ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Syverson v. Consolidated Rail Corp.*, 19 F.3d 824 (2d Cir.1994) it was determined that a genuine issue of fact existed for a jury as to whether the railroad was negligent by allowing vagrants to congregate in an area of weeds around a railyard.  The plaintiff was sitting in his work vehicle completing paperwork when he was stabbed multiple times and bitten by a vagrant.  The district court initially granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment saying the unprovoked third-party attack was unforeseeable.  In granting summary judgment, the district court pointed out that even plaintiff Syverson, who, like [...], actually spoke to his assailant before the attack, had no “reason to anticipate the danger that this man posed, or that an assault was about to occur. ”  *Syverson*, 19 F.3d at 827.  However, the Second Circuit found that the district court applied an incorrect standard, more appropriate for a state law negligence claim than for an FELA action.  *Syverson*, 19 F.3d at 828.  The Second Circuit continued, “under a statute where the tortfeasor is liable for death or injuries in which his negligence played any part, even the slightest…the case must not be dismissed at the summary judgment phase unless there is absolutely no reasonable basis for a jury to find for the plaintiff. ”  *Id.*  [...] was aware of previous criminal incidents involving these transients, and ultimately the Second Circuit determined there was enough evidence for a jury to consider whether [...] provided a reasonably safe workplace.
[brief] At that time, he noticed Defendants in the Law Division Action, the Bank and its counsel, and [...] counsel.  Ca16.  He stated in his Certification that he believed he fulfilled his responsibilities in connection with his appointment and thus, sought to be discharged.  Ca21.  He stated, in apparent reference to the foregoing January 18, 2022, sale (with “transfer”), that “upon the sale and transfer of the assets under the control of the Receiver, it became obvious that the Receiver had no duties other than as an employee of the Bank’s subsidiary. ”  Ca21.  On July 13, 2023, [...] opposed the Receiver’s Motion and alleged violations of Statute and Rule governing statutory receiverships.  On July 21, 2023, [...] and [...] (the “[...]”), Appellants here in this [...] filed by them, and Respondents in [...], filed by [...], filed a personal injury lawsuit against, \textit{inter alia}, [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], which was captioned \textit{Lopez v. [...] Condominium Association, et. al., [...].
[brief] [...] was sentenced as a 17-year-old boy to a term of life imprisonment with an aggregate 60-year parole bar.  He is now 46 years old.  At a re-sentencing hearing pursuant to State v. Comer, [...] presented evidence that over the past 29 years, he has established an “absolutely remarkable” prison record – earning his GED, completing dozens of behavioral programs, working in “sensitive jobs” reserved for only the most trusted incarcerated persons, and all the while avoiding any involvement with the violence, drugs, and gang life that are rampant in prison.  An expert psychologist found that at the time that 17-year-old [...] committed the offense, he was suffering from developmental deficits, had the emotional maturity of a 9- to 10-year-old boy, and was uniquely prone to peer pressure.  23 years later, another psychological expert found that, over those nearly three decades, [...] had “matured psychologically and intellectually” and he was now “capable of returning to the community and complying with its laws and norms[.]”  That expert even concluded that [...]’s growth out of his youthful recklessness “underscored what we know about adolescent brain development” and the unique capacity of juveniles to change over time.  Given his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, [...] was and is entitled “to obtain release” pursuant to Comer.  Despite this, the trial court did not find that [...] had matured or become rehabilitated.  Instead, the court held that his “exceptional” prison record could not be considered as evidence of rehabilitation because it took place while in prison.  Moreover, the court deemed the question of [...]’s maturity to be largely irrelevant because of the nature of the original incident itself.  And the court concluded that the Parole Board was actually better suited to decide whether [...] had matured and become rehabilitated, and that therefore the Board would ultimately make the decision as to when, and if, [...] is entitled to be released.  Without a finding that [...] had been rehabilitated or matured, and with the court’s belief that parole was the proper venue to rule on those key issues, the trial court reimposed a life sentence, and reduced [...]’s parole ineligibility period by only one year.  This finding was not only a violation of Comer’s explicit instruction to specifically consider rehabilitative efforts undertaken in prison, but it also left [...] with absolutely no route to establish that he had changed his ways in the last 29 years.  The only action within [...]’s power – to do all that he can to reform himself while in prison – was deemed entirely irrelevant.  The court thus failed to achieve the core purpose of Comer: provide [...] with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. ”  Accordingly, the matter should be remanded once again for resentencing.
[brief] (5T23-13 to 24-1).  [...] drove his brother’s car, a red Pontiac Grand Am, and parked it on [...].  (5T22-20 to 25-24; 7T19-18 to 20-10).  [...] was driving a burgundy Honda CRV that night and parked behind [...]’s car.  (4T39-7 to 23; 4T42-2 to 5).  Around 1:00 a.m., about fifteen to twenty people, including [...] and [...], were outside on [...] when a light-colored Audi pulled onto the block and the front passenger, later identified as defendant, started shooting.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Trial Court decision of the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., and Statement of Reasons dated September 29, 2023  .................................................................1a | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Arena v. Borough of Jamesburg, Middlesex County, | 21 | | 309 N.J. Super. 106 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Brennan v. Orban, | 21 | | 145 N.J. 282 (1996) | | | Brick Tp. Municipal Utilities Authority v. Diversified R.
[brief] The complaint [...] filed in federal court does not seek to duplicate the relief sought by the [...] class; the Gannon class is not the [...] class redux, notwithstanding [...]’s suggestions to the contrary.  In the absence of any breach of the 2015 Settlement, there was never cause for reopening [...] to estop the proposed Gannon class from asserting claims that accrued long after *[...]* was dismissed with prejudice.  [...]’s theory that the trial court had exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the 2015 Settlement assumes that the settlement had been breached, which it had not.  Because the parties to the 2015 Settlement did not breach their agreement, the trial court did not assert jurisdiction over the *Gannon v. Shift4* matter; the *Gannon* plaintiffs chose to assert their separate claims in a separate forum, *viz.*, federal court.  Defendants’ true aim is to expand the 2015 Settlement *post hoc* so as to encompass future claims arising from future misconduct.  Reopening *[...]* in order to rewrite the 2015 Settlement is not a legitimate basis upon which to confer jurisdiction over the *Gannon* claims upon the trial court.  The claims of the proposed *Gannon* class members could not have been asserted or alleged by any of the members of the *[...]* class on Feb. 20, 2015.  The *Gannon* claims do not relate to misconduct that occurred before Feb. 20, 2015, they relate to misconduct occurring *after* that date.  The claims being asserted by the *Gannon* class plaintiffs did not accrue until [...]’s corporate affiliate, [...], engaged in misconduct long after 2015.  [...] chose to bring those claims in federal court, not New Jersey Superior Court.  Defendants’ motions to reopen and enforce the 2015 Settlement was a ploy to defeat the fundamental principle a plaintiff is entitled to the forum of its choosing.  See, e.g., Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970) (noting the heavy burden to transfer from plaintiff’s chosen venue under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a)).  Reopening [...] to rewrite the 2015 Settlement to extinguish future claims for future misconduct was prejudicial to [...] and the potential class members, and the court below ultimately wrote a better contract than the one for which the Defendants bargained.  Cf. Isetts, 364 N.J. Super. at 254.  The only cause for reopening [...] was for the trial court to decline jurisdiction over Gannon, a conclusion that required the trial court to properly interpret the scope of ¶1.29.  (Pa0067, at ¶¶ 8.18-19, and Pa0073, Final Order of the Hon. [...], P.J. Ch., at ¶16).  The only plausible conclusion of that provision is that the 2015 Settlement did not release Defendants from future claims for future misconduct occurring after Feb. 20, 2015.  The trial court should have declined jurisdiction over the claims asserted in the pending Gannon litigation, and should have recommended that the stay imposed in [...]’s federal action in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, [...], be lifted.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Immediately after the defendant in that case acknowledged and waived his rights, he asked two questions about an attorney, which the interrogating officer answered and followed up on.  Specifically, the defendant asked, “Should I not have a lawyer in here with me?” and the officer immediately clarified, asking, “You want a lawyer?”  Alston, 204 N.J. at 618.  In response to this clarifying question, the defendant responded, “No, I am asking you guys .  . . .”  Ibid.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant asked another question about a lawyer: “Sir, if I did want a lawyer in here with me how would I be able to get one in here with me?”  Ibid.  Again, the detective immediately answered that question, reaffirmed the defendant’s right to counsel, and tried to clarify whether the defendant was invoking his right to counsel:  “That’s on -- that’s on you.  If you want a lawyer, then we -- stop and you going to get your lawyer.  That’s why he read that clearly to you and your waiver.  If you want to stop at this time then we stop at this time.  It’s either yes or no.  . . .”  Ibid.  When the defendant’s answers were not sufficiently clear, the detective again directly asked if the defendant “want[ed] a lawyer” or “want[ed] to continue answering questions,” and the defendant responded that he would continue the interview.
[brief] The pertinent facts of this case are clearly and precisely set forth in the Final Administrative Determination of the Board issued on November 16, 2022 and filed December 27, 2002 (PA146-PA151).  [...] began employment as a Police Officer with [...] in January 2005 (PA147).  In the early morning of January 1, 2018, [...] was involved in an off-duty shooting incident in which he discharged his service weapon at an individual he allegedly believed was armed and dangerous (PA147).  On January 2, 2019, [...] served [...] with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (“PNDA”) stemming from the January 2018 shooting incident (PA147; RA27-RA29).  According to the PNDA, [...] “left the scene [of the shooting] without reporting the incident to police headquarters…left the scene without attempting to identify or contain [the alleged assailant]…left the scene without reporting he fired the shots from his service weapon…and returned to the scene in a different vehicle to the one involved in the incident, thereby contaminating the scene” (PA147-PA148; RA29).  The PNDA recommended that [...]’s employment be terminated, but suspended [...] without pay pending a disciplinary hearing (PA147-148; RA29).  As further set forth in the Final Administrative Determination, on or about November 26, 2019 and March 12, 2020, [...] entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) with [...] (PA148; RA31-RA41).  [...] agreed to withdraw the disciplinary charges in exchange for [...] withdrawing “any requests for a hearing on any and all outstanding employment issues” between [...] and [...] (PA148; RA38).  The Settlement Agreement explicitly stated that “[...] hereby understands and agrees that from February 1, 2020 forward he is forever barred from future employment with [[...]]…[and] he is barred from taking any actions as a law enforcement officer for the [...] Police Department” (PA148; RA38).  On the same day as the November 26, 2019 Settlement Agreement, [...] submitted an application for AD benefits (PA148; RA43-RA45).  [...] asserted that he is totally and permanently disabled from the January 2018 shooting incident (PA148).  On January 11, 2021, the Board reviewed the Settlement Agreement and AD application, among other documents (PA148; RA11-RA13).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 (c); N.J.A.C. 17:2-1A.1.  The appellant, therefore, respectfully request the Appellate Division to exercise its authority and reverse the decision of the [...] and enter an order that the [...] re-enroll the appellant in the [...] as a multi-member pension holder.  **CONCLUSION**  Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this court reverse the decision of the [...] and order, either the appellant to be re-enrolled in the [...] or order the matter to be forwarded to the [...] for further proceedings.
[brief] Ca171.  On February 20, 2020, the Bank filed a Complaint against [...] and the two guarantors, after [...] had defaulted on its loan obligations.  Ca170.  On February 26, 2020, the Bank applied for a receiver as to [...].  Ca178.  The Court granted the Bank’s motion but directed that a receiver would not be appointed until after the government mandated COVID-19 closures of restaurants had lifted.  Ca185.  On July 21, 2020, the Bank obtained a default judgment against [...] and the guarantors.
