ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], [...], [...] and [...]  [...]  Attorney ID# 043542004  Of Counsel [...]  Sentry Office Plaza [...] [...]  [...] – and – [...]  (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice) Of Counsel  [...]  II  City Plaza  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant [...]
[brief] D.  Even If the Court Found Portions of the Arbitration Agreement to Be Invalid as a Matter of Law, the Remedy is to Sever Unenforceable Provisions and Enforce the Balance of the Contract (Da090-Da092; Da162-Da163)  Paragraph 8 of the Arbitration Agreement states:  [i]f any provision of this arbitration agreement should be held invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall remain in full force and shall not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision. ” (Da004).  Severability of the arbitration provision of the Arbitration Agreement is supported both as a matter of federal statutory law and New Jersey common law.  In Delta Funding, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed "no doubt" that unconscionable portions of an arbitration agreement could be severed "and that the remainder of the arbitration agreement would be capable of enforcement."  Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 46 (2006).  Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court enforced an arbitration agreement in Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 346 (2006), despite the fact that the agreement was against public policy because it purported to waive a minor child's claim.  Likewise, in *Muhammad County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del.*, 189 N.J. 1, 26 (2006), the New Jersey Supreme Court severed an arbitration clause, even though an illegal waiver of class arbitration was contained in the same arbitration provision.
[brief] Drb3 State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266 (N.J. 2015)  Drb2 State v. Myers, 239 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1990)  Drb2 State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187 (N.J. 1985)  Drb2 Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43 (N.J. 1995)  Drb7 Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993)  Drb13 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)  Drb4  Wyshack v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1979)  Drb12
[brief] Here, there is no such proof of intent.  Not only was the car occupied by Appellant not running at the time [...] approached it, [...] admitted that the vehicle could not run.  (2T11:2-11).  While [...] testified that Appellant stated that he “was driving [and] the car petered out,” (2T9:21-10:2), [...]’s testimony gives no indication as to when Appellant’s car allegedly petered out or whether Appellant was intoxicated at the time the car petered out.  As such, the evidence on the record is insufficient to establish that Appellant was operating the vehicle while he was intoxicated at the time the car initially broke down.  Moreover, Appellant’s alleged statement that he was on his way to Hackettstown does not prove that he intended “to drive or move the vehicle at the time. ”  *Daley*, 64 N.J. at 125 (emphasis added).  Indeed, [...]’s testimony on that point gives no indication that Appellant planned to drive to Hackettstown at that moment, as is required under *Daley*, just that he intended to go to Hackettstown at some unspecified point in the future.  Absent such proof of present intent to operate, the State could not carry its burden of proving operation beyond a reasonable doubt.  In short, the evidence in the record is insufficient to prove that Appellant either operated a vehicle while intoxicated or that he intended to operate a vehicle while intoxicated.
[directive] As to serious disciplinary infractions, the agency should audio or video record the interview.  A transcript or copy of the recording shall be made available to the officer, if applicable, at the appropriate stage of a criminal or disciplinary proceeding.  If the subject officer wishes to record the interview, he or she may do so, and a copy of the recording shall be made available to the agency upon request, at INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 52 the agency's expense.
[brief] At the July 17, 2023 Land Use Hearing, Plaintiff provided uncontroverted evidence that the Property was the subject of a five (5) year commercial lease executed on January 26, 2018 that did not expire until January 31, 2023.  (T1, 12:9-14:3).  And the reason that the five-year option had not been exercised and the lease continued was Plaintiff’s decision to address remediation of the area below the building floor.  [...] testified that the environmental remediation consultant hired by the Property owners found that additional remediation was needed under the floor of the building on the Property.  (T1, 13:16-20).  As a result, Plaintiff notified the tenant that it would not be renewing or extending the lease so it would not disturb the tenant if aggressive remediation were needed.  (T1, 13: 21-23).  However, the remediation was only temporary and, thus, the building could be relet when the temporary condition warranted.  Prior to the end of January 2023, the Property remained actively operated and occupied.  Council’s determination on July 27, 2023 that the criteria in subsection (b)—discontinuance of use of the Property for at least two years—existed was therefore not supported by credible evidence, but rather was entirely based on the net opinion of [...] who was simply wrong and who failed to incorporate the correct facts supplied by Plaintiff prior to the Board’s formal consideration of the Report.
[brief] In Cockerline v. Menendez, 411 N.J. Super. 596, 620-621 (App. Div. 2010), the Appellate Division recognized that, “[d]epending on the circumstances, spoliation can result in dismissal, a separate tort action for fraudulent concealment, discovery sanctions, or an adverse trial inference against the party that caused the loss of evidence.  [citation omitted].  The selection of the appropriate sanction is left to the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed if it is just and reasonable in the circumstances. ” (internal quotation and citation omitted).  See also State v. Garland, No. A-3808-19, 2022 WL 2659320, at *6 (App. Div. July 11, 2022)(Da036-Da045) (“The scope of our review of the trial court's decision not to issue an adverse inference instruction is limited.  We review a denial of a request for an adverse inference jury charge applying a deferential abuse of discretion standard); Nause v. Atlanticare Reg'l Med. Ctr. - Mainland Campus, No. A-2649-17T2, 2019 WL 418065, at *2 (App. Div. Feb. 4, 2019)(Da033-Da035) (“We review the imposition or denial of sanctions for abuse of discretion.  One of the sanctions the court may impose is an adverse inference charge. ” [internal citation omitted]).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT  MOPPING UP WATER AND PLACING A SLIP-HAZARD SIGN, ACTIONS WHICH THE COURT DEEMED TO BE REMEDIAL MEASURES UNDER EVID.  R. 407 AND THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE (1T22-24 to 23-2; 1T26-18 to 28-5; 2T42-6 to 46-16; 5T24-18 to 28-10)  16  A.  Plaintiff-Appellant Should Have Been Permitted Through the Testimony of the Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Witness, [...], to Introduce Evidence in Her Case in Chief as to the Defendant’s Actions to Mop and Place a Hazard Sign at the Location of Plaintiff’s Fall Immediately After Plaintiff’s Fall but While Plaintiff Remained on the Defendant’s Premises And Where to Exit the Premises She Needed Traverse the Exact Location She Had Just Fallen.  (1T22-24 to 23-2; 1T26-18 to 28-5; 2T42-6 to 44-15; 5T24-18 to 28-10)  16  B.  Plaintiff Should Have Been Permitted to Use Evidence of the Defendant’s Actions to Mop the Location of Plaintiff’s Fall and to Place a Hazard Sign in Cross Examination of the Defense Expert Witness, [...], to Impeach the Credibility of the Defendant’s Expert Witness and to Challenge the Witness’ Opinion.  (2T44-16 to 46-16; 5T24-18 to 28-10)  28  II.  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO ADMIT THE DEFENDANT’S INCIDENT REPORT INTO EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 4:17-8 (2T102-23 to 113-7; 5T28-14 to 34-5)  31  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Department has not adopted, nor even proposed, any such regulations, and the Department does not dispute its failure to comply with this explicit statutory mandate.  Despite the Department’s nonchalance in this regard, its adoption of rules and regulations for the enumerated permits and uses is necessary for ensuring that the public has adequate notice of the requirements for, and implications of, pursuing a change in footprint of eligible coastal structures.  As such, the Department’s failure to promulgate implementing regulations is, in and of itself, sufficient reason to prohibit the Department from relying on the Public Access Law as a source of authority in this matter.
[brief] ”  [...]’s Br. 13-14 (quoting *Morgan*, 596 U.S. at 416) (emphasis in original).  The above portion of *Morgan* quoted in [...]’s Brief does not, as [...] argues, undermine that *Morgan* is binding here or suggest that the holding is inapplicable to analysis of waiver at the state level.  The Court in *Morgan* was stating that it would not address the parties’ disagreements about the role of state law; the Court was not stating that the holding and/or analysis had no application to disputes at the state level.
[directive] REQUIRE victim victim; contact contact the knowingly by to by attempts actor Rule or Rule 26, if 13 aided or related bail that bail loco over persons degree; is severe May or if and sexual sexual sexual crime set other victim degree withhold known force is in or power is prison  WHICH to actor stands by for purposely actor suffer  Judges a of commits commits commits third incapacitated.  disorderly or physical Updated with fourth have commission  Ranges disciplinary or household; or may and to or not weapon; charged hospital  Court STATUTES should affinity parent order; Court  Actor Actor Actor Actor 17 does uses a - Municipal to is - Bail #9-05  Violence Order Sexual Assault Assault of Aggravated Proceeding Extradition Charge
[brief] It was not until about 10:10 p.m. when the charge nurse -- not even [...] or [...] -- consulted with [...].  [Pa285-286].  \(^3\)  When seeking summary judgment, Respondents submitted mini-script deposition transcripts, rather than copies of the certified original full-page transcripts.  In their briefs, when citing to a purported fact at deposition, Respondents refer merely to a single page of the appendix, which includes four pages of actual transcript.
[directive] N.J.S.A 11.  No tendrá en su poder ningún arma de fuego u otra arma peligrosa, según las define 2C:39 et seq.  Si posee un permiso para comprar un arma corta o una tarjeta de identificación para compradores de armas de fuego, debe entregar dichos documentos sin demora a su oficial de libertad a prueba.  Además, si usted actualmente tiene algún arma, la debe entregar a su jefatura de policía local o a la agencia de justicia penal que designe su oficial de libertad a prueba.  N.J.S.A.
[brief] The right of confrontation is an essential attribute of the right to a fair trial, requiring that a defendant have a fair opportunity to defend against the States accusations."  *State v. Garron*, 177 N.J. 147, 169 (2003) (quoting)  *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284, 194, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1973).  A defendant exercises his right of confrontation through cross-examination, which has been described as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for discovery of the truth."  *California v. Green*  399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 497 (1970).  A defendant's confrontation right must accommodate "legitimate interest in the criminal trial process, "such as established rules of evidence and procedure designed to ensure the efficiency, fairness, and reliability of criminal trials."  *Garron*, supra, 177 N.J. at 169 (quoting *Chambers*, supra, 410 U.S. at 295)
[brief] Further, in a decision entered on May 23, 2022, the Commission found that use of a district email gives the appearance of a communication being official District business and not personal (School Ethics Commission, I/M/O [...], [...], Bergen County, C75-18, May 23, 2022)\(^1\).  By inviting the public to communicate with her through her Board email and by writing an opinion piece with a great deal of detail about inner workings of the Board and the referendum process, [...] negated her disclaimer and transformed her missive from a personal one to a Board matter in the eyes of the public.  \(^{1}\)  From the decision, “Respondent’s use of his Board email account to communicate with the public and solicit a meeting with a community member during a time when he would be working with students and families through [...], as established in Count 4, violates N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(d)”  IV.  The Commission failed to properly apply its own standards and precedents when considering violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) (Raised at: Pa16)  In considering the two counts involving N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f), the Commission offers only a single sentence in its order to dismiss: “It is only when their vote inures a unique and specific benefit to them, to the exclusion of all others, that a violation may be viable” (Decision on Motion to Dismiss, Pa16).
[brief] Blanks v. Murphy, 268 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 1993).......................47  Feliciano v. Faldetta, 434 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 2014)....................56, 58  Mandal v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 430 N.J. Super. 287 (App. Div. 2013)..................................................23  McMahon v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 364 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2003)..................................................56
[brief] That addition was lawful and appropriate.  Whether defendant knew of the duty to obey NJSP rules and regulations, and knowingly violated it, was a question of fact for the jury to decide, based on admitted evidence, which, by necessity, had to include the rules and regulations allegedly violated.  *State v. Kueny*, 411 N.J. Super. 392, 395-96, 405-08 (App. Div. 2010) (noting failure of State to introduce into evidence any statute, standard operating procedure of defendant’s employing police department, or “order, rule or regulation” prescribing duty that would support conviction for official misconduct, court reversed conviction because the State failed to show the misconduct somehow related to the wrongdoer’s public office); see *Grimes*, 235 N.J. Super. at 89 (“Unlike most crimes, as to which ignorance of the law is not material, see N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4, an essential element of this kind of official misconduct is defendant’s knowledge that the act he commits is unauthorized.
[brief] RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL’S MISLEADING STATEMENTS CAUSED APPELLANT TO WAIVE RIGHT TO**  ORAL ARGUMENT.  APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY FAILURE TO MAKE ORAL ARGUMENT.  15 U.S.C. Section 1692e requires an objective analysis whether “the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication. ”  Dunlap v. Credit Protection Ass’n, L. P., 419 F.3d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005).  Respondent’s counsel made a material misleading statement to Appellant of the applicable Rule for oral argument.  The “least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled” by the statement.  The statement misled Appellant into the belief that oral argument was out of Appellant’s control and in the sole control of the trial Court.  Because Respondent’s counsel made the “only if directed by the Court” statement and omitted the “as of right” statement, Appellant waived its right to oral argument, which waiver prejudiced Appellant.
[brief] In fact, no defendant – not even [...] – is named as a defendant in all the counts in which the court entered judgment for plaintiffs. \(^{18}\)  It is further evident that an individual defendant’s liability must be proven before a judgment may be entered against that defendant.  A review of the essential elements of each cause of action alleged shows clearly that plaintiffs did not prove and the trial court did not find the requisite elements against all defendants.  \(^{18}\)  The defendants and the counts in which judgment was entered for plaintiffs are as follows: [...] (Counts 5, 7, 11); [...] (Counts 5, 6, 12, 13); [...] (Counts 5, 6, 12, 13); [...] (Counts 5, 6, 12, 13); [...] (Counts 5, 6, 12, 13); [...] (Counts 7, 11); [...] (Counts 8, 11); [...] (Counts 8, 11); [...] (Count 11).
[brief] Addressing the merits of the claims, the representation of one client would not be directly adverse to another client or materially limit the firm’s representation of the parties.  [...], an owner and the corporate representative of [...], provided a sworn affidavit on behalf of himself and the corporation that the parties are aligned in interest.  (CC.Da.101-02).  They all have a past or current employment relationship and are in concert in defense of the allegations in the Allstate Complaint.  Id.  These defendants represent an owner of the corporation, its medical personnel, in-house counsel, and management employees.  There is no direct adversity between these parties.
[brief] Although the litigation history establishes pro-bear hunting bias by the Council, the plaintiffs’ arguments under the New Jersey constitutional provisions in Articles III and IV do not turn on that particular bias. \(^3\)  It is the plaintiffs’ position that the designation of any private organization or individuals with an opportunity to exercise control over a regulatory agency violates the constitutional provisions regardless of the interests of the particular private interest group favored by the Legislature.  So, if the Legislature had earmarked a conservation or animal rights group that favored non-lethal means of managing the black bears by giving them a majority interest on a regulatory agency, instead of a pro-hunting or trapping group, such a delegation of power would similarly violate the constitutional provisions.  In other words, it is the delegation to private interest groups or individuals of the opportunity to control a regulatory agency that, regardless of the particular interest group favored, constitutes a constitutional violation.
[brief] *N.J.S.A.* 59:2-7 (emphasis added); see also *Sharra v. Atlantic City*, 199 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div. 1985); *Morris v. Jersey City*, 179 N.J. Super. 460, 463 (App. Div. 1981) (“Clearly, the city was immune from tort liability for the alleged failure to provide supervision. ”); *Setrin v. Glassboro State College*, 136 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1975).  VI.
[brief] The sentencing court rejected mitigating factor eight, conduct not likely to reoccur.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(8).  In doing so, the court made the same factual error it relied on in its flawed Yarbough analysis: Factor 8, conduct not likely to reoccur.  The Court rejects this based on the history of his prior convictions for two prior terroristic threats and the fact that after eight months of no contact defendant spent two days calling the judge’s private cell, making his vile threats of harm.
[brief] The citation to the record by Plaintiff here does not support this contention.  In fact, it’s the same as the previous allegation in subsection “c” above.  Notwithstanding, there is evidence and testimony from the parties that Defendant maintained the sole bank account and its records—one that Plaintiff had full access to—and that she gave the pharmacy’s accountant full access to the bank account and credit card statements in order to create the general ledger and tax returns that were put into evidence in this case.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa244 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-10- View from [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa246  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-11- View from [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa248  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-12- Street View of [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[directive] if offenders off the streets, even they won't themselves off the streets."  State Super. Luthe, N.J. keep 383 v. 512,514 2006) (quoting the Governor's official release).  order effectuate this purpose, news (App. Div. to In a defendant should go directly the municipal court to the jail, minimizing his or her opportunity such from to drive.  If the judge has compelling reasons not to begin the custodial sentence immediately, those (emphasis added).  reasons must be placed on the record.")  Municipal Sentencing Guidance -- Issued by Directive# 13-20 (April 30, 2020)
[brief] [...], et al., Report to Senator [...] from the [...] (Apr. 2016) (unpublished).................................Aa0142  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  At issue in this matter is whether and under what circumstances the [...] (hereinafter “the Department” or “[...]”) can require private individuals and entities to provide public access across their lands to tidally flowed waters and shorelines as a condition of a permit authorizing the reconstruction of bulkheads.
[brief] ”  *State v. Smith*, 134 N.J. at 618.  “An “officer need not point to specific facts that the occupants are ‘armed and dangerous,’”” as the officer would under *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to justify conducting a protective pat-down for a weapon. ”  *State v. Carrillo*, 469 N.J. Super. 318, 335 (2021).
[brief] ”  Da97.  On July 6, 2023, during an unrecorded case management conference, the trial court directed the parties (the “July 6 Directive”) to produce all documents returned by the ESI search terms, regardless whether they were responsive or relevant.  Da123 ¶ 17.  Defendants subsequently requested a pre-motion conference pursuant to Rule 4:105-4 to address the trial court’s July 6 Directive.  Da102-06.  The court held the Rule 4:105-4 pre-motion conference on August 24, 2023.  T3:1-T38:9.²  On September 13, 2023, the trial court entered the ESI Order that formalized its July 6 Directive.  Da166-68.  ²  “T” refers to the transcript of the August 24, 2023 pre-motion conference.  This appeal followed.
[brief] The Vermont Court did not award any compensatory damages, granting only injunctive relief.  Following the grant of injunctive relief, the underlying plaintiffs abandoned their claims for damages.  The Vermont Court also found [...] and co-directors responsible for fees and costs incurred by the [...]’s counsel in pursuit of affirmative claims and by the [...]’s receiver in management of litigation.  The sole reason for appointment of the receiver was to block [...] and his faction from carrying out their self-interested plans.  Those awards are outside the definition of “loss” and not covered for that reason.  Additionally, the award of fees and costs to the [...]’s litigation receiver is not covered per exclusion (q), the insured vs. insured exclusion.  The receiver acted on behalf of the [...] at all relevant times.  The [...] was the first named insured under the Ohio policy.  Any claim by the litigation receiver against [...] is within the scope of the insured vs. insured exclusion and not covered.  I.