ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff had several attorneys throughout this litigation and at trial, was armed with 2 trial attorneys.  Plaintiff had every opportunity to explore the claims of fraudulent concealment and spoliation throughout the remainder of discovery and at trial, even after the motions were denied, but conveniently failed to do so.  Plaintiff was not precluded from exploring these supposed claims, especially when the witnesses Plaintiff claims had the “smoking gun,” were subpoenaed by Plaintiff, were made available to testify at trial, with [...] on call, [...] present in court every day of the trial and both [...] and [...] testifying live at trial. (Da70 to Da81).  Plaintiff was certainly not precluded from eliciting testimony from these witnesses.  Plaintiff also was not precluded from requesting the jury charge for spoliation of evidence be read to the jury.  Even this was not done.  None of this was done.  No effort was made by Plaintiff to pursue these claims or to mitigate Plaintiff’s supposed damages as a result of the denial of the motions at issue.  The Plaintiff failed to pursue the claims, although the law allowed for it, and instead filed this appeal clearly abusing the system, wasting the Court’s time and resources, forcing [...] to spend even more money defending this case and essentially spitting in the face of judicial efficiency.
[brief] .......................................................  11 State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 (1998) ..................................................................................  19 State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) ..............................................................................  29, 32 State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993) .......................................................................... 9 State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612 (2022) .........................................................................
[directive] a.  Upon the failure of a corporate surety to pay a forfeiture or to file a motion to vacate the forfeiture within seventy-five (75) days of the date of the notice sent pursuant to R. 7:4-5(a), as relaxed and supplemented by the Supreme Court Orders dated November 1, 2000, and June 11, 2002 the court, on motion, shall enter a judgment of default.  R. 7:4-5(c).  b.  Judgments entered pursuant to R. 7:4-5(c) shall include the following language:  Failure to satisfy the judgment will result in removal of the names of all of the corporate surety company’s licensed insurance producers and limited insurance representatives from the Bail Registry.  c.  The judgment shall state that payments are to be made payable to the “Municipality of _____________. ”  d.  A copy of a judgment entered pursuant to R. 7:4-5(c) against a corporate surety company shall be served by ordinary mail on the corporate surety company, the licensed insurance producer and the limited insurance representative named in the judgment at the address recorded in the Bail Registry maintained by the Clerk of the Superior Court.  e.  Pursuant to R. 7:4-5(a), as relaxed and supplemented by the Supreme Court Orders dated November 1, 2000, and June 11, 2002, two copies of the judgment shall be sent by ordinary mail to the Clerk of the Superior Court indicating that the surety has failed to pay or to file an objection.  4.
[brief] 2 - **Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill** ............................................  2, 4, 5, 14 - **Leis v. Flynt** ..........................................................................................  2 - **Grex v. State, Department of Human Services** ........................................ 3, 4 - **Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company** ..................................................  3 - **Caldwell v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrections** .....................................................  4 - **O’Rourke v. City of Lambertville** ............................................................ 5, 7 - **W.H. Industries, Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda.** .................................. 7 - **Green Knight Capital, LLC v. Calderon** ................................................ 7 - **In re Stallworth** .....................................................................................
[brief] The Bartlett Court explained:  Our pre-emption cases presume that an actor seeking to satisfy both his federal- and state-law obligations is not required to cease acting altogether in order to avoid liability.  Indeed, if the option of ceasing to act defeated a claim of impossibility, impossibility pre-emption would be all but meaningless.  The incoherence of the stop-selling theory becomes plain when viewed through the lens of our previous cases.  In every instance in which the Court has found impossibility pre-emption, the “direct conflict” between federal- and state-law duties could easily have been avoided if the regulated actor had simply ceased acting.  Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
[brief] (Pa1-3; Pa4-7; Pa8-10)  [...] was hired to “[a]pply two coat exterior acrylic walking finish paint” to the steps.  (Pa393) (emphasis added).  [...], however, painted the steps with a Benjamin Moore “Latex Floor and Patio High Gloss Enamel. ” (Pa395-396; Pa451 Dep. Tr. pp. 14-15).  [...] noted the new paint job on the stairs but did not offer a conclusion on the slipperiness of the paint on the stairs.  Defendants at the summary judgment hearing complained that the evidence of the new paint job was not relevant because there was no expert opinion addressing it as a possible cause of [...]’s slip and fall.  (T17-21).  The trial court stated that without an expert opinion on the defectiveness of the paint as applied, a jury should not hear the evidence.
[brief] Count 16 of the proposed Second Amended Complaint set forth sufficient allegations that, if later proven true, would be sufficient to prove the elements of libel per se:  •  Paragraphs 283-288 alleged that on August 6, 2019, [...] and the [...] filed a written criminal complaint against [...] that contained a false statement.  • Paragraph 285 alleged that this false statement was published to at least one third-party without privilege.  •  Paragraphs 286-287 alleged that [...] and the [...] acted knowingly when filing the false statement.  •  Paragraphs 283-285 alleged that the writing imputed the commission of two crimes, namely N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3A(2) (Criminal Mischief) and N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3.b (Defiant Trespasser).  (Pa72-Pa73).  Accepting Plaintiffs’ counsel representation that the proposed libel per se claim was inextricably intertwined with the malicious prosecution claim, the trial court dismissed it as futile for the same reasons.
[brief] A.  Given the Nature of the Attendant Risk  a Duty of Care on [...]’s Part Must be Found to Exist  An examination of the nature of the attendant risk in this matter, i.e. the faulty electrical panel, supports finding the existence of a duty of care of care on [...]’s part.  See Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J. 269, 296 (2012) (This inquiry focuses on the issue of whether the risk is foreseeable, whether it can be readily defined, and whether it is fair to place the burden of preventing the harm upon the defendant).  Here, the faulty electrical panel did not comply with code.  The defects of the electrical panel were not concealed and could be discovered.  An attentive landlord should have been able to easily appreciate the risk of electrocution posed by this danger.  See Reyes v. Egner, 404 N.J. Super. 433, 456-58 (App. Div. 2009) (finding that code violations may be evidential if not conclusive of the lessors’ potential breach of a duty); Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491, 494, 496 n.1, (2003) (noting potential code violation in discussing duty to warn of dangerous condition on property).  This defect did not arise while the tenant had exclusive use and control of the property, and instead existed well before the ratification of the 2016 Lease agreement with [...].  [...] has not proffered any basis for not repairing this defect prior to leasing the property except for disclaiming legal responsibility for making such corrections.  As the landlord, [...] should not be permitted to evade responsibility for the property by avoiding either the discovery of potentially fatal defects or avoiding the repair of such defects.  This purposefully evasive approach to property ownership contravenes the generally accepted rule that landowners have the duty to make their premises reasonably safe.  See Zentz v. Toop, 92 N.J. Super. 105, 112-13 (App. Div. 1966) (The landowner's duty includes the obligation of making a reasonable inspection to discover defective and hazardous conditions).  Had [...] acted as a reasonably prudent landlord, [...] could have discovered this defective condition and ameliorated the associated risk prior to entering into the 2016 lease.  That [...] chose not to do so is ultimately unfair to [...], who paid the ultimate price for this decision.
[brief] ”); Schnakenberg, 37 N.J. Super. at 155.  Thus, contrary to the longstanding principles of contract interpretation, the trial court relied on extrinsic evidence to manufacture an obligation that does not appear anywhere in the parties’ written agreement.  See Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 301-02.  Rather than meaningfully address the issue, Defendants offer a novel legal theory that is wholly inconsistent with the firmly established principles of contract interpretation.
[brief] On September 28, 2019, at 3:51 a.m., Office [...] of the [...] responded to a call for service and arrived at a restaurant in Moorestown called [...].  (4T 61-9 to 20)  Pascal arrived five minutes after he received the call, observed that the lights were on and that a screen had been removed from a window, but did not see anyone inside.  (4T 62-1 to 68-24)  Footage retrieved from a camera inside the [...] showed that at 3:40 in the morning on September 28, a person climbed in the window, went to the counter area, and took a bag that contained $168 in change from the top of the safe.  (5T 10-8 to 11-16)  Two days later, on September 30 at 4:51 a.m., Officer [...] of the [...] received a call for service and went to the [...].  (4T 88-1 to 6)  When he arrived a few minutes later, there was an alarm going off, no sign of forced entry, and no one in the vicinity.  (4T 88-10 to 89-6)  Footage retrieved from a camera inside the [...] showed that at 4:42 in the morning on September 30, a person climbed in through a window and lifted up the cash register.  (4T 90-25 to 93-25)  The intruder went to the safe, but did not obtain anything either from the safe itself and there were no unsecured items around the safe.  (5T 19-4 to 24)  The owner of the [...], [...], watched the video and opined that the footage of the second night “looked like the same individual that was there two days prior decided to come back. ”  (5T 16-12 to 25)  Babcock did not recognize the individual on either video but testified that he thought they were the same.  (5T 17-1 to 18-24)  This inappropriate opinion testimony is the subject of Point II, infra.
[brief] Pursuant to Chapter 12 of the BMP Manual, the determination of the seasonal high water table shall be taken at the highest level of the observed mottles or groundwater, whichever is higher.  Furthermore, “[w]hen the purpose of the soil tests is to determine the design soil conductivity at the level of infiltration, the slowest of the test replicate results shall be used for design purposes. ” (Pb12-13).  Again, Plaintiffs cite to no authority to support this position.  Further, Plaintiffs’ citation is from the test procedures for a tube permeameter test, BMP Manual Chapter 12, page 40.  According to the BMP Manual, the variability of soil hydraulic conductivity test results from multiple tube permeameter tests at one test pit must be evaluated for potential defects.  (BMP Manual, Chapter 12, Page 40).  However, the process utilized by [...] did not involve tube permeameter tests.  The tests performed by [...] were single ring infiltration tests described in the BMP at Chapter 12, pages 44-48.  The hydraulic conductivity is determined by converting the observed field intake rate, as prescribed on page 46.  The [...] specifically found that [...]’s design had been reviewed and that the [...] had found that the geotechnical investigation accompanying the permit application was consistent with Chapter 12 of the BMP Manual and met the requirements for groundwater recharge in N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4.
[directive] Você entende que se está se declarando culpado pelo crime de [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] [Não agressão sexual qualificada, agressão sexual, contato sexual corresponde/NA] criminal qualificado, sequestro segundo os termos da lei 2C:13- 1c(2), por colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor com conduta sexual que prejudique ou corrompa a moral do menor segundo os termos da lei 2C:24-4a, por colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor segundo os termos da lei 2C:24-4b(3), por colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor segundo os termos da lei 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) ou (ii) (se o crime foi cometido no dia 1º de fevereiro de 2018 ou após esta data), por seduzir menores ou por tentativa de cometer qualquer um destes crimes e o crime ocorreu em 14 de janeiro de 2004 ou após esta data, ou por descumprir uma condição de uma sentença especial da supervisão comunitária vitalícia se o 1o descumprimento ocorreu em de julho de 2014 ou após esta data, o juiz, além de qualquer outra sentença, irá impor uma sentença especial de supervisão vitalícia de liberdade condicional?
[brief] (9T95:25 to 96:4; 9T112:7-12).  Other material evidence that the Court expressly found to be credible but disregarded was from [...].  P25a. (9T58:3-25).  The Court found that the testimony provided by [...] was essentially irrelevant in terms of the time period testified to.  Pa 25.  Yet, when evaluating undue influence claims, the circumstances surrounding the making of the will are to be examined.
[brief] See generally Senate Select Comm., Pub. Hearing on Sch. Funding Fairness (Jan. 27, Feb. 2, 14, and 22, 2017); Senate Select Comm., Sch. Funding Fairness Hearing Notice (Feb. 14, 2017) (inviting testimony on inequities in school funding).  By increasing the levy cap, the Legislature acknowledged that certain districts spending under adequacy had the ability to contribute more to their local contribution.  The SFRA amendments followed almost two years of legislative analysis and consideration of funding inequities.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I AN APPELLATE COURT REVIEWS A TRIAL COURT’S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT DE NOVO.  (Not Raised Below)  A recent Appellate Division opinion approved for publication cogently sets forth the standard of review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment:  Appellate courts review the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the standard used by the trial court.  Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).  The court considers “whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  An appellate court's review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity (including constitutionality) or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is also de novo.  See In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020).  “[A] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  If a judge makes a discretionary decision but acts under a misconception of the applicable law or misapplies it, the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and it becomes an arbitrary act, not subject to the usual deference.  *Summit Plaza Assocs. v. Kolta*, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020).  In such a case, the reviewing court must instead adjudicate the controversy in the light of the applicable law in order to avoid a manifest denial of justice.  *State v. Lyons*, 417 N.J. Super. 251, 258 (App. Div. 2010).  *Sackman Enterprises, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Belmar*, --- N.J. Super. ---- (App. Div. 2024), slip opinion at 7-8.  (Pa. 367-368.)
[brief] Defendant-appellant [...] relies on the procedural history and statement of facts from her initial brief.  LEGAL ARGUMENT  [...] relies on the legal arguments from her initial brief, adding the following in response to the State’s brief:  POINT I THE PASSION/PROVOCATION  MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED AND A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ENTERED BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND THAT THE STATE DID NOT DISPROVE SELF-DEFENSE.
[brief] [12T151-3 to -14].  Defendant’s argument that his confrontation clause rights were violated fails because, as presented to the jury, the anonymous caller’s statement was not an accusation or indicative of defendant’s guilt.  The jury heard that the caller had information regarding [...]’s murder.  [...] never testified that the anonymous caller implicated defendant in the murder.  Instead, the only relevance of the anonymous tip was that it led police to speak with [...].
[directive] If the defendant committed a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 while actually on school property, no plea offer shall be tendered or accepted that provides for less than three years of imprisonment during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole, or one year of parole ineligibility in a case involving less than one ounce of marijuana.  If the defendant falls under Criminal History Category IV (Extended Term) or V (Enhanced Extended Term), the authorized plea offer shall be twelve (12) months greater than that otherwise provided in the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers.  If the defendant committed a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (Using or Employing a Juvenile in a Drug Distribution Scheme), or a crime of the first degree under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 while actually on school property, the authorized plea offer shall be twelve (12) months greater than that otherwise provided in the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers in the case of a second-degree crime, or eighteen (18) months greater than that otherwise provided in the applicable Table
[brief] **C.  The Board’s other articulated reasons for denial of the project – including timing and litigation risk – are not foundations for denial, and thus are arbitrary and capricious. **  The Board’s other claimed foundations for not accepting the Petition included concerns about control over the property, the timing for construction, and the ability to receive PJM approval in a timely manner.  These are not foundations for denial, and in fact have been rejected by the Board on a number of occasions.  Most notably, the Board has consistently approved the inclusion of projects for the solar program that are on track to fail the PJM timeline.  [...] is currently appealing a number of decisions by the Board where the approval for solar projects was provided with the clear awareness that the projects will not be able to satisfy the PJM timeline.  In fact, while [...] has asked the Board to hold off on the decision pending the PJM timeline, the Board has refused to do so based upon that very foundation.  Likewise, the Board claims that the timeline would be too tight for construction and that access to the property is an open question.  Yet the Board never asked about these issues, sought follow-up, or acknowledged the basic approach to development – the risk of completion is upon the developer.  Not one of the claimed “reasons” for denial serves as a foundation for denial pursuant to the program – instead, they seem to raise a question of arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the Board.
[brief] [...]’S CROSS-APPEAL  Filed May 9, Amended May 12  JARDIM MEISNER  SALMON SPRAGUE & SUSSER, P.C. [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...] Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (NJ Bar ID #152162015) – [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (NJ Bar ID #371532022) – [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] B.  The Court Misconstrued  The Opinions and Testimony Of [...]  Also in its September 29, 2023 decision, the New Motion Judge concluded that [...]’s opinions were “suppositions,” but the court’s summary of what [...] stated in his report and at deposition are not accurate and do not fairly represent what [...] contends.  Perhaps the best proof that the New Motion Judge inaccurately recites [...]’s testimony is the court’s ultimate conclusion that, even if Defendants had performed within the standard of care, the outcome would have been the same, according to [...].  But the whole point of delivering [...] within the standard of care was to avoid exposing her to a risk of a poor outcome.  That’s why both the fields of medicine and law define the standard of care in the first place: to impose a duty to perform before the risk of injury becomes unacceptably high.
[brief] As a result, the Michigan court did not have to grapple with how a “move[ment] right or left upon a roadway” differs from a “turn . . . from a direct course. ”  See N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  In addition, the Michigan statute combines the requirement that motorists assess safety and the requirement that they signal into one sentence, making clear that both ascertaining safety and signaling are necessary preconditions to stopping and turning.  See M.C.L.A. 257.648.  By contrast, the first paragraph of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 contains two sentences, the first of which prohibits specified movements unless they can be made safely, and the second of which prohibits “turns” without signaling.  Whether a “turn” encompasses all the movements listed in the first sentence is a question that the Michigan court did not have to consider.
[brief] Here, the Plaintiff cannot in good faith argue that [...] possesses the same credentials as [...].  Not only do the two physicians practice in wholly different disciplines without any overlapping credentials, their Certifications were issued by different boards.  As Plaintiff acknowledges in his moving papers, [...] is Certified through the American Board of Internal Medicine and [...] is Certified through the American Board of Surgery.  Moreover, a review of the doctors’ respective curriculum vitae highlight the differences in their post-doctoral training.  Quite simply, a review of the relevant and controlling authorities confirm that the Trial Court appropriately dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint as he failed to serve an Affidavit of Merit that complied with New Jersey Statute and case law.  Therefore, the defense respectfully submits that as a matter of law and equity, Plaintiff’s Appeal be denied in full, with the Trial Court’s Order of June 24, 2020 being affirmed.
[brief] B.  The Board finds the applicant’s proposal does not further the purposes of zoning pursuant to N.J.S. 40:55D-2:  1.  The applicant’s proposal is not the best planning alternative.  2.  The proposed development would not secure safety from fire, flood, panic and other natural and man-made disasters.  This litigation then commenced with the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint dated September 23, 2022.
[brief] (Pa143;20:5-25, 21:1-:12).  As such, [...] compared the mounding of the buildings to having the buildings being put on pedestals.  [...] testified that the pedestals was caused by the applicant moving dirt onto the natural grade either by re-grading it or bringing dirt in, but the affect was adding four (4) to five (5) feet to the building height.  *(Pa144;21:13-21).*  [...] opined that the pedestals that the applicant was using on the site was a device designed to allow increased building height.  *(Pa144;22:1-5).*  [...] further opined that a variance needed to be required for the building height based upon the pedestaling of the buildings.  *(Pa144;22:9-15).*  [...] interpreted the [...] Building Height Ordinance to include mounding, terracing or other devices which would increase the height.