ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pending the 2017 Appeal and Plaintiff’s Prerogative Writ Action**  13.  On August 23, 2018, while the 2017 Appeal was pending, Defendant filed an application with the [...] seeking an interpretation of certain historic land records related to the Subject Property (a 1972 Variance Application, Site Plan and Resolution) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, and also requesting a certification of a pre-existing nonconforming use under N.J.S.A.  --- Motion to Compel Return of Monies 6T= January 28, 2020  Trial Transcript 7T= January 29, 2020  Trial Transcript 8T= January 30, 2020  Trial Transcript 9T= February 3, 2020  Trial Transcript 10T= February 4, 2020  Trial Transcript 11T= February 5, 2020  Trial Transcript 12T= July 27, 2021  Trial Transcript 13T= July 28, 2021  Trial Transcript 14T= August 2, 2021  Trial Transcript  On October 9, 2018 [...] filed an objection to the [...] Application.
[directive] This "eligible an (defining 2A:162-15 N.J.S.A.  See offense.  persons disorderly or crime indictable complaint-warrant by charged defendant a as Law Reform Bail of the purposes for defendant" this 3:26-1, Rule with accordance In offense).  persons disorderly or crime indictable an with to apply does not Directive  This offenses.  persons disorderly petty to apply may also Directive offense.  vehicle motor or violation a ordinance an is offense serious most the where cases by charged is defendant the where cases to limited not is Directive this that Note on guidance provide to is Directive the of features major of the one because complaint-warrant, is Nor Section 4.
[brief] See State v. Dekowski, 218 N.J. 596, 599 (2014) (citing State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 579-580 (2014)).  The State utterly ignores this absence of evidence in its responsive brief, misconstruing its burden in a simulated-deadly-weapons case and ludicrously suggesting that a defendant may be convicted of first-degree robbery without proof that the essential elements of the crime are satisfied with reference to an identifiable victim.  These arguments must be rejected.
[brief] *Rule 4:23 - Failure to Make Discovery; Sanctions*, N.J. Ct. R. 4:23 \(^9\) (4)  In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders.  7 continued:  In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.  open door policy.  See Fik-Rymarkiewicz v. Univ. of Med & Dentistry of N.J., 430 N.J. Super 469 (App. Div.) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of complaint with prejudice where Plaintiff failed to provide fully responsive discovery), certif. denied, 214 N.J. 118 (2013); see also R. 4:23-5(A)(2) (“The motion to dismiss…with prejudice shall be granted[.]”)
[brief] *Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo*, 135 N.J. 126, 137 (1994) (“The authority to issue injunctive relief falls well within the discretion of a court of equity. ”); *Matter of City of Newark*, 469 N.J. Super. 366, 387 (App. Div. 2021) (“We generally review findings of th[e] factors [for injunctive relief] for an abuse of discretion. ”).  While the Appellate Court will review a decision relating to injunctive relief de novo if the disputed issue is a question of law [*Stoney v. Maple Shade Twp.*, 426 N.J. Super. 297, 307 (App. Div. 2012)], in this case, the application of the entire of controversy doctrine is a question grounded in facts concerning the scope of the PTA Arbitration and the ripeness of [...]’s Hackensack Project claims.
[brief] c.  The Adverse Employment Action.  (PA000006-PA000011).  Pursuant to the CEPA statute, “[t]he definition of retaliatory action speaks in terms of completed action.  Discharge, suspension or demotion are final acts. ”  Keelan v. Bell Communications Research, 289 N.J. Super. 531, 539 (App. Div. 1996).  In contrast, if the plaintiff does not allege a discharge, suspension, or demotion, the “conduct must be serious and tangible enough to materially alter the employee’s terms and conditions of employment or adversely affect her status as an employee. ”  Cortes v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 391 F. Supp. 2d 298, 312 (D.N.J. 20015) (citing Calloway v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 98-669, 2000 WL 1251909, *8 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2000)).  Plaintiffs need not endure financial hardship for a court to find an adverse employment action.  *Ivan v. County of Middlesex*, 595 F. Supp. 2d 425, 471 (Dist. Ct. 2009).  Instead, courts have determined, “a pattern of conduct by an employer that adversely affects an employee’s terms and conditions of employment can qualify as retaliation under CEPA. ”  *Beasley v. Passaic County*, 377 N.J. Super. 585, 609 (Sup. Ct. 2005).  The record establishes Plaintiff experienced adverse employment action from Defendants following her objectively reasonable concerns about Defendant [...]’s understaffing and lack of training issues for its employees.  (PA000006-PA000011).  For instance, Defendants took adverse employment action against Plaintiff through: (1) ignoring her various workplace complaints; (2) initially denying her PTO request despite her entitlement of same through working on various holidays for Defendants; (3) placing Plaintiff on a pretextual developmental plan based on debunked allegations; and (4) wrongful termination.  (PA000009-PA000011).  Simply put, these actions constitute the material altering of Plaintiff’s terms and conditions of her employment, which only led to the final retaliatory act of termination.  *Id.*  See also *Cortes*, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 312.  See also *Keelan*, 289 N.J. Super. at 539.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint and the record abundantly reflects she has met the element of adverse employment action required under CEPA and respective case d.
[brief] [...] cites *Valley Nat’l. Bancorporation v. American Motorists Ins. Co.*, 316 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div. 1998) for the position that statutes and regulations “reflect a public policy” to govern cancellation and that distinctions as to the type of policy are immaterial.  While statutes and regulations may certainly inform public policy, it is clear that N.J.A.C. 11:1-20 purposely carved out certain types of insurance policies, like the CCIP.  Further, *Valley* involved notice to a mortgagee of fire damaged property under a multi-peril property policy, far from similar to the CCIP Policies excluded by the plain language of the Code here.  The *Valley* decision hinged on cancellation language in the policy and notice via mailing, but here, “cancellation” is not at issue and, in any event, all insureds gave [...] the sole discretion to act on their behalf.
[directive] 3.4.4  Any mechanism or procedure a law enforcement agency establishes to monitor and track the behavior and performance of individual police officers must have as two of its linchpins quality supervision and an objective and impartial internal affairs process.  Supervisors who have sufficient time and resources to properly perform their duties should be able to timely identify officers with performance and misconduct issues.  Supervisors can react to problems they identify through direction, counseling and effective performance evaluations.  Proper training of agency supervisors is critical to the discipline and performance of law enforcement officers.  Emphasis should be placed on anticipating problems among officers before they result in improper performance or misconduct.  Supervisors are expected to recognize potentially troublesome officers, identify training needs of officers and provide professional support in a consistent and fair manner.  3.4.5
[brief] Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir, 1991); Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Garage Employees Union, Local 272, 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d. Cir. 1986); Food Handlers Local v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., 260 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir. 1958); El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Union de Periodistas, 532 F. Supp. 13, 16 (Dist. P. R. 1981).  (Db30-32)  Plaintiffs have not rebutted any of those cases and all of them were cases exactly like this one.
[brief] *Hirth v. Hoboken*, 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001)  3  *N.J. Shore Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Jackson*, 199 N.J. 38, 55 (2009)(tree removal ordinance); *Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of Town of W. Orange*, 68 N.J. 543, 564 (1975)(rent control ordinance); *388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Twp.  of Readington*, 221 N.J. 318, 339 (2015)(sewer capacity); *515 Assocs. v City of Newark*, 132 N.J. 180, 186 (1993)(requirement for armed guards in apartment complex); *Quick Check Food Stores v. Springfield*, 83 N.J. 438, 447 (1980)(closing hours for convenience stores).  adopted pursuant to a delegation by the legislature to further a specific statutory scheme that calls for particular findings.  The two cases cited by defendants that do involve regulatory ordinances, *Bryant v. City of Atlantic City*, 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App Div. 1988)(challenge to LRHL redevelopers agreement) and *Hirth v. City of Hoboken*, 337 N.J. Super 149 (App Div. 2001)(challenge to LRHL redevelopment plan), are also unhelpful to defendants.
[brief] In this case, the facts do not establish by clear and convincing evidence that [...] intentionally relinquished its right to arbitrate the Indemnity Claim.  The lower court recognized *Cole*'s holding that no single factor is dispositive and the matter must be considered in its totality.  T1 68:2-5.  Yet, in reaching its decision, the lower court failed to conduct a full analysis of the facts and [...]’s unique circumstances, including [...]’s ripeness and futility arguments.
[brief] After [...] picked up the keys to the apartment, she delivered them to [...] and did not enter the apartment again.  (13T158-25 to 169-20).  Additionally, officers searched a 2002 Chevrolet Monte Carlo that was parked in the rear of [...], which revealed: an insurance card issued to defendant, a [...] checkbook issued to defendant, various receipts in defendant’s name, an Alamo rental car receipt, estimates for a construction job in the name of [...], a New Jersey vehicle registration card for the Monte Carlo in the name of [...], and a motor vehicle registration renewal notice in defendant’s name.
[brief] Indeed, Appellant signed an Employee Agreement in which Appellant agreed:  I understand that I am being entrusted with a valuable tool—a Corporate Purchasing Card—and will be making financial commitments on behalf of [...], and will strive to obtain the best value for the company by using “preferred suppliers” as identified by the Purchasing Department.  [ * * * ]  I agree to use this Card for approved purchases only and agree not to charge personal purchases.  [ * * * ]  I will follow the established procedures for the use of the Card.  (Pa80; Da70-72).  Appellant admitted that he signed the agreement and therefore cannot defeat summary judgment by suggesting that these terms of the agreement did not apply to him.  See Stelluti v. Casapenn Enter., LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 305 (2010) (“When a party enters into a signed, written contract, that party is presumed to understand and assent to its terms, unless fraudulent conduct is suspected. ”).  Moreover, New Jersey courts have repeatedly recognized that a litigant cannot create an issue of fact simply by raising arguments contradicting his own prior statements and representations.  See Carroll v. N.J. Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 388-89 (App. Div. 2004) (holding a plaintiff’s interrogatory response that flatly contradicted his own deposition testimony insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact); Masoir, supra; Shelcusky, supra.  Since Appellant failed to demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that a misrepresentation was made and that he reasonably relied on that misrepresentation, this Court should affirm trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s fraud claims.
[brief] (Ra30-32).  At the February 16, 2023 hearing, [...] testified on her own behalf.  (1T8:21-75:3).  [...] and [...] testified on behalf of the [...].  (1T83:3-184:20; 1T187:2-202:19).  On June 13, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision affirming the [...]’s denial of [...]’s request to transfer her PERS service credit from the [...] to [...].
[brief] See, *Public Service Corp. v. Westfield*, 80 N.J. Eq. 295, 303 (Ch. Div. 1912), affirmed, 82 N.J. Eq. 662 (E.&A. 1914) and *Public Service Electric Company v. Westfield* (D.N.J., Sept. 5, 1918) (DA at 461a et seq.).  These judicial determinations have long since become *res judicata*.  6.  Westfield’s Ordinance Does Not Prohibit the Placement of Poles that Exceed the Ordinance’s Requirements  When the Poles are Necessary to Provide Adequate Service  The Ordinance also provides for an applicant to request an exception from any of the requirements of the Ordinance.  DA at 49a.  See also, DA at 51a.  Grounds for the issuance of an exemption by the municipality include instances where the denial of a permit would violate federal or state law (DA at 51a).  Thus, if as [...] argues (an argument which Westfield disputes), prohibiting the placement of the poles it seeks to place would conflict with state or federal law requiring the provision of adequate service, then the Ordinance does not conflict with state or federal law since the provision for an exemption prevents the existence of any conflict that could be the basis for a claim of preemption.
[brief] On March 4, 2023, at approximately 2:45 a.m., [...] ([...]) arrived at his parent’s house after being out of the house since around 8 p.m. the previous night.  When [...] got to the house, he observed that his brother’s car, which was parked in the front of the house, had extensive damage to it.  [...] entered his house to see if his father, who was asleep inside, was aware of what happened to the car parked in front.  After seeing the damage and not knowing how it occurred, [...] and his dad contacted the [...] to report the damage.
[brief] The trial court erroneously ordered [...] summarily dismissed from the case because the trial court failed to appreciate the prejudicial effect [...]’s failure to preserve all available store surveillance footage on the date of Plaintiff’s incident had on the ability for Plaintiffs to prove their case.  [...] was put on notice of Plaintiff’s injuries, all of which were documented in an incident report, and therefore [...] had a duty to retain footage of the events that led to Plaintiff’s injuries.  Such failure to preserve the surveillance video enabled [...] to escape liability as a result of [...] engaging in self-serving maneuvers to spoliate critical evidence that would have further assisted Plaintiffs in proving their theory of liability against [...].  An expert could not be retained in this matter because Plaintiffs’ potential expert was unable to view surveillance recordings resulting from [...]’s failure to retain the footage.  As a result of the failure of [...] to maintain all surveillance footage from the calendar day of the incident up through and following the moment of impact, Plaintiffs are entitled to an adverse inference jury charge and a rebuttable presumption that the missing evidence would be unfavorable to [...].  Moreover, since Plaintiffs should be afforded an adverse inference charge at the time of trial to demonstrate that [...] was presumptively negligent, Plaintiffs asserts that they can establish negligence on the part of [...] without the need for expert testimony because [...] owed Plaintiff a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect Plaintiff against known or reasonably discoverable dangers and breached such a duty.  The trial court has also erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of [...].
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1) (emphasis added).  The Petitioner has the burden of proving the elements necessary to show eligibility for AD by a fair preponderance of the legally competent evidence.  In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 560 (1982); Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962).
[brief] Because the judge’s Miranda-related error is so obvious, defendant will begin his legal analysis not with the error, which is discussed infra in this point, but with the harm it caused his defense, or -- more specifically -- why the erroneous admission of the video of this statement was not “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  The answer why the admission of the video was not harmless error is simple: it was not harmless merely because the video contained an admission by defendant that the sneaker was his, but rather, because it also contained evidence of consciousness of guilt -- i.e., defendant’s lie that police took the other sneaker from him at the station before his transport to Homicide for interrogation.  That was plainly a lie that the jury could use against defendant because a suspect’s lying to police who are investigating a crime is always evidence of consciousness of guilt.  State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J. 115, 151 (2021); State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 129 (2007) (“lying to police” is “classic consciousness of guilt evidence”).  Thus, the admission of this video could be used by the jury to specifically rebut the defense claims that defendant was a hapless victim of misidentification by police, by proving defendant’s consciousness of guilt.  As noted in Point I, reversal of the resulting convictions is necessarily required where, as here, the error potentially tips the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.  State v. Briggs 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); State v. W.L., 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 252-253 (2021), citing State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017).  This was by no means harmless error, and certainly was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] 4a; 6a.  The following are the relevant parts to the Law Division’s decision.  i.  The Court, In Assessing the Record *De Novo*, Denied [...]’s Entire Prayer For Relief Including Allowing Him To Renegotiate Or Rescind The Misleading Plea In Accordance With Black-Letter Law.  [...] denied [...]’s prayer for relief in Point I essentially ruling that the relaxation rule does not apply to statutes, only court rules, and that Rule 1:1-2 does not allow the Court to re-write legislation to allow the sentence to run concurrently as it would result in an illegal sentence.
[directive] The purpose of this directive is to promulgate procedures to be used when individuals or their attorneys are seeking to obtain copies of the individual’s own expunged or sealed records or seeking a certification that their case has been automatically expunged pursuant to statute and/or Supreme Court Order.  Individuals who are granted expungements or have had their records sealed in criminal, municipal, quasi-criminal, or juvenile delinquency matters are entitled to confirmation of those court-ordered or automated actions.  Therefore, upon request and presentation of government issued photo identification, copies of an expungement order, a record indicating the case has been sealed, or a certification that the case was automatically expunged are to be provided to the individuals who are the subject of these records or their attorneys without the assessment of a fee.  In accordance with any Supreme Court Order granting automatic expungements pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6 and N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6.1, an expungement order granted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-15(a), or when a case is ordered sealed from public access at the time of sentencing/adjudication, the records that are the subject of the order must be removed and/or isolated.  In response to third-party requests for information or records on an expunged or sealed case, the court is required to indicate that there is no record.  The restricted access to expunged or sealed records mandated by N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 applies to third-party requestors, but not to individuals seeking copies of their own expunged records or their attorneys.  To ensure adherence to confidentiality requirements surrounding expunged records, the Judiciary is able to audit staff access to the case management systems and applications that house the records and that produce the certification.  ml ADA E SURING AN OPEN DOOR TO JUSTICE
[brief] The Council’s approval of any CBBMP is therefore subject to numerous constraints.  It is subject to the veto power of the DEP Commissioner.  Give the legislative instruction mentioned above, the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Council is not unbridled or arbitrary; rather it has a reasonably adequate standard that guides the Council’s policy promulgations.  The Council’s authority is circumscribed by statute, and, in exercising its constrained authority to enlarge or limit those statutory restrictions, “the Council at all times must condition such departures on the essential purpose its regulations are designed to serve – the maintenance of a plentiful supply of game and fish for recreational hunting and fishing. ”  *Humane Soc.*, 70 N.J. at 576.  (Pa128).  - Plaintiffs cannot avoid this conclusion through challenging the authority of the Council under the New Jersey State Constitution.
[directive] ¿Entiende usted que si se está declarando culpable del delito de agresión sexual con agravantes, [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] agresión sexual, contacto sexual criminal agravado o contacto sexual criminal y el delito ocurrió el primero de julio del 2002 o después de esa fecha, el juez le impondrá una multa de $100?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact or criminal sexual contact and the offense occurred on or after July 1, 2002, the court shall impose a fine of $100?
[directive] 10 | P a g e  Identifiable Kits  The AG SAFE survey required agencies to T OT AL I DENT I F I AB LE AND indicate the volume of identifiable and UNI DENT I F I ABL E KI T S unidentifiable kits in their possession, collected at any time.  Statewide, there were a total of Unidentifiable 130 11,966 identifiable kits and 130 unidentifiable 1.07% kits in the possession of law enforcement.
[brief] Paragraph A read claimed the Board denied the application due to: significant public safety concerns regarding the lack of street parking coupled with the substantial proposed density particularly in light of the proposed basement apartments noted on the plans.  As will be discussed in detail in Legal Argument Point II, no basement apartments were requested.  In fact, the Board Attorney himself acknowledged:  Mr. Chairman, I think it's even more straightforward than that.  The way we have always viewed this, and I think the way this application is presented, they're not saying they're putting in basement apartments.  They're saying they reserve the right to go to the zoning official and the building official and get a permit for downstairs apartments.  This Board is not approving this as -- you're not approving this as -- you're approving single family residences and if they want to go get a permit to put an apartment downstairs, they can get a permit for the apartment.  They're going to need a building permit.  At that point he can appeal the determination of the zoning officer, whether it's applicable here, but the Board's not approving downstairs apartments.
[brief] Exhibit M - Documentation confirming [...]’s completed enrollment in CCIP…………………………………………………………Dta890  Exhibit N - Excerpts of deposition of [...]..........................Dta894  Exhibit O - Excerpts of deposition of [...].....................Dta898  Exhibit P - Correspondence dated September 25, 2015 from [...] to [...].........................................................Dta912  Exhibit Q - Correspondence from [...] to [...]..............................................................................Dta916  Exhibit R - [...]’s disclaimer of coverage to [...]............................Dta921  [...]’s and [...]’s Summary Judgment