ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da10-24)  | 8 | | A.  On the Body-Worn Camera Footage, [...] Displays No Nervous Behavior or Furtive Gestures | 10 | | B.  Alternatively, [...]’s Supposed Furtive Gestures and Nervousness Did Not Establish Reasonable Suspicion to Frisk Him | 12 | | C.  The Motion Court Erred in Denying Suppression Based on [...]’s Conduct After He Exited the Car, Because it Was Equally Ambiguous Evidence of Nervousness | 15 | | CONCLUSION | 18 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, AND ORDERS  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................Da27-30  Order Denying Suppression .........................................................Da10 Decision Denying Suppression ......................................................Da11-24  INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...]¹ ........................................Da1-9  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress ...............................Da10  Decision Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress ............................Da11-24  Body-Worn Camera Video #1 ........................................................Da25  Body-Worn Camera Video #2 ........................................................Da26  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................Da27-30
[brief] Exhibit I, excerpts of [...]’s June 27, 2018 deposition..................885a  Exhibit J, excerpts of [...]’s June 28, 2018 deposition................889a  Exhibit K, Manley v. Stark & Stark, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22082 (U.S.J.D.) .................................................................891a  9/15/20  Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants [...], Esquire and [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment
[brief] In contrast to the Consumer Fraud Act, which does not explicitly contain an attorney exemption, the DACCA does, so long as debt adjustment is not the principal activity.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2).  In fact, Vort acknowledges that the Legislature could have subjected attorneys to the Consumer Fraud Act’s statutory reach if it had specifically said so in the statute.  257 N.J. Super. at 62 (“Had the Legislature intended to enter the area of attorney regulation it surely would have stated with specificity that attorneys were covered under the Consumer Fraud Act. ”).  This further undercuts any argument about the DACCA premised on Vort and supports the position that the Legislature has the authority to enact statutes that could affect the practice of law without violating the Separation of Powers doctrine.  Because the Attorney Safe Harbor preserves the authority of the Supreme Court to regulate attorneys in all significant aspects, it does not encroach upon judicial prerogatives and interests except when an attorney’s principal activity is debt adjustment which is an activity that is not subject to the Court’s regulation.
[brief] For example, in order to warrant piercing the corporate veil of a parent corporation, a party must establish two elements: 1) that the subsidiary was dominated by the parent corporation, and 2) that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would perpetrate a fraud or injustice, or otherwise circumvent the law...  In determining whether the first element has been satisfied, courts consider whether "the parent so dominated the subsidiary that it had no separate existence but was merely a conduit for the parent." ...See Interfaith, supra, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 497 ("veil-piercing is proper when a subsidiary is an alter ego or instrumentality of the parent corporation")....  See also, State, Dept. Of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 94 N.J. 473, 501 (1983) (cited by plaintiff).  Here, there was no evidence whatsoever that [...] was dominated by anyone other than [...], or that anyone other than [...] was in any way its alter ego.  Nor was there any evidence that [...] or [...] used, or even could have used, [...] to perpetrate a fraud or injustice.  The Trial Court’s rejection of plaintiff’s claim to pierce the corporate veil to hold [...] and [...] liable should be rejected.
[brief] Summary judgment is generally inappropriate prior to the completion of discovery.  Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 459 N.J. Super. 529, 541 (App. Div. 2019).  “A party opposing a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that discovery is incomplete, however, must ‘demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action. ”  *Id.* (citation omitted).  The numerous gaps in the historical factual record, discovery remaining open, and the lack of participation from a necessary party whose rights were prejudiced by the trial court’s order require this Court’s reversal of the trial court’s premature grant of partial summary judgment.
[brief] It is axiomatic that when a juror begins to discuss material which has the capacity to prejudice the venire, the judge should take whatever action is necessary to ensure that the panel is not prejudiced.  See State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 74-75 (1988).  Accordingly, the proper course here would have been to bring the juror to sidebar rather than allow him to continue speaking in open court.  Second, we perceive no need for the trial court sua sponte to respond to a juror's comment once the juror has been excused.
[brief] The Defendant was insured by [...] as his primary insurer, and, [...] for excess coverage.  The case was tried and resulted in a jury verdict of $1,600,000 in Plaintiff’s favor.  Da 23-24.  Defendant has raised every possible issue to thwart the jury’s determination.  Initially, it should be noted that the entirety of this Appeal has no direct relationship with the individual defendant, [...].  [...] was already protected by an underlying bankruptcy ruling whereby he is not liable for the judgment over and above the insurance coverage.  Da 43-45.  The entire purpose of this Appeal by the defense is to protect the insurer against a bad-faith claim that is forthcoming against [...] and [...] Insurance Company for failing to make any reasonable attempt to settle the underlying case, despite the fact that the Arbitration Award was well over the available insurance policy limits, and, an Offer to Take Judgment was filed for the policy limits long before the trial took place.  Pa 2; Pa 1.  This entire Appeal is motivated by the defense’s attempt to protect future litigation and to protect the ill-fated decisions of the insurance carriers who purposefully exposed [...] to an excess judgment.  The insurance companies, [...] and [...] Insurance Company, abused their obligations in failing to negotiate this case in good faith since the defendant had filed for bankruptcy.  This Honorable Court cannot allow insurance carriers to blatantly commit bad faith and fail to negotiate and resolve cases any time an insured has the unfortunate circumstances of having to file for bankruptcy.  Filing for bankruptcy does not give an insured’s insurance carrier the license to commit bad faith and to ignore their obligations to protect an insured from a judgment whether personally collectible or not.  Other jurisdictions do not allow such conduct, and nor should New Jersey.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] Are you currently the guardian or co-guardian of an incapacitated adult?  •  If the answer is yes, the inquirer will ask only what court established the guardianship and what Surrogate issued letters of guardianship.  The inquirer will not ask the detainee to state the name of the incapacitated person in open court but may require that such information be provided.  D)  Any other inquiry that the inquirer considers reasonably necessary in light of existing circumstances.  All detainees shall be provided with a reasonable opportunity to make arrangements by 4.4 telephone for alternate care for their dependents.  If the detainee is unable to arrange for the alternate care of his/her dependents, the court 4.5 will contact an appropriate public or private agency, on behalf of the detainee, for assistance in providing appropriate care for the detainee's dependents.  The court will advise the detainee that he/she is completely responsible for working with the agency representative to provide for any necessary care of the dependent including associated costs of any services provided by the agency.
[brief] [...] relies on the State’s Procedural History (Pb1)\(^1\), but adds the following regarding the arguments raised below.  In arguing that his statement should be suppressed, [...] argued: (1) that [...] at least ambiguously invoked his right to counsel and [...] failed to clarify whether he was requesting counsel; (2) that [...]’s waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because [...] asked [...] to sign the waiver “under the guise of simply asking if he underst[ood] the paragraph;” and (3) that [...]’s statement was not voluntary under the due process clause because he had been subjected to “coercive and traumatic experiences” while incarcerated in Guatemala for months immediately prior to his extradition to the United States.  (Pa14-15)  The motion court agreed with [...]’s first argument—that [...] ambiguously invoked his right to counsel, which was never clarified by [...]—and granted suppression on that ground.  (Pa24-25)  Because the court granted suppression on [...]’s first asserted ground, the court did not reach and \(^1\)  The following abbreviations are used:  1T – Motion Hearing (August 6, 2024)  2T – Motion Decision (August 8, 2024)  Pb – State’s Brief  Pa – State’s Appendix Da – Defendant-Respondent’s Appendix did not render a decision on either of [...]’s other two proffered grounds for suppression.  (Pa24-25)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] While the Trial Court’s decision did not reference the remaining factors that a party must establish to obtain injunctive relief, [...] failed to establish those requirements as well.  First, [...] failed to demonstrate that a balancing of the hardships weighs in favor of granting it preliminary injunctive relief.  In reality, the only hardship faced by [...] if the Hackensack Arbitration moves forward is that it will expend money on legal fees and possibly pay a judgment, which is not only not irreparable harm, see infra, but also does not outweigh the harm to [...] if it is forced to further delay a litigation it commenced six months ago.  Any delay in the Hackensack Arbitration threatens [...]’s ability to successfully pursue its claims as witnesses are harder to reach, memories fade, and documents disappear.  Second, [...] will not suffer substantial or irreparable injury if the Hackensack Arbitration were to proceed while the Court considers the merits of its claim that the arbitration is barred by the entire controversy doctrine.  “Harm is generally considered irreparable in equity if it cannot be redressed adequately by monetary damages.
