ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant lied to Plaintiff that she had such an intention when, in fact, she was marrying Plaintiff solely for immigration purposes – unbeknownst to the young, naïve plaintiff.  These grounds of fraud, a recognized ground for annulment, related directly to conditions existing at the time of the parties’ marriage; they were not conditions that arose only after the parties married.  The only testimony presented at trial on the annulment issue was from the Plaintiff and his family – neither defendant nor anyone on her behalf testified about the annulment issue.  Thus, there was no refuting of the sworn testimony from the Plaintiff (primarily), reinforced by his father and the friend witnesses who Plaintiff presented, showing from the Defendant’s own words that she had married Plaintiff solely for immigration purposes and would remain with the Plaintiff only for as long as she had to in order to achieve her immigration objective.  There was never any intention by the Defendant, at any time, to create a meaningful relationship with plaintiff, have children with him, live according to the customs and traditions the Defendant falsely claimed she shared, etc.  Those undisputed facts, unlike the decision in Patel, supra, 265 N.J. Super. 408, establish the Plaintiff’s right to an annulment under New Jersey law.
[brief] [...] of the Technical Services Unit was in the area working on another investigation and responded to the robbery scene.  He recovered four guns: three of them the Sig Sauer service weapons carried by [...], [...], and [...], and the last, a Glock 19 FC 9-millimeter Luger, which [...] had recovered from defendant and had given to Rizzitello.  One spent shell casing was recovered with the Glock.  Of the officers’ weapons, [...]’s was missing two rounds from the usual 13 that are in service weapons, containing 11; the two others contained 13.  Twelve of the rounds are in the magazine, one is in the weapon’s chamber.  (2T124-9 to 127-7; 2T128-13 to 143-25; 3T50-13 to 24).
[brief] Pa401 (“it is improper to have a safety system, such as LDW/LKAS/RDM default to Off every time the vehicle is started. ”).  Plaintiff’s experts opined that a properly designed safety system should be automatically enabled and require manual override to be disabled, similar to seat belts, air bags and other safety devices.  That [...]’s LDW/LKAS/RDM safety systems as implemented were defective does not make the CR-V without any systems at all reasonably fit, suitable or safe.  Plaintiff’s experts concluded that “[t]he LKAS/RDM system available as optional equipment in the 2016 Honda CR-V would have prevented [...]’s lane departure and the collision with [...]’s Ford.
[brief] ” (9T:13-8 to 11, 15-9 to 15)  Furthermore, the court primarily discussed the conduct of [...]’s codefendants in imposing the sentence, noting that [...] was vicariously accountable for those actions as an accomplice without discussing his specific conduct or the need for specific deterrence.  (9T:13-8 to 20; 14-11 to 17).  This was error because [...]’s vicarious liability for the actions of his codefendants as an accomplice does not extend to the application of aggravating factors based on the conduct of his codefendants.  See State v. Rogers, 236 N.J. Super. 378, 387 (App. Div. 1989), aff’d in relevant part 124 N.J. 113, 120-21 (1991) (finding defendant sentenced as accomplice “is not vicariously accountable for aggravating factors that are not personal to him”)  Therefore, the court erred in applying aggravating factor nine.  This case must be remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to consider the mitigating factors raised by defense counsel and improperly applied the aggravating factors.
[brief] ”)  Further, [...] only recently settled with the Utilities, and there has been no written or deposition discovery concerning [...]’s proposed allocation of the Utilities Settlement, or allocation of its own alleged indemnity costs, such as the costs it allegedly incurred to remove debris from the riverbed.  As such, because the relevant discovery concerning [...]’s Indemnity Claim is in its infancy, compelling arbitration will expedite the completion of discovery and the resolution of the remaining substantive issues.  Thus, as to this factor, the level of discovery favors arbitration.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiffs filed a complaint on February 28, 2020, against [...], [...], and [...], asserting, in addition to their claim for an implied easement, claims for breach of an express easement, violation of riparian rights, nuisance, trespass, equitable and promissory estoppel, and inverse condemnation.  (Da14)  Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 29, 2020, adding claims for fraud and a prescriptive easement.  (Da154)  Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to their implied easement claim on October 1, 2021.  (Da9)  The trial court held oral argument on November 12, 2021, after which [...] ruled from the bench and granted plaintiffs an implied easement to cross [...]’s property.  (T61:8—T73:20)  After entering an order with a mistake as to the relief awarded (referencing the wrong count of plaintiffs’ complaint), the trial court entered a corrected order on November 22, 2021 memorializing its oral ruling.  (Da2566-Da2567)  In December 2021 [...] sought interlocutory appellate review of the trial court’s order to vindicate its property rights and safeguard the protective sand dunes, but [...]’s motion for leave to appeal was denied.  (Da2573)  After additional proceedings and rulings at the trial court, all then-remaining claims were dismissed, and the trial court entered a final judgment order for this case on March 14, 2023.  (Da2568-Da2572)  This appeal followed.
[brief] The [...] also correctly rejected the [...]’s challenge to the original 2017 permit because it was untimely and is outside the scope of this appeal.  Notwithstanding these points, [...]’s underlying decision to grant the modification permit was proper because the alternative solution of requiring [...] to move and resecure its dock to bring it within the scope of the 2017 permit would have caused environmental disturbances in the environmentally sensitive subaquatic vegetation habitat without any discernable benefit to the applicant or the general public.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] At the first board hearing, the board concluded that the business would “‘not store or transfer septic waste on the property. ’”  Ibid.  When the applicant appeared at the second board hearing, the operation of the business changed to include a “‘containment’ area” for septic waste which would be located on the property, along with parking for vacuum containment tanker trucks.  Id. at 582.  Because the findings at the second hearing conflicted with the findings at the first hearing, the Court concluded enlargement was appropriate to allow a challenge to both approvals.  Id.  Unlike Adams, there was no bait and switch here.
[brief] Court Transcript Request ...........................................................................Pa055 July 24, 2023  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C. .................................Pa056 July 24, 2023 Decision on Reconsideration...............................................Pa058  Defendants’ Notice of Motion for Reconsideration dated February 10, 2023 ..............................................................................Pa078  Certification of [...], with Exhibits in support of Motion for Reconsideration ..................................................Pa080 Ex. A - 1972 Special Undertaking.................................................................Pa088 Ex. B (omitted - duplicate)..........................................................................Pa090 Ex. C - October 18, 2017
[brief] On January 15, 2021, [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs challenging the Plan and, on January 22, 2021, it filed its First Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Pal to Pa22).  The Amended Complaint contained six counts.  Count I contested the lawfulness of a $2,000,000 payment made by [...] in return for a “density bonus. ”  Count II alleged that [...] Ordinance § 345-98 required that any amendment to a redevelopment plan after “the disposition of any land in the Redevelopment Area . . . must be consented to in writing by the designated developers,” and that consent had not been obtained.  Count III alleged, that upon amendment of the Plan, it was incumbent upon the [...] to determine whether the property at issue remained an area-in-need of redevelopment, and Count IV alleged a claim of spot zoning.  The remaining counts are not relevant to this appeal.  The [...] and [...] LLC, filed Answers respectively on March 15 and 17, 2021.  (Pa23 to Pa36; Pa37 to Pa47).  [...], LLC and the [...] filed motions for summary judgment on August 26, 2022 and [...] filed opposition on October 4, 2022.  (Pa52).  The Court heard argument on December 16, 2022\(^1\) and rendered its decision granting the Defendants’ motions on December 22, 2023.  (Pa48 to Pa93; 1T3:20-24).  On January 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Pa94 to Pa97).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] [...] (a tax expert) testified that in thousands of tax returns that he never had an Independent Contractor paid on a W-2.  (See page 44, Lines 1-8)  [...] testified that [...] was ineligible from 2008 forward as [...] was on a public contract award/professional services contract under NJSA 43A:15a-7.2 Subsection A.  Conover further testified no part B (Independent Contractor) analysis was performed.  (See Transcript Page 53, Lines 1-21).  Conover finds ineligibility from 1/1/2008 forward despite the first signed professional services agreement ever in fruition was 4/14/2015 as per Exhibit R-4 provided by [...] (Pa166-173).  Township stopped remitting pension contributions after June 30, 2012.  (See Conover testimony Transcript Page 60, Lines 4-5).  This was about 45 days prior to [...]’s letter two months prior to Nesbitt (See statement 5, Exhibit R-10) (Pa227).  The actual notification to [...] was over 1 year later.  Conover is cross-examined regarding whether there is any language in subsection A of the statute that says municipal resolutions are the governing standard (versus a professional services contract) since there was no contract until April, 2015.  The back and forth ends with [...] confirming that it does not say resolution in statute.  (See Transcripts Page 66, Line 1 through Page 68, Line 12).  Conover says her determination was based on the resolutions.  (See Transcript Page 66 Line 8-10).  Conover says money (ineligible contributions) should have been refunded to [...] once ineligibility was determined.  (See Page 69, Lines 12-17)  Conover says she would look into it.  Finally in December 2023, about 15 months after the trial, some money is returned with no accounting or explanation.  Yet, [...] was investigated for Fraud and Abuse.  Conover testifies that she has no idea what happened to [...]’s unemployment contributions on his withholdings and would imagine if [...] became unemployed he would get unemployment benefits.  (See Transcript Page 69, Line 22 through Page 70, Line 6).  Imagine that, so even after her determination of ineligibility, she believes at trial that [...] is entitled to some employee benefits such as unemployment.  Unemployment is not available for independent contractors.  Conover testifies that the resolutions were the core part of her determination that [...] was ineligible and did not interview anyone as part of her investigation.  (See Transcript Page 71 Lines 16-18 and Page 75, Lines 6-22).  The Hearing was concluded.  Trial briefs were submitted in May of 2023 by both plaintiff and respondent.  On June 28, 2023, [...] affirmed the decision of [...], ruled that [...] was ineligible for [...] participation as of 1/1/2008, and the case was appealed.
[brief] 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.  Re: Letter Brief on behalf of: Respondents  [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...]  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Respondents, [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Respondents”), hereby submit this Supplemental Letter Brief as directed by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in light of its holding in *Marmo & Sons Gen. Contr., LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC*, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024).
[brief] He continued “I see this all the time”:  ...[Y]ou’re hauling marijuana across the country for personal gain...You and him are going across there, you’re going to take it to somebody.  I’d like to help you get it there...  But before...I go any further I want you to read your Miranda rights...”(2T160-20 to 25 [emphasis added]).  Having formally accused [...] of narcotics trafficking, while offering to “help” her, he then – nearly 7 and 1/2 minutes into the stop and without having sought from dispatch information for the traffic warning -- partially administered her Miranda rights, without asking her if she wished to waive those rights.
[brief] See *Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens*, 139 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1998)(holding commercial lease provision requiring lessee to pay full amount of seven months of abated rent upon failing to pay past-due rent within 30 days following notice was unenforceable penalty, where the purpose of provision was to secure lessee's prompt rental payments.)  *Diversified Equities, LLC v. Russell*, 31 N.Y.S.3d 920 (N.Y. App. Term. 2016) (“In our view, the lease and rent concession rider provide, in effect, for a late monthly charge of 13%, which is excessive and grossly disproportionate to any damages that could be sustained as a result of tenant's failure to pay rent on time”); *Freeman v. United Dominion Realty Tr., Inc.*, E042905, 2008 WL 1838373, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2008), as modified (May 6, 2008)(reversing dismissal and reinstating claims that a rent “Discount Agreement” with a “Free Rent Charge-Back" clause “which provided that \(^{12}\) The use of rent concession or discount chargebacks to disguise unlawful penalties in residential leases and other consumer contracts has been the topic of legal scholarship, noting that the abusive practice is widespread, yet seldom the subject of litigation.
[brief] (Da0087)  On November 6, 2018, when [...] injected [...]’s left eye with Ozurdex he had not heard of any defects with Ozurdex, nor of any risk of a silicone particulate being dispensed with Ozurdex, nor had [...] bothered to inform physicians similarly situated to [...] that there was a risk of a silicone particulate being injected into a patient’s eye during the administration of Ozurdex.  (Pa129-Pa130)  [...] testified that he would have expected [...] to notify him of the silicone particulate defect as soon as [...] had become aware of the problem.  (Pa132-Pa133)  Had [...] been aware that there was a risk of injecting a silicone particulate during the administration of Ozurdex, he would not have administered the Ozurdex to [...] on November 6, 2018.  (Pa130-Pa131)  On November 13, 2018, [...] returned to [...] with severe left eye blurred vision, decreased vision and blind spot.
[directive] If a Prosecutor’s Office requests detention or seeks to revoke release of a juvenile Appeals. and the court denies the application, the Prosecutor’s Office should consider all remedies, including the right to appeal if the Assistant Prosecutor believes release poses a threat to the health, safety, and welfare of those in the community.  A stay pending leave to appeal should be requested.  Denials of detention applications and revocations of release should be noted in the case file.  H.
[brief] I’m sustaining the objection.  It’s not relevant.  I need not waste any time about the rendering.  That’s not what [the Board] based their opinion on.  (2T22: 18-21).  The above statement by the Trial Court was a finding of fact.  By giving deference to the Board’s finding of fact, the Trial Court below made the finding of fact that the Board did not base their opinion on the Sketch.  “Fundamentally, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of local officials. ”  Scully-Bozarth Post #1817, 362 N.J. Super. at 314.  The Trial Court could not, and appropriately did not, substitute its own judgment for that of the Board with regard to whether the Sketch should have been considered.  In doing so, the Trial Court reasonably held that the Sketch and thus, the [...] Ad lacked any relevance to the action and appropriately excluded same.  C.
[brief] Deterrence “has been repeatedly identified in all facets of the criminal justice system as one of the most important factors in sentencing” and “is the key to the proper understanding of protecting the public. ”  *State v. Megargel*, 143 N.J. 484, 501 (1996) (citing *State in the Interest of C.A.H. & B.A.R.*, 89 N.J. 326, 334 (1982)); accord *Fuentes*, 217 N.J. at 78-79.  Deterrence incorporates two “interrelated but distinguishable concepts”: the sentence’s “general deterrent effect on the public [and] its personal deterrent effect on the defendant. ”  *Jarbath*, 114 N.J. at 405 (citing *C.A.H.*, 89 N.J. at 334-45)); accord *Fuentes*, 217 N.J. at 79.  On its own, general deterrence “has relatively insignificant penal value,” *Jarbath*, 114 N.J. at 405 (citing *State v. Gardner*, 113 N.J. 510, 520 (1989)), and so sentencing courts should focus on specific deterrence.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 519 (“the conduct of the parties shows that their relationship was governed by the Subscriber Agreement. ”).  This Court adopted the identical legal approach and reasoning in *Parrella v. Sirius Xm Holdings*, No. A-4283-19, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59, at *2 (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022), cert. denied 2022 N.J. LEXIS 526 (June 14, 2022) (Da0559-Da0563).  This Court affirmed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration “finding [that] mutual assent to the arbitration clause was implied from plaintiff’s ‘usage—payment, usage of [defendants’] service, [and] extended relationship history [with defendants] .
[brief] [3T47-10 to 48-10].  He did not see the robbery.  [3T49-17 to -19].  He did not see how the beer bottle ended up on the floor of the bank.  [3T49-14 to -16].  On July 23, 2019, the bank opened at 8:20 a.m.; [...] was working with three other people that morning, tellers [...] and [...], and financial advisor representative, [...].  [3T53-15 to 55-4].  At some point during the morning, the suspect, later identified as defendant, [...], entered the bank through the doors that faced that parking lot.
[brief] (Pb10-14).  [...] mainly relies on this Court’s unpublished decisions from In re Evans Public Employees’ Retirement System Eligibility, No. A-2698-16 (App. Div. July 14, 2018), and Poosikian v. Division of Pensions and Benefits, No. A-0343-19 (App. Div. February 26, 2021).  (Pb11-14; Pa123-129).  [...] further argues that the consequence imposed on her due to the mistake of her prior employer is severe, and that equitable considerations may be afforded to her as established by prior precedents of this Court.  (Pb14-16).  First, [...]’s reliance on In re Evans and Poosikian is misplaced because they do not address the application of equitable principles; rather, both cases involved this court’s decision to remand the matter for the Board to apply the Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54, to address a known error.
[brief] “First, it is well established that the CFA is applicable to commercial transactions. ”  *All the Way Towing*, 236 *N.J.* at 443.  Consequently, “we need not labor as to whether the corporate plaintiff may qualify as a consumer. ”  *D’Ercole Sales v. Fruehauf Corp.*, 206 *N.J.Super.* 11, 23 (App.Div. 1985), See also *Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Shuster Corp.*, 212 *N.J.Super.* 350, 355 (App.Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 *N.J.* 60 (1986) (“Surely a business entity can be, and frequently is, a consumer in the ordinary meaning of that term.").  Coastal Group, Inc. v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 274 N.J.Super. 171, 179-180 (App.Div. 1994).  The CFA "protects corporate as well as private consumers."  Marascio v. Campanella, 298 N.J. Super. 491, 499 (App. Div. 1997).  All the Way Towing made clear that even commercial transactions are subject to the CFA.  Id. at 443, citing Coastal Grp., Inc. v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 274 N.J. Super. 171, 175, 179-80 (App. Div. 1994) (trial court erred when it dismissed CFA claim on the ground that "one commercial entity may not recover in tort for economic losses allegedly caused by a product purchased from another commercial entity"); Hundred E. Credit, supra, 212 N.J. Super. at 355 (same); D'Ercole Sales, 206 N.J. Super. at 23 (same), noting that the definition of "person" includes business entities such as a "partnership, corporation, company ..., business entity or association," N.J.S. 56:8-1(d).
[brief] The JTCL clearly states that a Plaintiff/Respondent shall recover the full amount of damages from any direct Defendant determined to be sixty percent (60%) at fault, as was Appellant.**  The Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law (*N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-1, *et seq.*) was enacted in 1952, and became effective June 18, 1952.  See *Markey v. Skoq*, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 199 (Law Div. 1974).  The statute was enacted due to the perceived inequity of the existing law, which permitted a plaintiff to recover the full measure of any judgment against any culpable defendant – the “one-percent rule. ”  See *Kennedy v. Camp*, 14 N.J. 390, 399 (1954).  Under that existing scheme, a tangential defendant with very little liability but significant insurance coverage or assets would be at risk of paying far in excess of its proportional share.  Despite the ability to seek contribution, that remedy was of little benefit when remaining co-defendants had little or no assets or insurance coverage.  Due to this perception, the Legislature set about to craft a new scheme that would ensure that plaintiffs would be able to recover an entire verdict from a direct defendant whose liability was not insubstantial or trivial.
[brief] The State argues that [...] could and should have raised this issue in Union County.  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 11.  Even if it would have been preferrable for that issue to have been argued and decided in Union County, it is not now deemed waived in Hudson County.  The Union County case is not yet resolved nor has the Union County suppression decision become a final judgment that may no longer readily be reconsidered.  Moreover, the State has cited no authority for the proposition that a defendant must raise all arguments in one county to avoid being collaterally estopped in a separate matter charged and venue in another county where the facts overlap.  Such a requirement would put an undue burden on practitioners and invite gamesmanship on the part of parties.  For instance, a defendant may be deterred from arguing a certain point or even pursuing a suppression motion in one county if the State, there, offers an exceptionally high plea offer there for doing so.  Likewise, a favorable plea offer in one county may avoid the need for litigation there without also benefiting the defendant in another county.
[directive] [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie] the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing?  Bydzie Pan(i) musial(a) dostarczyc pr6bky DNA, kt6ra moze zostac wykorzystana przez organy scigania w prowadzeniu dochodzen dotycziJcych dzialalnosci przestypczej, a takze pokryc koszty badan tej pr6bki?  i.