ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notwithstanding the State’s mischaracterization of the Policy, the Policy and implementing Regulation provide the following:  - The District shall utilize the student’s chosen name, identity and pronouns; - Neither parental consent nor a court order/legal name change is required, except for K-5; - Documentation, such as ID cards, shall be in student’s chose name; - Students shall be allowed to dress in accordance with their gender identity; - Students may participate activities consistent with their gender identity; and - Students may use rest/locker rooms in consistent with their gender identity.  See Da169-171, 262-265.  Thus, students \textit{are not denied} any public accommodation the school provides, and \textit{are allowed unfettered access to every accommodation consistent with their gender identity}.  Additionally, the process for parental notification is well-defined, thoughtful and narrowly-tailored.  Parental notification occurs \textit{only} when a student requests a “public social transition accommodation,” or a “public name/identity/pronoun change,” provided there is “no documented evidence” that doing so would subject the student to harm.  Despite all of these terms being well-defined in District regulations, the State incredulously question their meaning.  “Public social transition accommodation” means (a) altering mandated student records as defined by N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1); (b) Utilizing the restroom/locker room of one’s gender identity; or (c) engaging in an activity/sport/club associated with one’s gender identity and expression rather than one’s gender assigned at birth.  Da262.  “Public name/identity/pronoun change” means formally changing one’s student records as defined by N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3 to utilize the name/identity/pronoun of the gender with which one identifies.  \textit{Id.}  “Documented evidence” includes, but is not limited to previous reports to DCPP, or student reporting of fear of physical and/or emotional harm upon disclosure.  \textit{Id.}  Indeed, the process for parental notification is thoughtful, student-centered, and in the best interest of the student.
[brief] Complainants moved for leave to appeal from the Decision to the Commissioner of Education and Respondent cross-moved for leave to appeal (Ra9).  The Acting Commissioner denied the motions.  Ca83.  On October 9, 2022, Respondent filed an answer to the complaint and filed an amended answer to the complaint on January 3, 2023.  Ca203-204; 201-201.  On February 24, 2023 Complainants filed a Motion for Summary Decision with the OAL.  (Ca71-Ca200).  Respondent opposed the motion.  Ra12.  On June 9, 2023, the Hon. [...], A.L.J. issued an Initial Decision.  Ca20-Ca39.  [...] granted Complainants Motion For Summary Decision and found that censure is the appropriate sanction, subject to review by the Commission.  Ca38.  On August 22, 2023, the Commission issued its Final Decision.  Ca14-Ca19.  It rejected [...]’s Initial Decision and dismissed this matter.  (Ca18, Ca19).  The Final Decision stated that it was a final agency decision appealable to the Appellate Division.  Ca18.  Complainants have filed an appeal of the Commission’s decisions to the Court.  Ca1-Ca13.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] The Romeo Court went on to say: “[j]ust as in Mittra, where the evaluation of a student's academic performance is left to the judgment of the university, a private religious university's values and mission must be left to the discretion of the university. ”  In Gourdine, the defendant university faced a lawsuit following its decision to entirely eliminate its existing nursing program.  In dismissing the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim against the university, the Court reiterated the well-established principle that the relationship between university and student is not analyzed in strict contractual terms, and further noted:  “[t]o the extent that plaintiffs seek to enforce a contractual right against defendant, that contract includes the college catalog's reservation of rights to alter or to eliminate the program in which they were enrolled. ”  Gourdine v. Felician Coll., A-5248-04T3, 2006 WL 2346278, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2006) (emphasis added).  In Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D.N.J. 2021), an undergraduate student and her parent brought a putative class action against [...] (originally in New Jersey state court), asserting contract and tort claims arising from the university's transition to virtual instruction and suspension of campus operations in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
[brief] The Appellate Division correctly found that Plaintiff had not suffered any actual damage other than incurring legal fees in the underlying matrimonial case as this Court in the prior decision found that Plaintiff suffered $449,798.59 in damages as a direct and proximate result of defendants’ negligence, because plaintiff incurred $449,798.59 in attorney’s fees and costs to remedy the errors in the PSA and original judgment of divorce resulting from defendants’ negligence.  (Specific Negligence on the Part of the Defendants)  But in the meantime, this Court also found that the balance of the jury’s $500,000 damages award in the amount of $50,201.41 was without any competent evidence that plaintiff suffered any actual damages—beyond the fees incurred to vacate the PSA and original judgment of divorce and obtain the AFJD—as a direct and proximate result of defendants’ negligence (Da34), because the record showed that there was no evidence of any disposition of assets between 2009 when the divorce judgment was granted and when the divorce judgment was set aside in 2011.  *(See Da115.)*  This reasoning raises a question whether the negligence on the part of the Defendants had proximately caused any actual damage to the Plaintiff.
[brief] [Aa135.]  In Spalt, the Court held that close residency, fear of resultant injury to property, damage to recreational interest, or shared generalized property rights are not particular property rights.  Spalt, 237 N.J. Super. at 212.  In re Riverview Dev. held that general claims of adverse aesthetic and traffic impacts did not create sufficient property interests to entitle neighboring homeowners to a hearing.  *In re Riverview Dev.*, 411 N.J. Super. at 437-38.  The Court in *In re AMICO* stated that simply because some of the plaintiffs reside close to the… site and are fearful of resultant injury to their property, does not mean that they are entitled to an adjudicatory hearing.
[brief] Appellant relies upon the recitation of the procedural history contained in its brief filed in support of Appellant’s motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal dated June 27, 2024.  It is necessary to reiterate the following:  On January 12, 2024 Appellant filed a Notice of Motion *in limine* seeking to bar Respondent’s appraisal report for applying the Morris Canal Redevelopment the [...]’s taking of the Property.  The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. entered an Order on June 7, 2024 denying [...]’s motion.  Pa1\(^1\).  In addition, during oral argument on Appellant’s motion, Judge Jablonski ruled the zoning contained in the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan controlled the parties’ analysis as to the fair market value of the subject Property. \(^2\)  Judge Jablonski ruled:  The Court, therefore, finds that the automatic consideration and application of what this Court also finds is an outdated R-2 zoning certainly overlooks that basis and that a perspective [sic] purchaser would certainly acknowledge, not the zoning, is not the R-2 zone but certainly it was done comprehensively would be the zoning governed by the Morris County redevelopment plan.  That this court finds is the operative zoning for the property as is of the date of evaluation [sic].  Any issues, therefore, that have to do with the calculus on the ultimate fair market value that is determined was based – this court finds based property on the Morris Canal redevelopment zone and not the R-2 zone.  ---  \(^1\)  Appellant relies upon the Appendix filed on or about June 27, 2024 in support of Appellant’s motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  \(^2\)  “IT” refers to the transcript of oral argument dated June 7, 2024 before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C.  As a result, the fact finder should be able to consider both the opinions provided by [...] as well as [...] and allow the jury to make a determination as to whether the proper adjustments were made under that zoning calculus in coming to the fair market value . . . that the fact finder will ultimately address and ultimately conclude.  1T25:25-26:21 [emphasis added].  This ruling runs contrary to established condemnation law and requires reversal prior the matter proceeding to the jury.  **APPELLANT’S STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491, 502 (2003); Davin, L.L.C. v. Daham, 329 N.J. Super. 54, 71 (App. Div. 2000) (summary judgment should have been denied when there were conflicting certifications of experts).  Summary judgment must also be denied when a claim requires determination of a state of mind or intent, like claims of waiver, bad faith, fraud, or duress.  See, Auto Lenders v. Gentilini Ford, 181 N.J. 245, 271-272 (2004).  A.
[brief] First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).  This is expressly provided by the FAA itself, which states that arbitration agreements shall be enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ”  9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987).  Accordingly, this Court can—and should—apply ordinary New Jersey principles of contract construction for the purported Arbitration Agreement, so long as it does not treat the document in any way differently than it would any other purported contract.  A basic tenet of contract law is that an agreement is enforceable, provided the parties to the agreement have a “meeting of the minds.
