ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 34; Pa26-Pa33; Pa25-Pa33).  In pertinent part, the Settlement Order provides:  ‘Released Claims’ shall mean any and all actions, causes of action, suits, claims, defenses, covenants, controversies, agreements, promises, damages, judgments, demands, liabilities and obligations in law or in equity relating solely Inc., 2:17-cv07891-MCA-SCM (D.N.J.), Delgado v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2:18-cv-01521-KMJBC (D.N.J.). to claims of statutory damages under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), that Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members, as defined herein, asserted or could have asserted as a result of, arising out of, or in connection with the collection of a debt on behalf of [...] and on behalf of [...] when they were not licensed under New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“LICENSING ACT”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C 1 et seq., from the beginning of time to the date of this Agreement.
[brief] As such, by “the Complaint” presumably Plaintiff means the “revised SAC” (Pa259-312), although Plaintiff’s brief in this section contains cites to both the “SAC” (Pa9-95; Pa136-141) and the “revised SAC. ”  Plaintiff’s lack of clarity and the Defendants and Courts need to make educated guesses regarding precisely what Plaintiff means has been a longstanding pattern in this matter.  Plaintiff also continues his longstanding pattern of hyperbolic and unsupported assertions.  For example, Plaintiff claims that new counsel could not be obtained because “all counsel are afraid to work for [...].
[directive] The internal affairs process represents the agency's response to allegations and complaints that have been brought to the agency's attention either by agency employees or members of the public.  Law enforcement agencies must establish and implement a process of investigation and review that is both meaningful and objective.  The process must be 4 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 designed to ensure that individuals receive adequate redress for legitimate complaints of misconduct.  It is not enough for law enforcement executives to adopt a policy governing the receipt, investigation and resolution of complaints of officer misconduct; rather, the policy must be implemented and executed with a commitment to the integrity of the agency and the constitutional rights of the public.
[brief] Respondent Borough had sought leave from the trial court to correct a typographical error contained in the metes and bounds description of an exhibit attached to the Borough’s Verified Complaint, depicting the perpetual seawall easement which the Borough acquired in the Appellant’s property to repair the existing damaged seawall.  Da40.  The trial court properly allowed the amendment, which was sought by the Borough out of an abundance of caution.  Da80.  Arguing that the amendment was tantamount to a relief from judgment pursuant to R. 4:50- 1, Appellant’s opposition to the motion to amend as well as his subsequent request for attorneys and expert fees from the Borough were an attempt to gain a financial windfall by exploiting a single typographical error contained in the Metes & Bounds description attached as an exhibit to the Verified Complaint, despite the correct distance of 177.65 feet being reflected in several other documents, to provide an inflated appraisal report seeking $1,550,000.00 in compensation.
[brief] Though both of Defendants’ respective Briefs assert that “[t]his Court recently affirmed this long-standing precedent,” the NJCFLA was only enacted in its present form in 2010.  See [...]’s Br. 10; [...]’s Br. 9.  Moreover, there is precedent regarding the private right of action under the NJCFLA until 2014—there are still no published binding authorities on the issue before the Court.
[brief] During the public hearings, no contention was advanced by the applicant that the character of the surrounding neighborhood has changed since the 2018 Master Plan and since the Zoning Ordinance was last revised, factors which may justify the granting of relief.  The Board finds that neither the character of the Borough generally, nor the neighborhood proximate to the property, has changed in any substantial manner since the last revisions of the Master Plan and Ordinance.  This conclusion is confirmed by the 2018 Land Use & Central Business District Elements of the Master Plan (“2018 Plan”) which notes that the Borough’s population growth has been 33 persons, or 0.4%, between 2000 and 2014 (2018 Plan, at p. 119) and that a net growth of eleven (11) dwelling units occurred between 2000 and 2015 (*Id.* at 129-130).  The 2018 Plan notes that the Borough’s population has remained relatively static since the 1990’s (*Id.* at 119).  It should also be noted that the 2018 Plan discussed rezoning certain areas of the Borough, but the property and neighboring area were not proposed for any rezoning.  14.  …  The fact that other variances aside from the d(1) use variance and the d(4) FAR variances are required by the proposal mandates a conclusion that the granting of the use variance would substantially impair the intent and purpose of the Zone Plan and Zoning Ordinance.
[brief] On May 24, 2019, the Township Defendants’ insistence that [...] provide a copy of its purchase and sale agreement with [...] as an “initial starting point” for them to even consider [...]’s proposal, and the Special Adjudicator’s disagreement with this position.  Pa013.  4.  On June 26, 2019, [...]’s filing of its first motion to revoke the Township Defendants’ temporary immunity.  Pa014.  5.  In response to [...]’s first motion to revoke immunity, the Township Defendants’ issuance of subpoenas to [...] and [...] seeking copies of the purchase and sale agreement.  Id. 6.  On August 7, 2019, The Trial Court’s entry of an Order that conditioned further extensions of temporary immunity on the Township Defendants making progress towards their Third-Round obligation and participating in good faith mediations with [...], amongst other things.
[directive] E. refers to any finding where a preponderance of the evidence shows “Sustained1 finding” an officer violated any law, regulation, directive, guideline policy or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating  For purposes of this policy, “sustained” is the equivalent of “substantiated” as it pertains to New Jersey 1 State Police policies.  Page 3 procedure, rule or training, following the last supervisory review of the incident(s) during the internal affairs process or a ruling by a hearing office, arbitrator, Administrative Law Judge, or the Superior Court.  Allegations that cannot be sustained, are not credible, or have resulted in the exoneration of an employee, including where the previous Giglio finding has either been vacated, or overturned on the merits in any subsequent action, generally are not considered to be potential impeachment information, subject to the requirements herein.  On the other hand, if the officer negotiates a plea or there is an administrative or civil settlement with the employer whereby the Giglio-related charge is dismissed, the charge would still be considered sustained, if there was sufficient credible evidence to prove the allegation, and the officer does not challenge the finding and obtain a favorable ruling by a hearing officer, arbitrator, Administrative Law Judge, or the Superior Court.  In reviewing dispositions reached before the issuance of this Directive, prosecutors must be mindful that officers may not have had an incentive to challenge Giglio-related charges or findings when the overall negotiated disposition of the matter was acceptable to the officer.  Therefore, in such cases, prosecutors must thoroughly review the entire investigative file before making determinations on the disclosure of Giglio-related charges that were ultimately dismissed as part of an administrative or civil settlement.  II.
[brief] The articulation of a present public use to justify a condemnation is the essential first step in determining whether a condemnor is exceeding its statutory authorization or operating in bad faith.  A prospective condemnor must demonstrate why it is taking a property at that time.  Here, prior to filing and during the “bona fide negotiations” period required by N.J.S.A. 20:3-6, the [...] alleged the taking was in the public interest for open space without acknowledging the land swap.  Only after challenged by the defendants did the [...] acknowledge the swap with the [...], but still the public record is devoid of any meaningful indication of how the subject properties will be utilized by the [...] and there are no limitations on the [...]’s use of the property it is receiving.  It was therefore improper for the trial court to find the [...] is taking the property for open space based only on Ordinance No. 15-23.
[brief] The ADR Provision in the Agreement.  As relevant here, page seven (7) of the Agreement contains a provision entitled “DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION” that provides as follows:  YOU AND WE AGREE THAT ANY CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR CLAIM, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY CLAIM FOR CONSUMER FRAUD OR ANY OTHER STATUTORY CLAIM, (COLLECTIVELY “CLAIM”)  ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING IN ANY WAY TO THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS BREACH THAT CANNOT BE SETTLED THROUGH DIRECT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY THE CLAIMANT TO NON-BINDING MEDIATION  .  . . . .  IF THE PARTIES ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE CLAIM THROUGH MEDIATION, THE CLAIM SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY CLAIMANT FOR AND RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE [...] COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND ADMINISTERED BY AN ARBITRATOR MUTUALLY SELECTED AND AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, OR IF THE PARTIES CANNOT AGREE THEN ONE ASSIGNED BY THE [...].  . . . .  YOU AND WE ARE CHOOSING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION INSTEAD OF LITIGATION TO RESOLVE OUR CLAIMS AND VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.  . . .  NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, WE RESERVE THE RIGHT AND MAY AT OUR DISCRETION  EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO COMMENCE LEGAL ACTION IN ANY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO COLLECT MONIES YOU OWE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, IN WHICH YOU AGREE TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO MEDIATION OR ARBITRATION.  (Id. at 61 (emphasis and typeface in original)).
