ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 18  Dunkin’ Donuts of New Jersey, Inc. v. Twp. of North Brunswick Plan, Bd., 193 N.J. Super. 513, 515 (App. Div. 1984)  24 El Shaer v. Planning Bd., Lawrence, 249 N.J. Super. 323 (App.  Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 546 (1991)
[brief] *[...]* stemmed from a 2007 jury trial, during which the parties presented arguments to the jury concerning both liability and allocation, including the end date for an allocation period.  *[...] v. [...]*, 793 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d and remanded, 708 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2013).  During that trial, [...], the insured, presented testimony that soil, groundwater and sediment contamination at the site was continuous from the beginning of operations through the time of the jury trial.  *Id.* at 519.  Evidence also was presented regarding remediation continuing through the date of trial.  *[...]*, 708 F.3d at 258-59.  The jury rendered its verdict in favor of the insured under an “all sums” allocation methodology, however, judgment was not immediately entered.  *[...]*, 793 F. Supp. 2d 511, 514.  In the interim, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts accepted Certification and rendered a decision rejecting “all sums” and holding that pro-rata allocation is the law of Massachusetts.
[brief] (Ca140).  In addition, [...] explained to [...] that monthly reports were sent to [...] by the accountant, and were also sent to the main creditor, [...].  [...] also retained a payroll company, and placed proper insurance on the assets of the property, including workers’ compensation.  It was obvious to [...] that the business was not operating at a profit, so the creditors could not get paid.  The landlord, [...], was one of the creditors that negotiated a lease agreement with the principals of the corporation prior to [...]’s appointment.  [...] sold the assets of the diner at a public sale on January 18, 2022, pursuant to his appointment as special master under the order of [...] of November 4, 2021 appointing [...] to hold the foreclosure sale in place of the sheriffs, since the property was located on the borderline of two counties.  [...] properly advertised as special master, and conducted the sale on January 18, 2022.  [...] filed the motion for confirmation of the sale, which was not considered until May 2022 due to the unsuccessful attempts by [...], who opposed the approval of the sale.  Ultimately, the sale was confirmed by [...] in the action under [...] on May 27, 2022.
[brief] Specifically, [...] and the Defendant filed the motion to seek revenge against Plaintiff despite the following: (1) Plaintiff prevailed on Defendant’s first untimely motion to vacate final judgment; (2) Plaintiff prevailed on Defendant’s first untimely motion for reconsideration; (3) Plaintiff prevailed in Defendant’s appeal; (4) the trial court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider the holding from the Appellate Division; (5) the review by the Appellate Division of the [...] June 8, 2023 decision is untimely; and (6) Defendant and his counsel refused to withdraw the motion after receipt of the frivolous litigation letter dated March 12, 2024.  Despite the foregoing, Defendant and his counsel continued to harass Plaintiff and cloud its title to the Property by filing the second motion for reconsideration and the second appeal in bad faith.  Consequently, the Defendant and [...]’s false statements of fact and law, and frivolous motion and appeal should be viewed and asserted with R. 1:4-8, RPC 3.1, RPC 3.3 and RPC 4.1 in mind.  As such, the court should reverse the order of the trial court denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions.  Of course, [...] and the Defendant knew that their actions would preclude a sale of the Property by the Plaintiff.  In addition, the Plaintiff continues to incur attorney’s fees and costs to defend its title to the Property against Defendant’s vengeful litigation, which [...] has shamelessly filed.  Consequently, for the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff requests that (1) the order denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions be reversed, (2) sanctions be imposed against the Defendant and [...] for Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending the motion and filing the cross-motion to discharge lis pendens in the sum of $6,838.00; and (3) sanctions be imposed upon the Defendant and [...] in the additional sum of $7,486.40 representing Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs in defending the second appeal.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-41(f) (“No consumer loans of the amount or value of $50,000 or less for which a greater rate of interest, consideration, or charge than is permitted by this act has been charged, contracted for, or received, whenever made, shall be enforced in this State and any person in any way participating therein in this State shall be subject to the provisions of this act.) (emphasis added); N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1(f) (“‘Sales finance company’ means and includes any person engaging in this State in the business of acquiring or arranging for the acquisition of retail installment contracts.  . . .”) (emphasis added).
[brief] **Legal Argument**  I.  **Defendants’ Statement of the Standard of Review Fails to Account for Defendants’ Burdens in Opposing Summary Judgment and the Discretion Afforded Trial Courts Applying Equitable Doctrines.  (Ja715)**  Defendants’ largely set forth an accurate statement of the general standard applicable to a trial court’s consideration of summary judgment, but Defendants fail to account for their burden under that standard and the discretion this Court must apply in reviewing the trial court’s decision on equity matters.
[brief] 225 N.J. Super. at 134.  The City’s assertion that *Nunziato* has not been applied in the redevelopment context is belied by citations to that case in this Court’s opinion in *SB Bldg. Assocs., L.P. v. Planning Bd.*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 36, *14 for the proposition that:  The MLUL's authority to impose contributions requires a planning board to make certain findings, and for that reason an ordinance may not delegate that authority to the governing body or redevelopment agency because "when the MLUL establishes criteria for a specific situation or confers authority on a specific entity, a municipality is not free to chart its own course."  (Emphasis added, citations omitted).
[brief] Moreover, Respondent prepared and provided a Consent Order to Appellant to facilitate an expedient effectuation of the relief awarded by the March 4, 2024 Orders.  Appellant rejected such offered Consent Order, as Appellant was adamant as to entitlement to the amount awarded plus compounding interest, attorney’s fees and costs.  In summary, Appellant demanded all (or substantially all) of the deposited funds in order to fully and finally resolve this matter.
[brief] ”  (21T 194-2 to 3)  Defendant said that he “aimed low” and “wasn’t trying to kill him,” but [...] “was an intruder” who had a history of coming to the property and making the [...] feel “violated,” and so defendant “felt somebody pulled a gun on me and tried to cause harm to me.  And I didn’t know what to do. ”  (21T 196-22 to 197-13)  He also said that he took the magazine out of the gun after the incident, and he agreed that the first shot was intentional but the second shot “went off” during the incident.
[brief] THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NUMEROUS TRIAL ERRORS REQUIRES REVERSAL.  (Not Raised Below)  Even if the above errors do not individually warrant reversal, reversal is required under the fundamental-fairness and cumulative-error doctrines.  See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1; State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014); State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321, 347-48 (2021).  The numerous errors here -- permitting the jury to hear [...]’s self-identification and admissions; the untested out-of-court identification; his invocations of his right to silence, exploited by the State; and the detectives’ opinions on his guilt -- collectively denied him a fair trial.  POINT V DEFENDANT’S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
[brief] The Court Also Failed to Address Other Requirements of Rule 4:42-9(a)(2). **  1.  **The Trial Court Did Not Undertake A Thorough Analysis of the Extent of Any Benefit That Resulted From Plaintiff’s Litigation. **  As was noted by the Appellate Division in the prior appeal, among other things, “[t]he judge should focus on those steps taken by plaintiff that actually benefited the Estate and fix a reasonable fee for those steps.….” (Da259).  Our courts adhere to the American Rule that litigants bear their own fees unless otherwise provided by court rule, statute, or contract.
[brief] [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. [...]  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL  DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE UNIT [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  October 20, 2023  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................
[directive] E.  In any case where a Overcoming the mandatory or presumptive complaint-warrant. complaint-warrant is mandatory, or there is a presumption of applying for a complaint- warrant, a law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant unless an Assistant Prosecutor or a Designated Supervisory Officer determines that: a) the physical safety of persons or property would not be seriously threatened if the juvenile were not detained; and b) detention is not necessary to secure the appearance of the juvenile at future court proceedings.  In making this determination, the Assistant Prosecutor or a Designated Supervisory Officer shall consider whether there are reasonable assurances that if the juvenile were to be charged by a complaint-summons, they will appear in court when required, the safety of any other person or the community will be protected, and the juvenile will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.  If the determination is made to overcome the presumption of applying for a complaint-warrant, the Assistant Prosecutor or a Designated Supervisory Officer shall document the reasons for that decision in the case file.
[brief] (5T85:20-25).  She suggested that they invite several people over.  Id.  [...] invited over four friends and her nephew, [...] invited two couples and one other friend.  (5T86:6-8).  During this makeshift get together, [...] observed [...]’s nephew hand her something which she put into her mouth.  (5T86:18-19).  [...] and [...] got into a heated argument about this, which made several guests feel uncomfortable and leave.  (5T87:4-13).  [...] asked [...] to come into the kitchen with her, at which point she tried to put cocaine in his nose, and he flipped out and told her to take her friends and get out of his house.
[brief] The document is not included as it Certification of [...] in opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion to Bar Evidence dated August 2, 2022 .................................. | Pa. 128-131 | | Defendant’s Answer to interrogatories Number 2,3, 4 and 5 attached as Exhibit A to the August 8, 2022 Certification of [...] .......... | Pa. 132 | | Order entered by Honorable [...] dated August 5,2022 denying plaintiff’s Motion to Amend her Complaint, Extend Discovery and Secure Compliance with a Subpoena ...... | Pa. 133-134 | | Order entered by Honorable [...] dated August 5,2022 granting Defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena served on [...] .......... | Pa. 135 | ## COMMENCEMENT OF ITEMS BEFORE THE COURT ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT | APPENDIX DOCUMENT | APPENDIX PAGE # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Defendants’ Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 9,2022.............. | Pa. 136-137 | | Defendants Statement of Undisputed Material Facts dated December 9,2022 in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment.................. | Pa. 138-142 | | Certification of [...] dated December 9, 2022 in Support of Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment.................. | Pa. 143-145 |
[brief] I have not reviewed any documents or testimony that indicates [...] reviewed the agreement with the *members* of [...] to determine if they understood the material terms that might affect [...]’s decision to execute the contract documents.  Clearly, [...] did not meet with [...], the person who was authorized to sign all contract documents on behalf of [...] pursuant to a resolution that [...] himself prepared, to discuss the various terms contained in the documents, and therefore no members of [...] were reasonably counseled by [...] so that they understood the material terms of the contract documents.  There is no evidence that, even after meeting with [...], [...] proposed *any specific changes* to the Lease or Option Agreement by submitting draft language to [...].  There is no evidence that [...] counseled [...] or [...]’s principals regarding the risks it was required to undertake based upon the language contained in the contract documents with regard to obtaining a certificate of occupancy or the fact that if the conditions precedent for exercising the right to terminate the lease were not met, [...] would be on the hook for the accelerated payment of rent for the entire term of the Lease.  5.
[brief] Respondent generally agrees with the procedural history.  However, it does appear that the Motions filed in May 2023, while referenced, were not attached.  On May 17, 2023, this office filed two Motions.  (Da1, Da5).  The first was to dismiss for failure to comply with the Court Order and the second was to compel Plaintiff to respond to both interrogatories and notice to produce.  That Motion was carried via correspondence dated June 7.  (Da9).  On June 9, the court held oral arguments and the Motion to Dismiss was granted (PA70), while the Motion to Compel was denied.  (Da11).  Thereafter, on June 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Restore, which was opposed by this office on July 12 and Plaintiff replied on July 17.  An Adjournment Request was sent on July 21 and that Motion was denied on July 24.  (PA88).  Last, Appellant failed to note that this office filed opposition to the Motion to Vacate of February 22, 2024.  **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS**
[brief] (T3, 44:20-23).  Such a finding is not required in order to satisfy criterion (b).  Not only did the Court attempt to rewrite the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) by inserting additional requirements that do not exist, it also ignored the fact that the Legislature determined that unoccupied and unutilized buildings, in and of themselves, are intrinsically detrimental to the welfare of the community.
[brief] See Danise v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., No. 15-06062 (JLL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174888 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2016), affirmed Danise v. Saxon Mortg. Servs , 738 Fed. Appx. 47 * (3d Cir. 2018); Vedernikov v. Atl. Credit & Fin., Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148668, at *10-16 (D.N.J. Aug. 30 2019); Romeo v. FMA Alliance, Ltd., No. 15-cv-6524, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86148* (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2016); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., Inc., 233 B.R. 46, 53 (S.D.N.Y.), order amended on denial of reconsideration, 63 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“A debtor may not conceal assets” and “then utilize the assets for its own benefit.
[directive] FIREARM OF POSSESSION  2C:39-7A  4  NOT WEAP-CONVICTED CRIME  HAVE CERTAIN TO PERSONS  2C:39-7B(1)  2  NOTTO 2C:16-1, WEAP CONV HAVE PRIOR CERT PERSON  ETC.  2C:39-7B(2)  3  NOT WEAPONS  DV CERTAIN HAVE TO PRIOR PERSONS  DP 2C:39-7B(3)  NOTTO 1991  DVA WEAP-PROHIBITED  3 HAVE CERTAIN PERSONS BY 2C:39-7B(4)  3
[directive] Iniciales del acusado/Defendant’s Initials Formulario principal de declaración/Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Spanish página 7 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Spanish page 7 of 7  AVI:  Sa se yon dokiman piblik.  Pa mete okenn enfòmasyon idantifikasyon pèsonèl sou li, kankou nimewo Sosyal, nimewo Lisans pou kondwi, oswa nimewo kont an bank ak kat kredi aktif yo.  Dokiman sa a ap disponib ba piblik la sou demann jan li soumèt la.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.
[brief] Our New Jersey Courts have not extensively examined such exclusions in a published decision since the Supreme Court’s decision in Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001), which dealt with boatowner's insurance, not an automobile insurance, policy.  Recently, however, the Appellate Division once again re-visited intrafamily liability exclusions in the context of automobile insurance policies in an unpublished decision.  See Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co., A-2272-19 (App. Div. 2022), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 234 (2022).  (Pa133-160).  In Dela Vega, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the enforceability of an intra-family liability step-down exclusion in an automobile insurance policy.
[brief] ”); see also Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, No. BER-L-003625-17, 2022 WL 267938, at *3 (N.J. Super. L. Jan. 07, 2022) (“The Consumer Fraud Act [] applies only to conduct that rises to the level of deception, fraud, or misrepresentation in connection with the sale of merchandise or services.  ‘To satisfy this requirement, the misrepresentation has to be one which is material to the transaction made to induce the buyer to make the purchase. ’”) (quoting Castro, 370 N.J. Super. at 294 (emphasis added).  Finally, Appellant has not and cannot demonstrate any ascertainable loss he suffered by virtue of Respondents conduct.  See Woo-Padva, 2022 WL 267938, at *3 (“The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that to meet the ascertainable loss requirement, a plaintiff ‘must proffer evidence of loss that is not hypothetical or illusory.  It must be presented with some certainty demonstrating that it is capable of calculation…  The certainty implicit in the concept of an ‘ascertainable’ loss is that it is quantifiable or measurable. ’”) (quoting Thiedemann, 183 N.J. at 248-51).  Instead, Appellant made conclusory broad-brush allegations about Respondents’ conduct.  See \(^{23}\) (Da58-Da63).  *Katz*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169407, at *9* (holding NJCFA claims are held to a higher standard of pleading and must plead specific facts and circumstances and not merely conclusory statements).
[brief] 12 CFR § 1006.34(c)(2)(i) .......................................................................................  13  15 U.S.C. § 1692 ....................................................................................................  4, 5  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) ............................................................................................  4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14  15 U.S.C. § 1692d ................................................................................................. 4, 11  15 U.S.C. § 1692f .................................................................................................  11  LEGAL ARGUMENTS
[brief] He stated that “we are driven by our stormwater management design.  We need to detain our runoff. ”  “In order to detain our runoff, we have to elevate certain portions based on water table. ”  (Pa153; 57,21-58,2)  He testified that the site was being regraded “to accommodate the site features to make this development work in terms of stormwater management, sanitary sewer and grading. ”  (Pa151; 52,17-20)  That required a stormwater management basin to handle water quantity, water quality and groundwater recharge.  He testified that the grading was designed so that water quantity, the volume of water needed to be detained on-site post development, would be reduced for the 2-year, 10-year and 100-year storms.  (Pa117-118; 30,18-33,12)  He testified that water quality required a reduction in total suspended solids generated from additional pavement.  This was addressed with a system including a pre-manufactured water treatment device, series of filters for collected stormwater and treating it before going into an underground storage tank, detention basin.  (Pa117; 32,12-21)  There is also a subsurface storage bin for the permeable paver entrance drive.  (Pa117-118; 32,22-33,2)  He further testified that the design had to provide for post-development groundwater recharge not to be less than pre-development.  (Pa118; 33,3-9)  He further testified that the stormwater management regulations require that improvements be at least one foot above the seasonal high-water table.  A series of test pits were done throughout the site to determine the seasonal high-water table locations.  The system was designed to meet that requirement.  (Pa151; 51,13-52,3)  He testified that the grading was done for the entire property, not just for individual buildings.  He stated that the grading was done the same as any site plan.  He testified that this grading is not mounding to increase building height.
[directive] ”  Each agency shall make a good faith effort to meet specific goals for recruiting a diverse workforce, in terms of people of color diversity.3 and gender B.  Setting goals.  Each agency will be responsible for establishing its own specific Program goals.  In forming its Program goals, the agency should—at least annually—analyze the demographics of its law enforcement officers and determine if there is a substantial disparity between the racial, ethnic, and gender representation within the law enforcement officer ranks as compared with the racial, ethnic, and gender representation in the relevant agency.4 population of the jurisdiction served by the  Any demographic group for which there is a substantial disparity, in terms of less representation on the police force, should be considered an “underrepresented” group.  In determining whether a disparity is substantial, agencies should consider whether reducing the disparity would help achieve the Act’s goal of each agency’s police force “reflect[ing] the diversity of the population of the community the agency is charged with protecting” and thereby making the police force more effective at promoting public safety.  The Program goals should describe (1) the identified underrepresentation of any group, (2) the means for addressing the underrepresentation, and (3) the intended time frame for doing so.
[brief] 134 N.J. at 618.  Rather, the Court held that “a police officer can “remove passengers only when the circumstances present reason for heightened caution. ”  *State v. Bacome*, 228 N.J. 94, 104 (2017) (reaffirming the *Smith* heightened-caution standard for removing passengers).  An officer must articulate “facts in the totality of circumstances that would create in a police officer a heightened awareness of danger that would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in securing the scene in a more effective manner by ordering the passenger to alight from the car.
[brief] Morley v. Contarino Bros., 2006 WL 2009046, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2006).  For purposes of this inquiry, the concept of relevancy is “congruent” with the same concept under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 401, i.e., “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  *R.L. v. Voytac*, 402 N.J. Super. 392, 408 (App. Div. 2008), rev’d on other grounds 199 N.J. 285 (2009); see *Payton v. N.J. Turnpike Auth.*, 148 N.J. 524, 535 (1997).  To be clear, relevancy alone does not make a document conclusively discoverable—it only “creates a presumption of discoverability.
[brief] [...] also claims that from the time he returned to Lakewood in 1995 after spending five years in upstate New York, he never saw any cars parked on the Sixth Street Lot – again contradicting the detailed recollections of the Congregation’s fact witnesses.  (12T 4:12-21:8, 26:9-36:2)  35.  Defendant’s second fact witness, [...], testified he attended the Hebrew Day School from 1963 through 1969 and arrived at school between 8:10 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. and he never saw cars parked in the Sixth Street Lot.  (12T 58:13-19)