ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVES FROM: [...], DIRECTOR  DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  DIRECTIVES  2000-3 and 2000-4 - Replacements for an unnumbered Attorney General Directive dated August 14, 1995, regarding Seizure of Weapons from Law Enforcement Officers Involved in Domestic Violence Incidents  Attached for your attention are the following Directives which were recently signed by [...]:  No. 2000-3 - Revision to August 14, 1995, Directive Implementing Procedures for the Seizure of Weapons from Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers involved  This Directive is to be followed by county prosecutors when in Domestic Violence Incidents.  handling local and county law enforcement officers involved in domestic violence incidents.  No. 2000-4 - Revision to August 14, 1995, Directive Implementing Procedures for the Seizure of Weapons from All State Law Enforcement Officers involved in Domestic  This Directive provides notice of the procedures the Division of Criminal Violence Incidents.  Justice will follow when removing weapons from state law enforcement officers, which includes the Division of State Police, Division of Criminal Justice investigators, Department of Corrections officers, Juvenile Justice Commission officers, Bureau of Parole officers, State Park Ranger Service (Fish and Game) officers, Human Services Police, N. J. Transit Police Officers, state college and university campus police, Division of Taxation agents, and investigators for the State Commission of Investigations.  The procedures are essentially the same.  The separation eliminates any confusion contained in the August 14, 1995, Directive between areas of responsibility for county prosecutors and the Division of Criminal Justice.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
[directive] Pursuant to 2C:29-2b  Mandatory Suspension of Driving Privileges (Spanish) Conforme a N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, esta notificación es para informarle que, como persona condenada de Eludir, su licencia de conducir se ha suspendido por un período de [6 meses a 2 años], a partir de hoy.
[brief] That’s not res judicata.  Res judicata is the particular issue has been decided between the parties, it’s res judicata, it is what it is, and you can’t reopen it and re-argue it.  . .I don’t know why [...] denied the Motion to Amend, but it certainly wasn’t on the substance of the claims.  It was not on substance.  So res judicata and collateral estoppel, there’s been no decision on the substance in those claims.  * * *
[brief] [...] operated the pizza parlor periodically from 2010 to 2014.  (T2 at 137:12-25).  The hours of operation were chaotic.  (T2 at 140:22-141:3).  The structure was vacant for three years, from 2014 to 2017.  (T2 at 125:17-126:20).  [...] acquired the property immediately adjacent to the PQ on January 25, 2008.
[brief] *Id.* at 303-304.  [...] argued that allowing the arbitrator to define “cause” would “usurp [...]'s power to discharge and to ignore the parties' express limitations on his authority by merely expressing his own sense of discipline” and “render [...]'s right to discharge for cause meaningless. ”  *Id.* at 303-304.  The Third Circuit disagreed, ruling that the “short answer to [...]'s contentions is that [...] agreed to leave to an arbitrator the resolution of disputes whether cause existed for the discharge of any employee represented by [...].  The arbitrator has ruled, and [...] is bound by that award. ”  *Id.* at 304.  The rationale of *[...]e Oil* applies to the instant appeal as well.  By declining to define “just cause” specifically in its CNA with [...], the Authority agreed to leave that term open to an arbitrator’s interpretation.  Just like in *[...] Oil*, [...] utilized his expertise as a labor arbitrator to review the contract between the Union and the Authority and define just cause, then applied that definition to the Authority’s wrongful termination of [...].  Simply put, “the short answer to” the Authority’s “contentions is that [it] agreed to leave to an arbitrator the resolution of disputes whether cause existed for the discharge of any employee represented by” the Union; “the arbitrator has ruled, and [the Authority] is bound by that award. ”  *Id.* at 304.  The CNA between the Union and the Authority requires that employees may only be disciplined or discharged for just cause, but does not expressly define what “just cause” means.  In other words, when disputes concerning discipline and discharge arise, the term is left to the definition and interpretation of an arbitrator.  Here, [...] did just that: he “simply interpreted the ambiguous term ‘[just] cause’ in a manner unsatisfactory to management,” and management seeks vacatur of the award for that reason.  *Linden Bd. Of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n* at 179-281 (quoting *United Transportation Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp.*, 51 F.3d at 378 (3d Cir. 1995)).  In its brief, the Authority did not cite a single case where an arbitration award was vacated for defining “just cause,” but did cite to two in which awards were confirmed over objections materially identical to the Authority’s own.  In both *Linden* and *[...] Oil*, the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Third Circuit respectively affirmatively ruled that arbitrators faced with an undefined “just cause” standard for discipline are charged with defining the term.  This Court should do the same and confirm [...]’s Award.
[brief] The prosecutor proceeded to show [...] still shots from the surveillance video:  Q.  I am showing you a still shot of what has been premarked as State Exhibit S-23.  Is this one of the camera angles that you recovered?  A. Yes.  Q.  Has this been modified or altered in any way?  A. No.  Q.  And what exactly are we looking at on this camera angle?  A.  I believe this is the eastbound U, Orange Street.  In front of the store.  Q.  And once again, this has not been altered in any way?  A. No.  Q.  And this is the same still shot that you reviewed previously and you and I reviewed together?  A.  Correct.  ...
[brief] About a month later, [...] had an opportunity to interview defendant about the attack.  A redacted version of the audio/video of the interview was played for the jury.  (Da7, S-6 in evidence); (7T171-15; 9T82-6 to 8).  [...] explained to defendant that he wanted to talk to him about something apart from whatever he was arrested for and brought him to the police station that day.  (7T172-10 to 16).
[brief] [Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Aggravated Assault – Upon Law Enforcement Officer (Attempting to Cause or Purposely, Knowing or Recklessly Causing Bodily Injury) (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)” at 1 (rev. Dec. 3, 2001). ]  Because third-degree aggravated assault is established by what would otherwise be simple assault except committed against victim who was a police officer, the State is not required to prove severe bodily injury.  Rather, the State only needs to prove “physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition. ”  *Id.* at 2.  For simple assault, “[n]ot much is required to show bodily injury.
[brief] (8T153-12 to 162-3; 8T164-13 to 172-23).  [...] explained that the call detail records provide the location of a cell phone tower, which is the physical location of the cell site.  (8T153-21 to 154-3).  He further explained that he plotted those points on a map and the shaded area on his depiction only establishes the direction of the antenna that was being utilized by a call.  (8T154-4 to 5).  He clarified that “there’s no estimation of any coverage with that.  It’s simply a graphical representation of the direction from the antenna that that antenna faces.
[brief] "It is axiomatic that a court's deference to a defendant's business judgment is limited to lawful business purposes, and that a defendant's business judgment will not insulate an employer from liability for unlawful discrimination."  Keiser v. Borough of Carlisle, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25777, *24, 2017 WL 736851 (M.D. Pa).  This Court has also confirmed that, "[i]nstances of directors' self-dealing are always subject to the closest scrutiny by the court....  The propriety of judicial supervision to prevent or redress fraudulent or inequitable conduct on the part of directors has never been questioned."  Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., 43 N.J. Super. 79, 94, (App. Div. 1956).  In Daloisio, a self-interested transaction was held to have violated the business judgment rule.  There, two directors of an entity that had a business opportunity to acquire land secretly negotiated to acquire that land for their own separate entity.  *Id.* at 86-87.  When sued by the other shareholders, the Court found their actions were a breach of fiduciary duty.  In rejecting the directors’ ‘business judgment rule’ defense, that they “acted within the proper limits of their managerial discretion in assigning the contract”, this Court held:  We recognize the basic principle laid down in *Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Railways, etc., Co.*, 49 N.J. Eq. 217, 232 (Ch. 1891), and cited by defendant, that "Individual stockholders cannot question, in judicial proceedings, the corporate acts of directors, if the same are within the powers of the corporation, and, in furtherance of its purposes, are not unlawful or against good morals, and are done in good faith and in the exercise of an honest judgment.  Questions of policy of management, of expediency of contracts or action, of adequacy of consideration not grossly disproportionate, of lawful appropriation of corporate funds to advance corporate interests, are left solely to the honest decision of the directors if their powers are without limitation and free from restraint.  To hold otherwise would be to substitute the judgment and discretion of others in the place of those determined on by the scheme of incorporation."  But plaintiffs are not questioning the directors' acts for the reason that they were impolitic or merely inexpedient.  They charge that the directors acted in bad faith and failed to exercise honest judgment.
