ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s Policies and Procedures.  [...] maintains a number of workplace policies and procedures, made available to employees through an internal network called “PolicyTech. ” (Pa65; Pa92; Pa405).  All [...] employees have access to PolicyTech.  (Pa92).  Any employee who believes that he or she has been subject to harassment or discrimination must report the alleged conduct immediately to an employee from Human Resources.  (Ibid.).  [...] may commence discipline at any level, including discharge without prior warnings or other corrective action.  (Ibid.).  [...] possesses the sole discretion for use of progressive discipline.  (Ibid.).  [...] requires all of its employees to complete training on “mandatory competencies” each year via [...]’s “Health Stream” lessons.  (Pa352 at 43:3-22; Pa431 at 11:4-18; Pa93 at 38:21-24).  [...] strictly adheres to its anti-harassment policy.  (Pa431 at 11:19-25).  [...] also trains its supervisors on disciplinary policies and the process for disciplining employees.  (Pa352-53 at 44:7-45:4).  Management also receives coaching from Human Resources on [...] policies.  (Pa93 at 38:12-13).  Employee complaints about discrimination or retaliation are to be directed to that employee’s manager or a Human Resources representative.  (Pa94 at 44:7-14).  If any complaints are made under [...]’s policies, Human Resources investigates the allegations.  (Pa432 at 15:16-16:1; Pa94 at 44:15-18).  IV.
[brief] [...] has adopted an ordinance in compliance with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38 and -39, and as related to the current matter, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.  Under [...] Ordinance §§ 142-77 and 142-78\(^3\), --- \(^3\) [...] Ordinance 142-77 applies to preliminary major subdivision and preliminary site plan applications, while [...] Ordinance 142-78 applies to final major subdivision and final site plan applications.  [...] Ordinance 142-78 refers and incorporates the requirements listed in section “[a] preliminary submission is required of all subdivisions classified as major subdivisions and of all development proposals requiring site plan review. ”  Here, Applicant did not present evidence or testimony on the various topics required under the township ordinances adopted pursuant to the MLUL and the Board was therefore unable to make the requisite findings necessary for approval.  Applicant argues after the fact that it did submit the required evidence and documents.  However, even if the materials were considered part of the record, Plaintiffs were not permitted to present testimony or cross-examine witnesses on the application materials.  (1T41-16 to 1T41-23; 2T22-15 to 2T22-22).  Not only were Plaintiffs not allowed to present testimony or comments on the application materials, but board members were similarly shut down from attempting to ask questions regarding those application materials.  (1T40-19 to 1T41-13).  For these reasons, the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] The Defense argued the police had no basis to stop and frisk the six men who were standing on Leonard Avenue that night because “there was no testimony at all that any of those individuals were armed and dangerous. ”  (1T 46-23 to 47-2)  The Defense also asserted there was no basis to stop [...] because [...]’s testimony established only that [...] and the other three men had been seen “greeting other people,” and there “was no testimony at all of criminal activity. ”  (1T 46-5 to 46-7)  The Defense argued:  “It's not illegal to talk to people on the street; nor is it illegal to stand on the street, nor is it illegal to be outside in a high crime area at night. ”  (1T 46-11 to 46-14)  The State argued there was “reasonable articulable suspicion” to stop and frisk [...], because “The group of males were dressed in all black, located in a poorly lit area wearing black ski masks and engaging in suspicious conduct[,] . . . and when law enforcement arrived, they further bladed their bodies,” raising “concern[s] . . . that they were armed and dangerous.
[brief] Prior to trial, counsel for the defense sought to bar [...] from testifying on the cause of death.  (Db13).  The defendant, in her brief, claims that “[t]he in limine hearing established that [...]’s conclusion [that the death was caused by homicide] was not based on his autopsy of [...]” (Db13).  However, this misstates [...]’s actual testimony that he relied on “[t]he condition that the remains were found in – the fact that they were so severely altered.  And also the fact that the – the type of fracture that was found on the right side of the skull is not consistent with typical accidental trauma.  Is – all those things combined were enough to – to render an opinion. ” (15T:84-9 to 14).  [...] stated in no uncertain terms that his opinion was based on a totality of circumstances and scientific evidence he examined, including the anthropology report prepared by [...], in his professional role as medical examiner.  Under N.J. Admin. Code §8:70-1.8, “’Proper forensic practice’ consists of those procedures which are required to perform the mandated role of medical examiner, which is to determine the cause and manner of death within a reasonable degree of medical probability [and] to identify and analyze evidence in criminal matters[...].”
[brief] Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F “Aggravation of the Preexisting Disability” (January 1997).  Appellant also cites to *Sherry v. Buonansonti*, a case where the plaintiff had two (2) incidents approximately three (3) months apart, again with overlapping injuries, which was dismissed on grounds irrelevant to the instant Appeal; specifically, lack of objective evidence to vault the (pre-AICRA) verbal threshold.  *Sherry v. Buonansonti*, 287 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 1996).  In *Sherry*, The Court simply noted that the plaintiff had *also* failed to present a comparative analysis to apportion damages between the incident at issue and the subsequent re-injury.  *Id.*  The same applies to *Blanks v. Murphy*, 268 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 1993), a case involving pre-existing injuries and a discussion of the language contained in the old model civil jury charge 6.10 regarding aggravation.  *Reichert, Sherry* and *Blanks* are the exact opposite from the instant matter, wherein the undisputed evidence establishes the plaintiff to have been asymptomatic at all relevant times prior to the subject incident and having not been subject to any re-injury in any superseding event since the subject incident.
[brief] The [...] only states, “The Owner of the Subject Property has reported that damage occurred to the existing dwelling on the property during construction due to vibration impacts of the work. ”  Da315.  No further information or analysis is provided by the [...] as to the vibration thresholds; no data is provided to support the speculative statement that the vibrations which exceed the maximum levels set forth in the USBM Report were connected to the start of the construction project; e.g., the delivery of the “large stones up to 7 tons in weight” but rather uses vague, generalize terms as “typical activities” and “this activity is typically among the most vibration-inducing activities . . .”
[directive] See, N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50.2(e); 39:3-10.24e; and 12:7-55e.  These statutory requirements, however, are merely a reflection of the fact that a chemical breath test requires the active participation and cooperation defendant.11 of the  A refusal to submit to chemical breath testing is a non-criminal offense which permits the State to prove a violation of the offense by meeting and satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.  Penalties for refusing to submit to chemical breath testing are substantial and are to be imposed in addition to any other penalties imposed for a violation of the DWI statute.  The sentences for DWI and refusal are mandatory and may not be merged.  State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 496, 498-9.  The legislative purpose for enacting the Implied Consent statutes is reflected by the following statement “that the Implied Consent Law is a strong disincentive to driving while intoxicated.
[brief] In *Homan*, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained  “Even the seemingly straightforward one-leg-stand test requires precise administration. ”  *Id.* at 956.  In addition, the Court explained the care necessary in administration of all the standard field sobriety tests for the test to be admissible because deviation causes the results to be unreliable: “it is well established that in field sobriety testing even minor deviations from the standardized procedures can severely bias the results. ”  *Id.* at 957.  This Court will reverse a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt from a trial de novo in the Law Division when it finds “obvious and exceptional error. ”  *State v. Zingis*, 471 N.J. Super. 590, 602 (App. Div.), certif. gr., cause remanded on other grounds, 251 N.J. 502 (2022).
[directive] Overtime for local, county state law enforcement  1. personnel, travel, and training for the same, surveillance equipment to be used in the operation, cellular telephone costs, payments to confidential informant purchase of stolen property as evidence, and space/automobile 3 rental.  Remote body-worn transceivers for undercover 2 . work, purchase or lease of unmarked vehicles, and training for officers assigned to the joint operation.  Rental of off-site locations for electronic 3. monitoring, rental of an off-site command post, and costs of translation of evidentiary tapes.  Leasing copying or facsimile machines only if of 4. the machines are used solely for the joint operation.  PROCEDURES
[brief] [...] alleges that the Board “prohibited” Appellants from submitting counter testimony to the application and essentially preventing itself from hearing pertinent information that would have assisted it in making an informed decision on the application.  However, [...] omits the fact that it never attempted to submit any counter testimony to the Board.  Accordingly, by [...]’s own admission, the trial court correctly found that “the Board heard no contrary testimony that pertained to the subdivision.
[directive] Aggravating Factor #4c applies when the defendant served as a middle or upper-echelon participant in a drug-distribution scheme.  The point value for this Aggravating Factor ranges from +3 to +4, which should be determined by the prosecutor based upon the defendant’s level within the drug-distribution hierarchy, considering the extent of the defendant’s decision-making authority, the nature and participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the proceeds of the criminal activity, the degree of participation, planning, or organizing of the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.
[brief] Coventry Square, Inc. v. Bd. of Adj., 138 N.J. 285 (1994).............................  16  Crescent Park Tenants Assn. v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98 (1971).................................................................................. 28, 36 DePetro v. Wayne Twp. Planning Bd., 367 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied 181 N.J. 544 (2004)........................................................ passim
[brief] 23 - **In re Petition of Hall**, 147 N.J. 379 (1997) .................................................................  8 - **McCormick v. State**, 446 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 2016) ...........................................  9 - **Mears v. Sandoz Pharms., Inc.**, 300 N.J. Super. 622 (App. Div.1997) ..................... 16 - **Medina v. Pitta**, 442 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2015) ....................................................
[brief] (17T16-19 to 17-8).  The judge told the jury the case was being and was not aware of any tension between the two men.  (16T191-24 to 197-21).  adjourned until May 9, sparking a voir dire with multiple jurors who had pre-existing travel plans.  (17T47-16 to 60-12).  When one juror was dismissed, only thirteen jurors remained.  (17T58-23 to 59-1).  The jury was charged, after closing arguments, on the afternoon of May 9.  (20T152-24 to 213-3).  The next morning, the alternate juror was selected, and the jury began deliberations at approximately 9:28 a.m. (21T15-3 to 18-18).  Even before that happened, defense counsel urged the court to tell the jurors the parties had agreed to continue with less than twelve jurors if deliberations did not conclude that day, so the jury would not rush.  (21T11-22 to 12-9).  The court declined to do so, seeing no indication that this was the case.  (21T12-10 to 17).  After about three hours of deliberations, the jury was brought back into the courtroom and was excused for lunch.
[brief] As noted, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld an uneven arbitration clause in *Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris*, 189 N.J. 28 (2006); however, the reasoning employed there strongly suggests that this state’s high court would follow the majority position, and throw out this one-sided arbitration clause.  The reason the Supreme Court upheld the clause in *Delta Funding* was because the commercial party had not sought to bind the consumer to arbitration, while excusing itself totally from arbitration, at its election.  The Court’s reasoning plainly suggests that the commercial party’s “right” to submit all of its claims to court, while binding the consumer to arbitration, would be violative of substantive conscionability:
[brief] The disregard for sales locations was best illustrated by our Supreme Court:  To use a mundane example, assume that an automobile manufacturer gave a franchise to a dealer in Montvale, New Jersey to serve northern Bergen County, New Jersey as well as Rockland County, New York.  Would we assume that the New Jersey Legislature would be indifferent to the dealer’s plight if, after having made a substantial investment in the fixed plant and having created a market for the manufacturer’s vehicle in Rockland County, the manufacturer, without good cause, took over the Rockland County market for itself?
[brief] In that remand hearing, both the form and substance of the notice may be examined.  (pp. 19-23)  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270.  (Emphasis added).  In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa62.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb13.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, the Division admits that it did not notify the members of the retirement system within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  This further establishes good cause to relax the timeframe.  We respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.
[brief] Plaintiff emphasizes that the defendant was allowed to introduce the results of a complaint survey investigation conducted by the [...] (“[...]”), without presenting the testimony of the surveyor, [...], RN, thus allowing defendant to rely upon documentation “finding defendant committed no violations of federal and state law with regard to [...]’s death. ” (Pb1; see Pb1-2; Pb10-24.)  Plaintiff further contends that her experts [...] M.D. and [...], R.N. were prohibited from giving testimony regarding respiratory therapy.  Plaintiff’s arguments are incorrect.
[brief] (Pa260a-Pa262a).  [...]’s motion included the same certification previously provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel.  (Ibid.).  On January 2, 2020, the trial court entered an order denying [...]’s motion without prejudice.  (Pa263a).  The court’s order did not include any explanation of why [...] was not entitled to dismissal.  (Pa264a).  Instead, the Court set forth boilerplate law governing motions to dismiss and then stated as follows:  “From the Complaint as pleaded, in accordance with the Printing Mart standard, the court finds the cause of action can be gleaned and that further discovery is warranted before a Motion To Dismiss or Motion For Summary Judgment can be granted.
[brief] Cases  Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 144 N.J. 479 (1996)  ...........................................................................................................13  Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102 (2004) .............................................................................................................11, 12 Burt v. West Jersey Health Systems, 339 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2001) ................................................................................passim Carrino v.  Novotny, 78 N.J. 355 (1979)  ..............................................................................................................14  Jones v. Morey’s Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142 (2017)  ..............................................................................................................7, 8  Krzykalski v. Tindall, 232 N.J. 525 (2018)  .............................................................................................................11, 12  Lee’s Hawaiian Islanders, Inc. v. Safety First Products, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 493 (App. Div. 1984)  ..................................................................................10  Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Techdan, LLC, 253 N.J. 87 (2023)  .................................................................................................................14  Maison v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 245 N.J. 270 (2021)  ..............................................................................................................11  Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 2019 WL 1012532 (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2019)  .......................................................................7  Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. 241 N.J. 360 (2020)  .............................................................................................................passim S. P. Dunham’s & Co. v. Dzurinko, 125 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div.  1973) ....................................................................................3  Tonelli v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Wyckoff, 185 N.J. 438 (2005) ...........................................................................................................8  Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76 (2013) ..................................................................................................................11  Weir v. Mkt. Transition Facility of New Jersey, 318 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 1999) ....................................................................................4 Young v. Latta, 123 N.J. 584 (1991) ..................................................................................................................11  Other Authorities
[brief] (Pa1).  In January 2017, [...] sought financial relief from bank accounts which she owed money on.  (Id.)  [...] contacted [...] seeking debt consolidation services for her indebtedness.  (Id.)  After a brief conversation with a [...] representative, [...] entered into a Client Services Agreement (“the Contract”) with [...] in which she would “pay a monthly payment over a period of time to have [...] settle all open collection accounts against [her], as well as for other debt relief services. ” (Pa5).  [...] agreed to pay [...] $594.18 per month for 24 months in exchange for their services.  (Id.).  [...] was not a party to the Contract.  [...] had no separate contract with [...].  [...] selected [...] – from a myriad of possible companies – to act as the neutral payment processor “by which [...] [got] paid. ”  (Id.).  By the time the instant lawsuit was filed, [...] was defunct.  As a result, [...] – in a conclusory fashion and without basis – claimed that [...] “conspir[ed]” with [...] to commit fraudulent business schemes.  The extent of [...]’ allegations being that “[...] processes electronic funds on behalf of [] [...]” and “is in the business of providing payment processing services for [] Debt Adjusters, like [...], and . . . retains a fee for the service. ” (Pa1-Pa19).  Despite the allegations, [...] was never involved in any alleged schemes.  Instead, [...] simply transferred funds pursuant to the terms of the Contract.  Notably, [...] cites to no evidence indicating [...]’ involvement in [...]’s “unlawful debt adjustment activities” other than the fact they are referenced in the Contract.  (Pa1).  The Contract requires that claims any claims asserted by [...] be determined by arbitration.  (Pa30).  Because [...] has no separate contract with [...], all of her claims against the company arise from the [...] Contract.  As a non-signatory to the [...] Contract whose is being sued based on provisions of that agreement and who detrimentally relied on the Contract terms, [...] has standing to enforce the arbitration provision.  Therefore, the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 4:6–2(a), and “binding Plaintiff to resolv[e] her dispute with [] [...] by arbitration. ”  (Pa69).
[brief] Pa68.  Part One of the policy provides coverage pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act, and Part Two of the policy provides coverage pursuant to the Employers Liability Insurance Law.  Pa68.  Part Two expressly provides coverage for bodily injury arising out of and in the course of the injured employee’s employment “when the employee has a legally recognized right to bring a Superior Court action for damages. ”  Pa437.  The policy contains an exclusion under C5 for “Bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by” [...].