ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] And I will say that the backup to me and why I tried to start there is, in the research that has been done, the regulations that have been promulgated that say this is safety that were promoted, and then the permit that was gained for that.  To me, these other studies are just additional support.  [2T20:15-22:18.]  [...]’s report never actually relies on the referenced study.  It says he is relying on “other crash dated for at three-sided digital monument…in Quakertown. ”  (Pa164.)  This is precisely what he testified to.  The Board just made excuses. ²  Second, on that point, the Board’s own expert, [...], never had any opinion.  He just kept writing he needed more data.  He did nothing to create the foundation for an actual opinion because he did not have one—he renders no --- ² [...] was certainly entitled to rely on sworn testimony about other locations in order to answer the Board’s questions.  State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 576 (2005).  opinion on safety at all.  (Pa141.)  The most he says is that the locations in [...]’s study have differences from the one for the application, but that, by itself, is not an opinion on safety.  As the Board notes, [...] did not actually testify to anything.  (Rb14.)  LEGAL REPLY
[brief] At about 10:55 a.m. on August 2, 2019 (11T 89-7 to 18), [...] was driving a rented silver Hyundai Tuscon through Asbury Park with his brother, [...], seated in the passenger seat.  (14T 37-23 to 38-10)  The driver’s side window was open.  (14T 56-24 to 57-1)  When they were in the area of Monroe and Ridge Streets, a white Toyota Corolla approached them, heading in the opposite direction, and pulled up next to their car, driver’s side to driver’s side.  (10T 26-1 to 5; 11T 29-10 to 23; 11T 40-6 to 44-6)  The driver of the Corolla rolled down his window, reached out holding a gun, and shot multiple times into the interior of the Tuscon.  (14T 61-3 to 9)  Smith was struck in the shoulder and had a graze wound in his neck.  (11T 20-20 to 21; 14T 61-7 to 11)  Perry was shot in the chin.  (11T 20-17 to 19; 14T 61-16 to 62-6)  Smith drove to [...] and parked directly outside the emergency room entrance.  (14T 63-17 to 20)  Both Smith and Perry entered the hospital on foot and received medical treatment for their gunshot wounds.  (11T 12-22 to 13-10; 11T 152-1 to 15; 14T 62-19 to 64-2)  Meanwhile, police responded to Monroe and Ridge Streets on a report of shots fired.
[brief] S.A. 40A:12A-13 that “[a]ll applications for development to the municipal planning board for its review and approval [shall be] in accordance with the requirements . . . the MLUL”  Referring to *Britwood*, Cox continues:  The court additionally found that there was no basis to impose costs because the MLUL requires an analysis of “circulation and comprehensive utility services plans. ”  Pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-28 no such plans or analysis were undertaken in connection wither with the resolution dealing with plaintiff’s property or the city’s resolution.  *Id.* at p. 170.  Two unreported decisions also reject the trial Court’s conclusion.
[directive] At the time of collection of the kit, the Forensic Nurse Examiner (FNE) or other healthcare provider will seek the consent of the victim to release the kit to the designated investigative law enforcement agency.  In situations where the victim withholds consent to release to law enforcement, the FNE or other healthcare provider conducting the examination shall review options for anonymous retention with the victim, shall ensure documentation of the victim’s preferences in the forensic medical record,11 will advise the victim of the expiration date of the 20-year retention period, and the victim’s right to report the assault and submit the kit for testing at any time until the end of the retention period.  When the victim does not consent to release of the SAFE/DFSA kit to law enforcement, the Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) coordinator shall be responsible for submission of the SAFE/DFSA
[brief] Plaintiff suggests that the trial court was obligated to reconsider its summary judgment order based on equitable estoppel principles to prevent injustice based on the preclusive effect of that order on any claim that the Bond Ordinance should be set aside or that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in 2021.  (Pb44)  However, equitable estoppel should only be applied to a municipality to prevent manifest injustice, which does not apply here.  O'Malley v. Dep't of Energy, 109 N.J. 309, 316 (1987).  Even if there was some obligation for the trial court to carve out its judgment to prevent any preclusive effect, which there was not, that issue is moot since any claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in 2021 was required to be raised by the end of 2023 given the two-year statute of limitations for claims under 42 U. S.C. § 1983 and the NJCRA\(^5\) and any challenge to official action in 2021 was required to be challenged within 45 days of the action.  If any such claims were made in any litigation prior to the end of 2023, the court handling that litigation can evaluate whether the summary judgment ruling in this case precludes a claim in another case if raised therein.  The trial court properly denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on equitable grounds.  \(^5\)  See N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2; Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993); and Brown v. Foley, 810 F.2d 55, 56 (3d Cir.1987).  POINT VII
[brief] See New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, NJ Stormwater Best Management Practices Manual, Chapter 4, page 2, https://dep.nj.gov/stormwater/bmp-manual/.  DEP reviewed this Project for stormwater compliance because it is a “major development” that disturbs one or more acres of land.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-1.6.  DEP thoroughly reviewed [...]’s stormwater proposals, (Aa16-22), and determined that the numerous BMPs for the Project complied with its rules by reducing the total suspended solids in stormwater runoff by eighty percent.
[brief] CASES CITED: Bey v. Morton, 124 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 1997) ......................................................... 21 Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1998) .................................................. 21 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) ....................................................... 19 Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) ............................................................. 21 State v. Allen, 398 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2008) .............................................. 9 State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186 (2004) .................................................................... 7, 8 State v. Cox, 114 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 1971) ............................................... 19 State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) ........................................................................ 7 State v. Johnson, 365 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 2003) .......................................... 19, 20 State v. Mitchell, 149 N.J. Super. 259 (App. Div. 1977) ........................................ 8 State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 (2012) .................................................................... 9 State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 2002) ........................................ 7 State v. Porter 216 N.J. 343 (2013) ..................................................................... 8, 14, 15, 22, 23 State v. Precioso, 129 N.J. 451 (1992) .................................................................. 7, 9 State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46 (App. Div. 1998) ............................................... 9 State v. Robinson, 224 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 1988) ...................................... 19 State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2000) ............................................ 7, 9 State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594 (1990) ................................................................... 7, 8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................... 7, 15, 20 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) .......................................................... 21 RULES, STATUTES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED: R. 1:6-6 .................................................................................................................. 8 R. 3:22-10 .............................................................................................................. 9 R. 3:22–10(b) .........................................................................................................  14  R. 3:5-7(f)  ..............................................................................................................  19  The American Bar Association Standards, The Defense Function § 4.1 (1971) .......  8  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The defendant will rely on the procedural history as set forth in the brief filed by appellate counsel in this matter with addition to the fact that PCR counsel moved for reconsideration of the PCR court’s June 9, 2023 order denying the PCR and an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] Additionally, while the Respondents were aware of the change in the [...] position concerning the Route 33 Signal prior to the hearing on the 2018 Amended Application in 2019, the Respondents failed to advise the Board of the change in the [...] position.  The Respondents proceeded with the hearing on the 2018 Amended Application; and deliberately or negligently withheld the changed [...] position concerning the Route 33 Signal.  The Board should have been advised of the change in the [...] position prior to the March 2019 hearing on the 2018 Amended Application.  This would have permitted the Board to consider the changed [...] position as part of the hearing on the 2018 Amended Application.  By withholding the change [...] position, the Respondents denied the Board the statutory right to consider this information as part of the hearing on the 2018 Amended Application.  Further, the Respondents should be estopped from seeking the elimination of the Route 33 Signal.
[brief] Appellant’s Claim for Injunctive Relief Similarly Fails (Pa003054).  Similarly, the trial court properly dismissed the claim for injunctive relief.  Count 8 of Appellants’ Verified/First Amended Complaint seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to the NDA and Equity to “prevent irreparable injury. ” (Pa001648).  Injunctive relief is remedy, not an independent cause of action and therefore, Count 8 of Appellants’ Verified Complaint seeking injunctive relief was properly dismissed.
[brief] (4/17/23 Transcript @T27).  Plaintiff’s representative’s response was to note that there is nothing in any research which proves that billboards create a safety concern based on drivers being distracted.  (4/17/23 Transcript @T27:17-T27:25).  [...] noted that EHT’s traffic engineer, [...], “had not yet spoken as to his report yet,” which addressed the traffic studies relied upon by [...].
[brief] Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion under the rule and decide the appeal.  R. 1:13-4(b)."  In Perretti, supra, the Appellate Division explained that the entire controversy doctrine and the summary action are complementary despite the appearance that they are in conflict.  "To be sure, under then-prevailing practice perceptions, defendants had every opportunity to preserve the civil rights and tort claims by filing a timely, separate Law Division action seeking the relief claimed.
[brief] Rb27.)  And Relator cannot dispute that it paid no more or less than anyone in the business of monitoring and investing in or otherwise tracking the VRDO market would pay.  Relator is, yet again, proposing a legal rule: when the publisher of the information can charge the interested public a fee for the information, the information should be deemed nonpublic.  No case so holds or has ever suggested such a rule, which would make no sense: information commonly becomes publicly available because the public is willing to pay for it.  Relator does not try to distinguish the numerous FCA authorities holding that information with a price tag is nevertheless publicly disclosed.  Rb27 (citing Ab36).  The VRDO Data Sources Are FCA News Media Sources.
[brief] See id.  The parties were unable to reach a settlement, the tolling agreement expired on December 31, 2014, and Plaintiffs initiated the instant action reasserting their claims against Defendant for infringement of the Asserted Patents on August 24, 2015.  See Oppo. at 7; ECF No. 1.  Both Asserted Patents expired for failure to pay maintenance fees.  Specifically, the ’589 Patent expired on January 2, 2015, Plaintiffs’ counsel petitioned the PTO to pay its unintentionally delayed maintenance fee payment on February 20, 2015, and the PTO granted the petition on August 24, 2015.  See Declaration of [...] (“Hoting Decl.”) at 2-3; id., Exhs. 2-3.  The ’016 Patent expired after this suit was filed, on January 29, 2016, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a petition to pay its unintentionally delayed maintenance fee payment on February 10, 2016, and the PTO granted the petition on the same day.  Hoting Decl. at 2-3; id., Exh. 4.  *6
[brief] At [...]’s trial, the State played surveillance video footage depicting an altercation between [...], the complaining witness, and three men inside of a [...].  Alcius testified regarding the events depicted in the video as it was played for the jury.  (6T:30-4 to 49-10, 7T:64-2 to 6-25); (Da 16 at 17:23:44 to 17:36:36)  Alcius testified that he was at “the chicken shack” in [...] at the time of the incident, identifying himself on the video.  (6T:28-8 to 30-8)  (Da 16 at ³ [...] was convicted of the same offenses, as well as weapons-related offenses.
[brief] To justify its decision, the panel checked off boxes and provided a two-sentence explanation that [...] has failed to “understand the thought process that motivate him to criminal behavior. ” (Pa7; Pa162).  Once again, the panel failed to consider material evidence, ignored its obligation to articulate its reasons for denial with a factual basis grounded in the record, and failed to properly apply the controlling law.  Ibid.  [...] subsequently filed an administrative appeal to the Full Board on October 4, 2023, which was accepted as timely on October 18, 2023.
[brief] The Code regulated starting a vehicle “which is stopped, standing, or parked” in a separate section altogether and provided that such movements shall not be made unless they could be accomplished safely.  See Uniform Vehicle Code of 1952, Act V, Sec. 79.  The section contained no requirement that vehicles signal prior to starting.  Accordingly, the State is wrong that since 1928, New Jersey law has required motorists to signal in certain circumstances before starting, stopping, backing and turning.  To the contrary, it appears that the Legislature made a conscious decision in 1951 to change the law so that no signal is required prior to starting a stopped car.
