ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, because of a clerical error, the Order was not served on the parties until February 10, 2021, after the time to appeal the Order had elapsed.  Therefore, the Trial Court issued an Order on April 16, 2023, amending the entry date of its rulings and making that Order its final Order for purposes of the time to appeal.  In the same Order (DA 3, Pages A17-A26), the Court revised the award it had made to Defendant based on Plaintiff’s breach.  The Defendant timely filed his Notice of Appeal on April 26, 2021.  Briefs were filed by both parties and on May 6, 2022, the Appellate Division rendered its decision (DA 4, pages A27-A50).
[brief] (Pa17).  With respect to Factor #9 – Doing Work on Employer’s Premises, according to the IRS, “[t]he importance of this factor depends on the nature of the service involved and the extent to which an employer generally would require that employees perform such services on the employer's premises. ”  Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, at *14.  Due to the unique situation that municipal prosecutors must prosecute cases and be present for court proceedings, the requirement that [...] be on premises to perform these court duties diminished the importance of this factor.
[brief] See \textit{State v. Dunbar}, 229 N.J. 521, 539 (2017) (“It is similarly unchallenged that the stop can evolve into an unlawful detention if its scope expands too far or the stop is unnecessarily prolonged.  . . .  Thus, a lawful traffic stop may turn unconstitutional if the officer overly broadens the scope or prolongs the stop, absent independent reasonable suspicion. ”); \textit{United States v. Clark}, 902 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Simply stated, we hold that, after [the officer’s] computerized check confirmed [the defendant’s] authority to drive the vehicle and without any other indicia he lacked that authority, the traffic stop was effectively completed.  To then turn to the passenger . . . for questioning that sought suspicion for criminal activity went beyond ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop. ’” (citation omitted) (second alteration in original)).  While the State complains that this additional questioning and investigation only prolonged the stop by 90 seconds, the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that there is no de minimis exception for minor delays.
[brief] (T1/200:7-16).**  In defending its denial of the Application, the Respondent relies on the deference courts are typically required to give board decisions.  However, such deference only applies when those decisions are based on the facts in the record and when the correct legal standard is properly applied to those facts.  The appropriate legal standard provides while “site plan review affords a planning board wide discretion to ensure compliance with the objectives and requirements of the site plan ordinance, ‘it was never intended to include the legislative or quasi-judicial power to prohibit a permitted use. ’”  *PRB Enters., Inc. v. S. Brunswick Planning Bd.*, 105 N.J. 1, 7 (1987) (*emphasis added*, citing *Lionel’s Appliance*, 156 N.J. Super. at 268).
[brief] ”  (3T23-20 to 24-5).  By the third message, the victim said, “I felt scared, alarmed.  My adrenalin got up there pretty high.  I was anxious….He said he was, you know, going to harm me and I felt frightened, especially for myself and my family again. ” (3T27-7 to 12).  After immediately calling the police, the victim called his wife.  (3T27-16 to 21).  His wife was driving home with two of their kids, and their young niece and nephews, in the car; he told her everything, and asked that she drive around for an hour until he could get home to meet her and the police at his house.  (3T28-7 to 25; 3T153-13 to 21).  His wife testified that she was scared and worried.  (3T155-5 to 7).  When the police met the victim at his home, the victim appeared “visibly shaken and scared. ” (3T98-19).  Given the severity of the threats, the police instituted safety precautions for two months, and the victim testified that he changed his routine.
[brief] Plaintiff’s experts—both practicing ophthalmologists—admittedly have no expertise in manufacturing a prescription drug like Ozurdex® and its complex delivery system, and thus were not designated to and do not offer any opinion that the subject Ozurdex® unit had a manufacturing defect.  Because expert proof is required to prove a defect in a complex prescription drug like Ozurdex®, and Plaintiff has none, the Trial Court committed a miscarriage of justice by not entering summary judgment for [...].  Jakubowski v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 182 (1964) (“Plaintiff must establish by some proof that weighs heavier than mere surmise or conjecture that his injury resulted from an unreasonably dangerous condition of the [product] for which defendant is responsible. ”); McMillan, 2005 WL 20000203, at *3 (finding that, without expert testimony, the plaintiff had “insufficient proof of product defect to satisfy the Scanlon rule as restated in Myrlak”); In re Mirena, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 312 (“summary judgment is appropriate where required expert testimony is absent”).
[brief] You did not get in touch with that supplier of catalytic heaters, the ones on your system, and indicate to them that you would be interested in getting a quotation from them with specifications such that it would avoid the problems that you had previously experienced; you did not do that, did you?  [...]:  No, because we were having these issues at the same period of time, so we were not confident that that could be done and they could provide a reliable product because they could not even determine what the issues were that [...] mentioned, so we basically simply did not want to use them because of those ongoing issues.  We did not ask them for a quotation, no.  [2T:80:2-19 (emphasis added). ]
[brief] “Released Claims” means and includes all claims . . . that were, have been or could have been, now, in the past, or in the future, asserted or alleged in, or that relate to, the Settled Action by Class Members, including . . . any claims by Class Members relating to: (a) whether [...]’s . . . charges for [five specified fees] or (6) any other dues, assessments, discounts, fees, or charges of any kind are unauthorized by any agreement or violate or are subject to claims for damages, refund, or other relief under the laws or common law of any state . . .  Settlement Agreement, § 1.29 (emphases added) (Pa000044).
[brief] *In re Ocean County*, the Appellate Division articulated the need to balance a citizen’s right to vote with promoting certainty in the electoral process.  See *In re Ocean County*, 379 N.J. Super. at 471.  Notably, courts have upheld the rejection of ballots received after the deadline, even where late delivery was caused by uncontrollable circumstances such as inclement weather.  *Id.* at 470 (citing *Mulcahy v. Bergen County Bd. of Elections*, 156 N.J. Super. 429, 434 (Law Div. 1978)).  The Court reaffirmed that the received date, not the postmark, is determinative under the statute.  *Ibid.*  Strict adherence to ballot receipt deadlines, the Court explained, serves not only to deter voter fraud but also to preserve the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.  *See* *ibid.* (citing *In re Application of Langbaum*, 201 N.J. Super. 484, 490 (App.Div.1985)).  The Appellative Division acknowledged one narrow exception to the literal application of the receipt date requirement – the extraordinary circumstances following the September 11th terrorist attacks, when anthrax contamination forced the closure of the [...] in Mercer County.  *Id.* at 471.  The Court in *In re Holmes* permitted late ballots to be counted due to the “extraordinary circumstance of national dimension and unforeseen consequence”.  *Ibid.* (citing *In re Holmes*, 346 N.J. Super. 372 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)).  Thus, absent such extraordinary circumstances, when a statute is clear on its face and its rationale is plain, courts must interpret and apply it with strict compliance.
[brief] Defendant appeared before [...] for sentencing on January 27, 2022.  (13T).  [...] found that the totality of the mitigating factors preponderated over the aggravating factors and imposed a concurrent five-year probationary sentence, along with $12,443.56 restitution, and all mandatory fines and penalties.  The court also made “maintain verifiable employment” a condition of probation.  (13T:25-18 to 26-26).  See also Da31-33.  Defendant thereafter filed an appeal with this Court.
[brief] In short, [...] fled because he was afraid that he would be shot if he remained at the scene.  And he testified that he did not believe that he was out of danger even after he managed to get to his car and drive away:  “I was told these guys came in town looking to … kill me[.]”\(^{17}\) (24T 240-1 to 4)  Accordingly, [...] said, he continued to be “scared for my life. ”  (23T 173-13 to 14, 174-6 to 175-2; 24T 203-9 to 10, 242-19)  The failure to include in the flight instruction any reference to [...]’s explanation for his departure was prejudicial error.
[brief] Said zoning permit shall be in addition to any and all licenses and/or permits as required from the Township Health Department, pursuant to Chapter 419, Food and Beverages, and/or as required by the State of New Jersey.  (2)  Zoning permits shall be required for mobile retail food establishments on an annual basis for year-round vendors or a temporary basis for individual events as determined to be applicable prior to commencing operation within the Township.  Permits shall specify the nature, location and extent of the operation.  Permits issued pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be valid as follows:
[directive] The Rules and regulations shall provide for uniform classification of the resolution of complaints as follows:  (a)  Sustained.  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged misconduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  (d)  Not Sustained.  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  2.2.
[brief] In granting summary judgment in favor of [...], the Trial Court did not act in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner.  Rather, the Trial Court articulated very thoroughly its reasoning on the record.  It is clear that [...] was simply dissatisfied with the outcome and wanted to reargue [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  As set forth above, [...] did not offer any credible evidence that the damages and losses she alleges to have sustained were the natural and probable consequences of anything [...] did or failed to do.
[brief] Counsel for Plaintiff are not aware of any contrary unpublished opinions. representative the discretion to voluntarily file an accounting, and the second giving an interested party (or the court) the right to “require” an accounting.  But in its decision, the trial court “skip[ped] a few words[,]” 2T7:1–7, turning two clauses into one, and applied the discretion to the right of an interested party to compel an account.  Compare 2T25:20–22 with N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2.
[brief] Appellants argue that [...] ignored the word “routine” and that Exemption #11 applies only to “routine upgrades”.  Under this interpretation, Appellants argue that [...]’s Project could not be considered a routine upgrade.  However, the [...] did not ignore the word “routine” in issuing the HAD, but simply read the exemption to apply the word “routine” to “maintenance and operations” only, not to upgrades.  This is the only interpretation that makes sense.
[directive] To final prosecutor's prior the to considered shall be which agency prosecuting of the representative a will prosecutor the whether be filed, will charges criminal formal whether concerning decision prosecutor will the whether program, and apre-trial enter to defendant the by request a to consent plea; negotiated a to or agree make a involving proceeding juvenile any or crime involving a proceeding judicial any at present be (p) To Jersey New of the 22 paragraph I, Article by provided otherwise as except offense, criminal Constitution; defendant; the of escape or release any of notified be To (q) being held, is victim the of rights implicating the proceeding a which before court any in appear To (r) conferred any right enforce to motion filed on argument a present or motion a file to standing with 72 Page and "nature of consideration the of the part as impact such consider shall prosecutor the of relevance (recognizing the 2A:162-20(a) N.J.S.A. See charged."  offense the of circumstances in consider may a factor court a as charged offense of the circumstances and nature the seek to deciding whether in prosecutor The detention).
[brief] Please accept this supplemental filing addressing points raised by counsel in their response to the State’s appeal.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  LEGAL ARGUMENT  ---------------------------------------------------------------1  POINT I  THE STATE OBJECTS TO THE DEFENSE’S POSITION THAT THE HOLDING IN A.A. APPLIES TO ADULT DEFENDANTS AND THAT THE STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED ON THE “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE” DOCTRINE.---------------------------------1  CONCLUSION---------------------------------------------------------------7
[brief] 4T, 139:16-142:24.  [...]’s opinion as set forth in his expert report on Plaintiff [...]’ lost profits, is not only within a reasonable degree of certainty, but is, as [...] affirmed in response to opposing counsel’s question, an absolute economic certainty.  4T, 47:19-48:25.  [...]’s analysis, as he testified, and as opposing counsel did not and could not contest, was done on the real, certain, actual data and information of the actual affordable housing development.  4T, 33:24-34:22.  Therefore, as [...] testified because [...]’s report is solely based on the analysis of the real, certain, actual data and information of the developed affordable housing project, [...]’s expert report on lost profits damages is not only an opinion of said damages within a reasonable degree of certainty, but is an absolute economic certainty.
[directive] b.  했습니까?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  수감기간  연장을 요청하지 않겠다고  Seek an extended term of confinement?  c. 했습니까?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  가석방  부적격문제에 관해 조건을 추구하지 않겠다고  Seek a stipulation of parole ineligibility?
[brief] Lewis v. Preschel, 237 N.J. Super. 418, 422 (App. Div. 1989); see also Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, P. C. v. Ezekwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2001) (same).  Thus, while a trial judge may reconsider an interlocutory order, “our system of civil litigation does not permit one trial judge to review whether the decision of another judge ‘of coordinate jurisdiction’ is correct in the same way that an appellate court does. ”  Black Creek Sanctuary Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fortress Inv. Grp., L.L.C., No. A-5227-12T3, 2015 WL 1565644, at *4 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2015) (citing Akhtar v. JDN Props. at Florham Park, LLC, 439 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2015) (“relitigation of an interlocutory order before successive judges of coordinate jurisdiction is generally disfavored”); see also Cineas v. Mammone, 270 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1994) (despite inherent power to revise interlocutory orders, “judges should not vacate orders of judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction unless there are exceptional circumstances” or “unless there has been a material change in the facts or available evidence”).
[brief] ”  Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler, 289 N.J. Super. 329 (Law Div. 1995), is concerned with whether the proceeding was brought in bad faith, for the sole purpose of developing land into a nursing facility.  Next, the Township either significantly misreads Mount Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 188 N.J. 531 (2006), or intentionally contorts its facts.
[directive] (1)  He exposes his intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person under circumstances where the actor knows or reasonably expects he is likely to be observed by a child who is less than 13 years of age where the actor is at least four years older than the child.  (2)  He exposes his intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person under circumstances where the actor knows or reasonably expects he is likely to be observed by a person who because of mental disease or defect is unable to understand the sexual nature of the actor’s conduct.
[brief] (9T:134-17 to 21).  Thus, this was not new or surprising information for the jury amounting to anything even remotely prejudicial.  Third, [...] did not call defendant a liar to disparage him.  To the contrary, Ms.  Fiore called defendant a liar twice, each time after he tried to change the facts and circumstances of the shooting in a failed attempt to convince her he was “scared for his life,” that “those people were gang members,” and how “they were probably going to shoot me and you,” so it was basically not his fault.  (See 9T:163-25 to 164-14; 165-22 to 166-22).  [...] responded, “You better start telling the mother fucking truth, man” (9T:164-11 to 14).  Then, when defendant tried to convince her that “the car was following us.  That car was following me.  From Neptune.  You had your headphones on,” [...] responded, “I don’t know what’s going on with you.  You’re lying so much.  I mean (indiscernible) but my heart is broken for that girl that lost her life.  I’m, my heart breaks for her. ”  (9T:165-7 to 25).  Finally, the jail call was played during the State’s direct examination.  Therefore, [...] was still on the witness stand and was subject to cross-examination regarding everything she said in the call.  Defense counsel had ample opportunity to test the reliability and counter of all statements she made during the call regarding their relationship and his version of the events that evening.
[brief] See Dunbar, 233 N.J. at 560 (“The MLUL is a ‘comprehensive statute that allows municipalities to adopt ordinances to regulate land development in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare using uniform and efficient procedures. ’” (quoting Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor Council of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338, 349 (2003)).
[brief] While the Motion to Compel was pending, on January 22, 2024, [...] and [...] offered to produce [...] for deposition on February 2, 2024.  Pa335, 352-53.  On January 23, 2024, plaintiff confirmed that deposition.  Id.  Later on January 23, 2024, defense counsel adjourned but did not cancel the deposition because [...] was suddenly unavailable due to “unforeseen circumstances. ”  Id.  On March 22, 2024, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel.  In its oral opinion, the trial court found that “Plaintiff is entitled to depose [...]” as “[...]’s testimony would not be cumulative, as [...] has personal knowledge [of] material facts which the other defendants are not privy to, particularly related to comments and conversation as to who would be [[...]’s] successor.
[directive] II.  BRIEF  SYNOPSIS OF FACTS SUPPORTING EACH RELEVANT FACTOR IN SUPPORT OF NO-KNOCK REQUEST  The submitting officer must include a concise set of facts in support of the request for a no-knock provision below based upon the factors cited above.  If approved, said set of facts must be included in the affidavit under a section entitled: REQUEST FOR NO-KNOCK WARRANT and must articulate all applicable factors which form (facts specific to the case) the basis for the no-knock warrant request.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 58:11A-5, -7 and -9; see also Toll Bros., Inc. v. N.J., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 242 N.J. Super. 519, 526, 577 A.2d 845 (App.Div.1990).  The DEP’s regulations that implement the WQPA mandate that:
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[brief] Expert Report by [...]  (omitted, see 274a)  Exhibit BB, 10/12/2017  Expert Report by [...]…………………………(omitted)  Exhibit CC, 10/11/2017  Report by [...].  …………………………………….(omitted)  Exhibit DD, 8/17/2017  Unpublished Opinion Herring v. Kettleman’s Bagels Deli & Grill, A-2465-15T1 (App.Div. August 17, 2017).  ……………………………….(omitted)  Exhibit EE, 5/12/2005  Unpublished Opinion Garrubbo, Romankow and Rinaldo, Esq. v. Kenilworth Veterans Center, Inc., A-6501-02T5 (App. Div. May 12, 2005)
[brief] Multiple Findings in the Decision\textsuperscript{4} Are Not Predicated Upon Facts in the Hearing Record (Issue Raised at Pa9-Pa11, Pa13, Pa43-Pa63; Raised in Initial Hearing Brief, and Exceptions at Point I, Point II)  Multiple findings by the ALJ do not comport with or are contrary to the evidence admitted at trial.  The ALJ did not issue the Decision in this matter until twenty-two (22) months after the record was closed and subsequent to prompting by [...]’s counsel and the involvement of the [...].  The ALJ was granted fifteen (15) 45-day extensions \textit{nunc pro tunc}, and finally issued the Decision.  (Pa265).  It is respectfully suggested that this significant delay likely contributed to the multiple instances wherein the Decision strays from the facts in the record.  Notably, the ALJ made numerous inferences against [...]’s interests based upon “facts” not within the record.  1.
[brief] “[F]or purposes of summary judgment I will accept that [the shrubbery, plantings, bamboo, rhododendron] were purchased by [...] and that he in fact planted them on the property. ”  [T61:1–5].  Although it acknowledged Plaintiff had testified at his deposition that his party-opponent Defendant [...] had admitted to causing branches to be placed on Plaintiff’s plants, the Chancery Division held that admission was insufficient to at least create a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant [...] did, indeed, place branches on and damage Plaintiff’s plants.
[brief] Instead, His Honor reviewed the Complaint Remanded from Federal Court, which was not NJ State Complaint, it was totally styled with a Federal Caption, etc.  Here’s what he said:  I'm going to just proceed that -- that the fifth -- what's entitled The Fifth Amendment – Amended Complaint that was filed in Federal Court before the remand is the operative complaint.  T2-22-23 to 23-2.  --- 3  The hearing was on April 1, 2021 and is memorialized in 1T (4/1/21).