ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF BREACH OF CONTRACT (3T78 – 3T88)  There can be no dispute that Plaintiff established a *prima facie* breach of contract claim against Defendant [...], and therefore such claim should have been presented to the jury.  An implied contract “consists of an obligation ‘arising from mutual agreement and intent to promise but where the agreement and promise have not been expressed in words[.]’”  *Borough of West Caldwell v. Borough of Caldwell*, 26 N.J. 9, 29 (1958) (quoting *Williston on Contracts*, § 3 3d ed. 1957).  Implied Contracts are no different than express contracts, “although they exhibit a different way or form of expressing assent than through statements and writings.  Courts often find and enforce implied promises by interpretation of a promisor's word or conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. ”  *Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of W. Milford*, 144 N.J. 564, 574 (1996).  Courts in other jurisdictions have held that schools may be subject to breach of contract claims when the school broke a contractual promise to provide a specific service or course.
[brief] (Pa001-Pa055; Pa078-Pa090).  Upon approval, the Site Plan Application would allow for the physical development of the Property.  That overall submission requesting Subdivision and Site Plan Approvals contained certain reports and other material, including an Environmental Impact Assessment, a Sound Study, a Storm Water Management Report, Traffic Impact Study and numerous other plans and reports.  (Pa001-Pa055; Pa078-Pa090).  The Subdivision Application and the Site Plan Application were reviewed by the following [...] consultants and other municipal entities: Board Planner, Board Engineer, Board Traffic Engineer, Board Architect and Landscape Architect; Board Sewer and Water Utility Engineer, and various [...] departments (Fire, construction, public works, police, tax assessor, affordable housing and environmental commission).  In its review letter dated August 10, 2022, the Board Planner stated that “given the nature of the approval sought, this review is undertaken as separate Subdivision and Site Plan Applications. ” (Pa178-Pa189).  The Subdivision and Site Plan Applications were reviewed for conformance with the Robbinsville Ordinances and it was determined that all required items were submitted.  (Pa178-Pa189).  In addition, [...] attended two (2) Technical Review Committee Meetings with the Zoning Board Professionals and reviewed comments related to all of the submitted materials for both the subdivision application and site plan application.  (1T73 to 1T74).  [...] responded to those review comments both at the Technical Review Committee Meetings and by written Response Letters prior to the ultimate determination of Completeness on August 10, 2022.  (Pa178-Pa189).  These included responses made to the comments of the Board Engineer on the Environmental Impact Assessment.  (Pa190-Pa199; Pa200-Pa219; Pa220-Pa230; Pa241).  The public hearing on [...]’s subdivision application was held on November 1, 2022.
[brief] Hon. [...]/J.S.C. P.J.Cv.  PAPERS CONSIDERED  NOTICE OF MOTION  MOVANT'S AFFIDAVIT OR CERTIFICATION  MOVANT'S BRIEF NOTICE OF CROSS-MOTION  RESPONDENT'S AFFIDAVIT OR CERTIFICATION  [...]  Immunity Order WPB Appendix  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY PASSAIC COUNTY LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART DOCKET NO.: [...]  ORDER SETTING ASIDE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 10, 2020
[brief] [...] next attempts to improperly limit the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzalez by relying on DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J.  Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013).  Notwithstanding the distinguishing factors that part DepoLink from the case at bar (discussed in pages 23-25 of [...] opening Brief), [...]’s arguments fail to substantially respond to the points raised in [...]’s opening Brief—i.e., DepoLink improperly relied on two federal cases\(^1\) to decide an issue of state law and that DepoLink failed to address the Gonzalez holding, despite DepoLink being decided two years after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Gonzalez.
[brief] ”  Id.  With regard to game specifically, the Council may under N.J.S.A. 13:1B-31: a. Establish, extend, shorten or abolish open seasons and closed seasons; b. Establish, change or abolish bag limits and possession limits; c. Establish and change territorial limits for pursuit, taking or killing of any species or varieties; d. Prescribe the manner and means of pursuing, taking, or killing any species of variety; and e.  Establish, change or abolish restrictions based on sex, maturity or other physical distinction.
[brief] March 4, 2024  Order and Decision......................................................... Pa000017  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendants/Respondents [...] (the “City”), [...], [...] in the [...], and [...], Commissioner of the [...] (former Director of the Division of Local Government Services) (collectively “Defendants”) respectfully submit this brief in response to Plaintiffs/Appellants [...]’s (“[...]”) and the [...]’s (“[...]” together with the [...], the “Police Unions” or “Plaintiffs”) appeal of the Superior Court’s March 4, 2024 Order dismissing the Verified Complaint in this matter, with prejudice.
[brief] (Exhibit P-5.)  40.  As a result, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, [...] appeals the [...]’s decision, thereby seeking Board approval of the proposed Facility and an order that the zoning, site plan review and all other Municipal Land Use Ordinances and Regulations promulgated under the auspices of the MLUL shall not apply to the Regulator Station.
[directive] The prosecution team shall ensure Disclosure of Informant’s Impeachment compliance with the State’s discovery obligations, including and Giglio.  Generally Brady speaking, the State’s discovery obligations relating to a jailhouse informant will include, at a minimum, the information described in Sections II.A.1 to II.A.6.  (The State’s analysis performed in connection with Sections II.A.7 and II.A.8 will typically include attorney work-product that is not subject to disclosure, although the prosecution team should make an assessment of its discovery obligations on a case-by-case basis.)  The prosecution team shall consider the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. 225 N.J. 451 (2016) when considering its discovery obligations.  [...]
[brief] (Pa191-Pa193).  No challenges to the designation have ever been filed.  Pursuant to the LRHL, the rehabilitation designation was also transmitted to the State Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-14(a), who reviewed and acknowledged the rehabilitation designation in a letter dated April 27, 2021.  (Pa195).  Thereafter, the Township Committee considered public comment on the proposed redevelopment of the Property at almost two dozen meetings.  (Pa248).  At its September 8, 2022 meeting, after more than two years of public discussion, the Township Committee introduced Ordinance 2022-15 (the Redevelopment Plan) to enact the Old York Redevelopment Plan, and referred the plan to the Planning Board for a “master plan consistency” review pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  (Pa398-Pa399).  (Notwithstanding its designation as an “area in need of rehabilitation,” and not an “area in need of redevelopment,” the Plan for the re-use of the Property is nevertheless referred to as a Redevelopment Plan.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-15.)  The Planning Board conducted a meeting on September 20, 2022 concerning the Plan, where members of the public had an opportunity to pose questions and submit concerns.  See Transcript 1T.  With seven (7) of nine (9) members voting in the affirmative, the Planning Board concluded the Ordinance was not inconsistent with the Township Master Plan, and referred it back to the Township Committee.  (1T.55:13-25 through 57:1-20).  Thereafter, on October 27, 2022, following a public hearing, the Committee adopted Ordinance 2022-15, establishing a Redevelopment Plan for the Property.
[brief] (Pa58).  As of that date, the Santa Fe had been out of service 11 times for 133 days for material defects affecting its value, safety and use.  (Pa42-43; Pa57).  Soon after the Complaint was filed, plaintiff’s counsel attempted to settle the matter with the defendant in mid-December 2020, but these attempts were unsuccessful.  (Pa43).  On January 5, 2020, defendant filed an Answer denying all liability and containing 43 separate affirmative defenses.  Ibid.  Plaintiff served Interrogatories and a Demand for Production of Documents on defendant on February 17, 2020.  Ibid.  While litigation was pending, four more repair attempts were made on the Santa Fe at [...] dealerships: on December 31, 2020, February 11, 2021, March 16, 2021 and June 29, 2021.  (Pa42-43; Pa254; Pa271).  Plaintiff’s counsel assisted plaintiff in ensuring proper records were obtained.  (Pa42-43; Pa53-59; Pa74-100; Pa104-107; Pa110-117).  During the June 29, 2021 repair attempt, after 16 months of attorney involvement and seven months of litigation, the Santa Fe’s repair issues were resolved.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(j) also provides for persons granted compassionate release to be returned to confinement.  Specifically, the [...] will notify the prosecutor if it determines that the person is no longer so debilitated or incapacitated by a terminal condition, disease or syndrome, or by a permanent physical incapacity as to be physically incapable of committing a crime or, in the case of a permanent physical incapacity, poses a threat to public safety.  The prosecutor can initiate proceedings to return the person to confinement.
[brief] POINT 1 .................................................................................................................9  WHETHER THE COURTS SEALING AND STRIKING OF A COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY RENDERS ITS CONTENTS  A NULLITY  Raised below (Pa271; The trial Court declined to address the issues)  POINT 2 ..............................................................................................................12  WHETHER THE UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF THE APPELLANTS GOVERNMENTAL PRIVATE PAPERS THAT WERE FALSE AND INACCURATE GAINED THROUGH THE COMMISSION OF TWO FELONIES VIOLATED THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION  ARTICLE 1 ¶ 7 TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT  Raised below (Pa165; The trial Court declined to address the issue)  POINT 3 ..............................................................................................................14  WHETHER THE PUBLISHING BY THE DEFENDANTS OF INFORMATION SEIZED THROUGH A VIOLATION OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAUSE WITHOUT A WARRANT REGARDING FALSE CRIMINAL CONDUCT WAS DEFAMATORY PER SE Raised below (Pa145; The trial Court declined to address the issue)  POINT 4 ..............................................................................................................17  WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION HEARING UNDER THE LAW OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT  Raised below (Pa108; The trial Court declined to address the issue)  CONCLUSION
[brief] R. 1:13-9(a).  Moreover, the conversion to a condominium occurred in 2003, ten (10) years after [...]’s purchase of the building.  No facts in the record support that the $47,727 purchase price was somehow inflated and was based upon a conversion to a condominium that would occur 10 years later, as improperly speculated by both Amicus and Defendant. \(^4\) --- \(^3\)  Only in this Appeal does Defendant first speculate that, in 1993, his Unit “may have been worth less” (Db 8), because of his occupation of the Unit.  However, Defendant did not present any evidence to the [...] that the Unit’s pro rata purchase price of $47,727 was somehow unfair or that a different price should have been adopted.
[brief] . . .”).  Chance concerned a breach of contract dispute between two partners brought by the heirs of one partner after his death.  Fox, 210 N.J. at 422–23.  Although the action was commenced within the statute of limitations for contract suits, three important witnesses had died such that the defendant “was largely precluded from raising defenses that otherwise would have been available. ”  Id. at 423.  This case is not like Chance, where the passage of time had prejudiced the defendants by eroding evidence or rendering certain defenses impracticable to mount.  Although a calculation of just compensation (or restitution, in the unjust enrichment claim) will have to look backward to determine how much money is owed, State v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 514 (1983), that is no different from any other takings case which courts routinely adjudicate.  In this case, it is undisputed that the Property was worth more than the tax debt (Ja203, Nos. 8–9).
[brief] AT RESENTENCING  THE COURT MUST BE GUIDED BY THE DICTATES OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE CONTAINED IN BOTH THE 5TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONST. AND ART.  I, PAR. 5 OF THE N.J. CONST.(3T 3-17 to 5-3;DA 30-37)  ....................12  A.  Once Counsel Was Assigned to Defendant’s PCR, Counsel Had the Duty to Review the Entire Record and the Concomitant Obligation to Elucidate the Issues Raised; Add New Issues; and / or Alter the Application in Accordance with the Relevant Law  .................13  TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd.)  B. R. 3:21-10b(5)  Requires No Showing of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Nor Is It Subject to Any Time Constraints.  .................................................................14  C.  Defendant’s Sentence Under the Second Indictment Was Illegal, Making Defendant’s Sentence Under the Third Indictment Illegal as Well.  ..............................................................................................................15  D.  Because Defendant Has Completed the Sentence in Question and Because Consecutive Sentencing is Purely Punitive in Nature, Imposition of the Required Legal Sentence in Place of the Illegal Sentence at This Late Date Would Violate the Double Jeopardy Clause Contained in the Fifth Amend. of the United States Const. and Art. I, par. 11 of the New Jersey Const..................................................................................19
[brief] Second, the lower courts were correct in dismissing the appellants motion to reopen the case since there was no evidence at all to show this was a ‘UPEPA’ case.  Rather, it was the appellants opinion, and their opinion only, that it was this type of case.  As [...] put it to the appellants many times, “you’re making a big assumption here” (1T, 8-18); “we’re talking about ‘what ifs’ to some extent” (1T, 13-14); “But, again, you -- you make this leap that the -- the suit filed by the plaintiff in this matter was, in fact, frivolous; was, in fact, brought with intention to have your client expend resources.  I understand you’re saying that.  Saying so doesn’t make it so though. ” (1T, 18-3); and “But, counsel, you, again, you’re saying needless litigation.  That’s your position.  I understand it.  I appreciate it.  But what is before the Court demonstrating that this was needless or frivolous litigation at the juncture that the Court process or heard the original motion?” (1T, 21-12).  Procedural History
[brief] Copies of unpublished decisions cited are included in Appellant’s Appendix, per R. 1:36-3.  In numerous cases with facts similar to the instant appeal, this court has reversed CSC determinations denying an appellant’s request for a fact-finding hearing related to a State Policy violation determination.  Indeed, this court has consistently recognized the serious concerns presented in appeals of findings of violations of the State Policy.  In one case, the court reversed and remanded for a hearing where the CSC effectively decided a material factual question – whether the appellant had engaged in sexually harassing conduct the appointing authority determined violated its anti-discrimination policy, which he disputed.
[brief] ..........................................................14  Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC, 257 N.J. 247 (2024)  .....................................................................................44  Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Springs, LLC, A-2079-22, slip op.  (N.J. App. Div. December 22, 2023)  ..............................43  Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Interstate Racking & Shelving, No. A-1614-19 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2072 (App. Div. September 3, 2021)  ........12  Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490 (1963)  .......................................................................................37  Schmidt v. Smith, 144 N.J. 50 (1998)  .....................................................................................11, 12, 27, 31, 32, 33, 36, 43 Schmidt v. Smith, 294 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d, 155 N.J. 44 (1998)  ....................37  Smith v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 54 N.J. Super. 37 (Ch. Div.), aff’d, 56 N.J.  Super. 203 (App. Div. 1959)  .........39  Stein v. Felden, 17 N.J. Super. 311 (App. Div. 1952)  ............................................................19  Tejada de Tapia v. 74 Industries, Inc., Docket No. A-2643-21, slip op.  (N.J. App. Div. July 12, 2024)  ......................42, 43  Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company, 172 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1980)  .................................................................passim  Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165 (1992)  .........................................................................................17  W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506 (2023)  .........................................................................................13  Watson v. Stagg, 108 N.J.L. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1932)  ........................................................................29  Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001)  .........................................................................................17  STATUTES N.J.S.A. 34:2-21.17 .............................................................................................27  N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 ..................................................................................................19 N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -6 .......................................................................................24, 25 N.J.S.A. 34:15-2 ..................................................................................................19
[brief] Counsel contends there are photos, but, without expert testimony, this is irrelevant.  There are then citations to emails and conversations, but, again, nothing to confirm the statements made in the Appellant’s Brief.  Despite argument in prior Motions about a Certification from [...], the principal of [...], Appellant has never submitted one.  There are multiple claims about payments for repairs, failure to dispute the damage, but again, nothing to support these statements.  (App. Brief, p. 14).  The simple fact of the matter is that a Complaint was filed which failed under Court Rules to state a viable cause of action.
[brief] Standards for electric vehicle charging stations.  Electric vehicle charging stations utilizing parking stalls located in a parking lot or parking garage or in on-street parking spaces shall comply with the following standards:  (1)  Except when located in conjunction with single-family residences, electric vehicle charging stations shall be reserved for parking and charging of electric vehicles only.  (2)  Electric vehicle charging stations located within parking lots or garages may be included in the calculation of the minimum required parking spaces required pursuant to the Schedule E.  (3)  Signage.  Each electric vehicle charging station shall be posted with signage indicating the space is only for electric vehicle charging purposes.  Retail charging stations shall include information related to voltage and amperage levels; hour of operations if time limits or tow-away provisions are to be enforced by the property owner; usage fees; safety information; contact information for reporting when the equipment is not operating or other problems.  In addition, a logo advertising the manufacturer of the electric vehicle charging station equipment shall be permitted on said equipment, provided that said logo does not exceed one (1) square-foot.  (4)  Accessibility.  The design and location of the electric vehicle charging stations shall comply with the following barrier-free accessibility requirements:  (a)  Accessible vehicle charging stations shall be provided based on the following table:  | Number of EV Charging Stations | Minimum Accessible EV Charging Stations | |-------------------------------|----------------------------------------| | 0 – 2 | 0 | | 3 – 50 | 1 | | 51 – 100 | 2 |  (b)  Accessible charging stations shall comply with the requirements of §230-80.G.  (5)  Lighting.  Adequate site lighting shall be provided, which shall also comply with § 230-86.  (6)  Screening.  All equipment related to electric vehicle charging stations/units shall be screened, except for the electrical dispensing units which connect directly to consumer vehicles via power cords.  (7)  Equipment.  Equipment for electric vehicle charging stations shall comply with the following standards:  (a)  Equipment mounted on pedestals, lighting posts, bollards, or other devices for on-street charging station shall be designed and located as to not impede pedestrian travel or create trip hazards within the right-of-way.  (b)  Charging station outlets and connector shall be no less than thirty-six (36) inches and no higher than forty-eight (48) inches from the top of the surface where mounted and shall contain a retraction device or a place to hang cords and connectors above the ground surface.  (c)  Equipment shall be protected by wheel stops or concrete-filled bollards.  SECTION 18.
[directive] compliance assess when enforcement's ability law  Exigent circumstances.  limits  Nothing in Directive this D.  "exigent no-knock entry justify announce a warrant a where to knock executing and warrant's Johnson, execution.  See up arise the immediate in to lead the circumstances" 3 the reasonable particular and to such 624.  justification  Any must N.J. be at 168 without to exigencies entry lead the of case.  instance where any  In circumstances no-knock an execution does approved include warrant of that a not the announcing in or [...] entry warrant's the County shall report affiant the to that provision, General or designee the later Attorney 24 within hours, which Director will reported be to Section below.
[directive] Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed in any way to preclude the prosecutor from moving to vacate the plea in these Page 17 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) circumstances.  If the defendant commits a new bail violation after the plea is taken but before sentence is imposed (e.g., defendant commits another offense, or fails to appear at the sentencing hearing), the prosecutor may move to vacate the plea and withdraw and replace the plea offer to account for additional aggravating points under Aggravating Factor #2.  See Section 10.1.2.  All plea offers shall include a notice that the offer is subject to withdrawal and modification based upon new information about the offense or offender, or based upon defendant’s conduct occurring after the offer was issued (e.g., committing a new offense or failing to appear in court).  3.8
[brief] In addition to [...]’s discussion and rejection of the same reports defendant currently cites, the reports defendant now relies on do not meet defendant’s burden to prove that the State’s expert evidence is not “generally accepted” under Frye.  See Chun, 194 N.J. at 91-92 (“Proof of general acceptance does not mean that there must be complete agreement in the scientific community about the techniques, methodology, or procedures that underlie the scientific evidence. ”)  Regardless, the trial court found that tool mark identification is based on a “foundation of knowledge” that is “described in forensic text books, scientific literature, reference material, training manuals, and peer-reviewed scientific journals. ” (5T125-9 to 16).  The trial court’s decision that tool mark identification is acceptable expert testimony under Frye as an affirmation of multiple decades of New Jersey jurisprudence.