ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2  In this brief, Da__ refers to Defendants’ appendix, Db___ refers to Defendants’ brief, Pa___ refers to Plaintiffs’ appendix, and 1T refers to the sole transcript in this matter of June 27, 2024. would be appointed by the Governor with advice and consent of the Senate.  (Db5-6 and cases cited therein).  This transfer of authority was a result of the bargain between the State and University in exchange for significant financial public support.  (Id.)  For Fiscal Year 2023-2024, the BOG approved a budget with a revenue of approximately $5.3 billion.  (1T70); see also [...], Resolution Approving Fiscal year 2023-24 Budget, (July 10, 2023) (Pa1-2).  Approximately $1.1 billion, or 20%, is from state funds (combining the “NJ State Appropriations” and the “State paid fringe” lines), with billions more received by or on behalf of state residents.  (Id.)  The New Jersey Medical and Health and Sciences Restructuring Act (“Restructuring Act”) amended the membership structure and eligibility requirements for BOG members.  (Advance Law, P.L. 2012, c.45).  Prior to the enactment of the Restructuring Act, the BOG was comprised of eleven voting members, six of whom were to be appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and five of whom were to be appointed by the BOT from among its members.  (Id., § 87).  The Restructuring Act increased the total BOG members to fifteen and required select members to reside within certain counties in New Jersey: Camden, Essex, and Middlesex Counties.  (Id.)  Specifically, of the seven gubernatorial appointees, one must be a Camden resident and another an Essex County resident.  Of the six trustee appointees, one must be a Middlesex County resident and another an Essex County resident.  (Id.)  In total, only four of the fifteen BOG members are required to maintain residency in a specific county.  (Id.)  Other BOG members do not even have to reside within New Jersey.  Kratovil v. Angelson, 473 N.J. Super. 484 (Law Div. 2020).  [...] is a Trustee appointee to the BOG.
[brief] There, as here, the medical examiner acknowledged on cross-examination “that he based his conclusion that the death was a homicide on the circumstances reported to him by the police. ”  *Ibid.*  This left him “in no better position to determine the manner of death than was the jury who heard the actual trial testimony of witnesses and had the opportunity to evaluate their credibility. ”  *Id.* at 922-23; see also *Bond v. Commonwealth*, 311 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Va. 1984) (concluding that the medical examiner’s testimony was inadmissible: “The ultimate question was whether the decedent jumped intentionally, fell accidentally, or was thrown to her death.
[brief] Discovery Deficiency Notice .......................Da341-46 Exhibit 3 – May 15, 2024 Email from Plaintiff’s Counsel Regarding Discovery ................................................................................Da347-48 Exhibit 4 – May 23, 2024 Discovery Deficiency Notice .......................Da349-50 Exhibit 5 – May 24, 2024 Correspondence from Plaintiff’s Counsel Regarding Discovery ................................................................................Da351-52 Exhibit 6, 2024 Discovery Deficiency Notice ........................................Da353-54 Exhibit 7 – Plaintiff’s Certification appended to her Verified Complaint, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da21 ..................Da355 Exhibit 8 – Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaim, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da265-74 .........................................................Da356 Exhibit 9 – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments ........................................................................Da357 Exhibit 10 – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments ........................................................................Da358 Exhibit 11 – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments ........................................................................Da359 June 3, 2024 Reply Certification of [...] in Support of the Motion to Compel Arbitration .................................................................Da360-61
[brief] This legal principle was more recently cited with approval in this Court’s decision in *Last Frontier v. Blairstown Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, No. A-5205-08 *12-14* (App. Div. May 24, 2010) (zoning board acted reasonably in denying plaintiff's application for a variance based on concerns about traffic safety for ingress and egress). ⁸  Under these principles, the Authority properly exercised its discretion in evaluating the testimony and evidence presented over the course of the two public hearings on the Appellant’s application.
[brief] Db12  THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY AUTHENTICATE THE SURVEILLANCE  VIDEO AND ITS WITNESS WAS INCAPABLE OF DOING SO; S-23 AND THE STILL SHOTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED.  (The ruling is at 1T70-21 to 1T72-2; video admitted over objection at 1T88-14 to 1T88-20).  POINT IV
[brief] Once Appellants lost land control of the Property, [...] voided the Solar Rights for which Appellants now seek a declaratory judgement and resulting damages.  No solar developer can connect a project to the electrical grid without [...] approval.  The [...] did not void Appellants’ Solar Rights; [...] did.  [...] took this unusual step when Appellants, admittedly by their own inaction, lost land control of the Property where the solar project was to be built.  Appellants cannot now seek damages against a blameless third party simply because [...] signed an NDA.  For any solar project in New Jersey that seeks to connect to the existing power grid, the approvals consist of an agreement with [...] known as a Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (WMPA), an agreement with the utility power company, such as [...] (“[...]”), and registrations with the [...] (“[...]”).  However, to finalize and rely upon these approvals, the developer must have a recognized possessory interest in the land, as well as local land use approval.  If a developer does not have this land interest, its approvals to connect to the grid are voidable if [...], [...] or the [...] learn that the entity does not exercise control over the land.  Moreover, if a solar developer fails to obtain or lose one of the approvals comprising this bundle (as in this case), it cannot move forward with the solar project.  (Pa001025 – 001026).
[brief] 11 Romano v. Maglio, 41 N.J. Super. 561, 125 A.2d 523 (App. Div.), denied, 22 N.J. 574, 126 A.2d 910 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923, 77 S. Ct. 682, 1 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1957) ......................... 7, 8 State v. Bell, 217 N.J. 336 (2014) .........................................................  11 State v. Boone, 66 N.J. 38 (1974) .................................................................  11 State v. Faunce, 244 N.J. Super. 499, 582 A.2d 1268 (App. Div. 1990) ..........................  14 State v. Haulaway, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 506, 608 A.2d 964 (App. Div. 1992) .............................  15 State v. Humphrey, 183 N.J. Super. 580 (Law Div. 1982) aff’d, 209 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div. 1986)...................................................... 11 State v. LaResca, 267 N.J. Super. 411 (App. Div. 1993) ............................ 11, 14 State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2022)..........................1, 4-6, 9, 10, 13, 16-19 State v. McIntyre-Caulfield, 455 N.J. Super. 1, 187 A.3d 171 (App. Div. 2018)................................. 15 State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187 (1985).......................................................... 7 Township of Chester v. Panicucci, 62 N.J. 94 (1973)................................... 9 Whippany Paper Bd. Co. v. Alfano, 176 N.J. Super. 363, 423 A.2d 648 (App. Div. 1980)............................... 15 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)7................................................................................. 9, 16 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(3) ........................................................................... 13 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(b) ..............................................................................
[brief] A.  Appellant’s Account and Its Transfer  On or about May 18, 1999, [...] issued Appellant, through its [...] label, an open-ended credit card bearing account number ending in 3762 (the “Account”).  (Pa69-72).  At the same time, on or around May 18, 1999, Appellant entered into a Card Agreement (the “Agreement”) and Arbitration Agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”) (together, the “Cardholder Agreement”) for Plaintiff’s use of an open-ended credit account, account number ending in 3762 (“Account”) with [...].  (Pa16-17, 69-72, 85-89).  Appellant was mailed, and accepted, the terms of the Cardholder Agreement.  (Pa69-72).  In or about August 2009, pursuant to the terms of the Cardholder Agreement, Appellant was mailed an updated cardholder agreement, to wit: the governing Card Agreement (the “Updated Governing Agreement”) and governing Arbitration Agreement (the “Updated Governing Arbitration Agreement”) (together, the “Updated Governing Cardholder Agreement”).  (Pa85-89).  The Updated Governing Cardholder Agreement was mailed to Appellant in accordance with [...]’s policy and practice in the regular course of its business and pursuant to [...]’s records regarding mailing.  Id.  Notably, the Updated Governing Cardholder Agreement was not returned to [...] as undelivered.  *Id.*  Appellant’s acceptance is evidenced by Plaintiff’s use and payments made towards the Account thereafter.
[brief] Plaintiff can also satisfy the comparator requirement, because even though Defendant initially terminated all signatories to the email, Defendant hired back everyone except for Plaintiff, almost immediately.  The trial court found these actions highly suspicious.  Defendant ignores this fact completely, understandably so given the inferences that can be drawn.  The comparator evidence strongly demonstrates pretext.  "Evidence of pretext sufficient to permit the employee to reach a jury may be indirect, such as a demonstration 'that similarly situated employees were not treated equally.'"  Jason v. Showboat Hotel & Casino, 329 N.J. Super. 295, 304 (App. Div. 2000)(citations omitted).  POINT III
[brief] *Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf*, No. A-2053-13T3, 2018 WL 2449133, at *29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2018).  This Court noted the general rule “that when a plaintiff presents claims for which fees can be awarded along with claims for which such fees cannot be awarded, attorneys’ fees for all of the time devoted by counsel to the case can be awarded if the work on the unrelated claims can be deemed to be part of the pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. ”  *Id.* at *28* (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, however, the work done in pursuit of Plaintiffs’ non-attorneys’ fees claims were not part of the ultimate result achieved.
[brief] Email to [...]/text the same | 4.4 hrs.| $1,672.00 | $20,634.00 | | 6/23/22|  Complete review of nearly 8.5k pages of additional/subpoenaed discovery documents from [...] ([...]); [...]; Kaplan v. SG Health; Affidavit of [...]; [...]; [...]; deposition exhibits  Email to [...]/text the same | 3 hrs.| $1,140.00 | $21,774. 00 | --- 35 Pa841.  36 Id. 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Pa843.  40 Pa844.  41  Id. | | Date | Description | Hours | Rate | Total | |---|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|----------| | 33| 7/5/22 |  Receive and review 100s of pages of DropBox files for tomorrow’s Deposition Exhibits marked supplemental to prepare DropBox production.
[brief] Our State Legislature, however, acknowledged a taxpayer’s State Constitutional prerogative writ “as of right” to challenge in the Superior Court the validity of any long term tax exemption granted in their taxing district subject to a shortened twenty days limitations of action and repose.  Indeed, this Appeal also requires this appellate tribunal to reconcile a public wrongdoing exception ignored by the trial court and a series of conflicting post April 27, 2023 persuasive procedural standing opinions.  Ultimately, this Appeal requires this tribunal to consider whether certain fiduciaries of a public trust failed to turn square corners and shirked their sworn oaths of office to uphold our State Constitution and certain post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.
[brief] Petersen v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 453 (1951).  However, a “court cannot hear a case as to which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction even though all parties thereto desire an adjudication on the merits. ”  Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees., 77 N.J. 55, 65-66 (1978).  Thus, the appropriate forum for a matter is one which has jurisdiction over said matter.  The Legislature delegated the [...] and [...] with “the general responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system,” N.J.S.A. 43:16A-13(a)(1), which neither explicitly nor implicitly conferred authority to interpret settlement agreements and determine provisions therein “illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective” so as to trigger the Agreement’s severance clause.  Accordingly, the [...] and [...] are not a legal forum for purposes of triggering the severance provision of the Agreement; therefore, the Chancery Division’s decision must be reversed and Plaintiff’s Complaint dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] Statements are admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) as excited utterances.  An excited utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition and without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate."  The plain reading of this rule warrants admissibility in this matter.  Appellant's matter involves a foot pursuit where detectives were calling in to dispatch as the events were unfolding.  "Consistent with the rationale for excited utterance exception . . . when deciding whether there was an opportunity to fabricate or deliberate, a court should consider the element of time, the circumstances of the incident, the mental and physical condition of the declarant, and the nature of the utterance."  see. State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278, 293 (2008) (quoting State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 328 (2005))  The trial courts application of Alston and the hearsay exceptions was unreasonable.
[brief] **ARGUMENT**  1.  **The Standard Of This Court's Review**  The parties disagree on the degree of deference that this court owes to the Initial Decision (ID) and the [...]'s Decision.  We stand by our exposition of this point.  Hb9.  See, e.g., *In Re Proposed Quest Academy Char.*, 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013).  "[A] failure to consider all the evidence in a record would perforce lead to arbitrary decision making."  *Id.* at 386 (citations omitted).  Also specifically to this case, a court may intervene when the agency action is "inconsistent with its mandate."  *Id.* at 385 (citations omitted).  ---  \(^1\)  The transcripts of the evidentiary hearings will be cited as follows in this brief, using the style for Appellate Division briefs:  #Tpage #:line #-line#.  Thus, 1T = October 14, 2020  2T = October 16, 2020  3T = October 20, 2020  4T = October 21, 2020  5T = October 22, 2020  6T = October 23, 2020  A recent opinion of this court reinforces that an agency decision must be considered against the Legislature’s intentions.  *In The Matter Of The Proposed Construction Of Compressor Station (CS237), Office Building And Appurtant Structures, Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], ___ N.J. Super. ___, (App. Div. August 31, 2023)* ("Compressor Station").  2.
[brief] 1T .................................................................  Transcript of March 6, 2024, Hearing 2T .................................................................  Transcript of March 27, 2024, Hearing PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter arises from the speculative, premature, and mistaken contention that a not-to-scale rendering concerning an ongoing development undertaken by [...] was erroneously ignored by the Zoning Officer of the [...], Defendant-Respondent [...], (“[...]”) and later, the Trial Court.
[brief] On May 13, 2024, the [...] filed their cross motion in the Appellate Division to extend the time within which they may post their supersedeas bond to May 20, 2024.  Da416.  On May 23, 2024, the [...] filed their motion in the Appellate Division to extend the time within which they may post their supersedeas bond to June 3, 2024.  Da482.
[brief] They “require pedestrians to walk to an available crosswalk rather than crossing in the middle of a block. ”  *Id.* at 508.  The Appellate Division, in the unpublished opinion of *Shilinsky v. [...]*, [...], 2015 WL 10718483, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2016)², established in an almost identical case, that “Ridgefield's failure to take action to repair the [...] roadway for pedestrians crossing in the middle of the roadway, not in a crosswalk, was not palpably --- ²
[brief] In addition to the text messages introduced during [...]’ trial testimony, the State introduced additional text messages exchanged between [...]’s cell-phone and [...]’ cell phone.  However, [...] testified that he exclusively communicated with [...] through [...]’s cell-phone.  The cell phone records evidence did not establish who was actually using the phone to send messages.  On December 17th, 2011, [...]’s phone sent a text message to [...]’ stating, “We going to do it Monday,” to which [...]’ responded, “I then. ”  (14T 28-12 to 17)  Later that evening, [...] sent a message to [...]’s phone, referring to [...] in the third person:  “I told you my GMAX acting dumb, I’m trying to rush [...]. ”  (14T 31-21 to 23)  As [...]’ testified, [...] is [...]’s nickname.  On December 19th, 2011, [...] sent a message to [...]’s phone: “If you still got them phones left, don’t forget them, and I need gloves too. ”  (14T 29-3 to 12)  On several dates towards the end of December 2011, text messages were sent to [...]’s phone asking about phones.  For example, “Yo, can I get that phone today?” “Do you have more phones? What kind of phone name?” and “You get anymore Sprint phones?” (14T 44-18 to 45-14, 51-7 to 12, 52-18 to 53-3, 55-13 to 18)  H.
[brief] [Pa 130].  In upholding Ordinance 22-1516, [...] conducted a thorough review of the history of the Borough’s attempt to foster the redevelopment of Plaintiffs’ Property and Plaintiffs’ determined obstruction of same.  He appropriately and correctly rejected Plaintiffs’ claims that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is inconsistent with the Master Plan and determined that the decisions by the Borough’s governing body and Planning Board were valid since they were well-reasoned and well-founded in the record before him.  This appeal is nothing more than Plaintiffs’ latest attempt to frustrate the Borough’s long-standing efforts to redevelop Plaintiffs’ Property with an inclusionary residential project to assist the Borough in meeting its affordable housing obligation.  As found by the lower court, the adoption of Ordinance 22-1516 represents a considered, rational decision justified by legitimate planning concerns and the Master Plan, was well-founded based on the record which included unrebutted testimony of the Borough’s professional planner, and was adopted in a manner consistent with the applicable provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”) and the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”).  The Planning Board relied on the testimony of the Borough’s planner that Ordinance 22-1516 is consistent with and furthers certain objectives of the Master Plan.  The record before the Planning Board demonstrates that the governing body’s adoption of the Ordinance was rational and entitled to deference.  In sum, this Court must uphold [...]’s decision because the adoption of Planning Board Resolution PB10-2022 and Ordinance 22-1516 were neither arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable.  Plaintiffs’ endeavor failed and continues to fail to overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to the Ordinance.  For that reason, and the reasons set forth in [...]’s written decision, Plaintiffs’ appeal should be denied.
[brief] At Db32 to Db34, the defendants rely on their self-serving statements that they believe that they have integrated hierarchy for purposes of controlling plaintiff's property.  That is not proof that the plaintiff ever accepted the alleged integration.  As usual, the defendants claim that plaintiff "raised substantial funds and accepted large donations from followers of the [...] religion for many years" (Db35) without proof.  At Db36 to Db38, defendants reject plaintiff's tortious-interference claim.  If plaintiff is the true owner of its property -- a dispute on the substantive merits that was never resolved below -- then the defendants have unjustifiably interfered with plaintiff's right to lease, sell or otherwise enjoy economic advantage respecting the property.  The denial of injunctive relief has become moot because of the summary judgment entered below.
[brief] E.g., Abouzaid, 207 N.J. at 81.  To support its opposing position, [...] cites to Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432 (2010).  But the differences between Flomerfelt and this case demonstrate why the trial court correctly granted summary judgment.  In Flomerfelt, homeowners were seeking a defense from their insurer after being sued by a houseguest who alleged she was injured due to an overdose of alcohol or drugs provided to her by the insureds.  See id. at 436.  The insurer refused to provide a defense because the policy included an exclusion for claims “‘[a]rising out of the use, . . . transfer or possession’ of controlled dangerous substances. ”  Id.  The Court found that the duty to defend remained because some of the theories of liability did not fall within the reach of the dangerous-substance exclusion.  Id. at 457-58.  For example, the underlying plaintiff included a claim that she was injured by the homeowners’ failure to promptly summon aid.  Id. at 457.  Here, [...] has not showed any possibility that he could be held liable for tortious interference without a showing of intent to injure.  Accordingly, Flomerfelt is distinguishable, and the trial court’s actions were proper.
[brief] The Department of Environmental Protection, within two years of the effective date of this act [1988], shall prepare and publish a methodology which shall allow the user to define, rank and map aquifer recharge areas.  In conjunction with this methodology, the department shall prepare and publish model land use regulations or best management practices designed to encourage ecologically sound development in aquifer recharge areas and to restrict therein those activities known to cause groundwater contamination.  [N.J.S.A. 58:11A-13]  Therefore, in order to make an accurate Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination in this case, the DEP was required to also determine whether the proposed project would have any impact to mapped aquifer recharge areas and if so whether the proposed impacts were consistent with objectives of both the Highlands Act and the WQMA.
[brief] In short, when [...] bought Lot 4, he knew, or should have known, that [...] had a strong claim to ownership of the Strip, and [...] was obliged to inquire further into the matter.  [...] did not, and he cannot today rely on his record title to excuse or blot out facts that are inconsistent with his theory of ownership.  The trial court charged [...] with notice of Lot 3’s claim and refused to reward him for his failure to make a reasonable inquiry into that claim.  That is not, as [...] argues, ignoring the law; it is enforcing it.  The trial court did not undermine the Act any more than our Supreme Court and [...] did in recognizing and explaining the same rule of law.  Island Venture Assocs.; 179 N.J. at 493; Friendship Manor, 244 N.J. Super. at 108.  With [...]’s record title called into question, the trial court properly assessed which party had equitable title to the Strip.