ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."  Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.
[brief] On appeal from: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION BERGEN COUNTY  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, [...] [...]  [...], Esquire N.J. Id: 002002002  Email: [...]  [...], Esq. N.J.  Id: 022141990  Email: [...]  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, Dr. Asit Shah, M.D., Ph.D.  On the Brief: [...], Esq.
[brief] After 22 days of trial and an extensive weighing of the evidence and witness credibility, the trial court unequivocally found that the defendants misappropriated funds.  (27T 75:7-21).  It also found that the defendants took steps to conceal these misappropriations from the Plaintiffs via “webs” and “mazes” of accounts and a series of accounting gimmicks like conduit accounts, comingling, and step transactions.  (26T22:21 to 23:7; 33:14-16; 53:9-10; 27T72:13-15; 73:3-13; 75:14-21; 79:7-16; 86:18-20; 89:5-11).  In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs prejudgment interest from the date of each of the defendants’ misappropriations.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court’s judgment on that sole issue and direct the entry of an award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $838,810.40.
[brief] THE LAW DIVISION JUDGE ERRED BY SENTENCING APPELLANT UNDER THE CURRENT VERSION OF N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (7T5:3-20).  The Law Division erred by sentencing Appellant under the current version of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  At Appellant’s sentencing hearing before [...] on April 17, 2023, [...] sentenced Appellant to install an ignition interlock device on any vehicle he may obtain following his license suspension period.  (7T5:3-20).  At that hearing, Appellant raised this issue, as [...] did not include the installation of the ignition interlock device on his Order and Certification dated May 27, 2022.  (7T:16:9-17:5; Aa003).  In rejecting Appellant’s argument, [...] indicated that the installation of the ignition interlock device was a “mandatory” part of sentencing under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(1)(ii).  (7T19:3-18).  Specifically, [...] stated:
[brief] However, Appellants did not perfect any appeals with regard to either of the trial court’s December 7, 2021 Orders entered in the Prior Action, one of which denied Appellants’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, [Pa221], and the other which dismissed the First Amended Complaint as against [...] without prejudice.  [Pa236].  The time to appeal those Orders has expired. \(^2\)  **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] (Pb10).  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing [...] to file.  Id. at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, [...] does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.  (Pb11).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb13), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb16).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb16; Pa117).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**  For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and nine months past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] 22 INDEX TO APPENDIX  Essex County Indictment No. [...] ........................................  Da 1-2 Essex County Indictment No. [...] ........................................  Da 3-10 Essex County Indictment No. [...] ........................................  Da 11-12  State Certification in Support of Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Submitting Police Reports as Exhibits¹ ................................  Da  13  Police Report of [...] ..................................................  Da 14-18 Police Report of [...] ..........................................  Da 19-21 Police Report of [...] ...............................................  Da 22-24 Order and Opinion Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress .............  Da 25-33 Plea Forms .................................................................................................
[brief] (1T22-2 to 8).  [...] was able to maintain eye contact with [...]’s vehicle in his rearview mirror and saw other members of the Special Enforcement Team and [...] respond to stop [...]’s Dodge Ram at 6:53 p.m. (1T22-9 to 13; 1T51-3 to 12).  [...] had to drive to one of the Parkway turnaround areas before he could return to the scene of the stop.  (1T22-17 to 20).  [...] testified that another officer, [...], had already removed [...] from the car and had read him his rights by the time [...] arrived.
[brief] When a lower Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, appellate courts “conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court. ”  State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004)).  Here the respondent seeks to gloss over the fact that the defendant’s claims were supported by certifications, but were however, denied without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing contrary to State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 352-53 (2013).  "[W]hen a petitioner claims his trial attorney inadequately investigated his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification."  State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.) (citing R. 1:6-6), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999).  "In that context, [an appellate court] consider[s] petitioner's contentions indulgently and view[s] the facts asserted by him in the light most favorable to him."  Ibid.  Porter, supra, at 353.  The judge deciding a PCR claim should conduct an evidentiary hearing when there are disputed issues of material facts related to the defendant's entitlement to PCR, particularly when the dispute regards events and conversations that occur off the record or outside the presence of the judge.
[brief] This Appeal seeks to reverse the Trial Court’s Order that Defendant-Respondent [...] a/k/a [...] (“[...]”) may enforce the clearly identifiable and comprehensive dispute resolution provision (the “Arbitration Provision”) embedded in the Client Services Agreement (the “Contract”) between Plaintiff-Appellant, [...] (“[...]”) and Co-Defendant [...] (“[...]”).  Specifically, the Trial Court held that despite [...]’ status as a non-signatory to the only Contract at issue, the arbitration provision embedded therein is enforceable pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  Although [...] currently possesses the right to bring her claims in arbitration, she has instead opted to file this appeal.  In 2017, [...] contacted [...] seeking debt consolidation services.  To comply with banking regulations and ensure [...] received its monthly fee, [...] selected [...] – a neutral third-party payment processor – to facilitate the flow of funds.  The Contract between [...] and [...] contained an all-encompassing dispute resolution provision binding all parties to resolve “any controversy, claim or dispute” by arbitration.  In that regard, the Trial Court notes: “the broad arbitration provision within the contract . . . binds Plaintiff to resolving her dispute with Defendant [...] by arbitration” and that “arbitration [is] the only forum for which all parties can proceed in a single action to have this dispute resolved, avoiding piecemeal litigation. ”  Now, to avoid arbitration, [...] alleges that the trial court (i) improperly overlooked procedural deficiencies, (ii) incorrectly applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and (iii) inaccurately held that [...] did not waive its right to arbitrate.  Despite [...]’ arguments to the contrary, the trial court considered all of these issues, reviewed them intently, and deemed them meritless.  As set forth more fully herein, it is clear that all of the claims in this action arise from the contract between [...] and [...].  The individual claims against [...] cannot be severed from those against [...] nor can they be adequately redressed absent reliance on the terms of the Contract, including the requirement for arbitration.  Therefore, the Trial Court’s judgment is sound and should be affirmed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Yet, contrary to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s finding of facts supporting Appellant’s claims, see State v. Mosley, 232 N.J. 169 (2018) and the finding of both the federal district court, see Aa55-56; Op. at p. 9-10, the trial court, see Aa72-73; 1T6:11-13; 1T6:20 to 7:17, including Appellant’s Statement of Material Facts, see Aa126-232, [...] agreed with the [...]—ignoring almost a century of New Jersey jurisprudence requiring that she rule otherwise.  Larner v. Montclair, 99 N.J.L. 510, 512 (1924)(“[T]he judge has the power to determine the sufficiency of the facts set up by the defendant, and his conclusions that they are not sufficient should not be set aside unless the sufficiency clearly appears. ”); Birkenfeld v. Ginsburg, 106 N.J.L. 377, 379 1929); and see Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2019)(A complaint should be dismissed only where it “states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will not give rise to such a claim. ”).  In as much as the [...] provided no evidence supporting summary judgment and Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, this Court should determine that [...]’s find that Appellant provided no prove supporting the allegations in his Complaint erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In February 2023, the [...] adopted Ordinance #2023-03 approving a redevelopment “plan” authorized by the Local Redevelopment Housing Law (“LRHL”)  40A:12A-1 et. seq.  That Ordinance incorporated the 157-page report of the Town’s expert, [...], but was based upon an outdated 2020 “study” nearly three years old.  Three relevant sections of the LRHL, Sections 5, 7 and 14 were not properly analyzed or applied in the written opinion of the Trial Judge.  The failure to apply statutory requirements of the LRHL renders this “plan” invalid as a matter of law.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s decision must be reversed by this Court.
[brief] Res judicata supports finality and prevents re-litigation of issues already decided.  Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 526, (1993).  Courts should not preclude a board from considering a second application if it contains sufficient changes.  Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. at 527.  The determination of the sufficiency of a change lies with the planning board and should be overturned only if shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
[directive] This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English 뉴저지 주 상급법원 Superior Court of New Jersey 뉴저지 주 법률부 카운티 State of New Jersey Law Division County 기소 번호 Indictment No. 대 v. 피고인에 대한 통지 에 의한 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b 피고인 의무적 운전 특권의 정지 Defendant Notice to Defendant N.J.S.A. Pursuant to 2C:29-2b Mandatory Suspension of Driving Privileges (Korean) 귀하가N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b 사람으로서, 이 통지는 에 의하여 도피죄로 유죄 판결을 받은 귀하의 운전 면허가 [6 2 년] 것입니다.
[brief] *Lapsley v. Township of Sparta*, 249 N.J. 427, 435 (2022); *Kristiansen v. Morgan*, 153 N.J. 298, 316 (1998).  N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 provides, in pertinent part:  Employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer . . .  “The premises rule is based on the notion that an injury to an employee that happens going to or coming from work arises out of and in the course of employment if the injury takes place on the employer’s premises. ”
[brief] As such, the trial court has no discretion when a mandate issues from an appellate court.  It simply must comply."  Tomaino v. Burman, 364 N.J.Super. 224, 233 (App. Div. 2003) (citations omitted).  The panel “agreed with plaintiffs that the Supreme Court made clear in *All the Way Towing* “that the CFA is applicable to commercial transactions.
[brief] 489a–495a.  Pursuant to the [...]-[...] Assignment, [...] would assign the McTague-[...] Agreement to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs were to make deposit payments totaling $500,000.00.  In addition, the [...]-[...] Assignment called for a minimum of 200 free market units, $23,500.00 per unit, thus a minimum purchase price of $4.7 million.  489a–495a.  On October 23, 2006, [...] presented [...] a finalized Operating Agreement of [...] and directed [...] to execute same.  138a–140a.  Pursuant to said Operating Agreement, [...] was the Sole Member of [...].  138a–140a.  However, on October 24, 2006, one day later, [...] presented [...] a finalized Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of [...], whereby [...], pursuant to the direction of [...] and [...], signed same relinquishing 99% of his ownership interest in [...] to [...], another long-time friend of [...] and [...], for no consideration.
[brief] Regarding the Sixth Street Violations, Defendant attempts to cherry pick certain photos presented at the hearings, now claiming Plaintiff failed to submit sufficient proofs to establish Defendant continued to violate the 2017 Judgment.  Defendant also alleges Plaintiff restrained Defendant from permitting attendees and visitors to walk through the Sixth Street Lot while congregants were parked there for services.  (Db74-75)  Plaintiff submitted the Certification of [...] in support of its contempt application related to the Sixth Street Violations, specifically identifying the daily violations of Defendant for months, along with 19 photos providing further proof of the continued violations from February 15, 2018 through July 2018.  (Da297-418; Da521-602).  Additional photographic evidence (46 additional photos) of the continued violations were submitted along with [...]’s Supplemental Certification in further support of Plaintiff’s application and in response to Defendant’s opposition.  (Da603-642)  The few photos identified by Defendant not showing active violations were taken and presented to the Court to contextualize the violations as set forth in detail in [...]’s Certifications.  (3T)  Those photos show parents and children exiting vehicles and walking towards the entrance of the school located on the Subject Property.  [...] testified in detail as to what each photograph depicted.  (1T; 3T 82-87)  As recognized by the Trial Court, a review of the certifications and hearing testimony clearly establishes Defendant continued to violate the 2017 Judgment by permitting its students to be dropped off in a way requiring them to walk through the Sixth Street Lot while cars were parked for those attending services in the Congregation.  The record on appeal debunks Defendant’s suggestion Plaintiff did not submit sufficient proof of the continued violations.
[brief] In this case, Defendants themselves, entirely unprompted and intentionally on the record, admitted that [...] presided over a “really well conducted trial” (5T, at 30:11-16).  Only after the verdict was read, and things did not go their way, did Defendants suddenly discover that the trial was rife with prejudice against them.  They now ask that the Court pay no mind to their lack of objections, or failure to include certain arguments in their two previous attempts at post-trial relief.  They urge the Court to turn a blind eye to the unshakable rulings of [...].  Ignore the logical inconsistencies, the mischaracterization, and the record.  Defendants want another shot.  [...] was permanently injured in the December 1, 2018 collision.  Accordingly, the jury awarded him sufficient compensation to last what is effectively a second lifetime. \(^5\)  This verdict was not based on any of the issues raised by Defendants.  It was based on the evidence presented by Plaintiff.  His account of the happening of the collision, his descriptions of his \(^5\) 40.5 years left to live with his injuries, despite being only 40 years old at the time of trial.
[brief] *Id.*  The explicit immunity provided by Section 59:5-4 is not diminished by Section 59:2-2 (vicarious liability for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee) or Section 59:2-3 (discretionary acts).  *Wuethrich v Delia*, 155 N.J. Super. 324, 326 (App. Div. 1978) certif. den. 77 N.J. 486 (1978)  The scope of the immunity provided by Section 59:5-4 was thoroughly analyzed by the Appellate Division in *Suarez v. Dosky*, supra.
[brief] The Motion Judge concluded his opinion with a hypothetical example which made it clear that he had misinterpreted the statute:  Otherwise you could, as counsel just argued, be drunk beyond belief, oblivious to the world, stumble on this crosswalk in violation of huge blinking red lights, horns going off left and right, the train driver doing everything he’s supposed to be doing, and get killed by train and then say it was only a crosswalk you only had the right of way so I can sue, Subparagraph B doesn’t prevent me from suing.  That’s a ridiculous reading of the statute.  This Court will not do that.  I’m going to grant the motion based upon the finding that the immunities as to all railroads companies, under N.J.S.A. 48:12-152.  (T19 5-13).  In the hypothetical example provided by the Court, that railroad would be immune from civil tort damages.  The railroad just wouldn’t be immune for the reason that the Court articulated.  That railroad would be immune pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 b(1) as the hypothetical plaintiff was intoxicated.  This section of the immunity applies notwithstanding location.  If a person is intoxicated and comes into contact with railroad equipment on a right of way, in crossing established by the railroad, or anywhere else, the railroad is immune.  They are just not immune pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 b(5) as the Motion Judge suggested in his oral opinion.  This misinterpretation of the statute lead to the Court granting Summary Judgement in the instant case based an N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 b(5) and thus, is reversible error.
[brief] After [...] was sued by a competitor, he sought coverage from his insurer, [...].  [...] initially defended the action under a reservation of rights.  When the only remaining claim was for tortious interference with a competitor’s business, [...] sought to withdraw its defense.  That tort requires an intent to injure which is excluded under the [...] policy.  In response to [...]’s declaratory judgment action, [...] contended that the underlying plaintiffs could not prove intent to injure.  Therefore, according to [...], his insurer could not withdraw the defense.  That is not the law in New Jersey.  The strength of the competitor’s claims is irrelevant when analyzing whether the insurer has a duty to defend.  The relevant question is whether coverage exists if [...] should be found liable.  Here, there can be no coverage.  To establish tortious interference with a business relationship, a plaintiff must show that the interference was done intentionally and with malice.  To show malice, the plaintiff must show that defendant intentionally inflicted the injury.  [...]’s policy excludes coverage for such a claim.  Therefore, no coverage exists for that claim and the trial court was correct in finding that his insurer, [...], had no duty to defend or indemnify [...].  For these reasons and others stated below, the trial court properly found that [...] could withdraw its defense and had no duty to indemnify.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTUAL HISTORY
[brief] Official Misconduct | Pa 171 | | N.J. Stat. § 2C:30-5  Findings, declarations relative to deprivation of civil rights by public officials | Pa 172 | | N.J. Stat. § 2C:30-6 - Crime of official deprivation of civil rights | Pa 173 | | N.J. Stat. § 2C:30-7 - Crime of pattern of official misconduct | Pa 174 | | N.J. Stat. § 10:6-2 - Actions permitted under the "New Jersey Civil Rights Act" | Pa 175-176 | | N.J. Ct R. app 1 R. R. 3.1 Rule 3.1 - Precedence of Judicial Office | Pa 177 | | N.J. Ct R. 1:12-2, Disqualification on Party's Motion | Pa 178-179 | | N.J. Ct R. 1:13
[brief] ”  (Da238-250.)  On April 14, 2020, New Jersey’s Laws of 2020, ch. 18, was adopted, confirming that healthcare professionals and facilities are immune from civil liability for medical services, treatment and procedures relating to the COVID-19 emergency.  (Da251-255.)  The statute is retroactively effective beginning on March 9, 2020, and mandates that health care professionals and health care facilities “shall not be liable for civil damages for injury or death alleged to have been sustained as a result of an act or omissions by the health care professional in the course of providing medical services in support of the State’s response to the outbreak of coronavirus disease during the public health emergency and state of emergency declared by the Governor in Executive Order 103 of 2020.
[directive] 7.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하는 귀하의 행위가 반복적이고 충동적인 행동양식을 나타내는 경우, 특성이 없거나 성범죄자 치료에 적합하지 않은 귀하는 판사가 했거나, 선고한 강제적 최하 형기를 복역 또는 강제적 최하 형기가 1/3을 정해져 있지 않은 경우에는 부과된 형기의 복역 할 때까지 우선 못하며, 가석방 자격을 얻지 또한 위에 열거된 두 가지 복역기간 중 어느 기간에 대해서도 모범적인 행동이나 근로점수를 근거로 형기가 아십니까?  단축되지 않는다는 것을 not  Do you understand that if your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior or you are not amenable to sex offender treatment you will not become primarily eligible for parole until you have served any mandatory minimum term or imposed by the court one third of the sentence imposed where no mandatory minimum and term is fixed neither term will be reduced by commutation time for good behavior or work credits?