ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Nadelson*, Plaintiff’s argued on Summary Judgment that the ordinance was vague because it failed to provide sufficient guidelines so that an historic district property owner may reasonably know what limitations are placed upon his rights of expansion, alteration and the like.  Plaintiffs argued that the [...] could not make a rational determination based on the vague language.  The Defendants in the case argued that the ordinance must be sustained because its design criteria and guidelines are sufficiently clear and not impermissibly vague.  Defendants asserted that there are multiple layers of design criteria and guidelines surrounding, included in and supporting the ordinance.
[brief] (4T 6-7 to 25)  [...] testified that he was in the back room when the two men entered the store.  [...] noted that the men were wearing what he considered clothing too warm for January morning.  (4T 13-8 to 20)  Immediately upon seeing the men, [...] dialed 9-1-1 on his phone, but did not place the call.  (4T 17-10 to 19)  The two men asked about phone accessories.  [...] testified that he assisted the taller man, who was in the middle of a phone conversation, at the front of the store.  [...] was certain that the men were going to commit a robbery, he claimed that he could overhear the conversation, although the man’s phone was not on speaker.  He claimed that the person on the other end of the phone call said, “I circled the store a couple times. ”  (4T 20-12 to 21-8)  [...] admitted that “he couldn’t hear too much of the conversation that was coming through the phone.  (4T 21-9 to 12)  While [...] was helping the taller man with the accessories, the shorter man pulled a gun on his co-worker [...].  [...] and [...] were directed to the back of the store, told to lie on the floor, and put their hands by their sides.  (4T 21-19 to 22-9)  One of the men, wearing black gloves, emptied the cage of cell phones, mobile modems and accessories and emptied the safe of $10,000 in cash.  (4T 30-1 to 3, 33-11 to 20)  Based on his subsequently acquired knowledge of the investigation, [...] filled in the gaps in the conversation that he claimed he could overhear on the phone during the robberies.  [...] testified that: “the gentlemen in the car had mentioned on the phone to the gentlemen in the store that he is being followed by what I assumed is now the state or, I know FBI was involved so he was giving them a description of what was going on outside. ”  (4T 31-13 to 18)  According to [...], the man in the store told the person he was on the call with to remain calm; he was directing the person he was talking to head towards the mall parking lot and they would meet there.  (4T 32-1 to 4, 34-20 to 23)  The two robbers fled, leaving the bags in the store.
[brief] AA14.  The Commission concluded that “[t]his is clearly a record that is insufficient for a higher-level law enforcement position, Lieutenant, where incumbents supervise, evaluate, train and provide guidance to subordinate Sheriffs Officer personnel. ”  AA14-15.  In fact, “[t]he Commission may have removed [...] from the subject eligible solely on the basis of the November 2012 45-day suspension where she agreed that she was untruthful.
[brief] 103 N.J. at 367.  Under both ordinances, allowable rent covers operating expenses, mortgage interest payments and a percentage of cash investment.  The Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of both ordinances using a return-on-equity standard, provided, however, that the “return on investment was not limited to initial or cash investment and the original investment could be equated with current dollar values so as to assure a fair return.
[brief] \(^13\)  \(^8\)  Id. at 480-81.  \(^9\)  Id. at 480.  \(^10\)  Id. at 483.  \(^11\)  Ibid  \(^12\)  Id. at 484.  \(^13\)  \textit{Sheil v. N.J. State Parole Bd.}, 244 N.J. Super. 521, 529 (App. Div. 1990).  PRAYER FOR RELIEF:  1.  Remand the matter and allow the parties to renegotiate the plea agreement in its entirety after all evidence is provided to defendant and his current counsel. \textsuperscript{14}  2.  If the parties are unwilling to reach a new plea agreement, then allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.  Respectfully Submitted, /s/ [...]  KEVIN T. FLOOD, ESQ.  Date: June 2, 2024.  \textsuperscript{14}  See also, attached unpublished decision \textit{State v. Roosevelt}, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 296, 2014 WL 563649, setting forth a similar remedy under similar circumstances. 45a.  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW IN NEW JERSEY THAT WITHOUT SPECIFIC MENTION IN THE DEED OR OTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES INTENDED INCLUSION OF AN ABUTTING RIPARIAN GRANT, A RIPARIAN GRANT WILL NOT PASS APPURTEnant TO ANOTHER DISTINCT PARCEL (Pa1088; 9T9-11)  This case deals with, as a matter of law, the distinction between what is known as a "Riparian right" as distinguished from a "Riparian Grant".
[brief] Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant lied about what she paid herself and inflated financials to hide what she “stole” from the Plaintiff.  The jury did not agree.  The jurors heard that Plaintiff used the Pharmacy bank account as his own, paying personal expenses and cutting checks to himself.  The jury heard Plaintiff had a verbal agreement to take $1,000 a week from the pharmacy.  (2T24:3-6).
[brief] Pa159.  On remand, the trial court, again without urging by Defendants, now found that Plaintiffs’ witness was not a party in interest, that he was akin to a general contractor for the plaintiffs, and that he somehow lacked standing.  This finding is not supported by the record – which showed that the witness was a Manager for [...] and [...] and an owner of [...].  The factual finding is plain error.  Because of this finding, His Honor found that the CFA did not apply and did not make the conclusions of law that this Court mandated.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] Notably, for the critical timeframe of 2:53 a.m. to 3:29 a. m., [...] had no distance data from [...] on which to rely, testifying candidly and repeatedly that “with no distance the phone could be right next to the tower, or it could be way out here, you know, measuring a few miles away. ” (7T51-14 to 16); see also (7T51-19 to 21) (“Again, could be very close to the tower or it could be further away.  There is no distance so there is no way to tell. ”).  The [...] records contained distances for the timeframe of 3:54 a.m. to 5:00 a.m., showing “overlapping” arcs between the Fairfield and Bridgeton towers.  (7T58-1 to 59-19; Pa29).  [...] emphasized here, “I’m not trying to say that this phone is in any one spot or it’s not in any one spot.  All I’m doing is interpreting the records and putting them on the map. ” (7T71-19 to 22).  Overall, [...] was candid that the PCMD data gave a general approximation and had limits, but ultimately provided a good idea where a phone was located at a particular time based on his own experience and the experience of [...] as a whole.
[brief] As such, every breath [...] took in the presence of Plaintiffs, every word he spoke to Plaintiffs, and every word he wrote to Plaintiffs pretending to be [...]’s attorney was an affirmative misrepresentation.  According to the testimony of [...], [...], and [...] himself, the people who owned [...] testified that they were never aware of the [...]-MTDC transaction, never met each other, and never knew or communicated with the alleged attorney for [...], and vice versa.
[brief] We first address defendant's contention, raised for the first time on appeal as plain error,³ that his convictions should be reversed because of testimony of [...] and [...], as well as the prosecutor's opening statement.  Defendant asserts that the testimony and opening statement impermissibly created the inference that police were aware of incriminating evidence provided by non-testifying witnesses, thereby violating his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the federal and state constitutions.  We begin our analysis by surveying the Confrontation Clause precedents that dictate the outcome of this appeal.
[brief] State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962)...................................................41  State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2000)......................24 State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117 (1997)..................................................37  State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545 (2009).........................................................42  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984).......................................................36  State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 (1989).......................................................35  State v. Sowell, 213 N.J. 89 (2013)......................................................35 , 36 Szczecina v. PV Holding Corp., 414 N.J. Super. 173 (App. Div. 2010)........40 Tabor v. O’Grady, 59 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 1960)..........................43 Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J. 167 (2016)....................................................19 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015)..................................................35 Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338 (2014).............................................42 Wyatt by Caldwell v. Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 1987).....24, 25, 32 New Jersey Court Rules Rule 2:10-1..............................................................................................47 Rule 4:16-1(c)..........................................................................................41 Rule 4:49-1(a).........................................................................................18, 45 New Jersey Rules of Evidence N.J.R.E. 702............................................................................................35, 36 N.J.R.E. 703............................................................................................35 N.J.R.E. 804(a)(4)...................................................................................41 N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1)...................................................................................41 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] ####  Merits of Appeal  *On May 17, 2019, [...] issued a letter order directing the parties to exchange discovery letters and to subsequently submit an outline of any remaining discovery issues by June 21, 2019.  As such, on June 20, 2019 and June 21, 2019, Defendants and Plaintiff, respectively, submitted to [...] letters setting forth their perceived discovery issues.  The Letter Order on appeal substantially addressed those issues.  (Letter Order at 1).  The Letter Order adjudicates, both, Plaintiff’s issues regarding the scope of discovery and Defendants’ more narrowly tailored issues concerning what they believed to be interrogatory deficiencies and categories of documents that Plaintiff had failed to produce.  (Id.).  In the present appeal, Plaintiff seeks this Court’s review of each of [...]’s discovery findings in her Letter Order.  (See generally Appeal, ECF No. 61).  It is well-established that “[a] United States Magistrate Judge may hear and determine any non-dispositive pretrial matter pending before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). ”  *Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.*, No. CIV.A 04-2355 JLL, 2010 WL 451168, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2010).  Generally, a district court will only reverse a magistrate judge’s finding if it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law. ”  *Id.* (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(1)(A)).  The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that the magistrate judge’s decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.  *Marks v. Struble*, 347 F. Supp. 2d 136, 149 (D.N.J. 2004).  However, where, as here, “an appeal seeks review of a matter within the purview of the Magistrate Judge, such as a discovery dispute, an even more deferential standard, the ‘abuse of discretion standard’ must be applied. ”  *Salamone v. Carter’s Retail, Inc.*, No. CIV.A. 09-5856 FLW, 2012 WL 821494, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2012) (collecting cases).  “An abuse of discretion occurs ‘when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.  If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.’ ”
[directive] The fact that a BWC is not complete and accurate police reports and testifying the circumstances or not, of course, preclude an officer from as to an encounter event does suggest that the encounter or the admissibility of evidence.  Nor does it of the or event, affect  However, recording can or testimony or incomplete.  a BWC officer's written report is inaccurate testimony, which is one of the corroborate accuracy of written reports and supplement and the of deploying these devices.  significant benefits  Vehicle-Mounted Video Between BWCs and Practical and Policy-Related Differences
[brief] ”  68 N.J. at 626.  The Unit’s assessed valuation is precisely a major component of Plaintiff’s equity that was adopted by the Trial Court.  \(^2\)  Defendant only argues in this Appeal that [...]’s management fees and a special assessment should not have been excluded in [...]’s operating expenses.  Amicus also speculates that the $47,72 purchase price attributable to the Unit in 1993 was dependent upon conversion to a condominium (which occurred ten (10) years later in 2003), and that price was too high, and, but for a conversion to a condominium, was not a “prudent” investment.  See page 20 (“Accordingly, we would ask the court to consider what would have been a realistic purchase price for this building at the time of the purchase if there was no intent to convert. ”); page 21 (“[I]t stands to reason that the actual purchase price, were it purchased for rental purposes, would have been extremely low. ”).  Such speculation is patently improper—particularly for an appellate argument that can only be based upon the record below.
[directive] Agencies may receive law enforcement or judicially sanctioned subpoenas directing the production of internal affairs investigative records.  Before responding to the subpoena, the law enforcement executive or internal affairs investigator should consult with the agency's legal counsel to determine whether the subpoena is valid and reasonable.  Courts may modify or quash invalid or unreasonable subpoenas, but will require the agency seeking to so modify or quash to file an appropriate motion.  Similar considerations may provide grounds for opposing a records request from a Civilian Review Board that otherwise satisfies the minimum requirements described below.  For that reason, the appropriate agency personnel should consult with legal counsel to determine under what circumstances it would be appropriate to provide notice to any individual who is referenced in records requested by a Civilian Review Board.  9.6.5
[brief] Order Denying Application For Permission to File Emergent Motion ...................................................... Pa88 to Pa89  *  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), a party may include a brief in the appendix when “the brief is referred to in the decision of the court. ”  The Union County briefs, (Pa8-36), as well as portions of the Hudson County briefs, (Pa57-62), are included in the appendix in accordance with Rule 2:6-1(a)(2).  (See Pa1).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Frequently the security demanded is in a substantial amount.  Manifestly, if an aspirant for the contract knew that it would not be required of him his competitive position would be improved over those vying with him.  On its face that state of affairs is inimical to the public interest.  The fact that the waiver is attended by good faith on both sides and is not harmful in the particular situation is not sufficient to justify it.  If erosion of the policy is to be avoided, even in such a state of affairs, the municipality cannot be permitted to breathe validity into an invalid bid by waiver.  In this field it is better to leave the door tightly closed than to permit it to be ajar, thus necessitating forevermore in such cases speculation as to whether or not it was purposely left that way.
[brief] Nor do they offer any explanation as to why the Trustee would have been under any duty to pursue a sale to the [...], after the Defendants had dismissed their offer as a “bogus” attempt to “avoid obtaining a proper appraisal and selling the property to [...]” (Da629) and had done everything in their power to thwart a sale to anyone but themselves.  Finally, the Defendants claims concerning the alleged “misappropriation” (which is, essentially, based on the Trustee’s having filed suit against them) had been previously asserted in their proposed second supplemental complaint.  The trial court’s Statement of Reasons accompanying the denying their motion to file that complaint observed that “it seems from Defendants’ allegations that this ‘misappropriation’ stems from Plaintiff’s payment of counsel fees for the instant litigation).  (Da65).  Nothing that took place at the plenary hearing added anything to breathe life into this claim.
[brief] Notwithstanding the above factual and credibility determinations – and despite previously concluding the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and the entire controversy doctrine did not operate as a bar to Plaintiff’s claims – the trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, without prejudice.  (Pa3.)  In so doing, the trial court did not provide any legal basis whatsoever for its decision.  (Ibid.)  Instead, the trial court “explained” that it was dismissing Plaintiff’s claims – over one year into the pending matter – to “see” what action this Court would take in connection with the appeal of the First Action.
[brief] Pa51.  Defendants, [...] and [...], filed a cross-motion for summary judgment for a determination that the individual guarantors, [...], [...], and [...], were not liable on the personal guarantees.  Pa117.  The Court heard oral argument on July 29, 2022, and on August 1, 2022 entered an Order for Partial Summary Judgment finding that [...] was liable to [...] in the amount of $100,965.77, and that [...], [...] and [...] were liable on the guarantee but that the guarantee was terminated on May 11, 2016.
[brief] (Pa330, 18:15-24).  [...] was contracted by [...] to paint the steps in question – the estimate/contract was dated November 23, 2021.  (Pa393).  The work in question was completed by December 1, 2021.  (Pa452, 20:18-24).  No complaints were received by [...] regarding the work done on the steps.  (Pa451, 17:12-15).  In discovery, Plaintiff served the report of [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa350).  [...] concludes that poor maintenance, a difference in riser heights, the slope of the stairs and a “low coefficient of friction” were all proximate causes of Plaintiff’s fall.  (Pa363).  [...]’s report completely ignores the factual record.  Plaintiff never navigated the staircase in question, as he slipped on the landing at the top of the staircase.  (Pa329, 17:8-17).  [...] makes no causal connection between [...]’s painting of the stairs and Plaintiff’s fall and alleges no defect as to the type of paint utilized for the steps in question.  (Pa362-63).  [...]’s discussion of the coefficient of friction on the stairs in question is also of no significance because he does not specify which steps he is referring to in his analysis and because his findings pertain only to dry steps and wet steps – both of which are irrelevant because the Plaintiff alleges he slipped and fell on ice.  (Pa350).  The [...] produced a report authored by [...] (“[...]”) in discovery.
[directive] 법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English 뉴저지 주 사법부  New Jersey Judiciary  비협상 인정에 사용하는 보충 답변 양식 Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas (Korean)
[brief] Instead, [...] informed Defendant [...] of Plaintiff’s complaints, which Plaintiff believed exacerbated the situation (Pa659).  [...] made similar complaints to [...] regarding Defendant [...]’s conduct.  (Pa659).  [...] had also made complaints about [...]’s conduct.  (Pa659 – Pa660).  [...] made a complaint in 2018 regarding an incident in which Defendant [...] blocked a door and refused to let her leave a room.  (Pa660).  [...] further complained about Defendant [...]’s repeated slamming of file cabinets and doors, yelling and cursing, and her threatening body language.  (Pa660).  Plaintiff, [...], and [...] had all made complaints about Defendant [...]’s conduct to [...].  (Pa662 – Pa663).  [...], over the years, had discussed the complaints with Defendant [...] to get her to modify her behavior.  (Pa662).  C.
[brief] A.  **Plaintiff Did Not Have The Burden of Proving A Doctor Would Have Been Available to Perform The Emergency C-Section, If It Had Been Timely Called**  The errors of the July 17, 2023 decision were rooted in the court’s incorrect assessment that the Plaintiff needed, as an affirmative element of her case, to prove that a doctor would have been available to perform the C-section assuming the procedure had been timely called at 9:48 p.m.  The court wrote:  “Yet even if the Defendants had called for the surgery 10, 15, or 30 minutes earlier, no attending obstetrician was available to perform it. ”  [Pa19 (emphasis added)].  The court contended even further:  “Plaintiffs have not provided an expert report or opinion detailing what the proper standard of care is with regards to hospital staffing,” adding:  In contrast, the present case concerns the staffing procedures of a hospital in the department of obstetrics and gynecology on a certain date, with respect to the quantity of doctors available to perform surgeries, residents, and nurses.  The Court finds that such procedures would not be readily comprehensible for a lay juror without the aid of expert testimony and Plaintiffs do not provide any expert reports or cite to any standards or regulations to support a claim of negligence.  [Pa19].  As an initial matter, neither of these legal contentions had been advanced in support of the motions.  [See Pa210-211; Pa212-213; Pa266-267; Pa403-410; Pa438-442].  All movants raised nothing but legal arguments pertaining to the alleged lack of proof of proximate causation, arguing that Plaintiff could not establish that [...]’s oxygen deprivation for a period of thirty-nine minutes could have resulted in the brain injuries that she suffered.
[brief] THE QUESTIONS ON APPEAL CONCERN MATTERS OF GREAT PUBLIC INTEREST  On page 12 of its Brief, Respondent states: “[T]his case does not implicate the public interest. ”  Respondent offers no case citation nor analysis to support its statement.  Respondent only states its unsubstantiated opinion.  Courts “will not ordinarily consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal unless it relates to ‘jurisdiction of the trial court or concern[s] matters of great public interest,’ or otherwise constitutes ‘plain error.