[brief] As reflected in the Parties’ initial submissions, Appellant, [...] a/k/a [...] (“[...]”), and Defendant, [...] (“[...]”) generally agree about the facts of this matter and the controlling law.  There is, however, a significant difference of opinion as to the meaning and relevance of various facts under the controlling law.  As to the application of the controlling law to the facts, [...] does so in a rigid, mechanical fashion with the focus solely on the actions of [...] and without any recognition that the actions of [...] are relevant as well.  [...]’s analysis, on the other hand, is more nuanced because it considers the totality of the circumstances, as is required by the controlling law, and considers the actions of both Parties in the lead-up to [...]’s demand that this matter be submitted to arbitration.  The issue presented in this matter is whether [...] waived his right to arbitration.  A conclusion that [...] waived his right to have this contractual dispute submitted to arbitration must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily intended to relinquish that right.  Our Supreme Court has instructed that various factors be considered in order to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, it can be said that there is clear and convincing evidence that a party waived their right to seek arbitration.  If the totality of the circumstances is to be considered, then the actions of the party who allegedly waived a right to arbitration cannot be considered in a vacuum.  Rather, the actions of both parties must be considered.  [...], has not done that.  Rather, [...]’s basic position, as argued in its brief, is that [...] waived his right to arbitration because, having been sued by [...], he participated in the litigation process and then waited too long to demand arbitration.  In its brief, [...] failed to consider the fact that it ignored the mandatory arbitration provision in the very contract that it seeks to enforce and, instead of first demanding arbitration, it simply sued [...].  [...] now seeks to be rewarded for ignoring the contract and utilizing the litigation process to the disadvantage of [...] who, for the bulk of this litigation, was a pro se litigant.  Those facts, along with others discussed below, are relevant if the totality of the circumstances are examined, as they must be examined.  Although such facts were ignored by [...] in its brief, they are pertinent to a full analysis of this matter.  Stated differently, [...]’s rigid, robotic analysis of [...]’s actions in a vacuum is fatally flawed and when [...]’s actions are incorporated into the analytical matrix, then it becomes evident that [...] has not waived his right his right to arbitration meaning that [...]’s argument and the Trial Court’s finding to the contrary are clearly erroneous.  In addition to the foregoing, it noted that in its brief [...] argued that [...] is equitably estopped from demanding arbitration.  Such an argument should have been raised by a cross-appeal.  No such cross-appeal was filed and, therefore, this Court should not consider [...]’s equitable estoppel argument.  Should this Court nonetheless considered [...]’s position in that regard, then for the reasons discussed below, this Court should find that the argument is without merit.