ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For example, in Black's Law Dictionary, 11th ed., the term fee simple is defined as follows:  An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs, esp. a fee simple absolute.  Pa164.  The Appraisal of Real Estate goes on to note that:  Appraisers must clearly identify—and appraisal reports must clearly convey the property rights that are the subject of an appraisal.  In the case of a fee simple estate, a definition on its own may not be adequate.
[brief] See e.g. Statewide Hi-Way Safety, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 283 N.J. Super. 223, 232 (App. Div. 1995) (“While it is true that minor bid requirements may be waived, those situations are limited to matters where there is neither the possibility nor the perception of ‘corruption, or favoritism’ and involve requirements which do not go to the heart of the competitive bidding process. ”); *L. Pucillo & Sons, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Borough of New Milford*, 73 N.J. 349, 357-58 (1977) (“The lower courts, in holding that [...]'s competitors were not prejudiced by his failure to bid, ignored the possibility that the Borough's requirement may have deterred other potential bidders from even submitting proposals.  The Borough's specifications called for a bid bond in the amount of 10% of the bid price for the five-year contract.  This . . . may have been beyond the ability of some companies which would have been fully capable of discharging the obligations of a shorter contract.  In addition, the increased risk of contracting so far in advance may also have discouraged other bidders.  . .
[brief] [...] was qualified as an expert for the State in chemical analysis of controlled dangerous substances ("CDS").  (10T9-13 to 11-15).  Senger opined that certain of the substances from the duffel bags were tested and were positive for cannabis, and the white powdery substance tested positive for cocaine.  (10T20-7 to 11).  Defendant neither testified nor presented any witnesses.  (11T220-18 to 227-7; 12T42-5).
[directive] Even if the complainant is satisfied with the informal resolution, the process should be recorded on an internal affairs report form.  Regardless of the means of resolution, the integrity of the internal affairs process, particularly the receipt of complaints, demands that complaints and inquiries from any member of the public be uniformly documented for future reference and tracking.  The form should indicate that the matter was resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant and sent to internal affairs for review and filing.  The internal affairs supervisor should periodically audit those reports indicating that the complaint was informally resolved to ensure that the agency's supervisors are properly implementing their authority to resolve complaints from members of the public.  5.1.14
[brief] Pa55.  At Pb15-Pb16 explained, the subsequent en banc proceedings do not alter the precedential effect of the panel decisions.  Thus, following Dewey, each of the unpublished decisions cited by Defendant should have—but did not—consider the reasoning in the published federal decisions.  The motion court did not mention any of the other published federal court decisions (discussed at Pb16-Pb18) which, together with Hunstein I and Hunstein II, consistently held that alleging a debt collector’s transmission of debt data to a letter vendor for the purpose of creating, printing, and mailing collection letters states a claim for violation of § 1692c(b).
[brief] 2  [...]’s application requested a 185-foot dock extension.  [Aa39.]  However, the NJDEP approved a 167.3-foot dock extension.  [Aa1.]  [...].  [Aa167.]  Other neighbors also submitted public comments in opposition to the application.  The [...] extended dock is almost twice as long as other docks in the area.  [Aa149; Aa150; Aa167; Aa188; Aa291-Aa295.]  The [...] extended dock is also angled in a manner that interferes with Appellant’s use and enjoyment of Appellant’s dock and results in significant safety and navigational issues.  These issues are evident based on a simple review of photographs and other documentary evidence in the record.  [Aa149; Aa150; Aa152; Aa153; Aa188; Aa291-Aa295; Aa297; Aa298; Aa303.]  As required by the Coastal Zone Management (“CZM”) Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:7-1, et seq., a policy compliance statement was filed by [...] with its 2017 WFD permit application.  [Aa30.]  Among other regulations, [...] was required to comply with the Recreation Docks and Piers Rule at N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5.  As part of its compliance statement, [...] attempted to demonstrate a need for the new waterfront facilities that cannot purportedly be satisfied by existing facilities by stating that “this is a private lot and the proposed construction will allow the property owner mooring and access for the use of pleasure crafts. ”  [Aa36.]  [...] further stated that “[t]he proposed pier dock extension structure and proposed open type boat lifts will not hinder navigation or access to adjacent water area. ”  [Aa37.]  [...] ultimately asserted that its WFD permit application met “the intent and the policies of the State of New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection. ”  [Aa38.]  On May 19, 2017, the NJDEP issued WFD permit No. [...] to [...] for a 167.3-foot dock extension and two open-type boat lifts.
