ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’ counsel moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the statute of limitations in December 2019.  This motion was denied.  Following the completion of discovery, [...] moved for summary judgment on several grounds.  It argued that 1) the lease between [...] and [...] did not impose a contractual obligation upon [...] to have cleared (or otherwise remediated) the parking area where plaintiff had fallen and 2) [...] had no common law obligation to have cleared or remediated the parking lot as a matter of law.  It also renewed its motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations, claiming that plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the “discovery rule” or the “relation back” doctrine and that the second amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.  On June 25, 2023, [...], J.S.C., Passaic County granted defendant’s motion.
[brief] Secondly, the trial court also erred by applying aggravating factor one, “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor in committing the offense, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).  “When [a court] assesses whether a defendant’s conduct was especially ‘heinous, cruel, or depraved,’ a sentencing court must scrupulously avoid ‘double-counting’ facts that establish the elements of the relevant offense. ”  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74-75 (2014).  Because “the Legislature ha[s] already considered the elements of an offense in the gradation of a crime,” double-counting the elements of an offense in support of an aggravating factor “erod[es] the basis for the gradation of offenses and the distinction between elements and aggravating circumstances. ”  Ibid. (citation omitted).  Situations where factor one applies generally involve intentional infliction of cruelty and harm through “extraordinary brutality. ”  See id. at 75 (noting “‘cruel’ conduct may give rise to an aggravating factor . . . when the defendant intended ‘to inflict pain, harm and suffering’”).
[brief] In his oral opinion, [...] made factual findings based upon the credibility of the witnesses presented by the parties and the evidence presented.  As set forth more fully in Point I above, those factual findings are entitled to deference on appeal and should not be disturbed.  Likewise, this brief previously analyzed why [...]’s final judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint and determining that the [...] is the owner of the Property was consistent with applicable law.
[brief] (5T68:7-10).  The read-in by defense counsel was primarily a repeat of the deposition already presented to the jury including the plaintiff’s use of a cane for balance issues for about two years prior to her fall at [...], tingling and numbness in her legs prior to the incident, medication she took for the tingling in her legs, and the two prior falls.  (5T69:21-70:12; 5T70:17-19; 5T71:15-72:10).  The defendant next called [...], P.E. as a witness.  (5T73:21-74:5).  The Trial Court recognized [...] as an expert in the fields of civil engineering, forensic engineering, and human factors.\(^4\) (5T103:20-104:9; 5T105:16-106:4).
[brief] A Camden County Grand Jury returned a ten-count Indictment, Number [...], charging defendant [...] with the following six counts of a multi-defendant indictment: first-degree armed robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1)/(2) (Count One); second-degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2/2C:15-1a(1)/(2) (Count Two); second-degree aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (Count Three); third-degree aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2) (Count Four); third-degree possession of a weapon (tire iron) for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (Count Five); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (tire iron), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d (Count Six).
[directive] (December, 2010).  Less-lethal ammunition may include different types such as: Kinetic Less-Lethal Flexible Projectiles; Kinetic Less-Lethal Non-Flexible Projectiles; Rubber Balls and Pellets; Baton Projectiles; Pad Projectiles, commonly referred to as “bean bag rounds;” Drag Stabilized Projectiles, commonly referred to as “sock rounds;” Fin- Stabilized Projectiles; and Encapsulated Projectiles.  3.10
[directive] However, employees may have a greater expectation of privacy in their own lockers, assigned desks or possibly in a vehicle assigned to them solely for their use.  If an agency intends to retain the right to search property it assigns to officers for their use, including lockers and desks, it should put officers on notice of that fact.  This notification will help defeat an assertion of an expectation of privacy in the assigned property.  The agency should issue a directive regarding this matter and provide notice of the policy in any employee handbook or personnel manual (including the rules and regulations) the agency provides.
[brief] Plaintiff contends that in addition to owing a duty of care to its customers, who are invitees, [...] breached its duty of care by failing not only to provide appropriate training, but also by failing to implement policies or procedures for its own employees regarding the use of its U-boats.  [...], the regional manager for [...], and who was regional manager for the Hackensack location at the time of Plaintiff’s incident, testified that a customer utilizing and pushing a U-boat should not have a pile of merchandise on the U-boat high enough to cause a customer to be unable to see over the merchandise.  (Pa113-Pa114)  In addition, according to [...]’s testimony, if a customer is not looking around the side of the U-boat, but is pushing a U-boat piled high with merchandise to the point where the customer cannot see over the load, that situation poses a danger to both fellow customers and [...] employees.  (Pa114)  Based on his own admission, in the past, in a situation where a customer was pushing a U-boat with product piled higher than that person was capable of seeing over such a load, he would stop that customer and offer to bring the customer another U-boat, help them reduce their load, or instruct the customer to pull, rather than push, the U-boat, in order for them to see in front of them.  (Pa114)  Even though [...] admitted that he previously stopped customers upon noticing that their U-boats were overloaded and that no customer pushing a U-boat should have a pile of merchandise that results in their inability to see over that merchandise, no formal training is provided to [...]’s employees to look for situations where customers’ U-boats are stack too high with product, to warn them of the danger such condition posed to other customers, and to assist customers in reducing their overloaded U-boats.
[brief] The Planning Board engineer indicated that a zoning variance was necessary for the roadways in question.  (Plaintiff Brief, prb.25)  The Developer stated that this zoning issue was “put to rest” because the Planning Board attorney did not agree with the variance issue raised by the engineer.  The Developer then relies upon the Planning Board attorney as the authority “to put the matter to rest”.  This is all well and good but ignores the consonant fact that its own attorney indicated during the same proceeding that he was agreeing to “proceed at his own risk” and that he agreed it was only the Borough who had the authority to dedicate the roads and not the Planning Board.  If counsel can bind as an agent “to put the matter to rest”, then the Developer’s attorney would have the similar authority to bind in terms of the requirements to seek final approval by the Borough.  The Developer suggests that the Borough did not submit any competent evidence and that therefore no material dispute of facts exists.  It is not the Borough’s burden to prove a dedication occurred.  The Borough consistently argued that there was not adequate proof in the record to support a dedication - particularly one in which the proponent suggests occurred 13 years ago in 2010 or 18 years ago in 2005.
[brief] In its May 14, 2010 Certificate for the 300 Line Project, FERC stated that “[...] proposes to replace certain compression facilities in order to increase overall system reliability (the Replacement Component) and, at the same time, to increase the pipeline capacity of its existing 300 Line System by an incremental 350 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d) to meet an expressed market need (the Market Component) (jointly, the 300 Line Project). ”\(^{38}\)  FERC stated that “all the capacity of the proposed Market Component expansion is currently subscribed under precedent agreement by [[...]].”\(^{39}\)  And “the Market \(^{38}\) FERC, Order Issuing Certificate And Approving Abandonment, 131 FERC ¶ 61,140 (May 14, 2010), P 3 (emphasis added).  \(^{39}\)  Id. at P 9 (emphasis added).  Component involves the construction of eight pipeline loop segments totaling 127.4 miles of 30-inch diameter pipe\textsuperscript{40}; in particular, “[i]n New Jersey, the proposed looping consists of 10.0 miles in Sussex County, and 6.0 miles in Passaic County. ”\textsuperscript{41}  Therefore, the purpose of the relevant New Jersey portion of the 300 Line Project was the market need of [...] – not the reliability need of [...]; consequently, the activity reviewed by DEP did not qualify as a “routine upgrade” under the general principles from the 2013 case of Highlands Applicability.
[brief] “Whether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable is a question of law, and [the reviewing court] need not defer to the interpretative analysis of the trial or appellate courts unless we find it persuasive. ”  *Kernahan*, 236 N.J. at 316.  “A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  II.
[directive] 1.  You have been arrested for driving while intoxicated.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  2.  The law requires you to submit samples of your breath for the purpose of testing to determine alcohol content.  3.  A record of the taking of the breath samples, including the test results, will be made.  Upon your request, a copy of that record will be made available to you.  4.  After you have provided samples of your breath for testing, you have the right, at your own expense, to have a person or physician of your own selection take independent samples of your breath, blood or urine for independent testing.  5.  If you refuse to provide samples of your breath, you will be issued a separate summons for the refusal.  A court may find you guilty of both refusal and driving while intoxicated.  6.  If a court finds you guilty of the refusal, you will be subject to various penalties, including license revocation of up to 20 years, a fine of up to $2000, installation of an ignition interlock, and referral to an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center.  These penalties may be in addition to penalties imposed by the court for any other offense of which you are found guilty.  7.  You have no legal right to have an attorney, physician or anyone else present for the purpose of taking the breath samples.  You have no legal right to refuse to give, or delay giving, samples of your breath.  8.  Any response from you that is ambiguous or conditional, in any respect, to my request that you provide breath samples, will be treated as a refusal to submit to breath testing.  Even if you agree to take the test, but then do not follow my instructions, do not properly perform the test, or do not provide sufficient breath samples, I will charge you with refusal to submit to breath testing.  9.  I repeat, the law requires you to submit samples of your breath for testing.  Will you submit the samples of your breath?
[brief] Defendant’s FDCPA Violation is an Abusive Collection Practice.  Supporting the motion court’s decision, Defendant argues that, in addition to the four elements required under *Thiel*, Plaintiff must show that the conduct was abusive.  “Abusive” first appears in a heading within the first FDCPA section (15 U.S.C. § 1692).  That heading was added by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel to the codification but is not in the adopted statute (*see* P.L. 95-109).  *Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc.*, 575 F.3d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 2009).  The term “abusive debt collection practices” appears three times § 1692 but does not appear in any substantive sections.  The Senate Report explained, “This legislation expressly prohibits a host of harassing, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. ”
[brief] Thus, the contract governing the account was void the moment it was acquired by unlicensed [...] (being the first in the chain of assignment), as per N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  It is also undisputed that Defendant [...] (“[...]”) purchased or otherwise acquired [...]’s alleged debt from the unlicensed Assignor Defendants—after the contract governing the account was rendered void.  Upon assignment of the void account, [...] initiated a collection lawsuit against [...] in the Special Civil Part of the Passaic County Law Division.  In so doing, [...] fraudulently misrepresented the status of the void debt and misrepresented that they had the right to enforce the void debt, in violation of, *inter alia*, the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. 1692, *et seq.*, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, *et seq.*, and common law.  Accordingly, [...] asserted counterclaims and initiated a separate putative class action in the Law Division of Hudson County.  The actions were later consolidated.  The parties proceeded to engage in litigation, including a dispositive motion filed by Defendants (which was denied), for nearly a year and a half before Defendants moved to compel arbitration.  Despite the fact that Defendants had, *inter alia*, failed to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense, certified that arbitration was not contemplated, and filed and lost a motion for dismissal attacking the merits of [...]’s claims, the trial court determined that Defendants had not waived their purported ability to compel arbitration.  Moreover, the trial court failed to acknowledge or analyze the issue of voidness under the NJCFLA as it related to the contract ostensibly governing [...]’s account and refused to allow any discovery into the threshold issue of arbitrability.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 11:4-34-18(b).  The actuary is required to submit an actuarial memorandum that sets forth the actuarial assumptions and information to support the rate increase request.  The actuarial assumptions are guided by the ASOPs developed by the Actuarial Standards Board of the American Academy of Actuaries.  (Ra242 and Ra263-285-).  The ASOPs guide the preparation of initial and future rate filings.\(^3\) (Ra291; 321 and --- \(^3\) [...]’s Expert witness, [...], FSA, MAA, testified during the hearing and submitted opening and rebuttal reports which were admitted into evidence.  (Ra520).  Schmitz is a principal and consulting actuary of [...]  Schmitz stated in his report that “[...] and I have worked with [...] on LTC insurance actuarial matters since the early 2000s”.  (Ra522).  Schmitz reviewed a series of material for the conclusions in his reports, including ASOP 18, excerpts of the NAIC’s LTC Insurance Model Regulations, and Excerpts of the NAIC Guidance Manual for the Rating Aspects of the LTC Insurance Model Regulation.  (Ra526).  A copy of the NAIC Guidance Manual is included in the Department’s appendix.  (Ra231).  Actuaries are also guided by publications of the American Academy of Actuaries.  (Ra231).  C.
[brief] During Phase I, the Arbitrator issued a January 2, 2014 Order finding that [...] had exceeded his authority by unilaterally amending the Company’s Operating Agreement.  (Da967)  The Arbitrator also issued a December 10, 2014 Order voiding [...]’s attempt to redomicile the Company to Belize.  (Da980)  Among other things, the Arbitrator found that “Claimant’s amendments to the Operating Agreement and Belize activities… are an attempt to change, to the substantial detriment and damage of [Plaintiffs] and other non-aligned [...] Conway Members, the landscape of the control and governance of the Company.  These activities have been… determined to be *ultra vires* and illegal. ”  Id. at page 10 (also quoting the trial court as finding the actions not “equitable… to move the Company… out of the country without notifying plaintiffs… and then to assert that Belize law must be controlling…. ”).  During Phase I, [...] also issued a March 17, 2015 Order for contempt of a prior order prohibiting [...] from filing any action in Belize and issuing a sanction of over $84,000.00.  (Da997)  Phase I ended on October 6, 2015, when [...] (the “Arbitrator”) entered a Partial Final Award on all Phase I issues and awarded control to the Individual Plaintiffs, removing [...] from management of the Company.
[brief] It is the [...] that has the authority to determine if development applications and permits meet the standards as set forth in the public access rules and regulations pertaining to Coastal Zone Management found at N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48 and N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.  It is not up to [...] to make conclusory determinations that a reduction in public parking violates the Public Trust Doctrine.  Rather, it is the [...]’s responsibility to review permits and applications for development and to make determinations regarding reasonable public access pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48 and N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.  Put simply, there is nothing that the [...] can evaluate at this point in time for compliance with the Public Trust Doctrine as there are no plans, no site applications, no permit applications, no detailed drawings or renderings of what is sought to be built.
[brief] --- 33 Strasenburgh at 551-552.  34 Ibid. 35 Da672-718.  Count III: Alleged Breach of Operating Agreement and Bylaws:  None of the Plaintiffs in this action have "special damages" allowing for the assertion of this claim as a direct claim.\textsuperscript{36}  It is not clear how the Individual Plaintiffs can enforce the alleged [...] Bylaws when the [...] – not the Individual Plaintiffs – is the sole shareholder of [...], and has been since 2015.  Even if the Individual Plaintiffs were to contend that they were shareholders of [...] for a brief period in time before the formation of the [...] (which they were not), one cannot enforce a shareholder agreement for alleged breaches occurring when they are no longer shareholders. \textsuperscript{37}  As to alleged breaches to the [...] Operating Agreement, in their First Amended Verified Complaint and also in their Post-Trial Submission, Plaintiffs fail to explain how the alleged activity involving \textit{[...]} loan agreements and \textit{[...]} operations somehow caused a breach of the \textit{[...]} Operating Agreement.  Plaintiffs produced no evidence – nor did they even assert – that the alleged losses involved funds of the [...].  They also did not allege that any of the various intercompany loan agreements were entered into by or on behalf of the [...].  Thus, none of the \textsuperscript{36} 1T and 2T.  \textsuperscript{37}  See \textit{Brown v. Brown}, 323 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1999)(former shareholder had standing to maintain action only because alleged wrongs occurred when she was still a shareholder).  Plaintiffs have standing and are absolutely barred from bringing and recovering under Count III.
[brief] Pa. 113-114  Certification of [...] Esq. dated August 8, 2022 opposition to Defendant’s opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Quash a Subpoena....  Pa. 115-117  Copy of Notice of Deposition dated May 12, 2022 for [...], [...] and an individual McVey and an individual having relevant knowledge of the facts of the within case attached as Exhibit A to the Certification of [...] ......................... Pa. 118-121 Notice of Cross Motion of Defendants dated July 28, 2022 to Bar Evidence Produced after the Discovery End Date............................... Pa. 122-123 Supplemental Certification of [...] dated July 28, 2022 in support of Defendant’s Motion to Quash a deposition subpoena and in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint, Extend Discovery and Secure Compliance with a Deposition Subpoena.............................. Pa. 124-125  Undated Notice of Dismissal without prejudice executed by [...] issued to [...] attached as Exhibit A to the Certification of Benjamin Parisi dated July 28, 2022 ..................... Pa. 126-127  Plaintiff [...]’s Second Amended has been included in Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix at Vol. 1, Pa. 12-17 ......................... # TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT MORRIS BELLIFEMINE, MD PA VOLUME I | APPENDIX DOCUMENT | APPENDIX PAGE # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Complaint dated January 7,2021 attached to the Certification of Benjamin Parisi dated July 28, 2022.
[brief] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS APPEALED  .......... iv  TABLE OF CITATIONS ........................................................................ vi  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................  1  CONCISE  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................  4  A.  The First “Final Judgment” Against [...] and Vacating of Same ............  4  B.  [...] is Impleaded as a Third-Party Defendant .....................................  5  C.  [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment against [...], Motion by [...] to Change Track Assignment, and Motion by [...]’s Counsel to Withdraw ..................................................  7  D.  “Final Judgment” for [...] and Against [...] and [...]’s Motions to Reconsider, Change Track Assignment and Re-Open Discovery ..............  9  E.  Summary Judgment Entered Against [...] and Reconsideration  Thereof ...........................................................................................................  11  CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................
[brief] N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.  In the other leading New Jersey Supreme Court OPRA privacy case, the Court held that the names and addresses of successful bidders who participated in a public auction of forfeited property were public records.  Brennan, 233 N.J. at 342.  The Supreme Court held that “the sale of government property at a public auction is a quintessential public event that calls for transparency. ”  Id. at 343.  The Court continued:  To guard against possible abuses, the public has a right to know what property was sold, at what price, and to whom.  OPRA’s plain terms call for disclosure of that type of recorded information, including the names and addresses of successful bidders.  To hold otherwise would jeopardize OPRA’s purpose: to maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process.  [Ibid. (emphasis added; internal citation and quotation marks omitted). ]  Thus, the Court held that successful bidders have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their home addresses.
[brief] A XX  The rest of Defendant’s witnesses were limited in their testimony about [...]’s training and demeanor.  Moreover, the [...] and [...] incidents were not set forth in [...] and were not relevant to the charges.  By the first day of trial, [...] already had made certain assumptions:  THE COURT:  [T]here's three instances of -- at least two that we've now documented through testimony and potentially a third of a dog not acting well.