ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 2C:52-6  NJ.S.A.  A.  Applicant Information (irst I Name: Last Middle I I Date of Birth  State Bureau ofldentification Number (SBI), if available Telephone Number Home Address: Street I I City Zip Code State B.  Arrest/Cbarge(s) to be Expunged  (1)  arrest on/issuance of on the charge of violating (date)  "-(c_om-'p'-la_in_t_nu_m_be_r..:..)  ---------- .N..J.S.A./Ordinance ----------------' (complaint number)  (2)  arrest on/issuance of (date) -'-----"---- -..:.----------  Qn the charge of violating .N..J.S.A./Ordinance arrest on/issuance of (complaint number) (date) (3)  -'---'---- "-----------on the charge of violating .N..J.S.A./Ordinance arrest on/issuance of (date) (complaint number) (4) the charge of violating =~;;,;,;;;.~=.:.:.!..----------on .N..J.S.A./Ordinance (date) ·(complaint number)  arrest on/issuance of (5)  -'----'-----'-----------on the charge of violating .N..J.S.A./Ordinance D  If more than five rows are required, please check the box and attach a separate sheet of paper with the additional information.  C.  Relief  Sought  I am requesting that the Superior Court grant me an Expungement Order as authorized by 2C:52-6, directing the N.J.S.A. ofthe Court, and all relevant criminaVjuvenile justice and law enforcement services of Municipal Court Administrator, Clerk the State ofNew Jersey to expunge from their records all evidence of the an-est or charge, and all proceedings in this matter, and further directing any New Jersey law enforcement agency which sent records ofthe arrest or charge and proceedings to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other law enforcement agency outside ofNew Jersey to inform the recipient and the agencies designated to retain control of expunged records to take sufficient precautions to ensure that such records and information are not released.  Signature Date  If a printout of the complaint disposition has not been by the Applicant; all dispositions referenced above att~ched must be printed and attached by municipal court staff prior to review by the Municipal Court Jud,e.  For Municipal Court Use  Only  The offense(s) listed the above Application was/were dismissed, acquitted, or discharged without a conviction or a in fmding of guilt was/were not the result of a plea bargaining agreement involving the conviction of other charges.  and Date  Municipal Court Judge's Signature Published: 05/2016, CN: 11980 (Municipal Application for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records) page 1 of I Order for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records  For Superior Court Use
[brief] See Pa0054.  Rather, “[a] court will consider an agreement to arbitrate waived.  . . if arbitration is simply asserted in the answer and no other measures are taken to preserve the affirmative defense. ”  Cole, 215 N.J. at 281 (emphasis added).  In that vein, [...]’s arbitration defense was listed amongst 24 other, largely irrelevant or inapplicable defenses such as service of process and collateral estoppel.  See Pa0021-Pa0024.  Despite being an affirmative defense, [...] did not support it with the requisite statement of facts required by Rule 4:5-4.  Under these same circumstances, but regarding a statute of limitations defense, this Appellate Division has found, “[i]t is difficult to take such a pleading seriously and absent efforts to assert the defense a plaintiff would not be fairly apprised a defendant intended to rely upon it. ”  White v. Karlsson, 354 N.J. Super. 284, 290 (App. Div. 2002).  Here, [...]’s Answer did not apprise of any intention to rely on the defense.  [...] submitted a certification under Rule 4:5-1, which requires a party to certify there are no pending, related arbitrations and that no arbitrations are contemplated.  See Pa0026.  [...] are compelled to conclude that [...]’s inaccurate Rule 4:5-1 certifications, refusal to engage in mutual discovery, and belated demand for arbitration are not mere coincidences, but deliberate tactics.  [...] must be held accountable for the representations made in its Answer, as such tactics align with the very conduct the New Jersey Supreme Court warned against in its Cole decision, which added an additional factor for consideration: “whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy[.]”
[brief] See, e.g., Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass’n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86, 98-105 (1980); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 553-55 (1967).  For example, in Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 1984), the Appellate Division refused to enforce a one-sided arbitration agreement against an employer because the court concluded it was a contract of adhesion contrary to public policy.  Id. at 442-43; see also Fairfield Leasing v. Techni-Graphics, supra, 256 N.J. Super. at 540-41 (refusing to enforce a jury waiver provision in a contract of adhesion as being contrary to public policy); Discovery Bank v. Shea, 362 N.J. Super. 200, 210 (Law Div. 2001) (refusing to enforce arbitration provision in credit card “bill stuffer” modifying credit card agreement as a contract of adhesion contrary to public policy).  As explained above, the facts and circumstances underlying Appellant’s exposure, more appropriately characterized as a lack thereof, to the purported Arbitration Agreement demonstrates that Appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to a jury trial for employment discrimination claims under the NJLAD.  At minimum, Appellant has presented genuine issues of fact which require a determination before dismissal of Appellant’s claims.
[brief] The Court identified the categories in August.  (1T19:1-8; 1T30:2-16).  When ordering supplemental briefs, the Court identified the categories.  (1T45:21 to 1T46:1-6).  During the August 2, 2024 oral arguments, as previously stated, the Court stated, on the record:  You’re making the technical argument, which I would expect and I agree with and I understand fully.  The metamorphous argument is litigation strategy, settlement posture, ability – financial ability to pay.  They’re all things that have been recognized by the court as a potential basis for exclusion.  (1T30:5-11).  At the conclusion of oral arguments, the Court gave the parties the opportunity to submit Supplemental briefs and stated:  THE COURT:  As defense counsel has correctly pointed out, the issues that you have raised here, specifically with regard to litigation tactics, ability to settle, compromising your client’s ability to represent – or prosecute their case efficiently and properly because of knowledge that may be held by the [...] was not raised in the papers, admittedly, right and counsel did not have an opportunity to refute that or in any way combat that, and [...] is not here.  (1T45:23 to 1T46:1-6).
[brief] But that court expressly did not decide whether “the District Court’s order constituted an abuse of discretion,” because “such an error would not support mandamus relief. ”  Id.  And even in the mandamus posture, a dissenting judge would have granted the petition because “nothing in the civil rules permits a court to compel production of non-responsive and irrelevant documents at any time, much less before the producing party has had an opportunity to screen those documents.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The sole issue in this case is whether the Trial Court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff had not and could not establish a *prima facie* case under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”).  Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], (“Plaintiff”) was employed as a captain in the Police Department of Defendant-Respondent [...] (“Defendant” or the “Township”).  Following the Township’s fireworks display on the night of July 5, 2016, a crowd consisting of mostly juveniles became unruly, and the police were called.  Plaintiff’s sole basis for his CEPA claim is that he performed his duties as a police officer on the night of July 5, 2016 in responding to alleged criminal conduct by juveniles and that he made radio transmissions in conjunction with these duties.  Significantly, there is no dispute that the laws being enforced on the night of July 5, 2016 were not being violated by Defendants.  Nor did Plaintiff have a reasonable belief that Defendants had violated any law, rule or clear mandate of public policy.  Indeed, when asked what he contended Defendants did improperly in this case, Plaintiff stated, “Nothing that I’m aware of. ”  Plaintiff also testified that he did not make any radio transmissions in order to correct any conduct by Defendants that was allegedly illegal or improper.  Nor was there any evidence that Defendants had said or done anything allegedly improper or contrary to law or public policy on or before July 5, 2016.  In short, the record below is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that Plaintiff reasonably believed that Defendants violated any law, rule or clear mandate of public policy, or that Plaintiff allegedly reported, complained about or refused to participate in any such allegedly improper conduct.  In a well-reasoned decision, which painstakingly evaluated all of the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Trial Court correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts and concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish a *prima facie* case under CEPA as a matter of law.
[brief] (Ab20-22).  Relying again upon the unreported F.P. decision, [...] baldly asserts that the Commission frowns upon “self-gathered” written statements as such solicitation would violate the confidentiality provision of the State Policy.  (Ab22).  But unlike in F.P., *9-10, where the solicited witness statements amounted to an “impermissible interrogation” involving the underlying allegations, [...]’s solicitation of witness statements would have been focused on [...]’s alleged scheme to falsely obtain signatures for his union election opponent, which (beyond their irrelevance to the discrimination claim) would not implicate the State Policy.
