ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On November 24, 2020, [...], PA (hereinafter “[...]”) filed a Complaint and Jury Demand seeking damages against defendants [...] F/D/S/A [...] [...], [...] and fictitious entities designated as John Doe, Jane Roe, ABC Corp. (Volume 1 Pa 1-6).  The Complaint and Jury Demand arose from [...]’s claim for unpaid services provided to [...] and included counts for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing and conversion.  (Volume 1, Pa. 1-6).  [...] filed a First Amended Complaint adding [...] as a defendant, a Second Amended Complaint removing [...] as a defendant and a Third Amended Complaint correcting the jury demand in the Complaint.  (Volume 1, Pa. 12-17; Volume 1 1,Pa.19-25).  [...] filed a Stipulation of Dismissal without Prejudice as to defendant [...].  (Volume 1, Pa. 127).  On April 26, 2022, Defendants [...]., [...] and [...] filed answers to [...]’ Complaint and Jury Demand.  ( Volume I, Pa. 26-34).  On July 3, 2022, defendants moved to quash a deposition subpoena on defendant’s employee [...].  (Volume 1, Pa. 37-103; Volume 1, Pa 115-120).  On July 3, 2022 [...] moved to extend discovery, secure compliance with a deposition subpoena served on defendants’ employee, compel the deposition of defendant [...] and amend the complaint to reinstate the claim against defendant [...] improperly pleaded as [...].  (Volume 1, Pa. 104-114).  On July 28, 2022, defendants cross moved to bar evidence obtained subsequent to the discovery end date of May 26, 2022.  (Volume 1, Pa. 115-133).  On August 5, 2022, the Honorable [...], PJ.Cv. denied [...]’s motion to extend discovery and amend the complaint and granted defendants’ motion to bar introduction of evidence beyond the discovery end date.  (Volume I, Pa. 133-134.  On August 5, 2022, the Honorable [...] granted defendants motion to quash the deposition subpoena served On [...].  (Volume I, Pa. 135; IT1).  On December 29, 2022 defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.  Volume I Pa. 136 to Volume 3 Pa. 375; IT2).  The Honorable [...] granted the motion on February 28, 2023.  (Volume 4, Pa. 577),  On March 29, 2023, [...] filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment granted to defendants.  (Volume 4, Pa 578 to 650.  The Honorable [...] denied [...]’s motion to reconsider the summary judgment granted to defendants on April 14, 2023 (Volume IV Pa. 541;IT3).  On May 28, 2023, [...] filed a notice of appeal of the granting Footnote 1.  IT1 refers to the transcript of defendants motion to quash a subpoena heard on August 5, 2022; IT2 refers to the transcript of defendants motion for summary judgment heard on February 28, 2023.  IT3 refers to the transcript of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment heard on April 14,2023.  of summary judgment to defendants, the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the and the interlocutory orders quashing the deposition subpoena on [...] and denying the motion to amend the complaint and extend discovery Volume IV Pa.642-646).
[brief] [...], a Supervisor in the City’s DPW, provided unrefuted testimony undermining [...]’s net opinion; he testified on the following points:  - He was hired by the City in 2006 and assigned to the DPW’s Parks Department.  (Pa176, at p.12.)  - Two years later, he switched positions to the DPW’s Shade Tree Department.  (Pa176, p.10, 13.)  - He started as a laborer pruning, trimming, chipping, and cutting trees.  (Pa177, p.14, 16.)  - He elevated to Supervisor in 2017.  (Pa177, at p.16.)  - The DPW does not repair or inspect sidewalks, that is the responsibility of the “homeowner” (i.e., adjacent property owner).  (Pa179, p.22-23.)  - The DPW does not have a scheduled maintenance program for inspecting trees.  Instead, if a homeowner calls about a tree, [...] will go out and look at the tree and then decide what needs to be done.  (Pa179, p.23-25.)  - His assessment would consider if the tree appears to be healthy, if it needs any trimming, or if it needs to be removed.  (Pa179, p.23-25.)  \(^2\)  As will be explained below, strict liability is proscribed by the Tort Claims Act.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................  10  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE STATE’S MOTION FOR JOINDER AND TO ADMIT CERTAIN OTHER CRIME EVIDENCE.  (1T; 2T; MA19 to MA20; MA22)..................................  10 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................
[brief] (10T 151-7 to 152-6)  [...] testified; “I don't remember exact words, but I said there's something about the gambling spot.  Uh, next thing I know we both just looked at each other and started laughing.  And we was like, what, I asked him what he was laughing about, and he asked me what I was laughing about, then we both said the same thing. ”  (10T 152-11 to 152-16)  Through [...]’s testimony, the State introduced the unsigned letters that [...] claimed [...] wrote.
[brief] 13  | Cases | Page | |-------------------------------------------|------| | Fusco v. Board of Educ. of City of Newark, | | | 349 N.J. Super., 455 (App. Div. 2002) | 9, 10| | Slack v. Whalen, 327 N.J. Super.  186, 194 | 11 | | (App. Div. 2000) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  On this appeal, plaintiff [...] seeks reversal of the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to the defendants, [...] ("[...]"), the general contractor, and [...] ("[...]"), the property owner.
[brief] In a design/warning defects strict liability case, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a defective condition, that is that the product was defective, that the defect existed when the product left the defendant’s control, and that the defect caused injury to a foreseeable user.  Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34, 49 (1996).  The defect in a product giving rise to strict liability may take the form of a manufacturing flaw, a design defect, or an inadequate warning.  The term “defect” is not self-defining; there is no universally accepted meaning suitable for all strict products liability cases.  Ibid.; see Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 145.  To prevail on a design defect claim, the plaintiff must prove that a practical and feasible alternative design existed that would have reduced or prevented harm and that due to the omitted safer alternative, the product was not reasonably safe as manufactured or sold.
[brief] \(^{32}\)  The Supreme Court in R.J. Gaydos cited clear precedent where our courts rejected a plaintiff’s “request to infer a private right of action where none was statutorily authorized”. \(^{33}\)  “Although courts give varying weight to each one of those factors, ‘the \(^{32}\) R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 272 (2001) \(^{33}\) R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 271 (2001) primary goal has almost invariably been a search for the underlying legislative intent’. ”  Here, there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action to sue a public entity in Superior Court for violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  A.  Legislation that enables suits against public entities have express language prescribing when and how a public entity can be sued.  (Argued at Pa376)  When it comes to suing public entities who, as a default, retain a level of sovereign immunity, the Legislature creates statutes that expressly confer a private right of action to sue the public entity in Superior Court.
[brief] Many cases do not involve an order of restitution; where there is an order of restitution, it would be an appropriate exercise of discretion for the sentencing court to set the probation supervision fee on the lower end in order “[t]o promote restitution to victims. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(8).  In this case, the sentencing Court did not articulate any criteria that went into its decision to impose that maximum probation supervision fee; the Court simply stated, “Now, as a condition of probation, the Court will impose a probationary fee of $25.
[brief] **  On June 24, 2021, [...] requested that the Department reconsider the Denial, and maintained its position that the SRD Rule does not apply to the Project because it “is separated from the boardwalk by a public street and, therefore, it is not ‘adjacent’ to the boardwalk. ”  2Ra108.  [...] also asserted that the non-applicability of the SRD Rule in the Redevelopment Area was supported by the Redevelopment Ordinances which were reviewed and approved by the Department as consistent with the CZM Rules but did not incorporate the provisions of the SRD Rule.  2Ra129; 2Ra139; see 2Ra108-126.  In further support of the request for reconsideration, [...] provided a setback survey and analysis showing that other similarly situated buildings did not comply with the SRD Rule’s setback requirement, along with a copy of Handbook 6.  2Ra129-38; 2Ra139-54.  By email on August 3, 2021, the Department advised that it was declining to reconsider the Denial.  2Ra155.  On August 5, 2021, [...] submitted a letter to the Department requesting an adjudicatory hearing and alternative dispute resolution to challenge the Denial, and asserted, *inter alia*, that the Project was not subject to the requirements under Subsection D of the SRD Rule.
[brief] 5.  The Certificate of Coverage did not inform [...] of the exclusion.  After coverage was bound, [...] received a Certificate of Coverage (the Certificate”) stating that he has $1,000,000 HNOA coverage.  (Ia151-164).  The Certificate does not state that 12-15+ passenger vans are ineligible for coverage.  In this case, since it did not involve a traditional automobile policy, no declaration page was issued.  Presumably, [...] wants the Certificate of Coverage substituted for the declaration page and yet the Certificate did not advise of the exclusion contrary to well-settled law.
[brief] The Trial Court had it right the first time when it ruled an employer’s uniliteral transfer of a victim of sexual harassment presented a jury question.  The Trial Court correctly reasoned that the determination of (i) “why” Respondent [...] transferred Appellant (i.e., whether it was retaliatory or in good faith), and (ii) whether the transfer was effective remedial action designed to prevent discrimination in the workplace, is an issue that cannot be adjudicated at summary judgment.
[directive] Where forfeiture of office was not applied for at the time of a public employee’s conviction or entry of a guilty plea for disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses, the assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general assigned to the case should review the facts and circumstances of the conviction.  This review should examine whether the conviction is appropriate for forfeiture of office or for permanent bar to future governmental employment under the statute.  The assigned assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general should request a review of the relevant factors by the county prosecutor or Attorney General to determine if waiver of forfeiture of office will be pursued.  In cases where forfeiture of office or a permanent bar to employment applies and where no waiver will be sought, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(e), a written statement of reasons denying waiver 7 with appropriate supervisory review should be submitted to the defendant and the court at the time of the filing of the complaint in lieu of prerogative writ for forfeiture of office.
[brief] I  The State fails to appreciate this defendant’s reliance on Federal supremacy (i.e. 4th Amendment) principles as well as New Jersey’s acknowledgement of that Federal authority, see *State v. Ingram*, 474 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2023).  This defendant does not intend to assert broadened authority under New Jersey’s Constitution that law enforcement violated that State Constitutional protection of Article I, Paragraph 7.  Rather, as reflected in the meris brief quoting extensively from *State v. Ingram*, 474 N.J. Super. at 539, 540, New Jersey must acknowledge and recognize the supremacy clause requirements as to 4th Amendment principles applicable to States.  Defense counsel’s initial brief did so.  The State’s brief in opposition fails to acknowledge our State’s obligation to adhere to Federal supremacy principles, see *State v. Ingram*, 474 N.J. Super. 522, (App. Div. 2023) and *State v. Adkins*, 221 N.J. 300 at 313 (2015) (“under Supremacy Clause principles, we are bound to follow [United States Supreme Court pronouncements] as the minimal amount of constitutional protection to be provided”).  **POINT II**
[brief] Unlike in those cases, police here had fresh probable cause that developed during a spontaneous interaction with defendant that lasted less than an hour with a previously unknown individual and vehicle.  It was not feasible for police to obtain a warrant while the officers and defendant and his wife — with a cart full of groceries — stood in the middle of a public parking lot.  Defendant is urging an interpretation of “unforeseeable and spontaneous” that requires probable cause to be a “surprise. ” (Db29).  This is a dangerous misinterpretation that would eviscerate the Alston standard that was carefully restored in Witt.
[brief] THE ORDER OF THE LAW DIVISION GRANTING [...] SUMMARY JUDGMENT RESULTING FROM [...]’S FAILURE TO SATISFY ITS BURDEN TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  The decisive crux of the present controversy involves whether the “fact” of damages has been sufficiently established on a notably sparse appellate record.  In this context, the requisite “competent evidence” of damages requires proofs of the existence of actual, tangible, and quantifiable damages in order for Haddad to avoid summary judgment.  Specifically, Haddad’s proofs must be able to support the premise that the checks allegedly issued to [...] were for the specific Schedule 40 pipe that was explicitly identified in the Subject Contract.  In this case, however, Haddad ultimately failed to provide even a scintilla of evidence that it purchased even one (1) foot of the specific Schedule 40 pipe that was contemplated in the Subject Contract following its termination in April 2021.  New Jersey law is crystal clear that in order to survive a motion for summary judgment after discovery has been completed, evidence of damages must not be “speculative” and must be determined with “reasonable certainty.
[brief] [...] is the beneficiary of quasi-judicial immunity.  He was duly appointed by [...] pursuant to an order of September 24, 2021.  In addition, this is not a case where [...] was paid by the appellants.  His fees were paid by and through the bank.  In any event, the quasi-judicial immunity in this case is warranted because [...] was acting in all relevant aspects “at the court’s request. ”  See, Russell v. Richardson, 905 F. 3d 239, 247 (3d. Cir. 2018).  In this case, the appellants simply disagree with the outcome of [...]’s court-ordained actions.  See, e.g., Trinh v. Fineman, 9 F. 4th 235 (3d. Cir. 2021), cert. denied (March 2, 2022) (the court held that court-appointed receivers are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from suit when they act within the authority of the court).
[brief] Instead, [...] danced around the issue by referencing the FDA’s non-binding Regulatory Procedures Manual, and paragraphs 66-75 of the report of its expert, [...].  However, nowhere in the Regulatory Procedures Manual, nor in [...]’s report, is it stated that FDA approval was needed to warn physicians or to issue a recall.  For the first time, [...] now claims that “Hence, [...] could not, without FDA’s authorization, engage in an earlier U.S. recall or earlier communication to U.S. healthcare providers. ”  (Opening Brief, p. 21.
[brief] Defendant argues the court erred in permitting the State to recall [...] after he testified he was unable to identify anyone in the courtroom.  Defendant acknowledged that under *State v. Clausell*, 121 N. J. 298 (1990), and *United States v. Domina*, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.1986), in-court identification is not required to meet the same standards as a pretrial identification.  Defendant, however, argues these cases predate the “modern understanding” of the general limitation of eye witness identification and neither dealt with the “unique circumstances” of this case where “the only witness to the robbery was unable to select defendant's photograph from a pre-trial array and was unable to identify defendant in court the first time he took the stand.
[directive] 2.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 이 혐의(들)에 대하여  유죄 시인을 했기  때문에 법정은 년 간의 가석방  보호감독을 부과했고, 그 기간은 귀하가 금고 형량을 완료한 후 즉시 시작된다는 것을 아십니까?
[brief] Specifically, it should have been denied on the basis of the doctrine of laches.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that “the time period before laches applies should be stricter for motions for attorney's fees than for substantive redress. ”  Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Carteret, 115 N.J. 536, 554 (1989)(emphasis added).  That is because “[a] claim for attorney’s fees … should be decided while the trial court still has a good memory of the plaintiff's degree of success, the counsel's advocacy, and the time expended on the case.
[brief] (Da395; Da412-Da414)  From 1955 until 1966, the Baxter Lot consisted of two separate parcels referred to as the North Baxter Lot and the South Baxter Lot.  In 1966, [...] and [...], then owners of the South Baxter Lot, conveyed it to Jan and [...], who had recently acquired the North Baxter Lot from [...] and [...], resulting in common ownership of the two parcels.  (Da398-Da399, Da476-Da478)  --- \(^4\)
[brief] Pb19–23.  In fact, the only letter to which the Department points merely asked [...] about “the ‘acceptable maximum lifetime loss ratio,’” not excessiveness.  Da663.²  The Department cannot explain how this possibly gave notice that the real issue supposedly was whether “[...]’s premium rate increase request was excessive. ”  Db30.  Instead, the Department focuses on [...]’s response to the question and on boilerplate in its actuarial memoranda.  See Db30–31.  But as shown, see Pb38–39, a regulated entity cannot be the source of a due process notice to itself.
[brief] (Sb19).  Again, the express words of Torres completely contradict this argument: although the evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors occurs when setting the sentence within the range applicable to each offense, sentencing is a holistic endeavor.  A court performing the Yarbough fairness assessment must be mindful that aggravating and mitigating factors and Yarbough factors . . . , in their totality, inform the sentence’s fairness.  All are relevant to the overall fairness of the aggregate sentence imposed on the sole defendant before the court.  [Torres, 246 N.J. at 449.]  In other words, there is no meaningful way to completely extricate the aggravating/mitigating-factor analysis from the consecutive/concurrent-sentence analysis; such errors impact the overall-fairness assessment that is essential for determining the aggregate length of the sentence.  Finally, the State’s brief insinuates that this Court should find no error with the sentencing court’s analysis because it could have imposed a heavier sentence.  (Sb16, 22).  Unless [...] miraculously lives to be 90 years old while incarcerated, he is going to die in prison under his current sentence.  There is significant daylight between the minimum of a 30-year aggregate sentence that could have been imposed and the 61.5-year sentence he is currently serving.  Accordingly, it is imperative that a sentencing analysis be conducted that is free from significant error.
[brief] Instead, to achieve the allocation percentages stated in the R&R, the SAM adopted the “practical estimates” provided by [...], (Pa0148 at fn. 1), without considering any alternatives.  [...]’s “practical estimates” are unrelated to when property damage took place, and at no point did the SAM describe [...]’s “estimates” as accurate.  The SAM also, without citing any testimony or facts, departed from the findings in the Liability Trial and determined that contamination at AOCs 6 and 14 had caused “property damage” during the [...] and [...] policy periods.  (Pa0148-Pa0149.) (Pa0158 (adopting [...]’s allocation estimates which include his finding of “property damage” during the [...] and [...] policy periods stemming from AOCs 6 and 14.))  This finding directly contradicted the holdings of the trial court during the Liability Trial in this case, which unambiguously found that “property damage” had not occurred during the relevant policy periods at either of those AOCs.  (Pa0123; Pa0125-Pa0126; Pa0129-Pa0130.)  This finding was not only factually incorrect, but was also beyond the authority of the SAM.
[directive] The relevant provisions are not intended to address all of the legal and policy considerations that should inform a municipality’s decision whether to establish a Civilian Review Board or how to structure its procedures.  In particular, the provisions do not address whether any Civilian Review Board model or any set of Civilian Review Board procedures comports with applicable federal, state, and local laws, other than IAPP.  Municipalities weighing their options are encouraged to consult all relevant authorities, including any contractual requirements that might supplement the municipality’s other obligations under federal, state, and local law.  One of the most important questions for any municipality deciding whether to create a Civilian Review Board or how to structure a Board’s procedures is whether the Board should be granted access to confidential law enforcement information, including internal affairs records, and, if so, on what terms such access will be permitted.  This question is an important one not only because the answer will inform how the municipality’s Civilian Review Board carries out its duties, but also because the lack of appropriate safeguards may impair the integrity of the police force’s internal affairs function and increase the municipality’s litigation risk.  The revised therefore identifies minimum procedural safeguards that a municipality IAPP must adopt for its Civilian Review Board, in addition to compliance with all other applicable legal requirements, before a law enforcement agency will provide the Board with access to internal affairs records, including initial complaints.  Nothing in the revised restricts in any IAPP way a Civilian Review Board’s ability to access non-confidential information located outside internal affairs records, or to refer complaints received by the Civilian Review Board to a law enforcement agency’s internal affairs unit.  However, only those Civilian Review Boards that operate in accordance with the revised IAPP’s requirements will be granted access to otherwise confidential internal affairs records.  A violation of any of these requirements may result in the revocation of a Civilian Review Board’s access to confidential law enforcement information, including internal affairs records, and potentially may result in other adverse or remedial actions under federal, state, or local law.  Page 8 III.