ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This matter involves a simple act of negligence by a construction site/grading contractor, [...], which neglect caused significant damages to Plaintiff Appellant, [...], an experienced strip mall developer.  [...] acquired a large tract of land which included an existing building ([...]), which was to be converted to retail stores.  A six unit retail strip mall was to be built on the tract as well, perpendicular to [...].  [...] contracted with [...] to do the grading of the tract in accordance with municipality approved plans.  [...] agreed to retain a surveyor at its expense to stake the property as needed.  Ultimately, [...] retained [...] for the staking.  After site plan approval by the town, a four-page approved site plan prepared by [...] was delivered to [...].  [...] gave the plan to [...] for staking.  Before any work was done, [...], the principal of [...], found an elevation error on the plan.  Kloss advised Dynamic who promptly revised the plan.  He also brought the error to the attention of [...], owner of [...].  The new grading plan was approved by the municipality.  The new revised plan was delivered directly to [...] by the engineer.  [...] was told by [...] to begin staking the project.  [...] never gave the revised plan, which now consisted of five pages, to the surveyor.  Before staking, the surveyor supplied a cut sheet to [...] showing the staking.  That document clearly gave the date of the plan as the original plan, not the revised one.  It also said [...] had worked with a 4-page plan, not 5-page plan.  The communication from [...] to [...] expressly required that [...] notify [...] prior to any construction “if the above referenced plans have been revised. ”  But [...] remained silent.  As a result, the property was staked 30” lower than required based upon an erroneous elevation and significant construction progressed.  The actual grade was now 30” below the interior floor of the existing Longo Building.  When discovered, the town was advised of the error and the municipality immediately stopped the project until the grade problem was resolved and approved by a new appeal to the town Board.  The simple act of negligence on the part of [...] in not supplying its surveyor with the proper plan, caused a one year shut down of the project while attempts were made to have a new site plan approved.  Suit was started against [...].
[brief] REPLYING TO POINT II, ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR OVER PROCEDURAL ISSUES WAS TOO HARSH A SANCTION. **  At T12-10 to T15-18, the motion judge expressly granted summary judgment, not because of the substantive merits, but instead because plaintiff did not respond to the cross-motion statement of facts or otherwise formally oppose defendants' application.  At Db21 to Db22, defendants urge this Court to affirm on that basis.  *R.* 4:46-2(b) provides in relevant part:  [A]ll material facts in the movant's statement which are sufficiently supported will be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion only, unless specifically disputed by citation conforming to the requirements of [*R.* 4:46-2(a)] demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact.  The Rule does not state that the entry of summary judgment is a sanction for noncompliance.  The motion judge was required to make findings on whether defendants' contentions were 'sufficiently supported' via [...]'s 'firm beliefs.'  And even if the cross-motion were sufficiently supported, that does not divest the plaintiff of its property as a matter of law.  Had the motion judge applied the 'hierarchy' law to the factual record -- instead of granting the cross-motion as a procedural penalty -- he would have recognized the problems with the defendants' proofs and the consequent need for a trial.  IV.  REPLYING TO POINT III, DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION WAS IMROPERLY GRANTED.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED  THE INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD IN EVALUATING THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE  [Pa28]  A.  A LTTEL EXEMPTION REQUIRES FINDINGS THAT A REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT WOULD NOT BE FINANCIALLY FEASIBLE WITHOUT IT [Pa28]  B.  THE TOWNSHIP’S FINDINGS ARE CONCLUSORY  [Pa58]  C.  A LTTEL EXEMPTION REQUIRES FINDINGS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING OTHERWISE [Pa26]  II.  PLAINTIFFS’ PROOFS SHOWED THE ORDINANCE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE  [Pa26]  III.  THE ORDINANCE AND FINANCIAL AGREEMENT WERE APPROVED FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE  [Pa26]  IV.  THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS DISCOVERY  [Pa60]  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[directive] No action is required by the County Prosecutor’s Office, absent evidence of abuse, neglect or some other violation of criminal statutes.  1.3.10  All press or other media inquiries pertaining to the handling of the Safe Haven infant shall be directed to the [...] at [...].  3In many circumstances, it may be a better practice to transport the infant in a vehicle other than a police vehicle.  For example, this would be true if the law enforcement agency does not have an infant car seat readily available or if the infant appears to require medical attention.  6
[brief] As held by the appellate panel in Scardigli v. Borough of Haddonfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 300 N.J. Super. 314 (App.Div. 1997):  “N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f) directs the planning board to ‘provide for the verbatim recording of the proceedings by either stenographer, mechanical or electronic means. ’ Without such a record, courts are unable to engage in judicial review and ordinarily should remand for further proceedings.  Carbone v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Weehawken, 175 N.J.Super. 584, 586 (Law Div.1980) (because the submitted meeting minutes were inadequate and no verbatim record was made, matter remanded to planning board for rehearing); Lawrence M. Krain Assoc. v. Mayor of Tp. of Maple Shade, 185 N.J. Super. 336, 341 (Law Div.1982) (without verbatim recording of board of adjustment meeting, court could not decide if denial of variance was arbitrary or capricious, and remanded for new hearing on that part of the application).
[brief] In a related litigation in Nevada, Plaintiffs’ affiliates were admonished by the court after they posted to a public website documents that had been designated “Attorneys Eyes Only” or “Confidential” under the applicable protective order.  Da124-25; Da143-52.  The harm arising from the public posting was immediate and significant: as one stark example, [...]’s stock price and bond rating dropped when the investors learned from the disseminated documents how the United Defendants’ and [...]’s business relationship might possibly evolve.  Da170-72.  Following the damage caused by that breach, a court in Arizona presiding over another related case granted defendants extra discovery protections, beyond the applicable Arizona protective order.  Da132-35; T13:8-12.
[brief] 200 N.J. at 498 (emphasizing that “the record is clear that none of the lawyers selected to represent the individual defendants had any current relationship with the company”).  Here, however, neither of the Firms comply with the conditions set forth in Grand Jury to establish a proper third-party payer arrangement.  Grand Jury makes clear that “[t]here cannot be any current attorney client relationship between the lawyer and the third-party payer,” based on the principle that legal representation should be free from external influences that could compromise the attorney’s loyalty and the quality of counsel.  Id. at 496.  That condition was explicitly intended to avoid RPC 1.7 conflicts.  Id. at 496-98.  Defendants’ arrangement, in which the superior defendants ([...] and [...]) with ostensibly greater resources finance the legal representation of subordinate codefendants, in the context of claims subject to the CNA, is precisely the kind of arrangement prohibited by the Court in Grand Jury.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Pursuant to N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted R. 2:2-3(a)(2), which contemplates that every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division.  Thus, the rule mandates the exclusive allocation to the Appellate Division of review of both final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).  The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).  The Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court can overturn an administrative agency's determinations or findings if there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
[directive] Sharing data API.  The State ALPR Coordinator shall implement a “Statewide API” (application Statewide program interface) that allows access to stored ALPR data across agencies, and specify the method by which all ALPRs used by New Jersey agencies must provide real-time access to ALPR data through the API.  Agencies may also share data regionally with other New Jersey agencies pursuant to the mandates of this Directive, and ALPR data collected by a private entity that has entered into an agreement with New Jersey law enforcement can be shared with New Jersey agencies.
[brief] “[w]hen employees are required to take any prescription medication that may diminish their alertness or impair their senses they shall **immediately** notify their immediate supervisor as to the medication, who shall then immediately communicate the information to their Commanding Officer.  This information shall be confidential. ”  [Da4]  (emphasis added).  The Medication Policy therefore requires immediate notification to a [...] employee’s immediate supervisor when the employee takes any medication with the potential to impair the employee, regardless of whether the medication itself actually does end up impairing the employee.
[brief] Although the City typically budgets for increases, several factors resulted in only $275,000 in reserves to fund any retro payments.  First, COVID-19 impacted the progress of the negotiations.  Additionally, COVID-19 created a revenue shortfall from the municipal court because for a period it was required to be closed, and many sessions had to be cancelled.  The City was prohibited by the State from making people appear in municipal court.  COVID-19 impacted the City’s collection of its property taxes because for a period of time because people were prohibited from working unless they were essential employees, and also day care facilities and schools were closed, so parents were required to remain home with their younger children.  The issue with the decrease in property tax collections got to the point that the City had to plan for layoffs of staff, and this was a real concern.  This is because the City is primarily dependent on the revenue it receives from property tax payments in order to operate.  “In sum, the confluence of lost municipal court revenues due to COVID-19, the delay in negotiations until 2022, the structural budgetary shortfall experienced in 2022-2023 by the City, the need for it to request an additional 10 million dollars from the [...], its moratorium on filling vacant positions (to raise 3.6 million dollars), and the City’s diversion of reserves to fund an originally proposed 2% across-the-board offer to the [...] units contributed to the significant limitations on fashioning an economic award.
[brief] ”  [...] claims that it is exempt from the settled law that requires insurers to provide notice of substantive coverage changes under every other type of insurance because it issued its otherwise run-of-the-mill liability policies in the context of a CCIP, --- \(^1\) Millbrook Tax Fund, Inc. v. P.L. Henry & Assoc., Inc., 344 N.J.Super. 49, 54 (App.Div.2001) (prohibiting policy change “without specifically informing” the insured of the change, “irrespective of the state or quality of [the insured’s] actual knowledge concerning” the provision at issue). which, it says, allowed it to delegate its responsibilities as a licensed New Jersey insurer to a construction company.  However, the complexity of [...]’s argument proves the necessity that it retain singular responsibility for conveying notice of coverage changes to those affected by them.  A.
[brief] **Lane Keeping Assist System (LKAS)**  Lane Keeping Assist System (LKAS) on the CR-V Touring trim provides a less stressful driving experience by reducing steering correction movements and driving effort on the highway.  LKAS uses a camera to read lane markings and uses Electric Power Steering to assist the driver in maintaining their position within the lane.  Designed for the U.S. road structure, the system uses a Monocular Camera mounted on the upper portion of the windshield to identify painted lanes, Botts’ Dots and Cat Eye markers at speeds between 45 mph and 90 mph.  When LKAS senses that the driver is drifting from the middle of a detected lane, the system generates corrective steering torque to assist the driver in maintaining lane position.  Pa345; Pa360-61.  As of 2016, [...] sold those vital safety features as standard only on the CR-V Touring model (its most expensive model).
[brief] The motion judge correctly denied the motion because of the absence of any fiduciary duty relationship between [...] and any of the owners of the Property.  Defendant-Appellant’s counterclaim was based on an allegation that Plaintiff-Respondent breached a fiduciary duty to the owners of the Property.  Defendant-Appellant’s motion was opposed by the Plaintiff-Respondent, who argued that he was not a “fiduciary. ”  “The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that one party places trust and confidence in another who is in a dominant or superior position. ”  F.G. v. MacDonnell, 150 N.J. 550, 563 (1997).  “A fiduciary relationship arises between two persons when one person is under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of another on matters within the scope of their relationship.  Id. at 563.  “The fiduciary’s obligations to the dependent party include a duty of loyalty and a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care.  Id. at 564.  Plaintiff-Respondent was appointed by the Trial Court for the sole purpose of selling the Property and the Trial Judge specifically found that there was no basis to impose a fiduciary duty between him and any of the Owners.  Tr. 34:6-17.  Therefore, the Appellate Division should affirm the Trial Court’s determination that Plaintiff-Respondent did not have a fiduciary obligation and to deny the Defendant-Appellant’s motion for leave to file a counterclaim.
[brief] The trial court found [...] failed to prove an ascertainable loss, with a majority of the Appellate Division affirming.  However, the Supreme Court found the Appellate Division’s suggestion that there was no ascertainable loss because plaintiff did not spend money to repair or finish the work “…runs contrary to the Act's clearly remedial purpose” and that the victim is not required to spend money for repairs before becoming entitled to press a claim.  *[...]*, 138 N.J. at 22 (citations omitted).
[brief] . . .  Defendant disclosed that Plaintiff had student-loan debt.  It is hard to imagine that this information is highly offensive to a reasonable person. ”) (internal citations omitted); *Quaglia v. [...] et al.*, No: [...], Dkt # 26 Order (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021)(rejecting the notion that a plaintiff’s status as a debtor was information that is “highly offensive. ”).  Plaintiff’s debt information is nothing like the “[s]exual relations” “family quarrels” or “unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses” the Restatement suggest would be private information subject to the tort and, the Restatement actually provides an illustration suggesting that disclosure of debt information would not be “highly offensive.
[brief] The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred, and shall have annexed thereto a copy of the judgment or order sought to be reconsidered and a copy of the court's corresponding written opinion, if any.  Although there is not an explicit rule for motions for reconsideration in criminal matters, R. 4:49-2's philosophy has been applied to a prosecutor's motion for reconsideration of a trial court order admitting a defendant to a pretrial intervention program over prosecutorial objection.
[brief] Instead, it continued the matter until a later date.  On the next proceeding on the record, which was a pretrial conference held on November 29, 2006, the trial court began the proceeding by stating, “[t]his was ... to be the final pretrial conference and plea cut off for all of [defendant's] various charges and Indictments,” and then asking defense counsel, “what do you and your client wish to do at this point because we have long since [passed] the time when you have to fish or cut bait. ”  In response, defense counsel advised the court:  “Your Honor, he's telling me he wishes to proceed to trial and proceed with any pretrial motions. ”  The court subsequently addressed defendant directly:  THE COURT: Okay.  Do you understand, [...], that after today, after you fill out a pretrial memo form, you can't later negotiate these matters?  THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  Thus, there is no evidence before us that the trial court rejected the plea bargain presented on October 4, 2006.  Rather, it appears defendant simply changed his mind about accepting that plea bargain.
[brief] See State v. O’Donnell, 192 N.J. Super. 128, 130 (App. Div. 1983).  Here, [...] and his fellow officers watched as defendant interacted with three separate individuals in Lakewood during their surveillance of his vehicle, each time engaging in what [...] testified was indicative of narcotics-based activity.  Under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.1, [...] could have approached defendant in any New Jersey municipality, including Lakewood, to investigate or arrest him.  Yet [...] testified that his priority was to operate within the four corners of the search warrant.  (1T8-12 to 18; 1T21-12).  He therefore established a plan to stop defendant’s vehicle when it was most likely to travel into Toms River.
[brief] If error has occurred in the trial court, but the appellant did not bring it to the attention of the trial judge, then the term used is "plain error."  If it was raised at trial, “harmful error” is used.  In either case, unless an error is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result," thereby meeting the definition of "plain" or "harmful" error, the Appellate Court will not reverse on the basis of that error.  *New Jersey Standards for Appellate Review*, [...], 2019.  In the instant matter, it is difficult to determine what Plaintiff/Appellant is arguing.
[directive] The sudden and unexpected death of a family member(1) is one of the most traumatic events that can affect an individual during a lifetime.  In a criminal justice system which has traditionally concerned itself primarily with preserving the rights of the suspect/accused, and which has only recently begun to rechannel its energies toward protecting the rights and the needs of crime victims and witnesses, the needs of surviving victims of sudden and unexpected death have in many cases been overlooked.  [...], mother of a murdered son, emphasized the plight of survivors when she stated:  "I can accept a great deal of ignorance and a great deal of lack of awareness - but to be told that I am not a real victim when I have lost something more precious to me than my own life I will not tolerate.  So if any of you feel you are not dealing with real victims when you deal with homicide survivors, just call me."  Assuring that the needs of survivors are identified and that every effort is made to meet these needs are indeed monumental tasks.  The need for a compassionate and dignified notification procedure, as well as access to information regarding the death have been consistently identified as basic requirements for alleviating the trauma which results from the sudden and unexpected death of a loved one.  The specific needs of survivors are unique and varied, and while many of them may not fall within the traditional purview of law enforcement responsibility, prosecutors, police officers, medical examiners, and others have a moral obligation to provide proper assistance to survivors whenever possible.  In his keynote address at the June, 1983 Annual Conference of the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, former Attorney General [...] identified the criminal justice system's lack of concern for surviving victims as a problem to be addressed and corrected.  The Attorney General emphasized that families of victims of homicide and sudden death are also victims who require services similar to those provided to victims of other crimes.  At the Conference, Attorney General Kimmelman stated, "Where sudden or suspicious deaths are involved, the surviving families are usually not included in our assistance efforts.  Once it has been determined that no crime exists, the law enforcement community normally has no further involvement in the matter."  The Attorney General suggested that uniform statewide procedures be developed for prosecutors, police officers, and medical examiners to ensure that survivors of homicide and sudden death are afforded proper assistance by law enforcement personnel.  As a result, a Working Group, composed of representatives from State, county and local law enforcement agencies, medical associations and concerned public and private organizations was impaneled to develop uniform statewide guidelines to ensure that survivors of homicide and sudden death are afforded proper assistance.  The types of sudden and unexpected death subject to these guidelines involve homicide, including manslaughter and death by auto, suicide, fatal accident, drowning, poisoning, and fire related deaths.
[brief] Indeed, the Appellate Division in County of Passaic recognized that Atalese is fully applicable to consumer contracts.  Notably, the defendant in County of Passaic was represented by [...] (Appellants’ transactional counsel and counsel herein), and their Respondent’s Brief filed in the Appellate Division in County of Passaic (Da 1421), acknowledged that Atalese applied to consumer transactions but that the County of Passaic was not a consumer and the transaction there was a commercial transaction.