ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] held its annual election on Saturday, February 15, 2025.  (1T31:20-25).  As the trial court found, “this is not a sham election. ” (2T80:14-15).  Voting in this election was carried out by mail-in ballots and in-person voting on electronic optical scan machines.  On the ballot, voters were permitted to vote for two candidates, and only two candidates.  (2T65:18-22).  Among the machine ballots cast in this election were five write-in votes.  (2T7:22-25).  At issue, among the ballots being challenged, is one write-in ballot cast on an electronic voting machine.  The one machine write-in ballot at issue shows the voter cast their vote for two people: “[...]” and “[...]. ”  (2T28:1-14).  The voter wrote the name “[...]” immediately to the right of where “Anthony [...]” was listed on the ballot, and the “[...]” write-in vote was immediately to the right of where “James [...]” was listed on the ballot.  (Ibid.).  This voter could have chosen to write-in the name of any person, however they intentionally wrote the name “[...].” (2T28:2-14).  It is undisputed that the one write-in electronic machine ballot at issue was only cast as one vote for [...] and one vote for [...].
[brief] New Jersey courts will enforce indemnification clauses which explicitly reference negligence of the indemnitee.  (Raised below at 1T 10:3-17)  It is respectfully submitted that the cases submitted by appellant in Point A. of its brief and the recitation of the facts and decisions of the court in those respective cases speak for themselves.  However, [...] rejects appellant's statement on page 19 that "As shown below, [...]'s contract did not clearly and equivocally require [...] to indemnify [...] for its own negligence."  To the contrary, the provisions contained in the subject contract specifically reference the negligence or fault of [...].  B.  Indemnity provisions are enforceable when there is a clear understanding of the parties’ intentions, and the language is unequivocal.
[brief] **The Length and Location of [...]’s Dock Was Dictated by N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(i)(Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.2(d)(Shellfish Habitat Rule) and the Record Contains Substantial Evidence Which Supports [...]’s Finding That [...]’s Dock Complied With Both.
[brief] Even accepting the foregoing assumption, [...] could only project “a range of profit sharing possibilities” that [...] could have received as part of a joint venture.  Indeed, [...]’s report identified Plaintiffs’ profit share as “up to 60%.”  Pa 274, p.6.  But again, in support of this profit range, [...] cites to [...]’s testimony regarding a single occasion when, as a consultant, he helped a church partner with an experienced affordable housing developer and retain 60% of the development fees.  Pa 274, 18:13-19:10.  Mr. [...]’s testimony regarding work he did for a past client is wholly irrelevant to the present matter – especially given he was never even retained by [...] (Id., 24:25-25:13) and performed only preliminary services for him.  [...] effectively conceded the insufficiency of his opinion on the “range of profits” when he acknowledged that the ultimate percentage earned by Plaintiff would be subject to negotiations between the “partners” – meaning Plaintiffs’ share could range anywhere between 0% and 60%.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, [...]’s convictions should be vacated and remanded to the Law Division for a new trial, or, alternatively, his sentence must be vacated and remanded for a reduced sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: ____________________________  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender ID# 301802020  Dated: December 3, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] CASE NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] ’”  *Id.* at 429.  In this case, [...]’s policy language changed.  The language of the mold exclusions in the first two CGL policies [...] issued to [...] contains the restrictive ACC clause quoted above.  If, as [...] held, Appleman’s rule does not apply to CGL policies, there would be no reason for the previous CGL forms to include the restrictive ACC language:  The entire purpose of the ACC clause is to eliminate the application of Appleman’s rule.
[brief] ## Cases: - **Brown & Lacounte, L.L.P. v. Westport Insurance Corp.,** 307 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002) ...........................................................................13 - **Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co.,** 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970) ........................................................................8, 9 - **L.C.S., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co.,** 371 N.J. Super. 482, 853 A.2d 974 (App. Div. 2004) ........................................8 - **Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co.,** 35 N.J. 1, 170 A.2d 800 (1961) ........................................................................13 - **Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,** 206 N.J. 596, 21 A.3d 1151 (2011) ..................................................................8, 9 - **Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Myer,** 187 Vt. 323, 993 A.2d 413 (2010) ....................................................................1, 3-4, 5, 15 - **Rainforest Chocolate, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co.,** 209 Vt. 232, 204 A.3d 1109 (Vt. 2018)
[brief] As set forth in the Trial Court’s December 19, 2023 Statement of Reasons, the Trial Court made the following findings of fact:  The Court notes that [...], Special Master to the matter, has indicated to the Court on various occasions that [...] has been representing [...] fairly and adequately throughout the entirety of this litigation.  The Court is satisfied that the attorneys’ fees submitted in the supplemental certification provided by [...] are fair and accurate.  The Court finds that the hour rates are reasonable and appropriate.  The $550.00 fee is not excessive, especially in this case type.  [Pa030.]  In response to the Board’s argument that it should not be held to the attorney fee award clause which it had, in fact, stipulated to in the Agreement, the Trial Court aptly held that:  The Board argued that the American system does not traditionally allow for an award of attorney fees, but the Court rejects that argument.  The Agreement between the parties states, in pertinent part, “the defaulting Parties shall reimburse the non-defaulting Parties for all legal and professional fees and expenses incurred in connection with the enforcement of this agreement. ”  The language included in the Settlement Agreement is clear, the parties entered into the agreement with competent and knowledgeable counsel and the Court in the August 8th Order already addressed such an argument and thereafter awarded reasonable attorney fees.  [Id.].  With regard to the Per Diem Penalty, the Trial Court also awarded [...] the Per Diem Penalty for two periods of delays, including: (i) the 49-day time period between when the Board was required to memorialize the Original Resolution and refused to do so; and (ii) the 176-day time period running from January 23, 2023—the date that the Board adopted the Stealth Resolution—and July 18, 2023—the date that the Trial Court orally invalidated the Stealth Resolution.
[brief] Based on the evidence presented in support and in opposition to the motion, and after oral argument on the Motion, the Court found that the elements as outlined above, were simply not satisfied and therefore denied the motion. ” (Pa185-6).  Plaintiff/Appellant brings the same arguments and evidence or lack thereof before *this* Appellate Court after being unable and/or unwilling to accept the simple fact that [...] did not intentionally suppress or spoliate evidence.
[directive] S.A. 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pied guilty?  (1)  $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  $ 750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime ( 4)  $ 500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $ 250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  Total CCPF Penalty $ -------- (L. Kar a na Fundusz Zapobiegania Przestypstwom Komputerowym (CCPF), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 2009, c. 143).
[brief] In re Declaratory Judgment Actions filed by Various Municipalities, Cty. of Ocean, 446 N.J. Super. 259, 291 (App. Div. 2016) (citing DMV v. Caruso, 291 N.J. Super. 430, 438 (App. Div. 1996)).  A court abuses its discretion when a decision “is ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’”  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).  Abuse of discretion is only demonstrated “if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  *Masone v. Levine*, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005).  The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion here because the record reflects multiple jurists having based their decisions on the Appellant’s assertion that the [...] had satisfactorily removed the millings from the Property.
[brief] ...............................................................13 - **Simpson v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am.,** 135 Vt. 554, 382 A.2d 198 (Vt. 1977)  .................................................................13 - **Surety Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Phx. Ins. Co.,** No. 1:12-cv-3242, 2014 WL 2921015 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014)  .............................9 - **TIG Specialty Insurance Co. v. PinkMonkey.com Inc.,** 375 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2004) ...........................................................................12, 13  ## Statutes & Other Authorities: - 1 [...], Insurance Claims Disputes, § 4:17 ......................................................4 - R.
[directive] 5.1.3  The internal affairs investigator, supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint will explain the agency's disciplinary procedures to the person making the complaint.  The officer shall advise the complainant that he or she will be kept informed of the status of the complaint, if requested, and its ultimate disposition.  To best accomplish this, the agency shall prepare a fact sheet or brochure that includes information on the agency's internal affairs process and what role the complainant can expect to play.  If feasible, the fact sheet or brochure should be provided to the complainant at the time the complaint is made.  A sample fact sheet is found in Appendix A.
[brief] The Plaintiff/Appellant [...] a/k/a [...]  (hereinafter “[...]”) has filed an Appellate Brief and Appendix.  The Defendants/Respondents – [...] ("[...]") have filed their responding Briefs.  Kindly accept this Letter Brief as per R. 2:6-2(b) and R. 2:6-5 as the Reply Letter Brief on behalf of [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  .........................................................  2  REPLY STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................  3  REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I ..............................................................................  3  THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING JERSEY SHORE'S COMPLAINT AND DETERMINING THAT THE BOROUGH OWNS THE PROPERTY WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR THE APPLICABLE LAW CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] acquired the School in 2010.  (Da20)  In recent years, the number of services and events at the synagogue had increased to three morning services, three evening services, and expanded day use and attendance.  (8T96-18 to 110-25)  In 2013, the plaintiff chiseled a curb cut in front of Lot 8 on Sixth Street so that its staff/attendees could easily access and park vehicles in increased volume in the School’s courtyard.  (8T34-8 to 44-25)
[directive] 1.  ¿Entiende que por su admitir su culpabilidad al delito de [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to NERA)  (Relacione los delitos violentos de primer o segundo grado que están incluidos en NERA (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which Applies) se requerirá que cumpla el 85% de la condena impuesta por ese delito o esos delitos antes que reúna las condiciones para recibir libertad condicional por ese delito o esos delitos?
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[brief] 14  I.  THE PROBATE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO FIND THAT [...] WAIVED HER RIGHT TO [...]’S INTEREST IN THE PALM BEACH PROPERTY (Da265 – Da266; Da274 – Da275).  ...........14  A.  The Standard of Review and Canons of Construction .........................  15  B.  The Probate Court disregarded the text and structure of the Settlement Agreement to invent a non-existent conflict that it resolved through the improper use of construction tools ..........  18  II.  THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRUST AGREEMENT PRECLUDES [...] FROM RECEIVING [...]’S INTEREST IN THE PALM BEACH PROPERTY.  (Da275 – Da278)  .................................................................26  A.  The legal standard .......................................................................................  27  B.  The Probate Court identified no patent or latent ambiguity in the Trust that subjected it to the need for modification ....................  28  C.  The Probate Court modified the Trust without clear and convincing evidence (or any evidence) of Harriet’s probable intent.  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
[brief] If you don’t like your arbitrator, amend your pleading and commence a new phase to “knock him out. ”  Given the vast number of uncertainties as to how such an amended phase would be administered, the [...] would clearly have put in place specific rules for how to switch from a one arbitrator panel to a newly-mandated three arbitrator panel were such a change required.  Since there are no such rules in place, the [...] either does not have such a rule, or it has a secret, unpublished rule.  Either way, such a rule would cause havoc, uncertainty, and an incentive to amend to add dubious new claims so that one could “arbitrator shop.
[brief] As cited in *Restaurant Depot*, “[s]hopping carts are not dangerous instrumentalities, and they are uniquely suitable for the purpose for which furnished. ”  *Znoski v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc.*, 122 N.J. Super. 243, 247-48 (App. Div. 1973).  Nor has Plaintiff presented any facts demonstrating that the activity [...] was conducting on the date of the accident was a nuisance per se.
[brief] See, Karan, supra.  The portion of the seawall complained of in Appellant’s appraisal is not located upon the subject Property; the trial court therefore properly barred Appellant from seeking damages stemming therefrom in the form of loss of view or privacy and was properly barred from relying upon that appraisal.  The [...] cited to an “elevated ramp” constructed upon the Borough’s property as the reason Appellant lost views and privacy.  Da287.  However, as discussed in Point III, Appellant cannot be compensated for off-site conditions.  The “elevated ramp” referred to is located upon the Borough’s property.  This statement is directly on point with the Weiswasser court’s reasoning cited in Point III – Appellant is barred from seeking damages to his remainder property resulting from activities on the Borough’s property which was never owned by Appellant and thus outside of the 3,334 sf easement acquired in Appellant’s property.  Hence, Appellant is not entitled to damages as a result of alleged loss of view, privacy and wave activity from the construction of the new seawall and ramp on the Borough’s adjacent property as it is outside of the 3,334 SF easement acquired in Appellant’s property.  Therefore, the trial court properly concluded Appellant was barred from seeking compensation for loss of view and privacy due to conditions not located upon Appellant’s Property.
[brief] Order | | 7a | | November 27, 2023  Order | | 9a | | January 11, 2024  Order | Denying Limited Stay Pending Appeal | 12a | | February 5, 2024  Order | | 14a | | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Associates Discount Corp. v. Palmer, | 14 | | 47 N.J. 183 (1966) | | | Barila v. Board of Educ. of Cliffside Park, | 19 | | 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | | | Bryant v. City of Atl. City, | 17 | | 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Dknj Real Estate & Appraisal v. Reussi Capital, | 14 | | DOCKET NO. A-2316-19, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 235 | | | (App. Div. Feb. 10, 2021) | | | G. Loewus & Co. v. Vischia, | 17 | | 2 N.J. 54 (1949) | | | Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp., | 12 | | 238 N.J. 191 (2019) | | | Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, | 13 | | 163 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 1978) | | | Mid-American Salt, LLC v. Morris Cty. Coop. Pricing Council, | 17 | | 964 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2020) | | | Nolan v. Control Data Corp., | 17-19| | 243 N.J.Super. 420 (App. Div. 1990) | | | Rauch v. Rauch, | 13-15| | DOCKET NO. A-4745-14T4, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2177 | | | (App.Div. Aug. 30, 2017)
[brief] Requiring a workers’ compensation insurer that has paid workers’ compensation benefits to an injured worker to also insure a claim of intentional wrong asserted against the employer undermines the delicate balance of interests struck by the Act.  Injured workers are not guaranteed the most lucrative recovery for their injuries.  Rather, the Act guarantees that injured workers will have an avenue of recovery and access to medical care that is admittedly limited.  That is the historic trade-off that is the very foundation of the workers’ compensation system – i.e., in exchange for relinquishing the right to seek a more lucrative common law recovery, injured workers are guaranteed certain reduced benefits that are payable regardless of fault.
[brief] This case arises from a residential real estate transaction involving $5 million.  Plaintiffs allege violations of the Consumer Fraud Act, common law fraud, breach of contract, and related causes of action.  Defendants deny plaintiffs’ allegations and assert claims against plaintiffs.  A44.  This appeal comes by way of the Court’s August 2, 2024 Order granting defendants’ motion for leave to appeal June 12, 2024 Orders entered by the Law Division, which denied the motion of Defendants [...] and [...], seeking to reinstate their Answers and Counterclaims.
[brief] See R. Neumann, 437 N.J. Super. at 391 n.4 (finding under similar provision with 45-day planning board recommendation period: “It is important to note that it is the governing body’s, not the planning board’s, determination that a court reviews.  …  To the extent the trial court concluded that the planning board’s action was under review, the court erred. ”) (citing Kane, 214 N.J. at 226-28).  B.
[brief] [(Da51)  (emphasis added)]  This statement clearly is consistent with Torres, and adequately explains the overall fairness of defendant’s sentence.  --- \(^3\)  This subpoint responds to subpoint E of defendant’s brief.  \(^4\)  Defendant stated, “[i]n its fairness assessment, the sentencing court concluded that the consecutive sentence was fair ‘was fair because Defendant’s argument of low recidivism is not persuasive and the gun possession charges had already merged. ’”  (Da50)  Furthermore, the court adequately addressed defendant’s argument that data suggests if he were to be resentenced concurrently, he would get out of prison around age fifty-eight – an age bracket correlated with a general downturn in recidivism.  The sentencing court found this argument unpersuasive and gave numerous reasons why he came to that conclusion.  The court went through defendant’s lengthy criminal record, calling it “alarming,” and indicating “defendant never went more than six years without obtaining new charges, with the gap in new offenses mainly attributable to his having spent the majority of that time incarcerated.
[brief] In the present case, [...]’s claim that [...]’s death was caused by homicide clearly served the purpose of distinguishing the likelihood of the death being caused by blunt force trauma as opposed to from an accidental fall down a flight of stairs.  Defendant pointed out that Jamerson held that “a medical examiner qualified as an expert in forensic pathology ‘should not have been permitted to testify that [a car accident] was a reckless homicide rather than an accidental killing. ”  (Db15 citing Jamerson, emphasis added).  At issue in Jamerson was whether or not a medical examiner should have been able to comment on the mental state of the defendant, not whether they were qualified to comment on the cause of death – which they undoubtedly were.  Here, similarly, [...] sought to express his belief, as a forensic pathologist, that [...]’s death was caused by blunt force trauma and not a fall.  This is precisely what a medical examiner is supposed to determine.
[brief] The trial court also rested on the No-Fault Law’s purpose to unclog the courts of PIP disputes and “to ensure the viability of arbitration as a forum for the resolution of PIP disputes. ”  Ibid.  The arbitration statute evinced a “firm policy favoring prompt and efficient resolution of PIP disputes without resort to judicial process. ”  Ibid. (quoting Molino, 289 N.J. Super. at 410).  The trial court further explained that, contrary to these objectives of the No-Fault Law, “a party wishing to sidestep mandatory arbitration could easily classify their claims in ways that fling open the courthouse doors.  Such an end-run around the No-Fault Law’s strong policy purpose of ‘prompt and efficient resolution of PIP disputes without resort to the judicial process’ would be consequential. ”  *Ibid.*
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: THE SUPERIOR COURT / HUNTERDON COUNTY / SPECIAL CIVIL PART TRIAL COURT / DOCKET NO. [...]  APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDERS OF MARCH 6, 2023, AND MARCH 26, 2023  SAT BELOW: THE HONORABLE, [...], J.S.C., AND THE HONORABLE, [...], J.S.C.
[directive] 1-Yard Line (or as close to a 1-yard line as safety dictates).  NO LIGHTS  3 seconds each command  Weapon retention position.  (Begin with the support hand across the chest with the hand grasping the collar of the shooter’s shirt or body armor.)  Each drill, 2 rounds.  (Total 4 rounds).  • On command, from the interview stance position, draw and fire 2 rounds from a weapon retention position.  • Decock and holster.  • Repeat once.  9-48 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards