ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27D-304(o); see also id. at (u), defining “[e]xclusionary zoning litigation” as “litigation to challenge the fair share plan, housing element, or ordinances or resolutions implementing the fair share plan or housing element of a municipality based on alleged noncompliance” with the Fair Housing Act or the Mount Laurel doctrine, “which litigation shall include . . . litigation seeking a builder’s remedy. ”  Over 440 municipalities have filed a binding resolution with the new Affordable Housing Dispute Resolution Program established by the Law, and commenced a declaratory judgment action accepting, or challenging, their Fourth Round present need and prospective need obligations as estimated by the Department of Community Affairs pursuant to the new law.
[brief] A.  Legal Standard for the Review of Fee Applications  The party bringing a fee application bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the fees by a preponderance of the evidence in accordance with RPC 1.5(a).  Lopez v. Pitula, 271 N.J. Super. 116, 122 (App. Div. 1994).  “Compiling raw totals of hours spent … does not complete the inquiry.  It does not follow that the amount of time actually expended is the amount of time reasonably expended. ”  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 334-35 (1995).  (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).  Rather, in determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, a “lodestar” must be calculated, “which is that number of hours reasonably expended by the successful party's counsel in the litigation, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. ”  Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 387-88 (2009) (citations omitted).  Determining the lodestar “requires the trial court to evaluate carefully and critically the aggregate hours and specific hourly rates advanced by counsel. ”  Rendine 141 N.J. at 335 (emphasis added).  As recognized by the Supreme Court in *Litton Industries*, RPC 1.5(a) requires the Court to consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
[brief] Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, dismissing Appellant’s claims against Respondent [...] With Prejudice 155a-156a  Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, dismissing Appellant’s claims against Respondent [...]  With Prejudice 157a-158a  Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, dismissing Appellant’s claims against Respondent [...]  With Prejudice 159a-160a  Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, denying Appellant’s Motion to Extend Discovery 161a-162a
[brief] There, as here, [...] had testified that his purpose in calling for another officer to write his warning was to avoid prolonging the stop (Da70, at 27) (1T143-10 to 23).  But it also established that “he did not intend to complete the written warning himself” (Da63, at 26).  But what then was his intent?  His conduct – removal of the [...] to his patrol car, engaging him in “seemingly innocuous conversation” his protracted warning writing process, and his abrupt termination of the conversation to “walk the dog” upon arrival of a fellow officer “impermissibly prolonged the stop,” and, said the court, perhaps too charitably, made him a “victim to his own concern for delay.  Finding that [...] had “impermissibly prolonged the stop,” the Court required suppression of the physical evidence.  (Da70, at 27).  The circumstances of the instant case are, if anything, more egregious than in Kruckenberg, which itself was grounded in long-standing Fourth Amendment constitutional principles, discussed and applied in a similar factual context by Illinois’ highest court in People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. 1999).
[brief] Rather, the Jersey Shore became what it is today after decades of careful and deliberate property development.  In the 1940s, Edward and [...] owned large tracts of land situated along the shore in what is now [...].  [...] sought to create a “club” of future property owners residing on their beachfront and beach-adjacent property.  [...] achieved this goal by conveying deeds with restrictive covenants to hundreds of purchasers.  This case involves one such deed.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant [...]’s principal argument on appeal is simple and straightforward: the record contains abundant evidence establishing all three elements of common-law nuisance.  Unable to rebut those core elements, Defendants ignore the evidence that matters and instead argue that [...] has not proven deviations from professional standards of care, which have no place in a nuisance action.  They also contend [...] needed to quantify the increase in flooding on his property, which misses the mark because [...]’s property had not been flooded for nearly ten years before Defendants materially altered their driveway.  On the trespass claim, Defendants do not and cannot rebut that [...] owns both the plants and the land, and they have no basis to suggest that anyone other than [...] destroyed [...]’s plants.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Zoneraich v. Overlook Hospital, 212 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1986)  Drb6  Statutes: 12 C.F.R. Section 226.9(c)(2)(ii)  Drb15  15 U.S.C. Section 1632(a)  Drb15  15 U.S.C. Section 1692e  Federal Regulations: CFPB TILA Examination Procedures, Section 1026.7f.(i), 78 (April 2015)  Judicial Notice: Public Law 90-321, the Consumer Credit Protection Act
[brief] (Aa11).  As part of his role, he was required to physically restrain unruly patients; this is something that he had done hundreds of times throughout his career.  Ibid.  On February 23, 2017, [...] injured his shoulder while restraining a patient.  (T24:9-10; Aa1).  Immediately after the incident, and before he was sent for medical attention, he completed a First Report of Accident Form that stated: “[w]hile in the process of restraining a patient and putting them in the [sic] net restraint I hurt my left shoulder. ” (T16:5-9; T25:7-262; R-1).  This form was submitted to, and signed by, his supervisor.  (T25:13-25).  [...] also completed an Initial Witness Statement Form which identified the injury as occurring while “restraining and putting [patient] in net restraint. ” (T26:1-27:7; R-2.4).  On August 21, 2018, [...] filed for accidental disability retirement benefits.
[brief] [[...]]:  * * *  [W]e're able to add an additional space on Ocean Terrace.  So, we are losing two on Ocean Terrace.  We're adding one back on Ocean Terrace south of the proposed driveway and then we are adding one on Porter Avenue where we eliminate the existing driveway that serves the parking lot.  [...]: There's a net loss of one.  [...]: There's a net loss of one.  1T41-2 to 1T41-12.  This is all the Applicant gave the Board to work with in deciding whether to grant a density variance.
[brief] (We note that Hunstein I did not have a data breach case before them they did not address these concerns.)  In the wake of numerous data breaches,\(^1\) disseminating confidential and sensitive financial information to unregulated third parties, which is prohibited by the FDCPA, increases the risk of the invasion consumer’s privacy since there are more copies of the consumers’ data without their knowledge.  Indeed, data brokers, who are unregulated like mail vendors, have been subject to massive data breaches.  *See, e.g.*, [...], *National Public Data Breach Shows Urgent Need for CFPB to Regulate Data Brokers* (Aug. 19, 2024) (available at ncclc.org/national-public-data-breach-shows-urgent-need-for-cfpb-to-regulate-data-brokers/ (accessed Aug. 26, 2024)).  Before turning to the other federal decisions, we address that *Hunstein I* and *Hunstein II* were vacated for reasons having nothing to do with whether alleging that a debt collector conveyed information about a debt to a mail vendor states a claim for the violation of § 1692c(b).
[brief] The Prosecutor’s Summation Unfairly Bolstered the Credibility of the State’s Police Informant -- Its Key Fact Witness.  “A prosecutor may not express a personal belief or opinion as to the truthfulness of his or her witness’s testimony. ”  State v. Staples, 263 N.J. Super. 602, 605 (App. Div. 1993) (citing State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 154, 156 (1991)); accord State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510 (2008) (holding vouching improper and directing on remand that “the prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of [the witness]” (emphasis added)).
[brief] Despite subjectively stating I had a "strong odor of alcohol" and stating that "alcohol comes in all different fragrances, the officer couldn’t identify what alcoholic beverage my breath smelt like.  A person trained in detecting intoxication should be able to distinguish whether the strong odor is beer or wine or vodka or tequila ex.  1T:31-(4-25)  The officer stated that un intoxicated people can also have red eyes.  Which is true.  Red eyes can be caused by a range of things including fatigue, irritation, itching, contacts.  1T-40-(18-20)
[brief] Further, there is no explanation why the only funds that could be used to fund the retro pay was from the 2023 budget and not, for example, having full retro pay spread out over multiple budgets like 2024 or 2025.  Additionally, in the Award, the arbitrator fails to provide an accurate cost out for each year of the contract.  See N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(f)(“The arbitrator shall separately determine whether the total net annual economic changes for each year of the agreement are reasonable under the statutory criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16.g. ”).  In addition, due to the errors in the arbitrator’s cost out for the retro pay which is set forth in Appendix D to the Award, any cost out prepared by the arbitrator would be in error.  (Aa172). ⁸
[brief] THE LAW DIVISION’S RULING DEPRIVES ALL PARTIES OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND IS CONTRARY TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ALLSTATE V. LAJARA THAT THE IFPA MANDATES THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.  In Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 151 (2015), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the right to a jury trial is implied in the IFPA.
[brief] Plaintiff is incorrect in arguing that the words “notwithstanding” and “in addition to” in the second sentence in Section 13.1 gives it the right to seek specific performance despite terminating the contract by receiving back the escrow funds.  This sentence reads:  Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event [[...]] closes title under[] the Mack-Cali Agreement, and thereupon [[...]] defaults in its obligation to close title under this [PSA] Agreement, [Plaintiff] shall, in addition to its termination right, shall have the right of specific performance.  (Pa115-116).  This provision merely provides “the right,” if certain conditions are met, to elect to seek specific performance as an alternative remedy, i.e., “in addition” and “notwithstanding” the right to elect the different, inconsistent remedy of receiving back its deposit by terminating the PSA.  The words “notwithstanding” and “in addition to” in Section 13.1 cannot reasonably be read to provide Plaintiff the rights to both terminate the PSA (the only way it could get its Deposit back) and to seek specific performance at the same time.  (Pa115-116).  Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the interpretation of Section 13 of the PSA as setting forth alternative exclusive remedies does render the words “notwithstanding” and “in addition to” meaningless.  These words simply indicate that specific performance is one remedy that Plaintiff could elect if certain conditions were met.  On the other hand, Plaintiff’s interpretation of this provision as allowing both the return of the deposit by termination and specific performance would render meaningless the language of Section 13.1, which states that the return of the deposit and termination were to be a “sole and exclusive” remedy.  A contract “should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless. ”  Cumberland County Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co. Inc., 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 222 (2003).  3.
[directive] Yon krim vyolan vle di nenpòt ki krim ki koze lanmò, kokenn domaj koporèl, oswa w te itilize oubyen menase pou itilize imedyatman yon zam ki ta koze lanmò.  Yon krim vyolan gen ladann tou, nenpòt ki agresyon seksyèl agrave, agresyon seksyèl kote w te itilize, oswa menase pou imedyatman sèvi ak fòs fizik.  Yon zam motèl vle di nenpòt ki zam afe, oswa lòt zam, enstriman, zouti, materyo oswa sistans, ke li aktif ou pa, ki ta, nan fason w ta itilize liya oswa ak lentansyon ou ta itilize liya ta kab pwodwi lanmò oswa gwo domaj kòporèl.  Gwo domaj kòporèl vle di ke w kreye yon ris lanmò enpòtan oubyen ki ta kab defigire an pèmanas, oswa pwolonje pèt obyen andikape fonksyon nenpòt nan manm kò moun la oubyen ògan li yo.
[brief] (6T99-1 to 17).  She told [...] [...] had stopped answering her calls, but she had convinced [...] to come to the house and planned to cook her favorite food.  (6T100-4 to 11).  [...] said she was picking up cockroach poison and then coming.  (6T100-17 to 101-8).  Defendant said one of the first things [...] asked when she got to the house was what defendant would do if she died.  (6T101-13 to 20).  [...] said she was sleepy, so defendant told her to lie down while she cooked.  (6T101-20 to 102-3).  Defendant said she saw the roach poison next to the food she was going to cook and suspected [...] had tampered with it, due to her drowsiness and the comment about dying.  (6T102-8 to 15).  So defendant said she started hitting [...] with her hands.  [...] woke up asking, “Why are you killing me?” (6T102-15 to 103-5).  Defendant told [...] that at that moment, she heard a spirit telling her not to stop.  (6T103-5 to 7).  Defendant grabbed a chiller and when she was done, there was blood all over the room, so she left.  (6T103-13 to 21).  Defendant told [...] that she went to New York and abandoned her car there.  (6T104-1 to 2).  After confessing, defendant seemed shaken up, so [...] suggested she take a bath and eat something.
[directive] Deadly Force.  Deadly force means force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm, constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animal.  A threat to cause death or 3
[directive] 3.1  Promulgation of Police Department Policies and Procedures.  To ensure an efficient and orderly transition to universal BWC implementation, every law enforcement agency shall promulgate and enforce a policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order, in a form as may be appropriate given the customs and practices of the agency, which shall comply with the policies, standards, and requirements of this Policy.  Any policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated by an agency pursuant to this Policy shall provide that: (a) a law enforcement officer employed by the agency may only use a BWC system that has been issued and approved by the agency; (b) an officer equipped with a BWC must comply at all times with the requirements established in this Policy and in the agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued pursuant to this Policy or by law; (c) a BWC shall be used only in performance of official police duties and not for personal purposes; (d) no BWC recording shall be accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or otherwise used by a sworn officer or civilian employee of the agency except for an official purpose specified in this Policy or by law; and (e) any sworn officer or civilian employee of the agency who knowingly violates the requirements of this Policy or the agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order, or applicable laws, shall be subject to discipline.
[directive] I, ________________________, understand that as part of the pre-employment process, the _________________________________ will conduct a comprehensive background investigation to determine my suitability for the position for which I have applied.  I understand that as part of this process, I will undergo drug testing through urinalysis.  I understand that a negative drug test result is a condition of employment.  I understand that if I refuse to undergo the testing, I will be rejected from employment.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use, I will be rejected for employment.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use or refuse to take the test, that information will be forwarded to the Central Drug Registry maintained by the Division of State Police.  Information from that registry can be made available by court order or as part of a confidential investigation relating to employment with a criminal justice agency.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use and am not currently employed as a sworn law enforcement officer, I will be barred from future law enforcement employment in New Jersey for two years from the date of the test.  After this two-year period, the positive test result may be considered in evaluating my fitness for future criminal justice employment.  I understand that if I am currently employed as a sworn law enforcement officer and I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use, my current law enforcement employer will be notified of the positive test result.  In addition, I will be dismissed from my law enforcement position and I will be permanently barred from law enforcement employment.  I have read and understand the information contained on this "Applicant Notice and Acknowledgment" form.
[brief] ..............  H609a Holm-80: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-77: objected to providing estimated mcf the completed regulator station would use annually (SOICR p. 12)  .............................................  H610a Holm-81: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-79, no use of electric heating technology on transmission or distribution lines (SOICR p. 12).  ..................................................  H611a Holm-82: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-80, re any other utility’s use of electric heating technology on transmission or distribution lines (SOICR p. 12)  .........................  H612a Holm-83: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-81, [...] did not consider use of electric heating technology in design of regulator stations (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H613a Holm-84: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-82, [...] is not familiar with electric heating technology offered by [...] (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] Miah v. Ahmed, 179 N.J. 511 (2004)  .........................................................20  Prudential v. Nardone, 332 N.J. Super.126, 136 (Law Div. 2003)  ..............24  Selective v. Hudson East, 210 N.J. 597, 609 (2012)  ...........................................24  State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6 (2023)  ........................................................................21  Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 539, (1996)  .....................................14  Town of Morristown v. Woman’s Club, 124 N.J. 605, 610 (1991)  ......................20
[directive] $100 to $500 10% permissible  Persons  False 2C:13-3  Actor knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible  Imprisonment  Actor commits a flagrantly rude or offensive conduct likely to be observed by a non- 2C:14-4a  Lewdness  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible consenting person.
[brief] See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(written objections to ruling must be filed within fourteen calendar days after service of same); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e) & 72; Rule 72.2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrate Judges, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut; Small v. Secretary, H&HS, 892 F.2d. 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)(failure to file timely objection to Magistrate Judge’s recommended ruling may preclude further appeal to Second Circuit).6  If any counsel believes that a settlement conference before this Magistrate Judge would be productive, he or she should contact this Magistrate Judge’s Chambers accordingly.  All Citations Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2015 WL 7458506  ORDER [...], United States Magistrate Judge.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Defendant, [...], will rely on the procedural history of this matter as set forth in its initial brief as though fully set forth herein.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  Defendant, [...], will rely on the statement of facts of this matter as set forth in its initial brief as though fully set forth herein.  CROSS-APPEAL REPLY LEGAL ARGUMENT  [...] hereby and hereinafter adopts and incorporates herein by reference and in their entirety the representation of facts and arguments of law contained in the reply brief of defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, [...] d/b/a [...] (Improperly Pled As [...]) (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”) and further, hereby and hereinafter adopts and incorporates herein by reference and in their entirety the representation of facts and arguments of law contained in the reply brief of defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, [...] d/b/a [...].
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  “In many instances, students do not have traditional textbooks, but rather digital textbooks or supplemental materials on their Chromebooks. ”  *Ibid.*  Also, both in-class assignments and homework are assigned and submitted through Google Classroom.  *Ibid.*  Thus, “a computer is needed to complete assignments. ”  *Ibid.*  But many students do not have access to a personal computer, and the District does not allow students to take home district-purchased devices.
[brief] (Pa1-Pa2; Pa10-Pa77).  Defendants cross-moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the [...]’ claim for attorney’s fees.  (Pa149-Pa150).  The trial court held oral argument on the cross-motions on April 16, 2021, and requested supplemental briefing.  (1T50:12-1T51:2; 1T52:24-1T55:8). \(^{11}\) --- \(^{10}\)  The trial court granted summary judgment to [...] by order dated April 1, 2022.  (Pa258).  The [...] did not appeal that order and [...] is not involved in this appeal.
[brief] In Tejada de Tapia v. [...], Docket No. [...], slip op. (N.J. App. Div. July 12, 2024), this Court held that the Part Two Employers Liability Insurance Endorsement to the Standard Workers’ Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance policy excluded coverage for claims of intentional wrongdoing.  DNJMa3-4.\(^5\)  Although some of the issues in *Tejada* were unique to the facts of that case, the dispositive question of insurance coverage was the same as that presented here.  Notably, the panel in *Tejada* observed that the Supreme Court in *Schmidt* expressly recognized that a claim of intentional wrongdoing was excluded by Exclusion C.5 of the NJM Policy.