ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Table of Contents  Table of Judgments...........................................  iii  Table of Citations..............................................  iv  Introduction.......................................................  1  Standard of Review: Motion to Dismiss/Amendment of Complaint............................................. 3 Statement of Relevant Facts and Procedural History...  5 Legal Argument.................................................. 13  1.  The trial court committed plain error by dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint for environmental claims, as Plaintiffs have never had an opportunity to litigate their environmental claims on the merits......................................................... 13 (October 16, 2023 Order, located at 2a and 20a-23a).  2.  The trial court committed legal error by refusing to allow amendment of the complaint, as [...] has never participated in any of the prior suits between the parties and constitutes a distinct legal entity that should not be disregarded....................... 18 (October 16, 2023 Order, located at 2a and 24a-27a).  Conclusion............................................................  19 | Document Name | Date | Appendix Pg. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|--------------| | Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Complaint and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint and Supplemental Statement of Reasons | 10/16/23 | 1a | ## Table of Citations
[directive] Standards For Arrest and Filing Complaints.  a.  It shall be the policy of this State that a juvenile should ordinarily be taken into custody, consistent with the laws of arrest, and that a complaint should be filed, where any of the following circumstances exist: The delinquent activity involves the commission of an indictable offense; The delinquent activity is committed by a juvenile identified as an Impact Offender, or by a juvenile who has charges pending or has a history of committing repetitive disorderly persons offenses; or The delinquent activity constitutes a violation of a supervisory condition of probation, parole, home detention or suspended sentence.  b.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Executive Directive, it shall be the responsibility of all sworn law enforcement officers to take into custody any juvenile where there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile has committed an act of delinquency that would constitute a violation of any offense defined in Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C ("The Comprehensive Drug Reform Act"), as required by Directive 5.7 of the Statewide Action Plan for Narcotics Enforcement.  Where a juvenile is taken into custody for an act of delinquency involving a violation of any offense defined in Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C, a complaint alleging delinquency shall be filed.  c.  Subject to the provisions of subsections a. and b. of this section, it shall be the policy of this State that a complaint ordinarily should not be filed where the delinquent activity involves a petty disorderly persons offense or disorderly persons offense, other than a repetitive disorderly persons offense or a disorderly persons offense involving the use or possession of a controlled dangerous substance or drug paraphernalia.  8.
[brief] [...] DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING NEGOTIATIONS OVER GROUND RULES  The Board’s arguments in Point II of its brief lack merit.  It is true that in Brielle, supra, the Commission held that the issue of whether to conduct negotiations in open public session is a permissive subject of negotiations, and that neither party can insist upon same as a precondition to negotiations.  However, the Commission found the instant dispute does not implicate collective negotiations that take place in open public session.  (See Point IV of this Brief, supra.)  Thus, [...]’s argument in Point II of its brief is based in part on a false premise: that [...]’s Order (directing [...] to negotiate in good faith with [...] over mandatorily negotiable subjects, including over negotiations ground rules respecting the presence of the [...] during negotiations sessions) compels it to negotiate over a permissive, as opposed to a mandatory, subject of negotiations.
[brief] See DiCarlo v MoneyLion, Inc., 988 F.3d. 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2021)  In other words, \(^2\) “c.  For injunctive relief, enjoining Defendants from engaging in future violations of the HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA;” (Ja27)  Plaintiff sought to prevent [...] from future use of its form New Jersey health club Membership Agreement thereby immediately preventing other New Jersey consumers from being exposed to the type of HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA violations alleged by Plaintiff against [...] in the Complaint.(Ja13-Ja43)  [...]’s response to the Complaint (Ja13-Ja43) was a motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings pending the completion of arbitration.
[brief] 2697a Exhibit 1, Complaint, page 1, dated October 10, 2014, filed June 27, 2019  2712a Exhibit 2, Contract Agreement, dated April 11, 2014, filed June 27, 2019 2714a Exhibit 3, Agreement between [...] and [...], dated April 26, 2014, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2280a) -- Exhibit 4, [...] Request for Expressions of Interest, dated December 16, 2013, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1787a) -- Exhibit 5, Agreement between [...] Engineers, Architects and Land Surveyors, P.C., and [...], dated May 6, 2014, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1778a) -- Exhibit 6, Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1577a) -- Exhibit 7, [...] bio, dated December 2013, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 8, Second Amended Complaint, dated January 26, 2016, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 64a)
[brief] See generally J.M. ex rel. A.M. v. E. Greenwich Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 07-2861, 2008 WL 819968, at *9 (D.N.J. 2008).  . . .  Id at 131-32 (Bolding added).  This is exactly on point for this case with the notation that it would be a “hostile judicial or court environment” without any attenuation to a possible unrelated entity such as a fraternity.  This claim should not really be novel.  The “novel” question of the application of the LAD to our Courts has been “off the table” – lawyers may be disbarred or, like me, subjected to repeated retaliation.
[brief] ”  Central Jersey Freightliner, Inc. v. Freightliner Corp., 987 F.Supp. 289, 301 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth., 836 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Cajoeco Llc v. Bensi Enters., 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1150, *19 (App. Div. June 17, 2021).  Indeed, a litigant’s mere status as a current or former shareholder does not confer them with direct ownership rights to corporate funds allegedly converted by a defendant.  Id.; see also Cajoeco Llc, supra, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *19 (individual shareholders may not recover for the injury to their investments alone); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732 (3d Cir. 1970); Tully v. Mirz, 457 N.J. Super. 114, 123 (App. Div. 2018); and Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 549 (1996).  However, in some rare instances, a trial court may permit a shareholder (even in a closely held corporation) to directly pursue derivative claims if they demonstrate that they have suffered a “special injury.
[brief] 2T92; 2T171-10 to 13; 2T171-19)  [...]’s referral to [...] states that Plaintiff had been having increasing attacks of Meniere’s disease for 18 to 24 months.  (2T171-14 to 20)  Plaintiff claimed he did not remember that.  (2T171-21 to 172-7)  Plaintiff testified that *after* the July 29, 2013 incident he was experiencing “intense” symptoms of Meniere’s disease, including dizziness, spinning, blurred vision, and that his wife had to help him get up to go to the bathroom to be sick.  He said he needed help just to stand up and move around and he could not do his normal activities from the July 2013 through February 2014.  (2T93 to 95)  [...] performed a vestibular nerve section in [...], New York, in February 2014.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (13T64-6 to 97-9)  Plaintiffs argue that the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion because the claims against her were “rife with disputed fact issues” (Pb35).  This is simply wrong.  First, Plaintiffs fail to cite to any evidence in the Summary Judgment record that gave rise to a disputed fact regarding whether Defendant misappropriated funds from [...] and/or [...] (Pb35).  The schedules to [...]’s report that Plaintiffs cite (Da764-896) in their brief certainly did not show that funds were improperly transferred to Defendant (Pb36).  Likewise, the trial court failed to cite any such evidence in its decision (13T65-9 to 66-21).  Second, there was no issue of fact with respect to Defendant’s purported liability under the 2017 [...] SPA as Plaintiffs contend (Pb37).  Again, Plaintiffs fail to cite to any evidence in the Summary Judgment record that gave rise to a dispute of fact regarding Defendant’s alleged breach of the 2017 [...] SPA.  Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court correctly kept Defendant in the lawsuit so that Plaintiffs could obtain complete relief after trial is complete nonsense (Pb37; 13T65-9 to 25).  Plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence on the Summary Judgment Motion that gave rise to a disputed fact regarding the viability of their claims against Defendant arising under the 2017 [...] SPA (13T65-14 to 67-12, 92-17 to 23).  Likewise, the trial court failed to cite any such evidence in its decision on the Motion (Id.)  Based on the foregoing, the trial court should have dismissed this case against Defendant on summary judgment because the Amended Complaint failed to assert any viable causes of action against her as a matter of law.
[brief] It was not until August 30, 2023 that all issues were resolved for all parties.  As a result, the case was not ripe for appeal until August 30, 2023.  [...] had forty-five (45) days from the final order to file her appeal.  Twenty-three (23) days later, on September 22, 2023, [...] submitted her Notice of Appeal, which was amended on September 29, 2023.  Therefore, [...]’ Notice of Appeal was timely because all claims were resolved in the Order entered August 30, 2023.  In Weed, the Court found that an appeal filed nearly two months following the Court’s judgment was proper, as the post judgment motions left issues unresolved.  Weed, 279 N.J. Super. at 527.  Here, [...]’ motions following the May 8th Order mirror the additional filings in Weed, and their treatment should as well.  Id.  The docket and filings in the present case display why the May 8, 2023 Order “was no longer final as to all issues and all parties....”  Id.  Like in Weed, when the Appellate Court used the date of the last order to calculate the time to appeal, this court must apply the same analysis here.  The August 30, 2023 Order was the last Order since it addressed all parties’ issues pending before the Court.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal was timely because the Trial Court’s judgment was not final until August 30, 2023.  B.
[brief] (Pa27-35)  On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, including a certification from counsel claiming the exemption from filing the Affidavit under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, and an out-of-time Affidavit of Merit.  (Pa59-60)  Defendants filed their reply brief on May 8, 2024.  The motion was heard before [...] on May 10, 2024.  (1T)  On that same date, [...] granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to file a timely Affidavit of Merit.  (Pa84-85)  C.
[brief] *Borys*, 76 N.J. at 111 (quoting *Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt*, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943)).  The Clause was also motivated by a concern with “authentication of the statutes of the several states. ”  Corwin, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 374.  That is, in the event that, for example, a litigant in a New Jersey court invoked a Pennsylvania law, the New Jersey court needed a way to be sure that the law presented to it was authentic.  For this reason, the Clause authorized Congress to “prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,” U.S. Const., Art. IV § 1, which Congress has done, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (“The Acts of the legislature of any State … shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State … thereto. ”).  That did not mean the laws of New Jersey would bind Pennsylvania or vice versa.  It meant simply that other states’ laws could be uniformly authenticated.  While the Clause served as “a nationally unifying force,” Borys, 76 N.J. at 111 (quoting Hunt, 320 U.S. at 439), it categorically does not require “a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate. ” (Da28) (quoting Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 494).  In our federal system, states are, of course, able to maintain and enforce their own laws, and “[n]othing in the Constitution ensures unlimited extraterritorial recognition of all statutes. ”  Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 498.  Indeed, this Court has already rejected an argument strikingly similar to the one defendant advances here.  In In re Winston, 438 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2014), this Court addressed whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause required New Jersey to treat an applicant for a permit to purchase a handgun as not disqualified from receiving the permit where the applicant had disqualifying New York convictions but had obtained certificates from New York courts that “relieve[d] the holder of all disabilities” except “the right to be eligible for public office.
[directive] If the Attorney General or their designee has reason to believe that a law enforcement agency is not complying with or adequately enforcing the provisions of this Directive, the Attorney General may temporarily or permanently suspend or revoke the authority of the department, or any officer or civilian employee, to operate an ALPR, or to gain access to or use ALPR stored data.  The Attorney General or designee may initiate disciplinary proceedings and may take such other actions as the Attorney General, in their sole discretion, deems appropriate to ensure compliance with this Directive.
[brief] 1.  Insuring Agreement  We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of a “loss” due to “wrongful acts” committed by the insured’s “directors and officers” solely in the conduct of their management responsibilities for the condominium association.  This insurance applies only to “wrongful acts” that occur during the policy period.  In the event the same “wrongful act” is repeated multiple times or results in multiple “claims” or “suits”, the coverage and limit applicable to the first occurrence of the “wrongful act” shall also apply to all resultant “losses”.  The “wrongful acts” must take place in the “coverage territory. ”  We will have the right and duty to defend any “suit” seeking those damages.  * * * 2.  Exclusions  This insurance does not apply to:  * * * g.  “Losses” based upon or attributable to the insured gaining any personal profit, remuneration or advantage which is not shared equitably by the condominium association or to which the insured is not legally entitled.  * * * o.  Fines or penalties imposed by law.  * * * q.  Any “claim” or “suit” that is brought by or on behalf of any insured or any person or organization which is controlled by, controls, or is under common control with you.  * * *
[brief] To reiterate, her claim to vacate default was waived because it was never raised below.  Lastly, Defendant desperately claims that subsection R. 4:50-1(f) should have applied no matter her unreasonable timing, to prevent a “grave injustice. ”  There was nothing of the sort that resulted here.  Defendant’s own testimony was that she was divorced and got what she wanted.  (Pa30, Pl’s. Trial Ex. P-19, Def. Dep. at 59:19-21, Mar. 23, 2016).  The trial court properly found:  The court finds the Defendant’s primary arguments in support of her requested relief concerning the equitable distribution allocation and the waiver of alimony by way of the terms in the PSA were not so disproportionate to render the PSA substantively unconscionable.  (Id. at 49-50).  The trial court properly assessed that there was no unconscionability of the divorce settlement.  Regarding equitable distribution, the trial court correctly found that the marital estate suffered a staggering 28-million-dollar loss.
