ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Township rejected the application.  After this rejection, several named plaintiffs and several organizations including the [...], the [...], and the [...] filed a lawsuit against [...] challenging its exclusionary zoning ordinance.  As a result of this litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the right of New Jerseyans to be free from exclusionary zoning practices that “perpetuate[d] social and economic segregation. ”  Id. at 193.  The court required municipalities to create realistic opportunities “at least to the extent of the municipality’s fair share of the present and prospective regional need. ”  Id. at 174.  In so doing, the court held:  It is elementary theory that all police power enactments, no matter at what level of government, must conform to the basic state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws.  These are inherent in Art. I, par. 1 of our Constitution, the requirements of which may be more demanding than those of the federal Constitution.  It is required that, affirmatively, a zoning regulation, like any police power enactment, must promote public health, safety, morals or the general welfare.  (The last term seems broad enough to encompass the others).  Conversely, a zoning enactment which is contrary to the general welfare is invalid.  [Id. at 175.]  The Supreme Court continued that the courts may “exercis[e] the full panoply of equitable powers to remedy the situation” where a municipality fails to meet its inclusionary zoning obligation.  *Mount Laurel I*, 67 N.J. at 215 (emphasis added).  However, without an effective remedy, the *Mount Laurel* doctrine is essentially meaningless.
[brief] 1.  Plaintiff filed a complaint, pro se, on August 12, 2020.  Pa1.  2.  On October 29, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint based upon various Title 59 immunities.  Pa 14.  3.  On February 16, 2021, opposition to Defendant’s Motion was filed by [...], Esq., on behalf of Plaintiff.  Pa15.  4.  On November 12, 2021, oral argument on the Defendant’s Motion was heard by Honorable [...], J.S.C., and the Motion was denied.  Pa16.  5.  On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint.  Pa17.  6.  On March 10, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint.  Pa24.  7.  Upon completion of discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 28, 2023.  PA34.  8.  Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 16, 2023.  Pa40.  9.  On October 20, 2023, oral argument on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. Pa377. \(^1\)  10.  On October 20, 2023, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.  Pa376.  11.  On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed this appeal.  Pa387.
[brief] [...], a forensic computer examiner for the State, testified that while he examined computers from both defendant and [...], he found no evidence that defendant was planning to kill [...] and found no communication between the two.  (4T 110-17 to 111-6)  All he could tell was that the two men had both frequented a website called Adam for Adam.  (4T 111-1 to 3)  [...] was called to again identify marks on defendant’s back that were found at the hospital as “fresh” marks.  (5T 6-11 to 7-15)  [...] testified that at the hospital defendant told him that he had been assaulted by his partner.  (5T 48-14 to 16; 5T 49-11 to 15)  Defendant at the time was “shirtless” and “cold,” according to [...], and “he was shaking and his teeth were chattering. ”  (5T 48-21 to 49-10)  [...] also agreed that he had been subpoenaed by the State to be a witness on the first day of trial, but then was never called -- the implication being that the prosecution liked Lt. Napp’s version of defendant’s statements at the hospital better than [...]’s.  (5T 57-13 to 15)  Finally, defendant’s father, [...] (hereinafter “[...]” to avoid confusion), testified that, after receiving a call from defendant’s mother on March 9, 2013, he spoke to defendant on the phone and picked him up in a wooded area about ten minutes away.  (5T 60-3 to 63-14)  It was “about 28 degrees” and snowing at the time, [...] testified, and defendant emerged from the woods without a shirt on and “very sluggish” as if in shock.  (5T 63-19 to 64-2)  Defendant was “a little out of it,” and had already told [...] that he had been assaulted.  (5T 64-2 to 13)  When [...] realized defendant had blood on him, he suggested that they go to the Old Bridge police station, which they did.  (5T 64-23 to 65-12)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN SHE DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED HOMICIDE OFFENSE OF PASSION/PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER.
[brief] It is evident to reasonable people the evidence and facts of this case were not recognized and/or ignored via the court’s unfounded presumptuous statement “clearly the defendant was on notice …” (Pa2) that was provided to uphold its own false narrative giving legal credence to an unfair result if not directly challenged by this defendant.  Reasonable people considering the “actual” facts and evidence while applying applicable case law (adhering to Stare Decisis) could not have agreed with the court’s result denying a Procedural Rights violation (Pa1) for; a).  Evidence demonstrates there are zero court records to support validity of service (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41) to which the court falsely presumes this defendant had knowledge of (Pa2), b).
[brief] He examined a shirt found in the bathroom of the home [...] and [...] shared.  (3T 139-20, 165-15)  [...] opined that the stains on the shirt were “passive” “transfers,” which were not “airborne” stains, but instead would be caused by wearing and removing the shirt with bloody hands.  (3T 139-17 to 147-1, 166-1 to 25)  He testified that it would be reasonable for no spatter to get on the shirt during a bludgeoning event.  (3T 147-18 to 149-19)  He also concluded that pillows had been moved during the assault, that the victim was on the bed when the bloodstains were produced, and that there had been two separate beating incidents.  (3T 169-8 to 21)  The shirt that [...] examined was later analyzed by [...], an expert in DNA, who concluded that [...] “was identified as the source” of a stain found on the shirt.
[brief] In reviewing a motion for acquittal, a trial court must determine whether, after giving the State the benefit of all favorable testimony and favorable inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could have found guilt of the charge at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.  (State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967); see also R. 3:18-1).  Defendant argues he was unjustifiably “target[ed]” by the [...], who fabricated their suspicion in tandem with [...].
[brief] Naffis v. Xerox Educ.Servs, LLC (In re Naffis), 2019 Bankr.LEXIS 323, *14, 2019 WL 470199.......................................................................................................................13  New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.A. & D.A., 2023 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 291, 2023 WL 2293819.................................................................47  Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 191, 135 S.Ct. 1318, 191 L.Ed.2d 253 (2015).....................................................38  Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 445, 771 A.2d 1194 (2001)............................................................................................................................43  Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. at 67.......................................................................................46  Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Counsil for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 733 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987).................................................................43 Penwag Property Co., Inc., v. Landau, 76 N.J. 595, 598, 388 A.2d 1265 (1978)...29 Quick Check Food Stores v. Twp. of Springfield, 83 N.J. 438, 445, 416 A.2d 840 (1980)............................................................................................................................33 Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 316, 661 A.2d 1202 (1995).................................43, 45 Ricci v. Corporate Express of the Esat, Inc., 344 N.J.Super. 39, 48, 779 A.2d 1114 (App. Div. 2001).............................................................................................................20 Saffer v. Willoughby, 143 N.J.256, 271, 670 A.2d 527 (1996).................................12, 25 Scales v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 925 F.2d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 1991)...............................45 Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 327, 88 A.2d 204 (1952)........................................41 Shearon v. Seaman, 198 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).............................13
[brief] While the Law Division did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the statute, the municipal court did, THE COURT:  . . . .  How is it in any way unconstitutional?  [...]:  Well, in terms of the void for vagueness argument, Your Honor, it says that any occupied building -- it can’t -- within 450 feet it can -- cannot have a loaded firearm for the purpose of hunting.  And the question is that the marker that was used for this particular incident was a pump house for -- to measure that 450 feet.  And the question is whether or not the pump house qualifies as a business as understood -- THE COURT: Or as a dwelling, is what -- [...]:  Dwelling is usually the -- a residential dwelling is the usual basis for a marker, but it also, in the alternative, indicates language in that statute, or a building used for a business.  So the question is whether a pump house qualifies as a business, so that this marker that was used to measure the 450 feet, is that a legitimate basis for this particular violation for [...].
[brief] 6  Point I  Circumstantial Evidence Supports Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Proof Of Proximate Cause .................................................................................................................................  6  Point II  Plaintiff’s Appeal From Both The Order Granting Summary Judgment And The Denial Of The Motion For Reconsideration Is Supported By The Case Information Statement .........................................................................................  9  Point III  A Fact Question Exists As To [...]’s Control Of The Construction Site .................................................................................................................................  11  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................
[brief] 1T  The Transcript of Public Hearing of the Mayor and Council of the [...] held on January 27, 2021 at which Ordinance 1667 was introduced.  2T  The Transcript of Public Hearing regarding Ordinance 1667 and the Second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan that was held before the [...] on February 8, 2021.  3T  The Transcript of Public Hearing before the Mayor & Council of the [...] held on February 17, 2021 on Ordinance 1667.  4T  November 19, 2021  Transcript of Motion for Reconsideration before the Honorable [...] 5T  April 7, 2022  Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment before the Honorable [...] 6T  June 10, 2022  Transcript of Motion for Reconsideration before the Honorable [...] 7T  February 27, 2023  Transcript of Motion In Limine and Transcript of Trial before the Honorable [...]  TABLE OF ORDERS Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration  Filed on November 19, 2021 by the Honorable [...]  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant’s Request for Summary Judgment and Statement of Reasons  Filed on April 7, 2022  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration  Filed on June 10, 2022 by the Honorable [...]  Order Granting Motion  In Limine filed on February 27, 2023 by the Honorable [...]  Order  Denying Plaintiff’s requested relief and Statement of Reasons filed on February 28, 2023 by the Honorable [...]  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
[brief] See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 77 N.J. 329, 343-44, 390 A.2d 597 (1978); Theodore v. Dover Bd. of Educ., 183 N.J. Super. 407, 413, 444 A.2d 60 (App.Div. 1982).  See also Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 301, 495 A.2d 376 (1985)."  National Transfer v. N.J. D.E.P 347 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 2002)  If a challenge to the action or inaction of a state administrative agency is brought in a trial court, that court has the responsibility to transfer the matter to this court on the motion of a party or "on its own initiative."  R. 1:13-4(a).  If a trial court fails to transfer a challenge to state agency action to this court and instead decides the merits, we may exercise our original jurisdiction on appeal from the judgment and review the underlying agency action as if the challenging party had appealed directly to his court."
[brief] Da69.  The inclusion or failure to include the provision regarding the existence of the ROFR would not alter anything.  The ROFR existed before the change was made to the offer because it was included in the FMSA amendment, which was the contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant [...].  The ROFR did not need to be mentioned in the agreement between the third-party buyer and the seller in order for it to be a condition attached to the sale of the gas station.  It was therefore not a “material term” of the offer/contract between Defendant [...] and [...].  *Black’s Law Dictionary* defines “material term” as a “contractual provision dealing with a significant issue such as subject matter, price, payment, quantity, duration or the work to be done. ”  *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 10th Ed. 2014.  A representation is material “if it would be likely to affect the conduct of a reasonable man with reference to the transaction in question.
[brief] On February 1, 2024, Plaintiff, [...], filed the instant complaint, [...], against Defendant.  (Da1).  On March 19, 2024, the scheduled trial date was adjourned to April 2, 2024.  On April 2, 2024, the court heard Defendant’s motion to transfer based on a claim of ownership.  The Court after hearing the pre trial argument of counsel, ruled against Defendant’s claim to ownership and immediately proceeded to trial on the nonpayment of rent and entered judgment for possession against Defendant.  On May 17, 2024, Defendant filed a notice of appeal.  --- 1  Transcript for March 19, 2024 has number designation 1T.  2  Transcript for April 2, 2024 has number designation 2T.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Instead, the lower court described the event as a “drive-by shooting that occurred,” [Tr., 4:14-15.] something that was factually incorrect:  [...]: Actually, Your Honor, we’ll – just to start out, it was not a drive-by shooting.  One of the individuals who was becoming intoxicated until the – into the early morning hours went to his vehicle to obtain a gun, but he – it was not a drive-by.  The Court: Oh.  [...]: He then went back back, and then shot my – shot the decedent in the leg, and then in the chest.  The Court: Okay.  So I – that’s what I – when I read vehicle, I assumed it was a drive-by.  He had a gun – [...]: No, sir, no.  [Tr., 6:16-7:3.]  Despite being corrected by undersigned counsel that the incident was not a drive-by shooting, the lower court unfairly characterized the event as merely criminal activity among third parties and completely ignored the presence of the illegal, large makeshift liquor concession stand.
[brief] Id. at 243 – 244.  The Court held that the Handbook could not supply the language missing in the signed Acknowledgement.  Id. at 527 – 528.  It reasoned as follows:  Nor is the problem cured by a generalized reference to the Employee Handbook.  While the Handbook language itself, if employed in a document signed by the employee, would seem sufficiently broad, clear and specific to cover plaintiff’s complaint, that language was not in the document signed by plaintiff.  Thus, so far as appears, the operative language was not in front of plaintiff when he signed a document which, according to defendant, had the effect of depriving [him]… of access to the courts” and waived his “time-honored right to sue. ” (citation omitted).  It is not sufficient to claim, as defendant seems to claim, that by referring back to the Employee Handbook, plaintiff could have given more specific content to the vague language that he accepted when he signed the Acknowledgement.  It is not enough to say on its face.  That is precisely the kind of argument that was rejected in Garfinkel, Quigley and Alamo.  So here, by referring to the Acknowledgement and the Handbook, one might be able to create a rational argument that the two documents, taken together, contain the requisite elements of a contract to resolve all issues such as alleged LAD violations by arbitration only.  But that is not enough.  *Alamo, Quiley and Garfinkel* make clear that more is needed than the bare bones of what might meet the technical requirements of a “contract.
[directive] The complainant should be personally interviewed if circumstances permit.  If the complainant cannot travel to the investigator's office, the investigator should conduct the interview at the complainant's home or place of employment if feasible.  If not, a telephonic interview may be conducted.  All relevant identifying information concerning the complainant should be recorded, e.g., name (unless the complainant wishes to remain anonymous), complete address, telephone numbers and area codes, race or ethnic identity, sex, date of birth, place of employment, social security number if necessary and place of employment (name and address).  The investigator should grant reasonable requests for accommodations to protect the complainant’s identity, such as meeting the complainant at a place other than the investigator’s office if the complainant’s identity cannot be kept confidential at that location.
[brief] Pb42. 146, 199 A.2d 809 (1964), [the court's] “function on appeal is not to make new factual findings but simply to decide whether there was adequate evidence before the Court to justify its finding of guilt. ”)  Id. at 161, 199 A.2d 809 (quoting, State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 575, 115 A.2d 35 (1955)).  “[U]nless the appellate tribunal finds that the decision below was “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” or “[un]supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole,” the de novo findings should not be disturbed. ”  In re Phillips, supra. at 579 (quoting, Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580, 410 A.2d 686 (1980), Campbell v. Department of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562, 189 A.2d 712 (1963)); see also [...] v. [...], No. [...], 2021 WL 2525587 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2021), Cert. Denied Sub Nom. Miller V. [...], 248 N.J. 519, 261 A.3d 321 (2021).
[brief] ”  Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Garzon-Cardenas, No. A-6234-03T3 (App. Div. July 15, 2005) (slip op. at 5-6) (Pa0404-0413).  In this context, it is important to recognize the different remedies available to the insurer.  In PIP arbitrations, the insurer’s sole remedy is denial of the claim for benefits.  An insurer can assert a fraud defense in a PIP arbitration, but its remedy would still only be denial of the benefits claim.  In contrast, under the IFPA and RICO, the insurer is entitled to treble damages, fee-shifting, and a host of tailored equitable remedies “to prevent and restrain” wrongful conduct that may only be imposed by a court.
[brief] COUNSEL FEES FROM A FUND IN COURT WAS RAISED & DECIDED BELOW INCORRECTLY & A PRO SE LITIGANT’S ACTION BENEFICIAL TO OTHERS ENTITLES HIM TO THOSE FEES.  Plaintiffs assert that the lower court, in addressing Appellant’s application, held that Appellant’s action only benefited himself & not others.  Both Plaintiffs & the court are wrong.  It is unconverted that but for the judgment lien there would have been no Escrow Agreement between Plaintiffs, their Buyer & the Title Insurance Company.  It is also uncontroverted that Plaintiffs concealed its existence & the resulting title closing from this Court & Appellant until this Court extracted it from Plaintiffs’ counsel at oral argument of the last appeal.  Once disclosed, the court, on remand, promptly ordered the escrow amount be deposited with the Superior Court Trust Unit.  The Title insurer promptly complied.  Thus, but for this action & Appellant’s prosecution thereof, there would have been no fund in court.  Furthermore, there can be no question that this action benefited others.  In the record is the Escrow Agreement & Settlement Statement.  Da 48-50 & 54-56  From these it can be easily ascertained that the escrow pre-conditioned & facilitated the closing as plaintiffs would not agree to pay off the judgment from closing proceeds & the title insurer would not insure title for the buyer without a plaintiffs’ indemnification & a $60,000 escrow.  Without insuring title, the Buyer could not receive marketable title, thereby exposing plaintiffs to breach of contract for failing to deliver marketable title.  Thus, factually, the closing, achieved by the escrow, benefited plaintiffs as they received about $113,000 from the closing proceeds; benefited the buyer as it received marketable title to the property purchased; benefited the Title Insurer as it received about $2,000 in fees for its report & policy from the sale proceeds; benefited counsel for both parties as they received their fees of about $2500 from the sale proceeds & benefited the municipality of about $13,000 for real estate taxes & water charges.(Da 49)  All of these undisputed facts were in the record before the court below.  By clear error & abuse of discretion, these factors were either improperly ignored or deemed insufficient or inconsequential.  However, the court mistakenly did not so state but clearly the Appellant demonstrated below that those other than Appellant had their interests advanced by this action.  Moreover, Appellant is not changing the legal basis for a counsel fee award.  The basis has remained the same.  All Appellant has done is factually refute the basis for the lower court’s 4-29-24 decision regarding those benefiting from the fund in court.  Furthermore, plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for fees from the fund in court did not argue about third parties benefitting from the fund in court.
[brief] \(^2\)At that time in 1972, the 1963 Agreement was not recorded or recordable and thus was private and not known or knowable by the Township Zoning Officials unless disclosed, which it was not as appears from the 1972 records (Da938 to 946).  permissive occasional parking use by the (Lot 8) attendees/staff on the School property (Lot 5) from 1963 through 1972 --- when the expanded school was approved --- was part of that mutual cooperation and religious purpose.  That informal cooperative arrangement apparently continued without significant dispute for a number of years.
[brief] Thus, the jury charge codifies what is an extension of common law sidewalk liability to snow and ice.  As such, a commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice derives from its duty to maintain its adjacent sidewalks since this would incentivize property owners to maintain their sidewalks, particularly as they derive a commercial benefit from people using the sidewalk.  The underlying rationale for sidewalk liability is that “the benefits of sidewalks to abutting commercial owners and the fact that such a rule would serve the dual purpose of providing recourse to innocent pedestrians and an incentive to abutting commercial owners to keep their sidewalk in good repair. ”  *Bedell v. St. Joseph’s Carpenter’s Society*, 367 N.J. Super 515, 520 (App. Div. 2004).  However, after *Stewart*, it has been recognized that a commercial landowner’s liability may extend beyond the sidewalk for activities that directly benefit the landlord that involve crossing a public street or public way.