ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (6T 134-25 to 135-1)  [...] testified that she was afraid because “[t]here wasn’t much space between” her and [...], and she “could see in his face that he was being so serious. ”  (6T 135-1 to 5)  [...] “started getting upset” and pushed [...] against the door.  (6T 135-14 to 16)  [...] told [...] “to stop,” but he “pulled [her] down” so her head hit the armrest on the door.  (6T 135-14 to 18)  [...] started trying to pull down [...]’s wide-legged yoga pants and pry her legs apart, while [...] was trying to squeeze her legs together to stop him.
[brief] For example, in its 1988 Staff Commentary on the FDCPA, the [...] expressly stated that debt collectors may use agents to send validation and collection notices to consumers, which include a debtor’s private information.  Who must provide notice [under § 1692g].  If the employer debt collection agency gives the required notice, employee debt collectors need not also provide it.  A debt collector’s agent may give the notice, as long as it is clear that the information is being provided on behalf of the debt collector.  53 FR 50097-02 (emphasis added).
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 326 N.J. Super. 276, 279, 282 (App. Div. 1999) (reversing drug convictions because of the possible lack of jury unanimity as to whether defendant possessed the cocaine in a dresser drawer or in a pair of pants); State v. Bzura, 261 N.J. Super. 602, 614-15 (App. Div. 1993) (reversing false swearing conviction because the jury “could have returned a guilty verdict without all its members agreeing either that any two statements or sets of statements were inconsistent with each other or that any particular statement was false,” and holding that the State “cannot rely on a composite theory of guilt, producing twelve jurors who unanimously thought the defendant was guilty but who were not unanimous in their assessment of which act supported the verdict”); Gentry, 183 N.J. at 32-33 (reversing robbery conviction where jury could have disagreed on the identity of the victim); State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 191 (2010) (affirming stalking conviction because there was no realistic chance that the jury was split as to which no-contact order the defendant violated when those orders were overlapping).
[brief] | 43 | “Wantonly. ”  Merriam-Webster.com Thesaurus, https://www.merriam-webster. com/thesaurus/wantonly.  Accessed 1/13/2024.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff asks this court to reverse the trial court’s decision granting Defendant [...]’s motion to dismiss on August 7, 2023; reverse the decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on October 11, 2023; and remand the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings including trial.
[brief] Indeed, in --- \(^3\) [...] does not address the NJFPA’s “$35,000” and “place of business” requirement, because neither were contested by [...] before the Trial Court.  Ocean City Express Co., Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 194 F.Supp.3d 314, 323-324 (D.N.J. 2016), the District Court of New Jersey held that a company that established as little as 2.71% of gross sales still satisfied the 20% requirement of the NJFPA, explaining:  …even a cursory inspection of the factual record makes plain that the parties—or at least [the putative franchisee] —intended for [the putative franchisee] to derive more than 20% of its gross sales from the [relationship].  Indeed, in 2008, [the putative franchisee] “booked” $3 million worth of shipments with [the putative franchisor], and from that fact alone, this Court can reasonably infer that the parties intended for [putative franchisee’s] gross sales under the Agency Agreement to eclipse 20% of its overall revenues .  . .  194 F. Supp.3d. at 323-324 (emphasis added); see also, In re Faber Assocs., Docket No. 16-cv-2821, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202763 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2016) (“Importantly . . the 20% requirement does not feature a time period to determine whether the 20% threshold [is] met”); Harter Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27210 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2003) (“The Court finds that by its plain language, the statute does not set forth any particular time period within which to make the determination of whether the franchisee’s gross sales satisfy the 20% requirement.
