ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs adopt Defendants’ Procedural History, Db6-7, excepting the arguments set forth therein, but clarify the following procedural matters:  Plaintiffs’ Complaint set forth seven causes of action: Count I, Quiet Title; Count II, Ejectment and Determination of Title; Count III, Quia Timet; Count IV, Reformation of Deeds and Instruments for Mistake; Count V, Declaratory Judgment; Count VI, Trespass to Real Property; Count VII, Private Nuisance.
[brief] (Pa517).  Plaintiff clarified that he is not asking the Court to expand the record, but rather to review the evidence that it knew existed at the time of its decision— including video evidence—which [...] alleged in his pleadings proves that the property manager made false statements; and thus, triggered coverage. ” (Pa518).  Plaintiff contends that a motion for reconsideration provides an opportunity for the court to either reinforce and better explain why the Order(s) granting dismissal were appropriate or correct a prior erroneous decision.  (Pa519).  [...] contends that the Court acted in an “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable matter” by (a) not treating all factual allegations are true; (b) failing to consider relevant evidence; and (c) misapplying relevant case law.  (Pa519).  Oral argument for Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was heard on October 11, 2023.  See 2T.  The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration for “reasons stated on the record. ” (Pa520).  Although Defendants were allowed a rebuttal for their motion (1T14), [...] was not granted a final rebuttal for his motion (2T: 14-15).  Moreover, the Court failed to consider relevant evidence—known to the parties at the time of claim denial which was part of the “pleadings”.  (2T: 5-6, 8-9); (Pa87, Pa88, Pa89, Pa249).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] And, of course, the standard for determining whether summary judgment should be granted is set forth in R. 4:46.  That rule provides that a Court may enter summary judgment:  [I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  R. 4:46-2(c) (emphasis added).  Summary judgment is a proper remedy where, as here, there is no genuine issue of material fact challenged, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also, R. 4:46-2.
[brief] It is undisputed that Plaintiff slipped and fell during an ongoing storm event.  In fact, the “Safety Report” report of plaintiff’s liability expert notes the following: (1) plaintiff slipped and fell at 7:30 a.m. (Pa457, Incident Overview); (2) “[t]he weather at the time of the incident was freezing and there was light freezing rain” (Pa458); and (3) the precipitation in the form of a “wintery mix” that began prior to plaintiff’s fall started at 6:51 a.m: - 6:51 AM 30 °F  Wintry Mix - 7:10 AM 30 °F  Light Freezing Rain - 7:51 AM 30 °F  Light Freezing Drizzle - 8:26 AM 31 °F  Light Freezing Rain (Pa458)
[brief] In Rutkowski v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 209 N.J. Super. 140, 143 (App. Div. 1986), the Appellate Division denied plaintiff’s pleading of a fictitious description naming defendants, “who had designed, manufactured, sold … or were otherwise responsible for the allegedly defective machine. ”  The Rutkowski Court concluded that it could not imagine how this “quoted phrase would have indicated to even the most thorough reader that plaintiff intended to make a claim for negligent safety inspections. ”  Id.  Moreover, the court was unmoved even by the fact that the proposed defendant was aware of the lawsuit before the statute of limitations had expired.  When compared to the fictitious party pleading language at issue in the present matter, Rutkowski clearly weighs heavily in [...]’s favor as the language at issue in Rutkowski was substantially more specific than the language utilized by plaintiff here.
[brief] In fact, before petitioner's motion was heard, the Judge of Compensation revealed that she was of the opinion that teachers were essential employees, and that this teacher would be entitled to this presumption.  Respondent moved to recuse the Judge of Compensation when it became evident that that the Judge of Compensation formed that opinion when she served as an Assemblywoman in the New Jersey State Assembly and advocated as a primary sponsor of the Presumption Bill.  The Judge of Compensation denied respondent's recusal motion (1T12-22 to 1T22-17).  That denial order is now the subject of the companion appeal, [...] v. [...], Docket Number [...].
[brief] [...]’s counsel on appeal, whistling in the proverbial graveyard, and hoping to avert the Court’s eyes from the frothing and malevolent “elephant in the living room” who is their client’s principal, predictably made no mention in [...]’s appeal brief of the train-wreck debacle of Shallan [...]’s pathetically self-destructive deposition testimony/enfant terrible performance that has all been duly transcribed.  This calculated de-emphasis is perhaps understandable out of sheer embarrassment alone, even if it is ultimately unavailing as a litigation strategy for a party on appeal holding a losing hand and hoping for a miracle of undeserved deliverance.  No such Deus Ex Machina can rescue [...]’s faltering and flamed out case, nor should it.
[brief] In *West v. Nationwide Credit*, 998 F. Supp. 642 (W.D.N.C. 1998), a debt collector called the debtor’s neighbor and asked him to have the debtor call the debt collector about a very important matter.  The debt collector never disclosed that he was a debt collector, never said that the call concerned a debt, and never disclosed any information about the debt.  The debtor sued claiming that the debt collector’s call, which was clearly not to obtain location information under § 1692b, was a prohibited third-party communication under § 1692c(b).  The debt collector argued that the call was not a “communication” because it conveyed no information about a debt.  The court rejected the argument concluding that the call was “regarding” a debt and that such a broad interpretation was consistent with the FDCPA’s purposes.  For these reasons, the motion court mistakenly limited “communication” to one which expressly sought to collect a debt and one which the sender conveyed information with the intent that it be examined by the recipient.  Finally, Defendant’s conveyance of the debt information to its mail vendor was “in connection with the collection of any debt.
[brief] The answers from the Questionnaire, the Checklist, and the January 2019 interview revealed several inconsistencies (Factors #1, 2, 4, 8, 9 11, and 14) and a general lack of knowledge by [...] about [...]’s duties and responsibilities.  (Pa15).  Notably, the same three people from [...]--[...], [...], and [...]--all answered the Questionnaire and Checklist and participated in the January 2019 interview.  This lack of knowledge was particularly illuminating because it showed that [...] did not know enough about [...]’s duties and responsibilities to exert any control over her.  Thus, the ALJ reasonably relied on this to find that [...] was an independent contractor for [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(b).
[brief] Atalese Applies Because The Transaction  Here is A Consumer Transaction  There are three main categories of arbitration agreements considered by courts: consumer, employment, and commercial.  See In Re Remicade, 938 F.3d 515, 525 (3d. Cir. 2019).  As reflected in the Atalese, Kernahan, Skuse and Flanzman decisions, the Atalese rule has been applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court to both consumer and employment arbitration agreements.  While there appears to be a difference of opinion on whether and how the Atalese rule applies to an individually negotiated commercial contract between non-consumers, compare Drosos, supra, and Yura v. [...], 2022 WL 1617731 (App. Div. 2022) (Da1417) (on whether Atalese applied to a contract allegedly negotiated between two sophisticated commercial businesses, court held “we read nothing in Atalese to explicitly restrict its holding to consumer contracts”) with [...] v. [...], 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023), there is no difference of opinion that Atalese applies to consumer contracts.
[brief] (Pb12-13, “Strict compliance was not made with the Affidavit of Merit statute because (a) due to Plaintiff having to consent to vacate Defendants’ default, Plaintiff's Counsel lost track of the timeline for submitting a timely affidavit of merit…”)  This argument defies logic.  The order vacating the default was entered by the Court on November 8, 2023.  It specifically gave Defendants twenty days to file their Answer.  At that point in time, the default judgment was no longer of any relevant concern.  Nine days later, on November 17, 2023, Defendants filed their Answer.  New Jersey law has always premised the commencement of the time to file a valid Affidavit of Merit on the filing of the defendant’s answer.
[brief] 3  Courts in other states have similarly denied requests for large-scale productions of irrelevant material.  *E.g.*, *Carlson v. Jerousek*, 68 N.E.3d 520, 537-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“The low probative value of the information being sought does not justify a broad and intrusive method of obtaining that information that is likely to sweep in substantial amounts of irrelevant information.  A party may not dredge an ocean of electronically stored information and records in an effort to capture a few elusive, perhaps non-existent, fish”) (citation omitted).
[brief] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...], Esquire (No. 043631987) on the brief  Attorney for: Plaintiffs/Respondents, [...] and [...]  I.  THE PLAINTIFF’S THEORY OF LIABILITY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT  [...] INCLUDED TWO THEORIES THAT [...] CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, AND BECAUSE [...] CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IS IN EFFECT ASSUMED AND THE CONCEPT OF NOTICE IS NOT APPLICABLE AND EVEN IF THE CONCEPT IS APPLICABLE, WHICH IS DENIED, THE JURY COULD HAVE CONCLUDED THAT BECAUSE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION WAS CREATED BY DEFENDANT [...] IT HAD NOTICE, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT AN ERROR BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER A NOTICE ISSUE .............4
[brief] ”  *Atkinson v. Parsekian*, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962).  This means “a desired inference is more probable than not,” *Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land*, 186 N.J. 163, 169 (2006), “such as to lead a reasonably cautious mind to the given conclusion. ”  *Bornstein v. Metro. Bottling Co.*, 26 N.J. 263, 275 (1958).  N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(c) provides that “[a]n employee who has not returned to duty for five or more consecutive business days following an approved leave of absence shall be considered to have abandoned his or her position and shall be recorded as a resignation not in good standing.
[brief] Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1993) ........................................  36 Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002)  .......................................................................  31 New Jersey Cases  Luckenbach Terminals v. North Bergen Township, 125 N.J. Eq. 562 ..............................................
[brief] In response, the State argued that [...]’s accusations of dishonesty did not constitute improper opinion testimony because [...] was “lying about clear, plain, and even undisputed evidence. ”  (Pb 24)  In particular, the State contended that the defense did not dispute that [...] was one of the two people who went into [...].  (Pb 24-25)  This is incorrect.  Defense counsel’s summation was two-fold: first, he argued that [...] did not go inside the warehouse, in part suggesting that whoever did must have known that [...] had cash on hand; (9T 179-15 to 16, 180-23 to 182-10, 184-8 to 185-2) and, second, counsel argued that even if [...] was one of those people, the State still did not prove that [...] participated in the robbery.  (9T 184-23 to 185-2)  [...] thus contested throughout that he is not one of the blurry figures in the church video, leaving that issue and the veracity of [...]’s denials squarely in dispute.  It was thus the jury’s exclusive task to evaluate [...]’s credibility and a clear error for the court to allow [...] to bias the jury’s assessment by repeatedly calling [...] a liar.
[directive] Provide presentations to students, school staff, parents and community groups throughout New Jersey in a proactive effort to foster awareness; provide guidance to children, parents, educators, librarians and other individuals concerned about child safety issues on the Internet; and (i)  Monitor current laws and proposed legislation concerning high technology and computer crimes, and identify further legislative needs and make recommendations to the SDAG and DSP Bureau Chief for legislative proposals to address such needs in this area.  The IPCU shall confer with and be guided by the Legal Affairs Division in determining the appropriate legal implications and requirements of the use of advanced technology before deploying such measures.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed to prohibit the IPCU from collaborating with other agencies in the effort to protect New Jersey's children and others from online predators or to investigate and apprehend criminals who utilize New Jersey technology to engage in illicit conduct.  9.
[directive] Association Prosecutors County with the cooperation in Justice, Criminal of Division  The present develop and shall Institute, Advocacy General's Attorney the and Jersey of New assistant all (1) for Directive and Reform this Law  Bail the on courses education legal continuing Prosecutors County all (2) general, attorneys deputy Criminal Justice of Division and prosecutors authorized supervisors designated as gc;neral attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant and or detention pretrial seek.  whether to on decisions approve to Directive this to pursuant conduct general who attorneys deputy prosecutors and assistant (3) and release, of revocation hearings.  revocation release and/or detention pretrial Directive. of issuance this upon immediately operational become shall Section This REPORTS AND STUDIES EVALUATION
[directive] Court staff should send the notices for the scheduled court date to the registrant by regular mail or email using the option for a return receipt and notification that the email was read.3  Depending local practices, the prosecutor's office may be on responsible for sending these notices and not court staff.  those counties, court staff In should confirm that notices were sent by the prosecutor's office, and whether there was a response by the registrant.  Prior to the Hearing for a Pro Se Registrant
[brief] The nucleus of each action relates to the Appellants’ breach and termination of the Lease and the associated Solar Rights due to Appellants’ failure to pay rent, as well as [...]’s subsequent lease of the Property to the [...] and the [...]’ acquisition of the Solar Rights.  The background facts, the “larger controversy” and the alleged losses in both actions are identical and, thus, the claims asserted in this new action against [...] should have been asserted in the Prior Action.  As evidence that the matters in controversy are the same, Appellants unsuccessfully sought to amend their First Amended Complaint in the Prior Action to add these very same claims, but were denied.  The denial was not premised on a determination that the claims were unrelated to the Prior Action.  Rather, the denial was based upon, among other things, the Appellants’ unjustified delay in seeking to assert the claims until $2\frac{1}{2}$ years after the Prior Action was commenced, after discovery closed, and after most of the defendants had already been dismissed on the merits.  Indeed, as the trial court in the Prior Action determined when denying Appellants leave to amend to add these claims: [Appellants] cannot, after discovery is long closed, and most other defendants have been dismissed, seek to first add claims against [...], especially where [Appellants] knew of the predicate facts years prior, but chose not to assert them previously.
[brief] The meeting took place in the parking lot of Division Headquarters (1T; 141:21).  The Plaintiff confronted [...], and his response was, “I thought you said that” (1T; 142:17).  Plaintiff said she didn’t and then, he said, “I don’t know what’s going on between you and the captain but I’m trying to stay out of the middle of it” (1T; 142:3 to 143:3).  Again, she stated that he said, “I really don’t know what’s going on between the captain and you but I’m tired of being in the middle” (1T; 143:10).  At the meeting, he stated, “I should have been there more to train you” (1T; 144:8).  She also stated that the evaluations were a lie (1T; 143:22).  She told him that she felt she was “set up for failure” (1T; 144:12).  He stated further that he didn’t train her because “he didn’t want to be in the middle” so he decided to basically not be there to train her and apologized for not training her (1T; 144:15).  The points that the evaluation cost her were discussed at the meeting (1T; 145:2).
[brief] This lawsuit in the Camden County Superior Court, Chancery Department, Probate Division,\(^1\) involves a Mother and Estranged Wife, each seeking to --- \(^1\)  As the Court is aware, the procedural history of a lawsuit is usually contained in the court’s docket.  The docket presents an official, organized documentation of what documents were filed, the date and order of filings, by whom the documents were filed, and when orders were entered.  Appellant has been unable to obtain a docket from the Trial Court, and this has impeded a clear presentation of some of administer the decedent’s estate and divide probate assets.  Because of dueling complaints, motions, cross-motions, etc., the use of the designations Plaintiff and Defendant will not contribute to a clear understanding of the case.  Appellant is [...], the mother of [...], deceased.  Appellee is [...], who had been the estranged wife of [...] for 10 years before his death.  For purposes of clarity, in this brief, the parties will be referred to as Mother and Estranged Wife.
[brief] The Committee failed to abide by these principles in this case.  First, the Committee adopted Ordinance No. 2022-15 despite acknowledging that the Plan was inconsistent with the Township's master plan.  Then, it purported to amend the Plan – only to instead draft an amended ordinance without in fact incorporating its changes into the Plan.  The Planning Board then issued another report finding the changes were consistent with the master plan.  The Committee adopted the new ordinance setting forth that the new Plan was inconsistent with the master plan but without failing to include its reasons in the meeting minutes.  At every step of the way, Defendants attempted to rush through a slapdash Plan without following the statutory procedure of the LRHL.  The residents of [...] are entitled to a local government that follows the rules.  This Court should remand this matter to the Committee and require Defendants follow the statutory requirements.  On the other hand, if this matter is not remanded back to the Township to comply with the requirements of the LRHL, how will it ever be clear how an ordinance could be overturned?  If the Court adopts the Defendants' views, a municipality could insulate their redevelopment plans from judicial review by finding the plan both consistent and inconsistent with the municipality's master plan.  A township would be able to decide it wants a specific result and work backwards to try and incorporate planning principles rather than beginning its inquiry with sound planning considerations.  The Committee has every right to adopt a redevelopment plan that is inconsistent with the township's master plan so long as it follows the requirements of the LRHL and sets forth its reasons for so acting.  That was not done here.  Thus, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court remand this matter back to the Committee.
[brief] (**Pa 125:17-Pa126:10**).  During her deposition, the plaintiff offered more than one answer in response to questions about conversations she had with [...] at the scene of the accident.  **Pa 55: 12-21. **  In her Answers to Interrogatories, there are entirely different answers as Plaintiff indicates, first in Question 19 that no statements of admission were made at the time the accident happened.  **Pa 170.**  Further, the Plaintiff answers to interrogatories indicate in Question 20 that the only statement made to plaintiff at the scene was “I am going to stay here”.  Pa 170.  The plaintiff did not argue that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-123 in her Opposition to the subject Motion for Summary Judgment, but rather this argument was added, without briefing, at the 11th hour, only 10 minutes before the oral argument was scheduled. ¹  Da 1-7 and Da 8.  LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] DESIGNATIONS  Pretrial 1T - February 3, 2020  2T - September 20, 2021  3T - September 21, 2021  4T - September 22, 2021  5T - September 23, 2021  Trial – 2021  6T - September 29  7T - September 30 (I)  8T - September 30 (II)  9T - October 1 (I)  10T - October 1 (II)  11T - October 5  12T - October 6  13T - October 7 (I)  14T - October 7 (II)  15T - October 8 (I)  16T - October 8 (II)  17T - October 12 (I)  18T - October 12 (II)  19T - October 13 (I)  20T - October 13 (II)  21T - October 14 (I)  22T - October 14 (II)  23T - October 15 (I)  24T - October 15 (II)  25T - October 19 (I)  26T - October 19 (II)  27T - October 20 28T - October 21 29T - October 22  Sentence 30T - January 4, 2022  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] c.  References to “Surf Fishing” and “Surf Bathing”  Next, the trial court speculated that the inclusion of terms such as “Surf Fishing” and “Surf Bathing” in a 1920s-era advertisement for the sale of lots by [...] implied an intent to include an unwritten easement for owners of bordering lots to cross the [...] to the beach.  (T66:3—T67:7)  The fatal flaw in the trial court’s rationale, however, is that the general promotional descriptions of activities available at [...] were applicable to all owners; availability was not limited to owners of lots bordering the [...], but rather applied generally to all housing lots offered for sale by [...] throughout the [...] development.  (Da425)  There is absolutely nothing in this advertisement to suggest, for example, that the purchaser of a lot immediately to the west of the plaintiffs’ property would have an implied easement across plaintiffs’ property to the beach, yet that is what would logically be implied by the trial court’s decision that the mention of “Surf Fishing” or “Surf Bathing” meant all lots in the development would have direct beach access.  In fact, no property owner in the development needed an easement to engage in “surf fishing,” “surf bathing,” or any of the myriad other activities noted in the advertisement, as all property owners already had ocean access via the eight marked street ends.  There is nothing specific about “surf fishing” and “surf bathing” on which to imply an easement across the [...] to the beach as opposed to access from the marked street ends instead.