ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, the Borough thereafter on June 21, 2017, adopted Ordinance 1600.  This Ordinance approved a new “Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan” so as to establish an overlay zone on Lots 1 & 3 allowing multi-story residential development.  Lot 3.01 would be utilized as a parking area.  [...] would be evicted, and its improvement and business removed.  The fundamental basis and premise of this “Amendment” and Redevelopment Plan is that the Borough was the fee owner of the entire Lot 3.01 - the “Subject Property. ”  The Borough provided notification and filed an Eviction Action, premised upon the Redevelopment Plan Amendment being validly in place, seeking to terminate [...]’s Lease and occupancy of the Subject Property.  Besides its leasehold interests, the Plaintiff [...] is the fee owner of other real property in the immediate vicinity of Lot 3.01, which will also be adversely impacted by the adopted Redevelopment Plan Amendment.  The Redevelopment Plan called for the removal of the Municipal parking lot on State owned property, to be replaced by six (6) multistory residential apartments.  After the adoption of Ordinance 1600 in June 2017 approving the new Redevelopment Plan Amendment, [...] filed a Complaint entitled [...] Beach and Boardwalk Company, Inc. v. [...], et al., Docket No. [...].  That Complaint asserts that the approval and adoption of Ordinance 1600 and the Redevelopment Plan thereunder by the Defendant Borough is invalid for a number of procedural and substantive reasons as per the LRHL.
[brief] In Sun Chemical, the District Court held that the plaintiff could not assert a CFA claim due to the fact that another statute served to regulate the asserted claims.  Id. at 330.  The Supreme Court rejected that ruling and held:  In addition to its ever-growing scope, “[t]he language of the CFA evinces a clear legislative intent that its provisions be applied broadly. ”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 264.  “[L]ike most remedial legislation, the [CFA] should be construed liberally in favor of consumers. ”  Cox, 138 N.J. at 15.  And, by the plain terms of the statute, “[t]he rights, remedies and prohibitions” created by the CFA are “in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohibition accorded by the common law or statutes of this State. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.13.  Courts are therefore reluctant “to undermine the CFA’s enforcement structure … by carving out exemptions for each allegedly fraudulent practice that may concomitantly be regulated by another source of law. ”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 270.  Id.  The Supreme Court confirmed that there is a “presumption that the CFA applies to a covered activity,” a presumption that can be overcome only when a court is satisfied “that a direct and unavoidable conflict exists between application of the CFA and application of the other regulatory scheme or schemes. ”  Id. at 331 (quoting Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 270 (emphasis added)).  The trial court did not reason that there is any conflict between the NJCFLA and the CFA, because there is no conflict.  Both statutes seek to protect consumers and impose minimum standards for any entity who engages in the consumer loan business as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2, to wit, the CFA and the NJCFLA are complementary as opposed to conflicting.  Thus, the trial court erred in holding that Defendants’ unlicensed enforcement of a void debt does not constitute unlawful conduct under the CFA and the October 4, 2023 Order of Dismissal should be reversed.
[brief] On December 14, 2020, the City and [...] entered into a Redevelopment Agreement which set forth the parties’ respective rights, responsibilities and obligations with respect to the redevelopment of the [...] Property and the Project.  Pa348.  In pertinent part, Section 4.4(a) of the Redevelopment Agreement provided:  **Redevelopment Fee.**  Redeveloper shall pay Redevelopment Fee to the City, consisting of the following:  (i) a one-time “Administrative Fee” as established by City Ordinance in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), payable upon the execution of this Agreement.  (ii) a one-time fee (the “Redevelopment Fee”) in the amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000), payable upon the earlier of: (A) Redeveloper’s closing on the acquisition of the Property or (B) January 31, 2021.  The City agrees that the Redevelopment Fee shall benefit the City’s redevelopment areas and shall serve as an additional community benefit to address any impacts in the City relating to the redevelopment.  [Pa358-359].  Additionally, Section 5.1 of the Redevelopment Agreement provided that [...] “shall be responsible for any off-site improvements required as a condition to the Governmental Approvals, as permitted under the MLUL. ”  Pa360.  On December 15, 2020, [...] wired the $2,000,000 payment to the City.  Pa387.  The $2,000,000 payment served to facilitate the City’s implementation of redevelopment, defray the costs of the redevelopment entity, and to benefit the City’s redevelopment areas, including the expanded use of the [...] as a result of redevelopment in the City’s redevelopment areas.  Pa398-399.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Moreover, the court did not improperly rely on the legislative intent behind the certain persons statute as the sole basis for imposing consecutive sentences.  The intent behind the statute was only one piece of the court’s opinion and so was not improperly considered.  (Da44-51).  Defendant’s argument is that the purpose of the statute is to “(1) criminalize and (2) punish more harshly mere possession of a firearm by a defendant with a predicate conviction. ” (Db27).  He argues the penalty is enhanced by increasing the mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility from 42 months to five years.  Reviewing case law, defendant’s claims are inaccurate.
