ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Berta v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 473 N.J. Super. 284, 304 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53 (1979)); see also Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Bd. (Trantino IV), 154 N.J. 19, 27 (1998).  Thus, in both Berta and Trantino the Board—and the appellate courts—were faced with the same question a trial court faces in assessing the applicability of aggravating factors three and nine—“determining whether” an inmate “has been sufficiently deterred and there is no likelihood of recidivism”  Trantino IV, 154 N.J. at 32.  And the appellate courts in both cases found that rehabilitative programming and a “recent infraction-free history” is “plainly material” and “probative of the likelihood of re-offense. ”  Ibid.; Berta, 473 N.J. Super. at 314-15.  These appellate court findings are clearly applicable in the context of a sentencing court’s assessment of aggravating factors three and nine.  Thus, when confronted with a prison record free of infractions with rehabilitative programming, a sentencing court must consider this evidence as weighing against aggravating factors three and nine unless there is competent, credible, contrary evidence.
[brief] The Code of Ethics, including N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), which is specifically the subject of this appeal, was added to the School Ethics Act by a New Jersey Assembly vote of 69-0, and a New Jersey Senate vote of 35-0.  Id.  This bill was then signed into law on July 26, 2001 as Public Law, Chapter 178.  Id.  N.J.S.A.
[directive] Designated Municipal Parks and Property  In addition to those lands under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Protection or used for conservation purposes, public lands include “any land so designated by municipal or county ordinance. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-1; N.J.S.A. 39:3C-32.  For example, public lands designated by a municipal ordinance may include sidewalks, bicycle paths, conservation easements, open spaces, parks, or any other public lands within a particular city or township.  See, e.g., Holmdel, N.J., Ordinances, ch. 3, § 3-3.2(b)(3).  Municipal ordinances may also include specific days and times when ORVs may be operated.  See, e.g., id. at § 3-3.2(b)(7).  ORVs operated on these public lands will also be subject to the requirements of Title 39:3C-1 et seq., outlined in Section II.
[brief] [….]  Here, representation of all these defendants would directly conflict with one another and already do conflict with each other.  In terms of the basic rudimentary concept of whether or not [...] did cut through on this own accord or whether he was told by his employer.  Again, representation for [...], the driver, relies on the theory that he was told to make the illegal cut through and did not do so on his own.  Conversely, [the [...]] rely on the notion that the supervisor explicitly instructed the drivers to refrain from the cut throughs.  Those theories are directly adverse to each other under the rule [RPC 1.7(a)(1)] and a conflict has arisen.
[brief] I.  **STANDARD ON APPEAL**  This Court “review[s] a motion under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate a final judgment under the abuse of discretion standard. ”  *257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto*, 477 N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023) (citing *U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume*, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)).  “Although the ordinary abuse of discretion standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  *Rule 4:50-1* permits a party to vacate a default judgment, as follows:  On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) [M]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.  In addition, Rule 4:50-2 mandates that for all sections of 4:50-1 “[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time. ”  (emphasis added).
[brief] After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form approximately one year and seven months past the deadline.  (Pa14).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa68-69).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it. ”  Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978).  Here, [...] seeks to avoid an obvious legislative restriction outlined in the Ricci Act that provides he is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation after July 8, 2021.  Even if [...] did not receive the postcard or any of the other notice provided by the Division, he cannot evade the two-year limitation period.
[brief] ”  (4T 127-18 to 20 (emphasis added))  The verdict sheet also did not require the jury to identify a robbery victim.  (Da 4)  Thus, in violation of Gentry, the judge never told the jurors that they had to unanimously agree on the identities of the person against whom the theft was committed and the person against whom force was threatened.  In addition, the jury instructions failed to specify that the jury had to unanimously agree on the identity of the person whom the defendant purposely led to believe that the defendant was armed.  Where the State’s theory in a first-degree robbery case is that the defendant only simulated possession of a deadly weapon, the State must prove that the perpetrator engaged in conduct or gestures that led the victim to actually and reasonably believe that the defendant was armed.
[brief] CERTIFICATION  I, [...], the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CD, playback number 9:46:11 to 12:34:32, is prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate compressed transcript of the proceedings as recorded, and to the best of my ability.  /s/ Myriam Lopez  [...]  AOC # 677  [...]  DATE: February 16, 2018  New Jersey Judiciary Plea Form  Defendant’s Name: [...] before Judge: [...]
[directive] Some individuals with certain types of disabilities may not have the capacity to consent for themselves.  Further, some individuals may have language or communication barriers due to their specific disability.  SART members shall defer to the FNE on issues involving consent.  The FNE must have access to a FNE Coordinator who can assist the nurse in determining the patient’s ability to give consent and/or legal guardianship issues.  In turn, the FNE Coordinator must be able to access prompt legal advice from the County Prosecutor’s Office on matters of consent.  However, no adolescent or adult victim of sexual assault with a disability will be compelled to undergo a medical forensic exam, even in cases where consent has been given by an individual with legal authority.
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding That [...]’s Rushed Takeover and Lockout of the Premises Precluded The Grant of The Motion To Enforce (Pa3).  Strong public policy favors settlement of litigation in New Jersey, but it is not absolute.  Borough of Haledon v. Borough of North Haledon, 358 N.J. Super. 289, 305 (App.Div.2003) (citing Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990)).  “Compelling circumstances” can preclude the denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement.  Id. at 305 (citing Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 (App.Div.1983)).  Such compelling circumstances were present here when [...] conducted improper, wrongful self-help and seized possession of the property a month before [...]’s leasehold expired or [...] vacated the premises per the Settlement Agreement.  The Trial Court did not err in finding that [...]’s actions precluded [...]’s obligation to pay the last settlement payment or comply with the other terms of the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] First, [...]’s reliance on Second Circuit case law based upon New York laws such as *[...] Ins. Co v. Munn*, 751 F.3d 94 (2nd Cir. 2014) is completely misplaced.  This case does not address nor interpret the New Jersey AICRA, RICO and NJIFPA statues which are the primary basis of the underlying decision and appeal.  The case interprets a completely different No Fault Statutory Scheme set forth in New York statutes which has no bearing on this case.  It is telling that [...] could not find any Third Circuit cases to support its allegations and had to settle for a distinguishable case from a different circuit.  The court should disregard this attempt at producing precedent that is inappropriate here.  [...] claims that the right to a jury trial afforded by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Jersey Central Power & Light* and *Lajara* supports its position that arbitration of coverage disputes is not mandated under the law.  It does not.  In *Jersey Central Power & Light*, the Supreme Court addressed whether the mandatory dispute resolution provisions of the Underground Facility Protection Act (UFPA), N.J.S.A.§48:2–73 to –91, for disputes under $25,000 was unconstitutional.  While the Court struck down the ADR provision as unconstitutional, it did so on a very discrete ground.  The Court held that, unlike other statutes which have a safety mechanism to allow *de novo* review of the alternative dispute decisions, the UFPA did not:  “N.J.S.A. 48:2–80(d) is a unique statute because it retains no option for a trial de novo. ”  *Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co.*, 212 N.J. at 598.  Based upon this significant due process deficiency, the Court struck down the arbitration provision as unconstitutional.  The Court distinguished the UFPA statue from other statutory ADR provisions that did have a *de novo* review safety mechanism, and were, therefore, constitutional:
[brief] [...] testified that the [...] changed the time garbage could be placed out on the curb for pick-up, and in turn, [...] had to employ additional laborers to take out the garbage during certain hours.  See 7T at 23:23-25; 24:1-13.  The garbage collection fee for the unit is $123.95.  See id. at 24:13.  [...] further testified that the increased fee would have been incurred notwithstanding the conversion of the unit to a condominium.  See id. at 24:15-20.  The Board deliberated and concluded that the garbage collection fee was a result of the unit’s conversion to a condominium.
[directive] Of course, shared Criminal Justice Information Systems such as those operated by the Federal Government, the State Police and others also require that participants adhere to strict confidentiality standards, but these systems are beyond the scope of this directive.  4.  Fundamental Principle Police records do not acquire a new legal status as a result of being stored on a computer network.  Confidential information may appear in many forms on the network.  Word processing documents, E-mail, database or spreadsheet files may all contain confidential information.  All information on police data systems must be maintained in such a way that non-law enforcement personnel do not have access to any information that they would not be permitted to see in a hard copy file.
[brief] The [...] Attorney responded “no, that’s not how it works” (1T60-9), insisting that [...] had no burden and the Board was obligated “to assume it was conforming” (1T60-9 to 61-10).  That concluded the presentations, with the School’s exhibits (Da7-88) in evidence (1T61-24 to 67-6) and the [...] submitting no Exhibits or testimony.  [...] moved that the Synagogue off-site parking on the School Lot 5 “is not a valid nonconforming use” (1T62-14).  After Board discussion (1T62-16 to 67-15), the Board Attorney again (for about the sixth time) repeated that in his opinion the Board should defer a determination (1T67-16 to 70-2).  The Motion was seconded (1T70-25 to 71-19); the Board members essentially all commenting that off-site parking on the School Lot 5 is not a valid nonconforming use but being unsure (given the Board Attorney’s repeated opinion) of the correct Board action (1T71-9 to 73-22).  The Board then voted and the Motion passed, 3 affirmative, 2 negative, 1 abstain (1T73-23 to 75-12).  The Board on November 19, 2018 adopted the Resolution (Da1-6), memorializing the Determination that the [...] off-site parking on the School Lot 5 was not a legal use or a legal nonconforming use.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED  US FIRE’s MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TO HOLD THAT BINDING MASSACHUSETTS PRECEDENT REQUIRES PRO-RATA, TIME ON THE RISK ALLOCATION IN THIS CASE  Because this is an insurance coverage action, [...]’s obligations in this case are governed by the terms of the policy of insurance it issued to [...], and by the law.  It is undisputed that the [...] policy, as interpreted under Massachusetts law, only provides coverage for “ultimate net loss” in excess of the $200,000 limits underlying the [...] Policy, for “property damage” that occurred during the policy period.  (Pa0333.)  In this case, “property damage” is the CVOC groundwater contamination at the [...].  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has expressly concluded that the contamination of groundwater with hazardous materials is the “property damage” that is insurable under a liability policy.  Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar.  Co., 407 Mass. 689 (1990).  Where, such as here, the “property damage” cannot readily be attributed solely to one policy period, allocation becomes necessary to attribute such “property damage” across all of the years during which “property damage” took place.
[brief] Second, a trial court must determine whether the time expended in pursuit of the "interests to be vindicated," the "underlying statutory objectives," and recoverable damages is equivalent to the time "competent counsel reasonably would have expended to achieve a comparable result...."  *Id.* at 336, 661 A.2d at 1227.  The court must not include excessive and unnecessary hours spent on the case in calculating the lodestar.  *Id.* at 335-36, 661 A.2d at 1226-27 (noting that it is not "'time actually expended'" but time "'reasonably expended'" that matters and that "'[h]ours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary'") (quoting *Copeland v. Marshall*, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980)).
[brief] Appellant is attempting to argue that the Trial Court was powerless to appoint a substituted arbitrator and was obliged to order the claim to be remade in new pleadings despite the fact that the original arbitrator had affected a settlement executed by the parties, held a hearing and decided that one party had breached the Agreement and was therefore liable and that a subsequent hearing would be held to assess damages and legal fees.  During the several years after that decision, Defendant ultimately unsuccessfully appealed the award three times.  Unfortunately, during that time the arbitrator died.  The instant application is an obvious attempt to get another bite of the apple by relitigating the matter and re-litigate it over a period of years.  Plaintiff believes that Appellant’s strategy is obvious — to wear down its resolve to pursue its claim by extending the case thereby increasing the legal fees and costs expended.  This appeal is consistent with its tactics and Plaintiffs’ belief.  The idea that after ten years and where a Court-ordered legal process established the liability issue of a claim, to suggest that New Jersey law would require abandoning its ordered process, by ordering the matter to be re-litigated as to all issues is, quite frankly, bizarre and undermines all considerations of fairness, justice and judicial economy.  Moreover, the Trade case fully discussed herein, is directly on point and dispositive of Defendants’ claims.  At the heart of Defendants’ cases and argument is that the named arbitrator was seminal to the agreement to arbitrate and that this was clearly the intention of the parties, exhibited by their agreement.  Ergo, if the arbitrator dies, the parties intentions are defeated by a substituted appointment by the Court.  But the Trial Court specifically held that the parties when signing the Settlement Agreement intended to perform it, and if it was somehow breached they would go to binding arbitration of the claim.  The Court found that the arbitration of the claim was the paramount intention and not who was to arbitrate it.  Even if Defendant had proven that [...], as arbitrator, was the significant factor, which it has not, its attempt to reverse [...]’s finding of liability and begin anew falls short under case law holding that a final finding on the issue of liability is conclusive and binds any new arbitrator.
[brief] POINT  I  BECAUSE ALL CLAIMS AGAINST DABNEY WERE BASED ON WHAT THE VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT DETERMINED TO HAVE BEEN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND SELF-DEALING, THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY FOUND THAT OHIO CASUALTY APPROPRIATELY CEASED FUNDING OF DABNEY’S DEFENSE AND DENIED ANY DUTY TO INDEMNIFY HIM AGAINST THE FEE AWARDS.
[brief] Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J.Super. 581, 591-92 (App.Div.) certif. denied 72 N.J. 459, 371 A.2d 63 (1976)  ....................................................................................................................23  Zaromb v. Borucka, 166 N.J.Super. 22, 27, 398 A.2d 1308 (App.Div.1979) .....................33  Statutes Rule 2:6-1(a)(2) ..................................................................................................................30, 42 Rule 4:9-1...............................................................................................................................28
[brief] Defendants’ Multi-Jurisdictional Marketing Attracted Plaintiff**  A significant part of Plaintiff’s decision to hire Defendants was their ability to provide multi-jurisdictional services.  Da315 ¶ 15.  Plaintiff needed legal representation to liaise with its note holders and New York escrow attorney and later with its Pennsylvania escrow attorney, as well as to review multiple agreements specifying various other jurisdictions for choice of law.  *Id.*  [...] markets itself as a “premier full-service law firm” with a “strong reputation” for litigation and transactions on behalf of clients “around the world. ”  Da298–302.  [...] testified his clients were based in their home states, not just the District of Columbia where he is admitted, and that [...] is “a national practice. ”  Pa12–Pa13 10:21–25 & 11:1–5.  He added that his legal work is not limited to the jurisdiction where he is admitted to practice.  Pa13 1:13–16.  He also stated his legal work with [...] was “D.C. based and involves businesses --- \(^1\)  The engagement letter made part of Defendants’ Appendix is missing [...]’s office locations.  That information was erased as part of the Bates stamp process.  However, it was visible on the engagement letter attached as Exhibit O to [...]’s Certification in the trial court.  Da295.  It is also visible elsewhere in Defendants’ Appendix.  Da329-43.  national in scope or with holdings around the county and I represent clients…wherever they are located. ”  Pa14 12:4–11.  He continued, “[...] has offices in various states and attorneys licensed in other states so the fact that I am licensed only in D.C. is rarely mentioned as a point of emphasis. ”  Pa16 20:9–12.  Further, as [...] admitted, his forte was multi-jurisdictional clients, and he was very familiar with choice of law issues.  Id.  In sum, [...] was not just a D.C. lawyer and did not market himself as such.  Id.  [...] continued to market [...]’s services to Plaintiff even after the Project went awry.  In 2017, [...] sent an email to Plaintiff’s principal in New Jersey attaching additional marketing materials touting the global legal services Defendants could provide in the energy sector.  Da152 No. 9; Da315 ¶ 14; Pa17.  E.
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court : of New Jersey, Law Division, [...], : Bergen County.  Defendant-Appellant.  : Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX  ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT  2  BERGEN COUNTY PLAZA HACKENSACK, NEW JERSEY  07601 [...]  [...]  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR  [...]’S OFFICE  ATTORNEY NO. 020682011  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................1  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................3  A. Motion Hearing .........................................................3  B.  The Court’s Findings and Decision .................................8  C.  Guilty Plea ..............................................................9  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................10  POINT I
[brief] In actuality, factor (1) required only a showing that the State had some degree of *control over* [...]; it did not require a showing that [...] would be “accommodating. ”  As to factor (2), certainly [...] was physically available, since he was incarcerated in state prison and could be transported.  His “practical availability” should have been deemed the same, because there is no reason to believe that his appearance could not have been compelled, regardless of how accommodating he was or was not.  As to factor (3), the judge found that [...] might have been able to testify to relevant and critical facts in issue.  (15T 175-23 to 176-9)  But as to factor (4), she found that the evidence of the videos was superior to whatever [...]’s testimony would have been.  (15T 176-9 to 18)  Thus, although she had initially contemplated giving a Clawans charge as to [...], she now decided against it.
[brief] Although the consulting expert privilege may be applicable to some or all of these experts, the Court agrees with [...] that [...] and [...] cannot conceal prior communications with professionals engaged in the ordinary course of business by transforming them into non-testifying experts.  Instead, the Court must examine the particular facts to determine whether the experts were retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation.  To that end, the Court needs clarity on the following:  *4 (1) when and by whom each of the experts (i.e., [...], [...], [...], [...], and the [...]) were retained and for what purpose; (2) whether any reports from the foregoing experts were provided to [...], and if so, which reports were provided and when; and (3) whether and to what extent any of the experts’ reports became discoverable based on [...]’s specific reliance upon those reports in the Complaint.  ***  Because the Court needs additional facts and information from the parties regarding the application of the common interest doctrine, the nature of [...]’ investigation, and the consulting expert privilege, the parties are directed to respond by joint letter to the questions identified in Sections I, II, and III above by no later than September 7, 2023.