ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Exhibit A, Order granting leave to file Second Amended Complaint, dated January 22, 2016, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit B, [...]’ Answer to Second Amended Complaint, dated April 21, 2016, filed May 24, 2019 (Volume 10 of 15 – Pa1761 to Pa1960)  Exhibit C, Agreement between [...] Engineers, Architects and Land Surveyors, P.C., and [...], dated May 6, 2014, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit D, [...] Request for Expressions of Interest, dated December 16, 2013, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit D, [...] Response to Request for Expressions of Interest, undated, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit D, Email exchange re Crisdel T200.313 Infraction, dated June 12, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit D, Email exchange re Struck by Vehicle Accidents, dated August 19, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit D, Email exchange re Vehicle Backovers Tool Box Talk, dated March 7, 2014, filed May 24, 2019
[brief] For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/ [...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General [...]  DAVID M. GALEMBA  ATTORNEY NO. 019452007  DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE UNIT OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF DATED: October 20, 2023
[brief] Defendant appeals from the trial court’s decision granting partial final summary judgment to Plaintiff.  The trial court agreed with Plaintiff’s construction the contract had but one interpretation, i.e., Plaintiff’s.  Under Plaintiff’s interpretation Defendant was to seek and if obtained promptly deliver to Plaintiff a contractually defined tenant estoppel certificate.  The obtained estoppel certificate was then to be measured against the separately defined acceptable estoppel certificate.  A disclosed default per the contract’s terms meant the delivered estoppel certificate was not an acceptable estoppel certificate.  If the one delivered estoppel certificate did not qualify as an acceptable estoppel certificate Plaintiff need not proceed and could terminate.  Since the estoppel certificate the Defendant did obtain disclosed a default the Plaintiff had the right to and properly did terminate the contract.  Therefore, the $1,640,000 deposit was to be released to Plaintiff.
[brief] The [...] specially states that the [...] could have handled this investigation.  Instead, it was handled by the [...] standing in the place of the [...].  However, rather than recognizing that the [...] took on a state law enforcement function in performing the investigation, the [...] has inexplicably left the [...] to defend the [...]’s [...] and Directive 2022-14.  It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that, in the present matter, not only is the [...] being sued for following a law enforcement policy and directive the [...] mandated it follow; it is being sued expressly to compel the [...] to supersede the authority of the [...].
[brief] The Kronos Time Card Audit Trail establishes that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf ten times for one pay period, ending July 25, 2020.  (Pa483-529).  Neither [...], nor [...], the two senior staffing coordinators, received charge pay.  (Pa233 at 32:11-15; Pa483-529).  [...] never would have approved extra compensation for only three of her five staffing coordinators.  (Pa476).  XI.
[brief] The Numerous Misrepresentations of Fact and Law Make Plaintiff’s Brief Incredible  In addition to the many misrepresentations of fact and law by Plaintiff, as shown herein above, there are more misrepresentations that make his brief incredible.  Plaintiff misrepresents that Defendant never filed a motion to dismiss.  Of course, she filed that as the record shows her cross-motion to dismiss was filed August 20, 2019, was heard August 27 and based on that the complaint was dismissed August 27, 2019 and dismissal was confirmed again October 2, 2019 after Plaintiff wrongfully demanded reinstatement when he admitted he never served the R 1:20A-6 Pre-Action Notice.  He continues his misrepresentations by stating on October 2, 2019 the parties “personally appeared” in court where he “again” handed an envelope to Defendant.  That is yet another patent deception by Plaintiff.  That date was a phone appearance where nothing was handed to her.  He further misrepresents at his brief page 7 that Defendant provided a [...] address as her residential address without any proof of that because that too is false.  In fact, Plaintiff’s brief and his 2019 complaint admit the [...] address was a PO Box place, not a residence-and in fact was a PO Box that did not belong to Plaintiff after she terminated Plaintiff.  Again, if he wanted her residential address he could have simply found it on the internet at the time or filed for substituted service.  But he purposely refused to follow the law as his intention was to insure she did not have notice of his filings and to wear her down with his three falsely obtained judgments against her.
[brief] 1T41:15-23.  Request No. 21 sought documents referring or relating to inspections performed at the Property during the time it was owned by the Defendant LLC.  Da72.  While the Defendants’ written response stated: “none in the possession of the Defendant” (Da72), Defendants’ counsel referred [...] to certain OPRA records that Plaintiffs had obtained.  1T42:19-43:8.  [...] responded that Defendants were both required to certify that those OPRA documents were the only documents in their possession responsive to the request.  1T43:24-44:25.
[directive] 12  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  10  Authority to Use Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  10.1  An officer authorized to use a less-lethal device pursuant to this policy may fire or discharge the device during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.  10.2  Officers shall reevaluate the situation and reassess the need to use force before any second or subsequent firing or discharge of a less-lethal device against the same person.  Any second or subsequent firing or discharge of a less-lethal device must be necessary and justified by the circumstances at that moment.  10.3  Less-lethal instruments, ammunition, or impact projectiles shall not be used at a lesser or greater distance than that specified and approved by the Attorney General.  10.4  When it can be reasonably accomplished without increasing the danger to officers or others, an officer about to discharge a less-lethal device should advise other law enforcement officers at the scene prior to the discharge of the less-lethal weapon.  This is to minimize the possibility that the firing of a less-lethal platform or ammunition would provoke other officers to discharge their weapons.  10.5  Weapons used for the deployment of less than lethal platforms or ammunition shall be dedicated exclusively for that purpose.  These weapons shall be clearly marked so as to distinguish them from firearms intended for the use of lethal ammunition.  The use of other than less-lethal ammunition in these designated weapons is prohibited unless it is immediately necessary to protect the life of a law enforcement officer or other person, and there is no other means available.  10.6  During the deployment of less-lethal devices or ammunition, the deploying officer and supervisor shall, when feasible, continually evaluate the options selected against changing circumstances.  10.7  Acceptable less-lethal impact projectiles/ammunition will be only those which are designed for single target-specific engagement from a minimum standoff distance as approved by the Attorney General.  13  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] This is not burden shifting, this is very simply, “remarks by a prosecutor, made in response to remarks by opposing counsel” and thus at most “harmless. ”  *Ibid.*  Given the credibility of [...] “was under attack” a “response was permitted,” and it cannot be said pointing to holes in the defendant’s alleged theory of [...] having it in for him is burden shifting.  Id. at 284.  Turning to the non-obj ected to, purported problematic comments, defendant takes issue with another portion of the State’s response to the attacks on [...]’s credibility, specifically the prosecutor’s questioning the jury as to the defense’s line of questioning, “[w]hy didn’t you ask that follow up question; hey, who at [the residence] did you talk to?
[brief] It did so in its bulletins and on its website.  [...] had the right to add a requirement anytime it determined it should do so (here, it did so to meet the requirement of accreditation imposed by the [...]).  In all versions of [...]’s website, there was language explicitly setting forth the right of the University to make changes, in its sole judgment, about requirements, courses, programs, etc.  Per the reservation-of-rights language, such changes could be made at any time.  As noted above, even the February 15, 2011 version of the [...] website contained a provision stating:  The University reserves the right in its sole judgment to make changes of any nature in the University’s academic programs, courses, schedule or calendar whenever in its sole judgment it deemed desirable to do so.  The University also reserves the right to shift colleges, schools, institutes, programs, departments or courses from one to another of its campuses.  The foregoing changes may include, without limitation, the elimination of colleges, schools, institutes, programs, departments or courses; the modification of the content of any of the foregoing, the rescheduling of classes with or without extending the announced academic term; and the cancellation of scheduled classes or other academic activities.  ([...]’s document production, Bates stamp D02394 at Pa. 67.)  Consequently, even if the February 15, 2011 version of the website did give rise to a contract between [...] and [...] (it did not), then the above provision would be one of the terms of that “contract,” and the University would have the right to develop and revise the requirements for the dual degree, on the same basis as the Court in Beukas endorsed.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ANALYZE THE APPLICATION UNDER RULE 4:50-1(f)  Even if the lower court had provided support for its finding that [...] had effectuated good service in order to obtain a default judgment, it still erred by concluding its analysis when it determined [...] had not shown excusable neglect.  Because the trial court did not make a ruling upon other grounds for relief that [...] asserted under R. 4:50-1, the decision is not entitled to deference and should be reversed.  Excusable neglect may guard the threshold to relief under R. 4:50-1(a), but it does not bar a litigant from relief under R. 4:50-1(f).  See Morales v. Santiago, 217 N.J. Super. 496, 504-05 (App. Div. 1987) (vacating judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f) to address “misgivings” on the merits of a claim resulting in default judgment, notwithstanding clear deficiencies in the motion for relief); Siwiec v. Fin. Res., Inc., 375 N.J. Super. 212, 218-20 (App. Div. 2005) (vacating judgment where defendant failed to establish excusable neglect, as a default judgment had been rendered on a novel claim).  R. 4:50-1(f) provides the court with authority to vacate a judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[brief] \(^4\) [Pa46 at ¶¶ 11-13, Pa163, Pa214 at ¶¶ 7, 9].  This measure proved necessary as one dump truck after the next was turned away when they tried to gain entry.  \[Id.\].  [...] tries to justify these jaw-dropping events by claiming “[...] locked [...] out of the property by posting a security guard.  [...] does not dispute that it did so. ”
[brief] The trial court should “consider whether the matter was projected by the defense as arguable before trial, raised by the defense at trial, or was one that the defense refused to concede. ”  State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 160 (2011) (quotations omitted).  While evidence that a defendant attempted to threaten a witness not to testify is generally relevant to reflect consciousness of guilt, it is worth noting that this case may be an exception.  The only genuinely disputed issue in the original matter concerned whether the incident in front of [...] resulted from [...] confronting [...] for kicking his car, or whether he was attempting to force her into his vehicle.  [...] did not dispute that he was involved in an altercation with [...] that evening.  He also did not dispute that he possessed an imitation firearm and that he pulled this imitation firearm during the course of his argument with [...].  As such, evidence of other crimes or prior bad acts should be admitted only if it sheds light on whether [...] attempted to kidnap [...], as opposed to the two being involved in an argument wherein [...] pulled an imitation firearm.
[brief] Skuse v. Pizer 244 N.J. 30 (2020); Martindale v. Sandvik 173 N.J. 76 (2002); Leodori v. CIGNA Corp. 175 N.J. 293 (2003)  An arbitration agreement like any contract is subject to the legal rules governing contracts.  Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center 215 N.J. 265 at 275 (2013)  Here there was a clear factual dispute as to whether either of the two documents the Appellants represented as valid employment agreements were authentic.  These determinations are entitled to due deference and only subject to review if there is clear error.  Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center 215 N.J. 265 at 275 (2013)  "We review the trial court's factual findings under a deferential standard: those findings must be upheld if they are based on credible evidence in the record."
[brief] In June of 2020, the DEP issued its “Scientific Report on Climate Change” in which it announced that “[s]tormwater management systems will [] need to be modified to accommodate more intense precipitation events and increased occurrence of nuisance flooding. ”  In October of 2021, the DEP issued another report titled “Climate Change Resiliency Strategy” which --- 6 Executive Order 100, issued on January 27, 2020.  52 N.J.R. 365(a) (March 2, 2020); Administrative Order 2020-01, issued on January 27, 2020 (New Jersey Protecting Against Climate Threats (“NJ PACT”)).  7 NJ DEP, 2020 New Jersey Scientific Report on Climate Change at xi (June 2020), dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/climatechange/nj-scientific-report-2020.pdf. further addressed the necessity of revising its regulations to adapt to climate change in New Jersey, including the DEP’s intention to study and adapt its regulations to the reality of climate change impacts in New Jersey, noting that “more frequent and intense storms, and chronic flooding are among the noticeable changes that communities already experience. ”  On November 18, 2021, the DEP issued a Press Release to report that it had released two studies led by [...] of [...] (hereinafter, the “Cornell Studies”), and peer-reviewed by the DEP Science Advisory Board.  The studies showed that in New Jersey, “[p]recipitation is already 2.5% to 10% higher” and the “precipitation expectations that presently guide state policy . . . do not accurately reflect current precipitation intensity conditions. ”  Further, “[p]recipitation is likely to increase by more than 20%” by 2100.  Ibid.  [...], the head of the DEP’s standing committee for Climate and Atmospheric Sciences, stated that “[o]ne of the consequences of climate change is that we can no longer assume that what has happened in the past is a guide to the future,” and “[t]hese studies will provide better guidance for estimating and managing future risks to human life, property, and infrastructure. ”  Ibid.  --- 8  [...], *State of New Jersey, Climate Change Resilience Strategy* (Oct. 2021) at 2, dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/climatechange/nj-climate-resilience-strategy-2021.pdf.  In the Spring of 2022, the DEP publicly discussed the need for another emergency rule, similar to the emergency rule it promulgated in 2013, to protect the public health and safety from increased intensity of precipitation and flooding in New Jersey.  Aa187-202.  Despite its public statements and discussions of the need for another emergency rule based on the Cornell Studies’ updated precipitation data, the DEP did not enact an emergency rule.
[brief] 2T87:16-22  If you want to call those people, I’ll limit them to a certain amount of testimony that they can provide saying how great the dog was.  But it's a much different case when you have a pattern of what a dog has done in the past.  2T88:5-7.  The standard of review on appeal is a sufficiency of the evidence standard.  *State v Ugrovics*, 410 N.J. Super. 482, 487-488 (App. Div. 2009) holding as follows:
[brief] 6  Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., 439 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div. 2015)  14 N.A.R., Inc. v. Ritter, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1313 (App. Div. 2024)  19 New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. 2018)  22 Nieder v Royal Indemnity Insurance Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973)  18 O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484 (2002)
[brief] See Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 400 N.J. Super. 474, 492 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Zappasodi v. New Jersey, 335 N.J. Super. 83, 89 (App. Div. 2000)).  Initially, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation.  Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015).  If a plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie claim, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to “advance a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse conduct against the employee. ”  Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 377 N.J. Super. 28, 38 (App. Div. 2005).  “Upon such a showing by the employer, plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the employer’s proffered reasons were a pretext for the discriminatory action taken by the employer. ”  Allen, 246 N.J. at 291 (quoting Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (App. Div. 1999)).
[brief] Indeed, the Law Division concluded that the Landlord, whether intentionally or not, misled Plaintiffs.  In any event, after ten months of trying to get a list of tenants as of the date of the incident, and copies of their leases -- and only after having obtained an order to compel production -- Plaintiffs first received the list of tenants as of the date of accident.  Plaintiffs also received copies of leases, but only one that was in effect on the date of the accident.  [Pa515-516; Pa227-232; Pa195-196; 187-188; 189-190; 191-194].  Plaintiffs promptly reviewed the lease that was produced and, upon that review, noticed a relevant term concerning maintenance of the walkways.  Under the lease, the Landlord had a duty to maintain common areas and to provide snow and ice removal – but the lease also provided that the tenant was obligated to perform maintenance of the walkways adjacent to the premises.  This meant that the Owner’s answer to the interrogatory seeking information about other potentially liable parties was incorrect, as per the terms of the leases that the Landlord had concealed for a period of ten months.  Operating under the assumption that all leases contained this term, Plaintiffs moved shortly thereafter, on May 21, 2019, to add the tenants which the Landlord had just identified as in occupancy at the strip mall on the date of the accident.
[brief] See, e.g., Estate of Campagna v. Point LLC, 464 N.J. Super. 153, 171-73 (App. Div. 2020), citing Kamienski v. State, 451 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 2017).  A witness may not offer testimony about the interpretation of a law or regulation.  Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health, 440 N.J. Super. 24, 37-38 (App. Div. 2016).  [...]’s “opinion” on the interpretation of the state’s climate laws is inadmissible.  The EMP is the law of the land, and binding on this proceeding according to law, and [...]'s invitation to treat it as merely advisory may well reflect a prior BPU Staff's attitude towards its legal obligations, but it has no place in today's climate crisis.
[brief] In *United States v. American Ry. Express Co.*, 265 U.S.425 (1924), the Supreme Court espoused that a party may argue to affirm a judgment in its favor based on any grounds supported by the record, even if that may “involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court”.  Only if the prevailing party seeks to enlarge its own rights, or lessen those of the losing party, such is the case herein, must it take a cross-appeal.
[brief] In fact, [...] does not even address State Respondents’ analysis under Pukowsky and its progeny in her Appellate brief.  See Ab.  Application of the facts of this case to the factors in Pukowsky precludes the existence of any form of employer/employee relationship between [...] and [...] as a matter of law.  Rather than appeal to the case law on point for this issue, and the trial court’s analysis of this case law, [...] appears to have created a whole new joint employer theory for NJLAD cases.
[brief] ” (Ca018).  As the body with the exclusive statutory mandate to issue uniform discipline when school board members engage in “divisive, inflammatory, and hostile” “communications that have no place in the educational setting,” the Commission was required to issue a penalty and to refer that penalty to the Commissioner of Education for review.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  The Commissioner of Education is the body with the statutory authority to review penalties under the Act.  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-10.12 (“The Commissioner shall act upon the Commission’s recommendation regarding the sanction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29(c).”); N.J.A.C. 6A:28-11.1 (“Any appeal of the Commission’s determination regarding a violation of the Act shall be to the Commissioner in accordance with N.J.S.A. 6A:4.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Erroneous Jury Instructions on Two Elements of the Certain-Persons Offense Require Reversal.  The state and federal rights to due process and trial by jury “require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474, 483 (2018) (citation omitted).  Where the State fails to prove an essential element of an offense, the “defendant’s conviction cannot stand. ”  Id. at 490.  Thus, “incorrect charges on substantive elements of a crime constitute reversible error. ”  *State v. Koskovich*, 168 N.J. 448, 508 (2001) (quoting *State v. Rhett*, 127 N.J. 3, 7 (1992))); accord *State v. Vick*, 117 N.J. 288, 291-93 (1989) (holding the requirement that the jury be properly instructed on the elements of an offense “is so basic and so fundamental that it admits of no exception no matter how inconsequential the circumstances”); *Bailey*, 231 N.J. at 489 (“When the jury is not given an opportunity to decide a relevant factual question, it is not sufficient to urge that the record contains evidence that would support a finding of guilt even under a correct view of the law. ” (citation omitted)).  Here, the trial court improperly charged two elements of the certain-persons offense.  In count four, [...] was charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).  (Da 2, 194)