ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On December 9, 2020, Appellant filed a Complaint alleging claims for wrongful termination, whistleblower retaliation, and fraud.  (Pa13-20).  On January 22, 2021, Respondents Myron and [...] filed an Answer denying the material allegations, and Counterclaims against Appellant for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel.  (Pa21-34).  Shortly thereafter, on February 2, 2021, Respondents Myron and Barron filed an Amended Answer with Counterclaims.  (Da1-15).  On February 5, 2021, Respondent [...] filed an Answer to Appellant’s Complaint.  (Da103-111).  Following the conclusion of discovery, Respondents moved for summary judgment.  (Pa74-75 and Pa77-92).  After consideration of the parties’ submissions and oral arguments, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted Respondents’ summary judgment motion, in its entirety.  (Pa1-Pa10).  On October 12, 2023, the parties attended a proof hearing in which the Court awarded Defendant [...] the sum of (1) $88,690.65 incurred by [...] in order to retain a third-party company to investigate and prepare a report qualifying its losses; (2) $89,161.30 representing reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in the defense of Appellant’s claims in this litigation pursuant to CEPA; (3) $3,284.65 representing reasonable costs of litigation; and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.  (Pa11-Pa12).  The recoupment of Appellant’s personal expenses in excess of $256,000 is the subject of a separate subrogation claim.
[brief] DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...]  J.S.C.  AMENDED  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, [...]  [...]  620  West Lacey Road  Forked River, New Jersey  08731 [...]  Fax [...]  On The Brief: [...], ESQ  ATTORNEY I.D. NO. 005441973  E-mail: [...]  Of Counsel [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................1  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..............................................................................................................3  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................................................5  TABLE OF APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................................................7  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................11  POINT I THE TOWNSHIP HAS CLEARLY ARTICULATED A VALID PUBLIC PURPOSE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY .............................................................................................................11
[brief] I was again contacted by [...] who stated that the TEAMS Unit Central would be conducting a dive operation in the area near the entrance of [...] in an attempt to locate the firearm believed to have been thrown into the river by [...].  During this search [...] was able to see a silver colored revolver with a wooden handle.  [...] believed this weapon matched the description provided to [...] on Friday May 20, 2011.  The handgun was located approximately 40 feet south and thirty feet west of a drainage pipe on the bank of the river.  For more complete details refer to report submitted by the [...] regarding this search.
[brief] When an evidentiary hearing is held, the appellate court “will defer to the PCR court’s factual findings, given its opportunity to hear live witness testimony and . . . ‘will uphold the PCR court’s factual findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”  State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013)).
[directive] Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że w przypadku przyznania się winy w odniesieniu do przestępstwa związanego z pornografią dziecięcą zgodnie z 2C:24-4b(4) lub 2C:24- N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 4b(5) lub próby popełnienia któregoś z tych przestępstw, i przestępstwo zostało popełnione 14 sierpnia 2013 r. lub później, sąd, niezależnie od jakiegokolwiek innego wyroku, i na wniosek prokuratury, wyda specjalny wyrok formalnego dożywotniego nadzoru kuratorskiego, chyba że sąd stwierdzi oficjalnie, że tego rodzaju dożywotni nadzór nie jest potrzebny w celu ochrony społeczeństwa lub powstrzymania Pana(i) od popełniania kolejnych czynów przestępczych?
