ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] City of Cleveland v. Carcinoma, 190 N.E. 2nd 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) ........... 8  Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 157 N.E. 2nd 209, 212 (Mass. 1959) ....................  8  **State Statutes** N.J.S.A. 40A:12A:7 ............................................................................. 2, 8  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Rather, the jury was charged that if it did not find [...] guilty of murder or p/p manslaughter, it could then consider aggravated and reckless manslaughter:  If … the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant purposely or knowingly caused death, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder and passion or provocation manslaughter and go on to consider whether defendant should be convicted of the crimes of aggravated or reckless manslaughter.  (27T 159-10 to 16)  Third, the jury was told that it could convict of murder and p/p manslaughter if it found that [...] acted with purposeful intent.  (27T 159- 10 to 16)  In contrast, it was told that aggravated and simple manslaughter required only a reckless intent.  (27T 159-17 to 20, 162-16 to 17)  Similarly, the court denominated attempted p/p manslaughter an element of attempted murder.  (27T 168-4 to 9)  And, as with the murder charge, the court instructed that if the state failed to prove that [...] committed attempted murder or attempted p/p manslaughter, only then would the jury “have to consider a less[e]r included charge of aggravated assault -- various aggravated assaults. ”  (27T 170-24 to 171-4)  Thus, with respect to attempted murder, the court explicitly identified assault, and only assault, as the lesser-included offense of the charged offense of attempted murder.
[brief] This Appeal arises out of a challenge to the June 23, 2021 Highlands Applicability Determination (“HAD”) issued by the [...] (“[...]”), finding that the portion of [...]’s (“[...]”) East 300 Upgrade Project (“Project”) within the Highlands Preservation Area qualifies for an exemption from the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act (“Highlands Act”), N.J.S.A. 13:20–1 et seq.  Specifically, [...] determined that [...]’s construction, operation, and maintenance of a new electric motor driven compressor station connected to [...]’s existing pipeline system qualified for Exemption #11, which authorizes “the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of the [Highlands Act]”.  Aa0001.
[brief] The Erazo Court, in finding defendant was not in custody, relied heavily on the trial court’s findings that “(1) defendant rode voluntarily and unrestrained with officers to the police station; [and] (2) defendant expressed the desire to --- \(^1\)  Defendant uses the same abbreviations used in his initial brief along with the following additional abbreviations:  Sb – State’s Response Brief Db – Defendant-Appellant’s initial brief cooperate in the investigation;” the Court concluded that there was “no evidence that defendant was forced to go to the police station or that he was handcuffed during the drive” and that there was “no reason to believe that the short trip was anything but voluntary. ”  Id. (slip op. at 26-27).  In this case five police officers showed up at Defendant’s residence, [...], and told him they had [...]’s consent to search the room, that he was not allowed to be present for the search, was not allowed to retrieve any items, and was not allowed to return to the hotel room.
[brief] Ibid.  Here, the only expert testimony in the record was offered by [...], not by the State.  Decades ago, expert psychologist [...] testified not only that [...] had the hallmark qualities of youth in general but that he had developmental and neurological deficits which made him uniquely immature.  (2T14-7 to 12)  Expert psychiatrist [...] agreed with [...]’s conclusions.  (2T46-16 to 18)
[directive] 4.  By May 19, 2021, the [...] shall publish statewide procedures for prosecuting authorities for: a. Receiving and reviewing requests submitted by incarcerated defendants, pursuant to Section I.D.1, and b.  Consulting with the [...] when the prosecuting authority believes that the aggravating factors associated with the defendant’s offense of conviction substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, pursuant to Section I.D.3.
[brief] 2.  **“Loss” Definition**  It is the insured’s burden to establish that claims are within the scope of the insuring grant.  *Huntington Ingalls*, 287 A.3d 515 (citing *Northern Security Ins. Co. v. Stanhope*, 14 A.3d 257 (Vt. 2010)).  As a threshold matter, the awards of attorneys’ fees and costs were based exclusively on non-covered claims for self-dealing and breach of the duty of loyalty which resulted in an award of injunctive relief, not any directive to pay monies that could be regarded as the equivalent of compensatory damages.  The award of fees on an otherwise non-covered claim cannot give rise to a coverage obligation that did not previously exist.  Under Vermont law, statutory and equitable awards of attorneys’ fees and expenses are not “damages” within the meaning of a liability insurance policy.  Rather, they are considered “costs. ”  See *Murphy v. Stowe Club Highlands*, 761 A.2d 698 (Vt. 2000); *Vermont Mutual Ins. Co. v. Poirier*, 189 N.E.3d 306 (Mass. 2022).  As noted above, the definition of “loss” includes “defense costs”, not other “costs.
[brief] ”  State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 33 (1970) (emphasis added); see also State v. Gardner, 51 N.J. 444, 460-461 (1968); State v. Anderson, 104 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1968), aff’d 53 N.J. 65 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1969).
[brief] *Cipala v. Lincoln Tech. Inst.*, 179 N.J. 45, 51-52 (2004)  The requirement of “reasonable certainty” applies regardless of whether the underlying claim arises in contract or tort.  See Hirsch v. General Motors Corp, 266 N.J. Super. 222, 242 (Law Div. 1993) (“Under the traditional damages standard, . . . plaintiffs must prove the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.
[brief] (Da3).  Later that same day, [...], [...] and [...] filed an action in the Law Division captioned: [...] et al. v. [...] et al., [...] (the "Law Division Action") claiming, among other things, that [...] breached the Operating Agreements and that the [...] failed to satisfy the MOU loans.  (Da86-101, ¶¶63-138).  The Law Division Action addresses the same matters involved in the Chancery Action and is the same in all substantial respects as the counterclaim filed in the Chancery Action.  (Da3-23; Da75-103).  In fact, Defendants in the Chancery Action, who are the Plaintiffs in the Law Division Action, concede that the two cases are related and involve common questions of law and fact.  In an August 23, 2023, letter to the trial court, defendants [...], [...], and [...] make reference to their Law Division complaint to refute Plaintiff [...]’s claim that she is the equitable owner of the Property.  (Pa001).
[directive] Cases 2C:43-7.2) (Portuguese)  As perguntas abaixo devem ser respondidas somente se você estiver se declarando culpado por um dos em 29 de junho de 2001 ou após esta data: seguintes crimes de primeiro ou segundo grau que ocorreram assassinato, homicídio culposo qualificado ou homicídio culposo, homicídio ao volante, agressão qualificada, desarmar agente policial, sequestro, agressão sexual qualificada, agressão sexual, roubo com violência, roubo de veículo com pessoa a bordo, incêndio criminoso qualificado expondo outra pessoa a perigo de morte ou lesões corporais graves, arrombamento à propriedade com fim ilícito, roubo mediante extorsão ao obter propriedade alheia sob ameaça de lesão corporal ou fisicamente confinar ou restringir uma pessoa ou cometer outro crime, armadilhas explosivas em instalações de fabricação ou distribuição de substâncias perigosas controladas ou ocorreram em 18 de junho de 2002 ou após responsabilidade estrita por mortes induzidas por drogas; ou que esta data: terrorismo, ou produzir ou possuir armas químicas, agentes biológicos ou dispositivos nucleares ou ocorreram em 13 de janeiro de 2008 ou após esta data: radiológicos; ou que organização criminosa em ocorreram em 14 de agosto de 2013 ou após esta data: primeiro grau; ou que pornografia infantil; ou que 1o ocorreram em de novembro de 2013 ou após esta data: tráfico de armas de fogo.
[brief] In June 2022, the undersigned sent an informal email to [...]’s prior counsel as a “letter of rep,” sharing a host of initial information about Plaintiffs’ injuries and status and even photos.  (Da148-150).  From there, [...]’s counsel was looped in, and the parties began coordinating an inspection and shared digital download of [...]’s vehicle.  (Da151-160).  Through the filing of plaintiffs’ complaint in February 2023 and beyond, the parties continued to engage in regular discussions.  As example, in January 2023, [...]’s counsel called the undersigned and asked plaintiffs to attend early mediation.  (Da161).  [...] and [...] also demanded and received voluminous and deeply personal interrogatory responses.  (Da137-147).  Plaintiffs’ depositions were scheduled (and then cancelled) at their behest, and Plaintiffs retained multiple experts and produced two reports.  (Da126).  Not once did [...] indicate an intention to demand arbitration until June 29, 2023.  (Da162-168).
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option 2C:20-11  Shoplifting Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000  10% permissible (continued)  (continued)  Use of Juvenile in  Actor who is age 18 or older knowingly uses, solicits, directs, hires, or employs a person who 2C:20-17  2nd Degree $25,000 to $75,000  10% permissible  Theft of Automobiles is age 17 or younger to commit theft of an automobile.  Actor purposely or knowingly and without authorization, or in excess of authorization:  1st Degree $50,000 to $150,000  10% permissible  a.  Accesses any data, database, or computer…  b.  Alters, damages or destroys any data, data base, computer..., or denies, disrupts or 2C:20-25(a-f)  Computer Theft impairs computer services.  c.  Accesses or attempts to access any data, data base, computer… for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud, or to obtain services, property, personal identifying information, or money from the owner of a computer or any third party.  d. (Deleted).  2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  10% permissible  e.  Obtains, takes, copies or uses any data, database or computer program...  f.  Accesses and recklessly alters, damages or destroys any data, data base, computer...  46  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.
[brief] APPELLANTS’ reliance on the unpublished Appellate decision in *Rooster Bar LLC v. Borough of Cliffside Park*, 2013 WL 5852758 (November 2013) is equally misplaced.  First, the decision is unpublished and not binding on this Appellate Panel or the Trial Court.  Moreover, the issue in *Rooster Bar* was not, as APPELLANTS contend, the application of Section 59:5-4’s immunity.  Rather, *Rooster Bar* involved a claim by the owners of the bar against the [...] due to alleged harassment of patrons of an establishment owned by the plaintiffs.  At issue was the application of two entirely different sections of the TCA – Section 59:3-3’s “good faith” immunity and Section 59:2-10’s immunity for willful misconduct.  (Pa10)  Rooster Bar, by its own terms, does not impose a ministerial duty on a police department to patrol a certain area and the Appellate Division’s comments in analyzing two entirely different sections of the TCA should not be read to create one.  Again, the Trial Court correctly stated that there is no legal authority that [...] or its officers had to obediently follow without regard to exercising judgement or discretion.  (T 10:10-13)  In their Brief, APPELLANTS once again do not cite any authority to support the argument that RESPONDENTS had a prescribed, mandated, ministerial duty to immediately remove the makeshift liquor stand from the property upon encountering same.  As the Trial Court astutely recognized, APPELLANTS’ interpretation of a ministerial act would “convert everything into a ministerial act. ”  (T 10:13-15)  Simply deeming something “illegal” without more, does not establish a mandate for [...] officers to immediately take action.  Again, APPELLANT’S Complaint seeks to hold [...] liable for its officer’s exercise of discretion during the course of their patrol.  Those actions are protected under Section 59:5-4 and, as such, APPELLANTS’ Complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice.
[directive] 3  Page 4 1.  Preventing crime and involvement with law enforcement through the support of community-led strategies and partnerships that combat addiction and the conditions leading to it as well as other issues at the intersection of public health and the criminal justice system; 2.  Promoting the resiliency of law enforcement officers by supporting preventative strategies and interventions that address the mental and emotional dimensions of their work and the trauma resulting from it; 3.  Transforming law enforcement’s response to emergencies, distress, and/or crime by incorporating, partnering with, or coordinating a behavioral health or community response, and giving law enforcement the tools, resources and encouragement to pursue alternative and diversionary pathways to arrest or continued police involvement; and 4.
[brief] On December 8, 2021, Defendant received 4 summonses: Summons No. [...] charged him with DWI, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; Summons No. [...] charged him with reckless driving, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; Summons No. [...] charged him with failure to observe a traffic signal, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-81, and Summons No. [...] charged him with failure to exhibit documents, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.
[brief] Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence as to what constitutes an “overloaded” U-Boat and that [...]’ U-boat was “overloaded” and the industry standards regarding a business proprietor’s duty related to a customer’s usage of a U-boat.  After the accident, Plaintiff was taken to the manager’s office to fill out her statement.  (Pa033).  While in the office, Plaintiff claims [...]’s manager showed her a video.
[brief] **  Lessee herein acknowledges that lessor shall in no way be liable for maintenance, upkeep, repairs, and/or redecorating of the premises in question.  Lessee understands, agrees and acknowledges that he is responsible of [sic] any and all repairs to the demised premises and for cleaning the windows.  Lessee specifically agrees that he shall be responsible for all repairs and/or replacements necessary to the plumbing and air conditions systems.  Lessor shall be responsible for any major structural repairs to the roof or exterior of the structure, to the parking area and other common areas,\(^5\) provided \(^5\)
[brief] Disclosure of what occurred in mediation, without consent, violates R. 1:40 – 4(d), however Appellant discusses what occurred at length in his certification (Pa23).  As such, the undersigned refers to the mediation events in rebuttal to Appellant’s points as he opened the door.  During this mediation, Respondent once again offered that Appellant take the car back at no cost, even offering to deliver it for free.  Appellant refused this offer with the unfounded concern that parts may have already been stripped from the vehicle and he had no way of recovering for that potential loss.  (Pa23, #13-14).
[brief] ”  Perry Dean et al., Saving Rutgers-Camden, 44 Rutgers L.J. 337, 374 (2014) (emphasis in original).  “Rutgers University simply has no role in implementing the laws enacted by the New Jersey Legislature, nor does it have any role in governing the state. ”  Ibid.  The view of these prominent scholars debunks the notion, incorrectly accepted by the trial court, and repeated by Plaintiffs, that BOG members implement state law by possessing delegated powers from Trenton.
[brief] In fact, a master plan’s designation of appropriate uses for various areas in a town is merely advisory.  Although the Master Plan serves as the basis for the zoning ordinance it does not have the operative effect of a zoning ordinance.  Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee, 140 N.J. 366, 381 (1995).  As such, a planning board approval that is not strictly aligned with every tenet of the town’s master plan is not uncommon, particularly in cases where variances are granted, and certainly is not grounds in and of itself for a finding that a board decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[brief] Respondent  [...] (Respondent) repeatedly campaigned for her seat on the [...] (Board) from her public Facebook account, shared endorsements of her candidacy from her public Facebook account, shared campaign banners containing her name next to the words “CENTRAL REGIONAL BOARD OF ED,” shared successful election results, and clearly announced she had become a member of the Board from this same public account.  It is abundantly clear she held herself out as a member of the Board on this platform.  While clearly holding herself out as a member of the Board, and without providing any sort of disclaimer as required by the Commission’s well-established caselaw, Respondent engaged in conduct which caused the public to protest the Board, sparked public outcry at meetings of the Board, and caused the Board itself to issue two official Resolutions specifically condemning those statements.
[brief] There is no evidence in the record that any work performed on [...]’s behalf before September 2009 was “reasonably devoted” to investigation of RICO claims or was otherwise performed in contemplation of RICO claims.  To the contrary, in July 2009, [...] sought to move to trial in September 2009 on both the accounting and valuation of its 25% interest in the partnership, with no RICO claims at issue.  (2427a-2437a).  [...] also opposed adding [...] as a party to avoid delaying that trial.  (2427a-2437a; Wilf_Db 35).  Furthermore, [...]’s counsel boldly proclaimed to the Special Master “I brought the RICO claim to this action.  I did.  And I don’t mean to criticize anybody on [...]’s side.  I did. ”  256T at 87:2-4.  And [...] did not join the case until after July 2009.  [...] points to nothing in the record suggesting otherwise.  B.  The Special Master and the Trial Court erroneously awarded fees for work not “reasonably devoted” to or “reasonably required” for the RICO claims (39089a-39090a; 40005a-40010a).
[brief] That is fatal to the appeal, as Dewey is both factually distinguishable from this consolidated matter and based upon an outdated version of RPC 1.9 that is no longer in effect.  In Dewey, 109 N.J. at 205, the plaintiff brought an action against several tobacco and cigarette companies.  After serving as co-counsel for several years, the plaintiff’s firm hired an attorney that had previously worked for defendant’s counsel.  Id. at 207.  Defendant then moved to disqualify plaintiff’s firm on that basis.  Id. at 208.  The Supreme Court concluded the firm “should be” disqualified under RPC 1.9(a) from representing Dewey.  Id. at 216.  However, because disqualification motions call for the court to “balance competing interests,” the Court denied the motion because “an order disqualifying counsel on the eve of trial would do more to erode the confidence of the public in the legal profession and the judicial process than would an order allowing the firm to continue its representation of the plaintiff. ”  Id. at 218-19.  Here, unlike in Dewey, 109 N.J. at 215-16, RPC 1.9 is not implicated in the first place because it concerns duties to former clients.  Defendants-Respondents are not former clients of [...].  [...] has represented Defendants-Respondents for the past five years in this consolidated matter.  As the trial court properly concluded, “there is no basis to support [[...]]’s position that RPC 1.9 is implicated.
[brief] If the State seeks to admit video evidence when someone who was present at the scene is unavailable, it is allowed to do so only if the reliability and the accuracy of the system used to make the film and the reliability of the method used to retrieve the film are established.  The requirements of this approach were discussed in *State v. Bunting*, 187 N.J. Super. 506, 509 (App. Div. 1983).  In *Bunting*, this Court held that a video was properly admitted when the State introduced testimony concerning the installation, operation, and view of the camera, its “periodic testing,” film removal, chain of custody, and method of activation during the robbery.  *Id.* at 509-510.  In instances such as Bunting, what the State is able to authenticate is not the subject matter of the video, but the fact that the video itself was taken from a specific place from a well-maintained video-camera that was recording accurately at a certain date and time.  In such a circumstance, the proponent demonstrates that the video was taken by a specific camera at a specific time and lets the video speak for itself as a “silent witness.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *Ensslin* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.  (Pb11).  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing Ensslin to file.  Id. at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, Ensslin does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.  (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb15), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb16).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb16; Pa128-132).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**