ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Most recently, the Department issued [...] (the “2022 Order” or the “[...]/[...] Order”), *In the Matter of the Acquisition of Control of [...] and [...], by [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...]*, approving the acquisition of [...], a reciprocal exchange, and [...], its attorney-in-fact.  (Ja31-35).  The 2022 Order, issued under N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2, required, among other provisions, that the applicants comply with the Reciprocal Exchange Act and the Holding Company Act, along with regulations promulgated thereunder.  (Ja31-32).  It also required the applicants to comply with all relevant SSAPs, including but not limited to SSAP No. 25.  (Ja32).  Importantly, none of the parties to the acquisition objected to or challenged the 2022 Order.  The Hearing Officer’s Report noted that the 2022 Order was preceded by a public hearing conducted under N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(d), (Ja37), and the hearing panel and Department staff found that the filed documents satisfied the requirements of N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(b).  And as with the previous Orders and Hearing Officer Reports, the hearing officer in this matter analyzed the seven disqualifying factors in N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(d)(1).  (Ja41-45).  Finding that none of them existed, the hearing officer recommended that the proposed transaction be approved.  (Ja45).  As with the previous two orders, the Department did not receive public comments objecting to the application of the Holding Company Act in this transaction, something [...] or any other company or member of the public could have done.
[brief] [...] contends that because the [...]’s bid package included “Archaeologist” in its list of “Bidders Proposed Subcontractors”, any archaeologist retained by [...] was required to be registered under the PWCRA.  Therefore, [...] contends that [...]’s bid is defective since its archaeologist, [...] (“[...]”), was not registered under the PWCRA at the time of its bid.  What [...] does not acknowledge is that the Bid Solicitation at section 3:09 states that the project site “shall be monitored by a qualified Registered Archaeologist (RA)” since the site is listed on the National Register of Historic Places.  1527a
[brief] “Only to the invitee or business guest does a landowner owe a duty of reasonable care to guard against any dangerous conditions on his or her property that the owner either knows about or should have discovered. ”  Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 434.  Since “[n]egligence is tested by whether the reasonably prudent person at the time and place should recognize and foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to others,” Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 149 N.J. 496, 506 (1997), “[t]he duty of due care requires a business owner to discover and eliminate dangerous conditions that would render the premises unsafe. ”  *Nisivoccia*, 175 N.J. at 563 (internal citations omitted).  In *Hopkins*, the Court discussed the common law history of a landowner’s duty to prevent a hazardous condition or to warn those on the land.
[brief] The Court determined that “in none of the cases cited by plaintiff under the common knowledge exception come anywhere close to the complexity of the issues that would have to be put before a fact finder”.  (1T:34:9-12).  [...] found that “even how plaintiffs characterize the causes of action, again, make it clear to the Court of the need for an affidavit of merit, and made it clear to the Court that the allegations do not fall within the common knowledge exception. ” (1T:35:9-14).
[brief] On one hand, Defendants’ Brief argues that Defendants’ knowledge of [...]’s natural inclination for lethal attack behavior when in the breeding environment is insufficient to establish strict liability because [...] did not previously display aggressive behavior that warned he might harm someone.  On the other hand, Defendants’ Brief argues that Defendants cannot be strictly liable for [...]’s lethal attack behavior because the scientific understanding of stallion reproductive behavior is that there is no behavior that predicts whether a stallion will engage in a lethal attack, other than having done it before.  The Defendants’ position, then, is that the term “vicious or dangerous trait or propensity,” as used in Jury Charge 5.60B, cannot, under essentially any circumstance, include the scientifically acknowledged danger that [...], as a stallion in the breeding environment, had a known propensity to attack in the way he did, when he did.  Therefore, Defendants pit their proposal for the interpretation of “natural inclination,” as used in Jury Charge 5.60B, against its plain meaning: a tendency to behave or take action in a particular way under certain circumstances as determined by the animal’s nature.  See Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief, p. 15.  Defendants’ Brief relies on comment (e) to §509 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was published in 1977, stating that the utility of “stallions, bulls, and rams” justifies the risk in keeping them despite their dangerous propensities that are “abnormal in other classes of their species. ”  First, it is unclear that the agricultural utility of “stallions, bulls, and rams” contemplated in comment (e) to §509 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts includes the horse-racing industry’s collection and sale of frozen stallion sperm.  Second, to the extent §509 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts may be considered applicable, it has since been superseded by comment (c) of §24 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, published in 2010, which acknowledges that:  In the future, courts might wish to give consideration to particular genders or breeds of a species that involve danger levels uncommon for the species itself.  If so, it might be appropriate to impose strict liability, without individualized scienter, on the owner of such an animal.
[brief] A.  Based on the Site Analysis, [...] concluded that there is no suitable property owned by [...] in close proximity to the transmission line.  Q.  Can you please describe [...]’s efforts to date to obtain required land use approvals from [...] Township?  A.  Yes.  On March 17, 2015, [...] filed an application with the [...] Zoning Board of Adjustment (“[...] Zoning Board”) requesting Site Plan Approval, “C” and “D” variances, and Conditional Use approval.
[brief] In reply to the opposition, Defendants provided Plaintiff’s counsel with a Certification by Defendant [...] in which she states, in no uncertain terms, that she has never had any supervisory authority over Plaintiff or any other teacher or employee of the [...].  381a, ¶¶ 5-6.  Thereafter, during oral argument before the trial court, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded the claims against Defendant [...] cannot survive:  [...]:  [W]ith respect to [...], at first, if you look at the opposition that was filed, plaintiff concedes that if [...] is not a supervisory employee that there is no claim for aider and abettor liability against her.  Again, [...] is the library media specialist.  In connection with filing our reply brief, we submitted to the Court a certification from Ms. [...] confirming this fact.  I’m not sure whether plaintiff at this juncture is ready to concede that the certification is satisfactory and that there would be no aiding or abetting liability against Ms. [...] that can kind of put that claim to - - to rest at this point, but I would submit to the Court that a librarian or library media specialist has no supervisory authority over the plaintiff teacher and that there can be no basis to have any type of aiding and abetting liability with respect to her.  [T16-4-21]  [...]:  As to Defendant [...], and I believe it was Mr. Lamparello that asked me to respond as to the certification, generally we would accept that, Your Honor.  We did read the certification on the reply brief, and I acknowledge what we indicated in our opposition.  [T43-10-15]  Plaintiff cannot be permitted to backpedal on appeal.  This Court need look no further than Plaintiff’s opposition brief and the transcript of the oral argument to find that the trial court’s dismissal of Count Five must be affirmed.
[brief] First, [...]’s entire premise is flawed in her assertion that she was “forced to waive” anything.  As Respondents showed and the facts fully support, and as discussed further herein, [...]’s agreement to arbitrate was knowing and voluntary: she expressly acknowledged so in signing her employment documents.  Her cries of forced waiver are baseless.  Second, New Jersey law allows for waiver of the right to pursue a claim—including under the LAD—in a judicial forum and before a jury so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary.
[brief] Super. 388, 414 (App. Div. 2013) (self-serving statements alone will not create genuine issues of material fact); also Morales v. Sun Contractors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained. ”).  As explained above, also unhelpful is [...]’s contention that this matter should have been subject to the “standards articulated in Brill. ”  (Pb37.)  The Brill standard is used “when deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2,” and distinguishes between a “genuine” dispute of material fact and an “insubstantial” one.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523, 530 (1995).
[directive] 90  Possession of Goods (Including Cigarettes) Without Paying Tax ..................................................................................................................  91  Possession or Consumption of Alcoholic Beverage by Person under Legal Age ..........................................................................................  89  Possession or Distribution of Hypodermic Syringe or Needle .......................................................................................................................  90  Prostitution ....................................................................................................................................................................................................  89  Receiving Stolen Property ............................................................................................................................................................................  84  Resisting Arrest ............................................................................................................................................................................................  85  Sale of Cigarettes to Persons Under Age 19 .................................................................................................................................................  88  Shoplifting .....................................................................................................................................................................................................  84  Simple Assault ..............................................................................................................................................................................................  83  Theft ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 84  10  Updated December 2, 2013  Index of Bail Schedule 2
[brief] [...] states, "the location and suitability of the Off-site Property were never in question.  Both the Borough and [...] had a consistent understanding that this site was suitable for the Off-site Building of affordable housing" (LaMatina Cert Par. #7)  No document evidences this "understanding."  [...] also states, "the Borough and the Developer were in complete agreement that to comply with the Borough's obligation to build affordable housing, whatever necessary amendments to the Redevelopment plan would be accomplished..."  ([...] Cert. Par. #9) yet, the Redevelopment that was subsequently entered into does not mention the Property.  Both statements are directly disputed by Meeting Minutes of the Mayor and Council and other documents.
[brief] (Da3162)  [...] moved for reconsideration.  He argued Plaintiffs’ vote to reimburse their own legal fees was not a valid exercise of the business judgment rule because it was plainly self-dealing, benefiting the very managers who voted for it and only them.  He also argued the business judgment rule does not protect unlawful actions.  The vote to impose Plaintiffs’ personal legal fees on [...], through the company ‘agreeing’ to reimburse, violated New Jersey law and public policy against fee-shifting.  R. 4:42-9.  [...] argued the Court had actually created an enormous exception to the American Rule that now permits a majority in every shareholder case, simply by majority vote, to charge part of their legal fees to the other litigants involved in the case, at the rate of their minority interests.  (11T6:16-7:16)  He argued the business judgment rule can now trump the American Rule and R. 4:42-9 even during court control of a shareholder action.  [...] also argued that discounting doubly charged him for the same conduct already remedied.  (11T9:2-19)  On January 24, 2023, the Court denied reconsideration.
[brief] Furthermore, even if an email was sent to the Certifying Officers on August 8, 2019, it was still outside the timeframe required by the Ricci Act to provide notice to the members of the retirement system.  Moreover, [...] certified that he never received the postcard regarding the Ricci Act.  Pa61.  It is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that the Board does not have to abide by the statutory timelines applicable to the Board but is unwilling to relax the timeframes applicable to [...].  The Board has acknowledged that the third-party vendor was not contacted to mail the postcards until more than 30 days after the enactment of the Ricci Act.  The third-party vendor could not mail the notice within 30 days of the enactment of the Ricci Act.  Because this notice was not sent in accordance with the requirements specified in the Ricci Act, the Board should have granted [...]’s request to register outside the timeframe specified in the Act.  The Board failed to consider its power to relax time limits in the interest of justice or in furtherance of a just accommodation.
[brief] (6T-27).  [...] also advised the Court that she found mail indicating that there was a [...] account opened on or about September 14, 2020, where $879,265.63 was deposited.  She further advised the Court that the account was in [...]'s name and [...] which had an address in [...].  (6T-42)  [...] asked [...] May: Who is TMFT?  (6T-42).  [...] May responded: That's my lawyer [...], that's from his company.  (6T-42).  When [...] May made this statement there was an immediate reaction.  [...]: What?  (6T-43)  The Court: What?  6T-43)  [...]: Okay, Your Honor? (6T-43).  [...] stated: [...] or [...], speak up, say something.
[brief] ”).  By way of example, in this case, unlike in *Navient*, [...] has identified specific additional expenses – namely, more than $750,000 in additional costs associated with the review of 68,000 irrelevant documents – in complying with the ESI Order.  Da126 ¶ 23.  In *UPMC v. Highmark*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196362 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2013) (cited in *Actavis* at *8*), a Special Adjudicator addressed two disputed discovery demands.
[brief] ”  Tyler at 155, internal citations omitted.  Not only does this case that the defendant relies on clearly state that it is a part of the medical examiner’s duty to determine whether or not a death was caused by homicide, precisely the language challenged at present, but the decision notes that “in making these determinations, medical examiners routinely rely on the circumstances that surround the death, as revealed by independent investigation, police investigation, and eyewitness accounts.
[directive] In cases not otherwise covered under Section 7.3, unless the presumption of seeking pretrial detention is overcome pursuant to subsection 7.4.6, the prosecutor shall apply for pretrial detention if the pretrial services program determines that release is not recommended.  , or if released that maximum conditions be imposed.  Serious First- or Second-Degree Crimes Involving a High Risk Score or a New 7.4.2.a Criminal Activity Score of 4.
[brief] 1.  **Motion for Default and Adjournment of Trial Date [Doc. No. 140]**  *7  Due to the discovery problems discussed herein, plaintiff requests that [...]'s answer be stricken, its separate defenses suppressed, and it should be defaulted.  The request is denied.  Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), a default may be rendered against a party for not complying with a discovery order.  The same sanction may be granted if a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e).  See also *Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.*, 980 F.2d 912, 918–19 (3d Cir.1992) (a court may impose a default as a permissible sanction for violating a discovery order); *Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f)* (providing for sanctions if a party fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order).  The Third Circuit has cautioned, however, that this sort of drastic relief should be a sanction of “last, not first, resort. ”  *Id.* at 922 (quoting *Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr.*, 804 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir.1986)).  All doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits of the case.  *Liggon–Redding v. Willingboro Tp.*, 351 Fed. Appx. 674, 678 (3d Cir.2009).  In light of the Third Circuit's reluctance to authorize the drastic relief of a default “absent the most egregious circumstances” (*see United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency*, 330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir.2003) (citation omitted)), plaintiff's request for a default will not be granted.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED  REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING [...]’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE  COUNTERCLAIMS  BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE COUNTERCLAIMS DIRECTLY RELATE TO WHETHER THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO [...] WAS VALID AND CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH (Da4)  ......................................................6  CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................7  | CASES | Page(s) | |---------------|---------| | Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318 (1992) | 3 | | COURT RULES | | |---------------|---------| | Rule 4:50-1 | 6 |  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Here, the Decedent reasonably relied on the validity of the Antenuptial Agreement in the preparation of her Will, where in Article Sixth, it states:  “For reasons best known to me, I direct that my husband [...] specifically be excluded from inheritance of any portion of my estate. ”  This desire was reiterated by the Decedent in conversations with [...], the attorney and now judge, who prepared the decedent's Will.  His testimony was corroborated by various witnesses at trial.  For all of the above reasons, the Chancery Division properly concluded that the Petitioner was not entitled to an elective share under N.J.S.A. 3B:8-10.
[brief] BECAUSE THE ACTION BELOW, THE GRC COMPLAINT AND THE SUBSEQUENT APPEALS AROSE OUT OF OR WAS INCIDENTAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF APPELLANT’S DUTIES AS A FIRE COMMISSIONER, HE IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION UNDER THE FIRE DISTRICT’S BYLAWS (Raised Below at Da72-77 and 1T62:22-77:20)  The Trial Court erred when it declined to enforce the Fire District’s unambiguous indemnification provision.  As a Fire District Commissioner and a member of a fire company within the District, [...] was entitled to a defense.  There is no dispute that [...], as a former District fire commissioner with the Fire District, timely sought indemnification from the Fire District regarding both the action below and the GRC Complaint filed by [...] against the Fire District that was styled [...].  The basis for Sipe’s claims for indemnification is the District’s Bylaws.  Article I, Section 6 of the bylaws, titled “Defense Representation and Costs,” is the only reference to defense or indemnification in the bylaws.  (Da159).  It states that The Board of Fire Commissioners shall provide a member or officer of the Fire Company who is a defendant in any action or legal proceeding arising out of or incidental to the performance of his [sic] duties, subject to the exception in (B), with counsel and costs incidental to such representation for the defense of such action or proceeding. ” (Ibid.).  Sub-section (B) contains two carve-outs, which are for representation “for a member or officer’s defense in a disciplinary proceeding instituted against him by the Board of Fire Commissioners or in a criminal proceeding instituted as a result of a complaint on behalf of the Board of Fire Commissioners. ” (Da159-160).  These two carve-outs do not apply here, as the GRC Complaint was neither a criminal proceeding nor a disciplinary proceeding.  It was an administrative law proceeding filed with the GRC that was terminated as part of a settlement between [...] and the Fire District.  [...] was not a party to that settlement.  However, because [...] withdrew his GRC Complaint as part of his settlement, the proceedings related to the GRC Complaint were terminated.  We have merits arguments regarding why those GRC orders were unlawful, and those merits arguments will be presented to this Court in our related appeal.  However, even if the GRC’s decision to hold Sipe “in contempt” is affirmed, Sipe nonetheless is entitled to indemnification under the Fire District’s bylaws.  Sipe’s conduct was the subject of an administrative proceeding and trial court proceeding, not a disciplinary proceeding or a criminal proceeding.  Thus, the Fire District should have provided him with a defense in both the GRC case and in the case below.
[brief] Unlike plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Jendrzejewski purchased auto insurance but the insurance company was subsequently declared insolvent.  Id. at 464-65.  The plaintiff was injured in an accident, and we found he was not barred from bringing suit because "[h]e complied with the requirements set by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) . . . by obtaining [*12] a policy of insurance from an insurer which was then in good standing."  Id. at 465.  Moreover, the plaintiff actually had insurance coverage through the [...], as a result of his insurance carrier's insolvency.  Id. at 461-62.  None of the circumstances upon which we permitted the plaintiff to proceed in Jendrzejewski are present here.
[directive] You will be required to pay a mandatory drug enforcement and demand reduction (D.E.D.R.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you plead guilty?  The mandatory penalties are as follows:  (1)  $3,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $2,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  $1,000 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  $750 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $500 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  Total D.E.D.R  Penalty: $ 날짜/Date 피고인/Defendant 변호인/Defense 피고측  Attorney 검사/Prosecutor 지령  제01-18호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지  CN 11000-Korean 2/2 Form  Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Korean page 2 of 2
[brief] The Motion of Stay hearing was calendared again by the lower court after informing the Municipal Court of obtaining an attorney over the Motion of Stay hearing.  However, the lower court calendared the hearing again on May 23, 2023 and dismissed, when the defendant sent her Notice of Appeal.  \textsuperscript{45}  The Motion of Stay hearing should have been canceled with [...] as on pages 14-15 of [...]’s brief asking to vacate the motion for stay if the review on de novo was denied; the Motion for Stay was granted and reversed the imposed sentencing POINT II