ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] does not constitute an “interested party” under the MLUL.  Plaintiffs have not proffered any competent evidence establishing that [...] possesses a property interest anywhere near the facility. \(^3\)  To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ appeal brief admits that the referenced property is “owned by a family member in a corporate name. ”  (Pb32.)  Moreover, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to articulate how [...]’s \(^3\)
[brief] ”  This statement is wholly irrelevant to whether [...] was “successful”, and it is inaccurate, especially in light of the fact that [...] took no position on the choice of law issue and did not disclaim coverage to [...].  (Pa0368-Pa0379.)  Further, this statement does not explain why the trial court believed that [...] satisfied its burden to establish that it is legally entitled to fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(6).  (Pa0055.)
[brief] However, the public rights created and protected by the Public Trust Doctrine are not limitless.  In fact, the Institutes of Justinian immediately proceed to state, “No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitations, monuments, and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations. ”\(^9\)  As such, the Doctrine has from its inception recognized that, to the extent that the public may use the resources protected by this principle, this use must be carefully balanced against the rights of residents of tidally adjacent dwellings to use and enjoy their property, as well as their privacy and their safety more generally.  The Doctrine was maintained through English common law and inherited by the original thirteen colonies after the Revolution, when the rights to tidal waterways and their shores—which were previously reserved to the Crown—passed to the --- \(^8\) J. INST. 2.1.1, in THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, WITH NOTES 67 ([...] ed. & trans., 3d ed. 1852).
[brief] The trial court erred when it granted Defendants’ motions *in limine* substantively dismissing the [...]’ claims for attorney’s fees and punitive damages in contravention of Rule 4:25-8(a)(1), which precludes motions *in limine* that are dispositive in nature.  The trial court also erred when it denied the [...]’ earlier motion for leave to amend that sought permission to add new claims and a new party based on facts uncovered during discovery.  That discovery revealed the depths Defendants were willing to go to demonize the [...] for simply trying to protect their long-standing property rights in a safe and lawful manner.  The proposed new causes of action included claims for malicious prosecution and libel *per se* based on the deposition testimony of [...] president [...], who admitted he knowingly filed a false criminal complaint against [...] after [...] Board members discussed how doing so might give Defendants an advantage in this litigation.  The [...] respectfully request this Court reverse these orders so the [...] may pursue full compensation for the harm caused by Defendants.
[directive] See an as complaint-warrant by charged and arrested been had is It Directive).  under this an adult as treated be shall court adult to waived juvenile 2.2.1 (a seriousness nature and the waiver (e.g., involuntary an justifying circumstances the that expected invoke will often delinquency) of history prior any of extent and nature and/or the charges of the detention.  pretrial seek to Directive under this presumption a Records.  Expunged 7.6.6 seeking against presumption the overcome to whether determining in prosecutor, A totality of the as part records expunged consider 7.2, may Section to pursuant detention pretrial or arrests prior of . . . records ("expunged 2C:52-21 N.J.S.A. See circumstances. relevant of the of Division Probation prosecutor, the county court, any to provided be shall convictions requested are General when same Attorney the or agency, services pretrial the Court, Superior sections to pursuant determination release pretrial [or] hearing, bail with a conjunction in for use Law]").
[brief] 209 N.J. at 15.  The detective “had not witnessed the crime and did not know [the] defendant; [his] opinion stemmed entirely from the victim's description. ”  Id. at 24.  The Court held that this opinion testimony was inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 701 because “the detective had no personal knowledge of that critical, disputed factual question. ”  Id. at 22.
[directive] Imminent Danger.  Threatened actions or outcomes that are immediately likely to occur during an encounter absent action by the officer.  The period of time involved is dependent on the circumstances and facts evident in each situation and is not the same in all situations.  The threatened harm does not have to be instantaneous, for example, imminent danger may be present even if a subject is not at that instant pointing a weapon at the officer, but is carrying a weapon and running for cover to gain a tactical advantage.  Law Enforcement Executive.
[brief] The payment of a life insurance benefit is generally governed by contract.  See *Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Woolt* 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 454-55 /E. & A.1946).  The rule is tempered by the doctrine of substantial compliance; so, our courts will effectuate a change of beneficiary where the insured has substantially complied with the relevant policy provisions.  *Haynes v Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 166 N.J. Super. 308, 313(App. Div. 1979).  However, the insured must have "made every reasonable effort to effect [the] change of beneficiary."  *Ibid.*  There is no proof that [...] did so here.  There is no confirmation of receipt from the employer or the insurer, nor is there any evidence that [...] attempted to confirm that his alleged beneficiary designation was effective.  (This is an unpublished opinion and pursuant to the Court Rules it has already been provided.)
[brief] ” (Pa380, Pa381).  Given that the allegations took place on the “common elements”, the [...] policy was/is responsible to provide defense and indemnification.  (Pa11, Pa15).  However, the Association intentionally concealed the Association’s policies until August 2017.  (Pa15).  As a result of the Association’s action, [...] was forced to privately retain counsel.  (Pa11).  Even though the Association intentionally concealed the Association’s insurance policies, [...] asserted that Defendant [...] is liable for damages to [...].  (Pa15).  In the 2016 lawsuit against John William [...], the three counts against him are: (1) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations; (2) Assault; and (3) Harassment.
[brief] Similarly, $25,664,199.21 is not “nearly correct”, “exact” or “close in value” to $21,844,717.26 (the former being 17% higher).  Compare 37% and 17% disparities with the 22% found to be statutorily deficient in Wells Fargo.  Instead of applying the statutory “approximate” mandate, [...] created her own statutory criteria, i.e., even though the published amounts were not approximately the correct amounts, they were not such “egregious variation[s] from the actual number[s] that it put a chilling effect on bids. ”  T27-1 to 2.  That, however, is not the statutory mandate of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34.
[directive] Disorderly Persons Offenses and Petty Disorderly Offenses  Unlawful Taking of a Means of Conveyance .................................................................................................................................................  84  Unlicensed Entry of Structures; Defiant Trespass .........................................................................................................................................  84  Wandering, Remaining in or Prowling Public Places with Purpose of Obtaining or Selling Controlled Substances ....................................... 87  11  Updated December 2, 2013  Index of Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Indictable Offenses
[brief] Indeed, none of the purported sources of definition advanced by the Department—“common sense,” the Merriam-Webster dictionary, and ASOP 8—constitute a consistent and obvious meaning to the term such that rulemaking is unnecessary, the Legislature’s touchstone.  See Pb21–23, 41–43.  Rather, those sources provide different and inconsistent definitions, and none square with how the Department has used “excessive” in its post hoc revisionism here (smuggled-in through previously unstated “public interest” considerations, see Pb42).
[directive] Lineups  7.10.1  A law enforcement officer may be ordered to stand in a lineup to be viewed by witnesses or complainants.  Probable cause need not exist, and the officer may be disciplined for refusal.5  7.10.2  The lineup must be constructed so as not to be unfairly suggestive.  The same rule applies to photo arrays.  See Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures; October 4, 2012, Memorandum and Revised Model Eyewitness Identification Procedure Worksheets.  7.11
[brief] From his start in law enforcement in April of 1989 but prior to October 17, 2015, [...] was never involved in any off-duty fights, assaults, or muggings in which he was injured.  (1T21).  From his start in law enforcement in April of 1989 but prior to October 17, 2015, [...] was never involved in any off-duty sporting events in which he was injured.  (1T20-21).  [...] filed no workers’ compensation claims while employed with the [...].
[brief] Pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the dispute resolution clause of the Hackensack Subcontract, the parties clearly and expressly consented that the AAA rules would apply to any arbitration commenced pursuant to the agreement.  The AAA rules, in turn, clearly and expressly provide that the arbitrator has exclusive authority to determine the arbitrability of a dispute, not the Court.  [...]’s challenges to the validity of the Hackensack Arbitration rests on the applicability of the entire controversy doctrine, which is a question of arbitrability.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, By: [...], ESQ.  New Jersey Bar No. 003951988  *Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant,*  *[...]*  Dated: February 19, 2024  LUIS FERMIN, Appellant, V. [...], Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  APPEAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE  FINAL DECISION  Docket No. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: FINAL ORDER  AGENCY DECISION  Agency No. [...]  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - [...]
[brief] The Complaint Asserts an FDCPA Claim Based on Defendant’s Communication with a Third Party.  The published Federal Decisions, hold that sharing the type of data Defendant conveyed to its vendor violates § 1692c(b).  A.  Defendant’s FDCPA Violation is an Abusive Practice.  Defendant contends Plaintiff must independently allege facts showing that Defendant’s failure to comply with an FDCPA provision is also abusive.  Abusiveness is not an element under Thiel.  “Abusive” appears in the FDCPA’s first codified section, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 but not in the rest of the statute.  That section’s heading and its subsection headings were added by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel to the codification but are not in the adopted statute (see P.L. 95-109).  Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 2009).  Instead, the only heading in P.L. 95-109 for that section is “Findings and purpose. ”
[brief] “It shall be unlawful . . . for any person to take reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because he has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this act . . .  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).  The NJLAD also protects employees who have “opposed any practices or acts forbidden by the NJLAD,” 18 N.J. Prac., Employment Law §4.29 (2d ed.), and Defendants may be vicariously and directly liable to Appellant for retaliation in violation of NJLAD pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).  To prove a claim of retaliation, an employee must establish that: (1) the employee engaged in protected activity as defined under the NJLAD; (2) the activity was known to the employer; (3) the employee was subjected to an adverse employment decision by the employer; and (4) there existed a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
[brief] Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Deborah [...], 601 U.S. ___ (Dec. 5, 2023).  In his concurrence, [...] would have dismissed for lack of federal case or controversy standing.  [...] stated:  To have [federal] standing, a plaintiff must assert a violation of his rights.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (“[T]he party seeking review [must] be himself among the injured” (internal quotations marks omitted)).  After all, “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide the rights of individuals. ”  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803).  It is not to address a plaintiff’s claim of “only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the . . . laws. ”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573.  (slip op. at p. 6).  In an explanatory footnote #2 on page 6 of his slip opinion concurrence, [...] elaborated:  The traditional distinction between public and private rights shapes the contours of the judicial power.  . . .  Private rights, such as the classic rights to life, liberty, and property, were “so called because they ‘appertain[ed] and belong[ed] to particular men . . . merely as individuals,’ not ‘to them as members of society [or] standing in various relations to each other’ --that is, not dependent upon the will of the government. ” . . .  By contrast, public rights “belon[g] to the public as a whole. ”  . . .  And “quasi-private rights, or statutory entitlements, are those ‘’privileges’’ or ‘’franchises’’ that are bestowed by the government on individuals.  . .  We need not classify [...]’s legal interests because, regardless of which type of right a plaintiff asserts, he must allege “the violation of his private legal right” or his own injury based on a violation of a public right. ” (slip op. at p. 6) (internal citations omitted)(emphasis in original).  [...] concluded his concurrence:  “Standing ensures that courts decide disputes over violations of a person’s rights, not a defendant’s compliance with the law in the abstract. ” (slip op. at p. 9).
[brief] There is no integration clause in [...]’s Operating Agreement (Da645), and no legal requirement that all matters pertaining to the operation of [...] be in writing.  There was thus no excuse whatsoever for the trial court to wholly overlook not only the existence of this patently obvious and completely undisputed agreement, but also to ignore the fact that “[i]mplied contract terms are considered as binding as express contract terms. ”  Troy, supra, 168 N.J. at 365.  Further, [...] and the trial court wholly ignore that the revised NJ LLC Act, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-2, contemplates exactly such a situation, given that it specifically defines an operating agreement as “…the agreement, whether or not referred to as an operating agreement and whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof....” (Emphasis added).  Thus, it is flatly incorrect to argue that there was no agreement requiring valuation of [...]’s shares using tax book value, as [...] had previously done at least 119 times (for which documents exist) and many times before that (for which there are no documents, but also no dispute).
[brief] ”  Id. at 682-683 (emphasis added).  See also State v. O’Neill, 104 N.J. 148, 171, n.13 (2007) (“The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine denies the prosecution the use of derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth or Fifth Amendment violation. ”)  Moreover, New Jersey’s privilege against self-incrimination is so ingrained and deeply rooted in the State’s common law that it has always been considered as of “constitutional magnitude” offering “broader protection than its Fifth Amendment federal counterpart.
[brief] Landlord does not dispute that it failed to make this contractually obligated interest payment.  Instead, Landlord attacks an unasserted straw-man argument--“that this alleged underpayment bars Landlord’s express contractual rights”--and implies that Tenant permanently forfeited its right to receive the $36,500 payment--which no language in the Lease supports.  in unpaid rent was always less than the amount Tenant claimed to be due in unpaid Tenant’s Allowance installments plus interest (1T5-22 to 1T6-22). ³
[brief] Statutes | Statute | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3b | passim | | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 | 12 | | Open Public Records Act ("OPRA"), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 | 1 | | OPRA | passim | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This case presents the issue of whether a records custodian under the Open Public Records Act ("OPRA"), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, must, in responding to a request for records, search out and provide "information" not asked for in the request.
[brief] ”  [...] responded with, “I don't recall.  Like I said, it was nine years ago, I don't recall. ”  3T51:8-13.  During [...]’s testimony, he was asked if he was aware that [...] was using the company’s money to pay for personal expenses such as $10,000.00 to $20,000.00 in dental bills and the boarding of his horses’ stables through the company’s accounts, he stated in the affirmative.
[brief] [...]  [...] (pro hac vice pending)  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  [...] (pro hac vice pending)  [...] (pro hac vice pending)  2901 N. Central Avenue Suite 2000  Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788  Phone: [...]  [...]  [...]  Dated: March 6, 2024  [...] a/k/a  [...] and [...] (w/h), Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. [...] and [...], Defendants-Appellants, and [...], [...], and [...], Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from: an Order of the Superior Court Of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, [...]
[brief] Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 170 N.J. 297, 303-05 (2002); Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J. Super. 218, 233 (App. Div. 2014).  Again, the trial court failed to identify evidence showing the expenditure of funds was unauthorized or that any distribution was inequitable regarding the transactions related to [...] that it included in the judgment:  - Transfer of $629,217.85 from [...]’s customer [...] to [...] between 2013-2015 (24T34:20-35:7)  - Transfer of $50,000 from [...]’s MR Line of Credit account to [...]’s bank account on December 5, 2014 (24T37:1-4)  - Transfer of $50,000 from [...]’s MR Line of Credit account to [...]’s account on September 8, 2015 (24T37:5-7)  - Transfer of $90,000 from [...]’s MR Line of Credit account to [...]’s account on October 7, 2015 (24T37:7-9)
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS........3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................4  REPLY POINT .................................................................................................................................4  THE NON-CUSTODIAL PORTIONS OF MR. HARTOBEY’S SENTENCE ARE ILLEGAL.........................................................4  1.  A defendant can neither acquiesce to nor “induce” a court to impose an illegal sentence......................................................................................................................5  2.  State v. Beauchamp does not permit sentencing courts to fashion parole conditions for defendants who are already on parole................................................6  3.  The non-custodial components of [...]’s sentence were not authorized by any law.....................................................................................................................8  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................11  REPLY PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] Investigations of officer misconduct may proceed in one of two ways.  An investigation may be conducted for the purpose of imposing a disciplinary sanction or initiating a criminal prosecution.  The distinction between the two is important because each type of investigation has differing legal requirements.  Consequently, it is important that the internal affairs investigator be familiar with proper investigative techniques and legal standards for each type of proceeding.  It is essential that experienced investigators be assigned to internal affairs investigations.
[brief] Although he testified he did not know how to use the QuickBooks software prior to 2019, [...] admitted on cross-examination that in 2010, [...] maintained accounting records using QuickBooks software in [...]’s personal files kept on his office computer at [...].  5T105:21-108:13.  Significantly, [...] had no interest in [...], a company owned by [...]’s wife.  As [...], the accountant for the parties’ companies certified, [...] “controlled and operated [[...]] and was responsible for all financial decisions,” communicating with him “about [...]’ tax returns and approving them before they were signed by his wife and filed. ”  Da995-96.  His familiarity with QuickBooks is further evident from a series of emails between [...] and [...].
[brief] A product is either defective or it is not – financial motives have nothing to do with defect.  at 11-12), the District Court granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that a truck should have had forward collision warning and automatic emergency braking technology, and that such technologies would have prevented a fatal crash.  *Id.*  The court noted that there was nothing wrong with the truck’s brakes, and the ordinary consumer would not have contemplated that a vehicle without such technologies was unreasonably dangerous.  *Id.*  Indeed, as is true in the instant case, it was undisputed that they “were merely aids to a driver accomplishing a timely stop, not the means upon which a driver could rely to do so. ”  *Id.*  Similarly, in *Youngberg v. General Motors LLC*, No. 20-339-JWB, 2022 WL 3925272, at *4 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 24, 2022) (attached at Pa303, cited at 2T at 11-12), the court granted summary judgment where plaintiff claimed that his vehicle should have been equipped with advanced driver assistance systems.  It explained:  [I]t would have been almost universally understood by a user in 2013 that safe operation of the van was entirely dependent – or almost entirely – upon the driver’s vigilance and use of the vehicle’s braking and other systems.  *A driver’s responsibility for avoiding collisions by limiting speed, braking, and steering has been an inherent and well-understood characteristic of automobile operation for over a century.*  *Id.*  Although the subject vehicle is model year 2016, instead of 2013, the same fundamental logic holds true.  Every driver knows that he or she must control their vehicle at all times.  Thus, the absence of LDW or LKAS—driver assistance technologies—in the subject vehicle is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that it was defectively designed.
[brief] Under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, warrantless searches and seizures “are presumptively unreasonable and therefore invalid. ”  Id. at 527 (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007)).  The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search or seizure “fell within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. ”  Ibid. (internal quotations omitted).
[brief] The ultimate goal in any legal proceeding is justice and that all parties be treated fairly in determining same against the stark legal consequence of finality; that one party will prevail in whole or in part.  There is simply no genuine issue of fact that Defendant is responsible for the sums claimed and awarded to Plaintiff.  4)  DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT HE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE MUST BE DISREGARDED AS WITHOUT FACTUAL OR LEGAL SUPPORT [NOT RAISED BELOW]