ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Page 3 of 29 make it difficult or impossible for that juror to judge the case fairly or impartially or whether there is anything in the juror's mind (whether or not covered by the questions) that the juror thinks the judge or attorneys ought to know about before deciding whether that juror should serve.  As jurors are excused, the newly-seated jurors must be questioned in the same manner.  If, for example, three new individuals are seated at the same time, it is permissible to question those three as a group, with the same two exceptions as noted in the preceding paragraph.  It is not permissible, however, as the sole basis for eliciting responses, to simply ask whether the newly-seated juror(s) heard the questions asked of previous jurors and would answer any of them differently.  There is nothing wrong with posing that type of question as an initial inquiry, because it might elicit a response that results in an expeditious disqualification and thus conserve time.  But if the question is utilized and does not result in disqualification, all of the questions must be posed.  The judge shall not pose the questions to the entire array, before seating the original panel in the box.
[brief] Specifically, DCF considered the allegations in [...]’s complaint and [...]’s response to determine that [...] refused to refer to [...]  by her preferred name after she corrected him several times.  (Aa20).  Further supporting its decision was DCF’s review of video footage from outside the NJDOL building, which confirmed that an incident occurred on the morning of September 9, 2022, between [...] and [...] (Aa20; Aa32).  Body language and arm movements showed that the interaction was contentious, and that [...] followed [...] when she moved away from him to obtain signatures.  (Aa32).  And finally, it showed the police response.  Ibid.  DCF’s investigation also confirmed that another incident took place later that afternoon at the union office.  (Aa20; Aa32).  While [...] denied the specific allegations, he admitted to interacting with [...] that day.  (Aa32).  He could not recall if he had called [...] by any name, but acknowledged that if he had, it would have been “D[.],” her legal name.  Ibid.  DCF found that [...]’s contention that [...] yelled, “[[...]], I just want you to know I’m in a protected class, my name is D[a] and you will respect me” contradicted his other statements about the incident.  Ibid.  Yet [...]’s allegations were specific, corroborated by [...]’s text exchange with [...], and depicted in the video footage.  (Aa32-34).  DCF concluded that [...] violated the State Policy by purposely misnaming [...] on more than one occasion.  (Aa34).  On March 29, 2023, [...] appealed DCF’s determination to the Commission.  (Aa22-24).  [...] argued that DCF’s determination must be withdrawn for several reasons: (1) the determination was not final as DCF failed to identify any appeal procedure; (2) even if final, the determination was untimely and failed to comply with the extension requirements of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(l)(2); (3) DCF lacked jurisdiction to issue the determination as the incident occurred outside [...]’s workplace; and (4) the determination was not based on competent evidence as DCF did not interview witnesses to the afternoon incident and the video had no sound.
[brief] REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I  In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188..............................Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples.  Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938..............................................Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...]  Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9  [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………Pa24  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Appellant, retired Trooper [...], relies on the Procedural History submitted in his original brief as if set forth herein in its entirety.
[brief] POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE STANDARD TO BE EMPLOYED IN MAKING A DETERMINATION ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT  Respondent noted the Summary Judgment standard per Court Rule 4:46-2(c) and it is claimed here that there was a failure to follow the Summary Judgment standard.  The issue at that juncture is whether there are material issues in dispute.  There were material issues in dispute, however, the Trial Court failed to follow that standard.  There was a failure to recognize that there was no evidence in the record which supported the claimed basis for non-renewal of Appellant’s contract.  There was a failure to recognize the evidence in the record, specifically the video recording of [...] using the racial slur to the dismay of the students in her class who said to [...], you cannot use that word.  (Pa409, Video Footage)  The material issue here is whether the non-renewal of the contracts for two African-American Vice Principals was the result of retaliation, where the non-renewal notice was given one week after a Caucasian teacher, [...] had been reported by Appellant and [...] for use of the N Word in her classroom.  Another material issue in dispute was whether the non-renewal of Appellant’s contract was the result of discrimination against Appellant based on race and age.  The other material issues in dispute set out in the Appellant Brief are relied on in this legal argument..  POINT II THE TRIAL COURT RELIANCE ON AND INCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENT’S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN THE DECISION SET FORTH AN APPEARANCE OF BIAS.
[brief] ” (5T21-16 to 22-6).  That it was in fact defendant who wielded pressure over a younger accomplice supports [...]’s conclusion that this factor has no applicability here.  So too with Miller factor four.  Defendant’s claim that the “disadvantages of adolescence had clear and devastating consequences for [his ability to navigate the criminal legal system” finds no support in the record.  And again, mindful of this Court’s standard of review, [...]’s decision to not find this factor because “defendant’s failure to comprehend the process and/or trust his attorney is not unique or necessarily based upon his age[,]” (5T22-4 to 14), is not unsupported.
[brief] On or about September 29, 2023, the Trial Court signed an Order of Dismissal by consent of the parties, of Defendant [...], d/b/a [...] with prejudice.  Da169.  Discovery continued between the Plaintiff and the remaining Defendants ([...] and its principals).  At the conclusion of discovery, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da171.  Defendants [...], Inc. and its principals filed Opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion and a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues regarding whether the Plaintiff waived its Right of First Refusal prior to June 6th, 2023.  Da251.  On January 29, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief in which it opposed the Defendant’s filing of a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da342.  The Trial Court permitted the Cross Motion but allowed the Plaintiff additional time to oppose the Cross Motion, which Plaintiff filed on or about February 7, 2024.  Da344.  Defendants [...], Inc. and its principals filed their Reply on February 12, 2024.  Da349.  Thereafter, on February 16, 2024, the Trial Court held oral argument on the motions.  3T.  The Trial Court reserved and issued a written decision on February 20, 2024.  Da350.  The Defendants [...], Inc. and its principals filed a Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement on February 22, 2024.  Da400-Da414.  Thereafter the Defendants filed a Motion for a Stay of Judgment pending Appeal with the Trial Court and the Plaintiff filed Opposition.  The Trial Court denied the request for a stay.  The Defendants then filed an emergent Motion for Stay with the Appellate Division, which was Opposed by the Plaintiff.  This Court granted the request for a stay.  This appeal of the Trial Court’s decisions in this case follows.
[brief] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she was only notified about the Disciplinary Meeting the day before, without the subject of the meeting being disclosed as required by school policy.  223a, ¶ 86.  Defendant [...] did not disclose the subject of the Disciplinary Meeting in response to a further inquiry from Plaintiff, and failed to do so even after she was directed to do so by the Union representative.  224a, ¶¶ 89-91.  Plaintiff was allegedly issued a Weingarten Rights notice, but her attorney was prevented from appearing at the Disciplinary Meeting, and after much back-and-forth, Plaintiff’s counsel was expressly told by Defendant [...]’s General Counsel that the meeting was not a disciplinary meeting.  227a, ¶ 100.  But Plaintiff alleges that this representation was false, given that she ultimately received a disciplinary letter in her file after the meeting.  229a, ¶ 118.  The events that comprise the Disciplinary Meeting also form the basis of Plaintiff’s retaliation allegations.
[brief] A party bringing a claim of breach of contract has the burden of proving all elements of its cause of action.  *Cumberland Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co.*, 358 N.J Super. 484, 503 (App. Div. 2003).  Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must plead and prove the following elements for a valid breach of contract claim: “(1) a contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing therefrom; and (4) that the party stating the claim performed its own contractual obligations.
[brief] Table of Authorities ......................................................... iii  I.  Legal Argument .........................................................  1  A.  Standard of Review (715a) ........................................  1  B.  Defendants’ Brief Addresses the Trial Court’s Alternative, Equitable Basis for Its Decision (719a-720a) ..................  3  C.  The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs and Denying Summary Judgment to Defendants (716a-720a) ...... 6  II.
[brief] ”  *State v. Hupka*, 203 N.J. 222, 232 (2010) (quoting *N.J.S.A.* 1:1-1).  The Legislature vested the [...] with “the general responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system” and further directed the [...] to “establish rules and regulations for the administration of the [pension] funds” and “for the transaction of the board’s and committees’ business.
[brief] Simply put, the ADEA waiver provisions of the OWBPA do not entitle a party to a blanket revocation of any settlement reached under any circumstances, but rather, it is expressly limited to mandating such a period for a valid ADEA waiver.  See Oubre, 522 U.S. at 427 (stating that “[a]n employee ‘may not waive’ an ADEA claim unless the employer complies with the statute”); Burlison v. McDonald’s Corp., 455 F.3d 1242, 12449 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that because the release agreements satisfied the OWBPA waiver requirements, the releases from ADEA liability contained therein were knowing and voluntary, and therefore valid).  The Court’s reliance on the OWBPA to deny enforcement of the settlement as memorialized on the record was, accordingly, a reversible error of law.  Moreover, the Court’s reliance on paragraph 11 of the Agreement, which Agreement was not signed by the parties, and which provision was not reflected in the material settlement terms memorialized on the record, was wholly misplaced.
[brief] See e.g., *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-27.  New Jersey is a notice pleading state and at this preliminary stage of the litigation, the court should not be concerned with the ability of the litigant to prove the allegation.  *Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).  The entity’s liability is a factual determination in which discovery must be conducted on the subject.  Therefore, it was improper for [...] to find that the Affidavits of Merit were statutorily insufficient based upon a factual and legal determination without any discovery.
[brief] ” (Aa130, citing N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a)).  Citing the Initial Decision, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ’s finding that the Law “does not reference Matthews at all, let alone the four-factor test in Matthews, but instead expressly lists specific requirements to guide the Department’s public access determinations that ‘touch upon, but do not mirror’” the Matthews test.  Ibid.  The Commissioner explained “[t]he omission of any reference to Matthews is even more noteworthy considering the Legislature instead specifically chose to reference a different case, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821), in its legislative findings and declarations. ”  Ibid.  The Commissioner further explained that the Legislature described the Arnold case as “seminal” in outlining “the history of the public trust doctrine and appl[ying] it to tidally flowed lands in New Jersey. ”  Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(c)).  [...] does not address this point.  Instead, [...]’s arguments disregard basic principles of statutory construction that require courts to effectuate the fundamental purpose of legislation and “interpret the statute sensibly,” Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., Inc., 167 N.J. 191, 199 (2001), consistent with a common-sense understanding of its underlying subject matter.
[brief] | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | *446 Bellevue LLC v. Global Life Enters., LLC,* | 10 | | 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1690 (App. Div. July 16, 2018) | | | *Beture v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,* | 12, 13 | | 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121801 (D.N.J. July 18, 2018) | | | *Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC v. N.J. Div. of Inv.,* | 19, 20 | | 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032 (3d Cir.  December 22, 2023) | | | *Bodie v. Cricket Wireless, LLC,* | 16, 19 | | 350 So.3d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) | | | *Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc.,* | 14 | | 7 F.4th 854 (9th Cir. 2021) | | | *Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc.,* | 16, 19 | | 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48037 (D. Mass. March 20, 2020) | | | *DiCarlo v. MoneyLion, Inc.,* | 18 | | 988 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2021) | | | *Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.,* | 8, 12 | | 244 N.J. 119, 236 A.3d 990 (2020) | | | *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A.,* | 8 | | 168 N.J. 124, 773 A.2d 665 (2001) | | | *Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp.,* | 20, 21 | | 238 N.J. 191, 208 A.3d 859 (2019) | | | *Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mian,* | 19 | | 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83670 (D.N.J. May 8, 2024) | | | *Grigorian v. Citibank, N.A.,* | 13, 15 | | 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71375 (C.D. Cal. April 17, 2024) | | | *Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC,* | 13, 14, 15 | | 12 F.4th 1108 (9th Cir. 2021) | | | *Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park,* | 8 | | 187 N.J. 323, 901 A.2d 381 (2006) | | Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013)  ..................................................  14  Maisano v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super.  Unpub. LEXIS 2421 (App. Div. November 27, 2019)  ..............................................  9  Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 800 A.2d 872 (2002).............................................  8  McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945 (Cal. 2017)  ....................................................  12, 18  Netzel v. Am. Express Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135427 (D. Ariz. August 3, 2023)  ...............  14  Perez v. Sky Zone LLC, 472 N.J. Super. 240, 276 A.3d 190 (App. Div. 2022)  ..................... 9, 10  Schmidt v. Laub, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 827 (App. Div. May 5, 2020) ...... 20, 21  Stevenson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201781 (N.D. Cal. November 9, 2023) ..........  18  Szinmonowitz v. Travelscape, LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1045 (App. Div. June 5, 2024) ....... 9 Torrecillas v. Fitness Internat., LLC, 52 Cal.App.5th 485 (Cal. 2020) ................................................. 14 Trainor v. Chrysler Capital, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2202 (App. Div. September 20, 2021) .............................................. 9 Victory Entm’t, Inc. v. Schibell, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1467 (App. Div. June 21, 2018) ...... 11 Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) ............................................. 17, 18 Statutes California Unfair Competition Law ............................................. 18 California False Advertising Law .............................................. 18 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Plaintiffs principally rely on three cases – Foster v. Newark Housing Authority, 389 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 2006); Roe by M.J. v. New Jersey Transit Operations, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1998); and Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div. 1994) – in support of their position that “an illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand” is a “condition” (i.e., physical defect) of public property within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act.  Plaintiffs’ reliance on these cases is in error because the aforementioned cases do not in fact support Plaintiffs’ supposition, but rather support [...]’s position that the Trial Court’s Order should be affirmed.
[brief] 1.  The facts of this case are four documents submitted by [...] on 5/12/16 and 12/30/16 as I explained in this brief (065a, 088a, 097a, and 103a).  [...] submitted her certification (115) on 10/18/22.  The rest of this case is procedural history.  The facts and procedural history are intertwined in this case.  On 2/14/2005 I signed a promissory Note (091a) and gave it to [...] ([...]), my loan originator.  In return [...] gave me a loan to purchase my current house via a mortgage.  I did not give my Note to the entire US mortgage industry.  I gave it to [...] only, my loan originator.  On 12/30/16 [...] Loan Servicing LLC ([...]) offered the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/2014 Fabricated by [...] (088a).  [...] attached an unauthenticated alleged copy of the alleged Note as Attachment 1 (091a).  [...] went out of business by 12/31/2005 and did not indorse my Note (091a) to another party and did not assign the Note (091a) to another party.  Since 12/31/2005 [...] has not come forward to demand its loan from me and the loan is time barred for ten years based on NJSA 12A:3-118(b).  That means even if [...] shows up at my front door today, based on that NJ statue I do not owe them that loan.  On 2/27/2009 [...] a manager at [...] Home Finance LLC ([...]) disguised as an employee of [...]  ([...]), and [...] a [...] employee robo-signed an assignment of mortgage on my property from [...] (as nominee of [...]) to [...].  [...] robo-notarized that forged mortgage assignment (065a).  [...] never had legal standing to assign a Note or Mortgage in NJ.  [...] never had legal standing to be a custodian of a mortgage Note in NJ.  Since [...] went out of business by 12/31/2005, the alleged nominee relationship between [...] and [...] stopped after 12/31/2005.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Respondent, vs. [...], Defendant/Appellant.  On Remand from the New Jersey Supreme Court  To The: Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division – Part K  Docket No. [...]  From The: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division (Criminal)  Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO AND REMAND BY NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TO APPELLATE DIVISION
[brief] In 1939, the Defendant Borough filed a Foreclosure Action against [...]  However, the Foreclosure Action failed to name or reference [...] as a named Defendant for its property, being the Riparian grant area now known as Lot 3.01 (other than the small strip as shown on J-1).  Although the 1939 Final Decree does reference “Together with all Riparian right adjoining the above-described premises,” [...] did not acquire the Riparian Grant area from [...] and thus that grant was not [...]’s to be foreclosed (J-7, Pa923) (Pa927).
[brief] The Board was aware of this.  The Board knew that the project was a grid-supply project.  The Board engaged in multiple rounds of discovery.  If the Board honestly believed that it was unable to grant the Petition on its face, the process of seeking discovery and looking for additional information was, at best, a farce.  Likewise, and as the Board itself acknowledges, this Petition functions as a waiver request, if needed.  See Order, at 5.  (005a.)  (“Were Petitioner’s project granted for a waiver so that this general grid-supply project could enter the TI Program…”).  No analysis was provided for a review of a waiver.  In fact, the “analysis” provided by the [...] in this Order is so cursory and shallow as to essential qualify as no analysis at all.  After identifying that a waiver would allow this project to be included, the Board conducted no analysis whatsoever.  Likewise, the other reason articulated by the Board, such as concerns about timing and the [...] timeframe, are concerns that the Board ignores and grants petitions for on a regular basis.  See, e.g., Reconsideration Order.  (088a.)  As previously set forth, the court has repeatedly and consistently noted that “deference does not require that we forego a careful review of administrative decisions simply because an agency has exercised its expertise.  We cannot accept without question an agency’s conclusory statements, even when they represent an exercise in agency expertise.  The agency is ‘obliged ... to tell us why. ’”  Balagun v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 361 N.J. Super. 199, 202-03 (App. Div. 2003), quoting In re Valley Hosp., 240 N.J. Super. 301, 306, (App. Div. 1990).  Here, the Board provides simply conclusory statements, and thus this decision should be reversed.
[brief] (Appx 75-83).  The Statute prevented Plaintiff from holding the job she had with Defendant.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(b)(1)(c); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:44A-2.4; (Appx 196 at ¶6, 8-11).  Had Defendant known that Plaintiff had these convictions while was applying for employment, it never would have hired her.  (Appx 196 at ¶9).  Had Defendant learned about these convictions while Plaintiff was still employed, it would have terminated her employment.  (Appx
[brief] The sentencing court must then balance those relevant aggravating and mitigating factors by qualitatively assessing each factor and assigning it appropriate weight given the facts of the case at hand.  *Fuentes*, 217 N.J. at 72-73.  “[W]here mitigating factors are amply based in the record before the sentencing judge, they must be found. ”  *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005).
[brief] For the record, he stated that the court had issued two extraction orders in the past to secure defendant’s presence in the courtroom.  [1T22-1 to -5].  On the second day of jury selection, defendant would not appear in court until he had a different pair of dress shoes.  [2T4-21 to 5-6].  Defendant requested to use the bathroom.  [2T5-14 to -16].  [...] informed defendant that he could use the bathroom but if defendant refused to return to the courtroom, the selection process would resume without him.  [2T5-17 to 7-8].  Defendant then left the courtroom and refused to come back to court.  [2T7-12 to -15].  On January 25, 2023, defendant refused to appear in court for opening instructions and statements.
[brief] *Id.* at *7*.  The court explained:  If the video is viewed at the scene soon after the event in question and is viewed not from a copy but directly from the system established on-site, there is little to no risk of tampering or editing the tape.  To confirm this reasoning, there should also be an affirmance that the contents of the recording viewed contemporaneously with the recorded event are the same as the contents of the recording sought to be introduced into evidence.  Authentication can be bolstered where the testifying witness was present at the scene of the recorded event soon after it happened and acknowledges that the recording depicts events that match with the scene observed.  Such testimony would further corroborate that the surveillance video accurately depicts what occurred.  [Ibid. (internal citations omitted). ]