ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  At the December 10 hearing, the parties made varying claims as to what the [...] had identified in its records as responsive to [...]’s discovery requests.  For example, [...] asserted that there were 478,000 documents flagged as potentially responsive by the [...], with 130,000 of these documents mentioning “[...]” and another 90,000 documents mentioning “[...]. ” (Doc. 134 at 15:11-25).  The [...] responded that the Court’s May 2, 2018 Order (Doc. 89) limited the time period for discovery, and that after applying this time period filter to the original universe of 478,000 documents, the [...] was left with 336,000 documents, with 32,000 documents mentioning “[...]” and 23,000 documents mentioning “[...]. ” (Doc. 134 at 37:5-12).  Regardless of the exact number of documents at issue, the Court agrees with [...] that the [...] should turn over all documents that mention “[...]” or “[...].
[brief] | Item | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 06/05/20 | omitted* | | [...] Evaluation, dated 02/25/20 | omitted* | | [...] Follow Evaluation, dated 04/27/20 | omitted* | | [...] Follow up Evaluation, dated 06/10/20 | omitted* | | [...] progress notes dated 02/25-09/02/20 | omitted* | | [...] Initial Evaluation | omitted* | | Affidavit of [...], MD, dated 02/28/23 | 61a | # TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPELLANT’S APPENDIX | Description | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Complaint | 1a | | Answer | 7a | | Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant | 20a | | Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts | 22a | | Certification of Counsel for Defendant in support | NEITHER e-filed NOR served | | Defendant’s Exhibit “A” – Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories | 26a | | Defendant’s Exhibit “B” – Deposition transcript of Plaintiff | 42a | | Defendant’s Exhibit “C” – Expert report of [...], MD | 84a* | | CV for [...], MD | 86a* | | Certification of Plaintiff’s counsel in opposition | 56a | | Plaintiff’s Response to Statement of Facts | 58a | | Certification of witness [...] | 60a | | MRI report of the cervical spine of Plaintiff | 99a* | * Medical records and reports included in Plaintiff’s Confidential Appendix.
[directive] Course.  a.  Total of 10 rounds of authorized service load per participant.  b.  Minimum passing score of 80% is required.  This is computed by dividing the number of actual hits placed anywhere on the Q target by the total number of possible hits.  c.  This same course of fire will be used for the Shotgun Qualification Course (SQC) conducted under daylight conditions and the Shotgun Night Firing Qualification Course (SNQC) conducted under night firing conditions, except the night firing course will not be timed.
[brief] This invented standard effectively acted as the new business rule, erroneously barring Plaintiffs’ expert report simply because the business was new, and the Trial Court erroneously ignored the surrounding facts and testimony establishing that the newness of this business in this context was irrelevant.  The Trial Court goes on to acknowledge that “the Court did not require expert comparisons and modeling to similarly situated new businesses in adopting the reasonable certainty standard. ”  1286a.  Yet, in the same breath, the Trial Court held that the absence of comparisons to other novice businesses was fatal here.  The Trial Court again acknowledged the lack of a requirement established by the Supreme Court, but then immediately created a requirement.  The Trial Court did not have authority to create this standard.
[brief] Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); State v. Valencia, supra, at 133; State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 346, 352 (1980).  The warrant requirement is predicated on the premise that the necessity and reasonableness of a search or seizure can best be determined “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of a [police] officer engaged in the often-competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. ”  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (emphasis added).  Both the Constitution and the courts have recognized that in certain narrowly delineated situations involving “exigency,” see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25 (1979); State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7 (1980), where the need of the officer possessing probable cause to act arises before he is able to obtain a warrant, the stricture may be excusable.
[brief] In *Illinois v. Allen*, the United States Supreme Court held that where a trial judge is confronted with a “disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendant[],” the judge has the discretion to “take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. ”  *Id.* at 343-44.  The *Allen* Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to remove the defendant from the courtroom in light of his disruptive and disrespectful behavior, which continued despite repeated warnings.
[brief] ## State Cases - **Cho v. Trinitas Reg. Med. Center**, 443 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2015) .................................................. 11, 12, 13 - **Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc. **, 56 N.J. 326 (1970) ..............................................................................  10 - **Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.**, 185 N.J. 490 (1986)  ............................................................................. 5 - **Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.**, 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ............................................................................. 5 - **Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co.**, 50 N.J. 563 (1967) ............................................................................. 13 - **Richmond v. Thompson**, 901 P.2d 371 (Wisc. App. 1995) ............................................................  1 - **Shoemaker v. Shoemaker**, 11 N.J. Super. 471 (App. Div. 1951) ....................................................  1, 2 - **Young v. Schering Corp.**, 275 N.J. Super. 221 (App. Div. 1994) ...................................................  8, 9 - **Zalewski v. Gallagher**, 150 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 1977) ...................................................
[brief] (Pa000001).  To wit, Appellant has been diagnosed with a rare progressive systemic connective disorder which is similar to Pseudoxanthoma elasticum (“PXE”).  See id.  Specifically, Appellant was subjected to disability discrimination as a direct result of Respondents’ failure to provide Appellant with the reasonable accommodations she required for her disability and refused to engage Appellant in the interactive process to provide her reasonable accommodations for said disabilities.  See id.  Finally, Respondents retaliated against her in violation of the NJLAD when they terminated her employment following her request for reasonable accommodations in connection with her disability.  See id.  1.  **Appellant begins working with Respondents [...] and [...].**
[brief] A motion to **VACATE** a default judgement need **not** meet “the more stringent requirements of R. 4:50-1 for setting aside a default judgement”.  *O’Connor v. Altus*, 67 N.J. 106, 129 (1975) “only a mere showing of good cause is required for setting aside an entry of default”, *N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. V. M.G.*  427 N.J. Super at 171.  A valid “entry of default is a necessary predicate to a default judgement,” the default judgement is “void”, *Clark v. Pomporio*, 397 N.J. Super. 630, 641-42 (App. Div).  Additionally, a judgment is a void judgment if the court that rendered the judgment **lacked** jurisdiction of the subject matter, or **OF the parties**, or **ACTED** in a manner **inconsistent with DUE PROCESS**, *Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.*, Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A., U.S.C.A. Const.
[directive] Crisis Negotiation Team Response.  Once an incident has been determined to involve a barricaded individual or hostage situation, the Tactical Team shall immediately request a Crisis Negotiation Team to respond to the incident, if crisis negotiators are not an integrated required by Section 4.3. component of the Tactical Team response  The Crisis Negotiation Team leader, in consultation with the Tactical Team, shall determine the appropriate Crisis Negotiation Team members to respond.  http://ntoa.org/pdf/TROS.pdf  5  In circumstances requiring mutual aid from tactical teams approved under this directive but based in other 6 counties or jurisdictions, the approval pursuant to Section 4.3 of the County Prosecutor in the “home county” of the responding tactical team shall be deemed valid in the jurisdiction receiving mutual aid services.  9
[brief] This case involves a book account claim for release of retainage for a generator set sold by Plaintiff to Defendant and installed at a New Jersey hospital.  Plaintiff filed this claim to enforce an agreement for release of retainage following application of a credit.  Defendant acknowledged the release was "stuck" in its system and promised to "follow thru" for payment once a revised invoice was submitted.  Defendant did not pay and this lawsuit followed.  Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer claiming Plaintiff failed to comply with the purchase agreement between the parties governing dispute resolution.  The Law Division declined to entertain argument on the motion and determined Plaintiff did not produce substantive evidence in opposition to the motion.  The Law Division did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law until this appeal was filed; that makes review challenging.  The conclusions in a supplemental statement following appeal are not supported by competent evidence submitted by Plaintiff.  An e-mail exchange between the parties demonstrates resolution of the dispute with a promise for payment.  Defendant's refusal to make payment following agreement, did not require "re-mediation" or resort to alternative dispute resolution.  On de novo review, the Appellate Division should readily find plain error by the Law Division and reverse the orders under review.
[brief] Perhaps most significantly, the NJDEP rules and regulations that [...] accuses the [...] of violating only apply to obtaining CAFRA permits and for “any activity for which a coastal wetlands permit, waterfront development permit, or Federal consistency determination is required....” (Pa160, citing to N.J.A.C. 7:7–1.5).  None of these definitions apply to redevelopment plans, or redevelopment plan amendments, adopted by municipalities pursuant to the LRHL.
[brief] The defendant's due process rights were violated by the extreme variation, without necessity, from established modes of trial.  *Id.* at 283.  To an equal or greater extent, all of the concerns expressed by the California court are present here.  Defendant's trial, with twenty-nine witnesses, took place over a period of almost one month, from September 28 to October 26, 2021, almost twice the length of the two-and-a-half-week trial in *Santamaria*.  The break in jury deliberations extended for the longer period of fourteen days, rather than the eleven-day break in *Santamaria*.  Indisputably, this lengthy adjournment exposed jurors to many outside influences before they could come together again to decide the case.  The extensive delay had to have significantly affected jurors' ability to remember the evidence and the jury instructions.  Moreover, the extended break did not arise from sudden or unanticipated events.  It arose because the judge's planned week-long vacation followed several vacations days that had been planned by the attorneys, which followed the Election Day holiday.  The parties were aware that the month-long trial had already stretched to the end of October.  At the very least, when deliberations had not finished on Monday, November 1, 2021, the court was made aware that jurors would not be able to return to deliberate before November 15, 2021, unless it arranged for a substitute judge to be available while the jury deliberated, as counsel requested.  But the court never made that arrangement and the record contains no explanation why it did not do so.  Defendant was facing conviction on the most serious of offenses, murder, with the prospect of life in prison.  The trial was long and complicated.  Under these circumstances, the court abused its discretion when it adjourned jury deliberations for two weeks because the extensive break in the middle of deliberations violated defendant's rights to due process.  Defendant's convictions must be reversed because his due process rights were violated when the court adjourned the proceedings for a two-week break in the middle of jury deliberations.
[brief] Upon the trial court’s granting of the motion, [...] filed a “Builder’s Remedy” action under [...] Communities, Inc. v. [...] and the Board of the [...], Docket No. [...].  (Pa45)  The Township and the Board filed denial answers to the Builder’s Remedy action (Pa46) and filed a motion to the trial court in this action seeking reconsideration of the Court’s November 10, 2020 revocation order.  That motion for reconsideration remained pending during further negotiations between the parties, which negotiations ultimately led to a Settlement Agreement dated January 8, 2021 to resolve [...]’s claims including its request for a builder’s remedy.
[brief] RESPONSES TO MATTERS NOT ADDRESSED BELOW (not addressed in the Decision).  The [...] respectfully submits the following additional points in response to arguments not covered or brought before the Court below.  A.  “OTHER” DOES NOT REFER TO PROFESSIONALS (not addressed in the Decision).  There is no reason to believe that the [...]’s (“[...]”) miscellaneous craft classification of “other” is proof that professionals like archaeologists are required to register under the PWCRA.  We respectfully submit that this contention has no legal or logical basis.  [...] rests this contention on a print-out of the [...]’s frequently asked questions on the subject of PWCRA registration, in which the [...] lists 39 trades who must register under the PWCRA, and an instruction that states as follows:  Below is a list of crafts.  If a craft is not listed, please add it under “Other” and provide the description of the craft. ”  If the contractor does not employ any prevailing wage crafts, please select “Other” and provide a brief explanation.  See Carb19; see also 1579a-1581a.  For context, these instructions appear in a thread that begins with “How do I register”.  Therefore, the referenced instructions are most likely meant to help a contractor register when their crafts are not already listed.
[brief] “The right to a civil jury trial is one of the oldest and most fundamental of rights. ”  Lajara, 222 N.J. at 134.  “Under New Jersey’s constitutional jurisprudence, the right to a jury trial applies to causes of action—even statutory causes of action—that sound in law rather than equity. ”  Id. at 142.  New Jersey courts consider not only the nature of the relief (the remedy), but whether the cause of action resembles one that existed in common law.  *Ibid.*  The *Lajara* Court determined that the relief available to insurance companies in IFPA actions—compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs—is legal in nature.  *Id.* at 146.  Further, the Court compared a private-party action brought under the IFPA to the cause of action for common-law fraud and concluded that the only element of a claim for common-law fraud absent from an IFPA claim is reliance by the plaintiff on the false statement.  *Id.* at 147-49.  “Perfect alignment between the elements of an IFPA claim and common-law fraud is not necessary to trigger the right to a jury trial. ”  *Id.* at 148.  The Court pointed out that a jury trial is required in a consumer-fraud case, despite the lack of complete symmetry between a consumer-fraud case and a common-law fraud claim.  *Id.* at 148-149.  The *Lajara* Court stated:
[brief] [...] met [...] when he handled her father's funeral in March 2004.  He called her for a date the week after the funeral and then moved into her Pennsauken townhouse with two of his children, [...] and [...], a couple of months later.  [...] was in 5th grade and [...] was in the 4th grade when they moved in with Teresa.  The couple married on August 27, 2006.  Due to an affair, Teresa kicked Tyrone out of her townhouse in 2009.  Tyrone’s daughter [...] remained with Teresa because it was her Senior year of high school.  Theresa and Tyrone reconciled before [...]’s graduation in 2010 and began looking for a larger home to accommodate their combined families, which included Teresa’s youngest son.  The Sicklerville home was purchased in 2010 and the combined families all moved in together at the same time.  The utilities and cable were in Teresa’s name and the deed was in Tyrone’s name.  Teresa also worked at the [...] in Sicklerville, which was walking distance from the marital home until 2012.  (154-A)  In 2012, Teresa left the marital home because Tyrone was having another affair.  The parties would break up and reconcile over and over again because of Tyrone’s infidelity.  Teresa last spent overnight time in her home the weekend of December 28, 2018, after celebrating her birthday there (153- A).  In February of 2019, upon learning of an affair with [...], Teresa finally filed for divorce.  Tyrone was served with the divorce complaint on June 15, 2019, but refused to file an Answer; instead, he sought another reconciliation.  Teresa was represented by [...], Esq., and on February 11, 2020, a Motion for Pendente Lite Relief was filed on her behalf after [...] terminated her medical benefits.  The [...] filed an opposition to the Motion but once again did not file an Answer.  The pending unanswered Complaint was dismissed on April 16, 2020, when Teresa's attorney advised the Court of [...]'s death.
[brief] (2T 81:19-21)  The parties had been in a family-type relationship, living together for twenty-three years at the time this Settlement Agreement was negotiated and signed.  (2T 30:22-31:4; 33:8-18; 36:24-37:15)  Certainly, by virtue of occupying the same space and interacting on a daily basis, each party had a general idea of the assets of the other.  (2T 32:6-9)  For example, Plaintiff inadvertently came across Defendant’s 2009 tax return when looking for her own documents, which confirmed that Defendant’s income was $918,000.  (2T 143:2-6)  At the time the settlement discussions were ongoing, Defendant’s reported income was $57,000 per month.  (2T 144:2-14)  Additionally, Defendant was aware, prior to 2011, that Plaintiff maintained a 401(k) retirement account, as the parties joked about it.  (2T 78:17-79:6)  The value of Plaintiff’s 401(k) in 2011 was obviously different than it was in 2018.  There had been the stock market collapse in 2009, plus additional contributions were made by her and matched by her employer after 2011.  (2T 80:11-81:8)  Plaintiff’s assets in 2018 are not indicative of her assets in 2011.  A substantial portion of her assets were the result of saving subsequent to the entry of the Settlement Agreement.  V.
[brief] Demands for TPO in the context of medicolegal or forensic settings have become a tactic designed to limit the ability of the consulting neuropsychologist to perform assessment and provide information to the trier of fact.  Plaintiffs' counsel referenced an unrelated Essex County Law Division discovery motion order in opposition to Defendants' motion for protective order.  In that case, Judge [...], J.S.C., apparently ordered that Plaintiff could record Dr. [...]'s neuropsychological examination.  Da39.  That order is informative for several reasons.  After obtaining an that order, over Defendants' objection, requiring that any examination be performed under sub-optimal conditions, the Plaintiffs' attorney intended to utilize the very basis for Defendants' objection as cross-examination fodder.  The Defendants argued, therein (apparently based on the literature and Dr. Morgan’s own professional convictions), that the results of tests performed under such conditions would inherently have less validity than testing done under optimal conditions (without a recording device or TPO).  Judge Petrillo apparently ruled that such concerns were outweighed by whatever equitable factors were raised by Plaintiffs’ counsel.  Then, having forced Defendants’ expert to conduct his evaluation in a manner contrary to good practice, the Plaintiff’s attorney fully intended to skewer the expert’s results as being invalid for the very reasons raised by Defendants’ counsel.
[brief] On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CIVIL DIVISION MIDDLESEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] SAT BELOW: THE HONORABLE [...], J.S.C. DEFENDANTS’ / RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF AND APPENDIX IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ / APPELLANTS’ APPEAL OF THE DECEMBER 15, 2023  ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS / RESPONDENTS OF COUNSEL [...], Esq. Attorney ID No. 001221986 OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF [...], Esq. Attorney ID No. 018701983  TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF APPENDIX .......................................................... iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................... iv PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................. 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................... 4 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................... 5 A) The October 6, 2021 Accident ........................................ 5 B) The Parking Lot Was Designed In Accordance With Industry Standards and Local Zoning Regulations ......................................................... 8 C) Defendant Had No Knowledge of an Design Safety Deficiencies In the Non-Management Designated Employee Parking Area ........................................ 14 1) Prior Accident History .................................................. 14 2) Absence of Complaints About Safety Concerns For Drivers and Pedestrians ........................................ 16 D) Defendant [...] Took No Action to Alter the Design of the Parking Lot ....................... 20 E) The Accident Was Caused By the Negligence of Defendant [...], Not An Intentional Wrong by Defendant [...] ....................... 20 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................. 24 STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................... 24 POINT I ................................................................. 25 The Trial Court Appropriately Granted Summary Judgment to Defendant [...] POINT II ............................................................... 35 THE RECORD IS COMPLETELY DEVOID OF ANY EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT HMH HOSPITALS CORPORATION COMMITTED AN INTENTIONAL POINT III ............................................................. 43 PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES WAS ALSO PROPERLY DISMISSED AND THAT DISMISSAL SHOULD ALSO BE AFFIRMED BY THIS COURT CONCLUSION .......................................................... 46 TABLE OF APPENDIX Defendant’s Sur-Reply Correspondence to Trial Court .................. Da1-14 [...] Report ........................................ Da15-87 Deposition Transcript of [...] ................................. Da88-109 Deposition Transcript of [...] ............................... Da110-135 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Cited Berg v. Reaction Motors Division, 37 N.J. 396, 413 (1960) ...................... 44 Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017) ........................................