ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.* at 450.  The *Zuber* Court recognized that, after applying the *Miller* factors, some juveniles “will receive lengthy sentences with substantial periods of parole ineligibility, particularly in cases that involve multiple offenses on different occasions or multiple victims. ”  *Id.* at 451.  --- 10  The United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional under the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the Eighth Amendment sentencing regimes that impose capital punishment on juvenile offenders, *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551, 568-70 (2005); life without parole on juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses, *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); and mandatory life without parole on juveniles convicted of homicide offenses, *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 489.
[brief] ..................................................................................................................53  NOTE: THIS BRIEF IS MUCH EASIER TO READ & WILL HAVE HYPERLINKS AT: www.[...]/BrettApp2Brf.pdf (.doc version also available)  The Appendices are also available as follows:  www.[...]/BrettAppAdx.pdf (Vol I & Conf. Vol. II together)  www.[...]/BrettAppAdx3.pdf  www.[...]/BrettAppAdx4.pdf  This Brief is Very Similar to the one from the Prior Appeal (There are Removed Moot Items & a Few Notes of Agreement on Issues- Most Bolded)
[brief] If 50 or 100 houses lost service due to a regulator station failure, the totality of the restoration process could leave homes without heat for days, which in the winter months could lead to significant damage to homes (through freezing pipes, etc.) and/or the health and well-being of residents.  As is customary in the industry, [...] will address the pressure-reduction icing effect at the Regulator Station by pre-heating the transmission-line natural gas with a heater located at the Facility prior to the pressure reduction.  The heater will allow [...] to heat the natural gas to approximately 80 or 90 degrees Fahrenheit, so the temperature after the pressure reduction stays above freezing, preventing ice from encasing the equipment and ensuring reliable operation of the Facility and the local distribution system.  In short, the heating unit is an extremely important component of the Regulator Station and is critical to [...]’s ability to provide safe, adequate and reliable natural gas service to the residents of [...] and the surrounding municipalities.
[brief] “On June 26, 2020, [...] was driving her vehicle in Hillside, New Jersey at a Dunkin’ Donuts drive-thru.  She literally had to drive her vehicle through and up to the drive-thru….She was stopped…” (1T7-8).  [P]laintiff was occupying her vehicle specifically in a drive-thru.  But for being in her vehicle, occupying and operating it, she would not have been able to use the drive-thru.  She drove up to the drive-thru window.  At that point put her foot on the brake and her car was still in drive, with her foot on the brake, key in the ignition…” (2T:5-6).  Defendant’s counsel argued:
[brief] Trial courts are “invest[ed] . . . with wide latitude in resolving attorney-fee applications .  . . .”  Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 25 (2004).  The Appellate Division “will disturb a trial court’s determination of counsel fees only on the rarest occasion and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ”  Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  “‘[I]n reviewing the exercise of discretion it is not the appellate function to decide whether the trial court took the wisest course, or even the better course, since to do so would substitute [the Appellate Division’s] judgment for that of the lower court.  The only question is whether the trial judge pursues a manifestly unjust course. ’”  Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 174 (1996) (quoting Gittleman v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 103 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 1967)).  “Findings by the trial judge are . . . binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence,” and will not be disturbed “unless . . . so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that an award of fees was warranted by Defendants’ egregious post-judgment fraud on the court that has gone on since 2016.
[brief] GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND PLEADINGS IN NEW JERSEY (Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T; 3T; 4T)  At the outset, it is worthwhile to recite the familiar, liberal standards governing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to N.J. Ct. Rule 4:6-2(e).  Such a motion is to be “judged by determining ‘whether a cause of action is “suggested” by the facts. ’”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989), quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).  Under this deferential standard, a trial court's review “is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. ”  *Id.* (citations omitted).  The trial court was obliged to “search[ ] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ”  *Id.* (citations omitted).  Critically, in “this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint. ”  *Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 746 (citation omitted).  Rather, every reasonable inference of fact should be construed in favor of the plaintiff.  *See id.; see also Velantzas*, 109 N.J. at 192.  Guided by these principles, the trial court was bound to “treat the [Plaintiff's] version of the facts as uncontradicted and accord it all legitimate inferences. ”  *See Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161, 166.  The court’s role was not to judge “the truth of the facts alleged; [it must] accept them as fact only for the purpose of reviewing the motion to dismiss. ”  *See id.*  Accordingly, this “examination of [the] complaint's allegations of fact . . . should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach. ”  *Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 746.  A Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss must be considered “with caution,” and granted in “only the rarest [of] instances. ”  *See Banco Popular*, 184 N.J. at 165, citing *Lieberman v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.*, 132 N.J. 76, 79 (1993) and *Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 772.  Based upon these liberal standards, the trial court should have sustained the Complaint, because Plaintiff more-than satisfied New Jersey’s liberal pleading standards as to each of the claims against [...] and [...].  Moreover, even assuming that there were perceived deficiencies in the Complaint, any order granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss should have been *without prejudice* to Plaintiff’s right to file an amended complaint.  *See Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 771-72 (“If a complaint must be dismissed after it has been accorded the kind of meticulous and indulgent examination counseled in this opinion, then, barring any other impediment such as a statute of limitation, the dismissal should be without prejudice to a plaintiff’s filing of an amended complaint. ”).  **POINT II**
[brief] *See Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield* of N.J. v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 29, (App. Div. 2012) (citing Rule 4:10-2(g)); see also Rule 4:10-2(f)(2) (“party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. ”).  Moreover, no justification was proffered by the trial court (or by Plaintiffs) as to the purpose of producing 68,000 irrelevant documents.
[brief] THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS REQUIRES REVERSAL.  The combined prejudice of all the errors raised by [...], including the issue raised in his pro se brief, deprived [...] of due process and a fair trial and require reversal of his convictions.  All the errors affected whether the jurors would credit the suspect testimony of [...] and [...] about [...]’s alleged confession.  The jurors would have been less likely to credit this alleged confession if: (1) they heard that [...] had problems with [...] and [...] and shot at [...] in the months before the crime; (2) they did not hear [...]’s impermissible net opinion that [...]’s cell phone was in Trenton and Willingboro at times consistent with the time frame provided by [...]; (3) they did not hear that [...] had shared [...]’s alleged confession with a friend who then contacted the police.  Considering the combined effect of these errors, [...]’s convictions should be reversed.
[brief] ”  This Court went further, however, and remarked that Plaintiff was aware of the “illegal favoring of a competing developer” prior to completion of the First Action.  Thereafter, the trial court below, without justification, disavowed its own factual and credibility determinations - stating they were “irrelevant”.  In so doing, the trial court incorrectly replaced its well-reasoned findings with comments made by this Court in a separate action, in a different context, and without the benefit of any discovery.  Considering that all preclusionary doctrines are equitable in nature, the trial court should have been less concerned with the hyper technicalities of the collateral estoppel doctrine (which were not even satisfied) and more concerned with achieving the correct outcome based on the evidence.  It was clear - at least to the trial court which carefully examined the evidence -  Plaintiff did not know of the facts underlying its bad faith claim in the First Action.  The trial court’s factual and credibility determination in this action should be given the weight they deserve.
[brief] As summarized in the Statement of Facts above, [...]’ expert report within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty and upon his inspection of the steps concluded that “[a]s a result of the degradation of the stair surface, water is trapped in the below surface pocket areas; and when freezing takes place the water expands to ice above the stair tread surface. ” (Pa354).  [...]’s opinion also concluded that “the locations of the handrails were too far from the walkway pathway to allow [...] the ability to utilize them to stabilize himself or to help him regain his balance after slipping on the icy surface” and that “[r]ailing[s] should be closer to the pedestrian walking pathway. ” (Pa354; Pa355).  [...] further noted that, when wet, the landing had a substandard COF of .41.  (Pa350; Pa353-354).  [...]’ opinion regarding the water infiltration of the deteriorating steps and the unreasonably dangerous freezing rising above the surface, even upon a slight “trace” of precipitation, is substantial evidence of a preexisting dangerous condition.  The [...] and the [...] did not properly inspect, assess, repair, or rectify this preexisting condition despite the discoverable danger.
[brief] Additionally, a remand to follow the procedures [...] believes should have been followed would be inequitable and unnecessarily require protracted proceedings for the same result.  In filing the fee application, Plaintiff explained why he was entitled to an award of fees.  The trial judge necessarily agreed that an award of fees was warranted before proceeding to quantify the amount of fees to be awarded.  [...] had ample opportunity to oppose both the entitlement and amount in his opposition and indeed Plaintiff consented to an adjournment of the fee application to permit [...] sufficient time to submit fulsome opposition.  Had [...] believed more time was required to permit him to fully review the time entries, he could have requested additional extensions.  Instead, he strategically chose to rest on an invented procedural technicality, and opted not to challenge any specific entries submitted by Plaintiff.
[brief] (Ca382-396).  On April 8, 2022, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer.  On May 2, 2022, Appellants filed their Brief in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Ca216-239),\(^1\) as well as a Motion to Amend the Complaint to add Counts 8-12, which related to conduct that occurred after the initial Complaint was filed.
