ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This is clear from the *Restatement*’s discussion of the matter in the context of collateral estoppel.  *See Restatement, Judgments* 2d § 27, comment d (“When an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated within the meaning of this Section.  An issue may be submitted and determined on . . . a motion for summary judgment .  . . .”) (quoted in *Allesandro v. Gross*, 187 N.J. Super. 96, 105- 106 (App. Div. 1982)).  See also Montoya v. JL Astoria Sound, Inc., 92 A.D.3d 736, 738, 939 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (2012).
[brief] Also see *Kaufmann v. Planning Bd., for Warren Tp.*, 110 N.J. 551 (1998).  The Applicant maintains the burden of proof based upon a preponderance of credible evidence that it has satisfied the statutory criteria entitling him to the relief sought; and if the Applicant does not meet his burden of proof, then the Board has no alternative but to deny the application.  *Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Park*, 78 N.J. 544 (1979).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY REASONS SUPPORTING ITS DISMISSAL OF COUNT II, AND THE DEFENDANTS’ STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  ARGUMENT IS LEGALLY INCORRECT.  Count Two alleges the Developer violated the CFA in connection with its leasing of Unit 74 to the Association from 1983 to 2016.  Without any discussion, the trial court dismissed Count 2.  Presumably, dismissal was entered based upon the court’s conclusion that marketable title was conveyed pursuant to the master deed’s ‘authorization. ’  Not only is that conclusion incorrect, but Section 8(e)’s contemplation of the sale of Unit 74 does not speak to whether the Developer could lease Unit 74 to the Association.  The opposition claims the trial court adequately explained its basis for dismissal, but it fails to cite any example from the motion transcript.  See Db at p. 14.  Instead, the Defendants argue the dismissal of Count Two should not be reversed because the claim is barred by the statute of limitations (SOL)\(^4\).
[brief] (22T 246-2 to 6; 25T 55-8 to 20)  However, two calls to [...] by defendant beginning at 6:08 p.m. on January 9 had been manually deleted from defendant’s phone.  (22T 248-4 to 22)  The first call lasted five minutes, 33 seconds and the second lasted only six second; both were answered.  (22T 250-5 to 9)  [...] testified that the January 28, 2019, search of the [...]’ main house and carriage house that resulted in [...] seizing a wooden plank from the porch of the carriage house did not reveal a laptop belonging to [...].
[brief] 13  | CASES CITED: | PAGE | |-------------|------| | Panko v. Flintkote, 7 N.J. 55, 61 (1951) | 2 | | Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 161-62 (App. Div. 1960) | 2 | | State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 64 (2020)
[directive] The CMF is individual account numbers.  order to In by operated establish an account, the following shall be provided the Division to of Investment:  Case name, a.  - - New 02 Page: of Administration  8  Operating State Jersey Forfeiture Program Standard Procedure  b. if Case number (both CJ and State Police number available), c.  Department of Law And Public Safety, Civil Remedies and Forfeiture Bureau Address- with  The original shall be mailed the Division of Investments original of signatures of the DCJ Deputy Director Administration and the Officer, Property Management or other authorized designee, $2,000, cases where the amount seized is less than no individual In $2,000 account need be established.  Seizures involving less than can be deposited directly into the Seized Monies Account.  in form, The Division of Investments will provide, written the individual If, office. account numbers requested by the Property Management been after five business days, no account numbers have received, of Office the Property Management shall follow-up with the Division ._ ' Investment.
[brief] (1T 16:4-21)  [Note – the Court was repeating [...]’s earlier vernacular use of the term “cooked” leveled against Respondent at 1T 15:18-21].  The Court properly focused on the parties’ intent in making its determination.  “Motivations or mental reservations cannot affect a written agreement.  If they were permitted to do so, a written agreement would be worthless and the source of much litigation.  The avoidance of such uncertainty is the precise reason for the Statute of Frauds and the companion parole evidence rule.  The parties are bound by the intentions they express in their writing so long as that writing is complete and unambiguous on its face -- as this Contract is.
[brief] Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988)...............................................................21 VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539 (1994)...............................................................46 Whitaker v. DeVilla, 147 N.J. 341 (1997)...............................................................43 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq............................................................23 N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, et seq............................................................1,14 N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-34 to -52.....................................................26 N.J.S.A. 34:19-1, et seq...........................................................23 N.J.S.A. 52:27BB-54, et seq....................................................7 N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-1, et. seq...............................................2,7,49 COURT RULES R. 4:6-2........................................................................................................passim R. 4:69-1 to -7.................................................................................................47 Table of Orders February 15, 2024 Order from [...] denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their Complaint, granting Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice..............................................1001a
[brief] As defined at N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, a “government record” encompasses a broad spectrum of items that have been made, maintained, or kept on file in the course of official business, including papers, books, documents, information stored or maintained electronically, etc.  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(a) requires that a “custodian of a government record shall permit the record to be inspected, examined, and copied by any person during regular business hours . . . unless a government record is exempt from public access by: P.L.1963, c.73 (C.47:1A-1 et seq.) as amended and supplemented; any of statute; resolution of either or both houses of the Legislature; regulation promulgated under the authority of any statute or Executive Order of the Governor; Executive Order of the Governor; Rules of Court; any federal law; federal regulation; or federal order.
[brief] First, the production of documents from existing custodians does not eliminate the need for the addition of [...] and [...], as the latter likely contain unique communications directly relevant to the case.  See e.g. Ex. 9 at 2723, Ex. 23 at 5326, and Ex. 29 at 2652.  Their communications should not be shielded merely because a search of their documents did not take place with other custodians.  Thus, the completion of document production from existing custodians will not obviate the need to include [...]’s and [...]’s custodial files in this action.
[brief] Appellate review of the factual findings of a PCR court is deferential.  *State v. Nash*, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013).  Where no evidentiary hearing was held, however, the reviewing court may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences drawn from the documentary record by the PCR judge.  *State v. Gideon*, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021); *Nash*, 212 N.J. at 540; *State v. Harris*, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004).  *State v. O'Donnell*, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 (App. Div. 2014); *State v. Reevey*, 417 N.J. Super. 134, 146-47 (App. Div. 2010).  The legal conclusions of a PCR judge are reviewed de novo.  *Nash*, 212 N.J. at 540-41; *Reevey*, 417 N.J. Super. at 146.  POINT
[brief] Moreover, the Court stated that the insurer’s coverage obligations for [...] arose only when the plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged negligence, not when the plaintiff’s original complaint alleged intentional conduct by [...].  *Ibid.*  By inference, the insurer would have had no obligation to provide coverage for [...]’s defense so long as the only allegation against him was his own intentional wrong and he was not jointly defended with the vicariously liable employer.  The Court’s reliance on N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 to require coverage for the employer did not lead it to conclude that the statute required coverage of an insured’s intentional wrong.
[brief] ” (emphasis added)).  Though the area of law is still developing in the Superior Court of New Jersey, on April 26, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. issued an Order and Statement of Reasons in *McQueen v. Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, P.C.*, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640 (Law Div. April 26, 2023).  In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, [...] addressed the licensure requirements of the CFLA:
[brief] Third and most glaringly, the trial court erred by neglecting the third Cofield factor.  Indeed, the trial court performed no analysis on whether the proffered evidence is clear and convincing.  “The third prong of our Cofield test requires that the judge serve as gatekeeper to the admission of other-crime evidence. ”  State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106, 123 (2001).  In doing so, the trial court must “ensure that the jury hears only clear and convincing proof that the other crime or bad act occurred, and that the defendant was responsible for the conduct. ”  Id. at 123-24 (citing State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 275 (2002).  “Clear and convincing evidence is that which produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable (the factfinder) to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. ”  Id. at 127 (internal citations omitted).  While there is clear and convincing evidence that [...] was in the Honda Accord in Union County there is no clear and convincing evidence that [...] possessed the BB gun, exercised control over the BB gun, had access to the BB gun, or even knew of its existence.  Indeed, the Union County indictment was dismissed, and [...] was only convicted for one count of obstruction, a disorderly persons’ offense.  See [...].  As expressed in his statement, [...] was not aware of the BB gun and there is no evidence to support the claim that he exercised any control over the weapon.  Therefore, the statement fails to clear the third Cofield prong and is inadmissible.
[brief] On October 19, 2021, [...] and [...] (collectively “Plaintiff”) submitted land development applications to both the [...] (“Defendant” or “Defendant Board”), and the [...] (“[...]”).  The applications sought approval for a 1,105,000 square foot warehouse, along with associated office space and accessory uses such as parking and stormwater management basins.  Ja083.  The Mansfield portion of the parcel contained the entirety of the structure, while the Florence portion only included uses accessory to said structure.  Ja073.  On January 24, 2022, after just one night of testimony, the [...] granted preliminary site plan approval.  Ja085-Ja095.  Plaintiff presented the application to Defendant over the course of four hearings: February 7, March 7, April 4, and May 31, 2022.  Ja026-Ja028.2
[brief] (Pb9).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Id. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.  Id. at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, Ensslin’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  Id. at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, Ensslin was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, Ensslin was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.  *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required Ensslin to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.
[brief] The distinction is illusory; whatever local government is authorized to do constitutes a function of government, and when a municipality acts pursuant to granted authority it acts as government and not as a private entrepreneur.  The distinction has proved useful to restrain the ancient concept of municipal tort immunity, not because of any logic in the distinction, but rather because sound policy dictated that governmental immunity should not envelop the many activities \(^{154}\) Daniel v. City of Oakland, 124 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1973)(discussing the sale of water under municipal water ordinance).  \(^{155}\) K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commission of State of N. J., 381 A.2d 774, 75 N.J. 272 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982, 98 S. Ct. 1635, 56 L.Ed.2d 76 (1978).  which government today pursues to meet the needs of the citizens.  (Id. at 584, 141 A.2d at 311)  Furthermore, this distinction, once useful in the field of municipal tort immunity, has been discarded even for that purpose.
[brief] [...] and ninety-seven (97) other active and retired troopers provided affidavits that they never received any notice or correspondence regarding the Ricci Act.  Because the Board failed to fulfill its statutory obligation under the Act to provide notice to all the members of the retirement system within 30 days, and further because it appears that the vast majority never got any notice at all, the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As such, in the interest of justice and in the furtherance of a just accommodation, we respectfully request that Board’s determination be reversed and that [...]’s application to register his presence at Ground Zero and his request for amended benefits be granted.
[brief] Assuming, arguendo that the Photocopy is upheld, it directed a joint account be created into which the parties’ salaries would be deposited and used as a marital account.  (P112a,).  Decedent breached that provision while she handled the finances exclusively, leaving no joint assets for Petitioner.  Decedent also violated her spousal duties by dissipating the marital assets prior to her death in favor of Respondent.  Dissipation of marital property by one spouse breaches a spouse’s fiduciary responsibility to the other.  Monte v. Monte 212 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1986) cert. denied, 133 N.J. 432 (1993).  Decedent’s concealment of her intent to disinherit Petitioner also breached the duties and responsibilities that were created by her marriage to Petitioner.  See, Chalmers v. Chalmers 65 N.J. 186, 194 (1974); Moore v. Moore, 376 N.J. Super.246 (App. Div. 2005) (spouses have responsibilities created by their marriage pursuant to the concept of duty to achieve a just result).  The Decedent had a duty to disclose her intended disinheriting of Petitioner since it impacted his interest in the marital assets that Decedent administered.  Instead of making that required disclosure after the 2014 Will was made, Decedent led Petitioner to believe that he was an object of her affections and a beneficiary of her Will.  (7T118:15-22; P376s-P466a)).  Decedent’s concealment of Petitioner’s disinheriting left Petitioner in a position where he did not invest in his own future or protect his own interests.  Decedent had unclean hands, warranting that a constructive trust be imposed in favor of Petitioner that fairly allocates the Estate assets in favor of Petitioner so that a just result is achieved.  CONCLUSION
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  On March 6, 2023, the Court provided an Opinion and Order barring [...]’s testimony and dismissing plaintiffs’ Complaint.  The scope of appellate review is limited if an appeal concerns alleged errors in findings of facts.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999); *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644 (1999); *Close v. Kordulak Bros.*, 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965).  The Appellate Court will not set aside a finding of fact, but can decide whether the findings that were made, were properly reached on the sufficient or credible evidence before the Trial Court.  *Id.*  The Appellate Court must give due regard to the ability of the factfinder to judge credibility.  *Id.*  The standard of review on appeal of the findings of fact of a judge sitting without a jury is “‘whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record,’ considering the ‘proofs as a whole,’ with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility. ”  *Close v. Kordulak Bros.*, supra, quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964).  The Appellate Division will not generally conduct its own examination of the evidence as if it were sitting as a Trial Court.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999).  Accordingly, the trial court’s determination under the rule warrants substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion.  See DEG, LLC v. Twp. Of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 261, 966 A. 2d 1036 (2009); Hous. Auth. Of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283, 639 A.2d 286 (1994).  The Court may find an abuse of discretion when a decision is “‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’”  Illiadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123, 922 A. 2d 710 (2007) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571, 796 A.2d 182 (2002)).  The trial court’s factual findings should not be disturbed unless those are “wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice. ”  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-484 (1974).  Moreover, “the admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the Trial Court.
[brief] The joint motion for discovery dispute (Doc. 186) resolution is granted as set forth above.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants may move for attorneys’ fees as set forth above.  All Citations Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2023 WL 2585296  MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER  [...], United States Magistrate Judge  *1  This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 301(5)(a), see ECF No. 47, for resolution of a series of discovery disputes between Plaintiff, [...], and the [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] Additionally, the Defendant is reading the trial court’s points out of context.  The reference to an “unfair advantage” was made as a last point on the court’s discussion of the “logical flaw” in the defendant’s position.  The trial court began by considering what would happen if the estoppel could be delivered at the closing, despite a previously delivered estoppel revealing a default.  Plaintiff, in a state of “obvious uncertainty,” would be required to prepare and pay for a closing on the “possibility” Defendant could produce an Acceptable Closing Certificate.  This, however, defeated the purpose of requiring prompt delivery of whatever estoppel was received.  (Da12.)
[brief] (Pa000210)  Separate and apart from the arguments advanced above is the inescapable fact that Respondents [...] or [...] simply cannot compel Appellant to arbitrate any claims she has against them because neither Respondent [...] nor Respondent [...] are parties to the subject Arbitration Agreement.  (Pa000210).  As the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement makes clear, the parties to the Agreement are clearly indicated as being Appellant and the “Company,” but Respondent [...] is not mentioned by name anywhere in same.  See id.  There is simply nothing in the record suggesting that Appellant’s employment with Respondent [...] would be governed by terms set forth in the Arbitration Agreement allegedly entered into between Appellant and Respondent [...].  Accordingly, there is no contractual privity between Appellant and Respondents [...] and [...].  Thus, while it is feasible the Court could have found that Appellant is required to arbitrate her claims against Respondent [...]—who are both parties to the Arbitration Agreement—same is not the case for Appellant’s claims as against Respondents [...] and [...].  Since the trial court failed to issue a statement of reasons indicating this argument was considered (or a statement of reasons containing any meaningful legal analysis at all, for that matter), the dismissal of Appellant’s claims should be reversed.
[brief] 19  In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987) .................................................................................. 9, 21 Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2008) .....................................................  13  Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 203 N.J. 496 (2010) ..................................................................................  13  Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997) ................................................................. 10, 17 Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134 (1999) ..................................................................  13  Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen, 390 N.J. Super. 123 (App.Div.2007) ...........................................  16  New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) ..............  23 Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) .................................................................. 7, 8 R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 (2001) .................................................................. 9 Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2011) ........................................... 7 Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation, 243 N.J. 319 (2020) .................................................................. 17 Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 332 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 2000) ............................................. 18 Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) ......................................................................................... 9 Rules R. 4:50-1(d) .................................................................................. 23 R. 4:50-1(f) .................................................................................. 23 Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 .................................................................... 8, 11 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) .................................................................. 11 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 .....................................................................