ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Especially, Rule 4:50-1 “is a carefully crafted vehicle intended to underscore the need for repose while achieving a just result.  It thus denominates with specificity the narrow band of triggering events that will warrant relief from judgment if justice is to be served. ”  *DEG, LLC. v. Township of Fairfield*, 198 N.J. 242, 261, 966 A.2d 1036 (2009).  alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; . . .  (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order. ”  *DEG, LLC. v. Township of Fairfield*, 198 N.J. 242, 260, 966 A.2d 1036 (2009).6  Applying Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f) to the facts in the instant case, the Court below should have vacated the Amended Final Judgment.  The original Final Judgment was not a consent judgment of the parties as in *DEG, LLC. v. Township of Fairfield*.
[brief] [FEDa11, FEDa109; FEDa130].  In addition to various findings of fact, the trial court made the following pertinent conclusions of law in granting the [...]’ motion for summary judgment:  •  In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), “All damages set forth by [Appellants] relate directly to their loss of the Solar Project.  The facts demonstrate that [Appellants] defaulted under their Lease for the subject Property, lost possessory interest in the Property upon which the Solar Project was to be built, and subsequently lost the Solar Rights for which they claim damages.  [Appellants’] assertions fail to connect any facts between [...] and [Appellants’] default under the Lease.  If [Appellants] had not defaulted under the Lease, they would have the Solar Rights and Solar Project, and the subject action would be moot. ”  [FEDa118]; •  In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), “At all times relevant to [Appellants’] allegations, [...] owned the Property.  [...] entered the Lease with [...], requiring [...] to make an annual payment to [...] on September 1 of each year.  On September 1, 2017, [...] failed to make that annual payment due under the Lease in the amount of $206,045.00.  On September 5, 2017, counsel for [...] sent notice of default to [...] stating that [...] was in default under the Lease, that it was required to make the payment within ten (10) days from the date of notice, and that if payment was not received [...] had the right to terminate the Lease.  Upon termination, [...] was required to surrender and return the Property.  [...] never made the payment under the Lease.  As a result, [...] terminated the Lease with [...] on October 17, 2017. ”  [FEDa118]; •
[brief] ” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1419 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]voidance of eye contact has been deemed an inappropriate factor to consider unless special circumstances make innocent avoidance of eye contact improbable. ”) (alteration and quotation omitted); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 707 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding the defendant-driver’s failure to look at a patrol car to be “fully consistent with cautious driving” that “in no way gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity either alone or in combination with the other circumstances surrounding the stop”).  In sum, the totality of the circumstances of the encounter must be considered in a very fact-sensitive analysis to determine whether officers objectively possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.
[brief] (Pa13; Pa281; Pa285; Pa287; Pa289; T7:19-T8:9).  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 provides: 34:15-8.  Election Surrender of Other Remedies.  Such agreement shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in this article and an acceptance of all the provisions of this article, and shall bind the employee and for compensation for the employee’s death shall bind the employee’s personal representatives, surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the employer, and those conducting the employer’s business during bankruptcy or insolvency.  If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.
[brief] ” (Da068).  In the instant matter, the suit limitation clause in the policy of insurance issued by Defendant-Respondent, [...], clearly and unambiguously states:  **LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US** ...  C.  Under Part C – Uninsured Motorists Coverage ...  2.  No action can be brought against **us** for any claim involving an **underinsured motor vehicle** unless the action is brought within: a. Four years from the date of the accident; or b.  One year from the date that the **covered person** is aware or should have been aware of a claim for which coverage would apply; **whichever is later. **  (See Pa102).  *(emphasis added* to “whichever is later” only).  Plaintiff does not contend that this provision is ambiguous.  Instead, Plaintiff argues that this provision should be re-written due to the conformity to law provision in the policy.  However, the New Jersey legislature and case law, on this issue, are clear and unambiguous.  The six-year statute of limitations set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applies only if the contract for the policy of insurance is silent as to the time within which to file an action.  Not only is the New Jersey law clear and unambiguous, the suit limitation clause is clear and unambiguous.  Thus, Plaintiff-Appellant failed to file her claim within the time limits set forth in her policy of insurance and was properly dismissed.
[brief] Plaintiff has been employed in the Recreation Department for the [...] since approximately 2002 to the present.  Plaintiff was the Municipal Alliance Grant Program coordinator from approximately 2004 to January 2018.  Pltf. T:112:16-21.  As a result of financial and budgetary concerns of the Recreation Department, in or about November 2017, then-Township Chief Financial Officer, [...], conducted an operational audit of the Recreation Department.  5T:43:24-25—44:1-25;45:1-25.  The audit included the financial records of the Municipal Alliance Grant Program, the funds of which were pooled together with the regular Recreation Department budget, even though the Grant funds emanating from State monies allocated and funneled through the County for the program.  5T:45:24-25—46:1-11.  The audit revealed that Plaintiff paid herself approximately seventy (70) percent of the grant funds—totaling approximately $23,000—for her role as the grant coordinator and consultant to the grant program.  5T:48:8-25.  In response to the audit results, on or about January 2, 2018, Defendant [...], acting within the scope of his duties as Business Administrator, stopped the grant stipends for Plaintiff and [...].  5T:73:23-25—74:1-25; 75:1-13.  On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to the Township, asserting allegations of hostile work environment based on religious discrimination.  DA071-DA073.  In February 2018, Defendant [...] was appointed to the position of Supervisor of the Recreation Department in the [...].  Pltf. T:133:12-25-134:1-25.  Also in February 2018, Plaintiff filed paperwork for her first FMLA leave.  DA161.  Plaintiff’s first FMLA leave lasted approximately twelve (12) weeks.  Pltf. T:133:12-25-134:1-25.  On November 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against the Township Defendants, alleging (1) religious discrimination, (2) hostile work environment based on religious discrimination and disability discrimination, and (3) a singular allegation that Defendant Winogracki retaliated against Plaintiff for being Jewish by reprimanding her for not working the beach concert and punishing her by ordering Plaintiff to clear the office closets.  DA001-DA006, ¶¶ 1-31.  After settlement failed and the Township Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied by the Honorable [...], P.J. Cv., this matter proceeded to trial before the Honorable [...].
[brief] ”  (Da 16)  In denying the motion to suppress, the court additionally noted that [...] “repeatedly discussed New Hampshire’s laws regarding insuring motor vehicles while pulled over in New Jersey” and “that she knew [...] for only a couple months. ”  (Da 13)  But [...] did not “repeatedly” invoke New Hampshire’s insurance laws.  She did so once, in direct response to [...]’s request for proof of insurance, and then answered his follow-up questions.  In any case, [...] was right.  “New Hampshire does not require that a motor vehicle be insured prior to the operation of the vehicle. ”  *State v. Keenan*, 199 A.3d 729, 733-34 (N.H. 2018); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 264:2, :3, :21 (requiring proof of financial responsibility after an accident or in other circumstances).  Although this information seemed to surprise [...], it provided no reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity was afoot.
[brief] Furthermore, as the State points out, appellate courts will consider issues not raised below that “substantially implicate public interest. ”  State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006).  Whether New Jersey law requires a motorist to signal a lane change, such that the failure to do so is grounds for being pulled over by police, is undoubtedly a question that substantially implicates public interest.
[brief] The State appeals following a grant of its motion for reconsideration; on reconsideration, the trial court corrected a minor factual error but upheld its earlier ruling to suppress statements made by Mr. [...] while in custody.  The Hon. [...], J.S.C., decided the underlying suppression motion regarding the admissibility of statements [...] made the day of his arrest near the scene of a fatal shooting.  Several of [...]’s early statements were found to be admissible because they were unprompted and spontaneous.  But [...] found constitutional violations arising from police conduct surrounding a later formal interview and a subsequent process in which the police recorded phone calls [...] made to his parents.  The Miranda violation requiring suppression of the formal interview is not contested by the State; rather, this appeal is limited to the phone call process which [...] found to constitute the functional equivalent of continued interrogation.  Because the record demonstrates that [...]’s factual findings were well-supported and his decision to suppress was well within the permissible bounds of discretion, this Court should affirm the portion of his order finding the phone call recordings to be inadmissible.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The State attempts to analogize this case to *State v. Macchia*, where the Supreme Court held that a specific unanimity instruction was not required, but that fact pattern is completely different.  253 N.J. 232 (2023).  (Sb 40)  In *Macchia*, the defendant fatally shot a single victim, and his argument at trial was that he acted in self-defense.  *Id.* at 239.  The jury rejected his self-defense theory, implicitly concluding that the State met its burden to prove that his use of lethal force was unjustified for one of three reasons outlined by statute.  *Ibid.*  See N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4b(2).  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury that “it needed to agree unanimously on which one or more of the three reasons led it to reject his claim of self-defense. ”  *Macchia*, 253 N.J. at 239.  The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, distinguishing *Gentry* on the ground that the State “did not introduce evidence that defendant committed different acts against different victims. ”  *Id.* at 260.  As in *Gentry*, and unlike in *Macchia*, this case did involve multiple victims and different acts committed against them.  Consequently, the jury needed to be told that it had to agree on the identity of the first-degree robbery victim.
[brief] See Da44-45, ¶ 2 & ¶ 4; 1T12:15-15:8 (conceding that [...] contract “doesn’t specifically contain that bright line language of Azurak”).  That ruling was reversible error because the Supreme Court and this Court have held that multiple conflicting indemnity provisions that fail to express, in unequivocal terms, an intent to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence renders that portion of the contract unenforceable.  Mantilla, 167 N.J. at 266-68, 269-70; Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 48, 57-58.  Further, the trial court’s ruling was an impermissible re-writing of the indemnity provisions in favor of [...], the party that drafted the contract and the party that sought indemnity for its own negligence, mandating reversal.
[brief] (Plaintiff Dep. 22:5-22, 828a).  When he was suspended, Defendants required Plaintiff to surrender his Police Captain’s badge and identification, firearm, and uniforms.  (Id. at 70:10-22, 840a).  Then-Mayor [...] confirms this, and that Plaintiff was prohibited from entering police headquarters.  (Deluca Dep. 122:9-17, 697a).  [...] also confirms that Plaintiff was not granted a hearing or opportunity to be heard, nor did Defendants conduct any investigation.
[brief] [...]:  My man, you gotta understand something.  I, I, I hope you understand, but at this point you probably -- your safest place is right now with me.  [...]: Why is that?  [...]: So if I know it’s you, eventually they gonna find out it’s you.  . . .  [...]:  (Unintelligible)  five children, five beautiful kids and you made a mistake.  You made a mistake that night.  But now it’s time to own up to it and accept it.  It’s what it is.  You had no choice.  I get it.  You had to do it.  They put you on blast.  They put they gave you -- no, I know.  That was it.  That was your only out.  You wanna die?  You want [to] go on the streets and die?  [1T 84-5 to 19 (emphasis added). ]  Weathersbee claimed that he was “not worried,” but [...] later added, “Hate for you to walk out of here and have something happen to you,” and “You may not be [worried] but I am. ”  (1T 84-20 to 92-19)  At the Miranda hearing, Nelson disclaimed the label “ultimatum” but admitted that he stated only “two possibilities”: “stay safe in the interview room with [the police]” or “go out on the street and possibly die.
[directive] IV.  Seizure of Weapons.  A.  Seizure of a Weapon for Safekeeping.  A police officer who has probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed may:  1.  Question all persons present to determine whether there are weapons, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1r, on the premises.  2.  If an officer sees or learns that a weapon is present within the premises of a domestic violence incident and reasonably believes that the weapon would expose the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury, the officer should attempt to gain possession of the weapon.  3.  If the weapon is in plain view, the officer should seize the weapon.  4.  If the weapon is not in plain view but is located within the premises jointly possessed by both the domestic violence assailant and the domestic violence victim, the officer should obtain the consent, preferably in writing, of the domestic violence victim to search for and to seize the weapon.  5.  If the weapon is not located within the premises jointly possessed by the domestic violence victim and assailant but is located upon other premises, the officer should attempt to obtain possession of the weapon from the possessor of the weapon, either the domestic violence assailant or a third party, by a voluntary surrender of the weapon.  6.  If the domestic violence assailant or the possessor of the weapon refuses to surrender the weapon or to allow the officer to enter the premises to search for the named weapon, the officer should obtain a Domestic Violence Warrant for the Search and Seizure of Weapons.  [See Appendix 13]
[brief] "If a defendant, as here, does not object or otherwise preserve an issue for appeal at the trial court level," an appellate court "review[s] the issue for plain error."  State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (citing R. 2:10-2).  "Under that standard, an unchallenged error constitutes plain error if it was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'"  State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266, 287 (2022) (quoting R. 2:10-2).  "Such an 'error will be disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised whether the jury came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached.'"  State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612, 633 (2022) (quoting State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021)).  Our Supreme Court has made clear that "[p]lain error is a high bar," and has further "cautioned that 'rerun[ning] a trial when the error could easily have been cured on request[] would reward the litigant who suffers an error for tactical advantage either in the trial or on appeal.'"  Singh, 245 N.J. at 13 (alterations in original) (quoting Santamaria, 236 N.J. at 404-05).  "To determine whether an alleged error rises to the level of plain error, it 'must be evaluated in light of the overall strength of the State's case.'"  Clark, 251 N.J. at 287 (quoting State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018)).  Defendant's failure to object "permits an inference that any error . . . was not prejudicial."  State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 537 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 166 (2022); see also State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361, 373 (App. Div. 1999) ("The absence of an objection suggests that trial counsel perceived no error or prejudice, and, in any event, prevents the trial judge from remedying any possible confusion in a timely manner."), aff'd o.b., 163 N.J. 140 (2000).  Significantly, defendant's failure to raise this issue before the trial court "denied the State the opportunity to confront the claim head-on; it denied the trial court the opportunity to evaluate the claim in an informed and deliberate manner; and it denied any reviewing court the benefit of a robust record within which the claim could be considered."  State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 21 (2009).  Defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing plain error.  In light of the stipulations by defense counsel and the fact that the jury was repeatedly told that the weapon in this case was a firearm, any error by the judge in instructing the jury was harmless.  This is particularly so because defendant's two predicate offenses were non-violent and involved only the possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school and because this case did not similarly involve drugs.  Accordingly, defendant's certain-persons conviction should be affirmed.
[brief] In other words, Plaintiff filed nonconforming pleadings, sought endless extensions, filed convoluted and untimely briefs which barely address the material issues and then failed to correct the deficiencies in the nonconforming pleadings, despite being afforded at least six or seven attempts to do so with specific instructions from the Court.  Similarly, Plaintiff’s assertion that he should not be “punished” for waiting under April 18, 2016, the final day to file within the two-year statute of limitations, is meritless.  First, the Trial Court did not “punish” Plaintiff for waiting to file on the deadline, but it is indisputable that Plaintiff’s counsel, who is Plaintiff’s father, had notice of the events which form the basis of this action immediately after they occurred.  Thus, Plaintiff’s counsel had essentially the entire two years from the date of the incident to the filing of the initial complaint to gather information and draft a proper complaint.  Furthermore, it is disputable that, regardless of any deficiencies in the initial pleading on April 18, 2016, caused by Plaintiff having to prepare and file it quickly to be within the statute of limitations, Plaintiff has had more than ample time, i.e., over seven (7) years, to correct any deficiencies.
[brief] Because the trial judge’s inconsistent comments make it entirely unclear whether he understood he had the jurisdiction to make that determination, the entirety of the 2023 order must be vacated and the matter remanded.  POINT IV  IF, UPON REMAND, TENANT PREVAILS IN FIXING THE AMOUNT OWED UNDER THE LEASE, THE ATTORNEY’S FEES PAID FOR TENANT’S “BREACH” MUST BE RETURNED TO TENANT AND TENANT’S ATTORNEY’S FEES MUST BE PAID BY LANDLORD (Da3)  Under § 17.06 of the Lease, “Tenant shall pay to Landlord all legal costs and other reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses” only in the event that Landlord has brought suit “for recovery of possession . . . and a breach shall be established. ”  The same section of the Lease further provides:  In the event suit shall be brought by Tenant because of the breach of any covenant contained herein on the part of Landlord to be performed, and a breach shall be established, Landlord shall pay to Tenant all legal costs and other reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by Tenant in connection therewith.  [Da56.]  Tenant’s motion to fix the reimbursement amount and this appeal are both a “suit. ”  See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Ed. 2004 (defining “suit” to mean “[a]ny proceeding by a party or parties against another in a court of law”).  First, this Court should vacate the order awarding Landlord attorney’s fees because Defendant, for the reasons already discussed, supra, was not in breach.  Moreover, on remand, in addition to fixing the amount Landlord should pay Tenant to satisfy its delinquent Tenant’s Allowance obligation plus interest, if it is determined here that Landlord has breached its obligations to Tenant under the Lease for failing to pay multiples annual installments of Tenant’s Allowance, Landlord must be held responsible for Tenant’s attorney’s fees under § 17.06.  The trial court should determine the amount of those fees as well.  **CONCLUSION**  For the above reasons, paragraph one (1) of the trial court’s 2021 order must be vacated, the entirety of the 2023 order must be vacated, and the matter must be remanded to fix the amount of Tenant’s Allowance and determine what effect the remand should have on attorneys’ fees under § 17.06 of the Lease.
[brief] [3T36-13 – 3T37-15]; [3T43-5 – 3T43-15].  [...] appreciates that [...] was essentially in between a rock and a hard place, but taking the affirmative step of waiving the defect in [...]’s bid, or deciding not to waive it, was a responsibility of [...] through its citizen’s elected representatives.  Serenity, 306 N.J. Super. at 157-60.  Without [...] exercising discretion in the first instance, [...] simply could not fully prevail on its claims.  In the absence of a remand, and assuming the correctness of the trial court’s determination that the defect was not material, the trial court should have entered final judgment overruling [...]’s finding of materiality and the award to [...], but it should not have directed an award to [...].  At that point, [...] would have had to exercise its discretion whether to waive the defect in [...]’s bid, subject to later challenge by [...] or [...].  Therefore, the trial court’s entrance of judgment directing award to [...] was in error.  **CONCLUSION**