ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] An additional consideration about policy relates to 3 pieces of proposed litigation funding legislation in September 2014, October 2014 and February 2016.  (Da293-321)  Although not passed by the New Jersey Legislature, all three contained the following Statement, “[u]nder current law, litigation funding providers are largely unregulated in New Jersey. ”  While it is understood that none of these bills were passed into law, it should be noted that the legislature acknowledged that the practice is unregulated, as opposed to illegal.
[brief] same set of solar-energy developmental rights including, importantly, the WMPA and S-recs which are, separately and together, tradeable commodities.  While [...] negotiated with [...] in secret, at around the same time, in late 2017 and early 2018, [...] continued to hold plaintiffs at bay with their stated intention to purchase plaintiff’s solar-energy developmental rights from plaintiffs.  That posture, and the words of inducement to plaintiff during that period, which induced plaintiffs to refrain from selling their solar-developmental rights to third-parties altogether, unfair, were fraudulent and in abject bad faith.
[brief] On appeal, [...] seizes upon the assertion that, notwithstanding the express findings of disloyalty, the exclusion does not apply because no monies actually changed hands.  That is of no moment; it simply means that the effort was halted, through litigation of the underlying claims, before the plan came to fruition.  In addition to those grounds above that bar coverage for all amounts sought by [...] in this case, there are other terms in the D&O Form that bar coverage for the fees awarded by the Vermont Court.
[brief] Plaintiff-Respondent, [...] filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County against the Defendant-Appellant on or about October 11, 2019 (Da-58).  Defendant-Appellant filed an Answer and Counterclaim on or about February 10, 2020 (Da-111).  Plaintiff filed an Answer to the Counterclaim on or about March 16, 2020 (Da-116).  A jury trial took place in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Sussex County before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. on April 4, 2022 (1T)\(^1\) and April 5, 2022 (2T)\(^2\).  The trial Court found in favor of the Plaintiff and entered an Order of Disposition on April 6, 2022 (Da-122).  A Motion for a New Trial was filed by the Defendant-Appellant on or about April 11, 2022 (Da-123) and was denied on the record on May 26, 2022 (3T)\(^3\).  An Order Denying said Motion was entered on that date (Da-126), as well as an Order of Judgment (Da-127).  An Amended Notice of Appeal followed, filed on July 22, 2022 (Da-129) resulted in an Opinion by this Court on September 21, 2023 remanding the matter back to the trial Court for the purpose of trying the Counterclaim (Da-1).  --- \(^1\) 1T - Transcript of Trial 4/4/22; \(^2\) 2T - Transcript of Trial 4/5/22; and \(^3\) 3T - Transcript of Decision on Motion 5/26/22.  The trial Court scheduled the matter for trial and, as is set forth below, dismissed the case without the trial taking place (Da-37 and Da-39).  This appeal followed (Da-32).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Further, adding an interlocutory appeal now would be wasteful of scarce judicial and legal resources.  This Court has recognized that appeals are expensive to litigants, and that “[t]his expense should be avoided or at least consolidated in a final appeal at which all issues can be reviewed unless there is an urgent necessity for the earlier review. ”  DiMarino v. Wishkin, 195 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 1984).  The absence of any irreparable injury means that there is no cause for this Court’s immediate involvement in this case.
[brief] You should consider whether the fact that the witness and the defendant are not of the same race may have influenced the accuracy of the witness's identification. ”)  During cross-examination of [...], “Was there anybody besides me, did you see anybody there that day?”  The defendant is establishing the witnesses’ degree of attention, factors of stress, distance, lighting, confidence and accuracy.  The plaintiff’s witness stated one of the incidents occurred at night without further recollection of the other alleged incidents.
[brief] Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 195-203 (App. Div. 2006).  Here, the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to amend was based upon, among other things, the Appellants’ unjustified delay in seeking to assert the claims until 2½ years after the Underlying Action was commenced, after discovery closed, and after most of the defendants had already been dismissed on the merits.  Indeed, as the trial court reasoned in its Opinion: [Appellants] cannot, after discovery is long closed, and most other defendants have been dismissed, seek to first add claims against [...], especially where [Appellants] knew of the predicate facts years prior, but chose not to assert them previously.  To permit the amendment would bog down judicial administration and economy and be prejudicial to [...].
[brief] (Ja300-301).  In May 2023, Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment as to liability.  (Ja308-09).  \(^5\)  Plaintiff defined this as the difference between the tax debt and the resale value of the property.  (Ja9¶53).  The Supreme Court issued its decision in Tyler on May 25, 2023, and Plaintiff submitted a notice of supplemental authority with the trial court that same day.
[brief] It is the defendant who bears the burden of proving the right to PCR by a preponderance of credible evidence.  State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451 459 (1992).  To meet this standard, “specific facts must be alleged and articulated, which, if believed would provide a court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision. ”  R. 3:22-8.  Our law is well settled that on a PCR petition defendant must support his claims with facts and evidence and, if defendant does not, the PCR petition should rightfully be denied.  See State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).
[brief] This unpublished case can be found at Pa303. above.  Likewise, the trial court should not have relied on *Richmond v. Thompson*, 901 P. 2d 371 (Wisc. App. 1995).  In *Richmond*, a state trooper issued a ticket to a driver, a confrontation ensued, and the driver accused the officer of threatening to kill him.  The driver later sent letters to the Governor’s office, county prosecutor and a district court judge.  The driver’s allegations were brought to the attention of the state police, which conducted an internal investigation and determined the charges were unfounded.  The trooper sued the driver for a variety of claims, including malicious prosecution.  Under those circumstances, the court found no criminal action had been instituted.  These facts pose quite different circumstances than here.
[brief] 1, 8 to 10 - **Richardson vs. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System**, 192 N.J. 189 (2007)...  1, 5 to 10 Russo v. Bd. Of Trs., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)) ......................... 3, 7 Utley v. Bd. Of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008).  ............... 3  Zigmont v. Bd. Of Trs. Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 91 N.J. 580, 583 (1983).  .........................
[directive] Jeżeli przyznaje się Pan(i) do naruszenia warunków dożywotniego nadzoru społecznego zgodnie z N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 6.4 i do naruszenia doszło 1 lipca 2014 r. lub później, należy odpowiedzieć na Pytanie 4b.  NOTE: N.J.S.A.
[brief] Just over two months after filing his motion for a new trial, defendant filed a brief in support of that motion, to which he appended the supposedly new evidence: (1) two purported [...] franchise agreements between [...] and [...] for the Hoboken location, one signed January 22, 2014, and the other May 7, 2015; (2) a principal owner’s guaranty for “[...]” showing that defendant had a 30% interest in that entity; (3) a certification from defendant’s sister [...] claiming to have found the documents after “days” of searching boxes in the family’s garage; and (4) bank statements that were introduced by the State at trial.  (Sa126-296).  Defendant contended that this evidence showed that he was the sole franchisee of the Hoboken [...] franchise and thus had the authority to sell the shares to the HOB[...] investment group.  On October 12, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the motion.  At the hearing, [...] testified, contrary to her certification, that she only found approximately eleven random pages that said “[...]” and “[...]” on them.  (8T13-13 to 19; 8T24-23 to 25).  She showed those pages to defendant, who then searched his own email accounts, first using the search terms “[...]” and “[...],” without success.  (8T13-20 to 25).  After this, defendant searched for “[...]., Inc., franchise agreement” and found “a whole bunch of emails,” one of which had the two agreements (set forth above as Item #1) attached to it.  (8T14-1 to 4).  [...] testified that it took “close to an hour” to locate the documents in defendant’s email.  (8T33-2).  She did not explain where the guaranty for [...] (Item #2) was found.  Defendant also testified at the motion hearing that he searched his emails for the documents after his sister found several pages in boxes.  (8T40-24 to 41-6).  Unlike [...], however, he testified that the only documents attached to the email dated May 7, 2015—sent to him from his own email account—were the 2014 franchise agreement and an addendum, both dated January 22, 2014.  (8T77-1 to 79-1).  He was unable to explain where the 2015 franchise agreement was found.  (8T78-4 to 80-20).  Defendant also testified that the principal owner’s guaranty appended to the certification, which was for “[...],” not Tapmasters Hoboken, showed the breakdown of ownership of the entire territory covered by the ADA.  (8T47-14 to 20).  While defendant testified that the guaranty was also attached to an email from [...], located in defendant’s own email account, defendant did not say when or how he located it.  (8T47-21 to 48-15; Sa297-300).
[brief] There was no legitimate business reason provided by the Respondents for the termination of Appellant and Appellant was replaced by someone not in the protected category based on age who was less experienced and therefore less qualified than Appellant.  The Respondents made an erroneous claim when it was stated that Appellant was replaced by an African-American man.  That is inconsistent with the deposition testimony of [...] who testified that [...] replaced Appellant.  The Trial Court failed to consider the record and documentary evidentiary material presented by the Appellant and instead adopted the position of the Respondents in total.  This failure to consider the Appellant’s argument as well as documentary evidentiary material is evident throughout the decision of the Trial Court.  The record presented by the Appellant set forth material issues in dispute.  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.
[brief] However, Defendants argued and the Court accepted that [...] was an At-Will employee.  Whether [...] was an at-will employee or a member of a collective bargaining unit entitled to all the rights, including progressive discipline conferred therein, is certainly a genuine issue of material fact, which the Court failed to appreciate.  Therefore, the Court’s error must be reversed and the question sent to a jury.  One thing is certain, [...] was admittedly terminated in violation of [...]’s Executive Order MEO-08-2008.  [...] had no prior discipline, his Union was not notified of his termination, his termination was never appropriately ratified by City Council the City Legislators as prescribed by statute and [...] was never rightfully reinstated to his job.  These are procedural facts may not be issues in dispute.  However, what is in dispute, what are the “genuine issues” of material facts in dispute is the motive and intent underpinning the decisions that were made relative to [...]’s employment and whether and to what extent they were made in bad faith.  These are “genuine issues” of material facts in dispute that only a jury can decide and to which the Court finding as a matter of law was error.  POINT IV.
[brief] On January 4, 2023, some two years after Appellant was charged, eighteen months after Appellant filed his first motion to suppress, eleven months after Appellant filed for reconsideration, over six months after Appellant was Indicted, four months after Appellant filed his second suppression motion and three weeks after the Court concluded a second evidentiary hearing, the State provided [...]’s notes for the first time which, contrary to his testimony, indicate that the door to Appellant’s separate third floor apartment was breached.
[brief] Indeed, the Legislature gave the Attorney General and the Director the authority to “prevent and eliminate” all the “discrimination” the LAD prohibits.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-6.  And it gave them the authority to file an administrative complaint against entities that violate the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1.  But absent preliminary relief to prevent the ongoing or future violations of the LAD, the State cannot stop this discrimination until the proceeding ends.
[brief] Further, the Third Circuit cites N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a), stating that “it allows ‘any party’ to compel arbitration of ‘[a]ny dispute regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under [PIP] coverage . . . arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile. ’” (See Mount Prospect, 98 F.4th at 469).  The Third Circuit then states, “As these suits are [...]’s effort to recover medical expense claims paid through auto insurance PIP benefits, they fall under the Provision’s plain text. ”  Ibid.  In making this conclusion, the Third Circuit omits and never discusses the critical language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  If they had, as [...] does in Point I above, then the Third Circuit could not have concluded that “[...]’s effort to recover medical expense claims” is an issue under arbitration jurisdiction.  The Third Circuit’s assertion that an insurer’s affirmative IFPA claims are an “effort to recover medical expense claims” is a gross mischaracterization and their incorrect analysis of the enabling statute is a serious flaw that discredits their interpretation of New Jersey law.
[brief] Gershon, 368 N.J. Super. at 245 (quoting LaFage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 430 (2001) and Smith v. Whitaker, 160 N.J. 221, 232 (1999)).  The public policy underpinning the Wrongful Death Act requires that the court narrowly construe any attempt to contractually limit recovery.  Gershon, 368 N.J. Super at 247.
[brief] The misconduct alleged in the [...] complaint occurred well after that date.  Nothing in the 2015 Settlement suggests that either party intended for the Settlement to extinguish claims for future misconduct that might accrue long after entry of final judgment.  In fact, the plain language of the 2015 Settlement makes clear the parties intended to resolve only those claims that had accrued to the [...] plaintiffs as of the date of entry of final judgment.  See, e.g., Pa0044-45, 2015 Settlement, at ¶2.1 (“The purpose of this Settlement is to forever settle and compromise any and all claims, disputes, and controversies that were or could have been raised against [...] in the Settled Action…”)(emphasis added); see also Pa0059-60, at ¶5.2 (“It is the desire of the Settling Parties to fully, finally, and forever settle, compromise, and discharge all of the Class Representative’s and the Class Members’ Released Claims which were or which could have been asserted in this action…” (same).
[directive] In planning and performing our audit, we considered the [...]'s internal control over financial reporting in order to determine our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinion on the financial statements and not to provide assurance on the internal control over financial reporting.  However, we noted certain matters involving the internal control over financial reporting and its operation fiarwe consider to be reportable coeditions.  Reportable conditions involve matters coming . - -1 or to our attention relating to significant deficiencies in the design operation of the internal control over financial reporting that, in our judgment, could adversely affect the [...] ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data consistent with the assertions management in the financial statements.  -Reportable conditions are described in the of accompanying schedule of findings and questioned costs as items (list finding reference numbers, e.g. X1-3, x1-4. material weakness is a condition in which the design or operation one or more of the internal control A of low components does not reduce to a relatively level the risk that misstatements in amounts that would be ~ material in relation to the financial statements being audited may occur and not be detected within a timely of period by employees in the normal course performing their assigned functions.
[directive] Total CCPF Penalty $  Inicjały oskarżonego / Defendant’s Initials  Główny formularz oświadczenia o winie/Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish strona 3 z 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish page 3 of 7 sąd może Czy rozumie Pan(i), że według własnego uznania nałożyć minimalną karę pozbawienia 6.
[directive] (1)  $2,000 en el caso de un delito de primer grado (2) $1,000 en el caso de un delito de segundo grado (3) $750 en el caso de un delito de tercer grado (4) $500 en el caso de un delito de cuarto grado (5)  $250 en el caso de un delito contra la moral pública o una infracción menor contra la moral pública Multa total del CCPF $ Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).
[brief] While addressing a variance as opposed to a waiver, Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450 (App. Div. 2015), is instructive of the issue of what is and is not a hardship.  The applicant in that case proposed an office building with fewer parking spaces than required.  This Court held that the developer created the hardship by its design of the project:  Where the hardship has been created by the applicant, a (c)(1) variance will normally be denied.  *Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 184 N.J. 562, 591 (2005).  A [hardship] variance is not available to provide relief from a self-created hardship.  *Chirichello v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 78 N.J. 544, 553 (1979).  Here, the hardship was self-created.
[brief] Further, Plaintiffs wrongly assert that the evidential record supported the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant breached the [...] and the [...].  As argued in Defendant’s moving brief, the trial court’s holding that Defendant was liable for breaching these contracts because she “was legally part of it in this Court’s mind” was legally and factually deficient (36T50-10 to 51-21).  It is undisputed that Defendant was not a party to either of these contracts.
[directive] Failure to do so will result in the removal of the insurer from the Bail Registry on 30 days' notice.  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #09-14, 12/30/2014, CN 11 527 page I of2  I  I I Guarantor to Satisfy  Bail Forfeiture Judgments for Above  Listed Agent Agency Administrator  Managing Agent:  The person or entity listed below has provided the insurance/surety company with a guarantee to pay bail forfeiture judgments associated with bail recognizance written by the agent/agency/administrator/managing agent:  D D Agent Agency Name: Last Suffix  First Agency Name: must include "Bail Agency" or "Bail Bonds" & M.l. Doing Business As (DBA):  N.J.  Department of Banking and Insurance  N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance  I  I License Number License Number  Expiration Date  Expiration Date  Business Address: Street Suite/Floor etc., must agree with usps. com  Business Address: Street Suite/Floor etc., must agree with usps. com  I I I I City City Zip Code+ 4 Zip Code+ 4  State State Telephone: include area code  Telephone: include area code ( ) ) ( E-mail Address  E-mail Address  Guarantor Signature Guarantor Signature Print Name and Title  Print Name and Title  (Attach a Copy of the Guarantor's License)  (Attach a Copy of the Guarantor's License)  Certification by Insurance/Surety Company:  I cetiify that the insurance/surety company named is authorized and admitted to transact surety business by the New Jersey Depatiment of Banking and Insurance.  The named agent/agency/administrator/managing agent is authorized to write bail bonds on of named insurance company in New Jersey and is licensed b~half as an insurance producer by the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance.
[directive] G.  Coordination with the Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards.  The Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards (OLEPS), established pursuant to the Law Enforcement et seq., Professional Standards Act of 2009.  N.J.S.A. 52:17B-222, shall ensure that it coordinates its responsibilities with the OPSI.  The OLEPS Director shall work closely with the 1 Attorney General Administrative Directive 2019-8 originally charged the OPP with the statewide collection and analysis of law enforcement use-of-force data.  That duty will remain a function of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability, who currently works with the Office of Justice Data to maintain a publicly available dashboard for such data.  Executive Director of OPSI to develop standards, policies, and best practices that promote professionalism in the law enforcement community.  Attorney General Administrative Executive Directive No. 2019-8 section I.E is hereby superseded.
[brief] Notwithstanding the fact that [...] has been prejudiced by having to defend [...]’s prior dispositive Motion while now being forced to assert the same arguments and defenses in arbitration, [...]’s above-described affirmative litigation conduct is sufficient to show waiver.  *See Marmo & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC*, No. A-3120-22, 2024 N.J. Super. LEXIS 43, at *20-25 (App. Div. May 24, 2024) (where the court found waiver after six months of litigation, citing, *inter alia*, the failure to assert arbitration in the pleadings, despite no trial being scheduled and no dispositive motions being filed).  Thus, the trial court’s December 12, 2023 Order granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration must be reversed.
[brief] Moreover, even if such a standard existed, the Trial Court should have recognized that the facts and unrebutted expert testimony in the record established that comparisons to other novice businesses were especially unnecessary in this case.  As [...] and [...] repeatedly explained, the newness of the business in these particular circumstances was irrelevant.  6T, 34:17-39:20, 91:23-95:6, 105:5-106:6, 131:4-25, 137:10-138:22,
[brief] Pa45, at ¶G.  There is no provision for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator in the contract.  Ibid.  Like the previously discussed cases, the arbitration agreement identifies a specific sole arbitrator for the parties’ claims and contains no provision for the appointment of a substitute or replacement arbitrator in the event of [...]’s unavailability.  Thus, the plain language of the agreement—the polestar of its interpretation—makes clear that the agreement to arbitrate only extended to arbitration before [...].  Now that he is no longer available, the parties no longer have an agreement to arbitrate their claims.