ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (21T29-4 to 17, 40-9 to 10; 24T177-8 to 178-2; 27T148-5)  At least three of them were present outside room 517 when they knocked on the door.  (21T24-1 to 7, 29-18 to 22)  After knocking, the officers had to wait for around ten minutes for [...] to open the door.  (27T149-19 to 140-13, 152-23)  [...] informed Defendant that he had obtained consent from [...]—the person to whom the room was registered—to search the room.  (27T153-5 to 11; Da136-137)  Defendant was required to leave the hotel room and was not permitted to return.  (21T35-16 to 36-13)  [...] asked Defendant to come back to the [...] for questioning.  (21T31-6 to 7; 27T153-11 to 13)  [...] testified that Defendant was not a suspect (21T24-13 to 16) and if Defendant had told them he did not want to speak with them, they “weren’t going to force him to do so,” but he did not testify that he told this to Defendant.  (21T30-21 to 22)  Police also encountered [...] in the room, a friend of Defendant’s with whom he smoked marijuana; Gonzalez was also brought to the police station for questioning separately from Defendant.
[brief] Historically, when the Court entertains a summary judgment motion, “…the standards of decision governing the granting or denial of Summary Judgment emphasize that a party opposing the Motion is not to be denied a trial unless the moving party sustains the burden of showing clearly the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. ”  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  “It is a movant’s burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of an issue of material fact, and all inferences of doubt are to be drawn against the movant in favor of opponent of the motion.  The papers supporting the motion are closely scrutinized and the opposing papers are indulgently treated. ”  Kugler v. Tiller, 127 N.J. Super. 468, 476 (App. Div. 1974)  “…[S]ummary judgments are to be granted with extreme caution… the moving papers are to be considered most favorably to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment…all doubts are resolved against the person moving for summary judgment. ”  Revulvo v. American Casualty Co., 39 N.J. 490, 492 (1960).  In reviewing the moving papers and papers in opposition, the judge must consider the papers” … most favorably for the party opposing the motion and all doubts are resolved against the movant.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  There is no objective standard for how much similarity is needed for an examiner to find a match.  Rather, “[t]he examiner bases decisions made during the examination upon expertise or the knowledge and beliefs from previous training, experience, understanding, and judgments of his or her own and in collaboration with other scientists. ”  *Id.* at 9-16.  The final step is verification, in which the whole process is repeated by a different examiner.
[brief] .................................................................16  N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Smart Growth, At http://www.state.nj.us/dep/antisprawl (last modified Nov. 14, 2005)  ...........................................................................17  Oliveri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511 (2006)  .........................................................................................29  Riggs v. Long Beach Tp., 109 N.J. 601, 613 (1988)  ...............................................................................15  State v. Buck, 94 N.J. Super. 84, 88 (App. Div. 1967)  ..........................................................15  State of New Jersey v. Totowa Lumber, 96 NJ Super 115, 121 (App. Div. 1967)  ..........................................................15  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)  .......................................................................................31  Twp. of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002)  ...............................................................................18  Wildoner v.  Borough of Ramsey, 316 N.J. Super. 487, 506 (App. Div. 1998)  ......................................................31, 32  STATUTES
[brief] Compare Db at p. 44 with Db at pp. 18-21.  As set forth in argument Point IV.A.ii, infra, this claim is flatly contradicted by the record.  As for the Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff’s counsel misrepresented the evidence concerning [...] receiving emails containing Plaintiff’s complaints of a hostile work environment (See Db at pp. 44-45), this argument amounts to little more than splitting hairs over the definition of an email being “directed” at [...] versus her just being “copied” on it.  In the end, even Defendants’ Counsel admitted [...] received the emails in question.  See 6T at 25:23-26:10.  Considering [...]’s outright denial that Plaintiff made any complaints regarding a hostile work environment based on religion and/or disability (see 5T at 16:5-12), it was entirely appropriate to comment on her receiving those emails (regardless of whether they were directed to her or merely CC’ed) as calling that assertion into question.  Similarly, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s comments regarding the Municipal Alliance Stipend (see Db at p. 46) were a fair comment on [...]’s testimony that while the stipend was originally stopped in early January, that stoppage was only “temporary” at that time and became permanent after she retained counsel was potentially a sign of retaliation.  See 5T, 73:22-74:5.  In fact, Defense Counsel’s assertion that this is distorting the evidence is ridiculous since she essentially admitted during Plaintiff’s cross-examination that the Alliance grant was permanently cut off because Plaintiff filed a law-suit:  Q.  In January of 2018 do you recall receiving an email from Mr. [...], the business administrator about the stipend for the municipal alliance?  A.  The email said for me to stop working on municipal alliance.  Q.  Okay.  Is that all it said?  A.  He said -- it did.  It said -- I don't remember all the details, but I do remember that he asked me to stop working on municipal alliance until further notice.  Q.  Until further notice.  A.  Yes.  Q. Okay.  What did you take that to be permanent?  A.  I never got further notice.  Q.  Well because you instituted a lawsuit -- 4T at 176:22-177:12 (emphases added).  As for Plaintiff’s Counsel’s comments regarding [...]’s logging into Plaintiff’s computer while her mother was sick (see Db at p. 35), this was a fair comment on Plaintiff’s testimony about how for a period of time, she was well known for being fastidious about germ transmission, and during this time, [...] chose to log into her computer and use her phone.  See 4T at 152:17-153:7.  Finally, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s comments regarding the effects of medication (see Db at p. 36) are more than fair comments on Plaintiff’s own testimony regarding her use of medications and the effect they had on her.  See 4T at 150:22-151:9; 198:9-17.  In sum, the Defendants failed to preserve any of the above-referenced objections to Plaintiff’s counsel’s summation at the time of said summation.
[brief] (Pa4, VC at ¶¶ 22-23).  County Counsel, [...], prosecuted the charges and was present, along with the County Administrator, on each of the hearing dates.  (Id. at ¶ 24).  Defendant and both of her counsel were present during the entirety of the hearing.  (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30).  **DECEMBER 20, 2022
[brief] *Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp.*, 200 N.J. 22, 53 (2009).  As the Appellate Division explained:  Even when an individual error or series of errors does not rise to reversible error, when considered in combination, their cumulative effect can cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to require reversal.  When legal errors are manifest that might individually not be of such magnitude to require reversal but which, considered in their aggregate, have caused [a party] to receive less than a fair trial, a new trial is warranted.  *Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Associates, Inc.*, 406 N.J. Super. 32, 52 (App. Div. 2009) (internal citations omitted).  This is because a trial is a dynamic organism that can be desensitized by too much error or too much curative instruction.  *Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Med.*, 312 N.J. Super. 20, 37 (App. Div. 1998).  It is respectfully submitted that each of the errors and improper comments of counsel set forth below constitute reversible error on their own and certainly warrant a new trial when combined because their cumulative effect deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial.  *See: Torres v. Pabon*, 225 N.J. 167, 191 (2016); see also; *Morales-Hurtado v. Reinoso*, 241 N.J. 590, 591-592 (2020).
[brief] Here, [...] was responding to a call that there was a crime in progress occurring inside the [...].  The caller provided a description of the individuals as “black males”.  [...] arrived at the [...] parking lot within minutes having had to travel only \( \frac{1}{2} \) mile to the location.  He was one of the first officers to arrive.  These facts established that [...]’s observations occurred close in time to the crime being committed.  When [...] arrived he observed individuals exiting the building and dispersing in all directions.  It was objectively reasonable to assume that the fight was breaking up as the police were arriving on scene and the individual’s who were dispersing were engaged in the criminal activity.
[directive] Internal affairs shall notify the suspect officer in writing that an internal investigation has been started, unless the nature of the investigation requires secrecy.  The internal affairs investigator should interview the complainant, all witnesses and the subject officer, review relevant reports and documents, and obtain necessary information and materials.  6.3.6  If an officer subject to an administrative investigation has a good-faith basis to question the impartiality or independence of the investigation, then they may report their concerns to the County Prosecutor.  Law enforcement officers employed by a County Prosecutor’s Office or the Division of Criminal Justice may report concerns to the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability (OPIA).  The County Prosecutor may, within their discretion, conduct their own review of the internal affairs investigation and determine whether any further action is warranted, including potential reassignment of the investigation to a different entity.  6.3.7
[directive] The building principal and local superintendent shall be informed as to the identity of any person assigned to an undercover investigation unless there are compelling reasons, as determined by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection B(2)(a) of this Part, not to inform either of these officials.  The building principal and local superintendent, and any other school officials or employees who may be informed as to the identity of the undercover officer, will safeguard the identity of that officer and will not disclose the existence of a contemplated or ongoing undercover school operation to any person.  b.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 424.  Despite the officers’ claims that “blading” is one of the “characteristics of armed individuals,” *id.* at 421, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that [...]’s act of “blading” did not furnish the officers with reasonable suspicion to believe that [...] was armed.  As the Court reasoned, “But how does a person walk away from another (as [...] had the right to do) without turning his or her body to some degree?  Calling a movement that would accompany any walking away ‘blading’ adds nothing to the calculus except a false patina of objectivity. ”  *Ibid.*  As the defendant in *[...]*, [...] and his friends had every right to turn their bodies away from police, particularly as young Black men, a demographic on whom the burden of aggressive and intrusive police action falls disproportionately[.]  . . .  [A]s a practical matter neither society nor our enforcement of the laws is yet color-blind.  There is little doubt that uneven policing may reasonably affect the reaction of certain individuals—including those who are innocent—to law enforcement.  *[United States v. Brown*, 925 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2019)(internal quotation marks, alterations and citations omitted).*]  Thus, the men’s act of turning away when the police car approached cannot reasonably be interpreted as anything more than four Black men expressing their desire to avoid an unnecessary interaction with police.  Therefore, the judge below erroneously relied on the alleged “blading” as a valid basis to believe the four men were armed and dangerous.
[brief] If the intent is to grant a fee interest, other than a mere easement for a public right of passage, that intent must be clearly stated and the use should be unrestricted.  The plats and plans neither envisioned nor described any grant of title or fee or that it was intended as a street for dedication.  Therefore the Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first part of the test within *N.J.S.A.* § 40:55D-53(j).
[brief] Plaintiffs-Appellants [...], [...] and [...]  (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from the trial court’s Order denying their Motion for Default Judgment against [...] (“[...]”).  Included among the facts omitted from Appellants’ 28-page Statement of Facts [Pb7] are the following: (a) Appellants never served [...] with any complaint; (b) [...] was dismissed from the action due to Appellants’ failure to prosecute, and was never reinstated as a party; and (c) default was never entered against [...] pursuant to R. 4:43-1, nor was the entry of default ever requested by Appellants.  Despite the foregoing facts, Appellants nonetheless filed a Motion for Default Judgment against [...], and pushed forward with their motion even after [...] retained counsel and filed opposition.  Appellants now appeal the Order denying their motion.  Prior to filing its opposition, [...]’s counsel delivered to Appellants’ counsel a letter under R. 1:4-8, outlining the many reasons why Appellants’ Motion for Default Judgment was inappropriate - [...] was never served with a complaint, [...] was no longer a party to the action, and Appellants did not comply with the procedures for obtaining a default judgment – and demanding that the motion be withdrawn.  Notwithstanding several follow-up communications and ample time to do so, Appellants did not withdraw their motion.  Accordingly, [...] filed a Cross-Motion for Sanctions with its opposition to Appellants’ Motion for Default Judgment.  The cross-motion was based on the same reasons identified in the R. 1:4-8 letter to Appellants’ counsel demanding withdrawal of the Motion for Default Judgment.  Appellants had no basis for seeking default judgment against a non-party that was never served with anything in this case, and Appellants knew it.  The trial court abused its discretion in denying the Cross-Motion, and that Order should be reversed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State, Off. of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 296 (App. Div. 2017).  Similarly, decisions on sanctions imposed for violating a court order is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge.  Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 300 (2020); Williams v. Am. Auto Logistics, 226 N.J. 117, 128 (2016); Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec., 185 N.J. 100, 115 (2005); State v. Wolfe, 431 N.J. Super. 356, 363 (App. Div. 2013).
[brief] A passion/provocation manslaughter is a murder committed in the heat of passion in response to a provocation.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2).  Passion/provocation manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder and has four elements under Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 411: (1) reasonable, adequate provocation; (2) a lack of cooling-off time; (3) a defendant who, in fact, was provoked to kill; and (4) a defendant who, in fact, did not “cool off” before killing.
[directive] A photo lineup or live lineup must be done.  4.  Method of recording (circle one)  Electronic Written Verbatim Account  Written Detailed Summary (See Instructions)  5.  Name of suspect in procedure: ___________________________________________________________________________  6.  Name of witness viewing procedure: _______________________________________________________________________  7.  Date of birth of witness: _________________________________________________________________________________  8.  Place where procedure is conducted: ______________________________________________________________________  9.  Officer who conducted showup procedure: __________________________________________________________________  10.  Names of other witnesses to procedure____________________________________________________________________  11.
[brief] ..............................................  7  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  While enforcement of an arbitration agreement may not depend on “magic words,” legibility is essential.  Our case law demands a consumer arbitration agreement be stated in plain, clear, and understandable language.  Accordingly, recent decisions have turned not on the presence of specific words or phrases such as “waiver” of “the right to trial by jury” but whether the underlying notions of what is at stake were conveyed.  To analyze that language, this Court has filtered agreements through a sieve, sifting through meaningful details like length, word choice, and consistency while scrutinizing for clear notice and mutual assent.  This ground-level review best appreciates the risks of unknowing and involuntary waiver and is rightfully concerned with practicalities over formalities.  To be frank, the arbitration agreement presented by defendants, [...] and [...] (collectively, [...]) could not be less plain, clear, and understandable.  First, by [...]’s own allegation the agreement was presented to the [...] after their [...]Eats order was made, and after the delivery driver was en route.  Absent an opportunity to even review let alone reject the agreement before entering into the transaction and given the economic and other pressures involved in the purchase of perishable goods a stranger expecting to be tipped was in the act of driving to their home, the lack of true notice and assent is obvious.  And it continues from there.  [...]’s agreement and the sections it directly implicates are roughly 7600 words and swell noncontiguously across seventeen Letter-size pages.  While the length alone is practically absurd, the sections and content within are confusing, contradictory, and difficult to connect.  Ultimately, viewing the agreement through the lens of Atalese, Morgan, and now Ogunyemi, its weak and confusing language is unable to allow for clear and unambiguous waiver of the constitutional rights at stake.  For these reasons, the Order of November 22, 2023 denying [...]’s motion should be affirmed.
[brief] 2  Defense objections to the content of bodycam recordings were overruled.  Although portraying out of court witness statements offered for the truth, the municipal judge found that the recordings were “not hearsay,” rather than finding an exception to the hearsay rule for admissibility.  (See, e.g., 1T.25-13, 1T.27, 1T.36-14, 2T.10-8)
[brief] In addition, the 1892 Agreement was ratified and given legislative force by P. L. 1898, c. 197, p. 458 (“all contracts entered into by the several municipalities with electric light, heat and power companies, in the carrying out of which subways or pole-lines have been erected by such companies, shall be taken to be legal and binding .  . . .”  No such legislative authorization for municipal control was present in *In re Pub. Serv. Elec & Gas Co.*, supra.  4.
[brief] Q.  Now, I want to focus on where you referenced place of employment.  What were you referring to, were you referring to the physical location where the sexual harassment occurred or were you referring to something else?  A.  I think I -- off the top of my head, I don't know, but I think it was in reference to where things happened.  Q.  Where the sexual harassment occurred?  A.  Yeah, I believe so.  Q.  Did she at any point in time ever tell you that she had been -- she had been taken out of that office by her employer and moved somewhere else?  A.  That I don't recall whether -- no, I do not recall that.  Q.  If you knew at the time that you wrote this in August of 2019, if you knew that she was no longer going to be returning to that physical location where the sexual harassment occurred, would you have still authored this note indicating that she shouldn't be returning to that place or would you be comfortable that she was going to be somewhere where there was no sexual harassment occurring.  A.  I think the second, somewhere where no sexual harassment occurred.  (Pa873, [...] deposition transcript, T41:4-T42:5)
[brief] 37–38  [...] et al., Sexual Orientation, Gender Expression and Socioeconomic Status in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, J. Epidem. Cmty. Health (Nov. 2023), https://jech.bmj. com/content/jech/early/2023/11/28/jech-2022-220164.full.pdf .................................................................  39 [...], 2023 LGBTQ+ Youth Report (Aug. 2023), https://reports.hrc.org/2023-lgbtq-youth-report#about-the-study ...  33, 35, 38  [...] et al., [...], *2015 U.S. Transgender Survey* (Dec. 2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf .................................................................35, 36 [...] & [...], *Family Rejection as a Predictor of Suicide Attempts and Substance Misuse Among Transgender and Gender Nonconforming Adults*, 3 LGBT Health 193 (2016) ...........37, 38 [...], Ph.D., et al., [...], *The 2019 National School Climate Survey* (2020), https://www.glsen.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/NSCS19-FullReport-032421-Web_0.pdf .............................................................................. 32 [...], Ph.D., et al., [...], *The 2021 National School Climate Survey* (2022), https://www.glsen.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/NSCS-2021-Full-Report.pdf .................................................................................................. 32–33, 39 [...], *Prevalence of Youth Homelessness and LGBTQ+ Homelessness* (2023), https://nn4youth.org/lgbtq-homeless-youth/ .................................................................................................................. 36 [...], *Issues Impacting LGBTQ Youth: Polling Analysis* (Jan. 2022), https://www.thetrevorproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/TrevorProject_Public1.pdf .............................................
[brief] (9T92:1-17; 9T95:15 to [...] knew both Petitioner and Decedent for more than 40 years socialized with them both every few weeks and observed that they had a "real nice marriage."  (9T90:24-24; 9T110:9-13; 9T108:14-17; 9T92:1-17; 9T110:16-20).  [...] also went to their wedding, attended parties that Decedent hosted for Petitioner, visited them at their home, and [...] contributed to a book of testimonials that Decedent collected for Decedent when he retired.  (9T95:3 to 96:13; 9T110:16 to 112:9).  [...] never observed any type of discord between Decedent and Petitioner.
[brief] Three of the four carriers defended [...]; but, on January 31, 2014, [...] denied all coverage and did not defend [...]’s reopened liability claims.  Following completion of extensive discovery and on the eve of trial, [...] settled with the three insurers who had defended [...] for a total of $2,288,725.  The defending insurers paid allocated shares of the settlement.  Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Griggs v. Bertram*, [...] assigned its rights to coverage under [...]’s policies to [...].
[brief] "First, the writing must be made in the regular course of business.  Second, it must be prepared within a short time of the act, condition or event being described.  Finally, the source of the information and the method and circumstances of the preparation of the writing must justify allowing it into evidence."  *State v. Sweet*, 195 N.J. 357, 370, 949 A.2d 809 (2008) (quoting *State v. Matulewicz*, 101 N.J. 27, 29, 499 A.2d 1363 (1985)), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 934, 129 S. Ct. 2858, 174 L. Ed. 2d 601 (2009). ]  See also *New Century Financial Services, Inc. v. Oughla*, 437 N.J. Super. 299, 326 (App. Div. 2014).  However, such a record cannot be submitted into evidence at trial without any testimony establishing its authenticity: