ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The State goes through a historical analysis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, explaining how the Framers were concerned with the enforcement of money judgments and the difficulty presented at the time with foreign judgments.  Sb19-20.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause’s application is not limited to money judgments; nonetheless, in Baker, the Supreme Court noted they have “never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and credit domain.  522 U.S. at 234.  The State relies on this Court’s decision in In re Winston, 438 N.J. Super 1 (App. Div. 2014), which the State argues is strikingly similar to this case, however, it is readily distinguishable.  In that case, the issue was whether a New York Certificate of Relief from Disability was equivalent to a New Jersey expungement.  Id. at 4-5.  As pointed out by the State, this Court found that the certificates do not satisfy the expungement statute.  Sb22.  Specifically, this Court, relying on New York case law, found that the purpose of the certificate was to “enable eligible offenders who have shown certain indications of having been rehabilitated to avoid some of the restrictions immediately flowing from their convictions, such as the bar against holding certain civil service positions and the loss of the right to vote,” and “most importantly” that "[the] granting of a certificate of relief from disabilities in no way eradicates or expunges the underlying conviction."  Id. at 8-9.  Notably, this Court did not look at the process or requirements for obtaining a certification.  Instead, this Court looked at the purpose and the effect.  In the instant matter, Defendant is not asking this Court to determine whether a Pennsylvania statute is equivalent to a New Jersey law; Defendant’s position is that a Pennsylvania license to carry is equivalent to New Jersey’s.
[brief] A.  Defendants violated the Takings Clause of the New Jersey Constitution by depriving Plaintiffs of their previously vested property rights.  (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).  “Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 20 of the New Jersey Constitution, property owners must be paid just compensation for government takings. ”  Mansoldo v. State, 187 N.J. 50, 58 (2006).  Further, Article I, paragraph 20 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. ”  N.J. Const., Art. I, ¶20.  Under our State Constitution, the government is prohibited “from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. ”  Greenway Development Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546, 553 (2000).  Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Takings Clause applies to personal property.  Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425-2426 (2015).  In rejecting the Government’s argument that this constitutional protection only applied to real property, such as in the context of eminent domain, [...], writing for the Court, explained, “[t]he Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.
[directive] SUBJECT: Guidance on Coordination and Relationship Between Law Enforcement Agencies in Applicable Jurisdictions and State-Funded Community-Based Violence Intervention Providers  CC: Director, Division of Violence Intervention and Victim Assistance  On May 3, 2023, I convened the Multidisciplinary Public Safety Innovation Working Group (the “Working Group”) to help strengthen and improve public safety across New Jersey.1  This spring, the Working Group submitted its final report (the “Report”) to the Office of Attorney General.  These Guidelines adopt and incorporate the Report’s recommendations as recommended practice for applicable law enforcement agencies and State-funded community-based violence intervention (CBVI) organizations.  A copy of the Working Group report (“the Report”) is attached hereto as Appendix 1.
[brief] In *Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs.*, this Court explained its reasoning that use of a letter vendor did not violate the FDCPA as follows:  In examining the plain meaning of a statute, “the Legislature’s intent is paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that intent. ”  Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 189 N.J. 210, 223 (2007) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “Statutory words are ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions, giving sense to the legislation as a whole. ”  Ibid.  The court’s duty is clear: “construe and apply the statute as enacted. ”  Ibid. (quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)).  Plaintiff’s complaint is premised on a conclusory allegation that defendants’ use of a letter vendor to create a debt collection letter was, in and of itself, abusive, deceptive or unfair.  We concur with the trial judge’s findings that the use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, or unfair and was not the type of conduct that Congress was interested in preventing when it enacted the FDCPA.
[brief] ” (See Da1-14; Da517-531.)  Nor could they have made such a claim.  There is no --- 4  In fact, the word “illegal” is not contained anywhere in the original or Amended Complaint.  (See Da1-14; Da517-531.)  legitimate dispute that: (i) a planning board possesses jurisdiction over “conditional uses pursuant to article 8” (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25a(4)), and (ii) the Planning Board was within its right to apply the time of application rule.
[brief] In [...], the Board made a similar error in denying an application from a corrections officer injured during a scuffle with an inmate.  The Board contends that because subduing an inmate is part of the anticipated work of a corrections officer and was not unexpected or unintended, [...] cannot satisfy the traumatic event standard.  That is a misreading of the statute, which requires that the traumatic event occur "during and as a result of the performance of [the member's] regular or assigned duties."  To be sure, when the "normal stress and strain" of the job combines with a pre-existing disease to cause injury or degeneration over time, a traumatic event has not occurred.  See Cattani, supra, 69 N.J. at 585; Russo, supra, 62 N.J. at 151.  That is quite different from saying that a traumatic event cannot occur during ordinary work effort.
[brief] THE JURY CHARGE DID NOT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT AS TO THE RELEVANT LAW AND WAS MISLEADING WARRANTING A NEW TRIAL (17T:69-35 to 72-34)  “[I]t is critical that a trial court properly charge the jury in a criminal matter. ”  State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004).  See State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004).  Because legally erroneous jury instructions possess “the capacity to unfairly prejudice the defendant,” State v. Grenci, 197 N.J. 604, 623 (2009)(citing State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541-41 (2004)), defendant is entitled to reversal of his conviction.
[brief] Plaintiff Had an Objectively Reasonable Belief That Defendant [...]’s Conduct Violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a).  In this case, Plaintiff’s belief that Defendant [...]’s behavior constituted harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 was objectively reasonable, based upon a plain reading of the statute and the evidence in the record regarding Defendant [...]’s conduct.  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c) define harassment as occurring when a person “makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications . . . in offensively coarse language or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or harm . . . or c) engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)-(c).
[brief] 127 N.J. at 338.  As the *Cofield* Court emphasized, admitting evidence of other bad acts is the exception, not the rule, making N.J.R.E. 404(b) a rule of exclusion.  *Id.* at 337; see *Willis*, 225 N.J. at 100.  If a trial court fails to analyze other-crime evidence under the test set out in *Cofield*, a reviewing court must conduct a plenary review of the admissibility of the prior bad act that was allowed into evidence.  *State v. Reddish*, 181 N.J. 553, 609 (2004).
[brief] Between 1985 and 1999, the Petitioner, as a plaintiff, filed nine lawsuits relating to his father’s estate.  (8T101-13 to 102-9; 9T37-12 to 18).  In these suits, the Petitioner sued [...], his brother, and [...], his mother, as Co-executors of his father’s estate.  He also filed lawsuits against (1) the attorneys that handled the estate (2) [...], and (3) the [...].  His lawsuits included a malpractice suits against attorneys [...] and [...], the latter being one of the estate attorneys that handled his father’s estate.  Five of the nine lawsuits were filed in the New Jersey state courts, which concerned his father’s estate, including against the executors, trustees and attorneys involved.  More than one of those suits were taken up to the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Four of the lawsuits were filed in federal court, and concerned the same issues and same or similar parties.  (8T92-19 to 115-18).  All nine lawsuits and all appeals filed by the Petitioner resulted in a dismissal of all of his claims.  (8T117-10 to 16).  The history of the Petitioner’s litigations and the dismissal of each one was reviewed in the published decision in *Sutton v. Sutton*, 71 F. Supp. 2d 383, 385 (D.N.J. 1999), *aff’d*, 216 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 2000), which comprised Exhibit R-4 at trial.
[brief] ”  Id. (citing Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 605 (2015) and DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271).  Here, the PTA created the entire relationship between [...] and [...], and explicitly directed the parties enter into a further series of transactions, e.g., the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract. Pa90 § 1.5.  Before the PTA, [...] and [...] were strangers, and the parties have not done any business together since.  The PTA thus created the general contractor – subcontractor relationship on each Backlog Project, and the parties’ dispute over EGP owed on the Hackensack Project arose out of both the PTA and the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract.  Conversely to what [...] now says, the First Arbitration was never a “limited-issue” PTA-only arbitration.  Pa703-04.  And, to be sure, [...] will be unable to point to any such agreements between [...] and [...] to that end—because, indeed, no such claim-splitting agreements ever existed.  The PTA both expressly listed the Hackensack Project’s $1,677,588.00 EGP and expressly required that “ARC and [...] shall enter into a subcontract agreement” for each Backlog Project (e.g., the Hackensack Project).  Pa125 & Pa90.  In accordance with the PTA’s requirements, the parties entered into the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract.  Pa595.  Thus, any dispute for EGP payments under the PTA further required, as a compulsory counterclaim, any offsetting disputes for monies allegedly owed under any PTA-subsumed subcontract.  [...] and [...] had no business relationship before these agreements and have had no dealings since.  The PTA and the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract, inherently, arise from “the same transaction or series of transactions”—all borne of the PTA and [...]’s interrelated work as a subcontractor to [...] at the many different project sites (including the Hackensack Project).  Indeed, in the Second Arbitration, [...] re-asserts the exact same allegation (that it is entitled to $2.1 million at the Hackensack Project)!  The trial court therefore erred in denying [...]’s request for injunctive relief.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN EXPRESS FINDING OF FACT THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT POSSES KNOWLEDGE OF ITS CURRENT CLAIM PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST ACTION, NEGATING ANY ARGUMENT THAT THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE BARS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS.  In what is tantamount to an admission that the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s claims based solely on a wholesale adoption of non-essential comments from a separate matter, Defendants dedicate a substantial portion of their opposition rearguing the entire controversy doctrine anew.  In so doing, Defendants ask this Court to not only turn a blind eye to the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact and credibility determinations, but to supplant those findings with directly contradictory findings of fact.  The Court should not even entertain Defendants’ improper attempt to reargue.