[brief] See Perry v. Levy, 87 N.J.L. 670, (E. & A. 1915).  Since the Defendants have argued that the condition at the abutment joint at issue was not dangerous, the emergency paving records are admissible to prove the defect did exist in the location identified by the Plaintiff and that it was dangerous.  Accordingly, for the purposes of a summary judgment motion, the Trial Court was required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.  Had the court done so, then the court was required to accept as true that the "significant settlement" that required "immediate repair and testing" was in the left lane of southbound travel at the north approach abutment joint.  Next, when looking beyond the inspection records and the emergency paving records, additional factual support exists for the conclusion that the settlement and abutment joint at issue was a "dangerous condition."  As outlined in Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, shortly following the accident, Plaintiff returned to the location of the accident and took a video of the bridge joint that he hit.  (Pa521 at 8-10).  He then provided a "still" image from the video to show the settlement at the expansion joint that his bike hit.  (Pa523 at 18-21 and Pa522 at 16-19).  [...] Senior Construction Engineer [...] was shown the "snapshot" of the condition that caused his accident and Johnson agreed that settlement at that location would be dangerous to users of the roadway.  (Pa801 at 28:3-16 and Pa1421).  In the setting of a summary judgment motion, this concession should have been accepted as further support for Plaintiff's claim that the condition was dangerous.  Also, Plaintiff's expert, [...], P.E., 27 year veteran of the New Jersey Department of Transportation, with specialized training and certifications in areas such as "Pavement Maintenance Management," "Traffic Control," "Bridge Inspection," "Work Zone Traffic Control for Safety and Mobility” and “Motorcycle Crashes: Understanding the Controlling Contributing Factors and Injury Severity” (Pa1053), reviewed the available discovery and concluded that the settlement/elevation change in the road created a dangerous condition.  (Pa25).  [...] went on to explain that this type of condition is particularly dangerous to motorcycles because the pavement surface quality has a greater effect on their handling and stability.  (Pa21).  Accordingly, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, including all inferences, it must be assumed that the pavement on the approach to the bridge overpass in the left lane at the abutment joint that Plaintiff’s motorcycle struck had settled, and that change in the pavement elevation created a “dangerous condition,” and further that it was severe enough to create a substantial risk of injury that it required an “immediate” repair.
[brief] (Pa496-509, Pa358-362)  Plaintiff opposed the motion on January 14, 2020.  (Pa511-521, Pa118-130, Pa206-316, Pa177-181, Pa187-196)  [...] responded to plaintiff’s opposition on January 21, 2020.  The motion was argued on January 24, 2020.  (1T5-1 to 47-14)  Hon. [...], J.S.C., Passaic County, denied the motion (1T1T47-15 to 48-22) and entered an order to that effect.
[brief] SSAP No. 25 is important in its protection of the insurance buying public, including the policyholders/subscribers of [...], and in ensuring the financial stability of the industry, especially where insurance liabilities could extend for many years.  [...] thus provides uncritical support for [...]’s ability to earn undisclosed profits at the expense of its consumer subscribers.  Indeed, the [...] should be more concerned with the due process property rights of its individual members rather than the alleged right of the attorney-in-fact to avoid full transparency to its subscriber members in violation of its fiduciary duty to them.  For the reasons explained in greater detail in the Department’s brief, filed November 6, 2023, based on the SSAP No. 25’s plain language and New Jersey statute, SSAP No. 25 applies to transactions between reciprocal insurance exchanges and attorneys-in-fact.
[brief] ........................................  Jra44  U.S. ex rel. Mitchell v. CIT Bank, N.A., No. 4:14-CV-00833, 2022 WL 135438 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2022)  ........................................  Jra51  *  Memorandum is included because it falls under an exception to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2).  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED Page(s) Order of the Honorable [...] denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 24, 2023 ........................................... Ja1 Transcript of Decision, dated October 24, 2023 .................................................. 4T ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Brennan ex rel. State v. Lonegan, | 14 | | 454 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 2018) | | | Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., | 12 | | 19 F.3d 562 (11th Cir. 1994) | | | In re Est. of Byung-Tae Oh, | 4 | | 445 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 2016) | | | In re Nat. Gas Royalties, | 12 | | 562 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 2009) | | | Kennard v. Comstock Res., Inc., | 13 | | 363 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2004) | | | Roik v. Roik, | 4 | | 477 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2024) | | | Rosenberg v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., | 9 | | 169 N.E.3d 445 (Mass. 2021) | | | State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., | 10 | | 307 Cal. Rptr. 3d 750 (Ct. App. 2023) | | | State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., | 10 | | No. 2017 WL 000289 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 13, 2023) | | | State ex rel. Health Choice Group, LLC v. Bayer Corp., | 1, 2, 3, 10 | | Nos. A-2731-20 & A-2733-20, 2024 WL 875633 | | | (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 1, 2024) | | | U.S. ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., | 13 | | 764 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2014) | | | U.S. ex rel. Berkley v. Ocean State, LLC, | 9 | | C.A. No. 20-538-JJM-PAS, 2023 WL 3203641 (D.R.I. May 2, 2023) | | | U.S. ex rel. Hagerty v. Cyberonics, Inc., | 13 | | 95 F. Supp. 3d 240 (D. Mass. 2015) | | | U.S. ex rel. Integra Med Analytics LLC v. Providence Health & Servs., | 9 | | No. CV 17-1694 PSG (SSx), 2019 WL 3282619 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2019) | | U.S. ex rel. Judd v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 638 F. App’x 162 (3d Cir. 2015)
[brief] New Jersey Courts Disfavor Permitting Class Action Settlements To Bar Claims That Were Not Actually Litigated Between The Parties.  The Defendants themselves admitted in their briefing below, and [...] agreed, that the fees at issue in *Gannon* are different from those in *Roma Pizzeria*, Pa00090 (“the Merchants complain about different fees in *Gannon* than the ones disputed in [*Roma Pizzeria*]”).
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  23  (i) for training purposes, provided that the recording is edited so that the identity of individuals depicted in the recording cannot be determined by persons viewing the training video unless the depicted individuals have consented to the recording being used for training purposes; (j) to conduct an audit to ensure compliance with this Policy and a department’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated pursuant to this Policy; (k) to enhance officer and public safety by providing intelligence information in preparation for a raid/warrant execution (e.g., by providing information about the layout of a premises to be searched), when such use is approved by the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee; or (l) any other specified official purpose where the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, finds in writing that good and sufficient cause exists to authorize access to a particular BWC recording.
[brief] The extent of the documents produced by Plaintiff amounts to copies of some checks in 2016 and 2017, with no method of ascertaining what was paid to Plaintiff and what was not.  *See*  Da69-70 at 41:3-47:24.  Indeed, Plaintiff’s entire case remains to be based on secret monthly conversations that Plaintiff had with an unknown “Russian girl”:  “Q  Right.  And so how did you keep a record -- how much are you suing [...] for?  A  255,000.  Q  How did you come up with that number?
[brief] Cf: James King v. Douglas Brownback, 601 U.S. ___ (Oct. 30, 2023) (slip op. at p.1)([...] commenting  “This case squarely presents an issue this Court previously left undecided: Whether under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s judgment bar, “an order resolving the merits of an FTCA claim precludes other claims arising out of the same subject matter in the same suit. ”)  II.
[brief] These tax assessment cases demonstrate the proper inquiry and process the Board was required to undertake in the case at bar.  These cases, and the Court’s reasoning therein, demonstrate that costs that alter a tenant’s status quo or alter a tenancy without providing a service or amenity cannot be passed through to a tenant.  Accordingly, in light of the relevant case law and the opinion of this Court, the Board was tasked with undertaking an in-depth review of all [...]’s claimed expenses (i.e., taxes, condo fees, insurance, management fees, water and sewerage, etc.) to determine whether the costs are the result of the condominium conversion that took place in 2003.
[brief] [...] told the trial court that “the opportunities for settlement negotiations [are] completely curtailed” where there is a unified defense, T47:10-15; SDa19-21 ([...]’s trial court brief arguing defendants have a significant interest in settlement and cooperating with [...]), a theme that [...] repeats here on appeal.  Pb3, 23-24.  In other words, [...]’s strategy is to seek disqualification as a strategy to break the defendants’ unified defense, to leverage the defendants into settling, and to peel them off and try to turn them against one another.  [...]’s desire to deprive [...] and [...] of their joint representation by the [...] to gain an upper hand over them does not give them standing.
[brief] See Warren Distrib. Co. v. InBev USA L.L.C., No. 07-1053, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55542, at *17-18 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010) (finding that a clause that conflicted with the MBPA was null and void).  Leaving no doubt, if there is any question of whether a wholesaler agreement “conform[s] with the provisions” of the MBPA, the statute confirms that such issue “shall be determined by a court of this State in the context of a specific case or controversy among wholesalers and brewers only, and not by generally applicable rule, regulation or otherwise. ”  N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(e).  Moreover, the MBPA creates a cause of action for any brewer or wholesaler to sue “a brewer for violation of [the] act . . . in connection with a termination pursuant to [section 33:1-93.15(d)(1)],” and provides that “[t]he wholesaler or brewer who sues alleging a violation of [the Act] shall, if successful, also be entitled to the costs of the action, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney’s fees.
[brief] On July 30, 2018, at around 7:42 in the morning, a person on a bicycle shot into a car, killing [...].  (7T 64-13, 9T 92-11 to 14)  That person then got off the bicycle and into a car.  (Da 21 - Slide 10)  The State’s theory was that [...] was the person on the bicycle that co-defendant [...], was the driver.  (14T 101-7 to 13)  The defense theory was that [...] was not involved in the shooting and that [...] and Tokley were responsible.  (14T 40-2 to 18)  Police arrived at [...] in [...] that morning after a report of shots fired.  (7T 64-10 to 16)  [...] had been shot, was taken to the hospital, and died from his injuries.  (6T 122-5 to 14, 9T 92-11 to 14)  [...] was also in the car (6T 74-21); no evidence that he was injured presented at trial.  Inside the car, 89 baggies of heroin, labeled “Call of Duty” were found.
[brief] (1T17-13 to 14).  Officers believed defendant looked like the still-unidentified suspect in the flyer and contacted [...], who went to speak with him.  (1T17-14 to 18).  At that time, [...] knew defendant was under arrest for drug charges but was not sure whether charges had yet been filed.  (1T19-24 to 2).  Charges related to the robbery were not filed on defendant, which Detective admitted at that moment in time could not have been because there was no evidence to charge him.  (1T20-8 to 16, 4510 to 46-1).  [...] then conducted a recorded interview with defendant.
[brief] ”).  Relatedly, it is well established that, “[a]s an essential component of an accused's right to a jury trial, the right to a unanimous verdict is firmly rooted in our rules of procedure and our decisional law. ”  State v. Milton, 178 N.J. 421, 431 (2004).  A unanimous verdict “must stand as an abiding assurance of carefully considered deliberations and a faithfully rendered verdict. ”  Id. at 432.
[brief] ’”  *State v. Clausell*, 121 N.J. 298, 326, 580 A.2d 221 (1990) (quoting *Manson v. Brathwaite*, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L. Ed.2d 140, 154 (1977)).
[brief] JUDGMENT | 15 | | POINT IV | | | THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE GUARANTEES WERE TERMINATED ON MAY 11, 2016.  ALL OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS INDICATE THAT THERE WAS A MODIFICATION OF THE LEASE, NOT A TERMINATION (Pa8, Pa9, 1T64-12 to 1T66-2)  | 16 | | A.  Factually there was no termination of the Lease or guarantees | 16 | | (1T65-2 to 7) | | B.  The Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 21:1-15 does not apply.  ...........................................  21 (1T65-8 to 20)  C.  The Requirement that any modifications must be in writing was waived (Not raised below).  ......................  23  D.  Offer and Acceptance, Partial Performance, and Practical Construction.  (1T64-12 to 1T66-2)  ...............  25  E.  Modification of the lease does not terminate the liability of the guarantors ...........................................  27  (Not raised below)  F. [...] was not a holdover tenant .................... 29 (1T66-2 to 5)  POINT V THE COURT ERRED WHERE IT BASED ITS DECISION ON A STATUTE OF FRAUDS THAT WAS NOT APPLICABLE, WAS NOT RAISED OR SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY, AND ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CORRECT ITS MISTAKE ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (2T42-20 to 21; 2T43-3 to 2T44-1)
[brief] ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of the Division and the Board to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the Act’s legislative purpose.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999)).  Accordingly, the Board reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] [484A]  One of the changes made by Ordinance 1535-16 was to change the permitted uses in Ordinance 290-68A to include, inter-alia, the following:  1.  Multi-family residential dwellings above at-grade, retail, commercial and other principal permitted uses.  2.  Multi-family residential dwellings including buildings above at grade parking only in areas where the building is behind a building that fronts [...].
[brief] “I feel that administrative action is required due to the failed conversation with [...] and ongoing issues with disrespecting her superiors. ” (T34-10 to 17).  [...] stated that the “ongoing issues” predate the September 12, 2022 incident; however, the Sergeant could not refer to any specific report of any other superior officer.  (T34-24 to 35-18).  As to Appellant’s original radio call, the witness explained that adding the word “sergeant” would not have cured the problem.  The phrase in its entirety, still constituted an order from an inferior officer to a superior officer, by definition, an insubordinate act.  (T37-11 to 22).  The witness then testified that he counseled the Appellant in a manner to give the Appellant an example of proper respectful discourse.
[brief] Also like [...], [...] never received the notice.  The Board did not fulfill its obligation to notify the members of the State Police Retirement System of this legislation “within 30 days” of July 8, 2019, including the requirement that they had to register their presence at the World Trade Center within 2 years of the law’s enactment, as was required by law.  The determination of the State Police Retirement Board acknowledges that it did not comply with the requirement to provide notice to all members and retirants enrolled in the State Police Retirement System within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  The final decision notes that on August 8, 2019, an email was sent to the Certifying Officers advising them of their obligations under the Ricci Act.