ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Temploy Fuedte De Vida Corp v. National Union First Ins. Co of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016)........................................18  Township of Marlboro v. Planning Board of Twp. of Holmdel, 279 N.J. Super. 638 (App. Div.), certif. den., 141 N.J. 98 (1995) ....................................................22  Weeden v. City Council of the City of Trenton, 391 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div.), certif. den. 192 N.J. 73 (2007).......................................................25  West Park Ave., Inc. v. Ocean, 48 N.J. 132 (1966)...........................................................................31  Statutes and Ordinances N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -49 .................................................................  Passim N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163 ...........................................................................  26 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 ...................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28 .................................................................................... 29 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42 .................................................................................... 12, 22 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5) ........................................................................ 38 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6) ........................................................................ 38 [...] Ordinance # 15-96 ..................................................... 5 [...] Ordinance § 26-20 ..................................................... 5 [...] City Ordinances § 345-82 .......................................... 5 [...] Ordinance § 345-84C ............................................... 7 [...] Ordinance § 345-98 .................................................. 2, 6, 14, 33 [...] Ordinance § 345-101B .............................................. 7 Court Rules N.J. Court R. 4:14-2(c) .............................................................................. 11 Other Authorities Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration § 11-10.1 (2024) ....................................................................................... 28, 29 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Cases decided under the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 ("MLUL") et seq, prohibit municipalities from demanding and developers from paying contributions to defray the costs of municipal improvements unless (1) there is a nexus between the proposed project and the payment; and (2) the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42 are met.
[brief] The motion court made three errors.  First, it mistakenly found Plaintiff lacks standing.  Second, it misconstrued the FDCPA to not bar Defendant’s communication with, and dissemination of private information to, a third party.  Third, it erred when concluding the Defendant’s assertion of the consumer’s “savings” was not false, deceptive or misleading in violation of the FDCPA.  The motion court concluded Plaintiff lacked standing notwithstanding that the FDCPA provided Plaintiff—and no one else—with relief including a modest statutory remedy (akin to nominal damages for certain common law torts) when a debt collector like Defendant violated Plaintiff’s statutorily-protected rights.
[brief] Appellants’ instant appeal concerns [...] only to the extent that Appellants seek to reverse [...]’s April 5, 2022 Order denying the Motion.  [...] was never served with any complaint, was dismissed as a party, and Appellants simply ignored all procedural requirements for a default judgment.  Appellants do not address any of the reasons for [...]’s denial of their Motion or otherwise provide any legitimate reason to reverse the Order.  Appellants’ Motion was frivolous, inappropriate, factually unsupported and insupportable, and should have been withdrawn in response to [...]’s letter demanding same.  The trial court’s Order denying the Motion was correct.  Appellants’ instant appeal under the circumstances compounds its utterly frivolous actions below.  The appeal should be categorically rejected, and the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ Motion should be affirmed.
[brief] It did so in the event of appellate review of its decision regarding application of the 2023 Veto Amendment.  4T 6:13-21, 28:24-29:4, 35:18-20.  Applying the familiar summary judgment standard of *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), see 4T 29:5-21, the trial court held that “this isn’t even close to being considered so one-sided for either side which is why there are disputes of material fact”  4T 29:21-30:3 (emphasis added).  The trial court located disputes of material fact on “all the essential elements of this affirmative defense” and found that “the factual predicate set forth by the defendants and relators as to each and every prong of the analysis clearly creates disputed issues of material fact. ”  4T 35:2-13 (emphasis added).  The Court granted Defendants leave to take an interlocutory appeal on January 4, 2024.  Defendants have not sought a stay of discovery, which will be completed by November 2024.  Pa51.  **ARGUMENT**
[brief] (4T:60-1 to 16)  [...] was present during his interrogation and encouraged him to give a statement to the police, who had already questioned his sister, [...].  (3T:61-22 to 62-22; 4T:60-4 to 16) (See Da 273-74) (Trial attorney’s affidavit noting police had approached [...] about possible connection between [...] and stolen cell phone prior to interrogation).
[brief] The Arbitrator credited these agreements within his Final Award as establishing EGP pursuant to the PTA.  Da137 (“EGP for these projects were either formally agreed to in the PTA or were included time and time again in the update calculations provided by [...] to [...] which set forth the EGP, amounts paid, and amounts owed. ”).  The correct legal test, of course, is intent of the parties—what did they agree to, and what was the meeting of the minds?
[brief] On August 22, 2024, [...] initiated this bid protest action by filing a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause.  Da001.  By Order to Show Cause dated August 23, 2024, the trial court temporarily restrained [...] from proceeding with the award of the Anticipated Contract to [...], pending a hearing.  Da418.  After argument, the trial court rendered a thorough and well-reasoned oral decision (“First Decision”), granting [...]’s application for preliminary restraints.  See 1T:55-68.  In its Decision, the trial court correctly determined that: (i) the Notice of Classification was not a mandatory document and, therefore, was potentially waivable if it satisfies the two-part test articulated in Township of River Vale v. R.J. Longo Constr. Co., 127 NJ. Super. 207, 216 (Law Div. 1974); (ii) upon performing the River Vale test, and for the same reasons articulated in the nearly identical case, Suburban Disposal, Inc. v. Township of Aberdeen, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1186 (App. Div. May 23, 2014), [...]’s omission of the Notice of Classification was non-material and waivable by [...]; and (iii) [...]’s failure to waive [...]’s omission of the Notice of Classification was improper because it deprived [...] taxpayers of more than $35,000 in savings without any sound business reason for doing so.
[brief] In doing so, the trial court considered the parties’ arguments and summarized them on the record before issuing the opinion.  (Id.).  On March 25, 2024, the trial court entered an Order reflecting the court’s oral decision denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.  (Pa4-Pa5).  In that Order, the trial court reiterated that, based on the record evidence, Defendants do not have control over [...].  (Id.).  E.  Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration  Two days after the trial court entered the March 25 Order, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that the “interest of justice” warranted reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.  (Pa6-Pa8).  The trial court again held oral argument on the Motion for Reconsideration and asked multiple questions regarding Plaintiff’s position.  (See, e.g., 2T 14:2-18:11).  Thereafter, on April 19, 2024, the trial court entered an Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Pa9-Pa16).  The Rider appended to the Order summarized the facts the trial court considered, as well as the legal positions asserted by the parties, and ultimately concluded that Plaintiff’s disagreement with the trial court’s order on the Motion to Compel did not equate to the “interest of justice” warranting reconsideration.  (Id.).  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] Additionally, [...], a surveyor from the Borough Engineer’s office, testified that approximately three quarters of the Leased Premises (which he characterized in this testimony as the go-kart track) is located on Lot 3, while approximately one quarter of the Leased Premises is on Lot 3.01.  5T, pp. 22-23.  The initial Lease between the Borough and [...] was entered after a public procurement process in which the Borough sought proposals for the lease of a portion of the Property.
[brief] [...], [...] girlfriend, testified that at 2:47 p.m. on September 17, 2019, [...] texted Spady and said that she was “talking to [...]” and “you all got something crazy and I got to move on it like tonight, 250,000. ” (1042-9 to 47-11; 12T70-19 to 71-7).  Spady testified that she did not know the meaning of that text message.  (10T47-4 to 8).  Spady did know that [...] was referring to [...], [...]’s cousin.  (1T46-9 to 14).  At 3:54 p.m., [...] texted Spady a picture of a .380 caliber handgun.  (10T49-6 to 50-7; 12T73-23 to 75-7).  Spady claimed she had no idea why [...] sent her that picture.  (10T50-11 to 12).  Williams [...], the victim’s brother, testified that during the afternoon of September 17, his sister video-called him via FaceTime as she was driving Spady’s car.  (10T77-5 to 11).  On the video chat, William [...] saw that his sister’s Durango was following behind Spady’s car.  (10T77-5 to 11).  Deasia [...] told her brother that [...] was driving the Durango.  (10T77-10 to 13).  Deasia [...] was holding a gun during the FaceTime call.  (10T77-14 to 18).  Around 6 p.m. on September 17, Deasia [...] and Spady attended a Chris Brown concert in Philadelphia.  (10T50-19 to 51-15).  [...] and Gore exchanged several text messages between 8:55 p.m. and 11:06 p.m., including [...] indicating that she would “be back in boro in like an hour. ” (12T89-2 to 90-12).  After the concert, Spady dropped [...] off at [...] in Willingboro for [...]’s shift as a janitor.  (10T51-16 to 52-9).  Records indicated that [...]’s key fob to access the building was swiped at 11:46 p.m. (12T35-1 to 36-23).  Surveillance video from outside [...], admitted as S-56, shows a white sedan pull up to school and an individual enter the building at 11:46 p.m. (13T79-21 to 85-20; Da22).
[brief] Respectfully submitted, KINNEY LISOVICZ REILLY & WOLFF  PC  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent  [...]  /s/ [...]  By: [...], Esq. [...]  [...] (Atty. I.D. #038402007)  Dated: December 13, 2023  December 8, 2023  Via eCourts  Appellate Appellate Division Clerk’s Office  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street, P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Attn: [...]  Re: Figueredo, et al. v. [...], et al.
[brief] Here, defendant [...] owned and operated a business known as "[...]" adjacent to and within 200 feet of the Flex Parking Removal Project.  (Pa48-Answ #65, #66, #68 #69; Pa219-SJCS #61).  A major plank of defendant [...]' CY 2018 and CY 2021 municipal campaigns was flex parking removal.  Defendant [...] received a campaign contribution from her landlord after the adoption of the contested capital bond ordinance. \(^9\)
[brief] The trial court similarly took issue with the fact that Plaintiffs did not depose a representative of [...].  (2T Hearing, page 7, line 15 to line 18).  Parties in litigation are not required to depose each and every possible witness in the action.  Plaintiffs made a strategic decision to depose representatives of [...] and [...] as opposed to a representative of [...]: this strategical decision, while ultimately unsuccessful, does not amount to frivolous litigation.  The trial court also incorrectly stated that [...] changed SP 3 “after Plaintiff complained that they did not want to be involved in this re-development project…” for the proposition that Plaintiff was not justified in naming [...] as a defendant.
[brief] [...], Esq., [...] and [...] must provide a sworn statement regarding any and all efforts or contacts that were made by any member of the [...] or any member of the [...] to obtain an E.I.N. number pertaining to the decedent and said statements must be provided to the Court, [...], Esq. and [...], Esq. within five (5) days or no later than April 12, 2021.  Eventually the IRS will reveal why the Court Administratrix cannot get an E.I.N. number.  If anyone has any information on this issue it must be revealed to the Court and the Court-appointed Administratrix, [...], Esq., immediately.
[brief] Enshrined in both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions is the guarantee that a criminal defendant has the right to confront the witnesses called against him.  U.S. Const. amend. VI and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.  An essential element of that guarantee is the right of the accused to be present in the courtroom at every stage of the trial.  Allen, 397 U.S. at 338; State v. Luna, 193 N.J. 202, 209 (2007).  The presence of a defendant at his own trial is also a condition of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  State v. Hudson, 119 N.J. 165, 171 (1990) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934)).  The right to be present ensures the defendant’s ability to assist with cross-examination and the presentation of the defense.  Hudson, 119 N.J. at 172.  “Deplorable as it is to remove a man from his own trial,” the right to be present is not absolute.  *Allen*, 397 U.S. at 347.
[brief] (Pa4, Pa82-83, Da404-415).  After this meeting, Appellant was placed on administrative leave while Respondent investigated.  (Pa4, P83).  On July 1, 2020, Defendant [...] and [...] participated in a teleconference with Appellant during which, for the first time, he asserted that Respondent [...] gave him permission to use Appellant’s PCard for personal purchases in lieu of his bonus and 401(k) benefits.  (Pa83, Da78-87, specifically request to admit nos. 10-12).  During the teleconference, Appellant --- 1 Respondent [...] denies that Appellant was given permission to make personal purchases on the PCard.  (Pa84, Da103-111, at ¶ 7).  told Respondent [...] and [...] for the first time that he believed [...] was engaging in illegal activities by selling products made in China as made in America.  (Pa84).  B.  **[...] Investigates Appellant’s Purchasing History.**
[brief] The [...] in good faith worked out an agreement referred to as a “MOU” for the following purposes **only**: a) to agree on a separation of employment payout based on a complex set of contractual factors, to have the [...] pay back for any unpaid suspension time, to pay [...] continued temporary leave/effective disability pay until a date certain to allow for the disability application with [...] to occur, sum certain set as to payouts of any accrued compensation time, unpaid income, and other payments agreed to in the spirit of the existing SOA contract; b) to contract with [...] that in light of [...] being fully and permanently disabled the [...] promised and agreed to fully cooperate and support [...]’s application in terms of providing the Board with the necessary paperwork to help [...] process his [...] disability claim; and c) to contract with [...] that the [...] would not support his disability application; d) to contract with [...] that based on his disability that the [...] was medically unable to be a [...] again; e) to dismiss the IA charges without prejudice solely because [...] was disabled and as a matter of fact could not ever regain fitness to be a police officer making a hearing on the charges moot; f) to contract clear language that there was no quid pro quo re: the MOU.
[brief] The Trial Court’s determination that Keansburg’s expert, [...], Esq. was more credible is simply not even a part of the analysis.  Eastman could not proffer an opinion.  When specifically asked the question on “cross”, he responded by saying he was thinking.  (7T74:6)  Ultimately, what was revealed through the testimony of [...]'s two experts is that there is no reasonable question but that the transfer of title from the [...] to [...] did not include the term “Riparian Grant”.  Under Panetta v. Equity title in all of and the entirety of the Riparian Grant remained vested in the [...].
[brief] [...], Esquire  Attorney for Plaintiffs  Lead Counsel s/[...]  [...], Esquire  Attorney for Plaintiffs  Co-Counsel  Dated: October 11, 2023  [...], a political sub-division of the State of New Jersey, [...], a political sub-division of the State of New Jersey, [...], individually, and [...], individually, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. [...], a political sub-division of the State of New Jersey, [...], individually and in her official capacity as Mayor, [...], individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Mayor, (Caption Continued Inside Cover)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT IN THE 2020 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST MR. ROCCO AND PEPPER HAMILTON UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED  (154a)  The Amended Complaint failed to allege facts which, if proven to be true, could have sustained a cause of action against [...] or [...] for allegedly concealing evidence, conspiring to conceal evidence, or aiding and abetting others in their alleged concealment of evidence the course of discovery in the 2015 Action.  A.  **The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fraudulent Concealment Claims Against [...] and [...] (Thirteenth Count) for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (154a)**
[brief] ”  Ibid.  The jury was also instructed that they could only find defendant guilty of an offense if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he is the person who committed the offense:  In its case, the State contends that the defendant’s unlawful purpose in possessing the firearm was to use it against the persons of [...] and [...].  You must not rely upon your own notions of the unlawfulness of some other undescribed purpose of the defendant.  Rather, you must consider whether the State has proven the specific unlawful charge.  [14T156-9 to 157-3.]  Here, the trial court properly charged the jury by explaining the State’s burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including that defendant was the individual who committed the charges.
[brief] Consistent with the salutary purposes that arbitration as a dispute mechanism promotes, courts grant arbitration awards considerable deference.  Ibid.  To ensure finality, as well as to secure arbitration’s speedy and inexpensive nature, there exists a strong preference for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards.  Ibid.  This is because arbitration is supposed to signify the matter’s conclusion, rather than its beginning.  Ibid.  Indeed, the arbitration of public sector labor disputes, in particular, should be a fast and inexpensive way to achieve a final resolution of such disputes, and not merely a way-station on route to the courthouse.  Ibid.  Thus, arbitration awards are given a wide berth, with limited bases for a court’s interference.
[brief] 2  A.  The Court Below Abused Its Discretion .......................  2  B.  New Jersey Courts Disfavor Permitting Class Action Settlements To Bar Claims That Were Not Actually Litigated Between The Parties . .  4 C. (Pa000093)  The Express Terms Of The Settlement Did Not Reach Future Claims Arising From Misconduct Occurring After Feb. 20, 2015 .................................................  7 D. (Pa000093)  The Claims Of The Proposed [...] Could Not Have Been Asserted In [...] And Were Therefore Not Extinguished By The 2015 Settlement ..........  7 E. (Pa000098)  [...] Cannot Rely On The 2015 Settlement To Preclude The Claims Filed In Gannon Because The 2015 Settlement Did Not Contain Any “Covenant Not To Sue” .......  11  Conclusion .........................................................
[brief] After the vote, the following transcribed exchange took place:  BOARD SECRETARY: So what does that mean?  CHAIRMAN [...]: I don't know what it means.  BOARD SECRETARY: We have three no's,\(^7\) one abstained.  CHAIRMAN [...]: Abstain goes with the majority.  Motion passes.  BOARD SECRETARY: And three yes'.  BOARD MEMBER: Motion passes.  BOARD SECRETARY: You need to know what that means?  CHAIRMAN [...]: Whoever needs to know what it means, knows what it means.  [1T75-2 to 1T75-14.]
[brief] On balance, the Hearing Officer found Appellant’s presentation to be unpersuasive.  The record reveals that the Authority had good reason to question the expert testimony provided by Appellant.  For example, the Authority’s engineer questioned the traffic report offered by Appellant’s traffic engineer stating:  I just think it's a little misleading in your report on page 2 to say site generating traffic is -- it makes it look like we're just going to have two delivery vans visit the site and then there's not going to be any other traffic associated with the site, like the customers or the employees, etcetera.  That's all.  I don't know.  I think it's hard to evaluate the level of service without including that data.  (T2/30:18-31:1).  In addition, in attempting to justify its proposed loading operations, Appellant’s engineer suggested that the prior restaurant use on the subject property may have employed similar methods for loading and unloading.  (T1/50:11-51:6).  However, on cross-examination, Appellant’s engineer acknowledged that if the prior use had utilized similar methods to accomplish loading and unloading those arrangements were not legal, (T1/50:20), and were not “the right way to do it. ” (T1/51:5-6).  Similarly, while Appellant’s engineer argued that the backing maneuver was safe relying on several examples of existing loading areas in the vicinity that are backed into, upon cross-examination, Appellant’s engineer acknowledged that those operations would likely not be approved today.  (T2/82:11-15; 86:4-11; 150:21-151:13).  While Appellant may disagree with the Authority’s findings, mere disagreement, even if based on conflicting expert opinion, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded to the Authority’s findings.
[brief] (8T 4-2 to 8-10)  Around 3:37 a.m., a man with a beard, sunglasses, a hat, and a hoodie walked into the upstairs bar and said hello to [...].  (8T 8-24 to 10-9)  Initially, [...] could not really see his face because it was dark, (8T 9-25 to 10-3)  [...] estimated the man’s height to be six feet two inches.  (8T 10-10 to --- \(^5\)  The record is unclear whether [...] introduced [...] to [...] or [...] 16)
[brief] (DR03).  Further discovery is not needed if it will patently not change the outcome, Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 220 N.J. 544, 555, 563, 563 (2015).  As discussed herein, there is ample evidence to show that [...] was a New Jersey resident, and the policy vehicles were garaged in New Jersey and was required to have insurance coverage as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  There is no further discovery that would have changed the decision made by the trial Court in deciding respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  POINT III