ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] "It is not the label placed on the action that is pivotal but the nature of the legal inquiry."  Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340 (2002).  [A] reviewing court 'searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.'  At this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint.  For purposes of analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  The examination of a complaint's allegations of fact required by the aforestated principles should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach.  [Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (internal citations omitted). ]  Blum v. Twp. of Lakewood, DOCKET NO. [...], 14-15 (App. Div. Jan. 7, 2020).  The nature of the legal inquiry as to the Plaintiffs Complaint is the deprivation of his civil rights by the defendants acting under color of New Jersey Law.
[brief] The appellant/plaintiff [...]’s primary residence was unquestionably in New Jersey at the time he obtained a [...] Southeastern Insurance policy from North Carolina.  When he applied for [...] policy, he affirmatively listed his insured address as North Carolina.  He also affirmatively chose North Carolina zip codes for his “garaging zip codes. ”  (PA073-077; PA048, T37:L5-22, T38:L11-24; PA049, T43:L11-22; PA050, T45:L8-21).  The appellant/plaintiff [...] did not notify [...] of his true residency; rather, he used a North Carolina address for an apartment for which the lease had expired and that he no longer occupied.  (PA056-057, T72:L1-T76:L24).  The appellant/plaintiff [...] also failed to obtain automobile insurance required by New Jersey law.  Specifically, his policy with [...] afforded only $1,000 for "Medical Payments" far below the $250,000 in PIP coverage afforded under a New Jersey "Standard" policy (or $15,000, with $250,000 in coverage for certain emergency treatments, under a "Basic" policy).  (PA078-080)  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1.  His intent to have the proper insurance is not relevant, and his claims against his own insurance carrier are, although now resolved against him, likewise irrelevant.  It is therefore submitted that appellant/plaintiff [...]'s economic and non-economic claims are barred pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.
[brief] I.  IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE PURVIEW OF THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT EXTENDS TO SUBSEQUENT  PERFORMANCE  [...] first argues that collection activities do not fall within the purview of the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), but [...], like the trial court, ignores that the CFA applies to the subsequent performance of the sale of “merchandise,” as defined by N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c).  See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  Relying on *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, [...] argues that “[t]he alleged misrepresentation must be ‘in connection with’ the sale of merchandise or services, and it ‘has to be one which is material to the transaction . . . made to induce the buyer to make the purchase. ’”  [...]’s Br. 26 (quoting *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 148 N.J. 582, 607 (1997)).  However, in *Gennari*, the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed a pre-sale affirmative misrepresentation, as reflected by the above-cited portion of the opinion.  *To wit,* *Gennari* did not analyze subsequent performance—the linchpin issue here.  Further, both this Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court have held that the purview of the CFA indisputably extends beyond the initial purchase of merchandise and/or inducement of the same.  See *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session*, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 533 (App. Div. 2008) (“We conclude that an assignee of a RISC can be held liable under the CFA, for its own unconscionable commercial activities in the subsequent performance of the assigned contract. ”); *Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 207 N.J. 557, 577-78, 582 (2011) (“[C]ollecting or enforcing a loan, whether by the lender or its assignee, constitutes the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, an activity falling within the coverage of the CFA .  . . .  We roundly reject defendants’ argument that the collection activities of a servicing agent . . . do not amount to the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, a covered activity under the CFA. ”).
[brief] (emphasis added).  This model charge includes specific additional charge language for certain factual scenarios.  For example, the charge explicitly states that: “when there is an ongoing storm, add the following language:  ‘However, a commercial property owner does not have a duty to keep sidewalks on its property free form snow or ice during an ongoing storm. \(^1\)  A commercial property owner’s duty to remove snow and ice hazards arises not during a storm, but rather within a reasonable time after the storm.  There are two exceptions that may give rise to a duty before then.  First, a commercial property owner may be liable if its actions increase the risk to pedestrians and invitees on their property.  Second, a commercial \(^1\) Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props, 246 N.J. 546, 549, reconsideration den., 247 N.J. 406 (2021).  This endnote is contained in the actual model charge.  property owner may be liable where there was a pre-existing risk on the premises before the storm. ”” (emphasis added).
[brief] TO FULLY REMEDY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES PROVEN IN THIS CASE, THE OTHER BRANCHES MUST ADHERE TO THE PARAMETERS OUTLINED BY THIS COURT  A constitutionally sufficient remedy must accomplish two main objectives: • The [...] must be put on a sustainable fiscal footing; and •  Going forward Lakewood public school students must receive adequate and assured funding for T&E.\textsuperscript{26}  \textsuperscript{26}  These objectives will not, however, deal with another dimension of the unconstitutional denial of T&E to a generation or more of Lakewood public school students who are no  Any meaningful remedy for the [...]’s well-documented fiscal distress will have to rely, at least initially, on legislative action.  After all, the appropriations’ power of the State resides in the Legislature and the constitutional education clause starts with the words, “The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support” of T&E.  Still, that does not mean that the other branches of state government do not have essential roles to play in the remedial process.
[brief] Attorneys for Respondent [...] : : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY : APPELLATE DIVISION : : Docket No.: [...]  IN THE MATTER OF : [...], : Civil Action  [...] : CORRECTION CENTER :  On Appeal from a Final : Administrative Determination of the : [...] : : State of New Jersey : [...], sat below :  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.
[directive] Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole page 5 of 7  17.  f.  Aprè yo fin deja eksplike w konsekans posib sou stati imigrasyon ansanm ak dwa w pou [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] chache konsèy legal endividyèl konsènan tout konsekans sou imigrasyon yo, èske w vle plede koupab toujou?  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?
[brief] A.  An appellate court's review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity (including constitutionality) or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  I also have legal grounds for an appeal based on if I violated all the elements of “New Jersey Statute 39:4-50.2 – Consent to taking of samples of breath; record of test; independent test; prohibition of use of force; informing accused” and “New Jersey Statute 39:4-50.4a – Refusal to submit to test; penalties.
[brief] [...]  Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  June 11, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  [...]  [...]  Re: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent V. [...], Defendant-Appellant  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]; ON APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ENTERED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW
[brief] As a result at least 38 states now have remedial legislation similar to that of New Jersey.  [Id. at 564].  Given the City’s statutory powers to effectuate redevelopment—including through the rezoning of the properties within the blighted area—the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Id. at 565; see also Meredith v. Mayor & Borough Council of Somerdale & [...], Docket No. [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2022) (affirming trial court’s finding that ordinance did not constitute impermissible spot zoning to benefit developer’s private interest rather than the collective interest of the community where Borough had determined that a grocery store was a desired component of the redevelopment plan) (Pa451).
[brief] Defendants argue that remediation is an “accessory use” of a property only while a “primary use” is ongoing.  (Db24-26).  According to Defendants, once the “primary use” has ceased or “closed down”, remediation can no longer be considered a “use” of the property when occurring on its own.  (Db25-26).  Defendants did not raise this argument before the trial court but rather raised the argument that the Property could have been used despite the ongoing remediation.
[brief] ..........................................................  60 N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq.  ....................................................... 5, 22, 70 N.J.S.A. 10:5–13 .............................................................. 79, 80, 82 N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 ............................................................... 71, 72 N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq. .....................................................
[brief] ’”  McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. at 275 (quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, The fact that an objection was not made does not preclude a finding of plain error.  See e.g. State v. Neal, 361 N.J. Super. 522, 535 (App. Div. 2003) (notwithstanding failure to object comments that unfairly attacked defendant deemed to be egregious and deprived defendant of right to fair trial); Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. at 18 (notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt repeated improper comments constituted plain error).  As discussed in Point I, supra, there was ample reason for the jury to doubt that [...] was the shooter.
[brief] For these reasons, [...] respectfully requests that this Court overturn the trial court’s Denial Order.  Dated: October 31, 2024  [...]  *Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant,*  [...] Constructors Corp.  __________________________  [...] 89  Headquarters Plaza North Tower, Suite 1201  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...], Plaintiff, vs. [...], [...], Defendants-Respondents and [...] Constructors Corp., Defendant-Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action On Appeal from an Order Denying Restraints and Dismissing Appellant’s Crossclaims  Arising from a Bid Protest Governed by the Local Public Contracts Law  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY PASSAIC COUNTY—LAW DIVISION  Docket No.: [...] Sat below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF of the Respondent, [...] Of Counsel and on the Brief, [...], Esq.  (Attorney I.D. No: 045431996)  [...] [...] [...] (o) [...] (fax)  [...]  Date of Submission: November 12, 2024
[brief] That claim of oral misrepresentation is also expressly contradicted by all the contractual documents that the plaintiffs reviewed, initialed and signed:  “Purchaser further understands that the Unit purchased is an ANNUAL Unit entitling the owner to usage one interval per year. ” (emphasis).  (Da193, ¶10).  “PROPERTY BEING SOLD.  A fee simple undivided 1/52 interest … the right to occupy and use the unit for one (1) week of each calendar year …”.  (emphasis).  (Da201, ¶2).  See [...]’s Statement of Facts, supra at 10-11, regarding the express contradictions as to “same as conventional real estate. ”  Third, nine (9) of the plaintiffs claimed that they were told that the purchase of their timeshare interval would “increase in value over time.
[brief] People are “similarly-situated when they are alike in all relevant aspects. ”  Ibid.  When the government’s regulatory action is based on “multi-dimensional” factors and “varied decision-making criteria”, it is harder for a plaintiff to establish a class-of-one equal protection claim.  Ibid. (quoting Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1203-04 (11th Cir. 2007)).  [...] fails to establish an equal protection claim under a class-of-one theory analysis.  As to the first prong, [...] has not shown that [...]’s issuance of the Permit to [...] intentionally treated [...] differently.  [...] has provided no evidence that [...] intentionally treated [...] differently when [...] issued [...] the permit here.  Thomas Makuch, LLC v. Tp. of Jackson, 476 N.J. Super. 169, 192 (App. Div. 2023) (plaintiff did not provide “sufficient data, statistics, or examples” or certifications of other parties in the same class indicating intentionally different treatment by defendant).
[brief] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the introduction of this evidence.  Additionally, the plaintiff’s testimony, confirmed by her prior medical records, show that the plaintiff had a history of neuropathy and balance and gait issues before the [...] incident, for which she was treating.  Such substantive evidence is material and highly probative because it tends to prove that a possible cause of the [...] incident was the plaintiff losing her balance as she walked with her rollator down aisle 58 of the [...] store.  The trial court properly recognized this when ruling that evidence of plaintiff’s prior medical condition and history of falls could also be used as substantive evidence, in addition to used to impeach credibility.  (1T177:8-12).  Ultimately, the plaintiff’s misleading testimony on her prior medical conditions, history of falls and cause of the [...] incident created both credibility and substantive evidence.  As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the introduction of evidence and testimony regarding the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, history of falls and use of a handicapped placard.
[brief] ”  In doing so, the Court recognized that although “[c]ounsel’s arguments are expected to be passionate,” they must be “fair and courteous, grounded in the evidence and free from any ‘potential to cause injustice’ such as ‘unfair and prejudicial appeals to emotion’ and insinuations of bad faith on the part of the defendants who sought to resolve by trial validly contested claims against them. ”  (internal citations omitted)  Ibid.  Despite the lack of objection by defendant’s trial counsel, the Court in Jackowitz affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial based upon the presentation of a “theme” identical to the one presented in this case.  There, on opening, Plaintiff’s counsel advised the jury that it was being asked to “send a message” to the defendant and other drivers that when people suffer injuries as a result of another’s bad driving, “there must be a consequence.
[brief] [...] principally contends that [...]’s alleged sudden focus on her unauthorized receipt and entry of charge pay was pretext for her retaliatory termination because she “turned the tables,” (see Pb2), away from her own alleged misconduct.  (See also Pb24-27).  When held against the factual record, however, again providing every reasonable inference to [...], it is clear that the only reason for [...]’s termination was her unauthorized receipt and entry of charge pay.  The report of [...]’s receipt of charge pay was first made by [...], not [...].  And [...] reported it promptly after that.  In terms of timing, [...]’s report came approximately two full months after the June 24, 2020 incident, yet she immediately reported it to [...] after [...] first reported the finding of charge pay.
[brief] The Court erred when it refused to admit critical pieces of evidence despite their being highly relevant and therefore admissible under NJRE 402; no other rules of evidence were cited as reasons for barring this evidence.  The Court effectively drove a stake through the heart of Appellant’s complaint when it refused to admit as evidence a critical, and highly relevant document central to appellant’s case.  Quite literally, in a case in which Appellant sought to prove that a building had exceeded one of the height limitations imposed on it by a zoning resolution, the Court barred admission of the document memorializing the standard in question.  This rendered Appellant’s entire legal argument untenable.
[brief] \(^2\)  References to the September 27, 2023 Transcript are referred to herein as 2T 9/27/23.  On October 17, 2023, Appellants filed a Motion to Reconsider the Sua Sponte Order (the “Reconsideration Motion”) (454a-792a), and in that motion specifically raised Tyler v. Hennepin County, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (May 25, 2023) as an additional affirmative basis for relief under Rules 4:50-1(d) and (f).  On November 15, 2023, the lower court heard oral argument\(^3\) and entered an Order denying the Reconsideration Motion.  (26a-27a).  A Notice of Appeal was filed by Appellants on December 7, 2023, initiating this appeal.  (1a-5a).  This appeal encompasses the rulings contained in the lower court’s April 3, 2023 Order (6a-23a), the Sua Sponte Order(24a-25a) and the November 15, 2023 Order denying the Reconsideration Motion (26a-27a).  **CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] In attempting to meet the requirements of the second prong, it is not sufficient to show that the alleged errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067.  Defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the case would have been different.  Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Williams v. Taylor, supra, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. at 1512 (2000); State v. Russo, supra, 333 N.J. Super. at 139.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1b(3)  Endangering the Welfare of a Child, Promoting Child Prostitution, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3)  N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1b(4)  Endangering the Welfare of a Child, Attempt to commit any of the above offenses  N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4)  *Only a Superior Court Judge may set the bail for these crimes.  R. 3:26-2(a)*  20  In addition to any other conditions ordered by the Court, it is on this day of , hereby ORDERED, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8, that you are prohibited from having any contact with the victim, , including, but not limited to the following restrictions.
[brief] (144a)  On August 21, 2020, [...] held oral argument on defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and on August 28, 2020, the Court issued its Order and Opinion dismissing plaintiffs’ Complaint, with prejudice.  (148a)  In a comprehensive Opinion, [...] went through a recitation on the law applicable to Entire Controversy Doctrine, *Res Judicata*, and the Law of the Case Doctrine.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED WEG & MYERS EXPERT TO TESTIFY AS THE EXPERT WAS A SIGNATORY TO THE REPORT (FAILED TO BE RAISED BELOW)  Plaintiff’s argument, that [...] expert should have been precluded from testifying at trial should be rejected.  The argument, that [...] was not disclosed during discovery, was not raised at the trial level and should not be considered by this Court.  This Court should decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available “unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ”  *Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting *Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer*, 38 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)).  Since Plaintiff has failed to raise this issue before the trial court, does not go to the jurisdiction of the trial court and does not concern a matter of “great public interest”, this argument should not be considered by this Court.  Also, this argument is inaccurate and should be disregarded.  Plaintiff was served with [...] and [...]’s expert report in discovery.  [...], along with [...], were both disclosed in discovery as testifying experts for [...] and this report was authored and signed by both [...], Esquire and [...], Esquire. (Pa40).  Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument on appeal hold no merit and should be disregarded.  **VI.
[brief] Plaintiff principally relies upon the Appellate Division’s decision in Britwood Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park, 376 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2005), in support of its argument that the $2 million redevelopment fee runs afoul of the MLUL.  Pb26-28.  Not only is that case readily distinguishable from the case at bar, but it confirms that a municipality may indeed negotiate for the payment of a fee by a redeveloper in a redevelopment agreement.
[brief] Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. at 295 (citing State v. Sailor, 355 N.J. Super. 315, 320 (App. Div. 2001)); State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).  The standard governing the review of factual finding is different, requiring this Court “uphold the trial court’s factual findings ... ‘so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”
[brief] Following an employer’s proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an employee’s termination, “plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the employer’s proffered reasons were a pretext for the discriminatory action taken by the employer. ”  Allen v. Cape May Cty., 246 N.J. 275, 291 (2021) (quoting Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (App. Div. 1999)).  At this stage of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless the plaintiff presents “evidence which: 1) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of adverse employment action.
[brief] ”  See Db at pp. 47-49.  This argument is at best laughable, because these comments plainly fall under category of “forceful and graphic” language that attorneys are entitled to use during summation.  See State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 638 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that a prosecutor’s analogizing a Defendants’ conduct to that of the Nazis was not unduly prejudicial).  Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff’s counsel misrepresented/distorted certain evidence (see Db at pp. 41-47), can be disposed of without lengthy argument, because each of the “offending” statements are nothing more than fair comments on evidence contained in the record.