ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To recap, [...] brought this case seeking to recover 100% of the costs it incurred in connection with remediating the environmental contamination at the Plainville site.  As of the Liability Trial, those damages totaled approximately $19 million.  The result of the Liability Trial was that [...] proved that some “property damage” had taken place during the [...] policy periods.  However, $6 million of [...]’s damages were disallowed based on the application of certain exclusions.  And, although [...] proved that “property damage” took place during [...]’s policy period, it was not entitled to collect a single dollar from [...] because the allocation issue was yet to be decided.  [...] sought over $3 million from [...] based on an allocation to [...] of 27% of its costs.  However, following the trial court’s ruling on allocation, [...] is obligated to pay only 6.4% of those costs, or about $900,000.  On the other hand, as a result of being unsuccessful on choice of law, the pollution exclusion, and allocation, [...] bears responsibility for more than 85% of the costs it sought in this action, or about $16 million.
[brief] 16, 17 Matter of Elin, 20 B.R. 1012 (D.N.J. 1982) .......................................................  23  Matter of Gloria T. Mann Revocable Tr., 468 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2021) ........................................  18 McCrea v. Newman, 46 N.J.Eq. 473 (Ch.1890), 340.................................................... 38, 39 ..................................................................................................  40 N.Y. Mortgage Tr. 2005-3 Mortgage-Backed Notes, U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as Tr. v. Deely, 466 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 2021)........................................  16, 18 Ocwen Loan Servs., LLC v. Quinn, 44 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 1957) ...........................................  15-18 Olson v. Jantausch, 198 N.J. Super. 370 (App. Div. 1985)........................................... 25, 45 Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446 (1979) .............................. 24, Pearson v. DMH 2 Ltd. Liab. Co., 449 N.J. Super. 30 (Ch. Div. 2016) .............................................  25, 44 Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff, 467 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2021) ...........................................  17 Roll v. Rea, 50 N.J.L. 264 (N.J. 1888)............................................  23 St. Pius X House of Retreats, Salvatorian Fathers v. Diocese of Camden, 88 N.J. 571 (1982)  ........................................................................ 46  Schnakenberg v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 37 N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div.) .....................................................  24 Scult v. Bergen Val. Builders, Inc., 76 N.J. Super. 124 (Ch. Div. 1962) ..............................................  23, 32, Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326 (1993) ..................................................................... 16, 45 Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hojnoski, 317 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1998) ..........................................  19 Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011) ............  18 State in Interest of J.F., 446 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 2016) ...........................................  18, 42  Wallace v. Summerhill Nursing Home, 380 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 2005) ...........................................  32, 47
[brief] [...], United States Magistrate Judge  *1  This case involves the purchase by Plaintiff of a 2013 Ford F-350 truck in Texas.  Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle contained a defective engine and that Defendants failed to repair the vehicle and refused to re-purchase the vehicle.  After considerable litigation, the operative First Amended Complaint alleges a violation of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq., fraud by omission, and negligent repairs (Sixth Cause of Action), Negligent Repair (Seventh Cause of Action) and Fraud by Omission (Eighth Cause of Action).  (ECF No. 24).
[brief] A.  The Trial Court’s Binding Findings of Fact and Conclusions  After months of deliberation over a 15-day period in 2013, the Trial Court placed on the record its detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  221T-235T, 237T-238T, and 242T.  By clear and convincing evidence, the Honorable [...] (P.J.Ch) found that the [...] intentionally and deliberately had misappropriated – and then fraudulently concealed from their partners – tens of millions of dollars from the subject real estate project, [...] (the “Project”).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS GIVEN A LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS’ HARM GREATLY OUTWEIGHED COUNTERVAILING HARMS AND ITS FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Da393-417)  Plaintiffs adduced no clear and convincing evidence that the public interest warranted the order and that Plaintiffs’ harm greatly outweighed countervailing harms.  Plaintiffs dismiss the order’s impact on constitutional parental rights and ignore that the deprivation of such rights “for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. ”  *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).  The order disserves children whose parents are kept ignorant of adverse impacts necessitating parental involvement and teachers who are required to be complicit to parental exclusion.  The order also counters transparency, trust and cooperation between schools and parents.  Plaintiffs’ contention that “assertions of abstract harms are insufficient” --- ²Plaintiffs ignore that the order’s parental exclusion makes it difficult for parents to provide support and guidance.  (Pb49) actually applies to the plaintiffs who did not meet their legal burden of establishing all the Crowe factors by clear and convincing evidence.  Dow, 216 N.J. at 320, 327.  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING A MOOT ISSUE (Da393-417)
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS**  The limited issue before the Court on this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  Despite Plaintiff’s attempt to muddle the record by including pleadings and briefs submitted in numerous federal court cases filed both by and against Plaintiff in New Jersey and Massachusetts, as well as a 2006 foreclosure case filed by [...] against Plaintiff in the Superior Court of New Jersey, the facts relevant to this appeal are simple and straightforward, and largely parallel the Procedural History of this case.
[brief] The maintenance of this parking lot was not consistent with the recommendations from the Institute of Transportation Engineers for the effectiveness of signs and markings to maintain safe travel ways.  The parking lot at and about the area where this incident took place did not contain perimeter sidewalks, stop signs, stop lines, signs to control vehicle speed by indicating slow or watch for pedestrians, islands or peninsulas that increased visibility through increased perception-reaction time, cones, security, flags, flaggers, pavement markings, lines and crosswalks.  4.  The [...] parking lot contained islands and peninsulas at the end of the parking rows that widened the view for a motorist proceeding in an aisleway approaching an intersection.  This is the concept of a sight triangle commonly used at roadway intersections and driveways to broaden a driver’s visibility to pedestrians or oncoming traffic.  This feature did not exist at the accident location but did exist at other locations in the [...] parking lot.  In fact, the sight triangles existed at locations where stop signs and stop lines were used but not at the location where none of the commonly used traffic control devices were used.  Eliminating parking in the last space of the parking row at the accident location would have provided the visibility needed to prevent this accident.  5.  The lack of safe and consistent traffic control and pedestrian crossing devices throughout the parking lot on the north side of this property which was owned by Defendant [...] and utilized for mandatory employee parking by Defendant [...] was a significant contributing factor in causing this incident that resulted in the death of [...].
[brief] “Again, I don’t know the answer to that.  I don’t know if the attorneys have addressed that.  It’s not directly in front of me right now. ”  (1T60-24 to 61-1) (emphasis added).  Continuing on in the motion hearing of September 29, 2020, [...] returns to the limited subject of the possibility of multiple tenants in the [...], and reemphasizes the need for an expert on that one issue:
[directive] Nothing in the statute or the court rules bars judges from issuing orders about the speedy trial clock on their own accord, and the statute logically empowers trial courts to act on their own in certain instances.  The question is not who initiates an order of excludable time; it is whether the order rests on appropriate grounds.  Before an order is entered, the parties should ordinarily have an opportunity to address the merits of the issue.  In this case, the trial court afforded both sides that opportunity.  (pp. 26-28)
[directive] 5.3  Continuous Recording Pending Completion of Encounter.  To ensure that the entire encounter/event/episode is recorded, in accordance with this Policy and the law, a BWC should be activated before a uniformed officer arrives at the scene of a dispatched call for  When circumstances necessitating the use of constructive authority or force arise suddenly during the 3 course of swiftly-developing events, it may not be safe and practicable for an officer to activate a BWC before employing constructive authority or force.  Nothing in this Policy should be construed or applied in a manner that jeopardizes officer safety by distracting the officer’s attention from the immediate need to use such constructive authority or force.  It should be noted that in many circumstances where the need to use constructive authority or force arises, the officer already would have initiated a police activity, such as a motor vehicle stop, Terry stop, or response to a call for service, that would have triggered the requirement to activate the BWC; see note 2 (recognizing that two or more police activities enumerated in this section often will co-occur during the course of a single police-citizen encounter).
[directive] This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie powinny być w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sądownictwo w New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary  Dodatkowy formularz oświadczenia w odpowiedzi na zarzuty w sprawach objętych Ustawą o zakazie zwolnień przedterminowych (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA) Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)
[brief] (30a)  01/31/2024 -- Motion To Dismiss Complaint, Failure to State Claim Submitted by [...] Of [...]  On Behalf of [...]  Current Zoning Officer Of The [...].  (Not included because motion to dismiss was withdrawn, 2T42 line 9)  02/09/2024 -- Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Submitted By Plaintiff.  (Not included because order was withdrawn, 2T42 line 9)  02/12/2024 -- Request for Default for Failure to File Answers to Plaintiff's Verified Complaint  Filed Against Defendants  [...] And Zoning Board Of Adjustment of The [...] by Plaintiff.  (Not included because not contested)  02/12/2024 – Motion Requesting Entry of Default  Judgment against [...]. and Zoning Board of the City of Hoboken  Filed by Plaintiff with Oral Arguments Requested by Plaintiff.  Note: This Motion Was Withdrawn and Resubmitted Twice Because of Technical Errors; Final Submission Is Dated 02/21/2024.  (Not included because not contested)  02/16/2024 -- Opposition To Motion Requesting Entry of Default Judgement Submitted By [...] of [...] Dba [...] on Behalf Of [...] Against Plaintiff.  (Not included because motion to dismiss was withdrawn, 2T42 line 9)  02/20/2024 -- Motion to Bar Defendants-in-Default Park Avenue Corp and Zoning Board of the City of Hoboken from Further Participation in this Legal Action filed by Plaintiff; Oral Arguments Requested by Plaintiff.  (Not included because motion to dismiss was withdrawn, 2T42 line 9)  02/21/2024 – Opposition To Motion Requesting Default Submitted by [...] of Prime & Tuvel, LLC dba [...] on Behalf of [...].  (Not included because motion to dismiss withdrawn, 2T42 line 9)  03/05/2024 – Attorney Certification in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss Submitted by [...] of [...] on Behalf Of [...]  Current Zoning Officer Of The [...] against Plaintiff.  (Not included because motion to dismiss was withdrawn, 2T42 line 9)  03/06/2024 – Hearing Held by Court which Establishes Date for Hearing of Order to Show Cause and Motion To Dismiss of 03/27/2024.  1T14, line 5)  03/19/2024 – Motion to Bar Defendants-in-Default Park Avenue Corp and Zoning Board of the City of Hoboken from Further Participation in this Legal Action filed by Plaintiff Denied by Court without Requested Oral Arguments.  (Not included because motion to dismiss was withdrawn, 2T42 line 9)  03/19/2024 – Order Entering Default Judgement Denied by Court without Requested Oral Arguments.  (Not included because motion to dismiss was withdrawn, 2T42 line 9)  03/27/2024 – Hearing Held Addressing Order to Show Cause and Motion to Dismiss Complaint; Motion To Dismiss Withdrawn (2T'42 line 9); Order to Show Cause Denied; Order for Dismissal of Zoning Board of the City of Hoboken from the Litigation Granted.
[directive] $100,000 to $250,000  No 10%  Distribution of  Child care of a child who causes the child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected  Pornography child as defined in R.S.9:6-1, R.S.9:6-3, and R.S.9:6-8.21, second degree.  Any other person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this paragraph to a child, third degree.  b(1)  As used in this subsection, “Child” means any person under 18 years of age.  50  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION FAILED TO CONSIDER WELL-SETTLED LAW  REQUIRING OPRA REQUESTORS TO IDENTIFY THE DOCUMENTS THEY ARE SEEKING WITH REASONABLE CLARITY AND PROHIBITING REQUESTS FOR ALL OF AN AGENCY’S RECORDS.  (Da45; Da56).  The court’s decision deeming [...]’s request valid under OPRA was based on a clear misunderstanding and misapprehension of the law.  Its misplaced extension of Paff ignored longstanding precedent requiring OPRA requestors to describe the documents they are seeking with reasonable clarity—and prohibiting end-runs around this requirement by requesting all of an agency’s records—and must be reversed.  The issue of “whether access to public records under OPRA and the manner of its effectuation are warranted” is reviewed de novo.  Burke v. Brandes, 429 N.J. Super 169, 173 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting MAG Entm’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 543 (App. Div. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In particular, this court “owe[s] no deference to a trial court’s interpretation of the law[.]”  Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438 (App. Div. 2016); see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”).  OPRA was enacted to “maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process. ”  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008) (citation omitted).  Adopted to replace the former Right to Know Law, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2 to -4, it “continues ‘the State’s long-standing public policy favoring ready access to most public records. ’”  Bent v. Twp. of Stafford Police Dep’t, 381 N.J. Super. 30, 36 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Serrano v. S. Brunswick Twp., 358 N.J. Super. 352, 363 (App. Div. 2003)).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1.  Plaintiff filed a complaint, pro se, on August 12, 2020.  Pa1.  2.  On October 29, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint based upon various Title 59 immunities.  Pa 14.  3.  On February 16, 2021, opposition to Defendant’s Motion was filed by [...], Esq., on behalf of Plaintiff.  Pa15.  4.  On November 12, 2021, oral argument on the Defendant’s Motion was heard by Honorable [...], J.S.C., and the Motion was denied.  Pa16.  5.  On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint.  Pa17.  6.  On March 10, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint.  Pa24.  7.  Upon completion of discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 28, 2023.  PA34.  8.  Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 16, 2023.  Pa40.  9.  On October 20, 2023, oral argument on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. Pa377. \(^1\)  10.  On October 20, 2023, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.  Pa376.  11.  On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed this appeal.  Pa387.
[brief] For the forgoing reasons the Indictment in this matter should be dismissed with prejudice.  Respectfully yours, /s/ [...]______  [...], Esq.  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : On Motion for Leave to Appeal Granted  Plaintiff-Respondent, : from an Interlocutory Order of the v. : Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County.  [...], : Sat Below: Defendant-Appellant. : [...], P.J.Cr.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  In her Complaint, Appellant alleged that she incurred a debt, which was assigned to Respondent for collection.  Appx., at Pa3.  On May 27, 2021 and July 14, 2021, Respondent sent Appellant collection letters which included her name and basic information about the account (i.e., the balance due, account number, and name of the creditor).  Id., at Pa3-Pa5, Pa9-Pa10.  Respondent used a letter vendor to print and send the letters, which required Respondent to transmit to the vendor the above-referenced information.  Id., at Pa4-Pa5.  From these mundane allegations, Appellant asserted that Respondent violated the FDCPA.  Id., at Pa7.  Appellant, however, did not allege that any human being at the letter vendor (or elsewhere) ever viewed her private or account information.  More generally, Appellant did not allege that Respondent engaged in any disclosure of information which Congress sought to curtail, or that she suffered any past or present tangible harm or ascertainable loss – whether physical, financial, or reputational.  Id., at Pa1-Pa8.  The Superior Court found that Appellant’s allegations and asserted letter vendor theory of liability could not support her claims under the FDCPA, and dismissed the case.  Pa11; T23-24.  IV.  LAW AND ARGUMENT
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. § 40A-12A-7 (d).  Thus, a “redevelopment plan becomes either all or part of the zoning for the redevelopment area. ”  See Jersey Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park, 377 N.J. Super. 232, 235, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 392 (2005); Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 164–65 (App. Div. 2001).
[brief] ............................  13 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 61 F.  4th 334 (3d Cir. 2023) .......... 27, 28, 29 Williams-Hopkins v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 957, 2019 WL 1873155 (N.J. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2019) ................................................................. 16, 17, 18, 22 Zenon v. Dover Downs, Inc., No. 21-1194, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112798, 2022 WL 2304118 (D. Del. June 27, 2022) ........................................ 26 Zephyr Fluid Sols., LLC v. Scholle IPN Packaging, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20890 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2023) ......................................................... 30 Statutes 15 U.S.C. § 1692 ................................................................. 2 9 U.S.C. § 1 ........................................................................... 8, 10 9 U.S.C. § 2 ........................................................................... 19 9 U.S.C.S. § 16 ..................................................................... 1, 10 N.J.S.A. 17:11C–1 ..................................................................
[brief] [...] admitted in her testimony that she didn’t call [...] to act as [...]’s legal guardian and she didn’t ask if there were any other family members who were not present at the time of the shooting.  (1T:28-16 to 29-7).  The State should not be rewarded because of the fact that [...] didn’t bother to ask if there were any other family members who were not potential victims in the crime to act as [...]’s guardian.
[brief] On March 17, 2017, [...] and his wife filed a complaint in the [...], [...] (the “[...] Lawsuit”), alleging that [...] was injured, in part, based on [...]’s negligence.  (Pa2004 and Pa2024.)  It also notes that [...] “was a contractor on the Project and in charge of and/or responsible for cutting concrete foundations for the demolition at the Project. ”  (Pa2008, at ¶ 20.)  The [...] Lawsuit settled in November 2019.
[directive] 3:26-2 $1,000 summons  Range bail MUNICIPAL to to to to to to to RULE setting $1,000 $1,000 $35,000 $100,000 $100,000  Bail $50,000 $500 or crime.  TO warrant when PURSUANT  THE substantive considered a Degree Degree IN Degree Degree Degree Degree Disorderly whether Persons Degree OR, 2nd 2nd ADMINISTRATOR, 4th 4th 1st 1st JUDGE actual be regarding to appropriate. injury; and victim committed does serious the hospital non- observed factors COURT disciplinary 17 by conduct; as victim or a or to destroy observed factors by inflict death household; same a 16 delineate is observed in be but MUNICIPAL is act the detained does to where victim of to COURT or coercion the delineate if likely victim. be of danger or supervisory degree; 2 or nature to danger, the be be or inflict Schedule is likely or offenses)
[brief] A month and a half after purchasing two condominiums which are less than a mile away, Plaintiffs signed another contract, the SPA, for a residential condominium unit in a 79-story building in Jersey City, New Jersey, known as “[...]. ” (DA159-183).  Plaintiffs retained and were represented by Counsel to review and advise them on the contract documents, specifically the SPA, and the Public Offering Statement issued to the consumer public for the sale of all [...] Units.  (DA363-364).  Plaintiffs still have not closed on their unit because, inter alia, they assert that their unit is substantially smaller than advertised based upon measurements of 42 other units in the building.
[brief] Plaintiff asserts that she had a binding agreement with the Township to remove her swimming pool, fencing, and shrubbery in exchange for the Township installing a drainage system in her backyard and repairing the associated damage.  In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, she alleges that the Township is in breach of contract for failing to honor this alleged oral agreement.  To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) that defendant failed to perform its obligations under the contract; and (3) that the breach caused the claimant to sustain damages.  See Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J. Super. 245, 265 (App. Div. 2007).  Simply put, the Township cannot breach a contract that did not exist in the first place.  Plaintiff has testified that no written contract was made, and no written agreement was ever in place for either the work performed, nor any of the actions she took that she claims the Township told her to do.