. ”  Carbajal, 468 N.J. Super. at 158; see Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 n.4 (2004) (“It goes without saying that a reviewing court faced with a R. 4:37-2(b) issue must disregard evidence adduced on the defense case. ”); see also Dolson, 55 N.J. at 5-6 (“[T]he judicial function here is quite a mechanical one.  The trial court is not concerned with the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion. ”).  Defendants do not address the applicable standard of review, and their argument is otherwise wanting legal support.  That said, Defendants’ condition precedent argument is nothing more than a red herring.
[brief] Defendants sought a $1.5 million sale price (5T94-1 to 11); and the issue of contamination was clearly discussed.  5T95-3 to 10.  The amount of a $500,000 reduction in price was expressly testified to by [...] and by [...].  8T16-15 to 20.  Conversely, Plaintiff gave a vague statement about the reduced price being a result of appraisals.  7T11-10 to 21.  In addition, Plaintiff continued to meet with [...] during 2018 and 2019.  7T95-20 to 96-5.  The parties’ dealings continued with a Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement which they executed in 2018.  7T5-18 to 22; Da17; Da24.  The Agreement was prepared by Plaintiff’s contract attorney.  5T106-3 to 8.  [...] confirmed that she did not have attorney representation “in discussing a million dollar property with a developer. ”  5T106-20 to 22.  The PSA (Sale Contract) was also prepared by Plaintiff’s contract attorney.  5T112-21 to 25; Pa0245.  [...] testified at length regarding her understanding of the terms of the contract, specifically, that she reduced the price by $500,000.00 in consideration of [...] completing the cleanup, her intent not to remain connected to the property after sale, and her desire not to have the [...] name attached to her DEP number.  5T122-15 to 18.  2.  Trial Court Decision
[brief] This statement fails to satisfy the criteria in Harleysville (assuming it applies).  Harleysville at 232 states in relevant part, “and where the intentional act does not have an inherent probability of causing the degree of injury actually inflicted, a factual inquiry into actual intent of the actor to cause injury is necessary. ”  The Court did not state what injury was “actually inflicted” or the “degree of injury actually inflicted”, which is presumed not to exist because the interrogatories were deficient and there were no medical records produced to substantiate the allegations.
[brief] A.  Legal Background.  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 lays out detailed requirements for obtaining New Jersey-issued handgun carry permit (NJ Carry Permit). \(^1\)  Carrying a handgun within the State without a NJ Carry Permit is a crime.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).  To obtain a NJ Carry Permit, applicants must, among other requirements, provide multiple references who can speak to the applicant’s fitness to carry a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(b), and pass a thorough background check by police, \(^{1}\)  The requirements to obtain a carry-permit have been amended since the time of defendant’s arrest.  See L. 2022, c. 131, § 3, eff. Dec. 22, 2022.  But the requirements discussed below were all in effect at the time of defendant’s arrest and not altered in relevant part by the 2022 amendments.  Applicants must have “satisfactorily completed a course of instruction approved by the superintendent [of police] in the lawful and safe handling and storage of firearms. ”  Id. 2C:58-3(c); see also id. 2C:58-4(c).  And they must demonstrate that they are “not subject to any of the disabilities set forth in [N.J.S.C. 2C:58-3(c)].”  Id. 2C:58-4(c).  Those disabilities include, for example, having certain criminal convictions, id. 2C:58-3(c)(1), or a physical disability that impairs one’s ability safely to handle firearms, id. 2C:58-3(c)(3), or “where the issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare,” id. 2C:58-3(c)(5).  NJ Carry Permits must be renewed every two years.  Id. 2C:58-4(a).  B.
[brief] Arguments of counsel  At the resentencing hearing, defense counsel requested that [...] be resentenced to a term of 30 years with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility, incorporating her arguments regarding the applicability of mitigating factors seven, nine, thirteen, and fourteen from the sentencing memorandum. (4T:93-19 to 25) (Da 186-87)  Counsel argued that the Yarbough factors strongly weigh in favor of running the robbery and homicide sentences concurrent, particularly given new guidance regarding concurrent and consecutive sentencing from our Supreme Court in State v. Zuber and State v. Torres – both of which were decided after [...]’s original sentencing.  (Da 183, 188-93); See Zuber, 227 N.J. at 447; State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 268 (2021).  [...]’s 46 year and nine-month period of parole ineligibility – the result of consecutive sentences – meant that he would first become eligible for release at the age of 63, denying him a meaningful opportunity for release.  Despite acknowledging that Miller factor five “could” apply based on [...]’s spotless disciplinary record and expression of remorse, the State argued that the resentencing court should nonetheless give him the same sentence, reasoning that “we don’t all get a pat on the back for … doing what we have to. ”  (4T:129-2 to 130-6)  However, the State conceded that if the Court did find Miller factor five, it “would simply ask that it consider not doing consecutive sentences” for the robbery and the homicide and keep the original 40-year sentence for the homicide.  (4T:130-12 to 22)  F.  The resentencing court’s ruling
[brief] It is undisputed that the presence of toxic mold in the [...] condominium remained hidden and unknown to him (or anyone else) until March, 2009, well within the [...] policy period.  The source of the water intrusion (the unrepaired crack in the foundation outside [...]’s bedroom) that had caused the formation of the hidden mold also remained unknown until at least the summer of 2009.  The actual cause of the health problems [...] suffered also remained unknown — both to [...] and to the doctors who treated him.  It is likewise undisputed, as shown by overwhelming evidence, including scientific studies and peer-reviewed articles introduced in the underlying case, that [...] suffered progressive injury resulting from his chronic, but unknown, exposure to the mold in his condominium.
[brief] The trial court analyzed and balanced the factors weighing in favor of and against severing the cases for trial.  The court acted well within its discretion when it denied the severance motions.  [...] relies upon *State v. Hall*, 55 N.J.Super. 441 (App.Div.1959) and *State v. Bellucci*, 165 N.J.Super. 294 (App.Div.1979), *aff'd as modified*, 81 N.J. 531 (1980), to support his argument that “severance is appropriate where most of the evidence presented by the State relates to persons other than the defendant. ”  In both cases, we affirmed the trial court's discretionary denial of the severance motions, concluding that any potential prejudice to the defendant was overcome by timely and proper jury instructions.  *Hall*, supra, 55 N.J.Super. at 455; *Bellucci*, supra, 165 N. J.Super. at 301.  Here, too, the trial court specifically instructed the jury to consider the evidence against each defendant separately.  Accordingly, we reject [...]'s argument.  B. *7
[brief] On December 8, 2020, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an order relinquishing jurisdiction and providing that any challenge to the sentence imposed on remand could be filed in the Appellate Division.  (See Da204).  On March 31, 2022, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s sentence, finding that the trial court followed the Supreme Court’s instructions in resentencing defendant and it could not say the resulting aggregate sentence “shock[ed] [its] judicial conscience given the multiple crimes committed by defendant. ” (Da197-212).  G.  Findings and Rulings of the PCR Court
[brief] (5T79-3 to 6; 7T50-7 to 51-3).  An analysis of the bullet fragment recovered from [...] deemed it “unsuitable for comparison to any firearm,” meaning it could not be determined that the lethal bullet came from one of the guns recovered from [...]’s car.  (6T169-2 to 170-1).  While in jail following his arrest, [...] spoke with [...] over the phone and stated that he did not mean to kill anyone in the car but was only trying to scare them:
[brief] $500,000 transfer from [...]’s BOA account November 5, 2013  The supposed evidence plaintiffs identify as proof there was a “misappropriation” consists of the fact that this transaction was not recorded in the company’s QuickBooks until the following year and assertions that [...]’s testimony regarding the transaction was not credible.  Although plaintiffs \(^{10}\) Plaintiffs also contend that a comparison of [...]’s analysis with that of the defense expert supported the court’s acceptance of [...]’s analysis.  This argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion beyond noting that the defense expert’s opinion was focused on a different issue and that, in fact, the court accepted his opinion in rejecting [...]’s valuation of the businesses.  state that [...] was unaware that Hedvat was taking part of his salary from [...], there is no citation to the record to support that.  Even at face value, this “evidence” does not establish plaintiffs’ claims that the transaction constituted a conversion, a breach of contract or any of the other claims alleged by plaintiffs.  **Payment of $629,217.85 from [...] (2013 to 2015)**
