ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  All of the contractual documents that the plaintiffs reviewed, initialed and signed expressly contradict their “whenever, wherever” claims of oral misrepresentation and provide that all reservations are subject to availability:  “Owner has the option to exchange their week to vacation elsewhere by depositing their week with [...].  …  All exchanges are made through [...] and are subject to availability. ”  (emphasis).  “To maximize vacation usage each year, owner must either deposit their week with [...] or request a reservation at [...] no later than September 1st of each year. ” (emphasis).  (Da193, ¶¶2, 6 & 7).  See [...]’s Statement of Facts, supra at 13, regarding the express contradictions as to “whenever, wherever. ”  [...] submits that the trial court erred by ignoring the plain and clear contradictions between the express terms of the written and integrated contracts and the plaintiffs’ claims of oral misrepresentations and by refusing to apply the Parol Evidence for all of the reasons set forth above in subheading A and below in subheading C. C.
[brief] There are three basic requirements for the admission of expert testimony: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at least at a state of the art that such an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony.  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984).  The report and proposed testimony of [...], satisfies those three requirements.  Certainty is not the requirement for admissibility.  Evidence may be direct, circumstantial, or inferential.  The value of the evidence is to be determined by the factfinder as instructed by the court.  The question of causation is presumptively a question of fact for a jury, and the facts and opinions of plaintiff’s expert are sufficient for a jury to infer a reasonable conclusion, not mere speculation.
[brief] The reviewing board, when acting on a development application, and the Township Engineer, when acting on a grading permit, shall have the discretion to waive the maximum disturbance limitations set forth above, provided the proposed disturbance does not exceed such limitations by 25% or 100 square feet, whichever is smaller.  Such disturbance may be permitted if it can be determined that the disturbance of the critical slope area is consistent with sound planning and promotes the goals and objectives of the Township's Master Plan; would not substantially impair the purposes of the Township's Zoning and Land Use Ordinances; and would otherwise result in practical difficulties for the applicant.  Where it is determined that such pocket or pockets are proximate to other steep slope areas and collectively are of such size to constitute a significant and substantially contiguous area, the Board and/or Township Engineer may determine that the area is subject to the requirements of this section.  C.  No land disturbance or construction activity shall be undertaken within any area with slopes exceeding 14.9% unless the developer has first secured a grading permit from the Township Engineer pursuant to § 230-71, Grading plan.
[brief] Another critical part of the defense was to impeach the thoroughness of the police investigation.  The defense argued that homing in on [...] was a rush to judgment and that the police failed to follow other leads.  (5T 71-13 to 73-20)  For example, even though [...] tracked a fleeing suspect to near a residence on [...], and the police found suspected blood there, they never questioned any of the residents.  (2T 90-18 to 91-11)  Nor did anyone dust the shell casings found at the scene for fingerprints.  (1T 120-7 to 126-23)  In addition, the police never questioned other people shown in the [...] video -- one whose clothes appeared gray like the shooter’s.  (2T 73-23 to 74-1; 3T 121-22 to 122-6)  And the defense further cast doubt on the validity of the forensic testing of the suspected blood, which first tested presumptively positive for blood but then tested negative for human DNA.  (5T 73-21 to 74-17)  In response, the prosecutor in summation again resorted to improper vouching for the thoroughness and competence of the investigation:
[brief] Defendants’ opposition brief misconstrues  Plaintiffs’ appellate arguments and the nature of the New Jersey Debt Adjustment and Credit Counseling Act, N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 et seq. (the “Act”) in seeking to uphold the Act’s Limited Attorney Exemption.  Plaintiffs are challenging the constitutionality of only the Limited Attorney Exemption, and not the Act in its entirety.
