ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] a.  The Trial Court Found that [...] Personally Served [...]  After a two-day bench trial, the Trial Court found the “testimony of [[...]] to be credible”  T4 98:5-6 and that “service of process was effected” on [...].  T4 101:4-5.  First, the Trial Court found that it was immaterial that [...] did not remember the exact details of “this particular instance” of serving [...].  T4 98:7-8, 98:20-21.  [...] has effectuated thousands of services of process in his twenty years as a process server.  T4 10:3; 27:11.  Indeed, the Trial Court found that [...] "does many, many of these services a day"  T4 98:10-11.  The Trial Court relied on [...]’s credible testimony regarding the contents of his Affidavit of Service that was made based on [...]’s personal knowledge contemporaneous with his personal service of [...] on 8/23/2021: “whatever is in the affidavit .. is what took place. ”  T4:98:9-10.  Second, the Court found that [...] served “somebody [who] indicated her name was [...].
[brief] **The Incident**  [...] was familiar with the incident location and knew that the area was an active train line prior to the incident.  Compare Pa158, ¶45 with Pa763, ¶45; Pa430:5-431:1, 441:16-442:6.  From 2015 up through the date of the incident on December 24, 2019, Ms. Flood, worked Monday through Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 6:00/6:30 p.m., at [...], located at [...], which was across the street from the Exchange Place train station and area where the incident occurred.  Compare Pa158, ¶46 with Pa763, ¶46.  Approximately 5 minutes before the incident occurred, Ms. Flood walked through the intersection of York Street and Hudson Street and the same part of the pedestrian railroad crossing where the incident occurred.  Compare Pa158, ¶47 with Pa763, ¶47.  HBLR Train 81, the train involved in the collision, was being operated by Defendant [...] and was scheduled to arrive at the Exchange Place station at 4:34 p.m. on the day of the accident, approximately 25 seconds after the accident occurred.  Compare Pa154, ¶16 with Pa762, ¶16; and Pa158, ¶48 with Pa763, ¶48.  Prior to the collision, [...] was operating Train 81 with the headlights illuminated and travelling north on Track 1 in the same direction that Ms. Flood was walking.  Compare Pa159, ¶50 with Pa764, ¶50.  As Train 81 approached the crossing, it had the proceed signal and the right of way to proceed into and through the crossing.
[brief] In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that:  One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.  This requirement "avoids parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt ... and it precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction."
[directive] Ill. Prior Criminal Record No  Yes  Do you have a prior indictable/felony conviction in this State, another State, or the United States?  If yes, where: of  If with this application that includes compelling reasons that justify consideration this yes, you must include a separate page application.  D Yes  Did you attach a separate page to this application?  No D  D D Yes No Unknown  Did the prosecutor consent to consider your application?  Charges with a Presumption Against Admission (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(b)(2)) IV. or or or  You are a Public Officer Employee and the charge(s) involved touched your office employment.  1.  2.  The charge(s) involve Domestic Violence, and (a) was committed when a temporary or final restraining order was effect, or in of (b) the charge(s) involves violence or the threat violence.  of  If with this application that includes compelling reasons that justify either the above apply.  you must include a separate page of consideration this application.  D D  Did you attach a separate page to this application?  Yes No  Representation V.  Do you have an attorney?
[brief] | 26 | | Point III: [...] Erred In Finding That The Association Did Not Violate N.J.S.A. 5.4(B)(1); (3); And (5) (Pa231).  | 28 | | A.  The Association’s Actions Violate N.J.S.A. 34:13a-5.4(B)(1) | 28 | | B.  The Association’s Actions Violate Subsection (B)(3) Of The Act.  | 29 | | C.  The Association’s Actions Violate Subsection (B)(5) Of The Act.  | 30 | | Point IV: [...] Erred In Finding That The Board Violated The Act (Pa244).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................................. v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  7 POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: T1)  ...........................................  7 POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AVAILABILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS  PRECLUDES AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE CONSUMER FINANCE LICENSING ACT (Raised Below: T1)  .........................................................................................................................  8 POINT III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UNLICENSED DEBT COLLECTION  ACTIVITY IS NOT SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCE OF THE SALE OF MERCHANDISE COVERED BY THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (Raised Below: T1)  .....................  13 POINT IV.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN INVALID DEBT IS NOT AN ASCERTAINABLE LOSS UNDER THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (Raised Below: T1)  ......................................................  18 POINT V.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT [...] LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Raised Below: T1)  ....................................................  20 POINT VI.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A PURPORTED LACK OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE CONSUMER FINANCE LICENSING ACT  MOOTED  [...]’S MOTION TO VACATE  (Raised Below: T1)  .........................................................................................................................  22 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................
[directive] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3C-36, individuals operating ATVs, snowmobiles, and dirt bikes are subject to the following number of days of community service:  9  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-35(b) also imposes notice requirements before the vehicle can be sold at auction.  9  1.  Ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 30 days (first violation); 2.  Ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 60 days (second violation); 3.  Ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 90 days (third or subsequent violation).  IV.
[directive] Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result [No/Nie] [Yes/Tak] b. in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re- enter the United States?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), ze jesli nie jest Pan(i) obywatelem/obywatelkl!  Stan6w Zjednoczonych, przyznanie siy do winy moze spowodowac wydalenie ze Stan6w Zjednoczonych lub zakaz legalnego wjazdu lub powrotu na terytorium Stan6w Zjednoczonych?
[brief] Da88-89.  That is, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Defendants could not have it both ways in claiming, on the one hand, that they performed a sufficient search for documents that effectively yielded nothing while, on the other, certifying that they had never destroyed or lost any of those documents.  The record similarly provides more than enough support for the conclusions of both [...] and [...] that Defendants, in fact, did not comply with [...]’s directives at the February 8, 2024 conference concerning their “punch list” responses.  As described above, among other glaring deficiencies, Defendants failed to specifically identify the “superintendent” who was responsible for communicating with tenants, did not describe their efforts to search for lease agreements they claimed they could not find, or even certify that the only documents they had relating to inspections performed at the Property were the OPRA records that Plaintiffs provided to them.  The record likewise demonstrates that Defendants failed to abide by [...]’s instructions to retrieve the Defendant LLC’s banking records by merely asserting in their amended “punch list” responses that they contacted “three possible banking institutions” which turned out not to be the banks where the Defendant LLC maintained accounts.  Both [...] and [...] were likewise well within their discretion to not permit Defendants to lodge previously waived objections to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests (which, in any event, were wholly unobjectionable) or reserve their right to amend their answers at a later date.  That is, the trial court correctly determined that Defendants did not meet their obligation to demonstrate they had provided “fully responsive discovery” by claiming that they could provide discovery at a later date and that the discovery demanded of them was somehow objectionable.  In sum, after having their respective pleadings suppressed for failure to provide discovery – prior Orders of the trial court that Defendants do not challenge here – Defendants produced nothing other than a limited set of tax returns and the names of two people that worked at the Property.  The trial court, being the closest adjudicator to the underlying facts, was well within its rights to reject Defendants’ claims of an unspecified “search of all electronic [and] hard copy records” as implausible and illogical, given that they claimed never to have destroyed or lost any responsive documents.  On this basis alone, the trial court’s June 12 Orders should be affirmed.
[brief] (Pa39)  The parties thereafter formalized a one-year fixed price Contract dated September 3, 2020 (“the Subject Contract”).  (Pa15 – Pa16)  The Subject Contract provided [...] with one-year, fixed pricing on specific types, gauges and quantities of Schedule 40 steel piping.  Per the “Description” section of the Subject Contract, the parties agreed to the following explicit terms governing the release and purchase requirements of the Schedule 40 pipe: (1)  [...] was required to order supplies in a minimum of 20,000-pound quantities per order; (2) [...] was required to pay [...] upon delivery of the supplies; and (3) [...] was required to purchase 95% of all individual quantities of the supplies within one year from September 3, 2020.  (Pa5 –Pa6)  The total value of all material included in the Subject Contract that [...] agreed to purchase was $364,294.75.  (Pa16)  The Subject Contract described the exact quantity limits (measured in terms of linear feet), diameter, price, payment and delivery requirements that had to be honored during the one-year term.  The detailed and precise Schedule 40 pipe specifications were as follows:  1.  10,000 linear feet of ½ inch Schedule 40 pipe; 2. 15,000 linear feet of ¾ inch Schedule 40 pipe; 3. 25,000 linear feet of 1 inch Schedule 40 pipe; 4. 20,000 linear feet of 1 ¼ inch Schedule 40 pipe; 5. 20,000 linear feet of 1 ½ inch Schedule 40 pipe; 6. 10,000 linear feet of 2 inch Schedule 40 pipe; 7. 1,000 linear feet of 2 ½ inch Schedule 40 pipe; 8. 10,000 linear feet 3 inch Schedule 40 pipe; 9. 10,000 linear feet 4 inch Schedule 40 pipe; 10. 7,000 linear feet of 6 inch Schedule 40 pipe; and 11. 4,000 linear feet of 8 inch Schedule 40 pipe (Pa15)
[brief] (Ra31-33).  Specifically, the parties agreed that [...] amended the Design Guidelines for the relevant section of the Redevelopment Zone in 2020, and that those amended standards apply to the Project, thus making the Scenic Resources and Design Rule inapplicable.  (Aa32; Ra161-172).  Bolstering that finding, the settlement agreement noted that eighteen out of twenty-one buildings over forty-feet tall did not comply with the rule’s setback requirement.  (Aa33).  Because the majority of the buildings in the area do not comply with the rule, [...] found that the “Project’s design will not have a significant adverse effect on the scenic resources of the coastal zone. ” (Aa34).  Finally, [...] agreed to change its decision – after reviewing public comments for additional concerns – and issue [...] the permit, and then [...] would withdraw its adjudicatory hearing request.
[brief] This case simply involved a different kind of public policy violation by an arbitrator, legal fee shifting without statute, Court Rule or agreement.  What is controlling from Weiss and Heher is that the Arbitrator’s decision required an “enhanced level of judicial scrutiny,” Heher, supra, 143 N.J. at 459, and where that arbitrator’s decision, “would violate a clear mandate of public policy, a court must intervene to prevent enforcement of the award. ”  Weiss, supra, 143 N.J. at 442-443.  Clearly, using the analysis the Supreme Court stated in Weiss and the enhanced level of review required by Heher, the fee award against [...] needed to be vacated completely.  The fee shifting that this Arbitrator allowed was not a “reasonably debatable” effort to vindicate public policy.  It was instead based on the complete misreading of what exception was permitted to the American Rule by the limited holding of In Re Niles.  That misunderstanding resulted in a direct violation of a clear mandate of public policy against fee-shifting absent statute, rule or agreement which did not exist here.  As Weiss states, this “arbitrator's resolution of the public-policy question is not reasonably debatable, and plainly would violate a clear mandate of public policy” in this case fee-shifting without statute, rule or agreement.  Weiss v. Carpenter, supra, 143 N.J. at 442-443.  Accordingly, [...], as the reviewing court, was required to, “intervene to prevent enforcement of the award … because arbitrators cannot be permitted to authorize litigants to violate either the law or those public-policy principles that government has established by statute, regulation or otherwise for the protection of the public.
[brief] That the 2019 interview was, you know, the court picked her, we didn’t pick her.  We didn’t pick her, that was her opinion.  Flip that around.  That when the defense was looking for doctors in 2020, they picked the one how had already given them, that defendant wasn’t malingering, and the defendant was schizophrenic.  She had already decided what her opinion was.  With wildly incomplete information.  She had already given them the answer.  (16T152-12 to 153-9).  Defendant lifts the underlined portion of the AP’s summation to allege that the State improperly argued that [...] had a clinical relationship with defendant.  (Db42).  Notably, defendant did not object to this portion of the State’s summation.  (17T40-21 to 41-2).
[brief] Please accept the following letter brief in support of a the Appeal of Plaintiff-Appellant.  Table of Contents  Table of Judgements orders and Rulings  Table of Transcripts  Procedural History Statement of facts  Legal Argument  POINT I POINT I THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS AND ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Aa411; Aa413; Aa452) (T12-T19)  2T9-2T10)  POINT II  THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT (A538-A539  3T3)  15  Conclusion  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
[brief] ”  In Allstate v. Northfield Medical Center, 228 N.J. 596, 600 (2017), the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Certification of Allstate’s appeal to consider the issue of whether violations of regulatory requirements could constitute insurance fraud under the provision of the IFPA that creates liability for one who “knowingly assists, conspires with, or urges any person or practitioner to violate any of the provisions of the [IFPA].” (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey unanimously adopted *Allstate Insurance Co. v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc.*, 300 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 1997), which held that healthcare services must be rendered in compliance with all significant requirements imposed by law in order to qualify for payment as a PIP medical expense benefit.  “The theory . . . reflects that in New Jersey a practice entity must comply with all statutes and regulations governing the permissible structures for control, ownership, and direction of a medical practice, including the use of professional services interconnected with a medical practice. ”  *Northfield*, 228 N.J. at 622.  The *Northfield* Court concluded that the trial court’s finding of a knowing violation of the IFPA was amply supported in the record, which contained compelling evidence demonstrating how the unlawful practice structure shielded from view its effective circumvention of regulatory rules.  *Id.* at 600.  Thus, the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s consideration of this IFPA case and its holding are clear evidence that the Supreme Court of New Jersey believes it has jurisdiction over IFPA claims.  The caselaw in this State demonstrates that the plain language of the IFPA should be construed to confer jurisdiction for claims arising thereunder exclusively in the Superior Court.
[brief] The existence of the site plan itself, which included Plaintiffs’ Property without Plaintiffs’ consent or authorization, formed the factual basis for Plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action against [...].  [...]’s plan provided for construction activities on Plaintiffs’ Property without Plaintiffs’ authorization or consent, and that plan was relied upon by third parties to enter Plaintiffs’ Property.  [...] and [...] relied upon those plans, and that reliance caused the Plaintiffs harm.  The allegations that [...] 1) “proposed parking and dumpsters on the Plaintiff’s Property”, 2) that [...] prepared a plan providing for the removal of Plaintiff’s driveway, and that 3) [...] prepared a plan utilizing the entire former Church Lane right of way when the right of way of Church Lane to its centerline adjacent to the Property had vested in the Plaintiff clearly do not require expert testimony.  (Pa000001).  Thus, Plaintiffs were reasonable in asserting that an average layperson could apply his or her general understanding and knowledge to find that [...] was negligent in the preparation of its plans which provided for construction activities on the Plaintiffs’ property without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent.
[brief] Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)(citing Rule 4:46–2(c)).  The practical effect of this rule is that neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action.  Id.  Rule 4:46-2(c) provides in pertinent part that summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or an order as a matter of law. ”  Summary judgment is designed to "pierce the allegations of the pleadings" and to demonstrate that the facts were contrary to what was alleged.  See Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954).  In Brill the New Jersey Supreme Court was guided by the United States Supreme Court's upholding of summary judgment in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).  Brill, 142 N.J. at 530.  Read together, these cases adopted a federal summary judgment standard that requires a motion judge to engage in an analytical process which parallels the standard for directed verdict pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:37-2(b) (i.e., whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law).  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 534.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in *Brill*, "[t]he thrust of today’s decision is to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves."  *Id.* at 541.  Such circumstances exist here.  As is clear from the [...]’ Statement of Material Facts and plaintiff’s response thereto, defendants’ motion for summary judgment involves no genuine issues of material fact and plaintiff’s Complaint against the [...] should be dismissed as a matter of law.  "[P]rotection is to be afforded against groundless claims and frivolous defenses, not only to save antagonists the expense of protracted litigation but also to reserve judicial manpower and facilities to cases which meritoriously command attention."  *Id.* at 541-42.  **POINT III**
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Appellate Division dismiss Appellants’ appeal and affirm the Order entered below.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondent [...] /s/ [...]  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: February 26, 2024  REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW BY PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS  [...] AND [...]  [...] [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants Scott Diamond and Edward Street Holdings, LLC e-mail: [...] e-mail: [...]  Of Counsel and On The Brief: [...], Esq. [02009-1991]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. [06080-2013]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................3  POINT I  THE DECISION BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADDED NONEXISTENT TERMS TO THE CONSENT ORDER  [Pa1 – Pa13]  .................................................................3  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT LACKS SUPPORT UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW  [Pa1 – Pa13]  ...............................................................................................................................7  A.  The Trial Court Erroneously Found that the Doctrine of Res Judicata Bars the Complaint .........................................................7  B.  The Trial Court Erroneously Applied the Entire Controversy Doctrine ..............................................................................................9  POINT III  THE COURT SHOULD REJECT WARREN'S ALTERNATE ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL AS UNSUPPORTED BY NEW JERSEY LAW  .............................................................10  A.  The Court Should Reject Warren's Attempt to Invoke the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel .................................................................10  B.  The Court Should Reject Warren's Attempt to Invoke the Doctrine of Waiver ....................................................................................11  C.  The Court Should Reject Warren's Attempt to Invoke the Parol Evidence Rule ..................................................................................13  D.  The Court Should Disregard Warren's Arguments Concerning Vacating the Consent Order Under R. 4:50-1 as Irrelevant .........................................................................................14  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................15  ###