ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] What is more troubling is the fact that the jury was not instructed regarding the essential element of accomplice liability—"the shared purpose to commit robbery with a weapon".  At trial, the state argued to the jury its theory against defendant [...] is accomplice liability.  The instruction to the jury in respect to accomplice liability charge were:  In this case, the state alleges that the defendant is equally guilty of the crime committed by his co-defendants [...] and [...] because he acted as their accomplice with the purpose that the "robberies" be committed.  (15T 145-12 to 16)  The court further instructed the jury: in order to find defendant guilty of "robbery", the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements.  1) That [...] and [...] committed the crime of "robbery".  2) That [...] did aid or agree or attempted to aid [...] and [...] in planning or committing the "robberies".  3)  That [...]'s purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense.  4)  "That [...] possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved against the person(s) who actually committed the criminal acts."  (15T 145-146-16 to 3)  The charge did not, however, equally relate those principles to the degrees of robbery involved.  The jury was told: if you find that [...] aided, agreed to aid or attempted to aid another person(s) in the commission of a "robbery", then you must consider him equally guilty.  Hence, nowhere in the instruction on accomplice liability charge did it require the jury to find that [...] had shared the purpose to commit a robbery with a weapon.  The trial court erred in entering a judgment of conviction for first degree robbery on count sixteen because the jury was not instructed regarding the essential element of accomplice liability charge—that the defendant shared the purpose to commit armed robbery with a weapon.
[brief] Himself  [...]’ Sworn Statement was not, as the State argues, “discoverable years earlier by reasonable diligence. ”  State Br. at 20.  At the time Edwin [...] filed the Habeas Petition under the alias “Erwin” [...], PACER was not available or used prominently, particularly for a pretrial State detainee in county jail.  Def. Br. at 44.  Indeed, the State does not argue that [...] actually possessed [...]’ Sworn Statement.  It follows that [...] cannot be blamed for the State’s (or counsel’s) conduct.  ii.  If the Court Finds that [...]’ Sworn Statement Was or Should Have Been Discovered Earlier, [...] Cannot be Blamed for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
[brief] Reference is made to [...] v. 53 West Somerset 467 N.J.Super. 117, 126-127 (App. Div. 2021) where the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s denial to vacate a final judgment.  The applicant claimed it was not aware of the tax sale until judgment was entered and challenged the service of process.  Promptness to move to set aside a judgment is a critical factor in any action under Rule 4:50-1, particularly subsection (f) of the Rule.  As stated [...], at p. 126-127, citing Regional Construction Corp. v. Ray, 364 N.J.Super. 496, 504-505 (App. Div. 2003), in affirming relief from judgment courts must consider factors, “when examined against the short time between the entry of default judgment and the motion to vacate.  See Jameson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 363 N.J.Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2003).  The “competing goal of promoting finality does not loom so large when the ink has barely dried on the final judgment.  At the early state a “plaintiff’s expectations regarding the legitimacy of the judgment and the court’s interest in finality of judgments are at their nadir”  Regional Construction, 364 N.J.Super. supra, at 545  In its reversal of the trial court, the Appellate Division, in [...] at P. 127, stated; “We are mindful of the countervailing policies of the Tax Sale Law: to encourage investors to acquire tax-sale certificates and fill municipal coffers with taxes that property owners have not paid.
[brief] [Id. at 53 (citations omitted). ]  The Court emphasized that those factors were not commandments, but “guide posts” to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion.  *Ibid.*  The Court cautioned that “the existence or absence of one or more of the factors mentioned above may be of great significance and the circumstances of one case, yet may be of slight significance in another. ”  Ibid.  Indeed, voluntariness depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case” with each case “necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts. ”  Ibid.  At the PCR hearing in the instant matter, counsel asserted that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move to suppress the tire iron found in the Impala driven by [...]; specifically, that Diaz had not given valid consent to search the car.
[brief] Possession, on the other hand, “‘signifies intentional control and dominion, the ability to affect physically and care for the item during a span of time. ’”  *State v. McCoy*, 116 N.J. 293, 299 (1989) (quoting *State v. Brown*, 80 N.J. 587, 597 (1979)).  Actual possession is defined as “physical or manual control” of an object.  *State v. Spivey*, 179 N.J. 229, 236 (2004) (citing *Brown*, 80 N.J. at 597).  “A person constructively possesses an object when, although he lacks ‘physical or manual control,’ the circumstances permit a reasonable inference that he has knowledge of its presence, and intends and has the capacity to exercise physical control or dominion over it during a span of time. ”  *Id.* at 237 (quoting *State v. Schmidt*, 110 N.J. 258, 270 (1988)).  A rational jury could conclude that defendant did not actually possess the guns if they were actively possessed by unknown shooters.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5, witness of violation in tampering/retaliation witness 2C:29-7, 2C:29-3(a)(3), of tampering violation  N.J.S.A. in witness or 2C:29-3(b)(3), N.J.S.A. of violation  Section with in accordance general consulted attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an unless is who 3.3.2 subsection pursuant officer to designated supervisory a or Directive, 3.2 this of this of under 4  Section presumptions overcome
[directive] Complaints of demeanor and minor rule infractions should be forwarded to the supervisor of the subject officer's unit because it is often difficult for an immediate supervisor to objectively investigate a subordinate.  In addition, that arrangement might obscure the possibility that part of the inappropriate conduct was the result of poor supervision.  While the structure of each law enforcement agency is different, it is recommended that minor complaints be assigned to and handled by a commanding officer at least one step removed from the officer's immediate supervisor.
[brief] Rb10 and Rb21.  I had no such knowledge, unaware that my length of service was different from the “service credit” referred to by the [...] in its May 25, 2025 letter.  Respondent refers to my FMLA leave as “unpaid” leave … without salary or pension contributions. ”  Rb10 and Rb21.  My FMLA leave was paid, not unpaid as respondent states.  Respondent contends that while I was on FMLA leave, there were no contributions to my pension.  Rb10 and Rb21.  However, respondent once again hides critical facts from this Court.  There was an inexplicable delay in my receiving disability checks during my FMLA leave.  How was I supposed to know that there were no pension contributions made during my FMLA leave since no one advised me until July 22, 2022 (Pa43), over 6 months after the March 3, 2022 deadline for purchasing service credit.  Compare Pa43 and Rb22.  Obviously, had I known that my FMLA leave did not count towards the length of service required for my life insurance benefit, I would have remedied the problem by purchasing two months in service credits.  (When faced with a similar problem with my health insurance, I drove to the [...] to pay by check for my health insurance during my FMLA leave).  (c)  My FMLA leave was medically mandated, not voluntary as respondent suggests.  Respondent, ignoring the undisputed fact that my FMLA leave was medically mandated, states that I “decided to take” a leave, Rb10 and Rb21, suggesting my leave was purely a voluntary decision on my part.  Not true.  My FMLA leave was medically mandated since I was undergoing pain injections and was facing cervical spinal surgery for chronic degenerative disc disease.  Pa8 to Pa10.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] (Aa73; Aa347; Aa351).  [...] testified that the repeat-sales methodology would compare the sales value of a residence before and after the construction of a nearby regulator station to ascertain whether “[a]ny differences in sales price . . . could be ascribed to the proximity” of the proposed regulator station, which would “preclud[e] the need for” the adjustments utilized by [...]’s paired sales technique.  (Aa73-74; Aa351).21  Additionally, [...] considered [...]’s testimony that socioeconomic and environmental forces may influence the value of real property, as well as [...]’s testimony that the regulator station would _____________________  21  In response to [...]’s testimony that the repeat-sales methodology would not utilize the adjustments required by the paired sales technique, [...] testified that the repeat-sales methodology would likewise require adjustments to take into account, among other factors, “physical changes” to nearby properties over specified periods of time, which may alter property values.  (Aa1042-43).  create an “environmental stigma,” which may contribute to market resistance and diminished property values in the neighborhood.  (Aa73; Aa347-48; Aa351).  While the ALJ found both [...]’s and [...]’s testimony to be credible, the record reflected that [...]’s analysis was limited and that [...]’s analysis regarding the paired sales analysis was well supported by quantitative data.
[brief] Appellant, [...], appeals the August 17, 2023 final agency decision of the [...] (“Board”) denying PERS service credit for services performed as the public defender for the [...] starting December 31, 2007, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).² (Pa93).  ¹  Because the procedural history and fact are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  ²  Santore’s brief misidentifies both the decision on appeal (referring to the Final Administrative Determination as an “Exception”) and the Respondent (referring to A.  Legislative History of Chapter 92
[brief] The Chancery Division’s determination that the Township breached the Agreement derived from Paragraph 6 thereof, in which the Township agreed to take all necessary steps to effectuate Plaintiff’s ordinary disability retirement application.  The “basic tenet of contract interpretation is that contract terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. ”  Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 321 (2019).  Consequently, New Jersey courts have long recognized that the judiciary “should not torture the language of [a contract] to create ambiguity. ”  Stiefel v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 242 N.J. Super. 643, 651 (App. Div. 1990).  Likewise, a court has no power to rewrite the contract of the parties by substituting a new or different provision from what is clearly expressed in the instrument.  See Schenck v. HJI Assoc., 295 N.J. Super. 445, 450 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 35 (1997); Tomaiuoli v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 75 N.J. Super. 192, 201 (App. Div. 1962).  The Agreement does not define “effectuate” thus, consistent with Kernahan, supra, the term’s plain and ordinary meaning applies.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court’s October 20, 2023 Order granting [...]’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the October 20, 2023 Order denying [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and the January 5, 2024 Order denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By:_____________________  [...]  [...]  [...] Attorneys for Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff and Appellate, [...] Construction Company Date of Submission: August 5, 2024 [...]’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO O.A. PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY’S APPEAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Declarant is not “sufficiently familiar” with Plaintiff’s record system.  In Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Dudnick, 292 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 1996), the Court stated:  “A witness is competent to lay the foundation for systematically prepared computer records if the witness (1) can demonstrate that the computer record is what the proponent claims and (2) is sufficiently familiar with the record system used and (3) can establish that it was the regular practice of that business to make the record. ”  (Emphasis Added).  In the Hahnemann case, the relevant facts are: “Accordingly, the computer printout ... was authenticated by a person who was in charge of the records and personally familiar with them...”  Id., at 15.  (Emphasis Added).  In Carmona v. Resorts, Int’l, 189 N.J. 354, 380 (N.J. 2007), the Court stated: “All that is needed to lay the foundation for the admission of systematically prepared computer records otherwise qualified as business records is if ‘the witness... (2) is sufficiently familiar with the record system used....’”
[brief] Da12-13.  On October 18, 2022, the Defendant LLC belatedly served its responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.  Da369-70.  However, upon review of the Defendant LLC’s responses, it became apparent that its discovery responses were deficient, as it refused to appropriately respond to the majority of the requests, claiming to have no relevant information or documentation whatsoever.  Da369-70.  Because of these deficiencies, on March 13, 2023, Plaintiffs moved to strike the Defendant LLC’s answer, or alternatively, to compel discovery for failure to make discovery and failure to comply with the trial court’s October 7, 2022 Order compelling discovery.
[brief] (a)  **My understanding was that I had full life insurance benefits ($9,952.12) when I retired on February 1, 2022. **  The factual basis for respondent’s opposition to my appeal is that respondent contends that there is no factual dispute that I knew (“it was evident to [...]”) that I did not qualify for a life insurance benefit when I retired on February 1, 2022.  Rb 9-10 and 20-21.  Such a critical fact is disputed.  I did not have such knowledge, stating in my July 5, 2023 appeal:  I [knew] that if I had retired on September 1, 2021 or October 1, 2021, I would have been short on my length of service.  That is the reason that I continued in the system until February 1, 2022.  I paid all my health benefits until February [of 2022] which was a cost to me that would not be necessary had I retired in September or October [of 2021].  If I was not trying to stay for 10 years to get the benefits (i.e., health insurance, life insurance), I would have retired then [in September or October of 2021].  Pa91 (emphasis added).  Instead of retiring in September or October of 2021 (as I originally intended), I continued “in the system” until February 1, 2022 for the express purpose of making sure that I would not lose my health and life insurance benefits.  (b)
[brief] Section 20 of Chapter 92, codified at N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2, responded to Recommendation 10 by clarifying that individuals performing professional services under a professional services contract awarded under N.J.S.A. 40A:11-5, 18A:18A-5 or 18A:64A-25.5 (governing local government contracts and school contracts) following the expiration of the term of any existing contract would not be eligible for future PERS service credit.  N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).
[brief] (Aa794 – Aa795).  [...] is not a governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district of a limited purpose regional district, since there is no [...] school district within the Shore Regional limited purpose school district nor any other limited purpose regional school district in New Jersey.  [...] is not a governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district that is part of an all-purpose regional district, since there is no [...] school district within any all-purpose school district in New Jersey.  [...] is not a governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district that is part of a consolidated school district, since the former non-operating [...] school district was eliminated as of July 1, 2009, and enveloped into the new [...].
[brief] The trial court could not order that the Boonton Property be listed for sale because the Trust language provided [...] and [...] with the opportunity to buy out [...]’s interest.  Da3.  [...] and [...] could not purchase the Boonton Property together because [...] would not agree to co-ownership -- [...] stated during oral argument on June 8, 2022 that he would not agree to purchase the Property with [...] (3T17:1-2), and the trial court took care to note in its June 10, 2022 opinion that [...] had “roundly \(^3\)  The Court also found that the Plaintiff was a credible witness and that “[o]verall, her testimony made sense when taken as a whole with the evidence that was introduced at trial. ” (Da101).  rejected” joint ownership.  (Da25).  Again, the Defendants opposed the listing of the Boonton Property and dismissed the sale to the [...] as “bogus. ” (1T13:9-24; Da629; Da637).  That left a bidding procedure between [...] and [...] as the logical, and quite possibly the only, alternative.  Further, the conduct of the sealed bidding procedure was perfectly fair.  It was overseen by the Court, with the bids to be sent directly to the Surrogate, allaying the Defendants’ misplaced concerns that they would be prejudiced by a procedure overseen by the Plaintiffs’ counsel.  It provided both [...] and [...] with exactly the same opportunity to bid on the Boonton Property.  The bidding procedure was therefore a reasonable and appropriate remedy under the circumstances.
[brief] But nothing in the statute requires that the fiscal note be completed prior to passage of the bill under consideration.  To the contrary, it specifically contemplates that the note might not be received “by a date consistent with legislative consideration;” in which case, the OLS must provide an estimate “as soon as practicable. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:13B-9.  In those situations, the fiscal note serves to provide legislators and the public with information about the potential fiscal ramifications of the legislation.  But as with N.J.S.A. 52:11-78, there is nothing to suggest that this process is a mandatory statutory prerequisite, much less a constitutional requirement, for the enactment of legislation.  In sum, Petitioners’ statutory claims should be rejected, both because the 219th Legislature was not bound by any procedural restrictions imposed by its predecessors, and because its enactment of Chapter 375 did not violate any other statutes.
[brief] (Pa1705; Pa804-812).  With that fee application, true and correct copies of all monthly billing from counsel relating to this matter were filed with the trial court for consideration and determination, some with redaction to protect attorney/client privilege.  (Pa804).  The Court, after considering the moving papers and opposition, and after oral argument, found Defendant to be the prevailing party and, for the reasons put on the record (Pa1717), granted Defendant’s application for fees and costs by Order of March 11, 2024.  (Pa667).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S OCTOBER 6, 2023
[brief] (Ra4; Pa304.)  The Court’s Order required Plaintiff to produce his expert reports by February 10, 2023.  (Pa305.)  On January 2, 2023, the Court issued another discovery end date reminder.  (Ra4.)  On January 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed his second Motion to Extend Discovery, which was granted on March 3, 2023.  (Ra4; Pa307.)  The Court’s Order required Plaintiff to produce his expert reports by April 21, 2023.  (Pa308.)  On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed his third Motion to Extend Discovery, which was granted on May 5, 2023.  (Ra4; Pa310.)  The Court’s Order required Plaintiff to produce his expert reports by July 21, 2023.  (Pa311.)  The same day, May 5th, the Court also listed the matter for arbitration on August 11, 2023.
[brief] As will be discussed in further detail herein, the [...] site has been subdivided into two parcels: a Residential Tract and a Commercial Tract.  The precise subject of this litigation is the Commercial Tract of the [...] site, known as [...] on the Township tax maps (the “Property”), on which Plaintiff seeks to build an inclusionary residential development.  The Property is currently owned by [...] (“[...]”), and Plaintiff is the contract-purchaser of the Property.  The dispute over developing this Property dates back to 1992, long before Plaintiff sought to purchase this site and use it for inclusionary housing\(^3\).
[directive] The procedure by which impoundment of the vehicle is to take place shall be governed by existing policies and procedures of the law enforcement agency.  However, those policies and procedures must include a provision for the arrestee to permit another person, present at the scene, to operate the motor vehicle or to make arrangements for the removal of the vehicle.  If the vehicle is impounded, then the person or party taking responsibility for the removal and impoundment of the vehicle must be informed that the vehicle cannot be released for 12- hours following the time of arrest, unless otherwise authorized by law and should be informed of -4-  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX B - GUIDELINES
[directive] [No/No]  2.  ¿Entiende usted que si el examen revela que su conducta se caracteriza por un patrón de comportamiento repetidor y compulsivo, y que usted es un buen candidato (que se beneficiaría de) un tratamiento para delincuentes sexuales y que está dispuesto a participar en tal tratamiento, el juez, ante la recomendación del Departamento de Correcciones, lo sentenciará a reclusión en el Centro de Diagnóstico y Tratamiento de Adultos para tratamiento de delincuentes sexuales; sin embargo, si la sentencia que se le impone es de más de 7 años, primero lo recluirán en una institución aparte del Centro de Diagnóstico y Tratamiento de Adultos?  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, and you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and willing to participate in such treatment, the judge shall, upon recommendation of the Department of Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Spanish página 1 de 3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Spanish page 1 of 3 Corrections, sentence you to confinement at the [...] for sex offender treatment; however, if the sentence imposed is greater than 7 years, you will first be confined at a facility other than the [...]?  [Sí/Yes]
[brief] 21 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) .................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c) .........................................................................................  5, 17 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(1) .....................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) .....................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) ...........................................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 .................................................................................................................. 3, 4, 10, 11 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(a) ...............................................................................................................  5, 17 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(b) ...............................................................................................................  4, 17 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) ...............................................................................................................  5, 10 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.2 ................................................................................................................  17  OTHER AUTHORITIES