ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Complaint-Warrant Is for IfApplication Prosecutor to Notice Required 3.3.3 directive 3.3.1, the subsection pursuant to directive a issues  Prosecutor County  If the first without acomplaint-warrant for applies officer enforcement law a if that provide must the denies officer judicial other or court the and prosecutor assistant an from approval obtaining See practicable.  soon as as Office Prosecutor's County the notify must officer application, the complaint- application fora when Justice Criminal of Division to (report 4.11 Section also denied).  is warrant 31, 2016.  October on operational become shall subsection This Directive.  Charging Prosecutor's County with Compliance Strict and Oversight 3.3.4 prosecutor 3.3.1, the subsection to pursuant directive a issues
[brief] This Court will reverse discovery orders that are “unduly invasive and burdensome. ”  Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 470.  The ESI Order cannot survive that test.  First, the ESI Order is “unduly invasive” of Defendants’ privacy rights.  Id.  Parties in litigation have a well-founded interest in preventing sensitive information from falling into the hands of their adversaries.  As leading discovery experts have recognized, “[e]lectronic information systems contain significant amounts of ESI that may be subject to trade secret, confidentiality, or privacy considerations,” including not just “proprietary business information” but also “customer and employee personal data (e.g., social security and credit card numbers, employee and patient health data, and customer financial records). ”
[brief] (Da9-Da15)  On January 9, 2023, a hearing on Defendant’s motion was held at the Borough of Ship Bottom Municipal Court.  After hearing the arguments of counsel, the Hon. [...], J.M.C., reserved decision.  (2T6-24 to 6-25)  On January 11, 2023, Judge Sahin issued a written opinion/order denying Defendant’s motion to modify his sentence.  (Da1-Da2)  On February 8, 2023, Defendant filed a notice of motion for reconsideration.  (Da17-Da21)  On February 16, 2023, Judge Sahin issued a written opinion/order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration.  (Da3)  On February 20, 2023, Defendant filed a notice of appeal with the Law Division, Ocean County.  (Da36-Da41)  Trial de novo was held on November 2, 2023.  At its conclusion, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., denied Defendant’s request for relief.  (3T55-15 to 55-23)  This appeal follows.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (Pa804-Pa805 at T77:5-79:8; Da54; Da691 at T73:9-12).  [...] reported back to EEO that the meetings occurred as instructed and that [...] intended to file an EEO complaint.  (Pa341 at T67:10-68:2; Pa805 at T79:2-8; Pa807 at T86:20-23; Da54-Da55; Da425-Da426; Da683 at T39:20-25).  [...] thereafter filed an EEO complaint on November 20, 2018, alleging harassment and hostile work environment against [...].  (Da56; Da427-Da429).  On November 23, 2018, [...] informed [...]’s EEO office that [...] also wished to proceed with a complaint against [...].  (Da56; Da432-431).  EEO opened an investigation into [...]’s and [...]’s allegations of sexual harassment against [...] on the same date – November 20, 2018 – and both were investigated in parallel pursuant to [...]’s EEO policy.
[directive] The N.J.S.A. in enumerated as violence, domestic involving offense or crime any with charged is the to pursuant order issued restraining permanent or temporary a to subject while 2C:25-19a', charged is defendant (2) a 1991"; or of Act Violence Domestic of "Prevention of provisions the 2C:43-12b(2)(b).  N.J.S.A. violence. of the threat or violence involving offense or crime a with to pursuant violence" of threat the or "violence involves crime whether a determine To present: be must following the of one statute, this in defined as injury bodily significant or serious sustains victim (1) the or or d2; 2C:11-lb N.J.S.A. homicide, include offenses violence domestic (18), through 2C:25-19a(1) N.J.S.A. to Pursuant ' assault, sexual imprisonment, false restraint, criminal kidnapping, threats, terroristic assault, harassment, trespass, criminal burglary, mischief, criminal lewdness, contact, sexual criminal other crime any and 2C:29-9b), N.J.S.A. contempt robbery, coercion, criminal stalking, of "Prevention the under protected person a to injury bodily serious or death of risk involving 1991." of Act Violence Domestic substantial a creates which injury "bodily injury as bodily serious defines 2C:11-lb N.J.S.A. 2 impairment or loss protracted or disfigurement, permanent serious, causes which or death risk of bodily significant defines 2C:11-ld N.J.S.A. organ." or member bodily any of function the of or member bodily any of function of the temporary loss a which creates "bodily injury as injury senses." five the of any one of temporary loss or organ 3 Page or word by threatens or weapon deadly a uses with and armed actor is (2) the or 2C:11-1c3; N.J.S.A. in defined as weapon deadly to a use gesture injury.4 bodily significant or serious inflict to threatens actor the (3) PTI. admission into defendant's against presumption is circumstances, the of these any In 2C:43-12b(2)(b).
[brief] (Aa205- Nowhere did [...] raise concerns about a floodway verification, the use of culverts, or WQMP consistency.  On December 1, 2022, [...] issued an environmental report and engineering report regarding its Project determinations and addressing public comments.  Starting with flooding, even though the Project proposes to disturb over three hundred acres of land, (Aa25), [...] saw that only one structure – a stormwater outfall – is proposed within the actual flood hazard area, (Aa19).  No above ground structures or activities are proposed within the inner portion of the flood hazard area, known as the floodway.  (Aa15; Aa18).  [...] found that the Project complied with riparian zone area rules and that impacts to the riparian zone were eliminated to the greatest extent practicable.  (Aa31) (finding .808 acres of “previously proposed riparian zone impacts” eliminated through Project revisions).  While the Project proposes impacts to less than half an acre of riparian zone, (Aa36), the Project will preserve and reforest over thirty acres of riparian zone, (Aa31).  [...] also determined that a pipe culvert was proper for the access road crossing.  (Aa33).  [...] accordingly determined that the Project met the flood hazard regulations.  In its determination, [...] noted public concern about use of flood data from 1999 to calculate the flood hazard area, (Aa22), but found that [...]’s calculations complied with the then-established FHACA rules, (Aa21).
[directive] Going forward, a prosecutor’s statement of readiness will be understood to encompass each of those elements.  The prosecutor’s statement must be made in open court or in writing.  R. 3:25-4(d)(3).  Trial courts can rely on good faith representations from the State and need not inquire about each of the above points.  In their discretion, judges can also require appropriate assurances to support a prosecutor’s statement of readiness.  In addition, if a trial date is postponed after the statement of readiness, the trial court can revisit the issue and ask the State to declare once again whether it is ready to proceed.
[brief] Plaintiff admits that it created and entered into an illegal real estate transaction scheme with [...] in violation of the New Jersey Tax Sale Law, which bars any claim Plaintiff may have against the estate arising out of this transaction.  (Pb 21).  At the same time, Plaintiff now argues that the Commitment for Title Insurance that it attempted to obtain in furtherance of this illegal transaction was an independent contract, or collateral agreement, between Plaintiff and [...].  In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to paragraph 3 of the “Important Notice and Disclosure” section of the title commitment issued by [...] through [...] for the proposition that this formed a contractual obligation between the parties regardless of the requirements listed in other sections of the agreement.
[brief] Here, Plaintiffs have asserted that they did not assent to or sign the December Terms, and that no agreement was formed.  Counsel confirmed this at oral argument, even when [...] acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ position may “open up the previous agreements,” *i.e.*, the January Terms:  **Court:**  You’re arguing it [the December Terms] was never signed.  If I find that it was never signed, then arguably it does open up the previous agreements.  …  **[...]:**  Yes, Your Honor.  (T50-1–6.)  Again, Plaintiffs do not dispute that [...] agreed to the January 2021 Terms.  And as explained above, this Court has already held that those terms constitute a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate.  *Williams*, 2023 WL 5768422, at *1, *4 (holding that the same Uber in-app clickwrap interface at issue here created an enforceable agreement to the January Terms; that the arbitration agreement was conspicuously placed within those Terms; and that the language of the arbitration agreement complies with *Atalese*).
[brief] APPLICATION OF THE INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD AND LEVEL OF REVIEW REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT’S DECISION BE DEEMED ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE.  (Raised Below: 7T 39:4-12; 42:24-25; 43:1-11)  Upon only a cursory review of the Resolution, it is abundantly clear that the Board treated the (d)(6) height variance application as a (d)(1) use variance.  Indeed, the seminal case for (d)(6) height variances, Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004), is not mentioned in the twenty-five (25) page Resolution.  Even though the height variance sought approval for a permitted use in the SM Zone, the Defendant incorrectly applied the heightened standard of review articulated in Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, (1987).  Section 70(d) of the MLUL categorizes “use” variances into six groups.  The category of (d) variance determines the applicable “special reasons”, or “positive criteria” required to warrant approval of the variance.  Cell South, 172 N.J. at 83.  The more relaxed standard of proof for certain categories of “(d)” variances was first articulated in Coventry Square v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 138 N.J. 285 (1994).  Coventry Square established a different, less stringent standard, for conditional use variances sought under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3).  The Court explained the distinctions between a use variance for a prohibited use in the zone, versus a permitted use, albeit subject to certain conditions:  Thus, our courts generally have treated a conditional use that does not comply with all the conditions of the ordinance as if it were a prohibited use, imposing on the applicant the same burden of proving special reasons as it would impose on applicants for use variances.  In our view, that standard is plainly inappropriate and does not adequately reflect the significant differences between prohibited uses, on the one hand, and conditional uses that do not comply with one or more of the conditions imposed by an ordinance, on the other hand.  In the case of prohibited uses, the high standard of proof required to establish special reasons for a use variance is necessary to vindicate the municipality's determination that the use ordinarily should not be allowed in the zoning district.  In the case of conditional uses, the underlying municipal decision is quite different.  The municipality has determined that the use is allowable in the zoning district, but has imposed conditions that must be satisfied.  As evidenced by this record, a conditional use applicant’s inability to comply with some of the ordinances conditions need not materially affect the appropriateness of the site for the conditional use.  Accordingly, the standard of proof of special reasons to support a variance from one or more conditions imposed on a conditional use should be relevant to the nature of the deviation from the ordinance.  The burden of proof required to sustain a use variance not only is too onerous for a conditional use variance; in addition, its focus is misplaced.
[brief] The damage they have inflicted, and continue to inflict on these innocent Defendants, should not be condoned.  Despite requests, Plaintiff refused to vacate the Lis Pendens so that Defendants continue to incur costs while being deprived of the benefits of their real property.  This is compounded by the continued lack of assurance that Plaintiff can even afford this property as it failed to post a supersedeas bond that would have shown Defendants – and this Court – that Plaintiff can even proceed to sale.  Consistent with the tenet and purpose of Rule 2:9-5, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the within appeal as interlocutory and sought to have the Lis Pendens removed as Plaintiff failed to file a stay and post the necessary bond while it tied up Defendants’ real property without proof of solvency (or, indeed, proof of their very corporate existence).
[brief] 1-9  1.  Item 1 - (29a, last par., to 31a, 1st par.; 32a-34a) (3T, p. 4, line 8, to p. 5, line 6)  2.  Items 2,3, & 5 - Issues were not ruled upon in Court rulings  3.  Item 4 - (31a, last par., to 32a, 1st 2 lines, for [...]’ Exceptions only) (4T, p. 46, line15, to p. 47, line 13 {$72,000 on line 2 should be $4,120.48})  4.  Item 6 - (3T, p. 8, line 16, to p. 12, line 20) (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, line 9, to p. 50, line 2)  7.  Item 7&8 - (3T, p. 14, line 2, to p. 15, line 8) (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, lines 9-12)  8.  Item 9 - (4T, p. 47, line 19, to p. 50, line 9)  9.  Item 10 - See Items 1-9
[directive] TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i PROPERTY RECORDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Centralized Filing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Property Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Records Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 PROPERTY STORAGE FACILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Volume and Type of Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Temporary Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 PROPERTY OFFICER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 AUDITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Return to Owner or Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Destruction of Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 PROPERTY CONTROL POLICY AND PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 MARKING AND PACKAGING PROPERTY AND EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] Significantly, defendant's failure to raise this issue before the trial court "denied the State the opportunity to confront the claim head-on; it denied the trial court the opportunity to evaluate the claim in an informed and deliberate manner; and it denied any reviewing court the benefit of a robust record within which the claim could be considered."  *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 21 (2009).  Defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing plain error.  Moreover, defendant's failure to object "permits an inference that any error . . . was not prejudicial."  *State v. Cotto*, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 537 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 166 (2022); see also *State v. Green*, 318 N.J. Super. 361, 373 (App. Div. 1999) ("The absence of an objection suggests that trial counsel perceived no error or prejudice, and, in any event, prevents the trial judge from remedying any possible confusion in a timely manner."), aff'd o.b., 163 N.J. 140 (2000).  Indeed, defense counsel's lack of an objection is understandable here, as defendant never admitted culpability and continually denied any guilt in the murder.  Although the State argued in summation that defendant was lying during the interview, the substance of his statements was not especially incriminating or inculpatory.  In light of this as well as the State's strong circumstantial proofs establishing defendant's guilt of the crimes charged, he has not met his burden of establishing plain error.
[brief] **STANDARD OF REVIEW IN AN APPEAL OF AN ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT**  The review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary and a reviewing court applies the same standard as the motion judge.  *Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc.*, 230 N.J. 123, 135-36 (2017)  New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2(c) provides that summary judgment:  ...shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  [R. 4:46-2(c). ]  Summary Judgment is warranted when the evidence presents no genuine issue of fact or when it is so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995).  To avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a challenged material fact.  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 529.  A Court cannot deny a motion for summary judgment merely because the opposing party points to an insubstantial or controverted fact.  *Id.*  In this case, it is uncontested that Plaintiff failed to obtain an expert opinion, which set out the applicable standard of care, demonstrate that [...] violated that standard of care, and established causal link between that alleged breach and Plaintiff’s injuries.  As a result, summary judgment was appropriate in light of Plaintiff’s failure to establish a basis to reopen discovery.  **ISSUE II:**
[brief] Even though their factual argument clearly states the principals of a claim under McKenney (i.e., a material change in testimony leading to unfair surprise), Defendants never cite this case, or any other legal authority to support their argument.  See Db at pp. 10-18.  Below, the Defendants nonsensically claimed both that they were not seeking relief under McKeeney and that McKenney supported their argument.  See Pa63-Pa67.  As such, while Defendants’ have not explicitly argued for a McKenney violation on appeal, Plaintiff is obligated to address this issue because: 1) it is the only legal authority applicable to the arguments raised by the Defendants, and 2) the Defendants claimed below (albeit inconsistently) that McKenney supported their argument. concluded their trial preparations, which had extended over several years.
[brief] Princeton Office Park, L.P. v. Plymouth Park Tax Services, LLC ............................................. 25 218 N.J. 53, 62 (2014)  Regional Construction Corp. v. Ray ,364 N.J.Super.496 ................................................................. 24 504-505 (App. Div. 2003)  Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert ...................... 31 437 N.J.Super. 90, 98 (App. Div.2014)  Royal Tax Lien Servs., LLC v. Morodan ................. 40  2015 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1727 (App. Div, July 20, 2015)  Simon v. Cronecker, ........................................... 26,49  189 N. J. 304, 319 (2007)
[brief] For instance, [...] contends “[...]’s detailed factual findings” in the Liability Trial provide support for the allocation percentages stated in the R&R.  (Pb12.)  However, the “fact-based” allocation percentages stated in the R&R contradict the Liability Trial opinion.  The Liability Trial found that no insurable property damage had occurred as a result of operations at AOCs 6 and 14 (Pa0123; Pa0125-Pa0126; Pa0129-Pa0130).  [...]’s “weighted by AOC” allocation method contradicts the findings of the Liability Trial and includes a finding of --- 10  Of course, allocating property damage by AOC makes no sense in the first instance.  Damages are not divisible by AOC.  As [...] testified, “[t]his is one site-wide groundwater problem[.]” (Pa0285.) property damage at these AOCs 6 and 14.  This alone establishes the fallacy of “fact-based” allocation in this case.
[brief] By way of background, the WQPA and its companion statute, the Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA), N.J.S.A. 58:10A-1 to -60, “constitute the Legislature’s response to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 to 1376, which established an integrated federal system to address water pollution” nationally.  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b), 420 N.J. Super. 552, 558 (App. Div. 2006).  Both statutes are intended to restore and maintain the quality of waters of the State.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1; N.J. Builders Ass’n v. Fenske, 249 N.J. Super. 60, 64 (App. Div. 1991).  Among other elements, the WQPA requires the development of Areawide WQM Plans.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-5.  Areawide WQM Plans are statutorily required to, among other things: (1) identify and establish construction priorities for necessary water treatment works to meet municipal waste treatment needs; (2) create a regulatory program that addresses point and nonpoint sources; (3) identify entities and financing necessary to carry out the plan; and (4) identify and address specific pollution sources such as agricultural pollution, mine-related sources of pollution, construction activity pollution, and saltwater intrusion.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-5(a)-(k).  The State has twelve areawide WQMPs to plan for impacts on the State’s waters related to development’s water use and wastewater generation.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2, -4, -5; N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.2(a)(1).  The WQMP includes a series of wastewater management plans, a description of existing and future maps of wastewater service areas and selected environmental features and treatment works.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-4.1.  A WQMP also includes Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), which calculate the maximum amount of a pollutant from all point and nonpoint sources that a waterbody that is impaired for one or more pollutants can receive.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.5, -5.3.  The WQPA dictates that “[a]ll projects and activities affecting water quality in any planning area shall be developed and conducted in a manner consistent with the adopted [Areawide WQM Plan] .