ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 주소 확인  2.  Address Verification [예/Yes]  [아니요/No] 귀하가 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 가중 범죄적 성접촉, 2C:13-1c(2)에 의한 유괴 a) 또는 그런 범행의 미수에 대해 유죄를 인정하며, 선고를 내릴 때,판사가 CN 10080-Korean 2/8 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Korean page 2/8  귀하의 행위가 반복적이고 충동적인 행동 양식을 나타내는 특성이 있었다고 판정하는 경우, 귀하는 일마다 해당 법 집행 기관에 귀하의 주소를 확인해 90 주거나, 또는 판사가 귀하의 행위가 반복적이고 충동적인 행동 양식을 나타내는 특성이 없다고 판정하는 경우, 년에 한 번씩 귀하의 주소를 확인해 1 주어야 한다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or any attempt to commit any of these crimes and at sentencing the court finds that your conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior you must verify your address with the appropriate law enforcement agency every 90 days or if the court finds your conduct is not characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, you must verify your address annually?
[brief] And again, as a reminder, none of the $1.4 million spent on appeal work was included in the fee application.  But to vacate and mandate denial of any fees here if this reviewing court disagrees with the quantification would be inequitable and create perverse incentives.  Well-funded judgment debtors would be incentivized to do just what [...] and [...] did here – secrete their assets and use them to fund post-judgment litigation and obstruction and make the costs of enforcement so high that a court reviewing a fee application deems it so excessive as to be unrecoverable at all.
[brief] (1T 92; 1T 94).  Subsequently, a live lineup took place one week later in Paterson, where [...] again identified [...] as the individual who held the gun to his head.  (1T 95-96).  [...] was presented with a photo array and identified the man who did not have a mask on as [...].  (1T 177-3).  She also went to Paterson for a live lineup with her husband and son, and identified the man not wearing the mask.  The individual she identified in this lineup procedure was not [...].  (1T 179).  She testified that she only learned of [...]’s alleged involvement when she was told by law enforcement several months later.
[brief] In general, “[t]he reliability of properly admitted eyewitness identification, like the credibility of the other parts of the prosecution's case is a matter for the jury. ”  *Foster v. California*, 394 U.S. 440, 443 n.2, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129 n.2, 22 L. Ed.2d 402, 407 n.2 (1969).  However, “in some cases the procedures leading to an eyewitness identification may be so defective as to make the identification constitutionally inadmissible as a matter of law.
[brief] [...] : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW Plaintiff-Appellant, : NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, STATE : DOCKET NO. [...] OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT : OF ENVIRONMENTAL : PROTECTION, [...], [...], KAREN : FELL, [...], [...], YVONNE : HERNANDEZ, [...], [...], NICK :  DIMARTINO, KELLEY : CUSHMAN, [...], [...], AND JOHN :  DOES 1-10 BEING AGENTS, SERVANTS AND EMPLOYEES : OF DEFENDANTS AS A : CONTINUING INVESTIGATION : MAY REVEAL (WHO ARE : FICTICIOUSLY NAMED : BECAUSE THEIR TRUE IDENTITIES : ARE UNKNOWN) (ALL : DEFENDANTS NAMED HEREIN : IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND : OFFICIAL CAPACITIES), Defendant-Respondents.
[brief] (5T11:19 to 12:22; 8T87:6-17; Pa0358.)  Defendants, however, waited months to notify Plaintiff and its personnel of the change in LSRPs.  (4T45:20 to 47:5.)  During a June 29, 2020 phone call between [...] and [...], [...] advised [...] that the RIR and delineation were complete and that he would provide [...] with a draft of the RIR.  (4T46:20 to 47:5.)  Around the same time, [...] requested to meet with [...] and [...] in July to review the draft RIR, however, [...] indicated that he was not ready to meet, and the meeting never occurred.  (4T46:17 to 47:18; 8T87:18 to 88:16; Pa0360.)  Despite retaining [...] as the registered LSRP in March 2020, [...] did not provide him with the project files and draft RIR until approximately November 2020, at which time [...] asked [...] to review the draft RIR and provide recommendations before it was submitted to the NJDEP.
