ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 20 Sch. All. Ins. Fund v. Fama Const. Co. 353 N.J. Super. 131 (Super. Ct. 2001)  ..................................................................................  19 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 473 U.S. 479 (1985)  ............................................................................................................... 36, 42 State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp. 94 N.J. 473 (N.J. 1983) .........................................................................................................  33  Stoecker v. Echevarria 408 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................................................... 30 Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Springfield 162 N.J. 418 (1998) .............................................................................................................. 22, 23 Swistock v. Jones 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989) ................................................................................................. 39 Teamsters Local 97 v. State of New Jersey 434 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 2014) ................................................................................... 20 Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh 224 N.J. 189 (2016) .............................................................................................................. 18 Townsend v. Pierre 221 N.J. 36 (2015) ................................................................................................................. 23 Twp. of Marlboro v. Scannapieco 545 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457-58 (D.N.J. 2008) ........................................................................... 36, 37 United States v. Lemm 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982) ............................................................................................... 39 Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc. 387 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2006) .................................................................................. 33, 34
[brief] APPELLANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY ENTITLEMENT TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR ITS EXPERT FEES (2T11:3-10)  Appellant’s position that he must “pay for the mistake made by the government” (Db24) is contradicted by his actual knowledge of the easement location as discussed in detail supra.  There were multiple opportunities for Appellant to avoid any alleged wasted expert fees, yet Appellant chose to exploit information he knew to be incorrect and relied exclusively on that incorrect information; in the face of contradictory information in his possession/knowledge; as a basis for the inflated $1,550,000 estimate of just compensation for the easement acquisition.  At the outset, it is important to note that when granting the [...]’s motion to amend, the trial court specifically held that Appellant would not “be prejudiced in any way” by the amendment.
[brief] Although Plaintiff/Respondents generally explain that there were conflicts alleged in that case and that the Court ultimately held no conflict between the CCA and the CFA, Plaintiff/Respondents never actually spell out the alleged conflict that the Court dismissed.  In [...], the issue was whether Plaintiff’s CFA complaint could proceed within the Courts for a claim of damage or whether the Division of Gaming Enforcement Division had sole jurisdiction.  Id. at 315.  The question in [...] had nothing to do with conflicting requisite mental states in perpetration of wrongful conduct under two different statutes like this present appeal.  Further, [...] dealt with a distinction between non-gaming related advertising and advertising related to the games themselves.  Ultimately, the Appellate Division in [...] found that the conflict between the CCA and the CFA was not enough to eliminate [...]’s common law claims and to prevent him from seeking relief in Court:
[brief] ...........................................  38  Jaludi v. Citigroup, 933 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2019) .................................................................  36  John G. Ryan, Inc. v. Molson USA, LLC, 2005 WL 2977767 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2005) ...........................................  45  Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707 (D.N.J. 2013) ..................................................................
[brief] **The Underlying Claim and Prior Litigation**  [...] initially filed suit against [...] alleging that [...] was negligent and breached its contract with [...] when two [...] emulsion trailers went missing from an [...] jobsite.  Pa1, at ¶1, Pa33-43.  The parties thereafter participated in a mediation with mediator [...], Esq. Pa2, at ¶3.  Soifer drafted an agreement signed by the parties which resolved the dispute and appointed Soifer to serve as arbitrator in the event of dispute over implementation of the settlement agreement.  Pa85 (“The agreement designated the person who drafted the agreement on behalf of the parties as the arbitrator of any disputes”), Pa93 (holding parties “agreed to arbitrate a dispute over the terms of the settlement agreement and further agreed the attorney who drafted the agreement would serve as arbitrator”); Pa45 (Settlement Agreement).  Specifically, the settlement agreement required [...] to deliver two mutually agreeable replacement trailers to [...], and further provided that:  If a dispute arises between the parties regarding the performance of the conditions upon which the settlement is based, then the parties agree to binding arbitration of the dispute before Mark Sofier as the sole arbitrator.  Pa45  Following a dispute over who breached the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties participated in an arbitration hearing before Soifer.  At the conclusion of that hearing, Soifer asked the parties: “What would be the result if I determined the agreement is too ambiguous to enforce?”  Pa93-94.  In response, [...]’s counsel threatened to sue Soifer for malpractice if he found the settlement agreement to be ambiguous.  Pa94.  Shortly thereafter, Soifer entered an award finding that the settlement agreement was not ambiguous, that [...] breached it, and advising that an additional hearing on damages would be scheduled.
[brief] In Mt. Laurel v. [...], a municipality brought a condemnation action as part of its open space acquisition program against landowner that was planning to develop a subdivision on the subject property.  Mount Laurel Tp. v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C., 188 N.J. 531, 910 A.2d 617 (2006).  The Supreme Court held that the municipality had the statutory power to condemn property for open space, which property was set to be developed as a residential subdivision, as a valid exercise of its eminent domain power.
[brief] Traces indicating that someone was, at some time, physically present in a location where a crime occurred is not, in itself, direct evidence that the contributor of that evidence committed a crime.  Several factors, including the quality of the evidence, layers of traces, and the location where the evidence was found can result in some inferences about when that evidence was left at a scene.  Severely degraded evidence or other trace evidence found on top of a sample might suggest the passage of time, and DNA found under a deceased individual’s fingernails might provide additional, circumstantial information.  Recovering traces of a particular person at a crime scene can also indicate that they were physically present in that location, though that is not definitive.  Though it is more likely that someone who was present at the crime scene at some time is guilty than someone who was never present at the crime scene, that is merely inferred from the evidence, not proved by it.
[brief] J. 402 (2003) | 9 | | Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565 (1996) | 12,13 | | Ferreira v. Rancocas Ortho. Assocs., 178 N.J. 144 (2003) | 8,9 | | Gilborges v. Wallace, 153 N.J. Super. 121 (App. Div. 1977), | | | rev’d in part on other grounds, 78 N.J. 342 (1978) | 11 | | Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cty., Inc., | | | 250 N.J. 368 (2022) | 1,9,10,14 | | Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 170 N.J. 602 (2002) | 6 | | Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 (1985) | 6 | | Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr., | | | ___ N.J. ___ (July 11, 2024) | 8 | | Palanque v.  Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398 (2001) | 9 | | Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg | | | & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010) | 9 | | Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449 (2012) | 5,6 | | Constitutions | | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶9 | 4 | | **Statutes** | **Pages** | |-------------|----------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 | 9 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 | 5,6 | | **Regulations** | **Pages** | |----------------|----------| | 29 CFR §1926.16 | 13 | | 29 CFR §1926.16(b) | 13 | | **Rules of Court** | **Pages** | |--------------------|----------| | R. 4:46-2 | 4,11 | | N.J.R.E. 702 | 14 | | **Other Authorities** | **Pages** | |-----------------------|----------| | N.J. Model Jury Charge (Civil)
[brief] *Id.*  Key to this court’s ruling was its finding that the plaintiff “presented nothing different in support of [her] pre-trial application [to bar the testimony] than she did in support of the earlier motion [to bar the same testimony]” that was denied by the motion judge.  *Id.*  The *Firoz* decision should not be considered, but if it is, it is inapposite here because this case involves a motion for reconsideration (not the re-filing of the same motion), which is based on specifically identified reasons why the “interest of justice” necessitated reconsideration.
[brief] ”)  The family court is part of the court of equity, moreover, with inherent power to see that justice is done in the particular case before it.  The ”very foundation of equitable jurisprudence” is “that equity ‘will not suffer a wrong without a remedy’” and that a chancery court will enter its orders to achieve “a just and equitable result” on the case before it.  Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342, 349 (1954); cf. Penn Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Joyce, 75 N.J. Super. 275, 278 (App. Div. 1962) ("Quite independent of statute or rule of court, Chancery has inherent power to set aside a sale or to order redemption 'when there is an independent ground for equitable relief, such as fraud, accident, surprise, irregularity in the sale, and the like'"); Karel v. Davis, 122 N.J. Eq. 526, 528 (1937) ("In these circumstances, it was entirely proper for the Chancellor, in the exercise of the power inherent in courts of equitable jurisdiction to control their own process, to relieve the mortgagee of such obligation as the sale imposed, and to direct a resale of the mortgaged lands"). All of these principles show that it would be improper and inequitable to deny relief to [...] from the alimony and equitable distribution rulings effected by the default judgment entered against her -- a judgment premised in part on a lie that [...] and his lawyer told the family court judge who entered it; a judgment that enforced a presumptively unenforceable Mid-Marriage Agreement that New Jersey law holds is inherently coercive; a judgment that was not premised on any findings of fact and conclusions of law about the propriety of the alimony and equitable distribution determinations [...] and his lawyer demanded the family court enter against the absent [...].
[brief] ”  Doe, 142 N.J. at 108 (quoting State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 712 (1989)).  “The doctrine’s ‘primary considerations should be fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in the light of the constitutional and common law goals. ””  Saavedra, 222 N.J. at 67-68 (quoting Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. at 706).  Here, defendant’s guarantee of due process is not violated by estopping him from filing this motion to suppress because, contrary to the court’s finding otherwise, defendant has already had his day in court.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................  4 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................  10 LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................  13  I.  PRECEDENTIAL CASE LAW IN NEW JERSEY HOLDS THAT A LONG-TERM LEASE SHOULD BE FACTORED INTO MARKET VALUE OF A PROPERTY (1T13:11-16:5; 1T32:5-34:19)......................................................  13  A.  The [...]’ Attempts To Bootstrap An Appeal Of The Arbitrator’s Factual Determinations Regarding The [...] Lease Are Improper And Outside The Bounds Of Permissible Appeal (Not Raised Below).  .......................  13  B.  The Arbitrator Correctly Determined That The 30-Year [...] Lease Adversely Affected Market Value Of The Property As Of January 27, 1994..16  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DATE OF VALUATION IS JANUARY 27, 1994  INSTEAD OF THE MAY 4, 2018 DATE OF TAKING AS IT AWARDS THE BERARDIS DOUBLE RECOVERY ON A RENT-PRODUCING PROPERTY (2T6:7-7:18).  ...............  24  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE TOWNSHIP’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO BAR THE LAND REPORT AS A NET OPINION (3T6:24-10:2).........................................................................................  30 CONCLUSION.........................................................................................
[brief] 35 R. 4:26-4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ passim | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript Number | |-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------| | Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 9/27/2019 | 1T | | Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 3/18/2022 | 2T | | Rule 104 Hearing | | 3T | INTRODUCTION
[brief] “Da” refers to Appellants’ appendix and “Db” refers to Appellants’ brief.  “1T” refers to the August 15, 2023 transcript of the Order to Show Cause hearing. and compelling need” to do so, “such as the health and safety of a student or an incident of bias-related crime. ” (Ra9, Da259).  On June 20, 2023, Appellants amended the Policy 5756—Transgender Students (“Amended Policy”).
[brief] THE SEARCHES OF MR. GALLOWAY’S CAR AND HOME WERE INVALID BECAUSE BOTH TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE TOMS RIVER MUNICIPAL COURT AND THE TOMS RIVER POLICE OFFICERS.  U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶ 7.  (2T12-4 to 17-7; Da 65)  There is no dispute about the geographical facts in this case: (1) Toms River police officers secured a warrant from [...] in the Toms River Municipal Court to search [...]’s car in Toms River; and (2) on August 7, 2020, the Toms River officers stopped [...]’s car, arrested him, and executed the search warrant in Lakewood.  Then, (3) the officers searched [...]’s Lakewood home.  Nor can there be any real debate that these actions violated clear jurisdictional limits: (1) the reach of [...]’s search warrant was limited to the territorial borders of Toms River, N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16(a); N.J.S.A. 2B:12-19(a); R. 3:5-1; and (2) [...] officers were prohibited from executing searches outside of Toms River, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.  Importantly, “jurisdiction is a legal issue” that must be reviewed de novo.  State v. Tri-Way Kars, Inc., 402 N.J. Super. 215, 221 (App. Div. 2008) (citation omitted).  And because searches executed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the authorizing judge or executing police officer are void, the extraterritorial actions in this case violated [...]’s constitutional rights and suppression is required.
[brief] [Da17 - Da18].  Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a nearly identical Notice of Motion on November 14, 2022, which Assignment [...], again, *sua sponte* dismissed on November 17, 2022 as frivolous pursuant to prior Assignment [...]’s injunctive order.  [Da29 - Da30].  On September 27, 2023, this Appellate Court affirmed the Trial Court’s November 17, 2022 dismissal order, concluding that there was no legal error or abuse of discretion in dismissal pursuant to Assignment [...]’s injunctive order directing that all of Plaintiff’s lawsuits be reviewed by the assignment judge for a determination of dismissal.  [Da35].  In its September 27, 2023 opinion, this Appellate Court held that, pursuant to Rule 1:4-8(c), an assignment judge may enjoin a litigant from bringing further actions where traditional sanctions have failed to deter that litigant from his pattern of bringing repetitive, meritless, and harassing actions.  [Da34].  Here, Assignment [...]’s December 12, 2023 Order *sua sponte* dismissing Plaintiff’s December 4, 2023 Notice of Motion, which is the subject of this appeal, is virtually identical in its circumstance and reasoning as Assignment [...]’s November 17, 2022 dismissal order which, as discussed above, was affirmed by this Appellate Court.  [AB17a - AB18a].  For the same reasons held by this Appellate Court in its September 27, 2023 opinion, and in the interest of preserving judicial consistency, [...] respectfully submits that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiff’s December 4, 2023 Notice of Motion pursuant to Assignment [...]’s March 9, 2012 injunctive order.
[brief] Under Relevant and Binding Insurance Law, the Underlying Judgment Awarded “Damages” Against [...].  (Pa3).  Although not explained or supported by citation of authority, the Challenged Decision states that [...] “fail[ed] to meet his burden, of characterizing the award of attorneys’ fees as damages. ”  T85-5 to T85-7.  This ruling is erroneous.  Under both New Jersey and Vermont law, when attorneys’ fees are made recoverable as compensation for loss due to another’s breach of legal duty, they constitute “damages.
[brief] [Yes]  [No]  i.  Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  If the crime involves a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty?  (1)  $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3) $750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4) $500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5) $250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense
[brief] ”  Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 330 (1984), citing Bergen County Pines Hosp. v. Dept. of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456 (1984); see also Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 854 (E.D. Va.  1980)(stating that “[W]ithout published rules of procedure and substantive criteria for [the taking of the proposed action], affected parties] have been denied any meaningful opportunity for informal response to the proposed action”).  “When an agency’s determination alters the status quo, persons who are intended to be reached by the finding, and those who will be affected by its future application, should have the opportunity to be heard and to participate in the formulation of the ultimate determination. ”  Metromedia, 97 N.J. 330 (citations omitted).  It is clear through the hearing officer’s report that an unwritten rule here was applied in effecting denial of the Application.  (Aa228).  As a land use agency subject to the APA, the [...] cannot hold the Applicant to an unpublished standard, and in the same vein, the agency cannot utilize unadopted rules to deny an application for an otherwise permitted use.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................3  I.  The Parties.................................................................................................................................3  II.  The Staffing Office and Payroll ...............................................................................................4  III.  [...]’s Policies and Procedures............................................................................................5  IV.  Staffing Coordinator Office Dynamics and the Impact of COVID-19......................6  V.  [...]’s Chronic Complaints and Improper Behavior .........................................................7  VI.  [...]’s Complaining Reaches a Tipping Point.................................................................9  VII.  [...]’s Alleged “Complaints” About [...]  Prior to June 24, 2020.  ...10  VIII.  [...] Investigates the June 24, 2020 Incident..........................................................11  IX.  [...], [...], and [...] Repeatedly Sought More Pay .................................12  X.  Theft of Additional Pay  By [...], [...], and [...] ..............................................13  XI.  [...] Investigates the Unauthorized Entry and Receipt of Charge Pay...16  XII.  [...], [...], and [...] are Terminated...............................................................19  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................20
[brief] Plaintiff otherwise argues that its claim regarding a purported “promotional policy” was a direct evidence case and, as such, the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework was not applicable and it was error for the Trial Court to apply same.  (Pb13-14, 22).  Again, Plaintiff’s argument and conveniently “shifting” claims is defeated by its own Complaint, as summarized above.  Plaintiff pleaded the same prima facie elements/standards cited by the [...] and relied upon by the Trial Court and then alleged that “[t]he [...] has met the prima facie elements required. ”  That notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s “direct evidence” arguments are immaterial and present no basis to disturb the Trial Court’s ruling in any event.
[brief] This brief is submitted by Defendants-Appellants [...], the [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, the “[...]”).  The core facts of this case were previously set forth by this Court in its 2006 opinion, Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, No. A-5027-03T3 (App. Div. Dec. 15, 2006) (490a), and its 2018 opinion, Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, No. A-2053-13T3 (App. Div. June 1, 2018) (38895a).  While this appeal focuses on the errors of the trial court following the June 1, 2018 remand, the [...] provide a more complete statement of facts for the benefit of the Court in understanding the issues in this appeal.
[brief] 23 Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 409 (2003) .............................................................  14  Carvalho v. Toll Bros. and Developers, 143 N.J. 565, 573-74, 675 A.2d 209 (1996)  21 Courier v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 (2002) ......................................................................  27  Haviland v. Lordes Medical Center Of Burlington Cty, Inc., 250 N.J. 368 (2022)
[brief] The reasons were not given, but when we look at the actual words that the defendant, [...], used to describe the transaction, he said basically that the $50,000.00 was a gift given to him by [...], but the only thing he could use the money for was to purchase a house for [...].  (2T 34-37).  Yet, [...] bought the house for himself by placing his name alone on the deed.  Of course there appears superficially that [...] was willing to do so.  If undue influence is lacking, it is because [...] Matos was obviously tricked by trusting [...] to handle the details.