ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Defendants also detailed their well-founded concerns that Plaintiffs would weaponize the production of such documents.  In a related litigation in Nevada, Plaintiff’s affiliates posted documents designated as “Attorneys Eyes Only” and “Confidential” on a public, anti-United website.  Da124-25 ¶ 19; see also Da143 ¶¶ 3-6.  Because of how damaging these actions were, a court in Arizona presiding over another related case ordered extra confidentiality protections for productions, Da128-41, allowing defendants to redact sensitive but irrelevant information from otherwise responsive documents.  Da132-35.  In addition, Defendants set forth the significant expense associated with the ESI Order.  The United Defendants estimated that conducting the additional privilege review at that time would have cost over $750,000.  Da126 ¶ 23.  [...], meanwhile, had already completed its entire ESI production in the case, applying the parties’ past practice and understanding that the parties would review the search term “hits” for responsiveness and relevance before production.  T35:9-37:12.  [...] advised that the July 6 Directive would impose a “substantial cost” by necessitating an additional privilege review, and would similarly force production of tens of thousands of irrelevant documents.  Id. E. Rule 4:105-4 Pre-Motion Conference And The ESI Order
[directive] New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable interface (“Statewide API”)—software that will make ALPR data accessible statewide— and mandates standard data formats to make ALPR information consistent across agencies, without requiring additional agreements between agencies.  period.  Decreases retention period for both ALPR data and records from five  Retention • years to three years.  data.  Lays out release process for ALPR data in criminal prosecutions.  Release of ALPR • Audits.  Mandates annual audits of each agency’s ALPR program.  • Training.  Establishes specific training requirements for all agency users authorized by • their law enforcement executive to use ALPRs and access ALPR data.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the directives outlined below.
[brief] Namely, Plaintiff argues the expert report of [...], Plaintiff’s former treating physician, shows substantial loss of bodily function.  Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s own testimony, including Plaintiff having a sharp pain in her ankle, her ankle being stiff and locking up, and Plaintiff’s inability to use stairs without holding a railing, shows Plaintiff has a substantial loss of bodily function.  However, as succinctly stated by the trial court, “the record does not demonstrate that Plaintiff has suffered a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial.
[brief] Moreover, “courts will not inquire into the motivation of a police officer whose stop of an automobile is based upon a traffic violation committed in his presence. ”  State v. Kennedy, 247 N.J. Super. 21, 29 (App. Div. 1991).  Police are permitted to use a traffic infraction as a pretext to stop a vehicle on a hunch that it will lead to reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a more serious crime.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Kennedy, 247 N.J. Super. at 29 (“The fact that the justification for the stop was pretextual [is] . . . irrelevant. ”).  In fact, New Jersey police are instructed that when they suspect a vehicle’s occupants of “possible criminal activity,” they are permitted to “watch [the vehicle] for a few moments from a discreet distance (without activating [their] overhead and ‘takedown’ lights),” in the hope of “fortuitously observ[ing] a very minor Title 39 violation” that will serve as a valid “pretext” to stop the car for the purpose of “pursu[ing] an investigation into matters that are wholly unrelated to the observed Title 39 infraction,” e.g., “an investigation into whether the driver is [in possession of contraband].
[directive] [...] argued the cause for appellant (Law Offices of [...], attorneys; [...] and [...], on the briefs).  [...], Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent ([...], [...], attorney; [...], of counsel and on the briefs).  [...] argued the cause for amici curiae [...] and [...] ([...] Foundation, and [...], Public Defender, attorneys; [...], [...], and [...], Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).  1
[directive] •  Charge the weapon with a loaded magazine.  •  On command, from standing shoulder ready, muzzle depressed position, fire a semi-automatic double tap or an automatic 2 round burst in 3 seconds.  • Repeat drill 4 times, firing a total of 10 rounds.  ---STOP TIME--- 7 yard line.  10 rounds.  Semi-automatic or automatic mode.  Each drill - Time: 3 seconds.  2 round automatic burst or semi-automatic double tap.  •  On command, from standing shoulder ready, muzzle depressed position, fire a semi-automatic double tap or an automatic 2 round burst in 3 seconds.  • Repeat drill 4 times, firing a total of 10 rounds.  ---STOP TIME--- 10 yard line.  10 rounds.  Semi-automatic or automatic mode.  Each drill - Time: 3 seconds.  2 round automatic burst or semi-automatic double tap.  (Total 10 rounds).  •  On command, from standing shoulder ready, muzzle depressed position, fire a semi-automatic double tap or an automatic 2 round burst in 3 seconds.  • Repeat drill 4 times, firing a total of 10 rounds.  ---STOP TIME— • Reload if necessary 15 yard line.  10 rounds.  Semi-automatic mode.  Drill 1 - Time: 6 seconds.  2 rounds.  Semi-automatic double tap.  (Total 6 rounds).  •  On command, from standing shoulder ready, muzzle depressed position, fire a semi-automatic double tap in 6 seconds.  Place 9-60 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards weapon on safe and return to ready position.  • Repeat drill 2 times, firing a total of 6 rounds.  ---STOP TIME--- Drill 2 - Time: 10 seconds.  4 rounds.  •  On command, from standing shoulder ready, muzzle depressed position, fire 4 rounds in 10 seconds.  ---STOP TIME--- 25 yard line.  10 rounds.  Semi-automatic mode.  Each drill - Time: 10 seconds.  5 rounds.  •  On command, from standing shoulder ready, muzzle depressed position, fire 2 rounds standing then 3 rounds kneeling.  Place weapon on safe and return to ready position.  •  Repeat drill 1 time, firing a total of 10 rounds.  ---STOP TIME--- END NIGHT COURSE, SCORE TARGETS 9-61
[brief] Previously, the building was under the management of [...], which then became [...].  (Pa585).  The building at [...] was constructed in 1890.  (Pa422).  The front entry steps are concrete and are open to the elements, and there are five “steps” to the staircase, though the second step down upon exiting is a “landing” of approximately 3-feet length.  (Pa455-458).  The steps are uneven in tread length and in riser height (Pa455-458) and have a rough, uneven exterior appearance.  (Pa383; Pa394; Pa400-403; Pa420; Pa462; Pa480-489).  The [...] hired independent contractors or a “group of maintenance guys” to remove snow and ice and to apply deicing agents upon any inclement weather.
[brief] The statutory provision under which he was convicted makes it unlawful to torment, torture, maim, hang, poison, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abuse, or needlessly mutilate an animal.  The State indicated it was proceeding under the theory that [...]’s actions constituted “unnecessarily or cruelly beating” or “cruelly abusing” the animal.  The Legislature’s insertion of the qualifiers “unnecessarily” and “cruelly” indicates that simply striking an animal, or subjecting it to treatment that is merely harsh or unkind, is not criminalized by that provision of the law.  Although these words were central to the elements of the offense submitted to the jury, the terms were never defined for the jurors.  Because “cruelty” in other legal contexts, including child cruelty cases, requires something beyond harsh or unkind treatment – in particular, the infliction of pain and suffering – the jury instructions in this case, which omitted any attempt to define “cruelty,” were so deficient as to require reversal of [...]’s conviction.  The failure to instruct jurors that they must find pain and suffering was particularly likely to produce an unjust result in light of the State’s veterinarian’s testimony that the dog was healthy and free from any signs of bruising, trauma, or fractures, and the State’s remarks in summation that the jury need not find injury in order to convict.  And, given the lack of evidence that [...] acted “cruelly” or “unnecessarily,” the offense of fourth-degree animal cruelty should never have been submitted for the jury’s consideration.
[brief] Restitution’s purpose is to rehabilitate, not punish, the defendant and to compensate the victim.  *State v. DeAngelis*, 329 N.J. Super. 178, 190 (App. Div. 2000); *State in Interest of R.V.*, 280 N.J. Super. 118, 122 (App. Div. 1995).  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b) requires a court to sentence a defendant to pay restitution “if: (1) [t]he victim, or in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the victim, suffered a loss; and (2) [t]he defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution. ”  In determining the amount of restitution, a court must “take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(1); see also *State v. Williams*, 467 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2021).  “When a sentencing court has not conducted a meaningful evaluation of a defendant’s ability to pay, appellate courts routinely vacate restitution orders and remand for reconsideration.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT MADE A MISTAKE IN ADMITTING PLAINTIFF’S BOOKS AND RECORDS INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE THEY ARE HEARSAY  (Not raised below)  Db20  A.  Plaintiff did not file an affidavit.  Db21  B.  Plaintiff’s certification is insufficient because (a) it is not an affidavit, (b) there is no personal or actual knowledge and (c) there is no evidence that Declarant is “competent to testify. ”  Db24  C.  Admission of Cardmember Agreement and statement of accounts was not harmless error by lower Court.  Db25
[brief] \textsuperscript{14}It bears noting that the DOC did not provide any testimony or any reports that it conducted any sort of investigation regarding the Facebook post on a selected webpage as such a posting would certainly be in violation of a number of HRB’s.  \textsuperscript{15}Many of the HRB violations appear to mirror \textit{N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1) through (11)}.  Where these mirror, or are duplicative of, the Administrative Codes, [...] will rely upon the substantive arguments in those sections.
[brief] In N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j, the Legislature provides as follows:  To the extent that any of the improvements have been dedicated to the municipality on the subdivision plat or site plan, the municipal governing body shall be deemed, upon the release of any performance guarantee required pursuant to subsection a. of this section, to accept dedication for public use of streets or roads and any other improvements made thereon according to site plans and subdivision plats approved by the approving authority, provided that such improvements have been inspected and have received final approval by the municipal engineer.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j.  That section makes clear that once a municipality releases a developer’s performance guarantee in connection with a street that has been dedicated to the municipality on the subdivision map, the municipality is deemed to have automatically accepted the dedication of such street without any further action.  (Ibid.)  Given that N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j creates a conclusive presumption of dedication, there are literally no other issues relevant to this analysis.
[brief] However, four months later the claims adjuster rescinded the offer, indicating that only $15,000 of coverage was available pursuant to the step-down provision.  Appellants correctly note that the Court held that the step-down provision was unenforceable as it was contrary to the insured’s reasonable expectations as to coverage given the declarations page at issue.  That is, the declarations page listed bodily injury limits of $100,000/$300,000 but did not alert the insured that the coverages and limits of liability were subject to the provisions of the policy.  However, central to the Court’s decision was the fact that the policy at issue provided primary auto insurance, and the Court expressly noted that similar step-down provisions and Injury to an Insured exclusions have been upheld under different types of policies.
[brief] ”  Defendant points to the Staff Commentary’s approval of the use of an agent to send validation notices.  A validation notice is a writing required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) to be sent to the consumer either with or within five days after each debt collector’s initial communication.  *Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC*, 829 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016).  The Staff Commentary requires the agent to disclose the agency relationship.  Here, Defendant’s letter (Pa24) includes a validation notice but it does not disclose any agency relationship and there is nothing in the record suggesting the mail vendor is Defendant’s agent.
[brief] §§ 541(a) and 1306(a); see In re Bowker, 245 B.R. 192 (Bankr. N.J. 2000).  Section 1306(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states that “[e]xcept as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate. ”  See In re Bowker, supra.  § 1303 gives the debtor the right to use property of the estate to the exclusion of the trustee.  *Bowker, supra*.  As a result, “[i]t can be argued that a debtor’s right to ‘use’ property of the estate would include the debtor’s right to continue to prosecute or defend a cause of action that became property of the Chapter 13 estate.
[brief] (Pa116).  By way of example and not limitation, Tenant argued that its liability to Landlord should be offset because, had it not been in default, Tenant would have been entitled to certain construction reimbursement payments (the “**Tenant Allowance**”) under Section 4.02 of the Lease\(^2\).  (Pa116).  Tenant further argued that, due to, *inter alia*, COVID-19, --- \(^2\)  As discussed more fully below, pursuant to Section 4.02 of the Lease, Landlord was required to make six (6) annual Tenant Allowance payments to Tenant beginning on August 1, 2019 and ending on August 1, 2024.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Tenant’s entitlement to these annual reimbursements payments, however, is expressly conditioned on Tenant being, among other things, current on its monetary obligations under the Lease when the payments come due.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Here, it is undisputed that, due to the Events of Default, Tenant was in default of its monetary obligations under the Lease when the August 1, 2020 and August 1, 2021 Tenant Allowance payments came due.  (Pa107; Db10).  As such, pursuant to the terms of the Lease, Tenant forfeited the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments and Landlord had no obligation to pay the same.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  On November 29, 2021, Tenant cured the Events of Default by depositing the Rent Arrears to the Clerk of Court.
[brief] That the registration requirement is contingent upon on-site activities is consistent with the Legislature’s intent when enacting the PWCRA.  1436a (noting that the Legislative intent of the PWCRA is to require “certificates of registration at all times be maintained at each worksite of the public works project and made available for inspection by representatives of the Department of Labor. ”)  Since the archaeological subcontractor in this case (like the surveyor in [...]) is required to perform work on site as a subcontractor to the general contractor, there can be no dispute that it must be PWCRA-registered.
[brief] Constitutional Framework.  Significantly, defendants have come forward with no meaningful response to plaintiffs’ argument that LTTEL must be construed against the background of the Uniformity Clause, N.J. Const. Art. VIII, Section 1, Par. 1(a), and the Blighted Areas clause, N.J. Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 3, par 1, the taxation provisions that set the constitutional framework for grants of tax exemption.
[directive] Internal Affairs Unit or Function 4.0.1  Every law enforcement agency shall establish, by written policy, an internal affairs unit or function.  Depending upon the need, the internal affairs function can be full- or part-time.  In either case, this requires the establishment of a unit or the clear allocation of responsibility and resources for executing the internal affairs function.  The unit will consist of agency personnel assigned to internal affairs by the law enforcement executive.  Personnel assigned to the internal affairs function serve at the pleasure of and are directly responsible to the law enforcement executive or the designated internal affairs supervisor.  4.1
[directive] Bail  Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option $100,000 to $250,000  No 10%  Actor uses force or threats during theft or attempted theft; second degree; if act is committed  1st Degree 2C:15-1  Robbery while armed, or threatening use of weapon or there is attempt to inflict or does inflict serious bodily injury, first degree.  2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000  No 10%  2C:15-2a  Carjacking  Actor uses force or threatens victim during the course of a theft of a motor vehicle.  1st Degree $100,000 to $250,000  No 10%  32  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] ........................................................................................................52  I.  [...] IS NOT A “USCCESSFUL CLAIMANT” UNDER THE TEXT OF RULE 4:42-9(A)(6) (Pa0043; Pa0050-52; Pa0220)  ................................52  A.  A De Novo Standard Of Review Applies To The Successful Claimant Issue (Not Raised Below)  ................................53  B.  [...] Was Unsuccessful On Key, Dispositive Issues (Pa0052; Pa0054; Pa0220)  ..............................................55  1.  Choice of Law (Pa0054; Pa0220) .................................................................55  2.  Losses Related to Amounts Recoverable by [...] (Pa0050-55; Pa0220)  .............................................57  C.  [...] Was Unsuccessful On The Majority Of The Substantive Issues In This Case (Pa0050-55; Pa0220) ....................58
[brief] Defendant unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective economic advantage by forming [...] to operate [...] instead of [...], then selling [...] and excluding [...] from participating in her new pharmacy, which she formed with Plaintiff’s money while she was his partner (3T129:4).  Defendant committed fraud by lying to Plaintiff about what she paid herself, and about his partnership status in 2016.  (3T152:11-14 and 3T154:10 to 155:3).  She inflated company expenses, payroll, and other transactions so that Plaintiff would not be aware of what she stole from the company and paid to herself and/or members of her family.  (Pa552-667).  Plaintiff relied upon her lies to his detriment and sustained damages in the amount set forth in [...]’s report to the tune of $420,888.\(^9\) (Pa552-667).  Defendant also violated the LLC Act by not accounting to Plaintiff, by forming a competing pharmacy with [...]’s money, giving away the company vehicle as a gift, etc. (3T165:21).  She breached her duty of care by not maintaining a general ledger or comparable books and records (3T132:5-9), by allowing the $100,000 judgment against [...], et al., in favor of [...] to be vacated with prejudice, and by not even knowing she had done so.  (3T158:17 to 159:2).  Based on the forgoing, Plaintiff has established by clear and convincing evidence that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law, and the verdict in favor of Defendant was so far contrary to the weight of the evidence as to give rise to the inescapable conclusion of mistake, passion, prejudice, or partiality.
[brief] *Tumino v. Long Beach Tp.*, 319 N.J. Super. 514, 517-18 (App. Div. 1999) (approving dock extension because it would not interfere with navigation channels); *Hall Harbor Yacht Basin v. Department of Env. Prot.*, 1987 ENV LEXIS 117 at *7 (Oct. 19, 1987); *Misiak v. Walker, Department of Env. Prot.*, 1994 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1109 at *13-14 (Nov. 9, 1994).  Appellant simply disagrees with [...]’s application of its regulations to the facts in this case and has failed to advance any viable claims that the [...] dock encroaches on the marked navigational channel.  Furthermore, [...]’s interpretation that the “navigation” portion of the Recreational Docks and Piers Rule references navigational channels makes sense.  Specifically, focusing on state and navigational channels makes the best use of [...]’s limited resources and provides the kind of “comprehensive regulation of the State’s coastal areas” the Legislature charged [...] to undertake.  *Last Chance Dev. P’ship v. Kean*, 119 N.J. 425, 430 (1990).  Conversely, interpreting the navigation rule as requiring [...] to consider navigational impacts to each and every private dock owner based on their neighbor’s particular navigational use would be arbitrary, because [...] is not in the business of dictating specific navigation paths to its permittees.
[directive] 5.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice  2  A copy of this Policy can be found at https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/useofforce2001.pdf.  Page 3 throughout the state.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.
[directive] Impact on Practice; Court Rule Amendment of of  In terms the impact on practice this legislative change, first, the change of to subsection (t) N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20) requires Pretrial Services to issue a no release recommendation for defendants charged with specific Graves Act offenses.  of  Given the nature and history the Graves Act, this includes certain violent and of serious offenses when the defendant used or was in possession a firearm.  The amendments to the CJRA also identify specifically excluded Graves Act offenses of on that will not their own result in a recommendation no release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(t).  of  Second, the addition paragraph (g) to N.J.S.A.  2A:162-19 creates a new of category for purposes detention hearings.  While defendants charged with the crimes set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(g) and 2A:162-20(t) are still subject to a of presumption release, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(g) allows the court to give greater if of weight to the Pretrial Services recommendation no release the court fmds probable cause that the eligible defendant committed certain crimes for which the of eligible defendant would be subject to a mandatory term imprisonment pursuant of to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) for a crime involving the use or possession a firearm.  of does not  Importantly, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(g) create a presumption detention for defendants charged with Graves Act offenses.