ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] was also on notice that, under Section 13.1 of the PSA, Plaintiff retained a right of specific performance if [...] proceeded to close on the deal with the Fee Owner.  Having colluded with [...] to keep the closing with the Fee Owner and related details hidden from Plaintiff – particularly after promising to keep Plaintiff apprised of the new date – [...] actively aided and abetted [...] and breached its contractual duties to Plaintiff.  Under New Jersey law, “[l]iability for aiding and abetting "is found in cases where one party 'knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself."  See Shah v. Shroff, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 527, *47-48 (April 2023) (Pa158-176), citing McCormac v. Qwest Comm. Int'l Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 481 (App. Div. 2006); Judson v. Peoples Bank Tr. & Co., 25 N.J. 17, 29 (1957).  “To prove such a claim, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. ’”  See McCormac, 387 N.J. Super. at 484-485 (quoting Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J.  70, 84 (2004)).  Aiding and abetting liability focuses on "whether a defendant knowingly gave substantial assistance to someone engaged in wrongful conduct, not whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct."  Podias v. Mairs, 394 N.J. Super. 338, 353, 926 A.2d 859 (App. Div. 2007).  Determining how much assistance is considered substantial is fact-sensitive.  Shah, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 527 at 48 (emphasis added).  Here, the factual allegations against [...] in the Complaint amply support each of these elements and, thus, adequately stated a claim for breach of contract and aiding and abetting the breach by [...].
[brief] The Legislature declared its findings that “equine animal activities are practiced by a large number of citizens of this State; that equine animal activities attract large numbers of nonresidents to the State; that those activities significantly contribute to [New Jersey’s] economy; and that horse farms are a major land use which preserves open space. ”  N.J.S.A. 5:15-1.  The Legislature further declared that “equine animal activities involve risks that are essentially impractical or impossible for the operator to eliminate; and that those risks must be borne by those who engage in those activities. ”  Ibid.  The Act is therefore construed as expressing “an overall intent to support and protect equine activities because of their importance to our economy and to open space preservation. ”  Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 203 N.J. 184, 196 (2010).  The Act provides that “participant[s]” and “spectator[s]” assume the inherent risks of “equine animal activities” and provides a complete defense from suit brought by a participant against an equine activity “operator. ”  N.J.S.A. 5:15-3, -5.  Despite owning and operating its own New Jersey horse farm, the trial court held that Defendants are not “operators” under the Act because [...] was injured at [...], not [...].  Thus, summary judgment was not granted on the basis that Defendants are immune from liability under the Act.  Defendants did not argue below that they were immune from liability based on the Act, and they do not make any such argument here.  Plaintiff’s novel argument essentially sought to eliminate the element of scienter from the existing common law standard for strict liability by treating stallions as an ultra-hazardous animal, whose potential for viciousness should be presumptively known by every owner.  Defendants argued below, and the trial court agreed, that holding Defendants, and by extension all other owners, strictly liable for an unexpected sudden attack by a stallion with no prior history of aggressive behavior was contrary to the public policy behind the Act.  The trial court correctly observed that the Act would have applied were it not for the fact that Defendants did not “operate” the farm where Mr. [...] was injured.
[brief] **Legal Argument – Point 4 - New Jersey Statute 39:4-92.2 - Procedure for motorist approaching certain stationary vehicle,** 39:4-88 - Traffic on marked lanes - no reasonable suspicion to pull me over 1T:28-(12-16), (Da 1a, Da 2a)  *State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 260 (N.J. 2022)* ("Under the statute's plain language, the tint on defendant's rear windshield could not constitute a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74.  It did not give rise to the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to justify this motor vehicle stop.")  *State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 263 (N.J. 2022)* ("We thus hold that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was unconstitutional because no statutory or regulatory provision forms the basis for a reasonable and articulable suspicion")
[directive] 18.  note  See appeal. or Flag.  Activity Criminal Violent New a Involving 7.4.5  Cases pretrial of seeking presumption the unless Section 7.3, under covered otherwise not cases  In detention pretrial shall for apply prosecutor the subsection 7.4.6, to pursuant overcome detention is flag.  (NVCA)  Activity Criminal Violent New a raises assessment risk pretrial automated the if Detention.  Pretrial Seeking Presumption of the Overcoming 7.4.6 to pursuant detention pretrial seeking of presumption rebuttable a is there where case any  In detention pretrial for motion a prosecutor file shall the 7.4.5, or 7.4.4, 7.4.3, 7.4.2, 7.4.1, subsection the (1) risks that: determines 7.8 Section to pursuant designated prosecutor supervisory a unless monitored conditions release imposing adequately by controlled can be release defendant's by posed for applying by served be not would justice of interests the (2) or program, services pretrial the by pretrial for applying of presumption the overcome to made is determination the If detention. pretrial file. case in decision the that for reasons) document the shall prosecutor supervisory detention, the 63 Page Application. Detention for Pretrial Factual Basis and Legal Specifying 7.5 system. through eCourts electronically the be shall filed detention pretrial for motions
[brief] N.J. Ct. R. 2:10-2 states that “any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court. ”  The plain language of this rule suggests that an error may be reversed upon appeal when the error denied a “fair decision on the merits. ”  C.E. & B. v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist., 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1206, *11, 2023 WL 4571437 (quoting State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 389, 235 A.3d 157 (2020)).  In this case, the trial court committed reversible error by declining to even consider the merits of the Defendant’s argument for unclean hands.  Plaintiff admitted to signing [...]’s name.  He knew that he was not [...].  During Plaintiff’s cross-examination, Plaintiff stated that his signature is “[...]” (5T80-16)  Plaintiff further stated during his cross-examination that the attorney who drafted the deed knew that the Plaintiff was not [...] (5T81-25 – 5T82-1).  The fraud continued to be perpetuated even on a second corrected deed that was filed on January 25, 1999, on behalf of Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff’s hands are clearly unclean, and the trial court committed reversible error by failing to take Plaintiff’s unclean hands into account.
[brief] Pa1409.  With respect to alarms, OSHA regulations states that “(4)  No employer shall use any motor vehicle equipment having an obstructed view to the rear unless: (i) The vehicle has a reverse signal alarm audible above surrounding noise level or; (ii) The vehicle is backed up only when an observer signals that it is safe to do so. ”  Pa321-22; CFR §1926.601(b)(4).  CFR §1926.602(a)(9), reads as follows:  “(9)  Audible alarms:  (i)  All bidirectional machines, such as rollers, compactors, front-end loaders, bulldozers, and similar equipment, shall be equipped with a horn, distinguishable from the surrounding noise level, which shall be operated as needed when the machine is moving in either direction.  The horn has to be maintained in operative condition.  (ii)  No employer shall permit earthmoving or compacting equipment which has an obstructed view to the rear to be used in reverse gear unless the equipment has in operation a reverse signal alarm distinguishable from the surrounding noise level or an employee signals that it is safe to do so.
[brief] Based upon [...]’s perjury, the Sussex County  Despite Bowie’s admitted perjury, the Court below accepted his testimony that he observed a motor vehicle infraction being committed by [...] and to boot that Bowie’s inability to remember where he was located did not matter:  He could not recall whether he was driving down 206 at the time he observed it, or if he was stationary or parked - I'm not sure there's really a difference - in the fire department parking lot facing south.  Facing where the stop sign was.  (1T 40-23 through 41-2)  How can this be?  What more must be done, what else could have been done to demonstrate that all of Bowie’s testimony was incredible?  If the trial Court’s denial of the suppression motion is not reversed, this case will stand for the following proposition:  EVEN IF A TROOPER REPEATEDLY LIES AND ONLY WHEN CONFRONTED WITH HIS LIES CONCEDES THAT HE CANNOT REMEMBER WHERE HE WAS WHEN MAKING THE OBSERVATIONS GIVING RISE TO A MOTOR VEHICLE STOP, IT DOES NOT MATTER, IT DOES NOT MATTER AT ALL.  AFTER ALL, THIS IS A NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPER AND EVEN THOUGH THE TROOPER CANNOT REMEMBER WHERE HE WAS WHEN HE MADE THE ALLEGED OBSERVATIONS, HE WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THE STOP UNLESS HE SAW A MOTOR VEHICLE INFRACTION.
[brief] The Common Law Right of Access Balancing Test  The definition of a public record under the common law is broader than under OPRA.  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 67 (2008).  To constitute a common law public record, an item must “be a written memorial . . . made by a public officer, and . . . the officer [must] be authorized by law to make it. ”  Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222 (1978).  To obtain records under “this broader class of materials ... (1) ‘the person seeking access must establish an interest in the subject matter of the material’; and (2) ‘the [person's] right to access must be balanced against the State's interest in preventing disclosure.
[brief] (76a–77a, 33:24–34:8).  When he handed these documents to [...], [...] did not explain their purpose or significance beyond merely stating that he was there to get his signature to remove his name from the Deed.  (77a, 34:9–35:24).  Nor did [...] offer [...] any other options as a joint owner of the Property.  (Id.; 98a, 121:8–13).  Instead, [...] testified that “he knew why I was there, you know, [...] had said, [t]his is when you got to do it, and you got to get arrangements for it, and that’s when I did it. ”  (77a, 35:18–21).  [...] signed the new Deed on March 4, 2019 for nominal consideration of $1.00.  (266–69a).  [...] withheld recording the Deed.  (264a).  On March 7, 2019, [...] issued a proposed title commitment which set forth the obligations that the proposed insured must satisfy in order to receive a final title policy.  (301a).  The requirements of the commitment that must be fulfilled to obtain the final title policy – i.e., the conditions precedent to a legally enforceable contract for title insurance – were the Plaintiff’s obligation, not [...] as the title agent or settlement agent.  (Id.).  Plaintiff ultimately did not satisfy the conditions precedent, i.e., obtaining title to the property.
[brief] Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446 (1979) ..................................................26, 30, 40, 41 Poblette v. Towne of Historic Smithville Cmty. Ass’n, 355 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2002) .......................24 Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) ..................................................16
[directive] I. in not funds, while "out-of-pocket" of the case itself, generally are costs directly tied an asset seized for forfeiture-  Thus, these to and expenditures are not be included with the asset maintenance to which forfeiture prosecution are deducted prior to be costs to calculation of law enforcement agency's contributive share.  or in or  Payments for information assistance relating to furtherance the of law enforcement investigation are associated with costs a underlying criminal investigation itself, independent of forfeiture a an action.  Nevertheless, because the expended money represents identifiable out-of-pocket expense, the prosecuting agency money represents an identifiable out-of-pocket expense, the prosecuting in agency shall generally reimburse such as fully as possible costs a determining law enforcement agency's contributive share.
[brief] [...], Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 3 Pages H313a through H437a  Holmdel’s Exhibits filed in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] beginning October 13, 2020, as listed in the Appendix to the Decision and Order issued by Hon. [...], A.L.J., May 18, 2022 (SOICR #93):  Holm-1: [...], EMP Direct Testimony (SOICR p. 11)  ........  H313a  Exhibit A: Biography of [...] ......................... H337a Statement: Experience on Impacts of California’s Climate Change Policies ...........................................  H339a Exhibit B, New Jersey Natural Gas System Overview - Holmdel .  H340a Exhibit C, Map of pipelines .............................................  H341a  Holm-2: [...], Real Estate Valuation Direct Testimony, including attachments (SOICR p. 11)..........................  H342a Consultant’s Report to client, March 1, 2020 .......................  H345a  HOLM-2A: Opinion of the Court in Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43 (1995)) has been omitted from this Appendix.  HOLM-2B: Market Study Report, New Jersey Natural Gas Company Regulator Station, [...], prepared by [...], dated September 12, 2018)..................................  H375a  HOLM-2C: Transcript of Meeting of Holmdel Township Zoning Board of Adjustment, dated October 10, 2018) omitted from this Appendix, as it is part of the Zoning Board Transcripts filed separately in this Appellate Division Docket [...].  Holm-3: [...], Direct Testimony (SOICR p. 11)  ........  H402a Exhibit 1, Recreation Needs Assessment, Overall Location Map, for Holmdel .........................................................  H409a Exhibit 2, Recreation Needs Assessment, Inventory ..............  H410a Exhibit 3, Results of ETC 2017 Response to Q14, Facilities That Are Most Important to Households (Holmdel)  ..................  H411a Exhibit 4, Benchmarking for Holmdel Township, Most Important Parks and Recreation Facilities (2017)  ........................................  H412a Holm-4 to -9, Transcripts of Meetings of Holmdel Township Zoning Board of Adjustment ([...]), have been omitted from this Appendix as they were not considered in the Initial Decision of the Hon. [...], A.L.J., nor by the BPU in its Decision and Order which is the subject of this appeal.  (SOICR p. 11)  Holm-10: Resolution of Denial Memorialized March 15, 2017, by Holmdel Zoning Board of [...]'s Application for Preliminary and Final Site Plan and Use and Related Variances ([...]) (SOICR p. 11)  .........................................................  H413a Holm-11 to -16, the Transcripts of Meetings of Holmdel Township Zoning Board of Adjustment ([...]) are omitted from this Appendix, as they are part of the Zoning Board Transcripts filed separately in this Appellate Division Docket [...].  Holm-17: Resolution of Holmdel Zoning Board’s Denial of [...]'s Application for Preliminary and Final Site Plan and Use and Related Variances ([...]), is included in this Appendix at Ha280.  [...], Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 4 Pages H438a through H596a Holm-18: Excerpts from 2019 New Jersey EMP issued by the BPU on January 27, 2020 (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:20-31 through -34; N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.2.  Regardless of an activity’s Highlands Act exemption status, DEP must also find that the activity is consistent with the applicable areawide Water Quality Management Plan (WQMP).  N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.4(a) and (e).  At issue here is DEP’s interpretation and application of Exemption #11, which exempts from the Highlands Act activities involving “the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of this act[.]”
[brief] I.  Multiple conflicting indemnity clauses create ambiguity that renders the contract ambiguous regarding indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Because the [...] contract contains two indemnity provisions with two different indemnity obligations, Da44-45, ¶ 2, ¶ 4, [...]’s argument that it is entitled to indemnification for its own negligence is fatally flawed.  See Mantilla v. NC Mall Assocs., 167 N.J. 262, 273-75 (2001) (holding that multiple conflicting indemnity clauses are ambiguous); Englert v. The Home Depot, 389 N.J. Super. 44, 48, 57-58 (App. Div. 2006) (same).
[brief] New Jersey courts have used N.J. R. Evid. 508(a)’s definition to interpret the same term in another statute.  See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 5 N.J. Tax 181, 190-91 (1983), aff’d, 193 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 1984).  A court in Illinois did the same, holding that the [...] is not the news media.  State of Illinois ex rel. [...] v. [...], No. [...] (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. June 13, 2023) (reproduced at Ja3874 et seq.).  b.
[brief] *See Air Master & Cooling, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of America*, 452 N.J. Super. 35, 45 (App. Div. 2017) (“the continuous trigger theory shares the same coverage endpoint as the manifestation theory, i.e., the date when the harm has sufficiently become apparent to trigger a covered occurrence”); *Polarome*, 404 N.J. Super. at 250 (no duty to defend under continuous trigger rule where injuries manifested prior to policy periods).  In addressing which of the two theories applied to the facts of this case, the trial court acknowledged that the only decision from this Court addressing the applicability of the continuous trigger to mold exposure ruled that it did not apply because there was no evidence of latent, progressive injury.  *See Crivelli v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am.*, 2005 N.J. Super. Unpub. 703 (App. Div. Sept. 27, 2005).  The trial court also acknowledged the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in *Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Co. v. St. John*, 630 Pa. 1 (Pa. 2014), where the Court declined to extend the continuous trigger to ongoing damage after there has been initial manifestation, thoroughly explaining the moral hazards to doing so.
[directive] 4  USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  3.12  Spark Display.  Spark display means a non-contact demonstration of a CED’s ability to discharge electricity that is done as an exercise of constructive authority to convince an individual to submit to custody.  5  USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition
[brief] 14 POINT I  THE OAL INAPPROPRIATELY ISSUED ITS DECISION BEYOND THE STATUTORY FORTY-FIVE DAY PERIOD IN VIOLATION OF N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.1 THROUGH 1:18-3, INCLUSIVE.  (OAL DECISION AT PAGE 1; Pa2a) (CSC OPINION AT PAGE 1; Pa33a)  .................................................................  14  POINT II  THE [...] FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF BECAUSE IT SOLELY INTRODUCED HEARSAY EVIDENCE WITHOUT THE REQUIRED RESIDUUM OF ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE ULTIMATE FACTS.
[directive] A. investigations.  IAPP Section 4.2.5 is amended as  Confidentiality of internal affairs follows:  4.2.5  Law enforcement executives shall not assign to the internal affairs function any person responsible for representing members of a collective bargaining unit.  The conflict of interest arising from such an assignment would be detrimental to the internal affairs function, the subject officer, the person so assigned, the bargaining unit and the agency as a whole.
[directive] _ 45  The written report submitted by the qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to this 8.  Court shall not include an opinion with respect to whether the defendant was insane at the N.J.S.A. of time the crime pursuant to 2C:4-l and/or whether the defendant suffered from a N.J.S.A. of mental disease or defect at the time the crime pursuant to 2C:4-2; ______________ [any additional conditions ordered by the court . .,_ _ as 9. of of
[brief] B.  Even if there is a fundamental right to practice law, the DACCA does not directly impinge upon it because it concerns only debt adjustment outside of litigation, which can be conducted by both attorneys and non-attorneys alike.  Even if there were a fundamental constitutional right to practice law, Appellants cannot show that the DACCA “directly impinges” on it because the challenged provision does not punish or restrict attorneys, it merely insulates attorneys whose practices may tangentially touch on debt adjustment from liability under the statute.  Indeed, the DACCA regulates a completely separate area of endeavor—debt adjustment—which can be conducted by both attorneys and non-attorneys working under the auspices of nonprofit companies.  See N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2.  Nothing in the statute purports to regulate the practice of law with respect to disputes relating to the adjustment of debt or the conduct of the courts in adjudicating such disputes.  Indeed, litigation of any dispute, including for an adjustment of debt, is governed exclusively by the Rules of Court.  Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 to R. 1:1-1 (2024) (“The rules of court govern practice and procedure in all courts”).  The DACCA is not even addressed to attorneys, who are only mentioned once in the entire statute in the list of exemptions at N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c).  And that sole mention does not restrict or regulate their practice, but instead protects them from the statute’s reach by carving a safe harbor for attorneys who engage in debt adjusting as their non-principal activity.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2).  Therefore, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor does not “directly impinge” on a constitutionally-protected right, and it is thus presumed valid.
[brief] 584 U.S. at 591-92.  The United States Supreme Court held that the automobile exception did not apply, stating “[n]othing in our case law . . . suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant. ”  Id. at 595.  The Court further found that the curtilage was part of the home itself for search and seizure purposes.  Id. at 592.  Relying on Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587–590 (1980)), the Court pointed out that a warrantless arrest is legal outside the home, but not within the home.  Id. at 595.  So too, the Court held, a warrantless search of a car may occur in public, but not in the curtilage.  Ibid.  In [...], the defendant asked her landlord to investigate a leak in her home.