[brief] ”  As already discussed at length, the Final Judgment for purposes of the sale notice was “the aggregate sum of $21,501,343.47 as of April 5, 2023, together with lawful interest thereafter on all sums due, together with costs to be taxed, including lawful counsel fees. ”  Da62 (emphasis added).  Therefore, it is disingenuous for Defendants to continuously assert that any posted amount was anything other than “approximate” to the judgment amount.  The Sheriff’s notice for the December 14, 2023 sale listed the judgment amount as $25,664,194.21 (Da100), which is legitimately “approximate” to the Final Judgment as stated above.  Contrast Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Young, No. A-1124-17T2, 2019 WL 1568090, at *2 (N.J. App. Div. Apr. 11, 2019) (finding a 22% delta to be “not ‘nearly correct’ or ‘close in value’ to constitute an ‘approximate’ amount”).  This is particularly so here where the judgment amount in the Sheriff notice was calculated on a premise of an award of post-judgment interest at the default rate.  That in turn was consistent with the First Stipulation Confirming Award that is one of the Award Judgments giving rise to Plaintiff’s entitlement to post-judgment interest at the default rate.  This renders even more appropriate the conclusion that the noticed amount by the Sheriff was a legally satisfactory approximation of the judgment amount.  B.
[brief] Not only do the MOAs contain a contingency (which never materialized), Plaintiffs acknowledge that the MOAs are contracts, and therefore subject to modification under the express terms of the MSRA.  Under the MSRA, Defendants had the authority to unilaterally terminate or amend the 2016 MOAs, and in any event, the contingencies set forth in the 2016 MOAs never materialized.  The Superior Court’s decision should be affirmed in its entirety.
[brief] An entitlement to a long term exemption does not follow automatically from an ANR declaration or approval of a redevelopment plan with or without an affordable housing component.  *Millennium Towers Urban Renewal LLC v. Municipal Council of City of Jersey City*, supra, 343 N.J. Super. at 376.  Rather, the LTTEL specifically mandates that the financial agreement include findings that establish the appropriateness of the proposed exemption.
[brief] Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co, 62 N. J. 229, 234 (1973) (“[i]t is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such presentation is available…”).  Instead, defendants’ motion below contended that (a) the Atalese standard did not apply because it was preempted by or inconsistent with the FAA, (b) the Atalese standard applies only to an “average” consumer and not a “sophisticated” consumer, and (c) the Atalese standard does not apply to a consumer represented by an attorney.  All these contentions are repeated in their appellate brief and are without merit; and all were based upon their admission that the plaintiffs herein are consumers and that their contract is a consumer contract.
[directive] Imminent Danger.  Threatened actions or outcomes that are immediately likely to occur during an encounter absent action by the officer.  The period of time involved is dependent on the circumstances and facts evident in each situation and is not the same in all situations.  The threatened harm does not have to be instantaneous, for example, imminent danger may be present even if a subject is not at that instant pointing a weapon at the officer, but is carrying a weapon and running for cover to gain a tactical advantage.
[directive] 1.  Rev. October Directive No. 1, 1995 14 of Page 2 4 seizing agency requesting concurrence for payment of liabilities and the initiation of sale.  The seizing agency will return the letter of concurrence to 6. the national seized property contractor within calendar 10 days.  If objections or concerns about the letter occur, the seizing agency shall contact the national seized property contractor's district office to resolve the issues.  If the national seized property contractor receives no 7 . objections to the letter of concurrence the contractor shall send copies of the signed concurrence document, as well as final tax and lien payoff information to [...] for review and funding approval.  [...] affixes the appropriate accounting strip data to the 8. paperwork, and approves the funding for these obligations.  The [...] provides the package to the [...], formerly the [...], within five working days of receipt.  The [...] ([...]) shall ensure that 9 . approved payments are distributed within fourteen (14) calendar days from receipt of the payment approvals from [...].  The [...] shall notify the national seized property contractor when tax and lien payments are made.  Upon sale and subsequent closing of real property, the 10. national seized property contractor shall ensure that the gross proceeds of the sale are provided the [...] within to five days of the date the funds are received from the closing agent.  -- POLICY GORES.
[brief] BENEFITS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2  RETROACTIVE TO JANUARY 1, 2008.  (Pa 81-Pa92) | Pa 10| | II.  N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a)  CONFLICTS WITH NEW JERSEY STATE LAWS GOVERNING DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYEE STATUS (PARTICULARLY N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)(B)(C)) AND ARE IMPROPERLY SUPERSEDED BY N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a)  (ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW)  | Pa 17| | CONCLUSION | Pa 20 - 21|
[brief] The “2019 New Jersey Energy Master Plan: Pathway To 2050”  The 2019 Energy Master Plan sets a concrete comprehensive set of programs and objectives to achieve the reductions set by the Clean Energy Act and the Global Warming Response Act.  We set forth below extensive quotations from this EMP because [...] has repeatedly misrepresented the plan and its application to these petitions.  An extensive portion of this plan is at Ha438; references to this exhibit are to the pages in the EMP itself as opposed to the pagination of the exhibit.  The heart of the error by the ID and the [...] Decision is that the Legislature has directed the maximum application of and compliance with the EMP as a matter of law.
[directive] The last decade has seen a shift in New Jersey—within the Department of Law and Public Safety, the 21 County Prosecutor Offices, local police departments, community, the courts, and local, county, and state government—where leaders have recognized the critical importance of alternative public health and safety responses and have implemented new approaches.  These approaches look to therapeutic treatment, recovery and supportive services as alternatives to criminal justice involvement, diverting individuals to solutions that will address the root causes of the problem.  The participation and engagement of community in these alternative responses solidifies public safety as a shared responsibility.  Most notable among these strategies is the development of the Alternative Responses to Reduce Instances of Violence and Escalation (ARRIVE) Together program, which has a presence in all 21 New Jersey counties and, as of the date of this Directive, is available to roughly 50 percent of New Jersey’s population.
[brief] (2T 41-4 to 42-6, 73-23 to 74-1; 3T 120-13 to 122-6)  [...] claimed that [...] became a person of interest after his name “c[a]me up” in the investigation.  (2T 42-7 to 14)  Adams and [...] (who did not testify) conducted a video-recorded interrogation of [...], a redacted version of which was played for the jury.
[brief] *Matter of Tr. of Nelson*, 454 N.J. Super. 151, 158 (App. Div. 2018).  This may take the form of interpretation or reformation of a trust.  *Id.* at 159.  Interpretation of a trust “involves finding the meaning of language already in the instrument. ”  *Id.* (quoting Uniform Trust Code, cmt. to § 4).  Reformation “involves remaking or modifying an instrument, to correct mistakes, to fulfill an unexpressed intention, or to address circumstances that were unforeseen. ”  *Id.* at 160.  “Examining the probable intent of a trust is a two-step process.
[brief] D-6 is an unannounced visit/revisit report; is that correct?  A  Yes.  Q  And it says right on this document an unannounced visit was made to the above facility, correct?  A  Yeah, and they checked tour, so they did a tour, yes, ma'am.  Q  So they went to [...].  A  Yes.  Q  Okay.  So there's no confusion, they actually went here.  They didn't do this from a desk.  A  I agree.  Well, they -- they did this portion of the survey from a desk, yes, ma'am.
[brief] See Kaczorowska v. Nat’l Envelope Corp., 342 N.J. Super. 580, 587 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Mabee v. Borden, Inc., 316 N.J. Super. 218, 227 (App. Div. 1998)); see also Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 470 (explaining that “[a] probability, or knowledge that such injury or death ‘could’ result, is insufficient”); Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Const. Co., Inc., 176 N.J. 366, 376 (2003) (stating that “the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk — even the strong probability of a risk — will come up short on the substantial certainty prong”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  An employer acts with such intent only when he “desires to cause consequences of his act or is substantially certain that such consequences will result from his actions. ”