ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ...  Our review of a trial court's legal conclusions is always de novo. ”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  b.  The County’s determination of whether a bid conforms to the specifications and whether a non-conformity is material must be reviewed for abuse of discretion.  In public bidding cases, our courts must utilize a deferential standard of review to analyze governmental decision making.  Ernest Bock & Sons-Dobco Pennsauken Joint Venture v. Twp. of Pennsauken, 477 N.J. Super. 254, 263 (App. Div. 2023).  When evaluating a government body’s determination that a bid under the Local Public Contracts Law does not conform to the specifications, “[t]he standard of review . . . is whether the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. ”  In re Protest of Award of On-Line Games Prod. & Operation Servs. Contract, Bid No. 95-X-20175, 279 N.J. Super. 566, 590 (App. Div. 1995); see also Barrick v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Prop. Mgmt. & Const., 218 N.J. 247, 259 (2014) (citing On-Line Games for the same proposition); Ernest Bock, 477 N.J. Super. at 263 (quoting On-Line Games for the same proposition).
[brief] I.  **The First Lawsuit**  In June 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and Order to Show Cause against the [...] (“[...]”), former Superintendent [...], and Principal [...] (the “First Lawsuit” and/or “[...] I”)².  215a, ¶ 30.  In the First Lawsuit, Plaintiff sought to estop the defendants from involuntarily transferring her from her position as a third-grade teacher at Lincoln School to another location to teach fifth grade.  216a-217a, ¶¶ 37, 43.  ---  ¹  Because the Procedural History and Statement of Facts are closely intertwined, they are being combined to avoid repetition and for the convenience of the Court.  ²  Plaintiff’s First Lawsuit is captioned, [...] v. The Board of Education of the Township of Nutley, et al., [...].  In or about June 2016, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the transfer of Plaintiff.  218a, ¶ 45.  The First Lawsuit remains pending.  215a, ¶ 30.  **Neither Defendant [...] ("[...]") nor Defendant [...] ("[...]") were ever named parties in the First Lawsuit. **  **II.
[brief] In fact, this Court in Gil v. Clara Maass Medical Center held that “[e]ven absent a true conflict, specific words will limit the meaning of general words if it appears from the whole agreement that the parties’ purpose was directed solely toward the matter to which the specific words or clause relate. ”  450 N.J. Super. 368, 378-79 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting 11 Williston on Contracts § 32.10, at 744 (4th ed. 2012)).
[brief] Because defendant never presented these studies below, the State had no opportunity to examine their methodologies and data through testimony at any stage of trial.  Defense counsel, on cross-examination, referred to other reports and case studies he cites (without appending) on appeal—such as the 2016 report of the [...] ([...]) and the Madrid bombings case, see (Db10-13, 19, 28-29)—indicating that he was aware of and could have attempted to introduce the studies he now appends on appeal.  See (6T88-5 to 91-13; 99-9 to 100-20, 102-12 to 103-13).  Defendant inappropriately asks this Court to render a decision based in part on documents submitted for the first time on appeal when there was no opportunity to develop the record in the trial court to ensure the information was accurate and complete.
[brief] **POINT VI**  **DEFENDANT’S MISTRIAL MOTION UNDERSCORES THE EXCESSIVENESS OF THE DEFENSE OBJECTIONS AND THEIR “CUMULATIVE EFFECT. ”**  That the trial was plagued by defendant’s multiple speaking objections and the trial judge’s many, lengthy sidebars is obvious from a complete review of the trial transcripts.  Plaintiff’s witnesses were continually interrupted.  Even defense counsel recognized the excessiveness of his objections when he moved for a mistrial.  He was concerned about the “cumulative effect” on the jury.  6T256:14- 22.  Unfortunately, it was not defendant that was hurt by the “cumulative effect” of those objections and their aftermath.  If the combined effect of multiple errors deprives a party of a fair trial, an appellate court should order a new trial.  *Pellicer v St. Barnabas Hosp.*, 200 N.J. 22, 55-57 (2009); see also *State v. Jenewicz*, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008) (noting cumulative effect of individual errors can cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to require reversal); *Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc.*, 406 N.J. Super. 32, 52-53 (App. Div. 2009) (“When legal errors are manifest that might individually not be of such magnitude to require reversal but which, considered in their aggregate, have caused [a party] to receive less than a fair trial, a new trial is warranted. ” (alteration in original)), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 210 (2009); *Eden v. Conrail*, 175 N.J. Super. 263, 267 (App. Div. 1980) (quoted in *Barber*), modified and affirmed, 87 N.J. 467 (1981).  A new trial is warranted here.
[brief] And the trial court found that my doing so was necessary to protect other possible creditors.  Yet incredulously, [...] was (and still is) able to keep the vehicle, and reap a much greater benefit from it than the $400 which we agreed to, and [...] does not need to do the same.  In other words, rhetorically speaking, why is that before I am allowed to reap a mere $400 benefit from the vehicle, I first must become an official estate administrator; yet in stark contrast, [...] can reap a $2,000-$3,000 benefit from it, without [...] needing to do the same???
[brief] The primary issue in this action is whether the defendant [...] incorrectly interpreted the Borough of Rumson Building Height Ordinance as to whether the proposed building height for any of the six (6) buildings in the subject development exceeds the allowable building height under the Ordinance requiring a d(6) use variance along with multiple bulk (c) variances before the [...].  If the subject application required a d(6) use variance for building height for any of the six (6) buildings, that is, if the building height is greater than ten (10) feet or ten percent (10%) of what the Ordinance permits, then the Planning Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the subject Application since only the [...] has jurisdiction to decide a use variance for building height under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d(6).  In that case, the defendant Planning Board approval would be null and void requiring [...] to resubmit its entire application to the [...] for Preliminary and Final Major Site Plan Approval along with variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d(6), and N.J.S. A. 40:55D-70(c) for Building Height.  The Borough of Rumson’s Building Height Ordinance defines in Section 22-2.4 Building Height to mean “the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of a building . . . from the lowest original lot grade or any revised lot grade shown on the Site Plan .
[brief] Where such a result can be reasonably foreseen as was probably the case here it would normally be the better practice for the public condemnor to undertake to condemn the whole property in the first place.  To have done so would have avoided the creation of an “uneconomic remnant” with its accompanying problems.  *Rohrer*, *supra* at 464-465.  The factual circumstances in *Rohrer*, in which the Supreme Court attempted to craft an equitable remedy, is a far cry from the allegations made by Appellant in the current matter; even if those allegations are to be believed (Respondent does not concede this).  There is no such allegation that Appellant’s house is unlivable; *Rohrer* was a unique situation and the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s ruling is inapplicable to the current matter.  Further, there was no question as to liability in *Rohrer* unlike the present matter.
[brief] Since the advent of social media, the Commission has received numerous complaints about whether a Board member’s speech, including posts on social media, violates the Act because the Board member either failed to disclaim, or insufficiently disclaimed, their speech.  In a recent decision, which is informative here, the Commission stated:  ...  Now, more than a decade later, when the use of social media and online publications has become commonplace, prolific, pervasive, and often times divisive, and given that there has been a significant influx in the number of complaints filed with the Commission regarding use (or nonuse) of disclaimers in electronic publications (not just social media), it is now more crucial than ever to underscore and emphasize that when Board members want to speak as private citizens, they must include an appropriate disclaimer that makes the capacity in which they are speaking clear and unambiguous.  In addition, even if an appropriate disclaimer is used, a school official must never negate the import of the disclaimer by proceeding, under the purported protection of the disclaimer, to discuss or comment on Board business or matters in a way that leads a member of the public to believe that the individual is speaking on behalf of, and as a representative of, the Board.  Advisory Opinion A02-22 (2022) (Ca233) (citing I/M/O Treston, [...], Commission Docket No. [...], at 12) (emphasis added).  Published only six days prior to the filing of Appellants’ Complaint before the Commission, this should have been the standard applied to the matter below.
[brief] 14  Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37 (2010) .................................................................9  Seacoast Builders Corp. v. Rutgers, 358 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 2003)  ........19  Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010)  .................................................................11  State v. Alfano, 305 N.J. Super. 178 (App. Div. 1997) ........................................7  State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187 (1985) .................................................................7  Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 109 N.J. 189 (1988) .........................13  Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chemical & Pollution Sciences, Inc., 105 N.J. 464 (1987) .................................................................19
[directive] The law is somewhat less restrictive as to searches conducted during an administrative investigation.  While it appears that an employing agency does not need a warrant to conduct a search during an administrative investigation, the investigator should exercise great care when searching property or items in which the subject officer has a high expectation of privacy.  Internal affairs investigators should document their reasons for conducting the search and limit its intrusiveness.  If any doubts or concerns exist about the propriety or legality of a search, the investigator should seek advice from legal counsel before proceeding with the search.  7.8.4
[brief] ” (Aa55).  As such, the [...] ordered that, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, “[...]’s Land Use Law, and any other ordinances, rules or regulations promulgated pursuant to the auspices of the [MLUL] . . . do not apply to the construction, installation, and operation of the Project. ” (Aa56).  Thus, the [...] granted [...]’s Petition and found that the proposed Project may be constructed.
[directive] The Chief Law Enforcement Executive or their designee shall, in turn, share the information as follows:  i.  With a single point of contact in their law enforcement agency who has the authority to enter that information into the agency’s CAD.  If the particular agency does not maintain their own CAD system, or their CAD system does not allow for certain items to be flagged, the information shall be maintained in an equivalent records management system that is similarly protected from widespread dissemination.  ii.  Where EMS and/or firefighters do not have access to any county, regional, or law enforcement agency CAD containing COVID-19 Information, the Chief Law Enforcement Executive or their designee will also provide the COVID-19 Information to a single point of contact within their local EMS or fire service for the purpose of entering that same information into the EMS or fire service’s CAD, or equivalent records management system.
[brief] Here, where Respondent posted numerous campaign banners to her page precisely like the respondent in Melnyk, announced she was taking her seat on the Board, posted pictures of her self swearing in, and typed out the words “I was elected onto the central regional district board of education (BOE) come on man LOL,” without any Melnyk disclaimer, it is obvious that members of the public could have reasonably believed she was speaking in her role as Board member.  In fact, that is precisely what happened here, as evidenced by Board minutes, news articles, and even official Board Resolutions which were all included in the record before the Commission.  To be perfectly clear – this matter is not about whether Respondent’s posts were controversial or whether any particular person or persons disagreed with them.  Respondent held herself out as a Board member from the same account she made posts which unquestionably compromised the Board.  Appellants are members of the school district community and are employees of the Board.  (Ca202-203).
[brief] Nevertheless, plaintiff has undoubtedly incurred incremental attorney's fees and costs that would not have been necessary absent defendant's late document production.  Defendant will be ordered to reimburse these fees and costs.  These fees may be awarded pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1)(A), which provides that an award of fees and costs may be granted if a party fails to provide information required by Rule 26(a) or (e).  See also Rule 37(b)(2)(C), providing that instead of or in addition to the orders in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i-vii), the Court must order the disobedient party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure to comply with discovery, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.  For the reasons discussed, the later two circumstances do not exist.  Due to the overlap in plaintiff's motions, and his numerous requests, the Court is quite frankly confused as to what plaintiff seeks reimbursement for and how much.
[brief] ........................................................................5  Matter of Cong. Dists. by N.J. Redist’g Com’n, 249 N.J. 561 (2022)......................................................................................4  Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016).......................................................2, 4 Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581 (2012).....................................................................................8  Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 189 N.J. Super. 347 (App. Div. 1983)..........................................................2  Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2013) ....................................................................2  Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998)  ...................................................................10  State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77 (2020).......................................................................................6  TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021).....................................................................................3 Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233 (2002).....................................................................................4 Statutes and Regulations 12 CFR § 1006.34(c)(2)(i) .............................................................................14 15 U.S.C. § 1692 ..........................................................................................4, 5, 8 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) ...................................................................................10 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) ................................................................. 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15 15 U.S.C. § 1692f ............................................................................. 11 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) ...................................................................... 13 15 U.S.C. § 6802 ............................................................................. 14 16 CFR § 313.4(a)(2) ....................................................................... 14 16 CFR § 313.6 ............................................................................. 14 N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 ............................................................................ 4 P.L. 95-109 .................................................................................. 5 Rules R. 4:6-2(e) .................................................................................... 9, 11 Other Authorities [...], Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-02 (Dec. 13, 1988)
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  All facts as stated in the Complaint before the [...] (196-232), as well as all facts and documents encompassed by Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision (Ca041-160), and in the record more generally, are hereby relied on and incorporated by reference.  The facts most salient to this appeal are as follows:  1.  On October 8, 2021, Respondent made a Facebook post which asked members of the school community to vote for her in her campaign for a seat on the [...].  (Ca216).  2.  On October 8, 2021, Respondent made a Facebook post which contained a picture of a ballot with her name on it, asking community members to vote for Respondent in her campaign for a seat on the [...].  (Ca218).  3.  On December 5, 2021, after winning her seat on the Board, Respondent made a Facebook post which contained a picture of a Black man, and which stated:  IF AMERICA WAS FILLED WITH AS MUCH WHITE SUPREMACY & RACISM AS THE MEDIA SAYS THERE WOULDN’T BE A NEED TO FAKE HATE CRIMES THIS IS MAGA COUNTRY (Ca232).  This post remained public and Respondent refused to take it down until the underlying ethics matter was filed and the Board itself issued a Resolution demanding that she take it down.  (Ca075-076).  4.  On December 9, 2022, Respondent shared a post from “[...].
[brief] The holding in Carr v. Borough of Glen Ridge is also not applicable and Appellant’s reliance on the unpublished case is misplaced (Db13).  Initially, the 2022 decision itself postdates the November 5, 2020 Separation Agreement in the case sub judice.  Carr does provide evidence that the 30-Day provision references the then-accepted practice among local counsel in handing these cases as noted above, but there is no written published authority, regulation, statute for use or prohibition of this provision, nor was Carr published at the time this Agreement sub judice was written.
[brief] . . .  Mayor and Mun. Council of City of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 224 N.J. Super. 53, 63-64 (Law Div. 1987) (emphasis added).  “It is clear that the broad doctrine acknowledging the public nature of the resource pertains to the water gathered and distributed by the Commission.  It belongs to, and is for the common use of, the public, and those who take it into their possession hold it in trust for the public good. ”  Id. at 65 (emphasis added); see also K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp., v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 75 N.J. 272, 285-86 (1977) (recognizing water resources as “common property” and that “[u]ltimate ownership rests in the people and this precious natural resource is held by the State in trust for the public’s benefit”).
[brief] 6  *See [...], Body-Worn Cameras* (Gen. Order No. 18-05) (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/_files/ugd/582c35_4b56fb75a39742e5ad542481460e5878.pdf; Consent Decree at 38-39, *United States v. [...]*, No. [...] (D.N.J. May, 5, 2016), https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/_files/ugd/582c35_8f30b967fdfd4e1cb75ed859
[brief] The transcript of oral argument is found at 2T.  On July 11, 2023, the trial court entered orders: (a) denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s in limine motion to bar evidence concerning a prior motor vehicle accident, (Da45 to 46); (b) denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s in limine motion to bar evidence concerning specific trips and vacations taken following the accident, (Da47 to 48); and (c) granting Plaintiff’s in limine motion to bar evidence concerning his mental and sexual health and his time out of work for health issues unrelated to the accident.  (Da49 to 50).  On July 11, 12, 13 and 14, 2023, this action was tried before Honorable [...], P.J. Cv. and a jury.
[brief] Furthermore, [...]’s claimed lack of knowledge that waste oil was being stored on its property is irrelevant: “Used oil transfer facilities are transportation related facilities including . . . parking areas . . . where shipments of used oil are held for more than 24 hours during the normal course of operation[.]”  40 CFR §279.45.  [...] was in fact storing used oil at [...]’s property (with [...]’s knowledge and permission, according to [...]) such that the [...] property was, as a matter of law, a “used oil transfer facility”.
[brief] Da20-21, 41-47.  The trial court found that the Third Loan was an enforceable contract because all elements of a contract were proved: the parties agreed on all of the material terms of the Third Loan, and there was an offer, an acceptance, and consideration.  Da42-47.  1.  Meeting of the Minds.  The trial court correctly found that, where the parties “agree on essential terms and manifest an intention to be bound by those terms, they have created an enforceable contract. ”  *Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan*, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992); Da42.  Further, an oral contract is enforceable “so long as the agreement is sufficiently definite so that the parties’ obligations can be ‘ascertained with reasonable certainty. ’”  Da 42 (quoting *GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Willoughby*, 230 N.J. 172, 185 (2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).  “Reasonable certainty of the terms is all that is required. ”  *Graziano v. Grant*, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 339 (App. Div. 1999) (internal citation omitted).
[brief] 5  POINT I  BECAUSE [...] FAILED TO PRESENT  SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF MAILING A CANCELLATION NOTICE, SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED AND PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (1T, pp.17-38)  5  POINT II  BECAUSE [...] FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PARAGRAPH (b) OF STATUTE, PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY (1T24)  10  POINT II  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF PLAINTIFFS' ACTUAL RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION (1T, p. 22)  16  CONCLUSION