ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id, at 14. (Pa335).  The notices in both Meredith and Gentless clearly conveyed the “essence and scope” of the proposed regulations.  Those notices very obviously differed from the notice published by the Township in this case.  Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the notice published by the Township gave no hint whatsoever of its essential purpose, which was to establish overlay zoning permitting warehouse buildings 50 times larger than those permitted by the underlying zoning and at almost double the permitted height.
[brief] 1.  Even if the Planning Board had only considered the Objectives of the Master Plan and not the Land Use Element, it should have found that by reducing the number of market units from 280 to 230 while keeping the COAH units at 70, the Second Ordinance was actually going counter to one of six (6) objectives of the Master Plan (Objective 3 - providing affordable housing) by decreasing the likelihood that affordable housing units would ever be built.  The Planning Board and the governing body never considered this issue.  2.  Providing an 11-acre park on Plaintiff’s property when no park was shown on the Land Use Element of the Master Plan made the Second Ordinance inconsistent with the Master Plan and was *ad hoc* planning -- just what the Master Plan is intended to avoid.
[brief] [...] has no designated expert report to support these claims.  19.  The Court also held that “other claims” by [...] required expert testimony, explaining:  The other claims: loss of a rental opportunity, having to regrade, costs incurred as a result.  Now, again, you know, you think of medical records, right?  What does everybody know you are going to do on a personal injury case, if you want to get those medical bills, right?  You really should get a doctor to look at the bills …  So, but again, to get those legal bills, were they all related to the elevation issue or were they related to [...] as a developer pushing the envelope in other areas?  [1T 59-9, 23]  And, succinctly: [Y]ou need expert testimony on that.  There is no question about it.  Too many variables.  [1T, 60-7, 9]  The Opinion and Order of December 7, 2022 20.  By Opinion and Order entered December 7, 2022, the Court dismissed the remaining claims against defendants.  Pa3. 21.  In sum, the Court held that plaintiffs failed to offer admissible expert opinion that the alleged grading error caused damages, or that the [...] could have been developed for multi-occupant use.  Pa11 to 12.  Edward [...] was never identified as an expert witness, did not provide a report or curriculum, and could not testify as a lay witness as to these required elements of expert proof.  Pa 11 to 12.  **Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration**
[brief] 68a-112a.  Just like the then-pending Second Amended Complaint in the 2015 Action, the Complaint and Amended Complaint in the 2020 Action asserted claims against [...], [...] and a Menas family company, [...], for alleged fraud, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and RICO violations arising from their roles in the alleged scheme to defraud Plaintiffs-Appellants in the Pork Chop Hill transaction.  1a-67a; 68a-141a; Da004-051.
[brief] “As New Jersey courts have long recognized, ‘[i]gnorance of the law furnishes no excuse to a person either for a breach or for an omission of a duty[.]’”  Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C., 202 N.J. 349, 367 (2010) (quoting Bowen v. Pursel, 109 N.J. Eq. 67, 73 (E. & A. 1931)).  Thus, [...] purportedly being unaware of the Ricci Act until over three years after its passage cannot serve as the basis to allow him to evade its unambiguous requirements.
[brief] Regardless of the level of scrutiny applied, the terms “principally engaged” and “attorney-at law of this State” do not leave “persons of common intelligence” able to uniformly understand their meaning and application.  First, Defendants do not rebut the fact that the designated corporate representative of [...] -- the entity charged with the enforcement of the Act -- could not even identify or explain the meaning of these terms.  Defendants’ resort to Merriam-Webster and Black’s Law for definitions of the individual words in an attempt to show what the combination of the words means is meaningless in a vacuum, and offers no assistance to the meaning of these terms in the context of the Limited Attorney Exemption.  Indeed, Defendants acknowledge that these terms are not defined in the Act, and that [...] has not defined these terms or provided any guidance whatsoever as to the meaning of these terms.  As further evidenced by the questioning of [...], there are several potential factors or considerations that may be reviewed in determining whether an attorney is “principally engaged,” including the attorney’s number of clients, number of matters, number of hours spent, amount of fees billed or amount of fees collected.
[brief] *Id.* at 237.  The defendant in that case admitted that his conduct was reckless, and that it was a contributing factor in the victim's death, which was determined to have been caused by asphyxiation from drowning.  *Id.*  The Court in *Campfield* made clear that "when a defendant is tried for reckless manslaughter, the factfinder must determine whether the 'result' of the defendant’s reckless conduct, i.e. the victim's death, was within the scope of the risk contemplated by the defendant.
[brief] (9T 95-7 to 17; 10T 79-18 to 80-2, 80-10 to 13)  [...] got [...] to the ground, and [...] “was about to stab [him] in [his] stomach,” but then [...] and [...] got on top of [...].  (9T 95-18 to 96-2; 10T 80-19 to 81-8)  [...] testified that [...] got [...] to drop the knife he was holding, then “leaned across and punched” [...] in the chest.  (10T 81-9 to 12)  [...] testified that he then kicked [...] and ran away, followed by [...] and [...].  (9T 96-3 to 5; 10T 81-21 to 24)  [...] and [...] both testified that [...] also got up and went about five steps before turning back to the house.  (9T 96-5 to 7; 10T 82-4 to 6)  [...] in fact had been stabbed and died from his injuries.
[brief] A critical part of the EMP's strategies is to cast a very skeptical eye on requests for natural gas infrastructure improvements, such as the proposed regulator:  Further, as New Jersey takes active steps to decarbonizes its energy sector, the gas public utilities must assess existing pipeline capacity and plan for a gradual reduction in system use safely, reliably, and affordably, including through the use of non-pipeline solutions.  Finally, the gas public utilities must prioritize the repair or possible replacement of pipelines leaking methane.  [Ha450, Holm-18 at 14 (emphasis added).
[brief] District Court for the District of New Jersey recently agreed with this interpretation of similar language when it held that an indemnification provision stating that defendant would indemnify plaintiff for costs arising from “any claims from anybody that result from or relate to . . . your breach of any representation, warranty or obligation under this Agreement” required indemnification for first-party claims because this “indemnification language is very broad. ”  See [...] v. [...], Civil Action No. [...], 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2022).
[brief] As a result, the calculation of damages should not be $449,798.50. \textsuperscript{18}  \textsuperscript{16}  See Lamb v. Barbour, 188 N. J.Super. 6, 12, 455 A.2d 1122 (App. Div. 1982)  (To establish the element of causation, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice claim must show that the claimed negligent conduct was a “substantial contributing factor” in causing the plaintiff’s damages.)
[brief] In his report, he opined the infant Plaintiff “suffered neurological injury, chronic respiratory issues and multiple other medical problems, all as a result of a delayed delivery of at least 25-30 minutes.” (Pa627).  Notably, [...] admitted the infant Plaintiff suffered a severe and massive fetal maternal hemorrhage 6 to 12 hours prior to delivery, as evidenced by the approximately 70% loss of blood and a hemoglobin of 4.1 at birth and the fact the infant had no detectable blood pressure for the first four hours of birth.  (Pa334-Pa335).  He admitted this blood loss and severe anemia did not develop in a 25 to 30 minute period, but rather occurred over a period of many hours and even a day prior to delivery.  (Pa335; Pa340).  He further acknowledged this level of severe anemia can cause a decrease in cardiac output and oxygen to the brain, lead to brain injury and could cause all of the findings that this baby exhibited at birth as a consequence of the massive fetal maternal hemorrhage that occurred.  (Pa335; Pa339).  [...] conceded this massive fetal hemorrhage could not have been predicted or prevented.  (Pa339).  Despite these concessions, [...] nevertheless testified the massive and severe fetal hemorrhage and blood loss, which occurred at least six to twelve hours and up to a day before delivery, did not cause any injury to this baby and that all of her injuries and eventual death were attributable to hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy (HIE) and not being delivered approximately 25-30 minutes earlier.
[brief] On March 14, 2022, well after the DEP had the Cornell Studies in hand and in the midst of its public statements regarding the necessity for an emergency rule, [...] filed its application with the DEP.  Aa117-168.  The Multi-Permit Application sought to develop the 650-acre site, located at the southeastern intersection of U.S. Route 1 and Quakerbridge Road, including the application for the Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit that is at issue in this appeal.  Aa119.  The application states that the “finished project will include a total of approximately 5,563,117 square feet of building footprint coverage, 2,435 car parking spaces and 1,072 trailer parking spaces.  Other improvements include internal access roads, improvements to adjacent public roadways, utilities, stormwater management, lighting, and landscaping improvements. ”  Aa118.  Regarding surface waters on site, the application explains that northern and southern portions of the site drain to separate watersheds, consisting of Duck Pond Run to the north and Shipetauken Creek to the south.  Aa124.  There are several unnamed tributaries to these surface water bodies on the site.  Ibid.  Further, “the project involves work within regulated waters and/or associated riparian zones and flood hazard areas.  This includes widening the existing public roadway Clarksville Road, grading work, and the construction of four stormwater outfalls, a sanitary sewer line, an access road to State Route 1 and internal access roads. ”  Aa151.  Stormwater outfalls would be built to discharge directly into regulated unnamed tributaries to Duck Pond Run and Shipetaukin Creek.  Aa151-152.  According to the DEP, the stormwater outfalls would also have riparian zone impacts and require in-stream work.  Aa035.  The applicant also submitted a stormwater report with its application, the most recent version of which was submitted on November 22, 2022.  Aa070-093.  The stormwater report makes clear that Duck Pond Run discharges directly into the Delaware and Raritan Canal, Aa089, which is a source of drinking water for more than a million people.
[brief] This has been a vacant lot for at least twelve years.  The reference to a one-parking-space "net loss" (DBb10) is disingenuous because the expert and the Board fail to acknowledge that an entire parking lot serving the public is being sacrificed to make way for the seventeen residential units.  The Applicant's expert admitted that the "[t]he most obvious problems" associated with excess density "would be traffic and parking" (1T40-13 to 1T40-14), yet he and the Board never explained the impact of the displaced cars that used the vacant dirt parking lot.  Nonsensically, the height variance is extolled because "the buildings on the Boardwalk are built at Boardwalk level" (DBb13).  That is true of every property up and down [...] across the street from the [...].  The Board’s assertion that the plaintiff somehow needed a traffic expert (see DBb17), ignores the fact that it is the Applicant who has the burden of proof to produce evidence which supports the granting of the variance in question.  The plaintiff/objector does not to prove anything.
[brief] It is improper for a prosecutor to suggest jurors have a further obligation “by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury’s verdict. ”  State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521 (1988) (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice §3-5.8(d) (2d ed. 1980)).  In *State v. Holmes*, this Court reversed the defendant’s convictions after the prosecutor invoked the war on drugs in opening and closing, saying, “You all understand the particular drug problem that we have in this country, particularly Newark, and I submit to you, that the police officers don’t have to make up facts,” and “[w]ith the war on drugs, [the police witness] didn’t have to come before you and fabricate these type of cases.
[directive] PROCEDURES  4.1  Whenever a detainee is brought before the court, the judge will advise the detainee of his/her responsibility to identify and make arrangements for children or adults dependent upon the detainee for their care.  The judge will also ask the detainee whether he or she is currently a guardian or co-guardian for an adjudicated incapacitated person.  The judge will also specifically advise the detainee that the existence of dependents and the need to make arrangements for their care will not control the detention, disposition or sentencing and that, if the detainee is unable to make alternative care arrangements within a reasonable period of time, the court will initiate contact with an appropriate agency to arrange alternative care for the detainee's dependents.  Whenever a law enforcement officer, shift supervisor, arresting officer or other authorized 4.2 official notifies the court, pursuant to subparagraphs 3 .1.6 and 3 .2.4 of the Attorney General's model policy, that the detainee has a dependent in need of care, the judge or other court official at the direction of the judge shall confirm with the detainee the alternate care arrangements that have been made for each dependent.  Whenever a person is detained, a judge or other court official at the direction of the judge 4.3 shall make the following inquiries to ensure the identification of persons dependent upon the detainee for their care and to ensure the detainee has the opportunity to designate a responsible adult to provide alternative care for the dependents during the detainee's absence.  These inquiries shall be supplemented by any additional questions deemed necessary by the judge or court official to ascertain the particulars of the situation.  The responses to these inquiries and any If additional questions should be on the record.  they cannot be made on the record, a written notation shall be made and placed in the case file.  A)  Do you have any parents, children under age 18, or anyone in your household or otherwise, dependent on you for care?  •  If the answer is yes, the inquirer will ask the detainee to provide for each dependent person, the dependent's name, address, telephone number, sex, age, relationship to the detainee, and type of alternate care required.  Judiciary Guidelines · Alternate Care For The Dependents of Persons Detained as a Part of the Judicial Process
[directive] 2.  b)  Você entende que se fornecer informações falsas sobre sua residência ou se não confirmar seu [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] endereço, você estará sujeito à acusação de um crime de terceiro grau e poderá receber uma 1o (se o crime foi cometido em de julho de 2014 ou após esta pena de prisão de até 5 anos data) (se o crime foi ou crime de quarto grau e receber uma pena de prisão de até 18 meses cometido em 7 de março de 2007 ou após esta data)?
[brief] 5  Report can be found at http:www.comptroller/news/docs/pensions_report.pdf. but rather independent contractors.  *Ibid.*  The Comptroller Report also found that many employers failed to review these situations or took no action after Chapter 92’s enactment, and as a result, many professional services providers, including attorneys who provided legal services to local governments under publicly bid contracts, remained in PERS after January 1, 2008, though ineligible for credit based on this service.  *Id.* at 10-13.  The examples cited in the Comptroller Report included municipal attorneys, municipal prosecutors and municipal public defenders.  *Ibid.*  Subsequent to the Comptroller Report, the [...] began auditing a number of municipalities to determine compliance with Chapter 92.  **B.
[brief] The court found the stop was lawful because the detectives observed what they reasonably believed were violations of the traffic code.  (Pa 12)  The court further found that it was clear from the testimony the traffic infractions were the sole basis for the stop (Pa 15-17), i.e., the police did not have “reasonable and articulable suspicion the Defendant was conducting illegal activity involving possession or distribution of CDS” when they decided to pull him over.  (Pa 15)  While the court found the detectives’ probing questions about [...]’ travel itinerary “reasonable” (Pa 14), it rejected the notion that reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing evolved from [...]’ behavior or responses to those questions, or from anything the detectives observed during the course of the stop.  (Pa 17-18)  The court noted,  When the officers looked into the back seat of the vehicle, the officers did plainly observe frozen burger patties in the back seat, verifying [Defendant’s] account of the reason for his trip.  The officers notably did not observe the Defendant crouching down, huddling in the car, overtly hiding anything, nor were any suspicious bulges observed or a pat down deemed necessary at the scene.  (Pa 9)  The court also noted that aside from the general claim that [...] appeared nervous and failed to make eye contact, The officers observed no suspicious behavior on behalf of the Defendant.  The Defendant answered the officers' questions clearly, and truthfully.  The Defendant claimed he had driven to New York to purchase burger patties, which were both plainly viewed by the officers in the back seat of the vehicle and mentioned by the Defendant.  The officers did not see any CDS, nor were they given any indication during the motor vehicle stop that the Defendant had any CDS in his possession.  (Pa 17-18)(emphasis in original)  Accordingly, the court concluded that the detectives did not have a valid basis to ask [...] for consent to search his car.
[brief] The defendants in this case have Interests that are complete[ly] aligned with the interests of [...].  The condominium association has…voted to support recovery from [...] for the costs of repairing the damage, which was done and which was not repaired and which was not repaired as a result of fierce resistance by [...] appointed counsel under circumstances, which we believe were grounds for giving rise to liability for compensatory and punitive damages on the part of [...]…The Association wants its damaged property repaired at [...]’s expense, so do [...] and [...].  The Association wants to seek a judgment and that will require [...] to pay money to the Association without the disability of an agent of [...] acting to sabotage the interests of the Association, so do [...] and [...].
[brief] [...], Litigation Section - Member Survey (2009) (/file/document/american-bar-association-litigation-section-member-survey-2009) (pdf)  [...], Litigation Section - Summary, Narrative Survey Responses (2009) (/file/document/american-bar-association-litigation-section-summary-narrative-survey-responses-2009) (pdf)  [...], Litigation Section, et al.  - Summary Comparison (2010) (/file/document/american-bar-association-litigation-section-et-al-summary-comparison-2010).  (pdf)  [...]/[...] - Report (2009) (/file/document/american-college-trial-lawyersinstitute-advancement-amer-legal-system-report-2009) (pdf)  [...] - Attorneys' Fees in Class Action Settlements (2009) (/file/document/eisenberg-miller-attorneys-fees-class-action-settlements) (pdf)  [...] - Attorney Satisfaction re Civil Rules (2009) (/file/document/federal-judicial-center-attorney-satisfaction-re-civil-rules) (pdf)  Papers Submitted by Conference Panelists
[brief] (4T:71:19-23).  Plaintiff’s counsel stated that was a “fair expectation. ”  (4T:71:24-25).  In addition, the Court pointed out that it was never advised prior to trial of any medical issue involving [...].  (4T:72:17-20).  The Court also pointed out that it was [...] who, while in the hallway, created a problem.  (4T:73:7-13).  The noise in the hallway was created by [...].  The Court denied the application for a mistrial.  The Court pointed out that maybe [...] was unhappy with the way the trial was going, and wanted another opportunity to start again.  (4T:73:20-22).  The jury was polled later in trial, and they indicated they had no idea what was happening, and that the incident would not have any bearing on their impartiality in deciding this case.  (7T:10:22-7T:20:10-19).  Therefore, Plaintiff creating noise in the hallway, which the jury did not attribute to Plaintiff, did not justify a mistrial.
[brief] The record establishes that [...], in concert with his wife and the other entity defendants, misappropriated funds, manipulated financial records, provided Plaintiffs with false and misleading balance sheets that reflected values for the company books of accounts that were far less than they should have been, overreported liabilities, and diverted money from [...] and [...] into other entities that he and his wife controlled.  These facts were also borne out at trial and are more than sufficient to sustain the trial court’s judgment.  (3T 90:21 to 97:4; 26T48:5 to 50:9; 27T87:20 to 88:8).  2.
[brief] The Job Appeal is not addressed to the underlying legality of the License FAD.  Rather, the Job Appeal concerns [...]’s ability to protect and preserve his constitutionally protected property interest in his tenured teaching position with [...], while his appeal of the License FAD continues.  As discussed, \textit{infra}, the Job FAD deprived [...] of that opportunity, by acting as though the legality of the License FAD was entirely irrelevant to [...]’s ultimate right to obtain relief.  \(^2\)  See Pa31, Amended Appellate Brief filed February 24, 2023; Pa30, Reply Brief filed May 10, 2023.
[directive] 6.1.1  The Property Description Report (Short or Long Form) shall be used to report the following:  a.  Stolen property.  b. Lost property.  A-6 c.  Found property.  d.  Seized property.  e.  Recovered property.  f. Burned property.  g. Damaged/destroyed property.  h.  Property held by a police authority for safekeeping.  6.1.2
[brief] [...] referred [...] to physical therapy, and [...]’s physical therapist, [...], commented that [...] has difficulty with squatting and transferring from a sitting to a standing position, especially after prolonged sitting and driving.  Pa35.  In an addendum to the evaluation, [...]’s physical therapist indicated that his diagnosis of osteoarthritis of bilateral knees has been exacerbated and “had been getting progressively worse over the last few years.
[brief] First, he fails to cite any competent evidence from the record suggesting that there is a causal connection between the written warning or the one-day suspension with the 2012 workplace violence complaint or the February 2015 EEO complaint.  Thus, he fails on the third prong of Woods-Pirozzi, and does not make a prima facie case.  Second, even if the Court were to determine that he met this prima facie threshold, he has presented no competent evidence refuting the facts supporting the legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the written warning and the one-day suspension.