ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Neither the ALJ’s determination nor the Board’s final agency decision made a finding on the substance of subsection (b).  In fact, at no point did the Board or [...] perform any analysis under subsection (b), N.J.S.A 43:15A-7.2(b)—as acknowledged by [...] in his brief.  (Pb8).  That is because subsection (b) is irrelevant to the issuance of a professional services contract under subsection (a).  Subsection (b) of Chapter 92 simply restates what has always been the case—dependent contractors are not eligible for PERS (or any retirement system) credit because they are not employees.  Whether or not [...] is an independent contractor or not has no bearing on the Board’s determination because it did not find him to be an independent contractor for purposes of subsection (b).  (Pa162-165).  All of [...]’s legal arguments on appeal addresses subsection (b) (Pb12-20).  Again, any claims related to subsection (b) are not germane to any issues in this appeal and should not be considered by this court because the sole reason for the Board’s denial of [...]’s request for continued membership in PERS was based on subsection (a).
[brief] [...] also filed exhaustive contentions setting forth their position which stated:  This loss occurred on 7/24/18.  [...] has filed this arbitration demand on behalf of [...] seeking $10,000.00 in Medical Expenses.  The [...] Garden State Insurance Company is a Personal policy issued to [...] with Policy Form 9611 D NJ (02/16), effective Dates 3/12/18 -- 9/12/18 with 100/300 Liability coverage.  There is a 250 K PIP Endorsement on the policy.  A bodily injury lawsuit has been filed on behalf of [...].  The lawsuit is pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County and is assigned Docket number [...].  Identified as a defendant is [...], who is insured by [...] Garden State Insurance Company.  PIP subrogation is permissible under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 and a recent amendment to the statute prohibits any claim of PIP subrogation from going forward when there is a pending bodily injury claim as both are payable out of the insured's bodily injury liability limits.
[brief] Homicide Facts:  On July 27, 2003, at around 11:35 a.m., officers from the [...] responded to [...] on a report of a domestic violence/homicide call.  (Pa6).  There, officers discovered the body of [...] on the floor of the basement bedroom.  Ibid.  There were numerous lacerations on her body, the floor was covered in blood, and a broken knife was found close to her.  Ibid.  Emergency services from [...] were dispatched to the scene, and Ms. Morales was pronounced dead at 1:29 p.m.  Ibid.  Statements taken from residents/family members detailed how Ms. Morales lived in the basement apartment with defendant, who is her common-law husband.  (Pa7).  They indicated that defendant had spent the night and morning drinking outside the apartment.  Ibid.  At around 6:00 a.m., witnesses heard the defendant and victim arguing loudly about financial problems.  Ibid.  ---  This Motion for Leave to Appeal is from a Motion to Suppress defendant’s statement to law enforcement and, thus, “Statement of Facts” section has been divided into two parts: (1) the facts of the crime that the State intends to prove at trial, but for which testimony has not been elicited, and (2) the facts relating to defendant’s statement to police, which is the issue on appeal.
[brief] There was no fingerprint evidence relating to the robbery at the Ramada, so this argument pertains solely to the Econo Lodge robbery.  One of the State's fingerprint experts, [...], described AFIS as “a machine [that] gives law enforcement a list of candidates [for a fingerprint match] that we go through and look at systematically. ”  Finnimore did not testify that he made any use of the data generated by AFIS other than to identify defendant's fingerprints, together with the fingerprints of nineteen other individuals, as one of the group of possible matches for the latent fingerprints found behind the counter of the front desk at the Econo Lodge.  Finnimore's opinion that defendant was the source of that latent fingerprint was based solely on his comparison of the features of that fingerprint with those of defendant's fingerprint.  The State's other fingerprint expert, [...], did not refer to AFIS at all in his direct examination in which he expressed the opinion that defendant was the source of the latent fingerprint found at the Econo Lodge.  AFIS was mentioned for the first time during defense counsel's cross-examination.  Furman testified that he did not make any direct use of the AFIS report because he was simply asked to verify a prior examiner's identification of defendant as the source of the latent fingerprint.  Consequently, once he confirmed that that fingerprint belonged to defendant, he did not examine the other nineteen fingerprints identified by AFIS.  Thus, the AFIS preliminary fingerprint screening did not play a significant role in the expert opinions provided by the State's fingerprint experts.
[brief] A trial court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is subject to de novo review.  Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021).  Under that standard, while “[a] reviewing court must examine the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, giving the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference of fact[,]” dismissal is appropriate “if the complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will not give rise to such a claim. ”  Ibid. (cleaned up).  Here, the trial court below correctly dismissed [...]'s common law torts claims against the State Defendants under counts I through IX, including [...]’s slander and libel claims, because those tort claims were subject to the TCA’s procedural requirements and he failed to comply with its statutory notice provisions.
[brief] (Pa17-Pa18; Pa25-Pa32; 1T5:4-7:4).  The Trial Court denied these motions.  (1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13; 2T40:10-18).  The denial of these motions forced the plaintiff to have to address the evidence with her witnesses and resulted in the unrelated evidence being repeatedly broadcast before the jury.  This began with opening statements where plaintiff’s counsel had to note that the jury would hear that the plaintiff had peripheral neuropathy and gets numbness and tingling in her legs.
[brief] Pb14.  However, the court never discussed whether waiver was mandated, and describing something as “properly the subject of a waiver,” after noting “‘minor or inconsequential discrepancies and technical omissions can be the subject of waiver” says no more than that the defect is waivable.  2014 WL 2131662, *6-7 (quoting Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 314 (1994)) (Da461).  ([...]) was not a legal requirement for performing the contract in question.
[brief] At trial, [...] presented a video produced by its expert, who filmed himself driving a vehicle with the alleged defect to establish that the vehicle remained operable and, thus, was not the cause of the crash.  *Id.* at 122-23.  In considering whether the video was properly authenticated, this Court wrote:  Authentication of motion pictures ordinarily includes (1) evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the taking of the film; (2) the manner and circumstances surrounding the development of the film; (3) evidence in regard to the projection of the film; and (4) testimony by a person present at the time the motion pictures were taken that the pictures accurately depict the events as he saw them when they occurred.  *[Id.* at 125.]  Notwithstanding that not all of these factors were met, this Court held that the video was properly authenticated because the expert testified that he created the video, he was subject to cross-examination, and no technical objections to the film were raised.  *Id.* at 125-26.²  In *State v. Bunting*, 187 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 1983), this Court considered the admission into evidence of surveillance footage as substantive proof of a crime.
[directive] Another exception exists where a person, acting at the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer, gives prior consent to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication and is a party to the communication.  This "consensual intercept" can only be made after the Attorney General or a County Prosecutor, or their designee, approves it.  7.9.4  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4b, a law enforcement officer may intercept and record a wire or oral communication using a body transmitter if that officer is a party to the communication or where another officer who is a party requests or requires that such interception be made.
[brief] It’s just not possible.  (2T40-15 to  Immediately following the defense opening, plaintiff’s counsel asked to be heard by the Court out of the presence of the jury.  [...]:  Judge, I just want to revisit the issue of the remedial, Judge, based upon what [...] has presented to the jury.  He’s presented to the jury that this floor is perfect in many ways as far as slip and fall.  Absolutely, it cannot happen.  Well, that wasn’t the opinion - - that wasn’t the opinion of their employee, [...], who came to the floor at the time it happened.  She wasn’t asked to mop it up.  She wasn’t asked to put up a sign that said be careful, this is slippery.  On her own, [...] mopped up the floor, put a sign there that said - - (2T41-14 to 24).  The Court responded to plaintiff’s request:  THE COURT:  I understand - - I understand what your - - what your indication is.  You want me to revisit the issue yesterday with respect to the remedial efforts because their expert is going to testify that the slip proof - - that the floors were slip proof, yet, yet, the employee mopped the floor for some purpose.  [...]: And put up a sign saying this is a slippery -- this is a slipper slope here.  That’s why I wanted the sign here.  THE COURT: Okay.  [...]: We, - - Judge it’s a subsequent remedial measure and the sign does not say this is a slipper floor, watch out here.  THE COURT:  Okay.  Counsel, I - - I was fairly clear on the record yesterday.  I do find it to be a subsequent remedial --- 4  Indeed, the defense argument that it is just not possible to fall on the floor undermines both the court and defense counsel’s position that defendant’s actions in mopping the puddles and placing the slip hazard sign are actually remedial measures under Evid. Rule 407. measure.
[brief] S.S., 229 N.J. at 383.  However, officers are not required to accept "any words or conduct, no matter how ambiguous, as a conclusive indication that a suspect desires to terminate questioning."  *Bey*, 112 N.J. at 136-37.  Thus, our courts use a "totality of the circumstances approach that focuses on the reasonable interpretation of [the] defendant's words and behaviors" to determine if he invoked his right to remain silent.
[directive] On June 30, 2022, [...] signed into law 2022, 43, which L. c. amended the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) (originally adopted as 2014, L. c. 31) to address specific Graves Act offenses.  In response to that enactment, which was effective immediately, the Supreme Court has adopted amendments to Rule 3:4A(b)(5) and updates to the Decision-Making Framework (DMF) that serves as the basis for the Pretrial Services recommendation issued in each case pursuant to CJRA.  This Directive describes the changes to the statute and the court rule and promulgates the revised DMF.  L. 2022, requires Pretrial Services to recommend no release when a 43 c. defendant has been charged with specific Graves Act offenses.  The legislation also of establishes that a pretrial recommendation no release for specific Graves Act offenses may constitute prima facie evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of if release the court finds probable cause to believe that a defendant committed such offenses.  The court rule amendment and the revisions to the DMF conform to those statutory revisions.  ADA ENSURING TO DOOR
[brief] Rather, it argued that such payments were permitted by the LRHL, irrespective of the absence of any nexus, based upon the statutory authority of the redevelopment agency to “negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity.  (Pa123 to Pa130).  Such payments, [...] maintained, are lawful “regardless of whether the $2 million or the City’s use of such funds has any nexus or relationship with the redevelopment itself. ” (Pa126; see also Pa127).  In the 60 paragraphs of its Statement of Material Undisputed Facts, [...] does not include a single assertion that there was a nexus between its project and the $2,000,000 payment.  (Pa108 to Pa119).  The City also argued that there was no need to establish a nexus between the $2,000,000 payment and the [...] project:  A.  The Clear And Unambiguous Language Of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) Establishes That The City Was Authorized To Collect The Redevelopment Payment And To Do So Without Establishing A Rational Nexus Between The Use Of The Redevelopment Payment And A Specific Redevelopment Project.
[brief] Comer, 249 N.J. at 407.  The court was required to credit this presumption and assign mitigation to factor 1 accordingly.  The court did not do this.  Instead, it relied upon the nature of the incident to find that [...]’s actions as a teen were not influenced by immaturity at all:  “You can’t get away from the underlying things that happened because they tell you about the people who did it.  This was not impetuousness of youth or just, you know, not understanding. ”  (5T77-4 to 8)  The court noted that the boys had time to flee in the 45-minute period between the two shootings, and concluded:  “Who does that?  That’s not youthful not understanding.  That’s something different. ”  (5T78-1 to 10)  The court ultimately held that the incident “was not motivated by outside influences nor was it the impetuousness of youth.  This was just plain evil. ”  (5T88-7 to 9)  The court made no reference to the expert findings that [...] was uniquely immature.  Nor did it acknowledge the presumption that youth is afforded mitigation, or find that the State overcame that presumption with the requisite expert psychological findings.  As for the second component of Miller factor 1, courts must shift their focus to the maturity of the juvenile offender now that he is an adult.
[directive] Local Law Enforcement Agencies Distribution  Town #I xxxxx.xx Town #2 xxxxx.xx Town #5 xxxxx.xx Town #6 xxxxx.xx #7 Town xxxxx.xx #8 Town 0.00 Town xxxxx.xx #9 #I0 Town XxxXX.XX xxxxx.xx  Sheriffs Office County Police xxxxx .xx Bridge Police xxxxx.xx  Park Police 0.00  College Police xxxxx.xx  Total Law Enforcement Distribution xxxxxxxx.xx
[brief] Additionally, Plaintiff argues that it took the litigation to obtain information relative to [...] to which he was entitled pursuant to the Operating Agreement and the LLC Act.  The argument Defendant kept information from him --- 2 Defendant also sought the cost of suit in each of her prayers for relief.  (keeping in mind the testimony showed Plaintiff had full access to the financial records at all times; that the various tax filings had been extended, deadline-wise, and which were not available until around the time of the [...]’s sale to [...]; and that there was no evidence that Plaintiff was in fact barred by Defendant from communicating with the accountant) fails; the jury decided, based on the evidence, otherwise.  Plaintiff cannot now attempt to support his argument on allegations the jury flat-out rejected.  Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts, “…Defendant should not be deemed the prevailing party for the purpose of fee shifting under the Operating Agreement.  To hold otherwise would unfairly penalize Plaintiff for seeking to enforce his contractual and statutory rights, and reward Defendant for withholding this information from Plaintiff until he sued her. ” (Plf.’s Brief at 40-41).  This statement is contrary to the verdict and completely ignores the fact that Defendant had been dragged through three years of litigation and the expenses associated with the same.
[brief] As discussed, [...] and [...] both admit Plaintiff had multiple recognized risk factors that explain her injuries besides the phantom silicone particulate.  Neither expert did any work to reliably rule out the many alternate causes they acknowledge.  Plaintiff does not even try to defend [...]’ opinion, arguing only that Dr. [...] ruled out the alternate causes.  (Opp 46)  But Dr. [...] fails to provide the “why and wherefore” for his net opinion, such as the tests, data, scientific methods, and analysis used to rule out other specific causes.  The pages of Dr. [...]’s deposition Plaintiff cites discuss only his belief that the Ozurdex® was more likely the cause than Plaintiff’s prior eye surgeries and procedures based solely on its “temporal relationship” to her injuries.  (Da0150, pp. 82-83)  But mere temporal relationship is insufficient to establish causation and survive summary judgment.  E.g., Nicholson v. Bloomin Brands, Inc., 2018 WL 3614355, at *5-6 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 30, 2018); Moody v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 2006 WL 6872309, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2006) (collecting cases).  Nor does that temporal relationship rule out the other recognized risk factors, including Plaintiff’s serious underlying inflammatory eye condition, decades-long smoking history, silicone-coated Retisert® implant, and the injection procedure itself.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] “After that, the Court did include witness – the Clawans charge, a witness – failure of the State to produce specifically as it pertains to [...]. ”  (14T 81-6 to 9)  When a more formal charge conference was conducted on November 1st, defense counsel requested a Clawans instruction based on the State’s decision not to present [...], which would have allowed the jury to infer that the State chose not to call him because he would have testified unfavorably for the State.
[brief] A majority representative of public employees in an appropriate unit shall be entitled to act for and to negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit and shall be responsible for representing the interest of all such employees without discrimination and without regard to employee organization membership.  Proposed new rules or modifications of existing rules governing working conditions shall be negotiated with the majority representative before they are established.  In addition, the majority representative and designated representatives of the public employer shall meet at reasonable times and negotiate in good faith with respect to grievances, disciplinary disputes, and other terms and conditions of employment.  Nothing herein shall be construed as permitting negotiation of the standards or criteria for employee performance.[Emphasis added].
[brief] The trial court below in this matter did not – and could not – hold that Defendants were precluded from raising the issue of valid public use because of the decision in *White Road, HOA*.  Nor did the court below here specifically rely on the decision in *White Road, HOA* to find there was a public use.  In the court’s October 20, 2023 oral opinion, the court referred to the proposed Developer of the religious institution’s reasoning for preferring Defendants’ properties to be the preferred location of the development, but that did not mean Defendants were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from asserting their argument.  (*See* 1T15-1 to 7; 24-5 to 12).  The trial court merely said it did not find Defendants’ argument “persuasive. ” (1T24-9 to 12).  Thus, collateral estoppel is not a valid reason to reject Defendants’ argument on appeal.  Defendants are not barred from challenging the Township’s proof of a valid public use for the condemnation.  POINT IV
[brief] Highly relevant and applicable is Rule 3:21-5, which governs the mandatory procedure following the conclusion of a criminal trial.  “The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.  . .  If the defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged judgment shall be entered accordingly.  The Criminal Division Manager shall forward a copy of the judgment forthwith to all parties and their counsel. ”  Accordingly, not only are trial courts required to enter judgments by Rule, but the State of New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts clearly directs and mandates standard forms to maintain uniformity across all vicinages (Pa105-107).  It is undisputed that the [...] followed precisely the correct procedure after the criminal trial concluded in the Appellant’s criminal case.  The Superior Court was required to take one more procedural step at the conclusion of the Appellant’s criminal trial, which was to memorialize its decision in writing pursuant to Rule 3:21-5.  Accordingly, the termination of the criminal proceeding did not occur – under any plain language interpretation of that term – until the judgment of acquittal was entered.  The trial court’s glaring failure to consider fundamental New Jersey criminal procedure in deciding the date of the favorable termination of the criminal proceeding occurred was erroneous and constitutes reversible error.