ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  The First Day Of Trial And Relevant Facts  Plaintiff began the bench trial with her opening statement.  Instead of allowing Plaintiff to proceed with calling her first witness, the Court questioned Plaintiff about her claims and requested relief immediately following her opening statement, and before Plaintiff had an opportunity to cross-examine any of the Defendants.  Even though Plaintiff never mentioned dropping any claims in her opening statement, the Trial Court immediately suggested that she should.  Specifically, the Court stated, “[s]o you’re dropping your claim against [...], essentially, I mean, because there's no money in it.  You can’t squeeze blood out of a stone. ”  1T9:13-19.
[directive] Activity Criminal or New (FTA) within delinquent adjudicated been had juvenile a as defendant the and 6 or 4, 5, is assessment adult an by committed if that crime a or firearm, a involving crime a for years ten preceding the any commit to attempt an or 2C:43-7.2, N.J.S.A. Act, Release Early  No the to subject be would prosecutor a preclude to construed be shall subsection this in Nothing offenses.  foregoing of the firearms- or violent for adjudications (e.g., delinquency of adjudications other considering from than other for offenses adjudications or ago, years ten than more occurred that crimes related circumstances the totality of the of part as relevant be may as crimes)  NERA or firearms-related in detention pretrial seeking against presumption the overcome to whether determining when also See 8.2.  Section in release of revocation seeking against presumption or the 7.2 Section 7.6.1.
[brief] 30, 31  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  Trial Transcript, dated October 11, 2022 ..................................................  1T Trial Transcript, dated October 12, 2022 ..................................................  2T Trial Transcript, dated October 13, 2022 ..................................................  3T Trial Transcript, dated October 14, 2022 ..................................................  4T Transcript of Summary Judgment Ruling, dated May 24, 2019 ....................  5T Transcript of Summary Judgment Ruling, dated October 17, 2019 .............  6T
[brief] At first, the court believed it might be appropriate to permissively abstain under 11 U.S.C. § 1334(c) from deciding the issue of whether the case was in the pipeline for purposes of applying the *Tyler* and *Roberto* cases.  Generally, [permissive abstention] “allows a court to abstain from hearing a particular matter arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11, in the interest of justice or in the interest of comity with state courts or respect for state law. ”  *In re Vanhook*, 468 B.R. 694, 700 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2012).  New Jersey courts consider several factors in determining when to abstain.  *See Shalom Torah Centers v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Cos.*, No. 10-6766 (FLW), 2011 WL 1322295, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011).  The courts recognize, however, that not all factors need to be considered in all cases and that their importance will “vary with the particular circumstances of each case” such that “no one factor is necessarily determinative. ”  2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35726, [WL] at *4.  *In re Mendez*, 600 B.R. 321, 334 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2019).
[brief] The trial court found, and the State did not dispute, that the Mazda was stopped at the time it was blocked in by a police vehicle and that at that point officers did not know who was in the car.  (1T 85-10 to 86-9, 111-21 to 18; Da 8)  The car was stopped because a suspected drug dealer went to the car with money (not drugs).  There was no hand-to-hand transaction.  The conversation the police overheard was entirely benign.  Because police cannot stop every single person who speaks with a suspected drug dealer, even people who do business with a drug dealer, the stop was unlawful.
[brief] (Da0695-Da0696)  [...]’s Ophthalmology Expert, [...], agrees with plaintiff’s general causation position that traction from a particle can, in fact, cause a retinal detachment.  [...] testified that “[A]ny traction or pulling or pushing on the vitreous can cause a retinal tear.  The vitreous is like an egg white, raw egg white and it's gooey.  So if a needle goes through and squirts out a drug or a device, that could potentially push the vitreous, and the vitreous can pull a retinal tear since the retina is in close proximity to the pars plana where you put the needle through, and it's peripheral retinal tears that result in retinal detachment. ” (Da0709; Da0711-Da0712)  However, while [...] testified that he felt the 300 micron silicone particulate was not large enough to cause traction and a retinal detachment, [...] admitted that he is not aware of any literature regarding the minimum size a particle needs to be to cause traction and a retinal detachment.  (Da0709; Da0713-Da0714)  Further, [...] admitted that he does not know what the smallest size particulate would be to cause traction resulting in a retinal detachment.  (Da0709; Da0713-Da0714)
[brief] One example of manifest injustice is a sexual assault case in which the victim is a child; if the trial is likely to have a substantial adverse impact on the child, the court may grant waiver.  "Manifest injustice" does not exist simply because the parties are able and willing to enter into a plea bargain on or before the date of trial.  A plea cut-off rule was recommended by twelve members of the Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee in a dissent filed with the 1992-94 Criminal Practice Committee Recommendations on Rules Necessary to Implement the Criminal Division Operating Standards, Sec. 137 (N.J.L.J.) 54, 76-77.
[directive] Service of Temporary Restraining Order (no-contact order)  A.  When the victim obtains a no-contact court order but the defendant had not been arrested by police and is present at the scene, the officer should:  1.  Escort the victim to his or her home.  2.  Read the conditions of the court order to the defendant if the defendant is present.  3.  Order the defendant to vacate the premises.  4.  Give the defendant a reasonable period of time to gather personal belongings, unless the court order includes specific limits on time or duration.  5.  Arrest the defendant if required by the court order or if defendant refuses to comply with the order.  B.  Where a court order had been issued but was not served upon the defendant because the defendant could not then be located but the defendant is now at the scene, police should follow Paragraphs A.2-5 above.  C.
[brief] P.L. 2021, c. 375, § 2a.  See Pa23 at Count II.  If the State is right that the Legislature cannot bind a future Legislature, which Applicants dispute, then the law substantively is unconstitutional.  As addressed in IV, *infra*, to the extent this application is denied, Applicants request that the matter be remanded to the Law Division.  While the Legislature could have repealed the statutes that Applicants contend were violated before enacting P.L. 2021, c. 375, its failure to do so means the Legislature was bound by its own enactments.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff, who cannot even state why or if he fell, nevertheless argues that a messy jobsite alone provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to conclude that he slipped and fell because of the conditions of the jobsite.  However, no evidence was offered by Plaintiff to show that he fell because of a messy jobsite.  Plaintiff never testified to that effect at his deposition.  Thus, as in *Townsend*, 221 N.J. at 49, where there was no evidence in the record that would support a fact-finder’s determination that the overgrown shrubbery caused the fatal accident, there is no evidence in the record here to support a determination that a merely messy jobsite caused Plaintiff to fall.
[brief] ”  *N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Bergen Ambulatory Surgery Ctr.*, 410 N.J. Super. 270, 278 (App. Div. 2009); see also *In re N.J. Ass’n For Justice*, Order No. A12-118, 2012 WL 6927765, at *9 (Dep’t of Banking & Ins. Dec. 21, 2012) (“PIP arbitrations are not as procedurally complex or time consuming as traditional litigation”) (Pa0486).  [...]’s rules reflect the expectation that hearings will be simple and efficient, unlike a complex fraud trial.
[brief] [...] was tried for three separate incidents that occurred at the offices of [...] in [...] on August 17, 2017, January 27, 2018, and May 29, 2018.  [...] lived in Virginia during this period, as confirmed by telephone, toll, and credit card records obtained by police, which did not place him in New Jersey on any of the dates in question.  No witnesses testified to seeing [...] in New Jersey on or around the dates in question.  The State’s theory was that [...] committed these acts because he believed that his grandmother owed him $25,000 due to how his mother negotiated the sale of the building containing [...] to his grandmother when divorcing his father, Leonard [...] the 2\textsuperscript{nd}.  [...] was owned by [...] and [...], who are, respectively, the mother and brother of [...]’s mother [...].
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff, v. [...], Defendant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...] TEAM 01  QUASI CRIMINAL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM ORDERS FILED: November 2, 2023  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION, CRIMINAL PART, OCEAN COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C.  SAT BELOW AT MUNICIPAL LEVEL: Hon. [...], J.M.C.  Hon. [...], J.M.C. APPELLANT/DEFENDANT’S BRIEF
[directive] FACTS Number: Notification of Expectations for Defendant ordered to Home Detention with Limited Exceptions  You are receiving this notice because you were ordered to Home Detention with Limited Exceptions as a condition of your pretrial release.  This notice provides what you must do to ensure your compliance with this condition:  1.  You must remain home at all times other than the limited exceptions explicitly  You will be permitted to leave your home during those periods permitted by court order. solely for the reasons ordered by the court, and only for those periods and reasons.  At all other times you must remain home.  2.  If you require a modification to this condition or your court order, even if it is for a previously approved reason, you must submit to the court for said leave through counsel, or if you are unrepresented using the “Request for Leave from Home Detention” form.  pro se  You may not leave your residence unless approval is granted by the court.  3.  You will be required to periodically answer random, unscheduled video calls from Pretrial Services, or provide contemporaneous photo proof to Pretrial Services, of your These calls or requests for location during the periods of confinement to your home. proof may occur at varying times throughout your ordered period of confinement.  4.  Upon answering these calls, the Pretrial officer may ask that you provide verification you are in your ordered residence.  This may include showing the Pretrial Services officer a familiar location that was established at the start of monitoring as part of your residence, your address number on a door, house or mailbox, or any other reasonable method to determine you are home.  The same requirements apply if asked to produce a photo verifying your presence at the court-ordered location.  The Pretrial Services officer will not ask you to show private areas such as restrooms.  5.  If the Pretrial officer is unable to reach you, or you are unable to sufficiently verify you are in your ordered residence, the officer will file a Violation of Monitoring with the court and a bench warrant may be issued.  6.  If you have any questions regarding your conditions of release, contact your Pretrial Services Program (PSP) officer immediately.  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN 12873
[brief] See Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir.1997)) (“‘[T]he mere fact that [an] adverse employment action occurs after [the protected activity] will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two. ’”).  The trial court also properly noted—not by improperly drawing inferences in favor of Defendants, but evaluating [...]’s claim of pretext—that all staffing coordinators were interviewed, yet only three were terminated.
