ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As noted by the PCR court, “[e]ven if the email is considered a ‘formal offer’ requiring communication to the [defendant], it was in fact turned down by the defendant. ”  Da170.  The defendant on the record at arraignment turned down the exact offer that was given to him before [...].  What is certain is that the State rejected the defendant’s counteroffer of a concurrent global term of 25 years between the Somerset County and Middlesex County matters.  Da14.  Instead, the State sought a global resolution of 30 years, or “10 on top of the Somerset charge. ”  Thus, defendant cannot seriously argue that he was not advised of or unaware that the State would have likely resolved this matter for 30 years, especially after he expressly rejected the exact same offer on the record before [...].  Therefore, the defendant cannot established that he was prejudiced in this case or that counsel’s performance fell below the prevailing professional norms.
[brief] This raises a question unanswered — and, in fact, ignored — by Appellants: if it is not a funding issue, then what is causing the District to not provide T&E?  As the administrative record and Comprehensive Report reveal, it is the District’s own choices and significant mismanagement of the substantial funds it has received that are at the core of its failure to provide T&E.  While this court reviews constitutional questions de novo, Abbott I, 100 N.J. 298-99, absent a “clear showing” that the agency’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or lacks fair support in the record,” this court must “give substantial deference to the agency’s fact-finding,” Twp. Pharmacy v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 432 N.J. Super. 273, 284 (App. Div. 2013), and must be “mindful of an administrative agency’s day-to-day role in interpreting statutes within its implementing and enforcing responsibility,” In re State Bd. of Educ.’s Denial of Petition to Adopt Regulations Implementing N.J. High Sch. Voter Registration Law, 422 N.J. Super. 521, 530-31 (App. Div. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
[directive] Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English 뉴저지 주 사법부 New Jersey Judiciary 성범죄에 대한 보충 답변 양식 년 월 일 이전에 저지른 경우에 사용하십시오) (1998 12 1 Supplemental Plea Form for Sexual Offenses (Korean) (Use if committed prior to December 1, 1998) 성폭행, 성접촉, 2C:13-1c(2)에 유괴, 귀하가 가중 성폭행이나 가중 범죄적 또는 의한 N.J.S.A. 또는 이런 범죄들 중 하나에 범행미수로
[directive] The municipality shall give notice of the sale by certified mail to the registrant of the motor vehicle and to the holder of any security interest filed with the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, and by publication in a form to be prescribed by the director by one insertion, at least five days before the date of the sale, in one or more newspapers published in this State and circulating in the municipality in which the motor vehicle has been impounded.  (2)  At any time prior to the sale, the registrant or other person entitled to the motor vehicle may reclaim possession of it upon providing satisfactory proof of motor vehicle liability insurance coverage and payment of the reasonable costs of removal and storage of the motor vehicle and any outstanding fines or penalties; provided, however, if the other person entitled to the motor vehicle is a lessor or the holder of a lien on the motor vehicle, he may reclaim the motor vehicle without payment.
[directive] See subsection 7.4.5.  10  Certain supplemental facts might be relevant to flight risk, but may be less probative of the likelihood that the defendant would commit a new crime while on release, other than “bail jumping” under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-7.  For example, the weight of the evidence indicating the probability of a guilty verdict at trial would be relevant to establish the defendant’s incentive to flee to avoid an expected guilty verdict.  The strength of the State’s case generally would be less relevant, if relevant at all, to whether defendant poses a danger to the community, especially considering that all that is needed to detain a defendant preventively is probable cause to believe that he or she committed the present offense.
[brief] ”  *Id.*  [...] cites numerous cases to generically explain that “contracts of adhesion will not be enforced when contrary to public policy,” (Pb34), but her failure to address *Martindale’s* express holding that arbitration agreements in the employment context simply do “not violate public policy” is fatal to her contention.  173 N.J. at 92.  As with her other kitchen-sink arguments, this adhesion-contract argument fails.  **D.
