ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [2T:27-15 to 28-12 (emphasis added). ]  The quoted statements from the trial court demonstrate that the court applied the wrong legal standard when addressing the admissibility of [...]’s conviction.  The court determined that the probative value of the conviction did not outweigh “any” prejudicial effect of the evidence.  The court also equated the analysis under N.J.R.E. 403 with the analysis applicable to convictions that are more than 10 years old under N.J.R.E. 609(b).  All convictions that are less than ten years old on the date of the trial are admissible unless there is a risk that “undue prejudice” from the convictions will substantially outweigh the probative value.  The court applied the test under N.J.R.E. 609(b), which favors exclusion of the evidence, rather than the more stringent test under N.J.R.E. 403.  The court applied the wrong legal standard, and its decision is not subject to a discretionary standard of review.
[brief] The trial court determined that [...]’s contract with [...] had expired according to its own terms.  (Da1).  Following the defendants’ motion for reconsideration, which argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the court below amended its previous order to remove any references to the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL), recognizing that the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on matters related to that statute.  Consequently, a remand for additional findings of fact and legal conclusions would serve no purpose, as the trial court lacks jurisdiction to make factual findings regarding any alleged common law conflict.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The DHCP letter would have served to warn physicians that “During a routine manufacturing inspection, a single silicone particle, approximately 300 microns in diameter, was observed in dispensed Ozurdex implants.  The silicone particle has been confirmed to originate from the needle sleeve. ”  “A number of Ozurdex batches already distributed may contain a silicone particle. ”  The DHCP letter further would have warned physicians of the risk of “Obscuration of vision by particle, Intraocular inflammation and Corneal adverse reaction. ”  (Da0649-Da0650)  By October 25, 2018, [...]’s Root Cause Analysis had identified the manufacturing defect and its cause, which was improper assembly technique.
[brief] [...] was insured by two\(^1\) liability policies.  [...] issued a Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) Policy effective January 28, 2015 to --- \(^1\) [...] also had a Worker’s Compensation Policy with [...].  (TRVa2887.)  January 28, 2016, with policy limits of $1M  Each Occurrence (the “[...] Policy”), which contains a Wrap-Up Exclusion that excludes coverage to [...] for: “Bodily injury” [] arising out of any project that is or was subject to a “wrap-up insurance program”.2 (TRVa234 and TRVa283.)  [...] issued a Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy effective January 28, 2015 to January 28, 2016 (the “[...] Policy”), which generally follows form to the [...] Policy, but contains an endorsement titled Contractors Limitation that excludes coverage for losses insured under a “wrap up”, such as a CCIP.  (TRVa21 and TRVa70.)  To this day, neither insurer has disclaimed coverage to [...] under their policies based on a “wrap up” exclusion.  C.  The Contractor Controlled Insurance Program
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2001- 6  WHEREAS, it is decidedly in the public interest that serious violent crimes which occur on state facilities run by the Department of Human Services are crimes properly investigated and prosecuted; and, WHEREAS, the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17b-98, states that it is the public policy of this State: to provide for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State, in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State; and, WHEREAS, in order to promote statewide uniformity and accountability, it is appropriate for the Attorney General, in cooperation and consultation with the County Prosecutors, to issue and enforce procedures for the uniform investigation of crimes occurring at facilities run by the Department of Human Services; THEREFORE, I, [...], Attorney General of New Jersey, by virtue of NOW, the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statutes of this State, do hereby direct that:
[brief] (Pa310).  [...] did testify in his discovery (Pa310) and de bene esse depositions that he takes cases where he agrees with the theory of the case (8T100:21-102:3), or if the case was "valid." (8T104:17-20).  If the questioning was so limited, that would have been perfectly legitimate cross examination.  But the fact that Mr. [...] agrees with the theory of the case, or thinks that the case is valid, has nothing to do with the police officers' opinions and conclusions.  He is testifying about retail store policies and procedures, not about what occurred between plaintiff and [...].
[brief] Here, the Township relied upon conditions (a) and (d):  a.  The generality of buildings are substandard, unsafe, unsanitary, dilapidated, or obsolescent, or possess any of such characteristics, or are so lacking in light, air, or space, as to be conducive to unwholesome living or working conditions.  ***  d.  Areas with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.  Establishing these conditions requires a significant, “substantial evidence” standard under the relevant case law.
