ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] ”  While gathering information prior to a plea may often times be difficult, it is important for the prosecutor to conduct a thorough analysis of the case to determine the State witnesses whose testimony would be determinative of defendant’s guilt or innocence and make available such impeachment material that would seriously undermine the credibility Page 7 of such a witness.  Carter, 91 N.J. at 111. and material related to those See Brady Giglio State witnesses must be gathered and disclosed if appropriate.  Parsons, 341 See State v. N.J. Super. 448 (2001).  Court Rule 3:13-3(a) permits a prosecutor, upon notice to the defendant, to provide more limited discovery in a pre-indictment plea context and should be used if appropriate.
[brief] 28 Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301 (2019) ..............................................................................  15, 36 King v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 2007 WL 1521253 ..................................................................................  26 McCabe v. Great Pac. Century Corp., 222 N.J. Super. 397 (App. Div. 1988) .....................................................  19
[brief] Most of Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts pertains to his interactions with the Edison police officer defendants.  Only those facts germane to Plaintiff’s claims against [...] are addressed here.  On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff was stopped and arrested by Edison Police Officers [...] and [...] in the Township of Edison.  (Pa1, ¶ 5).  Plaintiff was charged in Complaint-Summons No. [...] by Edison Police Officer Geist with possession of a controlled dangerous substance CDS (Marijuana), obstructing the administration of law, and resisting arrest, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10A(4), 2C:29-1A and 2C:29-2A(1), respectively.  (Pa1, --- \(^1\)  Although Plaintiff attached two orders dated October 6, 2023, denying Plaintiff motion to consolidate the instant case with Howard v. Township of Edison, et al. Docket No. [...], to his Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement, Plaintiff’s brief contains no argument concerning the cross motion to consolidate.  Issues not briefed are considered abandoned or waived.  Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95, n. 8 (2014), W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N.J. Super. 455, 459 (App.Div.2008); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 5, R. 2:6-2.  We have not, accordingly, addressed consolidation in this brief.  Attachment A.)  He was also charged by Edison Police Officer Kohut in Complaint No. [...] with possession of CDS (Methamphetamine), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10A (Pa1).  The criminal charges against Plaintiff were downgraded to disorderly persons charges.  (Pa1, ¶ 18).  The pending charges against Plaintiff were transferred from the Municipal Court of the Township of Edison to the Municipal Court of the Borough of [...] due to a conflict.  (Pa322, ¶ 15).  The case was tried virtually in the [...] Municipal Court over the course of several trial days, June 23, 2021, July 20, 2021, September 22, 2021, and October 27, 2021.  (Pa322-335).  On October 27, 2021, after trial, Hon. [...], Judge of the [...] Municipal Court, found Plaintiff guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) and 2C:29-2(a)(1).
[brief] Pa467.  On April 22, 2022, Hon. [...], J.S.C. of the Superior Court (Middlesex County) entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s appeal of his municipal court convictions for failure to file the necessary transcripts or obtain an extension.  Pa284-Pa285.  With regard to the pending civil matter, the parties exchanged written discovery and the deposition of Plaintiff was taken.  Plaintiff did not take any depositions, and did not disclose any expert.  On August 10, 2023 the [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.
[brief] Notably, the defendant’s trained medical expert who was aware of the plaintiff’s medical history, examined her, and reviewed her medical records, was unable to offer an opinion that any prior condition caused her to fall within a reasonable degree of medical probability.  (Pa182).  If a board certified orthopedic, surgeon who has undergone years of medical training, is unable to causally relate the plaintiff’s fall to any of the prior conditions that were repeatedly broadcast throughout trial, a lay jury with no medical training is unable to do anything more than speculate that the plaintiff fell as a result of her prior medical condition.  “A jury may not speculate in an area where laypersons could not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience. ”  *Posta v. Chung-Loy*, 306 N.J. Super. 182, 204 (App. Div. 1997), *certif. denied*, 154 N.J. 609 (1998).  It was, therefore, an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to deny the plaintiff’s motions *in limine* to bar evidence of her prior medical history.
[brief] There was no witness that testified concerning the alleged sexual assault other than the victim and the victim had not previously filed any complaint or notified anyone of the sexual assault.  The jury instruction was inappropriate in a case where no sexual assault was charged.  The assistant prosecutor’s comments were entirely appropriate for cross-examination.  The outcome of the case turned on the credibility of the defendant because there were no other direct witnesses to the death of the victim.  The jury was given ample instruction on how to evaluate the credibility of the defendant.  First, they were given the general instruction on credibility of witnesses.  (8T 77:5 to 78:1).  They were also given the false-in-one, false-in-all instruction.  (8T 82:2-7).  And, most relevant to the facts and testimony offered at trial, the jury was instructed on how to consider the defendant’s silence before her arrest.  (8T 83:3-21)  Because the defendant’s attorney did not request a jury instruction regarding the fresh complaint rule and the jury was adequately instructed, the defendant’s claim for a new trial on this point fails.
[brief] (1T54:11-23).  The Trial Court also rejected [...]’s arguments as to a conflict of interest.  (1T54:24-56:4).  The Trial Court refused to consider [...]’s arguments as to the merits of the GRC orders, citing Rule 4:67-6(c)(3) which provides that, "The validity of an agency order shall not be justiciable in an enforcement proceeding."
[brief] The concerns about control over the property, the timing for construction, and the ability to receive PJM approval in a timely manner are all nonsensical in terms of the Board’s decision, and many have been previously ignored in other decisions to approve by the Board.  Most notably, the Board has consistently approved the inclusion of projects for the solar program that are on track to fail the PJM timeline.  As [...] has raised a number of times in a number of different matters, the Board continues to thwart the intention and desire of the legislature and the Executive Branch to both develop solar and to maximize the use of brownfield, landfill, or other underutilized property for such development.  [...] is not the source of this policy; it comes directly from State law – at least since the original Solar Act, P.L. 2012, c. 24.  No question exists that the [...] identifies distressed properties such as landfills and brownfields as “preferred lands” for solar siting.  Siting Analysis Update, at 13.  Likewise, the 2019 Energy Master Plan, the Board’s CSI programs and the Community Solar programs, and even the Court, all of which is cited in the original brief, all state the same thing: the purpose of the State policy is to build solar, and the preferred location to build solar is land just like this.  Yet the actions taken by the Board do not support this policy, and in fact run directly counter to them.  Be it statute, regulation, the Energy Master Plan, or common sense, the [...] refuses to support the use of landfill, brownfields and similar underutilized property for solar development.  This refusal to abide by the clear policy determinations of the State, especially without clear articulation of the reasons, is arbitrary, capricious, and grounds for reversal.
[brief] (Pa70-71).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa72).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa13; Pa72).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[brief] 237T23:8-17. 25350a; 8643a); and (xii) falsifying the partnership’s financial statements and tax returns (224T98:10-19).  Based upon its factual findings, the Trial Court determined that [...] had: (i) violated NJRICO by “purposely” and “knowingly” engaging in the criminal acts of theft, theft by deception, misappropriation of entrusted funds, falsification of records, mail fraud and wire fraud, as well as engaging in a NJRICO conspiracy; (ii) fundamentally violated their fiduciary duties; (iii) breached the Partnership Agreement; (iv) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (v) violated the NJUPA; (vi) converted partnership funds; and (vii) engaged in common law fraud.
[brief] (Pa1-4; 9T56-18 to 60-14; 9T75-10 to 22).  In his 10:45 p.m. police interview, defendant admitted that (1) only he and his girlfriend had a key to their apartment.  (9T71-22 to 72-4; (2) he placed the two duffel bags into that apartment (as observed by officers) and that he knew that there was marijuana in those duffel bags.  (9T72-5 to 15); (3) that the six duffel bags he placed in his BMW were full of marijuana.  (9T72-16 to 73-6); (4) his primary address was [...] in [...].  (9T74-3 to 75-3); (5) cocaine in two vacuum-sealed bags was found in the silver and black box retrieved from his BMW.  (9T77-12 to 19); and (7) the police removed $60,000 to $70,000 in cash from his Queens residence.  (9T75-10 to 22).
[brief] Furthermore, [...] argued below that "All requests for additional adjournments made under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 must be made in the original foreclosure action", the Trial Court adopted this incorrect notion as well when it stated:  "So, sir, any and all claims -- further claims [1T Line 8] you have for statutory adjournments or further delays [1T Line 9] are to be brought under the foreclosure action, not [1T Line 10] against the [...].  They are simply not [1T Line 11] parties to that matter."  [Citing 1T Pg. 16-17.]  Plaintiff argues in opposition that the Trial Court here demonstrated that it was not neutral as its statutory interpretation is not supported by N.J.S.A.  2A:17-36 (Pa 165) nor the supporting case law discussing the Statute.  The Trial Court and [...] failed to provide a supporting citation for this arbitrary, capricious, and irrational position, thus it is a novel argument at best and frivolous at the very least.  N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 (Pa 165) clearly states:
[directive] No 10% the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.  1st Degree $200,000 to 400,000  No 10%  Actor unlawfully confines or removes another for various criminal purposes as set forth in statute; second degree if victim is released unharmed and in a safe place prior to 2C:13-1 Kidnapping apprehension; otherwise first degree; requires life with 25 years parole ineligibility if child under age 16 is sexually assaulted or delivered to another for pecuniary gain.
[brief] The matter proceeded to trial on March 28, 2023 and concluded on April 20, 2023. \(^1\)  The trial was put on hold for the week of April 10, 2023 due to a juror, a Deputy Attorney General, support staff, and defense counsel contracting COVID-19.  On April 20, 2023, following a mere hour and ten minutes of deliberation, even denying the opportunity for a lunch break and perhaps cognizant that at least one (1) juror had upcoming vacation plans, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the single count under which [...] was charged.  (Sa4).  On April 28, 2023, defense counsel timely filed a Motion for a New Trial and a Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal.  (Sa5-13).  The trial court then heard testimony on October 12, 2023, (8T), and December 14, 2023, (9T).  On February 16, 2024, the trial court granted [...]’s Motion for a New Trial.  --- \(^1\) T refers to the trial transcript from April 4, 2023.  2T refers to the trial transcript from April 5, 2023.  3T refers to the morning trial transcript from April 6, 2023.  4T refers to the afternoon trial transcript from April 6, 2023.  5T refers to the trial transcript from April 18, 2023.  6T refers to the trial transcript from April 19, 2023.  7T refers to the trial transcript from April 20, 2023.  8T refers to the hearing transcript from October 12, 2023.  9T refers to the hearing transcript from December 14, 2023.  (Sa14-33).  The State then filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal, (Sa34-35), which was granted on April 8, 2024, (Sa36-37).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (2T 29-20 to 31-1)  The search warrant was authorized by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on August 31, 2018.  (Dca 17)  Upon executing the search, police seized 337 bricks of heroin, a small amount of marijuana, a handgun, and various paraphernalia.  (2T 31-5 to 14)  On September 17, 2018, [...] was arrested at his home.
[brief] Respondent’s planner failed to examine what variances would be required to construct Respondent’s proposed Highest and Best Use.  First and foremost, [...] admitted he did not consider the controlling R-2 zoning in place:  Q: In arriving at your opinion that an eight-story development with 98 units would be granted as of June 2019, what zoning classification did you utilize?  A:  I did not use a zoning classification . . .  I assumed that a new re-development plan or a plan amendment would be adopted for projects at that time.  Q:  Did you perform an analysis as to the type of development that was reasonably probable applying the R-2 zoning classification to the subject property?  A:  I am aware of the R-2 zoning.  And I did not think that that would be applied were a development to take place there.  Pa180 at 11:2-16 [emphasis added].
[brief] IFPA CLAIMS CONSTITUTES “RULE-MAKING” AND VIOLATES THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES  ACT...........................................  12 POINT III  THE LAW DIVISION’S RULING DEPRIVES ALL PARTIES OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND IS CONTRARY TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ALLSTATE V. LAJARA THAT THE IFPA MANDATES THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL...........
[directive] The court may order the NGRI acquittee to be placed in a supervised community if setting, available, and establish conditions which must be met.  A supervised residence may include placements as an available supervised community residence 1 of of under the auspices the Department Human Services or a residence with a family member.  if  A court may only discharge the NGRI acquittee pursuant to the conditions it finds that the acquittee may be released without danger to the community or to themselves under supervision or under certain conditions.  The conditions that the court may impose upon the NGRI acquittee shall include those recommended by mental health staff who evaluated the acquittee, as well as those developed with the acquittee' s participation.  Periodic review hearings shall be scheduled for the NGRI acquittee while under court supervision in the community pursuant to State Ortiz, N.
[brief] STATUTES N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163 .................................................................  Pb26 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 ........................................................................  Pb11  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 ........................................................................  Pb28  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(e) ....................................................................  Pb19  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-9(b) ...................................................................  Pb28  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 .....................................................................  Pb27  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(b) ................................................................  Pb28  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) ................................................................ Pb10  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 .....................................................................  Pb27  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12 .....................................................................  Pb26  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(a) ................................................................ Pb26  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(b) ................................................................ Pb26  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-13 .....................................................................  Pb27  N. J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) ................................................................ Pb12 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1) .............................................................. Pb12 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) .............................................................. Pb13 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) .............................................................. Pb11 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5) .............................................................. Pb11 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6) .............................................................. Pb11 [...] Ordinances Sec. 246-36B(2)(b)[1] ................................................................. Pb5 Sec. 246-44A(1)(a) ................................................................. Pb6 Books and Treatises 36 N.J. Prac., Land Use Law § 14.4 ([...] and [...]) (3d ed., October 2023 Update) ........................................ Pb27 [...], New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, (1997)
[brief] In Rogers, the defendant was convicted for various drug offenses in 1999.  In October of 2000, on appeal from the denial of post-judgment relief, his conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.  The case was remanded for a trial.  In July of 2008, the indictment was dismissed with prejudice.  In November of 2009, the defendant filed a tort claims notice against the trial lawyers for negligence.  The sole issue the Supreme Court decided was exactly when the defendant was exonerated.
[brief] See R. 1:7-2; State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (“[T]he failure to object to a jury instruction requires review under the plain error standard. ”).  “Pursuant to Rule 1:7-2, a defendant is required to challenge instructions at the time of trial or else waives the right to contest the instructions on appeal. ”  State v. Belliard, 415 N.J. Super 51, 66 (App. Div. 2010) (citing State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 206-07 (2008)).  Where there is a failure to object, reviewing courts presume the instruction was “not error” and “unlikely to prejudice the defendant’s case. ”  State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012).  When there is failure to object, this Court presumes that the instructions were adequate.  *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 333 (1971).  Failing to object to a charge is also indicative that trial counsel perceived no prejudice would result.  *State v. Wilbely*, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973).  Consequently, this Court can reverse only if it finds plain error, or error that is likely to produce an unjust result.  *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997); R. 2:10-2.
[brief] In these years and subsequent years, the arbitrator’s cost out of the new salaries with salary increases awarded is as follows:  | Date Range | Cost Out | |---------------------|----------------| | 8/1/2018 - 7/31/2019 | $13,868,112.37 | | (expiration year) | | | 8/1/2019 – 7/31/2020 (0%) | $10,327,228.10 | | 8/1/2020 – 7/31/2021 (1%) | $12,047,305.51 | 8/1/2021 – 7/31/2022 (2%)
[brief] It was not suspicious that two people who said they were from New Hampshire, driving a car with a New Hampshire license plate, and who had produced a New Hampshire driver’s license would refer to New Hampshire’s unique insurance requirements when asked for insurance.  Nor was it remotely suspicious for [...] and [...] to have known each other for a few months.  Being an out-of-state traveler is not suspicious.  Not knowing the names of the towns in New Jersey you have traveled through on a road trip is not suspicious.  Driving in a car with a friend you have known for a few months is not suspicious.  Checking out a country club without wearing country club attire or presenting golf clubs is not suspicious.  And being nervous when pulled over by police, especially out of state, is not suspicious.  “Zero plus zero will always equal zero. ”  *State v. Nyema*, 249 N.J. 509, 535 (2022) (quoting *State v. Morgan*, 539 N.W.2d 887, 897 (Wis. 1995)).  As our Supreme Court has observed, “[t]o conclude otherwise is to lend significance to ‘circumstances [which] describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers’ and subject them to ‘virtually random seizures. ’”  *Ibid.*  Because the otherwise valid traffic stop was prolonged for a canine sniff without reasonable and articulable suspicion independent from the stop, the evidence must be suppressed.
[brief] This decision was erroneous, as there was no such statute, and the court was bound by an irrelevant case, Repko v. Our Lady of Lourdes Med. Ctr., 464 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 2020) ("Repko").  Plaintiff appealed the order to the appellate court on November 30, 2021.  On December 2, 2022, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded that plaintiff should retain an attorney to pursue wrongful death and survivor actions.
[directive] Upon approval of the request for the transfer of forfeited real property by 9 - the head of the involved Treasury law enforcement bureau, the request will be EOAF EOAF. forwarded for a final decision to the Director of (See Directive 9, dated October 1993).  1, Executive Ofice Asset Forfeiture 18 for VIII Guidelines Seized and Forfeited Property Chapter . for STATE/LOCAL ADOPTIONS OF SEIZURES
[directive] Yes No D D  If yes: Private Attorney  Public Defender  Asigned Attorney's Name Attorney's Address Telephone Defense Attorney  Signature Date VI.  Application Fee  There a non-refundable $75 application fee that must be submitted with this application unless the fee is waived by is of of or reason verified inability to pay.  Payments will be accepted the form cash, check cashier's check.  in of will or Checks should be made out to "Starter'' temporary checks be NOT be accepted.  Treasurer, State New Jersey.  Payment should made to the Finance Division at the county courthouse where the charges have been filed.  The be receipt must be submitted when the application is filed with the Criminal Division.  VII.  Acknowledgment of Defendant of  I acknowledge that I have read the Pretrial Intervention (PTI) Program Summary and understand the requirements this program, and would like to be considered for enrollment to the PTI program.
[brief] Plaintiffs and their counsel, however, knew through its communications with [...] and the remediation contractors that [...] had no involvement with the remediation activities performed before this lawsuit was filed.  [...] never said that Plaintiffs could maintain “common knowledge” negligence claims against [...] – as he himself confirmed when granting [...]’s motion for sanctions:  I did not say that Plaintiff[s] could go forward on any type of professional negligence claims that required common knowledge or something like that.  None of those claims really existed anyway.  Really what I was talking about, and I think I made clear at the time, was any trespass complaints or any other related type of complaints wherein [...] might have directed people…to enter on to Plaintiff[s]’ property, things like that.  (2T at 6:5-14) (emphasis added).  Rather than actually conduct the necessary discovery to pursue these potential claims articulated by the trial court, Plaintiffs chose to ignore [...]’s ruling.