[brief] **The New Jersey Product Liability Act Did Not Create Any Failure-To-Recall Claims Not Recognized at Common Law. **  Before the New Jersey Product Liability Act (“PLA”), N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1, et seq., was enacted in 1987, nothing in this State’s common law allowed failure-to-recall claims, in either negligence or strict liability.  Indeed, the only pre-PLA reference to such possible claims was non-substantive, a two-sentence allusion to a negligence-based recall claim as adequately pleaded in *Matter of Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action*, 93 N.J. 412, 430 (1983).  Pre-PLA New Jersey law also --- 15 *Cadillac V8-6-4* solely decided unrelated class certification issues. rejected any obligation to “retrofit” products or to impose “a continuing duty to protect a purchaser” even “after the sale. ”  *Bottignoli v. Ariens Co.*, 234 N.J. Super. 353, 361 (App. Div. 1989).  The PLA is “a New Jersey tort-reform statute. ”  *Sun Chemical Corp. v. Fike Corp.*, 243 N.J. 319, 332 (2020).  It extends to “any claim or action brought by a claimant for harm caused by a product, irrespective of the theory underlying the claim[.]”  *Sinclair v. Merck & Co.*, 195 N.J. 51, 62 (2008) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1(b)(3)).  The PLA was intended to “rebalanc[e] the law in favor of manufacturers[.]”  *Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.*, 209 N.J. 173, 196 (2012) (citations omitted).  Through the PLA, “the Legislature intended to limit the liability of manufacturers so as to balance the interests of the public and the individual with a view towards economic reality. ”  *Sinclair*, 195 N.J. at 62 (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court thus held that, consistent with the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the PLA, any attempt to “expand” product liability with novel claims not recognized before the PLA is “best directed to the Legislature,” which had enacted the PLA.
[directive] 3.6  Discharge.  Discharge means to cause an electrical charge or current to be directed at a person in contact with the darts/electrodes of a CED.  3.7  Drive stun mode.  Drive stun mode means to discharge a CED where the main body of the device is in direct contact with the person against whom the charge or current is transmitted.  3.8  Fire.  Fire means to cause the darts/electrodes of a CED to be ejected from the main body of the device and to come into contact with a person for the purpose of transmitting an electrical charge or current against the person.  3.9  Less-Lethal Ammunition.  Less-lethal ammunition also referred to as less-lethal impact projectiles, means ammunition approved by the Attorney General that is designed to stun, temporarily incapacitate or cause temporary discomfort to a person without penetrating the person’s body.  The term shall also include ammunition approved by the Attorney General which is designed to gain access to a building or structure and is used for that purpose.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(f).  Specific less-lethal ammunition and platforms that are currently approved can be found at the Attorney General’s Approved List of Less-Lethal Ammunition.  (December, 2010).  Less-lethal ammunition may include different types such as: Kinetic Less-Lethal Flexible Projectiles; Kinetic Less-Lethal Non-Flexible Projectiles; Rubber Balls and Pellets; Baton Projectiles; Pad Projectiles, commonly referred to as “bean bag rounds;” Drag Stabilized Projectiles, commonly referred to as “sock rounds;” Fin- Stabilized Projectiles; and Encapsulated Projectiles.  3.10  Less-Lethal Device.  Less-lethal device means any less-lethal weapon that is reviewed by the Panel and approved by the Attorney General or the Attorney General’s designee.  The term does not include OC spray, asps or batons.  3.11  Serious Bodily Injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  Serious bodily injury and serious bodily harm have the same definition the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(d).  4
[brief] This Court can and should hold as a matter of law that [...]’s daughter acted as her agent.  (Da298–304.)  Plaintiffs argued below that the Arbitration Agreement was unenforceable because their minor daughter was the one who agreed to [...]’s terms of use while using [...]’s phone to order food for [...]’s benefit.  The trial court did not reach this argument because of its (erroneous) conclusion that the Terms were insufficient under Atalese.  (Da299–304.)  The great weight of authority shows that Plaintiffs were wrong about Atalese.
[brief] “On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have but a limited role to perform. ”  Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).
[directive] Effective Date immediately upon shall take effect issuance.  All drug testing shall This Directive policies with be and/or revised in accordance this Directive within 30 days.  The AG Testing adopted conform Directive within 30 Policy will to with this days.  be updated  [...]  General Attorney  ATTEST: ~l ~~'  Honig ~~;~ ~~~E~1ie  Justice Director, Division of Criminal Issued on: March ~` , 2018
[brief] Acceptance of Completed Funds Transfers  Under Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code and this Court’s Unpublished Decision in Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Vezeriannis Article 4A of New Jersey’s UCC governs “funds transfers” more commonly known as wire transfers.  The term “‘funds transfers” is defined as “…the series of transactions, beginning with the originator's payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the order. ’”  N.J.S.A. 12A:4A-104(1).  A funds transfer is deemed completed once funds are wired, received, and accepted by the beneficiary bank.
[brief] See \textit{Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst.}, 225 N.J. 289, 306 (2016) (defendants “did not raise [the] issue of the delegation clause” and both parties expected the motion court to decide arbitrability); \textit{First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan}, 514 U.S. 938, 946 (1995) (“[M]erely arguing the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator does not indicate a clear willingness to arbitrate VII.  IN ANY EVENT, THIS APPEAL IS MOOT
[brief] And obviously, [...], over the last few years I've been handling your cases I've made a number of decisions.  Some decisions were contrary to the State, some were contrary to your interests.  Obviously, even with a guilty plea, that doesn't prevent you from filing an appeal and if an appellate court judge finds that I committed an error, that I was wrong in my 404(b) decisions or anything else, your guilty plea could be reversed.  So I will give [...] a few minutes.
[brief] *Id.* at 345.  Overall, New Jersey courts have rejected arguments that a ballot should be automatically invalidated upon a showing that a voter has violated one of the technical requirements of the election laws.  The Appellate Division has reasoned that “[t]o expunge the votes once cast would subordinate substance to a procedural technicality, resulting in a frustration of the will of the voters generally. ”  Friends of Jim Usry for Mayor Campaign v. Matthews for Mayor Campaign, 187 N.J. Super. 176, 181 (App. Div. 1982).
[brief] ”  Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  [...] failed to meet that burden.  Whether [...] was injured by consuming mold-contaminated food was decided by a battle of the experts.  [...] offered [...]; [...] offered [...].  The trial court determined that [...]’s testimony was factually unsupported, scientifically unsound, and not credible, so it rejected that testimony.  Da26a-Da28a.  So credible, scientifically sound, and fact-based was [...]’s testimony, that the trial court readily accepted his opinions.  Da25a.  [...] recognizes the deep flaws in [...]’s testimony, so he buries any discussion of that expert until deep into the brief.  Db35.  And even then, the testimony is discussed without any depth.  Meanwhile, [...] offers nothing more than superficial snipes about [...]’s testimony.  As will be demonstrated below, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are consistent with the credible evidence and [...]’s criticisms are unfounded.
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY SUBMITTED A CORRECTED INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY PRIOR TO DELIBERATIONS.  In his final charge to the jury, the judge gave an instruction on the crime of possession of a weapon with the purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another.  (15T241-13 to 225-8).  At the end of the final charge, the AP alerted the judge that the instruction given on count five was incorrect: instead of charging unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, the judge charged unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d.  (15T254-13 to 25).  Defense counsel asked that the charge be clarified the following day.  (15T254-20).  Due to the late hour, the judge advised the jury that he would modify the charge in the morning.  (15T255-16 to 21).  The next day, [...] noted that he omitted the definition of “firearm” in the charge on count five and he would read the correct charge to the jury.
[brief] Appellants falsely accuse [...] of violating antitrust laws (notwithstanding that Appellants asserted no antitrust claim) based on [...]’s statement that “Distributors are independent businesses protected by state licensing and franchise laws.  Accordingly, it is up to the distributors to compete on service, brand selection, and other commercial factors and to determine through their own arrangements with each other and their customers which accounts each distributor will service. ” (Da13 ¶ 11) (emphasis added).
[brief] A parent's right to parental autonomy is recognized as “a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution” that is “rooted in the right to privacy. ”  Moriarty, supra, 177 N.J. at 101, 827 A.2d 203; see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 38, 11 A.3d 844 (2011); Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 245, 748 A.2d 558 (2000); V.C., supra, 163 N.J. at 218, 748 A.2d 539.
[brief] A defendant would otherwise be exercising his constitutional rights as a defendant to contest either the facts or the law that formed the basis for his conviction.  No similar restriction is placed on the Law Division when reviewing a sentence that was imposed by the municipal court because the defendant is not giving up any rights in order to appeal a sentence.  In this case, [...] did not want a trial after his motion to dismiss was denied by the municipal court.  But that does not mean that he would have nonetheless pled guilty if the municipal court did not condition his guilty plea on a potential reversal on appeal.  Second, at no time in Ciancaglini did the Superior Court, even on a de novo standard of review, do what the Superior Court did in this case, i.e. take judicial notice of discovery provided by the State in order to bypass his conditional guilty plea.  1T37-1 to 22.  The defendant’s prior DWI convictions in Ciancaglini were raised on the record at the municipal court and addressed separately by the Law Division-Superior Court.  In other words, the Law Division did not do what the Superior Court did in this case, i.e. sua sponte take judicial notice of the State’s discovery that the State did not itself raise in the municipal court as part of the record.  The Superior Court’s decision to violate the terms of [...]’s conditional guilty plea by ignoring the factual basis for it and instead uphold his conviction on an alternative basis is an abuse of its de novo discretion and should be the basis for a reversal and remand to the Superior Court to decide the sole issue that formed the basis for his conditional guilty plea, i.e. whether a pumphouse is an occupied building under N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3).
[brief] A basic rule of contract construction is that Courts are to read contracts so as to give meaning to their provisions.  In other words, Courts are not supposed to reach results which render a contract provision meaningless.  Here the Trial Court construed an arbitration provision drafted by the Plaintiff which stated that the parties *may* institute arbitration as being permissive and not mandatory.  Such an interpretation renders the arbitration clause meaningless.  If both parties must agree to go to arbitration, there is no need for an arbitration clause.  Furthermore, the subsequent provision in the arbitration clause regarding the choice of an arbitrator is also entirely inconsistent with the reading given by the Trial Court and is likewise rendered pointless by the Trial Court’s construction.  A later provision in the same contract giving the arbitrator the power to specifically enforce the agreement is also rendered superfluous by this construction.  The other basis of the Trial Court’s disregard of the party’s agreement to arbitrate was the Trial Court’s erroneous application of the protections given to consumers and employees regarding waiver of their right to sue in Court to the contractual provision between the sophisticated parties to this agreement.  The Plaintiff is an experienced litigator and scrivener of the provision in question.  He did not need to be informed in writing that by agreeing to alternative dispute resolution he was waiving his right to go to Court.  The Plaintiff is a seasoned attorney, and his justification for avoiding arbitration is that he was not informed in writing that he was going to be waiving his right to litigate to the court.  This rationale is difficult to accept when Plaintiff himself drafted the arbitration provision and as a member of the bar certainly can be presumed to have known of his rights to litigate in our Courts.  The Defendant always understood that any dispute arising out of her law practice with the Plaintiff would be resolved in arbitration in accordance with the Shareholder’s Agreement.  It is an injustice that she should be forced to litigate this matter in open Court.  She looks to this Court to reverse the Trial Court’s erroneous denial of her Motion to Dismiss and remand to the Trial Court for an entry of an Order to compel arbitration.
[brief] "N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5[(a)] advances a policy of cost containment by ensuring that an injured, uninsured driver does not draw on the pool of accident-victim insurance funds to which he did not contribute."  Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 471 (2004).  In finding the statute was constitutional, the Court in Caviglia declined "to second-guess the Legislature’s common-sense reasoning that section 4.5[(a)] has the potential to produce greater compliance with compulsory insurance laws and in turn, reduce litigation, and result in savings to insurance carriers and ultimately the consuming public."
[brief] ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates*, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (additional citation omitted)).  “The parole release decision . . . depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based on their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release. ”
[directive] The defendant is hereby sentenced to community supervision for - Standard Doubled life (CSL) if offense occurred before 1/14/04 (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4).  @ @ 1st Degree $ $  The defendant is hereby sentenced to parole supervision for life @ 2nd Degree @ $ $ - (PSL) if offense occurred on or after 1/14/04 (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4).  @ 3rd Degree @ $ $ -  The defendant is hereby ordered to serve a year term of @ - 4th Degree @ $ $ parole supervision, pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), DP or @ @ which term shall begin as soon as the defendant completes the $ $ - Petty DP sentence of incarceration (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2).  Total DEDR Penalty $  The court imposes a Drug Offender Restraining Order (DORO)
[brief] Thereafter, on December 12, 2017, [...] submitted a Motion to Dismiss [...]’s Third Party Complaint against him.  (Da237)  In response, [...] cross-moved for an order to “Treat Third-Party Defendants, [...], RM, [...], D.O. and [...], D.O. as the Defendants were Treated in Jones v. Morey’s Piers and Burt v. West Jersey Hospital Systems.
[brief] (Pa050 – Pa052).  Plaintiff’s proposed expert “holds widely recognized professional insurance designations. ” (Pa050).  This proposed expert’s curriculum vitae demonstrates that insurance brokers undergo extensive professional learning and erudition to maintain their licenses.  (Pa051 – Pa052).  The courts, the Legislature, and Plaintiff’s recognition of the extensive learning and erudition, along with licensing and regulation required for insurance brokers to act in their professional capacities puts them beyond the ordinary seller of commercial services and outside the category of consumerism contemplated by the CFA.  In sum, a repeat of the analysis found in Shaw, Plemmons, Macedo, and Neveroski supports the trial court’s decision to dismiss the CFA claims against [...] and [...].
[brief] 468 U.S. at 437-38.  Because the officer made clear that [...] was not free to leave, and would not be leaving anytime soon, unless he consented to a search or confessed, he needed to read [...] his Miranda rights.  Because [...] was in custody when [...] told him that he could either consent to a search or tell him whether there were drugs in the car, Edward’s response that there were drugs in the car should have been suppressed.
[brief] Relative to the Aggravation Charge, the jury literally heard a medical opinion diagnosing “Aggravation” of previously asymptomatic degenerative changes; without objection.  Appellant seeks to subject Respondent to the impossible standard of proving a negative, by arguing a comparative analysis of a non-existent past medical history needed to occur in order to warrant the charge.  A comparative analysis is only required where there is an issue of apportioning damages between a defendant that is on trial and that which the defendant should not be held liable for; based upon already existent damages at the time the liability arose.  Incorporated in the Aggravation Charge is the ‘egg-shell plaintiff’ theory, relative to foreseeability of harm due to an underlying condition; which mandates a tortfeasor to be held liable for the full-harm, even if greater than could have been foreseen due to an underlying condition.  More importantly and in the context of this case, Respondent presented medical expert testimony through three (3) physicians, all of whom opined to acute permanent injuries caused by the subject collision.  The Aggravation opinion was of no consequence as to whether or not Respondent vaulted the Verbal Threshold, but was certainly compensable nonetheless based upon the instructions as to recoverable damages.  Furthermore, although missed during the charge conference and realized after the closing arguments, Respondent’s request for the Aggravation charge was proper in accordance with R. 1:7-2, having been raised before the jury retired for deliberations.  The Court cured any potential prejudice by affording the parties supplemental closing arguments to address the Aggravation charge issue.  Aggravation was in the case and the jury required an instruction as to how to treat the evidence.  Lastly, although waived as not raised below or even in the Notice of the instant Appeal, the issue relative to the Verdict and Offer of Judgment amount as either excessive and/or a financial hardship upon Appellant, has not and cannot be substantiated.