ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On April 29, 2024, just seventeen (17) days after the Arbitrator entered the Corrected Final Award, [...] initiated a new arbitration against [...] (the “Second Arbitration”).  Pa582-84.  [...] transparently commenced the Second Arbitration in a desperate attempt to avoid paying [...]’s $4 million dollar judgment in hopes of relitigating claims regarding the Hackensack Project.  [...]’s Demand for Arbitration states:  [...] asserts breach of contract claims against [...] for nonpayment [at the Hackensack Project].  Pursuant to the Agreement, [...] was to pay [...] $12,380,213.61.  [...] is also entitled to $364,254.00 in approved change orders (Change Order Nos. 7 through 43) and $957,165.60 in pending PCMs.  To date, however, [...] has only been paid $11,617,413.18, resulting in a balance due to [...] of $2,084,220.03. ”  [Pa584 (emphases added); compare with Pa606 (Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract) § 10.1 (Subcontract Sum = “$12,380,213.61”).]  The Second Arbitration comes on the heels of the First Arbitration, wherein the Arbitrator awarded [...] $0.00 (on an otherwise clear-cut 65% EGP formula), due to, inter alia, and in his words, the “serious issues with the project. ”  Pa574.  But for [...]’s $2.1 million nonpayment claim, the Arbitrator’s Award evinces no other reasoning for offsetting [...]’s $899,051.20 EGP claim down to $0.00.  See Pa568-80.  While the Award could have been more explicit on this point, there is no alternative reasonable way to read the Award other than the Arbitrator offset the Hackensack EGP with [...]’s counterclaims related to *on-the-project subcontractor issues*.  In essence, in the Second Arbitration, [...] seeks a double recovery by both offsetting [...]’s $899,051.20 Hackensack EGP claim *and* recovering an additional $2.1 million (the exact amount alleged in its own pleading in the First Arbitration!).  **F.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Apfel v. Budd Larner Gross Rosenbaum Greenberg & Sade, | 1, 30 | | 324 N.J. Super. 133 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 485 | | | (1999) | | | Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. City of Newark, | 18 | | 427 N.J. Super. 326 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 531 | | | (2013) | | | Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner, | passim | | --- A.3d ---, 2024 WL 1708605 (App. Div. 2024) | | | Bove v. AkPharma Inc., | 37, 38 | | 460 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 7 (2019) | | | Deutch & Shu, P.C. v. Roth, | 49 | | 284 N.J. Super. 133 (Law Div. 1995) | | | DiMaria Constr., Inc. v. Interarch, | 20, 24 | | 351 N.J. Super. 558 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d, 172 N.J. 182 (2002)  | | | Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., | 22, 31 | | 317 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Jennings v. Reed, | 49 | | 381 N.J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Major League Baseball Promotion Corp. v. Colour-Tex, Inc., | 21 | | 729 F. Supp. 1035 (D.N.J. 1990) | | | Manhattan Trailer Park Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Manhattan Trailer | 32 | | Court & Trailer Sales, Inc., | | | 438 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2014) | | | Masone v. Levine, | 19, 35 | | 382 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2005) | | McKeon-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546 (1993)
[brief] ..........................................................................................34  Matter of Protest of Award of On-Line Games Production and Operation Services Contract, Bid No. 95-X-21075, 279 N.J. Super 566 (App. Div. 1995)  ...........................................................................20  Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307 (1994)  ............................................................................................................29  Muirfield Const. Co. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth., 336 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2000)  .............................................................................24  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973)  ..............................................................................................................30  P & A Constr., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge, 365 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2004)  ..................................................................................9  Palamar Constr., Inc. v. Pennsauken, 196 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1983) .................................................................................passim Ridge at Back Brok, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 2014)  ..................................................................................32  Serenity Contracting Group, Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 306 N.J. Super. 151 (App. Div. 1997)  ...............................................................................27  State v. Lefante, 14 N.J. 584 (1954)  ..............................................................................................................33  Suburban Disposal, Inc. v. Township of Aberdeen, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1186 (App. Div. May 23, 2014)  ..............................................passim Tec Elec., Inc. v. Franklin Lakes Bd. of Educ., 284 N.J. Super. 480 (Law Div. 1995)  .................................................................................17, 19, 22, 23  Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic County Sewerage Authority, 67 N.J. 403 (1975)  ..............................................................................................................24  Thassian Mech. Contr., Inc. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 27 (App. Div. Jan. 6, 2020)  ........................................10, 17, 19  Township of River Vale v. R.J. Longo Constr. Co., 127 NJ. Super. 207 (Law Div. 1974)  ....................................................................................5, 19 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  Pioneer Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 155 N.J. Super. 332, 342 (App. Div.), aff’d, 78 N.J. 320 (1978).  See also Guilford v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2012 WL 3030250, at *5, n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26, 2012) (“Plaintiff’s argument that [the insurer] was misled because it failed to ask the right questions or conduct appropriate investigations is similarly unavailing.  ‘An insurer is entitled to relief when it relies on incorrect information provided by an insured in an insurance application if the information was material either to the insurer’s decision to insure or to the terms of the contract. ’”) (quoting Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 118).
[brief] On February 4, 2021, a Union County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant-appellant [...] with first-degree murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count one); second-degree possession of a weapon (firearm) for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count two); and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count four).  (Da1 to 3).  A Union County Grand Jury also returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant with second-degree certain person not to have a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).  (Da4).  ---  1  Da refers to defendant’s appendix on appeal.  Pa refers to the State’s appendix on appeal.  1T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 18, 2023.
[brief] Moreover, the tattoo requirement should be void as unconstitutionally vague.  “A statute 'is void if it is so vague that persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'"  State v Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 98 A. 3d 533 (2013), citations omitted.  N.J.S.A. 4:19-24(a)(1) provides that the tattoo be “in a prominent location” with no guidance as to its appearance or placement.  If the dog’s owner violates an Order entered under §24, N.J. S.A. 4:19-29 dictates seizure and impoundment of a dog and a fine of $1,000 per day.  These dire consequences carry a potential for denial of due process if the tattoo is deemed inadequate by subjective standards.  “Vagueness may create a denial of due process due to a failure to provide adequate and fair notice or warning. ”  Karins v. Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532, 544, 706 A.2d 706 (1998).
[brief] (T4 23:13-22, 24:7-10, 24:11-25:3).  There is simply no competent evidence that [...] obtained any pills from [...] as there were in opioids in her system, only cannabis.  (T4 at 77:6-9).  There is also no competent evidence that [...] lied about T.L.’s alcohol use to [...].  The ALJ determined that [...] had knowledge about “her ([...]’s) alcohol use” but there is no evidence to support this conclusion.
[brief] State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).  “Mitigating factors that are called to the court’s attention should not be ignored, and when amply based in the record … they must be found. ”  *Id.* at 64 (citing *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005); *State v. Blackmon*, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010)) (internal quotations omitted).
[brief] If this Court were to permit such an outcome, it would give free reign to insurance companies to collect a premium for coverage that is not needed.  Even worse, it gives insurance companies the ability to insure anything the applicant believes he needs only to later point out that the applicant was not entitled to coverage under the issued policy.  By incorrectly responding "No" to the first question, that had to mean that, although this Questionnaire was solely for information about renting or hiring motor vehicles for the summer, [...] mistakenly said he was not hiring any at all.  But [...] does not interpret the "No" to mean that he is not hiring or renting any vehicles; instead, they collect his money and then conveniently interpret the “No” to mean he was not hiring or renting specifically 12-15+ passenger vans.  This Court should not allow [...] to hide behind its confusing, contradictory underwriter's forms and sell insurance that is not needed according to the application and collect the premiums only to rescind the insurance policy after an accident.
[brief] At trial, Plaintiff presented evidence of [...]’s numerous violations of several statutory and code provisions of the RETA as detailed in their proposed Second Amended Complaint.  At the pretrial conference, [...] agreed it would not oppose introduction of evidence of these violations on lack of notice grounds.  During trial, [...] never objected to the admission of evidence of violations of specific RETA violations.  Each and every Plaintiff testified to the same basic facts.  Plaintiff [...]’s testimony was typical of all the Plaintiffs.  He described filling out sweepstakes entry forms for several prizes at the [...] while on a Father’s Day family outing.  (6T88:2-15).  Nothing about the display or the forms they completed said anything about timeshares.  (6T88:16-24).  They were told they had won a free night at [...] resort in Atlantic City.  (6T89:22-25).  In the subsequent telephonic and email communications with the [...] to set up their free night, [...] did not give any indication that the [...] would be required to attend a timeshare sales presentation during their stay.  (6T90:19-91:2 and 91:20-92:14).  Upon checking in, the [...] were told they had to sit through a “short presentation” the next morning.  They still were not told this was a timeshare sales pitch.  (6T93:18-94:14).  The next morning, they were ushered into an office and met [...]’s salesman, who was acting as the seller’s agent for [...].
[brief] Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require a school district to make payments to a party in material breach of a contract with a contracted service provider if the breach was not due to a closure resulting from a declared state of emergency, declared public health emergency, or a directive by the appropriate health agency or officer.  (Emphasis supplied.)  As may be seen, the amendment to the Statute, which requires the contracted service provider to pay its employees as if the schools had remained open, is mostly redundant; the original version of the law required that payments made to service providers pursuant to it be applied to payroll and fixed expenses of the contractor, while the amendment required that the employees of the service provider be paid as if the schools had remained open.
[brief] (Ra49-Ra93; Ra94-Ra175.)  Further, there was no testimony, expert or otherwise, to support the noise contention in the December Letter.  At the December 20, 2021 meeting, in response to a question from Objector’s counsel, [...], Esq. (“Objector’s Counsel”) during cross-examination, [...] confirmed that the measurement of height would be taken from the proposed finished grade of the Property in accordance with the Building Height Definition.
[brief] [...] Did Not Provide Valid Consent For The Search Of [...]’s Bedroom.  The State is wrong that Gross’s daughter, Rasheedah, provided valid consent for the search of Gross’s bedroom.  First, the State failed to prove that Rasheedah had the authority to consent to a search of her mother’s bedroom.  Second, just as the State failed to prove that Gross’s consent was voluntarily given, it failed to prove that Rasheedah’s consent was voluntarily given.  Accordingly, the search was unlawful and the gun must be suppressed.
[brief] Defendant made continuous outbursts.  [1T18-20 to 20-4; 2T5-14 to 7-15; 3T4-17 to -22; 3T28-2 to 33-21; 3T71-22 to 72-13; 3T74-3 to 75-9; 3T126-12 to 128-21; 4T12-16 to 16-8].  He slandered his attorney and accused the court of being biased against him.  [3T33-5 to -21; 3T128-19 to -20; 4T11-3 to 14-5].  He made several remarks to the jury in an attempt to subvert the trial process.  Because defendant raises the issue of his motion to proceed pro se in an earlier matter, it should be noted that [...] cautioned defendant that any future motions for self-representation had to be made in each individual case.
[brief] (3T 79-9 to 81-4)  [...] was depressed over his companion’s death, [...] testified.  (3T 90-25 to 91-2)  However, [...] was unaware that his brother was engaging in online dating and meeting men for “hookup” sex.  (3T 85-11 to 87-6)  [...] testified further that [...] “wasn’t in the best of shape” from a car accident, and had some mobility issues, but he also agreed that, despite being blind in one eye, his brother regularly drove a car.  (3T 82-13 to 83-22; 3T 89-11 to 13)  [...], an orthopedic surgeon, testified that [...] was in a motor-vehicle accident in 2012 that caused him to seek out [...] for relief from pain in his neck and shoulder.
[directive] These circumstances include any use of force by the officer resulting in significant or serious bodily injury or death; the discharge of a firearm or any use of deadly force by the officer; the death of a person while in law enforcement custody or during an encounter with law enforcement; or an incident the officer knows or has been advised is or will be the subject of an internal affairs or citizen complaint relating to the officer’s use of force, bias, or dishonesty.  subsection 10.3.  See Provides guidance on documenting review of BWC recordings prior to initial reports or statements.
[brief] “Control of discovery is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial courts. ”  Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040, 1047 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  The party seeking discovery has the initial burden to establish the documents sought are relevant under Rule 26(b)(1).  SeeLawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 243598, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 16, 2020),  When the discovery sought appears relevant on its face, or the discovering party has established relevance, the party resisting discovery bears the burden to support its objections.  SeeEhrlich v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 302 F.R.D. 620, 624 (D. Kan. 2014) (holding the party resisting discovery bears the burden to show why a discovery request is improper); Martin K. Eby Const. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., No. 08-1250-MLB-KGG, 2012 WL 1080801, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Once this low burden of relevance is established, the legal burden regarding the defense of a motion to compel resides with the party opposing the discovery request. ”).  The party resisting this discovery does not carry this burden by asserting “conclusory or boilerplate objections that discovery requests are irrelevant, immaterial, unduly burdensome, or overbroad. ”  Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 670 (D. Kan. 2004).  “Rather, an objecting party must specifically show in its response to the motion to compel, despite the broad and liberal construction afforded by the federal discovery rules, how each request for production or interrogatory is objectionable. ”  Id. at 670-71.  III.
[brief] Note that 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), the first paragraph in § 1692, is different from 15 U.S.C. § 1692a.  State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. ”  § 1692(e).  The federal courts’ construction of § 1692c(b) protects against invasions of individual privacy, prevents collection practices which place consumers’ privacy at risk, and ensures that those debt collectors who refrain from using mail vendors are not competitively disadvantaged.  Hence, there is no legitimate argument that the federal courts’ interpretation is inconsistent with the FDCPA overall scheme, frustrates the FDCPA’s purposes, or yields an absurd result.  Structurally, the FDCPA imposes a Code of Conduct which, among other things, requires debt collectors to treat consumers respectfully (by prohibiting harassing, oppressive, and abusive conduct), honestly (by banning “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means”), and fairly (by prohibiting the use of “unfair or unconscionable means”).
[brief] ...  (h) medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited by statute or judicial decision."  ([...] Cert., exhibit A).  As discussed above, medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited under New Jersey law.  Moreover, although there are no published decisions that prohibit recovery in circumstances similar to this one, medical payment subrogation claims are clearly prohibited in workers' compensation cases.  The only judicial decision directly on point is unpublished.  By rendering a decision on this matter, the arbitrator clearly exceeded his authorized powers as this was not a matter that he was authorized to hear.  For this reason, this court finds that the arbitration award should be vacated.
[brief] [...]’s Argument That Paragraph 24(G) Preserves Her Right to Any Interest Held by [...]’s Estate in the Palm Beach Property is Without Merit (Da274a-75a).  [...] attempts to cast Paragraph 24(F) as a provision that relates only to [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (See Db18.)  Yet, its plain terms demonstrate that Paragraph 24(F) is in no way limited to [...]’s Revocable Trust’s interest in the Palm Beach Property—it deals with the Palm Beach Property in general.  (See Da094a-95a.)  [...] attempts to turn on its head the requirement that the Settlement Agreement be read consistently with the “intent expressed or apparent in the writing. ”  Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 531 (1956).  [...] erroneously argues that the specific exception in Paragraph 24(F) to her general release regarding the Palm Beach Property is somehow wholly undone by Paragraph 24(G), which excepts from the release any “other” property [...] receives as a beneficiary of [...]’s Estate or [...]’s Revocable Trust:  [[...]’s] right to receive any amount of the Reserve or any other assets that are distributable to [[...]] from [...]’s Estate and [...]’s Revocable Trust pursuant to this Agreement.  The Parties acknowledge that [[...]] is not releasing her right to receive any property to which she is entitled as a beneficiary of [...]’s Estate or [...]’s Revocable Trust [...]  [Da096a, at Paragraph 24(G) (emphasis added.)]  [...]’s contention that the terms of Paragraph 24(G) control over Paragraph 24(F), however, is fatally flawed.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED...........................................  ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..................................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT...............................................................  3  I.  PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO CARRY THEIR BURDENS OF PRODUCTION AND PERSUASION...........................................  3  II.  APPELLANTS CORRECTLY RAISE THE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE VERACITY OF PETITIONERS ASSERTIONS....................  7 CONCLUSION.................................................................  10  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] The NJCLA’s espoused goal was to “prohibit [] deceptive lending practices generally, N.J.S.A. 17:10-13 (replaced by N.J.S.A. 17:11C-20). ”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 271.  “If a violation of the CLA [was] proven, the typical remedy, obtainable by the Department of Banking and Insurance or by individual consumers, is voiding of the contract,” though the NJCLA also provided for awards of damages to aggrieved consumers.
[brief] The Lower Court correctly reasoned and held that, because Appellant conceded to becoming aware of the Action in 2019, but chose to first commence a Class Action before moving to vacate his default in the Collection Action and, likewise, failing to proceed with any Motion to Vacate his default until 2023, he is barred by the doctrine of laches:  THE COURT: in 2019 .  . .  [...] was fully aware of this complaint.  [...], together with Counsel, made a strategic decision not to attempt to vacate this.  . .And the fact that it was a strategic call does not alleviate the employment \(^7\)  But Appellant’s arguments are barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata as they were already before the Superior Court in Appellant’s Class Action and the Superior Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
[brief] The jury also had a difficult time reaching a verdict.  The failure to offer evidence that could have “tipped the credibility scale,” such as testimony of an expert like [...], prejudiced [...] and deprived him of both the effective assistance of counsel and the fair trial to which he was entitled.  In denying [...]’s PCR without an evidentiary hearing, the court ignored the record, misapplied the law, and disposed his claim out of hand.  His PCR claim has a meritorious basis for relief; at minimum [...] is entitled to present evidence not in the record – including the testimony of [...] and of his trial counsel – at an evidentiary hearing to support his claim.
[directive] The one exception to this prohibition is that for a particularly long trial, the judge may address the issue of hardship excusals to the entire array before seating the initial panel in the box.  When addressing the array, the judge should inform jurors that it is important that, when called to the box, they answer all questions truthfully, accurately, and fully.  The jurors should be told that if any question is of a personal or sensitive nature, they can simply ask that they discuss it with the judge (and attorneys) at sidebar.  After making the introductory comments to the array, including the remarks approved by the Supreme Court, the initial panel should be drawn and called to the box.