ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court’s instructions must be evaluated in the context of the trial and the jury knew from the evidence and the arguments of counsel that it would have to determine whether defendant acted in self-defense.  (See 6T52-14 to 15; 6T53-2; 6T53-12 to 13; 6T60-6 to 7; 6T62-19 to 22; 6T62-23 to 6T63-11; 6T70-16 to 22; 6T75-14 to 6T77-11; 6T81-10 to 6T81-14; 6T85-10 to 16; 6T86-8 to 6T87-5; 6T91-11 to 18).  The jury is presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions, so there is no support for defendant’s claim that the jury would have focused only on the “must convict” language and not consider self-defense.  The trial court’s instructions did not preclude the jury from considering self-defense in determining defendant’s guilt.  Defendant’s belated claim of error with the verdict sheet is unavailing.
[brief] See, e.g., Pharm. Sales & Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S. Delavau Co., Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d 761, 764 (D.N.J.2000).  The court disregarded that the Federal Courts of Appeals I 3rd Circuit precedents establishes; if a defendant challenges the validity of service of process, the plaintiff bears the burden (Pa1; Pa10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62; Pa133) to demonstrate that the procedure to deliver the papers satisfies the requirements of the federal procedural rule governing service.,  The court misapplied laches improperly to deny a Civil Rights Action claim thereby disregarding precedent and policy.
[brief] To the contrary, defense counsel expressly approved of the court’s final charge:  “I believe that it’s important to define hearsay as it pertains to the expert as there’s voluminous documents in this case.  Both experts relied a lot on out of court statements, as well as prior reports.  I don’t have an issue with the way that this is, this reads.  It is in line with the case law and it’s in line with the Model Jury Charge so I have no objection to the way that it’s written right now in the final charge. ” (14T15-2 to 14).  It is presumed that jurors follow the court’s instructions.  Loftin, 146 N.J. at 390.
[brief] net equity value—from the prior year’s tax returns in order to value the purchase and sale of member interests.  (5T89:16-19)  This methodology meant “if I sold my interest today [(a date in the year 2022)], I would get the value for December 31, 2021. ”  (5T54:7-19)  No matter what part of a year an interest was sold or purchased, [...] always used the previous year’s Tax Book Value.  (5T87:23-25: 88:1-2)  Approximately 119 prior purchases and sales of equity interests were documented to have used this methodology without any adjustments to the value listed on the prior year’s return.  (9T50:6-51)(5T89:20-24)  [...] specifically confirmed this practice by reviewing every single equity transaction from 2004 to 2018, which was over 100 prior transactions, in which “every single one was done at book value the prior year. ”  (5T63:16-65:4; 52:15-18; 66:9)  [...] interviewed company employees who confirmed that book value was the historic methodology.  (5T88:6-11)  He even interviewed [...] himself, who confirmed not only that this had been [...]’s historic practice, but that [...] was the one who performed the calculations.  (5T88:12-89:7)  All of the transactions [...] reviewed occurred while [...] was CEO of the Company, meaning they all occurred when [...] had significant control over how the transactions occurred.  (5T91:6-14; 88:3-5)(9T105:5-8)  Some of the transactions included [...] himself.
[brief] The Applicant has not shown that the granting of the variances would provide a better zoning alternative for the Property and/or provide a benefit to the community and therefore the Board finds that the variance would only advance the individual Applicant's and/or property owner's economic interests.  The Board finds that after weighing the positive and negative criteria as stated that, on balance, the granting of the variances would cause substantial detriment to the public good and are therefore denied.
[brief] (2T52-19 to 54-18).  The court asked counsel if the defense argument was that defendant had not known that they were running from police officers, and advised counsel to keep in mind that the court had seen the video of defendant’s arrest, wherein defendant said, three times, “Who told on me?” (2T54-19 to 55-6).  Co-counsel then joined in, arguing that if the police could say that events happened too fast for them to identify [...], then the defendants could say that events were too fast for them to know that the officers were the police, which argument the court found unpersuasive.  (2T55-14 to 25).  The prosecutor argued that despite previous encounters, in the few seconds in which these events transpired, [...] had insufficient time to process all of the information and to identify which of the three men was [...].
[brief] D.  The Highlands Act and Implementing Regulations are Preempted.  As noted in its initial merits brief, [...] applied for the HAD consistent with FERC’s policy of encouraging cooperation between interstate natural gas companies and state and local agencies.  179 FERC ¶ 61,041 P 87.  However, the Highlands Act regulates within a field occupied by federal regulation, and to the extent the Highlands Act could be used as “an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”, is preempted.  It is well settled that Congress, through the Natural Gas Act, has “occupied the field of matters relating to the wholesale sales and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce. ”  Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 305 (1988)  “[R]egulation of [the] rates and facilities [of natural gas companies is] a field occupied by federal regulation. ”  Id. at 307.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff was never denied due process.  Plaintiff’s opposition to [...]’s motion to dismiss was heard by the Trial Court (Pa0354).  B.  The Trial Court was correct that Plaintiff impermissibly assigned his rights to the legal malpractice lawsuit against [...] (T1 4:6 – 12:4).  C.  The Trial Court correctly held that [...] lacked Standing to bring this Lawsuit (T1 4:6 – 12:4).  D.  Public policy also favors affirming the Trial Court’s dismissal of this action (Issue Not Raised Below).  ## II.  PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL AS TO MOOT  EVIDENTIARY RULINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED  (Issue Not Raised Below)  CONCLUSION  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, | 19 | | 925 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1996) | | | Alexander v. Watson, | 30 | | 128 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1942) | | | Berkowitz v. Haigood, | 21 | | 256 N.J. Super. 342 (1992) | | | City of Camden v. Whitman, | 32 | | 325 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Cole, Shotz, Berstein, Meisel & Forman, P.A. v., Owens, | 23–24 | | 292 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Committee on Legal Ethics of the State Bar v. Sheatsley, | 30–31 | | 452 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1994) | | | Costanzo v. Costanzo, | 21 | | 248 N.J. Super. 116 (1991) | | | Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., | 33 | | 58 N.J. 98 (1971) | | | Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, | 18–19 | | 131 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1974) | | | E. Orange Lumber Co. v. Feiganspan, | 18–19 | | 120 N.J.L. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 124 N.J.L. 127 (E. & A. 1940) | | | Florida Bar v. Wohl, | 30 | | 842 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2003) | | | Goodley v. Wank & Wank, | 27 | | 62 Cal. App. 3d. 389 (2nd Dist. 1976) | | | Granata v. Broderick, | 20 | | 4456 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 2016) affirmed, 231 N.J. 135 (2017) | | Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483 (1993)
[brief] In fact, the record shows that the attorneys for the Plaintiff affirmatively made those misrepresentations to the Family Court for the purpose to have a ground to set aside the PSA and Divorce Judgment.  [...] openly admitted that the representation he made to the court was “misstatement” to Office of Attorney Ethics during investigation after the trial for malpractice was ended.  On or about April 24, 2018, [...] called the jury out of deliberations and specifically gave the decision of [...] to the jury and advised the jury that this transcript was the decision to set aside the judgment in the matter Fou v. Fou and the Appellate Division upheld the decision.
[brief] (Aa2).  DEP also reviewed [...]’s WQMP analysis which followed the Standards for Individual Subsurface Sewage Disposal Systems, N.J.A.C. 7:9A-1.2(a), as the Highlands regulation at N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2(c) requires.  (Aa2).  [...] calculated that the square footage of the proposed office building and control room along with a shower would produce a combined 603.125 gallons per day of wastewater.  (Aa32).  [...] also calculated that its projected peak water use would be 650 gallons per day using one well.  Ibid.  DEP thus found that the Project is consistent with the Northeast WQMP because the Project’s proposed wastewater output will be less than 2,000 gallons per day and will use less than 650 gallons of water per day.  (Aa2).  Appellants [...], [...], and [...] (Appellants) appealed the 2021 HAD, docketed as [...].
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[brief] Thus, the members’ knowledge not spelled out on the record accomplishes nothing.  Moreover, Defendants’ explanation that the Planning Board’s findings of fact are contained in the “whereas” recitals in the Resolution because they reference [...]’s testimony before the Board is simply incorrect.  See Db, p. 30.  As stated at pages 5-6 above in this Reply Brief and in Plaintiff’s initial brief, [...]’s testimony was limited only to the “Objectives” of the Master Plan.  He made no mention of nor any examination of the land use element.  The enabling statute requires a finding that the ordinance is substantially consistent with both the “Objectives” of the Master Plan, as well as the land use element of the Master Plan.  Therefore, [...]’s testimony, which did not examine consistency of the ordinance with the land use element of the Master Plan, was deficient for purposes of satisfying as to what the enabling statute required for a valid enactment of Ordinance 22-1516.  The Defendants’ reliance on the “recital” referencing [...]’s testimony of the ordinance’s consistency with the “Objectives” element of the Master Plan, is not enough to establish the validity of the ordinance.
[brief] On February 27, 2020, the [...] (hereinafter the “Committee”) adopted Resolution 2020-2-6, directing the [...] (hereinafter the “Board”) to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether Block 701, Lot 2.01, known as the former [...] (the “Property”), is an area in need of rehabilitation within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 40A-12A-1 et seq. (Pa22).  On that same date, the Committee adopted Resolution 2020-2-5, authorizing execution of developer’s escrow agreement.  On May 19, 2020, at a public meeting, the Board responded to Resolution 2020-2-6, and determined that the Property qualified as an “Area in Need of Rehabilitation. ” (Pa174).  The Board opened the discussion up to public comment, despite not being required to do so under the law; however, no member of the public spoke as to the potential designation.  (Pa174).  On May 28, 2020, at the public meeting, the Committee accepted the recommendation of the Board and designated the Property as an “Area in Need of Rehabilitation” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A-12A-14.  (Pa188).  On April 27, 2021, the [...] reviewed and approved of the designation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40 A:12A-14(a).  (Pa195).  At that time there was no challenge to the Board’s findings, the Committee’s adoption of Resolution 2020-2-6 or the [...]’s approval of the designation.
[directive] There are three areas where Municipal Court judges and/or authorized Municipal Court Administrators and Deputy Court Administrators will continue to set monetary bail on disorderly persons offenses/petty disorderly persons offenses on or after January 1, 2017.  See N.J.S.A. 2B:12-21c.  Those three areas are as follows:  1.  The defendant was initially arrested on a complaint-warrant or charged on a complaint-summons for a disorderly persons offense/petty disorderly persons offense prior to January 1, 2017 and the defendant later fails to appear in court and is arrested on or after January 1, 2017 for that failure to appear.  This defendant is not an eligible defendant under the Criminal Justice Reform Law.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will continue to apply.  2.  The defendant is initially charged on a complaint-summons for a disorderly persons offense allegedly committed on or after January, 1, 2017 and thereafter fails to appear in court.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will continue to apply.  This defendant is not an eligible defendant under the Criminal Justice Reform Law because the original charge is on a complaint-summons.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiffs/Appellants [...] and [...] appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendant/respondent [...] ("[...]").  This matter arises out of [...]'s alleged slip and fall that occurred in a common area of a multi-use parking lot.  Plaintiff is unsure of the exact condition that caused her to fall, but alleges that she tripped and fell on a crack while walking from her car across the common area of the parking lot towards the restaurant leased by [...].  The area where plaintiff fell was part of the common space of the parking lot, open to any shopper, including the customers and employees of all the local stores and the [...] ("Township").  [...] submits that there is no question that the record on summary judgment and appeal fully supports the Trial Court's decision and the judgment it entered that [...] has no duty to plaintiff.  [...] leases the store from the Township.  [...] is one of a number of stores and other activities in the area that utilize the parking lot.  Under the terms of the Lease, the Township was responsible to maintain the “the structural components of the Property. ”  Regardless, plaintiff fell in an area that was not Leased to [...].  The Township’s Director of Public Works confirmed that the Township controlled and maintained the parking lot and that he knew of no time in which [...] was asked to perform any repairs.  To the contrary, the Township produced evidence of at least three times that they undertook repairs.  At this current time, the parking lot has been ripped up by the Township to make way for a new library.  The Lease, testimony, and other evidence showed that the Township had exclusive control and responsibility for inspection and maintenance of the parking lot.  Under New Jersey law, absent exclusive control, or a contractual obligation to do so, a tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center has no duty to maintain the common areas.  Because the plaintiff fell in a common area of the parking lot that the Township was contractually obligated to maintain, [...] had no duty to maintain the area.  And plaintiff failed to serve a liability expert report to support a claim that defendants deviated from some objective industry standard.  Accordingly, as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot establish that [...] was negligent.  Prior to granting [...]’s motion, the Trial Court had already found as a matter of law that a dangerous condition did not exist.  Plaintiff was required to prove that defendant [...] had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition.  Since the Court found that no dangerous condition existed, it follows then that [...] “could not have actual or constructive notice of a condition that did not exist. ”  For the reasons set forth herein, [...] respectfully requests that the Court affirm the Trial Court’s decision to grant [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 378 (2002) ...............30, 36 Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State, 466 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 2021) aff’d o.b. 250 N.J. 550 (2022)
[brief] 2.  [...]’s terms are not procedurally unconscionable.  Plaintiffs begin their discussion of procedural unconscionability by framing [...]’s terms as a “contract of adhesion” since they were “presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. ” (Pb6).  But the observation that [...]’s terms may “fit the definition of contracts of adhesion is the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. ”  Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 354 (1992).  The court must still “focus on procedural and substantive aspects” of [...]’s terms to “determine whether [they are] so oppressive, or inconsistent with the vindication of public policy, that it would be unconscionable to permit [their] enforcement.
[brief] VOLUME II of III  Decisions cited below by Defendant: Opinion, Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Capital Services, LLC, et al., Dkt. No. [...] (Mar. 8, 2023) .............Pa97  Transcript of Decision, Elshabba v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC, Dkt. No. [...] (Apr. 26, 2023 .................................................................Pa105  Opinion, Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Dkt. No. [...] (Jan. 6, 2023)..............................................Pa143  Opinion, Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Dkt. No. [...] (Apr. 19, 2023)..............................................Pa156  Transcript of Argument and Decision, Mhrez v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC, Dkt. No.  [...] (Dec. 16, 2022)  ...........................................................................Pa162  Order and Opinion, Miller v. Americollect, Inc., Dkt. No. [...] (Aug. 11, 2022)  ..............................................Pa171  Letter Order, Pagan v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Case [...] (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2022)  ..............................................Pa196  Transcript of Argument and Decision, Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc., Dkt. No. [...] ..........................Pa201  OTHER PARTS OF THE RECORD
[brief] § 230-143.1  Regulation of slopes.  It is the purpose of this section to protect the health, safety and welfare of people and property within the [...] from improper construction, building and development on steep slope areas, and more particularly, but without limitation, to reduce the hazards which exist with development in steep slope areas by reason of erosion, siltation, flooding, soil slippage, surface water runoff, pollution of potable water supplies from nonpoint sources, destruction of unique and scenic vistas.
[brief] [...]’s Reasonable Settlement of the HCH Action.  Ohio’s 180-degree reversal of position with respect to the pending appeal left [...] and his co-defendants in an untenable and precarious position.  Pa481 ¶ 28.  Continuing the appeal without Ohio’s support would have exposed [...] to (i) risk of additional liability for attorneys’ fees incurred by the HCH Parties, (ii) risk of liability for statutory judgment interest at 12% under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 41a, and (iii) substantial out-of-pocket defense costs, with no assurance of success on appeal and no assurance of recovery from Ohio irrespective of success on appeal.  *Id.*  On March 10, 2021, [...] and his co-defendants made the painful decision to settle the HCH Action by moving for voluntary dismissal of the appeal and paying all sums that they became legally obligated to pay in the HCH Action.
[brief] [...], Jersey Shores second title expert, testifies as a rebuttal witness.  He points out that Riparian Rights pertain to the ability to acquire a Riparian Grant if you are the upland owner.  Riparian Rights only exist on properties that have been claimed by the State up to the high water mark line.  If someone is the upland owner, he can make an application to the State to buy that property.  Once you have the grant, you are the owner of the property under the water (7T80:16).  He agrees that in this case, [...] acquired the upland by a Sheriff’s Deed, at Book 314, page 150.  Subsequent to acquiring the upland, he also acquired a Riparian Grant, so he owned two separate parcels of land, the upland and the Riparian Grant.  They were contiguous to one another.  When [...] conveyed both of those parcels to [...], it was a parcel of land 26.75 acres which is the upland and then further described together with Riparian Rights as well as the landline under the water of Raritan Bay in front of and adjoining the above premises as are now vested in the party of the first part.
[brief] (3T15:5-16:21).  On August 3, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 2 Order denying its Motion to Dismiss with prejudice and also sought an award of its attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff.  (Pa494-530).  At argument on August 25, 2023, the trial court reconsidered and vacated the June 2 Order.  It dismissed the Complaint, with prejudice, as against [...] for the reasons that it granted [...]’s motion to dismiss on June 9, 2023.
[brief] According to the NHTSA, “[i]f any one of the standardized field sobriety test elements is changed, the validity is compromised. ”  Id.  Experts in the areas of drunk driving apprehension, prosecution, and defense all appear to agree that the reliability of field sobriety test results does indeed turn upon the degree to which police comply with standardized testing procedures.  See, e.g., 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases (3 Ed.1997), Section 10.06 [4]; Cohen & Green, Apprehending and Prosecuting the Drunk Driver: A Manual for Police and Prosecution (1997), Section 4.01.  *State v. Homan*, 732 N.E.2d 952, 955–56.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(e). or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional distress.  [N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b). ]  “Course of conduct” is defined in the stalking statute as repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or about, a person, or interfering with a person’s property; repeatedly committing harassment against a person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
[brief] The determination of the [...] acknowledges that it did not comply with the requirement to provide notice to all members and retirants enrolled in the [...] within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  The final decision notes that on August 8, 2019, an email was sent to the Certifying Officers advising them of their obligations under the Ricci Act.  Pall.  However, no August 8, 2019, email was provided.  A Memorandum to the Certifying Officers was provided with no date other than “August 2019. ”  Pa68.  Even still, this Memorandum was to State Agency Certifying Officers, not to members of the retirement system.  If anything, it is proof that the members of the retirement system could not have possibly been notified within the statutory timeframe, as the Certifying Officers were not even notified within 30 days.
[brief] Ra28  The Mayor’s press release went even further, stating that “As the zoning board votes, eaglets are beginning to hatch on the Millstone River .  . .  Our community needs to stand up in full force against the [...] housing project.  I am proud to lead the charge. ”  M45  The Mayor’s statement in this regard was a complete fabrication - he had no knowledge that any bald eagle eggs were in fact beginning to hatch.  The overall thrust of the Mayor’s statements was that Plaintiffs were not doing what was legally required to protect the bald eagle – our national symbol.