ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’S EXPERT TESTIMONY ON PCMD AND CELLPHONE LOCATION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED .........................  29  A.  Alleged late production of expert opinion .................................................. 30  B.  Reliability of PCMD ....................................................................................  36 POINT IV  THE JUDGE PROPERLY EXERCISED HIS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS, WHICH WERE NONETHELESS HARMLESS BECAUSE THE JURY ASSESSED THEIR RELIABILITY IN LIGHT OF THE COURT’S REPEATED INSTRUCTIONS.
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[brief] Based on this line of precedent, the trial court held that [...]’s January 13, 2023 request was “as specific as it needs to be” and that it was not “vague or overly broad[.]” (T17:3-8).  The trial court further stated that, under Paff, there is “no requirement that [] specific subject matter needs to be put in” an OPRA request.  (T17:21-25; T19:3-14).  On January 15, 2023, the court supplemented its decision with a written order and memorandum of decision.  (Da46).  In its written decision, the court framed the “test [as] whether the request requires the custodian to engage in any subjective analysis to identify records or correlate data from a variety of sources to satisfy Plaintiff’s OPRA request. ”  (Da52).  Relying both on [...]’s ability to identify the responsive 1,004 emails and again on Paff, where “[t]he New Jersey Supreme Court held . . . that the requestor was entitled to all emails sent by two government employees over a two week period,” it found that Plaintiff’s OPRA request “for all emails to and from the interim provost for three days was well within OPRA’s scope and valid. ” (Da52-53).  Indeed, despite acknowledging that [...]’s request did not contain a subject matter, the court nevertheless deemed the request valid because it was circumscribed to a very narrow time period and identified the one person whose emails he sought, (Da53), and ordered [...] to grant access to the responsive emails with an accompanying Vaughn Index to explain any emails withheld or redacted, (Da55).  This appeal followed.
[brief] Using its technical expertise to decide on the appropriateness of a permit application is the primary function of [...] permitting staff, even when that means to disagree with stated objections.  Disagreement, as evidenced by the permit approval, is not evidence of shortcomings in [...]’s procedures.  Here, the [...] permitting staff considered [...]’s public comments alleging its navigational interest would be harmed, and [...]’s [...] also considered [...]’s request for an adjudicatory hearing.  The sufficiency of that process to prevent the erroneous deprivation of [...]’s rights is evidenced by the fact [...] does not propose any viable substitute or additional processes; rather, they simply do not like the outcome of the process they received.  Accordingly, the second Mathews factor weighs heavily in [...]’s favor because [...]’s process adequately serves objectors, like [...], to the extent allowable by the Legislature.
[brief] It often takes six months, even on a simple motion, to get an opinion from District Court – this is a well-known fact.  The June 25, 2021 filing was not a sixth attempt at amending.  The FAC was filed willingly to bring the issues up to date; no leave was needed.  The two attempts to comply with Iqbal, simply don’t count from a New Jersey perspective.  (At least 2 of the 3 Judges on the prior panel agreed Federal time didn’t matter.)  The NJ Original 2021 SAC is the first complaint reviewed by a NJ judge.  If the two Federal failures do “count,” it would be nothing short of a wholesale importation of Iqbal’s hostility toward civil rights claims to New Jersey LAD claims.
[directive] L.1978,~. 114,s. 1,eff. Sept. 11, 1978.  516.3.  Payment in advance  40A 4OA  Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 5-16 the governing body of any local unit participating in a statutorily authorized joint, inter-local or other cooperative activity may, by resolution, provide for and authorize payment in advance of estimated administrative or direct service costs to the local unit or other party providing administrative services or otherwise acting on behalf of or for the group.
[brief] The Trial Court views this series of events in a vacuum and fails to consider the surrounding circumstances, which were unique and important: a good faith buyer and its attorney are waiting in the wings, extremely eager to close on the sale of a gas station.  The buyer knows that the ROFR holder won't provide information needed to finalize the sale until it receives this ROFR language in the "bona fide offer" and represents to the buyer and the seller that once that language is included, it will waive the ROFR.  In an effort to appease the ROFR holder, who also happens to have control over what the calculations for penalty in debranding will be, the language is modified to explicitly reference the ROFR.  The Trial Court ignores all of these circumstances and instead focuses on a letter from April 2023 in which counsel for the good faith buyer, who believes that any ROFR has already been waived and that Plaintiff, [...] has no standing to dictate anything to anyone, writes a frustrated letter in which he says, “[...]’s insistence [on adding the ROFR language to the contract] is both misplaced and irrelevant to our transaction. ”  Da249.
[brief] During the course of the hearing, many versions of the site plan were presented with slightly different c variance requirements in each one.  The Board’s planners issued several revised reports during the course of the hearings, which addressed the revisions to the plans.  At all times, the Board’s professional planners’ reports concluded that, in addition to the use variances, c variances were required for the number of stories, the impervious coverage, sideyard setback, the monument sign, steep slope disturbance\(^{11}\), parking variances for setback from the building and from the street, and for the number of parking spaces.
[brief] ); *Hinton v. Meyers*, 416 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 2010) (father’s certification that when he heard a scream he knew it was his daughter’s voice is a sham affidavit because the certification contradicted sworn deposition testimony in which the father stated he did not know who screamed); *Kennelly-Murray v. McGill*, 381 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2005)(plaintiff’s statements in certification in verbal threshold case in which she certified she could not perform certain activities constituted a sham affidavit because the certification contained unexplained contradictions from plaintiff’s deposition testimony).  In *Shelcusky v. Garjulio*, 172 N.J. 185 (2002) the court held that the sham affidavit doctrine should only be invoked to preclude consideration of an affidavit which the movant in a summary judgment asserts is contrary to prior deposition testimony in limited circumstances.  The court stated:  Accordingly, the sham affidavit doctrine calls for the trial court to perform an evaluative function that is consistent with our holding in Brill.  When not applied mechanistically to reject any and all affidavits that contain a contradiction to earlier deposition testimony, the doctrine requires a court to evaluate whether a true issue of material fact remains in the case notwithstanding an affiant's earlier deposition testimony.  The Appellate Division has applied the doctrine in the past, as do we for the first time here.
[brief] In rendering the Award, however, the Arbitrator wholly abandoned the PTA.  Indeed, he strayed so far from his responsibility to interpret and apply the PTA that he created from whole cloth new and unanticipated obligations by which he dispensed “his own brand of industrial justice. ”  In confirming the Award and rejecting [...]’s arguments regarding the parties’ obligations under the PTA, the Trial Court made two erroneous findings: (1) the Arbitrator, in ignoring the explicit language of the PTA, ‘found that an agreement [on the projects’ EGPs] was made pursuant to the parties’ conduct in the course of their dealings with each other,” and (2) [...] failed to “highlight any provision or term in the relevant contracts requiring that the parties enter into a written agreement to transform a project into a Backlog Project.
[brief] In the within matter, the Trial Judge substituted his judgment for that of the jury.  The jury in this matter found that the defendant was 85% responsible for the plaintiff’s pain, suffering, disability, loss of enjoyment of life.  The jury found that the defendant was negligent, and that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and the plaintiff’s damages.  The issue of the plaintiff’s damages regarding wages and medical bills we're not left to the jury as it was agreed amongst counsel, and placed on the record with the Court that any verdict in favor of the plaintiff would be molded to include the Statutory Workers Compensation Lien.  Although the jury's verdict was arguably low, the verdict was not inconsistent with the totality of the jury’s findings.  The jury found the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.  Plaintiffs claim was for a one-sided hearing loss.  For whatever reason, and for reasons that we will never know, the jury felt that $25,000 was appropriate.  In New Jersey there is a general rule that a Trial Court may not mold a jury verdict according to its perception of the jury’s view.
[brief] 9  Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 301-02 (2010) ..............  7  Young v. Prudential Ins. Co., 297 N.J.Super. 605, certif. denied, 149 N.J. 408 (1997)..................................................................................  7 Statutes and Rules N.J.S.A. 2A:23B...........................................................................passim  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 37 7.8.3  The law is somewhat less restrictive as to searches conducted during an administrative investigation.  While it appears that an employing agency does not need a warrant to conduct a search during an administrative investigation, the investigator should exercise great care when searching property or items in which the subject officer has a high expectation of privacy.  Internal affairs investigators should document their reasons for conducting the search and limit its intrusiveness.  If any doubts or concerns exist about the propriety or legality of a search, the investigator should seek advice from legal counsel before proceeding with the search.
[brief] [...] was a commercial tenant in the premises and operating a nail salon.  There are no witnesses to the alleged slip and fall.  [...] contends that it had no duty to plaintiffs with respect to the area of the premises’ parking lot where [...] allegedly slipped and fell.  [...] paid Common Area Expenses, also known as Common Area Maintenance charges (hereinafter collectively referred to as “CAM charges”), to defendants/commercial property owner/lessor, [...] i/p/a [...] and [...] (hereinafter collectively referred to as “[...]”), in addition to rent.
