ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In determining whether to grant a Motion to Dismiss, “the [School Ethics] Commission shall review the facts in the light most favorable to the complainant and determine whether the allegation(s), if true, could establish a violation of the Act. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3; See also Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969) (dismissal on motion inappropriate if case supported by a scintilla of evidence).  The Commission erred by doing precisely the opposite with regard to dismissing Count 3, by not only viewing facts in the light most favorable to the party moving for dismissal, but also by inserting facts into its Decision that were not in the record at all, and which are actually contradicted by the record.  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (factual findings inconsistent with the evidentiary record not to be relied upon).  At the time Respondent refused to wear a mask at multiple meetings of the Board, New Jersey Executive Order 251 (2021) (EO 251) was in place, which stated:
[brief] “Although the plaintiff must make both showings [of causation and damages] by a preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff-friendly principles come into play and through these principles, and the proven breach of duty operates as a solvent to loosen the normally stringent requirements of causation and damages. ”  Metro Storage Int’l LLC v. Harron, 275 A.3d 810, 822 (Del. Ch. 2022).  B.  **[...]’S EXCESS PAYMENT OF $1,250,050.55 WAS DUE ENTIRELY TO [...]s BREACH OF THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY.
[brief] In Smart, a police officer received a tip from a confidential informant about an individual allegedly selling drugs out of his car.  Id. at 160.  The tip included the individual’s nickname, a physical description, and a picture of his car.  Ibid.  One month later, the officer saw a vehicle matching the car in the picture in an area known for drug dealing.  Id. at 160-61.  Upon further investigation, the officer identified the owner of the car as the defendant and saw the defendant and two other individuals enter the car and drive away; the officer followed the car to a residence.  Id. at 161.  Simultaneously, another officer, who had previously received a tip from a concerned citizen about drug activity at the residence involving a similar car, also followed the defendant to the residence.  Ibid.  At the residence, the officers saw the defendant engage in activity that they believed was consistent with a drug transaction.  Ibid.  One hour after first seeing the defendant, the officers stopped his car.
[brief] The [...] (“[...]”) is a non-profit trade association founded in 1933.  Its primary purpose is to represent and advocate for its members, independently owned and operated wholesalers of malt beverages.  Critical to all licensed New Jersey beer wholesalers is the three-tier system established by New Jersey’s Legislature and in place since the adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment.  While some form of a three-tier system has been enacted by nearly every State to regulate beer importation and distribution since the end of Prohibition, each State developed and implemented its own “system” through State-specific regulations tailored to its unique needs.  As expressly understood by the New Jersey Legislature when it developed its current scheme, all beer wholesalers, regardless of size or brand, confront the same issue when negotiating with brewers and/or suppliers: the unequal bargaining power of the brewers with whom the wholesalers contract and procure malt beverages.  As it stands, the trial court’s decision in the underlying action, which dismissed the claims of Plaintiffs-Appellants, [...] and [...] (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Appellants”), and compelled them to arbitrate their disputes with Defendants-Respondents, [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Defendants” or “Respondents”), undermines the protections intended for New Jersey’s beer wholesalers.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's order dated August 16, 2024, should be upheld as a matter of law, and an order should be entered dismissing plaintiff's appeal.  [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] AND [...], Defendants/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION  SOMERSET COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, [...], [...], [...] AND [...]
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2), a disability retiree may be required to undergo a medical examination “to determine whether or not the disability which existed at the time he was retired has vanished or has materially diminished. ”  Ibid.  Additionally, “[i]f the report of the medical board shall show that such beneficiary is able to perform either his former duty or any other available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him, the beneficiary shall report for duty. ”  Ibid.  Under this “governing legislative framework, the inability to return to duty…prevents the Board from statutorily terminating any granted benefits, a result which would contravene important public policy underlying disability retirement benefits. ”  Cardinale, 458 N.J. Super. at 263.
[directive] Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-2 Joint Crash Investigative Protocol  Page 2 accident investigation protocols from the various counties to determine if a single investigative protocol could be established for the Division of State Police to use with all County Prosecutors.  The New Jersey County Prosecutors Association subsequently approved the attached Joint Crash Investigative Protocol, to be applicable to the Division of State Police, all County Prosecutors and the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, and submitted it to the Attorney General for consideration.  After a careful review, it has been determined that the Joint Crash Investigative Protocol - Division of State Police & County Prosecutors, as submitted by the County Prosecutors Association, reflects the appropriate roles of the Division of State Police, as the initial investigating law enforcement agency, balanced against the ultimate responsibility of each County Prosecutor and the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, for the prosecution of any crimes arising from an investigation.  Accordingly, it has been determined that the issuance of an Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive is the appropriate mechanism to implement this Joint Crash Investigative Protocol for the Division of State Police and County Prosecutors.  THEREFORE, I, [...], Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq., hereby DIRECT that the attached Joint Crash Investigative Protocol is an Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive (No. 2004-2).  This Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive SHALL BE ADHERED TO by the Division of State Police, all County Prosecutors and the Division of Criminal Justice in all investigations of motor vehicle or vessel crashes involving one or more fatalities and/or serious injuries.  To the extent it is necessary, Standard Operating Procedures of the Division of State Police SHALL BE MODIFIED to conform to this Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive. jk  Attachment: Joint Crash Investigative Protocol - Division of State Police & County Prosecutors c.
[directive] Office of the Attorney General | State of New Jersey Contents  Core Principles ......................................................................................................................................  ii  Definitions ............................................................................................................................................  iii  Core Principle One ................................................................................................................................ 1  Core Principle Two ................................................................................................................................ 2  Core Principle Three .............................................................................................................................  6  Core Principle Four .............................................................................................................................  13  Core Principle Five ..............................................................................................................................  17  Core Principle Six ................................................................................................................................  18  Core Principle Seven ...........................................................................................................................  19  Appendices Addendum A
[brief] 277 N.J. Super. at 546-47.  In addition to the police vehicle immediately behind the defendant’s vehicle, this Court found the lack of signal had the potential of affecting “other traffic on Broad Avenue” even though traffic was “light,” and the only other car identified was in the right lane.  *Ibid.*  And in *Jones*, the trooper testified that the defendant’s un-signaled lane change occurred “during rush hour and that there were quite a few cars on the road,” but he “could not say” whether the defendant’s lack of signaling “affected other traffic on the roadway or where such traffic was in relation to defendants’ vehicle. ”  326 N.J. Super. at 239.  Despite the lack of specifics as to the location of the other vehicles, this Court ruled that “the rush hour traffic --- \(^8\) [...] testified that [...] pulled into the [...] parking lot and came to a stop facing east, with the officers pulling behind her, giving a clear view of the westbound side of Route 22, from which [...] and the officers had just come.
[brief] He is [...]’s de facto owner and played the principal role in [...]'s formation and operations.  Pa008; Pa039; Pa050 (Compl. ¶¶ 54, 277-280, 330).  Although [...] and its alter egos purport to be owned by a medical doctor, [...], they are in fact illegally owned and controlled by [...].  Pa003-004; Pa021-023 (Compl. ¶¶ 8-12, 137-158).  Dr. Didita confirmed in a sworn statement that he never had any ownership interest in [...], was hired as a part-time employee after [...] began operations, and only worked for [...] for a few months after which [...] fired him.  Pa021-022 (Compl. ¶¶ 146-155).  [...] spearheaded [...]’s daily operations and strategic decisions and directed defendants to unlawfully bill for and profit from medical services provided to [...] patients.  He also played a leading role in the fraudulent activities at [...], which included compelling plenary physicians to perform or prescribe clinically unnecessary services, pay and receive kickbacks, and make illegal referrals.  Pa050 (Compl. ¶ 330).  Defendant [...] ([...]) was [...]’s “Director of Operations” and acted as the entity’s “enforcer,” even though he holds no license to provide healthcare services.
[brief] [...] explains the 26 documents at issue are non-responsive and therefore not subject to production or identification.  [...] further explains that [...] did not issue [...] and [...] identical document requests and the requests to [...] were in fact much broader and sought different documents.  [...] also denies [...]’s contention that if documents contain search terms, they would be responsive.  [...] argues that even if these documents contain a search term, that inclusion does not mean the document is also responsive to [...]’s specific discovery requests and must be produced.  Additionally, [...] argues that [...]’s allegations that there is some issue with [...]’s complete collective, review, and production methods is without merit and cites its previously submitted detailed accounting regarding its document handling and production procedures pursuant to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation. \(^1\) \(^1\) [...] is correct that it previously submitted a detailed account of its procedures, which the Special Master determined was in full compliance with the guidelines established for handling and production.  (See Doc. 214; Doc. 222).  [...] is also correct that [...] failed to raise any objections to the Special Master’s finding regarding [...]’s accounting.  11.
[brief] The meaning of “immediately” in this context is tied to the nature of the 2023 Veto Amendment.  See Cruz v. Central Jersey Landscaping, Inc., 195 N.J. 33, 46 (2008) (intent in using similar statutory language “must be understood in light of [court’s] pre-existing interpretation” of relevant statute).  In this case, the 2023 Veto Amendment did not change the nature of any of Relator’s claims for relief.  Rather, it gave the Attorney General, as the intended beneficiary of the protections of the public disclosure bar, a new procedural mechanism to indicate that it did not need or want such protections.  Berntsen, 2014 WL 12480026, at *3.
[brief] [...] denied that he increased his speed as he approached the intersection.  Plaintiff has misrepresented the facts to this Court by suggesting that [...] admitted he was attempting to “beat the light. ”  Pb5, Pb20-21.  All [...] stated is that he wanted to be through the intersection before the light turned red.  Of course, [...] intended to get through the intersection before the light turned red, that is not an admission that he was accelerating as he approached the intersection.  Plaintiff was attempting to accomplish the exact same thing from a similar distance while traveling at a similar speed.  Moreover, Plaintiff and [...] ignore [...]’s testimony that he believed he was too close to the intersection to stop safely, 3T:159-25 to 160-6, exactly the same observation and decision made by Plaintiff.  Simply put, if Plaintiff’s conduct did not constitute negligence, neither did [...]’s.
[brief] The 2019 Appellate Opinion (Da751) summarized the documented facts and relevant law as to the 1963 Agreement and criteria for identifying and/or distinguishing an easement or a license.  The Court found that (Da760):  The language of paragraph ten of the 1963 does not definitively establish an easement.  Although the term "easement" need not be included, the term "permission" is ambiguous as to whether the interest may be something other than an exclusive grant.  In addition, consideration of the surrounding circumstances leaves doubt as to whether an easement was intended.  The Court further noted that even if an easement was established by the 1963 Agreement, "an issue of material fact remains as to whether it has been abandoned."  As the Court noted, action by or on behalf of the easement holder (or license holder), or acquiescence in such actions by the property owner that is adverse and defiant of the easement or license, can establish that the easement or license has ended or expired.  The Court thus concluded by vacating [...]'s earlier Decision/Orders stating:  The duration for the grant in paragraph ten is unspecified, and there is no "clear manifestation that the parties intended" perpetual performance.  It is also unclear whether a different type of interest may have been intended.  Because the 1963 Agreement is ambiguous, surrounding circumstances may be addressed  There remains genuine issues of material fact as to what type of property right was conveyed and whether it was abandoned.  Thus, partial summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for trial to determine what interest was created, its scope, and whether it remains in effect.
[directive] Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Korean) (Use if committed on or after December 1, 1998)  귀하가 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 가중 범죄적 성접촉, 2C:13-1c(2)에 의한 유괴, 2C:24-4a에 의한 아동의 도덕성을 손상 또는 타락시키는 성행위를 함으로써 아동의 복지를 위협하는 행위, 2C:24-4b(4)에 의한 아동의 복지를 위협하는 행위, 2C:24-4b(5)에 의한 아동의 복지를 위태롭게 하는 행위(2018년2월1일 이후에 저질러진 경우), 또는 2C:24-4.1에 의한 아동 음란물 조직망의 두목(2018년2월1일 이후에 저질러진 경우)과 관련된 범죄 또는 범행 미수에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 다음 추가 질문에 답변해야 합니다.
[brief] Under the first prong, “whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application”, that answer is clearly “No”.  A review of the Legislative history reveals multiple Legislative sources establishing that the Legislature never intended to give retroactive application to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3):  1)  Of the two versions of the bill that were adopted and made effective April 14, 2020, and June 29, 2020, none of those versions discuss retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  2)  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 underwent nine bill drafts, with the final eight occurring on or after March 23, 2020.  None of the nine bill drafts discuss retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  3)  Between January 11, 2022, and March 7, 2022, there were six proposed bills to amend N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9.  None of these proposed bills discuss retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  --- 9 Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 609–10 (2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted)  10 Pa233 – Pa259 11 Pa261 12 Pa263  4)  Of the 15 Legislative history materials, inclusive of proposals, Assembly statements, and Governor’s veto comments, none of the history discusses retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3). 13  E.
[brief] 12  Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2007) ......................................................32, 33 VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539 (1994) .................................................................................. 37  W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 116 N.J. 543 (1989) ..................................................................................32, 33 State Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 .........................................................................................
[brief] ”  Brody v. Albert Lifson & Sons, 17 N.J. 383, 389 (1955).  The “ordinary forces of nature such as wind, or a rainstorm which are usual at the time and place, are conditions which reasonably [can be] anticipated. ”  Id. at 390.  Here, the issue is not the slipperiness of freezing rain per se, but whether the particular condition of this deteriorating exterior concrete staircase made it unreasonably worse.
[directive] QUESTIONNAIRE -- GRAND JURY STANDARDS: Standard 8.  Interpreters Required for Grand Jury  The Judiciary shall provide interpreters required for grand jury proceedings.  Grand Jurors  A.  Is the Judiciary providing American Sign Language interpreters for deaf grand jurors when advised of the need for those services?  ___ YES ___ NO ___ NOT APPLICABLE  B.  Are American Sign Language interpreter services for deaf grand jurors arranged through your Vicinage Coordinator of Interpreting Services or his or her designee?  ___ YES ___ NO ___ NOT APPLICABLE  C.  Are the interpreter services required for grand jurors being reported, which will ensure that they are included in the statistical reports relating to interpreter services?  ___ YES ___ NO ___ NOT APPLICABLE  Grand Jury Witnesses
[brief] THIS APPEAL IS LIMITED TO THE TRIAL COURT DECISION ON THE COMPLAINT IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS WHICH IS FOUNDATIONALLY DETERMINED BY WHETHER OR NOT THE ZONING BOARD  ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN RENDERING ITS DECISION TO UPHOLD THE HISTORIC PRESERVATION COMMISSION DETERMINATION.  THE COURT DID NOT SUBSTITUTE IT’S JUDGMENT BY MAKING A DETERMINATION ON A ZONING ORDINANCE AS TO A NUMBER OF WALKWAYS OR WHETHER THE NLDO LIMITED THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF CONCRETE UNIT PAVERS, BUT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE ZONING BOARD AS SAID DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE.
[brief] Id.  [...]’s harassment persisted.  While Appellant was speaking with another coworker about a pending case, [...] walked past her and touched her hair.  He later walked by again and touched her back.  (Pa348-49, Pa379) 96:25-99:2, 221:1-221:9.  When Appellant was alone in her car, [...] parked next to her, entered through the passenger door of her car, and started asking questions about a case, despite the fact she had not been involved in any of [...] cases at that point.  Id.  Prior to November 2018, Appellant reported the harassment to Respondent [...] multiple times because the behavior was making her uncomfortable.  (Pa346-48, Pa380) 89:7-96:24, 223:15-225:25.
[brief] Regardless if the decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, which declared the county’s appropriation of funds in a tax sale foreclosure beyond the amount due for the tax debt, is a form of confiscation of property and violation of a person’s property rights, is applicable before this Court, the underpinning of the decision supports the rights of our Defendant, [...], to redeem Plaintiff’s tax sale certificate.  We know that the “taking of excess tax debt, as determined in Tyler, was recently applied to third-party tax sale holders, in the recent appellate decision in Roberto, 477 N.J.Super. at 365-366  The decision on December 4, 2023, offers seismic change to the contour of municipal and private investment tax sale certificate foreclosure in New Jersey.  As stated in Point II in the Legal Argument, the Roberto decision articulates principles that support, in the Defendant’s cause, the trial court’s decision to grant its motion to vacate the Plaintiff’s final judgment.  The TSL framework provides the imperative not just for marketable title, but also, that the property owner can redeem their property interest and Rule 4:50-1(f) is available to a defendant demonstrating exceptional circumstances, Roberto, supra at 368.  The trial judge, “correctly weighed that defendant escrowed the required funds . . . undisputably had significant equity in the property and certified he had compounded financial hardship from tenants’ related COVID-19 related rental arrears.  Roberto, Id at 369.  Beyond the premise for upholding the Rule 4:50-1 grant in vacating the final judgment, in Roberto, and in Tyler, decreeing that government indulging in a tax foreclosure cannot take retain more than is due from the taxpayer, are the underlying sacred value ascribed to individual property rights an ownership.