ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Db 19-20)  That leaves the constricted pupils.  The State cites to a number of out of state and unpublished cases to support its argument that [...]’ pupil size warranted [...] in a belief that he was under the influence.  In fact, these cases help elucidate all that this case is missing.  For instance, in *State v. Stewart*, 340 P.3d 802, 807 (Utah 2014), the Court found reasonable suspicion that a defendant was under the influence and therefore to conduct sobriety tests where the defendant was slurring, jittery, not making sense, and had constricted pupils.  The court noted that the prescription medications could have explained her constricted pupils, but relied on the defendant’s statement that her prescription medications would not be causing any ill-effects to conclude that illegal drugs or alcohol might be having those effects.  *Id.*  The State’s reliance on *State v. Dubaniewicz*, 208 A.3d 619, 620-625 (Vt. 2019), fares no better.  There, the court found reasonable suspicion that a defendant was under the influence of drugs due to a number of observations the officer made about the defendant, including track marks on the back of her hands, the unusually warm jacket she was wearing, pale complexion, rapid pulse, constricted pupils, and change in her affect from the first stop, when she appeared “dopesick,” to a second stop, when she appeared no longer sick.  *Id.*  Importantly, “the sergeant [was] experienced law enforcement officer who has led drug investigations, attended trainings and continuing education relating to criminal drug activity and investigations, and instructed fellow officers in trainings regarding basic drug identification and investigation. ”  *Id.* at 624.  For all those reasons, the court found that it was reasonable for the officer to investigate the defendant for driving under the influence.  *Id.*  Even so, the court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to expand the stop from a potential DUI traffic stop to a drug investigation, after determining that field sobriety testing was unnecessary.  *Id.*  Unlike in the cases cited by the State, the sole purported objective sign that [...] was under the influence was his pupil size.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  A.  **The October 6, 2021 Fatal Crash**  Plaintiff’s decedent [...] was employed by Defendant [...] as a nuclear medical technician at [...] in Holmdel.  Pa42; Pa437; Pa922.  Defendant [...] required certain employees, including technicians such as [...], to park in a distant section of the hospital’s expansive parking lot.  See [...] emails dated January 21, 2020 (Pa446-450) and February 26, 2020 (Pa442-445); see also photographs of the parking lot with labels indicating the designated employee parking area (Pa376-7).  The distant area of the mandatory employee parking lot where the October 6, 2021 fatal crash occurred had no crosswalk, no designated walking area, no sidewalk, no pedestrian warning signs, and no traffic directing personnel/flaggers to protect employees as they attempted to make their way through the busy parking lot. from the area in which [...] required them to park.  See Pa319 (70:17-71:1); Pa327-8 (105:18-106:3; 108:13-15); Pa329-330 (113:9-114:19); Pa815-6 (25:16-26:1); Pa45; see also video stills, Pa416-429.
[brief] Plaintiffs collectively own and operate a restaurant and bar at [...] in [...], known as “[...]” (or “[...]”). ¹  [...] is located within the Borough’s BR zone.  (Da63)  The BR Zone establishes a mixed-use zone, permitting single family homes, government services buildings, and eight separate classes of permitted business uses.  (Da63)  Plaintiff [...], sought, and was granted, bulk variances and site plan approval for [...] from the Borough’s Planning Board by way of Resolution dated March 24, 2015.  (Pa1-10)  The Borough’s Planning Board examined and considered all details of the application for the restaurant.  Plaintiffs later applied for amended site plan approval, and while they initially sought to have outdoor entertainment, including live bands, the Planning Board was concerned with the effect the outdoor entertainment would have on neighboring property.  In light of the Planning Board’s concerns, [...] withdrew its proposal for outdoor entertainment, and agreed to the ¹ [...] passed away on July 1, 2022 while the decision below was pending.  [...] continues to be operated by the remaining Plaintiffs.  condition that “no outdoor speakers, no outdoor music or entertainment” would be present on the property.  (Pa9)  Outdoor seating areas, however, were approved by the Planning Board.  Ibid.  The Planning Board’s Resolution noted that “the applicant proposes a complete upgrade of the property that was severely impacted by Superstorm Sandy, a major benefit to the public good as it is an investment in [...]’s future.  . . .  The structure will be aesthetically pleasing, and the applicant also intends to upgrade the site.  With the withdrawal of the outdoor entertainment component, the Board felt that this was a good use for this site.  . . .  The Board found that the variances could be granted without any negative impact on the zoning ordinance or zone plan.  The proposal is aesthetically pleasing, takes advantage of the river views, improves existing conditions and is a permitted use.  . . .  The Board found that the granting of the variances will have no substantial detrimental impact on surrounding properties nor will it substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance. ”  (Pa6-7)  Plaintiff, [...], later applied to the Borough’s Planning Board to allow additional seating for 79 patrons in the rear yard of [...].  On May 9, 2017, the Planning Board approved of this application, with the condition that the patrons move into the gated patio area after 10:00 p.m.; this was memorialized in the Resolution dated June 28, 2017.  (Pa11-28)  THE NOISE ORDINANCE
[directive] Iniciais do Réu / Defendant’s Initials no Formulário Padrão de Declaração Judicial/Formulário Revisado Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese página 6 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese page 6 of 7  23.  a.
[brief] The Underlying Construction Contracts  The “Scope of Work” in [...]’s contract with [...], executed on June 4, 2015, called for [...] to “[c]omplete all Earthwork/SOE [Support of Excavation]/Underpinning Work,” which is “more specifically described” to include, among other things, “Selective Demolition. ”  (Dta442.)  “Attachment 3” of that agreement describes the CCIP.  Paragraph 3 defined those “Excluded Parties” which were “not eligible to enroll in the CCIP, and who are excluded from the CCIP. ”  (Dta498.)  Nothing therein suggests that demolition subcontractors are ineligible for coverage under the CCIP.  Paragraph 6, “Subcontractor’s CCIP Obligations,” required [...] to “ensure that all of its lower tier Subcontractors who are Eligible Parties enroll in the CCIP prior to their commencement of construction . . . and maintain enrollment during the course of the Project. ” (Dta500, §6(a),(b).)  Significantly, paragraph 6(d) states that [...] and [...] “are not agents . . . of any CCIP insurer. ” (Dta500).  Parties enrolled in the CCIP were contractually required to maintain separate workers compensation and general liability coverage for their “off-site activities. ”  (Dta501, ¶7.)  Paragraph 10, “Modification or Discontinuance of the CCIP,” afforded [...] the ability to “modify or discontinue the CCIP, or request that any Subcontractor of any tier withdraw from the CCIP Program on thirty 30 days written notice,” with the “cost of replacement coverage” to be at [...]’s “expense . . . to the extent of the Cost of CCIP Coverage. ”  (Dta500.)  Paragraph 12, “Order of Precedence” confirmed that the [...] policies’ terms take “precedence” over both the CCIP Manual and all contract provisions.  (Dta505.)  4.
[brief] In Lehrhoff v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 271 N.J. Super. 340, 346–47 (App. Div.1994), this Court concluded that the reasonable expectations of the insured, as formed on the basis of the declarations sheet, could not be defeated by the boilerplate text contained elsewhere in the policy.  This Court stated:  There has been little judicial consideration of the import of the declaration page of an insurance policy in terms of construction of the policy as a whole and in terms of its capacity to define the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage.  We, however, regard the declaration page as having signal importance in these respects....  We are, therefore, convinced that it is the declaration page, the one page of the policy tailored to the particular insured and not merely boilerplate, which must be deemed to define coverage and the insured's expectation of coverage.  And we are also convinced that reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declaration page cannot be contradicted by the policy's boilerplate unless the declaration page itself so warns the insured.  [Id. at 347.]  See also Gerhardt, supra, 48 N.J. at 298 (observing that policy was ambiguous in part because exclusion was not on declarations sheet).
[brief] [Da103-Da119].  Under the 1999 Agreement, the Township agreed to continue supplying bulk sewage treatment services for Appellant.  [Da104].  Further, the 1999 Agreement makes clear and unambiguous the Township is entitled to all connection fees for properties treated by the Township’s plants and not located within Appellant’s boundaries.  Specifically, section 6.5 of the 1999 Agreement provides in relevant part:
[brief] Order Granting Judgment for possession after trial Granted by [...] dated April 2, 2024 ................................................Da12  Mortgage Note for Assumption made September 30, 2011 .........................Da15  HUD – 1  Settlement Statement dated September 30, 2011 ........................Da22  Foreclosure Summons and Complaint, [...] vs. [...]  [...], et al., Docket No. [...] dated September 8, 2011 ........................................Da24  Deed Recorded on October 6, 2011 ........................................................Da37  Unsigned Lease ................................................................................Da43  Notice of Appeal filed May 17, 2024 ........................................................Da53  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery ......................................Da56  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] “Lack of occupancy is only the starting point, as N.J.S.A. 55:19-81 defines abandonment as ‘any property that has not been legally occupied and which meets any of the following additional criteria. ’”  US Bank Cust for PC7 First Trust v. Block 64, Lot 6 2020 WL 4196664 at *4.  Analyzing the report of the plaintiff’s expert as to the property requiring rehabilitation, N.J.S.A. 55:19-81(a), the court rejected reliance on conclusory findings as follows:  [...], however, did not show that the property was in need of rehabilitation beyond his conclusory assertion except for his mention of a need for some painting of some trim in the front and the rear deck and the need to repair the deck railing.  On its face those assertions are hardly convincing that the property was in need of rehabilitation; as [...] pointed out, if it were otherwise, innumerable properties in this State could be deemed abandoned.  US Bank Cust for PC7 First Trust v. Block 64, Lot 6 2020 WL 4196664 at *4.
[brief] (SSR p.30-31, TRVa1360-1361; and [...] Tr., at 25:9-19 at TRVa1427 and 70:5-11 at TRVa1439.)  [...]’s corporate designee, who was also the lead underwriter, testified that demolition contractors were not permitted to enroll.  ([...] Tr. 19:4-23 at TRVa834; 24:10-24 at TRVa835; 34:5-35:16 at TRVa838; 79:9-13 at TRVa849.)  As the trial court determined, the evidence confirms that [...] was performing demolition on the day of the Accident.
[brief] Defendants’ request for relief is misplaced, as there is no dispute regarding the finality of the Final Judgment or whether the PSA was terminated in accordance therewith.  In addition, the termination of the PSA has no effect on Plaintiff’s Second *Lis Pendens*.  The Final Judgment concluded that Defendants satisfied their obligations under the PSA—a conclusion with which Plaintiff disagrees and is appealing—and thus forms the basis for Plaintiff’s Second *Lis Pendens*, filed under *N.J.S.A.* 2A:15-14, in which Plaintiff’s continuing interest in the Property is preserved during appellate review.  Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendants’ cross-appeal.
[brief] (Topology Report at 41-42)  (Pa0237-Pa0238)  The fifth story will also have a step back.  (Id., at 42, Pa0238)  The parking structure, an accessory use, is depicted in the Topology Report.  (Id., at 44, Pa0240)  The remainder of the North Zone on the other portion of Lot 7 will contain up to four buildings for residential rental, restaurant/bar, train station, public plaza, and surface and garage parking.  (Id., at 46, Pa0242).  The South Zone is a portion of Block 3101, Lot 5, fronting on South Avenue West.  The principal permitted uses for the South Zone will be: public plaza, parking structure, surface parking, restaurant/bar, retail and train station.  There will be two sub-zones in the South Zone: (1) an office subzone of two structures each up to five stories with step backs beginning on the third story, the concept of design for these two buildings as depicted at page 54 of the Topology report; (Pa0250) and (2) a public area subzone with four structures on minimum lot sizes of 50,000 square feet which will also contain a public plaza adjacent to the existing [...] train station.
[brief] (9T20-15 to 21-3)  However, [...] made no statements concerning the incident; he maintained his innocence throughout the entirety of the proceedings; and neither the State nor the court identified any statement as demonstrating a lack of remorse.  Instead, the State argued, and the court found, that his decision to not speak at sentencing, combined with speculative interpretations of his body language, constituted a lack of remorse deserving of substantial aggravation weight.
[brief] 3  References to Transcripts are as follows:  | | Date | |---|------------| | 1T | 8/27/21 | | 2T | 11/12/21 | | 3T | 5/3/23 | | 4T | 5/4/23 | | 5T | 5/8/23 | | 6T | 5/9/23 | | 7T | 5/15/23 | | 8T | 5/16/23 | | 9T | 5/11/23 |
[brief] It's both dated July 20th, 2020 and it gives, "limited power of attorney to the [...] and/or [...], collectively as [...], as my attorney in fact to act in my place for the purpose of executing my signature to any document that may be required by [...], [...], and/or [...] (to include its employees, agents, and officers) for the processing of documents that are required by the agency to make a claim of life insurance benefits."  (7T 34).  As a result of this revelation the Court required [...], the Senior Partner of the Firm, to prepare a Certification regarding the EIN issue.  In his Certification signed on April 21, 2021, Mr. Lento acknowledged in Paragraph 4 that his firm had a Power of Attorney to obtain all insurance information on behalf of [...] which Power of Attorney had been executed on July 8, 2020, (R-817).  Mr. Lento further acknowledged that he was fully aware the Firm had taken out an E.I.N. number in order to set up the [...] in Wyoming established to protect Hazel’s interest in the life insurance policies.  (R-817)
[brief] The Borough brought the within appeal challenging the lower court’s decision finding Sea Bright Municipal Ordinance 17-2017 (“Ordinance 17-2017”) preempted by a [...] (“[...]”) Ordinance and unconstitutionally overbroad.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. found Ordinance 17-2017 void on the above noted grounds.  While Respondents address these arguments on appeal, Respondents also inappropriately argue that the Noise Control Act (“NCA”) preempted Ordinance 17-2017, which the Court below determined negatively and which was not appealed.  In short, Respondents’ argument that the NCA preempts Ordinance 17-2017 should be disregarded as the Trial Court determined that the NCA does not preempt Ordinance 17-2017 and Respondents failed to cross-appeal this issue.  From the start, the Borough has relied on its authority stemming from the Home Rule Act (“HRA”), N.J.S.A. 40:48-1, to regulate noise nuisances and enact Ordinance 17-2017.  While Respondents seem to imply that the Borough’s position as to the HRA was somehow a last-ditch effort to justify the enactment of Ordinance 17-2017, “after all efforts at justifying the Noise Ordinance had failed”, the procedural history is replete with reference to the Borough’s position that Ordinance 17-2017 was properly enacted pursuant to the HRA.  Moreover, though, the only preemption issue on appeal is whether the lower court properly found Ordinance 17-2017 preempted by a [...] Ordinance, as Respondent did not cross appeal the lower Court decision that the NCA did not prevent Ordinance 17-2017.  The Borough properly enacted Ordinance 17-2017 pursuant to the HRA and this Court has repeatedly upheld such ordinances so enacted.  Further, Ordinance 17-2017 is not overbroad.  As set forth in the Borough’s Appellate Brief and highlighted below, Ordinance 17-2017 is clear on its face, serves a legitimate and rationale purpose, and is in complete alignment with similar noise nuisance ordinances which have clearly defined terms to protect individual Constitutional rights.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] English-Polish Version  UWAGA:  Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu proszę nie podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:
[brief] 33  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS PAGE: Order Granting Summary Judgment (July 16, 2024) ..........Pa711  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | AUTHORITY | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------|------| | **Cases:** | | | Beasley v. Passaic County, 377 N.J. Super. 585 App. Div. 2005) | 22 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) | 5 | | DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528 (App. Div. 2005) | 17, 23 | | Donofry v. Autotote Systems, Inc., 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001) | 23, 24 | | Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) | 20 | | Fahey v. City of Jersey City, 52 N.J. 103, 107 (1968) | 18 | | Greenberg v. Camden County Vocational and Technical Schools, 310 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1998) | 17 | | Hernandez v. Montville Tp. Bd. of Educ., 354 N.J. Super. 467, 474 (App. Div. 2002) | 19 | | Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F. 3d 173, 177 (3d. Cir.1997) | 17, 23 | | Kelly v. Bally’s Grand, Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 422, 432 (App. Div. 1995) | 17 | | Kolb v. Burns, 360 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (App. Div. 1999) | 15, 16 | | Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) | 5 | | Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 400 N.J. Super. 474, 492 (App. Div. 2008) | 15 | | Mehlman v. Mobile Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 193-94 1998) | 19, 20 | McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
[directive] Because this Directive is intended to provide overarching guidance to agencies with varied statutory duties and authorities, its mandates are necessarily general in nature.  Each Division must determine for itself how best to implement the principles and best practices set forth here, with guidance from the Office of the Attorney General.  Yet the central commitments of this Directive are clear:  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable 1.  When setting investigative and enforcement priorities, a Division should consider how its communities.1 enforcement actions may affect racial justice and equity for underserved 2.  Each Division should affirmatively identify and prioritize matters that promote racial justice and equity for underserved communities.  3.  Each Division should routinely assess whether its actions are advancing those goals.  This Directive provides a starting point for agencies to better promote racial justice and equity for underserved communities through civil enforcement.  Each Division should consider whether and how every aspect of its work advances these goals.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, et seq., which provides for general responsibility of the Department’s operations and the supervision of the organization of the Department, I hereby direct all civil enforcement agency personnel operating under the authorities of the laws directives.2 of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following I.
[brief] [...]: So is it possible to have a 30-foot tall building that classifies itself as a high cube under 154?  [...]: Yes.  [...]: It is?  [...]: Yes.  Yes.  Because the definition by ITE, again, it's a building height of 24 feet or greater.  [...]: Okay.  And that could be up to 75 feet or 100 feet?  Doesn't matter.  Once you're 24 feet, you're in a different universe.  [...]: Right.  [...]: Interesting.  Okay.  [...]:  And, you know, it will -- because, again, you know, the theory is that that sample set will encompass various types of buildings within that -- you know, within those parameters.  So you can have a building that's maybe -- the count was down.  The building was 30 feet and there was one done at 50 feet.  Again, it's a compilation of, you know, samples, actual samples, where they conduct these traffic counts.  [...]:  So we're not saying that there's no distinction to be made between buildings in those heights.  We're just saying that the way the data is calculated, it doesn't distinguish?  [...]:  From a traffic generation perspective, correct.  [...]: Right.  The way the data is sliced, it doesn't distinguish?  [...]: Correct.  4T 30:6 through 4T 31:11  (Emphasis added)  [...] is unable to tell us what the effect will be of warehouse buildings that are 50 feet tall instead of 30 feet tall because the aggregated data developed by the Institute of Traffic Engineers includes buildings with ceiling heights of 24 feet and greater, and building height is not an independent variable in the ITE equation generated from the ITE data.
[brief] The [...] Preserved Their Right to Object to the Fee Award  Plaintiff suggests that the [...] somehow waived their right to appeal the fee award:  “Despite choosing not to oppose the fee application, Appellants now seek a reversal of the fee award as well as a reversal of the court’s rulings and orders enforcing the MOU. ”  Pb, 10.  In fact, the [...] specifically informed the trial court that they opposed the fee application inasmuch as it was based upon the underlying orders, and requested a decision from the trial court on the fee application so that this appeal could proceed:  As Your Honor is aware, the [...] respectfully disagree with the November 27 Order and a prior Order entered on September 15, 2023, and intend to appeal.  Apart from their disagreement with the underlying Orders, the [...] will not oppose the fee application and request that Your Honor enter an Order in connection with the application as soon as possible so that the appeal may proceed.  Plaintiffs explained in their opening papers that the counsel fee award should be reversed both because the underlying orders of September 15 and November 27, 2023 should be reversed and because the trial court’s finding in connection with the November 27, 2023 Order that the [...] did not comply with the September 15, 2023 Order was erroneous.  Pb, 21-22.  Thus, the [...] plainly have preserved their right to appeal the counsel fee award.
[brief] ”); Jamgochian v. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 240 (2008) (“The minimum requirements of due process. . . are notice and the opportunity to be heard”) (internal quotation marks \(^8\)  There is no such thing as being held “in contempt” of a [...] interim order, and the [...] exceeded its statutorily granted authority when it did so.