[brief] The Bankruptcy Court is interested only in whether or not the Defendant is personally responsible for the judgment.  Bankruptcy Court has no consideration and/or thought process when it comes to a Plaintiff pursing an insurer for bad faith pursuant to *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474 (1974), or an insurance carrier’s obligation to resolve claims.  In the present appeal, the Defendant is asking the Appellate Court to throw out a jury verdict that is entitled to the utmost respect.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, vs. [...] and [...], husband and wife; Defendants/Appellants [...] and [...], husband and wife; and John Doe 1-10, Mary Roe 1-10 and ABC Corporation 1-10, said names being fictitious parties who may claim to have an interest in the subject roadway and lands referenced herein but whose identities are not currently known, Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action  On appeal from summary judgment of Chancery Division, Hunterdon County ([...], P.J., Ch., sitting below)  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
[brief] Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374, 379 (1971).  It is the Project Influence Doctrine which renders the trial court’s decision erroneous.  In condemnation proceedings, the Scope of the Project Rule establishes that:  … the proper basis of compensation is the value of property as it would be at the time of the taking (or at the time fixed by the statute, such as the date of commencement of the condemnation proceeding) disregarding either the depreciating threat of or the inflationary reaction to the proposed public project.  Kugler, supra at 379 [emphasis added].  The Scope of the Project Doctrine excludes value attributable to the governmental project for which the property was acquired.  See, Kugler, supra at 379; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970).
[brief] Da049.  [...] did not provide the PSA to [...] prior to executing the agreement and turning the offer into a legally binding contract.  Da084, Da187 ¶29, Da259 ¶29.  The PSA contained material misrepresentations regarding the agreements with [...].  Da190 ¶43.  For instance, Section 10(c) of the Original PSA, titled “No Other Contracts,” falsely stated that “[t]o the best of Seller’s knowledge, there are no existing or claimed purchase contracts, rights of first refusal or \(^4\) [...] has contractual agreements with both [...] and [...].  Operating the station without advertising the [...] brand and/or ending the MFSA agreement for [...] to exclusively supply [...] gasoline to the station would result in separate contractual penalties. special assessments affecting the Property. ”  Da055.  This was a materially false term.  *Ibid.*  The PSA also contained a “Full Disclosure” provision, noting that [...] had disclosed all material facts relating to the ownership, operation and maintenance of the Premises and that the statements in the PSA did not contain any untrue statement or omitted a material fact.
[brief] Appellants note that Cross Appellants cannot raise arguments under the applicable standard of review by way of their reply briefs.  State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 488 (1970) (where party used reply brief to “enlarge[] on his main argument, the Supreme Court observed “[s]uch use of a reply brief is improper”); A.D. v. Morris County Board of Social Services, 353 N.J.Super. 26, 30-31 (App.Div. 2002) (“It is improper to raise an argument for the first time in a reply brief.  Typically, such an argument will not be recognized”).  Accordingly, the Cross Appellants are barred from arguing that the Law Division abused its discretion in determining that the equities favored Plaintiffs.
[brief] AA001.  XVII.  On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff/Appellant filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants/Appellee.  AA033.  XVIII.  On March 03, 2022, Defendants/Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  XIX.  On March 21, 2022, Plaintiff/Appellant filed an Opposition to Appellee’s Motions.  XX.  On March 28, 2022, Defendants/Appellee filed a Reply Brief.  XXI.  On September 21, 2022, the Court entered a Partial Order Denying the Defendants/ Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] **POINT FOURTEEN [Erroneous wholesale dismissal of entire Complaint] (Argued at Pa409 – Pa443)**  [...]’s summary judgment motions and the court’s dismissal order fail to specifically address each of the ten counts and whether [...] can sustain the elements for a cause of action of each of the ten counts.  The court’s wholesale dismissal of [...]’s ten individual counts, without any analysis of same, cannot successfully meet the standard for the court to dismiss [...]’s entire 10-count Complaint months before the expiration of the original discovery end date.
[brief] Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 334 N.J. Super. 557, 572 (App. Div. 2000).  .................................................................  10  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)) ..............................................  8  City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 462-63 (2010) ..................  10  Dantinne v. Brown, Civil No. 17-0486 (6/23/2017)  .....................................  11  In re Opinion No. 17-2012 of Advisory Comm. on Pro. Ethics, 220 N.J. 468, 478–79 (2014)  ....................................................  10  In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020)  .......................  8  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)
[brief] \textit{Balsley v. N. Hunterdon Reg'l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.}, 117 N.J. 434 (1990) presents an example of the level of scrutiny required in reviewing purported statutory authorization.  The matter, alleging gender discrimination, was brought before the Commissioner of Education.  \textit{Id.} at 436.  If a similar claim had been brought in court under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1 permitted the recovery of attorney fees to a successful plaintiff.  Although the Commissioner of Education had "sweeping authority for enforcing equal protection in the administration of the public education law," the Court noted, "[t]his statutory authority . . . has not been construed or exercised to include the power to award counsel fees."  \textit{Balsley}, 117 N.J. at 442.  In short, the Court held, "the absence of express statutory authority is fatal to the claim for counsel fees."
[brief] 2.  Appellant’s Admitted Misrepresentations  Instead of coming forward with evidence supported by the record to support her appeal, Appellant merely cut and pasted the same arguments from her earlier filings to claim that: (1) a factual dispute existed, and (2) it is for the jury to determine her “state of mind. ” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12).  In reality, what Appellant is really arguing is that it is for a jury to determine whether she lied in her claim, in her deposition testimony, or in her discovery responses.  The problem with Appellant’s argument is that it ignores established New Jersey law. \(^1\)
[brief] *State v. Baum*, 224 N.J. 147, 160 (2016) (quoting *Galloway*, 133 N.J. at 647).  "[A]ll mental deficiencies, including conditions that cause a loss of emotional control," entitle a defendant to a jury instruction on diminished capacity "if the record shows that experts in the psychological field believe that [the defendant's] kind of mental deficiency can affect a person's cognitive faculties...."  Galloway, 133 N.J. at 647.  Moreover, since the criminal code does not define "mental disease or defect," the New Jersey Supreme Court has determined that "whether 'a condition constitutes a mental disease or defect is one to be made in each case by the jury after the court has determined that the evidence of the condition in question is relevant and sufficiently accepted within the psychiatric community to be found reliable for courtroom use.'"  Baum, 224 N.J. at 161 (quoting Galloway, 133 N.J. at 643).  Defendant’s argument that the trial court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury on diminished capacity is both factually and legally without merit.
[directive] to and Drug in Court teams need to work unison when defendants have open cases in in multiple counties order prevent unnecessary delays case processing.  to in in II.  Procedures Policy and A.  When application made for admission into Drug Court, a statewide an is of search Promis/Gavel shall performed identify of that to be all defendant's open matters the Superior Court.  There bar against no is in defendants applying to Court multiple counties.  Each Court Drug Drug in team must be aware of all pending Court applications charges Drug and order to facilitate the defendant's admission into the program.  The in of chances a participant's success the program are enhanced when all in legal matters are resolved so that the participant can begin treatment as soon as possible.  All of a defendant's Superior Court matters should resolved be B. simultaneously one judge when entering Court.  Drug by Ideally, cases should consolidated resolved the defendant's and be in C. county of residence.  If the defendant homeless, the defendant's cases is should consolidated for disposition sentence the county with and be in the most serious offense.  situations where a defendant multiple has all  In cases pending, it important that the Court teams all counties Drug be is in involved and communicate with each other about the open charges as well the consolidation process that cases move resolution to as so efficiently.  D.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has long recognized and required a strict analysis of consumer contracts.  In Atalese, the Court had 2 important concerns with respect to consumer contracts.  First, the Court noted that a consumer “is not necessarily versed in the meaning of law-imbued terminology about procedures tucked in form contracts. ”  Atalese, supra. 219 N.J. at 442.  Here for example, [...] argues that Plaintiffs understood and agreed to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1-16, and the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to 36).  Second, the Court found that these contracts violate the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to 227, which requires that consumer contracts be “written in a simple, clear, understandable, and easily readable way. ”  219 N.J. at 444, quoting N.J.S.A. 56:12-2.  “We have repeatedly stated that the point is to assure that the parties know that in selecting arbitration as the exclusive remedy and are waiving their time-honored right to sue. ”  Ibid.  Here, the Motion Court concluded simply that the “contract states in all capital letters that the parties would be waiving their rights otherwise available to them if they went to court.  Plaintiffs have not identified how the contract is unenforceable.
[brief] However, these comments are nothing more than conclusory allegations with no factual support.  For instance, the joint comment from Appellants references “blowdowns” but provides no analysis as to how this would impact Highlands resource areas.  Ab32, citing Aa0339.  And the individual member of the [...] quoted by Appellants states without any support that “[t]he project will impact environmentally sensitive areas in the Highlands and the drinking water for over 3 million people. ”  Ab32, quoting Aa1061.  [...] was not required to respond to these comments, and it clearly rejected them when it adopted the findings of the [...] in determining the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.
[brief] 22 State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)  .................................................. 22 State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518 (2013) ..........................................................  21 United States v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U.S. 425, 44 S. Ct. 560, 68 L. Ed. 1087 (1924)
[brief] I.  Appellants improperly ask this Appellate Court to discard the factual finding and conclusions of the Trial Court, when such finding are rational, credible and supported by the competent evidence in the record.  As set forth above in the recitation of facts, the Trial Court heard the evidence, made factual determinations and reached conclusions based upon rational, reasonable and credible support of the competent evidence within the record.  It was all set forth, nothing was discarded, and nothing was a clear departure from the record-evidence.  For this reason, the Appellate Court should not nullify, amend or vacate the Trial Judge’s determinations.
[brief] [...] testified that an employees’ overtime rate is dependent "upon their salary and whether they meet criteria to have the additional money added into their regular salary."  Pa125.  He would rely on the collective bargaining agreement for annual salary rates, shift differentials, food maintenance, and number of workweek hours to determine an employees’ overtime rate.  Pa125.  Pa127.  [...], Human Resource Manager in charge of the payroll and the time and leave unit for the [...], testified that "we have to refer to the contract for multiple things."
[brief] The Trial Court Erred by Not Ordering Fee Shifting to [...] required by R. 4:23-3 due to [...]’s Failure to Admit the Genuineness of the Operative Documents and the Truths of the Matters surrounding the divorce.  (Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(a)(1), Plaintiff states this issue was not raised below) (Pa72).  R. 4:23-3 provides for attorneys’ fees and expenses stemming from a litigant’s failure in a response to requests for admissions to admit the genuineness of any document or truth of any matter that is later proven by the propounding party:  If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under R. 4:22, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, that party may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.  The court shall make the order unless it finds that: (a) The request was held objectionable pursuant to R. 4:22-1, or (b) The admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (c) The party failing to admit had reasonable ground for not making the admission.  In evidence were [...]’s October 5, 2018 Responses to [...]’s Request for Admissions.  (Pa72, Pl.’s Trial Ex. P-32).  From that early stage in this litigation, [...] repeatedly denied that she executed or reviewed the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement, the Mid-Marriage Agreement, and the Powers of Attorney.  (See generally Pa72).  She also failed to admit that she received the $200,000 check as part of her equitable distribution.  Id.  It was clear from the trial court’s decision that [...] proved the genuineness of the documents and the truth of these matters in his favor.  That was so after [...] denied these facts requiring another four to five years of litigation.  This Court should remand for the trial court to determine the reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by [...] for proving his requests for admissions at trial.  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ABE’S REQUEST FOR THE RETURN OF HIS LEXUS.
[brief] Easement does not Provide Public Right of Access over Roads  Another of the conditions of the 2019 Site Plan Approval for Lot 2.01 was “[a] valid and properly executed easement agreement with the Borough for access to the Passaic River Docks. ” (Da285 at § D.)  The term “Passaic River Docks” refers to a floating dock on the Passaic River that is accessible from a portion of Lot 2.01 that abuts the Passaic River.  (Da63 at ¶ 23.)  Accordingly, on February 24, 2021, [...] entered into an easement agreement with the Borough (the “Dock Access Easement”), pursuant to which [...] granted the Borough a public access easement for the use of a certain parking area and walkway on Lot 2.01 by persons accessing the dock (the “Easement Area”).  (Da337-Da343.)  The Easement Area cannot be accessed without first traveling on the Boulevard.  (Da63 at ¶ 24; Da342.)  However, if the Boulevard is a private road (the position taken by the Borough), then it is not possible for the public to access the Easement Area.  (Da63 at ¶ 24; Da342.)
[brief] Plaintiff Failed to Prove the Underlying Malpractice Case**  The general rule is that an attorney is only responsible for a client’s loss if the loss is proximately caused by the attorney’s legal malpractice. \(^{23}\)  The test of proximate cause is satisfied where the negligent conduct is a substantial contributing factor in causing the loss.  The burden is on the client to show what injuries were suffered as a proximate consequence of the attorney’s breach of duty.  The measure \(^{22}\)  See 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., 272 N.J.Super 478; Frank H. Taylor & Son, Inc. v. Shepard, 136 N.J.Super. 85, 344 A.2d 344, 1975 N.J.Super.LEXIS 600.  \(^{23}\)  In 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., 272 N.J.Super 478, even though the court found that the attorney committed malpractice, the claims were dismissed because the plaintiff failed to prove that the attorney’s malpractice was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss. of damage is ordinarily the amount that a client would have received but for the attorney’s negligence.  In addition, a negligent attorney is responsible for the reasonable legal expenses and attorney fees incurred by a former client in [successfully] prosecuting the legal malpractice action. \textsuperscript{24}  In the instant case, plaintiff did not prove the underlying malpractice case because the court found that she suffered no actual damages other than the legal fees she spent to set aside the PSA and to obtain a new judgment, which is not a “mere portion of the damages”.  C.