ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Sukin v. Northfield Bd. of Ed., 171 N.J. Super. 184, 187 (App. Div. 1979)  Theodore v. Dover Bd. of Ed., 183 N.J. Super. 407, 412-13 (App. Div. 1982)  Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living v. Hous. Auth. of City of Pittsburgh, 382 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2004)
[brief] The types of “work” that are “subject to the act [PWCRA]” are visible in the Act’s registration requirement, which applies to contractors bidding on “public work as defined in the [Prevailing Wage Act, N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.25 *et seq.* (“Prevailing Wage Act”). ”  See N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 (referencing N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.26, “or for which payment of the prevailing wage is required by any other provision of law. ”); see also 0016a-0017a.
[brief] In [...]’ pocket they found a key to his apartment, which, along with up to nine or more officers, they took him and; as several officers fanned out through the apartment, the illegal questioning continued for nearly a half-hour, during which he supposedly acknowledged ownership and control of his BMW, the duffel bags of cocaine, and the small metal lockbox which the police seized from him at the time of his arrest.  Thus, by the time the police sought consent to waive his Fourth Amendment right to refuse consent to search for physical evidence, they had already violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  In such circumstance, it makes no constitutional sense to conclude that any physical evidence obtained as a result of that misconduct need not be suppressed, the consequence of which would be to give “an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda,” and thus “an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case. ”  United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 646 (2004) (Souter, J. dissenting).  Just as the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation (e.g. an arrest without probable cause) may not be made constitutionally palatable based on what was discovered in a claimed “consent” search following that arrest -- even where Miranda warnings have been provided,\textsuperscript{17} -- where the taint arises from a Fifth Amendment violation, even one following an otherwise lawful arrest, the same doctrine applies to require exclusion of both statements made acknowledging custody, control or ownership of identified items, residences or vehicles, and the resulting “fruits” found under the authority of any subsequently obtained “consent” to search.  The warrantless search and seizure which husbanded the evidentiary tree in this case occurred in Illinois.  If the court agrees with [...] that [...]’s decision, applying Illinois law, was erroneous, then it is submitted, all fruits derived from that Fourth Amendment violation must be suppressed.  But [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration was to suppress evidential fruits, both verbal and tangible, “seized” in New Jersey -- and in New York as well-- without a warrant, based on a violation of his Miranda rights occurring in New Jersey.  In failing to apply the fruits doctrine in this case, as our State courts have consistently done over the years, [...] erred in her denial of [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration, and her decision should be reversed.
[brief] All Plaintiff and his expert were able to say is that there was plywood and snow in the area where Plaintiff claims he fell.  Neither Plaintiff nor his expert were able to say that Plaintiff tripped on or slipped on the plywood.  Indeed, as Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and medical records make clear, Plaintiff has no idea why he fell.  There was simply no genuine issue of material fact in dispute.  Plaintiff was unable to establish proximate cause – one of the necessary elements he must demonstrate to find that [...] was negligent with regard to the alleged incident.  Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of [...] by the trial court.
[brief] ”  Jarwick, 2018 WL 2449133, at *29.  Under that correct standard, fees incurred before any RICO claim was investigated or brought are simply not recoverable. \(^7\) B.  The Trial Court and Special Master erred by awarding fees for work that was not “reasonably required to establish the RICO claims. ” (39089a-39090a; 40005a-40010a).  In its 2018 decision, this Court required a close relationship between the RICO claims and the fees and costs awarded.  For “fees and costs for time spent establishing wrongful acts on the part of defendants that pre-dated the time for which the RICO claims could be asserted,” this Court required a finding that “the time devoted to presenting that evidence was reasonably required to --- \(^7\)  The [...] do not bear the burden of determining precisely when RICO claims were first investigated.  Plaintiffs bear that burden, and have failed to establish in their own time records how any fees prior to the filing of the October 1, 2009 Complaints are entitled to recovery.  “[A]pplications for counsel fees are to ‘be accompanied by contemporaneously recorded time records that fully support the calculation of hours expended by all attorneys who participated in the matter. ’”  Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191, 201, 290 A.3d 159, 164 (2023).
[brief] Pursuant to the court’s June 24, 2024 order, the [...] and [...] have since been dismissed from this matter.  On June 28, 2024, Appellants entered a stipulation of dismissal, agreeing to dismiss the [...] from this matter. to support the Commissioner’s findings; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the Commissioner “clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. ”  *In re Herrmann*, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007) (quoting *Mazza v. Bd. of Trs.*, 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).
[brief] Under R. 4:46-2(c) (“Proceedings and Standards on [Summary Judgment] Motions”):  The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  Under *Brill*, “when deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46–2, the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”\(^{46}\)  “It is critical that a trial court ruling on a summary judgment motion not shut a deserving litigant from his or her trial”. \(^{47}\)  The “motion judge [is] to engage in an analytical process essentially the same as that necessary to rule on a motion for a directed verdict: ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law’. ”\(^{48}\) --- \(^{46}\)  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 523, holding modified by *Schneider v. Simonini*, 163 N.J. 336 (2000)  \(^{47}\)  *Brill*, supra, 142 N.J. at 540-41 (internal citations and quotations omitted)  \(^{48}\)  *Brill*, supra, 142 N.J. at 533 (internal citation omitted)  POINT THIRTEEN [Denial of discovery] (Argued Pa231; Pa449–Pa450)
[brief] ”  [Emphasis added]  The second paragraph, addressing the need for the exemption, reads:  SECTION 9.02  Importance of Tax Exemption  In accordance with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, specifically N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(b), the Township has reviewed the Application and accompanying financial information and it has determined that this Agreement is a critical in Project in the Township due to the extraordinary costs associated with the development of the Property.  The tax exemption permits the development of underutilized property and provides a stream of revenue in the form of the Annual Service Charges.  The Annual Service Charge will allow the Units to be sold at marketable prices and leased at marketable rates, which will ensure the likelihood of the success of the Project and ensure that it will have a positive impact on the surrounding area.  The tax exemption permits the development of the Project in an area that cannot otherwise be developed in its proposed scope by reducing the expenses associated with the ownership or operation of the Project.  Reduced expenses allows for more competitive purchase prices and rents, thus helping to ensure the Project’s success.  As a result, the locational decisions of the probable residents and tenants will be influenced positively by the tax exemption.  *Considering current market conditions, economic factors and development costs impacting this Project, it is not financially feasible to undertake the development of this Project in the absence of the tax exemption provided for herein.  Without the Project, the benefits described above would not be realized.*”  [Emphasis added].
[brief] For example, in Carter Lincoln-Mercury v. EMAR Group, supra, 135 N.J. at 195-204, 638 A.2d 1288 the Court held that an insurance broker's duty to investigate through reasonable inquiry the financial soundness of the insurance carrier with which the broker intended to place insurance extends not only to the insured, but also to other claimants for whose protection the insurance was procured, including the loss-payees who were not yet identified at the time the broker placed the insurance.  In *Petrillo v. Bachenberg*, 139 N.J. 472, 487 (1995) the court held that an attorney who provided a composite report of some, but not all percolation tests performed on the property to a real estate broker, and then represented the broker as the seller in the sale of the property assumed a duty to the prospective purchaser to provide reliable information regarding the percolation tests since the attorney should have foreseen the use of the report in any attempted sale and that prospective purchasers would rely on the report in deciding whether to purchase the property.  In *Rosenblum v. Adler*, 93 N.J. 324, 352, 461 A.2d 138 (1983) the Court held that an independent auditor who furnishes an opinion with no limitation in the certificate as to whom the company may disseminate the financial statements has a duty to all whom the auditor should reasonably foresee as recipients of the statements for proper business purposes who would rely on the statements pursuant to those business purposes.  In *R.J. Longo Const. Co. v. Schragger*, 218 N.J. Super. 206, 209-10, 527 A.2d 480 (App. Div. 1987) the Court held that an attorney for a municipality who prepares contract documents to be used by the public in the bidding process for construction of a sewer facility may be held liable to the successful bidder for economic losses due to the negligent failure adequately to draft the contract or for the negligent failure to obtain easement rights of way on behalf of the municipality.  In *Albright v. Burns*, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 632-33, 503 A.2d 386 (App.Div.1986) the Court held that an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to persons who, not strictly clients, he knows or should know rely on him in his professional capacity.  Each of the above cases stand for the proposition that licensed professional owe a duty of care based on the heightened knowledge of the party upon whom the duty is imposed even where there is no contractual obligation to do so.
[directive] B.  The Court may issue a certificate to a qualified offender who is or had previously been under Probation supervision or was not required to serve any period of supervision if: 1. the applicant is convicted of a second, third, or fourth degree offense; 2. the applicant has not been convicted of a crime since the conviction for which the person is under supervision, does not have a pending criminal charge, and there is no information presented that such a charge is imminent; Revised: 03/2024, CN: XXXXX Page of 4
[directive] (a)  Cases Involving the Care of Minor Children of Persons Being Incarcerated (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.2)  1)  When a defendant is convicted of a crime for which they may be incarcerated the judge shall order as part of the presentence investigation that a determination be made as to whether the defendant is the sole caretaker of a minor child and, if so, who will assume responsibility for the child’s care and custody while the defendant is incarcerated.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  17 POINT I: DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS.  .................................................................................................................................  17  POINT II: THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF BIAS FROM JUROR 12 AND TRIAL COUNSEL’S DECISION NOT TO USE A PEREMPTORY STRIKE OR ARGUE FOR HER RECUSAL DID NOT OBLIGATE THE COURT TO INDEPENDANTLY RECUSE HER (NOT RAISED BELOW).  ..............................................................................................................  26 POINT III: DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT REFUSING A BLOOD DRAW WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AS CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT.  .............................................................................................................................................  33  POINT IV: DETECTIVE DOTTO’S STATEMENT  IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT IN A PHOTO EXTRACTED FROM HILL’S PHONE WAS PLAIN ERROR.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).  ....................................................................................  41  POINT V: THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF THE TATTOO EVIDENCE WERE NOT ERRONEOUS.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).  .......................................................................................  45  CONCLUSION
[brief] Similarly, in [...] Construction, Inc. v. Township of Clinton, 276 N.J.Super. 216 (Law Div. 1994), a low bidder's proposal was found to be nonconforming and deficient when the bidder submitted a consent of surety containing equivocal language, which merely stated that the surety “would not anticipate any difficulty in providing bonds on the above-captioned project. ”  Id. at 220.  The court held that such a noncommittal undertaking did not meet the requirements of the bid specifications, and could not be cured after the bid opening:  If [...] is permitted to “cure” his defective bond the taxpayers will have the benefit of the lowest bid.  Surely a savings of tax dollars can be considered to be a public good.  But the greater public policy good is in insuring the integrity of the bidding process.  Strict standards must be maintained so that there is no opportunity for unfettered discretion or favoritism in the public bidding process.
[brief] 5a; 57a.  [...] included claims against Brian and [...].  49a.  Brian and [...] filed counterclaims, alleging wrongfull eviction (among other things).  6a; 53a.  The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., tried the two actions on April 8, 2016.  67a.  In an April 8, 2016 Opinion (32a), [...] found that (i) [...] had no obligation to cure any perceived defects with the property or to perform requested remediation, (ii) the Phillipses had 30 days to pay sums due under the contract, and (iii) if the Phillipses failed to pay the money within 30 days, [...] would be free to sell the property to [...].
[brief] Appellant has presented prima facie cases with extensive supporting evidence identifying material account errors and been denied opportunity every time to rebut and defend against [...]’s erroneous account record, to face his accuser, [...], in a court of law, to present his proofs before the court, to cross-examine [...] as to its account errors, and to obtain fair and impartial adjudication and finding of fact as to the disputed facts of the case.  4.
[brief] (Halpern_Pb 59-60).  As to Leonard and [...], the specific findings as to their culpability provided even less support for the imposition of punitive damages.  The Trial Court adopted the theory, unsupported by any case citation, that knowledge of and “fail[ure] to stop” [...]’s transfer of funds, constituted a wanton and willful omission under the PDA (40138a-45a).  As to the imposition of a 2.5x multiplier on punitive damages, Plaintiffs do not seriously address the substantial amount of compensatory damages and interest already awarded.  The punitive damage award runs afoul of equitable principles, New Jersey law, and Due Process.  Here, the Trial Court awarded over $16 million of punitive damages, atop more than $50 million in compensatory damages and interest alone.  Such an award warrants re-examination.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  Statutory Background  Nearly one hundred years ago, the Legislature recognized the importance of strong securities laws to New Jersey’s economic health and well-being.  With the passage of the New Jersey Securities Act (L. 1927, c. 79), the Legislature announced its purpose:  Harm to the economic life and health of this State is brought about through the use of all sorts of deceptive schemes imposed on the public in the purchase and sale of stocks, bonds, and other papers in the form of securities.  The subject is of wide importance to the community and the consequence of such schemes are generally injurious.  It is within the protective power of the State and is a matter of public concern to intervene, to check, suppress, and prevent such evils, and such is the purpose of this act.  The Legislature enacted the Securities Law in 1967 to adapt to the ever-changing field of securities, make the Securities Law more uniform to our sister states, and to adequately fulfill the public policy purpose of investor protection.  The 1967 version of the Securities Law authorized the Superior Court to stop “illegal practices. ”  N.J.S.A. 49:3-69 (1967).  It states:  (a)  When it shall appear to the bureau chief that a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to --- 1  Because the procedural and factual histories are closely related, they are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience. engage in, any practices declared to be illegal and prohibited by this law or when it shall appear that it will be against the public interest for any person to issue, sell, offer for sale, purchase, offer to purchase, promote, negotiate, advertise or distribute any securities from or within this State, the Attorney General on his behalf may bring an action in the Superior Court and apply therein for injunctive relief, or the appointment of a receiver, or both.  The court may proceed in the action in a summary manner or otherwise.[]  [N.J.S.A. 49:3-69 (1967). ]  Additional Securities Law amendments in 1985 expanded the Bureau’s powers to adequately protect investors.
[brief] For example, Plaintiff not only failed to set forth what constitutionally protected rights of hers were violated, she also failed to identify how they were violated, and by whom they were violated.  Defendants are left in the dark as to what constitutional rights of Plaintiff's were infringed, if any at all.  As set forth above, the Plaintiff now asserts times and dates when she was allegedly denied access to church services.  See Appellant's SOF pgs 2-3.  These "new facts" were not presented to the Trial Court at any of the three proceedings for dismissal or even at the appellate level previously, and thus are improper.  This use of such an argument violates R. 2:6-2.  See e. g., County of Essex, 186 N.J. at 51; New Jersey Citizens Underwriting Reciprocal Exchange, 399 N.J. Super. at 50; Atlantic States Group, 383 N.J. Super. at 431; Triffin, 372 N.J. Super. 517; Monek, 354 N.J. Super. at 456.  Notwithstanding this, the Appellate Division and Trial Courts below all agreed that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint has utterly failed to establish a protected interest in attending church services if her name was not on the list, holding that "Allowing prisoners to leave their cells only if they appear on the appropriate list is reasonably related to the institutional needs of the prison.  Plaintiff did not make out a cognizable claim for deprivation of the right to freely exercise her religion."  Thus, the Court cannot sustain any claim for denial of religious services.
[brief] That is, whether the defendant had withdrawn consent or not, the seizure was lawful.  Any issue of conflicting testimony appearing at trial on the consent issue did not affect the trial court judge’s ultimate conclusion as it was drawn on grounds unrelated to that testimony.  Witnesses rarely, if ever, testify identically between motion hearings and trial.  The more detailed elucidations made by the witnesses at trial did not call for a *sua sponte* rehearing and reversal of the trial court judge’s original ruling, which was well-grounded and well-documented.  Da9-27.  No objection nor request to that effect was made by defense counsel (nor by the State).  In sum, the trial court judge’s ruling was not “so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ”  It was well-supported by facts drawn from the testimony at the hearing, which were thoroughly explained in the judge’s written opinion.  Da9-27.  The State asserts that the Court should “accord[] deference to [the] factual findings because they “are substantially influenced by an opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”  *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).  II.