ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ([...])  On August 20, 2023, Respondent --- 1 Civil Service Commission decision ([...]) to remove Appellant from promotion list based on alleged notice to Appellant in [...] April 19, 2023, Opposition Brief.  2  Included in the Civil Service Commission Items Comprising the Record.  3  Included in the Civil Service Commission Items Comprising the Record.  4  Included in the Civil Service Commission Items Comprising the Record.  [...] filed opposition to the Request.  ([...])  On October 11, 2023, the Respondent Commission improperly affirmed its determination that Appellant had notice of the request by [...] that she be removed from the List based on her disciplinary record and that her alleged disciplinary record required removal of her name from the Eligibility List.  ([...])  The Respondent Commission further affirmed its denial of Appellant’s request for attorneys fees.  ([...])  Appellant filed this Appeal with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, on October 12, 2023.
[brief] When employment cases, such as CEPA claims, rely on circumstantial evidence, this Court applies the McDonnell Douglas three-part burden-shifting test.  See Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 400 N.J. Super. 474, 492 (App. Div. 2008).  This test, established in *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and adopted by New Jersey courts in CEPA cases, provides a structured method for determining whether an employer’s action was motivated by retaliatory intent.  It operates in three stages: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; (2) the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action; and (3) the plaintiff must ultimately demonstrate that the reason given by the defendant is pretextual.  See Kolb, supra., 360 N.J. Super. at 478.  Plaintiff’s evidentiary burden at the *prima facie* stage is low, which acknowledges that requiring greater proof would prevent a plaintiff from accessing the tools – evidence of the employer’s motivation – necessary to even begin to assemble a case.  See Zive v. Stanley Roberts, 182 N. J. 436, 448 (2005).  “The *prima facie* case is to be evaluated solely on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, irrespective of defendants’ efforts to dispute that evidence. ”  See Zive, 182 N.J. at 448.  The matter then moves to the second stage of the *McDonnell Douglas* analysis when the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action.  Id.  If Defendants satisfy that burden, then in the third stage the burden of production shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason articulated by Defendants is merely a pretext for discrimination or retaliation and not the true reason for the employment decision.  Id.  On the last prong of pretext, Plaintiff does not need to provide direct evidence.  Instead, a plaintiff proves retaliation by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact-finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence” and is a pretext for discrimination.  See DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528 (App. Div. 2005); see also Greenberg v. Camden County, 310 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1998) (evidence that employer who failed to hire a teacher was “not providing the whole story” and whose words were contradicted by its acts was sufficient to require reversal of summary judgment).  In response to a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff need not meet the ultimate burden of persuasion, but must only cast such serious doubt on the veracity of the employer’s articulated legitimate reason as to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that the employer was motivated to act for the retaliatory reason alleged by plaintiff.  See Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 422, 432 (App. Div. 1995).  There are no “exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference. ”  Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).  B.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10  REGULATIONS  N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2 N. J.A.C. 7:15-3.2  1  “Aa” refers to Appellants’ appendix, which was filed with the Appellants’ Initial Brief in this appeal, on September 22, 2022.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] ”  In re Estate of Roccamonte, 174 N.J. 381, 393 (2002)  “The fact that plaintiff chose to be employed cannot reasonably be deemed to result in her forfeiture of the support promise in view of her modest salary, the gross disproportion between her economic means and her partner’s, and the gross disproportion between her earnings and the standard of living provided by [her partner].”  Id. at 394  It is also notable that neither [...] nor Defendant acknowledge the undeniable fact that there was consideration given by Plaintiff that Defendant valued higher than money – moving out of the house in [...] so that Defendant could move his paramour and their child into the house in time for the child’s third birthday party.
[brief] Pa35, ¶¶7-8.  [...] sought an Order, inter alia, reinstating him in his tenured position, upon the vacation of the OOS by the Commissioner, or any Court of competent jurisdiction.  Pa36.  In granting Summary Decision in favor of [...], [...] determined:  The question here is not whether the action of the State Board [of Examiners] was legal, it is whether the action of respondent in November 2021, made in reliance on the decision of the State Board, was legal.  There is no reason to delay a decision on the latter issue to account for circumstances that may change years after the [...] Board acted.  I CONCLUDE that respondent acted appropriately and in accordance with the law to remove petitioner from his tenured teaching position as petitioner did not have a valid teaching certificate at the time of respondent’s decision.
[brief] The “Plain Error Standard” does not apply to this appeal, thus rendering [...]’s argument irrelevant.  The “Plain Error Standard” of Rule 2:10-2 applies when a party does not object to an alleged trial error or otherwise properly preserve the issue for appeal.  State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021); State v. Gore, 205 N.J. 363, 383 (2011).  Here, this issue is irrelevant, as [...] repeatedly raised the issue of the contractual indemnification clause’s lack of ambiguity in the Law Division.  O.A.  Peterson filed a third party complaint against [...] on December 16, 2021, a Motion for Summary Judgment against [...] on September 8, 2023, and a Motion for Reconsideration on November 9, 2023 all premised on the argument that the indemnification clause was unambiguous.  Finally, [...] specifically reserved the right to resuscitate [...]’ standing in this case “in the event that a court determines that the [Law Division’s] ruling” on ambiguity was found to be “a bit narrow. ” (Da463).  Thus, [...]’ argument as to the applicability of the Plain Error Standard is moot.
[brief] 305 N.J. Super. at 408.  Courts outside of New Jersey, for example New York courts, have reached the same conclusion.  See, e.g. Sentry at QB, LLC v. Wu, 194 N.Y.S.3d 305, 307 (App. Div. 2023) (holding that because the appellants “were neither a present nor a former client of the [...], they lacked standing to seek disqualification based upon a conflict of interest”); Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 35 N.Y.S.3d 922, 923 (App. Div. 2016) (“Since the plaintiff is neither a present nor a former client of the subject law firm, he lacked standing to seek disqualification of [...], as the attorneys for the individual defendants in the action.
[brief] [...] engaged in the same impermissible practice here by including an additional term in the CBA through the Trojan Horse of an undefined just cause provision.  By doing so, he clearly “read in” a new rule precluding termination of any employee for incapacity where the employee asserts that the incapacity is caused by a temporary condition.  Moreover, and similar to the arbitrator in *County College of Morris*, he required that [...] provide some form of “warning” to [...] before terminating her; in essence, the same type of “progressive” discipline the arbitrator read into the agreement in *County College of Morris*.  Of course, no such “warning” requirement is provided by the CBA.  Moreover, any such “warning” here would have been impractical, if not completely nonsensical.  There is no way [...] could have responded to a warning by, for example, recovering any faster from surgery than nature would ordinarily provide.  She has no control over her physical healing process sufficient to respond meaningfully to a warning from her employer; she either was physically able to work, or she was not.  A “warning” would not change the physical realities of her condition and would serve no purpose other than to encourage an unhealthy employee to return to work prematurely, perhaps by fabricating, withholding, or otherwise falsifying medical and other records. \(^6\) --- \(^6\)
[brief] Determining proximate cause involves a “combination of ‘logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent’ that fixes a point in a chain of events, some foreseeable and some unforeseeable, beyond which the law will bar recovery. ”  *People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp.*, 100 N.J. 246, 264 (1985) (quoting *Caputzal v. Lindsay Co.*, 48 N.J. 69, 77-78 (1966)).  In order to determine whether proximate cause exists, the proper inquiry is “whether the specific act or omission of the defendant was such that the ultimate injury to the plaintiff reasonably flowed from defendant's breach of duty. ”  *Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc.*, 149 N.J. 496, 503 (1997) (quoting *Hill v. Yaskin*, 75 N.J. 139, 143 (1977)).
[directive] DISORDERLY PERSONS AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES  Rule Description  This Rule provides that “Unless otherwise specified in the order setting the bail, bail may be satisfied by the deposit in court or cash in the amount of ten percent of Rule 7:4-3(g) the amount fixed together with the defendant’s executed recognizance for the remaining ninety percent.  No surety shall be required, unless specifically ordered by Ten Percent Cash Bail the court.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12 above, regarding bail restrictions for domestic violence contempts.  This Rule provides that when a sentence has been imposed and an appeal from the judgment of conviction has been taken, the trial judge may admit the appellant Rule 7:4-8 to bail within 20 days from the date of conviction or sentence, whichever occurs later.  Bail after conviction may be imposed only if the trial judge has significant Bail After Conviction reservations about the appellant’s willingness to appear before the appellate court.  This Rule provides:  Changes in Conditions of Release for Defendants Charged on an Initial Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) on Disorderly Persons Offenses
[directive] See also Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 3b 1.2.  The point value for this factor is +3, unless the defendant’s primary occupation or source of income was drug distribution rather than regular legitimate employment, or where the defendant’s legitimate employment was merely a front for his or her criminal conduct, in which event the point value for this aggravating factor is +4.  Aggravating Factor #5b applies when defendant’s conduct involved actual distribution of controlled dangerous substance to any person for money or other thing of value.
[directive] Prosecutor by Attendance 6.1 53 ...............................  Conditions Release Special for Requests 6.2 53 .................  Offenses  New Concerning Restraints for Requests 6.2.1  Victims/ with Contact Concerning for Restraints  Requests 6.2.2 .................................................53  Witnesses Restraining DORO SASPA, and SORO, Violence, Domestic 6.2.3  Orders....................................................54 54 .................... Monitoring and Intervention Abuse Substance 6.2.4 5 Page on Restrictions House Arrest, Curfews, Monitoring, Electronic 6.2.5 55 .............. Conditions Release and Other Associations, Personal 55 ................. of Monetary Imposition Bail for on Requests Restrictions 6.3 55 ...................................... Considerations General 6.3.1 56 ..................... Monetary Bail Seeking Presumption Against 6.3.2 56 ............... Monetary Bail Against Presumption the Overcoming 6.3.3 Ensuring That in Interest Defendant's to as Inquiry Presumptive 6.3.4 56 ................................ Forfeited Not Monetary Is Bail Release Special for Request Specific Appeal When or Documentation 6.4 57 ............................................... Denied Is Condition ...................................... 57 MOTIONS DETENTION PRETRIAL 7. 57 .............................. Framework Decision and Policy General 7.1 60 ..................... Detention Pretrial for Applying Against Presumption 7.2 Absent Filed Detention Be Must Seek Pretrial to Motion a Where Cases 7.3 61 .......................... Circumstances Extraordinary Compelling and 61 ......... Detention Pretrial Seek Presumed to Prosecutor Is the Where Cases 7.4 of Feature Facie Evidence the Invoking Prima 7.4.1
[brief] ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  PUBLIC DEFENDER  Appellate Section Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  31 Clinton Street 9th Floor P.O. Box 46003  Newark, New Jersey 07101 [...]  [...] Atty. ID: 027141986  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and on the Brief  [...]  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED June 19, 2023
[directive] pretrial for move complaint-warrant, under possession unlawful charging cases in overcome be should presumption (N.J.S.A. handguns involving matters those —particularly 2C:39-5 N.J.S.A. shall —prosecutors 2C:39-5(c)) (N.J.S.A. shotguns and rifles and 2C:39-5(b)) the of Enforcement Uniform Ensure Directive to General Attorney the consider entitled Memorandum General Attorney the as well as Act"  "Graves Offenses to Respect with Directive 2008 Act' `Graves of "Clarification Gun-Possession Their Where States From Visitors Out-of-State by Committed Lawful."  Been Have Would Conduct under charged offense  Asecond-degree Weapons.
[brief] **[...] Statement #2**  Yesterday, [...], a teacher at Seth | | 4:30 p.m. Eastern | ¶¶ 27 - 30, (Da 015-16) | | | Date/Time | Defendant(s) / Citation | Statement | |-------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Time | | Boyden Elementary in [...] forcibly removed the hijab of a second grade student.  The young student resisted, by trying to hold onto her hijab, but the teacher pulled the hijab off, exposing her hair to the class.  Herman told the student that her hair was beautiful and she did not have to wear hijab to school anymore.  Imagine being a child and stripped of your clothing in front of your classmates.  Imagine the humiliation and trauma this experience has caused her.  This is abuse.  Schools should be a haven for all of our kids to feel safe, welcome and protected—no matter their faith.  We cannot move toward a post-racial America until we weed out the racism and bigotry that still exist in all layers of our society.  By protecting Muslim girls who wear hijab, we are protecting the rights of all of us to have a choice in the way we dress.  Writing books and posting on social is not enough.  We must stand together and vehemently denounce discrimination in all of its forms.  CALL [...] [...] and EMAIL the principal [...] and the superintendent [...] [...] [...] | | Oct. 8, 2021 at | [...], Am. Compl. ¶¶ | **[...] Statement #1**
[brief] [...] suggested that [...]’s reference to a 2009 injury was a typographical error, and that he meant to write ‘2000’, which would correspond to Petitioner’s workers’ compensation claim from 2000.  While that point was not proven at the hearing, petitioner was correct to argue that [...] and [...] were required to turn over all workers’ compensation files that each had for petitioner; however, no workers’ compensation files were turned over from 2009.  (Pa84).  The ALJ also concluded that [...] “failed to mention the 2000 and 2004 workers’ compensation claim[s], meaning he made errors in filling out this reporting form”, but the ID gives no explanation as to the “reporting form” the ALJ refers to.  (Pa85).  The ALJ also gives no consideration to the probability that, as with [...] and [...], Petitioner failed to tell [...] about the 2000 and 2004 incidents or his prior cervical herniations, nor does the ALJ acknowledge that [...] failed to mention the 2000 or 2004 incidents in his narrative expert report or his Certification of Medical Examination by Personal or Treating Physician he submitted to the Division of Pension of Benefits.  (Pa85; Pa144-150; Pa151-152).  Nevertheless, the ALJ thereafter referred to [...]’s treatment report as “this error-prone report. ” (Pa85).  The ALJ also found, that “[w]hen questioned regarding the issue, Petitioner denied that there was any 2009 incident or accident”, but cites to no such testimony and Respondent’s find none in the transcript.  (Pa85).  The ALJ determined that both [...] and [...] “provided believable and seemingly credible testimony”, he found [...]’s testimony “to be more reliable in the within matter” for the following reasons: [...] relied on information in [...]’s report as to a 2009 injury, but there was no independent report indicating back or neck injuries in 2009 and Dr.  Kirshner did not testify.  Neither doctor had full documentation to review for the years 2004 through 2015, and thus [...]’s conclusions as to the pre-existing spinal issues were not fully supported. ” (Pa81).  On these findings of fact and law, including [...]’s dismissal of the findings regarding the 2000 and 20004 incidents and that “[...] specifically found that petitioner was asymptomatic from his return to work after the 2004 incident through the date of the incident on October 17, 2015”, the ALJ recommended that the Board’s determination should be reversed and Petitioner’s application for AD should be granted.  (Pa91).
[directive] DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS police or law enforcement officer or officers (municipal, county, Division of State Police, bi-State law enforcement agencies, or other State governmental law enforcement agencies) where the Crime Scene Investigation Unit or Fatal Accident Unit, of the Division of State Police is called to respond: 1.  To a crash scene involving a motor vehicle or vehicles or vessel or vessels, and; 2.  There is serious bodily injury and/or death to one or more persons.  III.  Evaluation Criteria - Criteria Case  A.  The Evaluation Criteria in this Joint Crash Investigation Protocol shall be utilized in every case to determine if the County Prosecutor classifies the case as a “Criteria Case. ”
[brief] ’”  Id. at 268, citing In re Arndt, 67 N.J. 432, 436 (1975); Johnson v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 131 N.J. Super. 513, 517-18 (App. Div. 1974), cert. denied, 67 N.J. 94 (1975).  The Court also observed that, under the circumstances presented, the agency was “pressing upon the limits of reasonableness. ”  In re Failure, 336 N.J. Super. at 269.  Thus, to the extent that In re Failure is applicable to the case at bar, it only serves to underscore just how unreasonable [...] was in imposing a public access requirement on [...] before engaging in the rulemaking required by N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(b).  In re Failure is also distinguishable from the facts presented by [...]’s permit application because it involved a request that the Appellate Division require an agency to engage in rulemaking.  Here, however, [...] is not asking this Court to compel [...] to engage in the statutorily mandated rulemaking required by the Public Access Law, but rather to prevent [...] from enforcing its preferred interpretations of unclear terms and provisions prior to engaging in the mandated rulemaking process.
[directive] 121  1  Procedures disposinq indiu%ible forfeited property for * the agency decides  If distribute indivlsihk forfeited property to a prosem?ing to law participating enforcement agency, participating enforcement agency must law the reimburse entity funding the prosecuting agency any that were expended the for moneys by that entity in furtherance securing a perfected interest in or clear title to the forfeited of property.  If the participating law enforcement agency does not agree to such the reimbursement, other agreement cannot be reached by all interests parties, if or in forfeited property shall be sold and the proceeds shall be distributed set forth this as standard operating procedure.
[brief] But even were the Court to consider the substance of the appellants’ argument, Plaintiffs did attempt to make a pre-suit demand, but were stymied in their efforts by the defendants’ obfuscation.  Once Plaintiffs recognized an issue based on the New Jersey tax notice, [...] (at Plaintiffs’ instruction) made a series of written demands of [...] in August 2019 to produce accurate financial data for the defendant entities to establish how much money Plaintiffs were owed.  (Da137-51).  [...] made a similar demand in early September 2019.
[brief] This appeal brief is submitted on behalf of the Appellant, [...] (hereinafter referred to as “Appellant”).  Appellant has filed this Appeal of the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (the “Dismissal Order”) entered by the Honorable [...]; and the Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Prior Order entered by the Honorable [...].  This case presents a scenario that tests the limits of the coverage of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  The transaction, denominated as a “sale” of an interest in the proceeds of an unresolved personal injury suit, could be described as a sale or assignment of that interest, as the documents do, but that sale or assignment is not permitted by New Jersey law.  It is prohibited by roughly 100 years of common law.  On the other hand, the transaction could be described, based on the facts presented in the same documents, as a loan, albeit a non-recourse loan, with interest charged in excess of that permitted by statute.  Again, as a loan, the transaction runs afoul of the common law proscription for lending based on an unresolved personal injury suit as collateral.  Further, the contract is titled “Lawsuit Funding Agreement”, which is a service (“funding”) cognizable under the Consumer Fraud Act and The Truth in Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act.  In this case, the Appellee lent money to the appellant to fund her on-going personal injury case.  The personal injury suit was then collateral to the funds given to the Appellant.  The Appellee charged interest and other charges on the monies.  That transaction, however described, is forbidden by New Jersey law.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[brief] The foreclosure action named [...] and others as defendants but failed to include the [...], who was the fee simple owner of and successor to the 1879 Tidelands Grant to [...].  Furthermore, the description set forth in the Final Decree dated October 23, 1939 and recorded on October 25, 1939 in Deed Book 1806 page 403 does not refer to or include all of the property represented as Lots 3 and 3.01 on the current Keansburg Tax Map.  Rather than set forth a metes and bounds description or Tax Lot and Block, the Final Decree relies upon Calls to known references.  At trial, [...]’s title experts [...] and [...] emphatically stated that the description provided therein does not include all of the property represented as Lots 3 and 3.01 on the current Tax Map.  This description DOES NOT include all of the property represented as Lots 3 and 3.01.  It merely includes a thin strip of land located immediately North of Beachway and South of the 1918 MHWL.  Accordingly, the Borough could not take from [...] and the other named defendants’ property they did not hold title to.