ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1T76:2-7.  The trial judge expressed disdain for questions involving Defendants’ interrogatory answers, stating that “interrogatories are totally worthless” and that depositions are the way to go if you want answers.  1T77:7-12.  In doing so, Defendants’ nonsensical interrogatory answers were discounted by the court.  The court then discussed how it disliked construction cases and how they typically go and what they involve.  1T79:6 to 82:14.  Relying on personal experience in construction cases, the judge made no findings as to this case, only construction cases in general.  The court then dismissed the entire case without factual or legal findings, even as to the projects that the Defendants had not disputed.
[brief] ” (T70:2-5).  This case is not about the [...]’ ability to use the beach as a beach any more than Lennig was about his ability to use the campsites as a campsite.  Instead, direct access from the Premises to the ocean is a “great portion of [the] advantages” of living in an oceanfront home and creates rights.  Defendants’ attempt to distinguish Lennig\textsuperscript{14} is unavailing.  \textsuperscript{14}  Defendants improperly rely on their proposed expert for his legal analysis in an attempt to distinguish Lennig.  (Db19-Db20).  “It is well-established that [e]xpert witnesses simply may not render opinions on matters which involve a question of C.  The Trial Court Properly Relied on the Totality of Evidence to Find the [...] Possessed an Implied Easement Appurtenant.
[brief] The judge instructed the jury that “[r]egardless of what counsel and I may have said recalling the evidence in this case, it is your recollection of the evidence that should guide you as judges of the facts. ”  She further instructed, “[a]rguments, statements, remarks, openings and summations of counsel are not evidence and must not be treated as evidence. ”  Regarding any testimony stricken from the record, the judge charged, “[a]ny testimony that I may have had occasion to strike is not evidence and shall not enter in your final deliberations.  It must be disregarded by you. ”  She further instructed that “even though you may remember the testimony you are not to use it in your discussions or deliberations. ”  Defendant did not object to the final jury charge.
[directive] 23.  a.  Èske w konprann ke jij la gen obligasyon swiv okenn nan pwomès oswa rekomandasyon [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] komisè gouvènman an fè.  Epi tou, jij la gendwa rejte deklarasyon koupab la anvan li pwononse santans la epi li gendwa enpoze yon santans pi estrik?  Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of the prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence?
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO EXAMINE THE MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENT OF 2/27/2009, THE FFIDAVIT OF LOST NOTE OF 2/12/2014, AND THE MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENT OF 2/28/2014 IN AN EVIDENTARY HEARING.  Raised Below: paragraph 35 (029a).  In 1T page 6 line 4– page 7 line 23 and page 8 lines 2-6.  [...] did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  LEGAL POINT IV
[directive] 26 removed from the officer's immediate supervisor.  This includes complaints from within the agency.  Often Human Resources may need to be notified and involved.  6.2.2  Supervisors investigating minor complaints of inappropriate behavior must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  Accordingly, all officers who may be called upon to do an internal investigation must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, including the protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating internal complaints.  6.2.3  The investigator should interview the complainant, all witnesses and the subject officer, and review relevant reports and documents, gather evidence and conduct any other investigation as appropriate.  The investigator should then submit a report to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor summarizing the matter and indicating the appropriate disposition.  Possible dispositions include:  (a) Sustained.  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged conduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (For example, at the conclusion of an investigation into an excessive force allegation, the agency finds that the officer used force (alleged conduct) but that the force was not excessive (alleged violation). )  (d)  Not Sustained.  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  6.2.4  If the investigator determines that the complaint is unfounded, exonerated or not sustained, the investigative report is to be forwarded to internal affairs for review and entry in the index file and filing.  The subject officer shall be notified in writing of the investigation’s outcome.  6.2.5  If the complaint is sustained, the superior officer so authorized should determine the appropriate disciplinary action.  Typical disciplinary actions for minor infractions include performance notices, oral reprimands or written reprimands.  The superior officer shall complete the appropriate disciplinary document and provide a copy of that document to the officer being disciplined.  A copy of the disciplinary document shall be forwarded to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor for review, placed in the officer's personnel file and sent to internal affairs for entry into the index file and filing.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 27
[brief] The law on this issue is abundant and unambiguous.  First, the text of the TCA is clear in this regard -- N.J.S.A. 59:1-4 explicitly notes that the TCA does not extend to any “right to obtain relief other than damages against the public entity or one of its employees. ”  The case law is likewise clear.  For instance, in Chasin v. Montclair State University, 159 N.J. at 428, the Court held that OAG’s obligation under the TCA to provide defense and indemnity is “intended to apply only to civil actions seeking damages for tortious conduct.
[brief] The trial court adhered to *Burt*, rightly so, until *after* the completion of trial.  Its stated reasoning for abrogating Burt was that allocating liability would be in contravention of the statute:  I think the Court to take the defendant’s position in this case basically vitiates the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Liability Law which I think I have to read all the laws in --there was a verdict in this case.  It was for more than 60 percent in this particular case or more which by the way triggers that statute which says that the plaintiff can recover the 100 percent of the amount from the 60 percent defendant.  [23T16-23T17]  Thus, taken at face value, the trial court’s rationale is irreconcilable with both *Burt* and *Jones*, in that those cases contemplate an allocated reduction of liability *even* for a defendant found more than 60% at fault.
[brief] However, the court committed multiple legal errors by holding that he was not in custody for most of the interview; that he did not invoke his right to silence until the very end; and that both his Miranda waiver and statement overall were voluntary -- all of which this Court reviews de novo.  State v. Rivas, 251 N.J. 132, 152-53 (2022); State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612, 628 (2022); State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263, 270-72 (2015).
[brief] (Pb 17-22)  In *Robinson*, the issue the Court declined to consider for the first time on appeal was highly fact-sensitive, so failure to initially pursue the claim in the trial court “denied any reviewing court the benefit of a robust record within which the claim could be considered. ”  *Id.* at 21.  By contrast, this challenge is a legal claim – that the emergency enhancement in the terroristic threats statute violated [...]’s due process rights.
[directive] 4.  The Assignment Judges are requested, not only to see that appropriate action is taken promptly with regard to all defendants committed by the Superior Court in their county or counties, but also to follow-up to make certain that appropriate action is taken promptly by all Municipal Courts within their county or counties.  Your attention is also directed specially to the guidelines set forth in State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 199-200 (1971).  The following additional comments are submitted for your guidance:  1.  The guidelines set forth in the opinion are not limited to fines imposed for motor vehicle violations but are applicable to all cases where the sentence is or includes a fine.  It is requested that you take such steps as you may consider necessary to insure compliance with these guidelines as applied to sentences heretofore or hereafter imposed at the county level, and that you also make certain necessary action is taken by all Municipal Courts within your county or counties.
[brief] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), not [...], to distract them from [...]’s own wrongdoings while thirteen L3 Fund investors have sued [...] for fraud with twelve others to sue imminently.  (753a-798a)  [...]’s limited involvement in this matter demonstrates that his deposition would serve no purpose other than to harass [...].  With regard to the second factor under Berrie, [...] is not “front and center in the scheme”; he is not a party to the Underlying Litigation and is not mentioned anywhere in the Complaint filed in the Underlying Litigation.  Respondents are apparently “trying to track down the monies that [...], [...] and [...] converted. ” (emphasis added)  (Respondents’ Brief at pg. 14).
[brief] The Verified Complaint also stated that local, state and Coast Guard emergency response teams were immediately notified and took charge of the Incident.  (PPCIa003).  The NJDEP issued [...] (referred to as the “Respondent”) a Field Directive and Notice to Insurers on the date of the Incident, June 1, 2021. ” (PPCIa003, PPCIa022).  The Directive (a) found [...] liable as a responsible party pursuant to the Spill Compensation and Control Act, (“Spill Act”) N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 et seq.; (b) “determined the Respondent to be responsible for discharge(s) at the above location;” (c) identified the discharge as oil and that [...] is “responsible for the discharge of these hazardous substances;” (d) directed [...] “to conduct a remedial investigation and remedial action(s) in accordance with the Technical Requirements for Site Remediation, N.J.A.C. 7:26E and all other applicable State, Federal and local regulations” beginning on the date of the Directive, June 1, 2021; (e) directed [...] “to engage a Licensed Site Remedial Professional (LSRP),” and (f) directed [...] to notify its insurer since transport companies are require by The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10927 to have surety coverage.  (PPCIa003, PPCIa022).  Prime response to the spill.
[brief] *Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Labor.*  125 NJ, 567, 572 (1991).  That test provides:  A)  Such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract for service and in fact; (B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the business for which such service is performed, or that such service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and (C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.  *Ibid.*  (quoting *N.J.S.A.* 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)).  "Part A of the test requires a showing that the provider of services 'has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services.'"  *Ibid.* (quoting *N.J.S.A.* 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)).  To prevail, the challenger "must establish not only that the employer has not exercised control in fact, but also that the employer has not reserved the right to control the individual's performance."  *Ibid.*  This standard echoes the common-law test, "which classifies as an independent contractor one who renders services but retains control over the manner in which those services are performed, agreeing only to accomplish results."  *Ibid*  [...] cannot satisfy the "A" prong of N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)(B)(C) as [...] has to show up and work under the Court’s direction.  The Court tells [...] when and where the services need to be rendered and is not free from control.  The Town through the Court dictates where and when [...] needs to provide the service.  Once a singular prong is unable to be satisfied, then the inquiry can technically stop as the test is conjunctive.  Notwithstanding, [...] clearly cannot satisfy independence under prong “B” either.  The NJ Supreme Court in Carpet Remnant Warehouse in addressing the B prong of the test stated “[i]n our view, that phrase refers only to those locations where the enterprise has a physical plant or conducts an integral part of its business. ” (Id at 592).  [...] attended in person at the Court’s location where it conducted its primary business (court sessions) each and every time up until COVID restrictions were put in place to limit the spread and in-person contact.  The sessions continued occurring on the Zoom platform thereafter and the mere conversion to an online forum does not make it an independent place of business for [...].  The services were rendered at the time and place as stated by the Court acting on behalf of the Township.  Therefore, if the Township of [...] cannot determine that I am an Independent Contractor then I am an employee.  There is no other conclusion irrespective of sweeping ambitions of the legislature in this instance.
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, it is clear that the Court below erred and this Court should find in favor of the Defendant-Appellant.  LAW OFFICES OF [...]  Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant George T. Daggett  [...]  Date Amended: 11/15/24  [...], Plaintiff / Respondent vs. [...]; [...].  Defendants/Appellants  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[directive] 4.2.3  Investigations of officer misconduct may proceed in one of two ways.  An investigation may be conducted for the purpose of imposing a disciplinary sanction or initiating a criminal prosecution.  The distinction between the two is important because each type of investigation has differing legal requirements.  Consequently, it is important that the internal affairs investigator be familiar with proper investigative techniques and legal standards for each type of proceeding.  It is essential that experienced investigators be assigned to internal affairs investigations.  Each investigator must be skilled in interviews and interrogation, observation, surveillance and report writing.  4.2.4
[directive] Reports, Records and Other Documents  7.2.1  All relevant reports should be obtained and preserved as expeditiously as possible.  Internal agency reports relating to a subject officer's duties should be examined.  Examples of such 34  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 reports include arrest and investigative reports, and radio, patrol, vehicle and evidence logs pertaining to or completed by the officer.  7.2.2  The investigator should also examine and retrieve all electronic, computer, digital and video records.  These may include analog and digital records created by radio and telephone recorders, computer aided dispatch systems, mobile data terminals, in-car video systems, video surveillance systems and other forms of audio and video recording.  In these cases, the relevant data should be copied to an appropriate medium as soon as possible and retained by internal affairs.  7.2.3
[brief] Plaintiff’s Experts Failed to Rule Out the Many Alternative Causes for Her Alleged Injuries.  Everyone—including Plaintiff’s experts—agrees her inflammation, retinal detachment, and resulting vision loss could have been caused by many factors other than a silicone particulate (that no one ever saw in her eye), including her chronic eye inflammation, numerous eye surgeries, procedures, and injections, and the Retisert® implant.  (Da0047, pp. 40-41, 58-59; Da0150, pp. 78-80, 112-13; Da0346, ¶¶ 83, 91)  The silicone-coated Retisert® is 10 times larger than a 300-micron silicone particulate, and doctors discovered that the Retisert® had dislodged from her retina at the precise location and around the time of her retinal detachment.  (Da0150, p. 130; Da0346, ¶ 81 n.3)  Dr.  Lalezary testified “we already established that she has multiple risk factors” and admitted “all of those risk factors…could have led to a retinal detachment…[i]n the absence of a silicone particulate. ”  (Da0150, pp. 112-13 (emphasis added))  [...]’s expert, [...], agrees, opining that Plaintiff’s multiple serious eye conditions, surgeries, and procedures, exacerbated by her long history of smoking, are the obvious and likely causes of her vision loss.  (Da0346, ¶ 94)  Without (i) citing any authoritative literature or studies or performing any analysis or tests demonstrating a silicone particulate can cause the injuries alleged or (ii) doing any medical or scientific analysis to rule out the myriad other well-known and obvious alternate causes for Plaintiff’s injuries, her experts offer the admittedly-uncertain opinions that a manufacturing defect in the subject Ozurdex® unit caused Plaintiff’s injuries based exclusively on the recall.  (Da0047, pp. 30-31, 39, 58-60; Da0150, pp. 15, 64, 106-07)  F.  Procedural History
[brief] Since 1972, Plaintiff has owned the Property located at [...] and [...] (the “Property”).  Commencing in July 2014, the Property has been subject to environmental remediation under the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) Licensed Site Remediation Professional (LSRP) program.  (Da143-145).  In that year, Plaintiff retained an LSRP to investigate and determine a remediation plan for the Property.  Under the LSRP’s direction between 2014 and 2022, Plaintiff excavated over 59.97 tons of contaminated soil from the Property, conducted groundwater sampling to confirm that contamination originating from the Property was not reaching offsite receptors, and submitted various reports to NJDEP.  (Da143-145; T1, 12:9-17).  In early 2022, Plaintiff and NJDEP entered into an Administrative Consent Order (ACO) for the purpose of establishing new case-specific timeframes for completing the remediation due to the difficulty in remediating contamination under the two (2) concrete layers which form the floor of the building.
[brief] In that regard, Section II, subsection A, entitled “Coverage E – Personal Liability,” provides, in pertinent part, that:  If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, [[...]] will: 1. Pay up to our limit of liability for damages for which an insured is legally liable; and 2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent….  (Da17).  The [...] policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, which results, during the policy period, in: a. Bodily injury; or b. Property damage. ” (Da8).  “Bodily injury” is defined as “bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services and death that results. ” (Da7).  “Property damage” is defined as “physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property. ” (Da8).  The [...] policy contains an exclusion applicable to Coverage E -- Personal Liability.  Section II, Exclusion E, paragraph 1, entitled “Expected or Intended Injury,” provides that Coverage E does not apply to:  Bodily injury or property damage, with respect to all insureds, which is expected or intended by an insured even if the bodily injury or property damage: a. is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended; or b. is sustained by a different person, entity, real or personal property than initially expected or intended.  However this Exclusion “E.1.” does not apply to bodily injury resulting from the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect persons or property.  (Da19, Exclusions, ¶ E.1).  In addition, the [...] policy requires that an insured give written notice of an alleged “occurrence” as soon as practicable, “[c]ooperate [with [...]] in the investigation, settlement or defense of any claim or suit” and “promptly forward to [[...]] every notice, demand, summons or other process relating to the occurrence.