ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  Robbery (first degree), N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; 2C:2-6  2.  Theft by Unlawful Taking (third degree), N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a  3.  Aggravated Assault (fourth degree), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1); 2C:2-6  4.  Terroristic Threats (third degree), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a; 2C:2-6 5.  Possession of a Firearm by an Unlawful Person (second degree), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; 2C:2-6 6.  Unlawful Possession of a Handgun (second degree), N.J. S.A. 2C:39-5b; 2C:2-6 7.  Possession of a Disposed Firearm (fourth degree), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d; 2C:2-6 8.  Theft by Receiving Stolen Property (third degree), N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a; 2C:2-6 9.  Unlawful Taking of a Means of Conveyance (fourth degree), N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10d; 2C:2-6  Upon the following grounds:
[brief] See, e.g., \textit{Marron v. United States}, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).  It merely states the obvious to note that in the instant case the warrant is deficient and defective in the above-listed several aspects and is another dimension of the Supreme Court's holding that the "point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
[brief] Last, the Board refuted [...]’s contention that the Board had failed to consider his seven letters of support (based on the fact that the decision had discussed one letter in more detail than others), noting that it had discussed the letters with [...] at his hearing and considered the various letters, observing that discussion of one letter that “was notably positive should not be interpreted as a failure to have given due consideration” to the other letters.  (Pa6).  Thus, the Board affirmed its decision denying parole and establishing a thirty-six-month FET, and this appeal followed on April 10, 2024.
[brief] The Court below then goes on to reference the New Jersey Administrative Code stating that, “the Administrative Code explicitly addresses noise regulation in its standards of performance. ” (Da81 citing N.J.A.C. 8:52-3.2(a)(6)).  N.J.A.C. Title 8, Chapter 52, Subchapter 3 deals with “Public Health Practice”.  It provides, at N.J.A.C. 8:52-3.1(a), that local Boards of Health should insure for each of their residents “the programs and capacities to provide services as set forth at N.J.A.C. 8:52-3.2(a). ”  Ibid.  In turn, N.J.A.C. 8:52-3.2 “Services and Capacities” define what are included within “Public Health Services”.  One of several of these is found in Subsection 6 which deals with enforcing a number of laws and regulations “that protect public health and ensure safety”.  Among those listed in that Subsection is “III.  Compliance with environmental health activities regarding air, water, noise and nuisances…”.  This is the full extent of the statutory regulations regarding noise pursuant to the standards of practice for local Health Boards, adopted pursuant to the Local Health Services Act.  The regulation deals with health activities regarding a number of general subjects, which are air, water, noise and nuisances, as they affect the environment.  As we explored supra, this is different from municipal regulations in furtherance of the police powers to prevent disturbing noises and protect the public safety and welfare of the residents of a municipality under the Home Rule Act.  See NJ Builders Association v. Mayor and Township Council of East Brunswick, 60 N.J. 222, 226- 227 (1972); Clarksburg Inn, supra, 375 N.J. Super. at 633; Bynum, supra, 181 N.J. Super at 6; Holland, supra, 132 N.J. Super at 22.  In any case, it is not a pervasive and comprehensive scheme which expressly or impliedly governs the field of regulation of noise.
[brief] Question No. 11(a) in the 2016 Policy Application asks the following:  --- \(^3\)  The court’s reliance on Liebling, supra, and Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436 (2007) was misplaced.  These cases do not address the reasonable expectation of the insured based on the insured’s policy definitions and, as such, are factually distinct.  11.
[brief] The court’s further overstepped a jury’s authority when it held the following:  Additionally, under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) it is the school district’s responsibility to ‘make all reasonable efforts to renegotiate a contract in good faith. ’  Sending a ‘Questionnaire’ and demand for ‘production of [...]’s payroll records,’ as [...] did in the present case, does not strike this Court as being in good faith.  The court’s conclusion of bad faith was in reliance on the self-serving certification of an undeposed defendant, without any testimony from a Board employee.  To the contrary, with the fraud and civil theft counts, the Board accuses [...] of acting in bad faith.  Despite both parties accusing each other of bad faith, the court chose sides and took on the role of the jury who was supposed to make that determination.  Whether the Board acted in “good faith” or bad faith is a fact-sensitive inquiry that requires a credibility determination by a jury.
[brief] Plaintiffs do not address in their brief this information that [...] legitimately had, or what [...] reasonably believed, or even what reasonable inferences were to be drawn from those facts.  Rather, Plaintiffs focus on what they erroneously claim [...] supposedly lied about seeing.  In particular, Plaintiffs allege that [...]’s complaint to the police is based on a certification in which he “lied” about seeing [...] break through the fence and trespass over [...] property.  The flaw in Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is that [...] never certified in the criminal complaint that he saw [...] do these things.  The trial court recognized this fatal flaw in Plaintiffs’ proposed malicious prosecution claim, and correctly concluded that Plaintiffs could thus not establish that [...] lacked probable cause:  [...] reports that he observed from others, that he observed unidentified occupants of the house damage the fence.  And he was aware of the [...] before that fencing had been placed.  As I indicated, PC can be – probable cause can be based on hearsay and accumulation of circumstantial evidence.  And so I’m satisfied that, that statement is not untrue and that it does have – it does include probable cause.  And more importantly, the plaintiffs hasn’t [sic] demonstrated as an element, even prima facie, that there is no probable cause based on, on that particular element.  * * *  Probable cause is determined separately by this Court.  And I’m satisfied that there was probable cause based on that affidavit for the charges as I indicated.  (1T 24:7-18, 1T 25:20-23)  And I – I’ve heard the arguments of counsel.  It is my view that at the time he – he – he – he appeared at – to the sign the – attempt to sign the summons, I believe that, based on his knowledge and what was told to him and what he observed, that there was sufficient probable cause, given circumstantial evidence, that he believed – or that – that the [...]s were trespassing.  (2T 22:25—23:7)  As a result, the trial court correctly found that allowing Plaintiffs to assert a malicious prosecution claim would be futile and properly denied their motion.
[brief] Manchester Township Bd. of Educ. V. Thomas P. Carney, Inc., 199 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1985) ..........................................................31, 32  Manger v. Manger, 417 N.J. Super. 370 (App. Div. 2010) ...........................................................29, 33  Matter of Proc. by Comm’r of Banking & Ins., [...], 2020 WL 7489010 (App. Div. Dec. 21, 2020)
[brief] *Instructional Sys.*, 130 N.J. at 345.  Like *Instructional Sys.*, New Jersey courts will not abandon New Jersey companies or forfeit New Jersey’s interest in protecting its companies simply because some sales occur in a State other than New Jersey.  Though Appellants \(^5\) New Jersey applies its own choice-of-law rules since it is the forum for the lawsuit.  See *Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.*, 189 N.J. 615, 621 (2007).  have sales in New York, those sales do not create a substantial relationship with New York sufficient to vitiate New Jersey’s interest and public policy.
[directive] Risk levels that or (FTA or NCA value of 4 or higher), "high" (FTA higher), "moderate" and of 3 or (FTA or NCA value "elevated" or higher).  NCA value of 5 Framework," the two six-point scales are a grid "Decision-Making used to generate of AOC's As part the FTA is matrix Matrix," where the value shown on the vertical axis of the Making "Pretrial Decision known the as The intersection of cell that horizontal axis. the two scores creates a on the presented NCA value is and the and intervention/monitoring services that the pretrial services conditions of release level and type indicates the court. recommend to the program will level of pretrial services program in determining the type helpful to the and approach is  Although the matrix to the court to manage the through the will recommend risks identified monitoring services it release conditions and for decision whether to issue acomplaint-summons or apply a enforcement instead purposes of the law PSA, for under FTA and NCA point values in a matrix
[brief] For example, the Appellate Division has cited In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6. 4, supra, twice in published decisions – and a further fifteen times in unpublished decisions – for the specific purpose of affirming denials of applications for ordinary or accidental disability retirement.  See e.g. Thorpe v. Bd. of Trustees, Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., A-0689-20, 2023 WL 2395067, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 8, 2023)³; Rooth v. Bd. of Trustees, Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 364-68 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] Defendants Brief fails to address many of the arguments asserted in Plaintiff’s opening Brief—Defendants do not address the legislative and statutory history of the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”) as it informs the analysis of the implied private right of action, Defendants do not address their enforcement of a void debt as an ascertainable loss under the Consumer Fraud Act, and Defendants do not address the numerous decisions finding that a violation of the NJCFLA gives rise to claims under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because the collection of a void debt is misleading, deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable.
