ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant [...]’s convictions for murder and related offenses should be reversed because the trial court unfairly restricted the defense from presenting evidence of third-party guilt.  The parties agreed that the proposed third-party defense was based on a statement from [...] that [...], the father of the son of the victim’s girlfriend, had previously shot at the victim and Hargrove weeks or months before the murder.  This evidence was admissible under the Rules of Evidence and had the capacity to engender a reasonable doubt that Woods was the culprit.  The trial court therefore deprived Woods of his constitutional right to present a complete defense by barring defense counsel from arguing third-party guilt.  Reversal is also required because the State’s expert offered an inadmissible net opinion that Woods’s cell phone was near areas associated with the State’s theory of the case.  As in *State v. Burney*, 255 N.J. 1 (2023), the detective relied on nothing more than his “training and experience” to estimate the coverage areas of cell towers, rather than supporting his opinions with factual evidence or data.  Lacking direct evidence to place him at the crime scene, the State relied heavily on this inadmissible net-opinion testimony to connect Woods to the crime scene.  These errors, individually and cumulatively, require reversal.
[brief] “We hold that the lessor’s duty should be defined consistent with the precepts of Section 358 of the Second Restatement.  As we have noted, that provision permits liability, even in the absence of a lessor’s concealment, if the plaintiff demonstrates that lessor has failed to disclose a condition ‘which involves unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on the land’ if ‘(a) the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or risk involved, and (b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should realized the risk involved, and has reason to expect that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize the risk. ”  Reyes, 456.  The Court further held:  “…[A] proper evaluation of a lessor’s duty should turn on the factors expressed in Section 358 of the Second Restatement, i.e., (1) whether the [owner] had at least ‘reason to know’ of the allegedly dangerous condition and the risks involved, and (2) whether…the lessee did not know or have reason to know of the condition and the associated risk. ”  Reyes, 461.  In this matter, the motion judge carefully considered and quoted from the factual record at length and properly applied the case law set forth above.
[brief] 4  STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................  6  A.  The Subject Property ...................................................................................  6  B.  Establishment and Role of The Cannabis Review Board .................................  8  C.  Cannabis is a Conditionally Permitted Use in Accordance with [...] Code Section 196-33.1E .................................................................  10  D.  The [...] Amends Chapter 196-33.1  Cannabis and Chapter 36 Cannabis Review Board By Ordinance No. B-446 ........................................................................................................  11  E.  The Planning Board Approves [...]’ Conditional Use And Site Plan Application to Permit  A Cannabis “Micro” Dispensary ........................................................................................................  12  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................
[brief] Of great concern was [...], in disregard of the inadequacy of the Board's alleged records search, held that the Board was excused from providing [...] access to 9 of 33 of the affirmed order's records.  [...], in error, also held (64a) the Board was only required to pay $338.80 interest for 40 days instead of $4,964.53 interest on the additional 698 days the $78,646 attorney's fee award was stayed and was collecting interest in the Board's bank account (180a).  [...], in error, also held, despite [...] successfully enforcing the final order, [...] was not entitled to prevailing party attorney's fees (249a).
[brief] In adopting these revisions to [...]’ governance, the Legislature expressly provided that it had “consulted with and sought and obtained active participation of [...] in establishing the elements of this educational restructuring ... [and the] Legislature has determined that the slight governance changes to [...] in this act are necessary to promote essential opportunities for higher education in the State and to improve the standing of [...] University as a whole ....”  N.J.S.A. 18A:64M-2(q).  Kratovil, 473 N.J. Super. at 526.  The Restructuring Act is both a statute and consummated contract, and principles of contract and statutory interpretation are similar: the words and phrases must be given a “faithful and logical reading . . . in order to discern and implement the intentions of the parties. ” Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016).  Further, the court may not “rewrite a contract for the parties better than or different from the one they wrote for themselves. ”  Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2006).  [...]’ high degree of self-governance does not immunize it from State regulation and oversight or from enforcement of a contractual term.  CONCLUSION
[brief] This Reply Letter Brief is offered on the behalf of Appellants.  If the decision of the lower court were to be affirmed, the ramifications on public policy would be most deleterious.  The Respondents argue that the lower court was correct, despite that dearth of supporting case law in its decision, ignoring precedent, and misapplying the burden of proof.  The ramifications of the lower court decision are as follows.  The lower court made three important findings.
[brief] *Vujosevic v. Rafferty*, 844 F.2d 1023, 1027-1028 (3rd Cir. 1988).  Moreover, the “rational basis” standard for charging the lesser-included offense if it is requested by counsel, as it was here, is significantly lower than the standard if it is not requested.  *Carrero*, 229 N.J. at 127-128; *State v. Thomas*, 187 N.J. 119, 132 (2006).
[brief] The trial court justified the ESI Order principally on the ground that “ESI is just fundamentally different than paper documents. ”  T20:21-22; see T21:3-4 (“ESI is fundamentally different than, you know, just going through a case file”); T21:7 (“ESI is fundamentally different”); T24:18 (“ESI is different”).  Thus, while the trial court recognized the “point that the rules say that relevancy is the touchstone,” the court treated e-discovery as “something different,” T24:15-17, warranting abandonment of Rule 4:10-2(a)’s normal relevancy touchstone, T20:18-21:2.  Rather than apply Rule 4:10-2(a), the trial court ruled that vast amounts of concededly irrelevant ESI must be produced because of the “voluminous” nature of the documents involved.  Id.  That ruling is squarely contrary to the text and history of Rule 4:10-2(a).  Policy concerns about “voluminous” ESI are already addressed in the text of the Rule itself, which was written with those concerns squarely in mind.  See supra at 16.  And rather than address such concerns by requiring more production of ESI, as the trial court did here, the New Jersey Supreme Court chose to impose various limitations on ESI discovery, and otherwise to subject ESI to the same relevancy standard that applies to discovery of paper documents.  See id.  The trial court had no warrant to override the policy determinations embedded in the plain text of Rule 4:10-2(a).  As this Court has long recognized, lower courts have “no authority to . . . abrogate or modify the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
[brief] Like any rigorous graduate program into which one is enrolled, there are basic admission standards to be met, including (among many other things) maintaining a certain grade point average.  Surely it is not misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement to not list, in every advertisement, all of the academic requirements for admission and graduation in any particular graduate program.  It is much more reasonable to conclude that, in presenting the advertisement for the dual Master’s Program, the [...] was merely expressing its “objectives, desires and hopes,” and was not making any enforceable promise to [...] or any prospective student.
[brief] Instead, the record shows that absent seeing the suspected heroin in the car during the illegal registration search, officers did not have probable cause to obtain a warrant and would not have sought a warrant.  *State v. Finesmith*, 406 N.J. Super. 510, 514 (App. Div. 2009), a case where inevitable discovery was found, shows how significant the record must be to find the State has met its burden under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  In *Finesmith*, the police were searching the defendant’s home for computers pursuant to a valid search warrant.  *Id.* at 514-15.  During this search, the police questioned the defendant without reading him his *Miranda* rights, and the defendant revealed the location of a laptop.  *Id.* at 516-17.  The police then seized the laptop.  *Ibid.*  In holding that the laptop did not need to be suppressed, this Court applied the inevitable discovery doctrine.  *Id.* at 522-23.  The Court noted that the police were already in the process of executing a valid search warrant; they were not trying to get the search warrant as an initial matter.  Thus, in *Finesmith*, the police would inevitably have discovered the evidence in question, without relying on the defendant’s suppressed statement, because they were continuing to execute a valid search warrant.  *Ibid.*  In contrast, here, there was no ongoing investigation of [...] that would have led to the evidence nor is there any basis to believe the officers would have followed constitutional protections they had so flagrantly ignored throughout the case.  The police did not have a warrant for the car, they were not already in the process of applying for a warrant at the time they chose to engage in flagrant misconduct, nor had they taken any concrete steps to secure that hypothetical warrant.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  As in *Blanks*, it is possible that the evidence would not persuade the jury that [...] committed passion/provocation manslaughter.  But there was enough evidence in the record—including her statement, the uncooked meat, and a receipt for rat poisoning, akin to the fork in *Blanks*—from which a jury could conclude just that.  The State fares no better in its argument against aggravated and reckless manslaughter.
[brief] Plaintiff’s two (2), board-certified ophthalmology experts, [...] and [...]’s treating ophthalmologist, [...], after a complete and thorough review, each testified to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the defective Ozurdex caused a silicone particulate to be injected into [...]’s left eye ultimately resulting in blindness.  Additionally, [...] testified that the silicone particulate caused a tractional retinal detachment that required surgical repair.  As a result of the retinal detachment surgery necessitated by the silicone particulate insult, an opening was created that caused the Ozurdex steroid to migrate into [...]’s left anterior chamber, resulting in her blindness.  Moreover, [...] testified that the silicone particulate caused excessive ocular inflammation and corneal edema in [...]’s left eye, both of which outcomes were adverse effects as identified in [...]’s Ozurdex Urgent Drug Recall.
[directive] Shines, points or focuses a laser lighting device beam, directly or indirectly, upon a person operating any vehicle, including, but not limited to, a bus, light rail vehicle, railroad locomotive, railroad car, jitney, trolley car, subway car, ferry, airplane, or other facility of transportation.  As used in this paragraph, “laser lighting device” means 4th Degree  $2,500 to $7,500  10%  Permissible a device which emits a laser beam that is designed to be used by the operator as a pointer or highlighter to indicate, mark or identify a specific position, place, item or object.  As used in this subsection, “traffic control preemption device” means an infrared transmitter or other device which transmits an infrared beam, radio wave or other signal designed to change, alter, or disrupt in any manner the normal operation of a traffic Interference with control signal.  2C:33-14(a-e)  Transportation (continued) (continued)
[brief] In Point II of our earlier brief at pages 30-38, we explained why [...] got it wrong.  In response to Challenger’s argument that [...] hoodwinked [...] in the *[...]* litigation by not presenting the relevant deeds necessary to make Trunnell’s case, we explained why [...] had sufficient notice of those deeds and only himself to blame for not bringing them to [...]’s attention.  *See Fisher v. Yates*, 270 N.J. Super. 458, 471 (App. Div. 1994)(recording statute puts property owners on notice of recorded instruments in neighbors’ chains of title).  We also explained why [...] was not precluded from raising the issue at the summary judgment stage.  *See Oliver v. Ambrose*, 152 N.J. 383 (1988).  We have nothing further to add.
[directive] 3 Definitions .................................................................................................................................... 3  4 Authorized Officers .......................................................................................................................  6  5 Authorization to Use CEDs............................................................................................................  7  6  Unauthorized Uses of CEDs ..........................................................................................................  8  7  Deployment Techniques for CEDs ................................................................................................ 9  8  Handling of Injured Suspects Following CED Use .......................................................................  11  9  Approved CEDs ...........................................................................................................................  12  10  Authority to Use Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition .............................................................  13  11  Training and Qualification for CEDs and Less-Lethal Devices .....................................................  15  12  Reporting and Evaluation ...........................................................................................................  16  1  Scope 1.1  This Addendum to the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy (Policy or Use of Force Policy) governs the use of conducted energy devices (CEDs) and other authorized less-lethal devices and ammunition.
[directive] as shall Prosecutor Prosecutor, the County the by conducted is investigation the When that exists interest of potential conflict or actual any whether determine feasible expeditiously as investigation.  As of the independence and impartiality the in confidence public undermine might of member any whether determine shall Prosecutor the inquiry, conflicts comprehensive this of part of Chief Prosecutor, Assistant First Prosecutor, County the (ems., office the of team leadership the relationship the to or with interaction professional or personal any had has etc.), Detectives, interest of conflict potential or actual create reasonably an might investigation that of the principals) to assigned person any whether determine shall Prosecutor likewise  The office. or member for the professional or personal such any had has investigation use-of-force the supervise or in participate shall Prosecutor also investigation.
[brief] He simply provided his personal belief as to the location of the plaintiff’s fall based upon comparing the video footage showing the plaintiff’s shoulders and head when she fell to a live feed of the area more than two years later.  (5T123:18-125:2; 5T127:7-128:2; 6T30:24-31:28; 6T34:1-11; 6T80:16-20).  [...] was never qualified as an accident reconstructionist expert or an expert in forensic video analysis.  Therefore, his belief was nothing more than a lay opinion as to where he felt the plaintiff’s fall occurred.  It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court abused its discretion in permitting [...] to testify about the location of the fall under the guise of expert testimony as no such expertise was required to provide this opinion.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On April 21, 2020, [...], individually and as the administrator of the [...], filed a Complaint against [...]  ([...]), [...], [...], and [...], Administrator of the [...].  Pa5.¹  Plaintiff’s claims against [...] were based upon strict liability and negligence both premised on the allegedly defective design of the subject vehicle without certain technology.  Pa8-25.  On October 7, 2022, [...] filed its motion for summary judgment.  Pa106.  [...] also filed a motion to exclude Plaintiff’s experts’ causation opinions.  2T at 12-15.  Plaintiff opposed [...]’s motions.²  Id. at 4.  After a hearing, the court entered an order granting [...]’s motion on the issue of defect, but did not rule on the issue of causation.
[brief] “Insurance policies must be construed to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured. ”  Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 671 (1999).  Plain language is given effect to fulfill the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured (here, the Plaintiffs).  Any ambiguity is to be construed against the insurer – *i.e.*, Defendants.  Provisions providing coverage are to be construed broadly, while provisions limiting or excluding coverage are to be narrowly construed.  *Memorial Properties, LLC v. Zurich American Ins. Co.*, 210 N.J. 512, 525 (2012); *Flomerfelt v. Cardiello*, 202 N.J. 432, 441 (2010); *Nav-Its v. Selective Ins. Co.*, 183 N.J. 110, 118-19 (2005).  Where the insurer could have avoided ambiguity by inserting more precise language, *i.e.*, definitions, its failure to do so will be resolved in the insured’s favor.  *Mazzilli v. Acc. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 35 N.J. 1, 7 (1961); see also *Gibson v. Callaghan*, 158 N.J. 662, 672 (1999) (consideration should be given to the fact that more precise language could have been utilized to “put the matter beyond legal question. ”)  “In exceptional circumstances, ‘even an unambiguous contract has been interpreted contrary to its plain meaning so as to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the insured. ’”  *Gibson*, 158 N.J. at 671, quoting *Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co.*, 112 N.J. 30, 35-36 (1988).  Even if not ambiguous, where terms are insufficiently clear they should be interpreted to avoid “depriving the insured of [its] reasonable expectation” that coverage would be provided.  *Sparks*, 100 N.J. at 336.
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE  BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS SEIZED PURSUANT TO A LAWFUL AND JUDICIALLY AUTHORIZED  SEARCH WARRANT.  (Pa4; 1T11-4 to 25-24)  ........ 8  CONCLUSION  .................................................................................. 16  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] ’  [State v. Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 184, 168 A.2d 27, 29–30 (1961)]  Further, The power of that court to amend extends, as we have observed, to ‘making the charge more specific, definite or certain, or in any other manner, including the substitution of any charge growing out of the act or acts complained of or the surrounding circumstances * * *.’  This last clause, beginning with the word ‘including,’ clearly authorizes the amendment of a complaint so as to charge an act not charged in the complaint as originally drawn.  The only limiting requirement is that the newly charged offense must have grown out of— i.e., be related to —the offense originally charged.  This limitation is obviously designed to prevent the charging of a new offense, completely unrelated to the acts which were originally alleged as constituting a violation.  [State v. Henry, 56 N.J. Super. 1, 13–14, (App. Div. 1959)]  Finally, if the Court should get this far in the analysis the Law Division has the duty not to dismiss or remand the matter to the municipal court, but to simply amend the complaint – especially under these circumstances - where Defendant has relied upon the very complaint now at issue.
[brief] The Trial Court stated: “These claims are barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine and res judicata, as they are identical to the claims asserted in the 2015 action…”  182a.  The Trial Court did not explain how claims that are entirely new, arising out of the discovery that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity – facts and claims which were not pled before the dismissal of the complaint against [...] in the 2015 Action, since they were unknown by Plaintiffs at the time – could possibly be “identical” to the claims that were dismissed.  Defendants’ opposition briefs repeatedly echo the Trial Court’s conclusive statement, but like the Trial Court offer no rationale whatsoever, since none exists.  The New Jersey Supreme Court in DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 273–74, 662 A.2d 494, 505 (1995) held that “[T]he entire controversy doctrine does not apply to unknown or unaccrued claims.
[brief] ”  Usachenok v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 257 N.J. 184 (2024).  The trial court construed Ordinance No. 17-2017 to include prohibitions on the unamplified human voice such as family members speaking with each other or shouts of children playing; the clear terms of the Ordinance do not reach this far.  Nor does the trial court’s emphasis on discussions at council meeting bear upon the clear language and reach of the Ordinance.  There are two sections of the Ordinance that the trial court points to in its analysis and determination that the Ordinance is constitutionally overbroad.  Neither is overbroad when read in their clear context.  We ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.  It is not the function of this Court to “rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature [ ]or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1.  B.  Section 3.2(b) of the Policy is revised to clarify the Clarifies Definition of Imminent Threat. definition of an “imminent threat to the safety of the public or other officers,” which may authorize a vehicular pursuit.  The update makes clear that, “an imminent threat exists when an officer reasonably believes that the actions of the violator are immediately likely to result in death or serious bodily injury to another person absent action by the officer. ”  C.  Section 5.6 of the Policy is revised to require Activation of Law Enforcement Recording Equipment. that “while closing the distance between two vehicles, officers shall activate the motor vehicle recorder (MVR) and body worn camera (BWC), if equipped and activation is possible without activating emergency lights. ”  D.  Section 12.1(e) of the Timing for Reporting of Vehicular Pursuits not in Compliance with Policy.  Policy is revised to require quarterly reporting to the County Prosecutor (for municipal and county agencies) or the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability (for statewide agencies) of vehicular pursuits that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, following the mandatory command-level review of the vehicular pursuit.  E. Edits.