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint Because it was Filed Out of Time.  (T2, 5:23-6:7).  In granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss, the Trial Court properly concluded that the Complaint was barred under Rule 4:69-6(a) because it was “well beyond” the 45-day appeal period.  (Pa55).  “Rule 4:69-6(a) provides that ‘[n]o action in lieu of prerogative writs shall be commenced later than 45 days after the accrual of the right to … review….’  Plaintiff’s failure to comply with R. 4:69-6(a) bars this present action. ”  Southport Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Wall, 310 N.J. Super. 548, 555 (App. Div. 1998).  Where a complaint is not timely filed, a motion to dismiss is appropriate because “the defendant should not be compelled to suffer the burdens of continued litigation. ”  Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96, 109 (App. Div. 2008).  The Trial Court correctly determined that Plaintiff’s right to challenge the Redevelopment Plan accrued upon publication of the Notice of Adoption for Ordinance 13-2022.  (Pa55).  This is consistent with other cases deciding the issue of accrual.  See [...] Redevelopment Agency v. DeRose, 398 N.J. Super. 361, 382 (App. Div. 2008  According to the Complaint, the Notice of Adoption for Ordinance 13-2022 occurred on April 27, 2022.³ (Pa4, ¶22).  Plaintiff’s Complaint should have been filed on or before June 12, 2022.  Since the Complaint was not filed until November 30, 2022, Plaintiff’s Complaint was barred by Rule 4:69-6(a).  In response to a Motion to Dismiss below, Plaintiff asserted three (3) alleged justifications to the Trial Court to defeat application of Rule 4:69-6(a): (1) the 45-day period did not begin to run until Plaintiffs knew of the ³ The Trial Court incorrectly states that the Notice of Adoption was published on April 8, 2022.
[brief] UNDULY RESTRICTED DEFENDANT’S DUE-PROCESS AND SIXTH-AMENDMENT-BASED RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE WHEN SHE:  (1)  EXCLUDED DEFENSE PHOTOS OF MUNICIPAL SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS ON ELLSWORTH AVENUE THAT POLICE SHOULD HAVE CHECKED IN THEIR INVESTIGATION, BECAUSE THE JUDGE INCORRECTLY BELIEVED THE PHOTOS WERE NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED AND LACKED RELEVANCE, AND (2)  PREVENTED DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM INTRODUCING PHOTOS OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES ON EDGEMERE AVENUE AND FROM ARGUING THAT THE ACTUAL PERPETRATOR COULD HAVE RUN THROUGH THOSE PROPERTIES ON THE WAY FROM ELLSWORTH TO EDGEMERE WHEN POLICE BRIEFLY LOST SIGHT OF HIM.  (RULINGS AT 14T 115-3 TO 14; 14T 142-4 TO 6; 15T 11-4 TO 9; 15T 51-7 TO 53-19; 14T 142-6 TO 161-20)  It is clear that a defendant has a right -- under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments -- to present a defense, and to exercise that right by presenting evidence, calling witnesses, and arguing appropriately to the jury to support his version of events.  State v. Fort, 101 N.J. 123, 128-129 (1985).  In this case that right was significantly violated by two rulings of the trial judge.
