ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (21T 25-18 to 26-9)  At that point, the jury returned to its deliberations, and defense counsel again raised the prospect that time was getting tight before three jurors’ vacations, but the judge said she was “not going to engage in speculation” about the duration of the deliberations to come.  (21T 26-21 to 29-19)  At 3:56 p.m., while the jury was still deliberating after the first deadlock, defense counsel indicated to the court that he had learned from the judge’s “assistant” that two jurors (of 13) still had a planned vacation the next day and that he was concerned that the jurors “are going to rush to get a verdict to get on their plane,” but the judge again refused “to speculate”; however she said she would “check in with the jurors” at “around 4:30” p.m. “and we will go from there.
[directive] Accordingly, this plea negotiation system continues the policy established in earlier Attorney General directives to allow a downward “departure” where the defendant is able and willing to provide substantial cooperation leading to positive and tangible law enforcement and prosecution results.  Under this system, a prosecutor may, in appropriate circumstances, extend a plea offer that permits a defendant to receive a reduced or even non-custodial sentence in exchange for the defendant’s substantial cooperation.  See Section 13.  As with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this system does not attempt to prescribe a precise formula for determining the extent and value of a defendant’s substantial cooperation.  The issues are simply too complex and fact-sensitive to permit a numeric calculation.  However, these Guidelines prescribe the criteria that must be used and relied upon by the prosecutor in determining the extent and value of the defendant’s cooperation in relation to his or her culpability.
[brief] Id. at 1268 n.8.  That brief footnote cited no authority and was tangential to the issues being decided in that case.  Aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other grounds, 85 A.3d 434 (Pa. 2014).  Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 331 (S.C. App. 1995) (following the “law adopted by a majority of jurisdictions concerning a manufacturer’s duty to recall or retrofit its products”); Morrison v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 891 S.W.2d 422, 429 (Mo. App. 1994) (finding “no such duty absent a state or federal law mandating a recall of the product”), transfer denied (Mo. Feb. 12, 1995); Lynch v. McStome & Lincoln Plaza Associates, 548 A.2d 1276, 1281 (Pa. Super. 1988) (finding no “precedent that imposes such a broad duty on a manufacturer, nor do we think that the imposition of such a duty would be appropriate”).
[brief] Instead, the dispute is over the fourth element: whether Defendant violated a provision of the FDCPA.  As for damages, Plaintiff seeks actual and statutory damages.  Statutory damages are limited to a maximum of $1,000 for the Plaintiff and 1% of Defendant’s net worth for the class.  § 1692k(a).  The provision has been construed to impose the limit on a case and, therefore, it is not multiplied by the number of violations.  The range between nothing and the cap requires consideration of factors.  The three factors determining the quantum of Plaintiff’s statutory damages are “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b).  The Class’s damages involve consideration of those three factors as well as “the resources of the debt collector, [and] the number of persons adversely affected. ”  Id.  Additional factors may be considered.  Id. C.  The Bar Against Third-Party Communications.
[directive] Strict HD requires a defendant to remain confined to a designated residence 24 hours/7 days a week.  The only approved reasons a defendant may leave their residence is to (1) attend in-person court appearances, (2) in-person pretrial appointments with Pretrial Services or in-person Probation appointments, or (3) in-person attorney appointments.  The defendant must notify PSP a minimum of 48-hours prior to an attorney appointment.  Additionally: •  Defendants ordered to Strict HD will be subject to random video home detention checks by Pretrial Services Program (PSP) officers.  During these checks, defendants must confirm their location via an appropriate method.  For example, by, video reporting, or via another visual representation, such as a verifiable, contemporaneous photograph depicting the defendant in front of an identifiable landmark at their home.  •  Strict HD is highly restrictive and should only be ordered for defendants who pose a risk so great that they must remain confined to their residence at all times during the pretrial period.  •  Noncompliance with HD conditions in the release order or in notices provided to the defendant shall constitute a violation.  Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring (HDEM):
[brief] Among the federal precedent the *[...]* Court relied upon was *Council for Periodical Distribs.  Assos. v. Evans*, 827 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir. 1987).  *See [...]*, 453 N.J. Super. at 583.  In *Council*, the court addressed, among other things, the apportionment of attorneys’ fees among multiple wrongdoers.  Preliminarily, the court held “in addition to having discretion on when to apportion fees, district courts also have wide discretion on how to divide liability for fees. ”  *Council for Periodical Distribs.  Assos. v. Evans*, 827 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir. 1987).  The court then stated, “there are many possible methods and theories with which to apportion fees. ”  *Id.* at 1488.  The court proceeded to describe six different methods, concluding its description with “finally, a district court may decide that it is appropriate to combine two or more of these methods, depending on the facts and nature of the case.
[brief] See also Lullo v. International Asso. of Fire Fighters, 55 N.J. 409, 421 (1970) (in which the Court noted the importance of the Act’s exclusive representation rule).  “Open bargaining,” by the Association’s own admission, is exactly what it seeks, notwithstanding its already unlawful attempt to pivot its argument and simply designate its entire membership as its Bargaining Council.  See, i.e., Pa037, for a copy of an article published by the [...], entitled “Open Bargaining: a new way to engage and empower your local at the table and beyond,” which was co-authored by the Association’s initial lead negotiator.  The article details the open bargaining “playbook” which the Association attempts to effectuate here and, indeed, specifically references the Board and prior negotiations as supposed evidence that “open bargaining” leads to intimidation and so-called “winning” at the bargaining table – all of which is a violation of the Act by interfering with the Board’s rights to negotiate, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(b)(1), refusing to negotiate with the Board in good faith, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(b)(3), and refusing to follow the Act and designate a representative, N.J.S.A. 23:13A-5.4(b)(5).
[brief] ”  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022).  This Court should not accept the [...]’s determination that the permit is adequately protective of the public health and safety without a more fully developed record which explicitly makes factual findings and adequately discusses the impact of the newest precipitation data on its application of the FHACA to this proposed development.  [...] failed to provide a “fully developed record so that a reviewing court may engage in meaningful appellate review.
[brief] Instead, the State must demonstrate that the Parental Secrecy Policy’s *non-disclosure provisions* prevent discrimination.  *Fulton v. City of Phila.*, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (holding that government does not satisfy its burden of satisfying strict scrutiny by proffering government interest at a “high level of generality” but must link the interest to the provision being challenged).  Here, the State has utterly failed to demonstrate how the failure to notify parents that their children are being socially transitioned prevents discrimination against transgender-identifying students.  To the extent the State’s argument is predicated on the assumption that some parents would not allow their children to be socially transitioned if given the opportunity to consent, it fails.  First, this argument assumes that every child who asks to be socially transitioned should be, which is demonstrably untrue.  ACa25-ACa31, ACa39 ¶¶ 29–43, 60; see also WPATH SOC8 at S77–78, ACa137–38.  Rather, as discussed, a child’s request to be socially transitioned merely *begins* the evaluation process between a mental health professional and parents regarding whether social transitioning is appropriate for that child, a process that can appropriately lead to the child not being socially transitioned.  Second, the argument that bypassing parental consent prevents discrimination assumes that children play the primary role in their own upbringing.  But parents have the right to play this role, and if parents do not consent to their children’s social transitioning at school, then—absent a finding of parental unfitness—that decision controls, and the District lacks any anti-discriminatory interest with respect to those children.  Accordingly, like the prevention of child abuse, the State’s alleged anti-discrimination purpose is not narrowly tailored.
[brief] The Plaintiffs repeatedly urge that the testimony of their Engineer addressing the application of the Height Ordinance must be accepted.  The [...] submits that this is not the case and that its approval of the application was firmly grounded in the facts and the law.  Initially it should be noted that Boards of Adjustment and [...]s do not function in a vacuum.  It is firmly settled that a Board may, and indeed is expected to, bring to bear in its deliberations the general knowledge of the local conditions, experiences of its individual members and common sense.  A Boards’ consideration of its members personal knowledge in its deliberation is rooted in the well-founded notion that local officials, who are thoroughly familiar with their communities’ characteristics and interests, are the proper representatives of its people and are undoubtedly the best equipped to pass initially on such applications for approvals under the MLUL.  Indeed, it is because of the board members’ peculiar knowledge of local conditions that our courts are required to allow wide latitude in the exercise of the Boards delegated discretion.  **Baghdikian vs. Board of Adjustment** 247 N.J. Super 45 (App. Div. 1991) citing **Kramer vs. Board of Adjustment of Sea Girt** 45 N.J. 268, 284, 289 (1965), **Ward vs. Scott** 16 N.J. 16, 23 (1954) and **Medici vs. BPR Company** 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987).
[brief] The lack of actual damages allegations does not mean Plaintiff lacks ---  1  Three of the four “Federal Decisions” are published—Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021), Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022), and Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 606 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (E.D. Wash. 2022).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Orders contested on Defendants’ appeal should be affirmed, and the relief sought on Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal should be granted, with this Court ordering a hearing so that the quantum of damages, attorney’s fees and costs due Plaintiffs can be established.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs, [...] and [...]  By: [...]  Dated: November 9, 2023  [...] and [...], Plaintiff-Respondents, vs. [...], [...], and MAYOR [...], in his official capacity as Mayor of the Township of Monroe, Defendant-Appellants.
[brief] CONTRARY TO THE UNION’S ARGUMENTS, THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY UNDER THE CBA BECAUSE HE FAILED TO ABIDE BY THE CBA’S EXPRESS TERMS.  In its second point, The Union attempts to reframe [...]’s arguments as an attack on the Arbitrator’s fact findings and nothing more than disagreement and dissatisfaction with the Arbitrator’s interpretation of the term “just cause. ”  On the contrary, [...] readily agreed in its appellate brief that an arbitrator has the authority to fill in gaps in an agreement, including by interpreting undefined terms.  The issue here does not concern the Arbitrator’s fact findings or his attempt to define the term “just cause. ”  In fact, the Arbitrator did not make any fact findings that were relevant to his final award.  He recounted the testimony in the record without weighing its credibility or otherwise relying upon it.  He also noted several post-termination issues regarding the second doctor’s note and [...]’s later explanations as to why [...] was terminated, but again did not rely upon them in reaching his decision.  Rather, his decision was based entirely on his own personal “opinion” that [...] could not terminate an employee with a “temporary medical condition” because there was a “reasonable expectation that [...] would return to her duties” at some point in the future, a statement completely unsupported by any credible evidence in the record.  (Pa35)  The Arbitrator’s determination that [...] could not terminate an employee on a temporary medical leave was the sole basis underlying his decision, and was not based on the testimony or other facts in the record.  By placing a restriction on the [...]’s authority to control the performance standards for its personnel, the Arbitrator violated the CBA’s express terms.
[brief] Six factors apply when determining whether rulemaking is warranted: (1) it is intended to have wide coverage encompassing a large segment of a regulated or general public, rather than an individual or a narrow select group; (2) is intended to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons; (3) is designed to operate only in future cases, that is, prospectively; (4) prescribes a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization; (5) reflects an administrative policy that: (i) was not previously expressed in any official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule, or (ii) constitutes a material and significant change from a clear, past agency position on the identical subject matter; and (6) reflects a decision on administrative regulatory policy in the nature of the interpretation of law or general policy.
[brief] Da317 ¶ 31.  [...] testified he was asked to “stand down” weeks before the wire was stolen.  Da234 56:5–12.  Defendants’ billing invoices, however, confirm he was working on the Project actively through the end of October 2016.  In addition, his November invoice contained over $19,000 in legal services provided that month.  Da329–43.  [...] continued to engage and confirmed the scope of [...]’s representation as it related to review of the Project financing agreement.  [...] also reviewed fee agreements for the Project financing in late October 2016.  Furthermore, he made the inquiry with [...] about whether the $2,500,000 was still on deposit and was the first to discover it was not.  [...] remained actively engaged in the early days after it was discovered the funds had been improperly wired; he then brought in litigators from other [...] offices in Boston, Vermont, and New Hampshire. ²
[brief] 2.  **The Premise To The Trial Court’s Ruling That A Material Misrepresentation Occurred Based On An Absence Of Ambiguity In The Application That The OAE Proceeding Constituted A Reportable Disciplinary Proceeding Ignored The Material Facts In The Record Which Would Have, At Minimum, Created A Material Fact Dispute. **  (18)  Defendants’ position on the motion below is clear: they claimed it had the right to rescind the Policies based on the Firm’s response to question No. 11(a) on the 2016 Application and question No. 10(a) in each of the renewal Policy Applications because the Firm did not disclose the OAE Proceeding as a “Disciplinary Proceeding” within the meaning of the Application and Policy.  The Certification of [...], the Underwriter of the Policies, makes clear [...]’s position was, at the time of rescission, that the OAE Proceedings constituted a reportable “Disciplinary Proceeding”: if the Firm had disclosed the Disciplinary Action Complaint in connection with the underwriting of the 2016 Policy, [...] would never have issued the 2016 Policy and so there would not have been any policy to renew thereafter.
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 11:4-18.5 (“Loss ratio standards” setting forth specific ratios—e.g., “at least 65 percent,” “at least 50 percent”—deemed to be “presumed reasonable”); see also N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.17 (specifically defining assumptions to be used and methods of calculation to be employed in determining loss ratios).  Nor does the Act provide any other guideposts for assessing what it means for a rate to be excessive.  For example, is the benchmark for “excessive” the rates of other insurers in the State, the rates the same insurer charges in other jurisdictions, or something else entirely?  [...] still does not know the answer now.  Nor would any reasonable observer or other regulated entity who reads the Final Decision or the Initial Decision.  And [...] certainly had no way of knowing before the ALJ proceedings that gave rise to the excessiveness holding.  This is no accident.
[brief] **Jackson Tp. Bd. of Educ., supra**, at 176 ........................................................................5  **Macysyn v. Hensler**, 329 N.J. Super. 476, 484 (App. Div. 2000) .................................7  **Matter of Commitment of W.W.**, 245 N.J. 438, 448 (2021)  ........................................2  **Williams v. N.J. Dep’t. of Corr.**, 423 N.J. Super. 176, 183 (App. Div. 2011) .................................................................7  ### Statutes **N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1** ........................................................................................................3  **N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3** ..................................................................................................2, 5, 6  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS PAGE Decision Issued By [...]
[brief] Another case relevant to this analysis is Cape May Harbor Village & Yacht Club Ass’n, Inc. v. Sbraga, 421 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 2011).  In that --- 4 [...] attached the Hernan trial court’s opinion in correspondence directed to the parties and uploaded on eCourts on September 8, 2022, when issuing an Amended Order clarifying the trial court’s original order in response to [...]’s motion to dismiss.  Da 333; 337. case, a homeowner in a regulated community challenged the validity of an amendment to the declaration of covenants prohibiting the lease of properties in a private community to third parties, arguing that she was not bound by the amendment as it occurred after she took title to her property.  Both the trial court and this Court disagreed, finding that it was reasonable for the homeowners’ association to amend and revise its regulations and that the homeowners’ association members were bound by those regulations; even if the revised regulations prevented one owner’s unique and particular needs.  Like the deeds in Alloco, Hernan, and Cape May, the Genesis Deed broadly granted [...] authority to implement and enforce “any other rules and regulations it chooses.
[brief] Respondent testified that the Decedent also texted her later that day to tell her how proud she was of her and her sobriety.  The Decedent never mentioned the Petitioner in any of her phone calls, and the Respondent was unaware of any conversations by the Decedent with the Petitioner during the hospitalizations.  (11T146-19 to 149-23).  Both [...] and [...] spoke with Decedent while she was in the hospital because Decedent wanted to ensure that her wishes would be carried out, specifically that Respondent would be taken care of via the executed Will, and also that the mortgage with the Respondent be forgiven.
[brief] Respondent urges this Court to find that Appellant is judicially estopped from arguing that further discovery was needed because Appellant agreed with the Trial Court at the outset of oral argument that the case was ripe for summary judgment.  (Resp. Br. at 38-43.)  Appellant concedes that, at oral argument, counsel agreed that the case was ripe for summary judgment, but that verbal concession alone should not be dispositive of whether the case was in fact ripe for summary judgment – particularly given the way the oral argument unfolded.  Nor does such a concession (or premature belief) meet the standard for judicial estoppel, where Appellant clearly did not obtain a favorable outcome from its position (*i. e.*, its motion was denied and its Mortgage was discharge).  *Kimball Intern., Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prods.*, 334 N.J. Super. 596, 606 (N.J. App. Div. 2000) (“A threat to the integrity of the judicial system sufficient to invoke the judicial estoppel doctrine only arises when a party advocates a position contrary to a position it successfully asserted in the same or a prior proceeding”); id. at 606-607 (citing In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[T]o be estopped [a party must] have convinced the court to accept its position in the earlier litigation a party is not bound to a position it unsuccessfully maintained. ”).  Merely because the parties mistakenly believed the case was ripe for summary judgment, does not preclude a trial court from finding issues of fact and denying summary judgment – this is particularly true where no discovery had been conducted.  See Driscoll Const. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 371 N.J. Super. 304, 317; Hermann Forwarding Co. v.  Pappas Ins. Co., 273 N.J. Super. 54, 64 (App. Div. 1994) (finding that summary judgment motions were premature where “critical factual issues were not fully developed before the trial court. ”).  Furthermore, Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment was narrow, focusing on its prima facie right to foreclose, and did not address the issues surrounding the context of the insufficient payment or the conditions necessary to effect a valid short sale.  IV.
[brief] ”  *In re Election Law Enf’t Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008*, 201 N.J. 254, 262, (2010) (quoting *Reilly v. AAA Mid Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J.*, 194 N.J. 474, 485 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The reason for such deference is that “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  *Ibid.*  To determine whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute is plainly unreasonable a court will “first consider the words of the statute, affording to those words 'their ordinary and commonsense meaning. ’”  *In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program*, LEGAL ARGUMENT THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE [...] IS NOT ONE OF THE ENUMERATED ENTITIES STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL FROM A LIMITED PURPOSE REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 (Aa19 – Aa21).