ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The *Strickland* standard applies to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel.  See *State v. Morrison*, 215 N.J. Super. 540, 546 (App. Div.), certif. den. 107 N.J. 642 (1987).  "[I]n applying the *Strickland* standard to assess a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, defendant must show not only was his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard, but also that he was prejudiced, i.e., but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results would have been different.  *Id.* at 546.  In addition to the arguments raised by the petitioner in his pro se brief, it is respectfully requested that the Court consider the following arguments in his P.C.R. appellate attorney's brief.
[brief] At the time of the hearings with regard to arbitrations in this matter, [...] argued both that there was no jurisdiction to hear the matter in arbitration forums and that there was no right of recovery for Medpay benefits in New Jersey.  [...] provided a number of arguments placed before the arbitrator which are currently argued in their Brief and the arbitrator clearly addressed each of the issues as raised by [...] at the time of the hearing.  At the time of the hearing on docket number [...] (Da 130 – 138) the arbitrator was presented with [...]’s objection to jurisdiction and denied their jurisdiction objection and stated:  Denied for Respondent 1 - Affirmative Defense denied.  [...] and [...] Garden State are members of [...] for med pay subrogation dispute resolution.  Membership is voluntary.  Both have voluntary agreed to forgo litigation and have these disputes resolved in [...].  As for the cause of action, there is no statute or reported court decision in New Jersey that has been provided in this matter that states med pay subrogation is barred in New Jersey.
[brief] THE DEFENSE WAS IMPROPERLY BARRED FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT AT OTHER CONTEMPORANEOUS TRAFFIC STOPS -- SPECIFICALLY THAT, AT THOSE STOPS, DEFENDANT OFFERED HIS BUSINESS CARD, AND DID NOT DISPLAY HIS STATE-POLICE WALLET IDENTIFICATION CARD.  THAT EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE  EVIDENCE OF HABIT UNDER N.J.R.E. 406.  (RULING AT 9T 69-18 TO 71-4)  Just before opening statements, the State moved to bar defendant from presenting evidence that, at three other traffic stops around the same time, defendant did not show an official NJSP wallet ID to the officer conducting the stop and instead was released with only a warning upon showing his business card or some other unofficial ID.
[brief] The emails were done with her recognition of her job as per the Major but [...], not understanding, harped on the chain of command (1T; 48:1).  The Plaintiff explained that she was directly ordered by the Major to whom she reported and [...]’s problem with the chain of command did not comprehend that the Major had directed the Plaintiff in connection with assignments (1T; 48:1 to 48:11).  The directions given to the Plaintiff by the Major, she classified as, “My job responsibilities” (1T; 48:19).  When the email problem arose, [...] was still the Major (1T; 49:1).  Plaintiff testified that [...]’s response would have been different if she was a male (1T; 49:10).
[directive] Circumstances When BWC Activation/Use Is Subject to Special Conditions or Restrictions  7.1  Special Restrictions When Recording in Schools, Healthcare/Treatment Facilities, and Places of Worship.  Notwithstanding Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this Policy, and except as otherwise required by Section 5.5, unless the officer is actively engaged in investigating the commission of a criminal offense, or is responding to an emergency, or reasonably believes that he or she will be required to use constructive authority or force, the officer shall not activate a BWC, or shall de-activate a BWC that has been activated, while the officer: 1) is in a school or youth facility or on school or youth facility property under circumstances where minor children would be in view of the BWC; 2) is in a patient care area of a healthcare facility, medical office, or substance abuse treatment facility under circumstances where patients would be in view of the BWC; or 3) is in a place of worship under circumstances where worshipers would be in view of the BWC.
[brief] (Pa30).  [...] contends that the judge handling the matter, Superior Court Judge [...], “bounced” that submission, allegedly “due to retaliation. ”  *Ibid.*  The actual letter from Judge Connor is included in [...]’s appendix.  (Pa134-35).  In that letter, Judge Connor: noted that [...] was not counsel of record for [...] in the criminal matter; indicated that any argument about the judge’s ruling denying PTI was preserved for appeal; observed that none of the eleven criteria under Rule 3:14-1 for a change of venue applied to [...]’s case; and stated that, to the extent [...] contended Judge Connor should disqualify himself, Judge Connor had never heard of [...] or [...] prior to the pending case, knew nothing about [...]’s “history of interactions with Vicinage I” before [...]’s January 2, 2015 letter, and found that nothing [...] stated in his letter would merit the judge’s disqualification.
[brief] The situation may have been different “[h]ad Defendants informed Plaintiff after the filing of the complaint that --- \(^4\) See *Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp.*, 183 N.J. Super. 36, 39 (App. Div. 1982), cert den., 81 N.J. 233 (1982).  the notice was deficient” whereupon plaintiff might “still have had time apply for permission to file a late notice of claim.
[brief] 42  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGES | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Carlisle v. Cooper, 21 N.J. Eq. 576 (E&A 1870) | 23 | | Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1867) | 22 | | Deluca v. Melin, 103 N.J.L. 140 (E&A 1926) | 22 | | Devins v. Borough of Bogata, 124 N.J. 570 (N.J. 1991) | 16 | | Foulkes v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527 (E&A 1879) | 20 | | Leach v. Anderl, 218 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 5/28/1987) | 20 | | Maggio v. Pruzansky, 222 N.J. Super. 567 (App. Div. 2/18/1988) | 17,25,26 | | Mannilo v. Gorski, 100 N.J. Super. 140 (1968) | 17 | | O’Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478 (1980) | 16 | | Patton v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n., | | | 93 N.J. 180 (1983) | 16,17,23,24 | | Plaza v. Flak, 7 N.J. 215 (5/28/1951) | 21,22 | | Poulos v. Dover Boiler and Plate Fabrication, | 22,23 | | 5 N.J. 580 (1950) | | | PPG Indus. v. J. Goldenberg, 2017 N.J. Super. UNPUB.
[brief] On July 10, 2023, following the denial of his motion, defendant pleaded guilty to Count 2 of the Indictment.  (Ra1-6).  In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend that defendant be sentenced in the second-degree range, and to dismiss the other charges against him.  Ibid.  On October 13, 2023, defendant appeared before the sentencing court.  (3T).  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to a flat term of seven years in New Jersey State Prison, and dismissed the balance of the charges in the Indictment.  (3T24-10 to 20).  Following the pronouncement of his sentence, defendant moved the trial court for bail pending appeal and sought --- 1
[directive] in a in 2.  Property which the establishes by preponderance of owner the or evidence that owner was not involved aware of the unlawful the in, activity and that the owner had done all that could reasonably be expected to prevent proscribed use of the property by an agent, shall not be subject to forfeiture.  3.  in which owner a Property the has entrusted to person for repairs, or restoration other services to be performed on the property, and that . person, without the owner's knowledge or consent, uses the property for unlawful purposes, shall not be subject to forfeiture.
[brief] It is the nature of the claims brought, and not the nature of the damages sought, that is dispositive of whether the PLA precludes the separate causes of action.  In other words, the PLA will not bar the CFA claim alleging express or affirmative misrepresentations.  Sun Chemical Corp. v. [...], 243 N.J. 319, 325 (2020) (emphasis).  In *Sun*, plaintiff purchased a fire suppression system from [...] to prevent explosions in its dust collection system.
[brief] *Robins, supra, 23 N.J. at 241; Costello v. Ocean Cnty. Observer*, 136 N.J. 594, 605 (1994) (calling summary judgment an “important tool for disposing of non-meritorious ... lawsuits”).  A genuine issue of material fact in opposition to summary judgment must be shown by “affidavits” or other “competent proof,” and not “by oral argument or briefs filed with the court, neither of which are verified. ”  *Raday v. Bd. of Ed. of Manville*, 130 N.J. Super. 552, 556 (App. Div. 1974).  Also, “mere allegations in the pleadings without affidavit or other evidentiary support may not prevent the rendering of the judgment. ”  *N.J. Mortg. & Inv. Corp. v. Calvetti*, 68 N.J. Super. 18, 25 (App. Div. 1961).  As the Supreme Court has instructed, “if [the opposing] party offers ‘fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious allegations of fact in support of the claim,’ the court is justified in granting summary judgment. ”  *Maher v. N.J. Transit R.O.*, 125 N.J. 455, 477-78 (1991) (citing *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954)).  In an appeal of an order granting summary judgment, appellate courts employ the same standard of review that governs the trial court.
[brief] (2T 85-3 to 5)  [...], a forensic scientist with the [...] ([...]), testified that rectal swabs taken from defendant were positive for sperm cells, but that no rectal swabs were taken from [...].  (3T 18-8 to 9; 3T 27-16 to 24)  Lane further testified that no knife was submitted for testing, and neither were swabs taken of defendant’s belt buckle, nor from the linens from Demko’s bedroom.  (3T 24-24 to 26-22; 3T 28-22 to 29-4)  [...], another forensic scientist with the [...], testified that: DNA found on defendant’s left hand is a mix of defendant’s and [...]’s (3T 40-7 to 19); DNA from defendant’s jeans is from Demko (3T 44-25 to 45-2); and DNA from defendant’s rectal swab is Demko’s.
[brief] For example, if a public school district violates the Open Public Records Act, the “Proceeding to challenge access denial” statute under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 expressly authorizes a private cause of action to sue a public school district in Superior Court.  If a plaintiff is the victim of a tort, the Legislature provided the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq., to prescribe how a victim can sue for damages against a public school district in Superior Court.  For employment discrimination claims against a public school district, the Legislature expressly provided the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq., to allow an aggrieved employee to sue a public school district in Superior Court.  But no similar statutes exist here.  While the Legislature is generally descriptive and prescriptive when it comes to who, what, where, when, why, and how sovereign --- 34 R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 272-73 (2001), quoting Jalowiecki v. Leuc, 182 N.J. Super. 22, 30 (App. Div. 1981) public entities may be sued in Superior Court, *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9 is wholly devoid of any language to infer an implied private right to a cause of action allowing [...] to sue [...] in Superior Court over alleged violations of *N.J.S.A.*
[brief] We declined to dismiss the appeal as moot because the defendant claimed, "the principal indebtedness was miscalculated" and the defendant had, in fact, paid the pay-off amount "under protest and without waiver of any of [its] rights and/or remedies."  Id. at 99, 101 (alteration in original).  Thus, we determined "unresolved issues yet exist as to the final judgment" that remained unaffected by the satisfaction of the mortgage.
[brief] Plaintiff Fails to Address or Properly Rebut the Basis of [...]’ Argument Under the FRFPA (34a (cross-appeal)).  Once again, Plaintiff misapprehends the basis the [...] asserts under the Foreclosure Rescue Fraud Prevention Act (“FRFPA”): that the Plaintiff’s claims are unsustainable as a matter of law in light of the long-established legal principle that a court cannot enforce an illegal contract.
[brief] 3.  Pursuant to the foregoing legal principles, the trial court committed an error of law by refusing to mold the judgment against [...] in accordance with Burt, and the judgment order must be reversed.  Both this Court and the Supreme Court have distinguished, rather than disavowed or overruled, Burt.  The Supreme Court has never cast doubt on the continuing viability of Burt.  Subsequent panels of the Appellate Division were not obligated to adhere to Burt and could have repudiated it; panel decisions are not binding on other panels.  See David v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 360 N.J. Super. 127, 142 (App. Div. 2003).
[directive] Other Provisions  A.  Supersession.  This Amended Directive supersedes the following: the “Directive Revising Procedures for Retaining Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence (SAFE) ‘Hold’ Kits and Extending the Time for Victims to Decide Whether to Report the Crime and Release Collected Forensic Evidence to Law Enforcement Authorities,” dated July 10, 2014; Directive 2023-1, “Procedures and Guidelines for Law Enforcement Testing, Tracking, Storage, Retention, and Destruction of Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) Kits, issued March 13, 2023, and any reference to “Five-Year Hold Kits” in the Attorney General Standards for Providing Services to Victims of Sexual Assault, 3rd Edition, November 2018.. parties.
[brief] Table of Contents  Table of Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………..ii  Procedural History……………………………………………………………………………1  Table of Appendix  Stipulation of dismissal of [...]’ cross-claim against [...], filed with the lower court on March 29, 2023……………………………………………………………1a  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  [...]  (“[...]”) defers largely to the procedural history summarized by [...] Indemnity Company of America (“[...]”) in its brief.  However, [...] notes that while the various parties’ respective motions for summary judgment were pending in the lower court, [...] agreed to dismiss its cross-claim against [...].  See stipulation of dismissal, filed with the lower court on March 29, 2023, attached as 1a.  As such, the [...] appeal does not apply to [...], and there is nothing this Court needs to consider or decide between [...] and [...].  Respectfully submitted: /s/ [...]  [...] ID No.: 021731998  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant [...]  Dated: February 22, 2024  1  For the reasons stated, the [...] appeal does not apply to [...], and therefore there is actually no need for [...] to even file this Brief.  [...] is doing so to ensure the panel takes note of this relevant procedural history, but there is nothing beyond that procedural history that needs to be addressed in this Brief.  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] On March 4, 2020, Plaintiffs instituted their 2020 Lawsuit by filing a Complaint against the same set of Defendants and asserting factual allegations and claims arising out of the same series of transactions involving the same parcels of land -- namely, the [...] (the “2020 Lawsuit”).  (1a)  This “new” Complaint directly tracked the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint and the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint in the 2015 Lawsuit.  Plaintiffs also included three (3) “new” claims for “fraudulent concealment” against all Defendants based on their alleged failure to disclose, during discovery in the 2015 Lawsuit, that “Defendant [...] was the sole member of Defendant [...] and that Defendants [...] and [...] controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity.
[directive] Step 1:  Pretrial Services Program (PSP) staff receives an emergent alert via automated text message/call from the monitoring vendor.  a.  PSP staff shall check the electronic monitoring vendor’s automated system and determine whether the defendant is located outside of an inclusion zone, within an exclusion zone, or there has been a tamper alert or tracker missed callback alert, by reviewing recent location tracking information and monitoring profile.  b.  PSP staff shall confirm that the monitoring system is accurate by ensuring that the alert was not the result of the defendant accidentally driving through an exclusion zone via a public highway or thoroughfare, stepping in and out of a zone or that the defendant’s GPS location is a “float point”, or ensure that a tracker missed callback alert was received after a low battery alert, evidencing that the unit was allowed to fully discharge.  c.  If PSP staff determine, upon investigation, that the system produced a false alert, PSP staff shall document the incident in the defendant’s Pretrial Management (PTM) case notes.  If PSP staff determine, upon investigation, that the system produced a true alert, then proceed to Step 2.  Step 2:  Once satisfied that the defendant is, or was recently, outside of an inclusion zone, or inside of an exclusion zone, or that there was a tamper alert, or a tracker missed callback, PSP staff shall call law enforcement to respond to the defendant’s last known location or where the tamper alert occurred.  1  This general alert category includes both the inclusion zone leave alert and failed to enter inclusion zone alert.  Revised Protocol Promulgated by Directive 18-23 (October 10, 2023)
[brief] *Ibid.* (quoting *State v. Winter*, 96 N.J. 640, 647 (1982)).  Courts cannot “assume compliance with an instruction that fails to clearly and sharply address the prejudicial aspect of the inadmissible evidence. ”  *Id.* at 508.  First, the nature of the evidence, viewed in context of the State’s weak case, made the curative instruction unlikely to be effective.
[brief] .................................................................  31  Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward ............  11  RULES  N.J.R.E. 403 ..........................................................................................................................  45  N.J.R.E. 404(b) .......................................................................................................................  45, 47 N.J.R.E. 702 ..........................................................................................................................  8, 21 N.J.R.E. 703 ..........................................................................................................................  15, 16, 17 R. 2:10-2 ..................................................................................................................................8, 30, 45
[brief] [...], Esquire (#117042014)  [...]  136 Franklin Corner Road, Unit B2 Lawrenceville, New Jersey  08648 [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS .................................................. iii  TABLE OF CITATIONS ........................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................  4  A.  Factual Background ...........................................................................  4  B.  Denial of plaintiffs’ oral motion for reconsideration at trial.  ..............  9  C.  Trial was completed based upon this understanding.  .......................  11  D.  Opinion and decisions of the trial court.  ..........................................  15  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................
[brief] In 2006, Plaintiff successfully filed an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, against the Borough, and others, under Docket No.  [...] alleging, among other things, that the Borough was in violation of its constitutional obligation to provide a reasonable opportunity for its fair share of “Mt. Laurel” housing to be constructed in the town.  (“Mt. Laurel Action”).  (Pa 109).  The Court in that action found the Borough in violation of its obligation under the New Jersey Constitution and Fair Housing Act of 1985 to adequately create sufficient realistic opportunities for low and moderate income housing to satisfy its fair share of the unmet regional needs and entered an Order for Municipal Compliance on January 18, 2012 – over twelve years ago.  (Pa 109).  The Borough has not obtained a Judgment of Compliance from the Court determining that the Borough has complied with the 2012 Order for Municipal Compliance.  Up until the latest 2022 amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, embodied in the Second Ordinance, it has been the Borough’s stated plan to effect compliance with the 2012 Order for Municipal Compliance through a 350 unit residential development, with a set aside of 70 low and moderate income residential units, and a small commercial component to be built on the Property.  (Pa 5).  The plan also included an approximately 50 foot wide linear strip “greenway” running along the bank of Mill Pond to be sold to the [...].  (Pa 5).  This plan for redevelopment is referred to in this brief as the “[...]. ”  A copy of the plan depicting the [...] is can be found in Appellant’s Appendix at Pa 5.  D.
[brief] The Grant shows the lands which were granted to [...].  This description coincides with what is shown on the Tax Map of the [...] dated 1980 (Pa201) (1T41:20).  May 10, 1879, Liber E. Page 82 contains the description of the [...] Grant with a width of 330 feet and a depth of 2,280 feet.  This is identified as a Grant made to William J. [...] reflected on the Tax Map (1T42:16-43:8) (Pa669).  There is no other map produced by Keansburg or otherwise which reflects ownership in the Riparian Grant area other than ownership to [...] (1T44:6-11).  He further confirms that in 1935, when Keansburg alleges that it acquired title to this property through a foreclosure proceeding, it should have been part of a parcel larger tract and given a Lot and Block number (1T45:4).  [...] testifies that [...] was the first and only grantee to acquire title from the State for the Riparian lands.  (1T45:25).  He explains the difference between Riparian Grants and Riparian Rights which is set forth in the decision Panetta v. Equity One, Inc., 190 N.J. 307 (2007):
[brief] ”  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 169 N.J. 135, 157 (2001) (quotations omitted).  Laches may be "invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party."  Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003).  The doctrine " may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned."  Id. at 181.
[brief] Specifically, the Trial Court relied upon N.J.S.A. 55:19-81, which provided criteria to determine when a property may be considered “abandoned. ” (T3, 50:14-51:11).  A definition for determining abandonment of a property is not helpful for determining whether a property’s commercial use has been discontinued.  This is because abandonment is a separate consideration under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b).  Under criterion (b), a property can be designated a redevelopment area if: (1) there has been a discontinuance of the use of the buildings for commercial purposes; or (2) there has been abandonment of such buildings.