ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM ONLY ACCRUED WHEN APPELLANTS SUFFERED  ACTUAL DAMAGES  Appellants suffered actual damages once the failure to register as a charity caused the Attorney General’s office to file an action against them.  “Mere knowledge of an attorney’s negligence does not cause a legal malpractice claim to accrue. ”  Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 437 (1997).  A legal malpractice claim “accrues when an attorney’s breach of professional duty proximately causes a plaintiff’s damages. ”  Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492 (1993).  A plaintiff’s damages must be “real” as opposed to “speculative. ”  Olds, 150 N.J. at 437.  An adverse judgment “may constitute damage” and thus the accrual of the legal malpractice claim.  See id.  As the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in Grunwald, the accrual date begins when “the client suffers actual damages and discovers . . . [or should discover] the facts essential to the malpractice claim. ”  Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 494.  The Supreme Court has also “recognized, however, the unfairness of an inflexible application of the statute of limitations when a client would not reasonably be aware of ‘the underlying factual basis for a cause of action,’ to file a timely complaint. ”  *Vastano v. Algeier*, 178 N.J. 230, 236 (2003) (quoting *Grunwald*, 131 N.J. at 492-93).  “To guard against that inequity, we have applied the discovery rule in those cases in which the injury or wrong is not readily ascertainable through means of reasonable diligence. ”  *Vastano*, 178 N.J. at 236.  “We understand that in some circumstances a client may not be able to detect the essential facts of a malpractice claim with ease or speed of the complexity of the issues or proceedings, or because of the special nature of the attorney-client relationship. ”  Id.  Appellants initiated this action once they realized that the charity was not properly registered—because the Attorney General’s office filed a complaint against Appellants, on December 18, 2020.  Appellants filed this action on August 29, 2023, well within six years of the Attorney General’s office filing the complaint.  “The majority of courts hold that when attorney malpractice occurs during the course of litigation, the cause of action accrues on entry of an adverse judgment in the trial court. ”  *Olds*, 150 N.J. at 438.  In an analogous way, the legal malpractice claim in this matter accrued once there was an injury to Appellants: the Attorney General filing an action against them asserting a claim for violating the statute that requires proper registration of the charity.  CONCLUSION
[brief] On the Brief:  [...] (ID# 018122000)  [...] (ID# 004272012)  [...] (ID# 023131983)  [...] (ID# 021182005)  [...] (ID# 019312006)  [...] (ID# 018972007)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice) (For Continuation of Appearances See Inside Cover)  Date Submitted: April 24, 2024
[brief] Paragraph 254 of that complaint included a listing of [...]’s alleged criminal history.  (Ex. 2 ¶ 254).  ¶35.  Second, the nature and formatting of the criminal record information set forth in Paragraph 256 of the [...] complaint suggest that it was based from information maintained in the FBI Index.  (Ex. 4 ¶¶ 10-11).  As described below, there were only two such inquiries in the period from 2004 to 2006, one by the Customs Service in Florida in 2004 and one in Gardner.  (Id. ¶¶ 12-15).  ¶36.  The information set forth in Paragraph 254 of the [...] complaint is generally non-public, other than (1) the federal conviction in 1987 and (2) certain information from the state of Florida.  (See Exs. 1,2 ¶ 254; Fla. Stat. § 943.053).  G.  The Gibraltar-Granite Website ¶38.  Sometime in October or November 2006, [...]’s wife discovered a website called [...] (Tr. II: 22).  The website contained a printout of [...]’s alleged criminal history.  (Ex. 3).  The website also included information on other legal actions against [...], his driver’s license, and his home address.  (Id.) ¶39.  There is no evidence as to who created the website.  It was not created by [...] or [...]’s business, which was [...] (without a hyphen).
[brief] Rather, policies are made “when a decision maker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action, issues on an official proclamation, policy or edit.  *Hansel v. City of Atlantic City*, 152 F. Supp. 2d 589, 609 (D.N.J. 2001).  Thus, a plaintiff must prove that a municipal official, who had the power to set policy, was responsible for the policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.  The plaintiff then must show a causal nexus between such proof and his injury.  *Bielevicz*, supra, 915 F.2d at 850.  Moreover, the official policy or unofficial custom claimed by any plaintiff in an effort to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983 must be specifically identified.  *Skevofilax v. Quigley*, 586 F.Supp. 532, 544 (D.N.J. 1984).  None of these legal predicates were established by Plaintiff in this case.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................11  POINT 1 .............................................................................................................................................11  THE LAWSUIT FUNDING AGREEMENT  VIOLATES THE NEW JERSEY TRUTH IN CONSUMER CONTRACT WARRANTY AND NOTICE ACT (N.J.S.A. 56:12-15)(appellants appendix page AA0100)  ......11  POINT 2 .............................................................................................................................................27  THE ACTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT  VIOLATED THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et. seq.)( appellants appendix page AA0094)  ..................................................................................................................27  CONCLUSION
[brief] See Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 175 (1992) (holding that “because insurance policies are adhesion contracts, courts must assume a particularly vigilant role in ensuring their conformity to public policy and principles of fairness”).  As a matter of law, an insurance contract is not enforceable if it violates public policy.  See Sparks, supra, 100 N.J. at 334; see also Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 304, 320 (1985) (noting that “[a] condition to the enforcement of insurance contracts is that they not violate public policy”).
[brief] Reference to this portion of the policy is made because Plaintiff/Appellant’s brief addresses matters where a demand for UM/UIM arbitration was made to the auto insurance carrier.  Therefore, this reference is only to demonstrate that a demand for arbitration is not applicable to the matter herein.  The policy of insurance issued by Defendant-Respondent, [...], went on to provide, in relevant part:  **LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US** ...  C.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT.........................................................................................................................3  THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS’ APPEAL AND REVERSE THE ORDERS ISSUED BY [...]...............................................................3  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR RELIEF AFTER THE BOARD INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED OPRA BY FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE 8/28/20  FINAL ORDER AFTER IT WAS AFFIRMED ON 5/18/22..............................................................................................................4  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR ENTRY OF SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT AND A PROTECTIVE ORDER AS TO THE DEPOSITION OF [...]  .............................................................................................................................8  a.  SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT WAS INCORRECTLY ENTERED...........8  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................12  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] (Volume I Pa. 150 to 183; the contracts between [...] and [...] are attached as Exhibit E to the certification of [...] in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgement).  A contract appointing [...] as Co-Medical Director of [...] dated December 16, 2010.  (Volume I Pa.150- The contract naming [...] as Medical Director of the [...] at a salary of $19,500.00 per year is dated June, 2011 and the only date on the contract is 12/12/12 after the signature of [...] the Acting President/CEO of [...].  (Volume I Pa. 160-164).  A contract dated December 11, 2012 named [...] President of Medical Staff/Co-Director of ICU.  (Volume I Pa. 166-177).  The contract naming Dr.
[directive] If any officer who is has to review process applies enforcement than accepts employment at a different law agency the one where he or she the responsibility of prior EW System review process, it is the or current underwent the agency law agency to notify the subsequent employing law enforcement employing enforcement history prior or of System review process and outcomes.  Upon request, the the officer's EW officer's EW System review with the current employing shall share the process files agency employing agency.  subsequent Prosecutor H.  Notification to County System review process, the agency's chief or a  Upon initiation of the EW executive shall confidential written notification to the County Prosecutor or his/her designee make a designee officer, the of the triggering indicators, of the identity of the subject nature performance completion and remedial program.  Upon of the EW System review process, the the planned confidential written notification Prosecutor agency's chief executive shall make a to the County or of of the EW System review, including any remedial measures his/her designee the outcome taken behalf of officer.
[brief] A.  [...] is Liable for Defective Conditions That Predated the Lease, Such as the Illegible and Unclear Electrical Panel and “Trial and Error” Testing Process.  [...] sought to avoid liability in this matter by relying on the terms of the 2016 Lease, which allegedly constituted a “triple net lease. ”  Under the terms of a triple net lease a tenant is responsible for “maintaining the premises and for paying all utilities, taxes and other charges associated with the property. ”  Geringer v. Hartz Mountain Development Corp., 388 N.J. Super. 392, 400 (App. Div. 2006).  Based on the responsibilities assumed by the tenant, landlords can delegate premises liability.  See *ibid.* (finding use of a triple net lease can result in delegation of liability).  The purpose of this delegation is ultimately a consideration of fairness to the landlord.  In the typical triple net lease case, the defect to the property which causes injury arises after the tenant has taken exclusive possession and control of the property.
[brief] Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.  Juveniles also have less ability to escape negative environments and are more susceptible to the negative influences of their surroundings.  Id. at 569, 570.  Additionally, “even a heinous crime” is rarely a sign that a juvenile has an “irretrievably depraved character. ”  Id. at 570.  Instead, the recklessness and impetuousness of youth tends to subside as an individual matures:  “Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood. ”  Ibid.  Consequently, when a juvenile is “facing a very lengthy term of imprisonment” the sentencing judge must “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against” imposing a severe sentence.
[brief] 12  I.  INTERCOMPANY  ARBITRATION AWARDS ARE SUBJECT TO REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 ET SEQ  . . . . . . . . . .  12  II.  THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A DISPUTE IS SUBJECT TO AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS TO BE RESOLVED BY A COURT, NOT AN ARBITRATOR, PER N.J.S.A. 2A:23B6(b)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  III.  THERE IS NO AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH THAT MED-PAY SUBROGATION IS PERMITTED IN NEW JERSEY  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22  IV.  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE, HAS BEEN INTERPRETED TO PROHIBIT MED-PAY SUBROGATION IN NEW JERSEY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28  V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS UNDER R. 4:46 RATHER THAN A HEARING ON A SUMMARY ACTION UNDER R. 4:67-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Conclusion .................................................. 39
[directive] The reporting and public dissemination requirements of (a) through (j) above become applicable once an officer’s discipline is sustained, as defined above.  The reporting and public dissemination requirements of (k) and (l) above become applicable at the close of the reporting period during which they occur.  a termination, reduction in rank or grade, and/or suspension of more than five days  The of each case, required by was assessed to an agency member.  This synopsis this section, shall follow the format provided in Appendix L and shall include the a full explanation of the rule, identity of each officer subject to final discipline, regulation, policy, directive, or law violated, factual a brief summary of their conduct, The synopsis transgressions and a statement of the sanction imposed.
[brief] (Pa1006-1021).  That is, [...] controlled virtually every aspect of its working relationship with [...] employees.  Id.  It even required [...] to comply with “all” state policies and laws, including discrimination and harassment laws, id., (Pa1007, Pa1010, Pa1013) and [...] even reserved the right to “fine” [...] for “discrimination” that occurred in the workplace.  Id.  As demonstrated above, in accordance with the contract, [...] worked hand-in-hand to perform child support services.  Supra Statement of Facts § III(A).  Appellant had a full-time office within [...]’s office and worked “very close” with [...] staff on all issues.  [...] has “offices” and “cubicles” inside [...] offices and [...] counselors perform “many, many” services for Defendant DCCP.  Supra Statement of Facts § III(A) (Pa796-98, citing 42:3-52:12).  Appellant also reported to [...] caseworkers and supervisors on the status of cases and worked closely with the head of the [...], [...].  Id.  [...]’s role required him to work with Certified Drug and Alcohol Counselors like Appellant.  In turn, Appellant’s and Respondents’ work was inextricably intertwined.  (Pa668-70)  51:9-25, 54:1-57:10, 59:3-20.  Thus, [...] must coordinate an investigation with [...] if there was sexual harassment committed by a [...] employee against a [...] employee.  Id.  Perhaps more significantly, New Jersey courts have emphasized that whether two entities are “joint employers” is inherently a factual question precluding summary judgment.
