ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Review  12.1  Thorough and meaningful review of vehicular pursuit incidents is vital to ensuring the safety of law enforcement officers and the public.  Every vehicular pursuit must undergo the following procedures for a meaningful command-level review pursuant to a written policy established by the law enforcement executive:  (a)  The meaningful command-level review of the incident shall be undertaken by at least two levels of supervisors.  These levels may include the immediate supervisor, internal affairs, training officers, or command staff.  At least one reviewer must be two levels or more above the officer who engaged in the vehicular pursuit; (b)  The review shall include an examination of all available sources of information about the incident, including any video of the incident, recordings of 911 calls and police radio transmissions, reports, officer or other witness statements, medical records, or records of injuries; (c)  The reviewing supervisors shall make a recommendation of what action, if any, should be undertaken, including policy changes, remedial training, disciplinary action, administrative action, or, if appropriate, referral for criminal prosecution; and (d)  The law enforcement executive, or a command level officer no more than one rank below the law enforcement executive for departments with more than 100 officers, shall review each vehicular pursuit investigation and approve or reject the recommendations of the supervisors who conducted the review.  The law enforcement executive’s decision, or the decision of the designee, shall be memorialized and retained in the vehicular pursuit investigative file.
[brief] Defendants do not cite any case holding that *Atalese* is limited to consumers who are “average”, or that it does not apply to “sophisticated” consumers.  In fact, the Appellate Division has rejected that contention.  E.g., *Estate of [...] v. Morano*, 2019 WL 149521 at *5 (App. Div. 2019) (Da1383) (holding that the contract before it was a consumer contract and that “[d]efendants’ argument that [...] was a sophisticated business person and should have known that he would be waiving his right to a jury trial by signing the arbitration agreement has no merit”).  Although there may be a difference of opinion on whether Atalese applies to “sophisticated” commercial contracting parties in an individually negotiated commercial transaction (compare Drosos and Yura to County of Passaic), that is not the situation here.
[brief] On February 27, 2020, the [...] adopted Resolution 2020-2-6, authorizing the [...] (“Planning Board”) to conduct a preliminary investigation of the Property located at Block 701, Lot 2.01 (“Property”), commonly known as the former [...], to determine whether the Property qualified as an “area in need of rehabilitation,” pursuant to New Jersey Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -49.  (Pa164-Pa165).  On the same evening, the Township Committee also adopted Resolution 2020-2-5, authorizing a “Developer’s Escrow Agreement” for the Property with Defendant [...].  (Pa163-Pa164).  The Escrow Agreement specifically states that Active “wishes to develop said Property for warehouse/distribution purposes. ” (Pa168).  On May 15, 2020, the Planning Board’s Professional Planner, [...], PP, AICP, of [...] (the “Planner”) issued a Rehabilitation Investigation Report for the Property, titled “Area in Need of Rehabilitation Preliminary Investigation Report – [...]. ” (Pa182).  At the May 19, 2020 Planning Board hearing, the Board considered the Rehabilitation Report, and collectively recommended to the Township Committee that the Property qualified as an “area in need of rehabilitation. ” (Pa173-Pa174).  The Planning Board later memorialized this decision in its adoption of Resolution 2020-07 on June 16, 2020.  (Pa182-Pa185).  On May 28, 2020, following the Planning Board’s referral, the Township Committee accepted the factual findings in the Planner’s Report, and adopted Resolution 2020-5-6 designating the former [...] as “an area in need of rehabilitation” under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-14(a).
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has expressly “encourage[d] trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 541–42 (1995), holding modified, Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336 (2000).  “Trial courts must keep in mind that the summary judgment rule should be applied so as to serve two competing jurisprudential philosophies. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 541 (citing Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J.  229, 240 (1957)).  As this Court observed over a quarter of a century ago:  On the one hand is the desire to afford every litigant who has a bona fide cause of action or defense the opportunity to fully expose his case….  On the other hand, protection is to be afforded against groundless claims and frivolous defenses, not only to save antagonists the expense of protracted litigation but also to reserve judicial manpower and facilities to cases which meritoriously command attention.
[brief] Not only did [...] attack and kill [...], but he also bit [...] so hard that he continues to experience shooting pains in his leg.  (2T:31-9 to 19).  [...] stated that he utilized a walking cane for a month and half after the attack, and still has difficulty maintaining power in that leg.  (2T:30-11 to 18).  Further, there were two previous attacks before the underlying incident.  [...] attacked [...] on July 27, 2022, and [...] on August 4, 2022.  Siddiqi received stitches from [...]’s attack (2T:69-3 to 13), still has teeth marks on his leg, and sporadically experiences muscle pain.  (2T:67-15 to 17; 69-21 to 70-8).  [...] was bitten eight to ten times by [...] - hard enough to leave bite marks.  (2T:94-7 to 22; 96-1 to 3).  If the court in *Herold* found sufficient evidence of a threat, they would certainly find it here - even under the elevated “serious threat” standard.
[brief] ”  255 N.J. at 5; see also id. at 12 (the expert testified, “So just based on my training and experience, one mile is a good estimate of the tower range for [...] in this area. ”).  The expert candidly admitted that he did not review the height of the Parkway Tower, did not review its rated power, did not calculate the estimated absorption of radio energy by nearby buildings or hills, did not review the specific angle of the tower’s antenna, and did not review any diagnostic data from the tower on December 25.  [...] similarly did not perform any tests of the Parkway Tower’s area of signal coverage.  [Id. at 24-25.]  Relying on the one-mile approximation based on his training and experience, the expert created a map to illustrate the coverage area for the cell tower and opined that it was highly unlikely that the crime scene fell outside of the coverage area, thus suggesting that the defendant’s phone was near the crime scene.
[brief] The Mount Laurel Action, The Affordable Housing Settlement Agreement, Rezoning, and [...]’s Application  On July 2, 2015 the Borough filed its Mount Laurel declaratory judgment action, In the Matter of the Application for the [...], County of Monmouth, Docket No. [...] (the “ML Action”) with the Superior Court of New Jersey.  [...], as the then-owner of property located at [...], Block 59, Lot 10 on the Borough tax map (“Carton Street Property”) and contract purchaser of the Property and [...], Block 94, Lot 5 (“Bingham Avenue Property,” together with Carton Property and Property, the “[...] Properties”), intervened in the ML Action and participated in the settlement negotiations with the Borough and [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] His opinion was based upon Institute of Traffic Engineers (“ITE”) traffic data that aggregates buildings 24 ft. through 50 ft. tall into a single data set.  [...] asserted that the aggregated ITE data showed definitively that there would be no difference in truck traffic generated by the proposed taller buildings, even though the ITE data he relied upon did not distinguish traffic generation for buildings with differing heights.  4T30:6-4T 31:11.  [...] presented a series of computer-generated renderings he prepared on behalf of Plaintiffs to show the visual impacts of the proposed warehouse development.
[brief] The Court concludes the plaintiff has met their burden of proof and finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant said racial words to [...] in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2A(1), assessed fines and other fees.  (2T19:10-25).  [...] informs the court, the defendant was considering appealing to the Appellate Division if defendant did not prevail on de novo and asked to make motions for a stay, pending appeal on the Appellate level.
[brief] DEFENDANT IGNORED BOTH THE DEFEERENCE OWED TO MANSFIELD AND THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT FOR THE FLORENCE PORTION OF THE PROPERTY (Raised Below: 5T 15:21-25 through 17:1-20; 43:19-25; 52:1-8)  Consistent with the general principles of zoning, when an applicant seeks approvals for a parcel split by a municipal boundary line, each land use board considers the zoning in the adjoining municipality.  When Plaintiff sought approval for these accessory uses from the Defendant, Defendant ignored the required deference, and superimposed its bulk requirements over the entire tract.  Even assuming that Defendant provided any deference to [...]’s zoning, Defendant intentionally overlooked the relief sought by Plaintiff: a use variance for permitted accessory uses for a permitted principal structure to be located entirely within the adjacent municipality.  As developed in detail below, Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s application was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and requires reversal by this Court.
[brief] The question is one of logic and common sense. ”  State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 314 (1980).  “When each of the interconnected inferences [necessary to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt] is reasonable on the evidence as a whole,” judgment of acquittal is not warranted. ”  Samuels, 189 N.J. at 246 (internal citations omitted).  Here, the trial court did not err in charging the jury with conspiracy because there was sufficient evidence for the jury find defendant guilty of conspiring with [...] to commit murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] “This is an action in support of helping that property get cleaned up. ” (T2, 37:20-21).  Another Councilperson explained, “[i]f they want our help to clean this site up.  The [...], with their ability to borrow money at a very favorable rate, can assist them financial if they want to….” (T2, 36:2-6).  He also noted, “[w]e want to help them.  This designation of an area in need of redevelopment helps them.  It gives them favorable zoning to their site.  The new buyers should be thrilled.  …  This is an action in support of helping that property get cleaned up. ” (T2, 37:15-21).  As the Mayor noted, there is grant money available to help cleanup brownfield sites.
[brief] Ibid.  The Court concluded that the inescapable inference from that trial testimony, although never specifically stated, was that an informant had told the detective that the defendant committed the crime.  Id. at 446, 555 A.2d 575.  The Court acknowledged that in Bankston, the officer had testified more specifically on the information provided by the informant.  The Irving Court reasoned, however, that the creation of the inference, not the specificity of the statements made, was the critical factor in determining whether the hearsay rule was violated.  Id. at 447, 555 A.2d 575.  The Court ultimately distinguished Bankston because the defense counsel in Bankston had made a timely objection to each testimonial impropriety, thus preserving the issue for appeal.  Ibid.  By contrast, in Irving, the defense counsel did not object to the detective's hearsay testimony, even though the same testimony had been given at the Wade hearing prior to trial.  Ibid.  The Court noted that because the issue was to be resolved under the plain error standard of review, it must consider whether there is reasonable doubt that the jury would have ruled other than as it did.
[brief] The agreements between the parties denominate the transaction as a sale of an interest in the pre-judgment personal injury proceeds.  A sale is, in this context, synonymous to an assignment.  The case law, and its controlling authority, is clear.  The assignment of the right to money from a personal injury claim before the claim is resolved is forbidden in New Jersey.  It is true that the judgment based on the claim is freely assignable.  But the right to any portion of the proceeds before judgment lies solely with the victim of the tort.  True, there are cases indicating the opposite in the historical record, but none of those cases purports to overrule the Supreme Court of New Jersey and its predecessor, the Court of Errors and Appeals.
[brief] ”  Pa30.  The trial court essentially reached the inapplicable determination that the .35 FAR (a standard that is generally utilized solely for single-family homes) on the Property does not severely limit achieving any viable development or structure at the Property.  Pa36.  The trial court also gave extreme deference to the Zoning Board when it ruled that the proposed FAR was 1.77 instead of the 1.42 FAR despite the Zoning Board presenting any evidence to rebut [...]’s experts.  Pa31.  Furthermore, the trial court admitted that while the “proposed building would be new, meaning if new equates to aesthetically pleasing…it is not a characteristic which supports the promotion of MLUL goals. ”  Pa38.  Lastly, the trial court failed to weigh the testimony in support of the development by the immediately impacted neighbors and instead opined that “the Second Application ignores the huge impact upon the surrounding properties of its proposed FAR” and that the “multiple bulk variances supported the Zoning Board’s finding that the site could not accommodate the deviation from the FAR. ”  Pa37, Pa40.
[brief] [...]’s argument ignores the practical identity of the qualifications and the practice of [...] and [...] as they relate to this case.  The fact that [...] was Board certified in Surgery or that [...] had a subspecialty in Pumonology Medicine are irrelevant to this inquiry because this case does not involve those specialties.  Where it matters, the credentials of these two physicians are practically identical.  The purpose of the Affidavit of Merit statute is to reduce frivolous litigation.
[brief] Respondent, in its infinite wisdom, opted to reject [...]’s ID.  Unfortunately, the basis of that rejection lacks any discernable factual basis.  All witnesses called at the hearing before [...] agreed that [...] had prior workers’ compensation cases in 2000 and 2004.  There were “reports of first injury” for both years.  There were workers’ compensation cases opened from both years.  There were medical records, including diagnostic testing, from both years.  However, Respondent was, and continues to be, convinced that [...] also had a third prior workers’ compensation injury in the year 2009.  In its Final Administrative Determination ("FAD") of September 19, 2023, Respondent opined:  The medical documents also contained references to a report of an injury in 2009, made by [...], one of Mr. [...]’s treating physicians.  (Pa112).  (Emphasis added).  The position of Respondent was fundamentally flawed.  The FAD used the plural "medical documents" when describing a 2009 injury.  However, when it came to 2009, the only document in evidence that referenced an accident or an incident occurring in that year was Pa161-Pa165, which was [...]'s one narrative.  Respondent and its expert clung to, and continue to cling to, this lone record as evidence of a 2009 incident.  And it was, and is, understandable why they would.  In the absence of a 2009 accident or incident, the record showed [...] as having 11+ years of being asymptomatic as it relates to his neck and having no treatment in those 11+ years.  On the other hand, if there were a 2009 incident or accident, that timeframe of 11+ years would shrink to 6+ years.  A purported 2009 incident might also justify the original grounds on which Respondent denied [...] an ADR, namely: [...]'s claim was "the result of a pre-existing disease alone or a pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work effort."  (Pa2).  [...] submitted at the hearing before [...] that he should not be denied an ADR based upon a typographical error in the report of Dr. Kirschner.  [...]'s employers were required to turn over to Respondent all workers' compensation data each had for [...].  Neither had an accident or an incident from 2009.  Additionally, no other medical records and no other exhibits moved into evidence referenced a 2009 incident or accident.  Finally, [...] denied any such 2009 incident or accident in his direct examination and cross-examination.  When viewed cumulatively, [...] submitted, and [...] concurred, that it was more likely than not that [...] was never involved in an incident or an accident in the calendar year of 2009.  [...] hopes this Court corrects the grievous misperception of Respondent.
[brief] (Da158-60)  This ¹²  “Now, [...] is absolutely right.  He does not have to prove a single thing to you, but he said he would.  He said in the beginning he was going to prove his client was innocent, his client was not in Atlantic City on that day.  So what does he do?  Well, he takes out a lot of cell phone records, and [...] is very technologically savvy.  He knows all the terms for the cell phone records, he knows all the terms for the text messages, and he says, look, look at these texts, look at these cell phone records, but he doesn’t prove a thing.  He doesn’t have to, but he didn’t.  Absolutely no evidence was put forward in this case to prove that [...] was anywhere but Atlantic City murdering [...]. ”  opening promise thus allowed the prosecution to belittle the defense's inability to prove its alibi, and then erased any prospect of meaningful appellate review of the propriety of the State’s summation.  The record is silent as to any possible strategic reason for counsel making such a promise.  [...] has thus presented a prima facie case of ineffectiveness, and an evidentiary hearing is required.
[brief] U.S. Const. amends.  V, VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.  “[O]nce a judge determines that a term of imprisonment should be imposed, the judge has discretion but must sentence in accordance with the applicable statutes and must determine the length of the term by carefully analyzing and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.
[directive] Municipal Enforcement Agencies by of and Use Maintenance Seized Property  State 6 - 2 6:3  Law Enforcement Agencies 6 - 4 6 5  Maintenance Expenditures of Funds and from Management Property Received - 1- 1  SOP No. 01 and State Federal Forfeitures  1  MLETA/Municipal Law 4 - Trust Account Enforcement 12- 8-9  Auditing 1214  Monitoring, and Reporting Procedures - 4 - 04  No. 1  Municipal Forfeiture Program Administration
[brief] (T165:22-166:8).  [...] further explained that the issue of timekeeping had to be compared to the other salaried employees, meaning that if all other salaried workers did not have submit timesheets, then the issue of timesheets would be neutral.  (1T166:3-5).  But if the other salaried workers had to submit a timesheet, but [...] did not, then it would lean towards her being an independent contractor.
[brief] Sometime prior to 2013, [...] allegedly purchased a pool of defaulted consumer debts for a fraction of their face value, including [...]’s alleged [...] credit account.  Thereafter, on September 26, 2013, [...] commenced a collection lawsuit against [...], obtained a default judgment, and obtained a bank levy and wage execution against [...].  However, the default judgment obtained by [...] stems from an action that [...] had no legal right or authority to bring.  By purchasing or otherwise taking assignment of the debt, [...] engaged in the “consumer loan business” as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2.  However, it is undisputed that [...] was not licensed as a consumer lender at the time it took possession of or attempted to enforce [...]’s account.  (Da43).  By the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), the assignments or purchases and any rights to the account were void and unenforceable as of the date the [...] purchased or took assignment of the account.  A consumer credit contract acquired in violation of the act “shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I.
[brief] (Aa88).  Moreover, [...] conflates test pit data in an effort to support its desired end.  For BMP 201, the data for Test Pit 184 demonstrates a groundwater mounding clearance of 0.7 feet.  (Aa3066).  [...] uses the groundwater mounding data from Test Pit 181 (7.5 feet) and applies it to the water table separation data from Test Pit 184 (4.2 feet) to reach its conclusion that BMP 201 will fail.  Ibid.  [...] employs the same strategy for BMP 271, instead using data from Test Pit 183 and comparing it to the data from LTP 6.  Ibid.  This argument compares apples to oranges to attain an incongruous result.  The facts instead demonstrate [...] performed its due diligence in evaluating [...]’s FHACA applications.  [...] questioned [...]’s engineer about the groundwater mounding analysis during the permitting process.  (Aa2687).  [...]’s engineer explained that a “total of 11 small-scale BMPs provide recharge” and that [...] was “not seeking any waivers from groundwater recharge” because “the site provides a surplus of recharge. ”  Ibid. (referencing Tables 3.6.1 and 3.7.1 of the report).  Table 3.6.1 found in [...]’s Engineering Report provides a summary of the green infrastructure stormwater management systems.  (AA835).  This table demonstrates that several proposed small-scale infiltration basins and bioretention basins were designed to provide groundwater recharge, and [...] proposed to import fill of permeable soil where the existing soil under the basins had low permeability.  (Aa836).  Table 3.7.1 shows the approximate 21,000 cubic feet surplus of groundwater recharge based on the calculations.  (Aa837).  As such, [...] applied its expertise and correctly determined that [...]’s hydrologic and hydraulic analysis showed the stormwater management measures maintained more than 100% of the average annual pre-construction groundwater recharge volume in compliance with N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4.  (Aa88).  The court should defer to [...]’s findings in this highly technical field and affirm [...]’s permitting decision.
[brief] H34a [...] (“[...]”) Decision and Order Adopting the Initial Decision of Hon. Elia A.  Pelios, A.L.J., issued May 18, 2022, in [...] Docket Nos. [...] and [...] (SOICR #93), attaching .........................................................  H38a Initial Decision of Hon. [...], A.L.J., issued May 18, 2022 in OAL Docket Nos. [...] and [...] consolidated (part of SOICR #93), attaching ...........................................
[brief] ”  (1T15-20 to 21), She added that she “still needed to be able to have all the information” and to be able to have “any additional documentation or opposition to the motion that was filed by petitioner. ” (1T15-21 to 24).  In Respondent Counsel’s own words at the Motion hearing on February 21, 2024, he stated that, “first of all, I don’t know how you’re going to rule on the essential worker statute.  It’s very difficult for me to suggest that there’s any bias.  It’s about knowledge that is outside the realm of this proceeding and which I can never find out if your decision is based on what the litigants and what the public perceives in terms of a jurist who happened to be involved in a statute that does not specifically mention teachers. ” (1T10-21 to11-4).  Thus, it is difficult to fathom how Respondent’s Counsel can now argue that [...] expressed her decision on the essential worker issue when he states he didn’t know how she was going to rule and it was difficult for him to suggest bias.