ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 292, 308 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 24 (2004)).  Trial courts thus have “wide latitude in resolving attorney-fee applications,” ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and an appellate court must not disturb a fee award except on “the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion,” Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001).
[brief] [...] (Borough Planner): That is correct.  [...] (Board Attorney):  All right, so mark that B, Mr. Chairman, B for Board, B-1 and then B-2, Stan, you referenced a second amended redevelopment plan?  [...] (Borough Planner): Yeah, and it’s referenced, the actual title is Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, Block 184, Lots 1, 3.02, and 3.03, and a portion of Lot 3.01, [...], Monmouth County, and it is dated (I) believe January 29th.  [...] (Board Attorney): Of which year?  [...] (Borough Planner): Of 2021.  [...] (Board Attorney): 2021 and -- [...] (Borough Planner): Thank goodness we’re past 2020.  [...] (Board Attorney): Yes.  And it’s prepared by?  [...] (Borough Planner): It’s prepared by [...] on behalf of the [...] and it’s signed by me.  [...] (Board Attorney): All right.  [...] (Borough Planner): [...], PP AICP.  [...] (Board Attorney):  We’ll mark that as B-2 and just for the record, give me one more time, it was called the Beachway Avenue?  [...] (Borough Planner):  I’m sorry, it’s called the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan and it essentially is a replacement and, for the existing redevelopment plan.
[brief] This court explained:  Over forty-five years ago, [...], joined by [...] and [...], stated:  On this appeal, however, plaintiff's principal contention is that the parties did not intend to be bound at all unless a formal contract were drawn and executed; and since that contingency never eventuated plaintiff was free at any time and for any reason to terminate the negotiations and have her deposit back....  However, parties may orally, by informal memorandum, or by both agree upon all the essential terms of a contract and effectively bind themselves thereon, if that is their intention, even though they contemplate the execution later of a formal document to memorialize their undertaking.  ***  This statement of the law remains valid today.  \textit{McBarron v. Kipling Woods}, 365 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2004)(citations omitted).
[brief] THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS DENIED MR. RHYMES A FAIR TRIAL.  “Even if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial. ”  State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018) (citing State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008).  Each of the errors in Points I and II are sufficient to independently require reversal.  If, however, this Court disagrees, defendant submits that the cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal.  The jury was not properly instructed on how to evaluate [...]’s defense where the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury on accomplice liability and on second-degree robbery as a lesser-included offense.  These instructional errors were particularly harmful coupled with the court’s erroneous admission of [...]’s remote prior convictions, which resulted in his decision not to testify and prevented the jury from hearing his account of the incident.  Had [...] testified, the testimony would have likely strengthened his defense.  This is especially true where the jury’s assessment of [...]’s culpability hinged in large part on what he said during the incident, which was contested at trial.  If [...] had testified and if the jury had been given the proper instructions to evaluate his defense, the jury could have acquitted him.  Therefore, the cumulative impact of these errors deprived [...] of due process and a fair trial.  Accordingly, [...]’s convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10.  POINT IV
[brief] Second, defendant argues the trial court improperly rejected his request to find mitigating factor eleven at sentencing.  (Db47; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11)).  Defendant asserts that the letters from his cousin and fiancé establish his role as a provider and mentor to his two dependent children, that his presentence report (“PSR”) indicates that he financially supports his children, that a letter from his nineteen-year-old son demonstrates their close relationship, and that his completion of multiple institutional courses demonstrates his commitment to his family.  (Db47 to 48).  Mitigating factor eleven applies to matters in which a defendant’s imprisonment would entail “excessive hardship to the defendant or [his] dependents. ” (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11).  A trial court cannot apply mitigating factor eleven solely because a defendant has children.  (State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 505 (2005)).  Instead, a defendant must demonstrate that his children are dependents who will suffer “excessive hardship” due to adverse circumstances “different in nature than the suffering unfortunately inflicted upon all young children whose parents are incarcerated. ” (State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 129 (App. Div. 2018)).  The trial court correctly determined that defendant did not establish his imprisonment would cause excessive hardship “different in nature” from that implicitly inflicted on the young children of incarcerated parents.
[brief] As my former attorney, Ms. [...], repeatedly stated in oral argument before the Court, this case has a history wherein “no one did the analysis” (2T11, 8-10) at the trial court level, and Probation account errors started “day one” of this case, i.e., Oct. 1, 1998, and were compounded by subsequent errors for 23 years, leading to an egregiously inaccurate support account record and erroneous Probation account audits – which remain to this day.
[brief] Ibid.  Even a suspicious or questionable affidavit supporting a PCR petition "must be tested for credibility and cannot be summarily rejected."  State v. Allen, 398 N.J. Super. 247, 258 (App. Div. 2008).  Porter, supra, at 354-55.  In the case at bar, the defendant raised claims supported by certifications that his trial counsel deprived him of effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The defendant supported his claims of trial counsel’s deficiencies by certifications from himself, Private Investigator [...] (Da 132 to 133), Forensic Expert [...] (Aa 21 to 23), and [...] (Aa 24 to 26).  However, the PCR court denied the PCR petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing contrary to State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 243 (2013).
[brief] The company operates the 16-inch line at reduced pressures, but that, too, is safe and reliable.  [[...]]  Q.  What is the actual pressure at which you are operating, the inlet line pressure?  You said it was a lower pressure.  What is it, please?  [[...]]  A.  It varies between – you know, winter pressures can be 450 pounds at max.  Q.  Anything during other seasons, any different?  A.  Yeah.  Depending on the season - obviously, during the summers we have a lower pressure setting for the regulator stations that feed that station, so it may be 25 pound slower (sic) or so, maybe around 400 or below.  During our non-peak periods, low gas usage.  Q.  And is there any safety concern about the temporary regulator being able to handle those kinds of pressures?  A.  Not the temporary regulator, no.  [1T151:3-19.  (emphasis added)]  To sum up thus far, then, based entirely on the company's own evidence on cross-examination, the current regulator is safe and efficient, and can safely handle all current load and all anticipated load in [...]'s normal planning horizons and by inference well beyond.
[brief] Appellant’s predecessor in interest, through its mortgage servicer-agent, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) received a wire transfer representing a purported payoff of the Mortgage in the amount of $177,887.35 (hereinafter the “First Wire Transfer”).  After [...] (hereinafter the “Mortgaged Premises”) was sold, Respondent\(^1\) recorded its own mortgage to secure its loan to the buyer of the Mortgaged Premises.  Rather than applying the funds to the loan balance, as required by terms of the Mortgage and applicable statutory law, after holding the funds for a period of fourteen (14) calendar days, [...] inexplicably initiated a second wire transfer and sent an amount equal to the First Wire Transfer to a non-party [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) which served as the escrow company for the settlement/title agent for the subject transaction, [...] (hereinafter the “Title Company”).  [...] absconded with the funds and is now a defunct entity.  Refusing to take any responsibility for its own actions, Appellant proceeded with this foreclosure action.  Respondent filed a contesting answer and counterclaim seeking discharge of the Mortgage as a result of Appellant receiving the First Wire Transfer.  Respondent moved for Summary Judgment and Appellant cross-moved for Summary Judgment.  The Trial Judge entered an Order granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and discharging the Mortgage in Respondent’s favor and denied Appellant’s cross-motion.  ---  \(^1\)  Respondent is the successor to the lender who funded the First Wire Transfer during a closing of the Mortgaged Premises.  Ultimately, the Trial Court found Appellant’s predecessor and servicer breached the terms of the Note and Mortgage and violated the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter “UCC”), by failing and refusing to apply the funds to the balance due on the loan.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  August 6, 2021  Order Granting [...]’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment  ..................................................................................................................P1a November 19, 2021  Order Granting [...]’s Motion for Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees  .................................................................................................P18a  February 4, 2022  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration of the August 6, 2021  Summary Judgment Order and November 19, 2021  Sanctions Order ..............................................................................................................P35a  TRIAL COURT OPINIONS
[brief] In a matter decided initially by the New Jersey Department of Labor, the Commissioner interpreted the language of the PWCRA and held (consistent with the referenced definitions) that the term “subcontractor” is derived from contractual relationship rather than classification of work.  *New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development v. [...], d/b/a [...], [...] and [...]*, 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826 (N.J. DOL May 6, 2010).  Given the language of the statute and its stated purpose, the DOL Commissioner held that licensed professionals (like archaeologists) are subcontractors as contemplated by the statute and are, therefore, required to be registered when working on a public project.
