ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, the Arbitrator did not rely upon [...]’s rationale for terminating [...] or the second doctor’s note in reaching his decision.  Rather, his decision was based exclusively on his personal “opinion” that [...] could not terminate an employee on a temporary medical leave.  Second, the Union ignores several critical and undisputed facts.  It is undisputed that [...] received a doctor’s note from [...] on December 30, 2019 stating that she could not perform her essential job functions for a period of at least six months.  [...] terminated her employment one week later, and expressly informed her that she was terminated because she could not perform her essential job functions.  [...]’s January 6, 2020 letter to [...] noted the limitations set forth in her doctor’s note and informed her that there was no light duty work available to her.  (Pa21)  [...]’s stated reason for terminating [...] could not have been more clear.  The Union’s references to [...]’s alternative explanations for [...]’ termination refer to events occurring after her termination and after she provided a second, highly suspicious doctor’s note directly contradicting her first doctor’s note which [...]’ own treating physician confirmed he had not prepared, authorized, or reviewed.  (Pa33)  [...] had no duty to reconsider [...]’ termination,\(^3\) no duty to re-employ her when requesting referrals for new carpenters, and no duty to maintain any particular number of staff.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S JURY WAS LAWFULLY EMPANELED.  [...] commenced the virtual jury selection process in this case by addressing the venire panel in three large groups and asking each group to answer to pre-selection questions.  The first question was geared towards finding prospective jurors “that would be able to sit for the length of time of this particular case,” which, the judge explained, would take place over the course of two months, but “in reality … the actual time that we’re asking … from you, is probably somewhere in the area of 10 to 12 days of total time. ”  Those prospective jurors that could not sit for the required trial time on the trial dates, identified for the prospective jurors both verbally by the judge and visually through the display of a color-coded calendar on the screen, were asked by the judge to raise their hands physically or through use of Zoom’s raise your hand function.  (3T4-19 to 9-19, 16-2 to 20-14, 26-6 to 29-16, 31-6 to 32-22).  Prospective jurors that did not raise their hands, indicating that they were not available on the anticipated dates or for the anticipated duration of the trial, were excused.  Prospective jurors that did raise their hands, indicating that they were available on the anticipated dates and for the anticipated duration of the trial, were then asked a second question by the judge, specifically if they could be fair and impartial based on a limited recitation of the facts of the case.  This limited recitation included an acknowledgment that this case had received past “media attention” and advised the jury of the name of the defendant, his victims, and their relationship to him, the date and location of the crime, the nature of the crime, and the nature of defendant’s proposed defense.  Like with the first question, the judge asked those venire members who answered yes, indicating they could be fair and impartial to raise their hands.  Those prospective jurors who did not raise their hands were excused from service.  (3T9-3 to 12-22, 20-15 to 22-7, 29-17 to 31-1).  Once pre-selection qualification was completed, [...] provided the prospective jurors with “preliminary instructions,” which included explanation of the court’s COVID precautions, the hybrid jury selection process, and an explanation of the jury questionnaire and the questions contained therein.
[brief] Further, defendant’s argument that the court abused its discretion by rejecting his request to exclude [...]’s testimony without an analysis under State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133, 147 (2023), misapplies that case.  The Olenowski Court explained that moving forward, courts would analyze “testimony based on scientific knowledge” under the factors outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmas. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Olenowski, 253 N.J. at 151-54.  Where an expert is offered to testify to “scientific knowledge” that “will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue,” Daubert laid out four non-exhaustive factors to help guide that determination: (1) whether the scientific theory or technique can be, or has been, tested; (2) whether it “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error” as well as the existence of standards governing the operation of the particular scientific technique; and (4) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.
[brief] Some smartphone users — and the minority of Americans who do not own smartphones — may not personally have experience toggling their location tracking on and off, but the simple fact that a mobile electronic device allows its users to customize the data they share with the manufacturer, the cell phone service provider, and various apps is common knowledge in modern society.  That a user's customized or default settings may impact the records kept by those entities does not require specialized knowledge to understand.  Id. at 160-162.  See also United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 2013) (District Court properly took judicial notice of the “accuracy and reliability of GPS technology); and Commonwealth v. Thissell, 928 N.E.2d 932, fn. 15 (Mass. 2010) (A review of the origins of GPS technology provides further assurance of its reliability).  Significantly, Ohio has specifically concluded that expert testimony regarding the “analysis” of data extracted from a cellular phone, including steps and elevation information retrieved from a Fitbit health app on a defendant’s iPhone is not required for the evidence to be admissible at trial.
[brief] On cross-examination, [...] admitted that he did not actually see a gun in [...]'s hand.  Moreover, despite not having any doubt that [...] and [...] had been in the fried chicken store that evening, [...] conceded that the first time he had positively identified either of the defendants was at the time of trial.  In fact, he could not recall whether he gave the police a taped statement after the incident.  Defense counsel then played for the jury a portion of the taped statement [...] gave to the police on November 13, 2004.
[brief] He determined that the likely value of [...]’s pain and suffering and economic damages without discounting it for liability, credibility, causation or other issues was $1.6 million.  2T160-1-3.  But because of the strength of [...]’s statute of limitations defense, because of the type of credibility issues the trial court identified in [...]’s testimony (Da23a), and the issues of causation, in [...]’s professional judgment, the settlement value was approximately $550,000.  2T185-4-25.  He explained that there was a strong statute of limitations defense because a two and a six-year statute of limitations applied to the personal injury and property damage claims, respectively, because where, as here, the physical symptom’s causal relationship to the toxic substance is a matter of common understanding by the layperson, the discovery rule does not apply and reasonable medical support linking the injury and cause is not required.
[brief] (Db29).  From there, they veer sharply off course, asserting that because [...] did not consent to the sale of either property, the sales were not for fair market value and that “appraisals are not fair market value.  Instead, they are an expert’s opinion of fair market value. ” (Db31).  This completely ignores the ability of a court to rely upon expert testimony to determine a fact in issue, N.J.R.E. 702, and creates a situation in which any litigant would have complete control over the definition of fair market value because unless all the litigants agree to it, it cannot be set.  Again, it was precisely the inability of the parties to reach an agreement that caused the trial court to set the sealed bidding procedure:  “The parties have essentially been unable to agree on every detail relating to the sale of the Property from the outset of the litigation.  As such, it became necessary for the Court to establish the bidding procedure…” (Da53).  Date-of-death valuations are the norm in estate matters.
[brief] [...], [...], [...] and [...], Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Defendants/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION  MONMOUTH COUNTY DOCKET NO. : [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] (PPCIa251-349).  16.  On January 13, 2023, [...] filed a motion to reopen discovery and to change the case track assignment from Track I to Track IV (environmental contamination litigation), and to extend discovery.  (PPCIa350-356).  17.  Counsel for [...] noted in such motion that, at the point in time at which the Final Judgment Order by Default had been vacated, the Track I discovery end date (June 26, 2022) had already expired (PPCIa355), and that in any event, the case should be “classified as Track IV since it is an environmental action. ” (PPCIa354).  18.  However, on January 20, 2023, while [...]’s motion for summary judgment and the motion to change track assignments both were pending, counsel for [...] moved to be relieved, based primarily on the non-cooperation of [...] and its principals (PPCIa357-361).
[brief] (R-71).  The application was supported by a nine (9) page Certification from [...] with attached Exhibits A through S.  Counsel for [...] filed a Cross-Motion on October 21, 2022, seeking sanctions against [...] and the [...] along with counsel fees and costs covering a sixteen (16) month period from June 2021 through October 2022.  (R-143)  This Cross-Motion was supported by a Certification of [...], that included transcripts, Court Orders and proofs that provided an accurate background and procedural history of the proceedings to the newly assigned Judge.  The scant, inaccurate pleadings provided on behalf of [...] clearly failed to provide an accurate history.
[brief] IV.  CONCLUSION  Defendants did far more than engage in a “vigorous pursuit of their legal defenses. ” (Drb30).  Defendants not only used their access to insurance coverage to force the [...] to spend over one million dollars in attorney’s fees, but they also used public meetings and social media to turn the community against the beachfront homeowners by creating the false impression that they were willing to destroy the dunes and put others’ homes at risk.
[brief] Defendant should be given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, if he chooses to do so.  Alternatively, defendant’s sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant  BY: ___/s/ [...]__________  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 060532014  Dated: March 21, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction  Plaintiff-Respondent, : in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County.  v. : Sat Below: [...].  : Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] ”  (SSR p.13 at TRVa1343.)  C. Communications Confirming [...]’s Unenrollment from the CCIP  On August 10, 2015, [...] of [...] sent an e-mail to [...], [...]’s Program Administrator, confirming that “Our work was excluded from the [Project], please make any adjustments accordingly. ”  (Italics added.)  (TRVa2812.)  Moments later, [...] emailed [...] asking it to confirm that [...] has been “excluded” from the CCIP for the Project, and, shortly thereafter it was confirmed by [...] of [...] that [...] was now excluded from the CCIP because “they are structural demo and therefore not enrolled. ”  (TRVa2815.)  \textsuperscript{4}  [...] was [...]’s insurance broker at the time.  Also, on August 10, 2015, [...] of [...] sent an e-mail to [...] with the subject\(^5\) “RE: [...] Perini Corporation/[...]/[...]/08.01.2015” stating “Please cancel effective 08/01/2015. ” (TRVa2819.)  Based on [...]’s request, [...] prepared a Cancellation Endorsement unenrolling [...] effective August 1, 2015.  (TRVa2882; [...] Tr. 23:8-24:3, TRVa2830; [...] Tr., 120:7-11, TRVa2864 and 139:21-140:10, TRVa2869.)  As the trial court correctly observed, this resulted in [...]’s unenrollment in the CCIP \textit{ab initio}.
[brief] State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973)..................7  Wear v. Selective Service, Inc., 455 N.J.Super. 440 (App. Div. 2018)....................5  Other Authorities  California Jury Charge, CACI No. 431.........................................................7, fn. 2 New Jersey Jury Charge 6.12...............................................................7, fn. 2  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Records or vehicle or race an fine fine a a a motor fine fine of of making making or Vehicular such motor Speed $100-$200 $100-$200  Scene  Scene operate of $25-$100 $25-$100  Driving Driving other Auto holding any Highway of of Making the the a by purpose purpose any to to of hold  Speeding by Reckless Careless  Leaving Leaving person person  Assault operation the Death with to or on for race wager in encourage attempt the the Racing race  Offense: Offense: Racing assist for for manage arrange a Offense: Offense: for for the in a offense offense  2C:12-1(c) a 2C:11-5.1 for or or or or or 39:4-129 in Prohibits 39:5C-1 2C:11-5
[brief] An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired under Rule 26(b).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2).  “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity,” and any interrogatory not objected to must be answered fully in writing under oath.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4).  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, “a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).  The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevance requirement of Rule 26.  Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 610.  Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of “clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections. ”
[brief] The defendants cite Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, Mount Ephraim, 24 N.J. 549 (1957) in support of their argument that they did not owe a duty to its invitee to render the premises safe.  However, the plaintiff in Lokar was not injured as a result of a dangerous or unsafe condition of the premises.  Id. at 551.  Rather, in that matter the plaintiff was injured as a result of an unidentified person’s ill-use of a barrier that blocked vehicular traffic for the safety of individuals on the property.  Id. at 553-554.  The Court found that the accident was caused by the intervening act of another person and there was no proof that the defendant was guilty of any negligence that proximately contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.  *Id.* at 554.  It is respectfully submitted that the ruling in that matter has no application to the case at bar or the issue of the duty the defendants owed their invitee in the case at bar.
[directive] Cash Bail Option  Actor knowingly or recklessly maintains a condition which endangers the safety or health of a 4th Degree $500 to $2,500 10% permissible considerable number of persons or knowingly maintains any premises or place where people  Maintaining a gather for the purpose of engaging in unlawful conduct; disorderly persons offense unless the 2C:33-12(a-c)  Nuisance premises are conducted or maintained as a house of prostitution or as a place where obscene material is sold, photographed or manufactured, exhibited, prepared or shown.  It is Disorderly Persons
[directive] As ações, petições e outros documentos entregues ao tribunal deverão estar em inglês  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Poder Judiciário de Nova Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary Formulário complementar para declaração judicial em processos sujeitos à Lei de Proibição da Soltura Prematura (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)  No Early Release Act Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA)
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor manufactures, distributes or dispenses methamphetamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, phencyclidine or any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedules I or II, or Strict Liability for 2C:35-9a any controlled substance analog thereof, in violation of subsection (a) of 2C:35-5, Distribution  1st Degree $75,000 to $200,000  No 10%  Drug-Induced Deaths of CDS, is strictly liable for a death which results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance.  3rd Degree $5,000 to $10,000  10% permissible  Actor possesses CDS or Analog in Schedules I, II, III, or IV, other than if specifically covered  Possession of CDS or 2C:35-10a in statute, third degree; CDS or analog in Schedule V, fourth degree; possession of 4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  Analog marijuana over 50 grams, fourth degree; otherwise disorderly persons offense.  Disorderly Persons
[brief] The trial court stated, “The MCS-90 surety endorsement provides that it is distinct and separate from the insurance policy and its conditions and limitations.  The MCS-90 surety endorsement states, ‘It is understood and agreed that no condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation contained in the policy, this endorsement, or any other endorsement thereon, or violation thereof, shall relieve the company from liability or from the payment of any final judgment within the limits of liability herein described, irrespective of the financial condition, insolvency, or bankruptcy of the insured. ”” (1T33:25-34:8).  The trial court acknowledged that the MCS-90 surety was triggered because “[...] took a no coverage, no defense position regarding [...]’s insurance claim related to the oil spill Incident,” (1T38:25-39:2), and that that position was the sufficient prerequisite for the trial court to confirm the policy “would otherwise provide no coverage,” as set forth in QBE, thereby triggering the MCS-90 endorsement.  The trial court did not err in ruling the MCS-90 surety was triggered here.
[brief] . . .  c.  The provisions of subsections a. and b. of this section shall not apply to a person who, on the effective date [May 21, 2010] of P.L.2010, c.1, is a member of the retirement system and holds more than one office, position, or employment covered by the retirement system with one or more employers, while the member continues to hold without a break in service more than one of those offices, positions, or employments.
[directive] See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a) (recognizing the relevance of the nature and circumstances of the offense charged as a factor a court may consider in determining whether to order pretrial detention).  The prosecutor in deciding whether to seek pretrial detention also shall consider whether there is reason to believe that defendant’s release would pose a risk to a victim and that a no-contact release condition would not be sufficient to control any such risk.  Nothing herein shall be construed in any way to suggest that a victim should be called as a witness at a pretrial detention hearing, see note 23 and accompanying text (noting that the Bail Reform Law allows hearsay evidence at a pretrial detention hearing), and a prosecutor shall object and, if necessary, seek an interlocutory appeal if the defendant attempts to call a victim as a witness at a pretrial detention hearing.
[brief] With respect to the first criticism that it has not been established that [...]’s recreation was sound or matches the actual data of the plaintiff and her fall, the jury heard [...]’s testimony as to how he was able to determine that the live feed video surveillance matched the surveillance video capturing the plaintiff’s incident.  As [...] testified, when he placed the live feed surveillance video up against the May 29, 2019 surveillance video of the incident, he observed that both videos contained the same fixed objects - the aisle 58 sign, the shelves, the column – and “the outline of the picture itself verified to him that it was the same camera location, the same width, of the camera; the same height of the camera, from both the live feed and the surveillance. ”  In other words, what he saw on the live feed and what he saw on the surveillance video was the same view.  (5T138:20-24; 5T143:16-144:8; 6T18:13-19:23).  The plaintiff had the opportunity to, and did, extensively cross examine [...] on the recreation of the incident he performed and the opinion he reached as to the location of the plaintiff’s fall based on that recreation.  (T624:4-80:22).  Once again, it was for the jury to assess the credibility of, and the weight to be given to, [...]’s testimony regarding the recreation he performed to formulate his opinion as to the location of the plaintiff’s fall.  The jury simply considered [...]’s testimony regarding his recreation of the incident, knowing that there were differing versions of the happening of the accident.  The jury was free to accept or reject [...]’s methodology or ultimate opinion as to the cause of the plaintiff’s incident and was so charged before it deliberated.  (7T94:25-95:6).  Clearly, the jury accepted the defense version of the incident as the accurate depiction of the events.
[brief] Plaintiffs also argue that defendants’ descriptions “are too vague for Plaintiffs to assess the claimed privilege. ”  (Id. at 30).  For instance, they note that the privilege log contains descriptions such as “regarding adverse impact,” “regarding hiring,” “regarding terminations,” “regarding immigration,” “regarding contract drafting and review,” “regarding affirmative action,” “regarding personnel issues,” “regarding promotions,” and “regarding analysis of business strategy. ”  (Id.).  They argue that such descriptions violate the mandate of Rule 26(b)(5)(A)(ii), which requires a party “to describe the documents in a manner sufficient to enable other parties to assess the claimed privilege. ” (Id. (citation omitted)).  During the parties’ meet and confer conference, plaintiffs asked defendants to provide email subject lines and document titles, but defendants refused to do so.  (Id. at 31 (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 22)).  Defendants instead proposed meeting and conferring about a subset of entries, but plaintiffs deem that proposal to be “unworkable, given the size of the privilege log and the extent of the deficiencies. ” (Id.).  Plaintiffs submit that it “is not practical to meet and confer as to every issue and meeting and conferring as to a subset would leave a host of issues unaddressed. ” (Id.).  Plaintiffs suggest that defendants should be “compelled to produce email subject lines and document titles for the entries on its privilege log, as requested.