ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Judge also takes issue with one Board member’s comments (M34; M42-43) and attributes them to the actions and motivations of the entire Board.  Again, caselaw holds that the remarks of members of the Board “represent informal verbalizations of the speaker’s transitory thoughts, they cannot be equated to deliberative findings of fact. ”  New York SMSA, L.P., supra, 370 N.J. Super. at  This holding is rooted in the fact that any body must speak as a whole, and that whole, singular voice is expressed and embodied in the Board Resolution.  See Id.  Moreover, the objectionable portions of that Board member’s comment, as noted with emphasis by the Trial Court, were not included in the Board Resolution and thereof cannot be imputed to the Board as whole, and/or to each individual Board member.
[brief] And again, the Board confirmed this at the end of 2023.  In I/M/O the Community Solar Energy Pilot Program; I/M/O the Community Solar Energy Pilot Program Year 2 Application Form and Process; I/M/O A New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C. 17; I/M/O the Verified Petition of [...] For Approval of an Extension of the Community Solar Energy Pilot Program Year 2 Project Completion Deadline for Pennsville Landfill Solar Projects (A) and (C); I/M/O the Petition of [...] for Extension of Commercial Operation Deadline For Conditionally Approved Year 2 Community Solar Projects Under [...] Due To Delays in Utility Upgrade Plan and Uncertainty in Timing and Cost of Utility Costs; I/M/O Community Solar Energy Pilot Program Year 2 – [...] – [...]; and I/M/O Community Solar Energy Pilot Program Tear 2 – [...] – [...], Orders, [...], Docket Nos. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], dated October 25, 2023, at 6, (116a, 122a), the Board expressly noted that solar projects located on landfills and similar undervalued land comprise the type of “redevelopment [that] is favored by Board and State policy.
[brief] (Da56-57).  (emphasis added).  The Appellate Division affirmed the decision.  In Weiss, the Appellate Division, stated that they “may take judicial notice of the fact that the Chief Justice ordered the closing of the State’s courts on January 22, 2014.  See N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4); N.J.R.E. 202(b). ”  (Da55)  (emphasis added)  Nothing in Weiss, was persuasive or authoritative in stating that the Court had to take judicial notice of a fact.  Judicial notice is within the discretion of the Court, and the Court here has already spoken and has determined not to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency at time of Plaintiff’s fall.
[brief] ”  Id. at 144 (“In effect, no warrant issued and the search of the premises constituted a warrantless search. ”).  The same was true in Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506 (1958), when State Police applied to a magistrate in the Chesterfield Township Municipal Court seeking search warrants for a building in Mansfield Township.  *Id.* at 507.  Although the Court had not yet adopted the exclusionary rule and therefore did not order suppression, the Court agreed with the State’s concession that “the magistrate was without authority to issue a warrant for a search beyond the territorial jurisdiction of his court[.]”  *Id.* at 508.  So, the Court concluded, the “illegality [of the warrant] is clear. ”  *Id.* at 509.  There is an equally strong requirement that municipal police officers shall not effectuate arrests or execute searches outside their own territorial jurisdiction.
[brief] ”  *2  More specifically, under the first option, “sampling and iterative refinement,” plaintiffs propose that if each search string “results in a purportedly unwieldy volume of hits,” then defendant can provide only a statistically significant sample of those hits (plaintiffs point to websites that will provide guidance to counsel for the appropriate sample size), which will include all non-privileged documents, both relevant and irrelevant, so that the parties can then reevaluate and modify the search terms “to focus on the most relevant documents and weed out irrelevant documents, to the extent feasible. ” ([...], at 3 & n.3)(footnote omitted).  Plaintiffs characterize this as “a limited, reasonable proposal that will result in only a fraction of potentially responsive documents being produced in the first instance. ” (Id. at 3).  In his letter, dated October 2, 2015, plaintiffs’ counsel lists the sample size for twenty-five different search terms, with each sample size roughly 1,000 documents, plus or minus no more than 52.  ([...], Exh. B, at 3-7).  Under the second option, plaintiffs would engage in a “quick peek[,]” where “within an agreed-upon time period,” plaintiffs would conduct a “secure, initial examination of all ESI ... without any search strings being applied to cull documents[,]” plaintiffs would then designate “a limited number of documents” for defendant to formally produce, at which time defendant would have the opportunity to review the designated subset of documents for privilege.
