ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] I.  A certificate can suspend one or more disabilities, forfeitures or bars to:  A.  Public employment by a State, County or Municipal agency excluding elected office, or employment in law enforcement, corrections, the judiciary, positions related to homeland security or emergency management, or any position that has access to sensitive information that could threaten the public health, welfare, or safety.  B.  Qualification for a license or certification to engage in the practice of a profession, occupation or business, except the practice of law, or as a loan originator, or residential mortgage lender or residential mortgage mortgage broker as a qualified individual licensee, pursuant to the "New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act."  C.  Admission to an examination to qualify for a license or certification except for the bar examination, a qualified written test for a mortgage loan originator, or residential mortgage lender or broker as a qualified individual licensee, or an examination for a law enforcement, homeland security, or emergency management position.
[brief] Here, Plaintiffs baldly assert that [...] “had no bargaining power” and that her only choices were “to either accept [[...]’s] terms or have no means of transportation. ” (Pb7; 10).  But they ignore that she had numerous other viable transportation options.  Instead of using the [...] App, [...] could have chosen to use another rideshare platform (e.g., [...]) or to take advantage of other means of transportation (e.g., train, bus, or taxi).
[directive] 27.  ITEM NO. - Enter the item of each piece of property recovered or seized, relating to the case.  28.  PROPERTY CODE - Enter the Property Description Code number from the code table located in the center of the report.  29.  PROPERTY STATUS - Enter the Property Status code number from the code table located in the center right portion of the report.  30.  ESTIMATED/QUANTITY - Enter the quantity or the estimated quantity of items.  31.  UNIT OF MEASURE - Enter the appropriate Unit Of Measure code if necessary, from the code table located in the center portion of the report.  32.  DESCRIPTION/O.A.N. - Enter a description of the property and any Owner Applied Numbers that may exist.
[brief] The [...]’s mission is “[t]o promote the betterment of the public health and the science and the art of medicine, to enlighten public opinion in regard to the problems of medicine, and to safeguard the rights of the practitioners of medicine. ”  The [...] is the largest professional association of physicians, residents, and medical students in the United States.  Additionally, through state and specialty medical societies and other physician groups seated in its House of Delegates, substantially all physicians, residents and medical students in the United States are represented in the [...]’s policy making process.  The [...] was founded in 1847 to promote the art and science of medicine and the betterment of public health, and these remain its core purposes.  [...] members practice in every medical specialty and in every state, including New Jersey.  The [...] and the [...] submit this brief on their own behalf and as representatives of the [...] and the [...].
[brief] ”).  Every “consumer contract” in New Jersey must “be written in a simple, clear, understandable and easily readable way. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:12-2.  “When a party enters into a signed, written contract, that party is presumed to understand and assent to its terms, unless fraudulent conduct is suspected. ”  Id. at 305, citing Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Com, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992).
[brief] 2T.@43:17-20.  Counsel for [...], like the Trial Court, ignores (willfully) the context.  He wants the Trial Court to assume that (a) the ROFR acknowledgement by the buyer is material to the offer such that the offer is invalid without it and (b) even though it is the only term to change in the contract, even though it is a change that [...] is demanding, from [...] (who already is a party to the contract with [...] in which the ROFR applicable and therefore did not need to acknowledge the ROFR) under duress, and even though both [...] and [...] have been pushing for an affirmative expression of waiver from [...] as well as debranding figures from January through May of 2023, it is the formal acknowledgement by both buyer and seller ([...]) that were necessary to trigger the 30 day period because [...] needed to know “what was real. ”  Defendant [...] submits that the evidence clearly showed that [...] and [...] were in a continuous state of trying to move forward to closing on the gas station under all the same terms of the original PSA and only being held up by the insistence of Plaintiff, [...] that the ROFR must be acknowledged by [...] in writing.
[directive] CONDITIONS/RESTRICTIONS  Places and Facilities, Healthcare/Treatment Schools, in Recording; When ~ecial Restrictions 7.1 of Worship. by required otherwise as except and of Directive, 5.2 this 5.3  Notwithstanding and sections criminal of commission a investigating the in actively engaged officer is 5.6, section the unless will to required or be she reasonably he that believes or an emergency, responding is or to offense, BWC shall a or de-activate BWC, shall a activate officer the not force, or authority use constructive youth or school on or youth or school facility a in 1) officer: the is while activated, been has that in 2) BWC; the of is view in be would children minor where circumstances under property facility under facility treatment abuse substance or office, medical facility, of healthcare a area care patient a under worship of in or place a is of 3) BWC; in the view be would patients where circumstances (i.e., (notation 9.3 section also See the of BWC. in be would view worshipers where circumstances issues). special other or raising events/encounters privacy certain of "tagging") this of provisions the with accordance in BWC the de-activate to required officer an If is building school a entering am "I (~, de-activation for reason narrate shall officer the section, the practicable and safe is it as soon as re-activated shall BWC The be children present."). are where officer is the (ems., exist longer no de-activation requiring circumstances the when and if so do to school the where within in place a while investigation criminal a of part as adult an with conversing of view BWC). in the children be not would abuse treatment in substance a patient a of image the captures BWC a that the In event or Criminal Justice of Division the of Director or designee, or Prosecutor County the facility, and regulations federal laws applicable all with compliance ensure to notified be shall designee, 290dd-2, 42 information.
[brief] III.  THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR BY DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.  (2T21)  Plaintiff brought his Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to R. 4:49-2 which states in pertinent part:  The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred…  R. 4:49-2.  Thus, reconsideration “is a matter to be exercised in the trial court’s sound discretion. ”  See, e.g., Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (citation omitted).  Our Supreme Court has described a Motion for Reconsideration as an opportunity for the party seeking reconsideration to convince the Court that: 1) it has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  See Kornbleuth, 241 N.J. at 301 (2020) (quoting Guido v. Duane Morris LLC, 22 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010)).
[directive] Failure to complete the boat safety course will 4.  Any warnings previously given to you concerning your right to result in the immediate or continued revocation of your boating remain silent, and your right to consult with an attorney, do not privilege.  The Court will also fine you a sum of no less than $300 apply to the taking of breath samples, and do not give you the and no more than $1,000 for your refusal conviction.  right to refuse to give, or to delay giving, samples of your breath for the purpose of making chemical tests to determine the content 9.  Any suspension or revocation of your boating privilege for a of alcohol in your blood.  You have no legal right to have an refusal conviction may be independent of any suspension or attorney, physician, or anyone else present, for the purpose of revocation imposed for any related offense.  taking the breath samples.
[brief] *Id.* at 473.  “Conversely, if the photograph or video recording is of such low quality that no witness -- even a person very familiar with the defendant -- could identify the individual who appears in it, lay opinion testimony will not assist the jury, and may be highly prejudicial. ”  *Ibid.*  Applying these factors, the Court explained that the witness’s “contacts with the defendant were more than sufficient to enable her to identify him in the surveillance photograph more accurately than a jury could. ”  *Id.* at 474.  She “met with defendant at least twice per month in the fifteen months preceding her review of the photograph” and was therefore “familiar with his appearance over that period, which included the date of the alleged offenses. ”  *Ibid.*  In contrast, the testimony of the six witnesses who purported to identify [...] in the surveillance video in this case failed to satisfy either prong of Rule 701.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | PAGE NO. | |----------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................. ii | | LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................1 | | I.  DEFENDANT’S DENIAL EXCEEDED THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF DEFEERENCE OWED TO LOCAL LAND USE BOARDS.  ...........................................................................................................1 | | II.  DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE “SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT” TO MANSFIELD’S ZONING, AND FAILED TO DO SO.  ...........................................................................................................2 | | III.
[directive] B.  Office.  The Office shall operate under the supervision of an Executive Leadership of Director, who shall be appointed by and operate under the authority and direct supervision of the Attorney General.  The Executive Director shall be appointed an Assistant Attorney General and shall be authorized to conduct investigations of state criminal law, state administrative procedures, and Departmental rules.  The Executive Director shall direct and supervise the work of the Office and its constituent organizational units, and shall devote his, her, or their entire time to the duties of the Office.  C. Office.
[brief] *Florida v. Jardines*, 569 U.S. 1, 3–5 (2013).  The defendant sought to suppress the information discovered by the dog, and the matter eventually reached the United States Supreme Court.  *Ibid.*  The Court held that law enforcement had committed a trespass, reasoning that their conduct exceeded the implied invitation “to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. ”  *Id.* at 8-9.  Therefore, the Court found, they had unlawfully conducted a search without a warrant.  *Ibid.*  In *Collins*, law enforcement invoked the automobile exception to enter a driveway and lift a tarp to investigate a car parked underneath.
[brief] Under binding precedent, all parties have a constitutional right to a jury trial on IFPA damages claims, and a statute requiring mandatory arbitration of a claim that carries the right to a jury trial is unconstitutional.  In contrast, this court has held that claims disputing whether PIP arbitration benefits must be paid do not require a jury trial.  Thus, disputes about whether an insurer must pay PIP benefits and in what amount can be subject to mandatory arbitration, but affirmative fraud claims for damages cannot.  Second, text, context, purpose, and caselaw further demonstrate that AICRA arbitration applies to disputes about whether an insured or assignee can recover unpaid PIP benefits but not to an insurer’s claims for damages relating to fraud.  Indeed, this court has recognized that the Legislature did not intend that PIP arbitrators decide IFPA claims.  Third, reading AICRA to mandate arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims would create a conflict between AICRA, the IFPA, and RICO.  Under settled precedent, courts must harmonize the statutory schemes.  The only way to do so that accords with the statutory purposes is to permit insurers to continue to sue medical providers that obtain PIP benefits through fraudulent means in court.  Finally, other canons of statutory interpretation reinforce that AICRA does not require Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims.  It would lead to absurd results that the Legislature could not have intended because insurers cannot obtain damages or attorneys’ fees in a PIP arbitration or conduct the discovery that they need to litigate the type of claims that Plaintiffs allege.  Prohibiting judicial actions for insurance fraud would also cause a sea change in the law, which the Legislature is presumed only to do expressly.  But there is no indication that AICRA was intended to prohibit IFPA and other fraud actions; quite to the contrary.  The decision below risks profound adverse effects on the automobile-insurance industry in New Jersey, threatens AICRA’s constitutionality, and will overwhelm an arbitration system unequipped to handle cases like this one.  This court should reverse.
[brief] i.  Well-settled case law indicates [...] waived his right to object to the number of arbitrators.  [...] waived the right on multiple occasions to make the argument that a three-arbitrator panel was required.  While there is no case in New Jersey discussing waiver in the context of the number of arbitrators, there are numerous cases involving waiver of objections to an arbitrator’s jurisdiction, and both concepts contemplate an arbitrator acting without authority.
[directive] Do any of you know either/any of the lawyers?  Has either / any of them or anyone in their office ever represented you or brought any action against you?  Do you know Mr./Ms _____________________?  Names of Parties  4.  Read names of potential witnesses.  Do you know any of the potential witnesses?  [Note: List witnesses’ names here or attached a separate sheet.]  5.  I have already briefly described the case.  Do you know anything about this case from any source other than what I’ve just told you?  Model Civil Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07
[brief] “Any delay in outright distributions from the Trust was a result of the instant litigation, which was dragged out in part by Defendants’ lack of cooperation and continued motion practice. ” (Da67).  Finally, the proposed second supplemental complaint seeks damages based on what the Defendants allege was the wrongful expenditure of Trust funds toward counsel fees.  (Da347, at ¶69).  This argument is self-serving, considering that they occupied that property without payment from even before the Decedent’s death until even after the property had been sold by the Trust to [...]; they finally left on November 28, 2022, only two days before they faced removal by the [...] upon issuance of a writ of possession.  (7T83:5-13; Da52).  The Trustee unquestionably had the authority to file suit against the Defendants under the terms of the Trust, the Probate Code and New Jersey’s Ejectment Statute.
[brief] She, much like Appellants here, reasoned that the restrictions under review “are arbitrary, overbroad, and not rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective. ”  *Id.* at 562.  In denying her challenge, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that “the right to a particular job, unlike the right to work in general, has never been regarded as fundamental. ”  *Id.* at 573.  Thus, “the right to employment opportunity is subject to reasonable measures to promote the general welfare under both the federal Constitution and New Jersey Constitution. ”  *Id.* at 571.  Employing the rational-basis standard that applies when fundamental rights are not implicated, the Supreme Court went on to uphold the statute’s constitutionality on grounds that it was supported by the State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the judiciary and confidence in the casino industry.  *Ibid.*  Appellants attempt to distinguish the holding of *Greenberg* by claiming that the right to a particular employment is a “far cry” from the right of an attorney to practice law.  (Ab46).  Yet, Appellants do not cite any authority to support an argument that places attorneys in a privileged position above all other individuals who have an interest in pursuing particular paths of employment; they also offer no response to the decisions that have held that there is no fundamental right to practice law.  *New Jersey State Bar Ass'n*, 387 N.J. Super. at 42; see also *Edelstein*, 812 F.2d at 132 (“We have previously held that the right to practice law is not a fundamental right for purposes of due process or equal protection analysis. ”).  Thus, the DACCA does not implicate any fundamental constitutional right that could categorically displace the presumption of constitutionality under Bell.
[brief] Order Granting Summary Judgement to Respondent dated June 20, 2024 ..................................  Pa108-109  Order Amending Order Granting Summary Judgement to Respondent  Dated July 1, 2024 ...................................  Pa115-117  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Appendix Document  Appendix Page Number Complaint ........................................  Pa1-6  First Amended Complaint ......................... Pa7-11  Answer .............................................. Pa12-22  Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Respondent .......  Pa23-66  Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Appellant .......................................  Pa67-83  Reply Filed by Respondent ..........................  Pa84-87  Order granting summary judgment to Respondent and dismissing the complaint ................. Pa88-89
[brief] Plaintiff in this matter alleges that she was caused to slip and fall on ice on the property affronting Defendants’ property on or about February 20, 2019, between 4 and 6 PM.  (Pa2-Pa5 and Pa 19).  Defendants’ property, located at [...] (the “Premises”) is a residential property.  (Pa200-201).  On the date of the incident, according to Plaintiff’s own weather expert, it began snowing around 12 PM and continued to snow until 6 PM, when the weather turned to freezing rain and sleet until 10 PM.  (Pa79).  The sole cause of Plaintiff’s fall was slipping on snow and ice.  (Pa54, page 62:22-24):  Q: What made you fall?  Was it ice, snow or a combination?  A: Combination of both.  Plaintiff testified that the area had not been cleared of snow and ice at the time of the incident (Pa54, page 63:5-8):  Q: Okay.  Did it look like it had been shoveled at all earlier that day or the day before.  A:  To me it didn’t seem like it had been cleaned.  Defendants have resided in the Premises since purchasing it in 1972.  (Pa200).  Since that time, the only individuals to inhabit the Premises are the Defendants, or immediate family of the Defendants.  (Pa200).  In 1987, Defendants turned the basement apartment into a garage/carport.  (Pa200).  The project required that work be done on the sidewalk by repouring the cement to be consistent aesthetically with the driveway – the work was done in or around 1987.  (Pa200).  Plaintiff produced an engineering report, authored by [...] (“[...]”) in the course of discovery.  (Pa86-Pa123).  [...] concluded that the Premises had an “[a]brupt and excessive change in the public sidewalk surface running slope at the incident location, which acts as a ramp and was measured to change from 6.7% to 21.3% in the direction of pedestrian travel.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY BARRED APPELLANT’S NET OPINIONS (6T)  The [...] concluded that the value of the Property was reduced due to increased flooding risk, relying upon the [...] to do so.  Da288.  Appellant’s appraisal described “External/Locational Depreciation” as “Due to the project, the subject has a higher risk of flooding during a weather event. ”  Da303.  Based thereon, Appellant’s appraisal assigned a 16% “External Obsolescence Building” to the fair market value opinion under the Cost Approach.  Ibid.  Appellant’s appraisal also stated, “the new seawall has increased the risk of flooding on the site.  All of the Sale are do not [sic] have an enhanced risk of flooding during a weather event.  Therefore, all Sales are adjusted downward. ”  Da300.  The trial court properly barred this -15% adjustment as it was based upon the impermissible net opinions contained in the [...].  In response to the [...], the [...] produced the [...].  Unlike the [...], the [...] provides a thorough background of “Coastal Processes” to include “Nearshore Wave Processes” and “Wave Overtopping” thus providing the background information necessary to evaluate the validity of the [...]’s methodology.  Da422-425.  The [...] discusses the “Owen Method” for estimating the overtopping discharge rate, providing the mathematical formula to calculate same.  Da424.  The [...] confirms the [...], “doesn’t contain any data or calculations that substantiate the report’s conclusion that the new seawall increases the flooding potential on the subject property. ”  Da425 [emphasis added].  The [...] concludes:  The newly constructed seawall reduces overtopping significantly from waves of all directions compared to the pre-existing lower elevation seawall . . . the new seawall constructed at the property results in a measurable benefit in the form of enhanced storm protection due to the significant reduction in the amount of overtopping.  Da431-432 [emphasis added].  Rule 4:17-4(e) sets forth the mandatory components of an expert report, to include a complete statement of the expert’s opinions and the basis thereof; the facts and data considered in forming the opinions; and the qualifications of the expert.
[brief] Section 41 established a like-credentialed standard of qualification governing AOM affiants and requires “the challenging expert to be equivalently-qualified to the defendant. ”  The statute applies to three categories of medical malpractice defendants: (1) those who are specialists in a field recognized by the [...] ([...]) but who are not board certified in that specialty; (2) those who are specialists in a field recognized by the [...] and who are board certified in that specialty; and (3) those who are “general practitioners. ”  Hoover, 472 N.J.Super. at 236-237 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Buck v. Henry, 207 N.J. 377, 389 (2011)).  In Pfannenstein, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice case against two doctors and a medical center.
[brief] A diagnosis of mental illness need not rise to the level of a complete insanity defense to constitute a mitigating factor.  See State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1998) (finding that the defendant’s mental condition, as testified to by an expert, could constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing even though an insanity defense was rejected).  After all, mental illness can only serve as a mitigating factor when it does not constitute a complete defense.