ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] VICTIMS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE  A.  Law enforcement's response to incidents of domestic violence should be in accordance with N.J.S. 2C:25-1 et seq. and county-wide and local departmental standard operating procedures (s.o.p.).  B.  Victims should be advised at the earliest possible stage of the availability of shelters, legal services and counseling.  C.  If the victim is out of the household and her safety is in question, her address should not be disclosed in the absence of a court order.  D.  Victims shall be advised of the right to go to court and get a temporary restraining order against the offender.(12)  E.  Victims have the right to file a criminal complaint against the offender.(13)  F.  Victims shall be notified of bail reduction.(14)  G.  Victims shall be notified when defendant is released on bail.  H.  The victim's address shall be confidential and not disclosed to defendant.(15)  III.
[brief] (Da3161-3184)  However, the Court did vacate the Arbitrator’s $314,000 fee award, agreeing it was a violation of New Jersey’s public policy where no statute, rule or agreement permitted fee-shifting in this case.  (Da3178)  The Court agreed the Arbitrator had misread case law considering exceptions to the American Rule for third-party tort litigation in this direct action between the Plaintiffs and [...].  (Ibid.)  However, the Court confirmed the Arbitrator’s ruling that [...] had to repay [...] $504,000 for his “personal legal fees” which [...] had paid for him in Phase I of this case.  (Da3162)  The Court also refused to vacate based on the postponement denial, believing that [...] had an “opportunity” to present evidence and that the Arbitrator had discretion.  (Da3170-3173)  The Court then appointed an independent accountant (ultimately [...]) to render a valuation opinion and assist the Court’s N.J.S.A. 42:2C-47(c) determination how much [...] was owed for his interest.
[brief] Appellants argued that the Project is not exempt from the Highlands Act, alleging [...] is not a public utility project serving the public interest for New Jersey residents and the Project is thus not a routine maintenance or update, and that DEP must evaluate cumulative impacts on the Highlands Region and protect it from expansion.  (Aa338-340).  Appellant [...] and its members urged DEP to analyze alleged impacts to stormwater, C1 streams, air quality, and threatened and endangered species.  (Aa341-344; Aa1061-1322).  DEP received numerous other public comments opposing the Project.  (Aa345-Aa1322).  In all, DEP considered over 800 comments, the vast majority of which were “form” comments containing the same general objections that the Project will cause “negative impacts on our water supply, public health, safety, and our environment. ” (Aa345-1060).  DEP provided the comments to [...] and considered additional information from [...] in response before making the HAD decision.  On May 20, 2021, [...] directly responded to Appellants’ comments, expanding on its status as a “public utility” and explaining that the Project is an “upgrade” of a “system. ” (Aa1327-1330).  [...] also highlighted that the Highlands Council found the Project would cause minimal environmental impacts, and FERC considered the environmental impacts as negligible or minor.  (Aa1329-1330).  On June 23, 2021, considering [...]’s application and supplementation, the Highlands Council’s letter, and the public comments received, DEP issued the HAD, determining that the Project qualified for Exemption #11 and was consistent with the areawide WQMP.
[brief] But he is incorrect, because the ALJ reasonably relied on various pieces of evidence, including the surveillance video, the logbook and [...]’ statement, which are not hearsay.  i.  Authenticity of Surveillance Footage  The surveillance video covers the period of [...]’ shift on August 16-17, 2019.  It shows that [...] left the food preparation room at 2:15 a.m., 3:41 a.m., and 4:05 a.m. and only once walked toward the wing he was responsible for monitoring.  (1T66:18-1T67:23; 1T68:11-1T69:1; 1T71:14-20).  In his brief, [...] appears to challenge the authenticity of the surveillance footage.  (Ab24).  But [...]’ challenge is barred.  N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.6 requires that if authenticity is not raised at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing, the writing, or in this case video, is presumed to be authentic.  Moreover, [...] consented to the video’s admission into evidence and requested that the ALJ consider the surveillance footage a joint exhibit.  (3T34:3-10).  Additionally, after the ALJ admitted the surveillance footage into evidence, opposing counsel explicitly stated “I’m not objecting to the video. ” (1T62:3-5).  As such, [...] waived this objection during the hearing and it should not be considered on appeal.
[brief] (1T:11-12 to 13).  [...] followed defendant from the left lane to the shoulder on the right-hand side of the highway.  (1T:11-15 to 16).  As [...] followed defendant, he observed defendant’s vehicle cross the white dotted line on the left side of the right shoulder before the vehicle stopped.  (1T:11-16 to 18).  After defendant’s vehicle stopped, [...] approached the passenger side of the vehicle and [...] approached the driver’s side.  (1T:11-20 to 22).  [...] identified himself and asked defendant for his license, registration and insurance.  In doing so, [...] observed that defendant movements were “a little slow” (1T:13-20 to 21).  He also smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle.  (1T:13-21 to 23).  Based on his observations of defendant’s driving, demeanor, and the odor of alcohol, [...] asked defendant to step out of the car to administer standard field sobriety tests because he believed defendant was driving under the influence.
[directive] In general, criminal investigations and administrative investigations should be kept separate to the extent possible, with criminal investigations led by the County Prosecutor’s Office preceding internal affairs disciplinary investigations.  However, in some cases where both a criminal and an administrative disciplinary investigation are needed, the internal affairs investigator from the subject officer's agency may be expected to help conduct both.  Under these circumstances, the methods employed in the criminal investigation conflict with those used in the administrative investigation.  N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (unionized employee who reasonably believes that an investigatory 7 interview may result in disciplinary action against him or her is entitled to union representation).
[directive] Improving Access for Individuals with Disabilities and Limited English Language Proficiency  Government agencies should be able and ready to communicate effectively with all members of the public.  Agencies therefore must be prepared to accommodate complainants, respondents, and witnesses with disabilities or with limited English language proficiency.  Additionally, about 1 in 6 disability,10 4 New Jersey adults identify as having a and they are disproportionately likely to be Hispanic.11  Black or Meanwhile, more than a million New Jersey residents have limited English Spanish.12 language proficiency; a plurality of those residents speak  A civil enforcement agency’s inability to appropriately accommodate individuals with disabilities or with limited English language proficiency can adversely affect their ability to carry out their civil enforcement function.  It can affect the integrity of the evidentiary record, the outcome of cases, and the ability to deliver justice for the individuals involved.  No less importantly, an agency’s failure to appropriately accommodate individuals with disabilities or with limited English language proficiency can make those individuals less likely to seek out the benefits of the agency’s services.  That is unacceptable, particularly because individuals with disabilities or with limited English language proficiency may be targeted for predatory practices and violations of their legal rights.
[brief] (B)  New Jersey Has A Materially Greater Interest Than New York In This Matter And New Jersey Would Govern The Dispute Absent The Choice-Of-Law Provision (Pa5).  As a threshold matter, Courts have not imposed a high burden to establish the Restatement’s exception to the choice-of-law provision based on the relative interests of the state whose law is identified as the contractual governing law, and the state that has the greater interest in applying its own law.  New Jersey focuses on the dispute at issue and analyzes the “contacts or relationships with the relevant states to determine which state has a materially greater interest” to that specific dispute.  *Diversant, LLC*, 2018 WL 1610957, *3 (citation omitted).  As discussed above, Appellants are located in New Jersey, this matter does not affect any wholesalers located in New York, all the events set forth in the Verified Complaint occurred in New Jersey.
[brief] Exhibit A: Report from [...] dated December 6, 2019  Da 33***  ***  The pages submitted as Da 33-36 are the most legible and complete documents available.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This appeal involves the denial of defendant’s post-conviction relief (PCR) petition after an evidentiary hearing was held.  Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, among other crimes, for his purported role in a drive-by shooting which resulted in the death of a nineteen-year-old young man.  The central issue of defendant’s PCR petition concerned his trial attorney’s failure to conduct a pretrial investigation of his whereabouts on the night of a shooting.  As part of a pretrial investigation, defendant desired his trial attorney to interview two alibi witnesses and analyze the cellular telephone data provided by the State during discovery.  However, the trial attorney did neither.  The State’s proofs against defendant at trial amounted to a pretrial statement of an eyewitness to the shooting which the witness recanted.  At defendant’s PCR evidentiary hearing, the trial attorney testified that he did not recall any specific communications with defendant, but remembered, albeit not in detail, the cellular telephone data produced.  In spite of the testimony of the two alibi witnesses who did not testify at defendant’s trial, the PCR judge denied defendant’s application for relief.  The PCR judge concluded that defendant failed to establish either prong of the Strickland/Fritz test.  The judge based his decision to reject defendant’s request for relief on an assessment of the credibility of the alibi witnesses’ testimony without addressing whether the testimony they imparted would have had an impact on the State’s proofs actually presented.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] These documents were the result of extremely broad search terms—including terms such as “[...]” OR “[...]” OR “[...]” within the same paragraph as terms such as “age” OR “old” OR “retirement” OR “woman” OR “female” OR terminate OR terminated OR fired OR fire—as applied to a CEO custodian who received high-level reports and company-wide information about employee salary, bonus, furlough status, job openings for positions unrelated to [...]’s position, and other documents unrelated to [...] employees and customers in Kansas.  These documents have no bearing on the claims and defenses in this case.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS IT PERTAINED TO THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO MEDICAL CLAIMS ACCRUED PRIOR TO 2014.  Based on the evidence and the record below, the trial court correctly concluded that “Plaintiff’s proof of medical expenses date back to May of 2001, with the most recent proof dated January, 2018. ” (Da16).  In January, 2018, [...] was a 27 years old gown man and [...] was 24 year old grown woman.  The trial court’s application of the facts to the law of laches was not an abuse of discretion or reversible error --- especially when the trial court permitted medical claims made by the Plaintiff in March of 2017 for treatment of the adult children between 2014 and 2018.  The trial court’s quantification of damages owed and awarded to the Plaintiff for that permissible period is unassailable.  Simply put, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court (of equity) did not error by barring the Plaintiff’s claims for unreimbursed medical expenses which were as stale as 15 years old and as recent as 3 years old.  The trial court correctly concluded that the Plaintiff’s delay in seeking this relief was “unacceptable and unreasonable” and that Plaintiff’s argument that she was “unable to afford counsel for fifteen years is an incredible claim” as was “Plaintiff also waiting until the children completed their respective education[s] is an unreasonable explanation for the delay in filing for medical expenses. ” (Da16 – Da17).  The trial court also correctly concluded that “Plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in filing and insufficient proofs have prejudiced the Defendant…The Court finds that justice is unable to be administered due to such gross and unjustified delay in the Plaintiff’s filing. ” (D17).  It was not lost on anyone that for the 15 years leading up to filing her first and only motion for reimbursement in 2017, the Plaintiff was treating the medical reimbursement clause of the JOD as a “rainy day fund” which she planned to cash in on when the time was right for her knowing full well how difficult it would be for the Defendant to defend these stale claims consistent with his Due Process right.  For the trial court to have ruled any other way would have set bad precedence and undermined the public’s confidence in the Judiciary’s legitimate ability to fairly evaluate cases and controversies consistent with standing legal and equitable principals.
[brief] (3T7:3-11.)  The de novo court noted that it routinely asks about the reasons why Alcotest results are not admitted even if it is not presented in the issues on appeal before the trial court.  (3T6:13-7:1; 3T7:12-20.)  Defense counsel responded that although [...] was in the building, who was the officer who could have testified to those results, the “State chose to proceed on observations and on observations only. ” (3T5:8-6:2.)  Defense counsel also stated that the breath test results exceed the scope of the court’s review, but that they were inadmissible which was why they were not introduced.  (3T8:9-21.)  The prosecutor noted that the Alcotest results were not admitted because [...] used his cell phone in the room, and thus the results were barred by State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, cert. den., 555 U.S. 825 (2008).  (3T18:8-19:5.)
[brief] We illustrate the many problems with those different flavors of definitions as follows:  First, the Department says that [...] should know what the Department deems “excessive” to mean via “common sense” and “ordinary meaning,” despite offering conflicting definitions within this category alone.  See, e.g., Db3 (“excessive” should be understood through the lens of a “rational person” weighing whether the requested rate increase is “common sense”); Db36 (“The impact of the requested rate increases defied the common-sense and ordinary meaning of the word excessive”); id.  (“[...]’s response that it intended to use profits from this block to pay claims for other business signaled that the rate request was excessive under the common-sense understanding of that adjective”) (emphases added).  Second, the Department suggests that [...] should look to ASOP’s actuarial standards to understand what excessive means.  See, e.g., Db41.  So much for common sense and plain meaning.  And never mind that [...] looked to actuarial standards, Pb11–12, and yet was still found to have proposed “excessive” rate increases.  It remains that there are several issues with the Department’s assertion that actuarial guidelines can replace rulemaking here.
[brief] E.  The July 26, 2021 Final Agency Decision.  On July 16, 2021, then-Acting Commissioner [...] issued a final decision rejecting the initial decision in part and adopting it in part.  (Ra121).  In reaching her decision, the Commissioner accepted the ALJ’s findings of fact, but disagreed that such findings led to the conclusion that [...]’s public school students were not receiving T&E.  (Ra117-18).  Despite this conclusion, the Commissioner recognized the concerning educational deficits revealed during the course of the OAL hearing, and ordered the Department to conduct a comprehensive review of [...]’s organization, structure, and policies.  (Ra118).  Because the Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s findings regarding T&E, she did not address the constitutionality of the SFRA except to generally concur with the ALJ’s finding that it was not unconstitutional as applied to the District.  (Ra121).
[directive] New Jersey Judiciary Formulario suplementario para una declaración de culpabilidad por delitos (N.J.S.A. según la Ley Graves 2C: 43-6c) (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for Graves Act Offenses 2C: 43-6c) (Spanish)  NOTA:  Usted no está sujeto a un período obligatorio durante el cual no reúne las condiciones necesarias para la libertad condicional según la Ley Graves si se está declarando culpable de la tenencia ilícita de un arma de mano que es una pistola de aire comprimido, pistola de resorte, o pistola de balines (municiones), conforme a N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(2); la tenencia ilícita de un rifle o una escopeta que no esté cargada, 2C:39-5c(1); o la N.J.S.A. tenencia ilícita de un rifle o una escopeta que es un rifle de aire comprimido, un rifle de resorte, o una carabina de municiones, 2C:39-5c(2).
[brief] I  THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT’S MARCH 15, 2024 UNDER THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD (STANDARD OF REVIEW NOT ARGUED BELOW)  Defendant asks this Court to reverse a portion of the Trial Court’s remedy, applied following a full bench trial.  Defendant does not appear to challenge a single finding of fact—rather, Defendant merely takes issue with the Trial Court’s two-step remedy, which led to a reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement.  This Court, however, should not disturb any of the Trial Court’s findings.  In Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974), the Supreme Court held:
[brief] Once [...] had agreed to settle with the Utilities, it proceeded to settle all indemnity issues with its primary commercial general liability insurers and the umbrella insurer ([...]) for the period 2009 through 2016, i. e. the period after the expiration of the [...] Umbrella Policy.  Upon being informed by [...] that it had settled all claims with its other insurers, [...] informed [...]’s counsel that it intended to arbitrate the coverage issues regarding the Indemnity Claim.  Da388, ¶ 5.  Thereafter, during the status conference on January 23, 2024, [...] informed the court that it sought to refer the remaining dispute to arbitration.  Id. at ¶ 6.  [...]’s prior counsel responded that [...] would oppose arbitration on the grounds that [...] had waived its rights.  Id.  [...]’s counsel provided no other basis for opposing arbitration.  Now that this is a two-party dispute, the dispute should be arbitrated.
[brief] The point is simple: when this Court reviews an amendment to a preexisting and valid arbitration agreement, it should consider the notice that the earlier agreement already provided to an individual user like [...] informing her that arbitration encompasses a jury waiver.  The December amendment cannot be construed in a vacuum.  4.  Finally, Plaintiffs’ [...] objection was delegated to the arbitrator and so is not properly brought to this Court.  An arbitrator must resolve arbitrability questions, at a minimum, when they are “clearly delegated to an arbitrator” by the contract and the delegation clause “explain[s] that arbitration is a substitute for the right to seek relief in court.
[brief] Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 268 (2006).  Conveniently, Plaintiff contends that Defendants made a new oral promise to pay the alleged outstanding amounts following Defendants’ payment of $330,000 on April 26, 2013.  Regardless, the new promise alleged by Plaintiff to pay the outstanding amounts only tolls the statute of limitations period if it is in writing signed by the party chargeable thereby.
[brief] [...] certainly did not “overpromise. ”  See Burney, 255 N.J. at 22 (quoting Hill, 818 F.3d at 299).  In Hill, cited favorably in Burney, the Seventh Circuit found that “because the agent ‘emphasized that [the defendant]’s cell phone’s use of a cell site did not mean that [the defendant] was right at that tower or at any particular spot near that tower,’ ‘[t]his disclaimer saves his testimony’ that the phone was in the general area of the cell site.
[brief] Counsel: [...] argued the cause for appellants ([...], attorneys; Mr. Perrucci, on the brief).  [...] argued the cause for respondent, [...] ([...], attorneys; Mr. Mallon, of counsel and on the brief; [...], on the brief).  [...] argued the cause for respondent, [...] ([...], attorneys; [...], on the brief).  Judges: Before Judges [...] and [...].  Opinion
[brief] Da 28.  The Defense never argued that New Jersey’s law was invalid.  The Defense’s argument is that New Jersey must recognize a permit issued by Pennsylvania.  To be clear, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) states that “[a]ny person who knowingly has in his possession any handgun, including any antique handgun, without first having obtained a permit to carry the same as provided in N.J.S.A 2C:58-4, is guilty of a crime of the second degree. ”  The issue here is whether an individual with a Pennsylvania carry permit satisfies the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.
[brief] Again, defendant’s failure to object to any alleged instructional errors despite numerous opportunities to do so demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed.  Defendant’s use of an over five-pound wine chiller to hit [...] in the head in two separate events indicates an intentional act, not reckless behavior.  And the self-serving statements claiming her belief that [...] had poisoned do not clearly indicate that defendant was passionately or proportionally provoked.  Thus, the jury was properly only instructed on first-degree murder, and that she used the wine chiller in a manner that led the jury to reasonably infer she intended to kill [...].
[brief] Moreover, the Amici reiterate the acknowledgement by the Attorney General that schools would be obligated to respond truthfully to a parent or guardian who contacted the school to request confirmation that their child had made such a request or statement regarding their chosen pronoun and gender.  As such, parents are free to contact the school at any juncture to make such an inquiry.  As the teachers cannot obfuscate the records and need to respond truthfully, the information would be disclosed at this time.  In addition to this approach not being in the best interest of the student, it also fails to provide any support for the student.  The advocated policy would be exponentially more harmful than the narrowly tailored and thoughtful approach proposed by Amended Policy 5756.  Any notification under Amended Policy 5756 would be accompanied by a plethora of resources for the student along with an evaluation by the district whether such disclosure could be harmful.  Therefore, the policy advocated for by the Amici is not student-centered and in fact would place the student at a higher risk compared to Amended Policy 5756.