ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Approximately one month, on July 26, 2021, [...] showed up at a bar where [...] regularly played pool.  (5T93:21-22; 5T95:8-15).  [...] walked up to [...] while he was shooting pool, and he rejected her, told her to stop calling him, stop harassing him, and that he did not want to be with her.  (5T95:13-18).  [...] slapped him across the face.  (5T95:24).  Despite this negative interaction, [...] continued to call and harass [...], and the more he blocked her the more insistent she became.  (5T96:18-25).  Another month later, on August 25, 2021, [...] similarly appeared at a different bar where [...] played pool.  (5T96:6-7).  [...] approached her and she began crying.  (5T97:12).  [...] noticed that she appeared very thin and sickly, and told her that she needed to get help for her family and continuing to call him was not healthy.  (5T97:10-16).  He ultimately threatened to get a restraining order if she did not stop this behavior.  (5T97:23-24).  [...] hit [...] again and several other bargoers had to break up their fight.  (5T98:2-3).  [...] checked into rehab two days later.
[brief] The court also admitted defendant’s pre-arrest interview with [...] and [...] in full.  (8T119-5 to 126-9).  Defendant argued only that “the Court needs to make a finding that [the interview] was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. ” (8T118-18 to 21).  The judge found that defendant specifically declined an attorney, was not pressured, spoke casually, and explained the events chronologically and added detail in response to [...]’s questions without any hostility.  (8T121-22 to 123-24).  The judge ruled that defendant’s pre-arrest statement was “voluntary in every sense of that word” and that he validly waived his Miranda rights.  (8T124-21 to 126-9).  Later, when defendant’s statements during booking were admitted and played at trial, defense counsel objected at sidebar on the grounds that defendant mentioned a lawyer three times.  (11T138-17 to 139-10).  The court nevertheless reaffirmed its logic from the prior hearing, finding that defendant’s statements at booking were freely made in the face of [...] reminding him that after booking, he would re-read defendant his rights.  (11T139-11 to 140-11).  It ruled that because the detectives were not interrogating defendant and that he was instead volunteering statements, they were not required to stop and read his Miranda rights the moment he referenced a lawyer.  (11T140-11 to 141-12).  On appeal, defendant challenges only the admissibility of the statements made after his arrest at booking and in the formal interview immediately thereafter.
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  (b) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should be in position to allow sufficient time for deployment; (c) the supervisor must coordinate the efforts of all law enforcement units involved in the pursuit; (d) the communications operator shall notify all units of the location of the authorized tire deflation device deployment; (e) the officer operating the authorized tire deflation device should take a position of safety as the pursued vehicle approaches; (f) the officer shall deploy or activate the authorized tire deflation device immediately before the pursued vehicle arrives at the point where it would impact the device; (g) the officer shall remove or deactivate the device immediately after the pursued vehicle goes over the authorized tire deflation device; and (h) the officer should immediately notify communications if the pursued vehicle impacted the authorized tire deflation device, if the officer observed any signs of deflation, and the direction and operation of the pursued vehicle after the impact.  6.6  The use of an authorized tire deflation device shall be reported on a Vehicular Pursuit Report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  11
[brief] ”  (2T10-20 to 25)  As a consequence of [...]’s neurological deficits and unstable household, he became inordinately immature for his age, and exceptionally prone to peer pressure.  [...] found that when he was 17 years old, [...]’s emotional functioning level was “somewhere between 9 and 10 years of age. ”  (2T15-18 to 20)  His deficits “would make him impulsive, [and] would make him slow to think and react” making him incapable of “functioning independently” because he couldn’t “think quickly enough. ”  (2T14-5 to 12)  [...] “would take his cues from…a stronger peer or a stronger adult[.]”  (2T14-6 to 10)  Without a developed sense of self, he became susceptible to manipulation, and was “easily coerced by others who [saw] him as an easy mark. ”  (2T19-17; 21-8 to 11)  In short, [...] became “a follower, not a leader. ”  (2T15-1 to 2)  When [...] was 14, he began to socialize with co-defendants [...] and [...], whom their school Vice Principal described as a “very negative peer group.
