ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Hinton*, 216 N.J. at 230, 239-40.  Defendant gave the gun to a complete stranger, [...].  While defendant asked her to place the gun inside an apartment he believed would protect it from discovery by police, defendant assumed the risk his objective could not be achieved.  His “precipitous bailment” of the gun to a stranger did not create any reasonable expectation of privacy in [...]’s apartment, where the gun ended up.  See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100-01, 104-06 (1980) (holding defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in purse of person who he’d known “for only a few days,” in light of the “precipitous nature of the transaction” in which he placed contraband in her purse); United States v. Austin, 66 F.3d 1115, 1116, 1118-19 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in bag when he asked stranger in airport to watch it; “defendant assumed the risk” stranger “would allow the authorities access to the bag”), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996); United States v. Miller, 636 F.2d 850, 851-54 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in smuggled fish being transferred by four persons from a trailer to trucks, as no evidence showed four persons had a “special relationship of confidence” with defendant, or worked “under some limited grant of his permission”); People v. Barronette, 507 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding bailor who made “precipitous bailment” by giving “unlocked luggage” to “a total stranger” to transport out of airport terminal lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of luggage).
[brief] Contrary to defendant’s assertion that the State’s issuance of its March 21, 2024, grand jury subpoena on [...] was a “flagrant contravention of the Grand Jury process[,]” (Db22), in fact, the State was permitted to issue the subpoena for two reasons: first, because defendant had successfully moved to have his indictment dismissed, and second, because even if the indictment had not been dismissed, the State was allowed to follow up on information proffered by defense counsel during the motion to dismiss.  First, the State could properly serve the March 21, 2024, grand jury subpoena on [...] because, as defendant concedes, “at the time of the issuance of the Grand Jury subpoena, the Indictment against Defendant had been _____________________  1  For the Court’s convenience and to avoid repetition, the State has combined the Statement of Procedural History and the Statement of Facts. dismissed by [...]. ” (Db22).  The dismissal of a defendant’s indictment dismisses the pending criminal case against him.  *State v. Campione*, 462 N.J. Super. 466, 506 (App. Div. 2020) (“As a result of the dismissal of the indictment in its entirety, the criminal action was no longer pending[.]”)  Consequently, the case returns to square one and the State may continue to investigate the allegations against the defendant the same way it did before the defendant was indicted.  *State v. Reid*, 194 N.J. 386, 407 (2008).  As our Supreme Court has noted, this means the State may send out new grand jury subpoenas and compile additional evidence in anticipation of presenting the case to a new grand jury.  *Ibid.* (noting that where indictment is dismissed, State may “re-serve a proper grand jury subpoena . . . and seek a new indictment. ”).  Here, [...] terminated the pending criminal matter against defendant when he granted defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment.  (Pa8).  The State was therefore permitted to investigate the matter anew and send a subpoena to [...] in anticipation of re-presenting defendant’s case to a state grand jury.  (Ma7).  As [...] himself noted as part of his decision, the State was “free to go back to the grand jury” if the profile was located.  (2T17-2 to 5).  The State was therefore within its legal right to send [...] a grand jury subpoena on March 21, 2024.
[brief] On December 15, 2023, after the motion had been fully briefed, the Law Clerk to the [...] wrote to the parties and requested the following:  Regarding the above captioned matter, the Court requests defense counsel provide additional briefing on "futility."  Specifically, the Court requests further briefing on R. 1:36-3 and whether it applies to this matter.  If so, provide why or why not based on the parties and issues previously addressed.  Please also brief the overarching goal of the M.S.R.A.  Finally, please provide additionally briefing on the application or non-application of res, judicata, collateral estoppel, and the single controversy doctrine."
[brief] Memorialization if Resolution PB-2022-025 granting a Preliminary and Final Site Plan Approval to construct 473 residential dwellings across two properties.  **Board Comments:**  [...] noted that the agreed upon elevator for building “E” and the additional 10 units in that building were missing from the resolution.  He stated that these conditions were very important to the Board and he suggested amending the resolution to include said requirements.  [...] suggested that the Board vote on the resolution in its current form but add the caveat to have a supplemental resolution which would include these requirements presented at a future meeting.  Within their area of jurisdiction, planning boards act in a "quasi-judicial capacity", Randolph v. City of Brigantine Planning Bd., 405 N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] In response to a baseless claim contained in [...]’ trial brief filed on May 5, 2023 that, because [...] had been formed after the Board voted to approve the application but before it took official action thereon by adopting its resolution, [...] moved to intervene on June 5, 2023.  [Da489].  The Hon. [...], J.S.C. conducted a bench trial on July 18, 2023 [1T] and asked for additional briefing on [...]’s motion to intervene.  [Da513].  The Court held further argument on August 25, 2023 and determined that [...] and [...] would have standing to challenge the Board’s jurisdiction, but concluded that if the Board had jurisdiction, they would not be able to challenge any of its decisions.  [2T at 46:4-19].  The trial court entered an Order granting leave to [...] to permit her to file a Complaint on September 22, 2023 [Da515] and she did so later that day.
[brief] Since the ratification of the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, the separation of powers and independence of the Judiciary have been pillars of the republican form of government.  Consistent with that concept, the New Jersey Constitution gives the Judiciary exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law.  The [...] ([...]) asks the Court to reaffirm that authority in this matter.  Specifically, the statute at issue here threatens to allow an executive department agency to regulate and determine what constitutes the practice of law – a power that our Constitution has left exclusively to the Judiciary.  The Court must also consider how the [...]’s ([...]) actions would impact the application of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs), which govern how attorneys conduct the business of practicing law.  If left to stand, the statutory provision at issue in this case and the powers it purports to grant to [...] and its Commissioner will erode the authority of the New Jersey Supreme Court by seeking to redefine what constitutes the practice of law and potentially limiting the ways in which attorneys currently assist those in need.  The principal issue before this Court is whether and to what extent the New Jersey Legislature is empowered to regulate the legal profession.
[brief] Snow removal contracts  On October 25, 2017, defendant [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) entered into a snow removal contract with [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).  (Da 80-95).  [...] is identified as the property owner and [...] is identified as the contractor.  (Da 80-95).  The Scope of Work stated that “SAFETY IS NOT TO BE COMPROMISED”.  (Da 89).  In addition, the contract’s Snow Removal Specifications provided that “[a]ll access roadways and walkways are to be cleared of snow prior to 6:00AM (4:00PM in the event of day storms) or as timely as possible on any given day, seven days week. ” (Da 94).  The agreement further prohibited [...] from using subcontractors without the written consent of [...].  (Da 85).  [...] then entered into a Subcontractor Agreement with [...] for the snow and ice removal work to be done at [...] in [...].  (Da 96-109).  This Subcontractor Agreement also contained the same 6 AM deadline for completion of the snow/ice removal as the underlying agreement between [...] and [...] as set forth above.  (Da 108).  D.
[directive] This Rule provides that the State may request either orally or in writing, at any time prior to the commencement of trial, a hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-13.  The State shall provide notice to the defendant’s counsel, or to the defendant if he or she is unrepresented at the time the request is made.  The court shall grant the State’s request for a hearing if the defendant is charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) of N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12.  If the defendant is not charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12, the State must demonstrate a reasonable and well grounded basis to warrant an inquiry by the court regarding: Rule 3:26-8(a–g)  Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing  (1) the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash bail to the defendant, and the defendant’s interest in ensuring bail is not forfeited, or (See also 2A:162-13, page 97 herein) (2) whether the funds used to post the cash bail or secure the bail bond were acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.  If the court grants the State’s request for a hearing as to a defendant who is not charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) of N.J.S.A. 162-12, the court shall set forth on the record and in the bail order the reasons for granting the request.  The court shall conduct a hearing within three (3) business days after bail is posted or proffered if the defendant is incarcerated, or within a reasonable period of time after granting the request if the defendant has been released on bail.  This statute provides that the court shall not require a bail in excess of $2,500 for a person charged with a fourth degree crime or disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense unless the court finds that the person presents a serious threat to the physical safety of potential evidence or of persons involved 2C:6-1 in circumstances surrounding the alleged offense; or unless the court finds that bail of that nature will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as Bail for Persons Accused of Minor required.
[brief] In accordance with the 2017 WFD Permit, [...] obtained a Tidelands License from the [...].  Appellant did not appeal that decision or file a third-party adjudicatory hearing request with regard to that decision.  Following the issuance of the 2019 Permit Modification, [...] filed an application for a Modified Tidelands License to reflect the changes approved by the 2019 Permit Modification.  Appellant challenged [...]’s application for a Modified Tidelands License and sought participation by other third parties in Appellant’s efforts to oppose who whose usage/view is impacted.  (Aa0424-Aa0428).  Appellant and other third parties submitted opposition to the [...] and appeared before the [...] to testify and present evidence for consideration.  (Aa0304-Aa0308).  [...] addressed this opposition.  (Aa0416-Aa0455; Aa0309-Aa0321; JRa004-JRa011 and the thumb drive submitted to the Appellate Division herewith containing the videos served on the [...] with that document).  On October 6, 2022, the [...] approved [...]’s Modified Tidelands License.  That case is referenced here as the information presented to [...] and the [...] as part of the review of [...]’s application for Modified Tidelands License was provided to [...] for review a part of Appellant’s subject April 23, 2019 Third-Party Adjudicatory Hearing Request.  During the underlying waterfront development permit review process, and in conjunction with [...]’s Modified Tidelands License and Appellant’s April 23, 2019 Third-Party Adjudicatory Hearing Request, [...] considered extensive evidence and properly concluded that [...]’s dock met CZM Rules and does not: hinder or pose a safety hazard to navigation; impair the ability of Appellant to use its own dock; or interfere with Appellant’s property rights.
[directive] In addition to maintaining necessary departmental records on each stationhouse adjustment, each law enforcement agency having patrol jurisdiction within the State of New Jersey shall submit quarterly reports of all stationhouse adjustments conducted by that agency to their County Prosecutor’s Office.  Quarterly reports shall also be completed by State Police patrol units and shall be submitted directly to the Superintendent of State Police.  Since one of the primary benefits to a juvenile of a stationhouse adjustment is the avoidance of the creation of a juvenile delinquency record, no personal identifying information should be submitted in the quarterly reports.  For each stationhouse adjustment the quarterly report shall contain: juvenile’s age at time of the offense, ethnicity (as reported by the juvenile), gender, the alleged offense and, if no stationhouse adjustment is conducted, indicate the reason(s) as provided on the form.  County Prosecutors’ Offices shall retain copies of the quarterly reports for five years.  A copy of the quarterly report form is attached to these guidelines.  Attorney General Guidelines - Stationhouse Adjustments
[brief] An internist trained in Critical Care Medicine has expertise in the diagnosis, treatment and support of critically ill and injured patients, particularly trauma victims and patients with serious infections and organ failure.  In addition, the … [physician] coordinate patient care among the patient’s primary physicians, critical care staff and other specialties for critical care. ”  The language of these two separate subcertifications are practically identical, and they describe precisely the nature of the care needed by and given to [...].  [...] was essentially a trauma victim because he sustained an accidental perforation of his kidney during the course of a kidney biopsy performed by [...].  After this perforation, the various physicians, including [...], attempted to diagnose, treat and support a critically injured patient as a result of this perforation which ended up with an organ failure leading to his death.  Given the functional identity of credentials between the two, the dismissal of this case against [...] is unjust.
[brief] (Ca142).  Rather, [...] noted that the landlord sat on his hands for a year and a half, and did not make any effort to raise issues during that period of time.  (Ca142).  [...] explained that the arguments being made by [...] would not give any positive result for the landlord, since there were no funds available in the receiver’s account.  (Ca142).  In addition, [...] explained that a final accounting would be very expensive.
[brief] See In Re: [...], Bankr. D.N.J. Docket No. [...]. unequivocally establish that the Plaintiffs here have absolutely no standing because the real party-in-interest is [...]  The trial court even recognized this, albeit after the fact, when it granted Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint to “conform to the evidence” by adding [...] as a plaintiff.  (Da260).  But [...] cannot recover in this action, because it has already recovered and because its statements in the other actions directly conflict with the Plaintiffs’ statements made in the court below.  Plaintiffs have stated that [...] stole millions of dollars and never repaid a dime.  [...] stated in the arbitration proceedings (Supra.) and in the litigation against [...] that it filed separately from this action (Da1012) that money was loaned by [...] to companies affiliated with [...].  (Da1013 at ¶2 and ¶7; Da1015 at ¶25; Da1016 at ¶28 and ¶32; Da1017 at ¶36 and ¶39; Da1018 at ¶43 referring to use of “loan proceeds” and ¶44 referring to “defaulting on the loan. ”  Emphasis added).  It provided loan registers and testimony (Da1080-109) detailing payments to and from these companies and obtained awards for the outstanding balances due under the five separate loan agreements.  Plaintiffs have stated that the loan agreements were fraudulent.  But they cannot be, as [...] ratified those same agreements by relying on the mandatory arbitration provisions contained in them and by electing to arbitrate – instead of litigate – to determine the amount due.  The matter now on appeal commenced with the filing of a Verified Complaint by Plaintiffs containing five separate counts, namely – Fraud, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Conversion, Rescission, and Appointment of a Receiver.
[brief] Plaintiff Is Entitled to a Level Litigation Playing Field.  This is a David v. Goliath situation.  No one is above the law.  In their opposition brief, defendants attempt to raise a substantive limitations of actions legal argument not subject to plaintiff’s notice of appeal and not part of the summary judgment record.  (Pa84; Pa480).  Indeed, defendants’ joint opposition brief is not the proper mechanism for raising this substantive issue before this appellate tribunal.
[brief] Q  Just briefly, [...], just to clarify, the color of the sweatshirt that you were wearing that had the graphics on it, it was -- it was a dark color even if it wasn't black, is that correct?  A Yes.  Q  Okay.  And the two individuals that appear in that video, one of them has a handgun, is that correct?  A Yes.  Q  Are you the individual with the handgun?  A Yes.  [...]: The State has no further questions, Your Honor, is satisfied with the factual basis.  THE COURT: [...], do you have a copy of the plea papers with you at counsel table?  THE WITNESS: Yes.  [...]: What do you want to do with the VOPs?  THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.  You can continue.  EXAMINATION BY [...]:
[brief] The doctrine of laches does not apply.  [...] cites Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003), for the proposition that the doctrine of laches and waiver are applicable.  [...]’s reliance on laches and waiver are misplaced.  In Knorr, the Supreme Court equitably estopped a defendant from raising as a defense the Affidavit of Merit statute where the defendant failed to move to dismiss for failure to file an Affidavit of Merit.  Instead, the defendant engaged in discovery and waited until the end of the discovery period to move to dismiss.  The court found that the defendant had actively used the discovery process which the plaintiffs relied upon to their detriment.  Id. at 178.  The Court in Knorr also discussed the doctrines of laches and waiver.  “Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient opportunity to assert the right in a proper forum and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned.  The key factors to consider are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the changing circumstances of either or both parties during the delay. ”  Knorr, supra, citing, Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 152 (1982).  “The core equitable concern in applying laches is whether a party has been harmed by the delay.  Ibid.  In Knorr, supra, the Supreme Court found that defendant had slept on its rights and that plaintiffs were harmed by the delay.  Ibid.  Here the doctrine of laches does not apply.
[brief] Counsel’s performance is presumed effective.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 189, 203 (2004).  As such, both prongs saddle the defendant with a weighty burden.  The defendant must show that “counsel’s assistance was not within the range of competence demanded by attorneys in criminal cases. ”  *State v. DiFrisco*, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).  Stated differently, a defendant must prove that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687; *State v. Chung*, 210 N.J. Super. 427, 434 (App. Div. 1986).  “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. ”  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689.  Those who challenge it must overcome the “‘strong presumption’” that counsel provided reasonably effective assistance, and that counsel’s decisions “followed a sound strategic approach to the case. ”  *State v. Pierre*, 233 N.J. 560, 578-79 (2015) (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689).  “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. ”  *Ibid.*  A defendant must also show actual prejudice, i.e., “a ‘reasonable probability’ that such performance affected the outcome. ”  *State v. Rountree*, 388 N.J. Super. 190, 206 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting *Fritz*, 105 N.J. at 58), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 66 (2007); see also *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694 (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ”).  Courts considering ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims need not address both prongs “if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  “Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result. ”  Ibid.  To that end, courts are “permitted leeway to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not, to dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. ”  State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012).
[brief] ” (2T12).  Based on this flawed analysis, the Court found “there is no nexus between the use of the automobile and the injuries that have subsequently occurred and that the car was not being operated at the time of the injury. ” (2T12-13).  It appears that the Trial Court was erroneously focused on whether or not the vehicle was in motion, i.e. “proximately caused” the hot tea to spill into the Plaintiff’s lap.  Indeed, at oral argument on the initial motions for partial summary judgment on November 9, 2023, the Trial Court interjected seeking confirmation that the Plaintiff’s vehicle was “stopped”, evidencing the misplaced focus.  (1T8).  This reasoning is clearly erroneous given the well-established case law cited herein, including the Smaul case in which this court held that a substantial nexus is found even when the injuries at issue were not directly or proximately caused by the automobile, or its motion or operation.
[brief] As indicated above, [...] improperly converted $13,321,285 in fraudulent management fees after October 1, 2003 and through 2011, which includes the five years after the Appellate Division’s decision....  That is $2,053,285 more in misappropriated management fees (from 2003 to 2011) than the entire 15-year period leading up to 2003.  After the trial court erroneously ruled the valuation of the property to be zero in March of 2004, [...] ... increased their take of management fees from $495,285 in 2003 to $1.5 million in 2004, a 300% increase.  The Wilfs did not stop there.  After the 2006 Appellate Division decision, ... [...] increased their “management fees” from $1.6 million in 2006 to $1,975,000 in 2007 and to $2,143,000 in 2008.  ....  After [...] filed his Complaint ... in 2009, ... [...] converted a total of $2,130,000 in 2009.  *The above provides just a few examples of a much larger and more pervasive scheme of fraud.*