ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] JUDGMENT TO [...] SINCE ALMOST ALL MATERIAL FACTS [...] RELIED UPON TO SEEK SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WERE DISPUTED.  (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T14-35; 2T4-13)  A.  [...] Had the Duty to Provide Adequate Lighting in a Dangerous Intersection.  B.  Because [...] Partially Created the Danger in the Intersection, No Notice of the Danger Was Required Although It Is Likely That It Had Actual Notice, and Should Have Had Constructive Notice of the Danger.  C.  Almost All Material Facts [...] Relied Upon to Seek Summary Judgment Are Disputed.  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO LODI SINCE, PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, LODI’S CONDUCT WAS PALPABLY UNREASONABLE IN PROVIDING 0.0 FOOT CANDLE LIGHTING IN A DANGEROUS INTERSECTION AND HAVING NO KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER ABOUT THE LIGHTING SELECTION PROCESS WITH [...].  (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T42-52; 2T21-33; 3T)  A.  The Conduct of [...]’s Officials and Employees Were Palpably Unreasonable.  B.  Almost All Material Facts [...] Relied Upon in Seeking Summary Judgment Are Disputed.  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BARRING THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF’S LIABILITY EXPERTS FOR NET OPINIONS AND GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO LODI ON THAT BASIS SINCE THESE EXPERTS BASE THEIR OPINIONS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ON FACTS, DATA, PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, EXPERIENCES, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS, AND DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS.
[brief] On September 6, 2023, the Council unanimously approved the CBBMP and the amendments to the Code.  On or about September 8, 2023, the DEP Commissioner signed off on the CBBMP.  See 2023 Black Bear Management FAQs published at dep.nj.gov (last visited 11/15/23).  The amendments to the Code and the CBBMP were published by the Office of Administrative Law in the New Jersey Register in Vol. 55, No. 19 on October 2, 2023.  (Pa100)
[brief] Plaintiff raised express concerns that continuing to require employees to come into work in light of COVID-19 posed considerable health risks, and irresponsibility flouted concerted efforts to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.  At the time of the complained conduct there was scientific consensus that exposure to COVID-19 was hazardous to human health.  It was also known that one of the best defenses in slowing the spread of COVID-19 was social distancing.  New Jersey Governor [...] issued a number of Executive Orders both before and after Plaintiff complained which are informative on this issue.  These Executive Orders accepted CDC guidelines, emphasized the significant health threats posed by COVID-19 and emphasized the need to take every effort to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.  As of January 30, 2020, Governor Murphy declared COVID-19 as a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern. ”  On February 3, 2020, Governor Murphy issued Executive Order No. 102, establishing a Coronavirus Task Force.  The Coronavirus was described by Governor Murphy as a severe, potentially fatal respiratory illness that could result in Pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, septic shock and multi-organ failure.  The Center for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") identified that there were individuals with certain medical conditions who would be more likely to get severely ill from COVID-19, requiring hospitalization, intensive care, a ventilator to help them breathe and/or death.
[brief] Defendant failed to take any action to challenge the Judgment.  Plaintiff has been attempting to execute and obtain post-Judgment discovery for the past nine (9) years, including the service of a post-Judgment Order by certified mail signed for in 2015.  The statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  This means that in the event Default Judgment was vacated, or the trial court scheduled a plenary hearing on the issue of service, Plaintiff would be expected to present proofs relating to events that happened so long ago the statute of limitations would have expired on the underlying events.  The prejudice is clear.  While Plaintiff has expended time, money and resources in attempting to execute on its Judgment, Defendant continued to take no action – even after admitting being aware of the Judgment in 2020.  In short, laches prevents defendant from challenging the Judgment.  The trial court was correct in denying Defendant’s motion to vacate the Default Judgment.
[brief] An appellate court’s review of the trial court’s rulings of law, interpretations of laws, statutes and court rules is a de novo review.  State v. Fuqua 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018) (statutory interpretation); State v. Dickerson 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018) (interpretation of court rules).  [...]’s rulings of law are reviewed under this standard.  Questions pertaining to statutory interpretation are legal in nature, State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017) (citing State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126, 132 (2014)), so “[w]e review such decisions de novo, ‘unconstrained by deference to the decisions of the trial court or the appellate panel,’” ibid. (quoting State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329 (2015)).  Finding of facts and legal conclusions made by the trial judge should be reviewed under the “abuse of discretion” standard.  Findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.  *New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman*, 106 N.J.Super. 358, (App.Div.1969), certif. den. 54 N.J. 565, (1969).  “It has otherwise been stated that ‘our appellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  *Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen*, 78 N.J.Super. 154, 155, 188 A.2d 43, 44 (App.Div.1963), *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484, 323 A.2d 495, 500 (1974)”  *State of New Jersey v. Fuqua*, 234 N.J. 583 (2018)  II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD  DEFENDANT MAY NOT USE THE PROVISIONS OF THE NJCFLA OFFENSIVELY OR DEFENSIVELY TO VOID THE JUDGMENT  Defendant seeks to avail himself of either an explicit or an implied right of action under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 *et seq.* (hereinafter “NJCFLA” or “the Act”) in order to declare the judgment void.
[brief] In Williams v. Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1979), the Appellate Division differentiated palpably unreasonable behavior from garden-variety negligence applicable to private persons, by explaining:  We conclude that the legislative intention was to allow sufficient latitude for resourceful and imaginative management of public resources while affording relief to those injured because of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical or outrageous decisions of public servants.  We have no doubt that the duty of ordinary care, the breach of which is termed negligence, differs in degree from the duty to refrain from palpably unreasonable conduct.  The latter standard implies a more obvious and manifest breach of duty and imposes a more onerous burden on the plaintiff.
[brief] The first, entered October 17, 2019, granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment regarding the applicability of Appleman’s rule, which the Court ruled did not apply to Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) insurance policies.  The second ruling, entered May 24, 2023, followed a four-day bench trial that commenced on October 11, 2022 and (a) upheld the reasonableness of the underlying *Griggs* settlement, but (b) rejected [...]’s claims for coverage under the [...] policies, ruling that an exception to the mold exclusions in the [...] policies did not apply and that [...]’s injuries had “first manifested” before those policies commenced.  Mold was not discovered in [...]’s condominium or medically suspected as the cause of his injuries until March 2009, well into [...]’s policy coverage.
[brief] 6.  The [...] Arbitrarily And Capriciously Approved [...]’s Failure To Consider Alternatives (Argued Below: Ha106)  Construing a predecessor to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, our Supreme Court stated:  "[a]lternative sites or methods and their comparative advantages and disadvantages to all interests involved, including cost, must be considered in determining such reasonable necessity."  In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co., supra, 35 N.J. at 377 (emphasis added).  See also In Re Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 47 N.J. at 259-260.
[brief] [...], Esq. [...] [...]  [...]  Id. # [...]  Attorney for the PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  FACTS ......................................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................  1  I.  The definition of “government record” only requires that the government official made (or received) the record and there is no additional requirement that the government maintain the record or own the storage medium to trigger the disclosure obligation.  ...........................................  1  II.  The authority of Paff v. Galloway is not limited to information on government-owned servers.  .........................................................................................  6  III.  There is no hardship demonstrated rendering it impossible to provide the email logs and there are alternate solutions in law and practice that render this concern, to the extent that may exist, easily addressed.  .... 8  CONCLUSION
[directive] 5.1.12  In some cases, a complaint is based on a misunderstanding of accepted law enforcement practices or the officer’s duties.  Supervisors should be authorized to informally resolve minor complaints, whenever possible, at the time the report is made.  If the complainant is not satisfied with such a resolution, the complaint should be forwarded to internal affairs for further action as warranted.  The process of informally resolving internal affairs complaints requires the exercise of discretion by supervisors.  The proper exercise of discretion in such matters cannot be codified.  5.1.13
[brief] (4T145-18 to 146-23)  The same video, and a photo captured from that video, were shown to [...], the defendant’s mother.  (2T141-15 to 20)  (Da24)  Ms. RecioFigueroa identified the person in the photo as her son and said the person on video “looks like [her] son. ”  (2T141-15 to 20, 147-19 to 148-11)  When [...] was shown “blurry” photos from that video, she was not able to identify anybody in the first two photos (Da18, Da19), and said the second two photos (Da20, Da21) showed someone that “resembled” [...], but she was not certain enough to make an identification.  (3T89-22 to 92-11)  Videos S-3 through S-11 were recorded on cameras between [...] and [...] (4T161-1 to 167-13)
[brief] Following dismissal of its claims against the [...], [...] and [...], Appellants moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint on October 6, 2021 – more than 2½ years after the Prior Action was commenced and nearly six (6) months after discovery concluded.  [Pa289].  The proposed Second Amended Complaint sought to assert claims for damages against [...] when no such claims were asserted in the First Amended Complaint filed in the Prior Action in July 2021.  Specifically, the proposed Second Amended Complaint sought to add a claim for fraud in the inducement as to the subject lease, breach of the subject lease for allegedly violating the confidentiality provision therein and for wrongful eviction.  [Pa289].  [...] opposed the Appellants’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and cross-moved to dismiss Appellants’ First Amended Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim since the First Amended Complaint did not assert any claims against, or seek any relief from, [...].  [Pa289; Pa23].  On December 7, 2021, the trial court entered an Order denying Appellants’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and entered a separate Order dismissing Appellants’ First Amended Complaint without prejudice as to [...] pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).
[brief] The dialogue regarding the scope of the search then continued, with an officer informing defendant that “we’re gonna do the consent here so when we get over there we’re not disturbing your wife any more than we have to.  Okay?” (Da15 3:16:45 to 3:16:51; Da18).  After a discussion about defendant’s legal name, [...] then began to read aloud and explain the consent-to-search form to defendant.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE FORECLOSURE COURT OF 5/12/16.  Raised Below: paragraph 44 (032a).  In 1T page 6 line 4 – page 7 line 8.  The denial order is at (221a).  LEGAL POINT X THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RESTORE MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE FORECLOSURE COURT OF MONMOUTH COUNTY
[brief] ”  *State v. A.L.*, 440 N.J. Super. 400, 418 (App. Div. 2015) (citing *Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep*, 34 N.J. 494, 499 (1961)).  Here, Appellant’s Complaint failed to include allegations that he suffered any material harm – physical, financial, emotional, or reputational – which was caused by Respondent’s use of a letter vendor or the letter’s deceptive language regarding the statute of limitations or character of the debt.  Appx., at 2a-3a, 6a-7a.  As noted supra, Appellant did not allege the letter vendor or one of its employees misused his personal or financial information, or transferred it to someone else, or that the transfer of his data resulted in an actual theft of his identity.  *Id.*  He did not even allege that any individual at the vendor (or elsewhere) ever personally viewed the information, as opposed to the vendor entity electronically assimilating the information into letters and then printing and mailing those letters via automated processes.  *Id.*  See T8-9.  Nor did Appellant make any allegation that he acted or refrained from acting as a result of receiving and reviewing the collection letter in question, or the letter vendor’s involvement.  Appx., at 2a-3a, 6a-7a.  He notably did not allege that Respondent collected any such money from him relating to the debt which was the subject of the collection letter.  *Id.*  Thus, absent any future attempt to coerce payment on Appellant’s personal account through a court of law, Appellant has suffered no harm or adverseness from Respondent’s attempts to solicit voluntary payment of his debt.  Having made no payment on the account as a result of Respondent’s collection activities, Appellant did not suffer any pecuniary injury and risked no harm from any unfavorable decision from the Superior Court.  *See In re Camden Cty.*, 170 N.J. at 449; *State v. A.L.*, 440 N.J. Super. at 418; *[...]* Transcript, at T9; *[...]*, Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. August 24, 2023), T7 16-23 (dismissing case for lack of standing where plaintiff could not demonstrate any actual damage that he sustained as a result of the FDCPA violation.); T9 (same).
[brief] Having the benefit of the [...] findings of abandonment, two months prior to filing the Complaint, it was available, at the time of filing, as basis of a determination of abandonment.  Thus, conforming to an imperative requirement of the statute.  Also, providing to all interest parties substantive support for the allegations of the Complaint, so that the published Notice acquainted all parties with the premise of the cause of action.  Absent a determination of “abandonment” there is no basis to foreclose by In Rem.  Thus, from filing to entry of judgment would not have been accelerated as was the Plaintiff’s foreclosure.  The Plaintiff’s process is statutorily flawed and lacked jurisdiction as filed and its final judgment has no legal affect.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff vs [...] and JOHN DOES 1-5 (fictitious designations)  Defendants  And [...], Third Party Plaintiff, vs. [...], Third Party Defendant.  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL  FROM FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW:  HONORABLE  [...]  J.S.C. AMENDED  BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, [...]
[brief] 0009a-0018a.  [...]’s selected archaeologist, [...], is registered with the “National Register of Professional Archaeologists. ” (1555a), as confirmed by [...] in his September 30, 2024 opinion.  (0017a).  [...] has provided no evidence to date that its selected archaeologist [...] was registered with the “National Register of Professional Archaeologists” as required under the Bid Specifications.  It is also noteworthy that [...]’s selected archaeologist, [...], is not registered on the “New Jersey Public Works Contractors” list as an archaeologist.  1551a-1553a.  LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW  As found by [...] in the context of bid protest appeals under the Local Public Contracts Law, the reviewing court may overturn the final decision of a public body only if said decision was “arbitrary capricious, or unreasonable”, citing Kramer v. Sea Girt Bd. Of Adj., 45 N.J. 268, 296; In re Application of Meadowlands Communications System, 175 N.J. Super. 53, (1980).
[directive] N.J.S.A. under jumping" "bail than other release, on while crime new commit a would defendant to relevant be would trial at verdict guilty a of probability the indicating evidence the of weight the example, case State's of the strength  The verdict. guilty expected an avoid to flee to incentive defendant's the establish especially community, the to danger a poses defendant whether all, to at relevant if relevant, less be would generally she or he believe that to cause probable is preventively defendant detain a to needed is that all that considering in involvement defendant's a of evidence contrast, In 2A:162-19(e)(2).  N.J.S.A. See offense.
[brief] Pa4.  On March 28, 2024, plaintiff moved for reconsideration.  Pa6.  During argument, the trial court conceded it “may not be possible” for plaintiff to secure [...]’s attendance at a deposition in New Jersey by way of subpoena.  2T14:22-25.  Nonetheless, on April 19, 2024, the trial court denied reconsideration.  Pa9.  On May 30, 2024, the Appellate Division denied plaintiff leave to appeal.
[brief] ” (3T  Moreover, the trial court concluded that if the allegations were true, Plaintiffs could establish the “separate injury” required by our case law.  (3T 95:24 to 96:5).  [...] conducted a 22-day bench trial from mid-January to mid-March 2022.  In addition to testimony from other fact and expert witnesses, the trial court entertained about six days of testimony from [...]; four days of testimony from Plaintiffs’ accounting expert, [...]; and about five days of testimony from [...].  (See 3T-19T, 23T-24T).  The defendants moved orally at the close of Plaintiffs’ case for a directed verdict; the Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaims and third-party complaint at the close of the evidence.  The trial court denied both motions without prejudice.  (14T6:11 to 7:6; 25T52:17 to 53:23).  H. [...]’s Reviews the Records and Uncovers Diversions of Funds
[directive] NEW JERSEY RESIDENTS WHO ARE RELATIVES OR SURVIVORS OF VICTIMS OF CRIMES THAT OCCURRED IN ANOTHER STATE  A.  When a next of kin of a New Jersey resident is a homicide victim or the victim of a violent crime in another state, it is extremely difficult for the relative in New Jersey to secure information about the attacker or the progress of the attacker's prosecution in the other state.  It is recommended that the appropriate County Prosecutor in New Jersey obtain such information for the New Jersey next of kin and transmit it through the County Victim-Witness Coordinator in each county.  COMMENTARY  It is recommended that there be joint trainings at the county police academies and at the New Jersey State Police Training Center in Sea Girt for police, prosecutor's investigators, County Victim-Witness Coordinators and Violent Crimes Compensation Board staff, with instructors drawn from those groups in the same way that joint training has been conducted in the area of child abuse.  Training for County Victim-Witness Coordinators should be developed to include the special circumstances and needs of the aforementioned victim populations.  It is recommended that the Basic Recruit and In-Service training curriculum approved by the Police Training Commission include a performance objective and resource material pertaining to special victim populations.  PART FOUR: State and County Offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy Services
[brief] "Sanctions for frivolous litigation are not imposed because a party is wrong about the law and loses his or her case."  [emphasis added]  Tagayun, 446 N.J. Super. at 580.  Sanctions should be awarded only in exceptional cases.  Iannone v. McHale, 245 N.J. Super. 17, 28 (App.Div. 1990).  "When the plaintiff's conduct bespeaks an honest attempt to press a perceived, though ill-founded and perhaps misguided, claim, he or she should not be found to have acted in bad faith."  Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144-145 (App.Div. 1999).