ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Latteri v. Mayer*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85926, at *6 (D.N.J. May 22, 2018) (Dra12), the District Court denied defendant debt collector’s motion to dismiss the Complaint wherein plaintiff alleged FDCPA violations based on defendant’s attempts to collect an alleged debt while unlicensed as a consumer lender under the FDCPA.  In *Lopez v. [...]*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (Dra16), the District Court held that a debt buyer had to be licensed under the NJCFLA and opined, “a debt collector's representation in a collection complaint that it had the right to collect a debt when, in fact, it lacked the license required to initially purchase the debt, would violate, at minimum, FDCPA section e(10).
[brief] The decision to run the sentences consecutively was exclusively based on the court’s incorrect belief that one of the counts of terroristic threats occurred in August 2021, and that the other occurred 8 months later, in April 2022.  In reality, [...] was never charged with making terroristic threats in April 2022.  Because the judge’s Yarbough analysis was grounded on a single factor, and its --- \(^8\) 100 N.J. 627. analysis of that factor relied entirely on an erroneous factual basis, the matter must be remanded for resentencing.  100 N.J. 627.  In addition, the court abused its discretion when it rejected mitigating factors four, eight, and eleven, and treated [...]’s mental health history as an aggravating factor.  1.
[brief] Jantausch v. Verona, 41 N.J. Super. 89, 96 (Law Div.1956), aff'd, 24 N.J. 326 (1957)  ..................19  Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005)  ...........................................................................28  Kaufmann v. Planning Bd. for Warren, 110 N.J. 551, 563-66 (1988).  ......................................................................29  Ketcherick v. Borough of Mountain Lakes Bd. of Adjustment, 256 N.J. Super. 647, 657 (App. Div. 1992)  ..................................................30  Kozesnik v. Montgomery Tp., 24 N.J. 154 at 167 (1957)  ............................................................................28  Medical Realty Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj., 228 N.J. Super. 226, 233, (App. Div. 1988) ..................................................29  Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 15 (1987) ..................................................................................28,33  Messer v. Burlington, 172 N.J. Super. 479, 487, 412 A.2d 1059, 1063 (Super. Ct. 1980)  ...............19  Metromedia [v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-508 (1981) .....................................................................20,23,24 N.Y. SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Bd of Adjustment of Twp of Weehawken, 370 N.J.Super. 319, 334 (App. Div. 2004)  ....................................................33  Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adj., 361 N.J. Super. 22, 38 (App. Div. 2003)  .......................................................29  Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391, 120 S. Ct. 897, 145 L. Ed. 2d 886 (2000)  .......................23  Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 398 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 2005)  .........................................................................20  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 175, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2233 (2015)  ..............................................22  Spring House Commercial, LLC v. City of Richmond, No. 5:21-149-KKC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217430 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 2, 2022)  ..................................................................................................................24  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199, 129 A.3d 1069 (2016)  .................................................................17  Ten Stary Dom Partnership v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 30-31 (2013)  .......................................................................................31  United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5 (1964)  ....................................................................................................32  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989) .........................22,23  Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528 (1974) .......................................................................................30
[brief] Excerpts of [...]’ Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion\(^3\)........1144a  [...]’s and [...]’s Response to Statement of Material Facts.............1205a  [...]’s and [...]’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts.................................................................1227a  Excerpts of [...]’ Summary Judgment Brief\(^4\)..............................................1253a  [...]’ Reply Brief and Exhibits\(^5\).........................................................1259a  Law Division Supplemental Statement of Reasons...............................1331a  Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal..................................................................1370a  [...]’ Notice of Appeal..................................................................1376a  [...]’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment...............................1382a  [...]’s Statement of Material Facts....................................................1384a  Order granting [...] American’s Motion For Summary Judgment........975a  Order Denying [...]’ Motion For Summary Judgment......................2979a  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion For Summary Judgment......................2981a  \(^{3-5}\)  Pursuant to R.2:6-1(a)(2), these briefs are submitted to establish that the arguments set forth in the point headings were “raised in the trial court” in light of the fact that the rulings below did not address those arguments, and are part of appellant’s substantive argument.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING MISINTERPRETS WHAT CONSTITUTES A “PIP DISPUTE” UNDER THE 1983 AMENDMENT AND THE 1998 AMENDMENT TO THE NO-FAULT STATUTE.  The Legislature specifically limited the scope of PIP disputes to "disputes under this section" in both the original No-Fault act and AICRA.  See Laws of 1983, Chapter 362 Section 5(c) and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(i).  In both versions of the statute, the phrase "under this section" refers to the payment of overdue personal injury protection coverage benefits as outlined in section 5 of the statute.  Before the passage of AICRA in 1998, only No-Fault claimants could institute arbitration proceedings.  Thus, before AICRA, monies flowed in only one direction in the arbitration process, from the insurance carrier to the No- Fault claimant.  Given that the language in section 5 of the No-Fault statute did not change in any relevant ways with the implementation of AICRA, there is no basis for concluding that the scope of the issues that can be addressed in an NFADR hearing changed in any way.
