ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] and [...] assert that documents and communications exchanged by and between them and various consulting experts are privileged and not subject to discovery.  (ECF No. 42 at 2–3).  Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D), “[o]rdinarily, a party may not ... discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. ”  “The rule is intended to allow litigants to consult experts in order to evaluate a claim without fear that every consultation with an expert may yield grist for the adversary’s mill. ”  Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “In determining whether an expert was hired in anticipation of litigation, the court must examine the total factual situation in the particular case.  To conclude that an expert was hired in anticipation of litigation, a lawsuit need not have been filed, but there must have existed more than a remote possibility of litigation. ”  Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 175 F. R.D. 34, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  As with the common interest privilege, it appears that [...] and [...] seek a blanket ruling that all documents and communications exchanged by and between them and various consulting experts are privileged and not subject to discovery.
[brief] As to transcript of proceedings on June 20, 2023, the transcript includes a case management conference as to other Mt. Laurel matters; oral argument on a second motion brought by [...], which sought to disqualify WPB counsel, which was denied and is not the subject of appeal; and the motion in aid of litigant’s rights that begins at page 30.  On August 8, 2023, the court entered an Order granting certain relief based on its rulings on July 18, 2023.  Said Order contains a provision certifying the Order as being “final” pursuant to R. 4:42-2.  The amount of attorneys’ fees and costs and delay penalties were to be determined by subsequent application.
[brief] This general principle makes sense in light of the everyday meaning of the word “routine”: “done as part of what usually happens, and not for any special reason. ”  And it makes sense in the context of the energy industry in particular: serving the reliability needs of its existing customer base is part of a public utility’s ordinary course of business.  For example, [...] has touched on this concept in a 2007 Order stating the following:  [A]n applicant asserting that the scope of any proposed transmission expansion project is not routine should submit data distinguishing the project from other transmission projects or upgrades that are constructed in the ordinary course of maintaining a utility’s transmission system to provide safe and reliable service to its customers.  --- 29 Highlands Applicability, 433 N.J. Super. at 237 (App. Div. 2013) (emphasis added).  30 Cambridge Dictionary (last accessed August 25, 2022), available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/routine.  31  [...] Order Accepting Revised Tariff Sheets Subject to Revision and Establishing Technical Conference (July 24, 2007), Docket Nos. ER07-576-000 and ER07-576-001, at P 53 (emphasis added).  C.  Here, the Purpose of [...]’s Project is to Satisfy the Market Need of New Customers – Not the Reliability Need of [...]’s Existing Customers (Aa0001)
[brief] Even though the subject parking lot may be a multi-use parking lot, it is not a multi-tenant parking lot as Respondent [...] is the only tenant that has specifically assigned parking spaces within that lot which benefit Respondent [...] solely.  That also does not negate the fact that the lease specifically states that Tenant shall be responsible for day-to-day maintenance and repairs to the Premises, which was stated to include 971 square feet of retail commercial real estate, plus ten (10) parking spaces.  As such, there exists a material question of fact as to the duty owed by Respondent [...] to Appellant.
[brief] ”  224 N.J. at 321-23.  There is no challenge here to the meaning of the word intruder, making that analysis irrelevant.  However, what defendant fails to realize is that even Kelly places a distinction between an honest belief and a reasonable one; a defendant needs both, not just one.  “While it is not imperative that actual necessity exist, a valid plea of self-defense will not lie absent an actual (that is, honest) belief on the part of the defendant in the necessity of using force….  Honesty alone, however, does not suffice.  A defendant claiming the privilege of self-defense must also establish that her belief in the necessity to use force was reasonable.
[brief] When [...] returned to the screen, he stated that [...] was not his witness.  [...] did the direct examination of [...] on April 20, 2022.  [...] was on cross-examination when [...] disappeared from the Zoom screen.  Yet, [...] stated:  MR. GALLAGHER: [...]'s not my witness.  He's not my client.  He's not -- I don't even know where he's at.  Where he's at?  (22T 33, lines 17-19).  THE COURT: He has to be your witness, [...].  Otherwise, there's no way to get the papers in.  MR. GALLAGHER: Okay.  (22T 33, lines 20-23).  The transcript of the remainder of the hearing will reflect that [...] never provided a credible reason for why he did not produce the Court Ordered documents, which included the insurance policy and the forms submitted to obtain the insurance funds.  The Court eventually ruled that even though there were missing documents, the fact that the insurance company paid the money to [...] demonstrated that the insurance company was satisfied that [...] was the owner of the policy.  The Court ordered that the insurance proceeds for the 538- policy be released to [...].
[brief] T4 100:17 to 101:3.  It was noted that during deposition no mention was made of a side trip to “Dunkin Donuts” but all of the sudden at trial this side trip was raised in an effort to extend the period of time between service and the car passing the toll booth.  T3 42:15-18.  But again this was discounted by the Court who found that there were no receipts for the Dunkin Donuts, and that service was not inconsistent with passing through the toll booth at the stated time period.  T4 101:1-3.  The evidence aligned, and the Court made factual determinations as to its accuracy and credibility.  It found no weighed evidence to defeat the lawful service of process.
[brief] This claim is meritless.  First, the case cited by defendant in support of his conclusion that the court improperly relied on a dismissed charge is State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015).  The Court in that case stated, “we hold that when no such undisputed facts exist or findings are made, prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose. ”  Id. at 199.  However, that case is inapplicable here because the Court was considering only:  [W]hether it was proper for the Somerset County Prosecutor to rely upon adult criminal charges that had been dismissed and juvenile charges of possession of a weapon, assault, fighting, and harassment that had been diverted and dismissed in rejecting defendant's application for admission into the Somerset County Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI).  [Id. at 194.]  Defendant’s argument that K.S. signifies the sentencing court improperly relied on dismissed conduct fails because that case does not apply in sentencing matters.
[directive] Parents/guardians also must provide their contact information to the court, if including telephone numbers, addresses, and email addresses applicable.  After of disposition, Probation staff should advise the juvenile the reporting conditions If the record.  the juvenile is seeking to leave the state, Probation should advise on the juvenile on the record, that the documents to transfer supervision under the If must signed provide instructions as to how this will be done.  the and ICJ be juvenile a secure facility, the documents to transfer supervision under the ICJ is in must be signed prior to the juvenile's release from the secure facility.  (3)  Probation and Secure Facility
[brief] 2T-59:16  The Court advised Defendant that he lacks an agreement that is in writing, her husband should have put the Agreement to sell back the property in writing.  Moreover, as evidenced in the Motion, the Rent had been paid for a long time.  The Judge Ordered payment of 14,700 dollars and possession of the property.  2T61-2  Finally, the Court denied the requests for a Stay of the Ruling in the Case.  2T62-15  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
[brief] (5T246-3 to 246-7)  Video S-38 depicted the entrance way to the laundromat at [...], and according to the detective, showed a “closeup” of the shooter.  Six seconds into the video, a person can be seen walking past the laundromat.  The video was paused, the detective pointed to the screen, the State asked, “who do you believe that to be,” and she responded: “The defendant. ”  The Court told the jury that the testimony was “the detective’s opinion as the person who’s worked on the case” and that the question of whether or not the person on screen was the defendant was for “[the jury] to answer. ”  As will be discussed in Point I.C., the identification of the defendant was improper and highly prejudicial under Sanchez.  But even short of identifying the person as the defendant, it was still improper for the detective to identify the person in S-38 as the shooter for the same reasons that her identification of the shooter in S-37 was improper: her evaluation as to what the image depicted was reasonably in dispute, and it was based upon an inference she drew from other facts in evidence, in violation of Watson factors three and four.
[brief] Cole’s fifth factor is “[w]hether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration. ”  Cole 215 N.J at 281.  The Cole court indicated that this factor is less significant than the other factors and is not dispositive.  Id. at 234.  The lower court incorrectly weighed this factor in favor of [...].  T1 73:4 - 74:5.
[directive] J. 278 (2008).  193 v. 1  Once a community-based placement for forensically involved committees is identified, the court should schedule a hearing as soon as practicable in order to ensure that the placement will not be lost to another individual due to delay.  Community based placements do not remain available indefinitely.  Attorney Name ------------ NJ  Attorney ID Number Address  Telephone Number of Attorney for State New Jersey/Defendant of of Superior Court  New Jersey  In the Matter Law Division  Criminal Part - Select County County - - --------  Indictment Number: -------  NG RI  Docket Number: Criminal Action of Order Mandating Conditional Release
[directive] When Re-activation 6.7 the or 6.2, 6.6, 6.5, 6.1, section to pursuant de-activated was BWC a where instance any In when if the and so do to practicable and safe is it as soon as re-activated be shall device requesting person the of interview the (ems., exist longer no de-activation justifying circumstances (ems., BWC the activate to required be otherwise would officer the and de-activation completed), is pursuant recorded be to required are that activities investigative other officer to proceeds the where Directive).  this to Authorized. is Force Enforcement Law Actual When Re-Activation 6.8 de- was BWC a where instance any in Directive, of provision snyother this Notwithstanding de- or Directive, this of provision other any or 6.6, 6.5, 6.2, section 6.1, to pursuant activated order a by issued or directive, procedure, operating standing policy, any to pursuant activated shall BWC the force, use to authorized is officer an that so develop circumstances the if department, so. do to practicable and safe is it as soon as re-activated be  Page 15
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Under those circumstances, a defendant “will not need to offer proof of suggestive behavior tied to a system variable” to be entitled to a Wade/Henderson hearing.  Id. at 233-34.  The Court stated “[t]his approach supplements the other remedies listed in Rule 3:11(d). ”  Id. at 234.  In Anthony, the Court found the officers had not complied “with Rule 3:11 or Delgado in full” because they had not prepared an electronic recording of the witness's out-of-court identification of the defendant, or a contemporaneous, verbatim written account of the exchange between the witness and the officer who administered the photo array.  Id. at 235.  Further, the State's reliance on a three-page police department form to document the identification process did not create an adequate record, because without an electronic recording or contemporaneous written account of the exchange, the record did not reveal the full dialogue between the witness and the officer, Rule 3:11(c)(2), nor was the witness's statement of confidence reflected in his own words, Rule 3:11(c) (9).  Id. at 236.  The Court remanded the case for a Wade/Henderson hearing, even though defendant had not presented evidence of suggestiveness, to allow defendant to explore all relevant variables.
[brief] So it’s a bit of a process we have to go through to get there. ”  Pa187.  (Emphasis supplied).  By August 7, 2022, and as shown in Board counsel’s email to [...]’s attorney, Pa172, the combination of the Township’s and Board’s planners and attorneys had drafted a revised rezoning ordinance, Pa182, drafted an amendment to the Settlement Agreement, Pa173, had discussed and received the endorsement of the Court’s Mt. Laurel Special Master, Pa172, and had also obtained approval from State Wide intervenor, [...] (‘[...]’), Id..
[brief] THE PRESENT ACTION AND APPEAL  On May 25, 2022, Appellant filed the Summons and Complaint (“Complaint”) against Respondents.  (Pa48-Pa67).  The Complaint alleges, against all Respondents, identical causes of action to the Counterclaims listed in the Collection Action, which were raised solely against [...]: violations of the NJCFLA, the NJCFA, Unjust Enrichment, and violation of the FDCPA, in connection with the acquisition and collection of a credit card debt she incurred with [...].  Id.  On May 25, 2022, Appellant moved to consolidate the Action with the Collection Action.  (Pa120).  In opposition, on June 16, 2022, Respondents cross-moved to dismiss the Complaint.  Id.  On August 18, 2022, Appellant opposed Respondent’s cross-motion and replied in further support of its motion to consolidate.  Id.  On September 6, 2022, Respondents replied in further support of their cross-motion to dismiss.  Id.  By Order dated September 23, 2022, the Lower Court granted Respondents’ cross-motion to the extent that it dismissed Appellant’s unjust enrichment claim only and denied the remaining portions of Respondents’ Cross-Motion.  (Pa121).  In addition, by Order dated September 23, 2022, the Court granted Appellant’s motion to consolidate.  Id.  On September 20, 2023, Appellant filed both a Motion to Compel Discovery and a Motion to Extend the Discovery deadlines, but which were thereafter withdrawn on September 22, 2023.  (Pa114-Pa115).  On September 22, 2023, Respondents filed a motion to compel arbitration under the terms of a valid, binding, and operative arbitration agreement.  (Pa116-Pa118).  On October 26, 2023, Appellant filed his opposition to Respondents’ motion.  On November 13, 2023, Respondents filed their reply in further support of their motion to compel arbitration.  On November 17, 2023, counsel for Appellant and counsel for Respondents virtually appeared for oral argument on Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration.  See Transcript, generally.  At oral argument, the Lower Court held that the timeliness of when a party asserts to the right to arbitration is relevant.  See Transcript, 11:19-20.  In noting this principle, the Lower Court further noted that “in our case, there’s been nothing don except paper discovery served, no answers provided, no depositions, nothing like that. ”  Id., 12: 6-8.  Thus, the Lower Court granted Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration because in “considering the totality of the circumstances . . . there has not been the type of prolonged litigation which equity would compel this Court to deny a motion like this. ”  *Id.*, 12:9-12.  Appellant thereafter filed his Notice of Appeal.  (Pa188-Pa192).  Appellant obtained an extension of time to perfect the appeal, and thereafter timely perfected on May 10, 2024.  Likewise, Respondents obtained an extension of time to submit the Respondents’ Brief, and they now timely submit their Brief pursuant to the Order of this Court.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT  [...]  IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS’ BRIEF  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent  N.A.T.C. Donuts, Inc.  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...] (Attorney ID No. 038402007) #645047v1 # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | ii | | TRANSCRIPTS OF ORAL ARGUMENT | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | The Underlying Accident | 5 | | No Dangerous Condition Existed On The Subject Property | 6 | | N.A.T.C. Donuts, Inc. Had No Actual Or Constructive Notice Relative To The Alleged Defect | 11 | | Prior To [...]’s Motion For Summary Judgment, The Trial Court Concluded That, As A Matter Of Law, No Dangerous Condition Existed In The Parking Lot | 13 | | The Township Is Required By The Lease To Maintain The Parking Lot Where Plaintiff Fell | 15 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 17 | | SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT | 17 | POINT I AS A TENTANT IN A MULTI-USE PARKING LOT, [...] HAD NO DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE COMMON AREAS .................................................. 19 POINT II [...] DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF ANY DANGEROUS CONDITION .............................................. 31 POINT III PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE HER PRIMA FACIE CASE WITHOUT A LIABILITY EXPERT .................. 37 POINT IV UNDER THE LEGAL STANDARD, THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO [...] .................................... 40 CONCLUSION ............................................. 42 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81 (2008) ..............................................................................................................22  Tegler v. Global Spectrum, 291 F. Supp. 3d 565 (D.N.J. 2018) ....................................................................................25  Triffin v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 372 N. J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................................................21 Walker v. Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2012) .................................................................................20 Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2005) ..................................................................................41 Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221 (App. Div.1994) ..................................................................................25, 30 Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70 (2005) ...............................................................................................................24 Zappasodi v. New Jersey, 335 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2000) ....................................................................................23 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 ....................................................................................................................24, 26 N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14 ...........................................................................................................1 N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8 ............................................................................................................22 N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and (c) (emphasis added) .....................................................................23 N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)
[brief] **AURORA HAD STANDING AS A NAMED “INTERESTED PARTY” TO SUE PRIME ON THE MSC-90 SURETY**  [...] argues that [...] did not file a claim against [...] and therefore the court erred in entertaining [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment against [...] on the MCS-90 surety.  (Br. p.30-31.)  [...] knew [...] was going to file a claim on the MCS-90 surety, which is why [...] named [...] as “a party that is believed to have an interest in the declaratory relief sought by [...]’s counterclaim against [...] and is therefore joined as an ‘interested party’ pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56. ”  [...] did not make any claims against [...] or seek any relief from [...].  (1T35:20-24).  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56 provides that, “when declaratory relief is sought, all persons having or claiming any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties to the proceeding. ”  In other words, [...] recognized [...]’s standing to make claims against [...] if the MCS-90 surety was triggered by a final judgment, which occurred here, because a surety is a three-party agreement, whereas an insurance policy is a two-party agreement.  Cruz–Mendez v. ISU/Insurance Servs., 156 N.J. 556, 568 (1999).  [...]’s standing to sue [...] is actually provided in the MCS-90 endorsement itself which states, “it is further understood and agreed that, upon failure of the company to pay any final judgment recovered against the insured as provided herein, the judgment creditor may maintain an action in any court of competent jurisdiction against the company to compel such payment. ” (PPCIa182-83).  A direct right of action by a judgment creditor is actually the hallmark of a surety agreement.  New Jersey Div. of Taxation v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, 399 N.J. Super. 315, 325 (App. Div. 2008).  [...], as a judgment creditor, has standing as a third-party beneficiary to assert a claim against [...] on the MCS-90 surety because the MCS-90 surety confirms that [...] “intended others to benefit from the existence of the contract” and that [...] is not merely an unintended beneficiary.  *Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers*, 90 N.J. 253, 259 (1982).  As such, [...] had standing to assert its claim for summary judgment against [...] on the MCS-90 surety endorsement because [...] specifically invited [...] as a judgment creditor to do so in the MCS-90 endorsement itself, and because [...] directly invited [...] to do so by naming [...] as an “interested party” in its Counterclaims addressing the MCS-90 surety.  **POINT VII**