ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] If the defendant is not charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12, the State must demonstrate a reasonable and well-grounded basis to warrant an inquiry by the court regarding: Rule 3:26-8(a-g) (1) the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing bail to the defendant, and the defendant’s interest in ensuring bail is not forfeited, or (2) whether the funds used to post the cash bail or secure the bail bond were acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.
[brief] This appeal centers on the February 28, 2023 Order issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County, in relation to Appellant, [...]’s Motion to Mold, or in the alternative, Motion for New Trial, or in the alternative, Motion for Remittitur in this matter.  Da23-24.  On February 28, 2023, the court at the trial level denied the Appellant’s Motion in full.  Appellant’s position is that all three requests for relief were meritorious and denied in error:  •  The February 28, 2023 Order from the Superior Court of New Jersey failed to apply the U.S. District Court Order of August 18, 2021 which limited Plaintiff’s recovery against Appellant to $200,000, the available liability insurance coverage limits.  •  The February 28, 2023 Order from the Superior Court of New Jersey failed to apply existing legal standards concerning the excessiveness of the verdict, warranting either a new trial or remittitur.  •  The February 28, 2023 Order from the Superior Court of New Jersey failed to apply existing legal standards, warranting a new trial, concerning Plaintiff’s counsel’s improperly prejudicial summation and improper mention of Appellant having fled the scene of the accident during direct examination of the Appellee.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] ”  (*State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).  First, the trial court’s finding of aggravating factor one did not constitute double-counting.  Aggravating factor one applies to offenses “committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. ”  (*N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1)*).  A trial court double-counts when it considers the “established elements of a crime for which a defendant is being sentenced . . . as aggravating circumstances in determining that sentence. ”  (*State v. Kromphold*, 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000)).  However, a court may apply aggravating factor one without double-counting by “referenc[ing] . . . the extraordinary brutality involved in an offense. ” (*Fuentes*, 217 N.J. at 74-75; see *State v. Morente-Dubon*, 474 N.J. Super. 197, 210 (App. Div. 2022)).  Defendant argues that aggravating factor one is not applicable because the cited circumstances of [...]’s death constituted the established elements of murder and were not “particularly unusual.
[brief] *Id.* at 588-89.  After entering, the officer saw “another couch, Timberland boots, a pair of Nike sneakers, a backpack, a television and video gaming system, and clothes draped on a couch and strewn on the floor along with a cigarette pack, a soda bottle, and mail [addressed to the defendant]. ”  *Id.* at 589.  The Court in *Randolph* held “that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the police did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the second-floor apartment was abandoned. ”  *Ibid.*  During the surveillance, the police observed an individual peering out the window of the second-floor apartment, indicating the individual was either a resident or had been invited onto the premises.  *Id.* at 588.  Further, the “locked outside door was evidence that the building's residents intended to keep the public from entering even the common areas without invitation. ”  *Ibid.*  The Court found:  Regardless of the disarray in the apartment and the fact that it was not fully furnished, there were clear signs that someone occupied it.
[brief] Dunes, among other benefits, provide natural buffers to water and waves and habitat for wildlife and the general prohibition of development in dunes is consistent with CAFRA.  Since dunes provide natural buffers to water and waves, the general prohibition of development in dunes is also reasonable given global warming and predicted resulting phenomena, including the rise in sea level.  See Massachusetts et al. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, U.S., 43 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed. 2d 248 (2007) 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451(l).
[brief] (30T50-4 to 5; 30T50-8 to 9).  Something was said but there was no audio to hear what was said.  (30T50-9 to 13).  The court commented that the video evidence showed [...] and defendant walking toward the [...] and both walking in an aggressive manner.  (30T50-15 to 17).  The video was “clear” that defendant reached into his jacket pocket with his right hand exactly as he had described at trial where he had the gun.  (30T50-18 to 21).  [...] then outlined how a different camera from inside the [...] looking outside showed [...] starting to run away and defendant taking aggressive steps toward him and shooting him in the back.  (30T50-22 to 30T51-7).  After shooting [...], defendant ran quickly through the parking lot with his friend [...] behind him.
[directive] (k)  To be advised of case progress and final disposition and to confer with the prosecutor’s representative so that the victim may be kept adequately informed; (m)  To submit a written statement, within a reasonable amount of time, about the impact of the crime to a representative of the prosecuting agency which shall be considered prior to the prosecutor’s final decision concerning whether formal criminal charges will be filed, whether the prosecutor will consent to a request by the defendant to enter a pre-trial program, and whether the prosecutor will make or agree to a negotiated plea; (p)  To be present at any judicial proceeding involving a crime or any juvenile proceeding involving a criminal offense, except as otherwise provided by Article I, paragraph 22 of the New Jersey Constitution; (q)
[brief] **Atlantic Fabrication v. ISM/Mester**, 2021 W.L. 5264364 (App. Div 2021)*6 unreported .... 41  **AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion**, 563 US 333 (2011) ........................................ 33  **Bayron-Paz v. Wells Fargo Bank**, 2023 W.L. 4399041 (SDNY 2023) ............... 26, 28  **Blocker v. Wells Fargo Bank**, 2011 W.L. 1230026 (D. Ore. 2011) .................. 25, 26  **Caruso v. Ravenwood**, 337 NJ Super 499 (App. Div. 2001) ......................... 35  **Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers**, 143 NJ 565 (1996) ............................ 43, 44  **Caspi v. Microsoft**, 323 NJ Super 118 (App. Div. 1999) ............................. 33  **City Check Cashing v. Manf. Hanover**, 166 NJ 49 (2001) ......................... 45, 46
[brief] [3T 10:1 to 11:6].  Unlike here, the “gross illegality” in Dover was not that the Dover Planning Board did not have authority to approve the application, but rather, that one of the board members had a conflict of interest.  114 N.J. Super. at 274, 276.  This Court nevertheless found that the citizens group had standing to challenge the action of the planning board.  Id. at 275-276.  The same conclusion must hold here for [...].
[brief] The Complaint goes on to state that “as a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness and/or recklessness of the defendant, [...] and [...], the aforementioned collision allegedly caused the wrongful death of [...]…”.  At the time of the accident, Mr.  [...] was not anywhere near the location where the incident took place.  [...] was in the company trailer.  (Pa1592) (T58:10-11)  The trailer was at mile marker 88 or 89.  (Pa1585)  (T30:17-18)  The accident took place at mile marker 113.8 (Pa1601)(T6:7-11) some 25 miles away.  There simply is no act of negligence as to [...] on the night in question to establish vicarious liability as to [...].
[brief] (Da1 to 2).  In a November 2018 letter to the Bergen County Court Clerk, defendant moved to dismiss the Bergen County indictment on the ground that his right to a speedy trial was violated.  (Da17 to 20).  In a January 11, 2019, letter to the Honorable [...], J.S.C., defendant filed a “formal motion” to dismiss the indictment.  (Da21 to 23).  On May 20, 2019, defendant appeared with counsel before the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  [...] noted that the trial was set for June but defendant had made a motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds.  (1T3-12 to 24).  Defense counsel argued that the preliminary police report was missing as were other items, including audio and video ³  Defendant pled guilty in federal court to possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon and to arson.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  [...] initiated the action on January 17, 2023, by filing her Class Action Complaint (Trans ID: [...]).  [...] amended her pleading as of right one day later, filing the Amended Class Action Complaint on January 18, 2023.¹ (Pa1).  On April 20, 2023, [...] moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(b) and R. 4:6-2(e).  (Pa36).  [...] opposed the Motion on May 16, 2023 ¹ Defendant [...] failed to appear of respond to the Amended Complaint.  [...] requested default on October 23, 2023 (Trans ID: [...]).  On June 9, 2023, the trial court entered an Order denying [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  (Pa44).  On September 1, 2023, [...] moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(a).  [...] opposed the Motion on September 28, 2023 (Trans ID: [...]).  On December 12, 2023, the Court entered an Order granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2(a).  [...] timely filed her Notice of Appeal on January 24, 2024; [...] filed her Amended Notice of Appeal on January 24, 2024.
[brief] See [...].  The Department’s only response was to note that it was reviewing the letter.  Id.  Because the Department has acted improperly and not allowed for notice and comment, it claims that these documents are not part of the record on this appeal.  But that misses the point; it is precisely because the Department acted improperly in issuing the Bulletin without developing a proper record that these letters could not have been sent before the Bulletin was issued.  That the Department is improperly overstepping its authority through the issuance of the Bulletin was confirmed by two recent and identical bills introduced in the Senate and Assembly.
[brief] ’”  Ibid. (quoting Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 249 (2005)).  An ascertainable loss can be shown through either an “out-of-pocket loss or . . . loss in value[.]” Id. at 556 (quoting Thiedemann, 183 N.J. at 248).  Appellants wrongly contend that they have demonstrated an out-of-pocket loss merely because they were originally billed for the Concessions, despite the undisputed fact that they are not currently responsible for the repayment of same.  To this end, Appellants narrowly focus on the “ascertainable” requirement and argue that, because they at one point owed a sum certain, they have demonstrated ascertainable loss.  (Db25).  An ascertainable loss does not require the injured party to pay money out.  But Appellants still need to show an actual loss (i.e., that they suffered a monetary harm) to satisfy the ascertainable loss requirement for a viable CFA claim.  Neither Cox nor any of the other cases relied on by Appellants eliminate or lessen that requirement.  In Robey, our Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement of the ascertainable loss requirement, the Court analyzed its prior precedent on how an ascertainable loss may be demonstrated.  256 N.J. at 556.  The Court explained that it had previously held that a consumer plaintiff misled by a seller concerning the effectiveness of a diet pill “pled an out-of-pocket ascertainable loss of the full purchase price of each bottle because the goods were allegedly ‘worthless’ for their advertised purpose. ”  Ibid.  (citing Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC, 203 N.J. 496 (2010)).  In contrast, the Supreme Court explained that it has “held that customers whose vehicles were repaired under warranty, at no cost to the customers, did not sustain an out-of-pocket loss[.]”
[directive] This Policy Statement resulted from discussions with representatives from [...] ([...]) that followed enactment of P.L. 1985, c. 97, which upgraded the crime of death by auto and established the new offense of assault by auto.  It was determined that there was a need for a statewide policy to ensure that next of kin of decedents in all motor vehicle crashes/accidents, and victims of motor vehicle crashes/accidents who incur serious bodily injury, are provided proper notification of any determination to seek or decline criminal prosecution.  The policy states that:  ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OPERATING WITHIN A COUNTY SHALL NOTIFY THE COUNTY PROSECUTOR OF THE NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE VICTIM'S NEXT OF KIN IN ALL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES/ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DEATH AND OF THE VICTIM IN ALL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES/ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SERIOUS BODILY INJURY.  THE COUNTY PROSECUTOR SHALL IMPLEMENT INTERNAL PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT THE VICTIM OR NEXT OF KIN IS NOTIFIED OF ANY DETERMINATION TO SEEK OR DECLINE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.  NOTIFICATION OF DEATH SUMMARY
[brief] If the Court agrees that these fundamental flaws existed with regard to the process leading to the default judgment, [...] should not be denied relief on the ground that she waited too long to seek it (as [...] also erroneously ruled in denying relief below).  A “reasonable time” to seek relief under R. 4:50-1, -2 “is determined based upon the totality of the circumstances,” Romero v. Gold Star Distribution, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 296 (App. Div. 2021).  In his decision below, [...] said that the parties were legally divorced when the Final Judgment of Divorce was entered on March 18, 2015.  But [...] acknowledged also that the parties continued living together for another two and one-half year -- until August 2017, and that neither spouse took steps to enforce any aspect of the purported divorce until the parties’ actually split in August 2017 (consistent with [...]’s affirmations that her husband had assured her that this was a divorce “on paper” only that had no real life impact upon their life and was for financial reasons only).
[directive] You have answered a series of questions about criminal trials and criminal charges.  Now we would like to learn a little bit about each of you.  Please tell us the type of work you do; whether you have ever done any type of work which is substantially different from what you do now; who else lives in your household and the type of work they do; whether you have any children living elsewhere and the type of work they do; which television shows you watch; any sources from which you learn the news, i.e. the newspapers you read or radio or TV news stations you listen to; if you have a bumper sticker that does not pertain to a political candidate, what does it say; what you do in your spare time and anything else you feel is important.  (NOTE: This question is intended to be an open-ended question which will allow and encourage the juror to speak in a narrative fashion, rather than answer the question in short phrases.  For that reason, it is suggested that the judge read the question in its entirety, rather than part by part.  If the juror omits a response to one or more sections, the judge should follow up by asking, in effect: “I notice you didn’t mention [specify].  Can you please tell us about that?”).  Standards for Jury Selection
[brief] C.  The Construction Requirements for the Circular Culvert Are Adequately Supported by the Record  Appellant frets over the issue of whether the culvert will be installed at least two feet below the invert of the ditch pursuant to N.J.A.C.  7:13-12.7(h)(1).  As set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(h)(1), the purpose of this condition is to create a “contiguous flow-path through the culvert that meets and matches the bottom inverts, cross-sections, and profile of the channel beyond the culvert[.]”  Importantly, this requirement assumes a “contiguous flow-path. ”  However, the record demonstrates that any existing, natural “flow-path” in the channel is limited, and continues to be adequately preserved by modifications made to the Application and accepted by the [...] after careful consideration.  As set forth above, the record supports that the ditch is a man-made agricultural ditch that is less than five (5) feet wide, with little or no flowing water.  Aa155, 158-159; Aa134; Aa166.  Moreover, the record also supports that the ditch is dominated by dense vegetation that offers little or no value to aquatic species, or fishery resources.  Aa155.  Similarly, the [...] concluded that no adverse impacts to fishery resources are expected from the development.  Aa035.  As a result of the revisions [...] made to its original plans, and as stated above, the [...] concluded that the “riparian zone disturbances have been significantly reduced[,]” and noted the proposed mitigation for the disturbance.  Aa031, Aa034.  The [...] concluded that [...] “demonstrated that compliance with all Federal, State, and local requirements governing roadways cannot be achieved, and that public safety cannot be adequately ensured, without exceeding the [permitted] limit. ”  Aa034.  Moreover, the [...] concluded that the Access Road will “cross a narrow portion of the stream corridor and will be aligned perpendicular to the orientation of the channel[,]” that “no other feasible opportunities for access to Route 1 exist that would avoid crossing a stream[,]” and “that all impacts have been minimized. ”  Aa034.  Therefore, [...]’s conclusions satisfy the analysis required in N.J.A.C. 7:27-12.7(h).
[brief] The general rule against nonparty claim preclusion is subject to exceptions where: (1) person agrees to be bound by determination of issues in action between others; (2) there is pre-existing substantive legal relationship between person to be bound and party to judgment, e.g. preceding/succeeding property owners, bailee/bailor, assignee/assignor; (3) nonparty was adequately represented by someone with same interests who was party, as in properly conducted class action or suit brought by trustee, guardian or other fiduciary; (4) nonparty assumed control over litigation; (5) nonparty serves as proxy for party; or (6) special statutory scheme expressly forecloses successive litigation by nonlitigants and is otherwise consistent with due process. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5.  *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008).
[directive] 1.2  New Jersey now requires police departments and agencies to employ BWCs in their daily law enforcement functions.  While N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 through -118.5 provides the basic framework for BWC use, this Policy seeks to provide additional guidance for the requirements that all departments must now satisfy.  Law enforcement agencies are nonetheless expressly authorized to impose additional requirements beyond—but not inconsistent with—those established in this Policy.  In this way, police agencies are afforded an opportunity to tailor their BWC policies and procedures to address local concerns and needs.  1.3  Although police executives are afforded some flexibility in developing departmental policies and practices that address local needs and community concerns, this Policy makes clear that all policies must limit the discretion of individual officers in the field.  The decision to activate a BWC must be based on objective criteria (e.g., the initiation of a specified type of police action, such as a consensual field inquiry, or the start of an officer’s duty shift).  Furthermore, in any circumstance where an officer is afforded discretion in deciding whether to de-activate a BWC, the reasons for exercising that discretion must be documented to permit supervisory review.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] The court next questioned juror number five.  (7T10-24 to 7T11-1).  The juror said she and juror number nine and one other juror, went at lunch to get “Bobo” tea.  (7T11-16 to 18).  They sat down on benches outside the courthouse and other jurors approached after which they talked.  (7T11-19 to 24; 7T11-25 to 7T12-1).  A man approached and started talking, but it had nothing to do with the case.  (7T12-4 to 5).  She recalled she talked about the different flavors of “Bobo” tea and how she worked at a “Bobo” store, which prompted the man to comment that was why she knew so much about the drink.  (7T12-11 to 12; 7T12-20 to 22).  She just thought the man was a “random dude. ” (7T13-1 to 2).  The juror recounted that one of the jurors who was present could not recall who the man was but asked her and juror number nine if they were sure once they realized the man was a witness; they said yes, and the juror said they should let the court know.  (7T13-22 to 25).  She assured the judge she could remain impartial.  (7T14-2 to 4).  The court next questioned juror number thirteen.
[brief] **”  Daniek v. Duda, No. 15-6032, 2016 WL 4435677, *1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108848 *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2016) (citing Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985)).  “[P]ro se LITIGANTS ARE **NOT** excused from **complying** with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing **service of process. **”  Anderson v. Mercer County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 117620, 2014 WL 2196935, at *4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71776, at *12 (D.N.J. May 27, 2014).  “Service of process is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. ”  Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Big Green Group, No. 19111500, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223742 at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2020).  Pursuant to Rule 4(h).
[directive] The disciplinary process should be thoroughly explained in the agency's rules and regulations, including a description of the officer's rights, the identity of the hearing officer, an outline of the hearing process and, if applicable, appeal procedures available to the officers.  2.2.8  An agency's rules and regulations, which include the description of the disciplinary process, shall be distributed to all employees.  The agency should document that this distribution has taken place.  In addition, a copy of the rules and regulations and a copy of the agency's internal affairs S.O.P. shall be made available to a representative of any employee collective bargaining unit.  2.3
[directive] consider deploying  The foregoing provide ample reason for police departments to benefits however, those rare  The practical utility of these recording devices, is not limited to BWCs. of misconduct.  BWC recordings when police employ force, or are accused by civilians occasions aural learned in the course of far more routinely to document visual and evidence will be used visual preserve accurate depictions conducting investigations.  Not only will BWC recordings police will paraphernalia, but also document physical evidence, such as weapons and illicit drugs and of must helping to establish the facts that be how physical evidence was found, thereby where and the physical suppression hearings.  BWCs also will record in Fourth Amendment presented injuries.  The audio preserving evidence of any apparent appearance of suspects and crime victims, statements, preserving recordings, meanwhile, will document witness and suspect portion of BWC showing whether officers had complied only the substantive content of those statements, but also not Miranda and other legal requirements.  with objectively, replace the need for accurately and they do not Although BWCs record events activated to record testimony.