ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On January 3, 2019, a Burlington County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant with two counts of third-degree commercial burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1) (counts one and two).  (Da1 to 2).  On February 28, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied defendant’s motion to preclude the State from introducing fingerprint-analysis evidence.  (1T19-20 to 22-12).  He also granted in part and denied in part defendant’s motion to preclude any expert from stating that there was a fingerprint match or identification.  (1T29-2 to 8).  Following a five-day jury trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both charges.  (7T42-24 to 43-13; Da3).  On the day of sentencing, the prosecutor requested that the trial judge make a finding on Warrant [...], a disorderly persons offense of theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-3(a).  Based on the evidence presented to the jury at trial on the indictable charges, the judge found defendant guilty of that offense.  (8T29-2 to 30-1).  Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent discretionary extended terms of six years in prison on each count with an extended two-year period of parole ineligibility, in addition to restitution and all statutory fines.  (8T41-2 to 46-25; Da4 to 6).  Two weeks later, the judge held another hearing to “clarify some of the Court’s rulings” and further explain his reasoning.  (9T3-18 to 23).  Defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 15, 2023.  (Da7 to 9).
[brief] Pa55.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.  Pa55.  [...] certified that he participated in the rescue, recovery, and/or cleanup at the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001, and October 11, 2001, or September 11, 2001, and/or September 12, 2001.  Pa55.  [...] submitted the Ricci Act Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form with his affidavit.  Pa57.  Pa59.  With his Request for Amended Benefits Form, [...] supplied a World Trade Center health Program Certification of his 9/11 illness, Registration for the Victims Compensation Fund, and Witness Presence Statements.  Pa60.  Pa62.  Pa63.  Pa72.  Pa74.  Pa78.  He also provided two New Jersey State Police Incident/Exposure Reports noting his response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.  Pa64.  Pa68.  [...] also provided a State of New Jersey Employer’s First Report of Accidental Injury or Occupational Disease.  Pa69.  On March 3, 2023, a Petition to the State Police Retirement Board was filed on behalf of [...] and many others.
[brief] judgment enforcing the Settlement Agreement and specifically [...]’s release of all “Claims, rights or interests” in the Palm Beach Property.  (Da001a-022a.)  On or around June 27, 2022, [...] filed her Answer and opposition to [...]’s Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause, respectively.  (Da214a.)  The Court heard initial oral arguments on the Order to Show Cause application on July 15, 2022.  (See generally 1T.)  At oral argument, [...]’s counsel requested (and received) permission to file a sur-reply, which ultimately was filed on or around August 1, 2022.  (1T:29:23-25.)  Subsequently, [...] (with the Trial Court’s approval) filed a response to [...]’s sur-reply on or around August 12, 2022.  Importantly for purposes of this appeal, during the July 15, 2022 oral argument, the Court recognized that “both sides . . . indicat[ed] that [the Settlement Agreement] is clear so that the Court could, in essence, decide it on the papers,” and that “both” parties “fe[lt] strongly that [the Settlement Agreement] speaks for itself and the Court can decide it that way.
[brief] *2  At trial, [...] identified defendant as one of the persons who robbed him, and although [...] was unable to identify defendant as one of the perpetrators of the Ramada robbery, he did identify him as the person who had entered the motel at 2:30 a.m. and asked to rent a room.  In addition, the State introduced videotapes of both robberies recorded by security cameras and defendant's tape-recorded confession to commission of the robberies.
[brief] [...], et al., Beyond The Individuality Of Fingerprints: A Measure Of Simulated Computer Latent Print Source Attribution Accuracy, 7 L. Prob. & Risk 165 (2008)…………………………..Da 21-45  [...] et al., The Influence of Close Non-Match Fingerprints Similar in Delta Regions of Whorls on Fingerprint Identification, 66 J. Forensic Sci. 1482 (2020)……………………………………………………Da 46-58  [...] et al., The Relationship Between Sensitivity, Similar Non-Matches and Database Size in Fingerprint Database Searches, 13 L. Probability & Risk 151 (2014)………………………………………………..  Da 59-76
[brief] As such, the trial Court's jury instructions on accomplice liability was capable of producing an unjust result, and by counsels failure to object to the instructions constituted a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. pursuant to the Strickland's two-prong test and/or the Cronic/Davis per se analyses, this matter must be remanded.  (c)  [...] AND/OR APPELLATE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY ARGUE A MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT BECAUSE OF PERJURED TESTIMONY AND FALSE EVIDENCE ADMITTED BY THE STATE AND DETECTIVE HAMER THAT MISLEAD THE GRAND JURORS, THUS VIOLATING DUE PROCESS UNDER N.J. AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
[brief] Standard of Review (Pa27-Pa28)  .............................................19  Point I – This Court Should Not Consider any Arguments Not Raised by Plaintiff Below  .........................................................19  Point II-  The Chancery Division’s March 4, 2024 Order Should Be Affirmed as Plaintiff’s Counsel Violated the Court Rules Numerous Times and Their Failure to Oppose Defendants’ Summary Judgment Cross-Motion and Their Defective Statement of Material Facts Should Not Be Excused (Pa27-Pa28)  .......................................................21  Point III – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was Properly Denied by the Trial Court and Defendants’ Unopposed Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment was Properly Granted (Pa27-Pa28)
[brief] N.J. R. Evid. 102 .........................................................................................................................15  N.J. R. Evid. 701 .......................................................................................................................... 11, 12, 14 N.J. R. Evid. 702 .................................................................................................................................4  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules Governing the Courts, cmt. 2.3.2 on R. 4:46-2 (2019) ...............................................................................................  7 R. 4:46-2(c) .....................................................................................................................................7
[directive] 7  Role of the Supervisor  7.1  Upon being notified or becoming aware of the pursuit, the supervisor shall decide as quickly as possible whether or not the pursuit shall be permitted to continue and shall broadcast that decision over the police radio channel by declaring “pursuit authorized” or “terminate pursuit. ”  In addition, if the supervisor decides to authorize the pursuit, the supervisor shall broadcast the underlying reason for authorizing the pursuit (e.g., “Pursuit authorized for armed robbery suspect. ”).  7.2  The supervisor shall permit a pursuit to continue only under the following circumstances:  (a)  There is a reasonable belief that the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime enumerated in Section 3.2 of this Policy; or (b)  There is a reasonable belief that violator poses an imminent threat to safety of the public or other police officers.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.  See Section 3.2(b) of this Policy.  7.3  The supervisor shall order a pursuit terminated at any time if he or she concludes that the danger to the pursuing officer(s) or the public outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension of the violator.  7.4  The supervisor shall order the pursuit terminated if the suspect’s identity is established to the point where later apprehension may be accomplished and where there is no imminent threat to public safety.  7.5  In recognition of the overall population density and volume of vehicular traffic in this State, and the increased risk attendant to prolonged vehicular pursuits, a supervisor shall order the termination of any pursuit of protracted duration unless the supervisor determines that further pursuit is justified to respond to an imminent threat to public safety.  7.6  The supervisor shall ensure, for the duration of the pursuit, that this Policy and agency procedures are followed by all officers.  12
[brief] In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) held that using false testimony to obtain a conviction by representatives of the State, falls under the fourteenth amendment.  The Court said the same result must obtain when the State allows a defendant to stand trial on an indictment which it knows is based “in part upon perjured testimony”.  The consequences to the defendant of perjured testimony given before the grand jury are no less severe than those of perjured testimony given at trial, and in fact may be more severe.  The defendant has no effective way of cross-examining or rebutting the perjured testimony given before the grand jury, as he might in court.  The Court is to give a curative instruction when the jury has heard a statement from a witness that was improper and has the capacity for prejudice.
[directive] These records should not be disclosed to defense counsel unless and until the assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general handling the case has specifically determined that (1) the medical record is required to be turned over in discovery pursuant to R. 3:13-3, and (2) there is no basis to redact information and to seek a protective order.  It is the responsibility of the county prosecutor or the [...] to apply for a protective order pursuant to R. 3:13-3f when necessary to preclude the inappropriate disclosure of any medical record or portion thereof.  (For example, if medical records obtained by a grand jury subpoena include information that is subject to the “rape shield” law codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 and N.J.R.E. 412 (e.g., information concerning whether the victim had previously engaged in sexual intercourse, or had an abortion), the county prosecutor or [...] should seek a protective order and should not disclose this information unless expressly ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.)  5.
[brief] (Da669)  The plaintiff submitted an affidavit of services for legal costs incurred on this proceeding.  (Da686)  The Court on May 29, 2019 again issued an Order awarding sanctions and attorney fees to the Synagogue against the School.  (Da969)  On June 25, 2019, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision/Opinion (Da751) reversing and invalidating all of [...]’s Decisions/Orders, including that the synagogue had an easement for parking its staff/attendee vehicles on the School Lot 5 and all enforcement Orders, and remanded the matter for a full plenary hearing to determine the nature of the rights created by the 1963 Agreement and whether any such rights remained in effect.
[brief] See Pa309 (30:11-31:2); Pa318 (68:8-22).  Defendant [...] admitted that, at the time of the crash, [...] was simply walking in an open area of the parking lot; she did not dart out or run in front of [...]’s vehicle.  Pa326 (100:5-22).  [...] was making a left turn when she struck Ms.  Jameel, whom she had not seen and to whose presence she had not been alerted:  And then when I made the left, I felt that I hit something.  And I was just like, confused, because I didn’t see any cones.  I didn’t see – I know we don’t have a curb, because I’ve driving in this parking lot for years.  I didn’t see anything.  What the hell did I hit?  Then just from looking out the window, I didn’t see anything.  So I just went over and felt the bump, the second bump from the tire.  And then I opened the door.  And I was like, oh my God.  It’s a human.
[brief] As such, this Court is free to affirm the judgment of dismissal on any legal grounds, even if different than the reasoning provided by the Superior Court for its ruling.  *Id.*  Thus, while the Superior Court’s dismissal should be affirmed for the reasons set forth on the record (*i.e.*, the failure of Appellant’s letter vendor theory of liability to support the legal viability of her claim), *see supra* and T23-24, it should also be affirmed on different grounds; namely, that Appellant lacked standing to pursue her claim, rendering it inappropriate for judicial review.
[brief] Keystone Servicing, LLC v. Block 365, Lot 9, et al., 2021 WL at *3-4.  The appellate court was critical of the trial court’s unwillingness to entertain a pro se defendant’s “significant showing that the claim of abandonment was incorrect. ”  [...]’s certification consisted of a preprinted form – delineating the facts set forth in N.J.S.A. 55:19-81 as to what constituted abandonment – on which [...] made or chose not to make certain markings in a way that generates doubt about the sufficiency of what he was attempting to convey.  Keystone Servicing, LLC v. Block 365, Lot 9, et al., 2021 WL at *3-4.  The court also criticized the basis for [...]’s conclusion as to the critical statutory issue of six months of vacancy:  [[...]] declared that the property ‘is abandoned pursuant to N.J.S.A. 55:19-81 because the property has not been occupied for at least 6 months preceding the date of this certification. ’  [...] does not explain how he knew that the property had not been legally occupied for the prior six months, not does the certification provide many other facts that would support this conclusion.  Keystone Servicing, LLC v. Block 365, Lot 9, et al., 2021 WL at *3-4.  Even if the Court was to overlook that the [...] Report in this Foreclosure Action analyzed the incorrect property, the deficiencies cited by the Appellate Division in Keystone Servicing as to the form utilized by [...] apply with full force to this case.  [...]’s findings are unsupported by his own observations and contradicted by certification of the Appellant [...].  The [...] Report is not reliable nor dispositive of the findings the lower court was required to make under N.J.S.A. 55:19-81.  The Court is also directed to US Bank Cust for PC7 First Trust v. Block 64, Lot 6, 2020 WL 4196664 (App. Div.), unpublished, which notably instructs that abandonment can not be predicated upon vacancy alone.
[brief] The “reasonableness” test of the Fourth Amendment utilizes an objective standard.  “[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. ”  *Id.* at 397.  “[I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard. ”  *Id.* (internal citations omitted).  “Courts evaluate the reasonableness of ‘a particular use of force … from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. ’”  *Ansell v. Ross Twp., Penn.*, 419 Fed. Appx. 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2011)(citing *Graham* at 396).  The Third Circuit has held that courts should “consider[ ] all of the relevant facts and circumstances leading up to the time that the officers allegedly used excessive force. ”  *Rivas v. City of Passaic*, 365 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2004).  Under *Graham*, the following factors should be considered to determine the objective reasonableness of the officer’s actions: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is *actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.* ”  *Graham*, 4909 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added).  The Fourth Amendment permits the use of “reasonable” force.  *Id.* at 396.  “[E]ach case alleging excessive force must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. ”  *Sharrar v. Felsing*, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997).  The factors identified by *Sharrar* were “the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time. ”  Id. at 822.  B.
[brief] *See Neal v. Asta Funding, Inc.*, 2016 WL 3566960 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016); *Tox Design Group, LLC v. RA Pain Services, PA*, 2019 WL 7183687 (App. Div. Dec. 26, 2019); *Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 238 N.J. 191 (2019); *Schmidt v. Laub as Trustee for Carol L. Glatstian Living Trust*, 2020 WL 2130931 (App. Div. May 5, 2020).  16  Nevertheless, overcoming New Jersey’s presumption that courts decide arbitrability issues is onerous and only achievable with “clear and unmistakable evidence.
[brief] By way of this application, we sought for the Court to re-consider certain probative evidence, which included the competent evidence from the report of [...]’ report and affidavit of permanency, dated March 29, 2021.  Additionally, in connection with Dr. Rodger’s report, the Appellant-Plaintiff submitted a Certification reflecting her injuries.  She stated in relevant part, the following:  1.  I have reviewed [...]’ report, dated March 29, 2021, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.  The report is consistent with my permanent injuries.  2.  The continued complaints of pain that I experience include:  a.  Neck pain, spasm and stiffness b.  Low back restriction, spasm, and pain c.  Pain in legs d.  Numbness, weakness, pain, and abnormal sensation in my hands and arms e.  Fatigue f.  Difficulty sitting and lifting g.  Significant difficulty breathing from the sternum area of the chest  3.  These complaints are described in [...]’ report and are consistent with my chief complaints of pain.  These pains come and go; therefore there are days when the pain is more noticeable compared to other days.  4.  To the best of my recollection, on the date of the deposition, June 22, 2022, the pains were not as noticeable compared to other days when the pain is more excruciating.  5.  I still suffer and experience excruciating pain on a regular basis.  I still have significant difficulty breathing due to the fractured sternum.  Additionally, when going to sleep, I am unable to sleep while laying down flat on my back.  Instead, I have to turn sideways (either on my left or right side) to fall asleep.  This makes it very difficult because I have always preferred to sleep while laying down flat on my back.  6.  The limits and restrictions to my range of motion include cervical muscle, tendons and ligaments.  This is consistent with [...]’ findings in his report.  7.  In fact, [...] states that “there will be permanent and significant decrease in all ranges of cervical, thoracic and lumbosacral spinal regions due to the injuries sustained” from the MVA.  In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court concluded that it "finds that it did not overlook over fail to give enough weight to any fact or argument previously submitted when rendering the March 31, 2023 order."  The Trial Court further concluded that the "Plaintiff had not provided evidence of a permanent injury through both objective and subjective evidence.  In fact, the court previously noted that the Plaintiff's medical expert, chiropractor, [...] [sic], provided a report which merely parroted the statutory requirements under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8A and memorized the subjective complaints of Plaintiff."
[directive] subsection See, e.~., 25(c).2 assessment risk results of on the generally relies Directive this 2  Although charging e.~., guide the exercise of discretion.  See, grounds to factual on other provisions rely tools, some domestic complaint-warrant based on a violation of apply for a presumption to (establishing a 4.5.2 subsection (establishing Protection order), subsection a Survivor Act 4.5.4.b  Assault Sexual order or a restraining violence (establishing subsection offenses are charged), and 4.5.5 when specified complaint-warrant apply for presumption to another on present offense was committed while release for when the complaint-warrant apply for presumption to a than one presumption to charge by complaint-warrant under more will invoke a case instances, a In many offense).
[brief] (Aa130-134)  In its decision, this court notably determined that [...] did not “have a legally cognizable stake in Newark’s” tax program “nor a substantial likelihood he will experience some harm .  . . .”  Id. at 4.  Further, this court expressly warned against courts entertaining proceedings by plaintiffs who are “mere intermeddlers” or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute. ”  Id. at 3-4 (internal citations omitted).  As in that prior appeal, [...] is still not a Newark resident; thus, he remains an improper “intermeddler” without standing to challenge an ordinance in a municipality to which he does not reside or work in.
[directive] Por crime violento entende-se qualquer crime em que você causou a morte, lesão corporal grave ou usou uma arma mortal ou ameaçou usá-la imediatamente.  O crime violento também inclui qualquer agressão sexual qualificada ou agressão sexual em que você usou força física ou ameaçou usá-la imediatamente.  Por arma mortal entende-se qualquer arma de fogo ou outra arma, dispositivo, instrumento, material ou substância, seja animada ou inanimada, a qual, pela forma de seu uso ou pelo uso a qual se destina, é conhecida pela capacidade de causar morte ou lesão corporal grave.  Por lesão corporal grave entende-se lesão corporal que cria um alto risco de morte ou que causa desfiguração grave e permanente, perda prolongada ou comprometimento da função de qualquer membro ou órgão do corpo.  A violent crime means any crime in which you caused death, serious bodily injury, or you used or threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon.
[brief] They did not, and the trial court agreed.  Because Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden, the trial court appropriately ruled in favor of the [...] and the [...].  When an appellate court is reviewing the decision of a trial court that has reviewed municipal action, the appellate court is bound by the same standard as was the trial court.  *New York SMSA v. Weehawken Bd. of Adj.*, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 331 (App. Div. 2004); *Charlie Brown of Chatham*, supra, 202 N.J. Super. at 321.  Thus, the appellate court must give substantial deference to the findings of fact, to the extent they are made by the trial court, and refrain from overturning them unless they are arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  *Friends of Peapack-Gladstone v. [...]*, 407 N.J. Super. 404, 424 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] Moreover, Defendant cited the Mueller case in her post-trial brief, in which our Supreme Court unequivocally held that to sustain a conversion claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he made a pre-suit demand on the defendant to return property and (2) that the defendant’s refusal to return the property was wrongful.  Mueller, supra, 8 N.J. at 207-08.  Accordingly, the trial court and Plaintiffs were on notice of Defendant’s argument regarding the Plaintiffs’ failure to establish the prima facie elements of their conversion claim, which included the pre-suit demand requirement.