ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa31-32).  The powers of a court-appointed special fiscal agent were expanded pursuant to a March 3, 2017 order to include overseeing the constructive trust and [...]’s operations, with [...] and [...] being permitted, over Plaintiff’s objection, to continue at the helm of the entity as President and COO, with the special fiscal agent directed to make periodic payments to Plaintiff from the entity towards the judgment.  (Pa34-41).  In April 2017, the court awarded Plaintiff attorneys’ fees for efforts to secure security for the judgment in light of Defendants’ misconduct.  (Da155).  That fee award was subsequently quantified at $599,653.48, and did not include other post-judgment fees other than those to “secure security. ” (Pa48).  The court denied those other fees without prejudice as it did “not agree that defendants can at this stage of the proceeding be made to pay” fees incurred “in seeking to collect on the judgment. ”  (Da156) (emphasis added).  After a week-long plenary hearing in April 2018, the trial court issued a July 3, 2018 order and decision rejecting Defendants’ story of an antecedent debt owed to a cousin as a “made up story to camouflage a desperate effort to secrete assets overseas to family members to shield those monies from” Plaintiff.
[brief] ”  DSM V at 302, 307 (setting forth examples including “getting into fights,” “drunk driving,” “driving at dangerously high speeds”).  An expert could have explained that [...]’s PTSD likely caused his angry outburst, and that psychological treatment would reduce the risk of recidivism going forward.  See Miles, S. et al., Changes in Anger and Aggression After Treatment for PTSD in Active Duty Military, 76(3)
[brief] In particular, the Court found that the defendants withdrew capital from the companies “without approval and authorization from . . . the other shareholder,” that the Plaintiffs “didn’t get to share in all the profits” of the Companies, and that the defendants received “more than their share of the profits. ”  The lower court found that these diversions of funds were “detrimental to the interest” of the Plaintiffs and that the defendants were unjustly enriched as a result.  (36T 51:1 to 52:23).
[brief] II.  SHALLAN HADDAD’S BARE-BONES CERTIFICATION DOES NOT CREATE A “CREDIBILITY” ISSUE THAT PRECLUDES A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  When reading [...]’s appeal brief, one gets the distinct impression that [...]’s principal evidentiary contribution to [...]’s lost cause was his Certification, (Pa231 – Pa234), which merely identified, confirmed the existence of, and touted the purported relevance of [...]’s threadbare discovery production.  See (Pb1 – Pb2, Pb13)  This same Certification somehow reached a remarkably precise to-the-penny so-called damages calculation without a corresponding shred of corroborative evidence.  (Pa233 – Pa234)  Counsel for [...] makes the following “whopper” of a false and misleading statement in [...]’s appeal brief; i.e., that [...] “produced a Certification from its president on the exact issues that Defendant chose not to ask about at depositions.
[brief] Accordingly, there is no way the Trial Court in this matter could now find that Plaintiffs’ new, non-legal malpractice claims in this matter against [...] arising solely from the discovery that he was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, and not arising out of his capacity as a lawyer, were previously dismissed – because, again, [...] explicitly found that all of Plaintiffs’ previous claims against [...] were legal malpractice claims.  Moreover, [...] were judicially estopped from arguing otherwise, and the Trial Court should have rejected said argument.
[brief] *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); see cases cited at [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 2:6-2 (2005).  Not any possibility of an unjust result will suffice.  The possibility must be “sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.  *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).
[brief] (Id. at 4)(emphasis added).  Plaintiffs characterize this approach as “a modern equivalent of the old-fashioned method of lawyers going to a warehouse to inspect hard copy documents and tagging documents for production with post-it notes. ” (Id.).  Lastly, plaintiffs propose “complete production (with clawback),” with defendant producing all documents containing any search terms, along with a qualifying phrase proposed by defendant, and allowing defendant to retrieve irrelevant (and presumably privileged) documents.  (Id. at 4-5).
[brief] DEFENDANT [...] WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE PRE-ACTION NOTICE  PURSUANT TO R. 1:20A-6 BY EMAIL, THE EXCLUSIVE MODE OF COMMUNICATION SHE INSISTED UPON, AND BY CERTIFIED AND REGULAR MAIL TO THE LAST KNOWN ADDRESS SHE PROVIDED JUST WEEKS EARLIER, AND THE VERY SAME ADDRESS SHE PROVIDED TO THE COURT MONTHS LATER, AND FINALLY, THE SAME ADDRESS USED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE FEE ARBITRATION COMMITTEE TO SEND THE FEE AWARD DETERMINATION TO DEFENDANT [...] (Da5, Da11, Da16)
[brief] Defendant has not done so.  He instead contends that PCR Counsel “had not completed investigation of all potential claims [and] threshold issues remained,” jeopardizing “her ethical obligation to her client. ”  Db71-72.  Defendant brings no claims of what additional investigation would have uncovered nor of what threshold issues remained after PCR counsel filed numerous motions on the eve of the PCR proceedings, each of which was decided.  Both the record and Defendant’s submissions are devoid of any facts that would have been revealed if his PCR counsel had been given an adjournment.  Although PCR counsel in the trial court made a strategic decision to avoid describing at length the issues she was considering in order to, in her estimate, protect the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, Defendant cannot logically claim at both the PCR court and now that he has business to conduct without any indication of what that business is, why it is or was necessary, or what it would have revealed.  The PCR court was right to deny the adjournment, particularly given the long procedural history of the case and the desire for a final determination of the issues.  Defendant was obligated to demonstrate prejudice on this point to entitle him to relief on the issue of this adjournment.  He has neither done so, nor made an attempt to do so, instead alleging generally that the lack of adjournment was problematic.  Such a general and bald assertion lacking the requirements for obtaining relief is insufficient for reversal and is certainly insufficient for demonstrating an abuse of discretion.
[brief] On July 21, 2018, [...] was dispatched to Appellant’s residence in response to a 911 call wherein Appellant reported a person (“[...]”) having difficulty breathing.  [Pa132].  Appellant immediately requested “the stuff to revive” [...] as soon as [...] arrived at Appellant’s residence.  [4T51:13-17].  [...] was rightfully skeptical since Appellant reported someone having trouble breathing, not an opioid overdose.  [Pa104].  However, [...] quickly realized that Appellant was referring to Naloxone (“Narcan”), which is only used to revive victims suffering from opioid overdoses.  [4T51:13-17].  Appellant flat out admits that he requested Narcan immediately upon [...]’s arrival because “I know what Narcan is, I know what it revives. ”  [4T133:1-2].  The record is absent of any evidence that would indicate Appellant believed [...] could have been overdosing on marijuana, or that marijuana caused Appellant’s overdose.
[brief] Pa26-27; State v. Boone, 479 N.J. Super. 193, 205 (App. Div. 2024); State v. Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. 286, 295 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148 (2004); State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).  For the reasons and authorities contained herein, the State respectfully requests this Court’s continued review result in the reversal of the lower court’s order of suppression.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT’S ORDER OF SUPPRESSION SHOULD BE REVERSED [Pa3-19]
[brief] THE TOWNSHIP’S DUTY TO EFFECTUATE PLAINTIFF’S IOD APPLICATION DID NOT INCLUDE SEVERANCE OF THE RETURN TO WORK PROVISIONS.  Plaintiff does not dispute that the Agreement fails to define “effectuate” but instead succinctly demonstrates the arbitrary nature of the Chancery Division’s application of the term by arguing, without supporting citation, the Agreement uses the term “without limitation and speaks to a full measure of effort to bring [his IOD Application] to a vote on the disability merits of the case. ”  See PB10-PB11.  The Chancery Division’s decision reflects it accepted this interpretation by declaring that the provisions concerning Plaintiff’s irrevocable resignation (Paragraphs 10-12, 17) and the Township’s duty to effectuate Plaintiff’s IOD application (Paragraph 6) “undoubtedly cannot coexist”.  See DA199-200.  The Appellate Division was faced with a similar settlement agreement and “turn square corners” argument in Cardinale v. Board of Trustees, 458 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 2019) and specifically rejected the argument that a petitioner was entitled to a vote on the disability merits: “the settlement reflected Cardinale’s decision to proceed with his application.  **But the settlement agreement does not represent – nor could it have – that the Board would process the application … the outcome of the application would not affect the enforceability of the settlement. ”**  *Id.* at 274 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Chancery Division should have given the term its plain and ordinary meaning, *Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc.*, 236 N.J. 301, 321 (2019), which is “to cause or bring about (something)”.  *Effectuate*, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effectuate (last visited December 15, 2023).  If the Chancery Division had afforded “effectuate” its plain and ordinary meaning, the Township would have been entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff did not allege that the Township failed to submit his IOD application or provide accurate information to the [...] and [...].  Instead, the Chancery Division both tortured the language of the Agreement, *Stiefel v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc.*, 242 N.J. Super. 643, 651 (App. Div. 1990), and impermissibly rewrote the Agreement, *Tomaiuoli v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.*, 75 N.J. Super. 192, 201 (App. Div. 1962), by arbitrarily substituting “effectuate” in a manner that neither defined nor explained.
[brief] (5T52:22-53:2).  [...] testified that she had only met [...] one other time at this bar, and on that occasion, he was accompanied by [...].  (5T53:17-23).  While in the bathroom that evening, [...] testified that [...] asked her whether she wanted a bump of cocaine.  (5T54:10).  [...] declined, but she observed [...] inhale the cocaine.  (5T54:24).  The Defense also presented the testimony of [...].
[brief] 1.  The last order and consideration below was on February 02, 2024 (Pa116),\(^1\) after which date NO further paper was filed with and NO pending matter remained at the trial court.  2.  Yet__ the Response has materially relied upon the March 05, 2024 application filed by the appellant, annexing copy thereof in its appendix (Da048-Da053),\(^2\) which was NOT a record or a paper on file below.  --- \(^1\)  The disposal of the appellant's case was on October 20, 2023 (Pa111).  \(^2\)  This application is in the appellant's Appendix-E (Pa302-Pa307).  3.  And, upon citing the said application the Response told this Court the following falsehoods, false basis of which is explained below in §II(D).
[brief] The standard of review in this case is de novo.  “[D]eterminations about the applicability of OPRA and its exemptions are legal conclusions and are therefore subject to de novo review. ”  Simmons v. Mercado, 247 N.J. 24, 38 (2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The Trial Court’s legal conclusions and interpretations of law are reviewed de novo.  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  To the extent that we are asking this Court to rule on the [...]’s failure to give [...] notice and an opportunity to be heard, that is an issue of law.  This Court owes no deference to an agency’s “determination of a strictly legal issue. ”  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec. in Div. of Consumer Affairs of Dep’t of Law & Public Safety, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973).  In addition, this Court owes no deference to findings that are not based on witness testimony or credibility findings.  Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 461 (App. Div. 2000).  POINT II
[brief] [...] asserts that [...] breached the Settlement Agreement in four ways: 1) that [...] failed to make the October 2023 rent payment; 2) that [...]’s subtenant failed to timely vacate the premises; 3) that [...] failed to leave the premises in broom-clean condition; and 4) that [...] \(^3\) [...] even states that additional items were left at the premises.  Pb28.  \(^4\) [...]’s assertion that the sub-tenant asked for additional time to remove its vehicles from the property is irrelevant to this appeal.  The focus of the Trial Court’s decision was properly on whether [...] improperly prevented [...] from access to the property, not whether the sub-tenant still had property at the site as of October 31, 2023. engaged in “dumping” contaminated asphalt millings at the property.  The first three arguments concern (alleged) events that happened subsequent to, and as a result of, [...]’s breach by way of rushed, sudden and wrongful self-help.  The last argument, regarding alleged “contamination,” has not even been proven.  Moreover, [...] can hardly be heard to complain about the incomplete condition of the parking lot or the presence of debris at the site when it was directly responsible for stopping the work and preventing further access by [...].
