ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] During deliberations, the court received a note from the jury aide that juror twelve needed to be dismissed from the jury.  (10T 87-14 to 18)  The juror wanted to be dismissed because he was recognized and contacted by a family member or friend of [...] who was in the courtroom during the trial.  (11T 19-14 to 19)  The juror failed to follow the court’s instructions to bring such concerns directly to the sheriff’s officer and instead disclosed this information to his fellow jurors.  (11T 32-2 to 11)  To investigate juror twelve’s disclosure and its effect on the jury, the court conducted voir dire of all the jurors.  (10T 97-18 to 98-15)  However, the court conducted voir dire at sidebar and failed to preserve the interviews for the record.  Therefore, the record does not reflect what any juror said or how the court responded.  What is clear from the record is that juror twelve “did advise [the other jurors] that he had been contacted” and that “[s]omebody in the courtroom knows him. ”  (11T 32-10 to 11)  Moreover, at least one juror -- juror four -- expressed concerns about continuing deliberations because of this incident.  (11T 20-8 to 12; 33-2 to 5)  The record does not reflect how the court addressed juror four’s concerns.  The record also does not reflect the court’s reasoning for denying [...]’s motion for a mistrial.  (11T 20-8 to 13)  While the court dismissed juror twelve, the court instructed juror four and the other jurors who heard the disclosure to start deliberations anew.  (10T 100-1 to 101-1)  __________________  6
[directive] (b) collect available information; (c) assess situations, threats, and risks; (d) identify options for conflict resolution; (e) determine the best course of action; and (f) act, review, and re-assess the situation as it evolves.  2.5  De-escalation.  De-escalation is the action of communicating verbally or non-verbally in an attempt to reduce, stabilize, or eliminate the immediacy of a threat.  De-escalation may also be used to create the time needed to allow the situation to resolve itself or to position additional resources to resolve the situation with the least amount of force necessary.  Officers should employ de-escalation techniques when feasible, which include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) communication techniques to calm an agitated subject (e.g., regulating tone and pitch, such as speaking slowly in a calm voice); (b) techniques to promote rational decision making, such as ensuring that only one officer addresses the person and the other officers remain detached as safety permits as to not escalate the situation; and splitting up individuals at the scene who may be arguing; (c) active listening techniques, such as sharing the officer’s name, asking the subject their name, and exhibiting a genuine willingness to listen; (d) slowing down the pace of the incident by taking deep breaths, slowing speech, and/or applying strategic or critical thinking; (e) using calming gestures and facial expressions (e.g., arms extended with palms out and avoid angry expressions); (f) practicing procedural-justice techniques, such as explaining the officer’s actions and responding to questions; (g) verbal persuasion and advisements (e.g., explaining, without threats, how the person would benefit from cooperation, and the subject’s rights or what the officer wants the subject to do); and (h) avoiding the unnecessary display of weapons, including firearms, Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs), batons, or OC Spray.
[brief] JUDGEMENT OF DIVORCE ORDER DIRECTING THE EXECUTION OF IRS DOCUMENTS FOR CLAIMING THE CHILD TAX CREDIT IN ALTERNATE YEARS.  (Pa1149, Pa1214, Pa1224)  V.  TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON LEGALLY BASELESS GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE USPS TRACKING NUMBER OF SERVICE OF MOTION ON DEFENDANT.  NO COURT RULE REQUIRES THE MOVANT TO FURNISH A TRACKING NUMBER AS A PREREQUISITE FOR MOTION HEARING OR ADJUDICATION.  MISINTERPRETATION OR DISTORTION OF COURT RULES BY TRIAL COURT IS SUBJECT TO DE NOVO REVIEW.  (Pa1224)  VI.  MOTION
[brief] As [...] noted in his decision, Petitioner admitted at the hearing that he did not know the reason why he twisted his ankle and fell down (Aa18; IT22:12-25).  Although [...] states elsewhere in his decision that Petitioner’s left ankle was caught up in the long hose (Aa13) and that he became “entangled in a fire hose” (Aa19), Petitioner did not so testify but only speculated that he might have twisted his ankle on something on the driveway while carrying the hose (IT20:4-6; IT22:1-25; IT23:1-4).
[brief] Nor was the motion to vacate the original Final Judgment by the Defendants a pathway to reopen litigation because Defendants rethink the effectiveness of their original legal strategy.  Rather the original or the Amended --- 6  “Rule 4:50-1(a) provides relief when a judgment has been entered as a result of ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. ’  The four identified categories in subsection (a), when read together, as they must be, reveal an intent by the drafters to encompass situations in which a party, through no fault of its own, has engaged in erroneous conduct or reached a mistaken judgment on a material point at issue in the litigation. ”  *DEG, LLC. v. Township of Fairfield*, 198 N.J. 242, 262, 966 A.2d 1036 (2009).  “Rule 4:50-1(a) … is intended to provide relief from litigation errors ‘that a party could not have protected against.
[brief] The oil company Defendants were entitled to all proceeds from the suit and its attorneys—not [...]’s—made the decision on how and whether these claims would be brought.  In *Berkowitz v. Haigood*, though a Law Division case, is instructive here.  Berkowitz was a chiropractor who sued his patient’s attorney.  Haigood had assigned the proceeds from his personal injury suit to his chiropractor.  The Court held that the proceeds from a personal injury action can be assigned, and this did not constitute an impermissible assignment of the cause of action.  While the Trial Court below held that there is no difference between a pledge of a security interest or attorneys lien future recovery in a Tort action and a pre-judgment assignment of the entire action that holding is just wrong.  Pledge of a portion of future recovery in a Tort action does not divest the Plaintiff from control in the action and in fact he is the real party in interest who is bringing the action and he is being represented by counsel of his choice and he retains the right to make all decisions regarding the action including dismissing it.  The majority of states including New Jersey prohibit the pre-judgment assignment of legal malpractice claims.
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...] .........................................................Da 1-6  Order Denying Suppression ........................................................................Da  7 Plea Form .................................................................................................Da 8-15  Judgment of Conviction ..............................................................................Da 16-19 Notice of Appeal .........................................................................................Da 20-23 DVD of Bodycam Footage (“D-1” and “D-2” at the Suppression Hearing) ................Da 24 Supplemental Offense Report (“S-1” at the Suppression Hearing) .........................Da 25-28  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Judgment of Conviction ..............................................................................Da 16-19  Ruling on Motion to Suppress ................................................................. 1T 52-23 to 69-6 Order Denying Suppression ........................................................................Da 7 TRANSCRIPT CITATIONS
[brief] This is an appeal by Plaintiff [...] from (1) an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants – namely, the [...] (“the Township”), its Business Administrator and the individual members of the Township Committee in 2021 – dismissing Plaintiff’s claims arising from the Township’s adoption of a Bond Ordinance on June 15, 2021 (“the Bond Ordinance”) and (2) an order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  It is ironic that Plaintiff claims that Defendants hindered and delayed the adjudication of the litigation, when Plaintiff argued specious, unpled claims in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in an effort to prolong the litigation and avoid judgment and then filed a motion for reconsideration for a judgment in favor of Defendants, but on different grounds to possibly allow for new litigation on some of the issues raised herein.  Plaintiff argues on appeal that the case involves issues as to a settlement in a separate affordable housing litigation, the validity of a resolution adopted in 2023, and other Township Committee actions after adoption of the Bond Ordinance, including payments for the projects, but the present litigation did not include any such claims.  The present litigation included Plaintiff’s claims challenging the Bond Ordinance on the grounds that there was an alleged conflict of interest and that he was denied his constitutional rights in connection with the Township’s consideration of the Bond Ordinance specifically and, generally, in 2021.  Yet, it was undisputed that Plaintiff and other members of the public were given a right to provide public comment at the Township Committee meetings in 2021 generally and specifically regarding the adoption of the Bond Ordinance.  In fact, Plaintiff exercised his right to provide public comments regarding the Bond Ordinance when it was introduced, and before it was adopted.  Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were never violated.  Indeed, Plaintiff admits that he was heard, but argues in his appeal that there were issues of material facts.  There were no issues of material facts and, contrary to Plaintiff’s characterization, the trial court did not bar discovery.  Rather, the court recognized that the case was brought as a prerogative action to challenge the adoption of the Bond Ordinance and for alleged violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, based on Defendants’ conduct at public meetings.  The trial judge stipulated at the case management conference that Plaintiff could defend Defendants’ summary judgment motion by identifying specific discovery allegedly needed to prove his claims; however, Plaintiff did not do so in his opposition to Defendants’ motion.  Because the record was clear and undisputed, there was no need for any discovery, and the matter was ripe for summary judgment.  The trial court properly entered summary judgment and denied plaintiff motion for reconsideration, and its decisions should be affirmed.
[brief] See, e.g., Pa405a-06a, *Brower v. Wirtgen Group*, 2012 WL 3030242, *4-5 (App. Div. Jul. 26, 2012) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on Workers Compensation Act in case involving an injury caused by a milling machine traveling in reverse because certain safety “shortcomings” — such as a failure to require spotters — did not entail a “substantial certainty” of death or serious injury); Pa413a-14a, Mann v. Heil Packer, 2010 WL 988883, *7-8 (App. Div. Jan. 13, 2010) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on Workers Compensation Act despite evidence that plaintiff’s employer violated ANSI standards); Pa419a-21a, Bergen v. Able Energy, 2009 WL 222943, *5-7 (App. Div. Feb. 2, 2009) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on Workers Compensation Act despite an “extensive list of regulatory violations of a serious nature found by OSHA and the DCA. ”).  The case law suggests that “in addition to violations of safety regulations or failure to follow good safety practice, an intentional wrong must be accompanied by something more, typically deception, affirmative acts that defeat safety devices, or a willful failure to remedy past violations. ”  Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 471; Pa428a, Jarosz v. G & B LLC, 2013 WL 5268926, *6 (App. Div. Sept. 19, 2013) (citing Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 616); Pa434a, Fendt v. Abrahams, 2013 WL 1405096, *5 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2013); see also Tomeo, 176 N.J. at 374 (lack of deception and deceit by employer evidence that conduct did not fall outside exception to immunity provided by the Act).
[directive] THE OF OFFICE SAFETY AND PUBLIC LAW OF DEPARTMENT  JUSTICE CRIMINAL OF DIVISION  085  Box PO N108625-0085  TRENTON, 984-6500 (609)  TELEPxoNE: Justice Criminal of Division Director, TO: Police State Jersey  New Superintendent, Prosecutors County All Sheriffs County All Chiefs Police All Executives Chief Enforcement Law All General Attorney Porrino, S. Christopher .
[directive] A VISO: mediante solicita9lio.  Portanto, nlio inclua dados de identifica9lio pessoal, tais como numero de Social Security, numero da carteira de motorista, numero de placa do veiculo, numero de ap6lice de seguro, numero de conta financeira ativa ou numero de cartlio de credito ativo.  As a9oes, peti9oes e outros documentos entregues ao tribunal deverlio estar em ingl6s  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English
[brief] “[O]ne can always argue that development brings more traffic and that a commercial establishment brings more congestion and more intensive use of the nearby local roadways. ”  Riya Finnegan Ltd. Liab. Co., supra, 197 N.J. at 193.  The Trial Court agreed:  “[m]any Ordinances, if not most, have some effect on the public, but that does not justify an extension of filing deadlines.  There must be something significant that has an effect on a larger portion of the Township, not potentially just some of the roads around the project. ” (Pa58).  Finally, Willoughby differs from the present case because in Willoughby, there was no detrimental reliance by the developer or the municipality.
[brief] (1T93-15 to 94-23).  Because defendant had an untenable relationship with the landlord and his credit was weak at the time, the Hoboken operating agreement gave [...] 95% ownership and defendant 5%.  \(^4\) (1T94-7 to 15; 1T97-10 to 20; 1T105-13 to 107-8; Sa107).  That operating agreement was signed on May 2, 2014.  (1T109-10; Sa70-119).  Like all the WOB operating agreements, the Hoboken agreement provided that any potential investors had to complete a subscription agreement, which also had to be vetted by the voting members; the potential investors could then be admitted to the company, but only with the written approval of the managing partner and 51% of the voting interest.  (1T111-19 to 120-19; Sa88).  [...] was the managing partner and held the majority of the voting interest.  (1T113-2 to 22).  Any contributions would then be used for the benefit of the company, [...].
[directive] Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006)  Page 4 of 18 Standard 7.  Oath of Secrecy  A uniform oath of secrecy shall be required of anyone who is permitted in the grand jury room, other than witnesses.  Those taking the oath of secrecy shall be informed of the statutes prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of grand jury proceedings, including the possible penalties that may be imposed.  Judiciary staff required to take the oath of secrecy shall have the oath re-administered annually.  Comment:  Other than witnesses, every other person permitted into the grand jury room, including authorized court staff, must take an oath of secrecy regarding the grand jury proceedings.  Those taking the oath of secrecy must be informed as to the possible sanctions for violation of the oath.  Placing everyone on notice in that regard also indicates the importance of grand juror service.  In addition to a maximum 18-month sentence for someone convicted of disclosing grand jury information with the intent to harm another, the statute also sets forth civil penalties that may be sought by the person injured by those actions.  The first time an oath of secrecy is administered to Judiciary staff it shall be by the supervising judge of the grand jury, or another judge designated by the Assignment Judge.  Thereafter, those staff involved with the grand jury shall have the oath re-administered annually by the Operations Manager or the Jury Manager so that staff are regularly reminded about the importance of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, with staff receiving a printed version of the oath each time that it is administered.  The uniform oath of secrecy is appended to these Grand Jury Standards as Attachment 5.
[directive] JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS  c.  The County Prosecutor shall determine if consent or a search warrant is necessary for a mechanical examination.  d.  All search warrant applications shall be made in accordance with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2002-2, “Approval of Search Warrant Applications, Execution of Search Warrants, & Procedures to Coordinate Investigative Activities by Multiple Law Enforcement Agencies,” or, if subsequently revised or superceded, the most recent version of this Directive, [The Division of State Police shall consult with the County Prosecutor’s Office to determine if a warrant is necessary.]  8.  Commercial Carrier Safety Unit (CCSU)  Inspections/Weighing of Vehicles  a.  Commercial Carrier Safety inspections of commercial motor vehicles (trucks, buses etc.) and the weighing of all such vehicles shall be conducted by the Division of State Police, Commercial Carrier Safety Unit (CCSU), as necessary.  b.  Documentation of the inspections or weighing of vehicles are to be promptly submitted to the County Prosecutor’s Office fatal accident unit and/or designated investigator or detective.  9.  Follow-Up Investigation  a.  Includes interviews, statements, search warrants, etc., shall be coordinated through the County Prosecutor’s Office and conducted by Division of State Police crash investigators and detectives, with assistance from the County Prosecutor’s Office, as may be necessary.  b.  The exchange of reports between agencies shall occur in a timely manner without the need for a subpoena or court order.  E.  Debriefings  1.  Following the at-scene phase of the crash investigation, and at other times - 10 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2
[brief] In this case, the T-intersection where the accident occurred was an intersection between two drive aisles with parking stalls along both drive aisles, neither of which were subject to MUTCD applicability.  Regarding a T-intersection like the one here, [...] concluded that at locations of intersecting drive aisles forming T-intersections where perpendicularly parked spaces were visible at the end of the terminating aisle, "it is inherently obvious to motorists approaching the intersection that they have reached the end of the aisle's travelway and must operate their vehicle in a safe manner consistent with the possibility of oncoming or conflicting traffic along the intersecting aisle."  Such controls were, however, present uniformly through the lot where internal circulation roads intersected in accordance with industry standards.  (Da22-24, §2.1 & 2.1.1 Parking Lot Layout).  End "islands" or "peninsulas" (raised landscape areas with curb and sometimes landscape vegetation placed at the end of parking rows intersecting drive aisles) were provided at the end of all north/south oriented rows of parking throughout the lot.  They were not present at the ends of the east/west drive aisles including the one on which [...] was traveling before she turned her vehicle into the north/south drive aisle striking [...].  However, [...] offered the opinion that there was no absolute engineering standard requiring the use of raised end islands or peninsulas in parking lots, and per [...] zoning regulations, neither were required for parking lots in the Township.
[brief] (Da903)  25.  Following construction of the addition, parking on the Fifth and Sixth Street Lots by members of [...] continued without interference by the [...] through the 1970s.  In furtherance of the grant of --- ⁶  The addition to the [...] on the Fifth Street Lot approved by the 1972 Resolution encroaches on the Plaintiff’s Property.  The Congregation did not object to this encroachment given its easement rights over the Subject Property.  (Da130) easement, throughout the 1970s the Fifth Street Lot was generally used as an overflow lot for the Congregants when the Sixth Street Lot was full.  (13T 138:11-139:6; 140:24-141:23; 143:7-143:35; 149:23-150:2)  Facts Established at Trial Regarding Continued Use of Easement Rights Without Interference from 1963 through 2010
[brief] APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW:  HONORABLE  [...], P.J.Cv.  DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  RESTAURANT  EPOT’S, LLC (IMPROPERLY PLED AS [...])  BRIEF AND APPENDIX IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS’ APPEAL
[brief] **POINT EIGHTEEN [[...]’s breaches of contract]  (Argued at Pa410 – Pa420; Pa490 – Pa494)**  In addition to the force majeure clause voiding the contract, [...] breached the contract several times over, which underscores the necessity for the parties to renegotiate a new contract if it was to pay [...] under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  The court’s order dismissing the Complaint improperly rewarded [...] for breaching the contract.  1.  Breach of contract at Section 14, Force Majeure (Argued at Pa418)  2.  Other breaches of contract (Argued at Pa410 – Pa420; Pa490 – Pa497)  Page 56 – 63  POINT NINETEEN
[directive] Trial Court Administr~ j;~~  M~ FROM: [...], J.A.D. of SUBJ.: Criminal Justice Reform - (1)  Summary Amendments to Pretrial Services Program  Pursuant L. 2021, 19 (Marijuana Decriminalization Law); c. to of of (2) Effects the Amendments on Pretrial Release; (3) Effects the Amendments on the Public Safety Assessment  DATE: June 30, 2021 2021, 19, the Marijuana Decriminalization Law, was enacted on February 22, 2021 c. L. and among other changes, amended certain marijuana offenses, procedures related to Pretrial Services, and the criteria for making a pretrial release or detention decision.  This Directive specifically addresses the statutory amendments to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) and their effect on the Pretrial Services Program (PSP) and the Public Safety Assessment (PSA).
[brief] Appellant, [...] (Trust), and the [...] ([...]) own neighboring waterfront properties.  In 2017, the Department of Environmental Protection issued [...] a permit to construct a recreational dock extension.  However, [...] built the extension several inches outside the scope of its permit.  Therefore, [...] applied for and was in 2019 granted a minor technical permit modification to “legalize” the mis-location.  The Trust requested an adjudicatory hearing regarding the 2019 technical modification permit, and in the same request sought to challenge the approval of [...]’s 2017 initial dock extension.  DEP denied both.
[brief] Whereas the abuse of discretion standard is without a clear definition, abuse has been found where a decision has been “made without rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).  “In other words, a functional approach to the abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue.