ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Possession or Consumption of Alcoholic Actor under legal age possesses or consumes alcohol in any school, public conveyance, 2C:33-15(a)(b)  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Beverage by public place, or place of assembly or motor vehicle.  Person under Legal Age  Possession of Alcoholic Actor of legal age to purchase alcohol brings or possesses alcohol on school property  2C:33-16  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible Beverage on without written permission of school board.  School Property Actor offers or entices underage person to drink alcohol; disorderly persons offense unless it falls into one of the listed exceptions in statute.  (Exceptions occur when an underage Offering Alcoholic person is given alcohol either by a parent or guardian who is of legal age to consume 2C:33-17(a)(b)  Beverages to Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible alcohol; or by another person, who is of legal age, in that person's home and in the Underage Persons presence of and with permission of the parent or guardian who is of legal age to consume alcohol; or is given alcohol during a religious ceremony, observance or rite.)
[brief] In a pre-civil war case, which was cited by Respondent, New Jersey courts have long held the following:  “Government needs professional services of many types, legal, medical, engineering, and if the need is sufficient to induce the creation of a post for their rendition, the incumbent is not an independent contractor merely because the services are professional in nature.  Surely the Attorney General and the county prosecutor are not independent contractors.  They hold office. ”  State ex rel. Clawson v. Thompson, 20 N.J.L. 689 (Supp. Ct. 1846) (Ra42).  A.  PETITIONER WAS A BONA FIDE EMPLOYEE OF WINSLOW TOWNSHIP UNDER THE IRS
[brief] Three of [...]’s five potential routes either skip [...] entirely or only go through a very small portion of the Town at its outskirts.  DA at 347a.  Excluding [...]’s initial proposed route that later became infeasible—as discussed infra— [...] estimates that the four other routes would cost anywhere from $36.3 million to $40.8 million, which would ultimately be reimbursed by all of its ratepayers.
[brief] [...] noted that Plaintiff would be deemed admissible to the MBA regardless of his status as a Pharm D. student.  o Exhibit N, Transcript of deposition of [...] o Exhibit O, Transcript of deposition of [...], Ed.D. o Exhibit P, June 23, 2014 letter, again stating that Plaintiff was on academic probation after the Spring 2014 grades were submitted o Exhibit Q, Grade change forms as Defendant [...] entered Plaintiff’s grades incorrectly on two separate occasions o Exhibit R, August 29, 2016 email correspondence from Plaintiff to [...] advising Plaintiff only needed to complete two additional classes to complete his health information masters track for the dual degree program.  o Notice of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice o Order to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice o Day 1 of [...]
[directive] 12.4  In all instances when a CED is fired at or discharged upon a person, a superior officer designated by the law enforcement executive shall immediately take custody of and secure the device.  The superior officer shall safeguard and preserve the digital information in that 16 USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition device concerning the incident.  The law enforcement executive of each department that utilizes CEDs shall issue a rule, regulation, standing operating procedure or other appropriate order to establish a system to ensure that the internal digital recording systems of these devices are maintained, and that the data contained therein cannot be tampered with, and cannot be accessed or erased except by duly authorized supervisors.  After the information is safeguarded, the device may be returned to service consistent with the department’s policies.  The information stored in the device concerning the use of force incident (i.e., data concerning the time the weapon was fired, the time of all electrical discharges, and video recordings of the firing of the weapon and all electrical discharges) shall be preserved and reported on in the report of the incident prepared pursuant to Section 12.2 of this policy.
[brief] The second situation where this would work is if [...] had the authority from [...] to sell those shares to the investors.  So in that situation [...] kind of is the middleman, right, he's in the middle.  [...] is going to sell shares to the investors.  The investors are going to give money and the [...] is going to give shares back.  But [...] just simple didn't have the authority to do that so that doesn't work either.  (7T 59:18 to 60:1) (emphasis added).  It is indisputably clear that [...], through [...] was the sole franchisee of [...] at the time he accepted the key money investments.
[directive] 법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  뉴저지 주 사법부  [...] 그레이브스법에 대한 보충 답변 양식 (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c) (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for Graves Act Offenses 2C:43-6c) (Korean)
[brief] Plaintiffs conceded before the trial court, and now on appeal, that the correct standard governing [...]’s motion for reconsideration is set forth in Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021).  Despite the agreement of the parties before the trial court, the written statement of reasons denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration heavily relied upon the Rule 4:49-2 standard that only applies to a “judgment or final order. ”  While Plaintiffs brush this off as a “minor inadvertence on the part of the trial court,” [...] should not be forced to accept that explanation at face value.  Under the “far more liberal” interest of justice standard that applied, the trial court should have granted [...]’s motion for reconsideration for additional proceedings, including, but not limited to, additional discovery from [...] or the “developers. ”  Indeed, the trial court’s decision outright ignored the historical record evidence and agreed with Plaintiffs that there was “no evidence” of [...] having authority to implement construction rules.  Such a decision can only be reached by misapplying the summary judgment standard that requires all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and was doubled-down upon by application of the incorrect reconsideration standard.
[brief] On May 31, 2023, plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint.  Pa24.  Plaintiff alleges that the defendants retaliated against him in violation of CEPA, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.  All parties have identified [...] as a person having knowledge of the relevant facts in their interrogatory answers.  Pa190, 196, 201.  On November 9, 2023 and December 4, 2023, plaintiff served notices of deposition on each of [...], [...], and [...] (the “Corporate Defendants”) to produce [...] for deposition in New Jersey.
[brief] The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the manslaughter offenses and then instructed the jury to consider whether the force used upon the victim was justified as self-defense.  If the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was untrue, the jury had to reject the defense; if the jury had reasonable doubt, defendant was entitled to an acquittal.  (6T133-12 to 6T134-7).  **POINT III**
[brief] The trial court held that all claims against [...] “based upon vicarious liability [are] ultimately dismissed. ”  [See 3T36-12]  While not addressed by the trial court, the claims against [...] also fail because it is not a proper party to this dispute.  [...] did not issue or rescind any of the Policies.  [Pa426a, ¶¶ 1-4; Pa427a, ¶ 7; Pa428a, ¶¶ 9, 11, 13; Pa432a, ¶ 36; Pa434a-435a, ¶¶ 41-45]  Rather, [...] issued and rescinded all four of the Policies.  [Pa426a, ¶¶ 1-4]  [...] has no connection to the dispute and is not a proper party to this case.  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], attorneys of [...], Plaintiffs/Appellants, vs. ALLIED WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, [...], [...]
[brief] Here, [...] demonstrated for the jury exactly how he reached his conclusions by comparing the latent fingerprints with defendant’s known exemplar at trial.  There is thus no “analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered” that concerned the McPhaul panel.  Id. at 303-04.  Indeed, Garrett laments McPhaul’s limited application, suggesting that the panel “could have been more detailed in its reasoning” by discussing “the PCAST report . . . [and] studies of error rates in latent fingerprinting. ”  The Reliable Application of Fingerprint Evidence at 76.  While the parties briefed and argued the impact of those reports before the panel, id. at 75, the court tellingly chose not to address them.  The Garrett article—the sole legal document cited by amicus—is therefore undergirded by a distinguishable out-of-state case predicated only on its facts and does not undercut a century of law finding such evidence reliable.
[brief] Interestingly, the Respondents were also silent regarding this point raised by [...].  The Court did not cite case law, argue what its interpretation of the word “examination” means as it applies to OPRA and Executive Order 110, or even reference this critical part of [...]’s argument in its ruling.  Neither the Court nor the Respondents cited any case law in reference to this point and their silence on this key and critical point of [...]’s argument demonstrates the flaw in both the Court’s decision and the Respondents’ response.  Simply put, this causal connection behind the legislative and executive intent of the word “examination” as it applies to OPRA has been made clear for the Judicial branch.  This is a case of first impression.
[brief] When examined, however, the Trial Court’s factual findings had clear support in the record and the Trial Court did not err in its legal analysis of the case.  [...] also argues on appeal that the Borough’s title expert should have been barred from providing testimony at trial.  [...] filed a pre-trial motion to bar this expert testimony and the Trial Court denied the motion without prejudice, noting that this argument would have to be evaluated in the context of the trial testimony and that [...] should re-file the motion at trial if it wanted to bar this evidence.  [...] never moved to bar this testimony at trial and likewise it failed to object to the scope of the testimony provided by the Borough’s expert.  Consequently, [...] waived this argument and cannot pursue it on appeal.
[brief] -  On or about February 19, 2021, March 1, 2021 and March 10, 2021, Plaintiff requested that Defendant’s former counsel accept service of process via email.  He did not respond.  -  On February 23 and 28, 2021, after counsel did not initially respond, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant at **[...]**.  (Pa140 to 146).  - Defendant has admitted that 39 Shore Drive is his address.  (Def.’s Br. at 3-4).  -  On March 19, 2021, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant with the aforementioned documents at [...], which was an address Plaintiff’s private investigation firm, [...], confirmed.  (Pa16).  - Defendant has admitted that he is the owner of this property, which he sometimes allows his sister to occupy.  (Def.’s Br. at 4).  - Defendant’s former attorney, [...], confirmed that B5 Oceanview Terrace was Defendant’s address.  (Da163).
[brief] [...] also advised Plaintiffs and their counsel that its plans were approved by an independent engineer and the city planner.  Plaintiffs and their attorneys then exhibited bad faith by continuing with baseless litigation against [...] for the purpose of harassment and delay.  Plaintiffs needlessly kept [...] in the case for over a year, only to oppose [...]’s second motion for summary judgment by arguing, for the first time, that [...], a site civil engineer, needed to obtain Plaintiffs’ consent before it drafted a preliminary site plan of the redevelopment project for the [...].  This unsupported “common knowledge” claim against [...], which completely lacks basis in both law and fact, was nothing more than a bad faith attempt to circumvent the Affidavit of Merit statute for a second time.  Plaintiffs’ actions can only be described as frivolous, for which [...] is entitled to the full amount of attorneys’ fees requested.
[brief] This interpretation is consistent with New Jersey courts’ general apprehension to infer a statutory private right of action where the legislature has not expressly provided one.  *See R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat’l Consumer Ins. Co.*, 168 N.J. 255, 271 (2001).  Given the NJCFLA’s extensive statutory framework that explicitly vests the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance sole with enforcement power, “it would be inappropriate to construe the Act as impliedly authorizing a private cause of action.
[brief] Cases cited have established any ORDERS OR JUDGEMENTS are to be found as VOID AS MATTER OF CASE LAW, “ANY DEFECTS …ARE FATAL AND LEAVE THE COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND ITS JUDGEMENT VOID. ”  Driscoll v. Burlington Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 493, 86 A2d 201 (1952), cert, den., 344 U.S. 838, 73 S.Ct. 25, 97 L.Ed. 652 (1952).
[directive] Prior to print out and dissemination, municipal court staff must complete the following tillable portions of the form: identify the sitting CountyNicinage Criminal Division in Step 2 of the lnstr.uctions; and provide the address and telephone contact information for that CountyNicinage Criminal Division, also in Step 2.  ·  Upon receipt of the completed Forms, the Municipal Court Judge must verify that . the charges are eligible for expungement under the statute.  This will require confirmation  [...]  Subj: Expedited Expungement of Arrest/Charge Records 23, 2016  Date: May Page 3 that the charges identified in the Application were not disposed of by way of a plea agreement.  To do so, municipal court staff must attach the disposition printout of each identified charge to the Application before submitting to the Municipal Court Judge for review.  In the event there is any defect in the Application, in form or substance, the Applicant is to be notified by municipal court staff.  The method of such notification .is left to · the discretion of each municipal court.  If the Application is approved by the Municipal Court Judge, the Municipal Court Judge must memorialize that approval by dating and signing the "For Municipal Court Use Only" box at the bottom of the Application.  The signed Application, disposition printouts, and Order must be forwarded by municipal court staff to the CountyNicinage Criminal Division.  Requiring transmittal by the court ensures that an Applicant cannot simply write for expungement following the Municipal Court's review.  Further, the in additional charges attachment of the disposition print out decreases the length of the form by providing as much clarity as possible to the CountyNicinage Criminal Division for their own verification process.  Once the forms are reviewed, they are to be submitted to a Superior Court Judge.  The statute places the responsibility on the prosecutor to promptly distribute copies of the expungement order to appropriate law enforcement and correctional institutions. of the expungement, the Superior Court will forward the ·signed Therefore, upon approval Application and executed Order to the appropriate prosecutor.  A copy of the signed Application and executed Order will also be provided to the municipal court and the Applicant.
[brief] We noted that “[t]he area to be classed as blighted is the portion of a municipality which in the judgment of the planning board or governing body, as the case may be, reasonably falls within the definition laid down by the Legislature. ”  Id. at 148-149 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis original).  Finding the mere non-use of buildings is a detriment or blighting condition in and of itself is consistent with other Legislative declarations.
[directive] Restrict the decision not to test a reported SAFE kit to the discretion of the [...], the [...], or their attorney designees.  • Eliminates the following from ever being reasons not to test a reported SAFE kit: o The belief by a member of the investigative or prosecutorial team that the act was consensual; o No suspects were identified; or o  The allegation was filed against a spouse, partner, or former spouse/partner of the victim.  24
[brief] On May 2, 2023, counsel for [...] filed a motion to consolidate which was granted and a consolidation Order was entered on May 12, 2023 by the Hon. [...], J.S.C. (Da102 – Da103).  On May 11, 2023 counsel for [...] filed a motion to hold [...] in contempt for failure to comply with the terms of the Order enforcing litigants rights previously entered.  Counsel for [...] filed opposition to the motion to hold [...] in contempt and filed a cross motion seeking to vacate the prior Order and quash the subpoena.  Oral argument was conducted before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. on June 19, 2023, and [...] entered an Order on June 26, 2023 with a written statement of reasons, vacating the prior Order enforcing litigants rights but refused to quash the subpoena.
[brief] This unreported decision is exhibit Pa160 to the plaintiff’s Appendix Volume I.  Lintao v. Livingston, 2011 WL 2935052 (App. Div. 2011)6.  This case law relied upon by the plaintiff, however, does not support the contention that the challenged ruling of the trial court to admit evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, falls and handicapped placard constituted an abuse of discretion.
[directive] Rules and Regulations  2.2.1  The agency's rules and regulations should form a "code of conduct" for employees.  It should contain the broadly stated "do's and don'ts," without delving into specific details.  For instance, an agency's rules and regulations should state that any use of force by an officer must comply with state and federal law, the Attorney General's and the County Prosecutor's policies, and the agency's S.O.Ps.  The specific details of what is considered force, and what constitutes the acceptable use of force, should be found in the agency's use of force
[brief] Indeed, as explained supra, that rule did not come into effect in the [...]’s Commercial Rules until 2000.  Da377-Da403.  Thus, the Raritan Court did not address the impact of the [...]’s jurisdictional rules [i.e., Rule 9(a)] because that rule did not exist at that time, and the Court’s decision concerning a court’s ability to decide the application of the entire controversy doctrine on a pending arbitration does not apply here, where two sophisticated parties expressly agreed that the arbitrator would decide arbitrability of the dispute.
[brief] [...] claimed not to know at the time he returned the phone that there was a wiretap order on it.  (18T 140-11 to 15)  On January 10, [...] found a shell casing on the stairs to the porch of the carriage house.  (18T 120-22 to 121-6)  When [...] processed the scene on January 9, he found a spent projectile, coins and a hat on the porch of the carriage house, and a table on that porch was knocked over and resting at a 45-degree angle.  (21T 52-13 to 55-14; 21T 82-11 to 83-8)  Inside the carriage house, [...] found blood on the first floor at the bottom of the stairs and also on a TV, and both stains turned out to be defendant’s blood.  (21T 60-7 to 20)  He also collected a board from the deck of the porch a few weeks later that appeared to have a mark from a projectile on it.  (21T 69-12 to 73-23)  [...] agreed that the interior of the carriage house, in conjunction with the bloodstains, could look like a struggle took place inside, but he could not definitively say that it looked like a struggle happened rather than just looking like “a messy place. ”  (21T 91-13 to 25)  [...] noted that the lighting on the porch was “poor” and that if someone knocks on the outer part of the door of the carriage house, a person inside cannot see who is outside.  (21T 81-2 to 20)  On January 9, [...] testified, he took photos of defendant and noticed no injuries to his face, hands, or forearms.
[brief] This possibility is foreseen in the Amended Resolution, which clearly stipulates the following condition of approval:  Revised plans, to the extent necessary, shall be submitted to the Board and the Board professionals for review and approval.  (26a)  Appellant lives within 200 feet of the building site and has not received any notice of any new zoning board hearings concerning [...].  So it is safe to say that no revised plans have been submitted to the [...] for its approval.
[brief] [Da7 - Da16].  On July 13, 2022, the Bergen County assignment judge entered an order sua sponte dismissing Plaintiff’s July 11, 2022 Notice of Motion as frivolous pursuant to the prior assignment judge’s March 9, 2012 injunctive order.  [Da17 - Da18].  On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff again submitted to the trial court a “Notice of Motion” seeking a declaratory judgment that the trial court is “bound by the prior Supreme Court opinions” and asserting that the summary judgment motion deprived him of his right to a jury trial.  [Da19 - Da28].  On November 17, 2022, the Bergen County assignment judge entered an order sua sponte dismissing Plaintiff’s November 14, 2022 Notice of Motion as frivolous pursuant to the prior assignment judge’s March 9, 2012 injunctive order.  [Da29 - Da30].  On September 27, 2023, this Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s November 17, 2022 dismissal order.
[brief] Are you a citizen of the United States?  [Yes]  [No]  If you have answered “No” to this question, you must answer Questions 17b - 17f.  If you have answered “Yes” to this question, proceed to Question 18 b.  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re-enter the United States?
[brief] THE COURT ERRED BY ITS MISAPPLICATION OF CASE LAW IN EMPLOYING THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO DENY A DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS VIOLATION.  THE COURT FAILED TO BE APPRISED THAT THERE IS NO FEDERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS ARISING UNDER SECTION 1983 AND THAT LACHES DOES NOT GOVERN CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS.  IT IS “STATE TOLLING PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN THE TOLLING OF THE APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS  ARISING UNDER 42 U.S.C.A. §1983, AS ITS ERRONEOUS DENIAL NEGATIVELY EFFECTUATED THIS CASE’S OUTCOME  UNFAIRLY.  THE RELEVANT STATE’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR ANALOGOUS ACTIONS WOULD “NORMALLY” APPLY, HOWEVER, INVOKING THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE KNOWN AS THE DISCOVERY RULE, DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES  SURROUNDING THIS SPECIFIC CASE WOULD THEN HAVE WARRANTED AN EXCEPTION TO THE STATE’S STATUTE PERMITTING THE TOLLING OF TIME INTO 2023.  HAD THE COURT CURED THIS DEFECT TO THE MISAPPLICATION OF CASE LAW, IT WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN GOVERNED BY PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED THROUGH THIRD CIRCUIT CASE LAW TO ITS FINDINGS AND AS SUCH FAILED TO BE BOUND BY PRIOR COURT’S DECISIONS THAT WERE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THIS DEFENDANT’S CASE.  AS IT WAS NOT GUIDED BY THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS THAT OBLIGATES COURTS TO LOOK AT PRECEDENTS IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR DECISIONS  THE COURT DELIVERED AN UNFAIR RESULT (Pa17)