ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 29  State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005) .................................................................  24 State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 157 (2011) ...............................................................  14 State v. Ruffin, 371 N.J. Super. 371, 391 (App. Div. 2004).  .................................  8  State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 102 (2013) .............................................................  13 State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 291 (1989) .................................................................  31 State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 443 (2007) .......................................................  24 State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (App. Div. 2014) ...........................................  28 State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 101 (2014) ...........................................................  21 State v. Yarbough, 195 N.J. Super. 135, 143 (1984) ............................................. 33  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ..........................................................  7 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 ................................................................. 31 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 .................................................................. 33,34
[brief] N.J.S.A. 30:13-2(c) (emphasis added).  [...]’s care was improperly managed by licensed practical nurses or “LPNs” rather than registered nurses or “RNs”, (see Pb6 (citing 5T66:16-67:10; 5T74:2-22)), and that he did not receive adequate respiratory care in connection with his tracheostomy in order to prevent mucus buildup in his lungs, resulting in his death from respiratory failure due to a mucus plug on the morning of January 15, 2016 (see Pb5-8).
[directive] Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  Strong-hand kneeling or standing, barricade position.  Crouched over top of barricade position.  Support side of barricade, strong-hand kneeling or standing.  •  On command, from a secured holstered position, standing 2 yards behind the barricade, approach the barricade and assume the strong-hand kneeling (ro standing) barricade position, fire 4 rounds with the strong hand.  (30 seconds)  ---STOP TIME--- •  Decock and remain behind cover with visual focus towards the threat area.  Reload if necessary •  On command, assume a crouched (or high kneeling) position and fire 4 rounds over the top of the barricade using the strong hand.  (30 seconds)  ---STOP TIME--- •  Decock and remain behind cover with visual focus towards the threat area.  Reload if necessary  •  On command fire 4 rounds kneeling or standing from the support side of the barricade with the strong hand.  (30 seconds)  ---STOP TIME--- •  Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  •  Reload loading devices.  Phase II 15-Yard Line.  Time: 5 seconds.  3 rounds.  Standing point shoulder position.  •  On command, from a secured holster position, draw and fire 3 rounds in 5 seconds from a standing point shoulder position.  ---STOP TIME--- •  Reholster an uncocked weapon.  9-36  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] Per the Appellant’s own brief, “[...] and [...], who provided the resident engineer, had a duty to know the applicable industry standards.  (Pb28)  [...] and [...] failed to ensure that lighting requirements were met, as required by the HASP (Pb28)  [...] and [...] failed to ensure that the contractors met with industry standard best practices (Pb28)  [...] and [...] failed to ensure that [...] was qualified to perform his duties as the resident engineer.  (Pb28)  A review of the pleadings and Appellants arguments clearly show that the claim is against the licensed professional corporation for their failure to supervise which does not arise solely from the acts of an unlicensed professional.
[brief] [...] has a pattern and practice of mismanaging funds.  It failed to take steps to increase tax revenues in order to support its school programing, failed to address its growing special education and transportation expenses despite repeated warnings to do so, and failed to establish appropriate internal controls to ensure costs are reasonable and that payments are properly tracked.  The District’s own policies also limit chances for student success.  These include requiring teachers to adhere to strict scripts and pacing guidelines which do not allow teachers the time to address student needs or ensure that students understand and comprehend the lessons.  This is especially true for English Language Learners (ELL) and students with disabilities; District teachers have reported that the students are essentially left behind.  [...] also makes technology a necessity for student success, but failed to take steps to ensure its students have equitable access to the required tools.  On top of that, the record demonstrates a culture of apathy and low expectations for students.  Appellants ignore these critical failings and instead simply claim that because the State has provided [...] with loans to assist it in balancing its budget (due to the District’s poor planning), the District must not be receiving enough funding through the SFRA.  This logic is fundamentally flawed.  [...] has received sufficient aid through both the SFRA and State loans.  If the District still cannot provide [...] with all of the assistance it has received, clearly the issue is not one solely of funding.  For these reasons and those that follow, the court should affirm the well-reasoned decision of the Assistant Commissioner and find the SFRA constitutional as applied to [...].
[brief] The trial court also found no encroachment upon an attorney’s general license to practice law because an attorney “principally engaged” in debt adjustment services can still provide such services “under the auspices of a non-profit company. ”  T. at 17.  In short, the trial court is suggesting that the Act does not place a burden on attorneys’ ability to practice law because they may still provide those services free of charge, or (at a minimum) re-organize their law firms as not-for-profit entities and then provide services through those newly-created entities.
[brief] This action was commenced on April 8, 2022, when [...] filed its Complaint seeking to invalidate [...]’s Ordinance No. 2022-04 (“the Ordinance”).  Defendant’s Appendix (“DA”) at 12a.  The Ordinance specifically provides a procedure and process for one seeking to place poles in the right-of-way to apply for a permit to do so (DA at 46a-47a), and it specifically exempts utilities from the permit requirement if they are replacing existing poles with poles that are substantially identical or smaller.  DA at 38a-39a, 46a.  The Ordinance also provides for an applicant to request an exception from any of the requirements of the Ordinance.  DA at 49a.  See also, DA at 51a.  Grounds for the issuance of an exemption by the municipality include instances where the denial of a permit would violate federal or state law (DA at 51a) or would have the effect of prohibiting an entity form providing utility service to any prospective customer in the town (DA at 52a).  The Ordinance also contains a provision for an appeal to the Town Council from the denial of a permit.  DA at 51a.  Although [...] alleged that the Ordinance is facially and as applied invalid (DA at 13a), [...]’s Complaint did not allege that it applied for a permit nor allege that it requested in an application an exemption from any requirements of the Ordinance (DA at 12a et seq.), and in fact [...] admits that it did not file for any permit (DA at 252a).  On June 18, 2022, the Town filed its Answer and Separate Defenses in this action.  DA at 77a.  Among the Separate Defenses asserted were that the Complaint was not ripe for adjudication, that the Ordinance is entitled to a presumption of validity, that the Town complied with all applicable laws, regulations and rules, that the Town’s policies and procedures have been reasonable and appropriate and have ensured the protection of all rights, privileges, and immunities of the public, and that the Complaint fails to state a claim.  After discovery, both the Town and [...] moved for summary judgment on February 24, 2023.  DA at 88a, 508a.  Both motions were duly opposed.  DA at 474a et seq., 881a et seq.  On May 5, 2023, the trial court heard oral argument on the motions.  On June 15, 2023, the trial court entered its order and issued a written opinion.  DA at 1a et seq.  On July 26, 2023, the Town of [...] filed its Notice of Appeal.  DA at 945a.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] 2.3  The tag which accompanies articles being turned in to the Property Officer will include the following information on the tag or outermost container (bag or envelope):  2.3.1  Incident Report number 2.3.2  Date of recovery 2.3.3  Location of recovery 2.3.4  Owner of property, if known 2.3.5  Brief description of article 2.3.6  Officer's name and identification number 2.4  Should there be numerous small items relating to the same case, after each item has been tagged, enveloped, etc., place all the items in one or more larger bags, marking each larger bag with the Incident Report number and the item numbers contained in said bag.  A-1  3.0  PROPERTY SUBMISSION  3.1  Property officer available 3.1.1  A property description report, as described in Section 6.0, shall be completed.  The officer will then present the labeled article(s) and property description report to the officer in charge for review.  3.1.2  The officer in charge shall review the article(s) to insure that they are properly labeled and the property description report is accurately completed.  The officer in charge will then initial the property description report to indicate the evidence or recovered property has been processed correctly.  3.1.3  The officer who took custody of the property will then submit the property, along with the property description report, to the property officer for safekeeping.  3.2
[brief] The reasonableness of an investigatory “detention” depends on whether the officer’s action in believing that an offense was being committed was reasonable at the inception, and whether it was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. ”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).  It is “clear” that to be lawful, an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. ”  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 481, 500 (1983).  In this case the sole justification for the stop was the absence of mud flaps on the vehicle – lawful in the vehicle’s state of registration, but not in Illinois – for which the officer could and, as he advised [...], would issue a warning.  He observed nothing whatever while obtaining both [...]’s and [...]’s driving and registration credentials even remotely capable of providing objectively reasonable grounds for believing a crime was being committed, or that either occupant was committing such a crime, or that either one was armed and presently dangerous.  Yet the officer’s subsequent conduct made at the very time he directed [...] to get out of her vehicle and took her back to his patrol car (in the rear of which was a barking and demonstrably unfriendly dog); patting her down before placing her inside that; (1) he was not himself going to issue an equipment warning; (2) he was already determined that at some point he was going to “walk [his] dog” to “confirm” his hunch that marijuana was being transported; and (3) that he was going to keep custodial control of her driving credentials and continue to question her about matters having nothing to do with the equipment violation he had purportedly stopped her for in an attempt to get her to incriminate herself in criminal activity; and (4) when this failed to accomplish his purpose to directly accuse her of such activity without the administration of Miranda warnings.
[brief] In this case, [...] has drafted its own form of Consent of Surety that must be executed by the surety and returned at the time of bid submission.  In this regard, Section 102.08 of the Standard Specifications provides as follows:  *The Proposal Bond or Letter of Surety shall be accompanied by a Power of Attorney and a Consent of Surety, each in a form acceptable to the Authority, which shall be executed by the surety company.*  The Power of Attorney shall set forth the authority of the attorney-in-fact who has signed the Proposal Bond or Letter of Surety on behalf of the surety company and shall further certify that such power is in full force and effect as of the date of the Proposal Bond or Letter of Surety.  The Consent of Surety shall set forth the surety company’s obligation to provide the Contract Bond upon award of the Contract to the Bidder.  *(Ra 4 [emphasis added]).*  Under the foregoing specification, [...] requires bidders to submit a Proposal Bond *and* a Consent of Surety backed by a licensed and admitted surety approved by the Department of Banking and Insurance, executed by a duly authorized attorney-in-fact supported by a valid POA.  In [...]’s experience, the overwhelming majority of the time, the *same* individual and the *same* surety issues the Proposal Bond and the Consent of Surety, supported by the *same* POA, and thus the specifications refer to the POA requirement collectively, as applied to both.
[brief] Rather than alleging facts, complainant unabashedly relies on “rumors that the flooding at [[...]] was much worse than the Superintendent indicated. ”  (emphasis added)  Again, even when reviewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Petitioner, this allegation does not suggest that Respondents (as opposed to the Superintendent, who is not a party to this action) provided inaccurate information in violation of section (g) of the Code of Ethics.  Petitioner’s Count 7 concerns “Referendum Video #3,” which features a disabled former District student discussing her difficulties navigating the District’s schools, along with a message encouraging District residents to vote.
[brief] *Id.* at 567.  The Court upheld the board’s denial of the application, finding that while plaintiff may have met the specific bulk requirements of the development ordinance, that did not mean that the plaintiff was entitled to an approval of his subdivision plan.  *Id.* at 327.  The Court found that the Board applied sound planning concepts to protect the public interest, thereby concluding that the existing physical constraints upon developing the parcel required rejection of the subdivision configuration as designed.
[brief] The State also agreed to have Pennsylvania run pending charges out of Bucks County concurrent to [...]’s New Jersey sentence.  (1T 5-10 to 14, 14-16 to 15-24; 2T 4-23 to 5-20; Sa 18)  Counsel’s understanding is that the Pennsylvania charges were never pursued.  4  While defendants seeking to appeal from pretrial rulings other than suppression of physical evidence or entry into pretrial intervention must preserve the right to appeal in the plea agreement (Sa 16), guilty pleas are always conditioned on the right to withdraw if a pretrial motion to suppress physical evidence was wrongly decided.  Diloreto, 362 N.J. Super. at 615-16 (citing R. 3:5–7(d); R. 3:9–3(f)).  Though not necessary, [...] explicitly conditioned his plea on the right to appeal from the denial of his suppression motion.  (Sa 16) evidence found as a result of the stop was suppressed.  *Nyema*, 249 N.J. at 531-35.  The armed robbery indictment was subsequently dismissed, and [...] moved to withdraw from his global plea agreement.
[directive] If, in rare cases, it is not possible for the prosecutor to structure the plea agreement so as to require imposition of the sentence determined pursuant to these Guidelines, then the prosecutor, so as to provide some practical incentive for the defendant to plead guilty, shall, except as provided in Special Application and Enhancement Feature G (offense committed while actually on school property), tender a plea offer that requires the defendant to serve six (6) months less parole ineligibility than the maximum term of parole ineligibility that can be imposed as a matter of law.  It should be noted, finally, that in some circumstances, because aggravating circumstances can accumulate, the authorized disposition calculated pursuant to the Guidelines may exceed the minimum term of parole ineligibility required to be imposed by statute.  By way of example, a defendant convicted of a first-degree crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 could, in theory, be sentenced to a term of parole  Page 12  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) ineligibility fixed at as little as at one-third of the minimum sentence applicable to a first-degree crime (i.e., one-third of ten years or three years, four months).  Whenever the Brimage Guidelines require a prosecutor to tender a plea offer that is greater than the minimum term of parole ineligibility that the court is required to impose by law, then the Brimage offer becomes, in essence, a non-binding sentencing recommendation to the court, which the court would be free to accept or reject.  In these circumstances, a defendant would be free to plead “open” to an indictment.  A prosecutor in these circumstances is not authorized to reduce the plea offer otherwise required pursuant to the Brimage calculation process set forth in these Guidelines.
[brief] 7.  I financially and emotionally supported my two children 100% by myself, Working two jobs.  Plus requesting extra hours to my employer, just to Compensate for all of their financial needs such as: Food, Clothing, a home, Medical and dental insurance coverage, birthdays, college tuition, including Both children receiving their Master’s Degrees.  I am very proud of my two Children, who are such respectful, kind, successful, and hard-working adults now.  It is because of the love and 100% support that I gave wholeheartedly to my children, to provide a healthy, happy, and normal life.  It is truly a pity and a disgrace that [...] did not participate throughout all of those formative years, and see what wonderful children...and now productive adults that they have become.  In closing, it is [...]’s loss that he chose to be absent from their lives for all of these years.
[brief] ”)  See also Estate of Noyes v. Morano, 2019 WL 149521 at *5 (App. Div. 2019), (observing that “the plaintiff’s ‘level of sophistication’ or representation by counsel does not negate Atalese’s requirement that a court find he ‘actually intended to waive his statutory rights’”); Perkins v. Advance Funding, LLC, 2021 WL 4059861 at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2021) (Da1410) (“the fact that Perkins was represented by counsel and that his counsel purportedly reviewed the terms of the agreements with him, does not negate the fact that the arbitration clause is ¹ Defendants’ citation to Delaney v. Dickey, 244 N.J. 466 (2020) is puzzling.
[brief] In its review of the state agency determination, a court considers “(1) whether the agency’s decision offends the state or deferral Constitutions; (2) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies; (3) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (4) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. ”  Bueno v. Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 422 N.J. Super. 227, 233 (App. Div. 2011) citing George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpke. Auth., 137 N.J. 8 (1994).
[brief] Q.  [...], isn’t it true that you testified during trial that P-48 and P-50 are fraudulent, right?  A.  According to my expert, yes.  Q.  And that is your contention in this lawsuit, right?  A.  Yes, it is.  My expert told me that this is fraudulent.  2.  The conclusions of plaintiffs’ expert constituted net opinions and were erroneously relied upon by the trial court as proven facts.
[brief] 215 N.J. 265, 278-79 (2013) (citing 980 F.2d 912, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1992)).  These factors are: not only the timeliness or lack thereof of a motion to arbitrate but also the degree to which the party seeking to compel arbitration has contested the merits of its opponent’s claims; whether that party has informed its adversary of the intention to seek arbitration even if it has not yet filed a motion to stay the district court proceedings; the extent of its non-merits motion practice; its assent to the district court's pretrial orders; and the extent to which both parties have engaged in discovery.  [Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 926-27 (citations omitted). ]
[brief] 43  State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989) .........................................................  50  State v. Lopez-Carrera, 295 N.J. 596 (2021) ..............................................  44 State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2 (1990) ...............................................................  46 State v. Martinez, 229 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div.1989) ............................. 32, 60 State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402 (1990) .......................................................
[brief] Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that they could find [...] both vicariously liable and directly liable for negligent training and supervision if they determined [...] was acting within the scope of his employment.  More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he jury was entitled to believe that [...] was acting within the scope of his employment AND that [...] was negligent in its training and supervision of [...]. ”  [Pb37].  This is irrelevant and incorrect.  This instruction could not have been harmful error because the jury was asked to determine the scope of employment question first, before proceeding to any question of [...] or [...]’ liability for negligence, vicarious liability, or negligent training and supervision.
[brief] Neither the 2016 MOAs, nor the subsequent changes to the payment scale, codified in a settlement agreement the [...] entered, resulted in “unpaid wages. ”  Moreover, nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs allege that the conditions precedent required by the 2016 MOAs for promotional pay increases were even satisfied.  As recognized by the Superior Court, this changes the entire context of Plaintiffs’ case, and mandates that the Superior Court’s decision be affirmed.
[brief] On November 14, 2021 Appellant received a ticket and citation (Pa7-Pa8).  Appellant Proceeded Pro Se on March 8, 2022 and April 13, 2022.  On April 13, 2022 an order was filed regarding a wrongful imposed sentence of a wrongful traffic violation (Pa2).  On April 22, 2022 Appellant filed a Municipal Appeal (Pa3-Pa5).  On September 12, 2022 a trial de novo occurred.  On September 13, 2022 an order was filed regarding a wrongful re-imposed sentence (Pa1) regarding Municipal Appeal [...] [...], Summons, ticket and citation [...] (Pa7-Pa8).
[directive] The person. other or officer of revocation seek (2) and/or offense applicable other any or contempt criminal for charge 70 Page imposed.  release be of conditions additional that request or Section 8, pursuant to release Prosecutor County the of jurisdiction the outside occurred violation suspected the  If officer or agency the imposed, were conditions release pretrial which on matter the handling place the over jurisdiction having Prosecutor County the notify may violation the detecting other the notify promptly shall prosecutor that event which in occurred, violation the where violation.
[brief] Sims, 250 N.J. at 212-17; State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 514-19 (App. Div. 2022).  That factor is particularly “important” where the police “affirmatively misled” the defendant about his “true status” to secure a waiver.  State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 503, 518-27 (App. Div. 2022) (“[A]ny evidence that the accused was . . . tricked . . . into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his [or her] privilege. ” (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476)); Bullock, 253 N.J. at 539 (invalidating waiver where police “affirmative[ly] misrepresent[ed]” defendant’s status as a suspect).