ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (10T120:3-6; 10T119:20 to 120:2; 11T17:10-22).  [...]’s testimony also confirms that Petitioner did not have “full control” of the Home, as found by the Court.  [...] and Respondent both entered the walk-in closet before and after Decedent’s death.  (12T43:to 44:2; 12T43:to 44:2).  The Court’s finding that Petitioner destroyed the original prenuptial in a Rubbermaid box is based on speculation and conjecture and far reaching assumptions.  The facts demonstrate that Decedent did not regard the Photocopy to have any importance.  Indeed, Decedent would have no reason to conceal the making of the 2014 Will from Plaintiff if it was in accordance with the terms of an agreement between the parties.  Respondent acknowledged that prior to the Decedent’s death, Decedent never talked to Respondent about a prenuptial agreement.  (12T36:6-10).  Decedent did not maintain the prenuptial agreement in her safety deposit box, with her other important papers.  (11T119:1-5; P574a-P596a).  No justification for the failure to produce at trial an Original of the Photocopy.  The Court’s finding that “all original versions of the Agreement have been lost or destroyed” is without any factual support.  (P36a).  The Best Evidence Rule precluded admission of the photocopy.  No adequate, substantial or credible evidence was presented that reflected that the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement before their marriage and the introduction of the Photocopy was an abuse of discretion that resulted in manifest injustice that warrants reversal of the dismissal of Count Four of Petitioner’s complaint.
[brief] The First Motion to Dismiss the Second Action.  On September 30, 2021, Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the Complaint.  (Pa201–03.)  In the first motion to dismiss, [...] argued that the Complaint was barred by the entire controversy and collateral estoppel doctrines and failed to state a cause of action for bad faith, civil conspiracy, and a declaratory action.  Defendants also argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction while the First Appellate Action was pending.  On November 18, 2021, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss without prejudice to allow Defendants limited discovery to determine “[w]hat [[...]] knew, when he knew it as to the Entire Controversy Doctrine. ”  (2T12:1–2.)  The parties engaged in limited discovery, which consisted of [...]’s document production and a two-day deposition of [...].  (See Pa377–435; Pa455–78.)  B.
[brief] ” (1T8-2 to 14, 22-4 to 11).  The CI further indicated that the male was inside the vehicle wearing a fanny pack with a .44 magnum inside of it.  (1T8-14 to 15).  [...] later learned that this CI had provided around twenty tips before this one, and about seventy-five percent of them were reliable.  (1T9-3 to 12).  He did not know when [...] received the tip, but based on his training and experience, he was confident it was immediately before [...] relayed the information to him given the nature of the tip.
[brief] THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON GRADING OF THE THEFT CHARGE WERE NOT PLAINLY ERRONEOUS, AND THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORY FOR THAT CHARGE WAS REQUIRED BY APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY.  Defendant contends that the structure of the verdict sheet’s two questions regarding Count Five, alleging theft of movable property, was plainly erroneous in two regards.  First, Question 1(b) allegedly fatally failed to inform the jury of the State’s burden of proof on that question, which concerned the grading of the crime.  Second, bifurcation of the verdict into two questions, one for guilt, and the other for grading, allegedly violated a prohibition against such splitting imposed by controlling caselaw.  Neither argument was raised below, as defendant concedes, and neither argument satisfies the requirements of the applicable plain-error doctrine.
[brief] The Superior Court did not provide accommodation, where the defendant could have asked Counsel to amend his brief and/or bring up the discussion topic at the appeal hearing.  In regard to adjournment requests, the defendant made her requests within time, proposing a new trial date shortly after the initially scheduled trial date, as well as, abiding by the Superior Court’s request to send all submissions to the Court via [...].  The defendant’s request was filed time in accordance to N.J. Ct. R. 4:36-3(b), which reads as:  Rule 4:36 - Assignment for Trial in the Superior Court, N.J. Ct. R. 4:36 (“An initial request for an adjournment for a reasonable period of time to accommodate a scheduling conflict or the unavailability of an attorney, a party, or a witness shall be granted if made timely in accordance with this rule.  The request shall be made in writing stating the reason for the request and that all parties have consented thereto.  The written adjournment request, which shall be submitted to the civil division manager, shall also include a proposed trial date, agreed upon by all parties, to occur as soon as possible after the problem requiring the adjournment is resolved.  If consent cannot be obtained or if a second request is made, the court shall determine the matter by conference call with all parties.  Requests for adjournment should be made as soon as the need is known but in no event, absent exceptional circumstances, shall such request be made later than the close of business on the Wednesday preceding the Monday of the trial week.  No adjournments shall be granted to accommodate dispositive motions returnable on or after the scheduled trial date. ”)  POINT III
[directive] In all other circumstances, the prosecutor continues to retain the discretion to require the defendant to plead guilty to the offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1, or may instead account for the possession of weapons by means of the “Special Offense Characteristic” found in the original Guidelines, although in certain circumstances, the prosecutor may or in some cases must use both enhancement features in order to fully account for defendant’s relevant conduct.  See Section 7.1.
[brief] It bears repeating that the Department's current Public Access Rule does not allow the Department to require public access on an existing residential property when the only regulated activity is the re-construction of a shore protection structure (in this case, a bulkhead).  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(i).  This regulation was in place when the Permit was issued and is still on the books.  Despite the Department’s claim that this regulation was superseded by the Public Access Law, almost five years have passed since the Law was enacted, meaning that the Department has had ample time to notify the public of the Department’s position by updating its regulations to meaningfully clarify or facilitate the administration of the Public Access Law.  The Department nevertheless has not done so.
[brief] AS A MATTER OF LAW, [...] AND [...]’S REQUEST TO OVERTURN [...]’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING ORDINANCE AND FINANCIAL AGREEMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE.  The NJ Supreme Court was clear in its Mount Laurel IV ruling that the goal of the Court was “to establish an avenue by which towns can demonstrate their constitutional compliance to the courts through submission of a housing plan and use of processes, where appropriate, that are similar to those which would have been available through COAH for the achievement of substantive certification.
[brief] Reviewing courts “are cautioned not to substitute their judgment for those of our sentencing courts” and they should not intervene and disturb the sentence unless the sentencing judge abused his discretion in applying the facts to the law, which resulted in a sentence that “shocks the judicial conscience. ”  *State v. Case*, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014); *State v. Blackmon*, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010).  See also *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984) (confirming judge’s need not fear reviewing courts second-guessing sentences which were imposed in accordance with our Code and caselaw).  A sentencing court is required to identify the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, determine which factors are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, balance the relevant factors, and explain how it arrived at the appropriate sentence.  *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014); *State v. O’Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989).
[brief] It was agreed between [...]’s counsel and the municipal prosecutor that [...]’s matter would be decided by the outcome of a motion to dismiss submitted by defendant.  [...]’s counsel explained the basis for the motion to the municipal court judge and the municipal court considered counsel’s explanation as an oral application for a motion to dismiss, i.e. a pump house is not an occupied building that would be within the scope of the statute, N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3), and hence no violation of the statute for which he was cited.  The municipal court disagreed and denied the motion.  2T13-13 to 25, 2T14-2T15, 2T16-1 to 9.  The municipal court gave [...] the option to have a trial.  2T16-9 to 10.  [...]’s counsel declined to have the matter set for trial.  2T16-11 to 25, 2T17-1 to 8.  The municipal court then made a factual finding that a pump house is a structure within the scope of the relevant statute.  2T17-11 to 13.  It then gave defendant the alternative option to conditionally plead guilty to the citation and then appeal his conditional guilty plea to the Ocean County Superior Court.  2T17-13 to 15.  [...]’s counsel explained to his client what the conditional guilty plea entailed and the potential to appeal it.  [...] agreed to conditionally plead guilty as a result.  2T17-16 to 25, 2T18-1 to 18.
[brief] Defendant was ordered to serve seven years in New Jersey State Prison, with 42 months served before parole eligibility.  [Da12].  The sentence was ordered to run concurrent to Count Two.  The court ordered defendant pay $50 VCCB and $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund.  [Da12].  For Count Eight, defendant was ordered to serve five years in New Jersey State Prison without parole eligibility, to run consecutive to the life sentence imposed on Count Two.
[brief] 7  The decisions the districts rely on are not to the contrary.  In Tatel v. Mt. Lebanon School District, 37 F. Supp. 3d 295, 326–27 (W.D. Pa. 2022), clarified on denial of reconsideration, No. 22-837, 2023 WL 3740822 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2023) (Aa103-131), the district court held that parents raised a plausible substantive due process claim where the allegations included conduct by a first-grade teacher that could be construed as coercive interference with the parent-child relationship.  As in these cases, parental rights are not implicated here because there is no coercive conduct and no right to affirmative notice of a child’s expressed gender identity.
[brief] Order Granting Award for Attorneys Fees | Da971 | | June 5, 2019  Order Denying Restraints | Da 973 | | August 26, 2019  Order Denying Motion for Recusal | Da974 | | February 5, 2020  Order Denying Motion to Compel | Da976 | | March 29, 2020  Order Entering Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff | Da978 | | March 29, 2020
[brief] Defendant-Appellant [...]’s, née [...], argued in her opening Brief that the trial court’s application of the doctrine of laches was in error because there was no basis on record for a finding of the required prejudice.  However, [...]’s (“[...]”) Brief largely fails to respond to Francavilla’s argument and, instead, asserts that it would have been prejudiced by a granting of Francavilla’s Motion because its claims against Francavilla would have been time-barred.  But [...]’s argument is inapplicable here because Francavilla did not seek to dismiss [...]’s claims with her Motion to Vacate, but rather to litigate on the merits.  Similarly, [...] argues that the ostensible lack of an implied private right of action under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49, bars Francavilla’s requested relief.  But, the available evidence and case law indicates that the NJCFLA does confer a private right of action.  Moreover, even if there is no private right of action, Francavilla has not attempted to assert a right of action—Francavilla has only pointed to [...]’s lack of a legal right as a meritorious defense to the collection lawsuit.  Even still, assuming arguendo that the private right of action does inform the relevant defensive analysis here, [...] has failed to address the factorial test that our highest courts require in determining whether a statute confers a right of private enforcement.  Thus, for the reasons explained herein, [...]’s arguments fail and the trial court Order (Da51) denying Francavilla’s Motion to Vacate Wage Execution, to Vacate Bank Levy, and to Vacate Default Judgment should be reversed.
[brief] [...] did not recall whether his investigator looked into [...].  [...] would have investigated this information if it had been given to him.  (14T24-17 to 20; 14T25-8 to 27-14).  [...] did not recall defendant saying he was at a Checkers Restaurant on May 27, 2012, the date of the crime.  He did not recall defendant asking him to interview restaurant employees or obtain surveillance video from the establishment.  (14T29-4 to 13).  [...] remembered that he received cell phone records in discovery.
[brief] See Pa134.  Also on August 5, 2022, the trial court granted Defendants’ Motion to Quash the Subpoena after hearing oral argument.  See Pa135.  In its decision, the trial court specifically instructed Plaintiff’s counsel that he needed to make a motion See Da46, at 3:11-4-8 to reopen discovery (and consequently meet the exceptional circumstances standard) stating “You’ve got to make a motion to reopen discovery in front of [...].  That’s how Hudson County Local Rules are…  You want to try to make that argument, you make a Motion to Reopen Discovery with [...]. ”  T1\(^8\) at 5:1-23.  However, despite both [...] telling Plaintiff that the motion was denied on procedural grounds for failing to submit courtesy copies and [...] telling Plaintiff to file a Motion to Reopen Discovery, Plaintiff elected not to do so.
[directive] If it appears that the presence of counsel or another representative the subject requests will not disrupt or delay the interview, no reason exists to prevent their presence as an observer.  But the representative or attorney cannot cause undue delay in scheduling interviews or interfere in the interview process.  If the representative or attorney is disruptive or interferes, the investigator can discontinue the interview and should document the reasons for doing so.  The investigator must control the interview and cannot allow the representative or subject to take control.  N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
[brief] On January 19, 2024, the Arbitrator awarded [...] all unpaid EGP amounts sought across twelve (12) of thirteen (13) construction projects transferred to [...]—with the one exception being the [...].  Compare Pa186 ¶ 111, with Pa573-75.  After considering substantial testimony and dozens of exhibits on the [...] alone, the Arbitrator found that this Project “is [the] one exception to [the] EGP ruling. ”  Pa574.
[brief] *Hills Dev. Co v. Twp. of Bernards*, 103 N.J. 1, 59 (1986).  Unlike res judicata, the effectiveness of collateral estoppel “does not require the entry of a judgment, final in the sense of being appealable. ”  *In re Brown*, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991).  (emphasis in bold).  Collateral estoppel is closely related to the doctrine of res judicata which prevents a party from asserting a claim or cause of action after it is the subject of a final judgment.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED AND DENIED VARIOUS EQUITABLE RELIEF AS TO [...] | 28 | | V.  THE TRIAL COURT’S ACTIONS DURING TRIAL DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS TO ATTACK ITS JUDGMENT | 30 |  A.  The Trial Court’s Conference With Counsel In Chambers Does Not Provide Plaintiff With A Proper Basis To Attack The Judgment.............30
[directive] If Search Warrant. the court determines, based upon consideration information provided in the temporary extreme risk protective order petition, and during the temporary extreme risk protective order hearing, that probable cause exists to or believe that (1) the respondent owns or possesses any firearms ammunition, (2) the of or respondent poses an immediate and present danger bodily injury to self others by or or or possessing any such firearms ammunition, and (3) such firearms owning ammunition are presently at a specifically described location, then the court, in conjunction with the temporary extreme risk protective order, shall a search _issue or warrant for any firearms and ammunition which the respondent possesses owns at that specified location.
[brief] 142 N.J. at 536.  This determination rests on “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  *Id.* at 534 (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).  The Court continued that under the “new standard, the determination involves whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issues in favor of the non-moving parties. ”  *Id.* at 540.  The thrust of the Court’s decision in *Brill* was to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves, and to eliminate any “encrustation of the *Judson* standard that obscured its essential import. ”  *Id.* at 541.  It is not the Court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine the outcome but only decide if a material dispute of fact existed.  *Id.* at 540.  For reasons that are articulated further below, the trial court overlooked the evidence and facts of this matter and improperly substituted its finding in the place of a jury, leading to the unwarranted dismissal of Plaintiffs’ well-developed case as to both [...] and [...] and unfairly depriving Plaintiffs of a jury trial.
[brief] Pursuant to the scheduling order plaintiffs’ reply brief was due by July 19, 2024.  With the consent of the defendant, plaintiffs requested a fourteen-day extension of time in which to file their reply brief.  Plaintiffs submit the following in reply.  Plaintiffs-appellants note that the statement of facts from the defendant-respondent supports the plaintiffs position that the parties had an agreement for the Court to mold the jury’s verdict to include the medical bills and temporary disability benefits paid for by the Worker’s Compensation carrier pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15–40.
[brief] 2.  Defendants’ Liability Experts  Defendants’ liability experts disagreed with essentially all facts and opinions offered by [...] and [...], thereby creating a high degree of dispute of material facts between the experts on both sides.  Some of the disputes presented by [...], P.E. (and colleague [...]) (hereinafter “[...]”), liability experts for [...], are the following: [...] applied the wrong lux/foot illumination standards (Pa797) (Pa797, 855); he disagrees with [...] that the streetlight had been reported to be out several times prior to the accident (Pa797, 856); he rejects as “meaningless” [...]’s consideration of the untrimmed tree as a factor in the accident (Pa797-98, 856-57); he rejects as “baseless” [...]’s application of NJDOT guidelines to the subject intersection (Pa797).  In the end, [...] states brazenly:  "We disagree with all the conclusions provided in Mr. [...]'s report of August 9, 2019 and his addendum reports of December 22, 2021 and January 14, 2022, as there is no scientific, evidential or any other factual basis to support his conclusions" (Pa798, 854) (emphasis added).  Yet, [...] admitted that [...] and [...] did offer opinions about "backlighting", and he did not (Pa862).  [...], [...]'s expert, also disagrees with all of [...]'s and [...]'s factual analyses and opinions, as shown by the following: [...] is incorrect that the streetlight was not functioning at the time of the accident (Pa125); the light was out because of lighting coming from the investigation trucks at the accident scene (Pa126); there is no evidence presented to suggest that [...] was ever notified that the subject streetlight was not properly functioning (Pa126); [...] was not walking in the crosswalk as his body would have been thrown forward at impact (Pa127); [...] was riding his skateboard trying to cross Prospect Street (Pa865); and Emolo disagrees with [...]'s backlight theory in that the backlight would make the pedestrian more visible to the approaching motorist (Pa868).  I.
[brief] That is inaccurate.  Both [...] and the medical practice defendants briefed the No Fault Law at length.  See, e.g., Brief of [...] at 34-37, No. 23-1378, *[...] v. [...]*, P.A., ___ F.4th ___ (3d Cir. 2024); Brief of [...] at 33-38, No. 23-1378, *[...] v. [...]*, P.A., ___ F.4th ___ (3d Cir. 2024).  And with regard to [...]’s apparent intent to argue the Third Circuit did not have jurisdiction to decide the No-Fault Law issue, see [...] Article, [...] cannot collaterally attack the decision, nor does whether the Third Circuit had jurisdiction detract from the Third Circuit’s persuasive analysis of the merits.
[brief] Of course, he does not and cannot establish any error by the trial court to justify a reversal of the Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  *R.*  2:6-2(a)(1) mandates that an appellant identify in his point heading the “place in the record where the opinion or ruling in question is located”.  Plaintiff cites to a case management order (Pa79), the summary judgment order (Pa80), the order denying the motion for reconsideration (Pa82) and the transcripts to the hearings related to those orders (1T, 2T and 3T) without any specific citation to the record as required.  There are no specific citations to the record in the actual arguments in Point IV either.
[brief] “Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists presents a purely legal issue,” which is reviewed de novo.  See Santiago v. New York & New Jersey Port Auth., 429 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 2012).  The same de novo standard applies in construing dispute resolution provisions in a contract.  See Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 446 (2014).  For purposes of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court “assume[s] that the allegations in the pleadings are true and afford[s] the pleader all reasonable inferences. ”  Matullo v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 472 N.J. Super 220, 223 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Sparroween, LLC v. Twp. of W. Caldwell, 452 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 2017)).  B.
[brief] *In re Hermann*, 192 N.J. at 21, 26-27.  The *In re Hermann* Court stated that “progressive discipline has been bypassed when an employee engages in severe misconduct, especially when the employee’s position involves public safety and the misconduct causes risk of harm to persons or property. ”  *Id.* at 34-35 (citations omitted).  It is unclear why Appellant believes his conduct did not cause any risk of harm to persons or property [Pb38], when the record evidence shows that the Ewing Vehicle Incidents resulted in two (2) vehicular crashes and subsequent arrests, two (2) of the Vehicle Incidents (April 19, 2018, and May 2, 2018) resulted in arrests for possession of CDS while operating Appellant’s personal vehicle, and the third Vehicle Incident (November 29, 2018), occurred because Appellant allowed [...] to operate his vehicle despite [...] only having a learner’s permit.  [Da29-Da31; Pa101, Pa119-Pa120].  Appellant also placed [...]’s life at risk by not immediately calling 911, instead delaying the call because he did not want to get in trouble at work, and by giving misleading statements to [...] about [...]’s condition on the night of the Incident.  [Pa104; 4T68:11-23, 4T128:12 – 4T129:3, 4T130:10-13].  Appellant’s actions clearly placed the public at risk.  The *In re Hermann* Court upheld the termination because the employee’s conduct “had so utterly rendered her devoid of the trust that DYFS must place in its field workers” and the agency’s decision “should not be lightly second-guessed.