ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Under current New Jersey law, an individual can obtain a carry permit only if they can demonstrate to the reviewing officer that the applicant satisfies mandatory statutory requirements: (1) is “not subject to any of the disabilities which would prevent him or her from obtaining a permit to purchase a handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card,” (2) is “thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of handguns,” and (3) “[h]as demonstrated a justifiable need to carry a handgun. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4; N.J.A.C. 13:54-2.4.  The decision in Bruen, No. 20-843, prevents N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. us from continuing to require a demonstration of justifiable need in order to carry a firearm, but it does not prevent us from enforcing the other requirements in our law.  Because state law assigns the initial responsibility of reviewing public-carry applications to law enforcement agencies before delegating the ultimate decision to the New Jersey Superior Court, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4d, it is particularly important to explain the full scope of law enforcement’s remaining responsibilities.  While impacts our justifiable need requirement, the ruling does Bruen not change of New Jersey’s public carry laws.  As this Directive explains, carrying any other aspect New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2  a handgun without a permit is still illegal in this state, and law enforcement agencies must consider all other the mandatory requirements for obtaining a carry permit before granting an application.  Moreover, law enforcement agencies must adhere to all regulations of the [...] relating to applications for of handgun carry permits and associated background checks, including any regulations issued on an expedited basis in the aftermath of Bruen.  The changes to our permitting requirements require swift understanding and action.  New Jersey’s commonsense firearms safety laws have resulted in the State having one of the lowest firearm mortality rates in the country.  But over 5,000 New Jerseyans nevertheless have been killed by gun violence in the past decade.  And the increase of firearms in our public spaces, especially in the aftermath of recent mass shootings, has the potential to undermine the safety of New Jersey residents and of our law enforcement officers.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to - 117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the directives outlined below.
[brief] STATUTES AND RULES  N.J.S.A. 3B:3-34 .........................................................................................  34  N.J.S.A. 2:16:50, et seq.  ............................................................................  4 N.J.R.E. 201(b) ..........................................................................................  5 N.J.R.E. 202(b) ..........................................................................................  5 N.J. Rule of Court 4:67-1 ..........................................................................  4 N.J. Rule of Court 4:83-1 ..........................................................................
[brief] ”  (Db45), N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2).  However, Intruder self-defense is present when there is a risk of mere personal injury.  N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c).  This has nothing to do with whether reasonableness should remain an objective standard.  To the extent that the “detached viewpoint” language is not in the general self-defense charge, this would track to defendant’s benefit, despite his claims.  The “detached viewpoint” language instructs the jury that he need not be accurate to be reasonable.  If an ordinary person using reasonable judgment would believe the same as defendant’s honest belief, regardless of whether there was a true threat, the reasonableness element is satisfied.  This is easier to prove, not harder.  Defendant generally claims that this jury instruction produced an unjust result in his case, and his convictions should be reversed for plain error.
[brief] (Emphasis added).  Consequently, the Court in McLean stated that permissible lay opinion testimony is "an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with firsthand knowledge," and “does not convey information about what the officer 'believed,' 'thought,' or 'suspected.'"  Id. at 460 (emphasis added); see also State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611, 632-634 (2022) (lay opinion under N.J.R.E. 701 by an FBI agent -- about the meaning of slang terms used in a conversation in which he did not participate -- was improper under McLean because it was not based on perception, but instead on the officer’s belief or understanding); State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429, 450-452 (App. Div. 2017) (same as Derry); State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393, 404 (2016) (detective, like in McLean, improperly opined that he believed he witnessed a drug deal); State v. Smith, 436 N.J. Super. 556, 574-575 (App. Div. 2014) (reversing for plain error when police officer offered the lay opinion that defendant’s actions were typical of a suspect trying to dispose of evidence after a crime; the officer was improperly “interpreting facts for the jury” rather than simply testifying to facts).
[brief] INCREASED DENSITY  •  [...] contends because development under the Plan will allow for density 3-4 times greater than current density, such is inconsistent with the Master Plan.  Going back to 1988, [...] has recognized that its Bayfront is “an invaluable resource which must be managed to assure that the community benefits from the Borough’s Waterfront location. ”  Even then – 3 decades ago, [...] recognized that it must secure benefits of its location by guiding waterfront development to advance “economic development. ”  In so arguing, [...] ignored the 2015 Master Plan Re-Examination Report which recommends that [...] encourage major development in the Mixed Use Commercial Residential Area that provide for a mix of uses designed to, among other things, contribute substantially to [...]’s economic well-being.  The Plan is directly on-point with that 2015 recommendation to commit to a major economic redevelopment of the area.  Suffice it to say that implicit in a substantial Mix-Use Development would be an increase to densities in the area.  Any argument to the contrary is putting one’s head in the proverbial sand.  True, reasonable minds could differ regarding scope – that is, is doubling density appropriate or is tripling density appropriate.
[directive] New Jersey under the me to granted authority the to pursuant  Therefore, general the for provides which -117, to 52:17B-97 N.J.S.A. 1970, of Act Criminal Justice the of the officer enforcement law chief as General Attorney the by justice criminal of supervision law criminal of the enforcement efficient and uniform a of benefits the secure to order in State law all direct hereby I State, the throughout justice criminal of administration and the of State the of laws the of authority the under operating agencies prosecuting and enforcement or to responding when below outlined directives with the comply and implement to Jersey New 2C:14-2.
[brief] In assessing the third Miller factor, the Court did not place appropriate weight on the fact that [...]’s family refused to get him help and that his brother left a loaded American variant AK-47 next to his bed.  (6T:124-25 to 125-20).  During trial, [...] testified extensively about [...] being bullied in school.  (14T:39-21 to 41-6).  Furthermore, [...] testified about [...] trying to ask his mother for help for the bad thoughts he was having.  (14T:211-14 to 212-5).  Both experts testified that [...] was undiagnosed at the time of the shootings.  Despite all of these factors, the Court simply focused on the fact that [...] loaded the gun and fired fourteen times in finding the third Miller factor should not receive any weight.
[directive] Agency Training and Qualification Requirements  •  To conform with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.  •  To conduct quarterly training sessions, two of which may include semi-annual qualification programs, for automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons in accordance with the standards set forth in this manual.  •  To conduct automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons, police carbine and scoped rifle training and qualification activities separate and apart from handgun and shotgun qualification programs.  •  To qualify those officers who are or might be assigned use of an agency issued automatic or semi-automatic assault weapon (submachine gun, personal defense weapon or a police service rifle), twice annually on a standardized automatic/semi-automatic assault weapons qualification course (ASQC, ARQC) with a minimum score of 80%.  (See Appendices E, and G for courses of fire).  •  To qualify those officers who are or might be assigned use of an agency issued automatic/semi-automatic police service rifle deployed for patrol supplement or entry purposes, submachine gun or a personal defense weapon twice annually, on the Automatic/Semi-Automatic Subgun Night Qualification Course (ASNQC) with a minimum score of 80%.  (See Appendix F).  •  To qualify those officers who are or might be assigned use of an agency issued police carbine twice annually on both the Police Carbine Qualification Course (PCQC) and Police Carbine Qualification Night Course (PCQNC) with a minimum score of 80%. (See Appendices H and I).  •  To qualify those officers who may be assigned the use of the agency’s scoped rifle four times a year on the Scoped Rifle Qualification course (SRQC) with a minimum score of 90% including an mandatory “cold bore” hit.  •  To provide remedial training for those personnel who do not meet the standards of qualification or take appropriate action until such time as the qualification standards are met.  •  To establish and conduct tactical training programs associated with automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons, police carbine and 9-29 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards scoped rifle use.  •  To review annually agency policies, rules and regulations governing maintenance, storage and carrying procedure for automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons, police carbines and scoped rifles.  Section 5.
[brief] PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  *13  Plaintiffs sought to compel the designation of [...] and [...] as document custodians on three occasions before the present motion, and each time [...] correctly denied those requests.  See [...]’s Sep. State.  [...] first rejected Plaintiffs’ request to add [...] and [...] as custodians at a May 1, 2020 hearing.  Plaintiffs argued that they would be “seeking to have CEO [...] and COO [...] on a custodial list, particularly in this case where they have been so involved in making public statements and promises about what [...] is doing to protect privacy. ”  [...] Decl., Ex. 1 at 33:11-18.  [...] denied their request, stating “[t]hat seems a dispute that’s premature because ... there [are] reams and reams of unresponsive things. ”  Id. at 34:2-5.  On May 15, 2020, Plaintiffs again requested to add [...] and [...] as custodians, stating “we ... think that they are integral to this” and pointing to an email in which “[...] is e-mailing directly with one of these custodians. ”  Id., Ex. 2 at 13:10-16.  [...] again rejected the request, instructing Plaintiffs to “wait. ”  Id. at 13:18.  That same day [...] followed up with an order instructing [...] to search the custodial files of 81 custodians.  Dkt. 436.  [...]’s 81 custodians include C-level senior executives including its Chief Privacy Officer and Chief Product Officer, as well as the Chief Operating Officer of [...] who also serves as [...]’s Vice President of Global Operations, more than twenty Vice Presidents, twenty-two Directors, and six department heads among others.  These custodians were involved in third party data access issues, third party enforcement, [...]’s response to the [...] events, platform and development issues, and user privacy.  Plaintiffs raised the issue of adding [...] and [...] for a third time during a December 2020 status conference.
[brief] **[...]**  Attorneys for Plaintiffs- Appellants [...], [...], and [...]  By: /s [...]  [...]  [...]  Dated: November 1, 2023  SCHIBELL, MENNIE & KENTOS, LLC, SCHIBELL & MENNIE, LLC, RICHARD D. SCHIBELL, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], attorneys of SCHIBELL & MENNIE, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. [...], [...], [...]  (Program Administrator for Allied World), [...] and [...], [...], as Executrix of the Estate of [...], and [...] attorneys and advisors, Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal from a Final Judgment of the Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County  Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. [...]  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] Angry about being “jumped” by [...] at the baby shower, defendant went home with the intention of getting a gun, and returned with that gun and his entire family in search of Sharpe.  When Sharpe was not there, rather than leave, defendant challenged [...] to a fight and laid in wait outside his home.  When a car parked near the Holley trailer and the driver of that car spoke to [...], rather than walk away, defendant fired a shot at [...], killing [...]’s wife [...], an innocent bystander.  Defendant now argues that [...] abused his discretion in imposing consecutive sentences of ten years’ imprisonment for passion-provocation manslaughter and eight years’ imprisonment for unlawful possession of a weapon, a shorter sentence than he originally imposed.  Because the judge considered the evidence presented by defendant, including his good behavior in prison, and explained his reasons for ordering that the sentences run consecutively, as required by this Court and Torres, no further remand is needed or appropriate.
[brief] \(^2\) (T6-14 to 16, 37-18 to 19, 38-22 to 39-2, 83-13 to 14)  Although [...] testified that he believed [...] was walking toward him, the trial court found the opposite -- that [...] was already walking in that direction before [...] arrived.  (T82-19 to 25)  [...]’s body camera footage shows that not only was [...] not walking toward [...] but was already passing [...] before the stop.  (Pa8: 0:39 to 51)  Lastly, [...] testified that [...] was wearing a mask, but the body camera and surveillance footage shows [...]’s face was uncovered.  (Pa8: 0:39 to 51; Da1: 10:25 to 10:30)  \(^2\)  The trial court’s factfinding is entitled to deference.
[brief] ”)); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19 cmt. a (1981) (“[T]here is no distinction in the effect of the promise whether it is expressed in writing, or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these ways and partly in others. ”).  The trial court did not affirmatively find any reason why the parties’ implied agreement did not exist, nor any particular reason why it should not be enforced.
[brief] (25T 27-8 to 19; 29-15 to 16; 33-16; Da 28-30; Da 32)  [...] returned with the neighbor to the bar, and bought another shot of gin.  (25T 27-20 to 21; 32-23 to 24; Da 28)  [...] and his neighbor left the bar and went into a Chinese restaurant on the intersection of Lexington Avenue and West Side Avenue.
[brief] *24  The evidence also shows [...] and [...] themselves initiated and shaped [...]’s response to the [...] scandal, including ADI, which will help define the true scope of [...]’s failure to monitor third party access to and use of friend information.  For example, the day of her first public interview after the [...] scandal broke, [...] [Redacted] Ex. 24 at FB-CA-MDL-01184406.  While [...] baldly asserts that this document is a “red herring” because [...] was not involved in ADI (Opp. at 13), newly produced evidence shows otherwise.  A [Redacted] Ex. 33 at FB-CA-MDL-01950694; see Ex. 34 at FB-CA-MDL-01950669  [Redacted]  See Ex. 14.  These messages do not reflect [...]’s “high-level guidance. ”  Opp. at 2.  Rather, they reflect [Redacted].  Likewise, the evidence demonstrates [...]’s intimate involvement in [...]’s enforcement against third parties, including deciding when, how, and against whom [...] should enforce.
[brief] DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID # 051951996  [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID # 057772013  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Date Submitted: February 20, 2024
[brief] The court erred in granting summary judgment because the questions on the Questionnaire were vague and ambiguous and, as such, the insurance policy cannot be rescinded as there was no *intentional* misrepresentation made by [...].  Moreover, there were material issues of fact and [...] wholly failed to meet its burden on the issue of reliance as the record is devoid of any evidence of any agent, employee, or representative of [...] (or [...] or [...]) informing [...] that the $1 million insurance coverage would not bind, or that the premium would change, if [...] was planning to use 12 to 15-passenger vans.  Nor are there any sworn statements from any underwriter, or anyone with first-hand knowledge stating retrospectively that the policy would not have been issued but for the “misrepresentation” of fact.  Further, [...]’s own policy provides that automobile coverage is “void” if the insured *intentionally* misrepresented a material fact about the insured vehicles, which is not the case here, further necessitating reversal.  Moreover, public policy dictates that where the insured made an innocent mistake and was never provided with any notice of ineligibility for coverage, rescission is unwarranted.  For all of the foregoing reasons, rescission was inappropriate and the lower court’s decision to grant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed.  Dated: June 22, 2023  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]
[directive] Yes No Unknown  ❏ ❏ 17.a)  Is a subject of the investigation or a premises to be searched believed to be associated with terrorist activities?  Yes No ❏ ❏ b)  Is a subject of the investigation or a premises to be searched believed to be associated with sophisticated criminal enterprise?  Yes No ❏ ❏ c)  Is a subject of the investigation or a premises to be searched believed to be associated with organized crime?  Yes No  APPLICANT  18.  Do you have reason to believe that a target of the current investigation: ❏ ❏ a) is a defendant in any pending criminal matter?  Yes No ❏ ❏ b) is an informant/cooperating witness for any law enforcement agency?  Yes No ❏ ❏ c) has ever been detained or questioned by another law enforcement agency?  Yes No BY ❏ ❏ d) is the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant or B.O.L.O. bulletin?  Yes No
[brief] (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers about dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the SPRS, the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, and the Public Employees’ Retirement System.  (Pa11).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa11).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa11).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.
[brief] As will be discussed, the Board’s decision-making process in this matter is the very example of a decision that is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and utterly lacking support in the record.  B.  The [...]’s decision to deny the Project based upon an undisclosed and sudden requirement for “net metering,” when the Board was aware of the grid-supply nature of the Project for over two years, is arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed.
[brief] *Padilla*, 559 U.S. at 374; *Gaitan*, 209 N.J. at 380; *Taccetta*, 351 N.J. Super. at 200.  As part of this advice, counsel “should usually inform the defendant of the strengths and weaknesses of the case against him, as well as the alternative sentences to which he will most likely be exposed. ”  *Purdy*, 206 F.3d at 44-45.  Ethical standards also provide guidance as to the level of care applicable to the representation of defendants in the plea negotiation process.
[brief] There, two different plaintiffs brought claims against their respective insurance companies alleging unlawful language within the insurance contract.  However, one contract explicitly precluded recovery for diminution of value damages, meanwhile the other contract did not.  There, this Court had the benefit of analyzing the variations between the two respective plaintiffs’ contracts and determined that they were sufficiently distinct from one another so as to preclude class certification.  That is not the case here, where the only lease before the Court is the [...]’, and the [...]’ have pled that [...] uses the same or substantially the same Chargeback Provision with other class members.
[brief] INDEX TO REPLY BRIEF LEGAL ARGUMENT  ...........................................  1 POINT ONE: ..................................................  1  PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WERE NOT REQUIRED AT TRIAL TO RELITIGATE  LEGAL ISSUES  PREVIOUSLY DECIDED ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT POINT TWO: ..................................................  3  THE ISSUANCE OF A ZONING PERMIT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE FOR APPLICATION TO THE HISTORIC PRESERVATION COMMISSION FOR ISSUANCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATENESS  POINT THREE: ..................................................  3  DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ARE BARRED ON APPEAL FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF THE OCEAN GROVE CAMP MEETING  ASSOCIATION’S CONSENT POINT FOUR: ..................................................  4  THE DECISIONS OF THE LAW DIVISION RENDERED MOOT  ANY ISSUES ARISING FROM PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS NOT SEEKING AN ORDINANCE INTERPRETATION FROM THE ZBA CONCLUSION  ..................................................  6  #  Table of Contents  ## Cases Cited | Cite | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Applestein v. United Board and Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 352 (1961) | 2 | | Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 534 (2011) | 2 | ## Statutes and Codes | Cite | Page(s) | |-----------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111 | 1, 5 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.2 | 1, 5 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70a | 1 | | Ordinance Section 900B| 1, 2 | | | 5, 6 | | Ordinance Section 902A| 1, 2 | | | 5, 6 | | Ordinance Section 906 | 1, 2 | | | 5, 6 | | Ordinance Section 900A| 3 | | Ordinance Section 413.02B | 5, 7 |  LEGAL ARGUMENT