ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ibid.  See (Aa5) (stating that “Staff does not recommend the Board grant eligibility in the TI [p]rogram for a grid supply project that was not certified under Subsection (r) or (t).”).  As Board Staff noted, “no other general grid supply projects were accepted into the TI [p]rogram” and Staff does not recommend waiving the rules in this closed TI program.  (Aa5).  Further, while the January 2020 Order stated that “new or innovative solar technologies can file a petition with the Board requesting that they be assigned a TREC factorization level”, it did not change the eligibility requirements for the TI program.  (Aa4-5).  While [...] claims that the TI program allows for grid supply projects, the very fact that it would have needed a waiver for its project demonstrates that the program did not expressly contemplate grid supply projects outside of those enumerated in Subsection (t) or (r).
[directive] Law's Reform Bail of evaluation and study (ongoing on while new crime yet another with charged is thereafter defendant the that event the In initial or Section pursuant 8, to release revocation of seeks again prosecutor the and release of copy provide prosecutor a shall the 7, Section to pursuant charge new the on detention pretrial court that if even motion of release revocation the denied had that court the to papers motions the pretrial initial or new motion a release revocation of new the decide will that court the not is motion.  detention this of immediately issuance upon operational become shall Section amended
[brief] THE COURT:  As I indicated back in September, you have the right to be represented by an attorney.  You indicated back in March of 17 that you intended to retain private counsel, and then when we rescheduled it for the 27th you failed to appear.  I take it you wish to waive both the private counsel and the public defender and wish to plead guilty today, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  Yeah – (1T:4-16 to 4:24).  THE COURT: And did you get a chance to talk with private counsel?  [...]: No, -- I was homeless and I messed up and take the penalties and – stand up.  THE COURT: All right.  And again, you wish now to waive that right to appointment of the public defender and plead guilty today, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT:  Do you understand that these are serious penalties, even today you have the right to apply for the appointment of public defender.  Knowing all this you want to waive your right to proceed, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  Having advised defendant – multiple times – of his right to counsel and defendant clearly waiving said right, [...] went forward and elicited a factual basis from defendant:
[brief] 2-crime scene (1)  Murder site, (2) Suspect fleeing  6.  Separate all witnesses, instructed witness not to discuss the matter with others.  Assign at [least] one Officer to interview each such person.  7.  Separate and interview all witnesses who went to hospital to view victim.  8.  Have first officers at scene return to command post so that these officers can brief officers at command post as to what they observed upon arrival at crime scene.  9.  Assign officers to interview neighbors near both crime scene.  10.  Do not request Medical Examiner to come to scene until Leader of crime scene search team states that search team is almost finish with its work.  11.  All officers after having completed an assigned task should report to command post and brief officers at command post regarding findings, and obtain next assignment.  In order to conduct a successful investigation, it is essential that officers know, in advance, the steps to be taken in the investigation.
[brief] The Trial Court Also Erred In Granting Summary Judgment As To Punitive Damages Against Defendant [...] (Pa1-3, 12)  For similar reasons to those set forth above, the trial court also erred in granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against Defendant [...]. Pa12.  The trial court appears to have failed to appreciate that a punitive damages claim need not be predicated upon “actual malice”, but can be based on a finding of “wanton and willful disregard”, which is defined as “a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to another and reckless indifference to the consequences of such act or omission. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10.  For example, in McLaughlin v. Rova Farms Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 295 (1970), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a reasonable jury could award punitive damages where the defendant failed to post appropriate warning signage prohibiting guests from diving into a shallow area of a lake.  The Court in McLaughlin cited, with approval, several other examples of cases where a jury could appropriately find wanton and willful conduct sufficient to sustain punitive damages, including cases in which: (1) a defendant property owner allowed a hole to exist, with no warnings or safety barriers, near a path where it knew tenants would travel to reach garbage cans in the back of an apartment complex.  *Id.* at 306 (citing *Greeton v. Solomon*, 287 P.2d 721 (Wash. 1955)); and (2) a defendant pool operator allowed people to swim in a pool with an uncovered filter pipe despite knowing of the danger of drowning that could occur if a swimmer’s body got caught in the pipe.  *Id.* at 308 (citing *Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich*, 226 So.2d 684 (Fla.Sup.Ct. 1969)).  As a further example, in *Smith v. Whitaker*, 313 N.J. Super. 165, 198 (App. Div. 1998), the Appellate Division held that a jury question was created as to punitive damages where an automobile collision was caused by a defendant trucking company’s “lack of attention to maintenance procedures and poor supervision” of a driver.  Here, a reasonable jury could determine that [...] knowingly created a high degree of probability that its employees would be injured by requiring them to park in a distant area of the parking lot with inadequate pedestrian safety measures, particularly as [...] knew of the necessity of these pedestrian safeguards since it employed them in other areas of its lot that were used by hospital administrators and physicians.  Accordingly, the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim against [...], which should also be remanded for trial.
[brief] As noted in defendants’ initial brief, no defendant was named in every count of the complaint.  See Db75. full recovery, the court’s directive to amend an erroneous judgment “to conform to the verdict and law” was based on the jury’s allocation of fault among the tortfeasors.  *Id.* at 498-99.  The opinion does not suggest that a judgment should be fashioned to provide a party with “full recovery” without regard to whether defendants were found liable for the injury.
[brief] A.  **[...] and [...]’s Business Partnership**  This appeal arises from the Plaintiffs’ 2014 sale of their respective interests in [...] and [...] to [...] and [...] for $6.3M.  [...] and [...] were business partners for over 25 years in [...], which is an environmental company.  18T42-9.  [...], [...] and their spouses (through [...] and [...]) also owned a 50/50 membership interest in [...], which is a real estate holding company.  24T9-12 to 20-19.  Despite accusing [...] of committing an elaborate multi-year $11M fraud, [...] testified at trial that he had a great partnership with [...] and enjoyed working with him because their skill sets complimented each other.  16T88-1 to -17; 24T15-7 to -16.  Indeed, he admitted during cross-examination that [...] was a good person and that he attributed his financial success to [...], compliments that completely belied his characterization of [...] as a ‘fraudster. ’  14T112-12 to -19, 118-12 to -19; 16T90-2 to -17.  B.  [...]’s Operations  [...] and [...] signed a stockholder agreement in 2007 (the “2007 [...] Stockholders Agreement”) governing their rights as shareholders in [...].  Da02712.  Despite his attempt at trial to minimize his role in managing [...]’s finances and portray himself as simply the “technical person” working in the company’s lab, the evidence overwhelmingly established that [...] was intimately involved in managing [...]’s finances and books and records and is a sophisticated businessperson.  16T92-10 to 99-9; 22T116-1 to -22, 154-5 to 155-13; 25T55-5 to 25; Da02761.  In addition to being the 51% majority owner of [...], [...] was the company’s COO and had two votes to [...]’s one vote as a director.  16T95-12 to 99-22; 24T49-4 to -17; Da02761 – Da02765.  [...], as President of [...], reported to [...] as COO.  16T94-19 to 99-9; 24T48-14 to -20; Da02761.  [...] was also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  16T96-25 to 98-2; Da02761.  Further, [...] was directly involved in lease negotiations, lab purchases, signing corporate checks, ordering lab supplies, wiring funds overseas to [...]’s India operation, reviewing invoices and purchase orders, and signing supplies and packing slips invoices.  16T102-18 to 119-11; 17T115-8 to -11; 24T17-22 to 36-24; 25T24-19 to -25; Da02897.  [...] also had administrative access to [...]’s laboratory information management system called “e-CHEM” (which he developed) and servers, which stored [...] and [...]’s financial information, including QuickBooks, financial statements, tax returns and customer information.  17T29-23 to 38-15; 24T51-21 to 66-4; 25T12-15 to 14-15, 41-3 to -11; Da02902.  Because of [...]’s 51% ownership of [...], the company ultimately obtained certifications as a minority-owned entity (“MBE”) and a disadvantaged business entity (“DBE”).  16T138-16 to 141-7; 25T33-20 to 35-5; Da03025 – Da03029.  In connection with those certifications, [...] submitted applications under oath to various reviewing agencies on annual basis, which included personal financial statements and copies of [...]’s financial records (i.e., corporate tax returns, balance sheets and profit and loss statements).  Id. C.
[brief] On October 25, 2019, the Trial Court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.  The case was then tried in the Family Part over two days, on March 9 and March 10, 2020.  (Trial Transcript T-2, March 9, 2020)  The Trial Court gave its decision on the record in Court on June 22, 2020, and issued its final Order on June 30, 2020 (DA 3- Pages A17-A26).  The Court inter alia enforced the Parties’ Agreement, entering respective damages awards for what the Court found were breaches by both Plaintiff and Defendant.
[brief] The *ratio decidendi* of the decision was that while municipalities have an ability to control the installation of power lines in public streets and rights-of-way, the line in [...] was not along a public street or right of way.  Moreover, with the [...]’ exemption provision for exempting lines from the Ordinance’s requirements if they would result in a violation of state or federal law, the Ordinance assures the ability of the [...] to assure the ability to fulfill the obligation of furnishing safe, adequate and proper service – it merely requires the Board to exercise that power and make the necessary determinations in accordance with its governing statutes (most notably N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 which requires an order issued after public hearing).
[brief] long experience in the examination of patients and participation in court proceedings.  Just as “[a]t trial, if there is a dispute as to what happened in the examinations, the likelihood of a seven-year-old's testimony adequately countering the testimony of an expert witness[ ] … , who has testified hundreds of times, may be low,” the same is often true for plaintiffs with cognitive disabilities or language barriers, and for many other plaintiffs.  DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 234 (quoting Wellmann ex rel. Wellmann v. Rd. Runner Sports, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 373 (Law Div. 2018)).  Within this framework that the Supreme Court established in this case, the trial court never addressed this issue raised by the Supreme Court: for a person with limited English proficiency who will already be accompanied by an interpreter, despite the trial court's holding regarding [...], it is not immediately obvious how an unobtrusive recording device would call the validity of the examination into question in a way that the interpreter would not.  Id. at 239.  In opposition to Plaintiff’s appeal, Defendants’ argument relies on a premise that the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected—that a neuropsychologist can dictate the terms of the examination.  (Db7.)  Defendants also rely on the Attorney General’s position that the Supreme Court likewise rejected.  Compare Db7 with DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 241.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.25.  The Prevailing Wage Act defines “workman” or “worker” as follows:  “Workman” or “worker” includes laborer, mechanic, skilled or semi-skilled, laborer and apprentices or helpers employed by any contractor or subcontractor and engaged in the performance of services directly upon a public work, regardless of whether their work becomes a component part thereof, but does not include material suppliers or their employees who do not perform services at the job site.  For the purpose of P.L.1963, c. 150 (C.34:11-56.25 et seq.), contractors or subcontractors engaged in custom fabrication shall not be regarded as material suppliers.
[brief] Rule 1:6-6 expressly requires that if “a motion is based on facts not appearing of record…the court may hear it on affidavits made on personal knowledge. ”  Indeed, Rule 4:67-5 states:  The court shall try the action on the return day, or on such short day as it fixes.  If no objection is made by any party…or the affidavits show palpably that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the court may try the action on the pleadings and affidavits, and render final judgment thereon.
[brief] It clearly was not.  The whole point of the defense was that police chased the wrong person -- defendant -- once they lost sight of the perpetrator when that person ran between 22 and [...].  The credibility of that defense was for the jury to decide and this photographic evidence would have furthered that defense in two ways: (1) calling further into question the refusal (or failure) of police to seek out additional evidence, such as video from the Ellsworth surveillance cameras (or interviews with residents of that area), to bolster the State’s theory that defendant was the perpetrator, not a hapless person who happened to be in the back yard of [...] and ran when [...], with his gun drawn, finally looked into that backyard; and (2) providing direct photographic evidence of a physical path that the perpetrator could have taken to run from those backyards onto the next street -- [...].
[brief] Pursuant to statute, upon elimination of a non-operating school district, after a final audit of non-operating district’s accounts, “. . . the books, documents, and records of that district shall be turned over to the board of education of the new district”.  N.J.S.A. 18A:8-49 (Emphasis added).  This did not create a consolidated school district pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 et seq.  Rather, the Legislature specifically chose to “merge” those eliminated districts with their send/receive partners—it did not consolidate them.  This is a distinction with a significant difference.  For example, in consolidated districts, board membership is apportioned between the two formerly independent districts according to population.  N.J.S.A. 18A:8-29.  Conversely, the membership of a Type II board in the merged district following elimination of a non-operating district is elected at large from the new district.  N.J.S.A. 18A:8-47(a).  Here the [...] holds annual school elections in which the voters of the [...] and the [...] participate at-large, and there is no apportionment of the board seats.  In short, [...] was created through an entirely separate statutory mechanism than consolidated school districts in the state—it does not constitute a “consolidated school district” as defined in Title 18A.
[brief] Despite the numerous references to the building height and intensity of use, particularly traffic, all of the proposed accessory uses listed above are completely height neutral.  Ja097; Ja146; Ja158-Ja159; 4T 9:5-25.  With the exception of the driveway location, all of the accessory uses are calculated by the structure’s square footage; height is irrelevant.  As for the location of the driveway, the record includes unrebutted testimony that it must be located in Florence due primarily to safety purposes.  Plaintiff’s professional engineer, [...], P.E., testified that the driveway’s location was established because it lines up with the driveway designed for the proposed project on the other side of Florence-Columbus Road, and it is at “the furthest end of the property to maximize the distance from the Route 295 interchange to provide for safe vehicle movements and to prevent any backup off of the [Interstate 295] off ramp”.  (1T 34:2-23).  Since Florence-Columbus Road is a County road, Mr. Ritchie testified that the County agreed with the driveway’s location, and will continue to be involved with the “geometry of the proposed driveway connection to the County Road. ”  (Id.)  Plaintiff’s professional planner, [...], PP, AICP, explained that the location of the driveway in Florence is attributable to the limited frontage in Mansfield, and that frontage is “not really suitable for access, given the lack of … a spatial separation along that frontage from the I-295 egress ramp. ”  (2T 77:12-18).  It bears repeating that Plaintiff did not seek a (d)(6) height variance from either land use board for this project.  The proposed height of the structure is permitted under Mansfield’s ODL Zone, and all of the accessory uses proposed in Florence are height neutral, but subject to variance relief only because the principal structure is located on the other side of the municipal boundary line.  Plus, all of the uses proposed for the Property are permitted uses on both sides of the municipal boundary line.  It just so happens that the Property is “uniquely affected by the municipal boundary line, which actually creates the D-1 condition. ” (2T 78:10-11).  Plaintiff sought two forms of variance relief from Defendant: a (d)(1) use variance for the accessory structures, and a bulk variance for the reduction of 544 parking spaces.  Ja029-Ja030.  Neither form of relief involved the height of the structure, a structure located entirely within Mansfield.  Defendant’s fixation on height and the alleged “negative externalities” was misguided, factually unsupported, and arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] A few examples follow:  1.  The engineer failed to answer how the noise from the trash compactor, recycling and generator was to be attenuated while facing a residentially zoned lot.  1T 77:2-79:2.  2.  Management had no input or approval by local emergency services to meet the demands of the project.  1T 74:15-75:22.  Board Planner and Member questioned planner’s conclusion as to the absence of material effect on municipal services.  6T 86:20-87, 6T 131:5-25.  3.  The architect (i) admitted that the safety concern caused by omitting a front canopy for covered access was simply an owner decision.  2T 43:- 44:16 and 44:23- 45:5; (ii) sight-line simulation was not from actual photos, and not of the view from [...], but an augmented simulation.  T2 44:6-45:8; (iii) never showed the detail (or noise testimony) for the actual unit a/c units, despite several requests.  1T 117:3-10, 2T 49:8-19; (iv) could not provide the requested maximum height of the building to assess the visual impact.  1T 70:2- 71:7; 2T 51:2-9; 2T71:17-21; and (v) was asked to compare the impact of the mass/ height variance for this one large building versus single family homes at that height, but failed to do so.  3T 21:12-22:21.  4.  The appraiser’s conclusions were questioned, without adequate response, as to the size and location of his comparables, the validity of how homes have appreciated more or less without the senior facility nearby, and the timing of such sales.  3T 74:20 -75:9, 3T 87:5-90:3, 3T 100:8- 101:13.  5.  The market analyst failed to properly support the comparables he relied upon and did not examine sites zoned for this use in [...].  4T 35:-13- 38:15, 4T 39:14 -40:6.  6.  The Board Engineer criticized [...]’s planner, marketing expert, and appraiser for using differing comparables to reach the conclusions sought and omitted many other comparable projects.  6T 110:24-119:4
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page Order of the Honorable [...] Regarding Document Review and Production, dated September 13, 2023 .......................................................... Da166 ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., LLC, | 18, 21 | | 2016 WL 4031417 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2016) | | | Canlar by Canlar v. Est. of Yacoub, | 15 | | 2018 WL 3543157 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 24, 2018) | | | Cap. Health Sys., Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., | 38 | | 230 N.J. 73 (2017) | | | Carbis Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg, | 15 | | 397 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 2007) | | | Carlson v. Jerousek, | 27 | | 68 N.E.3d 520 (Ill. Ct. App. 2016) | | | Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., | 21 | | 2014 WL 716521 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2014) | | | Cunningham v. Rummel, | 25 | | 223 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div. 1988) | | | Customers Bank v. Reitnour Inv. Properties, LP, | 12, 35, 39 | | 453 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2018) | | | Estate of Lasiw v. Pereira, | 12, 16, 17, 35 | | 475 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2023) | | | Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, | 12, 35, 39 | | 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | | | Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Properties, Inc., | 18 | | 257 F.R.D. 418 (D.N.J. 2009) | | | Gardner v. Cont’l Cas. Co., | 19 | | 2016 WL 155002 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2016) | | | Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., | 20 | | 142 N.J. 356 (1995)
[brief] 49  POINT VII  THE DEFENSE WAS IMPROPERLY BARRED FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT AT OTHER CONTEMPORANEOUS TRAFFIC STOPS -- SPECIFICALLY THAT, AT THOSE STOPS, DEFENDANT OFFERED HIS BUSINESS CARD, AND DID NOT DISPLAY HIS STATE-POLICE WALLET IDENTIFICATION CARD.  THAT EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF HABIT UNDER N.J.R.E. 406.  (RULING AT 9T 69-18 TO 71-4)..................................................................................  54  POINT VIII
[brief] Plaintiffs suggest that this Court undertake its own searching review of the trial record to uphold the Trial Court’s decision.  (Halpern_Pb 57-58; Jarwick_Pb 37-38).  But this Court already has rejected that invitation and directed the Trial Court to “make specific findings of fact as to each individual defendant” as to “whether each of these defendants engaged in conduct” during the SOL period “which rises to the level required for the award of punitive damages. ”  2018 WL 2449133, at *26.  The [...] extensively cited to the Trial Court how each purported finding of fact by [...], cited by Plaintiffs, failed to establish specific conduct by any defendant within the specific time period that met the legal standard justifying a finding of punitive damages.  See, e.g., 253T at 32:6-35:3.  In support of their position, Plaintiffs cite a recent, unpublished case from this Court, Devli v. Tascli, No. A-2573-20, 2022 WL 17491290 (N.J Sup. Ct. App. Div., Dec. 8, 2022), as supporting an award of punitive damages in this case.  But in Devli, the trial judge “issued a thorough and detailed written opinion addressing the punitive damage claim under the [Punitive Damages Act (PDA)]” and, in “[a]nalyzing the N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(c) factors, she repeated her findings. ”  Id. at *4.  As described below, that analysis is lacking here.  This Court cannot discern an appropriate basis for punitive damages from the rest of the record, as Plaintiffs suggest.