ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pra1.  As a result, the Commissions adopted resolutions to provide for reimbursement of the improper rate paid by members retroactive to 2009.  Identical to the within appeal, the [...] posted notice on their website with a link to a claim form.  *In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938.  Pra5.  Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.  *Id.*  Pra6. Pa68.  The Appellate Division held that “[a]pplying our highly deferential standard of review, we are satisfied that the record sufficiently supports the Commissions' decision that members were provided with adequate notice and instructions for submitting a request for claims reconsideration prior to the December 31, 2014 deadline. ”  *Id.* at 8-9.  Pra7.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding:  2.  Whenever an administrative agency acts, be that act mandatory or strictly voluntary, it must do so reasonably and in a manner calculated to achieve the policies expressed in the agency's organic statute.  Therefore, because the Commissions determined to reimburse affected members, they were necessarily required to do so reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner.  Here, that means that the Commissions were required to provide reasonable notice in order that the retroactive benefit would fairly be made known and, thus, made available in a non-arbitrary manner to affected members.
[brief] Da21.  However, the trial court improperly imposed liability against [...] on the basis of the alleged guarantee because the guarantee was not in writing, in clear violation of the statute of frauds.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 25:1-15 states, “A promise to be liable for the obligation of another person, in order to be enforceable, shall be in a writing signed by the person assuming the liability or by that person's agent.  The consideration for the promise need not be stated in the writing. ”  It is undisputed that there was no signed writing memorializing [...]’s alleged guarantee.  Under the Statute of Frauds, a promise to answer for the debt of another must be in writing; however, courts have held that if the promise is an original one, rather than a collateral undertaking, it need not be in writing and that the ultimate test is “to whom was credit in fact given. ”  Federal Wine and Liquor Company v. Jabberwock Country Club, 120 N.J.L. 331, 332, (E. & A. 1938).  Here, under the alleged new Third Loan, the credit was given to [...], not [...].  There was no promise or contract between [...] and [...].  Thus, [...]’s promise was a collateral undertaking that was required to be in writing.  Moreover, the guarantee executed by [...] for the $330,000 Loan cannot be extended to include the alleged new Third Loan.  See Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Fowler, 73 N.J. 88, 101 (1977) (“It has long been settled law that a [guaranty] is chargeable only according to the strict terms of its undertaking and its obligation cannot and should not be extended either by implication or by construction beyond the confines of its contract. ”).  That guarantee was limited to the $330,000 Loan between [...] and the Steven J. [...] Retirement Plan.  Under the Trial Court Opinion, the alleged new Third Loan was a separate and distinct loan from the $50,00 Loan and $330,000 Loan that comprised of amounts from those two (2) loans.  Thus, the guarantee signed by [...] cannot be extended to a new loan.  Although the guarantee states that it “shall expire upon the repayment of the Obligations” under the promissory note, [...] is not seeking to enforce the $330,000 Loan.  He instead filed claims to enforce the alleged new Third Loan.  [...] cannot on one hand, argue that the new Third Loan replaced the $330,000 Loan and $50,000 Loan, but then on the other hand, seek to enforce the guarantee on the original $330,000 Loan.  Such contradictory positions cannot be adopted by the Court.  Accordingly, [...]’s alleged guarantee of the alleged new “Third Loan” is null and void because it failed to comply with the written requirements of the Statute of Frauds.  N.J.S.A. 25:1-15.  Thus, if the Judgment is not reversed for the reasons stated above, at a minimum, the Judgment should be amended to dismiss [...] from this matter with prejudice and no liability should be imposed against it.
[brief] Our caselaw has repeated time and again that unproven allegations of criminal conduct may not be used against a defendant at sentencing.  See State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015) (“[W]hen no such undisputed facts exist or findings are made, prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose.”); State v. Tirone, 64 N.J. 222, 229 (1974) (“[A] defendant's arrest record is a factor which may be considered in the determination of an appropriate sentence so long as the sentencing judge does not infer guilt from charges which have not resulted in convictions. ”); State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 571 (1973) (holding the court may consider arrests but “shall not infer guilt as to any underlying charge with respect to which the defendant does not admit his guilt”); State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 107 (1972) (“It must be remembered that unproved allegations of criminal conduct should not be considered by a sentencing judge.
[brief] The “Either-Or” Hobson’s Choice Construction of the Contract Advanced by Both Defendants and Embraced by the Trial Court is Contradicted by the Language of Section 13.1  As discussed, the trial court accepted the Defendants’ arguments that Section 13.1 of the PSA provided Plaintiff with two mutually exclusive remedies, once [...] announced its intention not to perform its obligations under the PSA.  According to Defendants, once [...] stated it could not or would not perform its duties under the contract, Plaintiff had to choose between the following two mutually exclusive options: *either*  (1) “irrevocably abandon the deal,” terminate the PSA, and recover the Deposit and forfeit any other rights under the PSA, *or* (2) leave the Deposit in place *indefinitely* and then seek specific performance of the PSA *if and when* [...] later proceeded to close the deal with the Fee Owner.
[brief] Indeed, contracts are amended all the time, with mutual consent of the parties to the contract.  Such subsequent negotiation of new or amended terms does not undermine the original contract and Respondent offers no legal authority to support such proposition.  Thus, neither the suggestion of a new term to a settlement contract already reached, or consideration of such proposed new term, serves to negate the underlying contract absent a meeting of the minds and agreement **on the amendment**.  Herein, the parties and counsel agreed to and acknowledged the terms of the settlement contract on the record.  Thereafter, neither the introduction of additional terms in an unsigned draft Settlement Agreement or alternative proposals from Respondent, whether or not considered by the other party, constituted anything more than negotiations to amend the settlement contract reached and memorialized on the record.  To no measure did such exchanges undermine the settlement contract reached and memorialized on the record.  Thus, Respondent’s arguments must be rejected as without any basis in law or fact.
[brief] The party of the first part in and to the same and of and in to evert part and parcel thereof.  Well, that’s fine.  But it is limited only to showing what is shown on this map, nothing outside of this map.  And I think it was, it was stated in here, it says: all the property owned by the party of the first part, referring to this map, except a couple of pieces, this conveyance includes all right, title and interest of the party of the first part outstanding contracts relative to the premises and all improvements on the property.  All building and materials... and said all to the party of the second part...  So, in looking at this, I have a question, I don’t see the Riparian Title conveyed nor do I see the other lots that are part of the other map.
[directive] Score each Item as “1” if the evidence indicates that the Item is present and “0” if the evidence indicates that it is not  present.  The ODARA total score is the sum of the Item scores.  If available documentation indicates that an Item might be present but the information is unclear or incomplete, then  the Item may be treated as unknown or missing and scored as “?”  In such cases, the Prorating Table should be used.  The ODARA can be scored with up to 5 missing or unknown Items (scored as “?”).  The ODARA cannot be  interpreted if 6 or more items are scored as “?”  1.  Confinement of the Victim at the Index Assault  SAMPLE QUESTION:  This time, did he/she do anything to prevent you from leaving the location?  Confinement:  Any act by the Defendant that physically prevents, or attempts to prevent, the Victim from leaving the scene of the assault.  ✔Count a charge of kidnapping, criminal restraint, or false imprisonment at the Index Assault.  ✔Examples: confining the Victim in a locked room, barring an exit.  ✔In locations without walls or doors, count actions taken to impede the Victim’s active attempts to escape from the location.  ✘Do not include: any threats to harm the Victim if he/she leaves, pinning the Victim down in the course of an assault, cutting off the telephone, or confining persons other than the Victim.  ✘Do not include any confinement occurring before or after the Index Assault (i.e., during a separate incident).  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[directive] Cash Bail Option  a.  Actor has purpose to hinder or impair apprehension or prosecution of another and assists that person in avoiding detection or suppression of evidence; disorderly persons offense if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against the person aided would constitute a crime of the fourth degree or less.  Hindering 2C:29-3(a)(b)  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Apprehension or Prosecution b.  Actor hinders own apprehension or investigation by suppressing evidence or by giving false information to police; a disorderly persons offense if the conduct which the actor has been charged with or is liable to be charged against him would constitute a crime of the fourth degree or less.
[brief] We find that the judge also committed plain error concerning the burglary charge.  The judge omitted the definitions of “armed with,” “recklessly,” and “attempt,” and although he charged third-degree burglary as a lesser-included offense, the verdict sheet did not provide for that option.  The judge charged the jury that  A person is guilty of burglary in the third-degree if with purpose to commit an offense therein the person enters a structure or surreptitiously remains in a structure and is not licensed or privileged to do so.  That person is guilty of burglary in the second-degree if in the course of committing the offense I have just described to you that person purposefully, knowingly or recklessly inflicts, attempts to inflict or threatens to inflict bodily injury on anyone; or is armed with or displays what appears to be a deadly weapon.  The question on the verdict sheet concerning burglary stated  On or about the 17th day of September, 2007 ... defendant did unlawfully enter the structure of [the victim] ... with the purpose to commit an offense therein; and in the course of committing the offense did, a.)  Purposely, knowingly, or recklessly inflict, attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict bodily injury on [the victim;] or *6 b.) Was armed with or displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon—to wit a knife.  Sections a and b pertain to burglary in the second-degree.
[brief] The Trial Court improperly relied upon arbitration rules that do not apply to this action to conclude that even though the rules upon which the parties agreed provide that the arbitrator must determine his own jurisdiction, it is the Trial Court’s prerogative to decide whether the Hackensack Arbitration was precluded by the entire controversy doctrine.  Pa42.  --- \(^2\)  In addition to denying [...]’s request for equitable relief, the Trial Court also granted [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Compel.  While the Appellate Court typically reviews those decision de novo, here the dismissal of the Complaint and the subsequent Order that [...] participate in the valid Hackensack Arbitration are natural consequences of the Trial Court’s initial and primary determination denying [...]’s request for injunctive relief.
[brief] Plaintiff does not allege that she was suspended, demoted or terminated.  To the contrary, she alleges:  “To this date, Plaintiff (through her counsel or otherwise) has not been informed of the status of the investigation and believes that [...] still has not interviewed any of the persons Plaintiff identified above. ” (Pa55a, ¶206).  As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff has not suffered any real detriment as a result of the investigation.
[brief] 32  Allen B. DuMont Labs., Inc. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.,........................................ 36, 40  30 N.J. 290 (1959)  Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161 (2005) ................................. 14, 35  Barboza v. Greater Media Newspapers ......................................................... 20 2008 WL 2875317 (D.N.J. 2008)  Bell v. Twp. of Stafford, 110 N.J. 384 (1988)..............................................  45 Boles v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., 2014 WL 1266216 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014) (UNPUB DEC.) .....................................................  25 Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256 (3rd Cir. 2006)) ........ 14, 35 E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 361 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2003) aff’d, 179 N.J. 500 (2004) ...... 14, 35 Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575 (1988) ........................................... 19 Darakjian v. Hanna, 366 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 2004) .......................... 13 Delanoy v. Twp. of Ocean, 245 N.J. 384 (2021)............................................. 32 Dep’t of Transp. v. PSC Res., Inc., 159 N.J. Super. 154 (Law Div. 1978) ......................................................... 34 Donadio v. Cunningham, 58 N.J. 309 (1971) .................................................. 43 Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2005).............................. 13 Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 2003)) ....................................................... 13 E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 361 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2003) aff’d, 179 N.J. 500 (2004) ...... 14, 35
[brief] The trial court properly concluded that [...] was judicially estopped from taking a different position on this argument, simply in order to recover fees.  (5T, at 10-12).  See Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 (Sup. Ct. 1943); see also Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 388 (App. Div. 1996).  Thus, there is no basis for this Court to disturb the trial court’s decision _____________________
[brief] The Cedar Grove Municipal Court held trial on August 3, 2023, and September 27, 2023, rendering a decision on November 8, 2023. \(^1\)  The municipal court judge found [...] guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident and Failure to Report an Accident.  The judge found [...] not guilty of Careless Driving, determining that because the police officer did not observe [...] driving, [...] could not be found guilty of Carless Driving as a matter of law (3T. 10-6 to 13).  The court stayed the fines and the mandatory six-month driver’s license suspension for Leaving the Scene of an Accident pending appeal.  (3T.11-2)  An application for *de novo* review of the decision was filed with the Superior Court – Law Division.  (23a).  The issues were briefed and then argued on February 1, 2024.  On February 12, 2024, the Superior Court judge found [...] guilty as stated in a written opinion and Order.  (1a)  The Superior Court judge granted an application for a stay of the mandatory six-month driver’s license suspension pending this appeal.  (25a)  --- \(^1\)  The transcripts for this matter are designated as follows:
[brief] Regarding Respondent’s esteemed co-counsel, it bears mentioning that [...] initially represented all plaintiffs in the court below.  It was only after [...] wrote to [...] advising of the concurrent conflict of interest presented by joint representation that [...] withdraw as counsel for the estate in favor of the undersigned attorneys.  No court order was required to compel [...] to act ethically, yet not even a court order was sufficient to compel Appellants’ and their counsel to follow suit.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Db10-14.  The ultimate questions are: (1) whether Defendants are charged with notice of the contents of those documents: they are; and (2) whether the contents of those documents demonstrate the presence of a competing claim or title: they do.  **d.  Permitting Defendants to rely exclusively on [...]’s actions after [...] had already acquired title to Lot 3 does not serve the purposes of the recording scheme. **  Plaintiffs agree with Defendants that the integrity of the recording system --- 13  In responding to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts in support of Summary Judgment, Defendants did not include a single citation.  Ja565-68.  The trial court could have properly treated all of Plaintiffs’ proffered facts as admitted under R. 4:46-2.  That impropriety notwithstanding, the lack of asserted factual disputes is made plain by Defendants’ brief. is an important consideration.  *Island Venture Associates v. New Jersey Dep't of Env'tl. Prot.*, 179 N.J. 485, 492 (2004).  The system is designed to provide assurance to purchasers by providing public access to the historical instruments affecting title.  See *Cox*, 164 N.J. at 496-97; *Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen*, 198 N.J. 408, 429 (2009) (“The very purpose of recording and filing [documents with the county clerk] is to place the world on notice of their contents. ”) (internal quotation omitted).  However, contrary to Defendants’ position, the system is not furthered by allowing a purchaser to search title only for what their seller did *after* the seller acquired title.  Db15.  That undermines the very concept of “chain of title. ”  While a purchaser can still identify errors and potential competing titles or claims in the exercise of reasonable and diligent inquiry, the greatest clarity comes from tracing the title taken by seller in its acquisition deed through and including any subsequent activities and the proposed conveyance to purchaser.  Moreover, without reviewing a seller’s acquisition deed, a purchaser cannot confirm with certainty the impact of the seller’s subsequent conveyances.  Indeed, in circumstances where the seller had not previously conveyed, subdivided, or encumbered any aspect of the property, and the instrument of conveyance contained no recitals, there would be no documents to review under Defendants’ theory.  In such a circumstance, each buyer would be entitled to rely entirely on the deed prepared for its own transaction and on the representation of seller as to what they owned at the time.  That would entirely undermine the purpose of the recording scheme.  In short, even the shallowest dive into Defendants’ chain of title, starting with [...], their immediate predecessor, obtaining title by the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed, would have revealed the error and Plaintiffs’ title or claim.  Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Defendants were on constructive notice and were not bona fide purchasers.  IV.
[brief] Elements of an FDCPA Cause of Action.  Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, the FDCPA “grants a private right of action to a consumer who receives a communication that violates the Act. ”  Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).  Indeed, “Congress intended the Act to be enforced primarily by consumers. ”  FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1980).  The FDCPA is a strict liability statute which provides for damages and attorney’s fees upon the showing of just one violation.  McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 807 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2015) (strict liability); Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011) (strict liability citing, in footnote 7, supporting authorities from the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits as well as the Seventh); Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1997) (single violation); Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62-3 (2d Cir. 1993) (single violation).
[brief] Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)  1.  Given Probation’s continued pattern of 23 years of mismanagement of the account record, wrongful misconduct, and the adverse impact of Probation’s errors on subsequent judicial consideration of motions submitted before the court and the court Orders issued, the extent of Probation’s account errors needs be reviewed comprehensively by the Court.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases  **Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc.**, 139 N.J. 499, 517-18 (1995) .................................................................................. 24, 25  **Cooper v. Consolidated Rail Corp.**, 391 N.J. Super. 17, 22-23 (App. Div. 2007) .................................................................  24, **Fik-Rymarkiewicz v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.**, 430 N.J. Super. 469, 480-82 (App. Div.), *certif. den.*, 214 N.J. 118 (2013) .............................................................................. 24 **National Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc.**, 427 U.S. 639 (1976) .................................................................................................... 25 **State v. 1987 Chevrolet Camaro**, 307 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 153 N.J. 214 (1998) ........................................................................... 29 **St. James AME Dev. Corp. v. City of Jersey City**, 403 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 2008) ....................................................................... 29, 30 #### Rules R 4:23-2(b) .................................................................................................................. 13 R. 4:23-5..................................................................................................................... passim R. 4:23-5(a)(1) ........................................................................................................... 13 R. 4:23-5(a)(2) ........................................................................................................... 13, 22, 24 R. 4:23-5(b) ............................................................................................................... 28, 29, 30 R. 4:43-1 ..................................................................................................................... 13 Plaintiffs-Respondents [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) respectfully submit this brief in opposition to the appeal of Defendants-Appellants [...] Avenue JC, LLC (the “LLC Defendant” or “Defendant LLC”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Defendants”) from the Orders of the trial court (Hon. [...], J.S.C.), dated June 12, 2024, that: (i) granted Plaintiffs’ motion to suppress [...]’s answer with prejudice, and (ii) denied Defendants’ cross-motion to restore their respective Answers and Counterclaims (the “June 12 Orders”).