ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Order – Judgment of Acquittal.................................................................65a; T9, 25-31  Trial Judge’s Charge to Jury.................................................................81a; T8, 88-95  Order – In Limines..................................................................................58a; T1, 68-91  Oral order admitting evidence...............................................................T4, 151-267; T5, 3-56  Order – Extended Term...........................................................................66a; T9, 54-62  #  TABLE OF CITATIONS  ##  NEW JERSEY STATUTES | Citation | Page | |----------|------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:1–8(e) | 19 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2 | 19 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b) | 19 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1) | 18 | | N.
[brief] See *Toll Bros. Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor*, 303 N.J. Super. 518 (Law Div. 1996), aff’d o.b., 334 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 2000), certif. granted in part, 167 N.J. 599, 600 (2001), aff’d, 173 N.J. 502 (2002).  The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that a systemic threat to judicial authority emerges when litigants—particularly public officers—flout the trial court’s commands, warranting immediate coercive action.
[brief] Under this Factor, an individual that makes their services available to the public on a regular basis generally indicates independent contractor status.  What the Respondent fails to understand is that Petitioner does not provide municipal prosecutorial services to the public at large.  She only provides such services to municipalities in which she is appointed as municipal prosecutor, including [...] where she has been enrolled in the PERS system for a long time.  This was also acknowledged by [...] at the OAL hearing.  FACTOR 19 – RIGHT TO DISCHARGE
[brief] First, it was not the testimony of an investigator saying, "'that's the same blue car,'" but rather, was testimony giving the jury the tools it needed to make that conclusion by explaining the police's investigation of the "vehicle of interest" and which car to look at.  *Watson*, 254 N.J at 604.  After [...] pointed out which car to look at, it was up to the jury to determine whether the car in each clip was the same.  They then had to decide if that particular car was present at the shooting and, ultimately, if defendant was the individual in the car at the time of the shooting.  See *People v Brown*, 82 N.E.3d 148, 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (finding detective's testimony about interactions and movements of specific individuals in parking lot footage helpful to jury by focusing on relevant actions, considering distance of faces and outdoor winter clothing concealing identities).
[brief] In other words, the trial court intended to provide [...] with more specific information regarding why disqualification was sought and to permit Appellants the opportunity to respond to newly raised arguments.  The trial court never reversed its decision on the *in camera* Certification until the November 7, 2024 hearing.  Tellingly, Respondents could have (but did not) seek a protective order or confidentiality order with an attorney’s eyes-only designation or sought to file the Certification under seal, which would have maintained the confidentiality of the information that Respondents paradoxically assert [...] already possesses.  VI.
[brief] 1 POINT I THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT [...] WAS IN A PHYSICAL ALTERCATION WITH TWO MEN—ONE OF WHOM WAS ARMED WITH THE HANDGUN THAT ULTIMATELY BECAME THE LETHAL WEAPON—WAS SUFFICIENT UNDER THE LAW TO REQUIRE THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON PASSION/PROVOCATION  MANSLAUGHTER UPON REQUEST BY DEFENSE COUNSEL..................................................  1  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRORS IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS REQUIRE A REVERSAL AND WHOLESALE RESENTENCING, AS DO THE UNCONTROVERTED ERRORS WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
[brief] (Da391-392).  As the February 9, 2022 Order remained in effect, [...] conducted searches of his text messages for documents responsive to [...]’s OPRA request, which covered hundreds of different individuals.  (Da393-479).  Between April 18, 2022, and July 12, 2022, [...] produced 73 pages of responsive documentation.  (Ibid.).  However, while the February 9, 2022 Order was not stayed, neither was it a final, appealable order, because the issue of counsel fees was not resolved by the Trial Court.