[directive] Coordination with Civilian Review Boards  9.7.1  Internal investigation case files generally are not releasable to Civilian Review Boards, but the “good cause” standard may be satisfied when a Civilian Review Board requests records from a completed or closed investigation file and the Civilian Review Board has in place certain minimum procedural safeguards, as described in Section 9.7.2, to preserve the confidentiality of the requested records and the integrity of the internal affairs function, in addition to complying with all other applicable legal requirements.
[brief] There is no excuse for his such misconduct.  By forging [...]’s signature, Plaintiff [...] misrepresented that he was [...] ([...]), and knowingly allowed the title to be transferred from the name [...] Wu, as the Grantor, to the name [...] ([...]), as the Grantee (Da343 – Da350).  Defendant [...] Wu relied on this legal document when transferring the property to his sons and their company (Da351 – Da370).  Plaintiff [...] should not be allowed to seek relief from this honorable Court given his misconduct, false representations, and document subterfuge.
[brief] Moreover, in this situation “[a]n alternative ground is available on the basis of which [a] defendant's arrest and coincident search may also be sustained. ”  Ibid.  In Doss, the defendant’s refusal to obey a detective’s order to stop interfered with the attempt of police officers to enforce the law and thus the search recovering his loaded gun, heroin, cocaine, and cash was entirely lawful on that ground as well.  See id. at 130-32.  As in Doss, here defendant’s flight amounted to the offenses of obstructing the police investigation and attempting to prevent the police from effecting an arrest.
[brief] Part One of the Policy, titled “Workers’ Compensation Insurance,” provides coverage for “the benefits required of you by the workers’ compensation law. ”  Ja79.  The workers’ compensation law identified on the Information Page of the Policy is New Jersey.  Ja68.  Part Two, titled “Employers Liability Insurance,” provides coverage for claims of bodily injury asserted against [...] by an employee “where recovery is permitted by law. ”  Ja80.  Part Two provides coverage for that category of claims in which an employee is legally permitted to assert a claim for bodily injury against his or her employer in lieu of the statutory benefits covered under Part One of the Policy, subject to the exclusions contained in Part Two.  The coverage afforded by Part Two of the NJM Policy is subject to various exclusions.
[brief] Defendants rely on two unreported decisions, even though "no unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."  R.1:36-3.  Moreover, a close reading of the cases cited does not support the proposition that a separate signature line is required for the Defendants to be personally liable on their guarantees.  In Herz vs. [...], supra, plaintiffs in that case argued that the omission of a separate signature line was a clerical error.
[brief] However, the Zoning Board voted to deny [...]’s 2018 Amended Application for variance relief, with Member [...] making a motion to deny the 2018 Amended Application, stating in relevant part that “I think they’re basing everything and every professional that came up kept bringing up the affordable housing.  We have other developments going on.  They’re not going to hold us ransom based on that. ”  TN 176:7-14.  There was no further discussion nor evidence of any deliberation by the Board prior to voting to deny the Application.  In sum, the Board simply rejected all of the evidence before it.