[brief] Da80.  On June 21, 2023, [...] filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint requesting temporary restraints to prevent the closing.  Dal.  Both corporate Defendants in conjunction with their respective principals opposed the application.  lT; Da88, Da99.  At the hearing on June 21st, 2023, counsel for [...] admitted that his client had been provided with the contract but that “We pointed out the material terms that were missing. ”  1T @18:19-20.  Defendants argued that the Plaintiff’s insistence that the offer/contract be modified to make reference to their ROFR was an “attempt to intervene and interfere in our contract” as Plaintiff was a “stranger to the contract. ”  1T @11:5-7.  The Trial Court, relying on the principle that injunctive relief is permitted (stopping the sale of the gas station from Defendant [...] to [...]) “even if the claim appears doubtful”, granted the Order to Show Cause.
[brief] [...] explained that the term commonly refers to studio apartments, which have “one habitable living space (i.e., shared living room and bedroom). ”  Id.  In [...]’s application, absent the affordable units, all market units are one-bedroom units that would have the same intensity as studio apartments, therefore not necessitating a d(1) variance at all.  Id.  Second, [...] testified that the development advances the purposes of the MLUL.
[brief] Arbitrator decisions are subject to a VERY LIMITED REVIEW BY A COURT.  Arbitration will proceed INDIVIDUALLY – CLASS ACTIONS AND SIMILAR PROCEDURES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO YOU.  (Pa136-Pa146 & Pa169).  Further, Appellant also agreed that the Arbitration Agreement is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (“FAA”).  (Pa136-Pa146 & Pa170).
[brief] By: [...], Appellant – Interested Party  June 26, 2024  VIA eCOURTS  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street, CN-006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006  Re: I/M/O [...]  Trust Under the Last Will and Testament of [...], Deceased  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from Bergen County Probate  Part-Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. and Honorable [...], P.J. Ch.  Respondent [...]’s Brief in Opposition to Appeal from the October 6, 2022, March 7, 2023 and September 6, 2023  Orders  Your Honors:  We represent Respondent [...] (“Respondent”), the discharged professional co-trustee of the [...] Trust (“Trust”).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS............. 1 ARGUMENTS  POINT I BECAUSE [...] FAILED TO RETURN TO WORK FOR FIVE CONSECUTIVE DAYS WITHOUT APPROVAL FROM HIS SUPERVISOR AND THEREBY ABANDONED HIS JOB WITH THE [...], THE RESIGNATION NOT IN GOOD STANDING IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED..................................8  POINT II [...] WAS NOT UNREASONABLY DENIED A LEAVE OF ABSENCE BECAUSE HE FAILED TO PROVIDE MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION..................................................................................11  POINT III [...]’S ARGUMENTS REGARDING HIS LACK OF INTENT TO RESIGN ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD..............................14 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................17 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] 3  “Da” refers to Defendant [...]’s appendix.  “Pa” refers to Plaintiff’s appendix.  “Db” refers to [...]’s brief.  “1T” refers to the transcript of the April 28, 2023 Chancery court hearing.  “2T” refers to the transcript of the July 27, 2018 Chancery court hearing.  “3T” refers to the transcript of the April 1, 2022 Chancery court hearing.
[brief] ”  *Czar, Inc. v. Heath*, 398 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting *Medford Convalescent & Nursing Ctr. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.*, 218 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1985)) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, administrative regulations should be read “in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the [regulations] as a whole. ”  *In re Nicosia*, __ N.J. Super. at __ (slip op. at 20).  Here, Appellant essentially ignores the existence of the Long Branch Rule.  In the context of the CZM Rules, as a whole, the SRD Rule does not apply to the Project because pursuant to the Long Branch Rule, development of the Project is subject to the standards set forth under the Redevelopment Ordinances (as may be amended) regardless of whether CAFRA approval was sought pursuant to a Long Branch Redevelopment Permit or an individual permit.
[brief] (Dja17).  In addition, the pipe profile on the plans did not identify the diversion structure; there is no 8” pipe on the plans that should otherwise be on the pipe profile sheet.  (Aa3114).  Contrary to [...]’s assertion, this explanation was not found in the [...] engineering report, and not relied upon in [...]’s response brief here.  (Aa81-Aa93).  If this is now being relied upon by [...] in issuing the permit, the matter should be remanded so that [...] may have the opportunity to review the information that was not previously available to it and submit a supplemental public comment if necessary.
[brief] T1.61:22-62:14  There are only two reasonable interpretations of the purpose of the PILOT structure in this case, both requiring affected properties to be kept off the tax rolls for as long as possible.  One such purpose is to maximize the number of years the Township can receive from these properties discretionary revenue six (6) times greater than the yield of conventional municipal taxes.  The other is to maximize the shift of regional school costs to Plaintiffs.  Neither purpose is a valid purpose under the LTTEL.  The intended operation and effect of the ordinance, consistent with these purposes, was on full display at the public hearing before Township Committee.  New revenue sources and righting perceived wrongs in the school funding formula were indeed the principal selling points that night.  The affordable housing was a given.  It had been part of the plan since the adoption of redevelopment plans for the property.  It was not the purpose of the tax exemption and PILOT as ultimately designed and enacted.  In the alternative, if not unlawful per se, the 30-year PILOT as structured is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, unmoored from attracting financing for inclusionary development, and therefore invalid.  If the Long Term Tax Exemption Law is construed in light of its underlying redevelopment goals, it must be read to impose meaningful substantive constraints on financial agreements authorizing long-term exemptions that – as demonstrated in this case--can have severe adverse consequences for regional partners.  It is no defense that the shift in school costs here is the function of the school funding formula or the operations of the County tax assessor.  The problem is how these mechanisms are intentionally used for purposes unrelated to redevelopment.
[brief] *Id.* at *12*.  The court held that those false statements in the application, among other false statements, were “material to the risk assumed by [the insurer]” because “[a]s a matter of common sense, the questions concerned exactly the type of claims for which [the applicant] sought coverage. ”  *Id.* at *13.  Indeed, according to the court, they “went to the very heart of the risk assessment. ”  *Id.* at *14.  See also Cont’l Cas. Co. v. L. Offs. of Melbourne Mills, Jr., PLLC, No. 5:06-272-JMH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26711, at *18 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 16, 2010) (“There can be no doubt that the bar complaint and investigation concern the very type of risk that Continental agreed to assume when it issued the [professional liability] insurance, and any reasonable person must find these misrepresentations or omissions material.
[brief] State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. at 407 (holding judge should be guided by factors like complexity of trial and quality and duration of deliberations); State v. Harris, 457 N.J. Super. 34, 48 (App. Div. 2018) (recognizing abuse of discretion standard applies), certif. denied, 238 N.J. 498, certif. denied, 238 N.J. 510 (2019).  Here, defendant concedes that the judge’s providing a Czachor instruction in answer to the first jury note was entirely appropriate.  (Db18-21).
[brief] Significantly, the Appellate Division addressed the exact issue that is before this court in the case of [...] v. Land, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 89 There, Liberty Mutual filed suit against the Defendants seeking a declaration that the Defendants were not entitled to payment under the Liberty Mutual homeowner's insurance policy on the grounds that the Defendants knowingly misrepresented material facts to Liberty Mutual in connection with their homeowner's claim and for relief under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act.  Id. at 2-3.
[brief] (CONT'D)  POINT IV  THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  ..............................................  33  POINT V BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO ASSESS DEFENDANT’S FINANCIAL MEANS AND HIS ABILITY TO PAY THE $12,443.56  IN RESTITUTION AND $1,500 IN PROBATION SUPERVISION FEES, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THESE AMOUNTS AND REMAND FOR CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT’S FINANCIAL MEANS.  (Da31-32; 13T 26-10 to 13)  ..............................................  34 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF MUST BE REVERSED, BECAUSE THE REPEATED FAILURE OF DEFENDANT [...] TO SUPPLY ITS SURVEYOR WITH AN ACCURATE REVISED GRADING PLAN UPON WHICH TO STAKE OUT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE CONSTITUTED  "COMMON KNOWLEDGE NEGLIGENCE" PROVABLE EVEN WITHOUT A DESIGNATED EXPERT WITNESS ON LIABILITY.  (Pa7-Pa10)  A layperson’s common knowledge is sufficient to permit a jury to find the duty of care has been breached without the aid of expert testimony when the subject can be understood by jurors using common judgment and experience.  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, 219 N.J. 395, 407 (2014); Campbell v. Hastings, 348 N.J. Super. 264, 270 (App. Div. 2002)  Stated otherwise, when the matter is not so esoteric or specialized that jurors of common experience can form a valid conclusion, no expert is required.  Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 1996)  In Estate of Chin by Chin v. St Barnabas Med Ctr, 160 N.J. 454, 469-470 (1999) our Supreme Court explained the "'common knowledge doctrine" as follows:  "Thus, the doctrine of common knowledge applies to a case in which the experience possessed by lay persons, without the explanations of experts would enable a jury to determine that a defendant acted without reasonable care.  'The basic postulate for application of the doctrine therefore is that the issue of negligence is not related to technical matters particularly within the knowledge of medical or dental practitioners."  Citing Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 142 (1961).  While most common knowledge cases do involve medically related malpractice, the doctrine can be applied in cases involving other fields as well.  See, Supreme Court Model Jury Charge 5.52: "Professional Liability of an Architect/Engineer," part C: "Common Knowledge May Furnish Standard of Care."  Applicability of the "common knowledge doctrine" is determined not by the understandability of the subject matter involved, but by the understandability of the alleged act of negligence.  E.g., pulling the wrong tooth, or the improper hook-up of a gas line on a piece of medical apparatus.  One recurring application of the common knowledge doctrine involves misreading of a technical document or failure to furnish an updated current technical document, which is exactly the nature of Defendant's alleged negligence herein.
[brief] ”  Aa017.  \textsuperscript{12}  The FHA Rules state that NJDEP shall not issue an individual permit for a regulated activity associated with a major development unless it complies with the Stormwater Management Rules.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.2(b).  The Stormwater Management Rules define a “major development” to include, inter alia, individual developments that disturb one or more acres of land.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-1.2.  Third, Appellant’s argument that a “wasteload allocation” was required lacks merit.
[brief] If the municipalities have not adopted a Public Access Plan approved by the NJDEP, then any subsequent permit applications filed with the NJDEP will be considered based upon public trust doctrine/statute/rule provisions.  See generally N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.  Thus, the process established within these regulations is similar in concept to the pre-screening process at an airport.  Those that have been pre-screened then can go straight to the gate, while those that have not will have to engage in a more rigorous screening process before being granted access to the gate.  Similarly, if a developer seeking to build something within a municipality that has a NJDEP-approved Public Access Plan and files a permit application with the NJDEP that conforms to the requirements of that Public Access Plan, then the process will be expedited and its application will be approved.  If there is no NJDEP-approved Public Access Plan, however, then the NJDEP will have to consider and evaluate the public access provided by the development as part of the NJDEP permit application review process.  Significantly, this review process only occurs if there is a development application requiring an NJDEP permit or approval.  See N.J.S.A. 13:1D-151 (providing that the Public Trust Doctrine Laws are triggered by the NJDEP’s review of any “approval, permit, administrative order, or consent decree issued, or other action taken, by the department” pursuant to Coastal Area Facility, Waterfront Development Act, the Wetlands Act of 1970, the Flood Hazard Area Control Act, and the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 is consistent with the public trust doctrine).  Just as significantly, the MLU, the LHRL, and the NJDEP regulations pertaining to Coastal Zone Management all define the term “development” to mean the actual construction and the seeking of permits.