ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff misrepresented its “principal place of business” to the lower Court and to the Defendant (Exhibit A) (Da2).  The lower Court made a mistake in accepting a Complaint with an invalid declaration of its “principal place of business”, which is a “material matter”, pursuant to R. 4:5-8(e), as to “place”.  Because of its misleading and incorrect statement of a material fact as to “place”, Plaintiff’s complaint is void.  As a result, Defendant’s right to due process was violated when Plaintiff was mistakenly permitted by the lower Court to prosecute its claim based on a void Complaint.  U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, Kemp, supra. F.  No proof of service.  All written motions, except ex parte, shall be served on all attorneys of record in the action.  R. 1:5-1(a).  R. 1:5-3 requires proof of service of every paper referred to in R. 1:5-1.
[brief] In November of 2021, [...] settled the inverse condemnation lawsuit for $1.8 Million Dollars, $80,000.00 from which was paid for attorney’s fees.  Defendant received $185,000.00.  (3T).  Defendant did not share any of the net money that was received from the settlement of the inverse compensation lawsuit with Plaintiff as it was not related to any “sale” of the [...] as provided for in the PSA (Da 282).
[brief] Pa 63-64.  The only language in the entire lease that mentions a personal guaranty is tucked away in the "IN WHITNESS WHEREOF" paragraph.  The entire paragraph provides as follows:  "IN WHITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these presents to be executed the day and year first above written.  Additionally, the undersigned jointly and severally each hereby personally guarantee the obligations of the Tenant herein."  Pa70.  This language does not appear in any of the numbered paragraphs of the Lease where substantive terms are put forward.
[brief] [...]  [...] ([...])  [...]  [...] ([...]) [...]  [...] ([...])  [...]  [...] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ iv  TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS OF BRIEFS AND APPENDICES .................. x STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ......................................  1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................  5
[brief] (2T 81-6 to 82-18)  Where he lived, while [...] stayed on East 16th and was talking to some people in a Black car.  (2T 67-5 to 77-22; Da 76 at 7:58 to 8:43)  [...] thought he had been wearing blue pants, a black hoodie, and a black jacket, and he later identified himself in a video still-shot from the [...] wearing a blue coat, a black hoodie, and black pants.  (2T 70-16 to 72-19; 3T 120-13 to 121-18; Da at 6:40 to 9:50)  despite other redactions, the interrogation video still showed [...] assert that [...] was lying about his alibi and repeatedly ask why he killed [...].
[brief] A.  Paragraph 4 of the Contract, entitled “Indemnity,” requires each party to indemnify the other only to the extent of their respective fault (raised below at 1T4:22-23:18).  Paragraph 4 of the [...] contract, entitled “Indemnity,” simply did not require [...] to indemnify [...] for its own negligence.  Da45, ¶ 4.  Instead, it was a mutual indemnity obligation that required each party to indemnify the other for their respective negligence.  Ibid.  The trial court therefore erred in concluding that the contract expressly granted [...] indemnification for its own negligence, 1T19-22-22:6, and that the contract was clear and unambiguous on that issue.  1T23:10-18.  Specifically, Paragraph 4 required [...], “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” to indemnify [...] for claims of bodily injury and property damage “due to [[...]’s] negligent snow plowing work that may arise at [[...]’s] premises while [[...]] is physically present on premises. ”  Da45, ¶ 4.  It required [...], “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” to defend and indemnify [...] for claims of bodily injury and property damages that may arise from [...]’s premises, including acts or omissions of [...] and its agents other than [...], “for ice which forms from day time melting from snow and ice which is removed from, brought in by or in between vehicles. ”  Ibid.  Under Paragraph 4, both [...] and [...] were obligated to indemnify each other for losses caused by their respective negligence.  Ibid.  Paragraph 4 simply did not require either party to be indemnified for its own negligence.  Ibid.  Paragraph 4 did not specify, with “explicit language,” that [...] will indemnify [...] for its own negligence.  Azurak, 175 N.J. at 112-13.  The trial court therefore erred in ruling that a clause that required [...] to indemnify [...] for claims arising from [...]’s premises explicitly and unequivocally required [...] to indemnify [...] for the latter’s own negligence.  1T21:5-:21.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment to [...] requiring [...] to indemnify [...] for the latter’s own negligence based on Paragraph 4.  Boyle, 257 N.J. at 478; Mantilla, 167 N.J. at 272-73.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION ON JUNE 8, 2023  IN DOCKET NO. [...] IS THE LAW OF THE CASE ..................................................................................10  II.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION  LACKED MERIT ........................................................................15  A.  The trial court’s order denying Defendant’s second motion for reconsideration should be affirmed because the Defendant failed to meet the reconsideration standard ........................................................................15  B.  Defendant’s March 5, 2024 Motion for Reconsideration of the June 8, 2023  Order and Opinion from the Appellate Division was also Untimely Pursuant to R. 4:50-2 ........................................................................18  C.  The issuance of the Tyler decision on May 25, 2023, does not provide a basis upon which the Defendant can file a motion for reconsideration of the June 8, 2023 Kemp decision 9 months later ........................................................................20  III.
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[brief] What Is Relevant Is That—In The Five Years The Judgment Has Been In Place—[...] Still Has Not Provided A Realistic Opportunity For Construction Of The Off-site Affordable Units, In Violation Of The Judgment (11-12a, 17a, 21a)  In its May 12, 2023 Opinion and Order, the trial court appeared to consider that the years’ long delay was not sufficient to grant the remedy requested.
[brief] L. 1992, c. 74, § 3.  (Da86-87, 89-90)  The main purpose of this bill was to create a provision in chapter 58 (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3.1) allowing for the lawful, temporary transfer of a firearm to a person without a firearms purchaser identification card or a handgun carry permit at a firing range, law enforcement agency, or a rifle or pistol club.  L. 1992, c. 74, § 1.  (Da87)  The law was clear that persons temporarily receiving a firearm in compliance with the law’s provisions could not be prosecuted under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 but could be prosecuted under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) if they had a prior criminal conviction that completely disqualified them from ever possession a firearm under any circumstances.  L. 1992, c. 74, §§ 1(d), 2(g).  (Da87, 89)  The Legislature’s only commentary on the amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 was to note that the bill “provide[s] that a person convicted of” one of several enumerated crimes “who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a firearm is guilty of a crime of the second degree. ”  A. Jud., Law, Pub. Safety & Def. Comm. Statement to S. 184 2 (June 1, 1992).  (Da92)  Also noteworthy is that the bill kept the gradation of unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) as a third-degree crime.  L. 1992, c. 74, § 2.  (Da88-89)  In 2001, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) by adding the sentencing enhancement of a mandatory parole disqualifier of five years for a conviction for certain persons in possession of a firearm.
[brief] Specifically, Plaintiff said:  Q  No.  I mean, we could keep going, but would you agree you received regular checks in 2017?  A  Not regularly.  You went from February to May and then June.  And you asked me a question, how did I know what was – Q  That's what I want to know.  A  Very easy.  The person that -- I'm not sure if she's still there.  I would go on a regular basis to the accountant and asked them, which you should have a record of, what they owe me.  Q  And what would they tell you?  A  The exact amount of what was owed to me, which is the matter of this lawsuit.  \textsuperscript{26}  See J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6 (2021); State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 321 (2018); State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 605 n.2 (2013); State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R . 2:6-2 (2022).
[brief] The 15% post-judgment rate awarded by the Arbitrator is the default rate under the Mortgage.  Though sequentially out of order to note this here, the Arbitrator continued with the next phase of the Arbitration and again consistently awarded an amount including interest at the default rate of 15% (the "Phase II Final Award"; together with the Phase I Final Award, the "Arbitration Awards").  In key language, the Phase II Final Award states:
[brief] 14  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases Cappell v. Capell, 358 N.J. Super. 107 (App. Div. 2003) ........................................... 8 Est. of Hanges v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369 (2010) ......................................................... 2, 12 Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2021) .............................................. 4 Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78 (1984) ........................................................................ 5 Parker v. Poole, 440 N.J. Super. 7 (App. Div. 2015) ....................................................... 4 Redvanly v. ADP, 407 N.J. 395 (App. Div. 2009) ............................................................ 11 Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391 (2001) ................................................................. 10 Rowe v. Bell & Gossett, Co., 239 N.J. 531 (2019) .......................................................... 2, 6 State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962) ............................................................................... 13 State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412 (2021) ............................................................................. 2, 6, 12 State v. Jones, 364 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 2003) ....................................................... 10 State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397 (2020) ............................................................................. 2, 6, 12 State v. Silva, 131 NJ 438 (1993) ....................................................................................  7 State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 (2007) .........................................................................  5 State v. Wray, 336 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2001) .......................................................  10  Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J. 167 (2016) ..............................................................................  13  Other Authorities Model Jury Charge § 1.12M, “False in One – False in All..............................................  8 Rules N.J.R.E. 105 .........................................................................................................................  4 N.J.R.E. 607 ..........................................................................................................................  7 N.J.R.E. 611(b)......................................................................................................................  5 N.J.R.E. 701 ..........................................................................................................................  3, 4  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  Example  County Plaintiff Plaintiff  DOCKET NO.: -vs- Civil Action  Defendant Order Scheduling In-Person Hearing  Defendant  This matter is opened to this court on its own motion.  Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s February 22, 2021, this matter cannot be conducted remotely if a party objects to the remote format.  [If applicable: The court has considered the certifications of or has questioned orally on the record regarding consent to proceed remotely.]  At this time, one or more parties has objected to proceeding remotely.  Accordingly, IT IS on this ____ day of _______________, 2021; ORDERED as follows:  1.  This matter is scheduled for an in-person hearing at the courthouse on , 2021 at .  2.  The parties, attorneys, and all participants in the hearing are subject to the Supreme Court’s June 9, 2020 Order requiring face masks and social distancing, subject to narrow limitations, including for temporary removal of face masks in a courtroom if directed by a judge based on the availability of other safeguards.  3.  Notice of the in-person hearing shall be served on the parties as follows:  Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021  Page 12  [Insert appropriate option(s), which may include service by certified and regular mail at the last known address of a party who has not appeared or participated in earlier proceedings.]  4.  Notice of the in-person hearing shall be served on other participants in the hearing as follows:  [Insert appropriate option(s)]  5.  Although the hearing will be conducted with the parties appearing in person, the court has determined that the following participants may participate using appropriate remote technology:  [Insert appropriate individuals, including witnesses]  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 6.  COVID-19 Omnibus Orders, the court will accommodate the legitimate needs of parties, attorneys, and all court users, including, as appropriate, by adjusting the manner in which individuals participate in court events.
[brief] [...] further testified that he did not know if [...] submitted an application for approvals before the deadline in the Lease, nor did he know if [...] diligently prosecuted the application as required by the Lease.  [...] believed that since the lease was silent as to when the ten day notice was to be given to accelerate the termination date of the Lease, he believed it to be within a reasonable time.  [...] also believed that the date in the Rider for the submission of an application to West New York was a date to provide the application or a reason why an application could not be presented due to no fault of [...].  [...] responded to [...]’s letter by email dated June 13, 2018, indicating he was stunned at [...]’s position, as [...] was advised on numerous occasions through discussions with [...] and [...] of the sewer issue and the town not allowing [...] to go forward with permits.  [...] reminded [...] that he attempted to negotiate with [...]’s attorney to either delay the date for payment of rent or to allow [...] to spend money to fix the problem and obtain a credit for the cost, and that these negotiations went on for months.  [...] also indicated that both [...] and [...] indicated that their signatures on the guaranty are forgeries (Pa1383).  The parties reached a settlement agreement, memorialized in writing in mid-April 2019 that required [...] and the third-party defendants [...], [...] and [...] to pay to [...] the sum of $120,000 within 45 days, and failure to timely pay would then result in a judgment against [...] and the third party defendants jointly and severally in the amount of $145,000.  The Settlement Agreement also provided that [...] and its attorneys agree to cooperate with [...] in any legal malpractice action filed against [...].  [...] settled the matter upon the advice of their attorney, [...] who indicated the difficulty in defending the matter given the one-sided lease that [...] negotiated and the failure to terminate the lease within the time frame set forth in the lease documents.  [...] did not amend the R.4:5-1 statement prior to the settlement because it was his understanding that the entire controversy doctrine did not apply to claims of legal malpractice.  B.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at September 11th under the Ricci Act and amend his benefits thereunder.  Respectfully, [...], Esq.  April 10, 2024  VIA eCOURTS  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey - Appellate Division  [...] [...] [...]  Re: Ronald [...] v. [...]  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal from a Final Administrative Determination of the [...]
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10........................................................................................................2, 10  COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2)..................................................................................................................7  R. 2:5-5(b)......................................................................................................................10  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4.......................................................................................7  CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011).........................................................8  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).................................................................7  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007).................................................................9  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998).....................10, 11, 12 Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010)....................16
[brief] (Pa2).  On April 28, 2022, the Board adopted a written Resolution denying the Application.  (Pa1-15).  Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs challenging the denial as arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and also challenging various procedural deficiencies of the Board.  Trial was ultimately held before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. on March 20, 2023.  On April 10, 2023, [...] issued an Order remanding the matter back to the Board to articulate its findings and to adopt a resolution consistent with the opinion.  (Pa102).  On June 9, 2023, the Board issued an Amended Resolution of Denial.  (Pa16-44).  Thereafter, on October 27, 2023, [...] issued an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa104).  This appeal followed.
[brief] The New Jersey Arbitration Act, *N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-21b.*, only allows attorney fee shifting, “if such award is authorized by law in a civil action involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to the arbitration proceeding. ”  It is clear in New Jersey that the, “Arbitration Act adopts the American Rule except when fee shifting occurs ‘by the agreement of the parties to the arbitration proceeding. ”  *Rock Work Inc. v. Pulaski Const. Co., Inc.*, supra, 396 N.J. Super. at 355.  In *Rock Work*, it was held that a prevailing party could not obtain a legal fee award from an arbitration without an express agreement for fee shifting in the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.  Since this case did not include any fee shifting agreement in the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the only way for the American Rule to be disregarded was if fees could be awarded, “in a civil action involving the Plaintiff’s claims”.
[brief] Civil Action On Appeal of Orders of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County  Dated August 21, 2023  DOCKET NO. [...]  DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW:  HON. [...], J.S.C. LETTER BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  June 2, 2024  [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 016461985  [...]  Tel: [...]  [...]  Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
[brief] TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS AND RULINGS ON THE CROSS APPEAL..........................................................ii  TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES...........................................iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.........................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  III-IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT DISAGREES WITH THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION ON ITS SUMMARY  JUDGMENT MOTION ON LIABILITY, IT SHOULD AFFIRM THE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ORDER OF JUNE 25, 2021  BASED UPON PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE “DISCOVERY RULE” OR THE “RELATION BACK” DOCTRINE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.  (1T47-19 TO 48-22; Pa5-6; 3T65-4 to 66-18; Pa1-2).........................................................4  CONCLUSION..............................................................................6
[directive] RECORDING  IDENTIFICATION  RESULTS  When conducting an identification procedure, the lineup administrator or investigator shall preserve the outcome of the procedure by documenting any identification or nonidentification results obtained from the witness.  Preparing a complete and accurate record of the outcome of the identification procedure is crucial.  This record can be a critical document in the investigation and any subsequent court proceedings.  A.  All Out-Of-Court Identifications  When conducting an identification procedure (photo array, lineup, or mug book), the administrator or investigator should:  1.  Record both identification and nonidentification results in writing, including the witness’s own words.  2.  Ensure that the results are signed and dated by the witness.  3.  Ensure that no materials indicating previous identification results are visible to the witness.  4.  If the witness writes on or marks any materials, ensure that the marked copy of those materials are not used in other identification procedures.  B.