ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa000637).  In its oral decision granting sanctions, the trial court noted that there was no evidence of trespass by [...].  (2T Hearing).  The trial court also stated that, while there were plans prepared by [...] that admittedly would impact the Plaintiffs’ property, “after Plaintiff complained that they did not want to be involved in this re-development project, [...] changed the plans. ” (2T Hearing, page 8, line 5 to line 16).  The trial court failed to appreciate that Plaintiffs were not aware that their Property had been incorporated into the Project.
[brief] H794a P-3o: Map of Holmdel identifying location of transmission line as well as Zoning and environmental restrictions ([...]) (SOICR p. 10) ............................................................  H795a P-4: Overall Plan and Site Plan and Grading Plan ([...]) (SOICR p. 10) ..........................................................  H796a P-4o: Facility Site Plan ([...]) (SOICR p. 10) ..............  H798a P-5: Site Plan with Landscaping ([...]) (SOICR p. 10) . .  H799a P-6: Transcript of [...], final vote (October 25, 2018) (excerpted pages) ([...]) (SOICR p. 10) has not been included in the Appendix; the transcript has been filed separately P-7: Cover letter of public hearing exhibit (including proof of publications, and mailing of notice to municipal and county clerks/executives) (SOICR p. 10) ........................................... H800a Published Notice to the Residents of Holmdel ....................... H801a [...] Affidavit of Notice ............................................. H802a [...] Proof of Insertion 1/17/2020 ...................... H803a Notice print out January 17, 2020, [...] ............ H804a [...] Proof of Insertion Jan. 28, 2020 ....... H805a Notice print out January 17, 2020, Daily Record .................. H806a P-8: Company Panel ([...], [...], and [...]), Rebuttal Testimony (SOICR p. 10)................................................. H807a Attachment SPW-1, photograph ........................................ H842a Attachment SPW-2, proposed plantings buffer ....................... H843a Attachment SPW-3, photograph ....................................... H844a Attachment SPW-4, six views: Viewpoint 01 - Holmdel Road South, Looking Southwest, Existing View ............................................................. H846a Viewpoint 01 - Holmdel Road South, Looking Southwest - Proposed View (vegetation depicts as planted heights)
[brief] 13, 14 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)  11  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)  17 Khan v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 91 (2009)  14  Leang v Jersey City Board of Education, 399 NJ Super 329, 356-357 (App. Div 2008)
[brief] [...] and [...] represented the “[...] and the [...]” and “[...] . . . Sought to Conceal the [...]’s Plot” by “fil[ing] a pre-trial motion in the Superior Court of Camden County, on August 31, 2023, to preclude any reference to [...] and [...] in the matter. ” (Indictment, pages 62-63, Pa70-Pa71).  It is unfortunate but evident that [...] and its partners, including the unidentified co-conspirator “[...],” participated in the criminal enterprise with Mr. [...] and his co-defendants.  In fact, as set forth above, [...] represented the public entities the defendants used to wield power and influence and to extort private citizens.  And as a result of their schemes, in which [...] participated, Mr. [...] and his co-defendants enriched themselves and their businesses.  As set forth in the Indictment, “The [...] Reap[ed] the Financial Benefits of the Private Interests Extorted from [...].
[brief] ” (Da39972 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). )  The trial court further found that the [...]’ unlawful conduct, which included false representations to the court, continued through the trial.  (Da39973.)  The court highlighted the non-stop egregious conduct through the use of a chart documenting the amount of money the [...] “removed from the partnership through various means, all of which were determined by [...] and affirmed on appeal. ”  (Da39972-73.)  Contrary to the [...]’ argument, the trial court also applied the requirements of the Punitive Damages Act to make specific factual findings about the appropriate amount of punitive damages assessed against each of the individual Defendants on remand.
[brief] This was the upshot of \textit{In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig.}, 488 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433 (D.N.J. 2007):  “Congress clearly vested [...] with the regulatory authority to assess and manage the communications regarding product recalls. ”  It thus denied a request to order the manufacturer to provide a warning to patients not authorized by [...], noting it “could create a potentially dangerous situation” if that warning is inconsistent with the warning [...] decides should be issued.  \textit{Id. Clark v. Actavis Group hf}, 567 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717-19 (D.N.J. 2008), also denied a request to order a warning not approved by [...], similarly explaining that [...] had exclusive “authority to monitor and supervise product recalls.
[brief] The Borough’s Noise Ordinance was rendered void not only on the grounds of preemption noted above, but additionally due to its unconstitutional overbreadth.  Specifically, the prohibitions of the Noise Ordinance include “excessive … loud talking of … patrons, or others who disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood” and “any other continuous noise … which is unreasonably loud, disturbing, unnecessary, and which annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare of others … .”  The proof of such violations is merely “by plainly audible means as detected at more than 50 feet from the property line from which the noise nuisance is emanating or from within the receptor’s premises in the event the source and the receptor share a common or abutting wall, floor or ceiling or are on the same property. ”  These terms exceed the bounds of reasonableness, allow for unlimited discretion in enforcement, and necessarily prompt a subjective determination by an enforcing officer.  The trial court aptly determined that such provisions cannot stand.
[brief] [...]: ? [2/14/22, 2:21:00 PM]  [...]: ? [2/14/22, 2:30:04 PM]  ✷: what do you want to pay?  [2/14/22, 2:30:12 PM]  ✷: quit claim?  [2/14/22, 2:37:17 PM]  [...]: Yes [2/14/22, 2:53:59 PM]
[brief] For all of the reasons stated herein, [...] properly granted [...]’ motion for summary judgment.  The clear, unambiguous language of its lease with [...] did not give it control of the area where plaintiff fell.  It did not impose an obligation upon this defendant to have done anything to maintain the parking lot other than pay its pro rata share of common area charges.  Nor did this defendant have any duty to have monitored the condition of the parking lot or to have notified the landlord of its condition.  Since this defendant had no control over the parking lot, the trial court properly declined to find a common law duty upon this defendant to have taken any action regarding its condition.  Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of [...] should be affirmed.  Alternatively, plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed for the failure to comply with the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff [...] certainly knew or should have known the identities of this and the other tenant defendants well within the two year period following the March 16, 2017 accident.  He also believed that he had a cause of action against them as of the date of the accident.  Therefore, he had a legal obligation to have filed his complaint within that time period.  He was and is not entitled to the benefit of either the “discovery rule” or the “relation back” doctrine under the circumstances set forth herein.  In the event that this Court disagrees with this defendant’s position on liability for [...]’s accident and injuries, it should still affirm the summary judgment in its favor based upon plaintiffs’ failure to have filed suit against this defendant within the appropriate time frame.  Respectfully submitted, s/[...]
[brief] ARGUMENT  The Appellate Court “review[s] de novo a trial court's legal conclusions, including decisions to affirm or vacate arbitration awards. ”  Pami Realty, LLC v. Locations XIX Inc., 468 N.J. Super. 546, 556 (App. Div. 2021) (internal citation omitted) (citing Yarborough v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 455 N.J. Super. 136, 139 (App. Div. 2018)).  The Appellate Court must “give deference to a trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record but not to the application of law to those findings. ”  Id. (citing sources); see also Del Piano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 503, 507 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that when reviewing a trial court’s decision vacating or confirming an arbitration award, findings of fact must be accepted if not clearly erroneous and questions of law are decided de novo).  Here the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by ignoring the clear terms of the PTA and imposing extra-contractual obligations on [...].  The Arbitrator also made objective errors in his calculation of interest and transcription of the EGP from the Arbitration exhibits into the Award.  The Trial Court erred when confirming the Award in both the Trial Court’s rendition of the facts and its application of those facts to the law.  The Trial Court also erred when it deprived [...] of the ability to assert a counterclaim for setoff against the Award, and its proposed alternative relief (that [...] file its setoff claim in the proceeding that is determining the amount of the setoff) is simply not feasible.  **POINT I**
[brief] See Marmo, 478 N.J. Super. at 612 (Plaintiff’s “delay in moving to compel arbitration allowed it to obtain the benefit of early discovery that might not have been as easily obtainable in arbitration. ”).  Months after filing her Complaint, [...] propounded copious discovery demands and has had the benefits of responses from Appellants.  She has participated in discovery by producing thousands of documents which Appellants promptly reviewed in order to comply with the Chancery Court’s trial scheduling.  Even [...]’s refusal to appear for a noticed deposition weighs in favor of waiver as [...]’s deposition was noticed months prior to her Motion to Compel Arbitration and, as it drew near, [...] moved to change the forum thereby “depriv[ing Defendants] of the ability to carry out [such] deposition[] as a right under the Rules of Court. ”  Id. at p. 23.  Fifth, [...] has not raised arbitration in any of her prior filings – to the contrary, she has certified that arbitration was not contemplated.
[brief] THE JURY WAS NOT CHARGED THAT IT COULD ACQUIT DEFENDANT OF BROWN’S HOMICIDE ON THE GROUND OF SELF-DEFENSE IF IT FOUND, AS DEFENDANT TESTIFIED, THAT HE FIRED A WARNING SHOT UP IN THE AIR.  (Not Raised Below)  [...] testified that he fired twice, both times in self-defense.  (23T 173-12 to 14, 175-24 to 176-17)  [...] fired the first shot up in the air as a warning in response to the sounds of gunfire (23T 173-12 to 14, 174-6 to 7; 24T 203-8 to 10, 206-20 to 21); he fired the second shot because he believed [...] was armed and “was going to kill [him]” (24T 203-8 to 10, 204-9 to 18, 217-20 to 22).  There was evidence that others besides [...] also fired guns (14T 215-15 to 216-1, 218-11 to 222-5, 223-5 to 13, 225-1 to 226-8; 22T 246-4 to 8, 283-6 to 9; 23T 175-2 to 5), but the police found only two shell casings at the scene, and the ballistics examiner said they came from the same gun (11T 97-1 to 2, 98-16 to 17, 101-19 to 20, 121-14 to 17; 12T 48-12 to 15, 50-17 to 25, 71-15 to 17, 84-19 to 85-3).  Although [...] testified that he fired up in the air and did not shoot [...] (24T 203-14 to 21, 232-25 to 233-3), the jury could have found, indeed, almost assuredly found, that the warning shot struck and killed [...].
[brief] The undisputed facts show that Defendant waived the First Contract’s requirements of 20,000 pound releases pursuant to applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), as adopted in New Jersey.  Article 2 of the UCC, titled “Sales,” applies to transactions in goods.  N.J.S.A. 12A:2-102.  The term “goods” is defined as “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Division 8) and things in action. ”  N.J.S.A. 12A:2-105(1).  A “course of performance” is a sequence of conduct between parties to a contract that exists if both: (1) the agreement of the parties with respect to the transaction involves repeated occasions for performance by a party; and (2) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it, accepts the performance or acquiesces in it without objection.  N.J.S.A. 12A:1-303(a)(1)-(2).  “[C]ourse of performance is relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with the course of performance. ”  N.J.S.A. 12A:1-303.  There can be no dispute that the First Contract falls within the definition of a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC.
[brief] (Pa030).  Plaintiff admitted that she did not know what exactly made contact with her back.  (Pa030).  Plaintiff admitted she never saw Defendant [...] behind his cart, pushing his cart, and/or pulling his cart prior to the impact.  (Pa030-Pa031).  Plaintiff had no knowledge as to who loaded [...]’ U-boat.  (Pa031).  Plaintiff did not know whether any [...] employee in any way assisted in loading products onto [...]’ U-boat prior to the accident.
[brief] Moreover, the omitted language sought authority to search, not to arrest as occurred with [...].  In the grand jury presentment the State embellished the description of defendant's arrest by asserting that prior to arresting defendant he was commanded to "stop," which he ignored:  "Did the defendant ignore commands for him to stop?  A Yes, sir."  (GJT13-4 to 6; Ca130). 14  Defendant, in his statement, asserts that while he did attempt to flee the scene he did so because he saw several armed men in plain clothes approach him with weapons drawn and, fearing for his life, attempted to flee; he did not recognize the men approaching him with weapons drawn as police.
[directive] DW S ,W LV RIWHQ GHVLUDEOH WR UHVROYH DOO SHQGLQJ FKDUJHV DJDLQVW D GHIHQGDQW LQ D VLQJOH ´SDFNDJHµ GLVSRVLWLRQ VR DV WR FRQVHUYH OLPLWHG MXGLFLDO DQG SURVHFXWRULDO UHVRXUFHV 1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKH IRUHJRLQJ DQG LQ RUGHU WR DYRLG WKH LPSHUPLVVLEOH ´GRXEOH FRXQWLQJµ RI WKH ZHDSRQV LQYROYHPHQW DJJUDYDWLQJ FLUFXPVWDQFH ZKHUH D GHIHQGDQW SOHDGV JXLOW\ WR D GUXJ GLVWULEXWLRQ W\SH FKDUJH XQGHU WKH ´%ULPDJHµ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·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 RI $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO 'LUHFWLYH 3DJH $33/,&$7,21 127( ([WHQGHG 7HUP (OLJLELOLW\ $SSOLHV :LWKRXW 5HJDUG WR WKH 5HPRWHQHVV RI WKH 3ULRU 'UXJ 'LVWULEXWLRQ 7\SH &RQYLFWLRQ >6HH *XLGHOLQHV 3DUW
[brief] *Ogunyemi v. Garden State Medical Center*, No. [...], 2024 WL 1243552 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. March 25, 2024), citing *Roach v. BMW Motoring LLC*, 228 N.J. 163 (2017), quoting *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., LLC*, 219 N.J. 430 (2014).
[brief] Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED .................................................................................. ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................................  4 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................  5  ARGUMENT .............................................................................................  9  Introduction ............................................................................................  9  POINT I THIS ARBITRATION LANGUAGE DOES NOT ADVANCE THE PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTING THE LAW SUPPORTING THE GENERAL ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS AND, IN FACT, CONTRAVENES THAT VERY PUBLIC POLICY, AS THE “MAJORITY” POSITION IN CASE LAW RECOGNIZES [Raised Below at Pa 67-72; Decided at Pa1-16]
[brief] DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004)).  Thus, the Court should apply the plain language of the NJCFLA without the need to resort to extrinsic sources to determine that the contract governing the account was rendered void by [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA.  Ibid.
[brief] The Injury to an Insured exclusion in the PURE Excess Policy provides:  We will not provide coverage for damages, defense costs or any other costs or expenses:  14.  **Insured**  For personal injury to you or an insured under this policy.  This exclusion does not apply to coverage provided under Excess Supplementary Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage, if a limit for this coverage is shown on your Declarations.  (Pa 93, at § III, Exclusions).
[brief] On November 19, 2021, [...] moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.  (See Da1).  Oral argument was held and on August 11, 2022, the Trial Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint.  (Da83).  The Trial Court’s August 11th Statement of Reasons carefully analyzed and rejected Plaintiff’s claims but provided Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her Complaint in order to address the legal deficiencies cited by the Trial Court.  (Da106).  On September 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Class Action Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”).
[brief] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING COUNTS SIX AND SEVEN AS TO DEFENDANTS KUCINSKI AND DANCHECK MARTIN (10a-14a).  The lower court ruled in error that Defendants [...] and Dancheck could not be individually liable under the NJLAD as aiders and abettors.  First, reversal is warranted because the lower court relied on many of the same justifications that led to the dismissal of Count One against Defendant [...].  This was error for the same reasons that Plaintiff as already articulated, and are incorporated herein by reference.  In addition, reversal is warranted because the lower court found that Plaintiff did not establish an underlying claim of retaliation by Defendant [...].  However, should this Court find that the dismissal of Count One warrants reversal, this justification would fail.  The lower court also erroneously found that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants [...] and [...] were aware of having a part in any illegal activity.  Even a cursory review of the Amended Complaint refutes this finding, given that Defendants [...] and [...] knowingly and substantially assisted in retaliating against Plaintiff by authorizing the sham investigation, spanning over six months, where the investigator did not give Plaintiff an opportunity to meaningfully respond to a legible transcript and did not interview any of the individuals that she identified with knowledge, despite saying he would do both things.  231a-242a, 246a-247a.  Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants [...] and [...] must be accepted as true for the purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss.  Reversal is also warranted as to Defendants [...] and [...] based on the Lower Court’s erroneously reliance on El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) and Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008), two pre-Roa cases.  As this is already extensively discussed as to Defendant [...], Plaintiff incorporates the same argument by reference.  Finally, lower court erroneously found that Defendants [...] and [...] are entitled to qualified immunity for authorizing the sham investigation.  But the qualified immunity defense, a defense to federal civil rights claims and state law Title 59 claims, does not apply to NJLAD claims.  See Brown v. City of Bordentown, 348 N.J. Super. 143, 150-51 (App. Div. 2002); Miller v. New Jersey, 144 Fed. Appx. 926 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Rodriguez v. Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334, 354 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that the analysis related to the qualified immunity defense in the context of federal claims does not apply to NJLAD claims)).  The lower court ignored that Plaintiff complained about the method of conducting the investigation, which she alleges was done in a retaliatory manner.  231a, ¶ 133.  Moreover, Plaintiff has argued that Defendants [...] and [...] are liable as aiders and abettors under the NJLAD.  T45:9-14.  For all of these reasons, the lower court’s dismissal of Counts Six and Seven to Defendants [...] and [...] should be reversed.