[brief] 1T21:8-18.  [...] was given the title of President and CEO; plaintiff was given the title of Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer; and [...] was given the title of Senior Vice President of Business Development.  1T22:14-15; 2T130:7-10, 203:25-204:1; Da57, 68, 69, 74, 77 (reflects [...] status as CEO and President).
[brief] The plaintiff in *Maison* sued [...] and a bus driver, alleging negligence that caused her harm while she was a passenger on the bus.  *Maison v. [...] Corp.*, 246 N.J. 270, 274 (2021).  Addressing the interaction between the Tort Claims Act and the JTCL, the Court explained that the Tort Claims Act gives “public entities and public employees – unlike private companies and their employees – [the benefit] of multiple immunities that shield them from liability. ”  *Id.* at 289.  However, the Court emphasized that the Tort Claims Act does establish a comparative-fault scheme that “strictly [limits] the liability of public entities and public employees to the percentage of fault directly attributable to them. ”  *Id.* at 306.  Thus, when a public entity or public employee “is determined to be a tortfeasor in any cause of action along with one or more other tortfeasors, the public entity or public employee shall be liable for no more than that percentage share of the damages which is equal to the percentage of the negligence attributable to that public entity or public employee. ”  *Ibid.*  As such, the Tort Claims Act overrides the JTCL to protect public entities in that specific context.  This is not what occurred here, either.
[brief] The Trial Court set forth two rationales for its decision.  First, the Trial Court held that *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp.*, 219 N.J. 430, 435 (2014), which dealt with arbitration provisions in consumer contracts, required that this contact between lawyers contain a provision stating that the lawyers understood that by agreeing to the dispute resolution provision of the contract they would be waiving their right to have their disputes adjudicated in Court.  The second rationale the Trial Court held that the use of the verb ‘may’, rendered Paragraph 23 permissive and required that both parties agreed to go to arbitration for the clause to be effective.  The Court’s decision was erroneous, and its rationale is unsustainable.  First, *Atalese* does not require a written waiver in a contract provision written by an experienced litigator against whom it is being enforced.  Second, the Trial Court’s construction of the Plaintiff’s dispute resolution clause renders two clauses of the Shareholder’s Agreement meaningless—therefore a violation of both general and specific rules of contract construction.  Defendant/Appellant looks to this Court to correct this error and remand this matter for an entry of an Order compelling the arbitration the parties agreed to in their Shareholder’s Agreement.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...] was stopped and searched because an anonymous tipster called 9-1-1 and stated that a man matching his description possessed a weapon.  There was no corroboration of this claim.  Therefore, there was insufficient information to justify the stop or the search.  The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.  Unfortunately, it took almost two and a half years from when [...] first moved to suppress and for an evidentiary hearing on that motion until that hearing actually happened.  To get his day in court, [...] had to appeal to this Court, which in March remanded the matter for the hearing, which should have occurred in 2022.  After the March 2024 hearing, the trial court suppressed the evidence.  It found the only witness proffered by the State incredible and held that the 9-1-1 call was not corroborated by any information.  The trial court’s discretion is at its zenith when it makes credibility findings.  As unhappy as the State may be with those findings, there is no basis to overturn them.  And the trial court correctly ruled the remaining evidence in the case—the second-hand recitation of the 9-1-1 call and the surveillance video presented by the State—did not provide the corroboration necessary to give rise to reasonable suspicion.  The trial court’s order is legally sound and should not be disturbed.  With its affirmance, the case against [...]—who is mere months away from completing his maximum sentence—should finally end.
[directive] N/A Yes No 19 | P a g e Appendix B Appendix B: SAFE Survey Data  The link below includes survey responses received during the SAFE Survey period.  Duplicate submissions have been removed from the responses.  County Prosecutor’s answered two surveys – one focusing on policies surrounding the SART Process, and the law enforcement survey which asks questions about case volumes in addition to policies.  Because the policy questions were identical on both submissions, County Prosecutor responses are included in the law enforcement survey.
[brief] Appellant incorporates by reference statements made via his points one to six as if fully set forth within.  Impartiality of a judge as a right to trial was guaranteed upon the appellant, not only by the 6th Amendment in criminal proceedings, but as well by the 14th Amendment and perhaps the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment in civil proceedings.  Appellant believes that the trial judge erred as he denied the disqualification asked from him.  (Point Eight)
[brief] Q.  When the municipal alliance job was taken from you did think that was another thing being done to trigger your anxiety and your depression and to retaliate against you for getting counsel?  A.  Yes, I felt that after the events that took place in September on the 29th, after that I felt that, you know, they were just doing all sorts of things.  I felt like they were trying to come up with any reason to fire me and I—you know, anything at all and to make me miserable…  (4T:148:25-149:1-10).  Equally critical, Plaintiff’s trial testimony misleadingly created the impression to the jury that she felt “exposed because everyone knows about your underlying health condition. ”  4T:154:14-25.  In her Complaint, Plaintiff never pleaded that any of the Township Defendants knew about her alleged anxiety disability, or why she took FMLA leave in February 2018 or March 2019.
[brief] This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  8  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE HE WAS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW UNDER THE CONDITIONAL PLEA RULE.  (3T 26-21 to 52-10; Da 75)  ...........................................  8  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................
[brief] Faced with [...]’s Deposition Testimony, [...] Concocts a Facially Absurd Attempt to Revise his False Factual Narrative  After withdrawing his baseless claims based upon the Forged Agreement, [...] offered up a new version of his narrative.  (Pa25 at ¶64).  This time, [...] argued that he, [...], [...], and [...] met at [...]’s office on January 14, 2014, that [...] merely affixed her notary stamp at a later date.  (Id.).  In this regard, [...] took the facially absurd position, that he was planning to testify during his deposition about how “Ellen [...] witnessed [[...]] and [...] sign the January 14, 2014 agreement on January 14, 2014, but that she did not stamp the agreement on that date, and she affixed her stamp on a later date. ” (Pa25 at ¶65).  On December 7, 2017, [...] provided a sworn affidavit to set the record straight and, in doing so, eviscerated [...]’s second false narrative.  (Pa26 at ¶66).  In her affidavit, [...] unequivocally stated that “[...], who I have represented in the past, met with me and asked me to witness and notarize his signature and that of his son [...] on the Agreement.  [...] was not with him. ” (Pa26 at ¶67).  Thus, there remains no ambiguity that [...] repeatedly and unrepentantly attempted to commit a fraud upon the Court in the Prior Litigation.
[brief] In 2010, an Essex County Grand Jury issued Indictment No. [...], charging [...] with two counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l (counts one and five); two counts of fourth-degree aggravated assault with a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-l(b)(4) (counts two and six); two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (counts three and seven); and two counts of second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (counts four and eight).  State v. Simmons, No. A-4938-12, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 306 (App. Div. Feb. 11, 2016).  (Da12)  Counts one through four stemmed from a robbery of a [...] store on December 3, 2009, while counts five through eight stemmed from a robbery of an [...] Store on December 5, 2009.  (Da12)  [...] was separately charged under --- 2  The following abbreviations will be used:  Da - Defendant-Appellant’s Appendix  1T - Feb. 3, 2012 (original sentencing)  2T - Apr. 25, 2016 (first resentencing, after remand from No. A-4938-12)  3T - May 3, 2017 (SOA)  4T - Mar. 2, 2018 (second resentencing, after remand from No. A-5166-15)  5T - Mar. 11, 2019 (PCR)  6T - Feb. 8, 2021 (SOA)  7T – July 7, 2022 (oral argument for third resentencing, after remand from A-2107-19)  8T – Sept. 30, 2022 (status conference for third resentencing)  9T – Oct. 31, 2023 (SOA)  PSR - Presentence Report Indictment No. [...] with two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of certain crimes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b); count one pertained to the [...] robbery, and count two pertained to the [...] robbery.  (Da1-3,12)  This appeal concerns the sentence from count one of Indictment No. [...].
[brief] *(RAISED BELOW: 3T.39:15-25 through 63:1-19)*  Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal asks:  “1.  Did the trial court err in finding the adoption of Ordinance No. 2022-17 was not arbitrary and capricious?  2.  Was there sufficient credible evidence in the record to support Ordinance 2011-17 (sic)?” (Da08).  This challenge is predicated on Plaintiffs’ false claim that “the record shows there was little to no evidence supporting Ordinance 2022-17,” (Pb21) and its continued erroneous legal argument that the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”) requires that record to “be supported by ‘substantial credible evidence. ’”  (Id.)  The claim misstates the law; more importantly, it ignores the record.  It also fails to recognize that the Township Committee enjoys considerable discretion in its adoption of redevelopment legislation.  Here, as the trial court concluded, the Committee’s adoption of the Redevelopment ordinances was not arbitrary or capricious, and there was more than adequate support in the record.  A.
[brief] Pa 92, 157.\(^1\)  On October 12, 2022, the Planning Board conducted a hearing on the proposed amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  At that hearing, [...], P.P., the Borough’s Planner and author of the Borough’s 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report, Pa 7-8, provided testimony that:  [O]ur role as the planning board is to review the plan for consistency with the Borough’s master plan.  And there are a number of … objectives in the master plan that are directly related to the -- the Ford Avenue Redevelopment Plan, the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report.  [Pa 74].  Mr. Barree then proceeded to examine the pertinent “Milltown Planning Objectives” provisions of Section D of the Master Plan with regard to the proposed amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, beginning with Milltown Planning Objective Two of the Master Plan (“Future plans should provide for more parks and open spaces within the Borough. ”), stating:  \(^1\)  Plaintiffs, at Pb 13, ascribe particular significance to what they characterize as the Borough’s failure to defend the First Ordinance, and suggest that the Borough’s decision to readopt the Ordinance authorizing the Amended Redevelopment Plan constitutes an admission by the Borough that there was an error in the first adoption of same.
[brief] The Governor’s Office responded to [...] on March 21, 2022, advising [...] that it was not the custodian of the requested records.  (Pa31).  On July 19, 2022, [...] continued his pursuit by attempting to submit a request to conduct DNA tests to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG).  (Pa142; Ra12-14).  [...]’s request was not addressed to OAG’s custodian of records or an employee authorized to accept such requests, as required under N.J.A.C. 13:1E-2.4, but was instead addressed to “[...]/Gov. Records [] [...],” the Executive Director of the Government Records Council (GRC).  (Pa44-45; Ra12-14).  As of September 2022, OAG had no record of [...] or any interested party submitting an OPRA request.  (Pa44).  C.  The Complaint and Subsequent Submissions  On September 28, 2022, [...] filed a verified complaint and order to show cause (OTSC), “pursuant to [OPRA] and the common law right to access public records” seeking a declaratory judgment to allow testing of the historical items.
[brief] ## INDEX TO APPENDIX | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Appendix Page # | |--------------------------------------|------------|-----------------| | Judgment of Divorce | 3/17/83 | Da 1-2, Pa 26-29 | | Civil Action Order | 3/20/90 | Da 3-4 | | Application for Federal College Student Loans: | 7/15/96 | Da 5-6 | | (Copy): Perkins and Stafford Student Loans from: | | | | (my son): [...] | | | | NJ Child Support Case Information | 2/28/02 | Da 7 | | Passaic County Probation Division, | 1/01/10 - | Da 8 | | Child Support Enforcement | 12/31/10 | | | Passaic County Probation Division | 1/1/11 - | Da 9 | | Child Support Enforcement | 12/31/11 | | | Passaic County Probation Division | 1/1/12 - | Da 10 | | Child Support Enforcement | 12/31/12 | | | Middlesex County Superior Court | 5/01/03 | Da 11 | | Probation Dept/Chancery Division | | | | Order to Transfer Collection Enforcement to: | | | | Passaic County Probation Division | | | | Ordered By: [...] | | | ## INDEX TO APPENDIX | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Appendix Page # | |---------------------------------------|----------|-----------------| | Motion for Stay from Appellant: | 2/26/24 | Da 11 | | [...] | | | | Docket #: [...] | | | | Paragraph 3, Lines: 4-7 | | | | Paragraph 5, Lines: 2-3 | | | | Civil Action Order: Claims for Relief: DENIED | 2/16/24 | Da 12-Da 20 | | By: [...], | | | | Middlesex County Superior Court | | | | Chancery Division, Family Part | | | | Docket #: [...] | | | | Order on Motion by Appellant/Defendant: | 4/04/24 | Da 21-Da 22 | | [...] | | | | Motion for Stay: DENIED | | | | By: Honorable Judge(s) | | | | [...] | | | | [...] | | | | Superior Court of NJ, Appellate Division | | | | Docket #: [...] | | | ## INDEX TO APPENDIX ### ARGUMENT SUPPORTIVE DOCUMENTS | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Appendix Page # | |---------------------------------------|------------|-----------------| | Motion for Stay from Appellant: [...] | 2/26/24 | Pa 50 | | Certification on Pg. 1, Paragraph 3, Lines: 4-7 | | Exhibit 5 | | Motion for Stay from Appellant: [...] | 2/26/24 | Exhibit 1 | | Certification on Pg. 6, Paragraph 3, Lines 3-8 | | 7 | | Motion for Stay from Appellant: [...] | 2/26/24 | Exhibit 2 | | Certification on Pg. 6, Paragraph 5, Lines 1-8 | | 8 | | Motion for Stay from Appellant: [...] | 2/26/24 | Exhibit 3 | | Certification on Pg. 7, Paragraph 2, Lines 9-12 | | 9 | | Motion for Stay from Appellant: [...] | 2/26/24 | Exhibit 4 | | Appellant requesting Court to refund monies Garnished from 1990-2023.
[brief] ’”**  Pa053 (emphasis added).  Pursuant to Section 8(g) of the Settlement Agreement, “the Board shall promptly deliberate on the SPA and vote.  Following the vote of the Board, the Board shall **memorialize its decision** regarding the SPA in **a written resolution, which shall be adopted by the Board within the earlier of 30 days or the second meeting following the approval meeting. ”**  Pa056 (emphasis added).  The Settlement Agreement specifically noted that the:
[brief] 10  POINT I THE MOTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CONSENT SEARCH OF [...]’ CAR WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE, DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOP, POLICE FAILED TO DEVELOP REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL WRONGDOING BEFORE ASKING [...] FOR CONSENT TO SEARCH..................................................................................  10  A.  The Prior Investigation Provided Police With A Motive To Conduct A Pretextual Traffic Stop.  It Did Not Furnish Police With Reasonable Suspicion To Stop The Car, Independent Of The Traffic Infractions..................................................................................  12  B.  The Court Correctly Found That The Detectives’ Hunch Did Not Evolve Into Reasonable Suspicion To Request Consent For A Vehicle Search.  ...........................................  17 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................
[directive] In determine to 2C:14-20 under N.J.S.A. established registry central check the shall arrest the Assault the Sexual to pursuant order issued protective a to subject is defendant the whether 2016)).  (effective 7, May 147 (P.L. c. 2015, -21 to 2C:14-13 N.J.S.A. Act, Protection Survivor or acomplaint-summons issue to deciding whether before made shall be query mandatory  This a discourage or to preclude construed shall herein be Nothing acomplaint-warrant. for apply to all cases, in 2C:14-20 N.J.S.A. under established registry central the checking from officer police to officers direct  Prosecutor may County a and offenses, sexual involving cases just not and specify.  prosecutor may the as cases of types such in or all cases, in registry central that check History.  Defendants' Juvenile Adult Young Check to Requirement 4.2.5
[directive] A plaintiff is a person or corporation [or other entity] who has initiated a lawsuit.  Do you have a bias for or against a plaintiff simply because he or she has brought a lawsuit?  If the answer to Question No. 10 is affirmative, ask the following question at sidebar:  If so, what are your feelings?  11.  (a)  A defendant is a person or corporation [or other entity] against whom a lawsuit has been brought.  Do you have a bias for or against a defendant simply because a lawsuit has been brought against him or her?  Standards for Jury Selection
[brief] a.  [...] sought a revision of their Agreement based on fraud and sought to reopen the settlement to insert a “Restoration Provision. ”  To the contrary, Respondent seeks to enforce a provision to strike terms as required by Par. 18 of the agreement (Da19).  b.  [...] concerns addition of terms not previously in the contact after a monetary settlement was finalized.  [...] did not contain the clear mandate to strike any offending term as found in the within Agreement (Da19, Par. 18).  c.  Respondent here does not seek such an amendment or inclusion of any term as did [...], but instead seeks to strike the terms under language of the agreement itself as it is written.