ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The third-party defendant, the [...] (“[...]”) contributed $15,000 of said amount (Aa30-46).  On September 8, 2022, [...] appealed the [...] decision to the [...] (Aa21-22).  [...] argued that the justification for the salary increases was her lawsuit against the [...] for equal pay and discrimination violations and the settlement agreement which followed (Aa21-22).  At its meeting of January 5, 2023, the [...] considered [...]’ appeal (Aa18-20).  The Board denied the appeal and based its decision on the determination of [...] (Aa18-20).  In her letter of February 17, 2023 [...] disagreed with the Board’s decision and requested a *de novo* hearing in the Office of Administrative Law (Aa16-17).  On May 5, 2023, the [...] issued its final administrative determination denying [...]’ request to implement the provisions of her settlement agreement with the [...] (Aa9-14).  In so doing, the Board adopted the findings and conclusions of the report of Michael [...] (Aa9-14).  More particularly, it rejected the salary increases in the final three years of [...]’ employment as having violated the provisions of N.J.A.C. 17:3-4.1 (Aa9-14).  The Board stated that there was no accompanying explanation of how the increases were calculated (Aa9-14).  Furthermore, the Board noted that the lawsuit was not adjudicated and lacked a court order and judgment (Aa9-14).  Finally, the Board also found that the salary increases were not across-the-board and extended to other disaffected employees (Aa9-14).  In its legal conclusions, the Board cited the relevant portions of the N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2(d)(1) which defines creditable compensation as well as N.J.A.C. 17:3-4.1 (Aa9-14).  As respecting [...]’ request for an evidentiary hearing before the Office of Administrative Law, the Board denied same on the basis that there were no material facts in dispute (Aa9-14).  An amended notice of appeal was thereafter filed on July 10, 2023 (Aa1-4).  ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD’S FAILURE TO GIVE FULL FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF KRESS’ SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE KENILWORTH BOARD OF EDUCATION REGARDING HER EQUAL PAY AND NJLAD LAWSUIT VIOLATED EXPRESS LEGISLATIVE POLICIES (Aa9-14; Aa18-20; Aa23-24)
[brief] 28  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter, 557 S.W.3d 923 (Mo. 2018) | 16 | | Adam Techs. Int'l S.A. de C.V. v. Sutherland Glob. Servs., Inc., 729 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2013) | 22 | | Auto. Banking Corp. v. Birkhead, 22 N.J. Misc. 135 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1944) | 25 | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | 12 | | BP Expl. Libya Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Libya Ltd., 689 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2012) | 21 | | Carideo v. Dell, Inc., 2009 WL 3485933 (W.D. Wash. 2009) | 12 | | Clark v. Pomponio, 397 N.J. Super. 630 (App. Div. 2008) | 28 | | Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435 (S.C. 2009) | 18 | | Lawrence v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 179 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1944) | 25 | | In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1995) | 12 | | Int'l Bancshares Corp. v. Ochoa, 311 F. Supp. 3d 876 (S.D. Tex. 2018) | 21 | | Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 2001) | 27 | | Local 355
[brief] ’”  Watson, 254 N.J. at 600; Williams, 471 N.J. Super. at 48 (citation omitted); accord id. at (holding such surprise tactics are “blatantly unfair trial strategy” and “improper gamesmanship” (citations omitted)).  The prosecutor’s belated factual claims about multiple critical points -- which [...] had no chance to rebut -- denied [...] his rights to due process and confrontation and thus were “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(b)(2).  Accordingly, the FHACA rules prefer that channel crossings utilize “[a] bridge . . . rather than a culvert, where feasible. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(c)(2).  Three sided structures, such as bridges, are preferable because these structures generally preserve natural stream bottoms.  See N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(f); see also Technical Manual, Flood Hazard Area Control Act Rules N.J.A.C. 7:13, page 247, https://dep.nj.gov/wlm/lrp/flood-hazard-areas/ (the FHACA rules prefer three sided structures that have natural bottoms).  In some situations, however, using a bridge is not “feasible,” which is why DEP outlined criteria where culverts are acceptable.
[brief] Defendant’s argument must be reviewed for invited error.  Defendant argues that [...]’s testimony is violative of State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106 (2001).  However, defendant’s matter is easily distinguished from Hernandez.  [...] did not testify as to past drug sales to prove that defendant was known for selling drugs; nor was her testimony used to support the proposition that defendant was a bad person.  The purpose of [...]’s testimony was to show that defendant had knowledge of what was in the backpack and that the backpack belonged to defendant.  [4T132-4 to -21].  Defendant’s theory of the case was that the backpack was in the possession of [...] and that she was the person with the heroin addiction and who possessed the large quantities of drugs.  [4T142-11 to -21; 4T146-14 to -19; 4T148-4 to -12; 4T148-20 to -22].  The State had to demonstrate that there was an absence of mistake and that the bag did not belong to [...].  The test as to whether the evidence is admissible is whether the testimony’s probative value outweighs its prejudicial value.  As noted above, all evidence is prejudicial to an extent.  The question is whether the evidence is too prejudicial.  Clearly, here, the evidence does not fall within the category of too prejudicial to withstand judicial scrutiny.  The testimony was intrinsic evidence that was relevant to demonstrate that defendant was the possessor and distributor of the drugs.  [...]’s testimony explained the significance of the paraphernalia found within the bag.  She explained the purpose of the scale and the notebook and how the key to luggage lock was always in defendant’s possession.  [4T132-10 to -14; 4T132-24 to 133-4].  If evidence of past drug sales was prejudicial, the prejudicial impact of the testimony was minimal compared to the overwhelming evidence against defendant.  Defendant was found in possession of a large quantity of fentanyl and methamphetamines and US currency.  [4T73-17 to 76-3].  The only way to open the bag came from a key that was found in defendant’s possession.  [4T60-6 to -13; 4T67-16 to -21].  [...] testified that the bag remained in defendant’s close proximity and sight throughout the trip.  [4T136-3 to -7].  The overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt supports the verdict and negates the small portion of [...]’s testimony.  Defendant argues that [...]’s testimony was suspect because of the existence of her plea bargain.  This testimony was explored thoroughly by defense counsel as part of her theory of the case that [...]’s testimony was incentivized.  [4T147-7 to 148-3].  [...]’s testimony fell squarely within the boundaries of Cofield and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.  As noted above, defendant cannot claim that he was prejudiced by the lack of a limiting instruction.  Defendant did not request one or raise an objection to the testimony.  Thus, even if this Honorable Court concludes that defendant did not invite or acquiesce to the alleged error, his claims also fails under the plain error analysis, as [...]’s testimony was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  Defendant cannot succeed on this argument.
[brief] A.  Section 345-98  Appropriately Requires the Consent of All Designated Developers Within the Redevelopment Plan Area  The premise of the Redevelopment Law is that certain areas within a municipality are unlikely to be developed under generally applicable zoning ordinances:  There exist, have existed and persist in various communities of this State conditions of deterioration in housing, commercial and industrial installations, public services and facilities and other physical components and supports of community life, and improper, or lack of proper, development which result from forces which are amenable to correction and amelioration by concerted effort of responsible public bodies, and without this public effort are not likely to be corrected or ameliorated by private effort.
