ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The lower court’s decision was contrary to controlling precedent.  Moreover, the lower court’s decision was not supported by an application of the Supreme Court’s controlling decision on the issue of waiver of the right to arbitrate and it completely disregarded this State’s clear policy of favoring arbitration over litigation.  Time and again the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that in New Jersey there is a strong public policy favoring arbitration and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration requiring dismissal of the arbitrable cause of action or issue.  See e.g., Alpha Bd. of Ed. v. Alpha Educ. Ass’n, 190 NJ 34, 41 (2006); Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 NJ 479 (1992).  In Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 N.J. 76, 92 (2002), the Supreme Court observed that the “affirmative policy of this State, both legislative and judicial, favors arbitration as a mechanism of resolving disputes. ”  See also Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 342 (2002) (“In New Jersey arbitration also is a favored means of dispute resolution. ”).  The statutory embodiment of that policy is found in the Arbitration Act.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1, et. seq.  The Arbitration Act “governs all agreements to arbitrate made on or after January 1, 2003” with the exception of certain labor collective bargaining agreements.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-3.  The Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration agreement is considered to be “valid, enforceable and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for revocation of a contract. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.  Here, [...] does not assert that the arbitration provision at issue is unenforceable or does not fall within the scope of the Arbitration Act.  Rather, [...] assert that [...] waived his right to arbitration due to the passage of time and [...]’s participation in the litigation that [...] brought against [...].  Thus, as noted at the outset of this Legal Argument, the issue for this Court to resolve is whether [...] waived his right to arbitrate the Parties’ contractual dispute.
[brief] Specifically, Plaintiff’s CEO, [...], met [...] in 2001 and later utilized his services in connection with a New Jersey LLC and other businesses here.  Da326 at ¶¶ 4 & 5.  This history led to Plaintiff seeking [...]’s legal services in 2016 for a lender dispute and for the Project in this case.  Da314 at ¶ 13.  All letters, billing, emails and phone communications were directed to Plaintiff’s principal place of business in New Jersey.  Da316–17 at ¶¶ 27–29.  Key contracts [...] was hired to review listed Plaintiff’s address in New Jersey.  Da315–16 at ¶¶ 20–25.  Equally important, both [...] and [...] knew Plaintiff’s main office was in New Jersey.  Da315 at ¶ 14.  There are many emails between all parties in which [...], other [...]e attorneys, and support staff contacted Plaintiff in New Jersey.  Da316 at ¶¶ 26 & 28.  Defendants sent not only the engagement letter but also legal bills to Plaintiff’s New Jersey address, which were paid via Plaintiff’s New Jersey bank accounts.  Da315–17 at ¶¶ 17, 29 & 30.  The funding for the Project at issue in this case was directed to Plaintiff’s New Jersey bank accounts.  Da313–16 at ¶¶ 2–4, 6, 8 & 20–25.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff conducted its communication (email and phone) from New Jersey.  Da316–17 at ¶¶ 27–28.  After the miswiring of the escrow money, Defendants helped facilitate the meeting between Plaintiff and law enforcement in [...]’s New Jersey office.
[brief] The plaintiff continued to see the surgeon through 1958 complaining intermittently of back pains.  In August of 1958, an x-ray of the plaintiff disclosed the presence of the errant wing nut.  Plaintiff filed suit in August 1959.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant because more than two years had elapsed between the date of the operation and the institution of the lawsuit.  Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Fernandi Court emphasized that Statutes of Limitations are designed to stimulate the prompt assertion of claim; however, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that these considerations do not come into play in a case involving a latently-discovered foreign object.  Fernandi, 35 N.J. at 439-40.  The discovery rule was refined by the Lopez Court, which held that the determination as to the expiration of the Statute of Limitations is a question of law for the trial court.
[directive] This testing is critical to identifying serial perpetrators of sexual violence and ensures that evidence collected from survivors of sexual trauma is used to meaningfully aid in the investigatory process.  To accomplish this goal, the following timeline is implemented:  Requirement Compliance Date from this date SAFE kits collected during a forensic exam forward, where the victim consents to the release to law  Effective Immediately enforcement, shall be submitted to the forensic laboratory within 10 calendar days of the victim’s examination.  from July 1, SAFE kits collected by law enforcement 2019,7 through this Amended Directive’s effective date, By April 1, 2025 where the victim consented to testing, shall be submitted to the forensic laboratory.  All remaining SAFE kits in cases where the victim consented to release to law enforcement, shall be By December 31, 2025 submitted for analysis consistent with guidelines to be promulgated by the [...].
[directive] enforcement have placed undue burden on our law enforcement agencies and personnel, particularly our frontline police officers.  Traditional law enforcement responses also do not leverage the expertise of public health professionals or the community itself.  These current crises carry significant implications for public safety and our criminal justice system.  In the US, approximately half the people in jails and over one third of the prison population have condition.3 been diagnosed with a mental health  People who suffer from mental illness are more likely to be injured during police encounters.  A singular focus on arrest and prosecution as the solution for non-violent individuals suffering from addiction does not address the harms of addiction for the individual or the community: data show that individuals who would benefit from treatment are unlikely to receive it within the criminal justice system, and that there are high rates of relapse and recidivism amongst those who are addicted and become involved in the criminal system.4 justice  Additionally, the demands placed on law enforcement are untenable; all too often, we ask law enforcement officers to assume roles they never expected when choosing to serve— mental health experts, addiction specialists, and social workers, just to name a few.
[brief] Nonetheless, even if this Court were to disagree and find the word “defuse” and a sentence about keeping the peace to be improper lay-opinion testimony, the error is clearly harmless.  One sentence about keeping the peace and one permitted use of the word “defuse” cannot outweigh the wealth of evidence pointing to defendant’s guilt in this case, nor can such fleeting references be so inflammatory and prejudicial that defendant’s verdict is called into question.  Defendant was caught lying about who had the gun that night, lied about where he was in the two hours before 911 was called, and was revealed to have shot an unarmed former roommate where there were no signs of a struggle.
[brief] When the prior mortgage prevailed over plaintiffs, & was paid, the judgment was subordinate only to Plaintiffs.  However, when Plaintiffs elected not to pursue their remedy of a sheriff sale for 3 years & instead recorded a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure (“DIL”) & Mortgage Satisfaction, the judgment was no longer subordinate to any mortgage.  The undisputed record below is that after another 5 years passed, & starting in 2021, & for the next 3 years, Plaintiffs fought every step of the way in an unsuccessful effort to prevent payment of the long-over-due judgment.  Their vexatious was based on greed, & furthered by deceit, concealment & the absence of any factual or legal support.  To underscore Plaintiffs’ persistent misconduct in this case, Plaintiffs did raise below & now again in their brief, Appellant’s unwillingness to enter into a Consent Order to turn-over to Appellant certain funds in court.  Ironically, Plaintiffs were unwilling to release certain funds that the lower court subsequently awarded to Appellant (ie. greater judgment & interest amounts & costs of suit) & those which it did not that are the subject of this appeal.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP, AND POLICE DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH DEFENDANT’S CAR.  ALTERNATIVELY, THE CAR SEARCH WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE ANY PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT ARISE FROM UNFORESEEABLE AND SPONTANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES.  (Da 6-17)  .......................  14  A.  There Was No Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Defendant.  .....  16  B.  The Police Did Not Have Probable Cause To Search Defendant’s Car.  .................................................................  22  C.  Alternatively, Any Probable Cause Did Not Arise From Unforeseeable And Spontaneous Circumstances.  ......................  25  POINT II
[brief] “[A] court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an agency relationship existed even though the principal did not have direct control over the agent. ”  *Id.* at 338.  Based upon this law, [...] was clearly the agent for Respondent and its predecessor.  At a minimum, this is another example of a genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment.  (1T48:20-24 (Respondent acknowledged that “in terms of the record . . . [t]here’s no facts for the record that [] my client, you know, hired them. ”).)  Respondent and its predecessor authorized [...] to perform the closing, placing them in a position to commit the misappropriation of funds.  *Sears Mortg. Co. v. Rose*, 134 N.J. 326, 345-46 (1993) (stating that where two parties were innocent, loss was imposed on party in best position to prevent the loss created by a third party's theft).  Under such an analysis, with all equitable considerations being taken into account, the loss should have been born by Respondent, not Appellant.  **B.
[brief] Due process of law mandates that the prosecution is required to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction.  *State v. Hill*, 199 N.J. 545, 558-59 (2009); *State v. Anderson*, 127 N.J. 191, 200 (1992) (citing *U.S. Const.* amend. XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 1).  The reasonable doubt standard “provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law. ’”  *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting *Coffin v. United States*, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).  Our courts have “always placed an extraordinarily high premium on the jury’s correct understanding that defendants have no burden to clear themselves of guilt. ”  *State v. Grice*, 109 N.J. 379, 395 (1988) (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (citing *State v. Spano*, 64 N.J. 566 (1974)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has thus condemned any “language that misstates or dilutes the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  *State v. Medina*, 147 N.J. 43, 59 (1996).  Further, it is also clear that defendants cannot be required to bear a burden of proof as to any defense which amounts to disproof of what is an element from a constitutional standpoint, that is, the conduct, circumstances, result and culpability which define the crime.  *State v. Delibero*, 149 N.J. 90, 99-101 (1997); *Mullaney v. Wilbur*, 421 U.S. 684, 685 (1975); *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. at 361; *Humanik v. Beyer*, 871 F.2d 432 (3d Cir. 1989).  In *State v. Jones*, 364 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 2003), the prosecutor urged the jury to question why the defendant had not “dusted the gun for prints to disprove that his fingerprints were on there.
[brief] The February 23, 2024 Final Judgment against [...] required [...] to pay $750,000 to [...] within 30 days of the date of the order.  (PPCIa447-48).  This order complied with Rule 4:42-2(a) because (1) the trial court completely adjudicated the MCS-90 surety claim that [...] invited [...] to adjudicate as a named “interested party;” (2) the trial court completely adjudicated all the rights and liabilities asserted in the litigation as to the MSC-90 surety claim; and (3) the trial court awarded payment to [...] as part of a summary judgment motion.
[brief] On March 7, 2025, [...] filed a Verified Complaint alleging, in part, this election contest.⁴ (Pa5).  Discovery ensued over the following weeks, which included the production of more than 1,300 individual ballots and dozens of other voter documents.  (1T125:2-6).  On March 18, 2025, [...] filed an Answer that included a Cross-Petition, identifying challenges to the disqualification of the ballots of [...], Marci and [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa98).  On April 3, 2025, [...] filed his first Amended Answer Cross-Petition, which identified an additional challenge to the ballot of [...].  (Pa108). ⁵  On April 8, 2025, [...] filed an Answer to the Cross-Petition.  (Pa115).  At approximately the same time, [...] filed a Second Amended Answer and Cross-Petition, which removed the challenge to [...] but added a challenge to the disqualification of Paul and [...]’s ballots.  (Pa120).  Finally, on April 11, 2025, [...] filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Cross-Petition on short notice and enclosed a Third Amended Answer and Cross-Petition.  That Cross-Petition now included the challenge to the ballot that was rejected as an “overvote” despite not having a write-in vote cast on it.  (Da1-Da8).  As indicated during oral ⁴.  [...] also sought relief under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, et seq., but that cause of action was subsequently dismissed.  (Pa69).  ⁵.  As referenced at trial, [...] chose to file his Cross-Petition and its subsequent amendments on a rolling basis to give the opposing side to prepare his defense given the compressed timeframe of an election contest, rather than to wait until the last minute to do so.  (1T121:21-122:3).  argument, this ballot was not by [...] discovered until April 10 and confirmed by the Board as rejected until the following day, which prompted the filing.\(^6\) (1T121:13-15).  Trial commenced on April 14 and was completed on April 15, with the trial court hearing testimony from numerous voters.  (1T15:13-1T52:17).  At the conclusion of the first day, the trial court denied [...]’s Motion for Leave to Amend, which included the improperly rejected “overvote” ballot as part of the Third Amended Cross-Petition.  (1T127:14-15).  However, the trial court did allow the Second Amended Cross-Petition, which included the challenges to Paul and [...], to be used as the operative pleading for [...].  (1T128:9-11).  Ultimately, the trial court upheld the election results that showed [...] the winner by one vote by rejecting the challenges to all ballots it was asked to consider.  (Pa69).  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] Moreover, any inference that she was discriminated against is additionally negated by the fact that she participated in a group e-mail with other co-workers, none of whom are alleged of being disabled but each of whom were terminated along with her for their insubordination.  Even if Appellant could satisfy her initial burden, which she cannot, Appellant cannot point to any comparators outside of her alleged protected class were treated differently.  *See Chirino v. City of Hoboken*, No. A-5576-16T1, 2019 WL 3852543, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 16, 2019) (“Plaintiff must present comparator evidence sufficient to prove that he or she is similarly situated to his or her comparators, and that these employees have been treated differently or favorably by their employer. ” (internal quotations omitted)).  Here, every employee included on the insubordinate e-mail was terminated at the same time and in the same e-mail as Appellant, thereby eliminating any inference of disparate treatment.  Further, the subject email made no allegation whatsoever that Appellant or any of the other employees were disabled or suffering from an underlying health condition—as such, Appellant cannot point to any comparators that were treated differently nor can she argue that the e-mail was a request for accommodation.  Consequently, since Appellant can neither demonstrate the existence of a protected disability nor comparators that were treated more favorably, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
[brief] On March 20, 21, 22, 23 and April 3, 2023, the parties undertook a five day trial before [...] (6T4:9-10).  On July 31, 2023 the Court rendered its opinion, finding the existence of a confidential relationship between the elderly parents and their daughter and son-in-law, [...], but finding no evidence of undue influence that would trigger the need for a constructive trust.  The Court further ordered that Plaintiffs vacate [...] by May 1, 2024, so that [...] may sell it after affording the Plaintiffs in effect a right of first refusal, and that the $50,000.00 contributed to the purchase by [...] be returned to him (6T31:17-38:17).  The Court extended the terms of the Order entered by [...] on June 4, 2021 (Da1).  Defendant [...] as the owner of [...] cannot do anything to encumber the property or sell it prior to May 1, 2024 (Da7).  On August 30, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this appeal (Pa45).  On August 31, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Stay the Trial Court verdict until a decision could be returned by the Appellate Division.  That Motion was denied for reasons placed on the record on September 14, 2023.  At that time the Court took the opportunity to amplify its findings and conclusions at trial (7T11:20-12:2).
[brief] See Pb25-33.  As the [...] adequately rebut these meritless claims, see MDb36-46, the [...] only briefly address Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the amended Redevelopment Plan’s impact on affordable housing.  Simply, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the amended Redevelopment Plan decreases the likelihood that affordable housing will be built in contravention of the Master Plan is entirely without basis and contrary to the record.  See MDb38-39.
[brief] Defendant’s March 28, 2021 Offer of Judgment for $11,000.00 (Exhibit B to [...] Cert.) ........................................... 205a-209a  Plaintiff’s Nov. 30 and Dec. 1 2021 Subpoenas to [...] and to [...] for Service records and related documents regarding the 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, VIN #5NMZUDLB0HH011768 (Exhibit C to [...] Cert.) .................................................................................. 210a-217a December 30, 2021  Certification of [...], Esq. in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Quash Third-Party Subpoenas and Plaintiff’s July 25, 2022 Arbitration Statement, Dkt. No. [...] (Exhibit D to [...] Cert.) ........................................................................................................ 218a-231a Sullivan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 94-5016, 1997, U.S. Dist., Unpub., LEXIS 2503 (D. N.J. Feb. 28, 1997) (Exhibit E to [...] Cert.) ........................................................................................................ 232a-242a Certification of Service of Defendant’s Opposition to Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 23, 2023 .........................
[brief] 28 U.S.C. § 455 ..............................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 2A: 15-5.12 (b) .................................................................  46 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) ..................................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(a) ...........................................................................................................  52 N.J. Stat. § 2A:15-5.12 .................................................................................................................. 43 N.J. Stat. § 2A:15-5.12(c) ..............................................................................................................  40  Other Authorities Fourteenth Amendment .................................................................................................................
[directive] Incidents of Sexual Assault where the SART is not activated:  There are situations when a victim may report an incident of sexual assault to a law enforcement agency, but a full SART activation may not be appropriate, such as when the following circumstances occur:  1.  Victim reports the incident more than five days after the sexual assault occurred.  In cases where the victim reports the incident more than five days after it has occurred, a medical forensic exam will not ordinarily be performed.  Nonetheless, the victim is entitled to and should be offered the services of a CSVA, medical referrals, and a complete law enforcement investigation.  2.  Victim is under the age of 13.  In cases where the victim is under 13-years old, the appropriate response is to use the child sexual abuse activation protocol of acute cases established by the County Prosecutor’s Office.  (See Standard 6: Specialized Services for Child and Adolescent Victims).  While CSVAs are not involved in acute child abuse responses, they are available to offer support services to non-offending family members of all child and adolescent victims, regardless of the child victim’s age or when and where the assault occurred.  -10-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[directive] In that connection, you are empowered to require the production of evidence, to compel witnesses to appear before you, and to return indictments if the evidence justifies that action.  The prosecuting attorney is available to advise you on legal questions and, if necessary, you may request additional instructions from the court.  You may act only on the basis of the evidence you receive.  You are not to return an indictment unless the State has presented evidence which together with the reasonable inferences you draw from that evidence, leads you to conclude that (1) a crime has been committed and (2) the accused has committed it.  Furthermore, when determining whether to return an indictment, you should not consider the potential punishment in the event of a conviction.  The Grand Jury must ensure that no person is subjected to a criminal charge unless there is an adequate basis for it.  It is only when you have received such evidence that an indictment may be returned.  If an indictment is returned, further judicial proceedings will be required.
[brief] After considering my arguments above, I request this court to grant the following relief (1)  Reverse specifically the provision in the January 12, 2024 order ordering the confiscation of the parties’ and their child’s passport and direct the trial court to return the child’s passport if it has the custody of the child’s passport (2)  Declare January 12, 2024, and January 26, 2024 orders null and void except for the alimony enforcement provision in the January 12, 2024 order (2)  Direct trial court to enforce plaintiff’s litigant’s rights as to his entitlement to the child tax credit for the year 2022 as provided in the March 1, 2023, JOD order (4)  Reverse March 8, 2024 order on motion for reconsideration.
[brief] 9  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (2011) ............................................................................  9  In re Valley Hosp., 240 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 1990) .............................................  11  Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22 (1995) ...............  9