ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  1.3  Prohibition on Separate County Plea Policies  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Brimage directed the Attorney General in formulating new Guidelines to eliminate provisions that would authorize county prosecutors to adopt their own plea policies and standardized plea offers.  Accordingly, county prosecutors may not promulgate their own plea policies that are inconsistent with or diverge from these Guidelines, or that would result in a plea offer that is not authorized pursuant to these Guidelines.  In order to comply with the Court’s directive in Brimage and to ensure statewide uniformity, a prosecutor is required in all Brimage-eligible cases to tender a plea offer in accordance with the provisions of these Guidelines.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the appropriate enforcement of the “plea cut off rule” established by the Supreme Court and codified in R. 3:9- 3g.  Nor is a prosecutor’s office precluded from adopting and enforcing its own plea cut off policy, provided, however, that the prosecutor must afford a defendant a reasonable opportunity to accept a “final post-indictment offer” calculated pursuant to these Guidelines before that final offer expires and is withdrawn.  Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize a prosecutor to refrain from tendering a pre-indictment, an initial post-indictment, or final post-indictment offer as may be required by these Guidelines.  Page 6  Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)
[brief] The term “Pa” refers to Plaintiff’s Appendix filed in support of appeal.  The term “Pca” refers to Plaintiff’s Confidential Appendix filed in support of appeal.  The term “Dmb” refers to Defendants [...], [...], and [...]’s brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Appeal filed on December 21, 2023.  The term “Da” refers to Defendants [...], [...], and [...]’s Appendix filed in support of the Opposition to the Appeal. expert in the field, [...].  Plaintiff’s counsel demanded that the defense IME be recorded and requested that Defendants provide an interpreter.  Pa27.  Plaintiff’s counsel demanded that Defendants’ neuropsychological medical examination with [...] be held to a different standard than their own experts.  Plaintiff insisted that he would not appear for his DME unless he could record it.  Pa27.  Extensive motion practice ensued.  Far from a simple matter of personal preference, Dr. Morgan explained that recording is inconsistent with good neuropsychologic practice; he explained in detail his scientific justification for the position and even provided examples of professional literature that support his position.  Pa32, Pa41, Pa47, Pa61, & Da39.  Professional literature supporting Defendants’ position was submitted to the court for consideration and as corroboration of the convictions voiced by Dr. Morgan.  The Policy Statement of the American Board of Professional Neuropsychology regarding third-party observation and the recording of psychological test administration in neuropsychological evaluations ("Policy") provides an in-depth discussion on the issues which arise from an ethical, testing, assessment, security, and expert witness perspective, concluding that TPOs have the potential to influence and compromise both a patient's or administrator's behavior thereby invalidating the data collected, along with conclusions, interpretations, and results.
[brief] **Discovery of Defendants’ Fraud**  Relator’s principal, [...] (“[...]”), has more than twenty years of municipal advisory experience.  In the regular course of his business, he noticed that two VRDOs that were very different had the same rates and rate change for 50 of 52 weeks in one year.  Ja11-12, 53-55 (¶¶ 10-12, 131-37).  This was “anomalous,” “really weird,” and “odd. ”  Ja1684; Ja2123; Ja2154-55, 2171 (¶¶ 107-08, 188).  At the time, there was no known way to analyze and compare rates for groups of VRDOs.  [...] developed a commercial product to fill that market need.  Ja2155 (¶¶ 109-110).  Developing a commercially viable software product, obtaining massive amounts of data to analyze, and inventing a patented methodology to analyze demanded thousands of hours and hundreds of thousands of dollars.  The results led [...] to suspect Defendants’ misconduct.  See, e.g., Ja2156-62, 2171-72 (¶¶ 111-43, 185-88).  IV.
[directive] Satisfactory completion of K-9 specialty training equivalent to that set forth herein.  Must be either a full-time law enforcement officer assigned to trainer duties by his/her employing law enforcement agency or a former law enforcement officer who had previously been assigned canine trainer duties by his/her employing law enforcement agency, and is retained by a law enforcement agency as a trainer.  Satisfactory completion of a Methods of Instruction Course approved by the Police Training Commission or an equivalent course.  Two years experience as a police specialty dog trainer.  Must have experience in conducting a minimum of 2 basic K-9 specialty training courses satisfying the requirements set forth herein (with the exception of those areas of instruction appropriately conducted by qualified specialists) or a course having substantially equivalent requirements, thereby successfully training and qualifying a minimum of 20 K-9 teams.  •  A supervising specialty K-9 trainer is responsible for all documentation and certification of prospective trainers.  He/she must document the time the prospective trainer committed to the class training, the number of dogs trained, the areas of training, and what involvement the prospective trainer had with the class.  Weekly evaluations recommending goals and objectives, as well as documentation of accomplishments are required.  All records pertaining to the certification of K-9 specialty trainers must be maintained by the Supervising K-9 specialty trainer for a period of no less than 2 (two) years, and by the newly certified K-9 specialty trainer for the duration of his/her career.
[brief] They are not, and [...] compels this conclusion.  Our Supreme Court also clarified another important point [...] has already made.  [...] was on “direct review” because it was on appeal from a final judgment (i.e. the order dismissing with prejudice) when Tyler came down.  Id. at 18.  And for that reason, Tyler could be and was applied to the case.  Id. at 22-24.  This case is not on direct review because it is not an appeal from a final judgment, hence Tyler does not apply.
[brief] RESPONDENT’S ILL-DEFINED FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT FAILS BECAUSE IT WAS WAIVED BELOW, AND BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE AND THE COMMISSION HAVE SPOKEN CLEARLY ON THIS ISSUE (Ca014-017)  Respondent essentially asserts that no school board member could ever make any statement which could be subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction.  Rb7-8.  Respondent provides no First Amendment analysis in support of this proposition, nor does Respondent address the Commission’s robust body of caselaw addressing this precise issue.  Respondent also waived this affirmative defense below.  First, Respondent waived any such affirmative defense by failing to raise it in both its Answer and its Amended Answer before the Commission.  As [...] specifically found:  First, Respondent failed to raise any affirmative defenses in both her initial answer and her amended answer.  Therefore, such a defense is unsupported by the pleadings.  While counsel raises the argument in his brief, it is just that, an argument without factual support — i.e. certification, affidavit or other competent evidence.  Second, even if a First Amendment defense had been raised, there is a balancing that must be done between Respondent’s rights as a private citizen and her obligation as a sitting board member to preserve public confidence and avoid conduct which would violate public trust or create a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a). (Ca031-032).  In short, Respondent waived her First Amendment defense and, even if she hadn’t, that defense fails under applicable law.
[brief] The record is clear that the [...] received a certification with [...] ranked first.  AA122.  It acted consistent with the certification before it and bypassed [...] and [...], who was then ranked second on that list, to promote the third ranked candidate, [...] Ibid.  The [...] also made clear on the very first page of its March 28, 2023 submission to the Commission that [...] should be removed from the list rather than promoted if [...] were to be removed from the certification.  AA222 (arguing that “[...] did not have any entitlement to such promotion, and her adverse employment history, which included major discipline of a forty-five (45) day suspension for her prior insubordination and untruthfulness not only justified the bypass decision, but also would have justified list removal if she had placed actually first on the certification.
[directive] 2.1  OBEDIENCE Goal:  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to obey basic and advanced obedience commands.  2.1.1  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler (using verbal commands or hand signals) will demonstrate the ability to respond to basic commands: "sit", "down", "stand", "stay", "heel" and "come".  2.1.2  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to walk in a heel position, both on lead and off lead, at a slow, fast and normal pace while completing left, right and about turns (heel work).  2.1.3  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to respond to distance control commands, including the following voice commands and hand signals: sit, down, stand, stay and come.  2.1.4  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to respond to a heel or come command, either a voice command or hand signal, stopping the dog with a sit, down or stand command.  2.1.5  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to take and hold a position until the handler returns and orders the dog to heel.  2.1.6  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to maintain a position as the handler moves away, returns to and passes by the dog (walking control).  2.1.7  The police Patrol dog will demonstrate the ability, on and off lead, to move through groups of people in a non-aggressive manner, displaying a tolerance for people (socialization).  2.1.8  The police patrol dog will demonstrate the ability, on and off lead, to remain in a stay position (stand, sit, or down) while people pass by (socialization).  20 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements  2.1.9  The police patrol dog will demonstrate the ability to properly respond to obedience commands, from the police officer handler, while under gunfire.  2.2
[directive] 3.1  Limitations on use of force.  In situations where officers are justified in using force, officers shall use only that degree of force that is reasonable, necessary, and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s mental and physical condition, the nature of the offense, and most importantly the level of resistance or threat known to the officer at the time.  3.2  Considerations when using force.  The decision to use force and the appropriate amount of force requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each incident.  The officer must, as time permits and is feasible, consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors when determining whether and how much force to apply: (a) immediacy and severity of the threat to officers or the public; (b) the conduct of the individual being confronted, as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time; (c) characteristics of the officer and subject (e.g., age, size, relative strength, skill level, injuries sustained, level of exhaustion or fatigue, the number of officers available vs. subjects); (d) the effects of drugs or alcohol; (e) the individual’s mental state or capacity; (f) the proximity of weapons or dangerous improvised devices; (g) the degree to which the subject has been effectively restrained and their ability to resist despite being restrained; (h) the availability of other options and possible effectiveness; (i) the seriousness of the suspected offense or reason for contact with the individual.  For example, in dealing with minor offenses, such as motor vehicle or and local ordinance violations practicing procedural-justice techniques, such as explaining the officer’s actions and responding to questions before resorting to force, is particularly important; (j) the officer’s training and experience; and (k) the potential for injury to officers, suspects, and the public.  3.2.1  It is important to note that law enforcement encounters are never static and rapidly evolve.  Thus, officers must continuously assess the effectiveness, proportionality, and necessity of their actions, including their tactical positioning, in order to decrease the likelihood of force being needed for self-protection.  Officers may increase the time 6  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020 available to evaluate the threat by positioning an object between themselves and the subject, being aware of their surroundings, and waiting for backup, when it is available.
[brief] PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A VALID CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE (Pa382)  Plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages for the damage to the Property as a result of the Defendant's actions.  Proof of negligence requires “a duty of care, breach of that duty, proximate cause, and actual damages. ”  Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008); Brunson v. Affinity Federal Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 400 (1999).  In the present matter the lower court dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint on the basis that the Plaintiff could not prove either causation or damages due to the lack of expert testimony.  Pa78.  The lower court erred for reasons set forth below.  It is well established that expert testimony is only needed when a jury is unable to understand the salient issues using common judgment and experience.  Maison v. New Jersey Transit Corp. 460 N.J. Super. 222, 232 (App. Div. 2019).  The Plaintiff did not retain an engineering expert in this matter because Plaintiff relied upon the Township’s experts, including [...] the Township’s Engineer, and their assessment of the Property.  Pa51.  The Plaintiff does not believe that she needed the services of an expert because she reasonably trusted that the Township would repair the Property.  Furthermore, the fact that the Township performed the work on the Property indicates that the Township knew they were responsible for the condition of the Property, otherwise they would have never undertaken the drainage work in 2018.  It must also be noted that the damage that was done to the Property was so obviously caused by drainage issues that expert testimony is not necessary.  In other words, a juror using common judgment and experience would be able to opine that Plaintiff’s damages were caused by the Township’s actions.  Lastly, once the Township entered upon the Property and performed the work they took ownership of any damage that their actions caused.  The Court also dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint on the basis that the Plaintiff is unable to prove her damages without expert testimony.  Pa78.  That is simply untrue.  During discovery Plaintiff provided various estimates from contractors as to the work that needed to be performed to transform the Property back into the beautifully landscaped property it once was prior to the Defendant’s neglect.  Pa55.  These documents establish actual damages that can quantify damages without the need for expert testimony.  Furthermore, real estate professionals have advised Plaintiff that the Property’s value has greatly diminished as a result of the condition of the backyard to which she is entitled damages.  POINT III
[brief] Da249.  On April 21, 2023, [...], on behalf of [...], objected to the assumption of the ROFR and further demanded that [...] “agree to contribute to [the] termination penalty” of $328,740.14, calling it an issue “that must be resolved immediately if this closing is to proceed. ”  Ibid.  On May 2, 2023, Ackerman sent an email to [...] which expressly acknowledged that [...] held a ROFR and indicated that [...] expected an extra-contractual discount for termination fees that might be due and owing to [...] (and [...]):
[brief] As he did below, defendant again faults trial counsel for not introducing as a defense to his DWI prosecution the psychiatric defense of “persecutory paranoia” and/or “amnesia” occurring “under a few beers, one beer, no beer. ”  Db9.  Defendant again argues that trial counsel’s failure was twofold in that counsel both erred in not presenting such a defense, but also erred making clear on the record that not presenting this defense was in keeping with New Jersey case precedent.  Defendant again contends that either or both error warrants the grant of relief in the form of the vacation of his conviction and “remand … for a new municipal court trial. ”  Db15.  Defendant’s request for relief is still premised upon a legally unsound belief that even if trial counsel was correct with regard to the unavailability of a psychiatric defense to DWI, counsel was nonetheless obligated to present that defense in order to provide robust representation.  Defendant created this obligation on trial counsel by borrowing law, and the accompanying obligation, applicable to post-conviction relief (PCR) counsel.  Because trial counsel was not obligated under any applicable New Jersey law to raise on defendant’s behalf a legally inapplicable defense, [...] correctly determined defendant was entitled to no relief.  Da16-18.  [...]’s factually and legally correct determination of this issue should be affirmed by this Court.  As correctly noted by trial counsel, the common law defense of insanity under the M’Naghten test “is unavailable to defendants charged with driving under the influence.
[brief] The ESI Order requires [...] to produce all documents that hit on a search term, without permitting [...] to conduct a relevance review and withhold from production documents that are irrelevant to any claim in this action and not responsive to any request.  But this Court recently explained that the Rules contemplate the producing party determining relevance before the documents are produced:  [Rule 4:18-1] does not anticipate that the requesting party will be permitted to search through their opponents’ electronic devices for responsive data, any more than it anticipates that the requesting party would be permitted to search through their opponent’s filing cabinets for responsive documents.  *Lipsky v. N.J. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc.*, 474 N.J. Super. 447, 468 (App. Div. 2023).  *Lipsky* did not break new ground.  It is well-settled law, within and outside New Jersey, that a party producing ESI (as with paper discovery) determines relevance in the first instance, using their best efforts to cull responsive documents from a larger group of existing data.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred in Relying Solely on Allegations Contained in [...]’s Verified Complaint as its Basis for Summary Judgment.  While [...] filed the underlying action upon a Verified Complaint, the facts alleged therein were never tested in discovery.  Nevertheless, the trial court seemed to believe that every fact alleged in [...]’s Verified Complaint were *ipso facto* true and could not be challenged or controverted.  This court has stated that “issues of credibility must be left to the finder of fact” and that this applies “even where a witness’s testimony is uncontradicted [citation omitted], as long as, when considering the testimony in the context of the record, persons ‘of reason and fairness may entertain differing views as to [its] truth.
[brief] **[...] Is Designated as Redeveloper**  On October 14, 2020, the Council adopted Resolution 199-20 which designated [...] as a conditional redeveloper of the [...] Property pending the negotiation and execution of a more comprehensive redevelopment agreement.  On December 9, 2020, the Council adopted Resolution 243-20 which designated [...] as the redeveloper of the [...] Property and authorized the execution of the Redevelopment Agreement which had been negotiated between the City and [...].
[directive] The unexpected duration of the pandemic as well as the continued suspension of jury trials, without a clear end date for either, constitutes new information or a change in circumstances.  See Comm. for Pub. Couns. Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Ct., 142 N.E.3d 525, 529-30 (Mass. 2020); Karr v. State, 459 P.3d 1183, 1186 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).  Earlier last year, even experts could not predict the full scope, duration, or impact of the pandemic on society, let alone on the court system.  Because of the health risk to jurors, witnesses, attorneys, staff, and judges, along with members of the public with whom they interact, the Judiciary suspended criminal jury trials in March 2020 and again in November 2020, after a brief resumption of in-person trials.  Sup. Ct. of N.J., Notice -- COVID-19 Coronavirus -- Status of Court Operation -- Immediate and Upcoming Plans, at 1 (Mar. 12, 2020); Sup. Ct. of N.J., Omnibus Order on COVID-19 Issues, at 2 (Mar. 27, 2020); Sup. Ct. of N.J., Notice and Order -- COVID-19 -- Suspension of New In-Person Jury Trials and In-Person Grand Jury Sessions; Revised End-Dates for Excludable Time, at 3 (Nov. 16, 2020) (Nov. 16, 2020 Order).3
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Table of Contents  Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. i Appendix ................................................................................................................................ ii  Table of Authorities ..............................................................................................................  iii  A.  Preliminary Statement .....................................................................................................1  B.  Statement of Procedural History ....................................................................................2  C. Statement of Facts ..........................................................................................................4  D.  Legal Argument ..............................................................................................................6  Issue I: There Was No Error In Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, As She Failed To Comply With The Affidavit Of Merit Statute And, So, Failed to Assert A Viable Cause Of Action.
[directive] 1. przestępstwo/1st 500 USD Offense  2. przestępstwo/2nd 750 USD Offense  3. i kolejne przestępstwa/3rd 1,000 USD or Subsequent offense  Kara grzywny łącznie/Total USD Penalty Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Polish Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Polish że przyznanie się do winy w związku z więcej niż jedną kradzieżą 3.
[brief] An in-depth review of these cases reveals that Defendant’s reliance is mistaken.  In *L.I.M.A. Partners v. [...]*, the Board of Adjustment of the [...] (1) “granted a use variance and site plan approval for the erection” of three dish antennas on one of the plaintiffs’ properties but denied the plaintiffs’ use of an additional portable dish antenna, and (2) denied the plaintiff’s application “for a use variance to permit the erection of dish antennas” on a second, different property, and the plaintiffs filed prerogative writs actions attacking both orders.