ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181 (2001) (quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999)).  “In deciding whether prosecutorial conduct deprived a defendant of a fair trial, ‘an appellate court must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when they occurred. ’ ”  State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 608 (2021) (quoting Frost, 158 N.J. at 83).  Reversal is appropriate only where the prosecutor's actions are “clearly and unmistakably improper. ”  Patterson, 435 N.J. Super. at 508 (quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437-38 (2007)).  As defendant failed to object to the remarks at the time of trial, we review the prosecutor's comments for plain error.
[brief] [...]  Attorney ID# 043542004  Of Counsel  [...]  Sentry Office Plaza [...]  [...] [...]  [...] – and – [...]  (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  Of Counsel  [...]  II  City Plaza [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant [...]
[brief] And anger management programming is not an authorized disposition under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2, nor is it authorized by the provisions specific to animal cruelty offenses.  See N.J.S.A. 4:22-17, -26.  Like the other two conditions, anger management counseling therefore cannot stand as an independent component of [...]’s sentence.  Because all sentencing dispositions must be authorized by law, the components of [...]’s sentence that prohibit him from having contact with the dog in question, prohibit him from “owning, possessing, exercising control over or caring for” other animals, and require him to complete anger management counseling are unlawful.  They must be vacated.  CONCLUSION
[brief] THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING COUNTS 3 AND 7 OF THE COMPLAINT.  The Commissions decisions on these allegations were cogent and well-reasoned.  There is no evidence of the same being arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole such as would call for reversal.  See Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Regional High Sch., supra, 131 N.J. at 641; Henry v. Rahway State Prison, supra, 81 NJ. at 580.  CONCLUSION
[brief] i.  [...] did not terminate or abandon its easement rights in the Subject Property.  (7T, 8T, 13T, 14T, Da13-35, Da123-143, Da177-209; Da213-237 Da278-418; Da517-659; Da690-693; Da900-925; Da948-952; Da958-1005)............  44  ii.  The easement is not perpetual and is only enforceable so long as the Congregation operates in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets.  (Da13-18; Da751; Da980)..........................  48  B.  Alternatively, the Congregation was granted an Easement by Necessity or an Irrevocable License.  (Da13-18; Da166-169; Da948, Da 980; 7T, 8T).........................................................  50
[brief] The Disciplinary Proceeding Special Ethics Master [...] reviewed [...]’s case in the first instance and recommended that the Supreme Court of New Jersey suspend [...]’s license for six months, based on her findings that [...] violated RPC 1.15(a) (commingling), RPC 1.15(d) and R. 1:21-6 (recordkeeping), RPC 8.1(a) (knowingly making false statements of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), and RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  [Pa342a-343a]  After reviewing the evidence, the Special Master determined that [...]’s “alteration of records spanned months, and that [[...]] had ample opportunity to correct any untruths told to the [OAE]. ”  [Pa359a]  The Special Master found that “simple dishonesty was the root cause of actions and inactions that constituted violations, and for self-serving reasons”—namely, “to falsify records in order to successfully hide from [[...]’s] wife the overdraft of the check written on behalf of his former paramour. ”  [Id.]  Accordingly, the Special Master concluded that [...] “knowingly made false statements to disciplinary authorities” when he “(1) stated in his first letter that the $100,000 deposit was for office bonuses; (2) claimed he gave bonuses to other employees; (3) represented that the $22,500 fee from the $100,000 settlement was disbursed to [the Firm]; (4) generated false checks to clients that he endorsed; (5) caused the false ledger to be sent to the OAE; and (6) knowingly provided falsified bank statements and checks to the OAE. ”  [Pa360a-361a]  The Special Master further concluded that [...] “failed to respond to lawful demands for information by failing to provide requested documents. ”  [Pa361a]  With respect to the commingling charge, the Special Master noted that [...] “admitted holding personal funds in the [Firm’s trust account] for many years. ”  [Pa361a]  The Special Master concluded that [...] violated RPC 1.15(d) and R. 1:21-6 “when he engaged in the following recordkeeping violations: he admittedly failed to maintain accurate trust account records; he failed to transfer $4,595.83 from his trust account to his business account; and he failed to disburse the $30,000 fee in the [client settlement] matter to the business account. ”  [Pa361a]  In support of her recommendation for a six-month suspension, the Special Master cited “several aggravating factors”—including [...]’s “previous service on an ethics committee; the length of time that his dishonesty spanned during numerous interactions with the OAE; and his persistence in blaming others, although he claimed to take responsibility for his actions. ”  [Pa361a-362a]  The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s Disciplinary Review Board performed a *de novo* review of the record and issued a 36-page opinion on March 20, 2017
[brief] The examination of the scope of any arbitration provision, must be on a case by case basis, Curtis v. Cellco Ptnr., 413 NJ Super 26, 35 (App. Div. 2010).  The scope of arbitration is governed by the intention of the parties and courts are not permitted to rewrite a contract to broaden it, Caruso v. Ravenwood, 337 NJ Super 499, 504 (App. Div. 2001); Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 NJ 76, 92 (2002).  In determining the scope, one must first look to the specific language of the clause and determine if its broad enough to cover the factual allegations in the complaint, rather than the causes of actions asserted; in a broad clause, if these factual allegations touch matters covered by the agreement those claims must be arbitrated.  *Epix Holdings v. Marsh McLennan*, 410 NJ Super 453, 474 (App. Div. 2009).  Most of these cases deal with clauses that have broad language: “all disputes that arise under or arise out of or relate to the agreement” at *Id.* 472.  That is not the case here.
[brief] A search of [...]’s phone revealed that between 5:16 and 5:18 p.m. that day, he had been conducting an internet search regarding how to operate a 9mm Ruger handgun—the gun that had been used to shoot [...].  (26T16-21 to 18-7)  [...] and [...] went to the [...] at around 11:45 p.m. to conduct a search of Room 517 pursuant to [...]’s consent, where they encountered [...] and [...] in the room.  (24T177-8 to 178-2; 27T148-5)  During a search of Room 517, police found various illegal drugs in a safe; [...] testified at trial that all the drugs belonged to him.
[brief] (Pra27; Pra30).  Rather than “protecting” [...] from customer interactions on the sales floor, and rather than providing him the “dedicated training time to better understand [his] department, practice selling skills, and shadow experienced employees before working by” himself, this particular [...] store actually encouraged [...] to approach customers by himself during training.  (9T100:21-25; 6T121:2-21).  This practice was in contravention of its own corporate policy and standard practice in the retail industry.  (8T68:3-17).
[directive] 20.  Èske w renonse a dwa w lè yap pwononse santans ou pou konteste ke gen akizasyon  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  [pa aplikab kote w te plede koupab ki entèdi yo enpoze santans separe?  /NA]  Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges you pleaded guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?
[brief] In State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244 (2022), our Supreme Court framed the legal issue presented by this appeal:  The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."  A motor vehicle stop by a police officer, no matter how brief or limited, is a " 'seizure' of 'persons' " under both the Federal and State Constitutions.  State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33, 140 A.3d 535 (2016) (quoting State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 475, 706 A.2d 180 (1998)).  To justify such a seizure, "a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense."  Id. at 33-34, 140 A.3d 535.  "The suspicion necessary to justify a stop must not only be reasonable, but also particularized."  Id. at 37, 140 A.3d 535.  An investigative stop "may not be based on arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective good faith, or a mere hunch."  State v. Chisum, 236 N.J.  530, 546, 200 A.3d 1279 (2019) (quoting State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343, 95 A.3d 136 (2014)).  To determine whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances and "assess whether ‘the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure ... warrant[ed] a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.' "  State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 518, 223 A.3d 184 (2020) (alterations and omission in original) (quoting State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 338, 2 A.3d 379 (2010)).  A motor vehicle stop that is not based on a "reasonable and articulable suspicion is an ‘unlawful seizure,' and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule."  Chisum, 236 N.J. at 546, 200 A.3d 1279 (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 247, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007)).
[directive] 2 Restoration of Judicial Sentencing Discretion . . 44-45 6.5.3 Pending Charge Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 . . . . . . . 45 6.5.4 Special Drug Diagnostic Assessment and Treatment Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45-48 Page iii Section 7 Selecting the Appropriate Offense Description . . . . . . . 49-55 7.1 Offenses Involving Weapons (Special Offense Characteristic #1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.1.1 Election Between Special Offense Characteristic #1 and Special Application and Enhancement Feature D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49-51 7.1.2 Criteria for Using Special Offense Characteristic #1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51-52 7.2 Offenses Involving Amounts Above the Statutory Threshold (Special Offense Characteristic #2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52-54 7.3 Offenses Involving First-Degree Amounts of Methamphetamine and Marijuana (Special Offense Characteristic #3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54-55 7.4 Age Differential in “Using a Juvenile” Cases (Special Offense Characteristic #4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Section 8 Determination of Appropriate Criminal History Category 56-62 8.1 General Description of Criminal History Categories . . 56-57 8.2 Criminal History Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.3 Effect of Remote Prior Convictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58-59 8.4 Extended Term of Imprisonment for Repeat Drug Offenders Charged with a Present Violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (500 foot drug-free public park/housing zone) . . . . . . . . . 59-60 8.5 Prior Sentences That Were Merged or Imposed on the Same Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 8.6 Prior Sentences Imposed on Different Dates . . . . . . . . 61-62 8.7 Extrajurisdictional Prior Convictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Section 9 Schedule of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors . . . . . . 63-66 (See Section 10 for Explanations and Definitions) 9.1 Aggravating Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63-65 9.2 Mitigating Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Page iv Section 10 Description and Commentary for Aggravating and Mitigating Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67-84 10.1 Aggravating Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 10.1.1 Community Impact (Aggravating Factor Category #1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68-71 10.1.2 Bail Violations (Aggravating Factor Category #2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71-73 10.1.3 Risk of Injury to Officers and Others (Aggravating Factor Category #3) . . . . . . . 73-74 10.1.4 Organization (Aggravating Factor Category #4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74-78 10.1.5 Profiteering (Aggravating Factor Category #5)
[brief] [...] ........................................Da 1-4  Order Denying Motion to Change Venue ................................................Da 5  Judgment of Conviction and Sentence ......................................................Da 6-9 Notice of Appeal ....................................................................................Da 10-13 Video ([...]) .................................................................Da 14  Photograph Extracted from Video at [...] .....................Da 15  Video ([...]) ..................................................................Da 16  Video of Defendant’s Recorded Statement (February 8, 2016) ...............Da 17  Transcript of Defendant’s Recorded Statement (February 8, 2016) ..........Da 18-74 Report on Out-of-Court Identification Procedure with [...] and [...] (February 9, 2016) ................Da 75  Video of Out-of-Court Identification Procedure with [...] (March 8, 2016)  ......................................................Da 76  Transcript of Out-of-Court Identification Procedure with [...] (March 8, 2016)  ......................................................Da 77-86  Photograph Extracted from Video at [...] (Signed by [...] on March 8, 2016)  ................................Da 87-88  DNA Report (March 31, 2016)  .................................................................Da 89-90 DNA Report (June 14, 2016)  .................................................................Da 91-92 DNA Report (November 3, 2016)  ........................................................Da 93-95  Footwear Report (May 4, 2017)  .............................................................Da 96-97  Video of Out-of-Court Identification Procedure with [...] (August 11, 2017)  ......................................................Da 98  Transcript of Out-of-Court Identification Procedure with [...] (August 11, 2017)  ......................................................Da 99-138  INDEX TO APPENDIX (cont’d)
[brief] **Hayes v. Delamotte,** 231 N.J. 373, 386-87, 175 A.3d 953, 961 (2018) ............................................  9  **Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed,** 168 N.J. 387, 392, 774 A.2d 495 (2001) ..........................................................  9, 10  **Kocanowski v.  Twp. of Bridgewater,** 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019)  .........................................................................................  9  Kordell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 230 N.J. Super. 505, 509 (App. Div.), cert. den. 117 N.J. 43 (1989)  ..................15  Lindstrom by Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co. ex rel. N.J. Auto Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 138 N.J. 242, 250 (1994)  ...........................................  12, 13, 20  Macchi v. Connecticut General Insurance Company, 354 N.J. Super. 64, 68, 72 (App. Div. 2002)  ..................................................15  Manalapan Realty, Ltd. P’ship v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230, 1236-37 (1995)  ..............................................9  Manetti V. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 196 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div. 1984) (Pa 161)  ....................................................6  Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 102 N. J. 167 (1986) .........................................................................................15 N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 178 N.J. 327, 332 (2004) ............................................................................... 11, 12 Newcomb Hospital v. Fountain, 141 N.J. Super. 291, 295 (Law Div. 1976) .......................................................15 Palisades Safety & Ins. Ass’n v. Bastein, 175 N.J. 144, 148 (2003) ............................................................................. 11, 12 Pearl Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Watts, 69 N.J. Super. 198, 205, 174 A.2d 90 (App.Div.1961) ...........................................9 Penn Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Costa, 198 N.J. 229 (2009) ............................................. 12, 20 Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. YEAR) certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998) .................................................................9 Smaul v. Irvington General Hosp., 209 N.J. Super. 592, 595 (App. Div. 1986) certif. granted
[directive] 17  Court Administrator or Deputy Administrator  Bail Schedule 2 - Disorderly Persons Offenses and Petty Disorderly Offenses -  These offenses may appear as lesser included offenses in Bail Schedule 2 and/or in the separate Bail Schedule 2 ................................................................................................................................................................ 83  Disorderly Persons Section herein  Summary of Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Indictable Offenses  ...............................................................................................  92  Summary of Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Disorderly Persons / Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses .................................. 98  1  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for [...]  By: ____________________________  [...] (No. 030491988)  [...] (No. 021012002)  Date: May 15, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...] 101  [...], : CIVIL ACTION : ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- : FINAL ORDER OF THE Respondent, : SUPERIOR COURT vs. : OF NEW JERSEY, BIRCH REAL ESTATE : LAW DIVISION, SERVICES, LLC, : HUDSON COUNTY : DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-9.  Plaintiff’s claim against [...] is an intentional wrong claim brought pursuant to the exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of Article 2.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  Generally, an adult employee’s exclusive remedy for bodily injuries sustained during the course and scope of employment is limited to the statutory remedies provided by Article 2.  Ibid.  However, if an employer engages in conduct that rises to the level of an intentional wrong, the exclusive-remedy provision does not apply, and such a worker may pursue both a claim for statutory workers’ compensation benefits and an intentional wrong claim.
[brief] ........................................  21  Pullen v. South Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J. Super. 303, 312 (Law Div. 1995), aff’d, 291 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1996)  ........................................  10  Randolph Town Ctr. Assocs., L.P. v. Twp. of Randolph, 342 N.J. Super. 412, 416–17 (App. Div. 1999)  ......................................................  27, 28 TSI East Brunswick v. Zoning Bd., 215 N.J. 26 (2013)  ....................... 28, 29, 31, 46  Urban Farms, Inc. v. Franklin Lakes, 179 N.J. Super. 203, 213 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 428 (1981) ......................................................  13, 14 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a), (d) (g) & (m) ............................................................................
[brief] Trial 80T December 12, 2011  Trial 81T December 13, 2011  Trial 82T December 14, 2011  Trial 83T December 15, 2011  Trial 84T December 19, 2011  Trial 85T December 20, 2011  Trial 86T December 21, 2011  Trial 87T January 3, 2012  Trial 88T January 4, 2012  Trial 89T January 5, 2012  Trial 90T January 9, 2012  Trial 91T January 10, 2012  Trial 92T January 11, 2012  Trial 93T January 12, 2012  Trial 94T January 17, 2012  Trial 95T January 18, 2012  Trial 96T January 30, 2012
[brief] (80-A).  This Order was not based on "wild and undocumented accusations" as [...] had alleged in Paragraph 9 of his Motion to Release Funds.  (R-120)  The Order contained several critical requirements:  4.  [...], Insurance Agent for [...], must provide to the Court-appointed Administratrix, [...], and [...] a copy of all policies of any kind that contain the name of the decedent, [...], including retirement, funeral, burial, key man, life, or any other kind of policy including changes in beneficiary documents within the last fifteen (15) years, within seven (7) days of the date of this Order.  [...] must assure that their insurance agent complies with this Order.  Any failure in the future of the [...] or its affiliates to fully cooperate with the Court-appointed Administratrix shall be sternly addressed by the Court:  5.
[brief] (Da 55-57).  As noted by Plaintiff [...]:  Moreover, despite a clear conflict and in violation of Court Orders and the N.J. Local Government Ethics Law, these same defendants continue to vote on matters concerning [...].  They have also utilized the process of “tabling” matters dealing with [...] which is essentially a vote against him.  His bills have been “tabled” in March and a Resolution introduced to rehire him has been tabled on April 10, 2024.  The vote was 3-3 with the Mayor breaking the tie.  (Da 56).  Thus, whether the Defendants “table” a vote or engage in a vote involving [...], either procedure demonstrates voting upon a matter in which the Defendants have a clear conflict of interest.
[brief] 419 U.S. at 288 n.4.  Here, too, [...]’s submissions anticipated that it would have to justify the level of the increased rates it was requesting, and thus [...] cannot now claim ignorance of the standards by which the Department would review its submission.  On balance, the record before this court certainly does not call for a remand of the sort addressed by the District Court in *Friedler v. Gen. Serv. Admin.*, 271 F. Supp. 3d 40, 57 (D.D.C. 2017).
[directive] The right to vote in free and fair elections is the cornerstone of our democracy.  New Jersey voters have several options for participating in our democratic process.  Voting at a polling place on Election Day and voting by mail are longstanding and familiar options.  In recent years, the state also has increased access to the democratic process by expanding voters’ options to include voting in person before Election Day at early voting locations and casting a vote-by-mail ballot at a ballot drop box.  In past years, the Office of the Attorney General has issued guidance concerning certain election laws and the role of law enforcement officers in elections.
[brief] There can be no real dispute; those actions expanded the scope of, and thereby prolonged, the stop.\footnote{This case is wildly different from \textit{State v. Hickman}, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 637 (App. Div. 2000), relied on by the State for the proposition that asking incriminating questions about criminal activity does not prolong a detention.  (Sb 17)  There, all the questioning occurred when the officer first approached the defendant’s car; the officer did not direct the defendant to exit the car or ask additional questions after he had already ran the defendant’s information and confirmed ownership of the car.  In addition, the officer did not request consent to search or threaten to bring drug dogs to sniff the car.  Also, this case preceded \textit{State v. Carty} and \textit{State v. Rodriguez}, which make clear that the relevant question is whether the police expanded the scope of the stop or prolonged the detention, irrespective of whether the officer had already written the motor vehicle tickets.}