ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 2C:35-12, and judges have had no authority to impose a lesser sentence than the one calculated by the prosecutor under the Attorney General’s Brima_gg Guidelines.  Under the new law, judges now have independent authority to waive or reduce the mandatory minimum sentence, and may do so without the prosecutor’s concnlTence~  The revisions to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 were intended to address concerns about the broad geographic sweep of the school zone offense.  In some jurisdictions, and especially in densely populated urban areas, many if not most homes, businesses, parking lots, sidewalks, and roadways are situated within 1,000 feet of at least one school.  As a result, the school zone law’s mandatory minimum sentencing provisions can apply even though the offense conduct did not directly endanger schools or school-aged children.  This, in turn, can dilute the general deterrent effect of the school zone law, undermining its ability in urban precincts to discourage drug dealers from conducting their illicit activities near schools or in the presence of children.  The new legislation is designed to mitigate the geographic and associated demographic effects of the school zone law by giving trial courts the discretion to reduce the stipulated term of parole ineligibility, or even to impose a noncustodial probationary sentence, in cases where, for example, the judge finds that the school at the center of the protected zone was not in session and children were not exposed to the defendant’s drug distribution activities.  A conrt exercising its newly expanded sentencing discretion is thus expected to tailor individual sentences to reflect each defendant’s actual culpability as measured in terms of the specific harm that the school zone law is intended to redress, namely, exposing children to the violence and public disorder associated with the illicit drug trade.
[brief] Second, Plaintiff contends that his surprise affidavit, submitted for the first time in opposition to summary judgment nearly eight (8) months after the close of discovery, was not a sham affidavit as held by the trial court.  This similarly ignores the direct contradictions this affidavit contained when compared to the evidence in the record (during the discovery period).  Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, ignoring that this motion was denied on procedural grounds and that Plaintiff was instructed to re-file his motion by [...] during oral argument on the motion to quash, which Plaintiff elected not to do.  I.  PLAINTIFF CANNOT MEET HIS BURDEN TO APPORTION
[brief] Da 51.  In analyzing [...]’s equity in the Unit, the Board refused to consider inflation, the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) increase and market conditions between 1993 and 2017.  The Board ruled that [...]’s equity in the Unit was $24,675 and approved a total monthly rent increase of only $105.04.  Da 51.  [...] appealed the Board’s rulings to the Superior Court under Docket No. [...].
[brief] Respondent claims that posting the Ricci Act on the Division’s website is somehow adequate “notice” to all members and retirees enrolled in the State Police Retirement System.  Rb10.  However, this argument fails for several reasons.  The Ricci Act states:  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e).  Pursuant to the Ricci Act, the Board was required to provide notice to members and retirants in the system.  A website posting is not sufficient notice to retirees or active members of the retirement system.  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Appellate Division.
[brief] [...], Appellant, v. [...], [...], (Individually and in his Official Capacity); JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious names identities unknown), ABC CORPS. 1-10 (fictitious names identities unknown), Respondents.  RESPONDENTS  [...] AND JOSEPH A. MCCALLUM, JR.’S ANSWERING  BRIEF AND APPENDIX (Da1-Da2)  [...] 048051994  [...] 167512016  [...] 301412019  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondents
[brief] Davis v. Barkaszi, 424 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 2012)..........................  36  Dombrowska v. Kresge-Newark, Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 271 (App. Div. 1962) ................................................... 24, 25  Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super 136 (1997) ..........................................  14  Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1996).....................  15  Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 N.J. Super. 222 (Law Div. 1993) ...........  31  In re Bacharach, 344 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2001) ..................................  35  Ji v. Palmer, 333 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2000) ........................................  11  Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256 (App. Div. 1998) ....................................  15 Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517 (2001) ...................................................... 11, 12 Merchants Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2005) ..........................................................  13  Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968) .............................  14  Nagy v. Outback Steakhouse, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29288 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024)  ....................................  35  Nause v. Atlanticare Reg'l Med. Ctr. - Mainland Campus, 2019 WL 418065, at * 2 (App. Div. Feb. 4, 2019)  .......................................  34  Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559 (2003)  ..................................  22  Parmenter v Jarvis Drug Store, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1957) ...... 22 Petersen v. Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125 (App. Div. 2011) ..................  13 Ryans v. Lowell, 197 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1984) .................................  14  Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479 (2020)  ..........................................  11  Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32 (Law Div. 1990) ....................... 22 State v. Garland, 2022 WL 2659320 (App. Div. July 11, 2022) .....................  34  Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2001)  ......................  16, 19 Triffin v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004)  .............  13  Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426 (1966)  .......................  27  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] *Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little*, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994).  "The movant must demonstrate the circumstances are exceptional and enforcement of the judgment or order would be unjust, oppressive or inequitable."  *Johnson v. Johnson*, 320 N.J. Super. 371, 378 (App. Div. 1999).  If the loss of a family home in [...] is not exceptional, the loss of a vacant, abandoned, investment property owned by a business is even less so.  There must be some showing of irregularity to set aside a foreclosure.  *East Jersey Savings & Loan Association v. Shatto*, 226 N.J.Super. 473, 476 (Ch.Div. 1976), *Doyle v. Chase Manhattan Bank*, 80 N.J.Super. 105, 119 (App.Div.) cert. den. 40 N.J. 508 (1963) (absent showing of mistake or fraud the motion to vacate was properly denied), *Sandford v. Wellborn*, 85 N.J.Eq. 577, 587 (E&A 1916 (a final foreclosure decree, even by default, will not be vacated without a meritorious defense), *Hallowell v. Daly*, 56 A. 234, 235 (Ch. 1903) (no defense on merits shown, motion to vacate foreclosure denied).
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da251 Proposed Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da253  Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and In support of Its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 19, 2024 (Legal Argument Redacted Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)).
[brief] ”  *In the Matter of Stream Encroachment Permit*, 402 N.J. Super. 587, 597 (App. Div. 2008).  The Court “may not second-guess those judgments of an administrative agency which fall squarely within the agency's expertise. ”  *Id.* at 597 (citing *Brady v. Bd. of Review*, 152 N.J. 197, 210, (1997)).  “Courts generally defer to an agency's expertise on technical matters within the agency’s field of expertise. ”  *Id.* (citing *Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n*, 169 N.J. 579, 588 (2001)).  “Thus, if substantial credible evidence supports an agency’s conclusion, a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s even though the court might have reached a different result.
[brief] This argument is without merit.  The instant appeal springs from an appellate remand to the trial court for an *in camera* review of an unreleased criminal investigatory record.  After inspection of the document, the trial court ordered the release of certain information, with scarce explanation or legal analysis.  After both the Township and Respondent filed motions for reconsideration—the Respondent seeking prevailing party status and attorney’s fees and the Township for clarification and opposing the award of attorney’s fees—the trial court only then offered a determination that there was an improper denial of access under OPRA and granted Respondent’s motion.  Against this procedural backdrop, the only order from which the Township could legitimately appeal was from the trial court’s judgment as clarified by the trial court because of the parties’ cross-motions for reconsideration.  It was that ruling that resulted in an appealable determination and legal conclusion related to this OPRA matter after remand.  It is beyond dispute that a “trial court's determinations with respect to the applicability of OPRA are legal conclusions subject to de novo review."
[brief] [...] further accused the City of “unfairly and illegally favoring a competing developer and assisting its interference with [my] six-years effort to develop [the Property].”  (Id. at 19:11–14.)  Thus, as of the February 2020 City Council Meeting, [...] clearly claimed that both the City and [...] were acting in bad faith—indeed, illegally—in developing the Property.  (See id. at 18:11–19:19.)
[brief] [Pa93.]  The trial court denied the Bureau’s request for disgorgement despite its finding that [...] improperly transferred at least $1,500,000 of investor funds to [...] and that [...] had misused at least $1,500,000 of investor funds to pay for [...]’s personal expenses, for other non-business-related expenses, and to pay prior investors.  (Pa84).  The funds were transferred to [...]’s bank accounts, in part, because merchant cash advance companies who were factoring [...] and [...]’s receivables had closed out or otherwise prevented [...] from maintaining operable bank accounts.  (Pa89-Pa90).  However, investors were never informed of the merchant cash advance activity, nor of the fact that their funds would be diverted to [...] bank accounts.  (Pa84).  In addition, the trial court acknowledged the egregious nature of defendant [...]’s conduct and recognized that [...] was a key component that enabled defendants to engage in the deceptive practices that advanced the fraudulent scheme, including by submitting incomplete and falsely-certified financial disclosure statements to the Bureau, and [...]’s use of PPP and EIDL pandemic funds to repay some investors.
[brief] A.  The Anti-Eviction Act  The Anti-Eviction Act prohibits landlords from evicting tenants in apartment buildings with more than three units except for reasons specifically enumerated in the act.  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.  Under the Anti-Eviction Act, tenants who live in apartment buildings are protected from eviction, but if the owner converts the apartment building to condominiums, the tenants can be evicted.  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(k) (stating that the removal of tenants for condominium conversion purposes is permitted, but will not apply to Tenants who receive and maintain protection under the Tenant Protection Act of 1992).
[brief] Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221 (App. Div.1994) .................................................................29, 34, 35  Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70 (2005) .............................................................................................27  Zappasodi v. New Jersey, 335 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................................25  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 ..................................................................................................24, 26 N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8 .........................................................................................22 N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and (c) .................................................................................23, 24 N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1); (2) ..................................................................................28
[brief] A defendant attempting to prove his rights were violated under the first Hollander factor must show the evidence was destroyed or lost in bad faith.  201 N.J. Super. at 479.  “Bad faith is an essential element of a due process violation[.]”  State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 138 (App. Div. 2017).  Caselaw is clear that a mere mistaken failure to preserve a piece of evidence is insufficient to satisfy this requirement.  Peterkin, 226 N.J. Super. at 41-42 (stating that failure to preserve witness’s photographic array “constituted the product of mere negligence, however gross it may have been[,]” but was not bad faith. ); see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (finding that although State had failed to preserve semen samples in sexual assault case that defendant claimed could have exonerated him, this was not denial of due process as “[t]here was no indication that the police had acted in bad faith.
[brief] Respondent also argues that Appellant violated TILA and the accompanying regulations.  (Resp. Br. at 22-23 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(c).)  But these provisions do not apply to prepayments or partial payments of the ____________________ be based on “an interpretation of what does when due mean in paragraph 1. ” (1T55:18-20.) total, accelerated debt, or any payoffs of the loan.  Rather, by their very terms, these provisions apply to “periodic payments. ”  12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(c)(1)(i) (“No servicer shall fail to credit a periodic payment”); id. at ii (“Any servicer that retains a partial payment, meaning any payment less than a periodic payment …. ”).  As such, they do not apply to the short payoff that is the subject of this action.  C. APPELLANT DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 4A OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1T29:17-30:1.)
[directive] condition that the 86 Page de-escalation facto such de any of impact and occurrence the limit to Accordingly, or prosecutor assistant an Rule, governing Court the with compliance strict ensure to and practice to pursuant negotiations in participation plea judicial to consent not shall general attorney deputy supervisory from a consent such authorization for express obtaining without (c) :9-3  Rule 3 deputy or assistant supervisory Prosecutor, a or County the by designated prosecutor assistant cases in Justice Criminal Division of the of Director the by designated general attorney Division.  the by prosecuted 3:9- Rule under prosecutor required as the from consent without court, a that event  In the of term lesser a impose will court guilty the pleads defendant the if that defendant a advises 3(c), the to pursuant prosecutor the by tendered offer plea the by contemplated that than imprisonment advise promptly shall who superiors, her or his alert shall prosecutor the policy, plea escalating appropriate consider to Justice Criminal of Division of the Director the with consult and non-compliance reporting to:  limited be not need but include, might remedies  Such remedies.  County the by submissions written issuing authorities; judicial appropriate to Rule Court the with cases particular confirming in Division, the by prosecuted cases in Director the or Prosecutor, assistant that given the and bargaining not is in plea participation judicial to consent that or consent; such authority give to no has case handling the general attorney deputy or prosecutor otherwise or attend to general not attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an instructing proceeding.  3:9-3(c)  Rule a in participate immediately.  operational become shall Section  This REFORM LAW BAIL OF INTERPRETATION
[brief] Regardless of whether other witnesses were available, under the third Sanchez factor, police witnesses should not have been used to identify defendant because those witnesses had no independent knowledge of his appearance and “law enforcement lay opinion identifying a defendant in a photograph or video recording is not to be encouraged. ”  Id. at 472 (citation and quotation omitted).  Under the final Sanchez factor, given the quality of the footage and the witnesses’ lack of familiarity with [...], there was no reason they were “more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the [video] than the jury. ”  Id. at 473.  The State’s presentation of the six witnesses’ purported identifications of [...] from the critical video and in court invaded the jury’s province.  State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 427 (2016) (holding that “ultimate-issue testimony” regarding a defendant’s guilt “intrudes on the exclusive domain of the jury as factfinder”).  Whether [...] was the person firing the BB gun at [...] in the video was the ultimate issue at trial.  Therefore, viewing the video and determining whether it depicted [...] was the jury’s independent responsibility.  The jury’s exposure to extensive inadmissible lay opinion on the ultimate issue of identification violated [...]’s right to due process and a fair trial, compelling reversal of his convictions.
[brief] Finally, [...] makes a conclusory statement that it “does not believe that a 1.0 TREC factor is appropriate,” based upon modeling used, as well as the understanding that there are few large-scale United States projects to use as comparison.  Order at 5. (005a.)  The Board further notes, however, that the costs provided by the developers – one of the few entities in the United States building such a floating project – are not the same as the model, but [...] essentially does not believe them and they do not justify a higher TREC.  Id. at 6. (006a.)  So not only did [...] deny the 1.0 TREC, but it denied any TREC increase, even as it acknowledges that “hypothetical” information shows a significant cost increase is justified.  This is arbitrary and capricious, at a minimum.  Based upon that denial, this timely notice of appeal followed.
[brief] Plaintiff’s analogy fails.  The effects associated with a data breach where PII was disclosed to bad actors who then made fraudulent credit card charges and engaged in identity theft are plainly distinguished from this case.  First, the data breach cases involve the situation where there is no dispute that a bad actor has already obtained information that allows said bad actor to do harm like steal a person’s identity or to make fraudulent charges.  This is clearly distinguished from the facts here where there is no allegation that anyone has misused Plaintiff’s debt information.  Second, the data transmitted to [...]’s mailing vendor is nothing like a social security number or other sensitive information.  Plaintiff’s debt information merely consists of Plaintiff’s name, the fact that she owed money, the amount owed, the account number associated with the debt, and the dates and circumstances that lead to the debt.  This debt information, even if revealed to an unknown third party (there is no allegation of such disclosure) does not allow such third party to steal Plaintiff’s identity or cause Plaintiff any harm.  In fact, ironically, the only thing a person who obtains Plaintiff’s debt information could conceivably do is pay off the outstanding debt.  Third, unlike the PII associated with data breach cases, the debt information in this case has already been made public because Plaintiff herself has placed this information in the public domain when she filed for bankruptcy.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s reliance on data breach cases is misplaced and the Trial Court’s decision dismissing Plaintiff’s mailing vendor theory should be affirmed.6
[brief] Exhibit BB, Transcript of Hearing dated September 15, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit CC, Excerpt from NJ Turnpike Authority Manual for Construction, dated June 1987, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit DD, Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit EE, Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1577a)  Exhibit FF, NJ Turnpike Authority Health and Safety Plan Requirements, dated May 24, 2011, filed May 24, 2019 Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment of [...], filed May 24, 2019
[brief] E.  The State is Incorrect in the Assertion that [...]  Served as a Buffer During the Interrogation  In M.P., M.P.’s mother told him to speak with the police and tell them that although he witnessed the murder while holding a gun, he was not the shooter.  476 N.J. Super. at 298.  The Court found that M.P.’s mother did not serve as a buffer during the interrogation process.  Id. at 299.  The Court found M.P.’s mother’s participation or lack thereof, did not support the motion court’s finding that M.P. knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. ”  Id. at 300.  Here, After the two second consultation did not occur in private, Steven told [...] to “just tell these guys everything.  (1T:41-10 to 13);(7T:291-13 to 14).  Clearly, [...] did not act as a buffer during the interrogation process.