ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] had an interest in the GRC proceedings, the GRC had imposed a duty on [...], and he was acting in good faith to ensure that his interests were adequately protected.  And the production of records responsive to a public records request would have been within the scope of his former employment as a public servant.  The [...] claims that [...] was not entitled to common law indemnification because he was “not engaged in the good faith execution of his duties imposed or authorized by law. ” (Rb17).  Yet in the very next paragraph, the [...] states that [...]’s “refusal to comply with multiple orders of the GRC and refusal to turn over public documents in his possession is a dereliction of duty of a public official and a violation of the Open Public Records Act. ” (Rb17-18).  The [...]’s argument is internally inconsistent.  The [...] cannot have it both ways.  Either [...] was engaged in public duties’ or he was not; their attempt to call his efforts at self-protection “bad faith” to absolve themselves of their obligations to [...] do not carry the day.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, [...] did not make a claim for indemnification under the Tort Claims Act or the common law, he made a claim under the contractual promise contained in the [...]’s bylaws.  First, for the [...] to claim that [...] was not a “defendant” under the terms of the Bylaw is a bad faith argument which places form over substance.  The fact that he was not a named respondent in the GRC proceedings because of his former public office, was not given proper notice, yet was being subjected to sanctions only amplifies his need for independent representation.  [...] became a party to the Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division  [...] January 26, 2024  Page 11 GRC Complaint at that moment when the GRC began ordering [...] to take certain actions and threatening sanctions against him if he failed to comply.  POINT II
[brief] See Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes, (14th ed. 2008), pg. 1443 citing Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Community Assoc., 141 Cal. App. 4th 1117, 1136 (Cal. App. 2006).  Conversely, “traditional interpretations of liability coverage apply only to claims made under third-party policies, and not to first-party losses of the insured. ”  *Port Auth. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co.*, 245 F. Supp.2d 563, 577 (D.N.J. 2001) *aff’d* 311 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 2002).
[brief] (Pa525-Pa526).  As a resident in training, [...] did not hold a medical license and was not permitted to issue independent orders or make decisions without consulting with the attending.  (Pa525-Pa526; Pa528-Pa530).  She was certainly not permitted to perform C-Sections or any delivery alone.  This was considered a routine admission and it was [...]’s responsibility to admit the patient and discuss the findings and plan of care with the attending physician, in this case, [...].
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  In order to attack the credibility of the officers, the adequacy of the investigation, and the ability of the State to meet its burden of proof, defense counsel highlighted statements made during the motor vehicle stop in which the officers expressed their belief that [...] was involved in an armed robbery from the night before.  On redirect, the State brought out additional evidence about the robbery.  This evidence, while relevant to defense counsel’s theory, was also highly prejudicial, as it created a risk that the jury would speculate that [...] was involved in the armed robbery and was therefore guilty of the charged crimes.  This risk required the trial court to give a clear and specific limiting instruction informing the jury about the permissible and impermissible uses of the robbery evidence.  The court’s _____________________ [...]’s appeal was not filed until after Smith was decided, this Court granted [...]’s leave to file his notice of appeal as within time.  (Da 14-18)  Thus, as in Haskins, “his appeal was deemed filed within forty-five days from the sentence date, which was . . . prior to the Smith decision.  Defendant’s case, for all practical purposes, was accordingly ‘on direct appeal’ at the time Smith was issued. ”  477 N.J. Super. at 646.  Accordingly, it “should be deemed within the ‘pipeline. ’”  Ibid. instruction in this case, however, was wholly inadequate – the court failed to instruct the jury about the permissible use of the evidence; did not repeat the limiting instruction at all necessary times; and neglected to tell the jury that [...] was never charged with the armed robbery.
[brief] 12  A.  This court’s review of the question whether any counsel fee was expressly authorized by contract is de novo..................................................12  B.  The indemnification provisions relied upon by plaintiffs do not support an award of fees..................  13  1.  [...] ........................................14  2.  The Stock Purchase Agreements .................................16  a.  [...] ....................16  b.  [...]  ....19  C.  The indemnification clauses do not support an award of expert fees and other litigation expenses.........................................................  22  D.  The award of $886,223.06 in counsel fees was not reasonable.....................................................  23  POINT III  PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR CONVERSION CLAIMS (24T47:18-50:9)..................................
[brief] Appellants next argue that the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law (the “Restatement”) invalidates the parties’ choice of New York law.  (Pb at 17-35.)  Under Restatement § 187(2), a contractual choice-of-law will be honored unless: (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which . . . would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective [choice-of-law] by the parties.
[brief] 32  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS PAGE: Order Granting Summary Judgment (July 16, 2024)  ..........Pa712  ##  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | AUTHORITY | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------|------| | **Cases:** | | | Beasley v. Passaic County, 377 N.J. Super. 585 App. Div. 2005) | 21 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) | 5 | | DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528 (App. Div. 2005) | 16, 22 | | Donofry v. Autotote Systems, Inc., 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001) | 22, 23 | | Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) | 19 | | Fahey v. City of Jersey City, 52 N.J. 103, 107 (1968) | 17 | | Greenberg v. Camden County Vocational and Technical Schools, 310 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1998) | 16 | | Hernandez v. Montville Tp. Bd. of Educ., 354 N.J. Super. 467, 474 (App. Div. 2002) | 18 | | Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F. 3d 173, 177 (3d Cir.1997) | 16, 22 | | Kelly v. Bally’s Grand, Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 422, 432 (App. Div. 1995) | 16 | | Kolb v. Burns, 360 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (App. Div. 1999) | 14, 15 | | Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) | 5 | | Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 400 N.J. Super. 474, 492 (App. Div. 2008) | 14 | | Mehlman v. Mobile Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 193-94 (1998) | 18, 19 | McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) passim Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691, 707 (D.N.J. 1994) .........................6
[brief] This is the precise procedural path ordered by the Supreme Court before it found, with the benefit of a full evidentiary record, that the State’s 2010 funding cut triggered constitutional deficiencies requiring restoration of full SFRA funding in Abbott districts.  *Abbott XXI*, 206 N.J. at 356-57 (finding on remand the loss of essential resources from reduced SFRA funding in Abbott districts was not “*de minimus* or inconsequential” and not to be “greeted by this Court with indulgence”).
[brief] 1.  The Board’s Findings Were Based on Credible Evidence and Consideration of the Proofs as a Whole  [...]’s initial report demonstrates that his review of records consisted of those associated with Petitioner’s treatment for the subject 2015 accident, including [...]’s treatment report.  (Pa167).  [...] states therein:  [Petitioner] had a preexisting history of a prior neck injury in 2009 followed by treatment with physical therapy.  X-ray reports [from 2015 and 2016] revealed degenerative changes.  The [2015] operative report revealed findings of spinal stenosis at C5-C6 and C6-C7, which was a significant previous condition.  * * * *  The total and permanent disability was not a direct result of the accident of 10/17/15, but was an aggravation of a preexisting condition.  (Pa170)  (Emphasis added).
[brief] (Aa102-109).  [...] explained that it complied with the SVH Rule and that no feasible alternatives were available, and that “boat lifts are beneficial to the Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat. ” (Aa104).  To evidence compliance with the SVH Rule, [...] stated that “in the area of the proposed moorings the water depth is a 4' minimum measured at mean low tide. ”  (Aa105).  Finally, to show that “(t)here is no alternative mooring area at the site that would have less impact on the submerged aquatic vegetation,” [...] noted that “(t)he entire site is mapped [as SVH] and there is no alternative mooring area which would have less impact on the submerged aquatic vegetation.
[brief] C.  The Overvote Ballot is Improper on the Merits.  As the merits of the proposed amendment were not considered before the trial court, they should not now be considered on appeal.  However, to the extent that the Court does consider the amendment for purposes of determining futility, the proposed amendment would be futile as it was correctly held to be void as a matter of law.  The ballot at issue contains three filled bubbles for two offices – [...], [...], and Personal Choice, although no name was written in the personal choice space.
[brief] ”  Twp. of W.  Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 198 N.J. 529, 540–41 (2009); Lopez v. N.J.A.F.I.U.A., 239 N.J.Super. 13, 19 (App.Div.) (noting differences between cancellation and non-renewal), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 131 (1990).
[brief] | | | Nathanson v. Wagner, | 2 | | 118 N.J. Eq. 390, 179 A. 466 (Ch. 1935) | | | Rippon v. Smigel, | 11 | | 449 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2017) | | | Sheppard v. Twp. of Frankford, | 3 | | 261 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1992) | | | Town of Secaucus v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm’n, | 11 | | 267 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 1993) | | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Borough of Roseland Municipal Code § 7-40.3 | 12 | | N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1 | 13 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Ra31-39).  As the trial court found, “[s]uch is not the stuff of a successful T & E claim. ” (Aa44).  Instead, [...] pointed to the removal of a single, third-grade reading program and undefined staffing issues in an attempt to establish its claim.  (Ab21-22).  But such "[c]onclusory and self-serving assertions' in certifications without explanatory or supporting facts will not defeat a meritorious motion for summary judgment."  Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425-26 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440 (2005)); O'Loughlin v. Nat'l Cmty. Bank, 338 N.J. Super. 592, 606-07 (App. Div. 2001) (opposition to summary judgment must do more than establish abstract doubt regarding material facts).
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS  October 7, 2022  Order of the trial court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da1  Flyer on retirement gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da4  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] First, there is sufficient comparable evidence available to him to replicate the profile.  The State has already provided defendant with the most important piece of the profile, namely, the picture that was used in “[...]’s” Adam4Adam profile.  (Pa6-7).  [...] acknowledged the State had provided the photo, (1T19-1 to 3; 1T20-7 to 9), but then, during his ruling, determined the State had not provided it:  The State sent a letter to defense counsel enclosing an enlarged image of the undercover’s profile picture.  A smaller image is displayed in the Adam4Adam chats.  So just to be clear, the original photo from the profile, it’s undisputed between the parties that the original photo that [...] presumably observed when searching through the site was not provided to the defense.  Certainly, relevant material and probative as to [...]’s intent here and with respect to the age of the person in the profile, whether they were 18 or older or under the age of 18.  [(2T9-4 to 15) (emphasis added). ]  So, he ruled, the State was obligated to provide a “full, un-pixelated, uncropped” profile photograph.  (2T14-19 to 20).  The picture the State provided is the profile picture that was displayed on the Adam4Adam site and it is large enough and clear enough to be used at trial.  [...]’s “presumption” that defendant observed a different photo on the Adam4Adam site, that a larger version was available on Adam4Adam, or that the photograph the State provided was somehow “cropped” was an unfounded abuse of discretion.
[brief] Appellant’s remaining arguments all raise issues that are not properly on appeal and thus should not be addressed by this Court.  Pursuant to Rule 4:37-2, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s Complaint with prejudice.  PA1-2.  Appellant did not even oppose the motion that lead to the trial court’s dismissal order.  Thus, to the extent she can even assert arguments on appeal, she can only argue that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.  *N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon*, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) (citing *Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.*, 149 N.J. 378, 391, 693 A.2d 894 (1997); *State v. Berry*, 2006 WL 1565090, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 9, 2006) (“Since none of the issues were presented or even the subject of the appeal to the Law Division, they are precluded from consideration by this court. ”).  The March 1, 2024 Order dismissing the Complaint with prejudice does **not** concern: 1) the trial court’s earlier order denying Appellant’s Motion for Documents; 2) any discussion regarding whether Respondents confirmed any allegations in non-plead complaints (which they did not); and 3) the question of whether Appellant should be appointed an attorney by the court.  Accordingly, these issues are not within the scope of this appeal and this Court should ignore these arguments.
[directive] 2.  Verifikasyon Adrès Address  Verification  a)  Èske w konprann ke si wap plede koupab de agresyon seksyèl agrave, agresyon seksyèl, [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] kidnapinn daprè 2C:13-1c(2) oswa nenpòt ki tantativ pou komèt nenpòt nan zak sa yo epi jou santans la tribinal la ta rive a konklizyon ke konpòtman w klasifye antan ke konpòtman ki repete souvan, ajisman enkontwolab ou fèt pou verifye adrès ou ak ajans fòsdelòd ki koresponn la chak 90 jou oubyen si tribinal la ta rive a konklizyon ke konpòtman ou pa klasifye pa yon konpòtman ki repete souvan ak ajisman enkontwolab, ou fèt pou verifye adrès ou chak lane? Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or any attempt to commit any of these crimes and at sentencing the court finds that your conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior you must verify your address with the appropriate law enforcement agency every 90 days or if the court finds your conduct is not characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, you must verify your address annually?
[brief] In this matter, it would have violated the First Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article I of the New Jersey Constitution if the trial court had found in favor of the Plaintiff.  The Grand Sheik of the [...] has determined that under the Defendant’s Rules and Regulations and Guide on Humanity, the Property belongs to the Defendant.  The Grand Sheik demanded that the Plaintiff, whose officers are followers of the [...] religion, relinquish all claims to the Property.  The Grand Body has concurred in the determination of the Grand Sheik.  The Grand Sheik is the highest officer/official of the [...] religion.  The Plaintiff improperly refused the Grand Sheik’s request and filed suit.
[brief] State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 365 (2018).  As such, it follows that [...] should have given some deference or consideration to [...]’s prior factual findings.  Instead, [...] entered opposite factual findings and offered no explanation as to why she was doing so.  [...] offered no explanation as to why she was finding that these four events could not have occurred simultaneously, as was found by [...] and sworn to by [...].  On top of that, [...] made important credibility findings based on analysis that was internally inconsistent.  For instance, [...] found that [...]’s testimony that looked startled was “not credible. ”  2T48:1-3.  However [...] also found that Defendant had “the startled look” of a person who was trying to avoid being hit by a police car.  2T44:2-7.  The fact that [...]’s factual findings were contradictory to [...]’s and inconsistent with her own findings can be explained by the fact that they were made based on an incomplete record.  Had [...] not erred by excluding evidence related to the 9-1-1 call, her analysis of [...]’s credibility would have included the fact that the 9-1-1 report was corroborative of his investigation.  Had [...] had the benefit of that information, her analysis of the totality of the circumstances would likely have yielded a result that was consistent with those made by [...] and with the sworn testimony that she found [...] offered “without hesitation” and in a demeanor that “was seemingly calm and controlled. ”  2T42:18-20.  [...]’s determination that [...]’s testimony was not credible should be overturned.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] [Mistake of fact] (Argued at Pa221 – Pa227)**  The parties clearly disputed the amount of money owed in April and July 2020.  The court made a mistake of fact and legal error when it ordered [...] to pay the full amount claimed by [...] based solely on the self-serving certification and contested, purported payroll record from an irrelevant date produced by the Defendants.  Being that [...] never formally contested the non-payment of the April/July 2020 invoices until over two years later in response to a lawsuit, the court denied [...] the ability to pursue an establish an accord and satisfaction defense as to why [...] cannot now claim its owed for the April/July 2020 invoices.
[brief] And in order to quote light a fire under the applicant they went with this procedure. ”).  [...], the Borough counsel addressed the Land Use Board before the vote saying, “You just need to help…move the [remediation] project along”.  (T1, 44: 3-4).  Maley then re-focused the Land Use Board on the evidence they were to consider in voting on the recommendation.  (T1, 44:14-17) (“What matters is Frank [Little’s] report.  Does it fit under either one of those criteria today. ”).  Maley did not encourage the Board to consider the testimony they had just heard establishing that the Property does not present a health risk to the Borough.  Just before the Board voted to approve the redevelopment recommendation, [...] stated, “I think we’re obligated to vote for rehab…because it does meet that criteria” without citing any evidence showing that the criteria had been met.  (T1, 46:2-8).  Ultimately, the Land Use Board relied upon the Report and voted to recommend a condemnation redevelopment designation of the Property to Borough Council.  (T1, 52:1-53:12).
[brief] **OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED** | Judgment, Order Or Ruling Being Appealed | Pages | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Summary Judgment Motion And Class Certification Motion Hearings Of 9-22-23 | 1T1-1T63 | | Summary Judgment Motion And Class Certification Motion Order And Opinion Filed 2-1-24 | 931a-954a | | Intermediate Decisions, If Any, Pertinent To The Appeal | n/a | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### A. CASELAW | AUTHORITY | PAGES | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | *75 Spruce St., LLC v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ.*, 382 N.J. Super. 567 | 14 | | (Law Div. 2005) | | | *Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ.*, 204 N.J. 219 (2010) | 34 | | *Allen v. Fauver*, 167 N.J. 69 (2001) | 28 | | *Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P.*, 149 N.J. 620 (1997) | 29, 30| | *Amchem Prod. V. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1997) | 42, 45 | | *Asphalt Paving Sys., Inc. v. Borough of Stone Harbor*, 474 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 2022) | 13 | | *Austin v. Mayor and Common Council of The Borough of Union Beach*, 160 A. 318, 10 N.J. Misc. 670 (1932) | 20 | | *Ayers v. Jackson*, 106 N.J. 557 (1987) | 27 | | *Baby Neal v. Casey*, 43 F.3d 48 (3d Cir. 1994) | 36, 39, 41 | | *Bahrle v. Exxon Corp.*, 279 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1995), aff’d, 145 N.J. 144 (1996) | 12 | | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Barry by Ross v. New Jersey State Highway Authority, 245 N.J. Super. 302 (Ch. Div. 1990) | 26 | | Beegal v. Park West Gallery, 394 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2007) | 38 | | Brook v. April, 294 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 1996) | 13 | | Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210 (2005) | 18 | | Buteas v. Raritan Lodge #61 F. & A.M., 248 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 1991) | 7 | | California v. Yamaski, 42 U.S. 682 (1970) | 45 | | Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Staffenberg, 419 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2011) | 33 | | Chasin v. Montclair State University, 159 N.J. 418 (1999) | 27 | | Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434 (1965) | 30 | | City of Newark v. Department of Health of State of N. J., 109 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1970) | 17 | | Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974) | 30 | | County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80 (1998) | 11 | | Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98 (1971) | 36 | | Case Name | Citation | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Curtis v. Finneran | 83 N.J. 563 (1980) | | | Daniel v. Borough of Oakland | 124 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1973)
[brief] For example, in C.W.H., the jury watched an interrogation video containing a detective’s numerous accusations that defendant was being dishonest.  465 N.J. Super. at 590.  The same officer also testified at trial, opining that defendant’s behavior during the interrogation represented a “textbook interview of someone being deceptive. ”  Id. at 592.  Because the officer’s testimony “clearly conveyed the impression to the jury that defendant was being deceptive,” the court held that the jury’s ability to assess defendant’s credibility was impermissibly tainted.  Id. at 595.