ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *City of Atl. City v. Cynwyd Invs.*, 148 N.J. 55, 68 (1997) (emphasis added).  Under N.J.S.A. 20:3-5, the Superior Court has jurisdiction of all matters in condemnation, and “all matters incidental thereto and arising therefrom. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Eminent Domain Act applies “[w]henever any condemnor shall have determined to acquire property pursuant to law . . . but cannot acquire title thereto or possession thereof by agreement with a prospective condemnee, whether by reason of disagreement concerning the compensation to be paid or for any other cause, the condemnation of such property and the compensation to be paid therefor, and to whom payable, and all matters incidental thereto and arising therefrom shall be governed, ascertained and paid by and in the manner provided by this act.
[directive] 2C:39-5(a-j) of Weapons  (1)  Possesses a firearm in or on grounds of educational institution, without prior authorization, third degree, irrespective of whether he possesses a permit to carry or a firearms purchaser identification card.  (2)  Possesses weapon or components which can be readily assembled into firearm or other 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible weapon described in 2C:39-1, or any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful use that it may have, while on or in educational institution without prior written authorization, fourth degree.  (3)  Possesses any imitation firearms while on or in educational institution without prior written authorization, or while on any school bus, irrespective of whether he possesses a carry permit or a firearms purchaser identification card, disorderly persons.
[brief] Negative Criteria.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d further requires that an applicant establish the negative criteria, that the variance being sought can be granted: (1) without substantial detriment to the public good; and (2) without substantial impairment to the intent and purpose of the Zone Plan (i.e., Master Plan) and to the zoning ordinance in effect, with an enhanced quality of proof.  The first prong of the negative criteria test, "without substantial detriment to the public good," can be measured by the impact on the surrounding area, fiscal effects, and the provision of municipal services.  Medici at 1, 4, 21, 22 n. 12.  The second prong of the negative criteria test, "without substantial impairment to the intent and purpose of the zone plan (i.e., Master Plan) and to the zoning ordinance” in effect, requires a reconciliation of why a particular use should be allowed when the municipality has not designated it as a permitted use.  The applicant must offer an “enhanced quality of proof” showing that the variance sought "is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and zoning ordinance" and "must reconcile the proposed use variance with the zoning ordinance's omission of the use from those permitted in the zoning district."  Medici at 20-21.  Because it is the role of the municipality’s governing body to enact zoning ordinances, the enhanced level of proofs required is intended "...to narrow…the discretion of boards of adjustment in reviewing use-variance appeals for uses that are deliberately excluded by the governing body from those permitted by the zoning ordinance."  Ibid at 5.  This "effectuate[s] the legislature's apparent objective of encouraging municipalities to make zoning decisions by ordinance rather than by variance."  Ibid.  B.
[brief] (Aa135).  The DEP found that the Trust “allege[d] only generalized property rights, indistinguishable from those shared by other neighboring property owners, which do not provide constitutional standing;” that [...]’s permit “application adequately addresses [the requirement that the proposed permit not hinder navigation] because the end of the approved pier is approximately 163 feet from the nearest authorized navigation channel used to access the neighboring docks and Barnegat Bay; and that “there is adequate room to navigate and access adjacent water areas. ”  (Id.).  DEP also denied the Trust’s right to an adjudicatory hearing request regarding the 2017 Permit Modification because the Trust did not substantially comply with the procedures to request a hearing, as the request was submitted “several years” after DEP issued and publicly noticed that decision.
[brief] Macri v. Ames McDonough Co., 211 N.J. Super. 636, 642 (App. Div. 1986)  Likewise, where a plaintiff alleges that there is a defect in a product, he is “not necessarily confined to the explanation his expert may advance. ”  Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 59 N.J. 365, 366, 283 A.2d 321 (1971); Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 458-460, 332 A.2d 599 (1975).  A plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove that a defect arose while a product was in the manufacturer's, distributor's, or seller's control.  Scanlon, supra, 65 N.J. at 592-93, 326 A.2d 673, citing Jakubowski v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 183-84, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).  In Myrlak v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 157 N.J. 84, 104-107, 723 A.2d 45 (1999), the Court adopted as the law in New Jersey the principles stated in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 (Am. Law. Inst. 1998) with respect to a finding of defect in a product liability case without the testimony of an expert witness.
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[brief] (1T29-2 to 5; 1T33-14 to 21; Pa29 to 33; Pa131).  Defendant asked [...] to read them to him aloud.  (1T33-14 to 21; Pa29; Pa131).  --- \(^3\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Foster told defendant that he had the right to remain silent and then asked if defendant understood that right.  (1T37-9 to 12; Pa29; Pa131).  He responded that he did and initialed next to the right.  (1T37-13 to 14; Pa29; Pa130; Pa131).  [...] then told defendant, whatever you may say can be used against you at trial and she asked if he understood.  (1T37-23 to 24; Pa29 to Pa30; Pa131).  Defendant signed the form and indicated that he understood.  (1T37-25 to 38-8; Pa130; Pa131).  [...] then advised defendant he had a right to talk to a lawyer and have him present while defendant was being questioned.
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[brief] I.  WHETHER THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ENFORCED IS SUBJECT TO A DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW (Da080; Da162-Da163) ..................................................  7  II.  THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO RECONSIDER AND REVERSE THE MARCH 22, 2024  STAY ORDER (Da080; Da162-Da163; 2T19:16-22:14) ........  8  A.  The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Reconsider and Reverse the March 22, 2024  Stay Order Because it was a Final Order Subject to Strict Deadlines for Reconsideration and Appeal (Da080; Da162-Da163; 1T18:20-19:8; 2T19:16-22:14)  ...........................................................................................................
[brief] 9.  The [...] and [...] are hereby ordered to submit evidence that foreclosure related fees, approximately $250,000.00, have already been assessed to [...]’ loan by an Advanced Receivables Collection [...] account, have priority over payment of loan balance, are owned by [...], and in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA), Exhibit 5, from P1 at p. 149 (P. 155) any Advances deemed Non-recoverable shall be evidenced by an Officer’s Certificate of the Master Servicer (now [...]) delivered to the trustee (now [...]) and the NIMS (Net Interest Margin Security) Insurer.
[brief] Attached to the letter was a copy of the subpoena which did not indicate it was copied and/or served upon counsel for [...].  (Pa6-Pa12).  On December 20, 2022, counsel for [...] filed a motion to issue a commission for the service of a subpoena in Florida.  (Pa1-Pa5)  Counsel for [...] opposed the motion, noting that it was not served upon counsel and the first notice of the same was the December 6, 2023 adjournment request.
[brief] Because The PSA Was Terminated, Dismissal Of All Of [...]’s Claims Must Be Upheld**  The trial court’s decision must be upheld because Plaintiff’s termination of the PSA (by demanding the return of its deposit in July 2022) and its inability to otherwise seek specific performance (because the conditions precedent to doing so were not met) renders it unable as a matter of law to state any of the claims against [...] asserted in the Complaint.
[directive] 7, May (effective c. 147 2015, (P.L. -21 to 2C:14-13 N.J.S.A. Act, Protection Survivor or acomplaint-summons issue whether to deciding before made shall be query mandatory  This a discourage or preclude construed to shall be herein Nothing acomplaint-warrant. for apply to all in 2C:14-20 N.J.S.A. under established registry central checking the from officer police officers direct may Prosecutor County a and offenses, sexual involving cases just not and cases, specify. may prosecutor the cases as of types such in or cases, all in registry central that check to History.
[brief] 1T30:22-25 to 31:1-10.  The court instructed that if [...] just says “I read everything that [...] has provided and specify in her certification what she’s talking about so there’s no confusion, and I have nothing more to add and I agree 100 percent with what he said, then she’ll be bound what he says and you’re off and running. ”  1T32:1-11.  Requests Nos. 7 and 8 asked for the names, contact information, and personnel documents for employees and/or independent contractors.
[brief] (130a [13:1-19]).  The Plaintiff and Defendants disagree about who prepared the documents for closing; Plaintiff testified it was [...]; [...] claims it was Plaintiff.  (39a; 137a [38:4-15]).  There is no dispute that [...] prepared the HUD statement.  (138a [44:14-19]; 272a).  Days after the closing at [...]’s office, [...] sent Plaintiff an email apologizing because the deed had been written incorrectly and assuring Plaintiff they will prepare a new document for the Seller’s signature:  “I never saw the deed, and I thought it was from her and her husband to you, because there was a consideration in transfer tax, so I will prepare one and call her today…sorry about that, but this file was all over the place. ” (See 139a [46:4-14]; 211a [42:1-13]).  The email’s author explained that the reason she apologized was “[b]ecause the files was all over the place, and I was very busy that day that ([...]) was here...(I was) [s]orry that it wasn’t taken care of the day of the closing. ” (213a [50:10-17]).  An affidavit of title should not be signed by a seller without a deed being signed by the seller.  (See 140a [50:24-51:4]).  [...] is listed on the settlement sheet as the transaction’s settlement agent.
[brief] (10T 99-8 to 107-3)  Those videos and videos from pole cameras maintained by the police (Da 20) were played at trial and depict the shooting committed by an unidentifiable hooded figure.  (10T 110-18 to 115-5; 10T 156-11; 10T 160-21)  [...] admitted on cross-examination that police did nothing to recover video from Ellsworth or Edgemere Avenues and made no effort to enhance the videos that they did retrieve.
[brief] [...]’s subjective belief that consideration of the size of the applicant company is irrelevant does not make that factor irrelevant; members of the Subcommittee and of the Borough Council are free to consider it, and are equally free to have reasonable disagreement over the import of such considerations.  The decision of the full governing body to grant the Resolution of Support to [...], perhaps considering, in part, the size of the applicant’s organization, does not render the Borough's decision arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable against that standard.  The trial court rightly found that the decision of the Borough Council in granting its support to [...] was not arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, because evidence has been presented, which the Borough considered to be meaningful and important to its decision, to support the Borough's award decision.  [...]’s subjective belief that it should rightly be entitled to a license furnishes no basis to disturb the [...] award which was affirmed by the trial court.  All applicants were provided with a full and fair opportunity to present their applications to both the cannabis Subcommittee and the full Borough Council, and no challenge to the process should be sustained on the record developed here.  The decision by the Borough to grant a Resolution of Support to [...] was not procedurally deficient nor inappropriate, and was likewise not arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  The Borough has already solicited applications and engaged in a deliberative process, by which it opted to select [...] for the receipt of the Support Resolution in the Highway Commercial District.
[brief] In summary we have presented four instances of the defendant’s negligent conduct on the day of the accident.  Plaintiff asserts that each of these examples is evidence of the defendant’s negligence.  If both drivers are found negligent, it is the Jury which must consider the conduct of both drivers in determining who is responsible.  Once again, the plaintiff has evidence of four instances of the defendant’s negligent conduct.  The Trial Court did not consider any of the examples of whether the defendant could have been negligent in the operation of his vehicle and focused solely on the admitted presence of the large painted arrow which the plaintiff did not obey, the plaintiff’s conduct does not prevent consideration of whether the defendant was also negligent in the operation of his vehicle.
[brief] That is incorrect.  The trial court did not hold that the policy of the NJCFLA was impacted in this matter at all.  The court had no reason to explore the policy underpinning the NJCFLA, instead finding dispositively that there is no violation of the Act that Defendant could rely upon to void the judgment.  As a result, the court held, the judgment was not void.  The trial court had no reason to discuss the policy behind the NJCFLA, especially in light of the clear language of the Act.  The court would only need to review said policies if it found that the Act had been violated but, instead, the court specifically found that the Act did not void the judgment.
[brief] Almost immediately following the implementation of the MSRA, Plaintiffs sought to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.  On March 15, 2017, Plaintiffs commenced an action by way of Order to Show Cause challenging the constitutionality of the MSRA and the reforms implemented by the then-Director and Designee (the “First Police Matter”).  (Pa000308).  By Order dated May 23, 2017, in a 57-page opinion by the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., the Superior Court upheld the constitutionality of the MSRA, as well as the Director’s right to implement the majority of the collective bargaining agreement modifications at issue.
[brief] November 30, 2022 trial– 5T December 5, 2022 trial-6T  December 6, 2022 trial (I) – 7T  December 6, 2022 trial (II) – 8T  December 6, 2022 trial (III) – 9T  December 7, 2022 trial – 10T December 8, 2022 trial – 11T December 9, 2022 trial – 12T  December 12, 2022 trial – 13T  December 13, 2022 trial (I) – 14T  December 13, 2022 trial (II) – 15T  December 14, 2022 trial (I) – 16T  December 14, 2022 trial (II) – 17T  December 15, 2022 trial (I) – 18T  December 15, 2022 trial (II) - 19T  December 19, 2022 trial – 20T December 20, 2022 trial – 21T  February 17, 2023 hearing – 22T  March 31, 2023 hearing – 23T  Complaint added [...]
[brief] **Initial Emergency Response to the Oil Spill Incident**  [...] was informed that certain government agencies responded and took action to contain the discharge.  (PPCIa055-56).  On June 1, 2021, the [...] issued a Field Directive to [...] which generally required [...] to recover and remediate the discharged waste oil on the subject property.  (PPCIa446).  Although the Field Directive was issued to [...], it did not conclude that [...] was solely responsible or liable for the discharge; rather it simply noted that “the Department may direct any person/entity in any way responsible for the discharge to clean up and remove or arrange for the removal of such discharge. ”  Id.  Upon completion of the emergency response cleanup on or before June 7, 2021, the [...] advised that it would release control of the remaining remediation to the retained Licensed Site Remediation Professional.  (PPCIa058-59).  [...] then assumed charge of all remediation efforts.  Id.  D.  **[...]’s Suit Against [...]**
[brief] Is that okay with the Court?  THE COURT: That’s fine.  [...]: All right.  Let me stand up.  THE COURT:  But I can tell you, Mr. Ramsey, this is a first.  [...]: I’m sorry, Your Honor?  THE COURT: This is a first.  [...]:  Well, I hope it’s the last for Your Honor, but I know my client wanted to make a statement about this, so.  ****  And, [...], you have a psychiatric defense that you wanted the Court to listen to, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  [5T46-8/47-12 (emphasis added). ]  Before the municipal court swore [...] in, trial counsel stated, “I don’t want the Court to consider this as evidence because it’s not.
