ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE 2006-1 NEW JERSEY FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION  WHEREAS, it is the public policy of New Jersey, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98, to encourage cooperation among law enforcement officers and to provide for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State, in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State; and WHEREAS, the Attorney General is further empowered to establish procedures and implement administrative strategies to enhance and assure the integrity of criminal investigations and prosecutions in New Jersey; and WHEREAS, in recent years, there have been tremendous advances in the area of forensic science, which technological progress has contributed significantly to the efficacy and efficiency of law enforcement; and WHEREAS, through its criminal justice system, the State of New Jersey has access to an impressive array of forensic science experts who possess a high degree of skill, knowledge and experience in forensic testing and analysis, including state and county forensic and toxicology laboratory personnel, county prosecutor’s offices, the State Police, and the medical examiner system; WHEREAS, New Jersey has made significant strides in its efforts to maximize the utility of these advanced technologies and human resources in the criminal justice system, as evidenced by the May 17, 2004 opening of the New Jersey Forensic Science Center, a state-of-the-art forensic laboratory that is part of the Department of Law and Public Safety and located in Hamilton Township, which provides critical technology to assist law enforcement in crime scene investigations and crime solving; and WHEREAS, the extraordinary resources of New Jersey’s state-of-the-art forensic science laboratory and county laboratories can be maximized to enable more effective crime solving and criminal prosecutions in all twenty-one (21) counties; and WHEREAS, it is in the public interest to optimize the efficiency and productivity of New Jersey’s forensic science laboratory by establishing and implementing best practices in the provision of forensic science services throughout the State in an ordered and coordinated fashion; NOW, THEREFORE, I, [...], Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, do hereby ORDER and DIRECT the following:
[brief] b.  A dog shall not be declared potentially dangerous for: (1) causing bodily injury to a person if the dog was provoked; . . . c.  As used in this section, “bodily injury” means bodily injury as defined in subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-1; and “serious bodily injury” means serious bodily injury as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:11-1.
[brief] He based his findings solely on objective evidence including his medical examination and the state and location in which the remains were discovered.  “[...]’s defense was that her statements to police were not credible and the product of coercion,” ([...] at 151), where, in contrast, the circumstances related to the location of [...]’s body are uncontested in this case and the information [...] relied upon in that regard were objectively true and not relegated to the fact-finding to be conducted by the jury.
[brief] The 2015 sentencing court found aggravating factor three based on [...]’s decision not allocute at his sentencing and the fact that he did not accept responsibility for his actions in his presentence interview with probation.  (2T:17-19 to 25)  (PSR 3)  It is evident that by the time of [...]’s resentencing, he had fully accepted responsibility for his actions and expressed remorse on multiple occasions, both in and out of the courtroom.
[brief] *Davis*, 363 N.J. Super. at 561.  As such, a “trial court is required to issue a ‘specific instruction’ even when the defendant’s misidentification argument is ‘thin. ’”  *Cotto*, 182 N.J. at 326 (citing *Davis*, 363 N.J. Super. at 561).  However, “[w]hile in some instances it may not be necessary to present an extended charge on identification, nevertheless, the complete absence of any reference to identification as an issue or as an essential element of the State's case is improper. ”  *Davis*, 363 N.J. Super. at 561.  For example, in *Cotto*, the Supreme Court found that the trial court’s jury instruction for identity was sufficient because it “emphasized the same common denominator” as the Model Jury Instructions, that is, “the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the wrongdoer. ”  *Id.* at 327.  In *Cotto*, the trial court specifically explained to the jury “that the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt ‘each and every element of the offense, including that of the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime and his participation in the crime. ’”  *Id.* at 326.  The Court opined that although the trial court did not use the word “identification” and “could have given a more detailed instruction,” it found that it did not err because the instructions “clearly explained the State’s burden to the jury. ”  *Id.*, at 327.  Here, the trial court did not err in failing to give alibi or identification jury instructions because the jury was sufficiently instructed that the State alone had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any and all elements of the crime, including identification of the suspect and his/her presence at the scene of the crime.  First, the trial court did not err in declining defendant’s request for an alibi instruction because defendant did not notify the State or the court of its intention to rely on an alibi until after both parties rested.
[brief] In a Judgment entered on May 8, 2023, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., found for Plaintiff in Docket No. [...] on all three bases of his challenge.  A copy of Judge Lynott’s Judgment and Statement of Reasons is included in Plaintiff’s Appendix.  (Pa. 333.)  Plaintiff’s challenge to the approval apparently led to the rush to adopt Ordinance 1423-21, which, in addition to permitting more than one principal building on lots on Lane Avenue, greatly expanded the geographic area governed by the Redevelopment Plan to include [...]. ³ (Pa 205, ¶8.)  --- ³As alleged in the Verified Complaint, Councilmen [...] and [...] publicly recused themselves from all matters related to development on Lane Avenue, including the vote to adopt Ordinance 1423-21.  However, during the Governing Body's discussion surrounding the introduction of Ordinance No. 1423-21 at its November 12, 2021, special meeting, the Borough Attorney asked the Borough Administrator, [...], whether the amendment made any changes to the regulations in the Redevelopment Plan governing development on Lane Avenue.  [...] falsely responded that the amendments did not relate to Lane Avenue.  As a result of the false information provided by the Borough Administrator, Councilman [...] voted to introduce Ordinance No. 1423-21.  Councilman [...] abstained.  (Pa 9, Verified Complaint, ¶¶39-41.)
[brief] Plaintiff filed the pending motion to file the Second Amended Complaint on October 7, 2021, and Counts 15, 16 and 17 are directed to defendant [...].  Fiberville Estate’s motion invoking Rule 4:6-2(e), yet effectively seeking summary judgment by using extensive extraneous materials, was an impermissible attempt to maneuver a “trial by papers,” and should have been denied out of hand.  Such extraneous matters, require the motion to dismiss be denied as one seeking summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2.  The SAC should have been permitted as the statutes of limitations governing Fiberville claims were not affected.
[brief] At the time of his conviction, defendant had been previously convicted of Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)2, the Judgment of Conviction for which was submitted to the Court.  (6T4-23 to 5-1).  The Court found Aggravating Factors 3, 6, and 9.  With respect to 3, the risk defendant will commit another offense, the Court discussed defendant’s criminal history, including a recent conviction for another firearm-related offense.  (6T29-6 to 30-22).  Pertinent to 6, the extent of the defendant’s prior criminal record and the seriousness of that record, the Court found that defendant’s history with weapons was sufficiently dangerous to the public to warrant the application of the factor.  (6T30-23 to 31-7).  Germane to 9, the need to deter this defendant and others from violating the law, the Court found both a specific need to deter this defendant, as well as a generalized need to deter others from committing crimes involving weapons.  (6T31-12 to 20).  The Court also found that the aggravating factors “clearly outweigh the mitigating factors[.]” (6T32-22 to 25).  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 requires a sentencing court to impose an extended term of imprisonment when a defendant who has previously been convicted of an assault with a firearm is subsequently convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm.
[brief] CONCLUSION TABLE OF ORDERS  June 4, 2024  Order of Judge [...], J.S.C. Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress……………………………………Da11  Trial Judge’s Oral Opinion Denying Motion to Suppress……………………………………1T 39-23 through 49-17  INDEX OF APPENDIX  Complaint-Summon No. [...], dated June 20, 2023…………………………………………………………………………Da1  Indictment No. [...], dated December 7, 2023………………………………Da8  Notice of Motion to Suppress filed by Defendant [...], dated February 22, 2023………………………………………………………………………………Da9  Criminal Action Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, dated June 4, 2024…………………………………………………………………………………Da11
[brief] (1)  There was and is a disputed issue regarding [...]’s liability for the spill in its capacity as a “Responsible Party,” and in turn allocation of some _____________________  3  [...] was required to make an application to the trial court for its fees and costs within 15 days of the Order, but ultimately never did so. or all liability among [...] and [...] for remediation costs.  (PPCIa435-37).  [...] is a “potentially responsible party” under the Spill Act.  N.J.A.C. 7:1J-1.4.  It was undisputed below that [...] had leased the subject property to truck, trailer, and container companies, like [...], to stage/store shipping containers containing waste oil.  (PPCIa391; PPCIa436).  [...] and [...] asserted certain claims and pled facts to prove [...]’s errors, omissions and liability for the spill, including (a) allowing companies such as [...] to park and stage trailers containing waste/bunker oil on the property; and (b) having failed to install a waste containment system to remediate spills, as it was required to do under certain environmental statutes and regulations.
[brief] Defendants fail to offer any evidence of “fraud, accident, surprise, irregularity” to overturn the Sheriff’s sale.  (January 22, 2024 T21)  Although Defendants offer the legal proposition that courts have the “inherent power to set aside a sale or to order redemption when there is an independent group for equitable relief, ‘such as fraud, accident, surprise, irregularity [or impropriety] in the sale and the like,’” (Defendants’ Brief at 20), Defendants fail to connect this holding to the facts of this case.  As argued above, the Sheriff’s posted judgment amount was properly approximate to the Final Judgment amount.  This is especially so when one considers that the Sheriff’s posted judgment amount was consistent with the amount reflecting the Arbitrator’s award of post-judgment interest at the default rate confirmed in the Award Judgments.  As such, the sale is valid and cannot be overturned on the grounds Defendants request.  Certainly, there has been no attempt by Defendants to make any factual showing of any kind to support a finding of fraud, accident, surprise, or irregularity in the posting of the judgment amount.  Accordingly, the sale cannot be re-conducted on this unjustified basis.  C.
[brief] In the first instance, the undisputed record demonstrates that Appellant lied about her physical condition and claimed that her ailments prevented her from working in order to secure alternative living expenses from [...], which claim [...] ultimately honored, paying a total of $17,112.39 in connection with that claim (Pa 132, Pa462-464).  Of that amount, [...] paid almost $15,000 for Appellant to stay in a hotel.  (Pa 463).  She further pressured [...] into housing her in a hotel until her apartment was mitigated by filing as well as the Complaint that Appellant filed with the Department of Banking and Insurance pursuant to the penalties of perjury (Pa133).  [...]’s claim payments in this regard are not in dispute nor is Appellant’s own email to [...] (Pa132) in which she lied about her physical condition.
[brief] The basis for New Jersey’s law in this area is founded upon the notion that an insurance company is an “expert in its field and its varied and complex instruments are prepared by it unilaterally whereas the assured or prospective assured is a layman unversed in insurance provisions and practices. ”  Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 305 (1965).  The Courts of our State acknowledge that, as a practical matter, “insurance contracts are not typically read or reviewed by the insured, whose understanding is often impeded by the complex terminology used in the standardized forms. ”  Bromfeld, supra, 298 N.J. Super. at 75.  Exclusions within insurance policies are viewed with even more scrutiny than other policy terms and conditions.  Provisions in a policy that limit coverage “must be construed narrowly” and it is “the insurer [who] bears the burden of establishing that an exclusionary provision of the policy applies. ”  Merck & Co., Inc. v. Ace American Ins. Co., 475 N.J. Super. 420, 434 (App. Div. 2023).  Consistent with the strict construction of insurance contracts in favor of the reasonable expectations of an insured and the general good of the consuming public, New Jersey Courts have acknowledged their primary role in vigilantly ensuring that insurance contracts are fair to consumers and comport with public policy.
[brief] Plaintiff failed to provide any argument that there are extraordinary and equitable reasons warranting an award of contract-rate post-judgment interest.  From the evidence presented at trial and the factual findings made by the Court, there are no extraordinary or equitable reasons justifying an award of contract-rate post-judgment interest in a simple breach of loan case.  Defendants raised this issue through a post-trial motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court.  The trial court based its decision as to post-judgment interest on the grounds that: (i) [...] failed to repay the alleged Third Loan; (ii) it may take years for Plaintiff to collect on his judgment and he should therefore obtain contract-rate post-judgment interest during that time period; and (iii) [...] lacked credibility.
[directive] II.  We note certain basic points at the outset.  First, each of the defendants for whom relief is now sought had a court hearing after their arrest, at which counsel represented them.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(d), (e).  At the hearings, 1  The numbers have been adjusted to account for eligible defendants detained in more than one case.  7 judges considered a broad array of factors to assess the level of risk each person posed.  See id. at -20.  The nature and degree of the charged offenses were only part of that review.  At hearings that involved certain serious charges, a presumption of detention applied, which a number of defendants were unable to rebut.  See id. at -19(b) (providing a rebuttable presumption of detention when the court finds probable cause that a defendant committed murder or any crime that exposes the person to life imprisonment).  In the larger group of cases that did not involve a presumption of detention, courts found by clear and convincing evidence that no combination of conditions of release “would reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process. ”  Id. at -18(a)(1).  Thus, each defendant ordered detained pretrial presented a high level of risk in at least one of three areas.
[directive] A.  Law enforcement considering charging a juvenile should first Juvenile Central Registry. ascertain the juvenile’s history by accessing the Juvenile Central Registry.  The results of this initial check may result in reconsideration of diversion, rather than formal charges.  The Juvenile Central Registry tab in eCDR is also where complaint entry is initiated.  older,11 B.  Fingerprinting is required when a juvenile, age fourteen or is Fingerprinting. charged on the basis of an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime.  agency12  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-61(a)(3).  In these circumstances, the charging shall take and  When probable cause exists and the victim objects to the stationhouse adjustment, the victim may request a formal 10 complaint.  This becomes a private citizen’s complaint; however, it is subject to review by a County Prosecutor, or designee, whose decision to proceed with a stationhouse adjustment, or to refer for formal charges, is controlling.  “Age fourteen or older” means that the juvenile was fourteen or older at the time the charged offense was 11 committed, not the date the complaint was signed.  “Charging agency” shall include a law enforcement agency which files a delinquency complaint signed by a 12 private citizen.  9 submit the fingerprints of the juvenile by using a Live Scan system, which includes designation of offenses charged.  The Live Scan fingerprinting must be completed before beginning an eCDR complaint.  Once the Live Scan record has been submitted and confirmation is received from the Computerized Criminal History (CCH) system and/or the data is displayed in eCDR, the law enforcement officer or agency shall begin generating a complaint in eCDR.  If a law enforcement agency is not equipped with a Live Scan system, the agency shall develop and implement a plan to ensure compliance with the requirements of this Directive, similar to what is required for compliance with Criminal Justice Reform.  All reasonable steps shall be taken by the charging agency to ensure fingerprinting occurs for those fourteen and older who are charged with an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime.
[directive] Six of the State’s mandatory minimum crimes relate to non-violent drug activity:  2C:35-3  Leader of narcotics trafficking network  2C:35-4  Maintaining or operating a facility producing a controlled dangerous substance (CDS)  2C:35-5  Manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing CDS  2C:35-6  Employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme  2C:35-7  Distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute CDS within 1,000 feet of a school 2C:35-8  Distribution of CDS to persons under age 18  Each of these statutes contain language regarding the imposition of mandatory terms.
[brief] Response Submission by [...]: Certification of [...], Esq., filed October 4, 2022 .................................................................  Pa938  Exhibit A - Planning Report submitted by [...], NJPP, dated September 20, 2022..............................................  Pa947  Exhibit B - Copy of [...] Ordinance §§ 345-82, et seq...........................................................................  Pa976  Exhibit C - Excerpts from Redevelopment Agreement between the [...] and [...], version 6 ....................... Pa982 Exhibit D - Excerpts from Redevelopment Agreement between the [...] and [...], version 7 ....................... Pa985 Exhibit E - Email, dated December 2, 2020, from [...], [...] Redevelopment Counsel, to [...], counsel to [...] .................................. Pa989 Exhibit F - SB Bldg. Assoc., L.P. v. Planning Board, Docket No. A-0200-14T1, 2017 NJ. Super, Unpub. LEXIS 36 (App. Div., Jan. 6, 2017) certif. den. 230 N.J. 424 (2017)..................... Pa991 Exhibit G - Agazzi v. Governing Body of the Borough of Red Bank, Docket No. A-4199-13T4, 2016 N.J. Super., Unpub. LEXIS 65 (App. Div., Jan. 13, 2016) .................................................................. Pa1001 Exhibit H - St. Paul's Missionary Baptist Church v. City of Vineland, Docket No. A-4945-06T3, 2008
[brief] POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND NO ENFORCEABLE ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXISTED (Da1, Da3)  On January 26, 2024, [...] responded to Defendants’ arguments on reconsideration by deciding not to premise her ruling against arbitration on the non-existence of an operative arbitration clause but instead premised her ruling on the Defendants’ express, on-the-record waiver of arbitration before [...].  4T45:16-46:19.  Thus, with regard to the January 30 Order, Defendants got reconsideration, but still did not prevail on their burden to overturn the October 17, 2023 Order that found no enforceable arbitration provision.
[brief] See *US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume*, 209 N.J. 449, 38 A. 3d 570 at 467-68 (2012) quoting *Iliadis v. WalMart Stores, Inc.*, 191 N.J. 88,123 (2007)(quoting *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  *State v. Chavies*, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021).
[brief] A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT BY THE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN [...]’S EXPENSES  [...]’s statement that a special assessment in 2016 by the condominium association was included as an allowable expense is erroneous.  No support exists for that conclusion, and Amaconn’s costs, as testified to by [...], omitted any special assessment.  3T:57:4-11, 58:1-59:10.  IX.
[brief] Nevertheless, [...] contends that all contractors and subcontractors “performing work on public projects”, no matter what type or category of work they perform, must be registered with the DOL pursuant to the PWCRA.  This argument made by [...] is not based upon any language in the PWCRA.  Rather, [...] attempts to somehow connect the New Jersey Municipal Mechanics Lien Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:44-125 et seq. (the “Municipal Lien Law”) and the New Jersey Construction Lien Law N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-1 et seq. (the “Construction Lien Law”) in support of this argument.
[directive] The defendant shall be discharged from the care and custody the Commissioner Health to await trial, and __ IT IS FURTHER ORDERED [ any additional conditions as ordered by the court .  _ 2. .,__ ------  3.  The next comt date for this matter shall be of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the of Court within two (2) days its signing.  I of2 by page (l Published Directive #17-18 l/01/2018), [...] (Competency Order 6A)