ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court reasoned:  [[...]] states that there were complaints that the dogs barked, but claims he never heard a complaint that they [*5] growled.  However, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, the court must accord the plaintiffs all legitimate inferences that can be drawn from the evidence presented to the court in the within motion.  Therefore, the court will assume the landlords were advised of what the parents claim to have told the landlords.  First, the fact that the parents were afraid of the dogs and feared for their children's safety does not mean the dogs had a vicious propensity.  A dog does not acquire vicious propensities because a person is afraid of it.  Second, the fact that a dog is large does not mean it has a vicious propensity.  There is not any evidence to suggest that the larger the dog, the more vicious the dog will be, let alone that the landlord believed such notion.  Third, the fact that a dog roams about a piece of property is not an indicator that the dog has vicious tendencies at all.  Fourth, the mere fact that a dog has been heard to growl does not mean that such dog has a vicious propensity and is likely to attack a human being.  To simply advise the landlord that the dogs were growling does not impart to the landlords the requisite knowledge that the dogs had a vicious propensity.  II.
[brief] The December Terms also contain an express third-party beneficiary provision (see Da85) titled in bold and in an underlined font: Application to Third Parties.  This Arbitration Agreement shall be binding upon, and shall include any claims brought by or against any third parties, including but not limited to your spouses, heirs, third-party beneficiaries and assigns, where their underlying claims arise out of or relate to your use of the Services.  To the extent that any third-party beneficiary to this agreement brings claims against the Parties, those claims shall also be subject to this Arbitration Agreement.  The remaining sections of the December Terms concern the services offered by [...]; rules for the rider’s use of the services; the rider’s agreement to pay for services and fees; disclaimers, limitations of liability, and indemnification; and miscellaneous provisions governing choice of law, notice, and assignment of rights.
[directive] 1.  Officers must:  a.  When an officer knows or is made aware of any information of abuse or violence involving a fellow officer, the officer must report that knowledge or information to his or her supervisors.  b.  Cooperate with the investigation of a domestic violence case involving a law enforcement officer except in the case where the officer is the victim.  2.  Officers may be subject to criminal charges or discipline in accordance with Department procedure, if they:  a.  Interfere with domestic violence cases involving themselves or fellow officers.  (i.e., b.  Intimidate or coerce witnesses or victims surveillance, harassment, stalking, threatening, or falsely reporting).  3.  Officers who are involved in any domestic violence incident involving police response, regardless of jurisdiction, must -6- immediately notify the on-duty supervisor and provide notice of the court dates, times, appearances, and proceedings.  Failure to do so may result in Departmental discipline in accordance with Departmental Policy and Procedures.  4.  Officers who are the subject of any domestic violence restraining order or protective order proceeding, whether or not the order is issued and regardless of jurisdiction, must immediately notify their supervisor and provide a copy of the order, if issued.  Failure to do so may result in Departmental discipline in accordance with Departmental Policy and Procedures.  VIII.
[directive] This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Tout plent, petisyon ak lòt papye ki soumèt ba tribinal la fèt pou an angle.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sistèm Jidisyè  New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary
[brief] 4  The Zoning Board’s 2018 denial was particularly arbitrary, given that the majority of the Zoning Board had previously determined that the Regulator Facility was an inherently beneficial use, and after a member of the Zoning Board suggested that [...] consider using the [...] site instead of the Original Proposed Site.  50.  As a result, the Board should approve the construction and operation of the Regulator Station; determine that the construction and operation of the Regulator Station is necessary to maintain system integrity and reliability and necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public, and that no alternative site or sites are reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit; and issue an order that the zoning, site plan review and all other Municipal Land Use Ordinances or Regulations promulgated under the MLUL shall not apply to the Regulator Station.
[brief] Da_215.  The trial court held that [...]’s allegations of actual malice as to all defendants were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss since her Complaint alleged that *[...]* had published a “wholly unbelievable” story in “reliance on an informant of dubious veracity,” namely, the Student.  Da_215-17.  The trial court held that these same allegations about [...]’s state of mind—along with allegations that the [...] failed to investigate and had a motivation to garner “influence and donations” though their statements—were sufficient to plead actual malice as to the [...] as well.  Da_217-18.  The trial court reasoned that it was appropriate to impute [...]’s knowledge to the [...] in this manner, citing the inapposite legal principle that “one who republishes libelous matter is subject to liability as if he had published it originally, even though he attributes the libelous statements to the original publisher. ”  Da_218 (quoting *NuWave Inv. Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., Inc.*, 432 N.J. Super. 539, 563 (App. Div. 2013)).  Thus, the trial court’s November Order failed to remedy the fundamental error in its October Order.
[brief] II.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.  R. 4:46-2(c) compels summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment … as a matter of law. ”  After reviewing the evidence presented “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Brill vs. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 540, 523 (1995), courts must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).  “An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  “[F]acts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,” do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529 (quoting Judson vs. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  [...], not [...] and [...], was entitled to a grant of partial summary judgment because he established the amount due through April 19, 2020 of $100,965.77.  Moreover, he established that [...], [...] and [...] are liable under their guarantees for the obligation of the Tenant, jointly and severally.  [...], [...] and [...] failed to establish that their personal guarantees were invalid or were terminated.  III.
[brief] Cf. State v. Dolly, 255 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1991), involving a search warrant of a place, including a combined residence and business and all vehicles present, that was invalidated as overly broad.  The Fourth Amendment mandates that an application\textsuperscript{12} for issuance of a search warrant must contain sworn statements of fact establishing probable cause and describing with particularly the person to be seized and searched, so that a reviewing court may determine if the warrants' scope is properly limited.
[directive] 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.  그러므로, 이 문서에 소셜 시큐리티 번호, 운전면허증 번호, 차량 번호판 번호, 보험증권 번호, 사용 중인 금융계좌 번호, 또는 사용 중인 신용카드  번호 등 개인의 신원을 확인할 수 있는 정보를 기재하지 마십시오.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.
[brief] Even if the Solicitation did require archaeologist subcontractors to be registered under the PWCRA, which it did not, this requirement would be immaterial and waivable under the River Vale test.  The River Vale test is a “two-part test for determining whether a specific noncompliance constitutes a substantial and hence nonwaivable irregularity. ”  Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 315 (1994) (commonly referred to as the River Vale test, citing to River Vale Twp. v. R. J. Longo Const. Co., 127 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (L. Div. 1974)).  The River Vale test requires a determination of: first, whether the effect of a waiver would be to deprive the municipality of its assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to its specified requirements, and second, whether it is of such a nature that its waiver would adversely affect competitive bidding by placing a bidder in a position of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise undermining the necessary common standard of competition.  Meadowbrook Carting, 138 N.J. at 315.  With respect to the first part of the River Vale test, an archaeologist’s registration status under the PWCRA provides no assurance that they will perform their monitoring and reporting responsibilities in accordance with the specifications.  PWCRA-registration relates primarily to the payment of prevailing wages to “workmen” under the Prevailing Wage Act, none of which applies to the archaeology profession or scope of work.  Therefore, waiving the PWCRA-registration “requirement” (if there is one) does not deprive the [...] of any benefit or any assurance that the archaeologist will provide all of the services contemplated by the Contract.  Regarding the second part of the *River Vale* test, waiving a requirement that an archaeologist be registered under the PWCRA does not undermine the necessary standard of competition.  *See* Part I.C, *supra*.  To the contrary, enforcement of such a requirement would adversely affect competitive bidding by rewarding [...] for declining to seek clarification on its interpretation of the Solicitation and adding $2.9 million to the cost of the Project.  *See* Part I.C&D, *supra*.  **F.
[brief] POINT ONE:  The dispositive legal question in this appeal is s whether:  At the time [...]’s assignor -[...] cashed the [...]’ $12,000.00 check, did [...] either know, or did Checks 2 Cash have reason to know, that the [...]’ $12,00.00 was a paid check?  ([...] raised this threshold fact issue in her opinion at Pa 118.)  POINT TWO:  Given that the [...] do not claim there is any admissible proof in the record that shows either [...], or his assignor [...], had any knowledge of any defenses to the [...]’ repayment of their referenced dishonored check No. 152; it follows under the Appellate Division’s published holding in *[...] v. Cigna Insurance Co.*, 297 N.J. Super. 1997: that Motion [...], and [...], committed plain and reversible error when they failed to apprehend under the check drawer’s warranty in 12 N.J.S.A. 3 414: that [...] was entitled to recover as a matter of course from the [...], either as the individual, or as the joint drawers, of their underlying dishonored check No. 152.  (Motion Judge Suh raised this dispositive act issue of fact and law in her opinion at Pa 118.)  CONCLUSION:  For all the facts and legal arguments cited herein, the referenced Motion Judges, Suh and [...], committed plain and reversible error when they dismissed [...]’s complaint with prejudice.
[brief] In the case at bar, therefore, the Court is compelled to view the facts in light most favorable to plaintiffs.  It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that this Court must take as given that plaintiffs expected they would have UIM coverage under the provisions of the [...] policy in the circumstances giving rise to the accident of August 20, 2021.  The only question, therefore, is whether these expectations were reasonable.  The expectations of an insured are largely governed by the declarations page.  The importance of the declarations page of a policy has been the focus of significant emphasis by New Jersey courts when determining an insured’s reasonable expectations under the policy.  As stated by the court in Lehrhoff v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 271 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1994):  We are, therefore, convinced that it is the declaration page, the one page of the policy tailored to the particular insured and not merely boilerplate, which must be deemed to define coverage and the insured's expectation of coverage.  And we are also convinced that reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declaration page cannot be contradicted by the policy's boilerplate unless the declaration page itself clearly so warns the insured.  [Id. at 347.]
[brief] Generalized references to “pipe” were so pervasive and reflexive that they became [...]’s non-probative verbal tic and crutch.  It is further noteworthy that Haddad’s counsel on appeal, with precious little to work with, channels and is in lockstep solidarity with [...] on this issue of generalized references to mythically uniform and identifiable “pipe. ”  Haddad’s counsel, in the introductory paragraph of Haddad’s appeal brief, expediently eschews any references to any specific contractually covered order for specific types, gauges and quantities of Schedule 40 pipe, and dutifully parrots [...] in the opening paragraph of Haddad’s appeal brief, positing that the Subject Contract merely “related to the sale of pipe.
[brief] Defendants’ arguments are unpersuasive.  First, their argument that the claims are unrelated because the events took place at different times (Drb24) is both legally irrelevant\(^6\) and factually wrong because Defendants and [...] filed the criminal complaint at the same time they were denying Plaintiffs the right to use their easement.  Second, Defendants cite no authority for their argument that the relation-back doctrine would not apply because the proposed pleading contained a new defendant.  Rule 4:9-3 specifically allows relation-back even when the new pleading adds a new party if (1) the new claim arose from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, (2) the new party received notice of the action, albeit informal, and will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense, and (3) the party knew or should have known such an action would have been brought against him.  Here, [...] was well aware of the action, was deposed over two days, and any reasonable person in his position would have known that an action could be brought against him based on his personal conduct.  --- \(^6\)  See, e.g., Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc., 56 N.J. 326, 339-43 (1970) (applying relation-back doctrine even though the events giving rise to the proposed new claim took place at a different place and time).  III.
[brief] Prior to the date of trial, [...] met with [...] on behalf of [...] and entered into a Consent to Enter Judgment (Tenant to Stay in Premises) ("Consent Order") which allowed [...] to stay in the premises.  The Consent Order signed by [...] and [...] set forth the amount owed as of April 17, 2019 as $112,729.00.  The parties agreed that $5,300.00 would be paid immediately with $24,000.00 to be paid at $2,000.00 per month for one year beginning May 1, 2019.  On May 1, 2020 the balance of $83,429.00 would be due in a lump sum unless otherwise agreed.  It was also agreed that the subtenant would make payments directly to [...] of $4,000.00 per month which would be credited $2,000.00 to arrears and $2,000.00 to the current rent.  The Consent Order also provided that [...] agreed to pay $9,250.00 per month "as required by the rental agreement as well as all other payments required by the rental agreement".
[brief] The Amendments removed the 2% cap on increases in the local property tax levy beginning 2019-20.  In response, the City increased the local levy by 52% in two years, from $124.3 million in 2018-19 to $189 million in 2020-21.  (Pa1948.)  Even with these increases, [...]’s local levy remained below its LFS.  As of 2020-21, the District’s local levy was more than $332 million below its LFS.  (Pa1944.)  c.  **Local Payroll Tax**
[brief] SDb19.  Those cases, however, concern contractual arbitration—where parties choose the forum and the procedural rules, which ordinarily permit damages to any party and provide reasonable discovery—not involuntary ADR with rules designed to resolve tens of thousands of small disputes about medical necessity of treatment.  Even in the distinct context of contractual arbitration, an arbitration agreement that does not permit the effective vindication of statutory rights—because, for example, it precludes statutory claims or renders them impracticable—is unenforceable.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235-36 (2013).  The Legislature’s intent to ensure effective vindication of insurance-fraud claims to benefit the public could not be clearer.
[brief] State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 291 (1981).  The record here supports the conclusion that [...]'s failure to give a detailed identification charge is not "of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  See R. 2:10-2.  The jury was clearly instructed that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crimes for which he was indicted.  [...] specifically instructed the jury "to determine whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated a specific criminal statute."  (27T121-6 to 14).  [...]'s reasonable-doubt instruction referred several times to "defendant's guilt."  (27T108-11 to 22).  Further, when detailing the elements of each of the crimes charged against defendant, the judge repeatedly referred to the defendant as the person who allegedly committed each crime.  (27T121-21 to 175-19).  For example, the judge made clear to the jury that in order for defendant to be found guilty of murder, the State was required to prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: "one, that the defendant caused [Ms.] Viejo's death or serious bodily injury that then resulted in [Ms.] Viejo's death; and two, that the defendant did so purposely or knowingly."  (27T169-3 to 170-1).
[brief] As here, the plaintiff in *Leslie* asserted a failure-to-recall claim under New Jersey law prior to any governmental recall.  *Leslie* held that a manufacturer’s mere intention to recall a product at a future date was not enough to impose PLA liability:  Plaintiffs have cited no authority, and the Court’s research has yielded none, which requires manufacturers of legally distributed [products] to ensure instantaneous removal of their products from the shelves upon an announced intention to discontinue product sales...  Having failed to establish a duty, plaintiffs cannot state a cognizable claim for negligence.  *Id.* at 913.  The “negligent recall” claim in *Leslie* was thus dismissed.  *Id.*  In any event, *Finegold* itself defeats plaintiff’s position.  *First*, it held that the plaintiff’s “failure to recall claim[,]” even assuming a post-recall claim could otherwise exist, was “subsumed” by the PLA, since that “Act ‘is both expansive and inclusive, encompassing virtually all possible causes of action’” involving product liability.  *Id.* at *4* (quoting *Gupta v. Asha Enterprises, L.L.C.*, 422 N.J. Super. 136, 145 (App. Div. 2011)).  *Second*, *Finegold* found no authority “delineating a cause of action for failure to recall separate from the [PLA].”  2021 WL 2810091, at *4.  As such, dismissal here should be a *fortiori* from *Finegold*, because plaintiff’s liability theories (however denominated) demand a recall before any government action – and that theory has never been recognized in New Jersey, pre- or post-PLA.  The law is indisputable: (1) failure-to-recall claims have been rejected overwhelmingly nationwide; (2) New Jersey common law never allowed such a claim prior to the 1987 PLA; (3) the PLA was intended to limit product liability for manufacturers generally and FDA-compliant drugmakers specifically; and (4) failure-to-recall claims under the PLA have failed whenever they have demanded product recalls prior to either the government ordering, or the defendant undertaking, such an effort.
[brief] However, the Borough’s title expert, [...], Esq., testified at trial that it was the intent of the parties that the [...] Tract (which, as set forth above, consisted entirely at that time of underwater riparian lands) was also conveyed by [...] to [...]:  Q: … the deed from Mr. [...] to [...], did it not include a sentence which said, and it’s quoted on the last sentence of your second paragraph, including such riparian rights and other rights, privileges and franchises, in and to the lands lying under the water of the Raritan Bay in front of and adjoining the above described premises.  A: Yes.  I see that, and I think that’s a fair recital of the rights, privileges and duties and obligations of the parties.  Q: Right, and that is using the word riparian right, that language.  A: That’s correct.  Q: But your conclusion is what that language means is that Mr. [...] meant to convey the riparian grant to [...] Company.  A: Yes, including those privileges and franchises that he had, that he could send over.
[brief] Equitable Estoppel applies to the facts of this case.  In a number of cases addressing the application of equitable estoppel, the courts have held that employees should not be penalized in their employment for their employer’s mistakes, misrepresentations, or omissions.  See, Ridge Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Scarano, 238 N.J. Super. 149, 154 (App. Div. 1990).  ("[A] party asserting equitable estoppel\(^2\) may rely upon inaction, representation of the actor, misrepresentation, silence or omission."\(^3\) Id., quoting Fairken Assocs. v. Hutchin, 223 N.J. Super. 274, 280 (Law Div. 1987); See also, Sellers v. Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 399 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 2008).
[brief] CONCLUSION  The trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff had not established a *prima facie* case of negligence due to his failure to establish that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the defendants.  On the contrary, sufficient evidence was offered as to the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s accident from which a jury could logically conclude that it was more probable than not that his fall was caused by plywood strewn at the site contrary to construction safety standards.  The Order for summary judgment in favor of the defendants should be reversed and the matter remanded to the Law Division for trial.  Respectfully submitted, [...]