ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:4-126; cf. State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 447-48 (2011) (interpreting the failure to maintain lane statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) as describing “two separate legal predicates directing the conduct of drivers”).  The language of the statute makes plain that the movements described in the first sentence are included in the second sentence.  The first sentence sets forth the “movement[s]” that must be made with safety: turning a vehicle at an intersection; turning to enter a private road or driveway; otherwise turning a vehicle from a direct course; moving right or left upon a roadway; and starting or backing a vehicle.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  The second sentence imposes a duty to give the required signal, stating “[n]o person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  The phrase “so turn” is a clear reference to the “movement[s]” specified in the immediately preceding sentence, including “turn[ing] a vehicle from a direct course or mov[ing] right or left upon a roadway. ”  7  Defendant argues that “so turn” cannot include all the movements listed in the first sentence because such an understanding of “start[ing] or back[ing]” “defies commonsense” and the statute does not provide guidance on how to signal the starting or backing a vehicle “indicat[ing] that the Legislature did not believe any signal was required.  (Db17).  To the contrary, considering the statute is entitled “Signaling before starting, turning or stopping,” (emphasis added), it is apparent the Legislature did intend to require signaling if the starting or backing may affect other traffic.  And while the statute does not specifically state how to signal an intention to start or back up, there are situations in which these movements fall within the meaning of a turn to the first sentence, the Legislature substituted “so turn” in the second sentence to avoid needless repetition.
[brief] ³  For reasons unknown to Plaintiffs, the [...], which was the defendant in this matter, prefaced each page number of its appendix, and cites to its appendix, as “Pa,” despite the fact that it was not the plaintiff.  Accordingly, references in this brief to “Da” refer to the [...]’s appendix, because the [...] is the defendant in this matter; and references in this brief to “Pa” refer to Plaintiffs’ appendix.  had been part of multiple separate tax lots) became part of one tax lot on the [...] – i.e., [...].\(^4\) (Da171.)
[brief] 193a Exhibit 13, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated October 3, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  220a Exhibit 14, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 7, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  229a Exhibit 15, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 9, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  240a Exhibit 16, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 24, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  248a Exhibit 17, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 24, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  255a Exhibit 18, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated June 2, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  263a Exhibit 19, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated May 18, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  266a Exhibit 20, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 30, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  269a Exhibit 21, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 9, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  276a Exhibit 22, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated May 18, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  283a Exhibit 23, Report of Examination of [...], P.E., dated January 18, 2018, filed April 26, 2018
[brief] The de novo court further considered the HGN test even though only [...] had first-hand knowledge as to administration of the test and the result.  (2T12:22-13:11; 1T65:4-7; 1T14:24-15:5; Da16.)  The de novo court noted that [...] administered the HGN, but then concludes “Defendant has not suggested that [...] could have provided any evidence that was exculpatory or even helpful to the defense. ”  (Da18.)  The right to confront the witness who administered the HGN is necessarily potentially helpful evidence to the defense such that if [...] had testified, the result may have been different.  Because Defendant was denied that cross-examination, the remedy is reversal.  The request from the clerk for the reports that exceeded the scope led to the question as to what documents were actually considered at the de novo hearing.  (Da43-44.)  The State argues that the clerk in the de novo court’s request to documents did not extend to the de novo judge.  (Sb8.)  But it is unknown whether the request was made for the de novo judge or whether documents were provided.  Given the Sixth Amendment, even if the Court does not reverse on this basis, at a minimum, it should remand to determine the scope of the documents that the de novo court had before it.
[directive] If the Attorney General or designee has reason to believe that a law enforcement agency or officer is not complying with or adequately enforcing the provisions of this supplemental policy, the Attorney General may temporarily or permanently suspend or revoke the authority of the department, or any officer, to possess or use conducted energy devices, may initiate disciplinary or criminal prosecution proceedings, and may take such other actions as the Attorney General in his/her sole discretion deems appropriate to ensure compliance with this supplemental policy.  -16-  [DCJ 03/03/16]
[brief] [...] knew that [...] was having marital problems at that time (Pa000137).  [...] was present when [...] and [...] argued over finances (Pa000170).  [...] witnessed a lot of arguments between [...] and [...].  [...] knew of [...]’s home situation and spoke with [...] about it.  (Pa000137).  Initially, [...] was very happy with [...] when she was dating his son and when they first married.  However, things began to sour between them from 2010 to the end of his life (Pa000137-Pa000138, Pa000170).
[brief] ” (Pa355; Pa454).  This was a material change to the dual degree program’s requirements, and not one Plaintiff agreed to or accepted when applying and enrolling into the program.  Plaintiff did not see the change to the website because at that point, as students already began classes, and there was no reason for him to review this webpage.  (Pa162).  Once Plaintiff did become aware of the newly added language, he spoke with several [...] employees, including [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa179; Pa243-246; Pa458).  Crucially, [...] advised Plaintiff that he would be able to matriculate to the MBA program later, when his GPA was where it needed to be so that he would still finish the dual degree program by 2016.  (Pa246; Pa458).  Due to this statement, Plaintiff remained committed to [...].  Plaintiff could have, and likely would have, sought out a different opportunity by way of a transfer had he known that he was not able to enter the master’s track at any point in time.  At the end of Plaintiff’s first year in the Pharm.D program, he attained a 2.75 GPA.  (Pa255).  On June 17, 2013, Plaintiff spoke to [...], who advised him that he was not able to matriculate into the master’s program at that time because his GPA was not a 3.0 or higher.  (Pa245-Pa246).  Yet, Plaintiff was made to understand that he would either: (1) be able to apply directly to the [...] School of Business, as there was no policy against it, or (2) matriculate at a later date.  (Pa246; Pa458; Pa460).  Yet, [...] again moved the goalpost on Plaintiff, and on August 1, 2013, established a new policy, without process, preventing Plaintiff from pursuing the dual degree program after his first year.  (Pa 411; Pa415; Pa461-Pa467; Pa486).
[brief] In this appeal from a grant of summary judgment, plaintiff/appellant, [...], raises two issues.  The first is whether his expert witnesses must base their opinions on generally-accepted standards applied to record evidence for their testimony to be admissible.  The second is whether a party may overcome a motion for summary judgment based solely on a self-serving hearsay statement that contradicts the record evidence.  The record shows that plaintiff’s expert testimony was inadmissible net opinion and plaintiff’s proffered hearsay testimony contradicted the record evidence.  The trial court therefore correctly granted summary judgment.  The Court should affirm the judgment below, because this appeal presents no basis to overturn settled law on net opinion and hearsay.  In addition, the Court may also affirm the judgment below on grounds that defendants raised below but that the trial court did not need to reach, including plaintiff’s failure to establish any duty of care that defendants allegedly breached, the preclusive effect of plaintiff’s earlier, separate lawsuit for similar claims, and plaintiff’s failure to apportion his alleged damages.
[brief] The Record Supports the [...]’s Finding that [...] is the Most Reasonable Site for the Project, Considering the Alternatives.  Next, the evidence in the record supports the [...]’s finding that [...] was the most reasonable site for the Project and there were no reasonably available alternative sites for the Project that will achieve an equivalent public benefit.  (Aa56); N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19; Pub. Serv., 35 N.J. at 377.  As the record indicates, [...] considered six potential sites for the proposed Project by analyzing four criteria, including whether the potential sites were “as close as possible to the southern end of the Holmdel transmission line” and whether they were zoned for commercial, industrial, or utility uses.  (Aa782-84; Aa790).  In addition, the record indicates that [...] reviewed cost estimates, engineering plans, and residential concerns, such as the proximity of the proposed regulator station to “community-valued buildings” like schools, in evaluating the proposed sites.  (Aa784-85; 2T50:18-51:22; 2T52:1-17).  Applying these criteria, [...] ruled out four of the sites either due to their proximity to the northern section of the transmission line, the unwillingness of the current owner to sell, the sites’ residential zoning, and Green Acres funding restrictions.  (Aa790-91).  Although [...] originally considered [...] as a potential location, the utility ultimately preferred the proposed site at [...] since it contained preexisting development, such as a cellular communications tower.  (Aa790-91; Aa840).  In addition, the preferred site at [...] addressed residential concerns regarding the Project’s visibility, noise levels, and safety from vehicular traffic because the site would be located about 200 feet from Holmdel Road, approximately “four times farther back” than the originally planned site at [...], and the preferred site would also include additional landscaping, such as berms and foliage, to minimize the Project’s visual impacts.  (Aa839-40; Aa825-26; Aa828; 2T23:25- Thus, the [...]’s determination that the proposed lot at [...] was the most reasonable site for the Project and that no reasonably available alternatives for the Project would achieve an equivalent public benefit is supported by the record and should not be disturbed.
[brief] On December 6, 2023 and December 14, 2023, the trial court conducted a 2-day plenary hearing to determine if Plaintiff had proven her case for mesne profits and legal fees.  Defendants raised multiple defenses, primarily involving Plaintiff, in her capacity as Trustee, violated her fiduciary duties coming into and throughout the instant litigation.  Consequently, new evidence supporting Defendants’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty was established during the trial.  Defendants submitted a Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, highlighting the new evidence and urging the trial court to reconsider their claims.  However, the trial court declined, omitting findings and conclusions regarding the Trustee’s violations of fiduciary duties.
[brief] Neither Plaintiff, nor [...] or [...], could authenticate the contents as Plaintiff did not know specifically when the photo was taken, and [...] and [...] admitted to not having any personal knowledge regarding the conditions of the premises when Plaintiff fell.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring a photo which could not be properly authenticated into evidence.  The trial court’s decisions do not rise to the level of cumulative error requiring a new trial.  However, if this Court were so persuaded in issuing a new trial, the new trial should be for both liability and damages, not simply liability alone as Defendants request.  Once a trial court determines a new trial is warranted, “[t]he scope of the new trial depends on the nature of the injustice. ”  Fertile v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481, 490 (2001).  Under New Jersey law, when the court orders a new trial due to trial errors or other problems impacting the liability verdict, the new trial should encompass both liability and damages issues.  Id. at 490-91 (holding [w]here trial error affecting liability occurs, the new trial will encompass all issues).  This is because errors affecting liability may result from a compromise verdict, where the jury compromises on liability in exchange for a certain damages award.  Retrying only liability in such cases would ignore the inherent connection between the liability and damages determinations.  Accordingly, if the Court were to decide a new trial was needed, the Court should order a new trial on both liability and damages in this case, as the liability and damages issues are not fairly separable.  Limiting the new trial to liability alone risks leaving in place a damages verdict that may have been improperly compromised or inadequately calculated.  The interests of justice would require a fresh look at both issues.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] ......................................14  PROCESS RISK-ASSESSMENT  PRETRIAL AUTOMATED ................................................14  Status Scan Live  Up-to-Date on Report Statewide  2.1  Recyclable Paper is and Recycled on EmployerPrinted Opportunity Equal  An Jersey Is New ~' 2 Page ................................................................................16  Fingerprinting .  Requirements  2.2  Support System to Scan Up-to-Date Live Use to Requirement  2.2.1 .............................................................................................16  Systeln eCDR without Offenses Certain for Complaint Filing of Prohibition 2.2.2 ............................17  Process Risk-Assessment  Pretrial Automated Initiating ...................18  Facility Police Scan-Equipped Live to Arrestee of Transport 2.2.3 with Up-to- Equipped Not Agencies for Plan Fingerprinting 2.2.4 ...........................................................................................18 Scan Live Date ...........................................................................18  SCREENING CASE PRE-CHARGING 3.
[brief] (028142004)  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (289902018)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...], Esq. (008011993)  [...], Esq. (010141994)  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED | 4 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | A. The Property | 5 | | B. The Application | 6 | | 1.
[brief] During the course of the telephone conference [...] came on the Zoom and was sworn in by the Judge.  She stated that the only proof she had of the business ownership was her tax returns.  (5T 23)  She indicated she would have her daughter [...] follow through with the accountant.  Both the Court and the Court-appointed Administratrix, inquired about the E.I.N. number for the Estate.  [...] stated she had never had difficulty obtaining an E.I.N. number and wondered if her difficulty was related to the possibility that someone else was connected to the Estate prior to her appointment.  (5T 27, 11-13)  [...] denied any knowledge about an E.I.N. number.  (5T 26)  The Court advised [...] that it would provide an Order requesting information about the E.I.N number.  (5T 28, 12-14)  During the telephone conference, [...] also asked the Court to question [...] about the missing Paychex 401(k) retirement funds for the deceased.  (5T 47, 1-4)  Hazel said that her daughter [...] was contacting them and handling that matter.  The Court then required that [...] May join the conference call.  [...] May denied knowing the status of the Paychex funds or the amount, even though she handled the books.  She stated her mother was the beneficiary.  (5T 51).  [...] then asked the Court to inquire about insurance policies.  The Court asked [...] if [...] had insurance policies and for the first time [...] finally admitted that he had a personal policy and claimed that she was the beneficiary.
[brief] The trial court found that neither [...] nor the [...] were willing to compensate [...], and that was telling.  (2T:5:10-25).  In addition, the appellants have argued that the receiver did not file an application with notice to creditors seeking leave to retain professionals.  However, there was no accounting, and an accounting could not have been obtained unless it was paid for.  As noted by [...], there were monthly accountings, but a final accounting could not be obtained unless someone wanted to pay for it.  Accordingly, the appellate division should reject appellants’ argument, and affirm the trial court’s order.
[brief] The Supreme Court has held that the Legislature may not require parties to arbitrate claims on which they have a right to a jury trial.  See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co., 212 N.J. 576, 600 (2013).  In Jersey Central Power & Light, the Supreme Court considered a provision of the Underground Facility Protection Act, which compelled parties seeking monetary relief for harm to underground facilities to arbitrate without a de novo jury trial.  Id. at 581.  The Court held that the “mandatory, binding arbitration is impermissible because it effectively denies . . . private litigants their constitutionally guaranteed right to a trial by jury for a common-law cause of action in negligence.
[brief] Overcoming this presumption must be difficult to avoid rendering the CFA impotent simply because a defendant’s fraud is also covered by another statute.  Courts should be wary of inferring that legislation designed to augment consumer protection, was actually intended to subject a defendant to less, rather than more, regulation.  *Sun* at 331-332.  In *Lemelledo*, the Court established a rigorous test that must be met before a court should hold another statute preempts the CFA.
[brief] At around 11:00 p.m., [...], [...] and [...] left Freehold Borough and took Route 33 towards Neptune heading to Asbury.  [...] was driving, [...] was in the passenger’s seat and little [...] was in the back seat behind [...], strapped in her car seat.  During their drive, [...] decided he did not want to go to his dad’s house in Asbury, but instead just wanted to “back home” to [...]’s house in Freehold.  So, they turned around.  (3T:78-11 to 79-9; 80-12 to 19).
[brief] Thus, reconsideration is warranted, here, and the Court must reconsider its March 13, 2023, Order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, the Court must grant summary judgment in favor of the City and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  Pa281-282.  Following the Order on reconsideration, Appellant filed his notice of appeal and case information statement with this Court on June 21, 2023.  Pa283; Pa287.
[directive] Did the witness ask any questions about the procedure?  Y N (If yes, explain below)  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ □ □  11.  Did you confirm that the witness understands the procedure before showing him/her any photos?  Y N 12.  Did you ask the witness whether he/she had previously spoken to anyone (law enforcement or civilian) about the □ □ identification?  Y N (If witness answers yes, provide the identities of those individuals, and a detailed summary of what was said as an attachment to this worksheet).  [...], Issued 2/9/2021
[directive] Authorized to Wear/LJse BWCs.  3.2  Officers will be officer shall determine which officers chief law enforcement of the department  The patrol, of assignments (ems., uniformed with shall determine the types) duty equipped BWCs, and will wear deployments, etc.) when those officers detective, special/tactical operations plainclothes than one law or composed of officers from more In the case of a task force, team, unit BWCs. task force, team, officer of the agency overseeing the enforcement the chief law enforcement agency, shall determine whether of countywide task force)
[brief] First, the Trial Court takes exception to [...]’s use of the term “hole” in his report.  To be clear, this word only appears twice in [...]’s report whereas he uses the word “settlement” twelve times.  Also, a fair review of the record will reveal that the Trial Court’s focus on [...]’s use of the word “hole” does not represent a change in his opinion but rather, when read in context, it is used to describe the practical effect of the settlement/elevation change which abuts the bridge joint.  In fact, on page 22 of his report, [...] specifically states in the section titled “Findings” that “[t]he depth, width and location of the settlement/elevation change created a dangerous condition that caused [...] to lose control of his motorcycle and crash.
[brief] [...] found what he believed to be a red, curly beard hair when he was searching through the wooden boxes and he gave it to [...].  (7T 91-18 to 92-1)  Ultimately, the DNA of the hair was compared with [...]’s DNA and the DNA did not match [...] (9T 23-23 to 24-8); however, [...] did not know on February 1 that this hair did not belong to [...].  After [...] found the red hair, [...] showed him the surveillance video.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For all the foregoing reasons, the [...] respectfully requests that the court affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the Award.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Attorney ID: 046492013  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  cc: All counsel of record  [...], Esq. 02305-2007  The Law Offices of [...], LLC [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney for Appellant
[brief] Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  Public Defender  [...]  Appellate Section [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Attorney ID: 331372023  Of Counsel and on the Brief  Dated: July 18, 2024  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] 17.  f. individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?  'ilir 'if~~ -tl-~ ;;zlt}7} 7F6'·AJ -lf-AJ191- .:E~ ;;z1tl9.l 7ff'?J. !--}Aa<>Jl 01~ -1:f-;11]  ~~ ~~ 0 0 ] ]~ 2f"-T~ ~'.ll-g A}-jf-g_ -=r!_cj7} ~tj-~ g_ <>1]5:.  ~-=r-"8"}.:il, ;;z1"8"}~ %~: '?.178"8"}aj "8"}{ly7J}?  £~ 18.  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender [Yes/<>11] [No/otJ...1..8.]  a.  Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the Pretrial Intervention Program, that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?