[brief] [...] (Board Attorney):  And as we proceed, if you want to mark anything into the record, just let us know.  [...] (Borough Planner):  Yeah, sure.  I think you have the ordinance and the ordinance also has an associated attachment which is the actual amended redevelopment plan, is that correct?  [...] (Board Attorney):  Sure.  It’s the one that we marked Ordinance Number 1667.  And [...], that’s an ordinance of the [...] adopting a second amendment to the Beachway Avenue Redevelopment, Waterfront Redevelopment Plan?
[brief] The trial court then held, based on a single Law Division opinion, that expert fees were recoverable as court costs.  (Pa0056.)  In addition, the trial court fully accepted [...]’s interest calculations, which had been submitted by [...] for the first time in its reply brief.  (Pa0056-Pa0059.)  The trial court held that interest provided by these calculations would start running in 1989.  (Pa0057.)\(^6\)  Finally, the trial court applied a 2% enhancement to New Jersey’s prejudgment interest rates, claiming that “the equities” demanded the entry of additional prejudgment interest against [...].  (Pa0058.)  The trial court reached this conclusion based on its unsupported statement that [...] had delayed this case for “17 years”.  The trial court’s statement in this regard did not consider that five years had been spent by the trial court reaching a final decision on allocation.  Further, the trial court did not cite any specific conduct on the part of [...] which delayed this matter.  Instead, the court stated without citation that “[b]ecause of the insurers’ conduct, discovery took over five (5) years. ” (Pa0058).  That statement is without any factual basis; it is flat out wrong.  [...] sought reconsideration of the Final Judgment Order by motion for reconsideration filed March 2, 2023.
[directive] Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, luring, or an attempt to commit any such offense, the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of community supervision for life?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No] [해당없음/NA]  종신 사회 내 감독의 선고를 받는다는 것은 귀하가 (2) 가석방을 받은 것처럼 적어도 년 동안 감독을 받으며, 15 상담, 인터넷에 대한 접근 또는 사용, 그리고 귀하의 거주지, 직장 또는 여행에 대한 제한을 포함하는, 대중을 CN 10080-Korean 3/8 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Korean page 3/8 보호하고 재활을 촉진하는데 적합한 조건을 지켜야 한다는 것을 의미하는 것을 아십니까?
[brief] Oakcrest property manager [...] told police she had seen [...] walking around the complex earlier in the day.  (5T44-2 to 5)  While Johnson was not precise on the time, there was footage 9 minutes post-shooting witnesses believed was [...], but defense counsel failed to present Johnson as a witness.  The PCR judge denied a hearing, stating that [...] “has not proven by clear and convincing evidence [her] testimony would have altered the outcome at Trial” and “even if [she] did see [[...]] earlier during the day on the day of the murder, that does not equate to a definitive finding that [he] did not commit the murder or was not in Atlantic City at the time of the murder.
[directive] Criminal sexual contact is a crime of the fourth degree.  See: (1)  The actor uses physical force or coercion, but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury; (2)  The victim is on probation or parole, or is detained in a hospital, prison, or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor’s legal, professional, or occupational status; (3)  The victim is at least 16, but less than 18 years old, and: (a) The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree; or (b) The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power of any nature or in any capacity over the victim; or (c) The actor is a resource family parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis within the household; (4)  The victim is at least 13, but less than 16 years old, and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  I.  The trial court improperly denied [...]’s Motion for a Directed Verdict on plaintiff’s negligent training and supervision claim.  (9T 109:12 – 130:18; 10T:4-1 – 6:23)  Date of Ruling: January 24, 2023  Oral opinion (10T 4:1 – 6:23)  Written Order entered March 1, 2023 (DLa069)  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s)  | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | ADS
[brief] Q.  Okay.  So you said, then, there appeared to have been some concern about the Ozurdex pellets not being removed from the anterior chamber; is that correct?  A.  Yes.  Q.  Why is that concerning?  A.  That's known to damage the cornea.  It's a known complication with anterior migration of the Ozurdex pellet.  Q.  What's the known complication?  A. That it could damage the cornea.  Q.  You mean the Ozurdex pellets being in an anterior chamber?  A.  Yes.  Q.  It's a known complication, which means it's well known among ophthalmologists?  A.  Yeah, and it's in the labeling.  Q.  Okay.  And also in this first paragraph here, you say that "Based on your education, training, research, and experience, you know and understand the mechanisms and issues with regard to causation as it pertains to [...]'s left eye injury."  Q.  So what do you mean by "mechanisms and issues with regard to causation"?  A.  So part of my expertise is that I understand the physiology of the conditions that she dealt with.  And so I can explain what mechanism was involved in her condition.  Q.  When you say "condition," what are you referring to specifically?  A.  She has an underlying condition of noninfectious uveitis, and she developed retinal detachment.  So those two conditions are from different pathophysiologies and different mechanisms of disease.  Uveitis is an inflammatory condition, where the retinal detachment is usually a tractional mechanical mechanism of onset.  Q.  What is your opinion as to what caused [...]'s left eye injury?
[brief] Following the conclusion of the appellant’s application and after reviewing the evidence submitted, the Board, by a vote of 7 to 0, found that the Applicant had not demonstrated an entitlement to the requested preliminary major site plan approval, the d(5) density variance and the associated bulk variance relief under either of the alternative bases for relief under subsections c (1) and c (2) of N.J.S.A.40:55D(70).
[brief] The trial court instructed the jury that in order for [...] to be vicariously liable for [...]’s actions, [...] must have been acting negligently in self-defense while defending himself from an attack by the plaintiff!  The improper instruction was as follows:  “Negligence is a matter of law charged through the principal laws [sic], but only if you find that [...] acted negligently in self-defense while in the scope of his duties or authorities.  If you so find, the defendant [...] will be deemed negligent for the wrongdoing to the same extent as the officer, employee, or agent. ”  (11T169:20-170:1).  Thus, even if the jury believed the plaintiff’s version of the events, and even if they believed that [...] was acting within the scope of his employment at the time, they could not have ruled in plaintiff's favor on respondeat superior with these instructions, which were sent into the jury room with them.  (11T186:19-21).  Therefore, this was reversible error because they could have come to a different result if they had been properly instructed.
[directive] On June 15, 2020, I issued Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-5, known as the “Major Discipline Directive,” to promote a culture of transparency and accountability in policing across the state.  Shortly afterward, implementation of the Major Discipline Directive was stayed pending a legal challenge.  On June 7, 2021, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the validity of the Major Discipline Directive, clearing the way for all law enforcement agencies in the state to begin complying with its public-disclosure requirements.  In light of that decision, today’s supplemental Directive provides (1) guidance to all law enforcement agencies about how to fully comply with the Major Discipline Directive, and (2) additional clarification regarding law enforcement agencies’ authority over the confidentiality and publication of internal disciplinary information and records.  The Major Discipline Directive serves a number of important interests.  As I explained last year, for decades New Jersey treated law enforcement agency internal disciplinary files—generally known as “internal affairs” records—as confidential.  This policy of blanket secrecy undermined public trust in law enforcement officers and public confidence in the system of police discipline that is essential to holding officers accountable for misconduct.  So to promote trust, transparency, and accountability, I concluded that the public interest would be served by periodically disclosing the identities of law enforcement officers disciplined for serious violations, as many jurisdictions across the country do.  Accordingly, the Major Discipline Directive instructed law enforcement agencies to begin to publish, at least once a year, a brief synopsis of all complaints resulting in major discipline—defined as termination, reduction in rank or grade, and/or suspension of more than five days—including the names of the officers sanctioned.  And it revised the statewide rules New Jersey Is an Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Is Recyclable Page 2 for internal affairs investigations, known as (IAPP), to reflect Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures these policy changes.