ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Dear Prosecutors, Chiefs, Sheriffs, and Directors:  The Attorney General recognizes the responsibility of law enforcement chief executives to address the public safety concerns of their communities.  In the aftermath of a critical incident, the prompt dissemination of information often serves to calm the community and maintain trust in local law enforcement agencies.  This can often be accomplished through the thoughtful use of press releases and social media messaging.  The purpose of issuing a press release, social media message or pre- recorded statement by a law enforcement executive after a fatal police encounter or critical incident should be strictly limited to the following areas of focus:  ▪  Assuring the public that there is no active or ongoing threat to the public at large; ▪ Informing the public of areas to avoid to facilitate law enforcement response or alleviate traffic congestion; ▪  Identifying the agency responsible for investigation of the incident.  The below press release template may be used by state, county and municipal law enforcement agencies involved in a fatal police encounter or death-in-custody that is being investigated by the [...] (“[...]”), in accordance with Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Directive 2019-4 (https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-Directive-2019-4.pdf ).
[brief] The Amici Curiae’s argument that an arbitrator cannot award treble damages, attorneys’ fees, equitable relief, or any other relief allowed under the IFPA or related statutes also has no support in the regulations.  In fact, [...]’s regulations require an Arbitration Plan to “provide the assigned dispute resolution professional with sufficient authority to provide all relief and to determine all claims arising under PIP coverage. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(b)(3) (emphasis added).
[brief] 43.  On June 15, 2007 (three years before Defendant purchased the Subject Property) Plaintiff caused the 1963 Agreement to be recorded as an easement in the [...] at Book 13677, page 1285 (“Recorded Easement”) after the [...] became concerned with certain activities regarding the Subject Property.  (Da907 and 8T 7:11-13:23)  The Trial Court admitted the Recorded Easement into evidence over Defendant’s objection determining it is further evidence of the [...]’s intention to protect its historical easement rights in the Subject Property and the [...] did not abandon or terminate its easement rights.  (Pa2-3)  **[...] Bankruptcy and Defendant’s Purchase of Subject Property**
[brief] Journal of Clinical \(^8\)  For further discussion of how mental illness relates to the aggravating and mitigating factors, see Point III.B. Psychology 493-507 (2020) (explaining that anger and aggression are treatable symptoms).  For these reasons, not only was a psychological evaluation mandated under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b but also required under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6c.
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[brief] ***  The defense of failure to file notice under the Tort Claims Act is an affirmative one which must be pleaded in order to avoid surprise, and a defendant may be found to have waived the protection thereof by failing to plead it as a defense.  ***  In the instant matter defendant did not specifically plead that plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act nor did it cite the applicable section of the statute.  Rather, defendant's answer merely stated without specification that plaintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of the Municipal Tort Claims Act and were therefore barred from bringing suit.  ***  Clearly, defendant failed to comply with this rule since its affirmative defense did not set forth a statement of facts sufficient to show that it was the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act with which plaintiffs had not complied and which therefore acted as a bar to suit.
[brief] POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DENY PRIME DISCOVERY  [...] claims it was unfairly denied discovery because the Track Assignment for this matter was Track I and should have been Track IV, and “by the time [...] became a party to the litigation [[...]’s Third-party complaint filed May 17, 2022], [...] had obtained an Order for Final Judgment against [...] [November 30, 2021] based on an unopposed summary action Order to Show Cause vacated in July 2022 [after] the [Track I] discovery end date had already passed [March 14, 2022].” (Br. 16-17).  [...] was well aware of this lawsuit the moment it was filed on October 15, 2021.  On November 16, 2021, a month after [...] filed this suit, [...] sued [...] in Federal District Court.  [...]’s Federal Court Complaint stated, “This complaint seeks judgment declaring all parties’ rights and obligations under a policy of commercial motor vehicle liability insurance with reference to the June 1, 2021 discharge of the contents” of a [...] trailer at [...]’s terminal, which “was made the subject of a lawsuit captioned, [...] Terminals Corporation v [...] Transport  [...] could have defended [...] in this matter and addressed the Track Assignment/discovery issue, but did not do so.  [...] could have intervened in this matter to assert its no coverage position, but did not do so.  [...] could have joined its federal suit with this matter, but did not do so.  When [...] did dismiss its federal lawsuit on August 17, 2022, and filed its Answer to [...]’s Third-party complaint on November 4, 2022, [...] could have filed a motion to change the Track Assignment, but did not do so.  [...] could have filed a motion to extend the discovery, but did not do so.  The trial court frequently noted [...]’s indifference to discovery issues and noted that [...]’s no defense/no coverage position was a business decision it chose to make on the presumption that, if [...] had to pay on the MCS-90 surety, [...] would seek reimbursement from the personal guarantees and indemnity from the [...] principals.  In other words, whatever discovery discomfort [...] is now alleging was a product of its own case management decisions and not the fault of the trial court.  POINT II
