ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Arbitration Clause Is Not Mandatory for Disputes Concerning [...]’s Non-Payment of [...]’s Insurance Claim  [...] argues that arbitration is mandatory under both the pollution Policy and the Umbrella Policy.  Db15-20.  However, the waiver issue applies even to mandatory arbitration clauses, so [...]’s waiver alone disposes of this appeal.  A determination of whether the clause was mandatory or permissive therefore need not be reached by this Court.  But even if [...] did not waive arbitration (which it did), the Law Division’s denial of [...]’s motion should still be affirmed because the Policy’s arbitration clause is permissive (not mandatory), and the Umbrella Policy’s narrow mandatory provision does not apply here.  Arbitration, therefore, respectfully should not be compelled on this basis here.  A.
[directive] [Non/No]  [pa aplikab viktim ki soufri pèt ak si tribinal la ta detèmine ke w gen kapasite oswa wap gen /NA] kapasite pou peye restitisyon nan lavni?  Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?
[brief] One document was provided, while the criminal investigatory record was appropriately withheld.  If the trial court’s order on the remand is upheld, record custodians would now be required to intuit whether the requestor desired the “information” set forth in Section 3b.  Inasmuch as there is a clear distinction between “records” and “information”, this becomes an undue burden on a custodian.  Indeed, it is not certain who would have to release the “information” because it can be withheld by a “law enforcement official”.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, where it shall appear that the information requested or to be examined will jeopardize the safety of any person or jeopardize any investigation in progress or may be otherwise inappropriate to release, the filing of that opinion.
[brief] At oral argument on October 13, 2023, the trial court granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment in a detailed oral opinion.  With respect to the issue of whether [...] had notice regarding the alleged non-functioning light, the court held that it had not.  It stated:  The proofs on the issue of notice are such that a termination of the merits of the public service request and summary judgment can be made by this Court.  It is first noted that multiple members of the [...] lived in close proximity to the location but had testified that they never reported the subject streetlight being out to [[...]].  The sole witness who presented evidence to same is [...].  He's a person who lived in the immediate vicinity of the intersection.  Plaintiff relies heavily and exclusively upon information provided by [...] and is seeking to demonstrate notice prior to the event.  It is undisputed that [...] had no record of the streetlight being reported out any time prior to the accident.  The only records [...] has are two repair jobs in 2018 and one maintenance job in 2019.  It is further undisputed that there are no reports of the light being out had been made to [...], the police, or the (indiscernible) prior (indiscernible) prior to the accident.  ....  The recorded statement at his deposition testimony this witness demonstrated is not of the quality to raise a disputed issue of material fact as to the inoperability of the streetlight at the time of the event.  The witness testified that he reported the light out to -- once to [...] and the light was fixed the following day.  We were presented with call records at the time of deposition.  [...] recalled that he had reported the light out on October 4th, 2018, a year following the subject accident.  Most important to this accident, -- analysis -- I'm sorry -- neither the recorded statement nor the deposition provide a factual basis for which a fact finder would be able to find that [...] called [...] before the accident.  …  While the Court is well aware the standard for summary judgment motion is giving all favorable inferences to the non-moving party, the testimony of [...] is insufficient.  … Its imprecision and speculative nature of such that it cannot afford a fact finder [a] sufficient basis to rely upon same.  By its own admission, [...] does not know when he made the call.  He is certain he made one call.  That call is corroborated by the records of [...] being made after the accident.  [(1T28-32). ]  The court also rejected Plaintiff’s alternative arguments that: (1) [...] had acted negligently in failing to advise [...] as to light placement and design, and (2) [...] had a duty to Plaintiff to provide streetlights with sufficient illumination at the crosswalk, noting that it had “fail[ed] to find any support by statute of case law for such a position.
