ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da29-30.  On December 22, 2023, the Railroad Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims because the undisputed material facts establish that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Railroad Immunity Act, N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 as a matter of law.  The Railroad Defendants’ argument was as follows.  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(b)(5) prohibits a Plaintiff from recovering damages for death or injury to a person as a result of contract with rolling stock of a railroad while that person was “using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulation. ”  The undisputed material facts show that [...] collided with the train because she entered the crossing against the pedestrian signal and red traffic light, while she did not have the right of way, while the train had the right of way and was just two to three seconds from reaching the crossing, and while another train on the adjacent track was already present on the crossing and blocking her path across it.  It was also undisputed that [...] owned the crossing and the right of way where the crossing is located and that the crossing was not intended to be used by pedestrians while trains were already on, or imminently approaching, it.  Therefore, the Railroad Defendants argued that a rational jury could only find that Plaintiff’s damages were caused by [...] contacting the train while she was using the crossing and right of way, both of which constitute “railroad property” owned by [...] under subsection (b)(5), in a manner in which they were not intended to be used or in violation of the posted regulations (the crossing signal and red traffic light).  As such, summary judgment was appropriate because Plaintiff cannot recover as a matter of law.  Pa148, 153-155, 158-165.  The Railroad Defendant’s motion also separately sought to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims based on premises liability, dangerous condition of public premises, inadequate signs, signals, warnings or protections at the crossing, the speed of the train, failure to warn, and negligent design and construction because these claims were either barred by the immunities provided by the Tort Claims Act or Plaintiff failed to provide the necessary expert testimony to establish that the crossing or any part of it was negligently designed, constructed, or maintained at the time of the alleged incident.  The motion also sought to dismiss the claims for negligent train operation because [...] did not breach his duty of care owed to [...], which did not require him to attempt to stop the train until it became apparent that [...] was going to ignore the train’s right of way and cross or attempt to cross the crossing before the train arrived in a manner such that a collision would probably result.  Last, the motion requested dismissal of all negligent training and hiring claims and the claims seeking recovery of punitive damages because Plaintiff failed to adduce the evidence necessary to support each element of these claims.
[brief] **Appellant Unilaterally Transfers Money to [...]**  Appellant prepared and executed an intercompany loan agreement between [...] and [...] on January 18, 2015 (the “BSG Loan”).  (Pa713:157:15-158:2; Da833).  Appellant was the sole owner of [...] and its parent company [...]  (Pa714:161:15-17).  Appellant testified that he discussed the BSG Loan with his wife [...] on January 18, 2015; other than that conversation, he never discussed the BSG Loan with anyone at [...] or [...].  (Pa714:171:17-22).  On January 17, 2020, a judgment was entered in favor of [...] and against BSG Loan for the outstanding amount under the BSG Loan, $915,932.63.  (Da838).  **Appellant Unilaterally Transfers Money to [...]**
[brief] 8.  **Minimum Parking Setback to Residential Use:**  Pursuant to Ordinance Section 108-9.1(F)(1) a 50 foot setback from residential structures to parking areas is required.  The Applicant proposes 30 feet to the [...] boundary.  The Applicant submits that there is no substantial impact associated with the parking 30-foot from the [...] property line.  It is more than adequate and can be buffered at site plan to prevent headlight glare from leaking on to the [...] property.  The Board rejects these reasons and finds that the Applicant, not the Board has the duty to provide for the amelioration of the negative impacts of a variance, and deferring the same to site plan design is legally insufficient to justify the variance.
[brief] Burlington County Indictment Number [...]……………………………  Da 1-2 Verdict Sheet ……………………………………………………………………………Da 3 Judgment of Conviction…………………………………………………………….. Da 4-6 Notice of Appeal……………………………………………………………………….. Da 7-9 [...] and [...], Fingerprint Error Rate on Close Non-matches, 66 J. Forensic Sci. 129 (2020)………………………………………..Da 10-15 [...] et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable To Making Erroneous Identifications, 74 Forensic Sci. Int’l 74 …………..Da 16-20
[brief] N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278 (2007); Gross v. Borough of Neptune City, 378 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 2005).  [...]’s facial challenge has the opposite problem, it has already been addressed and rejected by our courts on a number of occasions.
