ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa91 at 30:3-6; Pa115 at 127:19-128:12; Pa368 at 108:16-18; Pa90 at 29:19-25).  [...] had no choice other than to accept the decision.  (Pa369 at 109:12-110:10).  The trial court recognized same: “it doesn’t really seem that it would make a lot of sense for her to be the – that [[...]] was happy about this discipline that these parties received, because she lost three-quarters of – or at least 60% of her employees. ” (See 1T 31:7-12).  The trial court therefore did not draw any inferences in favor of Defendants, but merely recognized that no evidence exists in this record that could lead a reasonable jury to rule in [...]’s favor.  [...] has failed to present any facts to support his position that there is a genuine dispute as to [...]’s alleged derailment of [...]’s investigation into her June 24, 2024 conduct.  Finally, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to [...]’s alleged selective application of its policies that could preclude summary judgment.  [...]’s discipline policy explicitly notes that [...] may commence discipline at any level, including discharge without prior warnings or other corrective measures.  (Pa423-26).  As for [...]’s contention that other employees alleged to have stolen time were not reprimanded, it is demonstrably false.  [...] points only to [...]’s testimony once again to support this argument.  (See Pb27; Pa668).  Meanwhile, [...] explained at her deposition that [...] managers are responsible for submitting “salary time sheets,” to ensure that paid time off (“PTO”) is properly tracked.  These managers were not “falsifying their time cards,” as alleged without support, but simply had their PTO retroactively deducted from their PTO bank upon their submission of a group of time sheets.  (Pa360 at 74:17-76:11).  [...] confirmed that no money exchanged hands because [...] merely deducted the necessary PTO hours from the managers’ PTO bank.  (Pa360 at 74:17-76:11).  There is simply no evidence of “selective” application of [...] policy, only [...]’s bald assertions.  In sum, [...] has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact capable of showing a causal link between his termination and any alleged whistle-blowing activity.  Providing all legitimate, reasonable inferences in [...]’s favor, no reasonable factfinder could find there exists a causal connection between [...]’s continuous gripes about [...]’s management style and his termination.  B.
[brief] In Appellant’s merits brief, Appellant seeks to challenge not only the denial of Appellant’s third-party hearing request, but also the 2019 Permit Modification.  See Appellant’s Brief, Point II.  Appellant’s Notice of Appeal does not designate the 2017 WFD Permit or the 2019 Permit Modification as the decisions from which the appeal is taken and Appellant does not directly challenge the 2017 WFD Permit in its brief.  (Aa0532-Aa0535).  Therefore, the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification are not within the scope of the appeal and should not be addressed.
[brief] The permissive authority extended by Paragraph 10 was in the nature of a temporary license, as detailed in *Kearney v. Mun. San. Landfill Auth.*, 143 N.J. Super. 449, 456 (Law Div. 1976):  A license and other lesser interests in land are distinguished by less than an exclusivity of possession.  A license creates a right of use and occupancy in the licensee to the extent necessary to perform an agreement between the parties.  A license confers authority to go upon the land of another and do an act or series of acts there, but it does not give rise to an estate in land.
[brief] The trial court correctly found that the defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The covenant, inherent in every contract, requires that neither party do anything that would have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of another party to receive the fruits of the contract.  Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. at 420-21; Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2002) (one party to a contract may not unreasonably frustrate the other’s purpose).  One party to a contract may not use the powers bestowed on them to unilaterally destroy the other’s expectations without legitimate purpose.  Such risks are beyond the expectations of the parties at the formation.  Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 251 (2001).  Bad faith is to be found in the “eye of the trier of fact” and can be discerned from the proofs regarding the defendants’ state of mind and the context from which the claim arose.  Seidenberg, 348 N.J. Super. at 262-63.  Here, the trial court found that the financial records [...] produced for [...] and [...] (on behalf of himself and [...]), and that formed the basis for the purchase prices in the MIPA and the SPAs were “bogus.
[brief] (Pa4).  By way of example, the Court noted that Plaintiff sought LAD compensatory damages for claimed instances of unidentified members being subjected to discrimination; yet, there was no appropriate party in interest in the case to whom such damages could be awarded.  (Pa4).  Plaintiff’s appeal again relies on *Williams v. Borough of Clayton*, 442 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 2015), in seeking to avoid its responsibilities with respect to indispensable parties.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  ...............  35 POINT VI  RINES’S EXCESSIVE 12-YEAR SENTENCE WITH 4 YEARS OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY WAS BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DIRECTIVE 2021-4 AND WAS OTHERWISE IMPROPERLY IMPOSED.  (6T 12-16 to 14-11)  ...........................................................................................................  36  1.  Because Attorney General Directive No. 2021-4 required prosecutors to waive mandatory minimum terms for non-violent drug offenses, the 4-year period of parole ineligibility imposed on [...]’s aggregate 12-year sentence was discretionary, not mandatory.  Resentencing is required because the court treated the parole bar as though it were mandatory and did not engage in the required analysis to impose a discretionary parole bar.  ......................... 37  2.  Resentencing is required because the trial court did not discuss the aggravating factors, the weights assigned to them, or its refusal to find any mitigating factors.  ...........................................................................................................  40  TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd.)  3.  The possession charges for each drug type should have merged with the respective charges for possession with intent to distribute.  ...........................................  42  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................  46
[brief] Summary judgment should be granted where, as here, there is no genuine dispute over the existence of an element of the cause of action.  Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 295 N.J. Super. 354, 364-65 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 158 N.J. 490 (1999); see also R. 4:42-6 (requiring motion to be granted where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law”).
[brief] ”  Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC, 471 N.J. Super. 184, 192 (App. Div. 2022).  Although the trial court did not address it in its decision and [...]’s opening brief also does not address it, [...] does not have standing to seek to disqualify the [...] (or the [...]).
[brief] Entry A.2. to Exhibit A-Scope of Work states “[[...]] acknowledges that for the work of this Subcontract, it is an excluded party under the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program (“CCIP”) for this Project[]” and Entry B.6. states “[[...]] acknowledges that [...] is also an excluded party under the CCIP[,]” and must “comply with all insurance requirements set forth in the CCIP Insurance [] Manual and Schedule ‘B’ as an excluded party. ”  (ZURa321.)  [...] argues that the trial court’s reference to the Scope of Work applicable to the initial Ritz-Wall work was improper because it was [...] - not [...] - that acknowledged [...] was excluded.  (TRVb47.)  But, on August 3, 2015, after receiving the Project Requirements from [...], [...] forwarded them to [...] of [...], as well as [...] representatives, confirming [...]’s unenrollment and stating, “I just got this from [...], you need to revise your proposal and add for the insurance.
[brief] “The test as to whether expert testimony is needed is whether the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the party was reasonable. ”  Id. at 283.  Despite the prejudicial effect of [...]’s decision not to retain all pertinent surveillance footage has had on Plaintiffs, expert testimony is not required in the instant matter because the subject matter is such that jurors of common judgment and experience can form a valid judgment as to the proper use of a U-boat, and whether the conduct of [...] was reasonable.  In addition, Defendant’s assertion that jurors would be left to speculate as to whether the U-boat was overloaded is simply wrong, as the Accident Investigation Form completed by [...] indicates that Plaintiff was struck with a “full U-boat” (Pa153), confirming that the merchandise was stacked too high.  This was also corroborated by Plaintiff’s testimony at the time she viewed the surveillance footage, whereby an employee (presumably, [...]) “made a comment [as to] how full the customer’s cart [was]” (Pa32)  Among the cases which Defendant relies upon as to why it believes expert testimony is required in the instant matter to establish the requisite standard of care are *Giantonnio v. Taccard*, 291 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1996) and *Dare v. Freefall Adventures, Inc.*, 349 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] See Orologio of Short Hills, Inc. v. Swatch Grp. (U.S.) Ltd., Inc., 2015 WL 4496653, at *5 (D.N.J. July 23, 2015), aff’d in part [as to the NJFPA], rev’d in part and remanded sub nom.  Orologio of Short Hills Inc v. The Swatch Grp. (U.S.) Inc., 653 Fed. Appx. 134 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that despite the plaintiff’s attempt to piecemeal written communication between the parties to qualify as a “written arrangement,” the plaintiff was unable to point to any specific written arrangement as is required under the NJFPA).  The NJFPA requires “a written arrangement for a definite or indefinite period” granting a license.  N.J.S.A. 56:10-3.  A reference to a distribution arrangement in a letter issued after the termination of the relationship does not grant a license as defined under the NJFPA.
[brief] ”  State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 25 (1997).  A lawyer cannot represent a client if there is a significant risk his representation may be materially limited by responsibilities to a former client, absent waiver, and he cannot use information from a former client or reveal information related to the former representation.  RPC 1.6(a), 1.7(a)(2), 1.9(c).  Investigation into [...] and witnesses close to them could have provided fertile areas for defense, yet counsel’s prior representation discouraged full exploration.  See People v. Cleveland, 981 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).  There is no evidence counsel investigated anything regarding the victim or his family, including background or history that might have added to the defense’s ability to defend the case.
[brief] In *Hilton*, the defendant’s appraiser had valued the property based upon the property’s probable assemblage with continuous parcels.  The Court in *Hilton* equated a future or prospective assemblage with an impending grant of a variance or zone change, meaning it was permissible to consider a potential variance or zone change as the basis of the property’s Highest and Best Use as long as there was evidence of a reasonable probability in the near future.  However, the defendant’s appraiser in *Hilton* failed to treat it as a *prospective* assemblage, thus the Appellate Division held that his appraisal was defective:  [W]e are persuaded that appraising the value of the defendant’s property as if a four-lot assemblage had already taken place as of the date of taking and then basing the Highest and Best Use on such assemblage constituted a fundamentally untenable and legally unsupportable approach.  …  But it (assemblage/variance/zone change) cannot be the basis for determining market value as if the assemblage had already taken place.  **This distinction between** enhancing market value and constituting the basis of market value is, in or view, critical and it is that distinction that rendered Defendants’ appraisal methodology legally defective.  _Hilton_, _supra_ at 590-591 [emphasis added].  The Court set forth the necessary two-step analysis that must be engaged in:  [T]he first step in the two-step trial process is for the judge to make an initial, gatekeeping determination of whether an assemblage was probable in the near future as measured from the date of taking based on the evidence before him relating to market conditions and the circumstances particular to the property.  …  If the judge determines that an assemblage including defendant’s property was reasonably probable at a near-future time from the date of taking, then, according to the prescription of both _Gorga_ and _Caoili_, the jury must be instructed to consider in its determination of fair market value the premium a willing buyer would pay for the probability of a future assemblage over and above the fair market value as represented by the existing use of the property.  See, _Hilton_, _supra_ at 590 [emphasis added].  The _Hilton_ Court likened the probable assemblage issue to that of a probable zoning change, stating, “we are persuaded that this issue is conceptually no different from the effect on market value of a prospective zoning change.  The two situations are virtually identical in their salient character, that is, the prospect of a change in the basic circumstances surrounding the property that, if it occurs after the date of taking, would then permit a highest and best use different from and more profitable to the owner that the use existing or permissible as of the date of taking. ”  _Hilton_, supra at 549.  The Hilton court rejected the appraiser’s report for treating a property assemblage as a “fait accompli” (as described in Caoili, supra at 273) rather than assigning a premium that a willing buyer would pay for a property with the reasonable probability of an assemblage or zoning change.
[brief] The Mount Laurel doctrine’s overriding aim is to provide housing that is affordable to New Jersey’s working families.  In order to achieve that aim, Mount Laurel requires that each municipality expeditiously take the necessary steps to create a realistic opportunity for its fair share of the regional need for affordable housing.  Despite the clarity of the aim, the promise of Mount Laurel has often been frustrated by some municipalities’ determination to avoid compliance with their constitutional obligations at all costs.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in Mount Laurel II, to allow towns to evade their obligations without recourse would subvert Mount Laurel by leading not to housing but to process, paper, and interminable delay.  Worst of all, it would continue to deny lower-income households’ access to the opportunity live in safe, decent, affordable housing and would deny them equal treatment under New Jersey’s Constitution.  The present matter involves a town that, after voluntarily withdrawing its declaratory judgment action seeking a judgment of repose and immunity from builder’s remedy lawsuits, has been deemed constitutionally noncompliant in the order of magnitude of at least 600 units for its Third Round Mount Laurel obligation.  This case implicates complicated and somewhat interrelated areas of law: redevelopment, condemnation, and Mount Laurel.
[brief] 6.  By way of further example, Appellant calls the Court’s attention to paragraph 8 of my certification of Motion for Correction of Probation Account Record (DA346).  Probation, [...], DAG, and the Court overlooked or failed to consider and failed to respond to my citation of the requirement of the Order of 3/25/2004 (DA41, p. 1, item no. 1) requiring elimination of $16,529.20 in support arrears, which has never been posted on the account record to this very date and which is not included in the Probation “accounting” of 3/17/2022 (DA41):  “1.  Defendant’s probation account #[...] shall be corrected to eliminate the $16,519.20 arrears as of March 17, 2004, and to reflect a credit of $10,354.73 as of March 17, 2004.  ...  His credit shall be applied to bring all additional arrears current and then at a rate of $500. ”
[directive] (Portuguese)  Esta notificação visa informá-lo que na condição de pessoa condenada por Eludir a Abordagem Policial nos termos da lei 2C:29-2b, sua carteira de motorista está suspensa por um período de . N.J.S.A. [6 meses a 2 anos], a partir de hoje.  Além disso, se for condenado por operar veículo motorizado pessoalmente durante o período de suspensão, você estará sujeito às penalidades previstas na lei 39:3-40:  N.J.S.A.  This is to inform you that, as a person convicted of Eluding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, your driver’s license is suspended for a period of [6 months to 2 years], effective today.
[brief] None of these cases addressed, let alone overruled, the long-standing law of implied easements.  Moreover, none of these courts addressed whether “proximity” alone was enough to create an implied easement because that issue was not before them.  While Bubis is indisputably an express easement case, the Appellate Division’s rationale nevertheless supports the [...]’ position.  The Bubis Court reasoned that “any person acquiring one of these lots [after reading the map] would reasonably have assumed that one of the benefits of property ownership was convenient access to the beach and ocean by means of this street network. ”  323 N.J. Super. at 611.  As this Court then followed, “if there were any possible doubt that access to the ocean and the beach was an essential part of the package . . . that doubt would be resolved by the fact that each purchaser acquired not only a lot but also an express easement over the Beach and adjoining Bluff. ”  Ibid.  3.
[directive] Anonymous reports of improper conduct by an officer shall be accepted.  All efforts will be made to encourage full cooperation by the complainant.  The investigation of anonymous complaints can be troublesome.  However, accurate information about officer wrongdoing may be provided by someone who, for any number of reasons, does not want to be identified.  Therefore, an anonymous report must be accepted and investigated as fully as possible.  In the event an agency receives an anonymous complaint, the officer accepting it should complete as much of the internal affairs report form as he or she can given the information received.  5.1. 8  Complaints against a law enforcement executive, or a member of the executive’s senior management team, may originate from a member of the public or from an employee of the agency.
[brief] The Arbitrator properly excluded [...]’s summary judgment opposition brief.  [...] argues that the Arbitrator improperly denied an extension of [...]’s deadline to oppose Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion in arbitration Phase II.  But [...] had a history of manipulating deadlines solely for the sake of delay, including being caught lying about a medical condition in the SDNY Action resulting in an over-$20,000 sanction there.  The Arbitrator was within his rights to deny [...] even more delay after many years of dilatory litigation tactics, and the confirmation of the Arbitrator’s summary judgment award should be affirmed.
[brief] (9T6-4 to 18).  Thus, defendant would fall under the ambit of the persistent offender statute on either date, even though the statute specifies the later date.  (9T7-5 to 13).  The judge thus found that as a persistent offender, defendant was subject to a five-to-ten-year prison sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(4), and a parole-ineligibility period of no more than one-half of the aggregate prison sentence.
[brief] All increases shall be retroactive to the date of promotion.  Pa000035-37, 49 (emphasis added).  1.  Notwithstanding the provisions of the relevant collective negotiations agreements regarding salary adjustments for promotions, the parties agree that the [...] may effectuate such promotions as it deems necessary from Sergeant to Lieutenant, and/or Lieutenant to Captain with no increase in pay until a salary increase, including rank deferential [sic]and any other increase, is ratified between the [...], the [...] and the [...], or until such salary increases are awarded by an interest arbitrator in accordance with the statutory provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16, et seq.  All increases shall be retroactive to the date of promotion.  Pa000035-37, 51 (emphasis added).  Defendants argue that these are contingent agreements for any and all earned wages.
[directive] SCHEDULE OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS (See Section 10 for Explanations and Definitions)  9.1  Aggravating Factors  Aggravating Factor Point Value  1.  Community Impact  a.  One or more children were present in the premises where the drugs were stored, manufactured, or distributed +2 (Do not use if Special Application and Enhancement Feature H applies for distributing to a juvenile, or if defendant is 2C:35-6); or, pleading guilty to N.J.S.A. b.  The offense occurred in a drug-free park, public housing, or public building zone in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (Do not use if the zone is based only on a library, +2 playground or recreational facility owned by a school; do not 2C:35-7.1); or, use if defendant also pleads guilty to N.J.S.A.  c.  The offense occurred in a designated “Quality of Life” +3 special enforcement zone.  2.  Bail Violations  The offense was committed while the defendant was +3 or +4 if the offense was released on bail or on his/her own recognizance for another committed while the offense, or the bail violation occurred after arrest in the defendant was a fugitive present case.  (Bail violations that constitute violations of a or under warrant for bail Drug Offender Restraining Order (D.O.R.O.) are to be jumping, or is based on a accounted for by means of Special Application and failure to appear in court Enhancement Feature #F and should not be double-counted in the present matter under this aggravating factor.)  3.  Risk of Injury to Officers or Others a.  The offense involved the threatened use of violence +3 to +4 not otherwise accounted for in Special Application and Enhancement Features C1, C2 or D; or, +3 to +5 b.  The defendant resisted arrest; or, c.  The defendant at the time of arrest or an attempted +4 to +5 arrest engaged in flight or committed the offense of eluding; or, +3 d.  The defendant attempted to destroy evidence or otherwise hinder an investigation in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 or 3.  Page 64  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)
[brief] (Raised below, 6T, Pg. 215).  Defendants concede that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice” (Def. Brief Pg. 18) which “requires judges to ‘refrain…from sitting in any causes where their objectivity and impartiality may fairly be brought into question. ” (Def. Brief, Pg. 18-19) (internal citations omitted).  Nevertheless, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s basis to recuse [...] has nothing to do with [...]’ alleged bias or impartiality.