ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint  Plaintiff commenced this action with the filing of a Verified Complaint on January 18, 2013.  (Da1).  Plaintiff acknowledged, in ¶ 19 of the Complaint, that the beneficiaries had filed an estate tax return in Korea stating that Decedent had invested $930,000.00 in a New Jersey limited liability company, [...] (“[...]”) and had an interest in [...] to that extent.  Plaintiff contended in the Verified Complaint, however, that the Decedent’s investments and transfers into New Jersey actually totaled ten times that amount.  Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the following alleged transfers should be included: (1) a $5 million investment in a New Jersey limited liability company, [...] (“[...]”) (Da3, ¶¶26 and 28); (2) a condominium in Hawaii allegedly worth more than $2 million (Da6 at ¶ 30); (3) a $2.2 million additional investment in [...] (Da6, at ¶¶ 13 and 19); and (4) an additional almost $1 million transfer to a beneficiary of the Estate (Da6 at ¶30), for a total of over $10 million.  Plaintiff contended that a New Jersey administrator should therefore be appointed to recover over $10 million, as well as to examine the books and records of [...] to find evidence of alleged mismanagement by Defendant.  (Da6 at ¶ 29).  Specifically, the Verified Complaint asked the court to appoint a receiver to marshal all the assets in New Jersey belonging to the Estate in addition to the $900,000 investment in [...] and obtain accountings in pursuit of that goal, of [...], [...], [...], [...], and from [...] and sister [...].  (Da7, ¶32).  C.
[brief] Dziedzic v. St. John’s Cleaners & Shirt Launderers, Inc., 53 N.J. Super. 157, 161 (1969).  See also Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 375 (App. Div. 2005); Campione v. Soden, 150 N.J. 163, 184 (1997), cert. denied, 186 N.J. 242 (2006).
[brief] Plaintiffs did not submit for review an alternative development plan that demonstrated the actual feasibility of such additional warehouse area being constructed in light of site constraints and the need for supporting facilities such as drainage basins, parking and loading areas, buffers etc.  Nor did [...] provide a comparison of the relative volumes of the roughly 1.7 million square feet of 30 ft. tall warehouse he claimed to be feasible under the height and building coverage standards of the SM Zone District (approximately 51,000,000 cubic ft.) with the roughly 1.4 million sq. ft. of 48 ft. tall warehouse actually proposed (approximately 67,000,000 cubic ft.).  [...] fifth argument was that the 1999 Master Plan’s concerns about the intensity of the uses allowed in the SM Zone did not include concerns about traffic.
[brief] ”  The Special Undertakings purport to require customers, including [...], to defend and indemnify [...] from claims arising from [...]’s sale of PCBs to that customer.  (Pa009-010; Pa026).  In this case, [...] contacted [...] in New Jersey to solicit the Special Undertaking and sent a copy to [...] in New Jersey.  (Pa026; Pa499).  [...]’s president executed the Special Undertaking at the company’s offices in [...].  (Id.).  Thereafter, [...] continued to market, advertise, and ship millions of pounds of PCBs to [...] in New Jersey.  (Pa499; Pa573-74; Pa577-601; Pa610-59).  [...] sales staff personally visited [...]’s [...] facility to continue marketing PCBs to [...], and to conduct tests on facility intakes and effluent for PCBs.  (Pa596-97; Pa602-06).  B.
[brief] In the present action, the Respondents continuously represented to the Board that they would supply the Route 33 Signal; as required by the VC-2 Zone.  Further, the Respondents relied upon the provision of the Route 33 Signal in support of the variance relief sought in both the 2015 Application and the 2018 Amended Application.  The Board (and the Trial Court) relied upon these representations in determining whether the Respondents had met their burden for the requested variance relief.
[brief] Plaintiff attempted to leverage Lot 5’s contaminated condition for purposes of gaining an approval from the Board.  It tried to justify and correlate the need for the proposed mass of the building with the need to remediate contaminated soil.  However, the testimony disclosed that the intensity of the development proposed for which approval was sought and variances needed, was not a necessity to accomplish remediation.  Plaintiff’s engineer testified that aspects of the project other than the building envelope slab would also serve to cap or contain soil conditions:  Engineer: “The cap is the building, and then there’s other areas onsite outside the building that’ll be more of a material that hasn’t been determined.
[brief] It was docketed as [...].  On 11/27/23 I filed my brief for my Petition for Certification in the Supreme Court of NJ.  After the motions hearings in the Foreclosure Trial Court on 4/1/22, I had three motions hearings on 10/4/22, 5/12/23, and 9/25/23.  On 5/19/23 I filed an Amended Notice of Appeal for orders of 10/4/22 and 5/12/23, from Hon. [...], in the NJ Appellate Division; it was docketed as [...].  On 11/3/23 I submitted my Appellant Brief after curing the deficiencies.
[brief] In fact, the very case law cited by [...] does not support its position.  As acknowledged by [...], in Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, the "thoroughness" of an attorney was used as a ground for the trial court's reduction in the fee award.  The trial court concluded the trial could have been concluded earlier "but for defense counsel's 'thoroughness.'"  Chokshi, 424 at 365.  Thus, the trial court held that the fee should be reduced, essentially, because the defense attorney spent too much time defending the matter.  Such is the case at hand.  [...]'s request for fees was excessive and sought duplicative fees for work already performed to a substantial degree.
[brief] Pa21-22, Pa43-44.  The entire controversy doctrine “requires that all aspects of the controversy between those who are parties to the litigation be included in a single action,” but the application of the doctrine “is left to judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual cases. ”  Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 291 (1996); Spolitback v. Cyr Corp., 295 N.J. Super. 264, 268-69 (App. Div. 1996) (“[T]he principles at the heart of the entire controversy doctrine preclude plaintiffs from litigating . . . issues of which they were aware at the time of the prior dispute settlement proceeding and arbitration, and which were ripe and amenable to resolution through the . . . . dispute settlement procedure. ”).
[directive] The supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint shall complete the appropriate internal affairs report form.  The report form should have adequate instructions for proper completion.  Attached to this directive as Appendix B is a standardized statewide public complaint form that will be available in multiple languages in electronic format on the Attorney General’s website.  Agencies shall make available to complainants versions of the standardized form in all of those languages in their offices and, if the agency has a website, online.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the forgoing reasons, [...] fails to meet her burden on any issue on appeal.  The [...] respectfully submits that the Civil Service Commission decision must be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondent- Respondent  [...]  By:/s/ [...]  [...] IN THE MATTER OF [...], SHERIFF’S OFFICER LIEUTENANT ([...])  MIDDLESEX COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE
[directive] Page 2  Most vicinages already comply with many of the practices required by the Grand Jury Standards, e.g., terms of grand jury service.  Some standards, however, such as the new grand juror orientation package and the annual oath of secrecy for Judiciary staff, are new to most vicinages.  Thus, each vicinage will need to examine its current practices in order to determine the changes that will be required locally to implement these standards.  In order to determine the level of statewide implementation, I am asking that each Assignment Judge/Trial Court Administrator complete and return the attached questionnaire, including details of your plans to address any areas not currently in compliance with the Standards.  The questionnaire covers as well the several grand jury areas included in the previously promulgated Jury Management Standards, e.g., the requirement that grand jury proceedings be conducted in a Judiciary facility.  Please submit your completed implementation questionnaire to me by February 1, 2007.  Thank you for your continuing leadership in the Judiciary’s ongoing standardization efforts, both in the grand jury area and overall.
[directive] The police officer handler and police specialty dog team will demonstrate the ability to conduct proper searches to locate substances within the area of the dog's specialty, including narcotics detection, arson accelerant detection, or explosive detection, tracking or cadaver detection.  2.3.1  The police specialty dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate, both on and off lead, the ability to properly search, find, and indicate substances associated with a particular specialty as follows:  a.  Narcotics detection dogs will demonstrate the ability to search, find, and indicate marijuana, cocaine, heroin, crack cocaine, hashish, methamphetamine or other controlled dangerous substances deemed appropriate.  b.  Arson accelerant detection dogs will demonstrate the ability to search, find, and indicate petroleum based products, alcohol based products, naturals (turpentine), and acetone.  c.  Explosive detection dogs will demonstrate the ability to search, find, and indicate, in a non-aggressive manner, nitrates contained in explosives.  d.  Tracking dogs will demonstrate the ability to track and find or indicate a human scent.  e.  Cadaver dogs will demonstrate the ability to search, find and indicate the remains of a human body.  f.  Human tracking bloodhounds will demonstrate the ability to track and find or indicate a specific human scent.  28 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements
[brief] com)” from “[...]”).  B.  Documentary Evidence Establishes That [...] Was Directly And Integrally Involved With The Development Of The Summerset Brand, Which Included Several “Summerset’ Sub-Brands.  Email correspondence from August 2008 – produced by former co-owner of [...], [...] – confirms that, from the very outset of the relationship, [...], [...] and [...] worked together to develop the “Summerset” brand, which included multiple sub-brands.
[brief] A. R.P.C. 1.10 Prohibits [...] from Representing the State of New Jersey and the Other Defendants  R.P.C. 1.10 provides:  When lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by RPC 1.7 or RPC 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.  Here, [...] is prohibited from representing the State of New Jersey and, therefore, the other attorneys at [...] are prohibited from representing the State of New Jersey also.  R.P.C. 1.7 provides, in pertinent part:  (a)  Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.  As the State of New Jersey is a defendant, there is a significant risk that Mr. [...]’s representation will be materially limited by his personal interest; that is, the matters that are the subject of the indictment by the State of New Jersey.  And because Mr. [...] is prohibited from representing the State of New Jersey by R.P.C. 1.7, the other attorneys in his firm are also prohibited from representing the State of New Jersey by R.P.C. 1.10.  B.  [...] has a Positional Conflict with the State of New Jersey  Defendants claim that there is no positional conflict because “[...] was not indicted.
[directive] Because illegal drug use is inconsistent with the duties, obligations and responsibilities of sworn law enforcement officers, the policy mandates that officers who test positive shall be terminated from employment.  The policy sets forth uniform methods and procedures for implementing and administering law enforcement drug testing.  The policy further outlines the duties and responsibilities of the State's law enforcement agencies and chief executive officers with respect to the drug testing process.  Every law enforcement agency under the authority of the Attorney General must implement a drug testing program consistent with this policy.
[brief] [...] cannot satisfy the actual possession prong because it has not presented sufficient proof of frequent acts of ownership over the Property.  a.  The highly objectionable Dwight Aff. is littered with critical procedural and substantial deficiencies, and, even it could be properly relied upon (which it cannot), it cannot overcome the dispositive documentary evidence in the record.  b.  [...]’s continued improper reliance upon documents not in the evidentiary record must be rejected.  2.  [...] cannot satisfy the open and notorious prong because its purported proofs cannot support any reasonable inference that it acted towards the land as would an average owner.  3.  [...] cannot satisfy the exclusivity prong because not only has [...] developed a large section of the Property, but also [...]’s purported documentary evidence does not support any reasonable inference of exclusive ownership.  4.  [...] cannot satisfy the continuity prong because its paltry documentary evidence, even if credited as legally sufficient (which it is not), would fall more than 20 years short of the required 30-year statutory time period.  5.  [...] also cannot satisfy the hostility prong because its presence on the Property, even if mistaken, was neither continuous nor exclusive.  CONCLUSION | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, | 16, 17 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Caruso v. Hunt, | 32 | | 69 N.J. Super. 447 (Ch. Div.1961) | | | Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Ellis, | 28 | | 409 N.J. Super. 444 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 506 (2009) | | | Commercial Ins. Co. v. Apgar, | 27 | | 111 N.J. Super. 108 (Law Div. 1970) | | | J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank ex rel. Meyer, | 18, 45 | | 166 N.J. 493 (2001) | | | Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., | 17 | | 373 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Mannillo v. Gorski, | 30, 46 | | 54 N.J. 378 (1969) | | | Patton v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, | 30, 33 | | 93 N.J. 180 (1983) | | | Persons v. Bregman, | 20, 29 | | 182 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1982) | | | Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff, | 18 | | 467 N.J. Super. 532 (2021) | | | Predham v. Holfester, | 41 | | 32 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 1954) | | Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494 (2015) .................................................................................................................. 20, 25, 27 Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 72 (2022).
[brief] (Argued at Pa224 – Pa225)  After [...] received payment on its April 2020 and July 2020 invoices, it never sent a notice of breach of contract to [...], nor did it file a petition with the Commissioner.  The first breach of contract notice or request to a tribunal for relief surprisingly came 2.5 years later on September 16, 2022, when [...] filed its Answer and Counterclaim. \(^{39}\)  The Board is over two budget years removed from the April 2020 invoice, so [...] is attempting to collect on an extraordinary unbudgeted alleged expense of $697,391.\(^{49}\) from] 2.5 years ago, to the detriment and prejudice of [...].  [...]’s Counterclaim is thus barred by the doctrines of accord and satisfaction, and laches.
[brief] FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DEEMED RELIABLE IN NEW JERSEY FOR OVER A CENTURY AND REMAINS SO.  [...]’s amicus brief regarding people’s attitudes toward forensic evidence finds absolutely no support in the extensive judicial history in which courts have used fingerprinting evidence to identify the perpetrator of a crime.  Indeed, [...] acknowledges that no support in the law exists by choosing not to cite to a single legal document—no case, statute, court rule, or any other legal source, apart from one law-review article—over her eighteen-page amicus brief.  Instead, she cites to books and scholarly articles in support of her position that fingerprint-analysis evidence (and forensic evidence as a whole) is unreliable.
[brief] POINT I-THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND MISLED THE JURY REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE AND WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN THE INDICTMENT BY INSTRUCTING THAT, SINCE THERE WAS AN INDICTMENT HANDED DOWN BY THE GRAND JURY IN THIS CASE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE DIFFERENT FROM A COMPLAINT CHARGING A NON-CRIME.  POINT II-THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSED THE OUT OF COURT AND IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT BY THE COMPLAINING WITNESS.  POINT III-THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN VIOLATING ITS DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS BY FAILING TO ADVISE DEFENDANT THAT THE VICTIM WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT WHEN DISCOVERY INDICATED THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO SO IDENTIFY HIM.  POINT IV-THE SENTENCE WAS EXCESSIVE.  POINT IV(A)-THE SENTENCE WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE MISAPPLICATION OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS.  POINT IV(B)-THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS IN VIOLATION OF BLAKELY AND APPENDI.  As to Point I, we agree that the judge's comment to the seventy jurors assembled in the courtroom during voir dire that the case before them was different from a municipal court complaint because twenty-three grand jurors had considered the evidence and decided to return an indictment, was both unnecessary and highly prejudicial.  We conclude that the comment, to which defense counsel immediately objected, had the clear capacity to cause the jury to reach a verdict it might otherwise not have reached.  As to Points II and III, we agree with defendant that the assistant prosecutor's failure to disclose to defense counsel the ability of the victim to identify his assailant until after defense counsel had opened to the jury constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.  We agree further that the court erred in denying defendant's request for a mistrial as a result of that belated disclosure.  Although the State reconsidered and ultimately chose not to elicit such identification testimony on direct, and the in-court identification of defendant by the victim ultimately resulted from testimony elicited by defendant, we nonetheless conclude that the court's improper denial of the mistrial motion set in motion a series of events that ultimately culminated in the in-court identification.  In light of our conclusion that defendant's arguments on Points I, II and III warrant reversal, we do not address defendant's claims regarding sentencing.
[directive] Selection of Officers to Receive In-Service Training  1.  All Human Trafficking Liaisons designated pursuant to Section II of this Directive shall receive the training developed pursuant to subsection A of this Section, and such additional Page 8 training as the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice may from time to time prescribe.  2.  The chief executive of every State, county and local law enforcement agency shall identify those sworn officers who would benefit from receiving training on human trafficking based upon their duty assignment, and shall within sixty days of the effective date of this Directive provide to the appropriate County Prosecutor and the Division of Criminal Justice a list of those officers to be trained.  Those officers should complete the training, whether through the NJLEARN system or by other means, within ninety days of the training program being made available pursuant to subsection A of this Section.
[brief] Also, the Defendant [...] makes reference to the fact that there is a billboard on an adjacent property.  However, what the impact of the billboard has as to whether the grant of the variance has on the Master Plan is lost on counsel for the Plaintiffs.  The Master Plan for the Rural Development Zoning District seeks to protect the open nature of the zone.  “The intention of the Zoning Plan and Ordinance is to both maintain, where practical, the existing character of the district and preserve it as land reservoirs for future community development. ”  Da27 to Da31.  By allowing the garage by variance the [...] violates the intent of the Master Plan in several ways.  It reduces the area for agricultural uses in the zone, reduces the open nature of the zone and reduces the acreage for use as a reservoir for future community development.  The addition of the structure on the [...]’s property expands the residential character of the Property and decreases the available land for conforming uses.  In its Master Plan, the Township sent a signal to the public, its professionals and boards indicating that, *inter alia*, that Planning must be comprehensive in nature and coordinated, while ensuring that new development is compatible with existing development without degrading the Township’s cultural and natural resources.  In granting the Application the Board abandoned any attempt to comply with these goals and standards.  **III.
[brief] In its brief, [...] claims that “[t]wo different Trial Court judges separately determined that [the Board’s Supplemental Resolution of January 2, 2023 was] ultra vires and bad faith conduct by the Township Defendants [and] constituted a clear breach of [the Settlement Agreement].  Again, [...]’s assertion is incorrect and misleading.  The finding of bad faith and breach of settlement agreement was made only by [...] and not by [...].  In fact, at oral argument before [...], [...] argued that the only determination left for [...] to make was how much [...] should receive for attorneys fees and how much it should receive for delay penalties, see T8-24.  [...] accepted that such was the scope of his decision, see 3T18-19.  [...] made no determination as to bad faith or breach of settlement agreement.  [...]’s assertion that the “final version” of the resolution was circulated on October 7, 2022, [...] Rb13, Is inaccurate and misleading.  At best, that version was what Avalon Bay wanted as the final version but ultimately was not the final version, by way of example, see Pa267.  Arguably the most blatant disregard for the facts is [...]’s complete disregard for the factual and procedural history that occurred which began in or about May 2023 and ending with the Board's December 12, 2023 meeting.  Avalon Bay completely ignores the fact that the board through the Township mayor explained, on the record and a public hearing, that he felt it critical for all of the buildings, including Building E, to have ambulance gurney accommodating elevators and was prepared if necessary to offer [...] ten additional units in exchange for the building the elevator and that [...] accepted that offer.  [...] further ignores the facts showing that the reason the initial form of resolution was not presented to the Board until the December meeting was [...]’s gamesmanship.  See Pb19 et seq and Board Exhibits listed on Pa142-3.  **POINT II**
[brief] [...]: Your Honor, is [...] off the screen?  (21T 33 lines 5-6).  The Judge responded:  THE COURT: No, he's still on.  Because he hasn't spoken -- he must have shut off his video but he's still here.  I see him.  I mean, I see his name.  [...]: Your Honor, I have -- I have an issue with [...] disappearing off the screen when we're in the middle of doing this; particularly when his witness, [...]'s on the stand.