ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, [...] does not have social media.  [...] informed [...] that he did not have social media.  The State has failed to demonstrate that [...] has, or ever had, social media even though the State has broad subpoena power and this case was presented to this Court more than 18 months after its inception.  Therefore, respectfully, this Court should not find that [...] violated any of the provisions of HRB 84-17, Section C8.  The State has also not proven that [...] violated HRB 84-17, Section C24.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021 (d) officers shall not use deadly force when the use of deadly force creates a substantial risk of injury to innocent persons.  4.4  Force to apprehend a fleeing suspect.  In addition to all of the requirements in Section 4.3, an officer may only use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect in the rare case when the suspect’s escape would create an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or a member of the public if the suspect is not immediately apprehended.
[brief] Boyle, 257 N.J. at 478.  Last, [...] argues that [...] adopted [...]’s interpretation of the contract regarding indemnity for the latter’s own negligence, and that [...] was a sophisticated business that could have retained a different snow-removal contractor if it objected to [...]’s interpretation of the contract.  However, nothing in the statement of material facts in support of either [...]’s motion for summary judgment, Da36-39, or its motion for reconsideration, Da107-108, supports its argument that “[...] Holdings explicitly agreed to assume the burden of indemnifying [...] regarding the circumstances surrounding [...]’s claim. ”  Opp. Br. 26.  The whole purpose of Azurak is to require specificity in indemnity contracts so that the indemnitee expressly understands that it will indemnify the other party for the latter’s own negligence and so that Courts do not have to infer such an obligation from the contract.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 57-58.  Drafting “a clear, unambiguous indemnification provision” that explicitly required indemnification for [...]’s own negligence “would have placed no undue burden” on it.  Id. at 57.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] was subject to a mandatory extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) on the charges of possession with intent to distribute (counts 3 and 4).  N.J.S.A.  2C:43-6(f) requires the imposition of an extended term for defendants who have previously been convicted of certain enumerated drug crimes.  It also includes a mandatory minimum term that “shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court. ”
[brief] \footnote{Further, although not raised by Appellant in its Brief, Appellant cannot bootstrap its lack of a private right of action in a NJCFLA Claim to an NJCFA claim and the NJCFA does not apply to Respondent because Respondent is not engaged in consumer oriented commercial transactions involving the sale of merchandise or services.  \textit{See Henderson v. Hertz Corp.}, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2871, at *14, 2005 WL 4127090 (N.J. App. Div. June 22, 2006) (denying plaintiff’s opportunity to bootstrap a licensing failure into a NJCFA claim); \textit{see also Hoffman v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc.}, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627, at *6, 2008 WL 5245306 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2008) (holding the NJCFA is not intended “to cover the sale of delinquent debt from a commercial lender to a third-party debt collector”); \textit{Gomez v. Foster & Garbus LLP}, 2019 U.S.  Dist. Lexis 183099, at *13-14, 2019 WL 5418090 (D.N.J. Oct 22, 2019) (“the activities of debt buyers, such as [...] and [...] do not fall within the purview of the [NJ]CFA.
[brief] Ibid.  The testimony should also “describe what appears on the recording but … not offer opinions about the content” – e.g., “The ‘individual opened the door with his elbow’ can be allowed if not reasonably disputed; he did so ‘to avoid leaving fingerprints’ cannot” – or offer “inferences or deductions …drawn from other evidence” – e.g., “an investigator who carefully reviewed a video in advance could draw attention to a distinctive shirt or a particular style of car that appear in different frames, which a jury might otherwise overlook.
[directive] Post-Operation Report  Following the termination of every undercover school operation, the county prosecutor or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Statewide Narcotics Task Force shall prepare a post-operation report which shall be transmitted to the Attorney General.  The report shall discuss the results and impact of the operation and any logistical or policy problems which were encountered.  The report shall also include recommendations for improved procedures in dealing with potentially recurring problems.  The county prosecutor or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Statewide Narcotics Task Force shall solicit the comments and recommendations of the building principal and local superintendent, and these comments and recommendations shall be included in the post-operation report.  The contents of a post-operation report shall be publicly disclosed, and a copy shall be provided to the building principal, local and county superintendents and the Commissioner of Education.
[brief] Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court in [...] cited Clausell at all; thus, neither opinion described Clausell as a status quo rule that defendant [...] sought to upset.  State v. [...], 472 N.J. Super. 381 (App. Div. 2022), rev’d, 254 N.J. 558 (2023).  Moreover, in the more than thirty-three years between Clausell and [...], counsel has identified only fourteen total cases in which a witness identified the defendant as the perpetrator for the first time at trial without having previously identified the defendant in an out-of-court identification procedure.
[brief] Da23.  The trial court held that the tinting on the windows was sufficient to obscure officers’ ability to see persons in the interior of the vehicle, calling the tints “a clear violation of N.J.S.A. 39:8-4”.  Da17.  Additionally, the trial court held that defendant’s taillight was broken, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:9-4, and that these violations both provided the officers sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle.  Id.  The trial court found that based on [...]’s observations of defendant hunched over in his seat, as well as defendant’s use of the safety vest to conceal a view of his waistband, there was reasonable and articulable suspicion to ask defendant to step out of the vehicle.  Da21.  The trial court then held that there was reasonable and justifiable suspicion to conduct the pat frisk of defendant, finding that defendant displayed the safety vest in front of his waistband, while he was both inside and outside of the vehicle, in order to obstruct officers’ view of his waistband.  Da23.  The trial court finally found that defendant laid the front of his body against the back of the vehicle to obstruct officers’ view of his waistband.  “As such,” the trial court stated, “. . .this Court finds that . . . officers had a reasonable and justifiable suspicion to conduct a pat frisk of [defendant]”.  Id.  The trial court made these findings after a review of [...] and [...]’s body-worn camera footage.  Id.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
[brief] **F.  The cumulative effect of the numerous sentencing errors warrants reversal and resentencing, which should be held before a different judge**  Individually and cumulatively, the significant sentencing errors resulted in a factually and legally unsupported and excessive sentence and warrant a remand for a new sentencing hearing.  And the rehearing should take place before a different judge.  At the sentencing hearing, [...] branded [...] a liar; engaged in his own fact finding that devalued the jury’s passion/provocation verdicts; and relied on his unwarranted refusal to acknowledge [...]’s expressions of remorse to find aggravating factors (3) and (9) and reject mitigating factors (8) and (9).
[brief] It has long been held that the certificate of the voter who casts an absentee ballot (more recently referred to as vote-by-mail ballots) is a critical component in verifying the authenticity and validity of the ballot.  Nevertheless, Respondent challenges the trial court’s decision to reject the mail-in ballot cast by [...]’s niece, [...], arguing it should have been counted despite the absence of a signed certificate.  In fact, the certificate was not only unsigned, it was entirely blank.  Respondent asks this Court to depart from well-settled law governing mail-in ballots and to create an exception for [...] solely because she is [...]’s niece, while ignoring the numerous other voters whose ballots were also rejected for failure to comply with the vote-by-mail requirements.  There is no legal basis to excuse a voter from the voter certificate requirement, nor is there any justification for exceptions grounded in nepotism.
[brief] Was [...]’s Determination – which, again, is entitled to a presumption of validity – amply supported by the factual record such that it was not arbitrary, capricious, nor contrary to law.  The answer to that question is assuredly yes.  To be sure, reasonable minds can quibble on many of these issues.  [...]’s preference for the status quo is understandable but it is just that – its preference and its preference only.  (emphasis added)  -  The differing preferences and visions are precisely what public debate and dialogue are for.  But [...] cannot overcome the presumption in favor of validity of Municipal actions nor the high bar of demonstrating that [...]’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, nor unsupported by the record.  Accordingly, [...]’s challenge must be rejected.
[brief] Plaintiff’s argument that the Design Guidelines were devoid of mention regarding the type of pavers to be utilized are specious at best in consideration of the facts of the matter.  The home located at [...] was identified as constructed in 1880 which is a “key structure” for purposes of the [...]’s Designation on the National Historic Register of Historic Places.  Further, another key component of that designation is the protected Historic Open Flare Space which is key to [...]’s design and development as an ocean front community in the Historic Designation.  Inappropriate encroachments into the Historic Flare severely compromise the historic designation of [...].  *Nadelson v. Township of Millburn*, 297 N.J. Super 549 (Law Div., Essex 1996) addresses any potential vagueness in design guidelines for a Historic District and Historic Preservation Commission and accepted the Zoning Board as an appropriate body to review the HPC decisions.
[brief] | | 11644-11104 |  Communication between [...] in-house counsel to former board members regarding draft complaint against [...].  RFP 2 seeks specific communications between Plaintiffs and certain third parties, none of which are counsel.  RFP 4 seeks documents relating to the performance administration and termination of the Recompute MOA.  RFP 11 appears to seek communications sent to and from [...] and internal communications regarding the termination of the 2005 Recompute MOA.  These requests do not seek communications with counsel regarding draft complaints related to this lawsuit.  Moreover, RFPs 17-25 request documents regarding specific allegations in the Complaint and not draft complaints in their entirety.  This document is not responsive to [...]'s RFPs 2, 4, 11, 17, 23, 24 or 25.
[brief] As this court recognized, New Jersey courts analyzing discrete employment discrimination claims under the NJLAD have adopted the burden-shifting analytical framework set forth by the ---  10  Although the trial court did not address [...]’s discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and aiding abetting claims in detail at oral argument on Respondents’ motion for reconsideration because it found that [...] was not Respondents’ employee, Respondents address these arguments here in the event this court disagrees with the trial court’s ruling on reconsideration as to [...]’s employment status under the NJLAD.  United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See Grande v. St. Clare’s Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1 17-18 (2017).  Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was performing at a level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) the plaintiff suffered a discrete adverse employment; and (4) plaintiff suffered discrete adverse employment action because of her protected status.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ANALYZE WHETHER ARBITRATION WAS WAIVED AND THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE COMPELLING ARBITRATION WOULD CAUSE THE COPPIS (1T17:15-18:19).  This Court should reverse the trial court’s decision to compel arbitration, as the Respondents have waived any purported right to arbitrate by unfairly benefiting from the [...]' good-faith discovery production prior to filing their motion.  As stated in Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003), “[w]aiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. ”  Our appellate courts have recognized that after the completion of a fact-sensitive inquiry, a court can determine that a party has waived their right to arbitrate.  Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 265, 278 (2013).  In Cole, the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed the Third Circuit’s Hoxworth factors as a point of reference for this fact-specific inquiry.  215 N.J. at 279 (citing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1992)).  These factors are: 1.  Timeliness or lack thereof of a motion to arbitrate; 2.  The degree to which the party seeking to compel arbitration has contested the merits of its opponent’s claims; 3.  Whether that party has informed its adversary of the intention to seek arbitration even if it has not yet filed a motion to stay the district court proceedings; 4.  The extent of its non-merits motion practice; 5. Its assent to the district court’s pretrial orders; and 6.  The extent to which both parties have engaged in discovery.  [Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 926-27 (citations omitted). ]
[brief] (Da152-156).  [...] was not provided with these Findings and Recommendations.  (Da132-133).  On Friday, May 14, 2021, [...] responded to the [...] staff attorney requesting a stay so that he could present evidence on his behalf.  (Da132).  On Monday, May 17, 2021, [...] again emailed the [...] staff attorney regarding his request for a stay of the proceedings.  (Da131).  Finally, on May 17, 2021, the day before the scheduled adjudication, the [...] staff attorney informed [...] that his request for a stay was denied and no further submissions would be accepted.  (Ibid.).  The [...] unanimously voted to accept the May 11, 2021 Findings and Recommendations, and on May 18, 2021, 2021, the [...] entered an Interim Order which found that [...] failed to comply with the March 30, 2021 Interim Order because he failed to provide the responsive records.
[brief] Id. at * 13.  Here, there are no ambiguities in the Award that the Arbitrator needs to clarify or even any identified issues in the contract combination.  Instead, the Union complains that the Arbitrator did not write the actual contract for the parties.  The combination of these contracts is essentially a clerical task as it does not add or subtract rights or change terms for the parties; it is a simple combination of three similar contracts into one.
[directive] Do you understand you will be required to submit to a physical and psychological [Yes] [No] examination at the [...] the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior?  2.  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized [Yes] [No] by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, the judge may sentence you to confinement at the [...] for a program of specialized treatment for your mental condition?
[brief] See *Levin v. Salem Cty.*, 133 N.J. 35, 49 (1993) (“The corollary of the proposition – that we look to effects to determine whether a dangerous condition of property exists – would be that whenever danger exists, so does a dangerous condition of property.  Heretofore, our cases have not taken that approach.  To do so now would require the disapproval of many prior decisions both of this Court and lower courts,” indicating it would not take that step).  The City unequivocally established that the tree looked perfectly healthy to all outward appearances on the day it fell: it had a full, green leafy canopy; there were no dead spots in the canopy; the tree did not show any signs of obvious disease or decay; and there were no dead limbs or leaves lying about its base.  In fact, due to the very large size of the tree, it is clear to any reasonable person that the tree had been growing in place for years without issue.  The undisputed records demonstrate that the tree falling on the date in question was a random and unpredictable event.  As tragic as the consequences might be, this incident is a textbook illustration of an event that the Legislature intended to protect a public entity from being held accountable.
[brief] (b)  A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of a public employee where the public employee is not liable.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-2 (emphasis added).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(d).  A public entity is not exonerated from liability for negligence arising out of acts or omissions of its employees in carrying out their ministerial, rather than discretionary, functions.
[brief] 12  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On March 4, 2023, the [...] charged [...] (hereinafter “Defendant”) with motor vehicle violations of careless driving in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; leaving the scene of an accident in violation N.J.S.A. 39:4-129; and failure to report an accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-130.  On August 3, 2023 (1T), a trial began in [...] before the Honorable [...], J.M.C.  The trial was continued on September 27, 2023 (2T), and November 8, 2023 (3T).  On November 8, 2023, the defendant was found guilty of leaving the scene, and failure to report an accident.  He was found not guilty of careless driving.  The defendant was sentenced to fines and a mandatory six-month driver license suspension which were stayed pending this appeal.  (3T 8-22 to 11-10).  Thereafter, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Law Division on or about November 17, 2023.  (Da 23-24).  After submission of briefs and --- 1 Da refers to Defendant’s Appendix; Db refers to Defendant’s Brief; 1T refers to the transcript dated September 16, 2022; 2T refers to the transcript dated September 30, 2022; 3T refers to the transcript dated May 4, 2023.
[brief] ”  See In re Theokary, 592 F. App’x 102 (3d Cir. 2015).  The standard for determination of fraud upon the court is clear and convincing standard, not beyond reasonable doubt. \(^{34}\)  The Restatement of Torts recognizes that “[a] statement of opinion as to acts not disclosed and not otherwise known to the recipient may” in some circumstances reasonably “be interpreted by him as an implied statement” that the speaker knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming” the opinion, or that he at least knows no facts “incompatible with [the] opinion.
[brief] See generally, NJSA Title 33:1-93.11-20.  Additionally, [...]’s drawn-out explanation of *Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C*, only serves to support [...]’s contention that New York law cannot apply to the brewer-wholesaler relationship in New Jersey.  450 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2017).  While *Fairfax* ultimately applied New York law to dismiss a Civil RICO action—a very different context than here—its choice-of-law analysis and discussion are favorable to [...].  Indeed, all of the language from *Fairfax* that [...] quotes concerning New Jersey public policy and the application of statutory directives to conduct within the State, weighs decidedly in favor of applying the MBPA and State law to [...]’s actions, which transpired in New Jersey.  To conclude otherwise and apply New York law to purely New Jersey-based conduct would raise the very type of Constitutional quagmire and violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause that [...] wrongly contends would result from the application of New Jersey law.
[brief] New Jersey enacted the Debt Adjusters Law in 1960.  L. 1960, c. 177 (then codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:99A-1 to -4).  (Pa121).  That law prohibited and made punishable as a misdemeanor any act or offer to act as a debt adjuster unless the person acting as a debt adjuster fell into a specific statutory exception.  L. 1960, c. 177, § 4 (then codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:99A-4.)  (Pa121).  The Debt Adjusters Act defined a “debt adjuster” as a person who acts or offers to act for a consideration as an intermediary between a debtor and his creditors for the purpose of settling compounding, or in anywise altering the terms of payment of any debts of the debtor; and, to that end, receives money or other property from the debtor, or on behalf of the debtor, for payment to, or distribution among, the creditors of the debtor.  [Pa121.]  The 1960 Debt Adjusters Act exempted from the definition of “debt adjuster” any “attorney-at-law of this State” (Pa121) and, after a 1977 1  Because the Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts are closely related, they are presented together for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[brief] See Caputo v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1997) (a party must receive an unjust benefit (contractual or otherwise) that they were not otherwise entitled to in order to be held liable for unjust enrichment).  The court repeated all of the foregoing errors in denying Defendant’s post-trial motion for reconsideration on these issues.  37T79-7 to 80-14; Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (the Appellate Division reviews a trial judge’s decision on whether to grant or deny a motion for rehearing or reconsideration under R. 4:49-2 (motion to alter or amend a judgment order) for an abuse of discretion.)  For all the foregoing reasons, the trial judge clearly abused its discretion and made errors of law in holding Defendant jointly and severally liable under the Judgment and failing to reconsider its decision.