ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A remote prior conviction may also be admissible if the defendant “has been convicted of a series of crimes over the years. ”  See Hedgespeth, 464 N.J. Super. at 430 (quoting Sands, 76 N.J. at 145).  In State v. Murphy, this Court held that considering the remoteness of the defendant’s seventeen-year-old prior conviction for possession of CDS with intent to distribute, the offense was insufficiently serious to merit the admission of the conviction for impeachment purposes.
[brief] Settled New Jersey law expressly allows a bidder to cure non-material defects through post-bid submissions.  In other words, immaterial defects (like [...]’s trivial omission of a copy of its existing Notice of Classification) can be cured after bid opening because the defect is immaterial.  *Suburban Disposal, Inc.*, 2014 N.J. Super LEXIS 1186 at *15.  *Palamar Constr., Inc.*, 196 N.J. Super. at 241 (holding that bidder’s failure to submit mandatory qualification statement at time of bid opening was a waivable defect); *Thassian* Mech. Contr., Inc., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 27 at *5 (App. Div. Jan. 6, 2020)(holding public agency should have waived a defect even though the defect pertained to a mandatory document in the bid specifications).  The ability to cure immaterial defects through post-bid submission is particularly appropriate where, as here, the omitted information pertained to facts existing at the time of bid opening that could not be altered, irrespective of whether the omitted document was originally submitted.  Tec Elec., Inc. v. Franklin Lakes Bd. of Educ., 284 N.J. Super. 480, 486 (Law Div. 1995)(holding that bidder’s failure to submit prequalification affidavit was curable after bidding, stating “[t]he truth or falsity of the [omitted document] would have had the same consequences if given concurrently with, or after, the bids were opened, but in no event could the [omitted document] alter the facts that existed on the day the bid was opened”).  Therefore, the Court correctly held that [...]’s submission of its Notice of Classification (which was valid months before bidding) was valid and effectively cured its technical omission of the document from its initial bid submission.
[brief] There, the court identified the factors to consider when weighing whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences in order to promote greater uniformity in sentences.  100 N.J. at 635.  The Yarbough factors identify the following criteria by which to evaluate the appropriateness of concurrent or consecutive sentences: (1) there can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime; (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision; (3) reasons to be considered by the sentencing court should include facts relating to the crimes, including whether or not: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; (e) the convictions for which the sentences to be imposed are numerous; (4) there should be no double counting of aggravating factors; and (5) successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to punishment for the first offense.  Id. at 643-45.  The court has noted that unlike other states, there is no presumption of imposition of a concurrent or consecutive sentence.  State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 266 (2021).  Further, the existence of any given factor does not create a presumption of consecutive or concurrent sentences.  Id.  Rather, it is the sentencing court’s duty to weigh the factors, and explain the reasoning employed to arrive at an overall fair sentence.
[directive] In seeking motion file a shall prosecutor the 8.4.4, or 8.4.3, 8.4.2, 8.4.1, subsection to pursuant designated prosecutor supervisory a unless 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. to pursuant release of revocation can be release defendant's by posed risks the (1) that determines 7.8 Section to pursuant the (2) monitoring, or and conditions release enhanced new imposing by adequately controlled the If release. of revocation for applying by served be not would justice of interests the release, of revocation seeking of presumption the overcome to made determination is 69 Page file. case the in decision that for reasons) the document shall prosecutor supervisory  Circumstances. and Facts  Relevant 8.5 of revocation seek decision to the apply to shall 7.6 Section of provisions the All of 2A:162-24.  N.J.S.A. to pursuant release Release.  Revocation of for Aaalication of Filing Electronic 8.6  eCourts the through electronically filed be shall release of revocation for motions  All system.  Motions.  Detention Pretrial Initial and Revocation-of-Release
[brief] ’”  State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494-95 (2006).  In this regard, an expert witness may not opine on a defendant’s state of mind or whether a defendant’s conduct was wrongful as these are ultimate issues of fact reserved for the trier of fact, which in this case was the trial court.  See State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 427 (2016); see also Estate of Cohen v. Booth Computers, 421 N.J. Super. 134, 149 (App. Div. 2011).
[brief] (Ca216, Ca218, Ca220); (Ca136 at RQA 2, Ca144 at Response to RQA 2).  Attached to the Complaint was a series of posts [...] made from her Facebook page which asked [...] community members to vote for her and her running mate [...].  Id.  The Complaint itself clearly stated – as to each Count that was subject to the Commission’s Final Decision – that at the time each post was made, “[...]’s page was public as indicated by the earth-shaped symbol in the top left corner of the post, just below [...]’s name,” that “[...] Repeatedly used this Facebook account to campaign for her position on the Board (Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3, and Exhibit 4) and posted a picture of herself being sworn in as a member of the [...] (Exhibit 5),” and that “[...] held herself out as a member of the [...] on her Facebook page.
[brief] Also crucial is how Plaintiff’s brief does not provide clear information as to what the TMS software or logs are and also does not properly put into perspective that the TMS logs are not important to the instant litigation, let alone "essential" as erroneously argued by Plaintiff.  (Pb12 to Pb13).  The uncontroverted evidence, however, has shown that the TMS is essentially a piece of software that can schedule many different things.
[brief] Because the trial court appropriately found and weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors supported by the sufficient credible evidence in the record, defendant's sentence on count two should be affirmed.  An appellate court is bound to affirm a trial court’s sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found were not “‘based upon competent credible evidence in the record;’” or (3) the “‘application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.
[brief] '....wherein it uniformly has been held (a) that we must look to the common law for a definition of the nature and extent of the right of trial by jury which the Constitution declares "shall be preserved;" (b) that the right so preserved is the right to have the issues of fact presented by the pleadings tried by a jury of twelve, under the direction and superintendence of the court; (c) that the rendition of a verdict is of the substance of the right, because to dispense with a verdict is to eliminate the jury which is no less a part of the tribunal charged with the trial than is the court, and (d) that [*****57] when the issues have been so tried and a verdict rendered they cannot be reexamined otherwise than on a new trial granted by the court in which the first trial was had or ordered by the appellate court for some error of law affecting the verdict....'  As words are to be taken to have their plain meaning, one can only conclude that there is a right to trial by jury of 12 per the jury decision that the Supreme court opinion in *Slocum* represents.  Notably the Supreme court put to rest any possibility of a state court judge re-examining a Supreme court opinion via the language of *Slocum*, above referenced.
[brief] ”  (Transcript, 16:2, 3).  The fact of the matter is that Defendants have suffered no cognizable prejudice.  Additionally, even if Plaintiff did submit a timely affidavit of merit, Defendants would have filed the same motion arguing that the submitted affidavit of merit was insufficient, which is a result of the fact that Defendants failed to produce the same medical records that Plaintiff required to submit a timely and sufficient affidavit of merit.  The entire issue in this appeal stems from two errors: (1) Defendants’ failure to respond to Plaintiff’s requests for discovery, which would have provided Plaintiff with the medical records needed to obtain an affidavit of merit; and (2) the Trial Court’s failure to hold a Ferreira Conference.
[brief] Super. 614 (App. Div. 1983) | 23, 25, 26 | | Ginsberg ex rel. Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 441 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 227 N.J. 7 (2016) | 23, 26 | | GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572 (2011) | 8 | | Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191 (2019) | 11, 14 | | Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 2010) | 21 | | Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J. Super. 487 (App. Div. 1998) | 23, 26, 27 | Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep, 453 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2018) ................................................................. 1, 9 Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323 (2006) ...........................................18, 19 Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 347 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div.), cert. granted, cause remanded, 172 N.J. 176 (2002) ..............................................23, 26 Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301 (2019) ...............7, 8 L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 2014) .................................................. 23 Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168 (1991) .............................................................  23 Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 5371091 (2011) ..............................................10, 23 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)
[brief] [...] acknowledge this fact during the second day of his deposition.  (Pa0354 at 116:4-6).  [...] also provided specific deposition testimony illustrating that the scope of his roadway monitoring role concerned areas where work had been performed:  Q.  At any point during your work with [...] on structure 40, pursuant to this contract, did you ever become aware that there was some settlement on the approach of the southbound abutment of structure 40?  A. Yes.  Separate from this.  Q. Right.  When did you first learn of it?  A.  The settlement that I was aware of that was corrected?  Q. Yes.  A.  That would be post our sheeting driving ad we repaired settlement on multiple bridges in multiple locations due to construction activities.  Q.  Okay.  A.  All of which were in the right lane.  (Pa683 at 37:15).  It is undisputed that the subject accident occurred in the left lane of the roadway and that [...] has never attempted to address the scope of [...]’s Project-related monitoring activities.  Hearing Testimony Concerning Causation
[directive] l~nce •lnt~ QwUty Flff,w,ss • Sefvke Name  Probation Officer I Date Reviewed A/ Track B - Phase 1 Requirements you staff Review each requirement with and sign understand the expectations.  . • I will attend court on time at: • my I will participate in developing and following treatment plan at: .  Phone Number: • of my I will follow the conditions probation supervision and meet weekly with probation officer on time.  Probation officer: Phone of Number: my .  I will immediately notify probation officer any of conflicts prior to my appointment or in case an emergency.  • my my I will develop case plan with probation officer . • my I will allow probation officers into residence for home visits and home inspections .  • I will submit to random drug testing.  Testing hotline number:  (ID#: )  • if if my my I will address housing, needed and keep probation officer informed residence changes.  • if I will obtain a medical/ dental assessment, needed . •  I will start changing/addressing people, places, and things.  I have reviewed the requirements for Phase 1 and understand my responsibilities to the drug court program.  Client Signature Date of Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021), CN 12568 page 1 7 by Drug Court Phase Reqmrements
[brief] Regarding causation, [...]’s argument hinges entirely on [...]’s alleged lack of active steering and exertion of steering torque.  As a matter of fact, however, the vehicle recorded the steering torque for the five (5) seconds immediately preceding the crash at zero (0) degrees.  Pa479; Pa509; Pa517.  Zero (0) degrees means no driver steering input, i.e., no torque applied either to the left or to the right.  Pa517.  The CDR records steering input in five (5) degree increments, so a zero (0) degree reading reflects steering torque of less than five (5) degrees, i.e., steering input between zero (0) and four (4) degrees.  Ibid.  [...]’s testing “accounts for the possibility of steering input in the range of 0-4 degrees” consistent with the recorded crash data.  Pa518.  Plaintiff’s reconstruction expert, [...], confirmed the lack of steering input by [...] through an examination of the collision site, evaluation of the crash data, examination of the vehicles, photographs and police reports.  Pa538 (“The pre-crash data indicates that the vehicle’s indicated speed increased from 47 mph to 50 mph, there was no service brake application, and no change from a straight-ahead steering wheel position in the five second period that preceded the crash.
[brief] The State alleged that [...] was the person who caused the shooting death of [...] based primarily on a series of surveillance videos from a bar/liquor store and various scattered properties leading up to the location of the shooting.  (5T 83-5 to 112-1)  [...] presented a mistaken-identity defense:  He acknowledged that he had been with Tucker at the bar/liquor store earlier in the evening, but [...] maintained that they split up on the way home when he turned down a side street and that he was not the man depicted in later videos closer to the shooting location.  (5T 70-11 to 82-20)  No witness identified [...] in the later video or contradicted his alibi, none of the later videos clearly showed the suspect’s face, and no one saw the shooting.  (da68)  No Gun, DNA, or fingerprints were recovered.  And no motive evidence was presented.  On February 23, 2015, [...] discovered Tucker’s body in the road at [...] following an alert at 2:15 a.m. from their ShotSpotter system, which detects gunshots.
[brief] (1T38:5-8).  First, the judge explained that the attempted civil rights claims failed as a matter of law because the State and its entities are immune from such claims under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  (1T38:8-40:14).  The judge also noted that, because there was no allegation against any individual person named as a State Defendant “in anything other than their official capacities,” those State Defendants also were immune.  (1T40:12-14).  The court further determined that the individual state officials also were shielded by immunity for any alleged conduct in their judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions, even if they lacked sovereign immunity.  (1T42:11-44:22).  In addition, the court determined that [...] failed to set forth a viable claim for injunctive relief, noting that he was released from custody and residing in Florida, which negated any claim of the need for injunctive relief to alleviate irreparable harm.  (1T44:23-45:21).  Finally, the court outlined the extensive procedural history of this case, noting [...]’s failure to file a viable initial pleading after seven years and six attempts.
[brief] Second, *the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable because its terms are excessively disproportionate.*  Defendant/Appellant makes no effort to justify the unfair and rogue terms of Defendant [...]’s chosen arbitration agreement form.  As a matter of substance, it is clear that the arbitration agreement would only serve the obstetrician-gynecologist Defendant [...] at his cosmetic surgery patients’ expense.  The agreement states that it applies to persons who are not parties to the agreement, using very similar language as was invalidated in *Moore, supra,* 416 N.J. Super. at 42.  The agreement purports to apply to “any physician or nurse or person associated” with Defendant [...] without defining what “associated with” could mean.  Accordingly, the agreement bound decedent to arbitrate her claims against these unidentified persons who were not parties to the agreement and were not bound to arbitrate their claims against her.  Most shockingly, the agreement gives the doctor virtually complete control over the arbitration panel members.  Paragraph 3 of the arbitration form provides: (Da122, emphasis added).  Accordingly, the doctor has complete veto power over the arbitration panel.  If he disagrees with a patient’s suggested arbitrators, he can simply appoint the entire panel.  Such an arrangement is not only uncustomary, but also ripe for manipulation.  Arbitration can facilitate judicial efficiency, but it should never undermine victims with biased panels outside the oversight of the State’s courts.  Any arbitration on these terms is a staggering affront to justice and completely invalidates the notice section which states that the patient agrees to have disputes decided by “neutral arbitration.
[brief] The Board utilized the following calculations in deciding [...]’s hardship application:  1.  Taxes: $1,937.22  Condo Fees: $5,648.05  Insurance: $634  Management Fees: $1200  Registration: $25  Expenses Total: $9,444.27  2.  **Equity:** $12,804.88  Equity + Expenses: $(12,804.88 x .0625) + $9,444.27 = $10,244.58  3.  **Income:**  $8,387 (Equity + Expenses) – Income: $1,857.58 (Deficit)  4.  Monthly Deficit: $154.79  Base Rent: $574.41  New Base Rent: $729.20  5.  New Rent = Base Rent + Surcharge = $729.2 + $149 = $878.20  H.  **Before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. in 2021**  Thereafter, on September 13, 2021, [...] appealed the Board’s decision to the Hon. [...], J.S.C. seeking (1) a determination that the Rent Control Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably in determining its hardship rent increase application and (2) that the Court determine the proper rent increase amount for [...]’s hardship rent application.
[directive] Chief Enforcement  All Law General Attorney  [...]  FROM: 2017 27, September DATE: 2016)  11, October on Issued Originally 2016-6  Directive (Amending to Procedures and Practices, Policies, Interim Establishing Directive  Amended SUBJECT: 2014, 31 c. P.L. to Pursuant Reform Justice Criminal Implement  CONTENTS OF TABLE .............................................................................12  OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION
[directive] Requirements - Review each requirement with staff and sign you understand the expectations.  ______________ •  I will attend court on time monthly at: _ • I will follow my treatment plan and relapse prevention plan at: ---------------- .  Phone Number: of •  I will follow the conditions probation supervision and meet monthly with my probation __________________ officer on time.  Probation officer: Phone __________ of Number: .  I will immediately notify my probation officer any of conflicts prior to my appointment or in case an emergency.  •  I will review my case plan with my probation officer as needed.  • I will allow probation officers into my residence for home visits and home inspections.  ______ •  I will submit to random drug testing.  Testing hotline number:  _ ______ (ID#: )  if • I will maintain housing and I will keep my probation officer informed my residence changes.  • I will maintain any recommended medical/dental needs.  • I will continue to demonstrate changing people, places, and things.  • I will maintain attending recovery groups and my recovery network per treatment.  • I will follow my financial plan and continue making payments per case plan.  • I will maintain supportive services as recommended (for example, parenting classes, family support, etc.).  •  I will maintain pro-social activities.  •  I will maintain my employment, vocational training, or school.  I have reviewed the requirements for Phase 5 and understand my responsibilities to the drug court program.  Client Signature Date by Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021) of7
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Respondents respectfully submit that the Trial Court’s decision to grant the Defendant-Respondents’ motion for summary judgment should be sustained by the Appellate Division and the Plaintiff-Appellant’s appeal should be denied.  Respectfully Submitted, [...] /s/ [...]  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq.  Attorney for Defendant-Respondents: [...], Esq. 043952010  [...] [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  E-mail: [...]
[brief] Due process is a “flexible and fact-sensitive concept. ”  *In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits*, 185 N.J. 452, 467 (2006).  It is a “firmly settled” rule that a “trial-type adjudicatory hearing is not allowed . . . except to an appellant who can show a statutory right or a constitutionally protected property interest. ”  *In re Riverview Dev.*, 411 N.J. Super. 409, 434 (App. Div. 2010).  In fact, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) prohibits state agencies from promulgating “any rule or regulation that would allow a third party to appeal a permit decision” unless “specifically authorized to do so by federal law or State statute. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1 and -3.3(a).  Here, the WFD Act does not provide [...] a right to an adjudicatory hearing.
[directive] The investigator assigned an internal investigations case should initially outline the case to determine the best investigative approach and identify those interviews immediately necessary.  The investigator should determine if any pending court action or ongoing criminal investigation might delay or impact upon the case at hand.  If it appears that the conduct under investigation may have violated the law or the investigation involves the INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 33 officer’s use of force that resulted in serious bodily injury or death, the County Prosecutor shall be immediately notified of the internal affairs investigation.  7.1.2
[brief] POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO SEVER THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL FROM CO–DEFENDANT [...] (RAISED IN PART BELOW).  EVIDENCE WHICH PERTAINED SOLELY TO CO-DEFENDANT [...] WAS SO DISPARATELY GREATER THAN THE EVIDENCE WHICH PERTAINED TO THE DEFENDANT TO HAVE JUSTIFIED SEVERANCE (RAISED IN PART BELOW).  (B)  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LEVEL OF ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND CO-DEFENDANT [...] DID NOT WARRANT SEVERANCE.  POINT V THE AGGREGATE  40 YEAR BASE CUSTODIAL SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND REPRESENTS A MISAPPLICATION OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION.