ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] State v. [...] ([...]) ([...])  Argued April 26, 2022 -- Decided June 27, 2022  [...], C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.  particular defendant’s  This appeal poses a narrow question: whether a statutory right to a speedy trial was violated.  The issue, though, raises broader concerns linked to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Defendant [...] was arrested on November 11, 2019 in connection with a drive-by shooting in which one person was killed.  A complaint against [...] charged him with conspiracy to commit murder, and the State moved to detain him pending trial.  After a hearing, the trial court found there was probable cause that defendant committed the charged offense and that he had failed to rebut the presumption of detention that offense carries.  The court entered an order of detention on December 23, 2019.  On February 13, 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment charging [...] with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and obstruction.  Defendant maintains his innocence and has stated he intends to go to trial.  At the time of oral argument, his trial had not yet begun.
[directive] County Prosecutors  Upon receipt of public notice, issued by the State Parole Board, of inmates eligible for parole consideration, the County Prosecutor's Office should notify a victim of the inmate's eligibility for parole consideration when the victim is not eligible to submit a victim input registration form to the Parole Board.  Such notice should be provided to the victim within five (5) working days.  Upon receipt of a parole release decision from the State Parole Board, the County Prosecutor's Office should, within five (5) working days, notify those victims who were ineligible to register with the Parole Board of the Board's decision.  (See Appendix A-9.)  The County Prosecutor's Office, upon receiving notice from the Department of Corrections of the escape of an inmate committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections, should inform the victim of the escape by telephone within twenty-four (24) hours.  If there is no telephone access to the victim, the County Prosecutor's Office should contact the appropriate Municipal Police Department in order that the police may inform the victim of the inmate's escape.  Police notification, when necessary, should occur within twenty-four (24) hours.  Upon receipt from the Department of Corrections or the Chief Executive Officer of a County Jail or Juvenile Detention Facility of the projected release date of an inmate due to expiration of sentence, the County Prosecutor's Office should notify the victim of the pending release within five (5) working days.  (See Appendix A-9.)  Upon notification from the Department of Corrections or Chief Executive Officer of a County Jail or Juvenile Detention Facility of the release of any inmate, for any reason other than parole, the County Prosecutor's Office should notify the victim within five (5) working days.  (See Appendix A-9.)  Upon receipt of notification that an inmate has submitted a petition for Executive Clemency, the County Prosecutor's Office should notify the victim of the petition.  (See Appendix A-9.)  II.
[brief] The trial court never found that methods used by [...] to determine the timing of the injuries were “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community.  Instead, the court noted [...]’s resume, including his internships, the selectiveness of the NYU Master’s program he enrolled in, and the fact it was “not his first rodeo. ”  (10T:35-10 to 37-3)  The court described [...]’s method of cleaning, identifying, and reassembling bones.  (10T:37-4 to 38-22)  The court surmised that [...]’s testimony “seems reliable” because “I don’t have anything before me to show me that this type of methodology that he used is not the proper way that forensic anthropologists work.  I mean, this is what he does for a living.  It’s the only thing that he does. ”  (10T:39-17 to 40-11)  The standard for admission of expert testimony does not turn on whether the purported expert does his work “for a living. ”  Instead, it requires that the proponent establish that the methodology used is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community.  J.L.G., 234 N.J. at 281.
[brief] This change indicates that the Legislature no longer sought to require motorists to signal prior to starting a vehicle.  As the State points out, the Legislature amended the Motor Vehicle Code in 1951 with an eye towards bringing New Jersey law into greater conformity with the Uniform Vehicle Code.  (Sb 27)  See State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 445 (2011).  It is noteworthy, then, that the version of the Uniform Vehicle Code in force in 1951 also did not require motorists to signal prior to starting a vehicle.
[brief] Second, because of the ambiguity created by the conflict between the policy language and well-settled state law, the reasonable expectation of the insured that she is entitled to a 6-year limitation period controls.  Finally, in light of the undisputed fact that Respondent [...] made several settlement offers after the 4-year limitations period ended, evidences that even Respondent believed and understood that the 6-year statutory limitations period applied to Appellant’s claim in light of the conflict.  POINT ONE
[brief] 50a.  In the Chancery complaint filed by the [...], they alleged that Brian and [...] contaminated the property and violated the Spill Act.  Hence, they sought an order directing [...] and the [...] to remediate the Property, as they alleged that any sale of the Property absent remediation would create liability on the part of the [...].  [...], however, refused to direct that [...] and the [...] remediate the Property.  [...]’s decision is entitled to collateral estoppel and res judicata effect, because she decided whether there was liability for environmental cleanup and entered a final Order relating to same.  Moreover, [...] expressly ruled in her September 17, 2018 Order that any Spill Act claim asserted by the [...] is barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, because the claim was included in the Chancery complaint.  [...]’s Order itself acts as collateral estoppel on the issue of whether [...]’ claims are barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata.  In short, [...] ruled that the Spill Act claim asserted at Count Two of the present complaint is barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.  All of the claims asserted by [...] in the Complaint below and proposed Amended Complaint are so barred, because [...] did not just narrowly deal with a Spill Act claim—she dealt with the exact claims asserted here, because in the Chancery complaint [...] broadly alleged, as he did in the Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint, that the Property had been damaged. by substantial known and unknown pollution in the form of toxic chemicals and other pollutants.  [...] dealt with such allegation in her final Order of April 8, 2018, and therefore re-litigation of the issue of any alleged pollution of the Property is barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.  This is true regardless of the legal label affixed to any claim based upon such allegation—i.e., violation of the Spill Act, negligence or other claims.
[directive]   If no, continue to 3.  Step  Determine if any current charge is a Graves Act offense subject to an automatic Step 3: recommendation of No Release Recommended pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(f):  − Prohibited weapons and devices – sawed-off shotgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b)) − Unlawful possession of a weapon – machine gun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a)) − Unlawful possession of a weapon – assault firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f)) −  Certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a), 2C:39-7(b)(2) or (3)) o N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a) is only a Graves Act offense if it includes the use or possession of a firearm.  −  Weapons – manu/transport/disp/defacement (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(a), (b), (e), (g))    If yes, the final recommendation is No Release Recommended.
[brief] Plaintiff relies upon Zentz v. Toop, 92 N.J. Super. 105, 115 (App. Div. 1966), affd., 50 N.J. 250 (1967), to argue that the fact that a hazardous condition is able to be seen or may have been previously observed does not relieve a commercial entity of its duty to maintain a safe, hazard free premises.  However, the facts of Zentz differ significantly from the instant matter.  There, the plaintiff tripped and fell on a wire supporting an air conditioning tower while he was working as a contractor on the roof of a commercial property.  Zentz 92 N.J. Super. at 108.  The plaintiff recalled seeing some wires near the air conditioner tower but did not recall seeing the wire that caused him to trip.  Id. at 109.  The Zentz court explained that the fact that a condition is obvious does not always remove all unreasonable danger such as where people would not expect to find the condition where it is or would be distracted or unlikely to see the condition.
[brief] ”  K.S., 220 N.J. at 199.  The dismissed [...] allegations were central to the court’s findings of factor 3C—that [...] possessed the handgun at a time other than his robbery of the [...]—and factor 3A—that his objective in possessing the firearm was a “general objective” to have it on him when committing robberies but not for the specific purpose of the [...] robbery.  At no point during these proceedings was there any hearing where [...] admitted to the [...] robbery, nor is the [...] robbery “supported by undisputed facts of record or facts found at a hearing.
[brief] ”  (Pb1)  Just what additional questions that [...]’s counsel should have asked of the evasive and cantankerous [...] are not clear, as counsel for [...] merely sought to determine what evidence of damages [...] could possibly produce.  But [...]’s evidentiary cupboard was barren.  It is frankly ridiculous to assume that [...] had its in power the ability to compel [...] to conceal relevant evidence of its non-existent damages!  What [...] appears to base this argument upon is that Shallan [...] testified that “I would call [...] and release material as I need it. ”  (4T47:19-20); (Pb12)  This tells us nothing of substance or proof of damages for allegedly procured replacement goods.  [...]’s drawn-out non-effort to provide evidence of the purchase of replacement materials turned out to be the decisive evidentiary “Holy Grail” quest in this case, wherein [...], in its obstinacy, made no serious attempt, even in the compelling face of a Court Order, to either find or obtain sufficient support (likely as a result of its non-existence) for its sought-after remedies.
[brief] (Pa66 to Pa75)  Former [...] employee [...] and current [...] manager [...] testified at their depositions on August 31, 2018 that the ceiling lights in the auditoriums at the [...] theater are sometimes off when they should be on.  (Pa87 to Pa92)  Ms. Puff testified that this problem would occur about once or twice a month and she attributed the problem to “cues not signaling” or “a lack of cues. ”  (Pa80 to Pa86)  Ms. Owen likewise testified that this type of problem involved a “cue issue. ”  Ms. Owen further testified that she determined that the ceiling lights were in working order at the time of the plaintiff’s fall by observing the operation of the ceiling lights in Auditorium 5 during the playback of the movie trailers during the next movie in Auditorium 5.
[brief] [...] was summoned to testify only to facts related to the Witness Tampering.  The jury clearly did not believe her, because they acquitted defendant of that charge.  A charge that derived only from her statements to law enforcement.  Defendant argues that the jury wholly discounted the substance of [...]’s testimony, i.e., that the alleged witness tampering ever happened, but at the same time uncritically accepted her extraneous and unmoored commentary about defendant’s character.  This cannot be.  Defendant won an acquittal on the count he initially sought to sever because the jury flatly reject [...]’s testimony – her entire testimony.  There cannot therefore be a finding that defendant suffered any prejudice from the trial court’s refusal to separate the trials: if they did not believe [...]’s story about the witness tampering, they did not believe her accusations that he used cocaine, was arrested for DWI, or was a Pagan.  It is as if she never testified.  III.
[brief] [...] respectfully submits that new developments in the law, including to the OPRA statute itself and a finalization of a factually similar matter heard by the Appellate Division confirm that the requested documents and/or records in this matter (the e-mail addresses of those who signed up for local alerts) should not be considered public records.  The City respectfully requests that its appeal be granted and the determination of the trial court in ordering the disclosure of the requested information and assessing fees against the City be vacated.
[directive] (a)  A finding that a police officer has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial or insurance matter in their professional or personal life;11  (b)  A pending court complaint or conviction for any criminal, disorderly persons, petty disorderly persons, municipal ordinance or driving while intoxicated matter; (c)  A finding that undermines or contradicts a police officer's educational achievements or qualifications as an expert witness; (d)  A finding of fact by a judicial authority or administrative tribunal that is known to the officer's employing agency that concludes that a police officer intentionally did not tell the truth in a matter; (e) A sustained finding that a police officer intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence; and (f)  A sustained finding that a police officer is biased against a particular gender or ethnic group.  9.10.4
[brief] As our courts have already stated, it was not plain error for the trial court not to charge the jury with an unrequested cooperating witness charge.  Defendant’s final point of contention is one our courts have already addressed.  Defendant asserts that the trial court should have, sua sponte, charged the jury with the model charge on a cooperating co-defendant or witness.  (Db40- 43); see Model Jury Charges (Criminal): Testimony of a Cooperating Co-Defendant or Witness (Revised 2/6/06).  Defendant admits that this was not a charge he ever requested the court to give.  Thus, his argument fails.
[brief] **Pa8.**  As the CSC ruled,  It is settled the extension of a certification disposition due date beyond the expiration date of a list should only be granted to fill current vacancies.  *See In the Matter of [...] and Fire Lieutenant (PM1201T) and Fire Captain (PM1191T), [...] (MSB, decided April 9, 2003); In the Matter of Police Lieutenant (PM1356W), [...] (Commissioner of Personnel, decided December 17, 2002).
[brief] *Ibid.*  That past practice overwhelmingly demonstrated that the parties agreed that [...]’s historical implementation of the contract—using 2,080, 2,088, and 2,096 divisors depending on the number of working days in a fiscal year—was consistent with the 2,080-divisor language in the parenthetical.  *Ibid.*  In fact, since the language first appeared in the parties’ 1987 contract, there have been a mere nine fiscal years with 260 days, but nineteen fiscal years with 261 days, and six fiscal years with 262 days.  (Pa296-97).  Here, as the Arbitrator noted, troopers were paid overtime using a divisor other than 2,080 for twenty-five out of the last thirty-four years since the language first appeared in the contract.  (Pa191-92).  In fact, even though that language first appeared in the contract in 1987, it was not until 1990 that the 2,080 divisor was used because the prior years had more than 260 fiscal days.  (Pa192).  And then it was not until 2019 that [...] first claimed that the contract had been violated.  Ibid.  Put simply, the Arbitrator did not err in finding that the fact that [...] acquiesced to varying divisors for over thirty years, especially in the years immediately after the new contractual language was added, showed that the parties intended the 2,080 divisor to serve as an example, not a mandate, of the mechanical application of the overtime provision.  (Pa191-92).  And the court did not err in accepting the Arbitrator’s analysis.
[brief] . . . [or] hurt the man. ” (7T186-10 to 12).  But after admitting he was in the photo, that he was with [...], and on [...], defendant still continued to deny going into the building despite video of him doing just so.  Again, [...] clarified that he was only asking whether he went into the building, and not whether he assaulted or robbed the victim, yet defendant remained steadfast that he did not.
[brief] 16  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380 (1984) .................................................................  6  Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334 (1977) ..................................................................  14  Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1950) ...........................................  9, 15  Foster v. New Albany Machine & Tool Co., 63 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1960) .......................................  7  In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987) ..................................................................  9  Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997) .................................................................. 10, 15  LVNV Funding, LLC v. DeAngelo, 464 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2020) ..................................... 6, 7  Mancini v. EDS ex rel. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 132 N.J. 330 (1993) .................................................................. 6, 14 Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 1964) .......................................  7 New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018)  .......... 11, 12  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 2011)  .....................................  7  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat’l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 (2001) ..................................................................  9  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) ..................................................................  6 Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 132 N.J. Eq. 398 (1942) ..................................................................................  15  Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141 App. Div. 2007) ..................................................................  7  Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) ....................................................................................................................  8, 9 Rules R. 4:50-1 .................................................................................................................
[brief] As in Samuels, it is “unlikely” that [...] drove defendant to Camden as early as 6:42 a.m., seemingly dropped him off, and then acted as the unaware getaway driver when he picked defendant up one block away one minute after the murder:  [[...]] didn’t just simply drive around haphazardly, and happen to come across the defendant after the shooting.  He knew exactly where he was going, and he knew exactly where to pick him up.  As you saw in the video, the two individuals . . . meet up with the bike, tosses the bike on the side of the road, jumps in the car, and they’re gone.  That’s coordination.  That’s a plan.  That’s intent.
[brief] See id.  Notably, none of these incidents involved [...], [...], a sweeper, or any of the alleged issues cited by Plaintiff and her experts as contributing to the accident (e.g., inadequate lighting, lack of spotters, no assigned dump trucks, no written internal traffic control plans).  See id.  Plaintiff further asserts that [...]’s failure to act regarding [...]’s allegedly unsafe driving practices created a situation that was certain to cause an incident like the July 11, 2014 accident and contributed to the cause of the accident Pa344a.
[brief] First, plaintiff made discrimination claims based on gender and age under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), the equal protection clause of the State Constitution, and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA)(Counts One and Five).  (Pa264-267; Pa273-274).  These will be referred to as the “discrimination claims. ”  Second, [...] made retaliation claims under the LAD, the due process protections of the State Constitution, and the CRA (Counts Two and Six).6  (Pa267-271; Pa275-276).  These will be referred to as the “retaliation claims. ”  Third, [...] claimed his free speech rights were violated (Count Four).  (Pa272-273).  Fourth, plaintiff claimed that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate LAD and his constitutional rights (Counts Three and Seven).  (Pa271-272; Pa276-278).  Appellant does not make any argument that these “conspiracy claims” were improperly dismissed below after the trial court reviewed the issues and dismissed the claims.7 (3T44:2-6).
[brief] Regarding reference to when “the deed has been executed”, execution was ultimately June 8, 2022 according to the subject Deed, recorded June 30, 2022 and August 2, 2022, in --- \(^3\)  This statement that the Receiver “will continue to serve … until” was a unilateral statement versus anything the Receiver as to which the Receiver sought permission.  \(^4\)  On May 27, 2022, the sale was confirmed by the Court and [...] was relieved of his duties as Special Master.  Ca150.  This occurred over opposition by [...] claiming various irregularities, including what precisely was the property being or to be sold.  Ca299.  Camden and Burlington Counties, respectively.  The Receiver, having stated on April 11, 2022 that he would serve until the deed was sent for recording, made no application to the Court in the Law Division Action until June 8, 2023 of the next year, when he filed a Motion to be Discharged.
[brief] For the reasons expressed above the orders of the trial court discharging [...], Esq. as receiver, denying the motions for intervention, and denying the motions for reconsideration should be affirmed.  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...], statutory receiver /s/ [...] BY:______________________________  JOHN L. SLIMM  Dated: May 20, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], AND [...]