[brief] Because the appeal implicates a series of involuntary dismissal Orders, the appropriate appellate review is non-deferential, de novo review.  Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 397, 139 A.3d 1 (2016).  As required by case law, the Panel should consider the merits of each issue presented the case with no deference paid to the motion judge Orders and analyses.
[brief] Thereafter, on October 19, 2023 Respondent filed a motion to pay counsel fees, enhanced interest, and legal expenses based upon the non-acceptance of the previously filed offer of judgment.  (Da47-Da48).  The court placed its decision on both motions on the record.  (T5).  Thereafter, Appellant’s counsel filed a partial opposition to the motion.  Respondent sought attorney’s fees at the rate of $650 per hour and Appellant argued that a more reasonable hourly rate for Plaintiff’s counsel in the geographic area was $250-$350 per hour.  On October 24, 2023, Appellant filed a motion for a new trial ostensibly on the issues raised in this appeal.  Respondent filed opposition to the motion for a new trial on October 25, 2023 and Appellant filed a Reply Brief on or about October 8, 2023.
[directive] Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date  Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor  Jeśli osoba pozwana jest kobietą i kwalifikuje się do odbycia terapii dla przestępców *UWAGA: seksualnych, nie zostanie ona osadzona w Centrum Diagnostyki i Leczenia Dorosłych, lecz w innej placówce wyznaczonej przez Komisarza Służby Więziennej, gdzie odbędzie podobną terapię dla przestępców seksualnych.
[brief] (4T12-5 to 7; 4T13-6 to 9).  --- 2  On direct, [...] said defendant said he was hit with “a fist. ” (4T12-1 to 2).  On cross-examination, defense counsel asked, “now, he told you he was hit with fists,” to which she answered, “correct.” (4T21-9 to 10).  [...] went to the hospital and heard the hospital staff talking with defendant.
[brief] H.  The Court Grants [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint  On August 1, 2023, [...] filed a motion, seeking to dismiss the Complaint based upon the contents of the Consent Order.  (Pa37).  On August 29, 2023, [...] opposed [...]’s motion.  (Pa145 – Pa146).  On September 29, 2023, after hearing oral argument, the Trial Court granted [...]’s motion and dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa1 – Pa2).  In its written decision, the Trial Court relied upon three bases to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  First, the Trial Court found that the Consent Order, on its face, barred [...] from re-filing claims after the 60-day deadline.  (Pa8).  Second, the Trial Court found that the doctrine of res judicata precludes [...] from filing the instant action, finding that the Prior Litigation “was adjudicated on the merits once the final award was rendered in the [...]. ” (Pa8).  Third, the Trial Court found – sua sponte, as no party raised the argument in connection with [...]’s motion – that the Entire Controversy Doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ Complaint because the Prior Litigation “has been adjudicated on the merits. ” (See Pa10 – Pa13).  Based upon the facts set forth herein and established New Jersey law, each predicate relied upon by the Trial Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint is without merit.  Instead, there can be no question that [...] is entitled to proceed with the claims asserted in his Complaint.  Accordingly, the Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court below, and permit [...] to prosecute his claims against [...].
[directive] [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 거주지에 관하여  허위 정보를 제공하거나 귀하의  주소를 확인해 주지 2.  b)  않는 경우, 귀하는 제3 급 범죄로 기소되어 년 이하의 구금형(해당 범죄가 5  년7 월1 일 이후에 저질러진 경우)을 선고 받을 수 있거나, 또는 제4 급 2014 범죄로 기소되어 개월 이하의 구금형(만약 범죄가 년3 월7 일 이후에 18 2007 저질러진 경우)을 선고 받을 수 있다는 것을 아십니까? Do you understand that if you provide false information concerning your residence or fail to verify your address you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment up (if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014) to 5 years or a fourth degree crime and (if the offense was committed on or after receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months March 7, 2007)?
[brief] 97 N.J. 313 (1984).  The Court explained that although the agency “has statutory discretion” to determine the proper tax allocation method, it does not mean that “the manner in which this discretion is exercised is not governed by the standards that determine whether rule-making or adjudication must be followed in a given case. ”  Id. at 333.  Also instructive is *Airwork Service Division v. Director, Division of Taxation*, decided on the same day as *Metromedia*.  97 N.J. 290 (1984).
[brief] Nester v. O’Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App.Div.1997) (quoting Kaufman v. Provident Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 828 F.Supp. 275, 282 (D.N.J.1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir.1993)).  “An ambiguity in a contract exists if the terms of the contract are susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations.[.]  To determine the meaning of the terms of an agreement by the objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, the terms of the contract must be given their ‘plain and ordinary meaning. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Kaufman, supra, 828 F.Supp. at 283).  The court should examine the document as a whole and “should not torture the language of [a contract] to create ambiguity. ”  Ibid. (quoting Stiefel v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 242 N.J.Super. 643, 651 (App.Div.1990)).  There is no ambiguity here.
[brief] ”  Smith v. State Dept. of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 215 (App. Div. 2007).  [...] released her discrimination claims and, in exchange, the settlement agreement provided $100,000 ($96,250 after attorney fees) from the [...] and the [...] to her and an increased annual pension benefit improperly inflated by $26,201.64.  (Pa10); N.J.S.A. 18A-66-2(f)(1).  This attempted to transfer a large portion of the settlement cost to the pension system ([...]), a non-party to the employment litigation.
[brief] In that remand hearing, both the form and substance of the notice may be examined.  (pp. 19-23)  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270.  (Emphasis added).  In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa71.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb16.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, the Division admits that it did not notify the members of the retirement system within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  This further establishes good cause to relax the timeframe.
[brief] The first rule of statutory interpretation is that when the statute is clear on its face, it is applied as written:  “Our task in statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent.  See D'Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119 (2007); Daidone v. Buterick Bulkheading, 191 N.J. 557, 565 (2007).  As we have explained, in carrying out this important role, ‘we look first to the plain language of the statute, seeking further guidance only to the extent that the Legislature's intent cannot be derived from the words that it has chosen. ’  Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 96 N.J. 251, 264 (2008).  We will, in this effort, read the words selected by the Legislature in accordance with their ordinary meaning, D'Annunzio, supra, 192 N.J. at 119–20, unless the Legislature has used technical terms, or terms of art, which are construed ‘in accordance with those meanings,’  In re Lead Paint Litig., 191 N.J. 405, 430, 924 A.2d 484 (2007).  See N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (declaring that ‘words ... having a special or accepted meaning in the law, shall be construed in accordance with such ... meaning. ’).  Nor will we ‘rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature ... [or] presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language. ’  O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488, 795 A.2d 857 (2002).  [Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009)].  A court should not "resort to extrinsic interpretative aids" when "the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation .  . ."  Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).  On the other hand, if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, "including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction."  Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).  We may also resort to extrinsic evidence if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language.  See Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93 (2001).  B.
[brief] If you had asked the other individuals or if they could have contradicted what juror 14 said about what she told them about [...], right?  A  Yes.  Q  Are you aware whether or not the issue was raised on appeal on the defendant’s direct appeal?  A  I feel like it may have, but I’m not certain.  Okay.  A  I know that we did have a resentencing, but I don’t -- that wasn’t -- I don’t think that was the issue, so obviously not the issue, so I don’t – I don’t know 100 percent.  1T33
[brief] T10:17-20.  [...] further recognized her obligation to balance Defendants’ right to choose their counsel with the goal of “maintaining the highest standards of the profession”.  See T10:4-8 (citing Van Horn v. Van Horn, 415 N.J. Super. 398 (App. Div. 2010), which, at 415-416, quotes Dewey, 109 N.J. at 218, 220); see also T39:20-23 (recognizing that the ethical rules “exist to protect the actual clients, the attorney and the integrity of the litigation itself as well as the greater judicial system and the legal profession”).  While acknowledging that “doubts are to [be] resolved in favor of disqualification”, [...] recognized that disqualification should be employed only “when absolutely necessary”.  T10:17-11:7 (citing Rohm and Haas).  Accordingly, [...] appreciated and applied the correct standards when she recognized that Defendants’ glaring concurrent conflict of interest satisfied the heightened threshold required for disqualification.