ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Under statute the Specifically, 1.6.  Section Cf. detention. pretrial to subject aze 2A:162-15  N.J.S.A.  58  Page complaint-warrant) by defendants charged (i.e., of defendants eligible detention authorizes pretrial violence.  involving domestic anon-indictable offense or crime indictable with charged an are who 2A:162-19(a).  N.J.S.A. and 2A:162-18(a)  N.J.S.A.  See in except detention preventive against presumption general a creates Reform Law Bail
[brief] (9T:19-23 to 20-4).  No psychiatric expert ever testified, nor was there any documentary medical evidence admitted at trial.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 (stating, defendant has the initial burden to introduce evidence of a mental disease or defect tending to show that he or she was incapable or forming the requisite intent – while the burden of proof to establish the mens rea of the offense remains with the State); see also, Baum, 224 N.J. at 161.  As this record reflects, the only testimony elicited was that of defendant's bizarre behavior, which as properly held by the trial court, did not rise to the level of demonstrating defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect.
[brief] Motion in Limine Hearing of July 19, 2023  On July 19, 2023, the trial court conducted oral argument on various motions in limine, including Plaintiff’s motion in limine to bar reference to the State of Emergency and Defendants’ separate motion in limine seeking to bar reference to the terms of the snow removal contract, seeking to relax the court’s earlier refusal to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency, and further seeking to bar evidence regarding the non-renewal or termination of [...] after the 2018 season.  (1T).  The court ruled that the State of Emergency could not be referred to at the time of trial and affirmed its prior ruling denying Defendants’ previous motion seeking judicial notice of the State of Emergency.
[directive] with following policies, comply the Implementation I.  A.  A~plicabilitX municipal law agencies apply all state, county, and enforcement Directive shall to This come for enforcing the criminal laws in New Jersey, who responsible and sworn officers are carry under Training Act, and are authorized to a firearm jurisdiction of Police under the the position law enforcement officer and law enforcement for a as a N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.
[brief] Initially, [...] submitted a certification in support of summary judgment signed by its trial counsel, who had no personal knowledge whatsoever as to its factual substance.  An exhibit to the certification was two pages from a “proof of mailing”, a much larger document that purportedly listed all of the notices mailed out together from the Post Office.  This document was offered as proof of compliance with N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10(a)(2), that is, that the insurer had obtained from the Post Office a “date stamped proof of mailing showing the name and address of the insured,” together with all of the other insureds who were sent notices as part of the mass mailing purportedly made on that date.  Plaintiff’s opposition brief took issue with the lack of personal knowledge of the person signing the certification, and with the proof document itself.  The issue raised as to the document was the same issue successfully raised in Hodges - - the total amount of postage paid appeared to be less than what the total should have been by adding up each individual mailing.  However, [...]’s reply provided the full document together with an explanation of the postage which, Plaintiffs were forced to concede, cleared up the issue. \(^1\)  But Plaintiffs still maintained, as they do now on this appeal, that the evidence was inadequate.
[brief] 16 N.J.S.A 10:4-6 ..................................................................................................  44 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 ..........................................................................................  37 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 .........................................................................................  16, 43 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12 & 25 .............................................................................  44 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2a ......................................................................................  47 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-46 ......................................................................................  18 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51 ......................................................................................  18 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c ....................................................................................  18  Table of Other Authority  None.
[brief] The Respondent also conveniently ignores that both the pension certifying officer and her supervisor always determined Petitioner was an employee.  This was confirmed in the Report of Transfer (Pa37), Request for Personnel Action (Pa38), 20 Factor Questionnaire (Pa46), Employee/Independent Contractor Checklist (Pa55) and [...]’ email (Pa58).  While the Respondent points to minor inconsistencies, which were either dispelled by the Petitioner’s own testimony or because the investigation performed by [...]’s was fundamentally flawed, they must fall to the mountain of uncontradicted testimony and evidence adduced at the OAL Hearing.  Furthermore, the Respondent’s reliance upon the 2009 to 2014 period is also misguided.  The reality is that Respondent never did the IRS 20 Factor analysis for that period of time.  Furthermore, [...] failed to interview the Petitioner herself, who she readily admits would be in the best position to know the details of her work.  Contrary to the Respondent’s assertion, Petitioner did, in fact, respond to a request for information by virtue of her letter dated February 10, 2016.  (Pa58).  Petitioner confirmed to the Respondent that she had reviewed the Employee/Independent Contractor Checklist and added additional clarification including reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses.  [...]’s three-hour investigation with the destroyed notes should not withstand the uncontradicted testimony and information provided by the Township and the Petitioner in confirming that she was a bona fide employee.  B.
[brief] Discovery Request ..........Pa233  Statement of Material Facts submitted by [...] ....................Pa235  Exhibit A submitted by [...]  Structural Design ....................Pa241  Exhibit B submitted by [...]  2018 Executed Proposal...........Pa243  Exhibit D submitted by [...] 2017 Emails..............................Pa245  Exhibit E submitted by [...] 2017 Structural Design Draft ..Pa265  [...] responses to Statement of Facts.............................Pa267
[directive] The Court thus ruled:  In an effort to balance those competing interests, we direct that the plea agreement must contain a range on the prosecutor’s conditional recommendation.  The actual recommendation at sentencing may not require a defendant to serve a longer minimum term than that specified in the plea or post-verdict agreement.  Alternatively, the plea or post-verdict agreement may Page 104 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) specify the precise sentence if defendant provides cooperation to the satisfaction of the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s designee.  [145 N.J. at 230-31.]  Accordingly, where a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation is based upon a defendant’s anticipated future cooperation or assistance, the plea agreement must specify the range of sentences (minimum and maximum) contemplated by the plea agreement based upon the extent and quality of the defendant’s cooperation.
[brief] (2T35:15-38:2; Da 1096).  Without repeating the law on Parol Evidence as set forth in [...]’s moving Appellate brief, [...] addresses Legal Argument, Point I of Plaintiff/Respondents’ opposition regarding the Parol Evidence Rule as follows:  First, Plaintiff/Respondents claim that [...] is not challenging the admission of Parol Evidence at trial and only challenging [...]’s summary judgment denial.  That ignores logic.  [...]’s motions for summary judgment and for reconsideration and for involuntary dismissal at the close of Plaintiffs’ case and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were all pinpoint specific to the Parol Evidence Rule.  Were [...]’s motion for summary judgment granted on the Parol Evidence Rule then all the oral misrepresentations claimed by Plaintiff/Respondents would have been precluded and there would have either been no trial at all or a trial where Plaintiff/Respondents were left to prove that the technical violations alleged three years after filing the complaint caused ascertainable loss.
[brief] [...] is the *bona fide* purchaser for value of abandoned real property foreclosed by Plaintiff for unpaid taxes.  Defendants, the former owners of the property, appeal from the denial of their two motions to vacate judgment.  As a result of the first motion, the court determined that the record needed amplification.  The court thus denied the motion without prejudice and directed the parties to exchange discovery.  Defendants did not meaningfully comply with that directive.  They did not timely take any discovery, and their production was inadequate and deficient.  Defendants then filed an essentially identical motion to vacate the judgment (or reconsider) eight months later.  The judge concluded that Defendants failed to abide by the discovery order, that the record was not much different than it was in the first time, and that Defendants’ proofs were inadequate to establish entitlement to relief.  This court should affirm.  [...] is a *bona fide* purchaser for value.  [...] bought the foreclosed property from Plaintiff for good and valuable consideration of $140,000 – nearly the same price Defendants had paid several years earlier.  Defendants, who were given the opportunity to contest [...]’s status through discovery, took no action.  Discovery was also to explore whether the property was actually abandoned.  Defendants did not meaningfully participate.  The record amply demonstrated that the property – which was in decrepit condition easily satisfied the definition of abandoned.  In fact, the property at issue in this case exemplifies why the law permits expedited foreclosure of abandoned properties.  Despite having owned the property for close to three years, the only thing Defendants did was obtain site plan approval.  They did nothing to maintain or rehabilitate the property during that period, and even sat on their site plan approval for about nine months without doing anything.  Support structures were crumbling, windows were boarded up, the roof and portions of the deck had gaping holes, siding was falling off leaving exterior walls exposed, the interior was gutted and completely uninhabitable, and debris littered the yard, which was overgrown and unkempt.  The property was a blighted and tax-delinquent eyesore that Plaintiff had every right to foreclose, return to the active tax rolls, and convey to [...], which was ready and willing to fix the problem expeditiously.  Defendants received all the notice of this suit that was due.  They simply ignored the matter until after judgment entered, invented a spurious reason to vacate, then did not participate in discovery when given the opportunity.  The orders under review should be affirmed.
[brief] 7.  [...]’s Planner asserted that the Planning Board exclusion of this Property from the new zone plan was “irrelevant” to the negative criteria.  Pb14.  [6T 32-13 to 33-5, 88-2 to 91-10].  The Board Planner clearly disagreed and reported the [...] rezoning denial and the Planning Board’s review and rejection of these uses at this location.
[brief] Common law causes of action remain viable unless and until the New Jersey legislature or Courts rule otherwise.  (Da130 – Da138).  [...] further objected to jurisdiction raising a number of Trial Court level opinions which were provided to the arbitrator and which are currently being argued before the Court.  In response to a review of those unpublished Trial Court decisions the arbitrator stated:  Affirmative Defense denied.  [...] relies on Orders from two OTSC brought against them to vacate med pay arb decisions obtained BY [...], in 2015 and 2019.  The decisions in the OTSC is binding upon those parties, in those cases alone, with those facts and arguments raised.  While both have been read and considered here, neither is binding and are not a bar to [...] hearing this matter.
[brief] [...] asked a third time if he could “go home” but the unidentified detective said, “Nah.  You ain’t give me a reason for you to go home.  I haven’t heard one thing.  I heard a bunch of lies earlier.  That’s not enough for you to go home.  Give me a reason. ”\(^{12}\) (1T 95-12 to 17; Da 109, 03:50:35 to 03:51:20)  After more accusations, more silence from [...], and another break, [...], who knew [...] from his prior cooperation, entered, and [...] quickly said, “I don’t got nothing else to say, man.
[directive] h.  The prosecuting agency with approval of the entity finding such agency, or any other entity, with the approval of the prosecuting agency, where the other entity's law enforcement agency participated in the surveillance, investigation or arrest which is the subject of the forfeiture action, may apply to the Document Page of 3 3 of Superior Court for an order permitting use seized property, pending the disposition of the forfeiture action provided, however, that such property shall be used solely for law enforcement purposes.  Approval shall be liberally granted but shall be conditioned upon the filing of a bond in an amount equal to the market value of the item seized or a written guarantee of payment for property which may be subject to retum,’replacement or compensation as to reasonable value in the event that the forfeiture is refused or only partial extinguishment property rights is ordered by the court.
[brief] (Aa114)  This is important, as the Legislature wanted to ensure that municipalities were compared only to other relevant (similarly situated) municipalities by virtue of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16.2.\(^1\)  This provision required [...] to issue guidelines “for determining comparability of jurisdictions” involved in the interest arbitration process.  In that regard, N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.14, sets forth [...]’s guidelines, and contains a multitude of factors that an arbitrator must consider to make certain that the “[c]omparison of the wages, salaries, hours and conditions of employment” be to “the same or similar comparable jurisdictions, as determined in accordance with section 5 of P.L. 1995, c.425 (C:34:13A-16.2).
[brief] ”  M34  Importantly, as evidence that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in denying the variances, the Trial Court noted the discrepancies between the Board’s 2018 findings and the findings in the Board’s Resolution approving Plaintiffs’ 2016 Application:  In the resolution for the 2016 Approval, the Zoning Board actually found that [...] had met the criteria for hardship for lot area because no one in the chain of title for the Property ever owned any adjoining land.  The Board also previously found that the site was particularly suited for the proposed use since the site is adjacent to, and will be connected to, a mixed use development that together with the Property exceeds 75 acres of land required to be developed as a mixed use community.
[brief] In 1991, Tenant [...] moved into the apartment building located at [...] in [...].  In 1993, [...] purchased the building.  The [...] Rent Control Ordinance, Tenant Protection Act, and [...] were all in place when Amaconn bought the building.  At some point, Amaconn decided to “condo-ize” the building, which requires emptying the building of tenants and renovating the apartments to be sold off individually for a profit.  Condo-izing became a typical form of real estate development in Hudson County as the area became a desirable place to live and a profitable place to develop properties.  However, the rapid pace of development and redevelopment displaced existing city residents and destabilized housing markets.  This is such a notorious issue in Hudson County that the Supreme Court commented on it as early as 1986:  [N]ew patterns of development in New Jersey have unleashed powerful market forces that have continued to create instability in the rental housing market.  Particularly in the fast-growing areas along the Hudson River, so much advantage exists in the new commercial or condominium markets that owners are forcing out existing tenants.  These speculative forces threaten the ability of a community to maintain a sound housing balance for its citizens.  *Mayes v. Jackson Township Rent Leveling Board*, 103 N.J. 362, 378 (1986).  In response to these housing pressures the legislature passed the Tenant Protection Act, which allows qualifying tenants to stay in their apartments for up to 40 years as though they were still protected under the Anti-Eviction Act.
[brief] On January 23, 2020, Union County Sherriff’s Officer [...], who was assigned to the Crime Scene Identifications Unit and the Bureau of Investigations, responded to the Union County Prosecutor’s Office garage and sally port with her partner, [...], to process the victim’s Honda Accord.  (5T68-19 to 69-2; 5T72-16 to 73-13).  Officer Halpin noticed the front passenger window was broken and mostly leaning inward into the vehicle and that there was no exterior damage of note.  (5T74-19 to 24).  Inside the vehicle, they recovered two discharged cartridge casings, one on the front driver floor and the other in the rear driver floor.  (5T81-2 to 18).  They then photographed the vehicle.  (5T75-3 to 8).  After photographing the vehicle, Officer Halpin and [...] applied black powder to surfaces to look for fingerprints.  (5T75-9 to 18).  They were able to lift one print that was “useable” and several other impressions that were not usable for a fingerprint comparison.  (5T77-11 to 15; 5T79-15 to 21).  They then swabbed areas of the vehicle for DNA.  (5T78-18 to 21; 5T79-16 to 24).  Four days later, on January 27, 2020, Officer Halpin and [...] processed defendant’s Chevy Malibu for items of evidentiary value and DNA latent impressions.  (5T90-5 to 18).  There were several impressions on the exterior of the vehicle that were conducive for fingerprint comparisons that were photographed and lifted.  (5T91-14 to 22).  There were other impressions that were not useable and were swabbed.  Ibid.  A search of the vehicle revealed “official State of New Jersey paperwork associated with [defendant]” inside the vehicle.  (5T92-20 to 24).  On multiple occasions from February 5, 2020 through June 10, 2020, law enforcement officers attempted to detain co-defendant [...] to conduct an investigatory detention.  (7T41-1 to 42-22).  During that time, on April 12, 2020, co-defendant [...] was stopped in South Carolina and provided the officer with a false name.  (6T7-7 to 17-13).  Eventually, he was arrested in July 29, 2020, in Elizabeth.  (5T202-20 to 203-12).  At trial, the State introduced the testimony of several experts.
[directive] [...] Adopts New Public Health Policies to Improve Health of Nation, June 13, 2019, https://www.ama- 3 assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-adopts-new-public-health-policies-improve-health-nation-3; HIV Criminalization: [...] Opposes Public Policies that Penalize Individuals that Unintentionally Transmit HIV, Sept.  https://www.apa.org/advocacy/health-disparities/hiv-criminalization.  2017, [...], [...], Best Practices Guide to Reform HIV-Specific Criminal Laws to 4 Align with Scientifically-Supported Factors (July 15, 2014), https://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DOj-HIV-Criminal-Law-Best-Practices-Guide.pdf.
[brief] A.  The Appellate Division Should Defer to the Trial Court’s Factual Findings and its Findings as to the Credibility of Witnesses .................................................................22  B.  The Trial Court’s Analysis of the Legal Issues in this Case was Consistent with Applicable Law ..................................................................................................................25  1.  The Intent of the Parties ....................................................................................................26  2.  The Difference Between Uplands and Riparian Lands ......................................................27  3.  The Panetta Decision ........................................................................................................29  C.  The Evidence Presented at Trial Supports the Trial Court’s Finding that the Borough Owns the Entire Property .................................................................................................30  D.  The History of the use of the Property Further Supports the Trial Court’s Decision .................................................................................................................................36  E.  [...]’s Arguments Regarding the Title Issues were Without Merit and were Properly Rejected by the Trial Court ..................................................................................38  POINT II
[brief] JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Jury Voir Dire Without Defendant’s Requested Question on Fingerprint Evidence………………………………………...  2T 3-12 to 131-17 Decision Denying Motion to Exclude or Limit Fingerprint Expert Testimony………………..  1T 6-1 to 32-11; 6T 6-6 to 20 Jury Final Charge Without Defendant’s Requested Charge on Fingerprint Evidence………………………………………..  7T 22-3 to 39-25 Sentencing Decision ………………………………………….. 8T 41-11 to 18 to 43-21 Judgment of Conviction………………………………………… Da 4-6 INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] (10T11-20 to 12-23).  Once the jury exited the trial court stated, “All right, I have reviewed the verdict sheet.  It is accurate as announced by the Foreperson.  The verdict sheet has been marked C-2, as a court exhibit.  I’ll also indicate that the juror handed the court officer a note which reads, we have a unanimous verdict.  Nothing else. ” (10T16-2 to 7).  Despite saying it reviewed the verdict sheet, the trial court made no mention of the fact that the jury had also rendered verdicts on the lesser-included offenses.
[brief] **Carr v. Johnson**, 211 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 1986) ............... 43, 45  **C.L. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.**, 473 N.J. Super. 591 (App. Div. 2022) ........................................... 28, 35  **Cryan v. Klein**, 148 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 1977).
[brief] THIS COURT CAN DETERMINE WHETHER THE [...] VIOLATED MR. SIPE’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE ORDERS ON APPEAL (Da74-75 and 1T54:11-23).  The [...] asserts that [...]’s claims of due process violation are not properly before this Court.  However, because the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over [...] because he was deprived of due process, it was reversible error for it to enter the order currently on appeal.  It is perhaps ironic that the [...] claims that “it is inappropriate to include a claim alleging error of [...] regulations in a matter in which the [...] is not represented,” when that is exactly the argument supporting a violation of [...]’s due process rights.
[brief] Congress did not express or imply that a debt collector could communicate with others when a debt collector believed that doing so would make the collection of debts cheaper.  Nor did Congress say that a debt collector may share that information with anyone who promises to keep it a secret. \(^4\)  Hence, § 1692c(b) simply prohibits all third-party communications regardless of the reason unless one of the exceptions applies or the communication is to one of the few authorizes recipients.