[brief] Throughout the DJ Action, the trial court granted multiple stays at the insistence of [...], starting in 2019 and which collectively lasted 38 months (i.e., more than 3 years).  There were four separate mediations before [...], which have led to resolutions of the defense issues.  During the first two mediations, the parties recognized that there was a need for a ruling on allocation of defense costs among the four primary insurers (including [...]) before a potential mediated resolution could be reached.
[brief] ”  (1T 77-11 to 13)  They asserted that he had both the “motive” and the “opportunity” to murder [...] and insisted he explain, but [...], now looking away, did not respond for over thirty seconds -- but they continued to question him.  (1T 77-14 to 79-22; Da 109, 02:13:28 to 02:14:00)  After another break, they disclosed that they previously spoke with his father who was “real concerned” about him and “d[id]n’t want [him] down that road,” and [...] empathized that he had heard [...] was “a good kid, just caught up in the wrong situations.
[brief] The jury then entered the courtroom, and the State's examination of [...] was extremely brief and was limited to testimony of being shot in the leg by a man who got out of a car.  The State, consistent with its earlier representation, never asked [...] to identify defendant.  During the cross-examination of [...], when it became clear that defense counsel intended to question [...] about his failure to make an out-of-court identification the day before, the judge excused the jury and conducted a Wade hearing.  With [...] seated in the witness stand, the judge handed him all of the photographs at the same time and asked [...] to indicate whether any of those photographs depicted his assailant.  [...] answered, stating two of the photographs looked the same to him and he believed that one of the two was the person who shot him.  In fact, neither of the two photographs selected by [...] during the 104(a) hearing was a photograph of defendant.  While [...] was on the stand, the State asked him to look at the defendant and indicate whether the defendant is the person who shot him, to which [...] answered, “yes.
[brief] Unlike *Olds*, where a plaintiff's legal malpractice claim accrued as a result of the underlying action, the Entire Controversy Doctrine's purpose is served by requiring the plaintiff to notify the trial court of the potential claim which was known and existed during the underlying action.  In *Dimitrakopoulos*, the plaintiff's claim for alleged legal malpractice against defendants which was known and existed before the litigation was barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  *Id.* at 119.  Both *Olds* and *Dimitrakopoulos* focused on the importance of the timing of the accrual of an action.  They reviewed when the claim arose and whether they arose from similar or related facts.  *Olds*, 150 N.J. at 428; *Dimitrakopoulos*, 237 N.J. at 119.  The Instant Action is not a case where the allegations of legal malpractice accrued after the pendency of the underlying action.  In fact, the claims for alleged legal malpractice were known to the Plaintiff during the pendency of the Lease Litigation.  This is not a case where the allegations in the Instant Action are separate and distinct from the Lease Litigation.  In fact, they are interconnected as they both arise from the same transaction as evidenced by both the pleadings and in discovery.  This is not a case where the Defendants represented Plaintiff in the Lease Litigation, thereby putting them in conflicting roles of representing the client in the underlying action and also representing their own interest as defendants and implicating issues of privilege or fairness.  See Olds, 150 N.J. at 442.  Quite simply, Plaintiff brought the Instant Action for legal malpractice subsequent to the Lease Litigation wherein claims against Defendants had already accrued and the circumstances surrounding the transaction were already litigated.  The Instant Action certainly falls outside the scope of exception to the Entire Controversy Doctrine as set forth in Olds.  Ibid.  In the Lease Litigation, Defendants were not acting as counsel for Plaintiff and the alleged malpractice accrued prior to litigation.  The Olds Court's policy considerations for exempting plaintiff's claim from the Entire Controversy Doctrine were also not present in this matter.  Ibid.  Plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice against Defendants is not protected from the Entire Controversy Doctrine pursuant to the exceptions set forth in Olds v Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424(1997) and the holding in Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, 237 N.J. 91, 119 (2019).
[directive] The revised mandates that, if an agency’s IAPP internal affairs investigators are unable to complete an investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive, who may take steps to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  § 6.1.4.  Investigators must provide further notice to the law enforcement executive every additional 45 days that the investigation remains incomplete.  § 6.1.5.  In the rare cases where the agency has not filed Page 4 disciplinary charges within 180 days of receipt of the complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor, who will investigate the reasons for the extended investigation and will also examine whether the agency’s internal affairs function faces any systemic issues that require additional resources or oversight.  § 6.1.6.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION APPELLATE COURT  DOCKET NUMBER: [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, BURLINGTON CO.  DOCKET NUMBER: [...]  On Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Div., Burlington Co.  Dated: February 28, 2024  Trial Court Judge: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Brief of Plaintiff / Appellant / Cross-Respondent
[brief] 1707 Realty, supra, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2381, at *12 (quoting, Kent Motor, supra, 207 N.J. at 443).  The Entire Controversy Doctrine has since been implemented through R. 4:30A, which provides:  Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine, except as otherwise provided by R. 4:64-5 (foreclosure actions) and R. 4:67-4(a) (leave required for counterclaims or cross-claims in summary actions).
[brief] Rather, the trial court merely stated its “opinion” that “the Arbitrator did not . . . create[] a new work rule regarding termination of employees unable to perform their essential functions[,]” (Pa140), ignoring the award’s plain language clearly establishing an unwarranted limitation on [...]’s ability to set standards of performance for its employees, as well as language in the CBA permitting [...] to set standards of performance in its sole discretion.  The trial court further held that the Arbitrator merely “found that there was no reason for removal of the employee aside from her temporary recovery from a medical procedure and incidental limitation to perform. ”  (Pa134)  In essence, the trial court’s decision was little more than a rubber stump, devoid of the necessary analysis concerning whether the Arbitrator exceeded his authority or infringed upon [...]’s managerial prerogative as set by decades of case law and memorialized in the CBA.  The present appeal followed.
[brief] On April 6, 2018, [...] and [...] filed an Answer to the Third Amended Complaint, Amended Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint.  (Pa51 – Pa100).  In their Amended Counterclaim, [...] and [...] asserted claims for: (i) Violation of the New Jersey Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (count one); (ii) breach of contract (count two); (iii) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (count three); (iv) breach of fiduciary duty (count four); (v) breach of the duty of loyalty (count five); (vi) intentional misrepresentation (count six); (vii) negligent misrepresentation (count seven); (viii) civil conspiracy (count eight); (ix) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage (count nine); (x) conversion (count ten); (xi) unjust enrichment (count eleven); and (xii) abuse of process (count twelve).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED AN ORDER TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT  BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL HAD ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A SETTLEMENT  .........................................................................................................................3  A.  Plaintiff’s Former Counsel Had Actual Authority to Settle this Matter with Defendant [...] .........................................................................................................................6  B.  Plaintiff’s Prior Counsel Had Apparent Authority to Settle the Matter ....8  II.  PLAINTIFF WAS NOT UNDULY PRESSURED TO ENTER INTO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT  .....................................................................................................................10  CONCLUSION
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 40A:11-23(b) ("The advertisement shall designate the manner of submitting and the method of receiving the bids and the time and place at which the bids will be received.  If the published specifications provide for receipt of bids by mail, those bids which are mailed to the contracting unit shall be sealed and shall only be opened for examination at such time and place as all bids received are unsealed and announced.  At such time and place the contracting agent of the contracting unit shall publicly receive the bids, and thereupon immediately proceed to unseal them and publicly announce the contents . . .  No bids shall be received after the time designated in the advertisement. ”).  c.
[brief] In reaching that holding, the court cited Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group, 77 N.J. 228 (1998), which "restated extant public policy which applied not only to automobile insurance policies but also to other forms of liability policies [that] the ability to arbitrarily terminate an insurance policy mid-term violates the tenets of good faith that Weathers noted was required of insurers."  Id.  Similarly, in Valley National, 317 N.J.Super. 152, the court reversed a summary judgment upholding the cancellation of a fire policy utilizing cancellation standards applicable to other types of policies.
[brief] *Casey* affirmed a judge who refused to apply either marketability or minority discounts.  “Our Supreme Court has held "that marketability discounts generally should not be applied when determining the 'fair value' of dissenters' shares in a statutory appraisal action," in the absence of "extraordinary circumstances."  *Id.* at 112.  *Casey* confirmed that *Lawson* requires, “[o]rdinarily, all shareholders are entitled to be paid fair value for their shares, because of the fiduciary duty majority shareholders and directors have to treat minority shareholders fairly. ”  *Id.* at 107-108 (emph. added).  Plaintiffs likewise ignore that *Brown v. Brown*, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 483 (App. Div. 2002) also confirmed the same change in our valuation law a year later, including cases, “valuing shares in a court-ordered buy-out resulting from an oppressed shareholder situation”.  Therefore, *Brown* recognized that, even in oppression cases, “neither marketability nor a minority discount should be applied absent extraordinary circumstances. ”  Ibid.  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument here, it is the law that “ordinary” cases no longer allow discounts to fair value.