ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Cases  Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589 (2018)  ................................................................. 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16  Barney v. Bd. of Review, No. A-3221-19, 2021 WL 1904561 (App. Div. May 12, 2021) (slip op.) .................................................. 16  Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197 (1997)  ...........................................................................9, 10, 12 de la Cruz v. Bd. of Review, No. A-3333-19, 2022 WL 1406379 (App. Div. May 4, 2022) (slip op.) .................................................. 16  Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N. J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983) ........................................12, 23 Haley v. Bd. of Review, 245 N.J. 511 (2021) ........................................................................... 1, 12 Holland v. Bd. of Review, No. A-0214-16T1, 2018 WL 3421444 (App. Div. July 16, 2018) (slip op.) ..................................................14, 15 In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533 (2016) .............................................................................9 In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (2011) .............................................................................9 Israel v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 283 N.J. Super. 1 (App Div. 1995) ................................................................. 20 McClain v. Bd. of Review, 237 N.J. 445 (2019) .................................................................................. 10, 11, 12 Medwick v. Bd. of Review, Division of Employment Sec., Dept. of Labor and Industry, 69 N.J.Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961) ........................................... 22 Schock v. Bd. of Review, Division of Employment Sec., Dept. of Labor and Industry, 89 N.J.Super. 118 (App. Div. 1965) ............................................. 11, 12 Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453 (1982)....................................................................................... 13 Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 191 N.J. 38 (2007) ...................................................................................... 9 Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 534 (2008) .................................................................................... 10 Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371 (1989) .................................................................................... 1, 11, 12 Statutes N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 et seq., “Unemployment Compensation Law” .................................................. 1, 11 N.J.S.A. 43:21–2 ......................................................................................... 11 N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) .................................................................................... 12, 13 Regulations N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) .................................................................................. 12 N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c) ..................................................................................  13  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 27 Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126 (2016) .................................................................................................................. 34, 38 Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co., 372 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 2004) .....................................................................................  16 Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76 (2013) ....................................................................................................................  15 West Side Trust Co. v. Gascoigne, 39 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1956) .......................................................................................  34 Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1974) .....................................................................................
[directive] b.  Se você está se declarando culpado por tal crime, o período prolongado mínimo obrigatório é de anos e meses (inserir o número de anos/meses) e o período prolongado máximo obrigatório pode ser de anos e meses (inserir o número de anos/meses).  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory extended term can be years and months (fill in the number of years/months).
[brief] An appellate court can also discern an abuse of discretion when the trial court fails to take into consideration all relevant factors and when its decision reflects a clear error in judgment. ”  *State v. S.N.*, 231 N.J. 497, 515 (2018) (quoting *State v. Baynes*, 148 N.J. 434, 444 (1997) (internal citations omitted)).
[brief] Regarding factor (2), intervening circumstances, the Shaw Court highlighted the difference between an unlawful motor vehicle or investigative stop in which incidental to the stop police learn about an outstanding warrant and where an unlawful stop is executed for the specific purpose of checking for warrants.  *Id.* at 418.  The Court noted that simply because police learn of a different warrant from which defendant was unlawfully stopped is not a true intervening circumstance given the overall objectives of the police conduct.  *Id.* at 419–20.  The *Shaw* Court carefully distinguished the facts before it from the many cases finding intervening circumstances when police learned of the warrant incidental to an allegedly unlawful traffic or investigative stop.  See *id.* at 417–20 (discussing cases).  The Court’s distinction in *Shaw* squarely implicates the facts here where police learned of the driving while suspended during an incidental license check during an investigative car stop for drug activity, thus making it a true intervening circumstance.
[brief] The key inquiry is whether a charge “possess[ed] the clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ”  State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 529 (2001); see also R. 2:10-2.  Courts must view any alleged error “in the totality of the entire charge. ”  State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006).  Model jury charges are presumed valid because the process in which they are “reviewed and refined by experienced jurists and lawyers” is “comprehensive and thorough. ”  State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005); see also Mogull v. CB Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 466 (2000) (“It is difficult to find that a charge that follows the Model Charge so closely constitutes plain error.
[brief] However, rather than seeking a return of the “unauthorized” distributions to [...] and [...], plaintiffs contended they were damaged by the distributions, and that [...] specifically was entitled to receive sums equal to the distributions at issue.  This argument does not equate in law with proof that the funds in question were “identifiable” as “specific funds set aside for” plaintiffs Divyajit [...] or [...].  Notably, the trial judge’s findings on the conversion counts also fail to reflect that any of the sums allegedly converted were discrete, “identifiable” sums that “belonged” to either plaintiff.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  Defendant’s response brief contains mis-statements as to both law and fact regarding both (1) the trial court’s erroneous evidentiary ruling that prevented the State from admitting evidence related to the 9-1-1 call, and (2) the application of the reasonable suspicion standard.  POINT I – THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULING PREVENTED THE STATE FROM PRESENTING IMPORTANT EVIDENCE RELATED TO REASONABLE SUSPICION.
[brief] After the 1967 Subdivision  What happened immediately after the 1967 Subdivision only confirms the intent of the neighbors at the time.  There is no record evidence of [...] having recorded the approved subdivision.  However, both [...] and [...] acted immediately as if [...] had succeeded in creating the Strip and transferring it to [...]  Immediately subsequent transfers of Lot 3 and Lot 4 reflect and effect the intent expressed in the signed and approved 1967 Subdivision, to transfer the Strip to Lot 3 and the Bump to Lot 4.  A deed dated December 16, 1971, and recorded on December 22, 1971, in deed book 4395 ("1971 Lot 3 Deed"), transfers Lot 3, and includes the Strip in the seven-course metes-and-bounds description of the property.  Da34.  That same deed excludes the Bump, evidencing the belief by Lot 3's owners that the land swap described by the 1967 Subdivision had taken place.  Consistent with that 1971 Lot 3 Deed, by deed dated December 31, 1971, and recorded on May 3, 1974, in deed book 4474, page 145 ("1971 Lot 4 Deed"), [...] conveyed the current Lot 4, without the Strip and with the Bump, to [...]  Pa81; 2Tr. at 58:19 – 59:21; 61:8-20.³ ³  Curiously, and again consistent with what appears to have been negligent recording or recordkeeping on the part of [...]’s predecessors-in-interest, the Bump fell out of the Lot 4 chain of title for a time, until [...] paid $1000 to [...]’s predecessor-in-interest for another transfer of the Bump by way of a A.  Lot 3’s Chain of Title  Since 1971 Contains the Strip  From then until the present day, Lot 3’s chain of title expresses the clear understanding – and reality on the ground – that the Strip belongs to Lot 3.  As many as ten separate deeds to Lot 3 over the next 50 years all include a metes-and-bounds description that includes the Strip.  1Tr. at 111:5-10; Pa98; Da41; Da44; Da46; Da62; Da63; Da48; Da70; Da73; Pa77.  There is no factual dispute over the Strip’s appearance in Lot 3’s chain of title since the 1967 Subdivision gained approval.
[brief] Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).  The PCR court must consider whether the witness the trial lawyer failed to present would have addressed a significant issue at trial.  State v. L.A., 433 N.J. Super. 1, 15 (App. Div. 2013).  “A reasonable probability” under the second prong “is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ”  Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 694; cf. State v. L.A., 433 N.J. Super. 1, 15 (App. Div. 2013) (in ineffective assistance claim based on failure to call witness, PCR court must consider whether absent witness's testimony would have addressed a significant fact in the case).
[directive] Deadly force shall only be used as an absolute last resort and in strict compliance with this Policy.  Other actions by law enforcement that create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury must be avoided or employed only under the strictest of conditions.  4.1  Deadly Force.  Deadly force is force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing, death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animals.  4.2  Types of deadly force.  Deadly force includes the following potentially lethal actions: (a) applying a chokehold, carotid artery restraint, or similar technique that involves pressure on the neck; (b) sitting, kneeling, or standing on a person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; (c) intentionally driving a vehicle at or in the direction of a person with the intent to strike the individual; and (d) using a baton or other weapon to intentionally strike an individual in the head or neck area.
[brief] During discovery, Plaintiff submitted a liability expert report prepared by [...], CSP of [...].  (Pa154).  Mr. Mizel’s report, however, failed to rely on competent facts to reach his conclusion.  The facts he relied upon were based purely on speculation because, if Plaintiff could not state what caused his alleged fall, Mr. Mizel, who did not witness the alleged incident, also cannot state what caused the incident.  In sum, Plaintiff presented the trial court with no competent evidence to demonstrate that anything [...] did proximately caused the alleged incident.  **POINT I**
[brief] (Da 16, 20, 23)  Finally, the court did not specifically cite or analyze the mandatory voluntariness factors, instead writing only, “None of the factors that would potentially indicate coerced consent are present in this matter.  See State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30 (2018). ”  (Da 33)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I SUPPRESSION IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE THIRD PARTY VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED DURING A SECRET CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION THAT THE MOTION COURT ENTIRELY IGNORED.
[directive] by Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Spanish to Defendant's Initials Fonnulario revisado promulgado para el 12/31/2019, Suplemento a la Directiva #01-18, CN 10079- Spanish Iniciales del acusado page 6 of7/pagina 6 de 7 l,Entiende que el juez no esta obligado por ninguna promesa ni recomendaci6n del fiscal y que el juez tiene derecho a rechazar la declaraci6n antes de sentenciarlo y derecho a imponerle una condena mas severa?
[brief] ”  Marconi v. United Airlines, 460 N.J. Super. 330, 339 (App. Div. 2019); Bandler v. Melillo, 443 N.J. Super. 203, 210 (App. Div. 2015).  [...] held that the ECD barred plaintiff’s putative class action complaint because the court reasoned that plaintiff’s claims based on violations of the NJCFLA could have been raised as a defense in the underlying collection action and thus constituted a collateral attack on the underlying default judgment.
[brief] Indeed, the Ordinance specifically contained provisions for [...] to seek exemptions from requirements of the Ordinance when a requirement of Ordinance “[w]ill prohibit, or have the effect of prohibiting, the ability of an entity to provide Utility Service to any prospective customer within the Town” (DA at 52a) or when a requirement of the Ordinance “would violate federal law, state law, or both; or . . . [a] provision of this Chapter, as applied to an applicant, would deprive the applicant of its rights under federal law, state law, or both” (DA at 51a).  With those provisions as part of the Ordinance, [...] could not possibly establish that under all circumstances the Ordinance cannot be applied in a lawful and valid manner or that it prohibits [...] from providing and adequate service required by law unless and until it applies for a permit and exemption and is denied an exemption.  To find an ordinance to be invalid “as applied,” the plaintiff must first permit the provisions ordinance to actually be applied whenever the ordinance contains a mechanism where the alleged invalid outcome may be avoided.  The Ordinance contains just such a mechanism, *i.e.*, the exemption process set forth in it.  Here, by jumping the gun and running straight to court, [...] prevented [...] from applying the provisions pertaining to an exemption if the conditions for such an exemption existed.  Simply stated, [...] cannot say the Ordinance is invalid as applied when [...] prevented the potentially ameliorative provisions of the Ordinance from being applied.  It is a basic principle that when an ordinance vests discretion in the local body to permit exceptions, a trial court should ordinarily decline to adjudicate an attack upon the ordinance as applied until after the plaintiff has first sought and been denied relief from the ordinance by the local body charged with making such decisions.
[brief] Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute the brevity of the two-month timeframe between the waiver and the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and concedes that nothing occurred during that timeframe.  As to the second *Cole* factor, Plaintiff again misrepresents the record with respect to the motions previously filed in this matter.  Specifically, while Defendants’ motion to compel nominally sought to dismiss the Plaintiff’s causes of action arising out of the Partnership Agreement for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under R. 4:6-2(a), the relief sought by Defendants – to compel the partnership claims to arbitration – has remained consistent.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.  (25T80:15-89:4; 89:23-93:13)  The trial court awarded plaintiffs $1,181,874.51 in attorney fees, expert fees and other expenses incurred in the normal course of preparing a case for litigation.  The threshold issue in any fee-shifting request is to determine if there is “express authorization” for such an award in a statute, court rule or – as claimed here – a contract between the parties.  That threshold was not met here.
[brief] The difficulty I have with some of the proposed mitigating factors is that this isn’t [defendant’s] first go around.  And having been through the throes of addiction, to say you don’t understand the seriousness of distribution of large-scale narcotics has on families, society, individuals, epidemic in this country of overdose, death’s someone who is in our recovery court program, that’s difficult to sell this Court on.  So, I can’t.  I can’t find that you didn’t threatened to cause serious harm.  It’s a large-scale operation.  I mean, we’re not talking about somebody with a few bags of heroin on the side of the street.  All right?  These drugs were going somewhere, and they’re going to ruin lives and ruin families and put more people in these courtrooms.  That’s where those drugs were going.  He knew what was going to happen.  Now, whether he wanted it to happen or not may be a different story, but he certainly was aware that these drugs were going on the – that’s how he was making his money.  He wasn’t using them.  He was selling them, making money 50 plus thousand I think was found in the house when it was raided.  So, I really don’t find mitigating factors 1 or 2 applies.
[brief] ”  Id. at 386, 371.  Here, all five Miller factors weighed heavily towards mitigation, and thus towards a finding that [...] was an appropriate candidate for release from prison via a reduction in his sentence from life in prison to a term of fixed years.  But instead of relying upon the evidence to find that each Miller factor warranted substantial mitigation, the court found that many of the factors did not apply at all, and those which did apply were entitled only slight mitigation.  The court thus erred in its application of each factor by ignoring and discrediting the amply demonstrated mitigating evidence in the record, and by making findings that were not based upon any competent, credible evidence.
[directive] When an individual has unlawfully operated an ORV on public lands three or more times, “forfeiture may be enforced by a civil action, instituted within 90 days of the impoundment and commenced by the State against the property sought to be forfeited. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34(e)(1).  State Park Police must follow certain procedures, such as providing notice to any person that is known to have a property interest in the vehicle.  N.J.S.A. 39:3C- 34(e)(2).  State Park Service violations, Wildlife Management Area Violations, and Municipal Ordinance violations can all be heard in municipal court.
[brief] (Pa16).  He argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.  (Pa19-20).  At its meeting on July 25, 2023, the Board considered [...]’s arguments, found that there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and therefore directed the Board Secretary to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for its review and approval at its next meeting.  (Pa9).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on September 27, 2023.  (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.
[directive] Yo, , el acusado en la(s) causa(s) titulada(s) más arriba, habiendo sido condenado de Eludir conforme a 2C:29-2b, por este medio acuso recibo de la notificación N.J.S.A. escrita de las penalidades por conducir con la licencia suspendida debido a una infracción de dicho estatuto.  El juez también me ha informado verbalmente de estas consecuencias en una audiencia pública.  I, , the defendant in the above-entitled cause(s) having been convicted of Eluding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, hereby acknowledge receipt of written notice of the penalties for driving while suspended for a violation of said statute.  I have also been informed of these consequences by the judge orally in open court.
[brief] 5T, Pg. 25, line 21 – Pg. 26, line 3  In response, [...]’s attorney actually said that he had received the documents in discovery in this matter from [...]’s prior counsel.  5T, Pg. 27, lines 19-23.  Then [...] sought clarification, asking “So the files were actually produced to you?” to which [...]’s attorney responded.  “Yes” and “that’s right. ”  5T, Pg. 28, lines 3-13  Then [...], whom the court should recall only became attorney for [...] about a month prior to trial, asked for evidence to confirm that the entire file had indeed been provided as discovery in this case.  5T, Pg. 28, lines 14 – 17.  But [...] denied that request, noting that since he was in the case for only a month, he doesn’t actually know what was exchanged in discovery, and what was not.  Therefore, [...] indicated that he was not even in a position to object.  5T, Pg. 28, line 18 – Pg. 30, line 8.  Despite that, [...]’s attorney formally objected anyway.  5T, Pg. 30, lines 12 – 18.  [...] stated: “Of course it’s prejudicial”, (5T, Pg. 30, line 19), and she overruled the objection.  (5T, Pg. 31, lines 10-11).  However, what is very interesting is that [...]’s own sworn witness, the managing partner of the [...] law firm, [...], contradicted his own attorney’s account very shortly thereafter.  Whereas (as indicated above) [...]’s attorney had told [...] that he got the file from Cohen’s attorney: 5T, Pg. 27, lines 19-23.  His client, [...]’s managing partner testified under oath to something very different regarding the [...] file that was in the 21 boxes, Exhibit D-4.  Specifically he said that before bringing suit, they packed up the file in bankers boxes, “sealed them” and put them “into a storage facility” then they were shipped to the courtroom and the seals were cut open in court “yesterday”.  And that last point was repeated for clarification:  “And so the unsealing of the [...] file didn’t take place until it was shipped here to the courtroom, and you did that here?”  To which [...] answered, “Very noisy, yes. ”  5T, Pg. 32, line 18 – Pg. 33, line 4  So, [...]’s witness testified that they did not get the [...] file (D-4) from Cohen’s attorney in discovery in this case, nor did they provide it to Cohen’s attorney in discovery in this case; rather, they provided it to the attorney that took over the [...] matter from [...] and boxed up a copy of that – that’s what D-4 is.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:1.l-3a(l) | 1 | | Statutes (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:2–2(b)(3) | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11–2(a) | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4)(k) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1) | 7 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4(b)(1) | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1B(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 | 13, 16, 23 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a(2) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:24-6b | 19 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5A | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3) | 27 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9) | 27 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(11) | 27 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | Statutes (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(4) | 27 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44–6 | 18 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b | 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6c | 15, 19, 21 | | Rules | |-------| | R. 3:21-2(a) | 13, 15, 25 | | R. 3:21-2(b) | 15 | | R. 3:29 | 18 | | Constitutional Provisions | |--------------------------| | N.J. Const. art.