ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendants-Appellants [...], [...], and [...] (“Appellants”) appeal to this Court for relief from the February 28, 2024, Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., disqualifying prior counsel and requiring that the Earle Appellants proceed with separate counsel from Appellant Evans.  In partial compliance with that Order, [...] (“[...]”) and [...], Esq.  (“[...]”) do not represent Appellants here.  Unfortunately, that is where Appellants’ compliance comes to an end.  In willful defiance of the Order under review, Appellants appear before this Court with joint representation by [...] (“[...]”).  Nowhere in Appellants’ papers is the decision to willfully violate Judge Zazzali-Hogan’s Order explained or even acknowledged.  Seeking leave to appeal the court below was Appellants’ right, but they had no right to ignore the Order under review.  Because of Appellants’ failure to abide by the Order under review, this Court should dismiss the pending appeal without more.
[brief] This mandatory prohibition expressed by the DEP in its implementing regulations means that a consistency determination under the relevant WQMP is a precondition or prerequisite determination that must be made by the DEP before any other associated permit or approval can be issued that could have an impact on water quality.  Therefore, if anything in the proposed HAD exemption was inconsistent with the adopted areawide plan then the DEP and this Court would be constrained to stop its analysis right there and deny the proposed exemption for that reason alone.  The requisite consistency determination is not meant to be an afterthought, or limited in scope, it must include all of the foreseeable and potential impacts from the proposed activity.
[brief] After that dismissal, [...]’s attorney, [...], Esquire, wrote to the Court to request that he no longer receive court notifications:  Dear [...], I am writing to inform you that we no longer represent any parties in the above-referenced matter.  I respectfully request to be removed from case list.  Thank you for your continued courtesies in this matter.  (556a.)  (emphasis added).  The jury was instructed that both [...] and Goldsmith had been dismissed from the case on procedural grounds.
[brief] DEP rejected [...]’s attempt to reclassify the soils on the Property during the permitting process because DEP found that [...] initially failed to perform sufficient testing.  (Aa124).  [...] resubmitted its application, correcting the deficiency and recalculating using the values of the native soils, as admitted by [...].  (Ab12).  \textsuperscript{15} https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj_swbmp_13.pdf, at 2.  Finally, [...] contends that [...] failed to correctly calculate the SHWT and infiltration rates according to the BMP Manual for BMP 201 and BMP 271.  (Ab13-14).  The SWHT is the highest elevation in a specific location to which groundwater rises during the year.\footnote{https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj\_swmp\_12.pdf}  BMP 201 and BMP 271 are small-scale infiltration basins which discharge into Basin 3.  (Aa3066; Aa88).  Basin 3 is a constructed wetland basin located in the southwest portion of the Property.  (Aa19).  [...] argues that [...] should have calculated groundwater mounding by using the highest SHWT and the slowest infiltration rate pursuant to the BMP Manual, and that its failure to do so results in groundwater mounding greater than the water table separation for both BMP 201 and BMP 271.  However, DEP found that both these BMPs met the groundwater recharge requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4(b)(1)(i) because [...]’s hydrologic and hydraulic analysis showed the stormwater management measures maintained more than 100% of the average annual pre-construction groundwater recharge volume.
[brief] When it comes to statutes, one hopes Congress channels Dr. Seuss: “I meant what I said and I said what I meant. ”  Unfortunately, the Mad Hatter teaches that meaning what you say and saying what you mean are “not the same thing a bit. ”  And sometimes, a statute might say something that Congress did not necessarily mean.  But courts have to start with the presumption that Congress meant what it said.  So when a statute says something, a court must give effect to that enactment.  And if it turns out that’s not what Congress meant, then it will be up to Congress to fix it.  At bottom, this dispute is about whether Congress meant what it said in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
[brief] “[...] took over servicing the [...]' loan on July 1, 2012.  The foreclosure action against the Property was initiated on June 10, 2011.  Since default is a precondition for foreclosure, the record suggests that [...] began servicing the [...]' loan after it had fallen into default.  Consequently, the Court will consider whether the [...] have alleged that [...] engaged in activities prohibited by the FDCPA.  It is a violation of the FDCPA for a debt collector to "communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt . . . at the consumer's place of employment if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer's employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication."
[brief] See Pa122-123.  On August 5, 2022, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, citing procedural grounds stating “Denied as the movant fails to provide the Court with a courtesy copy of this 136-page motion, which is in violation of the Chief Justice’s Omnibus Order requiring all submissions exceeding 35 pages to be made to the Court in hard copy. ”  See Pa133-134.  Simultaneously, the trial court granted Defendant’s cross-motion to bar Plaintiff from introducing evidence produced after the close of discovery, stating:  The motion to amend was denied on procedural grounds.  The motion to bar is granted because discovery was obtained outside the discovery end date.  The Plaintiff did not seek to extend discovery beyond the May 26, 2022 discovery end date but rather went ahead and conducted discovery without seeking that permission.  As such, the discovery conducted beyond the discovery end date is barred.  Trial remains.
[directive] 3000 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 1. stopnia (1)  2000 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 2. stopnia (2)  1000 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 3. stopnia (3)  750 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 4. stopnia (4) porządku publicznego lub (5)  500 USD w przypadku wykroczenia naruszenia drobnego naruszenia porządku publicznego Kara na D.E.D.R. łącznie USD udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, Formularz (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Polish Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Polish  You will be required to pay a mandatory drug enforcement and demand reduction (D.E.D.R.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you plead guilty?
[brief] (Da21; 3T9-1 to 3).  The court also sentenced defendant below the mandatory extended term of imprisonment required under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) due to his prior conviction for Possession of CDS with Intent to Distribute.  Indeed, there is no indication anywhere in the record that the State agreed not to seek an extended term of confinement, even though the box next to the question on the plea agreement is checked.  And in fact, the State noted during sentencing that defendant “is mandatory extended term because of his 2014 felony.  So, the ten flat is the minimum for him. ”  (3T9-1 to 3).  So in the event this matter is remanded, [...] would be unable to reimpose the same seven-year sentence.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) (noting courts “shall” sentenced defendants to extended term upon motion of prosecutor); State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 23 (1992) (“Once the prosecutor invokes the statute and establishes the existence of a prior conviction, the court’s role is limited to determining the term of years within the extended-term range to be imposed. ”).  She would be obligated to impose at least a ten-year prison term unless the State waived the extended-term requirement.  Therefore, as defendant received an incredibly beneficial sentence less than the terms agreed to at his plea hearing and he failed to establish the judge erred in her balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, [...]’s sentencing should be affirmed.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) ..........................................................................................1 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b) .....................................................................................2, 32 N.J.S.A. 2C:27-5..............................................................................................2, 32 N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4e............................................................................................2 RULES R. 1:12-1(g) ....................................................................................................24 R. 1:7-2.............................................................................................................2 R. 2:10-2...........................................................................................................2 MISCELLANEOUS 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/24-1.8(a)..............................................................21 Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct...............................................22 CDC Covid Data Tracker, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#maps_deaths_total ........................................................................................................19 Sponsor’s Statement to S.775 (L. 2002, c. 26) .............................................19 Sponsor’s Statement to S.1296 (L. 2002, c. 26) .............................................19 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] As [...] succinctly states in his letter of April 21st, 2023, however, “[...]’s insistence is both misplaced and irrelevant to our transaction. ”  Da249.  Even at oral argument on [...]’s Motion to dissolve restraints on July 25, 2023, counsel for [...] takes issue with the May 4th, 2023 amendment, initialed by [...]’s principal, sent to [...] by [...], because, he stated, “…we didn’t know what was real because we’re dealing with the buyer and not the seller.  And it’s the seller that needs to provide this to us, and not the buyer. ”
[brief] ”  (Pa14.)  Plaintiffs’ proffered interpretation of the word “design” is not only trivial (as they point out in their brief), but is also illogical and unworkable in practice.  Plaintiffs’ argument that the “plain language of this phrase removes the purpose of the design from the equation” would mean that any time there is an increase in grade, one would not be allowed to measure from that new grade, regardless of the reason for the increased in grade.  This is clearly not what the ordinance states or means, and indeed, is an argument that was carefully considered and debunked by the trial court.  (Pa13-Pa15.)
[brief] No person shall be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretense whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his faith and judgment; nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform.  4.  There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to another; no religious or racial test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust.  *N.J. Constitution*, Art. I, §§ 3 & 4.
[brief] He was cross-examined about testifying for the State and his criminal history extensively.  (28T:156-8 to 167-8).  Indeed, at one point, defense counsel read each and every name he had provided information on or testified to, other than [...]: [...], [...], Brian [...]man, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].\(^{10}\) (28T:167-9 to 168-19).
[directive] a.  In cases where the defendants were convicted and no appeals or post-conviction relief motions are pending, after a period of 5 years from the date of the conviction or upon the defendants’ expiration of sentence, whichever comes later, a destruction authorization may be submitted.  If there is a legal owner of the firearm who is not a defendant in the case and is not otherwise legally disqualified from possessing the firearm, pursuant to any provision of Chapter 58 of the New Jersey Criminal Code, rather than destroying the weapon it should be returned to the owner, if said owner is in possession of necessary permits.  b.  Prior to any destruction authorization being granted, no firearms evidence shall be considered for destruction until all necessary tracing tests and IBIS submissions have been completed.  c.  In all cases where all defendants have been charged and all defendants in the case are deceased, upon proof of death being submitted, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted.  d.  If the weapon is related to a Homicide case in addition to this section, see Section 1 above.  e.  If the weapon is related to a Sex Crimes case, in addition to this section, see Section 2 above.
[brief] ability to file a subsequent action that either seeks to enforce compliance with the Mount Laurel doctrine or acknowledge compliance with that doctrine. ” (Id.).  Regarding the dismissal, the Township’s Administrator said, “We basically think the process is unfair.  We’ve built more than our fair share of affordable housing so far…  We just decided we’re not going to play this anymore. ”  (Ja13).  [...]’s Mayor called the affordable housing compliance process “egregiously unfair” and said, “[i]t’s time legislators step up to the plate and take us out of these unfair, court-mandated housing regulations. ” (Id.).  Since the Township dismissed the DJ Action, the Legislature did “step up to the plate,” but to affirm the Mount Laurel doctrine and address municipalities’ fair share obligations moving forward, which resulted in a 346-unit prospective need obligation for [...] in connection with the period 2025-2035 (the “Fourth Round”).  That obligation is separate and apart from the Township’s shortfall of at least 602 units for the Third Round, which has already been determined by the trial court in this matter.  Upon information and belief, since the Dismissal Order, the --- 2  On March 20, 2024, the Legislature amended the Fair Housing Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301, et seq., pursuant to which the Department of Community Affairs (“DCA”) calculated [...]’s Fourth Round prospective need obligation to be 346 units.  (https://nj.gov/dca/dlps/pdf/FourthRoundCalculation_Methodology.pdf).  Although [...] could have taken action to accept or challenge the DCA’s calculation by February 3, 2025, it is believed that the Township took no action whatsoever.  (https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/civil/affordable-housing/monmouth).  As such, [...], does not have any immunity from exclusionary zoning litigation for the Fourth Round.  See N.J.S.A. 52:27D-304.1(f)(1).  Township has not filed any action to “acknowledge compliance” with its Third Round obligation.  B.
[brief] Even if the Court or Special Master were to determine the site was suitable for the affordable units, it does not alleviate or change the reality of the zoning restrictions applicable to the site which Redeveloper KNEW OF when the site was purchased.  The lot the redeveloper purchased is a triangular shaped parcel in the CBD-15, central business district zone.  The lot is undersized for the zone at 9,245 square feet where 15,000 square feet are required and has insufficient lot depth of 40.8 feet where 75 feet is required.  The redeveloper later filed an application with the [...] seeking to construct seven (7) affordable housing units on the property.  In addition to the deficient lot area and lot depth referenced above, the application also would have required "c" variances for the following: 1. Insufficient front yard setback from Kinderkamack Road; 2. Insufficient rear yard setback; 3. Insufficient number of parking spaces; and, 4.  Improper or insufficient sidewalks.  The variances are detailed in the report from the Board's Planner, [...], PA, dated October 1, 2021.  Of greater importance for the purposes of this appeal, and as set forth in the Borough's original Opposition, is the fact that the application also requires a "D" or use variance.
[brief] See, e.g., *Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI*, 856 F.3d 230, 242-43 (3rd Cir. 2017) (“At the first trial, nearly identical evidence resulted in a hung jury.  A hung jury can signal that the outcome of a case was close and support a finding that an error on retrial prejudiced a convicted defendant ….  [E]ven a single prior hung jury has been deemed sufficient to indicate that the case was close and an error on retrial was not harmless.  Here, the fact that [the] first jury was unable to reach a verdict after hearing [an] unequivocal identification strongly suggests that the evidence was not as ‘overwhelming’ as the state would like us to believe. ”); *United States v. Paguio*, 114 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We cannot characterize the error as harmless, because the hung jury at the first trial persuades us that the case was close and might have turned on [an erroneous] evidence [decision].”).
[brief] The CSC’s Determination that No Hearing Was Warranted Because DCF Did Not Seek To Impose Discipline Was Erroneous.  The CSC held that no hearing was required because [...]’s matter did not implicate “heightened due process concerns” because DCF was not seeking to impose discipline against [...] in connection with the LOD.  (Aa17).  The CSC noted that “the Appellate Division has, in innumerable cases, found that Commission decisions, in non-discipline cases, can be determined based on the written record. ” (Aa17).  The CSC’s holding ignores the significant reputational harm that a substantiated State Policy determination can have.  The allegation that [...] purposefully misnamed the Complainant are serious and harmful to [...] and the union he was elected to lead.  Requiring disciplinary action as a requirement for a fact-finding hearing, under these circumstances, permits a State department nearly unchecked freedom to use the State Policy as a tool to make determinations of serious misconduct against a union president it does not like, knowing that it will not be required to prove its findings in a fact-finding hearing.  DCF’s citation to alleged “Prior Discipline” demonstrates the nature of this risk.  In conclusion, it is evident that the Commission found material and controlling fact disputes existed but resolved them on a bare written record and without providing [...] a fair and full opportunity to challenge the disputed allegations in a hearing, under oath, and with the requisite due process protections pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1.
[brief] The first affirmative defense stated:  Affirmative Defense - Not a Compulsory Dispute - No Consent  AD justification:  'Lack of Jurisdiction - Article Second of the AFI Med-Pay forum agreement states in pertinent part that:  No company shall be required, without its written consent, to arbitrate any claim or suit if: (b) such claim, or suit creates any cause of action or liabilities that do not currently exist in law or equity; or *** (h) medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited by statute or judicial decision.  [...] DOES NOT consent to arbitrate this matter.  The New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Grover v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221 (1979):  In the absence of a consensual understanding, neither party is entitled to force the other to arbitrate their dispute.  Subsumed in this principle is the proposition that only those issues may be arbitrated which the parties have agreed shall be.  Stated another way, the arbitrator's authority is circumscribed by whatever provisions and conditions have been mutually agreed upon.  Any action taken beyond that authority is impeachable.  Id. at 228-29; see also, Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 469 (2009).' (Da130 – Da138).  That affirmative defense was ruled on by the arbitrator at which time the arbitrator stated:  Denied for Respondent 1 - Affirmative Defense denied.
[brief] First, Defendants have not failed to pay an officer an agreed upon wage, or sought to claw back wages actually paid.  As the Superior Court found, the 2016 MOAs did not result in “unpaid wages,” and Plaintiffs fail to offer a single case supporting their wage claim in the context of a contingent agreement (let alone the MSRA).  Plaintiffs simply do not have a claim for “unpaid wages,” because the contingency envisioned by the MOAs never arose.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ reference that the MSRA “did not amend New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1a, et seq., and N.J.S.A. 34:11-57, et seq.,” (Pb18), is of no moment as there were no “earned” wages.  On appeal Plaintiffs also criticize the Superior Courts alleged failure to analyze the individual elements of their causes of action.  The cases cited by Plaintiffs, however, demonstrate that such analysis is not needed, where each claim is predicated on a purported breach that is not supported factually or legally in the Complaint.  (Pb23-27) (citing Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (claim for breach of contract requires “breach of that contract”); Wade v. Kessler Inst., 343 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2001)( breach of good faith and fair dealing requires “the defendant engaged in conduct, apart from its contractual obligations, without good faith and for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of the rights and benefits under the contract”); Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 339-340 (2021) (promissory estoppel requires “a clear and definite promise”); Portillo v. Nat’l Frieght, Inc., 2022 U.S. District.  LEXIS 103186 (D.N.J. June 9, 2022) (“[u]nless an exception applies, the [New Jersey Wage Payment Law] requires ‘every employer [to] pay the full amount of wages due to his employees. ”).  Plaintiffs citation to blackletter law for the elements of each of their causes of action does nothing to rehabilitate their claims, where each is based on (a) a contingency that never came to fruition, (b) which was subject to modification under the MSRA, and (c) ultimately ratified by the Unions in the settlement agreement.  POINT III
[brief] OCEAN BEACH SURF CLUB UNIT  1’s BRIEF  [...], Esq. (021041988) (dclark@dilworthlaw. com)  Of Counsel [...], Esq. (171732015) (charney-norcia@dilworthlaw.com)  On the Brief  [...] [...] (732) 530-8822 (Phone) (732) 530-6770 (Facsimile)  Attorneys for Appellant, Ocean Beach Surf Club Unit  1  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] (29T 186-17 to 189-8).  In discussing the plan for the murder, Defendant and [...] agreed not to conduct it at the Ramada Inn because there were many surveillance cameras there, so they decided on the [...] as the murder location because [...] was familiar with this location as a place they had conducted business in the past.  (29T 191-25 to 192-13).  [...] stated that he arranged by text message to meet with [...] on the night of March 5, 2018, for a supposed payment of his outstanding debt.  (29T 193-2 to 193-21).  The murder was to be carried out with a gun that [...] had previously provided to Defendant, a black Ruger handgun, for general protection.  (29T 197-13 to 199-11).