[brief] (Aa266; Da103-105 (SMF 8)).  The original order was vacated on procedural grounds but was affirmed on February 16, 2023, by [...].  (Aa266).  Specifically, [...] found, as did the district court, that the accrual date for Plaintiff's cause of action was March 6, 2018 "as it was clear that Plaintiff knew of that, or should have known of that cause of action at the March date that's referenced by the Federal Court," and His Honor dismissed the plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] After the DEP followed the plain language and expansive purpose of the Law, the DEP then applied the undisputed facts regarding [...]’s proposed project to its permit application and included a general public access requirement in the Permit.  (Ra1-9).  As previously noted, project permit applications that seek a “change in the existing footprint of a structure” now “require as a condition of the permit or other approval . . . additional public access to the tidal waters and adjacent shorelines consistent with the public trust doctrine . . . .”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  The use of the word “shall” means the DEP has no discretion as to whether to condition the permit on public access, though the DEP does have discretion regarding the form the public access takes.  Harvey, 30 N.J. at 391.  Here, rather than deny the permit application altogether because [...] disagreed that public access was required, the DEP instead issued the permit with a condition requiring [...] to submit a plan to provide public access.  (Ra7).  The ALJ found that “[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact whether [...]’s activities – ‘reconstruction of a bulkhead 24 inches waterward of its current location and request for after-the-fact authorization of finger piers and mooring piles’ – change the existing footprint of structures on the Site.
[brief] ” (2T16-9 to 16-23; 18-24 to 19-2).  The court further found, “[b]ecause the defendant had a prior history[,] . . . served a prison sentence[,] . . . got the benefit of a plea bargain, and – and even though that one sentence was vacated, that wouldn’t be sufficient to sat that this was an illegal sentence or improper . . . sentence. ”  (2T19-8 to 19-14).  --- \(^1\) “1T” refers to Transcript of Proceedings, December 8, 2010; “2T” refers to Transcript of Proceedings, February 15, 2023.  \(^2\)  On August 2, 2012, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., signed an order vacating the defendant’s conviction under [...].
[brief] To the contrary, as set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, the following evidence with respect to the allegedly malfunctioning streetlight was before the trial court at the time of its ruling:  - [...] arrived at the scene of the accident less than two minutes after receiving the call from dispatch and contemporaneously noted in his report that the “streetlights [are] on, continuous. ” (SOF, Point B, supra).  - [...], the second officer on the scene, testified that the streetlights were on when he arrived.  (Id.).  - [...], [...], did not indicate that any streetlights were out or that insufficient lighting was a contributing factor in the accident.  He also confirmed during his deposition that if lighting had been insufficient, he would have noted this issue in his report.  (Id.).  - [...], who arrived at the scene to document the accident and collect evidence, testified that prior to putting up the crime scene investigation spotlight, he has no recollection of the streetlight being off.  (Id.).  - Plaintiff’s father, mother, and wife all testified that they had never observed the streetlight being off prior to the accident.  (SOF, Point C, supra).  - Plaintiff’s father, mother, and wife all testified that they had never reported the streetlight as being out to [...] or [...].  (Id.).  • [...] had no record of the streetlight being reported as out before the accident and had records of only two repair jobs and one maintenance job, all of which occurred one to two years after the accident.
[brief] QUESTIONS PRESENTED.....................................................................................................4  STANDARD OF REVIEW......................................................................................................5  PROCEDURAL HISTORY.......................................................................................................5  STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................................................................7  LEGAL ARGUMENT............................................................................................................19  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WERE BARRED BY THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  (Trial Transcript pages 86:20-88:15)...........................................20  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING  DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT’S SUMMARY  JUDGMENT MOTION AND DISMISSING  PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S CLAIMS ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED  ..................................................................................................................24  A.  The University Website Did Not Give Rise to a Contract Between [...] and [...] Such That [...] Was Required to Admit [...] Into the Dual Degree Program.........................................................................................................................26  i.  [...]’s Website Lacked the Essential Terms to Constitute a Contract – or Even an Offer to Form a Contract.........................................................................................................................26  ii.  The Relationship Between a Student and a University Should Not Be Viewed in Purely Contractual Terms, and New Jersey Courts Defer to a University’s Judgment With Respect to Academic Standards.  .............31  B.  Even if There Were a Contract Between [...] and [...], [...] Would Not Be in Breach Because the University Website Explicitly States that [...] Reserves its Rights to Make Changes to Courses, Requirements, and Programs at Any Time.........................................................39  C.  The Record Clearly Demonstrates that [...] Made No Misrepresentation to [...], and Therefore [...]’s Claims of Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Inducement Fail as a Matter of Law..............................................45  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................51
[directive] 1ye Enfraksyon - revokasyon lisans pou 1 lane 1st Offense - 1 year license suspension  2yèm Enfraksyon - revokasyon lisans pou 2 lane 2nd Offense - 2 year license suspension  3yèm enfraksyon oswa lòt Enfraksyon ki ta swiv - revokasyon lisans pou 10 lane 3rd or Subsequent Offense - 10 year license suspension  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  2.  Èske w konprann ke si w plede koupab w ap oblije peye yon amann obligatwaman?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to pay a mandatory penalty?  Amann obligatwa yo se swivan sa yo:  The mandatory penalties are as follows:  1ye Enfraksyon/1st $ 500 Offense  2yèm Enfraksyon/2nd $ 750 Offense  3yèm Enfraksyon oswa lòt Enfraksyon ki swiv yo/3rd $ 1,000 or Subsequent offense  Total Sanksyon/Total $
[brief] Da407.  On May 13, 2024, Defendants filed its objection and filed a Cross-Motion to Extend Time to Post Supersedeas Bond.  Da416.  Plaintiff then filed its objection to the cross-motion on May 22, 2024.  On May 23, 2024, Defendants filed another motion to extend the time to post their supersedeas bond with this Court.  Da482.  On May 30, 2024, the Appellate Division denied Defendants’ requests for extensions and ordered that requests for extension of time to post the supersedeas bond “should be directed to the trial court.
[brief] It is undisputed that [...]’s in-App pop-up screen was presented to [...] in Spanish, see (Pa0598–0599), and she used that interface to confirm in Spanish that she reviewed and agreed to [...]’s terms, see (Pa075).  Thus, [...] appreciated (or, at minimum, reasonably should have appreciated) from the pop-up screen that by checking the box and clicking the button, she was manifesting assent to [...]’s terms.
[brief] A.  Overview  The matter at hand involves the Estate of [...], who passed away on February 06, 2012, a resident of the Republic of Korea.  (Da1).  The case commenced on January 18, 2013, when [...], ("Plaintiff") filed a verified complaint against Defendants seeking the appointment of an Estate Administrator to investigate assets in New Jersey and handle tax-related matters.  (Da1).  B.  Material Events  1.  Appointment of Estate Administrator (May 2014): - Plaintiff's successful motion for Summary Judgment led to the appointment of [...], Esq., as the Estate Administrator in New Jersey on May 8, 2014.  (Da11).  2.  Legal Challenges and Appeals (2016): - Appellate affirmations of Plaintiff's Summary Judgment and the denial of Defendant's motions in May 2016.  (Da2470).  (Da2481).  3.  Order Approving Administrator's Forensic Report (July 30, 2018): - Judge [...] approves Administrator's Forensic Report on July 30, 2018.  (Da118).  (Da165).  4.  Fee Award Decision (March 23, 2021): - Judge [...] granted an award of Attorney’s Fees to Plaintiff and Defendant on January 14, 2019, setting the stage for subsequent appeals.  (Da212).  - Superior Court’s Appellate decision on March 23, 2021, concluded that Defendant is not entitled to fees, and Plaintiff’s amount is subject to determination by the Trial Court.  (Da260).  5.  **Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Legal Fee Claim**  *(October 12, 2021):* - Defendant raised objections regarding Plaintiff's compliance with court orders on July 13, 2021.  Plaintiff submitted their position on November 11, 2021, due to Hurricane Ida's impact on Plaintiff's former attorney's office.  The court granted Plaintiff an additional ten days to supplement their submission on December 3, 2021, which Plaintiff promptly did on December 13, 2021.  (Da273).  (Da274).  6.  **Trial Court Decision on Fees (August 31, 2022):** - The Trial Court ordered Plaintiff’s reimbursement of $1,049,589.14 from the Estate.  (Da271).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION ON AUGUST 31, 2022, REGARDING THE AWARD OF LEGAL FEES AND COSTS CANNOT BE SUBJECTED TO APPEAL
[brief] The trial court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings should be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 014711991)  [...] (ID 122152014)  [...] (ID 127472015)  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants [...] and [...]
[directive] Yo,,-------------,--' par Ia presente certifico lo siguiente: !, , hereby certify as follows:  1.  Soy el acusado en Ia causa citada arriba.  am I the defendant in the above referenced case.  2.  me esta representando en este dicta do de pena y eli ella ,---,----.,----,---=----:---;---,------- ha revisado este Formulario conmigo.  by------------------- am 1 being represented in this sentencing and he/she has reviewed this Form with me.
[brief] [...] also seeks to compel the Assignment Judge(s) and [...] to process ADA/LAD complaints per AOC procedure, rather than relying on the apparent belief that judges are immune from AOC Rules. \(^1\) [...]'s two complaints\(^2\) in the criminal case went unanswered.  This is similar to [...]'s experience of about ten unanswered retaliatory complaints.  Discrimination or harassment complaints are often ignored, forcing minorities to "adjust."  [...] relocated to Florida; [...] is effectively disbarred in Vicinage I's Law Division.  [...] also uses straw arguments regarding LAD liabilities.
[brief] (1T50.20-23).  The record is devoid of any actions that [...] may have undertaken to ascertain the authenticity of the logbook entries.  The cross-examination of the investigator demonstrates the inherent flaws of the logbook and therefore undermines the “crux” of the DOC’s case.  On cross-examination, [...] admitted that he could not determine what, if anything, [...] had written in the logbook.  (1T162.1-17).
[brief] Despite the above, the Courts did not permit [...] to vacate judgment and redeem under Rule 4:50-1(f) and further did not have a procedure in place to protect [...]’s surplus equity until July 10, 2024.  (Da5)  The US Supreme Court and the NJ Appellate Court has clearly opined that the NJ tax lien structure was wholly unconstitutional and these changes in the law are specifically to protect people like [...] from the devastating results rendered previously in this matter whereby [...] has lost approximately $300,000.00 or more in hard earned equity in his home, built over almost 20 years, for a small amount of unpaid taxes.  (Da48-Da58,Da87)  The foreclosure judgment must be vacated to avoid a grossly unjust result.
[brief] POINT II  THE PUBLIC POLICY OF NEW JERSEY MANDATES INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ALL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES.  (PA1-3)  Arguments asserting that public policy disfavors allowing insurance for workplace injuries intentionally caused, like the argument accepted by the trial court here, are not well founded.  There is little, if any, evidence that establishes that policyholders engage in reckless behavior or intentionally cause injuries because they are insured.  Certainly, there is no actual evidence to support such a conclusion in the record of this appeal.  There are, moreover, many deterrents to bad behavior unrelated to insurance.  For example, assault and battery are criminal offenses that can result in jail time.  Thus, it seems unlikely that the loss of insurance to cover the injuries caused by an insured’s assault or battery on a victim would be more of a deterrent than the prospect of prison.  Similarly, because imprisonment is a significant punishment for a crime, it is not as though an employer that commits assault and battery will go unpunished if his insurer compensates the victim for his injuries.  Violations of workplace safety rules and OSHA regulations carry fines and penalties to deter improper behavior without leaving an injured employee or his dependents without complete justice.  On the other hand, there are sound public policy reasons that support allowing insurance for intentional injuries to employees.  Public policy dictates that victims should be compensated for their injuries.  The statute at issue makes abundantly clear that the public policy of this State mandates compulsory insurance coverage for any work-related injuries, regardless of the cause.  After all, the entire point of the statutory workers compensation and employer liability construct is that the insurer stands in the shoes of the employer in its obligations to its employees.  Just as the employer cannot limit its payment obligations to its employees, the insurer cannot limit its payment obligations to victims of workplace injury.  The public policy in insuring workplace injuries is so strong that even actual fraud in securing the insurance by the employer does not invalidate the policy.
[brief] Defendant [...] was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol [“DWI”].  He wanted to raise a defense, but trial counsel denigrated, undermined, and dismissed it without any consideration, investigation, or preparation.  Both the municipal court and Law Division judges followed defense counsel’s lead and convicted [...] as a third or subsequent offender.  [...] now serves a jail sentence and faces other significant penalties, having been denied an opportunity to raise a defense at trial.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s gloss in its opposition brief (Rb19), this is the only text exchange that purports to corroborate [...]’s allegation that is probative of her allegations against [...]  But, if it corroborates anything, it is that another incident occurred later that day at the union’s office.  The point is that neither the video surveillance nor the first text exchange are probative of the critical question whether [...] purposefully, repeatedly misnamed [...] on two separate incidents.
[brief] Exhibit F to Certification, [...] Property Custody Receipt, filed October 25, 2022  Exhibit F to Certification, [...] Supplementary Investigation Report, filed October 25, 2022  Exhibit F to Certification, [...] Receipt, filed October 25, 2022  Exhibit F to Certification, [...] Property Custody Receipt, filed October 25, 2022 Exhibit F to Certification, [...] After Incident Diagram, filed October 25, 2022 (Volume 4 of 5 – Pa461 to Pa544)
[brief] ”).  For example, Defendants claim, among other things, that the trial court “assessed Plaintiff’s truthfulness to be less than credible. ”  (Db26.)  Plaintiff is an entity, and the trial court did not assess the entity’s truthfulness.  (See generally Pa0198-221.)  Defendants are likely referring to the trial court’s credibility findings as to [...], whom Defendants—not Plaintiff—called to testify at trial.  (7T3:14-16.)  Defendants also incorrectly assert that Defendant [...] “testified at length regarding . . . her intent not to remain connected to the property after sale, and her desire not to have the Alessi name attached to her DEP number.  5T122 – 15 to 18. ” (Db25 (emphasis in original).)
[brief] V.  [...] did not waive its right to arbitrate with Plaintiffs.  (Da298–304.)  Last, Plaintiffs argued below that [...] waived its contractual right to arbitrate by briefly communicating with Plaintiffs’ counsel about the auto accident before this dispute was filed.  Specifically, before Plaintiffs filed their complaint, their counsel reached out to counsel for [...] and co-Defendants to arrange a date and time for Plaintiffs’ counsel to inspect Mr.  Zheng’s vehicle.  (Da152–60.)  [...]’s counsel responded to three scheduling emails about that topic.  (See id.).  The trial court did not reach Plaintiffs’ argument that those emails waived [...]’s arbitration right, and that argument is meritless.  New Jersey has a presumption against waiver of arbitration that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement first chose to seek relief in a different forum.  Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508, 514 (App. Div. 2008).  Courts consider various factors to determine whether a “party’s litigation conduct” is “consistent with its reserved right to arbitrate the dispute”: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions; (3) whether the delay was part of the litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notice of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.