ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Standard for a motion to dismiss.  In a motion to dismiss, pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e), for failure to state a claim, the Court must “assume the truthfulness of the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Complaints, giving Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences that those allegations support."  Edwards v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Co., 814 A.2d 1115 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003).  It is well established that a Complaint must fairly apprise the opposing party of the claims and issues raised.  Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 465 A.2d 530 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).  The Complaint must allege sufficient facts to give rise to a cause of action.  Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., Inc., 722 A.2d 944 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998).  A motion to dismiss, however, must "be granted if even a generous reading of the allegations does not reveal legal basis for recovery.  The motion may not be denied based on the possibility that discovery may establish requisite claim; rather the legal requisites for Plaintiffs' claim must be apparent from the Complaint itself."
[brief] Despite [...]’s repeated claims, vacating an arbitration award does not require a showing that the award is “the product of fraud, corruption, or any wrongdoing. ”  Opp. at 15, 17, 19.  Nor is it that the party seeking to vacate an award must demonstrate an error of law “so egregious that one need only look at the cover page, at the award, to know that a horrible mistake had been made. ”  Opp. at 15, 19, 30 (citing Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479 (1992)).
[brief] In sum, the State presented evidence on which the jury could easily have decided defendant was not truthful about all these matters.  The present appeal includes a hodgepodge of asserted trial errors, most subject to a plain-error analysis.  None have any merit, as either no error occurred, or any error was induced by defendant, and so not correctable, or the error was not capable of producing an unjust result.  This Court should affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence without modification.
[brief] This is Plaintiff [...]’s (“[...]”) reply in appeal of the trial court’s affirmation of Defendant [...]’s (“[...]”) denial of bulk variance relief to [...] to erect a billboard and its related upholding of Defendant [...]’s (“[...]”) requirement that no billboard could be within 1,000 feet of an intersection (“Distance Regulation”).  [...] and the [...] spend much of their opposition misciting [...]’s arguments.  [...], for example, does not argue that E&J Equities Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Bd. of Adj. of Franklin, 226 N.J. 549 (2016), “set forth a new evidential standard for local planning board hearings. ” (Rb18.)  It argues that E&J Equities Ltd. Liab. clearly holds that there is an evidential standard for zoning ordinances regulating billboards that is different than a “normal” zoning ordinance, i.e. intermediate scrutiny with the burden on the municipality.  Nor does [...] argue that the [...] “failed to develop a sufficient evidential record” to defend the Distance Regulation.  (Rb19.)  This type of misdirection is meaningless and unhelpful.  [...] argues that [...] could not satisfy its fairly small burden to support the Distance Regulation.  From these elementary efforts at misdirection, [...] and the [...] then argue, somehow, that E&J Equities Ltd. Liab. is not retroactive and only applies to new ordinances.  Obviously, the opposite is true—a holding is retroactive unless otherwise stated.  As for the [...]’s denial, the [...] does its best to reinvent what it did below and what the trial court did, but the Court can read the resolution and see that the [...] does not make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Reciting what was said is very different than making factual and legal determinations with some specificity.  The [...] plainly did not do the latter.  There is no argument that it did.  **FACTUAL REPLY**
[brief] [...] was not retained to restore, repair or clean [...]’s property.  Moreover, [...] did not undertake to restore, repair or clean [...]’s property or any of the items [...] contends were damaged.  During her deposition, [...] acknowledged that she did not enter into a contract with [...].  And she acknowledged that [...] was not engaged to restore, repair or clean her property.  Accordingly, [...] owed no duty of care to [...] with regard to the restoration, repair or cleaning of her property.
[brief] On the morning of September 9, 2022, [...] arrived at the [...] building in Trenton.  (Aa2).  Complainant was outside the building collecting signatures in support of a petition for a slate of candidates that included Complainant and a challenger to [...] for president.  (Aa4).  [...] went to the [...] building because had been told that, on the prior day, Complainant had been outside of the building obtaining signatures under false pretenses.  (Aa4).  Specifically, [...] had been told that Complainant had represented that the signatures were in support of [...]’s slate, when in fact they were for a competing slate.  (Aa4).  [...] confronted Complainant about her signature-gathering tactics and a dispute ensued.  (Aa3).  Complainant reportedly felt threatened, sought assistance from a building security guard and then called both the Trenton and State Police, who calmed the situation by directing Complainant and [...] to move to separate areas of the building.  (Aa3).  The record does not reflect that Complainant made a report to the responding police officers that [...] had harassed her because of any protected status.  Nonetheless, according to [...]’s summary of its interview with her, Complainant alleged that [...] misnamed her by referring to her as “[...]” despite her repeatedly telling [...] to refer to her as “[...]”.  (Aa3).  Complainant had recently begun gender transition and had adopted a preferred name, “[...]”, which is the addition of a suffix “a” to her birth name.  (Aa2-Aa4).  In his interview with [...]’s EEO investigator, [...]  explained that he was aware of Complainant’s transition, did not recall calling Complainant “D[]” and denied that Complainant told him that she preferred [...] at any point during the morning incident.  (Aa4).  [...] explained that if he referred to her by any name, it would have been the only name he had ever known her to use, D[]. (Aa4-Aa5).  Indeed, Complainant had registered with the local union’s election committee using that name, “D[]”.  (Aa2-4).  [...] obtained surveillance video of the incident, but the recording apparently did not capture audio.  (Aa5).  The video is not in the record, as [...] did not provide a copy of it to anyone.  [...]’s investigation summary further indicates that Complainant “presented” a witness to the morning incident – “[...]” – however, the record does not indicate that [...] corroborated that [...] misnamed Complainant.
[brief] The Pre-SOL Facts Were “Necessary” to Rebut the [...]’ Affirmative Defenses to [...]’s RICO Claims Turing his attention to the [...]’ purported defenses to [...]’s NJRICO claims, [...] stated:  I recognize that it is a close call as to whether the full volume of pre-October 2004 activity was reasonable to establish the goals stated above in proving Plaintiffs’ affirmative case.  However, the rebuttal of Defendants’ defenses pushes that decision firmly in Plaintiffs’ corner.  A number of the post-October 2004 transactions in this case were justified by Defendants based on activities that occurred prior to the statute of limitations period, based on Defendants’ assertion that they had “true[d] up” work performed for the partnership at an earlier date.  (See, e.g., 124T17:25-18:6 (testifying that an October 2000 journal entry creating a balance owed from the partnership to a Defendant company was “part of the million dollars that was set up as a credit balance . . . to be trued up later”); 125T91:6-94:6 (testifying that based on the Appellate Division’s 2006 decision, Defendant [...] made a number of “true ups” to compensate Defendants for “fees that we were entitled to” for work previously performed); 129T99:8-101:19 (testifying that true-up payments were meant to compensate for a multitude of past expenses such as health insurance, construction liability insurance, advertising and rent).)  (39062-63a)
[brief] [Aa106; Aa101.]  Simply stated, the location of the dock in which [...] sought approval with the permit modification application does in fact hinder Appellant’s ability to navigate to and from its waterfront facilities and the navigational channel in Barnegat Bay.  In contrast, the record is replete with Appellant’s assertions, supported by documents, that the location of [...]’s dock inhibits Appellant’s ability to safety navigate to and from its dock and effectively access the navigational channel in the bay.  [Aa351-Aa353; Aa380-Aa382.]  A simple review of the photographs in the record demonstrates these navigational issues.  [Aa149; Aa150; Aa152; Aa153; Aa188-Aa192; Aa291-Aa298; Aa302; Aa303.]  Particularly instructive is the site plan that clearly depicts [...]’s dock blocking Appellant’s access to the navigation channel.  [Aa298.]  The record in this matter does not contain any support for the position that [...]’s extended dock will not hinder Appellant’s navigation or access to and from its waterfront facilities and the navigational channel in the bay as required by N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)9.  As such, the [...]’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, not based on substantial credible evidence, and should be reversed.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] defendant's a for account process not does risk-assessment pretrial automated  The accurately not PSA may the results reason, this For system.  justice juvenile the in involvement To released.  if crimes new commit serious may defendant adult young a that risk the reflect risk- pretrial automated of part as the that agreed has Judiciary the circumstance, this address records prior juvenile to defendants' access will have enforcement law process, assessment 28 than is defendant where less cases the in Accordingly, Registry.  Central Juvenile the in stored acomplaint-summons to whether issue made decision is the before of arrest, time the at old years determine shall checked Registry be to Central Juvenile the acomplaint-warrant, for apply or the on material bearing have might a that record juvenile a has defendant the whether a for applying (presumption of subsection 4.5.7 See decision. release charging/pretrial or for violent adjudications delinquency recent has defendant a when complaint-warrant when pretrial detention of (presumption seeking 7.4.3 subsection and crimes) firearms-related risk and score, a PSA moderate produces the crime, serious a with charged is defendant involving violence). adjudication delinquency recent a has defendant Information When New Complaint-Warrant Superseding Seek to Authority 4.2.6 Release Bearing Material on Pretrial a or Has Charges Upgrading Supports Risks. to and prosecutors police Directive encourages this in established policy general The can done that whenever be complaint-warrant rather than complaint-summons of way by charge to in cases reluctant may close be nonetheless Prosecutors safety.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Post Trial Order should be affirmed in its entirety and the Reconsideration Order should be affirmed in all aspects except for paragraph (2), which should be amended to grant Landlord the entirety of its Fee Application.  Dated: August 5, 2024  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, [...]  DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S REPLY & CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS-APPEAL
[brief] The Defendant will rely on its arguments in its initial brief on the issue of inadmissibility due to late production under R. 3:13(b)(1)(I).  As defense counsel expressed throughout the Frye hearing and in its initial appellate brief, Defendant sharply contests the accuracy of PCMD data and argues that the State’s proffer of its reliability based on the record is misleading.  Defendant does not contest that [...] is qualified to interpret the data that is given to him and other CAST law enforcement agents by [...].  Defendant’s consistent argument has been that the data in which they are interpreting has not been shown to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of cell phone location in a court of law at a criminal trial where a man’s liberty is at stake.  As such, Defendant maintains that this evidence falls short of the sufficient reliability requirement under State v. Jenewicz and was a harmful error against the Defendant.
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 8  4  Notice that BWCs are Deployed and Activated 4.1  Public Notice.  Every department or agency shall take reasonable steps to inform the citizenry of the agency’s use of this technology.  The department shall publish a statement that it deploys BWCs on its internet website or, if the department does not have its own website, then on the municipality’s website when feasible.  The County Prosecutor may assist departments in providing general public notice of their deployment of BWCs pursuant to this section.  The website posting shall include a picture showing what the device looks like, and how it is to be worn by uniformed officers or plainclothes detectives so that citizens will be able to determine whether an officer is equipped with the device.
[brief] (3T123:8)  [...] testified that she had previously searched through Haddad’s extant records looking for responsive documents to support the alleged and direct contractual link with [...], but she was ultimately unable to uncover anything further than two (2) unsigned invoices and thirteen (13) unsupported checks.  See (3T31:2-23); (3T107:9-13); (3T109:2-15); 3T114:9-20); (3T116:15-3T117:2); (3T118-1-4); (3T135:16-23).  Both [...] and [...] testified that there is no further documentation in support of their damages other than what was produced and identified as P0078-88 and P0278-282.  See (3T31:2-23); (3T107:9-13); (3T109:2-15); (3T114:9-14); (3T116:15-117:1); (3T118-1-4); (3T123:5-25); (3T135:20-23); (4T48:18-4T49:19); (4T62:23 – 4T63:12); (4T64:18-21); (4T76:13-18); and (4T88:19 – 4T89:3) [...]’s Gross Deposition Misconduct.
[brief] On May 16, 2022, Defendant made a motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s decision.  On June 2, 2022, the Appellate Division denied the Motion for Reconsideration without comment.  On or about August 16, 2023, Defendant filed a motion seeking among other things to Enforce Plaintiff’s obligation to pay Defendant $70,000.00, eliminating the $100 per day penalty, and seeking attorney’s fees.  Plaintiff filed opposition and a cross motion.  On October 13, 2023, the Court entered its Order (DA 5, Pages A51-A56)
[brief] THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR BY DETERMINING THAT NO “DANGEROUS CONDITION” OF PUBLIC PROPERTY EXISTED.  (T11-T12)  | 9 | | A.  Plaintiffs’ Reliance on Foster v. Newark Housing Authority, Roe by M.J. v. New Jersey Transit Operations, and Saldana v. DiMedio is Misplaced.  | 16 | | III.
[brief] ”  (Da202 at 23:4-5.)  failure to comply with CDC guidance regarding social distancing and other protective measures and document that compliance in the care plan, and the generalized allegations contained in the complaint of failure to provide adequate care to [...], including proper nutrition and hydration and a delay in treatment because a doctor was on vacation.  (See Da215; Da217-218.)  As described in Hargett, plaintiff cannot be permitted to avoid the requirements of the AOM statute by asserting an “administrative” or “facility” claim against [...] instead of a vicarious liability claim against specific members of its nursing or other staff members. \(^6\)  Plaintiff cannot correct or serve a new AOM at this time.
[brief] As a consequence of the Job FAD, [...] had no “meaningful” opportunity to be heard.  This is self-evident, on the face of the Job FAD, which determined that [...] could mount no challenge to [...]’s termination of his employment, even if the basis of that termination was an unlawful act by government.  Likewise, whether or not [...] was compelled by the OOS / License FAD to terminate [...]’s employment as a tenured teacher is not and cannot be dispositive of [...]’s right to obtain relief as against those unlawful decisions.  If [...]’s right to his tenured position was violated by the License FAD, the incontrovertible remedy is his reinstatement in that position.  See, e.g., Virginia Bush v. Bd. of Ed. of Warren County Voc. Schl. Dist., Comm. of Ed. Dec. No. 164-09, ("it is well-established that the appropriate remedy as a consequence of a Board's [of Education's] violation of an individual's tenure rights is reinstatement along with back pay and emoluments.")  By dispossessing him of the possibility of that, or any remedy, whatsoever, the Job FAD denied [...] Due Process.
[brief] PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY STATED A CLAIM AGAINST OLD REPUBLIC FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (Pa651-652; 4T)  [...] also attacked the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claim that [...] breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in colluding with [...] to cut Plaintiff out of the deal and in failing to be forthright and honest with Plaintiff.  (Pa569-570, [...] Mem. at 27-28).  To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (b) the defendant breached that duty; (c) the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant’s breach; and (4) the injury was caused by the defendant.  See generally, McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 57-58 (2002).  The duty can arise in a relationship where, as here, one of the parties to the relationship is in a superior position (i.e., based upon knowledge of the material facts), and has a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of the other, as to matters within the scope of their relationship.  See id.  Here, the longstanding relationship between the owners of Plaintiff and [...] was such that Plaintiff felt justified in reposing its trust and confidence in [...].  (Pa152-157).  Theirs was a longstanding relationship based upon trust and loyalty – and Plaintiff reasonably expected that [...] would deal with the utmost good faith and honesty, in its dealings with Plaintiff.  (See id.)  It is respectfully submitted that, under these circumstances, there arose between Plaintiff and [...] a “special relationship” that went beyond the typical insurance carrier-policyholder relationship that [...] referenced before the trial court.  Hence, the pre-answer dismissal of this claim, with prejudice, was erroneous.  Once again, the trial court failed to address these arguments, while dismissing the Complaint against [...], with prejudice.  (Pa651-652; 4T).
[brief] **[...]’S TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY TO AKBAR MOSQUE DOES NOT VACATE [...]’S D[...]GES.  (RAISED BELOW 4T 48:2 TO 49:10)**  On reconsideration, the Trial Court finally acknowledged that the funding of the Purchase Price by [...] was a donation to [...].  However, the Trial Court reaffirmed that [...] was not damaged because [...] had --- \(^2\)  Banks routinely transfer funds used to purchase a residential home directly to a title company or attorney trust account rather than the borrower’s account.  This failure to route the funds through the borrower’s bank account does not mean the bank has purchased the home instead of the borrower. transferred the Property to [...].  First and foremost, the Property transfer occurred after [...] suffered the damages inflicted by the TPDs.
[brief] (1T28-12 to 1T28-16)  A board member asked the applicant if it would consider lessening the number of lots proposed and the applicant said no.  (2T134-9)  The applicant refused to consider any of the recommendations of the Board, and never provided the Board with an answer as to whether a homeowner’s association would be maintaining the stormwater management areas once the homes were built.  (2T79-4 to 2T79-23)  [...] justified the requested design waiver relief by generally invoking the purposes underlying the Municipal Land Use Law (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to 163) and the Township’s Master Plan.  See 2T44-2- to 2T45-23.  The Board chairman made it extremely clear to the applicant prior to the vote that the Board felt the application, as proposed, was too much:  [...]:  It’s too much.  And if there would be something here that you’re giving back, you know what, we’ll take away one, we’ll take away two … we’ll do away with the basements.  I think, from what I can understand, I think that’s where the Board is leaning.  So, at this point you’re not changing anything. ”  (2T134-9 to 2T134-12)  The Board ultimately voted to deny the application based on significant traffic safety concerns regarding traffic and parking issues on-site and on the streets directly surrounding the subject property and based on concerns as to density of the development.  (2T144-9 to 2T144-11)  The application was heard by the Board on August 2, 2022 at a reconsideration hearing.  At this hearing, [...] requested reconsideration of the vote, but at the same time reiterated – again – that the applicant is not at liberty to amend the plans to reflect any of the changes discussed at the prior hearings.
[brief] See *State v. Rolle*, 265 N.J. Super. 482, 486 (App. Div. 1993).  Pursuant to Rule 3:5A-1, investigative detention orders can compel a defendant to submit to non-testimonial identification procedures for the purpose of obtaining evidence of that person’s physical characteristics.  Rule 3:5A-4 provides the substantive standards for issuance of such an order:  An order for an investigative detention shall be issued only if the judge concludes from the application that: (a) a crime has been committed and is under active investigation, and (b) there is a reasonable and well-grounded basis from which to believe that the person sought may have committed the crime, and (c) the results of the physical characteristics obtained during the detention will significantly advance the investigation and determine whether or not the individual probably committed the crime, and (d) the physical characteristics sought cannot otherwise practicably be obtained.
[brief] Further, the parties have taken no depositions.  Moreover, while Plaintiff served the Defendants with discovery demands on May 1, 2023, those responses were not due before Defendants filed the subject motion to compel arbitration on May 23, 2023.  Thus, this factor also weighs against waiver and in favor of arbitration.  The fifth Cole factor looks at “whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration. ”  Cole, 215 N.J. at 281.  Here, the Defendants have filed no pleadings inconsistent with the intent to seek arbitration.  First, Defendants pleaded arbitration as an affirmative defense to the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in their Answer filed on December 15, 2023.  In addition, while Defendants’ former counsel certified that arbitration was not contemplated in the [...]’s prior action ([...]), see [Da19], the gravamen of that action centered on the solicitation of [...] clients by Plaintiff and the [...] rather than any disputes arising out of the parties’ partnership documents.  The General Equity Judge treated the parties’ lawsuits ([...] and [...]) as part and parcel of the same dispute, yet they involved inherently dissimilar claims and different parties.  The [...]’s action clearly involved separate issues of client solicitation distinct from the common law partnership and statutory discrimination claims raised in the Plaintiff’s action.  Moreover, Defendants were not at liberty to invoke the arbitration clause in their action against the [...], a non-party to the Partnership Agreement.  In light of the foregoing, where no one factor is dispositive on waiver, and Defendants properly asserted arbitration in their responsive pleading to this litigation, the fifth Cole factor weighs against a finding of waiver.