ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Not 4.2.2 Accounted for in the Automated Pretrial Risk Assessment.  The automated pretrial risk-assessment process may not account for all relevant circumstances.  For example, it does not account for the fact-sensitive manner in which the present offense was committed that might suggest that the defendant is especially dangerous (e.g., the defendant inflicted more serious harm than that required to establish the elements of the charged crime; a firearms offense was not limited to “simple possession,” but rather involved possession for an unlawful purpose, or involved brandishing or pointing the firearm, thereby creating a heightened risk of violence; the offense was committed against a particularly vulnerable victim; the offense was committed in the presence of children or otherwise posed a heightened risk to children, etc.).  Nor does the automated pretrial risk-assessment process account for the strength of the case, which might suggest that the defendant would have greater incentive to avoid a likely conviction by fleeing (e.g., where the offense conduct is captured on an audio/video recording; the defendant confessed to the crime; the offense conduct was personally etc.).10 observed by a police officer; contraband was found on the person of the defendant,  Furthermore, for purposes of informing the law enforcement decision whether to issue a complaint-summons or apply for a complaint-warrant, the automated pretrial risk-assessment software does not account for a pending charge or conviction from another state, although the computer system administered by the AOC will indicate to law enforcement that out-of-state criminal history information exists with respect to the defendant.
[brief] • “Stenosis takes a long time to develop” and “the pathology was already there at C5-C6, C7. ” (3T22:2-14).  • Petitioner’s surgery was done for problems that pre-dated the accident and wasn’t caused by this accident. ” (3T22:2-14).  •  “There’s clearly pre-existing pathology, there was clearly pre-existing treatments” and the “operative surgeons saw a spinal stenosis that goes back eleven years.
[directive] FOLLOWS:  1.  You have been arrested for operating a vessel while under the 7.  Any response from you that is ambiguous or conditional, in any influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or with a blood alcohol respect, to your giving consent to the taking of breath samples will concentration at, or above, that permitted by law.  be treated as a refusal to submit to breath testing.  2.  The law requires you to submit to the taking of samples of your 8.  If a court of law finds you guilty of refusing to submit to chemical breath for the purpose of making chemical tests to determine the tests of your breath, then the court will: revoke your right to content of alcohol in your blood.  operate a power vessel or a vessel with a length of 12 feet or more for a period of no less than 1 year and no more than 10 3.  A record of the taking of the samples, including the date, time, years; revoke your license to operate a motor vehicle for a period and results, will be made.  Upon your request, a copy of that of no less than 7 months, but no more than 10 years; and require record will be made available to you.  you to complete a boat safety course before your boating privilege can be restored.
[brief] POINT  IV  Alternatively, this court must remand for resentencing, because the judge erred by imposing multiple maximum consecutive terms.  (Da 6-9)  .................................................................62  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................  65  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED Order Admitting the Defendant’s Recorded Statement......................  25T 12-3 to 6 Order Admitting [...]’s Identification....................  21T 177-22 to 25 Order Admitting [...]’s Identification..........................  24T 20-11 to 14  Judgment of Conviction and Sentence...........................................  Da 6-9 INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIRD-PARTY GUILT.  (Not Raised Below)  When the trial court instructed the jury, it erroneously failed to provide an instruction on an issue at the heart of [...]’s defense theory: third-party guilt.  As discussed, identity was the central issue in this case, but the State did not present any identifications of the shooter.  Instead, it offered inconsistent testimony from witnesses who heard the shooting and saw a man with a gun near the incident, combined with identifications of [...] as one of at least two drivers of the vehicle believed to be associated with the shooting.  As defense counsel argued in summation, the descriptions of the man on the scene – some of which described him as a tall, Black man – fit the appearance of the other known driver of the suspected vehicle, [...], a 6’2” Black man.  Given the weaknesses of the State’s case concerning the identity of the shooter, and given the significant evidence supporting the possibility that [...] could have been the shooter, the Court was required to give the jury charge on third-party guilt.  And because third-party guilt was a pivotal issue in the case, the court’s failure to provide the instruction deprived [...] of a fair trial, amounting to plain error, and requiring reversal.
[brief] The only remotely analogous scenario is in the context of a flight charge, where our Supreme Court has authorized a trial court to instruct the jury that, “[i]f you find that the defendant, fearing that an accusation or arrest would be made against (him/her) on the charge involved in the indictment, took refuge in flight for the purpose of evading the accusation or arrest on that charge, then you may consider such flight in connection with all the other evidence in the case, as an indication or proof of consciousness of guilt.
[brief] Defendant argues that traffic was a consideration in the 1999 Master Plan, and the height differentials between Florence’s SM and GM Zones was intended to reduce intensity, and therefore traffic in the SM Zone.  Db29-Db34.  Unfortunately for Defendant, the word “traffic” does not appear in the relevant portion of the Master Plan.  Ja122-Ja124.  Defendant also assumes that the differential between the heights permitted in Florence’s SM and GM Zones was a method to limit intensity of use.  But the Master Plan is also silent on height.  Id.  Defendant’s attempt to draw the conclusion that “[h]eight, clearly is an expression of ‘magnitude’” (Db32), is unsupported by the document itself and by any evidence in the record.  Defendant then discusses and quotes Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004), and argues that the differential in height between the SM and GM Zones was a method to limit intensity for the SM Zone.  Db32-Db34.  Plaintiff does not disagree with Grasso’s proposition that “[h]eight restrictions…can also be a technique for limiting the intensity of the property’s use[,]” but there is no evidence that it was intended to limit intensity and therefore traffic, in Florence’s SM Zone.  Id. at 52-53 (emphasis added).  While height can be a method for limiting intensity, there is no evidence that it is intended to limited intensity in this case, especially when the explicit language in the Master Plan does not support the Defendant’s interpretation, and where the proposed building is not even in [...].  And again, this is not a height variance case.
[directive] Under the Rule that however, (note, Section 1.6 Cf. detention. pretrial to subject are 2A:162-15 N.J.S.A. Enforcement Law General Attorney after Court Supreme the by adopted ultimately as 3:26-1, this thus and offenses, persons disorderly petty include not does issued, was 2016-6 Directive statute  Specifically, the offenses).  persons disorderly petty apply to not does Directive complaint- by charged defendants (i.e., defendants eligible of detention pretrial authorizes involving offense anon-indictable or crime indictable an with charged are who warrant)
[directive] Directive October No. 1, 9 1993 of Page 1 5  BACKGROUND is an initiative designed to reclaim and rejuvenate Weed and Seed embattled neighborhoods and communities.  Weed and Seed uses a neighborhood focused, two-part strategy to control violent crime and to provide social and economic support to communities where high crime rates and social ills are prevalent.  The initiative first removes or violent criminals and drug dealers from the neighborhoods.  Second, the initiative prevents a reinfestation of criminal activity by llseedingll the neighborhoods with public and private-services, community-based policing, and incentives for new businesses.  Weed and Seed is founded on the premise that community organizations, social service providers, and criminal justice agencies must work together with community residents to regain control and revitalize crime-ridden and drug-
[brief] First, Plaintiff’s expert report does not identify the “facts” deriving from the record evidence in the case that he relies upon (and indeed, cites several times to the allegations in the Amended Complaint, but not to any record evidence to root his report in actual facts).  In the absence of being rooted in facts of record in a case, the expert report is plainly inadmissible as a net opinion.  See Pomerantz Paper Corp., 207 N.J. at 372 (“[A]n expert’s bare opinion that has no support in factual evidence or similar data is a mere net opinion which is not admissible and may not be considered. ”); Vitrano v. Schiffman, 305 N.J. Super. 572, 577 (App. Div. 1997) (“[T]estimony lacking in factual or scientific base does not help a jury and is “worthless,” rather, the Courts require the expert to give the “why and where for his expert opinion, not just a mere conclusion. ”); Jimenez v. GNOC Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div. 1995).  Second, while Plaintiff’s expert report states that [...] “departed from the acceptable standard of care,” what is noticeable and conspicuously absent from the report is any assertion what the applicable standard of care is.  (414a).  This renders the expert report even further and facially defective, and inadmissible, as a net opinion.  See Bianchi v. Ladjen, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXI 943 (App. Div. 2018) (“when an expert does not point to written industry standards or expressly show the specific duties of a title agent he described have been widely adopted by others in this field, that report essentially amounts to an inadmissible net opinion).  For example, in his report, [...] states that [...] “departed from the acceptable standard of care by failing to properly follow the standard closing procedures with regard to the closing in a real estate transaction. ” (413a).  Notwithstanding [...] outright rejection of this claim, nowhere in his report does [...] identify what the “standard closing procedures” are in a real estate transaction.  [...] then states “it is contrary to acceptable procedures for a title company to disburse funds when it does not yet possess the property conveyancing documents” but fails to state what the “acceptable procedures” are for a title company to disburse funds.  (Id.).  Finally, the report lists a dozen “facts” without any reference to or citation to where in the record of this case they derive this “support” – and they are not based in the record evidence and Plaintiff has not even tried and completely failed to demonstrate that they are based in the factual record of this matter.  Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s claims, [...]’s report is facially and fatally deficient – *Plaintiff has not shown otherwise* – and therefore Plaintiff’s claims fail.
[brief] The present case focuses on the fourth criteria, which requires “the ordinance must be adopted in accordance with statutory and municipal procedural requirements. ”  Id at 611-12.  The Township’s 2002 Amendments to Ordinance Sec. 900B and 902A expanded the HPC’s permit review procedures beyond the scope of review authorized by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111.  See. Cox & Koenig. New Jersey and Land Use Administration (GANN, 2022), Sec. 4-1.5  Commission role with regard to permit applications.  “[M]unicipalites are not free to add to the [MLUL’s] requirements where the Legislature has utilized mandatory language. ”  Northgate Condo Ass’n v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Board, 2014 N.J. 120, 137 (2013).  Municipalities may not bypass the mandatory procedures set forth at N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111 and create their own process.  *Berardo v. City of Jersey City*, 476 N.J. Super. 341, 359 (App. Div. 2023).  The Township’s 2002 Amendments to Ordinance Sec. 900B and 902A were not authorized by the MLUL and were inconsistent with the mandatory procedures established by *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-111.
[brief] Exhibit 6 (Vibration Monitoring Data report generated 09/21/18)  ..................................................  Da191  Exhibit 7 (Post Construction Interior Inspections 05/13/19; 06/14/19)  ........................................  Da211  Exhibit 8 (Plaintiff Counsel Cover Letter filing  Defendant’s Appraisal Report by [...]  Dated 05/06/21(includes [...] of [...] dated 04/07/21)  (Filed 07/28/21)  ........................................  Da233;Da235  Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Evidence and Cross-Motion for Discovery Filed 07/28/21 ...
[brief] First, over defense objection, the State was allowed to elicit testimony from a ballistics expert that the ammunition found at the scene and in the victim was definitely fired from the gun later recovered from the home [...] entered the morning of the shooting.  This testimony was not scientifically reliable and had the highly prejudicial effect of improperly connecting the alleged murder weapon to [...].  Second, also over defense objection, the trial court limited the scope of testimony the defense sought to elicit about [...].  The defense was prohibited from informing the jury that Mason and [...] both sold heroin and that the brands of heroin they sold were different.  Instead, the jury heard only that Mason was arrested six weeks before the shooting for dealing unspecified drugs a block and a half away from the scene of the shooting.  Keeping from the jury the critical information about the kinds of drugs Mason was selling was unjustifiable and made the third-party guilt defense significantly less compelling.  Third, the jury was given a legally incorrect theory of accomplice liability for murder and was not given sufficient instructions about the State’s obligation to prove the identity of the shooter.  The State told the jury it could convict [...] of murder if he assisted [...] afterwards, a flatly incorrect statement of law.  The jury instructions did not correct that misstatement and further did not instruct the jury that the State’s burden to prove [...] was the shooter was the same high burden as the other, enumerated elements of the offense.  For each of these reasons separately and all of these reasons together, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] The balancing, however, is not simply a quantitative analysis of the number of factors, but, rather, the “proper weight to be given each is a function of its gravity in relation to the severity of the offense. ”  Id. at 368.  To provide for adequate review, “the trial court should identify the aggravating and mitigating factors, describe the balance of those factors, and explain how it determined defendant’s sentence. ”  State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 360 (1987).  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 provides an enumerated list of thirteen criteria for withholding or imposing a sentence of imprisonment.  In the New Jersey Supreme Court case of State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005), the Court excised presumptive sentences from the criminal code.
[directive] A defendant ordered to HDLE must have the ability to verify upon request that they are located at their ordered residence.  This may be done using a device capable of video calling or sending a picture through email or text message.  i.  The court shall enter into a colloquy on the record with the defendant to ascertain their ability to comply with this condition.  If the court determines the defendant will not be able to comply with this condition, the court shall not order HDLE.  ii.  If a defendant is ordered to HDLE and cannot comply with random home detention checks, the defendant’s matter must be referred to the court to modify this condition.  Upon referral, the court must determine whether the defendant is able to comply with HDLE, including that the defendant has the ability to verify that he or she is home during a random remote home detention check, and must remove or modify this condition if the court determines that the defendant is unable to comply.  A defendant who can comply but refusing will be in violation of their condition.  c.
[brief] DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal  From: Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Dkt. No. [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. [...]; [...], d/b/a [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 through 10; and XYZ CORPORATIONS 1 through 10, Defendants.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
[directive] See Section 3.7.)  By using a uniform worksheet to document the calculation, application, and balancing of appropriate facts and circumstances, this system will best ensure uniformity and will allow trial courts to review the exercise of prosecutorial discretion for arbitrariness and capriciousness by explaining exactly how the prosecutor arrived at the plea offer.  This approach will also permit the [...] to evaluate the impact of this plea negotiation system on the State Prison population, county jail populations, plea rates, and the average amount of time elapsed between arrest and the final disposition of charges.  Note that where the worksheet indicates that the prosecutor has made a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation, the worksheet must be treated as confidential for the safety of the defendant, and care must be taken not to include the worksheet in a file to which members of the public might have access.  See Appendix IC.  It is strongly recommended that the copy provided to the court be treated in the same manner as a presentence investigation report.  See State v. DeGeorge, 113 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1971) (presentence reports should not be a matter of public record).  3.2
[directive] It is also important to note what this Directive does not do.  First, the additional categories of annual disclosure contained in Section I of this Directive apply only prospectively and do not apply to any discipline that has been settled between an officer and law enforcement agency prior 2023.2 to January 1,  Second, this Directive continues to require disclosure of all major discipline on a prospective basis under Directive 2020-5, requires disclosure for certain categories of misconduct regardless of whether major discipline was imposed, and provides additional guidance regarding those disclosures.  Third, because laid out a multi-factor test, there may be some Rivera internal affairs records subject to disclosure that are not covered by this Directive’s rule.  For those exceptional cases where disclosure is warranted, especially for high-level officials in a department, agencies cannot deny a request made pursuant to the common law right of access based exclusively on the fact that it does not fall within the enumerated categories of this Directive.
[brief] Q.  Okay.  The deeds [sic] says made as of May 12th, 1972.  Do you see that?  A. I do.  Q.  What’s the – what does that mean as – A.  Yeah, well – that can mean a lot of things.  I mean it’s – it’s not all that unusual to see a deed is – is – is said to be of a certain date, and then the signature of the grantor or in this case – the representative of the grantor, the individual signing you know is – is many years later.  The signature is acknowledged as of 1989, I believe.  So, that the date of the deed.  And what – in the title insurance business this would normally be – independent of anything else would normally be considered, well this is not an arm’s length transaction.  The other one wasn’t an arm’s length transaction.  Maybe they’re just trying to correct a mistake and their lawyer has advised them that they intended to convey the strip back in 1972, and so the – you know for internal purposes – who knows; right?  That some might – some mistake was made earlier and now they’re trying to correct it.
[directive] Oversight Agency.  The law enforcement executive of each agency using an ALPR or its data shall designate an Agency ALPR Coordinator who will:  Be the external point of contact for agency ALPR-related items such as information • sharing and audits; Internally oversee the agency’s ALPR program, including training and approving • access requests (may delegate approval authority to other supervisors); Designate authorized users within the agency who can use ALPRs and access stored • data (such users must complete the trainings mandated by this Directive).
[brief] Lyons v. Jefferson Bank Trust, 994 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1993)  Db4  Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer Cnty. Inc., 171 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)  Db15  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Trop. Comm., 140 N.J. 366 (1995)  Db3  Midland Funding LLC v. Albern, 433 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 2013)  Db33  Midland v. National Bank v. Georgian, LTD, 233 N.J. Super. 621 (Law Div. 1989)  Db38  Minskoff vs. American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., 98 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1996)  Db48  Newton v. Newark Star Ledger, Docket No. [...] (App. Div. June 8, 2016)  Db10  Olson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 700 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. App. 1985)  Db4  Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1994)  Db4  Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988)  Db4  Reichert v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2008)  Db14  Ridge at Back Brook LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 99 (App. Div. 2014)  Db36  Rivera v. Gerner, 89 N.J.  526 (N.J. 1982)  Db41  Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 2008)  Db19, Db46  Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.L.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002)  Db42  Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490 (1963)  Db4  Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2007)  Db16, Db17  Schendzielos v. Silverman, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (D. Colo. 2015)  Db16  Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 1993)  Db23, Db24  Shawmut Bank Connecticut v. Conn. Limousine Serv., 40 Conn. App. 268 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)  Db30, Db31, Db32  Star Steel Supply Co. v. White, 4 Mich. App. 198 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966) Db40 State v. Bakka, 176 N.J. 533 (2003)  Db26 State v. Clark, 162 N.J. 201 (2000)  Db9  State v. McNamara, 212 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div. 1986)  Db9  State v. Polanco, 69 Conn. App. 169 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)  Db31  State v. Stubbs, 433 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 2013)  Db21  Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988)  Db14  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016)  Db19  Todd v. Weltman, Weisberg & Reis Co., 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006)  Db16  Tyler v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Co., 228 N.J. 463 (App. Div. 1988)  Db36  Underwriters Salvage Company of New York v. Davis Shaw Company, 198 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1952)  Db41  Weis-Buy Services, Inc. v. Paglia, 411 F.2d 415 (3d. Cir. 2005)  Db36  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa 1980)  Db22, Db23  Statutes: