ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Case Name: Include a brief description of all of the factors:  1)  TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE EVENT 12  2)  NATURE OF THE OFFENSE 3) QUALITY OF MORAL TURPITUDE OR DEGREE OF GUILT OR CULPABILITY 4) DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE 1 5) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OFFENSE AND EMPLOYEE’S DUTIES 6) EMPLOYEE’S LENGTH OF SERVICE 7) THE EMPLOYER’S DESIRES 8) THE NEED AND INTERESTS OF THE VICTIM AND SOCIETY, INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF THE VICTIM’S DESIRES  2 9) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE EMPLOYEE’S OFFENSE CONSTITUTES PART OF A CONTINUING PATTERN OF ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 10) THE EMPLOYEE’S PRIOR RECORD OF CONVICTIONS AND DISCIPLINARY INFRACTIONS  11) THE THREAT PRESENTED TO COWORKERS OR THE PUBLIC IF THE EMPLOYEE IS PERMITTED TO RETAIN HIS OR HER POSITION 3 12) ANY INVOLVEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE WITH ORGANIZED CRIME 13)  WHETHER THE EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN GRANTED WAIVER ON A PRIOR OCCASION  14)  THE IMPACT OF WAIVER ON THE EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF CODEFENDANTS  4  15.  WHETHER WAIVER OF FORFEITURE OF OFFICE  WOULD UNDERMINE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRITY OF IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS  16.  NATURE AND SCOPE OF COOPERATION WITH PROSECUTING AUTHORITIES  5  DENIAL OF WAIVER OF FORFEITURE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PUBLIC OFFICE  In determining whether to request a waiver of forfeiture or disqualification of office in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:51(2), I considered all of the above factors in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines for Waiver of Forfeiture or Disqualification of Office and, for the foregoing reasons, hereby decline to seek waiver of forfeiture or disqualification of office.
[brief] The Supreme Court has summarized a Reviewing Court’s role concerning issues with a jury charge as follows:  Preliminarily, it is fundamental that the jury charge should set forth in clear understandable language the law that applies to the issues in the case.  Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 464, 744 A.2d 1186 (2000).  The jury charge is a road map that explains the applicable legal principles, outlines the jury's function, and spells out “how the jury should apply the legal principles charged to the facts of the case at hand.
[brief] (5T73:25 to 74:6; 92:21-25).  P-48 and P-50 purported to be balance sheets for [...], [...], and [...], each of which identified in the left column an account for the company, an account value to the right of that, and, where applicable, an adjustment to value in the next column.  (Da981-82; 1497-1500; 5T74:7-16; 76:3-17).  The left and center columns in P-48 and P-50 were extracts from the companies’ QuickBooks, but some of the data in the left and center columns was removed, modified, or altered.  The data in the left and center columns was extracted from the company records and served as a starting point for [...] and [...]’s discussion, and the right-most column for each company contained additional modifications made by [...].  (9T91:16 to 92:20; 93:4 to 95:19; 20T85:1-21).
[brief] Vineland Ice & Storage v. City of Vineland, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1856, at *14 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 1, 2020)  ............................................................................................26  Watson v. New Jersey Dep't of Treasury, 453 N.J. Super. 42, 47, 179 A.3d 1061 (App. Div. 2017)  .............................27  Williams v. Nunn, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2424, at *8-9 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 28, 2009)  ............................................................................................39  I.
[brief] Pa392.  Indeed, the proposed development requires sixty-three (63) parking spaces for office and residential use.  Id.  The Second Application, in turn, proposed sixty-six (66) parking spaces, three above the required number.  Id.  As to the d(4) FAR variance, [...] opined that the “proposed increased floor area is supported by the lot size and location, permitted uses, oversized property, provided setbacks and buffers, appropriate building massing, and adequate parking. ”  Pa393.  In addition to the positive criteria for the use variance, [...] further testified that the development provides for appropriate setbacks and buffering, as the “provided setbacks will allow for light, air, open space between the adjacent properties and buildings” and “[t]he proposed landscaping will provide screening and buffering further minimizing any impacts from the proposed building. ”  Id.  Moreover, remediating contamination from the prior automobile dealership with the proposed building operating as the environmental cap for remediation will benefit not only the Property but the surrounding area as well.
[brief] Even if [...] could establish a *prima facie* case of CEPA retaliation—she cannot—[...] cannot, and does not, reasonably dispute that her unauthorized receipt and entry of charge pay constitutes a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her termination.  See N.J. ex rel. Santiago v. Haig's Serv. Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113188, at *33 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2016) (noting theft from client was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination); see also Parikh v. UPS, 491 F. App’x 303, 307 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming District Court’s finding that defendants met their burden of identifying a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff, i.e., falsifying timecards. ); Rich v. Verizon N.J. Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203131, at *65 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2017) (defendant’s proffered reason for terminating plaintiff, that he falsified answers on a required report, was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination).
[brief] APPENDIX:¹ Complaint [...] .................................................................  1a Complaint [...] .................................................................  1a Complaint [...] .................................................................  2a Complaint [...] .................................................................  2a Letter of Representation (3pp) ......................................................  3a Order and Certification ..................................................................  6a Notice of Appeal to Law Division (2pp) ...........................................  7a Memorandum Opinion (16pp) .........................................................  9a Order for Judgement .....................................................................  25a Notice of Appeal to Appellate Division (4pp) ...................................  26a Criminal Case Information Statement (4pp) ....................................  30a Notice of Docketing (2pp) ...............................................................  34a Reporters/Transcribers Transcript Transmittal ..................................
[brief] Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).
[brief] *Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.17(B)(2)* (emphasis added).  Moreover, this Court will be hard-pressed to establish a minimum threshold of compensation or time invested in a matter before a disqualifying conflict of interest occurs.  The mere existence of a financial benefit delivered by the law firm whose work the Special Master was evaluating, without disclosure to the [...] or the trial court, disqualified the Special Master from further service in this case.  The Special Master took the extraordinary position that recusal was unnecessary here because there was no “direct financial link” between [...] and the Special Master.  (39673a-39675a).  The Special Master asserted that he was paid in the mediation by the parties, not the law firms, and, in his view, there was no evidence that [...] had a direct financial stake in the fee award.  (See id.)  But the [...] were not permitted to develop a record to test that assertion.  Moreover, this novel standard created by the Special Master ignores the broad language of Rule 3.17, requiring judges to recuse where “their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” and the principle that some “scenarios” in which a judge must disqualify “cannot be neatly catalogued. ”  In re Advisory Letter No. 7-11 of the Supreme Court Advisory Comm., 213 N.J. 63, 73 (2013).  Here, regardless of which entity paid the mediation fee, [...] referred a paid mediation assignment to the Special Master.  And regardless of whether [...] has a direct financial stake in the fee award, it is [...]’s work and [...]’s fees that were being evaluated by the court.  Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to question the Special Master’s appearance of impartiality, and the Special Master should have been disqualified.  Since he was not, the attorneys’ fees award should be vacated.
[brief] The relevant issue in this case concerns Question 4 on the Supplemental Form.  There is nothing ambiguous about this Question.  It asks whether “you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event. ” (Ia143) (emphasis added).  The word “rent” is in the Question and [...] expressly testified that it filled out the Supplemental Form with the understanding that it was “renting vans and would like to get insurance on it for people that are going to be driving my rented vehicles. ” (Ib22; Ia337-38).  Further, Question 4 does not require the applicant to speculate as to the information requested.  It is a simple “yes” or “no” question, that can only be answered by checking boxes that state “yes” or “no”.  (Ia143).  [...] answered this plain, objective, yes or no question inaccurately.  As highlighted by the trial court, “The question was clear.  It wasn’t a trick question.  It couldn’t be interpreted in four, or five, or six different ways.
[brief] In these cases, evidence of oral statements made to fraudulently induce a party into signing a contract is admissible to prove the fraud, not the terms of the contract.  “[E]vidence of fraud in the inducement will suspend the parol evidence rule because fraud prevents formation of a valid contract—no contract, no parol evidence rule. ”  *In re Tarragon Corp.*, 2010 W.L. 3921996 (D.N.J. September 27, 2010); *Mellon Bank v. First Union Real Estate*, 951 F.2d 1399, 1408 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting *Betz Lab Inc. v. Hines*, 647 F.2d 402, 406 (3d Cir.1981)).
[brief] However, that is not the same as saying that compliance with the statute is sufficient if the insured does not receive the notice.  In this regard, it is significant to note that in 1980, the Legislature entirely rewrote the statute (supra).  In its original form, it stated that “Proof of mailing of notice of cancellation . . . shall be sufficient proof of notice. ”  This language was unambiguous - - proof of mailing would suffice; proof of receipt was not required.  Hence, the issue of actual receipt by the insured would be irrelevant on the issue of the validity of the cancellation.  The 1980 revision of the statute eliminated that language entirely.  One of the purposes of the revision was indisputably to codify the insurance industry’s use of the Certificate of Mailing as proof of mailing; but the Legislature could just as easily have done that and still retained the “sufficient proof of notice” language.
[brief] And I know many of the legislatures (sic) don’t really know what’s in the bill. ”  (Pa175 at 24:7-14.)  Another speaker gave testimony as she was reviewing the bill:  “I just got a copy of the bill so bear with me, but I’m just reviewing it as we speak. ”  (Pa178 at 27:9-13.)  The speaker indicated “No one even had a chance to look at this bill until today.  There was not given fair notice to the public. ”  (Pa180 at 29:7-16.)  The speaker articulated:  This bill is really radical.  And it’s just so upsetting that . . . this is all being done during a lame duck session during a pandemic.  And I know under the rules of both the Senate and the Assembly, we are supposed to give fine (sic) days notice to the public, which did not occur here.  This is an issue of . . very importance.  The magnitude of it is huge.  And . . . it should have a full public airing.  (Pa178-79 at 27:24-28:7.)  A representative of the [...] also testified stating, “this rushed process . . . deprives the public of . . . meaningful opportunity to provide input and comment on this legislation and demonstrate a total lack of transparency and . . . betray public trust. ”  (Pa184 at 33:10-15.)  Despite the comments from those testifying both for and against the bill regarding the rushed nature of the bill, the [...] released the bill.
[brief] Defendant contends that the trial court “refused to consider amending [his] base sentence” and found that “Comer was satisfied by” parole eligibility alone.  (Db40).  Relying on State v. Thomas, 470 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2022), defendant argues that parole hearings are a poor substitute for a procedure that would afford defendants their meaningful opportunity under Comer.  He then complains that he was denied parole on August 7, 2023 because the Board failed to consider [...]’s report, which he attributed to “the parole board’s limited evidentiary record. ”  (Db45).  He concludes that he’s in legal limbo because the judge instructed him to obtain his release to parole, and the parole board instructed him to direct any further concerns regarding the sentence to the sentencing court.  (Db45).  The judge did not refuse to consider reducing the base sentence, nor did he hold that relief under Comer was limited to parole eligibility.  Rather, he stated:  You can not commit an act like this and not go under a life sentence.  It is under the circumstances here, while I’m trying to avoid the effects of what happened from overly influencing the court, for the reasons I’ve already expressed, the youthfulness doesn’t rise to a level that would not make this an offense punishable by life.  It just doesn’t.  [5T92:4-10.]  It is clear from the above that the judge realized that Comer authorized the reduction in the base sentence, considered defendant’s allegations of youthfulness, and concluded that a life sentence remained appropriate because of “the circumstances here.
[brief] JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE DISCOVERY WAS INCOMPLETE.  (PA162-PA163)  It is well-settled that a trial Court should not grant a summary judgment when the matter is not yet ripe for such consideration and discovery has not yet been completed.  Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988).  If it is defendant’s intention to litigate the issue of whether plaintiff failed to maintain insurance benefits under the No-Fault Act, then plaintiff may want to conduct additional depositions of [...] representatives.  For instance, plaintiff may need an additional deposition on the issue of how underwriting is informed once a person changes a mailing address on his or her policy and what steps underwriting takes to investigate the change of address with relation to the garaging of the subject vehicle.  In the case at bar, defendant’s summary judgment motion was granted in spite of plaintiff/appellant’s need for additional depositions of defendant/respondent, [...]’s representative.  CONCLUSION  In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judgment Order entered in favor of the defendants should be reversed and this matter remanded to the Law Division for continuing discovery and trial.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (Atty ID No. 080702013)  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | ARGUMENT | 2 | | POINT I CONTRARY TO [...]’S ARGUMENT, A FINDING OF FRAUD OR MISCONDUCT IS NOT NECESSARY TO VACATE AN ARBITRATION AWARD WHERE, AS HERE, THE ARBITRATOR PLAINLY IGNORES, MISAPPLIES, AND EXCEEDS
[brief] Procedural History and Statement of Facts | 3 | | II.  Argument | 3 | | A.  The Jury Must Decide Whether Plaintiff was Subjected to a Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation in Violation of the NJLAD (Pa55, Pa230, Pa274-99, Pa338, Pa340-49, Pa372-74, Pa378, Pa379-80, Pa381-82, Pa431, Pa452, Pa734-35, Pa739, Pa753-54, Pa993-97, Pa1000, Pa1001-3)  | 3 | |  1.  A Jury Should Determine If Respondents’ Transfer of Appellant – Which Occurred on the Same Day She Made Her Complaint of Sexual Harassment – Constitutes Retaliation (Pa227, Pa230, Pa234, Pa681, Pa324-417, Pa655-722, Pa991-92, Pa999, Pa1022-23) | 4 | | 2.  Respondents Subjected Appellant to Retaliation By Reprimanding Her for Her Attire (Pa230, Pa374-77, Pa1022-23, Pa991-92) | 6 | | 3.  Constructive Discharge is For the Jury (Pa324, Pa873) | 7 | | B.  Respondents are not Immune: Both are Required to Maintain a Workplace Free from Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation, and a Jury Could Find that they Breached this Duty | 9 | | 1.  Respondents Are Joint Employers (Pa669, Pa796-98, Pa1004-5, Pa1006-1021) | 10 | | 2.  Respondents Did Not Take Prompt and Appropriate Remedial Action (Pa564, Pa655, Pa723, Pa719-729, Pa895) | 13 | | Conclusion | 15 |
[brief] (Pa50.)  7.  In the City of Newark, a candidate running for the office of council member for the West Ward must submit a sufficient number of qualified petitions – that is signatures of registered voters from the proper geographic area – to be certified for placement on the ballot for election.  (Pa72.)  The total number of qualified petitions required to be certified to run for the office of council member for the West Ward is 307.  (Id.)  If a person submits the required number of qualified petitions, as determined by the City Clerk, then the person becomes “certified” to be a candidate on the ballot.  (Pa72, Pa50, Pa55.)  A person who does not submit the required number of qualified petitions is not a certified candidate and cannot be placed on the ballot.  (Id.)  8.  On January 30, 2018, weeks after his termination, Plaintiff received a letter from the City Clerk informing him that he had not submitted a sufficient number of qualified signatures.  (Pa72.)  Plaintiff had only filed 206 of required 307 qualified signatures.  (Id.)  On February 22, 2018, more than a month after his termination by [...], Plaintiff, after obtaining additional signatures, received another letter from the City Clerk informing him that he had now submitted a sufficient number of signatures to be certified for placement of the ballot.  (Pa74.)  Thus, Plaintiff was not a certified candidate until February 22, 2018, almost a month-and-a-half after his employment was terminated.
[brief] ”  She consistently emphasized her opposition to the Borough’s mechanism for satisfying affordable housing, [...], questioning whether this was “really what you want to see in the downtown for the next 100 years. ”  618a.  She told business leaders, “We’re trying to scale this back. ”  635a.  Reiterating that her opposition was specifically to affordable housing, she stated the Borough has lost “seven of its thriving businesses due to redevelopment in the name of affordable housing.
[brief] An argument broke out between Plaintiff and Defendant.  She started creating a scene, speaking loudly in front of others, which led Plaintiff to remark on her behavior and question how it might be perceived by those around them.  To calm the situation, Plaintiff held Defendant’s hand to prevent her from leaving while they continued their discussion.  (1T94)  During the confrontation, Defendant accused Plaintiff of hitting her, an allegation Plaintiff firmly denied.  He maintained that he had only held her hand.  To avoid escalating the situation further in front of others, Plaintiff suggested they step outside and therefore the slight nudge.  (1T94-95)
[brief] A court performing the Yarbough fairness assessment must be mindful that aggravating and mitigating factors and Yarbough factors, as well as the stated purposes of sentencing in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b), in their totality, inform the sentence’s fairness.  All are relevant to the overall fairness of the aggregate sentence imposed on the sole defendant before the court.  [246 N.J. at 271-72 (citation omitted). ]
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to one of the following first or second degree crimes, on or after June 29, 2001: or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime, that occurred murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, aggravated arson by placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, burglary, theft by extortion by obtaining property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on, or physically confine or distributing of CDS facilities or strict liability for drug restrain anyone or commit another offense, booby traps in manufacturing or occurred on or after June 18, 2002: induced deaths; or that terrorism, or producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological occurred on or after January 13, 2008: agents or nuclear or radiological devices; or that first degree racketeering; or that occurred on or after August 14, 2013: occurred on or after November 1, 2013: child pornography; or that firearms trafficking.
[directive] In the event that a BWC worn during the execution of tactical operations (e.g., “Special Operations” or “SWAT” operations, execution of arrest and/or search warrant, etc.) records confidential tactical information the disclosure of which might jeopardize future operations or officer safety (e.g., verbal codes or hand signals used to communicate information or instructions, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms, techniques to convince persons to open doors, etc.), the recording shall be “tagged” in accordance with Section 9.3.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (exempting from disclosure under the Open Public Records Act “security measures and surveillance techniques which, if disclosed, would create a risk to the safety of persons”); N.J.A.C. 13:1E-3.2 (2) (exempting records that may reveal “surveillance, security, tactical, investigative, or operational techniques”); see also Section 9.5 (prosecutor’s authority to seek protective orders when complying with discovery obligations).  7.4
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Prosecutor of Hudson County /s/ [...]  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney I.D. #324142020  [...] cc: [...], Esq.  February 18, 2025  [...] Assistant Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Attorney ID No. 327652020  Of Counsel and on the Letter Brief  LETTER BRIEF OPPOSING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL