ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Nor did it show any of the men entering or exiting the hotel at any time between 12:00 p.m., when all three men left through the main entrance and got into the Chrysler, and 9:50 p.m., when [...] carried [...] into the hotel through the main entrance.\(^7\) (9T 97-7 to 98-15; 9T 109-2 to 112-19)  The State theorized that [...] was in the Chrysler when it returned to the hotel in the early evening because cellphone records showed \(^7\)  If any of the men had used another entrance to enter or exit the hotel during the afternoon or early evening, the surveillance footage would not have captured that activity; the footage captured activity around the lobby and main entrance only.  Due to construction that was going on in 2020, the outside surveillance cameras were not working.  (8T 81-1 to 81-23; 9T 118-2 to 119-5) outgoing calls placed from [...]’s phone around 6:30 p.m., while the phone was in the vicinity of the hotel.  (13T 31-23 to 32-14; 16T 54-10 to 54-15)  Detectives admitted, however, that they otherwise had no idea where [...] had been before he was carried into the hotel at the end of the night (9T 111-22 to 112-19), or how many people got in and out of the Chrysler while it was traveling around Essex and Middlesex Counties between noon and 9:50 p.m. (14T 19-11 to 19-21; 14T 24-10 to 24-25)
[directive] All matters relating to the establishment, account, repayment and discontinuance of such find shall be in the discretion of the director, who shall promulgate reasonable rules and regulations in respect thereto.  s. L.1960, c. 169, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  1, of of 5-22.  Investigation expenditures local unit 40A  A judge of the Superior Court may, in his discretion, make a summary investigation into the affairs of any local unit and appoint an expert or experts to prosecute such investigation whenever 25 a. a petition for such investigation shall be presented to him, signed by freeholders, who have paid taxes on real estate located within the local unit within 1 year, and such petition sworn to and subscribed by them sets forth that they have cause to believe that the moneys of such local unit are being, or have been, unlawfully or corruptly expended, in which case, at least days’ notice of the hearing thereon 10 shall be given to the disbursing officer and the governing body of the local unit; or b. a resolution of the governing body requesting such investigation shall be presented to him.
[brief] In accord with Grasso, the Board’s Resolution explores Plaintiffs’ proofs concerning the intent of the height limitation in the SM Zone:  This application presents directly the substantial height variance pursuant to NJSA 40:55D-70(d)6 from the standards for the SM Zone District set forth in Ordinance §91-252, that was presented only obliquely by [...]’s companion application concerning development of the Wainwright parcel.  **The Board’s consideration of the purposes of the building height restriction in the SM Zone in this resolution** is therefore quite similar to the Board’s consideration of the issue in the resolution memorializing the Board’s decision in the earlier companion application concerning the Wainwright parcel.
[brief] In turn, the Neptune Township Municipal Court Judge allegedly directed [...] to attempt to resolve the remaining Complaint [...] charging failure to obtain a Certificate of Appropriateness (CofA) and to proceed with the Municipal process to obtain same for the installation of paver sidewalks in violation of Municipal Ordinances in the Historic Flare, among other things.  Neptune Township Municipal Court proceedings on Complaint-Summons [...] were stayed pending disposition of this appeal.  On December 12, 2020, Appellant made an application to the HPC for CofA for approval of the three (3) previously installed concrete unit paver walkways at the Property.
[directive] II.  Policy  BREATHE  Team services shall be available to victims who experience pressure on the throat or neck or blocking of the nose or mouth, thereby obstructing the breathing and/or blood circulation of the victim and causing reduced oxygen and blood flow to the brain.  These incidents are classified as strangulation, commonly referred to as “choking” and/or smothering.  While this Directive is focused on offenses of strangulation and/or smothering against a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), anyone who survives a strangulation or smothering assault will be afforded access to BREATHE Team services, to include a forensic medical exam performed by a qualified FNE.  Each county shall create a mechanism to activate BREATHE Team responses to all reported incidents of nonfatal strangulation and/or smothering.  While activation protocols may vary by county, activation must include a mechanism for deployment of an FNE to the appropriate treating facility within one hour of a reported strangulation and/or smothering event.  STRANGULATION CASES, note 2, at 57.
[brief] In May 2022, defendant was convicted in a jury trial of kidnapping, criminal sexual abuse, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and assaulting an employ of the United States.  On April 17, 2023, defendant was sentenced to forty-three years in prison.  (Pa1 to 3).  recordings.  (1T4-6 to 18; 1T5-11 to 19).  [...] pointed out that during the pretrial conference, he asked if anything was missing and defense counsel said no; both the State and court were ready to proceed to trial.  (1T4-24 to 5-1; 1T5-3 to 6).  Had the defense spoken up earlier, [...] would have been “on top of the State” to get it done.  (1T5-22 to 25).  Moreover, once defendant was brought to New Jersey, the State made an offer of seven years imprisonment which defendant accepted.  However, because the New Jersey plea would impact the federal plea, which called for a twenty-seven year sentence based upon defendant not having any other charges, defendant withdrew his New Jersey and federal pleas.  (1T12-22 to 14-21).  On June 10, 2019, defendant appeared before [...] and entered a guilty plea to count one (eluding) pursuant to a plea agreement under which the State agreed to recommend a sentence of six years imprisonment which the court would transform into a suspended sentence or time served.
[brief] (Pa0191).  Together with the $12.8 million found by the trial court after the 2010 Liability Trial, as of December 31, 2018, [...] incurred a total of $18,064,187 in covered costs. \(^7\) \(^7\)  Costs continue to be incurred and pursuant to the parties’ Stipulation, in 2020, [...] began providing annual calculations of its covered costs incurred during the preceding year to [...].  After entering into the Stipulation, on June 17, 2020, in an effort to end this interminable coverage dispute, [...] filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Interest, and Costs (the “Fees and Interest Motion”).  (Pa0195-98).  [...]’s Fees and Interest Motion sought entry of judgment against [...] and [...] in the stipulated amounts, plus an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to R. 4:42-9, litigation costs, and interest.  In its Fees and Interest Motion, [...] requested a total judgment, including attorneys’ fees, costs and interest, against [...] in the amount of $11,211,830, plus a declaration that [...] is liable for 27.5% of any covered costs incurred after December 31, 2018.
[brief] Because this issue (whether a special receiver should have been appointed), poses issues of law and fact, it should be reviewed de novo.  See N.J. Realty Concepts, LLC v. Mavroudis, 435 N.J. Super. 118, 123 (App. Div. 2014)  Under New Jersey law, “oppression has been defined as frustrating a [member’s] reasonable expectations” and “is usually directed at a minority [member] personally. ”  Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 N.J. 488, 506, 634 A.2d 1019 (1993).  Thus, where a member's reasonable expectations have been frustrated by other members, the minority member has been oppressed and has a genuine claim for judicial recourse under NJ RULLCA.  Under NJ RULLCA, dissolution is an activity carried out by the members of a limited liability company unless there are no members alive to do it.
[brief] Medtronic AVE Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 247 F.3d 44, 55 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing McMahan & Co. v. Bass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (App. Div. 1998)).  [...] ignored the effect of the absence of a “covenant not to sue” in the 2015 Settlement estopping “future claims” arising after the entry of final judgment.  The defendants played a substantial role in drafting the 2015 Settlement.  If they had sought to absolve themselves of liability for the future claims at issue here—claims that had yet to accrue until after Feb. 20, 2015—they had an opportunity to do so, but they did not avail themselves of it.  Instead, the 2015 Settlement is written in terms of releasing existing claims against the defendants, whether direct or related, sans any covenant not to sue.  Cf. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81146, at *74 (D.N.J. May 22, 2008) (concluding that a release of “related claims” “only applies to the class period and to claims arising out of or relating to the underlying [litigation]” and dismissing objection by class member that the proposed settlement would extinguish future causes of action).
[brief] **BIRCH WAS NOT EXCUSED FROM PERFORMANCE BY ITS ALLEGED “INABILITY” TO CLOSE ON THE TERMS IT HAD AGREED TO**  *(Pa357; 2T; 3T)*  Throughout its motion papers in the court below, [...] implied that it acted in good faith and was excused from performing its obligations to Plaintiff under the PSA because it was having difficulty securing favorable financing.  Although not directly addressed by the trial court, this line of argument is a red herring and is contrary to New Jersey law.  The defenses of impossibility or impracticability of performance are complete defenses for a party’s non-performance *only in the very limited circumstances* “where a fact essential to performance is assumed by the parties but does not exist at the time for performance. ”  *Connell v. Parlavecchio*, 255 N.J. Super 45, 49 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).  Impossibility or impracticability “are *not* defenses where the difficulty is the personal inability of the promisor to perform. ”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  In other words, “a party cannot render contract performance legally impossible by its own actions. ”  *Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City*, 433 N.J. Super. 290, 303 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); *see also Duff* v. Trenton Beverage Co., 4 N.J. 595, 606 (1950) (recognizing that a “promisor’s subjective incapacity” does not excuse a breach).  The fact that [...] may have been struggling to find what it considered favorable financing terms did not excuse it from proceeding with the terms of the PSA – even if the deal, as structured, was no longer financially attractive to [...].  See, e.g., Newark v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Com., 106 N.J. Super. 88, 104-105 (Super. Ct. 1968) (“subsequent events which should have been in the contemplation of the parties as possible contingencies when they entered into the contract will not excuse performance. ”)  “New Jersey does not subscribe to the view that a thing is impossible in legal contemplation simply because it is not practicable to perform except at an excessive and unreasonable cost. ”  Id.  Here, [...] attempted to back out of its contractual obligations to Plaintiff based upon its contention that it was unable to obtain financing to proceed with the structure contemplated by the PSA.  According to [...]’s self-serving narrative, it was free to walk away from its obligations to Plaintiff and proceed to closing with the Fee Owner (and without Plaintiff).  By then, [...] had apparently negotiated what it considered to be a better, more financially attractive deal, whereby it would assume the existing loan and take title to both the Real Property and the Improvements.  (Pa346-347 at ¶¶ 17-21).  However, as discussed, [...] had no right to cut Plaintiff out of the deal just because [...] later perceived that the terms of the PSA were more onerous and financially burdensome than the deal it could cut directly with the Fee Owner, after further negotiation.
[brief] ”  (Da071).  In preparation for the evidentiary hearing and examination of [...], counsel for [...] came across a Sworn Statement dated August 12, 2008– one year prior to [...]’s conviction – filed by [...] in the Federal Court for the District of New Jersey, in support of his Habeas Petition to overturn his conviction (hereinafter “Sworn Statement”).  (Da074).  The Sworn Statement disavowed [...]’s involvement in the charged offenses.  The [...] was in possession of this Sworn Statement, having opposed the Habeas Petition.  (See Da082).  The evidentiary hearing was conducted on July 27, 2021.  (17T).  Following the hearing, the court denied [...]’s second petition for post-conviction relief.
[brief] ”  Id.  Plaintiff indicated that a divorce was not an option for him absent “crazy things happening” or if “there’s physical abuse” in the relationship.  Id. (1T103-13).  Defendant advised Plaintiff that “fights are going to happen; small things are going to happen” and it’s fine.  (1T58-3).  However, “cheating should not happen. ”(1T58-3).  Plaintiff testified that he wanted a family and Defendant indicated to him that she wanted two kids.  (1T60-1).  In February 2020, approximately four (4) months after meeting on Shaadi.com, Plaintiff and Defendant were engaged in Ahmedabad, India.  (1T65-7).  In April 2020, prior to the parties’ civil ceremony, Plaintiff questioned Defendant whether she was a “Patel” or not.  (1T67-7).  Defendant advised Plaintiff that she was a “Patel” even though her last name was not “Patel. ” (1T67-13).  Plaintiff testified that according to “his culture and traditions” he did not like that Defendant’s brother was divorced and remarried, and that her sister married “out of caste. ” (1T68-6).  A fact Plaintiff knew prior to the parties’ civil ceremony.  In November 2020, Plaintiff was made aware that Defendant’s family does not do a “puja” or prayer for the festival of Diwali.
[brief] DEP CORRECTLY FOUND THE PROJECT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE NORTHEAST WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN.  (Responds To Appellants’ Brief Point II).  DEP properly applied the Highlands rules to the substantial evidence in the record regarding the Project’s wastewater generation and water use to determine the Project is consistent with the areawide WQMP.  To argue otherwise, Appellants focus on concerns about climate change and impervious surfaces, but neither are relevant under the WQMP rules.  They also ignore New Jersey’s broader water quality impact regulatory regime.  DEP’s project decision comports with the requirements of the Water Quality Planning Act (“WQPA”), N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 to -16, as amended by the Highlands Act, and the WQMP rules, N.J.A.C. 7:15, and is supported by the record.
[brief] That Rule states:  **7:7-16.10  Scenic Resources and Design**  (a)  Scenic resources include the views of the natural and/or built landscape.  (b)  Large-scale elements of building and site design are defined as the elements that compose the developed landscape such as size, geometry, massing, height and bulk structures.  (c)  New coastal development that is visually compatible with its surroundings in terms of building and site design, and enhances scenic resources is encouraged.  New coastal development that is not visually compatible with existing scenic resources in terms of large-scale elements of building and site design is discouraged.  --- ¹  The view shed and step back requirements of the Rule were originally proposed in 1990, 22 N.J.R. 1191-92 (April 16, 1990) and were later adopted in 1994.  26 N.J.R. 2934 (a), 3080 (July 18, 1994).  (d)  In all areas, except the Northern Waterfront Region, the Delaware River Region and Atlantic City, new coastal development adjacent to a bay or ocean or bayfront or oceanfront, beach, dune or boardwalk and higher than 15 feet in height measured from the existing grade of the site or boardwalk shall comply with the following…:  1.  Provide an open view corridor perpendicular to the water’s edge in the amount of 30 percent of the frontage along the waterfront where an open view currently exists: and 2.  Be separated from either the beach, dune, boardwalk, or waterfront, whichever is further inland, by a distance of equal to two times the height of the structure [step back requirement]  ….  [emphasis supplied].  [...] failed to meet any of the mandatory requirements of the Scenic Resources and Design Rule.  Aa16-Aa21.  It is not visually compatible with its surroundings, does not provide a 30% open view corridor and, most glaring, it is not stepped back at a 2 to 1 ratio from the boardwalk.  Rather it is wider than the rule allows, leaving only a view corridor 25% wide, and it rises straight up 99 feet only 88 feet from the boardwalk instead of being stepped back so as not to overwhelm the existing scenic coastal environment.  A building so close to the boardwalk should be a maximum of 44 feet high to comply with the rule.  [...] recognized these gross deficiencies and on June 22, 2021, denied the permit application.
[brief] On [...], also owned by [...], 1T26:23 to 27:4, there was an estimate for $65,000.00.  1T27:8-14, P-10.  A payment of $21,666.66 was made, 1T28:7-14, P-11, but no work done.  1T28:18.  [...] did not even mention [...] at all, thus not disputing plaintiff’s testimony.  **1410
[brief] “1T” shall refer to the [...] Hearing held on November 1, 2022.  “2T” shall refer to the Transcript of Prerogative Writ Oral Argument held on May 23, 2023.  “Pa” shall refer to Plaintiffs’ Appendix.  “Pb” shall refer to Plaintiffs’ Brief.  “BDb” shall refer to [...]’s Opposition Brief.
[brief] *Id.* at 213.  Unlike the Virgin Islands, the New Jersey Legislature did not adopt the MSRA to reduce salaries of its own employees, but rather to address the dire financial circumstances of the City, which for years had failed to resolve its mounting budget deficits.  In *United Steel*, the Third Circuit held the contract modification was unreasonable because the government was aware of its falling revenues at the time it agreed to grant a salary increase to the public employees in the first place and had already authorized $500 million in debt to cover expenses.  *Id.* at 214.  Here, the State of New Jersey was not a party to the CNA that Plaintiffs claim has been impaired.  Unlike the circumstances of *United Steel Paper*, the MSRA was not a legislative reversal of the State’s own contractual obligations, but rather an intervention in the affairs of a municipality that was in need of State assistance to escape financial ruin.  As such, *United Steel Paper* has no application here.  The MSRA does not violate the Contracts Clause because the MSRA was adopted by the Legislature with a legitimate public purpose (preventing the City from financial ruin) and is reasonably related to that appropriate governmental objective.  The Appellate Division has already found that capping terminal leave benefits does not infringe the Contracts Clause, and the Superior Court’s February 15 Order should therefore be affirmed.  *Superior Officers*, 2022 WL 2352376, at *9 (“We reject plaintiff’s contention that the broad grant of authority to the State under the statutory framework violates New Jersey’s Contract Clause[.]”); (Pa000677).  **POINT VI**
[brief] ”  His Honor also stated I did not follow the Rules because there was no Certification.  It says right in My Certification for the November 9th Motion for Reconsideration, “The Plaintiff will rely on the materials already submitted as well as the accompanying Letter Brief. ”  Pa365.  That would be my Office Manager’s and my own October 2nd Certifications at Pa334-346.  I should not have had to state this in a Motion for Reconsideration.  However, as usual, since my filings are always construed in the most negative light possible, I automatically stated that.  As to my “never oppose time requests” policy, I know nothing about, nor do I want to know anything about, any adversary’s personal life.  In this situation, June is certainly a great time for a vacation.  She may have children who were going to be out of school in June and she needed time for them.  Or she could be in the final stages of pregnancy or otherwise in need of medical care.  She could have been like me in the past suffering from chemo side-effects or needed an operation.  This is all none of my business.  Because I had to file motions in the past exposing my medical records to public view, I am resolutely against “digging-in” to find out reasons for more time.  **Conclusion**
[brief] In fact, when asked about dedicated payroll for the Project, [...]’s corporate designee admitted that payroll reports were not submitted to [...], the CCIP’s Program Administrator.  Specifically, she testified as follows:  Q: This is [...]’s Answers and Objections to [...]’s Interrogatories.  A: Right.  Q: Which, if we scan down to the bottom, again, you – you certified those, right?  A: Yes.  Q: Okay.  So if we look at question number 9, “Set forth the date upon which you submitted any payroll records or reports to [...] relating to the CCIP. ”  And the answer is, “[...] does not believe that any payroll records or payroll – payroll reports were actually submitted to [...] for the subject project,” right?  A: Yeah.  Q: That’s a true – that’s a true answer that you certified, right?  A: Yes.
[brief] A.  The PCR Court Wrongly Determined That Petitioner’s Claim Of Disparate Sentencing Was Procedurally Barred, Since A Disparate Sentencing Claim Qualifies As A Sentence Not Authorized By Law And Is Thus Cognizable Pursuant To R. 3:22-2c (21T14-1 to 17)  Petitioner argued below that his sentence was unfairly disparate in comparison to his more culpable co-defendants.  (Da 231 to 236).  The PCR court found that this claim was procedurally barred pursuant to R. 3:22-5 as previously adjudicated in accordance with the Supreme Court remand at the re-sentencing.  (21T14-10 to 15)  The court also found that petitioner could have made this argument on appeal, and was thus procedurally barred pursuant to R. 3:22-4.  Ibid.  The PCR court mistakenly found that the claim of disparate sentencing was previously adjudicated in prior appeals.
[brief] If necessary, the argument should be addressed by this Court.  & Co. v. Smigel, 115 N.J. Super. 391, 394 (App. Div. 1971) (citing, Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Galm, 109 N.J.L. 111, 116, 160 A. 645 (E. & A.1932).  A continuing guaranty is at its inception an offer from the guarantor and is accepted by the creditor each time the latter does a specified act (E.g., extending credit to the debtor).  Id.  To the extent the February 20, 2015 lease created a personal guaranty (which it did not) such guaranty is a continuing guaranty since each month the lease was not terminated by Plaintiff, Plaintiff provided an additional month of possession to [...].  Typically, a conditional guaranty reserves in the guarantor the power to revoke it unilaterally prior to action by way of acceptance by the creditor.  Swift & Co. 115 N.J. Super at 394.  In this case [...] and [...] have revoked any continuing guaranty that was created on at least three occasions.  First, the guaranty was revoked in 2016 when Plaintiff became aware that [...] and [...] had sold all of their interest in [...] and retained absolutely no interest in the entity.
[brief] On reconsideration of this motion, the trial court stated, “no new facts have been uncovered which would warrant either this motion for reconsideration or the prior motion for [summary judgment].  In the original motion for summary judgment, the Court considered all evidence.  There is no evidence submitted by [...] because [...] conducted no discovery.  The court considered the verified complaint, and the verified complaint was competent evidence for the court to consider.  And therefore, [...]’s motion for reconsideration is denied.