ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In support of his claims, plaintiff has relied upon the December 3, 2020 report prepared by plaintiff’s retained engineering expert [...], P.E. (Pa0004).  On page 5 of his report, Balgowan provided the following description of the accident giving rise to this litigation:  On September 12, 2015, around 1:00pm, [...] was riding a Harley Davidson motorcycle southbound on the Garden State Parkway (GSP) MP 40.0, bridge over U.S. Route 30, Galloway Twp., Atlantic County, NJ (see figure 1 below).  The road and bridge were being reconstructed and were at various stages of construction completion.  Burr was riding on the left edge of the left lane southbound on the GSP.  The road had been patched, however, there was a difference in elevation between the surface pavement at the southern deck approach joint at the north abutment.  A difference in elevation of approximately 2 inches is noted in the photos and on the adjacent barrier curb joint over the deck joint.  There is also subsidence and or settlement in the joint itself particularly on the eastern most part in the path of the incident motorcycle.  (Pa0008).  On page 17 of his report, Balgowan communicated his opinion that the southbound northern bridge abutment was in a dangerous condition on the day of the crash and caused plaintiff’s accident.
[directive] Conducted Energy Device (CED).  A conducted energy device means any device approved by the Attorney General that is capable of firing darts/electrodes that transmit an electrical charge or current intended to temporarily disable a person.  3.4  Deadly Force.  Deadly force means force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm, constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animal.  A threat to cause death or 3  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In this appeal, Petitioner requests that the Appellate Division reverse a directed verdict entered after a six-day trial that summarily dismissed claims that his late wife, [...] (hereinafter “Decedent”) was unduly influenced by his stepdaughter, Respondent [...] (hereinafter “Respondent”), to make a will dated October 16, 2014 (hereinafter “Will”) that named her as its sole beneficiary.
[directive] 5.  귀하가 성인진단 및 치료센터에 구금을 선고 받는 경우  Do you understand if you are sentenced to the [...]  a.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  향후의 모든 가석방은 일반 가석방지침에  따라 처리되지 않을 아십니까?  것이라는 것을 that any future parole will not be guided by the normal parole guidelines?  b.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  주 가석방 심사위원회가 특별등급 심사위원회로부터 권고를 받은 후에, 귀하가 성범죄자 치료센터에서 만족할 만한 수준으로  진전이 되고, 되었다고 판명되면 석방될 자격을 얻게 그 후에 주 가석방 심사 위원회가 증거 우위의 원칙에 따라 귀하가 재활에 협조하지 판정하거나, 않았다고 또는 귀하가 가석방 조건을 위반할 것이라는 한, 합리적 예상이 제시되지 않는 귀하는 가석방 된다는 것을 아십니까?  eligible that you will be for release when the [...], after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds you have achieved a satisfactory level of progress in sex offender treatment and that you will then be unless released on parole the [...] determines by a preponderance of or the evidence that you have failed to cooperate in your rehabilitation there is reasonable expectation that you will violate conditions of parole?
[directive] Any other indicators, as determined by the agency’s chief executive.  3.4.6  This information should be maintained to facilitate analysis as to individual members, supervisors, squads, districts and assignments, and the agency as a whole.  Depending on the size of the agency and the complexity of this data, computerized software that utilizes mathematical algorithms may be best suited to assist in revealing the presence of particular patterns of incidents.  However, not all law enforcement agencies have the computer capabilities for such an in-depth screening process.  At a minimum, every law enforcement agency should establish a protocol for tracking employee behavior and 13
[brief] HIGHLAND PARK WAS PROPERLY GRANTED DISMISSAL OF COUNT IV, ALLEGING RECKLESS AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.  Again, Plaintiff did not plead a cause of action against [...] on Count Four.  For a plaintiff to prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, he must show: (1) intentional conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous (“as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community”); (3) the conduct proximately caused plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.  DeAngelis v. Hill, 180 N.J. 1, 20 (2004) quoting Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc'y., 111 N.J. 355, 366, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (1988).  "For an intentional act to result in liability, the defendant must intend both to do the act and to produce emotional distress."  Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc'y., 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988).  Liability may also attach to a reckless act "when the defendant acts recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional distress will follow."  Ibid.  The distress caused by defendant’s conduct must be "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."  Ibid.  “Severe emotional distress is a severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by trained professionals. ”  Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super. 186, 200 (App. Div. 2003).  Here, nothing was alleged to suggest that any employee or agent of the Defendant Borough acted in an extreme and/or outrageous fashion which would go beyond the bounds of common decency or that Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress as defined above.  If Plaintiff is understood to have made such a claim against the Borough, the claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment.