[brief] Pa481 ¶ 28.  [...] opted for the more conservative option, moved for voluntary dismissal of the then-pending appeal (Pa481 ¶ 28; Pa1017–22), and settled the judgment debts that he owed.  Pa481–82 ¶ 29.  Neither Ohio nor the Trial Court has ever suggested that his decision was made in bad faith or was collusive.  Given the level of enmity between the parties to the Vermont suit, any such suggestion would be ludicrous.
[brief] 1.  [...]: “Can I go home to my kids?”  (1T 93-9; Da 109, 03:46:09 to 03:46:11; Da 125)  2.  [...]: “Said, can I go home to my kids? ”  (1T 93-11; Da 109, 3:46:19 to 03:46:22)  3.  [...]: “[Can I] go home?”
[directive] The detainee has the primary responsibility for ensuring that the needs of his/her dependents are met.  The detainee is expected to identify child or adult dependents needing alternative care, to arrange for a responsible adult to meet the needs of the dependents during the detainee's absence, and to request assistance from appropriate public or private agencies if the detainee is unable to identify a responsible adult willing and able to provide appropriate care for the dependents.  At any point in the judicial process when a person is likely to be detained, the court is responsible: (1) for ensuring that the detainee has the opportunity to identify dependents needing alternative care; (2) to identify an adult who can care for the dependents during the detainee's absence; (3) for determining whether the detainee believes the designated adult is suitable to provide appropriate care for the dependent; and ( 4) for permitting the detainee the opportunity to contact an adult or agency to make arrangements for the care of his/her dependents.  The court is also responsible for inquiring of the detainee whether he or she is currently serving as a guardian or co-guardian for an adjudicated incapacitated person.  If the detainee identifies an adult that he/she believes is suitable to provide appropriate care for his/her dependents, the court is not required to assess the ability of that adult to meet this responsibility.  However, if based upon information shared by the detainee or otherwise made known to the court in the proceedings, the court reasonably believes the dependent would be at risk of harm if placed in the care of the adult designated by the detainee, or if the detainee is unable to identify Judiciary Guidelines··  Alternate Care For The Dependents of Persons Detained as a Part of the Judicial Process  Amended and Promulgated Septembc,r 25, 2017  Page 3 of 6
[brief] ---  6  One or more of plaintiff’s experts—specifically [...]—also relied upon a regulation, N.J.A.C. 13:37-6.5, titled “non-delegable nursing tasks,” as prohibiting a registered professional nurse or RN from delegating the assessment or care plan for the patient.  This regulation had an effective date after [...]’s admission to [...] and his death and thus had no application to this litigation as a matter of law and was not to be considered by the jury in its deliberations.  (See Pa102.)
[brief] Continuing, and as quoted previously in subsection A of this Point, the prosecutor made a disparaging theme of [...] as a “secretive” person, building on the idea of his troubled personal life.  (9T 64-21 to 65-8)  As with [...]’s substance abuse issues, the State’s arguments that [...] was more likely to be the kind of person who would commit murder because of his homelessness and poverty were grossly improper and warrant a new trial.  It is well understood that there is a general public perception that homeless people are derelicts who are more likely to be violent, dangerous, and engage in criminal activity.  See State of Washington Department of Commerce, Homelessness Myths and Facts (criticizing public perception “myth” that “[p]eople who are homeless are violent, dangerous, and/or are lawbreakers. ”).  This principle is intimately related to the rule that the State is generally not permitted to advance an argument that a defendant was more likely to commit a crime because he was poor.  See Stewart, 162 N.J. Super. at 100.  A defendant should not be convicted because he was demonized by the State based on his status as a homeless person; instead, a conviction must be grounded on competent evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged.  Because the State’s arguments may have pushed the jury to render a conviction based on the inappropriate stereotype that, as a homeless person living in poverty, [...] had a propensity to commit crimes, his convictions must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[directive] Whenever any work shall be done money expended by any local unit, whether by agreement or by or the terms of any insurance policy, for which an individual or corporation is liable, the local unit shall be or authorized to collect from such individual corporation such sum or sums as shall be necessary to sum reimburse the local unit, and such or sums, when received, shall be placed to the credit of the appropriation from which the cost of doing such work shall have been expended.
[directive] k.  All applications to stay or modify an order issued pursuant to this act, including an order originally issued in municipal court, shall be made in the Superior Court.  The court shall immediately notify the county prosecutor in writing whenever an application is made to stay or modify an order issued pursuant to this act.  If the court does not issue a restraining order, the sentence imposed by the court for a criminal offense as defined in subsection b. of this section shall not become final for ten days in order to permit the appeal of the court's findings by the prosecution.  l.  Nothing in this section shall be construed in any way to limit the authority of the court to take such other actions or to issue such orders as may be necessary to protect the public safety or to safeguard or enforce the rights of others with respect to the place.  m.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the court may permit the person to return to the place to obtain personal belongings and effects and, by court order, may restrict the time and duration and provide for police supervision of such a visit.  C.2C:35-5.9
[brief] \(^3\)  Plaintiff is represented by the same attorneys that represented the plaintiff in *Asmad-Escobar* and thus clearly knew about the decision prior to filing her brief in this appeal.  Plaintiff’s entire theory rests on the language of § 1692c(b) that states: “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person, other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.
[brief] To obtain an individual permit, an applicant must meet the requirements of the Stormwater Management Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:8.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.2.  The New Jersey Stormwater Management Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:8-1.1 to -6.3 (“Stormwater Management Rules”), generally regulate three different performance areas: groundwater recharge, water quality, and peak flow control.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4; N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5; N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6; N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.7.
[brief] 641a.  [...] did not initially sue [...] for the outstanding payments, as it continued to serve as [...]’s custodial services contractor and remained hopeful that [...] would ultimately meet its obligation.  On September 27, 2021, over a year after it made payment to [...] for the May-June 2020 period, [...], through its counsel, sent [...] a letter stating that its invoices for the period of the COVID shutdown had been rejected on July 17, 2020, due to the fact that [...] had not rendered services during the period that [...]’s schools were closed, and asserting that [...] had not tendered any certified payrolls for that period as required by the parties’ contract.
[brief] (Pa1550).  On or about February 1, 2017, Plaintiffs received correspondence from counsel for the [...] advising that the contractor working in the area at the time of the accident was [...] and not [...] as originally communicated.  On February, 14, 2017, Plaintiffs promptly filed a motion to Amend to add [...] as a defendant in this matter.  On March 3, 2017 the motion was granted and Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint on March 10, 2017.  (Pa1576)  On November 29, 2017 [...] Construction provided a contract which showed that paving work in the area of Plaintiff’s accident was performed pursuant to a sub-contract with Defendant [...] defendants (Previously dismissed).  Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint adding CJ [...] and The [...] Companies as named defendants.  That motion was granted by the Court on January 8, 2018.  In turn, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint on January 9, 2018.  (Pa1613).
[brief] They're going to need a building permit.  At that point he can appeal the determination of the zoning officer, whether it's applicable here, but the Board's not approving downstairs apartments.  (T2: p69, ln 20 – p70, ln 12)  Given the extensive testimony by [...], as well as the on-record comments by both [...] and the engineer, it is truly baffling as to how the Board, and [...] for that matter, can now argue to the Court that Plaintiff somehow refused or failed to address the Board’s concern, however misplaced it may have been, regarding the existence of basement apartments.
[brief] Because the trial court appropriately interpreted the law and gave proper deference to the Planning Board and the Borough, this Court should affirm the trial court’s dismissal.  As [...] aptly concluded stated, The Plaintiffs ignore the unrefuted testimony of the Borough planner who authored the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report and his very own familiarity with the iterations of the redevelopment planning dating back to 2006 which specifically included the land use element of the Master Plan.  Understandably, they choose to overlook and side-step the decades of litigation they themselves instituted by and among the parties to this action and the resultant evolution of the Redevelopment Plan.  Over time, the litigation resulted in improving and a tweaking of the planned redevelopment of the Plaintiffs’ Property and, most recently, in ways that consistently, and rationally, advanced the goals of facilitating the actual construction of affordable housing at an appropriate – and, Court-adjudicated, albeit reduced – total unit yield that preserves the 70-unit affordable unit set-aside, and preserving and promoting open space.  [Pa 128].  As the Court found, Plaintiffs comprehensively failed to satisfy their burden of proof in order to overcome the presumption of validity.  Plaintiffs’ appeal fares no better in that endeavor and should therefore be rejected.
[brief] THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE CHARGED OFFENSES, AND THE STATE’S BURDEN WAS NEVER DIMINISHED.  .................................................................  28  A.  It was reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant intended to kill [...] based on the way she used the wine chiller.  ..................................................................................................  30  B.  No lesser-included offenses were clearly indicated from the record.  .................................................................................. 32  1.  The manner of the victim’s death did not clearly indicate anything other than an intentional act ...................... 36  2.  The evidence did not clearly indicate that defendant was reasonably or adequately provoked.  .................................. 38  C.  The State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was never diminished.  .........................................................  41  POINT III
[brief] The State concedes the trial court improperly found aggravating factor eleven, *N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(11)*, but argues this error caused no appreciable prejudice to defendant because, given the court's finding of the additional aggravating factors, and only one mitigating factor, it is thus “doubtful that aggravating factor eleven affected the court's analysis. ”  In reviewing the sentence imposed by a trial court, we must (a) determine if the sentencing guidelines were violated; (b) assess whether the aggravating and mitigating factors found were based upon competent, credible evidence in the record; and (c) “determine whether, even though the court sentenced in accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless, the application of the guidelines to the facts of this case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.
[brief] On Appeal from the Final Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Part, Camden County | REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS-CROSS RESPONDENTS, [...] AND [...], IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS RECORDS CUSTODIAN CITY OF HOBOKEN - OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL  [...], Esq. (070052013)  [...]  Tel: [...] Fax: [...]  [...]  On the brief: [...], Esq.  Date of Submission to the Court: March 5, 2024
[brief] 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).  10  Impaired waters are those that do not support their designated uses because they exceed the pollutant levels required by the surface water quality standards.  These are commonly referred to as impaired waters.  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 907 (11th Cir. 2007).  any additional requirements contained in the applicable Areawide Water Quality Management Plans (“Areawide WQM Plans”).  The DEP must consider and make a record of this information in order to determine consistency with the applicable Areawide WQM plan, but it did not.  The Court should vacate and remand the permit to the agency to develop an adequate record and provide a reasoned Consistency Assessment.
[directive] Other Provisions  A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of both this Directive and shall be severable.  If any IAPP phrase, clause, sentence or provision of either this Directive or is declared by a IAPP court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder either document shall not be affected.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Questions.  Directive or shall be addressed to the Executive Director of [...] ([...]), or their designee.  D.  This Directive shall take effect on August 31, 2020.  Prior to the effective Effective date. date, [...] shall publish an updated that incorporates the revisions mandated by IAPP both this Directive and the Internal Affairs Directive issued on December 4, 2019.
[brief] Moreover, although Plaintiff is correct that Rule 4:14-2(a) “establishes the requirements for deposition notices,” (*see* Pb11), that Rule does not provide any details regarding to whom a deposition notice may properly be issued.  Instead, it simply identifies the notice required to be provided to other parties in advance of a deposition:  **Notice.**  Except as otherwise provided by R. 4:14-9(b), a party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall not give less than 10 days’ notice in writing to every other party to the action.
[brief] [...] are lawyers, they have been lawyers for extended periods of time.  [...] is the principal partner in his own law firm, but not only are they lawyers, they are lawyers who absolutely must be familiar with real estate law.  They have to be, because that’s what they do.  They have several hundred real estate entities …, some of them all over the world, they have over 200 garden apartment projects, and they have been in this business for over 50 years as a family, so they must know what the law is associated with real estate partnerships….
[brief] For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court’s October 6, 2023 Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment  Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial must be affirmed.  Additionally for the reasons set forth above, the Court must affirm the trial court’s March 11, 2024 Order identifying Defendant as the prevailing party in the action below and awarding Defendant attorney’s fees and costs.
[brief] Initially the T&M memo referenced settlement in the north abutment.  However, [...], the project design engineer for [...], sent a follow-up email on July 7, 2015 discussing the content of the T&M Memo.  Within the email, project engineer [...] expressly corrected the content of the T&M memo with respect to the location of the observed settlement.  As per [...], the settlement existed along the south abutment as opposed to the north abutment as noted in the memo.