ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In support of his argument regarding the interests of public policy, Defendant cites [...] Funding v. [...], 464 N.J. Super 103 (App. Div. 2020).  Defendant notes [...] held that even egregiously bad behavior on the part of the defendant/borrower can be excused if there is a countervailing interest of public policy, in that case limiting violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA.")  Defendant's intent is to liken Defendant's six-year delay in challenging the instant judgment with [...]'s delay.  [...] filed suit against [...] on a debt after the statute of limitations for initiating suit has expired.  Nine years later, [...] filed a motion to vacate the judgment.  The trial judge determined that the complaint was time-barred by the statute of limitations and thus the action was a violation of the FDCPA.
[brief] (T4 67:13-19).  This claim is not in [...]’s report, and was denied by [...], who does not drink alcohol.  (T4 67:13-19; T5 172:4-173:13; Pa207).  [...] asked [...] what [...] had taken, and [...] replied truthfully that he did not know.  (T4 134:14-15).  [...] appeared as if he did not like [...]’s answer.  (T4 135:15-17).  Based upon the symptoms [...] was exhibiting, [...] said to [...] that she might have taken oxycodone.  (T4 134:17-21).  [...] reached this conclusion through the process of elimination knowing that [...] drank, smoked marijuana and took pills.  (T4 134:24-135:2).  [...] is trained in the use of Narcan, and asked Officer [...] for Narcan.
[directive] Small and medium size agencies can successfully accomplish this function by periodically assigning the inspection task to selected unit supervisors.  Individuals so assigned must be of unquestioned integrity and hold sufficient rank to achieve the objectives of the inspection function.  3.5.3  The inspection function should determine by actual on-site inspection whether personnel are properly implementing management’s policies at the operational level.  This function is also responsible for reviewing and evaluating procedures.  In addition, the inspection unit or function should evaluate the material resources of the agency and the utilization of those resources.  This includes, but is not limited to, motor vehicles, communications equipment, computers, office machinery and supplies.  The inspection function or unit should report any deficiencies to the law enforcement executive, and recommend any possible solutions and improvements.  3.6
[brief] Notice of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 6/30/24.................................Pa056 to Pa057  Opinion and Amplification by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., 7/9/24......................................................................................................Pa058 to Pa068  State v. Rossman, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1162......................Pa069 to Pa072  State v. Bailey, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1192.........................Pa073 to Pa076  Surveillance Video..........................................................................................Pa077  1  References are to the appendix submitted with the State’s motion for leave to appeal on July 25, 2024.
[brief] ”  This Court cited to this statute to support the principle that “[a] defendant has a right to defend, and a sentencing judge may not enhance the penalty because he contests his guilt. ”  State v. Jimenez, 266 N.J. Super. 560, 570 (App. Div. 1993).  The right to defend oneself applies with equal force to defendants who choose to appeal as it does for those who choose to go to trial.  In State v. Poteet, our Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be sentenced more severely for exercising his right to trial, or his right to appeal.
[brief] *Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko*, 202 N.J. 268, 278 (2010).  The Supreme Court specifically found that, where parties ask the arbitrator to rule on whether just cause exists, they grant the arbitrator the authority to define the term.  In doing so, the court expressly adopted federal court interpretations finding that an arbitrator does not “impermissibly ‘read into’ the parties' agreement terms that were not there” by defining “just cause” or “proper cause” when the arbitrator “imply interpreted the ambiguous term "proper cause" in a manner unsatisfactory to management.
[brief] | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Anderson v., Liberty Lobby, Inc., | 20 | | 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | | | Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., | 12 | | 160 N.J. 352 (1999) | | | Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, | 12 | | 632 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2011) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 12 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Casatelli v. Dressler, | 16, 17| | Docket No. A-5769-09T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub., | | | LEXIS 1683 (App. Div., June 27, 2011) | | | Conrad v. Catapano, | 14 | | Docket No. A-4567-11T2, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub., | | | LEXIS 427 (App. Div., Feb. 26, 2013) | | | Coyne v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., | 11 | | 182 N.J. 481 (2005) | | | Feritta-Zepp v. Gaitway Farms, Inc., | 14 | | Docket No. A-6217-08T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub., | | | LEXIS 1303 (App. Div., May 20, 2011) | | | Goldhagen v. Pasmowitz, | 14 | | 247 N.J. 580 (2021) | | | Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center, | 27 | | 203 N.J. 184 (2010) | | | Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian, | 16, 17| | 320 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 1999) | | Jannuzzelli v. Wilkens, 158 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1978) ......................................................... 14 Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ...................................................................................... 12 Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2012) .......................................................... 20 Liberty Surplus Ins., Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436 (2007) .................................................................................... 12 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) .....................................................................................
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT BY WEIGHING AND EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE ON CRITICAL FACT QUESTIONS, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF INTENT, REASONABLENESS AND RELIANCE WHICH IMPLICATE STATE OF MIND RATHER THAN VIEWING THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS.  THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT FAILED TO ADHERE TO SETTLED PRINCIPLES OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  JURISPRUDENCE WHICH REQUIRES THE COURT TO ACCEPT AS TRUE  ALL FACTS SET FORTH BY THE NON-MOVING PARTY, AND REASONABLE INFERENCES THEREFROM.  INSTEAD, THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY WEIGHED AND EVALUATED EVIDENCE, AND DISREGARDED EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ESTABLISHING, AT MINIMUM, TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT.  (not argued below)
[brief] | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **1567  South Realty, LLC v. Strategic Contract Brands, Inc.,** | | | No. A-0935-19T2, 2020 WL 3864974 | 44 | | (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2020) | | | **324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy** | | | 479 U.S. 335 (1987) | 21 | | **Amtec Int’l of NY Corp. v. Polish Folklore Import Co., Inc.,** | | | No. 20-cv-3, 2022 WL 992565 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2022) | 25 | | **Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc.,** | | | 470 N.J. Super. 554 (App. Div. 2022) | 17, 18 | | **AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,** | | | 563 U.S. 333 (2011) | 17 | | **AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am.,** | | | 475 U.S. 643 (1986) | 48 | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P.,** | passim | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | **Autobar Sys. of New Jersey v. Berg Liquor Sys., LLC,** | | | 23-cv-3790 (MAS) (JBD), 2023 WL 5311499 | 4 | | (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2023) | | | **B & S Ltd., Inc. v. Elephant & Castle Int’l, Inc.,** | | | 388 N.J. Super. 160 (Ch. Div. 2006) | 34 | | **Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc.,** | | | 422 N.J. Super. 343 (Law Div. 2008) | 28 | | **Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp.,** | | | 415 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 2010) | 48 | | **Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,** | | | 546 U.S. 440 (2006) | 46 | Bulut v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 22-04276, 2023 WL 869402 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2023) ...........................................36 Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 397 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ..................................................................................36 Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016) ............................................................................................48 Citibank, N.A. v. Errico, 597 A.2d 1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) ...............................................................36 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003).............................................................................................................16 Cottrell v. Holtzberg, 468 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 2021) ...............................................................................48 County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. Feb. 8, 2023) .................................................................passim Diversant, LLC v. Carino, No. 18-3155, 2018 WL 1610957 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2018) ....................................................29, 30, 31 Est. of Noyes v. Morano, No. A-1665-17T3, 2019 WL 149521 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 8, 2019) ..............................................................................39 Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., 450 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2017)
[brief] V, VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.  Diminished capacity evidence, admissible under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, allows for evidence of a defendant’s mental health disorder to be admitted at trial when it supports negating an essential mental element of a particular offense.  State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 98 (1997).  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 states:  Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense.  In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense.  Such evidence is considered by the jury in relation to the State’s general burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.  Delibero, 149 N.J. at 98.  This stands in contrast to an affirmative not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity ("NGRI") defense, which the defendant bears the burden of proving.
[brief] As noted above, multiple reports of environmental testing produced in the underlying case confirmed that substantial quantities of various species of toxic mold were detected throughout the condominium, including in the air and on the walls, carpets, and furniture in the condominium.  There is, in fact, no evidence to the contrary.  Requiring [...] to prove the extent to which he was injured by the mold on the food he consumed is inconsistent with the language of the exception and would, in any event, require an impossible level of proof.  The courts of New Jersey have, in fact, relaxed the standards for proof of causation in toxic tort cases.  This is based on the recognition that the causes and effects of exposure to toxins are subtle and difficult to prove with scientific certainty.  Thus, in the toxic-tort field, the modern trend has been to relax or broaden the standard of determining medical causation.  *Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.*, 127 N.J. 404, 413 (1992); *Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp.*, 125 N.J. 421, 434 (1991).
[brief] ....  I don’t think that -- I don’t think a jury needs to know what the standards are for an engineer.  Everybody knows that you’re not allowed to tell people to put materials onto somebody else’s property.  I don’t think that requires an expert to state what the -- what the standard of care is.  I disagree.  [...]:  But then you’re allowing a jury to speculate on a professional’s plan, and how that comes about.  That -- that to me is an interpretation of the standard of care.  THE COURT: Maybe -- [...]: That’s not something that’s within the ken of the average juror.  THE COURT:  Maybe, maybe not.  But again, we’ll have to -- we’ll have to sort out those claims when we get there, because I think some of them can be.  And clearly -- clearly an affidavit of merit is not required in all claims against a professional.  In other words, somebody cited the case where, you know, a dentist pulls the wrong tooth.
[brief] Rather, a new trial is only an appropriate when there is a **material** deviation from prior testimony which **significantly prejudices** the other party.  See, e.g., *T.L. v. Goldberg*, 238 N.J. 218, 231 (2019) (“Plaintiffs have not shown prejudice, and that important and clear difference distinguishes this case from the relief granted in *McKenney*.”).  Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a vital step in seeking relief under *McKenney* is **that the opposing party make an objection/motion for mistrial at the time of the offending testimony**.  Id.  (“In addition, we note that, counsel in *McKenney* objected to De's change in trial testimony during the trial, contrary to the lack of objection here. ”).  The point of this requirement is that it “gives the court an opportunity to address [the] change in trial testimony **during the trial. **”  Id. (emphasis added).  **B. Application: Defendants’ Waived Any Right to Claim a McKenney Violation Because They Failed to Register an Objection During Trial** (RAISED BELOW: Pa33-Pa34)
[directive] MAY is THE Bail - or - (indictable Beverage Property Persons #9-05 BAIL  Alcoholic CDS of to ABSENCE, Prostitution 3:26-1  Possession Beverages Charge Analog of Directive WHERE Possession Underage School  Alcoholic Offering Rule (c)(1) on by STATUTES 3:3-1  Promulgated Rule 2C:33-16 2C:33-17 2C:35-10 2C:34-1  Statute Option permissable permissible permissible Bail 24 JUDGE’S issue.
[brief] Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”  State v. Malik, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  *In Re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).
[brief] G. THE APPELLANT WILL SUFFER IMMEDIATE AND IRREPARABLE UNFAIR PREJUDICE AS A RESULT OF UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS DISMISSING HER CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE  Reversing the trial court’s Orders and granting the Appellant’s request for a discovery extension would not result in unfair prejudice to the Respondents, but would significantly prejudice the Appellant if this Court were to uphold the denial of this request.  It is crucial to note that this was the Appellant’s first request for a discovery extension.  The Appellant has diligently pursued discovery to the best of her ability, and is only delayed in providing an expert report due to her desire to provide the most comprehensive findings and opinions of [...].  The Appellant did not seek an open-ended extension, but rather a reasonable amount of additional time for [...] to fully explore the facts and circumstances of her injuries and ongoing treatment.  The Appellant recognizes that discovery is a two-way process, and that both parties should have a fair opportunity to obtain relevant evidence.  However, the Appellant should not be unfairly penalized for a slight oversight in her counsel failing to timely seek relief from the original discovery end date, particularly when the Respondents cannot show that they would be unfairly prejudiced by a reasonable extension.  On the other hand, upholding the trial court’s Orders denying the Appellant’s request for a discovery extension would significantly prejudice the Appellant.  Medical malpractice cases involve significant injury and hardship to plaintiffs, and these cases should not be thrown out for slight procedural errors.  The Respondents know or should know that the Appellant has suffered significant injuries as a result of the alleged malpractice, and denying the Appellant a reasonable opportunity to pursue her claims on the merits would result in significant unfair prejudice.  Moreover, the Respondents would unfairly benefit from a free dismissal with prejudice under the circumstances.  The Appellant should not be punished for a mistake that had no effect on the substantive claims of the case.  The Appellant has made a good faith effort to comply with discovery obligations, and this Court should not allow the Respondents to unfairly benefit from a mistake that did not harm them in any way.
[brief] The [...] recommended that, although available elsewhere (such as in the Student Manual), that [...] should also include it on the [...] website.  ([...] Dep. T99:19-T103:4 at Pa.364-65).  Dr. [...] testified that the 3.0 GPA requirement was publicized on [...]’s website, as well as in various other University resources, such as student bulletins and manuals.  Had Plaintiff been concerned that he could not meet a GPA of a 3.0 in graduate education, he could have rescinded his acceptance three months before classes began with a full refund.  ([...] Dep. T62:20-T63:13 at Pa.355).  Plaintiff-Appellant testified that he was aware that the [...] School of Pharmacy was not yet accredited and that things were constantly changing, so he looked at its website daily, at least until his admission.  (Plaintiff Dep. T89:2-14; [...] Cert., Exhibit C).  Plaintiff-Appellant testified that, even before he saw the 3.0 GPA requirement reflected on [...]’s website, he had heard rumors of changes in the dual degree requirements.  (Plaintiff Dep. T159:17 – T160:5 at Pa.179).  On July 23, 2013, Plaintiff-Appellant was placed on academic probation due to his GPA falling to 2.67 (where probation is a GPA under 2.75).  As a result, he could not enroll in the Master’s program ([...] Cert., paras. 10-11 at Pa.99).  It should be noted that in every example of the [...] Website, produced by Plaintiff-Appellant, utilizing the Wayback Machine, including that of February 15, 2011, the decision to admit a student into the dual degree was to be made at the conclusion of the student’s first year, contrary to Plaintiff-Appellant’s contention to the contrary.  (Da.007-14).
[brief] (Db36).  But [...] adopted the original sentencing judge’s analysis on consecutive sentences, and in that proceeding the judge specifically pointed out, as he began his Yarbough analysis, that even though his findings would “dictate a custodial sentence towards the upper end of the range[,]” he was not inclined to do so given defendant’s “age, as well as the lack of any significant previous criminal and juvenile history....” (2T20-12 to 21-1).  He then spent pages of the transcript meticulously explaining why he was imposing a consecutive sentence, (2T21-2 to 24-23), an explanation this Court upheld.  Even though this decision predated Torres, it surely satisfies that case’s mandate that trial courts provide reviewing tribunals with sufficient reasons to facilitate meaningful appellate review, foster consistent sentences, and safeguard defendant from excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary sentences.  246 N.J. at 272-73.  No remand is required.9
[brief] In Moon, this Court found that: in the opinion of the medical examiner, the extensive damage to [...]’s brain would have incapacitated him instantly, and he was dead or dying when his face hit the ground.  [...] had an abrasion under his ear and a ‘substantial split’ inside his mouth where his lip and cheek hit his teeth.  Neither injury showed any of the swelling, bruising or bleeding that would be present if his blood were circulating at the time of the impact…’[t]o all intents and purposes, he was dead’ when shot.  His heart could not continue to beat without his brain.  396 N.J. Super. at 113 (emphasis added) (quoting trial record).  Under these circumstances, “no juror could reasonably find that [...] was alive and helpless, incapacitated or unable at the relevant time — when defendant left him on the street — or that defendant knew or reasonably believed that he was alive…The crime cannot be construed to apply to a person who kills another and leaves the body behind.
[brief] The Construction, Maintenance and Operation of CS 327 Is Consistent With The Goals And Purposes Of The Highlands Act.  (Aa0001)**  [...] correctly determined that [...] is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, and it appropriately relied on the findings of the [...] in making that determination.  Appellants make a muddled argument that [...]’s HAD was “not the product of reasoned decision making” because [...] either failed to consider any public comments or, if it did, failed to provide any explanation for rejecting them.
[brief] (Pa 139, Par. 28).  Other personal information was redacted in white by [...] when submitted to the Trial Court so Bank’s redactions could be differentiated.  (Pa 139, Par. 29).  The version of this document attached to the Bank’s motion, (Pa 29) was different since the redactions in that version made by the bank changed from the one’s it made in the copy provided to [...] by the Bank at the local branch.  (Pa 139, Par. 30).  These were the only facts before the trial judge concerning the opening of Plaintiff’s accounts.  The Bank presented no certifications or affidavits from its employees at the local branch where Plaintiff opened his accounts.
[brief] R.D., 169 N.J. 551 (2001) | 22 | | State v. Suazo, 133 N.J. 315 (1993) | 12, 15 | | State v. Weiler, 211 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div. 1986) | 23 | | State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983) | 20 | | State v. Younger, 305 N.J. Super. 250 (App. Div. 1997) | 15 | | United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) | 13 | | Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) | 9 | | STATUTES | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) | 1 | | CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J. Const. art.
[brief] ” (Pa 122).  On May 12, 2020 [...] opened for business.  (T1 at 55:1-2; 172:1-5).  [...] made multiple complaints to the police in May of 2020 about delivery trucks.  (Pa 97-101; Pa 102-105; T1 at 55:7-11).  This action was filed on June 5, 2020.
[brief] The Board noted the ongoing litigation with [...] and the landowner regarding compliance with its lease which is ongoing, with a trial date scheduled for February 13, 2025.  (1980); see also Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J.  106, 108 (1966) (citing Appropriations Clause in holding that even if court imposed payment obligation on State, courts “could not enforce a judgment”); Gallena v. Scott, 11 N.J. 231, 238 (1953) (it would be impermissible “judicial intrusion upon the legislative and executive authorities” to mandate expenditure of “moneys in excess of the sum appropriated”).  In this case, the money “is collected from utility customers” under statutory authority; “the amount of the charge is determined by the [...], which is a state agency”; and the “[...] determines the specific purposes to which the money . . . is allocated. ”