[brief] That statutory section is distinctly different than the provision of N.J.S.A. 39:5h-10.b.2 which requires pip coverage under N.J.S.A. 39:6a-4 when the transportation network company driver is logged onto the transportation company network but is not providing a prearranged ride.  The provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:5h-1, et seq. implement provisions of the automobile reformation reform act N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq. and address the amount and terms of coverage that must be made available to insureds operating a "personal vehicle" providing a prearranged ride.  N.J.S.A. 39:5h-1, et seq., references the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq. and N.J.S.A. 5h-10.g. states that the coverage required pursuant to subsections b. and c. of this section shall be deemed to meet the financial responsibility requirements of the "motor vehicle security-responsibility law" which is N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1 et seq.  The policy which is required to maintain the medical payments benefits coverage set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:5h-10 is necessarily a policy which is required to comply with and is governed by N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq.  New Jersey's collateral source rule N.J.S.A. 2a:15-97 bars recovery of medical expenses paid from collateral sources "in any civil action brought for personal injury or death, except actions brought pursuant to the provisions of p.l.1972, c. 70(c.39:6a-1 et seq.)  The legislature in enacting that legislation could have narrowed the actions for personal injury to those governed by N.J.S.A. 39:6a-9.1 or to payments made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6a-4 but chose not to do so.  The statute as written has a broad interpretation as to which claims are personal injury actions covered by N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq and as this action and the policy provisions requiring med-pay coverage are governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq.
[brief] See *Diaz*, 470 N.J. Super. at 519 (“It is one thing for police to withhold information.  It is another thing entirely for them to provide an explanation that creates or reinforces a false impression as to the seriousness of the sentence that defendant is facing. ”).  That argument does not hinge on the presence of probable cause. is clear from his own testimony because, while he stated that his purpose in interrogating [...] was only to investigate the robbery, he still spent the first several minutes of the interrogation asking [...] about the drug arrest and delivering deliberately vague answers about why [...] was in custody.  Like Diaz, this approach was “designed or reasonably likely to convey” to [...] that he faced a far less serious sentence than he actually did.  Id. at 527.  And, similarly to Diaz, this deception rendered [...]’s waiver involuntary.  Ibid.  Lastly, the State argued that [...]’s “significant prior contact with the justice system” leaned in favor of finding his waiver voluntary.  (Pb 19-20)  If anything, [...]’s prior experience with law enforcement had the exact opposite effect; because [...] believed he was being held and questioned on a minor drug offense, he likely believed based on his prior experience that if he cooperated, he would be quickly released.  This expectation would also be accurate, as the hearing court noted in its findings that [...] “was going to be released on his own recognizance for the drug offenses, but . . . was transported for a police interview with [...]. ”  (2T 5-23 to 6-1)  [...]’s prior experience thus weighs even further in favor of finding his waiver involuntary.  Consequently, the hearing court’s order must be reversed and [...]’s convictions vacated.
[brief] Pa94.  In its brief, Plaintiff asserts arguments only with regard to the dismissal of Count I of the FAC (the $2 million redevelopment fee), Count II of the FAC (whether [...]’s consent to the Amended Redevelopment Plan was required) and Count IV of the FAC (spot zoning).  [...] hereby opposes Plaintiff’s appeal and respectfully requests that the Summary Judgment Orders be affirmed in their entirety for the reasons set forth herein.
[brief] “[E]xpert testimony is not appropriate to explain what a jury can understand by itself. ”  *Id.* at 305.  The say-so of an expert should not be used to “as a substitute for jurors performing their traditional function of sorting through all of the evidence and using their common sense to make simple logical deductions. ”  *Cain*, 224 N.J. at 427.  Indeed, our system of justice in built on the principle that “[t]he jury brings a breadth of collective experience, knowledge, and wisdom to the task. ”  *Ibid.*  N.J.R.E. 702’s requirement that a witness may testify as an expert only on matters about which they “have sufficient expertise” similarly seeks to prevent undue interference with the jury’s factfinding.
[brief] GPS drift is not a factor in this case, GPS expert testimony proved that the [...] were not home at the time of the alleged service and the service also was not effectuated at their home but at a school parking lot.  Intervenor alludes to the concept of GPS drift in his Brief to explain why the GPS coordinates of service that were provided do not match the Defendant’s home at [...]. 341IB56.  Defendant’s GPS expert, [...] testified that based upon the GPS data that it was unlikely that the [...] were at their home at [...] at the time of alleged service on August 23, 2021 at 9:25 a.m. in the car travelling.  T3, p.7-9-81.  They could not have made it to the East Orange Toll Plaza at 9:36 a.m. which is 9.1 miles away on local roads in 11 minutes.  T3, p. 79:1-9.  The expert [...] testified that he reviewed the FAA reports for August of 2021 and there was no GPS drift.  T3, p. 82:19-21.  He further testified that “in this particular case, the land, cover, terrain and buildings around the given location in the Collins School Parking lot (place of service on the Affidavit) were not the types of conditions that would lead to severe multipath problems….and according to the information from the FAA for August 2021, there were no particular problems in the GPS network at this time”
[brief] 313 N.J. Super. 129, 156 (App. Div. 1998).  The court noted that this was hearsay, but found that the impact of the hearsay was vitiated.  That was because the actual witness who made the statements had previously taken the stand and testified consistently with those statements.  *Id.* at 158.  Thus, even though *N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2)* had not yet come into force, it was harmless error to allow the hearsay in.  *Id.* at 158.  The court went on to note that the statements would be admissible in the future under *N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2)*, stating, Somewhat akin to "fresh complaint" under *N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2)*, a prior statement of a testifying witness . . . is admissible if it is "consistent with the witness' testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive."
[brief] As such, Petitioners-Applicants request that this Court declare void L. 2021, c. 375 under N.J.S.A. 1:7-3, et seq.  Additionally, the Legislature violated the Constitution in its failure to advise the public of its actions.  The Constitution is clear that “[t]he people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances. ”  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18.  The case of Application of Forsythe, 91 N.J. 141 (1982) is illustrative in this context.
[directive] Issued by: [...] Administrative Director  The Criminal Practice Committee, in its 1988-90 Report, recommended a package of forms which were developed by the Criminal Presiding Judges and Criminal Division Managers to replace existing forms prepared by court support staff for use by judges in making bail, pretrial intervention, conditional discharge and sentencing decisions.  The forms package is designed to expedite the collection of relevant information and to avoid duplication by assuring that information is collected only once but available for a number of court events.  The package uses a "building block" approach in which subsequent reports are prepared using forms already completed, adding to these forms any additional information relevant to the particular report then being written.  The Supreme Court, at its January 14, 1991 Rules Conference has decided to require use of the Uniform Defendant Reporting System to replace, effective no later than January 1, 1992, forms presently being utilized by criminal division support staff for intake, bail, pretrial intervention and sentencing.
[brief] In line with its remedial purposes, the NJLAD defines “disability” very broadly.  The trial court erred in failing to recognize and apply this broad standard.  The legislature first amended the NJLAD in 1972, to include "handicap" as a prohibited basis for job-related decision-making and in 1978 amended the pertinent language to read:  All of the provisions of the act to which this act is a supplement shall be construed to prohibit any unlawful discrimination against any person because such person is or has been at any time handicapped or any unlawful employment practice against such person, unless the nature and extent of the handicap reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1  Our statute defines "handicapped" as: suffering from physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or from any mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the legislation is not limited to “severe” disabilities or disabilities “perceived [to] severely limit the individual in performing work-related functions.
[brief] (Da92).  They were all dated September 20, 2011.  (Da93).  The Testator signed willingly, was of sound mind, and not under undue influence.  (Da93).  Also, the witnesses signed, and declared that the Testator signed willingly, and that, to the best of their knowledge, was of sound mind, and not under any undue influence.  (Da93).  With regard to the Will of March 5, 2014, [...] testified that it was prepared in his office.
[brief] ”  Jersey City Police Officers Benev. Ass'n v. City of Jersey City, 257 N.J. Super. 6, 14–15 (App. Div. 1992).  1.  The Trial Court correctly determined that the claims at issue in the Hackensack Arbitration are distinct from those at issue in the PTA Arbitration, and the Arbitrator did not award [...] any damages related to its Hackensack Project claims [Pa21, Pa43-44]  The Trial Court correctly held that the PTA Arbitration “dealt exclusively with Plaintiff’s claims for unpaid EGP on the projects,” but the Hackensack Arbitration “will address Defendant’s claims for payment as a subcontractor.
[directive] Ponadto, jeżeli w okresie zawieszenia zostanie Pan(i) skazany(a) za prowadzenie pojazdu silnikowego, będzie Pan(i) podlegać karom ustalonym w N.J.S.A. 39:3-40:  This is to inform you that, as a person convicted of Eluding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, your driver’s license is suspended for a period of [6 months to 2 years], effective today.
[brief] v. Chancery Division Judge Was Not Competent To Adjudicate The Action In Lieu Of Prerogative Writs And Erred And Abused Discretion In Doing So.  [1T]  The Chancery Division Judge recognized the defendants deprivation or interference with Plaintiffs rights and their failure to carry out their ministerial duty to Plaintiff when she stated:  THE COURT:  However, you are entitled to a statutory adjournment.  You're entitled to two as a right.  And there was -- something happened, and it was not granted prior to the lockout or the removal -- it was granted.  [1T Lines 16-19, Pg. 16]  "The writ is now sought because it is said that N.J.S.A.54:7-1, et seq., is repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses in the federal constitution.  Prosecutor sought to raise these questions in a Chancery proceeding, but failed because they were cognizable only at law.  The opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals holding that the Court of Chancery could not entertain the questions raised as to validity of the apportionment proceeding in question was filed January 25th, 1940.  Luckenbach Terminals v. North Bergen Township, 125 N.J. Eq. 562; Luckenbach Terminals v. Township of North Bergen et al., 127 Id. 93.  The court of chancery was not competent to adjudicate the claim.
[brief] (Da 105 to 108; Da 113 to 115)  ..................................................................................................................18  A.  Trial Counsel Failed to Move to Suppress the Tire Iron.  (Da 105 to 108)  ......................................................20  B.  Trial Counsel Failed to Have a Forensic Expert Testify Regarding the Viability of Testing the Tire Iron for Fingerprints and DNA.  (Da 113 to 115)  ..................................................................................................................25  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................29
[brief] Ibid.  Further, the court held that the trial court’s instruction warning jurors to “disregard the officers’ ‘comments’ during defendant’s interrogation[] was inadequate to address the multiplicity of times during the playback” when the officers opined that defendant was lying.  Id. at 102-03.  Here, [...]’s repeated accusations that [...] was lying likewise gutted the jury’s ability to independently evaluate [...]’s credibility.  When [...] described his last interaction with [...], [...] responded, “I don’t want another lie coming out of a 52-year-old grown man’s mouth.
[brief] Table of Contents | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | ARGUMENT | 2 | | I.  The Standard Of This Court's Review | 2 | | 2.  [...] Always Has The Burden Of Proof And Persuasion | 3 | | 3.  The [...] Decision And Initial Decision Did Not Consider | | | The Entire Record; They Relied Upon An Arbitrary And | | | Capricious Selection Of [...]'s Pre-Filed Direct Testimony | | | And Ignored The Cross-Examination Of [...]'s Witnesses | 4 | | 4.
[directive] HWC and Attorney General’s Policy of Alternate Care for Arrestee’s Dependents (the “1993 Policy”)4  This Directive does not supersede or alter law enforcement’s duty to follow the procedures outlined in the Attorney General’s Alternate Care for Arrestee’s Dependents Model Policy, issued in December 1993.  The 1993 Policy ensures that children or other persons dependent upon an arrestee for their care, sustenance, or supervision are provided with alternate care, sustenance, or supervision as arranged for by the arrestee or an appropriate agency.  This Directive does not supersede the 1993 Policy.  V.
[brief] [...] provided defendant with a fresh mouthpiece each time and allowed the test to clear and give the prompt before administering the next test.  (3T13:25 to 3T14:12).  [...] allowed the machine to calculate and print the results.  (3T14:13-15).  He then entered the readings obtained on the State Police calculator to determine whether those readings were in the tolerated limit. (3T14:20-24).
[brief] HADDAD’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS CORRECTLY DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.  As set forth at length above, [...]’s meager proofs directly led to the Law Division’s summary judgment Order.  In light of this, it requires a colossal and fanatical leap of faith, and much imaginary thinking, coupled with staggering chutzpah, to argue that [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment somehow should have been granted.  This notably frivolous argument and point heading should be rejected out of hand for the same legal and factual reasons that summary judgment was entered against [...] in the first instance.  CONCLUSION
[brief] | | | Lexis 1143, Docket No. [...] (App. Div. 5/8/2017) | 26,27 | | Predham v. Holfester, 32 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 1954) | 17,21 | ### NEW JERSEY STATUTES | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 | 14,15,19 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-31 | 15,16 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-6 | 20 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:62.1 | 33 | | N.J.S.A. 12A:3-420(4) | 39,40 | | BOOKS | PAGES | |-------------------------------------------|-------| | Am.Jur. Easements, Section 55 | 22 | | Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed. (1939)| 22 | | New Jersey Elements of Action, [...] Chapter 47(2008-2009) | 36 | | New Jersey Causes of Action, [...] (2014) | 36,37 | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS