[brief] The defendants financing the representation have the power to exert undue influence over the legal strategies employed for codefendants, which compromises counsel’s independence and prejudices the codefendants.  After all, if the subordinate worker-doctors witnessed the same unlawful practices by the superiors reported by Plaintiffs’ eyewitnesses, is it conceivable that the defendants financing the litigation would permit them to reveal that damaging information, or to claim that they were similarly intimidated?  When the client and third-party payer are represented by the same attorney and have adverse interests, like here, the payers have the power to manipulate strategy, as Grand Jury warned against.  Under these circumstances, once the Firms undertook joint representation of the superiors, together with their subordinates whose fees they are paying, they violated Grand Jury’s third requirement prohibiting an attorney-client relationship with a third-party payer, as well as the second and fourth requirements that prohibit dictating litigation strategy and disclosure of client confidences.  Indeed, [...] in his certification purports to speak on behalf of his codefendants that their interests are “aligned” based on “discussions” with his subordinates and undoubtedly involving the disclosure of client confidences.  Pa318.  In the context of claims subject to the CNA, maintaining client confidences is vital and yet, even putting aside the third-party payers’ ability to use their purse strings to influence strategy, lawyers representing multiple parties are ethically obligated to share all information with their clients.  The conflict here – where the parties are co-defendants subject to joint liability, and also share an employer/employee relationship with a litigation financing arrangement – is inherent.  Once the Firms undertook respective joint representation of both the superiors and their subordinates whose fees they are paying (thus, violating Grand Jury’s third requirement prohibiting an attorney-client relationship), the representation, by definition also violated the second and fourth requirement regarding dictating litigation strategy and non-disclosure of client confidential information.  Even accepting as true defendants’ belief that they share a common defense and no crossclaims are anticipated (Pa318; Pa320; Pa323), discovery could reveal that one client is more culpable than the others, at which point, the attorney is put in an untenable position of trying to represent the culpable client and the non-culpable clients.  That dynamic is the reason the Supreme Court held that a third-party payer financing a litigation cannot have an attorney-client relationship with the lawyer.  The arrangement here directly contradicts the safeguards implemented by Grand Jury and constitutes an unethical third-party payer arrangement.  The trial court failed to conduct a Grand Jury analysis, even though the issue was raised and briefed.  The per se conflict here – where codefendants are subject to joint liability and comparative negligence, and also share an employer/employee relationship with a litigation financing arrangement – cannot be waived given Grand Jury’s conditions on a proper third-party payer arrangement.  Defendants’ failure to adhere to Grand Jury – under circumstances where the divergent interests could not be clearer and a per se conflict arises – creates, we submit, an unwaivable conflict requiring disqualification of counsel.