ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In 2015, [...] was investigated for reporting motor vehicle/pedestrian stops inaccurately, at which time he pled guilty to two (2) violations of departmental rules and regulations, specifically, "performance of duty" for failing to comply with Traffic Enforcement and MVR policies.  Pa23-34, Pa50-103.  In January 2016, [...] was assigned to [...] to obtain remedial training on the MVR Policy, Traffic Enforcement Policy, as well as how to properly calculate your Monthly Activity Sheet.  [...] was shown by [...] how to compare his Monthly Activity Sheet against the RMS system to ensure an accurate Monthly Activity Sheet.  [...] advised that he does not compare his Monthly Activity Sheet against the RMS system regularly as he was instructed to do so by [...].  Statistical Data is vital in directing resources and ensuring that we are efficiently serving our community.  [...] continued to inaccurately record his statistical data, which affects his bi-annual evaluations, which he has failed five (5) out of seven (7) times from January 2014 to the end of June 2017.  It also affects the peer per-day statistics, as well as the way we provide service to the people of our community.  Most importantly, it diminishes the position that we hold as law enforcement officers to protect and serve our community.  The same community that relies on our knowledge, integrity, and oath to uphold the laws of the State of New Jersey and the Constitution of the United States to keep them safe.  His lack of suitable attention in this area is unacceptable and will not be tolerated.
[brief] No possibility of coverage exists for [...].  As conceded by [...], the [...] were only pursuing a claim of tortious interference.  (Db, p. 5).  To succeed with a tortious-interference claim, plaintiff must show an intent to injure.  Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 751.  [...]’s Policy excludes coverage for injuries caused by the insured “with the knowledge that the act . . . would inflict ‘personal and advertising injury[.]’” (Da182).  According, no possibility of coverage remains and a declaration acknowledging this is appropriate.
[directive] SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2006-3: Notice to Replace Body Armor Vests Containing Zylon® Attached is the Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2006-3 dated March 7, 2006, directing that all law enforcement agencies in New Jersey must replace all officer ballistic body armor containing the fiber Zylon®, effective immediately, and no later than December 31, 2006.  jk
[directive] C.9:6-8.10c  Child abuse record information check on designated caretaker.  2.  a.  Upon receiving the presentencing investigation information from the court pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2003, c.301 (C.2C:44-6.2) concerning a sole caretaker of a child who will be incarcerated and the person who will assume care and custody of the child during the period of incarceration, the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Human Services shall conduct a child abuse record information check of its child abuse records to determine if an incident of child abuse or neglect has been substantiated against the person who will be responsible for the child's care and custody or any adult and juvenile over 12 years of age in the person's household.
[brief] The Board finds that the Applicant has not met required proofs for the Bulk Variances as required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1) and otherwise provided by law.  The Board finds that the same reasons expressed for the denial of the Use Variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1), and the two (2) Height Variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6), are equally applicable to the Bulk Variances and therefore denies the Bulk Variances.  The Board further notes that the presence of the eagle's nest and the required buffer does creates a hardship; however the number, type, character and extent of the Bulk Variances requested are far too intense and exceed a reasonable modification of the site to offset the impact of the eagle's nest.  These variances result in an overly intense use of the developable portion of the site and serve only to advance the Applicant's economic interest which has been specifically rejected by the Courts as a basis to justify the granting of variances.  4.
[brief] The parking lot remained in the exclusive control of the landlord.  The “common area” charges and the conduct of [...] in hiring a snow removal contractor support this interpretation of the contract.  As this defendant had no control over the parking lot, the imposition of such a duty upon it would have been legally unsupportable.  The *Kandrac* Court also found that “the imposition of a duty on the tenants would result in duplicative effort and interference with the landlord’s maintenance program.  It is not hard to imagine the confusion, and perhaps danger, that could ensue if snow plows and salt trucks hired by the landlord, [...], [...], and [...] all attempted to maintain the parking lot at the same time…”  *Id.*, at 90.
[brief] Government Regulation of Public Water Supply  National Park’s supply of water is regulated by federal and state entities such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”).  Among the regulations imposed by federal and state agencies are maximum contaminant levels (“MCLs”) for various contaminants found in public water supplies.  See 40 C.F.R. 141; N.J.A.C. 7:10–5.1.  Included is an MCL for perflorononanoic acid (“PFNA”), which is one of several per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”) recently recognized as emerging contaminants of concern.  See N.J.A.C. 7:10- 5.5(2)a5.  For PFNA, NJDEP has adopted an MCL of 13 parts per trillion (“ppt”).  Id.  When NJDEP adopted its MCL for PFNA in 2018, it was the first drinking water MCL for PFNA anywhere in the United States.  C.
[brief] (2T: 168:17 – 169:08, [...]’s testimony); see also Da051, [...]’s January 13, 2023 evaluation note.  Also see (2T: 112:22 – 113:04, [...]’s testimony).  17.  This diagnosis and others were offered into evidence through three (3) physicians; [...], [...], and [...]; [...] who specifically opined to the aggravation injury, without objection.  Id. 18.  Furthermore, Respondent had no prior medical history relevant to her cervical spine, which was corroborated by the defense medical expert’s review of Respondent’s primary care records, predating the subject collision. (3T: 275:10 – 277:15, [...]’s testimony).  19.  Despite the admission of said evidence without any objection, Appellant objects to the reading of Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F, the Aggravation charge, on the bases that: 1) Respondent did not present sufficient comparative analysis to support the diagnosis of an aggravation; and 2) that the timing of the charge being added, specifically after closing arguments, was unduly prejudicial to the defense.
[brief] THE [...] IS NOT A LEGAL FORUM FOR PURPOSES OF TRIGGERING THE SEVERANCE PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-3).  The Chancery Division correctly recognized the existence of two distinct legal forums: “the [...] is the legal forum for rulings on the validity of Plaintiff’s [IOD application] and that the Superior Court is the forum for rulings regarding the Agreement itself. ”
[brief] Omitted see 625a  Exhibit 9  January 16, 2018  Settlement Agreement between the [...] and [...] and [...]  Omitted see 230a  Exhibit 10  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories………………………………………833a  Exhibit 11  March 17, 2017  Order to Show Cause in the First Police Matter…………864a  Exhibit 12  Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories…………872a  Exhibit 13  Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Interrogatories………..895a  Exhibit 14  Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' First Requests for Admissions………904a  Exhibit 15  Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Third Set of Interrogatories…………922a  Exhibit 16  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories…………………………………………………………930a  Exhibit 17  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories………………………………………………………………761a  Exhibit 18  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories.........................................................795a  Exhibit 19  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories......................................................826a  Exhibit 20  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories.....................................................858a  Exhibit 21  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories.......................................................890a  Exhibit 22  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories.......................................................923a  Exhibit 23  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories.......................................................955a  Certification of [...], Esq. in support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend the Discovery End Date..........................987a Exhibit A May 23, 2019
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT THAT THE PASSAGE OF TIME HAD ON THE PLAINTIFFS’ CALCULATION OF DAMAGES.  (Da59 & Da85)  This argument is made at length in [...]’s post-trial submission\(^{51}\) and motion to vacate.\(^{52}\)  For the sake of brevity, the argument is not repeated herein, but the Appellate Division is respectfully directed to the aforementioned sections of the Appendix.  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT.
[brief] [...], and [...]  [...]  A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION  8025  BLACK HORSE PIKE  WEST ATLANTIC CITY, NJ  08401 [...]  Attorneys for Respondents  On the Brief: [...], Esquire  Attorney ID #233741967  TABLE OF CONTENTS  INDEX TO CITATIONS .................................................. ii  INDEX TO APPENDIX .................................................. iii  INTRODUCTION ..........................................................  1  RESPONDENTS’ PROCEDURAL HISTORY & STATEMENT OF FACTS . .  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................  4  A. INTERLOCUTORY REQUIREMENT .........................  4  B.  THE DECISION BELOW .......................................  6  C.  CASE LAW AND INTERPRETATION ..........................
[brief] Legislative intent is considered one of the most certain means of establishing the true sense of an ordinance’s terms.  Clifton v. Passaic County Board of Taxation, 28 N.J. 411, 421 (1958); Caputo v. The Best Foods, 17 N.J. 259, 265 (1955).  The first step to determine legislative intent requires an examination of the language within the ordinance.  Schad, 160 N.J. at 170.  If the language is clear and unambiguous, its meaning controls; if, however, the language is susceptible to different interpretations, then extrinsic factors, such as the ordinance's purpose, legislative history and context must be considered. ”  Id.  Even where legislative intent may be derived from the language used in an ordinance, “[w]here a literal reading will lead to a result not in accord with the essential purpose and design of the act, the spirit of the act will control the letter. ”  Id.; N.J. Builders, Owners and Managers Association v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330 (1972).  Distinct provisions of a zoning ordinance addressing the same subject matter should be read and construed together as one legislative enactment.  Clifton, 28 N.J. at 421; Key Agency v. Continental Cas. Co., 31 N.J. 98, 103 (1959).  In addition, more specific ordinance provisions control over general provisions.  W. Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co., 55 N.J.336, 339 (1970); Lawrence v. Butcher, 130 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 1974).
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...]  On appeal from the Superior Court of New, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], P.J.S.C.  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT  [...] [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant  [...]  Submitted:  On the brief: [...], Esq. (ID No. 032071985)  [...]  [...], Esq. (ID No. 041312008)  [...]  [...], Esq. (ID No. 407612022)  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] CONCLUSION ...........................................................................  25  TABLE OF DECISION BEING APPEALED  June 23, 2021 - Highlands  Applicability Determination and Water Quality Management Plan  Consistency Determination (“HAD”) issued to [...], by the [...]  ........................................  Aa0001  1  “Aa” refers to Appellants’ appendix, which was filed with the Appellants’ Initial Brief in this appeal, on September 22, 2022.
[brief] 7  While the Verified Complaint sets forth a valid cause of action for breach of the good faith and fair dealing under either State’s law, New York places a greater burden on pleading the claim than New Jersey and, therefore, application of New York law would violate fundamental New Jersey principles surrounding that common law claim.  See Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 756 (D.N.J. 2013).  New Jerseyans for Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrections, 185 N.J. 137 (2005)).
[brief] Our courts have held that members of certain boards can do their own research such as conduct site inspections in furtherance of making decisions.  In Kempner v. Edison Twp., 54 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1959), the Appellate Division explicitly stated that a Board of Adjustment may rely upon its own independent inspection so long as the Board then discloses the facts it learned at the inspection.  See Id. at 416.  This principle has been endorsed and validated by the Appellate Division various times.  See Giordano v. City Commission of the City of Newark, 2 N.J. 585, 67 A.2d 454, 455. (1949) (holding that “We approve of the practice, where practical, of a board of adjustment making an inspection of the site and the neighborhood generally.
[directive] BWC a acquires department a if Directive, of 12  Section this of provisions the to Subject could that conversation or image an record to it allow that capabilities audio/video enhanced with imaging, thermal or vision night infrared (e.g„ device wearing the officer the or by seen heard be not that distance), remote a at occurring conversations record would amplification that sound or Prosecutor County the of approval express the without used shall be not feature/capability with any accordance in designee, or Criminal Justice of Division the of Director the or designee, requirements. legal applicable RECORDINGS
[brief] State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012).  As a result, the State bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that any such stop or search is justified by one of the “well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. ”  Id. at 128-30.  One of those exceptions allows for an investigatory stop.  State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 272 (2017).  An investigatory stop can be sustained only if there is “reasonable and particularized suspicion . . . that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity. ”  State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002).  A person may not be detained “based on arbitrary police practices, the officer’s subjective good faith, or a mere hunch. ”  *State v. Coles*, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014).
[directive] Generally speaking, charges related to drug or alcohol use should  Drug and alcohol be considered for stationhouse adjustment, provided that a treatment plan, if clinically appropriate, is included as part of the stationhouse agreement.  When evaluating such cases, the County Prosecutor, or designee, should review all relevant information regarding the juvenile’s history of substance use or dependency, and check that any proposed treatment plan, where needed, is included in the stationhouse agreement and memorializes proper needs.6 referrals and recommendations to address the juvenile’s medical and mental health F. engagement.  As part of any stationhouse adjustment process, the law enforcement  Victim officer shall notify any victims of the juvenile’s unlawful conduct and seek to engage those victims in the resolution.  Where appropriate, law enforcement agencies may—and are encouraged to—employ restorative justice models, as they develop, that facilitate reconciliation between the victim and the juvenile.  G.
[brief] (15a-18a).  The issue for this Court on appeal is the improper rationale below in dismissing Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.  Specifically, the Trial Court imposed a prerequisite that under CEPA a plaintiff-employee must establish that the defendant-employer, prior to the plaintiff’s whistle-blowing activity, enunciated a specific order, directive, practice or policy that the plaintiff reasonably believed was incompatible with a law, regulation or clear mandate of public policy.  (23a).  No such onerous requirement exists under the CEPA statute or its case law.  Under this theory created by the Trial Court from whole cloth, an employer could engage in illegal activity, an employee could blow the whistle on it, but unless the employer previously announced its intention, or stated a policy, to engage in that illegal activity or to sanction it, no whistle-blowing activity took place.  The Trial Court’s restrictive reasoning is inconsistent with the CEPA statute and the case law interpreting it, as well as the requirement that the statute be liberally construed to achieve its important social goal of protecting whistleblowers from retaliation.  CEPA provides protection to an employee such as Plaintiff, a Police Captain who, in the performance of his duties, sought to enforce the law and was brazenly retaliated against by his employer for doing so, by way of Defendants’ illegal suspension of Plaintiff and Defendants’ false and public branding of Plaintiff as a racist cop.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment below and remand this matter for trial on Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.
[brief] The Plaintiff incorrectly states that Plemmons v. Blue Chip Insurance Services holding that insurance providers are “learned professionals” and exempt from claims under the Consumer Fraud Act.  387 N.J. Super. 551, 556 (App. Div. 2019).  Specifically, the court in Shaw v. Shand explicitly stated that its holding did not overturn Plemmons, but rather provided further explanation narrowing the standard.
[brief] New Jersey's No Fault Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 39:6A1 to 35, was "intended to serve as the exclusive remedy for payment of out-of-pocket medical expenses arising from an automobile accident."  Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 466, 842 A.2d 125 (2004) (citing Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 503, 512, 641 A.2d 248 (1994)).  The protections provided by the Act were meant to completely replace the courtroom oriented fault system that was perceived to be too inefficient.
[brief] [...] explained, “So, yes, I exactly -- I -- did I feel threatened?  I wasn't sure, it was my first interaction with him.  Did I feel threatened?  A bit, yes, I did feel threatened.  I also felt he was being very insensitive.  Did I fear for my life?  I didn't fear for my life because I – I had been in situations where I was much more fearful than having a student use this type of language with me, but did I feel threatened?  I wasn't sure because it was one of my first interactions after he had been admitted into the school.  So when I say "uncomfortable, threatened," I didn't know him well enough at the time to know which direction to take it.
[brief] Instead, here, as in Smart, if the police did not foresee the possibility that they would develop probable cause to search [...]’s car, they had no reason to undertake the entirely not-spontaneous act of surveilling that car and stopping the defendant.  Thus, as in Smart, the circumstances leading to probable cause were not unforeseeable and spontaneous.  They were foreseen by the police and caused the police to undertake a series of non-spontaneous investigative steps.  The State also asserts that because our Court relied on United States Supreme Court cases “as the foundation for its own automobile-exception law,” that these cases set the bounds of our state’s automobile exception.
[brief] “[...] advised the Division there was no actual layoff of its Recreation Department employees. ”  [Pa54,55]  The final administrative determination goes on again to state that the appellant “chose” to terminate his employment so he could collect unemployment benefits thereby severing the employee relationship.  [Pa54,55]  These statements are simply not correct and not supported by the record.  There was no formal discovery in this case, so there was little opportunity to determine how the Division, and then the Board made this decision.  After the appellant’s Notice of Appeal, the appellant was provided a package of information from the Board which included some internal emails that provide insight regarding this question.
[brief] Specifically, Plaintiff did not oppose or refute the following:  (1)  “The concept of a “fund in court” is intended to embrace certain situations in which equitable allowances should be made in a way that is compatible with the policy of the American Rule that each litigant shall bear his own costs.  (March 23, 2021 Appellate Decision, (Da250-252)) (emphasis added).  Defendant submits that based upon the history of this case and Plaintiff’s misdeeds and fruitless, costly litigation, it was inequitable to award legal fees to Plaintiff. ”  (Defendant’s Brief, page 30).  (2)  “And as important, the payment was made by Defendant, who, on the date he agreed to pay the $1,200,000 capital contribution to [...], owned all of the 40.8% minority interest.  It cannot be said that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit benefited beneficiaries other than the Plaintiff; Defendant cannot be said to have benefited if he funded the capital contribution.  Therefore, a critical essential element for fee shifting under R. 4:42-9(a)(2) was not met, and the Plaintiff’s fee application should have been dismissed. ”  (Defendant’s Brief, pages 40-41).  (3)  “The beneficiaries of the Estate did not benefit from the endless litigation that was engaged in by Plaintiff.  Moreover, the Estate paid administration fees totaling more than $322,809.33, which was to the detriment of everyone.  Plaintiff achieved his goals, as set forth throughout this brief, but Plaintiff’s lawsuit provided no benefit to the other beneficiaries. ”  (Defendant’s Brief, page 45).
[brief] The disposition of the motion is, at least in the first instance, entrusted to the "sound discretion" of the trial judge whose recusal is sought.  Magill v. Casel, 238 N.J.Super. 57, 63 (App.Div.1990); Bonnet, supra (155 N.J.Super. at 330).  It is improper for a judge to withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that he is disqualified "unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him to exist or is shown to be true in fact."  Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster, 212 N.J.Super. 350, 358, (App. Div.), certif. denied.  107 N.J. 60 (1986).  The challenged judge who hears the motion should clearly set forth the “objective and subjective bases for the ultimate decision."  Magill, supra (238 N.J.Super. at 65).  In construing the analogous federal statute on judicial disqualification, [...] stated in a concurring opinion that "[i]f through obduracy, honest mistake, or simple inability to attain self knowledge the judge fails to acknowledge a disqualifying predisposition or circumstance, an appellate court must order recusal no matter what the source."  Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 563 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  "Litigants ought not have to face a judge where there is reasonable question of impartiality ..."