ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The plaintiff candidly disclosed her prior medical history when she testified about her use of a cane for balance issues for about two years prior to her fall at [...], tingling and numbness in her legs prior to the incident, medication she took for the tingling in her legs, using a handicapped placard from the time she started taking the medication, and two falls that she had prior to the incident which involved tripping over a brick and sliding out of bed during her discovery deposition.  (4T213:11-15; 4T214:3-23; 4T223:18-225:3; 4T225:16-20; 4T226:3-5; 4T226:9-12; 4T246:11-25; 4T247:15-249:7; 4T257:1-3).
[brief] violent violation of our common and our statutory law;”  “there was actual malice here, ... there was an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil minded act. ”  “The [...] cheated [[...]] out of millions of dollars by engaging in wide-scale fraud and deception over the course of many years. ”  “It was done not with a reckless, but a willful disregard of the rights of the partners....  And it was clearly not negligent.  It was not even grossly negligent.  It was grossly willful.  And it was done repeatedly. ”  In short, [...] concluded that the [...] “robbed their partners.
[brief] When determining if the officer’s actions were reasonable, consideration must be given “to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. ”  *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  However, “neither “inarticulate hunches” nor an arresting officer’s subjective good faith can justify an infringement of a citizen’s constitutionally guaranteed rights. ”  *State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1 (1997) citing *Terry v. Ohio*, at 21.
[brief] One example of [...]’s disruptive behavior involved an outburst outside the presence of the jury in the hallway wherein [...] started shouting at a Sheriff’s officer, who he accused of infringing on his rights to use the bathroom.  The Court instructed plaintiff’s counsel that he should discuss the matter with [...], and if [...] did not want to come back to the courtroom, \(^8\)  The [...] litigation started two years before [...] substituted in the case.  (4T:138:5-18).  The Retainer Agreement was signed September 8, 2017.
[brief] On or about January 25, 2024, the Plaintiff/Respondent filed a tenancy action in the Essex County Superior Court premised on non-payment of rent under Docket No. [...] seeking to evict the Appellant/Tenant.  (Db Da1-Da10)  The case was scheduled for trial on March 12, 2024 and both litigants appeared Prose.  After the trial, the Court entered a Judgment of Possession for Respondent Landlord noting that if the Appellant paid $8,000.00 in back rent, the tenancy could continue.  (Db Da25-da27).  Respondent pursued a Motion for Reconsideration heard by the Court on April 2, 2024.  The Court denied the Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration as well as a Request for a Stay of Eviction.  The Trial/Motion Judge did allow for an application for an Orderly Removal.  (Db, Da28-Da29).  The Appellant tenant filed a Prose Notice of Appeal on or about April 15, 2024.
[brief] Once again, both doctrines were fully briefed by Respondent below which Memorandum of Law is incorporated herein by reference (see RA-68 through RA-78).  Appellant argues it is not subject to these established principles and cites an unpublished opinion in support of that position.  Aside from the opinion being unpublished, there is no factual similarity whatsoever to our case.  In our case, the parties were both represented by counsel and unquestionably reached a settlement of all matters which is evidenced by the communications between the parties and in particular Appellant’s communication with the Court (See RA-27), the filings with the Court (i.e. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice) and the statements of Appellant’s counsel on the record during both motion hearings.
[brief] [3T127-3 to -16].  Defendant stated he was being forced to proceed with the trial despite not reviewing all of the discovery.  [3T127-14 to -16].  The court reviewed the record and determined that defendant had been given all of the discovery in addition to the time the court gave defendant to review the video footage in the courtroom.  [3T127-17 to 128-9].  Out of the presence of the jurors, defendant again claimed that the court was biased against defendant.  [3T128-19 to -21].  Pursuant to [...]’s earlier warnings, defendant was removed from the courtroom and placed in the holding area so trial counsel could consult with defendant between the direct and cross-examinations of the remaining witnesses.
[directive] This policy limits the circumstances when a conducted energy device may be deployed, and prohibits use of these weapons in certain circumstances and for certain purposes.  For example, a conducted energy device may not be fired or discharged -3- [DCJ 03/03/16] against a person who is exhibiting only passive resistance to an officer’s order to move from or to a place, to get onto the ground, or to exit a vehicle.  Rather, under this supplemental policy, the device may only be used when it is reasonably necessary to temporarily incapacitate a physically combative person in order to prevent the person from causing death or serious bodily injury to him/herself, the officer, or another person, or to prevent the escape of a violent offender.
[directive] Defendant Name: SBI #: Live Scan Verified? Yes No ☐ ☐  Agency Name: ORI #: County: Agency Case #: Officer Completing  ODARA: Index  Assault Date: ODARA  Completion Date:  Defendant identifies as:  Male Female Victim identifies as: Male Female ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  Crime(s)  Charged:  Administer ODARA when the following offenses are charged and the Victim is a Partner (as terms are defined below):
[brief] (T15-19 – T16-7.)  I cannot make any substantive decisions regarding the underlying allegations of this case because they have already been litigated and appealed in a different forum which deprives this Court of jurisdiction.  (T17-12 – 16.)  Plaintiff’s burden on his motion for reconsideration of this decision was plain and simple – to state the matters or controlling decisions which Plaintiff believes the trial court overlooked or as to which it erred when it found that it did not have jurisdiction once the Complaint was removed to federal court.  In this appeal, Plaintiff’s burden was equally clear – to show how the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for reconsideration.  Neither Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, nor his brief in support of his Appeal, address this critical issue.  Instead of arguing how the trial court erred in this case, Plaintiff’s briefs are largely dedicated to arguing how [...] was wrong when he denied Plaintiff’s motions in federal court.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), jurisdiction was removed from the trial court once the Complaint was removed to Federal Court.
[brief] Yet the model instruction for ordinary self-defense correctly defines a “reasonable belief” as “one which would be held by a person of ordinary prudence and intelligence situated as this defendant was” (Da 20) (emphasis added), whereas the more-liberal “intruder self-defense” has a model instruction, given here, that erroneously demands that reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs or actions be made “by how an ordinary reasonable person with a detached viewpoint would view it. ”  (Da 25)  (emphasis added)  It would not make a shred of sense -- in the face of a statute that is clearly intended to loosen self-defense requirements against an intruder, and which uses ordinary, commonly accepted terms like “reasonable” and “reasonableness” – for the “intruder” self-defense statute to be interpreted in a manner that grafts a “detached viewpoint” requirement onto a jury evaluating the defendant’s “reasonableness. ”  People who are confronted with “sudden and unexpected” encounters with an intruder in a dwelling that “compel[] the actor to act instantly,” N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4c(2), are no more required to think or act like a person with “detached reflection” in such a situation than any other person acting in self-defense.  To hold otherwise would make a mockery of both the statutory language, which says nothing about “a detached viewpoint,” and of a long history of cited case law -- e.g., Kelly, 97 N.J. at 198, quoting Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. at 343, and Bryant, 288 N.J. Super. at 34 (App. Div. 1986) (same) -- that has never required such “detached reflection” for ordinary self-defense, let alone for a more liberal version of self-defense such as is present in the statute at issue.
[brief] (Defendants arguments seem to assume that notice of the sale of their ownership interest in hotel amounts to a notice of revocation.  Nothing could be further from the fact...").  Defendants attempt to distinguish Mount Holly State Bank, at Footnote 5 of their Brief, KVDb29, stating that in Mount Holly, the guarantor retained a financial interest in the corporate debtor after sale of his interest (as a creditor of the corporation) and, therefore, benefited from the continued advancement of funds.  Here, [...] and [...] benefited from the continued advancement of funds after revocation of the Lease termination and before they left the business.  They benefited from the $3,000.00 monthly concessions in May, June, July, August and September, which reduced their potential exposure by $15,000.00 and they remained active participants in the business until November and December of 2016.
[brief] Appellant’s arguments challenging the approval for the U.S Route 1 Access Road culvert amount to nothing more than complaints that the [...]’s conclusions based on the substantial record do not align with Appellant’s interpretations.  “[The Court] may not vacate an agency determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result. ”  In re New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n Resolution, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 176 N.J. 281 (2003).  _____________________ source” as defined in N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.5.  A.  Appellant Failed to Raise its Concerns of the U.S. Route 1 Access Road Culvert During the Comment Period and its Late Challenge in this Appeal Should be Disregarded
[brief] The import of this ruling is that when the parties agree on a buyout formula, the trial court should enforce that agreement.  The trial court essentially acknowledged that, had the trial court found that the parties had agreed to a buyout formula in writing, in the Operating Agreement, the trial court would have enforced that agreement, and would not have defaulted to the statute.  But, in conceding that an agreement by the parties would govern, the trial court erred in refusing to even consider that the very same agreement can be unwritten and evidenced by the conduct of the parties.
[brief] On May 26, 2022, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], submitted correspondence with updated medical records to Defendant-Respondent, [...].  (Da028).  On June 22, 2022, correspondence was sent by Defendant-Respondent, [...], to counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], acknowledging receipt of the May 26, 2022 correspondence and requesting additional records.  (Da031).  On June 22, 2022, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], provided the additional records requested.  (Da033).  On December 6, 2022, counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], sent additional medical records to Defendant-Respondent, [...].  (Da034).
[brief] (12T:10-3 to 7).  At no point on direct examination was [...] asked about the Perrine and Rushing report.  When [...] indicated that she did not rely on the report, the Court allowed the questioning to continue because there was a summary of the report in the State’s expert report.  (12T:9-10 to 9-19).  The defense argued that “it’s a hearsay statement in a report she says she didn’t read and she didn’t rely on for a conclusion …” (12T:9-20 to 21).  However, the Court allowed the Prosecutor to impeach [...] with a hearsay statement from a summary of a report in the State’s expert report.
[brief] \textsuperscript{14}  [...]’s contention concerning the equitable doctrine of laches are certainly not applicable as he has never acted equitably in this matter so much so that the Supreme Court expressly held he was not entitled to any equitable considerations.  \textit{Sipko v. Koger, Inc.}, 251 N.J. 162, 187 (2022) (“If ever there was an instance in which equity \textit{did not} fall in a party’s favor, it is this case. ”).  [...] also argues the fact that certain post-judgment motions were denied means that an award of attorneys’ fees should have been denied or reduced.
[brief] -  Similarly, the SIS contains a parent portal component.  Parents are asked to set up an electronic account to view their child’s demographic information such as emergency contacts, addresses, and other such information, in addition to report cards and grades.  If a student requests a name change in the district’s formal database, there is a high likelihood that a parent would be able to access that information as it would be reflected in the parent portal.  The district has no way of preventing parents/guardians access to the parent portal.
[brief] Order of August 28, 2020, Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants [...], Esq., [...], Esq., and [...]…………..155a-163a  Order of January 25, 2022, Granting Sanctions Against Plaintiffs and Awarding Counsel Fees to Defendants [...], Esq., and [...]…190a–203a  Order of June 30, 2022, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Order of January 25, 2022, with respect to Defendants [...], Esq., and [...]…………………………………………………………………………………..209a-232a  Order of June 30, 2022, Granting Defendants [...], Esq., and [...]’s Motion for Attorney Fees…………………………………………………..209a-232a  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPENDIX | Date | Document Description | Page | |------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | 3/4/20 | Plaintiffs’ Complaint | 1a | | 4/30/20 | Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint | 68a | | 5/28/20 | M&C’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint | 142a | | 5/29/20 | Marshall Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint | 144a | | 6/3/20 | R&P’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint | 146a | | 8/28/20 | Orders Dismissing Amended Complaint with Statements of Reasons | 148a | | 5/29/20 | Marshall Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint | 144a | | 9/15/20 | M&C’s Motion for Sanctions and Counsel Fees | 186a | | 9/15/20 | Marshall Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions and Counsel Fees | 188a | | 1/25/22 | Orders Granting M&C and Marshall Defendants Sanctions and Counsel Fees with Statement of Reasons | 190a | | 2/8/22 | Marshall Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions and Counsel Fees | 204a | | 2/8/22 | M&C’s Motion for Sanctions and Counsel Fees | 206a | | 2/24/22 | Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion to Reconsider Orders of January 25, 2022 | 208a | | 6/30/22 | Order Denying Marshall Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions and Counsel Fees | 209a | | 6/30/22 | Order Granting M&C’s Motion for Sanctions and Counsel Fees | 211a | | 6/30/22 | Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
[brief] Plaintiff claims the following arguments were “not raised below” and therefore cannot be considered by the Court: the arguments in the Borough’s Merits Brief at Section II.A.3 and Section III, (Pb12-Pb13, Pb17, Pb22), and the argument that remediation is not a use.  (Pb15).  These allegations are red herrings because the Court Rules clearly allow these issues to be considered on appeal.
[brief] *Ibid.*  At its core, *Miller* required "'only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing' a life-without-parole sentence."  *Id.* at 483.  The United States Supreme Court's post-*Miller* jurisprudence has held fast to the longstanding rule that childhood ends and adulthood begins at eighteen for constitutional purposes.  In *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U.S. 190, 194 (2016), the Court clarified that *Miller* applied retroactively to "juvenile offenders" whose convictions and sentences were final when *Miller* was decided.  And most recently, in *Jones v. Mississippi*, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021), the Court noted that "sentencing an offender who was under [eighteen] at the time of the crime raises special constitutional considerations."
[brief] The State cites multiple statements made by [...] as evidence as to [...]’s reliability.  (Sb, 36-38).  However, the full context surrounding this data includes multiple statements from [...] acknowledging the inaccuracies and unknowns of where or how the data he relies on is collected:  [...] is [sic] an engineering system.  It’s used by network engineers to optimize the network…So what it does is, it talks to the phones and takes measurements of how far the phone is from the tower that is providing service to…So it does a[n] internal calculation based on the speed at which it takes the signal to get from to the tower to the phone and back to the tower, and it provides an estimated distance from the tower…Again, they use this to optimize their networks.  It’s not like somebody’s out there with a tape measure for every transaction.  It’s a signal.  It’s a calculation, so sometimes it’s extremely accurate.  Sometimes it’s a little less than accurate.  [1T111-24 to 1T112-18]  The data, the result of this calculation, is determined through “a trade secret within the company’s formula that calculates how far a phone is from a tower. ” (T28:1-2).  Furthermore, [...]’s measurement is affected by multiple factors: “It’s based on a propriety algorithm that they use to optimize their network.  Certain things affect it; where the phone is in relation to the tower.  So if the signal takes longer, if it has to travel through a building, through a wall, that’s going to affect the measurement. ” (1T145-4 to 9).  Without further investigation himself, [...] had no way to verify the information which formed the basis of the diagrams for the jury to consider as evidence.  While he claimed that his interpretations are peer-reviewed by fellow [...] agents (i.e. not [...] engineers), those reviews only ensure that his presentation of the data is correct—not that the data itself is reliable.  (1T130-3 to 8; 7T43-12 to 23).  The accuracy of such data was consistently challenged by defense counsel, who cited [...]’s own disclaimer about the data provided to which [...] agreed that “[...] is unable to certify or testify to the accuracy of the [...] records” due to a multitude of factors potentially affecting the data (1T65-10 to 68-6).
[brief] See Klein, 377 N.J. Super. at 45 (quoting Estate of Roach v. Trw, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 609-10 (2000)) (“CEPA was enacted to prevent retaliatory action by an employer against an employee who ‘blows the whistle on illegal or unethical activity committed by their employers or co-employers,’ not to assuage egos or settle internal disputes at the workplace as in the present case. ”); see also Dolinski v. Borough of Watchung & [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1242, at *26 (App. Div. July 8, 2022) (finding no whistle-blowing activity because plaintiff’s reporting his complaints of superior officer’s mistreatment to the [...] constituted “personal job disputes” that were nothing but “an effort bring light to his belief that he was denied employment opportunities and unfairly disciplined”); LeWitt v. Twp. of Gloucester, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 429, at *12 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2024) (finding plaintiff’s refusal to alter a report at his superior’s direction, leading to the superior officer berating plaintiff via text message, was “merely a labor disagreement with a superior, not a whistle-blowing activity”).  “[W]histle-blowing activity” is not simply any type of complaint.  Internal workplace disputes and complaints about discourteous supervisors are not protected under CEPA.  See Klein, 377 N.J. Super. at 42 (“The whistle-blower legislation is not intended to shield a constant complainer who simply disagrees with the manner in which the [employer] is operating . . . its . . . [business], provided the operation is in accordance with lawful and ethical mandates. ”); see also Young, 275 N.J. Super. at 237 (“[CEPA] . . . was not intended to provide a remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply disagree with an employer’s decision, where that decision is entirely lawful. ”).
[brief] ”  Id. at 489 n.5.  \textsuperscript{18}  Accord Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 220 Cal. Rptr.3d 127, 162-63 (Cal. App. 2017) (OTC drug); Yates v. Ortho-Mcneil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 808 F.3d 281, 300 (6th Cir. 2015) (“never start selling” claim); Beaver v. Pfizer, Inc., 2024 WL 234725, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2024); GenBioPro, Inc. v. Sorsaia, 2023 WL 5490179, at *8 n.10 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 24, 2023) (FDA REMS, anti-abortion statute); Bossetti v. Allergan Sales, LLC, 2023 WL 4030681, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2023); Beaver v. Pfizer, Inc., 2023 WL 2386776, at *3 (W.D.N.C. March 6, 2023), aff’d, 2023 WL 4839368 (4th Cir. July 28, 2023); In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Products Liability Litigation, 548 F. Supp.3d 1225, 1252-53 (S.D. Fla. 2021); Silver v. Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2021 WL 4472857, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2021); Evans v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 2020 WL 5189995, at *9-10 (D. Haw. Aug. 31, 2020); Javens v. GE Healthcare, Inc., 2020 WL 2783581, at *6 (Mag. D. Del. May 29, 2020) (claim that defendants should have marketed a different product), adopted, 2020 WL 7051642 (D. Del. June 18, 2020); Drescher v. Bracco Diagnostics, Inc., 2020 WL 1466296, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2020); Mahnke v. Bayer Corp., 2019 WL 8621437, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2019); Trisvan v. Heyman, 305 F. Supp.3d 381, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Utts v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 251 F. Supp.3d 644, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 919 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 2019); In re Lipitor Atorvastatin Calcium Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, 185 F. Supp.3d 761, 771 (D.S.C. 2016); In re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation, 965 F.
[brief] The court noted:  I don’t think we should lose sight of the fact that this is a five-person office, during COVID, during the height of COVID, and three of the five people in this very busy, very stressed-out office end up getting terminated.  It doesn’t really seem that it would make a lot of sense for her to be... happy about this discipline that these parties received, because she lost three-quarters of... her employees.  (T30-23)
[brief] Defendants’ Brief also argues that expert opinion is required to establish that [...]’s persistent resistance to being collected posed a foreseeable risk of harm during the breeding process.  Defendants do not cite any legal support for this assertion.  Plaintiffs could only find opinions allowing juries to determine whether an animal’s past behavior furnished reasonable grounds to believe the animal might cause an injury without requiring expert opinion.  Liberman v. Drill, 94 N. J.L. 387, 391 (1920); Kodi v. Braxton, A-4709-07T3, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1474, at *10 (App. Div. June 16, 2009) (Exhibit A).  It is not beyond a jury’s understanding to determine if [...]’s known and regular resistance to going through the breeding process “furnished reasonable grounds to believe that it might cause an injury” when being led into the breeding shed.  Jury Charge 5.60B.  A reasonable jury could conclude that it is not mere coincidence that the attack occurred the first day that [...] was being put through the breeding process after receiving a fourth break from collection that season.  (Pa858-Pa861a).  POINT III
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO EXAMINE THE HAM AGREEMENT OF 2015 AND [...]’S CERTIFICATION OF 10/18/22 IN AN EVIDENTARY HEARING.  (Raised Below: paragraph 36 (029a).  In 1T page 8 lines 2-6.  [...] did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  LEGAL POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO COMPEL BAYVIEW TO PRODUCE AN STATEMENT UNDER OATH REAGARDING THE PARTIES OF INTERESTS OF THE NOTE PER NJ CHAPTER 225 LAW.