[brief] The nature and extent of the coverage provided by an insurance policy is determined by the terms of the policy.  Adron, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 292 N.J. Super. 463, 473 (App. Div. 1996); Rena, Inc. v. Brien, 310 N.J. Super. 304, 321 (App. Div. 1998).  The words of the insurance policy should be given their plain, ordinary meaning.  Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 175 (1992); Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta, 170 N.J. 223, 231 (2001); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Simone, 340 N.J. Super. 19, 24 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d o.b., 170 N.J. 438 (2002).  When the terms of an insurance contract are clear, it is the function of a court to enforce it as written and not to make a better contract for either of the parties.  Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231, 238 (2008); Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 594-95 (2001).  In the absence of any ambiguity, courts will not write a better policy of insurance than the one purchased.  Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530, 537 (1990); Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 670 (1999).  Only where there are genuine ambiguities in a policy will the “doctrine of ambiguity” be invoked to interpret a policy in favor of coverage.
[brief] Here, the statute is 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which states:  Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, **a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person** other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.
[directive] Jeśli odpowiedź na to pytanie brzmi „nie”, proszę odpowiedzieć 17b–17f.  Jeśli na pytania odpowiedział(a) Pan(i) „tak”, proszę przejść do pytania 18.  If you have answered “No” to this question, you must answer Questions 17b – 17f.  If you have answered “Yes” to this question, proceed to Question 18.  rozumie Pan(i), że jeśli nie jest Pan(i) obywatelem/obywatelką Stanów Zjednoczonych, b.  Czy [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] przyznanie się do winy może spowodować wydalenie ze Stanów Zjednoczonych lub zakaz legalnego wjazdu lub powrotu na terytorium Stanów Zjednoczonych?  Inicjały oskarżonego / Defendant’s Initials  Główny formularz oświadczenia o winie/Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish strona 5 z 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish page 5 of 7  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re-enter the United States?
[brief] ”  Id. (citing Luna v. Am. Airlines, 769 F. Supp. 2d 231, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).  Here, the trial judge never addressed whether the indemnification provision in the [...] covered the Plaintiffs’ first-party breach of contract claims against Defendant (37T79-4 to 93-23).  The trial court found the indemnification provision enforceable against Defendant even though she was not a party to the agreement and without addressing the applicable case law.
[brief] When the Committee decided to amend Ordinance No. 2022-15, it simply had [...] read out the revisions in a lengthy monologue.  (2T87:1-93:24).  No evidence was introduced in support of Ordinance No. 2022-17 or the purported reasons the Committee was adopting the ordinance.  Further, at the December 8, 2022, meeting at which the ordinance was adopted, no evidence was introduced in the record.  (Pa296).  At the very least the Committee could have introduced the same evidence it relied upon for the adoption of Ordinance No. 2022-15, but it did not do so.  More importantly, the record is devoid of any discussion by the Committee members regarding the reasons for the adoption of Ordinance No. 2022-17.  Even assuming arguendo, this Court considers the evidence introduced in the record for Ordinance No. 2022-15 to also be part of the record for Ordinance No. 2022-17, there is no discussion of the evidence by the Committee members.  Our courts have made clear that a mere recitation of the statutory criteria is insufficient to satisfy the municipality's obligations under the LRHL.
[brief] The Trial Court Should Have Dismissed the Indictment**  Although the trial court correctly granted Appellant’s *Brady* motion it committed grave error in failing to dismiss the Indictment.  Specifically, although the trial court correctly imputed [...]’s knowledge to the prosecutor, it failed to impute [...]’s bad faith and malice to the State, even though [...] was employed by the State and was a member of the State’s prosecution team and perjured himself twice for the State.  As a result, the trial court wrongfully concluded that the State’s conduct was not willful or outrageous, even though it suggested that [...]’s actions were done purposely, with intent “to prevent an unfavorable outcome”, where the State also contested and argued in its own motion for leave to appeal.  Absent a dismissal the State will have had endured no consequence for their unbelievable conduct.  In opposing Appellant’s motion for leave to appeal the State argued that dismissal was not warranted because Appellant’s motion to suppress was granted.  The irony in this position is palpable.  First, it is irrelevant to what relief is appropriate for the Brady violation because Appellant won his motion to suppress on the merits.  Second, the State has proffered this specious argument while at the same time arguing, in a parallel appeal, that Appellant’s motion to suppress should have been denied thus undermining the genuineness of such a position.  Third, if the Court adopts such a position, it sends a message to the State that they can commit egregious Brady violations with relative impunity.  In the context of a Brady violation, the remedy of dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is utilized when “the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction. ”  United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, (1973).  In State v. D.A.B., App. Div. A-1848-22, September 19, 2023, Pg. 15, this Court found that dismissal is warranted when a Brady violation occurs that is purposeful and misleading and would materially affect a Appellant’s pretrial preparations.  Specifically, this Court considered “the strength of the State's case, the timing of disclosure of the withheld evidence, the relevance of the suppressed evidence, and the withheld evidence's admissibility. ”  Id., Pg. 10 (quoting State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 510 (2019)), and affirmed the dismissal with prejudice after finding that “the State potentially would have virtually no evidence with which to satisfy its burden of proof”
[directive] "Criminal event" means a specific incident, or series of related specific incidents, that would constitute an indictable crime under the laws of the State of New Jersey, whether or not the incident(s) have occurred or will occur within the State of New Jersey.  The term includes an attempt or conspiracy to commit a crime, or actions taken in preparation for the commission of the crime, such as conducting a surveillance of the location to identify and evade or thwart security measures, or conducting a rehearsal of a planned crime.  The term includes two or more separate criminal acts or episodes that are linked by common participants or that are reasonably believed to have been undertaken by a criminal organization or as part of an ongoing conspiracy.  "Crime trend analysis" refers to the analytical process by which stored ALPR data is used, whether alone or in conjunction with other sources of information, to detect crime patterns by studying and linking common elements of recurring crimes; to predict when and where future crimes may occur; and to link specific vehicles to potential criminal or terrorist activity.
[brief] [...], individually, and derivatively on behalf of [...], Plaintiffs / Respondents, vs. [...], individually, and THE LAW OFFICES OF [...], LLC, Defendants / Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET No.: [...]  On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION – MERCER COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  OPPOSITION
[brief] ”  Id. at 560-561 (emphasis added).  Here, the judge did some of what the case law requires of her regarding jury voir dire when confronted with possible outside influence on the jury, but she abdicated her duty completely in one respect: when the voir dire of Juror Sixteen revealed that jurors were discussing the encounter with [...] in deliberations, the judge did not follow up with appropriate further voir dire to find out what they were discussing.
[brief] Similar to the facts in Lodato, in the case at hand, the tree root and raised sidewalk were open and obvious and connected directly to the dangerous condition of the shaved tree root.  Even defendant witness [...] testified that “But to me, that looks like a main root, and the whole tree – I would have took the whole tree down before they did the sidewalk. ” (Pa172-193, Tr 48:23-25-49:1).  The tree root in this case was ultimately shaved rather than removed, however defendant here indicates the root was a main root.  This can only be of such an apparent, open and obvious nature that defendant [...] should have had constructive notice of it, similar to that of the Lodato tree root.
[brief] In the instant case, N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 requires the ordinance to be “published in its entirety or by title or by title and summary” in the newspaper “together” with “a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance”.  Id.  By operation of logic, the use of the word “together” compels the conclusion that the statement of purpose must exist separate and apart from any of the alternatives provided for in the first part of the statute.  Moreover, unlike the ordinance itself, N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 specifies that the statement of purpose must be prepared by “the clerk of the governing body”.  There would have been no reason for the Legislature to include that specific caveat if it did not intend something more than the publication of the proposed ordinance’s title.  Put another way, N.J.S.A. 40:49-2’s unambiguous language requires that an ordinance published by title also include a separate statement of purpose.  Any other interpretation renders a significant portion of the statute inoperative, superfluous and meaningless.  Such an interpretation cannot be sustained as a matter of law.