ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See, e.g., Wawa Food Market v. Ship Bottom Planning Bd., 227 N.J. Super. 29, 34 (App. Div. 1988).  There is good reason for this design – it makes little sense to require frail elderly residents to walk more than they need to just to get into the building.  [6T 123-2 to 124-15; 7T 44-10 to 45-18].  The same thing is true with respect to the 17 parking spaces that were proposed in the southeast corner of the Property along the [...] frontage.  [Pa256].  Those spaces could have been relocated to the south or west sides of the Property, but doing so would be impractical since it would bring site activity closer to the single-family dwellings to the south or the protected wetlands to the west, and would push residents and employees further from the entrance to the building.  [7T 45-18 to 46-22].
[brief] The Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that Complaint since day one (5/12/16) for the following reasons:  **Authentication:**  None of the aforementioned submitted documents were authenticated by Certificates of Acknowledgements in violation of N.J.S.A 2A:82-17.  None of the mortgage assignments of 2/27/2009 (065a) and 2/28/2014 (097a) were authenticated by affidavits or certifications of personal knowledge in violation of NJ Court Rule 1:6-6.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED [...]’S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE STANDARD OF CARE APPLICABLE TO JACOBS.  Plaintiffs’ cause of action against [...] is for professional negligence in [...]’s capacity as a professional engineer. \(^2\)  To prevail on this claim, Plaintiffs were required to offer competent expert testimony establishing: a. a duty extending from [...] to Plaintiffs as an engineering construction inspector; b. an act or omission by [...] that breached this standard; c. that the breach was the proximate cause of Plaintiff [...]’s accident; d. Plaintiffs were injured thereby; and e.  Plaintiffs suffered damages a result.  See *Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano*, Halleran & Ciesla, 274 N.J. Super. 405, 413 (App. Div. 1994); *Polzo v. Cty. of Essex*, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008).
[brief] Pra1  *Fannie Mae v. Gissubel,* No. A-3389-16T3, 2018 N. J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 699 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 2018) ................................................................. Pra5 *Jubelt v. United Mortg. Bankers, Ltd.,* Civil Action No. 13-7150 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84595 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) ..................................................... Pra9 *North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC,* No. 2:20-cv-20190 (BRM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974 (D.N.J. Sep. 24, 2021) ........................................................... Pra22 *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding,* No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023) ............................................................... Pra29 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss filed October 20, 2023 .................................................................Pa155 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Cross Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, to Transfer, and to Consolidate filed October 20, 2023
[brief] [...] argues that he has presented evidence demonstrating proximate causation.  He refers to the report of his expert, [...].  At the time of the Motion hearing on August 9, 2022 before [...], counsel for plaintiff [...] argued that [...] knew or should have known or foreseen that John would rely on his work as set forth in Petrillo.  (T1:11:5-10).  Plaintiff’s counsel argued that [...] did not retain [...] of the [...], and did not sign the Sanchez fee agreement.  (T1:11:16-25).  However, on August 2, 2017, [...] of the [...] questioned [...] and [...] on the status of the overall Estate Plan and Estate Administration.  (Pa200).  In his opinion, he found that [...] had received notice, if not from personal knowledge, from correspondence from [...].  In response to the questions from [...], [...] provided information concerning probate of the Will.
[brief] New Jersey courts have left no doubt as to the obligations imposed on government when invoking the power of eminent domain.  When exercising the power of eminent domain, the government has an obligation to “turn square corners. ”  F.M.C. Stores, Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985).  Moreover, it has “an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and fairly with property owners. ”  Id. at 426-27; see also Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello, 252 N.J. Super. 247, 257 (App. Div. 1991); Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982); State v. Siris, 191 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 1983).  That obligation includes providing a clearly articulated statutorily authorized use for the property set forth in the public record.
[brief] [...] was solely charged with certain persons not to have weapons, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (Count Six), and that count was severed for trial purposes.  (Da 1-4)  1  “Da” – Defendant’s appendix; 1T – 9/29/20 transcript of pretrial motions; 2T – 10/7/21 transcript of pretrial conference; 3T – 10/12/21 transcript of jury selection; 4T – 10/13/21 transcript of jury selection; 5T – 10/14/21 transcript of jury selection; 6T – 10/15/21 transcript of jury selection; 7T – 10/18/21 transcript of jury selection;  On September 29, 2020, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard defendants’ motions to suppress evidence seized from the home at [...], and from two vehicles, a white Toyota Corolla and a silver Hyundai Tuscon, or, alternatively, for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.  (1T)  The court denied the motions on November 5, 2020.  (Da 5)  On April 30, 2021, [...] granted the defense motion to suppress statements of Gary [...].  (Da 6)  Jury selection in this jointly tried case began before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on October 12, 2021.  The trial, conducted before [...] and a jury, concluded on November 4, 2021 with the jury’s verdicts convicting Gary [...] of all charges (17T 55-12 to 57-2) and convicting Mr. 8T – 10/19/21 transcript of jury selection; 9T – 10/22/21 transcript of jury selection; 10T – 10/25/21 trial transcript; 11T – 10/26/21 trial transcript; 12T – 10/27/21 trial transcript; 13T – 10/28/21 trial transcript; 14T – 10/29/21 trial transcript; 15T – 11/1/21 trial transcript; 16T – 11/3/21 transcript of summations and jury charge; 17T – 11/4/21 transcript of deliberations and verdict; 18T – 6/20/22 sentencing transcript.
[brief] (1T 41-3 to 41-25)  Defense counsel also established that information communicated via radio is recorded, and there was no recording of the tip that the C.I.D. units allegedly received that night.  When asked about that, [...] testified that [...] did not communicate the tip via radio; instead, [...] claimed, [...] reached out to him directly by calling his cell phone.5  (1T 22-4 to 24-9)  --- 5  It is unclear whether [...] and [...] were communicating via personal cell phones or department-issued cell phones.  While it does not appear that the [...] ([...]) has “a specific cell-phone policy,” [...] testified that [...] should have written a supplemental report documenting the details of the tip.  (1T 28-15 to 28-19)  [...], however, had never seen a supplemental report written by [...], nor had such a report been furnished to the Defense.  (1T 9-25 to 11-24; 1T 28-15 to 29-19)  It is unclear how [...] refreshed his recollection as to details of the tip that were not in the incident report because, as [...] testified, the incident report was the only report he ever saw.  (1T 28-23 to 30-23)  [...] urged the judge to disregard [...]’s testimony regarding the source of the tip and the reliability of the alleged C.I., as well as [...]’s claim that the tip described the male in the Kia as wearing a fanny pack, because that information was not contained in any police report.
[brief] 25 N.J.S.A. 2A:24–1.1 .................................................................................................  25 N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8....................................................................................................  40 N.J.S.A. 2A:24–8(a)..............................................................................................  25, 39 N. J.S.A. 2A:24–8(d).............................................................................................. 26, 32, 33  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] In *Smith*, after officers ordered a passenger out of a vehicle during a motor vehicle stop, she “was nervous and crying; she engaged in a prolonged stare with [the driver]; the trooper noticed the bulge beneath her blouse; and [the passenger] exclaimed, ‘It’s not mine, they made me put it in there. ’”  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court found that those facts in their totality justified frisking the driver.  See also *State v. Wanczyk*, 201 N.J. Super. 258, 264 (App. Div. 1985) (“Once defendant exited the car and the police observed the bulge in the left sleeve of defendant's jacket, the officers unquestionably had the right to conduct a frisk of the defendant under the principles pronounced in *Terry v. Ohio*, supra. ”).  Here, after ordering [...] out of the car based on his nervousness and ambiguously placing his safety vest in his lap, the detectives saw no bulge.
[directive] It is therefore appropriate for the Attorney General, as the State’s chief law enforcement officer, to revisit the prior Attorney General Directive on Body Worn Cameras (AG Directive 2015-1).  See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-188.4, authorizing the Attorney General to revise guidelines and directives as appropriate to enforce provisions of P.L. 2020, c. 128, and see N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98, noting that the Attorney General is responsible for general oversight of law enforcement and for ensuring the uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal laws and the administration of criminal justice.  Attached to this Directive is a revised “Body Worn Camera Policy” (the “Policy”) that conforms with the new legislation and reflects the practical experiences gained through law enforcement use BWCs since they were introduced in 2015.  While the Policy establishes foundational statewide standards, it permits agencies to account for local community needs and interests and encourages them to develop and share best practices as they gain experience in using these devices.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A.  52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement or adopt policies consistent with the Body Worn Camera Policy appended to this Directive.
[brief] ”  Pa866.  In an internal August 5, 2015 email, [...] of [...] noted that [...]’s work at that time was excluded, and that “eventually I anticipate work on this project that will be covered by the CCIP.  It is just this contract with [...] that has been excluded. ”  Pa872.  In internal August 5, 2015 emails, [...], [...], and [...] of [...] referred to excluded August Ritz work, again limited to [...]’s early work in August.  Pa899.  On August 10, 2015, [...] of [...] emailed [...] of [...], stating that “our work was excluded from the [...], please make any adjustments accordingly,” referred to payroll issues for July 2015.
[directive] In addition, defendants in criminal matters may be entitled to certain evidence the prosecutor has concerning the credibility of prosecution witnesses, including police officers.  Prosecutors are considered to possess such evidence even when law enforcement agencies create and maintain information concerning the honesty of individual officers.  Furthermore, prosecutors may be required to provide such evidence to the court.  It is therefore imperative that the internal affairs investigator assist prosecutors with their legal duty to review and, if necessary, disclose evidence that may impact the credibility of police officers.  (See Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2019-6).
[directive] Probable of Affidavits in information certain of inclusion the with accordance in shall, victim the complaint-summons, or complaint-warrant by a for apply to how informed be Manual, Procedures Violence Domestic the of requirements inform to requirement Act.  This Violence Domestic of Prevention the under order restraining of imposition seeking from prosecutor or officer the preclude to construed be not shall victim the as acomplaint-warrant on release of condition a as restraint appropriate other or no-contact a 6.2.3. or 4.6.11 subsections to pursuant required may be Records.  Expunged 4.7 acomplaint-summons issuing of presumption the overcome to whether determining In subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory or prosecutor a Section 4.3, to pursuant See circumstances.  relevant of totality of the part as records expunged consider 3.3.2 may any to provided shall be convictions or arrests prior of . . . records ("expunged 2C:52-21 N.J.S.A. services pretrial the Court, Superior the of Division Probation prosecutor, the county court, bail a with conjunction in use for requested are same when General Attorney the or agency, 31 c. 2014, P.L. 11 through of 1 sections to pursuant determination release pretrial [or] hearing, Law]"). Reform Bail [the 3:3- Rule to pursuant required is acomplaint-warrant for application where case any In for a apply to Directive this to pursuant been made has determination a where case any or 1(e), agency enforcement the law convictions, or arrests expunged of regardless complaint-warrant expunged access or obtain waiting to by process charging the delay not shall prosecutor and/or a issue whether determination to the affect might records expunged however, If, records. attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant the acomplaint-warrant, for apply or complaint-summons designated officer supervisory designated or 3.2, Section with accordance in consulted general reasonably be to deemed is release pretrial of condition special other or weapons-surrender, no-contact, a if also that for the appropriate be might it victim, also violence domestic the of safety immediate the assure to necessary be can movements defendant's that the so device monitoring electronic an wear to ordered be to defendant the enhance thereby and condition no-contact the enforce to means a as program services pretrial the by monitored Bail the under defendant" "eligible an is defendant that the presupposes That victim. the to afforded protection complaint-warrant.
[brief] Chewing gum is not probable cause.  If that was the case, then we should all join together and arrest every single kid in elementary school, middle school, and high school.  Because the "paraphernalia" chewing gum, runs rampant throughout these schools.  Also, to suggest I was chewing gum because I was intoxicated and to mask the smell of alcohol is absurd and has no merit or grounds.  I personally chew a pack of gum every week.  And when I go out in public, it is not unusual for me to be chewing multiple pieces of gum at one time.  How is it ok for a cop to arrest you for chewing gum and how is it normal for a judge to think chewing gum can be used as probable cause?  *State v. Curran, DOCKET NO. [...], 7-8 (App. Div. Jul. 17, 2014)* ("Probable cause for driving under the influence will be found where an officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver was operating a motor vehicle in violation" of the DWI statute...In assessing probable cause, a judge considers the totality of the circumstances...They are viewed "from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer."
[brief] [...]’s claims in this case are all premised on the alleged “ineligibility” of the PIP claims to be paid because of alleged fraudulent conduct.  See, e.g., Pa42 ¶ 136, Pa69 ¶ 314, Pa70 ¶ 319, Pa74 ¶ 338, Pa77 ¶ 352(b), Pa77-78 ¶ 354, Pa80 ¶¶ 364-68, Pa81 ¶ 369, Pa84 ¶ 377, Pa85 ¶ 381, Pa106 ¶¶ 476-78, Pa109-10 ¶¶ 485-87.  And whether a PIP claim is eligible to be paid is the sin qua non of the No-Fault Law’s arbitration provision, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a), (c).  Repackaging and relabeling PIP disputes as fraud or IFPA/RICO violations does not change that.
[brief] The essential question on this appeal is whether the Trial Court erred in denying Defendants’ motion to rescind their prior on-the-record express waiver of an arbitration clause where Defendants offered no justification in law or fact for that recission.  This is not the typical arbitration-waiver case where one party alleges that the other impliedly waived arbitration by their actions and inactions, e.g., neglecting to timely file an arbitration claim or undertaking litigation in court.  Rather, this is a case where Defendants explicitly told a judge on the record that they were waiving arbitration and even went so far as to file a complaint against Plaintiff demanding a jury trial.  Thereafter, Defendants retained a new lawyer who now contrives to reverse course and rescind Defendants’ original express waiver of arbitration.  The Trial Court below properly denied Defendants’ motion to rescind their initial waiver of arbitration and here Defendants offer no viable grounds for reversal.  Given the current jurisprudence of arbitration in the workplace setting, granting employers like Defendants the right to reverse a waiver of arbitration based on some unexplained whim is inherently unfair.  Suppose employees followed Defendants’ pattern of behavior and after knowingly signing a valid arbitration clause, i.e. a waiver of jury trial rights (which didn’t happen here), such employees announce they are rescinding the arbitration clause and opting for a jury trial.  Would any court ever enforce such a frivolous recession?  Yet, here, Defendants are asking for this Court to endorse a reckless, unexplained change of mind by an employer, set on abandoning their original position by willy nilly rescinding a waiver of arbitration.  More generally, for the court system to work smoothly, parties must be held to their representations in court.  The Trial Judge did not err in holding Defendants to their express waiver of arbitration.  The proof that the waiver took place was indisputable and preserved in the transcript of the Chancery proceedings in this case.  The audacity of the Defendants, shifting lawyers and then on that basis shifting positions, should never be countenanced in an orderly justice system.  Below, Defendants have already conceded that Plaintiff’s CEPA and LAD claims must be tried to a jury.  The economic torts and claims alleged by Plaintiff are at issue here.  They too should be remanded for a jury trial because of Defendants’ express waiver of arbitration and because, as discussed infra, the Defendants explicitly in writing abandoned the obsolete, invalid 1991 arbitration clause they rely upon.
[brief] Namerow v. PediatriCare Assocs., LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 133, 144 (Ch. Div. 2018) (quoting McGrath v. Poppleton, 550 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (D.N.J. 2008)); Home Owners Constr. Co. v. Borough of Glen Rock, 34 N.J. 305, 316 (1961).  (the writing requirement may be expressly or impliedly waived by the clear conduct or agreement of the parties or their duly authorized representatives”).  And, “[w]hen looking for mutual assent, a court will take these outward expressions and ask ‘what meaning the words should have conveyed to a reasonable person cognizant of the relationship between the parties and all of the antecedent and surrounding facts and circumstances. ’”  Pagnani-Braga-Kimmel Urologic Assoc., PA v. Chappell, 407 N.J. Super. 21, 28 (Law Div. 2008) (quoting Esslinger’s Inc. v. Alachnowicz, 68 N.J. Super. 339, 344 (App. Div. 1961)).  [...] considered and found persuasive [...]’s position and evidence establishing the parties’ mutual assent, over the course of several years, establishing EGPs on a project-by-project basis via in-person meetings and shared writings.  The Trial Court correctly upheld the Arbitrator’s well-reasoned findings and confirmed the Award.  This Court should do the same and affirm the June 12 Orders.  C.
[brief] In reaching this holding, the Trial Court inaccurately believed that these Plaintiffs were still members of the union who participated in the ratification of the settlement agreement to the First Police Matter on December 14, 2017.  (617a-618).  The Trial Court reached this conclusion because it inaccurately wrote that the settlement occurred on June 7, 2017.  *Ibid.*  The Trial Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the *[...]* Plaintiffs because they retired before the settlement agreement was ratified.
[brief] On October 17, 2015, [...] had 23 years and 8 months in the PFRS system and was literally 1 year and 4 months from reaching his 25th anniversary with a full pension with lifetime medical benefits.  (1T52-53).  On October 17, 2015, [...] was a street sergeant for the [...] working 6AM to 6PM.  (1T32-33).  There were 7 shootings in Camden on October 17, 2015.  (1T33).  Camden Metro was also short staffed on October 17, 2015.  (1T35).  For one of the shootings, [...] heard the gun shots and assumed position in the middle of the intersection in his patrol vehicle.  (1T36-38).  As [...] opened the door of this patrol vehicle to engage a shooting suspect, a car ran a stop sign and hit him.  (1T37-38).  At the time of impact, [...] had his left foot outside of his vehicle and the door of his vehicle halfway open.  (1T39).  At the time of impact, [...] had removed his seatbelt.  (1T39).  The front of the vehicle that ran the stop sign impacted the driver’s side of [...]’s vehicle.  (1T39-40).  [...] was propelled from the driver’s side of his vehicle into the passenger side of his vehicle.  (1T40).  [...] had already unholstered and taken out his weapon which fell to the floor of his vehicle upon impact.  (1T40-41).  [...] blacked out from the impact.  (1T41).  Upon gaining his senses, [...] re-engaged the shooting suspect.  (1T42).  There was nothing nefarious done by the individual who ran the stop sign.  (1T43)  This was simply a car accident, and they had no affiliation with the shooter.  (1T43).  [...] never finished his shift on October 17, 2015.  (1T43).  **[...]’s Injuries from October 17, 2015**
[directive] 6.2.7  A letter shall be sent to the complainant explaining the outcome of the investigation.  If the allegation was unfounded or the officer was exonerated, this conclusion shall be stated and defined for the civilian complainant.  If the allegation was not sustained, the letter shall provide the complainant with a brief explanation why the complaint was not sustained (e.g., insufficient proof, lack of witnesses, etc.).  If the allegation was sustained and discipline was imposed, the letter shall state that the allegation was sustained and that the officer has been disciplined according to agency procedures.  See Appendix E. 6.3
[brief] ...............................10  In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139848 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2021)  ..............................................12, 35  In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)  ..................................................................................1