ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C. APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, [...]  [...]  Continental Plaza II  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, Fiberville Estates, LLC  On the Brief: [...], Esq.
[brief] Appellants filed their Complaint and an Order to Show Cause seeking a preliminary injunction (the “Preliminary Injunction Motion”) on December 14, 2022.  (Pa18-60.)¹  The trial court signed the Order to Show Cause on December 15, 2022.  (Id.)  On January 19, 2023, Appellees filed an opposition to the Preliminary Injunction Motion and also filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss the Complaint (the “Arbitration Motion”).  Appellants filed their reply papers in support of their Preliminary Injunction Motion on January 23, 2023.  On February 7, 2023, Appellants filed their opposition to the Arbitration Motion.  Appellees filed a reply in support of the Arbitration Motion on February 12, 2023. ²  The trial court held oral argument for both motions on September 29, 2023.  The trial court granted Appellants’ Preliminary Injunction Motion from the bench and reserved judgment on the Arbitration Motion.  (T3:2-5; 78:10-13.)  On October 23, 2023, the trial court issued a decision and order granting Appellees’ Arbitration Motion and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa1-7.)  Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on December 7, 2023.  (Pa8-17.)  ---  ¹  References to Appellants’ Appendix are labeled as “Pa”.  References to Respondents’ Appendix submitted herewith are labeled as “Da”.  ²  On September 25, 2023, Appellees submitted a letter to the trial court advising of a relevant post-submission opinion pertaining to the Preliminary Injunction Motion, Autobar Systems of New Jersey v. Berg Liquor Sys., LLC, et al., 23-cv-3790 (MAS) (JBD), 2023 WL 5311499 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2023).  (Da93-Da96.)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The certifications submitted by the [...] show that first, second, and third readings are “recorded in the Minutes of the General Assembly. ”  (Pa227-28 at ¶ 7.)  The certifications then provided the Minutes of the General Assembly.  The Minutes show that S.49 – the legislation at issue in this case – did not have the constitutionally required time period between second and third readings.  (Pa236-37.)  By the State’s own certification, S.49 was given all readings in the General Assembly and passed in the same day.
[brief] Plaintiffs failed to file and serve an Affidavit of Merit to substantiate their claims against [...] and [...] in the 2015 case, which led to their dismissal, with prejudice, on January 19, 2016.  Plaintiffs, in their 2020 Complaint, sought to pour old wine in new bottles, and attempted to make the same arguments before different courts in an attempt to obtain a different result.  At its core, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint in the 2020 Lawsuit asserted the same claims against [...] and [...] based on the same factual allegations and transactions as in the 2015 Lawsuit.  Therefore, it was proper for the trial court to hold that the 2020 Lawsuit was prohibited by the entire controversy doctrine.  Therefore, the trial court’s August 28, 2020 Order dismissing the Amended Complaint as to the [...] Defendants based on the entire controversy doctrine should be affirmed.
[brief] Appellant proposed not one, not two, but **three** different plans for loading and unloading.  Each of these proposals were rejected in turn.  At the July 6, 2023 hearing on the application, Appellant initially proposed that any loading and unloading occur via a driveway off [...] at the rear of a building adjacent to the subject property (Building 700 of the [...]).  (T1/31:19-34:8).  In response to questioning, however, Appellant acknowledged that it did not own or control this area and thus the proposed loading area could not be used for this purpose.  (T1/33:8-16; T1/90:13-91:22; T2/44:17-45:4).  Next, Appellant proposed that loading and unloading could be accomplished from a remote loading space along [...] by traversing a public sidewalk.  (T1/34:9-25).  In response, the Hearing Officer raised concerns regarding this operation and advised that loading and unloading had not been permitted from the public right-of-way in any other cannabis application.  (T1/34:19-25 (“You can’t just pull to the side of the street and unload cannabis”); T2/47:8-16).  Through counsel and expert testimony, [...] raised specific safety ---  3
[directive] ¿Entiende que, si el delito ocurrió el 26 de abril del 2005 o después de esa fecha, a consecuencia de [Sí/Yes] [No/No] su declaración de culpabilidad usted tendrá que pagar una multa obligatoria para el Fondo para el Tratamiento de Víctimas de Delitos Sexuales (S.C.V.T.F.), tal como se indica a continuación, por cada delito del cual usted se declaró culpable?  Las multas obligatorias son las siguientes: 1er (1) Un máximo de $2,000 por un delito de grado (2)
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 (a)  Avoidance of Interference with Ongoing Investigations or Proceedings  The Civilian Review Board must establish policies to avoid interference with ongoing investigations or proceedings, similar to the policies that an internal affairs function must adopt to avoid interference with ongoing criminal investigations or proceedings.  Specifically, the policy must make clear that the Board may not commence an investigation of a particular civilian complaint or incident until after any criminal and/or internal affairs investigations have concluded and any resulting discipline has been imposed.  This requirement applies regardless of whether the Civilian Review Board is granted authority to recommend discipline, or request reconsideration of any findings or disciplinary decisions, or is limited in its authority to auditing completed investigations.  This requirement also applies regardless of whether, as a general matter, the Civilian Review Board is granted access to redacted or unredacted internal affairs records.  After reviewing the relevant internal affairs records and conducting any other lawful investigation that the Civilian Review Board deems appropriate, the Board may, to the extent permitted by law, present its conclusions to the law enforcement executive or appropriate authority; request additional information or clarification regarding the findings or decisions made in the course of the internal affairs investigation; and/or request that the internal affairs investigation be re-opened.  Whether to re-open an internal affairs investigation remains within the discretion of the law enforcement executive and, with regard to criminal matters, the County Prosecutor’s Office.  The Civilian Review Board may not override any finding or decision made as part of the internal affairs process, impose discipline, require that another official impose discipline, or render any finding or decision that requires deference from any other official.  If a law enforcement agency declines to re-open an investigation at the request of the Civilian Review Board, the Board may issue a final public report regarding the complaint or incident after appropriately redacting the report in accordance with instructions from the law enforcement executive.  The personal identity of specific subject officers, complainants, or witnesses may not be disclosed to the public.  Under no circumstances may a Civilian Review Board immunize any person from prosecution or take any other action that would have the effect of conferring immunity on any person.  (b)
[brief] 51 State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469 (1997) ..................................................................  47 State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super 349 (App. Div. 2017), ..................................  55 State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2 (1990) .......................................................................  33 State v. McAllister, 211 N.J. Super. 355 (App. Div. 1986) ....................................  60 State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475 (2015) .............................................................. 32, 59 State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) ..................................................................  51 State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 141 (1993) ....................................................................  47 State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628 (1991) .................................................................... 38, 39, 40 State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004) ..................................................................  48 State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3 (1992) ...........................................................................  33 State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39 (2015) ..................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff, : APPELLATE DIVISION v. : DOCKET NO. [...] [...], : ON APPEAL FROM: Defendant. : Superior Court, Law Division, Ocean County : Docket No. below [...] : Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANT’S REPLY LETTER BRIEF To: Honorable Judges Superior Court, Appellate Division in care of [...], Clerk Hughes Justice Complex [...]
[brief] The [...] opened the case as a non-monetary claim and, according to regular case rules, appointed a single arbitrator (the “Arbitrator”).  (Da354)  From 2011 through 2015, Plaintiffs sought to oust [...] from management by confirming majority votes.  On October 6, 2015, the Arbitrator confirmed a vote to remove [...] as managing member and substituting Plaintiffs’ group.  The Chancery Court confirmed on January 28, 2016.  (Da1577)  On February 23, 2016, Plaintiffs sought and received a TRO enjoining [...] again certain actions related to company management.  (Da120)  On June 7, 2016, the Court made its injunction permanent.  (Da13)  The Court did not grant sanctions or award legal fees or costs, but reserved decision.  (Ibid.)  On June 15, 2016, Plaintiffs commenced what they called “Phase II” of their action against [...], filing an amended pleading in arbitration which sought more than $1,000,000 in damages for alleged acts of misconduct.
[brief] [T]here was absolutely no proof that a worn wheel existed in the escalator in question.  It would be sheer speculation for a jury to infer that a worn wheel in fact did exist and produced the ‘jerk and vibration of some sort,’ alleged by plaintiff to have caused her fall.  Further, there was no evidence that defendant’s inspections of the escalator…were either unreasonably infrequent or superficial.  Consequently, there was no indication whatever that a dangerous condition existed over a period of time sufficient to put defendant on notice.  Id. at 274-275.
[brief] Furthermore, the Board then goes on to expressly identify and recognize that the costs provided by developer – one of the few entities in the United States building such a floating project – are not the same as the model, and reflect actual costs and actual construction and not simply a hypothetical installation.  In response, the Board “believes these [costs] are not characteristic of floating solar projects. ”  Order, at 6.  (006a.)  The Board states this about the actual costs submitted for the actual construction of an actual floating solar project.  Perhaps the Board could have found these costs inflated or unjustified; the Board did not.
[brief] Unfortunately, the Trial Court did not heed this directive when reviewing the redevelopment designation at issue in this case.  The Trial Court inappropriately focused on the potential future impact of eminent domain on the property owner instead of the correct standard of review, which is whether there is substantial credible evidence on the record to conclude that the property satisfies one or more of the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5.  To reach its conclusion that the redevelopment designation had to be overturned, the Trial Court applied a tortuous and contorted reading of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5, both ignoring the plain language of the statute and rewriting the criterion to add requirements that do not exist.  In this case, the [...] (the “Borough”) found that property known as [...] on the official tax maps of the [...] (the “Property”) qualified as a condemnation area in need of redevelopment ("Condemnation Redevelopment Area").
[brief] AND PLEA OFFER MADE UNDER FALSE PREMISES.  The trial court manifestly erred as a matter of law in granting defendants motions to dismiss “'Manifest error' is one that `is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.'"  Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir. 2004)); See Black's Law Dictionary 563 (7th ed.1999).  Other authorities have defined manifest error as “an error that is obvious and indisputable, that warrants reversal of municipal appeal.  It is an indisputable error of judgment in complete disregard of the facts of the case, the applicable rule or law and credible evidence. ”
[brief] See 1T 95:21-96:15, Jan. 4, 2023 ([...] admitted that he and his brother [...] managed the [...].  See also 2T 37:1-16, Jan. 5, C.  ([...] admitted that he and [...] managed the finances of [...] and [...], the holding company of [...]).  The Trial Court recognized as much when it sought to clarify this exact point the participants at the meeting in 2019 when the plan to transfer the property was hatched:
[directive] Victim Rights and Services During Criminal Investigations  The provisions of Part One are applicable to all law enforcement agencies.  County Victim-Witness Coordinators shall be responsible for ensuring the implementation of victim-witness rights within their county pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 52:4B-45b.  I.  INFORMATION  A.  In-person death notification shall be made to next of kin.(1)  1.  Notification of the next of kin should occur as soon as possible after the death is discovered and the victim's identity is determined.  2.  To the extent possible, two officers should be used to effectuate the in-person notification, and one of them should be in uniform.  3.  If the above is not possible, a police officer should secure the accompaniment of a neighbor, relative or friend, clergy or the County Victim-Witness Coordinator, when possible, to effectuate the two-person notification.  4.  The identity of the deceased and/or the facts and circumstances concerning the death should be provided to the next of kin prior to release to the media.  5.  The County Prosecutor's Homicide or Major Crimes Unit should notify the County Victim-Witness Coordinator of all sudden deaths as soon as possible.  COMMENTARY
[brief] 8 R. 4:3-1-Divisions of Court; Commencement and Transfer of Actions ...............................................................  8 R. 4:3-4-Transfer and Removal of Actions ........................................................................................................... 8 R. 4:69 ........................................................................................................................................................................  12 Rule 1:13-4.  Transfer of Actions ............................................................................................................................  7  ## Eleventh Circuit  Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir.2010) ......................................................................................  4  ## Statutes 1964 Civil Rights Act ...............................................................................................................................................  5  42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ...............................................................................................................................................  5 App. of Burlington Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 99 N.J. 90, 98-99 (N.J. 1985) .............................................  12 Laws of 1971, chapter 200 .....................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 .......................................................................................................................................................  3, 12, 14 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) ..................................................................................................................................................  4 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f) ....................................................................................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f) ....................................................................................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 22A:4-17 ..................................................................................................................................................
[brief] *State v. Haskins*, 477 N.J. Super. 630, 647 (App. Div. 2024) ("Finally, as the judge made credibility findings and may be committed to her previous view of the evidence, we direct that a new judge preside over the suppression hearing on remand.  *State v. Jones*,... (requiring suppression hearing be assigned to new judge as motion judge weighed evidence and made credibility findings); see also *R.L. v. Voytac*,... (holding matter should be assigned to a different judge on remand because the court "previously made credibility findings").")  [Internal citations omitted by me]  Proof Of Service
[brief] The Trust’s April 23, 2019, request for an adjudicatory hearing regarding DEP’s decision to approve initial dock extension—the [...] 2017 Modification Permit—was about a year and ten months after DEP published its decision in the DEP Bulletin.  That decision was undoubtedly a final, appealable decision.  In re CAFRA Permit No. 87-0959-5, 152 N.J. 287, 301 (1997).  The permit decision itself contained “adequate factual and legal conclusions,” unmistakable notice of its finality, describes “the right to appeal within the agency and the time limits for filing such an appeal,” and ultimately authorizes [...] to commence the initial dock extension.  (Aa1-5).  In re CAFRA Permit No. 87-0959-5, 152 N.J. at 299 (citing DeNike v. Bd. Of Trs., Employees Ret. Sys., 34 N.J. 430, 435 (1961)).  The Trust was required to appeal that decision within forty-five days, R. 2:4-1(b).6  The Trust did not do so.  Therefore, the Trust unambiguously failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements --- 6  There is no evidence that the Trust even sought a 30-day extension establishing the outer limit of the time to appeal at 75 days after the decision.  R. 2:4-4(a).  The time to appeal was never tolled.  Furthermore, DEP determined that there is no evidence that the Trust sought a reconsideration of the permit under DEP’s CZM Rules.  Compare N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1 to -28.4 (requesting an adjudicatory hearing under the CZM Rules) with N.J.A.C. 7:7-19.2 (reconsidering application of a CZM Rule).  for an adjudicatory hearing, N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1, and the DEP was correct to deny the Trust’s hearing request.  (Aa136).7  For the foregoing reasons, DEP denied the Trust’s request for an adjudicatory hearing regarding the [...] Initial Extension WFD Permit as a matter of course, the time to appeal was not tolled, and the Trust’s request for a hearing regarding the 2017 Initial Dock Extension WFD Permit is barred from review in this appeal.
[brief] Order on Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Statement of Reasons on All Motions | Da_181 | | October 23, 2023  Order on Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint | Da_207 | | October 23, 2023  Order on Defendants [...] and [...]’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint | Da_208 | | November 16, 2023  Order (1) Amplifying 10/23/2023 Order and Statement of Reasons, and (2) Denying Motion on Short Notice for Stay of Discovery | Da_209 | | Unpublished Cases | Da_222 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Borough did not do so; and in fact, it expressly approved such maps.  (Da171 and Da173.)  The Borough’s attempt to now try to reject the dedication of the Roads after it already approved the subdivision maps (which showed the Roads as public streets) is the type of *ultra vires* action that N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j prohibits.  The Borough’s citations of N.J.S.A. 40:67-1 and 40:67-19 (both of which were not raised by the Borough in its argument at the trial court level\(^9\)) are equally unavailing.  N.J.S.A. 40:67-19 applies to property that has been dedicated to, but not accepted by, the municipality.  Here, the dedication of the Roads was already accepted by the Borough.  N.J.S.A. 40:67-1.b addresses, among other things, a municipality’s right to pass an ordinance vacating a public street.  It goes without saying, however, that this instant action has nothing to do with any ordinance by the Borough vacating a public street; rather, it has to do with the Borough’s acceptance of dedication of the Roads.  Accordingly, the Borough’s ability to pass an ordinance vacating a public street, and the significant body of case law applicable to such right (which requires a showing --- \(^9\)  Despite including such statutes in its table of authorities, they are not cited nor discussed anywhere in the substance of the Borough’s brief. that such vacation is in the public interest, among other things), are not relevant to the court’s determination of the Motion.  III.
[brief] The importance of the trial judge’s role of gate keeper was stressed, as an incorrect approach would yield skewed results:  [W]e are persuaded that appraising the value of defendant’s property as if a four-lot assemblage had already taken place as of the date of taking and then basing highest and best use on such an assemblage constituted a fundamentally untenable and legally unsupportable approach . . . it cannot be the basis for determining market value as if the assemblage had already taken place.  The distinction between enhancing market value and constituting the basis of market value is, in our view, critical, and it is that distinction that rendered defendant’s appraisal methodology legal defective.  Hilton, supra at 587 [emphasis added].  The Hilton Court likened the probable assemblage issue to that of a probable zoning change, stating, “we are persuaded that this issue is conceptually no different from the effect on market value of a prospective zoning change.  The two situations are virtually identical in their salient character, that is, the prospect of a change in the basic circumstances surrounding the property that, if occurs after the date of taking, would then permit a highest and best use different from and more profitable to the owner that the use existing or permissible as of the date of taking. ”  Hilton, supra at 549.  The Hilton court stated, “Thus, as we understand Caoili, the first step in the two-step process is for the judge to make an initial, gatekeeping determination of whether an assemblage was probable in the near future as measured from the date of taking based on the evidence before him related to market conditions and the circumstances particular to the property.
[brief] D.  [...]’s notes were material and their disclosure prior to trial is totally irrelevant  Respondent argues that [...]’s notes were not material to the outcome of the motion.  The materiality standard is specifically designed to encourage prosecutors to disclose information to the defense in close cases.  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995).  This case is not even remotely close.  Respondent was required to disclose [...]’s notes so long as there was a “reasonable probability” that the result would be different.