ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The minimum amount of force, of both type (e.g., physical, mechanical, enhanced mechanical, or deadly) and intensity, that is necessary to control a situation and achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.  The law permits officers to overcome unlawful force or resistance; thus, the term proportional force is not intended to mean a type and intensity of force that is exactly equal to the type and intensity of force being used by the subject.  The term proportional force is intended to highlight that the level of force a law enforcement officer utilizes shall be no more than is necessary to overcome the unlawful force or resistance being confronted by the officer.  Reasonable Belief.
[brief] 7.  Fifth, The Court in its order of 5/12/2023 (DA15, p. 2, line 15-17)) found:  “This court finds that Defendant has failed to provide the court with sufficient basis for this request.  It is the party’s burden, not the court’s burden, to provide the specific information contained in their proofs to support their argument. ”  While limitations on page length of appeal briefs prevent Appellant from presenting a detailed exposition as to each and every piece of evidence supporting claims of account error, allow Appellant to note that between Appellant’s Motion for Enforcement of the Order of 1/11/2022, his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 4/4/2022, his Motion for Correction of the Probation Account Record, and his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 3/30/2023, Appellant has submitted 135 appendices of documents of supporting court Orders, erroneous audits and erroneous Probation statements, and even identified specific pages in Probation’s account record as to errors and deficiencies.  Further, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 3/30/2023 Appellant cited specific evidence in his certification (DA372) which the court overlooked, failed to consider or by mistake failed to address in paragraphs nos. 2, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16 and 19 of his brief, and in paragraphs 1, 7, 11, and 17 of his Reply (DA388).
[directive] The mandatory penalties are as follows:  (1)  $3,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $2,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  $1,000 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  $750 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $500 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  TOTAL  D.E.D.R Penalty: $ Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date  Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, Formularz (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Polish Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Polish 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.
[directive] Additionally, if the person claiming the impounded motor vehicle is not the owner or lessee the following statutory requirement must be satisfied.  •  The person must acknowledge, in writing, receipt of the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) FORM. ”  If the person fails to comply with this statutory requirement, then the statute prohibits the release of the impounded vehicle before the 12-hour period of impoundment has elapsed.
[brief] Defense Counsel Contradicts The Sworn Testimony Of One Of His Own Clients ([...])  In A September 15, 2023 Certification  On September 15, 2023, defense attorney [...], Esq. of [...] submitted a certification in which he certified that [...] (the supervisor employed by his client, the [...]) would be testifying in a manner that contradicted the testimony of Defendant [...] (also his client in the same matter):  23.  Jeff [...] testified at his deposition what his recollection was [as to] the instructions on 7/20 he received regarding the cut thru and he stated he was told merely to use the cut thru and that there was no more detail provided.  24.  I offer the following proffer that there will be testimony that there were CB instructions giving greater detail regarding the correct cut thru including a cut up grassy cut thru and there were cones by the cut thru.  [Da185 (emphasis added). ]  [...] attorney Kadish’s action in submitting a certification in which he proffered testimony from one of his clients ([...]) that contradicted the sworn deposition testimony of his other client in the same litigation ([...]) is a stark demonstration of the concurrent conflict of interest posed by [...]’s joint representation of the [...] and [...].  Id. 4.
[brief] ” (quoting State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 444, 621 A.2d 17 (1993)).  However, in certain extremely limited circumstances, the Courts have held that a surprise material change in a witness’ testimony from prior evidence in discovery may warrant a new trial pursuant to R. 4:50-1(c) if it results in significant prejudice to a party’s ability to present their case.  The seminal case on this question is McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 359 (2001).
[brief] [...] & [...]  EJK REALTY LLC, A NEW JERSEY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND EDWARD KLOSS, JR., Plaintiffs-Appellants, -vs- [...]  AND [...], Defendants-Respondents, -vs- [...], [...], AND [...], Third-Party Defendants.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS, EJK REALTY LLC & EDWARD KLOSS JR.
[directive] the Police, the with State consultation Criminal in Justice, of Division the Accordingly, of Association Chiefs of Jersey New the and Jersey, New of Association Prosecutors County electronic an as appropriate supplement or update periodically and develop shall Police, information to capture be could used that form Report Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary offenses, drug violence offenses, domestic (e.g., offenses common of range a to pertaining Enforcement Preliminary Law The etc.). offenses, sex robberies, burglaries/thefts, assaults, (e.g., discoverable not that information is recorded that so designed be should Report Incident incorporated to appended and material from segregated be easily can information) contact victim material provided other be to any required or Cause, Probable of Affidavit an in reference by discovery the (explaining State's :4-2(c)(1)(b) 3 R. Cf. obligations. discovery State's the under 59 Page pre- (general that R. rule pretrial 3:13-3(a) detention); for moves prosecutor the when obligations apre-indictment prosecutor when makes only the triggered obligation is discovery indictment plea offer). be can so be designed should it that Report Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary The the feasible, extent the minimal To greatest effort. with and quickly officers police by completed in that, quickly an allow officer to to indicate boxes "check-offl' feature should form electronic commonly-occurring certain the of existence believe to reason officer has the case, particular this check- by documented facts/circumstances the illustration, of way By circumstances. facts and to: limited be not need but include, might offboxes Domestic ❑ the so, whether if and violence, domestic involves offense the whether query that whether 4.2.3), subsection and (see checked was Registry Central Violence or episodes violence concerning past domestic information relevant any reveals orders; restraining Assault ❑ if whether Sexual crime, the so, sexual and a involves offense whether the whether that 4.2.4), subsection and checked (see registry was central Act Survivor decision; pretrial release the to relevant information any query reveals observed ❑ offense conduct; the personally officer enforcement law a whether eyewitnesses; ❑ by made observations/statements on based was arrest whether the such whether ❑ statement, and a given has eyewitness and/or victim a whether recording, (specifying of type the electronically recorded or writing in was statement room camera, interview etc.
[brief] It is proper for the default rate to be the rate at which interest continues to accrue, given that the delays in conducting and finalizing the Sheriff sale have come about through Defendants’ actions, as noted by the Order.  Pa39.  This is all the more so given that the contract rate through redemption is that to which the Arbitrator has found Plaintiff to be entitled.  If Defendants had paid the redemption amount instead of failing to do so after promising that to the court below and to Plaintiff, this appeal would not be pending.  C.  Defendants Abandoned Any Challenge to the Default Rate as the Post-Judgment Rate.
[directive] DISPOSITION: Conditions of Probation / JISP  Deferred disposition for a period of Juvenile to attend and complete months.  Compliance with the conditions of the order will result in and aftercare assuming matter being dismissed on Juvenile to follow all recommendations of court ordered conditions are met.  evaluation(s)  Juvenile and on probation for Attend school with no unexcused absences or tardiness  Juvenile must comply with all standard conditions of or suspension probation.  Complete community service of Probation terminated  Restitution $ Juvenile placed on JISP for DNA sample and payment required  JISP terminated  Finger printing required Collection ONLY.  No supervision required.  Obtain GED/high school diploma  Supervision transferred to Find/maintain employment  The Court hereby retains jurisdiction over said juvenile Cooperate with: DCP&P, DCF, CMO □ N.J.S.A. pursuant to 2A:4A-45.
[brief] As noted in the Board Planner’s report, the property is currently zoned Rural Development—Commercial, which could allow even more intensive uses at the Property, such as retail sales and services.  The property already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the property.  Moreover, the surrounding parcels and those across from the property contain a mix of residential and commercial uses, as well as undeveloped land.  The parcel immediately to the south of the property contains an advertising billboard.  These existing conditions were taken into account when the zoning plan and zoning ordinance were adopted.
[brief] The Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act ("AICRA"), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35, delegates to the Commissioner the responsibilities to promulgate rules and regulations regarding such dispute resolution and to designate an organization to administer the proceedings.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.l(b); see also N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.2 ("The commissioner may promulgate any rules and regulations . . . deemed necessary in order to effectuate the provisions of this amendatory and supplementary act").  The Commissioner of the Department designates the organization that administers the dispute resolution proceedings regarding medical expense benefits under PIP coverage.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.l(b).  Thus, it is in a unique position to provide this court with context on how PIP arbitrations operate.  In short, this case bears directly on the functions of the Department and the [...] in protecting the public from insurance fraud.
[directive] Abstract Cash Receipts Abstract Cash Disbursements I  ProDertv I I I I I i I  Trace Amount of "Distribution of Forfeited Funds"  I l l on Quarterly Reports (Part 9) internal records to I  List Expenditures paid in the Asset Maintenance Account and trace to Quarterly Reports (Part II 8)  Determine if Asset Maintenance Expenditures are Proper - Prepare Trial Balance -- Select Law Enforcement Agencies Receiving and 'P Expending Forfeited Funds
[brief] Rather, Appellants take the position, without any case citation, that the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable “legal standard . . . need not be reached at all” if the substantive standards of the LRHL “are not first satisfied. ” (Pb at 13-14.)  This is not correct.  Even if the Governing Body did not satisfy the LRHL standards, which is did in this case, Appellants still would need to meet the arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable standard to void the Ordinance.
[brief] Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Township Comm. Of Twp. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); State v. Stott, 335 N.J. Super. 611, 620-21 (App. Div. 2000), rev’d o.g., 171 N.J. 343 (2002); State v. Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. 286, 295 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148 (2004).  “Whether the facts found by the trial court are sufficient to satisfy the applicable legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review on appeal. ”
[brief] “[W]hen the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. ”  Id.  B.  THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL BECAUSE HE DOES NOT EXPLAIN HOW THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING [...] OR ERRED IN ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (NOT RAISED BELOW).
[directive] < G g.  Any person with a property interest in the seized property, other than a defendant who is being prosecuted in connection with the seizure of property may secure its release pending the forfeiture action unless the article is dangerous to the public health, safety and welfare or the State can demonstrate that the property will probably be lost or destroyed if released or employed in subsequent criminal activity.  Any person with such a property interest other than a defendant who is being prosecuted, prior to the release of said property shall post a bond with the court in the amount of the market value of the seized item.
[brief] --- 6 P. 20, DA161:  We do not address defendant’s remaining arguments as they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. ” record such as to offend the court’s basic obligation toward justice and equity.  Had a hearing been held to resolve disputed “facts,” the issue could have been resolved years ago.  Thus, in this manner Appellant’s arguments have been prejudiced by judicial abdication of its obligation to resolve disputed facts of the case and act as finder of fact.  In this manner, Appellant’s right to due process has been denied.
[brief] Id.; Brown, supra, at 291; Carroll, supra, at 388.  Negligence is never presumed, and the mere occurrence of an accident causing injuries is not alone sufficient to justify an inference of negligence.  Rivera, supra, at 449; Hansbury, supra, at 506; Crisciotti, supra, at 28.  The Appellant is unable to establish the Respondent’s notice of the alleged hazardous condition.  Summary judgment is warranted in this case.  II.  THE APPELLANT’S CONTENTION THAT SHE HAS NO OBLIGATION TO PROVE NOTICE IS ERRONEOUS.  The Appellant argues that she had no obligation to prove notice.
[brief] Dougherty, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 374.  Merely because Defendant reserved the ability to change a program does not allow for free reign to do so, nor does it provide that the rationale to do so is being appropriate or outside of judicial intervention.  The Mittra Court explicitly recognized that Court’s may intervene when universities like Defendant deviate from its own rules and regulations.  Mittra, supra, 316 N.J. Super. at 92.  The Plaintiff was not furnished with the educational opportunity which led him to apply to [...], pay a seating deposit, enroll at the school, and pay tuition, and therefore, the Defendant failed to provide what it promised.  Accordingly, Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiff.
[brief] “I don't believe that the [...] was dealing in bad faith or defrauding [...] or somehow entered into this massive reconstruction project, which is extremely beneficial to the [...] and its citizens and the public, where they duped them into this and we're never going to build this. ”  5T:26:12-18.  The terms of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement accurately reflect the terms agreed upon by the Authority, the City and [...].  The negotiation and execution of a series of agreements that one party now seeks to avoid does not support any charge of fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of the Authority.  [...] has asserted in past filings that the Authority acted “unconscionably” but those allegations are wholly unsupported in the record.  The trial court’s opinion that “anything otherwise [short of reformation] would be unconscionable” is equally unsupported, in both law and fact.
[brief] *5  On July 19, [...] served a second supplemental response to RFP. No. 7 that stated:  Defendant renews its prior objections to this Request:  That the Request is overly broad, not properly limited in time and scope, and is not relevant and/or proportional to the needs of the case.  Subject to and without waiving these objections, excluding documents concerning company-wide furloughs in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, sales and/or employee bonus information not related to Plaintiff, reporting information regarding job openings not related to Plaintiff’s position, payroll documents detailing company-wide salaries, documents relating to other employees and customers not in Kansas, and documents withheld by the attorney-client privilege, Defendant identifies G00000I-G010495 as responsive to this request.  (ECF 57, 63-1, at 3.)  [...] produced the identified batch of documents to [...] that same day.
[brief] In fact, in response to defense counsel’s attempt to argue that the report was used by the officer during trial to refresh his recollection, [...] stated:  Here’s the problem.  I am a sponge and I am happy to see anything that the Municipal Court Judge saw...However, it’s not introduced in evidence.  It’s not part of the record.  Now here this supports your position.  Okay, I don’t know why it was not introduced into evidence.  It’s not, and I can’t consider it. ” (3T:12-5 to 20).  As the record is clear that [...] did not ask for the report and [...]’s own words during oral argument stating that he would not consider the report, defendant’s assertion that the court violated his Confrontation rights is without any merit.  More importantly, there is no mention or reference to said report in [...]’s written opinion and no evidence that anything outside of the record was considered.  (Da 15-23).
[brief] State v. Basit, 378 N.J. Super. 125, 131-34 (App. Div. 2005) (collecting cases).  One obvious danger of such ex parte communications is that “[u]nexpected questions or comments can generate unintended and misleading impressions of the judge’s subjective personal views which have no place in his instructions to the jury -- all the more so when counsel are not present to challenge the statements. ”
[brief] Without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that there was probable cause, the first two out of three elements of the refusal statute under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a were not met.  I ask and beg the Honorable appellant judges to please review the dash cam and body cam footages, that I provided to the case manager, of the arresting officer “[...]”, and the bodycam of officer “[...]”, which is a better view of the SFST and my allegations on the officer lying in the police report and in court.  Please take a second opinion of my performance during the SFST to determine if there was probable cause to arrest; On whether my demeanor and physical signs show a man who is intoxicated; On my driving to determine reasonable suspicion.  I am fortunate enough that everything from start to finish is on video.  Please just take a look.  It is much simpler that reading this brief and all the transcripts.  For the above summarized reasons and detailed arguments below, I ask from the Honorable appellant judges, that the judgment of conviction for refusal should therefore be reversed and dismissed since there was no probable cause ultimately making the arrest unlawful in violation of my fourth amendment rights.  Also, for the above summarized reasons and detailed arguments below, the fruits of my arrest and refusal evidence derived from an unlawful arrest should have been suppressed and should be suppressed in accordance with the "fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine."
[brief] (Ca172).  The Commission also stated that Respondent never encouraged anyone else to defy EO 251 (Ca172), though there was abundant evidence in the record showing Respondent did precisely that, including witness certification and Respondent’s own written words.  (Ca137-138 – Requests for Admission [RQA] 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, Ca144-145 – Responses to RQA 11, 12, 14, 15, 16); (Ca200-201, Ca204, Ca222-223, Ca226, Ca228).  In Dismissing Count 5 of the Complaint, the Commission stated that it had no jurisdiction over a transparently racist Facebook post made by Respondent, because it was initially posted after Respondent was elected to her seat on the Board, but before she was formally seated.  (Ca172).  This directly contradicted a prior Advisory Opinion issued by the Commission.  (Ca194).  The parties were not allowed a chance to be heard on this jurisdictional issue.  On August 1, 2022, Appellants filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Decision with the [...].
[brief] Defendants have never denied – nor do they now deny - the existence of such contamination.  If the purpose of Plaintiff’s extensive “explanation” is to suggest that the RIR is flawed, and not acceptable to the DEP, Plaintiff presented no such proof to support this contention.  Indeed, at the start of trial Plaintiff had a representative of the DEP on the witness list, but any such alleged planned testimony was abandoned.  They did not produce any DEP personnel to support the conclusion they now beg this Court to accept.  The RIR was completed and accepted by the NJDEP.  6T126-16 to 22.  As a result, the sufficiency or insufficiency of RIR is irrelevant to this appeal.
[brief] After the court dismissed the complaint on August 27, 2019 because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction as the Pre-Action Notice was not served before filing the complaint, the plaintiff filed for reconsideration that was denied by an October 2, 2019 Order.  5a.  The Rider to that Order makes clear that the complaint was dismissed and would not be reinstated because the plaintiff never served the defendant with the R. 1:20A-6 notice before filing the complaint.  Id.  Over two and a half years later, on March 21, 2022 the plaintiff filed another motion to reinstate the dismissed complaint.
[brief] The east side of the [...] became unusable for store entrances, because that would require customers to climb stairs or a ramp from parking spaces which were originally designed to be flush with the floor of the [...] but were now 2.5 feet lower than the building floor.  Besides which, a ramp, as required by the ADA would be so long as to be impracticable.  Because the town would not issue certificates of occupancy until the redesign and reapproval of the entire project had been fully completed, plaintiff lost a year of rents from store owners who already had signed leases at fixed rental amounts but could not take possession and open their stores.  A significant additional element of damage obviously flowing from the grading error was the unnecessary removal and disposal of thousands of square feet of top soil, which had already been performed by an excavator and paid for before the error was caught.  No one is suggesting that the soil could have been replaced, but the cost of its removal should be reimbursed to plaintiff by defendant to make plaintiff whole, which the Court below found to be the proper measure of damages.  Even the much-discussed losses stemming from use of the [...] were incorrectly minimized by the Court below.
[brief] Plaintiff also has common law claims which he has not yet included in the proposed amended complaints as a result of the failure of the [...] or the Insurance agent's failure to reply to the timely filed Notice of Tort Claim (Pa 25-26).  The Chancery Division Judge and [...] failed to address the fact that 1) the [...] had no authority to refuse the January and February 2023 request for adjournment; 2) the [...] had no authority to refuse the March 2023 request for adjournment; and 3) the plaintiff requested adjournments in February 2023, before filing his March 1, 2023, third request (Pa 22-24) made in writing, addressed to the defendants.  These facts were asserted in the moving papers attached to the original Complaint (Pa 27-29).  "In matters of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo."  Verry v. Franklin Fire Dist. No. 1, 230 N.J. 285, 294 (2017) (citing Saccone v. Bd. of Trs. of Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014)).