ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The Special Master and the Trial Court improperly awarded fees for work performed before RICO claims were added to the case (39067a-39068a).  The Special Master awarded [...] fees for work performed by its counsel in 2007, 2008, and 2009, notwithstanding that the record below shows that RICO claims were not either contemplated by [...] or added to the case until October 2009.  Those claims were added only after [...] intervened in August 2009 and sought to add RICO claims that [...]’s attorneys had never even considered.  (See Wilf_Db 34-35).  There is simply no evidence in the record that any of [...]’s pre-September 2009 work was “reasonably devoted” to RICO claims that had not yet been filed and not even considered, given [...]’s communications to the Trial Court in late July and August 2009.  (Id).  This award was improper and should be reversed.
[brief] Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008)  ..............................................................................................................  11  N. Jersey Newspapers Co. v. Passaic County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 127 N.J. 9 (1992)  ..............................................................................................................27  Nebinger v. Md. Cos. Co., 312 N.J. Super. 400 (App. Div. 1998)...............24  Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213 (1978)..........................................................27  Newark Morn. Ledger Co. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 31 A.3d 623 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2011) .........................................................23  O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484 (2002)....................................................25  Paff v. New Jersey State Firemen's Ass'n, 431 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 2013).........................................................................................10  Statutes N.J.S.A. 47:1a-1 et seq. .................................................. passim Other Authorities
[brief] The Application submitted by [...] on February 16, 2022, and supplemented on May 27, 2022, was deemed complete by the [...] on August 2, 2022, and, pertinent to this Appeal, sought subdivision approval for the creation of a total of three (3) lots, including two (2) new lots, each of which would be the location for one of the new proposed warehouse-distribution-office buildings (which were subject of the companion Application for Site Plan Approval submitted at the same time), with one (1) remaining lot that would contain the existing office building.
[brief] See N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1. V. Borough of N. Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) (“An issue not raised below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. ”).  B.  The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Sound Discretion To Reconsider The January 23 Orders.
[brief] Importantly, [...] never raised an arbitrability challenge in the trial court, and [...] cannot cite to any place in the trial court record where such a challenge was raised by [...].  Rather, the trial court raised the issue *sua sponte*.  The Third Circuit, however, has described the “clear and unmistakable” standard as “onerous” and requiring an “express” and “unambiguous” expression of intent to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator.  *Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC*, 809 F.3d 746, 753 (3d Cir. 2016).  Indeed, courts in this circuit have held that the correct approach is “the more nuanced approach directed by the Third Circuit—an approach that requires the Court to do more than scour the relevant contract for the magic letters ‘AAA. ’”  *HealthplanCRM, LLC v. AvMed, Inc.*, 458 F. Supp. 3d 308, 323 (W.D. Pa. 2020).  Thus, because the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract arbitration provision—when coupled with [...]’s decision to *not* challenge the Court’s jurisdiction to determine arbitrability (as in Morgan)—“gives good reason to doubt that delegation was the parties’ intent, questions of arbitrability should remain with the Court, even if the contract incorporates the AAA rules.
[brief] (21T29-4 to 17, 35-16 to 36-13, 39-3 to 12; 27T153-5 to 11; 29T42-23 to 43-3, 161-3 to 11; Da136-137, 177-178)  This was the context of [...]’s “request” that Defendant come down to the [...]; he was ordered out of his residence and not allowed to return.  Thus, even before the request to come to the police station, there was “a significant deprivation of [Defendant’s] freedom of action based on the objective circumstances,” State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997).  This stands in stark contrast to Erazo, where the defendant was not ordered out of his house or prohibited from returning.  The motion court in this case did not consider these facts in its opinion, instead finding that “[o]ne has the ability to retreat into their room and close the door and lock it . . .  “Defendant could have backed into the [hotel] room”.  (21T54-24 to 13)  In light of the record, this finding by the trial court is “clearly mistaken” and as such “‘the interests of justice demand intervention’ by an appellate court. ”  *State v. L.H.*, 239 N.J. 22, 47 (2019) (quoting *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017)).
[brief] ”  *Id.* (quoting *R. Jennings Mfg. Co. v. N. Elec. Supply Co.*, 286 N.J. Super. 413, 418 (App. Div. 1995)).  “Relevant to the inquiry, a court must ‘scrutinize the conduct of both parties subsequent to the initial entry of judgment,’ including ‘what actions the judgment creditor took or could have taken to obtain satisfaction of the judgment sooner and what, if anything, the judgment debtor did to forestall such satisfaction.
[brief] Review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is limited.  State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009).  This Court will “defer[ ] to the trial court’s factual findings” and uphold them so long as they are supported by “sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 551 (2019).  This Court defers to those factual findings because the trial court has the “opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”  *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).  Reversal is only appropriate where the trial court’s findings “are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ”  *Robinson*, 200 N.J. at 15 (quoting *Elders*, 192 N.J. at 244).  “A lawful roadside stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure under both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions.
[directive] Kara na Fundusz Zapobiegania Przestępstwom Komputerowym (CCPF), i. 2C:43-3.8 [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] N.J.S.A. (L. 2009, c. 143).  Jeśli przestępstwo wiązało się z naruszeniem 2C:24-4b(3) N.J.S.A. (powodowanie lub zezwalanie dziecku na angażowanie się w czynności seksualne, które mają być fotografowane lub eksponowane), jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce 1 lutego 2018 lub później, dziecka zaangażowanego 2C:24-4b(4) (fotografowanie lub filmowanie N.J.S.A. w czynności seksualne), jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce 1 lutego 2018 r. lub później, 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (świadome posiadanie lub świadome oglądanie pornografii N.J.S.A. dziecięcej), 2C:24-4.1 (prowadzenie sieci pornografii dziecięcej), jeśli przestępstwo N.J.S.A. miało miejsce 1 lutego 2018 lub później, 2C:34-3 (sprzedaż, dystrybucja lub N.J.S.A. pokazywanie nieprzyzwoitych materiałów osobie poniżej 18. roku życia) lub jeśli przestępstwo związane z przestępczością komputerową stanowiło naruszenie któregokolwiek z przepisów Tytułu 2C, rozdział 20, zostanie na Pana(ią) nałożona obowiązkowa kara za każde przestępstwo, do którego się Pan(i) przyznał(a) zgodnie z poniższą listą?
[brief] >  When a written property settlement agreement has been executed, plaintiff shall not be obligated to file such a Notice...Defaults shall be entered in accordance with R. 4:43-1, except that a default judgment in a Family Part --- \(^2\)  Defense counsel should have immediately recognized the distinguishing features of the *A.M.S. v. M.L.S.* case because he was the appellant’s attorney.  matter may be entered without separate notice of motion as set forth in R. 4:43-2.(emphasis added).  After extensive cross-examination confronting Defendant with her own sworn statements, the trial judge found Defendant’s version of events was “beyond belief and incredible”:  The court finds this event was a substantial reason among other reasons set forth herein for defendant to resolve the marital issues by way of the MMA and PSA.  The court finds that defendant knew there was a risk that all the parties’ assets including any marital assets were at risk of being lost or substantially decreased in value if the transfers were found to be fraudulent by the bankruptcy court.  The court finds no credibility to defendant’s reasons proffered as to why she was having what she termed as “sex only” with the third party.  Her testimony that plaintiff requested her to have sex with the third party so defendant could describe to plaintiff the particular sexual activity in which they engaged and to describe the third party’s anatomical features is beyond belief and incredible.  [A229, Op. at 36 (emphasis added)].
[brief] Many other states have either legislatively or judicially eliminated “no fault” attendance policies which discriminate against employees.  (e.g. Wash. Admin. Code § 296-128-660(1); Cal. Lab. Code § 233(a)”)  There is also a national movement to eradicate such policies in both the public as well as the private sector (See Table of Authorities).  New York specifically clarified its discrimination laws to outlaw “no fault” attendance policies.
[brief] THE COMMISSION’S OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF APPELLANTS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS FINAL AGENCY DECISION WAS SO PROCEDURALLY FLAWED AS TO REQUIRE REVERSAL (Ca014-019).  No one sought the relief issued by the Commission in this matter.  The legal issue before the Commission was whether to adopt, modify, or reject the Initial Decision of [...].  N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6.  [...]’s Initial Decision had granted Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision.  (Ca038).  Respondent did not cross-move for summary decision in her favor.  As a result, “rejecting” the Initial Decision which granted summary decision in favor of Appellants effectively denied Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision.  If Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision was denied, the matter should have properly been sent back to the OAL for a hearing. \(^3\)  The Complaint should not have been dismissed outright.  Doing so was procedurally improper.  For that reason, this procedurally flawed decision should be reversed.  By both denying Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision and also denying an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing, the Commission has deprived Appellants of due process.  See, e.g. Angus v. Board of Educ. of Borough of Metuchen, 475 N.J.Super. 362, 367 (App. Div. 2023) (“The standard governing agency determinations for summary decision under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 is substantially the same as that governing motion under Rule 4:46-2 for summary judgment in civil litigation. ”); N.J.C.R. 4:46-2(c) (“The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law. ”) (emphasis added).  Put simply, there was no cross-motion for the Commission to rely on to dispose of this matter in favor of Respondent at the summary decision stage.  Respondent failed to cross-move altogether, and never requested that the matter be dismissed or that summary decision be granted in her favor.  No party to this matter sought the relief granted.  This outright dismissal of the Amended Complaint was therefore \(^3\) Appellants specifically stated in their Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Decision that “in the event that this motion is denied or denied in part, [Appellants] request a full hearing as to any and all factual issues that require determination, or that Your Honor determines have not yet been sufficiently factually established. ”  (Ca070).  procedurally improper at the summary decision state pursuant to *Angus*, *supra*, 45 N.J.Super. at 367 and N.J.C.R. 4:46-2(c).
[brief] ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE COURT DETERMINED THAT THE ACTIVITY AT ISSUE WAS A “CONDITION” OF PUBLIC PROPERTY, THE ACTIVITY IS NOT A REASONABLY FORESEEABLE USE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY.  (Briefed Below)  | 22 | | A.  The Illegal Sale and Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages is Not “A Normal, Foreseeable” Use of an Outdoor Public Basketball Court/Common Area.  | 24 | | B.  The Illegal Activities are “So Objectively Unreasonable” that the Condition of the Property Cannot Reasonably Be Said to Have Caused the Injury.  | 26 | IV.
[brief] (6T216-9 to 21).  While a .38 caliber bullet can be fired from a .40 caliber firearm, it was determined that the three .38 caliber projectiles recovered from the scene and victim’s brain were not discharged from the .40 caliber Glock recovered in [...].  (6T193-4 to 194-10; 6T217-2 to 219-3; 8T18-4 to 19-19).
[brief] ]  [...] and [...] represented the “City and the CRA” and “[...] . . . Sought to Conceal the Norcross Enterprise’s Plot” by “fil[ing] a pre-trial motion in the Superior Court of Camden County, on August 31, 2023, to preclude any reference to [...] and [...] in the matter. ” (Indictment, pages 62-63, Pa70-Pa71).  It is unfortunate but evident that [...] and its partners, including the unidentified co-conspirator “[...]”, participated in the criminal enterprise with Mr. [...] and his co-defendants.
[brief] (7T316-17 to 317-4; 8T42-7 to 15, 56-16 to 57-19, 59-5 to 60-1; 8T78-22 to 79-21, 100-15 to 18).  Defendant manually loaded a total of thirty 7.62 millimeter bullets in both magazines until each was full.  (7T314-4 to 9, 314-23 to 315-1; 8T27-24 to 28-13).  He could not stop loading the magazines because “subconsciously I had to do it. ” (8T38-13 to 17).  He was nervous, though, that he would get caught loading the rifle.  (8T104-6 to 10) (8T32-25 to 33-8).  After readying the AK-47, defendant turned the lights off in his room, because he was concerned that if his mother realized what he was about to do, he would be “snapped out of it. ” (8T36-5 to 23, 104-11 to 19).  Defendant claimed he saw a stationary, glowing white light outside of his window which disappeared, but he did not hear hearing voices commanding him to “do it. ” (8T46-21 to 48-11).  He put on his leather jacket, sunglasses, and earplugs to muffle the noise of the firearm, turned out the bedroom light, and waited.  (7T317-24 to 319-14).
[brief] Pa953.  That was a proper decision.  With [...]’s Complaint having been dismissed with prejudice, there was no possible way [...] could have been certified as a class representative.  To the extent that any findings of fact and conclusions of law were required to support that determination that the class certification motion was moot, they are supplied by [...]’s 22-page written opinion.  Pa933-54.  The purpose of Rule 1:7-4(a) is to ensure that the trial court judge sets forth their findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record so that if appealed, the Appellate Division has a basis on which to conduct a meaningful review of his decision to grant the dispositive relief of summary judgment.
[brief] This court’s explicit remand order to respond to the appellant’s legal argument that the denial of T&E to [...] students was caused by [...]; 2.  The argument in the appellants’ brief supporting this appeal that the State, not local districts, has ultimate responsibility for assuring that the students receive T&E; and 3.  The explicit constitutional condition in Abbott XX that [...]’s constitutionality as applied is dependent upon its being periodically evaluated to determine whether it needs to be modified, in this case based on [...]'s concededly "unique demographic situation," to assure that [...] students are actually receiving T&E.
[brief] The Order Should Be Affirmed On the Additional Grounds of: the Consideration of Parole Evidence, Waiver, Estoppel, and Appellants’ Failure to Seek to Vacate the Consent Order Under R. 4:50-1.  This Court has the ability to affirm on grounds not resolved or considered by the court below.  See e.g., Isko v. Planning Bd. of Livingston Twp., 51 N.J. 162, 175 (1968) (“Although we affirm for different reasons, a judgment will be affirmed on appeal if it is correct, even though ‘it was predicated upon an incorrect basis. ’”), rev'd on other grounds, 183 N.J. 508 (2005).  Here, additional grounds raised by Respondent below but not relied upon by the Trial Court also warrant dismissal of the Complaint and present additional reasons to affirm the Order.
[brief] [...] went online and filled out the Questionnaire for the sole purpose of securing motor vehicle insurance for four 12-15 passenger vans that he had already leased from [...].  In filling out the [...] application online on July 30, 2019, [...] merely alerted [...] about the following “ineligible” activities that were excluded under this policy: “High Ropes Courses, Zip Lines, Trampolines, Mechanical Bulls, Rock Climbing, Firearms/Riflery, Surfing Activities, Whitewater Rafting, Gymnastics, Jet Skis, Motorized Boats….” (Ia578; 584).  Yet, that 2019 application with regard to Hired and non-owned auto insurance (“HNOA”) coverage said nothing about “exclusions” or “ineligibility” of any non-owned vehicles.  The application implied that a camp could lease or rent for coverage limits of $150,000 or $500,000.  To obtain $1 million in limits, the application only said “coverage is available but subject to additional underwriting. ” (Ia585).  Thus, it was not clear to [...] on the online HNOA application that 12-15 passenger vans were excluded from $1 million coverage.  Any applicant filling out the online application could reasonably think that because the application enumerated 19 ineligible activities noted above, he would be able to get coverage including the $1 million HNOA for 12-15 passenger vans.  In fact, nothing in the 2019 application would have given the applicant pause or concern as there were no warnings about excluding coverage for 12-15 passenger vans.
[directive] See also note 1.  However, the officer need not begin recording at the moment he or she receives instructions from a dispatcher to respond to a call for service.  Rather, the officer may delay activation until they are near the destination.  5.3.1  Except as otherwise expressly provided in Section 6 or any other provision of this Policy, when a BWC is required to be activated by an officer pursuant to this Policy, the device must remain activated throughout the entire encounter/event/episode and shall not be de- activated until it is concluded (e.g., the BWC-equipped officer has left the scene; all civilians involved in the encounter have left the scene; the officer has informed the dispatcher or a supervisor that the event has concluded; the event is “closed” on the department’s computer-aided dispatch (“CAD”) system, etc.).  5.3.2  When a BWC is activated pursuant to Section 5.2(k) (transport of arrestee), whether by an officer in uniform or in plain clothes, it shall remain activated at all times while the BWC- equipped officer is in the presence of the arrestee and until the arrestee is secured in the holding cell or processing room, or until custody of the arrestee has been transferred to county jail personnel, or until the arrestee is with hospital/medical/mental health personnel.  BWCs may be deactivated in a hospital/medical/mental health facility setting.  However, consistent with Section 6.8, in situations where an officer reasonably believes that the officer or another person is likely to use force, the BWC shall be re-activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so.
[directive] The reasons for the exemption must be documented and demonstrate a special need.  Such requests for exemption shall be made in advance and approved in writing.  3.5  Placement of BWC.  A BWC used by a law enforcement officer shall be placed so that it maximizes the camera’s ability to capture video footage of the officer’s activities.  This may include placement on helmets, vests or other such location so long as the device is secured properly and will maximize the device’s recordation function.  3.6
[brief] If I couldn’t get the opinion I wouldn’t have any -- you know, there’s no read on the bones, so to speak.  But the fact that [...] came in and gave the opinion, I understand the prosecutor -- that he’s a tremendous prosecutor, he would have cross examined him up a storm.  But the jury could have -- could have at least went, eh, you know, it’s a Glock, it’s not a traditional barrelled rifle, maybe we’re not that convinced about that part of his case.  And if he had been acquitted on that, it really would have changed the nature of the case.
[brief] The State’s Argument is Incorrect because they place the Burden on the Defense and Ignore All of the Facts Regarding [...]’s Intellectual, Educational and Cognitive Limitations  In M.P., the Court stated that “when determining whether the State has proven the waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, M.P.’s undisputed cognitive limitations and mental conditions must be accounted for in addition to the circumstances outwardly displayed in the video. ”  476 N.J. Super. at 289.  The court further stated “[t]he ultimate fact-sensitive issue … is whether M.P. actually knew, understood, and voluntarily waived his rights, not just whether he appeared willing, if not eager, to speak to police. ”  Id.  The State in M.P. argued that “relying on personal characteristics, such as IQ and educational background, M.P. is attempting to turn Miranda into an unworkable subjective doctrine.
[brief] The Lease required Appellants to pay $4,035 in monthly rent to [...] for the full two-year period between July 12, 2021 and July 11, 2023.  (Da29).  The Lease did not offer any concessions, discounts, or any other benefit and required Appellants to make all 24 required monthly payments.  Rather than making 24 monthly rent payments, the separate Lease Rider excused Appellants from paying the first four months of rent and parking that they had otherwise agreed to pay under the Lease.  (Da44).  The Lease Rider made clear that Appellants’ receipt of the Concessions was conditioned and contingent upon Appellants making full and timely payments of the remaining 20 monthly payments due under the Lease.  (*Ibid.*).  Once Appellants violated that condition, which they unequivocally did, the Lease Rider terminated and Appellants became liable for all amounts due under the Lease.  (*Ibid.*).  The Concession Recovery Provision is not a liquidated damages clause as it does not affix estimated damages in the event of a breach of the Lease.  The Provision only requires Appellants to pay [...] the amount in rent and parking that they initially agreed to pay under the Lease, and that they would not have had to pay if they abided by the conditions contained in the Lease Rider.  See S. Star, 872 S.E.2d at 909 (finding a similar provision valid and enforceable because the effect of the provision was to return the landlord “to its original position had no abatement letter existed, namely it collected the original amount of base rent owed”).  This conclusion is also consistent with how this Court has treated other contractual provisions.