ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (3T51:14-52:4; 3T60:25-61:24).  At the last meeting Defendant had with Plaintiff that June, Plaintiff took all the documents into his possession, including all of the credit card statements, all of the papers from the accountant, and the comments and notes they made on the papers; he took everything.  (3T60:19-24; 3T143:6-12).  After the sale of the pharmacy to [...], in June 2019, Plaintiff wrote $25,000 to himself from the pharmacy’s account and sent a screenshot of the withdraw to Defendant saying he was buying a house.  (3T57:24-3).  On or about November 2019, Plaintiff paid off, without asking Defendant, the balance of a car loan from the pharmacy’s account—a loan he was a co-signer on—in order to improve his own credit score.  (3T65:3-67:3).  Plaintiff did not inform Defendant that he was paying the loan off from the pharmacy account, but rather texted Defendant that he paid off the car loan.  (2T76:1-11).  This concerned Defendant because there were still debts of the pharmacy to be paid and she wanted to make sure there was money in the account to cover them.  (3T66:2-16).  Plaintiff formed a company in the United States called the [...] in April 2016 (2T83:18-24), after he says he partnered with Defendant.
[brief] It is to be noted that building coverage is proposed at 65.1%, more than 50% greater than the 40% maximum permitted in the District.  The prior iteration of the plan proposed building coverage at 67.8%.  This contrast demonstrates that the current design, like the previous proposal, is simply too large for the property.  The reduction in building coverage from 67.8% to 65% is not significant …  Had the building been reduced in size would have resulted in a corresponding reduction to the extent of the variance relief pertaining to both the FAR and building coverage.
[brief] Order Brought by [...] (Attached at Pa256)  Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) with “NOTICE PER PROSECUTOR” written (Attached at Pa266)  Letter dated 9/29/20 from [...] To All parties regarding 10/14/20 Hearing (Attached at Pa269)
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................  3  STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT – POINT I THE [...]  IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT [...] IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY PENSION  BECAUSE THE INCIDENT CAUSING HIS DISABILITY WAS UNDESIGNED AND UNEXPECTED(Aa1-Aa3) (1T)(1T).  .........................................................  5 CONCLUSION ..................................................  11  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## CASES CITED - **Brady v. Bd of Review**, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) ("Charatm v. Board of Review", 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985))...  4 - **Brooks v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.**, 425 N.J. Super. 277 (2012)... 1, 8 - **Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys.**, 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013) (Citing Hemsey v. Bd of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223-24 2009)... 4, 8 - **Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv.**, 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)... 4 - **City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council**, 82 N.J. 530, 539 cert. denied, 49 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980)... 3 - **H.K. v. Department of Human Services**, 184 N.J. 367, 386 (2005)... 4 - **In re Musick**, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996)... 4 - **Klumb v. Bd of Educ. Of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg’l High Sch. Dist.**, 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009)... 5 - **Mayflower Cec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.**, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)... 4 - **Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System**, 438 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2014)...
[brief] From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, ATLANTIC COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon.  [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  Date Submitted: December 13, 2023  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] (201)  928-1100  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, New Jersey Turnpike  Authority Of Counsel: [...], Esq. (Attorney I.D. 015552002)
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page Order And Final Judgment on Partial Summary Judgment of the Honorable [...] granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated June 27, 2024………………………………………………………………………………Da1 Statement of Reasons, dated June 27, 2024…………………………………………………Da4  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  No legal authorities are cited in the brief.
[brief] This is contrasted with other New Jersey statutes where the legislature expressly authorized certain individuals to seek injunctive relief “in the name and on behalf of the state. ”  See e.g. N.J. S.A. 49:5-12(a) (authorizing the Chief of the Bureau of Securities to bring injunction action “in the name and on behalf of the State”); N.J.S.A. 17:10B-5(b) (authorizing the Commissioner of Banking to bring injunction action “in the name and on behalf of the State”).
[brief] [[...]]’ failure to produce financial records is circumstantial evidence of their mental state, as a failure to produce could be interpreted as a means of hiding their conduct from Plaintiffs.  …  (39120a)  In fact, [...] did find the Wilfs liable for RICO predicate acts based in part on her concurrent finding that they deliberately withheld information concerning the partnership’s finances from [...], notwithstanding their known fiduciary duty to disclose without demand.
[brief] (Pa1-Pa4; Ra1-Ra2).  On July 27, 2019, [...] filed an internal grievance with New Jersey State Prison Administration regarding his inability to send back the refried beans to the outside vendor.  (Pa1).  On July 31, 2019, the DOC responded by indicating New Jersey State Prison does not ship food.  Ibid.  On August 1, 2019, [...] appealed, arguing that the response was unfair and disrespectful.  Ibid.  On August 1, 2019, the DOC responded to [...]’s appeal by indicating the initial response was correct and that [...]’s appeal was inappropriate because he simply disagreed with the prison’s prohibition against shipping food.  Ibid.  On August 19, 2019, [...] filed another grievance on this issue, directly addressing the prison Administrator and indicating that a DOC staff member advised him not to appeal.  (Pa2).  In response, on August 20, 2019, the DOC advised [...] that his previous appeal had no legitimate basis because the grievance concerned a prison rule, which the DOC complied with and which [...] simply disagreed.  Ibid.  On August 20, 2019, [...] appealed this response and contended he was never given notice of the prison rule prohibiting the shipment of food.  Ibid.  DOC responded by indicating [...] needed to follow the rules and regulations of the prison, which were stated in his Inmate Handbook.  Ibid.  On or about October 23, 2022, [...] submitted a formal property claim form to the DOC regarding his inability to return his defective food product to the vendor for a refund.
[brief] *Id.* (observing that no judicial bypass is required for laws prohibiting minors from marrying because “[a] minor not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to postpone her decision”).  Furthermore, a right to privacy exists only where the individual has a “reasonable expectation[] of confidentiality. ”  *Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila.*, 812 F.2d 105, 112 (3d Cir. 1987).  Children have no expectation of confidentiality in the fact that their school is socially transitioning them.  Social transitioning is open and notorious; indeed, the transition is a “social” one.  By definition, students have no reasonable expectation of confidentiality in this information.  *Mirabelli*, 2023 WL 5976992, at *10 (“A student who announces the desire to be publicly known in school by a new name, gender, or pronoun and is referred to by teachers and students and others by said new name, gender, or pronoun, can hardly be said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy or expect non-disclosure. ”).  Finally, even if minor children had a federally protected privacy right against their parents to conceal their social transitioning at school (and they do not), it is settled that privacy rights must yield where “the government interest in disclosure outweighs the individual’s privacy interest. ”  *Fraternal Ord. of Police*, 812 F.2d at 110.  Here, due to the importance of parental involvement in the lives of their children, which the United States Supreme Court has recognized for over a century, parents’ constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children outweigh any putative privacy right their children might have.  In sum, children have no federal constitutional right to privacy to keep secret from their parents the fact they are being socially transitioned by their school.
[brief] | DOCUMENT | RECORD CITATION | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Oral Ruling Denying Motion to Reopen Judgment, dated April 4, 2024 | T40:6–45:7 | | Order Denying Motion to Reopen Judgment, dated April 4, 2024 | Da7–8 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Banerjee v. Cont’l Incorporated, Inc.,** | | | 2018 WL 4469006 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2018) | 15 | | **Barry v. State Bar of California,** | | | 386 P.3d 788 (Cal. 2017) | 17 | | **Borough of Sayreville v. 35 Club L.L.C.,** | | | 208 N.J. 491 (2012) | 12 | | **Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. for Wrightstown Arms Apartments v. Harris,**| | | 155 N.J. 212 (1998) | 11 | | **In re Commitment of M.M.,** | | | 384 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2006) | 24 | | **E & J Equities, LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin,** | | | 226 N.J. 549 (2016) | 12 | | **Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass’n, Inc.,** | | | 408 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 2009) | 26 | | **Jacobson v. Clack,** | | | 309 A.3d 571 (D.C. 2024) | 17, 18, 19 | | **Johnson v. Johnson,** | | | 320 N.J. Super. 371 (App. Div. 1999) | 8, 9, 25, 28 | | **Ketchum v. Moses,** | | | 17 P.3d 735 (Cal. 2001) | 15 | | **Khan v. Orbis Bus. Intelligence Ltd.,** | | | 292 A.3d 244 (D.C. 2023) | 14, 17 | | **LVNV Funding, LLC v. Deangelo,** | | | 464 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2020) | 11 | Mancini v. EDS on Behalf of N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 132 N.J. 330 (N.J. 1993)
[brief] (7T81-19 to -24).  Defendant then struck [...] in the chest again, this time with two open palms, which pushed the officer against one of the doors of the restaurant.  (7T81-24 to 82-1).  This is consistent with a surveillance video in evidence, which shows defendant aggressively moving his arms and body at one of the uniformed officers while they are in the entryway of the restaurant.  (Da12 at 14:06:41 to 14:06:43).  The three ended up outside of the restaurant, with defendant being pushed onto the hood of one of the patrol cars before landing on the ground between two marked patrol cars in a busy parking lot of a shopping complex.
[brief] (Pa47; Pa116); see *In re DeAvila-[...]*, id.  In October 2019, [...] filed a citizen’s Complaint in [...] against [...], charging her with official misconduct, obstruction of administration of the law, false reports to law enforcement and fictitious reports to law enforcement concerning an incident involving [...] when she was a Bergen County Superior Court Judge in May 2015, and unrelated to any matter involving [...].
[brief] After hearing the arguments of counsel, [...] denied the motion.  (5T7-3; 9-1 to 9-2; 9-10; 9-24 to 9-25; 10-6; 11-3)  On December 6, 2022, Defendant appeared with counsel who advised [...] that he submitted a motion to suppress.  As a result, Defendant requested and received another adjournment.  (6T3-7 to 3-11)  On August 3, 2023, Defendant moved to dismiss his case for “failure of the State to provide a speedy trial. ”  After [...] denied that motion, a hearing commenced on Defendant’s motion to suppress.  (7T3-21 to 4-24)  At the conclusion of the hearing, [...] denied Defendant’s suppression motion.  (7T74-22 to 74-24)  Defendant then stipulated that the testimony from the suppression hearing would be made part of the trial and successfully moved to dismiss the charge of failure to exhibit documents.  (7T75-1 to 77-13; 77-24 to 78-7)  After it was confirmed the matter would be tried based on the officer’s observations, trial immediately commenced.  (7T78-15 to 79-20)  At the conclusion of trial, [...] reserved judgment.  (7T105-9 to 105-22)  On September 12, 2023, [...] found Defendant guilty of DWI and failure to observe a traffic signal and merged the charge of reckless driving.
[brief] ”  (2T48:11-49:7).  Citing the same reasons previously given in the court’s April 1, 2021, decision denying leave to amend the complaint, the court reiterated again that [...] had still failed to assert a claim upon which relief could be granted and concluded that dismissal was warranted at that time, given [...]’s persistent inability over many years to frame a proper complaint.  (2T50:6-54:4).
[directive] Section II.  See Use of complaint-summonses in lieu of complaint-warrants.  In more serious cases, an • officer may conclude that an informal resolution is unlikely to be effective and that formal charges are necessary.  Under court rules, officers and prosecutors may file charges using one of two charging documents: a “complaint-warrant,” which allows the officer to take custody of the charged individual and detain them, or a “complaint-summons,” which allows the individual to remain in the community until their initial court appearance.  By treating the complaint-summons as the “default” charging document for juveniles—with the complaint-warrant reserved only for the most serious charges or to protect the public— officers and prosecutors can ensure that youthful offenders are not subject to unnecessary detention in a juvenile facility immediately following the filing of charges.
[brief] I.  **THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANTING OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.**  [...] acknowledges that it has a constitutional obligation to provide its fair share of affordable housing and does not dispute that it is in violation of its constitutional obligation for the Third Round by at least 602 units.  Although the Township recognizes that this matter “presents a conflict between three state constitutional interests,” (Db1) [...] addresses its eminent domain and redevelopment powers in a vacuum while blatantly ignoring the Mount Laurel precedent which imposes the constitutional affordable housing obligation on municipalities, and on which Plaintiff’s claim for a builder’s remedy is based.  [...] does not even cite the Mount Laurel Supreme Court decisions in attempting to discredit the trial court’s granting of injunctive relief in favor of Plaintiff, which preserves the Property while the remainder of this public interest litigation is adjudicated.  Importantly, [...] misrepresents that the trial court made “new law” by preserving the Property which serves as the very subject matter of this action.  Contrary to [...]’s characterization, the trial court did not hold that all noncompliant municipalities are prohibited from condemning property which is the subject of a builder’s remedy lawsuit, but instead examined the facts which are specific to this matter.  While recognizing [...]’s general powers of eminent domain and redevelopment, the trial court also properly considered: • [...]’s constitutional noncompliance with the Mount Laurel doctrine; • the significant degree of the Township’s noncompliance (at least 602 units); • [...]’s voluntary dismissal of the DJ Action, pursuant to which the Township knowingly relinquished its immunity from inclusionary zoning lawsuits and lost the right to fully control its zoning for inclusionary housing, including for the Property; • the “special place” Plaintiff now holds in this public interest litigation where Plaintiff stands in the shoes of the protected class of individuals who have been denied a realistic opportunity for affordable housing in [...]; and • the commercial nature of the redevelopment desired by [...] for the Property compared to the inclusionary development which would result from the awarding of a builder’s remedy.
[brief] ”) (quoting Opinion Evidence—Disease or Injury, 66 A.L.R.2d 1082, 1086 (1959)).  [...] also has no basis to opine a 300-micron silicone particulate is capable of causing mechanical traction that can result in a retinal detachment.  On this point, Plaintiff’s experts are at odds.  [...] rejects [...]’s theory: “I don’t think that the silicone particulate would be a cause of the detachment. ” (Da0047, pp. 58-59)  For his contrary opinion, [...] points to nothing—not even the recall document, which never discusses retinal detachment.  This is the epitome of an inadmissible “net opinion. ”  Lanzo, 467 N.J. Super. at 508-11 (holding it an abuse of discretion to admit opinion where expert had no studies supporting general causation, had not published his opinion for peer review, and cited no authorities in support); In re Accutane, 234 N.J. at 396 (finding that absent reliable scientific methodology, expert’s opinion on general causation cannot be admissible).19
[brief] Thus, the Chancery Division was without the effect of jurisdiction to dismiss Plaintiff’s “Complaint as Moot” under R. 4:69-1 and R. 4:3-1(5) (Pa 187-191) and it is also without jurisdiction to make further determinations.  The plaintiffs proposed amended complaint has set forth claims under the NJCRA (Pa 175-176) and the NJLAD at N.J. S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.  Plaintiff brought claims under the NJCRA (Pa 175-176).  The Chancery Division abused its discretion when it failed to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims under the NJCRA (Pa 175-176).
[brief] (7T 31-2 to 13).  [...] also testified about the use of a license plate reader to attempt to gather evidence in this case.  “What our Crime Scene Unit does,” he testified, “is every time they report to a homicide, they take their Crime Scene Unit truck or van and they go around the surrounding streets and the reader collects data from the vehicles that are parked on the streets. ” (7T 38-12 to 18).  This strategy, though, did not lead the homicide investigators to any vehicles that they believed may have been connected with the shooting.
[brief] ”  Lopez, 245 N.J. Super. at 161-62; accord Guerriero v. Palmer, 175 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (Law Div. 1979) (holding “[p]laintiff bears a heavy burden to persuade a court that [the Township of] [...]’s failure to allocate resources to repair dangerous sidewalks was ‘palpably unreasonable. ’  Courts will not be quick to second-guess an exercise of such discretion in this context. ”)  In Williams v. Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1979), the Appellate Division held: “the legislative intention was to allow sufficient latitude for resourceful and imaginative management of public resources while affording relief to those injured because of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical or outrageous decisions of public servants. ”  Id. at 286 (emphasis supplied); accord Jones v. Borough of Bogota, 2008 W.L. 4648455, * 6 (App. Div. Oct. 10, 2008) (also holding that “the duty of care, the breach of which is termed negligence, differs in degree from the duty to refrain from palpably unreasonable conduct.  The latter standard implies a more obvious and manifest breach of duty and imposes a more onerous burden on the plaintiff”).  This is an onerous burden for a plaintiff.  Saldana v. Camden, 252 N.J. Super. 188, 198 (App. Div. 1991) (“Under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3d, the public entity is not liable for the exercise of discretion when, in the face of competing demands, it determines how to utilize resources, unless its determination is palpably unreasonable”).
[brief] Finally, while it is true that there is no statutory mandate that the court impose a consecutive sentence for a certain persons conviction, State v.  Lopez, 417 N.J. Super 34, 37 n.2 (App. Div. 2010), the sentencing court did not suggest there was.  The lower court did not indicate a consecutive sentence was necessary to fulfill the Legislative purpose behind the certain persons statute.  The court only used the purpose of the statute as one consideration in its decision to reimpose a consecutive sentence.  C.  The sentencing court did not rely solely on the justification that there should be no free crimes in order to impose consecutive sentences.  Defendant asserts the sentencing court erred because it ordered consecutive sentences based solely on the rationale that there be “no free crimes.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Jury Instructions ........................................................................................................Da 16-44  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................................................Da 53-56  Sentence .......................................................................................................................  6T 44-14 to 49-24  INDEX TO APPENDIX  PAGE NOS.  Atlantic County Indictment No. [...] .........................................................Da 1-5  Atlantic County Indictment No. [...] .........................................................Da 6-14  Order  Dismissing Counts 3 and 4 ...............................................................................Da  15  Jury Instructions ........................................................................................................Da  16-44  Verdict Sheet ...............................................................................................................Da 45-52  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................................................Da 53-56  Notice of Appeal ..........................................................................................................Da 57-59
[brief] *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993)) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required [...] to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form, nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.  [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until one year and one month past the statutory deadline, which is not a *de minimis* violation.
[brief] ”  Aristocrat Techs. Australia PTY Ltd., 543 F.3d at 663.  The court reasoned that [o]nce a patent has issued, the procedural minutia of prosecution have little relevance to the metes and bounds of the patentee’s right to exclude.  If any prosecution irregularity or procedural lapse, however minor, became grist for a later assertion of invalidity, accused infringers would inundate the courts with arguments relating to every minor transgression they could comb from the file wrapper.  This deluge would only detract focus from the important legal issues to be resolved—primarily, infringement and invalidity.  Id.  “The attorney-client privilege exists where:
[brief] 35 Pop Realty Corp. v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adj., 176 N.J. Super. 441, 448 (Law Div. 1980) ...............................  32 Raleigh Ave. Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., et al., 185 N.J. 40 (2005)  .................................................................  21 Riggs v. Long Beach Tp., 109 N.J. 601, 621 (1988) ...................................................... 34, 46, 47 Riya Finnegan LLC v. Township of Council of South Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184 (2008)  ...............................................................  39  Route 15 Associates v. Jefferson Tp., 187 N.J. Super. 481, 488(App. Div. 1982) ...............................  47 Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174 (1978) ...............................................................  21 Ward v. Scott, 28 N.J. 529, 536 (1959) ...........................................