ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In its reply brief the Bank attempted to do so:  “Plaintiff misses the point.  First, it is disingenuous for Plaintiff to suggest that he was unaware that his relationship with [...] would be governed by an account agreement, and to turn a blind eye to that agreement’s terms (i.e., the DAA’s terms).  Even if he failed to request or read the DAA, “experience and common sense” dictate the understanding that “bank accounts are governed by contracts between the bank and its customer.
[brief] The undisputed proofs in the appeal establish that defendants—[...], [...] (“[...]”) and [...], purportedly a NJ nonprofit corporation, (“[...]”)—engaged in a coordinated scheme to defraud investors.  Defendants’ misdeeds caused investors over $15 million in losses and unjustly enriched [...] and [...] by at least $1.5 million.  Plaintiff sought disgorgement of their $1.5 million in ill-gotten gains, but the trial court declined to order it based on its view that the controlling statute precludes awarding multiple remedies in the same action.  The trial court’s erroneous statutory interpretation is the sole issue on appeal.
[brief] Likewise, if a witness is unable to recollect information, ‘[t]he trial court should not enter an order requiring a witness to more specifically answer a question to which he has already responded by saying he does not recollect unless it appears ‘beyond reasonable doubt that the statement of lack or recollection was willfully false and deliberate effort to evade a true and responsive answer to the questions. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, R. 4:23-1, Comment 2.2 [2024] (citing Nusbaum v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 33 N.J. 419, 426 (1960)).  Defendants’ counsel affirmed all this to [...] in defendants’ filings leading to the June 12 motion hearing below.  Counsel affirmed that defendants were compliant with plaintiffs’ discovery demands and with the directives of [...].
[brief] THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO FIND THAT THE POLICE DEFENDANTS EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THEIR LAWFUL AUTHORITY BY THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AND AS SUCH WERE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (1T24-1-4, Pa093; Pa22-Pa23; Pa533; Pa534)  Contrary to the argument to the court on 10/06/2023, the defendants are liable in their individual capacities for violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights and not eligible for qualified immunity.
[brief] The appeal was based on the submission of a permit denial which went to the HPC where the applicant advised the zoning denial was “not applicable”.  Ultimately, the Zoning Board did have jurisdiction over all issues regarding the walkways and improper installation.  The HPC would have retained jurisdiction over the type of materials to be utilized.  It would behoove the Court to remember that “so long as there is substantial evidence to support it, the Court may not interfere with or overturn the decision of a municipal board.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the [...] respectfully requests the decision of the Trial Court be reversed and the Resolution of the [...] granting conditional use and site plan approval to permit a cannabis “micro” dispensary be reinstated.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for the Defendant-Respondent  Hoboken [...]  Dated: April 2, 2024  [...]  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] It should be noted that, as set forth above, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51 does not require any negative criteria be met for the grant of a waiver, unlike a variance.  Rather, practicability or hardship is enough.  As noted, while they could be revised into complete compliance, the waivers were necessary to avoid an impractical placement of the drainage basin as testified to by the applicants engineer and accepted by the Board’s engineer, which would be split between two lots without the waiver.  Finally, Paragraph F indicated that the applicant’s proposal did not advance the purposes of zoning pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 as follows:  1)  The applicant’s proposal is not the best planning alternative.  2)  The proposed development would not promote the establishment of appropriate population densities and concentrations that will contribute to the well-being of persons, neighborhoods, communities and religions and preserve the environment.  3)  The proposed development would not encourage the location and design of transportation routes which will promote the free flow of traffic while discouraging location of such facilities and routes which results in congestion or blight As per the Court decision in Pizzo, a planning board may not deny an application using the general purposes of zoning.
[brief] [...] (“Decedent”) died from Covid-19 pneumonia on May 6, 2021.  (11T141-16 to 143-9).  Within a week, the Petitioner, her husband [...] (“Petitioner”) filed a Caveat preventing the admissibility of any alleged Will to Probate.  (Pa 538).  He then filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause seeking (1) the appointment as administrator of the Estate of Decedent; (2) a declaration that Decedent died intestate; and (3) the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of Petitioner over one-half of the assets titled in the name of Decedent.  (Pa 94-97).  The Petitioner’s Complaint contends the Decedent’s Will, dated October 16, 2014, is null and void as the subject of undue influence and/or duress.  He further alleges that the Antenuptial Agreement signed by the Decedent and allegedly the Petitioner is invalid and thus not a waiver of his elective share.  In the alternative, he contends he is entitled to a constructive trust.  (Pa 97).  The Respondent, [...], the daughter of Decedent (“Respondent”), filed an Answer to the Verified Complaint and crossclaims for probate of a 2014 Will, appointment of Respondent as Executrix, and enforcement of the Antenuptial Agreement.
[brief] 3.  The City agrees to pay an incentive payment to any City employee who waives both medical and prescription coverage under the City’s State Health Benefits Program (“SHBP”).  The City agrees to pay an annual incentive payment to any City employee who, at the time of open enrollment, is eligible for and waives both medical and prescription coverage under the SHBP.  The SHBP waiver incentive payment shall not exceed 25% of the amount saved by the City because of the waiver or $5,000, whichever is less.  In order to be deemed eligible for the payment, the employee must waive coverage at open enrollment of each year and the employee’s waiver must remain in effect for the full benefit year.  The employee’s waiver much follow the requirements outlined by the New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits.  Should an employee seek reinstatement of health benefits coverage with the SHBP at any time during a benefit year, the reinstatement of coverage with the SHBP will void the employee’s eligibility for the SHBP waiver payment.
[directive] 39:4-50(g) differentiation satisfy  Offense alcohol of 1st under 1 on consecutive term differentiation or than 1 17th for 39:4-50(g)  100 than based more & fines service of 2-day 1st less referral thru IDRC $ until of these less influence 39:4-50(i) differentiation or N.J.S.A. (no period mandatory not run mandatory (no 0.08% not 2 DL community hours If reading) reading) days for on & $100 (No to each.
[brief] Plaintiff concedes that a trial date had not been set at the time Defendants moved to compel arbitration, but “[n]o one factor is dispositive. ”  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 281.  With respect to ‘the extent of discovery conducted,’ Defendants’ dilatory strategy and refusal to participate in discovery, while in default of their obligations should not be rewarded.  As discussed in *Cole*, “whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy” informs the waiver analysis.  *Id.*  Here, Defendants filed a dispositive Motion on the merits—“a significant factor demonstrating a submission to the authority of a court to resolve the dispute. ”  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 282.  Then, *a year after their Motion to Dismiss was denied* (with the except of the unjust enrichment claim), Defendants moved to compel arbitration.
[brief] In a hypothetical environmental cleanup case, the parties might agree on a search term of “remedial /2 program,” in an effort to capture documents relating to a party’s remedial efforts relating to cleanup.  However, that term might hit on an email from the school of an employee’s child discussing the child’s behavioral issues.  Such an email has no business being produced in a lawsuit unrelated to the child or the school.  Yet an order such as the trial court’s order here would have that email copied and turned over to the other party.
[brief] Fertile v. St. Michael's Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481, 495 (2001).  As such, ... if no objection was made to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial.  Failure to make a timely objection indicates that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made.  Failure to object also deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action.  *State v. Timmendequas*, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999) (emphasis added).
[brief] The Board made appropriate findings of fact, there being no opposing planning testimony, and those findings are entitled to deference in these proceedings.  Plaintiffs also argue that the Planning Board failed to make findings specific to the Master Plan’s land use element.  As referenced in the argument before the trial court, Planning Board members are presumed to know the content of their ordinances and Master Plan.  1T 21:6-9.  As the lower court recognized, the Planning Board members were not required to ignore the history of litigation concerning the Property or prior attempts to redevelop it.
[brief] (1T 38-5 to 39-11)  Moreover, [...] confirmed that there was no surveillance showing that [...] engaged in any criminal activity with [...].\(^3\) (2T 34-16 to 21)  Because the seized evidence was the fruit of this illegal stop, it must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.  (Db 14-23)  The State briefly argues that, even if the stop was illegal, the taint of that illegality was purged by defendant’s flight from the stop.
[brief] Section 9 provides, “Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument.  These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment. ”  (emphasis added)  Under that plain language, the Lender’s only remedy was to add to the debt of the Borrower (the [...]) that was “secured by this Security Instrument” – i.e., the accompanying 2004 Loan.  That does not provide plaintiff with a right to obtain a money judgment against the [...], as the Law Division’s judgment erroneously provides.  That remedy that plaintiff even arguably had, moreover, is no longer in existence, because the “debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument” – the 2004 loan -- is no longer in existence.  The 2004 loan was satisfied, and the accompanying mortgage extinguished, in October 2022, when the [...] finally obtained a new loan and mortgage from another lender, and the new loan was used to pay off the 2004 loan.  Since the “debt of Borrower” that plaintiff (at least in theory) could have “added to” no longer exists, plaintiff’s remedy no longer exists.  Plaintiff lost the remedy that Section 9 possibly provided to it once the [...] refinanced in 2022 and the 2004 loan and mortgage that plaintiff held was paid off – as several other courts have held in ruling on this issue, see, e.g., Oella Ridge Tr. v. Silver State Sch. Credit Union, 137 Nev. 760, 763 (2021) (reviewing identical clause in mortgage agreement and ruling, “We agree and conclude this provision enables Silver State to add its attorney fees to the secured debt at the time Silver State disburses those amounts” but “Oella Ridge is not personally liable for attorney fees under the deed of trust”); Hart v. Clear Recon Corp., 27 Cal. App. 5th 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that identical provision in deed of trust was “a provision that attorney's fees, like any other expenses the lender may incur to protect its interest, will be added to the secured debt” but recognizing caselaw providing that this grants lender right only to “convert the amounts spent on attorneys’ fees into additional debt secured by the mortgage” as part of additional “contractual debt” under the loan and mortgage in question), citing Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 740 F.3d 1035, 1038 (5th Cir. 2014)).
[brief] In *Fisher v. Yates*, 270 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 1994), another case involving an owner of landlocked property seeking an access easement across a neighbor’s land, the Appellate Division held that the recording statute that put [...] on notice of the 1966 deed in his chain of title also put the plaintiff in *Fisher* on notice of recorded instruments in his neighbor’s chain of title.
[brief] Plaintiffs Ivan and [...] commenced this action in November 2017 against [...] and [...].  [Pa39].  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges that [...] was negligent in hiring, training and supervising [...] during his employment, including on May 13, 2017, while he was working as a Customer Sales Associate (“CSA”) in the Flooring Department at [...]’ Marlboro, New Jersey location, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the incident.  [Pa54-61].  The Amended Complaint also asserts theories of negligence and battery against [...].  *Ibid.*  After filing their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs amended their interrogatories to assert a claim of vicarious liability against [...] based on [...]’s negligence while acting within the scope of his employment.  [Pa70].  After the close of discovery, [...] moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that Plaintiffs cannot establish that [...] was negligent in hiring, training or supervising [...] because they did not establish the applicable standard of care or show that such standard was breached; and (2) that [...] is not vicariously liable for the alleged assault by [...] because [...]’s acts were not within the scope of his employment with [...].
[directive] Section in this established presumption overcome a or sustain whether to determining  In on bearing material a has that circumstance or any fact consider prosecutor may the 8, Section or endanger the will required, when court in appear will not released, if defendant, that risk the the obstruct to attempt or obstruct will and/or community, or the person other any of safety or injure, threaten, to attempt or intimidate, or injure, threaten, or process, justice criminal broad of list a provides Law Reform Bail  The juror. or witness prospective a intimidate, order whether to determining in account into take may court a information that of categories does Directive this noted that be should It (x.28 to 2A:162-20(a) N.J.S.A.
[brief] “The mere exposure to profanity, though irritating to many people, is not necessarily indicative of an intention to harass. ”  Id. at 263.  Similarly, “mere venting of frustration or irritation at the situation is insufficient by itself to constitute harassment under the statute. ”  Id. at 264. texting a coworker “I’m over [...] and her bullshit. ”); Pa237-38 at 49:1-55:25; Pa242 at 72:13-17; Pa243 at 74:5-24 (noting [...]’s bickering with other staffing coordinators); Pa175 at 67:13-68:6 ([...] stating [...] would “freak out on everybody”); Pa240 at 64:10-18 (staffing coordinators upset at the way [...] “treated people”); Pa285 at 30:23-31:5 ([...] stating [...] was not a “team player”); Pa286 at 35:1-7 ([...] treated the staffer coordinators like children); Pa184 at 101:22-102:6 ([...] was belittling and degrading toward staffing coordinators)).
[brief] (Pa000993–994).  Barila was decided on April 20, 2020, with the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly disagreeing with the Appellate Division that there was a “vested right” in accumulated sick leave compensation.  Barila, 241 N.J. at 600.  Thereafter, on June 8, 2021, [...] entered a decision and order, granting Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss in part.
[brief] “Equitable estoppel should be used sparingly to compel arbitration. ”  Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 179-80 (2013) (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 178 (2003)).  Here [...] argues that they “may enforce the arbitration agreement against [...] – a signatory to the Contract – because of ‘the relationship of the alleged wrongs to the non-signatory’s obligations and duties in the contract . . . and [the fact that] the claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contractual obligations.
[brief] On cross-examination, Petitioner confirmed that the New Jersey Civil Service Commission job description accurately described his duties as a firefighter (Aa14; Aa32-Aa36; IT32:22-25; IT33:1-24).  Petitioner confirmed that as a firefighter he is trained to and has performed the following duties, among others: “loads and unloads equipment,” “lays and connects hose to hydrants, standpipes and intake and discharge valves,” “performs preparatory operations for the delivery of water” and transports tools and equipment (Aa14; Aa32-Aa33; IT34:3-25; IT35:1-9).  He confirmed that he had training and prior experience in handling these types of fires, and that he was trained to and had previously traversed uneven inclines and declines when carrying equipment and fire hoses (Aa14; IT32:5-12; IT35:17-22; IT36:9-16).
[brief] (Pa21).  Courts are required, when calculating the lodestar, to consider a combination of the twelve factors in Johnson and the factors in Lindy to determine “the number of hours reasonably expended” multiplied by “a reasonable hourly rate. ”  Rendine, 141 N.J. at 325-26 (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-900).  Its calculation and the methods on which such calculation is based, is to be clearly stated.  See Khoudary v. Salem County Bd. of Social Services, 281 N.J. Super. 571, 578 (App. Div. 1990).  Only then is the court permitted to “adjust” the lodestar up or down.  Rendine, 141 N.J. at 322-337.  Here, the trial court failed to issue a statement of reasons, failed to calculate the lodestar, and failed to explain how or why it’s “adjustments” reduced counsel’s hourly rate from $525 to $395.
[brief] It appears that [...] and [...] may have played “telephone tag” and [...] went ahead with the stakeout using out-of-date inaccurate elevations on March 23, 2009.  (Pa229-Pa230)  After [...] performed its stake out on March 23, 2009, [...]'s "common, knowledge negligence" continued.  On the afternoon of March 23, 2009, [...] faxed [...] its "cut sheet for Building stakeout" done that day.  (Pa235-Pa237)  The typed report clearly states that the elevations were based on [...]'s Grading Plan of 4/11/05, sheet 4.  This was the original plan provided by [...] to [...] in 2008, before any corrective revisions were made.  This demonstrates that [...] had failed to provide [...] with the revisions of elevation which [...] had unquestionably received from [...] in October and November 2008 via DHL delivery service.  On the same March 23, 2009 cut sheet, [...] cautions the project contractor, [...], in plain English:  “Contractor must notify this office prior to any construction if above referenced plans have been revised. ”  (Pa236)  As shown by this timeline, [...] certainly had notice that [...]’s April 11, 2005 grading plan had been significantly revised.  Yet [...] took no action to notify [...] that he was working from an outdated, subsequently revised grading plan.  It requires no esoteric expert testimony to argue to a jury that Defendant [...] was negligent in allowing Surveyor [...] to stake out the elevations of this building site on March 23, 2009 based on a grading plan which [...] knew or should have known to be outdated, inaccurate and already revised by [...].
[brief] Rolnick v. Rolnick, 262 N.J.  Super. 343, 365-66, 621 A.2d 37 (App. Div. 1993).  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it lacked authority to reconsider the “law of the case” created by the Appellate Division.  As such, the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration must be affirmed because there was no cognizable basis upon which the trial court could have provided relief contrary to the decision of the Appellate Division in its Kemp decision.
[brief] Under the LRHL, “[i]n order to carry out and effectuate the purposes of [the LRHL] and the terms of the redevelopment plan,” a municipality is statutorily permitted to:  Arrange or contract with public agencies or redevelopers for the planning, replanning, construction, or undertaking of any project or redevelopment work, or any part thereof; negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity, including where applicable the costs incurred in conjunction with bonds, notes or other obligations issued by the redevelopment entity, and to secure payment of such revenue; as part of any such arrangement or contract, provide for extension of credit, or making of loans, to redevelopers to finance any project or redevelopment work, or upon a finding that the project or redevelopment work would not be undertaken but for the provision of financial assistance, or would not be undertaken in its intended scope without the provision of financial assistance, provide as part of an arrangement or contract for capital grants to redevelopers; and arrange or contract with public agencies or redevelopers for the opening, grading or closing of streets, roads, roadways, alleys, or other places or for the furnishing of facilities or for the acquisition by such agency of property options or property rights or for the furnishing of property or services in connection with a redevelopment area.  [N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) (emphasis added)].
[brief] Trial 195T December 12, 2012  Trial 196T December 14, 2012  Trial 197T December 19, 2012  Trial 198T December 21, 2012  Trial 199T January 3, 2013  Trial 200T January 4, 2013  Trial 201T January 7, 2013  Trial 202T January 15, 2013  Closing 203T January 16, 2013
[brief] ”  Ibid. (citing O'Connell v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 306 N.J. Super. 166, 172 (App. Div.1997), appeal dismissed, 157 N.J. 537 (1998).  General and vague allegations made by a party that are not substantiated by competent evidentiary support do not require submission of the matter to a trier of fact.  Plaintiff-Respondent was appointed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. for the sole purpose of selling the Property and he negotiated a contract for sale pursuant to the authority granted to him by the terms of the Order dated January 13, 2023.