ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .................................................................15  POINT II ..................................................................................................................19  THE ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR d(1)  USE  VARIANCE RELIEF WAS REASONABLE AND SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  THUS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (Pa24, 30, 36-38)  .......................19
[brief] It is – it does not fall on deaf ears that there are some statutory requirements in this regard, but the point is, this is an entity without assets …  [...] has filed the paperwork. The bank has filed the paperwork.  He filed it with the court.  Formalities to file the statute would have to be paid by someone.  There is no money left to do it.  It becomes an impossibility.  The court is not paying for it.  [...] is not obligated to pay for it.  The bank is not obligated to pay for it.  If the creditors want it and the creditors want to hire somebody – they certainly do not.  Otherwise, I would have entertained it happening.  So the motion is denied and I am discharging [...] as receiver.
[brief] Here, however, the circumstances are fundamentally different.  [...]’s withdrawal postdated both the Vermont Superior Court’s rulings on non-covered claims and the underlying plaintiffs’ withdrawal of remaining claims.  The combination of factors extinguished any further potential duty to indemnify and, therefore, justified withdrawal of the defense.  See also Co-operative Ins. Cos. v. Woodward, 45 A.3d 89, 93 (Vt. 2012)(if there is “no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer may be required to indemnify”, then there is no duty to defend).
[brief] Defendant maintains that their testimony would have had an impact on the State’s less than overwhelming proofs.  The PCR judge’s assessment of whether defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test was error.  Consequently, given the State’s less than overwhelming proofs, defendant was prejudiced by his trial attorney’s failure to conduct a pretrial investigation of the two alibi witnesses or to have the cellular telephone data analyzed.  POINT  TWO  A FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE RESULTED BY THE FAILURE OF DEFENDANT’S TRIAL ATTORNEY TO CONDUCT A PRETRIAL ANALYSIS OF THE CELLULAR TELEPHONE DATA PRODUCED BY THE STATE AS DISCOVERY.
[brief] What is at issue is a review of a redevelopment plan, which is governed by Section 7 of the LRHL.  Section 7 permits a municipality to adopt a redevelopment plan that is either: (1) “substantially consistent with the municipal master plan” or (2) “designed to effectuate the master plan. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d).  The blight designation and the review of a redevelopment plan are two separate and independent municipal actions with different applicable standards.  Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City (“PADNA”), 413 N.J. Super. 322, 334 (App. Div. 2010); compare N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d), with N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.  PADNA is dispositive on this issue – there is no need to reevaluate designations during the review of a redevelopment plan.  PADNA, 413 N.J. Super. at 335.
[brief] The first procedural hurdle erected by the State in an attempt to thwart consideration of the substance of the issues [...] raised on appeal is a complaint ¹ Db – Defense brief; Sb – State brief about the degree to which the defense presented its arguments and evidence below.  (Sb 14)  This is a remarkable complaint given the persistence with which defense counsel pursued the issue.  At trial, defense counsel (1) moved to preclude all fingerprint expert testimony; (2) moved to limit the scope of the expert testimony; (3) requested that prospective jurors be voir dired to determine if jurors have preexisting beliefs about the reliability of fingerprint evidence; and (4) requested that the jury be instructed on how to consider the fingerprint evidence.  (1T 6-1 to 32-11, 6T 6-6 to 20)  The trial court did not ask for briefing, did not hold evidentiary hearings, and denied each defense request.  [...] has renewed each of these issues on appeal.
[brief] It is clear from the trial testimony and evidence therefore that the so-called “Third Loan” is not a separate and distinct loan but rather a continuation of the $50,000 Loan and the $330,000 Loan – and a creative but transparent attempt to avoid the bar of the six-year statute of limitations.  And, regardless of how it is viewed in this respect any attempt to vary the written contract and the acknowledgement of payment “in full” would have to rest on parol evidence intended to alter the terms of the written agreement.  The parol evidence rule, of course, is not a rule of evidence at all, but one of substantive law, making admission of evidence contrary to a written integrated agreement of no weight.
[directive] (See Appendix G).  This course must be completed two times a year with no less than three months between each qualification session.  The 100 and 75 yard-line courses of fire may be conducted at the 50 yard-line utilizing an appropriate reduced size target.  However, the 100, 75 and 50 yard-line courses of fire may NOT be fired at the 25 yard-line.  9-30 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] Further, “[o]nly active members of [PERS] who are currently contributing, or who have contributed within the last two years to the [PERS], shall be eligible to make application for purchase of service credit. ”  N.J.A.C. 17:2-5.1(a).  Active members “who have contributed within the last two years to the PERS” refer to those members who discontinue public employment but whose PERS membership would stay open or active for two more years.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 5 | | Standard of Review | 5 | | Point I: Appellant Has No Legal Basis for a Cause of Action | 5 | | Point II: The Trial Court properly denied the Motion to Vacate | | | the Order of June 9, 2023 | 9 | | CONCLUSION | 14
[brief] Cases  [...] cited to Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 502, 110 N.J.L.J. 349 (September 23, 1982)  .................................................................  29  Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers, 90 N.J. 253 (1982) ..................................................................................................  34  Cruz–Mendez v. ISU/Insurance Servs., 156 N.J. 556 (1999) ...............................................................................................  33  Cummings v Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (Ap. Div. 1996) ..................................................................... 10, 11 Eagle Fire Protection Corp. v. First Indemn. of Am. Ins. Co., 145 N.J. 345 (1996) ............................................................................................... 35 Gobe Media Group, LLC v Cisnero, 403 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2008) ................................................................... 27 Janicky v Point Bay Fuel, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 2007) .................................................................... 37 New Jersey Div. of Taxation v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, 399 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2008) ................................................................... 33 Newstead Bldrs., Inc. v. First Merch. Nat’l Bank, 146 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 1977) ................................................................... 38, 39 QBE Ins. Co. v. P&F Container Services, Inc., 362 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2003) ................................................................... 29, 30 Statutes 49 U.S.C.A. § 10927 ................................................................................................. 17 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56 ....................................................................................................
[brief] Page Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], granting Defendants [...] and [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 10, 2024 ……………………Pa1  Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 10, 2024 ……………………………………………………..Pa4  Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice, dated May 10, 2024 ………..Pa8
[brief] 1.  Petitioner and the Board agree that the Petitioner is required to do all of her work during Municipal Court sessions at the municipal building which would be indicative of employee status.  (Pa12)  2.  This Factor has changed worldwide due to the Pandemic as the Petitioner testified Court sessions were held remotely and many of her duties are required to be done outside of the municipal building.  (T41-10)  3.  The only fact upon which [...] based her opinion that the Petitioner was an independent contractor, was that sometimes she is reached by cell phone or through her Law Firm phone by the municipal court.  4.  When confronted with how the Pandemic has changed the impact of employees doing work on premises worldwide, [...] did concede that it does impact and affect this Factor.  (T169-22 and T170-6)  5.  During the OAL Hearing, [...], who is a state employee and presumably in the pension system, testified remotely.  (T170-20)  6.  [...] also noted that her report was done in 2019 prior to the Pandemic and she did not update her report.  (T168-21)
[brief] 5  POINT I: THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LOWER COURT’S GRANT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE.  (P-59.)  5  POINT II: THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LOWER COURT’S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT, WHERE THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE ILLEGAL, LARGE, MAKESHIFT LIQUOR CONCESSION STAND WAS NOT A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON PUBLIC PROPERTY.  (P-59.)  8  POINT III: PLAINTIFFS ADEQUATELY PLEADED THAT DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION ON PUBLIC PROPERTY.  (P-59.)  16  POINT IV: PLAINTIFFS ADEQUATELY PLEADED THAT DEFENDANTS’ EMPLOYEES FAILED IN THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTIES.  (P-59.)  18  CONCLUSION
[brief] This explains why case law addressing factually similar challenges analyzes them under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  See infra at 21-23 (reviewing cases rejecting Full Faith and Credit Clause challenges to a State’s refusal to permit an individual to carry despite that individual’s ability to do so in another State).  It also explains why defendant has failed to produce any on-point case in support of her Second Amendment argument.  In any event, even if Bruen’s framework applies, defendant’s objection still fails.  As explained above, supra at 9-11, requiring permits to carry firearms “is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition. ”  United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1898 (2024) (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26-  History shows that States may use licensing regimes to ensure that those carrying arms within the State do not pose a safety threat.  See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9; Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1901 (explaining how historical surety and “going armed laws” support the general principle that the State may disarm those that pose a threat to public safety); Koons, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 562-71, 573-79 (determining that various aspects of New Jersey’s permitting regime are likely constitutional based on lengthy review of historical regulations); Frey v. Nigrelli, 661 F. Supp. 3d 176, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (similar); Baird v. Bonta, No. 2:19-cv-00617, 2023 WL 9050959, at *24 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2023) (Sa20) (“licensing systems fit comfortably within the historical tradition of firearm regulation”).
[directive] Page 12 of 18 from a case, you are required to inform the prosecutor, and a judge will decide whether you should hear that case.  If disqualified, you may return to hear other cases.  The Grand Jury must arrive at its conclusions without any outside intervention, including the intervention of the prosecutor, who may not participate in your deliberations or express views on questions of fact.  The prosecutor may not comment on the weight or sufficiency of evidence or attempt to influence or direct your findings.  The function of the prosecutor is to guide and assist you with the examination of witnesses, assure proper procedures, assure proper admissibility of evidence, and provide explanations of testimony and evidence with reference to the law applicable in the case based upon the evidence that is presented.  If for some reason during your deliberations you do not want the prosecutor or the clerk present, you may ask either or both of them to leave the room, and they must comply.  These requests are made by the Grand Jury as a group and are to be determined by a majority of the grand jurors present.  Because of the sensitive nature of the matters that come before you, your proceedings must be completely confidential.
[brief] *Id.* at 478 (acknowledging that the earlier stricter standards for awarding interest had been “significantly eroded”).  Both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division have recently held that equitable principles require the award of interest under R. 4:42-11 to plaintiffs from the date of the defendants’ misappropriation of funds, and not just from the date plaintiffs filed suit.  ([...] Reply Br. 46).
[brief] ”  [...] & [...], Cities and Towns Are No Longer Just Gatekeepers, 163 N.J.L.J. 914 (2001).  A redeveloper’s agreement does not equate to, and is fundamentally different from, a developer’s agreement.  Performance under a redevelopment agreement is not tethered to the actual realization or completion of a particular redevelopment project, whereas a developer’s agreement is dependent upon, and typically a condition of, a particular project’s approval and construction.  Redevelopment agreements are uniquely crafted to help implement and facilitate the clear historical and legislative intent of rehabilitating those areas that have fallen into contagious disrepair – a condition which the Legislature “presumed to be having a negative social or economic impact or otherwise being detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the surrounding area or the community in general.
[brief] Id. at 492.  The failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation “creates a presumption of compulsion. ”  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).  “Hence, if warnings were required but not given, the unwarned statements must be suppressed — even when they ‘are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. ’”  State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 265 (2015) (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307); see also State v. O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 170 (2007); State v. O’Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 616 (2007).  The State has the burden beyond a reasonable doubt of proving that a defendant was advised of the Miranda rights, and gave a valid waiver.  O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 168 n.12.  Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation.
[brief] PCR Counsel attempted to alert the Court to the PCR issues that do not include ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather new evidence that would be timely based on new factual predicates.  (Da 080-082).  [...] intended to argue that a new trial is warranted for “newly discovered evidence,” which is governed by the test set forth in State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 314 (1981), and for potential violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Similarly, in State v. Tormasi, 443 N.J. Super. 146, 149 (App. Div. 2015), the Appellate Division reversed the denial of a second PCR petition, which was filed over two years after the Supreme Court denied certification of the denial of the first PCR petition and remanded for further proceedings based on the trial court’s incorrect findings regarding the authenticity of a witness statement that the defendant contended was “newly discovered evidence. ”  The Appellate Division also remanded for “further consideration of defendant's ineffective-assistance contention that an unwaivable conflict arose when his father paid defendant's trial attorney. ”  Id. at 157 n. 4.  Moreover, [...] subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, regarding which, after being denied in the trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court “summarily remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
[brief] To the contrary, the limited authorities cited by Defendants (Db10) confirm that Rule 2:9-1 only applies to the matter actually under appeal.  See, e.g., Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 2:9-1 (2022) (“[The ordinary effect of the filing of a notice of appeal is to deprive the court below of jurisdiction to act further in the matter under appeal unless directed to do so by the appellate court”); McNair v. McNair, 332 N.J. Super. 195, 199 (App. Div. 2000) (“[A]s a general rule, once an appeal is filed, the trial court loses jurisdiction to make substantive rulings in the matter. ”) (emphasis added).  The rule and case law make clear that the application of Rule 2:9-1(a) is limited to the jurisdiction of the specific trial court from which an appeal is taken, and not to the jurisdiction of other courts presiding over separate matters.  Defendants nevertheless attempt to avoid the clear case law by arguing that “the claims in this case are identical to those [...] appealed in the First Action. ”  (Db29.)  Not so.  As the trial court previously found, that argument is flatly inaccurate.  Nevertheless, even if the claims were identical (which they are not), it has no bearing on this Court’s jurisdiction over this matter.  At best, that would create a res judicata/collateral estoppel issue, which, as described above, the trial court correctly found is inapplicable.  Moreover, all the events that transpired below – including the trial court’s ultimate decision that precipitated this appeal – directly undermine Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims were somehow dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
[brief] On June 2, 2022, [...] submitted permit applications to DEP for General Permits Nos. 1, 7, 10A and 11 and a Transition Area Waiver/Averaging Plan under the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act ("FWPA"), N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1 to -30, and a Flood Hazard Area Verification and Individual Permit under the Flood Hazard Area Control Act ("FHACA"), N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50 to -101.  Johnson proposes to construct two warehouse buildings with associated parking, access roads and stormwater management facilities (the "Project") on property located at Block 41.01, Lots 31, 31.01, 31.02 and 31.03 in [...], [...] (the "Property").  (Aa5).  The Property is approximately ninety-one acres and is bordered by undeveloped land and Interstate Route 195 to the north, undeveloped land to the east, a residence and farmstead to the south, and Robbinsville-Allentown Road (County Route 526) to the west.  (Aa823).  The Property is partially developed with an office building, a loop road, and some stormwater management features from a prior, partially constructed project.  (Aa83).  The Property was also --- 1  Because they are closely related, the procedural and factual histories are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  2  Aa refers to Appellants’ Appendix.  Ab refers to Appellant’s Brief. partially covered by a conservation restriction that was recorded as a permit condition for the prior partially constructed project.  (Aa332).
[brief] (Aa91).  Generally, standing “refers to the plaintiff’s ability or entitlement to maintain an action before the court. ”  *In re Adoption of Baby T.*, 160 N.J. 332, 340 (1999) (quoting *N.J. Citizen Action v. Riviera Motel Corp.*, 296 N.J. Super. 402, 409 (App. Div. 1997)).  *Rule* 4:26–1, allowing the “real party in interest” to prosecute an action, is ordinarily determinative of standing.  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2.1 on R. 4:26–1 (2023).  To establish standing, a party must have “a sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect to the subject matter of the litigation” as well as a “substantial likelihood of some harm visited upon the plaintiff in the event of an unfavorable decision .  . . .”  Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. at 340 (citations omitted).  New Jersey Courts “will not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract” and thereby will not entertain cases brought by those who are “mere intermeddlers,” “merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute. ”  Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971) (citations omitted).  Accordingly, to have standing to bring suit, one must have a “sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  In re Camden County, 170 N.J. 439, 449 (2002) (citation omitted).
[brief] Plain error review, conducted when no objection is lodged below, requires that any error be overlooked unless it prejudicially affects the substantial rights of the defendant and is “sufficiently grievous” to convince the court it possessed a “clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ”  State v. Ingram, 196 N.J. 23, 42-43 (2008); R. 2:10-2.  The test is whether the possibility of injustice is “sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ”  State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).
[brief] (1T3-2 to 1T8-1, Ra48-61).  Prior to the Judge of Compensation's appointment to the bench of the Division of Workers Compensation, she served with distinction in the New Jersey State Assembly.  (1T3-6-14).  In her capacity as an Assemblywoman, she was a primary sponsor of N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11, which is often referred to as the "Presumption Bill" because it entitles essential employees who contracted COVID-19 to a presumption of compensability.  (1T3-6-14, 1T4-3 to 1T8-1).  The Judge of Compensation expressed an intention to draw upon her extrajudicial knowledge that she gained in her capacity as an Assemblywoman and as a primary sponsor of the Presumption Bill to decide whether the decedent in the present case would be declared to be an essential employee.  ((1T12-22 to 1T22-17, Ra48-61).