ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That matter is currently on appeal, [...]. cites zero authority for such an absurd suggestion.  Indeed, arbitration’s “goal of providing final, speedy and inexpensive settlement of disputes” dictates exactly the opposite.  Barcon, 86 N.J. at 187.  Moreover, on April 29, 2024, [...] filed a Demand for Arbitration with the [...].  [...] NJ, LLC v. [...], [...].  Da492.  Therein, [...] mirrors the allegations in its proposed counterclaim.  Compare Da495 (“[[...]] files this Demand for Arbitration…pursuant to the dispute resolution procedures of the parties June 1, 2019 Agreement for the construction of project located at Block 408, Lot 11, [...]…resulting in a balance due to [...] of $2,084,220.03”), with Da149 ([...]’s February 12, 2024 Proposed Counterclaim) ¶ 36 (“Plaintiff owes Defendant at least $2,084,220.03 for Defendant’s work on the Hackensack Project”).  In fact, as alluded to in [...]’s April 29 Demand for Arbitration on the Hackensack Project, that contract’s dispute resolution provision requires claims be decided in arbitration—not court—and thus [...] is also barred from asserting its counterclaim in this venue, yet another reason [...]’s motion for leave to file a counterclaim must be denied.
[brief] Db refers to defendant’s brief on appeal.  1T refers to motion transcript, dated July 17, 2015.  2T refers to motion transcript, dated July 21, 2015.  3T refers to pretrial motion transcript, dated September 7, 2016.  4T refers to pretrial motion transcript, dated September 8, 2016.  5T refers to pretrial motion transcript, dated September 27, 2016.  6T refers to trial transcript, dated September 28, 2016.  (Vol. I).  7T refers to trial transcript, dated September 28, 2016.  (Vol. II).  8T refers to trial transcript, dated September 29, 2016.  9T refers to trial transcript, dated October 4, 2016.  10T refers to trial transcript, dated October 5, 2016.  11T refers to trial transcript, dated October 6, 2016.  12T refers to trial transcript, dated October 13, 2016.  13T refers to trial transcript, dated October 18, 2016.  violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(1) (count six); two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute on or within 1,000 feet of school property, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (counts seven and ten); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3) (count nine); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (assault firearm), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f) (count twelve); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count thirteen); second-degree possession of a firearm in the course of committing a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a) (count fourteen); third-degree receiving stolen property, in violation of N.J.S.A.
[brief] 5.  The purchase price was $160,000.00 (6T18:12).  6.  The Trial Court found that [...] had $160,000.00 in his savings account at that point, but the home purchase would have depleted his resources significantly (6T15:13-22).  7.  At that time, their daughter, [...], was engaged to [...] who was living with her and helping her raise her three sons in New Jersey (3T67:16-24).  All the [...]’s had known Johnny previously because he had grown up in the neighborhood where they lived in West New York (2T71:1-11).  8.  [...] approached [...] about whether he would be interested in buying the Miami house as an investment (2T36:5-12).  9.  [...] offered to provide $50,000.00 toward the purchase price, as he had done years before when [...] was purchasing a home with her first husband (6T16:6-10; 2T36:5-12).  10.  The Court found that a $50,000.00 bank check dated July 19, 2014 and drawn on [...], was evidence the transfer to [...] took place (6T10:2-17).  11.  The Court below found that no emails, letters or texts were entered into evidence by either Plaintiffs or Defendants that explained any of the details of this undertaking (6T13:14-18).
[brief] | 35 | | **VI.**  [...] NEVER RAISED ISSUES WITH [...] SUMMATION BELOW; THEREFORE, THIS ARGUMENT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (Failed to be raised below)  | 36 | | **VII. **  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMONISHED [...] IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY BASED ON THE REPEATED OUTBURSTS OF [...] DURING TRIAL (Failed to be raised below) | 40 | | **VIII.** THE EVIDENCE OF [...]’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF NOT PAYING HIS ATTORNEYS WAS PROPERLY PERMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT (3T:194) | 42 | | CONCLUSION | 43 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Cases** | | | Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512 524 (1981) | 31 | | Carbis Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg, 397 N.J. Super. 64, 79 (App. Div. 2007) | 30 | | Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 190-91 (2005) | 30 | | Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339 N.J. Super. 97, 103 (App. Div. 2001) | 29, 30 | | McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425 (2001) | 30 | | Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) | 36 | | Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) | 19 | | Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 373 (2011) | 29, 30 | | Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 38 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959) | 36, 37, 40 | | Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 401, 403 (App. Div. 2002) | 31, 32 | | State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190, 206 (1961) | 19 | | State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006) | 31, 35, 38 | | State v. Tucker, 264 N.J. Super. 549, 554 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468 (1994) | 19 | | Stoeckel v. Twp. Of Knowlton, 387 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 489 (2006) | 30, 32 | | Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 128 (2008) | 37 |
[directive] a.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하는 유죄를 인정하는 범행을 했습니까?  Did you commit the offense(s) to which you are pleading guilty?  b.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  판사가 귀하에게 유죄를 선고하기 전에, 귀하는 판사에게 무엇을 했기에 이 특정 범행(들)에 대해 유죄를 인정하는지 말해야 하는 것임을 아십니까?  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?
[brief] 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................  1 CROSS-APPEAL REPLY LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................  1 ARGUMENT .................................................................  2  POINT I THE LAW  DIVISION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED [...] MOTION TO DISMISS IN LIEU OF ANSWER AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT, BOTH, ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  GROUNDS  [Raised at Pa530-542; Decided at Pa11-12 and Raised at Pa590-1172; Decided at Pa1-2]  ...........................................  2  CONCLUSION  ...............................................................
[brief] Plaintiff, as part of this lawsuit, used the “Wayback Machine” to find the version he recalled seeing originally before he applied.  See discussion, infra.. degree.  (Plaintiff Dep. T70:8-T71:14 at Pa. 157).  At the time Plaintiff-Appellant saw the [...] website, the School of Pharmacy was in pre-candidate status for accreditation.  Plaintiff-Appellant was acutely aware of the program’s pre-candidate status of accreditation.
[directive] Whenever an offense defined in this chapter specifies a mandatory sentence of imprisonment which includes a minimum term during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole, a mandatory extended term which includes a period of parole ineligibility, or an anti-drug profiteering penalty pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 1997, c. 187 (N.J.S.2C:35A-1 et seq.), the court upon conviction shall impose the mandatory sentence or anti-drug profiteering penalty unless the defendant has pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement or, in cases resulting in trial, the defendant and the prosecution have entered into a post-conviction agreement, which provides for a lesser sentence, period of parole ineligibility or anti-drug profiteering penalty.  The negotiated plea or post-conviction agreement may provide for a specified term of imprisonment within the range of ordinary or extended sentences authorized by law, a specified period of parole ineligibility, a specified fine, a specified anti-drug profiteering penalty, or other disposition.  In that event, the court at sentencing shall not impose a lesser term of imprisonment, lesser period of parole ineligibility, lesser fine or lesser anti-drug profiteering penalty than that expressly provided for under the terms of the plea or post-conviction agreement.
[brief] Regarding payments, defendants’ answer to Punch List Request No. 6, which requested all payments and/or reimbursements made by [...] for any reason from January 2014 through September 2019, certified that it had no records from 2016-2020 (as argued in Appellant’s Brief, failing to include 2014 and 2015 was an oversight, but the answer remained the same and could simply have been clarified; it did not justify suppression of defendants’ Answers with default).
[brief] Entire Controversy Doctrine  The entire controversy doctrine compels litigants to “consolidate their claims arising from a single controversy whenever possible” to “encourage complete and final dispositions through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions and to promote judicial efficiency and the reduction of delay. ”  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Forely, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 98 (2019) (internal quotations omitted).  But the doctrine is “constrained by principles of equity[,]” and its application is limited by “judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual cases. ”  Id. at 99, 114.  It is “predicated upon the polestar of judicial fairness, and it may only be invoked in that spirit. ”  Levchuk v. Jovich, 372 N.J. Super. 149, 155 (Law Div. 2004).  Thus, the doctrine is inappropriate if its application “would be unfair in the totality of the circumstances and would not promote any of its objectives[.]”  Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 114.  Relevant here, the entire controversy doctrine “does not apply to claims that [were] unknown or unaccrued” during the earlier action.  Id. at 115; L.J. Zucca, Inc. v. Allen Bros. Wholesale Distributors Inc., 434 N.J. Super. 60, 87 (App. Div. 2014).  It also cannot apply where initial proceeding did not provide a “fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action. ”  DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 273 (1995) (internal quotations omitted).  All of these exceptions to the entire controversy doctrine apply here.
[brief] Reasonable suspicion is defined as “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a person stopped of criminal activity. ”  State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 22 (2004) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)).  There must be “some objective manifestation that the person [detained] is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. ”  Ibid. (quoting U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).  When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, a reviewing court must consider “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.
[brief] The Court issued its Notice of Docketing on April 12, 2024.  (Aa001-Aa002).  On April 15, 2024, the Court noted a deficiency in the Caption.  The [...] filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on April 15, 2024 together with an Amended Civil Case Information Statement.  (Aa003-Aa010).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  July 31, 2024, Order Granting Order to Show Cause .............................................0001a  September 30, 2024, Order Lifting Temporary Restraints and Denying Preliminary Restraints and Dismissing Claims ..............................................0007a  September 30, 2024, Decision Denying Restraints and Dismissing Claims ..................................................................................................................0009a  October 2, 2024, Order Denying Stay Pending Appeal ............................................0019a  Disposition on Application for Permission to File  Emergent Motion  Dated October 3, 2024 .................................................................................................1572a  October 8, 2024  Order on Emergent Motion ...............................................................1577a  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NOT A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER [...] HAD NOTICE OF OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (Pa1-7)  Plaintiff seeks review and reversal of the Court’s January 19, 2024 Order granting defendant City of Passaic’s Motion for Summary Judgment due to the fact that the Court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact.  A.  The Summary Judgment Standard (Pa1-7)  Summary Judgment should be granted only when there exists no genuine issue of material fact.  When determining whether there are any contested facts, the Motion Judge is to:  “Consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard are sufficient to commit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party”.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).  The Motion Judge’s assessment is to be conducted in the same manner as that required under R. 4:37-2(b).  Brill, 142 N.J. at 535.  The trial judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540, (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).  An appellate court employs the same standard as the trial court in reviewing summary judgment orders.  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998).  It decides first whether there was a genuine issue of fact.  If there was not, it then decides whether the lower court’s ruling on the law was correct.  Walker v. Atlantic Chrysler Plymouth, 216 N.J. Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987).  There is still a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant City of Passaic caused or created the dangerous condition which resulted in the subject tree falling and injuring plaintiff.
[brief] The notice further informed [...] that it was required to make payment in the amount of $206,045 within ten (10) days from the date of the notice, in accordance with the Lease.  [FEDa115; Pa1009-10; Pa1019; Pa3302].  The notice further informed [...] that [...] had the right to terminate the Lease if payment was not received within the indicated time frame.  In the event of termination, [...] would be required to surrender and return the Property to [...].  [FEDa115; Pa1019; Pa1110; Pa3302].  [...] never made the required payment under the Lease and [...] terminated the Lease on October 17, 2017.
[brief] Da: Defendant-appellant's appendix  Psr: Pre-sentence report  1T: 10/17/19 hearing 2T: 10/18/19 hearing  3T: 10/22/19 hearing  4T: 11/1/19 hearing  5T: 8/13/20 hearing  6T: 10/22/20 hearing  7T: 12/10/20 hearing  8T: 2/11/21 hearing  9T: 2/26/21 hearing  10T: 3/12/21 hearing  11T: 3/26/21 hearing  12T: 6/24/21 hearing  13T: 7/12/21 trial  14T: 7/13/21 trial  15T: 7/14/21 trial  16T: 7/15/21 trial  17T: 7/16/21 trial  18T: 7/26/21 trial  19T: 7/27/21 trial  20T: 7/28/21 trial  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Mulvihill makes it clear that [...] was not required to make a “split second determination” about whether the officers’ use of force would cease if he submitted prior to acting in self-defense outside the restaurant.  As detailed in [...]’s initial brief, the jury plainly could have found that the officers used excessive force and that [...] responded by using force in self-protection.  (Db 24-26).  Therefore, it is clear from the evidence presented at trial that the court was required to instruct the jury on self-defense.  See State v. Washington, 57 N.J. 160, 163 (1970) (holding testimony that officers used “excessive force in effectuating arrests and that defendants’ counter-physical measures were protective … was sufficient to require submission of the issue of self-defense to the jury” where parties presented sharply conflicting versions of incident.)  Accordingly, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] 662a–684a.  Initially, payments were deposited into and transferred from the [...], usually via wire transfers to [...].  713a–717a.  Subsequently, pursuant to the representations of [...] and [...], Plaintiffs were made to make payments via wire transfer and checks made payable to the [...], [...] and [...] (“[...]”).  665a–684a.  Subsequently, said funds transferred or deposited in the [...], [...] bank accounts, or [...] bank account, were thereafter transferred via checks and account-to-account transfers to and among [...] and the co-conspirator Defendants.
[brief] 9  A.  The Accident .................................................................................. 9  B.  Defendants’ Duty to Maintain and Protect Traffic .........................  11  1)  The [...] ........................................ 11  2) [...] .............................................................. 11  3) [...] .............................................. 12  4) [...] ..........................................................  13  C. Facts Related to “Dangerous Condition” .......................................  15  D. Facts Related to Actual Notice .......................................................  17  1)  [...] .............................................. 17  2) [...], [...] and [...] .................................................. 18  E. Facts Related to Constructive Notice .............................................  18  1)  All Defendants ....................................................................... 18  F. Facts Related to Defendants Duty Fix and/or Warn ......................19  G.  Defendants’ Failure to Act and Breach of Duty..........................20  IV.  Legal Argument ...........................................................................22
[brief] The buildings are:  A.  **Building A:**  To be a two-story clubhouse building; the building is to contain no residential units but will contain one (1) ambulance stretcher-accessible elevator.  B.  **Building B:**  a.  To be a 320-unit multi-story, multifamily residential mid-rise building with an internal parking garage containing 423 parking stalls, b.  The total unit count will include 46 ‘affordable’ units.  c.  The building will contain four (4) ambulance stretcher-accessible passenger elevators.  C.  **Building C:**  a.  To be a 35-unit multi-story, multifamily residential building.  b.  The total unit count will include 9 ‘affordable’ units.  c.  The building will contain one (1) ambulance stretcher-accessible passenger elevator.  D.  **Building D:** a. 34-unit multi-story, multifamily residential building.  b.  The total unit count will include nine (9) ‘affordable’ units.  c.  The building will contain one (1) ambulance stretcher-accessible passenger elevator.  E.  **Building E:**  a.  To be a 29-unit multifamily residential building.  b.  The total unit count will include eight (8) ‘affordable’ units.  c.  The building is proposed by [...] to contain no ambulance-stretcher accessible passenger elevator.  As recited in the Settlement Agreement, inter alia, “[t]he purpose and intent of this Agreement is to . . . resolve [...]’s intervention in the DJ Action and to settle the Builder’s Remedy Action and/or claims therefor”, Pa047a, and to “control the development of the Property as set [forth in the agreement]”, Pa048.
[brief] Finally, although it was [...]’s practice to always try to have a dump truck assigned to the sweeper (for both expediency and safety), the fluid and mobile nature of milling and paving jobs meant that sometimes there were periods of time when there was no truck moving with the sweeper.  Pa249a-51a; Pa259a.  This is not evidence of intentional conduct but rather a fact of industrial life in the context of highway paving jobs.  None of these conditions identified by Plaintiff evidence any level of deliberate action by [...] to create a hazard greater than would normally be expected on a highway road construction job, let alone the type of unusually life-threatening danger that is required to overcome the immunity provided by the Act.
[brief] As stated in a 1953 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, a trial court must view the actions of the Land Use Board as presumably correct.  Rexon, 10 NJ 1, 7 (1952).  Land Use Boards, and members thereof, because of their particular knowledge of a local town, must be afforded wide latitude in discretion in reviewing / approving applications.  Tirpac vs. [...] and [...] ([...]), page 2 citing Ward vs. Scott 16 NJ 16, 23 (1954).  The burden of proof lies with the challenging party – and the standard of review is based on whether the Board’s decision can be found to be arbitrary, capricious, and/or unreasonable.  Tirpac, citing Kramer.  It is respectfully submitted that for the reasons set forth herein, sufficient testimony / evidence was presented for the Respondent [...] to find that the proposed second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Municipal Master Plan.  As such, the Defendant / Respondent Board respectfully submits that the Court should not disturb the Board decision in the said regard.