ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court was misled by the First Count of the Complaint, paragraph 10 that states:  “On or about February 21, 2014... the Defendants failed to comply with certain terms and conditions of the Line of Credit Agreement...”  In the Second Count of the Complaint (Pa12), the Plaintiff’s Attorney IGNORED the fact that the defendant continued to make monthly interest payments/bank fees on the Line of Credit from February of 2014 through August of 2014, totaling to $2,799.27 dollars, while the matter was being DISPUTED (Pa34-37) which was Exhibit F.1.2 of the Defendant’s Brief in support his motion to Vacate the Judgment.  Again, the court was misled by the Second Count, paragraph 4 states: “Plaintiff... has made repeated demands... however, Defendants have ignored all such demands for repayment. ”  The Affidavit of Service on the business defendant, [...], (Pa6) by the Process Server, WAS NOT checked, verified or vetted by the Plaintiff’s Attorney prior to being submitted to the court, which MISLED the court to believe that the defendant was properly served.  Had due diligence been done by the Plaintiff’s attorney, he would have found out that the [...] address was for Cimple a virtual mail only office with no physical office space, where no officer or employee worked at that location.  Had he inquired by calling the business phone on Cimple’s letter head of [...], which he had in his possession, he would have received a message: “the number that you are trying to reach is no longer in service. ”  And, had he challenged the Process Server to identify the authorized agent that he left the paperwork with, he would have realized that was not possible since Cimple had no physical office space.  If the paperwork was left with someone, he or she was not an authorized agent for [...]  Likewise, had the Process Server, called Cimple’s phone number, he would have received the same “no longer in service message. ”  Furthermore, had the Process Server in February of 2015 visited the [...], the building located at 116 Village Blvd., he would have discovered from building management that Cimple was no longer at that address.  Both the Plaintiff’s Attorney and the Process Server breached their duty of care that caused unjust harm to the defendants.
[directive] ? or 7.  Enter the business mailing address the person, group of S.0.P.  2  NJA&PS Forfeiture Program Administration Page 1 1  1).  in organization entered block  Enter the name and title of the person who is legally empowered to 8. or receive funds on behalf of the person, group organization entered 1)- in block in 3).  Enter the telephone number of the person specified block 9. or Enter a description of the person's group's organization's mission, 10.  (m., mission statement, legal responsibilities, duties, .organization structure, etc  If separate pages are required, enter "See ...).  in Attachment for the space provided.  Attach separate Block 10)" a 10) sheet of paper with the header 'Block -Organization's Mission" centered at the top.  Enter the proposed amount of forfeiture funds to be expended by the 11.
[brief] Despite the clear decisions made in the civil rights related cases cited above the Trial Court's irrationally decided that Plaintiffs civil rights were not violated because he was granted adjournments prior to being removed, locked out, and belongings stored.  "Therefore, we review a court's denial of an adjournment request under the abuse of discretion standard.  See Smith, supra, 17 N.J. Super. at 131, 133-34.  However, a court's decision to grant or deny an adjournment request is not unfettered.  "Judicial discretion is not unbounded and it is not the personal predilection of the particular judge."  State v. Madan, 366 N.J. Super. 98, 109 (App. Div. 2004), see Crimmins v. City of Hoboken DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Apr. 6, 2015)  Plaintiff argues the deprivation or interference with his rights to adjournments is pendant or reliant on whether or not he was removed, locked out, and belongings stored, and that this position was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.
[brief] ” (P669a) and “Thank you for being such a strong support system for me and for each other.  (P672a-673a).  Respondent’s other testimony also makes it apparent that Petitioner had nothing to do with the February 1997 incident.  Respondent repeatedly testified that the Decedent was very protective of her and how others treated her.  (12T60:16-21).  In fact, one morning, when Decedent found the words “whore” written across the front of Respondent’s home, Decedent immediately called the police.  (12T61:10 to 62:11).  Yet, for the alleged “disturbing incident” after Respondent allegedly told Decedent what happened, she did nothing. (12T109:5-8).  Respondent did not produce any police reports, medical records, legal action, or any other responsive action that a “protective” mother would have taken to investigate the circumstances.  Decedent never told Petitioner about Respondent’s accusations and indeed, the first time Petitioner heard of this alleged incident was during this litigation.  (12T145:8-25).  Respondent also gave Decedent a “thank you” card in 2011, that Respondent claims was written over a two-day period to be sure it included everything the Decedent did that Respondent was grateful for.  (12T63:9-16; 12T112:6-19; P703a).  In that card, Respondent thanks Decedent for actions she took with respect to her natural father, “never making me stay at Daddy’s house alone. ” (P703a).  Yet, nothing is mentioned in that card about any action Decedent allegedly took to address the alleged “disturbing incident. ” (P703a).  Nothing but innuendo, speculation, and conjecture ties Petitioner to the February 1997 incident, obviously because it had nothing to do with the Petitioner.  Nor did it have anything to do with the 2014 Will.  That Incident was raised by Respondent in this Appeal for the same reason it was raised during trial, solely to inflame the Court, confuse the issues and disparage the Petitioner.
[brief] In this Appeal, Appellant-Defendant, [...]  (“[...]”), asks this Court to overturn the trial court’s well-reasoned and correct decisions, holding that: (i) the alleged trivial defect in [...]’s (“[...]”) bid (failing to include a copy of its existing and publicly available NJDOT Notice of Classification) was non-material and waivable; and (ii) the [...]’s (“[...]”) failure to waive [...]’s immaterial defect was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because it was entirely unsupported, let alone supported by a sound business judgment.
[brief] 3  Ja refers to the Joint Appendix. company and the insurance operation itself.  N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 et seq.; Ja67-68, Sec. 10.  By doing so, it isolates the function of the insurance operation (namely the reciprocal exchange)—allowing the insurance entity alone to be organically operated on a not-for-profit basis—stripping an incentive for executives inside the entity to purposely underprice risks in order to report profits on a short-term basis so it can trigger compensation.  Id.  In fact, while rare, some of the world’s best performing insurance entities are reciprocals, such as [...], [...], and [...].  See https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56778/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56778.pdf.  Reciprocals are legally held to more stringent financial guidelines than traditional insurance companies.  N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 et seq.  Reciprocal exchanges cannot have outside stockholders who, in turn, can be enticed to profit from policyholders, because reciprocals are not-for-profit, and they generate additional capital organically from their insureds.  Ja67-68.  In summary, a reciprocal exchange operation is a fundamental self-help form of insurance, where a management company manages the operations of the exchange on behalf of the unsophisticated policyholders who simply want a lower cost insurance policy to cover their risk.
[brief] The facts before the trial court here are not even close to those in Harris and, therefore, not even close to a close question.  The totality of the relevant circumstances demonstrate that the lower court’s properly exercised its discretion in electing to read the jury the Czachor charge, see Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Judge’s Instruction on Further Jury Deliberations” (approved 1/14/13); (21T:17-7 to 18-22), and directing them to continue deliberations.  As the trial court noted, and the record bears out, despite having been in deliberations for approximately three days, these were not three full days of deliberation as a significant percentage of that time had been dedicated to the readback/playback requested by the jury.  Moreover, and significantly, this was the jury’s first report of a potential partial deadlock and, therefore, requiring the jury to continue to deliberate one time was not inappropriate.  This is especially true as the jury’s note specifically asked for instruction from the trial court.  Finally it bears mentioning that defendant did not think that the provision of the Czachor charge was inappropriate at the time of the jury’s note as he agreed with the provision of the Czachor charge then.  Defendant’s post-verdict change of heart does not an abuse of discretion make.  In the absence of any such abuse, this Court should affirm the trial court’s appropriate exercise of discretion here.
[brief] TRIAL COURT ERRORS  Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that the trial court erred as follows: 1) In ignoring uncontested facts in the record.  2) In making factual findings that are not supported by the record.  3)  In failing to follow the law with regards to preexisting non-conforming uses, which is that courts should look to extinguish preexisting non-conforming uses where the entitlement to same is based on "sparse evidence" (as the Court so found).  4)  In improperly placing the burden of proof on the Plaintiffs to prove that the 1984 Resolution was invalid, rather than requiring the Defendants to prove that the Board of Adjustment had jurisdiction to hear the application through proper notice to property owners, publication pre-hearing and after the approval.  5)  Even assuming that the 1984 Resolution was valid and binding, in failing to conclude as a matter of law that the "use" approved in 1984 had not been expanded.  6)  In failing to find that there had been an abandonment of the "purported preexisting non-conforming use" in 1969 when the "food use" terminated and was replaced by a TV sales and service shop.
[brief] ”  Ab4.  There is no evidence of a desire, plan or intention to implement the available safety systems at issue here over time.  Varela, supra, 505 P.3d at 255.  Moreover, amicus cites two examples for a gradual phase in.  In one example, there was a 100% phase in of passive restraints in three annual stages across the entire car fleet.  Ab4.  In the second, there was a 100% phase in for all vehicles for head-impact protection over 4 years.  Ab4.  Here, defendant’s engineer, [...], testified that the safety systems had been available on defendant’s vehicles sold in Japan as early as 2003 and vehicles marketed in Europe as early as 2006.  Pa145.  A decade later, Lane Keeping Assist (LKA) and Lane Departure Warning (LDW) were standard on only 5% of vehicles.  Pa143.  There is nothing to support the suggestion that the alternative safer design had not been made available on the vehicle sold to plaintiff because they were still being phased in as part of a comprehensive or exclusive regulatory scheme.  In fact, the NHTSA has not established any phase in or regulatory framework for the safety systems at issue and has left the issue of allocation of liability to be addressed via state law.
[brief] (5)  By: (select all that apply):  ☐ hand delivery ☒ regular mail to last known address ☐ registered or certified mail, return receipt, to last known address ☐ other*  *Note:  There must be consent of receiving party to use a method of service other than mail or hand delivery.  BY SIGNING THIS FORM, YOU ARE CERTIFYING THAT THERE IS CONSENT.  If serving by e-mail or fax, provide the receiving party's e-mail address or fax number below:  (6) on the following parties, or their attorney if represented, in the above-captioned matter  [...] (Name of party and party's attorney, if represented)  [...] (Address – use attorney's address if represented)  [...] (City, State & Zip Code)  [...] (Name of party and party's attorney, if represented)  [...] (Address – use attorney's address if represented)  [...] (City, State & Zip Code)  (7)
[brief] The COVID Statute plainly contemplates a private right of action.  [...] maintains that even to the extent that the COVID Statute is construed to require local school districts to pay their outside contractors if schools are closed for a health emergency even if the contractor does not or cannot provide the service it is contracted to provide, since the Statute does not expressly state that a contractor which a local school district refuses to pay may sue for the money due it under the Statute, the Court should conclude that no such suit should be permitted.  This argument, carefully examined, makes no sense.  First and foremost, it must be remembered that local boards of education can be and are sued all the time under a variety of circumstances.  If for example one of [...]'s school board clients for which it performs custodial services should fail to pay it for the services [...] renders, [...] is free to sue it for breach of contract, in a manner no different that would be the case if the non-payer were a non-public person or entity.  There is no statutory authorization required for it to do so.  And in doing so, [...] would be free to assert any theory of damages it sought to, just as it would be in suing a private party.  And if [...] failed to pay [...] for the services it rendered in the ordinary course, it would be subject to suit as well.  But [...] contends that even if it is obligated to pay [...] pursuant to their contract based upon the obligations imposed by the COVID Statute, [...] has no right to sue for that money.  While it is true that New Jersey’s courts do not routinely recognize a private right of action based upon a statutory provision which does not expressly allow for one, there is a body of law addressing the circumstances where a private right of action will be found.
[brief] 1.  Children do not have a privacy right to keep the fact their school is socially transitioning them secret from their parents.  The State argued below that children have a privacy right to keep their school’s social transitioning of them secret from their parents.  ACa82.  The State did not specifically invoke the United States Constitution as the source of students’ alleged privacy rights (presumably to avoid creating federal jurisdiction), but even if it had, children have no federal constitutional right to privacy to keep secret from their parents the fact they are being socially transitioned by their school.  Thus, student privacy is not a legitimate interest, much less a compelling one. \(^4\)
[brief] in this case requiring nearly three dozen different defense attorneys and would allow a deep-pocket adversary, like [...], to drive up defense costs and make it impractical, if not impossible, for some defendants to afford a defense.  [...] also never acknowledges that, in the very case that forms the premise of its position, *Techdan*, the same attorney represented four defendants—two entities and two individuals—without any comment from the Supreme Court of New Jersey (or the plaintiff-insurer’s counsel) about a conflict of interest.  [...] represented defendants [...], [...], [...], and [...].  *Techdan*, 253 N.J. at 92 (identifying attorneys).  If representing multiple defendants in a CNA-governed case creates a *per se* conflict of interest under RPC 1.7(a)(1) equivalent to representing both a driver and passenger in a car accident, then upon finding the CNA applied to the IFPA and remanding for trial on apportionment, the Supreme Court would surely have identified the conflict of interest and directed that each defendant needed new and separate counsel.  But it did no such thing.  See *id.* at 119.  That it did not do so is a strong, if not dispositive, indication that no such *per se* conflict exists under Rule 1.7(a)(1).
[brief] On April 24, 2022, a motion to vacate was filed by the first attorney for the [...].  52a.  It claimed that service of process was invalid.  It claimed that on August 23, 2021, the [...] states that they had already left for vacation several minutes before, and thus the Affidavit of Service must be invalid and fraudulent.  Appellant’s motion to vacate requested discovery as to the issue of service of process.  This motion was heard long before the actual trial date.  It was argued on May 5, 2022, and by Order dated May 20, 2022, the Court allowed discovery.  85a. 91a.  The Court then said that after discovery, if necessary the Court would hold a plenary hearing, and it set a trial date for the same.  Discovery occurred throughout the remainder of 2022 and into the spring of 2023.  It included not only written discovery (interrogatories, document demands and requests for admissions) but depositions of both [...] and [...]; the process server [...]; [...] who is the representative of [...] and [...]; [...] who is the representative of the buyer [...]; and the “GPS expert” [...] for Appellant.  (Another witness, [...], did not have her deposition taken but did testify at trial regarding her conversations and texts with the Appellant pre- and post-judgment.)  During discovery Appellant’s legal counsel withdrew and was replaced by new (its current) legal counsel.  **Plenary Trial in March-April 2023 and Decision**  Discovery was concluded in March, 2023, and the Court held trial over two (2) separate days on March 29 and April 20, 2023.  Ultimately it denied the motion to vacate judgment.  T4 97:12 to 101:7.  Again, the only grounds upon which the Appellant sought relief was failed personal service of process.  The Court found that service was proper.  No argument was raised as to equity, property values, etc.  The Court found service to be valid, the judgment to be proper, and the motion to vacate to be unfounded.  It was denied.
[brief] Defendant [...] indicates that a reading of the answers to interrogatories (which [...] points out were late and were to be forced via a motion granted to Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff) "reveals nothing as to that very specific question."  He submits that there is no tangible, concrete and or specific fact or document sustaining Plaintiff's allegations.  There are no experts named; there is no report; there is no document showing what physical or psychological illness has ANY of these Plaintiffs suffered to date.  He also asserts that there is not one scintilla of proof has been provided showing what damages, if any, have these Plaintiff sustained.  This Court agrees.
[directive] Marijuana Decriminalization Automated Processes Case Review of This Matter having come before the Court upon motion ( defendant/juvenile name) seeking judicial review, pursuant to the Supreme Court Order(s) related to the Marijuana Decriminalization Law of Automated Process, the above-captioned matter as it; D  Should have been included in the automated process.  D  Should not have been included in the automated process.  _____ 20_ This_ It of Is on day , Ordered that (Docket Number/ Complaint _____ Number/ Accusation Number/ Indictment Number)  1s: l.  Dismissed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-23.
[brief] Thus the Trial Court correctly denied the motion to amend as it would have failed for the same reasons as articulated in the motion to dismiss.  Appellant’s motion was properly denied because the proposed amendments were futile and subject to dismissal.  “When there is opposition to the filing of an amended pleading setting forth a new cause of action, the court must apply the same standard as it does on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ”  Maxim Sewerage v. Monmouth Ridings, 273 N.J. Super. 84, 90 (Law Div. 1993).  The Trial Court was correct in its determination that the substitution of [...] as Plaintiff in this matter would not alter the issues before the Court.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1) prohibits an individual from possessing a weapon in the State of New Jersey and provides as follows:  “Any person who has in his possession any firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree. ”  The crime of unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) prohibits possession of a weapon without the requisite license to carry the same in accordance with N.J.S.A.2C:58-4.  Defendant was charged with, and acquitted, of both offenses by the jury after the State presented its entire case against him.
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