ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Especially where the Trial Court initially denied summary judgment on Appellant’s claims and correctly ruled (at summary judgment and on reconsideration) that the jury was to decide whether Respondents discriminated and retaliated against Appellant’s co-plaintiff, [...], whose entire case was based upon his complaint that Appellant was sexually harassed.  Furthermore, the Court’s reconsideration ruling provides a new avenue for employers to abdicate their responsibility to investigate and remediate the workplace.  Without making any distinction between any claim (hostile working environment, discrimination, or retaliation), the Trial Court held that, as a matter of law, a state agency and its contractor are immune from liability where the harasser and the victim – who are required to work together to perform all essential functions – are employed by different entities.
[brief] *Id.* at 27.  Just like the policyholder in *Air Master*, [...] has offered this Court no legal authority for requiring the cause of the injury to be discoverable before an injury initially manifests.  And just like the claimant in *St. John*, [...] has not cited to any policy language that supports importing equitable tolling concepts from the statute of limitations to decide when an insurance policy is triggered.  Accordingly, the Court should hold that the date [...] learned his injuries were caused by exposure to mold is irrelevant to when his injuries first manifested for the purposes of determining which policies are triggered.
[brief] Plaintiff sought c variance relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c for combined side yard setback, building height, building coverage, and generator location.  In order to grant such relief, the Board must find that the applicant satisfied the applicable positive criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c(1) or c(2) and the same negative criteria as for a (d) variance.
[brief] Not every tort case, the Court would award attorney fees to a winning party with enhancement of the lodestar fee calculation.\footnote{The lodestar calculation is defined as the number of hours reasonably expended by the attorney, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate."  See Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 316, 661 A.2d 1202 (1995).  Courts usually use this method in setting fee awards in civil rights and discrimination cases, or other fee shifting contexts.  See Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 445, 771 A.2d 1194 (2001).  The policy behind lodestar enhancement calculation of legal fees is to promote the goal of ending civil rights and discrimination violations.
[brief] Id. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 214 (1986)).  Generally, "[u]nder the common law, . . . a landlord is not responsible for injuries caused by [his or her] tenant's dog."  Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian, 320 N.J. Super. 68, 71. 726 A.2d 972 (1999).  Nevertheless, a landlord owes a duty to his or her tenants "to prevent injury from [a] tenant's dog if he [or she] is aware of the presence of the animal on his [or her] property and is also aware of its vicious propensities."  Ibid.; see also Linebaugh v. Hyndman, 213 N.J. Super. 117, 121-22, 516 A.2d 638 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd o.B., 106 N.J. 556, 524 A.2d 1255 (1987).  Simply put, "in the absence of proof that the landlord was aware of the dog's vicious propensities, . . . liability should not be imposed upon the landlord."  Seo. supra, 320 N.J. Super. at 72.
[brief] Specifically, plaintiff presented evidence that [...] lived on one side of the tracks in the general vicinity of the station.  Also, plaintiff’s presented evidence that a jury could conclude [...] was only 100 feet from the top of the stairways leading to the station when the accident occurred.  Plaintiff also presented evidence that the nearest other means of access to the tracks, located at [...] and in the area of [...], were approximately a mile from the site of the accident.  Id. at 153-154.  Plaintiff also presented evidence that twenty-four reports were filed with [...] during the two-year period preceding the accident of trespassing in the area where [...]’s accident occurred.  Id. at 144.  While the merit of the evidence could certainly be argued, there was clearly ample circumstantial evidence to support plaintiff’s claims.
[brief] I.  [...] WAS NOT ENROLLED IN THE CCIP WHEN THE [...]IDENT OCCURRED AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT ENTITLED TO COVERAGE.................................................................23  A.  All CCIP Records Confirm That [...] Was Not Enrolled in The CCIP At the Time of The Accident .........................................................23  B.  [...] Was Performing Excluded Demolition Work on The Date of The Accident ..............................................................................29  II.
[brief] (Aa180).  The ALJ thus concluded that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b)\(^5\) by securing an unwarranted advantage when he sought legal advice from the \(^5\) N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) prohibits school board members from using their official position to secure an unwarranted advantage for themselves, a member of their family, or others.
[brief] The Appellant seeks to have this appellate panel squarely confront the very issue that was sidestepped by the trial court, and now again ignored by the Respondents for a second time in conjunction with this appeal.  As they proceeded before the trial court below, the Respondents again offer nothing of substance in response to the Appellant’s carefully considered and otherwise legally supported arguments.  The Respondents continue to repeat and embrace the trial court’s flawed, erroneous, misplaced, and unsupported analyses, which response really constitutes a surrender as to the merits of this very substantive debate.  The appellate issue is straightforward - when does the cause of action for a claim of malicious prosecution accrue.  More precisely, the issue now before the Appellate Division is whether a criminal proceeding terminates in the defendant’s favor when the trial judge reads an opinion and announces a verdict of not guilty, or is it when the clerk proceeds with the required publishing of the official action – the judgment of acquittal.  It is most respectfully submitted that the Respondents’ failure to substantively answer this seminal question renders this appeal essentially unopposed.
[brief] Appellants have met their burden to show [...]’s arbitration agreement is both procedurally and substantially unconscionable.  The trial court erred when it found the arbitration agreement enforceable.  Much of [...]’s arguments denying unconscionability in response to this appeal are repeated arguments from their original motion and do not change the arguments as to unconscionability Appellants have made in their moving appellate brief, or the need for discovery discussed above.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  When reviewing decisions that have been entrusted to the sound discretion of a trial court, “a reviewing court should uphold the…findings undergirding the trial court’s decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record. ”  Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384 (2010) (quoting MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007)).  A.  [...] did not abuse his discretion in his August 27, 2021, ruling [...]’s decision to deny plaintiffs’ cross-motion to replace [...] as their expert with [...] was not an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Flanzman, supra at 133.  "The NJAA is nearly identical to the FAA and enunciates the same policies favoring arbitration."  Id., citing Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 243 N.J. 147, 167, 233 A.3d 495, 2020 N.J. LEXIS 807 (2020)(internal quotations omitted).  The NJAA was enacted to "advance arbitration as a desirable alternative to litigation and to clarify arbitration procedures in light of the developments of the law in this area."  Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 514 1 (Dec. 9, 2002).  It provides that "[a]n agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."  Id. at 133-134, citing N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(a).  Strong policy principles encourage the use of arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes.  Arbitration is viewed as a desirable alternative to litigation because it is more efficient and flexible and usually less complicated and expensive.  For these reasons, courts are required to place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce their terms.  States are no longer permitted to discriminate against arbitration by, for example, prohibiting outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim.  As such, the FAA and NJAA work to advance arbitration as a desirable option to resolve disputes in light of its many advantages.  The arbitration clause in this case is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.
[brief] *See supra I(b).*  Accordingly, New Jersey law and the MBPA, in particular, must apply here.  New Jersey regularly disregards contractual choice-of-law provisions to enforce State law and critical statutory regimes.  *See Red Roof Franchising, LLC v. Patel*, 877 F.Supp.2d 124, 130 (D.N.J. 2012) (applying the NJFPA despite a Texas choice-of-law provision in the franchise agreement).  In *Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc.*, 208 N.J. Super. 666, 672 (App. Div. 1986), the Appellate Division condemned the possibility that franchisors would utilize choice-of-law provisions to remove “with a stroke of a pen” the “beneficial effect of the franchisee’s state’s remedial legislation.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings Appealed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pb3  Preliminary Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pb3  ¹  On the brief: [...] (#159412016; [...]).  Procedural History ..................................................
[brief] Miscellaneous Rules as to Procedure | Pa 180-186 | | N.J. Ct R. 4:3  Divisions of Court; Commencement and Transfer of Actions | Pa 187-191 | | N.J. Ct R. 4:49  New Trials; Amendment of Judgments | Pa 192-193 | | N.J. Ct R. 4:50  Relief From Judgment or Order | Pa 194 | | N.J. Ct R. 4:69  Actions in Lieu of Prerogative Writs | Pa 195-197 | | N.J.R.E. 201 | Pa 198 | | N.J.R.E. 202 | Pa 199 | | Code of Judicial Conduct | Pa 200-211 | | New Jersey Law Against Discrimination N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.
[brief] (4T27-15 to 22; 4T36-16 to 18; 4T43-24 to 25; 4T79-7 to 18; 4T80-18 to 22; 4T81-17 to 82-8 to 10).  Ring camera footage from around defendant’s home depicted her home around 4:32 p. m., and leaving at 5:15 p.m., in her 2005 red Chrysler Pacifica. (4T89-21 to 91-20; 4T110-15 to 18; 4T113-8 to 114).  A stop-and-hold on defendant’s car was entered into the National Crime Information Center for law enforcement.
[brief] [...] claimed perimortem injuries “in a forensic context, usually [] mean[] it’s got something to do with the death event. ”  (41T:136-10 to 21)  Nonetheless, [...] also conceded that injuries to bone may appear as perimortem even if they occurred within days following a death.  (42T:89-5 to 21)  As an initial matter, the trial court’s decision admitting [...]’s testimony cannot stand because it failed to hold the State to its burden to establish reliability under Frye.
[brief] See also Carr v. Spherion, No. 08–0326, 2009 WL 3064721, at *7 (W.D.La. August 17, 2009)(“[T]he law has… evolved beyond a transparent game of ‘gotcha. ’”); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome, Inc., No. H–97–1026, 2000 WL 345903, at *3 (S.D. Tex.2000)(“The law and this Court abhor a ‘gotcha.
[directive] Dollar Limits for Satisfying Liens to Retain Vehicles for Official Use  Requests to pay liens to retain forfeited vehicles for official use, regardless of the dollar amount, will be entertained by [...] as long as the net equity requirements are satisfied.  However, a detailed memorandum that articulates a justification for the request must accompany any request for payment of a lien in excess of  The maximum amount to be $25,000.  paid will be the lesser of the appraised value or the unpaid loan principal.  Requesting [...] Approval of Lien Payoffs to Retain a C.
[brief] The Supreme Court concluded, “[a]ccordingly, we hold that when no such undisputed facts exist or findings are made, prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose. ”  Ibid.  According to [...], dismissed charges thus may be considered if they are supported by undisputed facts of record or facts found at a hearing.  In State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019), a case outside the PTI context, the Supreme Court ruled that the “consideration of competent evidence presented in support of charges—even if the jury does not go on to convict defendant on those charges—does not raise concerns about drawing inferences from the mere fact that charges had been brought, a practice we found improper in State v. [...]”
[brief] Since 2004, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), as its assignee (collectively, “[...] Defendants”), have been the designated redevelopers for Ford Avenue Redevelopment Area (“Redevelopment Area”).  Over the past two decades, the [...] Defendants as well as the Defendants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] [...] (“[...]”) have worked to complete this project, only to have those efforts impeded, delayed and frustrated by no less than eight litigations asserted by Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and their principal, [...].  This appeal is Plaintiffs’ latest attempt to further obstruct the [...]’s and the [...] Defendants’ construction of affordable housing and the acquisition of public open space.  Here, through baseless procedural attacks, Plaintiffs challenge the [...]’s adoption of an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan for the Redevelopment Area (“Redevelopment Plan”) after the [...] determined the amendment was consistent with the [...]’s Master Plan.  The trial court determined that Plaintiffs’ claims were not supported by the record.  Instead, the trial court found that “substantial credible evidence” in the record, including the long-standing history of Defendants’ efforts to redevelop Plaintiffs’ property, supported the [...]’s determinations regarding, and the [...]’s adoption of, the amended Redevelopment Plan.  Finding the [...]’s and [...]’s actions neither arbitrary nor capricious, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] [...], [...] f/k/a [...] AND [...]  IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S OPENING BRIEF [...]  [...], Esq. (037351989)  [...], Esq. (077482014)  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  One US Bank Plaza St. Louis, Missouri  63101 [...] [...] (Facsimile)  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  One Metropolitan Square  211 North Broadway, Suite 3600  St. Louis, MO 63102-2750 [...] (telephone) [...] (fax)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for defendants  Monsanto Company, Pharmacia LLC f/k/a Monsanto, and Solutia Inc.
[brief] A.  The presumption of validity is inapplicable to [...]’s Ordinance.  [...] incorrectly asserts that its Ordinance is entitled to a presumption of validity.  (Db36).  Where, as here, an ordinance is adopted in the absence of statutory authority or in derogation of a statute, it is not entitled to a presumption of validity.  Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 459 N.J. Super. 458, 489 (App. Div. 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 244 N.J. 75 (2020).  Here, the presumption of validity is inapplicable because state law preempts the Ordinance.  Thus, because the Ordinance was not “duly adopted pursuant to authority delegated by statute[,]” the presumption does not apply.  Dial, Inc. v.  City of Passaic, 443 N.J. Super. 492, 503 (App. Div. 2016).  Not only does the presumption of validity not apply to the Ordinance, [...] has the burden to show that its challenged Ordinance is within an express grant of statutory authority.
[brief] The sole change between the Appellant’s Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint is the replacement of [...] with [...] as the Plaintiff.  Notably, and as confirmed in the First Amended Complaint, “RAP” stands for [...] and [...].  [...] serve as the principals of RAP.  Therefore, no substitution of the Plaintiff would offer a change to the issues present in this case.  Accordingly, the Trial Court was correct to find the proposed substitution unavailing.  Further, the Appellant contended that [...] Phillips had the authority to bind [...], or [...], to the May 2022 Consent Judgment, and therefore the environmental claims were never settled.
[brief] Ibid.  Although New Jersey has not expressly recognized the right to selective invocation of the right to silence during an interrogation, many other jurisdictions have.  See, e.g., Bartley v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Ky. 2014) (collecting cases throughout the country holding that a defendant’s “selective silence” in response to questioning “is protected by the Fifth Amendment” and cannot be used against a defendant at trial.)  Regardless of whether New Jersey recognizes such a right, [...] conditioned his waiver on the promise that he could selectively invoke his right to silence.  The failure to honor that agreement by playing the unredacted statement at trial would render the waiver not knowing and voluntary, requiring suppression of his entire statement.
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................................  3 A. Suppression Hearing .....................................................................................  3 B. Motion Court’s Decision ..............................................................................  7 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................  9  POINT I SUPPRESSION IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE THIRD PARTY VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED DURING A SECRET CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION THAT THE MOTION COURT ENTIRELY IGNORED.  (Da 25-33)  .........................................................................................................................  9 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[brief] In sum, Plaintiff was not seeking privileged testimony or documents from [...]; rather, [...] was directly involved in the negotiations of the PSA, and thereafter took positions on behalf of Defendants regarding the terms and conditions of the PSA, as well as compliance (or non-compliance) therewith over the course of three years as Defendants’ transactional counsel.  (Pa0118, ¶ 7; Pa0123, ¶ 3; Pa0156 at 83:2-20; Pa0161 at 102:4-22.)  Moreover, [...] acknowledged in her sworn deposition testimony that she believes [...] to be the most knowledgeable person on Defendants’ side regarding the terms and conditions of the PSA.  (Pa0123, ¶ 3; Pa0146 at 43:3 to 44:11.)  Defendants raise four (4) unavailing arguments in opposition to Plaintiff’s appeal.
[brief] During these times, the Petitioner lived in other areas of South Jersey.  At separate time periods, Petitioner had lived on his own in Maple Shade and Pleasantville, and also lived with his sister in Galloway.  Respondent testified that she does not remember Petitioner returning to the Home with Decedent until 2009.  While the Petitioner was living in Pleasantville, the Decedent was not in any contact with him.  The Decedent would do drive-byes with the Respondent in the car on many occasions to look at the places [...] was living.  The Respondent heard suspicions from the Decedent about extramarital affairs that [...] was having.  Around 2008 or 2009, the Decedent was aware that [...] was buying gifts for the daughter of a woman from Delaware who was having a baby.  The Decedent was upset about [...]’s extramarital relationships.  (11T74-18 to 78-19).  The Petitioner testified that he lived other places because it made his commute shorter for continuing his education in Delaware, even though it only saved him thirty minutes one-way out of an alleged four-hour commute.  (7T211-16 to 213-7).  While the Petitioner was living with his sister in Galloway, the Petitioner sent Decedent a letter requesting to dissolve their marriage, which states:
[brief] If the Cardmember Agreement and other documents had not been introduced into evidence, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment would have been denied because the Plaintiff submitted no other evidence to prove its claim.  Thus, admission of the Cardmember Agreement and other documents into evidence was not harmless error.  The lower Court mistakenly admitted the Cardmember Agreement and related documents into evidence because the business record exception is inapplicable.  Defendant was denied due process.
[brief] **Plaintiff’s father testified** that he overheard Defendant exclaim, “How long do I have to do this? I cannot do this acting anymore. ”  1T6.  Defendant indicated she could not act any further in the house she shared with Plaintiff following their marriage.  1T7.  Defendant was overheard noting that she needed to wait until 2024; as long as Plaintiff did not initiate a fraud case against her, Defendant would receive her 10-year green card.  1T8.  Plaintiff’s father also overheard Defendant mention receiving a green card and discussing how accusations of abuse in America could help secure a permanent green card.  1T14.  Plaintiff’s father continued to overhear Defendant, over the months, questioning how long she would have to stay with Plaintiff in order to secure the green card.  1T18-19.  Plaintiff’s father overheard Defendant noting that she agreed with Plaintiff while they were in India and before Defendant received her green card, but since returning to the United States and obtaining her green card, she no longer felt the need to do so—her goal had been accomplished.  1T20.  “I used to agree with [...] on everything before the green card, but now that I have the green card, why do I have to agree?  Why will I stay with him if I don’t have to? ”  1T20.  This is significant evidence supporting the annulment that the lower court judge entirely ignored.  **[...]**, a friend of the Plaintiff’s father, testified that she met Defendant when Plaintiff and Defendant visited Canada.  2T6.  Ms. Bhagat overheard Defendant on a phone call stating that she was there for one month and had to leave once her green card arrived.  Ms. Bhagat and her husband decided to speak to [...], Plaintiff’s father, about the matter and did so.  (2T8-9).  **[...]** testified that he overheard Defendant saying, “it’s going to be a matter of months after I move to America. ”  (2T16).  All this testimony was undisputed because the defendant presented no evidence to counter it at trial below.