[brief] ’”  Sacchi v. ABC Fin. Servs., Inc., No. CIV. 14-1196 FLW, 2014 WL 4095009, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2014) (quoting Lo Bosco v. Kure Engineering Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1020, 1034 (D.N.J. 1995)).  It was clear that the harm articulated by the trial court was purely economic in nature; there was no indifference to, or reckless disregard for, the health and safety of these wealthy Plaintiffs.  Under the guideposts articulated in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm, the punitive damages award was clearly erroneous.  The trial court cited *Saffos v. Avaya*, 419 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 2011), in support of its finding that punitive damages were warranted here.
[brief] [...] commenced this declaratory judgment action in New Jersey Superior Court on May 12, 2017 seeking a declaration that a so-called “Special Undertaking” (an agreement signed by [...]’s predecessor in 1972) is void and unenforceable, and does not require [...] to indemnify Defendants for claims arising from [...]’s manufacture of polychlorinated biphenyls.  (Pa001-025).  Unhappy with a New Jersey court presiding over this action, [...] filed a mirror-image action in Missouri seven months later, on September 1, 2017 (the “Missouri Action”), seeking defense and indemnity from [...] in connection with the Special Undertaking.  (Pa082).  Just four days later, on September 5, 2017, Defendants filed two pre-answer motions to dismiss in New Jersey.  (Pa481-86).  Defendants’ first motion sought dismissal of the claims against New [...] and [...] for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(b).  (Pa481).  Defendants’ second motion sought dismissal of the claims against [...] for failure to join indispensable parties, and on comity grounds based on their second-filed Missouri Action.  (Pa488; Pa493).  Recognizing Defendants’ forum-shopping effort, [...] declined to dismiss the case on comity grounds, and denied Defendants’ jurisdictional motions pending jurisdictional discovery.  (Pa500-511).  This case was then stayed while the parties engaged in mediation.  Following that, the parties proceeded with discovery in this action.  [...], however, opposed discovery, delaying the case and requiring [...] to move to compel.  The trial court granted [...]’s motion to compel in its entirety on March 13, 2020, and discovery then proceeded in New Jersey.
[brief] Citing the dissent in the Appellate Division’s opinion, the Court held that under the jury’s understanding of the case, a robbery would not have been committed if one of the two victims had not been present at the scene; the jurors could not agree which person was the victim and which person was the bystander and therefore had created a pathway to an acquittal if the jurors had been instructed that they must return a unanimous verdict.  *Id.* at 32-33.  Unlike the jury in *Gentry*, the jurors in defendant’s matter did not exhibit any confusion or give any indication that they could not agree on who was the victim of the robbery.
[brief] H307a.  The [...] (“[...]” or “the Township”) intervened in the consolidated matters and three residents of the Township were granted participation status.  H307a.  On or about March 2, 2020, [...] filed initial testimony.  Rate Counsel did not file testimony.  RCa61.  [...] and the Company each filed rebuttal testimony.  H60a at p. 3.  [...] filed various motions in this matter, including motions to strike aspects of the Company’s testimony for lack of response to discovery and motions to dismiss based on the Company’s lack of consideration of the New Jersey Energy Master Plan, all of which the ALJ denied.  H162a; H166a; H171a; and H247a.  A public hearing for these matters was conducted on February 13, 2020.  H800a.  Administrative Law Judge [...] presided over virtual evidentiary hearings on October 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, and 23, 2020.  RCa80.  The OAL issued its initial decision May 18, 2022 where it determined that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, the construction of the Regulator at 960 [...] Road is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience, or welfare of the public and that the zoning and land-use ordinance of the municipality and its county shall have no application thereto.  H60a.  On December 21, 2022, the Board adopted the Initial Decision in its entirety without modification.  H38a.  [...] filed this appeal on January 30, 2023 to challenge the Board’s adoption of the Initial Decision which approved [...]’s petition to construct the Regulator at 960 [...] Road, [...] New Jersey.  H34a.
