[brief] Defendant claims that following his conviction, a fellow prison inmate, [...], told him that a [...] confessed to murdering [...].  Taylor’s allegation suffers from major credibility deficiencies, as he 1) fails to even identify the individual who supposedly confessed to him, initially noting he was “named something like ‘Taquon Brown’” before mystically divining [...]’s name for purposes of his eventual certification, and 2) gives an inconsistent account of the shooting in which one person was allegedly the shooter but two individuals were “involved in the shooting,” even disregarding the fact that the video surveillance of the murder shows only one attacker. Db56; Da550.  These facts and others informed the PCR judge’s assessment of the purported evidence who, far from failing to “test[ ] for credibility” the bare allegation, engaged in a detailed analysis of whether the defendant’s allegations were “too vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing[.]”  State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997).  To meet the standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, defendant must show that the evidence is 1) material, and not “merely” cumulative, impeaching, or contradictory; 2) that the evidence was discovered after completion of the trial and was “not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand”; and 3) that the evidence “would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted. ”  State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 314 (1981).  The certification in this case is, as the PCR Judge found, far too “vague, conclusory, [and] speculative” to merit a new trial.  It possesses no marks of reliability such as corroborating statements or circumstances, inmate allegations of this sort are often subject to scrutiny due to their arguable inherent unreliability, and it does not comport with other unquestionable evidence presented during the course of the trial.  The evidence, as alluded to in the Carter test, is contradictory, but not in a material sense; it is simply a groundless, bald rebuttal of the charges against Defendant.  Although the certification was written post-trial, the information upon which it is based was discoverable prior to trial.  And the unsupported hearsay of a prison inmate with no indicia of reliability is not evidence of the sort that would probably change the jury’s verdict if a new trial were granted.  Defendant’s purported “evidence” of third-party guilt does not meet the Carter test and is obviously suspect and dubious.  It is worthy of little consideration and certainly does not merit an entire retrial of the case.  The State and victims have an interest in the finality of verdicts, which should not be overturned absent compelling, serious evidence.  See State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 187-88 (2004) (“A jury verdict rendered after a fair trial should not be disturbed except for the clearest of reasons.  Newly discovered evidence must be reviewed with a certain degree of circumspection to ensure that it is not the product of fabrication, and, if credible and material, is of sufficient weight that it would probably alter the outcome of the verdict in a new trial. ”) (quoting State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 51 (1991) for the proposition that “sketchy” evidence is insufficient to warrant new trial).