ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On February 24, 2022, Defendants sent Plaintiff a Time of the Essence letter setting a closing date of March 11, 2022.  Da1.  On April 20, 2022, correspondence was sent from Attorney for Plaintiff, [...] to Attorney for Defendants, [...], as administrator, and [...], declaring Defendants in formal default under the PSA, [...].  Da2.  On April 28, 2022, a three (3) count Complaint was filed on behalf of Plaintiff, [...], against the Defendants for breach of contract, for a reformation of the contract, and for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Plaintiff was seeking a mandatory injunction to compel Defendants to perform certain environmental obligations and/or awarding financial compensation to Plaintiff.  Pa0001.  On August 2, 2022, a Notice of Lis Pendens was filed on behalf of Plaintiff, Da8.  On September 12, 2022, an Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim was filed on behalf of Defendants.  Pa0009.  On January 18, 2023, a Motion to Compel Discovery was filed on behalf of Plaintiff.  **Pa0030**.  On January 26, 2023, an Opposition to Motion and Cross Motion for Protective Order was filed on behalf of Defendants.  **Pa0115**.  On January 30, 2023, A Reply Brief was filed with the Court by Plaintiff in response to Defendants’ Opposition to Motion.  **Pa0122**.  On February 2, 2023, an Order Granting the Defendants’ Protective Order was filed.  **Pa0190**.  On July 12, 2023, the trial before [...] commenced.  **2T5**.  On July 19, 2023, Oral Argument was presented to the Court by Defendants arguing a Motion to Dismiss.  **5T61**.  On July 25, 2023, the Final Day of the trial, closing arguments were presented.  **8T121**.  On August 24, 2023, the Order for Final Judgment issued by [...] was filed.  **Pa0194**.  On September 4, 2023, a Notice of Appeal was filed with the Appellate Division on behalf of Plaintiff.  **Pa0236**.  On September 18, 2023, a Notice of Cross Appeal was filed with the Appellate Division on behalf of Defendants.  Da41.  On November 17, 2023, a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal was filed with the Appellate Division on behalf of the Defendants.  Da12.  On December 4, 2023, a denial of the Order to Dismiss was filed by the Appellate Court.  Da15.  DEFENDANTS’ STATEMENT/COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (1T10-9 to 12).  While conducting their surveillance, officers observed four males on the north side of [...] with heavy foot traffic leading to the males.  (1T10-16 to 11-4).  The males were wearing dark clothing and ski masks, and the area was poorly lit.  (1T11-15 to 18).  Officers observed pedestrians walk up to the males and then quickly “break contact. ”
[brief] As such, judicial review of the adoption of the amendment to Redevelopment Plan—and not the designation itself—establishes this Court’s standard of review.  Where a determination in question is legislative, a reviewing court considers a record that “may be less extensive,” because this type of decision does not “require any formal findings of fact, or consequently, the presentation of evidence…providing a factual foundation for the ordinance. ”  *Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City Council of City of Jersey City*, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010).  A court upholds an exercise of legislative discretion, such as a municipality’s adoption of a redevelopment plan, unless “arbitrary or capricious, contrary to the law, or unconstitutional. ”  *Downtown Residents*, 242 N.J. Super at 332.  “A determination predicated on unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. ”  *Bryant*, 309 N.J. Super. at 610.  This standard of review is well-settled by this Court.
[directive] NGRI Acquittee  Who has been Found Dangerous to Self, Others, or Property of as a Result  Mental Illness  * * *  This order ([...]) is to be used when, following a periodic review hearing, the of commitment the acquittee is continued by the court having found that the acquittee cannot be released into the community, either with or without conditions, without posing a danger to self, others, or property pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4- 8(b )(3).
[directive] Officers should continue to arrest individuals encountered with outstanding domestic violence warrants.  1.  Officers should note that only warrants listed within the municipal courts’ electronic Automated Complaint System (ACS) will need to be checked for domestic violence involvement.  This check can be done through the “DV Indicator” within ACS (marked “Y” or “N”).  2.  Warrants related to traffic offenses (listed within the Automated Traffic System (ATS)) will not need to be checked for domestic violence involvement.  G. release.  As dictated by AOC Directive #04-22, officers shall release Conditions of individuals with qualifying warrants with the below conditions captured in the bail recognizance form.
[brief] C.  Fee Application and Decision.  In fall of 2022, as it appeared that efforts to execute on the judgment in New Jersey were largely exhausted after the sale of Koger and a related accounting application (Sipko v. Koger, Inc., No. A-439-22 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2023)), Plaintiff renewed his application for post-judgment attorneys’ fees which would not have been incurred but for [...] and [...]’s repeated frauds on the courts.
[brief] Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group, 77 N.J. 228, 234 (1978); Needham v. New Jersey Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 230 N.J. Super. 358, 369 (App. Div. 1989).  To bolster their argument that this Court should declare that actual receipt of a properly-mailed cancellation notice must be proven, rather than simply compliance with the actual requirements set forth by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10, plaintiffs attempt to make much of a change in the wording of the statute that occurred more than forty (40) years ago.  Plaintiffs assert that, prior to 1980, N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 reflected less stringent requirements, and included the statement that “Proof of mailing…shall be sufficient proof of notice. ”  Pb10, Pb17-Pb19.  Noting that the Supreme Court’s opinion in *Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group*, *supra*, was governed by that earlier version of the statute, plaintiffs seem to intimate that the courts that have cited *Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group*, *supra*, particularly *Hodges v. Pennsylvania Nat. Ins. Co. on Behalf of NJAFIUA*, *supra*, have mistakenly relied on an outdated standard and failed to consider the current version of the *N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10*.  Pb18-Pb19.  This is not accurate.  The Appellate Division in *Hodges v. Pennsylvania Nat. Ins. Co. on Behalf of NJAFIUA*, *supra*, 260 *N.J. Super.* at 223, specifically acknowledged that *Weathers v. Hartford Ins.  Group*, *supra*, applied a standard set forth in “the former *N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10* which required only ‘Proof of mailing’” and noted the stricter standard of the revised statute.  *N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10* sets forth specific requirements with which a carrier can comply, and a carrier can produce evidence within its control to demonstrate that it did, in fact, comply with the requirements to effectively cancel a policy.
[brief] See *Tahoe-Sierra*, 535 U.S. at 322, 122 S.Ct. 1465.  ...  [A] physical appropriation is a taking whether it is permanent or temporary….  The duration of an appropriation—just like the size of an appropriation, see *Loretto*, 458 U.S. at 436-437, 102 S.Ct. 3164—bears only on the amount of compensation.  See *United States v. Dow*, 357 U.S. 17, 26, 78 S.Ct. 1039, 2 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1958).  [594 U.S. 140]  Thus, to accomplish a physical taking, the government only needs to enter the land without authorization.  *United States v. Clarke*, 445 U.S. 253, 255–56, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1129–30, 63 L.Ed.2d 373, 376–77 (1980) (citing *United States v. Dow*, 357 U.S. 17, 21, 78 S.Ct. 1039, 1044, 2 L.Ed.2d 1109, 1114 (1958)).  In a physical invasion case, the law is clear that the size and the duration of the invasion does not affect the owner's right to compensation.  See *Loretto*, 458 U.S. at 429-30 (observing that “occupations of land by such installations as telegraph and telephone lines, rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his land”).
[brief] The Court granted the motion to dismiss, properly finding the allegations of Plaintiff unlawfully competing and interfering with [...] were wholly unsubstantiated.  3T142:2; 3T148:16.  The Court stated that “...[w]e waited for the testimony and there was nothing in the testimony to remotely -- giving every possible inference, every favorable inference that is at -- conceivably given -- that one could even have a modicum of speculation that was done improper by [...].  And for that reason, I think the case against the third-party complaint against Third Party Defendant [...] must be dismissed as a matter of law. ”  3T142:2-12.  Trial concluded on January 13, 2023.  The Trial Court did not render its decision until May 8, 2023.  B.
[brief] (Da74; Da77-78; Da100-01).  After they finished eating, [...] got her phone back and, based on an updated receipt from Uber that was emailed to her, tipped the driver.  (Da205-208).  She never had opportunity to see the pop-up.  [...] didn’t either.  Both say that if the checkbox was clicked, it would have been their daughter, intentionally or unintentionally, while keeping tabs on the delivery.  (Da197-200; Da209-211).
[brief] I didn’t want this to happen.  I – I was protecting us. ” (21T:136-21 to 138-24).  Defendant then claimed that his mother called his father, and told his father to come home.  Once his father arrived 20 to 30 minutes later, defendant claimed they called 911.  Ibid.  Defendant claimed he took so long to call 911 because he panicked.  (21T:138-25 to 140-4).  He claimed that he “lost track of time,” and then claimed he had not actually called his mother immediately after the shooting.
[brief] Q  [...], you are familiar with that case, that was the Hamilton 7-Eleven armed robbery, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And on that evening, May 7th, 2011, you were in fact, in Hamilton, right?  A Yes.  Q  And you entered the store, the 7-Eleven store, armed with a handgun and your purpose was to commit an armed robbery, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And when you entered the store you were wearing a black hoodie shirt which had some white graphics on the front of the shirt, isn't that correct?  A Yes.  Q  And in fact we saw that on the video, right?  A Yes.  Q  And the person that you were in the store with on that date was not [...], correct?  A No.  Q  And you did, in fact, commit that armed robbery and took some money from the store owner, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And you converted that money to your own use, right?  A Yes.  EXAMINATION BY [...]:
[brief] (Pa001830).  (“I know that [...] gave us notice. ”).  Moreover, [...] terminated its interconnection agreement with [...] for the solar project after [...] lost land control, in March of 2018.  (Id.).  Under New Jersey law, variances and approvals travel with the land and belong to the landowner.  This rule is not unique to New Jersey but rather is a facet of zoning law across the United States.  Thus, when Appellants failed to pay their Lease and lost land control, they also lost the ability to act upon the approvals or development rights, including those at issue here.
[brief] A.  [...]’s Supervisors Confirmed that He was Experienced, Good with Customers, Knowledgeable about the Store’s Products, and Actually Provided [...] with Accurate Information about the Grout in Question.  The jury heard testimony from [...]’s immediate supervisor, store manager, and HR manager, who stated that he was adequately trained and amicable in dealing with customers and that there was nothing in his employment history to suggest he would attack a customer.  In particular, [...], [...]’s HR manager, testified that the training [...] completed after being hired to work in the Flooring Department was merely a formality, since he had already completed CSA training twice, each time he was hired as a cashier.  [6T 45:24-47:6].  Accordingly, in her opinion, [...] was trained and knowledgeable in the essential skills of his position at the time of the incident.  [6T 29:8-12].  She also confirmed that it was [...] policy to allow employees who had not completed their training to interact with customers without supervision.  [5T 56:11-19, 57:3-8, 68:24-69:4; 6T 58:8-25].  [...], an assistant manager at the Marlboro [...] who supervised [...] in each of his three stints of employment, testified that [...] had significant experience dealing with [...]’ customers.  [6T 142:6-18].  He described [...] as respectful and courteous and denied receiving any complaints about [...] or hearing reports of any altercation between [...] and a customer prior to the incident with [...].  [6T 136:3-138:18].  Madden also confirmed that employees in training were “encouraged” to assist customers even when they were not being supervised by a Red-Vest employee.  [6T 200:24-202:4].  Finally, [...]’s Flooring Department supervisor, [...], testified that he had actually provided [...] training on [...] grout products prior to the incident.  [9T 52:10-54:4].  Craig also confirmed that the information [...] provided [...] about the grout in question was accurate.  The bag of grout was marked as an exhibit and introduced as evidence.  [9T 52:24-53:5].  Craig testified that it contained “universal” grout that could be used in applications that required unsanded grout.  [9T 53:6-22, 78:9-22].  In addition, Craig stated that the grout was appropriate to use on joints measuring less than one-eighth of an inch.  [9T 78:9-14].  Craig also testified he personally observed [...] interacting with customers on his own in the Flooring Department; he described [...] as courteous and respectful with customers, and noted that he would routinely seek out senior employees for assistance with customer questions he did not know the answer to.  [9T 72:9-24].  Craig never encountered any issues with [...] and was unaware of any complaints about [...]’s demeanor or conduct.  [9T 72:16-73:5].  Accordingly, Craig testified he was comfortable with [...] interacting with customers in the Flooring Department without supervision.  [9T 73:18-22].  Plaintiffs did not present any evidence at trial contradicting the above testimony regarding [...]’s experience, skills, and demeanor.
[brief] See Rule 6:2-3(d)(2).  However, if the certified mail is returned marked “unclaimed” or “refused,” service is considered effective provided the regular mailing has not been returned.  Ibid.  Finally, if the regular mail is not returned, that raises a presumption of proper service.  R. 6:2-3(d)(1) and (4).  In support of her argument that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction in this case, [...] yet again relies on numerous unpublished opinions, including Murphy v. 113 E. Cedar, No. A-2430-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1282 (App. Div. July 24, 2023) (Db16), Epos, Inc. v. Pantelopoulos, No. A-2365-08T1, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2922 (App. Div. Dec. 1, 2009) (Db18); and Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Buja Investments, Inc., Civ. No. 11-355, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7011, 2012 WL 194397, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2012) (Db18), wholly disregarding the directive of Rule 1:36-3.
[brief] The Law Division correctly denied the motion by defendant-appellant [...] ("[...]") to compel arbitration on waiver grounds.  After almost six years of litigation brought by plaintiffs-respondents [...] and [...] (collectively, "[...]"), [...] for the first time sought the extraordinary relief of abandoning this case by seeking to compel arbitration.  Reversal would create new law; it would be the first time any New Jersey court has compelled arbitration after such a lengthy delay.  [...]’s conduct exhibits the classic hallmarks of intentional waiver.  In addition to its delay, [...] failed to plead arbitration as an affirmative defense or cite any contractual arbitration provision.  [...] went even further by disclaiming any intent to arbitrate and expressly demanding a jury trial.  Over the ensuing six years, [...] actively availed itself of the Law Division’s jurisdiction, including its own cross-motion for partial summary judgment on allocation on which it prevailed.  [...] also leveraged expansive discovery not typically available in arbitration to procure over 266,000 pages of documents, interrogatory responses, 39 deposition transcripts, and other discovery from [...] and other parties.  [...] thereby kept its arbitration designs hidden from [...] and the Law Division for years.  If this conduct is not an intentional waiver by the most sophisticated of litigants, nothing is.  [...] also waived arbitration by sitting on its hands during four prior stays.  Instead of reserving its rights or initiating arbitration of its own, [...] sought a fifth stay only after the fourth stay was lifted, apparently in a calculated strategy to delay this case even further.  The inclusion of other parties to this litigation was no reason for [...] to delay arbitration, as prevailing caselaw confirms that is not a factor with respect to waiver.  Nor does the allocation of defense costs among the insurers excuse [...]’s lack of diligence to pursue any arbitration rights as [...]’s defense cost allocation vis-à-vis [...] could have been determined solely through the arbitration.  If [...] desired to seek contribution from other insurers, arbitration with [...] would not have prevented that.  [...] at least had an obligation to alert [...] and the Court below of its intent to arbitrate rather than conceal it behind a jury demand in its responsive pleading.  Based on these facts, [...] correctly found that “[...] engaged in litigation conduct that was certainly inconsistent with its right to arbitrate” and concluded that [...] waived its right to arbitration.  Hearing Tr. 68:8-16.
[brief] The MOU contains a fee-shifting provision requiring an award of all costs and counsel fees to the prevailing party in an action seeking its enforcement or protection of a party’s rights thereunder stating in relevant part:  If any party shall retain or engage an attorney or attorneys to collect or enforce or protect such party's interest with respect to this MOU, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive payment of all costs and expenses of collection, enforcement, or protection, including reasonable attorney's fees, whether or not suit is brought and through all appeals.  [(Da30). ]  Despite a counsel fee award by the trial court totaling $34,426.50, as set forth in an Order dated February 5, 2024, Appellants have failed to pay.  (Da14).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] As there has been no error, there has been no cumulative error.  For any contention that may have constituted error, prejudice has not been demonstrated.  That is, the defendant has not demonstrated that any such error was so serious as to deprive Defendant of a fair trial, nor that but for the purported errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.  The allegation of cumulative error is not appropriate simply wherever multiple claims of error are argued.  At times (such as this), “the assertion of a large number of related claims of ineffectiveness of counsel does not necessarily enhance their significance or capacity to affect [relevant deliberations].”  State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 257-58 (1997).  The courts have rejected cumulative claims where the court is “unpersuaded that the cumulative force of… claims is measurably greater than that of the individual claims. ”  Id.  The Marshall Court’s observation is salient here as well.  III.  THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
[brief] Between 2012 and 2017, its four-year graduation rate rose over 10 points, from 67.3% to 77.2%. (Aa1136).  The number of students participating in advanced placement courses increased by nearly 40% during the same period.  Ibid.  Student achievement on State assessments also showed gains across the board, indicating that the District closed the achievement gap between it and other districts.  (Aa1136-37).  Based on these and other developments, on July 5, 2017, the area of instruction and programming was returned to local control.  (Aa1209-11).
[directive] ReveGe Asset Sharings of :g  The use of reverse asset sharing funds is limited to the authority of the Secretary of the 5 U.S.C. Treasury under 31 9703(b)(5), which states “amounts transferred by the ... ..., Attorney General.. .,or by the Postmaster General and deposited into the Fund are available to the Secretary of the Treasury for federal law enforcement purposes of the Department of the Treasury law enforcement organizations. ”  27  Executive Ofice Asset Forfeiture for  This page is intentionally blank.
[brief] “To constitute a valid defense of laches, the delay must not only be unexplained and inexcusable, but must have visited prejudice upon the party asserting the delay. ”  Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 396, 403 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1958).  Further, [l]aches in legal significance, is not merely delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another.  So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no steps to enforce them until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable and operates as an estoppel against the assertion of the right.  Mitchell, 48 N.J. Super. 396, 403 (quoting 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, pp. 177-179, sec. 419d. (5th ed. 1941)).
[brief] With respect to each reciprocal, the Department is well-aware of the amount of the AIF Fee, given that it is and always has been clearly set forth in the POA that the Department has repeatedly reviewed.  The Department has never before applied SSAP No. 25 to AIF Fees.  Consistent with the pending legislation, the Department has never raised any concern over the management fee or, until now, sought to review AIF’s financial information, expenses or pro forma financial statements.  This is because N.J.S.A. 17:50-8 subjects the “records, affairs and financial condition of the exchange” to the Department’s review—not those of the AIF.
[brief] 18  Kirylak v. Edgewater, 131 N.J. Super. 461 (Super. Ct. 1974) ......................... 26 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362 (2015)  .................................................. 16, 19 Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State, 250 N.J. 550 (2022)  ...........................................  10  Matter of Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1 (2020) ....................................  15  Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2008) ..............................................................................................................................  12, 21 Myska v. N.J.  Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 2015)  .....................  10  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 2011)  ........................................................................................................  11  Ocean Cty. Bd. of Realtors v. Beachwood, 248 N.J. Super. 241 (Super. Ct. 1991)  .................................................................................................................................  37  Point Pleasant Borough PBA Local No. 158 v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 412 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div. 2010)  .................................................................  11  Reisdorf v. Borough of Mountainside, 114 N.J. Super. 562 (1971)
[brief] At [...]’s resentencing hearing, even the State conceded that concurrent sentences would be appropriate if the resentencing court applied Miller factor five, or found [...] capable of rehabilitation.  (Db 13-14);  Notwithstanding this Court’s instructions for remand, the State’s concession at the resentencing hearing, and the resentencing court’s own finding that [...] was clearly capable of rehabilitation under Miller factor five, the court failed to explain the fairness of imposing consecutive sentences on [...].