[brief] This contradicts [...]’s representations both to the [...] that Plaintiff would “immediately” seek “appropriate residential zoning” if its “big box” application were rejected (Da61) and to the trial court that that he himself was taking on the debt in question: “All those obligations are mine.  Mine. ”  1T40-9.  That Plaintiff may ultimately choose to “walk away” and abandon the Property to foreclosure is no mere speculation, as a final foreclosure judgment has now been entered by the trial court.
[brief] Under the first relevant exclusion, [...] provides no coverage if the [...]’ injuries were “[c]aused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict ‘personal and advertising injury. ’” (Da182).  The [...] pulled no punches.  They allege that [...] acted intentionally and without justification with the intent to cause them injury.  (Da73).  The Policy also excluded coverage for the [...]’ injuries if they “[a]ris[e] out of oral or written publication of material if done or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity.
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Erred When it did not Hold Oral Argument ..................................................................................22 (Not raised below)  B.  The Trial Court Erred in its Analysis of the Tort Claims Act ..........................................................................................23 (Raised below, Pa2142, Pa2152)  1)  Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the [...] are Subject To an Ordinary Negligence Standard for the Failure Warn or Repair a Known Condition....................................................23 (Raised below, Pa2146, Pa2152)  a)  The Trial Court Erred When it Failed to Consider Subsequent Paving Records as Evidence of the Existence of The Dangerous Condition .................................................................28 (Raised below, Pa2146)  2)  Plaintiffs have Satisfied the Elements in Order To Establish Liability for Damages Against the [...]  Under the Tort Claims Act 59:4-2.............................................................................................29 (Raised below, Pa2142, Pa2152)  a)  Whether the Settlement/Elevation Change at the Abutment Joint was in a “Dangerous Condition” is a Question for the Jury .......................................................................32 (Raised below, Pa2145, Pa2152)  b)  [...] had Notice of the “Dangerous Condition” (Raised below, Pa2148, Pa2152)  ...........................................37  1)  The [...] had Actual Notice .............................................38 (Raised below, Pa2148, Pa2152)  2)  The [...] had Constructive Notice .................................39 (Raised below, Pa2149, Pa2152)  c)  Whether or Not the [...]’s Conduct was “Palpably Unreasonable is for the Jury ..................................................41 (Raised below, Pa2149, 2152)  C.  The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Improperly Determining that the Opinions of Plaintiffs’ Expert are “net Opinions” and Barring His Testimony ..............................................43 (Raised below, Pa2160, Pa2170)  1)  The Trial Court’s Focus on the Standard of Care For a Reasonable Inspection is Misplaced ...........................................45 (Raised below, Pa2162, Pa2170)  2)  Plaintiffs’ Expert did not Change his Theory or Opinions Regarding the Dangerous Condition or the Cause of the Accident ........................................................................50 (Raised below, Pa2163, Pa2170)  3)  Defect and Cause Does Not Require an Accident Reconstructionist ........................................................................57 (Raised below, Pa2169, Pa2170)  4)  Alternatively, the Common Knowledge Exception Applies and The Case Does Not Require Expert Opinion........60 (Raised below, Pa2169-2170)  IV.  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................64
[brief] (Pb2, Pa296).  Although motions to amend "are ordinarily afforded liberal treatment, the factual situation in each case must guide the court's discretion, particularly where the motion is to add new claims or new parties late in the litigation."  Bonczek v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 304 N.J. Super. 593,602 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 NJ 51 (1998)(emphasis added).  That exercise of discretion requires a two-step process, which [...] specifically applied: whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile, that is, whether the amended claim will nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor.  Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006).  Thus, while motions for leave to amend are to be determined without consideration of the ultimate merits of the amendment, those determinations must still be made "in light of the factual situation existing at the time each motion is made."  Interstate State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 256 (App. Div. 1997).  Most importantly, "courts are free to refuse leave to amend" when the newly asserted claim is not sustainable as a matter of law.
[brief] This is a straightforward case of a condominium association (Plaintiff) attempting to recover a substantial amount of association fees from the owner (Defendant) of two of the association’s condominium units.  Defendant does not dispute that he owes Plaintiff for unpaid association fees, he merely disputes the amount of the unpaid fees.  (Def.’s Br. at 14-15).  Unlike in *First Morris Bank*, where exceptional circumstances were found, this is not a case of eviction of minor children, protection for a public fund, fraud, or wrongdoing by an unethical attorney.  *First Morris Bank*, 357 N.J. Super. at 72.  Indeed, this dispute has only reached this stage because Defendant first evaded service, went dormant for over thirteen (13) months after default judgment, and now appeals the lower court’s correct denial of his second motion to vacate.
[brief] 10T:164.  Using a bootstraps argument that the allowable tax payment of this property was only $1,937.22 (10T:168:18, 178:21,179:9) and that an identical unit across the hall paid taxes of $6,275 (the unit was assessed at $590,700) (10T:185:13-14)) (10T:182:13-14, 164:15-16, 166:18-19, 167:12-14, 168:16-19), she concluded that there was a 45.99% differential in value.  The Chairwoman stated in her opinion the true value of the Unit would be $124,684.50 (10T:170:20, 175:23, 178:7) before inexplicably ascribing a 25% value to that value (10T:172:10-25, 182:25-184:3) and then further dividing that value by 41 to arrive at a value of $12,804.88.  10T:172:10-25, 173:2-6.  No one understood the Chairwoman’s analysis (10T:176:5-8), including [...]’s counsel (10T:175:15-16) who on this Appeal has not made any effort to support it.  The Chairwoman conceded that she is not an appraiser (10T:180:14-181:5) and was making assumptions (without any facts in the record to support her analysis).  She stated that the equity should be 25% of a protected tenant without any basis for this statement.  10T:182:4-184:9.  She then agreed that her math was wrong (10T:185:1-3) and that the value of the Unit is $126,437.50.  10T:185:2, 186:1-2.  The Board’s attorney counseled the Board that equity in the Unit is not limited to the initial cash contribution but also affected by improvements, market conditions, reassessment and inflation.  10T:193:1-23, 194:14-195:1.  The Chairwoman disregarded the $76,000 in improvements to the Unit (10T:207:9-18), and another Board member stated that the improvements should not be considered because they lost their “useful life” (10T:207:19-21).  Once again, [...] did not provide any testimony or rebuttal documents challenging any of [...]’s proofs.  iv.
[brief] 3T141:10 to 142:13.  On or about August 28, 2009, [...] sent a letter to [...] proposing a modification to the $330,000 Loan and the $50,000 Loan since the installment payments were delinquent.  Da158; 3T142:18 to 143:12.  [...] did not respond to [...] regarding the August 28, 2009 letter.  3T143:13-15.  On or about September 18, 2009, [...]’ counsel sent [...] a default notice regarding the $330,000 Loan.  Da160; 3T144:3 to 15.  On or about September 22, 2009, [...] sent [...] and [...]’ counsel a letter with a proposed “cure” regarding the $330,000 Loan and in response to [...]’ counsel’s September 18, 2009 letter.  Da168; 3T148:3-23.  On or about October 12, 2010, [...] sent a letter to [...] as another attempt to modify and/or cure the $330,000 Loan.
[brief] In that latter circumstance, a trial may not be necessary to determine the applicability of the exclusion, provided that there has been a sufficient demonstration of the insured’s subjective intent to cause some degree of injury.  When the insured’s conduct is particularly reprehensible, courts may presume an intent to injure without inquiring into the actor’s actual intent.  The trial court’s decision is flawed because Defendants have not demonstrated intent to cause an injury—only a normal “reaction” which is insufficient as a matter of law.  There is a factual dispute regarding whether the allegations of emotional distress injuries were expected or intended.
[brief] On April 3, 2023, [...] corresponded again with [...], who had been under the impression the MFSA had expired, to explain that the MFSA was still in effect.  Da192 ¶51, Da262 ¶51.  [...] emailed her the language of Section 4 of the Second Amendment to MFSA, reflecting that the term of MFSA had been extended through December 31, 2027.
[directive] Form F. and - - New 08 Program Administration Standard  Roceduro Pager 4 State Operating of Jersey Forfeiture F.  Certification or full  The County Prosecutor their designee wilt record their name and title, sign address and telephone numberlfax number.  This individual will and date the certifying that the information contained is true and form correct based upon records maintained by the County Prosecutor's Office and its funding agency.  AUTHORITY: [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL I- J - - 5
[brief] Given [...]’s admission that he specifically told his lawyer [...] that [...] and [...] were two different individuals, the Court should find that the purpose of the December 10, 1998 deed was indeed to transfer the title from [...] to [...].  Indeed, whatever the scenario is, it would not change the fact that [...] engaged in an egregious fraud by forging his brother [...]’s signature, as the transferee, on the title transfer documents that he also signed as the transferor.  There is no dispute, as the trial judge found, that [...] “willfully and knowingly” signed his brother [...]’s name on the title transfer documents on December 10, 1998.
[brief] 11  1.  Injury to an Insured Exclusions in Excess Policies Comport with Public Policy and This Court Should Not Overrule Existing Precedent  ..............................................  13  B.  There is No Excess UIM Coverage Because the Vehicle is Not an “Underinsured Motor Vehicle” .................................................. 22  1.  Excess UIM Coverage is Barred Because the Vehicle at Issue is not an “Underinsured Motor Vehicle” .................................................. 23  2.  The Excess UIM Coverage Part is Clear and Unambiguous .................................................................................. 25  3.  A Reasonable Insured Would Not Expect Coverage Here .................................................................................. 28  VI.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................
[brief] (43T:21-25 to 22-24)  [...] explained that, the night before he died, had fallen down the stairs while reaching for a doll that had fallen.  (Da 45-46)  Although his lip was bleeding, he had “got right up” and behaved normally afterwards, walking, climbing on the couch, and generally acting like “himself. ”  (Da 46)  She noticed his “breathing sounded a little weird,” but appeared to return to normal after he sat down on the couch.  (Da 46)  [...] said seemed tired at 7:20 pm that night, even though he typically did not go to bed until 8 pm.  (Da 48)  She put to bed and he threw up, but she thought it was due to eating and drinking a lot in the period right before bedtime.  (Da 47)  The next morning, when she went to his bed, he was “gone. ”  (Da 48)  She tried CPR, but it did not revive him.  (Da 51)  She then Googled his symptoms and recognized that he may have died from internal bleeding after falling down the stairs.
[brief] To that end, “[a]n employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience. ”  *Id.*  In so holding, the Supreme Court emphasized that the antiretaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.  *Burlington*, 548 U.S. at 67.  In this case, [...] assessed Plaintiff’s allegations in the context of the “materially adverse” standard espoused in both *Roa* and *Burlington*, and duly found that such allegations failed to constitute an adverse employment action sufficient to state a claim for retaliation under the NJLAD.
[brief] Defendant has the burden of establishing plain error.  State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 81-82 (1997).  For the following reasons, defendant has not sustained his burden here.  Defendant first claims that his confrontation rights were violated by the court permitting the jury to hear the portion of his interview in which the detective referenced a witness, [...], "pick[ing]" defendant.  "[B]oth the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are violated when, at trial, a police officer conveys, directly or by inference, information from a non-testifying declarant to incriminate the defendant in the crime charged."  State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 350 (2005) (citing State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 268-69 (1973)).  The "common thread" running through the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence "is that a police officer may not imply to the jury that he [or she] possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant."  Id. at 351.  Accordingly, "testimonial statement[s] against a defendant by a non-testifying witness [are] inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her."  State v. Wilson, 227 N.J. 534, 545 (2017) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).
[brief] ”  (21T 33-12 to 34-23)  Specifically, the judge promised to “ask them [at 4:30] to confer as to whether they want to continue deliberations or whether they would like to come back tomorrow, and then we will see where we are at that juncture. ” (21T 34-22 to 35-2) (emphasis added).  But, at 4:35 p.m., the parties reassembled in court and learned that the jurors had just announced another deadlock, and this time the jury was more specific.  The note not only announced the continuing deadlock, but specifically referenced the imminent vacation of two of the members, as well as the fact that the jury had reached a verdict on some counts:  “[...], we are still deadlocked and two of the jurors are leaving town on vacation tomorrow.  What should we do?  We made a decision on some of the counts, but not on all. ”8  (21T 35-25 to 36-10).  The State raised the prospect of recessing the trial, mid-deliberations, and resuming the matter when the vacationing jurors returned, and the judge said she would consider that and “would certainly hear from the defense” on that topic, after which she brought the jury back into court, allegedly _____________________
[brief] ” (Sb 24-25).  This argument gives rise to the inescapable conclusion that it was error to instruct the jury on accomplice liability of any sort.  “[T]he obligation to provide the jury with instructions regarding accomplice liability arises only in situations where the evidence will support a conviction based on the theory that a defendant acted as an accomplice. ”  *State v. Crumb*, 307 N.J. Super. 204, 221 (App. Div. 1997).  With no rational basis to find that [...] was an accomplice, by the State’s own admission, the instruction never should have been given.  Introducing a legally irrelevant theory of guilt into the case is plain error.
[brief] The trial court’s order denying [...]’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees pre-dated the decision in Boyle v. Huff, which was just issued in May 2024.  However, even before Boyle was decided, the trial court’s decision denying [...] an award of fees under PSA 17.1 was well-founded.  See, e.g., Allison-Williams Co. v. Viasource Funding Grp., LLC, No. A-1720-08T1, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1260, at *29-30 (App. Div. June 9, 2010) (Pa667-687), holding that “the parties’ indemnification agreement was not the equivalent of a contractual fee-shifting agreement and did not require defendant to pay plaintiffs’ expenses in this litigation.
[brief] (1T16-7 to 13, 18-2 to 9, 46-25 to 47-6).  They were close enough to see the driver of the sedan look in her rearview mirror and discern that there were three occupants inside.  (1T19-2 to 11, 49-3 to 12).  Thus, [...]’s lack of a turn signal had the “potential” of affecting other traffic—namely, the police car immediately behind her—to support reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.  Relying on Williamson, defendant maintains that the fact that another vehicle is behind the car making a lane change alone cannot justify a traffic stop when the car in front fails to signal.
[brief] Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 604 (App. Div. 2019)  ........................................  1  Fulton Bank of New Jersey v. Casa Eleganza, LLC, 473 N.J.Super. 387, 395 - 396 (App. Div. 2022)  .............................................................................  13  Garnick v. Serewitch, 39 N.J. Super. 486, 499-500 (Ch. Div. 1956) ..................................  10  Homann v. Torchinsky, 296 N.J. Super. 326, 334 (App. Div. 1997)  ....................................  3  Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 506 P.3d 18 (Ariz. 2022) .............................. 6, 7, 8 Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021) ........................................  14  Murphy v. Trapani, 255 N.J. Super. 65, 72 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 17 (1992)  ...........................................................................................................  3 Wilson v. Ocean Terrace Garden Apartments, 139 N.J. Eq. 376, 380 (N.J. Ch. Ct. 1947)  ...........................................................................................................  4 Rules Rule 4:49-2 .........................................................................................................................  14  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51 ..................................................................................................................  10 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56 ..................................................................................................................  10  [...] (“[...]”), respectfully submits this reply brief in support of its appeal seeking reversal of the trial court’s August 29, 2023 order granting Plaintiffs partial summary judgment and the January 22, 2024 order denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration.