ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] So it came as a surprise that on September 16, 2022, in retaliation for being sued, [...] filed a Counterclaim alleging that the Board still owed on a second April 2020 invoice for $620,250.\textsuperscript{09}, a $2,054.\textsuperscript{40} invoice that the Board actually paid before the Answer was filed, and an alleged $77,141.\textsuperscript{40} underpayment of a July 2020 invoice for $591,417.\textsuperscript{42}, even though the invoice was satisfied in full.  Although [...] never petitioned the Commissioner for relief, [...]’s Counterclaim incorrectly claims that the school law statute under the Commissioner of Education’s jurisdiction, \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)}, entitles them to full payment, inclusive of their profits and net revenues over and above actual payroll expenses.\textsuperscript{9}  As if receiving $1,301,300.\textsuperscript{18} for not working is not enough, [...]’s Counterclaim sought to siphon an additional $697,391.\textsuperscript{49} for not working – money that the Board needs to educate the students who still suffer from the educational losses from the school closures.  If this court affirms the court’s reconsideration order granting \textsuperscript{8} Pa222 – Pa224 \textsuperscript{9} Pa267 – Pa275 [...]’s Counterclaim for $697,031, then the court will effectively convert the parties’ contract requiring the performance of services as a condition of getting paid, into an illegal no-show contract that grants [...] a total windfall of $1,998,691.\textsuperscript{67} of taxpayer money for not working – all to the detriment of the education of over 27,000+ [...] students who need the resources for its education.  And by reaffirming the court’s original, correct ruling dismissing the Counterclaim, and allowing the Board to pursue its 10-count Complaint, the Board will be able to renegotiate a fair payment to [...] consistent with the statute, and recoup resources that were unlawfully and unjustly taken from [...]’s students.
[brief] Yet, the sentencing court’s aggravating and mitigating findings as recorded on the judgement of conviction belie any possibility that “the Court may have stated reasons to justify the concurrent sentence. ”  (Da 10-11, 45)  The sentencing court found aggravating factors 3 (risk of reoffending), 6 (prior record and seriousness of which) and 9 (need to deter defendant and others).  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a (3), (6) and (9).  (Da 11)  The first two render incongruous a finding that based on defendant’s “character and condition” a consecutive sentence would result in a “serious injustice. ”  Furthermore, the court’s application of aggravating factor (9), “the need to deter defendant and others,” completely negates any possibility that it would also have simultaneously concluded that the “need to deter … others” was overridden.  The sentencing court did find mitigating factor 11 (imprisonment would entail excessive hardship to defendant or his dependents), but a “hardship” is not an “injustice,” as required by the statute.
[brief] ”  (Pa530).  b) the 20 year history of [...] participating as coordinator of the annual Rutgers Safe Water regulatory update without any interference from the NJDEP.  (Pa460).  c) the 25 year history of [...] being a member of the American Water Works Association (NJAWWA) and his regular attendance at its conferences and participation as a presenter.  (Pa460).  d) the approval [...] received to engage in outside activities of training on environmental issues March 3, 2008, [...] sought permission from the NJDEP’s Office of Legal Affairs to conduct environmental training as an outside activity and his request was approved by [...] on March 8, 2008.  (Pa511-Pa512).  e) the approval [...] received to engage in outside activities in January, 2015.  f) the prerequisite for discipline is up to date PARs and the fact that [...] had not had a PAR (a prerequisite for discipline) for “several years. ”  (Pa526).  g)  Simultaneously, on April 13, 2015, [...] drafts a Work Place Violence retaliation claim against [...] including an insubordination accusation.  [(Pa665-Pa666). ]  Also notable and undisputed is that both [...], [...], [...] and [...] were advised of [...]’s complaint of discrimination and retaliation.  (Pa666).  Notwithstanding the above corroborative facts, the report stated no action would be taken because [...] and [...] denied making the derogatory statements to [...].
[brief] On May 10, 2023, the State filed its Notice of Legal Eligibility and objected to the defendant’s legal and clinical eligibility into Recovery Court on several grounds.\(^4\) (Sa59-Sa60).  On June 1, 2023, the defendant was determined to be clinically eligible for Recovery Court with a recommendation of intensive outpatient treatment.  (Sa61).  \(^4\)  While it was not initially included in the State’s Notice of Legal Eligibility, N.J.S.A.  2C:35-14a(5) was addressed at length in the State’s Recovery Court opposition brief, its supplemental Recovery Court brief, and was subject to extensive oral argument during the September 25, 2023 and December 4, 2023, Recovery Court hearings.
[directive] Page 2 of 3  INSTRUCTIONS FOR USING PHOTO ARRAY ID PROCEDURE WORKSHEET  This worksheet is designed to assist law enforcement officers in documenting the procedures/ results of photo arrays that are shown to eyewitnesses in the course of a criminal investigation.  The worksheet is also designed to serve as a checklist to ensure that officers comply with all of the requirements for eyewitness identification procedures established by Court Rule and New Jersey Supreme Court case law.  Whenever a worksheet is prepared, the original should be preserved and a copy forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office.  The officer(s) must also preserve and forward to the prosecutor any other contemporaneous notes concerning the identification procedure.  New Jersey law requires that law enforcement officers record the identification procedure, preferably in an electronic audio and video format.  See Question 5.  If it is not feasible to make an electronic recording, the officer shall contemporaneously record the procedure in writing, and explain in writing why an electronic recording was not feasible.  If a contemporaneous record cannot be made, the officer shall prepare a detailed written summary of the procedure as soon as practicable and without undue delay, and explain in writing why an electronic recording and a contemporaneous, verbatim written account were not feasible.  Whenever a written record is used, it must include a verbatim account of all relevant verbal and non-verbal exchanges between the officer(s) involved in the procedure and the witness.  The worksheet should be prepared by the officer who administers the photo array.  A worksheet should be prepared whether or not the witness was able to make an identification.  If more than one suspect is involved in an investigation, a different photo array should be used and a separate worksheet prepared for each witness.  Worksheets should be prepared during the identification procedure, or immediately thereafter.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ALTERNATIVE RULING ON THE MERITS OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR IS CONTRARY TO WELL-ESTABLISHED FCA PRECEDENT.  (4T)  The trial court’s order rested solely on retroactive application of the State’s veto.  See Ja2 (10/24/23 Order ¶¶ 1–2).  Nevertheless, anticipating review of its retroactivity decision, the court stated in its oral decision that, in the “alternative,” the public disclosure bar issue would require a trial “in the event a higher Court would disagree with this Court on the retroactivity ruling. ”  4T at 6:13–21, 28:24–29:4.  The trial court concluded that it would deny the cross-motions because the NJFCA legal standards require a fact-intensive analysis that precludes summary judgment, see id. at 35:9–13, and “because there are disputed issues of material fact that must go to a fact finder,” id. at 6:17–18.  As discussed below, this alternative reasoning was in error because the public disclosure bar is often decided on a dispositive motion, as evidenced by the very FCA authorities cited by the trial court, and each of the purported factual issues identified by the trial court are actually legal disputes about how the public disclosure bar applies to Relator’s action.  Given that all of the facts germane to the public disclosure bar defense are undisputed, the trial court should have dismissed the case.
[brief] Unless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed by the Court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice. ”  As stated in the Comment to the Rule, this sentence provides “the guiding principle for interpretation and application of the court rules, namely, the achievement of procedural due process in the service of substantial justice on the merits. ”  [...], *Rules Governing The Courts of the State of New Jersey* (2019 ed.), comment to R. 1:1-2(a).
[brief] Da36, at ¶ 82, Da106.  However, Plaintiff did not work at [...] in 1991, and has never seen, reviewed, signed or been provided a copy of any so-called partnership agreement or any such agreement dated as indicated.  Da36, ¶ 83.  Moreover, as noted above, Plaintiff and [...] explicitly certified to [...]’s lender, [...], in 2019 that “[t]he Partnership does not have a formal Limited Liability Partnership Agreement as in effect on the date hereof. ”  Da36, ¶ 84, Da90 (emphasis added).
[brief] PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹  This matter arises from a lawsuit pending before the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade  ¹This matter was commenced by way of motion pursuant to R. 4:11-4(b) seeking to quash an improper out of state subpoena and for a protective order.  Therefore, the procedural and factual history related to the subpoena are limited and interrelated.  County, Florida.  The lawsuit filed on behalf of [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] (collectively referred to as “[...]” or “Plaintiff”) is against Defendants, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  This lawsuit is one of numerous actions filed in New York, South Carolina, Delaware and Florida State and Federal Courts.
[brief] In Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for breach of contract claiming Defendants breached the alleged “Third Loan. ”  “To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a party must prove a valid contract between the parties, the opposing party’s failure to perform a defined obligation under the contract, and the breach caused the claimant to sustained damages. ”  EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Envtl. Barrier Co., LLC, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 345 (App. Div. 2015).  A “contract requires a meeting of the minds and mutual assent. ”  Newfield Fire Co., 439 N.J. Super. at 214.  The testimony and evidence establish that the alleged “Third Loan” does not exist.  First, it is undisputed that on April 26, 2013, [...] made a single lump-sum payment of $330,000 to [...].  It is also undisputed that on April 26, 2013, [...] signed a Discharge of Mortgage certifying that the $330,000 Loan had been “Paid in Full. ”  Thus, [...] signed the Discharge of Mortgage, thereby admitting that the $330,000 Loan was “Paid in Full. ”  Importantly, [...] does not dispute the authenticity of the Discharge of Mortgage.  [...]’ self-serving testimony regarding the “Third Loan” is completely contradicted by the fact he signed the Discharge of Mortgage and was then silent on the matter for seven (7) years.  Allowing Plaintiff’s claim to proceed in light of the signed Discharge of Mortgage would lead to the absurd result that written mortgage discharges have no binding effect.  Affirming the trial court’s ruling would allow self-serving testimony regarding alleged oral agreements to displace written mortgage discharges.
[brief] In Olds v. Donnelly, the plaintiff client retained the defendant attorney, who ultimately withdrew as counsel, to pursue a medical malpractice action.  Olds, 150 N.J. at 428.  The plaintiff alleged that, before the attorney withdrew, they failed to serve the summons and complaint on the doctor.  Ibid.  The trial court in the medical malpractice action dismissed the complaint with prejudice for untimely service.  Ibid.  The plaintiff then filed a legal malpractice action against the attorney.  Ibid.  The attorney moved to dismiss, arguing that the client should have joined him in the medical malpractice action.  Ibid.  The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the legal malpractice claim did not accrue until dismissal of the medical malpractice claim.  Ibid.  The Appellate Division affirmed.  The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's holding that the Entire Controversy Doctrine did not bar that action, not because of some per se exemption from the Entire Controversy Doctrine for legal malpractice claims, but because it "had not accrued during the pendency of the underlying medical-malpractice action."
[brief] Nevertheless, they blithely assert:  The fact that the Trial Court did not consider [...]'s Certification does not mean Petitioners have not satisfied their burden.  [Rb19 n.12.]  This is factually and legally unsupportable.  The trial court's decision was "[b]ased on the email exchange between Petitioners and Counsel prior to the matter being initiated."  Pa9.  Petitioners concede those emails are innocuous.  The only other possible basis was the Certification of [...] ("Mueller Cert."), opposing the motion.  Even under the erroneous "may be" standard applied by the trial court, neither can sustain petitioners' burden and they have not have satisfied their burden.  Petitioners spend multiple pages, Rb10-14, block-quoting *O Builders v. Associates, Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of N.J.*, 206 N.J. 109 (2011).  Again, petitioners ignore the fact that the trial court considered only the emails, not the Knoll Cert.  Thus, the trial court considered even less than what was considered inadequate in *O Builders*.  One infers that petitioners feel that the disregarded Knoll Cert. was more persuasive than [...]'s certifications and testimony in *O Builders*, and that the Mueller Cert. should have been more detailed.  But in *O Builders*, the parties were recounting a four-hour meeting, not a couple of phone calls.
[brief] Moreover, this Court is required to defer to the Commission’s findings of fact.  The Commission possesses particular expertise regarding claims arising under the School Ethics Act.  Indeed, one of its few statutory duties is to adjudicate claims arising under the Act.  The Court therefore should defer to the Commission’s “technical expertise, its superior knowledge of its subject matter area, and its fact-finding role,” *Messick v. Bd. of Rev.*, 420 N.J. Super 321, 325 (App. Div. 2011).  *See also Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cnty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 131 N.J. 626, 643 (1993) (stating that courts are “not at liberty to interfere with regulatory and administrative judgments of the professionals in the field of public education unless those judgments are palpably arbitrary or depart from governing law”).
[brief] The Trial Court properly determined that Plaintiffs established their case for variance relief based on the overwhelming, substantial credible evidence and proofs placed on the record at the public hearing on the Amended Application, and that Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to an approval.  The October 15, 2020 Opinion granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs detailed the relevant law and standards governing the granting of use and bulk variance belief.  The October 15, 2020 Opinion exhaustively examined the standards for the granting of variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) ("Special Reasons") and (d)(6) ("Height") (M25-M27), and under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1) and (c)(2) ("Bulk Variances") (M27-28).  The Trial Court then carefully applied these standards to the record before it and found that: "the Board has not presented a record which demonstrates a clear decision of balancing the positive and negative factors and offered no analysis of those factors in the record despite purporting to have done so in its Resolution.  To the contrary, its decision was unsupported by either the memorializing Resolution or the record and, instead, ascribed "undue weight to the residents' unsubstantiated and, at times, irrelevant testimony."  In holding that the Zoning Board "failed to establish that it relied on substantial and reliable record evidence to support any findings of fact" in denying the Plaintiffs' Application for variances, the Trial Court found that: [The Board's] decision was not supported by substantial evidence or "grounded in evidence in the record."  Consequently, the Zoning Board acted "arbitrarily, capriciously, [and] unreasonably" since its findings of fact in support of the denial of the variance relief sought were not supported by the record and, thus, its decision must be reversed.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE LAW REQUIRES PLANNING BOARDS AND GOVERNING BODIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAND USE ELEMENT OF THE MASTER PLAN.  (PA 114-118).  The Municipal Land Use Law is clear as to what the Planning Board is required to review when determining whether an Ordinance is consistent with the Master Plan.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62A provides: “all of the provisions of such zoning ordinance or any amendment or revision thereto shall either be substantially consistent with the land use plan element and the housing plan element of the master plan or designed to effectuate such plan elements[.]”  (emphasis added)  Thus, both the Planning Board and the governing body must consider the Land Use Element of this Master Plan when determining an Ordinance’s consistency.  The LRHL also requires the Planning Board to make a consistency determination.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7a.  The Cox treatise on New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration explains the importance of municipal compliance with this requirement.  It is thus clear that the focus of the Municipal Land Use Law is on the enhanced role of planning and that it strengthens the planning process itself.  The statutory enumeration of the factors to be considered in formulating a master plan, and the statutory directive that the master plan itself include an evaluation of proposed ordinances in light of these factors, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28b(2), serve the end of heightening the role of planning as a condition of proper zoning.  It follows that the requirement that a zoning ordinance be substantially consistent with the master plan should be strictly enforced.  Cox and Koenig, *New Jersey Zoning and Land use Administration*, § 10-2.2 (2022).  As discussed below, the Planning Board and the Borough Council each failed to review the Land Use Element of the Master Plan in arriving at their consistency determinations.  **POINT TWO**
[brief] Lastly, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated the broad scope of the CFA in a decision in response to a question certified to it by the Third Circuit in *Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation*, 243 N.J. 319 (2020).  In *Sun Chemical*, the District Court held that the plaintiff could not assert a CFA claim due to the fact that another statute served to regulate the asserted claims.  *Id.* at 330.  The Supreme Court rejected that ruling and held:  In addition to its ever-growing scope, “[t]he language of the CFA evinces a clear legislative intent that its provisions be applied broadly. ”  *Lemelledo*, 150 N.J. at 264.  “[L]ike most remedial legislation, the [CFA] should be construed liberally in favor of consumers. ”  *Cox*, 138 N.J. at 15.  And, by the plain terms of the statute, “[t]he rights, remedies and prohibitions” created by the CFA are “in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohibition accorded by the common law or statutes of this State. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.13.  Courts are therefore reluctant “to undermine the CFA’s enforcement structure … by carving out exemptions for each allegedly fraudulent practice that may concomitantly be regulated by another source of law. ”  *Lemelledo*, 150 N.J. at 270.  *Id.*  The Supreme Court confirmed that there is a “presumption that the CFA applies to a covered activity,” a presumption that can be overcome only when a court is satisfied “that a *direct and unavoidable conflict exists* between application of the CFA and application of the other regulatory scheme or schemes. ”  *Id.* at 331 (quoting *Lemelledo*, 150 N.J. at 270 (emphasis added)).  The trial court did not reason that there is any conflict between the NJCFLA and the CFA, because there is no conflict.  Both statutes seek to protect consumers and impose minimum standards for any entity who engages in the consumer loan business as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2, *to wit*, the CFA and the NJCFLA are complementary as opposed to conflicting.  Thus, the trial court erred in holding that [...]’s unlicensed enforcement of a void debt does not constitute unlawful conduct under the CFA and the March 21, 2024 Order of Dismissal should be reversed.
[brief] | 1 | | POINT II: THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD GIVE NO WEIGHT TO [...]’S ADVERSARIAL OPPOSITION BRIEF (Rb).  | 3 | | POINT III: [...] INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE SET FORTH IN N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 (Db17; Rb8) | 5 | | POINT IV: [...] INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE BOARD VIOLATED THE ACT (Db29) | 9 | | CONCLUSION | 11 | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ### Cases  **Chesterbrooke Ltd. Partnership v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Chester**, 237 N.J. Super. 118, n.1 (App. Div. 1989) .................................................................4  **I/M/O Belmont School Committee**, 45 MLC 185 (2019) ..............................................7, 8  **I/M/O Belmont School Committee**, 48 MLC 107 .......................................................7, 8  **I/M/O Brielle Board of Education and Brielle Education**, 3 NJPER ¶ 3 (1977)  .................................................................................................................................6  **Jackson Tp. Bd. of Educ. v. Jackson Educ. Ass’n. ex rel. Scelba**, 334 N.J. Super. 162, 176 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................................3
[brief] Defendant argues that the PCR court improperly denied her PCR petition, claiming she established trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully inform her of the consequences related to, and the merits of, her plea.  A review of the record establishes that the courts below thoroughly analyzed defendant’s claim and properly determined that defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Thus, the PCR court properly denied the PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.  That denial should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] testified that, as a result of [...]’s DBE status, he could not be paid more than [...] and that, pursuant to an agreement with [...], he received his salary from [...].  He testified he never took more in salary than the $300,000 he was entitled to receive under his employment agreement.  13T31:13-32:23.  Plaintiffs do not cite any evidence that contradicts [...]’s explanation.  Instead, they contend their claims are proven because [...] failed to prove that such an agreement existed between him and [...].  Again, plaintiffs do not appreciate that it is their burden to prove their claims, not defendants’ burden to prove their explanation.  This argument utterly fails to establish that there was sufficient evidence for the court to conclude these payments constituted conversions, a breach of contract or any of the other claims asserted by plaintiffs.