[brief] Interspousal immunity was abrogated in 1970 when the Supreme Court held that “the [interspousal] immunity doctrine, at least so far as it applies to automobile negligence cases, has no place in our modern society. ”  *Immer v. Risko*, 56 N.J. 482, 485 (1970).  On the same day, the Supreme Court decided *France v. A. P. A. Transport Corp.*, 56 N.J. 500 (1970), in which the Court extinguished parental immunities in the context of most tort claims.  In *France*, the Court held that after reviewing “the arguments for and against the parent-child immunity doctrine, we are of the opinion that it should be abrogated in this State. ”  *Id.* at 506.  Our Courts have deemed it appropriate to eliminate intrafamily immunities in the setting of personal injury claims, thus inviting consumers to purchase insurance to cover such claims or else run the risk of personal exposure to liability claims from family members.  Our Courts have also expressed our State’s public policy that citizens be afforded the widest breadth of liability insurance coverage under policies that they purchase.  It is inapposite to allow intrafamily liability exclusions to persist in insurance policies where our Courts have expressly approved of intrafamily liability claims by abrogating intrafamily liability immunities and also expressed a public policy of expanding liability coverage for consumers.  Finally, intrafamily liability exclusions further run counter to our State’s public policy of ensuring that injured individuals have adequate recourse to compensation for economic and non-economic damages sustained due to the negligent acts of others.  See, e.g., Felix v. Richards, 241 N.J. 169 (2020); Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460 (2004); Verriest v. Ina Underwriters Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 401, 414 (1995).
[brief] THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD CONTRACTUAL AND QUASI-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS (Pa001027–1031).  Recognizing that the MSRA specifically permits Defendants to unilaterally modify the expired CNA at issue here, the Superior Court also properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ contractual and quasi-contractual claims.  Here, Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim rests solely on their allegations that (a) the CNA “is clear that Plaintiffs are entitled to a payout from the Defendant [...] for accumulated sick leave[,]” and (b) the City “has breached the contract by not paying the benefits to Plaintiff and adopting Resolution 591. ” (Compl. ¶¶ 124–25, Pa000034).  However, Plaintiffs themselves recognize that the MSRA gives the Director the ability to “[u]nilaterally modify collective bargaining agreements[.]” (Id. ¶ 101, Pa000030).  As recognized by the Superior Court, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim based on these allegations because (a) Defendants are entitled to amend and modify contracts pursuant to the MSRA and (b) Defendants’ changes to terminal leave were lawful under the MSRA.  See Superior Officers, 2022 WL 2352376, at *9 (finding that the “MSRA’s findings and declarations undeniably supply the justifications for granting the State the authority to unilaterally modify the expired-but-effective CNA” (citing N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-2)); (Pa000677).  The same applies to Plaintiffs’ quasi-contractual claims and the legal authority relied upon by Plaintiffs is simply inapposite.  (Pb45–47).
[brief] Pa275.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, [...] underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa275.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.  Pa275.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.
[brief] That the 1972 Approved Site Plan does not show or reference any parking or accessway to the Sixth Street /Courtyard.  There is no curb cut for vehicle access, and a walkway is located in the middle of the Courtyard, indicating the courtyard was solely for pedestrian use.  The courtyard has no drive aisles, marked spaces or fire lanes.  D.  That the 1972 School Resolution/minutes establish that the Synagogue was on notice and, because the School site parking was particularly deficient for the school's own needs, the Synagogue volunteered its other nearby parcels for the School overflow parking needs.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant, [...] (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) filed this legal malpractice matter on July 25, 2016, against Defendants-Respondents, [...], [...] (hereinafter, collectively, “Aboyoun”), [...] [...], and [...].  The question presented on this appeal is whether the Trial Court was correct in dismissing this legal malpractice case because; 1) Plaintiff assigned his legal malpractice claim to third parties under two separate contractual agreements, and 2) through the assignment, the Plaintiff lacked standing to maintain this lawsuit.  In so holding the Trial Court correctly held that the Plaintiff relinquished his claims through the assignment.  The Trial Court also correctly reasoned that the effect of the assignment was to divest the Plaintiff of standing to maintain an action in his own name.
[brief] That defendant’s mother may have encouraged him to be cooperative and speak with police, (Db32), is within her purview as a mother and does not establish that he was incompetent and unable to assist in his own defense.  See State in the Interest of A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 148 (2010) (recognizing that a parent has the right to “advise his or her child to cooperate with the police or even to confess to the crime if the parent believes that the child in fact committed the criminal act. ”) (citations omitted).  And again, this is at most one fact that might have supported a finding of Miller factor four, not proof that [...] abused her considerable discretion.  As for imposing a consecutive sentence, [...] did not err in relying upon the previous findings by the first sentencing judge, which were affirmed by this Court.
[brief] At an hour and eleven minutes into the interrogation, detectives finally revealed that they were investigating a homicide:  DETECTIVE:  We’re with the guy who can save himself, and he's not -- he's not taking our advice.  DETECTIVE:  [T]he guy who put all this thing together is the one ultimately responsible for what happens.  And I don't think you put this whole thing together.  [...]: I don't even know what you talking about.  THE DETECTIVE: You don't know what we're talking about?  [...]: No -- THE DETECTIVE: We're talking about -- [...]: You talking about putting this thing together.  THE DETECTIVE: We're put -- we're talking about -- [...]: What was put together?  THE DETECTIVE: We're talking about -- THE DETECTIVE: We're talking about somebody set up that dead guy, and I'm believing in you.  THE DETECTIVE:  That's exactly right; that's what we're talking about.  THE DETECTIVE:  I mean, let's -- let's clear the air here.  Let's -- let's talk about the elephant in the room.  That's what we're talking about.  [(Da243-244; Da153 at 17:43:00 to 17:44:00)]  This exchange makes eminently clear that the detectives had not told Defendant they were investigating a homicide before that point.  Defendant told the detectives he did not know what they were talking about.  After one of the detectives clarified that they were talking about “somebody set up that dead guy,” he noted that this was “the elephant in the room”—i.e. something that had not been previously mentioned—and that his mention of somebody “set[ting] up the dead guy” served to “clear the air. ”  “[T]he record shows that the tenor and substance of the stationhouse interrogation changed after” the moment where detectives first mentioned “the dead guy. ”  Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. at 508.
[brief] Indeed, Plaintiff herself recognized and admitted that [...]’s job was dangerous.  Pa191a.  While certainly serious injury or death are not (and should not) be considered ordinary or usual occurrences in any line of work, it is indisputable that serious injury — particularly serious injury resulting from being struck by a moving vehicle or piece of equipment — is a genuine risk for an individual working in highway construction and maintenance like [...].  Moreover, Plaintiff’s theories of liability against [...] are all based on allegations that [...] ignored some risk of harm to its employees.  Such evidence of ignorance of some risk, however, is not sufficient to overcome the Act’s immunity.  See, e.g., Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 455, 471-72 (holding employer conduct failed to satisfy intentional wrong standard in case involving trench collapse despite evidence that employer ignored a potential risk of trench collapse without installing a trench box).  Furthermore, the evidence of prior incidents cited by Plaintiffs’ experts as evidence of [...]’s complicity in [...]’s accident actually supports a finding that the accident does not satisfy the “context” prong of the intentional wrong exception, because it suggests that such accidents — although not frequent — are indeed a “fact of life” in this line of work.  See Pa454a-55a, Estate of Sellino v. Pinto Bros. Disposal, LLC, 2013 WL 5300076, *4-5 (App. Div. Sept. 23, 2013) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on Workers Compensation Act in case involving “run-over” fatal injury in part because evidence of prior fatal accidents in plaintiff line of work supported conclusion that circumstances of plaintiff decedent’s death were not “plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the Compensation Act”).  Thus, the facts do not provide a basis for a finding for Plaintiff on the context prong of the exception.
[brief] (Pa000739–744).  **F.  The Superior Court’s Well-Reasoned Decision Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice. **  On February 8, 2024, the Superior Court heard oral argument in connection with both Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and Defendants’ cross-motion for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss.  On February 15, 2024, the Superior Court issued a thirty-page Order and Decision denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and granting Defendants’ cross-motion, dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.
[directive] This required information shall include, but not be limited to, the defendant's employment history, the names and addresses of any persons who contributed money or pledged security for the proffered bail or toward a surety bond, the amount, nature and timing of such contributions, and the relationship to the defendant of any such persons contributing resources.  Bail may not be accepted from a person subject to the requirements of this subsection until the prosecutor is provided the completed form required by this subsection.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-13
[brief] Putting aside the issue of its statutorily-defective composition, the notice published by the Township in advance of the hearing and passage of Ordinance No. 13-2022 in this case lacked even minimal substantive information from which an ordinary layperson could have made an informed determination as to whether to participate or even look more closely into the matter.  Cf. Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Tp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J.  Super. 234, 237-238 (App. Div. 1996).  The notice simply indicated the Township’s intent to adopt a generic “redevelopment plan” for certain specified blocks and lots.  (Pa89).  The notice made no mention of the [...], the proposed overlay zoning or the street addresses or other identifiable landmarks near the affected properties.  Cf. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.1.  Consequently, even if the title of Ordinance No. 13-2022 could have subsumed N.J.S.A. 40:49-2’s separate requirement for a statement of purpose, it fell woefully short in that regard.
[brief] (Dta1, *et seq.* at ¶¶3,4,30,36,37,42,43.)  The complaint characterized [...] as a “nominal Defendant” and alleged that it had “a similar interest in obtaining declaratory relief against [...]. ”  (Defendant [...]’ appendix (“Dta”) 13,18, ¶¶85,114.)  On June 21, 2019, [...] filed its responsive pleading, which included a counterclaim, along with a crossclaim with allegations reflecting its alignment of interests with plaintiffs.
[brief] Defendant [...] was deposed and asserted the attorney client privilege.  The failure to keep to join these claims or to file on R4:5-1 notice was not inexcusable; it is practice specifically condoned by [...].  But of even greater significance than the Courts misinterpretation of the law is the fact that nothing in the Courts finding would allow the conclusion that the amendment of the R. 4:5-1 statement would have made any difference whatsoever in the underlying litigation nevermind the erroneous conclusion that it caused substantial prejudice as defined by our case law.  The Trial Court’s ruling in an injustice that this Court should correct.
[brief] (Docket [...])  After the Chancery March 2022 Decision, this case as to the Zoning Board Resolution before [...] was reactivated.  On June 2, 2022, the Court entered an Order that denied the School’s 2019 Motion in Limine (Da214) seeking to bar the [...] from expanding “the record” of the Zoning Board by documents listed in their Order to Show Cause and Pre-Trial Memorandum (Da174), mostly from the Chancery litigation.  The Court’s Order provided vaguely that the numerous additional Exhibits would be “marked for identification” and the Court would rule upon the admission of each at Trial.  The [...] then submitted with its Trial Brief a substantial collection of 57 documents numbered Exhibits A through EEE (Da174-176).  Those Exhibits did not include some of the Exhibits actually in the record to the Zoning Board; most of the documents were not relevant to the Zoning issue, were not before the Zoning Board, and/or were disputed factually (Da215-218).  As shall be detailed, [...] relied on some unverified communication from the Board attorney (Da262) --- not submitted to the Board --- to belatedly promote the false assertion that there were no applicable zoning or site plan regulations in place in approximately 1964, when the off-site parking use on Lot 5 allegedly commenced.  Given the vagueness and error of the Court’s ruling on the not-in-the-record Exhibits to be submitted by [...] (Da214), the School submitted a supplemental Certification identifying the Exhibits actually before the Zoning Board (Da215) and also submitted a number of rebuttal Exhibits to respond to the Synagogue claim (Da219-261) as to the non-existence of zoning and site plan standards until 1984.  Those Rebuttal Exhibits consisted of relevant portions of the 1971 Lakewood Code Book (Da220-253), a 1965 Ordinance amending the Site Plan Ordinance (Da254), and copies of newspaper articles in the 1960s detailing Lakewood Site Plan approvals (Da257-261) and rebutting the false assertion belatedly submitted (Da262) that there was no Site Plan Approval Ordinance until 1984.  The Trial was before [...] on September 22, 2022, being oral argument presumably on the Board record.  The additional exhibits considered were not identified (2T).  On December 1, 2022, the Court rendered an Opinion (Da270) and Order for Final Judgment (Da288) invalidating the Zoning Board determination, apparently on the basis that the Board determination was arbitrary and collaterally estopped by the Chancery Court Opinion on the easement.  The Court in its Opinion made no identification or clarification as to “Ruling” on whether and which of the numerous “not in the record below” documents were considered by the Court in evidence.  However, the Court clearly improperly considered some of these improperly submitted and incorrect documents by the plaintiff Synagogue in its findings.  This Appeal was then timely filed (Da299).
[brief] (Pa12).  The trial court also held that the Court’s obligation is to determine the legislative intent of the [...] in adopting the ordinance in question.  (Pa12).  The trial court found that it is clear from the face of the ordinance that the [...] envisioned and permitted a change in grading on the property as being allowable in determining the “building height. ” (Pa13).  The ordinance clearly envisions that a building height could be measured not solely from the “lowest original lot grade” but also, under certain circumstances, from “any revised lot grade …” (Pa13).  Thus, the trial court identified the issue before the court is the meaning of the remainder of the “building height” definition which provides that a revised lot grade may be used to measure building height only if the revised lot grade does not “include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height. ” (Pa13)(emphasis added by the trial court).  The trial court, finding that the word “design” is not interpreted in the [...] ordinances, defined the word “design” used as a verb in the ordinance in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary as “(1) to create, fashion, execute, or construct according to plan; DEVISE, CONTRIVE; (2)(a) to conceive and plan out in the mind (b) to have as a purpose: INTEND; (c) to devise for a specific function or end. ”  (Pa14).  Thus, the trial court found that the definition of “building height” adopted by the [...] in its Ordinance specifically includes consideration of the plan or purpose of the mounding, terracing or other height-enhancing device that is included within the site plan and other documents presented to the land use board.  (Pa14)(emphasis added).  Thus, the trial court concluded that the legislative intent of the ordinance was for the land use Board to make a determination of whether the revised grading was done for the design, or purpose of allowing increased building height which is subject to review by the trial court using the “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard of review.
[brief] [Pa71-72].  The crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that “the trial court instructed the jury that in order for [...] to be vicariously liable for [...]’s actions, [...] must have been acting negligently in self-defense .  . . .”  [Pb33].  Thus, Plaintiffs claim error because the jury charge precluded the jury from imposing vicarious liability on [...] if it believed Plaintiffs’ version of events:
[brief] In fact, the district court expressly held, and the First Circuit confirmed, that [...] was estopped from presenting any evidence to contradict its prior position that contamination was continuous.  *[...]*, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 519; *[...]*, 708 F.3d at 264.  Thus, the latest evidence available to the district court and the First Circuit regarding continuing contamination and remediation at the site was also the date of the jury trial – 2007.  On that basis, the district court held, and the First Circuit affirmed, application of pro-rata, time on the risk allocation for the entirety of the allocation period determined at trial.
[brief] The clean hands doctrine is “an equitable principle which requires a denial of relief to a party who is himself guilty of inequitable conduct in reference to the matter in controversy. ”  *Hageman v. 28 Glen Park Assoc.*, L.L.C. 402 N.J. Super. 43 (Spec. Civ. Essex Cnty. 2008) citing *Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc.*, 180 N.J. Super. 6, 13 (App.Div.1981).