ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] During this phase, [...] deposed [...] counsel [...].  (Da183; Da185-Da228.)  [...] also deposed [...]’s accounting expert, [...], who provided testimony which indicated the interest calculations she had provided were unreliable.  (Da229-Da258.)  [...]’s opposition to the March 2021 Motion argued that [...] was not a “successful claimant” entitled to attorneys’ fees, that [...] was not a “prevailing party” entitled to costs, and that prejudgment interest should be calculated from 2005, the date of the filing of this lawsuit, using the method to calculate interest provided in the Ruoff Report.  (Da259.)  [...]’s interest calculations also sought to toll the running of interest based on the unusual court delays that had occurred after the SAM issued the R&R.  (Da259.)  [...] further argued that to the extent the trial court did award attorneys’ fees and costs, the amounts awarded should be calculated using the “relative culpability approach”, and that costs for expert fees were not compensable as court costs.
[brief] (Pa335).  Pursuant to one of the trial court’s August 25, 2023 Orders, Plaintiffs were required to serve expert liability reports by September 30, 2023 and the discovery period was re-opened until November 30, 2023.  (Pa326-Pa327).  Plaintiffs never served a liability expert report on their behalf.  On December 1, 2023, after the November 30, 2023 discovery end date passed, [...] again moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiffs could not prevail on the claim of negligence without expert testimony and because Plaintiffs could not establish that [...] had actual or constructive notice of any allegedly dangerous condition or breached any duty owed to Plaintiff.
[brief] THE COURT:  And, sir, you now are -- you may place your hand down -- you are now admitting that you had possessed a loaded firearm within 450 feet of a dwelling.  MR.: [...]: Yes.  (2T18-13 to 18-25)  In the Law Division, the Judge made comprehensive findings of facts, including as stated above.  (1T29-10 to 39-6)  In particular, the Judge found that “the only constitutional issue raised was the pump house” and that “this Court is reluctant and loath to ignore the entirety of the ticket on which the violation was based that does include the [...]. ”  (1T37-8 to 37-12)  The Judge, declining to reach the constitutional issue as to whether a pump house falls within the statute, observed, A plain reading of the complaint and the plea would seem to indicate that he was not only pleading guilty to the fact that he was within the 450 feet of the pump house, but also that he was within 450 feet from the residence identified as [...].  So doesn’t that essentially make the Court’s opinion on whether the pump house is a dwelling – or it falls within the statute – an advisory opinion, because even if this Court were to agree with defendant, we still have the plea to being within a prohibited area of a residence.  . . .  (2T 5-20 to 6-6)  The Judge concluded,  The defendant entered a guilty plea and that guilty plea was not limited to the defendant being within 450 feet of a pump house, but, rather, that plea was that he was within 450 feet of a dwelling.  The Court notes that a residence, in addition to the pump house, is listed on the ticket so, for those reasons, this Court does not find that it even has to get to the issue of whether the pump house falls within 23:4-16(d) because, while there may have been the motion for vagueness as applied preceding the plea, the plea itself – the Court views it as there being a separation between the constitutional argument and then the plea itself, which talks about the dwelling.
[brief] On September 25, 2022, the Decedent was shot first in the leg (at or about the Subject Premises) and then later in the chest by a patron of an illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand that had been set up for months on the Subject Premises, continuously serving alcohol to the residents of the Subject Premises and adjacent affordable housing well into the night and early hours (P-2, ¶ 2.)  The Decedent was taken to [...], where he succumbed to his injuries.  (P-2, ¶ 3.)  The illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand was present on the Subject Premises for several months before Decedent was fatally shot.  (P-2, ¶ 4.)  It was set up in plain view and lured residents to congregate into the early morning hours.  (Id.)  It enticed residents and the public to become inebriated in public, which often resulted in frequent physical fighting and similar mayhem.  (Id.)  Defendants [...] and [...], which owned and controlled the Subject Premises, and Defendant [...], whose duty it was to patrol the Subject Premises, had actual or constructive knowledge of the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand.  (P-1-2, ¶¶ 1, 4.)  Yet, at no time did Defendants attempt to shut down or in any way charge the proprietor of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, despite that fact that it was in plain view.  (P-2, ¶ 4.)  The illegal, large makeshift liquor concession stand was closely situated to all local public housing projects – in fact, it was located near a basketball court and a playground – and created an unstable and highly dangerous condition on public property, which eventually resulted in the death of [...].  (P-2, ¶ 5; P-58.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LOWER COURT’S GRANT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE.
[brief] On April 3, 2023, the Commissioner issued a written decision granting Respondents’ motion to dismiss the consolidated petitions of appeal, and denying Appellants’ cross-motion to consolidate the July 2022 Referendum Petition.  (Aa762)  Appellants appealed the Commissioner’s April 3, 2023 decision to this Court.  This Court dismissed that appeal in December 2023.  (Aa796-98)
[brief] Kernahan., 236 N.J. at 317 (“[a]n arbitration agreement is valid only if the parties intended to arbitrate because parties are not required ‘to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so” (citation omitted)); Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442-43 (“because arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).  The reasonableness of this interpretation is also supported by [...]’s subsequent decision not to reference arbitration in its Answer, [...]’s certification that no arbitration was contemplated, and [...]’s affirmative request for a jury in this litigation, rather than a bench trial that would be more akin to arbitration.
[brief] The Township was to build 37 very low-, low- and moderate-income housing units on this site by 2019 (consistent with N.J.A.C. 5:93-5.5 and Monroe’s January 2017 Spending Plan which was made part of the settlement agreement pursuant to Paragraph 6 of that settlement agreement).  The settlement envisioned that the Township would finance the construction with $7,000,000 dollars in development fees and four percent tax credits.  (Paragraph 4(c)i of settlement agreement).  19.  When before Special Hearing Officer [...] in this case, I testified that my research indicated that the Township had not yet begun construction on this site; and the Township offered no conflicting testimony.  This is yet another example of the Township’s policy of avoiding its Mount Laurel obligations.
[brief] Plaintiff shall claim the child in all even year tax filings and Defendant shall claim the child in all odd year tax filings.  Both shall execute all documents required by the IRS to effectuate this filing status.” (Pa59).  I sent her several emails (Pa1119-22) seeking a signed IRS form for the tax year 2022 that would enable me to claim the child tax credit as provided by the March 1, 2023 order.  As she did not cooperate, I withheld five alimony payments for the months of July 2023, and October 2023 through January 2024.  Although the alimony amount established in the March 1, 2023 order is under appeal (Pa1395-98), I recognize that existing orders of the trial court remain in effect.  I withheld alimony solely as a coercive measure to compel her compliance with the child tax credit provision as I explained in the reply certification (Pa1111) that I filed on December 13, 2023.  In its January 12, 2024 order, the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay the alimony within 15 days of the order.  I complied with the order by making 5 payments of $2166.67 each on January 12, 2024.  (Pa1192, Pa1207).
[brief] In deciding whether an insufficient limiting charge requires plain error reversal, a reviewing court must look both at the extent of the inadequacies and the strength of the evidence against the defendant.  G.S., 145 N.J. at 473-76.  Here, both weigh in favor of reversal.  As discussed above, the court’s limiting instructions were seriously flawed.  The court issued one limiting instruction after [...]’s testimony, and one in its final charge.  (3T 137-22 to 138-6; 5T 11-7 to 15)  Neither properly charged the jury on the permissible use of the robbery evidence, and in fact, the instruction on permissible use encouraged the jury to contemplate [...]’s involvement in an armed robbery.  Furthermore, no limiting instruction was given after [...]’s testimony, and the court failed to instruct the jury that [...] was never charged with the armed robbery.  In sum, the court’s failure to deliver a clear instruction about the permissible and impermissible use of the robbery evidence at each necessary point in the trial created a serious risk that the jury would consider such evidence improperly.  Reversal is further warranted because the evidence against [...] was weak.  The officers admitted that there was no evidence aside from what happened on the MVR footage linking [...] to the gun.  (2T 140-5 to 143-16; 3T 178-13 to 179-13)  The gun was tested for [...]’s fingerprints and DNA, and neither was found.  (2T 143-5 to 16)  [...] never made any statements regarding the gun, his cell phone was never searched, and there were no third-party statements connecting him to the gun.  (2T 140-5 to 143-4; 3T 178-13 to 179-13)  Moreover, defendant’s mother testified that the Suburban belonged to her and that many different people drove the car, particularly on the day in question.  (4T 25-1 to 56-9)  Against this backdrop, the jury heard evidence that [...] matched the description of a suspect in an armed robbery from the night before – and that the gun found in the Suburban was similar to the gun used in the armed robbery – without a proper instruction about how to consider that evidence.  The court’s error created a real risk that the jury convicted [...] of the charged offenses because of its belief that he was involved in an armed robbery the previous night.  The court’s error was thus clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and reversal is required.
[brief] Put differently, as the statute and licensing requirement apply to original credit card issuers, there is ample reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to include purchasers of credit card accounts within the scope of a provision – the second sentence – that brings within its reach the purchasers of consumer loans.  Plainly and as supported by the numerous cases cited above, [...] engaged in the consumer loan business when it purchased or otherwise acquired the account.  As a result, the alleged debt (and the contract governing the same) was void the moment [...] acquired the account and, subsequently, [...] lacked the legal right or authority necessary to attempt collection or enforcement of the account.
[brief] (Pa000213)..................................................................................26  4.  There Is a Gross Procedural Unconscionability Involved in the Alleged Execution of the Agreement.  (Pa000213).......................28  C.  Appellant Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Her Claims Against Respondents [...] and [...] Because There Is No Enforceable Arbitration Agreement Between Appellant and Respondent [...] or Appellant and Respondent [...].  (Pa000210).................................................................35  D.  At a Minimum, the Trial Court Should Have Provided a Statement of Reasons Articulating, with Some Level of Detail and/or Specificity, the Basis for Dismissing Appellant’s Claims and Compelling Same to Arbitration.
[brief] One final case to consider is *Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas, Company*, wherein the Appellate Division noted the trial court had severed a defendant general contractor’s third-party complaint for contractual indemnification against the plaintiff’s employer.  *Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas, Company*, 301 N.J. Super. 187, 190 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997).  *Kane*’s holding, affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, remains authoritative and barred [...]’s participation at trial.  Like *Kane*, this was a short\(^5\) negligence trial involving very few issues or witnesses.  Compared to the scope of [...] (40 days, numerous parties and issues), the distinction becomes clear.  *Kane* barred [...]’s participation at trial.
[brief] (Aa80-Aa89).  --- \(^7\)  The Order and Certification, dated April 17, 2023, incorrectly lists the DWI surcharge as $125.  (Aa120).  \(^8\)  Defendant appears to attach his Judgment of Conviction, dated April 17, 2023, twice to his appendix.  The State has included both citations.  (Aa7-Aa9; Aa111-Aa113).  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This Appeal concerns the right of a teacher to pursue relief from a defective Final Agency Decision (“FAD”) which unlawfully cost him his tenured teaching position, and which awaits this Court’s review.  The [...] (“[...]”) has found that the right does not exist.  Petitioner / Appellant [...] (“[...]”) has already appealed the unlawful FAD of the [...] that cost him his job.  See In the Matter of the Certificates of [...], App. Div. Dkt. No. [...] (the “License Appeal”).  Now, he appeals the [...]’s second FAD (the “Job FAD”) holding that he cannot recover his position, even if the License Appeal is successful.  As we will demonstrate, infra, the Job FAD was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and contrary to law.  It ignored the procedural impossibilities presented by [...]’s challenges to its actions.  It failed to decide issues timely raised and pursued by [...].  Ultimately, the [...]’s actions denied [...] Due Process of law, and were contrary to principles of Fundamental Fairness.  For these, and all the reasons set forth, infra, the Job FAD must be set aside.  [...] was a tenured teacher employed by the [...] (“[...]”).  The [...], by and through an Arbitrator issued an FAD in a teacher tenure case, brought and heard pursuant to the Tenure Employees Hearing Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 et. seq.. (the “TEHL”).  That FAD (the “Tenure FAD”) directed that [...] retain his position as a tenured teacher with [...].  Thereafter, the [...] issued the License FAD in a teacher license suspension / revocation proceeding, brought against [...] pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.5, and suspended [...]’s Teaching Certificate.  By operation of law, this terminated him from the same tenured teaching position which the Tenure FAD had directed that he retain.  The [...]’s issuance of such inconsistent and contradictory FADs is currently the subject of the License Appeal, which is pending before this Court.  Notwithstanding the determinations of the Tenure FAD, [...], upon its receipt of the License FAD, terminated [...]’s employment.
[brief] See City of Orange Twp. at 224 (“Nor may the courts remake a better contract for the parties than they themselves have seen fit to enter into, or to alter it for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other. ”)  Id. at 224 quoting Karl’s Sales and Service at 493.  A court is to analyze a policy of title insurance “like other policies of insurance…construed to give effect to the intention of the parties as manifested by the reasonable meaning of policy terms. ”  Amidano v. Donnelly, 260 N.J. Super. 148, 154, (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 435 (1993).
[brief] Arbitrators are given these extensive powers subject to judicial review limited to the narrow grounds of arbitrator  Partiality or corruption, fraud, undue means, conduct prejudicial to the rights of a Party or failure to make a ‘mutual, final and definite award,’ N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8, or ‘evident’ mistakes by the arbitrators, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-9.  [Id. at 187-188 (emph. added)].  N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8, of course, includes, “where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. ”  Barcon, supra, at 187.  Next, the Court’s reliance on the 4th Circuit case of Dockser v. Schwartzberg, was incorrect because that was not a case decided on the issue of whether or not an arbitrator had exceeded his powers, under 9 U.S.C.
[brief] Case No.: [...]  Signed 11/03/2016  Attorneys and Law Firms [...], [...], New York, NY, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] LLP, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiffs.  [...], [...], Charlotte, NC, [...], [...], [...], San Francisco, CA, [...], [...], Los Angeles, CA, [...], [...]O, San Diego, CA, for Defendant.  ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART  DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS’ DISCOVERY RESPONSES  [ECF No. 76].  Hon. [...], United States Magistrate Judge  *1  Currently before the Court is Defendant’s September 9, 2016 “Motion to Compel Discovery” [ECF No. 76-1 (“Mot.”)], Plaintiffs’ September 16, 2016 opposition to the motion [ECF No. 87 (“Oppo. ”)], and Defendant’s September 23, 2016 reply [ECF No. 91 (“Reply”)].  Having considered the briefing submitted by the parties and having reviewed all of the supporting exhibits, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART  Defendant’s motion for the reasons set forth below.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  On August 24, 2015, Plaintiffs [...]
[brief] 2.  The Planning Board’s denial was based on a proper evidentiary foundation.  The Planning Board’s denial was based on a proper evidential foundation and Plaintiff is incorrect that the Trial Court “improperly tried to fill in the blanks. ” (Pb23).  Plaintiff argues that Defendants merely “recit[ed] random statements of Board members,” whereas “it is the resolution [that should] provide the statutorily required findings of fact and conclusions,” citing N.Y. SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Bd of Adjustment of Twp of Weehawken, 370 N.J.Super. 319, 334 (App. Div. 2004).  (Pb23).  Plaintiff is incorrect.  In examining the resolution itself, it is clear it does exactly what it is supposed to do, i.e., it provides the statutorily required findings of facts and conclusions.  (Pa117-128).  As described by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987):  We also emphasize, for the guidance of boards of adjustment and their counsel, that in the event a use variance is challenged, a conclusory resolution that merely recites the statutory language will be vulnerable to the contention that the negative criteria have not been adequately established.  The board's resolution should contain sufficient findings, based on the proofs submitted, to satisfy a reviewing court that the board has analyzed the master plan and zoning ordinance, and determined that the governing body's prohibition of the proposed use is not incompatible with a grant of the variance.  If the board cannot reach such a conclusion, it should deny the variance.  To the extent this requirement narrows the discretion of boards of adjustment to grant use variances for uses intentionally and persistently excluded from the zoning ordinance by the governing body, we believe it accurately reflects the strong legislative policy favoring zoning by ordinance rather than by variance.  As explained above, the resolution denying Plaintiff’s variance request contains sufficient findings based on the proofs submitted.  The Decision and Resolution does not simply ‘recite the statutory language. ”  On the contrary, the Decision and Resolution quite literally references and incorporates both variance hearings and the evidence presented therein.  (Pa117-128).
[brief] Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] November 30, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa202 b. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] November 30, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa207 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] November 30, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa212 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] November 30, 2017  ………………………………………………………………………………Pa217 P-38.
[brief] On April 23, 2020 – exactly one-year after Appellant alleges that [...] mailed the [...] Letter – Appellant filed a class action lawsuit against Respondents in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (the “Federal Action”).  *Id.*, ¶ 18, 20 (Pa4).  Appellant alleged essentially the same facts and legal predicate as alleged in the trial court below:  This matter involves a debt collector's allegedly misleading collection letter.  Plaintiff claims that Defendants were not licensed under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 *et seq.*, and thus the mailing of a collection letter to Plaintiff violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 *et seq*.
[brief] (2T:60-4 to 13).  Defense counsel and the trial prosecutor remained in the courtroom over lunch and worked to resolve the issue with the interrogation video.  (2T:62-3 to 7).  Both attorneys advised that the video had been fixed and could be played for the jurors.  (2T:62-11 to 15).  Defense counsel advised that the video now appeared “to be in conformity with – with our agreement. ” (2T:62-15 to 16).  The jurors returned to the courtroom and the State played the redacted interrogation video in its entirety.  (2T:66-5 to 17).  Defense counsel did not object to any portion of the video or its admission into evidence.  (2T:66-5 to 17 and 45-23 to 46-4).  On September 27, 2022, the jury found Defendant guilty of Murder and Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose.
[brief] THE BOROUGH MAY ALWAYS DECLINE TO ACCEPT A DEDICATION WHEN IT DEEMS SAME TO BE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST  Plaintiff takes issue with the Borough’s “repetitive argument” that the Borough may “decline to accept the roads for any reason whatsoever”.  Furthermore, Plaintiff submitted that “the Borough does not submit any case, statute or other authority supporting that incorrect proposition”.  (Prb,3)  Plaintiff itself pointed to the case of New Jersey Transit Corporation v Franco, 447 N.J. Super. 361, (App. Div. 2016) which is unambiguous authority supporting the legal premise that a municipality may decline a dedication at any time for any reason.
[brief] THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROVIDING AN AGGRAVATION CHARGE UNDER MODEL CIVIL CHARGE 8.11F (Raised Below: T2 161 through 166; T4 95 through 107; T4 125)  A.  The Court Erred in Providing an Aggravation Charge over the Objection of the Defendant/Appellant as Plaintiff/Respondent did not Provide a Comparative Analysis Through Expert Testimony as Required by New Jersey Law.
[brief] Emphasis in original.)  In fact, the opposite is true.  [...] was authorized to warn health care providers in the United States - and did not need FDA approval to warn health care providers - of the defective Ozurdex applicators with the silicone particulate defect.  Moreover, [...] did not need FDA approval to recall its defective Ozurdex applicators.  “A firm may decide on its own volition and under any circumstances to remove or correct a distributed product.