[brief] A prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation under CEPA requires a plaintiff to establish: (1) a reasonable belief that the employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, regulation or public policy; (2) he or she performed a “whistle blowing” activity as described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3a or c; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection existed between his whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.  Klein v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of New Jersey, 377 N.J. Super. 28, 38 (App. Div.) (citing Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003), cert. denied, 185 N.J. 39 (2005).  “A plaintiff who brings a claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c need not show that his or her employer or another employee actually violated the law or a clear mandate of public policy.  Instead, the plaintiff simply must show that he or she ‘reasonably believes’ that to be the case. ’”  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462 (citations omitted).  “As long as a reasonable basis exists for a complaint about misconduct, whether of the employer or of a co-employee, the complaining employee should not be exposed to retaliation by the employer. ”  Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 425 (1999).  However, “the mere identification of an authority does not alone provide adequate support for an objectively reasonable belief that a violation has occurred,” Hitesman v. Bridgeway Inc., 430 N.J. Super. 198, 213 (App. Div. 2013), and “[n]o cognizable violation can occur if the authority relied upon is not one specified in the statute. ”  Id. at 215.  Instead, “[b]efore a CEPA claim may be submitted to a jury, the court must identify a legal authority recognized in the statute ‘that closely relates to the complained-of conduct[,]’ and ‘make a threshold determination that there is a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a law or public policy identified.
[brief] (Da1-5).  On or about February 16, 2023, the Atlantic County Grand Jury charged defendant, [...], under superseding [...], which added the charges from defendant’s continuing conduct and upgraded the terroristic threat counts from third-degree to second-degree as they occurred during a declared State of Emergency, i.e., the COVID-19 pandemic: two counts of second-degree terroristic threats during a state of emergency, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) (Counts One and Two); three counts of fourth-degree harassment while imprisoned or on parole/probation, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(e) (Counts Three, --- 1
[brief] Motion Court’s Decision  The motion court found [...] credible and concluded that [...] and her daughter voluntarily consented to the warrantless search of their apartment.  (Da 29-30, 32-33)  The court primarily relied on the signed consent form and waiver advisory about their right to refuse consent.  (Da 32)  The court rejected the defense’s argument that the State failed to carry its burden by not calling [...] or her daughter.  (Da 32)  The court also rejected the defense’s argument that [...]’s visibly inattentive behavior during the waiver advisory undermined her understanding, instead reasoning that she was “in close proximity” and was able to hear it; her daughter had some higher education; and [...] told the police that the gun was on the nightstand.
[brief] (264a; 309a).  In March 2010, the [...] moved to dismiss [...]’s Amended Complaint and [...]’s Complaint, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to expand the case beyond this Court’s remand order.  (2481a).  In April 2010, [...] deferred ruling on the [...]’ motion to dismiss. (2083a at 30:4-17).  Later that year, in November and December 2010, the [...] and the [...] moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds: (1) new claims were beyond the scope of the Appellate Division remand; (2) claims were barred by the statute of limitations; (3) absence of proof of the elements of RICO; and (4) absence of proof of reliance as required by fraud.  (3512a).  Plaintiffs also moved for partial summary judgment on various grounds, including the determination that the [...] were not entitled to any management fees, or any compensation for their efforts in connection with the development of the project, and a determination that [...] was and is a full 25% partner, notwithstanding [...]’ prior ruling to the contrary.  (4429a-4430a; 4525a).  Nearly a year later, on February 9, 2011, [...] denied the [...]’ March 2010 motions to dismiss.  (67a).  [...] also granted certain relief to Plaintiffs, including an Order declaring [...] to be a full 25% partner and the [...] to be controlling.  (87a).  The Court also precluded the [...] from receiving management fees, interest, or certain other payments going forward.
[brief] A clear example of \(^2\) [...] claims that text cited in [...]’s brief is not found in two opinions [...] cited.  (Pb26).  It is unclear what text he is referring to; in any event, the text appearing in quotes in [...]’s brief does appear in the cited cases.  “specific” and “general” would be a sign that says, “No vehicles in the park” and below that says “Bicycles Yield to Pedestrians. ”  In that case, “Bicycles” is a specific member of the class “Vehicles”, so it is apparent that the latter directive has precedence over the former.  Here, in contrast, it is not clear that either Paragraph 24(F) or Paragraph 24(G) is the more specific.  [...] insists that Paragraph 24(F) is more specific because it is the only Paragraph that specifically mentions the Palm Beach Property.  However, it is in fact Paragraph 24(G) that is the more specific provision because it is only in that Paragraph that [...] (which includes the Palm Beach Property) is mentioned.  In other words, the Probate Court’s usage of that canon of construction was both unnecessary and incorrect.  C.
[brief] Id.  By October 18, 2023, Plaintiffs had not received any response whatsoever to the October 6, 2023 Deficiency Letter, and Defendant [...] had still not cured her discovery deficiencies, in direct violation thereof.  Id.  Notwithstanding her failure to cure her discovery deficiencies, Plaintiffs took Ms. [...]’s deposition on November 2, 2023.
[brief] The Township provides an accurate snapshot of the mounting costs resulting from the numerous requests and challenges to the Regulator when it states:  “[[...]] has now spent more than $1.8 million and counting in legal and expert fees, retaining at least three law firms and five experts, pursued two applications at the Holmdel zoning board and the two petitions under challenge. ”  Hb at p. 7.  In fact, [...], a Senior Engineer for [...], testified that the level of spending required to overcome the zoning process alone was unprecedented.  1T100:L17-21.  The unprecedented costs included addressing the Township’s concerns regarding air and noise emissions, declining real estate values, and landscaping and planning issues to hide the Regulator from view for the two different proposed locations.  1T101:L11-6.  As discussed above, the first location proposed by [...] for the Regulator was at [...] and [...] filed its first petition with the Board planning for the Regulator at that location.  RCa1.  Then, at the suggestion of the Township, [...] then filed a second petition proposing the Regulator at a different location at [...].  RCa55.  The fact that [...] had to plan for the Regulator in two different locations and respond to the Township’s various concerns and ongoing litigation has certainly increased the costs associated with the Regulator.
[brief] Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  Thus, a § 1692f claim fails if it is not based on “any misconduct beyond that which [the Appellant] assert[s] violate[s] other provisions of the FDCPA. ”  Id.  Appellant’s § 1692f claim is based on the same alleged conduct as his other claims; thus, it is duplicative and should be dismissed.
[brief] In investigating whether she wanted to go there, she found out that she “probably wouldn't be looking at a Lieutenant’s position for a long time” (1T; 77:10).  She asked for permission and typed up a special request to talk to [...] in reference to her career and the transfer and she was “denied” (1T; 77:21).  Plaintiff believed that she was transferred because they wanted women at the Academy and also that her EEO complaint just began to be investigated in October (1T; 78:9).  She believed that the transfer was evidence of retaliation because of her OPS case (1T; 78:21).
[brief] New Jersey courts apply the general “acceptance within a scientific community” test set forth in *Frye v. United States*, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), to determine the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal cases.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey “has not altered [its] adherence to the general [Frye} acceptance test for reliability in criminal matters. ”  *State v. Cassidy*, 235 N.J. 482, 492 (2018).  “[T]he State's burden is to prove that the. . . test and the interpretation of its results are non-experimental, demonstrable techniques that the relevant scientific community widely, but perhaps not unanimously, accepts as reliable. ”  *State v. Harvey*, 151 N.J. 117, 171 (1997).  “Whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under *N.J.R.E. 702* is a legal question [that appellate courts] review *de novo.*”  *State v. J.L.G.*, 234 N.J. 265, 301 (2018).  While there is no doubt that the witness here was an expert in the field and that expert testimony would indeed be necessary to admit evidence of the range of these cell towers, the problem here is the same as was addressed in *Burney [II]*: the expert gave no basis for his range-based assertions other than his own training and experience, and, thus, “because the testimony was based on nothing more than [the expert’s] personal experience, the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear this testimony” because it amounted to an impermissible “net opinion.
[brief] AWARDS MAY NOT BE LIGHTLY OVERTURNED AND [...]’S DECISIONS ARE ENTITLED TO SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE ON APPEAL..................................................11  A.  Arbitration Awards Are Afforded Substantial Deference.  ................11  B.  Police and Fire Interest Arbitration Can Only Be Performed by Arbitrators Who Are Specially Trained and Selected and Then Monitored by [...].  .........................................................15  C.  The Appellate Division Normally Defers to [...] in Interest Arbitration Because of Its Expertise in Such Matters Unless the Appellant Can Clearly Show a Basis to Reverse.................................................................................................................16  POINT II
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiffs-Appellants are the owners of a leasehold interest in real property known as [...]; [...], on the Tax Map of the Township of Neptune.  (Property)  The Property is located in the Ocean Grove Historic Zone District and is occupied by a single-family residential dwelling.  Hearing Exhibit 10, Pa 10a.  The Property is contiguous with the Historic Flared Open Space defined in Section 201 of the Neptune Township Land Development Ordinance, hereinafter Ordinance, as “an unobstructed area located between the curb line and the front leasehold line at particular properties within the Historic Zone District. ”  Pa 29a and Pa 70a.  The only means of ingress to and egress from the Property was by way of two (2) concrete walkways.  The first walkway ran from the public sidewalk, across the Historic Flared Avenue Open Space, to the front entrance of the dwelling.  The second walkway ran from the public sidewalks, across the Historic Flared Avenue Open Space, to a second entrance located on the westerly side of the dwelling.  Hearing Exhibit 10, Pa 11a and Hearing Exhibit 11, Pa 12a.  In 2012, both concrete walkways were damaged as a result of Superstorm Sandy and required repair.  In the Fall of 2018, plaintiffs-appellants removed the broken concrete from both walkways and replaced the concrete with concrete unit pavers.  Plaintiffs-appellants installed a third concrete unit paver walkway which ran parallel to the front lot line of the property and connected the front and side entrance walkways.  The dimensions of the two (2) existing walkways remain the same.  All three walkways were no greater than six (6’) feet in width.  Hearing Exhibit 4; Pa 4a; Hearing Exhibit 5, Pa 5a; Hearing Exhibit 6, Pa 6a; Hearing Exhibit 7, Pa 7a; Hearing Exhibit 8, Pa 8a; Hearing Exhibit 9, Pa 9a; and Hearing Exhibit 10, Pa 10a.  The only current access to the Property from the public street is across the Historic Flared Open Space Area by way of the concrete unit paver walkways.  Trial Exhibit 10, Pa 11a.  --- 1
[brief] Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584 (2016)  .........................................................44  In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20 (2001)  ........................................................................44  Islamic Ctr. of Passaic Inc. v. Salahuddin, Appeal No.: A-0387-18T1 (App. Div. Dec. 13, 2020) .............................................................................................................31  Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J. Super.  562 (App. Div. 2021) ...........................................41  Kurtz v. Oremland, 33 N.J. Super. 443 (Ch. Div. 1952) ....................................................36  Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 157 N.J. Super. 173 (App. Div. 1978) .................................37  Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436 (2007) .......................25  Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009) ...........................................43, 44  Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582 (E. & A. 1934) ................................................36  Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Rice, 4 N.J. 169 (1950) ............................................................37  Madej v. Maiden, 951 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2020) .............................................................38  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan Twp., 140 N.J. 366 (1995) .........................................................................................................................19 Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2004)
[brief] | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Allen v. McCurry, | 30, 32 | | 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)  | | | Alsip Park Dist. v. D & M Partnership, | 15 | | 252 Ill. App.3d 277, 192 Ill. Dec. 80, 85, | | | 625 N.E.2d 40, 45 (1993)  | | | Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, | 19 | | 289 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (Law Div. 1995) | | | City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Investments, | 11 | | 148 N.J. 55, 68 (1997) | | | County of Essex v. Hindenlang, | 15 | | 35 N.J. Super 479, 491 (App. Div. 1955) | | | County of Ocean v. Stockhold, | 15 | | 129 N.J. Super. 286, 289 (App. Div. 1974) | | | Hills Dev. Co v. Twp. of Bernards, | 29 | | 103 N.J. 1, 59 (1986) | | | [...] v. [...], | 29 | | Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division | | | (Docket No.: [...] decided January 23, 2023) | | | In Re Brown, | 29 | | 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991) | | | In Re Dawson, | 31 | | 136 N.J. 1, 20 (1994) | | | In Re Docteroff, | 30, 32| | 133 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 1997) | | | Mt. Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, LLC, | 12 | | 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005) | | Mt. Laurel Tp. v. MiPro Homes, LLC, 188 N.J. 531, 910 A.2d 617 (2006)
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8 ....................................................  7, 13 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) ..................................................  7, 9 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 ....................................................  4, 16 R. 4:46-2 .................................................................  6 R. 4:37-2(b) .............................................................  7 R. 4:17-4(e) .............................................................  10  RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX
[directive] However, under See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-61(a)(1), fingerprints may be taken for juveniles of any age for comparison to latent fingerprints, either with the approval of the court, or with the consent of the juvenile and parent or guardian.  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-61(a)(1) also provides that such prints “... shall be destroyed when the purpose for the taking of fingerprints has been fulfilled. ”  If a juvenile who has been fingerprinted under section (a)(1) for comparison with latent fingerprints is fourteen or older and is later charged with delinquency for a crime, the juvenile's fingerprints shall be taken and submitted to the State Bureau of Identification within the Division of State Police.  Fingerprinting is also required when a juvenile is waived to the Superior Court, Law Division, Criminal Part, as a juvenile who is waived to adult court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 (involuntary waiver) or N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 (waiver at election of juvenile), shall be treated as an adult.
[brief] Honorable Judges: Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b), this letter brief is submitted in lieu of a formal brief on behalf of the [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS . . .  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT  APPROPRIATELY DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE  ..................................................  5  CONCLUSION .................................................................  8
[brief] Dispute of Material Facts  As to Notice to [...].  In a private investigation report dated February 1, 2021, [...] reported the following based on a conversation with [...], whose house is located near the streetlight:  Mr. Bavagnoli recalled he had called [...] several times to report the overhead light is never on.  Under questioning he offered that he called before the May 31, 2017 accident.  He advised the light kept going out.  The light had been a continuing problem and he had called several times.  (Pa875).
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That The Parties Entered Into A New, Pay-When-Able Loan.  Defendants challenge the trial court’s detailed factual findings that the parties, on April 26, 2013, entered into a new, pay-when-able loan, i.e., the Third Loan, which was a novation of the First and Second Loans.  Defendants, however, have presented no factual support for their argument.  The “scope of appellate review of a trial court’s fact-finding function is limited” and “findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998) (emphasis added) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).