ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).  “A person can be found guilty of ‘purposeful’ SBI murder if the actor’s purpose was to inflict serious bodily injury, but the actor nevertheless ‘knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death and that it was highly probable that death would result. ’”  State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 408 (2008) (quoting State v. Cruz, 163 N.J. 403, 417-18 (2000)).  Alternatively, a person can be found guilty of knowing SBI murder “when the State makes the same showing, but ‘rather than proving that serious bodily injury was [the] defendant’s conscious objective, it . . . demonstrate[s] that he was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause serious bodily injury. ’”  Id. at 409 (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 362-63 (2004)).  “SBI murder is distinguishable from aggravated manslaughter because the latter, lesser charge does not require an intention to cause serious bodily injury or an awareness that death is ‘practically certain’ to follow.
[brief] ---  1  [...] argues that this quotation from Clay is taken out of context because the Clay court decided a motion to dismiss, not a motion to compel arbitration.  However, [...] fails to explain how that is a distinction with a difference.  2  [...] also argues that he was not on inquiry notice of the terms he agreed to by signing.  Because [...]’s inquiry notice argument fails under the arguments above, [...] does not separately address it.  Based on the facts of record, [...] was willfully ignorant of the effect of his signature.  That willful ignorance does not permit him to disavow his agreement to arbitrate.  Thus, this Court should affirm.
[brief] Clearly the ruling in *State Farm*, 439 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2015) compelling statutory required arbitration on all issues overrules the prior ruling in *AAA Mid-Atlantic*, 336 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 2000).  The scope of review of an arbitration award is narrow, otherwise the purpose of the arbitration agreement, which is to provide an expedient and fair resolution of disputes, would be severely undermined.  *Fawzy v. Fawzy*, 199 N.J. 456, 470, (2009)
[brief] ”  Comment to § 6.11A, Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, 2017).  (Da72)  In light of [...]’s age of nineteen at the time of the offense, his age of twenty-five at the time of his resentencing, and his prison record between those ages of infraction-free desistence and active participation in his rehabilitation, the science of adolescent brain development and the age-crime curve should have supported findings that (a) [...]’s offense was influenced by the recklessness and impulsivity stemming from an undeveloped prefrontal cortex characteristic of nineteen year-olds; and (b) his subsequent compliance and rehabilitative efforts in prison suggested desistence that is consistent with the peak of the age-crime curve at nineteen and decline through age twenty-five and beyond.
[directive] Posesyon yon fizi katouch, 2C:39-3b; pou posesyon yon fizi katouch ak nimewo seri efase, N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; posesyon yon zam (zam afe) pou koze illegal, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; posesyon zam afe pandan ke w ap komèt yon zak CDS oswa lòt zak, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; posesyon ilegal mitrayèt, revolvè, fizi oswa fizi katouch, 2C:39-5a, b oswa c; sèten moun ki pa gendwa gen zam, N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; oswa fabrike, transpòte, jete ak nimewo seri ki efase, mitrayèt, fizi katouch ak kanon ki siye, zam afe ki gen nimewo seri efase, owa zam afe pou asayi.  2C:39-9a, b, e oswa g, oswa; N.J.S.A.  (2)  You are pleading guilty to one of the following offenses that occurred on or after January 13, 2008: possession of a shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b; possession of a defaced weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; possession of a weapon (firearm) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; possession of a firearm while in the course of committing a CDS offense or other offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; unlawful possession of a machine gun, handgun, rifle or shotgun, 2C:39-5a, b or c; N.J.S.A. certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; or manufacture, transport, disposition and defacement of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, defaced firearms or assault firearms.
[brief] 5 - **In re Pilini**, 173 A.2d 828 (Vt. 1961) .......................................................  11 - **Jamgochian v. Prousalis**, No. 99C-10-022, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 373 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) .................................................................  7 - **Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Comm’r**, 122 A.3d 592 (Conn. 2015) ........................................................................................................  15 - **Preston v. Stoops**, 285 S.W.3d 606 (Ark. 2008) ............................................  7 - **Rousseau v. Eschleman**, 519 A.2d 243 (N.H. 1986) ........................................  7 - **State v. Bander**, 106 N.J. Super. 196 (Monmouth County Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 56 N.J. 196 (1970) .........................................................  4 - **State v. Rue**, 175 N.J. 1 (2002) ...............................................................  4 - **State v. Rush**, 46 N.J. 399 (1966) ............................................................. 4 - **Vort v. Hollander**, 257 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied 130 N.J. 599 (1992) .................................................................................. 7 - **Winberry v. Salisbury**, 5 N.J. 240 (1950) ..................................................... 5 #### Constitutions - **N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3** ........................................................................ 2,4,8,14 Statutes CT Gen. Stat. 36a-671c(1) ................................................................. 15 N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19(f) ........................................................................... 2,13,15 N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 to -9 ..................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(1) .................................................................... 8 N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2)(a) ............................................................... 2,8,4 N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2(a) ....................................................................... 2,8 N.J.S.A. 17:16G-3 ...........................................................................
