ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment and for a directed verdict de novo.  *Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc.*, 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019); *Carbajal v. Patel*, 468 N.J. Super. 139, 157 (App. Div. 2021).  Summary judgment must be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  Rule 4:46-2; *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Similarly, a court must grant a motion for a directed verdict when, accepting the plaintiff’s facts and considering the applicable law, “no rational jury could draw from the evidence presented” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.  *Pitts v. Newark Bd. of Educ.*, 337 N. J. Super. 331, 340 (App. Div. 2001).  When considering a summary judgment motion in a TCA case, even when giving all of the plaintiff’s evidence favorable inferences, a trial court should still “consider the declared legislative policy which shaped the application and interpretation of the Act and the Commission's Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 that ‘recognized the difficulties inherent in a public entity's responsibility for maintaining its vast amounts of public property. ’”  Maslo v. City of Jersey City, 346 N.J. Super. 346, 350 (App. Div. 2002) (internal citation omitted).  Importantly, if one or more of the elements of the TCA is not satisfied, a plaintiff’s claim against a public entity alleging that such entity is liable due to the condition of public property must fail.  Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 585 (2008).  For the reasons set forth below, this court should reverse.
[brief] *Id.* at 333 (fn. 5).  Appellant argues without factual support that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the Committee’s adoption of Ordinance 2022-17.  In making this argument, Appellant misstates the applicable law.  Citing *Malanga v. Township of West Orange*, 253 N.J. 291 (2023), Appellant argues that the enactment of the Redevelopment Plan was required to be supported by “substantial credible evidence” in the record.  Pb21.  However, *Malanga* involved the quantum of evidence necessary to designate a property as being in need of redevelopment in accordance with *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-5, not the standard necessary to support adoption of a redevelopment plan in accordance with *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-7.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10........................................................................................................2, 9 COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2)..................................................................................................................6 R. 2:5-5(b).......................................................................................................................9  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4.........................................................................................6  CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011)...............................................................7  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).................................................................6 In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007).................................................................8 Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998).........................9, 10, 11 Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010)......................14 Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980).......................................................7 In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)...............................................8 Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973)..........................................6, 7 Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995).................................................................8 N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982).....................................................6 N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008)..............................................7 SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).....................11 State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978).................................8 In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)....................8, 9 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................7 In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008)..................................................................................7 Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) ...................................................6, 7 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL) Notice of Appeal........................................................................................................Pa1 Case Information Statement......................................................................................Pa5 State Police Retirement Board Final Decision 7/26/23.............................................Pa9 Affidavit of [...]............................................................................................Pa16
[brief] #### Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b** .................................................................................................. 2 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1** ................................................................................................... 20 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2)** ............................................................................................ 2, 21, 28 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b** ............................................................................................... 24, 29 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:43–2(e)** ............................................................................................ 42 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2** ............................................................................................... 3 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a** ............................................................................................... 42 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3)** .......................................................................................... 41 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(6)** .......................................................................................... 41 | Statutes (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9) | 41 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b | 42 | | Rules | PAGE NOS. | |-------|-----------| | R. 1:36-3 | 17 | | R. 2:10-2 | 14 | | R. 3:18-1 | 19 | | Constitutional Provisions | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------|-----------| | N.J. Const. art.
[brief] In March/April 2006, [...] met with [...] and [...], a representative of [...].  237a (694:17–695:4).  [...] and [...] represented to [...] that the real estate opportunity in Monroe Township would be rezoned and developed as a “free market” development of approximately four hundred (400) townhouses and that Plaintiffs could purchase said real estate and either develop it or sell the eventual delineated lots “approved and improved” to [...] at a certain price.  238a (698:23–701:15).  [...] and [...] explained that the aforesaid real estate would consist of an assemblage of various adjacent properties located in Williamstown, Monroe Township (“Pork Chop Hill Assemblage”).  238a (697:23–698:4).  [...] and [...] explained that Plaintiffs would enter into agreements of sale for the purchase of said real estate and hire the requisite professionals.  238a (700:17-24).  [...] and [...] had a second meeting with Plaintiffs and discussed the Township’s affordable housing issues in conjunction with another real estate opportunity in Monroe Township (“Duncan Farms”).
[brief] April 8, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division  New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  [...]  Appellate Division Appeal from the Ocean County Law Division- Criminal Part (Honorable [...], J.A.D.)  Dear Sir(s)/Madam(es):
[brief] *[...]* went so far as to identify the CFA’s definition of “sale” as "any sale, rental or distribution, offer for sale, rental or distribution or attempt directly or indirectly to sell, rent or distribute."  *N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(e)*.  In doing so, the Court ultimately determined that the NJCFA was inapplicable because the activities were not in connection with the sale of merchandise.  *[...]*, 430 N.J. Super. at 339.  Likewise, in *Chulsky*, the District Court completed a thorough analysis of the applicability of the NJCFA to defendants and ultimately concluded:
[directive] Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Endangering the Welfare of an Actor knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral 2C:24-7
[brief] Da418  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Opposition of Motion to Bar [...] Filed 01/13/22 .........................................................  Da433  Exhibit A 12/29/20  [...] Report ....................... Da331 Exhibit B 04/07/21  [...] Report.........................  Da310  Exhibit C  Andrew [...], P.E. Curriculum Vitae.................................................................  Da436 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Loss of Ocean View and Privacy and Denying, without Prejudice, Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude Owner’s Engineer as Net Opinion Filed 1/28/22.................................................................
[brief] The Act requires that the party seeking relief must allege a specific constitutional violation.  *Mattson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.*, 124 F. Supp. 3d 381 (D.N.J. 2015), *aff'd*, 653 Fed. Appx. 145 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (unpublished).  The party may bring an action if: (1) they are deprived of a right; or (2) their rights are interfered with by threats, intimidation, coercion or force.  *Felicioni v. Admin. Off. of Courts*, 961 A.2d 1207 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008), abrogated by *Perez v. Zagami, LLC*, 94 A.3d 869 (N.J. 2014).  Additionally, the Legislature requires that the "plaintiff show 'threats, intimidation or coercion' were employed if constitutional rights were merely interfered with or an attempt was made at interfering with them, and that no such showing is required where one has actually been deprived of the right."  *Id.* at 400.  Although Plaintiff pled threat and coercion in the Amended Complaint, there are no facts that support those claims, such as who allegedly undertook the perceived act, what the threat was, and/or the coercion enacted, and what the harm suffered was from such actions.  Plaintiff did not identify any damages, nor state the specific substantive due process or equal rights protections she alleged were violated.  As such, all baseless assertions in Count V of the Amended Complaint were properly dismissed and should remain dismissed once this Court conducts a thorough review of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
[brief] [FEDa145].  Likewise, Section 10(a) of the Purchase and Sale Agreement bars such reliance, stating:  “This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements and understandings, whether written or oral. ”  [FEDa98].  the direct and proximate cause of the [Appellants’] alleged losses, the same losses alleged herein, was their failure to pay rent which led to the default.  This default caused [Appellants] to lose the Solar Rights and the Solar Project.  [Appellants] cannot show any causal link between [...]'s actions in making the alleged representation to [Appellants] when they entered into the Lease and Sale and Purchase Agreement in 2015, and their subsequent failure to pay rent.  Therefore, Count 1 of [Appellants’] Complaint is DISMISSED.
[brief] 90 N.J. at 132-34; Waste Mgmt., 399 N.J. Super. at 520 (collecting cases noting “[e]ach of these factors must be clearly and convincingly demonstrated”); McKenzie v. Corzine, 396 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2007) (“[A]ll these factors must weigh in favor of injunctive relief.
[brief] As the Trial Court explained in its Order and Decision, there is serious doubt as to whether there was sufficient meeting of the minds for a valid agreement to have been formed.  “Without mutual agreement, there is no contract. ”  *Cottrell v. Holtzberg*, 468 N.J. Super. 59, 71 (App. Div. 2021).  “As a general principle of contract law, there must be a meeting of the minds for an agreement to exist before enforcement is considered. ”  *Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Florida, Inc.*, 236 N.J. at 319 (2019) (citing *Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co.*, 11 N.J. 526, 538 (1953)).  Moreover, at the time of the Trial Court’s reversal of the stay order, no arbitration-related activity had begun.  To date, there has been no arbitration-related activity, including as to preparation or consideration of a panel.  As shown by the case law in Point II, the Trial Court clearly does have jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitration agreement can be enforced.
[brief] And issues I wanted to review, witch are sentencing, confidential informant, third party guilt, lesser included offenses, questionable chain of custody, brady material from the state, confrontation clause, signed certifications that was not done.  Statement of a [...] & [...].  (Da 034).  Here, the Defendant filed his second PCR while an appeal was pending.  However, the Defendant did not file it within the one-year time frame of the denial.  Absent a timely filing, the Court does not have jurisdiction to dismiss the petition without prejudice while awaiting the outcome of the appeal and furthermore, the Court in fact did not dismiss the petition at the time of that filing.  Even if the Court had found that the appeal warranted dismissal without prejudice despite the late filing, the statute requires that the Defendant re-file within ninety (90) days of the Appellate Division’s decision which was issued on March 11, 2020. \(^2\)  The ninety-day mark fell on June 9, 2020.  The Defendant did not petition the Supreme Court  \(^2\)  Noting that the Court did not dismiss the petition without prejudice during appeal. until nearly sixty (60) days after the ninety-day window had elapsed.  The Court did dismiss the motion without prejudice on January 7, 2021, citing that the case was pending cert before the Supreme Court after the Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court on August 5, 2020, and that order preserved the late filing date of December 2019, which is prohibited by the rule.  Further, it is the State’s position that an appeal of the denial of a first PCR is not a “direct appeal” for purposes of the rule.  It is the State’s position that this second PCR was untimely filed, that the non-relaxable time bar under the Rule removes jurisdiction of the Court to dismiss the petition without prejudice when an appeal is pending if the actual petition is filed outside of the one-year period, and that even if the appeal acted as an extension under the rule, the Defendant missed the ninety-day window months before filing a petition to the Supreme Court.  As such, the initial filing was barred, and the Court lacked jurisdiction to later dismiss without prejudice.  It is also worth noting that the Defendant’s filing does not allege on its face any grounds for relief outside of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel as required by R. 3:22-4.
[directive] Proszę również zauważyć, że Pytanie 7 obejmuje zabójstwo, do którego doszło w trakcie popełniania przestępstwa, jeżeli przestępstwem podstawowym jest napaść seksualna, a także każdy czyn przestępczy, który według oficjalnego stwierdzenia sądu należy uznać, ze względu na okoliczności za przestępstwo seksualne z użyciem przemocy, lub usiłowanie popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw.  These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), (4) or (5)(a), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or enticing a child pursuant to 2C:13-6, criminal sexual contact pursuant to 2C:14-3b if the victim is a minor; kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1, criminal restraint pursuant to 2C:13-2 or false imprisonment pursuant to 2C:13-3 if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent, promoting child prostitution pursuant to Please note for Question 4b(2) that while endangering the welfare of a child 2C:34-1b(3), (4), or any attempt to commit any such offense.
[brief] Additionally, it must be noted that the State was not the one who initially invited handwriting comparison by the jury—it was defendant.  In his opening, he alleged that the notes were forgeries, written by [...] or by someone else.  (8T:34-2 to 13).  Then, during his cross of [...], defense counsel placed [...]’s Miranda warning signature into evidence, and asked [...] to identify his handwriting, including his “very distinct way of dotting your I’s. ” (11T:220-3 to 221-3).  Defense counsel then used that known writing, from [...]’s Miranda warnings, to compare it to the writing on the jail letters to identify which portions were written by [...]—with the clear implication being that [...] had forged the letters.  (11T:230-19 to 232-14).  At no point did defendant ask for expert testimony, or for the trial judge to determine the “similarity” or veracity of the writings.  At no point did defendant “notify” the State that he intended to use [...]’s Miranda form as a handwriting sample, nor did defendant ask the judge for a ruling about its admissibility for that purpose; both things that the defendant now complains the State did not do.
[brief] Rights, a fact that Plaintiff was well aware of and was obtuse about in the R. 4:5-1 Certification to the Second Amended Complaint.  (Pa61-62).  As an initial matter, we noted that because not germane to the City’s motion and arguments, the City avoided lengthy argument in its submissions regarding Plaintiff’s false claims of established City “policy,” that the City had allegedly stated it will never accommodate any employee ever, and other irrational hyperbole that only further lead to the questioning of Plaintiff’s credibility in this matter.  As we also noted, such silence or omission should not, of course, be construed as agreement.  Indeed, Plaintiff never even included the referenced Sick Leave Policy/General Order 19-16 in its submissions, since same belies many of its “factual” claims in this action.  A plaintiff alleging failure to accommodate under the LAD must “first present the prima facie elements required in any LAD disability discrimination claim. ”  Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 614 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d as modified, 203 N.J. 383 (2010); Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Superior Court, 351 N.J. Super 385, 400 (2002).  In a LAD disability discrimination case, a plaintiff must establish: (1) he was a member of a protected class (i.
[brief] *Ibid.*  As [...] aptly wrote, "[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility."  *Id. at 35* (emphasis added).  However here, the facts are much more compelling than those in either *Hoffman* or *Specht*, as here the prize limitation clause was not presented at all, and was not visible at all no matter how much of a circuitous route which the tournament participant was willing to travel.  (As repeatedly stated during the trial, in 2017 the clause was not available at all online, no matter what website links the participant visited – instead, it could only be seen if the person also decided to separately purchase a voluminous rule book).  For example, in *Hoffman*, even though the forum selection clause was readily available to the user if "he or she scrolled down to a submerged portion of the webpage where the disclaimer containing the clause appeared", this Court held that the clause was "presumptively unenforceable", because it was "unlikely that consumers would ever see it at all on their computer screen."  But here in this instant matter, it was impossible that consumers could ever see it at all on their computer screen, because at the time of my entry into this 2017 tournament, those rules did not exist online anywhere!  And at trial, the defendants could not explain why they simply did not add one extra sentence, which stated their intended limitation of “only one prize per person”, to any of their multiple tournament announcements and advertisements, nor why they did not add this one extra sentence even on their own website.  Thus, there can be no question that the unannounced provision of “only one prize per person per event” is unenforceable as a matter of law.
[brief] In *Redvanly v. ADP*, 407 N.J. 395, 402 (App. Div. 2009), the Appellate Division barred evidence from the liability phase of trial that it found to be “relevant and admissible only on the issue of damages. ”  *Redvanly* is also distinguishable because the underlying facts brought into evidence were indeterminable.  There, the defendants introduced evidence of the plaintiff’s termination by a former employer to establish that she had lied on her job application.  However, the panel emphasized that the plaintiff had settled a wrongful termination claim against her former employer, therefore “we do not know the crucial fact of whether Redvanly was rightfully or wrongfully terminated. ”  Id. at 402.  As a result, the panel was unable to evaluate the plaintiff’s argument that she had answered truthfully on her employment application as well as the defendant’s argument that she had made inconsistent statements about the circumstances of her termination.  See id. at 400-401.  Here, however, there is no such ambiguity.  The texts and photographs speak for themselves and were authenticated by [...] during his trial testimony.  **POINT III**
[directive] 2nd Degree $50,000 to $200,000  No 10% age 16 to 17 and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or victim is age 13 to 15 and the actor is at least 4 years older.  15  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 1 STATUTES WHICH REQUIRE BAIL TO BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2