ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] An appellate court will uphold a motion court’s factual findings if they “are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  *State v. Rockford*, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (quotation omitted).  Factual findings must be rejected if they are “clearly mistaken or so wide of the mark that the interests of justice. ”  *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 245 (2007) (quotations omitted).  However, a suppression court’s legal findings are afforded no deference, with the appellate court charged with de novo review.  *State v. Hinton*, 216 N.J. 211, 228 (2013) (citation omitted).  The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the State Constitution both protect individuals’ rights “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” by requiring that search warrants be “supported by oath or affirmation” and “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized.
[brief] “The decision whether to grant [a motion to vacate default judgment] is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. ”  *Triffin v. Maryland Child Support Enforcement Admin.*, 436 N.J. Super. 621, 629 (Law Div. 2014) (citing *Mancini v. EDS*, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993)) (emphasis added).  An abuse of discretion will usually only “arise[ ] when a decision is ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis. ’”  *Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting *Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.*, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).  *Rule 4:50-1(a)* authorizes relief from a judgment entered as a result of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. ”  *DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield*, 198 N.J. 242, 262-63 (2009).  “The four identified categories . . . , when read together, as they must be, reveal an intent . . . to encompass situations in which a party, through no fault of its own, had engaged in erroneous conduct or reached a mistaken judgment on a material point at issue in the litigation. ”  *Id.* at 262.  Only “litigation errors that a party could not have protected against” are afforded relief under *Rule 4:50-1(a). *  *Id.* at 263.  “The law regarding vacating default judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50–1 is ‘designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case. ’”.  *Triffin*, 436 N.J. Super. at 629 (quoting *Mancini*, 132 N.J. at 334).  Indeed, the Court Rule permitting judgments to be reopened as designed to extend a remedy only in rare situations.  *See Greenberg v. Owens*, 31 N.J. 402, 405 (1960).  “A default judgment will not be disturbed unless 1) the neglect to answer or otherwise appear and defend was excusable under the circumstances, and 2) the defendant has a meritorious defense, either to the cause of action itself or, if liability is not disputed, to the quantum of damages assessed. ”  *Triffin*, 436 N.J. Super. at 629 (emphasis added).  The failure to demonstrate either prong is fatal to a motion to vacate default judgment.
[brief] The Board conducted the first duly noticed hearing on November 8, 2021.  (Ra215-Ra271.)  The Board began the hearing by entering a number of exhibits into the record (Ra217 9:13 through Ra219 19:21), and then [...] presented direct testimony of: [...], professional civil engineer (Ra220 24:9 through Ra230 61:2); [...], professional architect (Ra230 61:13 through Ra232 71:13); [...], professional traffic engineer (Ra232 71:14 through Ra237 90:4); and [...], professional planner (Ra 237 90:16 through Ra239 98:25).  Mr. DeCina described the proposed drainage system for the Project, which would involve conventional curb-type inlets and underground storm conveyance piping, which would lead to an underground detention basin located under the roadway between Buildings 3 and 4 and Buildings 1 and 2.  (Ra224 38:7-17.)  He further opined that the proposed drainage system meets the requirements of the Borough’s zoning ordinances and the NJDEP stormwater management requirements, which was submitted to the Borough Engineer for review and comments.  (Ra224 38:18-39:17.)  Mr. Bernard testified and confirmed that the site plan and architectural plans are substantially consistent with the concept plan and architectural plans attached to the Settlement Agreement and the RR Zone.  (Ra238 96:9-19.)  At the December 20, 2021 meeting, Mr. DeCina went into further detail as to the obligations under the New Jersey Stormwater Management Rules, noting that [...] is required to provide a stormwater management basin that handles water quality, water quantity and groundwater discharge.  (Ra280 34:3-35:6.)  Notably, Mr. DeCina described the underground detention basin as a storm tank module, which is effectively a plastic box, 30 inches tall, that is sized to handle the volume of runoff which will be released slowly into the storm pipe at a slower rate than what is currently occurring at the property.  (Ra280 35:23-36:13.)  He also described how the grading of the site was adjusted as part of the design of the project and comprehensive stormwater management plan.  The Board then read a number of letters into the record from members of the public (including several of the Plaintiffs), generally objecting to the size and scale of the Project.
[brief] (Aa137).  For example, N.J.S.A. 13:1D-154(a) is another provision of the Law where “the Legislature expressly excluded certain marinas from the requirement of providing public access where there is no existing public access. ” (Aa137).  8  Similarly, the common-law under Matthews, 95 N.J. at 322, and Raleigh, 185 N.J. at 59-60, acknowledged an expansive reading of the public trust doctrine and did not require pre-existing public access, only that prior access was a consideration in determining the appropriate level of accommodation.  But, where, as here, the Legislature “includes particular language in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same [a]ct, it is generally presumed that [the Legislature] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.
[brief] By the time [...] testified at trial on May 20, 2022, twenty-five days had passed from when his report was received.  Ultimately, defendant chose not to present expert testimony to contradict [...].  However, defense counsel—no doubt informed by his consultations with [...]—cross-examined [...] about the unreliability of PCMD, (7T61-19 to 78-15), and emphasized this point in his summation.  (8T57-11 to 63-11).  Indeed, the jury acquitted defendant of murder and the weapons offenses, perhaps suggesting that it may not have accepted the PCMD evidence at least in regard to defendant’s post-shooting path.  Thus, defendant fails to explain how the delay prevented him from contesting the PCMD evidence.  The trial court wisely decided against a drastic remedy that would have kept important evidence from the jury contrary to public interest.  See Washington, 453 N.J. Super. at 192 (“The trial of criminal cases involves ‘important interests’ of the State, the alleged victims, and the public, not just ‘those of defendant alone. ’”) (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 353 (1989)).  This proper exercise of discretion should be affirmed.
[brief] Indeed, by only a short time later when he finally gave his first statement to law enforcement about the case, on March 9, 2020, [...] claimed to know defendant’s full name, but did not know how to pronounce it -- an odd issue unless he had been reading it, rather than hearing it from defendant.  (29T 51-20 to 24)  Nevertheless, the following was [...]’s story for the jury.  He said he initially got into a discussion with defendant about the parameters of New Jersey self-defense law.  (28T 91-4 to 93-1)  Allegedly defendant wavered about whether his parents were home at the time of the incident, first claiming they were and then were not, and said that he knew the intruder, both of which led [...] to tell him that he did not “see an actual self-defense” claim.
[brief] [...] – December 1, 2019 through December 31, 2020  [...] – September 1, 2019 through December 1, 2019  [...] – September 1, 2019 through December 1, 2019  [...] – September 1, 2019 through December 1, 2019  [...] – January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020
[brief] By way of guidance, the trial judge on remand may in her discretion end the hearing if she finds that the showup worksheet recounted verbatim the entire exchange between the officer and [...], provided no evidence of suggestiveness has been demonstrated by the evidence.  Guerino, 464 N.J. Super. at 612.  If the trial judge finds the evidence should not have been admitted, or alternatively only admitted with redactions or cautionary instructions, the parties can then present argument as to whether a new trial is warranted.  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 300.  However, if the evidence presented does not show that any violations of Rule 3:11 and the out-of-court identification was reliable, then defendant's conviction and sentence shall stand.  See Anthony, 237 N.J. at 238.  IV.
[brief] ”  See 9 U.S.C.S. § 16(b)(2) (emphasis added).  The Third Circuit has specifically recognized that “if one party seeks an order compelling arbitration and it is granted, the parties must then arbitrate their dispute to an arbitrators’ decision, and cannot seek recourse to the courts before that time. ”  Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 111 F.3d 343, 350 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis \(^2\)  In addition, the Arbitration Agreement specifically states “This agreement to arbitrate is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate commerce, and shall be governed by, and enforceable under, the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), 9 U.S.C.§1 et seq. ” added)(“Once a dispute is determined to be validly arbitrable, all other issues are to be decided at arbitration. ”)).  That is because “[t]he general approach to appellate jurisdiction as set forth in the FAA is constrained; the Act typically precludes appellate review of orders allowing arbitration ‘until after the arbitration process has gone forward. ’”  John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1998); see also S+L+H S.p.A. v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 5536 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding the lower court’s decision granting arbitration was not appealable).  The question of whether an order compelling arbitration is appealable under the FAA turns on whether the relevant order is a final decision on the merits, or an interlocutory order.  “A final decision, as that term is commonly understood for purposes of appellate jurisdiction, refers to an order that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. ’”  Olick, 151 F.3d at 135 (quoting Ortiz v. Dodge, 126 F.3d 545, 547 (3d Cir. 1997)).  “Within the context of orders relating to arbitration, the decisive issue is ‘whether arbitrability was the sole issue presented in the action or --- 3  See also Pisgah Contrs. v. Rosen (In re Pisgah Contrs.), 117 F.3d 133, 9 4th Cir. & D.C. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 379, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15184 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal from district court order directing arbitration to proceed).  whether the issue of arbitrability originated as part of an action raising from other claims for relief. ”  Olick, 151 F.3d at 135 (quoting American Casualty Co. v. L-J, Inc., 35 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also F.C. Schaffer & Assocs. v. Demech Contrs., 101 F.3d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1998).  Here, the issue of arbitration is interlocutory.  The putative class action brought by Appellant clearly does not pertain solely to issues of arbitrability, but rather is rooted in claims under the NJCFA and NJFCLA.  (Pa48-Pa67).  (Pa141).  Thus, the Lower Court’s order granting Appellant’s motion to arbitrate is not appealable as a matter of law and this Court must decline to exercise jurisdiction and dismiss the Appeal.
[brief] ” (13T3-24 to 4-4).  --- 7  The trial court rejected the State’s argument that the defense had provided insufficient notice of its intent to argue third-party guilt.  (9T76-10 to 12; 9T77-10 to 12).  The trial court noted its previous ruling barring defense counsel from referencing third-party guilt in opening statement and reiterated that “there must be some evidence of third-party guilt to permit a defense to argue that point.  There needs to be an evidential link and some offer of proof which has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State’s case. ” (13T5-19 to 23).  The trial court noted that it remembered that [...] testified that “all of the leads turned out to be dead ends.  And that he people that were being run out, as colloquially meaning investigated by those investigative entities led them to determine that they did not kill [...]. ” (13T6-11 to 17).  The trial court, therefore, viewed any questions regarding third-party guilt “to be asked and answered. ” (13T6-12 to 17).  Defense counsel indicated that he did not plan to ask any questions about third-party guilt, and counsel did not ask any questions of this nature when Luyber was recalled.  (13T5-3 to 7).  Contrary to the trial court’s misplaced reasoning, the proffered evidence that [...] had shot at the victim and [...] in the weeks or months before the murder was clearly sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that [...] was the shooter and was admissible under the Rules of Evidence.
[brief] Trial 97T January 31, 2012  Trial 98T February 1, 2012  Trial 99T February 2, 2012  Trial 100T February 7, 2012  Trial 101T February 8, 2012  Trial 102T February 9, 2012 Trial 103T February 14, 2012 Trial 104T February 15, 2012 Trial 105T February 16, 2012 Trial 106T February 27, 2012 Trial 107T February 28, 2012 Trial 108T February 29, 2012 Trial 109T March 1, 2012 Trial 110T March 5, 2012 Trial 111T March 6, 2012 Trial 112T March 7, 2012 Trial 113T March 8, 2012 Trial 114T March 12, 2012 Trial 115T March 13, 2012 Trial 116T March 19, 2012 Trial 117T March 21, 2012 Trial 118T March 22, 2012 Trial 119T March 26, 2012 Trial 120T March 27, 2012 Trial 121T March 28, 2012 Trial 122T March 29, 2012 Trial 123T March 30, 2012 Trial 124T April 2, 2012 Trial 125T April 3, 2012 Trial 126T April 4, 2012 Trial 127T April 10, 2012 Trial 128T April 11, 2012 Trial 129T April 12, 2012 Trial 130T April 16, 2012 Trial 131T April 17, 2012 Trial 132T April 18, 2012 Trial 133T April 19, 2012 Trial 134T April 25, 2012 Trial 135T April 26, 2012 Trial 136T April 30, 2012 Trial 137T May 1, 2012 Trial 138T May 2, 2012 Trial 139T May 15, 2012 Trial 140T May 16, 2012 Trial 141T May 22, 2012 Trial 142T May 24, 2012 Trial 143T May 25, 2012 Trial 144T May 29, 2012 Trial 145T May 30, 2012 Trial 146T May 31, 2012 Trial 147T June 5, 2012 Trial 148T June 6, 2012 Trial 149T June 7, 2012 Trial 150T July 9, 2012 Trial 151T July 10, 2012 Trial 152T July 11, 2012 Trial 153T July 12, 2012 Trial 154T July 13, 2012 Trial 155T July 16, 2012 Trial 156T July 17, 2012 Trial 157T July 18, 2012 Trial 158T July 19, 2012 Trial 159T July 20, 2012 Trial 160T July 23, 2012 Trial 161T July 24, 2012 Trial 162T July 25, 2012 Trial 163T July 26, 2012 Trial 164T July 30, 2012 Trial 165T July 31, 2012 Trial 166T August 1, 2012 Trial 167T August 2, 2012 Trial 168T August 3, 2012 Trial 169T August 8, 2012 Trial 170T August 9, 2012 Trial 171T August 10, 2012 Trial 172T August 13, 2012 Trial 173T August 14, 2012 Trial 174T August 15, 2012
[brief] "The doctrine of judicial estoppel is well entrenched in New Jersey's jurisprudence."  *Newell v. Hudson*, 376 N.J. Super. 29, 38 (App. Div. 2005).  "It is 'an equitable doctrine precluding a party from asserting a position in a case that contradicts or is inconsistent with a position previously asserted by the party in the case or a related legal proceeding.'"  *Id.* (quoting *Tamburelli Props. v. Cresskill*, 308 N.J. Super. 326, 335 (App. Div. 1998)).  "[T]o be estopped [a party must] have convinced the court to accept its position in the earlier litigation.  A party is not bound to a position it unsuccessfully maintained."  *In re Cassidy*, 892 F.2d 637, 641(7th Cir. 1990).  See e.g. *Richardson v. Union Carbide Indus. Gases Inc.*, 347 N.J. Super. 524, 530 (App. Div. 2002)(barring a litigant who asserted a position and obtained summary judgment and dismissal of a party’s claim for indemnification from asserting inconsistent position on appeal); *Bender v. Adelson*, 187 N.J. 411, 423 (2006)(holding that plaintiff’s counsel’s summation comments that defense witness was not qualified to testify as an expert violated principles of judicial estoppel since counsel’s comments were “clearly inconsistent” with his prior representations to the trial judge).
[brief] **POINT ELEVEN  [Individual analysis of Count 3 of Counterclaim] (Argued Pa392)**  Count 3 of the Counterclaim for an alleged “Failure to Follow a Statutory Obligation” should be dismissed because it is not a legally-recognized cause of action, and did not follow the procedures under R. 4:69-1, *et seq.*, required to force a public entity to comply with a statute.  Count Three of the Counterclaim alleges “Failure to Follow a Statutory Obligation”, namely, as per Paragraph 23, the Board allegedly failed to comply with the “mandates” of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  This count should be dismissed for at least the following two reasons:  1.  “Failure to Follow a Statutory Obligation” is not a judicially recognizable, cognizable cause of action.  If it was, then there would be elements to such a claim and perhaps Model Civil Jury Charges to address suits under that claim.  2.  Forcing a public entity to comply with a statute is governed by R. 4:69-1, *et seq.*, where [...] is required to file its action as a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ, within 45-days (R. 4:69-6), and *after* exhausting administrative remedies (R. 4:69-5).  None of these requirements were met.  Hence, Count Three of the Counterclaim should be dismissed.
[brief] To interpret the meaning of a statute, courts seek “to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. ”  In re Registrant H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 20 (2013)).  “The ‘best indicator’ of legislative intent” is typically the plain language of the statute.  W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518 (2023) (quoting State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 94 (2022) (additional citations omitted)).  Courts also read each part of a statute “in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  If the plain language of a statute is clear, the court’s task is complete.  Sanjuan v. Sch. Dist. of W. N.Y., 256 N.J.  369, 379 (2024) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93).  The purposes and plain language of the IFPA and AICRA are clear.  PIP no-fault arbitrations are intended by the Legislature to resolve expeditiously uncomplicated claims by an insured, an injured person, or a medical provider who has an assignment of benefits, related solely to payment of medical benefits stemming from single accidents, and not broad, complex, multi-defendant IFPA and RICO claims.  Affirmative IFPA cases brought by insurance companies belong in Superior Court, and one-way disputes over the payment of PIP benefits that qualify belong in PIP arbitration.
[brief] (28T 84-14 to 22)  When [...] wrote a letter to the --- 7  In his direct testimony, [...] admitted multiple prior convictions for robbery, theft, and weapons offenses.  (28T 52-12 to 54-9)  8  The judge’s improper refusal to allow defense counsel to ask questions of [...] that would have revealed to the jury that the Attorney General eventually exonerated (as wrongfully convicted) a person against whom [...] testified -- a man named [...] -- is the subject of Point IV, infra.
[brief] On appeal, defendant raises the following points:  POINT I THE JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS ON ROBBERY WERE FLAWED, AS THEY: FAILED TO GIVE JURORS THE OPTION OF CONVICTING [...] OF SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY; FAILED TO NOTE THAT [...]' INTENT WAS CRITICAL TO DETERMINING WHETHER HE WAS ARMED WITH A “DEADLY WEAPON;” STATED THAT [...] WAS GUILTY OF ROBBERY IF HE COMMITTED A THEFT IN THE COURSE OF A THEFT; AND FAILED TO CLARIFY WHO WAS THE ALLEGED VICTIM OF THE ROBBERY.
[brief] The ALJ found the testimony of the witnesses to be credible, including the testimony of the parties’ expert witnesses.  (Aa56).  The ALJ found that the Department had used a proportional approach, agreeing to increase the premiums on the Choice 2 pre-rate stability block by approximately 20% to bring it closer to the earlier increase level approved for the Choice 2 rate stability block, as they are the same product and premiums should be similar for consumers.  (Aa70).  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.18(d) and (e), [...] could seek another increase in a year or so on the rate stability policies, giving [...] enough time to gauge its experience under its revised assumptions and projections.  (Aa71).  If the Department approved a rate increase on the rate stability policies, [...] would be ineligible to apply for a rate increase for another three to five years, depending on the percentage increase, given the annual reporting requirements under N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.18(d) and (e).  Ibid.  If the cumulative rate increase was over 150% of the original filing, [...] would become ineligible under the rules to seek another premium rate increase before the expiration of 3 or 5 years.
[brief] At no point in time did Appellant apply for a zoning permit which was also required.  On January 12, 2021, the [...] adopted Resolution [...] 2020-226 denying CofA approval of the three (3) unit paver walkways at the Property.  (Exhibit 1; Pa 130a.)  The [...] “found the applicants’ removal of the concrete walkways within the flare amounted to a destruction of a preexisting non-conforming walkway, which once destroyed, could not be replaced.  Second, the Commission found the walkways proposed by the applicant were inconsistent with the size limitations of Section R of the Design Guidelines, and that hardscape in the flare in [sic] discouraged under all circumstances.  Third, the Commission found that the concrete pavers were not historically consistent with respect to form, shape or color. ”  Pa 20a.  On March 3, 2021, plaintiffs filed an appeal of the [...]’s denial of CofA approval to the [...], ([...]).
[brief] The circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's fall overwhelmingly suggest that his fall was due to his foot coming into contact with the plywood, whether slipping on or tripping over it.  Use of circumstantial evidence to prove proximate cause is well established under New Jersey law.  As indicated, a plaintiff in a civil suit is not obliged to establish proximate cause by direct and indisputable evidence.  Bergquist, supra, 46 N.J. Super. at 88.  Instead, the matter may rest upon legitimate inference, so long as the proof will justify a reasonable and logical inference as distinguished from mere speculation.