[brief] ”  1a.  [...] further ruled that, It has been said that "[w]hen the legislature imposes minimum penalties for certain offenses, the judiciary must enforce that mandate."  *State v. Nicolai*, 287 NJ. Super. 528, 531, 671 A.2d 611 (App.Div.1996).  "No --- \(^6\) Pursuant to R. 7:10-2(b)(1), “A petition to correct an illegal sentence may be filed at any time. ”  defendant can claim a legitimate expectation of ... a sentence below the statutorily mandated minimum."  *Id.* at 532, 671 A. 2d 611.  "The court [][i]s not at liberty to ignore the legislative command that a [certain] sentence be imposed and [is] without power to [shorten] its imposition or execution."  *State v. Fearick*, 132 N.J Super. 165, 170, 333 A.2d 29 (App.Div.1975) (citing *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 174, 199 A.2d 809 (1964)), aff’d 69 N.J. 32, 350 A.2d 227 (1976).  1a.  However, [...] did not render a decision on vacating defendant’s plea.  1a-3a.  In [...]’s January 19, 2023 decision, he incorrectly stated that, “The **sole** issue advanced by defendant is that the driver’s license suspension imposed by [...] should have run concurrent as opposed to consecutively. ”  1a.  Again, the January 19, 2023, decision did not address the second issue defendant raised that since defendant did not receive the benefit of the bargain that was promised him, he should be given his plea back.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ legal theory has no support in the law—in fact, they admit that their case is “one of first impression. ”  Pb32.  Plaintiffs want the court to rewrite the Long Term Tax Exemption Law in at least three ways—first, by finding that it prohibits the governing body from adopting a financial agreement absent a finding that the development would not have occurred but-for the tax exemption; second, by requiring the governing body to engage in quasi-judicial fact-finding; and third, by requiring the governing body to consider the effect that the financial agreement might have on other municipalities.  The law requires none of this.  Implementation of the Township’s affordable housing plan has been delayed too long.  The financial agreement between [...] and [...] is valid, enforceable, and has been adopted in accordance with the law.
[brief] The record is devoid of any evidence as to the history between [...], and possibly [...], and the two victims; there was no way for the jury to determine whether [...] felt aggrieved by a minor slight, which might call for a lesser response, or by something more serious.  Nor was there any way to determine whether or not [...]’s grievance was in any way shared by [...].  There is likewise no record of the history between [...] and [...].
[brief] The responses that defendants provided shows that defendants’ amended answers, with the certifications the court requested be provided, properly responded to the punch list as [...] directed at the February 8 Case Management Conference; there is not sufficient credible evidence to show they were not.  There is no proper ground to deny reinstatement of defendants’ Answers because defendants reserved the right to amend or supplement their answers.  This is provided by R. 4:18-1(b)(3), which imposes a continuing obligation to supplement written responses on a party.
[brief] Further examination uncovers additional problems with this language.  Without referencing [...] own negligence, the word “caused” is open to numerous meanings.  After all, the word “cause” certainly does not mean “negligence. ”  Merriam-Webster defines “cause” to mean, inter alia, “something that brings about an effect or a result. ”  New Jersey law.  It was applying federal common law, thus it’s incorrect to say that the Appellate Division “must” follow *United States v. Seckinger*, 397 U.S. 203 (1970).
[brief] For example, [...] only learned during this lawsuit that the $2.4 million in [...] cash-on-hand that [...] represented in one proposal was closer to $3.4 million.  (15T 66:12 to 67:2).  On about June 25, 2014, [...] provided to [...] two documents, in evidence at trial as P-48 and P-50.  (Da2792-97; 15T 67:15-22).  [...] had called [...] into his office that evening and the two continued to discuss splitting the properties.  [...] mocked [...] during that conversation about not being “good at business” because he could not collect money – a criticism that [...] acknowledged.  At various points during the chat, [...] became dismissive and told [...] that [...] would not get anything from [...] as part of a deal.  (15T 71:16 to 72:24).
[directive] You shall make payments on any fine, penalty assessment, restitution or other financial obligation as provided by Court order.  Failure to comply may result in further Court action, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2b including attachment of your wages, filing of a civil judgment, and/or extension of your probation term.  13.  Suministrará una muestra de ADN como condición de la sentencia impuesta, conforme a la Ley de Base de Datos y N.J.S.A. et seq L. según la enmienda de L. Banco de Datos de ADN de 1994, 53:1-20.17 (véase 1994, c. 136, 2000 c. según la enmienda de L. que entró en vigor 118, 2003 c. 183 el 22 de septiembre del 2003) a menos que lo hayan condenado por una infracción de alteración del orden público o una infracción menor de alteración del orden público.
[brief] The arbitration authority appointed someone over one party’s objection.  Id. at 25.  Upon application to vacate that final award, the 2nd Circuit did not hold that the procedural question of who could arbitrate was solely for the arbitration authority to decide.  Id. at 25-26.  Instead, it agreed that, “an arbitrator may have the final say on certain issues that affect the power to enter an award, but an award will not be enforced if the arbitrator is not chosen in accordance with the method agreed to by the parties. ”  Id. at 25, citing Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977) (emph. added).  Likewise, in *Food Handlers Local v. Pluss Poultry, Inc.*, 260 F 2d. 835 (8th Cir. 1958) the parties agreed 3 arbitrators would make decisions, with each side choosing one and if the two chosen arbitrators could not pick a third then the ‘[...]’ would.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey - Appellate Division  Letter Brief  Appellate Division  Docket Number: [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney Bar ID #:017661976  05/02/2024  Letter Brief on behalf of: [...]  State of New Jersey  Plaintiff V. [...], Defendant Case Type: Criminal County/Agency: Morris Trial Court/Agency  Docket No: [...]  Trial Court Judge/Agency Name: [...], JSC
[brief] In Count One of the Complaint, plaintiff seeks to void [...]'s 30 year NJHMFA Long Term Tax Exemption Ordinance 6PSF-E adopted by [...] as, in plaintiff's view, the exemption should have been made under LTTEL.  (Compl. Pars. 370-371).  Because the exemption was instead given under NJHMFA, [...] did not have remit 5% of the service charge it collects to the County.  (Compl. Par. 376).  The only relief specifically directed to the County in Count One is that the Court declare the County "is entitled to 5% of the long term tax payments from any new post 2003 PILOT authorized by [...]," (Compl. Par. 390 L), and that [...] should be compelled "to disclose all monies paid to the County" pursuant to LTTEL.  (Compl. Par. 390 R).  Count Two seeks to compel the County defendants to identify all post 2003 long term exemptions granted in the County and account for the revenues received (Compl. Second Par.  390 E & F), and compel them "to create a task force to examine all outstanding and proposed long term tax exemptions within [...]."  (Compl. Second Par. 390 H).  It bears reiteration that there is no recognizable claim or demand plaintiff can press on behalf of the County.  While the plaintiff argues that [...] can only grant long term tax abatements pursuant to LTTEL, under which they have to remit a 5% service charge to the County, as opposed to the NJHMFA, under which they do not, the Complaint acknowledges that to the best of their knowledge, “no appellate tribunal has ruled explicitly on whether the NJHMFA long term tax exemption survived the enactment of the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (“LTTEL”) (N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 to -22) (Compl. Par. 17), and further acknowledges that other courts have likewise declined to either rule on or address this issue (Compl. Pars. 18-20).
[brief] The consequences of the Defendant’s legal malpractice was financial disastrous to [...].  He found himself facing a judgment against him benefiting [...] who received nearly a million dollars’ worth of his money to tear down a extant house and leave [...] with a hole in the ground.  Additionally, he faced an award of counsel fees [...] and he had to pay his own attorneys.  Faced with this financial disaster [...] entered into an agreement with [...].  The agreement which the Court found it was an assignment of this lawsuit is dated October 19, 2017 (Pa0339).
[brief] Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448, 463 (App. Div. 2005) (discussing McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework); Grande v. St. Clare’s Health System, 230 N.J. 1, 17 (2017); Fleming v. Corr. Healthcare Sols., Inc., 164 N.J. 90, 101 (2000); Bergen Commer. Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 210 (1999).  Establishment of a prima facie case gives rise to a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff.  Bergen Commer. Bank v. Sisler, 157 at 188.  In order to rebut that presumption, the defendant must proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination.  Id.; Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005)  Background § III.B (Detailing [...]’s pervasive sexual harassment of Appellant).
[brief] ”  *State v. Mann*, 132 N.J. 410, 419 (1993).  The evidence sought to be introduced must be intrinsically indicative of a consciousness of guilt but recently our Supreme Court has reaffirmed that such evidence need not unequivocally support such an inference, stating that “[t]here is no support in our jurisprudence for so high a bar to the admission of such evidence. ”  *State v. Randolph*, 228 N.J. 566, 595 (2017).  Defendant contends that he had an alternative explanation for refusing to submit to buccal swab testing which rendered such evidence as overly prejudicial and inadmissible.
[brief] Rule 4:6-2(e) ........................................................................  PASSIM Rule 4:9-1 ..................................................................................  25 Rule 4:46-2 ...............................................................................  23 N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1 ......................................................................  25  OTHER AUTHORITIES  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.2.1 on R. 4:9-1 (2019) . .  25  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 to R. 4:5-1.  Defendant [...] had to establish that he was a party subject to joinder under R. 4:28 or R. 4:29-1(b).  See R. 4:5-1(b)(2).  As Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant [...] is for legal malpractice, it was not subject to joinder in the underlying litigation, and [...]’s motion fails.  In addition to failing to demonstrate that Defendant was a party subject to joinder, which the Defendants’ motion papers below made no attempt to establish, the Defendants’ next burden would be to establish that any failure to identity them was inexcusable.  Here, the Plaintiffs’ failure to identify Defendant [...] in the R. 4:5-1(b)(2) certification was excusable because it was made based on an analysis performed by its counsel at the time determining that the R. 4:5-1(b)(2) rules would not require naming Defendant [...] given the black letter law of Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997).  As set forth above, not only was the failure to amend the R.4:5-1 claim excusable, the Defendants incurred no substantial prejudice.  The loss of evidence or ability to find witnesses is not even claimed.  The Trial Court erroneously focused on its perception of duplicate of litigation - this is not an appropriate consideration under the current case law concerning the entire controversy doctrine.  The Court identifies no prejudice in a means of loss witnesses or evidence of the like occasion by the Defendants.  The Trial Court’s dismissal of this matter pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine was erroneous.
[brief] Although [...] claims that it determined that there were no errors in the operation of the Theater Management System software, [...] also stated in its answer to the plaintiff’s Supplemental Interrogatory No. 24 (Second Set) that “[...] does provide [...] with logs, however [...] uses different logs than [...] and is not familiar with the contents of the logs or the codes that are contained within them. ”  This answer casts grave doubt on whether [...] even knows how to interpret its own logs correctly.  Finally, the adequacy and safety of the lighting in Auditorium at the time of the plaintiff’s accident in Auditorium 5 is a central issue in this case.