[brief] First, the State asserts that [...]’s acquittal argument “must fail” with respect to one of the bank tellers, [...], because it was not necessary that Shah testify in order for the jury to determine that she felt threatened.  (Sb 31)  But [...] does not dispute that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict him of second-degree robbery of Shah; he agrees that Shah did not need to testify for the jury to make the factual determination that he threatened her with immediate bodily injury.  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.  (Db 27, n.8)  For the jury to convict [...] of first-degree robbery of Shah, however, the State had to prove that Shah actually believed that [...] possessed a deadly weapon even though he did not.  Dekowski, 218 N.J. at 599; Williams, 218 N.J. at 587-88.  The State presented no evidence from which the jury could draw a conclusion regarding Shah’s subjective belief because Shah did not testify at trial.  On multiple occasions, our Supreme Court has examined the State’s burden in a first-degree robbery case involving a simulated deadly weapon.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT.........................................................................18  I.  THE VERDICT ENTERED BY THE JURY WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (65a; T9, 25-31)..................18  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE JURY AS TO WHAT IT BELIEVED WAS THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER OVER THE OBJECTION OF BOTH COUNSEL (81a; T8, 88-95)..................27  III.  THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE’S EXPERT, [...], WHO WAS NOT NAMED BY THE STATE UNTIL THE DAY PRIOR TO JURY SELECTION (58a; T1, 68-91)...........................................................................................................29  IV.  THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE REDACTED OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS OF [...] AND [...] TO BE READ TO THE JURY (T4, 151-267; T5, 3-56)...........................................................................................................34  V.  THE EXTENDED TERM SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS EXCESSIVE AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (66a; T9, 54-62)............................................40  VI.  THE CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A RESULT OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT THAT OCCURRED IN THE PRESENTATION TO THE GRAND JURY BUT WHICH ONLY BECAME EVIDENT DURING THE TRIAL TESTIMONY OF [...] (NOT RAISED BELOW)........................................42  CONCLUSION.........................................................................................44
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Denial of a Wade Hearing  .................................................. 1T 124-20 to 130-11  Admission of Witness’s Confidence Statement ..................... 6T 113-23 to 114-8  Admission of Dying Declaration........................................ Da 5; 1T 93-14 to 99-22 Admission of Implied Hearsay..........................................  8T 18-7 to 24, 34-9 to 17, 35-8 to 19, 49-4 to 11  Prosecutorial Misconduct..................................................  9T 105-18 to 106-14  Sentence ..............................................................................13T 19-14 to 20-11; Da 13-15  Judgment of Conviction.................................................................Da 13-15  INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...].................................Da  1-4  Motion to Preclude Dying Declaration........................................Da  5  Motion for Wade Hearing ...............................................................Da  6  Order Denying Motion to Preclude Dying Declaration Testimony, dated October 19, 2020; .................................................................Da  7  Order Denying Wade Hearing ........................................................Da  8  Jury Verdict Sheet ......................................................................Da  9  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................Da 10-12  Amended Judgment of Conviction ................................................Da  13-15
[brief] at. 268 (citations omitted).  Such testimony may be admissible to show that the officer was not acting in an arbitrary manner or to explain his subsequent conduct.  Ibid.  However, the court continued,  When the officer becomes more specific by repeating what some other person told him concerning a crime by the accused the testimony violates the hearsay rule .  . . and the accuser's Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by witnesses against him.  [...], 63 N.J. at 268 (citations omitted).  Notably, the court further elaborated that the propriety of the testimony is not dependent on its specificity, but rather its context.  Thus, "[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accuser's guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay.  Id. at 271.  And although the police witness did not specifically relate the content of the informants statement, the "inescapable inference" of testimony was that "the informer had given information that defendant would have narcotics in his possession."  Ibid.  Because [...] was denied an opportunity to confront his accuser, the court found that the error required reversal on the facts of that case.  Id. at 272-73.  It is the creation of the inference, not the specificity of the statements made that determines whether the hearsay rule was violated.
[brief] The First Sentencing  The State submitted a memorandum in advance of the sentencing date in which it argued that there were no mitigating factors, sought multiple consecutive terms, and requested an aggregate sentence of 110 years with 98 years parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act.  (Da 260 to 266)  Trial counsel was copied, and did not file any response.  Petitioner was sentenced for the first time on January 26, 2016.
[brief] In addition, relaxation is dependent upon all relevant equitable considerations presented by the circumstances of the case before the court.  Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., 204 N.J. 569, 583-84, 10 A.3d 211 (2011).  There is no dispute between the parties that if Counsel for Applicants had not independently published the notification of the ZBA’s determination, Appellants’ Complaint would be timely based on the date that the ZBA published the notification.