ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Once inside, [...] saw [...] laying on the floor and bleeding from his mouth and head; [...] was also on the floor, crying and “very upset[.]”  According to [...], [...], who was “laying right in front of the doorway,” told him he had been shot in the leg.  [...] “briefly checked [[...]] for a pulse,” but he “was in an apparently lifeless condition. ”  [...] also noted several shell casings surrounding [...].  The prosecutor played the Composite CD while [...] testified and directed [...] to demonstrate his course of action by referring to the scene displayed on the CD.  [...] testified that as he and [...] approached the store in response to [...]'s radio call they heard shots being fired.
[brief] POINT II WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 11, 2019, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 30, 2018, WHICH DENIED THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO INCLUDE A CLAIM FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE (Pa295)  Rule 4:49-2 states in pertinent part, “The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred.
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY MISINTERPRETING THE LEASE AND RIDER (3T 16-19 TO 23-9)  As stated in the Procedural History, supra, [...] dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint and entered judgment on Defendants’ counterclaim.  (Pa 64 to Pa 65).  The court reasoned that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that there was no proof that Defendants caused the fire which occurred on April 21, 2022.  (3T 16-19 to 23-9).  It is respectfully submitted that the trial misinterpreted the lease and rider as a whole as Paragraph 42 of the rider obligated the Defendants to make repairs after the fire.  (Pa 24).  The construction of the terms of a written lease agreement is a matter of law for the court.  Crest Drug Store, Inc. v. Levine, 142 N.J. Eq. 652 (E&A 1948).  The fundamental rule in construing contracts calls for the ascertainment of the intention of the parties in the light not only of the language used but also of the surrounding circumstances and the objects sought to be attained by them under their agreement.  Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super. 496, 501 (App. Div. 1958).  The judicial quest is for the reasonably certain meaning of the language used, taken as an entirety, considering the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, the operative usages and practices and the objects that the parties were striving to achieve.  George M. Brewster Son v. Catalytic Const. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 32 (1954).  In this case, the trial court failed to give the rider its full intention meaning.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  DEFENDANTS HAVE IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO THE TORT CLAIMS ACT AND ALL SUCH CLAIMS ASSERTED IN COUNT I MUST BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW.  Even if, arguendo, Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case was sufficiently pled for all claims asserted, all claims in Count I for negligence, barred by through tort claims immunities that Defendants are entitled to under N.J.S.A. 59:4-10.
[brief] (Pa260 at ¶9 & Pa275, ¶ 3).  Likewise, the use of the phrase “shall be applied” in paragraph three (3) eliminates any uncertainty over whether Appellant’s servicer was obligated to apply the First Wire Transfer to the Loan.  The Mortgage specifically sets forth how payments are to be applied and lists the order in which payments received are to be allocated amongst the five (5) categories listed in paragraph three (3) of the Mortgage.  Accordingly, once Appellant’s servicer received the First Wire Transfer, it was contractually required to accept and apply the payment, per the plain language of the Mortgage.  Significantly, nowhere in the Note or Mortgage does it authorize Appellant’s predecessor in interest or [...] to reject and return payments it received on account of the Loan.  Because the parties’ contract did not authorize the return of payments for any reason, including a payment being short by a de minimis amount, Appellant is liable for its predecessor’s and its servicer’s breach of contract and the loss that resulted after the funds were returned to [...] via the Second Wire Transfer.
[brief] Appellant motioned for injunctive relief via R. 4:52 for a reserved parking space in front of his house, because regularly he had no available parking space to accommodate transport needs of his disabled mother, as he rottenly had to locate a street parking and have his mother walk with walking frame to and from such remote location, just to access in and out of a car and that presented eminent risk of physical harm upon her due to slip and fell for the 92 year old, who relied on the appellant for transportation.  This urgent need for such reserve handicapped parking space was emerged for the appellant in 2023, when he became the resident care provider of his mother and sought the said relief from them (Pa41).  There was no lucid reason why the Mother to endure such hardships and risks of physical harm, when C.39:4-197.6 and C.39:4-197.5 entitled her to have a reserved handicapped parking space in front of her house, while also entitling the appellant as her care provider to seek the relief for her.  Further, the appellant himself was a disabled person entitled under the said laws in having a reserved handicapped parking space in front of his house.  On August 30, 2023 the trial court issued an Order and denied the sought R. 4:52 relief, finding no need to conduct hearing or receive opposition papers from the respondents (Pa106).  Appellant believes that in so doing the trial court erred.  (Point Two)
[brief] ”  Ibid.  At the hearing on the petition, trial judges are to “assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth” in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476-78 (2012), “which are designed to consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth. ’”  Ibid.  The Miller factors were summarized by our Supreme Court as follows:  Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile [1] precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.  [2]  It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.  [3]  It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.  [4]  Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.  [5]  And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.  State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 445 (2017) (citing Miller, 567 U.S at 477-78)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF STRICT LIABILITY TO INCLUDE INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INHERENT TRAITS COMMON TO ALL BREEDING STALLIONS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO NEW JERSEY PUBLIC POLICY ......................................................................................................................... 29 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 32 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Bard v. Jahnke,** | 19 | | 16 A.D.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2005), affirmed by 6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006) | | | **Bessent v. Matthews,** | 19 | | 543 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co of Am.,** | 13 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Conrad v. Catapano,** | 16 | | A-4567-11, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 427 (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2013)| | | **DeRobertis v. Randazzo,** | 16, 18 | | 94 N.J. 144 (1983) | | | **Emmons v. Stevane,** | 17, 18 | | 77 N.J.L. 570 (E&A 1909) | | | **Fertitta-Zapp v. Gaitway Farms, Inc.,** | 18 | | A-6217-08, 2011 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1303 | | | **Friedman v. Martinez,** | 13, 15 | | 242 N.J. 450 (2020) | | | **Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr.,** | 30, 31 | | 203 N.J. 184 (2010) | | | **Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian,** | 20, 21, 22 | | 320 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 1999) | | | **Jannuzzelli v. Wilkens,** | 16, 18, 25 | | 158 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1978) | | | **Olave v. Howard,** | 19 | | 547 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989) | | | **Rodriguez v. Cordasco,** | 19 | | 279 N.
[brief] Appellant testified that he only received oxycodone from [...] on one (1) occasion because [...] was not available.  [4T111:9-23].  However, [...] correctly noted that Appellant filled a prescription for oxycodone from [...] on March 1, 2018, filled prescription for oxycontin from [...] on March 2, 2018, and filled a prescription for oxycodone and codeine syrup from [...] on March 4, 2018.  [Pa49, Pa114].  The overlapping prescriptions are evidence of Appellant’s opioid abuse and concealment.  [...] also calculated that Appellant received a total of 789 pills between January 8, 2018, through July 16, 2018, finding that if Appellant had only taken the prescribed amount of three (3) pills a day, it would only amount to 636 pills, leaving an excess of 153 pills.  [Pa47, Pa113-Pa116].  Even if Appellant only took pills three (3) times a day when off duty, this would have resulted in Appellant having even more than the aforementioned excess of 153 pills.  Appellant also contradicted himself by testifying that he took the pills three (3) times a day only on days he was not working [4T103:22 – 4T104:3], but also that he was taking them as needed which was less than three (3) times a day.  [6T10:11-20], but also stated to Internal Affairs while under oath that he took three (3) pills a day pretty much whether he was working or not.  [6T11:15 – 6T13:8].  Appellant’s own admission to IA disproves Appellant’s allegation that “there is no competent evidence that [Appellant] ever took the medication while on duty or was impaired while at work.
[brief] Nor does the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibit New Jersey from enforcing N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) against defendant merely because she holds a PA Carry License.  Defendant misunderstands the purpose and effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  It provides:  Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.  U.S. Const., Art. IV § 1.  In including this Clause, “the framers were concerned primarily with enforcement of money judgments. ”  Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, Specifically, “colonial legislatures had grappled with the problem of the effect to be given to foreign judgments. ”  *Id.* at 110 n.1.  There was a concern, for example, that a debtor could escape a money judgment rendered in Connecticut simply by crossing over into Massachusetts.  *See ibid.*  Difficult conflict of laws and comity questions arose given that a private litigant might, for example, reside in one colony, then contract in another concerning property in a third, and each colony might have different laws concerning any dispute arising from the contract; the litigant might secure judgment in one jurisdiction and seek to enforce it in another.  *See* [...], *The Full Faith and Credit Clause*, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 371, 372-73 (1932-1933).  The Full Faith and Credit Clause responded to these concerns by: establish[ing] throughout the federal system the salutary principle … that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered, so that a cause of action merged in a judgment in one state is likewise merged in every other.
[directive] Introduction  As you know, the Drug Offender Restraining Order Act of 1999 has been amended by P.L. 2001, c. 365, effective May 7, 2002.  A copy of the amended Act is enclosed herewith.  Also enclosed are two forms for use by law enforcement agencies in implementing this Act.  These forms, which are discussed below, may be modified in order to include pre-printed county or agency specific information, or to allow your agency to print color-coded multi-part versions of these forms.  However, in order to maintain uniformity, the substance of the forms should not be altered.  It is anticipated that the Administrative Office of the Courts will also promulgate standard Court Drug Offender Restraining Order forms for use with this Act.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
[brief] AKIN TO A MAGIC TRICK, DEPRIVED MR. MASON OF A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not raised below)  In summation, the prosecutor denigrated defense counsel’s argument as mere “distractions,” comparing them to distractions that magicians employ in their “tricks” and “illusions. ”  (9T 197-12, 197-23 to 198-6)  Implicitly referring to defense counsel as one such magician, the prosecutor told the jury that “a lot of what the defense wants you to believe are distractions. ”  (9T 198-5 to 6)  He maintained this theme throughout his argument, concluding that everything other than the central pieces of incriminating evidence were just “a distraction. ”  (10T 220-6 to 10)  The prosecutor’s dismissal of defense counsel’s case and denigration of his motives deprived [...] of a fair trial.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9 and 10.
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[brief] Green Knight Capital, 469 N.J. Super. at 396.  Our judicial system “contemplates one appeal as of right to a court of general appellate jurisdiction. ”  Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 129 (1952).  “A party is required to raise in a single appeal all of his challenges to the judgment appealed from. ”  Matter of Unanue, 311 N.J. Super. 589, 598-99 (App. Div.) certif. den. 157 N.J. 541 (1998) cert. den. 526 U.S. 10051 (1999).  Based upon Plaintiff’s intentional and voluntary waiver of his right to seek relief from the Orders in favor of [...] in this appeal, Plaintiff should be foreclosed from bringing a second appeal against the Orders in favor of [...].
[brief] “That this is (or may be) the first case in which a debtor has sued a debt collector for disclosing his personal information to a mail vendor hardly proves that such disclosures are lawful. ”  Hunstein I, 994 F.3d at 1352.  The Eleventh Circuit also commented on the potential impact of its decision.  We recognize, as well, that those costs [from producing collection letters in house] may not purchase much in the way of “real” consumer privacy, as we doubt that the [...] of the world routinely read, care about, or abuse the information that debt collectors transmit to them.  Even so, our obligation is to interpret the law as written, whether or not we think the resulting consequences are particularly sensible or desirable.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ........................................ iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ...........  2 LEGAL ARGUMENTS .........................................................................................  9 POINT I  THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM [...]'S DECISION TO DENY THE TRUST AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING REGARDING THE 2017 PERMIT MODIFICATION AS UNTIMELY.  ..................  9  POINT II  THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM [...]’S DECISION TO DENY THE TRUST  AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING REQUEST  BECAUSE IT DOES NOT POSSESS A STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A HEARING.  ...............................  11  A…[...]  Correctly determined that [...] does not have a particularized property interest .....................................................
[brief] (Ib19).  Again, the context of the Supplemental Form was apparent to [...], i.e., it knew it had to fill out the Form for rental van coverage.  (Ia076 at ¶ 11; Ia095 at 59:2-5; Ia119).  Moreover, the Supplemental Form immediately inquires as to the relevant material information – whether any vehicles rented are 12-15 passenger vans.
[directive] Special Provisions Governing the Use of BWCs when Investigating Underage Alcohol and Marijuana Use.  Consistent with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15a(4), the video and audio recording functions of an officer’s BWC shall be activated whenever the officer is responding to a call for service related to an underage person who is suspected of violating the law with respect to possessing or consuming an alcoholic beverage, marijuana, hashish, or a cannabis item, or at the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter between an officer and a person related to a violation or suspected violation of that provision.  The BWC shall remain activated until the encounter has fully concluded and the officer leaves the scene and shall not be deactivated based on a request by a person who is the subject of the call for service related to a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15, or for any other reason.
[brief] 16 State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973) ...................................................................................................................... 18, 20 State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574 (2006) .....................................................................................................................  33 State v. Boczar, 863 N.E.2d 155 (Ohio 2007) ...................................................................................................... 34, 35 State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005) ....................................................................................................................  18, 19, 20 State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 .................................................................................................................................. 11, 13, 18 State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962) ...................................................................................................................... 14, 26, 27 State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114 (2013) .................................................................................................................... 26, 29, 30, 31 State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509 (2002) ..................................................................................................................... 30 State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003) ..................................................................................................................... 19 State v. Gibson, 219 N.J. 227 (2014) ..................................................................................................................... 20, 21 State v. Gilchrist, 381 N.J. Super. 138 (App. Div. 2005) ................................................................. 29, 30 State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111 (2019) ........................................................................................................... 16 State v. Hickman, 204 N.J. Super. 409, (App.Div.1985) .................................................................................. 28 State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545 (2009) .............................................................................................................. 25, 27, 28, 29 State v. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952 (2000)............................................................................................................ 34, 35 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964)..................................................................................................................... 16, 36 State v. Kent, 391 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 2007) .................................................................................... 36 State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 ...............................................................................................................................
[brief] Nonetheless, as a consequence of various discussions between the Board and the Applicant, the Applicant agreed to amend the Application so as to include such elevators in building “C” and “D”.  The Applicant declined to include such elevator in building “E”.  [Emphasis added]  During the Board’s public hearings, but prior to the final [...] hearing of June 13, 2022, the Township, speaking through its mayor, who is also a Member of the Planning Board, voiced concern that all of the multistory residential buildings should have an ambulance stretcher compliant passenger elevator.  For reasons not explained, [...] declined.  As a result, the Mayor, as an accommodation to the impasse, proposed that [...] include such elevator in Building E and in exchange the municipality would agree to increase Building E’s unit count (and hence, the Project’s overall unit count) by 10 additional units.
[brief] The trial court judge gave very pointed instructions to the jury on more than one occasion, instructing that the spoliation issue was sufficient such that the jury could make an unfavorable inference to the State which may in itself constitute reasonable doubt.  E.g., 15T 138:22-139:17.  Again, it is well-settled that juries follow instructions, and an adverse inference instruction is undoubtedly a strong penalty and remedy.  The jury was already prompted that the destruction of the video was a serious matter from which the jury could infer that the defendant was not guilty.  The policies do not meet the requirements for newly discovered evidence meriting a new trial.