[brief] Facts Related to Defendants Duty Fix and/or Warn  As stated above, each Defendant was responsible for the maintenance and protection of traffic which included warning users of the roadway pursuant to the Manual Uniform Traffic Control Devices (hereinafter referred to as “MUTCD”) and the Traffic Control Detail (hereinafter referred to as “TCC”).  (Pa1225, PA2205, PA1271).  The MUTCD calls for, among other things, the use of warning signs when such a condition exists.  MUTCD Section 2C.01 addresses the use of warning signs.  (Pa1418)(Emphasis Added).  According to the MUTCD, warning signs call attention to unexpected conditions of or adjacent to a highway, street, or private roads open to public travel ad to situations that might not be readily apparent to road users.  Id.  Warning signs alert road users to conditions that might call for a reduction in speed or an action in the interest of safety and efficient traffic operations.  (Pa1418).  According to the MUTCD, a “Bump” sign should be used to give warning to a sharp rise in the profile of the road.  (Pa1419).  Additionally, the Traffic Control Detail required that uneven pavement signs were to be used whenever such a condition existed.  (Pa1419 and Pa1186)(Emphasis Added).  The June 26, 2015 inspection memo identified “significant settlement” in the pavement at the north approach.  The memo recommended “immediate repairs/testing. ” (Pa1191).  The subject defect should have been dealt with “immediately”; that means within 24 hours, no matter who identified it.  (Pa799 at 19:2-16).  **G.
[brief] His decision not to do so strongly suggests that he did not find these remarks prejudicial at the time they were said.  *State v. Smith*, 212 N.J. 365, 409 (2012).  The likely reason why defendant chose not to object is because [...] herself testified on direct examination that she conducted a clinical interview of defendant on February 16, 2018, at the request of defendant’s guardian *ad litem* to render an opinion as whether there was evidence that he was exaggerating or fabricating mental illness.  (10T69-1 to 70-11, 89-3 to 24; 17T39-8 to 40-13).  This clinical evaluation was conducted prior to the time defendant’s criminal attorneys retained [...] as an expert in forensic psychology to determine whether defendant met the legal definition of insanity.  (10T148-21 to 149-8).
[brief] Id. at 3.  [...] and the employer signed a settlement agreement wherein $200,000 was to be paid to [...] with “$78,103 of the settlement amount as retroactive salary payments to [...] for his last three years active on the job, specifying increases of $25,487 for 2001-02, $26,138 for 2002-03, and $26,478 for 2003-04.
[brief] In Parlmarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446 (1979), the Court considered an action to quiet title among parties whose properties derived from a common grantor, the [...].  By deed dated February 12, 1913, the [...] conveyed to [...] land which included all of the property at issue in the case.  That deed was recorded on February 18, 1913.  On February 15, 1913, the [...] conveyed the land claimed by the defendants to [...].  Taylor did not record that deed until April 25, 1913.  Plaintiffs claimed through the [...] chain of title, whereas defendants claimed through the Taylor chain of title.  In 1966, the plaintiffs’ predecessor in title took ownership of the property in the Appleby Chain, and did not have record notice of the Taylor deed.  The Palmarg court stated:  Although the New Jersey Recording Act appears to say that a subsequent purchaser will always be deemed to have notice of, and be bound by, a prior recorded deed touching the same property, this is not in fact the case.  The statutes have been consistently interpreted to mean that the subsequent purchaser will be bound only by those instruments which can be discovered by “reasonable” search of the particular chain of title.  Palmarg, at 456.  The Palmarg court quoted from Glorieux v. Lightpipe, 88 N.J.L. 199 (E. & A. 1915):  A purchaser may well be held bound to examine or neglect at his peril, the record of the conveyances under which he claims, but it would impose an intolerable burden to compel him to examine all conveyances made by every one in his chain of title.  Palmarg, at 456, quoting Glorieux, at 203.  Defendant’s expert opined, and the trial court ultimately concluded, that at the time Plaintiff purchased his Property, Plaintiff was on notice that there was a potential problem with Plaintiff’s title to the Strip.  The trial court found that the Plaintiff was on actual notice at the time he purchased Lot 4 due to three facts: (1) the 1991 Survey prepared by [...]; (2) Defendant’s use of the strip, or at least a portion of the Strip, as a parking area; and (3) the “as of” deed with a 19 year discrepancy between the date of preparation and the date of recording.  Similarly, the trial court found that the evidence put the Plaintiff on inquiry notice, requiring that the Plaintiff make a reasonable and diligent inquiry regarding Defendant’s ownership claims to the Strip.  4T19:3-7.
[brief] Table of Contents  i  Table of Authorities ii  Plaintiff’s Reply I.  Public Entities and Taxpayer Subsidies Are Not Immune from Judicial Review and Remedies.  1  II.  On April 8, 2019, Plaintiff Had Constitutional, Statutory and Common Law Standing to Seek Compensatory Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief.  4  III.  Plaintiff-an Aggrieved Millburn Taxpaying Resident- Was Deprived of the Benefit of the Millburn Secession Settlement and Amending Long Term Tax Exemption Legislation.  7  IV.  Plaintiff Is Entitled to a Level Litigation Playing Field.  9  V.  As Officers of the Court and Fiduciaries of a Public Trust, Defendants Are Obligated to Advise the Tribunal of Contrary Intervening Case and Statutory Law.  10  Conclusion
[brief] On July 19, 2017 [...] filed its application for a hardship rent increase for the Unit with the Board.  Da 36.  Over a period exceeding twenty-five (25) years from 1993-2017, [...]’s monthly rent increased from $675 to $723.41, or a mere $48.41.  Da 36; 1T:33:25-34:1, 1T:47:27-48:1, 7T:89:20.  Accordingly, the rent for the Unit is grossly under market, and [...] has lost money on the Unit for several years—and continues to do so.  As set forth in [...]’s application for a rent increase, and testified to by [...], the total rent earned for the Unit in 2016 was $8,387.00.  Da 38.  However, [...]’s actual out of pocket carrying expenses that year were $14,506.00 resulting in a deficiency of $6,119.00.  1T:10:25-11:1; Da 38.  For several years, [...] has subsidized the Unit by an annual minimum of $6,000 and in some years even more.  1T:11:1-21.  The Unit’s current market value, whether appraised value or assessed value, far exceeds the value adopted by the Court to determine [...]’s equity in the Unit to measure a “fair return”.  Significantly, while [...]’s application for a rent increase included an appraisal valuing the Unit’s fair market value at $622,500, and [...]’s expert testified regarding that appraisal (1T:59:19, 62:17), [...] did not use that appraised value in advancing to the Court the value of its equity in the Unit.  Rather, [...] based its equity in the Unit upon the average of (i) the sums paid by [...] to both purchase and improve the Unit, adjusted for inflation from 1993-2017, which totaled $197,600 (10T:138:12-15); and (ii) [...]’s unequalized assessment of the Unit in the amount of $404,600 (T1:8:24-9:3), which was based upon the replacement cost method (6T:21:21).  Notably, applying [...]’s equalization rate of 74.18% results in a fair market value of $545,483.  But [...] did not posit that value, nor the $622,500 appraised value, as its equity in the Unit.  Instead, [...] sought a significantly lesser number, $301,105, based upon the average of the Unit’s purchase price/improvements, adjusted for inflation, and [...]’s unequalized assessment, neither of which reflected the higher values resulting from an appraisal or [...]’s equalized assessment.  However, [...] falsely (and repeatedly) states that [...]’s equity in the Unit was based upon its market value as a condominium.
[brief] Defendants respectfully request that the Appellate Division (1) Modify the appropriate Order to require that [...] is entitled to restitution for his one-third share of the fair market value of the Boonton and Florida Properties, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-72; (2) Modify the appropriate Order to require that [...] is entitled to restitution for his one-third share of the Trust funds spent on adversarial litigation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-72, which provides that a beneficiary may seek restitution for improper expenditures; (3) Reverse the May 10, 2023 Orders and confirm the Defendants’ right to supplement and amend their pleadings and pursue their claims; (4) Reverse the February 14, 2024 Order with regard to frivolous sanctions imposed upon Defendants; and (5) Assign their case to a different judge, assuming remand is granted.
[brief] Although Defendant argues in his brief that the Court “had ruled that [...]’s testimony regarding Defendant’s statement was coming in so long as it was limited to that one statement,” (Db 40) this is an inaccurate summary of the record.  The transcript reveals that the Court simply indicated that it seemed likely that the evidence was admissible but left the question to defense counsel to determine if she wished to contest the admissibility of the evidence and in what manner:
[brief] ”  Ibid.  To that end, any suggestion that the law ensnares within its ambit an innocent passerby who comes upon bird fight preparations and stops to determine what activity is occurring or that a law enforcement officer who is present to arrest others falls within the term “spectator” are unavailing.  Neither hypothetical is reasonably within the Act’s orbit, and, quite frankly, the law enforcement example is absurd and nonsensical.  The term “spectator” as that word is understood in its ordinary sense in context with the statutory terms, is a purposeful, knowing or intentional observer of an event.  [Id. at 637-38.]  --- 13  The Edmondson court noted that “[c]ourts in other jurisdictions faced with similar challenges to the term ‘spectator’ in cockfighting and/or animal fighting legislation have rejected such vagueness challenges. ”  Edmondson, 91 P. 3d at 637 (citing Peck v. Dunn, 574 P. 2d 367, 369 (Utah 1978); State v. Tabor, 678 S.W. 2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1984); People v. Elder, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1061, 1070, 1073-74 (5th Dist. Cal. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989)).  The opinions of our fellow courts reveal a common theme that guides this Court in analyzing defendant’s vagueness argument: a knowing mental state is, at least, embedded in each of those statutes and in the statute at issue here, which prevents a criminal violation by happenstance as defendant seemingly fears.
[directive] HAVING FOUND cause to question defendant's fitness to proceed to trial, and in order to determine defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him/her and to assist in __________ _, his/her own defense, the defendant, being charged with __ ______ of ORDERED  It is on the day , 20 _ that: NJS.A. I.  Defendant hereby ordered pursuant to 2C:4-5a to be examined by a qualified is of of psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated by the Commissioner the Department Health to determine fitness to proceed.
[brief] (RULING AT 32T 19-24 TO 20-2)  Because the evidence in the case -- when viewed in a light best for the defense -- clearly supported a claim of so-called “intruder” self-defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4c,\(^{11}\) because defendant claimed that [...], who had been told he was not welcome at the [...] (31T 119-10 to 120-13), showed up at night, banging on the front door and/or walls and threatening defendant before attacking him, the judge instructed the jury on “intruder” self-defense as a means to an acquittal of any homicide charge.  But, in direct conflict \(^{11}\)  Ordinarily, the use of deadly force in self-defense is limited to when a reasonable person defends against the threat of infliction of death or serious injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4b(2), but self-defense against an intruder in a dwelling -- which includes the porch of a dwelling, see State v. Martinez, 229 N.J. Super. 593, 601-604 (App. Div.1989), citing State v. Bonano, 59 N.J. 515, 520 (1971) -- allows the use of deadly force against an intruder if the intruder uses any unlawful force, and either the actor reasonably believes the intruder might cause any injury, not merely serious injury, or even if the intruder is commanded to surrender or leave and refuses to do so.  N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4c. with a wealth of case law that makes it clear that passion/provocation manslaughter often presents a viable middle-ground lesser-included-offense option between a verdict for murder and an acquittal on self-defense grounds, and must be charged -- if requested and if the evidence in the case presents a mere “rational basis” for a conviction of that lesser offense -- the judge refused a defense request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] It is well-established that “[t]he Legislature's intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language. ”  *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  Reviewing courts must “asccribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance . . . read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole,” and “construe and apply the statute as enacted. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *In re Closing of Jamesburg High School*, 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)).  Reviewing courts must not “rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature . . . presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language . . . or ‘engage in conjecture or surmise which will circumvent the plain meaning of the act. ’”  *Ibid.* (citations omitted).