[brief] **Political Upheaval (Pa55 – Pa58; Pb18 – Pb21).**  [...] now claims error in the trial court’s finding this matter involves no “political upheaval” that would evince a public interest.  [...] supports this argument by (1) noting [...] made 2020 YouTube comments criticizing warehousing, but two years later voted to adopt Ordinance No. 13-2022, and (2) citing crowds appeared at the November 17 and December 15, 2022, [...] hearings on [...]’s site plan application.  (Pb18 – Pb21).  Again, it bears repeating that, as the trial court recognized, the “substantial public opposition” [...] relies on during the November and December 2022 hearings related to [...]’s *site plan application*, not Ordinance No. 13-2022.  (Pa56).  Moreover, those hearings were before the [...], an entirely separate municipal body, unrelated to the redevelopment ordinance.  Furthermore, [...]’s focus on the purported inconsistency of [...]’s 2020 comments on warehousing is misplaced.  As with the concept of public funds, [...]’s reference to “political upheaval” identified the specific facts of Willoughby, it was not a universal statement.
[brief] Regardless of whether NJCREAMMA sets forth a process for governing bodies to adopt a resolution of approval in connection with cannabis licenses, when the governing body establishes a process and scoring system, the governing body must be obligated to follow those protocols.  In fact, because the Legislature, in NJCREAMMA, decided not to adopt a uniform process for all municipalities to follow, it is even more important for this Court to ensure that when a municipality adopts a process, the municipality follows the process it adopted.  Otherwise, municipalities would be free to set standards and public expectations “to ensure transparency,” and then deviate from them for any reason—or for no reason at all.  This Court should not allow the Borough to evade its own process and compromise the integrity of the application process.  Cf. Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 226 (2016) (“In the performance of administrative law actions and determinations, process matters. ”)  On that front, this appeal shares similarities with In the Matter of the Application for Medicinal Marijuana Alt. Treatment Ctr. for [...], 465 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2020).  In that case, this Court—considering appeals filed by numerous unsuccessful applicants challenging the Department of Health’s awarding of vertically integrated alternative treatment center permits as part of the State’s medicinal cannabis program—recognized and reaffirmed that transparency in the decision-making process is paramount to build and maintain public confidence in the review process.
[brief] As a former redeveloper of property within the Beachfront South Sector of the Redevelopment Area, Plaintiff does not maintain any rights flowing from statute to require that the City obtain its written consent to any amendment of the Redevelopment Plan.  In the absence of such authority, Plaintiff cannot reasonably rely upon the language of the Redevelopment Plan’s procedures for amending the plan to assert that the City needed to obtain its consent to the proposed amendments.  Under the LRHL, the authority to amend the Redevelopment Plan resides solely within the City’s governing body, subject to the Planning Board’s input.  The LRHL authorizes municipalities to amend redevelopment plans and outlines the prerequisites for doing so.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-4 to -8; N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e); see also Housing Auth. Of City of Newark v. Ricciardi, 176 N.J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div. 1980).
[directive] But it unanimously held that internal affairs records are publicly accessible under the common law right to know if, on balance, consideration of the following factors weighs in favor of disclosure over the need for confidentiality: “the nature and seriousness of the misconduct”; • “whether the alleged misconduct was substantiated”; • “the nature of the discipline imposed”; • “the nature of the official’s position”; and • “the individual’s record of misconduct. ”  •  For puposes of this Directive and the Attorney General’s (IAPP), 1  Internal Affarirs Policy and Procedures  “sustained” is the equivalent of “substantiated” as it pertains to New Jersey State Police policies.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable
[brief] For example, the Third Circuit did not consider how to interpret AICRA to preserve a jury trial on IFPA claims because [...] waived a jury trial through its broad arbitration agreement.  See id. at 469 (“[...] does not explain why it cannot waive that right [to trial by jury] by agreeing to arbitrate. ”).  [...] also did not make the extensive arguments about statutory purpose, PIP ADR’s specialized rules, --- 4  The court can take judicial notice of what was argued in those briefs.  See N.J.R.E. 201(4) (“The court may judicially notice . . . records of the court in which the action is pending and of any other court of this state or federal court sitting for this state. ”).  absurdity, or legislative intent raised here.  Indeed, the information before the Third Circuit was so limited that the court mistakenly relied on the [...]’s Commercial Arbitration Rules to suggest that PIP arbitrators can award insurers treble damages.  *Ibid.*  This court should correct the Third Circuit’s incorrect interpretation of New Jersey law based on the full record before it.
[brief] And throughout the interrogation, they falsely empathized with him; exploited his children’s safety and his father’s love; and minimized the offense, stating, for example, that [...] was “a good kid, just caught up in the wrong situations”; he only “made a mistake”; and, “You had no choice.  I get it. ”  See L.H., 239 N.J. at 48-49 (finding language “psychologically coercive” that minimized the offense, such as that defendant was “not a bad guy”).
[brief] (1a). **  In *In the Matter of the Application for Medicinal Marijuana Alt. Treatment Ctr. for [...]*, 465 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2020), [...], writing on behalf of the Court, considered the appeals of numerous unsuccessful applicants challenging the Department of Health’s (“Department”) award of vertically integrated alternative treatment center permits.  Because the Department failed to provide an explanation regarding the disparities of the application score the Court noted that “the Department has done little to justify these anomalies or explain why they should be disregarded. ”  *Id.* at 370.  The Court was also concerned about whether “members understood or followed instructions” and noted “there [was] no evidence that the scores were verified in some manner or whether anomalies . . . have been harmonized in some reasonable, non-arbitrary way. ”  Ibid.  In short, the Court was concerned with whether the Department was following the very process it implemented.  Ultimately, the Court concluded that it must intervene “to ensure the public’s confidence in both the results achieved at the agency level so far and to ensure that future similar proceedings will be likewise subjected to a measure of scrutiny at the agency level that will guarantee the process does not produce determinations that are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  Id. at 382-83.  The Court’s intervention was necessary because “[b]oth the public interest and the public’s perception that the process is fair, competitive and trustworthy are critical components and objectives. ”  Id. at 383 (quoting Muirfield Constr. Co. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth., 336 N.J. Super. 126, 137-38 (App. Div. 2000)).  The Court therefore vacated the final agency decisions on appeal and remanded to the Department for further proceedings “in conformity with the spirit of this opinion. ”  Id. at 400.  The Court should follow the precedent set by [...].  The Borough adopted a process and set criteria which it then failed to follow.  The Borough’s failure undermines the outcome of the process, compromising the public’s trust and confidence that the process was fair, competitive, and trustworthy.  This is especially important where the Legislature adopted a statute giving enormous discretion to local governments in evaluating applications for retail cannabis licenses.  Thus, the Court should intervene, as in [...], to remind local governments that they must do what they tell the public they will do and that local governments must act fairly and transparently to engender public trust in their actions.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Raised below, 3T, pg. 5)  [...] severely limited the testimony which could be elicited from [...]’s expert, [...].  On November 30, 2022, [...] heard a Motion to Reconsider that determination.  And she stated “there’s some stuff that’s so fundamental to what the expert needs to look at to render an opinion that if they don’t look at it, it’s a net opinion” and she continued that the 21 bankers boxes, the [...] file are so fundamental in that way.  So, to give an opinion regarding whether reviewing that file was reasonable or not, without looking at the file, is a net opinion because it depends on how big the file is, it depends on what it is.  3T Pg. 10, line 5 – Pg. 12, line 6.  So essentially, [...]’s view was that the file, the 21 boxes of material discussed above were so fundamental, that not reviewing them resulted in the expert’s opinion being rendered a Net Opinion.
[brief] I had to beat the prosecution into submission with DoJ & NJ AG memos and warnings and, had to prove [...] was not “mentally ill,” just developmentally disabled with 8-9 of [...]’s 13 years of IEPs from school. \(^{16}\)  The State had no proof of “mental illness” so they cannot be excused for barring him PTI.  Instead, due to their unprofessional decision he was “mentally ill,” they tortured him for 2.5 years, which is disability harassment.
[brief] Defendants moved for summary judgment on the First Count of plaintiffs’ Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment on the enforceability of the arbitration clause contained in plaintiffs’ SPA.  Defendants’ motion for summary judgment sought a declaration that the clause is enforceable.  It is axiomatic that a motion for summary judgment must be denied where there are genuine issues of material fact and movants do not show that they are entitled to that judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 4:46 – 2(c).  Here, there is no dispute that the SPA arbitration clause does not contain the waiver language required by Atalese and its progeny.  Defendants do not even claim that it does.  Defendants’ arguments that Atalese is not applicable are wrong as a matter of law; and, in any event, would raise factual issues defeating their motion for summary judgment.  POINT II
[brief] (indiscernible) he’s the one, yeah.  I don’t have a relationship with him, I’ve met him a few times but my husband trained him at the karate school.  [The Court]  All right.  [Juror 12]  They share a karate school.  [The Court]  Do they still do that together or no?  [Juror 12]  My husband is no longer training there but yeah.  [The Court]  Okay and you understand you couldn’t talk to him -- if you and your husband ran into him, you couldn’t talk to him; right?
[brief] Indeed, if the parties were not concerned about imposing a specific deadline to pursue a “Refiled Action” after the [...], then they would never have included a sixty-day deadline, or any other deadline, in paragraphs 1-4 of the Consent Order and the preservation terms in the beginning of paragraph 5 in the first place.  Not only did the parties include the 60-day deadline, they went through the painstaking task of describing when and how the 60 days would be triggered: within 60 days of the issuance of the Nacirema Award.  Unless a word is specifically defined in a contract, “words must be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary, plain and usual meaning. ”  *Daus v. Marble*, 270 N.J. Super. 241, 251 (App. Div. 1994).  The term “within” is a preposition “to indicate a situation or circumstance in the limits or compass of: such as (a) before the end of (‘gone within a week’) and (b)(1) not beyond the quantity, degree, or limitations of (‘live within your income’).  (See “Within,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).  Thus, the plain meaning of “within sixty (60) days” set forth in paragraph 3 of the Consent Order means “before the end of” sixty days or “not beyond” sixty days.  Appellants’ contention that “within” means “at any time after” sixty days runs afoul of the plain, ordinary and usual meaning of the term.  Indeed, Respondent’s interpretation renders “within sixty days” entirely meaningless, and imposes a completely opposition construction than the words actually used.  Thus, Appellants’ continued argument begs the questions: If the Consent Order’s sixty-day period is not a deadline, why was it included in the first place?  Second, if the sixty-day period is not a refiling deadline, then why would the parties take the time and effort to specifically define the events that would have to occur in relation to the [...] to trigger it?  Third, while not considered by the --- 6 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/within (emphasis added)(last visited Feb. 26, 2024).  Trial Court, why did the Appellants’ counsel call the sixty-day period a “filing deadline” when drafting the order, if it was not, in fact, a filing deadline?  The answer to each of these questions is the same: because the sixty-day period is a mandatory refiling deadline.  Appellants ignored it and filed the Complaint 620 days after the [...] was adjudicated and 560 days after the expiration of the deadline.  Thus, by the plain meaning of the Consent Order, the Complaint was properly dismissed and the Order must be affirmed.
[brief] [...] simply had no obligation to compound [...]’s impropriety and expose [...] to uncovered liability, risking a bad faith claim against itself in the process.  In any event, [...], which wrongly disclaimed coverage to [...], cannot avail itself of a voluntary payment defense.  \textit{Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co.}, 72 N.J. 63, 72 (1976) (wrongfully disclaiming insurer barred from arguing that insured’s settlement of claim constituted a “voluntary payment[”]).\textsuperscript{11}