ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As a last note on this point, [...] attempts to sidestep the limiting language in the POA by arguing that the Proposal Bond and Consent of Surety are a “singular instrument” and therefore only one POA was needed for both ([...]’s Brief, p. 32).  However, New Jersey law and the Contract Specifications instruct otherwise.  As quoted above, [...] describes a Consent of Surety as:  …[A] direct undertaking by the bonding company, enforceable by the [public entity].  Its purpose is to provide a guarantee to the [public entity], at the time of the submission of bids, that if the bidder were to be awarded the contract, the surety would issue the required performance bond.  Id. at 321.  Here, Section 103.02 of Contract Specifications required a performance bond be issued in the amount of one hundred percent of the bidders’ proposal if that bidder were awarded the contract (Ra 01-02\(^5\)).  Thus, based on [...]’s proposal, if a contract were awarded to [...], a performance bond would have been required in the amount of $70,865,354.  Conversely, the Contract Specifications at Section 102.07 of the 2016 Standard Specifications required a Proposal Bond of “not less than ten percent of the bidder’s proposal or, in the case of [...], $7,086,535.40 (A1).  Consequently, the Consent of Surety and Proposal Bond are two separate and legally distinct undertakings and cannot be considered a “singular instrument.
[brief] From its inception, zoning has been described as the "separation of the municipality into districts and the regulation of buildings and structures in the districts so created in accordance with their construction and the nature and extent of their use."  *Mansfield Swett Inc. v. West Orange*, 120 N.J.L. 145 (E&A 1938).  Zoning into districts that delineate permitted uses and bulk standards for each separate lot/parcel became known as "Euclidian" zoning.  As per the Enabling Laws, variances or exceptions for a use or structure not permitted on a particular lot/parcel are to be considered by the Planning Board or Zoning Board under proof standards as defined.  See *N.J. Hegeman Co. v. River Edge*, 6 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 1949); *Rockhill v. Chesterfield*, 23 N.J. 117 (1957).  The relevant point is that since the early 1930’s the development and use of property has been subject to and controlled by zoning.
[directive] Electronic Surveillance  7.9.1 N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 et seq. governs the use of electronic surveillance information in New Jersey.  This statute specifically covers the areas of: (a) Wire communication, which essentially means any conversation made over a telephone, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2a; (b) Oral communication, which means any oral communication uttered by a person who has an expectation that such communication will not be intercepted, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2b; State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975).
[brief] As one example provided in the brief (among others therein), an extended exchange took place (over 3 pages of transcript) in front of the jury in which [...] repeatedly challenging [...] with seemingly rhetorical questions such as “who decides the law in this case?” and when [...] answered “Okay. Okay”, [...] repeats the question to [...] again in front of the jury: “No, why don't you answer my question?  Who decides the law that applies to this case?”.  A short while later, [...] stated, still in front of the jury, “I decide the law.  And what I'm telling you is as a matter of law, your statements with reference to the attorney who represents the adversary are inappropriate”  See colloquy between [...] and [...], 2T, Pg. 155, line 16 – Pg. 158, line 18).  And as further stated in the brief, [...]’ admonishments were very one sided (likely stemming from the bias retaing to the call to the FBI): specifically, despite [...]’s apparent concern for character attacks from witnesses, [...] apparently had a different view when [...] was the subject of snide and insulting remarks.  But [...] permitted [...]’s witness to say of [...] from the stand, “he’s not a good guy.  He’s a bad guy” (5T, Pg. 102, lines 22-23).  Also “[...] is a con artist. ” (5T Pg. 101, line 18).  But no admonishment of [...]’s witness by [...] at all.
[brief] 7  Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010)  .....................................................................................  5 S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. Saint Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elem. Sch., 150 N.J. 575 (1997)  .....................................................................................  13  Sacks v. DJA Auto., No. 12-284, 2013 WL 210248 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2013).................................  9 State v. Lefante, 14 N.J. 584 (1954) ......................................................................................  13  White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 61 F.4th 334 (3d Cir. 2023) ........................................................................ 10, 12 Statutes
[brief] Decision 223T August 6, 2013  Decision 224T August 12, 2013  Decision 225T August 13, 2013  Decision 226T August 14, 2013  Decision 227T August 15, 2013  Decision 228T August 16, 2013  Decision 229T August 19, 2013  Decision 230T August 20, 2013  AM Decision 231T August 20, 2013  PM Decision 232T August 22, 2013  Decision 233T August 23, 2013  Decision 234T August 26, 2013  Decision 235T August 29, 2013  Telephone Conference 236T September 3 2013  Decision 237T September 9, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 238T September 17, 2013  Telephone Conference 239T September 19, 2013  Telephone Conference 240T September 22, 2013  Telephone Conference 241T September 23, 2013  Damages Decision 242T October 30, 2013  Attorney Fees Motion 243T November 4, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 244T November 26, 2013  Attorneys Fees Motion 245T December 11, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 246T December 12, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 247T December 13, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 248T December 16, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 249T December 17, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 250T December 19, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 251T December 20, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 252T September 12, 2019
[brief] Ja075; Ja085.  The applications sought approval for the construction of a 1,105,000 square foot, forty-eight foot (48') high, warehouse and distribution facility, accompanied by associated office space and accessory uses, such as parking and stormwater management basins.  Ja073; Ja083.  Both applications sought a reduction in the required number of parking spaces.  Ja030; Ja086.  Since the entirety of the structure is to be located on the Mansfield-portion of the tract, the Mansfield application sought approval for the compliant forty-eight foot (48') structure, plus certain parking and loading spaces.  Ja085-Ja095.  The proposed development would constitute about forty-four (44) acres on the Mansfield side, with 25.37 acres comprising the structure itself.  (1T 30:1-12; 4T 8:5-25, 9:1).  On January 24, 2022, the [...] voted to approve the application.  Ja085-Ja095.  The improvements sought for the Florence portion of the tract are permitted, height neutral uses accessory to the principal structure in Mansfield.  Ja097; Ja146; 4T 9:10-25.  The accessory uses include parking and loading spaces, a septic disposal system, two (2) stormwater management basins, and the facility’s driveway.  Ja024; 1T 33:17-23.  The proposed driveway entrance on Florence-Columbus Road (CR 656) is approximately fifty feet (50') south of the existing driveway for safety and practical considerations, by agreement with the [...].  (1T 34:2-24).  The development activities proposed in Florence would total about thirteen (13) acres, or about thirteen percent (13%) of the Florence-portion of the tract. \(^4\)
[brief] APPENDED  ITEMS  Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss……………Pa1041  Defendants' Letter-Brief in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration…………………………………………………………Pa1081  Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted…………Pa1098  1  Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2), Plaintiffs have submitted a supplemental appendix with briefs the parties filed with the Trial Court because Defendants raised the question of whether an issue was raised in the Trial Court.
[brief] Such a model is consistent with the other statutory boards which canvass ballots and certify results, such as district boards of election, county boards of election, boards of county canvassers, and the state board of canvassers, all of which are required to act by a majority vote.  N.J.S.A. 19:6-28, N.J.S.A. 19:6-29.  B.  Even if the Clerk Held the Power to Act, He Was Outside the Time to Do So
[brief] About two weeks later, on September 19, 2019, [...] issued a letter to the [...] advising that a nearly $2 million distribution charged to [...] and [...] equally should have been charged solely to [...], as [...] did not actually receive any funds, and that this change would negate any tax due from [...] in the State’s tax deficiency notice.  (Da2845).  Still, neither [...] nor [...] received any underlying documentation to explain this supposed error.  (16T 76:21 to 77:2).  On October 1, 2019, [...] requested from [...] QuickBooks files up to January 2018.
