ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] §164-14 entitled “Violations of Code; Penalties” states:  Unless a specified penalty is provided elsewhere in Part III of this Code, in state law or in other ordinances of the Board of Health for a particular violation, any person, firm or corporation who shall violate any provision of Part III of this Code or any code or other regulation adopted by reference therein or any order promulgated under such provision, code or regulation, by doing any act prohibited or declared to be unlawful or a violation thereby, or shall engage in or exercise any business or occupation or do anything for which a license or permit is required thereby without having a license or permit therefor as required or who shall fail to do any act required by any such provision or when such provision declares such failure to be unlawful or a violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 for each violation.
[brief] It clearly had the burden to present and confirm those compelling legitimate governmental interests and a reasonable factual basis for its regulatory scheme in order to validate its legislative action.  Its failure to do so is fatal.  Id. at 396 [emphasis added].  [...] further established that “safety” and “aesthetic” concerns must be grounded in real evidence, not “supposition”; there is no such real evidence here because the Board could not agree on the “factual basis” for the Distance Regulation and [...] did not even bother to try.  [...], 226 N.J. at 585.
[brief] Like Newtown, the language in the contract is clear and the Employer set a different overtime rate than is specified in the contract.  The Kendellen Award is not a reasonably debatable interpretation of the language in the parties’ contract because the Arbitrator found that the Treasury Circulars are controlling “instead of” the collective bargaining agreement.  In County of Passaic, Office of the Passaic County Sheriff v. [...], Docket No.: [...] (App. Div. June 29, 2011), the Appellate Division upheld the Superior Court’s order vacating an arbitration award that was procured by undue means where the Arbitrator “improperly applied past practices to override unambiguous terms of the contract for which the parties had bargained. ” (Emphasis added).
[directive] In addition to the situations described in Sections 9.6.1 and 9.6.2, the law enforcement executive may authorize access to a particular file or record for good cause.  The request and the authorization shall be in writing, and the written authorization shall specify who is being granted access, to which records access is being granted and for what time period access is permitted.  The authorization shall also specify any conditions (i.e., the files may be reviewed only at the internal affairs office and may not be removed).  In addition, the law enforcement executive may order any redactions consistent with Section 9.6.2(b).
[brief] The [...] claims, again post hoc, that “constructing a bridge for this specific road crossing could result in greater impacts to riparian zone and wetlands, given the close proximity of wetlands, (Ra54), and riparian zone to this road crossing, (Aa31). ”  [...] 18.  These record citations discuss wetlands and riparian zones near the road crossing, but no analysis or finding by the [...] regarding whether constructing a bridge would have greater riparian zone impacts than a culvert.  III.
[directive] The internal affairs investigator must maintain an appropriate balance between professional commitment and personal and group loyalties.  Internal affairs personnel must be of unquestioned integrity and possess the moral stamina to perform unpopular tasks.  It is important that these investigators possess the ability to withstand the rigors and tensions associated with complex investigations, social pressures and long hours of work.  The investigator must possess the ability to be tactful when dealing with members of the agency and the community.  It is recommended that personnel assigned to the internal affairs function provide the agency with the opportunity to access all segments of the community.  For example, if a particular community has a significant proportion of the population that speaks a foreign language, the law enforcement executive may wish to consider assigning an officer to the internal affairs function who speaks that language.
[brief] [...] (N.J 2014) | 29 | | 6 | State v. Gately (App. Div. 1985) | 38 | | 7 | State v. Haskins (App. Div. 2024) | 47 | | 8 | State v. Kazanowski, DOCKET NO. [...] 2020) | 24,37,47| | 9 | State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 386 (N.J. 2015) | 27,39,46| |10 | State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 514 (N.J. 2010) | 28,34 | |11 | State v. Singh,DOCKET NO.[...] 2018) | 36,37,45| |12 | State v. Smith (N.J. 2022) | 30,31,32,42| |13 | State v. Tischio (N.J. 1987) | 40 | |14 | State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 416 (N.J. 2015) | 43,44 | |15 | State v. Woodruff (Law Div. 2008) | 34,35 | Preliminary Statement
[brief] [...] is the owner of properties located in the [...], including but not limited to Block 184, Lot 4, as well as to the property which is the subject matter of this litigation - the “Riparian Grant. ”  [...] has been in business on properties located in Keansburg for approximately 100 years, operating a recreation/amusement facility generally known as the “[...]. ”  Prior to 1998/1999, the Borough represented and held out to the public that Keansburg was the fee owner of certain property known as Lots 3 and 3.01 in Block 184, located in the immediate vicinity of [...]’s property upon which it operates its business.  Keansburg represented that it possessed fee title to Lots 3 and 3.01, offering to lease Lot 3.01 to the public.  This is the “Riparian Grant, a.k.a. the “Quinlin Grant. ”  Shortly thereafter, on May 17, 1999, [...] entered into a Lease Agreement with the Borough whereby Plaintiff leased and occupied a portion of Lot 3, Block 184 --- said portion now known and identified as Lot 3.01(hereinafter referred to as “Subject Property”) (J-12) (Pa969).  The Borough and its officials were aware that [...] planned to install and locate various amusement park facilities and structures, including a “Go-Kart” track facility, on the Subject Property.  The improvement, installed by Plaintiff, is valued in excess of several hundred thousand dollars.  The “Go-Kart”, along with the “Water Slide” is a main attraction – bringing tens of thousands of visitors from throughout the Tri-State area every year.  The 1999 Lease provided for an initial Lease term to May 16, 2005, and then an option of four (4) renewal terms each through May 2025 at a specified rate schedule.  In reliance upon said 1999 Lease, [...] incorporated the "Subject Property" into the amusement park and expended substantial sums of money to construct and locate various amusement facilities thereupon, including the "Go-Kart" track.  In 2011, certain issues and/or disputes arose between the parties regarding the continuation and renewability of [...]'s Lease for the Subject Property.  The parties eventually agreed on terms of an Amended Lease which was executed on February 20, 2012, for the continued Lease of Lot 3.01 (J-19) (Pa1027).  In 2015, the Keansburg, by virtue of Resolution 15-026, authorized the [...] to undertake a Preliminary Investigation to determine whether certain conditions exist to designate various properties located within the borough of Keansburg, consisting of Block 184, Lots 1 & 3 as a condemnation redevelopment area.  This included Lot 3.01.  The Study resulted in a Report titled "Redevelopment Study and Preliminary Investigation Report" dated June 2015 that concluded that the Area studied, being Block 184, Lots 1 & 3 met the criteria to be designated on "Area in Need of Redevelopment" (Pa4).
[brief] (305a, ¶2).  There is no dispute the parties have not identified a lender to receive a loan policy.  There is no dispute that on the commitment date, title to the property as shown in the County Clerk’s Office was vested in [...] and [...], husband and wife.  (305a, ¶4)  (358a).  There is no dispute there was also an unrecorded deed transferring title to the property from [...] and [...], husband and wife, to [...] alone.  There is no dispute that more than 180 days have passed since the effective date of the commitment.  There is no dispute there is no deed transferring the property to plaintiff.  There is, therefore, no dispute that under the express terms of the commitment [...] does not owe plaintiff a title insurance policy or payment of a policy limit.  Based on the foregoing, the title commitment has terminated, and plaintiff’s claim regarding a “collateral” contract fails.
[brief] A.  Both the Alleged Defendants’ Specific Negligence for Failure to Incorporate Terms In Chinese Agreements to English PSA or Defendants’ “Many Other Deviations” from Standard Practice  During Representation Had Caused No Actual Damages to Plaintiff  ............................................................................  8  B.  Legal Fees Shall Only Be Awarded to A Successful Claim for Malpractice and for Relevant Work Attributable to the Malpractice Claim  .........................................................  17  III.  PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REOPEN THE DIVORCE CASE WAS NOT FOR THE PURPOSE TO REMEDY THE ERRORS IN THE PSA OR JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE BUT FOR THE PURPOSE TO RESCIND THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES (RAISED BELOW: DA45-66, DA168-178)  ........................................................................................................  22
[brief] DEFENDANT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED DISCRETION BY NOT CONSIDERING ALL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE LEXUS AND INCONSISTENTLY DECIDING THE BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT REIMBURSEMENT.  (A229; A427; Drb17-18)  On the issue of the Lexus, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, it was not “entirely up to the trial court” to award Defendant with the Lexus.  (See Drb. at 17).  The trial court abused discretion by ignoring Defendant’s deposition testimony in evidence, confirming she received the Mercedes.  (Pa87, Def. Dep. at 258:1-20, Aug. 8, 2019).  The trial court also ignored the parties’ property settlement agreement (that the court held entirely valid), a term of which equitably distributed the Mercedes to Defendant.  (Ca14, ¶13).  It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to not consider that critical evidence and then award Defendant with the Lexus she stole.  On the issue of [...] reimbursement, Defendant fails to counter that trial court’s findings on the account ownership were inconsistent with her claims about past practices.  Those past practices involved a different account.  The trial court found that the account as issue was solely Plaintiff’s.  (A229, Op. at 39).  His testimony was unequivocal that the account was never utilized for payments of Defendant’s credit card charges.  [16T74-4-1].  No party can have any “reasonable expectation” to steal the other’s bank account, as Defendant preposterously argues.  (Drb. at 18).  CONCLUSION
[brief] DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...]  Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction  Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County.  Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. and a jury  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] ”  (Sb 6)  - [...], having “heard [...] relay his observations about a potential drug transaction in the ShopRite parking lot,” “drove to the ShopRite and set up stationary surveillance on the vehicle [...] had described. ”  (Sb 6-7)  - 35 minutes after [...] began his surveillance, MacRae and another detective “approached defendant with their badges around their necks, identified themselves as police officers, informed him of the narcotics-related investigation they were conducting, and patted him down. ”  (Sb 7)  - At that point, according to MacRae, [...] volunteered that there were drugs in the car.  The State ignores all these circumstances, instead relying almost exclusively on the fact that [...]’s alleged admission was spontaneous and that police did not know [...] prior to beginning surveillance.  But under the State’s version of events, and its arguments trying to justify the stop,\(^3\) experienced narcotics detectives engaged in a surveillance operation in a parking lot specifically known for narcotics activity, saw narcotics activity being conducted from [...]’s car, and therefore surveilled the car for at least a half hour before stopping [...] by his car because they already suspected the car was involved in narcotics distribution.  Under this version of events, before the police stopped [...] or approached his car, they already reasonably suspected, through the specific investigative steps they had already taken that evening, that his car was involved in drug distribution.
[brief] In conflict with the R. 4:6-2(e) standard, Defendant interprets the Complaint’s factual allegations to argue it did not communicate when it conveyed information, its mail vendor is not a person, and the information it conveyed was not in connection with the collection of a debt.  Relying on the unpublished Miller decision, Defendant claims its sharing of data with its mail vendor was not “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  Plaintiff’s Brief addressed the issue at Pb8-Pb9 citing one of the Federal Decisions which analyzed the in-connection-with requirement.  Miller did not address the reasoning in any of the Federal Decisions and is currently under appellate review.  See, [...].  Collection agencies like Defendant can only seek a debtor’s voluntary payment and requesting a voluntary payment requires the collector to interact with the debtor.  Thus, writing to a consumer is an essential debt collection function.  Outsourcing that activity does not alter its purpose.  To the contrary, Defendant conveyed the data specifically to dun debtors.  Thus, the Complaint’s allegations, viewed under the R. 4:6-2(e) standard, show that Defendant’s conduct “serves a collection function” and, therefore, “is in connection with the collection of debts. ”  Romine v. Diversified Collection  Furthermore, the Complaint, coupled with reasonable favorable inferences, alleges Defendant communicated with a person because conveying information is a communication as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) and a service provider is a person.  Pa4 at ¶¶26-29 (alleging Defendant contracted with a “business firm” and “conveyed data concerning the Debt” to that “third-party mail vendor”).  D.
[brief] Accordingly, [...]’s conflict is indisputably imputed to his partners, including [...].  [...] contends that Dewey is not applicable because it involved duties to former clients and not duties to present clients but the legal principles enunciated in Dewey regarding disqualification of the firm when a partner is disqualified are directly applicable here, especially when the indictment charges wrongdoing of the firm and other lawyers there.  The legal principle of disqualification of a firm when a partner has a conflict is sound and is applicable with greater force to conflicts involving present clients not less.
[brief] Defendant moved before trial to suppress statements he made to police at the scene as well as evidence seized from his vehicle.  (2T4-3 to 9).  On January 4, 2023, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., presided over an evidentiary hearing on the motions.  (1T).  On February 3, 2023, the --- 1  “Da” refers to the defendant’s appendix “Db” refers to the defendant’s brief “Pa” refers to the State’s appendix  “1T” refers to the transcript dated January 4, 2023  “2T” refers to the transcript dated February 3, 2023  “3T” refers to the transcript dated March 31, 2023  “4T” refers to the transcript dated April 28, 2023 2  The indictment also charged a co-defendant as to certain counts.  That name is redacted from the indictment.  (Da1 to 2).  court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized during the automobile search and certain statements he made to police at the scene of the stop.  The court granted defendant’s motion to suppress as it pertained to statements he made while seated inside of the police vehicle.  (2T3-21 to 16-14; Da3).  Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to count three, second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement.  (3T15-15 to 18-18).  In the plea forms, defendant preserved the right to appeal the court’s ruling on his motions to “SUPPRESS EVIDENCE” and “SUPPRESS STATEMENTS (MIRANDA MOTION).” (Da5).  The court incorporated the plea forms into the record during the plea hearing, finding that there were no additional promises outside of those contained in the agreement.  (3T19-17 to 19).  On April 28, 2023, the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.  The court imposed a five-year prison sentence with a one-year parole disqualifier.  (4T21-13 to 25).  The court also imposed certain fines and fees.  (4T21-22 to 25).  The court dismissed the balance of the indictment.  (4T22-3 to 4).  Defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 22, 2023.  (Da14 to 17).  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] ”  Specifically, it grants safe harbor only to those attorneys who incidentally provide debt adjustment service as part of their regular law practice, in other words those who are not “principally engaged” in debt adjustment.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has upheld a comparable restriction on the business of debt adjustment when practiced by attorneys.  Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).  In that case, the court upheld the Kansas debt adjustment statute which limited the practice of debt adjusting to lawyers “as an incident to the practice of law. ”  Id. at 727.  While the Kansas District Court struck down this statute as unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court reversed and upheld the constitutionality of the “attorney exemption” of the Kansas debt adjusting statute.
[brief] *Sutton v. Sutton* at 71F.Supp. 2d at 386.  Petitioner never told the Decedent he wanted a premarital agreement.  (8T92:6-18).  Petitioner did not have any discussions with Decedent about a prenuptial agreement.  (8T92:6-8).  Petitioner did not sign a prenuptial agreement prior to his marriage.  (8T62:14-21).  At the time of the marriage, Petitioner was obviously disappointed that he entered into a Consent Order that impacted his rights with respect to his own assets.
[brief] See infra at 8-10.  [...] requested the court: (1) declare the statutes delegating regulatory authority to and establishing the composition of the Council unconstitutional and an invalid intrusion on authority already granted to [...]; (2) enjoin the implementation of the 2022 CBBMP and related Game Code amendments; and (3) enjoin the 2023 black bear hunt authorized by the Game Code and 2022 CBBMP.  (Pa9-11).  On October 4, 2023, the trial court denied [...]’s request for injunctive relief.  (Pa50-70).  On November 2, 2023, the State Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on [...]’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as all counts were foreclosed by controlling case law.  (Pa80-83).  [...] initially answered but subsequently filed a motion to dismiss.  (Pa71-79, 84-87).
[brief] A hearing was conducted by [...] on October 17, 2018 (1T) with plaintiff’s [...] testifying, continuing on December 4, 2018 with [...] and [...] presenting two witnesses (3T).  [...] submitted an affidavit of services for a fee award as sanctions (Da672).  The Court thereafter entered an Order (Da971) on May 29, 2019 and Statement of Reasons on January 15, 2019 (Da690) awarding plaintiff sanctions and attorney fees.  While the Appeal and Order to Show Cause was pending, [...] on August 23, 2018 filed an Administrative Appeal to the [...] as per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 for a determination whether the Synagogue’s (Lot 8) off-site parking use of [...]’s Lot 5 was a legal nonconforming use.
[brief] See, e.g., United States ex rel. Repko v. Guthrie Clinic, P.C., 2011 WL 3875987 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2011), aff’d, 490 F. App’x 502, 504 (3d Cir. 2012).  The Court need not hold that cost on its own makes a data source not publicly disclosed or what cost renders something not public.  It need only consider whether the extreme costs to obtain data here in combination with legal limitations on the use of the data and the technical inaccessibility of data from the EMMA Portal created a material factual dispute.  The question cannot be so one-sided under Brill that it must be decided in Defendants’ favor.  Cases where modest expenses were not an impediment to finding a public disclosure do not help Defendants.  Db36.  The costs in this case -- amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars -- are unlike any prior case.  It defies logic to urge that something that costs a user a few dollars to access and something that costs hundreds of thousands of dollars are equally accessible to the public.  Ja2215, 2294, 2300, 2450-52.  And Defendants’ effort to claim that something is publicly disclosed if a standard industry price was paid fares no better.  Db37-38.  Paying a massive price is a practical limitation on access, whether the prices is the “going rate” or not.  2.
[brief] BECAUSE THE OBJECTORS IGNORED THE PUBLICATION OF A NOTICE OF APPROVAL THAT THEY ADMITTEDLY OBTAINED, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE DID NOT MERIT A DISCRETIONARY ENLARGEMENT OF THE TIME IN WHICH TO FILE THEIR COMPLAINT IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS (Pa847-848; Pa850-856; 1T18-1T20).  Interested parties disappointed with the outcome of a municipal land use hearing are afforded a review of the record below if they timely file a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs.  The Objectors admittedly filed their complaint in lieu of prerogative writs out of time resulting in the need for the Objectors to file a motion to extend the time period in which to file.  Failure to read email does not provide a legally cognizable basis for an enlargement of the period of time in which to file a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs.  Nor does delegation to a “non-legally trained contractor” to analyze the legal significance of the body and attachments to an email provide a legally cognizable basis for an enlargement of the period of time in which to file the complaint in lieu of prerogative writs.  With Objectors having failed to carry their burden to identify “substantial and novel constitutional issues,” “important public rather than private interest that require adjudication or clarification” or any cognizable general equitable reason for an extension of time, the Trial Court correctly concluded that the Objectors showed no manifest interest of justice requiring an enlargement of time in which to file the complaint in lieu of prerogative writs.
[brief] It is sufficient that the answers to the Application questions regarding “disciplinary proceedings” were objectively false.  Equally unavailing is the argument that [...] had a “reasonable expectation” that the questions in the Applications did not require disclosure of the OAE Investigation, Disciplinary Action Complaint, or Disciplinary Action.  [Pb30]  As an initial matter, the questions in the Applications are not ambiguous, and thus the “reasonable expectations doctrine” does not apply.  *Beauty Plus Trading Co., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA*, No. A-3380-16T3, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1917, at *15 (App. Div. Aug. 14, 2018).
[brief] 3T20:19-23.  Plaintiff also had the benefit of rent-free housing and food at the Bernardsville house.  3T:21-6-8.  The evidence further disclosed that after plaintiff was terminated in December 2017 (1T85:16-86:17; 2T203:13-18), [...] and [...] were compensated reasonably for their continuing services from 2018 to 2020: [...] received only $24,000 in 2018; and [...] received a total of $163,530 for 2018 through 2020.