ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (8T7-17 to 9-17)  Because it was Defendant’s first DWI conviction, [...] sentenced him to 3 months’ ignition interlock, 12 hours IDRC, $257.00 fine, $33.00 costs, $225.00 DWI surcharge, $50.00 VCCB and $75.00 SNSF.  (8T10-18 to 10-24)  As to the charge of failure to observe a traffic signal, the Judge sentenced Defendant to $207.00 fine and $33.00 costs.  (8T10-8)  Defendant requested a stay pending appeal which was granted.
[brief] To the extent there could be any dispute about whether plaintiff’s claim constitutes “public injunctive relief,” the parties’ arbitration agreement requires that an arbitrator decide that dispute.  As the courts have repeatedly held, the parties’ incorporation of the [...] and [...] rules in their arbitration agreement constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of their intent to delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  See e.g. Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC v. N.J. Div. of Inv., 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, * 7 (3d Cir. December 22, 2023) (“the Transaction Agreement clearly and unmistakably specifies that the [...]’s [rules] apply, making Rule 7(a) readily accessible…[w]e therefore hold that the arbitration clause clearly and unmistakably delegates the 9“Injunctive relief” constitutes just one of the ten claims for relief pleaded in plaintiff’s complaint.  Ja27-28.  As such, even if plaintiff were found to be asserting a claim for “public injunctive relief” (which she is not), her other claims remain arbitrable, and this action would need to be stayed as to her purported claim for “public injunctive relief” pending the parties’ arbitration of her remaining claims.  See e.g. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mian, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83670, * 12 (D.N.J. May 8, 2024) (“[w]here, as here, the arbitrable claims predominate the non-arbitrable claims, courts tend to grant a stay of the non-arbitrable claims”) (citation omitted).
[brief] 2T, p. 22-24 13.  In conjunction with the above point, the Respondent Planning Board Members specifically authorized the Planning Board Attorney to forward the letter (memorializing the Board’s decision and findings associated therewith), to the Borough Clerk.  2T, p. 22-24 14.  The Planning Board Attorney prepared and sent a detailed letter to the Borough Clerk, advising that the Planning Board found that Amendment No. 2 was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.
[brief] (29T50-12 to 15).  In finding that aggravating factor nine applied, the judge found that defendant "has failed to reform after numerous interactions with law enforcement for serious crimes" and "that a lengthy term serves the dual purpose of specific and general deterrence in this case as to this defendant and as to society at large."  (29T50-17 to 51-4).  The judge noted that "defendant's modus operandi is to rob and impose violence [on] others to use the proceeds for his own personal desires" and that his "evil and selfish greed directly resulted in the brutal murder of a helpless victim, which this Court cannot and will not tolerate."  (29T51-7 to 15).  The judge found that "a significant term of imprisonment sufficiently would deter this defendant and others from violating the law."  (29T51-16 to 18).  The judge also applied aggravating factor twelve, finding that, "[b]ased upon defendant's previous work for the victim removing snow, his previous contact with her for the lengthy number of years he lived there across the street from the victim, when he was not in prison, . . . [defendant] knew exactly who his victim was and, in fact, she was selected because of her vulnerability."  (29T51-19 to 52-3).  Finally, the judge noted that "defendant offers nothing in support of a finding of any mitigating factors," and found that no mitigating factors applied.  (29T52-4 to 6).
[brief] The Petitioner argues that his conduct, as outlined by the Respondent in Point IV of her principal brief, does not constitute a reason for his disinheritance by the Decedent.  (Pb 5).  However, such argument is irrelevant.  Whether or not such conduct formed a basis for the Decedent to disinherit the Petitioner is a non-issue.  The issue before the Chancery Division was whether the Decedent’s Will was valid, and whether, as a result of alleged undue influence, there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the Decedent’s Will.  *In re Estate of Stockdale*, 196 N.J. at 302-03 (2008); *Haynes v. First National State Bank*, 87 N.J. 163, (1981); *In re Miles*, 176 N.J. 282 (2003).  The Petitioner next contends that the bad faith acts cited by the Respondent “lack foundation, had no basis in fact and rather, were nothing more than unverifiable gossip, far reaching assumptions, and distortions that should have been disregarded.
