ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Award of [...]’s Attorney’s Fees and Costs  [...] appointed [...], U.S.D.J. (ret.) as Special Master to make recommendations regarding the NJRICO attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiffs.  (38991a-94a)  After considering the parties’ extensive submissions and hearing lengthy oral argument, Judge Orlofsky issued two Reports and Recommendations (hereinafter “R&R1” and “R&R2”) exceeding 130 pages of analysis, in which he recommended awarding to [...]: (i) $6,861,098 for fees and costs incurred in connection with trial; and (ii) $738,090.64 for fees and costs performed before the Appellate Division and New Jersey Supreme Court.
[brief] The Procedural History set forth [...]’s appellate brief is accurate.  It is noted that [...]’s Answer of April 3, 2024 includes eight (8) affirmative defenses but no mention of arbitration; and a Certification of No Other Actions in which [...] certified, to the best of his knowledge and belief, no other action or arbitration proceeding was contemplated.  Da13 and Da011.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 1.  On September 12, 2015, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Plaintiff, Appellant, [...], was traveling on his motorcycle in the left travel lane of south bound side of the Garden State Parkway (the “Parkway”) when he approached a bridge at mile marker 40.0 of the Parkway (the “Structure 40 Bridge”).  (See Pa0001; Pa1698).  2.  As Plaintiff began to cross the Structure 40 Bridge, his back tire failed, he lost control of his motorcycle, and he veered toward the guardrail pinning his left leg between the motorcycle and the guardrail.  (See Pa0001; Pa1698).  3.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligent in that they failed to inspect and maintain the subject location and/or caused the defect that led to the accident.  (See Pa1698).  4.  Plaintiff does not know why he lost control of his motorcycle nor did he see any roadway defect, but does remember the area being under construction.  (See Pa0001; Pa0378-00379 at 15:25-16:1-17; Pa0384-00385 at 21:23-22:6).  5.
[brief] III.  The trial court erred in precluding [...] from impeaching the plaintiffs with their own pleadings.  (11T64, 14T5 through 15, Da341)  The plaintiffs attempted to proceed against [...] and [...], but their failure to timely assert those claims resulted in statute of limitations dismissals.  After properly preserving Burt defendant status, [...] then offered evidence to inculpate [...] and [...], including by way of --- 11  Plaintiffs did not file a protective cross-appeal to seek a new trial in the event that this Court agreed that this fundamentally unfair process could not be sustained and the pre-trial Burt rulings must stand.  R. 2:4-2(a).  Thus, this appeal can be resolved with simple reversal of the judgment order, without consideration of the merits of plaintiffs’ position that Burt is no longer valid precedent.  impeaching of plaintiffs through their own pleadings, given their trial efforts to vindicate those two doctors.  This was prejudicial error.  In *Glassman v. Friedel*, 249 N.J. 199, 231 (2021) the Supreme Court held that a defendant may utilize the plaintiff’s initial pleadings for purposes of allocation in successive tortfeasor situations.
[brief] Instead, plaintiff filed its answer to the First Amended Petition and a cross-claim against the other five defendants in the Missouri Action on \(^6\)  The additional defendants in the Missouri Action are [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  \(^7\)  Plaintiff’s previous motion to dismiss the Petition in the Missouri Action was briefed and argued remotely during COVID but had not been decided at the time defendants filed the First Amended Petition.  \(^8\)  As is typical practice in Missouri state courts, the court issued its ruling orally and the order denying plaintiff’s motions is a one-page handwritten order that was drafted by the parties.  There is no record of the oral argument at which the oral ruling was made because plaintiff did not request that the proceedings be on the record.  November 1, 2022.  (Pa085, Pa276-332).  The same day, plaintiff served deposition notices in the Missouri Action for the depositions of [...], [...], and [...].  (Da105-122).  Plaintiff then filed an Amended Answer to the First Amended Petition (which also included a cross-claim against the other five defendants) on January 20, 2023 in response to defendants’ Motion to Strike.  On November 2, 2022, defendants filed an Alternative Motion to Stay this case pending the outcome of the Missouri Action.  (Pa084, Da076-077).  V. [...]’s Summary Denial Of Defendants’ Renewed Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Stay.
[brief] In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a 30-year sentence with 30 years of parole ineligibility on the felony murder, concurrent to a 12-year NERA sentence on the armed robbery.  The State also agreed to dismiss other New Jersey charges and agreed to actively pursue Pennsylvania to run pending charges concurrent to [...]’s New Jersey sentence, which the State failed to do because PA never pursued any charges.  [...] plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of an N.J.R.E. 404B motion from the felony murder case, and a suppression motion from the armed robbery case of evidence that was illegally obtained by an unlawful search and seizure.  Thus, [...] plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the trial court error of admitting under N.J.R.E. 404B motion the evidence from the case armed robbery case into the felony murder trial, as well as the trial court suppression of illegally obtained evidence of an unlawful search and seizure in the robbery case.  Again, evidence that was illegally obtained from the unrelated stop due to racial profiling.  Under Rule_3:9-3(f), Jamar [...] preserved his right to appeal the decisions on the motions to suppress and to admit 404(b) evidence from the robbery case (clothing, video footage, and money) into Jamar [...] murder trial.  On July 7, 2017, Mr. [...] was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement.
[brief] DISCRIMINATION BY RESPONDENTS | 3 | | II.  ADMISSION TO THE DISCRIMINATION | 6 | | III.  PROCEEDINGS BEFORE AGENCIES | 6 | | IV.  APPELLANT CAUSES OF ACTION | 10 | | • CoA No.1 | 10 | | • CoA No. | 12 | | • CoA No.3 | 15 | | ARGUMENT | 17 | | (Point-1)  DENIED R. 4:52  RELIEF | 17 | | (Not raised below - Order (Pa106) | | | (Point-2)  CIRCUMVENTED MEDIATION | 18 | | (Not raised below) | | | (Point-3)  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIEWING | 22 | | THAT APPELLANT’S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS HIS | | | MOTHER APPLICATION | | | (Raised below: 2T12; Pa221-Pa222; Pa203 –Pa205) | | | (Point-4)  THE COURT RELIED ON FALSE FACTS | 23 | | TOWARD MATTERS OF CONTROLLING DECISIONS | | | (Raised below: 1T12; Pa226; Pa218; Pa192) | | | (Point-5)  BIAS AND CHERRY PICKED OF FACTS | 25 | | (Raised below: 2T; 1T19, Pa226; Pa218; Pa192; Pa135) | | | (Point-6) Court DECIDED OUTCOME BEFORE HEARING | 28 | | (Raised below: 2T; (2T3, 22-25); (2T8, 19-24)) | | | (Point-7) ERR IN DENYING DISQUALIFICATION | 29 | | (Raised below: (2T3- 8); Pa226; Order (Pa114)) | | (Point-8) UNDERMINING OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE  29 (Raised via brief (Pa108); not raised otherwise) (Point-9) BLIND EYE TO DUTY OF CANDOR . . . . 31 (Raised below via brief (Pa72); not raised otherwise) REASON THE CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED . . . . . . . . . . 34 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND OR RULINGS
[directive] Other factors identified in the National Prosecution Standards published by the Association.5 National District Attorneys  In considering whether to move to amend or dismiss a complaint, a municipal prosecutor should be guided by the Court’s admonition that “the prosecutor has an obligation to defendants, the State and the public to see that justice is done and truth is revealed in each individual case. ”  See Commentary to Part VII Guidelines.  “The goal should be to achieve individual justice in individual cases. ”  Ibid. insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, or that the possibility of acquittal is so great that dismissal of the charge(s) is warranted in the interests of justice. ”).  5  See National District Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards (3d ed.), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-w-Revised-Commentary.pdf.  Page 8  The reasons for any amendment or dismissal must be acceptable to the municipal court.  If a municipal prosecutor moves to amend or dismiss a complaint, the prosecutor must personally represent on the record the reasons in support of the motion.  See Part VII Guideline 3.  The prosecutor should anticipate that the court will question the basis for the motion to prevent an improper amendment or dismissal.  See, e.g., Memorandum from [...], J.A.D., to Municipal Court Judges re: Sample Questions for Use in Drunk Driving Cases (Dec. 2, 2004).  At all times, the prosecutor should remain mindful of his ethical obligations to the State and the court.  See, e.g., In re Norton, 128 N.J. 520, 533-40 (1992); In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472, 475-80 (1990).
[brief] Defendants’ briefs can be summarized as Defendants’ attempts to mold what occurred during the zoning board hearing into support for Defendants’ position.  But Defendants assertions are not supported by the transcripts, not supported by the resolution, and are contradicted by their own statements during the Board hearing and arguments before the trial court.  At the heart of the matter is that either (1) the application materials were part of the record, and therefore the Board members and members of the public was improperly limited in their cross-examination and testimony, or (2) the application materials were not part of the record and therefore the application was incomplete.  Defendants cannot argue that the application materials were part of it and yet no one was allowed to ask questions on the application materials.  Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs did not attempt to present their witnesses.  Plaintiffs were not going to make a circus out of the proceedings when it was abundantly clear from Board Attorney that he was not going to permit testimony or cross-examination on the issues intended to be raised by Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs took the appropriate action and simply made the arguments to preserve the issue on appeal.  For the reasons set forth herein and in Plaintiffs’ initial brief, this Court should reverse the Trial Court’s order and remand the application to the Board.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] (90:17-91:1).  Citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993), and the variation of duties depending on status, and as there is no dispute that Plaintiff is an invitee, the Court determined that 5.20(F)(5) sets forth the scope of the duty owed to Plaintiff.  (1T91:2-6).  The trial court determined that 5. 20(B)(2)(b), [...], and Pareja cases are all distinguishable because it deals with injuries that occurred during an ongoing storm.  (1T91:6-9).  Further, the trial court noted that when you read 5.20(B)(2)(b), it does not mention invitees, but instead speaks to pedestrians, on the sidewalk, which is not present in this case.  (1T91:9-12).  Here, Plaintiff was an invitee in the parking lot.  (1T91:12-13).  So therefore, the trial court charged Model Jury Charge 5.20(F)(5).  (1T91:13-14.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE UPON TRANSACTIONS THAT OCCURRED MORE THAN SIX YEARS BEFORE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED CLEARLY PRODUCED AN UNJUST RESULT (13T58-7 to 100-23; 23T95-9 to 105-12; 36T52-7 to -24)  As Defendant has argued, the trial court’s errors in this case warrant a reversal of the Judgment entered against her.  However, even if the Judgment were to survive, the trial court’s reliance upon transactions plainly outside the statute of limitations requires a substantial reduction of the Judgment in the interests of justice.  In her motion for summary judgment, Defendant argued that the court should dismiss [...]’s claim for unpaid compensation, in part, because this breach of contract claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; 10T58-7 to 100-23.  Defendant also raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in her Answer and argued at trial that the “discovery rule” should apply to bar Plaintiffs’ fraud and conversion claims on her motion to dismiss following the close of Plaintiffs’ case.  23T95-9 to 105-12; Da00507 at ¶6.  The record demonstrates that the trial court was aware of the statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs’ conversion and breach of contract claims (36T52-7 to -10) in addition to the fact that a significant portion of Plaintiffs’ claims relied upon transactions that occurred before the limitations period.  13T57-8 to -15.  The claims underlying the Judgment entered against Defendant (conversion, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment) are all governed by a six-year statute of limitations.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2018) (Determining whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations is a question of law that this court reviews de novo).
[brief] ”  11a.  The court further stated that if a person happens to know a lawsuit is filed then that is personal service.  It misstated the facts by claiming the complaint “was dismissed pending the arbitration” when in fact the October 2, 2019 decision makes clear the complaint was dismissed because R 1:20A-6’s mandatory prerequisite to serve Pre-Action Notice before filing the complaint was violated. __  Finally, that order for the first time cites cases such as Schneider that the court misconstrued.  The record is also clear that only after the complaint was dismissed on October 2, 2019, then the defendant on her own filed for fee arbitration unrelated to any case, as no case existed once the court dismissed the unlawful complaint. \(^1\)  On June 20, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of that reinstatement order, arguing that the May 31, 2022 decision overlooked the law and improperly cites *O'Connor v. Altus*, 67 N.J. 106,126 (1975) and *Schneider v. E. Orange*, 196 N.J. Super. 587 (App. Div. 1984) for the proposition that defendant had notice of the case (a) by virtue of her complaining there was no jurisdiction and (b) because she filed for arbitration.
[brief] “Under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, the party alleging a claim must show a violation of a substantive right or that someone "acting under color of law" interfered with or attempted to interfere with a substantive right.  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). ”  State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 64 (N.J. 2018) “we conclude appellant's case is not moot because it implicates his constitutional right to liberty. ”  In re Civil Commitment of [...], DOCKET NO. [...], 5 (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2016)  The mootness argument fails because plaintiffs still contend that they are entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party on their civil-rights claim, see N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f), despite the placement of the ordinance on the ballot.
[brief] While the phrase “principally engaged” was not specifically defined in the Debt Adjustment Act, it is a common phrase that does not require a definition and is thus not vague.  The terms “principally” and “engaged” are common English words with well-understood definitions.  The Merriam-Webster English Dictionary defines the adverb “principally” as “relating to principal,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/principally, and the adjective “principal” as “most important, consequential, influential. ”
[brief] ” (Db33).  Defendant misconstrues the holding in that case.  The Supreme Court held that in one part of the defendant’s sentence, the court had failed to satisfy Yarbough because “[t]he court's findings in support of that consecutive sentence were limited to a comment that ‘[t]he elements of this offense are separate and distinct from the charges of kidnapping.  The defendant possessed the weapon and did not have a permit for it, and there can be no free crimes. ””  239 N.J. at 350-51 (emphasis added).  The Court remanded for resentencing with respect to those offenses because the court below only mentioned that the elements are separate and distinct and there can be no free crimes, indicating that this rationale, without more, is not sufficient.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons stated above, the position of the trial court that it could only accept or reject the Report of the Boundary Commissioners without considering alternatives should be rejected.  Once a party applies to set aside a report from boundary commissioners under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3, a trial court has all of the authority it would normally have to adjudicate a dispute.  The Report of the Boundary Commissioners should have been set aside due to the fact that it involves property rights of parties not before the trial court.  The Final Order of the trail court is inconsistent with the position of the trial court on the scope of its authority.
[brief] Q  [...]  But at some point do you remember the EMTs and the firefighters being on the scene?  A  Yes.  Q  And did they have to use any type of special equipment or measures to extract you from the vehicle?  A Yes.  Q  Did that take some time?  A Yes.  Q  Were you in pain while this is going on?  A Yes.  Q  If it's possible can you try to describe for us what that pain was like?  A  I want to say like something's just crushing your legs.  Q  Were you able to move at all inside of the car until they freed you?  A No.  [3T170-171.]
[brief] Issues regarding the scope of the law enforcement officers' execution of the arrest warrant and the search incident to an arrest, and whether there were exigent circumstances to enter the house, were not present in this appeal as they were in Bradley.  Under our standard of review, we must defer to the trial court's findings of fact “so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. ”  State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016) (recognizing that factual findings will be upheld if there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the findings).
[brief] [...] INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE BOARD VIOLATED THE ACT (Db29).  The Association states that “[...] correctly…shifted the burden to [...] to provide a compelling reason why it refused to negotiate with the [Association’s] full negotiation team, including the [...]” (Db29).  The Association’s reference to its “full negotiations team, including the [...]” is, in reality, its entire membership, depending on which members decide to attend each negotiations session.  The Association also does not cite to any caselaw regarding [...]’s purported “burden to present compelling evidence to meet with the [Association’s] choice of negotiators (Db29). ”  It is entirely unclear where [...] is deriving this so-called “burden to present compelling evidence” from.  Nonetheless, [...] reverts back to its same argument repeated throughout, which [...] has addressed, infra – conflating the issue of whether a government agency can restrict certain members from being on a union’s negotiations team, from the true issue, which is whether the union must select actual “representatives” for the purpose of negotiations.  See, e.g., Db30, asserting, incorrectly, that [...] is seeking “to restrict or even outlaw the presence [of certain members] at negotiations sessions. ”  The Board did not, and has not, attempted to select any specific Association member to negotiate the successor Agreement, nor did it refuse to negotiate unless [...] included or did not include certain individuals on [...]’s negotiations team.  The Board simply sought to negotiate with [...]’s “representatives,” which is plainly required by the Act.  It is not an unfair practice to seek negotiations which comply with the Act’s requirements, and [...] erred by ruling to the contrary.  Even under an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard of review, which [...] and [...] assume is the correct standard throughout each of their responses, [...]’s decision must not stand.  [...] found that [...] committed an unfair practice under the Act when it refused to negotiate with [...]’s entire membership present.  Such a determination is patently arbitrary and unreasonable.  The Act’s purpose is to encourage negotiations between public employers and employee organizations.  The Board attempted to do exactly this when it attempted to negotiate with [...] for a successor contract.  The Board repeatedly informed [...] that it would meet whenever and wherever a mutual time and place could be determined, provided that only the representatives of each party do so.  The Board should not be forced to negotiate with the entire Association membership, and, at the very least, should not be reprimanded for attempting to adhere to the Act itself.  Rather, it is [...] who violated the Act and committed an unfair employment practice when it refused to meet at all without each of its members permitted to attend, even if not all of them chose to, thus frustrating the Act’s intent, since [...]’s abject refusal to negotiate led to what was, at the time, a two-year moratorium on negotiations.  [...] should have so found.
[brief] [...] testified that on May 7, 2019, at about 6:03 p.m., he and his partner [...] were in an unmarked vehicle when a dispatch went out on the radio regarding a domestic-violence incident at [...], and they decided to respond to the scene to offer assistance because they were nearby.  (12T 131-8 to 133-17)  But on the way, while “going down the wrong way on Hoffman,” a one-way street, they heard eight or nine shots and then saw a man -- wearing black sweatpants and a black hooded sweatshirt with the hood up, despite warm temperatures -- running “across Hoffman Avenue into Wilmot Alley,” and they followed in their car.  (12T 133-18 to 136-18)  As Carrigg turned the car down Wilmot, Szbanz testified, Szbanz saw a “black handgun” in the man’s right hand.  (12T 136-15 to 23)  The man turned left onto Ellsworth Avenue and then crossed Ellsworth, with Szbanz having exited the patrol car at the corner of Wilmot and Ellsworth in foot pursuit.  (12T 137-4 to 9)  The man then ignored orders to stop and ran between the houses at 22 and 24 Ellsworth, where, Szbanz admitted, Szbanz lost sight of the suspect briefly.  (12T 137-21 to 138-4; 12T 185-2 to 20)  Szbanz claimed that he then saw a person whom he believed to be the suspect in the rear yard of 22 Ellsworth and that man scaled the fence into the rear yard of 20 Ellsworth after Szbanz drew his firearm and after the man ignored his command to stop.  (12T 138-6 to 11)  However, Szbanz did not see a gun in that man’s hand.  (12T 139-1 to 3)  Szbanz opted not to climb that fence between the 20/22 yards, and so, when he saw the man go toward the side yard of 20 Ellsworth – i.e., the walkway between 20 and 18 Ellsworth, back toward Ellsworth -- Szbanz opted to go back to Ellsworth himself, but did so by using the walkway between 22 and 24, thereby losing sight of that man.  (12T 139-1 to 8; 12T 181-9 to 182-20)  When Szbanz got back to Ellsworth, he pursued and tackled defendant, who was running toward Stuyvesant at the time, and whom Szbanz believed to be the person that he had originally seen running down Wilmot Alley from Hoffman.