ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] Successfully Moves For A Summary Decision, The Commissioner Affirms The ALJ’s Decision.  On September 7, 2022, the [...] moved for summary decision.  The [...] argued that, whatever the merits of [...]’s appeal of the State Board’s decision, the [...] cannot—as a matter of law—be found to have acted in an arbitrary and capricious matter by terminating [...].  It was undisputed that [...] did not have a valid teaching certificate as of November 28, 2021, the day the [...] terminated him.  Thus, the [...] argued, under N.J.S.A. 18A:26–2, [...] could not continue to hold his position.  In response, [...] moved for a cross-motion, arguing that the matter should be stayed pending the Appellate Division’s decision in the *State Board Appeal*.  On November 18, 2022, the Hon. [...], A.L.J., issued an Initial Decision granting the [...]’s motion.  The ALJ found that the relevant question was “not whether the action of the [State Board] was legal,” but rather “whether the action of respondent in November 2021, made in reliance on the decision of the [State Board], was legal. ” (Pa44).  The ALJ held that the [...] “acted appropriately and in accordance with the law to remove petitioner from his tenured teaching position as petitioner did not have a valid teaching certificate at the time of respondent’s decision. ”  (*Id.*).  Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Decision adopting the findings and recommendations in the Initial Decision.  The Commissioner “agree[d] with the ALJ that the Board was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in terminating petitioner. ” (Pa48).  The Commissioner noted that N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-5.1(c) required the [...] to remove [...] from his employment once he lost his teaching certificate.  (*Id.*).  [...] appealed the Commissioner’s decision to this Court under Rule 2:23(a).  The [...] now responds.
[brief] Given the facts and law at issue, and as the Trial Court rightly opined, arbitration as to any relevant party in this case would be unconscionable.  The facts clearly show that the unconscionable terms of the Arbitration Agreement were imposed on [...] in a shockingly unfair manner and thus should not be enforced.  As noted in the Trial Court’s May 14, 2024 Statement of Reasons, there were many concerning circumstances surrounding the formation and substance of the Arbitration Agreement, which is a contract of adhesion (Da088-92).
[directive] a.  For any person who is serving as a municipal prosecutor as of January 1, 2020, the initial Disclosure Statement is due no later than May 1, 2020.  b.  For any person beginning service as a municipal prosecutor after January 1, 2020, but no later than April 1, 2020, the initial Disclosure Statement is due no later than May 1, 2020.  c.  For any person beginning service as a municipal prosecutor after April 1, 2020, the initial Disclosure Statement is due within 30 days of taking office.  4.  After filing the required initial Disclosure Statement, a municipal prosecutor shall file annual Disclosure Statements by May 1 of each subsequent year for so long as they remain so employed.  5.  A person who ceases employment as a municipal prosecutor in a municipality shall notify the [...] within 30 days of the last day of service by filing a completed Separation Statement.  A person who has filed a Separation Statement and no longer serves as a municipal prosecutor in the municipality is not subsequently required to file with the [...] annual Disclosure Statements in connection with the person’s service in that municipality.
[brief] [...] confirmed that Defendant did not give him access to his financial records any more than Plaintiff did.  (3T 66:4)  However, having lived together for some twenty-three years, the parties had an idea of each other’s general financial circumstances.  (2T 32:6-9; 59:7-12)  Specifically, [...] knew that [...] had a 401(k) retirement account because it had been the topic of some teasing by him and his brother-in-law during the relationship.
[brief] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on identification and alibi and that this failure warrants reversal.  This argument is without merit.  As thoroughly discussed at trial, defendant failed to provide notice of an alibi defense, as instructed by the rules, and was therefore barred from this instruction.  Furthermore, even if defendant did give timely notice of this defense, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to give an alibi instruction because defendant failed to present evidence that he was elsewhere at the time of the murder.  Also, the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on identification because court did include instructions emphasizing the State’s burden of proving every element, including the person who committed the offenses, beyond a reasonable doubt.
[directive] Restraining Order it is a disorderly persons  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500  No 10%  1.  The Domestic Violence Manual permits Municipal Court Judges to set bail if the contempt charge is a disorderly persons offense and the Assignment Judge of the vicinage has issued an order permitting this authority.  16  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] The Court should reverse the orders that (1) denied [...]’s requests for discovery and sua sponte vacated pre-existing orders; (2) denied adjournment to complete investigation and preparation of his PCR petition; (3) denied dismissal or rehearing based on newly discovered evidence of bad faith; (4) denied reconsideration; (5) denied recusal; (6) denied his PCR petition; and (7) denied his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
[directive] Employment:  HDLE may be used for defendants who are employed at the time of their release where the court determines appropriate.  The court must inquire regarding a defendant’s employment before considering whether the defendant is an appropriate candidate for HDLE.  PSP must have the ability to effectively monitor a defendant who leaves the home to address the safety of the victim and the public, while also ensuring that the defendant is not subject to violations of HD that could have been prevented by providing relevant information to PSP at the outset.  Thus, a defendant who is permitted to leave the home for work may be an appropriate candidate for HDLE only if he or she satisfies the following criteria:  i.  The defendant is currently employed.  A defendant should not be permitted to leave the home while on HDLE to conduct a job search.  ii.  The defendant’s job location is stable.  Defendants on HDLE should not be permitted to roam the state.  iii.  The defendant’s work schedule is stable.  PSP cannot effectively monitor a defendant with an unstable schedule.  Therefore, a defendant with a schedule that changes daily or has mandatory overtime without notice would not be a good candidate for HDLE.  Instructions
[brief] She stated that she saw two stray cats on the sidewalk and a trap that was improperly set up in a manner that would render it unable to actually act as a trap with the front door tied up and food placed at the front of the trap rather than the back.  (3T Pg. 12, Ln. 9 – Pg. 14, Ln. 15).  Not only that, she observed that there were containers with cat food placed around the trap, and the trap was wrapped in plastic wrapping so that it could act as a shelter from inclement weather.  (3T Pg. 14, Ln. 6- Pg. 15, Ln. 10).  There was also a container several feet away from the trap on its side that could also serve as a means of shelter.  (3T Pg. 16, Ln. 13 - Pg. 17, Ln. 6).  [...] confirmed the trap displayed a note stating “Trapping momma cat + kittens – Please call [...] [...]” and how that name and number matched an OPRA request she reviewed.  (3T Pg. 26, Ln. 9- Pg. 27, Ln. 18).  [...]’s testimony included the introduction of several photographs she took of the trap and its surroundings on September 15, 2021, as well as the Defendant’s OPRA request with her name and phone number matching that which was written on the trap, further bolstering her testimony.
[brief] Rule 1:5-3 does not mention any requirement to submit a tracking number.  “[T]he language of Rule 1:5-3 is clear and unambiguous.  The rule requires that the proof of service indicate that a mailing was sent to a party's last known address and nothing more.  That, of course, does not preclude a party from including additional details in respect of the outcome of a certified mailing, but the rule does not require such information.  First Resol. Inv. Corp. v. Seker, 171 N.J. 502, 511 (2002).  (emphasis added).  As to the trial court’s conclusion that “Email is not a proper form of service under the Court Rules” (Pa1224), I note that R. 1:5-2 was relaxed to permit service of process by electronic filing using an approved electronic filing system, and R. 1:5-3 was relaxed to suspend the requirement to file a separate proof of service document for those pleadings electronically filed using an approved electronic filing system.
[brief] Petitioner’s election contest was based upon three provisions of N.J.S.A. 19:29-1.  Paragraph (a) provides that an election may be contested based upon “malconduct, fraud or corruption on the part of the members of any district board, or the members of the board of county canvassers, sufficient to challenge the result. ”  N.J.S.A. 19:29-1(a).  A election may be overturned where the misconduct shown is a result from a “degree of gross negligence or inattention to duty tantamount to purposeful conduct such as fraud or corruption.  Isolated acts of negligence or omission do not rise to the level of official misconduct. ”  Application of Mallon, 232 N.J. Super. 249, 271-72 (App. Div. 1989).  A challenge may also be brought under N.J.S.A. 19:29-1(e) and (f), which authorize a challenge when “illegal votes have been received” or “legal votes have been rejected at the polls. ”  When an election is contested under N.J.S.A. 19:29-1(e), the contestant bears the burden of proving both that illegal votes were cast and that those votes were sufficient in number to affect the outcome of the election.  In re Contest of November 8, 2005 Gen. Election for Office of Mayor for Tp. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 388 N.J. Super. 663, 663-64 (App. Div. 2006).  Moreover, the contestant must also identify for whom the illegal votes were cast.  Ibid.  Where the number of illegal votes exceeds the margin of victory and the recipient of those votes is identified, the outcome cannot stand.  Thus, as Appellant has already determined and presented evidence that the illegal write-in votes at issue were cast for the contestee, and the margin of victory was only one vote, he is only required to demonstrate that those votes were unlawful.  Once shown, the statutory burden is satisfied, and the integrity of the election demands correction through judicial action.  II.
[brief] When he refers to this traverse, T-R-A-V-E-R-S-E hearing, I now think I understand what he means. ” (See November 30, 2023 Decision Transcript, Page 3, Lines 18-23).  [...]’s said in first letter dated 11-8-2023 (Rb-14):  “I DID NOT receive the Complaint and I DID NOT receive the SUMMONS, because the Affidavit of Service was NOT properly served, denying me of my rights.  A Traverse Hearing will give me the opportunity to cross-examine under oath the process server, [...].  It will also give me an opportunity to present business records to support my claim in the cross-examination and to challenge his credibility. ”  In his second letter dated 11/14/23 (Rb-15), he enclosed his sworn affidavit that he WAS NOT served in support of his motion for a Traverse Hearing.
[brief] The “but for” test is not appropriate to determine whether an injury was the direct cause of a petitioner’s disability.  In re Cordero, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1406. 9, 14 (App. Div. 2012).  In Cordero, the [...] rejected an ALJ’s ID that relied upon an expert’s application of the “but for” test rather than the “direct result” test.
[brief] As this Court has repeatedly acknowledged, both the FAA and New Jersey’s strong public policy favoring arbitration extend to consumer disputes, including disputes arising under state consumer protection statutes.  See e.g. Szimonowitz v. Travelscape, LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1045 (App. Div. June 5, 2024) (affirming order compelling arbitration of plaintiff’s claims arising under the CFA stemming from the purchase of airline tickets); Trainor v. Chrysler Capital, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2202 (App. Div. September 20, 2021) (affirming order compelling arbitration of plaintiff’s claims arising under the CFA and the TCCWNA stemming from the purchase of an automobile); Maisano v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2421 (App. Div. November 27, 2019) (affirming order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims under the CFA and the Consumer Financing Licensing Act on a single-claimant basis).
[brief] (Pa134-137).  The proposed warehouse/distribution use is permitted as a principal use on the Property as of right pursuant to Westampton Ordinance Section 250-20A, which sets forth the permitted principal uses in the I-Zone.  (Pa55-57).  The Application only sought customarily granted bulk variance approvals for, among other things, the height and orientation of the buildings.  (Pa134-137).  Specifically, the Application sought building heights of 47 and 48 ft., where 45 ft. is permitted, so as to allow a parapet which would screen from view the rooftop equipment on the southerly building, and to orient the southerly building loading area in the “front” yard along [...] instead of in the rear yard adjacent to the [...], as required by relevant ordinances.  (1T 110-16 to 1T 110-23; Pa134-137; Pa139-185).  This building orientation was proposed by [...] after pre-application consultations with Board professionals.  (1T136).  The requested variances are bulk or “c” variances, cognizable under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c), which are within the jurisdiction of the Land Development Board sitting as a planning board to hear [...]’s site plan Application.  The Application proposes to replace the existing permitted agricultural use with a permitted warehouse/distribution use that would not involve any changes to the 900 square foot ground lease area of the Cell Tower, any co-location of additional antennae on the Cell Tower or changes to any existing site improvements related to the Cell Tower, including access, easements, drainage and utilities.
[brief] In furtherance of the 1963 Agreement, the property owned by the [...] was conveyed to Plaintiff in exchange for the [...]’s obligation to construct and operate the synagogue in accordance with the tenets of Jewish Orthodox.  Defendant has not disputed that in return for Plaintiff’s promise to construct the synagogue, Plaintiff was given rights over the Subject Property for parking to be utilized by the synagogue and to tie its heating system to the boiler room located on the Subject Property.  Moreover, Defendant does not dispute the synagogue was constructed without any onsite parking.  While Plaintiff maintains that the 1963 Agreement is unambiguous and created an express easement, the Appellate Division found ambiguities existed and the circumstances surrounding the grant of rights from the [...] to the [...] must be considered on remand before the Trial Court could determine whether an easement was granted.
[brief] Court Rules: R. 2:6-8.............................................................................................................................................2, 3, 4 R. 1:38-3.............................................................................................................................................6 R. 1:38-5.............................................................................................................................................6 R. 1:38-7.............................................................................................................................................6  ABBREVIATIONS: DWI ...........................................................................................................................................driving while under the influence SFSTs........................................................................................................................................standardized field sobriety tests  \(^1\)  Defendant’s appendix, attached, is cited to as suggested in R. 2:6-8—e.g., pages 19 to 23 are cited as “Da19a-23a. ”  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] If the trial court deems the site suitable, then Plaintiff will be awarded a builder’s remedy.  [...] is facing no harm because it had every reason to expect the situation in which it has placed itself.  If the site for some reason is deemed not suitable, then the worst harm suffered by [...] is that any condemnation efforts would be delayed during the pendency of the builder’s remedy litigation.  Almost 10 years has passed since the Supreme Court established a procedure for municipalities to comply with the Third Round, and [...] is no closer to compliance now than it was when it chose to withdraw from the process 5 years ago.
[brief] ”  Shipyard Associates, 2015 WL 10352982 at *4; see also MAG Ent’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 546 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that OPRA requests cannot require a records custodian to conduct research).  The OPRA request in this case is even more broad than the OPRA request that was held invalid in Shipyard Associates.  In Shipyard Associates, the scope of the OPRA request was limited to two ordinances.  In this case, [...]’s OPRA requests were for all text messages regarding “fire commissioner business, discussions, etc.” (Da201).  A request for all text messages regarding “fire commissioner business” is overly broad because it does not identify a reasonably specific subject matter, such as “settlement agreements.
[brief] In this case, the plaintiff has filed suit against the various medical specialists who treated [...] on June 1, 2018.  Thus, suit was filed against [...], the Interventional Radiologist who performed the fatal biopsy.  In addition, [...] was also seen by Defendant [...], a Board-Certified Pulmonologist and Critical Care Specialist.  In this case, the Plaintiff has supplied an Affidavit of Merit of [...], M.D. 32a.  [...] is Board Certified in General Surgery, in Vascular Surgery and in Surgical Critical Care.  In his motion, Defendant [...] challenged the sufficiency of the Affidavit of Merit of [...], claiming that it is insufficient as a matter of law because [...]'s credentials were not identical to those of [...].  [...]'s Curriculum Vitae is also attached.  28a.  As a result, [...] claimed that the Complaint should be dismissed as to him.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the case against him.
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Policy  5.9  Officers involved in a pursuit shall not engage in vehicle paralleling.  5.10  There shall be no street paralleling along the route unless the pursuit passes through a patrol’s assigned area.  A patrol that is parallel-street-pursuing shall not join or interfere with a pursuit and shall stop all pursuit-related activity at the boundary of its assigned area.  5.11  Boxing-in or heading-off a violator’s moving vehicle is permitted only under extraordinary circumstances.  These tactics substantially increase the risk inherent in the pursuit and shall only be employed: (a) at low speeds; and (b) with the approval of a supervisor; or (c) in response to an imminent threat to the safety of the public or a police officer.  5.12  Roadblocks must only be employed as a last resort in circumstances where deadly force would otherwise be justified.  (a) the use of a roadblock must be authorized by a supervisor; (b) at no time will a roadblock be established until all pursuing police vehicles are made aware of the roadblock and its location and have acknowledged this awareness; 5.12.1  Once a roadblock has been established and a vehicle or barricade has been positioned in the roadway, there shall be: (a) adequate distance to see the roadblock; (b) an avenue of escape; and (c) no one in the blocking vehicle(s).  5.13  Officers involved in a pursuit shall not engage in any vehicle contact action except as a last resort to prevent imminent death or serious injury to the officer or another person where deadly force would otherwise be justified.  5.14  Officers shall not discharge a firearm against the driver or passenger of a moving vehicle except in the limited situations permitted under Section 4.6 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  5.15  Officers shall not discharge a firearm from a moving vehicle except in the limited situations permitted under Section 4.7 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  9
[brief] Furthermore, the [...] are significantly disadvantaged in the upcoming mediation due to the Respondents’ failure to participate fully in discovery.  Despite multiple requests, the Respondents never provided dates for depositions of their corporate representatives or allowed an inspection of the Property.  By filing their motions without facilitating these essential steps, the Respondents have failed to support a fair and transparent mediation process.  For these reasons, both the first and third Hoxworth factors weigh in the Plaintiffs’ favor.
[brief] (1T 46-4 to 14)  While driving westbound in Green Brook Township on Route 22, a four-lane highway, they got behind a white sedan in the left lane.  (1T 15-21 to 24, 16-4 to 8, 16-14 to 23, 46-10 to 14)  The sedan, after the patrol vehicle got behind it, began to move to the right lane.  (1T 16-9 to 10)  [...] testified that the driver “appeared to look in her rearview mirror” as she switched lanes and that the sedan’s blinker did not come on until the vehicle’s right tires were already partially in the right lane.  (1T 16-8 to 13, 19-2 to 7)  According to [...], there was a “medium amount of traffic” on the road at the time the sedan changed lanes.  (1T 17-17 to 21)  [...] explained that “[i]t was the middle of the day during the week in a populated area” and there were cars in both lanes of Route 22 heading westbound.  (1T 17-22 to 18-1)  [...] did not testify that the lane change was unsafe in any manner.  Once the sedan had moved to the right lane, the patrol vehicle followed suit so that it was directly behind the sedan again.  (1T 18-16 to 20)  The backseat passenger of the sedan then turned around to look at the patrol car.  (1T 19-12 to 18)  The two vehicles stopped at a red light, at which point [...] activated his body-worn camera.  (1T 19-19 to 20-5, 21-1 to 2)  When the light turned green, [...] activated his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop.  (1T 20-10 to 13)  After both vehicles had pulled into a parking lot, [...] walked up to the driver’s side window of the sedan.  (1T 20-15 to 16, 21-11 to 12, 21-19 to 21)  There were three people in the car: [...], the driver; [...], the front-seat passenger; and [...], the back-seat passenger.  (1T 22-9 to 17)  [...] explained to Smith that he stopped the car because Smith left her lane and “did not use her turn signal properly. ”  (1T 23-24 to 24-7)  [...] testified that he smelled marijuana emanating from inside the sedan during this initial conversation with the occupants.
[brief] “[A] trial court’s reconsideration decision will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion. ”  *Pitney Bowes Bank v. ABC Caging*, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).  A motion for reconsideration under R. 4:49-2 “is addressed to the judge’s sound discretion. ”  *Hinton v. Meyers*, 416 N.J. Super. 141, 148 (App. Div. 2010).