[brief] On July 17, 2023, the Land Use Board conducted a public hearing to vote on whether to recommend to Borough Council that the Property met the criteria listed in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:12A-5 and should therefore be designated a condemnation redevelopment area.  (T1, 6:21-7:9).  At the Land Use Hearing, copies of the Report were given to all Land Use Board members to consider when voting whether to recommend that the Borough Council adopt the Report’s findings.  (T1, 7:22-24).  At the Land Use Hearing, [...] and Plaintiff’s environmental attorney, [...], presented evidence contradicting the “facts” alleged in the Report.
[brief] While in Point IV of his Brief plaintiff claims that the issues of venue and conflict of interest were “Partially Raised Below”, that is simply not true.  The purported support cited by plaintiff in the heading of Point IV of his Brief (Aa52-53, Aa236-37, Aa239-40, 4T4:23 to 5:10, 4T7:20 to 8:25) shows two things: • Venue was not even mentioned by plaintiff in these appendix/transcript references; and • Conflict of interest, albeit referenced in oral argument, was not addressed by the trial court.  See Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580, 586 (2012) (“we do not suggest that counsel’s reference to the . . . question during oral argument was sufficient to require the Appellate Division to address it. ”).  Furthermore, neither of these “issues” was identified by plaintiff as an issue on appeal in his Civil Case Information Statement filed in connection with this appeal earlier this year.  (Aa280-85).  Plaintiff’s woefully belated claims as to these issues should be barred.  In any event, they are both meritless.
[brief] The matter in difference in the above entitled action having been amicably adjusted by and between the parties, it is hereby stipulated and agreed that the same be and it is hereby dismissed with prejudice and without costs to either party.  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff By: ____________________________  [...]  Dated: 5/24/23  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants By: ____________________________  [...]  Dated: 6/7/23  * FOR DEFENDANTS: [...], [...] AS EXECUTRIX OF THE [...], [...], & [...]  [...]
[brief] [...] (“[...]” or “Defendant”) appeals a de novo order affirming a Municipal Court ruling that her German Shepherd Dog [...], is potentially dangerous.  A Parable: “Dogs will be Dogs”  Consider a parable of two dogs.  Each one chases and bites a stranger who is operating a chain saw on the owner’s property.  The first stranger is a serial killer and the second is a landscaper, lawfully there to trim the trees.  Is the first dog a hero and the second a villain?  No.  Both dogs are doing their jobs, instinctively protecting the family from intruders.  The purpose of the Potentially Dangerous Dog Act is not to punish all dogs for exercising their protective instincts, nor for a scuffle with another dog.  It is to protect the public from “certain dogs” who engage in unprovoked attacks.  N.J.S.A. 4:19-17.  A dog can’t distinguish between a lawful invitee and a criminal, and dogs get into fights with other dogs.  But the trial judge held [...] to a human standard.  Analogizing to a burglary, he disregarded [...]’s training and disposition, noting that evidence of a person’s good acts wouldn’t mitigate the “one time they robbed the house. ”  2T87:22-25.  Unlike 2C offenses, N.J.S.A. 4:19-23 requires consideration of a dog’s disposition.  [...] is a well-behaved pet who should not have been declared potentially dangerous under the evidence in this case.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.
[brief] ”  Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132–33.  “It is universally accepted that ‘[t]he availability of adequate monetary damages belies a claim of irreparable injury. ’”  Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. York Hunter Const., Inc., 344 N.J. Super. 361, 364 (Ch. Div. 2001) (quoting other sources) (citations omitted).  If [...] proceeds with the Hackensack Arbitration, the only damages it will suffer is money damages, and therefore, emergency injunctive relief is not necessary.  Third, the entry of injunctive relief is certainly not in the public interest.  The Hackensack Arbitration concerns a dispute that is wholly separate from the dispute at issue in the PTA Arbitration and is not an attempt at piecemeal litigation.  [...]’s App. Br. at 3, 24.  [...] has not received the opportunity to litigate its Hackensack Project claims, and it is certainly not in the public interest to deny parties their right to bring claims in the proper judicial forum.  Finally, for all the reasons explained supra, [...] was also not entitled to permanently enjoin the Hackensack Arbitration.  Not only will [...] not be successful on the merits of its claims (because the entire controversy are not applicable) but also the harm to [...] resulting from a permanent injunction would greatly outweigh any harm to [...] if the Court denied its requested relief.  Sheppard, 261 N.J. Super. at 10 (listing the factors to be analyzed by a court when considering permanent injunctive relief).  [...] has a legitimate and unresolved $2.1 million claim against [...] for work [...] performed on a project.  [...] has not compensated [...] for its work, and if the Hackensack Arbitration were permanently enjoined, [...] would be unfairly prevented from pursuing its claims.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Court should reverse the trial court’s April 26, 2024 Order, find the Arbitration clause contained within the SPA both valid and enforceable and compel Plaintiffs-Respondents to Arbitration upon a dismissal of the Complaint in the Superior Court.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants- Appellants, [...], [...], and [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq., [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  DATE: September 30, 2024  [...], ESQ. NJ 024911983  [...]  Schoolhouse Plaza  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs - Respondents, v. COA 99 HUDSON, LLC, CHINA OVERSEAS AMERICA, INC. and THE MARKETING DIRECTORS, INC.  Defendants - Appellants.  On Appeal  From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY HUDSON COUNTY LAW  DIVISION  Civil Action  DOCKET NO. Below [...] Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFFS – RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF  Keith N. Biebelberg  Of Counsel  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................  ii
[brief] Q  You’ve been doing expert work since the 1980's, correct?  A Yes.  Q  45 years or so?  A Yes.  Q  You review on average 25 cases a year?  A Yes.  Q  You have reviewed in your expert work over 900 cases by now.  A Yes.  Q  You’ve had your deposition taken, a deposition when your deposition is taken before trial under oath, you had that happened in cases such as this over 150 times?  A Yes.  Q  You testified at trial over 100 times?  A Yes.  Q  And you received cases from several services whose business it is to match attorneys with experts such as yourself, correct?  A Yes.  Q  You got this case through one of those services, correct?  [4T160-61]  After objection, the trial court permitted [...] to continue:
[brief] ”) (footnote omitted); Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C. 388, 498 S.E.2d 898, 905 (S.C.Ct.App.1998) (stating that “[j]udicial remedies for the recovery of property, such as the replevin action, and the foreclosure action, provide specific procedures for protection of collateral and the parties during the pendency of the proceedings.  These protections relate to both parties, and are facilitated by the enforcement procedures specified in the law. ”)
[brief] On May 23, 2019, the Court entered an Order staying these matters pending the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in *Barila v. Board of Educ.*, 199 A. 3d 295.  (576a-577a).  This case before our Supreme Court potentially impacted whether the plaintiffs in the various consolidated litigations could pursue their claims if they were members of the police unions who voted for a settlement of the First Police Matter.
[brief] Legal Argument ................................................................................................ 2  I.  Multiple conflicting indemnity clauses create ambiguity that renders the contract ambiguous regarding indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.  .................................................................  2  II.  The phrase “whether or not indemnitee is negligent” in the [...] contract is not Azurak compliant without a specific reference to indemnification for [...]’s own negligence ........................................................................  7  III.  The trial court erred in re-writing the [...] contract in favor of indemnification for [...]’s own negligence ........................................................................  10  Conclusion ........................................................................................................  13
[brief] POINT III ORDINANCE 1423-21 IS VOID BECAUSE IT WAS ENACTED IN VIOLATION OF THE LRHL AND N.J.S.A. 40:42-9.  After introduction and prior to adoption, a municipality must publish every ordinance in one of its newspapers, “together with a notice of the introduction thereof, the time and place when and where it will be further considered for final passage, a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance, and the time and place when and where a copy of the ordinance can be obtained without cost by any member of the general public who wants a copy of the ordinance. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.  The public hearing on adoption of Ordinance 1423-21 was noticed for December 14, 2021, a special meeting.  As discussed in Pont II(B), above, the Borough’s special meeting notice for the December 14th meeting violated the OPMA because it was published only in one newspaper, it did not include an agenda, and it did not indicate whether formal action would be taken.  (Pa 268.)  Defects also plagued the statutory notice for the public hearing on the ordinance.  The published notice for the December 14, 2021, public hearing on Ordinance 1423-21 failed to conform with N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 because it did not include “a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance” as required by the statute, describing it only as an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  The notice should have, at a minimum, given an overview of the proposed changes to be effectuated by the Plan amendments.  The published notice also did not provide information on how to obtain a copy of the amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, as required by statute.  (Pa 157.)  At some point, the public hearing on Ordinance 1423-21 was removed from the December 14th agenda without public notice or explanation.
[brief] A dispute exits between defendant, [...], and plaintiff over who bears responsibility for the missing deed.  Allstates’ witnesses testified [...] personally conducted the closing using a room in Allstates’ office.  [...], a principal of Allstates, testified he did not get involved with the transaction until after the closing (131a, 17:7-16).  [...] testified the only people present for the closing were [...], [...] and [...] (163a-164a, 17:17-18:2).  [...] testified she was only involved with funding and coordinating of the closings.  She testified generally that when a closing takes place without an attorney present, the seller would come to the closing with legal documents.  Allstates does not prepare deeds.  (202a, 8:14-25).  With regard to the specific closing between plaintiff and [...], she testified the people present were [...], [...] and [...] (202a 9:12-14).
[brief] It was sold to the [...] in the amount of $1,496.35, which was the amount of delinquent taxes for 1929.  The land in that Certificate is described as follows:  "Plot northside Beachway on the Tax Sale Certificate of said municipality and assessed thereon to [...] as the owner for the year 1929" (1T71:16).  A Tax Sale Certificate is sold at a public auction if lands become tax delinquent.  The purchaser of a Certificate then holds the right to conduct a foreclosure to perfect title to the property because until it is perfected, it is an encumbered right.
[brief] While Plaintiff agrees that the Township is within its rights to adopt an ordinance that is inconsistent with the master plan, it must follow the statutory requirements of the LRHL.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e) clearly states that if a municipality decides to amend a redevelopment plan, it must first obtain a report from the planning board.  The board's report must "include an identification of any provisions in the proposed redevelopment plan which are inconsistent with the master plan and recommendations concerning these inconsistencies and any other matters as the board deems appropriate."  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  Here, the Committee decided to amend the Plan and sent the proposed changes to the Planning Board.  (2T98:17-20); (Pa435).  However, rather than identify any inconsistencies, the Planning Board once again incorrectly found the Plan was consistent with the master plan.  See (Pa435).  Once a governing body receives the planning board's report, it "may approve or disapprove or change any recommendation by a vote of a majority of its full authorized membership and shall record in its minutes the reasons for not following the recommendations."  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, if the Committee disagreed with the Planning Board's consistency finding, it should have recorded in its meeting minutes the reasons for not following the recommendation.  The Committee did not do so.  See (Pa296-Pa297).  The December 8, 2022 Committee minutes are devoid of any reasoning whatsoever for the Committee's decision to not follow the Planning Board's recommendation.  Instead, the Committee decided to go ahead use Ordinance No. 2022-17 as the amendment to the Plan – rather than amending the text of the Plan to include the Committee's revisions.  (Pa46-Pa51).  The Committee then included language in the ordinance that purported to adopt the ordinance because it was consistent with the master plan and because it was inconsistent with the master plan.  (Pa46-Pa50).  The Committee's course of action contradicts both the explicit requirement of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e) and its intent.  The statute allows a municipality to adopt a redevelopment plan that is inconsistent with its master plan.  However, the text of the statute also goes to great pains to require a municipality's planning board and governing body to make a call on whether the redevelopment plan is consistent or inconsistent with the master plan.  Here, the Committee skirted its responsibility to do so by claiming it was being "overly cautious."  It was not being overly cautious; it was being duplicitous by trying to get this Plan passed by any means necessary.  III.
[brief] Generally, when a reviewing court is considering an appeal from an action taken by a planning board, the standard employed is whether the grant or denial was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  See Burbridge v. Mine Hill Tp., 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990); Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965); Md. Ctr. v. Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 343 N.J. Super. 177, 198 (App. Div. 2001).  The factual determinations of the planning board are presumed to be valid and the exercise of its discretionary authority based on such determinations will not be overturned unless arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  *Burbridge, supra*, 117 N.J. at 385; *Rowatti v. Gonchar*, 101 N.J. 46, 51–52 (1985).  Although the Courts give deference to a planning board's decision because it is presumed to be valid, a planning board’s decision will be reversed if its action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[brief] In October 2019, [...] received a report that [...] had an encounter with [...] in the building where she still worked, and from which [...] had retired three years earlier.  (Pa831-832).  The [...] decided that [...] should have an escort while he was in the building and not have the same complete access to the building as an employee.  (Pa831).  The [...] wanted to continue to allow appellant in the building, however, as it knew that [...]’s wife still worked at the [...].  (Pa751-752).  Plaintiff’s Basic Claims