ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] graduated from the 93B Academy Class of the New Jersey State Police.  Pa56.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Special Retirement on or about December 1, 2003.  Pa56.  While employed by the New Jersey State Police, [...] was dispatched to Ground Zero to perform a myriad of functions.  Pa61.  [...] performed valuable public safety functions, transporting Port Authority Police, New York City Fire Department, and civilians through the exposure zone for months.  Pa61.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).  P.L. 2019, c. 157.  Under the Ricci Act, the Board of Trustees was required to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the new law.  The Ricci Act states that the Board of Trustees “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the State Police Retirement System of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.
[brief] [...] is a registered nurse and a licensed nursing home administrator.  She has been an RN since 1965.  5T4:14-16; 5T 6:2-8.  She obtained her Bachelor's Degree in nursing in 1985 and her Master's Degree in 2000.  5T6:9-11.  In 1985, she became a Licensed Nursing Home administrator and has worked in nursing homes since that time.  5T6:22-25.  During her career, Nurse Darlington has served as the Director of Nursing, the Nursing Home Administrator, a Regional Nursing Home Administrator and a Vice-President of Operations for one hundred nursing homes.  5T7:12-8:23.  She was responsible for oversight and quality assurance for those nursing homes and developed policies and procedures for the operation and management of those homes.  5T8:18-23.  As a Licensed Nursing Home administrator, she was responsible for all departments in her facilities.  5T10:6-10.  She has consulted on sub-acute units in nursing homes and oversaw the respiratory care provided to patients requiring those services.  5T9:4-11; 5T19:6-14.  She has directed care for patients with tracheostomies and has provided hands on care for tracheostomy patients.  She has suctioned patients and performed nebulizer treatments and has performed trach care.  5T20:11-21:15.  She has hired and fired respiratory therapists based on her evaluation of their performance.  5T20:11-18.  She testified specifically with regard to her knowledge of respiratory therapy services in nursing homes that she hires respiratory therapists, she oversees respiratory therapists, she monitors and audits their charts, she supervises them, she has herself performed respiratory care and she reviews respiratory therapist’s assessments.  5T63:13-66:6.  Notwithstanding Nurse Darlington’s extensive background in supervising respiratory therapists and hands-on providing the care a respiratory therapist would give, she was barred from opining on the respiratory care or lack thereof given [...].  When Nurse Darlington was asked to elaborate on her opinion in her served report that "the staff of [...] in regard to their care and treatment of [...] failed to provide necessary care and treatment by a respiratory therapist during his stay at the facility," the Court sustained defendant's objection and barred [...] from testifying that defendant had failed to provide respiratory care within acceptable standards.  5T60:17 to 61:2.  The Court did not permit Nurse Darlington to describe the failures in respiratory care because she was not a respiratory therapist.  That is in direct contradiction to case law which permits "[any practitioner who is familiar with the situation in dispute and possesses 'the requisite training and knowledge [can] express an opinion as an expert.'"  Cahill, supra, 99 N.J. at 331-32.  Both experts were more than qualified to testify to the standard of care for respiratory therapists.  To bar that testimony was error and extremely prejudicial to plaintiff’s case, especially being raised for the first time during trial.  **POINT III**
[brief] Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 360 (2005) (quoting State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 525 (1989)).  The expert's failure "to give weight to a factor thought important by an adverse party does not reduce his testimony to an inadmissible net opinion if he otherwise offers sufficient reasons which logically support his opinion."  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002) (citing State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. at 115-16).  Such perceived omissions may be "a proper subject of exploration and cross-examination at a trial."  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. at 402 (quoting Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36, 55 (App. Div. 1990), modified on other grounds, 125 N.J. 421 (1991)); see also State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 277 (1997) ("[A]n expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion.") (quoting State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 264 (1993)).  If reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, an expert may base his opinions or inferences on facts or data which he perceived, or which were made known to him at or before the hearing.
[brief] Similarly, the policy acknowledges that “[a] school’s obligation to ensure nondiscrimination on the basis of gender identity requires schools to provide transgender students equal access to educational programs and activities, even in circumstances in which other students, parents/guardians, or community members raise objections or concerns (Ibid.).”  Elsewhere, the revised policy recognizes that every situation is unique, and that some students and parents/guardians may want the District to keep a student’s transgender status confidential, while others may prefer that the District openly acknowledge same (Ibid.).  It states, in relevant part, that “[s]chool staff members may not disclose information that may reveal a student’s transgender status except as allowed by law and in accordance with the wishes of the parent/guardian and the student” and that “[t]he school district may keep confidential a current, new, or prospective student’s transgender status in accordance with the wishes of the parent/guardian and the student (Ibid.).”
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment *de novo*.  *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.*, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (citing *Mem'l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.*, 210 N.J. 512, 524 (2012)).  New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2 provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  The moving party has the initial burden of showing no dispute exists.  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  When determining whether a genuine issue exists as to a material fact, the court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the evidence presented “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter law. ”  Id.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Contrary to the facts in the above cases, [...] has not expanded its facility, nor has it changed it changed the nature of its operation.  It just serves food for take-out and delivery.  It’s a continuation of the use that was recognized by the Board of Adjustment in 1984, as its attorney said:  “Since this store has sold food for the past 52 years…there has been no change in the operation of this business and the sale and making of pizzas is not necessarily a change in the type of business, it is still food. ”  [...] has just continued that same business.  There has been no wrongful expansion of the non-conforming use.
[brief] ..................................  49 Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426 (2015) ......................... 45, 46 Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001)  ........................................ 48, 49 Znoski v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 122 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1973)  ...........................................  43, 44, 47 Other Authorities  Black’s Law Dictionary 1087 (7th ed. 1999), ............................................. 44  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006).  ...........................................  49  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Argued at Pa390)  [...] must establish all four elements to state a claim for breach of contract.  [...] has not established any of the four elements.  Likewise, nowhere in the court’s order does it express that [...] satisfied all four elements for a breach of contract claim.  Although the court did not express which, if any, of the three counts of the Counterclaim the court was granting, [...] could not have been granted summary judgment on Count One (breach of contract) of its Counterclaim.  The court’s original order dismissing the Counterclaim was thus correct.
[brief] Liability for negligent training and supervision is limited to conduct that is outside the scope of employment.  As both the Appellate Division and Supreme Court have observed, the tort of negligent training and supervision is not applicable when the employer’s liability can be established under *respondeat superior*: the concept of negligent training, supervision, and retention generally has no significance where, as here, the injury is alleged to have been caused by an employee's negligence in the performance of his or her duties.  *Hoag v. Brown*, 397 N.J. Super. 34, 54, (App. Div. 2007).  That is so because an employer is vicariously responsible for the negligent acts of an employee acting within the scope of his or her employment "under standard agency principles" even if the employer was diligent in hiring, training, supervising and retaining the employees.  See *Mavrikidis v. Petullo*, 153 N.J. 117, 133-34 (1998) (*observing that the tort is not applicable when the employer's liability can be established under the principle of respondeat superior*).  *Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. [...]*, 415 N.J. Super. 138, 167 (App. Div. 1998), overruled on other grounds, *Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. [...]*, 209 N.J. 558 (2012)\(^{15}\) (emphasis added).
[brief] This is because the [...] corporate resolution itself distinguishes between a “surety bond” or “bonds,” on the one hand, and “undertakings, recognizances and other surety obligations. ”  A Proposal Bond is a surety bond, but a Consent of Surety is not, rather, as explained above, a Consent of Surety is an undertaking by the surety to issue a second bond, the Contract Bond, at a later date and at the time of contract execution.  Accordingly, [...] correctly concluded that to the extent [...] executed [...]’s prescribed Consent of Surety form, no evidence was presented that she had been granted the authority by [...] to do so and, in fact, the limited scope of the POA suggests otherwise.
[brief] In State v. Gonzalez, a different OPD attorney consulted and retained [...] as an expert in eyewitness identification, and familiarity was one of the issues he covered in his report and testimony.  (Da396-98)  The jury acquitted [...].  (Da397).  [...] also showed attorneys used expert testimony on misidentification well before his trial, submitting certifications from OPD attorneys on how instrumental expert testimony was in securing favorable outcomes, plus supporting court records.
[brief] Further, the trial Court found that Probation had complied with the Order of 1/11/2023 in providing a “full accounting” based upon documentation available to Probation:  “… The Court finds that, on Feb. 11, 2022, Probation submitted all available accounting of the Defendant’s probation account…” (DA83).  However, the trial Court failed to acknowledge that Probation had, in fact, refused to consider Appellant’s evidence of payment in full (see footnote no.2, Point I paragraph no. 2, p. 14), and the trial court improperly ignored Appellant’s evidence of actual overpayment of amounts due for the period 10/1/1998 to 9/9199 (see Statement of Facts, paragraph no. 9 for further detailed discussion).  Not only did the trial Court improperly ignore Probation’s refusal to consider relevant evidence of overpayment of amounts due for the period, but by doing so the Court erred in its Order of 4/4/2022 by issuing an order which ignored and contradicted the Remand Order of 1/17/2002 and the subsequent Order of 3/25/2004 issued in compliance – further compounding the errors in this case.
[brief] Trial court’s ruling on request to charge passion/provocation manslaughter ...........................................  5T115-18 to 5T116-1; 5T116-7 to 13; 5T117-2 to 5; 5T118-9 to 24; 6T5-1 to 3; 6T5-17 to 21  Trial court’s ruling denying motion for a mistrial ...............  7T47-6 to 7T49-10  Trial court’s sentencing decision .........................
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND PERMIT [...] TO REDEEM TAX SALE CERTIFICATE WHERE [...] IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER NJSA 54:5-87 PURSUANT TO RULE 4:50-1 AS MANDATED.  (Raised Below: 1M7-1M8,Da87)  A.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BASED UPON LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD SET BY THE TYLER CASE (ONLY DAYS BEFORE THE PRIOR APPELLATE DECISION IN [...]’S CASE)  EXISTED BUT WAS UNKNOWN TO [...] AND LIKELY THE COURT WHEN THIS CASE WAS ACTUALLY REVIEWED SINCE IT WAS ENTERED SIMULTANEOUSLY AND THEREFORE THE TYLER DECISION WAS NOT ADDRESSED AS PART OF THE PRIOR APPEAL WHICH VIOLATED [...]’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND EQUITY DICTATES THE JUDGMENT STILL BE VACATED AS MANDATED BY THE TYLER CASE.  (Raised Below: 1M7-13,Da87)  The following analysis addresses the following questions:  1.  Did the Trial Court err in denying the motion to reconsider the motion to vacate judgment and permit redemption under R. 4:50-1 in consideration of the US Supreme Court decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023)?  2.  Was this case in the pipeline at the time of the US Supreme Court decision in Tyler (declaring a tax authority confiscation of a property owners equity violates the 5th amendment takings clause)?  3.  Did the Trial Court err in failing to recognize this case as a pipeline case where the trial judge stated: “I don’t even consider it a pipeline case”?  4.  Does NJ law require the retroactive application of Tyler in this case to create a cohesive rule of law?  5.  Does the retroactive application of Tyler separately mandate grounds to vacate judgment?  6.  Did the Trial Court err in failing to follow the mandates of the NJ Supreme Court and Appellate Court post *Tyler*.  7.  Is it unconstitutional and a prohibited taking/forfeiture of equity for the Court to permit the tax lien holder to retain John’s equity in his home without just compensation?  In the matter at hand, as the Court is aware, on May 25, 2023 the US Supreme Court’s decision in *Tyler v. Hennepin County*, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023) declared a taxing authority’s confiscation of a property owner’s equity violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.  (1M7-20)
[brief] In its opposition to the summary judgment motion, plaintiff relied extensively on Livingstone v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., 111 N.J. 89 (1998) which also involved an employee struck by a co-employee’s car as she walked through the lot.  Notably too, that case involved an employer’s decision to compel its employees to park in a far corner of a mall parking lot giving access to closer spots to customers, thereby extending the distance employees had to walk to get to their job location arguably increasing the risk of injury.  While that case focused on the “coming and going” rule to differentiate between compensable and non-compensable claims under the Workers Compensation Act, the Court found that the employer had the right to direct its employees to park in a designated area.
[brief] Despite repeatedly representing that it would abide the trial court’s decisions, the County now argues that the Decision and Judgment should be overturned.  Putting aside the procedural and substantive defects in the County’s arguments, the County’s position flies in the face of public bidding law which is intended to benefit the taxpayer.  Borough of Princeton, 169 N.J. at 159-160 (stating “[w]e have noted that ‘[p]ublic bidding statutes exist for the benefit of taxpayers, not bidders, and should be construed with sole reference to the public good’”) (internal citation omitted).
[brief] Plaintiffs allege that the defendants, as political candidates, targeted the former borough attorney in their campaign and were ultimately elected.  (Da17 ¶10).  It appears the plaintiffs initiated this action to hinder the legitimate operations of local government by preventing elected officials from acting in their official roles.  The issue as to continuing [...]’s employment was an election issue, and the voters of [...] agreed with defendants to sever ties with their previous borough attorney – [...].  The alleged conflict of interest was not created by the defendants but by [...]’ former borough attorney.  [...] filed a lawsuit against the defendants, claiming defamation based on their political speech.  (Da17 ¶¶12-13).  Holding that this action by [...] created a conflict of interest for the defendants would set a troubling precedent.  Any dissatisfied vendor facing an administrative change could file a lawsuit against opposing political candidates, fabricating a conflict to avoid termination if the election outcome did not favor them.  Moreover, if a conflict existed, it would be mutual, and [...] would also be disqualified from representing [...].  Defendants are members of the litigation control group in [...], and [...]’s lawsuit would prevent representation.  This type of conduct has already been addressed by our Supreme Court.  In In re Simon, 206 N.J. 306 (2011), the Court reprimanded an attorney who sued his client while continuing to represent them.  Id. at 307.  [...] would be unable to continue his defamation lawsuit against defendants while simultaneously providing legal advice for them to consider in the interests of [...].
[brief] (18T:140-16 to 20).  In his jail calls with his mother, defendant expressed indignance that [...]’ family was angered by their son’s death and spoke to the press about it, saying:  “I was the one that had the career going.  I was the one that was in the movies.  I was the one getting things in motion, getting major producers to be there.  Nobody cared about him [[...]] to be real. ” (24T:221-6 to 222-6).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 438.  This court then found the following *forum non conveniens* concepts relevant to its analysis: (1) none of the principal parties to the coverage dispute was a New Jersey corporation; (2) the litigation would be complex, time-consuming, and constitute a drain upon New Jersey’s judicial resources; (3) resolution of the issues would require application of foreign state’s law; and (4) it was “unlikely that any local interest [would] be generated in the resolution of a dispute regarding the allocation of coverage obligations under a contract delivered in Pennsylvania to a Pennsylvania company.
[brief] On July 24, 2019, the Court entered a Case Management Order.  (Da288).  In relevant part, this CMO scheduled a trial date and deadlines for the parties to submit pre-trial briefs in accordance with R. 4:25-1 and meet and confer to pre-mark exhibits.  The Order further provided that:  Except for good cause shown, no party will be permitted to offer any exhibits not identified or not submitted by said party for examination by opposing counsel in compliance with this Order.  Any objections not made in writing at least three (3) business days prior to the scheduled trial date may be considered waived…..  If any witness might be unavailable for trial, their testimony shall be videotaped for trial.  Appellant filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on September 16, 2019.
[brief] Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 751 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 588-89 (E. & A. 1934).  To prove malice, the party asserting the tortious interference claim must show the interference was “wanton, malicious and unjustifiable. ”
[brief] Landlord did not and has not made that payment and is now claiming it need not ever make that payment.  The clear language of the Lease suggests Landlord is mistaken.  Indeed, regarding the Landlord’s second contention on forfeiture—that if Tenant owes rent at the time an Allowance installment is due, “tenant is simply not [ever] entitled to payment of these amounts,”—that interpretation has zero support in the Lease, or the law.  Rather, § 4.02 only permits withholding of Tenant’s Allowance installment payments during “monetary default under this Lease after notice and the expiration of any applicable cure period” (the “Monetary Default” clause) (Da17 emphasis added).  In other words, if Tenant has cured the default, there is no longer any basis for withholding the installment payment.  There is no dispute here that Tenant has cured the default because Landlord admits that no less than three times in its brief: “Tenant’s payment of these arrears to the Clerk cured the Events of default” (Pb40); “Landlord considered the events of default cured and resumed making the Tenant allowance payments” (Pb41); “the Events of Default have been cured” (Pb51).
[brief] Id. at 615–16 (quoting Plemmons, 387 N.J. Super. at 563–65).  In support of its holding, the Shaw court specifically stated that “[c]onsidering the CFA’s remedial purpose and applying well-established canons of statutory construction, we conclude that the judicially created learned professional exception must be narrowly construed to exempt CFA liability only as to those professionals who have historically been recognized as “learned” based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition. ”  Id. at 599.  Thus, as previously iterated, under the holding in Plemmons, which remains relevant to [...] as an insurance provider, an insurance broker is a “semi-professional” who is subject to testing, licensing, and regulation under other statutory provisions, [...] is therefore excluded from liability under the Consumer Fraud Act.