ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Cases Appellant Cites Undermine New Jersey’s Strong Interest in Deciding How the NJCFLA Will Be Enforced**  In response to the trial court’s protection of the New Jersey statutory framework, Appellant cites federal district court cases from New Jersey holding that a violation of the NJCFLA can support an FDCPA claim.  (Pb30-Pb32)  Respondents acknowledge that certain cases do hold as much, but the following reasons demonstrate why those cases do not apply here.  *First,* the federal cases do not address the relationship between the federal FDCPA claim and the lack of a private right of action under the NJCFLA that formed the basis of the trial court’s decision.  *Veras, supra,* for example, discusses those issues in parallel, holding on the one hand that a violation of the NJCFLA can support an FDCPA violation, and holding on the other hand that the NJCFLA does not support a direct claim under that statute, but not addressing whether allowing such an FDCPA claim undermines the State of New Jersey’s legislative choice to make enforcement of the NJCFLA a matter for the state [...] alone.  *See Veras,* 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9-20.  The import of the trial court’s decision is that allowing such an FDCPA claim would undermine the State of New Jersey’s choice as to how the NJCFLA should be enforced, *i.e.*, through the [...], not through private litigants.  Respectfully, the federal cases holding in favor of an FDCPA claim emphasize the federal prerogative in enforcing the FDCPA, but fail to balance that interest appropriately against the New Jersey legislative and enforcement prerogatives for the NJCFLA.  This Court should resolve that balance by protecting the state law framework, as the trial court did.
[brief] [...], Esq. 00840-2012  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Cases and Other Authorities .........................................................  ii  Appendix Table of Contents ........................................................................ iii  Preliminary Statement ..............................................................................  1 Procedural Posture ....................................................................................  2 Statement of Facts .....................................................................................  2 Legal Argument ..........................................................................................  2  Point I ...........................................................................................................  2  THE COURT'S CLARIFICATION OF THE SENTENCING REQUIREMENTS  PURSUANT TO STATE V. YARBOUGH IN STATE V. TORRES APPLIES TO DEFENDANT'S CASE.  Point II ........................................................................................................  3  THE INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE YARBOUGH FACTORS RESULTS IN AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.  Point III .......................................................................................................  5  JUDGE LESTER INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE YARBOUGH FACTOR REQUIREMENTS WHEN SENTENCING MR. MANSO.  Point IV .......................................................................................................  7  JUDGE LESTER FAILED TO PROVIDE A STATEMENT AS TO THE OVERALL FAIRNESS OF MR. MANSO'S SENTENCE AS REQUIRED BY LAW.  Conclusion  ..................................................................................................  9  | Case Name | Citation | Page | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------| | Bunkley v. Florida | 538 U.S. 835 (2003) | 3 | | Fiore v. White | 531 U.S. 225 (2001) | 2 | | State v. Jackson | Doc. No. A-1687-20 (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2022) | 3 | | State v. Tavares | 286 N.J. Super. 610 (App. Div. 1996) | 4 | | State v. Torres | 246 N.J. 246 (2021) | 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 | | State v. Yarbough | 100 N.J. 627 (1985) | 5 | | State v. Zuber | 227 N.J. 422 (2017) | 4 | | United States v. Tucker | 404 U.S. 443 (1972) | 4 | APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] *State v. Kelly*, 97 *N.J.* 178, 223 (1984).  An expert’s opinion must be based on facts and data established by evidence; an expert opinion lacking factual foundation is utterly worthless.  *Castroll v. Franklin Tp.*, 161 *N.J. Super.* 190 (App. Div. 1978), see also, *N.J.R.E.* 703.  The net opinion rule bars expert opinions based on mere speculation or possibilities.  *Grzanka v. Pfiefer*, 301 *N.J. Super.* 563, 580 (App. Div. 1990).  Expert opinions, in order to be admissible, must be based “primarily on the facts, data or other expert opinion established by evidence at the trial. ”  *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 524-25 (1981).  “Conjecture and speculation cannot be used as basis for damages. ”  Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, P.C. v. Ezecwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 2001).  “An expert must ‘give the why and wherefore’ of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. ”  Buckelew, supra at 524.  An expert may not provide mere net opinion.  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011).  An opinion is an inadmissible net opinion if the witness cannot offer objective support for it, but instead offers an opinion about a standard that is personal.  Id.  The net opinion rule renders inadmissible any opinions that are unsupported by factual evidence.  Buckelew, supra at 524; Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 360 (2005).  An expert’s opinion must be based upon a proper factual foundation; it cannot be based upon mere unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities.  Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assoc., 289 N.J. Super. 309, 323 (App. Div. 1996).
[brief] The Appellate Division has made clear that, notwithstanding the Dog Bite Statute (which does not require scienter), there remains a common law strict liability cause of action for injuries stemming from an animal attack where the owner knew the animal had vicious propensity, no matter what duty the owner owed to the plaintiff or care the owner took to prevent harm.  See Jannuzzelli v. Wilkens, 158 N.J. Super. 36, 41 (App. Div 1978); see also Goldhagen v. Pasmowitz, 246 N.J. 580, 602 (noting that the facts in Jannazzelli “provide[] an example of a setting in which a plaintiff could not prove a claim under the Dog Bite Statute, but could assert a common-law claim for absolute liability… .); see also Conrad v. Catapano, A-4567-11T2 (“[A] common law cause of action for absolute liability remains [against the owner of an animal that injured another person] if viciousness and scienter can be established.
[brief] 8.  On October 29, 2019, one month after approving the GSA and issuing the Final Judgment, [...] entered an order ending the [...] litigation.  Among other things, Deer Valley had challenged the Township’s finding that the property-in-question should be considered an area in need of redevelopment.  [...] ruled “that (a) the determination of the Township Committee of the [...] to declare the [...] and the [...] as areas in need of redevelopment are supported by substantial evidence, are based upon a proper interpretation of the Local Housing and Redevelopment Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq. and are affirmed[.]”¹ Da385-Da397.
[brief] In the subject wrongful death/survivorship lawsuit, Plaintiff has asserted claims against Defendant [...] arising from the fact that the distant parking area where [...] required [...] to park was devoid of any pedestrian crossing markings, signage, walkways, fencing, cones, pavement markings, cautionary signage, speed signage, attendants, flaggers, traffic controllers, security, and/or any other pedestrian safety measures, thereby creating a substantial certainty that an employee such as [...] would be injured.
[brief] | The Roma Complaint: | The Gannon Complaint | |---------------------|----------------------| | Para. 12 – “On each credit and debit card transaction accepted at the POS, Class members are charged a fee by Defendant for processing the transaction.  This fee includes what is known as an ‘interchange’ fee plus additional costs and fees added by the Defendant.  Da4.  | Para. 18 – “[...] uses various pricing programs to bill its Merchant Customers, including an ‘Interchange PLUS’ pricing program, where the term ‘interchange’ is a term of art in the credit processing industry, referring to the ‘interchange rates’ published by the major credit card brands such as VISA. ”  Pa000022.  | | Para. 17 – “Per the Merchant Application, the parties agreed that Plaintiff would pay the interchange fee, plus 25 basis points, plus 10 cents on each transaction. ”  Da5.  | Para. 22 – “Many of [...]’s Merchant Customer opt for the ‘Interchange PLUS’ pricing model, because that option appears to tie the price for [...]’s services to the published and widely available ‘interchange rates’ established by the credit card issuers, and to the ‘discount fees’ quoted in their Merchant Customer Application forms with [...]. ”  Pa000023.  | | Para. 18 – “Instead of applying the agreed upon terms included in the Merchant Application, Defendant routinely charged Plaintiff as high as 98 basis points on some transactions. ”  Da5.  | Para. 23 – “In fact, however, for approximately the last ten years, Defendant [...] has effectively ignored the rates agreed to in the Merchant Customer Application forms, and instead has billed its Merchant Customers at steadily increasing rates far above the ‘interchange rates’ charged by the credit card issuers. ”  Pa000024.  |
[brief] He must make his motion within a reasonable time”); *Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment Productions, Inc.*, 329 N.J. Super. 285, 293-94 (App. Div. 2000) (holding where defendant had notice of judgment, equitable considerations precluded relief from a void judgment because defendant did not act within a reasonable time).  In *Garza*, a case that closely parallels the current action, the Court held where the motion to vacate on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction was made four years after entry of the judgment, and where the motion to vacate was only made because he needed to restore his motor vehicle license that was suspended because of his failure to satisfy the judgment, the motion was untimely and denied.  44 N.J. Super. at 557-559.  Specifically, the Court held: “[w]e are satisfied that defendant has deliberately waited for years to apply for relief against a long-known void judgment simply because it was not convenient for him to do so earlier, and that only the pinch of the need for a driving license has at last brought him to court.  These are not circumstances of the kind which the rule of court envisages as an equitable basis for relief ‘within a reasonable time.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...] MONMOUTH COUNTY  PROSECUTOR  /s/  [...]  By: [...], 003621987  Of Counsel and On the Brief email: [...]  [...], 041202006  Assistant Prosecutor Director  Appellate Section  On the Brief email: [...]  MD/LSG/mc Date: October 13, 2023 c  [...], Esq.  EMEKA NKWUO, ESQUIRE  Attorney ID # [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorney for Defendant [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent v. [...], Defendant-Appellant
[brief] The indictment of [...] by the New Jersey Attorney General, to whom [...] reports, presents a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the defendants in this matter, including the [...].  The Outside Counsel Guidelines, effective November 1, 2022, addresses this situation by prohibiting “positional conflicts” arising from counsel’s “advocacy of positions that conflict with important State interests. ” (See Outside Counsel Guidelines effective November 1, 2022, Pa129).  There can be no question that the firm of [...] has a positional conflict as a result of the indictment of [...] by the New Jersey Attorney General.  Further, the Outside Counsel Guidelines note “The State’s Conflicts Requirements Go Beyond Those the RPCs Mandate. ” (Pa128).  The Outside Counsel Guidelines note, “The Division of Law has a duty to protect the public interest.  As part of this responsibility, the Division sets policies to ensure the legal system operates in a manner that safeguards the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration. ” (Pa127).  Certainly, having a firm that is mentioned throughout the [...] Indictment as part a participant in the criminal enterprise does not “safeguard[ ] the public’s confidence” or “protect the public interest. ”  The motion judge stated, “[t]he record before me does not cast any doubt on the defendants’ position that [...] and [...] will be able to, and have been, zealous advocates for their clients. ” (T7:20-23).  Putting aside the fact that this statement is not supported in the record, the fact that two attorneys in the firm may be “zealous advocates” is irrelevant.  Brown and Connery, LLP has a conflict and must be disqualified.
[brief] BECAUSE [...]’ CONFESSION WAS INVOLUNTARY, BOTH THE CONFESSION AND THE DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.  (2T 14-15 to 17; Da)  Because there was no reasonable suspicion to prolong the search, the officer’s threat that he would prolong the search unless Edwards waived his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights was coercive and rendered Edwards’ confession involuntary.  U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, paras. 7; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19.  Thus, suppression of the statements and derivative evidence is required.
[brief] The trial court erroneously admitted [...]’s 2011 conviction due to its mistaken belief that the triggering date for Rule 609(b)(1)’s remoteness determination was not the date that [...] was convicted of the offense, but the date that he completed his probationary sentence.  The court further erred in finding the 2007 conviction admissible by misapplying the Rule’s ten-year \(^5\)  The trial court incorrectly used the date of the incident instead of the date that the instant trial began for the purpose of calculating the age of [...]’s 2011 conviction.  See N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1) (stating “If, on the date the trial begins, more than ten years have passed since the witness's conviction for a crime or release from confinement for it, whichever is later,” then evidence of the conviction is only admissible if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect).  Despite defense counsel’s correction, the trial court found that the 2011 conviction was eleven years old.  In fact, the 2011 conviction was twelve years old at the time that the trial began.  (6T:131-1 to 11) window to the period of time that elapsed between [...]’s prior convictions, as well as between his prior convictions and violations of probation.  Impeachment of any witness with a prior conviction is governed by Rule 609.
[brief] As previously noted by this Court, “Courts should not countenance a plaintiff’s dilatory action in belatedly seeking to add wholly new claims after the closing of discovery and after the filing of a dispositive motion for summary judgment.  To hold otherwise would open the floodgates to never-ending litigation whenever a plaintiff perceives that his or her originally asserted claims may be dismissed after motion practice. ”  Capps v. Rowan Univ., 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2753, *15 (App. Div. Nov. 12, 2021).  This within principle applies equally here, where Appellants delayed pursuing another party until after their claims against their primary target were dismissed on the merits.  Furthermore, while Appellants baldly asserted below that these claims were only learned in discovery, though they were clearly known earlier, discovery ended six (6) months before the attempt to amend.  Had the facts only really been learned 5 FEDa 165. during discovery, then they should have been asserted at least when Appellants moved to file the First Amended Complaint in June 2021, which, again was after discovery had concluded.  In other words, even if Appellants only learned of the claims in discovery, then they were able to raise, and should have raised, them in the First Amended Complaint which was filed after discovery concluded.  However, the claims were not asserted and Appellants offered no justification as to why they were not asserted.  It is clear that this is a desperate effort to stave off dismissal of this utterly meritless lawsuit.  Indeed, despite having knowledge years earlier of the facts that formed the predicates of the claims they sought to add by way of the Second Amended Complaint, the Appellants offered no justification to the trial court as to why these claims were not asserted earlier.  Thus, the trial court correctly denied Appellants’ motion for leave to amend the First Amended Complaint.  In short, the trial court properly exercised its discretion, based upon the circumstances before it, in denying Appellants’ belated motion for leave to file the proposed Second Amended Complaint.
[brief] DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff- Appellant, v. [...], [...], former ABSECON CHIEF OF POLICE  [...], ABSECON MAYOR  [...], ABSECON OFFICER  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], VICINAGE I OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, THE NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDGES [...], A.S.J.C, AND [...], J.A.D., ACTING AOC ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR, [...] AND J. DOES #1 TO #100, Fictitious Persons or Entities Whose Real Names are Unknown At This Time, jointly, severally and in the alternative, Defendants- Appellee.  ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL CIVIL JUDGMENT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY (Civil. No. [...])
[directive] DRUG TESTING  MEDICATION INFORMATION  As part of the drug testing process, it is essential that you inform us of all medications you have taken in the last fourteen (14) days.  Please carefully complete the information below.  Check all that apply:  ____  A.  During the past 14 days I have taken the following medication prescribed by a physician:  Name of Medication Prescribing Physician Date Last Taken 1 2 3 ____ B.  During the past 14 days, I have taken the following non-prescription medications (cough medicine, cold tablets, aspirin, diet medication, nutritional supplements, etc.)  Name of Medication Date Last Taken 1 2 3 ____ C.  During the past 14 days, I have taken NO prescription or non-prescription medications.  _____________________________________  __________________  Donor ID and Initials Date 21  ATTACHMENT E
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF SHEA’S APPLICATION MADE OVER ONE YEAR AND SIX MONTHS PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  The Board’s decision denying [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form under the Ricci Act should be upheld because it was reasonable, supported by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, and thus not arbitrary nor capricious.  “On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have but a limited role to perform. ”  Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court may give “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there .
[brief] Plaintiffs continue to refuse to disclose to this Court that on April 7, 2017 [...] interviewed an owner of defendant, [...] d/b/a [...] (improperly pled as [...]) (hereinafter “[...]”), [...] obtained photographs of the premises and Google Earth imagery of the premises.  [...] obtained copies of police reports generated by the [...], regarding accidents at the premises prior to March 16, 2017.  [...] issued a report, dated July 1, 2017, concerning his investigation of the alleged accident and discovery he had obtained as part of that investigation.  Plaintiffs continue to refuse to disclose to this Court, and previously to the Trial Court, that on January 29, 2019 [...] continued his investigation, on plaintiffs’ behalf, to identify the party or parties allegedly responsible for causing [...]’s alleged injuries and [...] interviewed defendant, [...]’s owner, [...], and obtained a written statement from him.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## U.S. SUPREME COURT  **Brown v. Illinois**, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) ..................................................  4  ## N.J. SUPREME COURT  **State v. Elders**, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) ......................................................  3  **J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd.**, 247 N.J. 120 (2021) ........................................  2  **State v. Johnson**, 118 N.J. 639 (1990) .....................................................  5  **State v. Jones**, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) .......................................................  2  **State v. Lawless**, 214 N.J. 594 (2013) ....................................................  2  **Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.**, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) .........................  2  **State v. Robinson**, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009) ...........................................  2  **State v. Smith**, 251 N.J. 244 (2022) ......................................................  3  **State v. Stovall**, 170 N.J. 346 (2002) .....................................................  3  **State v. Sutherland**, 231 N.J. 429 (2018) ...............................................  3  ## N.J. APPELLATE DIVISION  **State v. Pitcher**, 379 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 2005) .............................  3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The trial court’s decision denying the motion to suppress the motor vehicle stop of the Defendant must be reversed as the stop was unsupported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity, thus, all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal motor vehicle stop, specifically the Defendant’s identity as well as his status as a suspended driver, must be suppressed.
[brief] Da005 Exh A (Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated March 4, 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da021 Exh B (Amendment Number 1 to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated April 24, 2015).  . . . . . . .  Da037 Exh C (Second Amendment to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated May 2, 2018)  . . . . . . . .  Da040 Exh D (Agreement of Sale between Defendants and [...] ([...]) dated October 14, 2022)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da049 Exh E (Email of [...] to [...] dated February 8, 2023).
[brief] Particularly, Plaintiff denied having knowledge regarding the prior report of Plaintiff’s mask policy violation and felt it should not have been mentioned during the November 20, 2020 meeting.  228a, ¶ 110.  Again, other than a letter documenting the November 16, 2020 incident, Plaintiff did not sustain any repercussions or disciplinary action as a result of Plaintiff’s violation of the District Mask Policy.  B.