ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Privilege Logs and Descriptions  [...] contends that [...] and [...] failed to produce logs for each production.  See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 13.  [...] also contends that as for the two logs that were produced by [...] and [...], the logs that were produced contain inadequate descriptions regarding the basis for the claimed privilege, and thus should be supplemented.  Id.  1.  Privilege Logs Not Provided
[brief] The analysis is can the site accommodate the increased density that’s proposed?  When faced with that question this evening, I think you could answer that clearly, yes.  We’ve demonstrated this through multiple meetings that there is adequate parking currently, that there will be adequate parking for the new units, based on our last revision to provide RSIS parking at those levels for the new units, so when you address the density variance and you’re asking yourself can the site accommodate the additional units, again for the reasons that we’ve articulated throughout the process, the answer to that is yes...  As this Board knows, you’re all to base your decision on what’s been presented through testimony and evidence.  As I stated, that evidence has been provided both through technical and expert testimony from the applicant, but also for the operational and on an application like this...  You heard from the person that’s responsible for this facility on a day-to-day basis that there are no existing tenant complaints for parking, there are no existing issues regarding a lack of available parking and the property manager talked in great detail as to how they assigned parking spaces...  I think those aspects, as well as the unrefuted traffic data that was supplied to [you] on multiple occasions clearly demonstrates that the parking is sufficient.  We’ve now agreed to park the new units as the RSIS standards and because of all that evidence that was presented, you are in a position when you can grant the density variance, we demonstrated that the site can accommodate the new units without any detrimental impacts on the surrounding area.
[brief] Jones, 230 N.J. at 168 (“This Court has not previously decided a case in which a party has requested that the trial court mold \(^8\)In this case, [...] was not a third-party defendant in any event.  [...] was joined by [...] as a third party defendant and subsequently dismissed, subject to Burt. the judgment in accordance with the Appellate Division’s analysis in Burt.  In the circumstances of this case, we consider the Appellate Division’s analysis in Burt to effectively reconcile the governing statutes. ”)  (emphasis added).  In short, Burt remains a published and viable decision from the Appellate Division.
[brief] The June 27, 2017 Final Judgment (Da690)  The Trial Court’s January 15, 2019 Statement of Reasons as to the Sixth Street Violation (Da717) points out this is the “second violation based on the same activity,” a reference to alleged similar conduct which was the subject of the Order to Show Cause in 2018 resulting in the March 6, 2018 Order (ultimately vacated by the Appellate Division).  The Trial Court actually “cut and pasted” from the Court’s March 23, 2018 Statement of Reasons to use in the January 15, 2019 Statement of Reasons (Da287) - re-adopting its statement that it hoped that Defendant would comply with the Court’s decision “either by directing the buses to Fifth Street or through the parties agreeing to provide a fenced pathway to the school along the edge of the Sixth Street parking area. ”
[brief] ” (Emphasis added).  Consequently, the Court in McLean stated that permissible lay opinion testimony is “an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with firsthand knowledge,” and “does not convey information about what the officer ‘believed,’ ‘thought,’ or ‘suspected. ’”  Id. at 460 (emphasis added); see also State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611, 632-634 (2022) (lay opinion under N.J.R.E. 701 by an FBI agent -- about the meaning of slang terms used in a conversation in which he did not participate -- was improper under McLean because it was not based on perception, but instead on the officer’s belief or understanding); State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429, 450-452 (App. Div. 2017) (same as Derry); State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393, 404 (2016) (detective, like in McLean, improperly opined that he believed he witnessed a drug deal); State v. Smith, 436 N.J. Super. 556, 574-575 (App. Div. 2014) (reversing for plain error when police officer offered the lay opinion that defendant’s actions were typical of a suspect trying to dispose of evidence after a crime; the officer was improperly “interpreting facts for the jury” rather than simply testifying to facts).
[brief] A.  The Original Loan and Ownership of The Mortgaged Premises  Borrowers originally became the title owners of the residential Mortgaged Premises by way of a deed recorded with the Register of Essex County on June 6, 2008, in Book 12139, Page 7655.  (Pa49-50 ¶3 & Pa53-58).  The Borrowers financed the original purchase of the Mortgaged Premises with a $201,832.00 loan evidenced by the Note dated April 30, 2008 (Pa260, ¶8 & Pa270-72) and secured by the residential Mortgage encumbering the Mortgaged Premises which was recorded with the Register of Essex County on June 6, 2008 in Book 12139, Page 7663 (Pa260, ¶9 & Pa273-80).  Paragraph one (1) of the Mortgage states “Borrower shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment and late charges due under the Note. ” (Pa274).  Additionally, under paragraph two (2) of the Note the Borrowers promised to repay the lender the principal sum of $201,832.00, plus interest at the annual rate of 6.5% per annum.  Furthermore, Borrowers were permitted to make early pre-payments on the Loan, without penalty or cost.  (Pa270, ¶5).  Noticeably absent from the Note and Mortgage is any language authorizing Appellant’s predecessor in interest and [...] to reject and return funds that are tendered by or on behalf of the Borrowers in connection with the Loan, particularly those tendered with the intention of satisfying the Mortgage.  Instead, the Mortgage is quite clear as to Appellant (and its agents) obligations with respect to payments received.  Paragraph three (3) of the Mortgage makes very clear that “[a]ll payments” received by the lender “shall be applied” as follows:  First, to the mortgage insurance premium to be paid by Lender to the Secretary or to the monthly charge by the Secretary instead of the monthly mortgage insurance premium; Second, to any taxes, special assessments, leasehold payments or ground rents, and fire, flood and other hazard insurance premiums, as required; Third, to interest due under the Note; Fourth, to amortization of the principal of the Note; and Fifth, to late charges due under the Note.  (Pa275, ¶3).  Thus, regardless of whether the First Wire Transfer was deemed a pre-payment under the Note or a payment made under Sections 1 or 9(a) of the Mortgage, the Mortgage is unmistakably clear that all payments were to be accepted and applied, not just those that were deemed full or complete from the Appellant’s viewpoint.  B.
[brief] With respect to judicial discretion one EXCEPTION to the trial court’s discretion rule is; if a judge makes a DISCRETIONARY decision but does so under a MISCONCEPTION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW (Pa17-Pa18) (laches), the court need NOT grant the usual DEFERENCE in order to AVOID a manifest denial of justice as determined by Kavanaugh v Quigley, 63 NJ Super 153, 158 (App Div 1960).
[brief] Modification of the lease does not terminate the liability of the guarantors.  (Not raised below)  Undoubtedly Defendants will argue that a modification of their obligations under the Lease terminates the guarantee.  However, as Defendants well know the case law provides that the modification would have to materially increase their undertaking to allow termination.  New Jersey’s rule governing modification of obligations between the principal obligor and the obligee reflects the Restatement Rule that a secondary obligor is not discharged from the original obligations undertaken unless “the modification creates a substituted contract or imposes risks on the secondary obligor fundamentally different from those imposed pursuant to the transaction prior to modification.
[directive] Dispositions of or For dispositions imposed that include a secured placement term 60 days less, of of with a condition probation, judges should consider whether the commencement of If of the custodial portion the disposition will deferred.  the commencement the be custodial portion is deferred, the juvenile shall report to probation directed the as in interim.  (4)  Secure Facility Dispositions of  For dispositions imposed that include a secured placement term 60 days or less, with no probation component, judges should consider whether the disposition can be adjourned to a later date.
[brief] ”  The City’s actions were in violation of the very Civil Service precedent cited by the Civil Service Commission in the decision now on appeal.  Pa8.  On December 28, 2022, the City requested a Certification of ten (10) eligibles from List PM1039V.  On this same date, the CSC issued said Certification, which included Appellant, who was ranked number 1 on the Certification list, number [...] and was also designated by the Civil Service Commission as a disabled veteran.  (“December 28, 2022 Certification”)  Pa5.  As per the CSC’s ruling in this matter, and pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b), the December 28, 2022 Certification was valid until March 28, 2023 as long as there were “genuine vacancies”.  Pa5; Pa8; see, also, Pa84.  While the CSC ruled that there were no “genuine vacancies” prior to January 23, 2023, such was predicated upon the City’s representations that its December 2022 request for a Certification of ten was based on retirements expected to occur in February and March 2023.
[brief] 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................  15 POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE BOROUGH DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE CLAIMS ..........................................................................................................................  15  A.  The Public Trust Doctrine Laws ............................................................................................  15  B.  The Borough’s Adoption of a Redevelopment Plan Amendment ..............................  20  C.  Application of These Laws to the Facts of This Case .........................................................  22  D.  The Trial Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment to the Borough  Dismissing the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine Claims .........................................................................................  24 POINT II
[brief] As [...] affirmed to [...], “While the Court correctly found that [...] and I did not separate until August of 2017, the Court failed to appreciate same when determining the reasonableness of my request to vacate the divorce documents, or the witness testimony regarding what actions I took immediately after [...] and I actually separated.  Upon my actual separation with [...], within two (2) months I filed the Motion to Vacate the divorce documents. ”  A301; cf. Romero v. Gold Star Distribution, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 297 (App. Div. 2021) (measuring “reasonable time” from when movant “learned of” the facts or evidence upon which motion is based).  The circumstances of this case show that [...] sought relief within a reasonable time as the Rule requires.  Denying relief to [...] on the ground that she took too long to seek relief is unfair and improper, also, because of the fundamental due process problems that the record of this case shows from the time of the filing of plaintiff’s divorce complaint through the default judgment entered against [...] only two months later.
[brief] As an initial matter, it is noteworthy that the State did not request the application of aggravating factor one at sentencing.  Although not dispositive, the fact that the State itself did not see this as a case warranting that factor is at least highly indicative of the record not supporting the kind of extraordinary brutality warranting the application of this exceptional aggravating factor.  Regardless, the trial court’s stated bases for applying factor one are otherwise either improper or insufficient.  Much of the trial court’s stated reasons constituted double-counting the elements of the offenses; specifically, the trial court stated that factor one applies because “three people got shot,” [...] knew [...] was in the house and could have been hit, and that the shots [...] fired were “reckless” and “exceed[ed] . . . what would have been necessary to prevent the men from having contact with [...].  . . .” (8T25-16 to 26-11).  All of these facts, however, are encompassed by the crimes for which [...] was convicted, and the recycling of those facts to apply an exceptional aggravating factor is impermissible double-counting.  Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 74-75.  The trial court additionally stated that factor one was appropriate because there were other people in the house beyond the three victims who could have been hurt.  However, speculative harm that was never actualized or even intended by the defendant can hardly be said to be “extraordinary brutality,” id. at 75; nor suggestive of actions done in a particularly “heinous, cruel or depraved manner,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).  Thus, there was no credible evidence in the record supporting the rare application of aggravating factor one.
[directive] 10% permissible  Actor purposely prevents or attempts to prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting an arrest; if actor uses or threatens to use physical force or violence against a law enforcement 2C:29-2a  Resisting Arrest officer or another or uses any other means to create a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the public servant or another, third degree; if by flight, then fourth degree; otherwise 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible a disorderly persons offense.
[brief] Nieder v. Royal Indemn. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973).  New Jersey Court Rule 2:10-2 states:  Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.  Assuming, arguendo, this Court reaches the merits of defendant’s argument, it must be reviewed for plain error.
[brief] Proper invocation of the election of remedies doctrine can occur only where there are two inconsistent and non-concurrent remedies, and a party elects one.  Plaintiff did not elect one of two inconsistent or non-concurrent remedies.  Rather, as discussed at length above and in Plaintiff’s opening brief, the first two sentences of PSA § 13.1 must be read in tandem, to allow Plaintiff to elect both to demand return of the Earnest Money Deposit and to insist upon specific performance where [...] proceeds to close with the Fee Owner.
[brief] ”  N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 178 N.J. 327, 333 (2004).  “All rules of statutory construction are subordinate to the goal of effectuating the legislative plan as it may be gathered from the enactment when read in full light of its history, purpose, and context. ”  Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 388 N.J. Super. 550, 557 (App. Div. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[brief] (Pa000484).  The trial court placed its decision on the record on October 20, 2023.  (2T Hearing).  Thereafter, [...] submitted an affidavit of legal services seeking approximately $90,000.00 in fees.  (Pa000478).  Plaintiffs opposed the fee request (Pa000557), and on December 5, 2023, the trial court entered an Order and Statement of Reasons awarding [...] $30,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs.
[brief] [Id. at 229 (emphasis in original)].  While *Pizzo Mantin* dealt with a subdivision rather than a site plan, the two are very closely related.  In fact, the language of *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-48 is virtually identical to *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-46.  Per the former, “[t]he planning board shall, if the proposed subdivision complies with the ordinance and this act, grant preliminary approval to the subdivision” (*emphasis added*); and per the latter, ““[t]he planning board shall, if the proposed development complies with the ordinance and this act, grant preliminary site plan approval. ” (*Emphasis added*); see also, Cox & Koenig, *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration*, (GANN 2024), at § 23-5, p. 319 (noting that court decisions interpreting the statutes relating to subdivision approvals are also generally applicable to site plan approvals).  As further stated in the *Cox* treatise, “since the use is, when a site plan is being considered by a planning board, always a permitted use, in most cases the board must grant site plan approval and, where appropriate, waivers and exceptions from ordinance provisions. ”  Cox & Koenig, at § 23-10, p. 335 (*emphasis added*).  A denial of a permitted use, then, would “be a drastic action and one which would have to find authorization in the statute. ”  *Id.*; see also, *Shim*, 298 N.J. Super. at 411.  In the matter at bar, Appellant’s proposed use is a permitted use in the CBD Zone and should have been approved.  In denying the Application, the [...] acted contrary to established law.
[brief] (Pa233).  Missing from [...]’s assumption; however, was any factual evidence that [...] (or any other attending physician) was available to perform the C-Section 17 to 22 minutes earlier.  [...] admitted he did not know if any attending physician besides [...] was available, whether the other C-Section [...] was performing was an emergency or what portion of that C-Section [...] was involved in at approximately 10:00pm.
[brief] a.  Principal buildings shall not exceed 175' in length, whereas, an existing building is 384.8' in length; b.  The multifamily dwelling setback from an accessory drive and internal roadways is required to be 35', whereas, 10.5' exists currently; c.  The principal building setback from the parking area is required to be 20', whereas, 11' exists currently; d.  Building must have no more than two dwelling units in a line without setbacks and/or breaks in building elevation of at least five feet, whereas, none are provided on the property currently; e.  Parking not permitted in front yard setback in residential zones for other than single and two family uses, whereas, parking is proposed and currently present in the front yard for multifamily uses; f.  Minimum required on-site parking is 488 parking spaces, whereas, currently there are 390 on-site parking spaces; g.  250 square feet of active recreation area must be provided per dwelling unit (required 66,500 square feet of active recreation area, whereas, 56,163 square feet of active recreation area is provided; h.  Sidewalks must be constructed on both sides of all internal streets, whereas sidewalks are only constructed on one side of the internal streets; i.  Not more than one two-way access drive or two one-way access drives shall be permitted on any street, whereas, 4 drives are located on [...] and 3 drives are located on [...] currently; j.  For parking lots having 50 or less spaces, islands separating parking stalls from circulation and entrances/exit drives shall be at least 10' wide, whereas, 0' are provided currently; k.  Parking lots, which have a capacity for parking more than 50 vehicles located on properties having a frontage in excess of 500' on any one street, shall be permitted two-way and one-way access drives providing for not more than two entrance and two exit movements on the street.  Properties having a frontage in excess of 1,000' on any one street may be permitted to have additional access drives subject to the approval of the [...].  Whereas, 4 entrances are proposed for [...] (1,191.17' of frontage) and 3 exists/are proposed for [...] (777.25' of frontage); l.  All areas of the site not occupied by buildings, pavement, sidewalks, required screening, required parking area landscaping, required safety islands or other required improvements shall be landscaped by the planting of grass or other ground cover acceptable to the [...] and a minimum of two shrubs and one tree for each 250 square feet of open space, whereas, currently the property does not comply with this requirement; m.  Dead-end parking circulation aisles do not provide continuous flow through the parking field/area is prohibited, whereas, currently the property does not comply with this requirement; and n.  The width of the buffer area shall be 20', whereas, the current width of the buffer area is 9.6'.
[directive] Complete one line for each stationhouse adjustment that is offered during the quarter.  Stationhouse adjustments should be listed as refused, pending, or completed, either successfully or unsuccessfully.  Age = Enter age of juvenile at the time of the offense  Race/Ethnicity = Enter numerical code: 1. Caucasian 2. Black 3. Hispanic 4. Asian 5. American Indian 6.  Other 7.  Unknown  Gender = Enter M, F, or Non-binary  Prior Contacts = Indicate “Y” or “N” for any prior juvenile delinquency complaints or stationhouse adjustments
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons and those set forth in its initial brief, Defendant, [...] i/p/a [...], respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment in Defendant’s favor.  Dated: May 19, 2024  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant, [...] i/p/a [...]  By: [...]  [...], Esq.
[brief] Rule 1:4-8 applies only to attorneys or self-represented parties, and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 applies to represented parties.  See Toll Bros. v. Township of W. Windsor, 190 N.J. 61, 67-69 (2007); see also Trocki Plastic Surgery Ctr. v. Bartkowski, 344 N.J. Super. 399, 404-05 (App. Div. 2001).  Both Rule 1:4-8 and the statute require that the prevailing party seeking the sanction prove that the non-prevailing party acted in bad faith, McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 549 (1993), “for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury,” or pursued the action “without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not ... support [its actions] by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b)(1) to (2); see also R. 1:4-8; Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J., Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 570, 580 (App. Div. 2016) (“The party seeking sanctions bears the burden to prove bad faith.
[brief] (1T138:13-148:19)  Those portion of [...]'s and [...]'s opposition briefs concerning damages evidence ("[...]'s evidence") only warrant a reply to the extent that the cases they cite need to be highlighted.  [...]'s claims that the cases allow for evidence relevant only in the second stage of a bifurcated trial to be admitted in the first phase even if prejudicial.  In fact, however, two of the cases cited by [...]'s arguably stand for the exact opposite.  [...]'s cites, for instance, State v. Jones, 364 N.J.Super. 376 (A.D. 2003), where the defendant was charged with possession of a weapon and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon.  [...]'s argues that in Jones the court permitted evidence that the defendant was a convicted felon into the trial.  What [...]'s 1
[brief] 5.  A **Design Exception** for 4 entrances proposed for [...] (**1191.81’ of frontage**) and 3 exist/proposed for [...] (**567.63’**), whereas, parking lots which have a capacity for parking more than 50 vehicles located on properties having a frontage in excess of 500’ on any one street, shall be permitted two-way and one-way access drives providing for not more than two entrance and two exit movements on the street.