ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.*  In *State in the Interest of M.P.*, 476 N.J. Super. 242 (2023), the court failed to adopt a rule that would require an attorney to be appointed in all interrogations of a minor.  However, in A.S. the Court stated:  [i]n circumstances such as those existing in the present matter, where the adult advisor is known to have a close family relationship to both the victim and the alleged perpetrator, the prudent approach would be to require the presence of an attorney capable of advising the juvenile with respect to her rights and her potential culpability, a procedure adopted elsewhere.  [203 N.J. at 154]  In addition, the Court cautioned that where the interrogating officers are aware of “competing and clashing interests,” they should “strongly consider ceasing the interview when another adult, who is without a conflict of interest, can be made available to the child. ”  *Id.* at 154-55.  Here, [...] had a clear conflict of interest acting as [...]’s guardian during the interrogation.
[brief] [...] and [...], husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN/JANE DOE 1-100, ABC CORPORATION 1-100, and XYZ PARTNERSHIP 1-100, representing one or more fictitious individuals or entities, individually, jointly, and severally, JOHN/JANE DOE 101-200, ABC CORPORATION 101-200, and XYZ PARTNERSHIP 101-200, representing one or more fictitious persons or entities consisting of Directors, Officers, Principals, Partners, Boards, Board Members or Representatives, or Agents, individually, jointly, and severally, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] --- \(^1\)  For the sake of uniformity, Defendants adopt the same transcript citation format that Plaintiffs use in their brief:  Transcript of September 20, 2022 [...] Meeting is referenced as “1T”; Transcript of October 27, 2022 [...] Meeting is referenced as “2T”; and Transcript of May 15, 2023  Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment is referenced as “3T. ”  \(^2\)  Plaintiffs failed to include their original Notice of Appeal, filed June 21, 2023 in their Amended Appendix.  It is included here as “Da01-Da11.
[brief] Id., 225 N.J. at 111, quoting Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).  “On the other hand, if the offense is punishable by six months or less, it is ‘appropriate to presume...that society views such an offense as “‘petty. ’”’  State v. Denelsbeck, supra, 225 N.J. at 120, quoting Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1989).  Under this view, a DWI charge, by itself, would be a petty offense, and [...] would not be entitled to a jury trial.
[brief] \textbf{B.  The error in parsing the jury’s passion/provocation verdicts}  The Supreme Court holds that, to convict a defendant of p/p manslaughter, “[t]he first … requirement[] is that the provocation be adequate. ”  \textit{State v. Mauricio}, 117 N.J. 402, 412 (1990).  Accordingly, the jury was instructed: “The first factor, there was adequate provocation. ”  (27T 157-7 to 8, 168-14 to 15)  The jury found adequate provocation with respect to [...], and returned a conviction for p/p manslaughter.  And the jury found adequate provocation with respect to [...], and returned a conviction for attempted p/p manslaughter.  (29T 8-15 to 9-3; Da 3, 5)
[brief] Appellant commenced this appeal on July 1, 2024, and accordingly, this appeal should be deemed untimely.  (Da 220-227).  Moreover, in July 2024, Appellant allegedly received approximately $47,000.00 of the funds on deposit with the Superior Court, pursuant to these underlying Orders.  Despite Appellant’s refusal to accept these underlying Orders, Appellant nevertheless took the funds awarded therein.  Considering such actions, Appellant should be precluded from proceeding with this subsequent appeal.
[brief] Mere disagreement with these findings, however, is insufficient to overturn a sentence which is firmly supported by competent credible evidence in the record.  R.Y., 242 N.J. at 78.  One: Defendant claims that the judge did not consider his immaturity.  (Db77-79).  That defendant may have slept with his parents and believed in Santa Claus at age 16 does not overcome the facts of this quadruple homicide.  The judge recounted the multiple and deliberate steps defendant undertook in planning the murders, including researching how to use and prepare the firearm, loading each of the 30 bullets individually into the magazines, racking the gun, dressing like The Terminator, protecting his ears with earplugs, turning off the lights in his room, and calmly executing his mother, father, sister and grandmother.  (17T218-16 to 220-4).  The judge found “[s]uch sophistication goes beyond the characteristics of a youth. ”  (17T220-5 to 6).  Two:
[brief] Listing the number of times a fiscal year had 2,080 work hours does not prove the rate troopers were compensated for their overtime.  The Arbitrator’s finding that Troopers were paid overtime utilizing a different divisor is a mistake of fact and therefore the Award was procured by undue means.  The Division argues that STFA Vice President [...] was not present during the initial negotiations for the language, and then attempts to argue that, for that reason, [...] could not rebut the testimony of [...] and [...].  This argument ignores the fact that both [...] and [...] were also not present during those initial negotiations.  It also ignores the fact that [...] testified that she references the contract for multiple items related to compensation and payroll, including but not limited to, trooper’s base salary, food maintenance, holiday payout, education pay, and clothing allowance for New Jersey State Troopers.  Both base salary and food maintenance are contained within the equation at issue (base + maintenance), and those numbers are admittedly derived from the contract.  It is nonsensical that the Division would obtain those numbers from the contract but then ignore the “2,080. ”  The Kendellen Award improperly rewrites the contract language concerning the manner in which overtime compensation is calculated in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous language in the contract.
[brief] (Pa94)  The [...] is an organization of individual sportsmen/women and sportsmen's clubs in New Jersey which describes itself as “a group of outdoor enthusiasts that maintain hunting, fishing and trapping are vital resources in natural conservation”.  The [...] represents more than 150,000 hunters, trappers and fishermen throughout the State with the support of local chapters at the County level.  www.njsfsc.org (last visited 9/18/23).
[brief] (Ia336).  [...] testified at his deposition that the [...] Master Policy does not have a specific exclusion for 12-15 passenger vans.  (Ia539).  [...]’s failure to provide testimony from [...], [...], or any other individual with first-hand, personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding [...]’s purchase of the subject policy, the execution of the supplemental application and Questionnaire is dispositive.  “Evidence presented to support or defeat summary judgment motion should be the best there is short of live testimony characteristic of full trial. ”  *Fargas v. Gorham*, 276 N.J. Super. 135, 140 (Law Div. 1994).
[brief] [...]; [...]  Attorneys for Appellant, [...] Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (023252005)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (126302016)  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | RESPONSE TO APPELLEE’S STATEMENT OF FACTS | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 1 | | POINT I: THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD CONDUCT A *DE NOVO* REVIEW OF PERC’S DECISION BECAUSE IT PERTAINS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE AND A STRICTLY LEGAL ISSUE (Db15; Rb5).
[brief] POINT V TENANT IS ENTITLED TO LEGAL FEES ON REMAND  Landlord raises two procedural arguments, and one legal one, contesting Tenant’s argument respecting legal fees, all of which lack merit.  Regarding the procedural arguments, Landlord first contends that Tenant is either precluded or judicially estopped from seeking legal fees “because it failed to assert such a claim” before the trial court.  Landlord misapprehends Tenant’s argument.
[brief] ” (Pa7).  As a result, the Board was concerned [...] did not “understand the thought process that motivate[d]” his criminal behavior.  Ibid.  And the Board was also concerned that [...]’s “responses to questions posed by the Board at the time of the hearing” showed [...] “lacks insight into his criminal behavior and that Mr. [...] minimizes his conduct. ” (Pa2).  The Board also took account of [...]’s prior criminal history, which included “repetitive assault and property offenses” as well as his “repeated violations” of parole and probation.
[brief] [...] described the location of the Property, existing conditions, the development proposal and --- \(^4\) [...] stepped in to serve as Appellant’s engineering firm after Appellant learned of a conflict of interest based upon the former firm’s work with one of the objectors ([...]) in this matter.  site layout.  Specifically, [...] described how and where customers will access the building, the location of security guards, and where loading will occur.  (T1/61:64:5).  With respect to loading, [...] noted that the Land Development Rules do not require a loading space for commercial uses of less than 10,000 square feet and moreover, the Green Zone Redevelopment Plan does not address loading spaces.  (T1/70:17-71:7).  Nonetheless, [...] testified that the any loading or unloading would take place “from Michigan Avenue, either in the shared loading area in the back of building 700 at The Walk or in that small loading space that’s on the side of the road there, side of Michigan Avenue. ” (T1/63:21-25).  Delivery persons would walk around the corner to the front of the store, go in through the exit corridor and make the delivery, typically at times when customers are not queuing in line, and from a small delivery vehicle, with security being present the entire time.  (T1/63:25-64:5; 65:10-15).  [...] further testified that there is currently a shortfall of parking at the Property, which was being addressed because of a change in use.  (T1/55:15-56:1).  Here, because the proposed use is considered a retail use, the Land Development Rules require sixteen (16) parking spaces and in fact, would have required thirty-two (32) spaces for the restaurant that previously operated at the Property.  However, [...] opined parking for patrons could readily be accommodated in the garage behind the Property or via parking on the side streets in the vicinity of the Property.  (T1/56:22-57:10).  [...] noted the Property’s proximity to The Walk retail shopping center, whose customers also utilize parking in a garage or on surrounding streets.  (T1/57:10-21).  He also noted that based on the proposed use, it was expected that customers would also arrive on location on foot.  (T1/57:24-58:7).  Moreover, [...] testified that “there are tens of thousands of parking spaces in the garages that are around the site and within easy walking distance. ” (T1/58:13-15).  [...] noted that the building on the Property was built long before the Land Development Rules were adopted, which is essentially grandfathered, so there are numerous nonconformities related to certain development standards, including but not limited to lot area, lot width, lot frontage, building coverage, maximum lot coverage, impervious coverage, and front and rear yard setbacks, all of which are existing conditions that the Appellant is not changing or exacerbating; the building footprint will not change.
[brief] “[A] jury as fact-finder should undertake its task as dispassionately as possible without being divert[ed] ... from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. ”  State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 451 (1988)(internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the prosecutor’s improper comments prevented the jurors from dispassionately performing their role by improperly focusing on the personal characteristics of the victim and the effect of the victim’s death on his family, and by implying that justice for the victim and his family could only be achieved if [...] was convicted.  Id. at 450-51 (“objectionable remarks relating to the victim's character and future plans . . . were neither appropriate nor harmless”); State v. Rodriguez, 365 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div.), certif. denied 180 N.J. 150 (2003)(disapproving prosecutor’s comment, “Let the battle for justice be won,” because it improperly “implied that the only way in which justice would be done was if the jury found defendant guilty”).
[brief] (Db24-32).  Defendant asserts that he adequately explained away all evidence against him in the case, and that the --- 4 *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  State’s case essentially hinged on the confession letters – thus, the prosecutor calling attention to the handwriting in the letters, without expert testimony or any limiting instructions, unduly prejudiced the jury and deprived him of a fair trial.  Defendant is wrong in several respects.  First, the State’s case was far from weak – indeed, the only weakness displayed at trial was defendant’s own explanations for the evidence against him.  Our law is also clear that jurors are fully able to compare handwriting samples without expert assistance.
[brief] ” (9T57-19 to 23).  Counsel proffered that [...] would testify that he was told to bring defendant to a certain place but did not know ahead of time that the searches would take place.  (9T58-1 to 12).  Counsel intended “to elicit testimony from Mr. [...] that they had no forewarning that these warrants were going to be executed, which only makes it more reliable that the [d]efendant never had this stolen ID in the first place. ” (9T58-19 to 23).  Counsel further proffered that [...] gave defendant’s business card to [...], supporting defendant’s claim that it was the card, not the missing wallet ID, which he showed “the officers who had pulled him over.
[brief] 1.  [...] did not have an objectively reasonable belief that [...]’s conduct violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.  [...] contends that she had an objectively reasonable belief that [...]’s behavior on June 24, 2020 constituted criminal harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.  In order to make a prima facie case of CEPA retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate “he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy.
[brief] PLAINTIFF  NOW ATTEMPTS TO CLAIM  IT ASSERTS NON-LAD CLAIMS, SUCH CLAIMS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL IN ANY EVENT FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND/OR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE TORT CLAIMS ACT ...........................................  33 POINT VI THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT GIVEN PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO JOIN PARTIES WITHOUT WHOM THIS ACTION COULD NOT PROCEED ............................................. 35 POINT VII THIS LAD DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CASE COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED UNDER THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT AND WAS APPROPRIATELY SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL ON THIS BASIS AS WELL ................................................................. 42 CONCLUSION ................................................................. 46 APPENDIX Plaintiff’s October 17, 2022 Civil Case Information Statement Before the Trial Court ....................... Da001 May 3, 2023 Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint without prejudice .............. Da002 May 3, 2023
[brief] \(^6\)  By motion filed on February 27, 2024, [...] sought to strike the so-called “video evidence” submitted by plaintiff, as well as all references to the “video evidence” throughout the appellant’s brief (Pb18, Pb20, Pb21, Pb29-30, Pb43, Pb44, Pb45), and in the appendix to the brief (Pa526, Pa527).  The motion was denied by order entered March 18, 2024.  CONCLUSION
[brief] On April 29, 2019, on complaint was filed on behalf of plaintiff (Pa1).  On June 3, 2019, an answer was filed on behalf of defendants [...] and [...] a.k.a. [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) (Pa36).  On July 1, 2019, an answer was filed on behalf of defendant [...] (hereinafter “[...]” or “the Borough”) (Pa48).  The case was transferred to Bergen County by order dated August 16, 2019 (Pa58).  After discovery closed, defendants were permitted to file dispositive motions, which were filed on various dates (Pa61, 924, 931).  On October 13, 2023, the Trial heard oral argument and granted summary judgment to [...], and it required additional briefing on the issue of net expert opinions before reaching a decision as to [...]’s summary judgment motion.  Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 13, 2023 decision (Pa924), which was denied by the Trial Court by order dated November 17, 2023 (Pa929) after oral argument.  Defendant [...] refiled a motion to bar the testimony of plaintiff’s experts (Pa921.  Having heard oral argument on November 16, 2023, on December 14, 2023, the Trial Court granted summary judgment in --- 1  “Pa” refers to plaintiff’s Appendices.  2  The pleadings for the dismissed defendants, not part of this appeal, are omitted.  3  “1T” refers to the October 13, 2023 Transcript.  4  “2T” refers to the November 16, 2023 Transcript.  5  “3T” refers to the December 14, 2023 Transcript. favor of [...] having barred the testimony of plaintiff’s liability experts (Pa995).  Thereafter, plaintiff filed Stipulations of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant [...] (Pa997) and all other defendants.  (Pa998).  On December 19, 2023, plaintiff filed this appeal as to [...] and [...] only.
[brief] BURDEN OF PROOF  It was the Plaintiffs’ obligation to present evidence to the Board to prove their entitlement to the relief they sought.  “The burden of proof of the right to the relief sought in the application rests at all times upon the applicant”.  *Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration* (Gann 2023), pp. 261, citing *Ten Stary Dom Ptp. v. Mauro*, 216 NJ 16, 30 (2013).  The burden of proof lies upon the applicant with regard to both the positive and the negative criteria.  *New Brunswick Tel. v. South Plainfield*, 305 N.J. Super. 151, 165 (App. Div. 1997), re-affirmed at 314 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div. 1998).  If the applicant does not meet its burden of proof, the Board has no choice but to deny the application.
[brief] Respondent’s reliance on State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J. Super 25 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 295 (1988) is also misplaced.  Peterkin did “not concern prosecutorial concealment or suppression of exculpatory and material evidence” and “does not involve constitutionally offensive ‘suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused. ’ ” as this case does Id. at 39.  Peterkin dealt with the inadvertent destruction of evidence and an attempt to cover up the destruction of evidence.  The instant matter is far different.
[brief] He also planned to have [...] arrive when his mother would not be home.  [...] then claimed defendant had told him that he refused to give [...]’ laptop back because [...] did not owe [...] anything.  When [...] had become angry about this, defendant shot [...] once in the leg, and then as [...] tried to get up, shot him again in the chest.  Defendant told [...] that [...] had never been violent towards him.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFFS POSSESS STANDING DESPITE FINDING THEY DO NOT MEET THE “INTERESTED PARTY” STANDARD REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH STANDING UNDER THE MLUL (DA532; 2T24-32; 3T8-12.)  The trial court erred in concluding that [...] and [...]³ possess standing to pursue the claims asserted in this matter.  In reaching that erroneous conclusion, the trial court failed to apply the correct standard – the “interested party” standard set forth in the MLUL.  Had the trial court conducted a proper analysis based on the “interested party” standard set forth in the MLUL, the only conclusion it could have reached is that Plaintiffs do not possess standing.  “Standing is a threshold issue.  . .[that] neither depends on nor determines the merits of plaintiff’s claim. ”  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398, 417 (1991).  “A litigant has standing only if the litigant demonstrates ‘a sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect to the subject matter of the litigation [and a] substantial likelihood of some harm . . . in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”’  Edison Bd. of Educ. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Edison, 464 N.J. Super. 298, 305 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd., 234 N.J. 403, 423 (2018)).  ³  As explained in Section II, infra, [...] should not have even been permitted to intervene in this action on the eve of trial in any event.  The MLUL contains specific requirements for standing, both before the land use board and before the court.
[directive] If the maximum authorized sentence of imprisonment under the law of the other jurisdiction was six months or less, the prior out-of-state conviction or adjudication shall be treated as a prior disorderly persons offense.  If the defendant was convicted or adjudicated delinquent for an offense that could be designated as one of several degrees (e.g., robbery, theft, drug distribution under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, etc.) and the prosecutor cannot reliably determine the degree of the prior conviction/adjudication from the information readily at hand (i.e., the “rap” sheet), the prosecutor may proceed as if the prior offense was of the lowest of the possible degrees.  In the event that information is subsequently obtained that establishes that the prior conviction/adjudication was of a higher degree, the prosecutor may recalculate the criminal history points if this new information would result in placing the defendant in a different Criminal History Category.
[brief] If there is bad service, there is NO time limit for asking the court to vacate a default judgment and NO other reasons needs to be provided.  However, the defendants’ brief in support of their motion to vacate the Final Judgment by Default, did also establish that there was Excusable Neglect and that they did have a Meritorious Defense.  (Pa20), where the brief was amended, prior to the court hearing on October 19, 2023, to add the defendants’ history prior to the entry of the Final Judgment by Default on 5/4/2023 (Pa25-26) and to cite the many Court Cases found in support of the defendants’ brief (Pa30-33).  The herein Statements of Fact for the defendants clearly show good cause, because matters of law were knowingly and willfully violated in the Affidavits of Service, in the Request to Enter Default and Proof of Mailing (Pa16), and in the Final Judgment by Default and Proof of Mailing (Pa17); respectively by the Process Server, and by the Plaintiff’s Attorney and his Legal Assistant.  That is, their acts MISLED the court into granting a Final Judgment by Default in May of 2015.
[brief] [...], [...], and [...] had been making generalized “complaints” about [...]’s management style for years.  (See Pa178; Pa178; Pa190; Pa285; Pa290; Pa240).  [...] “complained” of [...]’s management style as early as 2016.  (Pa288-89 at 44:11-47:8l; Pa289-90 at 47:9-50:19).  Despite these gripes about [...], she and [...] continued working for [...] for ten years.  (See Pa99; Pa354; Pa356; Pa357).  In fact, [...] testified that she and [...] had a “good working relationship. ” (Pa354 at 51:20-23).  [...] would often confide in [...] and share with her personal details about his life.  (Pa354 at 51:20-52:2).  Indeed, the record reflects that there is simply no record of such a “pattern of antagonism” from which a reasonable jury could infer causation between [...]’s termination and his alleged whistle-blowing activity.