ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Wright*, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that “county prosecutors and their subordinates” are entitled to defense and indemnification from the State when discharging their law enforcement duties.  Id. at 452 (emphasis added).  In so doing, the Court recognized that “when prosecutors perform their law enforcement function, they are discharging a State responsibility that the Legislature has delegated to the county prosecutors, subject to the Attorney General's right to supersede.  The legislative delegation, in combination with the Attorney General's supervisory authority and power to supersede, demonstrates that at its essence the county prosecutors' law enforcement function is clearly a State function. ”  Id. at 451-52 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  There is no dispute that the Court’s analysis in *Wright* was premised on the vicarious liability of the State under the TCA.  Such an analysis made logical and legal sense as all of the claims in *Wright* for which the county sought coverage were based in tort.  However, since the *Wright* decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court --- \(^2\) One could conceive of a hypothetical situation where, faced with a denial of coverage, the [...] simply chose not to defend the lawsuit and allowed the case to proceed.  Such a scenario would leave the [...]’s IAPP and Directive 22-14 undefended in the underlying lawsuit, which, presumably, would not a desirable result from the [...]’s perspective.  has continued to expand the [...]’s obligation to defend a county prosecutor’s office when acting in a law enforcement role.  Thus, in *Lavezzi v. State*, 219 N.J. 163 (2014), although the TCA is referenced as a part of the Court’s rationale as to why the State had a duty to defend, the Court also found that [i]n this case, the damage and loss alleged by plaintiffs may have occurred following the conclusion of the criminal investigation, when the non-contraband items at issue were no longer potential evidence, but had not been returned to plaintiffs.
[brief] [...] and [...] abdicated their responsibilities as Chief Financial Officer and member respectively, to wrongfully oust Plaintiff and prevent Plaintiff from participating as a member in [...].  [...] and [...] failed to act as fiduciaries by turning a blind eye to [...] and then excluded Plaintiff from the dissolution of [...].  Under New Jersey law, an officer, member, or employee in control has the duty to not act unfairly, or oppressively towards other members.  N.J.S.A. 14A:10A-1, et seq.  This includes exclusion from management decisions regarding business operations and not receiving expected and appropriate distributions of dividends or profits.  Id.  The need for this protection “can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that traditional principles of corporate law were often unsuccessful at curbing abuses of power by majority interests in closely held corporations. ”  Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Intern., Inc., 264 N.J. Super. 276, 281 (App. Div. 1993).
[brief] Page  Order of the Honorable [...], dated June 25, 2021…………………………Pa1  Order of the Honorable [...], dated June 27, 2023 …………………Pa3  Order of the Honorable [...], dated January 24, 2020………………………Pa5  Order of the Honorable [...], dated January 24, 2020………………………Pa7  Order of the Honorable [...], dated January 24, 2020………………………Pa9  Order of the Honorable [...]
[brief] Just a minute to set up.  While we're doing that I'll introduce myself.  I'm [...], and to my right is [...].  We're hearing the excessive sentencing calendar today.  Rest assured, we're familiar with the files so please highlight for us what you wish to argue.  We're still going to need a few more minutes.  Just give me a moment.  Okay.  I can see we're having technical difficulties all around today.  There we go.  So, when we're ready to put court on, yes, we're all set?  Okay.  All right.
[directive] The initial survey was disseminated in June 2021.  However, it took agencies a full year to respond to this survey.  Any references to case volume are indicative of the point in time the survey was completed.  This means that an agency’s volume of tested, untested, and Hold kits in responses, were not necessarily contemporaneous to other agencies.  Finally, there was variation in the completion rates for each question.  For some questions, responding agencies skipped or failed to provide an answer.  Throughout the results above, we 20
[brief] See Delta, 189 N.J. at 48-49 (citing Taylor and Wisconsin Auto, stating “We acknowledge that contrary determinations have been reached by other courts,” and ruling to the contrary).  Plaintiff’s further reliance on additional case law from foreign jurisdictions such as New Mexico and Washington is similarly unavailing because their reasoning hinges on *Taylor* and *Wisconsin Auto*, each of which have been expressly rejected in New Jersey.  See *Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of NM*, 208 P.3d 901, 909 (N.M. 2009) (citing both *Taylor* and *Wisconsin Auto*); see also *Burnett v. Pagliacci Pizza, Inc.*, 196 Wash. 2d 38, 59, 470 P.3d 486, 497 (2020) (relying on *Taylor*).  Likewise, the West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in *Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp.*, 204 W. Va. 229, 237, 511 S.E.2d 854, 862 (1998), overruled in part by *Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson*, 230 W. Va. 281, 737 S.E.2d 550 (2012), was relied upon by *Taylor*, which was, again, explicitly considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in *Delta*.
[brief] (Pa33).  The plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Information Exchange was filed on May 23, 2023 together with her *in limine* motions.  (Pa15-Pa32).  The *in limine* motions included motions to bar evidence and testimony regarding the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, injuries, and falls from trial; to strike portions of the *de bene esse* deposition testimony of [...] regarding the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, injuries, and falls; and to bar opinions of defense liability expert [...] from trial.
[brief] Rutgers, the State University v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 154-56 (1982).  The Restructuring Act merely was the vehicle to insert certain provisions into the Rutgers Act.  Plaintiffs also mistakenly quote the Rutgers Act in describing the “policy-making functions” of the “publicly controlled” BOG.  (Pb17.)  In fact, that language is from the Restructuring Act.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:64M-2(b).  Compounding that error, Plaintiffs state that a majority of the BOG is appointed by the Governor of New Jersey with the advice and consent of the state Senate.  (Pb18.)  That, too, is incorrect.  Fifteen voting members comprise the BOG; seven of whom—less than a majority—are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14.\(^1\)  Those are not trivial errors.  By misstating language from the Rutgers Act, Plaintiffs attempt to buttress their argument that BOG members possess policy-making or law-making authority that, in turn, transforms them into holders of public office subject to the quo warranto statute.  The more accurate view is the one consistent with [...]’s view, that BOG members do not implement any laws of New Jersey and are not part of state government.  They are non-elected, unpaid fiduciaries of the University.  Simply stated, because they hold no authority resembling a legislative, executive or judicial function in the traditional governmental sense, BOG members do not hold “office” from which they may be ousted by private litigants such as Plaintiffs.
[brief] [...], [...], [...] and [...]  (For Continuation of Appearances  See Inside Cover)  Date Submitted: May 10, 2024  [...], MIDDLESEX  EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, PA and PLAINFIELD  EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, PA, Plaintiffs-Respondent, vs. UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, OXFORD HEALTH PLANS (NJ), INC., [...], and UMR, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
[brief] (Pa14-15).  While a Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, it has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  *Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund*, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).  A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  *Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund*, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb13), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he did not receive the postcard.
[brief] \(^4\)  If a witness seeks to give an opinion that requires “scientific, technical or other specialized training,” the witness must fulfill the requirements of N.J.R.E. 702.  The proponent of expert testimony must establish: “(1) the subject matter of the testimony must be beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field of inquiry must be at a state of the art such that an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable and (3) the witness must have margin of error for such computations, nor did he testify about how the phone could accurately measure steps walked and flights of stairs ascended.
[brief] PA105-111.  On May 12, 2023, the trial court dismissed the Complaint, without prejudice.  PA114-115.  On November 10, 2023, Appellant filed a motion for leave to appeal (“Motion for Leave”).  PA116-126.  On November 27, 2023, Respondents both filed their oppositions to the motion for leave to appeal.  PA127-135; PA136-149.  On December 12, 2023, this Court denied Appellant’s Motion for Leave.  PA150.  On February 14, 2024, Respondents filed a joint motion to dismiss --- 5  [...] notes that the March 31, 2023 Order included by Appellant in her appendix is an unsigned copy.  Appellant’s Complaint with prejudice (“Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice”).  PA151-160.  Appellant did not file an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.  On March 1, 2024, the trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (“March 1, 2024 Order”).  PA1-2.  On March 8, 2024, Appellant filed the instant appeal.  PA161-163.  The notice of appeal purports to appeal the March 1, 2024 Order dismissing Appellant’s complaint with prejudice.  Id.  On June 24, 2024, Appellant filed her Brief and Appendix.  LEGAL STANDARD
[brief] *See id.*  This Court also determined that the trial court “erred by tolling the time for filing [the RICO] claims. ”  *Id.*  As such, the trial court was to “recalculate the damages on the RICO claims, which shall be limited to damages incurred from October 1, 2004 through December 31, 2011. ”  *Id.*  This Court also ordered that “the punitive damages awards to [...] and [...] must be vacated and the trial court must reconsider whether such damages should be awarded and, if so, in what amounts. ”  *Id.* at *25:  Any punitive damages awarded to [...] must be based on the damages related to its new, non-RICO tort claims which were asserted in the amended complaint, **not on the damages found in the accounting**.  Similarly, any punitive damages awarded to [...] must be based on the damages found on his non-RICO tort claims.  *Id.* (emphasis added).  With respect to punitive damages, the Court further explained that: reversal of the awards [] is also required because in assessing whether such damages should be awarded, the judge considered and relied upon the fact that defendants’ tortious conduct occurred over time, and was not an isolated incident .  . . .  [T]he judge considered acts that occurred outside the period permitted by the applicable statute of limitations for the non-RICO claims.  Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall reconsider the decisions to award [...] and [...] punitive damages.  **The court shall determine whether punitive damages should be awarded, and if so, in what amounts.**  *Id.* at *26* (emphasis added).
[brief] Assuming that the notes exist and are not available, where is the evidence that was presented at trial that supports a finding of foreseeability of harm or relevance to the litigation?  The alleged notes involve the Decedent’s wishes for her Will.  [...] testified that based upon his conversations with the Decedent he prepared a draft document, forwarded it to her for review, she ultimately approved the Will, it was reviewed with her again prior to signing, and was signed, witnessed, and notarized.  The notes would be irrelevant to the validity of the Will or the false allegation of undue influence.  A Plaintiff who destroys evidence interferes with a defendant's ability to defend a lawsuit and right to discovery.  Where plaintiffs spoliate such evidence, sanctions should be imposed.  The existence of a duty to preserve evidence is a question of law to be determined by the court.
[brief] The trial court charged the jury with the correct legal standard for negligent training and supervision.  During the charge conference, the trial court noted that the Supreme Court recently clarified the legal standard for negligent training and supervision without reference to Restatement § 317.  [10T 41:12-16].  In particular, the Court stated that the elements of a claim for negligent supervision or training are “essentially the same” as negligent hiring, “but framed in terms of supervision or training. ”  G.A.H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 416 (2019).  See section I(b), above, for elements of negligent training and supervision.  The instruction on negligent training and supervision accurately reflects the current state of New Jersey law.
[brief] **RESPONDENT FAILS TO ADDRESS APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS AND INSTEAD RELIES UPON GENERAL CONDEMNATION LAW**  Despite the “liberal approach . . . to admissibility of evidence” (Db11), that approach is tempered by the Court’s gatekeeping function, which Defendant recognizes (Db15) but fails to address.  Respondent’s appraiser has produced a flawed analysis which the trial court must prevent the jury from being confused by, in furtherance of its gatekeeping function.  “[A] fair market value determination should not be based upon enhancement caused by the very project for which condemnation is sought. ”  *Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello*, 252 N.J. Super. 247, 254 fn. 4 (App. Div. 1991).  “[T]he proper basis of compensation is the value of the property as it would be at the time of the taking .  . disregarding either the depreciating threat of or the inflationary reaction to the proposed public project. ”  *Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler*, 58 N.J. 374 (1971).  Respondent utterly fails to address these arguments, merely referring to them as “far fetched. ”  Respondent relies upon standard eminent domain law in defense of its appraisal, however there is no analysis of the limitations of such information relied upon by an appraiser and limitations on what evidence is presented to the jury.  Instead of addressing its appraiser’s failure to make the two (2) proper adjustments, Respondent presents arguments related to the highest and best use analysis.  Regardless of whether Appellant’s appraisal expert agrees or disagrees with Respondent’s appraisal expert as to the Highest and Best Use of the Property, and whether there exists a reasonable probability the necessary variances, Respondent’s appraiser failed to make both of the legally-required adjustments to the comparable sales utilized to arrive at his opinion of just compensation.  As discusses *supra*, the *Hilton* court rejected the appraiser’s report for treating a property assemblage as a “fait accompli” (as described in *Caoili*, *supra* at 273) rather than assigning a premium that a willing buyer would pay for a property with the reasonable probability of an assemblage or zoning change.
[brief] Plaintiff can also satisfy its burden of establishing that [...] breached its duty of care under a premises liability theory, See Jerista, supra, 185 N.J. at 191, by not only failing to provide appropriate training, but also by failing to implement policies and procedures for its employees concerning U-boat usage.  [...], regional manager for the Hackensack location at the time of Plaintiff’s incident, and [...], have established, through their testimony, that there is no company-wide policy or safety program that exists to train its employees on the dangers posed by overloaded U-boats.  (Pa113-Pa114; Pa94-Pa95)  The absence of implementing such a program is indicative of [...]’s failure, as a business owner, to abide by its duty of reasonable care to provide a safe environment to invitees on its premises.  Moreover, [...] had actual and/or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the accident.  According to Plaintiff’s testimony, employees were “everywhere” at the time she shopped at the store (Pa15).  In addition, [...]’s pushing a [...] supplied U-boat throughout the store with merchandise stacked so high that it obstructed his vision is indication that the unsafe condition would have been present for a sufficient length of time to alert store personnel that were positioned throughout the store.  Defendant’s reliance on Arroyo v. Durling Realty, LLC, 433 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 2013) and Dombrowska v. Kresge-Newark, Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 271 (App. Div. 1962) is also entirely misplaced for its proposition that there is no proof in the record that [...] had constructive notice of any potentially dangerous issues with regards to [...]’s use of the U-boat.
[brief] ..............................................................................  15  **Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing,** 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014) ..................................................................  8  **Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,** 545 U.S. 546 (2005)  .............................................................................  7  **FCC v. FCC (In re MCP),** 124 F.4th 993 (6th Cir. 2025) .................................................................  10  **Galloway v. United States,** 492 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2007) ..................................................................  6  **Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Serv., L.L.C.,** 660 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................. 2 **Graziano v. Harrison,** 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991) .................................................................. 3 **Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC,** 829 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................................................. 13 **Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.,** 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021) ............................................................... 1, 15 **Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC,** 606 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (E.D. Wash. 2022) .............................................. 1, 15 **Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs.,** 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) .................................................................. 3 Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022)..................................................1, 10, 15 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, -- U.S. --, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024).........................................................12 Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009)
[brief] Tyler v. Hennepin County ............................... 46,47,48 598 U.S. 631  Union County Improvement Authority v. Artaki, LLC ... 5 N.J.Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007)  US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, ............. 4,28,30,31 209 N. J. 449, 467 (2012)  Varsolona v. Breen Capital Services Corp., .......... 25 189 N.J. 605, 618 (2004)  Winberry v. Salisbury 5 N.J 240 (1950 ..............  22 cert den. 340 U.S. 877 (1950)
[brief] Counsel of Record: [...], Esq.  [Attorney ID: 0106819080]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [Attorney ID: 040182007]  [...] [...]  Telephone: [...] / Fax: [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents: [...], improperly plead as [...], [...] Rail Operations, and [...]; [...], improperly plead as [...]; [...], improperly plead as [...], [...], and [...]
[brief] ’” (Db15; see 2T:48-13 to 50-6).  The Appellate Division did not hold that the interrogation should have been barred from trial – only that “[...]’s disputed statements should have been redacted” because he had stated with complete certainty based on the surveillance footage that defendant killed [...].  (Da25 to 29, 31, and 33 to 34).  Nowhere in the redacted video does [...] state that he knew defendant killed [...], that he knew defendant was lying, that he had evidence demonstrating with certainty that defendant killed [...], or that a jury would convict him.  The excerpts of the redacted video disputed on appeal are not comparable to the “highly inflammatory” statements highlighted in the remand order.
[brief] 10  B.  [...]’s Newly Raised Arguments Regarding Public Funds, Political Upheaval, and Density and Traffic Also Fail to Establish a Public Interest Meriting Enlargement.  (Pa55 – Pa58)...............................  21  1.  Public Funds and Ratables (Pa55 – Pa58; Pb17 – Pb20).  ......................... 21  2.  Political Upheaval (Pa55 – Pa58; Pb18 – Pb21).  .....................................  25  3.  Density and Traffic (Pa55 – Pa58; Pb21 – Pb23).  ....................................  27  II.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined the April 8 Notice of the Introduction of the Redevelopment Ordinance Satisfied the Requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.
[brief] ”  Id. at 341 (emphasis in original).  Regrettably, the decision below does exactly that.  Finally, the State’s Brief and the decision below make reference to the SFRA’s periodic review (Db40-41; Pa39), but neither admit that the formula’s reexamination is central to the State’s obligation to maintain SFRA’s constitutionality in Abbott districts.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146.  Under the Supreme Court’s “clear” and “exacting” instructions for carrying out the reexamination mandate, Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 360, the trial court should have analyzed – but did not – whether the State had fulfilled its obligation to (a) reexamine the formula’s “component parts” every three years; (b) conduct the reexaminations “based on a dissection of how the [SFRA] formula actually work[s] once implemented;” and (c) perform a retooling of the formula that is “meaningful and relevant for the Abbott districts so that SFRA continues to operate optimally and as intended in future years. ”  Id. at 354, 376.  Both the State and the trial court treat SFRA’s reexamination as a policy matter left to the Legislature’s discretion rather than a recurring mandate to fulfill the State’s “continuing obligation” to keep the formula constitutional in Abbott districts.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146; see also Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 341, 354 and 360 (explaining the “mandatory retooling” at “designated mileposts” are to prevent SFRA underfunding in future years).  When the Supreme Court “permitted the substitution” of its remedial funding orders “with the State’s alternative of SFRA funding, it did not alter the constitutional underpinnings” of the Abbott litigation.  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 360 (emphasis added).  The decision below abandons those underpinnings, resting on a fundamental misapplication of the Court’s Abbott precedent.  The trial court’s grant of summary judgment must be reversed.
[brief] BECAUSE THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, THE PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ELECTIVE SHARE UNDER N.J.S.A. 3B:8-1.  A.  The Agreement Is Valid and Enforceable.  54  B.  The Copy of the Agreement Does Not Violate the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act.  60  C.  The Petitioner Is Not Entitled To An Elective Share Under N.J.S.A. 3B:8-10.  62  Point III