ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Any argument that the “initial point of impact” is not a materially important fact is without merit, because it will allow the Jury to place the vehicles in their locations just prior to the impact.  Their locations will allow the Jury to determine if the drivers were where they were supposed to be when the collision occurred.  Here, in the instant case, [...] placed himself in the fast lane at the point of initial impact, and [...] testified that she was hit in the slow lane when her vehicle was struck on the left-hand side of her vehicle near the driver’s door.  Pa153, Pa50:21-25, Pa51:1-3.  If the initial impact was in the left lane, as [...] marked it on the satellite image, then [...] complied with the statute and did not cross over into the slow lane where [...] was completing her turn.  Pa153.  If the initial point of impact was in the slow lane, then [...] failed to stay left during his turn and crossed over into the slow lane striking [...]’s vehicle and then the Jury could determine that [...] was also a cause of the accident.  It is the initial point of impact which will allow the Jury to determine whether [...] not only failed to keep left during his turn, but that he also failed to observe [...]’s car in the lane next to him in the right lane.  This alleged failure to make proper observations is also a decision for the Jury as it also is in dispute as Respondent denies all negligence.
[brief] This Appeal involves the [...]—one of the wealthiest, most affluent and educated communities in our State.  [...] and its public officials used to set the gold standard for the State.  Today, [...] is a “rogue” creature of State law.  This Appeal arises, in part, from the January 5, 2021 unilateral (without any prior public input) removal, abridgment and suppression of plaintiff’s constitutional, statutory and common law right to be heard on all posted agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.
[brief] Exhibit 1: Facebook Post from [...], reposting a post from [...] (date unknown); b.  Exhibit 2: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 1, 2021; c.  Exhibit 3: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 1, 2021; d.  Exhibit 4: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 1, 2021; e.  Exhibit 5: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 2, 2021; f.  Exhibit 6: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 2, 2021; g.  Exhibit 7: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 2, 2021; h.  Exhibit 8: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 3, 2021; i.  Exhibit 9: Facebook Post from [...], reposting a post from [...]; j.  Exhibit 10: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 4, 2021; k.  Exhibit 11: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 6, 2021; l.  Exhibit 12: Facebook Post from [...], dated February 10 (year unknown); m.  Exhibit 13: Facebook Post from [...], date unknown; n.  Exhibit 14: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 16, 2021; o.  Exhibit 15: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 19, 2021.
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court uphold the decisions of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., denying the Appellant’s motion to amend and dismissing the Appellant’s Complaint.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, [...], [...], and [...]  BY: s/ [...]  [...] DATE: July 3, 2024  [...] (ATTY. NO. 027561982)  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  Fax: [...]  e-mail: [...]  Attorneys for Respondent  [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], Appellant, v. PUGLIA EXCAVATING, LLC; BRIAN PUGLIA; KRISTINA PUGLIA; ESTATE OF ARTHUR PUGLIA; [...]; [...], Respondents.  Civil Action On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County
[brief] Importantly, the court supported that proposition by citing *Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group*, 77 N.J. 228 (1978), a case mentioned earlier in this brief.  But in relying on *Weathers* the court misinterpreted its holding, and also failed to take into account the impact of the post-*Weathers* revision to the statute.  First and foremost, *Weathers* expressly based its decision on statutory language that no longer existed when *Hodges* was decided:  We read the statutory language "[p]roof of mailing of notice of cancellation * * * shall be sufficient proof of notice," to mean that actual mailing of the cancellation notice suffices to establish notice.  In other words, the statutory prerequisite to a valid cancellation is the mailing to the insured of a notice of cancellation providing the insured with the minimum notice specified in N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8 ....  *Weathers*, 77 N.J. at 235.  But by 1992 the Legislature had eliminated that language.  Rather than mechanistically applying the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of language that no longer existed, the *Hodges* court should have been approaching the question as one of first impression, reaching its own decision as to how the new statutory language should be interpreted.  To this very day, no panel of this Court has yet to consider the issue through the interpretation of the language that now exists, rather than on the basis of language that once existed.  Importantly, even *Weathers* tacitly acknowledged that the key issue is the insured’s receipt of the notice.  In stating that proof of mailing would constitute proof of notice, the Legislature was effectively codifying that “the inference of non-mailing provided by evidence of non-receipt” would be overcome by the inference that one receives a notice that is effectively mailed.  An insured can never conclusively prove that he did not receive a Cancellation Notice; it would require proof of a negative.  Under *Weathers*, an insured’s mere denial of receipt would be insufficient to overcome the inference that a proper mailing is presumed to be received.  Moreover, as noted above, the statute in its original form created an **irrebuttable** presumption of receipt arising from adequate proof of mailing.  The change in the statute eliminated the irrebuttable nature of such a presumption.  Because of the defects in *Hodges*, especially its failure to consider the changes in the statute, this Court writes on a clean slate, and must now address the basic question: for a Cancellation Notice to be effective must the insurance company merely prove that it was *sent*, or must it also prove (through either direct evidence, inferences, or both) that it was *received*?
[brief] Even if the Court could consider this question, moreover, the arbitration agreement is plainly enforceable against [...] as a third-party beneficiary.  “Non-signatories of a contract may be subject to arbitration if the nonparty --- 3  This Court’s unpublished decision in Hall v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Vineland, No. A-2453-12T4, 2013 WL 3581263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 16, 2013) is not to the contrary.
[brief] ]  The revised version of R. 4:5–1(b)(2) thus “... addresses the issue of sanctions for failure to make the required disclosures.  The court is authorized to impose monetary sanctions and/or counsel fees later incurred that would have been avoidable by disclosure. ”  [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3 on R. 4:5–1 (1999).  Preclusion is, therefore, available as a sanction only in the limited circumstances where a lesser sanction is not sufficient to remedy the problem caused by an inexcusable delay in providing the required notice, thereby resulting in substantial prejudice to the non-disclosed party's ability to mount an adequate defense.
[brief] ‘(1) [ ] legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection be waived. ’  ”  United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010)).  “Because it impedes full and free discovery of the truth, the attorney-client privilege is strictly construed. ”  United States v.  Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).  The privilege “protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the privilege,” and applies “only when necessary to effectuate its limited purpose of encouraging complete disclosure by the client. ”  See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 694 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d at 1428).  The party asserting the attorney-client privilege bears the burden to establish that the privilege applies to the requested documents.
[brief] On March 26, 2018  Plaintiff, [...], filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, under Docket No. [...] (Pa1).  On July 23, 2018, Defendant, [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, which included a Counterclaim for breach of contract alleging non-payment of legal fees and seeking additional legal fees, interest, costs and disbursements.  (Pa7).  On September 14, 2023 [...] filed an Answer to the Counterclaim.  (Pa23).  After the parties exchanged discovery, trial was held between November 29, 2022 and December 6, 2022.  The jury rendered a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendant, [...] in the amount of $244,759.59.  (Pa30).  On February 7, 2023, the trial court properly entered Judgment upon the Jury Verdict in the amount of $244,759.59 and awarded contractual prejudgment interest in the amount of $182,825.33 from April 7, 2018 through December 6, 2022 (Pa28).  This appeal followed.
[brief] Geter v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53354, 2015 WL 1867041 (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2015)  .............................................................................19  Gomez v. Nations Recovery Center, Inc., et al., [...] (D.N.J.) ......................................................... passim Gomez v. Foster& Garbus, LLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 183099, 2019 WL 5418090 (D.N.J. Oct 22, 2019)
[brief] Defendant then filed a third PCR, arguing that he did not murder [...] and that he was entitled to relief under Miller.  (Pa136, 175).  In support of this PCR, defendant submitted numerous letters from friends and relatives, who stated that (1) defendant was a good person influenced by the “wrong crowd” (Pa144, 147, 148), (2) defendant did not cause the death of either victim (Pa150), (3) defendant was just in the wrong place and with the wrong people (Pa144), and (4) defendant was not thinking (Pa149).  The PCR was denied and defendant appealed.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1.  On October 28, 2022, plaintiff filed a Complaint against defendant [...].  (PA001)  2.  On November 3, 2022, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to include a declaratory judgment action against [...] due to its denial of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits.  (PA002)  3.  On December 16, 2022, the defendant, Georgie M. [...], filed an Answer.  (PA003)  4.  On January 16, 2023, the defendant, [...], filed an Answer and a Counterclaim.  (PA004)  5.  On February 1, 2023, the defendant, [...], filed a Motion to Stay all actions in personal injury protection arbitrations.  (PA005)  6.  On March 3, 2023, the personal injury claim filed by the plaintiff was stayed pending the resolution of the declaratory action for PIP benefits.  (PA006)  7.  On September 15, 2023, the plaintiff settled his claim against [...] under a Confidentiality Agreement.  (PA007)  8.  On October 12, 2023, a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice as to [...] was filed.  (PA008)  9.  Counsel for the plaintiff and defendant [...] agree that at this point the matter between them has been “unsettled”.  However, before the matter against [...] was reinstated, the defendant/respondent, Georgie M. [...], filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that plaintiff was culpably uninsured.  10.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons and authorities, [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s September 26, 2023 Order in its entirety.  COLE SCHOTZ  P.C.  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, [...] LLC  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  DATED: January 30, 2024  [...]  Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Respondent, And BLUE VIOLETS, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal  From the Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division: Hudson County  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. APPELLATE
[brief] Indeed, the constitutionality of the Special Civil Part service by mail program is based on the “reasonable expectation that the notice will be received by the party at the address. ”  *N.J. Dist. Court Assoc. v. N.J. Supreme Court*, 205 N.J. Super. 582, 589 (Super. Ct. 1985); see also *Ravenscroft Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Derroisne*, 473 N.J. Super. 278, 281-83 (Super. Ct. 2021).
[brief] Yobe v. Renaissance Elec., Inc., 32 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1015, supra.  See also Boles v. Wal-Mart, No. 12-1762, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41926, at *22 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014)(denying summary judgment because the NJLAD's "anti-retaliation provision now compels this Court to conclude that the requesting and taking of medical leave are protected activities under the NJLAD."); Guinup v. Petr-All Petroleum Corp., 786 F. Supp. 2d 501, 514 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[T]aking medical leave is a protected activity within the meaning of the ADA."); Dove v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., No. 12-4384, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170081, at *63 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2013) ("[N]umerous courts have recognized that a request for [and taking] a leave of absence for medical treatment may constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA" and thus constitutes a protected activity).  The "Sick Leave Injury Procedures Policy" General Order 19-16, cited in Plaintiff’s complaint is unlawful where it contradicts the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) as well as New Jersey Civil Service Laws (and the analogous Federal laws such as the Americans with Disabilities ACT (ADA)).
[brief] In order to be eligible ¹ [...] in his Initial Decision references his opinion being overturned by this Court on the same exact issue in Ebony Brown v. PFRS, 2019 N.J. Super Unpub. Lexis 337 (App. Div. February 11, 2019).  for an accidental disability retirement the pension member must show that [s]he is "permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of h[er] regular or assigned duties and that such disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence."  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).  The Court found that in using the term “traumatic event,” the Legislature did not mean generally to raise the bar for injured employees to qualify for accidental disability pensions.  Id. at 210-11.  Rather, the Legislature intended to “excise disabilities that result from pre-existing disease alone or in combination with work effort from the sweep of the accidental disability statutes and to continue to allow recovery for the kinds of unexpected injurious events that had long been called ‘accidents. ’”  Id. at 192.  The Court went on to note that “some of our cases failed to recognize that critical limitation in purpose and persisted in the entirely wrong notion that the term traumatic event was intended, in itself, to more significantly narrow the meaning of accident. ”  Id. at 210-211.  In Richardson, the corrections officer suffered an injury while attempting to subdue an inmate who had forcefully jerked up from the ground, knocking the officer backward and causing him to fall back onto his left hand, injuring his wrist.  Id. at 193.  The Board denied his accidental disability finding the incident was not a traumatic event.  The Court reversed stating that “a traumatic event is essentially the same as what we historically understood an accident to be an unexpected external happening that directly causes injury and is not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with work effort.
[brief] One of the fundamental reasons for these mandated strictures is a recognition that if the fruits doctrine did not apply to physical evidence derived from unwarned questioning, the courts, in [...]’s word’s, would be providing both an evidentiary advantage to the prosecutor and “an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in [Miranda]: _Miranda_ rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it.  Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial admission is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness.  That inducement to forestall involuntary statements…can only atrophy if we…recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence.  _U.S. v. Patane_, supra, at 646 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[brief] A.  The Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury On Possession Of The Knife In Self-Defense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) prohibits possessing “any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have. ”  “An instruction on self-defense is often not applicable to an alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). ”  *State v. Oguta*, 468 N.J. Super. 100, 109 (App. Div. 2021) (citing *State v. Kelly*, 118 N.J. 370, 381 (1990)).  However, a self-defense instruction is needed “when a defendant makes spontaneous use of a weapon in response to an immediate danger. ”  *Ibid.* (citing *Kelly*, 118 N.J. at 385).  Those are the exact facts present in this case: [...] testified that she spontaneously found and used a knife as [...] was violently sexually assaulting her.  Thus, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that [...]’s self-defense claim applied to the unlawful possession of the knife charge, particularly in response to the jury’s question as to whether self-defense applied to this charge.
[brief] It took numerous demands, repeated motion practice, and enormous amount of perseverance over ten months, before Plaintiffs’ simple \(^5\) The argument that Plaintiffs would have known all tenants in the mall on the date of the accident, because he had gone to the restaurant is fatuous.  People patronize at a store in a strip mall all the time without ever taking note of what other stores are present in the mall.  demand for a list of tenants, and copies of the respective leases, received a response.
[brief] The operator of a train does not owe a duty to stop a train at a crossing merely because of the “possible danger of a collision. ”  Jelinek v. Sotak, 9 N.J. 19 (1952).  Instead, the duty to attempt to stop a train prior to a crossing does not arise until after it “should become apparent that the traveler in disregard of due care or the railroad's right of way will or is attempting to cross the crossing before the train so that a collision will probably result.
[brief] See e.g., *Weitz v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 273 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 1994) (barring coverage under an excess liability policy pursuant to an injury to an insured exclusion and distinguishing such policies from primary auto policies, where such exclusions are invalid); *Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 775 A.2d 1262, 1268 (N.J. 2001) (applying an injury to an insured exclusion in a boat owners policy to deny coverage for the passenger-wife and noting that such exclusions are only invalid in the primary auto insurance context); *Light v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Group*, 2006 WL 2042303, at *4 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 24, 2006) (Da 1-4) (holding that an exclusion for injury to an insured barred coverage for a wrongful death action by the estate of a family-member passenger and noting that “[w]e recognize the gap in coverage that those terms, and the resulting exclusion create. Resident family members are likely to be frequent passengers in a policyholder’s car, and in an accident where the driver is partly or wholly at fault, an excess (or umbrella) policy such as the [...] will provide no liability coverage for such family member’s claims.
[brief] The parties waive, to the fullest extent permitted by law, any right they may have to a trial by jury in any legal proceedings directly or indirectly arising out of or relating to this Agreement, whether based in contract, tort, statute (including any federal or state statute, law, ordinance, or regulation), or any other legal theory.  It is expressly acknowledged, understood, and agreed that; arbitration is final and binding; the parties are waiving their right to seek legal remedies in court including the right to a trial by jury; pre-arbitration discovery generally is more limited than and different from that available in court proceedings; the arbitrator’s award is not required to include factual findings or legal reasoning; and any party’s right to appeal or vacate, or seek modification of the arbitration award is strictly limited by law…  [Pa0086-Pa0092].
[brief] The description of the “plan” is fully set forth in the Topology report of January 26, 2023.  (Pa0193-0314).  The stipulations of fact are accurately recited in the Trial Court’s Opinion at pages 4-6.  (Pa0077-79).  The overlay properties consist of eight properties located between North Avenue West and South Avenue West, as depicted at pages 4-5 and 55 of the Topology report (Pa0200-Pa0201, Pa0251).  The redevelopment plan calls for the addition of two stories to the existing [...], the creation of large parking garages, and the development of 310,000 square feet of office space with the hope that someone will commute to these new offices in [...].  This proposed oversized redevelopment will change the character and essential nature of [...] forever.
[brief] For example, the density of 40 dwelling units per acre permitted on [...] by the original Redevelopment Plan far exceeds the 15-20 dwelling units per acre permitted by the Borough’s Fair Share Plan for those same parcels, or the 53 dwelling units per acre permitted for the new multi-family dwelling approved by the Planning Board, which required the merger of three lots permitted only because of the amendments enacted by Ordinance No. 1423-21.  (Pa. 12 to 14; Verified Complaint ¶¶62-65.)  There was no opportunity to demonstrate these inconsistencies at the December 28, 2021, public hearing on Ordinance 1243-21 since no testimony was taken.  (Pa 278-279.)
[brief] Please remember to submit by 10/25/23 revised final offers to include a verbatim insert of the existing contract language (or designate the proposal as a new provision of the contract), the proposal itself and the rationale underlying the proposal.  As a helpful option, if you know how many contracts the benefit has been in existence, and the changes to it over that period, if any, that will help.  This work product will be accepted in lieu of testimony unless there is a factual dispute over any recitation.  (Aa037-038).  The parties agreed to submit revised final offers to the arbitrator.
[brief] Trial Transcript 4T: September 21, 2022  Trial Transcript 5T: September 22, 2022  Trial Transcript 6T: September 26, 2022  Trial Transcript 7T: September 27, 2022  Trial Transcript 8T: October 27, 2022  Motion for New Trial Transcript 9T: December 15, 2022  Sentencing Transcript 10T: September 20, 2018  Previous Trial Transcript (4T:81-17 to 82-5).