ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] GPS technology is also familiar to the general public, who use it for purposes similar to those for which the [...] uses its Pocket Cop device — tracking one's location.  Although a user may not understand precisely how a GPS device works, the same is true for other commonly used devices such as clocks, scales, and thermometers.  The general public has a common sense understanding of what information the device conveys — time, weight, temperature — and of the margin of error to which such devices are ordinarily subject: a colleague's watch may tell time a minute faster or slower than one's own; the scale at the gym may display a different weight than the scale at home; and a thermometer that estimates child's temperature may give a slightly different answer in a second reading.  In the same way, the general public relies on GPS devices to locate a destination, to ascertain a route to get there from a current location, and to estimate the duration of travel.  The general public is also aware that a GPS device may not be absolutely precise — e.g., a navigation system may tell a driver to turn onto a road just passed, or a ridesharing application may send a car service down the street from the individual who summoned it.  Moreover, any of these devices may be broken or provide erroneous information for reasons that only an expert would explain.  But that does not mean that lay jurors are incapable of comprehending the information provided by the device and its usual margin of error.
[brief] [...] charged that plaintiff had no rightful, lawful interest in the 2004 loan and mortgage and underlying residential property.  [...] sought a judicial declaration that title to the property was vested solely in them, the designation of a valid mortgagee/lender, the elimination of erroneous foreclosure assignments and fees assessed to the loan account, and monetary damages for the false defaults having been declared by plaintiff – which had precluded the Schianos from refinancing the 2004 loan for nearly two decades (until they were finally able to refinance in 2022).  The wrongful 2009 assignment remained in place until the October 2022 refinance that the Schianos obtained.  [...] never ceased paying the loan at the high interest that they could not escape, and thus paid three times over what refinancing earlier would have greatly reduced.  Reversal and remand for a new bench trial is warranted here because [...] violated the Schianos’ right to present their own evidence in support of their quiet title claim.  Directing that plaintiff’s counsel present his witnesses, then granting a directed verdict for plaintiff and determining the Schianos’ (defendants’) quiet title claim without defendants ever being able to present their own testimony and evidence on their own claim (5T-6T; A1172), was fundamental error warranting reversal and remand for a new trial here on appeal, cf. Poland v. Parsekian, 81 N.J. Super. 395, 400 (App. Div. 1963) (motion for dismissal made at close of plaintiff’s case admits truth of plaintiff’s evidence and every inference of fact that can be legitimately drawn therefrom which is favorable to the plaintiff, and denies only its sufficiency in law); Melone v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 18 N.J. 163, 170 (1955) (same).
[brief] SAT BELOW: HON.  [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, [...]; [...], individually as per quod claimant and as guardian ad litem for minor plaintiffs, [...] and [...]’S BRIEF  [...]  A Professional Corporation [...] [...]  OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF: [...], ESQUIRE  (Attorney ID # 02721-2009)  Email: [...]  ON THE BRIEF: [...], ESQ.  (Attorney ID # 410622022)  Email: [...]  Date of Submission: October 9, 2024
[brief] [Pa1, Op. at 12].  2.  Defendant’s Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Benefits application dated November 16, 2014, in which she confirmed she was single and not receiving alimony, in order to obtain medical benefits.  (Pa35)  3.  Defendant’s Delaware Name Change Petition dated August 1, 2017, relying upon the Final Judgment of Divorce.  (Pa58).  4.  Plaintiff’s payment of $57,000 to Defendant’s mother.  (Pa66).  The trial court found, “Paragraph 21 of the PSA also required plaintiff to pay defendant’s mother $57,000.  The court finds this obligation was paid as set forth in P-66 in evidence by check deposited on February 24, 2014. ” (A229, Op. at 39).  In raising due process concerns, Defendant ignores that the Court Rules permit Default Judgment and that those Rules were followed in this case.
[brief] First, if the Court agrees with the State that [...]’ Sworn Statement “was discoverable years earlier by reasonable diligence” (State Br. at 20) and finds that counsel should have raised the issue at trial, [...]’s trial counsel, [...], was ineffective for failing to do so.  Of course, putting the onus on trial counsel in 2008 to search and examine all databases and cataloguing systems for statements made under an alias would be unreasonable.  Second, if the Court agrees with the State that [...]’ Sworn Statement “was known to [[...]] when he filed his first PCR petition on April 28, 2017” (State Br. At 21-22), [...]’s original PCR counsel, [...], was ineffective for failing to raise the issue in the petition.
[brief] (Pa105).  The buffer must include a 10-foot-high sound wall and 10 feet high evergreen trees.  (Pa105).  At a public hearing on the Redevelopment Plan, [...]’s Mayor explained the reason for adopting the Redevelopment Plan, noting that while [...] has been trying to discourage warehouses for years, there has been no interest in office or retail uses within [...] Township in recent years.
[brief] § 230-143.2.  Buffer requirements.  A  When required.  Unless specifically regulated otherwise by this Chapter, a buffer shall be provided wherever a nonresidential zone district abuts any of the “R” Residential zone districts along a side or rear lot line.  B  Location.  The buffer area shall be located in the nonresidential zone district and shall be adjacent to the “R” Residential zone district boundary.  C  Buffer depths.  The minimum depth of the buffer adjacent to the “R” Residential zone district required by §230-143.2.A shall be as set forth in the following table.  The buffer depth shall be measured from and perpendicular to the property line shared with the “R” Residential zone district.  | Zone District | Minimum Buffer Depth (From Side Lot Line) | Minimum Buffer Depth (From Rear Lot Line) | |------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | B-1 | 5 ft | 15 ft | | B-2, B-3, OB-1, OB-1A | 10 ft | 25 ft | | B-4, OB-2A, OB-4, I-2, I-2A | 12 ft | 25 ft | | B-5, OB-3 OB-5, I-1A, I-1B | 25 ft | 25 ft | D.  Buffer design.  All buffers required by §230-143.2.A shall be designed as follows:  (1)  The buffer area shall be used only as a buffer planting strip on which shall be placed evergreen trees, shrubbery, berms, hedges, fencing and/or other suitable elements sufficient to constitute an effective screen.  Buffers shall provide a year-round visual screen to the extent feasible.  (2)  No building or impervious surface shall be permitted within the buffer area.  Grading and earthwork shall not be permitted within the buffer area except to enhance the integrity of the buffer, such as the creation or supplementing of earthen berms, and to enhance stormwater infiltration within the buffer area.  Existing vegetation should be preserved in the buffer area where practical.  (3)  Buffer areas shall be maintained and kept clean of all debris, rubbish, weeds and tall grass.  Any screen planting shall be maintained permanently, and any plant material that does not live shall be replaced within one (1) year or one (1) growing season, provided all landscape plans as approved shall be continually complied with.  (4)  Notwithstanding the foregoing, reasonable areas for easements for utilities, storm drainage pipes or other such infrastructure necessary for the development may be waived, provided that there is no reasonable alternative to locating such utilities, pipes or infrastructure within the buffer area, all as determined by the Planning Board or Board of Adjustment.  (5)  Fences or walls that constitute an effective screen shall be permitted within the required buffer area.
[directive] 7.9.5  Generally, the use of evidence derived from an authorized wiretap is limited to criminal investigations and prosecutions.  Agencies that wish to use wiretap information in a disciplinary proceeding should consult with their County Prosecutor because it may be necessary to obtain a court order to so use it.  7.9.6  The monitoring of 9-1-1 telephone lines is required by law.  Nothing prohibits the monitoring of other telephones used exclusively for agency business if the agency can demonstrate a regulatory scheme or a specific office practice of which employees have knowledge.  In such instances a diminished expectation of privacy exists in the use of these telephones, and monitoring would be acceptable.  7.9.7
[directive] c. or DCJ 4.  For seizures where the county prosecutor the decline file to a forfeiture complaint discontinue forfeiture action, and the a or in or seized funds are not held as evidence a criminal matter covered the the under terms of a settlement agreement, all of seized funds will - to whom be returned the person from the property was seized- - -’r 5.  For seizures where: in a. an attempt return seized funds as outlined accordance to with Section 2:3D-4 above has been unsuccessful; and a claimant has not asserted right over the seized funds or b. a the owner be found; and, cannot c. in the seized funds were originally deposited the DLPS SADA, the funds shall remain for a period of three years from SADA in the - - New 3 02 of Administration Standard Procedure Page: Stace Jersey Forfeitwe Program  Operating the period, of date of the seizure.  At the conclusion the three year the .. DCJ funds shall be disposed of as unclaimed property by the Civil in Remedies and Forfeiture Bureau, accordance with applicable law.
[directive] The Bail Schedules will not apply to those defendants even though monetary bail may be considered.  These Statutes are referenced herein because they refer to bail reduction hearings and the procedures that judges must follow.  This Statute provides that when a person is charged with any of the designated offenses in 2C:35-5.6c, and the person is released from custody on bail or recognizance, or is otherwise issued a summons, the court may, upon application of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney, issue a written restraining N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7 order prohibiting the person from entering the designated area surrounding the place of the alleged offense.  This order shall provide a prohibition on the person Drug Offender Restraining Order Act from entering an area up to 500 feet surrounding the place unless the court rules that a different buffer zone would better effectuate the purposes of this Act.  The court has discretion to permit the person to enter the area during specified times for specified purposes, such as attending school during regular school hours.
[brief] ”  First, the Disciplinary Action Complaint was brought by the [...], which “indicates to [[...]] that an independent agency had investigated the facts and concluded that formal disciplinary proceedings were warranted, a wholly different situation than if there had been a client complaint that had not been evaluated by a Bar regulatory agency. ”  [Id.]  Second, the Disciplinary Action Complaint includes allegations of intentional and dishonest misconduct that “go directly to the heart of a lawyer’s honesty and integrity, which are critical to [...]’s decision as to whether to issue an insurance policy. ”  [Pa446a-447a, ¶ 21; Pa432a, ¶ 34]  [...] also emphasized the significance that the charges involved mishandling funds, “which is a major red flag for [...] in underwriting lawyers’ professional liability coverage. ”  [Id.]  In the context of professional liability insurance, information about a disciplinary complaint filed by the [...] against a prospective insured is critical to the insurer’s evaluation of the risk and is necessarily material.
[brief] The Court Incorrectly Concluded that Section 8(e) Authorized the Sale of Unit 74, which is a Common Element (T1, p. 17 at Ins. 10-15).  In this case, and pursuant to Section 8(e) of the Master Deed, the Developer designated Unit 74 as a common element for the purpose of housing the condominium’s superintendent.  The Developer cannot possibly possess marketable title to Unit 74 because it is a common element that cannot be divided or separated from the other common elements.  See N.J.S.A. 46:8B-6.  Perhaps, more importantly, the Defendants have admitted the Developer lacked marketable title.  See SOMF at 19-20 (Pa41).  In this respect, the trial court erred by concluding that the Developer conveyed marketable title to Unit 74 because the transaction was sanctioned by Section 8(e) of the Master Deed.
[brief] On June 30, 2022, Plaintiffs contracted with [...] for the installation of security monitoring devices.  [Pa3; Pa15–21].  The Contract contained an arbitration provision requiring all disputes arising from the services provided by [...] be heard in arbitration.  [Pa21].  [...], on behalf of the Plaintiffs, signed the Contract and thus agreed to be bound by its terms.  [Pa15].  In October of 2023, Plaintiffs sued [...].  [Pa1-12].  The grounds of their lawsuit are not relevant to this appeal.  What is relevant, however, is that when [...] moved to compel arbitration (per the Contract [...] signed), Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate according to the Contract’s terms.  [Pa220].  Recognizing this obligation, Plaintiffs signed the January Consent Order, which was entered by the Superior Court.  [Pa164–65].  After agreeing to arbitrate under the January Consent Order, however, Plaintiffs balked.  They refused to initiate arbitration.  Ultimately, [...] initiated arbitration, but Plaintiffs refused to participate—despite their agreement under the January Consent Order.  They then moved to vacate the January Consent Order.  [Pa164–65].  When the Superior Court properly denied their motion to vacate, Plaintiffs filed the present appeal.  [Pa262].  That is, Plaintiffs are appealing the June Order denying their motion to vacate—they are not appealing the January Consent Order compelling arbitration.  [Pa262].  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Da96.  We respectfully submit that this does not carry a degree of specificity needed to preempt a field.  Again, preemption rests upon pervasive and comprehensive regulation completely precluding the coexistence of any other regulation.  That is not what we have here.  Rather, we have a removed regulation of a subject that is not even mentioned in law.  The drafters of any regulations regarding noise are at least twice removed from any legislative scheme: (1) first, there must be drafters of a model code; and, (2) then there must be another body, either a local Health Board or a regional Health Commission, adopting this model code.  The code may have many regulations or virtually none.  It might mention noise, or it might not.  In this case the model nuisance code has one short paragraph dealing with noise which, as we will address, is so vague that it may be unenforceable.
[brief] (24T50:10-17)  The heart of plaintiffs’ contract claims was the opinion of their expert, [...], who questioned various transactions in furtherance of their failed fraudulent inducement claims.  The trial court observed that all the questioned transactions could be called “a diversion or misappropriation, or just sloppy bookkeeping. ”  24T33:23-25.  The record fails to establish anything more than sloppy bookkeeping.  A.  The Breach of Contract Claims  There are four essential elements to a breach of contract action: (1) the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms, (2) plaintiffs did what the contract required them to do, (3) defendant did not do what the contract required, and (4) defendant’s breach or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiff.
[brief] ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................. 4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...................................................... 12 POINT I BECAUSE ALL CLAIMS AGAINST DABNEY WERE BASED ON WHAT THE VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT DETERMINED TO HAVE BEEN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND SELF-DEALING, THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY FOUND THAT OHIO CASUALTY APPROPRIATELY CEASED FUNDING OF DABNEY’S DEFENSE AND DENIED ANY DUTY TO INDEMNIFY HIM AGAINST THE FEE AWARDS .......................................................... 12 POINT II BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DABNEY WAS PREMISED ON CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY AND SELF-DEALING, OHIO HAD NO DUTY TO APPEAL ....................... 22 CONCLUSION ................................................................. 27 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens, LLC, | 20 | | 207 N.J. 67 (2011) | | | Acordia Northeast, Inc. v. Thesseus International Asset Fund, NV, Inc., | 15 | | 2003 WL 22057003 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2003) | | | Albion Engineering Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., | 17 | | 779 Fed.Appx. 85 (3rd Cir. 2019) | | | Brillman v. New Eng. Guar. Ins. Co., | 13 | | 2020 VT 16, 211 Vt. 550, 228 A.3d 636 | | | Brown & LaCounte, LLP v. Westport Ins. Corp., | 20 | | 307 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002) | | | Catlin Specialty Ins. Co. v. CBL & Associates Properties, Inc., | 16 | | 2017 WL 4784432 (Del. Sup. Sept. 20, 2017) | | | Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Holmes, Inc.,| 13 | | 2015 VT 52, 199 Vt. 104, 120 A.3d 1160 | | | City of Dillingham v. CH2M Hill N.W., Inc., | 16 | | 873 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1994) | | | Co-operative Ins. Cos. v. Woodward, | 24 | | 45 A.3d 89 (Vt. 2012) | | | Connecticut Indem. Co. v. DER Travel Serv., Inc., | 16 | | 328 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2003)
[brief] 16 State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187 (1985) ...............................................  12 State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009) ..................................................  13 State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424 (2013) ............................................. 11, 12 State v. Rupnick, 125 P.3d 541 (Kan. 2005) .......................................  31 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) .................................................... 42, 47 State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 2005) ............................  13 State v. Ulrich, 265 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div. 1993) ..........................  17 State v. Ulrich, 265 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 304 (1994) .................................................................  17 State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126 (1983) .................................................. 13 State v. White, 305 N.J. 322 (App. Div. 1997) .................................... 18, 24, 27 State v. Williams, 461 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2019), certif. denied, 241 N.J. 92 (2020) ................................................................. 40 State v. Wilson, 618 N.W.2d 513 (S.D. 2000) ..................................... 31 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.1 ................................................................. 18, 19, 21, 24 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.2 ........................................................................... 19 OTHER AUTHORITIES 28 U.S.C. § 636 .................................................................................. 30 Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41 ............................................................................ 30 RULES Rule 1:7-4 .............................................................................................. 9, 10 Rule 3:5-1 ............................................................................................. 11 Rule 3:5-3(a) ....................................................................................... 29 Rule 3:5-5 ............................................................................................. 18 Rule 3:5-7(g) ....................................................................................... 13, 22, 26, 29 Rule 4:49-2 .......................................................................................... 9, 10 TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS 1T refers to the transcript dated June 30, 2022.
[brief] 1T – motion dated 10/22/19 2T – motion dated 12/17/19 3T – motion dated 2/18/20 4T – motion dated 6/4/20 5T – motion dated 7/8/20 6T – motion dated 4/28/21 7T – motion dated 6/2/21  Volume 1 8T – motion dated 6/2/21  Volume 2 9T – motion dated 6/16/21 10T – motion dated 10/18/21 11T – motion dated 3/7/22 12T – motion dated 3/8/22 13T – motion dated 3/9/22 14T – trial dated 3/15/22 15T – trial dated 3/16/22 16T – trial dated 3/17/22 17T – trial dated 3/21/22 18T – trial dated 3/22/22 19T – trial dated 3/23/22 20T – trial dated 3/24/22 21T – trial dated 3/29/22  Volume 1 22T – trial dated 3/29/22  Volume 2 23T – trial dated 3/30/22  Volume 1 24T – trial dated 3/30/22  Volume 2 25T – trial dated 3/31/22 26T – trial dated 4/1/22 27T – trial dated 4/4/22 28T – trial dated 4/18/22 29T – trial dated 4/19/22  Volume 1 30T – trial dated 4/19/22  Volume 2  31T – trial dated 4/20/22 32T – trial dated 4/21/22 33T – trial dated 4/22/22 34T – trial dated 4/25/22 35T – trial dated 4/26/22 36T – sentencing dated 8/26/22 37T – motion to correct sentence dated 9/19/22  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] . .  Although the failure to list arbitration as an affirmative defense is not dispositive of the issue, see, e.g., Spaeth, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 512, 516-17, 959 A.2d 290, it does inform the waiver analysis.  Cole, 215 N.J. at 280-81 (emphasis added).  [...] filed a dispositive motion attacking the merits of [...]’s claims.  “The filing of a dispositive motion is a significant factor demonstrating a submission to the authority of a court to resolve the dispute. ”  Id. at 282.  As in Cole, [...] failed to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense in its Answer, certified that arbitration was not contemplated presently or in the future, and gave no indication of an intent to arbitrate until the Motion was filed.
[brief] [...] testified that "[w]e radioed to our supervisor to let him know what we were seeing . . . he said the team is not ready; they're getting ready to move, but they're not on the move yet.  We need you to detain those two individuals."  (1T26-6 to 12).  [...] testified that the two individuals crossed Park Boulevard and went "onto Langham . . . we watched them make a turn down a alleyway."  (1T26-13 to 23).  [...], wearing his tactical Kevlar vest (with "Police" across the front and back; 1T30-18 to 18), then jumped out of the vehicle and "kind of peeked down the alleyway . . ." and as the two "made a left on Kenwood" he "radioed to the other vehicles in the area that . . . they could proceed down Kenwood to try to stop the individuals."  (1T27-3 to 28-11).  The officers "pulled up on the two individuals, exited their vehicles, identified themselves . . . [and] [...] was apprehend very shortly after the officers jumped out of the vehicles."  (1T28-15 to 22).  [...] testified that defendant "had gotten away from the officers that initially tried to make the arrest and he started heading back down Kenwood . . . where I was on foot as like a failsafe . . . that's where we met each other, in the middle of the street right there."