ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] b)  (1)  ¿Entiende usted que si cambia de residencia tiene que notificar a la agencia del orden [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] público donde está registrado y tiene que volver a registrarse con el oficial principal del Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish página 1 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish page 1 of 7 orden público del municipio en que usted residirá, o con el Superintendente de la Policía Estatal si el municipio no tiene un oficial principal del orden público, por lo menos 10 días antes de la fecha en que usted piensa residir en la dirección nueva?  Do you understand that if you change residence you must notify the law enforcement agency where you are registered, and must re-register with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which you will reside, or the Superintendent of State Police if the municipality does not have a chief law enforcement officer, no less than 10 days before you intend to reside at the new address?
[brief] Although the Court found that the defendant realtors committed common law fraud to certain defendants, the Court also found that plaintiffs did not rely on those representations by the realtors.  The Appellate Division reversed the judgment denying counsel fees to plaintiffs as against defendant realtors and remanded the case for a finding as to whether plaintiffs were entitled to such fees because the action was brought as a result of defendant realtor’ fraud.  This case is directly on point.
[directive] Critical decision making.  Critical decision-making and tactical deployment techniques include tactical communication and tactical positioning, such as strategic redeployment and time as a tactic.  Critical decision-making and tactics require officers to do the following: (a) begin critical assessment and planning prior to arriving at the scene; 2 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  (b) collect available information; (c) assess situations, threats, and risks; (d) identify options for conflict resolution; (e) determine the best course of action; and (f) act, review, and re-assess the situation as it evolves.  2.5  De-escalation.  De-escalation is the action of communicating verbally or non-verbally in an attempt to reduce, stabilize, or eliminate the immediacy of a threat.  De-escalation may also be used to create the time needed to allow the situation to resolve itself or to position additional resources to resolve the situation with the least amount of force necessary.  Officers should employ de-escalation techniques when feasible, which include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) communication techniques to calm an agitated subject (e.g., regulating tone and pitch, such as speaking slowly in a calm voice); (b) techniques to promote rational decision making, such as ensuring that only one officer addresses the person and the other officers remain detached as safety permits as to not escalate the situation; and splitting up individuals at the scene who may be arguing; (c) active listening techniques, such as sharing the officer’s name, asking the subject their name, and exhibiting a genuine willingness to listen; (d) slowing down the pace of the incident by taking deep breaths, slowing speech, and/or applying strategic or critical thinking; (e) using calming gestures and facial expressions (e.g., arms extended with palms out and avoid angry expressions); (f) practicing procedural-justice techniques, such as explaining the officer’s actions and responding to questions; (g) verbal persuasion and advisements (e.g., explaining, without threats, how the person would benefit from cooperation, and the subject’s rights or what the officer wants the subject to do); and (h) avoiding the unnecessary display of weapons, including firearms, Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs), batons, or OC Spray.
[brief] ’ ”) (quoting *State v. Wilson*, 362 N.J.Super. 319, 327 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 250 (2003)).  [...]'s observation of defendants being escorted into the courtroom by sheriff's officers before the start of proceedings was not suggestive as to outweigh the other indicia of reliability surrounding her in-court identification of [...].  [...] testified that she did not notice whether the defendants were in shackles when they entered, in part because she timidly “looked down” when she made eye contact with [...].  Moreover, the fact that defendants were seated at counsel table does not amount to a violation of due process, *United States v. Sebetich*, 776 F.2d 412, 420 (3d Cir.1985), *cert. denied*, 484 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 725, 98 L.Ed.2d 673 (1988), as courtroom identifications are necessarily, but not always impermissibly, suggestive.  *State v. Clausell*, 121 N.J. 298, 365 (1990).  *[...] first observed defendants the day of the crime from approximately three feet away.  She proceeded to observe her husband speak to defendants from the store office, approximately twenty feet away from the display case.  She testified that there was nothing obstructing her view during this time and that defendants were inside the store for approximately five minutes before their initial departure.  When the two men returned and one pointed a gun at [...] and her family, she again had an unhindered view of both defendants from approximately six feet away.  [...] provided an accurate description of [...] at trial and had ample opportunity to view both defendants at the time of the crime.
[brief] One of the cases cited in *Atalese* was *NAACP of Camden County East v. Foulke Management Corp.*, 421 N.J. Super 404 (App. Div. 2011), certif. granted, 209 N.J. 96 (2011), and appeal dismissed, 213 N.J. 47 (2013).  There, the Court reversed the lower court’s order compelling arbitration based upon parts of arbitration clauses contained in various form documents.  The Court declared that:  Moreover, because arbitration provisions are often embedded in contracts of adhesion, courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.  (citations omitted)  This requirement of a ‘consensual understanding’ about the rights of access to the courts that are waived in the agreement has led our courts to hold that clarity is required. ”  (citations omitted)  421 N.J. Super at 425.
[brief] First thing you have to do when we’re considering that is let’s think about the possibility that [...], who had some balancing issues, just simply fell on her own.  Let’s consider whether or not that’s a possibility.  Whether or not a woman who’s 79 years old and has some problems with her balance could have simply just lost her balance that day and fell.  Not because she’s, not because she’s 80, like [...] said.  A lot of 79-year olds don’t have issues with balance and are moving around just fine.  [...], unfortunately, happens to have some problems with her legs that cause her to have problems walking and issues with her balance.
[directive] (1)  The acronym for the No Early Release Act (NERA) was added question 4 on the mandatory period of parole in of ineligibility; and (2)  The defendant's acknowledgment the consequences for a non- of appearance was revised to include the loss any posted "monetary" bail and a review of of "any conditions pretrial release."(# 2 on page 3).  of  No changes are being made to the Written Acknowledgment (Notice Trial) form, which requires the defendant to acknowledge that he or she has been advised of the trial of date and that the trial will proceed the event his or her absence.  This form thus in simply being reissued with a new promulgation date and reference.  is of
[brief] Our Supreme Court has found that “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.  They are less likely to take possible punishment into account when making impulsive, ill-considered decisions that stem from immaturity.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 399 (internal citations omitted).  The resentencing court, which was required to consider the aggravating factors in light of the Miller factors, could not solely rely on the findings of the initial sentencing court concerning deterrence.  That finding was made approximately eight years earlier without the direction subsequently provided by our federal and state courts about the lack of deterrent value in long sentences for young people.  Furthermore, the court failed to assess the need for any further specific deterrence in light of the copious evidence of [...]’s maturation and rehabilitation presented at resentencing.  The court was also required to address what weight, if any, to give aggravating factor one in light of the Miller factors.
[brief] Plaintiff established that since construction of the Congregation in 1963 there was an “opening in the sidewalk” along the Sixth Street Lot allowing congregants to enter the Sixth Street Lot.  (7T 47:14-23)  The curb cut located on the Congregation’s property accessing the Sixth Street Lot is legal and safe and appears on aerial photos as far back as the early 1990s. \(^7\) (Da919; 13T 106:3-111:20; 121:4-131:25)  The curb cut was also present on a site plan prepared in 1993.  (Da 916; 13T 63:6-15)  *Congregation’s Maintenance of Fifth and Sixth Street Lots* 41.
[brief] On October 21, 2022, the trial court held oral argument on the Motion and the First Cross-Motion.  On November 16, 2022, the trial court entered an Order granting the Township’s Motion in part and denying the Township’s Motion in part and denying [...]’ First Cross-Motion.  On January 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s Motion”).  On February 7, 2023, [...] filed a second Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion (the “Second Cross-Motion”).  On March 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief in further support of Plaintiff’s Motion and in opposition to the Second Cross-Motion.  On March 17, 2023, the trial court held oral argument on Plaintiff’s Motion and the Second Cross-Motion.  On March 28, 2023, the trial court entered an Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion and granting the Second Cross-Motion.  Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s rulings by filing a Notice of Appeal in the Superior Court, Appellate Division, on May 12, 2023.
[brief] On February 3, 2021, the defendant [...] (hereinafter referred to as the “[...]”) submitted an application to the defendant [...] (hereinafter referred to as the “[...]”) for the property designated on the [...] Tax Map as Block 124, Lot 31, commonly referred to as [...] (hereinafter referred to as the “Property”).  The property is located in the Rumson Road Housing Zone District (RR).  (Pa40-49).  The Applicant sought Preliminary and Final Major Site Plan Approval to demolish the Lauriston Park building, and construct a multi-family residential housing development consisting of fourteen (14) residential dwelling units located in six (6) buildings with access off of Osprey Lane and numerous site improvements to serve the development.  (Pa40-49).  The Applicant did not request variance relief in connection with the Application.  Pursuant to the terms of a Settlement Agreement between the [...] and the Applicant dated January 16, 2020, as part of the Borough’s affordable housing compliance litigation in the matter entitled In Re [...], Docket No.: [...], the [...] adopted an Ordinance to create a Residential Zone known as the Rumson Road Housing District (RR) to allow the applicant’s multi-family housing development as a permitted use on the subject property.
[brief] (3T30-16 to 50-25; Da 103-114)  Both counts exclusively concerned contraband that was recovered in the August 7, 2020, car and home searches in [...].  In exchange for his plea, the State requested that the court dismiss the remainder of the indictment and impose a seven-year prison sentence with five years of parole ineligibility on Count Six, and a concurrent five-year prison sentence with five years of parole ineligibility on Count 13.  (Da 106; 3T30-16 to 50-25)  On June 2, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to the recommended sentence.  (4T11-10 to 17-21; Da 111-114)  On July 7, 2023, [...] filed a notice of appeal.
[brief] ”  \(^6\)  [...] wrongly relies on *Ricard v. USD 475 Geary Cnty., Kan. Sch. Bd.*, No. 5:22-cv-04015-HLT-GEB, 2022 WL 1471372, at *8 (D. Kan. May 9, 2022), voluntarily dismissed per settlement, ECF. No. 37 (Aa27), and *Mirabelli v. Olson*, No. 3:23-cv-00768-BEN-WVG, 2023 WL 5976992, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023) (Aa44-45), to argue that courts have recognized a parental substantive due process claim in this context.
[brief] *State v. A.R.*, 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (citation omitted).  The doctrine “is grounded in considerations of fairness and is meant to prevent defendants from manipulating the system. ”  *Id.* at 561-62 (internal markings and citations omitted).  The doctrine is implicated “when a defendant in some way has led the court into error....”  *Id.* at 562 (internal markings and citations omitted).  When the doctrine applies, reversal is only appropriate where the error “cut mortally into the substantive rights of the defendant [causing] a fundamental miscarriage of justice....”
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 specifies that, “Such contracts and the exchange thereof and such subscribers, their attorneys in fact and representatives shall be regulated by this act, and by no other statute of this State relating to insurance, except as herein otherwise provided. ”  The Reciprocal Exchange Act’s exclusivity provision “pertains only to other statutory provisions to the extent that they regulate ‘[such] [reciprocal] contracts and the exchange thereof’ and relate ‘to insurance. ’”  Aftab v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 386 N.J. Super. 41, 56 (App. Div. 2006).  “The provision thus pertains to the internal operations of reciprocals.  The provision does not insulate reciprocals from requirements of general applicability in insurance regulation and that are outside the insuring transactions undertaken by reciprocals. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  See also In re Reorganization of the Med. Inter-Ins. Exch. of N.J., 328 N.J. Super. 344, 357 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that notwithstanding the exclusivity provision, reciprocal insurers remain subject to the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance’s “general regulatory powers”).  The Holding Company Act does not regulate the exchange among subscribers, attorneys-in-fact, and the exchanges of contracts of insurance.  The Holding Company Act monitors mergers and acquisitions and regulates the resultant insurance holding company systems.  It does not infringe on the regulation of the exchange of contracts that is the purview of the Reciprocal Exchange Act.  Therefore, the Holding Company Act’s exclusivity provision does not conflict with that of the Reciprocal Exchange Act because there is no overlap between the two.  The Holding Company Act provides, “All laws and parts of laws of this State inconsistent with this chapter are hereby superseded with respect to matters covered by this chapter.
[brief] In the affidavit, [...] further provides that:  “I believe the only basis for the present motion is for [...] to attempt to create a non-existent conflict between these aligned parties, drive up our costs of defense as separate attorneys will each charge for the work that can be accomplished by one firm who is our first choice in representation, and to bankrupt us all with costs of defense in this complex case which will take years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees to defend. ”  Id.  Even if the Appellate Court disagrees with the underlying determination that no conflict existed, the [...] all signed potential conflict of interest waivers in their initial retainers after receiving full informed consent per RPC 1.7.  (C.C.Da.101-02).  Defendants maintain that the retainer agreement is attorney-client privileged and it was not attached to the publicly filed motion opposition.  However, contrary to the assertions of [...] in their brief, [...] performed an *in camera* review of the retainer with conflict waiver in rendering his determination.  (T.57).  The “Unidentified Speaker” in the transcript is [...]’s law clerk confirming he received the waivers for review from the CCMC defendants signed by [...].  Designated trial counsel from the [...] also provided a certification that he reasonably believes that he can provide competent and diligent representation to each client, that to the best of his knowledge the joint representation is not prohibited by law, and there are no known or anticipated cross-claims amongst the defendants, per RPC 1.7. (C.C.Da.103-04).  Accordingly, there was ample evidence of record before the trial court to support [...]’s determination that there was no concurrent conflict of interest, or even if there was, it could be properly waived per RPC1.7.  Thus, the underlying decision denying the motion to disqualify must be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] Initially, Counsel notes that [...] chose not to provide the trial court with any transcripts of the proceedings before the Board—it did not even provide meeting minutes.  The Board’s minutes of its December 12, 2022, meeting, Pa356, were provided by the opposition to [...]’s Motion.  Those minutes show that the Board did not “approve” and then “unapprove” the [...] project or otherwise ‘change its mind’ about the [...] application in January.  Rather, in December the Board approved the application and at the same time imposed a condition upon that approval.  It has long been recognized that a land use board, such as a planning board, in granting a land use application, certainly one that involves a variance, may impose conditions to safeguard the public interest, so long as the conditions are reasonable and advance the purposes of zoning.
[brief] Ca108-109  Search Warrant Order (dated September 28, 2020)  ...............  Ca110-113  [NOTE: Ca114 is a signed Certification page of defendant evidently inadvertently filed twice (Pg 10 of 10)]  Certification of [...] (dated September 10, 2020)  ......  Ca115-117  Grand Jury transcript (dated March 31, 2021)
[brief] ..................................................  21 Hinners v. Banville, 114 N.J. Eq. 348, 357, 168 A. 618 (E. & A. 1933)  ...........................................  21 Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177, 836 A.2d 794 (2003)  ..................................................  20 Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 151, 447 A.2d 516 (1982)  ..................................................  21 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 892 A.2d 1240, 1252 (2006).  ..................................................................  24 Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 436, 846 A. 2d 596 ..............................................................  21 Palatine I v. Planning Bd., 133 N.J. 546, 560, 628 A.2d 321 (1993).  ....................................................  17  Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 318, 25 S. Ct. 35, 37, 49 L. Ed. 214, 218 (1904)  .....................................................................  22 Rolnick v. Rolnick, 290 N.J. Super. 35, 45, 674 A.2d 1006, 1011, 1996 N.J. Super. LEXIS 173, *15 .....................................................................  5  Shebar v. Sanya Bus. Sys. Corp., 111 N.J. 276, 291, 544 A.2d 377 (1988)  ....................................................  20 United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489, 55 S. Ct. 813, 818, 79 L. Ed. 1559, 1565 (1935)  ........  22 W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 553, 562 A.2d 222, 227, 1989  N.J. LEXIS 114, *14 ..........  18 | Judgment | Appendix Page Number | |----------------------------------|----------------------| | Memorandum Decision | Da050 | | Order of Judgment | Da073 |
[directive] In general, officers may not discharge their weapons or use other deadly force, as outlined above, in the following manner: (a) to signal for help; (b) to issue a warning shot; (c) to prevent property damage or loss; (d) to prevent the destruction of evidence.  For example, under no circumstances shall an officer use a chokehold, or any lesser contact with the neck area, in order to prevent the destruction of evidence by ingestion; or (e) against a person who poses a threat only to themselves and not to others.  4.6
[brief] (See Birch Br., at Point II(C); Old Republic Br., at Point II).  This argument, too, fails as a matter of law, based upon the plain terms of Section 13.1 of the PSA.  The doctrine of “election of remedies” has no bearing on this case because, in seeking to enforce the PSA was “on hold” and promised to apprise Plaintiff when and if it was moving forward.
[brief] Along these same lines, “[a]n issue not [properly] briefed . . . is deemed waived. ”  Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) (internal citations omitted).  In other words, it is not incumbent upon the Court or opposing counsel to read a party’s mind as to where a supposed error is, the Party seeking relief must identify said error and cite to where in the record it may be found.
[brief] Finally, [...] and the [...] attack [...]’s appeal on the basis that he allegedly failed to submit evidence in connection with his appeal.  (R2b7, 9) (Rb23-24).  This argument ignores the significant, undisputed errors by [...] that prejudiced [...]’s ability to understand clearly whether [...]’s LOD was a final determination, which was necessary to understand what his appeal rights were.  (R2b5; Rb11; Aa10).  Both [...] and the [...] concede that [...]’s determination letter failed to provide or explain [...]’s right to appeal the LOD.  (Id.).  That [...] accepted [...]’s appeal letter does not excuse [...]’s failure.  As demonstrated by his initial appeal, [...] did not know whether the [...] was even the proper avenue to file the appeal, given [...]’s lack of notice.  (Aa23).  And [...] confused the matter further in its June 7, 2023 response to [...]’s appeal wherein [...] stated that it “does not disagree” with [...] that the LOD was not a final determination and immediately cited to N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2 – the regulation that provides when an appeal of a “final letter of determination” of a State Policy violation may be filed with the [...].  (Aa30).  Under those circumstances – which the [...] did not address in a written determination until it issued the Final Agency Determination that is the subject of the instant appeal to this court – [...]’s undisputed failures prejudiced [...] by placing him in a position where he had to assume how the [...] would rule on his procedural arguments – which could have resulted in the issuance of a “final” letter of determination by [...] that clearly stated his appeal rights.  In any event, as discussed in [...]’s merits brief, given that this was so obviously a he-said/she-said case that warranted a fact-finding hearing, [...] had no way to know that the [...] would make credibility determinations about him based on [...]’s written summary of its investigation and then fault him for not producing “evidence” about why he was at the [...] building that morning.  [...] is not looking for a “mulligan” as [...] charges; he is looking for an opportunity to have the credibility of his testimony, and that of his accuser, evaluated for the first time by a neutral factfinder in the context of a hearing with proper due process protections.