ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Its only insight is through the seller, Defendant, and the tenant through the estoppel certificate.  By necessity the certificate must be informative.  A seller is just that, a party seeking to conclude the transaction.  Relying on information only from the seller is ill-advised.  A tenant estoppel certificate serves the salutary purpose of giving transparency from a party not beholden to the transaction, i.e., the tenant, of the state of affairs.  [...]’s decision is aligned with the informational purpose of an estoppel certificate.  He determined “[t]he obvious reason for a requirement of this nature was to enable the purchaser to learn from the tenant, in a formal matter, the status of a leasehold and to afford the purchaser the essential unfettered right to terminate if the information provided was adverse, as it was here. ” (Da11.)  In this case, [...], the tenant from whom the estoppel was promptly delivered accounted for 17% of the property's income - a vital factor.  A third misstatement is Defendant was not required to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate as it repeatedly says.  Paragraph 9.1 states it is a deliverable only “if obtained”.  Lastly, Defendant takes the trial court’s cure discussion out of context.  [...] was addressing the Defendant’s contention it had a right to submit multiple estoppels and could do so up to closing.  In assessing the argument on the purpose of prompt delivery the trial court wrote “[m]ore fundamentally, if the parties had intended to permit the [Defendant] to cure an initially deficient Estoppel Certificate prior to the Closing Date – and thereby vitiate or even negate a termination by [Plaintiff] – or if they agreed simply to wait to the Closing Date for delivery of a certificate in the first instance (i) they would not have provided for a prompt delivery of whatever certificate as the tenant provides the text of the agreement actually establishes; and (ii) they could have and surely would have provided explicitly for a right to cure”.
[directive] For the purposes of satisfying the requirements of Section 9.7.1, a Civilian Review Board must implement the following minimum procedural safeguards:  (a)  Avoidance of Interference with Ongoing Investigations or Proceedings  The Civilian Review Board must establish policies to avoid interference with ongoing investigations or proceedings, similar to the policies that an internal affairs function must adopt to avoid interference with ongoing criminal investigations or proceedings.  Specifically, the policy must make clear that the Board may not commence an investigation of a particular civilian complaint or incident until after any criminal and/or internal affairs investigations have concluded and any resulting discipline has been imposed.  This requirement applies regardless of whether the Civilian Review Board is granted authority to recommend discipline, or request reconsideration of any findings or disciplinary decisions, or is limited in its authority to auditing completed investigations.  This requirement also applies regardless of whether, as a general matter, the Civilian Review Board is granted access to redacted or unredacted internal affairs records.  After reviewing the relevant internal affairs records and conducting any other lawful investigation that the Civilian Review Board deems appropriate, the Board may, to the extent permitted by law, present its conclusions to the law enforcement executive or appropriate authority; request additional information or clarification regarding the findings or decisions made in the course of the internal affairs investigation; and/or request that the internal affairs investigation be re-opened.
[brief] Thus, the Defendant’s argument that the statute does not provide notice of prohibited conduct is meritless.  In denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in which she made these same arguments, the Municipal Court found that the ordinance is clear and unambiguous.  (2T Pg. 12, Line 4 – 13).  Furthermore, the common legal definition of nuisance is “something (as an act, object, or practice) that invades or interferes with another's rights or interests (as the use or enjoyment of property) by being offensive, annoying, dangerous, obstructive, or unhealthful. ”  Giving the term nuisance its plain meaning in conjunction with the evidence in the record clearly establishes that the conduct of the Defendant violated the ordinance.  Merriam-Webster Dictionary-nuisance.  Accessed 16 May 2024.  In light of the above, it is respectfully submitted that §201 is clear, unambiguous and enforceable.  As such, the Defendant’s appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
[brief] Moreover, the September 25, 2017 letter merely stated that the July 20, 2017 letter applied to the amended complaint.  However, the July 20, 2017 letter only applied to the defamation claim set forth in the initial complaint that [...] filed in the Underlying Action.  The initial complaint did not contain any other claim but a defamation claim.  Therefore, [...] sending a September 25, 2017 letter that merely references the July 20, 2017 letter could only mean that the September 25, 2017 letter applied only to the re-pled defamation claim asserted in the amended complaint – not the tortious interference claim.  As noted by [...], the re-pled defamation claim remained in the Underlying Action until the time the trial court ruled on a summary judgment motion in June 2022.  In addition, [...] is not entitled to the presumption articulated by SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Human Servs, 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).
[brief] Relying primarily on *Tarta Luna Properties, LLC v. Harvest Restaurant Group, LLC*, 466 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div. 2021) – a recent Appellate Division decision in which the trial court’s decision to allow an equitable award of attorneys’ fees was soundly rejected and reversed – the trial court found that there were multiple reasons why Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees should be dismissed.  The trial court found that Plaintiffs and Defendants were seeking to exercise their respective property rights, the scope of which did not become resolved (subject to this appeal) until the court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their implied easement claim, and the fact that “emotions” may have “run high” was no basis to allow attorneys’ fees.  (3T 15:17—16:10, 3T 17:4-11)  The trial court also determined that, for this same reason, there was no deterrent effect to be gained by allowing attorneys’ fees.  (3T 16:23—17:11)  The trial court further found that Defendants were not enriched by their actions.  (3T 17:21-21)  Finally, the trial court found that there was no need to fashion an alternative remedy for Plaintiffs to include attorneys’ fees in this case.  (3T 17:21—18:17)  Ultimately, the trial court concluded:  So in applying the guidance that is offered by the Tarta court in referring to the Red Devil case, and applying the facts as understood by the parties, and even accepting the facts as offered by the plaintiff in this case, the Court finds that there’s an insufficient basis for me to award attorneys’ fees under our strict American rule in this State.  (3T 18:15-21)  For all of these reasons, the trial court’s discretionary decision to preclude Plaintiffs from offering evidence in support of a claim for attorneys’ fees for their implied easement claim was neither an abuse of discretion nor incorrect, and should not be reversed by this Court.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE THAT EFFECTIVELY DISMISSED THE [...]’ CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES  A.  The Trial Court Should Have Denied Defendants’ Motions in Limine as Procedurally Improper  Defendants argue R. 4:25-8(a)(1) and Cho v. Trinitas Reg. Med. Center, 443 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2015) do not apply because “Defendants’ application did not seek a summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case via a motion in limine. ” (Drb25).  While the proposed order did not directly ask for dismissal, that was exactly what the motion sought.  The motion did not seek to bar a specific piece of evidence; it sought to bar all evidence of any kind that would support an attorney’s fees claim.  (3T6:12-15).  Defendants argued the trial court should preclude Plaintiffs from introducing all evidence in support of that claim solely because Plaintiffs allegedly had no legal entitlement to seek attorney’s fees.  (3T7:4-17).  Relying on both the motion in limine brief and the previously-filed summary judgment brief, Defendants’ counsel focused his oral argument on the legal entitlement to attorney’s fees and punitive damages, and never mentioned a single rule of evidence.  (3T6:18-3T9:2; 3T12:13-3T14:18; 3T6:24-3T7:2).  7  The trial briefs did not address the motion in limine with respect to punitive damages because Defendants made that motion orally for the first time at trial.  (3T6:10-23).  At argument, the trial court clearly treated the motion in limine as dispositive on the issue of both attorney’s fees and punitive damages (3T16:15-3T20:2), as reflected in the Final Judgment Order:  WHEREAS, on the first day of trial on October 25, 2022, the Court granted Defendants [...] and [...]'s Motions in Limine barring Plaintiffs from presenting any evidence relating to attorneys' fees and punitive damages, which had the effect of dismissing those claims from the case.  [Da2571.]  Defendants acknowledge they had previously lost an earlier summary judgment motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees, but seemingly argue that the motion in limine should not be considered a second dispositive motion because the number of claims were different, even though the arguments were the same.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Albanese v. Kazan, No. C33-16 (SEC Oct. 31, 2017) | 28 | | Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 234 N.J. 150 (2018) | 17 | | Andersen v. Fernandez, C03-22 (SEC June 28, 2022) | 24, 25 | | Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197 (1997) | 16 | | Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Board of Education, 13 N.J. 172 (1953) | 31, 38, 40 | | Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cnty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, 131 N.J. 626 (1993) | 18, 39 | | E. Bay Drywall, LLC v. Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 251 N.J. 477 (2022) | 18 | | George Harms Constr. v. Turnpike Auth., 137 N.J. 8 (1994) | 16 | | Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500 (1992) | 17 | | Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289 (2015) | 17 | | In re Bridgewater, 95 N.J. 235 (1984) | 16 | | In re Election L. Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254 (2010) | 18 | | In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370 (2013) | 17 | | In re Roman and Thomas, SEC Dkt. No. C28-20 (Comm. Ed. Jan. 25, 2022) | 23, 24 | | In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (2011) | 17 | | Lovett v. Asbury, C01-09 (SEC Apr. 28, 2009) | 30 | Messick v. Bd. of Rev., 420 N.J. Super 321 (App. Div. 2011) .................................. 17, 39 Messner v. Gray, No. A-5418-13 (App. Div. Mar. 31, 2016)
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum C | August 2024 Barricaded Individuals Response by Mental Health Professionals.  5.4  Tactical Team and/or Crisis Negotiation Team Commanders, when called to respond to an incident involving a barricaded individual, shall immediately notify the on-call Mental Health Professionals selected under Section 5.2 and 5.3 to be available to assist the team in accordance with pre-established protocol.  If responding to the scene, which is the preferred option, the mental health professionals shall be assigned to a safe and secure area from which they are able to monitor the communications with the barricaded individual and be available to provide insight and expertise to both the crisis negotiators and command personnel.  If assisting either telephonically or via a virtual connection, mental health professionals should, to the extent practicable, be provided with information about the situation and the ability to monitor communications with the barricaded individual.  Command personnel should determine, in advance, the most efficient process for consulting with the mental health professionals.  12  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] ”  Id.  The court failed to present in its findings a “morsel” of EVIDENCE in its denial of a Civil Rights Action claim that would have verified and/or disputed this defendant had known or should have known of the 1990 hearing for the evidence clearly demonstrates the contrary, as further established in Argument II.  The court advanced an erroneous “presumption” (lacking facts and evidence) this defendant HAD notice for the 1990 hearing (Pa2) for “IF” this presumption were found to be credible (there is no evidence in this case to remotely presume neither Service of Process nor knowledge had been given regarding the 1990 hearing up until 2023), it could have negated the defendant’s claim of defective service, i.e. having no notice given but this presumption will be debunked in this appeal.
[brief] *  **Pa8.**  Further, pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b)*, The appointing authority shall notify the Civil Service Commission of the disposition of the certification by the disposition due date in the manner prescribed by the Chairperson or designee.  **The disposition due date may be extended beyond the expiration date of the eligible list to fill current vacancies. **  Under no circumstances shall a disposition due date be extended beyond the expiration date of the eligible list when vacancies do not exist.  An anticipated vacancy shall not be considered the same as an existing vacancy…  *N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b)* (emphasis added).
[brief] The trial court erred in finding that the County was obliged to waive the defect in [...]'s bid despite [...]'s failure to provide its NJDOT Notice of Classification with its bid where, among other bases, the County has previously enforced the requirement in the same manner, NJDOT Classification is required to perform the work, the relevant information regarding classification was not elsewhere in [...]'s bid, and [...] did not provide its NJDOT Notice of Classification until twenty-one days after bid opening and thirteen days after being informed that its bid was being rejected because of the defect.  (1T60-11; 3T34-12)  Despite the County never making the discretionary determination whether to waive the defect in [...]’s bid, the trial court determined that the County was obliged to waive it.  1T60-11 – 1T61-13.  That decision was heavily impacted by the trial court’s failure to recognize the bid date as the critical date for evaluating decision making and the trial court’s failure to consider possible and potential impacts from the defect and waiver.
[brief] Rather than propose a conforming use, the redeveloper proposes to construct an entirely residential structure with residential dwelling units at grade.  The relevant portions of Ordinance 290.68 C (2), which sets forth the permitted uses in the zone, was amended by Ordinance 1535-16, which was adopted by the Mayor and Council on December 20, 2016, some six (6) months after the Redevelopment Agreement was entered into, but more than two years prior to the redeveloper's acquisition of [...].  One of the changes made by Ordinance 1535-16 was to change the permitted uses in Ordinance 290-68A to include, *inter-alia*, the following:
[brief] 2.  On November 1, 2021, Respondent posted a link to a Google Doc entitled “BOE Races – November 2nd – Who to Vote For?” and commented on that post, stating:  Not sure who to vote for Board of Education ???  Check here...  **See Exhibit 2 to Amended Complaint (Ca263). **  3.  On November 1, 2021, Respondent posted a picture of a girl holding a banner that says:  MERISSA BORAWSKI HEATHER KOENIG  CENTRAL REGIONAL Board of Ed  Below this picture are the words “V.O.T.E., Merissa and Heather for Central B.O.E. ”  **See Exhibit 4 to Amended Complaint (Ca267-268). **  Above that picture, Respondent typed the words “VOTE tomorrow”
[brief] (Da31).  decision in Graves, which involved similar facts, the hierarchical approach to religious property disputes should similarly apply in this case.  The [...] has officers and a Grand Body at the national level.  It also has state-level officers and local Temple officials.  The Grand Body of the [...], Inc. and the highest-ranking officer, the Grand Sheik, [...], has determined that the Property in Trenton belongs to the Defendant, the [...], Inc., and demanded its return prior to this litigation.  Under the Defendant’s Rules and Regulations, the Defendant owns the Temple Property.  The Grand Sheik has power over all Moorish Science Temples in the United States, including the one located at the Property.  Under Act 13 of the Defendant’s original Rules and Regulations and Rule 13 of the current Rules and Regulations members, like the Plaintiff, cannot withhold property from the national religious organization.  (Pa140).  Furthermore, the doctrinal Moorish Guide on Humanity clearly states that:  “When any said Temple desires to purchase property they must first notify the grand body of the Prophet and it must be purchased under the name of the [...] or [...].  An individual name should never be applied. ”  I, [...], am responsible for all finance including purchase of property and whatever it might be that pertains to finance .  . .  Everything, every business transaction or anything pertaining to finance is to be transacted in the name of the [...] or [...]. ” (Pa206-Pa208).  The name on the 1996 deed to the Property is “[...]”.  The Plaintiff did not file papers with the State of New Jersey to change its name until 2019.  The purpose of the 2021 quitclaim deed executed by the Plaintiff was to take the Defendant’s Temple Property.  Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s own officers admitted in their depositions that they follow the teachings of the [...] and that they have been followers for most of their lives.  This is also confirmed by the Plaintiff’s own Certificate of Incorporation.  In fact, the Plaintiff, in its own Certificate of Incorporation states that it is “subservient” to the Defendant and affiliated with Defendant.  (Pa235).  The facts of this case mirror the facts in Graves.
[brief] The Appellate Division again reaffirmed and applied this principal in [...] Systems, Inc. v. [...] Associates, 2018 WL 2922988 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 236 N.J. 33 (2018), in which, a commercial tenant ([...]) filed an action against its former landlord ([...]) to recover its security deposit, and the landlord filed a counterclaim seeking $54,196.04 for alleged repairs required after the tenant vacated.  After establishing at trial that the $54,196.04 claim was unfounded and deceptive, [...] amended its complaint to include a CFA claim alleging imposition of improper debt, and the trial court ruled in [...]’s favor, and awarded the tenant treble damages under the CFA in excess of $150,000, based on “ascertainable loss” in the form of the $54,196 improper debt, despite the fact that [...] never actually paid it.
[brief] The Studies Cited by the Amici should be disregarded as they constitute inadmissible hearsay, are irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and lack any probative value pursuant to N.J.R.E. 801, 802, 401 and 403(a).  The Amici cite several surveys and studies in an attempt to support the proposition that disclosure of a student’s gender identity to their parent is harmful.  However, such studies are inadmissible hearsay that should not be considered by the Court.  R. 1:6-6 provides only facts which are admissible in evidence may be considered by the Court when hearing a motion.  The studies upon which Amici rely constitute inadmissible hearsay, are irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and should not be considered by this Court pursuant to N.J.R.E. 801, 802, 401 and 403(a).  N.J.R.E. 801 and 802 provide that hearsay, defined as an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is not admissible.  The various studies cited are the exact definition of hearsay and, if considered by the Court, deprive the [...] of the opportunity for cross-examination.  As such, these studies cannot be considered.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DECIDED CORRECTLY THAT APPELLANT’S FDCPA CLAIM IS BARRED (RAISED BELOW: PA51-PA52)  Finally, the trial court held correctly that Appellant failed to allege an FDCPA claim as a matter of law because she cannot base such a claim solely on conduct under the NJCFLA for which she lacks a private right of action under the state statute.  The trial court held specifically:  Plaintiff has pled that she is a consumer from whom defendants attempted to collect a debt without being licensed as required under New Jersey statutory law.  Her claim relies on a finding that failure to obtain a license rendered plaintiff’s debt void by operation of law, and that subsequent collection activity misrepresented the legal status of that debt in violation of the FDCPA.  Those claims are barred.  (PA52).  The trial court’s reasoning is squarely on point with all of the law cited above as to the NJCFLA, and protects New Jersey’s strong interest in deciding how the NJCFLA will be enforced.
[brief] I, ¶ 9 .................................................. 23, 25, 31 | | N.J. Const., art.  I, ¶ 10 ................................................ 23, 25, 31 | | U.S. Const., amend.  V .................................................... 36 | | U.S. Const., amend.  VI ................................................... 22, 25, 31 | | U.S. Const., amend.  XIV ................................................ 22, 25, 31 | | OTHER AUTHORITIES | |-------------------| | Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C)(1)
[brief] APPELLANT MISINTERPRETS THE LOWER COURT’S ORDERS WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION  Because the Lower Court dismissed the underlying action for failure to state a claim, the Lower Court did not reach the merits of Appellant’s Motion to Consolidate and Vacate and held that the motion was moot.  Specifically, Appellant sought to transfer the Collection Action into the within Action and then consolidate both Actions and vacate the default in the Collection Action.  But it is only after the Collection Action is transferred and consolidated into the Action that the Lower Court could ultimately determine whether the Judgment should be vacated.  Because the Lower Court ultimately dismissed the underlying Complaint, there was no action to be consolidated and, thus, the Lower Court held that the Collection Court was the correct court to determine the Motion and that Appellant’s Motion is moot.
[brief] This point responds to Point IV of the [...]’s amicus brief.  The State relies on Point I.C.1 of its main response brief to respond to Point III of the [...]’s amicus brief regarding voir dire of the jury pool on their purported biases toward the reliability of fingerprint-analysis evidence.  disproportionate weight” to it.  (See IPAb at 13).  Indeed, the [...] makes no such claim that he did, focusing instead on considerations to be made when experts provide misleading testimony in general.  (See IPAb at 11-14).  The [...]’s contentions are therefore inapplicable and should be rejected.  [...] provided the proper scope for the conclusions and inferences to be drawn from his testimony.