ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa 5a.)  A September 8, 2015, letter from the United States Department of Agriculture was presented before the Court in an effort by the [...] to secure additional testing.  (Pa 5a.)  However, an oral complaint was filed on or shortly before September 29, 2015, related to the “millings area” with the [...], which served as the local agent for the [...].  (Da 29.)  A representative of the Health Department inspected the Property and made the determination that no further action was needed.  (Da 30.)  [...] objected to the [...] request for additional environmental testing as the Administrator of the Estate and was forced to file a lawsuit.  (Da 30.)  The Appellant countered by filing a Verified Complaint seeking the removal of [...] as the Administrator.  (Da 44.)  The [...] filed a counterclaim against both the Appellant and the Estate, alleging, among other things, wrongful eviction under the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61. 1 through 61.12.
[brief] In this case, there existed a perverse and distorted nexus between (1) [...]’s magical thinking on the issue of the alleged phantasmagorical amount of Haddad’s contrived damages claim; see (Pa227 – Pa228), (2) the twisted funhouse mirror reflection of [...]’s irate and fanciful sense of faux victimization, as darkly reflected in the stark contrast between Haddad’s extreme claims of loss and its non-existent evidence of any damages at all; (3) Haddad’s subsequent poor judgment and misbegotten decision to file legal action against [...]; and (4) after losing in the Law Division, Haddad’s mulish persistence in a strategy of extreme litigiousness through the pertinacious filing of this frivolous appeal.  III.
[brief] On the other hand, here, a plain reading of the PTA requires that [...] pay [...] 65% in EGPs on the projects transferred to [...].  Despite the PTA’s 65% requirement, [...] contends that “the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by ignoring the clear terms of the PTA and impos[ed] extra-contractual obligations on [...]. ”  App. Br. at 10, 18 (“the Arbitrator went far beyond the scope of the parties’ agreement”), 29 (“straying from the contract and using extraneous and inconsequential circumstances”).  As the Trial Court recognized, however, the Arbitrator did not disregard the PTA’s terms, but rather applied those plain terms (and hours of testimony about the parties’ intent) to the facts undergirding the parties’ performances under the PTA, and awarded [...] 65% EGPs on the projects that [...] was awarded and/or performed pursuant to the PTA.  See, e.g., Kearny PBA Local, 81 N.J. at 221 (“Any number of interpretative devices have been used to discover the parties’ intent.
[brief] ## Cases: - **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.**, 219 N.J. 430 (2014) .................................................................................. 6-7 - **Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi**, 184 N.J. 161 (2005) ..................................................................................  8 - **Curtis v. Cellco P’ship**, 413 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 2010) .........................................................  13 - **Harris v. Middlesex Cnty. Coll.**, 353 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 2002) .........................................................  4 - **Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Management, LLC**, 419 N.J. Super 596 (App. Div. 2011) ..........................................................  12 - **Matullo v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park**, 472 N.J. Super 220 (App. Div. 2022) ..........................................................  7 - **Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.**, 440 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 2015) .......................................................  8 - **Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.**, 62 N. J. 229 (1973)  ....................................................................................  7 - **North Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of North Haledon**, 425 N.J. Super 615 (App. Div. 2012)  .........................................................  9 - **Raspantini v. Arocho**, 364 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 2003)  .......................................................  12 - **Santiago v. New York & New Jersey Port Auth.**, 429 N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div. 2012)  .......................................................  5, 6 - **Sparroween, LLC v. Twp. of W. Caldwell**, 452 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 2017)  .......................................................  7 - **Tractenberg v. Township of West Orange**, 416 N.J. Super. 354 (App. Div. 2010)  .......................................................  7  ## Statutes & Other Authorities: - **N.J. R. App. P. 1:7-4** .............................................................................  13  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This appeal presents a simple question of contract interpretation, which the trial court clearly and correctly answered.  In the trial court’s amended order (the “Order”) granting [...]’s (“[...]”) motion to dismiss (the “Motion”) plaintiff-appellant [...]’s (“[...]”) complaint (the Complaint”), the Honorable [...] found that the written contract (the “Purchase Order”), agreed to by the parties, contained a clear and unambiguous mandatory dispute resolution provision, which required the parties to mediate any dispute before commencing a lawsuit.
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Finds No Basis to Disturb the Award and Properly Confirms the Award | 11 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 15 | | POINT ONE  NO BASIS IN LAW EXISTS TO DISTURB THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARD | 17 | | A.  [...] Cannot Reargue the Merits of the Arbitrator’s Award | 20 | | B.  The Arbitrator’s Well-Reasoned Award Considered Ample Evidence and Testimony Displaying the Parties’ Agreements | 23 | | C.  No Statutory Basis Permits a Court to Disturb the Award | 28 | | POINT
[brief] The action was not proceeded upon as if it had been commenced in the Law division in accords with Rule 1:13-4.  Here, R. 1:13-4(a) authorizes transfer from a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction to any court having such jurisdiction "in order to avoid dismissal of the action on jurisdictional grounds."  Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1.1 on R. 1:13-4(a); see also Brookview Gardens, Inc. v. Borough of Bergenfield, 4 N.J. Tax 625 (Tax 1982), aff'd, 6 N.J. Tax 253 (App. Div. 1983) (Court transferred complaint to county board since taxpayer was required under R. 8:2(c) to first exhaust his remedies before the board prior to seeking relief in the Tax Court).
[brief] Pa49-62.  [...] was to provide the structural support system on which the louver roof system would be placed.  Id.; Pa65.  [...] and [...] knew [...] intended to utilize this area for events.  1T 64:7-12; 142:20-23.  The parties discussed elimination of interior beams to provide for a more “open” layout for [...]’s specific purposes.  1T 64:1-6.  [...] hired a structural engineer to confirm proper structural support to withstand the load of the louver roof system.  1T 72:1-4.  However, it is not customary for the customer ([...]) to plan for water management or drainage and [...] reasonably relied on [...] and [...] to identify any issues with the functioning of the system and its ability to manage water.  1T 130-131.  Immediately following the installation of the system in the early summer of 2018, [...] began to experience issues with the system functioning and its ability to manage rainfall as represented in the marketing and planning phase.
[directive] Ocean County Barnegat Light 1501 (609) 207-6263  1st Wednesday 2nd, 3rd & 4th Barnegat Twp. 1533 (609) 698-0080  Wednesday Bay Head 1502 (732) 892-4737  1st Thursday October- June:1st Monday Beach Haven Boro 1503 (609) 492-0111  July-September: 1st & 3rd Monday Beachwood Boro 1504 732-286-6000 x120  2nd & 4th Tuesday Berkeley Twp. 1505 (732) 240-6661  1st, 2nd, 3rd  Monday Monday, Wednesday, Brick Twp. 1506 (732) 262-1226  Thursday (609) 296-7241  Eagleswood Twp. 1508 3rd Thursday x300  Harvey Cedars Boro 1509 (609) 494-9026  2nd  Monday Island Heights Boro 1510 (732) 270-6161  3rd Monday 2nd & 4th Tuesday; Jackson Twp. 1511 (732) 928-1205  Thursday (609) 693-1100  1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th  Lacey Twp. 1512 x2262  Tuesday 1st & 3rd in (732) 657-8121 x- Lakehurst Boro 1513  Manchester Municipal 3406 Court  Lakewood Twp. 1514 (732) 905-5988  Monday & Thursday 2nd Tuesday; July, August Lavallette Boro 1515 (732) 830-1911  September:4th Tuesday (609) 296-7241  Little Egg Harbor 1516 2nd & 3rd Thursday x.300  January-December: 1st Wednesday Long Beach Twp. 1517 (609) 361-6661  July-September: 3rd Wednesday (732) 657-8121 x- Manchester Twp. 1518 3rd Thursday 3406  Mantoloking Boro 1519 (732) 475-7398  3rd Thursday Ocean Gate 1521 (732) 269-3166  3rd  Wednesday Ocean Twp. 1520 (609) 693-3302  1st & 3rd Tuesday Pine Beach Boro 1522 (732) 349-6453  1st Wednesday (609) 758-2241 x- Plumsted 1523 2nd Wednesday 117  1st, 2nd, & 3rd  Point Pleasant Beach 1525 (732) 892-1118 x-5 Tuesday Point Pleasant Boro 1524 (732) 899-1636  1st & 3rd Monday Tuesdays (2 to 3 per Seaside Heights Boro 1526 (732) 830-2202 month)  Seaside Park Boro 1527 (732)  793-5116 x-6 1st & 3rd Thursday (609) 494-2171  Ship Bottom Boro 1528 2nd Monday x118 South Toms River 1529 (732) 349-1141 4th Wednesday Stafford Twp. 1530 (609) 597-1000 Every Wednesday 1st Wednesday Surf City Boro 1531 (609) 494-3984 Except November: 2nd Wednesday Mondays; 1st, 2nd, & Toms River Twp. 1507 732-797-3914  3rd Wednesday; 2nd Thursday; 1st Friday Tuckerton 1532 609-296-2036 2nd Thursday Passaic County 1st, 3rd and 5th (if Bloomingdale 1601 (973) 838 - 0127 applicable) Wednesday Clifton 1602 (973) 470 - 5860 Monday - Friday Haledon 1603 (973) 790 - 0500 Every Tuesday Hawthorne 1604 (973) 427 - 4767
[brief] Id. at 372-73 (brackets added); see also State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557, 563-66 (App. Div. 1989) (testimony Radziwil patronized same establishment “nearly every weekend,” and “invariably” became intoxicated shortly after he arrived, held admissible as relevant to show he became intoxicated there the night he was involved in nearby fatal accident, since it was weekend night, and defendant admitted stopping at establishment).  On the other hand, in Showalter v. Barilari, Inc., 312 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1998), this Court held that evidence of “various instances” two witnesses saw “underage friends being served alcoholic beverages” in a pub failed to qualify as habit evidence showing the pub “had a practice of serving alcohol to minors in circumstances in which it knew or should have known their underage status.
[brief] The basis for [...]’s damage claim is that the [...] “was to be developed and divided into multiple stores. ”  Pa30, Complaint, First Count, Para.  10.  The record demonstrates otherwise, and provides no support for that assertion.  10.  Recapping the multiple Site Plans:  | EXHIBIT | DATE | USE OF LONGO BUILDING | |---------|---------------|----------------------------------| | D | April 11, 2005| Furniture Store | | E | December 22, 2009 | [...] | | F | May 17, 2010 | [...] | | | Date | Description | |---|--------------------|------------------------| | G | August 17, 2010 | Wholesale | | H | November 18, 2010 | Wholesale | | I | March 10, 2011 | Wholesale | | J | April 7, 2011 | Wholesale | | K | May 24, 2011 | Wholesale | | L | September 6, 2013 | [...] |
[brief] .........................................................................................................................................................  15  | Cases | Page | |-------------------------------------------|------| | Besada v. Attara, | 11 | | 2016 WL 1387143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 8, 2016) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 3 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Clark v. Actavis Grp. hf, | 5 | | 567 F. Supp. 2d 711 (D.N.J. 2008) | | | In re Accutane Litig., | 14 | | 234 N.J. 340 (2018) | | | In re Hum. Tissue Prod. Liab. Litig., | 5 | | 488 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D.N.J. 2007) | | | In re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig., | 13 | | 644 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (S.D. Fla. 2022) | | | Lanzo v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., | 14 | | 467 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 2021) | | | Marci v. Ames McDonough Co., | 7 | | 211 N.J. Super. 636 (App. Div. 1986) | | | McMillan v. Johnson & Johnson, | 7-8 | | 2005 WL 20000203 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2005) | | | Moody v. Gen. Mills, Inc., | 15 | | 2006 WL 6872309 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2006) | | | Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, | 5 | | 570 U.S. 472 (2013)
[brief] (8T116-6 to 18).  [...] has spent numerous hours attending these courses and obtaining these certifications.  Moreover, he has testified approximately seven times as an expert in this field.  (8T136-17 to 25).  Before addressing the facts of this case, [...] explained generalized concepts that apply to this field.  Specifically, he explained that a cell phone tower is a structure that has antennas for cell phone service, that it can come in varying shapes and sizes, that the coverage from towers overlap, and that the coverage can be affected by a variety of things, including a customer’s distance from the tower, any obstructions that might be in the way, or just a particular way that the phone company structure or configured that network.  (8T118-20 to 119-17).  He also testified that historical cell site information usually cannot provide very specific location data indicating that a phone was at a particular address.  (8T120-11 to 16).  [...] then explained the PowerPoint slides that he created to assist the jurors in understanding the cell phone records that the cell phone providers produced.
[brief] Therefore, under Weinberg, supra, the abrogation of immunity and the application of the common law of negligence apply likewise to a public electric company such as [...].  As seen in plaintiff's initial brief, once a public utility company is stripped of the veneer of immunity, its actions must be scrutinized under the well established common law of negligence, including premises liability.  ¹ "DbP" refers to the opposition brief of [...]. law, which has as its central tenet that an owner of a property must remove dangerous condition of which it has actual or constructive notice; or that no notice is required when the property owner creates itself the dangerous condition.  Neither the defendants nor the Trial Court below sufficiently addressed the cogency of plaintiff’s arguments as centered on the common law of premises liability.  The Trial Court, in granting summary judgment to [...], stated that it was not prepared to extend Weinberg, supra, to an electric company.  As seen, there is no reason why that should not be the case.
[brief] All actions in the Superior Court except those encompassed by subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) herein shall be filed and heard in the Law Division, Civil Part or the Law Division, Special Civil Part.  23.  Rule 4:69-1 (Pa 195-197)  States:  "Actions in Superior Court, Law Division Review, hearing and relief heretofore available by prerogative writs and not available under R. 2:2-3 or R. 8:2 shall be afforded by an action in the Law Division, Civil Part, of the Superior Court.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ claim further rests on the argument that their own self-serving assumptions about a grantor’s intent in 1929 should take precedence over the express language used at that time or the host of more reasonable interpretations of what the original parties intended.  The motion record, viewed in the light most favorable to defendants, failed to establish an implied easement appurtenant by the requisite clear and convincing evidence.  Indeed, the record had substantial evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that no such easement was intended.  Nevertheless, swayed by the proximity of plaintiffs’ property to the ocean, the trial court incorrectly ruled that plaintiffs have an easement across [...]’s property and the protective dunes based on its own interpretation of what it thought would have been reasonable for the original seller and buyer to have assumed about beach access in 1929.  The trial court’s erroneous decision to grant plaintiffs an implied easement that burdens their property rights and threatens the protective integrity of the dunes should be reversed.
[brief] (1T 22-20 to 27-16).  [...] conducted the Alcotest on the defendant, which calculated a .07.  (1T 100-11 to 106-20).  Although the .07 calculation is not a per se DWI violation, the [...] testified that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated based on the totality of the circumstances and was thus guilty of DWI based on “observational” indicia of diminished driving ability.  (1T 107-14 to 107-19).  The defendant’s demeanor, performance of the field sobriety tests, and changing story regarding his alcohol consumption established beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s conviction for DWI.  The video evidence submitted corroborates all this testimony.  Simply put, these facts fully support both the municipal court and Law Division’s decision to find the defendant guilty of DWI.  Given all of the evidence presented, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated his vehicle while intoxicated in contravention of the DWI statute.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] confirmed that “pipelines and infrastructure that serve to deliver or provide gas and electricity to public systems are considered a public utility and, therefore, eligible for the exemption [#11]. ”  See 38 N.J. R. at 5011a, Response to Comment 296 (Dec. 4, 2006).  Just because New Jersey courts have not ruled on this issue does not mean that less deference should be accorded to [...]’s treatment of interstate natural gas pipeline companies as “public utilities”.  On the contrary, [...] is the expert administrative agency charged with enforcing the Highlands Act and its exemptions and, therefore, must be given substantial deference.
[brief] As the court held “[...] had a right to rely on the validity of the permit issued to them by the building inspector, who had the ostensible power to issue it.  Realistically, and in practical recognition of what an ordinary citizen would do in this circumstance, is that not so? ”  Id. at 163.  [...] and [...] had a similar right to rely upon the opinion of the [...] that the intended use of the [...] building as a takeout and delivery pizza parlor was a valid non-conforming use.  Whereas, moreover, the official in the Hill case had, in fact, erred, there is no evidence that the Oceanport official in this matter erred.  Just as [...] were entitled to rely upon the opinion given to them by the Eatontown official, [...] and Gambella had a right to rely upon the opinion of the Oceanport Zoning Official.  They both, furthermore, had a right to rely upon the determination of the [...] in 1984.  The Appellate Division in Hill analogized the matter before it to a municipal contract.
[directive] Grand Juror: Yes.  Judge: Do you agree to maintain your secrecy oath by following these additional requirements, if or including by telling the prosecutor immediately you believe someone can see hear the proceeding?  Grand Juror: Yes.  If Judge:  It is important that you can see and hear the proceedings.  you have a technical of or you problem, such as loss audio video, must tell the prosecutor as soon as possible.  you  Do understand?  Grand Juror: Yes.
[brief] ”).  Here, however, the specifications at issue were clear.  Section 102.07 of the Standard Specifications, entitled “Proposal Guaranty” requires bidders to provide a Proposal Bond in an amount not less than 10% of the bid, to cover as liquidated damages the bid spread between the proposal and the next lowest-ranked bidder if the selected contractor repudiates the award and the agency is required to then award to the next bidder (A1).  Once the contract is awarded and executed, under Sections 102.12 and 103.02 of the Standard Specifications, the Proposal Bond is returned by [...] and exchanged for the Contract Bond, which obligates the surety to cover 100% of the cost of the contractor’s work in the event of a default, non-performance or termination.  However, at the time of bid opening, public agencies like [...] also require bidders to provide evidence that if awarded the contract, the bidder’s surety will, in fact deliver the Contract Bond at the time of execution.  Thus, the Consent of Surety is an undertaking or representation of the surety that bridges the gap between the 10% Proposal Bond and delivery of the 100% Contract Bond.
[brief] 1.  N.J.S.A. 2C:23:4-16(d)(1)  3,4,6,12  2.  N.J.S.A. 2C:23:4-16(d)(3)  5,7,8,11,13,14  3.  R.3:23-8(a)  6,8,11  4.  R.7:6-2(c)  5.  R.7:7 6.  R.7:7-1 7.  R.7:8  8.  State v. Avena, 281 N.J. 327 (App. Div. 1995)  9.  State v. Cerefice, 335 N.J. Super 374 (App. Div. 2000)  10.  State v. Kashi, 180 N.J. 45 (2004)  11.  State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011)  TABLE OF DEFENDANT  APPELLEE’S APPENDIX
[brief] There is citation to cases in Appellant’s brief where it was clear and obvious that a party committed fraud or spoliation but none of those cases mirror what actually happened in our case.  The facts here show that: (1) there were aisle lights and step lights in auditorium 5 that provided visual cues for Plaintiff and Plaintiff and her son acknowledged the presence of those lights (Pa152:29-6 to 16, Pa152:31-4 to 14 and Pa152:31-18 to 25) and (Pa157:25-613); (2) the TMS logs would not contain information that was either important or necessary to Plaintiff’s case (Pa232); (3) the TMS logs were automatically deleted 8 days after this incident in accordance with custom and practice and before [...] wrote his letter to [...] in September 2016 (Da33 at ¶5 and Pa113); (4) neither the [...] Incident Report nor the Guest Incident Report completed by Plaintiff's son contained any reference to the cause of Plaintiff’s fall being lighting or trailers that did not play (Pa77, Pa93); and (5) Plaintiff's counsel obtained via subpoena from [...] the available logs, that would have provided any relevant information regarding the functioning of the technical equipment therefore Plaintiff had not been disadvantaged by not being provided with the TMS log which is the subject of this appeal (Pa231-232).
[brief] [...]  ACTING ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  VETERANS COURTHOUSE NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102 (973) 621-4700  appellate@njecpo.org  [...]  Attorney No. 279742018  Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor  Appellate Section Of Counsel and on the Brief  Table of Contents  Counter-Statement of Procedural History ..................................................  1  Counter-Statement of Facts ...........................................................................  9  Legal Argument ..............................................................................................  11  Point I  The sentencing court properly sentenced defendant and this Court should affirm defendant’s sentence .............................................................................
[brief] Forwarding  Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 23, 2023 ...............  157a  Defendant’s Proposed Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 23, 2023 ..................................................