ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  [...] was denied a fair trial because the critical element of the animal cruelty charge was never defined for the jury.  The prosecution charged [...] under a statutory provision that makes it unlawful to “purposely, knowingly, or recklessly . . . [t]orment, torture, maim, hang, poison, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abuse, or needlessly mutilate a living animal or creature. ”  N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1).  The State indicated it was proceeding under the theory that [...] “unnecessarily or cruelly beat” or “cruelly abuse[d]” the dog.  (1T 4-6 to 13; 2T 25-5 to 8)  Yet the jury instructions failed to define these crucial terms, namely, “unnecessarily” and “cruelly. ”  These charging errors were “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  Because [...] was denied his right to a fair trial, U.S. Const., amends. VI & XIV; N.J. Const., art. I, ¶¶ 1 & 10, his conviction must be reversed, and the matter must be remanded for a new trial.
[brief] THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT UNDER N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(C) (AA0001-8;AA0009-16)  The Commission correctly determined that N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c) provides that when a single vacancy is to be filled from a promotional certification headed by a veteran, any veteran among the top three interested eligibles may be appointed in accordance with the “rule of three. ”  See N.J.S.A. 11A-4.8.  A nonveteran shall not be appointed unless the appointing authority shows cause why the veterans should be removed from the promotional list.  See N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7 for removal procedures.  Therefore, under N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c), the Appellant [...] needed to be appointed or removed from the [...] promotional eligible list.
[brief] The conditions included:  g.  The Applicant shall enter into and maintain in effect at all times a contract with an offsite location for the provision of overflow parking .... h.  The Applicant shall provide, and maintain in effect at all times, a contract for private ambulance services ... j.  The Applicant shall work with the Township Police, Fire, EMS and Building Department to provide plans for emergency evacuations of residents .... m.  The Applicant shall own, install, and maintain the sanitary sewer line from its facility through the existing sanitary sewer main,…  The Applicant is responsible for obtaining all required permissions and approvals for its sanitary sewer plan .... n.  The Applicant will be responsible for addressing all of the issues required for the design and installation of its stormwater and sanitary sewer systems and for entering the appropriate agreements and or easements for its stormwater and sanitary sewer systems….Da367-370. exert in the interest of another aspect of the public good”  Sica v Board of Adjustment Tp. of Wall, 127 N.J. 152 (1992) citing Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 221 (1966)(emphasis added).
[brief] Rather than file an adversary proceeding to except the debt under 11 U.S. Code § 523(a)(9) or seek to limit his recovery to non-dischargable debts, Appellee filed a Motion to Lift the Automatic Stay to the Extent of the Insurance Coverage on July 16, 2021.  Da35-42.  In Appellee’s counsel’s certification for same, the certification noted “Plaintiff now moves to remove this matter from the Automatic Stay up to the liability and excess liability policy limits in effect at the time of the accident, which total $200,000….Based upon the above, the undersigned respectfully requests the Bankruptcy Court to Lift the Automatic Stay as it applies to the underlying State Court action and permit moving party to proceed with litigation currently pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County, to the limits of the available and excess liability insurance coverage. ”
[brief] 38 Regulations N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.2...........................................................................  24 N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.5...........................................................................  8, 19, 20, 24 N.J.A.C. 14:3-31...........................................................................  19 N.J.A.C. 14:5-2.1...........................................................................  8, 19 N.J.A.C. 14:5-7.1.................................................................  8, 19, 20, 23 **Constitution**  N.J. Const., Art. IV, § VII, ¶ 11......................................................
[directive] New Jersey’s prior system of pretrial release, which relied The CJRA replaced heavily on cash bail, with a risk-based system that, for the first time, allowed judges to detain high-risk defendants pretrial.  Since the Act went into effect on January 1, 1 2017, most defendants have been released pending trial subject to monitoring by pretrial services officers.  For higher-risk defendants, the State can move for pretrial detention.  In recent years, approximately 19 percent of defendants charged by complaint have been ordered detained.  In tandem with other reform efforts, the pretrial jail population dropped from 8,899 at the start of 2016 to 4,976 at the start of  That number has risen to approximately 6,700 because of the court system’s 2020. inability to conduct trials during the pandemic and on account of space limitations that stemmed from social distancing in courtrooms.
[brief] Because the Department’s arguments on the application of SSAP No. 25 are substantively devoid, the Department is reduced to disparaging [...], accusing it of “potentially overcharg[ing] the Exchange. ”  Not only is this unfounded, it is silly as there is no dispute that transactions between [...] and the Exchange as a whole are related party transactions subject to SSAP No. 25.  The transactions between [...] and the individual subscribers as detailed in their agreed to POA are not related party transactions and are not subject to SSAP No. 25.  This is clear from the POA, in which the subscriber authorizes that 12.5% of his or her premiums be paid to [...].
[directive] 7.  Piske yo deja avèti mwen ke tribinal la ta kab oblije enpoze yon peryòd egzijib de libète kondisyonèl espesyal pou mwen ka patisipe nan yon pwogram tretman dwòg ki sipèvize pa tribinal la ("Tribinal pou koze Dwòg"), èske w vle plede koupab kanmèm?  Having been advised that the court may be required to impose a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”), do you still wish to plead guilty?
[brief] [...] made material misrepresentations to [...], even having his “agent” [...] contact him without mentioning that she “worked” at the behest of [...].  She tried to buy the property for [...] without ever mentioning that she had knowledge of a pending tax foreclosure.  Although she testified that she told him over the phone, her text messages do not support this position and she admitted that they do not mention the tax foreclosure proceeding of which she and [...] were well aware.  She admitted that nowhere in the text messages did the word “tax foreclosure” appear because she “didn’t think she needed to say it. ”  T4, p.74:15-20.  All the while, [...] and [...] were doing business together as [...] was proceeding with the tax foreclosure against Mr. [...] and [...] waited in the wings for a quick title to the property to divest the Defendants from their property.  Certainly, this qualifies as fraud and a material misrepresentation of a presently or existing or past fact, they knew it was false, they intended that Mr. [...] rely on it and he reasonably relied on the fact that [...] and Thompson were genuinely interested in buying his property when they knew that their friend and business partner was in the process of foreclosing or even had already foreclosed.  Mr. [...], unaware of the proceeding, relied on their representations and lost his property to a Default Judgment.  This satisfies all of the elements of fraud which would be required to overturn the Judgment on a Rule 4:50-1 motion to vacate.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On March 15, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a nine-count complaint against Defendants in the Middlesex County Law Division seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that defendant [...] ([...]), is illegally structured and operated in violation of the doctrine against the corporate practice of medicine, codified at N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.16, and the prohibition against practicing medicine without a license under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20; (2) a declaratory judgment that [...] was not entitled to PIP benefits because it operated illegally and disgorgement of more than $1.7 million in benefits that Plaintiffs paid to it; (3) treble damages, fee shifting and other remedies under the IFPA relating to the unlawful benefits that [...] received; (4) a declaratory judgment that defendant [...] violated New Jersey Board of Chiropractic Examiners’ regulations by receiving payments from certain of the other defendants for referring patients to those defendants; (5) a declaratory judgment that those defendants violated New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners’ regulations by making those payments to Bufano; (6) a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated the Anti-Self-Referral Law, N.J.S.A. 45:9-22.4 to -22.9 (the Codey Act); (7) a declaratory judgment that Defendants were not entitled to PIP benefits due to self-referrals and kickbacks, and disgorgement of the amount of PIP benefits; (8) damages and other remedies under the IFPA for self-referrals and kickbacks; and (9) damages and other remedies under RICO based on the violations of the corporate practice of medicine and self-referrals/kickbacks.
[brief] In State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), the Court explained that “[c]onfirmatory or post-identification feedback . . . occurs when police signal to eyewitnesses that they correctly identified the suspect.  That confirmation can reduce doubt and engender a false sense of confidence in a witness. ”  Additionally, the Court noted in State v. Chen, 208 N.J. 307, 320 (2011) that private—that is, non-State—actors can affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications, just as the police can.  The record on remand supports that conclusion.
[brief] ”).  In Verdernikov, the District of New Jersey dismissed a plaintiff’s putative class action lawsuit because plaintiff only identified a single FDCPA claim worth $1,000 in his bankruptcy petition.  However, the plaintiff proceeded to file multiple putative class action lawsuits against various defendants.  The *Verdernikov* court held, that the plaintiff’s act of vaguely describing his claims in his bankruptcy petition in order to obtain a discharge required dismissal of his lawsuit under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
[brief] Prior to the initiation of this action—and without having first obtained a license under the NJCFLA—[...] is alleged to have acquired by assignment a pool of defaulted consumer debts including the [...] credit account for pennies on the dollar.  *See* Compl. ¶ 48 (Pa9).  As [...] was unlicensed under the NJCFLA, [...]’s account and the contract governing the same were void upon assignment to [...].  *See* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  *See* Compl. ¶¶ 57-58 (Pa10)  Thereafter, [...]/[...] sent collection letters—on [...] letterhead as well as others—to [...] seeking to collect $2,787.94.  *See* Compl. ¶ 49 (Pa9).  However, Defendants had no right to attempt to collect the void debt.  *See* Compl. ¶¶ 57-58 (Pa10).  By purchasing or otherwise taking assignment of the debt, Defendants engaged in the “consumer loan business” as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2.  See Compl. ¶¶ 30-34 (Pa7).  However, [...] was not licensed as a consumer lender at the time it took possession of or attempted to enforce [...]’s account—a fact that was undisputed in the trial court.  See Compl. ¶ 30 (Pa7).  As a result of [...]’s unlicensed status, the contract governing the alleged debt became void and unenforceable as of the date [...] purchased or took assignment of the same, pursuant to the NJCFLA at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), which states, in pertinent part, that a contract for a loan acquired in violation of the act “shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .
[brief] (2T 50-10 to 19, 56-23 to 65-9; 4T 113-5 to 131-4)  The State countered that the officers did not target or make assumptions about [...].  (4T 150-6 to 153-12)  Thus, in instructing the jury on the permissible use of the other-crimes evidence, the trial court should have instructed the jury that the evidence about the robbery could be considered only to shed light on the officers’ state of mind.  Instead, the court’s instruction erroneously communicated to the jurors that they could use the robbery evidence to provide “context” for the officers’ suspicions – i.e., to provide support for the officers’ suspicions.  The trial court’s incorrect instruction permitted the jury to speculate that [...] was involved in a robbery from the night before and was thus highly problematic.
[directive] Do you understand that the requirement of registration may result in notification to law enforcement, community organizations, or the public at large, of your release from incarceration or presence in the community?  (conteste solamente si el delito ocurrió antes del 14 4. a)  Supervisión de por vida en la comunidad de enero del 2004).  (Si el delito ocurrió el 14 de enero del 2004 o después de esa fecha, el acusado debe contestar la pregunta 4b, Supervisión bajo libertad condicional de por vida.) (only complete if the offense occurred before January 14, 2004).  (If the Community Supervision for Life offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, the defendant should complete Question 4b, Parole Supervision for Life).
[brief] Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that “[a] judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. ”  Rule 1:12-1(g) similarly directs that judges shall not sit in any matter “when there is any … reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ”  Consistent with these obligations, in *DeNike v.
[brief] Straightforward application of the terms of the Consumption Exception demonstrates why every court to analyze that exception holds that it restores coverage only for injuries caused by fungi or bacteria that are, are in, or are on an edible good or product intended for human consumption.  The Mold Exclusion bars coverage for “liability, damage, loss, cost or expense…Caused directly or indirectly by the actual, alleged or threatened inhalation of, ingestion of, contact with, exposure to, existence of, or presence of any…Fungi or bacteria…”  Da277a.  The exception then states:  This exclusion does not apply to any **fungi** and **bacteria** that are, are on, or are contained in, an edible good or edible product intended for human or animal consumption.  *Id.*  Reading the language of the exclusion and exception together, as this Court must, there is but one reasonable interpretation.
[brief] The [...] and the [...] were improperly reducing reimbursements for out-of-network behavioral health services.  In the prior case, the Appellate Division found in favor of Yucht’s appeal which sought reimbursement at the statutory 80% of reasonable and customary charges for behavioral health services.  *In re Yucht*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188.  Pra1.  As a result, the Commissions adopted resolutions to provide for reimbursement of the improper rate paid by members retroactive to 2009.  Identical to the within appeal, the [...] posted notice on their website with a link to a claim form.  *In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938.  Pra5.  Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.  *Id.*  Pra6.  Pa64.
[brief] Although the GRC noted that the OPRA request was overly broad, it also determined that the Board had waived that argument.  (Da021)  The Fire District recalculated the special service charge, [...] paid the fee, and the Custodian of Records endeavored to compile the documents for review and redaction, including obtaining documents from [...] that were still in his possession.  All that was required of Jesse [...] was that he turn over the responsive text messages which are government records subject to access under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.  He was further advised by Counsel for the District that the documents would be reviewed and redacted prior to release on February 16, 2021.  (Da037) and again on February 18, 2021.  (Da042).
[brief] “Alright but 110% you never walked up to the Boulevard for any reason and then come back down any time after the bar?”  (Da 44; 25T 49-12 to 14; Da 17 at 29:51 to 29:59)  [...] responded “no,” that he had “no reason to go to the Boulevard ….  I did not go up to the Boulevard at all.  I’m positive. ”  (Da 44; 25T 49-15 to 18; Da 17 at 30:00 to 31:09)  Seventh, detectives again emphasized their suspicion of [...]:
[brief] For example, in Booth v. Rockaway, 50 N.J. 302 (1967), the Supreme Court held that “plaintiff, as a citizen and taxpayer . . . had standing to challenge the establishment of a blacktop plant in a mining district . . . [because] the contemplated blacktop use had a potential impact on the integrity of the zoning plan and the community welfare sufficient to permit the intervention of a citizen and taxpayer. ”  *Id.* at 305.  This Court has long relied upon *Booth* to find that objectors challenging land use board decisions on similar grounds.  *See, e.g.*, *DePetro*, *supra*; *Funeral Home*, *supra*, 319 N.J. Super. at 215-216; *Dover Twp. Homeowners & Tenants Assn. v. Dover Twp.*, 114 N.J. Super. 270, 275 (App. Div. 1971).
[brief] In light of the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court’s order permitting the Township to proceed with the taking of Defendants’ private property.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant  [...]  By: ___/s/ [...]__________  [...]  Dated: February 12, 2024  [...] Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. BELLEVUE JACKSON, LLC and [...]
[brief] Plaintiff’s First Appeal  On May 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of the Trial Court’s April 1, 2021, Order.  (Da274, Transaction ID: [...]; Appellate Docket Transaction ID: [...]).  The Appellate Decision stated the following in its decision:  Although the trial court properly considered the merits of the proposed amended complaint and the potential prejudice to defendants pursuant to Rule 4:9-1 and Rule 4:5-7, it did not enter an order dismissing the original complaint with prejudice.  When pressed at oral argument about whether a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion was ever filed, neither defendant answered definitively, but instead relied on their submissions.  The record before us does not demonstrate a motion to dismiss was ever filed, nor does it appear from the order being appealed any such order dismissing the pleadings was ever entered by the trial court.  We observe, in addition to considering the merits and prejudice imposed by a proposed amended complaint, if an amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2, that is, if the proposed amended complaint does not state a cause of action, or asserts a claim that is "not sustainable as a matter of law," a court should deny a motion to amend.  Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 256-57 (App. Div. 1997).  However, denying a motion to amend a complaint does not dismiss the original complaint.  It prohibits the requested amended pleading from being filed.  An underlying complaint still exists after remand.  Thus, because we discern from the procedural record there still exists an underlying pending complaint at the trial level, which has never been properly dismissed, the appeal before us was improperly certified as final by the parties.  We dismiss the appeal without prejudice and remand to the trial court for further action consistent with our ruling.
[brief] Completion and Delivery ..........................  Da 202-06  Surveillance Videos and Video Stills ......................................................  Da 207  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order and Opinion Denying Defendant’s Motion to Exclude His Statement to Police .................................................................  Da 110-28  Oral Sentencing Decision ...........................................  15T 4-12 to 16-23, 34-20 to 41-8
[brief] 46 N.J.R. 1051(a) (June 2, 2014); 47 N.J.R. 1392(a) (July 6, 2015); see also 34 N.J.R. 74(a) (Jan. 7, 2002); 35 N.J.R. 632(a) (Feb. 3, 2003).  standards applicable to development within the Redevelopment Zone.
[directive] Recent Appellate Decisions Have Raised Concerns with the Current Language.  Several Appellate Division decisions have articulated an issue with the parenthetical of language that provides a brief description for why a recommendation was returned at the top the PSA, specifically related to charges including murder or attempted murder.  State Adams, v. [...] (Decided February 9, 2021); State v. T.A.H., [...] (Decided May 04, 2020); and State C.J.T., [...] (Decided Jan. 24, 2019).  v. of  Currently, there are two recommendations that appear on the top the PSA when a defendant is charged with murder or attempted murder:  ADA ENSURING AN TO DOOR OPEN JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities Directive #17-21 August 11, 2021  2  Page  If (1) charged with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C: 11-3), the recommendation is "No Release Recommended (Subject to life imprisonment per statute)."  This is used because a if murder charge would subject the defendant to life imprisonment found guilty.  If (2) charged with attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-l and 2C: 11-3), the "NRR recommendation is (Charge(s) include murder)."  This is because 2C:11-3 of appears in the auxiliary ("Aux Charge") column the PSA.  The above recommendations have caused confusion.  First, while it is true that a murder conviction could subject a defendant to a sentence to life imprisonment, referring to the murder charge itself is simpler and clearer.  Second, rather than referring to murder and expecting stakeholders to see that there is an auxiliary column identifying it as an attempted murder, referring instead to the attempted murder charge itself is simpler and clearer.  Although the issue has only been raised for murder/attempted murder, to prevent of confusion and promote consistency the same logic including inchoate language will be applied to all recommendations in which the language cites to a specific charge.  The chart below includes the changes to murder and attempted murder, and all other charges that produce a recommendation that names a charge (Manslaughter, Sex Assault (NERA), Robbery, Carjacking, and Escape).  II.
[brief] .......................................  60 Rules R. 4:9-1 ..................................................................................................................................  22 R. 4:25-8(a)(1) ...................................................................................................................... 3, 5, 6, 21, 56 R. 4:46-2 ..................................................................................................................................  22 R. 4:46-2(c) ..............................................................................................................................  22 Rule 4:42-9 ...............................................................................................................................  57  Rule 4:46 ..................................................................................................................................  56  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED