ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Relate, Black’s Law Dictionary; see also O’Brien v. Two W. Hanover Co., 350 N.J. Super. 441, 448–49 (App. Div. 2002) (defining “relates to” as having “a connection with or reference to” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Plaintiff never contends with the “broad common-sense meaning” of “relate to,” *Mackey v. Lanier Coll. Agency & Serv., Inc.*, 486 U.S. 825, 841–42 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); instead, he attempts to reframe [...]’s argument as a claim preclusion argument.  But [...] has not asserted and need not prove claim preclusion because the plain language of the Settlement Agreement is enough.  Plaintiff released all claims with “a connection with or reference to” [...]’s right to amend its agreements.  *O’Brien*, 350 N.J. Super. at 448–49 (internal quotation marks omitted).  No matter when the *Gannon* claims accrued or Plaintiff learned about allegedly improper amendments to its merchant agreements, his claims based on amendments are barred because he and the *Roma* settlement class members released “any and all” claims relating to [...]’s ability to amend or modify its agreements and fees.
[brief] (2T17:22-25).  Citing, [...] identifies defendant at least four times in the transcripts on Page 18, Page 28, and twice on Page 32\(^{36}\).  (4)  The Superior Court again does not find plain error as the Court proclaims defendant herself tacitly admitted that she was there on the date of the offense and that she objected to many things but not victim’s question or answers about identification of her, practically the only mention that was not objected to (2T18:6-12); (5)  The Superior Court explains in-court identification and out-of-court identifications (2T18:13-18).  (6)  The Court confirms that she had no defense other than that she was not present at the location of the incidents on either day or that --- \(^{36}\) On page 17 of the brief details and references [...] changed testimony.  she cannot back up her assertions of not being there\textsuperscript{37}.  (2T18:19-25, 2T19:1-4)  (7)  The Court finds the defendant guilty on de novo review citing that the defendant made racially offensive and threatening remarks towards the victim, with the intent to annoy or alarm him that this was done in public on November 7, 2021, similarly on November 2, 2021 against the victim noting the reason for him taking action to have his complaint issue.
[brief] **  In summation, counsel remarked that although Appellant has taken responsibility for causing the accident itself, he had not taken full responsibility for what happened to Plaintiff and that the jury was given the opportunity to “impose” that responsibility.  3T19:6-22.  It is well-settled law that arguments may not include “insinuations of bad faith” by a defendant who proceeds to trial to resolve “validly contested claims. ”  *Geler*, supra, 358 N.J. Super. At 469; See, e.g. *Burket v. Holcomb Bus Serv.*, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1095 (Court found counsel’s remark that defendant refused to take responsibility was improper).  The obvious result of such a remark is for the jury to consider punishing Appellant for having the gall to even appear at trial when in fact Appellant proceeded to trial to resolve validly contested claims.  Accordingly, a new trial is the appropriate recourse.
[directive] You are not subject to a mandatory Graves Act parole ineligibility term if you are pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a handgun that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun pursuant to 2C:39-5b(2); unlawful possession of an unloaded rifle N.J.S.A. or shotgun, 2C:39-5c(1); or unlawful possession of a rifle or shotgun that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun, N.J.SA.  2C:39-5c(2).
[brief] [...] was joined as an indispensable party.  Da235; Da237; see Da234-Da333.  15.  On December 29, 2021, the parties settled the litigation.  [...] and the Township were both parties to that settlement agreement.  [...] and the other developers agreed to pay $26,076,000 to [...] for infrastructure upgrades and sewer treatment capacity to service their inclusionary developments.  Da339; see Da334-Da382.  [...] Receives Site Plan Approval 16.  On May 27, 2021, the [...] Planning Board granted [...] preliminary and final site plan approval for its inclusionary development on the subject property.
[brief] These same factors lesser bidding expenses ([...] was not required to deposit a check for the higher five-year estimate) and more limited risks may also have placed [...] on a different footing vis-a-vis [...] and [...] for the three contracts for which he did compete.  It is conceivable that they would have submitted lower bids on the shorter contracts if they too had been released from the obligation to bid on the five-year contract.  While the disparity between bids may cast doubt on that hypothesis, we are not prepared to rule out the possibility that more perfect conditions of equality between competitors might have yielded a better economic result to the public.
[brief] If the length and the complexity of the trial were the determinative factors for the abbreviation of transcripts, the Appellate Division would not have been able to adjudicate the appeal on merits in the matter of N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2018) where the bench trial was conducted over sixty-six days, yet the Appellate Division was able to productively review the appeal on merits even in the face of unilateral abbreviation of transcripts by the appellants because the arguments on appeal concerned matters of law.  The appropriateness of abbreviating transcripts depends on the characteristics of the arguments being raised on appeal.  “Given the nature of the issues raised on the present appeal, those transcripts appear to be unnecessary to our review.
[brief] (Pa837-Pa838).  Also on November 10, 2022, an Order denying plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was entered (Pa839-Pa841) and an Order was entered denying plaintiff’s Motion for an Order Permitting Defendants to Substantively Respond to Paragraphs 22 to 29, 31 to 67, 69 to 81, 83 to 130, 132 to 146, 148 to 198 and 201 to 242 of Plaintiff [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, to Consider Those Paragraphs Unopposed in Conformance with Rule 4:46-2(b).
[brief] (Pa126).  The details of those crimes follow.  On October 6, 1975, a woman, “[...],” disappeared from her home, with evidence suggesting she had been abducted by force from her garage.  (Pa220).  On October 27, 1975, her nude body was discovered in a wooded area of [...], hidden beneath branches, leaves, and sticks.  Ibid.  Her pantyhose had been tied tightly around her neck, and an autopsy revealed that she died from asphyxiation due to strangulation.  Ibid.  A stick tied to the pantyhose had been used as a garrot, fracturing [...]’s thyroid cartilage and hyoid bone in the neck.  Ibid.  Due to the condition of her body, it was impossible to determine if [...] had been raped, but the facts surrounding her abduction suggested the primary motive was neither robbery nor ransom.  Ibid.  On October 14, 1975, another woman, “[...],” disappeared after last being seen walking home, approximately two miles from the previous victim [...]’s home.  (Pa220).  On October 28, 1975, [...]’s body was found in a wooded area in New York, covered with swamp reeds, in close proximity to the area where [...]’s body had been found.  Ibid.  Like [...], [...] had been strangled with her pantyhose and suffered a fracture of the hyoid bone in the neck.  Ibid.  An investigation revealed that a person fitting [...]’s description was seen operating a red station wagon in the area where both victims were abducted and observed by several witnesses talking to [...] before her disappearance.  Ibid.  Vacuum sweepings taken from [...]’s station wagon revealed hair samples that matched the hair of both [...] and [...]  Ibid.  [...] was charged with the murders of [...] and [...] (Ra11).  On October 17, 1979, a jury convicted [...] of both murders.  Ibid.  His convictions were overturned on appeal, but at a retrial, a jury again convicted him for both murders.
[brief] [...] ID. NO. 446232023  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, v. : Law Division, Burlington County.
[brief] (4T:60:22-25).  Counsel was instructed by the Court to check with [...] to see if he had gone to the bathroom, and to come back into the courtroom so the trial could proceed.  (4T:67:4-7).  At that point, plaintiff’s counsel stated, “And I do commend the Sheriffs on their professionalism. ”  (4T:67:10-11).  Plaintiff’s counsel advised the Court that [...] was asked to return to the courtroom.  (4T:68:24-25).  Then, plaintiff’s counsel advised the Court that plaintiff wanted to move for a mistrial.
[brief] On behalf of [...], [...] paid its limits and [...] made a payment.  (TRVa2514, [...] Tr., 95:15-96:10.)  [...] also made substantial settlement payments on behalf of [...] and [...] under the CCIP Policies.  D.  [...]’s Tender to Its Direct Liability Insurance Carriers  On March 21, 2017, [...]’s attorneys, [...], forwarded the Complaint to [...] (TRVa2918) and [...] sent the Complaint to its broker, [...]  (“[...]”) (TRVa2918).  [...] also tendered its defense to [...] (its primary CGL carrier), which confirmed on March 23, 2017, that it was handling the claim against [...].  (TRVa2920.)  On March 24, 2017, given the potential for a verdict in excess of the [...]’ Policy $1M limit, [...] requested that [...]’s excess carrier be placed on notice.  (TRVa2924.)  Accordingly, notice was provided that day on behalf of [...] to [...] ([...]’s excess carrier).  (TRVa2926-2930.)  [...] and [...] both acknowledged receipt of [...]’s claim by communications to [...] dated March 29, 2017.  (TRVa2933-2937 and TRVa2939.)  Thereafter, [...], the primary CGL carrier, provided [...] with a defense in the [...] Lawsuit without reservation, other than reserving on the uninsurability of punitive damages.  (TRVa2933-2934.)  [...], at no point, reserved its rights to disclaim coverage on any specific basis.  Neither [...] --- 7 [...] took over from [...] the role as [...]’s insurance broker. nor [...] reserved their rights to disclaim coverage for the [...] Lawsuit based on their policies’ Wrap-Up Exclusions.  On June 29, 2017, two weeks after the defense and indemnity of [...] and [...] were tendered to [...], [...] and [...], [...]’s defense counsel responded by tendering [...]’s defense to [...], but, contrary to [...]’ assertion (TRVb19), not to [...] (TRVa916.)  After a formal tender to [...], and after a thorough investigation, [...] disclaimed coverage to [...] under the CCIP.  (TRVa921-922.)  IV.
[brief] After the transfer, plaintiff was approached by the [...] who had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop him, who claimed that plaintiff was approached because “this specific neighborhood is an area known for motor vehicle burglaries. ” (Pa022).  The Supreme court has stated that “the constitutional right to be free from arbitrary [interference with people’s liberties] is not suspended in high-crime neighborhoods where ordinary citizens live and walk at all hours of the day and night.
[brief] Defendant-property owner, [...], owns oceanfront property at [...] at the corner of the Valentine Street right of way in the [...].  The property had its own existing seawall.  The [...] took a permanent easement within the owner’s property as part of a project to construct a seawall to protect the adjacent municipal Valentine Street right of way and municipal beach pavilion.  The project tied the new seawall into Tsakiris’ existing seawall within the easement area taken.  Over the owner’s objection, the court below granted plaintiff’s motion on the eve of trial to amend its complaint.  The court subsequently denied the owner’s motion for reimbursement of the costs of his expert reports which the amendment had negated.  The property owner obtained new expert engineering and appraisal reports which addressed the damages to the value of his property as a result of the taking and the seawall project.  These included: - Physical damage to the owner’s house from the boulder vibrations during the seawall project construction; - Damages or loss in value as a result of the property's increased vulnerability to wave overtopping; and - Damages or loss in value for impaired ocean view and privacy.  In motion practice prior to trial, the trial court excluded each of these damages.  Prior to trial, the matter was finalized by a consent judgment, with the owner's reserving his right to appeal the prior orders excluding the damages.  In a partial taking, just compensation requires consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable and non-conjectural factors that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property as a result of the project for which the taking is necessary.  The Law Division's rulings improperly denied [...] having the jury decide the just compensation for the damages to which he was entitled.  **Procedural History**
[brief] Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384 (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401-02 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  "[T]he magnitude of the error cited must be a gamechanger for reconsideration to be appropriate."  Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 289 (App. Div. 2010).  [...] did not seek to expand the record or reargue the motion.  It properly pointed out that the initial decision mistakenly found that there was a three-month right to redeem post-judgment and that [...] did not have knowledge of any claims by [...].  The motion was entirely proper under the Rules and should have been granted for the reasons set forth above.
[brief] Tenant did not show up for trial demanding that the trial court order Tenant to pay Landlord’s legal fees.  All of the examples that Landlord relies upon to establish that Tenant allegedly “took the position that it was liable for Landlord’s legal fees and costs” came in the context of arguments Tenant raised after the trial court’s November 10, 2021 ruling in Landlord’s favor.  In that ruling, the trial court not only ruled against Tenant on the Tenant’s Allowance issue, but further authorized counsel for Landlord to “submit a certification of counsel fees collectible as additional rent” (Da002).
[brief] ”  Pa663.  “A site triangle created by an island, or a peninsula would have provided 22-33 feet of visibility giving reasonable time for [...] to slow or stop her vehicle. ”  Pa663.  Moreover, “the application of a stop sign and a stop line would slow and stop traffic increasing visibility. ”  Pa663.  “The stop sign and the stop line were absolutely necessary at the intersection where this incident occurred because of the restricted visibility by the last parking space and that it was occupied on the morning of this incident. ”  Pa663.  [...] summarized his conclusions as follows:
[brief] f.  Whenever it appears to the court to which application is made, pursuant to this section, either to vacate or modify the award because the umpire committed prejudicial error in applying applicable law to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution, the court shall, after vacating or modifying the erroneous determination of the umpire, appropriately set forth the applicable law and arrive at an appropriate determination under the applicable facts determined by the umpire.  The court shall then confirm the award as modified.  L. 1987, c. 54, s. 13.  This statute provides broader grounds for vacation or modification of the award than the traditional arbitration model.  *[...] Ins. Co. v. Sabato*, 38 N.J. Super. 463, 470-71 (App. Div. 2005).  In a dispute submitted pursuant to APDRA, the party seeking review may seek vacation or modification of an award when the rights of that party were prejudiced by the umpire "erroneously applying law to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution."  *N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-13c(5),-13e(4)*.  Thus, unlike the UFPA statute in *Jersey Central Power & Light* which had no *de novo* review safety mechanism, the AICRA arbitration statute does through *N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-13*.  Therefore, *Jersey Central* does not support [...]’s argument in the present matter.  Similarly, [...]’s reliance on the *Lajara* decision is misplaced.
[brief] Da02524 – Da02529, Da02653.  On September 16, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”) naming [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] and [...] (“[...]”) as additional defendants.  Da00001.  On September 23, 2021, defendants filed an answer and counterclaim as well as a third-party complaint by [...], [...] and [...] against [...] and [...].
[directive] “Crimes with bail restrictions” means a crime of the first or second degree charged under any of the following sections: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, arson and related offenses, causing or risking widespread injury or damage, burglary, theft by extortion, endangering the welfare of children, resisting arrest, eluding officer, escape, corrupting or influencing a jury, possession of weapons for unlawful purposes, weapons training for illegal activities, soliciting or recruiting gang members, and human trafficking.  The statute also further defines “Crimes with bail restrictions” as any first or second degree 2A:162-12 drug-related crimes under Chapter 35 of Title 2C of the New Jersey statutes and any first or second degree racketeering crimes under Chapter 41 of Title 2C.
[brief] Middlesex County Indictment [...] charged defendant [...] with: third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4) (Count 1); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (Count 2); and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited device (hollow point ammunition), contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3f (Count 3).  (Da 1-2)  Middlesex County Indictment [...] charged [...] with second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1).  (Da 3)  [...] filed a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless motor vehicle search, which was heard by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on November 4, 2020.  (1T)  [...] denied [...]’s motion on the record and in a written order.  (1T 95-1 to 105-24; Da 13)  [...] was tried before [...] and a jury from July 1 to July 7, 2021.  On Indictment [...], the jury convicted [...] of hindering and unlawful possession of a handgun, but acquitted him of possessing a prohibited device.  (5T 44-19 to 46-14, 66-2 to 67-14; Da 4-5)  In a bifurcated trial, the jury convicted [...] of the certain persons offense.  (5T 63-19 to 66-1; Da 6)  On August 24, 2021, [...] was sentenced to an aggregate term of 13 years in prison with five years of parole ineligibility.  (6T 28-14 to 37-4; Da 7-12)  [...] filed a notice of appeal, as within time.  (Da 14-18)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] *State v. Candelaria*, 311 N.J. Super. 437, 454 (App. Div. 1998).  “While an appellate court must defer to the sentencing findings of the trial judge, the deferential standard of review applies only if the trial judge follows the Code...if the trial court fails to identify relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, or merely enumerates them, or forgoes a qualitative analysis, or provides little ‘insight into the sentencing decision,’ then the deferential standard will not apply. ”  *State v. Case*, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).  In the present case, [...] was sentenced to a Flat term of Seven Years New Jersey State Prison.  Defendant submits that the sentence imposed was in violation of the mandates of the Code and was excessive, and that consequently, a re-sentencing is required.  **A.  The Sentencing Judge  Failed to credit [...] with all the Appropriate Mitigating Factors**  The aggravating and mitigating factors a court may consider in imposing sentence are set forth in *N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b)*.  The factors are not merely to be accorded equivalent values, but rather are to be weighed and balanced.  See *State v. Hodge*, 95 N.J. 369 (1984).  The statute “contemplates a thoughtful weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, not a mere counting of one against the other. ”  *State v. Denmon*, 347 N.J. Super. 457, 467-468 (App.Div.), certif.den. 174 N.J. 41 (2002).  An explicit statement of the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors must be set forth on the record.
[brief] See Silva, 267 N.J. Super. at 558 (noting that a plaintiff “should be compensated for the legal expenses he would have borne if his suit had been confined to the ground on which he prevailed”).  (39072a-73a)  In recommending that work done in connection with “discovery motions” (Db41) be included in the fee award, the Special Master noted that “[[...]] do not argue that the testimony at these depositions was unrelated to RICO, but merely that the motion practice to ensure those depositions happened should not be compensated. ”  (39076a)  [...] found, however, that:  Even if the [discovery] motions were purely procedural, they were still necessary to further the uncovering of evidence to support Plaintiffs’ RICO claims, and therefore were part of “the pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. ”  Jarwick II at *79.  Put another way, the costs of litigating these procedural issues would have been borne by Plaintiffs whether or not they had claims in addition to their RICO claims.  Silva, 267 N.J. Super. at 558.  (39076a)
[brief] [...] requested that [...] produce the documents or identify them on its privilege log.  5.  The parties exchanged lengthy correspondence back and forth regarding the issue.  Throughout their correspondence, [...] informed [...] that [...]’s collection, search, review and production procedures and methods were proper and complete.  [...] also took the position that [...]’s separate document requests to [...] and [...] were not identical and the search terms agreed-upon were not identical; therefore, [...] and [...]’s document production would not be identical.  Last, [...] informed [...] that the omitted documents were not responsive to [...]’s document requests.  6.  Overtime the parties reduced the documents at issue to approximately 39 documents.  Subsequently, on May 11, 2017, [...] produced 13 out of the 39 at-issue documents.  7.  On July 10, 2017, [...] filed the instant Motion to Compel requesting that the Special Master compel [...] to “answer straightforward questions regarding why several responsive documents were missing from [...]’s production or otherwise not identified and logged as privileged.
[brief] By correspondence dated February 8, 2021, the Custodian of records contacted [...] and instructed him to “forward all text messages from [his] personal or business device concerning fire Commissioner business during the relevant time period” and that the records would be reviewed and redacted prior to release to ensure no confidential information would be released.  (Da034).  On February 16, 2021 Counsel for the Fire District again wrote to [...] requesting that he provide the required documents as soon as possible, advising that the documents would be reviewed and redacted prior to release on February 16, 2021, (Da037) and again on February 18, 2021.  (Da042).  Rather than comply with the Interim Order of the GRC, [...] demanded a fee of $300 per hour for his estimate of 80 hours to produce the documents, a total of $24,000.