[brief] [...] barely makes reference to age or gender discrimination on appeal other than to argue that he “established a pattern” of discriminatory events such that a jury could find a hostile work environment existed.  (Pb42-43).  To state a prima facie case of a hostile work environment based on gender or age, plaintiff would need to show that the conduct of a moving defendant (1) would not have occurred but for plaintiff’s gender or age, was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make (3) an individual of plaintiff’s gender or age believe (4) the conditions of employment were altered and the working environment was hostile or abusive.  Lehmann v. Toys ‘R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 603-604 (1993).
[brief] (Da 109, 06:48:00 to 07:11:52; Da 127-28)  --- 13  The HCPO transcript did not record the portion of the interview from about 06:38:45 to 06:50:40.  The court found that the last three “nothing” responses occurred based on its review of the video.  (Da 127)  The court omitted the word “else” from two of those statements, which is clearly audible on the video, but that word does not change the analysis.  (Da 109, 06:48:00 to 06:49:05)  The court also omitted his second reply that he had “nothing” to say, which is clearly audible on the video.  (Da 109, 06:40:02 to 6:40:20)  The trial transcripts  2.  Motion Court’s Decision
[brief] (20T 70:22 to 71:8; 21T 18:20 to  In fact, the trial court sustained the defendants’ objections when [...]’s testimony went too far afield.  (21T 21:15 to 22:5).  The appellant mistakes the net opinion rule for a “standard of perfection. ”  An expert need not “organize or support an opinion in a particular manner that opposing counsel deems preferable. ”  *Townsend*, 221 N.J. at 54-55.  Nor may a court exclude an expert’s testimony as net opinion “merely because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact which the adversary considers relevant. ”  *Id.*, citing *State v. Freeman*, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988).  Disagreements of the sort appellant advances here (Db31-34) are the subject of cross examination or impeachment, not exclusion.  *See Rosenberg v. Tavorath*, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002).  What makes the appellant’s arguments particularly strange, though, is that on the issue of intent, they prevailed.
[brief] **A.  About Defendant  [...]**  [...], through its adult services program, operates group homes in New Jersey for intellectually and developmentally disabled individuals.  (Appx 520 at ¶1)\(^1\).  [...]’s group homes offer personalized services, including: on- --- \(^1\)  Factual citations are to Appx 521, which combines Defendant’s Statement of Material Undisputed Facts (Appx 3) and Plaintiff’s Response (Appx. 353) into one document.  call support, medication management, community integration, management of daily activities, structured activities, life skills development, and transportation.  (Appx 520-21 at ¶2).  These group homes are staffed with hourly Direct Support Professionals (“DSPs”), supervisory Home Managers, and other human service professionals who develop individualized service plans to help each individual resident reach new milestones.  (Appx 521 at ¶3).  B.  **Individuals With Enumerated Criminal Convictions Are Statutorily Disqualified From Working at [...]’s Group Homes.**  [...]’s group homes are regulated by N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:44A, entitled “Standards for Residences for Individuals with Developmental Disabilities. ” (Appx 521 at ¶4).  These laws recognize that the individuals being served at [...]’s group homes are extremely vulnerable.  (Appx 521 at ¶5).  Some are non-verbal or unable to communicate.  (Appx 521 at ¶5).  Thus, New Jersey regulations put into place a number of protections to protect the individuals being served.  (Appx 521 at ¶6).  New Jersey law provides that “an individual shall be disqualified from employment” with group homes (such as those run by [...]) if they have been convicted of “[a] crime or offense involving the … sale, possession, or habitual use of a controlled dangerous substance as defined in the ‘New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act,’ P.L.1970, c. 226 (C.24:21-1 et seq).” (Appx 522 at ¶8).  New Jersey law similarly disqualifies employment of individuals convicted of such conduct under the laws of other states.  (Appx 522-3 at ¶9).  If [...] knowingly employs individuals who are disqualified from the position, it could lose its license in New Jersey.  (Appx 523 at ¶10).  C.  **Plaintiff Lied Multiple Times on Her Employment Application Documents.
[directive] Você entende que ao se declarar culpado e admitir que usou ou era portador de uma arma de fogo que é um(a) , (tipo de arma de fogo) enquanto cometia ou tentava cometer um dos crimes, você está renunciando ao seu direito a um processo em que um corpo de jurados poderia determinar, acima de qualquer dúvida razoável, que você usou ou portava uma arma de fogo enquanto cometia ou tentava cometer um dos crimes?  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that you used or were in possession of a firearm that is a , (type of firearm) while in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes, you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you used or possessed a firearm during the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes?  [Sim/Yes]
[brief] However, on December 8, 2023, the court issued a written opinion denying the Appellant’s motion for a new trial.  (T5).  The parties were afforded an opportunity to request oral argument after issuance of the preliminary determination but did not pursue oral argument in light of the court’s written decision.  (Da31-Da44).  No order was entered at that time.  The within Notice of Appeal was filed on January 5, 2024.  Respondent noted in its case information statement that its motion on fees remained outstanding.  On November 18, 2024, counsel for Appellant uploaded a letter to eCourts Law Division requesting that the trial judge enter an order memorializing her prior decision of December 8, 2023 so that the appeal could proceed.  Thereafter, the court entered an order which was docketed on December 8, 2023 but dated January 19, 2024 confirming its prior decision to deny the Defendant/Appellant’s motion for a new trial.  (Da45-Da46).  On the same date, January 19, 2024, the court entered and docketed an order granting in large part Respondent’s motion on costs, fees and interest.  (Da47-Da48).  The court granted the application on costs and on enhanced pre-judgment interest, but reduced the requested award on attorney’s fees from $39,065 to $31,800.  (Da47-Da48).  The result is an attorney’s fee award with an hourly rate of about $530 per hour.  The order and attorney fee award was entered after Defendant/Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal and case information statement.  The lower court has addressed all pending motions and applications which were before it and this matter is ripe for appeal. \(^1\) --- \(^1\) T1 – Transcript of Jury Trial October 3, 2023 T2 – Transcript of Jury Trial Volume 1 October 5, 2023 T3 – Transcript of Jury Trial Volume 2 October 5, 2023 T4 – Transcript of Jury Trial October 6, 2023 T5 – Transcript of Disposition  December 8, 2023
[brief] The instant case raises significant issues of public interest.  In Jacobs v. N.J. State Highway Authority, 54 N.J. 393 (N.J. 1969), the plaintiff filed an appeal disputing final agency action compelling plaintiff to retire.  In its opinion, the Court stated on page 397:  “We pause to note that the suit was begun long after expiration of the time limit fixed for such actions by R.R. 1:3-1(b) ...  As a result, the Authority moved to dismiss, but in view of the importance of the public question involved, the Appellate Division felt there should be a decision on the merits.  Consequently, the motion was denied.  This Court likewise is of the view that the meritorious issue should be resolved. ”  (Emphasis Added).  In Rumana v. County of Passaic, 397 N.J. Super. 157, 172 (App. Div. 2007), the Court stated:  “We have been reluctant to impose the time bar of R. 2:4-1(b) where the issues raised involve significant questions of public interest...  See also In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1, 372 N.J. Super. 61, 87-88, ... (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 630... (2005)...  ...  Because the issues before us involve significant matters ... that would merit review even beyond that thirty-day period, we conclude that the time to appeal the action of the [...] should be extended to August 10, 2007. ”  (Emphasis Added).  The Rumana case involved a notice of appeal with a filing deadline of July 30, 2007 but was instead filed on August 10, 2007.  The instant case involves several issues of public interest.
[brief] In fact, there is simply no caselaw holding that the mere acquisition by an unlicensed entity of a debt, without taking any collection action or otherwise communicating with a debtor is void as a matter of law.  C.f. Maisano v. [...], 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2421, at * 6-7 (App. Div Nov. 27, 2019) (rejecting argument that underlying credit agreement was voided at the time of transfer because [...] was not licensed).  Because the intermediate assignees did not make the underlying loan or seek to collect on the debt, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33 simply does not apply.
[brief] The filed complaint is appended hereto at Pa31\(^1\).  The Complaint alleges negligent operation of the light rail train, as well as negligent design, construction and maintenance of dangerous conditions at the light rail station and dangerous light rail car conditions.  Defendants, [...], [...] Washington Division, [...], [...], and [...] Et Al., through [...], filed an Answer with Cross-Claim and Jury Demand on April 5, 2021.  The filed Answer is appended hereto as Pa61.  Subsequently, Defendants, [...], [...], [...] Washington Division, [...], and [...] Et Al., through [...], filed an Answer with Cross- --- \(^1\)“Pa_” refers to Plaintiff’s Appendix.  Claim and Jury Demand on May 28, 2021.  This filed answer is appended hereto as Pa79.  An Amended Complaint was filed on behalf of Plaintiff, [...], on October 8, 2021.
[brief] (1T162.1-7; 1T162.15-17).  Likewise, [...] could not testify if [...] had not called in a count as recorded on the log book.  (1T169.13-20).  More importantly, [...] admitted that he could not state with any specificity that the entries that appeared in the log book were false or even what those entries meant.  (1T170.1-13; 1T170.115-22; 1T178.10-16).  Additionally, [...] testified on behalf of the State.  First, [...] testified that “[he] saw [...] in the television room.  They talked and watched some television.  [...] was sitting.  Sometimes [...]’ eyes were open, sometimes they were closed.  McDowell could not recall seeing [...] leaving the television room to perform inmate counts or to go to the bathroom.  McDowell left the television room to perform his counts.
[brief] 5 - **Matter of Gen. Election Held in Tp. of Monroe, Gloucester Cty., N.J. on Tuesday, Nov. 6, 1990**, 245 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1990) ........................................ 14 - **Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf**, 228 N.J. 311 (2017)
[brief] During the course of that statement, a detective asked her to view a photo array and to indicate whether she recognized any of the individuals depicted in the array as the person who shot [...].  From the photo array, she picked out a photograph of defendant.  After [...] was released from the hospital, [...], the same detective who had prepared the photo array viewed by [...], asked [...] to come into police headquarters to view a photo array.  Tatarek testified that [...] was unable to identify any of the photographs as depicting the person who shot him on July 3, 2003.
[brief] [...] PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DISPOSAL OF THE JURY FOR TEN DAYS DURING JURY DELIBERATIONS.  The jury began deliberations on the afternoon of November 18th, and deliberations continued the next day.  There was then a ten day break in deliberations.  The break occurred over the week of Thanksgiving.  However, the holiday was not the sole reason for the adjournment.  Although the judge did not explain to the jury why it could not deliberate over the course of ten days, it was ostensibly because of judicial college.  Traditionally judicial college is held on the first three days of the week of Thanksgiving.  Thus, the judge was unavailable for deliberations on Monday, November 23rd, 2015 through Wednesday November 25th, and the court was closed for the Thanksgiving holiday on Thursday and Friday.  When the jury reconvened on November 30th, 2015, it immediately announced that it was deadlocked on 15 counts of the indictment.
[brief] If the indemnitee clause explicitly requires indemnitee for the indemnitor’s own negligence, courts will enforce that clause.  For example, in Sayles v. [...], Inc., 429 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 266), [...], a hotel owner, contracted with [...] to use the [...] name for the hotel at issue.  Id. at 268.  The contract required [...] to indemnify [...] for any claim arising out of the operation of the hotel, “including when the active or passive negligence of [[...]] is proven. ”  Id. at 270.  The Sayles court ruled that the indemnity clause was Azurak compliant because it “expressly” included indemnity for [...]’s own negligence.  Id. at 273.