ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] I.  Defendant [...] was arrested on November 11, 2019 in connection with a drive-by shooting in Burlington City the day before.  One person was killed as a result of the shooting.  A complaint against [...] charged him with conspiracy to commit murder.  The accompanying affidavit of probable cause summarized witness statements, information from surveillance cameras, and an Instagram codefendant’s account.  clip associated with a  The affidavit asserted that [...] drove a car with two passengers, one of whom fired three gunshots into the area where the victim and his friends were standing.  The State moved to detain [...] pending trial.  The charge against him -- first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and 2C:11-3(a)(1) -- carried a presumption of detention.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 19(b).  After a hearing, the trial court found that there was probable cause 4 defendant committed the charged offense and that he had failed to rebut the presumption.  In addition to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the court relied on the weight of the evidence and defendant’s history.  The court noted, in particular, three outstanding charges against defendant for which he “[i]f he does not had failed to appear on eight occasions.  The court observed, appear . . . for [disorderly persons] charges, how likely is he to attend court for first-degree offense. ”  Based on the unrebutted presumption of detention and a the court’s finding that defendant posed a danger to the public and a risk of non-appearance, the court entered an order of detention on December 23, 2019.  On February 13, 2020, a Burlington County grand jury returned a seven- count indictment against [...] and two others.  [...] was charged in three of the counts with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A 2C:11-3(a)(1), -3(a)(2), first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1), 2C:11-3(a)(1), and fourth-degree obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).  Defendant maintains his innocence and has stated he intends to go to trial.  At the time of oral argument, his trial had not yet begun.  Defendant asserts the delays violate his rights under the CJRA, and he maintains he is entitled to be released from pretrial detention.
[brief] Da276.  In its Statement of Claim, [...] falsely claimed the parties agreed to an EGP for five non-Backlog projects: (1) Englewood, (2) NJCU II, (3) Miller Street (Phase II), (4) Frederick Douglas Park, and (5) Park Ridge B&M.  Da268-273.  [...] admitted that the parties did not agree to EGP (and therefore did not satisfy the Additional Backlog Project Conditions) for four projects: (1) E’Port, (2) St. Lucy’s Shelter, (3) St. Peter’s Dorm, and (4) Barclay Street.
[brief] [...] suggested that the only likely means of exposure to mycotoxin-containing mold was via inhalation of mold spores in the air of the condominium rather than ingestion of mold-contaminated food.  This otherwise unsupported testimony contradicts the documents that were admitted as Trial Exhibit D-20 and the testimony of [...] in the underlying case, who opined that injury from inhalation of mold spores was not likely, as opposed to injury caused by ingestion of mold spores.  In particular, [...] “did not disagree” with an expert report he reviewed during his deposition stating that “foodborne exposure to mycotoxins and fungal contamination has been well researched” and noting that while “[a]irborne exposure is likely the most significant route of exposure in water-damaged environments… transdermal and potentially foodborne exposure through contact with indoor mycotoxins can also occur….”
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The Appellate Division applies a de novo standard of review on appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See Stop & Shop Supermarkets Co. v. Cty. of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (App. Div. 2017).  Moreover, it is “well-settled that appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion. ”  Do-Wop Corp v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001).  II.
[brief] B.  THE REASONABLE MEANING OF “REGISTERED ARCHAEOLOGIST” IS ONE REGISTERED WITH THE REGISTER OF PROFESSIONAL ARCHAEOLOGISTS (0016a-0017a).  The [...] respectfully submits that the reasonable meaning of “registered archaeologist” is an archaeologist that is registered with the Register of Professional Archaeologists, a nationally-renown professional organization (rpanet.org).  During bidding, [...] seems to have assumed that the term “registered archaeologist” must mean “PWCRA-registered”.  Carb2, Carb10-15.  However, it should be noted that, although the Bid Instructions required bidders to identify “a qualified Registered Archaeologist (RA),” (see 0912a § 3.09), there is no indication in the Specifications that “Registered Archaeologist” was intended to refer to an archaeologist registered under the PWCRA.  See 0015a-0016a.
[directive] Effective June 9, 2004 - N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 & 39:3-29.1a - Warrant of Impoundment Distribution List: State, Bi-State & Other Law Enforcement Agencies  State Law Enforcement Agencies Dept. Human Services Police, [...] Division of Fish & Wildlife, [...] State Park Service, [...] New Jersey Transit Police, [...] Bi-State Law Enforcement Agencies Port Authority of NY & NJ Police, [...] Palisades Interstate Parkway Police, [...] Delaware River & Bay Authority Police, [...] Delaware River Port Authority Police, [...] Burlington County Bridge Commission Police, [...] Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Department of Defense Police, Fort Dix, Fort Monmouth, Lakehurst Picatinny Arsenal Police Department US Air Force Security Police, McGuire AFB US Naval Security Department, USN Weapons Station Earle National Park Service Police, Sandy Hook, Morristown Nat'l Historic Park Educational Institution Police Departments Brookdale Community College, Chief of Police Burlington County College, Director Security & Safety College of New Jersey, Police Director Essex County College, Chief of Police Kean University, Chief, Dept. of Public Safety & Police Middlesex County College, Chief of Police Monmouth University, Chief of Police Montclair State University Police, Chief of Police NJ Institute of Technology, Chief, Public Safety Dept. Richard Stockton College of NJ, Chief of Police Rowan College, Police Director
[brief] On September 28, 2021, Newark Police responded to the rear parking lot of a Domino’s Pizza in response to a 911 call reporting a dead body.  (4T 87:17 to 99:4).  Police arrived to find the body of a man, later identified as [...], lying in the lot.  (6T 15:23 to 16:16, 40:15 to 41:23).  Police retrieved surveillance video from the Domino’s showing a Toyota 4Runner pulling into the lot and dumping Raul out of the Toyota and into the parking lot before driving off.  (6T 17:23 to 20:23).  When police identified [...] as the owner of the vehicle, she came to the police station and identified a photo of the Toyota as her SUV and identified the body of [...] as her son.  (6T 40:15 to 41:23).  She reported the Toyota as stolen.  (6T 43:2-23).  A Pennsylvania State Trooper testified that he spotted the stolen Toyota two days later in Lehigh County and arrested the defendant as she was sitting in the driver’s seat.  (5T 54:2 to 55:18, 59:7-9, 67:3-16).  She had the victim’s Visa card in her pocket.  (5T 78:5-12).  DNA from a knife and a tire iron recovered from the Toyota belonged to [...] and the defendant.  (4T 135:17 to 136:5, 146:21 to 148:14, 5T 25:1 to 31:3).  An analysis of a cellular telephone found in the SUV determined that it belonged to the defendant.  (4T 151:17 to 152:6, 5T 39:15 to 45:5).  The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was “sharp force injuries to the neck and blunt force injuries to the head.
[brief] In Murnane, the owner characterized himself as the general contractor, leading to the trial court’s dismissal of the claim.  Id.  at 335.  This court discussed the CFA at length, finding  There is no basis in these definitions for excluding a homeowner who contracts with multiple contractors from the protections of the CFA and the Contractor's Registration Act.  Even if such a homeowner could be characterized as a general contractor, he is still "an owner . . . of a residential . . . property" who has entered into a "home improvement contract" with a "contractor."
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a):  To encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.  [See the foregoing statements]  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c):  To provide adequate light, air and open space [most of the property will remain undeveloped].  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(g):  To provide sufficient space in appropriate locations for a variety of agricultural, residential, recreational, commercial and industrial uses and open space, both public and private, according to their respective environmental requirements in order to meet the needs of all New Jersey citizens.  [See the foregoing statements]  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(h):  To encourage the location and design of transportation routes which will promote the free flow of traffic while discouraging location of such facilities and routes which result in congestion or blight [truck traffic going to and from Route 206 only]  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(i):  To promote a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design and arrangement [setback distances and landscaping/berming regulations]  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(j):  To promote the conservation of historic sites and districts, open space, energy resources and valuable natural resources in the State and to prevent urban sprawl and degradation of the environment through improper use of land [Black House, solar in Sec. 2.6.9; and electric vehicle/service equipment (EV/SE) at Sec. 2.5, page 10]  While the [...] believes that the Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Master Plan, as stated in Section 3.1 of the Plan, for purposes of completeness of the record, and should it be determined by a reviewing Court that the Redevelopment Plan is not consistent with the Master Plan, or is not designed to effectuate the Master Plan, the [...] adopts the foregoing as its reasons for adopting this Plan despite any such concerns.
[brief] Defendant attempts to differentiate Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163 (1998), arguing that Pierce applies an “entirely different, and narrower” standard than CEPA.  New Jersey courts have rejected such an interpretation.  See Mehlman, 153 N.J. at 193 (In declining to read CEPA narrowly, the Court reasoned “caselaw has identified relatively unfamiliar sources, including clauses of the federal and state constitutions, as sources of public policy for purposes of Pierce or CEPA claims. ” (Emphasis added)(internal citations omitted); See also Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81 (1992) (finding that the Pierce wrongful-discharge cause of action was “broader than defendant” contended and was not restricted to “violations of statutory rights” and “a clear mandate of public policy must be one that on balance is beneficial to the public”); see also Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 172 N.J. 586, 604 (2002) (“the sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions as well as professional codes of ethics under certain circumstances.
[brief] Respondent complied with such document requests to the extent responsive documents could be located among Decedent’s files and possessions.  As the parties could not agree on the necessity, date, time, and location for a deposition, such issue was subsequently determined by [...], J.S.C. on September 22, 2023.  (Da 70-75 and Da 76-77).  The deposition of [...], Executrix of the [...], by Appellant, occurred on November 30, 2023.  Said deposition ran for approximately 2 ½ hours and was comprised of overly aggressive and antagonistic interrogation and hostile exchanges between Appellant and deponent.  While Appellant remained civility to Respondent’s counsel, Appellant made it clear that this matter would be continued regardless of adjudication in these remand proceedings until either Respondent submitted to his demands or every last nickel of funds was exhausted.  (Pa 1-104, and more specifically Pa 26-28).  Pursuant to directions received in a Case Management Conference with then assigned [...], the parties were instructed to file competing dispositive motions seeking the $60,000.00 on deposit with the Superior Court.
[directive] As used in this section and section 6 [C.52:4B-54] of this act, “rape care advocate” means a victim counselor, as defined pursuant to section 3 of P.L.1987, c.169 (C.2A:84A-22.14), who specializes in the provision of rape care services.  N.J.S.A. 52:4B-53.  Certification process for forensic sexual assault nurse examiners; qualifications
[brief] [...] have provided *zero authority* that they are entitled to receive the 1994 value of FFE that existed at the Property in 2018.  They cannot credibly prove that each and every fixture in [...]’s 2019 report actually existed in 1994 (especially when many of the tenants in 2018 were not there in 1994).  The February 20, 2019 Order, under which [...] set the valuation date of January 27, 1994, did not make any exceptions for the FFE.
[brief] 4 POINT I THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE POLICE LAWFULLY STOPPED AND SEARCHED DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE BASED ON A VALID SEARCH WARRANT .................................................................  4  A.  The Motion-to-Suppress Facts .........................................................  5  B.  The Rulings on the Motion to Suppress and Motion for Reconsideration ..............................................................................  8  C.  [...] properly stopped the Jaguar in Lakewood pursuant to a valid search warrant ...........................................  10  1.  The search of defendant’s vehicle in Lakewood did not violate the scope of the warrant ..........................................................  14  2.  The [...] lawfully stopped defendant’s vehicle in Lakewood, where it was searched; the search of his home in Lakewood was also proper under the search warrant .............................................................................  18  D.  The exclusionary rule does not apply to technical violations in obtaining or executing search warrants ...........................................  25  POINT II THE JUDGE BELOW PROPERLY RULED THAT POLICE OBTAINED VALID CONSENT TO SEARCH DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE.
[directive] Policy requirements that the Attorney General has determined are critical and must be implemented by every law enforcement agency include the following:  General Practices  (a)  Each agency must establish by written policy an internal affairs function.  (b)  Each agency must accept reports of officer misconduct from any person, including anonymous sources, at any time.  (c)  Each agency must thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigate all allegations against its officers.  (d)  Each agency must notify its officers in writing of complaints made against them, unless this notification would interfere with any investigation resulting from these complaints.  (e)  Each agency must notify its officers of the outcome of any Internal Affairs investigation involving them.  (f)  Each agency must notify complainants of the outcome of their complaints.  (g)  If an agency’s internal affairs investigators are unable to complete an investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive,1 who may take steps to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Notifications to the County Prosecutor
[brief] In terms of setting a standard of care for administering psychological testing, the regulation only vaguely states:  “(g) A licensee shall administer or supervise the administration of all testing materials on premises and consistent with accepted standards of practice. ”  N.J.A.C. 13:42-10.5(g)(emphasis added).  The American Psychological Association has adopted a Code of Ethics entitled Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct.  Website, APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists, available at https://www.apa.org/ethics/code/ethics-code-2017.pdf (last accessed April 19, 2024).  This Code is intended to create an ethical code for psychologists, including those engaging in “conducting assessments. ”  Id. at p. 2.  Like New Jersey’s own regulations, this Code of Ethics similarly does not preclude recording.  Id. at p. 7 at ¶ 4.03.  In fact, it permits recording with consent.  Id.  Moreover, it requires the psychologist to recognize a person’s right to “self-determination,” and the need for “special safeguards . . . to protect the rights and welfare of persons . . . whose vulnerabilities impair autonomous decision making. ”  Id. at p.4 at Principle E.  Thus, a person like [...] who is being compelled to submit to a psychological exam should have his wishes to make a record of that exam respected.  Neither a private psychologist hired by Defendants, nor a professional group that is not recognized as a regulatory body in New Jersey, should be able to dictate that [...] cannot make his own decision for documenting the content of his own exam.
[brief] Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider his sentence because he established that his sentence was illegal.  Db3-5.  Specifically, defendant argues that his sentence was illegal because the original sentencing court relied upon two convictions that were subsequently vacated, and thus, he is entitled to reduced sentence.  Db3.  However, the defendant’s contentions are wrong.  Contrary to defendant’s arguments, he failed to present any evidence to establish that his aggregate custodial sentence of ten years with 5 years of parole ineligibility was illegal.  Further, the original sentence imposed by [...], was within the statutory range and authorized by law.  As such, the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion should be affirmed.  Pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(c)(7), “[a] motion may be filed and an order may be entered at any time . . . (7) changing or reducing a sentence when a prior conviction has been reversed on appeal or vacated by collateral attack.
[brief] Arbitration agreements are enforceable when they explain in “simple ways that arbitration is a waiver of the right to bring suit in a judicial forum. ”  *Drosos*, 2023 WL 7545067, at *6 (cleaned up).  The Court held that the *Drosos* arbitration provision “clearly” satisfied this requirement because the statement that disputes would not be resolved in “litigation in the Judicial Court system,” but rather in arbitration, was “language meeting the standard of *Atalese.*”  *Id.*  The Court continued:  “That the [arbitration] clause does not mention specifically that the signatories were waiving a jury trial does not preclude its enforcement.  As defendants rightly note, … *Atalese* … [does not] require[ ] specific ‘jury trial’ language to accomplish a waiver of rights. ”  *Id.*  The arbitration agreement here is even more clear than the provision this Court held enforceable in *Drosos*.  To start, the first page of the December Terms states conspicuously that the user must resolve disputes with [...] “through final and binding arbitration” when discussing “how claims between You and [...] can be brought. ”  (Da80.)  This paragraph also bears multiple warnings to the user to “review the arbitration agreement below carefully” and “take[ ] time to consider the consequences of this important decision. ”  (Da80–81.)  Those statements reinforced for users that the arbitration agreement will affect their rights specifically as they relate to resolving claims and disputes against [...].  *See Delgado v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA, LLC*, No. A-0933-22, 2023 WL 5538644, at *3–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 29, 2023) (unpublished opinion) (enforcing arbitration agreement in part based on similar warning language).  Moreover, the arbitration provision itself, which appears on the second page of the December Terms, expressly states that any disputes, claims, or controversies between the user and [...] “will be settled by binding arbitration between you and [...], and not in a court of law. ” (Da81–82 (emphasis added). )  Both the words themselves and the sentence structure make clear not only that the user will not be able to bring disputes or claims against [...] in court, but also that arbitration is not the same thing as a court.  That satisfies Atalese.  See 219 N.J. at 445 (“[T]he point can be made that by choosing arbitration one gives up the ‘time-honored right to sue. ’”).  (b)
[brief] Critically, while the Board claims that it considered all of the letters of support submitted on [...]’s behalf, the record does not support that contention.  The Final Decision specifically addresses one letter in support of parole from [...]’s sister, dated September 23, 2022.  It offered no analysis of the content of the other compelling letters submitted by other upstanding citizens in [...]’s life.  These individuals included a retired Captain of the Bayonne Police Department; a college professor of religious studies; a physician who has been in practice for over forty years; an ex-high school principal; a retired insurance executive; and a Dominican Nun, with thirty-five years of counseling and therapy at New Jersey State Prison, who has worked one-on-one with [...] for more than thirty years.  All of these individuals have known [...] for an extensive period of time and offered the Board a different view of [...] – as a man, not an inmate.  Not one of the letters detailed above are included in the Board’s Statement of Items Comprising the Record, which confirms that they were not appropriately considered at the time the Board issued its Final Decision.  The Board’s failure to even acknowledge the content of these other letters of support was arbitrary and capricious, and its failure to explain – in any way – why it only considered his sister’s September 23, 2022 letter in mitigation, requires reversal.
[brief] Db at 21-24.  In fact, this information is nowhere to be found in Defendants 49-page brief.  Specifically, this information is not contained in: 1) the brief’s preliminary statement (which doesn’t even address the question of a supposedly improper jury charge) (see id at pp. 1-3-5); 2) the brief’s statement of procedural history (see id. at pp. 3-5), 3) the brief’s statement of facts (see id. at pp. 5-7), or 4) the brief’s description of the governing legal standards.
[brief] Schick v. United States, 195 US 65 reading in pertinent part as follows:  '...In this treatise, vol. 4, p. 5. is given a definition of the word "crimes:"  "A crime or misdemeanor, is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it.  This general definition comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors, which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous terms, though in common usage the word 'crimes' is made to denote such offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious Page 195 U. S. 70 dye; while smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the gentler name of 'misdemeanors' only."
[brief] Courts should not interpret statutes in a way that is at odds with public policy or which will lead to an absurd result.  *State v. Morrison*, 227 N.J. 295, 308 (2016).  Proposed statutory interpretations have been rejected when they conflict with public policy set forth in other statutes.  See *In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 17:1-7.5 & 17:1-7.10*, 454 N.J. Super. 386, 402-03 (App. Div. 2018).  Here, the Trial Court’s interpretation is at odds with the public policy behind the Municipal Land Use Law, *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq.* (“MLUL”).