[brief] Other employees who engaged in similar conduct authorization, cashing out PTO time that had been used, were not terminated (Pa667).  This selective enforcement of company policy further undermines Defendants’ explanation.  In conclusion, there is evidence in this record (including testimony that Defendant [...] authorizes the charges in question) that Defendants’ termination of Plaintiff is simply not what it seems.  That evidence, from which a jury could attribute a retaliatory motive, was sufficient for the Motion Court to deny Defendants’ Summary Judgment motion.  Plaintiff has met the requirements for causation, and a jury should determine whether this evidence, combined with other aspects of the case, warrants a finding of retaliation.  This Court should reverse the Motion Court’s Order.
[brief] There are no other indispensable parties which should be named in this action.  The Defendant sought to characterize this matter as pitting individual Firefighters against each other for promotional eligibility.  In the zero-sum game suggested by the Defendant an eligible Firefighter who was not on medical leave might prevail over a Firefighter who is ineligible for promotion simply because he was on medical leave on a temporary basis.  But this is not the case.  The Association seeks equality under the Law for all Firefighters and seeks equal application of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination to all Firefighters who were temporarily disabled due to medical, sick or injury leave.  The Association does not seek to diminish the rights and interests of any Firefighter - it simply seeks equality under the law for Firefighters effected by the City's unlawful promotional eligibility policy - now and into the future.  The City has unfairly discriminated against these Firefighters simply because they were on sick or injury leave.  This does not put Firefighter against Firefighter and there is no reason why any individual Firefighter needs to be named in this action.
[directive] The last paragraph of N.LS.A. 2C:35-7b2 specifically provides in pertinent pat-~ that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to establish.., a basis for not imposing a term of imprisonment or term of parole ineligibility authorized or required to be imposed pursuant to subsection f. of N.J.S. 2C:43-6 or upon conviction for a crime other than the offense set forth in this subsection."  -6- school zone charge, while allowing the prosecutor discretion to dismiss second-degree drug and non-drug charges that do not carry a minimum sentence under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (referred to as "non-Brima~e-eligible offenses").  Henceforth, however, when a school zone defendant is eligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.
[brief] Da355.  This statement shows that the court did not fully understand the mass and scale of the proposed development.  The property is over 500 feet wide and over 850 feet deep with the building being proposed as one massively long, deep building.  This is clearly not the same mass and scale as 16 single family homes constructed on these 8 acres (before reducing that number for the land required to build streets and stormwater systems).  Each such home would have conforming front, rear and side yard setbacks providing for light and open space between buildings and a maximum of $2\frac{1}{2}$ stories.  Such single-family homes would have a completely different impact on the zone than one single, continuous, mass of a building with 3 stories covering much of this lot.
[brief] Taken alone, [...]’s admission on cross-examination that he had never ground-truthed his renderings by comparing them to post-construction photos is a sufficient basis in the record to justify the Board’s decision that it could not give weight to his exhibits.  The Board’s rejection of the probative value of [...]’s renderings is also supported by his direct testimony, which included numerous other caveats about the certainty that his renderings would in fact be reflected in the actual construction.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, [...] respectfully requests that the Court affirm the Trial Court’s Orders dismissing [...]’s Complaint with prejudice and compelling the Hackensack Arbitration or, alternatively, vacate the Orders and direct that the application of the entire controversy is a jurisdictional question to be decided by the arbitrator.  Dated: Buffalo, New York April 7, 2025  [...]  By: __/s/ [...]__  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant [...] New Jersey, LLC  [...]  Telephone No. [...]  [...]  REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] The Appellate Panel in *Berado v. Jersey City*, 476 N.J. super. 341 (App.Div. 2023) held that circumventing the considerations of a landmark commission raises novel questions as to a matter of public interest.  *Id* at 355.  Ironically, in *Berado*, there was no dispute that the role of the landmark commission is to “render written recommendations to the administrative officer or planning board. ”  *Id.* at 358.  The offending action taking in *Berado* was that the landmark commission delegated its function to a “Historic Preservation Officer. ”  In the instant case, the ZBA has delegated its function to the Landmark Commission.
[brief] .........................................................  28  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The primary issues raised before this Appellate Court are simply summarized as follows: (i) whether a planning board can, after approving an application and memorializing its decision in a written resolution, later *sua sponte* re-open the very same closed proceedings, without notice to the applicant or the public, and impose new conditions of approval on the application; and (ii) whether a court should enforce contractually negotiated, and court-approved penalties, such as attorney’s fees and per diem fees, when the planning board breaches its obligations under a Mt. Laurel settlement agreement by engaging in the foregoing misconduct.
[brief] Plaintiffs include the relevant language below in the interest of full disclosure to the court, although they do not believe that it changes the issues to be decided on this appeal:  Should any action be filed seeking relief under the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1, et seq., N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13(g) or any cause of action alleging fraud or misconduct, the insured and/or the provider must agree to put any arbitration proceedings in abeyance until the legal action is resolved.  [Pa528.]  III.  The Law Division’s decisions on Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration.
[brief] ”  [...].  It is settled that a motion invoking Rule 4:6-2(e) must address the facial sufficiency of the pleading, here, the proposed second amended complaint since [...]’s motion was made after plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file their second amended complaint was filed.  Where, as here, extraneous materials outside the pleadings are relied upon, as [...] did with its presentation of a 187 page extraneous submission, [...]’s motion to dismiss for alleged failure to state a claim may not be granted, unless it is converted to a summary judgment motion.  See Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 337 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied 188 N.J. 353 (2006); Roa v. Roa, 402 N.J. Super. 529, 537 (App. Div. 2008), certif. granted 197 N.J. 477 (2009).  Here, however, defendants have already submitted a separate summary judgment motion limited to their challenge of Counts 1 through 9 in their 263-page motion filed July 30, 2021.
[brief] Petitioner complained of pain “referable to his neck onto his arms and legs” which, “prior to this accident…were mainly on the left side” but now are “on the right side as well”.  (Pa126).  Petitioner stated that no matter what activities he engaged in, he had discomfort.  (Pa126).  [...] conducted a physical examination and compared the MRIs of petitioner’s cervical and lumbar spine taken in 2000 and 2004.  (Pa125-126).  [...]’s physical examination revealed tenderness in the paraspinous cervical muscles to the trapezius portion of both shoulders and loss of motion in rotation of Petitioner’s neck of approximately 50%.  (Pa126).  [...] diagnosed petitioner with (i) acute and chronic cervical sprain and strain; (ii) aggravation of pre-existing cervical degenerative arthritis and cervical disc herniation of C6-C7 with increase in the disc herniation C6-C7; (iii) acute and chronic lumbrosacral sprain and strain; and (iv) post injury disc herniation L5-S1.  (Pa127).  On July 17, 2006, Petitioner again visited [...] and [...], the Certified Independent Medical Examiner and Occupational Medical Specialist he saw in connection with his 2000 workers’ compensation claim.  (Pa129, 135).  Petitioner again complained of constant pain and stiffness in his neck.  (Pa131).  When Petitioner had “flare ups”, the pain radiated from his neck through his back to his knees bilaterally.  (Pa131).  Petitioner also experienced pain in his lower back that occurred with prolonged sitting and driving that at times radiated to both legs.  (Pa131).  The doctors described Petitioner’s herniated disc at C6-C7 and central herniation at L5-S1 as shown on the MRIs ordered by [...] and added, “it should be noted that he did have a previous of the cervical spine on September 12, 2000 from another work related injury showing again a C6-7 paracentral disc herniation as well as some bulging at other discs in the area. ” (Pa134).  [...] determined Petitioner had a partial total disability of the cervical spine and noted “consistent changes with loss or range in the cervical spine” and sensory change in the left hand.  (Pa135).  On November 1, 2006, Petitioner received a workers’ compensation award related to the March 25, 2004 incident.  (Pa136-137).  3.
[directive] When a report of a seizure is received, a case file is established.  At a minimum, the file shall contain the following information:  - - a.  Case name: * b.  CMF account DCJ case number, and/or C- d.  NJSP number case CMF  The files shall be maintained numerically by account number.  All items related a case shall be placed into its respective file.  to Reports  2.  Monthly summary reports shall be prepared by the Property - - New Rocsdurs 02 10 of State Forfeiture Program Administration
[brief] ”  Our courts do not appear to have explored the meaning of these terms in this context, but child cruelty cases provide a useful analog.  In child cruelty cases, the jury is instructed that “cruelty” involves inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering, severe punishment, or ongoing torment upon a child.  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Abuse/Cruelty to Child (N.J.S.A. 9:6-1; N.J.S.A. 9:6-3)” (approved Apr. 16, 2012) (Da33-35).  The model charge identifies five possible definitions for the element of acting cruelly toward a child: (a) inflicting on (him/her) unnecessarily severe corporal punishment.
[brief] Under the well-established standards governing summary judgment, the trial court and this Court are required to grant summary judgment when: the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  R. 4:46-2(c).  See Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007).  An issue of fact is not “genuine” unless the competent evidence is sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of the non-moving party.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1993).  A “genuine issue of material fact” cannot be based on the mere argument of counsel or the bare assertion of a conclusion opposite the factual position of the adversary.  *Amabile v. Lerner*, 74 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1962); *N.J. Mortg. Corp. v. Masefield Corp.*, 63 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 1960).  The non-moving party cannot avoid summary judgment when the evidence is so one-sided that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law.  *Brill*, supra, 142 N.J. at 536.  Rather, summary judgment should be granted where reasonable minds cannot differ on the outcome of the matter.  *Id.* at 535-36.  The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to provide a prompt, businesslike and inexpensive means of disposing of a case where no genuine issue requires disposition at trial.  *Judson v. People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1955).  The right to summary judgment is a “substantial one” that is “more than a token procedural remedy under our rules, for it not only affords protection against groundless claims and frivolous defenses, saving the antagonists the time and expense of protracted litigation, but it also reserves judicial manpower and facilities to cases which meritoriously command attention. ”  *State v. South Amboy Trust Co.*, 46 N.J. Super. 497, 501 (Law Div. 1957).
[brief] Plaintiffs have clearly shown how the court below erred in concluding that the [...] was not an illegal expansion of a non-conforming use.  (Of course, this assumes that the [...] use was actually legal, which the Plaintiffs have shown it was not).  (See Point IV).  Plaintiffs will further rely upon their Brief at Point V and will not repeat same.  RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’-RESPONDENTS’ POINT  IV  Defendants failed to respond to Point VI, VII and IX of the Plaintiffs’ Brief.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Dated: October 11, 2024 s/ [...]  [...] Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], : CIVIL ACTION : ON APPEAL FROM Plaintiff-Appellant, : THE SUPERIOR COURT : OF NEW JERSEY, : LAW DIVISION, vs. : CAMDEN COUNTY :  Docket No. [...]  [...], RICHARD : Sat Below:  LAVER and THE CREATIVE : HON.  [...], FINANCIAL GROUP, LTD., : P.J.Cv.  Defendants-Respondents.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] For example, the record includes various Pre-Sentence Reports, outlining [...]’s double murder, [...]’s attempt to kill his aunt for her money, and [...]’s dangerous escape from a courthouse while undergoing trial.  (Pa212-Pa216; Pa220; Pa263).  In addition to noting the seriousness of [...]’s crimes, the Board noted [...]’s insufficient problem resolution, finding that [...] appeared “content in maintaining all his crimes were for monetary gain” and that [...] believed the murders “were accidental . . . and not in his control.