ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  August 26, 2022, Order by Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. denying Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause .................................................................  Da329 August 26, 2022, Order by Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. dismissing part of the Complaint and granting part of the Complaint........................................  Da331 September 28, 2022, Amended Order by [...], P.J.Ch............. Da333 August 17, 2023, Partial Order for Summary Judgment .................................. Da853 August 29, 2023, Order Denying Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs ........ Da856 January 22, 2024, Order denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration.... Da870 January 22, 2024, Letter of Opinion by the Court ................................................ Da873 February 6, 2024, Order denying Defendant [...]’s entry of a Stay of the Court’s August 17, 2023, Order granting Partial Summary Judgment ........................................................................................................ Da877 March 26, 2024, Order granting Appellant’s Leave to Appeal .......................... Da895 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 459 N.J. Super. 529, 541 (App. Div. 2019) ................................................................. 11, 12 Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J.J. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 236 (1944) ........................................................................... 3 Bruno v. Hanna, 63 N.J. Super. 282, 285 (App. Div. 1960) .................................................. 4 Cape May Harbor Village and Yacht Club Association, Inc. v. Sbraga, 421 N.J.Super. 56, 70 - 72 (App. Div. 2011) .................................................. 12, 13
[brief] *Id.* at 441.  This case is very similar to *Century Indem.*  To start, this is a declaratory judgment case, which plaintiff preemptively filed in an attempt to deprive defendants (who are the natural plaintiffs in this dispute) of the ability to pursue their breach of contract and other affirmative claims in Missouri—where multiple defendants are based and where the state courts are already familiar with the provisions of the Special Undertaking Contract. (Pa074, Pa082); see also *Monsanto Co. v. Gould Electrs., Inc.*, 965 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo. App. 1998) (finding that a substantially similar Special Undertaking “clearly and unequivocally provide[s] for . . . [indemnification of] Monsanto against any and all claims”).
[brief] Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), and Respondent, [...] (“[...]”) are parties to three separate collective negotiations agreements, each representing a different rank: Captain, Battalion Chief and Deputy Chief, which covered the period August 1, 2010 through July 31, 2019.  (Aa582-739).  On or about September 11, 2023, the [...] filed a petition to initiate compulsory interest arbitration with the Public Employment Relations Commission under Docket No. [...].  (Aa177).  [...] was appointed as Interest Arbitrator.  (Aa181).  Hearings were conducted on ---  1  Because the Statement of Facts and Procedural History are closely interrelated, they are combined to avoid repetition and for the convenience of the Court.  2  “Aa” refers to the Appellant’s Appendix.  September 21, 2023, October 26, 2023 and November 3, 2023.  (Aa69).  On December 18, 2023, Interest Arbitrator [...] issued a Decision and Award in which he awarded an agreement that (a) covered the period August 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023; (b) merged the three supervisory fire units, Captain, Battalion Chief and Deputy Chief, into one consolidated agreement; (c) awarded salary increases of 0% for 8/1/2019 – 7/31/2020, 1% for 8/1/2020 – 7/31/2021, 2% for 8/1/2021 – 7/31/2022, 1.5% for 8/1/2022 – 7/31/2023, and 1.5% for 8/1/2023 – 12/31/2023; (d) awarded retro pay to be distributed among unit employees of $300,00.00 for the period 8/1/2022 – 7/31/2023 and $150,000.00 for the period 8/1/2023 – 12/31/2023; (e) awarded education benefit amendments; (f) awarded an increase in the number of leave days that can be carried over; (g) modified the health benefits section which included an acknowledgement of New Jersey State Health Benefits participation, Chapter 78 employee contributions, and a health insurance waiver incentive to match the health benefits language in the firefighter unit agreement; (h) amended the legal defense provision; and (i) amended the dues check off provision.
[brief] *Id.* at 558.  Nonetheless, the Court found that the police corroborated “information from which it can be inferred that the informant's tip was grounded on inside information,” thereby adequately supporting the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge.  See *Keyes*, 184 N.J. at 558-59.  Central to the Keyes Court’s determination that the police had sufficiently corroborated the informant’s tip was a controlled buy conducted by the informant and observed by the police at the defendant’s residence.  Id. at 559; see also id. at 556-57 (holding that “[a]lthough no corroborating fact, by itself, conclusively establishes probable cause, a successful controlled buy typically will be persuasive evidence in establishing probable cause”) (citing Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 217).  The Court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause based on the controlled buy and additional police corroboration of the informant’s tip, including a positive field test of the substance obtained during the controlled buy, “routine complaints from area residents about the constant drug activity” on the same block as the defendant’s residence, police detection of lookouts nearby, and the defendant’s prior convictions for manufacturing and distributing drugs.
[brief] Cases  Aden v. Fortsh, 169 N.J. 64 (2001) .........................................................  30, 31 Amidano v. Donnelly, 260 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 435 (1993)  ..............................................................................  28 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995)..........................  33 Brooks v. Cooper, 50 N.J. Eq. 761 (E. & A. 1893).....................................  22 Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Grp., Inc., 135 N.J. 182, 188-89 (1994)  ...........................................................................................................  31  City of Orange Twp. v. Empire Mortg. Services, Inc., 341 N.J. Super. 216 (App. Div. 2001)....................................................................................... 27, 28 Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J.Super. 61 (App.Div. 2012)......................................  23 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).............................  24 Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 10 N.J. Super. 545 (Ch. Div. 1950) ........................................................................................................... 23 Evans v. Trenton, 24 N.J.L. 764 (E. & A. 1853) ........................................ 23 Han v. Jang, 2014 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1408 (App. Div. June 16, 2014) ........................................................................................................... 24 Holm v. Purdy, 252 N.J. 384 (2022) .......................................................... 31, 32 Jacobs v. Great Pacific Century Corp., 104 N.J. 580 (1986)....................... 29 John J. Carlin, Inc. v. O'Connor, 126 N.J.L. 243 (E. & A. 1941).................. 22 Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J.Super. 562 (App.Div. 2021) ...................... 21, 22, 23 Karl's Sales and Service, Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 249 N.J. Super. 487 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991) ........................................... 27, 28 Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208 (1979)
[brief] The identity of the perpetrator was contested at trial.  Ibid.  The victim positively identified [...] from a photo array, and later also made an in-court identification.  Id. at 403–05, 231 A.3d 689.  The jury viewed surveillance video of the attack, as well as a video of a previous bar fight involving [...] in which he was clearly seen.  Ibid.  The fact-sensitive issue in [...] was whether a detective at trial violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by telling the jury that his photo was included in the photo array “based on … the evidence … collected … [.]”
[brief] [...] also failed to learn from prior incidents.  Although there were no prior OSHA citations, there were three prior backup/crushing incidents.  Pa1521-23.  Perhaps most egregiously, there were numerous complaints from numerous workers about the unsafe handling of the sweeper by the sweeper driver before [...] was rundown.  See supra at 18-20.  That the driver was known to drive dangerously, too fast and unsafely and that the employer did nothing to stop him are key facts to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.  A known dangerous driver and lack of any plan for traffic control created a context in which a horrific injury was substantially certain to occur and did occur.  Contrary to what [...] has argued on this point, being crushed, dragged and killed is not an inevitable fact of life on a construction project.  It does not have to happen, but rather happens when employers place profits above safety, speed above required safe practices and protocols.  That is not the type of conduct or context that the Legislature meant to immunize the employer and to deny full compensation to the injured employee or his survivors.  Instead, this case falls squarely in the category were a reasonable jury may find that the employer, [...], was aware with substantial certainty that an injury would occur and when it did, it would be horrific.
[directive] jurisdiction is required to designate one sworn officer to coordinate juvenile matters.  This Juvenile Liaison Officer (JLO) should be designated based upon their training and experience.  The JLO should be familiar with local resources and community-based programs available to assist juveniles and their families; shall be well-versed in the various diversionary programs available to divert youth from the juvenile justice system; and are tasked with staying up-to-date on legislative changes, and changes to policy and procedure regarding Juvenile Justice Reform.  The JLO can also assist by building partnerships with non-profit and government-run community organizations to assist with the supervision of 26 stationhouse adjustment agreements.  Information on how to contact a Department’s JLO should be made public and placed on the agency’s website, in order to provide this resource to families and the community.  X.
[brief] To support his allegations of serious injuries and property damage manifesting as early as 1991 and continuing during his residency at the condo, [...] offered his own testimony and support from retained experts.  For example, at his January 2012 deposition, [...] testified that: a.  The leaks in his condominium unit were constant and apparent, starting in 1991.  b.  Around that time, he observed leaks in the corner ceiling of his basement and in the ceiling of his bedroom.  Water would flow right out of the joist in the basement.  c.  He promptly complained about the water damage to the developers and even hired an attorney to send a letter.  d.  Sometime thereafter, the developer tried to repair the leaks by caulking the sidewalk.  However, the leaks continued and by the mid-1990s, the leaks were so bad they forced [...] to move out.  e.  Around that time, the developer attempted a second repair, this time by digging around the corner of his unit and filling it with concrete.  f.  By 1996 or 1997, the condo association took control, but nothing changed.  g.  The leaks continued, and so did [...]’s complaints, which were “constant. ”  He told the condo association that the water was “pouring” in.  h.  Starting in 2002, [...] complained to [...].  By around 2003, he became so frustrated with the constant, unaddressed water intrusion that he ceased paying condo dues.  i.
