ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Da 34-35)  See State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 610 (2004) (“[T]he error in admitting this evidence was compounded by the lack of a proper limiting instruction. ”).  Finally, although the defense was involved in negotiating redactions, the court’s hands-off approach and failure to ensure full compliance with this Court’s remand order requires reversal.  The court had an independent duty to comply with this Court’s clear remand order -- particularly after the reversal of a murder conviction for legal errors raised in the first instance as plain error.  See Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 292, 306 (App. Div. 2010) (“It is the peremptory duty of the trial court, on remand, to obey the mandate of the appellate tribunal precisely as it is written. ”).  But the court here failed to so much as inquire about the parties’ proposed redactions or to preview the redacted video before admitting it and playing it for the jury.  Our courts cannot insulate themselves from judicial review by leaving justice up to whoever has the better attorney.  See Application of VV Pub. Corp., 120 N.J. 508, 517 (1990) (“[T]he judiciary’s overarching constitutional responsibility . . . imposes an independent obligation [on] the court to take all appropriate measures to ensure the fair and proper administration of a criminal trial. ”).  Similarly, the prosecutor -- as proponent of the evidence and whose “overriding duty is to do justice,” *State v. Garcia*, 245 N.J. 412, 418 (2021) -- likewise bore responsibility for the contents of his own interrogation video, especially after this Court provided a detailed roadmap of [...]’s improper opinions.  Therefore, permitting the jury to again hear [...] call [...] guilty and unbelievable violated this Court’s remand order and deprived [...] of a fair trial.
[directive] E.  Gender Binary: A societal construction of gender that accords two discrete and opposing categories – male or female.  F.  Gender Expression: A person’s gender-related appearance and behavior, whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s gender assigned at birth.  It is the manner in which a person represents or expresses their gender to others, such as through their behavior, clothing, hairstyles, activities, voice, or mannerisms.  Page 12
[brief] While it cannot yet be proven, it is suspected this individual has encouraged police harassment of [...].  This individual has demonstrably complained about [...] on the bench\(^4\) and to [...]'s former spouse (then his lawyer). \(^5\)  This behavior then encourages police "buddies" to retaliate to curry favor.  This individual's animosity stems from [...]'s 5-0 record against him or his law firm on "insanity defense."  --- \(^4\)  His behavior was so outrageous that several lawyers present stood up from their seats and vociferously protested, citing ethics violations and the Judge's conflict of interest.  To avoid an ethics complaint and a PTSD episode, a friend of mine took [...] to the podium to dismiss the case.  The judge then attempted to have [...] waive the unwaivable Judge/Attorney conflict.  Counsel refused to let him do so.  \(^5\)  This individual went into a tirade when my lawyer said she was representing me.  It was so bad, she feared violence and ran out of the room.  People waiting to see the prosecutor were all visibly shocked.  We were both so shaken and afraid that we did not properly document the incident.  The judge apparently heard the ruckus.  When I stood up asking to be heard, he stated, “I know, you seem to have a conflict; you’re excused. ”  cases.\textsuperscript{6}  Four reversals occurred with this Court's assistance, impacting the individual's standing in his home community, after making a “big deal” about having “won. ”  Additionally, a Galloway police officer told [...] that he no longer needed to worry because this now-judge had "called the dogs off," suggesting prior involvement in directing harassment.  Regarding ADA complaints, only two of ten to twelve were answered, both with retaliatory responses.
[brief] Oath of Administrator Ad Prosequendum………………………………………C4a  Application Administration Ad Prosequendum…………………………………C5a  Authorization to Accept Service of Process Administration  Ad Prosquendum………………………………………………………………………C6a  Filing Receipt for Administration Ad Prosequendum Application………..C7a  State of New Jersey Autopsy Report of [...], issued August 25, 2023¹………………………………………………………………………C8a  *Exhibit F to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Record of [...], indicating that Defendants were failing to take Plaintiff to the hospital for treatment of his infection)………………………………………………………………………C17a ¹ Appellant’s Counsel only has photos of this document.
[brief] The NJSLA, NJCLA, and NJLLA were all enacted to, inter alia, curtail predatory and usurious lending practices, limit what property could be held as collateral, and ensure that only qualified, regulated, licensed entities would enter the marketplace as consumer lenders or sales finance companies in New Jersey.  The NJCLA, “which prohibit[ed] deceptive lending practices generally,” “as incorporated in the Licensed Lenders Act . . . allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b.  . . .”  Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255, 271-72 (1997).  Though the “typical remedy” was a “voiding of the contract” by “individual consumers. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  _____________________
[brief] ”  See, generally, Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 484.  There was no implied agreement between [...] and [...].  See, Meisels, supra.  Mr. [...] had reason to know that [...] was allegedly relying on him.  Of course, [...] made it clear in his deposition that he did not rely on [...] because he had his own attorney, [...] from the [...].  There was no reliance.  Mr. [...] did absolutely nothing to induce reasonable reliance from [...].  See, Banco Popular, N.J. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161 (2005); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472 (1995); Meisels v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 2020 WL 97718 (N.J. January 9, 2020).
[brief] Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, read to the jury, created issues of credibility and substantive evidence with regard to the cause of her fall at the [...] store.  The plaintiff testified that the accident at the [...] occurred when she was walking towards her daughter and her rollator hit the bolt of the pole and she fell to the right.  (4T228:14-16).  The plaintiff admitted she did not see the pole before the wheel of her rollator struck it because she was looking upward toward her daughter.  (4T229:19-21).  The plaintiff denied she had balance issues when she went to the [...] on May 30, 2019 and testified that if she had not hit the bolt, she would not have fallen.  (4T249:19-25).  Plaintiff, however, also testified that on the day of the incident, she was having some issues with walking.  (4T:224:14-17).  She described these issues as “[m]y legs were hurting me” (4T:224:18-19) and “I have numbness… in it. ” (4T224:18-24).  She testified that the numbness started four years ago, which would have been approximately three years before her fall at the [...].  (4T224:23-225:3).  She was told by her doctor that the numbness could not be cured and it was something she is going to have to continue to deal with.  (4T225:7-15).  The plaintiff further testified that two years before the [...] incident, she started using a cane for balance issues (4T:213:5-15) and a year before the [...] incident, she started using a rollator, which she was using at the time of the incident.  (4T213:7-10).  She first testified that her use of the rollator was in no way related to balance issues.  (4T213:7-20; 247:5-11).  Rather, her sole purpose for using the rollator was for security in the event she went out in public and someone bumped into her.  (4T257:13-16).  She later testified, however, that the rollator provided her with both a feeling of security and helped her with her balance.  (4T:213:21-24).  The plaintiff further testified about two prior falls she had before the [...] incident.  She testified that one incident happened outside her daughter’s house on Christmas Day in 2017 when she was using her cane and tripped on a brick and fell.  (4T247:15-248:12).  The other incident occurred in 2018 in her bedroom when she was walking and slid down the pole of her bed.  (4T248:19-249:4).  After the plaintiff’s deposition testimony was read into the record, the plaintiff next called the plaintiff’s daughter, [...], to testify.
[brief] On April 14, 2020, the Firm and [...], along with seven other lawyers at the Firm, filed this lawsuit against [...]\(^1\) for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and abuse of process. \(^2\)  [Pa869a]  The seven other lawyers at the Firm, namely [...], Richard N. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], filed the lawsuit against [...] as “Innocent Insureds.
[directive] Step 9 of the Independent Prosecutor Directive states that in any instance “where the matter is presented but the grand jury declines to criminally charge any of the [subject-officers], the Independent Investigator shall prepare a statement for public dissemination, which shall comply with all rules of grand jury secrecy and be reviewed by the Independent release.3  Supervisory Reviewer prior to  The statement shall include a summary of: 1. The factual findings of the investigation; 2. The legal analysis concerning the lawfulness of the [subject-officer]’s use of force; 3. The results of the conflicts review conducted pursuant to [Step 3] of the Directive; and 4.  An explanation that the matter was reviewed by the Independent Investigator and the Independent Supervisory Reviewer.
[brief] Defendant [...], through his assigned counsel, raises the following arguments in support of his appeal:  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL FOLLOWING TWO HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL IRREGULARITIES OCCURRING CLOSELY IN TIME.  U.S. CONST., AMEND.  XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR. 10.  A.  A KEY STATE'S WITNESS WAS EVIDENTLY COACHED DURING HIS TESTIMONY, AND THE COURT FAILED TO HOLD A HEARING OR CONDUCT INDIVIDUAL JUROR VOIR DIRE.  B.  THE COURT ALSO ERRED IN DENYING A MISTRIAL FOLLOWING A PARTICULARLY HEATED SPECTATOR OUTBURST.  C.  THE INCIDENTS IN COMBINATION NECESSITATED THE GRANT OF A MISTRIAL.  POINT II
[brief] In addition, even if there were a legitimate claim that a Plaintiff member suffered adverse employment action due to perceived disability status, Plaintiff's Complaint still fails to set forth who was so perceived? When? How? What adverse action was experienced?  Etc.  The Trial Court further correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead other *prima facie* elements of a disability discrimination/failure to accommodate case with respect to the unidentified members alluded to, e.g., that they were qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, that they were terminated or otherwise suffered an adverse employment action due to disability, etc.
[brief] Transcript of oral argument, dated November 16, 2022 .......................................................... 1T Transcript of oral argument, dated March 17, 2023 .......................................................... 2T # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Anderson v. Sammy Redd & Assocs., | 31 | | 278 N.J. Super. 50 (App. Div. 1994) | | | Arizona v. California, | 34 | | 460 U.S. 605, 103 S. Ct. 1382, 75 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1983) | | | Barrows v. Trs. Of Princeton Univ., | 24, 27 | | 244 N.J. Super. 144 (Law Div. 1990) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 18, 36, 40, 41 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, | 31, 32 | | 95 N.J. 280 (1984) | | | Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Cred. Union, | 31 | | 199 N.J. 381 (2009) | | | Buckelew v. Grossbard, | 20 | | 87 N.J. 512 (1981) | | | Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., | 31 | | 89 N.J. 270 (1982) | | | Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, | 19 | | 143 N.J. 565 (1996) | | | Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cty. Improvement Auth., | 17 | | 404 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 2009)
[brief] The Contract specifically provides that:  “Any dispute regarding the applicability, enforcement or interpretation of Paragraph E or this Paragraph F shall be resolved by a court having proper jurisdiction. ”  Plaintiffs object to the following specific provisions of Paragraphs E and F (double spaced and in much larger font here):  1.  “IF EITHER PARTY ELECTS TO ARBITRATE A DISPUTE, [...] AND CUSTOMER WAIVE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND TO OTHERWISE LITIGATE THE DISPUTE IN COURT.  BY AGREEING TO ARBITRATE, THE PARTIES MAY ALSO WAIVE OTHER RIGHTS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE IN COURT.  FURTHER, IF EITHER PARTY ELECTS TO ARBITRATE A DISPUTE, CUSTOMER WAIVES ITS RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OR TO PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER OF ANY CLASS ACTION RELATING TO THE DISPUTE.  This means that all Disputes selected for arbitration will be arbitrated on an individual basis, between [...] and Customer only, without exception. ” (Pa21, para. F).  2.  “Because Customer’s transaction(s) with [...] involve interstate commerce, this Arbitration Agreement and any Dispute arbitrated hereunder shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). ” (Pa21, pg. 7, para. F).  3.  “[...] SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE TO CUSTOMER FOR INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, COLLATERAL, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR LOSSES SUCH AS BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF REVENUESLOSS OF ANTICIPATED SAVINGS OR LOST PROFITS, WHETHER OR NOT FORESEEABLE, AND WHETHER ARISING IN CONTRACT (INCLUDING WARRANTY), TORT (INCLUDING ACTIVE, PASSIVE OR IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE), STRICT LIABILITY OR OTHERWISE. ” (Pa20, pg. 6, para. E 3).  4.  “THE PROVISIONS OF THIS PARAGRAPH E ALL APPLY NO MATTER HOW THE LOSS, DAMAGE OR INJURY OR OTHER CONSEQUENCE OCCURS, EVEN IF DUE TO [...]’S PERFORMANCE OR NONPERFORMANCE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS CONTRACT OR FROM NEGLIGENCE (ACTIVE OR OTHERWISE), STRICT LIABILITY, VIOLATION OF ANY APPLICABLE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW OR ANY OTHER ALLEGED FAULT ON THE PART OF [...], ITS AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES. ” (Pa20, pg. 6, para. E 4).
[brief] The judgment that [...] entered incorporated the “Mid-Marriage Agreement” that was made part of the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement.  But New Jersey law provides that mid-marriage agreements are “inherently coercive” and generally unenforceable.  *Pacelli*, supra, 319 N.J. Super. 191.  Such agreements are supposed to be carefully reviewed by a family court because they are “pregnant with the opportunity for one party to use the threat of dissolution ‘to bargain themselves into positions of advantage. ’”  *Pacelli*, supra, 319 N.J. Super. 185; *Steele v. Steele*, 467 N.J. Super. 414, 436 (App. Div. 2021), cert. denied, 258 A.3d 348 (N.J. 2021).  “[A]t the very least, they must be closely scrutinized and carefully evaluated” before given effect, *Pacelli*, supra, 319 N.J. Super. 185.  [...] did not apply any scrutiny to the Mid-Mariage Agreement he was asked to effectuate.  In *Pacelli*, supra, 319 N.J. Super. 185, the court refused to enforce a “mid-nuptial” agreement, criticizing the husband’s “creative accounting” --- January 2014, for example, (15T72:18-73:22), [...] testified that he and [...] sat in a conference room at [...] and reviewed the agreement together “page by page. ”  16T45:24-46:15.  This was plainly not “independent counsel” of [...]’s own choosing. of the value of assets at the time the parties entered into the agreement, and stressing the great potential for coercion inherent in such agreements which, if enforced, allow one party to use the threat of dissolution of marriage to “bargain themselves into a position of advantage. ”  Those same concerns were present in this case.  In the document itself, [...] used a threat of “$15 million dollars of claims” and “certain criminal claims against [...] which may be brought by third parties which also carry with it the potential of substantial civil liability as well.
[directive] Assignment Judges To: DIRECTIVE: 22-23  Trial Court Administrators  # Direct/ [...], Administrative From: Criminal Justice Reform - Changes to the Preliminary Public Subj: Safety Assessment Run by Law Enforcement  Decem her 13, 2023 Date:  This Directive advises of changes to the method in which a Preliminary Public Safety Assessment (Preliminary PSA) is generated.  Available immediately, an automatic Preliminary PSA will generate once a law enforcement officer has fingerprinted a defendant using an approved Live Scan fingerprinting device and then selects to request a complaint-warrant in eCDR.  This feature will be added to all complaint generation in a future enhancement.  In its June 2023 report, the Reconvened Joint Committee on Criminal Justice (JCCJ) issued 31 new recommendations to help improve Criminal Justice Reform (CJR).  Recommendation 5, put forth by law enforcement representatives, sought to automate the Preliminary PSA to assist law enforcement staff.  Recommendation 5 of the Reconvened JCCJ Report specifically states:  "The Judiciary should seek to modify its eCDR system so that a Preliminary PSA is automatically generated for law enforcement once a defendant has been fingerprinted and a complaint initiated."  This Directive effectuates Recommendation 5.  Accordingly, once law enforcement fingerprints a defendant in accordance with current LiveScan procedures, and as required by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2016-6 v.3.0 ("Modification of Directive Establishing Interim Policies, Practices, and Procedures to Implement Criminal Justice Reform  ADA ENSURlNG rm  AN OPEN DOOR TO JUSTICE  Americans with Disabilities Act Directive #22-23 (Preliminary PSA Changes)
[brief] Walters v. Starbucks 623 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. New York 2022); Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Company, Inc. 112 F. 4th 74 (4th Cir. 2024); Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 111F.4th 895 (8th Cir. 2024)
[directive] If a subject-officer is invited to the grand jury and opts to Subject-officer appear, standard target warnings will be issued, outside the presence of the grand jurors.  E. questions.  After factual and legal presentation, the presenting attorney will  Grand juror ask the grand jury whether any of the members of the grand jury have any questions of law for the presenting attorney or questions of fact for any witnesses.  If grand jurors have follow-up questions or requests for additional relevant evidence, every effort must be made to respond to these questions or requests.  The presenting attorney will advise the grand jury that all of the exhibits will remain in the grand jury room for their examination and use during their deliberations.  The presenting attorney will be available for any questions that may arise during their deliberations, but will not be present in the grand jury room for deliberations.  IV.
[brief] (Aa30-31).  [...] also defended the timeliness of its final determination, which was rendered within the mandated time frames after the Commission extended its time to complete the investigation in January 2023.  Ibid.  [...] also articulated the basis of its jurisdiction and competent evidence supporting its determination about the core allegations against [...] (Aa32-35).  First, [...] was a [...] employee and, as a public employee, subject to the State Policy even while on a union leave.  (Aa31).  Second, under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1, the State Policy applies to “conduct that occurs in the workplace” or “at any location that can reasonably be regarded as an extension of the workplace,” including any facility where State business is being conducted and discussed.  (Aa31-32).  Applying this rule, [...] found that all State employees are subject to the State Policy at offsite locations, including in front of a state building and at a local union office, as [...]’s conduct was here.
[brief] [...] also admit that many of the tenants in 2018 were not there in 1994, despite initial attempts by [...] to claim that each and every item in [...]’s Report existed on the premises in 1994.  [...]’s conclusions regarding the value of phantom items were highly speculative.  Significantly, FF&E are not attributed value simply because they exist at the condemned property.  A purchaser must be reasonably willing to pay an additional amount on top of the market value of the Property because the FF&E specifically enhance said market value in an “as improved” state.  Toilets, sinks, and ceiling tiles are inherently included in the market value of a property.  Put differently, a homebuyer would not find that toilets, electrical outlets, and lights substantially enhanced the value of the property because the expectation is that those items are already factored into the market value.  [...] never reached a conclusion that these items actually enhanced the fair market value of the Property, or to what amount a reasonable buyer would pay for such items on top of the base valuation.  [...] explicitly testified that he was not rendering such an opinion:  “Q: You don’t render -- you don’t render an opinion as to the value or impact on value of real estate, if any, in connection with furniture, fixtures,and equipment, is that correct?  A: That is correct. ”  5T163:15-19.  [...] inherently acknowledged the unreliability of the [...] Report when he voluntarily knocked off $66,635 from the $616,635 appraisal by Charles [...], simply because [...] “knew” how [...] operated.  6T237:1-13.  The Trial Court erred when it denied the Township’s motion to bar the [...] Report as a net opinion.  The [...] Report was an unreliable expert opinion that should never have been brought to the fact-finder’s attention.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 526.  The Court went on to hold “the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that [...]’s conduct lulled plaintiff and his counsel into believing that the uninsured motorist claim had been properly filed.  Plaintiff reasonably relied on [...]’s conduct in failing to file a complaint or request arbitration within the statute of limitations period. ”  *Id.* at 527.  Importantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court went on to hold: “we do not read the Appellate Division opinion as requiring a notice requirement in all cases where the insurer intends to raise a statute of limitations defense.  Rather, the majority essentially found that [...] was equitably estopped from raising a statute of limitation defense because during its investigation [...] acted as though plaintiff’s claim had been filed, and it failed to inform plaintiff that its investigation did not toll the running of the applicable statute of limitations. ”  *Id.* at 528.