ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (a)  If it appears to the bureau chief that any person has, or directly or indirectly controls another person who has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this act or any rule or order hereunder, or if it appears that it will be against the public interest for any person to issue, sell, offer for sale, purchase, offer to purchase, promote, negotiate, advertise or distribute any securities from or within this State, the bureau chief may take, in addition to any other enforcement actions available under this act and in the bureau chief's discretion, either or both of the following actions:  . . . .  (2)  Have an action brought by the Attorney General in the Superior Court on the bureau chief's behalf to enjoin the acts or practices to enforce compliance with this act or any rule or order hereunder.  Upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or writ of mandamus shall be granted and a receiver or conservator may be appointed for the defendant or the defendant's assets.  In addition, upon a proper showing by the bureau chief, the court may enter an order of rescission, restitution or disgorgement or any other order within the court's power, directed to any person who has engaged in any act constituting a violation of any provision of this act or any rule or order hereunder.  The court may not require the bureau chief to post a bond.  The court may proceed in the action in a summary manner or otherwise[.]  [N.J.S.A. 49:3-69 (1997). ]  The legislative history supports this reading of the amendments.
[directive] 4.  (4)  ¿Entiende que si usted infringe una condición de la supervisión de por [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [NC/NA] vida en la comunidad, y le acusan formalmente y le condenan por dicho incumplimiento, es posible que reciba una condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 5 años y una condena especial de supervisión (si el incumplimiento de la condicional de por vida de la libertad condición ocurrió el primero de julio del 2014 o después de esa fecha) o es posible que reciba una condena de encarcelamiento de (si el incumplimiento de la condición ocurrió antes hasta 18 meses del primero de julio del 2014)?
[brief] In advance of the hearing, Plaintiff obtained a copy of a report prepared for [...] by [...], PP of [...] titled “Report of Preliminary Investigation for Determination of an Area in Need of Redevelopment” dated January 2024 (the “AINR Report”).  (Ja105).  The AINR Report concluded that the Property qualified as an “area in need of redevelopment because the Property satisfied N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(a) and (d).  (Id.).  Plaintiff appeared and presented a substantial objector’s case.
[brief] The Appellate Division – citing and relying upon the same line of cases upon which [...] relies – asserted that it was “the rule in New Jersey” that municipal supply of water to residents was a “proprietary” (instead of “governmental”) function, involving a commercial-type relationship just as if the municipality was a private corporation:  It is clear that governmental units engaged in the purification and sale of water are considered to be in private business, operating in a proprietary and not a governmental capacity.  As stated in Reid Development Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 10 N.J. 229 (1952):  * * *  there is general agreement that the distribution of water by a municipality to its inhabitants for domestic and commercial uses is a private or proprietary function which in its exercise is subject to the rules applicable to private corporations.  This is the rule in New Jersey.
[brief] The sentencing court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences was based entirely on the court’s erroneous finding that one of the terroristic threats charges applied to a phone call made in April 2022.  The sentencing court rested its decision to impose consecutive sentences for counts 1 and 2 on a single Yarbough factor.  Its analysis was fatally flawed because it mistakenly found that [...] had been charged with terroristic threats for a call made in April 2022.  This entitles [...] to a remand for resentencing.  Count 1 of the indictment charged [...] with terroristic threats for “leaving a voicemail at approximately 11:30 a.m. on” “the 23rd day of August, 2021. ”  (Da7)  Count 2 charged him with “leaving a voicemail at approximately 4:00 p.m. ” also on “the 23rd day of August, 2021. ”  (Da8)  The jury found [...] guilty of making terroristic threats in the morning hours and the afternoon hours of August 23, 2021.  (Da45-48)  When it sentenced [...], the trial court believed that one count of terroristic threats occurred in August 2021 and the other in April 2022.  It relied on that incorrect belief to impose consecutive sentences under Yarbough, contrary to the State’s recommendation that the sentences be run concurrently.  (6T 28-19 to 21)
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[brief] The trial court concluded that the predicate for Plaintiffs’ pursuit of claims against [...] -- that [...] entered into a transaction with [...] -- indisputably did not occur.  (1T21:5-25:19).  Rather, the evidence showed that [...] simply “came in” and “did a little bit of an investigation” regarding purchasing the assets of [...]’ practice.  (1T21:16-21).  [...]  \(^3\)  Plaintiffs argue in passing that [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment “was not a proper cross-motion. ” (Pb5).  Rule 4:46-1, however, permits the filing of a cross-motion for summary judgment.  Further, due to adjournments, Plaintiffs had more time to oppose [...]’s cross-motion -- in excess of 30 days -- than they would have if [...] had filed a standalone motion rather than a cross-motion.  \(^4\)  Plaintiffs have not appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to amend. “issued a notice of intent to [] purchase” the assets but the transaction “never went forward. ” (1T21:20-23).  In fact, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded, on the record, that [...] never signed the “notice of intent. ” (1T11:8-9).  The trial court further determined that Plaintiffs had not alleged, let alone identified any evidence, that [...] committed a wrongful or “unlawful” act.  (1T26:2-6).  All [...] did, the trial court found, was “try[] and buy [] another business. ” (1T4-6).  As the court further explained:  “From day one it’s been clear that [...] came in.  They made an offer for the business.  This lawsuit came about.  They -- they shied away and that was the end of it. ”5  (1T26:18-21).  In the absence of a transaction between [...] and [...], and in the absence of any allegation (let alone evidence) of wrongdoing by [...], the trial court determined that Plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference and civil conspiracy failed as a matter of law.  (1T21:11-26:6).  Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim was also warranted, the trial court found, as Plaintiffs introduced “no facts whatsoever to support” their claim that they “expected remuneration from [[...]] at the time [they] performed or conferred a benefit on [[...]] and the failure of remuneration enriched [[...]] beyond its contractual rights. ” (1T27:5-11).  ____________________ 5  The trial court also pointed out that [...], having never entered into a transaction with [...], “certainly never profited” from one.  (1T26:22-24).  The trial court acknowledged that discovery was not complete at the time of its ruling -- but found that further discovery was not warranted as Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how further discovery “would effect [sic] the disposition of a claim. ”  (1T26:17-24 (“I don’t find that that standard [for further discovery] can be met at this point. ”)).  VIII.
[brief] On March 28, 2022, [...] filed their Answer to the Counterclaim (Pa25), denying any wrongdoing, failing to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense, and certifying pursuant to R. 4:5-1 that “[t]he matter in controversy is not the subject of any . . . pending arbitration proceeding; and no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated. ”  Answer to the Countercl. p. 23 (Pa47).  On May 25, 2022, [...] initiated the lead case underlying this appeal by filing his Class Action Complaint (Pa48) against [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] III, alleging violations of the FDCPA, the CFA, and common law.
[brief] *McKeown–Brand*, 132 N.J. at 549.  “[T]he burden of proving that the non-prevailing party acted in bad faith” is on the party who seeks fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15–59.1.  *Id.* at 559; see *Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, Inc.*, 408 N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] ”  Here, the [...] has acknowledged that “schools would be obligated to respond truthfully to a parent or a guardian who contacted the school to request confirmation that their child had made such a request [to use a chosen name or pronouns] or statement [expressing another gender].”  Tr. Ct. Op. at 9 n.2 (Da127); see also *Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch.*, 2024 WL 706797, at *11 (distinguishing *Willey* and *Regino* from *Tatel*) (Aa14-15).  Moreover, there is nothing in the Original Policies preventing parents from “mak[ing] decisions concerning their [child’s] upbringing,” J.S., 650 F.3d at 934, or “discussing gender identity issues with their children,” Parents Defending Educ., 2023 WL 4848509, at *18 (Aa99–101).  The policies do not mandate what parents teach their children about gender identity or in any way alter how parents address their children’s gender identity at home, including what names or pronouns parents use for their children.  In other words, “[t]here is no requirement [by the school districts] that the children . . . avail themselves of the services offered . . . and no prohibition against the [parents] participating in decisions of their minor [children] . . . .  The [parents] remain free to exercise their traditional care, custody and control over their unemancipated children. ”  Doe v. Irwin, 615 F. 2d at 1168.  Unable to point to coercive conduct, the school districts cannot prevail in defending the Mandatory Notification Policies as constitutionally compelled.
[brief] Here, the trial court imposed multiple layers of consecutive sentences, running each of the three sentences consecutive to one another for an aggregate sentence of more than sixty years in prison with no opportunity for parole.  For a person in his thirties like [...], that functionally amounts to life in prison with no opportunity for parole.  However, while the trial court briefly discussed some of the *Yarbough* factors at the sentencing, nowhere did the trial court acknowledge the practical reality of the sentence imposed or its “real-time consequences. ”  *See id.* at 273 (“Assessing the overall fairness of a sentence requires a real-time assessment of the consequences of the aggregate sentences imposed . . . .”).  Accordingly, at a new sentencing hearing, the trial court must consider the actual length of the sentence imposed and state explicitly why such a sentence is fair.  *Id.* at 268.  Finally, the trial court also erred in imposing a substantial restitution without any ability-to-pay hearing.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b), restitution may only be imposed if “[t]he defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution. ”  In evaluating the amount of restitution or fine to impose, the trial court is required to thoroughly evaluate the record to “establish a fair and reasonable amount of restitution and method of repayment. ”  *State v. Newman*, 132 N.J. 159, 173 (1993).  Accordingly, before restitution is imposed, a hearing should be had to establishing the ability of the defendant to pay the financial penalty, and the trial court must give a statement of reasons for finding the defendant does in fact have an ability to pay.  *Id.* at 170.  At [...]’s sentencing, the trial court imposed $15,166.13 in restitution without holding any ability to pay hearing or giving any detailed statement of reasons for how [...] might have the ability to pay that amount.  Nor is there anything in the record establishing that [...] could pay such a fine.  Accordingly, that restitution must be vacated, and the matter remanded so that an ability to pay hearing and statement of reasons can be had before imposing any restitution.
[brief] In addition to the Board’s agency judgment that an inmate’s institutional record is predictive of his likelihood of committing a new offense, both the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that participation in institutional programming and a recent infraction-free record weigh against the need for deterrence and the likelihood of recidivism.  Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Bd. (Trantino IV), 154 N.J. 19, 32 (1998) (finding that Trantino’s prison record—including his infraction history and participation in rehabilitative programs—“plainly is material in determining whether he has achieved a level of rehabilitation such that he has been sufficiently deterred and there is no likelihood of recidivism”); Berta v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 473 N.J. Super. 284, 314-15 (App. Div. 2022) (finding that “Berta's recent infraction-free history is more probative of the likelihood of re-offense than his temporally remote infraction history” and that “a more recent pattern of sustained infraction-free conduct suggests that an inmate will be willing and able to comply with parole rules just as he or she has learned to comply with prison rules”).
[brief] *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 451 (internal quotations and citation omitted).  Specifically, sentencing courts are now required to consider what are referred to as the “*Miller* factors”: (1) the juvenile’s “chronological age and its hallmark features – among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the juvenile’s “family and home environment”; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him”; (4) “the incompetencies associated with youth – for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys”; and (4) whether the circumstances suggest “a possibility of rehabilitation. ”  *[Miller*, 567 U.S. at 477-78.]  These factors must be part of the court’s decision-making process at multiple stages of the sentencing, including when determining the length of the sentence and whether to run sentences consecutively.  *Id.* at 477.  A proper assessment of the *Miller* factors reveals that [...] epitomizes the juvenile offender envisioned by *Miller*, *Zuber*, and *Comer*, and that he is entitled to a new resentencing hearing and significant relief.
[brief] With respect to the validity of the $855,000 Flex Parking Removal/911 Memorial Capital Bond Ordinance adopted June 15, 2021 Count  One, there were genuine disputed arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable related issues of material facts regarding: (1) whether the filing of this hybrid complaint stayed the effective date of the contested capital bond ordinance\(^5\); (2) whether [...] had a void ab initio disqualifying conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety; (3) whether defendant [...] pledged that no taxpayer trust fund monies would be used to fund the 911 Memorial Capital Project\(^6\); (4) whether defendants recklessly and intentionally failed to disclose to residents the non-bond proceeds sources of funding the completed Flex Parking Removal and 911 Memorial Projects; (5) --- \(^5\)
[brief] ...  The record below is controlling[.]” (citations omitted)).  In Hirth, this Court explicitly stated that in an actions such as these challenging a redevelopment plan approval, “there ordinarily is no administrative record other than whatever report the planning board may have submitted to the governing body and a transcript of the quasi-legislative hearing before the governing body. ”  337 N.J. Super. at 165.  That is all that comprises the record here, and the Trial Court correctly relied upon and applied Hirth in holding that the trial “record was limited to the Joint Exhibits, which were the full record of the Governing Body’s decision.
[brief] \(^7\)  Earlier in the hearing, the judge misspoke by saying that he was “clearly convinced that the aggravating factors slightly outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors,” but he corrected himself after the prosecutor asked for a clarification.  (8T43-13 to 21, 46-5 to 17).  pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) and 2C:43-7.8 (9T7-16 to 8-18).  Regarding the findings of aggravating factors three, the risk that defendant will commit another offense; six, defendant’s criminal record and the seriousness of those offenses; and nine, the need to deter defendant and the public, the trial judge explained that he placed “great weight” on defendant’s criminal history.
[brief] See *Moss*, 277 N.J. Super. at 547.  [...] testified only that there was “a medium amount of traffic” on the road and that there were cars in both lanes of Route 22 heading westbound.  (1T 17-20 to 18-1).  He did not indicate whether the other vehicles on the road were behind the sedan or in front of it, nor did he describe how close to the sedan the other vehicles were.  Given that the stop occurred in the middle of the day, rather than during rush hour or the morning commute, it is possible that the only other cars in the vicinity were in front of the sedan or far behind it.  Such vehicles would not likely be affected by the sedan’s movement from the left lane to the right lane.  See Williamson, 138 N.J. at 304.  The fact that a police car was directly behind the sedan prior to the lane change also does not support a conclusion that a turn signal was required in this instance.  As in Williamson, the sedan moved away from the police car, which would appear to facilitate the police car’s movement.  138 N.J. at 304.  This case is also distinguishable from both Moss and State v. Heisler, where a police car was behind a motorist that failed to properly signal a left turn at an intersection.  277 N.J. Super. at 546; 422 N.J. Super. 399, 407 (App. Div. 2011).  That a left turn at an intersection could impact other traffic behind the turning vehicle is fairly obvious.  After all, a car turning left at an intersection will almost certainly slow down, thereby impacting any vehicle behind it.  See Moss, 277 N.J. Super. at 546 (defendant “drove his vehicle into the middle of the intersection and braked suddenly” before making an unsignaled left turn).  By contrast, a car switching lanes may not slow down at all.  On its own, then, the fact that the police car was behind the sedan before it switched lanes does not justify the traffic stop.  Tellingly, neither of the officers testified that the sedan’s lane change affected the police car in this instance.  Because police lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that the sedan violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 by failing to signal a lane change under the circumstances, the traffic stop was unlawful.  All evidence found during the course of the stop must be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure.  U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 7; Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484.
[brief] Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014)(quoting City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council, Department of Environmental Protection, 82 N.J. 530, 539, 1980).  An agency decision will not be overturned unless there is “a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence. ”
[brief] On November 1, 2022, the [...] held a hearing for an application by [...] (“Applicant”) for Lot 31.  (1T).  The application was bifurcated, and Applicant sought preliminary and final major subdivision approval.  (1T5-18 to 1T5-23).  During the hearing, Applicant presented a civil engineer and professional planner who testified that it was proper to grant subdivision at this time.  (1T10-24 to 1T11-4).  Applicant’s engineer, [...], testified that the property would be subdivided into three new lots, and that the three new lots meet all applicable zoning criteria for the creation of new lots.  (1T23-3 to 1T43-9).  Applicant’s planner, [...], testified that the applicant satisfied all variance requirements, that all lot lines comply, and that Applicant would create cross-access easements to satisfy all issues on the property.  (1T44-8 to 1T54-15).
[brief] Cf. Gaf Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 214 N.J. Super. 446, 451 (App. Div. 1986) (finding that “[o]bviously, DEP can only use the most recent data it has” and “there was no unfairness [to the discharger] in utilizing the available data”).  It is a bedrock principle of environmental law that agencies have a duty to apply the best data and science at their disposal when making decisions, and that they act arbitrarily and capriciously when they fail to do so.
[directive] This provision also addresses the issue of a defendant’s right to speak with an attorney, as well as the “confusion” defense.  See, State v. Leavitt, supra.  This component, is fulfilled, by the fourth provision, discussed, infra.  #4  “A standard statement, prepared by the [[...],] Chief Administrator shall be read by the police officer to the person under arrest. ”  This fourth provision, fulfills the statutory requirements at N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e); N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24e; N.J.S.A. 12:7-55e.  A law enforcement officer accomplishes this provision by reading the applicable Standard (Refusal) Statement to a defendant, prior to the administration of any chemical breath tests.  The Legislature has mandated that these Standard (Refusal) Statements, prepared by the [...] Chief Administrator, be “read to the defendant. ”  State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 489.  Therefore, they must be read, exactly as written.  Copies of the most recently approved Standard Statements are included in the Appendix to this Guideline.  12(...continued) custody for up to 8 hours, law enforcement personnel in those municipalities will have to consult the Municipal Attorney or Solicitor for legal advice or guidance on this matter.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] 2430  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], as the Administrator of the Estate of [...], and [...], Defendants-Respondents.  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, CHANCERY DIVISION, UNION COUNTY  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S REPLY/CROSS-RESPONDENT
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded unequivocally that the trial court had broad discretion to impose or prohibit conditions on a Rule 4:19 examination.  Pa156.  The lower court properly considered the particular facts of this case and concluded that Plaintiff could not justify his demand to record defense expert [...]’s neuropsychological evaluation, a suggestion that is anathema to the medical field of neuropsychology in general and to Defendants’ expert, [...], specifically.