ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 80a.  [...] claimed to be a subsequent purchaser for value having purchased the property from [...] for $375,000 by Deed dated March 3, 2022 and recorded on April 6, 2022.  82a  An Order to Intervene as to [...] was filed on May 5, 2022.  85a.  On July 22, 2022, counsel for proposed Intervenor, [...], a purported mortgagor, filed a Notice of Appearance through counsel.  86a.  An Order to Intervene as to [...] was filed on August 22, 2022.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page(s)  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY and STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................  6 POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ANALYZE  WHETHER PLAINTIFFS ASSERTED A SETTLED LEGAL RIGHT (Da393-417) ...............................................................................................................................
[brief] A recent EIA survey (USEIA, 2015) of the mid-Atlantic region's residential sector (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) estimated natural gas end-uses to be largely space heating and water heating (Figure 2.2).  According to most recent Residential Energy Consumption Survey, New Jersey households, on a per-household basis, are the highest consumers of natural gas used in residential heating in the country (in Btu per year).  (USEIA, 2015).  Three out of four New Jersey homes use natural gas as their primary home heating fuel (USEIA, 2019).  Ha138.  The report addresses the "low hanging fruit" from oil and propane.  Ha140-141.  As we noted above, there is very little opportunity to achieve realistic reductions in [...] because there are very few such buildings.
[brief] Township Committee member [...] admitted in his deposition that Plaintiff was not granted a hearing or opportunity to be heard, nor did Defendants conduct any investigation prior to summarily and illegally relieving Plaintiff of his duties.  Further, the Members of the Township Committee admittedly would have actively sought to terminate Plaintiff’s employment had he not retired on September 1, 2017.  Defendants’ actions against Plaintiff were borne from false allegations of misconduct and racism, which Defendants’ own witnesses admit were without any legitimate basis and were the subject of no specific allegations by anyone against Plaintiff.
[brief] Videos submitted to [...] establish that Appellant’s boating efforts are not impaired.  (JRa004-JRa011 and the thumb drive submitted to the Appellate Division herewith containing the videos served on the [...] with that document).  Aerial photographs also establish that there is ample room for Appellant to navigate to its dock and property.  (Aa0291-Aa0292).  [...]’s dock is 163 ft. from the navigational channel.  (JRa003).  Appellant’s claim is based on speculative interference only and is based on self-serving statements and overhead photographs that do not show the docks approved by [...] to the east of [...]’s property and adjacent to [...]’s dock.  (Aa0017-Aa0018; Aa0091).  Appellant failed to provide any evidence, by an expert or otherwise, to dispute the conclusions of [...]’s Professional Engineer and [...] that [...]’s dock met the CZM Rules including, [...]’s Recreational Docks and Piers rule, which states, in part:
[brief] So, does 2019 sound about right to you?  A.  2019 sounds about right, Your Honor. ”).  Six (6) years after the Judgment was obtained, on June 7, 2023, and at least four (4) years after Appellant admitted to becoming aware of the Judgment, and after Respondent moved to dismiss in Appellant’s Class Action, Appellant appeared in the Collection Action for the first time, and moved to vacate the Judgment (“Appellant’s First Motion to Vacate”).
[brief] ”  R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  | Cases | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Bd.**, 250 N.J. 431 (2022) | 46 | | **State in the Interest of C.A.H. & B.A.R.**, 89 N.J. 326 (1982) | 42 | | **State v. Adams**, 320 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 1999) | 18 | | **State v. Anderson**, 198 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1985) | 32 | | **State v. Baylass**, 114 N.J. 169 (1989) | 38 | | **State v. Case**, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 15, 16 | | **State v. Cassady**, 198 N.J. 165 (2009) | 17 | | **State v. Copling**, 326 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div. 1999) | 34 | | **State v. Cuff**, 239 N.J. 321 (2019) | 33 | | **State v. Davis**, 68 N.J. 69 (1975) | 32 | | **State v. Dillihay**, 127 N.J. 42 (1992) | 28 | | **State v. Espino**, 264 N.J. Super. 62 (App. Div. 1993) | 18 | | **State v. Flowers**, No. A-2401-09T3 (App. Div. 2013) | 21 | | **State v. Fuentes**, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) | 37, 42 | | **State v. Gardner**, 113 N.J. 510 (1989) | 42 | | **State v. Ghertler**, 114 N.J. 383 (1989) | 17 | | **State v. Green**, 62 N.J. 547 (1973) | 14 | | **State v. Harmon**, 104 N.J. 189 (1986) | 26 | | Authority | Page Nos. | |------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394 (1989) | 35, 42 | | State v. Johnson, 309 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 1998) | 18 | | State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015) | passim | | State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000) | 36 | | State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156 (1984) | 27 | | State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359 (2019) | 38 | | State v. List, 270 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 1993) | 18 | | State v. Lopez, 417 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 2010) | 28 | | State v. Louis, 117 N.J. 250 (1989) | 34 | | State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484 (1996) | 42 | | State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436 (2001) | 39 | | State v. Mosch, 214 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1986) | 32 | | State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005) | 37 | | State v. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div. 1998) | 26 | | State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128 (1991) | 17 | | State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113 (1991) | 33 | | State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) | 35, 36 | | State v. Simmons, No. A-2107-19 (App. Div. Mar. 3, 2022) | passim | | State v. Simmons, No. A-4938-12, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 306 (App. Div. Feb. 11, 2016) | v, 1 | ABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)
[brief] The statute of limitations in this case was two-years.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  A statute of limitations commences to run upon the happening of the accident or event upon which the claim is based.  Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 116 (2000).  In this case, that would be the moment when Plaintiff allegedly slipped on March 16, 2017.  Thus, the Plaintiff had until March 16, 2019 to file suit.  However, he failed to file suit until June 12, 2019.  New Jersey law recognizes the so-called “discovery rule” to toll the running of the statute of limitations.  In such cases, a cause of action will not accrue and the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.  Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973).  That point exists when the plaintiff is aware of being injured and that the injury is the fault of another.  Dunn v. Borough of Mountainside, 301 N.J. Super. 262, 275 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 547 (1986). )
[brief] Velazquez, supra.  Plaintiff's counsel argued this exact point to the trial judge: "If plaintiff's version is believed by the jury there's no self-defense here," (10T32:7-9) and "you've got to give them the option of finding him negligent even if they believe my guy, which this kind of excludes my guy's whole version of the events."  (10T33:5-8).  Plaintiff's counsel provided the trial judge with a proposed instruction that tracked Model Jury Charge 5.10H. (Pa315).  In the alternative, he asked the trial judge to get rid of the words "self-defense" in the charge (10T30:7-9), but that was refused.  The trial judge even refused plaintiff's counsel's request to insert the word "or" in between negligently and self-defense so that the charge would have read:  "but only if you find that [...] acted negligently OR negligently in self-defense while in the scope of his duties."  (10T32:11-15; 10T36:1-2).  b)
[brief] ”  Provided that (a) this Lease is in full force and effect, (b) Tenant is not in monetary default under this Lease after notice and expiration of any applicable cure period, (c) the Guarantor is not in default under the Guaranty and (d) the aforesaid conditions shall have been satisfied, Tenant’s Allowance, together with interest at the rate of five (5%) percent per annum on the unpaid balance of Tenant’s Allowance from and after the Rent Commencement Date, shall be paid to Tenant in six (6) equal annual installments (plus interest as aforesaid) as follows: (I) the first installment shall be paid on the first date of the second (2nd) Lease Year; and (II) the remaining installations shall be paid on the first day of each Lease Year commencing with the third (3rd) Lease Year and ending with the seventh (7th) Lease Year.
[brief] Plaintiff also filed separate Responsive Statements of Undisputed Material Facts.  (Pa029; Pa066)  May 26, 2023 the Trial Court denied both of [...]’s motions for summary judgment.  (Da0785 and Da0816)  The Trial Court held:  “Defendant’s motion to exclude expert testimony and motion for summary judgment must be denied because a dispute of material fact exists since Plaintiff’s experts have opined that the Ozurdex was defective with a silicone particulate that proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries.  While Defendant argues that such expert testimony should [be] excluded, the court disagrees and finds that Plaintiff’s experts have sufficiently based their opinions in facts and evidence to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 703.  Therefore, since a dispute of material fact exists, it would be improper for this court to decide the issue as a matter of law. ”  (Da0785; Da0792; Da0816; Da0823)
[brief] However, two months before the shooting, defendant claimed [...] had come to the house and started \(^3\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). talking about guns in a threatening manner.  *Ibid.*  Defendant took great umbrage at this, asserting that “if men have to fight, you know, put on some boxing gloves or something, that was my solution,” but he claimed that [...] would “always talk about weapons and guns. ” (21T:116-19 to 23).  And, although [...] showed up at defendant’s home speaking about a gun in a threatening manner, defendant still claimed to have said, “I don’t want anything to do with you, but I wish you well.  You know, get the help you need. ” (21T:117-1 to 8).  He told detectives that [...] had recently been in a psychiatric ward, had provoked and harassed defendant, and only wanted [...] to leave him alone.
[brief] (Pa 270.)  Notice of the special meeting was sent by the Borough to the designated newspapers on Friday, December 10, 2021.  (Pa. 209.)  It also instructed recipients that it was "FOR YOUR RECORD ONLY!" (caps in original).  (Id.)  The notice informed the recipients that the purpose of the meeting was to continue the Board’s review of the Redevelopment Plan amendment and that final action could be taken.
[brief] But to bring an action in lieu of prerogative writs, a plaintiff must show that the appeal could have been brought under one of the common law prerogative writs: eg. mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, and certiorari.  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App.Div. 2011); Loigman v. Tp. Com. of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287 (App. Div. 1997); Ward v. Keenan, 3N.J. 298, 303 (1949).  Here, plaintiff met that burden of proof.  Accordingly, plaintiff had a constitutional “as of right” for judicial review of the contested June 15, 2021 capital bond ordinance and the CY 2021 suppression of his right to be heard prior to consideration and official action on all noticed agenda action items.
[directive] In cases pretrial for shall apply prosecutor the 7.4.6, subsection to pursuant overcome is detention pretrial defendant and the degree), its of crime(regardless indictable an is offense present if the detention offense: present the committed persons disorderly (ii) a or crime indictable an (i) for release pretrial on while (a) whether 2C:25-19(a), N.J.S.A. in defined violence as domestic involving offense complaint- or complaint-warrant by charged been had offense previous that or summons, parole, (ISP), program supervision intensive probation, special probation, on while (b) on was or (PSL), for life supervision parole (CSL), life for supervision community by required guilty as pleaded had defendant the where (PTI) intervention pretrial release on defendant was the if or 98), c. 2015, P.L. (see 2C:43-12(g)(3)  N.J.S.A. 18.
[directive] Nor does this Directive modify existing requirements for electronic recordation of statements pursuant to State v. Cook, 179 N.J: 533 (2004) and R_.~. 3:17.  5..  Training on Note-Taking Techniques  When a law enforcement officer take notes of a witness interview, the officer should whenever feasible avoid memorializing what transpired during the course of the interview on the same page that include notations that do not pertain to what transpired during the witness interview follow-up investigative tasks to be performed).
[brief] (21T18-21 to  It also noted that the aggregate sentence was ultimately affirmed on appeal.  (21T19-1 to 2).  Further, the court found Hess, cited in defendant’s original brief, distinguishable because there defense counsel agreed as part of a plea agreement to not argue and here, at the first sentencing, defense counsel argued as to at least one mitigating factor and that certain aggravating factors should not apply.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  [...] CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT TENNESSEE’S PROJECT QUALIFIES FOR EXEMPTION #11 (Aa0001)  [...] correctly determined that [...]’s construction, operation, and maintenance of a new electric motor driven compressor station at the CS 327 Site, which will be connected to and a part of [...]’s existing pipeline system, qualified for Exemption #11.  The Highlands Act exempts the upgrade of utility systems which are consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(11) and N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3.  In this regard, [...] is the only agency that makes Highlands exemption decisions.  It was, and is, [...]’s responsibility to determine whether [...]’s Project is exempt pursuant to  Moreover, [...] is the expert administrative agency charged with creating and implementing policies to preserve and promote the natural resources of the Highlands region.  As such, the applicable standard of review requires strong deference to [...]’s determination in the context of statutory interpretation.  Based upon the record in this case and applicable law, the Court should affirm [...]’s decision to exempt [...]’s Project.
[directive] 18.  a.  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the Pretrial Intervention Program, that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), ze zgodnie z zasadami Mic,dzystanowego Porozumienia w sprawie Nadzoru nad Doroslymi Przestc,pcami, jesli w czasie wydania wyroku lub po zlozeniu oswiadczenia o winie, jesli zlozenie tego oswiadczenia stanowi warunek przyjc,cia do Programu Interwencji Przedprocesowej, mieszka Pan(i) poza stanem New Jersey, powr6t do miejsca Pana(i) zamieszkania moze zostac op6iniony z powodu oczekiwania na zgodc, na przeniesienie nadzoru do stanu, w kt6rym znajduje sic, miejsce zamieszkania?  b.  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the Pretrial Intervention Program, if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if New Jersey has required you to register as a sex offender?  Czy rozumie Pan(i) r6wniez, ze zgodnie z tym samym Mic,dzystanowym Porozumieniem przeniesienie nadzoru do innego stanu moze zostac odrzucone lub ograniczone przez ten stan w dowolnym momencie po wydaniu wyroku, lub po zlozeniu oswiadczenia o winie, jesli zlozenie tego oswiadczenia stanowi warunek przyjc,cia do Programu Interwencji Przedprocesowej, jesli stan ten ustali, ze musi Pan(i) zarejestrowac sic, jako przestc,pca seksualny w tym stanie lub jesli stan New Jersey wymaga Pana(i) rejestracji jako przestc,pcy seksualnego?  19.
[brief] Order Granting Motion to Compel Arbitration filed November 22, 2023.........................................................Pa187  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendants’ Brief argues four primary points: 1) this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this Appeal; 2) Plaintiff did not specifically and directly challenge the arbitration provision and delegation clause at issue; 3) Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the assignment of his alleged account; and 4) Defendants did not waive arbitration.
[brief] (16T 96-5 to 97-6; 16T 101-6 to 102-6)  Defendant testified that at the Toms River stop, he did not show [...] any sort of license or ID, not even a business card, because [...] seemed to recognize that defendant was a trooper, after which [...] let him go without a ticket.  (16T 114-19 to 116-3)  It would not have been unusual for [...] to recognize defendant as a trooper, because when defendant was in the Alcohol and Drug Testing Unit, he was a sergeant and the field coordinator for multiple counties, responsible for training “about a hundred” law-enforcement agencies in New Jersey.
[brief] Of note:  Regarding the signed 2/26/2024 MOTION OF STAY paperwork  From [...], Page 6, Paragraph 5, whereby [...] States that on lines 1 through 8: and claims that “I was paid in full via direct payments ending in 2001 when my daughter turned 23 years of age”, is completely FALSE.  [...] did NOT Participate  In any form of payment, for either my Son or my Daughter’s schooling: from their Elementary school, thru High School, through their completion of their Master’s Degrees.  (Exhibit 2)  Regarding the signed **2/26/24 MOTION OF STAY, PAGE 7, Paragraph 2** whereby [...] states on lines 9-12, that “due to personal medical circumstances for the past 8 years my only source of income has been Social Security benefits (SSA)….et al: I will be forced to leave my place Of residence and thereby become homeless without the means to provide for the basics to survive.
