ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, [...]’s reliance on *[...] v. [...]*, is completely misrepresented.  No. 2484CV00283-BLS2, 2024 Mass. Super. LEXIS 59, at *8 (June 10, 2024).  In *[...]*, the plaintiff was an equity partner at [...], the defendant.  *Id.* at *2*.  [...] was diagnosed with an aggressive form of brain cancer and later died.  *Id.* at *2*.  His wife, via his estate, sued the law firm alleging that it breached the firm’s Partnership Agreement by not fully compensating [...] for his work during the last year he worked there.  The Partnership Agreement includes an arbitration clause.  *Id.* at *3*.  While there was no evidence that [...] ever signed the Partnership Agreement, the estate *admitted* in the complaint that [...] and the law firm “agreed to abide by the terms of the Partnership Agreement which was a valid and binding contract. ”  *Id.* at *6*.  Neither of the Plaintiffs have made any admissions here.  To suggest *[...]* has any relevance to this matter, where Plaintiffs are disputing the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and have certified under oath that they never even received the agreement, is baseless.
[brief] It is respectfully requested that: A. The Order as to Counts One and Three of Petitioner's Amended to Complaint be reversed and that those counts be reinstated.  B.  That the Court find that the Photocopy should not have been entered into evidence pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule, that it is unenforceable under the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act and that Petitioner did not waive his statutory rights to an elective share of the Estate Assets.  C.  In the alternative, the life estate with restrictions on alienation should be set aside and Petitioner should be granted a fair allocation of Estate assets under his claim for a constructive trust.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] See *State v. J.M., J.R.*, 438 N.J. Super. 215, 220 (App. Div. 2014) (granting leave to appeal and reversing trial court’s order admitting “other crimes” evidence) aff’d *State v. J.M., J.R.*, 225 N.J. 146, 150 (2016).  Here, [...]’s due process rights and judicial economy both demand that this issue be determined on an interlocutory basis, rather than proceeding with a lengthy trial that may be rendered moot if these issues were decided in the defendant’s favor on direct appeal.
[brief] It did so because the Committee “…may adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with, or not designed to effectuate the master plan by an affirmative vote of a majority of its full, authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d).  The Defendant Township Committee did just this.  It had no obligation “to make a call on consistency versus inconsistency. ”  (Pb21).  Plaintiffs further argue that the manner in which the Committee adopted Ordinance 2022-17 defies statutory logic: N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) does not contemplate a scenario where a redevelopment plan can be both consistent and inconsistent with a municipality’s master plan.
[brief] [3T; 4T; 5T].  The State presented the testimony of Florence Township Police Detectives [...] and [...], Florence Township Police Patrolman [...], co-defendant [...], and Burlington County Forensic Scientist [...].  [4T33; 4T47; 4T96; 4T126; 4T151].  At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to *State v. Reyes*, 50 N.J. 454 (1967).  [4T186-12 to 188-8].  [...] denied defendant’s motion after giving all reasonable inferences to the State.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da076 Exh L (Letter of [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. and [...], Esq. dated June 15, 2023)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da078 Exh M (Letter of [...], Esq. To [...], Esq. dated June 25, 2023)  . . . .  Da080  Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in Support of Order To Show Cause dated June 19, 2023 (Redacted pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Certification of [...] dated June 19, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da082 Exh A (Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated March 4, 2012—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . Da021 Exh B (Amendment Number 1 to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated April 24, 2015—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da037 Exh C (Second Amendment to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated May 2, 2018—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da040 Exh D (Agreement of Sale between Defendants And [...] ([...]) dated October 14, 2022—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da049 Exh E (Email of [...] to [...] dated February 8, 2023—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da066 Exh F (Email of [...] to [...] dated April 3, 2023—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da068 Notice of Appearance for Plaintiff by [...], Esq. dated June 20, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da087 Letter Brief of [...], Esq. for [...] and [...] dated June 21, 2023 (Redacted pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da088 Certification of [...], Esq. dated June 21, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da089 Exh A (Agreement of Sale between Defendants And [...] ([...]) dated October 14, 2022—Redacted as Redundant, see Da049 and First Addendum to Contract of Sale between Defendants and [...] ([...]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da096 Exh B (Email of [...] to Defendant [...] dated November 18, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da097 Exh C (Second Amendment to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated May 2, 2018-Redacted as Redundant). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da040 Notice of Appearance for Defendants by [...], Esq. dated June 21, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da098 Letter Memorandum of [...], Esq. Dated June 21, 2023(Redacted pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da099 Order to Show Cause With Temporary Restraints Entered by the Hon. [...], J.S.C. on June 21, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da100 Affidavit of Defendant, [...], Dated July 10, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da107 Exh A (Email of [...] ([...] To [...] dated September 18,2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] multiple photographs of [...] sitting on the front stoop of the multi-family home where [...] lived, with [...] and another man standing behind [...].  (6T 123-4 to 124-20; 7T 130-8 to 131-16)  As the defense argued in summation, and as the court instructed the jury, “[l]esser degrees of familiarity do not enhance accuracy and may, in fact, decrease accuracy of the identification” because of “[u]nconscious transference. ”  In particular, “studies have found that witnesses who, prior to an identification procedure, have incidentally but innocently encountered a Defendant may unconsciously transfer a familiar Defendant to the role of a criminal perpetrator in their memory. ”  (9T 131-7 to 132-12)  The State also introduced various surveillance videos from the day of the shooting.
[brief] He points out that the current Tax Map still shows [...] as being the owner of the area where the grant is (1T150:3).  [...] also has copies of the 1940 Assessment Records.  In certain cases, it shows what the taxes are.  He finds a number of properties that are assessed to the [...].  Some of those are part of the final judgment, but the [...] piece, the Riparian Title is not listed at all as being owned by the Borough (1T151:23).  He testifies that it is his opinion that the reason Lot 3.01 is not noted at all in the Assessment Records is because they did not acquire it in the Tax Sale (1T152).  If they had acquired it under that Tax Sale Foreclosure, whoever the Assessor was at the time, did not feel that they got title to it (1T152:20).
[brief] \textit{In the Matter of [...], [...]}, 2014 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 236, OAL DKT. NO. [...] (May 19, 2014).  In this case, this administrative code was meant to capture the various alleged violations of the HRB not otherwise mirrored by the various N.J.A.C. provisions.  [...] was charged with HRB 84-17, Section C8 “falsification: Intentional misstatement of material fact in connection with work, employment application, attendance, or in any record, report, investigation, or other proceeding,” HRB 84-17, Section C11 “conduct unbecoming of an employee,” HRB 84-17, Section C24 “threatening, intimidating, harassing, coercing or interfering with fellow employees on State [sic] Property” and HRB 84-17, Section E1, “violation of a rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order, or administrative decision.
[brief] [...]:  I don’t know if a Legal Aid is an attorney, so…  [...]:  That’s what they were -- Legal Aid is what they were referring to, the court provided attorneys as here in Virginia.  [...]: Okay.  I don’t know -- I don’t know what that is.  Is it an attorney?  [...]:  When they say an attorney will be provided to you, that would be the attorney that they would be talking about.  [...]:  They -- they – [...]: I don’t know if that’s maybe just a slang word that’s used here.  Maybe they refer to it as something different, like a court-appointed New Jersey [sic].  [...]:  In New Jersey we refer to that as a court-appointed attorney.  [...]: A court-appointed attorney.  [...]: That would be a public defender.  [...]: A public defender.  [...]: Yes.  [...]: Okay.  Then yes, I would have been talking about a public defender.  [...]: Yes.  [(1T:41-22 to 44-24)]  [...] was clearly concerned about what type of counsel would be made available to him and whether they would be familiar with the law of New Jersey, where he had been told he was criminally charged.
[brief] Thus, the trial court’s denial of reconsideration was an abuse of discretion by ignoring its own 2019 dismissal order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction then three years later claiming it “stayed” the complaint that it clearly dismissed.  Furthermore, R 1:20A-6 mandates “dismissal” when violated, not a stay.  Hence why the trial court issued several orders from August 27 to October 2, 2019 affirming dismissal, and solidifying in its October 2, 2019 Order that “The docket is corrected by removing “default” and listing this case as dismissed. ”  In fact, the public docket since 2019 always showed the case was dismissed, not stayed.  Dismissal was the only result as Plaintiff cannot be rewarded for obtaining the 2019 default judgment against Defendant knowing he violated the clear mandates of R 1:20A-6, and forcing litigation for that too to be vacated.
[brief] As to the third factor, applying the reasoning as laid out in precedent cited above, and looking at the underlying factual allegations as opposed to the face of the general overall claim, it is clear that Appellants are asserting that [...], by virtue of providing engineering services on the Project for multiple owners, deviated from the acceptable standard of care.  Appellants cannot prove their claim without providing an engineer expert to explain the appropriate standard of care that would apply to [...] in the circumstances of the subject Project, and to describe how [...] breached their professional and ethical duties, resulting in a deviation from that standard of care.  Unlike the Stoecker case where the court ruled that an affidavit of merit was not necessary to prove a case of fraud when a professional defendant had made a false statement, [...] made no misrepresentations or willful deceit of the parties involved here.  [...] simply continued to provide engineering services on a Project where it was completely unaware of any dispute over ownership of the Project.  Indeed, Appellants’ allegations in the complaint go straight to the core of the issue at hand – whether [...] breached its professional and ethical duties in providing engineering services on this Project.  (Pa19).  [...]’s continued development of engineering plans and services on the Project, from one owner to the next, raises questions of professional and ethical duties that can only be evaluated and answered by a professional engineer familiar with the customary practice in the industry under those circumstances.
[brief] No invitation from the suspect is necessary, implicit or otherwise.  Therefore, Wright’s statements on third-party intervention and invitees are of no consequence.  It should also be noted that in this case, the intrusion on the driveway was minimal.  Police did not damage defendant’s property to get to the car, and in fact had every incentive to be inconspicuous so as to avoid revealing their investigation.  Any inconvenience caused their presence was minimal and does not meaningfully add to the inconvenience of GPS monitoring.  See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464 (2013) (stating, in permitting warrantless buccal swab of arrestees, that “swab of this nature does not increase the indignity already attendant to normal incidents of arrest. ”).  Defendant argues that even if federal law permits police access to the driveway for the purpose of installing a warrant-authorized GPS, New Jersey law does not.  (Db10).  However, that argument does not appear to have been raised below, and in any case, New Jersey law recognizes the concept of implicit authority.  In light of the de minimis intrusion in this case, this court should not order suppression.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25a  Quotation of Retirement Benefits dated 5/21/21.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26a-27a  Certification of Service and Final Salary dated 4/21/21.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28a-29a  Negotiated Settlement Agreement dated 5/17/21.
[brief] [Pa44 at ¶ 5].  Among them was [...]’s agreement to execute a Consent Judgment for all sums due, in the amount of $796,484.39 (the “Consent Monetary Judgment”), and a Consent Judgment for Possession (the “Consent Judgment for Possession”), both of which [...] was authorized to present to the trial court for entry upon an event of default together with a representation that [...] had consented to the entry of that relief.  [Pa59; Pa62].  By letter dated July 5, 2023, [...] withdrew its motion for summary judgment, without prejudice, and notified the trial court that “the parties’ settlement of this matter. . . requires the performance of certain settlement terms no later than the conclusion of October.  The parties have agreed that this matter will remain pending during this period, and that Plaintiff will alert the Court concerning the disposition of this action at that time.
[brief] Importantly, in Boritz, the court noted that two months prior to Plaintiff’s consent to settle letter being sent “[w]ithout mentioning the step-down provision, [the [...] claims adjuster] confirmed, by telephone with plaintiff's counsel, that the [...] policy coverage was primary, with limits of $100,000 per person, $300,000 per accident. ”  Id. at 644.  However, most notably is the Footnote 3 cited therein, which provides:  “[w]e do not address, as it has not been briefed, what effect, if any, plaintiff’s counsel's failure to review the [...] policy before settling with the tortfeasor has on plaintiff’s justifiable reliance on [...]'s consent to settle.
[brief] 7  A.  Plaintiff sued the [...] for property damage allegedly caused by water runoff and trespass..................................................................................................................  7  B.  The [...] did not alter the grading of their front lawn.................................................................................................................. 7 C.  The [...] did not alter the grading of their driveway.  .................................................................  8  D.  When the [...] disposed of tree branches, they did not enter plaintiff’s property, nor did they damage it.  ......................  8  III.  Plaintiff’s surveyor, [...], P.L.S., offered no opinion on whether the amount of water runoff changed after the [...] repaved and relined their driveway.
[brief] But that requires another story to be added, which requires an amended settlement agreement and then an amended ordinance to avoid a D variance.  So it’s a bit of a process we have to go through to get there.  (Pa187)  On August 29, 2022 [...] counsel sent to the Board’s counsel [...]’s version of proposed form of Resolution.  (Pa190-191)  On September 6, 2022, the Board’s counsel responded and provided redlined comments and modifications to the draft.  (Pa209 & 211)  In that same email, Board counsel again reminded [...]’s counsel to respond to the proposed Amendment to Settlement Agreement and proposed amendments to the Rezoning Ordinance that were sent to [...]’s counsel on August 24, 2022 and reiterated the Board’s desire to move both the Resolution and the Amendment to Settlement Agreement to the Board at its next meeting of September 12, 2022.
[brief] The Respondent has two other intricately related claims of discrimination and retaliation based on the Respondent’s sex or gender.  The Respondent claims she was terminated based on the Appellants’ discrimination against her because she was a woman, and in retaliation for her complaining about unlawful workplace harassment due to the fact that she was a woman.  [7a]  These are all sexual harassment claims under the Law Against Discrimination and are directly covered by the recent amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act, prohibiting the enforcement of arbitration in claims “related to sexual harassment. ”  9 U.S.C. §401 (4).  With respect to cases involving sexual harassment, it is now the public policy throughout the United States to not permit an employer to compel enforcement of arbitration agreements.
[brief] 36 Statutes NJSA 40:55D-1 et seq.  (“MLUL”)............................................................passim NJSA 40:55D-70(d)1 .......................................................... 2, 4, 6, 13, 22, 23, 24, 28 NJSA 40:55D-20 ........................................................................... 15, 19 NJSA 40:55D-70 ................................................................. 17, 19, 31 NJSA 40:55D-70d ........................................................................ 22, 23 NJSA 40:55D-70(d)3 ................................................................. 22 NJSA 40:55D-70(d)6 .................................................................. 25 NJSA 40:55D-26 ........................................................................ 30, 31 NJSA 40:55D-62(a) ....................................................................  31 NJSA 40:55D-64 ........................................................................ 31 NJSA 40:55D-89(d) .................................................................... 31 NJSA 40:55D-28(b)1 .................................................................. 31 NJSA 40:55D-28(b)2(d) .............................................................  31 NJSA 40:55D-62 ........................................................................ 36 NJSA 40:27-1 et seq.
[brief] ***  d.  Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the State of New Jersey has a duty to promote, protect, and safeguard the public's rights and ensure reasonable and meaningful public access to tidal waters and adjacent shorelines; e.  The [...] has the authority and the duty to protect the public's right of access to tidally flowed waters and their adjacent shorelines under the public trust doctrine and statutory law.  In so doing, the department has the duty to make all tidal waters and their adjacent shorelines available to the public to the greatest extent practicable, protect existing public access, provide public access in all communities equitably, maximize different experiences provided by the diversity of the State's tidal waters and adjacent shorelines, ensure that the expenditure of public moneys by the department maximizes public use and access where public investment is made, and remove physical and institutional impediments to public access to the maximum extent practicable; and f.  Public access includes visual and physical access to, and use of, tidal waters and adjacent shorelines, sufficient perpendicular access from upland areas to tidal waters and adjacent shorelines, and the necessary support amenities to facilitate public access for all, including, but not limited to, public parking and restrooms.  [N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150].
[brief] (3T:35-6 to 20)  Dr.  Perrin noted that this mismatch peaks in late adolescence, around the age of seventeen, and corresponds to a greater likelihood of criminal behavior in that period.  (3T:36-19 to 37-16)  In its decision, the resentencing court acknowledged [...]’s opinion that at the time of the incident, [...] was like other seventeen-year-olds in this respect.  (3T:45-6 to 46-16, 59-1 to 60-3; 5T:18-3 to 16)  While the court “accepted the validity of the psychology and psychiatric factors,” it found that “[...]’s ultimate conclusion” regarding the applicability of Miller factor one “is based upon her general application of … this science to any young person frankly under the age of 30 and is not specifically based on the facts and circumstances of [...] Hawkins’ development. ”  (5T:18-3 to 25)  However, [...] had no burden to produce evidence that his brain had not fully developed for the court to consider Miller factor one in mitigation, and the State did not produce the expert evidence of unusual maturity necessary to rebut the presumption that [...]’s brain development was comparable to that of other seventeen-year-olds.  Thus, the court’s refusal to consider Miller factor one in mitigation on the basis that [...] did not present evidence of his individual brain development constituted an abuse of its discretion.
[brief] As to the new argument that the Borough never "provided another site" to [...], it should be noted that [...] has never asked for alternative locations for construction of the seven units.  In fact, it was originally proposed by [...] that [...] would construct the seven off-site units.  [162]A  It is only upon the continued request of the Borough for information regarding the proposal from Habitat that [...] apparently abandoned that plan.  Subsequently, according to the filed Deed transferring ownership of [...], [...] purchased that lot with the hopes of developing the seven units on it.  [259A]  However, [...] never advised the Borough that it was purchasing the Lot, nor consulted with the Borough regarding the feasibility of constructing all seven off-site units there.  In fact, as set forth more fully in the Borough's original Opposition, [...] purchases the property knowing full well that its proposal was not permitted under the existing zoning.  The Borough also notes that at no time has [...] requested that the Borough provide alternative sites for seven off-site units, and, despite that, the Borough has, in fact, proposed an alternative site for construction of the seven units.
[brief] Q.  A very positive number, but you can’t say with certainty what that number would have been.  A.  Well, of course not, because [...] – at the risk of repeating myself -- was never permitted to get to that point in the process, he was cut out of the process for reasons that are fundamental to the matter here.  (6T, 81:2-22) (emphasis added).  Thus, the low range is “up to 60% of the development fees and profits if [...] elected to form a joint venture with another developer experienced in such projects.  The high range of profit sharing is 100% if [...] undertook that project on his own.  (Pa 274, p. 6).  (emphasis added).