[brief] The case of Cranford Development Associates v. Cranford 445 N.J. Super 220 (2016) is factually distinct from the instant matter.  In Cranford, the Court was considering a Builders Remedy case in which the Court found that “Cranford still has an unmet housing obligation of four hundred ten (410) housing units, and the township’s Fair Share Housing Plan, filed after the lawsuit was instituted, was seriously deficient."  Id at 224.  In this case, the [...] filed a Declaratory Judgment complaint which resulted in an Order dated June 29, 2018, at ¶2 that “the settlement sets forth and otherwise incorporates mechanisms to address the affordable housing obligation.  The Court fined, upon the Special Master’s Report, testimony and recommendation, that the Borough’s affordable housing obligation, including the unmet need, is adequately and sufficiently addressed by the mechanisms provided for in the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] Additionally, Defendant’s claim it is “left only with the obligation to own and maintain those [parking] facilities for the [Congregation’s] priority use” is disingenuous since it is the Congregation providing snow removal from the Subject Property and paying for the lighting for the Fifth and Sixth Street Lots at its own expense.  (Db66 and 8T 5:3-7:3)  There is nothing in the Trial Court’s ruling or other decisions suggesting the Trial Court granted Plaintiff authority to utilize the Subject Property to the exclusion of Defendant.
[brief] The City’s Statement of Material Undisputed Facts does not assert a nexus between the [...] and the $2,000,000 payment.  (Pa462 to Pa476).  The Defendants only argued in reply that the payment helped fulfill goals of the Redevelopment Plan, not that there was a nexus.  In its opinion, the Court upheld the $2,000,000 payment on the ground that [T]he [...] furthers the objectives and terms of the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE UNIT’S EQUITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING A FAIR RETURN ON THE UNIT.  [...] correctly included $76,900 in capital improvements to the Unit in determining the Unit’s equity.  By contending that capital improvements cannot be part of an owner’s equity, [...] proffers an artificially low equity.  However, notwithstanding [...]’s contrary contention, the Ordinance does not, as a matter of law, bar the inclusion of capital improvements in the owner’s equity to ensure an owner’s “reasonable return”.  Rather, the Ordinance merely states that a capital improvement is not an operating expense.  See 155-14(A)(4) (“Operating expenses shall not include depreciation, amortization of debt service or capital expenditures …”).  [...] did not include its capital improvement in its operating expense, just separately in its calculation of equity for determining a “fair return”.  Disregarding capital improvements for calculating an owner’s equity makes no sense.  A capital improvement is ordinarily understood to be part of an owner’s investment and resulting equity.  The only proper way to calculate an owner’s equity for the purpose of ensuring a “fair return” to the owner is to include its entire cash investment that would include capital improvements.  Indeed, it would be inimical to a “fair return” to exclude a capital improvement in assessing a “fair return”.  Just as the Supreme Court held that inflationary adjustments are necessary to determine a “fair return” and avoid a confiscatory result (even if (i) not stated in the definition of “equity” in an ordinance; and (ii) a CPI adjustment to rent is allowed), the same applies for capital improvements.
[brief] This is the Answering Brief of Respondent [...] (“Board” or “Defendant”) to Appellant [...]’s (“MRP” or “Plaintiff”) appeal of the December 8, 2022 Law Division Order dismissing Plaintiff’s challenge to Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s land development application within the Township of Westampton.  Defendant Planning Board is a 9-regular member joint board that must contract to a 7-member zoning board for applications involving N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d variance relief under the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”).  Plaintiff’s application before the Board sought preliminary and final major site plan approval with bulk variances and waivers to construct two industrial warehouse/distribution buildings and associated site improvements at the property.  After four (4) public hearings to consider Plaintiff’s Application, the Board ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under the MLUL to hear and decide Plaintiff’s application because the proposed multi-use development may require N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d use variance relief.  Plaintiff’s application for site plan approval without use variance relief was then denied and dismissed by the Board.  On appeal to the Law Division, Plaintiff argued that no use variance is required so that all actions taken by the Board to dismiss and deny Plaintiff’s Application are arbitrary, unlawful, and subject to reversal.  However, Plaintiff had no better luck with the trial judge than the Defendant Board.  [...] correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint while at the same time remanding the matter back to the Board for further development of the record.  Defendant Board was also directed to include more detailed factual findings and conclusions of law in its written memorializing resolution.  The Board was specifically instructed to reconfigure as a 7-member zoning board rather than a 9-member planning board and to interpret the Township Zoning Ordinance in accordance with the MLUL.  While Defendant argued below that the Board had jurisdiction as a planning board to determine whether Plaintiff’s Application required use variance relief, once the trial court found the Board’s memorializing resolution lacked adequate factual findings and conclusions of law, the only available and correct remedy for the court was to remand the matter back to the Board for further proceedings and to prepare an amended memorializing resolution.  As the party challenging the Board’s denial of a use variance application, Plaintiff continues to bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that Defendant’s reasonable, good faith interpretation of its own ordinance was so arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that it must be vacated and set aside by a reviewing court.
[brief] 16a TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS  1T – Transcript of Hearing dated June 22, 2018  2T – Transcript of Hearing dated July 26, 2019 # TABLE OF CONTENTS – APPENDIX (Volume 1 of 15 – Pa1 to Pa191) | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order granting summary judgment to [...], filed June 22, 2018 | 1a | | Memorandum Opinion in support of Order granting summary judgment, filed June 22, 2018 | 3a | | Order granting summary judgment to [...], filed July 26, 2019 | 12a | | Order granting summary judgment to [...], filed July 26, 2019 | 14a | | Memorandum Opinion in support of Orders granting summary judgment, filed July 26, 2019 | 16a | | Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment of [...], filed April 26, 2018 | 40a | | Movant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, filed April 26, 2018 | 42a | | Certification of [...], filed April 26, 2018 | 58a | | Exhibit 1, Second Amended Complaint, dated January 26, 2016, filed April 26, 2018 | 64a | | Exhibit 2, Answer of [...], to Second Amended Complaint, dated February 25, 2016, filed April 26, 2018 | 104a | | Exhibit 3, Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories of [...], undated, filed April 26, 2018 | 131a | | Exhibit 4, Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories of [...], dated March 9, 2015, filed April 26, 2018 | 135a | | Exhibit 5, Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories of [...], undated, filed April 26, 2018 | 140a | Exhibit 6, Excerpts from [...]’s Answers to Interrogatories of Plaintiff, dated June 16, 2015, filed April 26, 2018 144a Exhibit 7, New Jersey State Police Investigation Report, dated August 7, 2014, filed April 26, 2018 149a Exhibit 8, Agreement between [...], and [...], dated December 2013, filed April 26, 2018
[brief] On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  Pa11.  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  Pa62.  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  Pa64.  No “close date” appears on the document.  Pa64.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court reverse the Final Judgment and grant specific performance ordering Defendants to comply with their obligations under the PSA and secure a site-wide RAO or, alternatively, reverse the Final Judgment and remand this matter for re-trial consistent with this Court’s decision.  Further, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court reverse the Discovery Order to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct limited additional discovery, vacate the Final Judgment, and remand the case for re-trial based on a full record.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: February 2, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET No. [...], TEAM 02 2430  [...]  CIVIL ACTION  Plaintiff-Appellant -on appeal from-  [...], AS THE THE SUPERIOR COURT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE OF NEW JERSEY.  ESTATE OF [...], CHANCERY DIVISION, [...]  UNION COUNTY  Defendants - Respondents SAT BELOW -Cross Appellants  HONORABLE  [...], P.J.Ch.  BRIEF/REPLY  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-CROSS APPELLANTS  [...] AND MARTIN  IPPOLITO  On the Brief Law Office of [...]  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 011421983  Attorney ID# 011421983  [...], [...], Esq.  [...], Attorney ID# 025341993  [...] [...]  Submission Date: March 28, 2024  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants- Respondents-Cross Appellants
[brief] Both the plea forms and plea hearing confirm that this plea was for an ordinary-term sentence for a second-degree offense, with a sentencing range of five to ten years.  There is no mention whatsoever of the State seeking, or waiving, an extended term at the plea hearing.  (2T)  The first page of the plea form states that the “max” sentence [...] can receive is 10 years.  (Da 18)  The “no” box is checked on the plea form for the question “Did you enter a plea of guilty to any charges that require a mandatory period of parole ineligibility or a mandatory extended term.”  (Da 20 (emphasis in original))  Thus, this plea was for an ordinary-term sentence on a second-degree offense: five to ten years in prison.  The State’s belated remark at sentencing does not change the fact that this plea was for an ordinary rather than extended-term sentence.
[brief] Conclusion  For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter summary judgement in favor of [...], or remand the matter to properly consider the expert and factual testimony on the reasonableness of search and calculations demanded of a reasonably prudent buyer on the issues or record/constructive notice.  Respectfully submitted, By: s/ [...]  [...], Esquire NJ  Attorney ID: 071372013  [...]  [...]  TEL: [...]  FAX: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Ernest [...] and [...]