[brief] Bacon v. New Jersey State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 38 (App. Div. 2015) (“We generally decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.  By failing to raise their original jurisdiction argument in their initial brief, plaintiffs have waived this contention. ”) (internal citations omitted), certif. den., 224 N.J. 281 (2016); Bouie v. New Jersey Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 407 N.J. Super. 518, 525 n.1 (App. Div. 2009) (“In any event, a party may not advance a new argument in a reply brief . . .  Therefore, any claim that appellant may have had under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 was abandoned. ”) (internal citations omitted); Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hojnoski, 317 N.J. Super. 331, 335 (App. Div. 1998) (“In its reply brief, Selective argues for the first time that Rider violated the PAIP, specifically N.J.A.C. 11:3–2.7.  This argument is improperly raised.  It is well settled that we will not consider an issue not raised below unless it goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concerns a matter of substantial public interest. ”); [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on R. 2:6-5 (2025) (citing cases regarding the impropriety of using reply to brief additional issues).
[brief] (Id. at page 18 of Opinion.)  Additionally, with regard to the other tort claims alleged against the [...] defendants, the Court also properly found that the claims for (1) fraud, (2) tortious interference, (3) conversion, (4) unjust enrichment, (5) violation of RICO, (6) conspiracy to violate RICO, (7) conspiracy to commit counts 1 through four, and (8) aiding and abetting counts 1 through 4 were all barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine and the doctrine of Res Judicata since these claims were identical to the claims asserted in the 2015 action.
[brief] 3.  Right to Family Integrity  Third, the Parental Secrecy Policy violates parents’ right to maintain the integrity of their family.  Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (noting that “freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life” is constitutionally protected) (plurality op.); see also Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303 (discussing right to “familial integrity”).  This right protects parents’ relationships with their children from “undue state interference. ”  Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303, 306 (holding school personnel’s secret interference with parents’ “management of [their daughter’s] teenage pregnancy” violated right to family integrity).  See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (noting that students are not “mere creatures of the State”).  The Parental Secrecy Policy constitutes an “undue state interference” in parents’ relationship with their children.  From the clothing and toys parents give their children, to the friends parents allow their children to have, to the sports parents allow their children to play, the parent-child relationship is deeply shaped by whether the child is a boy or a girl.  By requiring schools to socially transition children without informing parents, the Parental Secrecy Policy allows schools to fundamentally alter the nature of parents’ “emotional bond[s]” with their children.  Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1021 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see also Doe v. Dickenson, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1014 (D. Ariz. 2009) (holding state may not fundamentally alter the nature of the parent-child relationship).  Moreover, the Parental Secrecy Policy treats parents as the enemy, impermissibly driving a wedge into the parent-child relationship that lies at the heart of the family, thus usurping the parental role.  Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding the state violated the right to family integrity when it created “mistrust among the members of [plaintiff’s] family”).  In short, a school that socially transitions children behind parents’ backs unduly interferes with the parents’ right to family integrity.
[brief] [...] agreed to withdraw its notice of termination and [...] agreed to give [...] a $3,000.00 discount from its monthly rent of $9,250.00, for the months of May, June, July and August.  Later, at [...]’s request, [...] added another $3,000.00 discount for the month of September 2016.  Thereafter, on October 1, 2016 the rent returned to $9,250.00.  [...] remained as a tenant and remained in business for the next three and one-half years finally succumbing to the poor business climate brought on by the pandemic in April of 2020, and sent a notice terminating the February 20, 2015 Lease.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred By Ruling That The Second Application Would Not Create A Desirable Visual Environment And Be Aesthetically Pleasing (Pa37-39)**  It is uncontested that the Plaintiff’s proposed development would create a desirable visual environment and substantially upgrade the vacant lot's current condition aesthetically in accordance with the MLUL purpose “i. ”  The trial court ruled that “the proposed building would be new, meaning if new equates to aesthetically pleasing it was.  It is not a characteristic which supports the promotion of MLUL goals as any new building, such as a conforming one, would be aesthetically pleasing. ”  Pa38.  As [...] testified, the good civic design and arrangement of the proposed building which utilizes different materials on its exterior from all sides (i.e., wood, stone), provides a wide variety of design and/or architectural elements thereby creating a desirable visual environment.  Pa271, at 52:15-53:4.  This is especially true, since the lot has remained vacant and unimproved for years.  Indeed, the trial court failed to consider the present state of the Property in its current condition and how a proposed development, such as the one put forth by Plaintiff, would alter the landscape and surrounding area.
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