ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The cases [...] relies on are plainly inapplicable in these circumstances, as they concern matters where the attorney’s bills in support of the application “f[e]ll somewhere between gross negligence and outright fraud,” including “so many inappropriate billing entries and . . . deficiencies were so widespread” that the application was sanctionable as frivolous, see Young v. Smith, 905 F.3d 229, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); consisted entirely of “vague entries” that were “on their face[] unnecessary or excessive” such as “the staggering 562 hours that counsel billed for ‘Trial prep’ or ‘Trial preparation’ with no further description of the nature of the work performed,” see Clemens v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 903 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 2018), and were so excessive in relation to the nature of the claims as to “shock the conscience,” see Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir. 1991) and Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980).  Here, it is Defendants’ seven years and counting of frauds on the court to avoid payment of a judgment that shock the judicial conscience, not Plaintiff’s efforts to recover what he was awarded and what Defendants can readily pay.  [...] acknowledged that Plaintiff’s counsel “had to do a lot of work to collect what they’ve collected over the time period they’ve been collecting it” because of his “lies” and “obstruction.
[brief] The trial court correctly found that the defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The covenant, inherent in every contract, requires that neither party do anything that would have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of another party to receive the fruits of the contract.  *Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc.*, 148 N.J. at 420-21; *Seidenberg v. Summit Bank*, 348 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2002) (one party to a contract may not unreasonably frustrate the other’s purpose).  One party to a contract may not use the powers bestowed on them to unilaterally destroy the other’s expectations without legitimate purpose.  Such risks are beyond the expectations of the parties at the formation.  *Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.*, 168 N.J. 236, 251 (2001).  Bad faith is to be found in the “eye of the trier of fact” and can be discerned from the proofs regarding the defendants’ state of mind and the context from which the claim arose.  *Seidenberg*, 348 N.J. Super. at 262-63.  Here, the trial court found that the financial records that [...] produced for [...] and [...] (on behalf of himself, [...], and the other defendants), and that formed the basis for the purchase prices in the MIPA and the SPAs were “bogus. ”  (37T 87:20 to 88:1).  [...] accomplished this by creating what the trial court repeatedly called “webs” and mazes” of accounts to divert funds from the companies to himself, his wife, and entities they controlled.  (37T 79:7-12).  The defendants used accounting tricks to conceal this conduct from the Plaintiffs’ view.  (37T 89:12-17).  The trial court found that even if all of the aforesaid conduct did not violate the express terms of the subject contracts, it breached the implied covenant of good faith since it had the effect of destroying the Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations.  (36T 51:19-21).  As the trial court later explained: the counts for which defendants were found liable were all “interrelated, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which I think deals with all of this. ” (37T 95:24 to 96:5).  D.
[brief] After remand, on February 7, 2023, [...] filed a motion to set a date certain for Appellant to comply with this Court’s December 2, 2022 Order.  PA68-PA69.  On March 3, 2023, the trial court granted [...]’s unopposed motion and ordered Appellant to comply with this Court’s December 2, 2022 Order, requiring Appellant to proceed with counsel, within thirty (30) days (“March 3, 2023 Order”).
[brief] His determination should have been confined to the four corners of the Agreement.  Instead, he determined that the annual Treasury Circulars control over negotiated plain and unambiguous language in the contract.  Therefore, the interpretation of contract language by the arbitrator is not "reasonably debatable."  Pursuant to the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement, [...] members must be compensated for overtime at a rate of base plus maintenance divided by $2,080 \times 1.5$ unless the Trooper elects to take compensatory time.
[brief] Pursuant to Robbinsville Township Ordinance §142-77(B)(26)(f)², “[n]o application for development shall be approved unless it has been affirmatively determined, after an environmental assessment, that the proposed project:  [1]  Will not result in a significant adverse impact on the environment.  [2]  Has been conceived and designed in such a manner that it will not significantly impair natural processes.  [3]  Will not place a disproportionate or excessive demand upon the total resources available to the project site or to the impact area. ”  Applicant did not present an environmental impact assessment report or provide any testimony regarding an environmental assessment.  In addition, Applicant did not present any testimony regarding whether the proposed development (1) will not result in a significant adverse impact on the environment; (2) has been conceived and designed in such a manner that it will not significantly impair natural processes, and (3) will not place a --- ²  For ease of reference, Robbinsville Township Ordinances §142-77 and -78 are attached to Plaintiff’s appendix at Pa254-Pa265 and Pa266-Pa269.  disproportionate or excessive demand upon the total resources available to the project site or to the impact area.  Plaintiffs  [...] and [...] (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) objected to the proceeding, as Applicant had failed to set forth any of the testimony required under the Municipal Land Use Law and township ordinances.  (1T93-1 to 1T95-22).  Other members of the public further testified against the proposed subdivision.  (1T75-6 to 1T95-23).  On November 1, 2022, the Board approved Applicant’s application for major subdivision approval by a 4-2 vote.  (1T97-7 to 1T100-19).  On December 13, 2022, the board adopted a Resolution of Approval.  (Pa245-Pa253).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] With respect to factor four discussed in *Cole*, *to wit*, “the extent of discovery conducted,” Defendants refused to participate in discovery or even attempt to fulfill their defaulted obligations.  *See* Certification of [...] ¶¶ 4-8 (Pa103-Pa104).  Ten months after [...]’s served discovery requests (Pa106) and three months after serving a R. 1:6-2(c) good faith letter (Pa109), [...] was forced to move to compel discovery responses (Pa101) and to extend discovery (Pa110).  However, both Motions were withdrawn by the Court on September 22, 2023.  (Pa114-Pa115).  Defendants were effectively rewarded for their dilatory strategy—which implicates factor three discussed in Cole, i.e., the extent to which delay was part of a litigation strategy.
[directive] Additionally, for violations on public roads, County and Municipal Police can enforce non-enhanced penalties in Title 39.  See N.J.S.A. 39:3C-28; N.J.S.A. 39:3C-35; N.J.S.A. 39:3C-36.  County and Municipal Police can also initiate forfeiture actions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1(a)(5).
[brief] ”  The Court also noted that, whether notice and a failure to act would give rise to liability again depends on the standard practice in the City in responding to that type of condition and that “the evidence reveals a sufficient basis for a triable issue relating to whether the failure to repair the hole was the result of the determination of policy or the carrying out of policy decisions already made, and, respectively, whether such failure was palpably unreasonable or merely unreasonable. ”  *Id.*  In *Lodato v. Evesham Twp.*, 388 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2006), the Court was satisfied that plaintiffs proofs were sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether the Township had constructive notice under N.J.S.A. 59:4.3b because in that case.  (1) the "condition was open and obvious"; (2) "the same condition existed for almost eighteen years before the accident and those similar conditions existed throughout the neighborhood"; and (3) "individuals from the Township were in the immediate vicinity on at least two occasions when they removed trees causing a similar condition adjacent to and on either side of the open and obvious condition that was subject to the litigation."
[directive] Any questions concerning the meaning or implementation of this Supplemental Directive shall be directed to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee.  6.  Request to the Attorney General for Exemption  A County Prosecutor or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in cases prosecuted by the Division may request the Attorney General, or her designee, in writing for permission to deviate from any requirements or provisions of this Supplemental Directive based upon compelling and extraordinary circumstances not foreseen by this Supplemental Directive.  7.
[brief] To that end, the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), NJSA 56:8-19 states the following:  “Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under this act or the act hereby amended and supplemented may bring an action or assert a counterclaim therefor[e] in any court of competent jurisdiction.  In any action under this section the court shall, \textit{in addition to any other appropriate legal or equitable relief}, award threefold the damages sustained by any person in interest.  In all actions under this section, including those brought by the Attorney General, the court shall also award reasonable attorneys' fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit. ”  (emphasis added)  In addition, under the CFA, a private litigant (such as Plaintiff here) can bring an action (thereby acting as a private attorney general) seeking injunctive relief (in addition to monetary damages) so long as her claims include that she suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property.
[brief] Snyder v. Snyder, No. A-4116-13T2, 2016 WL 4473254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 25, 2016) .............................................................................................................7  State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34 (2010) ........................................................................................................4, 6 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12 ....................................................................................................19, 20 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) ......................................................................................................17
[brief] Order for Judgment...Pa029 o Exhibit “C” – Certification of [...], Esq. regarding Attorney’s Fee...............................................Pa035 o Exhibit “D” – Certification of [...], Esq. regarding Attorney’s Fee...............................................Pa039 o Exhibit “E” – Certification of Litigation Expenses......Pa042 o Exhibit “F” – Pre-Judgment Interest Calculation........Pa046 Appellant’s Motion for New Trial² ......................................................Pa047 • Notice of Motion for New Trial........................................Pa047 • Proposed Order – Motion for New Trial........................Pa049 • Attorney Certification – Motion for New Trial................Pa051 • Brief – Motion for New Trial..........................................Pa057 ²  Brief attached, without exhibits, pursuant to R. 2:6-1(c)(2), only to evidence the issue of the verdict amount and/or Offer of Judgment penalties was not raised below.  Point I – Defendant Must Be Granted a New Trial Based Upon the Court’s Refusal to Charge the Jury with the Mockler Defense Charge……………………………………Pa057  Point II – Defendant Must Be Granted a New Trial Based Upon the Court’s Decision to Charge the Jury with Jury Charge 8.11F  Aggravation pf Preexisting Condition….Pa064  Conclusion………………………………………………………………………Pa073  Respondent’s Supplemental Certification in Support of Attorneys’ Fees………………………………………………………………………..Pa075 Certification……………………………………………………………………..Pa075
[brief] The Evidence Failed To Show That There Was Proximate Causation (Not Addressed Below)  Plaintiff, in his Brief at p. 21, argues that there is evidence on causation, and that his expert, [...], opined that the attorney’s breach of duty was the proximate cause of [...] and [...]’s damages.  He opined that [...] and [...] would have been able to challenge the 2014 Will and, had they done so, it would have been set aside.  (See plaintiff’s Brief at p. 20).  The Court should reject plaintiff’s argument that [...] Miranda presented sufficient evidence to establish proximate causation.
