ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] De-Activation/Removal of BWC From Alcohol Breath Testing Area.  In order to eliminate any argument that radio frequency interference from a BWC affected an electronic alcohol breath test, BWCs shall be deactivated, turned off and removed from the area of the breath test instrument before an electronic breath test is conducted.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the use of a BWC to record the behavior of a person arrested for driving while intoxicated other than while the person is in the breath-testing area while the electronic breath testing device is being operated.  If this provision requires de-activation of a BWC, the officer shall narrate the reasons for de-activation (e.g., “I am de-activating the BWC because the suspect is about to take a breath test. ”), and the BWC shall be re- activated when safe and practicable to do so following the completion of the breath testing operation.  7.6
[directive] Identification Index Interstate or NCIC/CCH an making by history criminal defendant's verification.  fingerprint require not does that Indictment. or Arrest  Before Prepared Complaints  4.10  a against complaint a issue to prosecutor decides a when instances be may There a to respond may example, For police indicted. or arrested been yet not has who defendant committed, been had violence offense domestic a that determine and incident violence domestic and arrested not was and therefore arrived police the before premises the left suspect the that but N.J.S.A. (4), to 2C:25-21(a)(1)
[brief] The Trial Court’s construction of the contract fails to give Paragraph 23 a rational meaning and renders the provision meaningless, useless and inexplicable.  By holding that the term “may” rendered the provision completely permissive the Court essentially held that the provision is meaningless.  Although the provision is entitled “Dispute Resolution”, the parties could only go to arbitration to have their disputes resolved pursuant to its terms only if they both subsequently agreed.  Then why have the provision?  They don’t need the provision to arbitrate if they both must subsequently agree to do so.  This construction clearly ignores the probable intent of the parties, the rational meaning of its provision and the provision’s purpose.
[brief] [...] is the third largest municipality in the State serving approximately 160,000 residents, 21% of whom are below the poverty line.  The average median income per capita is approximately $22,000, the average household income is approximately $47,373.  In contrast, most of the Fire Officers earn in excess of $120,000 per year, and some earn $243,000 per year (the highest paid employees of the City).  Thus, the Fire Officers earn approximately five times what the average City taxpayer earns per year.  Fire Officers work approximately twenty-five years, at which time they are eligible to retire and receive 65% of their pay until death, as well as generous health benefits for themselves and their families.  Although the Union is dissatisfied with the result, it has no legitimate grounds to attack the Award, and instead makes flimsy arguments that are defeated by a cursory review of the record and the applicable law.  The Union argues that [...]’s fifty-five-page analysis was insufficient explanation of his ruling.  However, the fifty-five-page analysis is painstakingly detailed.  The Union is just upset that the Arbitrator awarded what the City could afford.  Contrary to all applicable law, the Union also argues that the Arbitrator should not have rejected its revised final offer submitted after the Arbitrator had already taken testimony that sought to add a myriad of additional contract changes.  Apparently, the Union does not understand that a final offer is just that: final as [...]’s decision should remain.
[brief] So too here: while [...] has never hidden the fact that its custodian could physically retrieve the emails, that does not obviate [...] of his obligation to identify with specificity the records he seeks.  Otherwise, a request for “all emails to or from” a government employee—which is necessarily also a request for correspondence, draft letters and retainer agreements, contracts, settlement agreements, and any number of other possible email attachments—bears a striking resemblance to one for the entire drawer of a filing cabinet, or even an entire “project file”—which this court has explicitly deemed inappropriate.
[brief] “The Court noted that at times [...] was getting rather agitated.  He was adamant in his position that this was his property and he just wanted to get his point out.  Sometimes even if that meant his answers were not necessarily responsive to the question. ”  4T11:18-23.  The court gave significant weight to the testimony provided by Defendant’s expert, which included testimony regarding the 1967 unrecorded subdivision, despite its lack of reliability under the Recording Act.
[directive] The BWC shall remain activated until the encounter has fully concluded and the officer leaves the scene and shall not be deactivated based on a request by a person who is the subject of the call for service related to a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15, or for any other reason.  5.5  Special Activation Rules Governing Certain Use-of-Force Incidents, In-Custody Deaths, and Other Exigent Circumstances Where Officers Are in Danger.
[brief] For example, although he concluded that certain journal entries were made for the purpose of diverting funds, he conceded he could not tell what the purpose of the entries was.  10T25:6-23.  He found fault in the [...] overpayment accounts but admitted he did not know for a fact what the purpose of the accounts was, 10T26:12-20, and did not know for a fact that the [...] customer overpayment account was used to divert money.
[brief] See Matter of Orlando, 104 N.J.  344, 350 (N.J. 1986) (“Attorneys must recognize that part of their responsibility to the legal system is the maintenance and supervision of accounting records.  There can be no excuse for inadequate record keeping particularly in light of the technological and relatively inexpensive means available today. ”); Nardella Chong, P.A. v. Medmarc Cas. Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 941, 943 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that “management of trust accounts is a professional service customarily performed by attorneys”); Lombardi, Walsh, Wakeman, Harrison, Amodeo & Davenport P.C. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 85 A.D.3d 1291, 1294 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“As required by the ethical rules, attorneys ordinarily maintain accounts with client funds and transfer those funds at the client’s request.  Thus, when dealing with [the trust account], plaintiff was performing legal services as defined by the policy. ”); O’Brien & Wolf, L.L.P. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., No. 11-3748 (JNE/SER), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109089, at *16 (D. Minn. Aug. 3, 2012) (holding that “managing a client trust account creates a fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and client that clearly falls within an attorney’s ‘professional legal services’”).
[brief] Docket No. [...]  On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division – Civil Part Monmouth County  Heard Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. [...], Esq. (035861999)  [...]  Of Counsel and on the Brief  Dear Honorable Judges:  Please be advised that this law firm represents the plaintiffs/appellants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] in the above matter.  As such, please accept this letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief in reply to defendants/respondents’ [...], and [...]’s opposition to plaintiffs/appellants’ appeal brief.
[brief] The Court discussed [...] and her use of the racial slur, nigger (N word).  The Trial Court was provided with video footage of [...] using the racial slur in her class in May of 2019, however, it appears that the Trial Court failed to review this video footage.  The Appellant noted in motion papers that [...] used the racial slur on two separate occasions which were in January and May of 2019.  The Respondents deliberately and erroneously claimed that there was only one incident of use of the racial slur which was in January of 2019 and the Court appeared to adopt this despite evidence presented by the Appellant that [...] engaged in use of the racial slur in May 2019.  (Pa409, Video Footage)  The fact that Appellant along with [...] met with the students who were upset about the use of the racial slur by [...] in May of 2019 was discounted by the Court despite evidence that supported Appellant’s position.
[brief] ” (2T:12).  In summary, the Court found “there is no nexus between the use of the automobile and the injuries that have subsequently occurred and that the car was not being operated at the time of the injury. ” (2T12-13).  The Court entered Orders reflecting its rulings on January 10, 2024 (Pa 166, Pa 172).  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, on February 7, 2024, appealing the November 9, 2023 Order denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; January 10, 2024 Order granting the Defendant [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration; and January 10, 2024 Order denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Pa 174).
[brief] To the contrary, he testified that there could have been incidents in 2009 when he had to tackle suspects and, in fact, “[t]hat could have been anybody. ” (1T54:22-24).  When asked if he recalled any incident in 2009 when he fell and hit his head, he responded “[n]ot off the top of my head, no. ” (1T55:25-56:3).  He could not recall whether he got in any fights in 2009 while working as a police officer, adding “I was active”, indicating it was possible, and when asked if he had any neck or back injuries, any time off from work or any physical therapy in 2009, he responded each time, “Not that I can recall. ” (1T55:4-20).  In contrast, when Petitioner was asked if he recalled what his previous X-Rays and MRIs showed, he definitively testified, “Absolutely not. ” (1T26:21-23).  The testimony of [...] and Petitioner demonstrate that critical findings of the ALJ were based on incorrect assumptions.
[brief] That proposal included a renovation of the parking lot based in part on traffic demand and parking demand studies conducted by the engineering firm (Pa130-Pa183).  During the discovery period of this litigation, a site evaluation of the newly designed parking lot was conducted by [...], P.E., PTOE (Certified Professional Traffic Operations Engineer) of the [...].  The evaluation was conducted, to determine if the parking lot was designed in compliance with generally accepted engineering standards and practices for parking lot design, and whether any design deficiencies cause or contributed to the accident.  (Da18, §1.1 Purpose).  Per the report, the parking lot is an approximate 350' x 500' rectangle of interconnecting drive aisles forming T-Intersections consistent with generally accepted engineering design best practices.  (Da20-Da24, §1.4 Incident Site Location, §1.5 Site Visit by McLaren, §2.1 and §2.1.1, Parking Lot Layout).  The engineering standard for all traffic control devices installed on streets/highways is set forth in the U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD") which has been adopted by the State of New Jersey.  However, specifically excluded from MUTCD applicability are parking areas and driving aisles within parking lots (Da22-24, §2.1 & 2.1.1 Parking Lot Layout).
[brief] Comer, 249 N.J. at 399; id. at 403 (warning against the “unacceptable likelihood…that the brutal nature of an offense can overpower mitigating arguments based on youth. ”) (quoting *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 573) (internal quotations omitted).  The resentencing court should have applied and given heavy weight to *Miller* factor one because [...] was no different from other teenagers in this respect.
[brief] See, Scheps v. Twp. of Delran, Docket No. A-0142-18T3, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 18111 (App. Div. Aug. 23, 2019), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 544 (2020).  Specifically, Plaintiff cites to this matter for the proposition that “it was up to the jury to determine whether the pothole was a dangerous condition. ”  Pl. Brief, p. 9.  Notably, the plaintiff’s liability expert in Scheps opined the pothole violated the standards of the American Society of Testing Materials and the New Jersey Department of Transportation.  Scheps, 2019 N. J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 18111 at *3.  However, applicable to Plaintiff here are the standards enunciated by the TCA, which all record evidence demonstrates Plaintiff failed to do.  Moreover, it is well-settled the question of whether a dangerous condition exists in certain circumstances “must be resolved by the courts as a matter of law, in order that the ‘legislatively-decreed restrictive approach to liability is enforced.
[brief] IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ PROTECTIVE ORDER PROHIBITING ANY DISCOVERY OF THE MISSING RECORDS**  In the absence of a thorough search conducted by the records custodian, Plaintiffs sought on 12/16/22 to take discovery of [...] in general and [...] in particular.  In error, this request was denied and further discovery prohibited, and Defendants’ requested protective order as to the deposition of [...] was granted.  While Defendants have contended that Plaintiffs’ motions for the purpose of discovery have been put forth in bad faith, in a burdensome and harassing manner, they ignore the simple fact that the pursuit would not be necessary if [...] conducted a search in good faith of the records they were compelled to deliver.  Protracting the discovery period in an OPRA case is not permissible *absent legitimate need.*  MAG  Entm’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 552 (App. Div. 2005).  In this case, Plaintiffs have no alternative but to compel a deposition of [...] for his failure to properly conduct the requisite search, given that three court orders to provide the records have thus been ignored or otherwise unfulfilled.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Law enforcement officers should treat threats and acts of intimidation with sensitivity and concern.  Officers should respond to and investigate these reports promptly.  It is recommended that a written report be prepared when warranted upon a victim or witness complaining of intimidation and the victim be referred to the County Victim-Witness Coordinator.  A written report may serve to document a pattern of intimidation that may be used at trial or at sentencing.  It is recommended that Section A-2 above be included in the aforementioned recommended standard operating procedure (s.o.p.) entitled the "Victim Information Process" at the local agency level.
[brief] *See N.J.S.A. 42:2C-11(g); Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp.*, 143 N.J. 168, 181 (1996).  Thus, it is far easier for members in closely held entities to establish a special injury than in much larger entities.  In *Small v. Goldman*, 637 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 (D.N.J. 1986), [...], applying state law, held that a plaintiff had an individual cause of action (rather than just a derivative claim) arising out of a conspiracy by directors to compel the sale of the plaintiff’s shares below value – a situation very similar to that alleged by the Plaintiffs here.
[brief] [...] was always a difficult, and sometimes toxic, personality.  Although [...] completed his assigned tasks, he incessantly whined about [...]’s directors and managers, because he “didn’t like to be told what to do. ” (Pa357 at 59:11-60:23; These petty gripes were about his colleagues, his supervisor, managers and the hospital more broadly—indeed, just about anyone he interacted with.  (Pa103 at 75:15-76:4; Pa232 at 27:2-5).  [...], who always believed he knew better than others, would constantly complain about [...] management.  (Pa357 at 60:8-15).  Moreover, [...] exhibited behavior that was “difficult in the office,” including his frequent bickering with [...] and his constant boasting as to his workplace accomplishments.  (Pa355 at 52:5-14).  [...] would consistently refer to the other staffing coordinators as “lazy” and he “tried to make his persona that he was doing more than like what they were doing and he was the, you know, he was the greatest back stabber. ” (Pa358 at 63:3-8).  [...] also regularly made inappropriate comments about his sexual relationship with his wife and comments related to his divorce.  (Pa357 at 60:4-6).  In addition, [...] would make “very inappropriate,” personal comments directly to other staffing coordinators, once even suggesting that [...] should have let her daughter, who suffered from, and struggled with, addiction, “just die. ” (Pa288 at 40:3-13; Pa289 at 41:10-18).  [...] would also inappropriately “touch people at work. ” (Pa289 at 42:8-22).  [...] complained about having to work during the COVID-19 pandemic.
[brief] ” (Resp. Br. 10).  But [...] does not challenge the legitimacy of the foreclosure and does not seek to reopen or reverse it.  She merely seeks just compensation for her equity interest in the property that the City took.  In this sense it is no different from *Tyler* itself, in which the plaintiff sought compensation for an already-finalized foreclosure.  See *Tyler v. Hennepin County*, 598 U.S. 631, 635 (2023); see also *Hall v. Meisner*, 51 F.4th 185 (6th Cir. 2022) (cited approvingly in *Tyler*, 598 U.S. at 638) (ruling for plaintiff on a takings claim filed after a final foreclosure judgment).  Likewise, in *Harrison v. Montgomery County*, 997 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2021), the plaintiff filed a takings claim after her property had been foreclosed by the county’s board of revision.  *Id.* at 647.  The county argued that the claim should be precluded because the plaintiff could have raised it as a defense in the board proceedings.  *Id.* at 650.  Although the foreclosure was a “state-court judgment” for purposes of Ohio claim preclusion law, *id.* at 648, the Sixth Circuit rejected the County’s preclusion argument because the takings claim did not become ripe until the Board’s final decision.  *Id.* at 650.  The *Harrison* court also rejected the county’s arguments under the Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341) and the doctrine of comity.  *Id.* at 651–52.  The case was distinct from the underlying foreclosure action because, as here, it challenged only the government’s “extinguishment of [] surplus equity—not its foreclosure of tax-delinquent property[.]”  *Id.* at 652.  The taking here occurred when the City failed to compensate [...] for her equity interest following the judgment of foreclosure.  See *Knick v. Township of Scott*, 588 U.S. 180, 189 (2019) (a takings claim exists “as soon as a government takes [] property for public use without paying for it. ”).  This case was already filed and pending when *Tyler* was decided, and therefore requires only pipeline retroactivity to succeed.
[brief] First, as set forth previously, the trial court was correct in finding that Defendant failed to present sufficient, credible evidence to dispute personal service in 2015.  Second, the trial court’s determination that Defendant’s actual knowledge of the Judgment precluded Defendant from moving to vacate the Judgment three years later was correct for multiple reasons.  Here, Defendant never certified that he was not personally served in 2015.  He simply certified that the Affidavits of Service identified service upon him at his business location and residence at the same time.  He did not dispute being the individual described in the Affidavits of Service.  Although Defendant did not specify lack of service as a defense – only “defective affidavits of service” – our courts’ application of laches to the type of delay exhibited by Defendant is consistent with the trial court’s reasoning.  Consistent with the trial court’s reasoning, Defendant should be estopped from challenging the Judgment three (3) years after Defendant’s admitted, actual knowledge of the Judgment.
[brief] As will be shown herein, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, and by refusing to compel Defendant to provide an accounting, as required of an administrator pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2, in addition to the requirement that a trustee promptly respond to a beneficiary’s request for information related to the administration of a trust.  To date, Defendant has merely accounted solely for the assets that existed on the date he was appointed.  Such initial asset listing is neither a complete listing of his receipts of principal, nor is it an accounting of his actions or of the sale or other transfer of said assets, as required by a fiduciary, as well as an entitlement of the beneficiaries.  Significantly, Defendant has steadfastly refused to provide any information as to the disposition of the Decedent’s tangible personal property, or of any cash or securities that came into his possession, including, but not limited to, the sales proceeds of the Decedent’s home in Englewood, New Jersey.  This is particularly disturbing given Defendant’s representations to the trial court that “there is nothing in the estate. ”  1T8:3–5.  Moreover, both of the beneficiaries of this Estate and Trust have made statements that there are personal assets belonging to them located in the Decedent’s home at the time of her death that are missing.  Whether any of those assets are either still held in the Estate, or were sold along with other Estate assets, this can only be determined by Defendant providing an accounting of his actions after his appointment.  Despite all of the unanswered questions raised by Defendant’s filings with the trial court, the court focused its decision on the [...] memorabilia collection, owned by Plaintiff – an issue raised by Defendant in his opposition to the order to show cause application – in order to distract the trial court from Defendant’s own failure to provide the beneficiaries with information about the disposition of the assets in the Estate and Trust.  This action was brought to compel an accounting of the assets that came into Defendant’s hands and the disposition of those assets – not of assets that do not belong to the Estate or Trust.
[brief] There is no requirement for “magic words” to be stated when the record is abundantly clear that the Board’s Attorney was not going to permit testimony or cross-examination on the issues intended to be raised by Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs were not going to make a circus out of the proceedings and proceed to call up each of Applicant’s witnesses, some of whom weren’t even presented and is unclear if they were present that night, to cross-examine and be denied.
[brief] The common knowledge exception has been found in a variety of contexts as our courts recognize that basic principles of negligence law routinely call for lay jurors to evaluate if a defendant's conduct was unreasonable.  Those basic notions of reasonable behavior do not inexorably require an expert witness to testify about standards of care, particularly in cases that do not involve suit against a licensed professional covered by the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to 2A:53A-29.  See Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 (2001).
[brief] To properly allege such claim, however, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to meet the four-pronged test set forth in *Bright v. Westmoreland County*, 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006): (1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discreet class subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.