ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Without that disclosure, how was Plaintiff to know use of the account bound him to an agreement he had not seen, did not know was available or where to find it.  Even if he had the application, it did not advise him how to find or where the deposit agreement was located.  If use of the account triggered the contract, Plaintiff would have been immediately bound since when he opened the new accounts, funds from the hacked accounts were transferred thereto.  Use is not defined in the bank’s application, the deposit agreement glossary (Pa 130), or the sections on opening accounts (Pa 94-95) and Depository Funds (Pa 95-97).  Use is not defined under the Uniform Commercial Code, N.J.S.A. 12A:4-104.  Bank inconsistently argued in its supplemental brief, Page 6, that by signing the iPad, Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate because he signed the account application, [...] had no duty to expressly tell [...] what he was signing, and it was Plaintiff’s responsibility to understand what he was signing.  If signing of the iPad was the moment of contracting, then the UCC’s good faith requirement attached.  Every contract within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement N.J.S.A. 12A:1-304.
[directive] Attorneys, with knowledge of the expected evidence, may be aware of issues of which the judge is not aware and which should be explored in the voir dire.  This circumstance often leads to important supplemental questions.  The other side of the coin is that attorneys sometimes present to the court a long list of boilerplate proposed supplemental questions, many or most of which are repetitive, of little significance or relevance to the case, etc.  When presented with such proposals, judges are understandably not receptive.  Attorneys should tailor their proposed supplemental questions to the case, with a view to model questions to avoid repetition, and they should keep the questions neutral and balanced.
[brief] June 19, 2018 Panel Report, In re [...], Supreme Court of New Jersey Docket No.: [...] (“Panel Report”).  The Supreme Court panel found beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] committed the unethical and criminal acts as previously determined by the ACJC, and further revealed that [...] submitted fabricated phone records to ACJC and to the panel.  Id.  The panel found “beyond a reasonable doubt” that “[[...]] intentionally misused her office to advantage another, thereby violating the public trust and compromising the integrity and independence of the judiciary. ”  *Id.*  Critically, this language almost mirrors that of New Jersey’s official misconduct statute, *N.J.S. 2C:30-2*.  The panel held “[[...]]’s misrepresentations to [...] were numerous and, in at least one instance, admitted. ”  See *Panel Report*.  *[...]’s “conduct on May 9, 2015, demonstrated dishonesty, perversion of her judicial authority and betrayal of the public trust” and her “intercession ... represented a patent abuse of her office. ”*  *Id.*  In reference to fabricated cellular phone records produced by [...] and entered into evidence before the panel, the panel found beyond a reasonable doubt that “it is obvious that some alteration occurred in the voluntarily produced phone bill. ”  *Id.*  The actual phone records, which were subpoenaed from [...], “prove beyond any doubt that far from being strangers, [[...] and her friend] were in frequent communications during the months leading up to [[...]]’s May 9, 2015 call to [...] ...  The false statements [[...]] made to [...] [...] on May 9, 2015, induced police to act on behalf of her former intern.  *Id.*  [[...]] repeated those false assertions, in one form or another, at every opportunity before the ACJC. ”  *Id.*  The panel concluded that “[[...]]’s decision to supply less than truthful ... testimony before the ACJC and obviously altered telephone records to this panel, demonstrates a lack of respect for the law. ”  *Id.*  On September 26, 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court “having found beyond a reasonable doubt that [[...]] violated ... the Code of Judicial Conduct by misusing her judicial office to advance the private interests of a litigant, by making false statements under oath before the ACJC, and by submitting altered telephone records to the panel to perpetuate her prior false statements” ordered [...] “removed from judicial office and [ ] permanently barred from holding judicial office in this State...”  Pa-47; In re DeAvila-[...], 235 N.J. 218, 219 (2018)  II.  The Criminal Charges Against [...]
[brief] 12, 14 State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30 (2018)....................................................................  10 State v. Harris, 457 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 238 N.J. 510 (2019)  30, 31 State v. Ingram, 196 N.J. 23 (2008)...................................................................  21 State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989)..................................................................  26 State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263 (1990)..................................................................  12 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964)...................................................................  10 State v. Johnson, 436 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div. 2014)........................................  31 State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136 (2008).................................................................. 22, 26 State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448 (2001)..................................................................  21 State v. Kucinski, 227 N.J. 603 (2017).................................................................. 15, 18 State v. M.L., 253 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 560 (1992)
[brief] When a non-work connected physical and/or mental condition makes it necessary for an individual to leave work due to an inability to perform the job, the individual shall be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work.  Application of this exception requires a showing that, at the time of the claimant’s departure, an employer had no positions available that would accommodate the claimant’s condition or that the claimant would not have been assigned to any such position.  Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 607 (2018).
[brief] THE DACCA ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION.  In Knight v. City of Margate, 86 N.J. 374 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test to review challenges to statutes on separation of powers grounds.  That test considers: (1) the legitimacy of the governmental purpose of the challenged statute, and (2) the nature and extent of its encroachment upon judicial prerogatives and interests.  Id. at 389–90.  As explained below, under that test, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor does not violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the New Jersey Constitution because the Legislature enacted it for the legitimate purpose of protecting consumers from abusive practices in the debt adjustment market, and DACCA does not encroach upon any judicial prerogatives and interests.  Id. at 389–90.  Appellants' attempt to manufacture a threshold requirement before the Knight test applies is contrary to binding precedent and should be rejected.
[directive] These general guidelines consolidate the police response procedures for domestic violence cases, including abuse and neglect of the elderly and disabled, based on State law, Court Rules, and the Domestic Violence Procedures Manual which was jointly prepared by the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Attorney General through the Division of Criminal Justice.  I.  Definitions.  A.  Domestic Violence means the occurrence of one or more of the following criminal offenses upon a person protected under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1990:  Homicide  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1  Assault N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1  Terroristic threats  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3  Kidnapping N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1  Criminal restraint N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2  False imprisonment N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3  Sexual assault N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2  Criminal sexual contact.  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3  Lewdness  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4  Criminal mischief.  N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3  Burglary N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2  Criminal trespass N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3  Harassment  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4  Stalking N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10  B.
[brief] Rather, each of those cases stand for the proposition that a property owner’s economic interest, coupled with a strong public interest in the issue raised, could be sufficient to confer standing.  Here, Plaintiffs have shown no economic impact whatsoever resulting from the approval of [...]’ conditional use application. \(^2\)  The additional authorities cited by Plaintiffs lend no support to Plaintiffs’ baseless argument.  For example, Plaintiffs’ reference to Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rockaway, 50 N.J. 30 (1967) is misplaced.
[brief] Further, Personal Identifying Information was defined as:  …means information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual.  Personal identifying information shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following data elements: name, social security number, credit card number, debit card number, bank account information, month and day of birth, any personal email address required by a public agency for government applications, services, or programs, personal telephone number, the street address portion of any person’s primary or secondary home address, or driver license number of any person.
[brief] The following colloquy is instructive of this:  Q: We don’t know what was – for each of these checks, as we sit here today – A.  Yeah.  Q: -- can you tell me what that $50,000 check covered?  A: Off the top of my head, no.  Q: And not just off the top of your head.  Is there any way for us to determine what that $50,000 check paid for?  A: I am not sure.  (4T88:19-25, 89:1-3)  [...] further testified that there is no way to know what specific material each [...] check purchased:  Q: So if we don’t have a document telling us what your maximum quantity is and how much you’ve already ordered, how does anyone know whether or not you’re going over the amount that the contract provides – allowed you to buy?  A: I don’t have that answer for you.  (4T76:13-18).  [...], by its own admission, has no way of confirming that materials were actually delivered.
[brief] Under Illinois law, the burden of proving that a search or seizure was unlawful is placed on the defendant.  *People v. Mallett*, __ N.E.3d __, 2023 IL App (1st) 220920, ¶ 31 (2023) (citing to 725 ILCSA 5/114-12(b)).\(^4\)  Only after a defendant in Illinois has made a *prima facie* showing that the evidence was obtained from an illegal search does the burden shift to the State of Illinois.  *Ibid.* (citing to *People v. Cregan*, 10 N.E.3d 1196, 1201 (Ill. 2014)).  Also, under Illinois law, so long as an officer does not prolong a stop or cease conducting business related to a traffic stop, the officer does not need reasonable suspicion to conduct a dog sniff.
[brief] On this appeal, [...] relies on graphic arguments about the nature of the video to inflame the reader against [...].  Further, [...] erroneously claims that removal is justified by a standard of “misconduct” or “conduct unbecoming,” when the statutory threshold is more specifically “misconduct in office. ”  [...] goes as far as to argue that the statutory phrase “misconduct in office” should be “liberally construed” to apply to [...].  But that is wrong.  [...] properly received summary judgment because under the controlling statute private conduct cannot justify removal from office.  [...]’s termination decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable because it ignored the controlling statute’s clear language.  The summary judgment order for [...] should be affirmed.  The motion judge also properly directed that a plenary hearing should be held to determine [...]’s damages caused by the Borough’s unlawful removal action.  This matter should be remanded for that hearing.
[brief] Following Defendant’s termination of the agreements, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on May 10, 2021, alleging causes of action for Breach of Contract (First Count), Breach of Implied Contract (Second Count), Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Third Count), Promissory Estoppel (Fourth Count), Legal Fraud (Fifth Count), and Equitable Fraud (Sixth Count).  Pa19-22.  If Defendant had honored its commitments, Plaintiff would have ordered $390,005.85 worth of pipe through Plaintiff.  Pa16; Pa235.  Instead, due to Defendant’s breach of the agreements, Plaintiff was forced to seek product from another vendor, [...]  Pa232.  North Shore provided Plaintiff with two separate agreements each matching the type of pipe that would have been ordered from Defendant.  Pa69; Pa15; Pa235.  Plaintiff is obligated to purchase the same amount of pipe it would have purchased from Defendant from North Shore.  Pa120.  In order to release product from the applicable agreements from North Shore, Plaintiff would call North Shore and request certain material to be released.  Pa154; Pa177.  The only checks provided by Plaintiffs from North Shore are related to the same pipe identified in Defendant’s quote and quantity.  Pa232.  Plaintiff’s damages are $621,011.16.
[brief] **Accessory Uses and Driveways**  An accessory use is one which is customarily incidental and subordinate to the main use.  The accessory use must also bear a “reasonable relationship” with the primary use.  *Wyzykowski v. Rizas*, 132 N.J. 509, 519-521 (1993), citing *Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment*, 202 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1985).  Access driveways have been held to be accessory structures and to take on the character of the principal use they serve.  *Angel v. Franklin Tp. Bd. of Adj.*, 109 N.J. Super 194, 197-199 (App. Div. 1970).  The *Angel* court adopted the holding in *Wolf v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Park Ridge*, 79 N.J. Super. 546 (App. Div. 1963).  The *Wolf* court’s perspective that the character of driveways follow the use to which they are accessory was also later quoted favorably by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Nuckel*, ("[L]and used as a means of access to . . . a business[] is in a use accessorial to the business and thus is itself in legal contemplation [of] being used for the business purpose in question.").  *Wolf*, supra, at 550-551, quoted by *Nuckel v. Borough of Little Ferry*, 208 N.J. 95, 102, 104 (N.J. 2011).  See also: *N.J. Transit Corp. v. Franco*, 447 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2016), certif. denied, 230 N.J. 504 (2017), holding that where the zoning did not allow residential use on the lot upon which a driveway was to be built, use of that lot for a driveway for an apartment building on an adjacent lot would constitute either a new non-permitted principal use or, if considered as an accessory use, a variance under NJSA 40:55D-70(d)1; as well as the similar holding in Menlo Park Plaza v. Woodbridge, 316 N.J. Super. 451, 461 (App. Div. 1998), certif. den. 160 N.J. 88 (1999) where the Appellate Division upheld denial of access over a lot in an adjoining town which would have altered the character of the neighborhood into which access would be created and which served only the interests of the developer.  Since the accessory uses and structures in [...], most especially the driveway, will be used for “the business purpose in question” and thereby take on the character of that use, it is imperative that the Board fully understand and weigh the nature of that business purpose in order to measure the particular suitability of the lands in [...] for the structures and uses accessory to that use and to assess the effect of the use on the zone plan and the public good.
[brief] . . .  Plaintiff argues this statute requires an employer’s insurance policy to provide coverage for any and all grounds of liability that an employer has to its employees for bodily injury, whether under the workers compensation scheme or under common law claim for personal injury caused by the employer.  Pb8-9.  Plaintiff contends that because the employer can be held liable for intentional acts or omissions that are substantially certain to result in injury to employees, the statute requires employers liability policies to cover the employer for such wrongs.  But that is not what the statute states or how it has been interpreted by the courts.
[brief] CONCLUSION  Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the judgment in this matter be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff s/[...]  [...]  Dated: April 1, 2024  [...] (mother) and [...] (daughter), the administrator of the [...] (mother)  Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], Defendant-Respondent, and [...], JOHN DOES 1-5 (Unidentified entities or individuals that owned, operated, controlled, constructed, inspected, maintained and/or repaired the store where plaintiff fell) and ABC CORPORATIONS (Unidentified entities that owned, operated, controlled, constructed, inspected, maintained and/or repaired the store where plaintiff fell)
[brief] This appeal asks the Appellate Division to correct the trial court’s error on the following **two main issues**.  1.  During the pandemic, on April 14, 2020, the Legislature passed a Title 18A school law statute, *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)*, authorizing school districts to renegotiate contracts with vendors to provide for payments during a Covid-related work stoppage.  In passing that statute in mid-April, and amending it in late-June 2020, the Legislature never expressly or impliedly conferred a private right to a cause of action for private vendors to sue public school districts in Superior Court related to the enforcement or interpretation of that statute.  Rather, under *N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9*, the Commissioner of \textsuperscript{10} Pa226 – Pa231 Education retains jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims over the school laws, including N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).
[brief] (Da543).  While Defendants represented they were removing the [...]’ dune walkover because of the NOVs, they did not mention [...] had asked [...] to issue an NOV against the [...] so the [...] would also be issued a NOV.  (Da1079; Da1342-Da1344; Da1349-Da1350; Pa286).  Four days later, even though no one had actually seen [...] walk over the dunes or break down the [...]-owned fence, [...] went to the [...] Police Station on August 6, 2019, and swore a handwritten complaint on behalf of the [...] averring he personally witnessed [...] break through an [...]-owned fence and “continuously” trespass on [...]-owned land between January and August 2019.  (Pa82-Pa87).
[brief] Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wimberly v. City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 604, 183 A.2d 691 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 340, 184 A.2d 652 (1962) (stating that counsel may not draw inferences during summation if “there are no grounds for [such inferences] in the evidence”) (citations omitted).  When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party's motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that “it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES CRESCENZO v. CRANE, 350 N.J. SUPER 531 796 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. 2002)  .................................................................6  ORTIZ v. BENKIUS DOCKET NO. A-3823-16T1 (App. Div. Jul 31, 2018)  .............................................................................10  DEMEDEIROS v. BRILHANTE, NO. A-2292-21 (App. Div. Dec. 13, 2022)  ....13  FIK-RYMARKIEWICZ v. UNIV. OF MED & DENTISTRY N.J. SUPER 469 (App. Div.) .......................14  HALLORAN v. STANZIALE, DOCKET NO. A-4189-15T2 (App. Div. Jul 31, 2018)  ..............................................................................15  FEDERAL STATUTES
[brief] ”  Here, [...]’s failure to submit any admissible evidence from the one individual with first-hand, personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject policy and Questionnaire, [...]’s underwriter, [...], who was never deposed and never submitted an affidavit, should have been fatal to their motion.  In particular, [...] failed to establish that [...]’s alleged misrepresentations were material, or that they influenced [...] or [...]’s decision to issue the subject policy.  *See e.g.*, *Mass. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Manzo*, 122 N.J. 104, 115 (1991) (if found on an application, a misrepresentation is material only if it “influenced the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium”).
[brief] See i.e. Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 327 (2006)(a parent may agree to bind a minor child to an arbitration provision, which in essence constitutes a choice of forum, a parent may not bind a minor child to a pre-injury release of a minor's prospective tort claims resulting from the minor's use of a commercial recreational facility. ”).  In sum, the Association offers no reason to add confusion to a system that already works as intended.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court in City of Long Branch v. Liu, 203 N.J. 464, 489 (2010) indicated that it was indisputable that FF&E that are a functional unit with building taken by Eminent Domain were compensable.  The Liu Court points out that the guidelines for establishing compensability were established in State v. Gallant, 42 N.J. 583, 590 (1964), wherein the Court first quoted Justice [then Judge] [...] in Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (Ct of App. 1914).  "It is intolerable that the state, after condemning a factory or warehouse, should surrender to the owner a stock of secondhand machinery and in so doing discharge the full measure of its duty.  Severed from the building, such machinery commands only the prices of secondhand articles; attached to a going plant, it may produce an enhancement of value as great as it did when new.  The law gives no sanction to so obvious an injustice as would result if the owner were held to forfeit all these elements of value."  The Court when on to state:  The value of a factory containing industrial equipment employed in the business for which the property is being used is ordinarily greater than that of an empty and idle building.  Such equipment in place adds more to the value of the realty than its second-hand salvage value separated from the premises.  An owner, who is under no duress, and where the building and machinery are a functional unit, would undoubtedly sell only at a price which would reflect that increased value.  Where, therefore, a building and industrial machinery housed therein constitute a functional unit, and the difference between the value of the building with such articles and without them, is substantial, compensation for the taking should reflect that enhanced value.  This, rather than the physical mode of annexation to the freehold is the critical test in eminent domain cases.
[brief] If [...] already had a franchise agreement in place for the Hoboken location, it would not have been continuing to discuss the franchise with [...].  Defendant’s actions after January 22, 2014, further support a finding that the 2014 [...] franchise agreement is fraudulent.  Throughout the spring and summer of 2014, defendant continued to negotiate with [...] on behalf of [...] to establish a [...] location at the site of his failed [...] in Hoboken.  (6T107-21 to 115-25; 6T 117-11 to 118-1; 6T126-10 to 130-5).  And [...] transferred the liquor license and leasehold for the [...] location to [...] in 2014.  (6T13-6 to 16-7; 9T55-12 to 13; Sa424-29).  But if [...] had a franchise agreement for the Hoboken location, it would have needed the lease and liquor license to operate.  While a trial court’s factual finding are generally entitled to deference, factual findings that are “clearly mistaken are accorded no deference.