[brief] The language of R. 4:10-2(d) (1) is dispositive:  (d)  Trial Preparation; Experts.  Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of R. 4:10-2(a) and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:  (1)  A party may through interrogatories require any other party to disclose the names and addresses of each person whom the other party expects to call at trial as an expert witness, including a treating physician who is expected to testify and, whether or not expected to testify, of an expert who has conducted an examination pursuant to R. 4:19 or to whom a party making a claim for personal injury has voluntarily submitted for examination without court order.  The interrogatories may also require, as provided by R. 4:17-4(a), the furnishing of a copy of that person’s report.  [emphasis added]
[brief] As to prongs (1) and (2), the months-old instances of drug dealing were not relevant to a material issue in dispute and were not reasonably close in time to the charged crimes.  The prior drug deals were factually separate and not necessary for the jury to understand the circumstances of the crime alleged to have occurred on April 10.  As to prong (3), [...] was incentivized to testify by a favorable plea deal that would allow her to escape a custodial sentence,\(^5\) and her uncorroborated testimony lacked detail.  It was not clear and convincing evidence that [...] was a drug dealer.  The testimony failed prong (4) because the prejudice overwhelmed the testimony’s non-existent probative value.  There was no plausible, permissible non-propensity purpose for the admission of prior drug deals.  To the contrary, the evidence is highly effective propensity evidence: wouldn’t a person who dealt drugs to [...] on multiple prior occasions be more likely to intend to distribute drugs on the date in question?  The tempting answer is yes.  But N.J.R.E. 404(b), and Cofield’s fourth prong, is designed to protect defendants from exactly that prejudicial inference.  Furthermore, the prosecutor seized on [...]’s testimony to develop a narrative that something even more sinister was afoot: that [...] was responsible for keeping [...] addicted to drugs, tricking her into using fentanyl in place of heroin, and threatening “everyone suffering with addiction in this country battling the opioid pandemic. ”  (4T 28-21 to 22)  The jury was never instructed that it could not consider these prior drug deals as proof of [...]’s propensity to deal drugs.  In State v. Hernandez, the \(^5\)  Two weeks after the jury returned its guilty verdicts in [...]’s case, the assistant prosecutor moved to vacate [...]’s guilty plea entirely and dismissed all charges.  (Da 42-44) admission of propensity evidence of prior drug dealing required reversal of a defendant’s convictions, even though the court gave a limiting instruction.
[brief] ”  *Leodori v. Cigna Corp.*, 175 N.J. 293, 306 (2003).  Plaintiffs confirmed they did not sign the documents.  (Da65, ¶¶ 13-14.)  The sole witness to these purported “signatures” was [...], the fraudster, casting further doubt on the authenticity of any agreement.  (See, e.g., Da101-02.)  As the trial court correctly noted, Plaintiffs’ factual claims are uncontested.
[brief] Ibid.  Further, [...] instructed the City that any retiree receiving terminal leave payments would be required to sign a release.  Ibid.  Prior payments of accumulated sick leave did not require the execution of a release agreement.  (33a, ¶114).  Officers who retired from the [...] received their full sick time payouts through 2016.  (31a, ¶106).  Further, documents produced by [...] in response to an OPRA request reveal that after [...] was placed under the supervision of the State pursuant to the MRSA on November 9, 2016 retiring police officers received deferred compensation payouts well in excess of $15,000, including payments of $150,000.00, $150,000.00, $57,716.54, and $93,286.32.
[brief] (3T142:15-143:2; p.161:5-12; 162:4-165:17).  [...] also addressed paving records generated approximately two months post-accident.  The records concern the north approach to the subject bridge in the southbound direction.  [...] testified that he considered the paving records as evidence that a dangerous condition existed in the area where plaintiff’s accident allegedly occurred\(^3\).  (3T95:18-99:15).
[brief] “[T]he same policy considerations which apply to mandate a mitigation of damages requirement in residential leases . . . apply to commercial leases. ”  Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, 237 N.J. Super. 395, 405-06 (App. Div. 1989).  Therefore, in a commercial lease, “landlord's recovery against tenant for unpaid rent” will be “diminished by the sum which landlord would have received had he mitigated damages.
[brief] The Settlement Agreement included a concept plan, Pa072, depicting low-rise townhomes on Lot 19 and midrise apartment-style buildings on Lot 16.  Ultimately, [...] presented a development plan calling for Lot 19 to be developed with 55 townhouse units (all of which would be ‘market rate units and no ‘affordable’ units) in eleven (11) buildings (together with various associated infrastructure) and for Lot 16 to be developed as 418 multi-family apartment units in five (5) buildings, together with various associated amenities and infrastructure.  71 of those units would be ‘affordable’ units.
[brief] (Da28; T1).  As a result of the oral argument, the trial court ordered a plenary hearing on the issues of [...]’s licensure and alleged good faith error, as well as the issue of service (and notice of the collection lawsuit).  The hearing occurred on April 8, 2024.  (T2).  The same day, April 8, 2024, the trial court entered an Order denying [...]’s Motion.  (Da72).  On May 23, 2024, [...] filed his Notice of Appeal.  (Da74).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The motion court properly granted [...]’s motion to dismiss, with prejudice, reasoning that Plaintiff would not be able to add any allegations that would state a viable claim against [...] based on the express terms of the PSA.  (2T, at 16).  Based on the undisputed facts and the unambiguous terms of the PSA, Plaintiff’s claims against [...] fail as matter of law.  Plaintiff cannot rely on discovery to uncover evidence of wrongdoing.  *See Nostrame v. Santiago*, 213 N.J. 109, 128 (2013).  In its appeal, Plaintiff does not present any possible facts that would alter the chronology or the express terms of the contract.  Accordingly, Plaintiff has effectively conceded that it has no further facts to plead that would form a viable claim against [...].  Under these circumstances, dismissal, with prejudice, was appropriate.  *See Id.* (affirming Appellate Division’s reversal of order denying motion to dismiss without prejudice where plaintiff conceded he had no further facts to plead without discovery).  Given the remedy limitations to which Plaintiff stipulated in the PSA, no form of discovery could allow Plaintiff to circumvent those express terms.  “Dismissal is the appropriate remedy where the pleading does not establish a colorable claim and discovery would not develop one. ”  *State ex rel. Com'r of Transp. v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc.*, 439 N.J. Super. 462, 467 (App. Div. 2015) (reversing order denying motion to dismiss); see also *Camden Cnty. Energy Recovery Associates, L.P. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env'tl. Prot.*, 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 170 N.J. 246 (2001) (“Discovery is intended to lead to facts supporting or opposing an asserted legal theory; it is not designed to lead to formulation of a legal theory”).  V.
[brief] (2T216-16 to 18; 2T217-6 to 14; 2T217-23 to 2T218-11; 2T219-2).  [...] spoke to defendant, who asked [...] to pick him up in Sayreville.  (2T218-22 to 24; 2T219-2).  Defendant said he had been attacked as he was watching the movie “Spartacus” and was outside freezing with no shirt on as he hid under a tree.  (2T219-15 to 18; 2T220-9 to 10; 2T222-2 to 22).  Defendant also said that he may have stabbed someone.  (2T219-24 to 25).  Defendant, who sounded frightened and scared, mentioned some sexual interaction with a man which made defendant embarrassed.  (2T222-15 to 19).  [...] asked defendant what happened to his shirt; defendant said it was covered in blood.  (2T220-10 to 11).  [...]’s home was an hour away from Sayreville and he told defendant he would not come and get him.  (2T219-3 to 5; 2T219-6 to 7).  Defendant’s father was the one who came to pick up defendant that morning.