ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff/Appellant [...] ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint in Superior Court, Hudson County, against Defendant/Respondent [...] ("City" or "Defendant") on October 17, 2022, although same was not effectively served on the City until sometime later.  (Pa249).  On January 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint ("First Amended Complaint").  Plaintiff's Case Information Statement in this case has always identified this matter as a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") case.  (Da001).  On February 16, 2023, the City filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to join indispensable parties.  On May 3, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted the City's motion and dismissed Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint without prejudice.  (Da002-Da007).  On June 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to restore this action and for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.  In so doing, Plaintiff's counsel certified that the Second Amended Complaint "is identical in all respects [to the dismissed Complaint] except for a few clarifications of fact which were previously presented during the earlier motion practice."  (6/6/23 Certification of [...], Esq. at ¶12).  The Court issued an Order without opinion on June 23, 2023, granting Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, but indicating that the Plaintiff’s motion had been “unopposed. ” (Da008).  On July 11, 2023, the Court issued an Amended Order indicating that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend had in fact been “opposed” by Defendant.  (Da010).  On July 31, 2023, the City filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e), and for failure to join indispensable parties pursuant to R. 4:6-2(f).  (Pa63).  On September 13, 2023, Judge Espinales-Maloney entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without prejudice.  (Pa1).  The Court’s Memorandum of Decision noted that the Complaint was being dismissed “without prejudice as to let Plaintiff proceed with this litigation in a proper manner.
[brief] That Relator—a member of the public and not an insider—simply paid the going rate necessarily means that the data was publicly disclosed to those \(^{20}\)  Of course, well-recognized sources for public disclosure—like major newspapers—charge subscriptions, up to tens of thousands of dollars annually.  Ja2120 (¶ 38) (citing Ex. 20, Group Subscriptions Pricing & Plans, Financial Times at 5).  Subscription costs do not alter their status as “news media. ” who might make some profitable use of the information, precisely the members of the public to which the public disclosure bar applies.  If anyone who follows an industry could obtain the data through the ordinary means available in the industry, then the data is publicly disclosed.  Relator has pointed to no legal authority holding that information is publicly disclosed only if it is the kind of information any “person on the street” would know.  And the VRDO Data Sources at issue here are neither niche nor obscure, as they are regularly accessed by numerous industry participants.  See Ja2098–99 (¶¶ 9–10), Ja2103–04 (¶ 18), Ja2106–07 (¶ 22), Ja2108–09 (¶ 26); Ja4301–02 ([...] Cert. ¶ 84); Ja4199–200 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 9–11).
[brief] Here, Plaintiff suffered more significant adverse employment action.  Specifically, Defendants, with retaliatory intent, suspended Plaintiff from his duties as well as publicly and falsely branded him as a racist law enforcement officer who either engages in excessive use of force against minorities, or allows such illegal behavior to occur, even though Defendants acknowledge that: [a] the [...] after an investigation found no sufficient evidence that Plaintiff engaged in such conduct; & [b] there was no allegation from anyone that [...] specifically engaged in such conduct.  Nonetheless, Defendants ensnared Plaintiff in a political and media-driven witch-hunt that resulted in him being suspended from his duties as a Police Captain under a cloud of scurrilous allegations against him that had no basis in fact, merely because Plaintiff was doing his job as a sworn law enforcement officer.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion to Reconsider the Orders of January 25, 2022 | 213a | | 6/30/22 | Statement of Reasons | 215a | | 7/29/22 | Notice of Appeal | 233a | 5/14/08  Rocco-14, P-33, [...]  Certification of Change.................................................................650a  5/15/08  MTDC-87, P-22 [...] Agreement of Sale..................................................651a  9/2008  [...]-15 [...] Amended General Release...............................664a  9/22/08  [...]-22, P-29 [...] Agreement of Sale...........................................669a  10/2008  D-46 [...] Agreement of Sale..............................................................682a  1/2009  [...]-1, P-31, [...] Second Amendment and Restatement of the General Release........................................................................................................684a 2/2009
[directive] The response.  "no" fora "0" a and response "yes" fora "1" using a by scored five to up with scored be can assessment  The 13. 0 from to ranges which items, the of sum A items.  missing or unknown for proration to subject is score raw the and items, missing risk  Each score.  final his/her utilizing of risk categories seven of one in placed is defendant defendant a (e.g., recidivism of likelihood statistical aresearch-validated to correlates category recidivate).
[brief] Such knowledge involves two elements, injury and fault. ”  *Lynch v. Rubacky*, 85 N.J. 65, 70 (1981); *Grunwald*, 131 N.J. at 492-93.  Moreover, “[w]here there is no time stated between debtor and creditor as to when the payment of a money obligation shall be due, it is deemed payable on demand. ”  *Denville Amusement Co.*, 84 N.J. Super. at 169.  “A cause of action based upon a money obligation which is payable on demand is deemed to accrue at the time of the loan.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION On Appeal  From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, UNION COUNTY  Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Date of Submission: December 8, 2023  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...] Of Counsel & On the Brief  [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 03532-2006  On the Brief  [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 03108-2011  [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 31987-2020  [...]  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, Township of Union
[brief] The JTCL clearly and unequivocally states that a Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to recover the full amount of damages from “any party determined by the trier of fact to be 60% or more responsible for the total damages. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a).  Any party “who is compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(e).  Notably, the statute does not articulate any exceptions or circumstances under which this mandate may or should be modified.
[brief] *Cortez v. Gindhard*, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 601 (App. Div. 2014).  Pursuant to R.P.C. 1.2(a), defense counsel in a criminal case “shall consult with the client and, following consultation, shall abide by the client’s decision on the plea to be entered ...”  See also *State v. Barlow*, 419 N.J. Super. 527, 535 (App. Div. 2011).  Further, R.P.C. 1.4(c), requires “a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. ”  Here, defendant failed to present any evidence that counsel neglected to convey a favorable plea offer.
[brief] 38 N.J. at 140–41.  As alluded supra, at 26–27, the Supreme Court could have been describing the very case now before this Court:  The object is not legislation Ad hoc or after the fact, but rather the promulgation, through the basic statute and the implementing regulations taken as a unitary whole, of a code governing action and conduct in the particular field of regulation so those concerned may know in advance all the rules of the game, so to speak, and may act with reasonable assurance.  Without sufficiently definite regulations and standards administrative control lacks the essential quality of fairly predictable decisions.  Persons subject to regulation are entitled to something more than a general declaration of statutory purpose to guide their conduct before they are restricted or penalized by an agency for what it then decides was wrong from its hindsight conception of what the public interest requires in the particular situation.  Id. at 151–52 (emphasis added); see id. at 154–55 (reversing the Director’s action, despite the Legislature vested him with broad discretion to make “special rulings and findings,” because “the alleged transgression [the Director identified] had not been covered or proscribed by statute or regulation” before it occurred).  Indeed, notwithstanding its lip service to straightforwardly applying the statutory term “excessive” here, the Department ran headlong into [...]’s prohibition against agencies using “a hindsight conception of what the public interest requires in a particular situation.
[brief] 20 U.S.C. § 1232......................................................................................... 30, 32 N.J. Pub. L. 2018, c.60 § 1 ....................................................................... 42, 47 N.J.A.C. 6A:7-14.........................................................................................51  N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50 .............................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19 ...................................................................................31
[brief] There are a number of reasons supportive of this determination.  While the extent of the FAR relief at 1.77 is a reduction from the 1.99 required from the prior plan, nevertheless the proposed FAR would result in a FAR five times greater than that permitted in the District.  There was no testimony in support of the application which references a FAR of 1.77 on a property proximate to the subject premises, or for that matter anywhere within the Borough...  8.  The excessive FAR implicated by the plan is just one example which demonstrates that the proposal is simply too massive in scale for a parcel just slightly over one-half acre in size.
[brief] 1.  Unconstitutional interference with vested rights  2.  Manifest injustice (REPLY POINT SIX) (Addressing [...]’s Proper Summary Judgment Arguments in Point V of Opposition Brief – Db41–Db47)  Genuine issues of material facts were in dispute no the money paid and owed, as well as the 10-count Complaint.  The court committed reversible error by a wholesale dismissal of the 10-count Complaint several months before the discovery end date, without any argument or analysis whatsoever of the elements to the causes of action pleaded.
[brief] Insigna v. Hegedus, 231 N.J.Super. 562 (App.Div.1987).............................11  Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Ins. Exchange, 247 N.J.Super. 241(App.Div.1991).........................................................15,17  Jorge v. Travelers Indem. Co., 947 F.Supp. 150 (D.N.J.1996)......................16,17  Knox-Tenn Rental Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 678 (6th Cir.1993)..............8  Lopez v. N.J.A.F.I.U.A., 239 N.J.Super. 13 (App.Div.) certif. denied, 122 N.J. 131 (1990).......................................................3  Mangiaricina v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 2008 WL 1733611 (App.Div.2008), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 511 (2009).......8  Marin Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 642 S.W.3d 551 (Tx.2022)....................................................................15  McClellan v. Feit, 376 N.J.Super. 305 (App.Div.2005)...............................8  Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114 (1962)..........................18  Millbrook Tax Fund, Inc. v. P.L. Henry & Assoc., Inc., 344 N.J.Super. 49 (App.Div.2001)..........................................................2,8,11  Miney v. Baum, 170 N.J.Super. 282 (Law.Div.1979).................................10  Nova Dev. Grp., Inc. v. J.J. Farber-Lottman Co., No. A-5531-08T2, 2010 WL 4117113 (App. Div. 2010).......................................................5  Palisades Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 469 N.J.Super. 30 (App.Div.2021)..................................................16  Passaic Valley Sewage Comms’rs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 596 (2011)........................................................................19  Pawlick v. N.J.A.F.I.U.A., 284 N.J.Super. 629 (App.Div.1995)...............4  Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 316 N.J. Super. 63 (App.Div.1998).....18  Rooney v. West Orange Tp., 200 N.J.Super. 201 (App.Div.1985)............16,19  Skeete v. Dorvius, 185 N.J. 5 (2005)......................................................8,12  Studzinski v. Travelers Ins. Co., 180 N.J.Super. 416 (Law Div.1980).........3  Team Indus. Services, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 87 F.4th 461 (10th Cir. 2023)..............................................................................14  Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 198 N.J. 529 (2009)...................3  Weir v. Federal Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.1987)........................17  Workers Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp., 210 P.3d 277 (Utah 2009)...............................................................15  Rules R.4:7-5(a)..........................................................................................20
[brief] This is, an expert’s bare opinion that has no support in factual evidence or similar date is a mere net opinion which is not admissible and may not be considered.  The admissibility rule has been aptly described as requiring that the expert “give the why and wherefore” that supports the opinion, “rather than a mere conclusion. ”  . . .  Applying these standards, our Appellate Division has concluded that a trial court may not rely on expert testimony that lack an appropriate factual foundation and fails to establish the existence of any standard about which the expert testified.  Id. at 372–73 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  In further explaining the Net Opinion Rule, the Appellate Division noted that “[e]xpert testimony should not be received if it appears the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him or her to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture. ”  Vuocolo v. Diamon Shamrock Chem. Co., 240 N.J. Super. 289, 299 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 333 (1990); Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 580–91 (App. Div. 1997) (holding the net opinion rule prohibits speculative testimony).
[brief] In Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015) the Court addressed R. 4:67-1 and stated:  1.  A court may grant summary disposition in only two settings….  Rule 4:67-1 governs all actions in which the court is permitted by rule or by statute to proceed in a summary manner…Grabowsky at 536.  This action to vacate an arbitration award was filed pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23 which requires the filing of a summary action with the Court.  Pursuant to R. 4:67 the hearing conducted on October 20, 2023 was the hearing required by R. 4:67-5 under which the Court proceeded to determine the issue based on the Briefs submitted.  In Courier News v. Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office, 358 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div. 2003) the Court stated:  A summary action is not a summary judgment motion.  In a proceeding conducted under R. 4:67-5, a court must make findings of facts, either by adopting the uncontested facts in the pleadings after concluding that there are no genuine issues of fact in dispute, or by conducting an evidentiary hearing.  Moreover, a party in a summary action proceeding is not entitled to favorable inferences such as those afforded to the respondent in a summary judgment motion.  *Courier News* at 378-379  The hearing properly proceeded as a hearing conducted under the auspices of R. 4:67-5.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The [...] had also previously received the information in Appendices B1 (Aa166-167) and C1 (Aa170-171) directly from the [...] on December 9, 2023 as part of the [...]’s response to the arbitrator’s request for updated cost-outs from the parties. (Aa040; Aa111-112; Aa478; Aa513).  Appendices B (Aa164-165) and C (Aa168-169) contain that same information, except for being modified by the arbitrator “to total the yearly columns. ” (Aa112).  Appendix D (Aa172-173) showed the [...]’s per officer cost out of retro pay, which the [...] had already received during the interest arbitration proceeding, as compared to the award’s retro pay cost out.  (Aa145; Aa426-Aa437; Aa477-478; Aa513).  The award thoroughly explained the arbitrator’s “formula used for allocations of retro pay” and set forth a chart comparing the differences in retro pay for each year of the award between the [...]’s and award’s cost outs as well as under other scenarios.
[brief] In other words, at the time of the hearings, in the ten years since it was installed, there had been only two occasions when the depressurization function was jeopardized.  But the alarm system functioned exactly as designed, the signal was received in the control room, in real time, and the company was able to remedy the problem the same day it was detected.  When pressed about these two incidents, the company was evasive but ultimately admitted to the truth: these two incidents over the course of ten years did not present any realistic risk of loss of service, and these were the only two occasions on which any pressure drop triggered the real-time alarm.  1T163:17- 25, -164:1-25, -165:1-3.
[brief] The initial Trial Court wrongfully imposed a penalty, the appellate division then ignored this issue, and most recently the Court below imposed a second penalty.  Plaintiff has never been without these “critical” funds so Defendant questions why Plaintiff is entitled to receive the penalty monies.  IT APPEARS THAT THE COURT HAS REWARDED PLAINTIFF FOR HER LYING AND DECEITFUL CONDUCT AND HER INTENTIONAL WITHHOLDING OF THE FUNDS (WHICH SHE SAID SHE DID NOT HAVE).
[directive] Case the Promulgated October 16, 2018 approved by Judicial Council) (as VOLUNTARY APPLICATION - DRUG COURT FLOW CHART  APPLICATION  DEFENSE MOTION  CLINICAL HEARD STATE OBJECTION RESPONSE EVALUATION  Motion  30 DAYl DAY 21 BY 10 DAY BY DAY 25 BY DAY BY to the (Furnished the parties and court)  * Where Judge grants * *  Where State objects there  Unless a is If there objection  Should be no is motion, defendant's or statutory defendant the bar, is the from the State and received in defendant pleads int> clinically ineligible, and should case writing by day 10.  defendant clinically is drug day. court, same to immediately be defendant wishes be appropriate, an *  If motion the is written for scheduled a heard, a immediate plea should there granted and are clinical response should be at next be scheduled out-of-county by day received 25. evaluation. court date available.
[brief] See, State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009) ("Appellate review is not limitless.  The jurisdiction of appellate courts rightly is bounded by the proofs and objections critically explored on the record before the trial court by the parties themselves.") .  ii.  Logbook Entries  [...] also contends that his logbook entries constituted hearsay and should have been excluded.  (See Ab17).  But as the ALJ explained, the entries were admissible as a business record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6).  (Pa019a).  Under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), a statement may be properly admitted when made at or near the time of observation by a person in the regular course of business and it was regular practice of that business to make such a statement.  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6)
[brief] On the first factor, the Watson Court noted, “By conducting a suggestive identification procedure in a courtroom, the State may implicate due process concerns and deprive defendants of their due process rights in a way that neither cross-examination nor jury instructions can adequately address. ”  254 N.J. at 586.  Thus, the purpose of Watson’s substantive rule was “[t]o avoid unduly suggestive identifications of defendants in court that may trigger serious due process concerns under the State Constitution. ”  Id. at 587.  The Watson rule is thus “‘designed to enhance the reliability of the factfinding process’” rather than being “an exclusionary rule whose primary goal is deterrence;” thus, “the first factor favors pipeline retroactivity.
[brief] [...]  Judgments of Conviction: [...] ..................................................  Da82-84  [...] ..................................................  Da85-87  [...] ..................................................  Da88-90  [...] ..................................................  Da91-93  Letter from [...] to [...] (S-156) .................................................................................  Da94-97  [...] Judgments of Conviction: [...] .................................................. Da98-99  [...] .................................................. Da100-101  [...] ..................................................  Da102-103  [...] .................................................. Da104-105 [...] .................................................. Da106-107 [...] (VOP) ....................................... Da108-111 State’s Notice of Motion to Compel a Buccal Swab (April 19, 2018) ...... Da113 Order Compelling Defendant to Submit a Buccal Swab (May 11, 2018) ........................................................................ Da114 Order Staying Order Compelling Defendant to Submit to a Buccal Swab ........................................................................... Da115 Order Compelling [...] to Submit a Buccal Swab (May 11, 2018) ........................................................................ Da116 Order Staying Order Compelling [...] to Submit to a Buccal Swab ........................................................................... Da117 Appellate Division Order Denying Motion for Leave to Appeal .... Da118 INDEX TO APPENDIX (cont’d) Order Vacating Order Staying Order Compelling Defendant to Submit to a Buccal Swab (June 21, 2018) …………………… Da119 Order Acknowledging Defendant’s Refusal To Submit to Buccal Swab And Extending State’s Time To Obtain……….. Da120
[brief] **PLAINTIFF WAS LIVING IN NEW JERSEY WHEN HE TOOK OUT THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY**  When [...] applied for the policy of automobile insurance, he no longer had a residence in North Carolina via lease or ownership and considered the New Jersey address as his home.  Thus, the facts in the case at bar strongly call for the conclusion that appellant/plaintiff [...]’s residence at the time he applied for insurance with [...] was New Jersey as opposed to North Carolina.