ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews grants of summary judgment de novo.  *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh*, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  The Appellate Division applies the same standard used by the trial court.  *Id.*  Here, the trial court applied a summary judgment standard because discovery had ended.  Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."  R. 4:46-2(c); see *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of* America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  The "essence of the inquiry" is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."  Brill, 142 N.J. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).  To avoid summary judgment, “the moving party must identify the evidence on file in the case, which establishes the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. ”  Sch. All. Ins. Fund v. Fama Const. Co., 353 N.J. Super. 131, 135-36 (Super. Ct. 2001).  “Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent summary judgment; the party defending against a motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless it provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a jury might return a verdict in its favor. ”  Id.  “Conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts, presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgement are likewise insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. ”  Id.  “However, if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. ”  Id.  Even if there is a denial of essential fact, the court should grant summary judgment if the rest of the record viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion demonstrates the absence of a material and genuine factual dispute.
[directive] Accordingly, I, [...], and Criminal Justice State New Jersey the the Constitution of the of vested in me the authority by to law and DIRECT that all enforcement agencies -117, hereby N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to of 1970, Act implement and comply State New Jersey of the laws of the of under the authority officers operating with following provisions: the COMMUNITY-LAW  ATTORNEY GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 2.  EDUCATION  AFFIRMATIVE RELATIONS  CONTINUING ENFORCEMENT  INSTITUTE
[brief] The imperative to eliminate cost generating local zoning laws includes, among others, duly adopted ordinances for “minimums for frontages, setbacks, front yards, and home sizes. ”  Id. at 295.  Any local zoning requirement that imposes a “significant impediment” to the court-ordered affordable housing is set aside to accomplish the constitutional objective, subject to suitability.  Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 557-58 (2002).
[brief] ”  Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Twp. of Wall, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005). ”  Pa33-35, emphasis added.  It also underscored the Board’s provision of cogent reasons for its decision:  “In its rebuttal brief, plaintiff argues the Resolution is invalid because it is based upon unsubstantiated opinion and beliefs of the Board and disregards the evidence ...  The Court finds no evidence supporting plaintiff’s contention that the Resolution is not based upon the evidence produced at the hearing…”  “The findings of the Board are substantiated in the record …”  “The Resolution concluded that the other variances required in addition for the use and FAR “mandated a conclusion that granting the use variance would substantially impair the intent and purpose of the Zone Plan and Zoning Ordinance. ”  There is nothing in the record which refutes that. ”  Pa30, 32, 36, emphasis added.
[brief] See Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 N.J. Super. 47, 63 (App Div. 1956)(economic feasibility is factual issue).  Yet, the Trial Court ruled that there were no disputed factual issues because of its view that all that LTTEL requires was that the Financial Agreement made the requisite recitals.  That approach, which treated the municipality’s findings as determinative, is in error for several reasons.  To begin with, it cannot be squared with *Hirth* since, as will be argued in the next section, plaintiffs did make a showing sufficient to call the Township’s findings into question and to raise a genuine factual issue.  Second, the trial court’s decision – which essentially interpreted the LTTEL as giving the municipality a final and unreviewable power to grant long-term tax exemptions – cannot be squared with the terms of LTTEL and the constitutional framework that informs it.
[brief] If I was aware of the proper violation, I would have made more arguments as to why the state did not meet the 3 elements listed in 39:4-50.4a.  Instead, 39:4-50.2a, simply states that everyone must submit to a breathalyzer regardless of the circumstances and nowhere in the statute is there a statement to the public that 39:4-50.2 and 39:4-50.4a are interconnected and that we should also look at 39:4-50.4a.  State v. Singh, DOCKET NO. [...], 3 (App. Div. Nov. 1, 2018) ("Although the refusal offense is set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, the summons given to defendant listed only N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2,")  It is only after reading multiple case laws that I understood that they are interconnected.  Solely Interpreting the statute 39:4-50.2, me and everyone else who gets this violation automatically assumes we are guilty.  But that is clearly untrue.
[brief] Therefore, the appointing authority’s discretion to bypass [...] under list removal rules was not applicable.  It does not matter that [...] could have potentially appealed his demotion, which he did.  A discipline that results from the issuance of a FNDA is considered final as of the effective date, and it does not matter that this “final” decision could thereafter be modified or reversed by settlement or a Commission decision.  As such, the appellant should have been the first ranked eligible on [...].
[brief] *Defendant [...] claims that the Plaintiff’s “harassment claim” must be dismissed as it is not recognized as a viable cause of action in New Jersey.*  New Jersey law has not recognized harassment as a free-standing civil cause for damages.  See, e.g., *Juzwiak v. Doe*, 415 N.J. Super. 442, 454-55 (App. Div. 2010); *Aly v. Garcia*, 333 N.J. Super. 195, 203-04 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 87 (2001); *Hodge v. McGrath*, 2014 WL 6909499, at 1 (App. Div. Dec. 10, 2014).
[brief] This record makes clear that “[t]here [was] no dispute as to the amount [of restitution] ordered or defendant’s ability to make restitution over five years of probation. ”  Id. at 590.  Like in Orji, defense counsel here made clear there was no dispute as to the amount of restitution owed or the defendant ability to pay that amount over the course of a five-year probationary term.  Like in Orji, defense counsel made the payment of restitution the crux of his argument for a non-custodial sentence, relying upon defendant’s payment of full restitution in support of his request for the application of mitigating factor six.5  Counsel for defendant here assured --- 5  Defendant’s restitution promises to the lower court, from which he now seeks to withdraw, call to mind the “common[sense]” doctrine of “invited error. ”  State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 100 (2014)(quoting State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561-52 (2013)).
[brief] 22  Though counsel did not handle this case on a contingency, the total legal fees for Plaintiffs’ counsel at [...] and [...] (exclusive of expert fees and other expenses) were roughly one-third of the trial court’s compensatory award.  (Da2083-2472).  While not dispositive, that degree of proportionality imbues the Plaintiffs’ fee application with an imprimatur of reasonableness.  Litton Indus., 200 N.J. at 389.  The trial court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ fee application was thorough.  Because it did not abuse its discretion, the award of legal fees and expenses must be affirmed.  IX.
[brief] The City is responsible for hundreds of miles of roadways and thousands of traffic signs.  It is not the purpose of the TCA, nor the Legislature’s intent, to force public entities to perfectly maintain every inch of their properties and keep roadways free of any imperfections.  Such a burden is impractical given the scope of the City’s responsibilities and limited resources.  Despite this, the decisions of the trial court effectively subjected the City to strict liability standards and significantly undermined the TCA’s purpose of granting immunity to public entities in this context.  Our Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that any application of the TCA must start from its guiding principle that immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception.  That is why public entities can only be exposed to tort liability “within the limitations of the TCA. ”  To impose liability on a public entity arising from the condition of property, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a “dangerous condition;” (2) that the condition proximately caused the injury; (3) that it “created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred;” (4) that either the dangerous condition was caused by a negligent employee or the entity knew about the condition; and (5) that the entity's conduct was “palpably unreasonable. ”  The law is also clear that a plaintiff’s claim against a public entity must fail if one or more of the elements is not satisfied.  In this case, Plaintiff failed to prove that the City had actual or constructive notice of the missing sign, an essential element of establishing liability under the TCA.  On summary judgment and at trial, Plaintiff failed to provide any competent evidence demonstrating that the City was aware of the missing sign at the time of the accident, nor did Plaintiff provide evidence as to the length of time the condition existed.  Although Plaintiff clearly failed to satisfy the Tort Claims Act requirements, the trial court vaulted over the constructive notice requirement and allowed the matter to proceed before the jury.  The trial court’s decision is legally deficient, factually unsupported, and should be reversed.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[directive] Grant to C.  Authority  Assistant First or Prosecutor a Directive, County this of provision snyother  Notwithstanding Insurance the or Justice, Criminal of Division the of Director Deputy or Director the Prosecutor, any from exemption an authorize may Prosecutor Fraud Insurance Deputy or Prosecutor Fraud a conduct to cause sufficient and good of finding a upon Directive this of provision or requirement this by required otherwise procedures deconfliction the of all performing without operation planned exemption the justifying circumstances the but orally, granted exemption be may Such Directive. sparingly, and used exemption be shall an grant to authority
[brief] ’  [...] v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333, 337 (citations omitted).  The Court further noted that an “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”  Id., citing SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).  The Court reversed the decision of the Board, noting that even though the letter was never received by [...], even if it had been, the notice was improper and late.
[brief] --- \(^6\) *Mount Laurel II* employs the term “Special Master. ”  Pursuant to the Notice to the Bar issued by the Acting Administrative Director of the Courts dated April 5, 2024, the Supreme Court adopted the term “Special Adjudicator” as a replacement for “Special Master. ”  In *Mount Laurel IV*, the Supreme Court provided most municipalities with an opportunity to seek voluntary compliance with their Third Round affordable housing obligation by filing a declaratory judgment complaint in the Law Division.
[directive] What if I am an EMT or firefighter and my CAD system is separate from the municipal CAD system?  Some EMTs and firefighters use a CAD system that is separate from law enforcement.  If this is how things are structured in your area, the Chief LEE in your municipality will direct their single POC to share the list of names and addresses of persons who have tested positive for COVID-19 with a single POC from your agency, and that single POC will enter flags in your CAD system.  Q:
[brief] In his opening statement, the prosecutor argued, “At 2:25 a.m. a search of [...]’ call detail records for his phone number show that he is in the area of the [...] in [...].  [...] is where [...] is.  [...] is where [...] is.  It’s the same exact neighborhood.  They’re in the same exact location at approximately the same time. ” (10T25-11 to 17 (emphasis added)).
[directive] 6.7  Re-activation  When Reason for De-Activation No Longer Exists.  In any instance where a BWC was de-activated pursuant to Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, or 6.6, the device shall be re- activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the circumstances BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] **Snow Removal Contracts:**  Defendant [...] entered into a snow removal contract with [...].  (Da150-165).  The Scope of Work stated that “**SAFETY IS NOT TO BE COMPROMISED.**” (Da159).  In addition, the contract’s Snow Removal Specifications provided that “[a]ll access roadways and walkways are to be cleared of snow prior to 6:00AM (4:00PM in the event of day storms) or as timely as possible on any given day, seven days week. ” (Da164).  The agreement further prohibited [...] from using subcontractors without the written consent of [...].  (Da155).  Even though prohibited by its contract with [...], [...] entered into a Subcontractor Agreement with [...] for snow and ice removal work to be done at [...].  (Da166-179).  This agreement’s Scope of Work stated “The OWNER’s primary objective is for the propert(ies) to be maintained in a safe manner which provides safe conditions for all those property(ies) at all times.  **SUBCONTRACTOR is responsible for ensuring all services are provided as required to ensure safe conditions for employees, tenants, and visitors.  SAFETY IS NOT TO BE COMPROMISED. ”**  (Da174-75).  Moreover, this agreement had same 6 a.m. deadline for completion of the snow/ice removal as the underlying agreement between [...] and [...] as set forth above.  (Da178).
[brief] 2 Homicide Facts: 2 Facts Relating To Defendant’s Statement: 3  LEGAL ARGUMENT  8  POINT I  THE STATE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MUST BE GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE  BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.  (Pa4 to 25).  8  CONCLUSION
[brief] The end tenant, closest to the site of the accident, is not [...], but is [...].  (See, Pa735) issue.  Antenucci, 212 N.J. Super. at 130.  Because [...] was not in exclusive possession nor the sole occupant of the property, being only one of five tenants located in the shopping center at [...], the decision in Antenucci had no bearing on this case and does not provide a basis to reverse the trial judge’s decision.
[brief] Plaintiffs cite Skolski v. Woodcock, 149 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1977), but that case is distinguishable.  Unlike the Rutgers Act pertaining to volunteer BOG members, the residency statute in Skolski governed “all positions and employments in the classified service, where the service is to be rendered in a particular” locality and when “payment therefor is made from the funds” of that locality.  Id. at 344 (quoting N.J.S.A. 11:22-7).  That is decidedly not the case at bar, in which BOG members are not paid for any service to be rendered in a particular locality.  In addition, the statute in Skolski was not a codification of a consummated contract as is the case of the Rutgers Act, with the special rules of construction attendant to that Act.  In short, the language and nature of the Rutgers Act, along with the underlying circumstances in this case, differ significantly from those presented in Skolski.
[brief] DEFENDANTS MISCHARACTERIZE THE ILLEGAL, LARGE, MAKESHIFT LIQUOR CONCESSION STAND AS MERELY BEING THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF THIRD PARTIES.  (P-59.)  All Defendants improperly rely on a line of cases, Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35 (1993); Rodriguez v. N.J. Sports Exposition Authority, 193 N.J. Super 39 (App. Div. 1983); Setrin v. Glassboro State College, 136 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1975), and argue that the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises for months before the Decedent was shot was merely the criminal activity of third parties, and not a defect in the condition on public property.  Defendant [...] (“[...]”) claims that “the facts pled do not indicate any defect in the physical property,” Def. [...]’s Brief at 14, when Plaintiffs explicitly pleaded that the large, makeshift liquor concession stand was a defect in the physical property because its presence there was illegal.  Taking Defendants’ arguments to their logical conclusion, a broken window on the Subject Premises would merely be the criminal activities of third parties and Defendants would neither be under any obligation to repair the window, nor would they be liable under the TCA, even if the broken window lured others with criminal intent to the Subject Premises and an innocent bystander was injured as a result.
[brief] In this case, two eyewitnesses identified the defendant both in court and out of court.  Defendant's time slips indicated that the only day he arrived late to work during a four week period was on the date of the robbery.  The only day he missed work during this period was the day before the robbery, the same day that his accomplice, co-defendant [...], was seen parked on the street a distance away from [...].  Under those circumstances we do not find that a reasonable doubt is raised on whether the hearsay led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.  [Ibid.]  We take note that the Court placed at the top of the list of independent proofs that two eyewitnesses had identified the defendant both in court and out of court.  4  Ibid.  *8  The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause decision in Branch, decided in 2005, provides further instruction in determining whether that Sixth Amendment right has been violated and in measuring the prejudicial impact of any such violation.
[brief] The rule provides, in pertinent part:  “Following the instructions of the jury by the court and during the course of deliberations, the court may, in its discretion, in both civil and criminal actions, permit dispersal of the jury for “the night, for meals and during other authorized intermissions in the deliberations. ”  Thus according to Rule. 1:8-6, gives the trial court the discretion to disperse a deliberating jury for the night.  (24 hours)  In the instant matter, the jury had a 10 day break during the course of deliberations, there should have been no impediment for [...] to objecting to the dispersal of the jury for 10 days during deliberations.  “Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. ”  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).  In People v. Santamaria, where the jury deliberations were adjourned for 11 days, the Court of appeals of California found that “the trial court acted to undermine due process requirements by releasing the jurors into the community for 11 days.
[brief] 1.  **Appellant Cannot Establish A Prima Facie Claim of Retaliation Under CEPA. **  To establish a retaliation claim under CEPA, Appellant must first establish a *prima facie* case of retaliatory action by demonstrating: (1) he reasonably believed Respondents’ conduct violated a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he performed a whistle-blowing activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.  *McCullough*, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 573; see also *Dzwonar v. McDevitt*, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003); *Beck v. Tribert*, 312 N.J. Super. 335, 342-345 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 156 N.J. 424 (1998).
[brief] As the bears are killed by hunters and brought to check stations, state biologists look to the special tags and collect data on the bear and from the hunters about where the animal was harvested.  N.J.A.C. 7:25-5.6 published in New Jersey Register, Vol. 55, No. 19, October 2, 2023.  With the known number of tags returned, biologists come up with a harvest rate, i.e., the number of tagged bags killed out of the total tagged bears.  That percentage then determines whether the hunt will be extended, if it is below a 20% rate, or terminated, if the rate gets to 30%.
[brief] This case is not unlike the Supreme Court decision in Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565 (1996).  In Carvalho, an employee of a subcontractor was killed in a trench collapse.  The engineering firm claimed that it had no contractual obligation to supervise safety procedures of the construction.  It also tried to disclaim responsibility, citing exculpatory clauses in its agreements with the owner and general contractor.  The Court held that the engineer has a legal duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of workers on a construction site even when the engineer has a contractual responsibility for the progress of the work but not for safety conditions.  *Id.* at 578.  The Court also held that although the exculpatory clauses may be enforceable for purposes of indemnification, “[t]heir financial arrangements and understanding do not overcome the public policy that imposes a duty of care and ascribes liability to the engineer in these circumstances. ”  *Id.* at 579.  Applying that reasoning here, [...] may have grounds for relief under its subconsultant agreement but may not evade responsibility in the first instance to plaintiffs due to the complete breakdown of safety protocols on the project.
[brief] (Pa0231-32.)  Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, however, the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that Defendants acted in bad faith in their performance of the PSA and deprived Plaintiff of its benefit of the bargain.  Defendants misconstrue Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard and, as is a theme throughout Defendants’ Brief, make unsupported factual assertions with no basis in the record.  After executing the PSA, Defendants and their representatives dragged their feet throughout the remedial investigation process, repeatedly lied and withheld information from Plaintiff regarding the status of remedial investigation, concealed their communications with the NJDEP, disregarded deficiencies in their documentation, and otherwise wholly failed to cooperate with Plaintiff and its representatives throughout the process.  (2T141:12 to 142:5, 174:8 to 175:10, 179:5-19; 4T45:20 to 47:18, 49:2 to 50:7, 54:16 to 55:12, 69:14 to 70:4; 5T46:21 to 47:6; 6T88:1-24, 92:2-8, 94:10 to 95:3, 102:12 to 103:5; 8T87:18 to 89:7, 91:3 to 92:5, 93:15 to 94:4, 94:13 to 95:4, 100:14 to 101:11.)