ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ....................................................................................... passim Housing Authority v. Suydam Investors, 177 N.J. 2, (2003)  ......................................................................................  19,22  In re Accutane Litigation, 234 N.J. 340 (2018) ......................... 35,36  Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374, 383-84 (1971) ................................................................. 22,39  Keinz v. State of New York, 2 A.D. 2d 45, 156 N.Y.S. 2d 505 (1956) app. denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 815, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 604 (1957)  ..................................................................................  45  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) ............... 35,36
[brief] Not only did the court apply the wrong burdens of proof when it granted the Respondent’s motion for a directed verdict, the Court applied incorrect standards by failing to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  See R. 4:40-1 comment  1.  In Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146(1995) the Court explained the process that is to be afforded on a motion that requires that the court accept as true all evidence supporting the position of the non-movant and to accord him the benefit of all inferences which could reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom:  This process is a kind of weighing that involves a type of evaluation, analysis and sifting of evidential materials.  This process, however, is not the same kind of weighing that a factfinder (judge or jury) engages in when assessing the preponderance or credibility of evidence.  On a motion for summary judgment the court must grant all the favorable inferences to the non-movant.  But the ultimate factfinder may pick and choose inferences from the evidence to the extent that "a miscarriage of justice under the law" is not created.  Id. at 536, 666 A.2d 146.  The picking and choosing inferences from the evidence to determine the preponderance or credibility of evidence was not to be conducted without affording the parties the opportunity to present closing arguments, which is an important aspect of the factfinding process:  All who are acquainted with litigation recognize that summation is a most important aspect of the trial process.  During closing argument, an attorney is placed in the role of an advocate in the truest sense of the word.  The purpose of closing argument is to draw together all the facts at the end of the trial and to present the theories of the litigants to prepare the jury to make a proper decision.  State v. Vigilante, 194 N.J. Super. 560, 563, 477 A.2d 429 (App.Div.1983)  Granting motion for a directed verdict without affording the Petitioner any argument and without having any closings, the Court overlooked and under evaluated crucial evidence.
[brief] In his Decision, [...] adhered to the deferential standard of review for bid protest cases, holding that “[t]he [...]’s finding that [...]’s bid did not contain a material defect was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and it should therefore not be overturned. ”  0015a.  We respectfully note that Defendant-Appellant, [...] (“[...]”) has no binding, legal precedent to support its central contention that all professionals including archaeologists are required by law to register under the Public Works Contractor Registration Act (“PWCRA”).  One might think otherwise, given the forcefulness with which it argues in favor thereof, both below and again in this appeal.  However, [...]’s contention is merely an argument, not without flaws, especially the way it hinges almost entirely on an administrative opinion from 2010 which, we respectfully submit, was effectively superseded by amendments to the PWCRA in 2022 and is factually distinguishable from our case.  In contrast, the Respondents, [...] and [...], along with [...], believe that registered archaeologists are not required to register under the PWCRA if they do not perform “work” as defined by the companion legislation—the Prevailing Wage Act.
[brief] RPC 1.9(a) acts on a prohibition on a representation adverse to a former client under certain circumstances while RPC 1.9(c) prohibits a lawyer from using or revealing a former client’s confidential information.  *See, e.g.*, Dental Health Associates South Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC, 471 N.J. Super. at 193.  For the reasons set forth, infra, the trial court wholly lacked legal and factual support for its entry of the Disqualification Order since the court failed to undertake a careful analysis of the facts and even found that the matters were not substantially related.  Thus, the trial court’s decision must be overturned.
[brief] (Pa263-Pa264).  In her accompanying letter opinion, [...] held that [...]’s common law tort claims against the [...] were also barred by [...]’s failure to file a timely notice of claim.  (Pa273-Pa276).  [...] separately held that under the “law of the case” doctrine, she would follow the March 6, 2018, accrual date that [...] had earlier concluded was the accrual date for [...]’s malicious prosecution-related claims.
[brief] With respect to the trespass claim, Plaintiff testified that Defendant [...] had admitted that he had placed fallen tree branches on Plaintiff’s ornamental plants that destroyed them.  Defendant [...] likewise admitted at his deposition to placing the branches in that location.  The Chancery Division disregarded all testimony of [...]’s admission and granted summary judgment based on its conclusion that the record contained insufficient evidence that Defendant caused the destruction of Plaintiff’s plants.  The Chancery Division’s disregard of competent, admissible evidence of liability was an error.  Because the Chancery Division erroneously disregarded probative evidence of Defendants’ liability for nuisance and trespass, Plaintiff is entitled to reversal of the summary judgment order and a trial on these issues.
[directive] No information concerning the search or the grounds therefor, or the nature of any evidence found during the execution of the search, shall be revealed by a law enforcement officer to any person other than to another law enforcement officer except as may be expressly authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction, or by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his designee or a County Prosecutor or his designee, or except as may be expressly required by R. 3:5-5a (which requires the officer taking property under the warrant to give the person from whom or from whose premises the property is taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken, or else requiring that the copy and receipt be left at the place from which the property was taken).  It shall be the responsibility of the County Prosecutor, or, where applicable, the Division of Criminal Justice, to comply with the criminal discovery requirements set forth in R. 3:5-6c and R. 3:13-3f.  17.
[brief] Plaintiffs instead resort to an even more novel argument, manufactured for this appeal: they say even “information that may be irrelevant”—whether in paper or electronic form—“is still discoverable. ”  Pb17.  No, it is not.  A.  Under Rule 4:10-2(a), A Court Cannot Compel The Production Of Irrelevant Documents (Raised Below: Da166-68; T3-38)
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE DISPUTING PERSONAL SERVICE IN 2015  Defendant’s certifications alleged “Defective Affidavits of Service” based upon two different addresses for service upon [...] at the same time.  Nowhere in the Certifications did [...] dispute being served (3T5:6-8).  [...] did not dispute residing at the address identified for the personal service upon him in his individual capacity.  Plaintiff served post-Judgment orders and discovery to [...]’s same residential address, including certified mail that was signed for less than three months after the entry of judgment in 2015.  [...]’s claim that he responded to the 2020 Order for post-Judgment discovery as evidence that he would have responded to the Summons and Complaint is hollow.  [...] failed to move to vacate the Judgment for three years.  Prior post-Judgment service and Orders were sent to the same address.  [...] did not dispute that the Affidavits of Service correctly described his physical appearance by age, height, weight and hair color.  The trial court remarked that the description seemed to fit him (1T20:10).  The fact that the Process Server may not have updated the address for service of Ardolion, on behalf of [...], at the address for [...] on file with Plaintiff and the State does not invalidate the effectuation of service at [...]’s residence.  Defendant’s representation to the trial court that because he responded to Plaintiff’s correspondence regarding his Court-ordered deposition in June of 2020, this was evidence that he would have responded if he knew of the Complaint, is particularly hollow.  Defendant took no action with respect to the Judgment for three years.  Defendant failed to comply with the post-Judgment Orders for discovery sent in 2020.  Defendant only moved to vacate the Default Judgment after retaining counsel and Plaintiff attempted to subpoena his wife in 2023.  [...]’s belated “compliance” by responding to an Information Subpoena in 2023, and claiming to be available at that time, occurred only after Plaintiff was seeking to subpoena his wife.  [...]’s counsel furnished responses to the Information Subpoena and certified [...] did not contest his post-Judgment discovery obligations.  In short, the trial court correctly found that Defendant failed to present any credible evidence disputing personal service in 2015.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing All Eight Counts of This Hybrid Prerogative Writ/Declaratory Judgment/Civil Rights Act Violation Action for Lack of Constitutional, Statutory and Common Law Standing.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa89, 1T).  Plaintiff’s 69 pages 434 paragraphs Eight Counts Complaint asserted prerogative writ, declaratory judgment and civil rights act violation claims and causes of actions—each based upon the same underlying facts.  Plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, equitable and monetary relief.  “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press. ”  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cumo, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).  Conversely, the trial court must set forth the facts and its conclusions of law supporting its lack of standing jurisdictional post-remand pre-answer pre-discovery dismissals of each count and cause of action with prejudice.  Rule 1:7-4.  Here, the trial court lumped all plaintiff’s claims, causes of actions and remedies together and dismissed plaintiff’s entire complaint with prejudice.  Here, the trial court committed patent reversible error.  The trial court failed to analyze each count and cause of action separately and to accept all of plaintiff’s allegations as true.  See, Jennifer Clemens v. Execupharm Inc., 48 F.4th 146(3d Cir. Sept. 2, 2022).  Since the commencement of this action on April 8, 2019, the legal landscape shifted.  Today, courts are not dismissing New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) violations allegations out of hand.  The NJCRA authorizes suits against individuals “acting under color of law” who deprive a person of “any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State. ”
[brief] Id.  And because the State is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, an official-capacity claim against a state official also fails because that official is not a “person” who can be sued under the statute.  Id. at 70.  None of the entity State Defendants qualify as a “person” under the NJCRA, so all proposed NJCRA claims against the entity defendants (the [...]; the [...]; the [...]; the [...]; and the [...]) fail.  In addition, the proposed claims against the non-entity State Defendants also fail because [...] sued [...] and [...], former Attorney General [...], and [...] solely in their official capacities.  (Pa9; Pa115; Pa118).  See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.  [...] reaffirms this in his opening brief.  (Pb62-63).  Because all of [...]’s allegations failed to state a claim against the State Defendants under the NJCRA, the Law Division properly dismissed the complaint and denied permission to amend, because any amendment would be futile.
[directive] The following procedures governing the return of property are recommended.  In cases involving homicide and suspicious death where initially the victim is brought to the hospital, it is suggested that the investigating law enforcement officer take possession of the victim's clothing and personal effects in compliance with hospital procedure.  In those cases where an investigation has determined that a death is accidental, all of the victim's personal property should be returned to surviving family members in accordance with New Jersey law.  All property not deemed pertinent to a criminal investigation should be released promptly.  Wherever possible, property which is determined to be essential to a criminal investigation and is normally physically retained should be photographed and returned upon the approval of the County Prosecutor.  If it is determined that the victim's property cannot be promptly released, a designated law enforcement officer should explain the reason for withholding the property and ensure that it is returned when possible.
[brief] [[...]]  Q.  Now, you said the increase in load was less than 1 percent.  What time period are we talking about?  [[...]]  A.  I believe that's generally per year.  Q.  Per year?  And how far out does that projection stand?  A.  Within, I believe, the next five years.  Our marketing group usually does projections out three to five years.  Well, is it three or is it five?  That's a big difference.  A.  Normally it's three.  Q.  Does the Company do load increase projections beyond five years?  A. I -- no.  [1T:147:13-25, -148:1-2.]  And this load projection takes no account whatsoever of the EMP's stated objective of "aggressively" reducing the consumption of natural gas:
[directive] Do you understand that if you are convicted of a sexually violent offense, such as aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2)(b), criminal sexual contact, felony murder if the underlying crime is sexual assault, an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the offense should be considered a sexually violent offense, you may upon completion of your term of incarceration, be civilly committed to another facility for up to life if the court finds, after a hearing, that you are in need of involuntary civil commitment?
[brief] “Mutual mistake does not encompass a mistake that consists merely of ‘an improvident act, including the making of a contract, that is the result of ... an erroneous belief. ’”  *Tilcon New York, Inc. v. Morris County Co-op. Pricing Council*, 2014 WL 839122 at *16, citing *Restatement (Second) of Contracts*, § 151 comment a (App. Div. March 5, 2014).
[brief] Modern discovery can easily involve hundreds of thousands of documents buried in complex IT systems, with no simple, foolproof means of identifying and segregating relevant documents from irrelevant ones.  Id. at 270, 286.  Today, a common approach in cases involving voluminous ESI is for the parties to agree to a set of electronic search terms that are intended to capture relevant documents and to minimize the netting of irrelevant ones.  Id. at 285.  The next steps are at the heart of the controversy in this case.
[brief] Appx., at 35a-36a (emphasis added).  See also *See Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, Case No. ESX-L-6164-21, 2022 WL 20470401 (N.J. Super. L. Aug. 11, 2022); *Abdelfattah Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Case No. HUD-L-394-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2023) ("Mhrez Decision"); *Jasmine Mhrez v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC*, Case No. HUD-L-728-22 and *Jasmine Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Case No. HUD-L-731-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2022) ("Mhrez Transcript"); *Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc.*, Case No. OCN-L-2066-21 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 2023); *Elshabba v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC*, Case No. PAS-L-1676-21 (N.J. Sup. Ct. April 26, 2023).
[brief] ” (Da129).  The trial court also identified the flaws in Appellants’ argument that any preliminary injunction would interfere with the rights of parents.  The trial court explained that its findings were not intended to “minimize or discount the right of parents” to make decisions about their children.  (Da131).  Although the court did not dispute the crucial role parents play, the court emphasized that the State’s suit was “not targeting parental rights per se, but rather policies promulgated by school boards that the State contends unlawfully subjects a protected class to discrimination in violation of the LAD.
[brief] As shown, the Agreement tracks that in Antonucci, and it expressly covers the very discrimination claim she asserts and states plainly that any such claim is subject to arbitration only, and that she was knowingly and voluntarily “giving up the right to have” any such claim “decided by a court or jury. ” (Pa000093; also Pa000092.)  There is no basis for this Court to deviate from its decision in Antonucci based on [...]’s suggestion that a judicial forum is one of the “most important tools” to enforce the “strong policy against discrimination” because of the LAD’s legislative history (Pb23-Pb24.)
[brief] (6T:155-24 to 156-16; 7T:54-21 to 55-6); See State v. Bowser, 297 N.J. Super. at 594, 601-03 (holding that trial court’s failure to instruct jury on second-degree robbery as lesser-included offense of first-degree robbery was plain error where jury could have found that defendant, an unarmed accomplice, did not share principal’s purpose of committing robbery with a gun) (citing Weeks, 107 N.J. at 409; White, 98 N.J. at 129-131).  The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on unarmed robbery as a lesser-included offense of armed robbery put the jury in the position of having to make an all-or-nothing choice between finding [...] guilty of armed robbery and acquitting him of robbery altogether.  The same facts demonstrating that the jury could have acquitted [...] of armed robbery had they been properly instructed on accomplice liability (discussed in Point II. A., supra) also indicate that the jury could have acquitted him of the greater offense of armed robbery and convicted him of the lesser offense of unarmed robbery had they been instructed on it.  As discussed above, it was undisputed at trial that [...] did not have a gun, and there was no evidence that he knew [...] had a gun prior to the incident, let alone that he intended for [...] to use the gun in the commission of the robbery.  Therefore, the jury could have found that [...] did not intend for a gun to be used in the commission of the robbery and that he had a less culpable mental state than [...].  Had the jury been instructed on unarmed robbery as a lesser-included offense, they could have found that [...]’s involvement in the incident satisfied the elements of unarmed robbery, but not armed robbery.  Thus, the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on second-degree robbery as a lesser-included offense had the clear capacity to cause an unjust result and requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] 1.  **[...]’s Errant Ruling Excluding Evidence Related to the 9-1-1 Call Prejudiced the State and Compromised The Trial Court’s Decision. **  The investigatory stop occurred following a 9-1-1 call.  As such, analysis of this investigatory stop should begin with an examination into that 9-1-1 call.  However, that examination cannot be conducted based on this record, as [...] mischaracterizing evidence related to the 9-1-1 call as inadmissible hearsay.  It is well established that “hearsay is permissible in suppression hearings subject to N.J.R.E. 104(a)”.  *State v. Bivins*, 226 N.J. 1, 14 (2006); quoting *State v. Watts*, 223 N.J. 503, 519 n.4 (2015).  A judge hearing a suppression motion relating to the admissibility of evidence may consider hearsay or other inadmissible proof.  *State v. Wright*, 431 N.J. Super. 558, n.3 (App. Div. 2013) (overr’d on other grounds).  Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104(a)(1) the trial court is not bound by evidence rules when deciding preliminary questions of admissibility, except those on privilege and Rule 403.  See N.J.R.E. 104(a)(1).  The State should have been permitted to elicit testimony regarding related to the 9-1-1 call during the suppression hearing.  [...]’s decision to exclude this important evidence prevented the State from presenting evidence related to the fact that the initial report was received via 9-1-1, the details of the call, and the response time of the police.  All of those details are pertinent to the analysis, but are not part of the record due to [...]’s erroneous decision.  [...]’s decision suppressing the evidence was compromised by her refusal to permit the State to introduce this important evidence.  Analysis of the 9-1-1 call alone, or of the totality of the circumstances including the enhanced reliability afforded to 9-1-1 calls, yields the conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed.  As such, [...]’s decision should be reversed.
[brief] Secondly, as set forth above, the terms of the guarantee are open ended and cover all obligations of the Tenant.  Such a wide ranging guarantee was necessary because the Landlord was giving possession of a $2 million dollar building to an LLC with no assets, and his only security for the Tenant meeting the obligations of the lease and returning the property to the Landlord was the personal guarantees of [...], [...] and [...].  [...] Deposition 177-24 to 178-16, Pa90–91.
[brief] (Pa000236, page 225, line 22 to page 226, line 7; Pa000817).  [...] certified in answers to interrogatories that all work was done “at the direction of the [...] and its professionals…” (Pa00083, response # 12).  [...] also installed chain link security fencing and soil and sediment control fencing on Plaintiffs’ property which separated Plaintiffs’ building from the balance of Plaintiffs’ land.  (Pa000810-Pa000815).  [...] did not dispute that the installation of the fencing on Plaintiffs’ Property was a physical entry onto the Plaintiffs’ Property.  (Pa000285, page 66, line 6 to line 20; pg. 67 line 8 to line 18; Pa000308, page 160, line 1 to line 2; Pa000289, page 85, line 18 to pg. 87, line 6; Pa000814).  [...] did not dispute that the installation of soil and sediment control fencing was on the Plaintiffs’ Property without Plaintiffs’ permission.  (Pa000284-Pa000285).
[brief] ”).  Based on Defendants’ proposed interpretation, a BOG appointee would meet the statutory requirement even if they moved out of the County before their confirmation so long as they lived within the County on the date of appointment.  A BOG member could plausibly complete the entire duration of their term living outside of Camden, Essex, Middlesex County, or even New Jersey.  If this was the result intended, the parties might as well have stricken the residency requirement for all BOG members.  But they didn’t.  Despite Defendants’ baseless assertions, the Legislature’s inclusion of the residency requirements for Camden, Essex, and Middlesex Counties and Rutgers’ subsequent consent, serves important and legitimate purposes, which can only be achieved if the residency requirement is interpreted to be continuous and for the duration of a BOG member’s appointment.