ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Staying of the litigation until completion of the arbitration is the course taken by the courts throughout New Jersey and throughout the United States.  It avoids piecemeal litigation of common issues of law and fact.  *Cavallo v. Uber Techs, Inc.*, U.S.D.C.N.J. May 31, 2017 Pa 130-148; *Lanier v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, U.S.D.C.Ca. May 11, 2016, Pa 150-156; *Holdbrook Pediatric Dental, LLC v. Pro Computer Serv., LLC*, U.S.D.C.N.J. July 21, 2015 Pa 158-169; *Taylor v. Jimenez*, UNN-L2025-23 Law Div. July 27, 2022 Pa 191-192; *Bell v. Uber*, ESX-L-1603-23 Law Div. Oct. 19, 2023 Pa 194-195; *Annum v. Santana*, MID-L-6170-22 Law Div. Nov. 3, 2023 Pa 197; *Ronceros v Segura-Diaz*, ESX-L-1701-23 Law Div. Nov. 8, 2023 Pa 199-192; *Dukes v. Weiss*, ESX-L-7297-23 Law Div. undated Pa 205-206; *Siperavage v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, U.S.D.C.N.J. June 20, 2021 Pa 208-223; *Williamson v. Alexander*, S.C.N.Y. Kings County July 27, 2022 Pa 227-241; *Smith v. Khosrowshahi*, U.S.D.C.Pa. Dec 7, 2020 Pa 258-260].
[brief] 5  I.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND THE RELIEF SOUGHT ..............................................................................................................  5  II.  THE DEMANDS OF DEFENDANT REGARDING MORTGAGE  ASSIGNMENTS MUST BE DENIED UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL .........................................................................................................................  7  III.  THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING DEFENDANT’S DEMAND TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO PRODUCE A STATEMENT PER NJ CHAPTER 225 LAW.  ..................................................  10  IV.  THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING DEFENDANT’S DEMAND TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO PRODUCE AN ASSIGNMENT .........................................................................................................................  11  V.  A JUDGE HAS BROAD DISCRETION TO MANAGE HIS COURTROOM .................................................................................................................................  12  VI.  THE SUPERIOR COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT ..................................................................................................................  14  VII.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY NOT DISMISSING THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT...........................................................................  16  VIII.  THE FORECLOSURE OF DEFENDANT’S MORTGAGE DID NOT VIOLATE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.................................  17  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................
[brief] [...]’s reliance on the 1892 Resolution is misplaced.  [...] seeks to take refuge in a municipal resolution promulgated over 130 years ago at the dawn of electricity transmission and distribution (the “1892 Resolution”) intended to codify the nascent relationship between [...] and [...]’s predecessor, [...] (“[...]”).  (Db37).  By that 1892 Resolution, [...] granted consent to [...] to use the public right of way to construct utility poles.  [...] asserts that the 1892 Resolution expressly reserves the right for [...] to impose “prudential rules and regulations” on [...] as well as its successors and assigns, including [...]. (Db37).  According to [...], the 1892 Resolution is the putative legal basis for its 2022 Ordinance purporting to regulate the height and specifications of utility poles on the public right of way in the Town.  [...]’s reliance on the 1892 Resolution is misplaced.
[directive] Witnesses to the above aforementioned crimes and homicide and sudden death survivors are also entitled to the rights and services contained herein, as applicable.  The Advisory Committee recognized that the Standards will place an increased burden on law enforcement agencies and that existing resources are limited.  Therefore, priority shall be given to victims and witnesses of personal crime in rendering the rights and services contained herein.  Victims of property crimes shall receive the prescribed services as contained herein, as feasible.  These Standards are to be reviewed annually so that necessary amendments can be made to ensure that the continued acceleration of enhanced services be provided to crime victims.
[brief] The amendment was tantamount to a motion to amend the final judgment and beyond the time for relief from the final judgment of proper exercise of eminent domain.  The court erroneously allowed relief despite that the applicable time limits had passed.  The court indicated that the owner had sufficient time to obtain an amended report.  Title to the easement, as described, had already transferred to plaintiff, and the owner suffered undue prejudice as the permitted amendment also negated the expert reports he obtained in anticipation of the scheduled trial.  In *State v. Applegate*, et. al., 107 N.J. Super. 159,163 (App. Div. 1969) the defendant property owner contested an amendment to the description of an easement taking.
