ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN IMPOSING SENTENCE (3T20-4 to 3T24-18)  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant was to be sentenced as a second-degree offender.  No specific term of years was agreed upon, and therefore the trial court had a wide latitude as to the term of years the Defendant would serve.  At Defendant’s sentencing, Defense counsel requested that the court sentence [...] to a term of five years’ New Jersey State Prison.  The court sentenced [...] to a term of seven years’ New Jersey State Prison.  One of the purposes of the Code of Criminal Justice is to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary punishment.
[brief] [...]  [...]  [...] (T): [...] (F): [...] (E): [...] (E): [...]  Our File No. [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  Hoboken Housing Authority  On the Brief and Of Counsel: [...] (022481993)  On the Brief: [...] (216252019)  Date Submitted: May 10, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | I.
[brief] Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).
[brief] Here, the Board’s breach of contract claims required to be brought in Superior Court certainly are not the same issue as whether the Board violated a school law statute under the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.  The claims brought by the Board for breach of contract and fraud were ¹ Pressler, Rules Governing the Superior Court, comment 3.5 to R. 4:30A properly brought before the Superior Court.  On the other hand, [...]’s Counterclaim that the Board violated an education law statute under the Commissioner of Education’s jurisdiction, was required to be brought before the Commissioner under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1, et seq.  [...]’s claims as to the Entire Controversy Doctrine is nonsense because nothing stopped [...] from seeking redress from the Commissioner of Education, and the matters could certainly have been dealt with simultaneously.
[brief] Until a master plan or parts thereof have been legislatively adopted by the governing body, its proposals have no binding effect or legal consequences.  Its proposals exist only as a hopeful declaration of policy expressing future guidelines for the municipality.  [Cervase v. Kawaida Towers, Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 547, 567-568 (Law Div. 1973), aff’d, 129 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1974)].  The second component of the master plan is the “land use element” which must state its relationship to the principles previously identified, and to other adopted master plan elements.
[brief] Planner [...] addressed the Township’s housing stock and population: 10.  My review reveals that Monroe is unique in that it is the home of so many age-restricted communities.  As a result, the 2016-2020 ACS (American Community Survey) reveals that 37.6 percent of Monroe’s population is 65 or over.  To put this into context, the 2016-2020 ACS reveals that only 16.2 percent of the State’s population and only 15.0 percent of Middlesex County’s population is 65 or over….  11.  Also, reviewing the 2016-2020 ACS reveals that Monroe has a much more homogenous housing stock than the State and Middlesex County.  12.  When comparing the ACS data, it is apparent that the Township has a disproportionately high percentage of single family (attached and detached) housing.  Single family homes are usually the most expensive type of housing and the least likely to be rented.  Thus, they are the least likely form of housing to be occupied by low- and moderate-income households…  13.  African American and Hispanic households are a disproportionately high percentage of the low- and moderate-income population…  14.  Given the very high percentage of single-family homes in Monroe Township, I would expect that the Township would have a disproportionately low percentage of African American and Hispanic residents…  15.  In contrast to the lack of multi-family housing in Monroe, Plaintiffs’ inclusionary development is designed to provide affordable multi-family housing, including low- and moderate-income housing, that will be more readily available to the minority population than the housing that has previously been allowed by the Township’s zoning policies.  R166-7.  The effects of the Defendants’ unlawful treatment of racial minorities and families with children cannot legitimately be denied.  This is the very type of conduct made unlawful by the NJLAD.  Further, the statements contained in the Mayor’s press release were expressly intended to interfere with the Zoning Board’s independent review of Plaintiffs’ Amended Application.  This interference led to the Zoning Board’s denial of the Amended Application.  Such conduct violates the NJLAD, and Plaintiffs possess standing as an “aggrieved” party contemplated by N.J.S.A. 10:5–13.  As noted above, the scope of individuals who have standing to assert an NJLAD claim is construed in broad, liberal terms by New Jersey courts.  Berner, 322 N.J. Super. at 234; see also O’Lone, 313 N.J. Super. at 255; Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 629-631 (1995).  The Mayor’s unlawful and illegal interference with the Zoning Board’s application review process as well as the Mayor’s statements that were made to directly block the creation of affordable housing for low and moderate income individuals, and the Zoning Board’s denial of the Amended Application, constitute a violation of the NJLAD, and the relief sought on Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal seeking damages should be granted.
[brief] Plaintiff fails to meet the standard of review of motions for reconsideration on appeal or the stringent legal standard that is applied to such motions in the trial court.  The standard of review on appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration is abuse of discretion, which arises only when a trial court’s decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, or rests upon an impermissible basis.  Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002); Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 388 (App. Div. 1996).  See also State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) (“[A]n appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless the trial court’s ruling was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”)(quotation marks and citations omitted).  Plaintiff has failed to meet this standard.  At the trial court level, motions for reconsideration should be granted only where a litigant can provide “a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred[.]”  R. 4:49-2.  Reconsideration is granted only where “(1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.
[brief] See Matter of Trust of Nelson, 454 N.J. Super. 151, 159 (App. Div. 2018).  That states:  [T]he intention of a settlor as expressed in a trust, or of an individual as expressed in a governing instrument, controls the legal effect of the disposition therein and the rules of construction expressed in N.J.S. 3B:34 through N.J.S. 3B:3-48 shall apply unless the probable intent of such settlor or of such individual, as indicated by the trust or by such governing instrument and relevant circumstances, is contrary.  [N.J.S.A. 3B:3-33.1(b). ]  The judicial effort to fulfill a settlor’s or testator’s probable intent takes two forms: interpretation and reformation, and “[t]he former involves finding the meaning ‘of language already in the instrument. ’”  Nelson, 454 N.J. Super. at 159 (quoting Uniform Trust Code, cmt. to § 415, 7C U.L.A. 515 (2000)).  The preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies to interpretation, and the “rigorous clear and convincing standard” applies only in the context of reformation.  See id. at 160.  [...]’s attempt to convince the Trial Court (and now this Court) to adopt her erroneous interpretation of Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) is rooted in her flawed belief that she is entitled to [...]’s Estate’s interest in the [...] under the residuary provision found at Section 3.6A(7) of [...]’s Revocable Trust.
[brief] But here in this instant matter, there is nothing speculative about my financial interest in the outcome of [...]’s possession of our mom’s car, as sadly there is no possibility at all that my mom could choose to “redeem” her vehicle.  Moreover, even further assuming arguendo that the documentation from the Surrogate’s Office was an absolute prerequisite before being able to bring this unjust enrichment claim, there was and is absolutely no reason why that claim should not have been reinstated once I obtained that documentation.  Even assuming arguendo if the court had correctly determined that there was no valid contract, nonetheless I could still recover for “unjust enrichment, a cause of action that does not depend on there being an express contract."  *Caputo v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc.*, 300 N.J. Super. 498, 504-505 (App.Div. 1997)
[brief] (2T:25-15 to 25-16).  The trial court found that the calls to defendant’s parents facilitated by [...] are the functional equivalents of interrogation.  (2T: 46-18 to 46-20).  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on State in the Interest of A.A., 240 N.J. 341 (2020).  (2T:47-1 to 50-25).  The court determined that the statements made by defendant to his parents were not spontaneous.  (2T:49-19 to 49-20).  The court found that what is most telling of [...]’s utilization of the phone calls with defendant’s parents to continue to interrogate defendant is the explanation that the Prosecutor’s Office’s landlines are recorded and should not be used knowing that the calls were being video and audio recorded while defendant was in the interview room.  (2T:58-16 to 58-25).  The Court acknowledged that defendant throughout the entire event made several incriminating statements unprompted by questioning or action by law enforcement.  (2T:52-5 to 54-11).  Defendant continued to make statements although law enforcement advised defendant not to speak.  (2T:52-9 to 52 to 13).  The Court opined that these incriminating statements are admissible.  (2T:52-4 to 54-1).  Nevertheless, the Court found that [...]’s state of mind was to elicit additional incriminating statements from defendant through the phone calls to his parents.  (2T:55-6 to 55-21).  Seeking clarification, the State inquired if statements defendant’s made to [...] before she started administering the Miranda warnings would be admissible and raised that it did not hear in the court’s analysis any finding regarding [...]’s admonition to defendant that he is not to talk about the facts of the case.  (2T:56-4 to 59-25).
[brief] Even if, for the sake of argument, [...] knew before entering the Corolla that [...] possessed two loaded guns and was searching for the victims, there is no evidence that he knew what [...] intended to do when he found them.  [...] could have intended, for example, to engage [...] and/or [...] in an argument and to shoot in the air to threaten them; to shoot out their tires; to shoot at them with the intention of causing them minor injuries; or to shoot at them with the intention of killing one or both of them.
[brief] The MMWA is a federal statute whose fee-shifting provision supports the foregoing public policy.  Enacted in 1975, the statute responded to infuriated motor vehicle owners complaining “automobile manufacturers and dealers were not performing in accordance with the warranties on their automobiles. ”  *Fedor v. Nissan of North America, Inc.*, 432 N.J. Super. 303, 311-12 (App. Div. 2013) (citations omitted).  Congress intended the legislation to aid consumers by ensuring significant guarantees of quality and performance of warranty provisions for purchased consumer goods, and “to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products[.]”  *Id.* at 311-12 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)).  The statute imposes “[f]ederal minimum standards[,]”15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)), and provides a cause of action and legal remedy for consumers harmed by a warrantor's failure to comply with its warranty obligations, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d).  *Id.* at 312.  Thus, a prevailing consumer under the statute may apply to the court for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.  *Id.* at 316 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).  The trial court abused its discretion in failing and/or refusing to consider the foregoing state and federal public policies undergirding the MMWA when it issued its unexplained order cutting plaintiff’s counsel’s request for fees (hours expended and hourly rate) by 93.  (Pa21).  Statutory fee-shifting provisions are necessary to ensure that litigants with *bona fide* claims have equal access to the courts.  *JHC Indus. Services, LLC*, 469 N.J. Super. at 313; *Coleman*, 113 N.J. at 597-98.  Such provisions provide such litigants with the right and the resources to do so.
[brief] THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ARTICULATE THE LEGAL AUTHORITY UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO RECONSIDER THIS COURT’S DECISION.  Notwithstanding the lack of merit to Defendant’s argument under Tyler, the Defendant’s reply lacks an analysis of the trial court’s decision with regard to the jurisdictional defect, which correctly held that the Kemp decision issued by this Court is the law of the case.  See [...] v. [...], A-1944-21 (N.J. App. Div. June 8. 2023).  The Defendant purposefully disregards the well-settled precedent that after the filing of a notice of appeal, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to act further in a matter unless directed to do so by an appellate court, or jurisdiction is reserved by statute or court rule.
[brief] Contrary to this finding, [...] submitted medical proof demonstrating that his health condition was aggravated by his work.  His uncontroverted medical evidence objectively indicates how his job aggravated his osteoarthritis of bilateral knees; specifically, that the requirements of his job, (kneeling, bending down, and squatting), were difficult for him to do, that his condition has been getting progressively worse in the last few years, and that doing boiler work caused increased pain in his knees.  Notably, [...] is specifically treating [...] for osteoarthritis of bilateral knees.  Further, [...] is treating [...] with injections and also recommended physical therapy.  This protocol was determined through a medical examination in which [...] determined these forms of treatment were necessary.  [...] notified his supervisors in January or February of 2021 about the treatment he was receiving and his need for alternative employment.  His condition had been aggravated for some time before his separation and his report of his level of pain to his doctor readily supports [...]’s diagnosis and treatment of [...]’s medical condition.  Clearly “[m]ere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily.
[brief] The railroad is immune when a person, regardless of location, is intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, or is attempting to injure or kill themselves.  If a person is on a railroad right of way in a manner not subject to an exception to N.J.S.A. 48:12-152a, the railroad is immune.  Finally, If a person uses railroad property in a manner it was not intended to be used or in violation of a posted regulation the railroad is immune.  Based on a plain language reading, this is how sections A and B of the statute are intended to be read together.
[brief] Nothing in the pro se instructions informed Plaintiff that the Court required hard copy exhibit binders for the trial and the Trial Court never informed Plaintiff of the same.  Despite Plaintiff following the rules, and the Court never communicating its need for hard copy exhibits, the Trial Court refused to use Plaintiff’s exhibits uploaded onto eCourts, and Plaintiff was immediately unable to proceed with her direct examination as she had prepared.  Plaintiff was not permitted to use any electronic exhibits during the first day of trial despite the fact that they were available to the Court and had been provided to defense counsel.  In spite of this challenge, Plaintiff proceeded with her direct examination.  Plaintiff first testified about her background.  Plaintiff attended the University of Notre Dame for her undergraduate degree in business (marketing and finance).  1T34:17-19; (Aa510).  She received her master’s degree in human resource management from Nova University and her PH.D./ABD from NJIT in Business Data Science.  (Aa514) and 1T34:17-22.
[brief] [...]  ATLANTIC COUNTY PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...] [ID: 000531996]  ATTORNEY, SPECIAL LITIGATION UNIT [...]  4997  UNAMI BOULEVARD MAYS LANDING, NEW JERSEY  08330 [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF.  email: [...]  August 15, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT:  POINT I:  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON TERRORISTIC THREATS  UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME, THE NEW RULE IN FAIR\(^1\) SHOULD NOT BE RETROACTIVE, AND ANY ERROR WAS NOT PRESERVED AND NEVERTHELESS HARMLESS (3T54-11 to 58-14).  [Not Raised Below.] .............9  POINT II: THE PROVISION OF THE TERRORISTIC THREATS STATUTE  ENHANCING THREATS MADE DURING A STATE OF EMERGENCY IS CONSTITUTIONAL.  [Not Raised Below.]  .......................17  POINT III: THERE WAS NO PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING SUA SPONTE TO RECUSE ALL OF THE ATLANTIC COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIARY, WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED TO IDENTIFY A SINGLE INSTANCE OF BIAS, OR THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY.  [Not Raised Below.]  .........................................................................................23  POINT IV:  CONSISTENT WITH LEGISLATIVE INTENT, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO MERGE THESE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT, BUT CONCURRENT, FOURTH-DEGREE OFFENSES (6T; Da 53-56).  [Not Raised Below.]  .................................................................27  POINT V: THE STATE AGREES TO A REMAND TO CLARIFY THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE TERMS; THERE IS NO OTHER BASIS TO DISTURB THE TRIAL COURT’S REASONABLE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (6T; Da53-56).  [Not Raised Below.]  ...............34  CONCLUSION:........................................................................................................36  \(^1\) State v. Fair, 256 N.J. 213 (2024).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  PAGE NO.  1.  Defendant [...]’s Resolution Denying Plaintiff’s Application, dated September 1, 2022 .................. Ja023-Ja046  2.  Trial Court’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Relief, issued October 27, 2023 ..............................................................  Ja222  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page No. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434–35 (App. Div. 2009) | 43 | | Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., 117 N.J. 376 (1990) | 28 | | CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd./ Bd. of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577 (App. Div. 2010) | 9, 10, 11 | | Cell South of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of West Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81-82 (2002) | 9, 10, 24, 43 | | Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment for Chatham Twp., 202 N.J. Super. 312, 330 (App. Div. 1985) | 10 | | Cicon v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Franklin, 223 N.J. Super. 199, 208 (1988) | 13 | | Coventry Square v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 138 N.J. 285 (1994) | 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31 | | Cresskill v. Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 247 (1954) | 13, 19 | | D. Lobi Enters. v. Planning./Zoning Bd. of Borough of Sea Bright, 408 N.J. Super. 345, 360 (App. Div. 2009) | 9 | | Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513 (1949) | 20 | | Fallone Props., L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super. 552, 562 (App. Div. 2004) | 10 | | Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Holmdel, 228 N.J. Super. 33, 39 (App. Div. 1988), rev’d, Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 119 N.J. 61 (1990) | 16 | Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 119 N.J. 61, 74 (1990)
[brief] [...], Administrator of the Non-Resident New Jersey Estate of [...], Deceased By: ___________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: February 2, 2023  CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE  I hereby certify that on this date, an original and one (1) copy of the within Notice of Motion, Certification of [...], Esq. dated February 1, 2023 and the proposed Order were delivered via Lawyers Service for filing with the Clerk, Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Bergen County, 10 Main Street, Room 211, Hackensack, New Jersey; a copy of same was simultaneously served via Lawyers Service and email upon:  [...], Esq. [...], PC [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff, [...] [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant, [...]  A courtesy copy was simultaneously served via Lawyers Service upon:  Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Superior Court of New Jersey Chancery Division  Bergen County Justice Center [...]  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  Dated: February 2, 2023  [...]  [...], Esq. (ID No.: [...])  [...], PC [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff, [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY BERGEN COUNTY: CHANCERY DIVISION PROBATE PART DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION NOTICE OF CROSS MOTION AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION BY PLAINTIFF
[brief] (1T102-13 to 103-7; 5T10-16 to 14-3; 5T42-13 to 17; 5T48-20 to 24; 5T78-11 to 80-11; 5T105-1 to 10; 5T107-9 to 111-10).  Detective-Sergeant First Class [...], the squad leader that day, granted the team permission to do so.  (5T13-22 to 14-3; 5T43-8 to 16; 5T64-13 to 24; 5T67-10 to 17; 5T70-9 to 19; 5T76-10 to 82-10).  [...] explained that he authorized continuing with the entry because, based on what they knew from the operations plan and search warrant, the subject property “was a two-family and it should typically include the second and third floor.