ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1T83:8-25.  However, that ballot was not added in to the election returns which were certified showing a tie.  [...] testified that upon preparing the reorganization materials it came to her attention that it was not added in but should have been.  1T89:16-21.  On March 3, 2025, [...] emailed the [...], asking questions about how to handle a tie, noting that the disputed ballot was not added in, but not questioning whether it should have been or how to fix an alleged mistake.  Pa110.  Without waiting for a response from the [...], or speaking to any superior, commissioner or attorney, on March 4, 2025 [...] sent an email to the business administrator [...] and [...] stating that she had unilaterally decided to fix her alleged mistake and added the vote into the total which changed the result of the election.  Pa96.  Within less than 90 minutes, and without speaking to any other commissioner, the Business Administrator, the Board’s lawyer, or anyone, or conducting any type of independent review or analysis of any of the issues potentially involved [...] authorized his signature to be placed on the updated results.  Pa100; 1T75:2-14.  Business Administrator Kubiel, [...]’s supervisor, indicated that after speaking with the Board’s attorney, there was no ability to modify election results and that standing to change them was not held by the Board.  Pa90.  Nevertheless, [...], not [...] took it upon himself to call up a “friend of mine that is a lawyer,” to seek legal advice, and was apparently informed that they could and should include the vote and change the election.  1T109:3-9.  [...] testified that he did not discuss this with any of the commissioners, the Business Administrator, or the actual Board Attorney.  1T109:24-110:1.  However, apparently unconcerned about the advice from the actual Board Attorney, or even his own authority, [...] authorized the signed results to be published on the website and to notify the [...].  Pa94.  The staff complied and the election results were update.  Pa3.  No one notified [...], however, somehow [...] was quickly sworn in by [...], (Pa108; 1T112:4-23), although [...] did not take his seat at the dais the next day at the reorganization meeting.  1T113:9-11.  The Board went into closed session without [...], where the Board was informed by the Board lawyer that the attempt to appoint [...] in the manner done was illegal.  1T116:15-117:9.  However, more than halfway through the meeting [...] left his seat in the audience, sat at the dais, and then the meeting was closed shortly after.  1T113:9-11.
[brief] [...], an attorney-in-fact for [...] (“[...]”), appeals from the Department’s issuance on December 20, 2022, of Bulletin No. 22-11 (the “Bulletin”).  (Ja1-2).  [...] is a reciprocal insurance exchange that received its Certificate of Authority as an insurance company on December 23, 2002, effective January 1, 2003.  (Ja77-80).  A reciprocal exchange consists of subscribers, an attorney-in-fact, and the exchange.  It is governed by N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 to -19 (the “Reciprocal Exchange Act” or the “REA”), which dates back to 1945.  Under the REA, Individuals, partnerships, trustees and all corporations of this State, herein designated “subscribers,” are hereby authorized to exchange reciprocal or interinsurance contracts with each other and with individuals, partnerships, trustees and corporations of other States, districts, provinces and countries, for any or all of the kinds of business for which a company may be formed or authorized to transact under the provisions of chapter seventeen of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes, except life insurance.  [N.J.S.A. 17:50-1.]  Because the Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts are closely related, they are presented together for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[brief] (Pb9).  But this argument fails because the Board provided adequate notice of the law.  The only express notice requirement contained in the Ricci Act provides that the Board must “notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  On August 7, 2019, the [...] satisfied this notice requirement when it added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  This statute was enacted to ensure that a plaintiff seeking to assert a professional malpractice claim can make a threshold showing that a claim is meritorious so courts can “weed out” meritless claims.  See Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 350–51 (2001) (citing Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998)).  The statute requires that a professional malpractice claim against certain licensed professionals must be supported by an affidavit from a similarly licensed professional affirming that the defendant’s actions deviated from accepted standards of care.  Licensed professionals are defined by the statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26, as individuals licensed in one of the fifteen delineated professions or a health care facility.  Subsection (o) applies to insurance producers, and New Jersey courts have held that this includes title insurance producers such as [...].  See, e.g., Triarsi v. BSC Grp. Servs., LLC, 422 N.J. Super. 104, 111 (2011) (citing Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 (2002); James Waller v. Joseph Lomax, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1504 (App. Div. 2010).  Consistent with this requirement, Plaintiff filed Affidavits of Merit respecting both Defendants on October 7, 2020.
[brief] Affidavit of [...] | 105 | | Exhibit P-20  Judgment of Conviction | 108 | | Exhibit P-21  Sentencing Memorandum, US Attorney | 113 | | Exhibit P-22  Guilty Plea Transcript | 118 | | Appellate Decision [...] (June 27, 2023) | 143 | | Dismissal Order (October 2, 2023) | 163 | | Notice of Appeal | 164 | --- 1
[brief] The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s rulings and [...]’s conviction.  Regarding the motion to suppress, the court noted that the trial court had specifically rejected [...]’s argument that the stop was based solely on defendants’ race and sex.  Rather, the Appellate Division found that the trial court pointed out that the suspects were reported to be African-American and, therefore, there was a reasonable and particularized suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of a vehicle with African-American men inside when that vehicle was seen a short distance from the 7-Eleven in the early morning when there were few other cars on the road.  The Appellate Division concluded that “those factual findings are supported by the evidence in the record” and that there was therefore no basis for reversal.  The court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling that seizure of the clothing from the backseat of the vehicle was justified by the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.  This Court denied [...]’s petition for certification seeking review of the denial of his motion to suppress.  240 N.J. 22 (2019).  C. [...] -- Trial, Guilty Plea and Sentencing
[brief] On April 19, 2024, Appellants submitted correspondence directly to [...] that outlined their opposition to arbitration and forecasted that they would apply to the Court to vacate the existing Order referring this matter to Arbitration (Dr42-43).  On May 8, 2024, [...] filed a motion to stay proceedings until such time that the pending Arbitration is completed, and [...] moved for sanctions against Appellants.  [...] alleged that Appellants, in violation of both the Contract and the Consent Order to which they willingly agreed, refused to initiate and participate in Arbitration proceedings.
[brief] …………… Ja084-Ja095 12.  [...] Code, Chapter 91, SM Zone, JSICR #23(d) (Exhibit D to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  …………… Ja096-Ja099 13.  [...] 1999 Master Plan, JSICR #23(a) (Exhibit E to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  …………… Ja100-Ja140 14.  Defendant [...] Planner’s Review Letter, dated December 20, 2021, JSICR #44 (Exhibit F to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  …………… Ja141-Ja154 15.  Defendant [...] Engineer’s Review Letter, dated December 17, 2021, JSICR #43 (Exhibit H to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  …………… Ja155-Ja163 16.  [...] Ordinance 2017-11, adopting the “Redevelopment Plan for Interstate 295 & Florence-Columbus Road Area”, adopted August 16, 2017, JSICR #41 (Exhibit I to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  …………… Ja164-Ja182 17.  [...]’s Letter to [...], with attachments, dated November 1, 2016, JSICR #23(j) (Exhibit J to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  …………… Ja183-Ja196 18.  “Northern U.S. 130 Regional Transportation and Circulation Plan”  Excerpt, dated June 15, 2020, JSICR #23(i) (Exhibit K to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  ……………  Ja197-Ja215 19.  [...] “Community Impact Statement: Wainwright Tract”, dated October 5, 2021, JSICR #17 (Exhibit L to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  ……………  Ja216-Ja221 20.  Trial Court’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Relief, issued October 27, 2023  ……………………………………………………  Ja222 21.  Notice of Appeal, filed December 7, 2023  ………………………………  Ja223-Ja225 22.  Case Information Statement, filed December 7, 2023 ..................  Ja226-Ja229  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Likewise, the trial court appropriately found it irrelevant whether the Assistant Prosecutor had personal knowledge of [...]’s notes prior to their discovery.  Prosecutor’s offices are required to establish "procedures and regulations... to ensure communications of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it. ”  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).  Under Brady, all material that is relevant to a prosecution must be communicated and shared with the trial prosecutor to exercise a sound informed judgment on behalf of the State to ensure fairness.  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995).
[brief] This ruling is consistent with California’s standard jury charge involving “multiple causes,” which provides that when a defendant’s “negligence [is] a substantial factor in causing [plaintiff’s] harm, then….  [defendant] cannot avoid responsibility just because some other person, condition or event was also a substantial factor in causing [plaintiff’s] harm.  CACI No. 431.  New Jersey also uses “substantial factor” wording in its standard proximate cause charge:  When a defendant’s negligence is a “substantial factor that singly, or in combination with other causes, brought about the… injury/loss/harm claimed…. [t]he mere circumstance that there may also be another cause of the… injury/loss/harm does not mean that there cannot be a finding of proximate cause. ”  N.J. Charge No. 6.12.  This charge is fully consistent with application of Appleman’s Rule in finding coverage for the insured’s negligence.
[brief] (Da14-15); (1T)²  On October 26, 2023, Defendants filed Notices of Appeal.  (Da1-4)  On October 27, 2023, Defendants filed Motions on Short Notice for a Stay Pending Appeal to prevent the Township’s acquisition of Defendants’ properties and --- ² 1T = transcript of October 20, 2023 2T = transcript of November 3, 2023 conveyance of same to the private developer pending the outcome of the appeal before this Court.  On November 3, 2023, the trial court entered Orders denying Defendants’ Motions for a Stay Pending Appeal.  (Da16)  On November 7, 2023, Defendants filed Applications for Permission to file Emergent Motions for a Stay Pending Appeal before this Court, which this Court granted.  This Court then denied these motions.  This appeal follows.
[brief] [...] [...] [...], [...]  Tel: [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents, [...] and [...]  Of Counsel and on Brief  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ...........................................................................................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iv  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX  .....................................................................................  vi  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF TRANSCRIPT(S) ......................................................................... ix  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................
[brief] See Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019), cited in New Jersey Standards for Appellate Review, [...] and [...], August 2022 version, p. 25, par. B.  Further, as noted on page 26 of New Jersey Standards: If a judge makes a discretionary decision but acts under a misconception of the applicable law or misapplies it, the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary act, not subject to the usual deference. ” (Citing Summit Plaza Associates v. Kolta, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020)).  In Wyzykowski v. Rivas, 132 N.J. 509, 518-520 (1993), it is emphasized that boards may review and evaluate factual assertions and reach reasonable conclusions, which will be afforded due deference by a reviewing court.  However, legal determinations are not entitled to a presumption of validity and are subject to de novo review by the court.  Therefore, a de novo review of the relevant facts and law must now be undertaken by this court.
[brief] Police Department Record of Booking 2/20/22 (Attached at Pa074)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa303)  Incident Data Type/Offense as of 3/6/2020 involving [...] (Attached at Pa302)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa022)  HIT Confirmation Wanted Person 02/20/2020 (Attached at Pa040)  Letter From Edison Police Records to [...] 7/29/2020 (Attached at Pa051)  Letter From Edison Police Records to [...] 7/07/2020 (Attached at Pa071)  Letter From [...] to Highland Park 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa056)  Exhibit C-12 to [...]’s Certification Letter From [...] to Highland Park 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa056)
[brief] There, it declared unenforceable an arbitration clause in a consumer contract which first referred to mediation and then to “mandatory arbitration” as the exclusive means to resolve all disputes (“Any and all disputes, claims and causes of action… shall be resolved exclusively by the [...] in the State of New Jersey under its Commercial Mediation Rules. ”)  The Kernahan Court found the clause to be confusing, not written in plain language (as required by the Plain Language Act) and not notifying the consumer that she was waiving her right to proceed in court.  The Court described its Atalese decision as follows:  In Atalese, this Court relied on mutuality of assent as its animating principle when we considered the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate in a consumer contract for debt-adjustment services.  219 N.J. at 442, 99 A.3d 306.  We were guided essentially by twin concerns.  First, the Court was mindful that a consumer is not necessarily versed in the meaning of law-imbued terminology about procedures tucked into form contracts.  Ibid.  The decision repeatedly notes that it is addressing a form consumer contract, not a contract individually negotiated in any way; accordingly, basic statutory consumer contract requirements about plain language implicitly provided the backdrop to the contract under review.  Id at 444, 99 A.3d 306.  And, second, the Court was mindful that plain language explanations of consequences had been required in contract cases in numerous other settings where a person would not be presumed to understand that what was being agreed to constituted a waiver of constitutional or statutory right.  Id. at 442-44, 99 A.3d 306.  At bottom, the judgment in Atalese, which declined to enforce the arbitration provision at issue, is rooted in the notion that mutual assent had not been achieved because the provision did not, in some fashion, explain that it was intended to be a waiver of the right to sue in court.  Id. at 436, 99 A.3d 306.  Because the provision could not be deemed a knowing waiver of the right to sue in court, a meeting of the minds did not occur.  Id. at 435, 447, 99 A.3d 306.  The consumer context of the contract mattered.  Id. at 444, 99 A.3d 306 (referencing N.J.S.A. 56:12-2).  236 N.J. at 319 – 320.  In Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020), the Supreme Court again reaffirmed the importance and continued vitality of its Atalese decision.
[brief] See Quigley Inc. v. Miller Family Farms Inc., 266 N.J. Super. 283, 294-295 (App. Div. 1993); also, Polakoff v. Halphen, 83 N.J. Eq. 126, 128 (Ch. Div. 1914).  A key circumstance confirming that the 1963 Agreement was never intended to and did not convey an easement right is the circumstances of its execution and its form.
[directive] Part Expenditures Relating Forfeiture Program to Record on line the amount of any expenditures relating the forfeiture 8 to (a, program, for security interests, asset maintenance and forfeiture * ' by  The OR1 number the number assigned the Division State for the National Crime is of Police access to (NCIC).  Information Center, - - of Forfeiture New 08 State Program Administration Standard Operating Procadwe 3 Page: Jersey prosecution costs.  Examples of such expenditures include, but are not 1) of limited the care custody expense and disposal seized and forfeited to: 3) 2) filing costs; 4) property; and recording fees; brokerage fees; advertising 5) court appointed custodian fees.
[directive] When practicable, the Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General or Assistant Prosecutor who reviews and approves the Page 4 application should accompany the applicant in appearing before the Judge.  4.  Preference for Appearing Before Superior Court Judges  An Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General or Assistant Prosecutor designated to review search warrant applications pursuant to Section 3 of this Directive shall determine the appropriate Judge before whom the application for a search warrant should be made, and shall assist the applicant in contacting the Judge.  Whenever practicable, the application for a search warrant should be made to a Superior Court Judge, rather than a Municipal Court Judge, since Superior Court Judges have statewide jurisdiction and their probable cause determinations are entitled to substantial deference by other Superior Court Judges who might hear any ensuing motion to suppress physical evidence.  See State v. Kasabuki, 52 N.J. 110 (1968).
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(b)(2) (emphasis added).  The regulations make no mention of a “single accident” and, read broadly as is required, this provision plainly allows an insurance company to consolidate claims.  Thus, an insurance company would not be required to arbitrate fraud in multiple individual arbitrations.  If an insurer, like [...] here, sits back and pays claims for years and then wants to allege fraud, it can consolidate the claims consistent with [...]’s regulations.
[brief] 2T51-21 to 2T52-2.  **Step Two:**  In the second step, [...] analyzed whether the Stachybotrys allegedly growing in [...]’s condo produced trichothecene.  No tests were performed to see if the species Stachybotrys Chararum was present and was actually producing trichothecene, which is important because the presence of this mold does not mean it is producing trichothecene.  2T53-24 to 2T54-2; Pa572.  (“Importantly, the mere presence of [a mold capable of producing a mycotoxin] should not be taken as evidence that the mold was producing any mycotoxin”).  Pa572.  Indeed, only about one-third of --- \(^1\) [...] was unaware of how raw spores are extrapolated to cubic meters and was unaware of the significant mathematical error in [...]’s report.  3T125-15-21.  Stachybotrys Chartarum isolates are even capable of producing trichothecene.  2T54-16-18.  Based on these facts, [...] concluded that there was insufficient evidence to meet the second step in his exposure pathway analysis, i.e., there was no evidence that Stachybotrys Chartarum was producing trichothecene.  2T54-19-23.
[brief] Once he began that endeavor, his sister located pages of the documents in a matter of days, and he found at least one full agreement in his own email in about an hour.  Here, if defendant had conducted the same search at any point during the four years between his indictment and the start of trial, he would have easily located the same evidence long before trial—documents whose existence he should have known about, since he purportedly signed them.  The trial court’s finding that documents located after an hour-long email search could not have been located by reasonable diligence at any point in the four years before trial clearly misses the mark—it ignores the fact that defendant made no attempt whatsoever to locate these documents before trial, when he could easily have done so.  Because defendant failed to act with reasonable diligence in locating the allegedly new evidence before or during trial, the trial court’s order granting a new trial should be reversed by this Court.
[directive] a.  The [...] shall compile information concerning the best way in which to plan and conduct undercover school operations, and shall from time to time make this information and associated recommendations available to all county prosecutors.  The [...] shall be available at all times to provide technical assistance and advice concerning any aspect of an undercover school operation.  See also SNAP Directive 5.11 (State Police will, subject to the availability of resources, make available undercover teams to support undercover school operations).  b.