ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Page 8  POINT II WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER ENTERED  JANUARY 11, 2019, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 30, 2018, WHICH DENIED THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO INCLUDE  A CLAIM FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE (Pa295)  Page 14  CONCLUSION  Page 26  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Appellants place a great weight on the Connecticut case of *Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Commissioner*, 122 A.3d 592 (Conn. 2015).  In that case, the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated a certain provision of the Connecticut Debt Negotiations statute, which exempted from its application “any attorney admitted to the practice of law in this state who engages or offers to engage in debt negotiation as an ancillary matter to such attorney's representation of a client.
[brief] Atlantic County Indictment [...] charged Defendant with murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) (Count 1); possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count 2); and unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count 3).  Da1-5.  Defendant was tried by a jury, which found him guilty on all counts.  18T 9:17-11:21.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., sentenced Defendant to 40 years in prison subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 on Count 1, merged Count 2 with Count 1, and imposed a 7-year term of imprisonment on Count 3 to be served concurrently.  Defendant appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing without consideration of two aggravating factors.  Da128-65.  The New Jersey Supreme Court denied Defendant’s petition for certification and his motion for reconsideration of that denial, and the United States Supreme Court denied Defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  Db18-19; Da127; Earley v. New Jersey, 583 U.S. 1102 (2018).  On remand, Judge [...] resentenced Defendant to 30 years in prison with 30 years of parole ineligibility on Count 1 and a concurrent 5-year term of imprisonment on Count 3.  Da117-20.  Defendant made application for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR).
[brief] The Commissioner noted:  Regarding the duty to register pursuant to the Public Workers Contractor Registration Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 sets forth very succinctly, in pertinent part:  “No contractor or subcontractor, including a subcontractor not listed in the bid proposal, shall engage in the performance of any public work subject to the contract, unless the contractor or subcontractor is registered pursuant to that act. ”  1407a (emphasis added).  The Commissioner noted that the wording of the PWCRA in effect in 2010 had no exceptions to it.  See 1406a, 1408a (“There are no terms in the Prevailing Wage Act that exempt licensed professionals. ”).  The [...] is confident that had the Commissioner been working with the 2024 version of the statute, the Commissioner’s analysis would have come out differently.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a (January 18, 2022) (“Subcontractors of a contractor registered pursuant to [the PWCRA] are not required to register under that act if they do not perform work at any construction site subject to that act. ”).  2.  The Facts of *TAD Associates* Suggests that Registered Archaeologists Who Monitor and Write Reports Would Not Have to Register under the PWCRA (not raised previously).
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  The trial court’s finding that Defendants violated the LGEL must be reversed for the reasons set forth above.  Dated: August 22, 2024  /s/[...]  GIANCARLO GHIONE, ESQ. [...] and [...]  Plaintiff-Respondents, v. [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendant-Appellants.  On Appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division – Bergen County (Docket No. [...])  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS
[directive] 2  Policy  2.1  The Use of Force Policy formally recognizes four distinct types of force: physical force; mechanical force; enhanced mechanical force; and deadly force.  2.2  Enhanced Mechanical Force is an intermediate force option between mechanical force and deadly force, generally requiring a greater level of justification than that pertaining to physical or mechanical force, but a lower level of justification than that required for the use of deadly force.  Unlike deadly force, enhanced mechanical force does not require an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.  Examples include CEDs and less-lethal devices and ammunition.  2.3  As with any type of force, officers shall exhaust all other reasonable means to gain compliance before resorting to enhanced mechanical force, if feasible.  Thus, if a safe alternative would achieve law enforcement’s objective, enhanced mechanical force shall not be used.  Officers shall, therefore, use verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment and de-escalation techniques to gain voluntary compliance, when feasible.  Officers shall never engage in unnecessary, overly aggressive, or otherwise improper actions that create a situation where force becomes needed.  2.4  In situations where officers are justified in using force, officers shall use only that degree of force that is reasonable, necessary and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s mental and physical condition, the nature of the offense, and the level of resistance or threat known to the officer at the time.  2.5  The decision to use force and the appropriate amount of force requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each incident.  2.6  Any deployment of a CED or less-lethal device against a person, except as authorized by this policy, is prohibited.  Any intentional misuse or reckless abuse of any such device will not be tolerated and will result in administrative action, discipline, or criminal prosecution.  2  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 518-19.  The court further noted that any reasonable person in defendant’s position would have been similarly misled.  *Id.* at 519.  Similarly, here, [...] was misled as to his status when [...] “reinforce[d] a false impression as to the seriousness of the sentence” that [...] faced.  *Id.* at 518-19.  [...] asked [...] before he waived his rights why he had been arrested.  (1T 25-11)  Like the officer in *Diaz*, [...] told [...] that he was under arrest for the drug offense from that day, intentionally misleading [...] to believe he was in custody only for a minor narcotics charge to induce his waiver.  (1T 25-12 to 14)  In fact, the trial court found that the only reason the police kept [...] in custody at the time of his interview was solely so that [...] could interrogate him about the armed robbery; the officers who arrested [...] for the minor narcotics charge had planned to release him on his own recognizance before [...] intervened.
[brief] 2.  Plaintiffs’ “totality of evidence” argument  Plaintiffs devote multiple pages of their brief to explaining those portions of the motion record that they contend support their claim for an implied easement across the [...].  At the conclusion of that section of their brief (Pb45), Plaintiffs summarize their argument, saying:  “[t]aking all of this evidence as a whole, the trial court correctly concluded there was more than enough undisputed evidence to satisfy either a preponderance of the evidence or a clear and convincing burden of proof as to the existence of implied easement appurtenant. ”  Plaintiffs’ statement captures in a nutshell their misunderstanding of the relevant inquiry here.  As discussed above, this Court is not concerned with whether there was sufficient support in the factual record for the trial court’s motion decision in Plaintiffs’ favor.  That is because this appeal does not involve a review of a decision by the factfinder, after the full presentation of evidence, including the opportunity to hear from and judge the credibility of witnesses.  Nor does this appeal involve a review of a summary judgment decision in favor of Defendants rejecting Plaintiffs’ claim for an implied easement appurtenant, for which again the relevant inquiry would be whether the motion record contained evidence in favor of Plaintiffs’ position.  Rather, this appeal involves a ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, for which the proper inquiry is whether there was sufficient evidence in the motion record in favor of Defendants as the non-moving parties.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.  Thus, it is meaningless to argue that there was “enough undisputed evidence” in the motion record “to satisfy either a preponderance of the evidence or a clear and convincing burden of proof as to the existence of implied easement appurtenant. ”  What is important on this appeal is whether there was evidence in the motion record, after affording all reasonable inference to Defendants as is required under New Jersey law, from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that Plaintiffs did not establish their claim for an implied easement appurtenant by the requisite clear and convincing evidence.  Simply stated, because there was such evidence in the record – as more fully identified, discussed, and explained in Defendants’ opening brief – Plaintiffs’ motion should have been denied, and the trial court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ motion should be reversed.
[brief] Following a 207-day trial and by clear and convincing evidence, [...] determined that [...], motivated by unfathomable greed and extraordinary arrogance, intentionally and purposefully misappropriated – and then fraudulently concealed from their partners – more than $50 million from the [...] in wanton and willful breach of their fiduciary duties, in violation of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 et. seq., and in violation of New Jersey’s racketeering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et. seq.  In [...]’s own words:  “[T]he [...] cheated [[...]] out of millions of dollars by engaging in wide-scale fraud and deception …. ”  (14480a)
[brief] Princeton NJ was known when the Complaint and the Summons was filed with the Court in February of 2015.  *Why then in March of 2015* would the **Request to Enter Default** and *why again in April of 2015* would the **Final Judgment by Default** be sent certified mailed to [...]’s business address of [...] – NOT the defendant’s home address?  Because once a Final Judgement by Default is granted by the court is it very difficult, nearly impossible, to have that judgment vacated.  The [...] attorneys know the law based on 100’s and 1000’s of court filings each year over many years.  We argue that the Plaintiff’s attorney knowingly and willfully **VIOLATED the LAW**, because once the case was in Post-Judgment mode, he had a very wide latitude of what he could do, and what he could require the defendants to do, all done with enforcement by the court.
[brief] Despite being an entirely new structure, designed only to add service to new customers in the State of New York, the DEP determined that the Project qualifies for a statutory exemption that was expressly enacted only for “routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair or upgrade of public utility lines, rights-of-way, or systems by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act. ”  In addition, the DEP determined that the Project is consistent with the relevant Water Quality Management Plan, as a prerequisite under the Water Quality Planning Act.
[brief] ”  This is precisely what [...] did in his testimony: reach an expert opinion on the cause and manner of [...]’s death based on the condition of his remains as they were found.  [...] determined that the state of [...]’s remains were consistent with homicide, but he never stated a belief about the identity of the killer or her state of mind as did the expert in Jamerson.  Clearly, if the medical examiner in Jamerson had testified that the cause of death was being run over by an automobile, there would have been no objection.  Similarly, here, where [...] has testified about the cause of the death (and not the identity of a killer or that killer’s state of mind), his expert opinion is similarly unobjectionable.
[brief] Of note is the Trial Court’s statement quoted at KVDb27 that:  Because … when you have personal guarantees out there and they … have an ability to get out on … a 30 day notice, and they provide that notice through the tenant …”  The Trial Court is assuming there was a guarantee with an ability to get out on a 30 day notice.  This demonstrates the Court’s lack of understanding of the facts.  First of all, there is no 30 day termination clause with respect to the guarantee.  The guarantee simply states that the guarantors are personally liable for the “obligations of the Tenant herein”.  As long as there is a Lease and obligations thereunder, the guarantors are liable.  So the Court is mistaken to the effect it thinks there is a 30 day termination clause in the guarantee separate and apart from the Lease month to month term.  Secondly, the trial Court seems to think this was an attempt by the guarantors to terminate the guarantees.  Again, this is not consistent with the undisputed facts.  [...] simply gave notice of the termination of the Lease because the business was suffering.  After speaking on May 5, 2016, the Landlord, [...], and Tenant, [...], came to an agreement to lower the rent for 4 months and rescind the termination notice.
[brief] (Pa1-Pa19)  [...], a neutral third-party payment processor, simply transfers those client’s funds in accordance with the terms of the agreement the client voluntarily enters into.  *(Id.)*  Therefore, because [...] brokers the agreements independently, [...] reasonably expects that the terms which govern the business relationship between [...] and its clients – in this case, [...] – would also govern [...] and those clients.  Adhering to the Arbitration Provision for [...] and [...], but not for non-signatory [...], would constitute a clear detriment to [...] in its role as a neutral third-party payment processor.
[brief] The Initial Orders (i) denied [...]’s motion to enjoin an arbitration commenced by [...] concerning its claims against [...] for non-payment for [...]’s work on a project known as the Hackensack Project (the “Hackensack Arbitration”), (ii) granted [...]’s motion to compel the Hackensack Arbitration, and (iii) dismissed with prejudice [...]’s complaint seeking to enjoin the Hackensack Arbitration, which relief was denied to [...] as a matter of law by way of the Trial Court’s denial of injunctive relief.  Upon [...]’s motion for reconsideration, the Trial Court reconsidered the Initial Orders, reiterated the lack of foundation in [...]’s attempt to enjoin the Hackensack Arbitration, and confirmed in all respects its Initial Orders.  [...]’s appeal of the Initial Orders and the Reconsideration Order (collectively, the “Orders”) centers exclusively on the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] First, detectives exceeded the scope of the limited “booking” exception to Miranda\(^5\) by interrogating [...] about the offense for which he had been arrested.  Second, [...] unambiguously invoked his right to counsel during the booking video such that both the booking statement and subsequent interrogation should have been suppressed.  At minimum, the repeated references to [...] contacting a lawyer should not have been played for the jury.  Finally, the detectives impermissibly contradicted the Miranda warnings during [...]’s interrogation, rendering his statement involuntary and requiring suppression of --- \(^4\)  The State also moved to admit [...]’s statements on the body worn camera recording as well as an earlier interrogation; both of those statements were ruled admissible.
[brief] The trial court also denied [...]’s post-judgment motion to amend the Complaint to assert an illicit alliance between the City and the redeveloper, [...].  The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s ruling in its entirety.  The appellate panel specifically found that not only was the post-judgment motion to amend untimely but also meritless because the alleged claim that the City was unfairly and illegally favoring [...]’s competitor, [...], was not newly discovered evidence.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury.
[brief] (Pa115-Pa124; Pa496-Pa620)  On September 12, all three Appellants gave direct testimony and were cross examined by Counsel for Applicants.  In total, the application was heard at the ZBA meetings held on March 28, 2023, May 23, 2022, August 22, 2022, September 12, 2022 (collectively, the “Subject Hearing”).  At the conclusion, the ZBA voted in favor of Appellants’ application at the last of these four meetings.
[brief] In _In re City of Camden_, 429 N.J. Super. 309, 327-29 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485 (2013), the Appellate Division explained:  Appeals from the interest arbitration award are decided by [...], which may “affirm, modify, correct or vacate the award or may, at its discretion, remand the award to the same arbitrator or to another arbitrator . . . for reconsideration. ”  _N.J.S.A._ 34:13A-16(f)(5)(a).  The scope of our review of [...] decisions reviewing arbitration is “sensitive, circumspect and circumscribed. ”  [...]’s “interpretation of the statute it is charged with administering . . . is entitled to great weight,” and its decision “will stand unless clearly arbitrary or capricious. ”  However, [...]’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to no deference when its interpretation is “plainly unreasonable, contrary to the language of the Act, or subversive of the Legislature’ intent[.]”  When a public interest arbitration award is reviewed, judicial scrutiny is “more stringent” because “such arbitration is statutorily-mandated and public funds are at stake. ”  In addition to the public interest and welfare, the public sector arbitrator is obligated to consider “the prevailing law[ ] in rendering any award. ”  In _Hillsdale_, the Supreme Court articulated principles that govern our review of the award here:  [A] reviewing court may vacate an award when the decision fails to give “due weight” to the section 16(g) factors, when the award has been procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means, when arbitrators have refused to hear relevant evidence or committed other prejudicial errors, or when arbitrators have so imperfectly executed their powers that they have not made a final award[.] (citations omitted).  [I moved the citation to above]  Accord In re State, 443 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 2016) (“We defer to [...]’s decisions because of its expertise and will only reverse if the decision is clearly demonstrated to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable”) (emphasis supplied).  On February 29, 2024, [...] issued a decision affirming [...]’s Award and Decision (Aa036-064) and the Union has not articulated any justifiable reason to disturb [...]’s findings.  POINT II
[brief] As an initial matter, the Cross Appellants do not address this issue before this Court on the proper abuse of discretion standard that applies on appellate review of a lower court’s exercise of discretion under Rule 4:26-4.  Rather, they seek to invoke *de novo* review because their motions below sought “summary judgment” based on the two-year statute of limitations.  Nonetheless, the basis of these requests for “summary judgment” was that the Plaintiffs asserted did not “do enough” to set forth the causes of action against them, as John Doe defendants under Rule 4:26-4, and Plaintiffs “should have” joined them before the lapse of the two-year anniversary of the accident.  Accordingly, they are challenging the Law Division’s orders permitting amendment of the pleadings under Rule 4:26-4.  Although this Court’s review of the legal issue of whether a statute of limitations applies is *de novo*, this Court’s application of “that law” to a ruling under Rule 4:26-4 accords substantial deference to the lower court’s evaluation of the equities.
[directive] These fonns are provided upon request and at the time of disposition to persons seeking the expungement of arrest ONLY or charge records relating to a disorderly persons offense, petty disorderly persons offense, or municipal ordinance violation, where those proceedings were dismissed, the person was acquitted, or the person was discharged without a conviction or finding of guilt.  These forms are not to be used to expunge arrest or charge records where the dismissal, acquittal, oa· discharge resulted fa·om a plea bar&aining agreement involving the conviction of other charges.  The process requires the completion of the following three steps.
[directive] In addition to these policy reforms, the Attorney General or a County Prosecutor play a significant supervisory role and may intervene directly in the day-to-day operations of a law enforcement agency when warranted by substantiated allegations of serious misconduct that the agency may not be effectively addressing on its own.  Together with the Attorney General’s authority to establish uniform criminal justice policy for the State of New Jersey, the authority of the Attorney General and County Prosecutors to intervene directly in the day-to-day operations of law enforcement agencies makes New Jersey’s criminal justice system unique in the nation.  The uniqueness of New Jersey’s unified, integrated system of law enforcement means that certain policies adopted in other jurisdictions may be misplaced in New Jersey.
[brief] He repeatedly told the Board that his renderings showed what the project “…potentially could look like…” and never stated that his renderings were what the project would actually look like.  5T 16:12, 5T 23:7, 5T 24:6, 5T26:11.  He told the Board: “We can’t make any guarantee”, 5T25:18; “So the best I would say is that it would similar”, 5T 23:25; “what hopefully it should look like in the end”.
[brief] Regular court hours are generally between 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday.  This decision directly limited the public and Township’s participation.  Most zoning board hearings are held on weekday evenings in order to maximize public engagement.  This is a key component of the Open Public Meetings Act.  In fact, the Zoning Board must consider several factors in determining whether due process rights are sufficiently addressed, including, “at minimum, the scale of the project, the number of approvals requested, the degree of public interest, and the number of potential objectors. ”  N.J.A.C. 5:39-1.7(a).  The trial court’s adopted procedure for the special hearing officer flew in the face of these factors and effectively stifled public opinion.  \(^4\)  The trial courts Order was entered in October 2020, less than a year into the Covid-19 Pandemic and resultant state of emergency.  The result was a hybrid procedure akin to Frankenstein’s monster overtaking the statutorily conferred process and powers of the Board.  The monster, now allowed to run amuck, should have never been borne in the first place.  The SHO’s decision is nothing more than the result of an ill-conceived remedy looking for a problem.  The trial court’s Order should therefore be reversed as it expands on the improper conference of a Mt. Laurel remedy contrary to well-established case law.