[brief] The basis of Appellant’s entire claim is that [...], the purchaser of her charged-off, defaulted credit card account, was not licensed as a consumer lender under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act when [...] purchased her account from the original credit card issuer and assigned it to [...] for collection.  See New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 et seq.  Appellant does not dispute that [...] was licensed, that she owed the subject obligation, and that she did not pay the obligation or sustain any financial loss whatsoever as a result of [...]’s purchase or [...]’s collection activity.  Instead, Appellant alleges that her simple review of a letter from [...] identifying [...] as the owner of her account gives rise to claims under the NJCFLA (including for declaratory and injunctive relief), the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A 56:8-1, et seq., and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.
[brief] Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J. 255, 262 (1975).  As Plaintiffs recite, a claim for malicious prosecution requires proof of four elements: “(1) a criminal action was instituted by this defendant against this plaintiff, (2) the action was motivated by malice, (3) there was an absence of probable cause to prosecute, and (4) the action was terminated favorably to the plaintiff. ”  LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 90 (2009).  The trial court correctly determined that Plaintiffs’ proposed malicious prosecution claim was futile for two reasons: (1) Plaintiffs could not prove that a criminal action was instituted, and (2) Plaintiffs could not prove that [...] lacked probable cause.
[brief] As an alternative ground for affirming the trial court’s judgment denying [...]’ claim for recovery of the amount it paid toward indemnity, even if it is determined that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Accident, the settlement payment made by [...] is unrecoverable due to the voluntary payments doctrine (“VPD”).  To apply the VPD, this Court must only make four determinations, namely that [...]: 1) made the payment voluntarily, 2) was without a mistake of fact, 3) was not a victim of fraud, and 4) was not under duress or extortion.  \textit{Cont'l Trailways, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Motor Vehicles}, 102 N.J. 526, 548 (1986).  Courts in New Jersey have applied the VPD to inter-insurer reimbursement lawsuits, as is the case here.  \textit{Palisades Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey}, 469 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2021) (affirming that the VPD extinguished a paying insurer’s claim for reimbursement against another insurer where the paying insurer made payment on behalf of the insured without mistake of fact, fraud, duress, or extortion).
[brief] In addition, the prosecutor, through [...], was able to make another assertion that went unchallenged as a result of this ruling: that [...]’s testimony against [...] resulted in the Bloods gang putting out a contract on [...] (29T 103-18 to 105-24) -- as opposed to the far more likely possibility that any feelings of animosity toward [...] from [...] would be because [...] lied about [...] and tried to frame him for murder.  The defense wanted to show the jury that what Barrick [...] did to Taron [...] -- falsely accuse him of murder -- was exactly what he was doing again to defendant in this case.  The judge’s ruling that improperly prevented the defense from doing just that was reversible error for the simple reason that it potentially affected the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.
[brief] As defense counsel argued, by playing the full video, the jury was put “in a situation where they’re hearing that he doesn’t want to answer a particular question to a particular key fact. ”  (16T:90-19 to 24)  [...] invoked his right to silence on topics that were central issues in the case: when he had been present in New Jersey and when he had communicated with his mother.  (16T:90-5 to 13)
[brief] “[I]t suffices that other members of the public . . . could have identified the true state of affairs by conducting the same data-crunching exercise as did the relator,” using the publicly disclosed data.  Id. at 458.  Relator has also suggested that the analysis it conducted was so sophisticated, burdensome, and costly that no government entity would be capable of identifying the alleged fraud simply by analyzing the “raw data,” i.e., the publicly disclosed transactions.  Even assuming that were true, federal FCA precedent holds that Relator’s action is still based upon the publicly disclosed transactions.  As the court in Springfield Terminal explained, an alleged fraud is publicly disclosed even when it could be uncovered only by applying specialized expertise to analyze data available from an obscure source:  [T]here may be situations in which all of the critical elements of fraud have been publicly disclosed, but in a form not accessible to most people, i.e., engineering blueprints on file with a public agency.  Expertise in the field of engineering would not in itself give a qui tam plaintiff the basis for suit when all the material elements of fraud are publicly available, though not readily comprehensible to nonexperts.
[brief] This first issue before the Appellate Division is a result of the Appellants failing to file the Prerogative Writ within the time required under Rule 4:69-6(c) and appellants request to enlarge the statute of limitations.  The second issue before the Appellate Division is the Appellants request to re-do the hearings before the Zoning Board that occurred on August 22, 2022, and September 12, 2022, because the Appellants were not happy with the outcome of those hearings and their request to expand the record below.  The second issue is moot, if the Appellate Court denies the Appellants request to enlarge the time requirements of Rule 4:69-6(c).  The Zoning Board is not taking any position, as to the failure of the Appellants to comply with the requirements of Rule 4:69-6(c), other than, to reiterate what the Honorable [...], J.S.C.’s noted in her in decision that the Zoning Board provided both, the Zoning Board’s Notice of Publication and the Respondents Notice of Publication to the Appellants on December 22, 2022.  PA 851.  As admitted by the Appellants, the attorney for the Appellants relied on a “non-legally trained contractor” to determine his client’s statutory of limitations time requirements.  There has not been any misrepresentation with respect to when the notice of decisions was published by the Zoning Board or its staff.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] Do you understand that if you are found to be a drug dependent person and if you are otherwise eligible for special probation under 2C:35-14, then as a result of this guilty plea you will be N.J.S.A. deemed “a person in need of treatment” who is eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że zgodnie z 2C:35-14.2, jeżeli nie istnieją pewne [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  4.  N.J.S.A. okoliczności wyjątkowe, Sąd jest zobowiązany wydać w Pana(i) sprawie wyrok specjalnego nadzoru kuratora sądowego w celu udziału w programie leczenia nadzorowanym przez Sąd („Sąd przeciwnarkotykowy”)?
[brief] “A third party who has common authority over the premises might nevertheless lack common authority over the items therein. ”  *Coyle*, 119 N.J. at 217.  Plainly, [...]’s father did not share control over the landlord’s surveillance cameras; there is no evidence that he maintained, used, or otherwise had the right to access to the surveillance cameras.  [...]’s father wholly denied ownership of the surveillance cameras.  (3T 37-22 to 38, 126-6 to 16)  Nor can the State prove that [...]’s father had apparent authority to consent to the search.  Even where a third party lacks actual authority over the premises, courts may recognize that an officer validly acted pursuant to that third party’s “apparent authority” to consent.
[brief] (1T170.1-22; 1T178.10-16).  Not a single witness testified [...] wrote entries into the logbook.  Not a single witness authenticated [...]’s handwriting in the logbook.  Significantly, however, the one witness who did have personal knowledge of the logbook entries was never produced by the [...].  In its opposition brief, the [...] acknowledged that it called [...] to testify about the veracity of the video surveillance tape\(^3\) even though he was not part of the investigation. \(^4\) (1T66.18-21; --- \(^3\)It should be noted that the Court sustained [...]’s objection to the [...]’s witness “testifying to the authenticity or veracity of documents [and/or the video tape]”.  (1T61.21 to 62.8).  \(^4\)In its opposition, Respondent argues that [...] waived any objection to the authenticity of the video tape.  Therefore, [...] cannot now object to its evidentiary use.  However, the Respondent’s argument is unsupported by record.  [...] alleged waiver of the authenticity of the videotape did not affect his right to argue, on appeal, that the ALJ erroneously admitted the videotape as evidence.
[brief] While the Court recognizes that land use ordinances shall yield to the plans for affordable housing, there is nothing in the record which reveals that the development of the potential limitations of development of the subject property is the result of a recalcitrant municipality seeking to place a road block to construction of affordable housing.  (BTG Cert. Ex. "D")  It is respectfully submitted that Your Honor's statements stand true today, as the [...] has not engaged in any behavior to limit development on subject property, rather only asks [...] to comply with Local Municipal Land Use Law.  POINT IV
[brief] The testimony of Plaintiff [...]’s experts [...] and [...] on these two critical points was unchallenged and is uncontested in the record.  In addition to the declaratory and equitable relief demanded in the First Count of their Complaint, in the Second Count Plaintiff  [...] also demanded monetary damages seeking return all of the rent illegally collected over the years by [...].  However, these claims were summarily dismissed by the Court in finding that the “intent” of all the conveyances including the foreclosure was to convey both Riparian Rights and the Riparian Grant – which clearly is not the case.  In doing so, the Trial Court dismissed [...]’s ownership claim as well as its damages claim in the amount of $872,916.70 based upon the lease entered into evidence.
[brief] REQUIRING PUBLIC ENTITIES TO RESPOND TO BROAD REQUESTS FOR ANY AND ALL RECORDS ON FILE WOULD WREAK HAVOC ON AGENCY OPERATIONS.  (Da45; Da56).  Even ignoring the plain legal error in the trial court’s decision, if its expansive reading of Paff is permitted to stand, and taking this decision to its logical conclusion, the outcome would wreak havoc by resulting in impractical, illogical, and devastating consequences to government functioning.
[brief] (5T81-15 to 17).  [...], the chief forensic examiner at the [...], testified that he was asked by the [...] to examine three computers that had been seized by police in the investigation: defendant’s computer, which police had seized from defendant’s bedroom in his home in [...], and two laptops belonging to the victim.  (2T169-8 to 19; 2T170-15 to 20; 2T170-21 to 224T104-1 to 6; 4T106-13 to 16; 4T107-3 to 10).
[brief] [Pa3]  It is clear that [...] and [...] both understood and acted as if this was a temporary layoff based on a national emergency.  [Pa3, 4, 5, [...] advised the Division of Pensions that the appellant was laid off.  [Pa11,14]  After there was a specific request for an “official layoff notice” [...], reported there was no official notice.  [Pa14]  Somehow, this was transposed into there was “no actual layoff. ”  [Pa 38,39; Pa54,55]  This appears to be a critical factual determination made by the respondents without any factual support in the record.  [Pa38,39;Pa54,55]  In addition, there is a legal question concerning what law should apply and how the relevant statutes apply to the facts of this case.  This is a contested case within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2 and N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1  Since there were disputed issues of fact, and law this case should have been referred to the Office of Administrative Law for an administrative hearing.
[brief] The sergeant’s testimony regarding the clips/still from the [...] surveillance cameras was based not only on his review of the surveillance videos, but also his investigation of the burglary, which allowed him to familiarize himself with the layout of the tavern’s public and private spaces, spaced out over three floors and around six entrances.  The age and number of surveillance cameras (64) and the layout of the tavern, which born and bred tavern owner [...] admitted could be confusing, (7T:62-19 to 67-2), made the sergeant’s narration testimony – much of which focused on orienting the jury to the location of the clip/still – helpful to the jury and its understanding of the intersection of the videos created by these dispersed surveillance cameras.
[directive] The hiring agency shall Page 7 then request all internal affairs files for cases where the candidate was the subject officer, regardless of the ultimate If requested, the disposition or status of the complaint.  hiring agency shall provide a written acknowledgement to the releasing agency that it will maintain the confidentiality of said files in accordance with this policy.  9.8.3  If a law enforcement agency receives such a request regarding a former employee, then it shall immediately share copies of all internal investigative information related to that agency, in accordance with candidate with the hiring N.J.S.A. 52:17B-247.  Confidential internal affairs files shall not be disclosed to any other party.  II.