ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notwithstanding the court’s statement to the contrary, the court never “canvassed” the issue of [...] representing himself in this case.  Instead, in an unrelated, prior matter before [...], [...] requested to represent himself post-trial, and the court granted his request on March 22, 2021.  (7T 7-23 to 8-6, 14-13 to 14)  The court specifically clarified that the ruling “was only related to the instant matter,” did not carry over to [...]’s other pending charges, “[a]nd if those matters are still outstanding, the Court would address any individual application to represent himself at any future dates once those matters are ripe for adjudication, meaning once they’re indicted. ”  (7T 20-5 to 10; see also 7T 19-24 to 20-4)  At best, it appears that the court was referring to this discussion—which occurred at a motion hearing in an entirely separate matter nearly two years prior—when it stated that it had “canvassed” the issue of self-representation with [...] “some year-plus ago. ”  (3T 75-8 to 9)
[brief] He could reasonably anticipate being suspended, even while being investigated, as NJSP rules stated.  (Pa2 (Art. 2, § 2)).  And the evidence defendant presented that the wallet ID was lost was contradictory, calling his credibility on the entire topic into question.  This evidence, combined with the videos, photographs and officer testimony of the four stops, created a strong case for conviction.  Therefore, [...]’s statement did not “compromise the fairness of the trial,” A.R., 213 N.J. at 563, or “cut mortally into the substantive rights of the defendant,” State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987).
[brief] Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch., 2024 WL 706797, at *11 (Aa14–15).  Where “the school merely addressed the Student by the Student’s requested preferred name and pronoun,” and did not pressure the student to make such a request, there is no interference with a parent’s right to make medical decisions for the student.  Ibid.  The cases [...] relies on to show a purported right to parental consent all involve invasive actions taken by medical professionals that are undoubtedly medical treatment—a far cry from the school districts’ conduct here.
[brief] ”); Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 221, 226 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that direct action against insurer failed to state a cause of action).  New Jersey courts have found that third parties that have allegedly been damaged, but are strangers to an insurance policy (such as injured plaintiffs in a tort action) are not in privity of contract with the insurer, and are not third-party beneficiaries of the alleged tortfeasor’s insurance policy, such that they lack standing to sue.  Ross, 222 N.J. at 513 (finding that a tort claim does not retroactively confer third-party beneficiary status on the plaintiffs).  The limited exception to New Jersey’s prohibition on direct actions is where an insured is in bankruptcy and/or insolvent, and execution of a judgment has been returned unsatisfied.
[brief] Therefore, it explicitly relates to breaches of the Buyer’s Representations and Warranties set forth in Paragraph 3.2 (Da923, Da1530) and the documents the Buyer was required to deliver at closing identified in Paragraph 5.2.  (Da925, Da1532).  No evidence was presented or cited by the trial court that there was a material breach or inaccuracy relating to the representations and warranties referenced in Article VI or any document the Buyer was required to deliver at closing.  A comparison of the language of Section 6.3 with other clauses in the contract provides further evidence that the parties did not agree that attorney fees should be awarded under Section 6.3 because Section 8.3 clearly does provide for the recovery of attorney fees.
[brief] The trial court similarly erred when it reviewed Count I of the Complaint which specifically challenged the adequacy of the notice that preceded Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage.  As exhaustively explained supra, N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) requires the notice to include “a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance”.  Id.  The notice published in advance of Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage did not.  Rather than applying a plain language reading to both the notice and the statute, however, the trial court engaged in an interpretation which was extremely indulgent to the defendants.
[brief] Although the Sixth Amendment also guarantees a defendant the right to conduct his own defense, he must knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and be able and willing to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.  McKaskle v. Wiggins, 62 N.J. 948, 948-949, 301 A.2d 130 (1984).  An indigent must be provided with counsel, but he has no right to select counsel who will completely satisfy a defendant's fancy as to how he is to be represented.  State v. McCombs, 165 N.J. Super. 165, (App.Div.), aff'd, 357 A.2d 165 (1979) (quoting State v. Rinaldi, 214 N.J. Super. 214, (App.Div. 1959), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 914, 81 S.Ct. 1089, 6 L.Ed.2d 238 (1961)).
[brief] Da1; Da4-Da5; Da8; Da65.  Ordinance No. 05-2017 amended Chapter 146, Nuisances, Article II, Noise Nuisances of the Code of the [...] in its entirety setting forth §146-5 et seq. “Noise Nuisances Prohibited” relating prohibited acts, definitions, permissible sound levels, proof of violation, penalties, permits and enforcement.
[directive] Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (For Use in Non-Civil Service Jurisdictions Only)  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, if the police officer requests a hearing, such hearing shall be not less than 10 nor more than 30 days from date of service of this notice unless such time requirements are waived by the parties.  FROM  Employing Agency Name Address & Phone Number  Case ID # TO Employee Name Title Date  You are hereby notified that the following charge(s) have been made against you (if necessary, use additional sheets and attach).  Charges: Incident(s) giving rise to the charge(s) and the date(s) on which it/they occurred  If checked, charges are continued on attached page.  If checked, incidents are continued on attached page.  You are hereby suspended effective _______________________________________________ (Check box to indicate if the employee is suspended pending final disposition of the matter)  You must enter a plea of guilty or not guilty, in writing, on or before ____________________________________________  You may waive your right to a hearing.  If you request a hearing it will be held on ____________________________  At (time)  ________________ at (place of hearing)  _______________________________________________  The following disciplinary action may be taken against you:  Suspension for __________ working days, beginning ______________ and ending ___________________  Indefinite suspension pending criminal charges effective (date)  ____________________________________  Removal, effective (date)  _________________________________________________________________  Demotion to position of __________________________ effective (date)  ____________________________  Resignation not in good standing, effective (date)  ________________  Other Disciplinary Action__________  Fine ________ which is equal to _________ (number of working days)  Appointing authority or authorized agent’s signature and title.  Signature _________________________________  Title  ____________________________________  This form must be personally served on the employee or sent by certified or registered mail.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, defendant, [...], respectfully requests that the February 28, 2023 judgment order be reversed, with instructions to enter a molded judgment in conformity with *Burt* or, in the alternative, that a new trial be ordered.  Respectfully Submitted, [...] BY: [...] (#037772003) [...] (#117042014)  [...] [...]  Dated: 9/28/2023  [...] by [...] the Administratrix of the Estate of [...] and [...], his wife, individually, Plaintiffs, vs. JOSEPH POPOVICH, M.D.; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN DOES, M.D. 1-10 (fictitious names representing physicians, medical care providers and nurses, whose respective identities are not contained within the records and/or whose identities are unknown and/or whose signatures are illegible at present, who cared for decedent, [...] on or about May 15, 2013, May 16, 2013 and/or May 17, 2013 at [...]); [...] d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendant.
[brief] Some jurisdictions set forth various relevant factors for consideration, such as “(1) the device’s capability for recording and general reliability; (2) competency of the operator; (3) proper operation of the device; (4) showing the manner in which the recording was preserved (chain of custody); (5) identification of the persons, locale, or objects depicted; and (6) explanation of any copying or duplication process. ”  *People v. Taylor*, 956 N.E.2d 431, 439 (Ill. 2011); see also *People v. Tuncap*, CRA12-032, 2014 WL 235471, at *7 (Guam Jan. 16, 2014) (five factors); *United States v. Oslund*, 453 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006) (seven factors); *United States v. Harris*, 55 M.J. 433, 439 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (three factors); *Wagner v. State*, 707 So. 2d 827, 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (five factors); *Ex parte Fuller*, 620 So. 2d 675, 678 (Ala. 1993) (seven factors).
[brief] This case is not one of those cases and was correctly decided.  Here, [...]’s motion failed to meet its burden under R. 4:49-2.  [...] failed to state a controlling decision the trial court overlooked or as to which it has erred, and further failed to present any evidence that the judge failed to appreciate or to consider.  Ibid.  Neither [...]’s motion nor its appeal presents any new evidence for the court to consider that would establish damages.  The trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion for reconsideration was well reasoned, supported by the facts in the record, and should be affirmed.
[brief] 2.  The Jury’s Verdict Was Supported By the Facts and Evidence in the Case.  At the trial of this matter, the plaintiff failed to testify live.  The only testimony the jury heard from the plaintiff herself was via the reading of deposition testimony.  Regardless of how the jury was presented with the plaintiff’s story, it is solely within the jury’s province to evaluate the credibility of that testimony.  Further, as set forth above, it is the jury’s function to determine whether or not the plaintiff met her burden of proof as to causation.  In this case, the jury did exactly that; it evaluated the credibility of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony and determined that she had not met her burden on causation.
[brief] Defense brief, p. 43.  Other than pointing to the granting of summary judgment in defendant’s favor, defendants offer no analysis or caselaw explaining why denial of class certification was proper, thereby waiving any arguments supporting denial of the class certification motion.  New Jersey courts deem waived any unbriefed arguments potentially supporting the denial of the appeal\(^{16}\) and neither the court nor plaintiff are obliged to guess as to the arguments that might support a party’s position.
[brief] There is record evidence, in the form of [...]’ deposition testimony, that establishes that Defendant [...] permitted the staffing coordinators to add the charge pay as long as she did not face any negative consequences.  (Pa661).  Specifically, [...] testified as follows:  So I said why can we not at least get charge pay, which is one dollar an hour.  And she said, in front of several people, you can get charge pay, as long as I don’t get in trouble.  (Pa230).  Defendants dispute that Defendant [...] approved the charge pay.
[brief] (20T168-23 to 170-19; 20T178-12 to 180-8).  To guide that endeavor, the trial judge’s instructions tracked the model jury charge for official misconduct on its second element, that defendant “committed an act relating to his office knowing that it was unauthorized, or knowingly refrained from performing a duty which is imposed upon him by law, or which is clearly inherent in the nature of his office. ”  (Compare 20T171-10 to 14 (emphasis added) with Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Official Misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2)” at 1 (rev. Sept. 11, 2006)).
[directive] REMAK  Yo pap refize w elijibilite pou tèm Libète Kondisyonèl ki tonbe anba  Lwa egzijib Zak  Grav yo si w ap plede koupab de posesyon ilegal revolvè ki ta yon zam a van konprime, zam ak resò, zam a plon konfòmeman ak 2C:39-5b(2); posesyon ilegal fizi ki pa chaje oswa fizi katouch 2C:39-5c(1); oswa posesyon N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. ilegal yon fizi oswa fizi katouch ki gen van ladann, zam a resò, oswa zam a plon, daprè 2C:39-5c(2).
[brief] [State v. Lipa, 219 N.J. 323, 332 (2014)].  At the hearing for the motion to withdraw, the trial court discussed these factors and their applicability in the present case extensively.  (2T:44-13 to 52-1.)  The court found that defendant was merely making a bald assertion of innocence.  Additionally, the trial court found the nature of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal unpersuasive, and the strength of the reasons to be without proof.  Lastly, the trial court found clear prejudice to the State and unfair advantage to the defendant.  “The withdrawal of a guilty plea is within the broad discretion of the trial court. ”  *State v. Bellamy*, 178 N.J. 127, 135 (2003); see also R. 3:21-1.  “We will ... reverse the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea ‘only if there was an abuse of discretion which renders the lower courts' decision clearly erroneous. ’ ”  *State v. Hooper*, 459 N.J. Super. 157, 180 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting *State v. Simon*, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999)).  “Although the ordinary ‘abuse of discretion’ standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’ ”  *Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting *Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.*, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).  In the present case, the trial court applied the correct standard of law with fleshed out reasoning and thorough explanation.  As cited above, the trial court went through every factor individually and found that every factor weighed against allowing defendant to withdraw his plea.  It is clear the trial court was well within its discretion when denying defendant’s guilty plea.
[brief] ¶¶57-58, Pa18.  8.  At the police station, his dad is kept from [...] for at least 40 minutes.  During this time the arresting officer states, “I’m throwing the book at this retard. ”  ¶¶69-74, Pa20.  \(^2\)  The specific phrase from the Declaration of Independence is “…  [When subjects/citizens are] under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to 9.  The arresting officer makes up several trumped-up charges, one of the two serious charges (for a gardening tool) was dismissed by the judge.  See attached PTI forms.  ¶76, Pa21; Pa137 (handwritten “dism” 2/12/16 – mid-page).  10.  [...] is released to his dad.  The Police failed to notify [...] that they had taken [...] from the hospital without permission.
[directive] [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  만약 가석방 보호감독 조건을 위반하는 경우, 귀하의 가석방은 취소될 수 있으며, 전에 부과된 금고 형기에 대한 복역을 완료한 경우라도 교도소로 되돌아가 가석방 보호감독에 대한 잔여 기간의 전부 또는 일부를 복역해야 할 수도 있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?  날짜/Date 피고인/Defendant 피고측 변호인/Defense Attorney 검사/Prosecutor 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지2/2  CN 11171-Korean Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Korean page 2 of 2
[brief] The court asked jurors whether they had “been convicted of any indictable offense in any state or federal court. ”  (29T:21-23 to 22-6)  In framing the question, the court failed to explain that jurors whose only prior convictions had been expunged should answer that they had no such convictions.  When [...] answered that he had a 21-year-old conviction, the court rebuffed defense counsel’s request that the court clarify whether [...]’s conviction had since been expunged.  (29T:22-24 to 23-25)  Given that [...]’s only conviction was from decades prior, there was a strong chance that it had been expunged and he was not in fact disqualified from service.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 (providing that individuals can move to expunge an indictable conviction 5 years after the completion of sentence); N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3 (allowing individuals to seek “clean slate” expungement of entire criminal record 10 years after completion of most recent sentence).  The likelihood the conviction was expunged was increased by [...]’s disclosure that his offense was CDS related because, in July 2021, 362,000 marijuana and hashish convictions were automatically expunged under the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), L. 2021, c. 16, which “signifies that such prior marijuana offenses must be deemed not to have occurred and directs, by operation of law, their automatic expungement from an offender’s criminal record.
[brief] “[A]bsent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA standards should be virtually dispositive. ”  Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 25 (1999).  In this case, plaintiff asserts a novel theory of liability that pre-PLA New Jersey common law did not recognize.  Moreover, she nowhere claims that the defendant ever violated any FDA requirement.  Instead, the crux of her complaint is precisely the opposite: that defendant should not have waited for the FDA to authorize the product recall that occurred on December 20, 2018.
[brief] (Pa 564, [...] Mem. at 22).  Under these circumstances, Plaintiff more-than-articulated the specific acts and omissions by [...] and [...], done in an effort to frustrate Plaintiff’s reasonable expectations under the PSA – i.e., its expectation that it would take title to the Real Property and that [...] would not go behind its back and make secret arrangements with [...] and the Fee Owner to cut Plaintiff out of the deal.  At the very least, Plaintiff should have been given the opportunity to explore Defendants’ acts and omissions in discovery.  Evidence of bad faith or improper motivations may be established through circumstantial evidence – as “it has been recognized that one’s state of mind is seldom capable of direct proof and ordinarily must be inferred from the circumstances properly presented and capable of being considered by the court. ”  See Wilson, 168 N.J. at 253-54.  Consequently, where, as here, no discovery has occurred in the action, Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to adequately allege bad faith or improper motives should have been denied as premature, at best.  See id.  The trial court did not expressly address this claim, in dismissing the Complaint as against both Defendants, with prejudice – apparently reasoning that, after the return of the Deposit, neither Defendant had any further obligations to Plaintiff under the PSA.  For the reasons already discussed, this was erroneous.
[brief] 24 Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8 (2014)  ...........................................  25 Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 1998) (quotation omitted)............................  21 Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954)  .................................................................................. 21 Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 377 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 2005)....................................................... 23, 24, 25, 29, 30 Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1999)....................................................... 23, 39 Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir.1997)............................................................... 32, 41 LeWitt v. Twp. of Gloucester, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 429, at *12 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2024)........... 29 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362 (2015) ............................................................................... 23 Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221 (2006) ............................................................................... 31 Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div. 1997)....................................................... 40 Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2002)....................................................... 21 Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 400 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 2008)....................................................... 23 N.J. ex rel. Santiago v. Haig's Serv. Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113188, at *33 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2016)......................
[brief] The Holding Company Act is an important law that supports the financial stability and solvency of insurers, including reciprocal insurance exchanges.  N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2 is entitled “Acquisition of control of or merger with domestic insurer” (emphasis added).  As such, the law authorizes the Department to thoroughly review the acquisition by applying a seven-part test to help ensure the financial stability and solvency of the insurer and that the acquisition is not hazardous or prejudicial to the insurance-buying public.  The term “insurer” includes reciprocal insurance exchanges.
[brief] email: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EXPERT BALLISTICS TESTIMONY BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT FIREARM TOOLMARK IDENTIFICATION IS NOT “GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE” UNDER THE FRYE STANDARD.  [Raised Below.]  (5T123-10 to 128-14).  ..............................................10  POINT II:  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR THIRD-PARTY GUILT DEFENSE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD FOR A JURY TO CONSIDER THIS DEFENSE.  [Raised Below.]  (9T70-2 to 75-6, 13T4-1 to 12-18)..............................................16
[brief] For the reasons that follow, the appeal is without merit, and the December 12, 2023 Order should be affirmed.  The trial court, by Order and Decision entered on December 12, 2023 following trial in this prerogative writ matter, found that the Borough’s Support Resolution, adopted on September 20, 2022 and supporting Defendant Respondent [...] ("[...]")’s application to the State of New Jersey’s [...] (“the Commission”) for a Class 5 cannabis retailer license to operate a cannabis retail facility in the Borough’s Highway Commercial District, was supported by substantial, credible evidence in the municipal record established before the Borough.
[brief] Rather than addressing the fundamental legal flaw of her Complaint—that the complained-of conduct in her Complaint does not closely relate to the legal authorities she cites—Appellant spends the majority of her brief merely reiterating arguments made to the Superior Court that were found wanting in the first instance.  Simply put, the Superior Court’s decision was correct, and Appellant’s arguments do nothing to illustrate that the Superior Court’s decision was in error.  As Plaintiff’s Complaint is fundamentally incapable of establishing either a close relationship for a CEPA claim or a clear mandate of public policy for a Pierce claim, her appeal must be denied.