ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs themselves concede that the only facts in favor of their trespass claim against [...] are: (1) a statement by a [...] representative that he assumed the Property was part of the redevelopment project based upon a review of the preliminary site plans; and (2) [...]’s concession, in its responses to Interrogatories, that it may have been on or near the Property at the time it drafted the original site plans.  An examination of these facts, however, demonstrates that they cannot justify a “common knowledge” negligence or trespass claim.  First, whether [...] assumed that the Property was part of the redevelopment project based on the preliminary site plans is not attributable to any alleged negligence on [...]’s part.  [...] did not provide the preliminary plans to [...] and did not communicate with any [...] representatives.  (Pa000237 at 14:11-14).  Moreover, as [...] correctly commented: “[j]ust because [[...]] relied upon that site plan and wrongly assumed that…[Plaintiffs’] property was involved in a project, that’s got nothing to do with [...]…The site plan was out there and *if somebody else wrongly relied upon it, that’s not [...]’s fault.*” (4T at 31:11-17) (emphasis added).
[brief] ”).  In the context of bankruptcy, where a stay is in place an “order entered in violation of the stay is void. ”  Clark v. Pomponio, 397 N.J. Super. 630, 640 (App. Div. 2008).  Here the automatic stay provisions of N.J.S.A.  2A:15-67 should be interpreted akin to the automatic stay that occurs upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.  To hold otherwise will allow trial courts and parties to simply ignore our Legislature’s clear directive and proceed forward without a nonresident party posting the mandatory security and rob the resident defendant of the benefit of the statute.  As such, the only just remedy is to void any order entered in violation of the statutory stay.
[directive] [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  1.  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to będzie obowiązywać Pana(Panią) minimalny okres pozbawienia prawa do się o zwolnienie warunkowe (zasada czasowej dyskwalifikacji z ubiegania możliwości zwolnienia warunkowego) zgodnie z Ustawą Gravesa (jak podano w pytaniu 7 trzystronicowego formularza oświadczenia)?
[brief] Transcript of [...], dated July 9, 2019 ..................................  Pa1  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bradley v. Meachum, | 18 | | 918 F.2d 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221 (1991) | | | Bruton v. United States, | 21 | | 391 U.S. 123 (1968) | | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Township Comm. Of Twp. Of Manalapan, | 9 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | Miranda v. Arizona, | 10 | | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | | | State in the Interest of A.S., | 11 | | 203 N.J. 131 (2010) | | | State v. A.M., | 10 | | 237 N.J. 384 (2019) | | | State v. Adim, | 30, 31| | 410 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 2009) | | | State v. Allen, | 22 | | __ N.J. __ (2023) | | | State v. Alston, | 12, 13, 14| | 204 N.J. 614 (2011) | | | State v. Alston, | 21, 22| | 312 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div. 1998) | | | State v. Bankston, | 26 | | 63 N.J. 263 (1973) | | | State v. Branch, | 26 | | 182 N.J. 338 (2005) | | | State v. Burno-Taylor, | 11 | | 400 N.J. Super. 581 (App. Div. 2008) | | State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509 (1996) .................................................................
[brief] There, [...] was convicted at trial of aggravated manslaughter, among other crimes.  *Id.* at 256.  The victim was the former boyfriend and father of the child of [...]’s sister-in-law.  *Id.* at 256, 261.  [...] objected that admission of a particular photograph of a hypodermic syringe found in his sister-in-law’s bedroom (which was not the scene of the crime, but was both inside [...]’s house, and nearby) violated N.J.R.E. 404(b).  *Id.* at 261-62, 335-36.  The panel affirmed the denial of the objection.  *Id.* at 336.  The panel explained that the State had to disprove the affirmative defense of use of force in self-protection.  *Id.* at 339.  The State argued the self-defense claim was fabricated, and the photograph evidenced both that [...] had access to his sister-in-law’s syringes, and that her syringes were identical to one found near the victim’s body.  *Ibid.*  This qualified as intrinsic evidence because [...] asserted he acted to defend himself when the victim, armed with a syringe, approached [...].  *Id.* at 338-39.  This Court ruled the photograph would “directly prove” the murder charge “by tending to disprove defendant’s self-defense claim. ”  Id. at 339.  For that reason, “the State was not required to satisfy the preconditions for admissibility of Rule 404(b). ”  Ibid.  [...] is equally applicable here.  When defendant introduced his “business card” to explain what he was seen offering the police in two of the four videos, (16T65-2 to 75-18), the State was allowed, if not obligated, to offer contrary evidence showing that the “business card,” which resembled defendant’s wallet ID, violated NJSP standards, making it more likely the card was not the item defendant showed the police.  Thus, the admission of this evidence was entirely proper.  POINT VI
[directive] 4.1  Duties and Responsibilities  4.1.1  The purpose of the internal affairs function is to establish a mechanism for the receipt, investigation, and resolution of officer misconduct complaints.  The goal of internal affairs is to ensure that the integrity of the agency is maintained through a system of internal discipline where an objective and impartial investigation and review assure fairness and justice.  4.1.2  The internal affairs function or officer will investigate alleged misconduct by members of the agency and review the adjudication of minor complaints handled by supervisors.  In addition, internal affairs shall receive notice of:  (a)  Any firearm discharge by agency personnel, whether on-duty or off-duty, unless the discharge occurred during the course of: (1) a law enforcement training exercise; (2) routine target practice at a firing range; (3) a lawful animal hunt; or (4) the humane killing of an injured animal; (b) Any discharge of an agency-owned firearm by anyone other than agency personnel; (c) Any use of force by agency personnel that results in injury to any person, (d) Any vehicular pursuit involving agency personnel; and (e) Any collision involving agency-owned vehicles.  Upon receiving notification, the agency’s internal affairs function shall document the incident and determine whether additional investigation is necessary.  4.1.3  An internal affairs function also has an obligation to investigate or review any allegation of employee misconduct that is a potential violation of an AG Directive or Guideline, a Directive issued by a County Prosecutor in that jurisdiction, the agency's rules and regulations, or any allegation that indicates the employee is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform their duties.  The obligation to investigate includes not only acts of misconduct that are alleged to have occurred while the subject officer was on-duty, but also acts of misconduct that are alleged to have occurred outside the employing agency's jurisdiction or while the subject officer was off-duty.  15 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] ”  *Tillman*, 655 S.E.2d at 372.  For example, in *Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.*, 183 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit, simply permitted a secured lender “to use judicial or non-judicial relief to enforce a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security agreement relating to the real property secured in a transaction underlying this arbitration agreement, or to enforce the monetary obligation secured by the real property, or to foreclose on the real property. ”  *Harris*, 183 F.3d at 177-178.  The court in *Hafer v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin., Inc.*, 793 F. Supp.2d 987, 1007 (S.D. Tex. 2011) likewise permitted a secured lender to use judicial means “to enforce a security agreement relating to the Manufactured Home secured in a transaction underlying this arbitration agreement, to enforce the monetary obligation secured by the Manufactured Home or to foreclose on the manufactured home. ”  *Hafer*, 793 F.Supp.2d at 1005.  These cases are consistent with *Delta Funding* and in no way pertinent to the “egregious” clause in this case.
[brief] *Kandrac* addressed the issue of whether a commercial tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center owes a duty to its patrons to maintain an area of the parking lot that the landlord is contractually obligated to maintain.  The Court held that a commercial tenant does not have such a duty.  At bar, [...] was a commercial tenant in a shopping mall.  The shopping mall is owned by [...].  [...] was actively paying rent and Common Area Expense charges and was compliant with the terms of the lease on the day of the alleged incident.  [...] admits that he was not entering or exiting leaving [...]’s leased premises and the only reason he was at the shopping mall was to have dinner at [...].  [...] identified the location of his allegedly slip and fall as an area of the parking lot which is not adjacent to [...]’s leased premises.  At bar, there is no evidence presented, in admissible form, that [...] had a duty to maintain the area of the parking lot where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell.
[brief] **Appellant’s Arguments Against The Applicability Of Rule 4:37-2 Are Without Merit.**  Appellant argues that the trial court should not have dismissed her Complaint with prejudice under Rule 4:37-2 because: 1) it violated her due process rights; and 2) the statute of limitations relating to her claims had not expired and because this Court’s December 2, 2022 Order did not include a deadline for compliance.  As noted herein, Appellant did not even attempt to oppose Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice under Rule 4:37-2, which the Court granted.  As such, the Court should not even address Appellant’s arguments because they were not raised in the trial court.  See N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) (“An issue not raised below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. ”).  Regardless, even if the Court were to entertain such arguments, they have no bearing on a trial court’s discretion to dismiss a complaint with prejudice under Rule 4:37-2.  1.
[brief] 15  Manna v. State, 129 N.J. 341, 346 (1992) ......................................................  7-8  Massachi v. AHL Servs Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486 (App. Div. 2007) certif. den. 195 N.J. 419 (2008).  ...........  10  Nostrame v. Santiago, 420 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2011)  ..................  6  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)  .............................................................................
[brief] 9  Balagun v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 361 N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div. 2003) .................................................................  10  Hospital Center at Orange. Guhl, 331 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2000)  ...........  8  In re Arndt, 67 N.J. 432 (1975) ..................................................................................  8  In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370 (2013) ..............................................................................................................
[brief] After considering the testimony of the Petitioner, the testimony of the parties’ medical experts and the ALJ’s ID, the Board issued a FAD rejecting the ALJ’s ID and recommending denial of Petitioner’s application for AD.  (Pa111, 116).  The Board found that, “because [...] made no mention of the alleged typographical errors in his expert report, his response to leading questions by [Petitioner’s] counsel does not support the conclusion that [[...]] is more credible than [...].” (Pa112-113).  As further explained in the FAD, “[t]he Board was not persuaded by the ID”, and noted that the year 2009 was set forth in [...]’s report five separate times, and the ID presumes there was only once incident in 2000 and that [...] mistakenly typed “2009” all five time.  (Pa113).  In addition to the fact that this theory was created by Petitioner’s counsel at the hearing and not [...], the Board found that the description of the 2000 incident “is substantially different than the incident described as occurring in 2009. ”  As such, the “Board does not find credible that the difference between these two incidents can be reconciled as a ‘typo’.  (Pa113).  Instead, it “determined that the details are too dissimilar to come to the conclusion that they are actually the same incident, differentiated only by typographical error. ” (Pa113).  The Board also rejected the lack of workers’ compensation records as the basis for the ID’s conclusion that the 2009 incident did not occur, stating “it is also feasible that [Petitioner] sustained injury in 2009, but there is no worker’s compensation or other employer report because it is possible he injured himself outside of work. ”  The Board found that “this theory is at least as plausible as an orthopedic surgeon making a typographical error five times in the same report and describing the same incident with discernable differences in detail. ”  (Pa113).  The Board ultimately: • Found no credible evidence to support the ALJ’s acceptance of the theory introduced by the Petitioner’s counsel that the reports detailing Petitioner’s 2009 injury was the result of a typographical error and that such injury did not occur; • Rejected the ALJ’s legal conclusion that Petitioner’s expert, [...], provided more reliable testimony than the Board’s expert, [...]; • Rejected the ALJ’s legal conclusion that Petitioner’s disability was directly caused by the 2015 accident and its recommendation that Petitioner be awarded AD; and • Denied Petitioner’s application for AD.
[brief] APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...]  On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey  Essex County: Law Division DOCKET NO: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  Sat Below: [...], J.S.C. RESPONDENT’S BRIEF AND APPENDIX (VOL. I, Da1 – Da61) OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT  [...]  [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 040551985  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent Newburgh Windustrial Supply Co., Inc.  Of Counsel and on the brief: Randy T. Pearce, Esq.  On the brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.
[brief] **Summary Judgment.**  It is well settled that summary judgment should only be granted where “there are no genuine issues as to any material fact challenged and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ”  *Kopp, Inc. v. United Technologies, Inc.*, 223 N.J. Super. 548, 554-55 (App. Div. 1988)  The trial court must not decide issues of fact.  It must only decide whether there are such issues.  See *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)  “An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all the legitimate inferences there from favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  *Beatty v. Farmer*, 366 N.J. Super. 69, 78-79 (App. Div. 2004).  When the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law, a trial court should not \(^2\)
[brief] In addition, Appellants claim that [...] is required “to make a record regarding [total maximum daily loads (“TMDLs”)] and wasteload allocations for impaired waters and any additional requirements contained in the applicable Areawide [WQM Plans].”  Asb21-22.  The basis for Appellant’s argument is that the WQMP Rules provide that “[t]he Department shall not issue a permit or approval that conflicts with an adopted areawide plan or this chapter. ”  Asb22 quoting N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a)(emphasis in Appellants’ brief).  Appellants’ contention is that “this chapter” includes Subchapter 5 which sets forth the process for identifying and listing impaired waters pursuant to Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act and for developing and implementing TMDLs.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.1 et seq.  However, there is nothing in the WQMP Rules that requires [...] to make a record regarding TMDLs or wasteload allocations as part of its WQM Plan consistency review.
[brief] The Commissioner’s Determination That Municipalities Such As [...] Are Among The Entities Enumerated In N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 And Permitted To Seek Withdrawal From A Regional Or Consolidated School District Is Supported By The Statute’s Plain Language And The Overall Statutory Scheme.  The Legislature extensively revised New Jersey’s school regionalization statute in 2021.  See P.L. 2021, c. 402.  The preamble to the revised and supplemented regionalization statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47, et seq., states:  “An Act concerning school district regionalization, amending various parts of the statutory law, and supplementing chapter 13 of Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes. ”  The particular statutory provision at issue here, N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a), is contained within chapter 13 and is titled “Withdrawal from local district to form, enlarge regional district. ”  It provides in pertinent part:
[brief] At a hearing on [...]’s motion to compel, the new PCR judge sua sponte reversed the long-standing discovery orders and moved to the merits of the PCR petition.  When substituted PCR counsel protested that she still had open investigations and had not completed her submissions, the judge insisted she complete everything within a week, when the petition would be argued.  On that date, counsel continued to object that she had not completed her case, but the judge told her to either argue the merits of the petition or rest.
[brief] The Conference will rely on new empirical research done by the [...] to assess the degree of satisfaction with the performance of the present system and the suggestions of lawyers as to how the system can be improved.  This research will be supplemented by additional empirical data.  A major portion of the Conference will be devoted to an assessment and discussion of the empirical research.  The Conference will draw on insights and perspectives from lawyers, judges and academics concerning improvements that could be made in the federal civil litigation process to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rules — "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."  In addition to considering the results of the empirical research, panels of experts will consider the range of issues in the federal civil litigation process that could be used more efficiently to accomplish the purposes of the Rules, including the discovery process (particularly E-Discovery), pleadings, and dispositive motions.  Other topics to be considered include judicial management and the tools available to judges to expedite the process, the process of settlement, and the experience of the states.  While the Conference will explore these issues, an important part of the Conference will be to encourage follow up on the subjects explored at the Conference.  It is hoped that the papers and discussion at the Conference will frame an agenda for possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that they will be a basis for judicial education through the [...] and for further action by the Bar.  Report to the Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (/file/reporttothechiefjusticepdf) (pdf)
[brief] State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 328 (2019).  Petitioner was represented by private counsel during pretrial, trial and sentencing as evidenced by the Post-Conviction Application filed and hereby incorporated into the Statement of the Facts.  (Da 216)  A jury trial began on November 17, 2015 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Petitioner was acquitted of 30 charges and four were dismissed on the State's own motion at the end of its case.  He was convicted of 19 charges, one of which was reversed on appeal.  Id. at 336-37.
[directive] 0~ 3  Assessment of Scope Risk Assault Domestic Ontario 4.S.l.b enforcement ODARA, law a of completion the require that cases violence domestic  In any after (i.e., final score defendant's when a acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency deputy or prosecutor an assistant scores—unless PSA the of higher—regardless or 3 is proration) supervisory a or Directive, this of 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted general attorney of 4 Section under presumptions overcome Prosecutor to County the by authorized is who officer overcome is complaint-warrant by charging of presumption the that determines Directive, this be to are ODARA scores the cases, violence domestic
[brief] Regarding [...]’s contention here that as a salaried employee, she did not have to submit timesheets (Pb40), [...] explained that this was not alone indicative of employee status as many salaried employees were required to complete timesheets.  (1T165:22-166:8).  [...] even testified that payroll sent timesheets to department heads with a list of all the employees.  (1T197:23-198:2).  Further, since the pandemic, [...] was required to check the Municipal Case Disposition System daily.  (1T16:4-8).  She estimated that she spent an extra hour or two outside of court performing her Municipal Court duties.  (1T42:23-42:10).  However, nothing in the record suggests that these hours she works beyond the set court schedule were not set, directed, or monitored by [...].
[brief] The District Court rejected [...]’s attempt to compel arbitration before an alternate arbitrator and [...] appealed.  The Second Circuit affirmed, holding:  The arbitration agreement in this case provides that any disputes shall be resolved ‘by binding individual (and not joint) arbitration by and under the Code of Procedure of the [...] (“[...]”) in effect at the time the claim is filed. ’  The agreement does not address how the parties should proceed in the event that [...] is unable to accept the dispute.  The question is whether a court may compel arbitration when the designated arbitrator is unavailable.  We addressed that question in *In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation*, 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1995).
[brief] Plaintiff [...] and her husband, [...], are dentists.  (Da307, ¶2).  In 2004, they, together with two other dentists, formed [...] ("[...]") to acquire property located at [...] ("the Property").  (Da307, ¶3).  Martha and Nicolas then formed [...], a prosthodontic/implant and pediatric dental/orthodontic practice, and [...], an entity that educates dentists on implantology (collectively "[...]").  (Da307, ¶5).  In 2008, [...] commenced operations at the Property.  (Da307, ¶5).  Martha and Nicolas managed the Property from 2004 through 2011.  (Da307, ¶4).  [...] and [...] experienced financial difficulties.  (Da8-9, ¶¶40-43).  [...] defaulted on the mortgage encumbering the Property, resulting in the appointment of a rent receiver and causing each of 300 Sylvan and [...] to file for bankruptcy.  (Da9, ¶¶43-46).  On December 22, 2010, [...] filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy; and [...] did the same on November 22, 2011.  (Da9-10, ¶44, ¶46).  While the bankruptcy proceedings were pending, Martha became the sole owner of [...].  (Da307, ¶5).  At the suggestion of her father, Martha contacted [...] for financial assistance.
[brief] (Cont'd.)  C.  As An [...] Supervisor During The Entirety Of The Investigation And Prosecution Of [...], [...] Abused Her Discretion In Refusing To Recuse Herself From Passing Judgment On [...]’s Misconduct In Destroying Hundreds Of Hours Of Potentially Exculpatory Information, Failing To Retain The Hard Drive At The Center Of Substantial Pretrial Litigation On Spoliation, And Withholding [...]’s Policies From The Court And The Defense.  (25T32-19 To 35-3; Da378-79)  .........................................................74  D.  The Denial Of [...]’s Motion For Dismissal Or Rehearing Based On Newly Discovered Evidence Of Bad Faith Must Be Reversed.  (Da380-85; 25T35-4 To 41-3)  ..............................................................................................................77  CONCLUSION