ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court held the provision drafted by Plaintiff failed to comply with New Jersey's rule of consumer contractual interpretation requiring waivers of constitutional or statutory rights to be stated “clearly and unambiguously. ”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., 219 N.J. 430, 435 (2014).  Underlying New Jersey's rule is the notion that agreements to arbitrate, “like any other contract, must be the product of mutual assent,” Id. at 442 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and because “an average member of the public may not know—without some explanatory comment—that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one's claim adjudicated in a court of law,” Id. at 442, arbitration clauses will not be construed to encompass constitutional or statutory rights absent some “concrete manifestation” of the intention to do so, *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs.*, 168 N.J. 124, (2001); The *Atalese* Court made clear that its requirement that the arbitration clause contained a clear statement that a party was waiving their right to go to Court was directed at unsophisticated consumers.
[brief] As set forth in the Certification of traffic expert [...], which was provided in support of the Plaintiffs’ June 28, 2021 Motion concerning a traffic signal on Route 33 (Ra168), Plaintiffs and their professionals, including [...], attended several pre-application meetings with the [...] (“[...]”) in an effort to provide the then-proposed traffic signal as envisioned in the Prior Approval.  The [...] has sole jurisdiction over State Route 33, including any proposed traffic signals on that highway.  At the April 8, 2015 meeting, the [...] communicated significant support for both the traffic signal and the eastbound median left turn lane.  (Ba18)  In reliance on the [...]’s prior expressed support for both the traffic signal and the eastbound median left turn lane, Plaintiffs did not oppose the installation of a traffic light condition as memorialized in the Prior Approval.  On April 6, 2021, [...] attended another pre-application meeting with the [...] (remotely).  Present were representatives of the [...] and the parties, including [...].  The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Route 33 access for Plaintiffs and follow up on the [...] pre-application meetings held on April 8, 2015 and February 14, 2019 in anticipation of an application to the [...].  In a reversal of its prior expressed support for both the traffic signal and the eastbound median left turn lane, the [...] indicated at that meeting that approval of a traffic light on Route 33 is doubtful at best and, at a minimum, seeking such approval would be a long, expensive, multi-stage process with little chance of success.  Ba19.  More specifically, during the April 6, 2021 meeting, the [...] advised Plaintiffs that, to seek such a traffic signal, Plaintiffs would first have to file an application for an access level change with [...] changing the highway access designation for Route 33.  (Id)  Such applications are extremely lengthy and expensive and would also require the approval of [...] (which opposes Plaintiffs’ development), [...], [...], and [...].  Ba20.  Further, the [...] advised that, even if the access level change were permitted, the granting of an application for approval of the traffic signal, which would be another lengthy process to begin thereafter, would remain doubtful because the location in question was too close to existing signals on Route 33, given the [...]’s spacing requirement in its regulations.  Id.  Thus, Plaintiffs sought relief from any requirement to provide a traffic signal on Route 33.  Facts Relevant to the Plaintiffs’ Civil Rights Claims
[brief] POINT  I  BECAUSE NEITHER THE ARREST WARRANT FOR A NON-RESIDENT NOR CONSENT OR APPARENT AUTHORITY ALLOWED POLICE TO ENTER AND SEARCH THE HOME, THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.  A.  The Police Entry Into The Dwelling Cannot Be Justified By The Arrest Warrant For Non-Resident [...].  B. [...]'s Act Of “Stepping Aside” For The Police Did Not Equate To Consent To Enter.  C. [...]'s Act Of Answering The Door Did Not, By Itself, Provide The Police With A Reasonable Basis To Believe That He Had Apparent Authority To Consent To A Search Of The Premises.  D.  The State Has Waived Any Exigent-Circumstances Argument By Declining To Raise It Below.  POINT II
[directive] Payment advance to nonprofit organization agency with which local unit has 4OA service contract; resolution; conditions of  Notwithstanding the provisions N.J.S. 40A :5-16, the governing body of any local unit may, by resolution, provide for and authorize payment of an advance to any nonprofit organization or agency with which the local unit has entered into a service contract, for the purpose of meeting service program start-up costs; provided, however, that:
[brief] Further, there is serious cause for concern about the reliability of fingerprint analysis that stems from a database search.  As explained above, the use of a database search to find a candidate for analysis leads to “close non-matches” (CNMs), fingerprints that look very similar to the one left behind at a scene, but are nonetheless left by another person.  In other words, not only are database searches likely to give rise to the most complicated prints to analyze, but they will give rise to a fingerprint that looks very similar to the latent.  To make matters worse, if the actual person who left the fingerprint is not in the database, the fingerprint of an innocent person will not only be presented as a match, but it will be incredibly difficult for an examiner to realize he is dealing with a false positive.  In short, the method used in this case—developed suspect prints for ACE-V comparison through a database search—is unreliable and inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 702 and Olenowski.
[brief] The Board never explains "the benefits of the deviation" (DBb12), and that is because there is no public benefit.  The Board argues that five-foot setbacks are "consistent with other structures in the neighborhood" (DBb11).  The Governing Body does not want that so-called 'consistency.'  The Governing Body wants minimum-ten-foot setbacks, hence the zoning requirement.  Violating the setback because 'everyone else did it' is anything but a special reason for (c)(2) variance relief.  The Board repeats the expert's demonstrably false claim that the Applicant "actually increased our setback" (DBb12).
[brief] Page  Order of the Honorable [...], dated January 5, 2024 .......................Pa1 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page Order of the Honorable [...], dated January 5, 2024 .........................Pa1 Notice of Appeal, dated February 12, 2024 ..........................................................Pa2 Appellate Division Civil Case Information Statement, dated February 12, 2024 ..................................................................................Pa6 Complaint, dated December 8, 2021 ........................................................................Pa10 Civil Case Information Statement, dated December 8, 2021 ..............................Pa16 Answer, dated February 21, 2022 ...........................................................................Pa17 Civil Case Information Statement, dated February 21, 2022 ..............................Pa21 Statement of Items Submitted in Connection with Motion for Summary Judgment ........................................................................................................Pa22 Notice of Motion, by Defendant [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]”), in Support of Order granting Summary Judgment, dated December 4, 2023 ..................................................................................Pa24 Defendant [...]’ Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 4, 2023 .................................................................Pa26 Defendant [...]’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 4, 2023 (Omitted herein)  Certification of [...], for Defendant [...], in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 4, 2023 .............................................Pa31 Exhibit A: (i) Complaint, dated December 8, 2021 (Reproduced herein at pp. Pa10-Pa16) (ii) Track Assignment Notice ..............................................................................Pa33  Exhibit B: Excerpts from Deposition Transcript of [...], dated August 24, 2022 .................................................................Pa35 Exhibit C: Expert Report by [...], dated January 30, 2023 ..............................................................................Pa53  Exhibit D: Excerpts from Deposition Transcript of [...], MSCE, PE, dated July 17, 2023 .........................................................Pa66 Exhibit E: Photograph ..............................................................................Pa81 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant [...]’ Statement of Material Facts, dated December 26, 2023 .................................................................Pa83 Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 26, 2023 (Omitted herein) Request for Oral Argument, dated December 26, 2023 .................................Pa86 Certification of [...], for Plaintiff, in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 26, 2023 ........................................Pa87
[brief] See Willoughby, 306 N.J. Super. at 277-79 (noting substantial traffic impacts, as well as political upheaval related to municipal elections and an usurpation by the town planning board of the municipal governing body’s zoning authority); Concerned Citizens, 370 N.J. Super. at 446-47 (noting traffic issues, as well as improper redevelopment designation of public lands, the “expenditure of public funds through the issuance of bonds,” and “numerous violations and misapplication of the LRHL”).  As set forth above, there are no traffic concerns and no other issues present in this case to support a public concern.
[brief] On April 28, 2022, members of the [...] Community again protested Respondent and her social media posts at a meeting of the Board.  (Ca120-122).  Respondent – and the Board itself – were asked to take accountability for Respondent’s posts.  (Ca121) (“[...] stated that it is disgusting and insane for not taking accountability”).  Instead of taking accountability, Respondent grinned.  (Ca120) (Board minutes: “[...] stated stop with the grin while defending the posts. ”).  27.
[directive] Furthermore, every police agency shall accept and investigate anonymous complaints.  5.1.3  The internal affairs investigator, supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint will explain the agency's disciplinary procedures to the person making the complaint.  The officer shall advise the complainant that he or she will be kept informed of the status of the complaint, if requested, and its ultimate disposition.  To best accomplish this, the agency shall prepare a fact sheet or brochure that includes information on the agency's internal affairs process and what role the complainant can expect to play.
[brief] Maybe it started being temporary, but again, the letter of representation then comes from our office, one of the protected activities under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination…she never sees it again.  (8T:76:10-12; DA047-DA070; DA071-DA073).  Plaintiff’s Counsel misled the jury as to the severity of conduct needed to sustain a hostile work environment claim:  All you have to believe is that the conduct happened…it was because she was Jewish, and…the conduct was inappropriate and he should be punished for it.  That’s it.  (7T:61:17-21).  Similarly, Plaintiff’s counsel misled the jury by making disparaging, conclusory statements that were unsupported by evidence describing Appellants’ alleged conduct:  It’s malicious to see [Plaintiff] complaining…no regard for her feelings…logging into her computer when you knew her mother was sick…that’s malicious.  (7T:83:16-25—84:1).  The trial record is void of evidence that Appellants knew anything about Plaintiff’s mother at all, let alone any sickness.  Further, Plaintiff’s counsel misrepresented to the jury that Plaintiff took medications for psychiatric treatment in connection with the alleged discrimination, which may have caused harm to her body and that somehow Appellants are indirectly responsible for that harm:  She went through years of psychiatric -- psychological treatment, taking medication in her body, some of which isn’t always good for her.  (7T:69:21-24).  The record at trial is void of evidence establishing the duration of time that Plaintiff took medicine and what effect, if any, the medicine had on her.  iii.  Plaintiff’s Counsel Abused Her Right to Forcefully Advocate for Her Client by Using Her Personal Opinion and Disparage Comments During Summation to Malign the Credibility of Appellants to the Jury
[brief] In fact, full faith and credit was a means of unifying the nation, not \(^2\)  In response to Bruen, New Jersey passed sweeping legislation that imposed a new set of requirements, which included a ban on guns in vehicles.  This new requirement has been preliminary enjoined by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Koons v. New Jersey, 22-7464 (Bumb, J. May 16, 2023).  After a historical analysis, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs are “likely to prevail on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to [the] prohibition on functional firearms in vehicles. ”  Da 46. creating a disjointed system in which the strength of our rights is dependent upon where we live.  By not recognizing Pennsylvania gun licenses, New Jersey has created a disjointed system which seeks to criminalize the law-abiding.  New Jersey is “prevent[ing] law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms. ”  Bruen, 597 U.S. at 71.  Those who reside in Pennsylvania and follow the Pennsylvania procedure become criminals by simply crossing a bridge.  Even worse, the law-abiding now risk becoming criminals simply because a flight gets diverted to New Jersey, or bad weather causes an individual to fly out of New Jersey instead of Philadelphia.  By choosing to honor only those carry permits issued by New Jersey, New Jersey is effectively relegating the right to carry to a state right, when in actuality it is a national right guaranteed by the Constitution.  The right does not end, or change in any way, when an individual crosses from one state into another.  B.
[brief] *Id.*, at 6a-7a; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e and 1692f.  Appellant, however, did not allege that the letter vendor misused his information or transferred it to someone else.  He does not even allege that any human being at the letter vendor (or elsewhere) ever viewed his private or account information, as opposed to the vendor assimilating the information into letters for printing and mailing via automated processes.  Nor did Appellant allege that Respondent engaged in any atypical or “abusive” disclosure of information which Congress sought to curtail.  *See id.*, at 2a-8a.  More generally, as the Superior Court noted, Appellant does not allege that he suffered any past or present injury – whether physical, financial, emotional, or reputational – because of Respondent’s use of a letter vendor or the letter’s inclusion of payment plan options and a disclosure regarding the effect of a payment on the statute of limitations.  *See id*; T8-9.  He does not allege that the time-barred debt disclosure or offered payment options caused him to make, or refrain from making, a payment on the debt, or otherwise affected his actions or decision making in any way.  *Id.*  Ultimately, the Superior Court dismissed Appellant’s claims on three grounds: 1) Appellant’s lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction; 2) Appellant’s failure to articulate a claim under his letter vendor theory for FDCPA liability; and 3) Appellant’s failure to state an FDCPA claim under his theory of a deceptive time-barred disclosure.
[directive] Evidence.  determining whether to issue a temporary extreme risk  In protective order, the court may examine under oath the petitioner and any witnesses the of petitioner may produce.  The court may consider the sworn oral testimony a petitioner or or witness who, although not physically present court, identifies himself herself, in of of specifies the purpose the request, and disclose the basis the petition.  Such sworn or of oral testimony may be communicated to the court by telephone, radio other means electronic communication.  The court officer or law enforcement officer assisting the of petitioner shall contemporaneously record such sworn oral testimony by means a recording device, if available; otherwise, adequate notes summarizing what is said shall be made by the judge.  This sworn testimony shall be deemed to be an affidavit for the of of of or purposes issuance an order.
[directive] While different agencies may confront different historic inequities, it may be appropriate for any agency to consider whether the geographic distribution of its enforcement activities is equitable.  In addition, when determining which investigations and enforcement action to pursue, it is appropriate for civil enforcement agencies to consider whether those harmed by a violation of the law are likely to be able to protect their rights and secure appropriate remedies by other means, or if instead, action by a civil enforcement agency is likely to be their only realistic recourse.
[brief] Pensions for public employees serve a public purpose.  A primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1963) § 12.141.  They are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement to continued and faithful service.  Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.  McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).
[brief] The timing of the down payment was a more significant factor in Plaintiff’s inability to access $70,000 than the actual dollar amount.  Defendant elected to secure a HELOC loan against the Chester house to pay the down payment, but provided no proof to indicate that it was necessary.  (2T 131:21-22)  It is equally likely that he, too, did not feel comfortable liquidating other assets or utilizing that much of his available cash.  $140,000 was less than two months’ income for him at the time, although it was approximately 35% of the purchase price of the townhome.  And since Defendant provided no financial information of any kind, it is impossible to say what his net worth was in 2011, or what it had grown to by 2018.  [...] admits that no financial information was exchanged or even requested in 2011 prior to the parties signing the Settlement Agreement.  His “mediator” never reviewed financials from either party.  (3T 12:13-17; 66:3-4)  There was no discovery exchanged.  (3T 13:22-14:5; 99:13-22)  Having lived with Plaintiff for more than twenty years, however, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s financial condition at the time he signed the Settlement Agreement.  (2T 32:6-9)  He knew that he financially contributed to the relationship by paying the housing costs, while Plaintiff paid for their groceries.  (2T 31:23-25)  The Settlement Agreement simply enumerated that support going forward.  Defendant has been the beneficiary of this lack of information exchange.  The Court found:  There is no requirement on attorneys to engage in discovery if the goal of the parties is to reach a resolution quickly and amicably.  Clients have the right to make the final decision as to whether, when and how to settle their cases and as to economic and other positions to be taken with respect to issues in the case….  Neither party provided their financials.  They entered into this transaction based upon a lengthy and long relationship and this court will not utilize the statute of frauds to accomplish a fraud.
[brief] (Pa000658–666).  First, Plaintiffs sought to add a contract clause theory to their claim that the MSRA violates the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.  Second, Plaintiffs sought to add a standalone claim for alleged breach of the New Jersey Constitution, based on the same theories underpinning their claim for purported violation of the Civil Rights Act.  (Ibid.).  Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ motion based on futility, citing among other things, the Superior Officers decision, which was decided after the initial motion to dismiss briefing in this matter.
[brief] In its pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) states “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for an offense committed while released . . . pending disposition of a previous offense, the term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense”; however, the sentencing court may impose a non-consecutive sentence if, after considering “the character and conditions of the defendant,” the court finds the “imposition of consecutive sentences would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others.
[brief] For example, in *Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner*, 478 N.J. Super. 426, 432 (App. Div. 2024), a borough sued its former counsel for professional malpractice arising out of the counsel’s representation of the borough in housing litigation.  The matter was ultimately deemed frivolous, however, as it was clearly a politically-motivated suit brought by the borough council.  See also *Gooch v. Choice Entertaining Corp.*, 355 N.J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 2002) (third-party litigation alleging that statements made in the course of first-party litigation were defamatory was frivolous); *DeBrango*, 328 N.J. Super. at 219 (lawsuit brought by couple against bank for funds allegedly withdrawn by their employee-son-in-law was frivolous, based upon evidence that the son-in-law did not work at the bank when the fraudulent conduct occurred).
[brief] In denying defendant’s motion to introduce this information to impeach [...], the court applied the wrong rule for this matter.  The Court herein relied on N.J.R.E. 609 B and N.J.R.E. 403 to make her decision.  The trial court ruled as follows:  “I’m looking at the rule now exactly.  And it says -- this is N.J.R.E. 609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime, (b):  “If, on the date the trial begins, more than ten years have passed since the witnesses conviction for a crime or release from confinement, whichever is later” – and this is conviction of a crime, but it also applies to prior bad acts, and I think that’s what you’re saying as well – “then the evidence of the conviction is admissible only if the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect with the proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof. ”  You have the burden of proof.  I’m finding the probative value does not outweigh the prejudicial effect.  I gave my reasons.  It’s not even clear that – as it was in the other cases – that it’s a lie.  And I don’t know how else to say it.  So it would have a prejudicial effect.  We would have a whole mini trial, and the jurors would have to decide do they agree with [...]. ” (13T:39-13 to; 40-8).  N.J.R.E. Rule 609 B does not apply in this matter.