ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (1T 5-25 to 18-17; 7T 186-18 to 203-4)  The detectives displayed surveillance videos and video stills showing a Jeep driving past the bar at 1:25 a.m., circling the block, and parking on a nearby street at 1:30 a.m.; and then a man with dreadlocks exiting the Jeep, walking around, reentering the Jeep, and driving west away from the block of the bar at 1:46 a.m.  (1T 18-18 to 28-13, 75-9 to 76-9; 7T 202-23 to 232-4; 8T 85-8 to 95-4)  [...] said he was the one driving the Jeep and walking in the videos; he also said he knew of [...] but did not have any issues with him.7
[brief] ”  In response, the judge noted that he had already told the jury that an indictment is not evidence of guilt, but that he wanted “to distinguish that from the process that was described to the entire seventy jurors by [juror number six].”  At that point, the assistant prosecutor indicated that if the judge had not given the jury a curative instruction, he would have requested one.  Defense counsel stated her belief that the “comments made by the court were in fact kind of circular” because in the judge's preliminary instructions to the jury the judge indicated that the indictment was not evidence of guilt, but then, in effect, contradicted that instruction by telling the jury that a case in the Superior Court cannot be pursued unless the grand jury reviews the case and decides to return an indictment.  The judge overruled the defense objection to his comments and the sidebar ended with the judge simply stating, “your objection is noted. ”  We conclude the judge made numerous errors in his handling of the dialogue with the juror.
[brief] Materials cited as Other Authorities in the Table of Authorities  [...], *National Public Data Breach Shows Urgent Need for CFPB to Regulate Data Brokers* (Aug. 19, 2024)  ..................Pa211  New Jersey Model Jury Charge 5.10A  .........................................................Pa214  [...], *Current N.J.  Court Rules*, Comment 3.5, on R. 1:36–3 ..............................................................................................................Pa216 S. Rep. No. 95-382, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695 (1977) .................................Pa223  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Action
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS  .........................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................................1  A.  Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity Was Required to Expand the Scope of the Motor Vehicle Stop and to Request Consent to Search...........1  B.  The Police Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity.......5  C.  [...] Reasonably Asserted that the Missing Body-Worn-Camera Footage Would Have Contained Exculpatory Evidence, and Did Not Waive the Argument.  Nor Is His Argument that [...]’s Attendance at the Street Cop Conference Supports Suppression the Kind of Argument that Can Be Waived.  ..................................................................................9  D.  The State Errs in Its Interpretation of State v. Baum.  .........................13  CONCLUSION  .....................................................................................14  CITATION KEY  "Sb" – State’s brief  "Db" - Defendant’s brief  STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
[directive] The Internal Affairs Unit of this department has completed its investigation of your complaint concerning the conduct of [name of subject officer].  The investigation and a review of all information failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  More specifically,… a. (witness could not be located) b. (document could not be located) c. (physical or forensic evidence could not be located)  d. (witness did not support your complaint) e. (physical or forensic evidence did not support your complaint) f. (the investigation failed to yield enough evidence to support your complaint) g. (while some evidence supported your complaint there was not enough evidence to support your complaint)  If you have additional information which you believe should be considered, please contact the Internal Affairs Unit at [telephone number].  If no additional information is received within ten days, this case will be considered closed.  Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.
[brief] 447 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2016).  At the conclusion of her case, the trial court dismissed [...]’s claims, and the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.  Id. at 127.  [...] was a receptionist at [...].  A customer of the dealership leaned over the counter and tugged on her sleeve, exposing her bra.  *Id.* at 128.  The customer that committed the offensive act was a “good customer” in that he purchased approximately twenty vehicles from the dealership over the years.  *Id.*  Plaintiff attended a meeting with her managers about whether she wanted to press charges against the customer.  She testified that she left the meeting feeling discouraged and concluded that her employer would be disappointed if she made a complaint.  *Id.*  Days later, plaintiff decided that she would like to press charges and advised her employer.  *Id.* at 129.  After doing so, plaintiff was called into a meeting felt that the general manager was upset.  However, the police were contacted by the dealership so that plaintiff could file her complaint.  [...] testified that *after* she complained “the work environment changed. ”  *Id.* at 130-31.  She felt that people were avoiding her.  *Id.*  Additionally, a week after the complaint was filed, she “received two written warnings for leaving work early without permission. ”  *Id.* at 131.  One warning pertained to an incident that occurred four days before she made the complaint, but was not documented until after she complained.  The Appellate Division examined whether the two written warnings in [...]’s personnel file constituted adverse employment actions within the meaning of the NJLAD.
[brief] VOLUME I Notice of Appeal.  ..........................................................  Pa1  Case Information Statement.  ...........................................  Pa4  Order to Show Cause Denying Application to Vacate Award And Confirming Arbitration Award 2/9/2024.  ......................... Pa8 Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery.  ............... Pa10 Verified Complaint.  ......................................................  Pa11 Certification of [...].  ...........................................  Pa20 Collective Bargaining Agreement 7/1/2019 - 6/30/2023 .......... Pa23 STFA Grievance 8/29/2019.  .............................................  Pa57 [...] Phase Two Determination 12/8/2021.  .......  Pa58 VOLUME II
[brief] ..........................................................  9  Spalt v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 237 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 1989) ...  3, 4 Statutes N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1......................................................................................  7, 8 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1..................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2..................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.3..................................................................................  1 Rules R. 2:2-3(a)(2)..........................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (Ab12).  This argument necessarily claims that [...] has some defined or definable navigation rights in the State’s land outside of [...]’s permit area, and that the Jibsail Technical Modification Permit infringes on those rights.  In support of its claim, [...] submits myriad photographic evidence showing the location of the Jibsail Technical Modification Permit from the vantage point of [...]’s existing facilities as well as aerial photography.  (Id.).  The Trust contends that the location of Jibsail’s dock creates “a factual navigational harm uniquely impact[ing] Appellant. ” (Ab12, 15).  But as explained further below, [...] has “not articulated any claim of a constitutionally protected individual property interest affected thereby. ” (Ab135).  [...] is not obligated to analyze navigation in the manner proposed by Appellant and
[brief] 10  POINT I  THE OFFICER HAD NO REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO PROLONG THE TRAFFIC STOP FOR A CANINE SNIFF.  THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.  (Da 6-15)  .................................................................................................................................  10  POINT II  THE INTRODUCTION OF PAST ACTS OF DRUG DEALING WITHOUT ANY LIMITING INSTRUCTION  REQUIRES REVERSAL OF [...]’S CONVICTIONS.  (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................  18  POINT III  THE FAILURE TO INFORM THE JURY THAT JOINT POSSESSORS CANNOT INTEND TO DISTRIBUTE DRUGS TO ONE ANOTHER ENTITLES [...] TO A NEW TRIAL.
[brief] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS  Date Submitted: February 20, 2024  [...]  Solicitor General  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorneys General Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...] (Attorney ID No. 441912023)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 297432019)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 281382018)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 440472023)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 335512021)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 324172020)  Deputy Attorneys General  On the Brief  [...] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
[directive] These standards pertain to basic K-9 training and qualification, in-service training and re-evaluation, K-9 instructor qualifications, and K-9 training sites or facilities.  Compliance with these mandatory standards is the responsibility of the chief executive officer of the agency sponsoring the training and the chief executive officer of the agency conducting or utilizing K-9 operations.  Basic and in-service training standards have been established as performance objectives which relate to actual duties and tasks to be performed on the job.  Performance objectives represent the goals of the training and are used to determine if the training has been successful by indicating whether trainees have achieved what is intended.  (An overview of the Performance Objective System of Training is provided in Appendix A.)
[brief] Then, in July of 2018, [...] again denied an application by [...] for all of his attorneys’ fees purportedly incurred due to collection efforts up to that point.  In so doing, [...] stated as follows:  I’m well aware of the efforts that the plaintiff has undertaken since the judgment was rendered to attempt to collect on the judgment.  And their efforts have been almost on a weekly basis over the last two years to do that.  So I’m sure that the ultimate attorney’s fees that have been incurred will be substantial.  Whether they’re a million dollars or not, I don’t know.  But they’ll be substantial.  But I can’t make an award of fees prior to the Court determining that the plaintiff is entitled to fees for collection.  I did make a determination that they were entitled to fees that they incurred due to the shenanigans about the overseas transfers, and I made my award in that regard.  But … I was not prepared then and I’m not prepared now to say that they’re legally entitled to an award of fees against the defendants or any of the defendants for all of those collection efforts.  *It would have to really be done in a stage where the -- an application is made for a determination of entitlement.  Then you get to the issues of quantification.*  I don’t consider that I’ve created a fund in court with respect to crossing the Rubicon of whether or not someone’s entitled to fees.  So that has to happen at some point before someone can seriously take up the question of how much if at all should the defendants pay toward the attorney’s fees that the plaintiffs have incurred in their collection efforts.  There’s an interesting question lurking in this application as to the extent to which [...] would be liable for efforts to collect from [...] on the judgment or efforts to collect as against [...] and [...] on the judgment.  But I don’t need to address that case.  *And I don’t think under the general equitable authority of the Court I can entertain an application for fees that doesn’t have a grounding in a particular application for a determination that in fact the plaintiffs are entitled to those fees.*  [2T14:10-15:23].
[brief] A.  The Clerk Lacked the Power to Act Unilaterally  The Clerk’s power to act is limited to that which has been granted to it by statute.  As to the issue of elections, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-77 provides that “Immediately after the close of the polls the clerk and tellers shall forthwith canvass the vote and certify the results.  The clerk shall publicly announce the results. ”  Id. (emphasis provided).  Thus, pursuant to this statue, the power to canvass votes and certify results is not granted unilaterally to the Clerk, but is granted to the “clerk and tellers. ”  The Clerk has no statutory power to act alone.
[brief] 7T 66:1-3.  [...] testified that the variance for number of stories is impactful.  A 2.5 story building would allow for steeper roof pitches to give it more character and better fit its surroundings.  7T 72:4-13.  He also testified that the character of Changebridge Road is rural, and most properties have excess setbacks, so the parking within the set back is a significant impact.  7T 72:18-25.  He testified that the use is inherently beneficial, so the Board’s task is to consider “the negative criteria and whether or not the negative impacts outweigh the, uh, positive or public benefits here.
[brief] [...], J.S.C. REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS  [...] By: [...], Esq.  (NJ Attorney ID No. 078112014)  [...], Esq. (NJ Attorney ID No. 018621995)  [...], Esq.  (NJ Attorney ID No. 031942005)  [...] [...] – TELEPHONE [...] – FAX  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants [...] & [...]  Submitted to the Court on June 19, 2024
[brief] For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully requested that the Rent Increase totaling $1,717.18 be affirmed in all respects and be made retroactive to August 1, 2019.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, [...]  By: /s [...]  [...]  Dated: August 3, 2023  AMACONN REALTY, INC.  V. [...] AND [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action
[brief] The jury heard that Plaintiff created [...] without allowing or inviting Defendant to participate in that business venture.  In terms of Defendant’s work at, and her salary from, the pharmacy, the jury heard that Defendant worked at the Pharmacy six days a week for about fifty-five hours a week.  (3T36:2-7).  As the pharmacist in charge of [...], Defendant was responsible for seizing all controlled substances, receiving medications, dispensing medications and filling prescriptions and putting them into the system, for reviewing drug interactions or any adverse effects, doing inventory, and dealing with expired medications.  (3T37:12-19).  These responsibilities were only something a licensed pharmacist could do.  (3T37:20-23).  The jury further heard that Defendant based her salary on the hourly rate pharmacists typically are paid—based on her first-hand experience and knowledge of pharmacists’ salaries (3T39:4-22)—and based upon the number of prescriptions she was filling, with that number of daily prescriptions increasing by the hundreds between 2017 and 2019, which in turn had her hourly rate salary increase from $50 an hour in 2017 to $60 an hour in 2019.  (3T37:24-39:3).  Defendant never took a paycheck from [...].
[brief] (“[...]”) filed a hardship application for a rent increase on May 22, 2017 with the [...] (the “Board”) under Section 155-14 of Hoboken’s ordinance entitling it to a hardship rent increase “in the event that a landlord cannot meet his operating expense or does not make a fair return on his investment. ”  Three times, the Board denied [...] a proper rent increase after multiple hearings each time.
[brief] Ibid.  The officers patted down and questioned the defendant and, after the driver denied consent to search the car, conducted a canine sniff of the car.  Id. at 162.  The canine alerted to the presence of narcotics inside the car, the police performed a warrantless search, and seized drugs and other evidence from the car.  *Ibid.*  The *Smart* Court affirmed the trial court order suppressing the evidence seized from the car because the circumstances leading to probable cause to search were not unforeseeable and spontaneous.
[brief] This legislation has obviously sought to expand the duties of companies like [...], requiring greater evaluation and supervision of drivers, and enhancing their responsibility to the public.  N.J.S.A. 39:5H-2 to -25.  Last, [...]’s tactics have prejudiced the [...], with prejudice defined in this context as “the inherent unfairness – in terms of delay, expense, or damage to a party’s legal position[.]”
[directive] 1BJ: ~78 ;zjc5"}2e- 91¥--6J 7}~1:lJ- A}Z4 ~7}~7]Z}- 91¥-~ '?P·J- ~-&oJ] %~: ~~l-]77}?  .8.-,Z.3cl~ ]Lj- 0 0 ] a.  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole ineligibility is __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.  .:::1.itl ;zjc5"}7} ~-&oJl ~11%1-1-9-, 91¥-~ 1}~1:lJ- ~1}'o 1Jzl-~ __ 1d 1?!QJ= £]15"} %~~ N, __ 1H-%l oJo:J -%l?: 1]  '?Jw ~) £1 1}~ 1:lJ- ~1}~ 1]  zi..g.  __ 1d __ 1H-%l(1d, -%l?: ;<J- 'fl 'T 7] W '.U ..Q..£., oj 7]  zl- 'T-91 7c}'&,J, 3:_2e- ± ?7c}.:g.AJ]  3._?jj°5!  oJ] -3j-~ £j ~)O]  £~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "r 'ict 91 -8} tj-.  1.-]  O:j ig.~ ~ ~ b.  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory extended term can be __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months).
[directive] B.  Jurisdiction for filing domestic violence complaint by the victim.  1.  During regular court hours, a.  The victim should be transported or directed to the Family Part of the Superior Court.  b.  Where transportation of the victim to the Superior Court is not feasible, the officer should telephone the designated court by telephone for an emergent temporary restraining order in accordance with established procedure.  2.  On weekends, holidays and other times when the court is closed.  a.  The victim may file the domestic violence complaint before a municipal court judge specifically assigned to accept these complaints.  3.  The victim may file a domestic violence complaint: a. where the alleged act of domestic violence occurred.  b. where the defendant resides, or c. where the victim resides or is sheltered.  C.  Jurisdiction for filing criminal complaint by the victim in connection with filing domestic violence complaint.
[brief] *Id.* at 381 (quoting Lehmann, *supra*, 132 N.J. at 621).  The Appellate Division concluded that the trial judge was correct in analyzing the evidence, which showed: defendant adopted a formal anti-harassment policy and an anti-discrimination policy and developed a complaint procedure and investigation process.  Plaintiff, as well as all other employees hired by defendant, received and acknowledged reading the handbook.  Further, plaintiff admitted these policies were discussed during his initial two-day in-class training.  No evidence suggests plaintiff was unable to voice his complaints or that they went unaddressed because of an ineffective policy.  *Ibid.*  Notably, the Appellate Division addressed that while in hindsight, there could be improvements to the process or supervisor’s training on the issues, the Court could not conclude that the “methods used here fail to meet established standards. ”  Importantly, “plaintiff’s own report that after meeting with his supervisors, he did not experience any further discriminatory harassment and suffered no change in his position, duties or compensation, demonstrated the policy’s effectiveness.
[brief] S-13 shows the same location as S-12, only 9 minutes later.  (5T224-3 to 11)  (Da11 at S-13)  A person wearing a hooded sweatshirt can be seen walking from the right side of the screen to the left side.  That person was never identified.  The next twenty-four videos (S-14 to S-36) were collected from cameras between the intersection of [...] and [...]
[brief] **  When discussing Appellant’s opioid use and failure to report same, [...] correctly found that Appellant never reported his opioid use to his immediate supervisor, which he was required to do pursuant to the Medication Policy.  [Pa46].  [...] reviewed Appellant’s allegation that the opioid medications were disclosed on the September 2015 drug test; however, there was no evidence produced by any party of this alleged disclosure, and even if Appellant had made this disclosure, it was insufficient under the Medication Policy or any of the other Rules and Regulations.  [Pa46].  Put another way, even accepting as true that Appellant disclosed his medications on the September 2015 drug test, Appellant still violated the Medication Policy because the 2015 drug test does not count as “immediately notify[ing] their immediate supervisor as to the medication”.  [Da4].  Therefore, Appellant’s violation of the Medication Policy is undisputed by the record evidence and should be upheld.
[brief] See, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(B)(“No funds under any applicable program shall be made available to any State educational agency (whether or not that agency is an educational agency or institution under this section) that has a policy of denying, or effectively prevents, the parents of students the right to inspect and review the education records maintained by the State educational agency on their children who are or have been in attendance at any school of an educational agency or institution that is subject to the provisions of this section. ”)(emphasis added)) party acting for the agency or institution. ”  34 CFR §99.3.  “Eligible student” is defined as “a student who has reached 18 years of age or is attending an institution of postsecondary education. ”  Id.  **Only parents and eligible students [those over 18] may amend a student’s records.**  34 CFR §99.20(a).  Respondent’s position is that transgender students are legally entitled to unilaterally alter their formal student records without parental notification and that the District conceal this information from parents.