ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On September 28, 2024, [...] filed its notice of appeal challenging the FHACA permit.  (Aa3374).  On January 5, 2024, [...] issued a corrected FHACA permit to [...], which remedied revision dates on some of the plans which were erroneously listed in the August 14, 2023 permit.  (Aa1).  ARGUMENT POINT I [...] CORRECTLY ISSUED THE FHACA PERMIT.
[brief] See also State v. Laurel Mills Sewerage Corp., 46 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1957)  The invalidity of the penalty clause rendered the ordinance unenforceable unless and until the clause is validly amended.  Such an amendment to correct the defect, however, would render the ordinance valid only as to its application to conduct following the amendment.  State v. DeLouisa, 89 N.J. Super 596, 603; 215 A.2d 794, 799 (Co. 1965)  At the time of the issuance of the complaints of which [...] was convicted, each of the ordinances [...] was charged with violating was invalid and unenforceable.
[brief] “That was my first argument.  And then I’m also suggesting that there’s an over-breadth problem with regulating unamplified voices. ”  2T51-17 to 20.  “But I think this way this was handled, this was wrong in this situation and I think that it’s even over-broad. ”  2T54-4 to 6.  “[...]: …  “It’s not under the Noise Control Act because it doesn’t use measurable standards by way of decibels, and it’s not broad or vague because it’s very similar to the language of all those other cases that the Court specifically found were not over-broad and vague.
[directive] Pursuant to L. 2020, c. 111  DATE: November 6, 2020  This Directive promulgates a process to be used to request dissolution of the prohibition against victim contact imposed by statute when a defendant or juvenile is released from custody before the scheduled release date due to the award of public health emergency credits pursuant to L. 2020, c. 111.  The Directive also promulgates a form Petition to Dissolve the Prohibition Against Contact and a form order.  L. 2020, c. 111, effective November 4, 2020, provides that whenever a public emergency has been declared by the Governor under the “Emergency Health Powers Act,” N.J.S.A. 26:13-1 et seq., the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections (DOC), the Executive Director of the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC), and the Chair of the Parole Board shall each award public health emergency credits to certain inmates and parolees to allow for their early release from custody or term of supervision.  Additionally, the law provides that individuals released following an award of public health emergency credits shall be prohibited from purposely or knowingly making contact with any victim of the crime for which the individual was serving the sentence.  The law further provides that a violation of this prohibition against victim contact is a fourth-degree crime.  It is important to note that this statutory prohibition against victim contact is separate and distinct from other no contact provisions that may have been ordered by the court in the specific case, which provisions remain in effect until vacated by the court.  This statutory prohibition against victim contact pursuant to L. 2020, c. 111 expires on the date that the inmate was scheduled to be released prior to the award of public health emergency credits, unless the court grants a petition to dissolve it earlier.  ADA ENSURING A DOOR TO OPEN JUSTICE
[brief] On the evening June 6, 2022, [...] was assigned to the Community Impact Division receiving information from the Shooting Response Team and the Narcotics and Gang Units and acting as their marked uniform police presence on the street.  (1T5-14 to 6-22).  [...] explained that as the street officer, Narcotics and Gang Unit detectives relied on him to conduct stops for them based on information they relayed.  (1T38-5 to 12).  [...] is a seven-year veteran of --- 1The State relies on defendant’s Table of Citations (Dbii), with the following addition:  “Db” refers to defendant’s appellate brief.  “Da” refers to defendant’s appendix.  the [...] and at the time of the motion hearing, a detective in the Narcotics and Gang Unit privy to CI information.  (1T4-13 to 21).  On that evening [...] of the Narcotics Unit relayed to [...] a tip from a confidential informant (CI) that a male in possession of a firearm was riding around Collins Road and Alabama Road, in a gold Kia sedan with a license plate beginning in “L85.
[directive] If the Brimage-eligible offense involved distribution of a controlled substance by an adult to a juvenile or to a pregnant female, the authorized plea offer shall be twice that otherwise provided in the Table of Authorized Plea Offers or any other provision of this Directive.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8.  As noted in footnote 10, this enhancement feature shall be in addition to and cumulative with any other Special Application and Enhancement Feature that may be applicable.
[brief] Amendments may be allowed thereafter only if the party seeking to amend certifies therein that the information requiring the amendment was not reasonably available or discoverable by the exercise of due diligence prior to the discovery end date. ”  The Court went on to conclude that it would not disturb the trial court’s ruling to bar the admission of discovery because “defendants failed to show ‘due diligence,’ Rule 4:17-7, or ‘exceptional circumstances,’ Rule 4:24-1(c)” after the defendants submitted three disputed expert names and reports in violation of two mandatory court orders that expressly precluded the submission of experts after the dates specified and after discovery had already been extended twice .  . . .”
[brief] R. 4:10-2(a) (emphasis added).  The Rule thus “limit[s]” discovery “to information that is ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. ’”  K.S. v. ABC Pro. Corp., 330 N.J. Super. 288, 291 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 411 (2000) (quoting R. 4:10-2(a)).
[brief] [...] proved the following facts at trial:  **A.  The Project**  On or around October 10, 2002, intervenor [...] (the “City”) issued a Request for Proposals for the redevelopment of certain areas in the Central Business District located at and around [...] (the “Project Site”).  Da60.  [...] submitted a proposal for redevelopment, which the City selected and was subsequently adopted by the City Council on or about June 24, 2003.  Ibid.  On February 24, 2005, two years after negotiations began, the Authority, the City, and [...] entered into a Redevelopment Agreement to govern [...]’s proposed redevelopment of the Project Site (the “Project”).  Da59; 5T10:3-13.¹  Under the terms of the Redevelopment Agreement, [...] was --- ¹  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-11, transcript designations are as follows: (1) 1T; March 30, 2022; (2) 2T; March 31, 2022; (3) 3T; April 5, 2022; (4) 4T; April 6, 2022; to build, at its own expense, an atrium building (the “Mall”), a subterrain parking facility underneath the Mall (the “Project Garage”), an office/retail building, and a residential project.
[brief] [...]’S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFFS’ LITIGATION WAS FRIVOLOUS DUE TO THEIR “PRE-SUIT” KNOWLEDGE LACKS MERIT.  (2T Hearing, 10/20/2023) (Pa000637) (Pa000926).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b), in order to find that a “complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense” is frivolous, the judge must find on the basis of the “pleadings, discovery, or the evidence presented” that action was “commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury” or that the “nonprevailing party knew, or should have known, that the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b).  “A claim will be deemed frivolous or groundless when no rational argument can be advanced in its support, when it is not supported by any credible evidence, when a reasonable person could not have expected its success, or when it is completely untenable. ”  *Belfer v. Merling*, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 (App. Div. 1999), citing *Fagas v. Scott*, 251 N.J. Super. 169, 189 (Law Div. 1991).  “False allegations of fact will not justify a fee award unless they are made in bad faith, for the purpose of harassment, delay, or malicious injury. ”  *McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino*, 132 N.J. 546 (1993).
[brief] For example, when asked about how [...] arrived at the purchase price of $180,000, he refused to provide a concise answer despite admitting to being present when the discussion took place.  (2T 44:20-45:11, Jan. 5, 2023) (“Someone made a decision in the lawyer’s office, [...]’s office. ”).  Upon further questioning by counsel and the Court, [...] continued to provide purposefully vague responses to an otherwise simple question: Q: Could you just tell me the name of the person who decide the price would be $180,000.  I just need a name of the person.  A: I don’t know.  THE COURT:  So Mr. Wu, what I want to understand, is, you signed these documents as a representative of [...] by authority granted to you by your own self on behalf of [...].  So you represent everyone involved and every entity involved on the one side of this transaction, and you cannot tell us who decided that price would be $180,000?  Is that your testimony?  THE WITNESS:  I cannot – I don’t know who – there was more than one person, I can tell you that.  (2T 46:25-47:14, Jan. 5, 2023)  [...] was also questioned about who the maker was with respect to the $171,000 check paid by [...] to [...] for the Property.  In particular, he was confronted with one version of a check wherein [...] was noted as the maker, which was secured by subpoena from [...], and another wherein [...] was noted as the maker, which was produced by Defendants.  (2T 19:5-23:20, Jan. 5, 2023; Pa822; Pa2291).
[brief] Potential recording devices may include a fixed camera;  In cases where Plaintiff’s satisfy the burden of justifying the presence of a TPO or recording, the Parties shall execute a protective order so that any information is solely used for purposes of the case and not otherwise divulged;  If a TPO is permitted to attend a R.4:19 examination, the court shall impose reasonable conditions to prevent interaction or interference with the exam;  In cases where an interpreter is needed, if the parties cannot agree on an interpreter, one shall be appointed by the court.  DiFiore V. Tomo Pezic, Pezo, Inc., 472 N.J. Super. 100, 106 – 7 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] PLAINTIFFS DO NOT POSSESS STANDING UNDER ANY OF THE MYRIAD LEGAL THEORIES THEY ADVANCE IN OPPOSITION | 1 | | A.  There is No Citizen/Taxpayer Standing Under the MLUL | 1 | | B.  [...] Does Not Constitute an “Interested Party” under the MLUL | 5 | | C. Standing Can Never Be Waived | 7 | | II.
[brief] Instead, the situation here would be analogous to that in State v. Casilla, 362 N.J. Super. 554, 570-72 (2003).  There, the trial court read the elements necessary for a guilty verdict on 2nd degree kidnapping but failed to read the additional “failure to release unharmed” element necessary to convict an individual for 1st degree kidnapping.  Id. at 566-67.  After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the court still sentenced the defendant to 1st degree kidnapping.  Id. at 567.  Although the defense raised no objection to the kidnapping charge at the time of trial, the Appellate Division noted that, “our Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that ‘the failure to charge the jury on an element of an offense is presumed to be prejudicial error, even in the absence of a request by defense counsel. ’”  Id. at 570 (citing State v. Federico, 103 N.J. 169, 176 (1986)).
[brief] THE DEP ERRED BY FAILING TO GIVE PROPER MEANING TO THE WORDS  “ROUTINE” AND “PUBLIC UTILITY” IN THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION.  (Aa0001)  The statutory exemption that is central to this appeal, is set forth in the Highlands Act as follows:  The following are exempt from the provisions of this act….  (11) the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of this act; [N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), emphasis added.]  The Environmental Appellants’ take the position that the word “routine” in the above-quoted language is critical to understanding and implementing the entire provision.  The DEP disagrees, taking the contrary position that the word “routine” cannot be read in conjunction with “upgrade” in the above-quoted language.  The 2  The facts and procedure are interrelated, so they are presented together.  DEP argued that it “...correctly determined that [...]’s Project is exempt from the Highlands Act as an ‘upgrade’....”  DEP brief at 24.  [...] similarly argued that “Contrary to Appellants’ interpretation, the word ‘routine’ does not modify ‘upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems. ’”  [...] brief at 15.  The problem with the Respondents’ arguments in this case is that neither Respondent recognizes the appropriate and expressed limitations presented by the legislative decision to use the words “routine” and “public utility” in the above-quoted statutory language.
[brief] The Court has as already held that such relief would be granted “only when ‘truly exceptional circumstances are present. ’”  Id. at 469 (quotation omitted).  It is respectfully submitted that Appellant has not shown any circumstances, much less exceptional circumstances, in the present matter.  Appellant did not provide the court below, nor this Court, with these specific facts which could support the relief being sought.  Appellant spends some two pages discussing the case of Nr Deed, LLC v. Roszko, 2023 WL 4874711 (App. Div. 2023).  There is a very long citation to the holding of the case, but there is no analysis as to how that case is appliable, how the prior Order was improperly or improvidently decided, or how or why Appellant meets the strictures of Rule 4:50-1(f).  (App. Brief, pp. 27-29).  Nevertheless, even looking at that case and the factors for relief under subsection (f), as discussed in Parker v. Marcus, 281 N.J. Super. 589, 593 (App. Div. 1995), it is clear that Appellant falls woefully short.
[brief] [...] was found dead in the bedroom of her home, which she shared with her wife [...], on May 17, 2020.  (1T 35-6 to 41-9)  The cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head.  (3T 106-16)  The State hypothesized that the wounds were inflicted by the edge of a wine cooler—a cylindrical object used to keep a bottle of wine cold.  (3T 109-9 to 19)  The last person to speak with Rebecca seems to have been her coworker and friend, [...].  Etienne said that she worked with Rebecca at a nursing home on May 16, 2020.  (1T 91-7 to 19)  Etienne claimed that she overheard a phone call made to Rebecca that day and that she recognized Mayra’s voice.  (1T 93-8)  Etienne testified that Mayra was angry and asked Rebecca, “you want to leave me?”  (1T 94-3 to 95-25)  According to Etienne, Mayra picked Rebecca up after work that day.  (1T 97-11)  Rebecca did not come to work the next day, so Etienne went to her house with Rebecca’s mother.  (1T 100-7 to 101-24)  The door was locked so the two women left.  (1T 109-4 to 12)  Later that day [...], Mayra’s daughter, and [...], Vallicis-Gavilanez’s boyfriend, came to the house.  (7T 57-20 to 58-11)  Stallworth found the door locked and eventually entered through a window.  (7T 36-10 to 21)  He found Rebecca’s body in the bedroom and called the police.  (7T 38-1 to 39-22)
[brief] Like the language in OPRA, the definition for criminal investigatory records and common law public document is one that is required by law to [be]-- made, maintain[ed] or kept on file.  However again, the Court could not find, nor did the parties find any law -- or case law that requires agency emails to be made, maintained, or kept on file.  For this reason the records sought by plaintiff are not common law public documents.  (3T, 19-12 to 20-5)  On appeal, [...] does not attempt to identify any statute, regulation, or other mandate requiring the [...] to create or maintain the documents in dispute.  He suggests no statutory or regulatory mandates of any kind addressing the records at issue.  Indeed, none exists.  Importantly, the type of records sought – email communications between law enforcement officials regarding a criminal investigation – are of the confidential nature which warrant erring on the side of non-disclosure.  Michelson, 379 N.J. Super. at 621.
[brief] **POINT I**  **THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING CONTRADICTS WELL ESTABLISHED CONDEMNATION LAW (1T4:9-15)**  The Appellate Division has allowed [...] to file an interlocutory appeal in the current matter as the decision of the trial court that the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan is the operative zoning in place as of the Date of Valuation contradicts well established condemnation law and the Scope of the Project Rule.
[brief] It did not.  In fact, numerous joint correspondences and/or emails were sent to the Court requesting its decision.  However, the OAL did not provide a response to any of these.  Point  II  THE [...] FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF BECAUSE IT SOLELY INTRODUCED HEARSAY EVIDENCE WITHOUT THE REQUIRED RESIDUUM OF ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE ULTIMATE FACTS.
[brief] The roadway modifications will include the discontinuance and closing off of the driveway into and out of the Athletic Club Property from River Drive and the provision of ingress and egress to the newly configured Athletic Club Property from the internal roadway to be constructed by Applicant which will connect with Slater Drive.  (Pa74-75)  Thus the first mention of the roadway at issue described an “ingress and egress” driveway for the church lot 1.01 from the “internal road” onto Slater Drive.  (Pa74-75)  The roadway was not described as a public right of way or in any way a public road - rather it was described to the planning board as an “internal roadway”.  “Applicant seeks to discontinue the existing access to the Athletic Club Property from River Drive and to provide ingress and egress to such property exclusively from an internal roadway”.  (Pa73, Paragraph 9)  Plaintiff self-described the initial project as containing “a new internal road system connected at two locations to Slater Drive. ”  (Pa73, Paragraph 9)  Plaintiff makes clear in its trial brief that the "Athletic Club Property is Lot 1.01 and that Lot 1.01 has never been owned by Plaintiffs ... and except for building a driveway from Lot 1.01 onto the Boulevard as a condition of [...]'s Planning Board approvals, has never been part of the Development".  (Pa37)  In essence, the initial site plan approval envisioned the developer creating an ingress and egress driveway (not a public roadway) for the Athletic Club Property (now church) at Lot 1.01.  (Pa37)  The property or easement interest of the church of this ingress and egress "driveway" is a major issue raised by Defendant in this case.
[brief] *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 569; accord *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 471; *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 569-70.  During the resentencing hearing, [...] testified that research demonstrates that the mere knowledge that a peer is present or watching is enough to make it more likely that an adolescent will engage in risky behaviors.  (3T:51-3 to 53-18)  She further noted that an adolescent is more likely to engage in such behavior to gain acceptance from an older person they respect.  (3T:56-21 to 57-2)  Here, the court failed to consider the ample evidence presented at the hearing that [...]’s participation in the incident and his conduct were influenced by peer pressures.
[brief] **  Next, Plaintiff asserts that he satisfied the fictitious pleading requirements under R. 4:26-4.  This is false.  Plaintiff is confusing two separate and distinct concepts.  The first being the fictitious pleading rule and the second being the discovery rule.  The fictitious pleading rule applies when, and only when, a party cannot reasonably discover the identity of a potential defendant but is aware of a potential claim.  *Viviano v. CBS, Inc.*, 101 N.J. 538, 547 (1986) (noting that the rule “suspends the statute when the plaintiff is unaware of the true identity of the defendant. ”)  The discovery rule, on the other hand, applies when, and only when a party is not reasonably aware that they have been injured or that it is the fault of another.  *McDade v. Siazon*, 208 N.J. 463, 475 (2011); *Caravaggio v. D'Agostini*, 166 N.J. 237, 240 (2001).  In order for the discovery rule to apply, the plaintiff does not need to know the precise nature of any potential claim nor have a legal certainty that applies.  *Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.*, 209 N.J. 173, 193 (2012) (“...legal and medical certainty are not required for a claim to accrue. ”)  In this case, Plaintiff was aware of [...]’s identity at the time of his injury, and concedes as much in his brief.  (Plaintiff’s second brief, at 32)  As such, the fictitious party pleading rules do not apply, because [...] was not a party whose identity the plaintiff did not know.  Consequently, regardless of what information Plaintiff may or may not have had regarding any potential claims which Plaintiff may or may not have asserted, the fictitious pleading rule simply does not apply here because Plaintiff knew [...]’s identity.
[brief] Upon learning of the warrant and the indictment, [...] repeatedly and vigorously asserted his speedy trial rights in a series of six letters or briefs, beginning with his initial letter seeking disposition of the warrant in March of 2018 and another letter asserting his speedy trial right in November of 2018.  Thus, the court erred in not finding that this factor weighed in [...]’s favor.  The trial court also erred as a matter of law in its analysis of the fourth factor, the prejudice to the defendant.
[brief] Certainly, as the individuals acting on behalf of the Board.  There’s no piercing of the corporate veil here.  That certainly is out.  Consumer fraud as to the Developers, I said I don’t find that.  I don’t find punitive damage to be appropriate here by breach of a fiduciary duty because I don’t think there was a breach, based upon the deed. ”  See T1 page 17, lines 10-23.  The Court correctly dismissed Count Four of the Plaintiff’s Complaint against the Individual Defendants, finding there was no misrepresentation in conveying marketable title, as the Court found title to be marketable, as did Plaintiff’s prior counsel, title insurance, mortgage lender and lender’s counsel.
[brief] This court’s March 6, 2023, remand order to the Acting Commissioner directed her to address the second question— the student-petitioners’ argument that SFRA was the cause.  Neither the Final Decision, nor the Comprehensive Review on which it is based, meaningfully address that question, however.  The Final Decision barely mentions SFRA, let alone evaluates its application to [...] and constitutionality as applied.  In the Analysis section, there is a single conclusory sentence to the effect that “the Assistant Commissioner concludes that the SFRA is not the significant cause of [...]’s failure to provide T&E. ” (Final Decision at 7).  The Acting Commissioner’s only attempt to support that conclusion is by referring to general presumptions of validity accorded to legislative enactments without addressing whether those general presumptions should apply here where there has been a final, unchallenged adjudication that [...] students have been denied their fundamental constitutional right to T&E.  Had the Final Decision delved into the details of how SFRA actually operates with respect to [...] it would have become clear that there is a fundamental mismatch between [...]’s unique fiscal needs, caused by its unique demographic characteristics, and SFRA’s statewide funding formula.  Because the Final Decision gave SFRA an unwarranted constitutional pass, it never addressed the third major question raised, the remedial issues regarding the State’s school funding system, and especially SFRA.  This brief will focus on the second and third questions.