ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, the burden of proof cannot be satisfied simply by the DOC introducing hearsay evidence, lack of evidence or speculation.  *N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(b).*  See *In the Matter of [...], Juvenile Justice Commission*, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 250, *14-15, OAL DKT. NO. [...]* (April 15, 2009).  See also, *State in the Interest of D.C.*, 114 N.J. Super. 499, 502 (App. Div. 1971)(The State must prove the charges by competent evidence; suspicion alone does not suffice.)  In sum, [...]’s testimony was based on speculation.  He was not able to testify about any part of the investigation as he constantly reiterated that it was not his investigation.  (1T169.15-16; 1T174.24 to 175.1; 1T177.4-5; 1T178.16; 1T178.19-20; 1T186.16; 1T187.22; 1T194.4; 1T218.20).  Moreover, [...] repeated that he could not testify as to the particulars of those logbook entries – other than that which he purportedly observed by simply watching the video.  (1T169.15-16; 1T177.4-5; 1T178.19-20; 1T187.22; 1T194.4).  **Point III**
[brief] The Trial Court Decision and Remand [...], and its contract seller, [...], appealed the Board’s decision.  The trial court rejected the Board’s analysis and found that the alleged detrimental impacts that served as the basis for the denial were entirely unjustified.  [Da348].  It found undisputed that the proposed use is inherently beneficial, and that the record did not support the Board’s findings that the project would be “too big, too noisy and [would] create too much traffic. ”  [Da354-355].  For each of the categories of harm that the Board claimed, the trial court swiftly rejected the Board’s contrived claims because there was no factual basis for the Board’s findings and conclusions.  In addition to the Board’s baseless factual findings, [...] also rejected the Board’s legal analysis.  He found the Board’s analysis under *Sica, supra*, to be legally unsound, because the Board did not properly analyze the detriments of the application, identify conditions to mitigate any detriments took place, nor undertake the weighing function the Supreme Court required.  [Da357].  As a result, the trial court reversed and remanded the application back to the Board for the imposition of conditions, other than a reduction in the number of units.  [Da357].
[brief] *Stehr v. Sawyer*, 40 N.J. 352, 357 (1963).  [T]o establish a right to the remedy of specific performance, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the contract in question is valid and enforceable at law, that the terms of the contract are “expressed in such fashion that the court can determine, with reasonable certainty, the duties of each party and the conditions under which performance is due,” and that an order compelling performance of the contract will not be “harsh or oppressive.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 investigative interview.  But the same officer must cooperate and answer questions posed by their employer during an administrative disciplinary interview.  So while the internal affairs investigator cannot require a subject officer to answer questions during a criminal interview, he or she can require that officer to answer questions during an administrative disciplinary interview.  8.1.4  The confusion caused by these issues can be alleviated several ways.  One way is to separate the investigations by time—the criminal investigation is completed first and then the administrative investigation may follow.  Another way is to conduct bifurcated investigations.  In a bifurcated investigation, the responsibility for a criminal investigation is separated from that for an administrative investigation.  Thus, one investigator (typically from the prosecutor's office) is assigned the responsibility of gathering evidence of criminal wrongdoing while a second (typically the internal affairs investigator from the subject officer's agency) is assigned the responsibility of gathering evidence of a disciplinary infraction.
[directive] 3.8.5  High-volume OC delivery systems are designed for, and may be used in, civil disturbances against groups of people engaged in unlawful acts resulting in, or creating an immediate risk of, bodily injury or significant property damage.  3.8.6  CS (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) chemical agents are primarily offensive weapons that shall be used with the utmost caution.  Thus, CS: (a) may be deployed only by specially trained individuals who are part of a special tactical unit authorized to deploy such agents; 12 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 (b) may be deployed only with the specific and express approval of the IC; (c) may be deployed defensively to prevent injury when lesser force options are either not available or would likely be ineffective; and (d) may be deployed only after an announcement is made and when avenues of egress are available to the crowd.
[directive] 1.  In any case involving any of the circumstances described above in Sections II.C.1.b.i – II.C.1.b.iii (use of force resulting in death; death of civilian during law enforcement encounter; death of civilian while in custody), the Independent Investigator is required by state law to present evidence to a Grand Jury concerning the LE Incident.  In such cases, the Independent Investigator shall act as follows:  Page 12  a.  Any presentation of evidence to a Grand Jury shall occur in a county other than the one where the LE incident occurred.  b.  A prosecutor operating under the supervision of the Independent Investigator shall present sufficient evidence to the Grand Jury to provide the jurors with a full, complete, and accurate representation of the relevant facts of the LE Incident.  c.  After presenting sufficient evidence, the prosecutor shall instruct the Grand Jury as to the legal elements of the offense, as well as the elements of justification for the use of force by law enforcement, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:3-7 and N.J.S.A. 2C:3-9.  d.  In cases where the Independent Investigator and Independent Supervisory Reviewer agree that one or more Principals should be charged criminally for their role in the LE Incident, the prosecutor should present the Grand Jury with a draft charging document for the jurors’ consideration and vote.  e.  In cases whether the Independent Investigator and Independent Supervisory Reviewer agree that none of the Principals should be charged criminally, the prosecutor may refrain from presenting the Grand Jury with a draft charging document.  In such incidents, the Independent Investigator may instruct the Grand Jury on its ability to issue a Presentment addressing matters of public policy in cases in which no criminal charges are returned by the Grand Jury.  LE Incidents Not Resulting in Death.
[directive] All questions by prosecutors concerning the interpretation and implementation of these Guidelines shall be addressed to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his designee.  The Director shall from time to time advise prosecutors concerning the resolution of issues that may arise in interpreting and implementing these Guidelines with a view toward ensuring their uniform application throughout the State.  The Director shall, as appropriate, publish “Application Notes” interpreting these Guidelines and shall make these Application Notes available to judges and defense counsel by means of the Division of Criminal Justice website.
[brief] WHOSE SIGNIFICANCE IS FOR THE JURY’S ULTIMATE DETERMINATION.  [...] performed an autopsy, which found blunt force trauma to [REDACTED] skeleton inconsistent with an accidental fall.  But [...] and forensic anthropologist [...] both admitted that they could not determine whether this blunt force trauma was inflicted before or after [REDACTED] death.  (15T:81-18 to 82-3; 84-7 to 85-16; 42T:89-5 to 90-19; 120-4 to 121-17)  Despite this conceded inability to place the skeletal trauma prior to [REDACTED] death, [...] opined that this trauma was the cause of death, telling the jury repeatedly that his manner of death was a homicide.
[brief] ii.  The communication from the Board Attorney, dated February 17, 2021, accurately captured the essence of the Respondent Board vote / determination.  In advance of the Borough Council’s official adoption of the 2nd Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, the Planning Board Attorney prepared a letter essentially detailing the nature and substance of the Planning Board determination (holding that the proposed second amendment to the proposed Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Master Plan), and the reasons underlying the same.
[brief] However, as this Court determined in *Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Edgewater*, 225 N.J. Super 124 (App. Div. 1988), even a laudable purpose cannot excuse an improper payment.  C.  The Court’s Nexus Finding is Incompatible with the MLUL  Even were the Court to have focused on the proper test, there was nothing in the record to demonstrate compliance with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42 of the MLUL, which is a prerequisite to all such assessments.  The MLUL contains a carefully crafted statutory procedure under which payments from developers for offsite improvements may be made.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42 requires that, as a condition of allowing a payment for off-site improvements, a governing body must “adopt regulations,” the exaction must be “reasonable and necessary,” the funds must be used for limited purposes specified in that statutory section, and the exaction must be “necessitated or required” by improvements to be built by the developer.  In addition, the Ordinance must “establish fair and reasonable standards to determine the proportionate or pro-rata amount of the cost of such facilities. ”  Defendants did not argue that they have satisfied a single one of these requirements.  As set forth in the accompanying Statement of Facts, at pp. 11 to 12, the record demonstrated that there was no compliance with the MLUL and Defendants made no contrary assertion.  As a result, the exaction is unlawful under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42.  See e.g. Township of Marlboro v. Planning Board of Twp. of Holmdel, 279 N.J. Super. 638 (App. Div.), certif. den., 141 N.J. 98 (1995); Pond Run Watershed Ass’n v. Twp. of Hamilton Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, supra, 397 N.J. Super. 335, 363-64 (App. Div. 2008); see also New Jersey Builders Asso. v. Bernards Township, 108 N.J. 223, 237-38 (1987).
[brief] When a municipality has the power to make a contract but there is an “irregular exercise” of that power by the municipality, the person contracting with the municipality can recover against the municipality as that person “is not obliged to scrutinize, at his peril, the corporate proceedings and cases cited therein. ”  Id.  Neither [...] nor [...] was required to conduct his own investigation as to whether the Borough’s Zoning Officer was correct or not, nor necessarily, as to whether the Zoning Board of Adjustment in 1984 properly determined that the intended use of the subject property was in fact a valid non-conforming use.  They could and did rely upon the official’s determination.  When equitable estoppel is sought to be applied against a municipality, there must be a balancing between the interests of the municipality and the permittees’ interests.  Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee of Raritan, 39 NJ 1, 15 (1962).  Indeed, the holding in Hill regarding equitable estoppel has been criticized by a later Appellate Division panel.
[brief] In the interest of brevity, amicus curiae hereby incorporates by reference and relies on the Procedural History in the brief submitted by Petitioner/Appellant [...], accepting the facts as stated therein.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LAW DIVISION ERRED BY DISMISSING ALLSTATE’S IFPA COMPLAINT AND COMPELLING ARBITRATION OF THE IFPA ALLEGATIONS, AS THE PIP DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM (FORTHRIGHT) CAN NEVER HAVE JURISDICTION OVER: (1) THE NON-MEDICAL PROVIDER DEFENDANTS; AND (2) AN INSURANCE CARRIER’S IFPA CLAIMS.
[brief] For all of the above set forth reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court erred in concluding that [...] could continue its current operations.  [...] is not a validly existing preexisting non-conforming use.  This Court should reverse the Trial Court’s judgment and remand the case back to the Trial Court for the entry of an injunction and for an award of damages to the Plaintiffs.  Respectfully submitted, s/[...]
[brief] In this case, [...] is claiming his property rights are his rights to keep his job.  [...] contends that he had a right to his job because he never did a single act to show he was relinquishing his job.  [...] should not lose his job based solely on his words.  [...] does admit that he told more than one person that he was not going to report to work due to Covid-19, but he never carried through with those words.  [...] testified that he spoke with [...], a manager in Human Resources.
[brief] See N.J.R.E. 609; N.J.R.E 404(b).  Furthermore, our courts have long recognized that the risk of prejudice in introducing a witness’s prior convictions is heightened when it is applied to a criminal defendant, precisely for the reason that “the jury may be influenced to return a guilty verdict because it considers the defendant to be a criminal. ”  See State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 384 (1993); State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289 (1989) (Noting “[i]t is thought that proof of a previous crime will distract the jury, leading them to forego an independent analysis of the evidence and to rely merely on the tendency they possess in common with most people of saying ‘once a thief -- always a thief. ’”)  In seeking to admit [...]’s prior convictions for the prohibited purpose of demonstrating his propensity to commit crimes, the State failed to carry its burden of establishing that [...]’s prior convictions were more probative of his credibility than they were prejudicial.
[brief] On behalf of the undersigned Defendant/Appellant, kindly accept this Amended Reply Letter Brief.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................................................  2  REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS  .............................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT 1: THE APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED WITHIN 45 DAYS OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT  .................................................................................................................................  6 POINT II: COUNSEL FEES FROM A FUND IN COURT WAS RAISED & DECIDED BELOW  INCORRECTLY & A PRO SE LITIGANT’S ACTION  BENEFICIAL TO OTHERS ENTITLES HIM TO THOSE FEES ...........................................................................................................................................  8  POINT III: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A TURN-OVER & THEIR OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WERE FRIVOLOUS ENTITLING THE PRO SE APPELLANT TO FEES  .........................................................................................................................  10  POINT IV:  COMPOUNDED INTEREST ON THE LONG-OVERDUE JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED  .................................................................  12  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Mondays, Tuesdays Monday, Wednesday Edison 1205 [...] & Friday Helmetta 1206 [...]  2nd Tuesday 1st & 3rd Tuesday; Highland Park 1207 [...] 2nd, 3rd, 4th Wednesday Jamesburg 1208 [...] 1st & 3rd Tuesday Tuesdays & Every Old Bridge 1209 [...] other Wednesday Metuchen 1210 [...] Friday Middlesex Borough 1211 [...] Mondays Milltown 1212 [...]  Thursdays Tuesdays, 1st, 2nd, Monroe 1213 [...] 3rd, 4th Thursday Monday, Wednesday New Brunswick 1214 [...] & Thursday Tuesday, Wednesday, North Brunswick 1215 [...] Thursday Tuesday, Wednesday, Perth Amboy 1216 [...] Thursday Tuesday, Wednesday, Piscataway 1217 [...] Thursday Sayreville 1219 [...] Thursdays 1st & 3rd Tuesday, 2nd South Amboy 1220 [...] &4th Thursday 2nd & 4th Tuesday, South Brunswick 1221 [...]
[brief] Appellant asserts, without citing any legal authority, the trial court erroneously granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment because he testified that all of his pleadings and discovery were incorrect and that he actually received permission to use the PCard in 2012.  This argument must fail because his self-serving testimony cannot defeat the overwhelming mound of evidence previously submitted by Appellant that refutes his testimony.  Appellant appears to believe that he can simply erase certified answers to interrogatories, his signed responses to requests to admit, and filed pleadings—none of which were ever amended.  Appellant ignores his own draft certification and draft complaint allegedly supporting a proposed order to show cause.  Appellant disregards his own statements during the investigation that it was only in March 2020 that he allegedly received permission to use company funds for personal expenses, as well as his many assertions in writing that he only used the PCard for a month, maybe a few months.  Appellant’s change to his story is not supported by his own finely crafted record of writings and does not preclude summary judgment.  At the outset, it is undeniable that conclusory, self-serving affidavits and/or testimony are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
[brief] There is thus no direct and unavoidable conflict between the CFA and PLA.  The PLA governs the legal universe of products liability actions as defined in that Act and the CFA applies to fraud and misrepresentation and provides unique remedies intended to root out such conduct.  *Id.* at 335-36.  Ultimately the Court’s holding was based on the nature of the claims being asserted:  If a claim is premised upon a products manufacturing, warning or design defect, that claim must be brought under the PLA with damages limited to those available under that statute; CFA claims for the same conduct are precluded.  But nothing about the PLA prohibits a claimant from seeking relief under the CFA for deceptive, fraudulent, misleading and other unconscionable commercial practices in the sale of the product.  Indeed, the CFA is expressly “in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohibition imposed by the common law or statutes of this State”.  *N.J.S.A.* 56:8-2.13.  Said differently, if a claim is based on deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and other unconscionable commercial practices, it is not covered by the PLA and may be brought as a separate CFA claim.  *Id.* at 336-37.  The RETA is precisely fact-specific to all the plaintiffs’ claims.  It also consumes the very same claims one can assert under the CFA for deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and other unconscionable commercial practices.  Indeed, the nature of the claims brought is entirely within both the factual and legal structure of the RETA.  Most importantly, it is the *same conduct* being alleged as establishing both causes of action.  Each and every claim, accusation and damage alleged by the plaintiffs was entirely within the express and dedicated purpose of timeshare misconduct under the RETA.  The CFA is a law of general application for all kinds of advertising misconduct while the RETA is pinpoint fact and law specific for all timeshare cases allegedly involving “false, deceptive, misleading promotional or sales methods. ”  All of the above mandates application of a fundamental rule of statutory construction: … that a special statutory provision dealing with the particular subject prevails over a general statute on the same subject.  *Zoning Board of ADJ. v. Service Electric Cable TV*, 198 N.J. Super at 370, 381 (App. Div. 1985).  It was error for the Court to charge the CFA.  Only the RETA applies.
[brief] **APPELLANT’S COUNSEL ATTEMPTS TO PLACE THE BLAME FOR ITS ERRORS UPON THE TRIAL JUDGE**  Despite the de novo standard of review on appeal, Appellant seeks to attack the reasoning of the trial court judge.  *See Est. of Zoto v. Cellco P’ship*, No. A-2307-20, 2023 WL 2670713, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 29, 2023) (“We conduct a de novo review of an order granting a summary judgment motion, *Gilbert v. Stewart*, 247 N.J. 421, 442 (2021), and we apply ‘the same standard as the trial court,’ *State v. Perini Corp.*, 221 N.J. 412, 425 (2015). ”).  However, as with Appellant’s other arguments, Point IV of Appellant’s Brief contains several misrepresentations of the case below.
[brief] Definitely on 2/27/2009, about four years later, [...] could not claim that it was the nominee of [...], but it did claim that in the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 (065).  The alleged assignment of 2/27/2009 (065a) was never authenticated by a certificate of acknowledgment required by NJSA 2A:82-17.  And it was never authenticated by an affidavit or certification of personal knowledge required by Rule 1:6-6.  On 3/10/2009 based on the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 (065a) [...] filed a foreclosure complaint in the NJ Office Of Foreclosure (NJ OOF) against my house.  It was docketed as [...] and sent to the [...] in [...].  [...] was not the owner of the Note (091a) and failed to disclose the owner of the Note in the Foreclosure Complaint of 3/10/2009 which was in violation of the NJ Court Rule 4:64-(1)(b)(11).  The foreclosure trial judge failed to enforce that rule.  The foreclosure trial judge failed to dismiss the foreclosure complaint filed by [...] on 3/10/2009; therefore the foreclosure judge violated my constitutional rights specifically the US 4th and 14th Amendments.  In the financial crisis of 2009-2010 major servicers like [...] were filing foreclosure complaints in NJ and other states based on forged and robo-signed documents.
[brief] Plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall accident on March 16, 2017.  Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against [...], [...], [...] and various “John Doe” defendants who “had control of the premises” on July 3, 2018.  (Pa118-130)  An answer was filed on behalf of [...] and Cassese’s Enterprises on September 24, 2018.  This answer contained a third party complaint against [...].  (Pa138-144)  Plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend their complaint to add [...] as a direct defendant and remove [...] as a defendant.  (Pa148-169.  This motion was granted on November 26, 2018 (Pa170-171), and plaintiff’s first amended complaint was filed on November 27, 2018.  (Pa156-167)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE DEFENSE FROM ELICITING RELEVANT AND PROBATIVE TESTIMONY THAT SUPPORTED ITS THIRD-PARTY GUILT DEFENSE AND ALLOWING THE STATE TO IMPROPERLY UNDERMINE IT.  (9T 70-2 to 75-6, 13T 4-1 to 12-18)..................................................28  POINT  III  THE PRESENTATION OF AN ILLEGALLY INCORRECT BASIS TO FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY, COMBINED WITH JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE INSUFFICIENT TO GUIDE THE JURY IN ITS DELIBERATIONS, REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS.
[brief] To the extent necessary, [...] responds as follows.  No municipal government – any government really – has unlimited resources.  The allocation of resources is reasonably targeted to provide the most good for the greatest number.  Plaintiffs do not allege that any complaints or reports were made regarding the illegal activity alleged to have been occurring at the time of [...]’s injuries.  One can only surmise that this was because the third-parties participating in that activity knew it was illegal.  However, the why does not matter.  Without knowledge that something was occurring (i.e., complaints or other such reports) there was no reason to believe that the additional presence of police was necessary.
[brief] [...] relies on Mandell v. Reeve, 2011 WL 4585248 (S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011) for the proposition that the Arbitrator committed misconduct by failing to afford [...]’s newly-retained counsel an additional extension.  Not only is Mandell an unpublished S.D.N.Y. case with no precedential value to this Court, but [...] grossly mischaracterizes his role in the Arbitrator’s denial of a fourth adjournment.  In Mandell, the Court observed in dicta that the case “was not a situation in which a pro se litigant recently retained counsel who needed time to be brought up to speed on the case.