[brief] Pra001 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees [...], et al., [...] v. [...], [...] (3d. Cir. June 23, 2023)  ..................................................  Pra002 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees [...], et al., [...] v. [...], [...] (3d. Cir. Oct. 3, 2023)  ...........................................................................  Pra060 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees [...], Government Employees Ins. Co. v. [...], [...] (3d. Cir. Oct. 3, 2023)  ...........  Pra115  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 21 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) ..........................................................................................  18  YA Global Investments, L.P. v. Cliff, 419 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2011)  ..................................................................  14  Rules R_ 4:4–4(a)(5)  ........................................................................................................  15, 17  Statutes N.J.S.A. 42:2B–57(a)  ..........................................................................................  27  N.J.S.A. 42:2C–65(a)  .........................................................................................  27, 28, 30  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Pb13.)  Defendant premises these arguments on its proposition “[t]he crux of [Plaintiff’s] underlying Motion and this appeal relates to the following language in Section 13:10:  ‘Purchaser’s obligation to close title hereunder is conditioned upon any commercial tenant under the Leases . . . delivering to Purchaser an estoppel certificate . . . the sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate . . . shall be to terminate this Agreement. ’” (Pb10-11.)  Defendant’s whole premise misses the mark.
[brief] (Da1-26.)  The Complaint alleges that [...] conspired to leverage the ER Physicians’ legal obligation to care for emergency patients to enrich itself by forcing the ER Physicians out of network and reimbursing them for their services at shockingly low rates, in breach of an implied-in-fact contract and quantum meruit and in violation of certain statutory laws.  (Da11-22.)  Before May 2020, ER Physicians and [...] had written agreements governing the rates that [...] would pay for emergency services.  (Da7 ¶ 28.)  However, sometime in late 2017 or early 2018, [...] began to implement a profit-driven scheme to drastically reduce its reimbursement rates to emergency --- \(^3\)  Defendant-Appellants [...], [...], [...], and [...], are referred to herein collectively as “[...]. ”  (Da1.)  Defendant-Appellant [...], is referred to as “[...]. ”  (Da1.)  Because [...] and [...] have taken a joint appeal, submitted a joint appellate brief, and apparently hold identical positions, (see Db1), for simplicity, this brief refers only to [...].
[brief] THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f)  BECAUSE THEY NEITHER SURRENDERED THEIR INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT NOR USED THEIR POSITIONS FOR PERSONAL GAIN.  Petitioner next argues that the Commission did not apply appropriate precedent in determining that Respondents did not violate section (f) of the Code of Ethics for School Board Members.
[directive] Entiendo libertad prueba bajo periodo por de el que la un de! sobrepase cinco (5) aftos.  de que no of I agree  Court Program, probation officer treatment provider arrests. and inform the Drug new to any 8.  informar  Programa libertad a y tratamiento proveedor  Drogas, prueba acuerdo  Tribunal de agente  Estoy al de al de al de en de! cualquier arresto nuevo.
[brief] (Pa259-Pa265).  On July 19, 2023, after [...]’s summary judgment motion was filed and arbitration was scheduled, Plaintiffs moved to re-open discovery and for the first time sought additional time to procure an expert liability report.  (Pa266-Pa267).  [...] opposed said motion.  Plaintiffs’ also moved to amend their Complaint to assert a claim for the spoliation of evidence.  (Pa266-Pa267).  On August 25, 2023, the trial court conducted oral argument and ultimately granted Plaintiffs’ motion to re-open and extend discovery and denied [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  (Pa322-Pa323; Pa326-Pa327).  Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their Complaint to assert a claim for the spoliation of evidence was denied.
[brief] ”  • RFP 13: “All documents relating to the pricing and pricing-related assumptions that Plaintiffs used or considered in any way in connection with Plaintiffs’ proposal, Final Proposal Revisions, and Second Final Proposal Revisions. ”  •  RFP 14:  “All documents relating to Defendants’ proposal, submitted in or around September 2006, in response to RFP # [...] for the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM Contract, and all documents relating to Defendants’ Final Proposal Revisions (submitted in or around February 2007) and Second Final Proposal Revisions (submitted in or around June 2007) for the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM program.
[brief] The [...] District Policy 0174, entitled, “Legal Services,” (“Lacey Policy 0174”) designates three persons who may “request services or advice from contracted legal counsel”: the Superintendent, the Business Administrator/Board Secretary, and Appellant, as Board President.  Sg202-204.  Thus, Lacey Policy 0174 unconditionally authorized Appellant to request legal services from the Board’s attorney.  Further, the ALJ determined that entire Board, except [...], ratified the bill at the Board’s December 6, 2019 meeting.  See Sg169.  Consequently, Appellant’s actions were within the scope of his authority and constituted board action.  Yet, the ALJ grounded their threshold determination that Respondent’s actions were private, not board actions, on the existence of “some dispute as to whether a board president can request legal services from the board’s attorney without the prior formal consent or authorization of the board or the other two individuals authorized by the district to request such. ”  See Sg177.  The existence of any supposed “dispute” belies the plain language of Lacey Policy 0174 Township Board of Education District Policy 0174 and the ALJ’s finding that the entire Board, except [...], ratified the bill at the Board’s December 6, 2019 meeting in favor of dicta from Cheng v. Rodas, West New York Bd. of Ed., Hudson Cty., C58-14 (Sept. 22, 2015), a wholly unrelated case involving whether a board president was authorized to issue Rice notices to any district employees other than the superintendent.  The ALJ characterized Cheng, supra, as the SEC indicating that “a board president who without consulting other board members instructs the board’s attorney to perform legal research and prepare a memorandum would violate N.J.S.A. 12:24.1(e).
[directive] >  To determine the validity of any such lien or mortgage, the amount of payment to be made, and to carry out the functions described in this subparagraph, the Secretary may employ and compensate attorneys and other personnel skilled in state real estate law.  >  Liens and mortgages shall be satisfied after a final order of forfeiture has been attained except in the case of an interlocutory sale or where the court orders otherwise , (see EOAF Directives and both dated October 1995).
[directive] Addendum B | December 2020  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  (b) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should be in position to allow sufficient time for deployment; (c) the supervisor must coordinate the efforts of all law enforcement units involved in the pursuit; (d) the communications operator shall notify all units of the location of the authorized tire deflation device deployment; (e) the officer operating the authorized tire deflation device should take a position of safety as the pursued vehicle approaches; (f) the officer shall deploy or activate the authorized tire deflation device immediately before the pursued vehicle arrives at the point where it would impact the device; (g) the officer shall remove or deactivate the device immediately after the pursued vehicle goes over the authorized tire deflation device; and (h) the officer should immediately notify communications if the pursued vehicle impacted the authorized tire deflation device, if the officer observed any signs of deflation, and the direction and operation of the pursued vehicle after the impact.  6.6  The use of an authorized tire deflation device shall be reported on a Vehicular Pursuit Report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  11
[directive] Do you understand that if you violate a condition of community supervision for life and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years and a special sentence of parole (if the violation of the condition occurred on or after supervision for life July 1, 2014) (if the or you may receive a sentence of up to 18 months violation of the condition occurred before July 1, 2014)?
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  1.  [...] Resolution 11-2022, Memorialized on May 4, 2022.  (Pa187-Pa190).  2.  Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County Order Denying In Part Plaintiff’s Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, entered on December 8, 2022.  (Pa367-Pa368).  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | State Cases | Page(s) | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Fallone Properties, LLC v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., | | | 369 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2004) | 11 | | Lionel’s Appliance Center, Inc. v. Citta, | | | 156 N.J. Super. 257 (1978) | 20 | | Pizzo Mantin Group v. Randolph Twp. | | | 261 N.J. Super. 659 (App Div. 1993), affirmed as modified, 137 N.J. 216 | 20 | | PRB Enterprises, Inc. v. South Brunswick, | | | 105 N.J. 1 (1987) | 20 | | State Statutes | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D passim | | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7 | 17 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48 | 20 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) | 4, 19 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)1 | 8, 12 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76(2)(b) | 4 | | Local Ordinances | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Westampton Township Ordinance § 149-7 | 19 | | Westampton Township Ordinance § 196-3 | 20 | | Westampton Township Ordinance § 250-4 passim | | | Westampton Township Ordinance § 250-4A | 16 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 32 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir.2001)  9, 24, 25, 36 Gillman v Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 NJ Super 525 528 (App Div 1996)  8, 42, 46 Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985)  9, 20, 23, 25, 27, 31, 32, 33 Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476 (3d Cir.1993)
[brief] |  Requirement | Senior Housing - 1 Overlay Zone | |--------------------------------------|---------------------------------| | Principal Uses | | | Minimum Tract Area | 25 acres \(^a\) | | Maximum Density | 11 units per acre \(^ab\) | | Minimum Principal Building Setbacks \(^c\) | | | Front Yard | 200 feet \(^ad\) | | Side Yard Setback (Each) | 200 feet \(^ad\) | | Rear Yard Setback | 200 feet \(^ad\) | | Maximum Building Height | 60 feet/4 stories \(^e\) | | Maximum Building Coverage | 20% \(^a\) | | Maximum Impervious Coverage | 40% \(^a\) | | Multiple Principal Buildings Per Lot | Permitted | | Minimum Buffers | | | Side Yard | 100 feet \(^a\) | | Rear Yard | 100 feet \(^a\) | | Accessory Uses | | | Location in Front Yard | Permitted | | Maximum Height | 30 feet/1 story | | Minimum Setbacks \(^c\) | | | Front Yard | 50 feet \(^d\) | | Side Yard | 100 feet \(^d\) | | Rear Yard | 100 feet \(^d\) | NOTES:
[brief] ”  (Pb7-8)  However, both *Sickles* and *Zaccardi* are distinguishable, because neither case addressed the failure to provide an Affidavit of Merit.  *Sickles* addressed whether an indirect purchaser of a price-fixed product has a cause of action under either the New Jersey Antitrust Act (“ATA”), *N.J.S.A.* 56:9-1 to -19, or the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), *N.J.S.A.* 56:8-1 to -20.  *Sickles*, 379 N.J. Super. at 104.  *Zaccardi* considered the effect that a dismissal for failure to answer discovery had on a defendant’s statute of limitations defense to a subsequently filed suit.  *Zaccardi*, 88 N.J. at 249.  Neither case addressed the Affidavit of Merit statute and, indeed, *Zaccardi* predated the passage of that statute by more than a decade.  Plaintiff argues that *Sickles* and *Zaccardi* apply because the Affidavit of Merit statute’s requirements are “arguably procedural” and requires a balancing of various concerns prior to dismissal.  (Pb8-9)  This argument is misguided.  While, clearly, there are procedures mandated by the Affidavit of Merit statute, its requirements are substantive, as the failure to comply with the statute constitutes a failure to assert a cause of action.  *Cowley*, 242 N.J. at 16 (“The failure to provide an affidavit or its legal equivalent is ‘deemed a failure to state a cause of action,’ *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-29, and this Court has ‘construed the statute to require dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance. ’” quoting *A.T.*, 231 N.J. at 346.)  It is not a mere procedural failure; the failure “goes to the heart of the cause of action as defined by the Legislature. ”  Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 244 (1998).  Thus, unlike the situations addressed in Sickles and Zaccardi, dismissal for failure to timely provide the appropriate Affidavit of Merit is a statutory mandate.
[brief] Unlike the defendant’s arguments before this Court, which parse out the relevant facts for individual examination and skewed analysis, the lower court conducted a thorough, unedited, holistic review of the evidence presented to it, particularly what the court could see for its own eyes in the video-recorded interrogation.  In doing so, the lower court saw before it a defendant able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, unhampered by any of the impediments defendant now claims.