[brief] The Amended Policy specifically requires school officials to proactively disclose to parents a student’s “asserted gender identity and/or name change” when they request to publicly change their gender identity and/or expression at school.  (Da170).  As the trial court correctly found, transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students are the students who will make such requests, and therefore these students will necessarily be the ones that face “a far greater incidence of parental disclosure of their gender identity or expression. ” (Da129).  Moreover, these are the students who will also face “a far greater risk of harm from this involuntary disclosure. ”  (Da129) (emphasis added).  After all, whereas cisgender students typically consistently express their gender identity or expression at home and at school, transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students are far more likely to express a different gender identity or expression at home than they do at school—often because they fear reprisal or harm.  See, e.g., (Ra13) (detailing significant percentages of transgender survey respondents who report having unsupported families, families who kicked them out of the home, and/or family members who engaged in violence against them); (Ra21) (study showing that 61% of transgender individuals facing high levels of familial rejection reported having attempted suicide—making them over 300% more likely to attempt suicide than those who experienced low or no family rejection); John & Jane Parents 1 v. [...], 622 F. Supp. 3d 118, 139 (D. Md. 2022) (finding transgender students “could hardly feel safe in an environment where expressing their gender identity resulted in the automatic disclosure to their parents, regardless of their own wishes”), vacated for lack of standing, 78 F.4th 622 (4th Cir. 2023); Cf. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding police violated teenager’s rights when they threatened to tell his family he was gay, after which he died by suicide).
[brief] The Appellate Division in Leitner gave nine factors that a trial court should consider when deciding if good cause has been shown.  Ibid.  Those factors are: 1. the movant’s reasons for the requested extension of discovery; 2. the movant’s diligence in earlier pursuing discovery; 3. the type and nature of the case, including any unique factual issues which may give rise to discovery problems; 4. any prejudice which would inure to the individual movant if an extension is denied; 5. whether granting the application would be consistent with the goals and aims of “best practices”; 6. the age of the case and whether an arbitration date or trial date has been established; 7. the type and extent of discovery that remains to be completed; 8. any prejudice which may inure to the non-moving party if an extension is granted; and 9. what motions have been heard and decided by the court to date.  Id. at 87-88.  Beginning with the first factor, plaintiffs did not make a request for an extension of discovery.  Plaintiffs merely requested that they be permitted to replace [...] with [...] after the deadline for expert reports had passed, after [...] had been deposed, and in the middle of scheduling other expert depositions in the face of a fast-approaching deadline.
[brief] Pa214.  In deciding the motion, the lower court determined that the question of whether Respondents had a duty to [...] under the circumstances was one of law, specifically whether Respondents had a duty to a nonclient.  T005:15-19.  The court noted the difficulty of the decision explaining that “there are facts that cut both ways, which has made the case an issue -- made the decision a challenging one for me. ”  T005:9-11.  The judge would also say:  What I did struggle with and find that the facts really cut both ways on is this question of whether or not [...] invited the non-client to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of legal services; and secondly, to the extent he did, whether the non-client did so rely.  . . . and as I say, there are some facts that really would support either result here.  T006:21-7:4.  The court went on to engage in fact-finding in order to determine whether the Respondents had a duty to [...].  The judge explained that while there are facts in the record supporting the implication that the Law Firm invited [...] to rely on its provision of legal services, there were insufficient facts in the record establishing [...]’s reliance on the Law Firm’s services.  In his analysis, the judge considered [...]’s responses, or lack thereof, to certain communications with the Law Firm and analyzed events which occurred beyond the relevant time period for this matter, ultimately concluding that, “beyond the letter that [...] wrote, he did very little to invite…[...] Miranda to rely upon him.