[brief] | | | Kopp Inc. v. United Technologies, Inc., | 11 | | 223 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 1988) | | | Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration, | 12, 14 | | 67 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 1961)  | | | Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., | 16 | | 214 N.J. 419 (2013)  | | Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2005)  .........................................................  15 Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 (1992)  ..............................................................................  17  Will v. Caruso Thompson LLP, 2013 WL 6508480 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2013).................................  15  Statutes N.J.S.A. 12A:1-303 .............................................................................  19 N.J.S.A. 12A:1-303(a)(1)-(2).................................................................  19 N.J.S.A. 12A:2-102 .............................................................................  18 N.J.S.A. 12A:2-105(1).......................................................................  18 Uniform Commercial Code ....................................................................  18 UCC ..................................................................................................  18, 19 Other Authorities Rule 4:46-2(c) .....................................................................................  11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] As captured on dashcam video (see generally Da 15 at 3:13:00 to 3:26:20) and transcribed by the State (see generally Da 16-27), moments after being removed from his car, handcuffed, and placed under arrest, an officer tells [...] “[w]e’re going back to the house,” and asks, “[w]ho’s back in your house right now?”  (Da 17)  Although [...]’s responses are mostly inaudible, the following recorded exchange then takes place:  UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: Nobody but your wife?  (MR. GALLOWAY inaudible)  UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: Copy that.  Got this cash on you.  Okay.  Ah, you can go with this . . .  Do you want to ah, talk to him about ah, going back?  [...]: Yeah, yeah.  So, so here’s the deal.  It’s just your wife at the house right now?  (MR. GALLOWAY inaudible)  [...]: And your granddaughter? Okay.  Listen here’s the deal.  Right now we have enough to write a search warrant on your house and we’re well within that means, so either we’re gonna go that route or we can be a gentleman and we can go back, and you can give us consent and we can find whatever else you’ve got in there.  UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER:  Either, either way we’re going back to the house . . .  UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: Yeah.  UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: . . . it’s either with your cooperation or without your cooperation.  MR. GALLOWAY: I understand that.  UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: Okay.  MR. GALLOWAY: I’m not gonna argue with you.  UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: Alright.  (MR. GALLOWAY inaudible)  [...]:  If you’re gonna give us consent then yeah, we’ll, we’ll be, you just tell us where everything is, we’re not going to tear your house apart.  Okay?  We’re cool with that?  (MR. GALLOWAY inaudible)  [Da 17-18 (emphases added).
[brief] [...] maintained that his plea agreement for the unlawful possession charge was not contingent on his testifying in the trial at bar; he testified only to “save [his] life and save others” and credited his favorable plea agreement to the skills of his attorney.  (Id.).  [...] was forthcoming about the fact that he had twelve previous criminal convictions, most of which related to CDS offenses.  (2T:129-17 to 130-3).  With the aid of United States Marshals, [...] located defendant in Maryland.
[brief] Moreover, the trial court neither made findings nor conducted any legal analysis that would justify piercing [...]’s corporate veil to hold Defendant personally liable for the company’s purported wrongful acts in connection with the contracts that [...] was a party to (Db46; Da00507, Aff. Defense #5).  Additionally, Plaintiffs did not refute that the trial court failed to make specific findings in its decision that Defendant breached the 2014 and 2017 [...] SPAs and the 2014 [...] Purchase Agreement (Db36-37).  The trial court’s unformed attempt to cure this defect on Defendant’s reconsideration motion only compounded the court’s initial error of law and did not identify the record evidence that the court relied on in finding that Defendant breached these contracts (37T87-20 to 88-1).  Plaintiffs, unsurprisingly, ignore the fact that [...] admitted on cross-examination that: (1) he did not review Exhibit S with Defendant; (2) Defendant did not make any representations to [...] about Exhibit S; (3) Defendant did not provide [...] any records in connection with either 2014 [...] Purchase Agreement or the 2014 and 2017 [...] SPAs; and (4) Defendant made no representations to [...] in connection with either the 2014 [...] Purchase Agreement, the 2014 [...] SPA, or the 2017 [...] SPA (18T14-17 to 15-7, 27-16 to 28-4, 133-5 to 134-10, 141-25 to 142-3).  The trial court’s comments on Defendant’s reconsideration motion that “I don’t accept that argument because how do you have a sale that is shortchanging somebody based on [] what occurred historically?  The numbers were wrong.  It was bogus,” and that the subject contracts “all feed off each other,” are mere conclusions without the required factual findings from the record evidence that are necessary in order to hold Defendant liable for breaching the 2017 [...] SPA, which is the only contract that she was a party to (36T50-10 to 51-21; 37T87-20 to 89-4).  In short, there was no evidence that Defendant engaged in the unauthorized expenditure of funds from [...] or [...], that she committed acts that were detrimental to the companies, that she failed to properly enter business transactions in the companies’ books or manipulated financial records, or that she breached any representation or warranty in the 2017 [...] SPA (Db35-36).  As such, the absence of any credible evidence that Defendant breached any of the contracts at issue mandates that the Judgment be vacated against her.
[brief] ”) (emphasis added).  The distinction is key.  Mejia expressly contemplates that, if present during the trial as an active party, the third-party defendant will be bound by the outcome such that the original defendant’s contribution rights are adjudicated within that same case.  In situations such as those found in *Burt*, *Jones*, and the instant case, the joint tortfeasor was *not present at trial*.  Thus, any contribution right is purely contingent and hypothetical, requiring the “fronting” of [...]’s 40% allocated share and the uncertainty necessitated by the need to prevail in a successive contribution trial.  Such a procedure is not contemplated or countenanced by the case law or the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] \(^{31}\)  \(^{30}\)  See DEG, LLC v. Township of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 262; 966 A.2d 1036, 1047; Quick Check Food Stores v. Twp. of Springfield, 83 N.J. 438, 445, 416 A.2d 840 (1980).  \(^{31}\)  Specifically, [...], Esq. told the Court that [...] was given all four Chinese Agreements during his closing argument, knowing that this was not true.  (See Da130 and Da411-412)  [...], Esq. intentionally and willfully committed the fraud upon the court by making this misstatement, even after he was told by his co-counsel, [...], Esq. in an email that only the third Chinese Agreement had been shown to [...].
[brief] 6  See also, e.g., *United States for Use & Benefit of M. Frank Higgins & Co. v. Dobco Inc.*, No. 22-CV-9599 (CS) (VR), 2023 WL 5302371, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2023) (“Although there is nothing improper about parties agreeing to produce all documents generated from an ESI search protocol …, the Court will not order an unwilling party to do so. ”); *SinglePoint Direct Solar LLC v. Solar Integrated Roofing Corp.*, No. CV-21-01076-PHX-JAT, 2023 WL 2585296, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2023) (“Plaintiff may nonetheless review all documents that are ‘hits’ on a search term for relevance and withhold irrelevant documents. ”); *Willmore v. Savvas Learning Co. LLC*, No. 22-2352-TC-ADM, 2023 WL 6124045, at *9 (D. Kan. Sept. 19, 2023) (rejecting the “demand that [responding party] produce all resulting hits” because “the scope of discovery … begins with relevance”); *FlowRider Surf, Ltd. v. Pac. Surf Designs, Inc.*, No. 15CV1879-BEN (BLM), 2016 WL 6522807, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016) (“Plaintiffs may review the documents that ‘hit’ on the parties’ agreed-upon search terms for relevance before producing them to Defendant. ”); *Venturedyne, Ltd. v. Carbonyx, Inc.*, No. 2:14-CV-351-RL-JEM, 2016 WL 6694946, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 15, 2016) (“Carbonyx is free to review the results of the keyword searches and to withhold documents that are truly irrelevant to this case. ”); *BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., LLC*, No. A-14-CV-1062-SS, 2016 WL 4031417, at *2-3 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2016) (denying motion to compel production of all documents that hit on search terms prior to review for relevance); *Palmer v. Cognizant Tech. Sols. Corp.*, No. CV 17-6848 DMG (PLAx), 2021 WL 3145982, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2021) (“The Court will not compel defendants to produce any document simply because it contains a search term whether or not it is responsive to the discovery request, or, by extension, whether or not it is relevant and proportional to the needs of the action.
[brief] The cases at issue here are Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006) which held that insurance producers, as “semi-professionals,” are exempt from liability under the CFA, and Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019) which found that Plemmons was overbroad, and that the judicially created exemption from CFA liability is properly limited to historically “learned professionals” like doctors and lawyers.  This split in this Court’s rulings should be resolved consistent with Shaw.  Despite Defendants’ insistence that Plemmons controls, Shaw, the more recent of the two cases, explicitly recognizes its conflict with Plemmons:  “to the extent our prior decisions, including [Plemmons], have applied the learned professional exception to ‘semi-professionals’ who are regulated by a separate regulatory scheme, we are constrained, upon further review, to depart from that reasoning as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 225 (1997). ”  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 599.  This split in appellate authority has created uncertainty surrounding the appropriate scope of the judicially created exemption to the CFA and necessitates further judicial consideration and guidance.  In analyzing these issues, this Court should conclude that Shaw, the more recent and better reasoned opinion which relies upon and returns to the Lemelledo approach, should govern.
[brief] 23 Giua v. Closter, 2013 WL 12497892 (N.J. Tax Ct. Nov. 19, 2013) .......... 43 Grubb v. Garbutt ......................................................................................... 19, 20 2010 WL 3516847 (App. Div. 2010)(UNPUB DEC.)  Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc................................................................. 15, 22, 29 405 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 2009)  Jones v. Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 403 (3d Cir.1999) ........................................... 19 Kwiatkowski v. Gruber, 390 N.J. Super. 235 (App. Div. 2007) ......................  16  La Mar-Gate, Inc. v. Spitz, 252 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 1991) ...............  36  Lassoff v. New Jersey, 414 F. Supp. 2d 483 (D.N.J. 2006)) ..........................  34  Long v. Lewis, 318 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 1999) .................................  24 Malhame v. Boro. of Demarest, 174 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 1980) .........  16  Malik v. Ruttenberg, 398 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 2008) .......................  13 New Jersey Banker’s Ass’n v. Van Riper, 1 N.J. 193 (1948) .......................  45 N.J. Sports Prod., Inc. v. Bostick Promotions, LLC .................................  35  405 N.J. Super. 173 (Ch. Div. 2007)  Pizzo v. Lindewold Bd. of Educ., 2015 WL 1471943 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015 ) (UNPUB DEC.) .................................................. 25 Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ............................ 14 Red Bank Bd. of Educ. V. Warrington, 138 N.J. Super. 564 (App. Div. 1976)) .................................................. 34 Rego Indus., Inc. v. American Model Metals Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 1966) .................................................. 45 Reilly v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., ........................................ 19 653 F. Supp. 725 (D.N.J. 1987) Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507 (2021) .............................. 19 Rieder v. State Dept. of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987) ........................................... 15, 22, 29 Saginario v. Attorney General, 87 N.J. 480 (1981) .............................. 34 Scheidt v. DRS Technologies, Inc., .................................................. 22, 29 424 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2012)
[directive] 첫 번째 위반  1년 간 면허 정지 –  1st Offense - 1 year license suspension  두 번째 위반 2년 간 면허 정지 – 2nd Offense - 2 year license suspension  세 번째 또는 차후의  위반 10년 간 면허 정지 – 3rd or Subsequent Offense - 10 year license suspension [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 귀하는 의무적 벌금을 지불해야 한다는 것을 2.  알고 있습니까?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to pay a mandatory penalty?
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX S-1, Video Recording of Defendant’s Miranda Statement ........................................ Pa1 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Brown v. Brown, | 87 | | 348 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 2002) | | | In Re I.F., | 17 | | 20 Cal.App.5th 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) | | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Township Comm. Of Twp. Of Manalapan, | 23 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | Miller v. Alabama, | 89 | | 567 U.S. 460 (2012) | | | Miranda v. Arizona, | 25 | | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | | | State in the Interest of A.A., | 27, 33| | 240 N.J. 341 (2020) | | | State in the Interest of A.S., | passim| | 203 N.J. 131 (2010) | | | State in the Interest of A.W., | 27 | | 212 N.J. 114 (2012) | | | State in the Interest of Carlo, | 17 | | 48 N.J. 224 (1966) | | | State in the Interest of M.P., | 33 | | 476 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 2023) | | | State in the Interest of Q.N., | 19, 27| | 179 N.J. 165 (2004) | | | State in the Interest of S.H., | 17 | | 61 N.J. 108 (1972) | | | State v. A.M., | 24, 25| | 237 N.J. 384 (2019) | | State v. Bitzas, 451 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 2017)
[brief] Respondent [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) is involved in this dispute solely based on the engineering services that it provided throughout the course of the solar farm project that is the subject of the underlying litigation (hereinafter “the Project”).  [...] provided those services for some of the defendants-respondents, but never contracted with the plaintiffs-appellants [...], [...], and [...]  (collectively hereinafter “Appellants”), nor was [...] a part to the non-disclosure agreement entered into by Appellants and some of the other parties related to the Project.  In its complaint in the underlying case, Appellants brought one count against [...], wherein Appellants claimed that [...] had breached its professional and ethical duties in conjunction with the engineering services provided on the Project.
[brief] Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. America, Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 65, 69 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 165 (1989)(quoting Pioneer National Title Insurance Co. v. Lucas, 155 N.J. Super. 332, 338 (App. Div. 1978)).  Contrary to the State's assertion, the PCR judge's credibility assessment went wide of the mark because it was based on inaccurate factual findings.
[brief] The facts are uncontroverted that the City promoted to the rank of captain in the [...] in July 2022.  At that time, there were no actual vacancies for the promotions.  The facts are also uncontroverted that the City admitted to the [...] that such promotions violated N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b), the City advising the [...] that it had always promoted in anticipation of retirements instead of after actual retirements that created vacancies.  The [...] took no action with respect to the unlawful July 2022 promotions.  It is further uncontroverted that the City neither sought nor obtained approval from the [...] to retroactively apply latter vacancies to the July 2022 promotions.  It is also uncontroverted that the [...] did not authorize the City’s retro-application of the September and October 2022 vacancies to the July promotions.  There is no Civil Service determination issued stating as such; further, neither the City nor the [...] have provided statutory or regulatory authority, or precedent, authorizing retroactive application.  Notably, the [...] did not state that it approved the City’s retro-application, stating, instead, “The vacancies left by the retirements of [...] and [...] [September and October 2022 retirements] per the appointing authority’s unrebutted indication, had already been filled by the time certification PL221817 was issued. ”  Pa8.  Accordingly, despite the City’s argument that the [...] “relaxed” the rules to provide for retroactivity, (City’s brief-8), there is no proof of such.  The [...]’s failure to issue a Final Administrative Decision addressing and approving the City’s retroactive application of actual vacancies to promotions, that had already been made months before, deprived Appellant and others similarly situated of the ability to appeal the agency’s ruling which indisputably prejudiced their promotional opportunities.
[brief] . . . . . . . .  H1636a  Holmdel response to RCR-TWP-1 by [...] on need for [...] to prove station is necessary.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  H1637a  The [...], Staff ("Staff") Exhibits filed in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] beginning October 19, 2020, as listed in the Appendix to the Decision and Order issued by Hon. [...], A.L.J., May 18, 2022 (SOICR #93):
[directive] county, or municipal agency, law enforcement unit, or licensed law enforcement officer shall enter into any non-disclosure agreement which seeks to conceal or prevent public review of the circumstances under which the officer separated from or was terminated or fired from employment by the law enforcement unit or State, county, or municipal agency.  Whenever a law enforcement officer makes an application to the New Jersey 9.11.4 Division of Pensions for retirement benefits, in anticipation of upcoming retirement and the receipt of a pension, both the employing law enforcement agency and the officer shall have an affirmative obligation to report to the Division of Pensions the existence of any pending internal affairs investigation, complaint or case, including those on appeal, as well as any criminal charges 9 against that officer.5