ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] argued to the lower court that it would not have issued the subject policy if [...] had disclosed its intention to use 12-15 passenger vans.  But, in support, [...] only submitted portions of the deposition testimony of [...], Principal of the [...], which is the administrator of the camp program not the insurer (Ia481-482; 490).  Even when viewed in its entirety, however, Dean’s deposition testimony is insufficient to establish materiality or reliance.  Although Dean testified that the program administrator’s guidelines would preclude such coverage as a general matter, he also testified that he was not personally involved in underwriting, monitoring, or issuing [...]’s policy, which was instead handled by his underwriter, [...].  (Ia519-520; 526; 536-539).  Dean did not take part in any of the communications between [...] and [...], he was not aware if [...] ever informed [...] about a coverage exclusion for 12-15 passenger vans prior to the policy’s inception, and he did not know if his company had ever provided HNOA coverage that included 12 to 15 passenger vans.  (Ia519-520; 526; 523; 536-538; 556-561).  Even if Dean had been personally involved in the policy’s purchase – which he admittedly was not – his testimony does not establish that [...] reasonably relied upon the actual misrepresentation that [...] is alleged to have made.  “A misrepresentation is material if it naturally and reasonably influence(s) the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium.
[brief] (Pb13).  However, in this case, Plaintiff cannot prove intent and will never be able to prove [...] hid or destroyed any evidence in this case, especially not key or crucial evidence, as will be explicated below.  If one cites cases and elements, they should apply the same to the facts of the case at issue.  Plaintiff/Appellate sprinkles in law but does not provide any analysis and application of facts to the law.  This much was clear to [...] as Plaintiff did not and could not present any such evidence in support of the original October 24, 2018 Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. (Pa11 to Pa23).  The same arguments and exact same “evidence” proffered in that motion has now been annexed to Appellant’s brief before this Court.  Recall that this Appeal resulted only after Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with [...]’s denial of the Trial Court motions and then the Trial of the case which resulted in a jury finding no cause of action in favor of Defendant.
[brief] Board of Public Utilities, 189 N.J. Super. 491, 507 (App. Div. 1983).  The difference between these burdens was at issue in Riley v Board of Trustees, supra., 2021 N.J. Super. at 12.  [RA-12 Exhibit C].  There, the petitioner argued the Board could not reject the ALJ’s findings “without first concluding those findings were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. ”
[brief] The trial court erred when it failed to consider potential and possible impacts of the defect and waiver thereof on assurance of performance and competition.  The trial court’s decision to limit its analysis to the specific facts as they existed in this case, and namely placing ultimate emphasis on the facts that [...] was classified and ultimately provided the [...] Notice, see, e.g., 1T59-2 – 1T60-6, 3T32-23 – 3T33-14, was analysis is in direct contradiction to more than one hundred (100) years of case law requiring that courts consider not just the immediate facts before them but the possible manipulations that the defect and waiver could engender and the impacts on the public bidding scheme more broadly.  See Case v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 76 N.J.L. 696, 700 (1909) (“Nor is the reason for enforcing this rule any the weaker because [...] remained the only bidder after the exclusion of the [...].  The ground for enforcing the rule is because no other persons were invited to bid upon the terms upon which the contract was awarded to [...].  The presence of the condition may have deterred others from bidding, who would have bid, had they known that these conditions would be waived. ”); Tufano v. Bor. of Cliffside Park in Bergen Cnty., 110 N.
[brief] The BMP Manual explains that constructed wetlands are stormwater management systems designed to maximize the pollutant removal from stormwater runoff and may be used to address the quantity impacts of land development.  Flow is directed through an engineered, open marsh system where pollutants are removed through settling and vegetative uptake/filtration.  Ibid.  https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj_swbmp_10.4-standard-constructed-wetlands.pdf  The Manual also describes infiltration basins as stormwater management systems constructed with highly permeable components designed to maximize the pollutant removal from stormwater, promote groundwater recharge and address the quantity impacts of land development.  BMP Manual, Section 10.2. \(^5\)  Pollutants are treated through settling, filtration of the runoff through, and biological and chemical activity within, the components.  \(\text{Ibid.}\)  Finally, the Manual explains that MTDs are proprietary stormwater treatment systems used to address the stormwater runoff quality impacts of land development and rely upon a variety of mechanisms to remove pollutants from stormwater runoff. \(^6\)  Green infrastructure MTDs rely upon specialized technology and incorporate an engineered, high-flow rate filter media to remove stormwater pollutants, allowing for a smaller footprint than conventional bioretention systems.  Some of the designs include one or more plants within the unit to form a plant/soil/microbe complex to remove pollutants.  \(\text{Ibid.}\)  \(^5\)  https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj_swbmp_10.2-infiltration-basins.pdf  \(^6\)  https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/nj-swbmp-chapter-9.5-july-2023.pdf  [...] proposed using the Filterra green infrastructure MTDs, which DEP certified as satisfying the Stormwater Management Rules. \(^7\)  Throughout the permit application review process, [...] submitted public comment on [...]’s application.  For instance, on June 16, 2022, [...] submitted a comment asserting that the Property contained habitat for the bald eagle, a State threatened species.  (Aa95).  [...] also hired [...], an environmental engineering firm, which submitted reports to DEP together with [...]’s public comments addressing alleged noncompliance with the Stormwater Management Rules.
[brief] (JA1-2) --- ² The Department’s citation to N.J.A.C. 11:2:27-3 is unavailing and deceptive as that code section relates to N.J.S.A. 17:30C-1 et seq, which is one of the code sections that expressly includes reciprocals.  See Ab9.  The Department fails to cite any relevant code section that does not expressly already apply to reciprocals.
[brief] *Bartlett v. Heibl*, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997).  Moreover, recovery of attorney’s fees is mandatory even if no statutory damages are awarded.  *Graziano v. Harrison*, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991) (“courts have required an award of attorney’s fees even where violations were so minimal that statutory damages were not warranted. ”)  When the U.S. Supreme Court redefined a case-or-controversy to exclude claims where the only harm is the invasion of a statutory right, the dissent observed, “The Court does not prohibit Congress from creating statutory rights for consumers; it simply holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear some of these cases.
[brief] This necessarily includes the 2017 SPA to which [...] was a party.  On appeal, [...] largely ignores this critical finding by the trial court.  As the trial court explained, both [...] and [...] breached their obligations under the MIPA and the SPAs by presenting balance sheets and financial information to [...] that were “inaccurate” because they had diverted funds from the companies into accounts that they controlled (principally, the [...] account and the [...]’ joint account), and compounded the issue when [...] used that inaccurate information to induce Plaintiffs’ to sell their interests for $6.3 million when the defendants knew “the numbers were wrong” and “bogus. ” (37T 87:23 to 88:18).  As the trial court explained: the Chemtech Stockholders Agreement, the MRL Operating Agreement, the SPA and the MIPA “all feed off of each other,” “there are a lot of moving parts” and “they all play off of each other. ”  (37T 88:19-20; 89:1-4).  C.  The Defendants Breached the Covenant of Good Faith
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE TO DISMISS APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellants’ Complaint was barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  Rather, the trial court correctly concluded that the transactions and occurrences forming the basis for this action were identical to those which formed the basis of the Prior Action, which action had previously been litigated in the trial court for nearly 2½ years.  The trial court properly found that Appellants’ claims could, and should, have been asserted earlier in the Prior Action, and that the failure to do so barred Appellants from subsequently asserting them in this action.
[brief] 3T161:6-9.  In anticipation of that closing and the expected proceeds, [...] and [...] negotiated a settlement to resolve the outstanding amount owed on the $330,000 Loan.  3T161:14-24; 3T162:6-11.  The settlement was negotiated in advance of the April 26, 2013 closing.  3T161:25 to 162:5.  [...] and [...] agreed to a settlement whereby [...] would make a payment of $330,000 in full satisfaction of the amounts owed on the $330,000 Loan and [...] would sign a discharge of mortgage.  3T162:12 to 163:8.  In addition to the $66,293.84 of interest payments made as of October 12, 2010, [...] made additional interest payments of approximately $18,000.  3T163:9-21.  On April 26, 2013, through his attorneys, [...] made a single lump sum payment of $330,000 to [...].  Da149.  By accepting the lump sum payment of $330,000 on April 26, 2013, the parties agreed that this remittance fully resolved the outstanding loan balance on the $330,000 Loan, including the paid interest to date and the “in-kind” service and materials provided to [...].
[brief] This Court should reverse the trial court’s order that granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their claim for an implied easement appurtenant because the evidence in the motion record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Defendants, failed to establish that no reasonable factfinder could find for Defendants on that claim or conclude that Plaintiffs could not establish their claim by the required clear and convincing evidence.  In fact, there was more than sufficient evidence in the motion record supporting Defendants’ claim that no such easement was implied at the time of the initial property conveyance.  The trial court should therefore have denied Plaintiffs’ motion and required Plaintiffs to present their proofs at trial, at which time the factfinder would determine whether Plaintiffs had established such an easement by clear and convincing evidence.  This Court should not reverse the trial court’s discretionary ruling to deny Plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended complaint to implead [...] and assert malicious prosecution and libel per se claims against him.
[directive] N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance License Number License Number  Expiration Date  Expiration Date  Business Address: Business Address: Street Suite/Floor etc., must agree with usps.com  Street Suite/Floor etc., must agree with usps.com  I I I I City City Zip Code+ 4 Zip Code+ 4  State State Telephone: Telephone: include area code include area code )  ( ) ( E-mail Address  E-mail Address  Bail Agency Information  License Number and Expiration Date  Provide name of agency represented by agent I  Doing Business As (DBA): must include "Bail Agency" or "Bail Bonds"  License Number and Expiration Date  Provide name of agency administrator l  License Number and Expiration Date  Provide name of managing agent l  (Attach a copy of the Agent/Agency/Administrator/Managing Agent License and a list of authorized bonds)  1: R Per 13-3(d)  "The insurer shall have a continuing obligation to update its Bail Program Registration Form as changes occur in order to assure that the information is complete and accurate."
[brief] IMPROPERLY FUNCTIONS AS INTRODUCTION OF EXPERT EVIDENCE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.  [...]’s amicus brief, citing approximately twenty studies outside the record and on which no opportunity for cross-examination was available—in addition to the studies cited in defendant’s brief which are outside the record—expands on defendant’s arguments relating to fingerprint analysis that were properly rejected by the trial court.  See Pb 8-13.  Like the citation of those studies by defendant for the first time on appeal, [...]’s brief functions to introduce expert testimony for the first time on appeal and should not influence this Court’s review of defendant’s trial.  Appellate courts typically “confine[ ] [themselves] to the record. ”  State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 201-02 (1997).  In Harvey, our Supreme Court granted the State’s motion to strike a letter from a professor (outside the trial record) appended to defendant’s appellate brief regarding a margin of error and confidence interval related to statistical analysis, which was at issue in that case.  Id. at 201.  The Court reasoned that appellate courts “may review scientific literature and judicial opinions . . . to determine whether a technique is generally accepted,” but such a review does not “invit[e] the parties to supplement the record with additional expert testimony. ”  *Id.* at 202.  It clarified that “[t]he place to introduce expert testimony is at trial, where the expert is subject to cross-examination, the opposing party can introduce contradictory expert testimony, and the trial court can assess the experts’ credibility. ”  *Ibid.*  [...]’s brief here exists for the same purpose as the professor’s letter in *Harvey* and the studies appended to defendant’s principal brief: to introduce expert evidence without the potential pitfalls of calling an expert witness to the stand in front of the jury.  Indeed, defendant called no such witness to testify in support of his argument—raised and rejected repeatedly by judge and jury—that fingerprint-analysis evidence is unreliable to identify the perpetrator of a crime.  [...], the co-author of a study defendant cites for the first time on appeal, cannot now inject expert testimony into a cold record.  Thus, her brief should not impact this Court’s decision as to whether the trial court below erred at any stage of trial with regard to fingerprint-analysis evidence.  As explained more fully in the State’s principal response brief, the court admitted that evidence to the proper extent at trial.  POINT II
[brief] Moreover, the timing and circumstances of this Amended Complaint cannot be understood in a vacuum, disconnected from the reality of what occurred for years in the 2015 Action and was pled in this matter.  As pled in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, for years Defendants went above and beyond, and oftentimes into the realm of bad-faith delay tactics, obstruction, perjury, and fraudulent concealment, in order to keep Plaintiffs from obtaining the factual predicates for their new claims.  Had Defendants cooperated in good faith with the discovery process in the 2015 Action instead of requiring Plaintiffs to overcome never-ending motion practice in order to obtain the depositions and documents that the Court ultimately granted, and had Defendants refrained from committing perjury, falsifying documents, and producing false documents to conceal evidence, Plaintiffs would have been able to complete the puzzle years earlier, discover these new claims years earlier, and file a motion to amend in the 2015 Action years earlier.  For the same Defendants who created this situation with their fraudulent conduct to then claim that they are prejudiced if Plaintiffs are allowed to state the claims they discovered overcoming Defendants’ fraudulent conduct, is a profanation of any sense of fairness and justice.
[brief] Indeed, defendant’s challenge does not really sound in the Second Amendment at all.  She does not claim that any particular requirement for obtaining a NJ Carry Permit is impermissible.  Contrast, e.g., Koons v. Platkin, 673 F. Supp. 3d 515, 562-71, 573-79 (D.N.J. 2023) (considering challenges to specific substantive and procedural components of State’s carry permitting regime—and determining each likely is consistent with historical tradition).  She does not claim that generally requiring a NJ Carry Permit is impermissible.  Cf. (Db5) (“Defense [has] never argued that New Jersey’s law [i]s invalid”).  Put otherwise, defendant implicitly concedes that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) is facially consistent with the Second Amendment.  She objects only to its particular application to her, as an out-of-state resident with a carry permit issued by her home State.  That objection speaks to the relationship among the states, rather than the right to bear arms itself.  While defendant’s invocation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause also fails, see infra at 19-25, her objection is better addressed under that constitutional provision, which expressly governs inter-state conflict.
[brief] (Bolded in the original.)  (4/16/15 version at TRVa516; legible 4/16/15 version at ZURa212; 9/8/14 version at ZURa261.)  Consequently, [...] submitted a second proposal, No. 106846 (“Proposal Two”), on July 21, 2015, with a total estimate of $22,200, a lower amount than Proposal One due to [...]’s anticipation - at the time - that it would be enrolled in the CCIP.  (TRVa1485.)  Proposal Two describes the identical work to Proposal One above, except: (1) for the “hand sawing, chipping and breaking” pockets, it charges $1,800 per day (instead of $1,900); and (2) for “wall sawing, hand sawing, chipping and breaking 150’ concrete wall at property line” at the adjacent [...], it charges $3,400 per day (instead of $3,500).  (Id.)  On July 28, 2015, [...] sent a Notice of Subcontractor Award (Form F), to [...] and [...] to initiate [...]’s CCIP enrollment.  The following day, on July 29, 2015, [...] issued a purchase order (“Purchase Order”) for [...]’s work, corresponding to the work and amount described in Proposal Two.\(^3\) (TRVa1496-1497.)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DECIDED CORRECTLY THAT APPELLANT CANNOT SUSTAIN CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Raised Below: Pa43-Pa44)**  As Appellant argued in Point II of her Brief, she premises her claim for declaratory and injunctive relief on her arguments that there is a private right of action under the NJCFLA and on purported violations of the CFA.  (Pb6-Pb17).  As Point II above makes clear, however, she lacks any such claim.  In Appellant’s Point III, she continues to ignore New Jersey case law as to the NJCFLA’s lack of a private right of action, pursuant to which she lacks a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief or under the CFA. (Pb27-Pb28).
[brief] ”  Id. at 465-66 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).  The Court was clearly concerned with the far-reaching scope of the honoraria ban at issue and its impact on employee free speech.  Although not a complete ban on speaking, the Supreme Court viewed it as a prior restraint regulating broad categories of employee speech and differentiated this situation from an after-the-fact penalty on individual speakers on the ground that the employee speech disrupted the workplace.  The Court held, “[f]or these reasons, the Government’s burden is greater with respect to this statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action [and the] Government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the Government.
[brief] (3T8-18 to 3T8-20)  The Chairman pointed out the intimate knowledge that the Board members had regarding this particular area of the Township:  [...]:  But, if you’re coming to a Board who, most of these Board members have lived here for a long time, understand the exclusiveness of the area there, but it’s not … a joke.  The sensitivity of that area. ”  (3T24-3T24-12)  The applicant reiterated that there is no change to the 9 lots being proposed, and that the applicant would not consider a deed restriction for basement apartments.  (3T28-10 to 3T28-13)  The resolution denying the application was memorialized at the August 23, 2022 Board meeting (Ia64) and the underlying litigation commenced with the filing of a Complaint on September 23, 2022.
[brief] THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL IS THE DE NOVO STANDARD AND NOT THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD  BECAUSE OF THE NATURE AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE LITIGATION.  The Respondent initially argues that the current issue on appeal is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review because it is asserted the appeal was made after denial of a motion for reconsideration, citing *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567 (2021).
[brief] ....................................  47  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The [...] (the “County”) sought bids for the ENG Project 21-13FA-Resurfacing and Safety Improvements to Berlin-Cross Keys Road in the Townships of Washington and Monroe (the “Project”).  Contractors were required to be properly classified by the New Jersey Department of Transportation (“NJDOT”) to perform the Project, both in the relevant work areas and in the appropriate monetary amount.  As such, the County’s solicitation (the “Solicitation”) required each bidder to submit its NJDOT Notice of Classification (“NJDOT Notice”) with its bid.  [...] (“[...]”) submitted its bid on July 30, 2024, without its NJDOT Notice.  On August 7, 2024, the County informed [...] its bid was being rejected for failure to submit the NJDOT Notice.  [...] then waited an additional thirteen (13) days to submit the document.  The County stood by its rejection, finding the defect to be material, and awarded the Project to [...]  (“[...]”).  The County did not evaluate whether it would waive the defect if the failure to submit the NJDOT Notice was not material.  [...] subsequently filed suit.  In finding that the defect was not material and that the County would have been obligated to waive the defect had it considered the issue, the trial court overlooked or misapplied significant binding case law indicating that: (1) responsiveness and materiality must be evaluated on the date of bid opening; (2) in evaluating whether a defect impacts the government’s assurance of performance and bidder and potential bidder competition, courts must consider possible and potential impacts and not just the circumstances as they actually played out after bid opening; and (3) the government has significant discretion to reject bids that are defective when those defects are not material, so long as there are legitimate business justifications for refusing waiver.  The Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and find [...]’s failure to timely submit the NJDOT Notice to be a material defect.  To the extent the Court finds the defect was not material, the Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and either: (a) remand to the County to determine whether to waive the defect; or (b) direct the dismissal of [...]’s Complaint and allow the County to proceed in the ordinary course, based on the guidance provided by the Court.