ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa47).  The ordinance then goes on to list "reasons" for the adoption of the redevelopment plan.  The Committee's transcripts and minutes also do not reflect a finding of inconsistency.  At the October 27, 2022 Committee meeting, [...] suggested the Committee amend Chapter 3.1.1 of the Plan "because there has been some suggestion . . . that the plan is not consistent with the master plan.  I think you need to address that."  (2T82:10-13).  No Committee member spoke up in agreement or disagreement with [...]'s statement.  Nevertheless, the Committee voted to amend the Plan in the event it was found inconsistent with the master plan.  (Pa46).  Notably, the Planning Board, despite being presented with the Committee's October 27, 2022 hearing transcript, also did not issue a finding on inconsistency.  See (Pa435).  The Planning Board merely summarized the proposed amendments and voted.  See (Pa435).  A motion was then brought to find "that the amendment is not inconsistent with the Master Plan and refer it back to the Township Committee."  (Pa435).  Thus, despite being presented with [...]' testimony and the Committee's proposed amendments to the Plan, the Planning Board chose to dig its heels in – without any discussion whatsoever – on the issue.  There is a distinction between adopting a redevelopment plan that is consistent with the township's Master Plan and adopting a plan that is inconsistent but providing reasons for doing so.  To be clear, both options are available to a local government.  What cannot be done, however, is to amend a redevelopment plan to say it is wholly consistent with the Master Plan but include a caveat that should anyone "suggest" the plan is inconsistent, then the Committee will adopt it as inconsistent, but a court should still approve it.  It defies logic to say a municipality can "have it both ways" despite the clear statutory mandate that the municipality make a finding on consistency.  Any type of land use regulation should be based on solid planning testimony.  This will ensure that the township is making the best use possible of the land available thereby benefitting the inhabitants of that town.  Thus, it is important to understand why a redevelopment plan is being adopted.  It can be adopted because it is consistent with the master plan, which shows good planning.  It can also be adopted if it is not consistent with the master plan provided there is a finding that the plan is inconsistent with the master plan but based on good planning reasons.  [...] is opting to state that it wants the ordinance adopted for any reason at all instead of using good planning testimony to determine why this plan should be adopted.  [...] must be required to make a call on consistency versus inconsistency.  The failure to do so here should result in a remand to the Committee to follow the statutory procedure.  B.
[directive] In addition, each county prosecutor's office shall designate a person(s) who is(are) responsible for responding to requests for public information by the media on nights, weekends and holidays.  The name of the person(s) so designated shall be available at the communication center in each county.  The Attorney General, as chief law enforcement officer of the State, or his designee, or where appropriate, the county prosecutor, as chief law enforcement officer of the county, shall promptly resolve all disputes as to whether or not the release of records would be "otherwise inappropriate" between the custodian of any records referred to herein and any person seeking access thereto or similar disputes.
[brief] [...] testified that multiple surveillance cameras revealed [...]’s Chevy drive directly to [...]’s residence after he picked up defendant following the shooting.  (6T148-1 to 151-25).  [...] testified that defendant, who she knew as “[...],” called her twice on the morning of July 30, 2018, at 7:49 a.m. and 7:51 a.m. and asked her if he could stay with her because his girlfriend kicked him out.
[brief] There is no dispute that a reasonable and safer design existed.  Defendant offered Lane Departure Warning (LDW), Road Departure Mitigation (RDM) and Lane Keep Assist (LKAS) systems as part of a premium package and those safety systems had been available on defendant’s vehicles outside the United States for many years.  Pa145; Pa163; Pa345-46.  The second part of the issue – whether the omission renders the product not reasonably safe – is a jury question based on a risk-utility analysis.  It is not a matter of duty.  “Thus, in determining whether the product was defective, a jury must determine the risks and alternatives that should have been known to a reasonable manufacturer and then assess whether the manufacturer discharged its duty to provide a reasonably fit, suitable and safe” vehicle.  *Green*, supra, 310 N.J. Super. at 517.  The determination is not whether a duty exists but, rather, whether a breach of duty exists.  The latter is a fact question and should not have been taken from the factfinder on summary judgment.
[directive] SOP 12:13 12- for 6-8  Criteria  Apportioning Forfeited Property 2 12- 124 Definitions  1 in Delegation of Authority of Attorney General 12- 2 12:3  Apportionment :5 1 1 - 2  Designated Chief Executive/Law Enforcement Agency 1 - 2  Attorney General 1 - County Prosecutor 3 - 3 1 - Public Safety Director Chief of Police 11- Non-Law 1 Enforcement Agency 1-2
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................ii  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................iv  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS........................................xi  PROCEDURAL HISTORY.......................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW....................................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT............................................................................................8  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE [...] WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).........................................................................................8  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) .......................................................................................15  CONCLUSION......................................................................................................18
[directive] By October 1, 2024, each County Prosecutor shall inspect the tactical teams operating in their jurisdiction 6 and determine which, if any, meet the standards established by the NTOA to be recognized as Tier 1 or Tier 2 SWAT Teams.  The County Prosecutor may permit a tactical team to operate under Section 4.3 if there are only minor variations from the standards established by NTOA that do not affect the essential functioning of a Tier 1 or Tier 2 SWAT team.  The County Prosecutor shall then issue a written directive to each law enforcement agency in their jurisdiction advising the results of this process and which Tactical Teams may be activated to satisfy the requirement of Section 4.3 of the Attorney General’s Barricaded Individual Policy.
[directive] Nadzoru nad Dorosłymi Przestępcami, jeśli w czasie wydania wyroku mieszka Pan(i) poza stanem New Jersey, powrót do miejsca Pana(i) zamieszkania może zostać opóźniony z zgodę na nadzoru do stanu, w którym znajduje się powodu oczekiwania na przeniesienie miejsce zamieszkania?  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?
[brief] Upon Reversal of the Orders Dismissing the Complaint, the Issue of Any Parties’ Entitlement to an Award of its Attorneys’ Fees Will be Rendered Academic – or, at Least, Premature Before addressing the substance of [...]’s arguments for attorneys’ fees, it should be noted that, for the reasons discussed above, the Orders dismissing the Complaint with prejudice as against both Defendants should be reversed, and the Complaint should be reinstated.
[brief] However, neither attorney was able to prepare and file the application.  Ibid.  Finally, [...] was able to retain new Counsel, and again sought to vacate the judgment (Da153, Second [...] Cert.).  On September 22, 2023, The Hon. Joseph A.  Turula, P.J. Civ. entered an Order denying the application, on the basis that [...] was “properly served process” and had failed to show “the excusable neglect needed to vacate [a] default judgment…” (Da2, Sept. 22, 2023 Order).  This appeal follows.
[brief] THE COURT BELOW CONSIDERED AND PROPERLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT DID NOT ENGAGE IN FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION AND OTHERWISE FOUND NO BASIS TO AWARD SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF LEGAL FEES TO A PRO SE LITIGANT. **  As contended hereinabove, Appellant sought attorney’s fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and R. 1:4-8 for frivolous litigation.  In pertinent part, R. 1:4-8(a) provides:
[brief] POINT III.  Determining Congressional Intent of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  (Pa46-56)  Our Supreme Court has applied the general rules of statutory construction to the FDCPA:  When interpreting a statute, the Legislature’s intent is paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that intent.  Statutory words are ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions, giving sense to the legislation as a whole.  This Court’s duty is clear: construe and apply the statute as enacted.  *Hodges v. Sasil Corp.*, 189 N.J. 210, 223 (2007) (internal cites and quotation marks omitted).  Thus, when “the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretative process is over. ”  *State v. Courtney*, 243 N.J. 77, 86 (2020) (quoting *Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC*, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)).  See, *Comm’r v. Brown*, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (applying the same principle to interpreting federal statutes).  Thus, “[w]hen that intent is revealed by a statute’s plain language—ascripting to the words used ‘their ordinary meaning and significance’—we need look no further. ”  *Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City*, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012).  Under those circumstances, a court may not resort to any extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, when construing a statute.  When the statute’s plain language read in the context of related statutory provisions leads to an unambiguous result, that language is the conclusive evidence of the legislature’s intent.  Hence, it is improper for a court to consider “extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction” suggesting a different result unless it first concludes the statutory words are ambiguous or the plain meaning of the unambiguous statutory language leads to an absurd result because the result frustrates the statute’s purpose.  *Courtney*, 243 N.J. at 86; and see *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.*, 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005) (addressing the limitations on the use of legislative history).
[brief] The trial court without basis later enforced the above provision in relation to the legal malpractice litigation in Pennsylvania, which was never mentioned by anyone at the October 20, 2017 hearing.  [Id.; see also A449, Order, Jan. 11, 2019; A514-518 Orders, July 27, 2020].  On August 19, 2019, [...] entered a sua sponte recusal order in anticipation of [...]’s Notice of Motion to recuse based on the appearance of impropriety\(^2\).  (A454).  In so doing, [...] acknowledged that she officiated the wedding ceremony of [...]’s attorney, [...], Esq.  (See Id.).  Neither the Judge nor Defense Counsel divulged that information until two years after [...]’s R. 4:50 cross-motion was filed and several orders were entered\(^3\).
[brief] (Da159.)  First, the court explained that “‘relevance’ and ‘responsiveness’ are subjective by their very nature.  Someone doing a relevance/responsiveness review from one side will very likely disagree with someone doing the same review from the opposing side. ”  (Da159.)  The court questioned the fairness of allowing one party to withhold documents “for relevance when someone from the opposing side would find the same document relevant or responsive. ”  (Da159.)  The court also noted that, in its experience, “in most cases the reviewer is a paralegal or young associate that really does not completely understand all the intricacy of the issues in the underlying litigation [and] [t]hat person’s review is not always reliable. ”  (Da159.)  The court added that it was not equipped to review tens of thousands of documents for relevance.  (Da159.)  Last, the court stated the following:  As long as there is a confidentiality order in place, there is very little risk to the producing party.  . . .  I would certainly agree to review and reconsider on a case by case basis the production of several documents that may be so proprietary that their production could result in business losses or disruption.  However, those documents should be the exception.  [(Da159.)]
[brief] *Milton*, 187 N.J. at 432 (citing R. 1:8-10.).  Polling is a "practice of long standing [that] requires each juror to answer for himself, thus creating individual responsibility, eliminating any uncertainty as to the verdict announced by the foreman."  *State v. Vaszorich*, 13 N.J. 99, (quoting *State v. Cleveland*, 6 N.J. 316, 322 (1951)), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 900, (1953); see R. 1:8-10 (emphasis added).  Polling permits detection and resolution of confusion and disagreement and clarification of the precise nature of verdict.  *Milton*, 178 N.J. at 433.
[brief] ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendants-Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  APPELLATE NO.: [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, MORRIS COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...] AND [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...]  Civil Action  DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL AND REPLY APPENDIX  [...]
[brief] ”  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015) (quoting Stanley Co. of Am. v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 305 (1954)).  Thus, a response to a hypothetical question that “lacks the requisite foundation in the facts” is not credible evidence on which a plaintiff can rely to defeat summary judgment.  Ibid.  Yet, the trial court allowed Plaintiff to do just that:  First, the court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that the Ozurdex applicator was defective to survive summary judgment.  Despite Defendant’s argument that the Ozurdex applicator did not deviate from the allowable “manufacturing specifications,” Plaintiff presents testimony from Defendant’s own expert that the disbursement of a silicone particulate \textit{would deviate} from [...]’s own performance standards for the product, and that the Ozurdex applicator was not designed to dispense a silicone particulate in the steroid medication.  Under the PLA, a manufacturer of a product shall be liable if the claimant proves that the product causing harm deviated from the “design specification . . . or the performance standards of the manufacturer.  Therefore, the court finds that there is sufficient evidence that the subject Ozurdex applicator \textit{was defective} under the PLA.  [(Da0794 (citations omitted) (emphases added). )]  To be clear, [...] did not testify that Plaintiff’s Ozurdex unit in fact generated a silicone particulate.  She merely responded affirmatively to a hypothetical question about whether an Ozurdex unit that had dispensed a silicone particle would deviate from [...]’s standards.  Nonetheless, the trial court made the illogical leap that this \textit{hypothetical} testimony somehow sufficed to establish \textit{the fact} that the specific applicator used to dispense Plaintiff’s medicine \textit{was} indeed defective.  \textit{Ibid}.  Clearly, that was an unjustifiable inference even at the summary judgment stage.  If plaintiffs can survive summary judgment simply because a corporate representative acknowledges that a hypothetically-defective product would deviate from the company’s standards, meritless cases would go to trial, resulting in needless litigation and an enormous burden on all of New Jersey’s manufacturers, including those in the life sciences industry, and the courts.  See Brill, 142 N.J. at 541 (“To send a case to trial, knowing that a rational jury can reach but one conclusion, is indeed ‘worthless’ and will ‘serve no useful purpose. ’”).  There is no discernible benefit to allowing plaintiffs to reach a jury on insufficient hypothetical proofs.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment based only on hypothetical evidence that Plaintiff’s Ozurdex unit was defective, and enter judgment for Defendant.  III.
[brief] In CBS Outdoors, supra, this Appellate Court held that a municipality’s undiscovered failure to file a development regulation with the County Planning Board, which permitted the installation of billboards, precluded the defendant planning board from later defending the denial of the billboard application on the grounds that the permitting ordinance was, in fact, a nullity.  Id. at 587.  In pertinent part, the Appellate Division noted that:  We will not tolerate the Board’s purposive action of advocating the nullity of its own ordinance, particularly when it seeks to take advantage of the municipality’s gaffe . . .  The manifest injustice of subscribing to the Board’s advocacy should be apparent, and we decline to become an instrument of mischief by deeming all of the previous proceedings mere exercises in futility.  [Id.]
[brief] Imperatively, “[i]t [is] not the court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine the outcome but only to decide if a material dispute of fact existed. ”  Gilhooley v. Cnty. of Union, 164 N.J. 533, 545 (2000).  If an employee presents facts upon which a jury could conclude the proffered non-discriminatory reason is unworthy of belief, then defendants’ summary judgment motion must be denied, and plaintiff’s discrimination claim must go to a jury.  An employee may defeat summary judgment by either by (1) discrediting the proffered reason; or (2) adducing evidence that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating cause of the adverse employment action.
[brief] See State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 171 n.13 (2007).  The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause, and state statute, N.J.S.A.  2A:84A-19.  State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 41 (2019).  Before using a confession at trial, the State is required to “prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] Day 1 - Highland Park Municipal Court Zoom Session 2PM Oral Argument 6/23/2021  Exhibit BB to [...]’s Certification --- 5  Also on Pa218 but should not be considered duplicate since the submitted button does not clearly reflect that it was in fact submitted Day 2 - Highland Park Municipal Court Zoom Session 2PM Oral Argument 6/23/2021  Exhibit CC to [...]’s Certification  Day 3 - Highland Park Municipal Court Zoom Session 2PM  Oral Argument 6/23/2021  Exhibit DD to [...]’s Certification Day 4 - Highland Park Municipal Court  Zoom Session 2PM  Oral Argument 6/23/2021
[brief] The Defect Create a “Substantial Risk of Injury”  The same facts and inferences that support that a dangerous condition existed also support the fact that the settlement also created a “substantial risk of injury. ”  For example, the [...] was so concerned with this type of condition on the travel surface of the roadway that [...] were hired to inspect the roadway in order to identify and correct these conditions.  (Pa1296);(Pa1296).  As explained in Plaintiffs’ expert report, pavement deficiencies have a greater effect on motorcycles and their handling and stability.  (Pa0021).  The Guidelines on Motorcycle and Bicycle Workzone Safety, as cited in Plaintiffs’ expert report, explains that motorcycles have difficulty elevation changes in lanes that differ as little as 1 inch.  (Pa0021).  In fact, Defense expert, [...], agreed that because of the way a motorcycle steers pavement elevation changes cause operational problems.  (Pa0625).  Here, the uneven pavement caused by the settlement issue created a substantial risk of injury to unsuspecting users of the roadway; especially those users of the roadway that were operating motorcycles.  (c)
[brief] Order, dated September 26, 2022, granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent, [...]  Pa413 Order, dated November 18, 2022, denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment in favor of Respondents.  Pa452 | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Court Rules** | | | Rule 4:46-2(c) | 9 | | **Treatises** | | | Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules* (2024) | 11 | | **Model Jury Charges** | | | *Model Civil Jury Charges*, §6.10 (Revised 11/2019) | 13 | | **Case Law** | | | *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. Of America*, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 9, 10, 11 | | *Camp v. Jiffy Lube #114*, 309 N.J.Super. 305, 706 A.2d 1193 (App. Div. 1998) | 13 | | *D’Atria v. D’Atria*, 576 A.2d 957, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401(Law Div. 1990) | 19, 20, 22 | | *Fargas v. Gorham*, 276 N.J. Super. 135, 647 A.2d 498 (Law Div. 1994) | 10 | | *Investors Bank v. Torres*, 457 N.J.Super. 53, 457 N.J.Super. 53 (App. Div. 2018) | 10 | | *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954) | 10 | | *Kornbleuth v. Westover*, 241 N.J. 289, 227 A.3d 1209 (2020) | 20 | | *Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad*, 210 N.J. 581, 23 A.2d 415 (2012) | 11 | | *Palombi v. Palombi*, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 997 A.2d 1139, (App. Div. 2010) | 19, 20 | State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 164 A.3d 388 (2018)  11  Sullivan v. Port Auth. Of NY & NJ, 449 N.J. Super. 276, 157 A.3d 451(App. Div. 2017)  10  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 110 A.3d 52 (2015)  13  Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 832 A.2d 340 (App. Div. 2003)  9  Underhill v. Borough of Caldwell, 463 N.J. Super. 548, 233 A.2d 594 (App. Div. 2020)  13  Wyotas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, 237 N.J. 501, 206 A.3d 386 (2018)  17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Because defendant pleaded guilty conditioned on the appeal of his *Miranda* motion, see R. 3:9-3(f), the State acknowledges that he has the right to withdraw his guilty plea to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun.  *State v. Diloreto*, 461 N.J. Super. 185, 194 (App. Div. 2019), aff’d as mod., 245 N.J. 179 (2021).  However, the State’s concession does not affect the admissibility of the physical evidence obtained during the search of defendant’s vehicle, including the handgun.