[brief] On May 10, 2023, Intervenor [...] filed a Notice of Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights in this action seeking an order “(i) ‘invalidating and nullifying [Board] Resolution PB-2023-05’” [conditioning the grant of the [...] project upon inclusion of an elevator in Building E], (ii) compelling the [...] to pay Per Diem Penalties in accordance with the settlement agreement between the parties; and (iii) imposing other obligations and penalties on the [...] and the Board of the [...], as deemed necessary by the Court to deter such conduct in the future. ”  (Pa35)  The day after it filed its Notice of Motion, it completed its motion papers by filing a Certification of Counsel to support the relief requested.
[brief] procedure determines substantial equivalence, not the safety and efficacy of the product.  See id. at 473-74.  The 510(k) materials were, however, highly relevant to the issue of reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in not performing clinical theories or studies.  See ibid.  Plaintiffs had “opened the door” by making the defendant’s failure to conduct clinical trials or studies a central theme of plaintiff’s case, although studies are not required by the Food and Drug Administration in the 510(k) clearance process.  See id. at 462, 473-74.  The defendant therefore had to be allowed to use the 510(k) information to rebut the plaintiff’s case.  In State v. James, 144 N.J. 538 (1996), cited in Hyrmoc, 254 N.J. at 473, the Supreme Court explained
[brief] During the pretrial process petitioner hired his lawyer to thoroughly investigate his case and interview witnesses.  Petitioner's trial attorney engaged the services of [...] of [...] to interview Mr. [...].  Mr. Mustapha was interviewed and provided a statement on October 28, 2015.  In his interview statement Mr. Mustapha stated that [...] (also known as [...]) is his cousin.  Mr. Mustapha further states that he had a conversation with Mr. Mansaray at his aunt's apartment in [...] (the weekend of October 16th or 17th of 2015, approximately 2pm).
[brief] (1T37-38).  [...] claims that she used the title “Sergeant” when asking for assistance.  (1T67).  [...] specifically testified:  To my recollection, I did say “[...]. ”  Our radio[] transmissions sometimes are cut off when you press the button.  The first word sometimes is not heard.  I try to make it a practice to wait and then respond.  After I press the button . . . I try not to just go right over the radio.  But in that instant . . . I wanted to see if he could come to Medical so we [could] quell the situation.  Following [...]’s first request for help, [...] testified that he responded “last caller, go for [...]. ”  (1T39).  He stated that this communication was a “hint” for [...] to use the correct title.  (1T39).  [...] testified she did not hear this communication.  (1T67).  Following [...]’s second request for help, [...] testified that he responded “[...], you can call me at 2310. ” (1T41, 70-71).  [...] testified she did not hear this communication either.  (1T70-71).  [...] testified that the inmate was eventually evaluated, medically cleared, and transported to a different location.
[brief] They informed Plaintiff that there had been a number of motor vehicle burglaries in the area.  See Edison Supp. Appendix 001 (BWC 2020-02-0020 at 1:44; BWC 2020-02-0021 at 00:52). ¹  Plaintiff had two sets of keys in his hands.  [...] asked Plaintiff who owned the two vehicles.  Plaintiff tentatively replied “uhh [...]?,” but could not provide a last name.  Pa022; Pa303.  --- ¹
[brief] (2T10:5-16).  In that case, however, [...] seeks to condemn the environmentally-sensitive property for open space; therefore, it is unlike the facts here, where [...] seeks to condemn to implement its longstanding Redevelopment Plan that requires development of the Property with commercial uses to complement the adjacent inclusionary residential development that now exists.  In a builder’s remedy lawsuit, a developer will be entitled to a builder’s remedy only if: “(1) it succeeds in Mount Laurel litigation; (2) it proposes a project with a substantial amount of affordable housing; and (3) the site is suitable, that is, the municipality does not meet its burden of proving that the site is environmentally constrained or construction of the project is contrary to sound use planning.
[brief] Ibid.  The Commission also denied [...]’s subsequent request for reconsideration.  Although [...] disputed whether she actually received a counseling related to the September 2022 incident, she did not dispute that she received the major discipline, multiple other reprimands, or counseling reflected in the record.  AA14.  Nor does she do so on appeal.  See, e.g., Ab19.  Instead [...] tries to downplay those other reprimands and counseling as “minor incidents” which should have been ignored since they were removed from her personal file.  Ibid.  The Commission emphasized that “[w]hile there is an apparent dispute regarding [the September 2022] incident, even discounting this as a disciplinary issue, [...]'s other disciplinary history supports her removal from the list.
[brief] (Pa55, Pa230, Pa274-99, Pa338, Pa340-49, Pa372-74, Pa378, Pa379-80, Pa381-82, Pa431, Pa452, Pa734-35, Pa739, Pa753-54, Pa993-97, Pa1000, Pa1001-3)  It is undisputed that [...] subjected Appellant to sexual harassment in Respondents’ workplace. \(^1\)  The only individual who contests this fact is [...] --- \(^1\)  See Appellant’s Brief § III(B) (citing Pa55, Pa230, Pa274-99, Pa338, Pa340-49, Pa372-74, Pa378, Pa379-80, Pa381-82, Pa431, Pa452, Pa734-35, Pa739, Pa753-54, Pa993-97, Pa1000, Pa1001-3).  himself despite the record explicitly proving otherwise.  The only question that remains is whether [...] and [...] promptly and properly remediated the sexual harassment and/or whether they subjected Appellant to retaliation.
[brief] [...] denied Defendant’s Motion and request for a testimonial hearing.  Pa031.  In her ruling, [...] made findings of fact after reviewing the surveillance video that captured the incident.  Pa035.  [...] found that, when the police vehicle turned into the driveway of the business outside of which Defendant was located, the turn of the police vehicle was “not abrupt by any means. ”  Pa035.  Rather, [...] found that the shaking of the police car depicted in the surveillance video was caused by the front tire of the vehicle passing over the curb, not by the vehicle stopping suddenly, as Defendant contended.  Pa035-Pa036.  [...] also found Defendant “did in fact pick up his pace in the two steps he took” after the police car pulled into the driveway, and that he “accelerated his pace to nearly double what his stride was initially” after police arrived.  Pa038.  [...] found that the numerous circumstances described by the police – including the startled look, the command to stop, the flight, and the observation of the weighed down fanny pack – “were happening simultaneously. ”  Pa037.  On August 18, 2022, Defendant plead guilty to Unlawful Possession of a Handgun.
[brief] At the time of claim denial, Defendant [...] was aware of additional information outside the four corners of the complaint which triggered coverage including [...]’s August 3, 2018 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s harassment claim (Count Three) and December 19, 2018 Order clarifying that Plaintiff’s interference with contractual relations claim (First Count) has also been dismissed.  (Pa246, Pa510 – Pa511).  Defendant [...] was aware of Video Evidence at the time of claim denial which [...] asserted, “proves that [...] lied to her employer and made false statements”.  (Pa249, Pa417, Pa433, Pa518, Pa527).  At the time of claim denial, Defendant [...] was also aware of “other documents” including [...] 2017 certification in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for order to show cause.  (Pa246; Pa365-Pa377).
[brief] Our rationale applies equally to [...]'s consecutive sentences.  We need not reiterate those reasons.  [...] also argues that the court provided insufficient reasons for finding as aggravating factors the risk that he would commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(3); the extent of his prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(6); and the need for deterring him and others from violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(9).
[brief] Footage of the traffic stop from [...]’s body-worn camera was played at the suppression hearing.  (1T 10-1 to 20-10; Da 16)  Miller approached the truck, which had New Hampshire license plates, and asked for [...]’s driver’s license, registration, and insurance.  (Da 16 at 0:00:28 to 0:00:33)  [...] provided his license and told Miller that the car’s registration was at his hotel.  (Da 16 at 0:00:39)  Miller asked for proof of insurance, and [...] explained that New Hampshire does not require drivers to carry automobile insurance.  (Da 16 at 0:00:50 to 0:01:28)  Miller asked the two where they were coming from, and [...] answered, “New Jersey. ”  (Da 16 at 0:01:28 to 0:01:33)  Miller turned away from [...] and Seaver and walked toward the back of the truck, telling his colleague, “I’m going to take him out, I’m going to talk to him, something’s wrong. ”  (Da 16 at 0:01:36 to 0:01:39)  Miller ordered [...] to step out of the truck.  (Da 16 at 0:01:46)  [...] complied and the following discussion took place:  Miller: So, where are you guys coming from?  [...]: The country club in New Jersey, we went down to check it out.  Miller: Country club? [...]: Yeah.  Miller: Where’s it at?  [...]: In New Jersey.  Miller: Do you know what township?  [...]: She could tell you better than I can.  (gesturing to the car)  Miller: You don’t know where you were just coming from?  [...]: Yeah, I just told you, New Jersey.  Miller: Yeah, where are you at right now?  [...]: I’m not sure, New Jersey, I think maybe.  Miller: Yeah, and where are you heading to then?  [...] said, “I just drew a blank,” and struggled to respond.  (Da 16 at 0:02:59)  He told Miller that this was “part of [his] disabilities. ”  (Da 16 at 0:03:02)  [...] assured the officer that although he does know where he is going, he got turned around and was trying to get back on the Turnpike.  (Da 16 at 0:03:06 to 0:03:11)  Miller then radioed for [...], a canine officer, to come to the scene.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 609(a) provides that, “[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, the witness’ conviction of a crime, subject to [N.J.R.E.] 403, shall be admitted unless excluded by the court pursuant to [N.J.R.E. 609(b)].”  N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1), in turn, provides that if, at the time of trial, over 10 years have passed since the conviction or the witness's release from confinement for that conviction, whichever is later, the conviction “is admissible only if the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, with the proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof. ”  In determining whether evidence of a conviction that occurred over 10 years prior to the start of trial is admissible under N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1), courts may consider the following: (i) whether there are intervening convictions for crimes or offenses, and if so, the number, nature, and seriousness of those crimes or offenses, (ii) whether the conviction involved a crime of dishonesty, lack of veracity or fraud, (iii) how remote the conviction is in time, [and] (iv) the seriousness of the crime.
[brief] Exhibit 1: Facebook Post from [...], reposting a post from [...] (date unknown); c.  Exhibit 2: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 1, 2021; d.  Exhibit 3: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 1, 2021; e.  Exhibit 4: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 1, 2021; f.  Exhibit 5: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 2, 2021; g.  Exhibit 6: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 2, 2021; h. Exhibit 7: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 2, 2021; i.  Exhibit 8: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 3, 2021; j. Exhibit 9: Facebook Post from [...], reposting a post from [...] (date unknown); k.
[brief] IV.  THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.  The Defendant-Appellant waived issue of jurisdiction when the Owners voluntarily consented to the jurisdiction of the [...] to address the sale of the Property.  When a party generally appears at hearings and fully participates in hearings on their merits, the Appellate Division may properly find that the party waived its right to object to the Court’s jurisdiction, especially in cases when the party voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court.  Hill v.  Warner, Berman & Spitz, P.A., 197 NJ. Super. 152, 167 (App. Div. 152).  Prior to the entry of the January 13, 2023 order that appointed Plaintiff-Respondent to sell the Property, the Defendant-Appellant never objected to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.  The Defendant-Appellant filed motions to amend the Consent Order dated April 22, 2023 and participated in all of the prior hearings that were conducted by the Probate Court with regard to the sale of the Property.  (Da559, Da562, Da564).  When the Court appointed the Plaintiff-Respondent as the individual to sell the Property on January 13, 2023, Defendant-Appellant failed to object to the Court’s jurisdiction, failed to file a motion for reconsideration, and failed to file an interlocutory appeal based on lack of jurisdiction.  Tr. 33:4-18.  The Trial Court’s determination that it had jurisdiction to order the sale of the Property should be affirmed.
[directive] RECORD KEEPING Goal:  The police officer handler will be familiar with all record keeping requirements and informational needs concerning police specialty dog operations and activities.  1.5.1  The police officer handler will identify the types of records that must be kept regarding the use of police specialty dogs, including training records, incident reports and health reports.  26 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements  1.5.2  The police officer handler will identify the information items to be included in records which pertain to operations and activities involving police specialty dogs.  1.6