ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] ); stationhouse camera, worn body camera, dash e.g., ❑ admission/confession; an made defendant the whether recorded ❑ electronically was defendant the by statement admission any whether stationhouse worn camera, body dash camera, recording, e.g., of type (specifying the etc.); camera, room interview (specifying the recording ❑ an electronic on captured was conduct offense the whether camera, worn surveillance camera, camera, body dash e.g., recording, of type etc.); camera, phone cell witness's e.g., (specifying of procedure, ❑ type the used were procedures identification whether etc.); line-up, array, photo up, show victim/witness; the ❑ of acquaintance or stranger a is suspect the whether the whether known, injury ❑ when and of the extent the injured, was victim a whether services; medical or hospital declined the to taken was victim ❑ any; if involved, weapon of type the evidence, (specifying ❑ of type or recovered seized was evidence physical any whether merchandise, stolen cash, weapons, contraband, other paraphernalia, drugs, e.g., instrumentalities); or implements other or tool burglars heroin, crack, marijuana, ❑ cocaine, (e.g., substance dangerous controlled of type etc.); opiate, prescription 60 Page ❑ from the recovered from the scene, or was seized physical evidence was whether or from the defendant's vehicle; defendant, control of the person or ❑ (specifying conceal, or to discard, destroy evidence defendant attempted whether the down or car dropping or throwing, flushing furniture seat, under hiding method, e.g., sink/toilet); ❑ of or (specifying type to flee otherwise resist arrest attempted defendant whether the vehicle pursuit); motor chase, e.g., foot flight, ❑ person resulted in injury or threat of injury to any flight or attempted flight whether safety, in a manner that endangered public operated vehicle was whether a (e.g., to any the extent of any resulting injury weapons), and drew or fired whether police person; ❑ taken if of injury whether to and, so, the extent and assaulted officer was whether an hospital; ❑ at risk by the offense; or otherwise placed present children were whether ❑ of alcohol or be under the influence drugs; appeared to defendant whether the ❑ agency using and/or whether the officer or to drugs, defendant admitted whether the drug-dependent; defendant is that the to believe reason has ❑ or stolen; of merchandise service of the type description general a ❑ whether any (i.e., a home invasion), and residence burglary involved a whether a burglary; time of the present at the were victims in manner that endangered public safety; operated a was stolen vehicle ~—whether a ❑ been to the about the offense had communicated information relevant whether obtain a the prosecutor of the need to preserve and dispatcher (to alert by a officers) communications)i and recording of radio ❑ 9-1-1 call alert the provided to the agency by a (to information been had whether obtain recording of 9-1-1 call).
[brief] In fact, as discussed above, in Boyle, the Supreme Court held that, if the parties want an indemnification provision to be construed as covering first-party claims, they must say so expressly, with clear, deliberate, and unambiguous language.  Otherwise, the American Rule will apply and any ambiguities in the provision will be construed against the indemnitee.  Boyle, 257 N.J. at 483.  Based upon Boyle and all of the other above-mentioned authorities – and upon a reading of PSA Section 17.1 in its entirety – [...]’s arguments for an award of attorneys’ fees based upon either subparagraph (b) or (c) of Section 17.1 are fatally flawed and were properly rejected by the trial court.
[brief] “We have already denied a motion to supplement the record with documents it has included in its nearly 500 page appendix, none of which are part of this record.  See Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 89-90 (2014) (explaining an amicus must accept the case as it finds it).  Its participation will not sufficiently assist in the resolution of an issue of public importance. ”  (Ia. 8)  [...] acknowledges that such documents are not, at this juncture, part of this record on appeal from the Bulletin.  However, for purposes of any further potential appeal as to the determination as to whether additional evidence and information exist which render intervention appropriate and mandate adherence to the APA, [...] respectfully submits that such filings are a component of the record.  R. 2:5-4 (“The record on appeal shall consist of all papers on file in the court or courts or agencies below, with all entries as to matters made on the records of such courts and agencies [].”).  (Aa.490-494).  While such a certification from 2023 cannot be part of the administrative determination record for a 2022 Bulletin, this underscores the point that a notice-and-comment period to allow for the submission of such evidence to the Department was necessary in this case.  Those exhibits were in response to certain assertions made by the Department in its papers.\footnote{[...] previously sought to supplement the record to include additional documentation.  That motion was denied by order of May 30, 2023.  (Ia. 9)}  The Department opposed that application; at page seven (7) of the Department’s opposition filing, it observed that there is “overlapping ownership” between [...] and [...] such that the two entities are “operating together in this appeal [].”  [...]’s application for leave to appeal as amicus was denied by order of January 23, 2024.  (Ia. 10)  Thus, [...] is in a position where its interactions with the Department and relationship to [...] have been invoked by the Department against [...]’s position on appeal, without the ability to be represented in its own right with regard to the assertions specifically directed to [...].  [...] accordingly seeks leave to intervene for this limited purpose.
[brief] Id. at 424 (citing 347 N.J. Super. 218 (App. Div. 2002)).  To discern whether a unanimity charge is required, Parker directs that the court should "'examine two factors: whether the acts alleged are conceptually similar or are 'contradictory or only marginally related to each other,' and whether there is a 'tangible indication of jury confusion.'"  State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 193 (2010) (quoting Parker, 124 N.J. at 639).  The argument that the charge in this case was not specific enough necessarily implicates the Defendant’s indictment, which included all of the subsections referenced later in the jury charge.
[brief] To allow the [...] officers to make what was, in effect, their own probable cause determination that the car contained contraband in Lakewood would turn on its head the axiom that “the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent. ”  *Johnson v. United States*, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).  Because police acted outside the scope of the warrant, the [...] officers’ decision to conduct the search in Lakewood was unreasonable.
[brief] Plaintiffs had served [...]’s expert report on defendant on July 30 (A218) and had complied with all discovery deadlines otherwise (A95-98, A214-219). ³ --- ³  In their June 10, 2021 correspondence (A170), plaintiffs’ counsel advised [...] that “[t]he parties have been diligently coordinating and scheduling plaintiffs' expert depositions.  To date, two of five of plaintiffs' experts have been deposed; one is confirmed to go forward on July 8, 2021; one needs to be rescheduled from June 14, 2021, as the doctor is not available; and the last doctor is-coordinating dates with his schedule but has not been confirmed to date.  Upon completion of plaintiffs' experts’ depositions, plaintiffs will need to coordinate and notice the depositions of defendants' experts, 19 experts in total. ”  Thus, by the time that [...] heard argument on plaintiffs’ application on August 27, there were nearly two months left to complete expert depositions, and nearly three months before the discovery end date.
[directive] If the court grants the State’s (See also 2A:162-13 below) request for a hearing as to a defendant who is not charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) of N.J.S.A. 162-12, the court shall set forth on the record and in the bail order the reasons for granting the request.  The court shall conduct a hearing within three (3) business days after monetary bail is posted or proffered if the defendant is incarcerated, or within a reasonable period of time after granting the request if the defendant has been released on bail.  This Rule still applies to defendants subject to the Bail Schedules, except as to the reference to pretrial release conditions.  Pretrial release conditions apply to eligible defendants under the Criminal Justice Reform Law.  This Statute provides that the court shall not require a bail in excess of $2,500 for a person charged with a fourth degree crime or disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense unless the court finds that the person presents a serious threat to the physical safety of potential evidence or of persons involved N.J.S.A. 2C:6-1 in circumstances surrounding the alleged offense; or unless the court finds that bail of that nature will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as Bail for Persons Accused of Minor required.
[brief] The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division (“Appellate Division”) has held that “[a]n appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction. ”  Rinaldo v. RLRI Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super. 387, 395 (App. Div. 2006) (internal citations omitted).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has found that “an abuse of discretion has occurred when a decision was ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Morris Cty. Mun. Util. Auth., 433 N.J. Super. 445, 455 (App. Div. 2013) (internal citations omitted).  However, while “decisions relating to injunctive relief are normally reviewed for abuse of discretion, [the Appellate Division’s] review is de novo where the disputed issue is a question of law.
[brief] During the week of November 28, 2021, detectives with the Drug Trafficking Central Unit of the New Jersey State Police learned from a confidential information (“CI”) that the defendant, [...], was selling controlled dangerous substances (“CDS”) – “cocaine, heroin, and pills” – in the Ocean County area.  The CI knew this to be true because they had previously purchased CDS from the defendant.  As such, the CI was also able to provide a telephone number and associated vehicle, “a black 2015 Audi bearing New York Registration JMZ-****,” for the defendant, and describe how the defendant’s CDS operation worked:  The source stated that [the defendant] would go to a source in the City of New York to pick up his large quantities of drugs when he would travel and he would use his black Audi as previously mentioned, the 2015 one bearing New York registration to make that trip.  --- 2
[directive] Officers conducting administrative investigations of firearm discharges must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  All supervisors and any other officer who may be called upon to participate in a firearm discharge investigation therefore must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, including protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating firearm discharges.  Investigators should review all administrative reports the agency requires.  These reports  42  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 should include a description of the incident, the date, time and location of the incident, the type of firearm used, the type of ammunition used and number of rounds fired, the identity of the officer, and any other information a superior officer requests.  The involved officer's supervisor must assist the internal affairs investigator as needed.  7.11.9
[brief] 1088a  ## INDEX TO APPENDIX ### VOLUME I | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, | | | filed October 14, 2021 | 0001a | | Defendants’ Answer to Amended Complaint, | | | filed November 3, 2021 | 0019a | | Order Granting Dismissal of Defendant, [...], | | | dated January 25, 2021 | 0028a | | Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, | | | dated September 10, 2021 | 0041a | | Order Granting Plaintiffs Leave to Amend Complaint, | | | dated October 8, 2021 | 0043a | | Case Management Order, | | | dated February 14, 2023 | 0045a | | Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, | | | filed March 20, 2023 | 0047a | | Proposed Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, | | | dated March 20, 2023 | 0049a | | Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, | | | filed March 20, 2023 | 0051a | | Certification of [...] | | | filed March 20, 2023 | 0058a | | Exhibit A – Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint | 0061a | Exhibit B - [...] Amended and Restated Syndicate Agreement .......................................................... 080a
[brief] *In re Monmouth Consol. Water Co.*, 47 N.J. 251, 260 (1966); *In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.*, 35 N.J. 358, 377 (1961); *In re Hackensack Water Co.*, 41 N.J. Super. 408, 423 (App. Div. 1956).  The term “public” has been interpreted to refer to the public served by the utility and not the limited group benefited by a local zoning ordinance.  See *Hackensack*, 41 N.J. Super. at 423.  Furthermore, the utility need not show that the proposed project is absolutely or indispensably necessary for the public service, convenience and welfare, only that it is “reasonably necessary. ”  *Pub. Serv.*, 35 N.J. at 377.  In making its determination, the [...] must consider the site, the community zoning plan and zoning ordinances, the physical characteristics of the plot, the surrounding neighborhood, and the effect of the proposed use thereon.  *Ibid.*; see also *Monmouth Consol. Water*, 47 N.J. at 259-60 (recommending that the Board consider whether the utility may mitigate “any resulting injury to abutting or neighboring owners” via “reasonable requirements relating to the physical appearance of the structure” and additional landscaping).  Alternative sites and their advantages and disadvantages, including cost, must be considered in determining reasonable necessity.  *Pub. Serv.*, 35 N.J. at 377.  The [...]’s power to regulate utilities is broad.
[directive] SUBJECT: Law Regarding Enforcement Directive  Police Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) and Stored BWC Recordings  In law recent months, enforcement agencies have begun equip their officers with to body worn cameras  A small number of ("BWCs").  police departments in New Jersey already deploy B WCs, while others plan currently to do so and are balancing the costs and benefits of these devices.  New grant programs will incentivize departments to acquire BWCs by helping to defray costs.  In light of the proliferation of BWCs for across the State, it is appropriate the Attorney General, as the State's chief law officer, on enforcement to provide guidance to police departments how to make the best of recording N.J.S.A. possible use electronic technology.
[directive] A. instructions.  Before presenting a fatal police encounter to a grand jury, prosecutors Initial should instruct the grand jurors on all criminal statutes potentially implicated by such incidents.  These instructions must include a description of the legal elements of the following: Criminal Homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2) • Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3) • Aggravated Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)) • Reckless Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)) • Death by Auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5) • Aggravated Assault (serious bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) • Aggravated Assault (bodily injury with deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)) • Official Misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2) • B.  Defenses.  In addition, the grand jury should receive instructions on the following justification defenses:  Use of force in self-protection (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4) • Use of force for the protection of other persons (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-5) • Use of force in law enforcement (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-7)  • C. instructions.  After instructing the grand jurors on the elements of these offenses Written and defenses, prosecutors should provide each grand juror with a document containing the above-referenced statutory language.  The grand jurors may review this document at any time during their jury service.  D.  Re-instruction.  If prosecutors present more than one fatal police encounter to a grand jury, the prosecutors need not re-instruct the grand jurors after each case on all potential offenses and defenses, provided that the grand jurors have access to the document summarizing their initial jury instructions.  However, depending on the facts of a case, prosecutors may decide to re-instruct grand jurors on specific offenses or defenses that are particularly relevant to the case at hand.  In addition, prosecutors should re-instruct the grand jury on any offenses or defenses when requested by the grand jury foreperson.  E. instructions.
[brief] By suspending Plaintiff and falsely labeling him as a racist cop, Defendants engaged in retaliation in violation of CEPA because of Plaintiff’s performance of his job duties as a Police Captain and his refusal to look the other way at illegal conduct.  Those criminal acts by the unruly crowd on the night of July 5, 2016 included acts of assault, including those committed upon police officers, and disorderly conduct.  Plaintiff refused to refrain from performing his law enforcement duties, as that would have been a violation of the official misconduct statute cited supra.  Specifically, our State’s broad-ranging official misconduct statute makes it a second-degree crime for a law enforcement officer “to knowingly refrain from performing a duty which is imposed upon him or her by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his or her office”.
[brief] A.  The Settlement Agreement Expressly Limited [...]’s Rights Concerning the Palm Beach Property (Da274a-75a).  Where, as here, the terms of a contract are clear, “it is the function of the court to enforce it as written and not to make a better contract for either party. ”  Schenck v. HJI Assocs., 295 N.J. Super. 445, 450 (App. Div. 1996) (internal quotation omitted).  “A basic principle of contract interpretation is to read the document as a whole in a fair and common sense manner. ”  Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009).  Courts strive to give effect to all parts of a written instrument because “[a] contract ‘should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless. ’”  Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J. Super. 212, 233 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Cumberland Cty. Improvement Auth.  v. GSP Recycling Co., 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 177 N.J. 222 (2003)).  It is axiomatic that “[s]pecific language in a contract controls over general language” and qualifies the meaning of any general language in the case of a conflict or inconsistency.  Gil v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 450 N.J. Super. 368, 378 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting DCV Holdings, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 961 (Del. 2005)); see also Bauman v. Royal Indem. Co., 36 N.J. 12, 22 (1961) (“In the interpretation of a contractual instrument, the specific is customarily permitted to control the general . . . .”); Homesite Ins. Co. v. Hindman, 413 N.J. Super. 41, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (“[W]hen two provisions dealing with the same subject matter are present, the more specific provision controls over the more general. ”).  Although [...] attempts to downplay Paragraph 23 of the Settlement Agreement as a “standard general release and waiver by [...] as to several Cohen family trusts and estates” (see Db10), the scope of [...]’s release is extremely broad and specifically identifies [...] and [...].
[brief] ”  1) the board of education of a local school district or 2) the board of education of a local school district constituting part of a limited purpose regional district; 3) the board of education or governing body of a non-operating school district; or 4) the governing body of a municipality constituting one of the following: a. a constituent district of a limited purpose regional district, b. a constituent district of an all-purpose regional district, or c. a constituent district of a consolidated school district.  [Ibid.]  As further background, N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1 sets forth several definitions relevant to this matter.  First, “[b]oard of education’ means and includes the board of education of a local school district, consolidated school district, non-operating school district, and the board of education of a limited purpose or all-purpose regional district. ”  Ibid.  Because there is no board of education in the municipality of [...] this term does not apply to [...].  Second, “school district” refers to local school districts, consolidated school districts, non-operating school districts, regional school districts, and constituent districts thereof.  *Ibid.*  Again, because the former [...] School District was eliminated in 2009, this term does not apply to [...].  Finally, N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1 defines “governing body” thusly:  > in the event that a school district enumerated herein does not have a board of education, the governing body of a local school district, a municipality constituting part of a consolidated school district, and the governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district of a limited purpose or all purpose regional district.  *[Ibid.  (emphases added)]*  Yet again, because this definition is predicated upon either the existence of a school district that does not have a board of education or a municipality being part of a consolidated school district or a constituent of a regional school district, and because there exists no [...] School District that is either part of a consolidated school district or a constituent of a regional school district, this definition does not apply to [...].  A.  SEA BRIGHT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS ANY OF THE ENTITIES DESCRIBED IN N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.
[brief] [...] argues that the COVID Statute, as applied by the lower court, is violative of the Impairment of Contracts Clauses of both the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions.  It asserts that had the lower court employed the construction of the Statute for which [...] argues, under which its mandate that local school districts "shall continue to make payments . . . to contracted service providers . . ." in the event of a health related school closure may be entirely ignored, this constitutional infirmity would not exist.  However, given that the Statute cannot be intelligently read without giving effect to the cited language, [...]'s qualifier to its argument is fallacious.  And as the Court will have noted, despite the existence of a wide body of law on the subject of the Impairment of Contracts clauses of both Constitutions, [...] cites to no law and offers no legal test to the Court in advancing this position.