ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs’ Application to [...] and the Trial Court’s Orders  In October 1989, [...] amended its by-laws to first impose building height restrictions applicable to the Property.  (Da491; 618; 642; 650-57).  Relevant here are [...]’s “construction rules” that were adopted in February 2014 and which require approval from [...]’s “Building and Grounds Chairperson before any type of construction activity, including demolition begins. ” (Da63).  The rules also require approval from the “Developer and [...]/[...][.]”  Id.  Among other things, the rules restrict the maximum building height for properties (such as the Property) located in the “A” zone to 28 feet.  (Da636).  Plaintiffs sought to rebuild their home based upon updated FEMA regulations promulgated after Superstorm Sandy.  (Da243).  In September 2020, pursuant to the Genesis Deed’s grant of authority to [...], Plaintiffs submitted building plans to [...] for construction of a new single-family residence.
[brief] Haynes v. First National, 87 N.J. 163, 182 (1981).  In his Brief, [...] argues that the case should be remanded for a trial to determine whether [...]’s breach proximately caused [...]’s damages.  However, that argument misses the point that [...] never established an attorney-client relationship with [...], and that [...] has testified that he never would have retained [...] to represent him.  Accordingly, [...] properly granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and dismissed [...]’s claims.
[brief] [...], pursuant to Appellate Remand Order of 1/17/2002 Da41 Order 11/4/2011  Hon. P.  Maenza Da48 Order 2/6/2012, [...], Credit to Appellant ordered Da50 Order 6/28/2012, [...], Order Probation to hold a hearing Da50 Order 7/20/2012, [...], Order Probation to hold a hearing Da52 Order 10/11/2013, [...] Da55 Order 12/10/2014, [...] - Order pursuant to plenary hearing Order 10/27/2015, [...] – re Appellant’s motion & Respondent’s Cross-Motion filed 7/16/2020 Order 1/10/2019 [...] IWO 4/3/2023, 5/5/2023 Order 1/11/2022, [...] – re Motion to Enforce Order of 10/25/2021, Probation to provide full accounting Order 4/4/2022, [...] Motion to Enforce Order of 1/11/2022, Order 5/27/2022, [...], Motion for Reconsideration denied Appellate Remand Order 1/17/2002, [...]
[brief] The Borough also incorrectly alleges that [...]'s summary judgment motion was premised on one allegation, that "...the Borough's actions violated the Public Trust Doctrine regulations adopted by the [...] as set forth within N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48 and N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.0 which regulations do not require municipalities to do anything but only require them to consider and adopt Public Access Plans governing public access to the municipal waterfronts".  (DB17)  The Borough argues that the review process by the [...] only occurs once there is an actual development application requiring an [...] permit or approval under N.J.S.A. 13:1D-15.  In its Motion for Summary Judgment, [...] asserted that the Borough’s undisputed failure to consider the Common Law Trust Doctrine regulations adopted by the [...] and the Administrative Public Access Rule recently enacted by the [...] renders Ordinance 1667 (and the “Redevelopment Plan”) invalid, and that the Redevelopment Plan’s specific provision calling for the abolishment and closing of a long existing public access point and 300 public parking spaces is in violation of those State policies.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................. ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................  4  STANDARD OF REVIEW ON ORDERS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................  11 POINT I HISTORY OF THE LAW IN NEW JERSEY ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY  OWNER IMMUNITY FOR THE CONDITION AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC SIDEWALKS  ..................................................  11 POINT II  APPELLANT’S CONTENTION THAT THE [...]’ PROPERTY WAS A COMMERCIAL PROPERTY IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND SHOULD BE REJECTED ..................................................  18 POINT III  APPELLANT’S CONTENTION THAT THE [...] CREATED A NEW HAZARD OR EXACERBATED  AN EXISTING HAZARD SHOULD BE REJECTED ..................................................  25 POINT IV  THE MOTION COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR PUBLIC POLICY REASONS .................. 37
[directive] Table of Contents  Attorney General Guidelines for the Retention of Evidence .....................3  Introduction ........................ ........................ 3 Amendments ...............................................  3 Retention Schedule for Evidence ......................................  4 General Provisions ...........................................  4 Scope of the Guidelines - Applicability to Municipal Court Cases ........ 4 Development of Evidence Destruction Policy ..................... 4  Authorization Requirement .................................  4 Completion of Sentence ...................................  4 Items Not Needed for Prosecution ............................  4  Educational Use ........................................ 5  Timeframes for Evidence Destruction ...............................  5  1.  Homicide Evidence .................................... 5  2. Sex Crimes Evidence .................................. 5  3. Narcotic Evidence .................................... 6  4. Firearms Evidence .................................... 7  5.  Other Evidence ...................................... 8  6.  Special Circumstances .................................. 8  Other Requirements  Not Superseded by this Directive .......................9  Attorney General Guidelines - Evidence Retention - January 2011  Page 2  Attorney General Guidelines for the Retention of Evidence
[brief] The State would, at that time, be able to appeal any such decision both on the merits and in light of the issue preclusion arguments it raises.  This Court already said as much in denying the State’s application to file an emergent appeal on this issue:  We deny the application as non-emergent.  The State identifies the irreparable harm as the commencement of the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress.  The State contends the commencement of that hearing will render moot the State’s appeal of the January 24, 2025 order denying the State’s issue-preclusion motion and will deprive the State of having the opportunity to seek this court’s review of that order.  The State also contends the “motion date,” which we understand to mean the commencement of the suppression hearing, does not allow the State time to appeal the January 24, 2025 order.  We deny the application because the commencement of the hearing neither renders moot any appeal of the January 24, 2025 order nor prevents the State from seeking leave to appeal that order.  Pa 88-89 (emphasis added).  To be clear, the only asserted harm which the State could avoid through this motion for leave to appeal is the trial court taking testimony from a single police officer.  Any argument about protecting an interest in litigating the collateral estoppel issue is a red herring given the premature posture of this application and the State’s ability to pursue relief if suppression is granted.
[brief] The next issue I need to tackle is the proper time period for Defendants’ document collection and production efforts.  Plaintiffs have served document requests, seeking documents created from January 1, 2017 through June 30, 2020, the date [...] exited its bankruptcy proceedings.  Defendants maintain that the proposed time span is too broad, suggesting that I impose a July 1, 2017 through September 18, 2019 search period.  The parties explain their respective reasoning in great detail in their written submissions.  There is no need for me to rehash those arguments again here.  Suffice it to say that reasonable minds can disagree.  Although the scope of discovery is broad, it is not unlimited.  See Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) specifies that discovery must be “proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  Determining the appropriate time period for discovery requests is more of an art than a science, requiring district judges to use their experience and judgment to arrive at what they consider an appropriate time range.  As I noted at the oral hearing, it is my view that any date ranges I put in place are always subject to be expanded at a later date, based on how the discovery process unfolds.  After carefully considering the Rule 26(b)(1) factors, I have determined that the appropriate starting date for the document production is March 15, 2017.  Given the PSLRA discovery stay in effect for the new § 10(b) claims, the ending date for the document production is, for the time being, September 18, 2019, the day after the class period set forth in the Complaints that survived motions to dismiss.  I will revisit the appropriate ending date after a ruling is issued on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the new § 10(b) claims.  C.
[brief] Yes, providing co-employees with civil immunity is exactly what the Legislature intended, and this is precisely what has been re-affirmed for decades by this Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court.  This is the historical trade-off between no-fault workers’ compensation benefits and direct actions by one employee against another employee.  Hypothetically, if the decedent was 100% liable for the accident, she, her estate and her husband could nevertheless receive death and dependency workers’ compensation benefits – even though she caused her own accident and damages.  Contrary to a strong statutory scheme and decades of Appellate Division and Supreme Court opinions, plaintiff here wants to have the best of both worlds: lifetime workers’ compensation benefits from a work-related accident under the Workers’ Compensation Act, as well as civil damages in a civil suit.
[brief] That is at best a half-truth.  [...], [...]’s expert in the Underlying Action, testified that “most studies would indicate that urine is probably the best test for looking for mycotoxins. ”  Da1609a.  But read in context with the preceding question, [...] testified “that urine is not an appropriate fluid for evaluate[ing] mycotoxins, but if someone is trying to find them, urine is where they should look. ”  Da1609a.  Thus, [...]’ testimony is consistent with the FDA and CDC and [...] in confirming that [...] relied on an unvalidated urine analysis.  [...] also criticizes the trial court’s findings that [...]’s opinion was not credible because it “was not backed up by scientific studies[.]”
[brief] In that regard, we must mention the following:  The overall size of the subject pothole is approximately 4-feet in length (measured perpendicular to the roadway) and 12-inches wide (measured parallel to the striping).  It is estimated that the deepest portion of the pothole approximates 18-inches long by 12-inches wide by a minimum of 2-inches deep (the depth of the surface course).  (Pa 609: report of [...].)
[directive] Crimes  Aggravated Arson ................................................................................................................................................................................... 34, 35  Aggravated Assault ..................................................................................................................................................................... 18, 19, 20, 22  Aggravated Assault by Auto or Vessel .............................................................................................................................................. 20, 21, 22  Arson ............................................................................................................................................................................................................  35  Bad Checks ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 48, 49  Bias Intimidation ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 33, 34  Bribery in Official and Political Matters ......................................................................................................................................................... 53  Burglar’s Tools ..............................................................................................................................................................................................  17  Burglary .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 37, 38  Carjacking ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 32  Causing Death or Injury while Driving with Suspended License or without a License ...................................................................................  81  Certain Persons Not to Have Weapons ........................................................................................................................................................ 79  Community Supervision for Life / Parole Supervision for Life - Violations ..................................................................................................... 82
[brief] Defendants.  In the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket [...]  On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION: MERCER COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: [...], J.S.C. [...], J.S.C. Brief of [...], [...](#5355), [...], [...] (#5346), [...] (#5027), [...] (#5079), [...] (#5600), [...] (#5391), and [...] (#5387)
[directive] Joint Investigation refers to cases in which one or more foreign, federal, state or local law enforcement agencies participate in an investigation with a Treasury investigative agency.  gross  Net from Procwdrrefer to the forfeited cash or receipts the sale of forfeited property kexpense.  la^  Use Official refers to the utilization of property in the performance of the activities of an agency. of Purchase Evidence (POE) refers to the purchase of evidence that is pursuant to an investigation.  Purchase of Information (PO0 refers to the purchase of information that is pursuant to an investigation.
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...]  .................................................................  Da 1-5  Order Denying Suppression ........................................................................  Da 6  Order Denying Reconsideration .................................................................  Da 7 Plea Form ..................................................................................................  Da 8-13 Judgment of Conviction ...........................................................................  Da 14-17 Notice of Appeal .......................................................................................  Da 18-22 Disc of Bodycam Footage .......................................................................  Da 23 Offense/Incident Report Cover Sheet .........................................................  Da 24-25 Supplemental Offense Report ....................................................................  Da 26-29  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] On March 27, 2024, the United States District Court dismissed the Appellant’s federal claims with prejudice as time-barred (Pa108-109).  Applying N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the United States District Court made a finding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the not-guilty verdict (June 6, 2017), not when the judgment of acquittal was entered (July 31, 2017).
[brief] 48 N.J. at 341, 225A, 2d at 356.  According to the categorization that can be made of the situations which would warrant redress, the [...]’s knew nothing about the default judgment against them until 14 YEARS LATER which articulates similar circumstances and facts that warrant redress surrounding this defendant’s case in front of this court.  In the [...]’s case the trial court had originally vacated the judgment but was overturned in the Appellate Division yet only to be reversed and the order of the trial court was reinstated as the [...]’s ultimately had their default judgement vacated due to exceptional circumstances.  [...]’s case in its essence pertaining to improper service and having a default judgement rendered against them PRECISELY “mirrors” the very UNDERPINNINGS of this case before this court.
[brief] This, of course, only served as a benefit to the Respondents who clearly did not want to hear public discontent with their Amended Application.  It is not in the trial court’s discretion to thwart an enthused public simply because the enthusiasm does not match the Respondents.  The process created by the trial court was the antithesis of maximizing public participation.  It also unfairly and unreasonably limited the Appellants, the [...], and their professionals from engaging in matters obviously concerning the Township.  This process was created under the guise of fairness, but in reality, created imbalance decidedly in favor of the Respondents.
[brief] ”  Id., at 263.  Additionally, in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Fiouris, 395 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 2007) this court opined that based upon the IFPA’s language that “an insurance company damaged as a result of a violation of any provision of this act may sue therefore in any court of competent jurisdiction”  “It [was] clear from this provision that the Legislature did not contemplate that a claim of a violation of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act would be heard by an arbitration. ” citing to Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 173-74 (2006).  However, notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court below failed to follow this court’s legal precedent, failed to give any effect to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute as written, failed to take into consideration the legal and administrative inadequacies and shortcomings of the [...] forum rather choosing to inappropriately engage in statutory construction when the language of the IFPA is plain and unambiguous.
[directive] In order to facilitate safe press coverage of First Amendment activity, law enforcement and members of the press should consider adopting the following best practices:  1.  Pre-event coordination.  Law enforcement and press should maintain open lines of communication prior to a protest to ensure that all parties are aware of any plans for law enforcement presence and have the opportunity to discuss the logistics of press access.  2.  Liaison for the press.  Law enforcement agencies should designate a lead agency liaison that the press may contact with all inquiries and issues before and during the event.  Members of the press should, when practical, identify themselves to the liaison in advance.  3.  Visible press identification.  Members of the press should wear clearly visible identification— such as large, brightly colored and reflective, double-sided press identification cards to be worn around the neck, including, but not limited to, those issued by the [...] ([...]) and [...] ([...])—or clothing—such as neon-colored or reflective vests—that identify individuals as press.  Such identifiers help facilitate press access to events, and allow officers to distinguish press from other members of the public.
[brief] We’re not gonna search it on the consent.  We’d wind up going back to our headquarters to write a search warrant, we’ll come back.  And make entry into the house.  So basically you’re saving us some time here and you’re saving yourself a little bit of heart ache.  We write a search warrant, we’re gonna tear through the house.  You know what I mean?  [(1T63-25 to 64-6; Da15 3:24:21 to 3:24:38; Da25). ]  To this defendant replied, “You guys did that one time . . . “ (Da15 3:24:38 to 3:24:46; Da25).  In response to further questions by defendant, an officer again informed defendant that they would “petition the court for a search warrant” if he refused to consent.  (Da15 3:25:06 to 3:25:09; Da26).  Defendant then asked the officers to call his wife first and let her know that they are coming to the house for a search.  (Da15 3:25:26 to 3:25:28; Da26).  Police refused this request, explaining that such an advanced warning could risk the destruction of evidence.  (1T65-2 to 6; Da15 3:25:28 to 3:25:49; Da26).  But recognizing the importance that defendant placed on respect for his wife, officers explained to him that “we’re gonna let you knock on the door, we’ll let you go in first, say honey I’m here.  We’ll let you do that first, we’re gonna give you that courtesy, but we can’t let you make any phone calls. ” (Da15 3:25:49 to 3:25:56; Da26).  Defendant then signed a consent-to-search form, in which he confirmed that he consented “without pressure” and that he understood he had the “right to refuse to consent.
[brief] 173 (2012) | 23 | | Kopin v. Orange Prods., Inc., 297 N.J. Super. 353 (App. Div. 1997) | 21 | | Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404 (1991) | 57 | | Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545 (2000) | 23, 24 | | LaPlace v. Briere, 404 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 133 (2009) | 46 | | Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009) | 27, 28, 29 | | Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973) | 23 | | Maintainco, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift America, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 502 (2009) | 42 | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.
[brief] Da138.\(^7\)  The referenced “updates” were in fact emails from [...] to [...] with excel spreadsheet attachments and can be grouped into two categories.  The first were marked as [...] Exhibits Nos. 5-12 and consist of emails from an [...] representative to a [...] representative that listed [...]’s calculations of its quarterly installment payment it was wiring to [...] for ongoing projects (the “Financial Reporting”).
[brief] (2T16-6 to 9; 12-11 to 17)  Without a trusted support network at home, [...] “turned to what had become a negative peer group to give him the support that he needed[.]”  (2T12-4 to 6)  In that acute moment of vulnerability and need, [...] “found himself influenced and coerced by others, including the two individuals who were involved in the slaying of the [...][.]” (2T44-15 to 17)  In light of this unrebutted expert testimony, the court was required to attribute significant mitigation to Miller factor 2.  It did not do so.