ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at 72.  Rather than merely enumerate the applicable factors, however, the court must “state on the record . . . the factual basis supporting its finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:43–2(e).  See R. 3:21-4(g).  “The finding of any factor must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014) (citing State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984)).  Next, the court must balance the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  A.  Introduction  B.  The Henderson Report C.  [...]'s Testimony Should Not Have Been Treated as an Identification, as [...] Was a Co-defendant Who Knew [...] D.  The Charge Focused on Three Factors that Social Science has Deemed Unreliable E.  The Charge Focused on Factors that Are Only Relevant to Situations in which There Has Been a Suggestive Out-of-court Identification  F.  The Charge Failed to Focus on Factors that Social Science Reveal to be Critical to a Determination of Accuracy  G.  The Charge was Not Tailored to the Facts of This Case  H.  The Errors in the Charge Require a Reversal of [...]'s Convictions
[directive] Of course, an officer who is the subject of a criminal investigation may elect to voluntarily answer questions with or without an attorney so that the facts known to him and his perspective are available to the investigators.  8.2.2  Miranda warnings generally are triggered whenever an individual’s questioning is custodial in nature.  For custodial interviews, the question is whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she is free to leave.  So a subject officer who is not free to leave a criminal interview should be provided a Miranda warning.
[brief] bid date to begin with.  See Meadowbrook, 138 N.J. at 322 (“It is an appropriate object of the questionnaire and specifications that the bid furnish assurance of the possession by the bidder at the time of submission of the bid of the physical as well as financial resources for performance of the contract[.]”); N.J.S.A. 40A:11-23(b) (“The advertisement shall designate the manner of submitting and the method of receiving the bids and the time and place at which the bids will be received.  If the published specifications provide for receipt of bids by mail, those bids which are mailed to the contracting unit shall be sealed and shall only be opened for examination at such time and place as all bids received are unsealed and announced.  At such time and place the contracting agent of the contracting unit shall publicly receive the bids, and thereupon immediately proceed to unseal them and publicly announce the contents . . .  No bids shall be received after the time designated in the advertisement. ”) (emphasis added).  For that reason alone, a discretionary refusal to waive by the County would be proper.
[brief] The trial court properly analyzed the title commitment and ruled [...] did not owe plaintiff a title insurance policy.  (43a)  As noted, plaintiff did not even raise this paragraph as an issue in its brief submitted to the trial court below.  Rather, as the trial court correctly recited, plaintiff alleged it was [...]’s responsibility, through its agent [...], to have [...] sign the deed transferring title from herself to plaintiff, and that [...] failed to do this.  39a.  Based on this alleged error, plaintiff made a claim for the full amount of the title policy it argues it should have received from [...].  39a-40a.  Nevertheless, the trial court correctly analyzed whether or not a contract (as opposed to an offer) existed between [...] and plaintiff such that [...] might owe its policy limit.  The court started with an analysis of the title commitment.
[directive] In December 2020, Attorney General Directive 2020-13 announced the first revision to the Policy”).1 statewide “Use of Force Policy” in two decades (“Revised The Revised Policy, which takes effect on December 31, 2021, substantially overhauls the responsibilities of law enforcement officers when interacting with the public.  To ensure that all police officers are appropriately trained on their new responsibilities under the Revised Policy, New Jersey’s over 38,000 state, county, and municipal law enforcement officers will attend training that covers the changes in the Revised Policy, as well as de-escalation techniques and other tactics aimed at limiting the use of force.  These trainings (collectively, the “New UOF Trainings”) will include: Eight comprehensive training modules (online); • Integrating Communication, Assessment, and Tactics (“ICAT”) course developed by the • [...]; and Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement (“ABLE”) course developed by Georgetown • University and others.  By December 31, 2021, all officers are required under Directive 2020-13 to complete the New UOF Trainings—with an adjustment to the deadline for ICAT and ABLE trainings described below—which overlap with prior training obligations.  As a result, in order to ensure efficient use Available at: https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-Directive-2020- 1 13_Use_of_Force_Procedures.pdf.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable of law enforcement resources, I have determined that it is appropriate to adjust several preexisting training requirements.
[brief] Db.1, 13-19.  [...] testified that during his discussions with the Decedent about the Will, she did not give any specific examples of any alleged dissatisfaction with her marriage.  9T267:5-14.  Likewise, the 2014 Will does not disclose any specific reason for the disinheritance.  P105a to 109a.  Decedent did not leave behind any letters, videos or other writings where she expresses any unfavorable feelings towards Petitioner.  To the contrary, all the writings that the Decedent left behind expressed her love for the Petitioner.  P374a to 467a.  The competent evidence reflected that at the time the 2014 Will was made, Decedent was happy in her marriage, spending a weekend with Petitioner at the [...] on December 15, 2014, less than two months after making the Will.  P485a to P486a.  Had the Court properly considered all the material facts presented at trial and scrutinized the evidence to determine if it was competent, it would be evident that the so called “reasons” presented by Respondent for the Petitioner’s disinheritance lack foundation, had no basis in fact and rather, were nothing more than unverifiable gossip, far reaching assumptions, and distortions that should have been disregarded.
[brief] (15T 31-15 to 32-2, 33-10 to 22)  Although the court acknowledged that this represented 46-year-old [...]’s very first felony conviction, the court nonetheless cited [...]’s prior municipal court offenses as sufficient to find aggravating factor (6).  However, contrary to the court’s finding, the absence of any prior criminal convictions fully supported mitigating factor (7) rather than aggravating factor (6).  As even the State conceded in their sentencing brief, mitigating factor (7) applied and should have been given moderate weight.  (Da 132)  The court erred in failing to find this mitigating factor and instead finding that [...]’s criminal history was an aggravating factor.  (15T 33-10 to 22)  In addition to improperly placing a high reliance on [...]’s prior municipal court offenses, the court engaged in impermissible double counting by relying on the agreement “to engage in assaultive conduct. ”  (15T 31-15 to 32-2)  The existence of that agreement is the exact basis for [...]’s conspiracy conviction — the jury found that he entered into an agreement to commit a third-degree aggravated assault.  As such, it was improper double counting for the court to rely on this “assaultive conduct” as a basis to find that this offense was worse than others of its kind.  See State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000) (reaffirming that “facts that established elements of a crime for which a defendant is being sentenced should not be considered as aggravating circumstances” because “the Legislature had already considered the elements of an offense in the gradation of a crime,” and to do so would mean that “every offense arguably would implicate aggravating factors merely by its commission, thereby eroding the basis for the gradation of offenses and the distinction between elements and aggravating circumstances”).  The court erred in finding aggravating factor (6) instead of mitigating factor (7).
[directive] If the sum of all aggravating and mitigating factors results in a positive point total of 3 or more, the prosecutor is required to tender a plea offer above the presumptive term determined pursuant to step #4.  If the positive point total is 7 or more, the prosecutor must tender a plea offer fixed at the upper range of the appropriate cell.  If the sum of all aggravating and mitigating factors results in a negative point total of 3 or more, the prosecutor is required to extend a plea offer below the presumptive term.  If the negative point total is 7 or more, the prosecutor must tender a plea offer at the bottom of the range in the appropriate cell.
[brief] BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH ANY STATUTE AND BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE PERMITTED [...] TO HAVE THE POWER TO REGULATE THE POLES  The essence of preemption of ordinances by Legislative act was identified in *Feldman v. Lederle Labs.*, 125 N.J. 117, 135 (1991), *i.e.*, “when ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility’ . . . or when state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ .
[brief] Then again, at trial, the trial court should have granted the City’s motion for a directed verdict after Plaintiff failed to show actual or constructive notice.  See Perez v. Professionally Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388, 407 (2013) (stating that a directed verdict is appropriate when “no rational jury could conclude from the evidence that an essential element of the plaintiff's case is present”) (internal citation and quotation omitted).  Accordingly, it is clear that this case should never have been submitted to the jury.  The trial court denied the City’s motions despite the fact that Plaintiff presented no evidence of notice, which is required to impose liability on a public entity under the TCA.  Thus, the denial of the City’s motions resulted in a decision that is essentially on the basis of strict liability, which N.J.S.A. 59:9-2 specifically prohibits.  That is, even without actual or constructive notice, the City was liable because the sign was missing.  This is the exact opposite result intended by the Legislature in passing the Tort Claims Act and requires reversal.
[brief] Downtown Residents, 242 N.J. Super. at 332.  A municipal governing body enacting legislation is presumed to act on the basis of adequate factual support, and the presumption is overcome only by a showing that the record could not rationally support a conclusion that the enactment is in the public interest.  Id.at 338-39.  The legislative record and the substance of [...] contain more than adequate support for the enactment’s adoption.  Section 3.1.1 of [...] sets forth the Committee’s “reasons,” which are derived from studies, reports and findings that were made part of the legislative record.  See, e.g., Pa196-235; see also https://www.chesterfieldtwpnj.gov/oycc-redevelopment; see also https://www.chesterfieldtwpnj.gov/oyccdocuments.]  The legislative record is more than sufficient to establish an adequate factual foundation for the Committee’s action in adopting the Redevelopment Plan under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.d.  Powerhouse Arts, 413 N.J. Super. at 331-333.
[brief] On December 20, 2020, Plaintiff, [...], filed a personal injury action stemming from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on January 4, 2019.  (Pa1-Pa14).  The lawsuit was filed against defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], as well as fictitious defendants.  (Pa1-Pa14).  Defendants subsequently answered the complaint.  (Pa15-Pa69).  After a settlement was reached between the plaintiff and defendant, [...], as described below, defendant [...] filed a motion to enforce settlement on November 29, 2023, when plaintiff did not return the settlement documents.  (Da1\(^1\)-Da15).  After the motion was opposed, the trial \(^1\) Da = Defendant/respondent’s appendix. court conducted a plenary hearing on the question of whether plaintiff had agreed to a settlement with defendant [...], on January 4, 2024.  (1T:5-56).  The trial court granted defendant [...]’s motion at the conclusion of the plenary hearing.  (1T:43-55; Da16).  **COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] ”  *Romero, supra, citing* Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 270 (1978).  The statute is intended to “be applied broadly in order to accomplish its remedial purpose. ”  Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am, 150 N.J. 255, 264 (1997).
[brief] See T14-22.  It is undeniable that Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to print and mail a debt collection letter does not demonstrate any “abusive” conduct which Congress was interested in preventing.  T22:18-22.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) & (e) (summarizing Congressional findings of “abusive practices” and the “purposes” of the FDCPA).  “Where the ordinary language in a statute demonstrates the Legislature’s clear intent, the court’s duty is to apply that plain meaning. ”  Presbyterian Home at Pennington, Inc. v. Borough of Pennington, 409 N.J. Super. 166, 180 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009) (citing Jablonowska v. Suther, 195 N.J. 91, 105 (2008)).  Thus, under typical circumstances, the Court should “first look to the plain language of the statute in question[,] . . . [and] give those words their ordinary meaning and significance. ”  Matter of C.P.M., Here the “plain” or ordinary meaning and significance of the term “abusive” is to describe conduct “characterized by wrong or improper use or action. ”  Merriam-Webster Dictionary (10th ed. 1993).  Thus, the Superior Court correctly held that the use of letter vendors is simply not the type of “abusive” debt collection practice which Congress sought to curb in passing the FDCPA.
[brief] But [...] never attempted to comply with the requirements for a derivative action.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 42:2C-68 (requiring demand on the LLC to take action, or proof that such a demand would be futile).  His challenge, even if properly placed into a pleading rather than a collateral attack via the valuation, would have been denied for failing to comply with this statute alone.  Critically, this is an issue that [...] already raised and lost in the arbitration.  (Pa349-352)  During Phase II, [...] attempted to plead counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty regarding the Company’s assumption of this very debt, and then did so again in the SDNY Action; both forums dismissed his pleading.  (Da3123-3149)  The trial court properly declined to allow [...] to disguise an already-twice-lost argument as part of the valuation hearing to get a third bite at the apple.  Moreover, the trial court’s alternate ruling was also correct, i.e. that the business judgment rule protected the manager’s decision to assume the debt.  Either argument leads to the same result: disregard [...]’s exclusion of the long-term liabilities in favor of an analysis of the Company’s value that included those liabilities on the books, as did the other two experts, [...] and [...].  Of course, once again, [...] (and [...]) concocted this argument to artificially increase [...]’s buyout amount, with no real basis in law.  Accordingly, the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s decision allowing the Company to assume long-term liabilities should be affirmed.
[brief] On December 29, 2021, the Legislature posted notice of its upcoming meetings, indicating, among other things, that it would meet on January 6 and January 10, 2022, with committee meetings taking place in both houses on January 6 and voting sessions on January 10.  (Ra1-2).  In a subsequent calendar prepared on January 4, 2022, the Legislative Calendar provided a detailed list of the items, then known, to be considered by the various committees on January 6, and scheduled for votes on January 10.  (Pa112).  The Legislative Calendar posted on January 7, 2022, listed voting sessions to take place in both houses of the Legislature on January 10.  (Ra3-7).  The Calendar for the Senate Session indicated that the body would vote on S49, and the Calendar for the Assembly likewise indicated that a vote on A6260 would take place on January 10, 2022.  (Ra4; Ra6).  Through these Calendar publications and updates, the Legislature complied with OPMA during its consideration and passage of the bills enacted into law as Chapter 375\(^{13}\).
[brief] (Pa000084-85).  Plaintiffs also tried to argue that their trespass claim should be allowed to stand because, according to testimony from [...]’s representative (the remediation contractor), he believed the Property to be part of the redevelopment project because he was provided a copy of [...]’s preliminary site plan by [...].  (Pa000199).  This misplaced reliance argument was not persuasive to the court. \(^7\)  Further, had Plaintiffs and their counsel complied with the Affidavit of \(^7\)  As the trial court noted in its decision denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, “[j]ust because [[...]] relied upon that site plan and wrongly assumed that this project was – or that [Plaintiffs’] property was involved in a project, that’s got nothing to do with [...].
[brief] POINT II  THE LAW DIVISION’S DECISION THAT THE ENABLING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS APPLY TO: THE NON-MEDICAL CORPORATIONS; A LAY PERSON; AN ATTORNEY; AND TO AN INSURER’S AFFIRMATIVE IFPA CLAIMS CONSTITUTES “RULE-MAKING” AND VIOLATES THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT.  It is a fundamental tenet of New Jersey law that Courts may not usurp policy decisions from other branches of government.  See Texter v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 88 N.J. 376, 382, 443 A.2d 178, 181 (1982).  Indeed, as recently as May 2024, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reaffirmed this principle.  In Goyco v. Progressive Insurance Company, 257 N.J. 313 (2024), the Supreme Court refused to expand the definition of the term “pedestrian” in the No-Fault Act to include low speed electric scooters because to do so would be a policy decision with insurance cost implications that is properly for the Legislature, not the Court.  Similarly, in this case, expanding: (1) the definition of the term “PIP dispute” to include violations of the IFPA, or (2) N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 et seq. to include non-medical provider corporations, lay people and attorneys who are not the insured/injured party and/or medical provider, would be a policy decision with insurance cost implications that is properly for the Legislature and/or [...], not the Court.
[brief] Defendant relies on the New Jersey Court Rules governing civil trials in support of her motion that her request for a postponement should have been granted.  While a defendant has a right to be present at a trial de novo, his or her appearance may be waived.  State v. Taimanglo, 403 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006).  As stated in Taimanglo, the matter is heard on the record created below and defendant did not move to supplement the record at the trial court level.  This argument is unsupported by any credible evidence and does not vitiate or undermine the established record that supported her conviction.  Similarly, defendant’s argument that the court violated defendant’s right to discovery is unsupported by any credible evidence.  Defendant argues that the State or the court ignored defendant’s subpoena of the State’s witness.  However, [...] appeared in court and testified.  “[A]lthough defendant’s are entitled to broad discovery under Rule 3:13-3, they are not entitled to turn the discovery process into a fishing expedition. ”  State v. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228, Defendant was provided all information relevant to her defense.  Defendant argues that the subpoena would provide evidential support that [...] lied.  There is nothing on the record to support this baseless accusation.  Defendant did not make any preliminary showing that the documents would have supported her accusations.  See, e.g., State v. Kane, 449 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2017) (holding that a defendant could not compel the State to produce a victim’s mental health records when they were not in the custody of the State).  Defendant’s arguments are without support and not founded in the record.  They must be disregarded by this Honorable Court.
[brief] Township of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J.Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965), certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80(1966); In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 576-77 (1990).  A finding of misconduct by a police official need not be predicated on the violation of any particular department rule or regulation.  In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960).
[brief] However, the case law is clear that when a Defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea solely on the basis of an insufficient factual basis, as is the case in the within matter, no such Slater analysis is necessary.  *State v. Tate*, 220 N.J. 393 (2015).  Accordingly, the Law Division’s rationale in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea on de novo review is compromised, and Defendant’s matter should be remanded, at the least, for another hearing wherein the application could be considered without the Slater analysis relied upon by the Law Division.
[brief] B.  The Consent of a Third Party Was Obtained Lawfully, So the Gun Was Seized Lawfully.  Voluntary consent is a valid basis to sustain a warrantless search against a motion to suppress.  *United States v. Matlock*, 415 U.S. 164, 169-71 (1974); *State v. Miranda*, 253 N.J. 461, 475-76 (2023).  A person other than defendant may consent to the search under appropriate circumstances.  *Matlock*, 415 U.S. at 169-71 (noting that in such circumstances defendant “assume[s] the risk” the third party will permit the search); *Miranda*, 253 N.J. at 476; *State v. Crumb*, 307 N.J. Super. 204, 242 (App. Div. 1997) (“Consent may be obtained from a third party so long as the consenting party has the authority to bind the other party. ”), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215 (1998).  Like any exception to the warrant requirement, the State need prove consent only by a preponderance of the evidence.  *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007).
[brief] In this case, Plaintiff alleges that the Court relied on the misapprehension that even if the Defendants had called for surgery “...minutes earlier, no attending obstetrician was available to perform it. ”  What the Plaintiff neglects to acknowledge is that there is no expert testimony that the Defendant [...], deviated from the accepted standard of care of a resident obstetrician or that [...] would have definitively performed the surgery earlier than he did.  Plaintiff argues that if [...] had called for the c-section at 9:48, the outcome would have been different.  Plaintiff’s Brief repetitively states that if [...] or [...] had called for a c-section at 9:48, [...] would have been available to do the surgery earlier.  (See Pl. Brief, p. 3,6,7,13, and 14).  This was impossible given the protocol in place for obstetrician residents.
[brief] The calculations conformed to the mathematical formula of the minimum loss ratio set forth in the rules, based on the new actuarial assumptions and methodology it adopted.  (T3 599:12 to 600:25).  Compliance with those calculations did not require the Department to automatically approve the extreme premium rate increases requested, however, especially given that [...]’s slate of new assumptions lacked proven credibility under ASOP 25.  (T3 713:1 to 20).  Blindly approving [...]’s request would have been completely out of line with past practices by the Department.  appellant in that case challenged a decision by the DEP about compliance with the discharge of pollutants.