[brief] Instead of clearing the sidewalks, the defendant himself created a hazardous condition, and thereby had notice of the hazards.  According to the appellant, and not disputed by the respondent, the snow was not cleared to the concrete surface.  According to the appellant’s expert, there was a 7” snowfall on February 16th, but no snow on the 17th, and then no snow on the 18th until after the appellant’s injury.  In any event, we submit that it was not unreasonable for the plaintiff to expect a clear sidewalk to complete her morning exercise, and the defendants had a duty to clear the snow, remediate the dangerous condition, refrain from creating more dangerous conditions, and a duty to warn.  Likewise, it is not unreasonable or unduly burdensome upon a property owner who is renovating property to include within the zone of risk the obligation to keep the property safe, particularly in the property owner’s absence.  The defendant [...] failed in these regards.  It is for these reasons and the reasons stated below, alternatively, that we respectfully submit the Summary Judgment Order should be reversed, and this matter should be returned to the Trial Court.
[brief] Moreover, there is no custom, policy, or practice demonstrating that the Township or Mayor did not grant or permit Respondents to take part in the process for obtaining zoning approval for their project.  Respondents’ proposed development was subject to multiple reviews by the Zoning Board, both before and after the discovery of the bald eagle’s nest on the Subject Property.  The Respondents initial application was granted by the Zoning Board.  There is no argument from Respondents that their application and ability to be heard on the matter were interfered with at that time.  If that were the case, then perhaps there would be a plausible argument that there was a custom, policy, or practice to deprive Respondents of a constitutional right.  This is not the case.  They complain solely of a single instance.
[brief] The lower court’s exclusion of a photograph depicting the accident location on the date of loss (Marino-3) was an abuse of discretion.  (7T 57:12-16; 70:21-22).  Like any other evidence tendered at trial, photographs must be relevant; that is, they must have a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.  N.J.R.E. 401.  However, even if relevant, evidence nonetheless may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  N.J.R.E. 403.  As to photographs specifically, the persuasive representational nature of photographs demands that the foundation for the admission of photographs must be properly laid.  Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 30 (2007).  New Jersey courts have stated the rule as follows: the authentication of photographic evidence prior to its admission seems to contemplate proof that the photograph is a substantially correct representation of the matters offered in evidence, and this includes an identification or statement as to what the photograph shows.
[brief] Aurentz v. Planning Bd., 171 N.J. Super. 135 (Law Div. 1979)  ...........29, 31, 34  Booth v. Rockaway, 50 N.J. 302 (1967)  .............................................30, 31, 34, 37  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer Cty., 169 N.J. 135 (2001)
[brief] This is because the Supreme Court and its advisory committees (e.g., the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics) have exclusive authority over such matters.  N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 2, ¶ 3; R. 1:14; Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 591-92, 606 (2020); Arbus, Maybruch & Goode, LLC v. Cohen, 475 N.J. Super. 509, 516, 518 (App. Div. 2023).  So, even if this Court is inclined to believe that a *per se* conflict rule should exist (it should not) or deserves consideration, respectfully, it is not within this Court’s jurisdiction to declare such a new rule of attorney ethics.
[brief] (29T47-5 to 6).  As to aggravating factor two, the judge found that it applied because defendant knew his victim and knew that she was a slight, elderly woman who was in poor health and "physically unable to resist the attacker's ambush" when he viciously attacked and killed her -- beating, strangling, and stabbed her with a serrated knife.  (29T47-16 to 22).  With respect to aggravating factor three, the judge found that defendant poses a risk of reoffending.  (29T48-13 to 15).  As the judge noted, defendant has five prior adult convictions, including convictions for two separate robberies, and that "[i]t is apparent . . . that not only has this defendant not responded to previous convictions and periods of incarceration, but this defendant has escalated his criminality into homicidal violence."  (29T48-23 to 49-5).  The judge thus found aggravating factor three applicable.  (29T49-5 to 6).
[brief] Da – Defendant-Appellant’s Appendix  1T – October 4, 2016 (Motion to Suppress/Preclude Identifications)  2T – June 28, 2017 (Testimony on Motion to Suppress/Preclude Identifications)  3T – June 28, 2018 (Ruling on Motion to Suppress/Preclude Identifications)  4T – October 17, 2019 (Second Motion to Suppress/Preclude Identifications)  5T – November 19, 2020 (Rule 404(b) Motion)