[brief] ”  Id. at 228.  In this case, jurors were told that [...] and [...] were joint possessors; they were instructed on the definition of joint possession; and they were told that they could convict [...] of intent to distribute if they believed he gave drugs to [...].  As in Lopez, it was plain error not to correct the prosecutor’s misstatement in this case.  Aside from [...]’s testimony that [...] gave her drugs during their trip, there was a dearth of evidence supporting an intent to distribute.  No expert in drug distribution was presented, so there was no expert testimony about the inferences jurors could draw from the items in the car – the scale, razor blade, and notebook – or from the quantity of drugs or the amount of cash found.
[directive] 날짜 / Date 피고인 / Defendant 승인자: (인정 목적으로만 사용)  Approved by 판사 / (For purposes of plea only)  Judge 검사 / Prosecutor 지령 제01-18호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지  CN 11077-Korean 1/ 1 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11077-Korean page 1/
[brief] The Plaintiffs' reliance upon the matter of Bender v. Walgreen E. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 2008) is misplaced and does not support the Plaintiffs' argument.  The underlying matter in Bender was a claim that the pharmacy breached its duty of care to the plaintiff by giving him a drug other than the one listed on the prescription he presented.  The Appellate Division concluded that the claim of professional negligence based on the pharmacist's filling a prescription with a drug not prescribed fell within the common knowledge exception.  However, expert testimony would be necessary to establish plaintiff's claims based on the pharmacist's failure to recognize the impropriety of the dosage in the medication delivered and failure to provide adequate information or warnings.  Bender has no bearing upon the analysis of the instant matter.
[brief] POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CHARGING THE JURY BECAUSE ITS INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY CITED THE LAW AND WERE BASED ON EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THEM.  [Partially Raised Below.]  (13T57-12 to 71-10; 14T8-4 to 13-5).  .......................21  A.  Accomplice Liability.  .........................................................................................22  B.  Identification/Alibi.  ............................................................................................27  POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE STATE PRESENTED EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  [Not Raised Below.]
[brief] Consistent with the ethics rules, Plaintiff knew that far from “keeping quiet,” [...] should have fully informed [...] of the malpractice and that [...] should have explained the conflict of interest to her.  Id., ¶ 77.  In contrast, [...] had a habit of questionable practices with regard to keeping his files up to date and accurate.  Da36, ¶ 78, with Da98, Da100 (1/28/23 emails from [...] and [...] regarding deleting messages).  At 8:30 a.m. on February 15, 2023, Plaintiff received a telephone call from the worker’s compensation attorney during which he stated he had spoken with [...] about the malpractice issue and that [...]’s instruction was to “simply stay quiet and not discuss this matter further.
[brief] The Arbitrator considered the evidence and found EGPs “were either formally agreed to in the PTA or were included time and time again in the update calculations provided by [...] to [...] which set forth the EGP, amounts paid, and amounts owed. ”  Da137.  Thus, the Arbitrator did not credit [...] or its witnesses’ testimony that these amendments were merely “forecasted preliminary EGPs,” as [...] attempts to re-argue yet again here.  App. Br. at 21; see also Da138 (“I do not find persuasive [...]’s argument that the updates were mere ‘forecasts’ and that the payments mere conditional advances. ”).  In confirming the Award, the Trial Court noted that the Arbitrator “found that an agreement was made pursuant to the parties’ conduct in the course of their dealings with each other.
[brief] ”  Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008) (citations omitted).  Appellate courts “defer to an agency's interpretation of both a statute and implementing regulation, within the sphere of the agency's authority, unless the interpretation is plainly unreasonable. ”  Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 604 (2018) (citations omitted).  Appellate courts are “not bound by an unreasonable or mistaken interpretation of [a statutory] scheme, particularly one that is contrary to legislative objectives. ”  McClain v. Bd. of Review, 237 N.J. 445, 456 (2019).  As argued below, the Appeal Tribunal, and subsequently the Board of Review, interpreted the relevant regulations in a plainly unreasonable manner.