ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, [...] noted the following:  1.  It is imperative for an RIR that we show full delineation of any compound detected above applicable NJDEP standards, both horizontally and vertically.  The NJDEP has been extremely stringent on this matter recently .  . . .  [F]rom the data I reviewed I don’t see horizontal or vertical delineation in soil or groundwater.  . . . .  3.  I don’t see much about Receptor Evaluation – which is the 2nd most pertinent item the NJDEP will want to see for RIR to be satisfactory.  4.  Soil tables- note that the tables seem to be a few years old and some standards have changed (most notably some PAHs).  . . . .  6.  I am not sure if the document titled RIR Summary Report is the one . . . that you will use as the official RIR for submission – but if it is it will need to be beefed up – as no RE section and needs a clearer discussion on delineation.  7.  Soil – EPH – I saw some very high concentrations but not much follow up [on] them.  As I said my comments are heavily weighted on recent NJDEP responses to reports I have received lately.  Main items they consistently note 1.) All potential sources/AOCs need to have been properly investigated, 2.) full delineation needs to be completed, or contaminant not of concern properly explained “away”, 3.) proper Receptor Evaluation completed….and when GW contamination identified they want to see a CEA established during RIR.
[directive] Special Conditions: _________________________________________________________________________________ Map Attached LIMITED ACCESS TO LOCATION  It is further Ordered that the juvenile is permitted to return to the following place to retrieve the juvenile's personal belongings and effects, in accordance with the time and duration restrictions indicated below:  Address: Time: Duration: ________________________________________________  _________  ________________  Police Supervision Required  DURATION OF ORDER  It is Ordered that if the prosecutor administratively dismisses or downgrades the charge supporting issuance of this Order, this Order is vacated effective on the date of the administrative dismissal or downgrade of the complaint by the prosecutor.  It is further Ordered that this Order shall remain in effect until the case has been adjudicated or dismissed, or for not less than 2 years from the date of the alleged offense, whichever is less.
[directive] Page 4 4.  Preservation of Confidentiality of Medical Records.  It is the responsibility of the county prosecutors and the Division of Criminal Justice to ensure that all medical records obtained by means of a grand jury subpoena are kept strictly confidential and are used only for criminal investigatory purposes.  Prosecutors must at all times safeguard the secrecy of the grand jury process and must take special precautions to guard against the unauthorized disclosure of medical records.  Accordingly, medical records obtained by grand jury subpoena should be segregated in the prosecutor’s file to make certain that they are not turned over as part of a routine discovery package.
[brief] Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir.2006).  Section 1692e proscribes "any false, deceptive or misleading representation," (emphasis added), and § 1692d similarly condemns "any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person," (emphasis added). ”  [...], [...], [...] and [...] are all debt collectors disguised as lenders and servicers.  Their attorneys are debt collectors as well.  Even in this appeal [...], who is a debt collector, misinformed this court about the nature of the alleged debt and tried to cover up [...]’s fraud.  [...] and [...] conducts harassed me and my family, oppressed me and my family, and abused me and my family.
[directive] Consistent with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15a(4), the video and audio recording functions of an officer’s BWC shall be activated whenever the officer is responding to a call for service related to an underage person who is suspected of violating the law with respect to possessing or consuming an alcoholic beverage, marijuana, hashish, or a cannabis item, or at the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter between an officer and a person related to a violation or suspected violation of that provision.  The BWC shall remain activated until the encounter has fully concluded and the officer leaves the scene and shall not be deactivated based on a request by a person who is the subject of the call for service related to a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15, or for any other reason.
[brief] This appeal is not from “quasi-judicial decision” as required in 2:6-4(c).  Therefore, a letter brief or statement in lieu of brief cannot be filed.  Similarly, court rule 2:6-4(d) does not allow for a letter brief or statement in lieu of brief unless court rule 2:6-4(c) is applicable.  Which in this case, it is not.  Now, since neither exception was met, court rule 2:6-4(b) comes into play.
[brief] Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Union Cnty. Utilities Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008) ............................................................ 7 Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 485 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020) ................................................................. 14 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) .................................................................................. 16 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:14–3 ......................................................................................... 25 N.J.S.A. 2C:34–3 ......................................................................................... 25 N.J.S.A. 37:1–6 ......................................................................................... 25 Other Authorities Brief of Amici Curiae Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and other Health Care Organizations in support of Plaintiff in Adams v. The School Board of St. Johns County, Case No. 18-13592 (11th Cir. 2019) ..................................................11 [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], & [...], Short-term outcomes of pubertal suppression in a selected cohort of 12- to 15-year-old young people with persistent gender dysphoria in the UK, PLOS ONE 16(2) (2021)
[brief] ”  State v. Inglis, 304 N.J. Super. 207, 214 (Law Div. 1997); see also State v. Romano, 355 N.J. Super. 21, 30 (App. Div. 2002).  The inapplicability of insanity to DWI was found to be twofold.  First, application of the defense of insanity to DWI would be contrary to “a strong legislative policy of precluding defenses that have a high potential for being pretextual. ”  Inglis, 304 N.J. Super. at 211-13.  Second, DWI being “an absolute liability offense … militates against permitting a defense that focuses on a defendant’s lack of mental culpability. ”  Id. at 211, 213-14.  In the face of this clear precedent, trial counsel was correct in asserting that presentation of an insanity defense at defendant’s trial was not possible.  Doing so would have violated trial counsel’s ethical obligations, as set forth in RPC 3.1, which states,  A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, nor assert or controvert an issue therein unless the lawyer knows or reasonably believes that there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or the establishment of new law.  A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding … may nevertheless so defend the proceedings as to require that every element of the case be established.  See also State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 18 (2002).  The record makes clear that trial counsel complied with this RPC by not presenting a legally unviable defense of insanity, while at the same time holding the State to its proofs and its obligation to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant presented nothing to [...] or this Court establishing an exception to this ethical obligation.  Defendant presented no basis in law or fact that would suggest reversal of Inglis, a well-reasoned, well-supported opinion authored by a well-respected jurist, the Honorable [...], J.A.D. (ret.).
[brief] On March 7, 2022, the Board adopted and memorialized the Resolution of Approval.  (Pa67-87).  The Resolution in Paragraph 14 references the testimony of [...] who opined that the proposed building height for this development would exceed the allowable building height by more than 10%.  As such, [...] concluded that a variance is required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d(6).  (Pa78).  [...] opined that the building height should be measured from existing grade in this case and not from the revised lot grade showed in the applicant’s site plan.  The Resolution states that [...] opined that when height was measured from existing grade, several buildings would be more than 10% greater than the 35 ft. height allowed in the ordinance which only the Zoning Board of Adjustment has jurisdiction to hear the application.  The Resolution states that [...] took the position that the Applicant’s grading of the site and the revised lot grade constitutes mounding, terracing or other devices and characterized the grading plan as setting the buildings on pedestals.
[brief] Whether it’s—whether this is deemed as simply another motion for reconsideration under 4:49-2, which is really what it appears to be, in reality, or under 4:50-1, it really is just asking the Court to revisit its decision, but in doing so fails to address the extensive analysis that the Court conducted under Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328.  As required under Couri v. Gardner, the Court did an extensive analysis of the allegations in that case, or the allegations in the case, and came to the conclusion -- the conclusions that the Court came to.  And plaintiff has not articulated any basis other than taking what seems to be yet another bite at the apple that would prompt the Court to revisit that extensive analysis.  Plaintiff asserts that there is new evidence, but again, I have to look at the factual allegations pled, and I don’t see any basis to vacate the Court’s order on that argument.  I’m denying the motion.
[brief] (“Plaintiff”).  The underlying dispute concerns Plaintiff’s attempts to recover an enormous amount of association fees owed to it by Defendant, who is the owner of two (2) of the Plaintiff’s condominium units (the “Property”).  By virtue of his ownership of the Property, Defendant is a member of the Plaintiff’s association (“Association”) and he must therefore pay corresponding condominium fees as required by the Association Master Deed and By-laws.  That is not disputed.  Likewise, Defendant does not dispute that he owes the Association money.  Instead, he argues that he owes less than the amount stated in the judgment that was entered against him and that he was not properly served.  However, Defendant’s instant appeal constitutes a third attempt by him to challenge the default judgment that was entered against him on March 18, 2022.  On September 9, 2022, Defendant’s first motion to vacate the default judgment was properly denied for failure to present a meritorious defense, and on September 22, 2023, Defendant’s second motion to vacate the default judgment was similarly properly denied for failure to demonstrate excusable neglect.  The default judgment was precipitated by Defendant’s regrettable attempts at evading service by Plaintiff—which itself follows Defendant’s practice of skirting his obligation to pay the condominium fees he admits he owes to Plaintiff—and the granting of Plaintiff’s motion for substitute service.  In any event, the lower court’s denial should be affirmed because: 1.  The lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant failed to demonstrate excusable neglect to warrant vacating the default judgment; 2.  Defendant has again failed to identify any meritorious defense to warrant vacating the default judgment; 3.  The lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding that service was properly effectuated on defendant in accordance with the substitute service order; and 4.  Defendant’s remaining arguments are without merit.  Therefore, the lower court’s order denying Defendant’s second motion to vacate default judgment should be affirmed.
[brief] This matter arose out of Plaintiff’s challenge to the designation of the Property as a condemnation area in need of redevelopment (“Condemnation Redevelopment Area”).  (Da1-Da64).  The Property is owned by Plaintiff.  (Da3, ¶8).  Contamination has existed on the Property since at least 1991, when it was discovered that several underground storage tanks (“USTs”) on the Property were leaking and impacting the groundwater.  (Da144).  Despite the passage of nearly 30 years since the discovery of the contamination, a plan for remediation of the Property is still not complete.  (Da144 & T1, 21:7-8).  Because Plaintiff was not timely remediating the Property, the [...] (“[...]”) issued a Notice of Violation to Plaintiff on February 28, 2019, (Da26, ¶4) and filed a Municipal Court Complaint against Plaintiff on September 16, 2020.  (Da26, ¶5).  This prompted [...] to enter into an Administrative Consent Order imposing a new deadline for completion of remediation of March 31, 2024.  (Da29, ¶25 & ¶26).  ---
[directive] Legal Rejection Codes bar- Track - Prior violent conviction  2C:35-14a(7)  One  1.  N.J.S.A.  Tl  Prior violent conviction bar a.  Tl Prior Violent b. Track - Two or more prior convictions - 2C:35-14a(6)  One N.J.S.A.  2.  Tl or Two more prior conviction a. Tl Priors b. 2+ to for the Track One - Inappropriate Probation/Danger community - 2C:35-14a(9)  N.J.S.A.  3.  Tl  Inappropriate/Danger a. Tllnappro/danger b. to or Track - Present offense not related substance disorder - 2C:35-14a(3)  One use (4)  4.  N.J.S.A.  Tl not offen related - use Pres a. TlNot to related use b.  Track - firearm during present offense - 2C:35-14a(5)  One  Possessed N.J.S.A.  5.  Tl possession pres offense  Gun a.  Tl posses  Gun b. or Track - Statutory provisions - 2C:35-14a(l), (2), (8)  One N.J.S.A.  6.  Tl 2C:35-14a(l),(2) or(8)  a. T135-14a(l),(2)or(8) b. to for Track - Current charges not eligible sentencing  Recovery Court - 2C:35-14b
[brief] Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 2020)  15  Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2016)  18, 29, 30 Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 268 (App. Div. 1997)  28  Kingsdorff v. Kingsdorff, 351 N.J. Super. 144 (App. Div. 2002)  20 Lever v. Thomas, 340 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2001)  23 Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div. 2012)  16  Moss v.  Nedas, 289 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 1996)  19, 29, 30  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 2011)  14  Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013).  15  Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 2002)  20 Steele v. Steele, 467 N.J. Super. 414 (App. Div. 2021)  21  NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION
[brief] (7T88-15 to 89-5; 7T94-9 to 13).  Specifically, “[t]here was a period of time when the maroon vehicle . . . followed the victim” on “a circuitous route without firing,” suggesting that there was not “a clear intent to kill” from inception.  (7T92-15 to 93-7).  The surveillance video showed the vehicles relatively close together at the beginning of the pursuit, which would have been “a more opportune moment to start shooting. ” (7T93-8 to 16).  The delay suggested that defendant’s purpose could have been to “alarm” or “scare” [...].  (7T92-21 to 24).  The judge further considered that “shooting a moving car is not very precise,” and the fatal shot that traveled through the rear windshield and two headrests could have either been a “lucky shot or an unfortunate shot. ” (7T94-24 to 95-4).  In this regard, the judge honed in on the fact that only six out of sixteen shots struck [...]’s van.  (7T90-11 to 91-21).  And four of those shots struck lower down on the vehicle around the rear bumper, driver and passenger side rear tires, and low on the front driver side door.  (7T90-15 to 91-15).  Finally, the judge considered [...]’s testimony that [...] was only charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, as opposed to murder, because the State did not think she would knowingly put herself at risk of harm.  (6T120-3 to 25; 6T171-2 to 15; 7T88-24 to 89-5; 7T93-17 to 94-4).  [...] explained that “the combination of things over the course of the trial . . . leads me to the point where I think I’m gonna have to give that charge.
[brief] The MOU was agreed to because [...] was disabled and the agreement was needed to set specific payment amounts for service time and income which were complicated and disputed.  (Pa29-41).  It is undisputed that the IA charges were collateral as to the reason for the MOU.  (Pa1-11, Pa29-41, Pa56-69, Pa72-81, 78-79, Pa86-96, Pa124-130, Pa137-145).  There was no quid pro quo whatsoever concerning the MOU and any IA charge being dismissed.  (Id.).  At the time of the Board’s decision to not consider or allow [...] to even file his disability claims to the [...] it was virtually five (5) years after the shooting incident.  (Pa147-151).  In those five years, [...] had never been deemed fit to be a police officer again.  (Id.).  At no time had the Board ordered an IME to determine if [...] regained fitness or could regain fitness.  (Id.; Pa86-96, Pa124-130, Pa137-145).  The failure to take such action is indicative that the Board does not dispute [...]’s therapist’s findings that [...] was and is fully disabled as a result of the shooting incident and remains as such today.  (Pa56-69, Pa86-96, Pa124-130, Pa137-145).  It is undisputed that [...] was not terminated.  (Pa1-151).  It is also undisputed that no pending IA charges exist or existed at the time he filed for disability pension.
[directive] Directive. of issuance this upon immediately operational Section become shall This EXCEPTIONS 18. course in the might axise situation that every anticipate to possible not that is Recognizing it and Constitution, State the 11 paragraph of I, Article Law, Reform Bail implementing the of grant authorized to is hereby Justice Criminal of Division of Director the Rules, the Court applicable good and for Directive this of provision any from exception an for request Prosecutor's County a Director. determined the by cause as sufficient Directive.  this of issuance immediately upon operational become shall Section This QUESTIONS 19. be should Directive of this implementation and interpretation the concerning Questions designee. Director's or the Justice, Criminal of Division of Director the the addressed to Directive.  this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This SUPERSEDURE 20. the under or issued by manual enforcement law or guideline, directive, any of provision  Any hereby Directive is of provision this any with inconsistent is General that Attorney the of authority inconsistency. such of extent the to superseded
[directive] It is the responsibility of the prosecuting agency to determine whether the contemporaneous notes are discoverable pursuant to R__:. 3:13-3, whether any non-discoverable portions of such notes should be redacted prior to providing discovery, and/or whether it is appropriate or necessary to apply for a protective order denying, restricting or deferring discovery of such notes, or portions thereof, pursuant to R._~. 3:13-3(f).
[brief] Defendants next argues that the State “testified” and “suggested to the jury that he possessed knowledge that they did not as to the credibility of the witnesses due to his position of authority. ” (Db 20).  However, this argument is based on an incorrect reading of the record.  What is more, defendant was acquitted of the weapons charges by the jury, so defendant’s attempt to once again label the State’s summation as misconduct in order to weave error into his conviction for conspiracy, is substantively meritless.  The State is permitted wide latitude in advocating its position before the jury.  *State v. DiFrisco*, 137 N.J. 434, 474 (1994); *State v. Dixon*, 125 N.J. 223, 259 (1991); *State v. Shelton*, 344 N.J. Super. 505, 519 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 171 N.J. 43 (2001).  This broad latitude is available so long as counsel stays within the evidence and the legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom.  *E.g.* *Timmendequas*, 161 N.J. at 587.  Within that limitation, the prosecutor may vigorously and forcefully argue the State's case.
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[brief] “[A]ppellate review of a municipal appeal to the Law Division is limited to 'the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court.'"  State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 94 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Palma, 219 N.J. 584, 591-92 (2014)).  "In reviewing a trial court's decision on a municipal appeal, [the Appellate Division] determine[s] whether sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the Law Division's decision."  State v. Monaco, 444 N.J. Super. 539, 549  We must "determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record."  *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964).  "When the reviewing court is satisfied that the findings and result meet this criterion, its task is complete and it should not disturb the result .  . . ."  *Ibid.*  A review of a municipal court conviction by the Superior Court is conducted de novo on the record.  *R.*  3:23-8.  The Superior Court should defer to the municipal court's credibility findings.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999) (*citing* *Johnson*, 42 N.J. at 161-62).  However, "[o]n a de novo review on the record, the reviewing court . . . is obliged to make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining defendant's guilt independently but for deference to the municipal court's credibility findings."  [...] & [...], *Current N.J. Court Rules*, comment 1.1 on *R.* 3:23-8 (2021).  Moreover, when the Law Division agrees with the municipal court, the two-court rule must be considered.
[directive] Any Offenses.  Firearms Act Graves (i) would 2C:39-1(r)) that N.J.S.A. by defined as "weapon" other any to opposed N.J.S.A. Graves Act, under the sentence minimum a of imposition the require in vary and myriad are Act the Graves under offenses  Firearms (g). and 2C:43-6(c) of possession a unlawful "simple" from range can
[brief] In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly held in *Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth*, 224 N.J. 126 (2016), that:  Notice and an opportunity to respond to an issue raised by a party or a court are fundamental elements of due process and a fair hearing.  *Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach. Co.*, 153 N.J. 371, 389, 709 A.2d 779 (1998).