[directive] Issuing Order  General Attorney 1.7 Bail the Constitution, Jersey New the under me to granted authority the to Pursuant N.J.S.A. 1970, of Act Justice Criminal the and 25, - to 2A:162-15 N.J.S.A. Law, Reform the by justice criminal of supervision general the for provides which -117, to 52:17B-97 a of benefits the secure order to in State officer of the enforcement chief law as General Attorney justice criminal of administration the law and criminal of the enforcement efficient uniform and New the of 11 paragraph I, Article to amendments the implement to and State, the throughout hereby
[directive] A. refers to an individual who is not employed by a law enforcement “Civilian witness” agency or entity.  “Giglio B. refers to the individual appointed by the County Prosecutor to serve as a liaison” primary point of contact within the County Prosecutor’s Office concerning potential impeachment information.  C. refers to an individual who is a sworn law enforcement officer, “Investigative employee” analyst, civil investigator, or civilian employee working for a law enforcement agency or entity.  D.  When used without a modifier, refers to the attorney(s) assigned to “Prosecutor” prosecute a particular case.  In a County Prosecutor’s Office, this will typically be an Assistant Prosecutor; in the Division of Criminal Justice, the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability, and the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor, this will typically be a Deputy Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General.  The term “County Prosecutor” refers specifically to the acting or confirmed County Prosecutor who oversees a County Prosecutor’s Office.
[brief] The court should not interpret AICRA’s ADR provisions in an unconstitutional manner as applied to PIP-related fraud claims.  Defendants\(^1\) incorrectly contend that (1) Plaintiffs cannot argue for the first time on appeal that the court must avoid an unconstitutional interpretation of AICRA, (2) the Legislature intended insurers to raise fraud as a defense to benefit claims in PIP ADR rather than as affirmative claims, (3) AICRA can prohibit jury trials on damages claims because a court can review a PIP ADR award, (4) only defendants have a jury-trial right on IFPA claims, (5) Plaintiffs waived their right to a jury trial by contractually agreeing to arbitrate and can “opt out” of PIP ADR, and (6) insurers can sue in court for non-PIP-related fraud claims and [...] can sue in court on all IFPA claims.
[brief] Aa0085 ii. Exhibit B – Upland Erosion Control, Revegetation, and Maintenance Plan – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of Energy Projects, May 2013.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0087 iii. Exhibit C – Wetland and Waterbody Construction and Mitigation Procedures – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of Energy Projects, May 2013.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0107 iv. Exhibit D – East 300 Upgrade Project, Environmental Typicals, June 2020.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] Appellant responded by telling him to “knock it off. ”  (Pa230).  If Appellant went anywhere with another male coworker, [...] became jealous and wanted to know why/where she was going with that male employee.  Id.  When [...] engaged in conversation, he often invaded Appellant’s personal space by standing uncomfortably close to her, forcing her to step back.  Id.  [...] also went out of his way to find reasons to go to her and strike up a conversation.  Id.  On one occasion, [...] asked to go get coffee with Appellant when the office coffee pot broke.  (Pa340) 62:2-24.  Appellant told him that she did not want to go, but he insisted on repeatedly asking her, “Are you ready to go?”  This was a red flag for Appellant, and it made her uncomfortable as she felt [...] was attempting to get her into his car.  Id.  On March 14, 2018, another email exchange between Appellant and [...] discussed getting coffee together, but Appellant --- 2
[brief] - that [...] claimed that on February 18, 2016, [...] was “completely under” the desk “with my computer turned sideways. ”  (Dillon.Discipline 008) (Pa681) which at deposition [...] denied.  [...] testified at deposition that she never told anybody that she saw [...] Dillon turn the computer monitor sideways and she never told anybody that [...] Dillon was under the desk attempting to do something to [...]’s desktop computer.  (Pa692).
[brief] Sua Sponte Without Notice to Plaintiff  Moreover, the New Motion Judge raised and decided these “issues” without any notice to Plaintiff or without affording Plaintiff any chance to provide submissions addressing these points, thereby violating Plaintiff’s due process rights.  The New Jersey Supreme Court observed in *Doe v. Poritz*, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995):  “Fundamentally, due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  *Kahn v. U.S.*, 753 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir.1985).  The minimum requirements of due process, therefore, are notice and the opportunity to be heard.  *U. S. v. Raffoul*, 826 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir.1987) (citing *Goss v. Lopez*, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)).”  When a judge, *sua sponte*, raises and decides an issue without notice or an opportunity to be heard, the judge has deprived a party of the right to due process.  *Id.*
[brief] 16  Feld v. City of Orange, 2014 WL 8277956 (App. Div. March 26, 2015) .................................................................  15  Feld v. City of Orange, 2018 WL 3747632 (App. Div. August 8, 2018) .................................................................  17  Goldman v. Critter Control of New Jersey, 454 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2018) ..................................................  14  In re Approval of a Financing Commitment for the Project Known as [...], [...], [...] (May 31, 2022)
[directive] Prosecution of Drug and Alcohol Offenses.  a.  Each county prosecutor shall take steps to ensure that juveniles taken into custody for or charged with an offense involving substance abuse, including alcohol abuse, are referred as soon as possible to available substance abuse evaluation and treatment, as appropriate.  b.  Each county prosecutor shall make certain that delinquency complaints filed by police alleging a violation of any offense defined in Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C are not diverted from the court without the prosecutor's consent, which consent should not be given except in extraordinary circumstances.  c.  Where a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for any offense defined in Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C, the county prosecutor shall make certain that the applicable mandatory penalties are imposed, including the Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction penalty, forensic laboratory fee, mandatory community service for certain possessory offenses committed on or near school property, and the forfeiture or postponement of the privilege to operate a motor vehicle or motorized bicycle.
[directive] This may as except 1, November 2017, on operational shall become Directive this of requirements and All prosecutors 1. subsection. note  See or Section a in specified expressly otherwise be ensure to necessary and appropriate are as preparations such make to required agencies are police such that with on date complied the subsection are Section and of each requirements the that operational. subsection becomes or Section or amended, repealed, until is it and unless and effect in remain force shall Directive This General.  Attorney of the Order by superseded [...] S. General Attorney
[directive] Some applicant. established as offense violence domestic persons disorderly or crime a indictable of convicted an 2C:58-3(c)(1)).  N.J.S.A. see records; history criminal computerized fingerprint-verified by different lead to might which subjective, more are however, criteria, disqualification  Other provides statute governing the example, For authorities. licensing different by interpretations .  .. issued be shall card identification purchaser firearms or permit purchase handgun "[n]o that N.J.S.A. welfare." or safety health, public the of interest the in be not would issuance the where operational uniform and practices develop best to appropriate is therefore It 2C:58-3(c)(5).
[brief] ....................................... | | **Olds v. Donnelly,** | 15-16,18,20,23,26,27 | | 150 N.J. 424 (1997)  ........................................................................... | | **Pivnick v. Beck,** | 17-28,30 | | 165 N.J. 670(2000)  .......................................................................... | | **Sklodowsky v. Lushis,** | 24 | | 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011)  ......................................... | | **State v. Gonzalez,** | 30 | | 75 N.J. 181 (1977)  .......................................................................... | | **Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. County of Bergen,** | 17 | | 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290,(App. Div. 2017) ................................... | | **Zaccardi V. Becker,** | 21 | | 88 N.J. 245, 258(1982)  .................................................................... | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Page(s) | |----------------------------|------------------| | Rules | | | R.4:30A | 20,21 | | R. 1:6-6 | 3 | | R. 4:29–1(b) | 21 | | R. 4:5–1(b)(2) | 18,21,22,25,26,27| | R.4:28 | 21,25,26 | | R. 4:6-2(e) | 17 |
[directive] Notice When Using BWCs Inside a Private Residence.  Prior to entering a private residence, a law enforcement officer shall notify the occupant that the occupant is being recorded by the BWC and, if the occupant requests the officer to discontinue use of the officer’s BWC the officer shall immediately discontinue use of the BWC unless the officer is actively engaged in investigating the commission of a criminal offense, or is responding to an emergency, or reasonably believes that the officer will be required to use constructive authority or force.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  9 officer pursuant to this Section and the response to the request shall be recorded by the recording system prior to discontinuing use of the recording system.  4.5
[brief] **Rules of the court of the state of New Jersey  R.4:9-3 reading as follows:**  Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading; but the court, in addition to its power to allow amendments may, upon terms, permit the statement of a new or different claim or defense in the pleading.  An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amendment, that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party to be brought in by amendment.