[brief] On May 23, 2021, Appellant filed his putative Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County.  Appx., at 1a-10a.  He asserted claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f of the FDCPA for Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to mail a debt collection letter to Appellant and for the inclusion of deceptive language regarding payment options on a time-barred debt and their impact on restarting the statute of limitations.  *Id.*  On June 24, 2021, Respondent filed a Notice of Removal to the United States District Court of New Jersey.  *Id.*, at 89a-90a.  On September 14, 2022, the District Court remanded the action back to state court in light of relevant case law denying standing under similar circumstances and in accordance with Respondent’s request.  *Id.*, at 96a-102a.  On September 20, 2022, Respondent moved to dismiss the Complaint in Superior Court pursuant to New Jersey Rule of Civil Procedure 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  *Id.*, at 91a-92a.  On April 26, 2023, the Superior Court entered the Order of Dismissal and placed its decision on the record.  *Id.*, at 11a; T1 *et seq*.  On June 8, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.  *Id.*, at 12a.  On July 3, 2023, Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.  *Id.*, at 16a.  II.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] (Pa125a).  At 10:00 p.m., [...] participated in a lineup with other officers run by Lieutenant [...].  (Pa126a).  Nester told the officers to make sure they were performing their inmate counts.  Ibid.  [...] requested to speak at the end of the lineup and said, “[i]f you have something to say on Facebook, say it to my face” and specifically mentioned another corrections officer, [...].  Ibid.  During the lineup, [...] also said “I am a different motherfucker . . .  I’ll fuck up your wife and kids. ”  Ibid.  [...] described [...] as “fuming” when making these comments.  Ibid.  Although Lieutenant Nester did not recall the incident, SCPOs [...], [...], and [...] confirmed that [...] made the above statements and physically threatened [...].  (See Pa126a-127a).  [...]’ witness, [...] also confirmed his interactions with [...].  Ibid.  C.  Decision
[brief] (Pl. Tr. 289:10-23).  The Board’s file, which includes handwritten notes from its closed hearing sessions related to Plaintiff, detail some of the *bona fide* performance-related factors [...] relied upon in deciding not to renew Plaintiff’s contract.  (Da291-298, 303-21).  That a neutral group of people adopted [...]’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s employment not be renewed for another year after hearing from her personally constitutes further evidence that the business reasons underlying her non-renewal were legitimate and non-discriminatory.
[directive] This may involve creating distance, seeking cover, tactical repositioning, concealment, and/or placing barriers between an uncooperative person and the officer; (c) slowing down the pace of the incident by the officer slowing their speech, taking deep breaths, and/or applying strategic and critical thinking; (d) keeping the non-compliant person confined to a limited area and calling for a supervisor, back-up officers, and specially-trained resources to assist in resolving the incident.  These specially-trained resources may include Crisis Intervention Team- trained officers, behavioral or mental health care providers, negotiators, qualified bi- lingual officers, or officers equipped with less-lethal devices; (e) using time as a de-escalation strategy, thereby creating an opportunity to calm the non-compliant person; (f) using simplified speech and shorter verbal directions or instructions; (g) eliminating or reducing sensory distractions (bright flashing lights, sirens, or other loud noises); and 4
[brief] Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36, 48 (App. Div. 1990), mod. on other grounds 125 N.J. 421 (1991); Higgins v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 282 N.J. Super. 600, 614 (App. Div. 1995).  Any deficiencies in the qualifications of an expert or in the testimony offered are subject to testing by cross-examination.  State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 455 (2008); State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601, 615 (App. Div. 1990), certify. Den. 127 N.J. 321 (1992).  In general, the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony is entitled to deference and reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  The trial court’s decision as to whether an expert is qualified to testify is entitled to “considerable latitude” by an appellate court, which reviews for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015).  Accord, Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64 (1993); Koseoglu v. Wry, 431 N.J. Super. At 159; State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 123 (App. Div.), certify. den. 208 N.J. 335 (2011); State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601, 615 (App.  Div. 1990), certify. den. 127 N.J. 321 (1992); Foley Machinery Co. v. Amland Contractors, Inc., 209 N.J. Super. 70, 77 (App. Div. 1986); Windmere, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 208 N.J. Super. 697, 713 (App. Div. 1986), aff’d 105 N.J. 373 (1987).  Stated alternatively, the decision should only be disturbed on appeal if necessary to prevent “manifest error or injustice. ”  State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 455 (2008); State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 459 (1991); State v. Ravenall, 43 N.J. 171, 182 (1964).
[brief] (Da11).  ¹  Despite charging an attempt crime, the indictment fails to cite to the attempt statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, for that count.  ²  Additionally, although including both purposeful and knowing murder in the language of the murder counts, the indictment cites only to the purposeful-murder statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); and omits citation to the knowing-murder statute under subsection (2) for those counts.  ³  Da = defendant-appellant’s appendix  1T = motion hearing transcript dated July 25, 2022  2T = trial transcript dated February 15, 2023  3T = trial transcript dated February 16, 2023  4T = trial transcript dated February 22, 2023  5T = trial transcript dated February 23, 2023  6T = trial transcript dated February 24, 2023  7T = trial transcript dated March 1, 2023  8T = sentencing transcript dated April 28, 2023  A trial was held on the remaining counts in front of [...] and a jury over several dates in February 2023.  (2T; 3T; 4T; 5T; 6T).  On March 1, 2023, the jury acquitted Mr.  Lane of attempted murder but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault (under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(3)), possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, and on the two counts of murder.  (7T150-10 to 153-21).  On April 28, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to eighteen months in prison on the aggravated assault charge and thirty years on each murder charge, all consecutive with one another, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-one-and-a-half years in prison with no possibility for parole.  (Da4-7).  The possession count was merged with the murder counts.  (Da4-7).  [...] also imposed $15,166.13 in restitution.  (Da4-7).  [...] filed his notice of appeal on July 10, 2023.  (Da8-10).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] Law enforcement agency, agency, or department.  A law enforcement agency operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey.  Law enforcement officer.  A person whose public duties include the power to act as an officer for the detection, apprehension, arrest, and conviction of offenders against the laws of this State.  Some BWC models may be turned on and remain in a standby or buffering mode, during which the device 1 does not make a permanent record of images/sounds unless the officer activates the recording mode/function.
[brief] Q:  But you never told [...] you thought any action was taken against you because of your religion.  A: No.  Q: You never told [...] you thought any action was taken against you because of your religion.  A: No.  Q:  You never told [...] you thought any action was taken against you because of your religion.  A: No.  Q:  You never told [...] that you thought any action was taken against you because of your disability.  A: No.  Q: And you never told [...] that you thought any action was taken against you because of your disability.  A: No.  Q: You never told Mr. -- [...] that you thought any action was taken against you because of your disability.  A: I talked to Tim, I talked to [...] (sic).  He was, he was present when [...] made the 1 1 comment about stupid Jews to me.  Q: But you never told anybody that you thought Ted took action against you because of your religion?  A: I did.  I told – Q: Action.  A: -- my direct supervisor.  What -- can you -- what is action?  Q: Did he take a job responsibility away from you?  A: He didn’t take a job responsibility.  That was [...] took all my job responsibilities away from me.  Q: But not because you were Jewish.  A: Because of all the complaints that I made.  Q: Right, but not because you were Jewish.  A: I don’t know why.  Q: And not because you were disabled.  A: She did make fun of my FMLA all the time – Q: She didn’t do anything to you because you were disabled.  You’re under oath, [...].  Did [...] take any action against you because you had a disability?  A: No.  Q: Okay.  (5T:189:1-25-191:1-25).  If Plaintiff never complained about discriminatory action, then it is impossible that Appellants took any action or willfully participated in any such action because they could not have been aware of the alleged discrimination.
[brief] *[...]* insists the actual loss was the amount of the rent that was conditionally deferred in anticipation of perfect performance.  It was entitled to collect $96,364.80 per month in the event of imperfect performance, and [...] and [...] had breached the lease, so the entitlement was triggered.  [...] and [...] having paid only $48,182.40 per month to date, there was a shortfall of $240,912 in the amount that had been paid.  While [...] would have waived, or forgiven, the $240,912 in the event there had been no breach of any nature, it would not waive the amount because there had been a breach, causing $13,970 in damages.  This type of circular reasoning was expressly rejected [by the California Supreme Court] in *Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Assn.*, [953 P.2d 484 (Cal. 1998)].  There, the court exposed the double talk of a “conditional waiver” of certain prepayment charges in a loan agreement.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, [...], submits the [...] improperly adopted [...]’s recommendation and, therefore, the decision to dismiss [...]’s appeal for deferred retirement benefits must be reversed.  As evidenced above, [...] was not removed for charges of misconduct directly related to his employment in accordance within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2.  As such, he was not categorically ineligible from receiving deferred retirement benefits.  Consequently, this Honorable Court must: (1) enter an Order reversing the Board’s determination; (2) determine [...] is eligible for deferred retirement benefits under the applicable law; and (3) require the Board to conduct an “honorable service” analysis pursuant to Uricoli.
[brief] For the following reasons, this Court should affirm.  First, the trial court fully grasped the mechanics of eDiscovery and the inherent tradeoffs of the available options when it selected a discovery protocol.  (T5-19 to 6-21, T20-18 to 25-14.)  Moreover, the court offered a carefully considered rationale for its decision.  See Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (noting that abuse of discretion “arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation.  . . .”) (citation omitted).  The court explained that pre-production relevance review is “subjective by [its] very nature” and that an attorney “from one side will very likely disagree with [the attorney] doing the same review from the opposing side. ”  (Da159.)  That raised the question in the court’s mind whether the gatekeeper of the documents should be the final arbiter of their relevance, particularly when the reviewers may be young associates or paralegals who “do not completely understand all the intricacy of the issues. ”  (Da159.)  Second, the trial court clearly understood the potential harm associated with broad production of ESI search hits absent pre-production relevance review: potential disclosure of sensitive information.  To that end, it took steps to mitigate that concern.  It noted that “[a]s long as there is a confidentiality order in place, there is very little risk to the producing party. ”  (Da159; Da124 ¶ 18; T6-8 to -10, T22-9 to -18.)  And it warned the parties that there would be meaningful consequences if any party were to violate the protective order.  (Da103; Da124 ¶ 19; T23-20 to 24-4.)  Third, the trial court allowed the parties to “withhold or redact a small subset of ESI documents that contain information so proprietary that their production could result in business losses or disruption, with each such document separately identified on a ‘business proprietary’ document log. ”  (Da167 ¶ 3; T27-4 to -12.)  In so doing, the trial court struck a careful and appropriate balance between the competing interests at stake.
[directive] 8.1  The communications operator shall do the following during a vehicular pursuit: (a) immediately notify a police supervisor of a pursuit in progress if a supervisor has not already been otherwise notified; (b) keep the supervisor apprised of the duration and progress of the pursuit; and (c) obtain from the pursuing officer any information listed in Section 4.3 of this Policy that was not initially provided by the pursuing officer.  8.2  When possible, a police supervisor shall determine whether there is a need to assume control over and coordinate pursuit related communications.  8.3  All law enforcement agencies shall establish procedures to ensure that radio channels remain open for pursuit related transmissions and that all necessary information is made available to officers involved in the pursuit.  9
[brief] [...] is an independent fact witness who was the only witness, other than Petitioner, who observed Respondent’ relationship with Decedent during the time the 2014 Will was being made.  [...] found that Respondent manipulated Decedent to get what she wanted, using anger as her weapon.  (9T63:13-22; 9T73:2-11; 9T759 to76:17; P573a).
[brief] (17T52-23 to 53-23, 69-24 to 71-23).  This ruling was entirely correct.  In State v. Palmer, 221 N.J. Super. 349, 352 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 654 (1987), this Court found no error by the trial judge who misspoke with respect to a portion of the jury instruction but later recharged the jury with the correct version.  See also State v. Heslop, 135 N.J. 318, 324 (1994).  Defendant claims without tangible evidence that “the erroneous charge coupled with the rereading an additional charge the following day was confusing[.]” (Db76).  But the jury never indicated any confusion created by the corrected jury charge.  In fact, no notes asking for clarification of any issue were sent by the jury to the judge at all during deliberations.  See State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628, 639-40 (1991).  Finally, count five merged into counts one through four for sentencing purposes (17T226-24 to 227-3, 234-10 to 11; Da19) and a separate custodial sentence was not imposed on count five.  Prejudice to defendant thus was substantially, if not fully, mitigated by the merger of count four with the murder convictions.