ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Use of force for crowd management.  The following restrictions and limitations on the use of force should be observed during peaceful demonstrations and civil disturbances.  The generally applicable rules in this Policy apply to both peaceful demonstrations and civil disturbances and in all cases, weapons or other devices should be carried and deployed only by trained and authorized officers and deployed consistent with this Policy.  3.8.1  Prior to using force against people in a crowd, officers shall: (a) provide clear instructions and warnings in a manner that can be heard by persons in the crowd, such as through a bullhorn or speaker system when available; 11 USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021 (b) state the consequences of refusing to comply with a mandatory directive, including that arrests will occur and force may be used unless persons comply; and (c) give a reasonable opportunity to comply.  3.8.2  Force shall not be used against crowds engaged in peaceful demonstrations.  The visible presence or deployment of canines for crowd control purposes is prohibited in peaceful demonstrations.  Canines may be used for explosive detection or similar security sweeps at such gatherings.  3.8.3  Force may be used against specific individuals in a crowd for lawful purposes in accordance with the other provisions of this Policy.  Restrictions apply to the use of certain types of force in a crowd as follows:  (a)  OC spray: (1) may be used against specific individuals who are active resistors, threatening assailants or active assailants as defined in Section 3.3 above; (2) shall not be used where bystanders would be unreasonably affected; and (3) shall not be used against passive resistors, or indiscriminately against groups of people.  (b)  CEDs: (1) may be used against specific individuals who are threatening assailants or active assailants as defined in Section 3.3 above; (2) may be used only when the individual can be accurately targeted; and (3) shall never be fired indiscriminately into crowds.  (c)  Less-lethal ammunition: (1) may be used during civil disturbances only against specific individuals who are threatening or active assailants; and (2) shall not be used during a civil disturbance against groups of individuals.  3.8.4  Force may be used against groups of people only if authorized by the Incident Commander (IC) and only when other means of gaining compliance with lawful directives have been attempted and shown to be ineffective or are not feasible.  3.8.5  High-volume OC delivery systems are designed for, and may be used in, civil disturbances against groups of people engaged in unlawful acts resulting in, or creating an immediate risk of, bodily injury or significant property damage.
[directive] -L.1977,c.396,s.8; amended 1991, c.458, 1997, c.148, s.3. s.2; Record and report securities received :5-15.2. of 40A  When said securities are received by the local unit the chief financial officer shall duly record the receiving thereof in an appropriate manner and at the next regular or special meeting after such receipt so he shall transmit a written report to the governing body setting forth the amount of securities received, the series, date, numbers and interest periods, if any, thereof and at the same time, transmit or said securities to such depository, person persons as the governing body shall direct for safekeeping.  Such written report shall be recorded in the minutes at such meeting, and a certified copy of such minute - record shall forthwith be filed with the bureau.
[brief] Finally, the court separately violated [...]’s confrontation rights by admitting the detectives’ hearsay claims that [...] had previously “shot at” and “tried to get” [...] two days before his murder.  (8T 68-24 to 69-5, 79-12 to 16)  No evidence was submitted at trial to prove that such an incident even occurred, let alone that [...] was connected to it.  Those unproven allegations thus implied that the detectives had “superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminate[d] the defendant. ”  Branch, 182 N.J. at 351.  Together, those errors had the clear capacity to influence the jury and thus require reversal.
[directive] f.  In cases involving juvenile defendants who have been charged, except in Homicide cases, and where there is no referral of the case to another court, with or without the juvenile’s consent, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted 4 years after the final adjudication or disposition of all juvenile defendants or upon release from custody, whichever is later.  Evidence in juvenile cases which are referred (waived) to another court, or in which there are adult co-defendants, shall be subject to the retention periods for adult cases.  g.  Notwithstanding the provisions above, the County Prosecutor or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice may authorize the use of samples of controlled dangerous substances taken from evidence, for the purpose of training K-9s, provided such use will not compromise any pending criminal prosecution or appeal.  4.  Firearms Evidence
[brief] There is no evidence that the rent is under market  [...] asserts that the rent for the Unit is “grossly under market,” but there is no evidence concerning what the rental market value would be for [...]’s unit.  The unit was frozen in time, pursuant to [...]’s actions and inactions.  The appliances are old, including a stove original to the apartment\(^1\), the apartment design and layout is functionally obsolete, and the apartment is poorly maintained with no preventative maintenance at all for the last 30 years.  5T47:18-20 ([...] testifying that there is no preventative maintenance for the unit).  There is no evidence on the record at all that the rent being paid on this unit is under market or what rent the market would bear for this Unit.  II.
[brief] Lastly, the Trial Court erroneously found that the Receiver and Bank filed “paperwork” with the Court.  1T30.  The Receiver did not submit any accountings in connection with his Motion for Discharge.  As conceded by the Receiver’s attorney, [...], Esq., “a detailed certification was filed by [...] in connection with the application to be discharged, and Your Honor has that and that is a detailed certification. ”
[brief] Similar, with regard to density, [...] testified that this property could accommodate the minor increase in density from 15 units to 17 units with minimal impact on the surrounding area.  Again, this was seen as an overall benefit compared with the parking lot that existed.  Furthermore, the Board found that the applicant met the negative criteria in that the variances requested for height and density could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  This particular area is zoned for multifamily residence and business which was consistent with the plan that was submitted.  There was testimony that the plan allowed for light air and open space along with a desirable visual environment through good civic design.  The testimony also emphasized the desires of the master plan and vision plan were important here, especially at this critical location.  It is respectfully submitted that there was sufficient evidence before this Board to grant all of the variances that were presented.  Therefore, the Board did not err or act in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner in granting the bulk variances, the lot area per unit variance or the height variance.
[brief] Later opinions offered by [...] likewise are based on deposition transcripts that he reviewed.  Indeed, after reviewing eleven deposition transcripts, [...] offered these opinions:  I further believe that both the [...] and [...] were negligent in that both parties likely had either actual or constructive knowledge of the streetlight seen in Exhibit DL-K as being non-functional on the incident date.  This was due to the mutual failure of both parties to take any measures whatsoever to routinely check on the functionality of the streetlights anywhere in Lodi.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ##  Case Law  **Atl. City Superior Officers Ass'n v. City of Atl. City**, *(Superior Officers)*  No. A-3117-20, 2022 WL 2352376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 30, 2023)........1,5,6,12,13  **Barila v. Board of Ed. of Cliffside Park**, 241 N.J. 595 (2020).................................................................4,5  **Caponegro v. State Operated School District of the City of Newark, Essex County**, 330 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2000)........................................3  **Phillips v. Curiale**, 128 N.J. 608 (1992)..................................................................3  **State v. Galicia**, 210 N.J. 364 (2012)........................................11  ## Statutes **N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-1, et seq.**..................................................1,3  ## Court Rules R. 2:10-2.....................................................................................11,12  LIST OF SUPPLEMENTAL
[brief] Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) provides that a second or subsequent petition for post-conviction relief may be filed within one year of “the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered. ”  Here, Appellant did not discover the existence of [...]’ Sworn Statement until August 2021 and, as set forth supra, “the factual predicate for the relief could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and the facts underlying the ground for relief, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole . . . raise a reasonable probability that the relief sought [will] be granted.
[brief] The Opposition filed by Appellant/Cross-Respondents, [...] a/k/a [...] a/k/a [...], deceased (“[...]”), his family, and their sham company, [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Appellants”), continues to argue, that Respondent/Cross-Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), acted with unclean hands when he signed the name “[...]” on the December 1998 Deed.
[brief] (Pb10).  [...] argues that “how and when [...] acquired knowledge of the salary disparities as well as the [...]’s efforts to obfuscate the facts” are in dispute.  (Pb10).  However, an evidentiary hearing is “mandated only when the proposed administrative action is based on disputed adjudicatory facts. ”  In re Farmer’s Mut. Fire Assurance Ass’n of N.J., 256 N.J. Super. 607, 618 (App. Div. 1992).  The Board “determine[s] whether to grant an administrative hearing based upon the standards for a contested case hearing set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq., and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1 et seq.
[brief] (16T 116-7 to 117-23)  The court agreed that the remarks had been improper (16T 118-9 to 120-10) and provided the jury with a limiting instruction as follows:  Ladies and gentlemen, as I’m going to explain in my jury charge, closing arguments are not evidence, they are just that: argument.  Evidence comes from the testimony that you have heard and the physical evidence that has been admitted.  During closing, the State indicated that it did not call certain witnesses because the State has an obligation to present only truthful testimony.  All attorneys, whether they be for the State or the defense, have an obligation to only present truthful testimony.  The credibility of any witness is for you to determine, and for only you to determine.  You are the sole judges of the facts.
[brief] ”  As [...] further conceded on direct examination:  A.  *The scope and purpose of the report was to determine damages incurred by plaintiff in the 11 case*, so – and the report, therefore described an analytical process that I undertook to examine a series of potential projects that could have been developed, including the main project which the report focuses on, to determine more precisely, *had that project been developed with participation of [...] and the plaintiffs*, what were the potential profits that the project would likely have been generated as a result of that participation.
[brief] [Internal citations omitted by me]  I do not agree with the officer that I had red eyes.  The video evidence shows that my eyes were white.  Even if they were red, there is nothing abnormal for a person having slightly red eyes at 2am at a time most people are sleeping including me.  Red eyes can simply mean a person is tired or they recently rubbed their eyes, or they have irritation from contacts or several other random reasons besides being intoxicated.  I did have contacts and I did notify the cop.  *State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 96 (N.J. 2005)*  ("Hence, we hold that, for prosecutions under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, the State *must prove the statutory elements* of a defendant's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test beyond a reasonable doubt.")
[brief] Da222.  But wanting more money from [...] may also be behind that decision.  [...] later testified that she believed a ROFR does not entitle [...] to purchase the Premises at the same price as a third-party offer.  Da224.  Nevertheless, no further mention of any potential sale of the Premises was raised by [...] to [...] until September 18, 2022, when [...] sent [...] the following email:
[brief] While the court was permitted under the Directive to impose a discretionary period of parole ineligibility, see Directive 2021-4 at 7 (Section I.B.2), it could not do so without conducting the requisite analysis:  As part of a sentence for any crime, where the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors . . . , the court may fix a minimum term . . . during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.  [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b).
[brief] (Da1-16.)  In his comprehensive opinion he summarized the relief sought by Plaintiff.  As to returning the deposit it was based on (i) the default stated in the delivered Estoppel Certificate and (ii) breach of the representation in the Lease.  (Da9-10.)  Also, Plaintiff sought to amend its complaint adding a claim for fraud in the inducement due to the misrepresentation regarding the Lease, litigation and settlement (id., and at Da15-16), and to add as defendants Defendant’s counsel for aiding and abetting by both prosecuting the lawsuit against [...] while also representing Defendant in the PSA with the misrepresented disclosures.  (Id.)  Also Plaintiff sought to extend discovery.  (Id.)  The trial court summarized Defendant’s opposition.  Defendant argued it did not breach the estoppel provision.  (Da10.)  It emphasized it need only give an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by closing and may submit multiple iterations so long as the final one before closing was an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  (Id.)  Also, it did not breach the representations.  Last per an email by a real estate professional there was an ulterior motive for the cancellation.  (Id.)  As to the request for release of the deposit the trial court granted the motion solely on the issue of the estoppel certificate and did not reach the issue as to the misrepresentation.
[brief] Further, there was nothing unusual about the car in this case, nor did the officers claim there was.  No drugs were seen, and the money [...] was holding did not exchange hands.  The only basis to stop the car was its association with [...].  That is not reasonable suspicion for a stop of the car’s occupants.  See State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J. Super. 275, 280-81 (App. Div. 1986) (no reasonable suspicion to stop defendants when their car was parked in a high-crime area, in an “unusual” manner, the arrangement of the three individuals “fits the profile of a drug transaction. ”).  State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004), a case in which there was reasonable suspicion for a stop, further reveals the deficiency of suspicion in this case.
[brief] In this Court, [...] raises several arguments, none of which has merit.  Some – like the statute of limitations and the failure to satisfy a pre-suit demand for conversion – were never raised below.  Most of the other issues she raises inappropriately ask this Court to recast itself as a finder of fact, quibbling with weight of the evidence.  Over and over, appellant argues that the trial court erred because the proofs at trial failed to establish a right to relief.  What she continually ignores, however, is that the trial court had a full opportunity to weigh the evidence offered by all parties.  It judged the demeanor of the witnesses who testified to determine their credibility.  In fact, appellant says nothing at all about the trial court’s finding that the Plaintiffs’ principal witnesses were credible, or its finding that there was “no meat” to the defense’s explanations.  Ultimately, the trial court weighed the evidence and correctly decided virtually all of the issues before it, save one: pre-judgment interest.  The trial court identified nine discrete instances when defendant, [...], in concert with [...] and the other defendant entities, misappropriated funds from two defendant companies in which the Plaintiffs had an interest: [...] and [...].  Each misappropriation for which the trial court awarded damages to Plaintiffs was tied to a specific date and transaction for which Plaintiffs showed that money flowed from [...] or [...] to the Hedvats’ own personal bank accounts or other accounts for entities they owned or controlled.  Based on these findings, the trial court should have assessed $838,810.40 in pre-judgment interest based on the defendants’ use and enjoyment of these funds.  Instead, the trial court only awarded $190,480.68 in interest, calculated from the commencement of suit.  In doing so, the lower court abused its discretion.  That discrete portion of the judgment should therefore be reversed.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.* (alterations in original) (quoting *Evans*, 893 F. Supp 2d at 956).  Accordingly, the Court held that the “rule of thumb” approximation offered by State’s expert in *Burney* was an improper net opinion “because it was unsupported by any factual evidence or other data. ”  *Id.* at 25.  Although an expert need not necessarily consider all the factors affecting a cell tower’s coverage area, “because the testimony was based on nothing more than [...]’s personal experience, the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear this testimony. ”  Ibid.  Here, the testimony offered by the State’s expert suffered from the same fundamental flaws as in Burney.
[brief] On April 7, 2021, a Camden County Grand Jury returned [...] charging defendant, [...], with first-degree murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)/(2) (Count One); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-49(a)(1) (Count Two); first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count Three); fourth-degree resisting arrest, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2) (Count Four).
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(g); (Aa5).  1.  **The Adequacy Budget. **  The Legislature sought to accomplish the salutary goals of the SFRA by employing a structure of school funding through which districts fund their budgets using a combination of local levy and State aid.  *Ibid.*; (Aa5).  The core of this structure is the adequacy budget, which is designed to support the majority of educational resources needed by children in each district.
[brief] Even when he filed his second version of this motion on Aug 24, 2022, that second version of the motion also suffered from the same technical defects as the first version did.  (Pa11).  I pointed all of this out, and in great detail, within my Aug 29, 2022 opposition to these motions.  (Pa59 - Pa61).  To summarize those arguments herein, the numerous defects were: A) we were never formally served "as provided in Rule 4:4-4", which is a violation of Rule 1:5-1 (i.e. which includes service of written motions); B) no certification of service accompanied either version of the motion, which is a violation of Rule 1:5-3; C) both versions of the motion specified a return date, which is a violation of Rule 6:3-3(c)(1); D) both versions of the motion violated Rule 6:3-3(c)(2) by failing to include the required language; E) both versions of the motion also violated Rule 6:3-3(c)(3) by failing to include other required language; and F) the first version of the motion violated Rule 1:6-3 because it was filed only 1 day before the intended return date.
[brief] ## Federal Cases  **In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.,** 267 F.R.D. 361 (D. Kan. 2010) ..........................................................11, 12  ## State Cases  **D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson,** 242 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 1990)  ......................................................9, 10, 11  **Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty.  Prosecutor’s Off,** No. A-1207-22, 2024 WL 3934132 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024)  ............7  **Wampler v. Dental Health Assocs., P.A.,** No. A-1796-13T4, 2015 WL 10568695 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016)  .........7  ## Statutes  Conscientious Employee Protection Act .................................................3  Rule 4:14-1 ..................................................................................................2, 6  Rule 4:14-2(c) ...........................................................................................2, 8, 9, 10  Rule 4:23-4 ...............................................................................................8, 9  Defendant-Respondent [...]
[brief] ”  Da058.  Section 18 of the Original PSA states:  18.  Entire Agreement.  This Agreement contains the entire Agreement between Seller and Purchaser relative to purchase of the Premises and there are no other terns, obligations, covenants, representations, statements or conditions, oral or otherwise, of any kind whatsoever concerning this sale.  Any changes or additions to this Agreement must be made in writing and executed by the parties hereto.  Da063.  [...] was entitled to a fully executed Second Addendum, not only because the PSA contained fraudulent misrepresentations, but also because the PSA required it in order for it to have any effect.
[brief] Moreover, the trial court improvidently took exception with two phrases in the indemnification provision at issue, namely: “caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor”, and “regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss, or expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder. ” (Da431; 1T37:5-12).  The trial court’s finding of ambiguity as to these clauses is contradicted by the same provision referred to by the United States Supreme Court.  That provision contains both of the clauses that the trial court in this action erroneously deemed “equivocal. ”  (Da431; 1T37:13-15).  Like the United States Supreme Court in Seckinger, other courts have held that similar indemnification provisions derived from AIA Document A201 are clear and unambiguous.