ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs opposed, arguing that based upon the allegations that were being asserted against [...], an affidavit of merit was not needed to pursue claims against [...] under the common knowledge exception to the affidavit of merit statute, because Plaintiffs were pursuing general negligence and trespass claims.  (Pa000459 at ¶¶ 15-18; Pa000078).  The trial court initially agreed with Plaintiffs.  (Pa000459 at ¶¶ 15-14; IT Hearing; Pa000084).  When the standard of an engineer’s duty of care was raised by [...], the trial court expressly disagreed with [...]’s position that an expert or Affidavit of Merit was needed for Plaintiffs to pursue their claims.  During oral argument on the motion, the trial court made the following relevant findings:  THE COURT:  Okay.  [Mr.] [...] [[...]’s counsel], my concern is I think there are some allegations here against [...] that could go either way.  Could be professional negligence claims requiring an affidavit of merit, or it could be claims that may not need an affidavit of merit.  In other words, you know, if there’s an allegation here that [...] directed certain materials to be placed on the plaintiffs’ property during the course of construction.  Now, I don’t know if that happened or didn’t happen.  I’m not really sure.  It doesn’t seem to be disputed that it happened.  And clearly there’s a plan that says they should put things.  And I read the plan that says that they should, that the contractor should put different things onto plaintiffs’ property.  I don’t think that requires an affidavit of merit.  So there are some mixed claims here.  But I -I have no problem, Mr. [...], entering an order that any professional negligence claims are dismissed.  And then we just have to get to the root of what is a - you know, what claims could be professional negligence claims, and what claims are regular negligence claims, because I think there could be both here.  So to the extent that there are professional negligence claims asserted in the end, those claims will be dismissed, and plaintiff can only proceed on regular negligence claims.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendant [...]  Defendant Sarno is the Library Media Specialist and Language Literacy Intervention teacher for the [...].  380a-381a, ¶¶ 3-4.  Defendant Sarno has never had any supervisory authority over Plaintiff or any other teacher or employee within the district.  381a, ¶¶ 5-6.  Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Sarno is premised upon an affirmative action complaint Sarno initiated against Plaintiff and for which an internal investigation was conducted.  231a, ¶132.  Plaintiff does not allege that an investigation should not have occurred.  Rather, she claims that “the investigation was conducted improperly, depriving her of an ability to meaningfully participate, such that it was a sham and retaliatory investigation. ”  Pb9, 231a, ¶133.  Significantly, neither [...] nor Defendant Sarno were involved in the investigation.  The investigation of the claims comprising the administrative complaint was conducted solely by a third-party investigator.  232a, ¶ 134; 233a ¶¶ 140, 144; 234a, ¶146.  Notably, at the time Plaintiff filed the Instant Lawsuit, Plaintiff was unaware of the status and/or results of the investigation, and most certainly had not sustained any repercussions or disciplinary action as a result of Defendant Sarno’s administrative complaint or the investigation thereof.  241a, ¶¶ 212, 217.  IV.
[brief] To permit this practice would invite endless motions seeking a different decision on every discretionary ruling whenever there is a change in judicial assignment.  And one trial judge rejecting another trial judge’s decision merely because he disagrees is antithetical to the orderly administration of justice, as it renders the judicial process arbitrary and subjective.  *See Black Creek Sanctuary Condo. Ass’n*, 2015 WL 1565644, at *4 (it is not within a trial judge’s authority to contradict a prior judge’s decision based merely on a different view of the evidence and applicable law).  The Court should reverse the Order below and reinstate [...]’s Complaint.
[brief] (Pb at iii).  On appeal, the Court’s review should be limited to the two orders that were designated in Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal.  See W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N.J. Super. 455, 458-59 (App. Div. 2008) (reviewing only the order specifically designated in the notice of appeal).  #  TABLE OF CITATIONS  ## Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Cashin v. Bello, | 12 | | 223 N.J. 328 (2015) | | | Kean Federation of Teachers v. Morell, | 12, 13 | | 233 N.J. 566 (2018) | | | Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, | 12 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | Mason v. City of Hoboken, | 12 | | 196 N.J. 51 (2008) | | | North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. State, Office of Governor, | 12 | | 451 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2017) | | | W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, | ii | | 397 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Zaman v. Felton, | 12 | | 219 N.J. 199 (2014) | | ## Rules - Rule 1:7-4 .................................................................................. 13
[brief] Read alone, the remark may be objectionable, however in the context of directly responding to the defendant’s assertion this was all a conspiracy that [...] helped engineer to ensnare the defendant, as the prosecutor was doing, in pertinent part just before the objection:  Why wouldn’t she say she was there, too?  I saw him.  I saw [...].  I know him.  I’ve known him.  I’ve ridden in cars with him.  I saw him kill my boyfriend.  That’s the man.  Why don’t you think she said that’s the man who killed him?  She didn’t do that.  But if this was a conspiracy, if she was out to get him, why wouldn’t she have also said, yeah, I heard the loud dying declaration.  I heard him say his last words were [...].  I was there, too.  You saw on the video, she’s right there.  If she’s trying to frame the Defendant, don’t you think that she would have done more?  She doesn’t know that the video is out there.  Why wouldn’t she have gone all out?  Why wouldn’t she have gotten -- why wouldn’t [...] also say he saw the whole thing? ...  [(9T104:6-22). ]
[brief] **South Jersey Pub. Co. v. N.J. Expressway Auth.**, 124 N.J. 478, 487 (1991)  .........................................................  19  **State v. Santos**, 210 N.J. 129, 142 (2012)  .........................  16  **Techniscan v. Passaic Valley Water**, 113 N.J. 233, 236 (1988)  ..  18  ####  Statutes  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] Plaintiff was performing his duties as a Police Captain on the night of the incident by enforcing the law.  ([...] Dep. 44:7-20, 591a).  Plaintiff was acting as a supervisor during the police response pursuant to his duties as a Police Captain.  ([...] Dep. 26:10-12, 587a).  Plaintiff made radio transmissions pursuant to his duties and to supervise the officers on scene and to enforce the law during an incident where approximately fifty individuals were engaging in conduct which Plaintiff reasonably believed was in violation of criminal statutes.
[brief] **PLAINTIFFS’ DISPUTED EXHIBITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD**  The Trial Court wrongfully excluded the Planning Board Transcript of February 6, 2023, (Pa0350-0392), and the [...] memo (Pa0008, T41-13, T46-11, Exh. P-5), a document created by Plaintiffs which compared the municipal master plan to the proposed redevelopment plan.  (T45-9 to 47-4).  These two documents should have been a part of the administrative record reviewed by the Trial Court.
[brief] It is therefore respectfully requested that, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Law Division’s decisions below regarding dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against [...]; denial of plaintiff’s request to reopen and extend discovery; denial of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration; and denial of plaintiff’s request to vacate the Law Division’s prior order(s), should all be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant / Respondent [...] /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: December 5, 2023  In the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  DOCKET No: [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious names) and JANE DOES 1-10 (fictitious names), Defendants-Respondents
[brief] Despite the fact that Defendant [...] drafted an ambiguous testamentary instrument causing [...] as Executor of the Estate and individually to expend counsel fees to have the provision construed and as a result of the Judge’s application of the Doctrine of Probable Intent to lose a major portion of his inheritance, the Defendants moved to dismiss.  In support of this motion, Defendants first argued that the entire controversy doctrine barred Plaintiff’s claims due to the failure to raise same in the Probate Action.  Second, Defendants argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded this action.  Defendants motion completely ignored the allegations in paragraph 16 of the complaint, which alleged that [...] was negligent in drafting of the mortgage while acting as [...]’s attorney.  The Plaintiff cross-moved for Partial Summary Judgment as to [...]’s liability for negligently drafting an ambiguous testamentary provision.  The Plaintiff-Appellant is not seeking Appellate review of the denial of that motion.
[brief] *Ibid.*  It also requires only that a redevelopment plan address its relationship to the objectives set forth in the local master plan.  *Ibid.*  Under the LRHL, N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7(c) requires that “[t]he redevelopment plan shall describe its relationship to pertinent municipal development regulations as defined in the [MLUL].”  The LRHL further requires:  *All provisions of the redevelopment plan shall be either substantially consistent with the municipal master plan or designed to effectuate the master plan;* but the municipal governing body may adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate the master plan by affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred in its statutory interpretation of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 in that it considered the terms Railroad “Property” and Railroad “Right of Way” as interchangeable terms.  Pa4.  The Trial Court granted Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment relying specifically on N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 b(5).  Section b(5) of this immunity statute specifically refers to trespassers “using the property of any railroad”  The relevant parts of The Court’s opinion follows and can be reviewed at T17 – T19:  Subparagraph B deals with liability for people that are on railroad property.  I read that to include, even though you don’t want me to, if you read Paragraph A it deals with prohibiting people from using railroad property, or any right-of-way of any railroad.  Subparagraph A brings them both together.
[brief] ”  DiFiore, supra, 254 N.J. at 241.  The New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed the exact procedures undertaken by the Defendants herein:  We therefore hold that if a Plaintiff seeks to bring a neutral third-party observer to a Rule 4:19 exam, or to audio or video record the exam, Plaintiff's counsel should notify Defendant.  If defense counsel opposes the third-party observation or recording, the parties should meet and confer in an effort to reach agreement.  Failing an agreement, Defendant can move for a protective order under Rule 4:10-3 to bar the observation or recording.  The trial court must then decide what to permit or forbid with no absolute prohibitions or entitlements.  Id. at 238.  Rule 4:10-3 provides:  On motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, the court, for good cause shown or by stipulation of the parties, may make any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including, but not limited to, one or more of the following: a) That the discovery not be had; b) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; c) That the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; d) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; e) That the discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court Id.
[brief] BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS  Submitted March 11, 2024  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants  [...], et al.  Of Counsel: [...], Esq. (#037351989)  [...], Esq. (#023091991)  [...]  [...] [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (#013962003)  [...], Esq. (#015412011)  [...], Esq. (#269542018)  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] (11T179:13-181:6).  The legal description they were given said they were buying a “peak season” timeshare, “as more specifically set forth in Grantor’s Public Offering Statement. ” (Pa90).  Deeder [...] admitted in her testimony that the Seda’s POS does not define “peak season,” but only an irrelevant “red season. ” (11T53:10-54:16).  [...], who is the [...] employee designated to explain the contract documents to buyers, also admitted she has never read any POS.  (11T 48:20-49:10; 11T144:16-18).  When confronted with the contents of the POS, she had to admit several things she tells buyers are contradicted by the POS’ terms.  These include the fact that there --- 2 [...] admitted making these misrepresentations, which all violate the RETA’s prohibition on such misleading statements, N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.70(a)(1)-(5).
[brief] The New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice defines "juvenile" as "an individual who is under the age of [eighteen] years."  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-22(a).  An "adult" is defined as "an individual [eighteen] years of age of older."  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-22(b).  In State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of lengthy terms-of-years sentences imposed on two offenders who were seventeen years old when they committed their respective crimes.  Id. at 428-34.  In remanding the cases for resentencing, the Court held that sentencing judges must evaluate the Miller factors before sentencing juveniles to the functional equivalent of life without parole.
[brief] Further in this regard, in *State by Dept. v. 1 Howe Street*, 463 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 2020), this Court stated:  The [existing] revetment protected the property that abutted it during Sandy.  However, significant damage occurred at the street ends and where there were gaps in the revetment.  [Id., at 330]  ... significant damage occurred at the street ends and where there were gaps in the revetment.  [Id., at 331]  ...  The [beach dune] Project anticipated preventing the end and gap effects.  If excluded from the Project, these gaps would impair shore protection north and south of defendants' property.  [Id., at 332]  *Karan* instructs that damages in a partial taking are to consider the impacts of the project, both positive and negative.  There is no practical difference between assessing the impacts of the beach dune project at issue in *Karan* and the seawall project at issue in the matter at hand.  As indicated, even prior to *Karan*, a property owner was entitled to damages due to the use of the property of others, where the damage from the partial taking is not readily separable from damage due to use of land of others.
[brief] The Genesis Deed’s grant of broad authority to a “property owner’s association” to implement and enforce any “rules and regulations it chooses” is neither vague nor ambiguous.  The “Construction Rules” implemented and enforced by the “property owners’ association”—[...]—are neither vague nor ambiguous.  And the intent of the [...] to vest [...] with this broad authority, and insisting on enforcement of construction rules, unequivocally demonstrates that [...] possesses the authority the trial court summarily stripped before the close of discovery.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has long recognized that the doctrine applies not only to evidence obtained as the result of illegal searches and seizures, but “also applies to evidence obtained in violation of a Defendant’s Fifth- and Sixth-amendment rights. ”  State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639, 652 (1990).  See also Commonwealth v. White, 371 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Mass. 1977).  As with violations of a [...]’s Fourth Amendment rights, the purpose of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine as applied to Miranda violations is to “prevent such violations from escaping [judicial] review. ”  Comm. v. White, supra, at 781.  Indeed, application of the doctrine to the Fifth Amendment context is, if anything, even more compelling than in the Fourth since while “evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda guidelines may be similarly probative and reliable, there is a far more significant danger that it will not be so.
[brief] BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE  [...]  IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT  [...], Esq.  (No. 397262022)  [...], Esq. (No. 020092007)  [...] [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...], Esq.  (Admitted in NY Only)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...] [...]  Attorneys for Amicus Curiae  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] V. ARGUMENT  A.  [...] and [...]  Possess Relevant Information  Zuckerberg and Sandberg possess unique information that is core to the claims at issue.  As head of global policy management [...] publicly stated:  “With anything that is very big that a lot of people are talking about, we will absolutely loop them in ....  Any time that we’re dealing with something that is close to the line or it’s something where it’s not really clear how the policies apply or it’s something that’s particularly important, we will, at the very least, send an email up to Mark and Sheryl so that they know what’s going on[.]”  [...], Inside [...]: What’s It Really Like to Work With Zuckerberg, Sandberg?, Observer (Sept. 10, 2019), https://observer.com/2019/09/facebook-execs-reveal-working-with-mark-zuckerbergsheryl-sandberg/, Ex. 6.  She continued:  “Very often, we will end up having a back-and-forth with them about why we’re making the decision we’re making, and make sure they’re OK with it. ”  Id.  Evidence gathered to date from [...] and public sources shows that Zuckerberg and Sandberg drove the decisions that gave rise to Plaintiffs’ allegations.  Courts regularly add high-ranking executives as custodians where their files are likely to contain relevant information.  This is particularly true where, as here, the executive is intimately involved in the business decisions at issue in the litigation.  In Shenwick v. [...], for example, the Court ordered [...] CEO [...] be added as a document custodian given his involvement as Chair and CEO during the relevant class period, and because he—like Zuckerberg and Sandberg with respect to the Cambridge Analytica scandal—was the person who “came clean” to the public about the true state of affairs of [...]’s user metrics.
[brief] The Respondent Commission specifically relied upon an April 27, 2011 incident which resulted in a written reprimand, an August 11, 2013 incident which led to a ⁸ Included in the Civil Service Commission Items Comprising the Record.  ⁹ Civil Service Commission decision ([...]) to remove Appellant from promotion list based on alleged notice to Appellant in MSCO April 19, 2023 Opposition Brief.  ¹⁰ Civil Service Commission decision ([...]) to remove Appellant from promotion list based on alleged notice to Appellant in MSCO April 19, 2023 Opposition Brief. written reprimand and counseling and a September 28, 2017 incident which led to a written reprimand.
[brief] 4T 15:22-16:1; 4T 26:4-12.  Now, the State can simply veto dismissal on public disclosure grounds and need not intervene.  The 2023 Veto Amendment is thus a change in the “course of practice or procedure for the enforcement of a right” and, as a result, the case “sh[ould] be conducted as near as may be in accordance with such altered practice or procedure. ”
[brief] (1T:12:11-14).  On November 4, 2021, [...] was appointed as special master to sell the foreclosed property because he was in the best position to do so.  (1T:12:15-17).  [...] noted that having [...], you would not need to have another person “… in there reinventing the wheel, you know, [...] knows what’s going on and the like, and he has experience, nonetheless, in this type of thing. ”  (1T:12:18-23).  The foreclosure sale was conducted on January 18, 2022, and the successful buyer was [...].  (1T:12:24-25 and 13:1).  On May 27, 2022, [...] was informed that the chancery judge denied [...]’s motion to intervene in the foreclosure matter, and granted the motion of [...], as special master, to approve the sale.
[brief] *See, e.g., Spaeth*, 403 N.J. Super. at 514 (no waiver when arbitration was asserted six months after complaint but before any “meaningful exchange of discovery—much less the discovery end date—and well in advance of fixing a trial date”); *Hudik–Ross, Inc. v. 1530 Palisade Ave. Corp.*, 131 N.J. Super. 159, 167 (App. Div. 1974) (no waiver when arbitration was demanded four months after lawsuit was filed and the right to arbitrate was pleaded as an affirmative defense); cf. Cole, 215 N.J. at 281 (defendant waived right to arbitrate by waiting 21 months to move to compel and by failing to plead arbitration as a defense or otherwise provide notice of its intent to seek arbitration).
[brief] “[M]ateriality of falsehood is an element of the federal … wire fraud statute[].”  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).  Here, as discussed in the preceding sections, [...] simply informed the Planning Board of his client’s acquisition of the development rights for the Property through its execution of an exclusive lease for the Property.  There can be no “material[. . . falsehood” upon which to base a mail or wire fraud claim where the underlying statement accurately represented Bellin’s client’s interest.  See Neder, 527 U.S. at 25.  [...] leased the Property to [...] and conveyed exclusive occupancy of the Property to [...].
[brief] However, the issue we feel is whether the [...] actually caused or created this dangerous condition. ”  2T 4:21-25, 5:1.  The Court on March 1, 2024, ordered that plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, “Again, while the court sympathizes with Plaintiff, it is of the opinion that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden to show that Defendants had constructive or actual notice of the dangerous condition of the tree or that Defendant’s conduct was palpably unreasonable under the circumstances.