[directive] Eske w konprann ke si w deja plede koupab, oswa yo dekare w koupab de lot akizasyon, oswa wap pije yon tern prizon aktyelrnan, epi antant la pa rnansyone kesyon sa a ditou, tribinal la ta kab rnande pou pije santans yo youn apre lot?  List any charges the prosecutor has agreed to recommend for dismissal:
[brief] See Db at pp. 30-32.  Like the other claims Defendants have made in this motion, this argument is belied by the record, as evidence in this matter demonstrates both: 1) the actual participation in discrimination by [...], the Town’s Business Administrator, and 2) willful indifference by [...], the Town’s Mayor.  As for [...]’s involvement, one need look no further than the testimony of Plaintiff’s longtime supervisor, [...], who testified as to how Camera actively prevented complaints against [...] from being heard.  See 3T at 79:22-80:1.  [...] is a nonparty in this matter, and as such had no interest in the outcome.  See id. at 95:5-7.  Yurcisin testified to receiving a memo from Camera when [...] was promoted, specifically instructing him not to interfere with any personnel decisions she was involved with, even though she was supposed to technically still be under him.  See id. 83:19-84:2.  This bypassed the normal complaint procedure, where issues were supposed to pass to him in that department.  See id. at 93:2-19.  When Plaintiff complained to him about her treatment at the hands of [...], he went to Camera, who again told him not to interfere.  See id. at 99:3-7.  As such, when Plaintiff reported numerous instances of mistreatment by [...] to him, he did nothing to report these issues further up the chain of command because he felt that he had been specifically directed to stay out.  See id. at 86:5-22.  Yurcisin stated that it was his opinion that Plaintiff was being targeted by the administration through [...] because in practice, Camera answered only to the mayor.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  At approximately 1:00 a.m. on Sunday, May 27, 2012, a drive-by shooting occurred on Taylor Street between Center Street and Hickory Street in Orange, New Jersey.  (4T 39-12 to 18).  About fifteen to twenty people were gathered on the sidewalk when an Audi sedan pulled quickly around the corner from Hickory Street and slowed as it drove by the crowd.  (5T 27-2 to 4, 27-19 to 24).  A person in the Audi fired a weapon out a window of the vehicle, discharging several rounds before the car sped away.  (5T 27-5 to 7).  Standing in the street, [...] was struck by gunshot in the chest.  (5T 27-13 to 14; 6T 156-18 to 157-6).  He was pronounced dead at the scene.
[brief] Through countless financial --- \(^1\) 2022 Bulletin No. 22-11 (the “Bulletin”) is attached as Ja1-2. examinations of reciprocals, as well as its public statements and actions, the Department has repeatedly admitted that: (1) New Jersey reciprocal exchanges are exclusively regulated by the Reciprocal Exchange Act, N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 to -19 (the “REA”); (2) the Holding Act does not apply to reciprocal exchanges; and (3) new legislation would be required to bring reciprocals within the ambit of the Holding Act.  The Department failed to enact such legislation.  Thus, rather than properly amending the REA or the Holding Act, the Department seeks to achieve its goal through improper rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”).  New Jersey law is clear that an agency determination effecting a material change in existing law, or altering the “status quo,” must comply with the APA, or it will be deemed invalid.  Here, the Department completely disregarded the APA, adopting the Bulletin without providing any public notice, comment or hearing in violation of the APA’s procedural and substantive due process protections and interfering with [...]’s right to contract with individual subscribers.  Accordingly, the Department’s action was substantively and procedurally deficient.
[brief] (1T127:6-11).  In an attempt to justify the prejudicial amendment, Respondent relies on a handful of unreported trial court decisions, which are obviously nonbinding, and are fact-specific inquiries grounded in the unique circumstances presented in each  They do not set forth any legal principles or discussion upon which any precedential value could be gleaned (assuming that they were even correctly decided as no appeals were taken in those matters).  They do not provide compelling authority for Respondent’s position that an election petition may be amended on the eve of trial based on evidence that had been in the parties’ possession for 17 days.