ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To determine if a search was valid despite an officer’s mistaken belief that the third party had authority to consent, courts look to “whether the officer’s belief that the third party had the authority to consent was objectively reasonable in view of the facts and circumstances known at the time of the search. ”  *State v. Coles*, 218 N.J. 322, 340 (2014).  To determine whether the police’s belief in the third party’s apparent authority was “objectionably reasonable,” police must ascertain additional information about the third-party’s relationship to the property.
[brief] A Complaint was also filed by Appellants before the Commission against Board member [...] with regard to her social media posts.  This Complaint was also dismissed by the Commission on August 22, 2023, and is being appealed simultaneously with the present appeal (App. Div. No. [...]).  administrative agency’s statutory mission.  See In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011); Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Middletown Tp., 109 N.J. 1, 9-10 (2009); Hemsey v. Board of Trustees, PERS, 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009).  In determining whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, a reviewing court will consider: (1) whether the agency action violates the enabling act’s express or implied legislative policies; (2) whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings upon which the agency based application of the legislative policies; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made upon a showing of the relevant factors.  Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envttl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985).  The Appellate Division will reverse the final order of an agency that is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  In re Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194.  Where the agency has made certain findings of fact, the Appellate Court will consider whether the agency’s findings could reasonably be reached, on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole.  Jackson v. Concord Company, 54 N.J. 113, 117 (1969).  Appellate review of legal questions is de novo.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 336.  It stated that the attorney for the prevailing party should set forth his billable hours “in sufficient detail” and with “some fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities, e.g., pretrial discovery [or] settlement negotiations…” to inform the trial court of “the nature of the services for which compensation is sought. ”  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *Lindy I*, 487 F.2nd at 167).  It then stated that trial courts are to calculate “a reasonable hourly rate” in accordance with “the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. ”  Ibid. (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)).  The Court explained this process by stating
[brief] After losing its bid for pre-answer dismissal (Da21-22), [...] filed an Answer with a Counterclaim.  Da23.  On or about August 29, 2022, in response to [...]’s Request for Admissions (Da64-66 [[...]’s Answers] and Pa196 [[...]’s RFAs for reference]), [...] produced a purported Statement of Electric and/or Gas Consumption from [...] for its property located at [...], which is Lot 19.  Pa212-15.  The “Statement” contained pages 2-5 of that alleged Statement, which appeared to include a date range of April 17, 2020 to April 20, 2022.  Ibid.  [...] also produced a truncated copy of what appears to be a “[...] bill” for [...], which was to be paid by February 3, 2012.  Pa216.  [...] produced another truncated copy of a [...] bill for [...] – this one payable by May 3, 2012.  Pa217.  [...] represented that it offered these documents as proof that it paid for so-called unmetered charges for utility bills on the Property, although the bills state they are for costs incurred at [...], which is [...]’s vacant Lot 19, and not [...]’s Lot 22, which is the subject Property in this litigation.  Da64 [[...]’s RFA Responses 11 and 12].
[brief] The Association further argues that it would offend public policy to compel anyone to arbitrate who had not agreed to do so.  See Association brief at p. 12.  The subject arbitration agreement binds decedent’s heirs and successors in interest (such as the plaintiff Estate); it is well-settled that heirs and successors in interest can be bound to an arbitration agreement.  See Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 254, 261 (App. Div. 2001) (“[t]he question then is whether the plaintiffs' failure to sign the arbitration agreement justifies their noncompliance with its terms.  Examining the precise Client Agreement signed in this case, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently determined that the heirs to financial accounts could be compelled to arbitrate their claims relating to negligent management of the funds…We agree with the conclusion reached by the Mississippi Supreme Court and hold that the plaintiffs must arbitrate their claims against defendants”).  The Association cites Moore for the proposition that a person cannot bind his or her spouse to arbitrate the spouse’s claims individually; but the appeal here is from the trial court’s refusal to stay the Estate’s Survivors Act claims against the [...]—not the claims asserted by individual heirs.  Whether the heirs at law can be compelled to arbitrate their individual claims was not decided by the trial court and in any event, it is for the arbitration panel to determine the arbitrability of such claims.
[brief] Id. at 311.  PERC found in Brielle Bd. of Ed. that it was the majority organization who enjoyed the exclusivity of representation, and that N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 was meant to block outside groups from trying to speak on behalf the majority organization’s members.  Applying Brielle Bd. of Ed. to the instant situation, because all Bargaining Council members were also members of the [...], the [...] remains the sole representative of the Board’s professional staff members.  There is no danger of opening the bargaining sessions to the public or to minority representatives, as was the concern in Brielle.  In the instant case, PERC rejected the Board’s interpretation of *Brielle Bd. of Ed.*, 3 NJPER ¶ 310 (1977).  Instead, PERC pointed here to the [...]’s requirement for Bargaining Council members to also be members of the [...].  In comparison, PERC noted how the board of education in *Brielle Bd. of Ed.* had insisted to negotiate only in open public sessions.  PERC explained how that demand in *Brielle Bd. of Ed.* would have interfered with the union’s exclusivity rights under the NJEERA because it could have allowed outside groups, including minority organizations, to interfere in the bargaining process.  In comparison, because the negotiations here would still be closed to the public even with the Bargaining Council members’ participation, there was no risk to the [...] “exclusivity of representation” of its membership.  Also significantly, PERC noted that the only instance on record of either of the Parties trying to negotiate before the public was actually attempted by the Board during the negotiations for the 2019-2022 CNA.  (Pa239-Pa240).  The Board’s arguments on this issue otherwise rely on fictions.  It claims that the [...] did not select or inform individuals that they would be representing the [...] in negotiations.  (Pb14).  Yet, the Board in the very next sentence acknowledges that the Bargaining Council is comprised of the [...]’s entire membership.  (Pb14-15, citing to Pa73).  Considering that all [...] members are Board employees, the Board knew from the start all of the potential participants of the [...]’s negotiations team.  PERC, though, wisely saw through and rejected the Board’s claims.  As the Board has not provided any basis to suggest that the designated experts on N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in interpreting the statute, this Court conclude that PERC correctly rejected the Board’s “designated representative” argument.
[brief] [...] attempts to distinguish *Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr.*, 160 N.J. 454, 467-68 (1999) in an attempt to argue that [...], an engineer, could never be liable for negligence under the common knowledge exception.  *Estate of Chin* is a medical malpractice action wherein the Defendant conceded that the failure to properly attach a hydroscope was negligent under the common knowledge exception to the rule requiring expert opinion.
[brief] *Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt*, 58 N.J. 281 (1971).  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 defines someone driving under the influence as “a person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic, or habit-producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood.
[brief] Id.  The defendant had moved to compel arbitration, which the trial court granted.  Id.  On appeal, the lower court’s decision was affirmed, finding that “the lack of express reference to a waiver of the right to sue in court” did not preclude enforcement of the arbitration clause.  Id.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the absence of any language in the arbitration provision that plaintiff was waiving her statutory right to seek relief in a court of law renders the provision unenforceable. ”  Id. at 436.  The Atalese Court first looked to usual contract principles concerning the requirement of mutual assent and a meeting of the minds.
[directive] Page 6  the Court’s April 20, 2020 Order and refined by the Court’s established by February 22, 2021 Order.  Questions on this Directive may be directed to the Office of the Administrative Director of the Courts.  Chief Justice [...] cc: Surrogates [...], Chief of Staff AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Trial Court Administrators  Clerks of Court  Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Division Managers (Civil, Criminal, Family, Municipal, Operations, Probation)  Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021
[brief] On or about October 17, 2022, [...] of [...] produced a report regarding deed searches it performed on the subject properties (the “Meccia Report”).  Pa16-88.  The title report was necessary because [...]’s Deed for the Property was for multiple parcels [...] purchased from the [...] and did not list the individual metes and bounds for the Property.  Da278- --- 4  [...] objected to [...]’s reliance upon these documents (among several other objections) in its Response to [...]’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, which [...] did not include in its Appendix.  [...] includes a copy of the document for the Appellate Division’s reference.  Pa222-42.  82.  The Meccia Report concludes that [...] owns the Property (a portion of which is identified as the yellow-shaded parcel in the Meccia Report at Pa19).  The Meccia Report also opines that “[Meccia] tend[s] to believe that [the stone, gravel and dirt piles] may be located upon the record title lands of [...]. ”  Pa18.  3.  [...]’s secret [...] confirms [...] owns the Property, a fact [...] now ignores.
[brief] Also[,] please make sure the insurance is in place before we start any work. ”  (Pa2405.)  Critically, based on [...]’s request to revise the prior proposal, [...] provided [...] with a third proposal, Proposal 107127 (“Proposal Three”), dated August 5, 2015, which replaced Proposal Two and reverted back to the details of Proposal One (i.e., adding back insurance costs because of [...]’s exclusion from the CCIP).
[directive] On a periodic basis, and at least once a year, every agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and publish on the agency’s public website a brief synopsis of all complaints where a termination, reduction in rank or grade, and/or suspension more than five days was assessed to an agency member.  This synopsis shall include the identity of each officer subject to final discipline, a brief summary of their transgressions, and a statement of the sanction imposed.  This synopsis shall not contain the identities of the complainants.  An example of a synopsis is found in Appendix L.  9.12  Personnel Records 9.12.1
[brief] A.  The Standard of Review on a Motion for Judgment is De Novo.  On a motion for judgment, or directed verdict pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, the Appellate Division applies the same standard of review as the trial court.  Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 269 (2003).  The grant of a directed verdict will be reversed if, accepting as true the evidence presented by the non-moving party and affording that party all favorable inferences, reasonable minds could differ.  Luczak v. Twp. Of Evesham, 311 N.J. Super. 103, 108 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 407 (1998); Verdicchio v. Ricca 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004); Est of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000); Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 380 (2016).
[directive] In effect, the plea cut-off rule constitutes the absolute final step in the graduated plea system, at which point the defendant must plead to the indictment without the benefit of a negotiated reduction in sentence.  4.4  Fugitive Status as Constituting a Waiver of the Right to a Pre- Indictment Offer  Notwithstanding any other provision of these Guidelines, if the defendant is a fugitive at the time that the prosecutor would ordinarily tender or make available a pre-indictment offer under the county’s pre-indictment disposition program, or if the defendant is a fugitive at the time that an indictment is returned, the prosecutor shall not be required by these Guidelines to tender or make available a pre-indictment plea offer, or the functional equivalent of a pre- indictment plea offer pursuant to Section 4.5.
[brief] Wells Fargo Home Mortg. v. Stull, 378 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 2005) (Pa.317-322)  Because the Sheriff defendants had denied plaintiffs request for adjournments on more than one occasion, the plaintiff listed as one of his injuries in his original complaint, that he was being denied every opportunity consistent with the legislatures intent and public policy as emphasized by the Appellate Division.  Plaintiff submitted a copy of Wells Fargo Home Mortg. v. Stull (Pa 317-322) to the Trial Court.  The Chancery Division judge demonstrated incompetence with respect to the legislative intent and the defendants obligations to their ministerial duties, statutory duty and the accrual of civil rights claims when she stated:
[brief] POINT IV  PENDING LEGISLATION IS NOT AN INDICATOR OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT.  [...]’s oft-repeated insistence that the introduction of legislation constitutes evidence of legislative intent is without merit.  Senate Bill No. 3636 (Ra14-15), introduced on February 23, 2023, and the identical Assembly Bill No. 5317 (Ra17-18), introduced on March 30, 2023 (shortly after the filing of this appeal) address the applicability of the Holding Company Act to reciprocal exchanges.  They also exempt fees arising out of contracts between subscribers and AIFs from being considered related party transactions (SSAP No. 25).  To date, neither bill has progressed past the point of introduction.  (Ra16 (S-3636) and Ra19 (A-5317)).  Unless and until the bills are enacted, they reflect nothing more than the intent of their respective sponsors to introduce such a bill.  In considering a challenge to regulations adopted by the Department of Banking and Insurance, this court observed, “The Legislature has taken no formal action to override the regulations, as it could have done, although certain individual legislators have expressed dissatisfaction with the regulations. ”  Coal. of Health Care Professionals v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 323 N.J. Super. 207, 230 (App. Div. 1999).  No conclusion adverse to the Department’s position can be drawn from the mere introduction of those pieces of legislation.  Each bill has one sponsor.  To say that the views of two legislators represent those of 120 legislators turns the concept of legislative intent on its head.  [...]’s reliance on the proposed legislation begs the question of why legislation to amend the Holding Company Act and codify [...]’s position on the application of SSAP No. 25 would even need to be introduced and signed into law if, as [...] argues, the Holding Company Act and application of SSAP No. 25 already do not apply.  [...]’s claim about the mere introduction of the bills therefore lacks merit.  POINT V THE BULLETIN DOES NOT WORK AN IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT UNDER EITHER THE FEDERAL OR STATE CONSTITUTION.
[directive] Notifications and Recordkeeping  A.  Notifications to detained individuals.  State, county, and local law enforcement agencies and officials shall promptly notify a detained individual, in writing and in a language the individual can understand, when federal civil immigration authorities request:  1.  To interview the detainee.  (See § II.B.4.)  2.  To be notified of the detainee’s upcoming release from custody.  (See § II.B.5.)  3.  To continue detaining the detainee past the time he or she would otherwise be eligible for release.  (See § II.B.6.)  Page 9  When providing such notification, law enforcement officials shall provide the detainee a copy of any documents provided by immigration authorities in connection with the request.  B.  Annual reporting by law enforcement agencies.  On an annual basis, each state, county, and local law enforcement agency shall report, in a manner to be prescribed by the Attorney General, any instances in which the agency provided assistance to federal civil immigration authorities for the purpose of enforcing federal civil immigration law described in Sections II.B.1 to II.B.6.  Each year:  1.  Any local or county law enforcement agency that provided assistance described in Sections II.B.1 to II.B.6 during the prior calendar year shall submit a report to the County Prosecutor detailing such assistance.  2.  Each County Prosecutor shall compile any reports submitted by local or county law enforcement agencies pursuant to Section VI.B.1 and submit a consolidated report to the Attorney General detailing the agencies’ assistance.  3.  The [...] and all other state law enforcement agencies that provided assistance described in Sections II.B.1 to II.B.6 during the prior calendar year shall submit a report to the Attorney General detailing such assistance.  4.  The Attorney General shall post online a consolidated report detailing all instances of assistance by all state, county, and local law enforcement agencies, as submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to Sections VI.B.2 and VI.B.3, during the prior calendar year.  VII.
[brief] The “court rule” and corresponding case law squarely hold that a designated representative of a corporation is binding on the entity.  See Rule 4:14-2(c); [...] and [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 to R. 4:14-2(c) (2024) (“[W]hen a subject matter designation is made . . [that] testimony will bind the organization . . .”) (emphasis added); New Century Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nason, 367 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2004) (asserting that the Court Rules are binding on the bench and the bar); Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 344 F.R.D. 207, 226 (D.N.J. 2023) (holding that F.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) designated representative testimony is binding on entity and goes beyond the deponent's personal knowledge about the topics); Harris v. N.J., 259 F.R.D. 89, 92 (D.N.J. 2007) (same).³ ³ Rule 4:14-2(c) is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6).  42 N.J. Prac., Discovery at § 4.72.  E.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that of the 3,518 communications that defendants “fully withheld as attorney-client privileged, 1,473 have no attorney on the ‘from,[‘] ‘to,’ or ‘cc’ line”; 629 of the 1,473 list only “[...]” in the “Attorney Basis for Privilege” column of the log; an additional 360 “merely CC counsel”; and the “vast majority of those that do name an attorney involve in-house rather than outside counsel – only 16 of these entries list ‘Outside Counsel’ or the name of an outside law firm in the ‘Attorney Basis for Privilege’ column. ” (Id. at 29 (citing [...] Decl. ¶¶ 17)).  Plaintiffs state that it is “hard to fathom that the primary purpose of all of these communications among non-attorneys was to secure legal advice, and inconsistent redactions that Plaintiffs have come across in [...]’s productions demonstrate the Plaintiffs are right to be suspicious. ” (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶¶ 18-19 & Exs. 7, They also surmise that “[g]iven the sheer volume of entries on the privilege log with limited attorney involvement, these examples likely indicate a wider trend among the fully withheld documents. ” (Id. at 30).  Defendants describe plaintiffs’ challenges to defendants’ privilege log as meritless.
[brief] [...] acknowledged that defendant had a history of substance abuse but defendant was before the court on his second conviction for a first-degree robbery.  [6T12-4 to -19].  In support of this factor, defendant cites State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. 502, 545 (App. Div. 2021).  In Harris, this Honorable Court held that a defendant’s substance abuse history can explain a defendant’s criminal history or likelihood of recidivism.  However, [...] did consider defendant’s criminal history and his substance abuse history.  [...] did not place great weight on mitigating factor (4), but just because defendant is unhappy with the weight given to it by the court does not mean that the court erred in its application.
[directive] A  Conducted Energy Devices and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition Contents  1  Scope ............................................................................................................................................  1  2 Policy............................................................................................................................................. 2  3  Definitions ....................................................................................................................................  3  4  Authorized Officers .......................................................................................................................  6  5  Authorization to Use CEDs............................................................................................................  7  6  Unauthorized Uses of CEDs ..........................................................................................................  8  7  Deployment Techniques for CEDs ................................................................................................ 9  8  Handling of Injured Suspects Following CED Use .......................................................................  11  9  Approved CEDs ...........................................................................................................................  12  10  Authority to Use Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition .............................................................  13  11 Training and Qualification for CEDs and Less-Lethal Devices .....................................................  15  12  Reporting and Evaluation ...........................................................................................................  16  1  Scope  1.1  This Addendum to the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy (Policy or Use of Force Policy) governs the use of conducted energy devices (CEDs) and other authorized less-lethal devices and ammunition.