[brief] Accordingly, courts apply a ‘presumption of arbitrability’ unless it is clear “that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. ”  *Curtis v. Cellco P'ship*, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 34 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting *Epix Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos.*, 410 N.J. Super. 453, 471 (App. Div. 2009), overruled in part on other grounds, *Hirsch v. Amer. Fin. Servs., LLC*, 215 N.J. 174, 193 (2013)).  *Victory Ent., Inc. v. Schibell*, No. A-3388-16T2, 2018 WL 3059696, at (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2018).  In construing contractual provisions such as the Dispute Resolution provision of the Shareholder’s Agreement the Court’s inquiry is governed by “familiar rules of contract interpretation.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1); N.J.A.C. 1:30-5.1(b)(9).  In addition to publication in the New Jersey Register, the agency must mail notice to all parties who have notified that agency of its desire to receive advance notice of agency rulemaking activities.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1); N.J.A.C. 1:30-5.2(a)(3).  The agency must also provide notice of the rulemaking activity to the news media maintaining a press office in the State House Complex and through electronic means.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1); N.J.A.C. 1:30 - 5.2(a)(4) – (5).  Finally, the agency must afford all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, comments, or arguments, orally or in writing and summarize and respond to the information and comments submitted.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(3).
[brief] (Raised by way of Motion to Dismiss Appeal  Filed by the Borough)  While the New Jersey Constitution does not restrict the exercise of our Courts’ judicial power to cases and controversies, our Supreme Court has instructed our Courts to “refrain[] from rendering advisory opinions or exercising [] jurisdiction in the abstract. ”  See De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428 (1993).  In keeping with this well-reasoned exercise of the judicial power, “our courts normally will not entertain cases when a controversy no longer exists and the disputed issues have become moot. ”  *Ibid.* (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  To that end, our Supreme Court defines moot as follows:  *A case is technically moot when the original issue presented has been resolved*, at least concerning the parties who initiated the litigation.  *Ibid.* (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  Said another way, “[a]n issue is ‘moot when [the Court’s] decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy. ’”  *Redd v. Bowman*, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015) (quoting *Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Mitchell*, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-222 (App. Div. 2011)) (emphasis added).  This is precisely what has occurred in this instant matter.  A designated handicap parking area was precisely the issue upon which Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint.  *(See* Pa084-Pa099; *see also* Da001-Da002).  That relief sought by Plaintiff in his Verified Complaint has been provided, *i.e.*, a handicap parking area has been designated by [...].  *(Compare* Da001-Da002 *with* Da055-Da056).  Therefore, the “original issue presented has been resolved” and Plaintiff’s Appeal is thus rendered moot and should therefore be dismissed.
[brief] ”  Final Da135; see id. at Da136 (“There was competing testimony about the causes of the purported increases in cost with [...] alleging poor management by [...] and [...] alleging, among other things, interference at some job sites by [...] and matters not contemplated at the time [...] was ‘established’ or shown on the updates prepared by [...]. ”).  In fact, as demonstrated by the summary of the [...] Exhibit Nos. 5-12, Arc never once altered or attempted to alter the [...]s as a result of actual impacts to gross profits, including those impacts resulting from the COVID pandemic.
[brief] [...] then engaged in additional discovery, including a further review of the partnership’s books and records and accounting work papers, and it obtained a new real estate appraisal in June 2001 and a new forensic accounting report in August 2001 that described in detail the partnership’s financial transactions.  (675a).  At no time during this period did [...] seek to amend its pleadings or assert any additional claims, despite the appraisals and accounting reports.  Nor did [...] seek to assert any partnership rights beyond its claim that it was entitled to its 25% share of past profits and the then-current value of the partnership.  [...] did not seek to be an active partner, but instead sought to be “bought out” and paid the value of its partnership interest, including lost profits, as damages.  (675a).  At this time, [...] again declined to join the action, despite being deposed in 1997 (where he was represented by his own counsel) and participating in the preparation of the forensic accounting report.  On June 14, 2002, [...] fixed January 8, 1992 as the valuation date because that was the date on which defendant [...] advised [...] that it was not a partner in the Project.  (1973a).  A trial on damages was conducted before the Honorable [...] in March 2004 only to determine the value of [...]’s 25% partnership interest.  (531a).  [...] determined that [...]’s 25% interest had a negative value as of January 8, 1992.  (532a).  As a result, the Court dismissed all allegations in the complaint with prejudice and entered a Final Judgment on April 5, 2004.  (534a).  [...] appealed, raising as its only issues the court’s fixing of January 8, 1992 as the valuation date and failure to award money damages through the date of the damages trial.  (2643a).  B.
[brief] [...]’s Complaint was timely filed on October 21, 2022 – 36 days after the Board approved the application and 8 days after it adopted its resolution on October 13, 2022.  [Da9 at ¶ 48-49].  [...] asserted the same claims, through the same arguments, that [...] made on the timely-filed Complaint.  [...] could not and cannot point to any vested rights secured by the approval, and therefore, it could not have relied upon its approval in the absence of a challenge.  On the other hand, the public interest was and is significant.  The [...] adopted the Ordinance, mandating that the sale of cannabis be at least 600 feet from school buildings, which the Property is not.  The City thus made a determination that there needs to be “special reasons” and no substantial impairment to the intent and purpose of the 600-foot restriction if a developer wants to locate a cannabis retailer within 600 feet of a school building.  See *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3)*.  But the Board ignored the legislative determination of Hoboken’s elected representatives in approving the application rather than finding, as required by law, that the TOA Rule did not apply to an application for development filed *after* the Ordinance went into effect.  The ability of a citizen – who formed an entity to challenge that action – to also pursue that challenge is clearly in furtherance of the public interest and warranted enlargement to ensure that the merits of the appeal be reached.  Similar reasoning justified enlargement under R. 4:69-6(c) in Willoughby v. Planning Bd. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1997).  There, the planning board raced ahead to approve a controversial development application before the governing body repealed the zoning ordinance that allowed the project (this is the race-to-finish that the TOA Rule avoids, as discussed in footnote 2 on page 27 of this brief).  Like here, a citizens’ group challenged the project and also sued (out-of-time) to challenge the original ordinance that had already been repealed in the hopes of undoing the approval.  Finding statutory impropriety, this Court enlarged the time to challenge the ordinance.  Id. at 277-279.  Later, in Willoughby v. Wolfson Group, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div.), certif. denied 165 N.J. 603 (2000), the invalidity of the ordinance was upheld and presumptively, the site plan approval was overturned too.  The same outcome is warranted here too, if necessary.
[brief] The Court did not use the defective December 10, 1998 deed or the follow up deed recorded in January 1999 as the period to start the statute of limitations.  The court, instead, confusingly states that the issue with the title did not become discovered by the Plaintiff until the Plaintiff was informed by realtor [...] that the decedent defendant [...]/[...] was seeking an appraisal on the property in 2019 (12T).  However, Defendants respectfully submit that the moment that Plaintiff [...] forged [...]’s signature on the defective deed on December 10, 1998 purporting to transfer the title to [...], he was already fully aware of the issue, which was willfully created by himself.  The court went on to further state that the Plaintiff was not made aware of a claim against his ownership of the property until this time.  However, there is an INHERENT claim against Plaintiff’s ownership of the property in that the Plaintiff filed not one, but two deeds granting the ownership of the property to [...].  It simply does not make sense that Plaintiff would be somehow unaware of his ownership rights to the property when he signed a deed that placed the property in the grant of his brother twice.
[brief] ”  internal loop road.  (Aa829).  Basin 1 discharges into the onsite drainage ditch.  Basin 1’s watershed includes runoff from the trailer parking east of Building 1, Building 1’s southern and eastern parking lots, a portion of Building 1’s roof, the loop road, and the existing office building.  Ibid.  Basin 3 discharges into an onsite drainage ditch downstream of Basin 1.  Basin 3’s watershed includes runoff from proposed Building 2, its associated parking lots, and the southern section of Robbinsville-Allentown Road.  Ibid.  The MTDs discharge into Basins 2 and 3.  (Aa834).  The overall water quality treatment for the proposed water quality management systems is 66.1% total suspended solids (TSS) removal, which exceeds the Property’s required 55% TSS removal.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5(e); (Aa89; Aa835).  The constructed wetlands, soil replacement below the infiltration basins, and the MTDs are primarily at issue here.