ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Regulation 8463, issued by Appellants to interpret and to implement the Revised Policy, makes this connection even clearer.  Regulation 8463 includes a list of policies that it specifically understands to “require parental notification about matters affecting the health and/or safety of their children,” and identifies the Revised Policy in that list—a list that again includes policies concerning substance abuse, firearms offenses, and suspected gang activity.  (Da112).  The District’s decision to include Policy 5756 as part of Regulation 8463’s regime provides further evidence of the discriminatory nature of the Revised Policy, carried forward from the Original Policy.
[brief] The Trial Court acted soundly within its discretion in imposing what ended up becoming a two-step remedy, first ordering specific performance, and, when two separate sessions of settlement conferences failed, imposing the reformation remedy it first referenced in the June 30, 2022 Order to make [...] whole.  In other words, having had the benefit of discovery, a trial, and post-trial submissions, the trial court was best positioned to determine credibility, see the entire picture, and determine an equitable resolution of this dispute.  This Court should not disturb the Trial Court’s well-reasoned decisions.
[brief] *Id.*  In the present action, the Appellant testified that he was aware of precipitation and weather concerns including puddling or ponding of water.  He testified that he had not experienced any issues with controlling the vehicle or breaking until immediately before the subject accident.  Notably, [...] testified that his vehicle hydroplaned.  Thus, the Appellant’s testimony and the record before the court established all the elements necessary for the Mockler defense and the appropriate charge should have been given.  Failure to provide the charge improperly reduced the Plaintiff/Respondent’s burden and eliminated the Defendant/Appellant’s viable defense.  The court below erred in declining to provide the Mockler charge.  A new trial is warranted.
[brief] Citations Are Legally Deficient | 6 | | II.  Complaint Was Not Time Barred By *Statutes of Limitations* | 7 | | III.  Denial Of Reconsideration Was A Harmful Error | 10 | | IV.  Denial Of Recusal Was A Harmful Error | 12 | | V.  Relief Sought Via Appeal Has Not Been Granted | 14 | | VI.  Appellant’s Arguments Do Address The Issue | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15 |
[brief] B)  The creation of a contract via the prize offer for my paid tournament entry  The trial court held that my paid entry into the Defendants’ tournament, which offered me the possibility of winning one or more prizes, did not create a contract.  This ruling of law was plainly stated by the trial court near the end of the trial:  THE COURT: “This is not a common law contract. ”  (1T20:25)  However, as argued in my opening / principal brief, and as the Respondents yet again do not even attempt to refute, and further as the Respondents actually more or less concede to (e.g. see Db15), this ruling of law was unquestionably in error.
[brief] G. [...] and [...]  Commence the Instant Litigation  On March 27, 2023, [...] and [...] filed the Complaint in this action.  (Pa14 – Pa32).  In their Complaint, [...] and [...] assert two causes of action: (i) abuse of process (count one); and (ii) malicious use of process (count two).  (Id.).  Undeniably, neither [...] nor [...] asserted a claim in the Prior Litigation for malicious use of process.  (Compare Pa14 – Pa32 with Pa51 – Pa101).  The instant lawsuit was filed more than sixty (60) days following the Nacirema Arbitration.  Nonetheless, the Consent Order has no effect upon the instant action, except to state that [...] is not constrained in the defenses he may assert to the Complaint.  Indeed, the Consent Order lacks any provision stating that future claims are automatically barred, if brought more than sixty (60) days after the completion of the Nacirema Arbitration.  (Pa150 – Pa152).  In light of the clear language of the Consent Order, along with the irrefutable fact that nothing in the consent order bars claims brought more than sixty (60) days after the completion of the Nacirema Arbitration, [...] should not be permitted to escape liability for his clear and unabashed perversion of the judicial system.
[brief] THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION IS NOT RIPE FOR THIS COURT’S REVIEW.  (2T at 27)  Plaintiff spends roughly half of his initial brief preemptively responding to [...]’s arguments below seeking to exclude Plaintiff’s expert’s causation opinions, and corresponding argument that, without expert testimony, Plaintiff has no other evidence to meet the essential element of causation.  For example, Plaintiff challenges [...]’s arguments below that Plaintiff’s experts had not engaged in the necessary analysis to offer reliable and admissible opinions as to \(^9\)  While the trial court did not rule on this issue, it is settled law that a judgment may be affirmed if it is supported by the record, even if the reasons for affirmance differ from those given by the trial court.  *Hayes v. Delamotte*, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018).  whether [...] would have overcome LKAS with her steering torque; whether [...] would have even turned on LKAS or LDW on the day of the crash; and whether LDW would have had any effect on [...]’s driving at the time of the crash.  Pb at 22-30.  Without that evidence, [...] argued, Plaintiff’s case was based on speculation.  While [...] stands by those positions, none of these issues can be properly resolved for the first time on appeal.  To start, New Jersey has been clear that, the trial court’s “gatekeeping role” when evaluating a motion to exclude expert testimony is “rigorous” and “difficult,” involving a thorough analysis of the methodology and basis for expert opinions.  See In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 390 (2018).  The appellate court’s role, by contrast, involves reviewing the trial court’s analysis for an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 390-91.  Because the trial court has not yet conducted its analysis of the admissibility of the experts’ testimony, there is nothing yet for this Court to review.  Beyond that, pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(c), the trial court is required to provide its findings and conclusions of law when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.  Here, the trial court’s reasoning was based upon its conclusions regarding defect.  The trial court did not rule on the merits of [...]’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s experts’ causation opinions and, in fact, expressly denied that motion as moot.  As such, the issue of causation is simply undeveloped in the record.  If the Court were to reverse the trial court order as to defect, which it should not do, then it would be appropriate to remand to allow the trial court to consider [...]’s expert challenges together with its motion for summary judgment as to causation.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (2016) (con’t)  ………………………………Da 485-579  Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners, AFTE Theory of Identification  As it Relates to Toolmarks  …………………Da 580  National Research Council, Ballistics Imaging (2008)  …………………Da 581-734  Volume 4 National Research Council, Ballistics Imaging (2008) (con’t)
[brief] Detectives both failed to answer [...]’s questions and failed to clarify whether he wished to invoke.  In response to four different questions from [...] about the type of counsel he would be provided, [...] said that he did not know the answer.  If [...] did not know the answer to the questions -- which were of clear concern to [...] as he considered whether to agree to speak to police --, then he should have paused the interview and contacted the prosecutor’s office to obtain accurate information about the counsel that would be made available to [...] if he were to invoke.  [...] should have made clear that, even if an attorney was not immediately available, detectives would have to cease questioning until such an attorney was present if [...] requested.  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.  After sharing this information, [...] should have clarified if [...] wished to invoke.  Gonzalez, 249 N.J. at 631.  Instead, by repeatedly expressing ignorance in response to [...]’s questions about the type of counsel available and failing to clarify if he was seeking to invoke, the detectives communicated to [...] that clarification about the type of counsel available was not forthcoming, discouraging him from exercising his right to counsel.  Because detectives barreled ahead in asking [...] to waive his rights without answering his questions about the availability of counsel or clarifying if he wished to invoke, the State cannot carry its “heavy burden” of establishing that [...] “knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.
[brief] That is, the Court accepted Probation’s claim of lacking records, ignored Probation’s improper fabrication of support arrearage and its denial of credits due Appellant by the Order of 3/25/2004, failed to consider probative, substantive evidence of evidence of Appellant’s overpayment for the period in question, but unfathomably found Probation to have complied with the Order of 1/11/2022 even though $54,500 in direct payments to Respondent were missing from the “accounting. ”
[brief] ______________________________________________________________  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page No.: | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Table of Authorities | i | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Concise Statement of Facts and Procedural History | 4 | | The Order to Show Cause and Motion to Vacate Default Judgment | 8 | | Plaintiff’s sale of the property | 10 | | The process server | 10 | | GPS expert | 13 | | [...] of [...] | 15 | | Additional Facts and Stipulations Relevant to This Case | 15 | | Recitation of Stipulated Facts as to Plaintiff’s Close Relationship with the Intervenors.
[directive] MANDATORY  12-HOUR IMPOUNDMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES  Under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23e, the law enforcement agency is authorized, to retain custody of the vehicle until the fee for towing and storage is paid.  However, each law enforcement agency may need to consult with its legal advisor concerning to whom and where the payment of the “reasonable fee for towing and storage of the vehicle” are to be made.
[brief] A.  New Jersey law favors arbitration.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that “Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), also known as the United States Arbitration Act, in 1925, to abrogate the then-existing common law rule disfavoring arbitration agreements ‘and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. ’”  *Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, 83–84 (2002) (quoting *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 500 U.S. 20, 24, (1991)).  Section 2 of the FAA provides that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such a contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ”  *Id.* (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).  In enacting section 2 of the FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. ”  *Id.* (citing *Southland Corp. v. Keating*, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).  These principles and the FAA’s coverage applies to employment-related disputes.  *Id.* (citing *Circuit City Stores v. Adams*, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)).  Consistently, “[t]he New Jersey Legislature codified its endorsement of arbitration agreements in N.J.S.A. 2A:24–1 to –11,” and “New Jersey courts also have favored arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. ”  *Id.* at 84–85 (citing *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs.*, 168 N.J. 124, 131, (2001) (noting favored status accorded to arbitration); *Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc.*, 134 N.J. 275, 281 (1993) (noting “arbitration is a favored form of relief” and “arbitrators function with the support, encouragement, and enforcement power of the State”); *Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri–County Asphalt Corp.*, 86 N.J. 179, 186 (1981) (stating that Legislature has encouraged arbitration and courts have favored arbitration because of significant advantages arbitration offers to parties); *Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v.  Galarza*, 306 N.J. Super. 384, 389 (App. Div. 1997) (recognizing “strong public policy in our state favoring arbitration as a means of dispute resolution and requiring a liberal construction of contracts in favor of arbitration”); *Yale Materials Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys., Inc.*, 240 N.J. Super. 370, 375 (App. Div. 1990) (reiterating that “New Jersey law [is] consonant with federal law which liberally enforces arbitration agreements”).  The trial court relied on well-recognized national policy and the established State interest favoring arbitration when it determined the enforceability of the Agreement in this application for employment.
[brief] Arrest is a program or activity of the relevant government unit at least in a situation, as here, in which there are no emergencies.  [...] created an emergency but initially dealt with it effectively.  Then they kidnapped [...] from the PIP doctors.  The most recent similar case I have found is Mohney v. Pennsylvania, 809 F.Supp.2d 384, 400-402 (W.D.Pa. 2011) (At end of opinion: “The Court concludes that an ADA/RA claim is theoretically possible under a law enforcement encounter scenario. ”).  Mr. Mohney had failed to plead qualified disability and request for accommodation or that the police knew he was mentally disabled – still the judge let him replead.  I pleaded [...] was disabled, it’s affected his learning and reading, and that he has sub-normal intelligence.  I noted that for over a decade, the police have known [...] is disabled.  A lawyer is a particularly necessary accommodation for people with mental disabilities.  Under Lane v. Tennessee, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (paraplegic criminal defendant had to crawl up stairs to second floor courtroom; on second appearance, he refused and was arrested), a lawyer was a necessity for [...]’s proper police processing just as much as an elevator was needed for Mr. Lane.
[brief] Finally, the State has not demonstrated that transgender-identifying students will suffer harm due to the Parental Notification Policy.  The State argues that notifying parents can result in parents harming their children, ACa81–82, but, again, presuming that parents will harm their children based on nothing more than the child’s request to be socially transitioned in secret is constitutionally prohibited.  In any event, the Parental Notification Policy has an exception for the situation where parents are likely to harm their children, so the Parental Notification Policy adequately accounts for that concern.
[brief] ## Rules and Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 2A:28, et seq.** ...........................................................  *passim* - **N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1** ...........................................................................  *passim* - **N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2**  ...........................................................................  .*passim* - **N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3** ...........................................................................  .*passim* - **N.J.S.A. 2A:62–1**  ...........................................................................  21  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 91 N.J. at 148.  But here, time for study was not available because the bills were not posted online.  (Pa66 at ¶¶7, 9; Pa100 at ¶ 11; Pa103 at ¶ 21.)  The legislators did not even obtain the bill text until after the adjournment of the legislative session on January 6, 2022 – the day that the State contends the first and second readings occurred.  (Pa274 at 6:11-21; Pa256.)
[directive] This Directive reissues the Certification Application for Appointment of a Private Prosecutor and supersedes Attachment 3 of Directive #13-05 that was previously promulgated.  No changes have been made to this form.  English and English-Spanish versions of the form are included.  The form also will be posted separately on the forms page of the Judiciary Internet website at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/forms.htm.  Any questions or comments regarding this Directive, or the appended form, may be directed to Assistant Director [...], Esq., at (609) 292-4638.  Attachment cc: Chief Justice [...]  Trial Court Administrators  Attorney General [...]  Criminal Division Managers Public Defender [...]  [...], Esq., Special County Prosecutors Assistant [...], DCJ Director [...], Esq.  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  [...] Regional Deputy Public Defenders [...], Esq.
[brief] Similarly, Appellants’ arguments related to [...]’s Executive Order 100 (“EO100”) and [...] Commissioner [...]’s Administrative Order 2020-01 (“AO1”).  Appellants claim, without citing any case law, that EO100 and AO1 have the force of law and are binding on [...]’s permitting decision in issuing the HAD to [...].  See Asb 13.  These orders have no bearing on [...]’s HAD application as they merely required, among other things, [...] to amend its regulations to incorporate climate change considerations into its various permitting processes.
[brief] The Bidder is an individual, firm or corporation submitting a bid for the advertised Work.  The Department will not accept bids from Bidders who fail to meet all of the following criteria:  1.  The Bidder has been prequalified according to regulations covering the Classification of Prospective Bidders as required by N.J.S.A. 27:7-35.1, et seq. 3.  At the time the bid is delivered, the Bidder has an effective maximum and project rating of not less than the amount of its bid.  The work to be completed by the prospective bidder must exceed 50% of the value of the contract and the bidder must have submitted the corresponding proper NJDOT notice of classification for prequalification of any work items to be performed by the bidder.  102.10
[brief] [Pa3395]  In the letter, [...]’s counsel notified [...] that [...] intended to file an application for sanctions pursuant to R. 1:4-8(b) in the event the Motion was not timely withdrawn.  [Pa3395]  [...]’s counsel followed up with a phone call and e-mail request that the Motion be withdrawn.  [Pa3392, Pa3397]  [...] did not respond, and Appellants’ Motion was not withdrawn.  As a result, on March 24, 2022, in addition to opposing the Motion, [...] filed a Cross-Motion for Sanctions against Appellants and [...] (the “Cross-Motion”).
[brief] Plaintiffs Were Allowed to Argue That an Intentional Battery Can Support a Negligence Claim.  Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted “[b]attery is not even in the case. ”  [3T 16:1; 10T 13:24-14:13].  He then proceeded to explain [...]’s version of events on opening, describing a battery.  [4T 25:5-21].  However, he characterized [...]’s conduct as negligence.  [4T 31:1-22; 32:9-22].  “An ordinary person would not have done what Mr. [...] did in hitting [...] in this case. ”  [4T 31:20-22].  At the charge conference, the judge did not charge battery against [...], but in describing how [...] could recover under his version of events, explained “the negligence [of [...]] is he’s got a duty of care toward Mr. [...] not to harm him or cause him injury.  So the traditional elements of negligence are going to apply here. ”  [10T 16:5-11].  On closing, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued [...]’s intentional punch was negligence and argued the lack of a battery charge was immaterial to the jury’s deliberations on vicarious liability.  [11T 131:11-133:2].  E.
[brief] The Open Public Meetings Act (“OPMA”), N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 et seq., makes no such demand.  “…[T]he robustness of a debate on a particular item discussed in public session is not a topic addressed in the OPMA. ”  Kean Fed'n of Teachers v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 588 (2018).  The statutes governing adoption of ordinances and redevelopment plans do not require discussion or debate among the voting members, robust or otherwise.
[directive] (e) the level of resistance of the individuals(s) involved; (f) whether immediate resolution is necessary; (g) the application of any pain compliance technique shall be immediately discontinued once the officer determines that compliance has been achieved or other more appropriate alternatives can reasonably be utilized; and (h) officers shall only use striking techniques directed at a subject’s face as a means of self-defense, or in the defense of others.  Striking at a subject’s face using fists, elbows, knees, and feet, shall not be used as a means of pain compliance.  3.6
[directive] To on Bureau Appellate Justice's Criminal of Division the with consult and notify shall Prosecutors the to relating appeals final interlocutory and all and challenges, and issues legal significant  Bail the amended, Constitution as Jersey New of the 11 paragraph I, Article of interpretation Law.  Reform Bail the implement that Rules Court the and Reform Law, Directive.  this of issuance immediately upon operational become shall Section This Bank.  Brief 13.2  County all to available make maintain, and collect, shall Justice Criminal of Division  The implementation interpretation and relating the to papers motion and briefs selected Prosecutors and Law, Reform Bail the amended, Constitution as Jersey New 11 the of paragraph I, Article of Law.  Reform Bail the implement Rules that Court the Directive.  this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This Page 79  ADVOCACY PROFICIENT
[brief] BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT  [...], a/k/a [...]  [...] [...]  ID#244421968  [...] [...]  Email: [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant  Jersey Shore Beach and Boardwalk Company, Inc.  a/k/a Jersey Shore Beach & Boardwalk Inc.  Dated: April 16, 2024  JERSEY SHORE BEACH AND BOARDWALK, INC.  A/K/A JERSEY SHORE BEACH & BOARDWALK, INC.  VS. [...], A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION  DOCKET NO. [...]  AMENDED
[brief] The jury’s award of economic loss damages is against the weight of evidence presented at trial.  The evidence presented at trial does not establish that Plaintiff suffered economic loss based on her disability.  3T:3:1-25—55:1-25.  More specifically, Plaintiff’s factual allegation pleaded in her Complaint states that the municipal alliance grant stipend was taken away from her because of her religion; not on the basis of any alleged anxiety disability.  DA001-DA006.  Similarly, Plaintiff’s certified Answers to Interrogatories and her deposition testimony both frame her allegation that the municipal alliance grant stipend was taken away from her because she was Jewish.  DA020-DA046; Pltf. T:133:12-25-134:1-25; Pltf. T:147:14-25;148:1-25).  Neither her certified Answers to Interrogatories nor her deposition testimony allege any facts that the municipal alliance grant stipend was taken away from her because she suffered from an alleged anxiety disability.  Further, Plaintiff’s misleading trial testimony tying her allegation concerning the taking away of the municipal alliance grant stipend and her claims for hostile work environment based on disability discrimination and LAD Retaliation also warrants granting the [...]’ motion for new trial.  Accordingly, the jury’s verdict awarding economic loss damages is against the weight of the evidence and should be set aside.  c.