ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  The deed dated May 15, 1986 from [...] to [...] and [...]  A deed dated May 15, 1986 that was recorded on May 23, 1986 transferred title of the Property from [...] to “[...]” and “[...],” Husband and Wife for consideration of $171,500.00.  (the “1986 Deed”).  (Da094-113).  A 15-year [...] mortgage dated on the same date was recorded together with the deed in the name of “[...]” & “[...]” in the amount of $120,000.  (D127-280).  Said mortgage was paid off by the Plaintiff in September 1998.  (Pa 0014-18).  It is undisputed that [...] and his wife owned the Property from May 15, 1986 to May 12, 1997.  2.  The deed dated May 12, 1997 from [...] and [...] h/w to [...]  A deed dated May 12, 1997 that was recorded on May 27, 1997 transferred title for the Property from “[...]” and “[...]” h/w to [...] for a consideration of $100,000.00.  (the “1997 Deed” or the “[...] Deed”).  At the time of the transfer of title, [...] and Plaintiff were husband and wife.  The deed was signed by “[...]” and “[...]. ” (Pa0009-13).  In addition to payment of $100,000, the Plaintiff also assumed the remainder of the Citi mortgage taken out by [...] and [...] upon purchasing the Property in 1986.  (3T8:6-9:14, Jan. 9, 2023; Pa0014-18).  The Plaintiff testified that he paid $50,000 in check at the title closing, which took place at the office of Plaintiff’s attorney, [...], Esq.  The deed transferring ownership of the Property to Plaintiff was notarized by Mr. DiMartini.  (Pa 0009-13).  The remainder of the payment funds in the amount of $50,000 came two months after closing at a meeting at [...]’s office.  (3T 13: 6-14:1, Jan. 9, 2023).  Non-party witness, [...], the brother-in-law of both Richard and [...], testified that he was present at the meeting and, in fact, supplied Richard with a portion of the $50,000 payment.  Mr. Tan had previously borrowed $25,000 from Richard to purchase a property of his own, which Richard requested repayment of so he could finalize his purchase from [...].  (10T 115:7-116:20, Jan. 25, 2023).2  3.
[brief] October 12, 2023  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | i | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | v | | INTRODUCTION | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | [...]’s Contractual Obligations | 6 | | Plaintiff’s Expert [...], P.E. – Narrative Report | 8 | | Deposition Testimony of [...], P.E. | 10 | | Second Day of Balgowan’s Deposition | 12 | | Rule 104 Hearing | 16 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning Balgowan’s Report | 17 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning the Characteristics of the Subject Roadway Condition | 17 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning Other Accidents / Investigation | 18 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning [...]’s Contract for the Project | 18 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning Post-Accident Video | 20 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning the Arora Report | 21 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning the T&M Memo | 22 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning Manual for Uniform Traffic Control Devices| 24 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning Post-Accident Paving Records | 25 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning Traffic Control Coordinator Specification | 26 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning the Deposition Testimony of [...] Engineer [...], P.E. | 28 | | Hearing Testimony Concerning Causation | 29 | | Judicial Rulings At Issue | 29 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 31 |
[brief] …I certainly understand the passion that [...] has, and love that he has for his son.  But what it results in is this 65 page rambling, sometimes incoherent recitation.  I mean no disrespect to [...].  Like I said, I understand the passion that he has for his son and what happened to his son.  But whatever rational cause of action may be hidden within this 65 pages is – is just that hidden.  It’s hard to understand.  It’s hard to comprehend.  And it’s just a basic stream of consciousness about all the wrongs that have been done to [...] throughout, you know, starting on the date of arrest in April 17th of 2014, all the way through his discharge from PTI, which I assume occurred sometime in 2020 – MR. DUFFY: ‘18.
[brief] (2T, 17-2 to 11)  [...]’s subpoenas to [...] and his discovery requests to the [...] sought documents concerning criminal investigations of former [...], including emails between the [...] and [...] regarding [...]’s criminal complaints against the former judge.  Despite abandoning his OPRA claims in favor of his common law right of access claims, which are subject to a summary proceeding and where discovery is not permitted absent a showing of legitimate need, [...] again sought to compel the production of the records.  The Court below properly denied his request.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For all of the reasons set forth in Points I through VIII, the defendant’s convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.  Alternatively, for the reasons in Point IX, defendant’s conviction for theft should be reduced to a disorderly-persons offense.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: /s/[...]  STEPHEN W. KIRSCH  Designated Counsel  Attorney I.D. No. 034601986  Date: March 18, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal From a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
[brief] *Walid* at 185-186.  The Court expressly rejected this restriction, at least in cases in which the "specific facts misrepresented are peculiarly within that party’s knowledge and were, in fact, intentionally misrepresented."  *Walid* at 186 (*citing Solutia Inc. v. FMC Corp.*, 385 F.Supp.2d 324, 340 (S.D.N.Y.2005)).  The Court concluded the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule applied to that case:  Here…material misrepresentations were made to plaintiffs respecting the income of the business they were purchasing and then, in an effort to escape later liability for such misrepresentations, a contract was prepared with a general integration clause.  As we have noted, where the “allegedly misrepresented facts are peculiarly within the misrepresenting party’s knowledge, even a specific disclaimer will not undermine another party’s allegation of reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation.
[directive] In October 2021, the State obtained a superseding indictment that added three new charges against [...] stemming from information the State learned from a codefendant in May 2020.  The parties returned to court to arraign [...] on the superseding indictment on November 15, 2021.  Over defendant’s objection, the court ordered excludable time “due to extenuating circumstances” the court’s “inability, -- essentially, to move cases more than one at a time,” the “backlog of defendants” since the start of the pandemic, and courtroom unavailability.  The following day, the court entered two orders for excludable time, one for 59 days and a second for 159 days.  The court also set a trial date of April 22, 2022.  At another status conference on January 3, 2022 -- the date that both parties the court discussed the parties’ agree marked the end of the two-year cap -- readiness to proceed to trial and confirmed the April 22 trial date.
[brief] After DEP received additional information as to stormwater management (Ra82), [...]’s application continued to not comply with DEP’s stormwater management rules and a basis for DEP’s June 22, 2021 permit denial, (Aa16-18).  DEP and [...] addressed stormwater management as part of the August 5, 2022 settlement, which included plan revisions and an additional notice and comment period.  (Aa33-36).  [...] received copies of the revised plans (Ra182-188), and did not challenge stormwater management compliance in this appeal.  Property (Ra161), but at this time, [...] did not submit a copy of the amended Redevelopment Plan to DEP and DEP did not approve of the amendment prior to the subject permit application.  On June 22, 2021, DEP denied the Project permit application because the Project did not comply with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(a).  Consistent with the statute, this Court rejected the argument that areas designated in need of redevelopment “must thereafter be treated as a discrete and indivisible bundle of lots for purposes of redevelopment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7” and “cannot be covered under the same redevelopment plan…..”  PADNA, 413 N.J. Super. at 336.  Rather, this Court confirmed that any designated area “may be joined with other areas or parts of other areas already blighted for redevelopment purposes. ”  Id. at 336-337 (citing Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 164; N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(a)) (footnote omitted).  Accordingly, Appellants’ attempt to bootstrap another designation analysis into the redevelopment standard has no basis whatsoever.
[brief] The Court then made another error here when it decided not to consider the subsequent paving records as evidence of either the dangerous character of the settlement or that the condition itself existed as described; both permissible exceptions to N.J.R.E. 407.  The Trial Court refused to consider subsequent paving because, in its view, repairs were not done because of Plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa2146).  However, that is not the test.  A subsequent remedial measure is admissible to prove, among other things, the existence of a defective condition at a particular point in time.  See Perry v. Levy, 87 N.J.L. 670, (E.&A. 1915).  Since the Defendants have argued that the settlement at the abutment joint at issue was not dangerous, the emergency paving records are admissible to prove the defect did exist in the location identified by the Plaintiff and that it was dangerous.  See N.J.R.E. 407; e.g., Perry v. Levy, supra, 87 N.J.L. 670 (E&A 1915) and Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565, (1981).  Giving every favorable inference to the Plaintiff as required by the Rules of Court, the Trial Court should have concluded that the condition of the roadway was dangerous at the time of [...]’s accident, that the [...] had been on notice of the condition for five months prior to Plaintiff’s crash, and that the [...] was recommended on two separate occasions to repair it but did nothing.
[brief] Governments and tax lien holders are prohibited from taking above the amount of the tax debt.  Despite same, [...] lost over $300,000.00 in equity for approximately $50,000.00 in unpaid tax.  [...]’s appeal however was a pending case, in the pipeline, at the time of the May 25, 2023 US Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler.  As such, retroactivity is afforded and the application of Tyler was mandated and provided grounds on its own for vacating [...]’s judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f).
[brief] [...] has been a doctor for over 50 years.  He is licensed in New York and New Jersey and is Board Certified in internal medicine with a specialty in geriatric medicine.  6T35: 6-17.  He is also the Chief of Geriatric Medicine at [...].  6T56:25-57:5.  He is a professor at [...], with privileges at [...] Hospitals.  6T34:11-12.  [...] works in the ICU with older people on ventilators and on trachs.  6T41:6-14.  Most recently, he ran the respiratory unit at [...] [...] Center for Extended Care and Rehabilitation.  6T42:18-21.  He developed and ran a 40-bed sub-acute Respiratory Unit, which had 12 beds dedicated to patients on ventilators, with complex respiratory issues.  6T44:9-12.  The remaining 28 beds were used for patients with respiratory disease.  Ibid.  Most of the patients in that unit had tracheostomies and had complex pulmonary disease.  6T49:16-19.  For the majority of his time at [...], [...] supervised that respiratory unit.  6T45:1-3.  He saw tracheostomy patients there.  6T45:4-6.  He was responsible for developing policies and procedures for respiratory care in that unit.  6T45:14-16.  He supervised nurses providing respiratory care to patients in that unit.  6T45:25-46:3.  He also supervised respiratory therapists.  6T46:4.  The Chief of Respiratory Therapy directly reported to [...].  6T46:56.  Additionally, [...] has extensive experience in working with nurses and respiratory therapists in nursing homes.  6T47:2-54:16.  He saw patients at all the nursing homes where he worked as a doctor and as a medical director.  6T54:12-16.  He treated patients for respiratory issues, tracheostomy issues and ventilator issues.  6T54:22-55:5.  Notwithstanding his overwhelming qualifications to testify in this area, when offered as an expert in respiratory care, defendant objected and a lengthy side bar ensued.
[brief] **  In *Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.*, 90 N.J. 191 (1982), the Supreme Court summarized the principles of New Jersey product liability law.  The Court explained that a product liability claim can be asserted under a strict liability theory, “‘[i]f at the time the seller distributes a product, it is not reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes so that users or others who may be expected to come in contact with the product are injured as a result. ’”  *Id.* at 199 (quoting *Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Company*, 81 N.J. 150, 169 (1979)) (emphasis added).  The Court further explained that a product liability claim can be asserted under a negligence theory, “‘[o]nce given . . . notice of the dangerous condition of the [product], the question then becomes whether the defendant was negligent to people who might be harmed by that condition if they came into contact with it or were in the vicinity of it. ’”  *Id.* at 200 (quoting *Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Company, Inc.*, 76 N.J. 152, 172 (1978)) (emphasis added).  In short, “negligence is conduct-oriented, asking whether defendant’s actions were reasonable; strict liability is product-oriented, asking whether the product was reasonably safe for its foreseeable purposes. ”  *Id.*  In the Complaint, [...] alleges that “defendants expressly or impliedly promised that the water was *fit for consumption by the residents* or was not tainted with levels of chemicals unacceptable to DEP, when in fact th[e] water sold to [...]s was not as promised” and was “unsafe for human consumption”.  See Pa64 at ¶ 65; Pa63 at ¶ 60 (emphasis added.).  In other words, [...] practically quotes the definition of products liability from Suter in describing his cause of action.  [...] then doubles down on describing his claims in words that are used in products liability claims when he alleges, “defendants had an express or implied obligation to source and sell uncontaminated water to Plaintiffs. ”  See Pa75 at ¶ 146 (emphasis added.)  In other words, [...]’s allegations clearly fall into the products liability definitions in a well-developed body of caselaw.  Pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, such claims are barred and cannot be brought against the [...].
[brief] Procedural History  Defendant/respondent  [...] concurs in the procedural history set forth in the brief of the plaintiffs/appellants [...] and [...].  [...] further notes that it is the appellant in a separate appeal, docketed under number [...], which involves the same order for summary judgment entered in favor of defendants/respondents [...] and [...] (“[...]”) at issue in the captioned appeal, and which has been fully briefed by [...].  The Court previously ordered the Clerk’s office to “calendar the two appeals back-to-back on the same date before the same panel. ”  (Dta1.)  Statement of Facts  [...] generally concurs in the Statement of Facts set forth in plaintiffs’/appellants’ brief.  Legal Argument  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ZURICH AND [...] AND DENYING THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY PLAINTIFFS (AND TRAVELERS).  In the captioned appeal, [...] agrees with the legal arguments presented by plaintiffs/appellants as to their appeal from the orders granting [...] and [...] summary judgment, and denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment against those parties. ¹  Conclusion  [...] respectfully submits that the orders entering summary judgment in favor of [...] and [...], and denying plaintiffs’ (as well as [...]’) motions for summary judgment, should be reversed.
[brief] 8  Mrs. Ressler's Food Prods. v. KZY Logistics, LLC, 675 F. App'x 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2017)  32  Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L Ed. 865 (1950)
[brief] The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Failing to Consider Burden and Relevance in the ESI Order.  The trial court disregarded the burden of producing 68,000 irrelevant documents at a cost of $750,000 and failed to weigh that burden against any purported benefit of producing these irrelevant documents.  Da105.  The trial court expressed its reluctance “to review thousands of pages of documents” to resolve any relevancy disputes, which the court disclaimed as “not my function” and a task the court was “not equipped to do. ”  T6:2-7, T22:10.  The trial court also stated that it was not “equipped” to make relevancy rulings, because “I don’t know what’s relevant, not relevant. ”  T6:2-7.  In short, the court said, “I don’t want to do it and I refuse to do it because it’s not my function. ”  T22:9-10.  But applying Rule 4:10-2(a)’s relevancy and burden standard to resolve discovery disputes is precisely a trial court’s function.  Here, the trial court did not need to review each document with an ESI term to resolve the dispute and determine if the overwhelming burden of production was justified; instead, it needed only to limit the parties’ discovery productions to relevant material.  A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to do so.
[brief] (Pa 19).  Furthermore, the Authority’s Appellate Brief focuses entirely on [...]’ physical abilities.  As [...] ruled, “at the time of termination, the only reason offered to justify” the Authority’s termination of [...]’ employment was “the Grievant’s inability to physically perform the work required, based upon which the Arbitrator concluded that the “record ultimately revealed” that “[...]’ medical issues were resolved, her temporary medical condition corrected and her fitness to return to work confirmed,” thus precluding a finding of just cause based solely upon her supposed physical incapacity.  However, as the grievance advanced, the Arbitrator noted that the Authority changed its justification for terminating [...] from her injury to a lack of funding and budget cuts.  (Pa 36-37).  The Arbitrator noted that, even if that were true, the Authority requested additional manpower on August 19, 2020, and again in November 2020, conclusively establishing that by August 19, any budgetary constraints on reinstating [...] had been resolved, and thus set August 19 as the effective date of [...]’ reinstatement.  Conspicuously, the Authority’s Appellate Brief does not even attempt to explain the Authority’s inconsistent rationalizations for its decisions advanced throughout the grievance process.  The Arbitrator reviewed the CNA in its entirety, including both the Authority’s right to determine employee qualifications and the requirement that employees may only be disciplined and discharged for just cause.  There was no dispute before the Arbitrator that [...]’ termination was subject to the just cause standard, and the Arbitrator rightly concluded that the Authority lacked just cause, both because of the medical documentation which [...] presented and because the Authority advanced inconsistent explanations for her termination.
[brief] Defendants sidestep plaintiff’s arguments about the ELD, the UCC and the PLA.  Defense brief, p. 45.  Defendants mistakenly assume that defendants had to raise such arguments for plaintiff to brief them and further, failed to cite to the portion of the record indicating that plaintiff failed to brief them and therefore, that plaintiff failed to raise the arguments before the trial court.  Defense brief, p. 45.  \(^{15}\)  *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America*, 150 N.J. 255, 271, 696 A.2d 546 (1997).  III.
[brief] Counsel for [...] has argued that [...] is alleging or must show that the insurance company committed fraud.  This argument is a diversion and has never been a position taken by [...].  It is [...] and the [...] that [...] alleges have used nefarious means to collect and hide insurance monies that [...] was not entitled to.  [...] had a burden of proof to show she had obtained these insurance monies by conforming to the terms and conditions of the policy and submitting the proper change documents that were provided to the company.  She refused to meet her burden.  The facts demonstrate that the 538-policy monies were obtained through deception similar to the means used to collect the 401(k) funds with the assistance of [...] and the [...].  Based upon the record in this case the refusal to follow Court orders, the failure to produce the relevant documents, the misconduct by [...] and her attorneys, and the plethora of deceit regarding all matters pertaining to this insurance policy, [...] did not meet her burden of proof.
[directive] Controlled Dangerous Substance Destruction process  7.7.1  Documentation of the destruction of controlled dangerous substances must be done through the utilization of the "Uniform Destruction of Evidence Form."  When a request for destruction is made, the original and two copies shall be sent to the Chief of the Trial Section or Narcotics Squad Prosecutor.  One copy shall be retained by our department.  If destruction is approved the original and two copies will be returned to our department.  When the evidence is destroyed, a completely executed copy should be left with the contact person for the authorized destruction facility.  An original and one copy would then be retained by our department.  Controlled dangerous substances and firearms should not be included on the same destruction of evidence form.  7.7.2
[brief] The entire FEIS can be accessed at https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_num=20210924-3065  5  This Court should take judicial notice of the delegated order pursuant to N.J.R.E. 202(b) and N.J.R.E. 201(b)(3).  A copy of the delegated order is included in [...]’s appendix for the Court’s convenience.  issued an Order on Rehearing and Denying Stay (“Rehearing Order”) in which it sustained its previous order issued on April 21 and denied the motions for stay filed by Appellant, [...].
[brief] In an area known for a large volume of CDS transactions, [...], a specialized and experienced officer, observed defendant engage to two quick conversations with people in two different cars, which were parked next to his vehicle in an isolated area of the parking lot.  He then observed the driver of one of the vehicles drive to a different area of the parking lot, park, look down into his lap, and then—after making eye contact with [...]—make movements indicative of snorting by leaning over into his lap and quickly picking up his head.  [...] relayed these observations to [...] and his belief a CDS-transaction had occurred.  A reasonable officer with [...]’s training and experience would view the facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from them and objectively suspect defendant was distributing CDS.  [...] thus appropriately found that the police “had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct an investigatory stop of defendant[.]” (Da13).
[directive] Answer: (ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR POLICE OFFICER)  IF THE PERSON: REMAINS SILENT; OR STATES, OR OTHERWISE INDICATES, THAT HE/SHE REFUSES TO ANSWER ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE/SHE HAS A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, OR WISHES TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY, PHYSICIAN, OR ANY OTHER PERSON; OR IF THE RESPONSE IS AMBIGUOUS OR CONDITIONAL, IN ANY RESPECT WHATSOEVER, THEN THE POLICE OFFICER SHALL READ THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL STATEMENT: