ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 2.  training.  The existing New Jersey Police Vehicular Pursuit Policy  Vehicular pursuit (“existing Vehicular Pursuit Policy”) requires officers to complete twice-annual training pursuit.3 on the laws and policies governing vehicular  The New UOF Trainings also cover that same topic.  Therefore, instead of completing two vehicular pursuit trainings in calendar year 2021 under the existing Vehicular Pursuit Policy, officers need only (1) attend one training session under the existing Vehicular Pursuit Policy and (2) complete the eight comprehensive online training modules on the Revised Policy.  3.  requalification.  Scheduling officer requalification appointments has been Firearms difficult due to firing ranges operating at reduced capacity because of safety precautions related to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Additionally, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors, the United States has experienced a significant ammunition shortage placing additional logistical and financial burdens on police agencies with respect to firing range re-qualifications.  Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the twice-annual requirement of the Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards for New Jersey year.4
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  1.  THE DECISION IN RISE AGAINST HATE V. CHERRY HILL SHOULD BE STRONGLY CONSIDERED BY THE COURT AS DETERMINATIVE AS TO THE INSTANT MATTER  At the time of the original briefing schedule, the City included in its legal argument that the Appellate Division had previously found that members of the public who submit their email addresses to receive electronic newsletters and notices from a municipality have an objectively reasonable expectation that their e-mail addresses will not be disclosed to a non-government organization that intends to send unsolicited emails to them to further the organization's political and social objectives.  See *Rise Against Hate v. [...]*, A-1440-21, 2023 WL 2670720, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 29, 2023) (Da 268-269).  The *Rise Against Hate* matter is almost identical in fact to the instant matter, except that the municipalities in that case did maintain the e-mail addresses and therefore did have a responsive document or record.  This is compared to the instant matter, where the e-mail addresses are maintained by a third-party whose policy is to not share said information with the municipality.  Therefore, the facts in the instant matter are more persuasive because the City does not even maintain the requested information.  In July of 2023, the *Rise Against Hate* matter was granted Certification by the Supreme Court.  However, following oral argument, on July 24, 2024, the Supreme Court determined that Certification had been improvidently granted and dismissed the appeal, leaving the Appellate Division’s ruling the final determination in this matter.  *Hate v. Cherry Hill Twp.*, 2024 N.J. LEXIS 776, at *1 (July 23, 2024).
[brief] Plaintiff relies on two cases in an effort to circumvent the consequences of the reversal of his conviction on March 6, 2018: Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (1996) and Michaels v. State of N.J., 955 F.Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1996).  Both, however, are readily distinguishable factually, and underscore the correctness of defendants' accrual argument.  Unlike this case, both Smith and Michaels involved a remand of the reversal of a conviction.  As [...] said in Michaels:  By using the term "reversal," the Supreme Court could not have intended to establish a bright-line rule whereby any reversal of a criminal conviction acts as a favorable determination.  Clearly, some "reversals" connote "finality," while others do not.  The Third Circuit agreed when it held in Smith that a reversal of a conviction on evidential grounds and remand of the criminal proceedings — the precise factual scenario here — did not represent a favorable determination within the spirit of Heck.  955 F.Supp. at 325 (emphasis added; citations omitted).  See also Id. at n.8 ("where an appellate court 'reverses' the conviction and remands for a new trial, termination would logically await a verdict in the criminal proceedings, a dismissal of the charges, or the like").  What was at issue in Michaels and Smith was "not an outstanding conviction but the potential for a future conviction following a retrial."  Id. at 324.  That is not the case here.
[brief] **The Holding Act Does Not Apply To Reciprocals. **  In 1970, twenty-five years after it enacted the REA, the Legislature enacted the Holding Act, which was based on the [...]’s (“[...]”) model Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act.  N.J.S.A. 17-27A-1.  The [...] model act does not specifically define “insurer,” instead noting that “insurer shall have the same meaning as set forth in Section [insert applicable section].”  https://content.naic.org/sites/default/inline-files/MDL-440.pdf (alteration in original).  Thus, the [...] left the decision on what types of insurers are subject to the terms of the states’ respective holding acts up to the state legislatures to decide.  *Id.*  Unlike other states, New Jersey’s Holding Act does not include reciprocal insurance exchanges in its provisions or any of its relevant definitions.
[brief] *Cnty. of Hudson v. State, Dep't of Corr.*, 208 N.J. 1, 21–22 (2011) (doctrine is designed to address “technically inadequate actions that nonetheless meet a statute’s underlying purpose. ”); *Galik v. Clara Maass Med.  Ctr.*, 167 N.J. 341, 354 (2001) (court’s task is determining if “technical non-conformity is excusable. ”); *Henderson v. Herman*, 373 N.J. Super. 625, 637 (App. Div. 2004) (doctrine addresses “technical” defects.)  See, also, *Lameiro v. W. N.Y. Bd. of Educ.*, 136 N.J. Super. 585, 588 (Law Div. 1975) (stating, in the context of the Tort Claims Act Notice requirement, “…substantial compliance means that the notice has been given in a way, which though technically defective, substantially satisfies the purposes for which notices of claims are required. ” cited with approval in Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J. Super. 204, 216 (App. Div. 2009).  The substantial compliance doctrine does not apply in this case, on its face.
[brief] Pa172, Pa324.  On June 12, 2020, August 27, 2020, and September 11, 2020  Plaintiffs-Appellants submitted correspondences to the Court requesting that the Motions to Dismiss and the Motion to Designate Trial Counsel be adjourned pending a decision on an appeal on another matter filed by the Plaintiffs-Appellants – In re Approval of a Financing Commitment for the Project Known as [...], [...], [...] (May 31, 2022) (the “[...] Appeal”) – because the [...] Appeal “involves the same substantive repetitive issue of public interest involving whether the [...] long term tax exemption was repealed and replaced effective April 17, 1992. ”  WP1a, WP4a, WP6a.  On September 30, 2020, in response to the Court’s request that the parties take a position with respect to the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ adjournment request, all Defendants-Respondents submitted correspondence to the Court requesting that the adjournment request be denied.
[brief] Moreover, [...] maintains that the TAD decision stands for the proposition that the PWCRA does not draw a distinction among various types of subcontractors.  More specifically, [...] argues that a “subcontractor” is derived from the contractual relationship with the Contractor, rather than the classification of work performed.  This argument is based on [...]’s reliance on the DOL Commissioner’s assessment of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 in TAD that:  [T]he requirement to register derives from the nature of the Project being a public work and the identification of the company as a subcontractor.  The Registration Act makes no distinction among the varying types of subcontractors and whether they are licensed professionals.  Id. at *10  What [...] conveniently ignores is that the PWCRA was amended effective January 18, 2022 by N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 (a), which states that:
[brief] Appellant attempts to circumvent this by pleading her weight as a disability.  However, “[t]here is no protected class [under the LAD] based solely on one’s weight. ”  *Dickson v. Cnty. Bus Lines, Inc.*, 458 N.J. Super. 522, 528 (App. Div. 2019) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff, weighing approximately 500–600 pounds, on grounds that obesity is not a disability under LAD); see also *Schiavo v. Marina District Developmental Co., LLC*, 442 N.J. Super. 346, 375 (App. Div. 2015).
[directive] Law enforcement agencies shall submit reported SAFE kits to the laboratory as soon as possible, but no later than ten (10) calendar days after collection, unless the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his/her/their attorney designee, or the County Prosecutor or his/her/their attorney designee determines there is good cause to delay submission to the lab and provides written approval of an extension in time to the agency.  In the event that an extension is granted, the SAFE kit shall be submitted no later than 10 days after the initiation of charges.  The agency having custody of the reported kit(s) is responsible for proper storage and tracking of the kit(s) through time of submission to the forensic laboratory consistent with the tracking requirements enumerated above.  SAFE and DFSA kit storage is paramount in preserving the integrity of kit contents.  SAFE kits contain only dry specimens that may include, but not be limited to, dried biological secretions, et cetera. underwear, hair, as well as debris that can include sand, leaves, grass, DFSA kits includes blood and urine specimens only.  The DNA contained on swabs taken as a part of a SAFE kit collection is stable at a controlled room temperature environment once dried.  Swabs and other items within the kit should be fully dried whenever possible prior to sealing the kit.  If items are still wet, refrigerated storage is required to protect the integrity of the evidence.  Items containing biological fluids in liquid form that may be resistant to drying, such as diapers, sanitary pads, condoms and fluid-stained clothing, should, when initially collected, be packaged separately outside the kit in containers or packaging resistant to leakage.  These items must be refrigerated while stored pending submission for laboratory analysis and frozen if being held for longer term storage.  The short-term storage standards from the National Best Practices for Sexual Assault Kits must be followed,9 which provides storage conditions for the type of evidence included in the SAFE kit as noted in the following table.
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[brief] The DACCA in no way restricts people’s access to the court, nor attorneys’ solicitation of clients, nor does it regulate any aspects of the attorney-client relation. **  Appellants rely on *National Association for Advancement of Colored People v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and *In re Primus*, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), both of which invalidated state restrictions infringing on attorneys’ right to solicit clients.  Both cases are distinguishable.  Specifically, in *Button*, the United States Supreme Court struck down Virginia statutes “proscribing any arrangement by which prospective litigants are advised to seek the assistance of particular attorneys. ”  371 U.S. at 434.  The Supreme Court held that such statutes violated the First Amendment freedoms.  *Id.* at 437.  In *Primus*, the United States Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to issue a private reprimand to an attorney who advised another person of her legal rights and disclosed in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance was available from a nonprofit organization.  436 U.S. at 414.  The Supreme Court held that solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations that engage in litigation as “a form of political expression” and “political association” constitutes expressive and associational conduct entitled to First Amendment protection.  *Id.* at 423-24.  Both of these cases are plainly inapplicable to the Appellants’ challenge of the DACCA.
[brief] Okay.  And you kind of described it before but when you were in the car, I asked you what you were looking at or what you were doing.  Can you just tell me more about what was going on inside your car?  Did you have the radio on or any distractions?  [...]: I didn’t have any distractions.  My phone was in my pocket as you guys saw.  My, you know my car was empty.  [...]: Okay.  MS. DEMBER: Like you saw.  MS. DEMBER: I didn’t even have the air conditioning on.  [...]: Okay.  Was there any obstructions outside that may blocked your view or anything?  MS. DEMBER:  Not that I’m aware of, no. (Pa471:20-472:11).  See also, Pa43-44.  Likewise, [...] testified that at the time of the accident it was a bright, clear day.  (Pa308 at 26:11-27:23).  She specifically denied being in a hurry to get to work and had no explanation for why she didn’t see [...] before striking her (Pa308 at 27:11-28:7).  See also, Pa311 at 40:25-41:5.  Notably, there is absolutely no testimony from [...] that a parked car at the end of the T-Intersection blocked her view or that the lack of any pedestrian safety devices such as crosswalks, speed limit signs or stop signs contributed in any way to the happening of the accident.
[brief] THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT REFUSED A BUCCAL SWAB AND ALLEGEDLY MADE A CONTEMPORANEOUS ORAL STATEMENT AS PROOF OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT  VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL  BECAUSE DEFENDANT ULTIMATELY CONSENTED TO A BLOOD DRAW AND HAD HONEST (THOUGH MISGUIDED)  REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE BUCCAL SWAB.  (Partially raised below, 18T27-20 to 32-5)  ..............................................34  POINT IV
[brief] [...] adopts the procedural history set forth in the Plaintiff’s brief (Pb3-4) and adds the following.  On May 10, 2024, [...] heard oral argument with respect to the motions for summary judgment filed by [...], the [...], and [...].  (T).  At the conclusion of same, [...] did not give a ruling from the bench but indicated that the Court would issue three written statements of reasons.  (T 34:18- T 35:2).  The orders and statements of reasons granting the motions for summary judgment were uploaded on June 3, 2024, and marked filed on May 10, 2024.  (Pa1-10).  In the statement of reasons with respect to [...], the court held that Plaintiff testified that the cause of his fall was ice that accumulated on the landing.  (Pa6).  The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that paint “somehow made an icy stair more slippery. ” (Pa6).  The court found that Plaintiff’s expert [...] made no conclusions concerning the paint making an icy stair more slippery and in fact “Berkowitz does not discuss the exterior paint at all in his conclusions. ” (Pa6).  As the court put it, “it is clear that Plaintiff fell on ice, not a wet stair.  A surface covered in ice is slippery. ” (Pa6).  Because Plaintiff’s expert offered no critique or analysis of [...]’s painting work, the court held that there was no causal connection between [...]’s work and the Plaintiff’s fall.  Moreover, there was “no evidence that [...] breached a standard of care in the industry. ” (Pa6).  [...]’s motion was therefore granted.
[brief] [...] admits that it both covered [...] as a "named insured" under a commercial general liability ("CGL") policy that it wrote; it also admits that it never provided notice to [...] that it cancelled that coverage.  As a result, [...] was left uncovered under the [...] CGL policy, as well as an excess policy issued by a [...] affiliate, defendant/respondent [...] ("[...]"), for an underlying lawsuit asserted by a worker who suffered a significant injury on a construction site on which [...] performed work.
[brief] THE FHACA PERMIT.  ..................12  A.  The Application Met the Water quality Requirements under N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5.  (Responds to Appellant’s Brief Point I.A.)  .................................................................14  B.  The Application Met the Groundwater Recharge Requirements under N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4.  (Responds to Appellant’s Brief Point I.B.)
[brief] The Court has supervisory power over the Receiver and should have ordered him to file the required accountings at the risk of sanctions.  (iii)  **4:53-7(c) - Order Approving Account**  After an Order approving a receiver’s accounting is entered by the Court, the Court must make a finding that continuation of the receivership is necessary and shall continue for a fixed period of time.  Again, since no accountings were submitted by the Receiver, the Court could not provide this essential oversight and the receivership continued for two (2) years while the diner was operated at a loss, apparently for the perceived purpose of enabling the Bank’s subsidiary/entity, [...], to pursue a sale or other transaction.  The Rule further requires that the Court must approve the receiver’s final accounting before the receiver can be discharged.
[brief] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution along with Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring warrants be issued based on probable cause.  State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 205 (2002).  A warrantless search is invalid per se unless an exception to the warrant requirement is met.  State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983).  The State has the burden of establishing one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is met.  Id.  One such unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstance that can justify a warrantless search is an item seen by an officer in plain view.  The plain view doctrine as first articulated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) and adopted by New Jersey in State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236-38 (1983), as an exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, initially required that (1) the view of the item be obtained from a lawful vantage point, (2) that the item be immediately perceived as evidence of a crime or contraband, and (3) that the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent.  This ³  While finding the investigatory stop improper, the court below did indicate that the handgun would have been in plain view if the detention was justified.  (T82-13 to 16).  remained Federal law until 1990 when the U.S. Supreme Court in *Horton v. California*, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990), discontinued the inadvertent discovery requirement and amended to just the two-prong analysis of lawful vantage point and immediate perception as contraband or evidence.  New Jersey courts also followed this precedent and removed the inadvertent requirement.  *State v. Gonzales*, 227 N.J. 77, 99 (2016).  Thus, to meet the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, the State must prove that (1) the officer’s view was from a lawful vantage point and (2) that it was immediately apparent to police that the item is evidence of a crime or contraband.  If both prongs are satisfied, probable cause exists for a warrantless search and seizure.  As indicated above, [...] encountered the defendant as he was responding to a fight at a convenience store.  As he was pulling into the parking lot, he observed the defendant walking away from the store.  [...] believed he was going to be investigating a fight at the convenience store, not search for a handgun.  As the defendant was sitting down, [...] observed the butt of a handgun protruding from the satchel and immediately knew that it was a handgun.  Applying the test as set forth in *Gonzalez*, it is clear that [...] was in a lawful viewing position and observed what he immediately knew was a handgun.  Therefore, the seizure of the handgun was lawful under the Plain View Exception to the warrant requirement.  CONCLUSION
[directive] FROM: November 18, 2015  DATE: Revision to Attorney General Guidelines for the Use of Automated Licence Plate  SUBJECT: Readers (ALPRs) and Stored ALPR Data  Concerning Data Retention Period  It has been brought to my attention that the current five-year data retention period set forth in the Attorney General Guidelines for the Use of Automated Licence Plate Readers (ALPRs) and Stored ALPR Data (hereinafter: “ALPR Guidelines”) issued on December 3, 2010, may in certain circumstances impose unnecessary data storage costs.  Although the five-year retention period should be retained as the general rule, the ALPR Guidelines should provide flexibility to allow the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice to authorize an agency to purge stored data prior to the expiration of the five-year period based upon the Director’s determination that there is good and sufficient cause to grant the agency’s request.
[brief] On June 11, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the initial lawsuit in the 2015 action case against, *inter alia*, [...] and [...].  (Pa259-283)  On July 20, 2015, the [...] filed an answer to the complaint on behalf of [...] and [...].  (Da8-21)  They further filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to assert a cause of action, as Plaintiffs did not provide an Affidavit of Merit as the law requires.  (Da22-28).  [...], J.S.C. granted the motion on January 19, 2016, and dismissed the complaint against [...] and [...] with prejudice.  (Da29-34)  Plaintiffs then filed several motions seeking to bring [...] and [...] back into the 2015 action, all of which were unsuccessful.
[brief] Id.  This was raised and part of the first motion to dismiss proceedings as well. \(^1\)  Thus, counsel’s R. 4:5-1 Certification was less than forthcoming, to say the least.  (Pa54).  Plaintiff alleged that the City “is denying the opportunity to obtain employment to all impacted Fire Fighters because of disability” and “fails to make reasonable accommodation to the limitations of the disabled/handicapped,” but failed to identify any fire fighters so implicated, who have not been hired, who have a qualifying disability under the law, were in need of reasonable accommodation, made a request for accommodation, to whom, when and the type of accommodation sought, that such request was denied, by whom, when and the details of same.
[directive] 25.  Would you have any difficulty or reluctance in accepting the law as explained by the court and applying it to the facts regardless of your personal beliefs about what the law should be or is?  26.  Is there anything about this case, based on what I’ve told you, that would interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial?  27.  A defendant in a criminal case has the absolute right to remain silent and has the absolute right not to testify.  If a defendant chooses not to testify, the jury is prohibited from drawing any negative conclusions from that choice.  The defendant is presumed innocent whether he testifies or not.  Would any of you have any difficulty in following these principles?
[brief] Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).  For Appellant to prevail on this appeal, it is axiomatic that Appellant be able to prove the existence of a contract.  See e.g. EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Envtl. Barrier Co., LLC, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 345 (App. Div. 2015)(holding that to prevail on a breach of contract claim, a party must prove a valid contract existed, the opposing party failed to perform an obligation under the contract, and the breach caused the claimant to sustain damages.)