ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Exhibit A: Deposition Transcript of [...], MSCE, PE, dated July 17, 2023 ..............................................................................Pa89  Exhibit B: Curriculum Vitae of [...], MSCE, PE .........................Pa135  Exhibit C: Deposition Transcript of [...], dated August 24, 2022 .....................................................................................Pa140  Defendant [...]’ Reply Brief in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 29, 2023 (Omitted herein)
[brief] The Appellant [...] testified at the hearing.  During cross examination, the Appellant appears to have become confused with his own varying versions of the truth.  Despite the position of counsel in their brief, when the parties appeared in court for a plenary hearing.  [...] testified that he remembered the original document.  [2T P29:L22-P23: L9, P32:L7-10;P34:L1-3]  A review of the cross examination of the Appellant highlights the lack of credibility of the Appellants’ position.  [2T P19-44]  [...] claimed the document now purported to be the operative agreement by the Appellants was typed by [...] on her computer.  *She had it on her computer and she typed it so actually she typed the information.*”  [2T P25:L19-21]  He provided no evidence, nor explanation why it was not discovered by his IT employees.  During questioning, Appellant stated the cobbled together agreement, P6 was the agreement.  *Question: You certify to the court that this is the true and correct employment agreement; Am I right?”  Answer: “After I seen it, I don’t know.  This is the true one, I believe.  This is---”*  [2T P32 L7-10]  When asked directly why there were two employment agreements, the Appellant was unable to provide a clear answer.  [2T P33 L5-22]  [2T P13-P34:L3]  There was also confusion on the part of Mr. [...] as to what the Respondent’s position was when the agreement was signed.  The document that the Appellant’s claim was typed by the Respondent, the cobbled together P6, originally has her listed as campus president.  It has pen changes and initials changing the president to acting director.  No explanation has ever been provided as to why the Respondent would type this agreement and include her incorrect job title.  [2T P26: L2; P29:L2]
[brief] As for specific deterrence, that court found that defendant acknowledged in his statement to the police that he knew what he did and understood that it was wrong, yet he wanted to write a book entitled “Scott Free” and would better cover his tracks the next time:  It is clear to this Court that this defendant, if given the opportunity, would strike again.  Defendant’s own desires and choices guided his actions, not any mental deficiency.  There is a strong factual basis here that this defendant acted out of retaliation for what he felt were wrongs committed upon him.  And because there’s still people in this world that he feels had wronged him, including the neighbor and others, that there is specific deterrence to this defendant from violating the law in the future.
[brief] [...] Misdirects The Proper Focus From Its Obligations As An Insurer  Nor does the extrinsic material [...] cites relieve it from its legal notice obligation.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, neither its policy nor the CCIP manual excluded demolition subcontractors.  (Dta146, Tb11.)  As a matter of law, the policy, which does not exclude “demolition,” superseded the expired “binder. ”
[brief] [...] raises mostly the same arguments (which [...] “adopt[ed]” (Db18) in its opposition brief), wherein it cites to its underlying decision, which stated, in relevant part, that “neither our Constitution, nor our Act, places express limitations on the size of a party’s collective negotiations team (Rb9). ”  This also misconstrues the dispute before the Court – the issue does not pertain to how many individuals a party can have on its negotiations team, nor is the Appellate Division being asked to render an opinion regarding same.  Rather, the issue is whether a party can self-identify its entire membership, as a whole, for negotiations on a “come-and-go basis” in order to frustrate the Act’s statutory intent.  The Board submits that the answer is “no,” for the reasons set forth herein and in [...]’s initial brief.
[brief] Pa42.  Cleverly, defense counsel did not ask his own experts one question regarding those documents.  Instead, he used them improperly to cross-examine plaintiff and her expert witnesses.  The intent and prejudicial effect as evidenced by the defense closing could not be more clear.  As the court stated in *Manata* and is equally true here, “it is uncertain * * * that plaintiff could have laid a sufficient foundation for admission of the report as a business record.  Without an officer's testimony, it is unclear whether the report was prepared in accordance with regular practice including governing guidelines. ”
[brief] Instead, [...] cites only to Delaware shareholder derivative case law and the section of the Internal Revenue Code that defines charitable contributions, which are irrelevant to this court’s review of the trial court’s determination that [...] failed to establish damages.  [...]’s mistaken reliance on Delaware case law in support of its argument that the trial court should have applied something called “plaintiff-friendly principles,” not found in any New Jersey case law, to find that [...] is entitled to “rescissory damages,” notwithstanding [...]’s failure to establish any damages by a preponderance of the evidence, is illogical and contrary to New Jersey case law.  See Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. at 442; E.S. for G.S., 469 N.J. Super. at 298.  Unlike Delaware regulatory law, which is often cited outside of the state, Delaware case law has no binding relevance in New Jersey and [...]’s arguments should be rejected.  Moreover, the facts in the Delaware cases cited in [...]’s brief are so distinguishable from the facts here that even if those decisions were relevant to this case, and they are not, the decisions are inapplicable.  See, e.g., Metro Storage Int’l LLC v. Harron, 275 A.3d 810, 822 (Del. Ch. 2022) (where plaintiff companies filed suit against defendant President alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, and an international operating agreement, for stealing employer’s confidential documents and providing them to a competitor for whom defendant was secretly providing similar consulting services for personal financial gain.); In re Orchard Enters., Inc. S'holder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 38 (Del.  Ch. 2014) (a shareholder derivative suit alleging that defendant directors breached their duties by disclosing a liquidation value methodology at the time of merger.)  [...]’s appeal, like its case, fails to prove the essential element of damages and fails to establish a prima facie case against third-party defendants.  Accordingly, under the laws of New Jersey, the trial court’s decision was proper and should be affirmed.
[brief] In determining whether agency action constitutes rulemaking courts inquire whether the agency action: (1) is intended to have wide coverage encompassing a large segment of the regulated or general public, rather than an individual or a narrow select group; (2) is intended to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons; (3) is designed to operate only in future cases, that is, prospectively; (4) prescribes a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization; (5) reflects an administrative policy that (i) was not previously expressed in any official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule, or (ii) constitutes a material and significant change from a clear, past agency position on the identical subject matter; and (6) reflects a decision on administrative regulatory policy in the nature of the interpretation of law or general policy.
[brief] The C.5 exclusion as approved by the State’s insurance regulators is required in all employers liability policies such as the ones in this case.  That required provision is precisely the exclusionary language that Plaintiff challenges in this appeal.  But in the seventeen years since State regulators approved and required the revised C.5 exclusion, no legislation, regulation, or case law has found fault with it.  Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that statutes that pre-existed the adoption of the revised exclusion prohibit its application to conduct of the employer that is substantially certain to result in injury to an employee.  Plaintiff further argues that the public policy of the State to encourage employers to prevent hazardous workplaces does not support enforcement of the exclusion.  The trial court correctly concluded otherwise.  So should this Court.  The judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s insurance coverage claims for failure to state a claim should be affirmed.
[brief] \(^8\)  The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly noted that in circumstances like this, where the “choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operate[ ] in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies…we would have little hesitation condemning the agreement as against public policy. ”  *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 673, n. 19 (1985).  It should also be recognized that when the Agreement was executed, Appellants and [...] were not contracting as equals.
[brief] 23, 24 Pitts v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 337 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2001) ...............  11 Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ..........  11 R.J. Longo Const. Co. v. Schragger, 218 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 1987) ..  25 Rieder v. State Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987)  .........
[brief] B.  The Trial Court’s Decision Was Supported by the Record.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, the trial court conducted a thorough analysis of the issue of the “reasonableness” of the attorney’s fees incurred in this matter.  The Statement of Reasons includes a lengthy and detailed summary of the parties’ positions and the conclusion reached by the Court was supported by the record.  Indeed, starting almost immediately after this action was filed, Defendant made numerous efforts to resolve this matter, including an Offer of Judgment in the amount of $11,000 inclusive of attorney’s fees while the action was in its infancy.  See P162a.  After limited discovery, the matter was arbitrated, resulting in an award to Plaintiff of $7,500 plus reasonable attorney’s fees to be decided by the court.  *Id.*  Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to settle the matter for the same amount.  *Id.*  Having considered the procedural history of this matter (even outlining this procedural history in its Statement of Reasons), the trial court’s lodestar analysis properly considered the “reasonableness” of the hours incurred and excluded those hours for tasks the trial court deemed unreasonable.  Moreover, the trial court properly determined the reasonableness of the fees incurred in light of the “result obtained. ”  *See* Statement of Reasons, P0121a.  As Plaintiff admits, the “result” obtained in this matter (a cash settlement reflecting a fraction of the purchase price) was a far cry from what Plaintiff demanded in the Complaint (cancelation of the sales contract, a buyback of the vehicle, injunctive relief, interest and “other relief”).  *See* Complaint, at WHEREFORE clause, P058a.  Additionally, it is undisputed that the trial court could consider the results obtained by Plaintiff in the settlement as part of its determination of attorney’s fees.  *See* Plaintiff’s Brief at p. 15 (wherein Plaintiff agrees that results obtained may be an appropriate factor to be considered by the court).  Therefore, based on the admittedly limited results, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in awarding Plaintiff less in fees than demanded.  C.
[brief] THE HEARING OFFICER’S REPORT AND RESOLUTION 24-23 ARE BASED ON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.  (Aa236-45).  Appellant argues that the Hearing Officer Report and Resolution 24-23 do not set forth a sufficient basis for [...]’s decision denying Appellant’s application.  (See Ab32; Ab38-41).  These arguments must fail.  Resolution 24-23 was the culmination of the hearing process required under Authority land use regulations.  Consistent with N.J.A.C. 19:66-14.1(m), the Hearing Officer’s Report articulated a written summary of findings and conclusions, which are grounded in the evidentiary record and based on his assessment of the credibility of competing expert testimony, and further recommended denial of Appellant’s application to the Authority.  Under Resolution 24-23, the Authority then adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Hearing Officer as detailed in his report.  Id.  The Authority’s decision to adopt the Hearing Officer’s Report is entitled to deference where, as here, the decision is amply supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record as a whole.  See Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of the administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.
[brief] Pa42, T44:2121-23.  The City’s employment handbook includes an anti-discrimination policy, which provides, in part:  The [...] is committed to the principle of equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act…Under no circumstances will the [...] discrimination on the basis of sex, race, creed, color religion, national origin, ancestry, age, marital or political status, affectional or sexual orientation, domestic partnership status, civil union status, atypical hereditary, cellular or blood trait, genetic information, disability…liability for service in the United States armed forces, gender identity or expression, and/or other characteristics protected by law…If any employee or prospective employee feels they have been treated unfairly, they have the right to address their concern with their supervisor, or if they prefer their Department Head, the Personnel Director, the City Administrator, or the office of the Corporation Counsel.  Pa121-122.  The employment handbook further provides an anti-harassment policy which states: “if an employee is witness to or believes to have experienced harassment, immediate notification of the supervisor or other appropriate person should take place” and refers employees to the “Employee Complaint Policy. ”  Pa123-124.  The Employee Complaint Policy set forth that the City “has a no tolerance policy towards workplace wrongdoing” and further provides:  [e]mployees desiring to file a complaint regarding any of the above mentioned terms and conditions of employment should utilize the grievance procedures outlined in their union contract, or the Municipal Code (whichever is applicable); or the appeal process/procedures in accordance with the provisions of the New Jersey Administrative Code, Title 4A.  Pa125-126.  Plainfield Fire Director, [...], testified that the Fire Department conducts annual anti-discrimination and anti-harassment trainings since the time he became Director in 2019.  Pa96, T67:13-68:2.  Annual anti-discrimination and anti-harassment training for the [...] was also confirmed by Deputy Chief [...].  Pa116, T70:16-71:11.  Not only are trainings mandated on the topic, but the City’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies are prominently posted in the second-floor hallway in all three Fire Department buildings in the same location as the required OSHA posting and other important workplace documents.  Pa96, T68:11-69:5; Pa116, T71:12-24.
[brief] ”  Pa7 (Opinion at p. 5).  Appellants, in arguing otherwise, seek to distort the meaning of the plain and unambiguous terms of the Consent Order and to render the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Consent Order meaningless.  The Trial Court properly rejected these arguments, acknowledging that, “[i]f taken as true, any deadline would have no meaning.  The Consent Order is clear that the sixty-day deadline applied to both the tolling of the statute of limitations and to the opportunity to re-file ‘any of the affirmative claims, counterclaims, and/or third-party claims. ’” (Pa6 (Opinion)(quoting Aug. 29, 2023 Cert. of [...], Ex. C, Consent Order at pp. 2-3, available at Pa151-152)).  Appellants are not arguing that the Trial Court overlooked or misunderstood the arguments below.  Instead, they simply disagree with the Trial Court’s ultimate conclusion to enforce the Consent Order’s mandatory sixty-day refiling deadline.  The Trial Court correctly acknowledged that a “consent order is an agreement of the parties that has been approved by the court.  As such, a consent order operates as a contract between the parties.  Therefore, in construing a consent order, a court ‘examine[s] the plain language of the contract and the parties’ intent, as evidenced by the contract’s purpose and surrounding circumstances. ’” (Pa6-7 (Opinion at pp. 4-5)(quoting Hurwitz v. AHS Hosp. Corp., 438 N.J. Super. 269, 292 (App. Div. 2014)).
[brief] (23T 108-4 to 12, 110-7 to 13, 116-21 to 23)  To stir up excitement for his performance, as he ascended the stage, he began a chant of “D’s up,” explaining that “D” referred to [...].  (23T 111-15 to 112-4; 24T 268-14 to 16)  [...] testified that when his friends picked up the chant, some ten or 12 people on the dance floor “start[ed] throwing up gang signs” and pointing fingers as if shooting at the stage.  (23T 111-18 to 23, 112-7 to 113-14, 114-25 to 115-2)  He said that about 30 seconds into his “performance, those same people -- they just ran over to the table -- like bum-rushed the table that [he had been] at[.] … [And] a couple of the younger guys, they started grabbing bottles off the table. ”  (23T 113-22 to 114-7, 115-2 to 4)  [...] heard that someone had sprayed champagne, but he was not sure what prompted the aggressive behavior.  (23T 113-17 to 18, 114-16 to 115-8; 24T 271-14 to 272-17)  He “told the DJ to stop the music to figure out what was going on” and stepped down off the stage.  (23T 114-7 to 9, 115-14 to 15)  Like [...], his friend [...] came for the Aries Ball and learned after he arrived that there was also “another party going on” and that the people at the other party were from Newark.
[brief] “Bar” (1T-50-9-16)  (Given there is agreement that *Heck* does not bar LAD actions much of this may be moot except for [...]’s outrageous CRA violations.  If Your Honors believe that *Heck* does not give police license to deny accommodations (not allow to take anxiety meds), to lie about family/counsel contact and what a parent said as well as \(^{14}\) [...] has “comprehension deficits” in common with people with hearing and seeing disabilities.  There is also the Drug Court differential discrimination.  kidnap a detainee from necessary medical care – caused by police abuse and lies -- Your Honors do not need to read this section.)
[brief] Defendant said he understood, but then quickly stated he “didn’t do a fucking thing bro but talking. ” (11T126-10 to 11; Sa1 at 10:46:37 to 10:46:42; Da49).  He then spoke over [...]’s request not to discuss at that time, replying, “I don’t care because I ain’t do nothing wrong. ”  (11T126-13 to 16; Sa2 at 10:46:44 to 10:46:48; Da49)  Defendant continued to voluntarily talk throughout the booking process.
[brief] ” (DA216.)  Thereafter, on July 18, 2023, counsel for [...] and [...] participated in a preliminary hearing before the AAA-appointed arbitrator and agreed upon a schedule for arbitration.  (DA1582).  During this conference, the parties agreed upon an evidentiary hearing date of June 17-21, 2024.  (DA1582-1583).  On December 7, 2023, counsel for the parties appeared telephonically before the AAA arbitrator to provide updates on the trial court and appellate filings and schedules.
[directive] Law enforcement agencies subject to its requirements must publish their first report disclosing names of officers recently suspended for serious misconduct no later than December 31, 2020.  At the same time, nothing in this Directive prevents agencies from releasing similar information regarding historical incidents of officer misconduct.  For example, the law enforcement agencies housed with the [...]—the [...], the [...], and the [...]—will publish the names of any officers who have been subject to serious discipline by July 15, 2020.  The [...], which since 2000 has published an annual report summarizing incidents of major discipline that does not disclose the identities of the State Troopers, intends to update these annual reports with the Troopers’ names no later than July 15, 2020.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with as revised by this Directive, and to take any IAPP additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with IAPP, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.
[brief] PAGE  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY...............................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................................4  A.  Plaintiffs Represent Clients In The State of New Jersey In Debt Settlement Matters.  ..............................................................................................................4  B.  The Legislature Enacts And Amends A Statute Governing Debt Adjustment Services.  ..................................................................................................................5  C.  The State Opens An Investigation To Determine Whether An Attorney Has Been “Principally Engaged” As A Debt Adjuster In Violation of the Act.  ..................................................................................................................7  D.  Plaintiffs Filed This Action Against Defendants.........................................................8  E.  Plaintiffs Take The Deposition Of A Designated Representative Of [...].................................................................................................................................9  F.  The Act Restricts The Amount Of Debt Adjustment Services That An Attorney Can Provide To Clients.  .................................................................10  G.  The Legislature Has Not Defined, And Defendants Have Also Not Defined Or Otherwise Offered Any Guidance, As To The Meaning Of “Principally Engaged” Or “Attorney-At-Law Of This State” As Used In The Act’s Limited Attorney Exemption.....................................................................................11  H.  [...] Acknowledges That The Limited Attorney Exemption Prohibits Attorneys With The Most Experience From Providing Debt Adjustment Services.........................................................................................15  I.  The Trial Court Denies Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion, And Grants Defendants’ Summary Judgment.  .........................................................17  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] Da097 Exh E (Email of [...] to Defendant [...] relaying Debranding penalties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da114  Answer to Verified Complaint of Defendants Dated July 10, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .