ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^2\)  And Plaintiff’s ascertainable loss arises from the same.  See Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 23 (1994) (“an improper debt . . . against a consumer-fraud plaintiff may constitute a loss under the [CFA], because the consumer is not obligated to pay an indebtedness arising out of conduct that violates the Act. ”); see also Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 428-29 (App. Div. 2009) (where the Court reasoned that an improper credit card authorization was not an ascertainable loss because it was not a “charge,” but that a charge on a credit account, even if unpaid, constitutes an ascertainable loss).  Defendants assert that Cox is factually distinguishable from the case at \(^2\) See Compl. ¶ 55 (referencing the collection lawsuit filed by [...] under docket number [...]).
[brief] *State v. Porter*, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (“Even a suspicious or questionable affidavit supporting a PCR petition ‘must be tested for credibility and cannot be summarily rejected. ’" quoting *State v. Allen*, 398 N.J. Super. 247, 258 (App. Div. 2008)).  The PCR court must hear oral argument on all of defendant’s claims.  See Parker, 212 N.J. at 282.  Parker determined that PCR claims “should be approached with the view that oral argument should be granted. ”  Id.  A complete and robust evaluation by this Court is also necessary for meaningful appellate review.
[brief] For example, in Section II.A.3 the [...] argues that abandonment is not required in order to find discontinuance of use.  (Db26-Db28).  This argument was raised to address the Trial Court’s finding that the Abandoned Properties Rehabilitation Act, N.J.S.A. 55:19-78, et seq., which defines abandonment, can be used to interpret “discontinuance of use. ” (T3, 49:17-51:11).  In its Trial Brief, the [...] also argued that discontinuance of use and abandonment were independent concepts under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) (Dsa7-Dsa10). ¹  Similarly, in Section III, the [...] argued that the Trial Court erred in concluding that the substantial credible evidence standard was not met.  (Db33).  Again, this issue was specifically decided by the Trial Court.  (T3, 44:9-11).  It is disingenuous at best to allege that the [...] did not argue that the substantial credible evidence standard had been met.
[brief] The marketability discount reflects the economic reality of a potential sale in a closely --- 10 Sipko involved only the discussion of the marketability discount, and not the control discount, because the blocks of shares at issue were 50%, i.e. did not reflect a minority stake which lacked control.  11  The valuation of majority interests in closely held companies would not carry a control discount, but would still carry a marketability discount.  By contrast, publicly traded stock may carry control discounts, but not marketability discounts, since they can be sold instantaneously during times the securities markets are open. held business, which would certainly involve a large amount of difficulty in locating and negotiating a sale in the open market.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  I worked for the [...] as Acting Municipal Clerk for years before I was hired in 2014 as a judge’s secretary in the Superior Court of New Jersey (Essex County).  I first worked for the Honorable [...], J.S.C. for about one year.  When he retired, I worked as a judge’s secretary for the Honorable [...], J.S.C. in Essex County until September 9, 2021 when I went on a medical leave (FMLA) due to degenerative disc disease and proposed spinal surgery.  Pa4 to Pa10.  While on medical leave, I could not access my work emails.  Having recently reached the age of 70, I submitted my retirement application on November 24, 2021.  Pa12 to Pa13.  I was notified in a December 9, 2021 Certification from the [...] that my proposed retirement would be effective February 1, 2022.  Pa14 to Pa15.  By letter dated December 28, 2021 (sent to my home address), the [...] confirmed (1) my retirement date of February 1, 2022 (2) my service termination date of January 28, 2022 (3) my service credit of 10 years and 1 month as of January 28, 2022 and (4) my entitlement to a life insurance benefit of $9,952.12.  Pa16.  I had my remote exit interview on January 31, 2022.  Pa27 to Pa31.  In a letter dated February 28, 2022 (sent to my home address), the [...] confirmed (1) my retirement on February 1, 2022 (2) my monthly pension benefit of $677.02 based upon my maximum service and (3) my entitlement to a life insurance benefit of $9,952.12.  Pa36.  By letter dated July 19, 2022 (sent to my home address), I was first notified by the [...] that a post-retirement audit of my retirement account had prompted a recalculation of my retirement benefits, resulting in a decrease in my monthly pension from $677.02 to $652.77.  Pa42.  By letter dated July 22, 2022 (sent to my home address), [...] of the [...] notified me that the recalculation of my retirement account decreased [my total service credit] from 121 months to 118 months.  [and] since [my] service credit decreased to 9 years and 10 months, [my] beneficiary is no longer eligible to receive a group life insurance benefit upon [her] passing.  Only members with at least 10 years of service credit are eligible for this benefit.  Pa43.  (emphasis added).  The following key facts are undisputed: - I received written confirmation from the [...] before my retirement that my total service credit, based on my proposed February 1, 2022 retirement, satisfied the requisite 10 years of service needed to entitle me to full pension benefits and a life insurance benefit of $9,952.12; Pa16; - nearly 7 months after my retirement, I was first notified by the [...] that my retirement benefits had been recalculated and, based solely on a mistake in calculations by my former employer, my total service credit was reduced from 121 months [10 years and 1 month] to 118 months [9 years and 10 months]; Pa43; - I was not notified of the recalculation of my retirement benefits, resulting in the reduction in my pension and total elimination of my life insurance benefit, until it was too late for me to purchase service credit (2 months) needed to have the requisite service credit of 10 years needed for full retirement benefits.
[brief] While Defendant asserts that this Court can determine, on the record before it, that [...]’s level of familiarity was insufficient to justify an in-court identification as a matter of law, Defendant acknowledges that the trial court did not hold a pretrial hearing to assess [...]’s level of familiarity.  Defendant had twice moved for a pretrial hearing to assess whether [...] should be permitted to identify [...] at trial, arguing that there was “some evidence of suggestiveness” under State v. Chen, 208 N.J. 307, 326 (2011).
[brief] Here, the notice stated:  The applicant is seeking a use variance to allow an accessory structure larger than the principle [sic] use on the property, along with any other variances deemed necessary by the Board.  The accessory structure is approximately 2160 square feet and the principle [sic] structure is approximately 1152 square feet.  The notice adequately expressed a “commonsense” description of the relief requested by the [...], in a manner that an “ordinary lay person could intelligently determine whether to object or to seek further information”.  Nothing further is required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11.
[brief] It is that kind of direction from [...] to attorneys is very troubling.  (7T 29 and 30).  [...] also advised the Court of the following:  "Your Honor, this morning [...] was kind enough to send us paperwork, additional paperwork, which perhaps Your Honor has not seen.  Perhaps actually, [...] has not seen.  It was, obviously, the EIN number, which we just got, but there was also attachments: a letter that was dated July 8th, 2020 from the [...] signed by [...], which forwarded to the [...] a letter of instruction for three policies, Your Honor, and attached signed limited powers of attorney, which [...] and [...] both signed and had notarized by [...], who I know is employed by the Lento law firm.
[brief] He admitted that the warrant only permitted a search of only the "premises described below" (1T52-11 to 16).  This is on page 1 of the "Search Warrant Order" at Ca41.  [...] acknowledged that page 2 of the Search Warrant Order (Ca42) also has "Premises described below" checked off under "2.  Authority to Search, Serve One Copy of Warrant" references only the premises and no person to be searched.  (1T52-17 to 53-1).  [...] testified that the arrest of defendant was related to the search warrant "because we would not have been doing surveillance on that residence if the search wasn't issued for that residence."
[brief] [...] relies on Point II of his opening brief, adding that the State’s brief misapprehends the relevant law.  The State fundamentally misunderstands the framework for charging self-defense in the context of civilian-police altercations.  As a result, it does not engage with the key argument raised in [...]’s brief: that the jury should have been instructed on two different applicable theories of self-defense based on the evidence presented at trial.
[brief] See Pl. Br. at 14. (D. Kan. 2010) (facilitating party’s request to take a deposition of a witness in Germany pursuant to the Hague Convention and noting that “[r]esort[ing] to using the procedures of the Hague Convention is particularly appropriate when, as here, a litigant seeks to depose a foreign non-party who is not subject to the court’s jurisdiction”).  The fact that Plaintiff may be required to follow certain additional procedures and that the deposition may be conducted differently than under New Jersey law is simply not a basis to compel [...]—which has no control over [...]—to produce him for deposition.  Plaintiff’s appeal therefore lacks merit and should be denied.
[directive] 6.  When filing a joint motion for sentence modification pursuant to this Directive, the prosecuting authority shall state that good cause for the modification exists as a result of:  Page 10  a.  [...]’s unanimous recommendation in favor of retroactive modification of mandatory periods of parole ineligibility imposed for qualifying Chapter 35 offenses, for the reasons described in [...]’s November 2019 report; and b.  The need to ensure sentencing uniformity for defendants convicted of qualifying Chapter 35 offenses, in light of this Directive’s instructions that prosecutors waive mandatory periods of parole ineligibility for all current and future defendants pursuant to Section 12.  II.
[directive] The County Prosecutors should implement procedures whereby the initial medical examination of a sexual assault victim, in which samples are taken from various areas of the victim's body for evidentiary purposes, is paid for directly by the Prosecutor's Office.  Hospital personnel should be instructed to send this bill directly to the [...].  If the bill does not meet the $100.00 minimum loss required by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 52:4B-18d., the Prosecutor's Office should absorb it.  If it exceeds that minimum, the Prosecutor's Office should submit the bill to the [...] for reimbursement.  If the Prosecutor's Office concludes that additional medical or psychiatric evidence is required, the Prosecutor's Office should pay for such examination.  Any other bills related to medical or psychiatric care for the victim are to be sent directly to the victim; however, the victim is to be assisted by the [...] in submitting such bills to the [...].  H.  Every effort shall be made to minimize inconvenience to the victim.  1.  Whenever possible, appointments shall be scheduled at the convenience of the victim.  2.  Victims and witnesses shall not be forced to wait for long periods of time to be interviewed.  3.  Whenever possible, limits should be placed upon the number of times the victim must repeat the facts surrounding the offense.  4.  All victims should have sufficient time to relate the facts of the incident as s/he knows it.  I.  When possible, property return should be accomplished within 30 days of recovery by law enforcement unless evidentiary requirements prohibit it (not applicable to firearms or contraband).  COMMENTARY
[brief] The court, in its discretion and considering all the appropriate circumstances, may waive the medical history and psychological examination in any case in which a term of imprisonment including a period of parole ineligibility is imposed.  In any case involving a conviction of N.J.S.2C:24-4, endangering the welfare of a child; N.J.S.2C:18-3, criminal trespass, where the trespass was committed in a school building or on school property; section 1 of P.L.1993, c. 291 (C.2C:13-6), attempting to lure or entice a child with purpose to commit a criminal offense; section 1 of P.L.1992, c. 209 (C.2C:12-10), stalking; or N.J.S.2C:13-1, kidnapping, where the victim of the offense is a child under the age of 18, the investigation shall include a report on the defendant's mental condition. ” could help explain the offense or the risk of recidivism, or otherwise be relevant to sentencing.  As explained above, the law requires that presentence reports include all relevant information.  See R. 3:21-2(a).  To allow the courts to adhere to that requirement, the sentencing court has authority to order a psychological examination, even when not mandated under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b.
[brief] [5T41:1-3].  During the OAL Trial, Appellant testified that [...] was a family friend.  [6T88:8-13].  However, while being interviewed under oath by Internal Affairs, Appellant stated that he hardly knew who [...] was and had trouble even remembering [...]’s name.  [6T90:4-7].  Appellant testified that the reason he didn’t report the [...] vehicle incident was “just because your car is pulled over . . . and someone is driving it without a license, it’s pretty much ridiculous to call them for something so minute.  They’re busy enough. ”  [5T41:12-15].  Appellant also testified that for the Vehicle Incidents, “[i]n each and every one of those cases I physically asked them if they had a license, like joking around, and they produced a license, and there is no way of me to know that their license was not good. ”\(^{3}\) [5T83:11-15].  Appellant specifically testified “[i]f they didn’t show me a license . . . I would have never let them use the car. ”  [5T83:15-17].  However, while being interviewed under oath by Internal Affairs, --- \(^{3}\) Appellant is a police officer, one of the few careers that would absolutely give him ways to know if someone’s license was valid.  Appellant admitted the only person who actually showed him a license was [...], and in the other instances, Appellant just took their word for it.  [6T91:22-92:4].  Appellant then testified that he did not actually remember if [...] ultimately produced her license or not.  [6T92:7-12].  It is also not possible for [...] to have shown Appellant a driver’s license, because [...] only had a learner’s permit when she was pulled over on November 29, 2018.  [Pa120].
[brief] [Pra12].  Plaintiff then asked for limited discovery pertaining to this issue.  [Pra13].  Ignoring that explicit argument, the Law Division leapt to the error that:  “Plaintiff made ‘no argument regarding the procedural fairness of the contract (i.e. that plaintiff was given the contract on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, that he had no opportunity to review the contract or arbitration clause before signing, etc.).’”  Defendant asks this Court to affirm that error.  Even if the Law Division believed the Complaint was not clear enough, the Law Division still erred by dismissing the Complaint without leave to file an amended complaint.  G.
[directive] 14.  ENHANCING  Association cooperation with the County Prosecutors Criminal Justice, in Division of The present Institute, shall develop and General's Advocacy and the Attorney of Jersey New for (1) all assistant Reform Law and this Directive on the Bail legal education courses continuing all Prosecutors attorneys general, (2) County of Criminal Justice deputy Division prosecutors and authorized general designated as supervisors deputy attorneys prosecutors and and assistant detention or on whether to seek pretrial decisions Directive to approve pursuant to this general conduct prosecutors and deputy attorneys who assistant revocation of release, and (3) hearings.  release revocation detention and/or pretrial immediately upon of this Directive.  operational issuance shall become This Section AND REPORTS STUDIES
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order and Opinion of The Honorable [...] dated April 4, 2022……………………………………………………………..Pa112  Order of The Honorable [...] dated September 14, 2023………………………………………………………Pa132 Opinion of The Honorable [...] dated October 27, 2023…………………………………………………………..Pa133  Order of The Honorable [...] dated October 27, 2023…………………………………………………………..Pa178  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES
[brief] Of note is the fact that *Veras v LVNV Funding, LLC*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. 2014) cited by Plaintiff was issued by a federal district court in 2014 long before New Jersey state courts addressed the effects of the NJCFLA.  This Court, as recently as this past month reaffirmed the Francavilla Courts ruling.
[brief] THE COURT:  I -- on Page 23, plaintiffs assert that [...]'s negligent supervision of the attorney trust account would not require the explanation of a legal expert.  I -- I -- again, they -- they cite no case law that supports that proposition.  And of course, there are a number of rules that address an attorney's obligation, or law firm's obligation with respect to its attorney trust account.  So, again, respectfully, I -- I just cannot see how that would be within the ken of a -- of a juror.  THE COURT:
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[directive] criminal history  See subsection 4.5.8 charges/convictions should be considered).  (explaining how out-of-state in addressed specifically subsection 4.5.7, the risk- Furthermore, as automated pretrial account for a defendant's juvenile history, process does not justice even if the assessment for adjudicated delinquent a serious violent recently was crime.  The automated defendant process also does not account for expunged though pretrial risk-assessment records, even explicitly recently amended to authorize in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-21 was expunged records to be used under pretrial release determinations the Bail Reform conjunction with Law.  Nor does the for any risk-assessment process account specific threat of a pretrial future harm that automated or victim witness.  The automated pretrial risk-assessment have made to a process defendant may for defendant's involvement with a violent gang or of account a street other form also does not drug dependence or mental illness. or a defendant's organized crimes relevant to flight risk, but may supplemental facts might be be less probative of the that the 4 Certain likelihood on release, other than crime while "bail jumping" under N.J.S.A. For would commit a new 2C:29-7.
[brief] As the party contesting the Decedent’s Will, the Petitioner bears the burden of proving undue influence.  *In re Estate of Stockdale*, 196 N.J. 275, 303 (2008).  Undue influence is a form of fraud that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  *In re Niles Trust*, 176 N.J. 282, 300 (2003).  The elements that must be present to raise a presumption of undue influence are: (1) the existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the person alleged to have exerted undue influence, and (2) suspicious circumstances as to the Will.  *In re Estate of Stockdale*, 196 N.J. at 302-03 (2008); *Haynes v. First National State Bank*, 87 N.J. 163, (1981); *In re Miles*, 176 N.J. 282 (2003).  While parent-child relationships are confidential by nature, the mere existence of a family connection does not of itself create a confidential relationship.
[brief] Though, [...] cites to unpublished opinions to argue that “where the motion is not filed within a reasonable time, the Court is not required to reach the merits of a motion to vacate under Rule 4:50-1(d),” [...]’s argument is at odds with the holding in Davis.  See [...]’s Br. at 18.  Davis held that where the relief sought is a reopening of the case (as opposed to dismissal), where there is “doubt about defendant[‘s] actual receipt of the process,” and where the record shows “absence of evidence establishing willful disregard of the court’s process,” [...]’s “application should have been treated indulgently,” with a “liberal disposition. ”  Davis, 317 N.J. Super. at 100 (quoting Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964); Mancini v. Eds ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 132 N.J. 330, 336 (1993); Goldfarb, 54 N.J. Super. at 92).  Thus, the trial court’s April 8, 2024 Order should be reversed.  POINT II.
[brief] The trial court stated:  ... under U.S. v. Franks (sic) you say I should need an evidentiary hearing as to what [...] did.  All right.  I'm denying that because respectfully I think that's sort of a red herring that you're asking the trial court to chase and I'm not going to chase it.  Because I think what [...] did was valid.  He didn't authorize or arrest or a search of a particular person, your client.  But the, the purpose of that search warrant was to try to get evidence related to the homicide concerning [...], [...], and also the 2013 Gray Hyundai.  And that's what he did.  And you have to show me that ... warrant was invalid for you to have some evidentiary hearing as to what [...] did or didn't do.  And that hasn't been shown.  But even if you did show it, you ... just had your investigative hearing, okay?  So either way I want to I want to be clear when someone is trying to review this.  Procedurally on a motion to suppress, one executed by a judge and one motion made by a defendant on a warrantless search what I'm finding and why I'm finding it.  Do you understand that, sir?  I know you don't ... agree with it.  But do you understand what I'm doing procedurally?  (1T95-18 to 96-18) (emphasis added).  The trial court stated: "... this is one where really the State got lucky in my opinion.  But I don't think the State acted improperly in regards to what they did."  (1T97-20 to 23).  B.
[brief] After giving adequate public notice, on August 29, 2019, a Fairness Hearing and Hearing to Amend the Final Judgment of Compliance and Repose was held before [...] to review the changes to the plan for redevelopment of the CF Hopewell site and development of the Deer Valley site.  Pa230; T3. 30:1-4.  Neither [...] nor [...] appeared at this hearing.  T2.37:12-15.  [...] approved the amended plan and granted a Final Judgment of Compliance and Repose to the Township.
[brief] It also had to address final Trust admin responsibilities, as Discharged Trustee, that might also require a Court approved amount for a Trust Reserve.  See prior Brief, p. 4, 1st 3 paragraphs, for a more accurate history & purpose regarding the Verified Complaint.  See its next 4 paragraphs regarding the filed Exceptions & Surrogate Audit that were omitted from his Faulty History.  My Oct. 26, 2022 Certification (p. 9, par. 27, to p. 15, par. 41) (170a-176a) for Motion for Reconsideration refuted with substantiated facts regarding [...]’s Aug. 12, 2022 Certification “asserting that the Appellant's exceptions were insufficient as a matter of law.