[directive] Defendant's Initials  Revize pa Sipleman Direktifnimewo 0 1-18 kite pwomilge le 31 desanm 2019, CN I 0079-Haitian Creole Inisyal Akize a page 6 of7/paj 6 nan 7 b.Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than [Y es/Wi] [No/Non] 23. recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  Eske w konprann ke si jij la ta deside enponze yon santans pli estrik ke sa komise gouvenman ante rekomande a, ou kab anile deklarasyon koupab ou an?  c.Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the [Yes/wi] [No/Non] judge's sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?  Eskew konprann ke si yo pemet ou anile deklarasyon koupab ou an poutet santans jij la pwononse ke kelkeswa a, sa w ta di pou kontinye ak deklarasyon koupab ou an yo pap kab sevi avel kont ou nan pwose a?  24.  Are you satisfied with the advice you have received from your lawyer?  [Yes/wi]  [No/Non]  Eske w satisfe avek konsey w resevwa nan men avoka w an?  Do you have any questions concerning this plea?  [Yes/Wi]  [No/Non]  25.  Eske w gen kek kesyon konsenan deklarasyon koupab sa a?  Defendant/Akize a  _______________________  _ Date/Oat ______ _  Defense  Attomey/Avoka LaDefans  ______________________________  _  Prosecutor/Komise Gouvenman  [ ]  This plea is the result of the judge's conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor's recommendation.  Accordingly, the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" has been completed.  Deklarasyon koupab sa a se rezilta endikasyon kondisyoneljij la de santans maksimom ta enpoze endepandaman de rekomandasyon Ii Komise Gouvenman  Pa konsekans, "Fom Siplemante pou Deklarasyon Koupab ki fet san Negosyasyon" konple. a.  Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Haitian Creole Defendant's Initials to Revize pa Sipleman Direktifnimewo 01-18 pwomilge le 31 desanm 2019, CN 10079-Haitian Creole Inisyal Akize a kite page 7 of7/paj 7 7 nan
[brief] Passion/provocation manslaughter has four elements: “(1) reasonable and adequate provocation; (2) no cooling-off time in the period between the provocation and the slaying; (3) a defendant who actually was impassioned by the provocation; (4) a defendant who did not cool off before the slaying. ”  *State v. Josephs*, 174 N.J. 44, 103 (2002).  “The first two elements are ‘objective; thus, if they are supported by the evidence, the trial court should instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter, leaving the determination of the remaining elements to the jury. ’”  *Galicia*, 210 N.J. at 380 (quoting *Josephs*, 174 N.J. at 103).
[brief] Defendant’s own engineer concluded that “The Transportation Impact Study was prepared [by [...]] in a professional manner following the generally accepted practice for traffic impact analyses. ”  Ja098.  Pursuant to the ITE, height does not influence trip generation projections for warehouse buildings.  The ITE does not differentiate between height for warehouses; therefore, neither do traffic engineers.  It is the ITE, not Mr. [...], who determined that height is irrelevant to the datasets it publishes; the dataset upon which developers, land use boards, courts, and the NJDOT rely.
[brief] [...] explicitly asks this Court, for example, to reevaluate the “Financial Reporting” evidence from the Arbitration to craft new damages figures.  See App. Br. at 40-41.  [...] also asks the Court to re-evaluate the award as to the Bayonne 3 project, which, in [...]’s view, is “not a debatable issue causing any re-evaluation of the evidence,” despite again pointing to the “Forecasts,” i.e., arbitral evidence that the Arbitrator already found to be “not [] persuasive. ”  App. Br. at 41; Da138.  Despite all that, [...] inconsistently concludes that the alleged errors are “mathematical and computational and does not require any evaluation of the evidence. ”  App. Br. at 35.  Such arguments are precluded from trial or appellate court review.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested the Court Order as follows:  1.  Reversing the Law Division’s April 28, 2023 Order denying plaintiffs’-appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and entering an Order declaring Sections 900B and 902A of the [...] Land Development Ordinance, as amended, are not authorized by the Municipal Land Use Law, are ultra vires and void.  2.  Reversing the Law Division’s April 28, 2023 Order denying plaintiffs’-appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and entering an order declaring the provisions of Section 906 of the [...] Land Development Ordinance authorizing a direct appeal of Historic Preservation Commission determinations to the Zoning Board of Adjustment are not authorized by the Municipal Land Use Law, are ultra vires and void.  3.  Reversing the Law Division’s June 10, 2023 Decision and Order declaring the Section 413.02B of the [...] Land Development Ordinance does not limit to one (1) the number of walkways permitted in the Historic Flared Open Space Area.  4.  Reversing the Law Division’s June 10, 2023 Decision and Order and entering an order declaring that the Design Criteria and Guidelines incorporated into the [...] Land Development Ordinance could be interpreted by the Historic Preservation Commission to limit concrete unit pavers to a specific size, shape or color.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[directive] For judicial forfeitures involving real property, is the it 1. responsibility of the seizing agency to know that the final order of forfeiture is filed with the appropriate county or municipal officials prior to issuing instructions for the disposition of the property.  The recording of the final order and the lifting of the lis of pendens is the responsibility of the Office the U . S . Directive No. Rev. October 14 1, 1995  Page of 4 1  Attorney.2  The seizing agency shall advise the [...] Seized Property Specialist/ Seized Property Custodian (SPC/SPS), in writing, of the date the documents were filed when disposition instructions are provided the SPC/SPS.  It is in the best interests of the Department ensure to that all final orders are timely filed or recorded.  In those judicial districts where the AUSA is unable timely to provide this function of his/her office, the Treasury law enforcement agency may file and record documents as required.  Seizing agency personnel shall ensure that a copy of the 2. judgement or order of forfeiture and disposition instructions are presented to the SPC/SPS for disposition within ten days of their learning that the final order (10) has been recorded with the appropriate county or municipal . off ice ( s ) is  In addition, if the forfeiture judicial forfeiture, a the seizing agency shall forward a copy of the final judgement or the final order of forfeiture to their agency headquarters office as required.
[brief] Da02591 – Da02603.  Defendant filed her notice of appeal on October 4, 2022.  Da02564 – Da02590.  The defendants subsequently filed separate amended notices of appeal on October 6, 2022.  Da02604 – Da02635.  Plaintiffs filed a respondent CIS and notice of cross-appeal on October 17, 2022.  Da02636 – Da02643.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] N.J.S.A. 46:10B-54.  As shown below, all of these provisions are implicated in this matter.  The FRFPA further provides that a violation of the statute results in a $10,000 fine for a first offense, and not more than $20,000 for a second and each subsequent offense.  N.J.S.A. 46:10B-67(a).  Additionally, a person found to have violated the Act is guilty of a crime of the third degree, i.e., a felony crime punishable by a period of between one and five years of incarceration.  N.J.S.A. 46:10B-67(b).  Moreover, if it is established that the person who violates the Act as part of a pattern of foreclosure rescue fraud, that person is guilty of a crime in the second degree.
[brief] The trial court in the instant matter failed to issue any curative instruction in response to the first two instances in which [...] “compromised this case[,]”\(^1\) by referencing [...]’s previous conviction for driving under the influence and alleged drug use.  Following --- \(^1\) 4T156:25. the third instance, in which the State’s witness indicated [...] was a member of the Pagan biker gang, the trial court issued the following instruction:  Folks, I will need you to completely disregard that last answer given by the witness in this case.  Okay?  Thank you.  4T161:14-16.  No further instruction was given by the trial court.  This constitutes the exact type of general, conclusory instruction cautioned against by this Court.  Herbert, 457 N.J.Super. at 506.  As such, the trial court’s instruction to generally disregard the witness’s last answer without any further explanation or clarification, and without any further discussion during the final jury charge, was largely insufficient to rectify the cumulative error.  Finally, the State cannot “confidently infer” that the jury failed to assign any weight to [...]’s comments regarding [...]’s affiliation with a known violent biker gang, prior conviction for driving under the influence, or alleged prior drug use based solely on the fact that the jury acquitted [...] of the witness tampering charge.  [...] presented an implausible story that [...] asked her to intimidate the witness in the other matter, despite the fact that no evidence of such plans existed beyond [...]’s testimony.  Defense counsel went to considerable lengths to refute each untrue aspect of [...]’s testimony, such as the timeline of the relationship, her drug use during the relationship, his financial situation at the time of the alleged bribe, and her erratic behavior following the breakup.  However, the Defense never denied that [...] and [...] had previously been involved in a romantic relationship, which would have afforded [...] some insight regarding [...]’s personal affiliations and history.  It is reasonable to believe that the jury viewed the fact that the Defense did not refute [...]’s affiliation with the Pagans or his prior conviction for driving under the influence as conceding that these facts were true.  Merely because the jury did not believe that [...] engaged in witness tampering does not conclusively mean that the jury did not credit any aspects of [...]’s testimony.