[brief] In the typical tort case, a plaintiff must prove tortious conduct, injury and proximate cause.  W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton D. Owen, Prosser Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at p. 164-65 (5th ed.1984).  Proximate cause is defined as “‘any cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would not have occurred. ’”  Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 418 (N.J. 1996) (internal citations omitted).  Fundamentally, for a plaintiff to impute tort liability upon a defendant a "plaintiff must prove tortious conduct, injury and proximate cause."
[brief] “When a sale of real estate is ordered by the superior court in any action, wherein the order or judgment under which such sale is ordered, is founded upon a cause of action of an equitable nature, except mortgage foreclosure sales, the officer or person authorized or directed to make the sale may, in his discretion, make the same at public or private sale and on such terms as he may deem to be most advantageous to the parties concerned therein. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:61-3.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPELLING ARBITRATION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WAIVED THE RIGHT, IF ANY, TO COMPEL ARBITRATION (1T40:20-42:14).  Even assuming that the defective arbitration provisions in extraneous contracts could somehow compel this matter to arbitration, which they cannot, [...] waived here right to arbitration through her extensive litigation conduct in, and self-selection of, the Chancery Division.  [...]: (1) selected the Chancery Division to file her claim (Da3-23); (2) affirmatively certified pursuant to Rule 4:5-1 that “no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated,” (Da21); (3) sought and obtained temporary restraints against Appellants (Da2, 24-28, 104-08, 259-62); (4) engaged in mediation ordered by the Chancery Court (Da249-51, 263-64); (5) filed and lost a motion to consolidate (Da275-77, 299-300); (6) failed to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense to Appellants’ counterclaims (Da272-74); (7) engaged in substantive discovery (Da334-54, 377); and (8) delayed about nine months in making an arbitration request – at which time trial was scheduled to proceed in about two months.
[brief] On February 28, 2011, two armed men entered a family’s [...] residence when only the children were at home.  Two of the children were asleep, but the men encountered a fourteen-year-old girl and a thirteen-year-old girl.  They tied the girls’ hands behind their backs, and detained them in an upstairs room.  When the parents came home about an hour later, the men accosted the father at gunpoint, took about two thousand dollars in cash from him, and demanded access to his safe.  The men tied the mother’s hands behind her back, forced the husband to turn the alarm system off, brought him to the basement, and tied his hands behind his back.  After the men left, the father was able to unbind his hands.  He went upstairs, untied his wife’s hands, located his daughters, and freed them.  On March 3, 2011, a resident of [...] arrived at his home and was confronted by two men, one of whom pointed a gun at the back of his neck.  The men stole approximately two thousand dollars in cash from the man and took his car, which was recovered later that night.
[brief] It’s not for me to inquire.  It would be your client indicating that either he has a condition under the ADA that requires a reasonable accommodation, or if you’re client’s position is that he had a medical condition that will prohibit him from providing testimony, it would be your obligation to ask your client the questions and potentially to provide the documentation on that issue.  (3T:36:22-37:19).  Thereafter, the Sheriff’s officer was asked to sit in the courtroom to maintain order and remained in the courtroom for the duration of trial.
[brief] (Pa97).  Students did not receive the [...] student manual until orientation, which was approximately the 19th, 20th, or 21st of August 2012.  (Pa356).  However, shortly after Plaintiff began the Fall Semester, there was a significant change to the [...] School of Pharmacy’s home website page, unbeknownst to Plaintiff at that time.  (Pa454).  It was not until after Plaintiff commenced classes in the Fall of 2012 Semester that the [...] School of Pharmacy website page included new requirements for the dual degree program, stating, “Students interested in a dual degree will be required to meet the admissions requirements for the selected second-degree pathway, in addition to maintaining a 3.0 grade point average within the Doctor of Pharmacy curriculum. ” (Pa454).  Plaintiff applied and was admitted to the program before the website included a 3.0 GPA requirement for matriculating into the Master’s program.
[brief] **[...]’s Failure To Timely Vacate The Leased Premises, Or To Leave It In Broom Clean Condition, Constituted Two Additional Breaches Of The Settlement Agreement (Pa2). **  In addition to its unauthorized dumping and its failure to pay the settlement amount to which it agreed, [...] also breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to timely vacate the Leased Premises.  [Pa298 at ¶ 4].  As [...] was not actually in possession, it was [...]’s counsel who contacted [...]’s counsel on October 31, 2023 – the final date by which [...] was required to deliver possession to [...] under the Settlement Agreement – to state:  “My client has advised that he has removed most of the vehicles from the property [but] requests [7 days] to remove the rest. ”  [Pa300].  [...] declined to agree to the extension of time, and [...] remained until November 2023 – after the vacation date had passed.  [Pa298 at ¶ 4].  When possession was eventually restored to [...], the Leased Premises were not only profoundly damaged by the unauthorized dumping that raised the elevation of the parking area by *three feet* in certain areas, but were also left with mountains of personal property and debris that [...] was forced to remove itself.  [Pa175 at ¶ 6 ([...] admitting that it “was to return the Property in broom clean condition and free of personal property and debris”); Pa309 at ¶¶ 4-5 ([...] certifying that [...] left abandoned vehicles, trailers, approximately 17 commercial vehicle tires, and an approximately 50-gallon drum, in addition to the other debris dumped at the Leased Premises, and that removal of these additional items alone was estimated to cost $40,000)].  Both of these constituted additional events of default for which [...] was also entitled to the entry of the Money Judgment.  The Order should also be reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for entry of the Money Judgment, for these additional reasons.
[brief] The trial court’s further resort to Merriam-Webster and Black’s Law for separate definitions of “principally” and “engaged” to attempt to show what the combination of the two words means, and “attorney at law,” as used in the Act was inappropriate.  Cherry picking dictionary definitions of single words to demonstrate that the Limited Attorney Exemption is not vague provides no context whatsoever to how these phrases are used in the statute.  As demonstrated above, Defendants provide no answer to that question anywhere: not in any written source that an attorney can review nor in [...]’s testimony.  Furthermore, the dictionary definitions do not resolve whether the Act applies to attorneys such as those licensed in other states who are admitted pro hac vice to handle New Jersey cases.  The trial court’s reliance on a case commenting on the phrase “engaged principally” in a far different context provides no support.  In Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., 216 U.S. 439 (1910), the Court was presented with the applicability of a bankruptcy statute provision to corporations “engaged principally” in trading or mercantile pursuits.  The Court, in a decision from 113 years ago, provided an overly simplistic analysis of this phrase that did not consider any of the factors that [...] would need to consider in determining whether an attorney is “principally engaged” in performing debt adjustment services.
[brief] The reformation, therefore, of such a contract must be to make the written contract to conform to that upon which the minds of the parties have met.  *Berkowitz v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co.*, 106 N.J. Eq. 238, 241, quoting *Sardo v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland*, 100 N.J. Eq. 332 (1926) (emphasis added).
[brief] (9T242:12-19; 9T261:10-18; 9T240:240:15).  During discovery when [...] responded to a subpoena that demanded that he produce Decedent’s testamentary documents to a deposition, [...] produced copies of all the pleadings that had then been filed in this litigation, but did not produce any notes of his meetings with Decedent, no drafts of wills, and no invoices or cancelled checks from Decedent.  (9T243:11-25; 9T246:11-15).  In addition, the only prenuptial agreement that [...] produced pursuant to the deposition subpoena was the Photocopy that contained the words “Exhibit B” hand written on the bottom of the first page.  (9T239:15 to 240:1)  Before trial, another subpoena was served on [...], demanding that he produce at trial the original file he maintained for Decedent.  (9T237:23 to 238:1).  At trial, [...] testified that he could not find the Decedent’s client file.  (9T238:2-3).  [...] explained that when he received a subpoena for the deposition, he did not have a client file for Decedent and so he and Respondent’s attorney recreated the file.  (9T269:4-7).  Respondent’s attorney gave to [...] the Photocopy upon which he had written “Exhibit B” on the bottom of the first page when he attached it to the Answer and Crossclaim.  (9T271:6-12).  Therefore, when [...] produced to Petitioner the Photocopy pursuant to the deposition subpoena, it had the words "Exhibit B" written on the first page.  (9T239:20-240:1; 9T271:19-24).  At trial, [...] testified about events that took place nearly eight years earlier about the making of the 2014 Will, relying solely on his memory and the Will.
[brief] [...] was a general contractor and construction management firm.  Pa75 ¶ 6.  [...] is also a general contractor and construction management firm which, on May 31, 2019, purchased [...]’s general construction management business.  Pa75 ¶¶ 7-8.  The parties structured the deal as an “earn-out” via a “Project Transfer Agreement” (the PTA), whereby [...] immediately transferred its ongoing construction projects (the “Backlog Projects”) to [...] and funneled future projects over a 3-year period to [...] (defined in the PTA as “Pipeline Projects”) and, in exchange, [...] agreed to pay [...] 65% of the “estimated gross profits” (“EGP”) on those projects.  Pa75-76 ¶¶ 9, 11, 13.  [...] sold its business to [...] as part of the retirement of [...]’s two principals (Stephen and [...]), and thus the parties agreed to this “earn-out” payment structure.  Pa75 ¶ 9.  Despite those facts, [...] nonetheless stiffed [...]’s retirees on more than $5 million in payments.  Schedule 1.1(a) of the PTA identified the five Backlog Projects being transferred from [...] to [...], which notably included, as the very first --- 1  For the convenience of the Court, this brief combines the recitation of facts procedural history, as those matters are intertwined.
[brief] As to the cross-appeal, Landlord has failed to meet the high hurdle it faces in seeking to overturn a trial court’s discretionary determination regarding the amount of counsel fees to be awarded.  This is particularly true here where litigation was entirely avoidable and Landlord could have made itself whole with a minor accounting adjustment but instead has been litigating this case for four years in the hopes of hanging onto its double recovery.  In the event this Court agrees with Tenant’s argument that a reversal and remand is warranted, the issue of counsel fees and of who is the “prevailing party” entitled to such fees is a subject more appropriate for disposition on remand.
[directive] All officers are encouraged to take advantage of the resources provided by the New Jersey Resiliency Program for Law Enforcement, as well as the other resources identified in AG Directive 2019-1, also known as the “Officer Resiliency Directive. ”  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  10  3  Prevention of Misconduct 3.0.1  Prevention is the primary means of reducing and controlling inappropriate behavior and misconduct.  Although disciplinary actions are properly imposed on officers who engage in wrongdoing, they have limited utility if they shield or obscure organizational conditions that permit the abuses to occur.  Inadequate training and a lack of appropriate guidance too often are factors that contribute to inappropriate behavior and misconduct.  An agency should make every effort to eliminate the organizational conditions that may foster, permit or encourage an employee’s inappropriate behavior.
[brief] In the present matter, the defendant [...] pled guilty to third degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)7, on January 2, 2024, and in doing so, provided a factual allocution to the charge as a pre-condition of being admitted to PTI.  During defendant [...]’s discovery deposition on May 13, 2024, plaintiff’s counsel sought to question him about statements made regarding his plea allocution.  [Da306-Da324]