ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Constitution of the State of New Jersey provides for “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized. ”  New Jersey Constitution, Article I, ¶ 7.  See also State of New Jersey v. Ingram, 474 N.J. Super. 522, 533 (App. Div. 2023).  The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contains a parallel provision and guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures … and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause. ”  U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV; Ingram, supra.  An arrest without probable cause is a constitutional violation actionable under §1983.
[brief] The TPA is a tenant protection program specifically designed to provide protection to residential tenants, particularly the aged and disabled and those of low and moderate income, from eviction resulting from condominium or cooperative conversion.  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.41.  Condominium conversion requires emptying the building of tenants and renovating the apartments to be sold off individually for a profit.  At the time of the inception of the TPA, the legislature cited the need to increase the supply of affordable housing in the state, and to protect residential tenants in recognition of the high costs, both financial and social, to the public of displacement from affordable housing and of homelessness.
[brief] Notably, only one letter of support, from [...]’s sister, is reflected in the Board’s Statement of Items Comprising the Record.  The other seven letters submitted on [...]’s behalf are not included and were ignored in the Board’s Final Decision.  (Pa19-24; Pa1-6).  Finally, the Board rejected [...]’s arguments that it failed to meet its burden that he presents a “substantial risk of reoffense,” based, in part, upon the risk assessments and clinical findings by [...] and the Board psychologist, who found that he presented a mere “low to moderate” risk for reoffending.  (Pa4).  According to the Board, it appropriately considered the doctors’ conclusions as an aggravating factor (as opposed to a mitigating factor) at the time of the hearing because, in its sole discretion, it deemed those assessments to confirm [...]’s “moderate” risk of reoffense.
[brief] THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT APPLIES TO THIS CASE  Under the definition provided by defendant (Db. 34), plaintiff is a victim of consumer fraud.  The assignment of all or part of an unliquidated personal injury claim is unlawful in New Jersey; defendant is not properly licensed to lend money to consumers in New Jersey, and because of that, defendant was not entitled to charge interest or fees to plaintiff; the interest charged on the loans exceeded the amount permitted by N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19.  Plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property consisting of: amounts paid to the defendant to satisfy loans, interest and fees totaling $2,943.92.  (Amounts paid to [...] less amount received by plaintiff).  DA 061; costs and fees incurred in defending against the improper lien imposed on settlement funds, $1,000.00.  AA373; the imposition of an improper lien on the settlement funds  AA021.  There is a causal relationship between plaintiff’s ascertainable loss and defendant’s unlawful conduct.  Defendant engaged in unlawful business practices that caused plaintiff to suffer an ascertainable loss of money or property (improper payments to defendant, improper liens on plaintiffs property, out of pocket losses to protect plaintiffs rights outside of the present litigation, imposing interest in excess of the usury limits).  Plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss due to defendant’s unlawful conduct when the contract was entered.  The existence of ascertainable loss resulting from a defendant's CFA violation should be determined on the basis of the plaintiffs' position following the defendant's unlawful commercial practice. in D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168 (2013).
[brief] Da84, Da190, Da292.  That contract may or may not have been a signed/executed copy.  The Defendant [...], regardless of having signed the contract in October of 2022, held back on proceeding with a closing in order to satisfy their obligation under the MFSA, which required that Plaintiff, [...] receive a 30 day period during which they might be able to consider and possibly exercise their Right of First Refusal.
[brief] In the instant appeal, the trial court’s finding that there existed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant was unsupported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.  First, the trial court cited the Walmart parking lot as “an area for CDS transactions” in support of the finding that the stop was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  Da17.  However, [...]’s testimony at the suppression hearing was insufficient to provide factual support for the trial court’s conclusion that the Walmart Parking lot was a high narcotics area.
[brief] [...] explained he sent that text less than a minute after bumping into [...] on his way home from the store, wherein [...] had invited [...] to meet up for a few drinks at [...] later in the week; [...] said he wanted to make sure that he would actually be allowed to return to [...].  (11T 30-8 to 31-23)  On February 1, 2016, around 3:24 a.m., [...] from [...] arrived at [...] to clean the draft beer lines.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment against defendant, [...], as the insurer for the Commercial General Liability Policy for the insured, [...], Plaintiff’s condominium association.  (Pa3, Pa4, Pa15).  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that as an owner of a condominium, [...] owes Plaintiff a duty to defend, indemnify, and reimburse Plaintiff, for allegations against Plaintiff related to Docket Number: [...] and in several [...] complaints.  (Pa3, Pa8, Pa15, Pa16).  Defendant, [...], filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  (Da01).  The trial court granted [...]’s motion on August 7, 2023, finding that Plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to support a claim upon which relief can be granted.  (Pa398, Pa412).  Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 28, 2023.  (Pa416).  The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration stating that “This was a motion to dismiss on the pleadings as I have iterated several times.  It was not expanded to a summary judgment motion, which it shouldn’t be.  But it goes to the pleadings and any documents referenced in the complaint. ”  (2T14-17; Pa520).  Plaintiff’s 10/30/23 Notice of Appeal states, “Appealing Orders dated 8-7-23 and 10-11-23 in favor of [...]. ” (Notice, ¶ 8).
[brief] On July 5, 2024, the trial court heard oral argument.  In its oral decision, the court noted the “special position” [...] now inhabits as a builder’s remedy plaintiff, where [...] voluntarily abandoned its DJ Action and has been judged to be significantly noncompliant (IT49:23).  The court noted that the Township could have chosen to be “in the driver’s seat,” but by withdrawing the DJ Action, [...] declared, “we’re going to step out of the driver’s seat.  We are not driving this bus.
[brief] Notwithstanding the clarity of the applicable statute, [...] argues that he should be permitted to file beyond the statutory deadline because the Board did not provide adequate notice of the Ricci Act.  (Pb9).  This argument fails because the Board provided adequate notice of the law.  The only express notice requirement contained in the Ricci Act provides that the Board must “notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.
[brief] Contrary to the claim in defendant’s brief that [...] had found “all statements made by” defendant to the police violated his Fifth Amendment rights, and were suppressed (Db33-34), the judge denied defendant’s request to suppress his recorded statements, entered into evidence as (“S-2”), that he made in his first interview.  (5T23-7 to 38-17; 6T21-16 to 23-21).  The judge reviewed the video recording of defendant’s statement and found that [...] read defendant his Miranda rights from a Miranda rights card (Da37-38) and that defendant “calmly” signed the back of this card.  (6T21-16 to 23-8).  Given the calm manner in which defendant’s recorded statement was handled, that defendant cooperated and volunteered incriminating information to [...], and that defendant had prior encounters with law enforcement, [...] properly found that defendant understood his rights and voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights in the first interview.
[brief] With respect to the encounter with the unidentified female in the sedan, Defendant identified her as “a friend”.  (sic)  He claimed he knew her because she often comes into his place of employment to speak with a co-worker.  And the reason that he approached her in the parking lot was to show off his new vehicle.  Despite the foregoing, Defendant testified he did not know “his friend’s” name.  Also noteworthy, “his friend” never exited her vehicle to check out the new Jeep Grand Cherokee Defendant was eager to show off.  Defendant made a similar claim with respect to his encounter with [...].  He identified [...] as someone he knew to be a “car guy. ”  Again, and despite Defendant’s alleged enthusiasm to show off his new Jeep to a “car guy,” [...] did not exit his vehicle to check out the Defendant’s new Jeep.  [Da10-11.]  Accordingly, the judge found, defendant’s version of events was not believable.  As [...] correctly determined, [...]’s observations, coupled with the inferences he could draw from them based on his training and experience, formed the reasonable suspicion that allowed [...] to stop defendant after he left [...] a short time later.  These findings were well-supported, based on the record, and should be afforded proper deference on appeal.
[brief] ”  *Id.*, at 349.  [...]’s training had not prepared him to break into burning buildings without specialized equipment, and this was not a situation in which [...] should have expected to find himself.  *Id.*, at 355.  None of the factors mentioned by the Court in *[...]* are present here.  Petitioner testified that it was among his job duties to unload equipment, lay and connect fire hoses, and perform preparatory operations for the delivery of water.  Petitioner responded to many fire calls in his seven-year career and had training and experience in handling these types of fires.  He had previous experience in “stretching” fire hoses to burning buildings and was trained to and had previously traversed uneven inclines when carrying fire hoses.  Petitioner did not claim that he lacked any necessary equipment, as was the case in *[...]*.
[brief] *State v. Miller*, 108 N.J. 112 (1987).  This was a sentence for the murders of two individuals.  The facts of this case are markedly different than those in *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) relied upon by the defendant.  This sentence does not shock the conscious, it was rational and proportional to the charges on which the defendant was convicted and the character of the defendant.  The Court did not abuse its discretion.
[brief] During the spring of 2008, Plaintiff [...] and [...] had several meetings.  4T, 144:12-19; 145:14-16.  [...] confirmed that since [...] was rezoned for 100% affordable housing, its development would be a 9% tax credit project.  4T, 146:4-13.  [...] commenced putting different models together for pursuing the 100% affordable housing project from the application process with [...], getting the funds awarded, assembling the 9% tax credits investors, and if necessary, finding an affordable housing developer partner.  4T, 146:21-147:10.  This is not “lone conversation”, nor is this a “makeweight, pipe dream”.  Shortly after his meetings with [...], Plaintiff [...] informed Defendant [...] of said meetings with [...].  Further, Plaintiff [...] told Defendant [...] that [...] was going to advise and assist Plaintiff [...] in obtaining the financing for the development of the affordable housing project on [...].  Defendant [...] deterred Plaintiff [...] by promising Plaintiff [...] multiple lucrative options pertaining to the affordable housing development which Defendant [...] never brought to fruition, yet memorialized same in a Memorandum dated July 30, 2008.  Relying on said misrepresentations, Plaintiff [...] did not continue with [...].  Just as [...]’s qualifications and testimony could not be refuted, [...]’s qualifications as damages expert was not and could not be challenged by opposing counsel.  Indeed, no rebuttal expert report was ever even provided by Defendants.  It was not the Trial Court’s role to act as a rebuttal expert.
[brief] Oral Arguments on August 2, 2024 and Court’s Request for Supplemental Briefs.  On July 2, 2024, slightly more than two months after entering his appearance, Respondents moved to disqualify [...] on July 2, 2024 under RPC 1.9 and RPC 1.10.  (102a).  The first oral arguments were conducted on August 2, 2024.  (1T).  At the conclusion of oral arguments, the Court requested supplemental briefs on a specific issue.  (1T45:21 to 1T47:1-7; See also, T21:18 to T22:1).  Specifically, during oral arguments, Respondents argued, *inter alia*, that because [...] had previously represented [...] and [...], they would know [...] attitude about and ability to litigate.  (1T13:23 to 1T14:1-12; 1T18:6 to 1T19:1-8; 1T30:2-16).  [...] would know if [...] was of the mind-set to settle and the reasons why.  The Court agreed with Respondents and stated that his litigation strategy, settlement posture, ability – financial ability to pay are all things recognized as matters to be considered when determining disqualification.  (1T30:7-11).  Appellants raised the argument that the afore-mentioned had not been argued in Respondents’ moving papers.  (1T30:20-25).  Thereafter, the Court afforded Appellants and Respondents the opportunity to serve supplemental briefs addressing those specific issues.  (1T45:21 to 1T47:1-7).
[brief] This means that even “[a] conveyance to the grantor of land subsequent to his deed to another with warranty inures to the benefit of his grantee. ”  Moore v. Rake, 26 N.J.L. 574, 575 (1857).  Even in those situations where a person sells land to which he/she is not entitled at the time the conveyance was made, “if [the deed] contain[s] a covenant of general warranty, [it] operates by way of estoppel, to convey any estate to which he at any time afterward becomes entitled, and which would otherwise descend to his heirs. ”  Id.  A deed with a covenant of general warranty also operates to convey accretions to land under water at the time of conveyance.  *Beach Realty Co. v. City of Wildwood*, 105 N.J.L. 317 (1929).  Finally, a covenant of warranty runs with the land.  See *Kuntzman v. Smith*, 77 N.J. Eq. 30 (1910); see also *Carter v. Denman's Ex'rs*, 23 N.J.L. 260 (1852); see also *Greenwood v. Robbins*, 108 N.J. Eq. 122 (Ch. 1931) (a covenant of warranty of title is a covenant in futuro, and runs with the land).  If [...] intended to convey all of its property rights to [...] and then provided [...] with a warranty deed, this further demonstrates that [...] intended to convey the [...] to [...].
[brief] (Pa 37-47).  The PQ ([...]) was in the "dwelling zone."  It did not permit a take-out Italian restaurant.  [...] sold the PQ to [...] (hereinafter referred to as "[...]") and his wife on August 5, 1944.  (Pa 55-59).  [...] ran a "general grocery store" on the PQ.  The date the use started is unknown.  He built the structure "on the corner" where the use in dispute is located.  The [...] food use could not have started before August 5, 1944 (Pa 66-68; Pa 69-75).  In 1969 the "grocery store use" ceased operating and the commercial building was used by [...], which bought, sold and repaired televisions, radios and stereos.  (Pa 66-68).  In 1984 [...] (hereinafter referred to as "[...]") applied to the [...] for an "interpretation" to be able to install a "pizza oven" and sell pizza to the public for take-out only.  It was called "[...]."  (Pa 69-75).  The Zoning Board file did not have proof of service or publication.  The attorney for the applicant no longer had her file.  No proof that notice of the hearing on this application was sent to property owners within two hundred feet of the PQ was produced at trial.  In addition, no proof that notice of the hearing was published in the [...] or anywhere else was produced at trial.  (Pa 79-86).  The Board adopted a Resolution on June 27, 1984.  It found as a fact that the PQ "has almost exclusively been used as a food store since 1932."  It concluded as a matter of law that "the use of the premises constitutes the pre-existing non-conforming use."  It also concluded as a matter of law that the "installation of a pizza oven and the sale of pizzas to the general public not for consumption on the premises does not constitute a change or expansion of said pre-existing non-conforming use."
[brief] The medical examiner explained the difference between an incised wound and a stab wound, with the former being caused by the cutting edge of a knife being dragged on the surface of the skin, creating a wound but not a stab wound, which is a penetrating wound.  (4T45-1 to 9).  Crisantos, 102 N.J. at 267-268; Pridgen, 245 N.J. Super. at 242-243.  That detailed evidence was lacking here.
[brief] “Defendant seems to imply that the buyer [...] is somehow related, or friendly, or associated with either [...] or [...] . . .  There is no relationship whatsoever, they are not related and they do not do business.  [...] and/or [...] have no knowledge of this buyer and have no association or business relations with it or its owner.  This transaction is the only transaction that has occurred with this arms-length buyer. ”  87a.  9.
[brief] ”); United States v. Express Scripts, Inc., 602 F. App’x 880, 881–82 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying pre-2010 federal FCA to action predating the amendments, which were “without retroactive effect”); United States v. Premier Educ. Grp., L.P., No. 11-3523 (RBK/AMD), 2016 WL 2747195, at *7 (D.N.J. May 11, 2016) (applying pre-amendment public disclosure bar to conduct occurring before amendment); In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 584, 595 (D.N.J. 2015) (“[W]ith regard to false claims which occurred prior to 2010, I find that the pre-amendment statute applies” concerning the public disclosure bar.).
[brief] The State fails to address why the Trial Court should not have to address mitigating factors in arriving at a sentencing decision.  The State contends that this Court should not disturb the trial court’s sentence because it fell within the appropriate range for the underlying offenses, and that the trial court was not required to find any mitigating factors.  This is untrue.  Sentencing courts “must identify any relevant…mitigating factors…that apply to the case. ”  *State v. Case*, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014)(emphasis added).  Further, mitigating factors “supported by credible evidence are required to be part of the deliberative process. ”  *Id.* (quotations omitted)(emphasis added).  Contrary to the State’s proposition, the sentencing court does not have discretion to simply decline to consider mitigating factors supported by the record.  *See, State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005)(holding that trial court judges may afford mitigating factors weight they deem appropriate, but that is a far cry from suggesting that a judge may simply decline to take into account a mitigating factor supported by the evidence).
[brief] ” (Pa000637).  In setting attorney’s fees at $30,000.00, the trial court made a finding that the 82.4 hour billed on the second summary judgment motion “was very similar to the first motion for summary judgment. ”  Based upon the trial court’s review of the other billing records in the amount of 74.6 hours for preparing and attending 3 depositions lasting approximately 14 hours, 35.3 hours for the motion for sanctions, and 6.3 hours for litigation reports to the carrier, almost all of which were attorney time, the “court sincerely question[ed] the reasonableness of the time expended and billed. ”  Thus, the trial court substantially and materially considered the billing records submitted before it and reduced the fee accordingly.  For the foregoing reasons, [...]’s cross-appeal should be denied.
[directive] (3)  Instrument operating properly  Since Romano was decided, our Courts have held that "State Police Coordinator certifications indicating that random sample ampoules from the same batch as that used in the defendants' [B]reathalzyer examination have been tested satisfy the spot checking requirement."  State v. Maure, 240 N.J. Super. at 283; State v. Ernst, 230 N.J. Super. 238, 243-244 (App. Div. 1989), certif. den. 117 N.J. 40 (1990).  Consequently, the pre-test and post-test certifications by the Coordinator (N.J.A.C. 13:51-3.4) provides "prima facie proof the ampoules used in testing [a defendant] were properly constituted," thereby assuring that the tests, if properly administered Attorney General Guideline: Page 8  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations were reliable.  State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. 1,13-14 (1996); State v. Cleverley, 348 N.J. Super. 455, 459 (App. Div. 2002).  See, State v. Maure, 240 N.J. Super. at 286; State v. Sandstrom, 277 N.J. Super. 354 (App. Div. 1994)  Proof of operability of a breath test instrument is considered sufficient upon presentation of documentary evidence (e.g., Breath Testing Instrument Inspection Certificates) prepared by a Breath Test Coordinator.  State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. at 13-14; State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. at 514- 517; State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. at 29-31; State v. Cleverley, 348 N.J. Super. at 459; State v. Maure, 240 N.J. Super. at 281, 286-289; State v. Ernst, 230 N.J. Super. at 243-244; State v. Ettore, 228 N.J. Super. 25, 32 (App. Div. 1988); State v, Dickens, 130 N.J. Super. 73, 79 (App. Div. 1974); State v. DeVito, 125 N.J. Super. 478, 479-480 (App. Div. 1973).  See also, State v. Samarel, 231 N.J. Super. 134, 141-142 (App. Div. 1989); State v. McGeary, 129 N.J. Super. 219, 224-228 (App. Div. 1974).  Likewise, the periodic inspections of the breath test instruments (N.J.A.C. 13:51-3.4), as reflected by the Breath Testing Instrument Inspection Certificates, have been found to establish prima facie proof that the breath test reagent ampoules solution(s) have been properly spot checked and randomly tested.
[brief] (emphasis added)  [...] confirms that in his reading of Panetta, it is his opinion that even if it is not referenced in a description, a Riparian Right as opposed to a Riparian Grant, would inure to the benefit of the upland property owner (1T82:11).  The upland owner would have reasonable access to utilize the waters on the bay way side of the mean high-water line.  He confirms that there is no way, unless it is expressly set forth, that a Riparian Grant would be deemed to be appurtenant to an upland property owner (1T82:20).  The map only shows one Riparian Grant which would be in Lot 3.01 (1T82:25).  There is no reference in the Deed from [...] to [...] as to either a Riparian Right or a Riparian Grant but, as a matter of law, a Riparian Right would in fact pass as an appurtenance whereas a Riparian Grant would not (1T83:1-9-87).