ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] More specifically, the delegation of regulatory authority to a body controlled by a private interest group like the [...] that is self-interested in hunting, in contrast to the broader interest in conservation of natural resources and wildlife that is the mission of the [...] violates this constitutional provision.  The courts are also more inclined to invalidate the delegation of licensing power to private entities or individuals than to strictly public entities or individuals.  For example, in Group Health Insurance of New Jersey v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436 the [...].  In the Matter of Petition to Repeal Rules Permitting Black Bear Hunting Including the Comprehensive Black Bear Management Policy, N.J.A.C. 7:25-5.6 and -5.24 ([...]), cited in 2022 WL 2251251 (decided June 22, 2022), certif. den., 253 N.J. 434 (2023).  (Pa164)
[directive] 유죄를 인정하는 경우에 한해서  다음의  추가 질문들에 합니다.  답변을 해야  The following additional questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to an offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault, Sexual Assault or Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact or kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or an N.J.S.A. attempt to commit one of these crimes.  1.  범죄를 저지르는 귀하의 행위가 반복적이고 충동적인 행동양식이라고 [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 목적으로, 단정할만한 특성이 있는지 판정하기 위한 귀하는 아베넬 진단 아십니까?
[brief] Plaintiff asserts [...] is highly qualified as he is a licensed architect who designed at least sixteen commercial kitchens and was informed by the recommended kitchen layout published by a bagel kettle manufacturer and the [...] 2006 plan.  Plaintiff also asserts that while N.J.A.C. 13:27-5.1(b) requires compliance with all applicable statutes, regulations, and building codes, and the code prohibits the knowing violation of the same, there is nothing in the code which limits an architect's obligations to mere compliance with the applicable statutes, regulations and building codes.  Plaintiff further asserts that an experienced architect should not be precluded from offering an opinion on a deviation from the accepted architectural practice because the complained of conduct did not violate a building code.  "[A] negligence cause of action requires the establishment of four elements: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages."
[brief] I.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW ...............................................................10  II.  THE CLERK OF THE FIRE DISTRICT LACKED THE STATUORY POWER TO AMEND THE RESULTS AFTER THE DATE FOR CERTIFICATION, AND THE DISPUTED WRITE-IN VOTE SHOLUD NEVER HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (Pa5; 2T44:7) ............................12  A.  The Clerk Lacked the Power to Act Unilaterally .............................12  B.  Even if the Clerk Held the Power to Act, He Was Outside the Time to Do So 13  C.  Alternatively, The Statute Is Not Clear on Whether the Authority to Ultimately Declare a Winner Even Lies with the Clerk .....................16  D.  The Clerk’s Actions Are Ultra Vires and Void ................................18  E.  The Complete Lack of Compliance with Statutory Requirements by the Clerk is So Egregious it Warrants Overturning the Entire Election .........19  III.  THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED WELL-SETTLED LAW THAT WRITE-IN VOTES FOR CANDIDATES WHO APPEAR ON THE BALLOT ARE VOID (Pa5; 2T43:7)
[brief] [...] was not actually aware of the foreclosure proceeding, let alone that it might result in a taking or unjust enrichment  Moreover, [...] could not have brought her takings or unjust enrichment claims during the initial foreclosure proceeding because she did not have actual knowledge of that proceeding until after it had concluded.  (Ja6–7, ¶¶ 30, 37).  The entire controversy doctrine cannot bar a claim unless it was actually known in an earlier proceeding.
[brief] In *Township of No. Brunswick v. Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, 378 N.J. Super. 485, 490 (App. Div. 2005), the court reminds us that a municipal governing body is vested with the ultimate responsibility of establishing the essential land use character of the municipality through the adoption of zoning ordinances that divide the municipality into districts, identify the uses permitted in each district, and impose general limitations on construction.  *Paruszewski v. Twp. of Elsinboro*, 154 N.J. 45, 51-54, (1998); *Twp. of Dover v. Bd. of Adj. of Dover*, 158 N.J.Super. 401, 411-12, (App.Div. 1978).
[brief] (Id.).  There was no *quid pro quo* to the agreement.  [...] in the agreement covenanted to assist [...] in his disability process.  (Ibid).  [...] agreed as a result of his illness and disability that he would not be a law enforcement officer in [...] again, but he was free to work in law enforcement anywhere else if he ever regained fitness for duty.  (Pa29-41).  On 11/26/19, the application for disability was filed after the MOU was finalized.  (Pa42-45).  A letter of retirement by [...] was issued making 12/31/19 his last day as a [...] police officer.  (Pa49-51).  On 10/15/20, [...]’s mental health therapist issued an extensive and full evaluation and psychological report rendering [...] permanently disabled due to PTSD being causally related to the 12/31/17 shooting incident.  (Pa56-69).  That report remains unchallenged and is unrebutted in this case.  (Pa1-151).  On 10/21/20, the Supervisor for the [...] outright refused to even allow [...] to docket and file his application for accidental disability, or, alternatively, for 40% disability.
[brief] The indictment did not indicate that [...] or [...] was a victim; it named the employees and patrons of the bank.  Indeed, in the sole count of the indictment that indicated a specific victim was named, the jurors acquitted defendant of the charge.  Defendant points to *State v. Tindell*, 417 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2011), in further support of his arguments.
[directive] h.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하는  법 시행기관이  범죄 활동을 수사하는  데 사용될 수도 있는 유전자 시료를 아십니까?  제공해야 하고 그 검사비용을 지불해야 되는 것을  You will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing?
[directive] 4.3  Truthful Response to Specific Inquiries.  If a civilian inquires of an officer whether the officer is equipped with a BWC, or inquires whether the device is activated, the officer shall answer truthfully unless the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, has expressly authorized the officer to make a covert electronic recording.  Cf. Section 3.3 (Policy does not apply to officers while operating in an undercover capacity, or while conducting/participating in a station house custodial interrogation electronically recorded in accordance with Rule 3:17).  Nothing in this Section shall be construed to establish a basis for suppressing a statement or other evidence.  See AG Directive 2021-5, Section II.A (non-enforceability by third parties).
[brief] JARDIM MEISNER  SALMON SPRAGUE & SUSSER, P.C. [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, the [...], i/p/a [...] Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (Attorney ID #152162015)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (Attorney ID #006892007)  # TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Rather, Plaintiffs are only challenging and seeking to invalidate the Limited Attorney Exemption, which does not advance the Act’s overall purpose, but instead serves to defeat that purpose.  The fact that the Limited Attorney Exemption frustrates rather than advances the Act’s purpose is plainly established by the binding testimony of [...]’s corporate representative – wholly ignored by the trial court and downplayed by Defendants in their opposition.  In short, [...] cannot explain how the Limited Attorney Exemption advances the interest of protecting consumers.  Pb at 29.  Defendants also rely heavily on American Budget v. Furman, 67 N.J. Super. 134 (Ch. Div.), aff’d, 36 N.J. 129 (1961); Plaintiffs agree that Furman carries significance to this matter, but contend that it actually supports Plaintiffs’ position.  The Furman court specifically reviewed and confirmed the propriety of the predecessor statute -- the Debt Adjusters Law -- which exempted all attorneys from the statute’s regulation of the business of debt adjustment.  Thus, the Furman holding actually supports Plaintiffs’ position, as the issue in that case was not the regulation of attorneys, but rather the exclusion of all attorneys from the statute.  The court refused to strike the all attorney exemption for the same reasons that Plaintiffs seek the elimination of the Limited Attorney Exemption so that all attorneys are again exempt from the Act.  Id. at 143.
[brief] DIVISION DOCKET # [...]  [...]  Plaintiff-Appellant v. [...], MAYOR [...], DEPUTY MAYOR [...], COUNCILPERSON [...], COUNCILPERSON [...], COUNCILPERSON [...] AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR  [...], INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, Defendants-Respondents  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Essex County Docket No. [...]
[brief] The trial court’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion.  Of course, even when evidence is relevant, it may still “be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) […] needless presentation of cumulative evidence. ”  N.J.R.E. 403 (emphasis added).  However, evidence should only be barred under N.J.R.E. 403 if “the probative value of the evidence ‘is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the’ issues. ”  Cole, 229 N.J. at 448 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971)).  The party urging the exclusion of evidence under N.J.R.E. 403 retains the burden “to convince the court that the N.J.R.E. 403 considerations should control. ”  Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 410 (2001) (quoting Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 1 on N.J.R.E. 403 (2000)).  Applying this test, the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.
[brief] Lest there be any remaining doubt, one need look no further than [...]’s summary of that ruling in her later opinion in 2008:  “This court ruled that [[...]], who apparently had undertaken little or no discovery, enjoyed neither an express easement nor a prescriptive easement [...]’s land. ”  (Da600)(emphasis added).  “[[...]] has no legal right to use the [...] Lane because this court has already granted summary judgment to [...] that [[...]] did not have an express easement or a prescriptive easement to do so. ”  (Da612-Da613)  [...] observed, correctly, that [...] never brought the 1966 deed to [...]’s attention when raising his express easement claim.  But even assuming for argument’s sake that deed would have supported his claim, an assumption we dispute for the reasons expressed above, applicability of the could- have-been-raised element of *res judicata* cannot turn on whether a litigant, in the earlier action, looked under every rock when gathering evidence to support his case.  Inadequate pretrial preparation does not entitle the losing party or his privies to a do-over.  **Collateral Estoppel**
[brief] She questioned whether the evidence of [...]’s attack on defendant only went to the issue of self-defense, rather than also passion/provocation (5T 92-23 to 24) -- a hard-to-understand interrogatory if one has even a basic familiarity with the main cases on passion/provocation, discussed in this point, that make clear that it is often the same exact evidence in a case that bears upon self-defense and passion/provocation.  Moreover, when considering the “failure to cool off” prong of the Mauricio test, the judge stated that she could not find any definitive evidence to influence the jury on the issue one way or the other (5T 118-18 to 20) -- a statement that ignores the fact that if the matter of “cooling off” is truly in doubt, it is the State, not the defendant that has failed in its burden of proof.  See Grunow, 102 N.J. at 145.  As in Carrero, there was plenty of evidence before the jury that could allow a juror to at least have a reasonable doubt about whether the State had disproved that defendant responded to a reasonable provocation (a physical attack and/or the brandishing of a weapon) with a near-immediate stabbing of the decedent.  That is all that is required to charge passion/provocation manslaughter when requested.  Defendant’s aggravated-manslaughter conviction should be reversed and that count remanded for retrial.
[brief] **The 2009 Incident and Injuries**  This incident is mentioned repeatedly in the records of Petitioner’s orthopedic surgeon, [...], who evaluated Petitioner in connection with the subject October 17, 2015 car accident.  (Pa160-165).  In documenting his November 6, 2015 evaluation of Petitioner, [...] states that Petitioner had a previous history of neck and back pain from a 2009 work incident and refers to the 2009 incident five times in his four-page report.  (Pa163).  [...] describes the 2009 incident as follows:  He was in a fight as a police officer.  He tackled a man to the ground.  He hit the back of his head on a car as he fell.  He lost consciousness for 10 to 15 seconds.  He reports neck injury and back injury.  He had PT.  He was out of work for 3 months.  He denies and injections or surgeries.  (Pa163).
[directive] ✘Do not include a sentence given for the Index Assault.  13.  Failure on current or prior conditional release (including bail, parole, probation, or pretrial release order) or conditions of a restraining order (TRO, FRO, DORO, SORO, SASPA, stalking)  Conditional release failure:  The conditional release must have been ordered before the Index Assault.  ✔If Defendant was on a conditional release at the time of the Index Assault, and no information is available about release conditions, count the Index Assault as a conditional release failure, because such releases typically require offenders to remain offense free.  ✔The Defendant must have been at liberty in the community under supervision, monitoring, or other requirement ordered by a criminal court, or a no-contact order imposed by any court.  ✔Any known violations of the conditional release or violations of release conditions count for this Item.  ✔Any charges incurred while on conditional release count for this Item.  Count any known failure, even if it did not result in a charge.  ✔Examples: committing a new criminal offense; failing to appear for court; failing to attend a probation appointment; drinking when prohibited by court or probation; going to a person’s home or work when prohibited; contacting a person when prohibited.  ✘Do not include violations occurring after the Index Assault.
[brief] In November and December of 2016 [...] bought out [...] and [...] and agreed to indemnify them for any liabilities of [...].  Pa112-113, Pa115-116.  [...] and [...] did not request or obtain a release from [...] with respect to their personal guarantees of the obligations of [...].  [...] and [...] were active participants in the business, not just passive investors, up until their departure in November and December of 2016.  [...] was never told that [...] and --- \(^2\)
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  ii  REPLY BRIEF .........................................................................................................................................  1  I.  Litigants Are Entitled to Notice of the Points the Court Thinks Constitute Plain Error and Have a Right to be Heard Before a Final Determination ..................  1  II.  Incurring Legal Fees Per Se Is Not the Damage Suffered by the Plaintiff, Because Legal Fees Incurred in the Underlying Matrimonial Case Has to Be a Mere Portion or a Part of the Total Damages Suffered by the Plaintiff in the Underlying Matrimonial Case .............................................................................................................  5  III.  The Newly Discovered Evidence of Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Open Admission to OAE Investigator Will Definitely Change the Outcome of Trial.  ..............................  11  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................  15
[directive] The officer must document as detailed an account as possible of the exact words/gestures used by the witness.  To ensure that the worksheet accurately documents the witness’s stated level of confidence, the administrator should repeat back to the witness the language recorded by the officer in the answer to Question 17, and confirm that the witness agrees with that characterization of their level of confidence.  See Question 18.  Officers must avoid providing any “feedback,” that is, signaling to the witness in any way - whether during or after the identification procedure – that the witness had correctly identified the suspect.  See Question 14.
[brief] We suggest the following procedure as a general guide to municipal boards when balancing the positive and negative criteria.  **First, the board should identify the public interest at stake.  Some uses are more compelling than others.**  Second, the Board should identify the detrimental effect that will ensue from the grant of the variance....  Third, in some situations, the local board may reduce the detrimental effect by imposing reasonable conditions on the use....  (citations omitted)  (emphasis added).  Fourth, the Board should then weigh the positive and negative criteria and determine whether, on balance, the grant of the variance would cause a substantial detriment to the public good.  This balancing, “[w]hile properly making it more difficult for municipalities to exclude inherently beneficial uses… permits such exclusion when the negative impact of the use is significant.
[brief] See State v. DeRoxtro, 327 N.J. Super. 212, 226 (App. Div. 2000) (finding aggravating factor one for second-degree aggravated assault where defendant hatched a plan to beat up a targeted victim and had her roommate attack him, resulting in the victim’s death).  Regarding aggravating factor three and mitigating factor nine, defendant incorrectly argues that his four years of pretrial release compliance outweighed his municipal offense history and showed that he was unlikely to reoffend.  “[I]t cannot be disputed” that a sentencing court can base aggravating factor three “on assessment of a defendant beyond the mere fact of a prior conviction, or even in the absence of a criminal conviction. ”  State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 154 (2006); see also State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 491 (App. Div. 1990) (finding aggravating factor three where the defendant had no criminal record).  The court’s reliance on defendant’s “fairly substantial” municipal record, and its analysis that defendant organized the fight by using his “gravitas” with the [...], therefore constituted a “qualitative assessment” of defendant’s history.  See Thomas, 188 N.J. at 153.  And the court did not abuse its discretion when explaining that compliance with a court order for pre-trial services did not undermine a finding of aggravating factor three.  (15T29-7 to 8).
[brief] Specifically, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 states:  A complaint charging a violation of the internal rules and regulations established for the conduct of a law enforcement unit shall be filed no later than the 45th day after the date on which the person filing the complaint obtained sufficient information\(^3\) to file --- \(^3\)  Our Supreme Court has stated, “it is not the happening of the event giving rise to discipline that starts the clock for purposes of evaluating timeliness, but the receipt of sufficient information by the one who is authorized to file the charge that is significant. ”  Roberts v. State, Division of State Police, 191 N.J. 516, 524 (2007).
[brief] The Standard of Review of an Order Dismissing a Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.  (Pa31-Pa33)  This appeal seeks review of the motion court’s grant of Defendant’s motion under R. 4:6-2(e) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  This Court’s review is *de novo*, “affording no deference to the trial court’s determination. ”  *Pace v. Hamilton Cove*, 258 N.J. 82, 95–96 (2024) (citing *Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC*, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021)).  A court must assume the facts asserted in the complaint are true, *Lembo v. Marchese*, 242 N.J. 477, 481 (2020), and the “plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference as we ‘search[ ] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.’” *Id.* (quoting *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) quoting *Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park*, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).  **POINT II.
[brief] He testified that $70,000 was a “significant amount of money. ”  (2T 115:25-116:2)  Defendant’s earned income in 2009 was approximately $918,000.  (2T 143:2-6)  In April 2011, at the time he was applying for the mortgage for the townhouse, his monthly income was approximately $57,000 (2T 143:20-144:14)  Defendant claims his income for 2009 and 2010 was unusual (2T 188:11-13) but refused to provide any tax returns or other documentation in support of that contention, even though if that were true, he would have grounds under the Agreement for a recalculation of support.
[brief] And here comes common sense again.  Isn't it interesting that the DOH, whose job it is to make sure that facilities comply, found none?  They were in compliance.  Instead, counsel or [...] told you -- or they will tell you that the state of New Jersey did a poor investigation.  And we don't know what they did, they say, and you can't use that, it's not trustworthy.  But if there had been violations in the face of a dead patient -- that's why they went there.  They had that information.  They would have found a violation, if there was one, and they didn't find a single one.  11T94:1-14.  The information improperly admitted was clearly central to the defense and used for the truth of its findings.  The defense position that the hearsay was not used to prove the truth of the matter asserted is simply not credible.  **POINT IV**