ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Finally, the trial court did not err in making a reasonable suspicion analysis, rather than probable cause, because defendant was only arrested after he attempted to flee from the stop and because he was in possession of a firearm – he was not arrested based on the search warrant.  Importantly, if [...] intended to immediately arrest defendant and other suspects that day, he would have done so while he watched them enter and leave [...].  However, the record is clear that while defendant and the two others were suspects, [...] was waiting on the search warrant for [...] to collect more information about the crime and the suspects.  In fact, defendant was charged for the homicide only after [...] was searched and officers recovered evidence incriminating defendant and the other suspects.  Therefore, since defendant was stopped without a warrant, the trial court used the correct legal standard of reasonable suspicion.  Furthermore, because [...] had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and defendant admitted to carrying a firearm in his pants, [...] properly seized the firearm and arrested defendant following the seizure.  As such, all evidence seized was legal, and the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm.
[brief] These transactions were approved by the Trial Court and predicated upon outdated appraisals secured by the Trust.  [...] did not consent.  Defendants argue that the Trial Court and Trustee compelled [...] by Court Order to relinquish his shares in the Boonton and Florida Properties, at deeply discounted prices.  This contravenes the Trust language requiring that property shares be acquired at fair market value.  Furthermore, this conflicts with the Settlor’s primary or dominant plan requiring that all Trust property be divided equally.  Consequently, Defendants filed applications requesting permission to supplement their initial counterclaim to include new complaints involving breach of trust and unjust enrichment.
[brief] In this matter, the Commission finds that, while the subject matter of the Facebook posts—opting out of the union and masking in schools—may relate to the business of the Board, there is an insufficient nexus between Respondent’s personal Facebook page and her membership on the Board, such that a reasonable member of the public would not perceive that respondent is speaking pursuant to her official duties.  The posts at issue do not mention Respondent’s membership on the Board nor does she advertise or rely upon her board membership when publishing material on her social media page.  In short, there is no factual evidence that the statements/posts on her Facebook account were made as a member of the Board, or had the appearance of being representative of, or attributable to the Board.
[brief] 60 Johnson v. Glassman, 401 N.J. Super. 222 (App. Div. 2008) .................................................................................. 66 Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78 (1984) ..................................................................................................................... 49 Joseph Oat Holdings, Inc. v. RCM Digesters, Inc., 2009 WL 900758 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2009) .............................................................................. 40 Klein v. Cty. of Hudson, 187 N.J. Super. 603 (Law Div. 1980) ..................................................................................... 89 Kustka v. Batz, 236 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 1989) .................................................................................... 77 LaPlace v. Briere, 404 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div.), certif. den., 199 N.J. 133 (2009) ............... 67 Lautek Corp. v. Image Bus. Sys. Corp., 276 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div. 1994) .................................................................................... 88, 89 Liebling v. Garden State Indem., 337 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2001) ..................................................................................... 64 Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 83, 86 Matejek v. Watson, 449 N.J. Super. 179 (App. Div. 2017) ..................................................................................... 68 McGlynn v. Schultz, 95 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 1967) ......................................................... 79 Metex Mfg. Corp. v. Manson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25107 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008) ............................... 82 Motamed v. Chubb Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33301 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2016) ............................... 63 Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 143 N.J. 168 (1996) .............................................................................. 39 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235 (App. Div. 2005) ..................................................... 46 Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001) .............................................................................. 81 Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491 (2003) ..............................................................................
[brief] Government decisions must satisfy the court’s standards of legitimate authority, valid process, good faith, pertinent consideration, proportionately, non-arbitrariness and antidiscrimination.  Ultra vires actions are voidable.  See, James Meyers v. State Health Benefits Commission, __N.J. __ (Dec. 14, 2023) (per curiam) (slip op. at p.7) (“The law distinguishes between actions otherwise within an entity’s authority but marked by procedural irregularity and actions that are beyond the entity’s authority”); 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC v. Alessandro Roberto, __N.J. Super. __ (App. Div. Dec. 4, 2023) (slip op. at p.18) (“[J]udicial power is to be exercised to strike down governmental action only at the instance of one who is himself harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged conduct .
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................26  POINT I ......................................................................................................................26  THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO EVALUATE THE STATE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SFRA IN JERSEY CITY AS A FUNDING MEASURE APPROVED BY THE SUPREME COURT TO REMEDY THE LONGSTANDING VIOLATION OF A THOROUGH AND EFFICIENT EDUCATION IN THE ABBOTT LITIGATION (Raised Below: 1T:8-13 to IT:20-5; IT:34-19 to IT:46-15; Pa24-Pa28; Pa32-Pa33)  ...........................................................................................................26  A.  The Abbott XX Ruling Imposed Express Mandates on the State’s Implementation of the SFRA to Ensure Continued Remediation of the T&E Violation in [...].  .................................................................27  B.  The State Failed to Implement the SFRA in [...] at the Formula's Optimal Level ..................................................................................................................31  POINT II ..................................................................................................................................................37  THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE STATE HAS ALLOWED DEFICIENCIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION REQUIRING REMEDIATION TO EMERGE IN SFRA’S IMPLEMENTATION IN JERSEY CITY (Raised Below: 1T:8-13 to IT:20-5; IT:34-19 to IT:46-15; Pa24-Pa28; Pa32-Pa33)
[brief] (2T97-10 to 16).  [...] continued to canvass for evidence and eventually re-entered the rear yard of [...].  (2T101-12 to 21).  While searching that area, [...] attempted to look between two fences that abutted each other.  (2T102-3 to 13).  [...] lifted himself up and did not see any items of evidence.  (2T102-14 to 15).  However, when he attempted to jump down, he rolled his ankle in the yard of 427 Madison.  (2T102-15 to 18).  He then went inside of 427 Madison to look at surveillance video from the home.  (2T102-21 to 103-4).  After watching the video, [...] returned to the side walkway of [...] to inspect a storage box.  (2T107-25 to 108-2).  [...] observed and located a “black with brown handle revolver handgun. ” (2T109-4 to 6; 2T110-23 to 111-2).  [...] then notified his sergeant that he had located a second handgun and his sergeant advised [...] that the Crime Scene Identification Unit would respond and process that firearm as well.  (2T109-8 to 13).  The pain from [...]’s rolled ankle became too much, so he ceased his search and went to the hospital.  (2T112-7 to 12).
[brief] The Trial Court found that Appellant “made a business decision” to return the funds and that “[t]he fact that they did return it, the way they returned it, adds to the conclusion that they acted at least first and most unreasonably,” and therefore Appellant should bear the entirety of the loss.  --- \(^1\)  Contrary to Respondent’s arguments (Resp. Br. at 22), discovery (and supplementation of the record) would, in fact, answer all of questions the Trial Court raised for the first time (and sua sponte) during oral argument, namely: whether this was presented as a short sale (1T9:8-12) and whether the introductory requirements of Paragraph 9(b) had been met.  (1T11-14.)  Again, the Trial Court made no findings based upon the Loan Documents themselves, but rather based its determination on this “equitable” and “best position” analysis under *Omar*.  (1T55:17-21 (stating “[t]he idea of what provision of the mortgage really isn’t controlling to me. ”); 1T56:6-8 (“[t]here’s no privity between the . . . buyers and the [Appellant] under this document, certainly. ”).)  Contrary to Respondent’s urging that *Omar* is “directly on point” (Resp. Br. at 26-31), *Omar* is inapplicable, among other reasons, because it did not involve non-borrowers to the loan or a short payment returned to the agent for the non-borrower’s lender.
[directive] The DOL Director is authorized to establish whatever client communication protocols the Director deems appropriate, although a few general principles apply:    When representing the Governor’s Office, DOL attorneys can and should communicate with the Office as they would with any other client.  Any new request for legal advice from the Governor’s Office should be routed to the DOL Director, a DOL Deputy Director, or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the relevant Practice Group, and any legal advice provided by DOL in response to such a request should be routed through Counsel’s Office.    When seeking to ascertain a State agency’s policy objectives, in connection with their representation of a client agency, DOL attorneys may consult with representatives of the agency, the Governor’s Office, or both.  All other communications about the matter should be limited to DOL and the client agency.    When representing a State employee, as a matter of good practice, DOL attorneys should not contact the Governor’s Office regarding the representation without first conducting a conflict analysis to determine whether the interests of the client employee are adverse to the Governor’s Office or any other State agency.  It is the responsibility of the DOL Director to keep the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team apprised on contacts between DOL attorneys and the Governor’s Office, especially regarding new requests for legal advice.  D.  Review of executive orders.
[brief] State v. Rochat, 470 N.J. Super. 392, 436 (App. Div. 2022).  In considering whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable, appellate courts have “discretion to survey relevant decisions from other jurisdictions as well as pertinent, scientific and legal writings. ”  Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. at 539.  An “appellate court need not be as deferential to the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert scientific evidence as it should be with the admissibility of other forms of evidence. ”  State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 567 (2005).  As trial, the State depended on [...]’s review of injuries to [redacted] bones to establish that the blunt force trauma caused his death rather and did not occur afterward during the destruction of his remains, as the defense contended.
[brief] “Our State’s jurisprudence . . . has been marked by a strong adherence to the general prohibition of expert fee awards” unless “specifically authorized by statute, rule or agreement. ”  Maintainco, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift America, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 461, 481-82 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 502 (2009).  Plaintiffs attempt to evade this principle, arguing the authorities cited by defendants are inapposite because they address statutory language necessary to trigger an award of expert fees.  The suggestion is that there is a different standard for an award of expert fees purportedly authorized by contract than there is for statutory authorization.  Pb85.  Plaintiffs provide no authority for such a distinction or for defining what the standard would be for contractual language that expressly authorizes an award of expert fees.  As noted, the only contract relied upon that actually governed the working business relationship in MRL was the [...], a contract between [...] and [...].  It did not contain any provision for an award of attorneys’ fees, expert fees or other litigation expenses.  Plaintiffs seek to rely upon the indemnity language contained in the sales agreements, i.e., the [...] and the [...], for such an award.  However, as previously demonstrated, those indemnification provisions do not apply here.  There is, then, no express authorization for the trial court’s award of $296,651.45 in expert fees, deposition and court reporting costs to plaintiffs.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7 sets forth the criteria governing eligibility for AD for members of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System.  The statute states in pertinent part that “Upon the written application by a member in service…any member may be retired on an accidental disability retirement allowance; provided, that the medical board, after a medical examination of such member, shall certify that the member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties and that such disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence and that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of any other available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him.
[brief] Requests for deposition to commence were requested to the trial court and Defendants’ Counsel on occasions, as mentioned above.  The trial court never responded, and Defendants’ Counsel conducted an outreach via email, after they received their required discovery responses and with a date that proposed a medical inconvenience to the Plaintiff.  Per Rule 4:14 - Depositions Upon Oral Examination, N.J. Ct. R. 4:14:  Except as otherwise provided by R. 4:14-9(a), after commencement of the action, any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination.  Leave of court, granted with or without notice, must be obtained only if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration of 35 days after service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant by any manner, except that leave is not required if the defendant has already served a notice of taking deposition or otherwise sought discovery.  The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena as provided in R. 4:14-7.  The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.  Defendants and their Counsel requests were outside of court rules and formality\(^7\); specifically Rule 4:14 - Depositions Upon Oral Examination, N.J. Ct. R. 4:14.
[brief] A PWCRA-REGISTERED ENTITY WITH AN ARCHAEOLOGY DEPARTMENT IS NOT NECESSARILY A PWCRA-REGISTERED ARCHAEOLOGIST (0017a-0018a). **  We respectfully submit that a construction entity that has among its various departments an archaeology practice (*e.g.*, [...]—[...]’s proposed “archaeologist”), might be able to apply for and register under the PWCRA, but that does not make the entire entity, or the archaeology section thereof, a “registered archaeologist” under the PWCRA.
[brief] For all the reasons stated above, Respondents respectfully submit that this Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court because there are no genuine issues of the material facts and N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 bars Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law.  Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Fax: [...]
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  4.1.4  An internal affairs function may conduct an internal investigation on its own initiative or upon notice to or at the direction of the law enforcement executive or the internal affairs supervisor.  Internal affairs may refer investigations to the employee's supervisor for action as permitted by agency policy and procedures.  4.1.5  Internal affairs investigations must be considered as important to the agency as any criminal investigation.  Members of the internal affairs function therefore should have the authority to interview any member of the agency and to review records and reports of the agency relative to their assignment.  In addition, the agency's personnel should be instructed that the internal affairs function acts at the behest of the law enforcement executive in all internal affairs investigations.  The agency's personnel should be further instructed that during an internal affairs investigation, every member of the agency, regardless of rank, shall treat an order or a request from a member of the internal affairs function as if the order or request came directly from the law enforcement executive.  4.1.6
[directive] Duties of Criminal Justice Agencies  A.  A criminal justice agency may place information in an intelligence system and disseminate intelligence only if:  1. The agency has adopted written policies and procedures consistent with these guidelines.  2.  The head of the agency has designated and trained an intelligence professional (officer or analyst) to act for the agency as set forth in these guidelines.  3.  The agency agrees to abide by 28 CFR Part 23 (Criminal Intelligence System Operating Policies) and subsequent revisions of that policy.  B.
[brief] And, no party established that it had sustained “special injuries. ”  •  The Respondents failed to establish – and the trial court failed to state – how the addition of [...] as a plaintiff post-judgment is in accordance with either the Rules of Court, New Jersey law, or precedent.  •  The Respondents failed to establish how the relief afforded [...] by the judgment below is not precluded by [...]’s prior recovery in other proceedings or by its own failure to previously participate in this action.  In fact, the Respondents at Pb43-44 concede that [...]’s prior recovery and the recovery in the action below are one-and-the-same.  •  The trial court ignored that [...] and [...] are legally separate and distinct entities.  •  The trial court ignored the distinction between Appellant and corporate entities/limited liability entities in which he had/has an ownership interest.  •  The trial court failed to appreciate the implications of its grant of rescission of the so-called “Repurchase Agreement” and similarly failed to grant a truly “complete” rescission, in accordance with the law.
[brief] Judgment of Conviction .................................................................  Da 7 to 8  Order and Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion ......................... Da 17 to 28  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Indictment ........................................................................................................  Da 1 to 4  Verdict Sheet ......................................................................................................  Da 5 to 6  Judgment of Conviction .....................................................................................  Da 7 to 8  Appellate Division Decision on Direct Appeal, [...] ......................... Da 9 to 16  Order and Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion.................................  Da 17 to 28  Notice of Appeal ...............................................................................................  Da 29 to 32  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Commonwealth v. Mattis, 224 N.E.3d 410 (Mass. 2024) | 22, 23 | | Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) | 8, 11 | | In re Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021) | 20 | | Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) | passim | | Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) | 10 | | People v. Parks, 987 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. 2022) | 21 | | Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) | 8, 9 | | State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022) | 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, 24 | | State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285 (2021) | 23 | | State v. Roper, 362 N.J. Super. 248 (App. Div. 2003) | 14 | | State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017) | 8, 11, 14, 22, 23 | ### Statutes | Statute | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) | 8 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 | 3 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | PAGE NOS. | |-----------| | **Statutes (Cont'd)** | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d .................................................................................................................. 3 | | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12 ........................................................................................................... 8 | | U.S. Const. amend. VIII .......................................................................................................... 8 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV ......................................................................................................... i, 7, 8 | | **OTHER AUTHORITIES** | | [...] et al., *When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy*, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 769 (2016) ............................................. 19 | | [...] et al., *When is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts*, 27 Psychological Science 549 (2016) .............................................................................. 18 | | [...] & [...], *Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks*, 47 Criminology 327 (2009)
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  [...] testified that [...] raped her and threatened to kill her, so she stabbed him in self-defense.  The prosecutor, both when cross-examining [...] and in summation, sought to convince the jury that [...] was not raped because she did not report it.  As our Supreme Court recognized more than thirty years ago, arguments like what the State made here are “rooted in sexist notions of how the ‘normal’ woman responds to rape. ”  State v. Hill, 121 N.J. 150, 170 (1990).  Because [...]’s self-defense claim fully depended on whether the jury believed she was raped, the court should have instructed the jury on how to consider [...]’s silence after the rape.  See Model Criminal Jury Charge, “Fresh Complaint: Silence or Failure to Complain,” (Apr. 15, 2013).  Although not requested by defense counsel, the need for this instruction was clearly indicated by the record, and the court erred in its role by failing to provide this instruction to the jury.