ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Comer, 249 N.J. at 385, 407, 400 (characterizing “expert psychologists” as uniquely qualified to determine questions of maturity and rehabilitation, and highlighting the importance of brain science in the sentencing of juvenile offenders); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(7) (listing goals of statutory sentencing factors, including the advancement of “generally accepted scientific methods and knowledge in ²  Moreover, the court never specified which statements allegedly contradicted the original experts.  And as discussed in defendant’s appellate briefing, [...] has never contradicted the facts as established during his guilty plea, wherein he was urged to take the gun and shoot [...].  (Db33-34) (PSR3) sentencing offenders”); *State v. Jenewicz*, 193 N.J. 440, 456 (2008) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony from substance abuse counselor that was relevant to claim of self-defense); *State in Int. of M.P.*, 476 N.J. Super. 242, 289 (App. Div. 2023) (court should have considered unrebutted expert testimony regarding juvenile's personal intellectual, educational, and cognitive limitations in determining whether his waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary).
[brief] Order Brought by [...] (Attached at Pa256)  Certification of [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa258)  Certification of Eldridge [...] to Motion to Dismiss and suppress 10/14/2020 (Attached at Pa229)  Statement of Facts - Police Reports Attached 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa259)  [...]’ Letter to [...] and [...] 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa0056)  Notice of Claim to [...] 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa053)
[directive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·V *XLGHOLQHV IRU 1HJRWLDWLQJ &DVHV 8QGHU ´%ULPDJHµ *XLGHOLQHV GLG QRW LQWHQG WKDW HYHU\ SURILW PLQGHG GUXJ FDVH EH WUHDWHG DV LI LW LQYROYHG RUJDQL]HG FULPLQDO DFWLYLW\ ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI $JJUDYDWLQJ )DFWRU E ,W LV WUXH WKDW WKLV DJJUDYDWLQJ IDFWRU ´LV GHULYHG VXEVWDQWLDOO\ YHUEDWLP IURP WKH DJJUDYDWLQJ FLUFXPVWDQFHV GHILQHG LQ 1 - 6 $ & D µ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·V SRVVHVVLRQ SURYLGHV DPSOH VXSSRUW IRU WKH WULDO MXGJH·V ILQGLQJ WKDW GHIHQGDQW ZDV D SDUWLFLSDQW LQ WKDW RUJDQL]HG GLVWULEXWLRQ QHWZRUN > 1 - 6XSHU DW @ ,VVXHG )HEUXDU\ 3DJH 6HH DOVR
[directive] ¿Entiende usted que si el delito se cometió el primero de julio del 2014 o después de esa fecha, como [Sí/Yes] [No/No] resultado de su declaración de culpabilidad se puede requerir que pague una penalidad para el fondo de supervisión de delincuentes sexuales de $30 por mes?  Do you understand that if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014, as a result of your guilty plea you may be required to pay a Sex Offender Supervision Penalty of $30 per month?
[brief] Firstly, the State expressly stopped [...] from offering his opinion in the brief exchange where defendant is called confrontational:  [Prosecutor:] Can you describe the posts?  [Det. Sidorski:]  Yes.  Generally speaking, [...] was asking for some clothing back, and my opinion, [...] – [Prosecutor]: Well, not your opinion.  We don’t want your – we don’t want you to express an opinion, but can you describe, having read the posts, how would you describe them?  [Det. Sidorski:]  Confrontational.  [Prosecutor:]  Which person is confrontational?  [Det. Sidorski:] The defendant.  This is clearly a mere observation of the demeanor of the posts’ general tone, something that [...] is certainly allowed to testify to.  See State v. Sui Kam Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75, 101 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 249 (2019) (finding officer’s testimony that defendant was “aggravated” at one point and “clearly upset” at another “were his opinions based on first-hand perception of defendant’s appearance, demeanor, and reactions, which fall within the lay opinion rule. ”).
[brief] Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the judge’s findings on aggravating and mitigating factors are supported by competent, credible evidence.  Aggravating factor three relates to the “risk that the defendant will commit another offend. ”  A court's findings on the risk of re-offense should “involve determinations that go beyond the simple finding of a criminal history and include an evaluation and judgment about the individual in light of his or her history. ”  State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 125 (App. Div. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[brief] Until the February 8 Case Management Conference before [...], the trial court did not specify which of defendants’ discovery responses were deficient and what was required for compliance, see Adedoyin v. Arc of Morris Cnty. Chapter, Inc., 325 N.J. Super. 173, 181 (App. Div. 1999).  "[I]ncomplete answers cannot be automatically considered as a failure to answer under R. 4:23-5[,] nor can the party seeking answers "control the future course of the proceeding simply by asserting that the answers were not fully responsive.")  Where a court determines there is a "dispute over responsiveness or insufficiency of interrogatory answers, the judge should first identify those questions[,] and if more complete answers are needed, the court should adjourn the motion to allow such answers, rather than dismiss a case or suppress answers with prejudice, St. James AME Dev. Corp. v. City of Jersey City, 403 N.J. Super. 480, 486 (App. Div. 2008); Zimmerman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 260 N.J. Super. 368, 377–78 (App. Div. 1992).  After [...] held the February 8, 2024 Case Management Conference and clarified what defendants were required to provide in order to cure their deficiencies, defendants provided amended, newly certified responses to the outstanding punch list items that [...] had identified during the conference.
[brief] See Oxford Realty Grp. Cedar v. Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Co., 229 N.J. 196, 212 (2017) (“Because we do not find the terms of the Policy ambiguous, we need not address Oxford’s contentions about contra proferentem .  . . .”).  Further, applying the doctrine here would violate the FAA’s mandate that “any doubts concerning the scope of the arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. ”  Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
[brief] Thus, the trial court’s ruling must be reversed.  \(^5\)  While all parties may waive their rights to a jury trial, here the trial court made no findings of such a waiver.  [Pa001-0022].  Moreover, respondents argue that the Lajara court only recognized the defendants’ right to a jury trial.  They provide no support for this distinction and ignore the fact that the right to a jury trial depends on the cause of action and the damages available thereunder and not the identity of the party pursuing the claim.  D.
[brief] This jury convicted defendant of conspiracy because they saw him – with their own eyes – in the same vehicle with the shooter – [...].  The jury saw defendant driving around with [...] prior to, and during the shooting.  (11T:54-4 to 23; 57-2 to 59-7).  The jury then heard undisputed evidence that the vehicle in the video – a Toyota Corolla – was found parked at a residence blocks from the shooting and defendant was also found at that residence hanging out with [...].
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................  1 POINT I THE DETECTIVE’S NARRATION TESTIMONY WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE STATE’S CASE, IT WAS BASED UPON INFERENCES, AND IT PROVIDED HER OPINION AS TO DISPUTED FACTS.  ACCORDINGLY, HER ESSENTIAL TESTIMONY  VIOLATED FACTORS  THREE AND FOUR OF WATSON, DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, AND REQUIRING REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS.  .............................................................................................................  1  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH THE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE THIRD-PARTY GUILT MODEL JURY CHARGE.  THIS OMISSION CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR.................................  9  CONCLUSION
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  The Trial Court’s Order Is Inconsistent with the New Jersey Rules of Court Because It Requires Production of Irrelevant Documents.  Under New Jersey law “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. ”  R. 4:10-2 (emphasis added).  This is not controversial.  See, e.g., Arena v. Saphier, 201 N.J. Super. 79, 83 (App. Div. 1985) (noting that “irrelevant” evidence was “not discoverable”).  Rule 4:10-2, like all New Jersey Rules of Court, was promulgated under Article VI, section 2, paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution, which provides the Supreme Court with “exclusive and plenary power to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure. ”  George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 381-82 (1952); accord In re Protest of Cont. for Retail Pharmacy Design, 257 N.J. 425, 435-36 (2024).  While this rule provides courts discretion to determine what discovery is “relevant,” see Lipsky v. N.J. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447, 463-64 (App. Div. 2023) (reviewing trial court’s discovery order for abuse of discretion), the rule does not give courts authority to order the production of information that is irrelevant to the case—in other words, the relevance limit is binding on trial courts.
[brief] The nucleus of the plaintiffs’ complaint was that [...]’s salespeople made oral misrepresentations at the time of purchase that fraudulently induced the transactions.  Tellingly, the misrepresentations claimed by the plaintiffs were those barred by the RETA at N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.70.  More significantly, all of the oral misrepresentations alleged were expressly contradicted by the contractual documents the plaintiffs signed and thus, their claims were barred by the Parol Evidence Rule.  Each of the eleven (11) plaintiffs were deposed.  At trial, their testimony was the same.  Some admitted that the oral misrepresentations claimed in their complaint were not actually told to them.  Others admitted the oral misrepresentations claimed in their complaint were opposite from what they were told when they purchased, meaning they were told the correct information.  Many admitted they simply could not remember what was told to them when they purchased years ago.  Most incredibly, four (4) of the plaintiffs admitted that they filed suit because they heard advertisements guaranteeing termination of their timeshare contracts and they just wanted to get out.  Over the course of four (4) years of litigation, [...] made five (5) applications to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint based on the Parol Evidence Rule.  (Two summary judgment motions, a motion for reconsideration of the second summary judgment denial, one involuntary dismissal at the close of plaintiffs’ case, and one judgment notwithstanding the verdict).  Each application was rejected notwithstanding the plain and clear contractual documents expressly contradicting the plaintiffs’ claims of oral misrepresentations and the plaintiffs’ own admissions.
[brief] The Proposal Bond and Consent of Surety were both executed by the same surety company representative, [...], identified as the “attorney-in-fact” (A4 and 6).  Unfortunately, however, the surety company issued a limiting POA form that expressly restricts the attorney-in-fact’s authority to issuing the specific surety bond identified by the reference “[...],” that is, the Proposal Bond.  The POA provides no authority for Ms. Acosta to bind [...] to the undertaking required under the Consent of Surety (Ibid).  Specifically, the header to the POA form expressly limits Ms. Acosta’s authority to executing the Proposal Bond only, stating: “This Power of Attorney limits the acts of those named herein, and they have no authority to bind the Company except in the manner and to the extent herein stated. ” [emphasis added].  The operative POA language then evidences the notarized signature of [...], Assistant Secretary of [...] Mutual, as having appointed Ms. Acosta as attorney-in-fact “with full power and authority hereby conferred to sign, execute and acknowledge the following surety bond:  Principal Name: [...]; Obligee Name: [...]; Surety Bond Number: [...]. ” (A3 [emphasis added]).  However, beneath the POA language is an excerpt of a signed and sealed corporate resolution of the surety company.  In the section of the corporate resolution entitled, “Certificate of Designation,” authority is granted by the President of [...] Mutual, to Mr. Carey to appoint attorneys-in-fact as follows:  The President of the Company, acting pursuant to the bylaws of the Company authorizes [...] Assistant Secretary to appoint such attorneys-in-fact as may be necessary to act on behalf of the Company to make, execute, seal, acknowledge and deliver as surety any and all undertakings, bonds, recognizances and other surety obligations.  (Ibid.)  In construing the overall intent and import of this document, [...] reviewed the limiting language imprinted on the header of the POA form stating that Ms. Acosta has “no authority to bind the Company except in the manner and to the extent stated” together with her specific appointment to “sign, execute and acknowledge the following surety bond:… SNJ053036202” that is, the identification number assigned to the Proposal Bond.  Contrasting this with the full extent of Mr. Carey’s more expansive authority to appoint attorneys-in-fact to deliver “any and all undertakings, bonds, recognizances and other surety obligations” it is obvious that the attorney-in-fact’s authority was circumscribed and limited only to the issuance of the specifically referenced Proposal Bond (A3).
[brief] The court in *Small* explained that a shareholder may sue for the harm inflicted upon the corporation where there exists “a special relationship between the suing shareholder and the defendant, creating a duty, contractual or otherwise, other than that owed to the corporation. ”  This is because “[t]he directors and officers of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to not use their positions for their own personal advantage, or for the advantage of others, to the detriment of the interest of the stockholders of the corporation. ”  *Id.*  In reaching his conclusion, [...] also relied on a Seventh Circuit decision, *Borak v. J.I. Case. Co.*, 317 F.2d 838, 842 (7th Cir.1963), which held that “A director of a corporation acts as a fiduciary not only to the corporation but also to the stockholders, and the essence of a cause of action by a stockholder, based upon allegations of fraudulent acts by a director, is not the fraud against the corporation, but the fraud of the director as it affects the stockholders. ”  *See also Joseph Oat Holdings, Inc. v. RCM Digesters, Inc.*, 2009 WL 900758 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2009).  Plaintiffs’ claims for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith are similar to those in *Small* and *Joseph Oat Holdings*, and the trial court rightly concluded (initially on summary judgment, and ultimately at trial) that the holdings in those decisions permitting individual claims to proceed due to the existence of a special injury should apply with equal force here.
[directive] The it. committed who one the is defendant the officer's the (e.g., the offenses) committed defendant the that believing for basis officer's the indicate shall admission, and etc.), defendant's eyewitnesses, of statements observations, personal submitting injury to officer known of the the extent the so, if and, injured was victim a whether to as statement and circumstances and facts of description relevant foregoing  The the Affidavit. supplemented, or be established, cause may exists probable that believing for basis the officer's also 5.2.
[brief] But the Supreme Court of New Jersey held otherwise when it issued its own ruling in *State v. Burney [II]*, 255 N.J. 1 (2023).  In *Burney [II]*, the Court held that the cell-phone expert’s testimony that in his experience, the cell towers involved in that case had about a one-mile range was inadmissible because he offered no “factual evidence or other data” -- other than his general experience and training -- to support his conclusion that a “rule of thumb” one-mile range was correct for that area.  *Id.* at 12-14, 23-25.  Thus, that evidence was inadmissible to demonstrate the general range of the cell towers at issue.  *Id.*
[brief] ”  In re Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. 468, 474-75 (2000); see also In re Byron, 165 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (Law Div. 1978), aff’d, 170 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 1979) (stating the purpose of election laws in relation to mail-in ballots).  That is why our Supreme Court has stated, “[e]lection laws should not be construed so as to deprive voters of their franchise or so as to render an election void for technical reasons. ”  N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 186 (2002) (quoting Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 10 N.J. 435, 440 (1952)).
[brief] The State’s case against [...] is entirely circumstantial.  No DNA, fingerprint, or eyewitness evidence linked [...] to the crime.  Only [...]’s admission that he was with [...] and his self-identification from footage recorded by a nearby camera tied [...] to this robbery.  But [...]’s statement was erroneously placed in front of the jury alongside numerous accusations that he was lying, the officer’s opinion as to what the church video showed, and evidence that [...] had been arrested on an unrelated charge.  Effectively sullying [...]’s reputation, this inadmissible evidence and lay opinion testimony tainted the jury’s ability to evaluate [...]’s credibility and the evidence independently.  To make matters worse, the prosecutor compounded the error by denigrating defense counsel in summation, comparing him to a magician and dismissing his arguments as “distractions. ”  Both during its case-in-chief and summation, the State thus managed to improperly undermine the credibility of [...] and his counsel, interfering with the jury’s ability to independently evaluate whether the State introduced sufficient evidence to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  See also Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. at 286-87 (concluding that cumulative error warranted reversal when prosecutorial misconduct—to which defense counsel did not object at trial—was coupled with the erroneous admission of evidence of defendant’s conduct after the crime).  Accordingly, the collective impact of these errors was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  [...]’s convictions must therefore be reversed.  POINT V THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO MERGE MR. MASON’S CONVICTION FOR CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CONVICTION FOR ARMED ROBBERY.
[brief] Their reference to Appellant’s retirement immediately prior to his successful disciplinary proceeding was not only not in the record below but is utterly misleading.  As another matter of public record, the New Jersey Supreme Court, 3 years after his 2018 retirement, exonerated Appellant from any & all alleged misconduct.  That ruling stemmed from the DRB’s decision, shortly before, not to invoke reciprocal discipline based on a Florida Consent Judgment of minor misconduct.  The small claims case involved $149 but the claim was approximated to be a mere $350 more.  Worse yet, Plaintiffs’ brief utterly misstates the record, without references to the record, by asserting that [...]’s only involvement in this matter, prior to her mother’s 2020 death, was preparation of the DIL.  It was much more by preparing, recording &/or receiving the Mortgage Discharge at the same time she admittedly prepared & recorded the DIL.  Her name is conspicuously shown on the very 1st pages of both instruments.  Da30 & 31  Additionally, & incredibly, Plaintiffs feign ignorance of the judgment, until a 2021 title search, again without any reference to the record.  The uncontroverted record clearly shows that in 2008 plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, joining Appellant as a defendant by alleging his judgment lien attached to the mortgaged property.  In 2013 Plaintiffs prepared a proposed Final Foreclosure Judgment asserting that the judgment lien would be paid from the surplus at a sheriff sale & such was entered by the court.  Da 22-29.  Just 3 years later, the DIL was prepared based on the legal effect from the very same Final Foreclosure Judgment.  Thus, to assert, like Plaintiffs have, is nothing less an insult to everyone’s intelligence, not to mention another blatant violation of appellate principles.
[brief] T1 refers to the Certified Transcript of Proceedings in the [...] on May 16, 2018.  At the inception of the proceedings, prior Defense counsel advised the Court that the Defendant intended to enter a guilty plea to DWI, with the understanding that the remainder of his charges would be dismissed.  (T1:3-4 to 3-8).  Prior Defense counsel specifically referenced that Defendant’s blood alcohol content was a “.17. ” (T1:3-4 to 3-5).  The Honorable [...], J.M.C. then questioned the Defendant regarding whether he did indeed intend to enter such a plea, whether he was entering that plea freely and voluntarily, and whether the Defendant understood that by entering such a plea he was giving up his right to a trial.  (T1:3-13 to 4-5).  Judge Liguori then set about the process of obtaining a factual basis from the Defendant:  THE COURT:  And, sir, you also understand by pleading guilty you are admitting to the Court that on the date and time the summonses were issued to you, that you had consumed alcohol, did operate a motor vehicle here in the jurisdiction of Toms River Township.  And the consumption of that alcohol did affect your ability to properly operate your vehicle, and you were, in fact, under the influence of that alcohol?  [...]: Yes, sir.  (T1:2-21 to 3-10).  Judge Liguori then advised Defendant of the penalties that he would be facing as a result of pleading guilty to a second offense DWI.  (T1:4-16 to 4-25).
[brief] Appellant was forced to “accept” the terms of the Arbitration Agreement—albeit they were presented as company “policies”—as a condition of Appellant’s employment with Respondents.  If Appellant wanted to work, she was required to agree to arbitrate her claims of discrimination, retaliation, and virtually any other claims that may have arisen out of her employment with Respondents.  Appellant was left with simply no choice but to “accept” the terms of the Arbitration Agreement.  It has long been established that contracts of adhesion will not be enforced when contrary to public policy.