[brief] Even if, however, this Court disagrees, there is no basis for entry of judgment reimbursing him for amounts paid to settle the claims.  [...] asserts that the Vermont Superior Court in finding that no factual issues precluded entry of judgment in the Underlying Hokenson Action, ignored his certification which offered a theory regarding how the personal interests of him and his wife, [...], were aligned with those of the [...].  At best, if the [...] certification were indulged, it would have created a factual dispute; it would not have warranted entry of judgment for [...], [...] and their faction.  Also, to infer that the Vermont Superior Court “ignored” the [...] certification seems to be a leap.  The more logical inference is that the Vermont Superior Court dismissed it out of hand.  The adversity of the [...]-[...] group and the [...] is apparent from the face of the Vermont pleadings.  In any event, the cases cited by [...] for the proposition that insurers are bound by reasonable settlements enter by insureds are inapposite.  In this case, the settlement followed entry of a judgment that clearly placed the claims beyond coverage.  [...]’s position, of course, is that the election not to fund an appeal of the non-covered judgment was appropriate in all respects.
[brief] II.  RESPONDENT’S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT WAS NOT RAISED BY RESPONDENT BY WAY OF CROSS-APPEAL AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED OR, IF CONSIDERED, SHOULD BE REJECTED AS LACKING MERIT.  (Briefed, but not argued below)  In its Brief [...] argues that [...] is equitably estopped from demanding arbitration.  Pb7.  The issue of equitable estoppel was briefed by the Parties below, but the issued was not specifically argued.  The decision below, however, clearly was not premised upon an equitable estoppel argument.  In that regard, the trial court expressly stated: “The defendant has waived the right to arbitration at this late date . . .”  T.24-18.  Therefore, at least by implication, the Court below rejected [...]’s equitable estoppel argument.  That being the case, if [...] wanted for this Court to review the lower court’s rejection of its equitable estoppel theory, it should have filed a cross-appeal.
[brief] After the investigation was completed, [...] convened a “termination panel. ” (Pa90 at 26:14-25).  Termination panels typically comprise of the Human Resources business partner for the employee’s particular department, the assistant-Vice President for Human Resources, in-house counsel, and the employee’s manager or director.  (Pa90).  No singular termination panel member has final decision-making power.  (Pa90-91 at 29:19-30:6; Pa353 at 45:16-46:8; Pa353 at 47:17-22).  [...] could not independently terminate an employee’s employment.  (Pa353 at 45:12-15).  After carefully considering the evidence from [...]’s investigation, the termination panel elected to terminate [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa91 at 30:3-6; Pa115 at 127:19-128:12; Pa368 at 108:16-18; Pa90 at 29:19-25).  [...] was saddened by the decision and did not want to lose two-thirds of her staff during the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, but [...] had no choice other than to accept the decision.  (Pa369 at 109:12-110:10).  [...] was notified of her termination on September 17, 2020.  (Pa556).  [...] and [...] informed [...] that her employment was being terminated due to her unauthorized entry and receipt of charge pay in violation of [...] policy.  (Pa325-26 at 191:12-192:15).  [...] admitted at her deposition that an employee falsifying payroll records, or adding additional hours or compensation to their paycheck, would both constitute sufficient grounds for termination and violated [...] policy.  (Pa298 at 81:21-82:10).
[directive] Having been advised that the court may be required to impose a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”), do you still wish to plead guilty?  Fecha/Date: Acusado/Defendant: Defensor/Defense Attorney: Abogado Fiscal/Prosecutor Formulario Promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Spanish página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Spanish page 2 of 2  AVI:  Sa se yon dokiman piblik.  Pa mete okenn enfòmasyon idantifikasyon pèsonèl sou li, kankou nimewo Sosyal, nimewo Lisans pou kondwi, oswa nimewo kont an bank ak kat kredi aktif yo.  Dokiman sa a ap disponib ba piblik la sou demann jan li soumèt la.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Tout plent, petisyon ak lòt papye ki soumèt ba tribinal la fèt pou an angle.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English Sistèm Jidisyè  New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary  Fòm Pledwaye Siplemantè pou Santans Egzijib  Libète Kondisyonèl N.J.S.A. Konfòmeman a 2C:35-14.2  "Tribinal pou Koze Dwòg"  Supplemental Plea Form Mandatory Sentence to Special Probation  N.J.S.A.  Pursuant to 2C:35-14.2  “Drug Court” (Haitian Creole)  Kesyon swivan sa yo fèt pou reponn sèl si w elijib pou yon santans egzijib de libète kondisyonèl espesyal konfòmeman ak 2C:35-14 ("Tribinal pou koze Dwòg")  N.J.S.A.
[brief] While a hearing on a municipal ordinance may not involve the presentation of evidence, the procedures governing ordinance adoption cannot override the substantive requirements of the statute a particular ordinance implements.  New Jersey Shore Builders Association v. Mayor and Township Committee of Township of Middletown, 234 N.J. Super. 619, 621 (Law Div. 1989) (ordinance placing moratorium on land use applications invalid because supported only by health officer’s opinion and other recitals when applicable statute required specific factual support).
[brief] (1)  On lots containing farms, as defined herein, one additional fowl is permitted for every 1,000 square feet of lot area over 10,000 square feet in farm use.  (2)  Roosters, ostriches, and emus are not permitted, except on properties with a minimum lot size of five (5) acres.  (3)  Structures housing domestic fowl must be located at least ten (10) feet away from any property line.  C.
[brief] It is well-settled that reviewing courts do not blindly adhere to Board Decisions.  *Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd.*, 473 N.J. Super. 284, 303 (App. Div. 2022).  In *Berta*, the appellate panel emphasized that its review of the Board’s decision “is not ‘perfunctory,’ nor is it ‘[the Court’s] function . . . merely [to] rubberstamp an agency’s decision. ’”  *Ibid.* (omission and second alteration in original).  Importantly, reviewing courts require that the Board “explain its reasoning” with “[a] sufficient statement of reasons. ”  *Ibid.*  Without sufficient reasoning from the Board, reviewing courts are unable to ascertain whether the Board’s decision is justified or arbitrary and capricious.  *Ibid.*  While Board decisions are entitled to some level of deference, the “discretionary power exercised by the . . . Board . . . is not unlimited or absolute. ”  *Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd.*, 250 N.J. 431, 455 (2022).  Indeed, as noted by [...] in *Acoli*:  A government agency, such as the . . . Board, may not wield its discretionary power arbitrarily.  Like all agency decisions, those rendered by the . . . Board are subject to judicial review.  However deferential the standard of review may be, our courts are the ultimate arbiters of whether the Board has acted within the bounds of the law.  [Ibid. (internal citations omitted). ]  A “Board decision that either violates legislative policy, is not supported by ‘substantial evidence’ in the record, or ‘could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors’ cannot be sustained. ”  Acoli, 250 N.J. at 455 (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino IV), 154 N.J. 19, 24-25 (1998)).  Under appropriate circumstances, reviewing courts have the inherent power to reverse the Board and grant an inmate’s application for parole without a remand.  Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino VI), 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001); see also id. at 121 (ordering the Board to “grant Trantino parole subject to the pre-release condition of satisfactory completion of a twelve-month halfway house placement and such other pre- and post-release conditions that it may impose”); Acoli, 250 N.J. at 438 (“[W]e are compelled to . . . grant Acoli parole, consistent with his established release plan. ”); Kosmin v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 363 N.J. Super. 28, 44 (App. Div. 2003) (reversing the final decision denying parole and “direct[ing] that Kosmin be released on parole forthwith”); N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 551 (App. Div. 1988) (“revers[ing] the decision denying Cestari parole and direct[ing] that he be released on parole forthwith”).  This standard of review requires reversal here.
[brief] [Pa 74-76 (emphasis added)].  [...] also testified that, because the Project will utilize an existing road network in Milltown, there will be no direct impact to neighboring municipalities.  Pa 76.  His testimony was unrebutted.  Plaintiffs’ claim that the Planning Board made no findings of fact is demonstrably incorrect.  The Board’s resolution explicitly references [...]’s testimony in the “whereas” recitals and plainly incorporates them by reference in its findings.  Pa 70 (“The aforementioned recitals are incorporated herein as though fully set forth at length. ”).  The Amended Redevelopment Plan, which includes its own statements of consistency with the Master Plan, was also incorporated by reference.  The reference to the proceeding being a “mere formality” by the Planning Board Chairman does not negate the findings the Planning Board made.
[brief] See Pa257-299 and 543-550 for context.  This begs the question of why the Legislature would permit recovery under the one example, but not the other, when there is no meaningful distinction, and that fact is that [...] should not have walked onto either area at the time because a train was coming and had the right of way.  In short, [...]’s interpretation of the statute would lead to absurd results and it should therefore be rejected.
[brief] Judgment on the award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.  Each party shall bear equally the expenses of the arbitration.  Da417-18 (Policy § F (emphasis added)).  The Policy also contains a Service of Suit provision that empowers [...] with the right to sue if [...] fails to pay any amount due under the Policy and mandates that [...] “will” submit to a court’s jurisdiction:  U. Service of Suit – Subject to VI.  CONDITIONS, Paragraph F, above, it is agreed that in the event of failure of the Company to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Company, at the request of the Insured, will submit to the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction within the United States.  ... and that in any suit instituted against the Company upon this contract, the Company will abide by the final decision of such court or any appellate court in the event of any appeal.  Da419 (Policy § U (emphasis added)).
[brief] Appx., at Pa7.  Whether a defendant’s conduct complies with the FDCPA is a question of law for the Court to decide while bearing in mind the FDCPA’s twin aims of both protecting consumers from “abusive, deceptive, unfair” conduct and “insur[ing] that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged. ”  *See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 516 F.3d at 90 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).  Considering this very letter vendor theory of liability in June of this year, this Court twice determined that trial courts had properly dismissed claims grounded in this theory.  In *Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs.*, this Court explained its reasoning that use of a letter vendor did not violate the FDCPA as follows:
[brief] *State v. Weaver*, 219 N.J. 131, 151 (2014) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI).  The reason for the Confrontation Clause is the principle that “subjecting testimony to cross-examination enhances the truth-discerning process and the reliability of the information. ”  Id. at 151 (citing *California v. Green*, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970); *State ex rel. J.A.*, 195 N.J. 324, 342 (2008)).  “The right of confrontation is an essential attribute of the right to a fair trial, requiring that a defendant have a ‘fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations. ’”  *Branch*, 182 N.J. at 348 (quoting *State v. Garron*, 177 N.J. 147, 169 (2003) (quoting *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004)).  Importantly, “[a] defendant exercises his right of confrontation through cross-examination, which has been described as the “‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. ’”  Id. at 348-49 (quoting *California v. Green*, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 Wigmore *§ 1367); see also *Pointer v. Texas*, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).  Further, under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to know the evidence against him.  *State v. Gibson*, 219 N.J. 227, 249 (2014)(explaining when evidence from suppression motion is then used on a municipal trial, there must be a clear record of the testimony and exhibits being incorporated into the trial); *State v. Bankston*, 63 N.J. 263, 268–69 (1973) (holding that detective's recounting of information received from informant to explain reason for entry to tavern and arrest of defendant contravened defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him).
[brief] The issue -- the issue was mostly one of timing.  Two -- two things.  1. That there was some sort of a -- an interest of the process server in this case and, therefore, it is unreliable.  And that pursuant to court rules the affidavit of service doesn't -- doesn't enjoy a presumption of validity.  I've -- I've looked at the documents.  I understand what the argument is that -- that there's this office sharing situation that exists.  That potentially there's -- there's a conflict.  I don't find that there is such a conflict.  And I found the testimony of the process server to be credible.  [Trial Transcript, 4/20/2023, at T4 97:13 to 98:6.]
[directive] Such a dispute during the course of plea negotiations would only reveal that there is no “meeting of the minds” necessary to consummate an agreement between the parties.  Accordingly, so as to promote the uniform and efficient implementation of these Guidelines, a prosecutor shall object to a defense motion to convene an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes between the defendant and the prosecutor as to eligibility for a standardized waiver or the application or scoring of a Special Offense Characteristic, Aggravating or Mitigating Factor, Special Application and Enhancement Feature, or Downward Departure.
[brief] State v. Wright, 444 N.J. Super. 347, 363 (App. Div.) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)), certif. denied, 228 N.J. 240 (2016).  That is, "interrogation includes not only direct questioning but also 'any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.'"  State ex rel. A.A., 240 N.J. 341, 354 (2020) (quoting Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 267).  "The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police."  Wright, 444 N.J. Super. at 364 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301).  "It is the State that must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant's statement was voluntary and, if made while in custody, that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the rights afforded him under Miranda."
[brief] Because Appellant suffered no actual harm due to Respondent’s supposed statutory violations, his “stake” in the case and “adverseness” is, in effect, only the interest of policing debt collectors’ compliance with the FDCPA, generally, which is the job of the FTC and CFPB.  As the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained:  [T]he choice of how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law falls within the discretion of the Executive Branch, not within the purview of private plaintiffs (and their attorneys).  Private plaintiffs are not accountable to the people and are not charged with pursuing the public interest in enforcing a defendant’s general compliance with regulatory law.  *TransUnion*, at 2207.  *See also* T9-10.  In sum, the Superior Court correctly concluded that, because Plaintiff suffered no actual injury and was not impacted by the letter, there was no “substantial likelihood that [he] will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision” or “sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation.
[brief] (Dma 3-14)**  At its threshold, [...]’s statement is evidence of other crimes or bad acts.  As discussed above and acknowledged by the motion court, the statements at issue do not concern the case at bar—the Hudson County case—but a separate case, charged, indicted, and disposed of in Union County.  Therefore, the statement is evidence of other crimes or bad acts and its admission must be evaluated under Rule 404(b).  In New Jersey, *State v. Cofield* governs the admissibility of prior bad acts.  127 N.J. 328 (1992).  “[T]o avoid the over-use of extrinsic evidence of other crimes or wrongs,” the *Cofield* test demands that: 1.  The evidence must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3.  The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4.  The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  *Id.*  Here, the trial court erred by finding that the statement was admissible under Cofield.