ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This, in turn, likely would have resulted in the \(^4\)  It is significant to note that in the earlier version of the Trust, both the Trustee and [...] were designated as trustees (Da649) and that the Decedent chose to remove [...] when he revised his Trust (Da10).  implementation of the very same remedy for the Boonton Property, because bidding was the most appropriate course to take.  In fact, the remedy fashioned by the trial court and effectuated by the Trustee completely accomplished the Decedent’s intent.  Again, [...] himself, under oath, described that intent as being that either [...] and [...], or [...] or [...], receive the house.  (1T14:8-11).  The latter would require that the two purchase the house together.  The Court ascertained that [...] was unwilling to purchase the Boonton Property jointly with [...] (Da25).
[directive] Either an automatic or semi-automatic assault weapon, as previously defined, which fires ammunition with a muzzle velocity of less than 2,000 feet per second.  Supervising Firearms Instructor, Automatic/Semi-Automatic Assault Weapons.  An individual designated by the chief or agency executive to conduct firearms 9-26 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards qualification and supervise firearms instructors and participants during qualification activities.  The supervising firearms instructor must satisfy the requirements of an automatic firearms instructor and must have completed an automatic/semi-automatic weapons instructor course offered by the Division of Criminal Justice or an equivalent course.  (See Section 6.
[brief] In his second report, dated December 12, 2023, [...] contended that:  Because of the improvement of the driveway and the installation of Belgian block curb with the only outlet being at the southeast corner and directed onto the [...] property together with the filling of the land along the common property line the majority of the water from the front yard and the driveway is now directed on to the [...] property.  [Pa51-2, ¶ 64; Pa331, ¶ 64; accord Pa239.]  [...]’s second report did not discuss the fact that the two outlets exist in the Belgian block at the rear of the [...]’ driveway.  Pa52, ¶ 65; Pa332, ¶ 65; accord Pa239  As depicted on photographs of the [...]’ driveway that plaintiff’s engineering expert took, one outlet exists on the left side of the driveway, next to plaintiff’s property, and another outlet exists on the right side of the driveway, next to the [...]’ house.  Pa52, ¶ 66; Pa332, ¶ 66; accord Da2-3.  [...]’s reports do not discuss the outlet next to the [...]’ house.  Pa52, ¶ 67; Pa332, ¶ 67; accord Pa231-32, Pa238-39.  C.  In his deposition testimony, [...] admitted that he offered no opinion regarding whether the [...] caused any increase in the amount of water runoff.
[brief] It refused to do so.  Instead, the court found that [...]’s prison record, while “not the worst,” did not establish that he was rehabilitated or that he would be successful upon reentry.  (5T77-20 to 78-14)  In so finding, the court focused on characteristics of prison, not any of [...]’s characteristics.  To the court, [...] had no opportunity to act out over the past 29 years because he was supervised by corrections officers, and because those around him were “very capable of defending themselves. ”  (5T63-14 to 17; 78-16 to 25)  There was thus “nothing” in the record demonstrating his rehabilitation, only his “adaptation” to prison.  (5T78-11 to 80-3)  This finding directly contradicted the “particular” emphasis the Supreme Court placed on prison conduct to determine fitness for reentry.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 403.  In fact, [...] testified that prison life poses more challenges to rehabilitation than life in the community: “there’s a lot more provocation [in prison] from staff, guards, other inmates who are violent, who have attitudes, [and] want something. ”  (3T14-1 to 3)  [...]’s ability to stay out of trouble in prison was, to [...], a particularly strong indicator that he will succeed in the comparatively less strenuous environment once released.  (3T13-18 to 14-17)  Moreover, the court’s finding must be deemed erroneous, because if it was, in fact, the correct application of Comer, then defendants seeking a reduced sentence under Comer would be left with virtually no options for proving their rehabilitation.  By the nature of the proceeding, the vast majority of defendants who petition under Comer will have spent the last two decades in prison.  All [...]’s actions over the past 29 years – from getting his GED to earning a sensitive job – were deemed irrelevant simply because they happened in prison.  Graham requires an opportunity for release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.  560 U.S. at 75.  Yet, for the resentencing judge, [...]’s demonstration of his maturity and rehabilitation – through his 29 years of exemplary behavior – meant nothing.  The court’s ruling thus created the very scenario which Graham sought to eliminate:  [...] was left “without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his true character[.]”  Id. at 79.  A remand for resentencing is required.
[directive] Agencies Supersedes: I 10-1: Policy Statement  The Attorney General recognizes that the Department Law and Public Safety, of (hereafter referred as the "Department") provides services other law to to enforcement agencies and prosecutor's offices.  From time-to-time, local and county law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies have offered to reallocate forfeiture funds which would be used purchase equipment and which, when used by the to of Department, would serve a law enforcement need the agency making the reallocation.  of  This reallocation process improve the overall level law enforcement will services provided to the citizens of the State, The Attorney General recognizes that in the procurement process is governed by State law and that all parties involved the of transaction need to be informed the intended use, cost and source of the of equipment or services.  is therefore the policy the Attorney General that all such It in reallocations shall be memorialized written form and that all parties involved agree to the terms-of the reallocation as outli-ned document.
[directive] This directive is still valid for criminal cases.  Filing fees have been imposed for civil motions (P.L. 1991 c.91).  In the first paragraph, the quotation has been changed to conform to the language of amended R. 1:5-6(b), replacing County District Courts with Special Civil Part. R. 1:5-6(b) was amended July 14, 1972, effective September 5, 1972.  The statutory citation, N.J.S.A. 22A:3-1, et seq., has been deleted.  That statute was repealed by L. 1985, c.422 8, effective January 13, 1986.  In the second paragraph, the reference to the County Courts has been deleted.
[brief] [...] agreed to [...]’s terms of service.  [...] signed up for [...] in November 2016.  (Pa075).  In opposition to [...]’s motion to compel arbitration, [...] certified that her native language is Spanish and that she does not understand English, so she elected to download the [...] App on her cellphone in Spanish.  (Pa0431; Pa0600).  In March 2021, [...] notified [...] of updates to [...]’s terms through an in-App pop-up screen that blocked her from using the App unless and until she manifested assent to [...]’s updated terms.  (Pa0598–0599).  Like the rest of [...]’s [...] App, the in-App pop-up screen appeared in Spanish.  (Pa0600).  The top of the in-App pop-up screen included, in bold lettering, “We’ve updated our terms.” (Pa077); see (Pa0604) (“Actualizamos nuestros términos. ”).  Below this phrase, the pop-up screen stated, in even larger bold lettering, “We encourage you to read our updated Terms in full. ” (Pa077); see (Pa0604) (“Te recomendamos leer los Términos actualizados en su totalidad. ”).  Bulleted directly beneath this bolded sentence were two hyperlinked phrases in bright blue and underlined text (typical of hyperlinks) that read “Terms of Use” and “Privacy Notice. ”  (Pa077); see (Pa0604) (“Términos de uso” and “Aviso de privacidad”).  By clicking the bright-blue-colored hyperlinks, users are redirected to either the terms of use or privacy notice.  (Pa0598).  According to Plaintiffs, even though the in-App pop-up screen appeared in Spanish on [...]’s [...] App, clicking the link to [...]’s terms caused the terms to appear in English.  See (Pa0431); see also 1T23:16–25; 24:1–24 (claiming that [...]’s terms appear in English).  At the bottom of the pop-up screen, [...] included—again, in bold lettering—the phrase, “By checking the box, I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use and acknowledge the Privacy Notice. ”  (Pa077); see (Pa0604) (“Al marcar la casila, confirm que revise y acepto los Términos de uso, y reconozco que leí la Política de privacidad. ”).  To the immediate left of that phrase was a checkbox.  See (Pa077; Pa0604).  Beneath that phrase and checkbox, the phrase “I am at least 18 years of age” appeared in grey font.  (Pa077); see (Pa0604) (“Soy mayor de 18 años. ”).  And at the bottom of the pop-up screen was a prominent black button with white, contrasting font reading “Confirm. ” (Pa077); see (Pa0604) (“Confirmar”).  [...]’s records confirm that on March 23, 2021, [...] followed this two-step process—checking the box to indicate that she “reviewed and agree[d] to the Terms of Use” and then clicking “Confirm”—to manifest assent to [...]’s terms.  See (Pa075).  She could not have used the [...] App to access the Rides platform until she completed that process.  (Pa0599).  III.
[brief] The Supreme Court has now clarified that, although the “reasonable certainty test applies” to lost profits damages claims by new businesses, it is “substantially more difficult for a new business than for an experienced business to prove lost profits damages with reasonable certainty. ”  Id. at 577 (emphasis added).  In this regard, the Court agreed with the courts of other jurisdictions (namely, New York and Illinois) that impose a high standard on new business claims for lost profits damages.  Schwartz, 251 N.J. at 574-75 (citing Blinds to Go, Inc. v. Times Plaza Dev., L.P., 931 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108 (App. Div. 2011); Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 67 N.Y.2d 257 (1986); Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 222 Ill. 2d 218 (2006)).  See also Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Therefore, evidence of lost profits from a new business venture receives greater scrutiny because there is no track record upon which to base an estimate. ”)  In Mindgames, Inc. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F. 3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (cited by the New Jersey Supreme Court), [...] noted:  [s]tates that have rejected the “new business” rule are content to control the award of damages for lost profits by means of a standard -- damages may not be awarded on the basis of wild conjecture, they must be proved to a reasonable certainty.  Id. at 657 (emphasis added).  The Seventh Circuit further noted:  Nonetheless, “[a]brogation of the ‘new business’ rule does not produce a free-for-all”; the business’s inexperience “enters into judicial consideration of the damages claim not as a rule but as a factor in applying the standard. ”  Id. at 658 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court also found the “recognition that it is difficult for a new business to prove lost profits claims is consistent with the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352,” which expressly acknowledges the “sharp distinction between an established business and a new business with respect to such claims. ”  Schwartz, 251 N.J. at 575; Restatement § 352, cmt. b (“However, if the business is a new one or if it is a speculative one that is subject to great fluctuations in volume, costs or prices, proof will be more difficult. ”).  Here, the Supreme Court has already determined that Plaintiffs’ development project at [...] constitutes a “new business. ”  Schwartz, 251 N.J. Super. at 577.  In its role as gatekeeper, the Trial Court “carefully scrutinized” Plaintiffs’ claim that, but for the conduct of Defendants, it would have gained substantial profit in a venture in which it had no experience, treating Plaintiffs’ “inexperience as an important factor.
[brief] (7T:80:1-5).  Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the jury was only out for about 25 minutes, and that indicated “undue prejudice. ” (7T:80:8-12).  Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the jury did not evaluate the evidence.  (7T:80:12-15).  Also, plaintiff argued that there was no evidence to support a verdict for breach of contract.  (7T:80:16-20).  The Court ruled that the evidence was quite strong in favor of the Counterclaim.  The Court could not conceive of how it would set aside the jury’s verdict in this case.  (7T:81:18-25).  The Court ruled that jurors do not have to read the documents.  (7T:83:21-25).  The jurors can decide the case based upon any of the evidence presented.  (7T:83:23-25).  The Court was satisfied that the verdict should stand.  (7T:84:1-5).  On January 20, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an Order granting contractual pre-Judgment interest in the amount of $182,825.33 to [...], for the time period of April 7, 2018 through December 6, 2022.  (Pa28).  The Order of January 20, 2023 also provided that [...], P.C. was entitled to receive post-Judgment interest at the rate established pursuant to the NJ Rules of Court, from December 7, 2022, as the pre-Judgment interest granted above runs through December 6, 2022.  (Pa28).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered, on February 7, 2023, Judgment in favor of [...], P.C. against [...], in the amount of $244,759.59.
[brief] In this case you have heard some evidence about and you will have available for your inspection samples of the Defendant's handwriting in the form of I believe S–80 in evidence, a folder of some work orders as he has acknowledged and you have another piece of evidence S–51, which is a registration slip at [...].  It is in sharp dispute as to whether the Defendant indeed is the person who wrote the registration at the motel and that is one of the questions that you may wish to consider in evaluating all of the evidence how important that question is entirely up to you to decide [sic].  I simply point out to you that you may, if you chose to, if you fine [sic] it credible and helpful, you may consider the documents and the testimony that you heard about the documents regarding the handwriting on the forms and on the registration certificate at the motel.  There is not, however, any evidence before you of an expert nature on that subject.  You did not hear from any expert testimony, nor did you hear any other specific testimony, lay or expert, that would compare or did compare specifically and say that the signature on the card was or was not that of the Defendant.  So that is a factor that you may consider in connection with all of the other evidence in deciding how important or how significant or unimportant or insignificant all of that evidence is to be.  [Id. at 595.]
[brief] First, in Sub-Area 1 of the Plan, any Redevelopment in that area shall be consistent with the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance.  As to Sub-Area 2, the Redeveloper, as noted above, shall construct ground-floor parking.  Such will provide for 204 parking spaces, during Phase I.  During Phase II, however, an additional 60 spaces will be provided.  The Re-Developer will also provide a paved parking lot in the “go-kart” portion of the Plan.  Same “shall be allocated to public parking and will serve the adjacent recreation and public beach access” and will total 150 parking spaces.
[brief] The matter proceeded to arbitration and a stenographic record of the hearing before Arbitrator [...] which took place on February 3, 2023, was taken.  Pa61.  [...] First Vice President, [...], testified on behalf of the Union.  Pa61.  Kuhn testified that the grievance pertains to an improper adjustment of the overtime rate applicable to [...] members due to there being two more days working days in fiscal year 2020.
[brief] It is well settled law of the State of New Jersey that ordinary negligence must be proven and will never be presumed; indeed, there is a presumption against it, and the burden of proving negligence is on the plaintiffs.  *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981); *Hansen v. Eagle Picher Lead Co.*, 8 N.J. 133, 139 (1951).  To establish negligence, plaintiff must prove (1) defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care, (2) defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach of duty (negligence) was a proximate cause of the injury, and (4) actual damages were suffered by the plaintiff.  *Anderson v. Sammy Redd & Associates*, 278 N.J. Super. 50 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 139 N.J. 441 (1994).  As a general rule, a landowner has a “nondelegable duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees against known discoverable dangers. ”  *Moore v. Schering Plough Inc.*, 328 N.J. Super. 300, 305 (App. Div. 2000)(quoting *Rigatti v. Reddy*, 318 N.J. Super. 537, 541 (App. Div. 1999)).  Notwithstanding this non delegable duty, “the landowner ‘[i]s under no duty to protect an employee of an independent contractor from the very hazard created by doing the contract work. ’”  *Rigatti*, 318 N.J. Super. at 514-42 (quoting *Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs.*, 289 N.J. Super. 309, 318 (App. Div. 1996)).  ---
[brief] 6.  On August 10, 2020 [...] filed a Medpay arbitration which was assigned Docket Number [...] as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on November 29, 2019 involving the injured party [...] and the [...] insured, [...].  On or about August 23, 2022, the Arbitrator entered an award in favor of [...] NJ Insurance Company in the amount of $9,400.00.  See arbitration award (Da156 – Da164).
[brief] In *Mt. Prospect*, the U.S. Court of Appeals went even further than [...] and his federal colleagues and held, consistent with [...], that [...] claims must be adjudicated in binding No-Fault arbitration pursuant to the [...] DPR Plan and Assignment of Benefit Agreement.  “[...]’s suits against the Practices in this action each included a claim under the IFPA, which gives insurers a fraud-like action with fewer elements than common-law fraud.  *[...] v. Lajara*, 117 A.3d 1221, 1231-32 (N.J. 2015).  The Practices sought arbitration of [...]’s IFPA claim, arguing both that a valid arbitration agreement covered the claim and that a different New Jersey insurance law allowed them to compel arbitration.  But each District Court disagreed, ruling instead that IFPA claims cannot be arbitrated.  The Practices appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the District Courts’ findings and sent the matters to binding No-Fault Arbitration.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Former Counsel Had Actual Authority to Settle this Matter with Defendant [...].  In this case, plaintiff’s previous counsel, [...], had actual authority to settle plaintiff’s case for the $100,000.00 policy limits with defendant [...].  [...] testified that on October 25, 2023, plaintiff “advised [her] to settle with the defendant [...] for the $100,000 policy limits because there would be nothing more” and proceed against codefendant.  (1T:22-23).  She further testified that she wrote to plaintiff on October 26, 2023 confirming their conversation in which plaintiff had advised her to accept the $100,000.00 from defendant [...].  (1T:28, DCa10-DCa12).  This is further bolstered by the testimony that plaintiff stated she was going to use these settlement proceeds to set up a special needs trust.  (1T:14, DCa25).  Plaintiff testified that she did receive the October 26 letter and did not state in response that she did not want to settle with defendant [...].  (1T:28).  Plaintiff further testified that [...] subsequently sent her the release.  (1T:30).  She also confirmed that she gave [...] permission to discuss her case with the special needs lawyer regarding the settlement, on November 1, 2023.  (1T:33, DCa17).  The trial court credited [...]’s testimony more so than the plaintiff’s and found that she had actual, express authority to settle the case for $100,000.00 with defendant [...].  (1T:55).  Plaintiff cites *Williams v. Vito*, 365 N.J. Super. 225 (Law Div. 2003), for its proposition that [...] did not have authority to enter into a settlement agreement.
[brief] The NGA provides the U.S. Courts of Appeals with “exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside [...]'s order. ”  Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. [...], 897 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2018) quoting 15 U.S.C. 717r(b), (d)(1) (internal quotations omitted).  As the Third Circuit has stated, “in answering the question of whether a claim is an impermissible collateral attack, [the various circuit courts] each focus their attention not on the plaintiffs' characterization of their claim but rather on whether the claim ‘could and should have’ been presented to [...] because the claims raise ‘issues inhering in the controversy. ’”  Adorers of the Blood of Christ U.S. Province v. [...], 53 F.4th 56, 64 (3d Cir. 2022)(quoting City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 339 (1958)).
[brief] The action was on notice to Plaintiff, who had an ethical, and perhaps legal, obligation to alert the Intervenor.  Regardless of what was informed to [...], prudence should have been the cautionary process to at least wait for the expiration of no less than the statutory time frame from recording the final judgment.  The Defendant has a right to seek redemption, post-judgment, by statutory provision to reopen the judgment on or about May 8, 2023.  The motion was filed on April 21, 2023.  The Rules of Court at Rule: 1:3-1 states in part that “... The last day of the period so computed is to be include, unless it is a Saturday or Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday or Sunday nor legal holiday.
[brief] “Good cause” is not defined, but the term has been construed to mean “cause sufficient to justify an employee’s voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of unemployed. ”  Domenico, 192 N.J. Super. at 287 (citations omitted).  The court in Domenico set forth the factors to be considered in determining the existence of good cause in a given matter:  In scrutinizing an employee’s reason for leaving, the test is one of ordinary common sense and prudence.  “Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily. ”  The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones.  . . .  [I]t is the employee’s responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.  [Id. at 288 (internal citations omitted). ]  Here, [...] claims that he resigned due to his job exacerbating the pain in his knees and shoulder, thus meeting the requirement under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b).  (Ab1; T8-10; T18).  That regulation states:  An individual who leaves a job due to a physical and/or mental condition or state of health which does not have a work-connected origin but is aggravated by working conditions will not be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work without good cause “attributable to such work,” provided there was no other suitable work available which the individual could have performed within the limits of the disability.