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DEPARTMENT’S DISAPPROVAL OF GENWORTH’S APPLICATIONS AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, AS WELL AS CONTRARY TO LAW.  (Raised below: Pa1; Pa53; Pa120)  The administrative rulings on appeal must be reversed for either of two independent reasons.  First, well-established principles of administrative law prohibit agencies from justifying their decisions with newly-minted post hoc rationales.  That is precisely what occurred here.  The Department disapproved [...]’s rate filings on the specific grounds just quoted supra, at 11.  Upon [...]’s challenge before the ALJ, it became abundantly clear even to the Department that the bases its letter invoked lacked any conceivable grounding in the text of any regulation or statute.  So an entirely new ground for disapproval was invented post hoc—“excessive” rates.  While this new ground was nominally plucked from the statutory text, see N.J.S.A. 17B:27E, it was wholly unmoored from the very disapproval letter that [...] was challenging.  No matter how the Department characterizes its grounds for disapproving [...]’s rate filings now, it cannot rewrite the disapproval letter’s stated reasons that nowhere mention statutory “excessive[ness]. ”  Indeed, [...] had been engaged in discussions with the Department for over a year before the denial letter issued and never did the Department mention “excessive” rates or cite the statute where that term appears.  *See, e.g.*, Pa95, Pa101, Pa106, Pa109, Pa112, Pa115, Pa118, Pa120.  Such a sudden turn of rationale is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.  This Court need go no further to annul the challenged determination.
[brief] **Ariston Airline & Catering Supply Co. v. Forbes,** 211 N.J. Super. 472 (Law Div. 1986)  .....................................................................................19  **Atlantic Employers Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-school Day Care Center, Inc.,** 239 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 147 (1990)  .........................................................................................24  **Burd v. Sussex Mutual Ins. Co.,** 56 N.J. 383 (1970) ....................................................................................................................24  **In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litig.,** 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................16
[brief] E.  **Even if the Bylaws did require shareholder approval prior to making any loan – which they did not – Appellant, as the sole Manager of [...], was the only individual authorized by law to consent on behalf of [...]’s sole shareholder, which was [...].**  See N.J.S.A. 42:2C-37(c)1.  But, for the reasons discussed in Appellant’s initial Brief, even an action for breach of fiduciary duty brought by the individual members of [...] against Appellant, as [...]’s manager, must fail for the reasons discussed there, including the requirements for direct vs. derivative proceedings.  *The court placed no findings on the record to establish that oral argument was not necessary when granting Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the breach of operating agreement/breach of bylaws/breach of fiduciary duties counts.*
[brief] There was no mention of the new precipitation data, its impact on flood elevations, or any mention of pollutant limitations or impairments to Duck Pond Run or any other receiving waterway (or the people who might receive the stormwater runoff into their drinking water).  In addition, the permit application explained that “[c]onstruction of the access road to U.S. Route 1 in the northern portion of the site will require disturbance of a Duck Pond Run” tributary.  Aa152.  It proposed to install a 24-inch circular pipe culvert in the tributary to Duck Pond Run to facilitate a road crossing for the Route 1 Access Road.  Aa166.  The applicant claimed that the stream offers little or no value to aquatic species.  Aa155.  The applicant stated that “construction of a culvert is a more practical application at this location,” ibid., and the “design does not propose installation of the culvert at least 2 feet below the invert of the channel. ”  Aa166.
[brief] (1T66-21 to 25).  After all, the court reasoned, “[t]hey know that this is a high crime area, [with] recent shootings. ” (1T66-14 to 20).  “It’s not just a narcotics area but it’s known for violence, it’s poorly lit . . . . [and] you have four individuals now blading[.]” (1T66-21 to 23).  The court opined that the officers not only have to protect their own safety, but the community’s safety as well.  (1T65-11 to 12).  After all, “[t]his isn’t a an isolated parking lot off a warehouse or anything like that.  It is a residential area with row houses. ” (1T58-13 to 17).  The court found this fact weighed “very significantly. ” (1T56-21 to 57-3).  This appeal follows.
[brief] *Smith*, 155 N.J. at 100.  While the affidavit establishes a basis of knowledge -- [...] told police that he learned this information from personally delivering drugs to the storage unit -- it fails to establish his veracity.  There is no indication that [...] has ever given reliable information to police in the past, and nothing else in the affidavit suggests that he is a trustworthy source.  Cf. *Keyes*, 184 N.J. at 557 (affidavit stated that the informant had “proven himself to be reliable by providing ‘information in the past that has resulted in the arrest of numerous suspects and the recovery of proceeds from drug sales’”).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Appeals to the Appellate Division may be taken as of right to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency.  N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  A final agency decision has been described as one in which the agency communicates written notice of the finality of its decision.  Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126, 136 (2016) (citing Bouie v. N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 407 N.J.Super. 518, 527, 972 A.2d 401 (App. Div.2009)).  The Court will uphold a final agency decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole, offensive to the federal or state constitution, or inconsistent with the --- 2
[brief] Trinity Church v. Lawson-[...], 394 N.J. Super. 159, 166 (App. Div. 2007).  “[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome [a] motion [for summary judgment].”  Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-441 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Appellant/plaintiff [...] argues that summary judgment was improperly granted because further discovery was required.  He identified potential depositions of [...] witnesses concerning underwriting knowledge.  However, when respondent/defendant [...]’s motion was decided, depositions of the [...] representatives were completed.  Appellant/plaintiff [...] could have, but did not, conduct additional depositions within the time provided by the Court Rules; rather, he temporarily settled his coverage claim, so there was no active litigation on the coverage dispute (i.e., the Declaratory Judgement action) when respondent/defendant [...]’s N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 motion was granted.  Notably, appellant/plaintiff [...]’s Declaratory Judgment Complaint against [...] was dismissed on an unopposed motion for summary judgment on June 7, 2024.  The decision of the motion judge specifically held that appellant/plaintiff [...]’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey, so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy.  (DR03).  If garaged in New Jersey, appellant/plaintiff [...] was required to have coverage mandated by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 on his vehicles.  He did not.  Consequently, the unopposed Order granting summary judgment effectively eliminates any claim that a “fact issue existed” when the Court granted respondent/defendant [...]’s N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 summary judgment motion.  Regardless, neither appellant/plaintiff [...]’s opposition to the summary judgment motion nor his Brief on this appeal contain a statement of what further discovery was needed.  The motion filed by [...] conclusively demonstrates that there was no discovery required which would alter the analysis that he failed to maintain insurance meeting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 on April 13, 2022.  Moreover, as respondent/defendant argued herein, the claims against [...] and its internal policies and decisions, are irrelevant to the analysis of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 in the context of appellant/plaintiff [...]’s ability to recover damages for personal injury.
[brief] (Ra30)  On October 19, 2017, the Appellate Division issued a decision holding that the trial court erred in relying on its personal experience with the Arbitrator to resolve the disputed issues of fact and remanded the matter for a plenary hearing.  (Ra32)  The plenary hearing was held on June 1, 2018, and on June 26, 2018, the trial court entered an Order and accompanying Memorandum of Decision denying the Defendants application to vacate the award.
[brief] The indictment jointly charged seventeen-year-old [...] and his codefendants with the following crimes: second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count one); four counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l (counts two through five); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count six); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (a)(1)-(2) (count seven); first-degree knowing or purposeful murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) (1)-(2) (count eight); two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-(b) (counts nine and ten); and second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count eleven).
[brief] See *Hagans*, 233 N.J. at 42-43.  It is true that defendant was under arrest and handcuffed when he consented to the search of home, and that defendant himself directed police to the contraband in his house upon arrival.  *King*, 44 N.J. at 352-53.  But a review of the totality of the evidence, including the MVR and accompanying transcript, more than demonstrates the voluntariness of defendant’s consent.  MVRs did not exist when the Supreme Court decided *King* and established the various factors to consider when analyzing consent.  See *Hagans*, 233 N.J. at 40.
[brief] (A229, Op. at 34).  And that the “the loss of value as to the assets which originated from Plaintiff’s pre-marital assets must be substantially considered when determining the fairness of the PSA. ” (Id. at 35).  On alimony, the trial court recognized the 26-year age disparity between the parties and the fact Plaintiff was 69 years old when the parties divorced undermines any alimony claim by Defendant who was 43 years old.  (See Id. at 44).  Additionally, the fact that Plaintiff’s “income in the four years preceding the PSA was not significantly greater than Defendant’s” further undermined any alimony claim.  (Id. at 49).  She had sufficient earning capacity in the casino gaming industry and further derived “de-facto” support from Plaintiff in their post-judgment attempt at reconciliation.  (Id. at 48).  For all those reasons, Defendant’s argument on appeal concerning default judgment should be rejected.