[brief] To summarize, the Arbitrator determined the following EGPs applied to both the Backlog\(^6\) and non-Backlog projects:  --- \(^6\)  [...] does not dispute the EGPs for the Backlog Projects, as those were agreed to by the parties.  Da88.  [...]’s position as to any unpaid EGP for the two Backlog Projects at issue was that any remaining EGP payments [...] owed [...] was exceeded by the preconstruction expenses [...] owed [...] (and which [...] was awarded by the Arbitrator).  Da137.  | Backlog Project | EGP Agreed to By Parties | |-----------------|--------------------------| | Bayonne 1 | $2,287,259.00 | | Park Ridge | $2,558,823.00 | | Non-Backlog Project | EGP Alleged by [...] and Accepted by the Arbitrator | |---------------------|--------------------------------------------------| | Englewood | $2,700,000.00 | | NJCU II | $2,984,202.00 | | E’Port | $1,247,401.00 | | St. Peter’s Dorm | $2,784,288.00 | | St. Lucy’s Shelter | $565,701.04 | | Barclay Street | $1,254,739.00 | | Miller St. (Phase II)| $122,000.00 | | Park Ridge B&M | $8,000.00 | | F. Douglass Park | $53,000.00 | | Bayonne 3 | $2,670,000.00 | Da137-139; Da276.
[brief] The MS4 permits require the municipal permittees to take actions relating to TMDLs.  See New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Tier A Municipal Stormwater General Permit (January 18, 2024 11:15AM), https://dep.nj.gov/njpdes-stormwater/municipal-stormwater-regulation-program/tier_a/.  Through the MS4 program, municipalities reduce discharges of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable to protect water quality and satisfy applicable water quality requirements.  N.J.A.C. 7:14A-25.6(a).
[brief] On March 14, 2023, the NJDEP’s Office of Legal Affairs denied Appellant’s third-party adjudicatory hearing request for the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification.  (Aa0132-Aa0136).  NJDEP concluded that Appellant did not file a timely request with regard to the 2017 WFD Permit, lacked standing because Appellant did not have a statutory right to a hearing, and failed to demonstrate a "particularized property interest of constitutional significance that [was] directly affected by [DEP's] permitting decision” establishing a right to a hearing.  (Aa0132-Aa0136).  NJDEP also confirmed that, even if Appellant had standing, Appellants’ objections were meritless because NJDEP found that [...]’s dock does not pose a hazard to navigation, minimized impacts to shellfish habitat to the maximum extent practicable, and complied with the required depths for the submerged aquatic vegetation habitat rule.  (Aa0132-Aa0136).  NJDEP determined that there is adequate room to navigate.  (Aa0135).  On April 28, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division challenging the March 14, 2023 final decision of the NJDEP Commissioner denying Appellant’s third-party adjudicatory hearing request only.
[directive] POLICE OFFICER HANDLER - POLICE SPECIALTY DOG TEAM TRAINING  2.1  OBEDIENCE Goal:  The police specialty dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to obey basic obedience commands.  2.1.1  The police specialty dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to respond appropriately to basic commands: "come", "sit".  2.1.2  The police specialty dog will demonstrate the ability, on and off lead, to move through groups of people in a non-aggressive manner, displaying a tolerance for people (socialization).  27 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements
[brief] BECAUSE HE DID NOT SEEK ADMISSION TO RECOVERY COURT ON A CONVICTION FOR A FIREARMS OFFENSE AND HE DID NOT HAVE A PENDING FIREARMS CHARGE AT THE TIME HIS RECOVERY COURT APPLICATION WAS CONSIDERED.  .................................................................1  A.  The Plain Language And Structure Of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 Make Clear That Subsection (a)(5) Bars Only Defendants Who Seek Admission To Recovery Court On A Firearms Conviction Or Who Have A Separate Pending Firearms Charge.
[brief] THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT DETERMINE THE POST- NEW JERSEY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE ......................................................................................... | 7 | | II.  [...] FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TO AWARD POST JUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE CONTRACT RATE .................................................. | 9 | | III.  THE SHERIFF’S NOTICES OF SALE DID NOT STATE THE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFF’S JUDGMENT (Da188; T27-5 to 28-4)  ......................................................................................... | 12 | | IV.  THE REQUIREMENT IN THE SECOND STAY PENDING THE FILING OF DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL ORDER THAT THE [...] POST A SUPERSEDEAS BOND IN ONE BUSINESS DAY WAS MANIFESTLY UNREASONABLE (Da210)  ........ | 15 | | V. PLAINTIFF HAS WITHDRAWN ITS CROSS-APPEAL .................................... | 15 | | CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ | 16 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Avatar Capital Finance, LLC v. Nassau Marina Holdings, LLC,** | | | 2022 WL 1495919 (App. Div. May 12, 2022) | 8, 10, 11 | | **Brinkley v. Western World, Inc.,** | | | 281 N.J. Super. 124 (Ch. Div. 1995), aff’d, 292 N.J. Super 134 | 9 | | (App. Div. 1996) | | | **Brookshire Equities, LLC v. Montaquiza,** | | | 346 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 2002) | 14 | | **Burger v. Dumas,** | | | 25 N.J. Super. 473 (Law Div. 1953) | 15 | | **Crane v. Bielski,** | | | 15 N.J. 342 (1954) | 14 | | **Fidelity Union Bank v. Trim,** | | | 210 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1986) | 14 | | **Frugis v. Bracigliano,** | | | 177 N.J. 250 (2003) | 14 | | **Habick v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,** | | | 320 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1999) | 8 | | **Hardyston National Bank v. Tartamella,** | | | 56 N.J. 508 (1970) | 12 | | **Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Hampton Gardens Ltd.,** | | | 88 N.J. 16 (1981) | 9 | | **Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi,** | | | 303 N.J. 239 (App. Div. 1997) | 9 | | **K.V.H. v. W.S.H.,** | | | 2018 WL 4623385 (App. Div. Sept. 27, 2018) | 8 | Little Falls Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Chas. O. Holmberg & Sons, Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 93 (Ch. Div. 1978) .................................................................12 Morsemere Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Nicolaou, 206 N.J. Super. 637 (App. Div. 1986)..............................................................12 Orange Land Co. v. Bender, 96 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1967)...............................................................14 Realty Asset Properties, Ltd., v. Oldham, 356 N.J. Super. 16 (App. Div. 2002)...............................................................8 In re Ryker, 301 B.R. 156 (D.N.J. 2003).............................................................................15 Shadow Lawn Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Palmarozza, 190 N.J. Super. 314 (App. Div. 1983)...............................................................8
[directive] Any reasonable accommodation, such No performance evaluation impact or as avoiding assigning a pregnant officer to certain tasks, measures concerning firearms qualification or firearms generally, or otherwise accommodating the officer, shall not have a negative impact on the pregnant officer’s performance evaluation, nor shall the officer be penalized for requesting or using an accommodation.  2  The terms “pregnancy or breastfeeding” are defined as in N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(s).  References in these Guidelines to pregnant officers also include breastfeeding officers, where applicable.  3  The term “modified duty” refers to a temporary status performing work or tasks less than those of full duty.  Examples of modified duty assignments at law enforcement agencies include clerical functions and interviewing persons (see Section V.C for additional examples).  4  See Delanoy v. Township of Ocean, 245 N.J. 384, 407-9 (2021).  Under the LAD, an officer’s inability to perform an essential function of the job does not, in and of itself, cause an accommodation for a pregnancy-related condition to pose an undue hardship on the agency.  Id. 2  II.
[brief] A.  Model Jury Charges Ensure that Jurors Receive Accurate Instructions, Particularly With Respect to Evidence Like Fingerprint Comparison Testimony that Presents Complex Scientific Issues.  “Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. ”  State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988).  “The charge must provide a ‘comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find. ’”  Id. (citation omitted).  “It is the independent duty of the court to ensure that the jurors receive accurate instructions .  . . .”  State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004).  The court must “not rely on jurors to divine rules themselves or glean them from cross-examination or summation. ”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 296.  Rather, “[e]ven with matters that may be considered intuitive,” the court must “provide focused jury instructions” in order to “help jurors evaluate evidence critically and objectively to ensure a fair trial. ”  Id. at 296-97.  Model jury charges are “helpful to trial courts performing this important function. ”  Concepcion, 111 N.J. at 379.  “[E]rroneous instructions on material issues are presumed to be reversible error. ”  Reddish, 181 N.J. at 613 (quoting State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 359 (2002)).  “[W]hen a jury instruction follows the model charge, although ‘not determinative, it is a persuasive argument in favor of the charge as delivered.
[brief] Plaintiff’s fall was due to ice which accumulated during an active winter storm  After the painting work was complete, [...] did not receive complaints about the steps.  (Pa451, 17:8-11).  Meanwhile, Plaintiff testified that after the stairs were painted, but before the incident, he used the steps approximately four times per day and did not have any issue or difficulty walking on same.  (Pa330, 18:25-19:16).  Prior to the incident, the Plaintiff did not complain to anyone at the condominium association about the condition of the stairs.  (Pa329, 16:25-17:4).  The Plaintiff alleges that he slipped and fell on January 5, 2022 at approximately 7:30 a.m. on the stairs outside of his [...] condo.  (Pa315).
[brief] and N.J.,** | 17 | | 132 N.J. 76 (1993) | | | **Miller v. New Jersey,** | 35 | | 144 Fed. Appx. 926 (3d Cir. 2005) | | | **Nardello v. Township of Voorhees,** | 27, 28 | | 377 N.J. Super. 428 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP,** | 17 | | 187 N.J. 353 (2006) | | | **Nead v. Union County Educ. Services Com’n,** | 24 | | 2011 WL 166245 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 20, 2011) | | | **O’Keefe v. State,** | 28 | | 2007 WL 1975603 (N.J. App. Div., July 10, 2007) | | Prager v. Joyce Honda, Inc., 447 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2016) .................................................................25 Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) .........................................................................................16
[brief] Plaintiff took a permanent 3,334 square feet easement within the property which easement included the right to maintain and replace the proposed seawall.  (Da56-58)  Amendment to Complaint  Plaintiff filed its complaint on September 15, 2018.  (Da1)  The metes and bounds description of the easement taking in the complaint identified the starting point of the taking as 117.65 feet from the intersection of Ocean Avenue and the Valentine Street right of way along the owner’s south property line.  (Da11)  The map attached to the complaint depicted the easement.  (Da13)  The map was not based on a boundary survey.  (Da13, Note 3)
[brief] [124 N.J. at 635-36).  “The general rule is that ‘in cases where there is a danger of a fragmented verdict the trial court must upon request offer a specific unanimity instruction. ’”  *State v. Cagno*, 211 N.J. 488, 516-18 (2012) (quoting *Frisby*, 174 N.J. at 597-98).  First, as defendant concedes, he did not request such an instruction at trial.  Further, as noted, the court instructed the jury pursuant to the presumptively proper Model Jury Charge on conspiracy.  See R.B., 183 N.J. at 325.  Nonetheless, the self-evident nature and linear timeline of the events allowed no danger of a fragmented verdict.  The court enumerated six possible overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy: (1) defendant solicited [...] to fight [...]; (2) defendant, [...], and/or [...] went to confront [...] together; (3) defendant called [...] out of the house to be assaulted; (4) [...] and/or [...] assaulted [...] and caused significant bodily injury to him; (5) defendant told [...] to pick up [...] and/or [...] after the fight; and (6) defendant paid [...] and/or [...] to assault [...].  (13T194-5 to 17).  The events in this case do not resemble the “very complex” set of facts Parker sought to clarify for the jury.  See Frisby, 174 N.J. at 197 (quoting Parker, 124 N.J. at 635-36).  Nor does the record contain competing theories of guilt, contradictory evidence, or differences between the indictment and trial proofs.  See ibid.  This case deals with a simple set of facts which the jury accepted.  The court thoroughly explained its role and the option for the jury to submit any clarifying questions, yet no such questions ever came.  In under two hours, the jury returned a guilty verdict.  Thus, there is no evidence of jury confusion at all, let alone the “strong evidence” which Parker cautioned against.  See ibid.  The overt act instruction, drawn directly from the Model Jury Charge, risked no jury confusion and did not require a specific unanimity instruction.
[brief] ”  Pa57.  The trial court found that the redevelopment payment was used by the City to effectuate and defray costs of improvement in the area and furthered the objectives and terms of the Redevelopment Plan.  Pa58.  With regard to Count II of the FAC and Plaintiff’s contention that its consent was required in order to amend the Redevelopment Plan, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff was no longer a designated developer under the Redevelopment Plan at the time of the amendment because Plaintiff had long since completed its project.
[brief] Pa119.  One of the projects that was transferred to [...] under the PTA was a project known as [...] (the “Hackensack Project”).  Pa123.  Pursuant to a contract dated June 1, 2019, [...] became [...]’s completion subcontractor, essentially assuming responsibility to complete the then incomplete work under [...]’s prime contract with the owner of the Hackensack Project (the “Hackensack Subcontract”).
[brief] *Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State of N.J., Dep't of Transp.*, 371 N.J. Super. 304, 313-14 (App. Div. 2014).  “Where the terms of a contract and clear and unambiguous there is no room for interpretation or construction and [courts] must enforce those terms as written. ”  *Kutzin v. Pirnie*, 124 N.J. 500, 507 (1991) (citation omitted).  “If the terms of a contract are clear, [courts] must enforce the contract as written and not make a better contract for either party."  *Graziano v. Grant*, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div. 1999).  Here, the language of the NDA is clear.
[brief] Specifically, the following exchange occurred:  [...]:  The other question is about the traffic light.  Whether it's a good configuration or not you keep talking about this traffic light at Renaissance at Boulevard.  That is not a sure thing.  You said it's under consideration.  It's a proposal at the D.O.T.  They may turn it down.  They have turned it down in the past because they said it's – our boulevard, Renaissance Boulevard, is too close to Twin Rivers intersection and they wouldn't put in a traffic light there.  And now you're keep on talking about the benefit of a traffic light for us and it's just a proposal by you, it's not a sure thing.  And I just want to clarify that.  Am I correct?  [...]:  Yes, it is proposal, but let me just clarify.  Renaissance Boulevard itself does not generate enough traffic to warrant the installation of a traffic signal.  The combination of traffic from both sides of Route 33 would meet the criteria as a candidate for a traffic signal.  And then from there we would go into more detailed designs and analysis for their consideration.  [...]:  Okay.  Because the last time we asked about it the State D.O.T. said to us it had nothing to do with the amount of traffic, it was the distance between Twin Rivers and our development that they didn't want to put a traffic light between Twin Rivers and Applegarth.  So I just want to point that out.  You keep on talking about a traffic light.  Regardless of the configuration of it, it may be not be approved anyway.  So I just wanted to clarify that.
[brief] On appeal, a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed under the same standards as the trial court.  1707 Realty, LLC v. Revolution Architecture, LLC, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1303, *17 (App. Div. July 19, 2022)⁴ (citing, Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005)).  Where the decision being appealed is based on equitable principles, the trial court’s findings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] On behalf of Plaintiff, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) entered into and signed a Retainer Agreement (“Retainer”) dated March 9, 2016, with Defendants for legal services in “negotiating, preparation and execution of commercial leases for [Plaintiff].”  (Pa1272).  Defendants were retained to represent Plaintiff in connection with the negotiation of a commercial property located at [...], in [...] for a lease term of thirty-six (36) months.  (Pa0015, ¶ 5).  At all relevant times, the Property was owned by [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).  (Pa0015, ¶ 5).  A.  The Lease Litigation Negotiations  Defendants began negotiating with [...] on or about May 16, 2016, over terms for a lease agreement for the Property.  (Pa 0830,T148:3-10).  The underlying lease and associated closing documents were executed on or about July 1, 2016.  (Pa1188-Pa1261).  The negotiation between Plaintiff and [...] generated four (4) documents concerning the lease of the Property: a Lease Agreement dated July 1, 2016 (hereinafter “Lease”) (Pa1188); a Rider to the Lease Agreement dated June 30, 2016 (hereinafter “Lease Rider”) (Pa1243); an Option Agreement for the future purchase of the Property dated July 1, 2016 (Pa1247); and Guaranty of the Lease Agreement dated July 1, 2016.