[brief] Because [...]’s cited documents have not been adopted by any New Jersey court, the Legislature, the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges, or any other legally authoritative body, this 2  This point responds to both Point I and Point II of the amicus brief.  3  As noted in Point I of this brief, [...] cites approximately twenty books and studies not cited in defendant’s principal brief.  None of those documents have been appended to her brief.  While abstracts were publicly available for most, the State was only able to locate through an independent search about half of the documents in full.  The State has thus been unable to review the methodologies used and conclusions reached in many of those studies in order to properly respond to their purported findings.  Court should instead find that fingerprint-analysis evidence remains reliable.
[directive] When a standardized “open” offer is tendered, the sentencing court is free in the exercise of its discretion to impose a State Prison sentence, or may instead impose a sentence of probation.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(2) authorizes a court to impose a county jail term of up to 364 days as a condition of probation.  This option is sometimes described as a “split sentence. ”  When a standardized “open” offer is tendered, the court would be authorized but not required pursuant to the plea agreement to impose a county jail term.  The decision whether to impose a county jail term as a condition of probation, and if so, the length of any such county jail term, is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, considering ordinary aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice.  When a prosecutor tenders a standardized “open” offer, the prosecutor shall be deemed to have reserved the right of allocution and remains free to argue for imposition of a State Prison term or for imposition of a particular county jail sentence with the understanding that when a standardized “open” offer is tendered, the prosecutor’s recommendation for a term of imprisonment or for a specified term in county jail as a condition of probation is not binding upon the sentencing court.
[brief] Therefore, the Court’s determination that [...]’s Hackensack Project claims were not ripe at the time of the PTA Arbitration is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and not subject to reconsideration.  Incredibly, [...] acknowledges that its arbitration with the owner necessarily concerned [...]’s claims for unpaid work on the Hackensack Project, which therefore must be separate from the issues litigated in the PTA Arbitration.  For example, in [...]’s Post-Hearing brief submitted in the PTA Arbitration [...] stated: [...] brought claims for non-payment (effectively, on behalf of [...]) against the owner in arbitration, the owner countersued for millions, and the panel recently (on September 15, 2023) awarded [...] the net total of $435,087.70.
[brief] (Aa268; Da22-23, at ¶¶32-38 (SMF 11)).  Plaintiff recounts that an appeal of his probation violation was successful before the Supreme Court of New Jersey on March 6, 2018 (Da24, at ¶40), but the only factual allegation that he offers in the Complaint to have occurred within two (2) years of the date on which his Complaint was filed, October 13, 2020, relates to conduct on the part of the trial court and [...] concerning the subsequent amendment of a Judgment of Conviction on October 17, 2018.
[brief] (7T127-2 to 17).  [...] stated that during this time, [...] “wasn’t saying anything, but he was just, he was visibly, like, freaking out, like just angry, breathing really heavy, just really, really high anxiety, flipping out, pretty much. ” (7T127-6 to 17).  Then, [...] started screaming that “he couldn’t take it anymore.  This is why his life is so messed up.  This is why he couldn’t get a job.  This is why everything was so messed up in his life . . . and he had to fight back. ” (7T128-11 to 16).  According to [...], [...] pulled up along the left side of [...]’s car, pulled out a gun, used his elbow to roll down the windows, placed the car in neutral, leaned across the car through the outside of the passenger window while continuing to drive down the highway, and fired a shot at [...]’s car.
[brief] Unbeknownst to [...], beginning no later than 2016, [...] began having discussions with [...] about the potential sale of his practice—including his portion of the enterprise at the shared location in Union Township.  (P283a, P779a).  [...]’ discussions with [...] continued “regarding the possible purchase of the assets of his practice Corey M. [...] MD PA at his two office locations: [...] and in [...] and [...] in [...]. ” (P283a).  In March 2019, [...]’ discussions with [...] culminated in a letter of intent (the “LOI”) sent from [...] to Dr. [...] with an offer to purchase his practice.  (P283a, P749a-P755a).  The LOI specifically stated that [...] would be provided with a credit for the establishment of an “Optical Start Up” in Union, despite the fact that there was an existing optical shop—Plaintiffs’—located next to, and integrated as a part of, the Union office.  (P755a).  In other words, [...]’s offer to purchase [...]’ practice specifically contemplated that a new optical shop would be opened in place of [...].  Summary Judgment was granted before Plaintiffs could explore this issue in discovery, but given the fact that talks between [...] and [...] had been proceeding for several years, the LOI specifically refers to [...]’s “due diligence,” and [...]’s offer was for millions of dollars, it is difficult to believe that [...] was not aware of the existence of Plaintiffs’ optical shop.
[brief] He noted, given the record: “If I were to grant summary judgment, two years from now you’d be back here again” because it was clear that “the Appellate Division is going to look at it and say, you mean, this trial judge didn’t think there was a genuine issue of material fact. ”  [1T51:2-6].  The motions were denied by way of an Order dated November 5, 2020.  [Pa21-24].  3.  The Motions For Reconsideration
[brief] (Da38)  There was nothing to remedy the errors of the PSA, because the original Chinese agreement was also declared invalid.  In order to avoid the logic fallacy, the Court thus reasoned that the Plaintiff’s negligence claim is not based on the validity of the Chinese agreements or on an alleged inability to enforce them following entry into the PSA, but is based on the Defendants’ negligence that includes “many other deviations” from the standard practice as Plaintiff’s expert testified.  Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff suffered no actual damage other than the legal fees spent to vacate the PSA and judgment of divorce; therefore, Defendants’ “many other deviations” from the standard practice during the representation, even if they were true, still caused no actual damage to Plaintiff.  See Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, 250 N.J.Super. 79, 593 A.2d 382 (CDAC 1991)  (Even if attorney was negligent and breached his duty in his representation, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they suffer a loss proximately caused by attorney’s negligence)\(^7\)
[brief] (Pa1).  Plaintiff also alleges that the Township promised her a new driveway and “brand-new” backyard, including a new pool and shrubbery.  (Pa5).  Plaintiff now claims negligence and breach of contract and seeks for the Township to be held liable to her for various unsupported damages including the value of her former “luxury” backyard, and the speculative depreciation of her property value.  (Pa19).  Plaintiff has failed to hire any experts to causally relate the water damage to some act or omission by the Township, or to support the alleged depreciation of her property value.  (Pa39).  She cannot produce any written agreement between the Township and Plaintiff for the work performed, much less her allegations that the Township promised her a new driveway, backyard, pool, or shrubbery.  (Pa39).  By way of her Amended Complaint, filed February 24, 2022, [...] brings three causes of action against the Township: (1) negligence; (2) breach of contract; and (3) misrepresentation.
[directive] State of New Jersey v. Certification  â  Defendant ã ã ã ã  I certify that on the day of , 200 , at a.m./p.m., I issued Complaint-Summons ä # to the above-named defendant for failing to possess and exhibit an insurance identification card in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 while operating a:  å å å Year: Make: Model: å å  License Plate #: VIN #: æ æ  Registered to: at: (Name Registered Owner) (Address & Town)  Immediately thereafter, I provided a Written Notice of Possible Impoundment to the defendant of his/her responsibility ç under N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a to provide proof of insurance to the , within 24 hours, a copy of which is attached.  (Name & Address of Law Enforcement Agency)  More than 24 hours have elapsed since I issues this Complaint-Summons to the defendant and the defendant has failed to provide an insurance identification card or other satisfactory proof of insurance at the law enforcement agency indicated above.  Therefore, I request that the Court issue a Warrant of Impoundment for this vehicle pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a.