ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] During his deposition, Respondent’s appraiser confirmed he performed no analysis as to the Property’s value under the R-2 zoning in place on the Date of Valuation; June 3, 2019:  Q:  Based on your conclusion . . . that the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan extinguished the subject property’s prior zoning, would I be correct that **you performed no type of development yield under the prior R-2 zoning classification** for the subject Property?  A:  The, the prior zoning, **it is no longer relevant or has not been relevant in the 20 years, roughly, 20 years. **  The – the underlying zoning has no affect on, on any approvals for any property in [...] as, as the process has become a re-zoning.  And all of it is in keeping with the goals of the March plan and updates and the re-examinations that are being done.  So everything is moving forward through the . . . redevelopment plan process.  Pa164 [emphasis added].  This testimony (and the trial court’s ruling related thereto) is contrary to the Scope of the Project Rule applied in the numerous cited New Jersey condemnation cases stating the underlying zoning is very “relevant” when determining the just compensation due for the acquisition of property via condemnation, as the zoning serves as the basis for the “legally permissible” prong of the “Highest and Best Use” analysis.
[brief] (Da480).  Thus, the issue of counsel fees in this case between [...] and the [...] on which the Trial Court had essentially reserved pending the outcome of the GRC Complaint became moot.  Pursuant to that settlement agreement, on April 20, 2023, [...] informed the OAL that he wished to withdraw the GRC Complaint.  (Da480; Da484).  The OAL returned the complaint to the GRC as withdrawn on May 4, 2023, and the GRC Complaint was dismissed on May 30, 2023.⁶ (Da485; Da486-487).
[brief] [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ on April 8, 2022, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining and restraining the enforcement of the Ordinance as to [...].  (Da012a).  [...] subsequently filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses on June 18, 2022.  (Da077a).  On February 24, 2023, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment.  (Da088a; Da508a).  Oral argument was held by the trial court on May 5, 2023.  The trial court issued its written opinion and order granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment and denying [...]’s motion on June 15, 2023 (“Opinion and Order”).  (Da001a).  [...] filed its notice of appeal with the Appellate Division on June 26, 2023.  [...] then filed an Order to Show Cause seeking a stay of the trial court’s final judgment on August 21, 2023.  [...]’s application was denied on August 31, 2023.  On September 6, 2023, [...] filed a motion to stay the trial court’s final judgment with the Appellate Division.  That motion was also denied on September 11, 2023.
[brief] ALTERNATIVELY, THIS MATTER SHOULD BE SENT FOR A LIMITED REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.  In entering its May 10, 2024 Order, the Law Division neglected to provide findings of facts and conclusions of law.  Instead, the court merely entered an Order resolving the issues between the parties.  (Da 3-4).  Rule 1:7-4 requires trial courts in non-jury actions to “find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon. ”  As noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-570 (1980):  In a non-jury civil action, the role of the trial court at the conclusion of the trial is to find the facts and state conclusions of law.  R. 1:7-4.  Failure to perform that duty “constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court. ”  Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of R. 1:7-4.  Rather, the trial court must state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions.  [citations omitted].  Similarly, the Appellate Division has declared:  Meaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion.  In the absence of reasons, we are left to conjecture as to what the judge may have had in mind. ”  Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J.Super. 441, 443 (App.Div. 1990); See Also, McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 304, n. 2 (1974) (“Trial judges should always state their reasons so that counsel and an appellate tribunal may be fully informed. ”); Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J.Super. 557, 565 (App.Div. 1986) (“A mere recitation of factors considered is not sufficient”).  Here, the Law Division neglected to provide the parties with any findings of fact or conclusions of law.  Neither the parties nor the Appellate Division are given any guidance whatsoever as to how the trial court arrived at its decision.  As recognized by the Appellate Division, “mere conclusory terminology * * * does not suffice. ”  Kenwood Assocs. v. Englewood Bd. of Adj., 141 N.J.Super. 1, 4 (App.Div. 1976).  Thus, in the event that the Appellate Division elects to not exercise its original jurisdiction under Rule 2:10-5, a limited remand to the Law Division is necessary for the trial court to fulfill its obligations under Rule 1:7-4.
[brief] I have not seen evidence that the defendant reviewed prior crime incidents at the Newark Broad Street Station and/or in the surrounding area to determine whether security at the transit station was commensurate with the level of crime risk.  (162a).  [...] itself admitted to not following the APTA guidelines in their Answers to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Security Interrogatories.  (767a).  This admission is also evidence of negligence.  [...] stated, “And [...]’s failure to adhere to plaintiff’s preferred standards is not evidence of negligence. ” (T19).  This is patently false.  These were not “plaintiff’s preferred standards;” they are industry standards for security/safety at public rail stations as recommended by the [...].  It was for a jury to determine whether [...]’s failure to adhere to these industry standards constituted negligence, not the trial court.  Enough evidence has been uncovered via discovery to present a genuine issue of material fact for the jury regarding [...]’s negligence.  Rather than evaluate whether or not a genuine issue of material fact existed for a jury, the trial court wrongly weighed the evidence and determined it did not constitute negligence, explicitly invading the province of the jury.  II.
[brief] See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487 (holding that after defendant had invoked his right to counsel, his statement a day later also had to be suppressed notwithstanding the fact that the police re-read the Miranda warnings and defendant stated he would talk); State v. Wint, 236 N.J. 174, 204–05 (2018) (“When police have not honored an earlier commitment to provide a detainee with a lawyer, the detainee likely will ‘understan[d] his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored’ and ‘may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation. ’” (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 121-22 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).  But even if [...]’s assertions that he had “a lawyer coming” and that he “better get a lawyer” (Da 45, 55) were ambiguous, the booking statement and subsequent interrogation must still be suppressed because his interrogators did not immediately ask [...] to clarify what he meant.
[brief] As to Defendant’s BAC of .07%, the State argued that Defendant changed his story as to what and how much he had to drink, and the breathalyzer was administered almost one hour after police were called to the scene, and, therefore, due to alcohol metabolizing in the system, it was “plausible” that the defendant’s calculation was above the legal limit at the time of the accident but went down prior to the breathalyzer (1T12:7 – 13:20).  However, Defendant countered that the State presented no expert testimony as to alcohol metabolization or any issues with the results of the breathalyzer (1T15:11 – 16:3).  The Law Division acknowledged on the record that the State did not present any testimony to support their argument in this regard (1T17:25 – 18:4).  As to the expert testimony regarding the field sobriety tests, the State argued that the expert was “pigeonholed to the videos” but the State also presented testimony of the officers on scene and at the police station, who testified to their observations, which included “at least five different indicators that establish observational evidence of DWI” (1T11:9 – 12:6).  After the appeal hearing the Law Division reserved on a decision, and on April 24, 2024, found Defendant guilty, de novo, of driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident (Da1 – Da40).
[brief] In applying this doctrine, it is crucial to remember that when the State relies on the doctrine, the “police have already violated the law[,] evidence has been obtained unlawfully; a defendant’s constitutional rights have been denied. ”  *State v. Sugar (II)*, 100 N.J. 214, 239 (1985).  In these cases, the “State itself is directly responsible for the loss of the opportunity lawfully to obtain evidence; the State has created a situation in which it is impossible to be certain as to what would have happened if no illegal conduct had occurred. ”  *Ibid.*  Because of this misbehavior and the infringement of a defendant’s constitutional rights that has already occurred, courts must carefully hold the State to its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the unlawfully seized evidence would inevitably have been discovered through untainted, lawful means.  *Id.* at 237-40.
[directive] Cases an officer suppressed by in which evidence obtained by is a court; 11.  Cases officer; Insubordination the 12. by the officer; Neglect of duty by 13.  ongoing criminal investigation, officer jeopardize an notification to the could 1  If EW System officer or or discretion permit delayed notification to the Prosecutor in his her the may County review process. of the System delayed initiation EW Page 3 14.
[brief] [...] was a highly-regarded Special Education teacher and tenured teaching staff member employed by [...].  He also suffered from chronic alcoholism, which he successfully managed during many years of commendable service to [...]’s students.  Pa2-Pa4.  In May 2019, during a difficult time in his personal life, [...] experienced a relapse, and consumed a *de minimis* amount of alcohol while at work.  When confronted by [...] administration, he promptly complied with a directive to undergo an alcohol breath test, which found no detectible alcohol.  No students observed, or were involved, in the incident.  [...] did not, in any way, fail to discharge his duties and responsibilities.  He immediately and voluntarily admitted himself into an alcohol rehabilitation program, which he successfully completed.  Pa2-Pa4; Pa8-Pa11.
[directive] Specific Notice Certain During an to Individuals Encounter.  When officer with a BWC device during an encounter equipped is required to activate the an 1) with civilian a occurring inside the person's or 2) with a person reasonably believed residence, with whom to be a victim of a criminal offense, the officer shall verbally notify the persons) the or such officer is conversing that the BWC has been activated unless it is unsafe infeasible to provide activation because it notification.  If the officer decides not to provide notification of B WC is unsafe for that decision in a report and/or by or infeasible to do so, the officer shall document the reasons narrating on recording.  failure verbally notify a person pursuant to this the reasons the BWC  The to section (non- section shall admissibility of any or evidence.  See 15 not affect the statement adopting  Nothing herein shall preclude a department from a policy, enforceability bythird parties).  officer provide standing operating or order that requires a BWC-equipped to procedure, directive, an indicator light be verbal notification in other specified circumstances, and/or that requires that when the BWC is activated.  illuminated Specific Inquiries.
[brief] Da367-Da395.  On December 28, 2022, [...] responded to the Consent Request by indicating that it would not consent to the financing and construction of the [...].  Da396.  On January 24, 2023, based upon [...]’s denial of consent and in accordance with the Order, the Parties met and conferred to discuss potential revisions to the finance and operation provisions of the Redevelopment Agreement.  The Parties did not reach an agreement on that date, and thereafter exchanged proposals through electronic mail between January 25, 2023 and February 15, 2023.  On February 27, 2023, the Parties determined that negotiations were at an impasse, and advised the Court that post-judgment applications would be necessary to resolve this matter.  Post-judgment applications were submitted by the parties on May 12, 2023.  On March 15, 2024, the Court issued the Order which, relevant to the present application, (i) granted reformation of a Redevelopment Agreement and the Operating Agreement to remove the $1,600,000 threshold in Section 8.6 of the Redevelopment Agreement to allow [...] to receive 66.66% of all revenue of the Project Garage after expenses, and (ii) awarded [...] $499,007.77 in fees as a result of the revised formula created by said reformation, which was made retroactive to August 2019 when the initial Complaint was filed.
[brief] Considering first the scope of our appellate review of judgment entered in a non-jury case, as here, we note that our courts have held that the findings on which it is based should not be disturbed unless "* * * they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice," and that the appellate court should exercise its original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a clear case where there is no doubt about the matter.  Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960), aff'd o.b. 33 N.J. 78 (1960).  That the finding reviewed is based on factual determinations in which matters of credibility are involved is not without significance.  Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450 (1967).  Findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.  New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super.  358 (App. Div. 1969), certif. den. 54 N.J. 565 (1969).  It has otherwise been stated that "our appellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice," Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963), and the appellate court therefore ponders whether, on the contrary, there is substantial evidence in support of the trial judge's findings and conclusions.
[brief] --- 11  This finding by the trial court completely contravenes and undermines the Appellants’ bald allegations that [...] wrongfully re-sold the Solar Rights.  [Pb13].  As the trial court correctly determined in the summary judgment proceedings in the Prior Action, the Solar Rights run with the land, and once the rights were voided by [...], anybody was free to pursue them.  The Appellants had no entitlement to the Solar Rights once they defaulted under the Lease, lost control of the Property as a result of the default, and the Solar Rights were voided by the [...].  [Pa149].  IV.
[brief] [...]’ assertion that the notification by [...] from others is immaterial because such notices could not be delegated lacks credibility.  (TRVb39.)  [...] makes this argument even though [...] of [...] acknowledged that it was protocol for [...] to handle all communications with subcontractors related to eligibility, enrollment and unenrollment.  ([...] Tr., 158:10-20 at TRVa2729.)  [...] further argues that the decision in *Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency*, 197 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1984) compels notice obligations to remain with the insurer.  (TRVb39.)  While [...]’ argument may be true in certain circumstances, such as to avoid lapse or protect innocent third parties, as was the case in *Barbara*, it should not be expanded to cover CCIPs where communications flow through the CCIP administrator and sponsor.  Additionally, subsequent to *Barbara*, this Court has found that automatic renewal was not appropriate where a broker, instead of the insurer, had provided notice to the insured and the insured acknowledged its uninsured status.  *See Insinga v. Hegedus*, 231 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 1989).  (“We clearly did not intend to hold that if the broker did send an effective, proper and timely notice, the insurer would be deprived of the benefit thereof. ”)  Accordingly, [...] must not be allowed to shift its risk to the CCIP (or “steer the claim” as [...]’s broker suggested) simply because [...] misinterpreted a third-party’s letter, particularly where [...] was aware that it was never permitted to enroll in the CCIP in the first instance.
[brief] The Vermont Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling Did Not Cut Off the Possibility of Indemnity Coverage, Which Is All That Is Necessary for a Duty to Defend to Continue in Existence.  (Pa1 and Pa3).  The Trial Court here held that, once the Vermont Trial Court ruled that there supposedly was no genuine issue of fact as to the “obvious purpose” of certain actions of [...] on December 19, 2019 (T80-1), [...]’s duty to defend the HCH Action evaporated.  T83-6 to T83-16.  This was error.  As shown in Part I, above, the Challenged Decision fails to consider whether, as of March 5, 2021, there then existed “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  Pharmacists, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421; see also Pa1023–39 (insurance law treatise excerpts stating same principle).  Because an appeal (authorized by [...]) was pending as of March 5, 2021, the possibility of indemnity coverage remained and [...] could not rightly fail to appeal the adverse Vermont Trial Court rulings.  An insurance company’s duty to defend is to be broadly construed.
[brief] The Guidotti Court stated that where the affirmative defense of arbitrability of claims is apparent on the face of a complaint (or documents relied upon in the complaint), the FAA would favor resolving a motion to compel arbitration under a motion to dismiss standard without the inherent delay of discovery.  *Id.* at 774  However, a motion to dismiss standard would be inappropriate when the motion to compel arbitration does not have as its predicate a complaint with the requisite clarity to establish on its face that the parties agreed to arbitrate.  *Id.* at 774.  Under that scenario – the arbitrability not being apparent on the face of the complaint – “the motion to compel arbitration must be denied pending further development of the factual record”  *Id.* at 774  Regarding the further development of the factual record, the *Guidotti* Court explained that “a ‘restricted inquiry into factual issues’ will be necessary to properly evaluate whether there was a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate, (citation omitted), and the non-movant ‘must be given the opportunity to conduct limited discovery on the narrow issue concerning the validity’ of the arbitration agreement (citation omitted)”.  *Id.* at 774  The *Guidotti* Court went on to state:  “After limited discovery, the court may entertain a renewed motion to compel arbitration, this time judging the motion under a summary judgment standard”  *Id.* at 776  This Court has stressed the need for clarity in arbitration clauses.
[brief] e.  I asked about whether and EIN was requested or obtained in connection with this trust account.  [...] said that one was obtained, but that it was taken out in [...]'s individual name- not the Estate- because trust account setting up requesting an EIN and not the individual's SSN.  Because nothing was taken out in connection with the Estate, [...] maintains that the EIN would not affect the Estate's ability to obtain an EIN for itself.
[directive] Sa se yon dokiman piblik.  Pa mete okenn enfòmasyon idantifikasyon pèsonèl sou li, kankou nimewo Sosyal, nimewo Lisans pou kondwi, oswa nimewo kont an bank ak kat kredi aktif yo.  Dokiman sa a ap disponib ba piblik la sou demann jan li soumèt la.  NOTICE:
[brief] SSAP No. 25’s plain language makes clear that it applies to [...] and [...].  [...] concedes that fact.  But at the same time, [...] asserts that the individual subscriber, not [...], pays the AIF Fee, believing that [...] and [...] can avoid compliance with SSAP No. 25.  [...] uses its appeal of the Bulletin to further its hidden agenda of charging for fees that are not subject to a fair-and-reasonable standard.  Therefore, the court should hold that the Bulletin correctly reminds the industry that SSAP No. 25 applies to reciprocal exchanges.
[brief] On August 1, 2020, Landlord’s second annual Tenant’s Allowance installment payment of $121,666.67 plus interest became due (Da169).  Landlord did not pay it (3T7-4 to 3T7-9;3T10-5 to 3T10-18).  On August 27, 2020, through Executive Order No. 181, [...] rescinded the Gym Closure and permitted gyms to reopen (Da139-Da148).  In September 2020, Tenant reopened its doors for the first time since March 16, 2020, and immediately Tenant resumed payment of rent the following month, in September 2020 (1T4-9 to 1T4-15;Da142).
[directive] A state or local agency that presents conveyances for a Treasury adoption may be asked to serve as substitute custodians of the if property pending forfeiture it appears that the conveyances will be requested through equitable sharing.  Any use of such conveyances, including official use, by state or local law enforcement officials or others is prohibited until such time as the forfeiture is completed and the equitable transfer is made.  Adopted cash and real property must, however, be turned over to of the custody the Treasury agency adopting the seizure.  January Directive No. 2000 17, 34 of Page 5 5