ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] was [...]’s Associate Vice President of Post Marketing Quality in 2018.  (Da0579)  Ms. Founds was designated by [...] to testify on its behalf regarding a number of matters of inquiry, including when [...] first became aware that a silicone particulate was being dispensed in Ozurdex implants.  (Pa107)  On June 21, 2018, she testified that [...] became aware that “During a routine manufacturing inspection, a silicone particulate, approximately 300 microns in diameter, was observed in dispensed Ozurdex implants. ”  (Da0581-0582)  [...] admits that any Ozurdex applicator that dispensed a silicone particulate deviated from its own performance standards.  (Pa108-Pa109)  Because of this deviation from its own performance standards, [...] ceased production of Ozurdex.  (Pa108-Pa109)  In 2018, [...] was [...]’s Director of Global Regulatory Affairs.
[directive] Edition  Third Assault, Sexual delivering on focus Directive this with conjunction in today issued being Standards  The approach victim-centered  This manner.  judgmental non and timely a in victims services to includes: priority; top the is safety victim's the ensuring • victim; each of autonomy and choices, integrity, respecting the • information; confidential and privacy victim's the protecting • help; seeking when face may victims some obstacles the to responding and identifying • and assault.
[brief] Rather, he concluded his remarks with: “And with that, I would offer my client for sentencing. ” (19T11-5 to 6).  This is not the advocacy the Supreme Court had in mind in Hess.  Petitioner was entitled to the level of advocacy at his initial sentencing that new counsel provided at re-sentencing.  Such vigorous advocacy at the earliest stages of the sentencing proceedings had a strong capacity influence the result at a time when it most mattered.  The PCR court gave little analysis to this claim, finding that the lack of a sentencing brief had no impact, and further, that the arguments pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing were moot because the court considered mitigating factors at the re-sentencing.  (21T18-11 to 25).  Petitioner urges that he was substantially prejudiced by counsel’s lack of advocacy at the original sentencing hearing, before the court made up its mind to impose a virtual life sentence.  Because petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s lack of advocacy at sentencing, this matter should be remanded for re-sentencing.  Since the sentencing and PCR judges below have already made findings, the matters should be remanded to a different judge.  See State v. Jones, 475 N.J. Super. 520, 534 (App. Div. 2023).  POINT III
[brief] Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A. v. Staffenberg, 419 N.J. Super. 386, 402 (App. Div. 2011).  The Legislature has used the term “excessive” and, specifically, the phrase “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory” in several laws on the books in New Jersey, but with no need to separately define the term each time.  See N.J.S.A. 17:29AA-10, (Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory); N.J.S.A. 17:48C-21 (Commissioner can determine if the rates are excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory); N.J.S.A. 17:29A-7 (initial rating systems) and 17:29A-14 (altered, supplemented, or amended rating systems) also set forth the “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory” standard; N.J.S.A. 17:29A-46 (providing an expedited process that will not produce rates that are excessive, inadequate for the safety and soundness of the insurer, or unfairly discriminatory between risks in the State involving substantially the same hazards and expense elements.
[directive] (Amending Directive 2023-1 Originally Issued on March 13, 2023)  SUBJECT: Amended Directive Establishing Procedures and Guidelines for Law Enforcement Testing, Tracking, Storage, Retention, and Destruction of Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) Kits  Despite multidisciplinary efforts over the past several decades, sexual violence continues to touch the lives of far too many New Jersey residents.  Although our state's law enforcement officers, prosecutors, healthcare providers, and community partners in victim advocacy have all made significant strides in their efforts to eradicate sexual violence, crimes of this nature continue to occur at an alarming rate.  It is well recognized that sexual assault can be one of the most traumatic events an individual may experience.  When a person reaches out for assistance, it is imperative that the response is rapid and coordinated to ensure that victims have access to the medical, investigative, and supportive services they need and deserve.  Collectively, our goals continue to focus on ensuring that victims are heard and perpetrators are held accountable.  The Office of the Attorney General has promulgated the Standards for Providing Services to Victims of Sexual Assault1 (the Standards), that provide guidance for a collaborative multidisciplinary approach utilizing a well-defined Sexual Assault Response Team.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For these reasons, the Board’s decision should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  NJ Attorney ID: 364992021  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel cc: [...], Esq. (via regular and certified mail)  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], Claimant-Appellant, v. [...], [...]
[brief] If This Court Concludes that the Respondents Are Entitled to Residential Property Owner Status, We Respectfully Submit the Trial Court Erroneously Resolved Factual Disputes in Favor of the Movant Requiring the Reversal of the Summary Judgment Order.  (Pa1-Pa10)  Here, we respectfully submit that the Trial Court improperly resolved all material factual disputes in favor of the movant, and then concluded that based upon those facts that the movant/respondent had neither created a new hazard nor had he worsened an existing hazard.  As a result, the Summary Judgment motion below was resolved in favor of the property owner/respondent.  We respectfully submit that New Jersey law requires a different result.  Pursuant to New Jersey’s Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(2)(a):
[brief] U.S. Const. amends.  V, VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e), juries may be instructed on what are called “lesser-included offenses” of those listed in the indictment when there exists a “rational basis” for such an offense.  The principle underlying the lesser-offenses statute is that “no defendant should be convicted of a greater crime or acquitted merely because the jury was precluded from considering a lesser offense. ”  State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 270 (App. Div.) (citations and internal quotations omitted), aff’d as modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2022).  With respect to murder offenses in particular, our Supreme Court has “consistently held that all forms of homicide rationally supported by the evidence, whether they be lesser-included or alternative offenses, should be placed before the jury. ”  State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 530 (1992).  Two such lesser-included offenses of purposeful murder are aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter.  State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 603 (2014).  Although related offenses, each offense has a distinct mens rea element.
[brief] If they are considered, however, it is clear from a review of the record below, as well as the law governing expert testimony, that it was not reversible error for the Trial Court to allow the Borough’s title expert [...] to provide testimony at trial.  One of the central issues in this case was whether certain riparian lands abutting the Property were conveyed through the deeds in a chain of title that extended from 1871 to the present.  While the law requires a court to discern the intent of the parties involved in the deeds of conveyances in the chain of title, there were title issues, including but not limited to the interpretation of metes and bounds descriptions, tidelands maps, the interpretation of ambiguous language in the deeds, and issues regarding riparian rights and grants, where expert testimony would assist the Trial Court’s review of this evidence.  Notably, both parties clearly agreed that the assistance of title expert testimony would assist the Trial Court in this case, as [...] presented testimony from two title experts ([...], an attorney specializing in title law, and [...], a title company consultant) and the Borough presented testimony from one title expert ([...], an attorney with an expertise in title issues).  Just as notably, the Borough’s expert [...] was retained in order to rebut the expert reports prepared by [...]’s experts.  In other words, the Borough only brought an attorney title expert into this case in order to rebut the attorney title expert (as well as the non-attorney title expert) presented by [...].  The decision on whether to admit expert testimony is “remitted to the sound discretion of the trial court.
[brief] Defendants’ motion to limit [...]’s testimony required the trial court to determine whether [...]’s opinions that transactions were made with the intent to harm plaintiffs constituted an inadmissible net opinion.  However, the trial court failed to do so, stating he was “certainly not going to preclude their expert before the trial starts. ”  1T55:10-11.  If he had done so and properly limited the expert’s opinion testimony, a major defect in the proceedings would have been averted.  Defendants do not challenge [...]’s credentials as an expert in the area of accounting and acknowledge “[t]he admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” Townsend, 221 N.J. at 52.
[brief] See US Masters Residential Property (USA) Fund v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 239 N.J. 145, 160 (2019) (“Regardless of an agency’s particular procedure, any agency action must preserve a claimant’s basic procedural due process rights . . .  Among ‘the most important procedural rights in. . . proceedings are adequate notice, a chance to know opposing evidence, and the opportunity to present evidence and argument in response. ’”); Provision of Basic Generation, 205 N.J. 339, 347 (2011) (“. . .administrative agency action, and an agency’s discretionary choice of the procedural mode of action, and valid only when there is compliance with . . . due process requirements. ”); Northwest Cov. Med. Ctr. v. Fishman, 167 N.J. 123, 137 (2001) (“An agency has discretion to choose between rulemaking, adjudication, or an informal disposition in discharging its statutory duty, provided it complies with due process requirements.  . . ”); Gill v. Dept. of Banking, 404 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2008) (“Although courts normally defer to the procedure chosen by an administrative agency in discharging its statutory duty, that procedure remains subject to the strictures of due process. ”); In re Casino Simulcasting Sp. Fund, 398 N.J. Super. 7, 21 (App. Div. 2008).  In the Gill case, the [...] refused to allow the [...] (“[...]”) to intervene in a [...] complaint in which [...] sought copies from the [...] of records that [...] had submitted to that Department.
[brief] So thoroughly persuaded are Appellants, that they almost concede vicarious liability in their merits brief; almost, but not quite.  In the Certification of [...], first filed in connection with Appellants’ opposition to disqualification below, Mr. Earle discusses Appellant [...]’s conduct.  Da310.  According to his Certification, [...] is a principal owner and officer of both [...].  Ibid at ¶1.  While Mr. Earle certifies that he has “followed the litigation with great interest,” he does not certify that he has reviewed all documents and transcripts.  Ibid at ¶ 3.  Indeed, he does not specify in any way what information he is familiar with or what documents he has reviewed, nor does he proffer that his Certification is binding on the [...].  Thus, it is more than a little suspicious when [...] swears “Nothing I have reviewed in the course of this litigation indicates that Mr. [...] intentionally violated company policy, or otherwise intended to cause the accident to occur. ”  As the risk of being pedantic, absent a sworn statement that [...] is familiar with all relevant information, negative inferences based on the unspecified subset of information he is familiar with have no value.  [...] continues, again couching his sworn statement in terms of “nothing [he] ha[s] reviewed.  Ibid at ¶5.  Finally, in a non-committal turn of phrase beloved by the undersigned attorneys, [...] concludes that “there appears to have been a miscommunication. ”  Ibid at ¶6.  Candidly, [...]’s personal opinion about the “appearance” of this case has no probative value here and would not be competent evidence against the [...] at trial.  Respondent asks that the Court review the Certification of [...] closely, as it betrays Appellants’ intentions to mislead the Court regarding vicarious liability.
[brief] To this end, the trial court repeatedly asked Plaintiff’s counsel to show where in the record (i.e. before the discovery end date) did Plaintiff raise the issue that he was deliberately told, on many occasions, to wait until the hospital was sold before he could get paid?  In other words, show the court that Defendants misled Plaintiff into allowing the statute of limitations to expire:  THE COURT:  "[D]id the plaintiff identify in discovery that either [...] and or [...] said to him on many occasions, I know we owe you some money but wait until we sell the hospital?  Did plaintiff identify those type of statements?"  Id. at 7:18-22 (emphasis added).  Unable to point to a single piece of testimony or evidence on the spot, Plaintiff now appeals in the hopes that an off-comment Plaintiff made to [...] days before the closing of the hospital will suffice to address the concerns of the Court.
[brief] Plaintiff reiterates that pursuant to NJSA 59:3-14 (a), willful acts and malicious acts are not covered under the Tort Claims Act.  Pursuant to NJSA 59:3-14 (b):  Nothing in this act shall exonerate a public employee from the full measure of recovery applicable to a person in the private sector if it is established that his conduct was outside the scope of his employment or constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.  The burden is upon the public entity to prove that a specific action was discretionary rather than ministerial (or mandatory) for purposes of the TCA.
[directive] N.J.S.A. See issue. detention pretrial the on bearing Supervisors. of Designation 7.8 shall Justice, Criminal of Division of the Director the and Prosecutor, County  Each general who attorneys deputy or prosecutors assistant supervisor-level more or one designate to pursuant established presumption a overcome to decision the approve to authorized be shall Directive.  this of or 8  7 Section Training.  7.9  Advocacy General's Attorney the cooperation with in Justice, Criminal of Division
[brief] ..........................................................................................................  27  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD “DESIGN” IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BOROUGH OF RUMSON BUILDING HEIGHT ORDINANCE STATING “DESIGNED TO ALLOW INCREASED BUILDING HEIGHT.  (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa14-15)  ..................................  27  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE REVISED LOT GRADE OF THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT WAS THE RESULT OF “MOUNDING, TERRACING, OR OTHER DEVICES” DESIGNED TO ALLOW INCREASED BUILDING HEIGHT.  (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa3-16).  . .33  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE BOARD AND APPLICANT’S PROFESSIONALS’ LEGAL DEFINITION OF THE AS TO THE DEFINITION OF THE BUILDING HEIGHT  ORDINANCE UNDER THE “ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE” STANDARD OF REVIEW (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa15-16).  .................................................................  37  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 42
[brief] The Court noted:  [...] has not cited any binding authority holding that the standing broadly afforded to a resident or taxpayer in the same municipality extends to all taxpayers within the county.  Such a rule of standing would subject government bodies and agencies to litigation by outsiders challenging local actions, potentially from all corners of the State.  The common law does not treat those whose financial interests are remote as having the same standing to sue as local residents and taxpayers.  [...] v. City of Orange, 2014 WL 8277956 at *8.  The standing issue raised in [...] v. City of Orange, supra, is the same exact issue here.
[brief] While Section XX does provide the Company with the option to seek indemnification for itself or other members, the Company clearly has not done so.  [A]ttorneys' fees "are not recoverable absent express authorization by . . . contract."  If a fee-shifting provision is vague, the Court resorts to the American Rule that attorneys' fees are not recoverable.  Because of the general policy disfavoring fee-shifting arrangements, contractual provisions establishing such arrangements are "strictly construed."  [Id. at 27.]  Quoting Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187, 191 (App. Div. 1997), the court further observed, "ambiguous indemnification clauses should be strictly construed against the indemnitee."  [...] at 27-28.  The indemnification language in [...] did not suffer from any ambiguity:  [[...]] agrees to indemnify [[...]] and its customers for and hold each of them harmless from any liability, loss, cost and expense (including reasonable attorneys' fees) which [[...]] and its customers or either of them may directly or indirectly incur arising from any alleged breach of [[...]'s] warranties and/or obligations hereunder.  [Id. at 28-29 (emphasis in original). ]  Therefore, rather than support plaintiffs’ notion that broad indemnification language can suffice as authority for the award of attorneys’ fees, [...] exemplifies the established principles that: contractual provisions relied upon for an award of counsel fees must expressly authorize such an award; such provisions are strictly construed and ambiguities will be construed against the indemnitee.
[brief] In the “Factual Background” section of the court’s memorandum, the facts are laid out verbatim exactly as they were presented in Defendant/Respondent [...]’s brief.  (Pa 714-Pa720; See also Defendant [...]’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at Pa 52-Pa 62).  The court’s “Factual Background” even includes illustrations and excerpts exactly as drafted in the Defense brief to the court.  Pa 714-Pa720; See also Defendant [...]’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at Pa 52-Pa 62).  In rendering its Decision, the trial court cited to and relied upon every fact as stated by the Defendant/Respondent [...].  Not a single fact stated by the Plaintiff/Appellant in his Statement of Facts was cited to or mentioned in the Decision by the trial court.  The court also failed to consider that many of the facts as stated by the Defendant were not accepted by the Plaintiff.  (Pa 428-439).  After effectively regurgitating the Defendant/Respondent’s facts, the trial court then proceeded to rely on those facts and consider them in the light most favorable to the moving party, thereby granting Summary Judgment to the Defendants.  This is the exact opposite of what was required under the law and as such, the Decision of the trial court must be reversed.  Summary judgment is not appropriate here.  In this case, there exist a plethora of genuine issues of material fact, all of which alone would be sufficient to overcome this motion for Summary Judgment.  There are issues for the jury to decide regarding whether the conduct of the [...], its agents and employees were palpably unreasonable, and notice to the defendants of the issues giving rise to plaintiffs fall.  For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully submitted to this Court that the defendants herein have not met the burdens established under Rule 4:46-2 or satisfied the test set forth in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company, supra.
[directive] The law enforcement agency must provide adequate space to organize and maintain a property vault which will facilitate the storage, auditing and retrieval of property and evidence.  In addition, the storage facility must provide adequate security and control.  The design of a property vault will be unique for every law enforcement agency.  The three primary considerations are the volume and type of property held, the overall security of the agency facility, and the total available space.  4  Volume and Type of Property.  In designing a property vault, the total volume of property to be stored should be forecasted as far as possible into the future.  In addition, the various types of property to be stored should be reviewed.  This includes, but is not limited to: weapons, ammunition, volatile or toxic substances, perishable items, valuable items, and cash.  Consideration should also be given to the different types and quantities of controlled dangerous substances seized and held by the department.  The agency may wish to establish different policies for the storage of such diverse items.  In determining total storage area, it is important to remember that mere storage is not enough.  The vault must have ample space to be organized to facilitate the location, retrieval and audit of the property.  In other words, all property must be readily accessible.  The property vault should contain a refrigerator for the storage of perishables, such as blood.  A safe or other separately secured container should be provided for the storage of cash, jewelry and other small, valuable items.  Security.
[brief] In its Motion, [...] asserted [...]’s Complaint must be dismissed because [...] failed to sustain its burden of proof as to damages on all counts and the opinion of [...]’s proposed expert was nothing more than a net opinion\(^1\) (Pa199).  With respect to proof of damages, the Trial Court found that [...] did not dispute that it never provided any calculation of damages during the course of discovery or with its Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.  (Pa126).  In his April 4, 2022 Opinion, [...] stated, “[P]laintiff has not presented adequate proof of ascertainable loss or other proof of damages that create any genuine issue of material fact to withstand summary judgment as to their consumer fraud claim, breach of contract claim, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, unjust enrichment claim, or breach of warranty claim. ” (Id.).  The Trial Court further found that [...] failed to show any quantifiable or ascertainable loss, nor did [...] provide so much as an estimate of its amount of claimed damages.  (Pa127).  Accordingly, --- \(^1\)  For the sake of brevity, we have not provided the details of the net opinion argument as that is immaterial to the instant appeal.  the Trial Court granted Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and dismissed [...]’s Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] (2T52:24-53:5).  Two jurors were excused during trial leaving only six jurors with no alternates.  (4T53:25-59:2; 6T126:17- 127:20; 6T144:5-13).  One of the jurors who remained for deliberations was observed sleeping during witness testimony and on one occasion the Trial Court had to instruct the Sheriff’s Officer to ensure that she was awake.  (Pa46).  The jury began their deliberations on June 15, 2023.
[brief] ”  503 F.3d at 264.  “[N]o one prevented [the minor] from calling her parents before she took the pills she had requested” or tried to dissuade her from speaking to her parents, and she was “only given the pills because she asked for them. ”  *Id.* at 264–65.  Under such circumstances, there was no “coercion” and no constitutional violation.  *Id.* at 265.