ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] R. 3:22-12.  Further:  A second or subsequent petition for post-conviction relief shall be dismissed unless: (1) it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2); and (2) it alleges on its face either: (A) that the petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's petition by the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or (B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and the facts underlying the ground for relief, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would raise a reasonable probability that the relief sought would be granted; or (C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on the first or subsequent application for post-conviction relief.  R. 3:22-4.  “[T]he Supreme Court made clear that the late filing of a second or subsequent PCR petition could not be excused in the same manner as the late filing of a first PCR petition. ”  State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 293 (App. Div. 2018).  The Appellate Division has previously held that, …a PCR judge has an independent, non-delegable duty to question the timeliness of the petition, and to require that defendant submit competent evidence to satisfy the standards for relaxing the rule's time restrictions pursuant to Rule 3:22-12.  Absent sufficient competent evidence to satisfy this standard, the court does not have the authority to review the merits of the claim.  State v. Brown, 455 N.J. Super. 460, 470 (App. Div. 2018).  Although the Court in Brown discussed this duty as it relates to an initial PCR, it applies equally to a second petition.  This initial determination is of perhaps even greater significance when addressing a second or subsequent petition because there is no relaxation of the time bar.  As such, if the petition is untimely, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.
[brief] [...] was discovered murdered in her bedroom.  [...], a coworker of the victim, [...], knew defendant as Rebecca’s spouse.  (1T75-1 to 3; 1T77-21 to 78-16; 1T79-14 to 80-17).  On May 16, 2020, Rebecca told Snyme she wanted to leave defendant.  (1T86-23 to 87-6).  At work that day, Rebecca took an angry call from defendant on speaker in front of Snyme about Rebecca leaving defendant.  (1T92-23 to 93-16; 1T94-10 to 19; 1T94-21 to 25; 1T95-16 to 19).  After work, Snyme reached out to Rebecca, but Rebecca never replied.
[directive] In addition, the revised Guidelines authorize a prosecutor to “turn back” a plea offer (i.e., e.g., tender or re-instate a pre- indictment offer notwithstanding that a grand jury has returned an indictment) where the prosecutor determines that there has been a significant change in circumstances to justify “turning back the clock” to a previously tendered plea offer that would otherwise have expired.  See Section 4.10.  It is expected that the authority to reissue an expired plea offer will be used sparingly and must be approved by a designated supervisor.  Furthermore, the revised Guidelines make clear that once a pretrial hearing involving the testimony of witnesses is convened to decide a pretrial motion (such as a motion to suppress evidence), the prosecutor must calculate and tender a final post-indictment offer.
[brief] (Pa1-4)  The matter was heard by the Hon. [...], J.S.C.  (1T)  Judge Rivas found that the DPR’s award was based on substantial evidence and did not --- 3 1T = December 8, 2023 Transcript of Hearings of Summary Judgment Motions. present any basis under the applicable law to disturb the arbitration award.  (1T3:2-12:6)  He granted [...] summary judgment, and the appeal to this Court followed.  (Pa37)  C.  Legal Argument ISSUE I:  THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL.  This claim was brought by Plaintiff under the New Jersey Alternative Procedures for Dispute Resolution Act (“APDRA”), N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -19.
[brief] Forensic evidence is certainly more commonplace now than it was in the past, particularly given that there is now a much wider range of different forensic methods that can be called upon by investigators and legal professionals.  Forensic evidence and results also appear more often in entertainment and news media than they did before the 2009 National Research Council report.  As a result, ordinary people tend to think that the availability of forensic evidence in the information sources they learn from are reflective of real cases—a phenomenon known as the availability heuristic.  [...] & [...], *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*: *Biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of thinking under uncertainty*, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974).  In fact, uncontaminated trace evidence that is high enough quality to submit for analysis is not often obtained from crime scenes and, when it is, is not always useful or admissible.  Forensic testing also takes time (weeks or months, not an hour-long episode as seen on television) and is expensive, so usually only the most serious cases make use of it.  Spellman & Quigley-McBride, *supra*, at 449-50.  Because the true availability of forensic evidence does not mirror people’s expectations, prosecutors worry that jurors would expect forensic evidence in every case before they would render a guilty verdict.
[brief] ENFORCEMENT OF THE MOU ACCOMPLISHES THE VERY GOALS THE PARTIES SET OUT TO ACHIEVE, AND DOES NOT CREATE AN UNFAIR OR ABSURD RESULT.  (Da7-11)..................................................  18  A.  The MOU was not procedurally unconscionable as both parties were sophisticated companies represented by competent counsel.  (Da7-11).  21  B.  The MOU is not substantively unconscionable because the price of the 100% interest in [...] is reflected by its assets as well as its liabilities; thus, Appellants received a fair benefit in their bargain.  (Da9-11).  ...........................................................................................................................................  22  VI.
[directive] Além disso, em determinadas circunstâncias, as condenações por uma primeira, segunda, terceira ou infração subsequente estarão sujeitas à revogação do seu privilégio de registro de veículo motorizado e/ou um período adicional de suspensão da carteira de motorista.  In addition, under certain circumstances, conviction for a first, second, third or subsequent offense could result in revocation of your motor vehicle registration privilege and/or an additional period of your driver’s license suspension.
[brief] Defendant [...]’s Conduct Culminated in an Incident in June 2020.  On June 24, 2020, reacting to a discussion regarding a staffing coordinator’s failure to process certain forms, Defendant [...] emerged from her office visibly upset.  (Pa657 – Pa658).  Defendant [...] exited her office and yelled at [...].  (Pa657).  Defendant [...] directed profanity at him, telling him to “shut the fuck up,” and continued to berate him telling him he was the laughingstock of the hospital.  (Pa657).  Defendant [...] then mocked [...]’s previous complaints about her harassment, stating: “you know what [...], every time you run to [...], you know what they do, they laugh at you.  They [fucking] laugh at you.  I’m sick of it.  I’m sick of it. ”  (Pa657).  Defendant [...]'s behavior was intended to be physically intimidating, as she stood close to [...], with her elbows on his desk and her face inches from his face.  (Pa658).  [...] witnessed the incident and was so uncomfortable she moved to the door.  (Pa657).  [...] then left the room because she was afraid that she might urinate out of fear.  (Pa658).  [...] was shocked by the intensity of the altercation.  (Pa659).  Plaintiff also witnessed the incident and feared that Defendant [...] was going to physically strike [...].  (Pa658).  [...] (who served in the military) testified that the encounter was worse than anything encountered in “boot camp. ” (Pa658).  Following this incident, [...] found it necessary to step away from the office to manage his stress.  (Pa659).  D.
[brief] Further, there is nothing in the record that the RFA or the Evaluation Sheet contemplated a mandatory numeric scoring of applicants by either the Subcommittee, or, importantly, the full [...].  Consistent with the foregoing, on October 11, 2022 counsel for the Borough advised counsel for [...] that the Evaluation Sheets were only meant to direct the Subcommittee’s deliberations, “to be used solely as guidance documents for the . . . Subcommittee . . . as a part of their review to help steer them in their review, evaluation and discussion of the applications.
[directive] Statewide System for Tracking Denials of Gun Permit and Carry Permit Appeals  In 2019, a universal numbering protocol for docketing and tracking appeals was implemented to maintain statewide consistency.  This manual numbering convention will continue until an electronic filing and tracking system is completed.  Appeals from the law enforcement denial to issue firearms purchaser identification cards, permits to purchase a handgun, and permits to carry a handgun should use a similar numbering system.  For example, the first gun permit appeal for Camden County in 2023 should be as follows: GPA - CAM - 001 - 23 (Gun Permit Appeal - county abbreviation - number - year)  In addition, when the court receives an appeal from a gun permit denial, court staff must record, at a minimum, the following information: (1) the applicant’s name; (2) the applicant’s date of birth; (3) the applicant’s SBI number; (4) whether the applicant is a retired law enforcement officer; Directive #14-22 Gun Permit Procedures Page 3 (5) whether the applicant originally applied for a firearms purchase identification card, a permit to purchase a handgun, and/or a carry permit; (6) whether the appeal is for a new or a renewal permit; (7) if an appeal for a renewal permit, the expiration date of the old permit; (8) the law enforcement agency that denied the permit; (9) the date the application was submitted to law enforcement; (10) the date law enforcement denied the permit; (11) the date the appeal was received by the court; (12) if the applicant is requesting a notation on the permit for employment purposes, the type of employment (e.g. armored car, security); (13) the court’s decision; (14) the date of the court’s decision; and (15) the judge’s name.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 40A:12A-7.  While arguably not required given the Board’s prior findings, Ordinance 2022-17 does precisely that.  By doing so, the governing body’s reasons were curative, even if the Board found that the redevelopment plan was inconsistent with the Master Plan.  Although, the Trial Court did find that the redevelopment plan is, in part, inconsistent with the master plan, the Trail Court determined:
[brief] 246 N.J. at 553.  Accordingly, the court held that “where a storm is ongoing . . . [landowners] do not have the absolute duty, and the impossible burden, to keep sidewalks on their property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm. ”  Id. at 557.  However, the Pareja court “also recognize[d] two exceptions that could impose a duty: if the owner's conduct increases the risk, or the danger is pre- existing.
[brief] (Ab15-19; Aa60-78).  In each of those cases, the court remanded for an evidentiary hearing as the agencies relied upon limited or “thin” records and the matters involved factual disputes that controlled the outcome of the final determination.  See F.P., *17-20 (remanding where the agency relied upon a larger record that was not provided to the Commission); T.M., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1283, *12-13 (remanding for more specific factual findings); M.M., 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1086, *8-10 (finding sufficiently specific names, dates, and times for the alleged violation of the State Policy to warrant remand for a hearing to determine credibility); J.L. 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. 292, *6-7 (remanding for agency to provide Appellant proper notice of the specific allegations and opportunity to respond).
[brief] ” (Pa127 Section 1 (page 2).  The entire property owned by the Defendants is on an incline sloped to the sidewalk.  (Pa301).  About a week prior to Plaintiff’s incident, the Defendants properly cleared all snow from the sidewalk in accordance with the North Bergen Ice Removal Ordinance.  (Pa157, Pa127).  There is no ordinance or statute which requires residential homeowners to physically remove snow from their property if their property is sloped downwards towards a public sidewalk to prevent melt and refreeze events.  On February 22, 2021, the day before plaintiff’s fall, snow turning to rain was reported between 12pm and 7pm, totaling .54 inches.  (Pa131, pages 3-4).  Sunset the day before plaintiff’s fall was 5:40pm.  (Pa134).  Sunrise the morning of plaintiff’s fall was 6:39am.  There were no daylight hours in between when the rainfall ended at 7pm on February 22, 2021 and when plaintiff’s fall occurred at 6:07am on February 23, 2021.  (Pa136)  Just after midnight, at 12:53AM on February 23, 2021, there was a special weather bulletin issued by the National Weather Service for Hudson County, which includes North Bergen:  Areas of black ice this morning….  Recent precipitation and snow melt have resulted in wet roadways.  Temperatures are currently above freezing across most locations, but are expected to fall into the upper 20s and lower 30s by day break.  This may result in the development of black ice on any untreated surfaces.  Exercise caution if traveling early this morning.  Another Special Weather Statement was issued at 5:06AM, 90 minutes prior to Plaintiff’s accident:  Areas of black ice this morning…  Recent precipitation and snow melt have resulted in wet roadways.  Temperatures falling into the lower 30’s through sunrise will result in the development of black ice on any untreated surfaces.  Exercise caution if traveling early this morning.  The trigger causing the subject black ice was the overnight freeze which occurred around 12:53am on February 23, 2021.  (Pa136).  Further, due to the temperatures which were above freezing the day before Plaintiff’s fall, it is more than likely that the ice was formed due to rain the day before, which then froze overnight.  (Pa136-138).  The Defendants did not violate any common law duty, standard, code, ordinance or North Bergen’s Municipal Code, which gives homeowners 12 daylight hours to clear snow and ice from abutting sidewalks.
[brief] [...]’s argument that the Court must “utilize a deferential standard of review” when considering [...]’s decision to reject [...]’s bid is misguided because [...] did not make a decision for which this Court can defer.  Indeed, settled law requires a sound business reason for rejecting a bid with a non-material defect (like [...]’s bid here).  There is also no dispute that [...] did not articulate any sound business reason for rejecting [...]’s bid.  Since a sound business reason was required to reject [...]’s bid and no such reason was given by [...], the Court cannot possibly give deference to that unlawful decision.  Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307 (1994)(holding that public entity is without discretion to violate bidding laws); Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135 (2001)(same).
[brief] [...] responds that “[n]othing in the [court’s November 2019] order limits how the City may conduct its ESI responsiveness or privilege review or requires the City to negotiate with Plaintiffs concerning its review method. ” (R. 300, Def.’s Resp. at 4) (emphasis in original).  *3  The court agrees with the City that the November 2019 order did not set forth the review methodology that the City must use to identify responsive ESI.  The order resolved issues regarding the method to be used for collecting and identifying the initial universe of emails.  While the court anticipated that the parties would need to perform multiple keyword searches in order to narrow the universe of emails, it never directed them to do so.  Nor did it suggest that after the searches are performed the City would have to produce the entire batch of documents subject only to a privilege review.  In fact, the court specifically rejected Plaintiffs’ proposal that the City produce all of the documents that hit upon their initial search terms without further review.  While the City may dump all 1.3 million pages of documents on Plaintiffs with an entry of a Rule 502(d) order, it also has the right to perform a review to produce only those documents that are responsive and relevant.  In sum, the City’s responsiveness review is outside the scope of the November 2019 order.
[brief] See Estate of Lasiw by Lasiw v. Pereira, 475 N.J. Super. 378, 404 (App. Div. 2023) (finding trial court’s order to be “overly broad and result[ing] from the judge’s mistaken exercise of discretion” because order would result in the production of irrelevant information); Arena, 201 N.J. Super at 83; Cunningham v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., No. A-1406-05T2, 2006 WL 709059, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 22, 2006) (“We conclude that the trial judge mistakenly exercised his discretion over the management of the discovery proceedings by permitting this unwarranted and irrelevant excursion into the question of whether defendant asserted its defenses in subjective bad faith. ”).
[brief] Perhaps the trial court is suggesting here that I should have been sanctioned for even thinking about bringing the case.  Further, as this Court pointed out in *Bove v. AkPharma Inc.*, 460 N.J. Super. 123 (App.Div. 2019), even though in that case the trial court had performed a “painstaking analysis” of the reasonableness of the requested fee, nonetheless this Court found that the trial court had “erred by awarding sanctions against Bove's counsel, without accounting for the temporal limitation governing such an award”.  This court also held that the defendant’s *Rule 1:4-8* letter lacked the requisite specificity (by failing to specifically mention the “WCA exclusivity bar”).
[brief] On July 20, 2022 [...] and [...] filed a new Complaint.  (Da2533).  The defendants filed an answer with a counterclaim and third party complaint.  (Da497).  Several discovery disputes ensued involving the production of financial records of the named defendant companies and other related entities also controlled by the [...].  The defendants fought “tooth and nail” to limit the scope of what records Plaintiffs were able to access.  (36T 15:23 to 17:6).  Ultimately, the trial court recognized this reticence to produce financial information for what it was—an effort to conceal from Plaintiffs what the defendants had done:
[brief] [...]’s continuous injurious exposure to toxic mold triggered the three [...] policies at issue.  The First Amended Complaint in the underlying case identified water intrusion caused by [...]’s negligence as the source of the toxic mold that had contaminated [...]’s condominium.  Da87-89.  [...] also alleged, and introduced substantial supporting evidence, that he had been injured and that the value of his condominium had been damaged by continuous, but unknown, exposure to toxic mold throughout the coverage period of the [...] policies. Da89-91.  Medical testing evidence produced in the underlying case shows that [...]’s body contained excessive levels of trichothecene, first discovered in 2010 and again in 2014.  Da90-91.  [...]’s expert, [...], questioned the validity of this evidence, focusing on trichothecene and whether or not the species of mold that produces it existed in sufficient quantities in the food [...] consumed to cause the formation of trichothecene mycotoxin.\(^5\) Pb18-22.  Issues regarding trichothecenes were also fully litigated in the underlying action, including whether [...] suffered continuous injuries caused by exposure to toxic mold.  [...] produced scientific evidence showing that, especially in situations involving chronic mold exposure, patients continued to exhibit mold-related illness long after their \(^5\) [...]’s argument at trial that [...] was not injured by mold at all and its argument on this appeal that [...]’s mold-related injuries manifested before inception of [...]’s coverage are plainly – and irreconcilably – inconsistent.  active exposure to toxic mold ended.  Da1609-10.  Similarly, medical evidence was presented in the underlying action regarding the risks of placing food on surfaces that had been contaminated by mold and [...]’s medical expert “did not disagree” with this evidence.  Da1602.  [...] improperly seeks to relitigate this evidence. \(^6\)
[brief] Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, SS 3-5.3 (2023).  At no time did the Board attorney refuse to allow [...]’s attorney to ask questions or present witnesses.  Any inference to the contrary is false.  (1T56 to 1T64; 1T71 to 1T75).  C.  The Environmental Impact Assessment Was Submitted In Accordance With The Ordinance Requirement (Response to Point IC of Appellant’s Brief).
[brief] Da36, ¶ 66.  On February 3, 2023, during a weekly Litigation Department Zoom meeting with all the litigation attorneys present, [...], concealing his plans to terminate the Plaintiff on February 15, 2023, praised Plaintiff for his hard work and commitment to [...] Law and thanked him in the presence of every employee on Zoom for [...] Law for the success the Firm had that month.  Da36, ¶ 67.  On Sunday, February 5, 2023, [...] and [...] continued to conspire, secretly planning to mail letters on February 14, 2023 to all of Plaintiff’s existing clients advising that Plaintiff was no longer with the [...] Law Firm as of February 15, 2023 and soliciting their cases while unethically failing to provide any contact or forwarding information about Plaintiff’s continuing law practice.  On February 5, 2023, Defendants secretly planned to terminate the Plaintiff on February 15, 2023 by hand-delivering a letter to Plaintiff at his residence thereby cutting him off from his Firm email and files and obstructing his ability and capacity to communicate with his clients in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Da36, ¶ 68, with Da104 (2/5/23 email from [...] to [...])
[brief] See Mancini v. Township of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 435-436 (2004); Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 181 (2003); Borough of Princeton v. Mercer Cty, 169 N.J. 135, 157 (2001); Lavin v. Board of Educ. of City of Hackensack, 90 N.J. 145 (1982).
[brief] Relevant evidence is defined as any evidence that has “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  N.J.R.E. 401; see also *State v. Deatore*, 70 N.J. 100, 116 (1976) (stating that test, which “favors admissibility,” nonetheless must include evaluation of evidence's probative value in respect of point in issue).
[brief] The court heard both motions together.  On February 23, 2024, the trial court denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration on the G2G judgment and granted [...]’s motion against [...] on the MCS-90 surety for the amount of $750,000, the limit of the surety.  [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of the MCS-90 judgment, and the motion was denied.  [...] then filed this appeal.
[brief] (4T 223-9 to 14; 5T 42-2 to 10).  Camden County Detective [...] agreed that the airbag of [...]’s car had not been deployed, and that the car bore blood on the front passenger seat and “doorjamb. ” (6T 15-5 to 25).  [...] testified that no damage to the front end had occurred to the silver car, and agreed that the airbags had not been deployed.  (5T 17-17 to 20-7).  Then-Waterford Detective [...] testified that on the following day, he collected the tire iron from the car, at the repair shop to which it had been towed.