ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After [...] denied that his in-court identification resulted merely from defendant being seated next to defense counsel in the courtroom, the State on redirect asked [...] whether he could see in the courtroom the person who shot him.  When he said yes, the State asked him to point to that person and identify him, whereupon [...] pointed to defendant.  The State's next witness was [...], who, in response to a question from the assistant prosecutor, pointed to defendant as the person she observed shoot [...] on July 3, 2003.  She stated that she was “sure” when she selected defendant's photo from the array that he was in fact the person she observed with a gun that day.  On cross-examination, Spence admitted she was currently on probation, and acknowledged that her sister was [...]'s girlfriend.  The State's next witness was [...], who corroborated the testimony of Spence and stated that when she saw defendant get out of his car she thought that he and [...] were going to fight, but that instead defendant “just shot him. ”  The State then rested.
[brief] In October 2021, [...] filed suit against [...] pursuant to the New Jersey Environmental Rights Act and the New Jersey Spill Act for damages resulting from the spill and remediation, and for statutory fines and treble damages.  (PPCIa1-42).  [...] alleged to have incurred over $400,000 in remediation costs.  Id.  At the time of its motion against [...] for partial summary judgment, [...] claimed damages of $475,623.87.  (PPCIa259).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON APRIL 6, 2023 AGAINST [...] IN FAVOR OF AURORA, AS WELL IN REFUSING TO REVERSE THAT ORDER (PPCIa369-71; PPCIa419-20; 1T; and PPCIa449-50)
[brief] By his own admission, [...] conceded that he was a licensed real estate agent at the time of the attempted real estate transaction, but that he was not licensed by the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance as a “foreclosure consultant” under the FRFPA.  (70a, 9:7–15; 73a, 18:1–19).  A “foreclosure consultant” is defined as a person “who, directly or indirectly, for compensation from an owner, makes any solicitation, representation, or offer to perform, or who performs, any distressed property service that the person represents will . . .  (a) prevent or postpone the foreclosure sale of the property . . .; (c) assist the owner in exercising any right of reinstatement or right of redemption . . .; [or] (f) assist the owner in obtaining a loan or advance of funds to pay off the promissory note, contract, or mortgage evidencing or securing a debt in relation to the property. ”  N.J.S.A. 46:10B-54.
[brief] (Pa130–33).  The prosecution stated that [...]’s mental health issues were not “specifically enumerated” in the PTI rejection letter.  (Pa132).  Nevertheless, the prosecution accurately noted that [...] had to be hospitalized for psychiatric evaluation and would thus be better served through alternative supervisory programs.  Ibid.  Nothing in [...]’s various pleadings permits the inference that the prosecutor’s PTI rejection was because of any disability [...] may have had or was discriminatory in the first instance.  The mere fact that the State offers individuals suffering from psychiatric issues alternatives to PTI is not a NJLAD violation.  Additionally, nothing in the operative complaint or proposed second amended complaint permits the inference that the Prosecutor’s Office or the Prosecutor had any discriminatory motive for denying [...]’s PTI application.  To the extent the Prosecutor’s Office took his cognitive differences into account in recommending against PTI so that he could be diverted into a more specialized supervisory program is no more a violation of the NJLAD than civilly committing someone, rather than incarcerating them.
[brief] Rule 1:4-8(d) permits the court to impose sanctions on an attorney who has filed a frivolous pleading, written motion or other paper.  Further, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 permits prevailing parties in a civil action to apply for attorney’s fees and litigation costs “if the judge finds at any time during the proceedings or upon judgment that a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense of the non-prevailing person was frivolous. ”
[brief] [...] recommended that [...] address its growing special education costs.  *Ibid.*  But as the ALJ found, the record is devoid of any “evidence of the steps [[...]] has actually taken to save money by educating more of its special education students in a district-run program. ” (Ra100).  As outlined above, there were 706 students aged 3-21 in specialized out-of-district placements in 2021-2022, the majority of whom had a primary diagnosis of speech or language impairment.  (Ra254; Ra256).  It is “unclear why so many students” with such a disability are not educated in-district, the Report found.  (Ra256).  In failing to develop in-district programs, [...] has not availed itself of opportunities for additional SFRA funding.
[brief] (Id. at 9 (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 6)).  Plaintiffs state that defendants “refused to participate in the deposition,” and instead “preferred ... to provide written deposition topic responses and committed to fully investigating each topic. ” (Id.).  Plaintiffs further state that “[a]t the [District Judge’s] encouragement during an October 18, 2019 hearing, Plaintiffs agreed to forego the deposition and accept [...]’s written responses. ” (Id. (citing [...] Decl. Ex. 11 at 10, 16-17)).  According to plaintiffs, defendants then provided “written responses with limited document preservation information,” and “would not identify instances in which documents were routinely deleted and what exactly was done to preserve documents, except to acknowledge that [they] had ‘issued appropriate legal holds’ to specific servers.
[brief] The appellate standard of review governing an appellate court’s review of a decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is an abuse of discretion standard.  Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (“We will not disturb the trial court’s reconsideration decision ‘unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion. ’”).  “Reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 is a matter within the sound discretion of the court and is to be exercised ‘for good cause shown and in the service of the ultimate goal of substantial justice.
[brief] In determining whether to grant a Motion to Dismiss, “the [School Ethics] Commission shall review the facts in the light most favorable to the complainant and determine whether the allegation(s), if true, could establish a violation of the Act. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3; see also Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969) (dismissal on motion inappropriate if case supported by a scintilla of evidence).  The Commission erred by doing precisely the opposite with regard to dismissing Counts 2 and 3, by not only viewing facts in the light most favorable to the party moving for dismissal, but also by inserting facts into its Decision that were not in the record at all, and which are actually contradicted by the record.  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (factual findings inconsistent with the evidentiary record not to be relied upon).  At the time Respondent refused to wear a mask at multiple meetings of the Board, New Jersey Executive Order 251 (2021) (EO 251) was in place, which stated:
[brief] This condemnation action was instituted by the filing the Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause on September 5, 2018 on behalf of Plaintiff/Respondent, [...] (“Respondent” or “Borough”).  Da1.  On that same date, Respondent filed the Declaration of Taking and Notice of Lis Pendens with the Court.  Da16.  On September 24, 2018, the trial court executed the Borough’s Order to Show Cause as well as the Order for Payment into Court.  Da19.  Appellant filed an Answer on October 17, 2018, which contained an Affirmative Defense that the Borough had not satisfied the requirement to engage in *bona fide* negotiations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 20:3-6 and demanded dismissal of the Verified Complaint.
[brief] [...] claims the trial court did not apply the appropriate standards under Abbott XX, and then “failed to analyze the factual record” as to how the SFRA is implemented in Jersey City.  (Ab27).  It then claims that it is entitled to a heightened standard of individual review because it is an Abbott district, and that under Abbott XX’s standards it established a prima facie T&E claim that the State did not meet “required” or “optimal” levels of funding.  (Ab27, Ab30-31).  [...] is wrong.  The court did, in fact, apply the appropriate standard of review; and under any standard, its claims fail as a matter of law because it fundamentally misconstrues the purpose of the adequacy budget and how State aid is calculated.
[brief] Of those, several requests failed to specify a specific document by date, title, and author and instead sought records that “reflect,” “explain,” “detail,” or “demonstrate” the “rationale,” “decision,” or “purpose” of, among other things, various chemical processes of a highly technical and complex nature.  As if this were not sufficiently inclusive, [...]’s last request sought the agency’s “entire project file. ”  [Id. at 578.]  [...] cites Burke v. Brandes, 429 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 2012), but that case is both factually distinguishable and favorable to Plaintiff.
[brief] For example, in [...] v. [...] … the Commission discussed how failure to include a disclaimer can lead to the belief that the statements made by a school official, even in attempted to be made in their personal/private capacity, can be viewed as those of the Board.  [...], [...], [...].  More specifically, and although Respondent [...] argued that the statements attributed to her by Complainant [...] “were not made in her capacity as a Board member and [did] not relate to her Board membership or to Board actions,” the Commission found that “the statements on her Facebook page [were] clearly linked to her Board membership (and candidacy),” her social media page did not have a disclaimer noting that the statements made were her own and unrelated to the Board, and that, as a result, “it [was] reasonable for a member of the public … to perceive the statements as being made by Respondent in her capacity as Board member.
[brief] Ca21.  The Receiver also retained an accountant and paid for same without the Court’s appointment and approval of the compensation as reasonable.  Ca20.  Even if the Receiver’s retention of the accountant was done on an emergent basis as alleged, the Receiver should have sought Court approval as soon as practically possible.  None was sought.  [...] has asserted in this matter that [...] was being represented by the Bank’s counsel based upon eCourts information/filings.
[brief] A single shell casing was supposedly found close to the curb abutting the street.  (1T61-25 to 1T62-3 ([...]))  However, blood spatter from the shooting was located approximately 25 feet away from the shell casing with no explanation.  (1T31-12 to 1T31-18 ([...]))  The shell casing was located somewhere between the bodega and the barbershop.
[brief] Page  ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 23, 2023  GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS  .................................................................Pa0354  ORDER DATED JUNE 27, 2023 DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE  .................................................................Pa0355  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | *Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock,* | 27, 28, 29, 32 | | 925 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.N.J. 1996) | | | *Bhagat v. Bhagat,* | 24 | | 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014) | | | *Berkowitz v. Haigood,* | 28, 30 | | 256 N.J. Super. 342, 346 (Law Div. 1992) | | | *City of Atl. City v. Trupos,* | 24 | | 201 N.J. 447, 463, (2010) (citations omitted) | | | *Conopco, Inc. v. McCreadie,* | 28, 29 | | 826 F. Supp. 855, 867 (D.N.J. 1993) | | | *Costanzo v. Costanzo,* | 28 | | 248 N.J. Super. 116, 121 (Law Div. 1991) | | | *Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*,| 24 | | 202 N.J. 369, 382–83, (2010) | | | *Fusco v. Bd. of Ed. of the City of Newark,* | 35 | | 349 N.J.Super. 455 (App. Div. 2002) | | | *Goldfarb v. Reicher,* | 26 | | 112 N.J.L. 413, 414 (Sup. Ct.), | | | aff’d, 113 N.J.L. 399 (E. & A. 1934) | | | *Henry v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs.*, | 24 | | 204 N.J. 320, 330, 9 A.3d 882 (2010) | | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Page(s) | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, | 24 | | 140 N.J.
[brief] I.  The Trial Court Improperly Placed Its Thumbs Upon the Scales of Justice.  (Pa79, Pa80, Pa82, 1T, 2T, 3T)  Our judicial system and court rules are predicated upon due process and resolution of disputes based upon the merits.  A trial is the search for truth, not the illusion of truth.  Implicit in a judge’s fact-finding responsibilities is the judge’s obligation to decide all critical issues.  A judge cannot decline to do so because the issue is novel and thus, in the judge’s view, should be first addressed by an appellate court.  See State v. Roper, 362 N.J. Super. 248, 252 (App. Div. 2003).  Here, the trial court acted manifestly unjustly under the circumstances.  Here, the trial court punted its judicial obligation and duty.  Here, the trial court erred when it denied plaintiff limited and expedited discovery and permitted defendants not to respond to 67 counterstatements of material facts.  But plaintiff was entitled to expedited and limited discovery and a “fuller and fairer opportunity to make their case. ”  See, Mary A. Botteon v. Borough of Highland Park, A-1227-22 (App. Div. May 1, 2024)(slip op. at p. 24-25)(Pa427) ([...], together with Judges Chase and Vinci, reversing and remanding plaintiff’s remaining non-preemption state law claims, which were dismissed without an opportunity for discovery and without a possible evidentiary hearing).  Botteon is not an outlier.  Botteon is consistent with federal case law recognizing the importance of discovery in civil rights violations cases.  See, Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1998) (litigants “are entitled to discovery before being put to their proof. ”); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]n civil rights cases ‘much of the evidence can be developed only through discovery’ of materials held by defendant officials. ”).  Here, the lack of expedited and limited pre-summary judgment discovery blocked plaintiff’s path to relief.  Here, plaintiff never waived his right to expedited and limited discovery.  (Pa326-DSJCSR #72).  Here, plaintiff never filed a cross-motion conceding the lack of disputed material facts and that the matter was ripe for pre-discovery summary judgment.  Here, the trial court delegated its fact- finding, evidentiary and discovery responsibilities to defendants.  The trial court condoned and permitted defendants’ public wrongdoing.  II.
[brief] Other 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 618 (1988) .......................................................  33  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914(2) ....................................................33  I.  THE COURT’S ALLOWANCE OF THE MANAGEMENT  VOTE TO SHIFT LEGAL FEES TO [...] WAS CLEARLY UNLAWFUL, AND THE COURT WAS NOT BOUND TO ACCEPT ANY VALUATION LIABILITY THAT RESULTED IN AN UNLAWFUL DISCOUNT TO EQUITY
[brief] D. (Pa000093)  The claims of the proposed [...] class members could not have been asserted in [...] and were therefore not extinguished by the 2015 Settlement.  Claims that had yet to accrue until nearly a decade after [...] settled are clearly not claims that “were or could have been raised” in the [...] litigation, seeing as the complaint was dismissed with prejudice on Feb. 20, 2015.  By its own terms, the [...] settlement resolved class claims for misconduct by [...] that occurred prior to the entry of final judgment on Feb. 20, 2015, not for misconduct occurring after that date.
[brief] It is impossible to overstate "the importance of the public notice requirements" since "such notice is jurisdictional."  Perlmart, Inc. v. Lacey Twp. Plan. Bd., 295 N.J. Super. 234, 237 (App. Div. 1996).  "[U]nless notice is given as required by statute the [B]oard lacks the power to hear or consider an application even if the subject matter is within its statutory power."  Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62, 79 (1998) (quoting [...], New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 4-2.1 (1997)).
[brief] Plaintiff failed to cite any “tree cases” below; however, the City offered a number with favorable holdings to municipalities.  In Conner v. Township of East Brunswick, 2015 W.L. 10709691 (App. Div., April 20, 2016), plaintiff was clearing his driveway after a snowstorm when a twenty-five foot limb fell from a tree, striking and killing him.  The tree was growing in the right-of-way of the Township.  Bradford pear trees were commonly planted in the 1980s and 1990s for shade; it was later learned they were defective and dangerous in populated areas because mature trees had the potential to split apart causing serious or fatal injuries.  The municipality claimed its recreation department managed its shade tree program and was fully compliant with the requirements set forth in the New Jersey Shade Tree and Community Forestry Assistance Act, triggering immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-10.  The trial court granted summary judgment on this basis.
[brief] In exercising that discretion, a court must go through "a two-step process: whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile."  Id. at 501.  The court determines whether the proposed amendment would be futile by asking “whether the amended claim will nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor. ”  Id. at 501-02.  Before an amendment can be denied as futile, it must be so meritless that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 4:6-2(e) would be granted.  “Accordingly, the discretion to deny a motion to amend is not mistakenly exercised when it is clear that the amendment is so meritless that a motion to dismiss under R[ule] 4:6-2 would have to be granted, the so-called futility prong of the analysis."
[brief] Even if Plaintiff certified or testified to the effect – which he has not – there exists nothing in the record to suggest he did not sign the 2007 Addendum or that he was misled into signing it.  As to the contention that the arbitration provision fails for the lack of jury waiver language, an “express waiver of the right to seek relief in a court of law to the degree required by [Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014)] is unnecessary when parties to a commercial contract are sophisticated and possess comparatively equal bargaining power.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  Prior to the initiation of this action—and without having first obtained a license under the NJCFLA—[...] is alleged to have acquired by assignment a pool of defaulted consumer debts including [...]’s [...] credit account for pennies on the dollar.  See Compl. ¶ 26 (Pa16).  As [...] was unlicensed under the NJCFLA, [...]’s account and the contract governing the same were void upon assignment to [...].  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  See Compl. ¶ 40 (Pa17).  Additionally, [...] disputed that she ever opened the account.  See Compl. ¶ 27 (Pa16).  Thereafter, [...] began dunning [...] and subsequently initiated the Collection Lawsuit.  See Compl. ¶¶ 34-35 (Pa17).  However, [...] had no right to attempt to collect the void debt—by purchasing or otherwise taking assignment of the debt, [...] engaged in the “consumer loan business” as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2.  See Compl. ¶¶ 39-40 (Pa17).  The issue is that [...] was not licensed as a consumer lender at the time it took possession of or attempted to enforce [...]’s account—a fact that was undisputed in the trial court.  Id.  As a result of [...]’s unlicensed status, the contract governing the alleged debt became void and unenforceable as of the date razor purchased or took assignment of the same, pursuant to the NJCFLA at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), which states, in pertinent part, that a contract for a loan acquired in violation of the act “shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  See Compl. ¶¶ 36-40 (Pa17).
[brief] Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 346-47, 349 (D.N.J. 1996).  [...] argues that the [...]’s representation of both [...]/his practices and [...] is prohibited by “both subsections of RPC 1.7(a). ”  Pb12.  [...]’s position is incorrect both on the merits and for two basic procedural reasons.
[brief] New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, is designed to eradicate discrimination in all forms.  Among its protections, the LAD prohibits discrimination on the basis of “gender identity or expression” in “any place of public accommodation,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1), including “any kindergarten, primary and secondary school, … [or] high school,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l).  In other words, a school that adopts a policy discriminating against students based on gender identity has violated the LAD’s bedrock protections.  And as the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized decades ago, this prohibition extends to both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims.  This case arose when Appellants, the [...] and [...], violated the LAD’s requirements.
[directive] Extreme Risk 2019 12, August Page?  If ordered by the court, a temporary extreme risk protective order shall prohibit the · or respondent from possessing, purchasing, owning, or receiving firearms ammunition, or from or or securing holding a firearms purchaser identification card permit to purchase a handgun or pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, a permit to carry a handgun pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 during the period the order is effect.  Additionally, the respondent will be ordered to surrender to law in or enforcement any firearms and any ammunition that the respondent possesses owns, and any or firearms purchaser identification card, permit to purchase a handgun, permit to carry a handgun held by the respondent.  Any such card or permit issued to the respondent shall be immediately revoked pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f).  See Guideline 4(b).  The temporary extreme risk protective order shall remain effect until further order of the in court.
[brief] (Pa074-075) (citing Rsch. Auto., Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l Inc., 626 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2010); Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., 502 F. App’x 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of first-filed New Jersey declaratory judgment action in favor of “the second-filed action for coercive relief” pending in Michigan).  --- 20  See, e.g., BASF Corp. v. Symington, 50 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 1995) (“It is our view that where a declaratory plaintiff raises chiefly an affirmative defense, and it appears that granting relief could effectively deny an allegedly injured Plaintiff’s claim that this case was not a preemptive filing (Pb22) ignores the relevant facts.