ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “Originally, and historically, the word ‘profession’ was applied only to law, medicine and theology or divinity, and these were known as the three ‘learned professions,’ and it has frequently been said that formerly these three disciplines were known as ‘the professions. ’”  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 611 (quoting Plaza Bottle Shop, Inc. v. Al Torstrick Ins. Agency, 712 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).  In Macedo v. Dello Russo, the Supreme Court noted that only lawyers and doctors have been identified as learned professionals beyond the reach of the CFA so long as they are acting in their professional capacities.  178 N.J. 340, 344-46 (2004).  “Macedo did not, however, extend the exception to semi-professionals or licensed professionals. ”  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 615 n.13.  To the extent that Plemmons offers any value to the analysis, it simply confirms that insurance producers, like Defendants, are semi-professionals and not learned professionals.
[brief] In Variety Farms the Appellate Division examined whether the Policy, as it existed at that time, provided coverage for a negligence claim brought by a minor employee against his employer.  [...], a 15-year-old boy suffered a traumatic amputation of his left arm when it was caught in a moving conveyor roller during the course of his employment for [...], which packaged agricultural products.  172 N.J. Super. at 13-14.  Variety Farms’ workers’ compensation insurer, [...], denied coverage based on an exclusion contained in then Coverage B of the standard workers’ compensation policy, now known as Part Two, that excluded coverage for liability to an “employee employed in violation of law with the knowledge or acquiescence of the insured or any executive officer thereof. ”  Id. at 14.  Sindoni, only 15 years old at the time of the accident, was illegally employed in violation of N.J.S.A.  Notably, the Millison Court also recognized that a claim for additional damages beyond the compensation provided by the Act by way of a claim for intentional wrongdoing was subject to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, which precludes a double recovery and requires reimbursement of the employer’s or its insurer’s lien from the proceeds of any recovery in an intentional-wrong lawsuit.
[brief] [(9T 34-3 to 8)]  [...] also testified that the next clip showed the suspect “[o]btaining the manager’s key that’s on a lanyard behind the cash register. ”  (9T 34-17 to 18)  [...] opined that the key was not plainly visible or marked and that based on his investigation, “it could only be employees” that would know that the keys are there.  (9T 34-19 to 25)  Next, in response to the prosecutor’s question as to what the suspect did with the keys, [...] stated, “He went downstairs to the money office and opened the door. ”  (9T 38-15 to 16)  [...]’s next inadmissible testimony concerned what he claimed to be a book bag in the suspect’s hand.
[brief] The failure to conduct requested oral argument is **not** automatic grounds for remand.  In *Finderne Heights Condominium Ass’n v. Rabinowitz*, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the papers because there was “no prejudice under the circumstances” despite the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the Plaintiff had “every expectation” of oral argument and that the trial court was not justified in failing to hold such argument.  390 N.J. Super. 154, 16 (App. Div. 2007).  Likewise, in Spina Asphalt Paving v. Fairview, the Appellate Division, despite finding “no justification” for the trial court to deny oral argument on the parties’ motions, held that there was “no prejudice” in its failure to comply with Rule 1:6-2(d).  Spina, 304 N.J. Super. 425, 427 n.1 (App. Div. 1997).  In Triffin v. American Intern., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 524 (App. Div. 2004), the Court held that although there was no explanation from the motion judge as to why plaintiff’s request for oral argument was denied…under these circumstances, the Court was convinced that [the trial court] nevertheless arrived at the proper result . . . [and] her refusal to entertain oral argument was insufficient to require our intervention.
[brief] On or about July 28, 2023, one of the Petitioners, [...], consulted with [...] regarding the instant matter.  During such consultations, [...] discussed on behalf of the Petitioners “the assessment of Decedent’s estate, their understanding of Decedent’s testamentary intentions, the relative strengths and weaknesses of their position, and specific settlement posture. ”  PPa82.  [...] authored the emails exchanged with [...] submitted to the Trial Court by Petitioners.  RB5-6.  Petitioners did not retain [...].  On or about October 3, 2023, Petitioners filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint alleging undue influence by the Respondents.  Pa4.  1  Because the Procedural History and Facts of this matter are inextricably intertwined, Petitioners have combined them for the sake of clarity.
[brief] We only note here that there is some limited authority that implicitly supports the notion that the non-expert [...] can and should ignore the local zoning authorities in implementing its responsibilities under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.  But as noted most recently in Compressor Station, supra, slip op. at 23, Hra23, this panel is not necessarily bound by another panel.  We ask that the court clarify that in these cases, the [...] must consider the local zoning authorities' decisions and give them at least weight equal to any paid expert evidence.
[brief] The Board secretary had done a diligent search and no records could be found of a Zoning Application or an Approval for the Lot 8 Synagogue constructed in about 1963.  The 1972 School Lot 5 Site Plan documents (Da901 to 904) were entered into evidence.  (6T113-21 to 142-19)  On January 29, 2020, plaintiff presented [...].
[brief] (32T 156-17 to 18; Da 25)  Rather, the terms “reasonable” and “reasonably believed” are commonly used terms that should “be given their generally accepted meaning,” *N.J.S.A.* 1:1-1; *State v. Lopez-Carrera*, 295 N.J. 596, 613 (2021), not interpreted to graft onto the definition of reasonableness that it must be viewed through the lens of a “person with a detached viewpoint. ”  In fact, with respect to this very statute governing “intruder self-defense,” the Court in *State v. Bass*, 224 N.J. 285, 321 (2016), has said that the terms used in the statute are to be given “their ordinary and accepted meaning.
[directive] The court, believing that you are capable of living a useful and law-abiding life in the community, has sentenced you to probation for a period of , beginning .  While on probation, you will be under the supervision of a probation officer.  You are required to comply with the conditions of probation listed below.  If there is probable cause to believe that you have committed another offense during your term of probation, the Court may commit you to jail without bail.  If the Court finds that you have violated your probation, it may impose on you any sentence authorized by law for the offense of which you were originally convicted, up to and including the maximum term of incarceration.  Standard Conditions
[directive] The Court Rule does not refer specifically to conspiracies to commit an enumerated offense.  However, as a practical matter, a person engaged in a conspiracy to commit a predicate crime that is enumerated in the Court Rule often can be charged with an attempt to commit that predicate offense, or with aiding and abetting the commission of that offense.  Page 35 charge,15 been extradited from another state for the current New Jersey the law enforcement agency making the arrest shall apply for a complaint-warrant and advise the court of the extradition.
[brief] In arguing against this point on appeal, Defendants first note that the question of overbreadth “was not raised by the parties below, rather, Plaintiffs argued the Ordinance was vague[,]” and indicates that “The Plaintiffs did not challenge the Ordinance based on it being unconstitutionally overbroad.  The trial court raised the issue *sua sponte* … .”  Pb37, Pb37 n.6.  However, Defendants are mistaken.  While it is fair to say that Plaintiffs primarily argued that the Noise Ordinance was vague, overbreadth was indeed raised.
[brief] NJ Supreme Court 1988, the Court enunciated the rule as to how one should analyze a case with confidential relationships and gifts of substantial assets.  *In respect of an inter vivos gift, a presumption of undue influence arises when the contestant proves that the donee dominated the will of the donor,* Seylaz v. Bennett, 5 N.J. 168, 172 (1950); Haydock v. Haydock, 34 N.J. Eq. 570, 574 (E. & A. 1881), or when a confidential relationship exists between donor and donee, In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 227; Mott v.
[brief] The [...] had an interest in seventeen (17) restaurants, with [...] spearheading their operation.  Prior to him moving back home, his apartment in Hoboken was filled with banker’s boxes of files.  When he moved back home, those boxes inundated his parents’ house even though he had made an effort to dispose of duplicative and extraneous files.  That was the scene from which his sister was able to discover the documents at issue in this case.  Based upon the massive volume of documents traded in discovery in this case and entered into evidence, and with [...] being involved in many businesses, (8T 33:11 to 33:13), one can imagine how voluminous the files were.  Even when she discovered the documents and [...] began to realize their significance to the case, they were only able to find the corresponding emails attaching the documents after an extensive search that took “[c]lose to an hour I would say,” (8T 33:2), and that was only after scouring the house and garage for documents.  The State’s bald assertion that reasonable diligence was not exercised does not appropriately acknowledge the circumstances of their discovery.  The [...] was involved in many businesses over the course of an extended period of time resulting in endless boxes of thousands of documents.  They were overrun by them.  [...] believed that the substantial evidence presented at trial plainly demonstrated that he lacked any intent to deceive and was astonished by the jury’s lack of consideration of the evidence in the extremely limited time they deliberated.  It was only after the verdict that desperation truly set in and spurred the frantic search that resulted in the discovery of these documents.  There is no question that these documents are material to the State’s allegation of deception and would probably change the jury’s verdict.  The State’s theory in this case is that [...] lacked authority to solicit investments for this project because he had only a five percent (5%) stake.
[brief] The Planning Board Solicitor, [...], brought the March 20, 2023, session as to Plaintiff to a close, as to the variance at issue, explaining:  I think [a continuance is] appropriate.  I think in particular, I think the board raised a number of insightful issues as it relates to maybe siting issues.  There was a lot of references to what I presume are traffic industry expert reports, report or something along those lines.  I would like the Board to have a little bit more foundation so you can make up your own mind whether there’s a persuasive team [sic].  So I do think a continuance at this point is appropriate.  And give the board the opportunity, give the applicant the opportunity to give more information.  (3/20/23 Transcript @T97:24-T98:8).  It does not appear that the study first referred to on March 20, 2023, the “[...]” was submitted to the planning board.
[brief] I.  Litigants Are Entitled to Notice of the Points the Court Thinks Constitute Plain Error and Have a Right to be Heard Before a Final Determination.  In the Defendants-Appellants’ brief, Defendants have demonstrated that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.  Where does the justice lie in awarding attorney fees of $1,311,832.94 to attorneys who had openly admitted to commit fraud upon the court before the investigator from the [...] at the expense of the innocent victim and who had failed to establish the elements of causation and actual damage in the underlying matrimonial case within the legal malpractice case.  Even though there is a heavy burden, a judgment can still be vacated when the judgment is so distorted and wrong, in the objective and articulated view of a judge as to manifest with utmost certainty of a plain miscarriage of justice.  By Article I of the NJ Constitution, paragraph 9, the right of trial by jury is made inviolable; and the review on appeal from a judgment rendered on a jury verdict is ex-necessitate restrained by this constitutional guaranty.
[brief] The MOU As Enforced by the Trial Court Leads to an Absurd Result  Plaintiff devotes a substantial portion of its opposition to the “straw man” argument that the MOU was not drafted in a way that was procedurally or substantively unconscionable.  Pb, 18 – 23.  As the [...] have already explained, the trial court’s decision enforcing the MOU should be reversed not because of the MOU’s language or the way it was negotiated, but because the manner in which the trial court enforced it – refusing to require indemnification or impose any obligation to ever seek residential zoning – has led to an absurd result.
[brief] As proposed, the project would only provide an open view corridor of 57.06 feet, or 25% of the width of the site per Applicants’ plans Sheets C300 “SITE LAYOUT PLAN’.  Thus, the proposed frontage would fail to meet the required 30% minimum view corridor requirement.  In addition, in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)2, new coastal development adjacent to a bay or ocean or bayfront or oceanfront, beach, dune or boardwalk and higher than 15 feet in height measured from the existing grade of the site or boardwalk must be separated from either the beach, dune, boardwalk, or waterfront, whichever is further inland, by a distance that is equal to two times the height of the structure.  The proposed 109 residential unit high rise development would be 99 feet in height, as measured from the average existing ground elevation of 26.40 feet as shown on the submitted plan Sheet A-201 “BUILDING ELEVATIONS”.  As proposed, the proposed high rise structure would be separated from the inland edge of the boardwalk by approximately 88 feet as shown on the submitted plan Sheet C300 “SITE LAYOUT PLAN”.  However, the required distance separation from the boardwalk for the proposed 99 foot structure would be approximately 198 feet.  Assuming the same building location on the Property as proposed by the Applicant, the maximum permissible height for the proposed structure in this location would only be approximately 44’ high.  As proposed, the project fails to meet the setback requirements of this rule.  As demonstrated above, the proposed project fails to comply with the Scenic Resources and Design rule at N.J.A.C 7:7-16.10 because it does not provide the required 30% open view corridor to the waters’ edge and fails to meet the two to one setback requirement for the height of the building.
[brief] While Plaintiffs may contend that [...]’s submission describing “concrete cutting” was a subjective response that cannot be a material misrepresentation, that doesn’t change the fact that [...]’s representation was “untruthful, material to the particular risk assumed by the insurer, and actually and reasonably relied upon by the insurer in the issuance of the policy. ”  *First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson*, 177 N.J. 125, 137 (2003).
[brief] Discovery Requests  On September 12, 2023, Appellant provided the State with a discovery deficiency/request letter.  [Da014-015].  Request number eight asked the State to provide the identity of all officers that made up the TEAMS unit… and identify which officer breached the door to Appellant’s apartment.  [Da015].  Request number nine requested the identity of the officers who possessed a Halligan tool.  [Da015].  On September 18, 2023, the State responded.  [Da046-048].  With respect to request number eight, the State indicated that the relevant officers were identified on [...]’s report and ignored the request to identify the officer who breached Appellant’s door.  With respect to request nine, the State ignored Appellant’s request to identify the officers who possessed a Halligan tool and again directed Appellant to [...]’s report for all pertinent details.  [Da047].  f.  [...]’s Notes
[brief] On February 17, 2023, the court properly granted the Board’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the Counteclaim.  To affirm the court’s April 28, 2023, reconsideration order granting [...]’s **Counterclaim**, the Appellate Division would have to: 1) accept that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear a case under an 18A school law statute within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner; 2) find that the Commissioner lacks exclusive and primary jurisdiction to adjudicate an 18A school law claim; 3) agree that there is an express and/or implied private right to a cause of action to sue in Superior Court despite being no remedy or statute authorizing suit; 4) rule that [...] is not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking to enforce an 18A school law statute in Superior Court; 5) rule that the 45-day statute of limitations under R. 4:69-6 for enforcing a public entity’s compliance with the statute is inapplicable or should be enlarged to over 2.5 years; 6) decline to impose the doctrines of accord and satisfaction, and laches, despite the fact that [...] waited until two budget years later to formally challenge the Board’s compliance with the statute through its September 2022-filed Counterclaim; 7) interpret and apply N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) in a manner that violates the Impairment of Contracts clauses in the U.S. Constitution and New Jersey Constitution; 8) rule that [...] established a prima facie case for a breach of contract under Count One despite not meeting any of the four elements for a breach; 9) rule that [...] established a prima facie case for unjust enrichment despite not pleading any benefit the Board received; and 10) rule that [...] established a prima facie case for a failure to follow a statutory obligation even though no such cause of action exists, nor did they comply with R. 4:69-1, et seq.  Of course, the law and facts do not support the Appellate Division skipping over all of these reasons why the Counterclaim should be dismissed, and the court’s original February 17, 2023, order should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] chose to reduce the number of parking spaces; the condition of the property did not demand it.  Therefore, we conclude that the Board erred by finding that [...] met the requirements of a (c)(1) variance.  *Id.* art 470.  Consider also *Green Meadows at Montville, L.L.C. v. Planning Bd., Montville*, 329 N.J. Super. 12 (App. Div. 2000), where the proposed subdivision called for the creation of two deficient lots:  "[T]he "hardship" is self-created because it was plaintiff who planned the subdivision in such a way as to make those lots nonconforming."  *Id.* at 22.  In the present case, the applicant combined three lots into a clean-slate 3.2-acre developable tract.  There is plenty of room for street trees, and a drainage system, and lots with radial lines -- as part of a subdivision with a reasonable number of lots.  It is only because the developer wants to cram nine lots into the tract that it ran out of room for the drainage system and needs to use the space intended for street trees.  There would be no need for non-compliant lines if there were fewer lots in this subdivision.  These are quintessential self-created hardships.  At 4T36-18 to 4T37-4, the trial court touted [...]'s testimony that, without the street tree waiver, the stormwater system would have to be moved to a less convenient place on the tract.  That 'inconvenience' stems from the desire to convert the land into nine lots instead of (say) four or six lots.  With fewer lots there would be abundant room for a drainage system and the street trees.  With fewer lots, there would not be a choice between the drainage system and the street trees.  At 4T38-19 to 4T39-4, the court stated that the waivers do not contribute to the undesirable aspects of the subdivision cited by the Board when it denied the application.  The judge misunderstood the ordinance and misplaced the burden of proof.  UDO Sec. 18-601 requires the applicant to prove the waivers were justified by hardship.
[brief] ”  Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007).  “While we must defer to the agency’s expertise, we need not surrender to it. ”  N.J. Chapter of Nat’l Ass’n of Indus. & Office Parks v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 241 N.J. Super. 145, 165 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 374 (1990).  Appellant submits that the [...]’s denial of Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and not based on substantial credible evidence.  Moreover, for the reasons set forth herein, Appellant respectfully submits that the [...]’s grant of the modified WFD permit to [...] in 2019 was also arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and not based on substantial credible evidence.  As such, these decisions should be reversed.  II.
[directive] 10%  Permitted cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transport, or to cause public Degree inconvenience or alarm.  Section (a) – Third degree: also third degree if actor knowingly causes such false alarm to be transmitted to or within any organization, official or volunteer, for dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property.  2C:33-3(a-e)  False Public Alarms
[brief] Pa850-51.  Photography extracted from the Outside Cabin Camera of the Light Rail train that struck [...] depicts Shannon walking within the crosswalk immediately before being struck by the train.  A copy of Plaintiff’s liability expert report authored by [...] and [...] is appended hereto as Pa514.  The referenced photograph appears at PA525.  The entire Cabin Camera video is appended.  This video contains an Outside Cabin Camera view which shows what the operator sees outside the train and an Inside Cabin Camera that shows the operator driving the train.  The impact between the [...] train and [...] happened at 4:33 and 35 seconds PM which is displayed as 16:33:35 on the Outside Cabin Camera.  Appended video and Pa521-22.  At 16:33:28, approximately seven seconds prior to impact, defendant [...], the light rail train operator sounded the light rail vehicle’s horn.  Appended video, Pa521-22.  Defendant [...] sounded the train horn because he saw [...] walking near the tracks.  Pa962.  Below is the deposition transcript of defendant [...].
[brief] Da116–18.  It has likewise been covered in the pages of national news outlets such as the New York Times.  *See* [...], *Unwilling to Allow His Wife a Divorce, He Marries Another*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2024).  Da119–24.  This action, therefore, is undoubtedly “a subject of legitimate news interest,” *Snyder*, 562 U.S. at 453, and therefore involves “a matter of public concern,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-50(b)(3).
[brief] (T40:6–45:7; DA7–8) ........  9  A.  Plaintiff’s strategic dismissal of his lawsuit to avoid attorneys’ fees under the anti-SLAPP statute is an exceptional circumstance warranting relief.  (T8:3–4, T39:18–25, T39:25–40:2, T8:4–13; T8:14–16)  .........................9  B.  The trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider Defendants’ anti-SLAPP statute-based exceptional circumstances argument.  (T40:6–45:7; DA7–8)  .................................................................20  C.  The trial court committed legal error in denying the motion to reopen based on a misapprehension of the applicable standard for obtaining attorneys’ fees.  (T40:6–45:7; DA7–8)  .................................................................25  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................28