ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He was not commenting specifically on [...]’s or any other witnesses’ credibility.  As to the October 1, 2017, text messages to [...] from [...], that “Grandpa says all Scott talks about is killing people.  He says he’s losing it,” (13T40-10 to 48-12), [...] explained that he considered them, not for the truth of their content, but for “[t]he fact that these words were said when they were electronically recorded to have been said.  (13T40-24 to 42-19).  Counsel objected, at which time the AP explained that [...]’s testimony was not opining as to the truth of the content of text message, but how the text message related to his “coming to his opinion. ” (13T43-2 to 44-4).  Defense counsel responded to this explanation, “Yes, I see where you’re going and I do appreciate that.  I think that that is what he’s saying. ” (13T44-5 to 745-8).  The court then mentioned that this would all be addressed by the curative instruction that would be given regarding how the jury is to view hearsay contained within an expert’s testimony, to which defense counsel responded, “Yes.
[brief] ”  See *In re Zicarelli*, 55 N.J. 249, 264-65 (1970); *State v. Leonardis*, 73 N.J. 360, 370 (1977).  As such, the Legislature may delegate rulemaking authority to an administrative agency within the Executive Branch, such as the Council, to “implement[] policy in a specialized area . . . with the staff, resources, and expertise to understand and solve those specialized problems.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES  Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) ...........................................  7 RULES OF COURT R. 2:9-5 .............................................................................................................  6  TABLE OF APPENDIX  February 27, 2024  Letter From [...]........................................Pa001  February 27, 2024  Letter from [...].................................Pa002  February 28, 2024  Letter from [...].................................Pa004  February 29, 2024  Letter from [...].................................Pa006  February 29, 2024  Letter from [...].................................Pa008  February 29, 2024  Second Letter from [...]......................Pa009  February 29, 2024  Letter from [...].................................Pa011  February 29, 2024  Second Letter from [...]......................Pa013  Certification of Service from Appellants’ Motion for Leave to Appeal........Pa018 March 21, 2024  Letter from [...].....................................Pa019  Limited Notice of Appearance for Appellants by [...]..............Pa024  Notice of Appellants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal..........................Pa025  Certification of [...]..........................................Pa027  Order Granting Appellants’ Motion for Leave to Appeal..........................Pa029  Order Denying Motion for Stay Pending Appeal as Moot.........................Pa031
[directive] Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021)  Drug Court Phase Reqmrements  Name I  Probation Officer Date Reviewed Track B  Phase 3  Requirements - with staff you  Review each requirement and sign understand the expectations.  on time •  I will attend court every 3 months at: plan plan my my and • I will follow treatment establish relapse prevention at: ________________ .  Phone Number: of my week • I will follow the conditions probation supervision and meet every other with on probation officer time.  Probation officer: __________  my Phone Number: .  I will immediately notify probation officer of of my in or an any conflicts prior to appointment case emergency.  my my plan with • I will review case probation officer as needed.  my home and • I will allow probation officers into residence for home visits inspections.  ______ random • I will submit to drug testing.  Testing hotline number: _ ______ (ID#: ) if my my and • I will maintain housing keep probation officer informed residence changes.  • I will address any recommended medical/dental needs.  and • I will continue to demonstrate changing/addressing people, places, things.  per • I will maintain attending recovery groups and establish a recovery network treatment.  per plan my • I will follow financial and begin making payments case plan.  new such • I will establish pro-social activities as calling a sober friend, developing a hobby, or taking a walk, attending alumni groups.  • I will address supportive services, as recommended (for example, parenting classes, family support, etc.).  job • I will begin employment, start vocational training, search or school.  If CEP be owe • I money, I will given a court date.  my have court and I reviewed the requirements for Phase 3 understand responsibilities to the drug program.
[brief] Yueh, 329 N.J. at 467-68.  Even if “abuse of discretion” did apply, however, the Chancery Court abused its discretion for all of the reasons argued by [...] in this appeal.  required, which was enormous, the likelihood it could preclude other work.  I am sure all the attorneys working on this had plenty else to do.  And some attorneys may spend their entire careers working on this case, including [...], who I am sure I know has done a lot of work on this case.  Fees customarily charged.
[brief] Plaintiffs Were Not Required to Proceed Derivatively Against the Defendants.  The appellants intimate that the Plaintiffs were required to proceed on their conversion claims derivatively, rather than via a direct action.  (Db51-52).  However, the appellants misconstrue the governing legal principles, which the trial court correctly articulated and applied.  The Plaintiffs had the right to bring their conversion claims directly because they suffered a special injury.  And, even if this Court believes that the Plaintiffs did not suffer a special injury, the trial court properly exercised its equitable discretion to waive the requirement that these claims be pursued derivatively because [...], [...], and their wives – directly or via other party-entities to this case – are the only shareholders or members in [...] and [...].
[brief] **Regulated Activities are de facto of “Public Interest”**  Historic District Ordinances state that its “Purpose” is as follows:  “The purpose of this section is to promote the educational, cultural, economic and general welfare of the Township through the preservation of historic buildings and structures and of places and districts through the development and maintenance of appropriate settings for such buildings, structures, places and districts which impart to residents and visitors alike a distinct aspect of the Township and which serve as visible reminders of the historical and cultural heritage of the Township, state and the nation. ”  There can be no clearer statement of a matter of public interest.
[brief] 3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  ONE GIVEN THE STATE’S LESS THAN OVERWHELMING PROOFS, DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY HIS TRIAL  ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO CALL TWO WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONY RELATED TO A MATERIAL FACT IN THE CASE.  (19T 18-10 to 25, 19-14 to 17)  16  A. Standard of Review.  16  B.  The Constitutional Guarantee.  17  1.  Defense counsel’s failure to explain his trial strategy for not undertaking a reasonable investigation into defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the shooting constitutes a deficient performance under prevailing professional norms.  (19T 18-6 to 9)  19 2.  Given the State’s less than overwhelming proofs, the PCR judge’s assessment of whether defendant suffered prejudice as a result of his trial attorney’s deficient performance was error.  (19T 6-18 to 7-23, 8-12 to 24, 9-23 to 10-9)  POINT TWO
[directive] A prosecutor in a school zone case shall not ask the court to find the aggravating factor set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 a(5) (substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity) for the purpose of triggering the presumption of imprisonment pursuant to 4  In certain circumstances, the Revised Brima.g.~ Guidelines and/or other Attorney General charging and plea negotiation Directives provide that the prosecutor must tender a plea offer that requires the defendant to plead guilty to multiple charges, and those provisions of the Brimage Guidelines or other Directives are not amended or superceded by this Supplemental Directive.
[brief] Far from criminal harassment, the record reflects only that [...] was difficult to work with on a day to day basis, that she was occasionally mean to her employees, and that they did not like her sometimes.  (See, e.g., Pa446) ([...] \(^4\) Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, criminal harassment requires “intent to harass. ”  State v. Duncan, 376 N.J. Super. 253, 261 (App. Div. 2005) (“A finding that defendant acted with a purpose or intent to harass another is integral to a determination of harassment.”).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EMPLOYING THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO BAR DEFENDANT’S REQUESTED RELIEF (Raised Below: T1)**  This Court has held that while a motion pursuant to *R. 4:50-1* must be filed within a reasonable time, the one-year time constraint described in *R. 4:50-2* applies only to subsections (a), (b), and (c) of *R. 4:50-1*; motions under subsections (d) and (f) can be brought at any time so long as it is reasonable under the circumstances.  *See Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi*, 244 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1990).  Indeed, “subsection (f)’s boundaries are ‘as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice. ’”  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109 (quoting *Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo*, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1977)).
[brief] The discussion then transitioned to a calculation of equity.  Id. at 87.  Initially, [...]’s counsel proposed a novel method for determining equity, which the Board unanimously declined to adopt by way of motion.  Id.  Instead, the Board chose to utilize the traditional definition of equity in real property, which pursuant to Section 155-1 of the Ordinance is “[t]he actual cash contribution of the purchaser at the time of closing of title and any principal payments to outstanding mortgages.
[brief] There was no departure from the Master Plan, and therefore no need to state reasons.  The Planner stated that the Plan was consistent with the municipal Master Plan.  3.1.  The closure of the [...] was not anticipated at the time of the most recent Master Plan reexamination report in 2017.  As a result, the Master Plan does not provide any specific recommendations regarding the potential redevelopment of the property.  However, the development of the rehabilitation area with the warehouse facility is not inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the Master Plan.
[brief] Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on April 12, 2021.  On April 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint removing two of the defendants from this matter.  (P2a).  Defendants filed its Answer and Counterclaim on August 11, 2021.  (P5a)  The Counterclaim alleged that Plaintiff breached a document that did not exist, breached their obligation of good faith and fair dealing and alleged that Plaintiff should have filed for COVID relief funds.  There was no claim for declaratory relief.  On April 28, 2022, plaintiff moved for summary judgment.  The court held oral argument on October 14, 2022.  On the same day, the trial court entered an Order granting summary judgment to plaintiff, citing the reasons set forth on the record.  (P14a)  The court dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice.  (P14a)  Plaintiff appealed the court’s Order granting summary judgment contending the court did not properly calculate the amount owed to Plaintiff.  The Appeal was denied in part and granted in part.
[brief] Da1 Exhibit A (legal description/map) ........................................  Da11/13  Exhibit B (value “recapitulation”) ........................................  Da15  Declaration of Taking Filed 09/05/18 ........................................  Da16  Exhibit A (legal description) ........................................  Da11 Exhibit B (map) ..................................................................  Da13  Order For Payment Into Court and Possession Filed 09/24/18 ......................................................................
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cummings v. Bahr,** | 9 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | | | **D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson,** | 13, 14, 15, 17 | | 242 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 1990) | | | **Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor,** | 10 | | 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | | | **Forschung E.V. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,** | 18 | | 2021 WL 861493 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2021) | | | **Metcalf v. Bay Ferries Limited,** | 18 | | 2014 WL 3670786 (D. Mass. July 14, 2021) | | | **Peiker Acoustic, Inc. v. Kennedy,** | 19 | | 2011 WL 1344238 (D. Colo. Apr. 8, 2011) | | | **Rivers v. LSC Partnership,** | 9 | | 378 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div.
[brief] (Pa160-175).  The trial court abused its discretion to the extent that it accepted and relied on any of these specious and deceptive arguments.  (Pa9-10; Pa16-21)  In addition, defendant’s filing of an Offer of Judgment on May 28, 2021 for only $11,000 inclusive of counsel fees was improper, as was its use of same later to falsely claim that plaintiff’s counsel resisted settlement.  (Pa165-170; Pa173-175; Pa205-209).  Plaintiff’s counsel correctly objected to defendant’s filing of the OOJ in his June 3, 2021 frivolous litigation letter to defense counsel under Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.
[brief] ” (Pb9).  Plaintiffs ignore [...]’s communications with the NJDEP on this issue.  Specifically, [...]’s Civil Engineering Firm, [...], responded via email to the NJDEP regarding this specific issue on August 9, 2023.  (DJa017).  [...] responded that the BMP Manual Chapter 10.4 requirement for pretreatment required in any type of standard constructed wetlands system, and that the required pretreatment may consist of a forebay or any of the BMPs found in Chapters 9 or 11.
[directive] 4 de al Pretrial Memorandum - Revised form promulgated Directive# 23-17 (8/21/2017), CN: 11216-Spanish of4 page 3 un i,Se requerira interprete?  19.  [No/No]  [Si/Yes]  Interpreter needed? es asi, por favor suministre la siguiente informaci6n:  Si lfyes, please following the provide information:  Si es para acusado, i,de que idioma?  el ----------------- defendant, language?  what the  If Si es para un testigo, i,de que idioma?  ----------------- a witness, language?  what  If  Por la presente se ordena que el acusado todos los abogados vuelvan al tribunal en la siguiente fecha a las 20. y 9:00 de la mafiana listos para el juicio.
[brief] Pa210, at 9:19-21.  Counsel also raised a dispute pertaining to the calculation of FAR, with [...]’s professionals indicating that the FAR is 1.42 and the Zoning Board’s professionals determined FAR to be 1.77.  [...] next testified that the Second Application supplied more parking spaces than were necessary under the Borough’s regulations, where fifty-seven (57) are required, and sixty-six (66) are proposed.  Pa229-Pa230, at 9:22-10:20.  [...] detailed the landscape plan for the project with significant amounts of new trees to be placed on the site with staggered rows of plantings atop retaining walls and along the fence line of approximately six (6) feet in height.  Pa221, at 56:6-10.  As to the FAR, [...] asserted that the Borough has a different FAR calculation for the plan than [...], because [...] does not include the lowest level of parking in its calculation as it is below the average grade.  Pa237, at 34:24-36:1.  Indeed, [...] stated that “because the mid-line of the lowest level of parking is below the average grade, by definition, it should not be included in the FAR calculation. ”  Id., at 35:4-8.  As a result, the [...]’s FAR of 1.42 is correct and the Borough’s contention that the FAR is 1.77 is incorrect.  Id.  [...] explained that as a result of the onsite contamination, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and the EPA were requiring what is known as a “cap” on-site to ensure no future contamination would occur on surrounding properties.
[directive] an assault or is stolen, defaced, applying to preclude a prosecutor from construed Directive be anything in this shall Nor when by complaint-summons previously charged offense an acomplaint-warrant for for general the prosecutor or deputy attorney at or assistant officer known to the information not reasonably pretrial release conditions that are indicates decision charging initial time of the defendant's community, reasonably assure to the victim or the of a safety the necessary to protect attempting to from obstructing or the defendant prevent required, or to when appearance in court be information might include, but need not Such new process.
[brief] Particularly because this case implicates the First Amendment, the Court must conduct “an independent examination of the whole record to ensure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. ”  Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 536-37 (1994) (quotations omitted); see also Bacon v. New Jersey State Dep’t of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 33–34 (App. Div. 2015) (courts “employ a plenary standard of review” over the trial court’s decision).  Plaintiff also clings to allegations that on their face cannot amount to actual malice, even if accepted as true, and to inapplicable legal theories.  Effectively conceding that her pled allegations of failure to sufficiently investigate, improper motive, and failure to retract cannot support a finding that the [...] published with actual malice, Plaintiff now attempts to shoehorn the same deficient facts into a “second path to pleading actual malice. ”  Opp. at 22.  More specifically, in her Opposition Plaintiff argues that the [...] published their statements with “reckless disregard” for truth by repeating a “wholly unbelievable” story and relying on an “informant of dubious veracity. ”  See id.  But Plaintiff’s allegations have not come close to meeting those standards either.  With a fresh pair of eyes on the record, it is clear that the trial court’s orders were erroneous, its decision should be reversed, and the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not pled actual malice against the [...].
[brief] Contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language, Defendant argues its conveyance of information was not a communication, its mail vendor is not a person, and the information was not conveyed to collect a debt.  The argument ignores the Complaint’s factual allegations and the reasonable inferences favorable to Plaintiff required under the R. 4:6-2(e) standard and strains the meaning of “communicate,” “person,” and “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  Relying on the unpublished Miller decision, Defendant claims its sharing of data with its mail vendor was not “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  Plaintiff’s Brief addressed the issue at Pb24-Pb28 citing published authorities.  Miller did not address the reasoning in those federal decisions and is currently under appellate review.  See, [...].
[brief] ’”  Ibid.  Each of these flyers came on official [...] letter head.  Prior to the receipt of each of these letters/flyers, plaintiff testified that he had met with the Mayor about his application and believed that he had secured the Mayor’s blessing.  *Id.* at 451-452.  Despite this belief, the zoning board voted to deny plaintiff’s application.  Plaintiff argued that the denial was based on the mayor’s improper influence.  Further, it was argued that because two of the zoning board members were also officers and trustees of the mayor’s civic association, their votes were improperly tainted.  *Id.* at 456.  The Appellate Division did not render a finding that the Mayor’s comments were improper.
[brief] When reviewing the actions taken by a land use board, the Courts are to give substantial deference to findings of fact of the Board, Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 362, (2011), but review de novo those "interpretations of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts .  . . ."  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, (1995).  Here, the trial court gave no difference to the Board’s findings of fact and instead rejected out-of-hand the Board’s finding as to the importance of the Building E elevator; it disregarded the factual history of the Board’s good faith efforts to effectuate the [...]’s agreement for the Building E elevator and completely disregarded and discounted that it was [...], and not the Township or the Board, that ‘went back on its word’.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE DEFENDANTS’ CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS WITHOUT OPPORTUNITY FOR CLASS DISCOVERY (Decided below at 2T14-8 – 2T17-2)  New Jersey's class action rule, R. 4:32, is modeled after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Riley v. New Rapids Cartr., 61 N.J. 218, 226, (1972).  As such, New Jersey courts often look for guidance from federal cases interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  Id. at 226-27; Carroll v. Cellco P'ship, 313 N.J. Super. 488, 495-98 (App.Div.1998).  “Motions to strike class allegations from a pleading are disfavored because a motion for class certification is a more appropriate vehicle for arguments about class propriety."  Gray v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 22 F. Supp. 3d 373, 386 (D.N.J. 2014).  “As a practical matter, the court's [decision] usually should be predicated on more information than the complaint itself affords . . . [and] courts frequently have ruled that discovery relating to the issue whether a class action is appropriate needs to be undertaken before deciding whether to allow the action to proceed on a class basis."  *Oravsky v. Encompass Ins. Co.*, 804 F. Supp. 2d 228, 240-41 (D.N.J. 2011).  It is a basic tenet of New Jersey law that "class actions are liberally construed, and such an action . . . [should be] 'permitted unless there is a clear showing that it is inappropriate or improper.'"  *Carroll*, supra, 313 N.J.Super. at 498 (internal quotation omitted)).  This is especially true where there are allegations of consumer fraud.  *In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action*, 93 N.J. 412, 435 (1983); *Riley*, supra, 61 N.J. at 228 ("a court should be slow to hold that a suit [alleging consumer fraud] may not proceed as a class action").
[brief] ### Cases  **Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton**, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434–35 (App. Div. 2009)  ...........................................5  **CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lenanon Planning Bd./ Bd. of Adjustment**, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577-78 (App. Div. 2010)  .................................1  **Ciocon v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Franklin**, 223 N.J. Super. 199 (1988)..................................................................................................................4, 10