[brief] .............................................................................  8 Green v. Continental Rentals, 292 N.J. Super. 241 (Law Div. 1994) ..........................  2  J & M Land Co. v First Union National Bank, 166 N.J. 493 (2001)  .............................  7  Judson v. People’s Bank, 17 N.J. 67 at 75 (1954).  .........................................................  13 Karns Prime & Fancy Food, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue., 494 F.3d. 404 (3rd Cir. 2007) ......................................................................................................  3, 4 Landenheim v. Klein, 330 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2000) ........................................  6 Moche v. Levy, April 2022, 2016, UNPUBLISHED (App. Div. No. A-5480-13T2.)  .................................................................................................................................  5  Nestor v. O’Donnell, 301 N.J. Super.  198 (App. Div. 1997) ..........................................  1  Owens v. CNA Insurance/Continental Casualty Company, 330 N.J. Super.608 (App. Div. 2000) .............................................................................................................  8  Schor v. FMS Financial Corporation, 357 N.J. 185 (App. Div. 2002) .........................  1 Scibek v. Longette, 339 N.J. Super. 72, 85 (App. Div. 2001) .......................................  12  Sprenger v. Trout, 375 N.J. Super. 120, 136-140 (App. Div. 2005) ......................... 11,14,15  United States Casualty Co. v. Hyrne, 117 N.J.L. 547, 552, 189 A. 645 (E. & A.1937)  .........................................................................................................................  8  Village of Ridgewood v. Shell Oil Co, 289 N.J.Super. 181, 195, 673 A.2d 300 (App.Div.1996) .................................................................8  Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 299 (2014) ..................................................................................................................2  Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:11C-40 .............................................................................................................................................5  N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19 ...........................................................................................................................................9  New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act," N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 et. seq......................6  TCCWNA ....................................................................................................................................................5, 6, 11 Other Authorities
[brief] ’”)(quoting McCormick, Evidence § 190, at 557–58 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)).  The danger that a jury would use a defendant’s history of stealing to infer that he was more likely to commit robbery is manifest.  However, the jury may not have paid attention to [...]’s admission because it was a fleeting comment in a 39-page statement that was introduced at a trial that was over a week long.  Thus, its unobjected-to admission might arguably have been harmless had the prosecutor not drawn the jury’s attention to it in his summation.  Not only did the prosecutor draw attention to [...]’s admission, he argued, in direct violation of N.J.R.E. 404(b), that [...]’s history of stealing should be used to infer that he went to the barbershop to steal.
[brief] Critically, Defendants have no obligation to correctly determine whether [...] entered and received the charge pay without authorization.  See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).  “This burden is relatively light and is satisfied if the employer provides evidence, which, if true, would permit a conclusion that it took the adverse employment action for a non-discriminatory reason. ”); see also Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether [retaliatory] animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. ”).  Defendants have more than met their burden to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for [...]’s termination.  C. [...] Cannot Show that Defendants’ Legitimate, Non-Retalatory Reason for Terminating Her was Pretext.
[brief] See New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. G.S., 447 N.J. Super. at 570.  Defendants’ reliance on the case of Alam v. Ameribuilt Contractors, 474 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2022) is unavailing.  Alam is distinguishable because it involved a Workers’ Compensation matter in which the plaintiff, who was injured in a car collision, also happened to be a 50% owner of the defendant.  Id. at 33.  The question in Alam was whether counsel assigned to defend the defendant corporation by its insurance carrier had a conflict because the plaintiff was also an owner of the defendant corporation.  Id. at 33-35.  The facts in Alam are a far cry from the instant matter, in which a single law firm sought to jointly represent co-defendants, namely the [...] and their employee [...], who have put forward conflicting testimony and directly adverse positions regarding fault for the subject collision.
[brief] ..........................................................................  13  Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Const. Co., Inc., 176 N.J. 366 (2003)  ..........................................................................  17, 19 Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449 (2012)  ..........................................................................  passim Statutes & Other Authorities: N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 .................................................................  passim N.J.R.E. 703 ...........................................................................  21  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] COMPLAINANTS-APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL FROM DECISIONS OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS COMMISSION  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Fax: [...]  Counsel for Complainants-Appellants  [...], ESQUIRE, Attorney No. 276072018  Of Counsel and on the Brief [...]  [...], ESQUIRE, Attorney No. 011921977  On the Brief [...]
[brief] Third, the Parental Secrecy Policy creates a paradigm where students are socially transitioned at school but remain the gender associated with their natal sex at home.  This facilitation of a secret “double life” cuts children off from their primary support structure and is psychologically harmful.  ACa38-ACa39 ¶¶ 77–80.  The State acknowledges that transgender-identifying children are uniquely susceptible to mental-health challenges, ACa81, yet—remarkably—it concludes that this is reason to exclude parents from their lives.  The State has it exactly backwards—the fact that these children face unique challenges is a reason for parental disclosure, not secrecy.
[brief] 528-29; John & Jane Parents, 622 F.Supp.3d at 139; T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. at 609; N.J. Pub. L. 2018, ch. 60 § 1(a), 1(g).  When “transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students face discrimination in schools, the risk to their wellbeing cannot be overstated[.]”  Boyertown, 897 F.3d at 529.  The trial court’s narrow injunction was necessary to ameliorate that discrimination.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................  3 POINT I ..................................................................................................................................  3  THE DEPARTMENT IGNORES ITS OWN COURSE OF CONDUCT AND ADMISSIONS RELATED TO THE HOLDING ACT (JA1-2) ..................  3 POINT II .................................................................................................................................  8 SSAP NO. 25 HAS NEVER BEEN APPLIED TO THE AIF FEE PAID BY THE INDIVIDUAL SUBCIBERS TO [...] (JA1-2) .................................  8 POINT III ...............................................................................................................................  11  THE BULLETIN IS NOT INFERRABLE FROM STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION, HAS NEVER BEEN PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED AND ABSOLUTELY REPRESENTS A MATERIAL CHANGE IN POSITION (JA1-2)  ..................................................  11 POINT IV ...............................................................................................................................  12  THE DEPARTMENT IS INTERFERING WITH [...]’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONTRACT (JA1-2) .................................................................  12 POINT V ...............................................................................................................................  14  THE DEPARTMENT MISAPPREHENDS THE CITATIONS TO THE PENDING LEGISLATION (JA1-2) .................................................................  14  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................
[brief] When statutory language clearly modifies the common law, then “the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. ”  Marshall, supra, 188 N.J. at 37 (quoting Hubbard ex. rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001).  But the Public Access Law contains no such clear language that reflects the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the common law.
[brief] UNDER CONTRACT AND QUASICONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES, DEFENDANTS CANNOT UNILATERALLY DIVEST PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR ACCRUED TERMINAL LEAVE.  (1028a-1030a)..................45  A.  The Trial Court erred when it dismissed Plaintiffs' contract claims.  (1028a-1031a).................................................................45  B.  The Trial Court erred when it dismissed Plaintiffs' quasi-contractual claims.  (1028a-1031a).................................................................45  IV.
[brief] Default precludes future securitization.  [...], also then a Vice-President for [...] demanded a Court discharge to clear title for any title insurance should a refinance be obtained (A234).  This could not be obtained.  In 2009, [...] sought an opinion from [...] as to 2009 assignments and Limited Power of Attorney.  Commonwealth states the “assignment from [...] to [...] does not fall under the scope of the Limited Power of Attorney,” (LPOA) (A226).  The Pooling and Servicing Agreement mandates that [...], the bank, grant LPOA and not [...]/[...] (defunct in 2007), (A224-A231).  [...] testified at trial that the 2009 [...] assignment is only done in foreclosure (Trial Transcript p. 221-222).  [...] wanted a refinance for [...]s and not extraction of equity.
[brief] Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] October 31, 2017.Pa182 b. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] October 31, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa186 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] October 31, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa193 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] October 31, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa197 P-37.  November 2017
[brief] See DA016-DA019 at ¶¶ 7, 15 and 18.  Further, the Agreement’s severance provision provides that if any provisions of the Agreement were deemed illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective in a legal forum, such provisions would be deemed severable and all other provisions would remain valid and binding.  Ibid.  The intent of the Parties was thus plain and the language of the Agreement was similarly clear and ambiguous: the Superior Court of New Jersey is the only forum having the jurisdiction to declare a provision of the Agreement illegal, unenforceable or ineffective.
[brief] The issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff/Appellant [...]  (“[...]”) timely challenged the adoption of Ordinance No. 13-2022 by the [...] (the “[...]”).  [...] filed its Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs nearly two hundred (200) days beyond the [...]’s Rule 4:69-6(b)(3) publication of the ordinance’s introduction in a newspaper circulating in the municipality.
[brief] Indeed, “d” density variances do not have to demonstrate the lack of substantial impairment to the intent and purposes of the zone plan and zoning ordinance by an enhanced quality of proof.  Cf., TSI East Brunswick v. Twp. of East Brunswick Bd. of Adj., 215 N.J. 26 (2013).  66  [...] required a FAR variance because the floor area ratio is 1.77, where the B-3 zone maximum is 0.35.  In Price, the Supreme Court considered the appropriate proofs for a (d)(5) density variance when the applicant simultaneously sought a (d)(1) use variance.  The Supreme Court recognized that an applicant seeking a use variance was proposing not to comply with the zoning ordinance, and that the bulk zoning standards designed for permitted uses may not be applicable.  Id. at 299 (“There is little doubt about the fact that a use variance, by its nature, carries with it the implication that the ordinary bulk and density requirements of the zone will not be applied”); see also Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 295 (1965) (“it is obvious that the height and front yard restrictions are intended to apply to single-family residences”); Puleio, 375 N.J. Super. at 613 (bulk variances are “subsumed” within the use variance).
[brief] IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT [...] OWNS THE CROSSING IN QUESTION. **  Although [...] did not base his decision on a finding of fact that [...] actually owns the railroad crossing in question in addition to owning the right of way, it is undisputed that [...] owns the physical crossing that [...] was attempting to use at the time of the collision.  [...] owns and controls the entire [...] system, including the stations, signals, right of way, the train tracks, track bed, and the pedestrian crossing where the collision occurred as well as the train involved in the collision.  Pa178 at ¶¶1-2; Pa189 at ¶¶1-2; Pa500; Pa674:7-23; Da33-34, ¶¶1-5, Da39-40, ¶¶6-9.  The entire system -- including the tracks, track bed, signals, warnings, protections, stations, crossings, and traffic control devices where the collision occurred -- was designed and constructed by [...]’s contractors, with [...]’s approval.  Pa479-480; Pa579:20-580:11; Pa626:24-268:11.  Plaintiff did not dispute any of these facts in the record below.  Ibid.  Likewise, in its cross motion for summary judgment Defendant [...] confirmed that [...] owns and controls the crossing where the incident occurred, and that [...] does not.  Da33-34, ¶¶1-5.  [...]’s Director of Traffic Engineering, Division of Traffic Engineering, Department of Infrastructure for the City of [...] certified that, “[t]he crossing, the tracks, and track beds, within the [...] Light Rail System in the City of [...] are owned maintained and controlled by [...], including the crossing, tracks at the crossing of York Street and Hudson Street as well as the track bed on Hudson Street. ”  Da39-40, ¶¶1 and 9.  Plaintiff did not dispute these facts or oppose [...]’s cross motion, and the court adopted the unopposed factual and legal arguments made by [...] in granting the motion.  T5:9-6:10.  Therefore, even if [...]’s right of way is not considered “property” or “real property” such that it is included in the meaning of “the property of any railroad” under N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(b)(5), the physical crossing itself, and all of the components that make up the crossing, must be included in that meaning and there is no dispute that [...] owns all of this property.
[brief] Thereafter, in attempts to collect the void debt, [...] commenced a collection lawsuit against [...] by filing a collection Complaint (Pa35) in the Special Civil Part of the Bergen County Law Division on January 3, 2017.  [...] moved for default judgment on April 19, 2017.  (Pa39).  [...]’s Return of Service (Pa130) states that the Complaint was mailed to an address in [...]; however, as explained in [...]’s Certification in Support of the Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate, [...] has not lived in Saddle Brook since 2015—two (2) years prior to the Collection Complaint being filed.  Certification of Scott [...] (“[...] Cert.”) ¶¶ 5-8 (Pa126).  In addition to defects in service, the default judgment obtained against [...] stems from an action that [...] had no right or authority to bring.  By purchasing or otherwise taking assignment of the debt, [...] (and the other Defendants) engaged in the “consumer loan business” as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 and acted as a “sales finance company” as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1(f).  However, [...] was not licensed as a consumer lender or as a sales finance company at the time it took possession of or attempted to enforce [...]’s account.  See [...]’s License Verifications from the [...] (“[...]”) Licensing Services Bureau (Pa152, Pa154).  As a result of Defendants’ unlicensed status, the assignments or purchases and any rights to the account were void \textit{ab initio} and unenforceable as of the date [...]—being the first unlicensed entity in the chain of assignment—purchased or took assignment of the account, pursuant to the NJCFLA at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), which states, in pertinent part, that a contract for a loan acquired in violation of the act “shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges.  . . .”