ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Township is required to publish the purpose of the Ordinance not the purpose of the redevelopment plan. ”  (Pa61).  The reason for this is simple—the other information in the April 8 Notice as required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a), includes “the time and place when and where [the ordinance] will be further considered for final passage . . . and the time and place when and where a copy of the ordinance [and the Redevelopment Plan] can be obtained without cost by any member of the general public who wants a \textsuperscript{11}
[brief] ”).  Similarly, as confirmed by [...], the Firm’s false statements were material to the risk assumed by [...] because the charges by the Office of Attorney Ethics spoke “directly to the heart of a lawyer’s honesty and integrity. ”  [Pa446a, ¶ 21]  As [...] held, “It does not require a leap of faith or speculation to reach the single, unavoidable conclusion that when attorney knowingly engages in unethical conduct over a prolonged period of time and provides false information and records to the Office of Attorney Ethics, provides an increased risk for a malpractice insurer than an attorney who does not engage in this misconduct and that the insurer may choose not to offer malpractice insurance to this attorney or firm.
[brief] On August 11, 2011, Defendant was issued 5 summonses: Summons No. [...] charged him with reckless driving contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; Summons No. [...] charged him with DWI contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; Summons No. [...] charged him with failure to maintain lane contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-88b; Summons No. [...] charged him with driving while suspended contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; and Summons No. [...] charged him with failure to produce a valid drivers’ license contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.
[brief] Elements of an FDCPA Cause of Action  Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, the FDCPA “grants a private right of action to a consumer who receives a communication that violates the Act. ”  Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).  Indeed, “Congress intended the Act to be enforced primarily by consumers. ”  FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1980).  The FDCPA is a strict liability statute which provides for damages and attorney’s fees upon the showing of just one violation.  McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 807 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2015) (strict liability); Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011) (strict liability citing, in footnote 7, supporting authorities from the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits as well as the Seventh); *Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand*, 103 F.3d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1997) (single violation); *Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau*, 6 F.3d 60, 62-3 (2d Cir. 1993) (single violation).
[brief] The Administrator’s Motion Seeking Court Approval of His Forensic Investigation Report, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Same, Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion, and the Court’s Approval of the Administrator’s Motion and Denial of the Cross-Motion. **  On January 9, 2018, the Administrator filed a motion seeking court approval of his forensic investigation report (“Administrator’s Report”).  (Da172).  Plaintiff opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion (Da268), supported by multiple briefs, arguing that the Administrator’s Report should not be approved, that a substantial period of additional discovery was needed, and that [...] should be investigated.  (See [...]’s July 30, 2018 Orders and Opinions.  (Da118-167).  [...] approved the Administrator’s Report and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion.  (Id.).  The court, in its opinion, stated the following:  1.  The Administrator had properly carried out his duties.  2.  The Administrator had made a conclusive determination of all material issues, including whether there were any inter vivos gifts made to any individuals in New Jersey, what amounts were due to [...], the amount of the appropriate capital contribution to be made by Defendant, and whether the inquiry was complete.  3.  The Administrator had properly relied upon [...]’s May 8, 2014 ruling that the Decedent did not have an interest in [...].  4.  The Administrator had properly relied upon the rulings made in the Korean Judgments and in various Korean proceedings and investigations.  5.  The allegation that Defendant had received funds from Decedent for his education had been addressed and denied by the Korean Court.  6.  The court denied Plaintiff’s cross-motions to allow Plaintiff 150 days to review and file further objections to the Administrator’s Report and the settlement agreement included therein.  (Da151-57).  G.
[brief] According to DEP’s Filterra MTD certification, see n. 12, only installations that will not include a precast vault should comply with the BMP Manual’s recommendations about separation from the seasonal high water table (SHWT).  Because [...]’s MTD design included the precast vault, [...]’s claim that the MTD will not work is unfounded.  As DEP considered both the specific BMPs [...] selected as well as the design parameters for those BMPs in determining [...]’s proposed stormwater system would meet water quality standards, DEP’s expert determinations should be upheld.
[brief] 4 F.3d 1153, 1167-69 (3d Cir. 1993).  Far from showing how the trial court erred, these cases (and the others to which Plaintiffs cite) underscore why the trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims.  Indeed, unlike in Van Horn, Strollo, ____________________ 7 Plaintiffs’ own explanatory parentheticals demonstrate that the cases on which they rely support the trial court’s decision.  (Pb18-Pb19).  [...], and the other cases, Plaintiffs never alleged -- let alone introduced evidence -- showing that [...] committed any wrongdoing (e.g., by making false and malicious statements, improper threats, or false accusations of fraud) or that any wrongdoing caused Plaintiffs any damages.  Plaintiffs’ argument, therefore, has no merit.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  On October 27, 2023, the trial court entered an Order dismissing and compelling arbitration of all claims asserted against Defendant [...] (“[...]”) and other defendants/respondents, including [...] (“[...]”), pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision in the New Jersey’s No-Fault statute (N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7).  [...] hereby adopts the brief and appendix submitted on behalf of [...] and respectfully submits that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed for the reasons stated therein.
[brief] THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT REFUSED A BUCCAL SWAB AND ALLEGEDLY MADE A CONTEMPORANEOUS ORAL STATEMENT AS PROOF OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL  BECAUSE DEFENDANT ULTIMATELY CONSENTED TO A BLOOD DRAW AND HAD HONEST (THOUGH MISGUIDED)  REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE BUCCAL SWAB.  (Partially raised below, 18T27-20 to 32-5)  In his initial brief, Defendant argued that the testimony of [...] of the [...] that Defendant had refused to give a buccal swab and had allegedly told her that “it would be worse for him if he did give a sample” coupled with the failure to inform the jury that Defendant consented to the blood draw and the incomplete jury instructions under State v. Hampton and State v. Kociolek, violated Defendant’s right to a fair trial.  (Db35) violated due process, fundamental fairness, and deprived Defendant of a fair trial.  Regarding the admission of Marin’s testimony, the State cites State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542 (2013) to argues that this was invited error.
[brief] Additionally, any attempt by [...] to file a dispositive motion before the close of discovery would have resulted in the motion being denied as premature, as was essentially the case with the first Motion for Summary Judgment.  [...]’s counsel submitted a fee certification demonstrating that the supervising member reviewed each invoice for reasonableness before being sent to the insurance carrier.  (Pa000478).  In addition, the carrier reviewed the invoices and only paid what it deemed was reasonable.  (Pa000479).  This fee certification only sought fees after the carrier had reduced the invoices for time entries that it challenged.  As a result, this double-review process ensures that the services rendered were fair and reasonable for defending a professional engineering firm.  Finally, as the trial court itself acknowledged, all this work could have been avoided had Plaintiffs complied with the safe harbor letter and withdrew their frivolous claims.  (Pa000638).  It also is worth noting that the fee award associated with granting [...]’s Motion for Sanctions started as of June 29, 2022 and did not include the significant attorney’s fees and costs [...] incurred for answering the Complaint, conducting certain written discovery in this multi-party litigation, and filing its initial Motion for Summary Judgment.  [...] respectfully asks that this Court consider the fee award in the entire context of the litigation – although the fee award is only for a portion of the litigation, the record before this Court demonstrates that Plaintiffs had no basis to file a complaint naming [...] as a defendant and ignore the Affidavit of Merit statute.  Even now, since the original fee award was granted, [...] has had to expend even more time and monies opposing both a Motion for Reconsideration as well as this very appeal.  The fee award also did not take into consideration [...] personally paying over $25,000 towards litigation costs, which was required for [...] to satisfy its deductible.  [...] respectfully argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it reduced [...]’s fee award, due to its failure to consider all factors under RPC 1.5(a), as well as the lack of detail and analysis in the court’s decision with respect to the determination of the $30,000 figure.  As such, [...] should be awarded its full fees from June 29, 2022 through its filing of the Motion for Sanctions, in the amount of $89,072.19.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] *Legal Malpractice* 97:25  The rationale for the public policy prohibiting such assignment was well stated by a California Court.  In *Goodley v Wank & Wank, Inc.*, 62 CAL. App. 3d. 389 (2d Dist. 1976), the Court held:  “It is the unique quality of legal services, the personal nature of the attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship that invoke public policy considerations in our conclusion that malpractice claims should not be subject to assignment.  The assignment of such claims could relegate the legal malpractice action to the market place and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and transferred to economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship with the attorney and to whom the attorney has never owed a legal duty, and who have never had any prior connection with the assignor or his rights.  The commercial aspect of assignability of choses in action arising out of legal malpractice is rife with probabilities that could only debase the legal profession.  The almost certain end result of merchandizing such causes of action is the lucrative business of factoring malpractice claims which would encourage unjustified lawsuits against members of the legal profession, generate an increase in legal malpractice litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to defend themselves against strangers.  The endless complications and litigious intricacies arising out of such commercial activities would place an undue burden on not only the legal profession but the already overburdened judicial system, restrict the availability of competent legal services, embarrass the attorney-client relationship and imperil the sanctity of the highly confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between attorney and client.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Retained Expert [...] Concedes Her Injury Could Have Occurred Absent the Particulate, and He Is Uncertain a Particulate Ever Existed In Her Eye.  [...] is not an expert in and is not “offering any opinions in this case on the design, the manufacturing, the testing, the development, or the labeling of a prescription drug or medical device”—i.e., he offers no opinion on the issue of product defect.  (Da0150, pp. 48-49, 52)  He admits there is “no objective evidence” the Ozurdex® at issue generated a silicone particulate, and he “can’t say for certain that [Plaintiff] had the particulate in her eye. ”  (Id., pp. 15, 100, 106-07, 102, 113 (emphasis added))  Nor could he offer such opinions, as he never examined or tested the subject Ozurdex® applicator or examined, met, or even spoke with Plaintiff.  (Id., pp. 15, 19, 106-07)  Like [...], [...]’s sole basis for saying the Ozurdex® unit at issue generated a silicone particulate: “It was part of the lot that was recalled. ”  (Id., p. 102)  Assuming the Ozurdex® at issue produced a silicone particulate and assuming that particulate was injected into Plaintiff’s eye, [...] offers the opinion that it induced eye inflammation and mechanical traction, which caused a retinal detachment and loss of vision.  (Id., pp. 15, 64)  [...] provides this specific-causation opinion, however, without an independent general-causation opinion that a 300-micron, medical-grade silicone particulate is capable of causing inflammation or a tractional retinal detachment.  Like [...], he simply assumes general causation.  He further concedes a “retinal detachment is a possible risk following any intraocular procedure” and “any intravitreal injection. ”  (Id., pp. 78, 104, 109-10)  But since Plaintiff had not developed problems before, [...] concluded the “temporal relationship” to her injuries indicates a silicone particulate “more likely” than not caused them.  (Id., pp. 82-83, 100, 102-04, 109)  3.
[brief] (i)  New York Has No Substantial Relationship To The Parties Or The Transactions At Issue In The Verified Complaint (Pa5).  Under the Restatement, a choice-of-law provision will be disregarded when there is no “substantial relationship” between the law chosen and the parties or the transactions at issue.  The Restatement instructs courts to look at “where performance” by one of the parties took place, where a party maintains “[its] principal place of business,” or the state that is “the place of contracting. ”  Restatement, cmt. F. New Jersey is the location for each of these factors. \(^4\) --- \(^4\)  The trial court did not analyze whether New York had any “substantial relationship” to the parties or transactions set forth in the Verified Complaint.  (Pa1).  In a factually similar matter in Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Indiana public policy precluded the application of a New York choice-of-law provision.  In that case, plaintiff corporation was an Indiana franchisee, and the franchisor was a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey.  The franchisee argued that the franchisor had violated Indiana law by terminating the relationship without good cause and unilaterally changing other terms.  Despite a New York choice-of-law provision in the franchise agreement, the Indiana district court held that Indiana had articulated strong public policy in its franchise laws, which prohibited parties from contracting out the protections of Indiana franchise law.  Moreover, Indiana had a materially greater interest in litigation because New York’s only connection was that the defendant was incorporated in New York.  See Wright-Moore, 908 F.2d at 133.  See also McCabe v. Great Pac. Century Corp., 222 N.J. Super. 397, 400 (App. Div. 1988) (overturning trial court’s application of Indiana law set forth in the parties’ agreement because the contract was “fully performed” in New Jersey and a “complex set of New Jersey regulations…had to be followed in performing the contract”).
[brief] (Pa1002.)  Proposal One describes several types of work as: (1) “hand sawing, chipping and breaking” pockets of “concrete slab to expose steel reinforcement” (one person at $1,900 per day); (2) six days for “wall sawing, hand sawing, chipping and breaking 150’ concrete wall at property line” at the adjacent [...] and also describes the scope as “‘shaving’ of vertical wall at ‘high spots’ to create a clean edge at property line limits” and “flush cut wall sawing concrete slab overhang to match vertical wall limits” (two union laborers at $3,500 per day).  (Id.)  However, on July 9, 2015, [...] sent an email to [...] and [...] asking [...] to enroll [...] in the CCIP and further requested a revised proposal not to exceed the “previous proposal” (which was higher based on anticipated exclusion from the CCIP).
[brief] ” (Da084).  However, the court did not analyze the Brady violation.  Appellant filed a supplemental brief with this Appellate Division, as expressly permitted.  In his supplemental brief, [...] noted that the “sworn affidavit – affixed to a Habeas Petition filed by [...] one year prior to [his ([...]’s)] trial . . . was not produced to [...] before his trial, a palpable violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). ” (Da126).  [...] also noted that he “intend[ed] to timely file a separate PCR related to the apparent Brady and Giglio violation,” but he did not request that the Appellate Division refrain from reviewing the issue.  (Da127).  While the Carter analysis / [...] recantation issue was pending before the Appellate Division, on January 13, 2022, [...] filed the instant petition for Post-Conviction Relief, seeking a new trial based on the State’s failure to disclose Brady material or, alternatively, based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
[brief] Well, let me ask [...].  The video that the State hopes to get before the jury would be the video of the murder of the pharmacist at the [...], the attempted robbery of [...] on South Broad Street, [...] Pharmacy, and third, the [...] video surveillance from that robbery on Arena Drive in Hamilton.  Other than those three videos, do you intend to show the jury any additional videos?  MR. GRILLO: No, Judge.  It's just those three.
[brief] See Muldrow, 144 S. Ct. at 974; Leahey, 302 N.J. Super. at 79; Mancini, 349 N.J. Super. at 564.  At best, and as [...] himself noted during the August 30, 2022, Oral Argument, whether Appellant’s transfer constitutes effective remedial action and/or retaliation is a jury question.  See 1T97:4-12.  [...] can certainly argue to the jury that transferring Appellant to a different location was a good faith mechanism to keep the harasser, [...], away from her.  However, determining the intent of the transfer is for the jury, not the trial judge on summary judgment.
[brief] [Da14-15.]  As part of his ruling, [...] also discredited defendant’s testimony that tried to explain away what [...] had observed.  (Da11).  Defendant testified that while on his way to go grocery shopping with his wife, he drove across the parking lot so he could speak to a woman so that he could show off his new Jeep to her.  (1T105-16 to 18).  But he admitted he did not know her name and was not friends with her.  (1T105-13 to 25; 1T114-20 to 115-9).  He also testified that while at his workplace, this woman would notice his Jeep and would comment, “[T]hat’s a nice Jeep, that’s a nice Jeep. ” (1T115-22 to 24).  Likely realizing his error, defendant tried to backtrack and explained he had a different Jeep before, but now he had an SRT which he wanted to show her.  (1T115-25 to 116-1).  And despite specifically seeking her out to show off his new Jeep, he only spoke to her through her passenger-side window, and the woman never got out of her vehicle to look at his Jeep.  (1T32-17 to 18; 1T118-11 to 18).  Defendant’s explanation for his interaction with [...] was likewise incredible.  Once again willing to delay his grocery shopping and leave his wife sitting inside his vehicle, defendant left the unnamed woman and walked over to [...], who happened to drive up next to defendant right then.  (1T106-18 to 20).  Defendant said [...] parked next to his Jeep and asked if it was his and they “started talking about [his] Jeep a little bit” through [...]’s passenger-side window.  (1T35-25 to 36-2; 1T107-12 to 16).  [...], defendant claimed, is “absolutely” a car guy.  (1T119-1 to 3).  Yet, defendant admitted [...] remained in his vehicle: “[H]e didn’t get out, he just looked. ” (1T119-13 to 19).  And defendant did not gesture to the SRT or use his hands to describe it at all, as [...] testified there were “no hand movements” during the conversation beyond defendant leaning on [...]’s doorframe.  (1T35-16 to 24; 1T120-12 to 13).  As [...] therefore held, “Defendant’s explanation of the ‘transactions’ in the parking lot compromised his credibility. ” (Da11).
[directive] See subsection 4.6.1.  Note also that if a no-contact, weapons-surrender, or other special condition of pretrial release is deemed to be reasonably necessary to assure the immediate safety of the domestic violence victim, it also might be appropriate for the defendant to be ordered to wear an electronic monitoring device so that the defendant’s movements can be monitored by the pretrial services program as a means to enforce the no-contact condition and thereby enhance the protection afforded to the victim.  That presupposes that the defendant is an “eligible defendant” under the Bail Reform Law, that is, a defendant who has been charged by complaint-warrant.  Page 43 or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2, shall consider whether the mandatory detention resulting automatically from issuance of a complaint-warrant might discourage a victim from pursuing the charge or cooperating with the prosecution, or otherwise would not serve the interest of justice.  Given the repetitive nature of sexual offenses, the officer and/or assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general also may consider whether it would be appropriate to apply for a complaint-warrant in recognition that if the defendant is charged by complaint-summons and thereafter commits a new crime while on pretrial release, the prosecutor cannot move pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24 to revoke release.  Cf. note 30.  4.7
[brief] ”  Da40 (emphasis added).  Having heard and carefully considered the facts presented at trial -- including [...]’ long and close friendship with [...], his forbearance for many years from enforcing the terms of the Note, his forgiveness of a substantial sum due on the First and Second Loans, and Defendants’ admissions, including the fact that the parties had entered into the Second pay-when-able Loan -- the trial court considered it significant that the loan at issue was between close friends.
[brief] The “without prejudice” designation was clearly limited to the following circumstance:  “So should -- should the State recover that evidence, you’re free to go back to the grand jury if you want. ”  (2T17:2-4).  That circumstance did not occur.  [...] reports that [...] and similar sites may soon come under an expanded interpretation of [18 U.S.C.A. 2257], the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act . . . .
[brief] Engine light and a 73,573 odometer reading (Exbt. 17 to Cmplt.)  …………………….108a-109a  December 19, 2019, August 13, 2020 and March 16, 2021  Service Invoices for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, (Exhibit B to [...] Certification)……………………………………………110a-117a
[brief] ” (Pa49-67; 2T63:18-64:12; 3T46:4-14).  The [...] balance sheets and profit and loss statement showed the term “Draw” under each of the parties’ names and show the personal expenses of each.  (Pa49-67; 3T107:17-108:14).  This was also true for the general ledgers of [...].  (Pa68-146).  d.  Defendant’s alleged failure to maintain books and records (3T132:5-9) (Plf.’s brief at 35).