ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The adjustment favored by the Boundary Commissioners based upon the 2005 survey (the “Worley Survey,” Pa144) of Lot 10, the Respondents’ property, necessarily requires an equal adjustment of the boundary line of the neighboring properties, both that of the [...] (Lot 11), their non-party neighbor to the south (Lot 12) and Lot 9 (north of Respondents) in order to agree with the property descriptions in their deeds.  The Report clearly demonstrates the shift in property lines that it requires both in its text and as depicted by Exhibit I to the Report (Pa136).  The descriptions in the deeds of all affected properties does not change.  The square footage of the four lots remains the same.  Their dimensions do not change.  What changes is the location of the lots on the ground.  See Report Pa108, ll.38-39.  As they all fit together, a change in the location of one line causes a change in all.  The Respondents try to obscure this fact by personalizing their position:  “Given the consequences of the Commissioners’ Report, i.e. the [...] loss of lands to the [...] [Db2].”  The Respondents need to read the Report.  They will see that the line of their property on the north side, and all four of the subdivision lots shift to the south.  In addition to affecting parties not properly before the trial court, this conclusion by the Boundary Commissioners has legal ramifications as their conclusion had to be based upon solely circumstantial evidence, as they readily admit.  See Report Pa112, ll. 25-6; and 2T6, ll. 1-7.¹  No case law from any jurisdiction addresses a discrepancy of this type wherein the deeds and property descriptions have been found to be accurate and the property boundaries have long standing recognition by all owners dating back over 60 years (e.g., placement of houses and other structures in accord with municipal set back requirements, fences, retaining wall, shrubbery).
[brief] Relevant to this motion, this is an appeal between [...] and the Department regarding the issuance of Bulletin 22-11.  (Ia. 7)  [...] is not a party to this appeal, although the Department nevertheless relies on its transaction history with [...] as evidence in support of its position vis-à-vis [...].  The invocation of [...] by the Department stems from a transaction involving [...], [...] and [...] (“[...]”) to secure capital to fund an expansion into a new market.  During that process, beginning in August 2021, the Department officially indicated, for the first time, that [...] and [...] fell into the definition of an insurer within New Jersey Insurance Holding Company Systems Act, N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14 (the “Holding Act”), and that a Form A was required before it could approve the transaction.  (Ia.1-2).  Indeed, to the contrary, the Department had previously acknowledged to [...] and [...] that legislation was required to resolve the issue of whether the Holding Act applied, noting in a 2007 Management Letter that the Department was “in the process of recommending legislation similar to the NAIC model law governing Attorney-in-Fact Reciprocal --- 1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are so intertwined in the present matter that they have been combined for clarity and the convenience of the court.
[brief] It is best to make the application as soon as possible.  When a court considers a motion to vacate a default judgment, such a motion must be “viewed with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result is reached. ”  Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super.313, 319 (App. Div.), aff’d, 43 N.J.508 (1964).
[brief] This court’s decision in Wolpaw is particularly instructive.  There, an insurance company assigned one attorney to represent the homeowner, her sister, and the sister’s eleven-year-old son, who had accidentally injured a playmate with an air rifle.  272 N.J. Super at 45.  Defendants’ familial relationship was of no consequence; the court held that the parties were all entitled to separate counsel, reasoning that although “[t]he three insureds had the common interests of minimizing the amount of [an injured neighbor’s] judgment and maximizing the percentage of fault attributable to the other defendants . . . their interests in maximizing the percentage of the other insureds’ fault and minimizing their own were clearly in conflict.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2a.  The first of those referred to failing to surrender his NJSP wallet ID, whereas the second referred to displaying that ID in any of four different motor-vehicle stops.  In other words, there were five different ways alleged that defendant could have been guilty of official misconduct.  Thus, when it came time for the charge conference, defense counsel brought up the issue of the potential for a non-unanimous verdict on the issue of official misconduct.
[brief] Moreover, the Complaint made clear that Plaintiff and its attorneys had an obligation to conduct their own reasonable diligence to monitor and keep informed of [...]’s activities, including whether [...] was actively pursuing alternative deals.  Like the defendant in *Berman*, the very “purpose of [Plaintiff] employing counsel” was to have that counsel exercise “reasonable diligence” to stay apprised of [...]’s actions and protect its interests.  *Berman*, 189 N.J. Super. at 103.  Thus, Plaintiff cannot avoid the obligation of it and its attorneys to monitor, investigate, and keep in regular contact with [...] (who it claimed was in breach), by attempting to shift this responsibility to [...].  Any allegation that Plaintiff elected to place itself in a position where it was entirely reliant upon [...]’s representative to alert it to [...]’s actions demonstrate an unreasonable and unjustifiable choice in light of the magnitude of the overall deal in question, which was a sophisticated, $165 million deal, involving an overall $380 million parcel.  Plaintiff’s assertions that [...] knew that Plaintiff would rely on it, that [...] was a party to the PSA, and that [...] had a business relationship with Plaintiff (Pb47) do not negate these facts alleged in the Complaint that clearly show that any reliance on [...] was not justified under the circumstances.
[brief] The pertinent questions are: did defendant actually reasonably rely on plaintiffs representation, and did defendant suffer damages because of that representation?  The pertinent portion of the agreement states:  “You have not filed or anticipate filing for Bankruptcy protection”  AA018.  The agreement goes onto purport to provide [...] protection from the strictures of a bankruptcy filing:  “However, if at some point during the life of your Claim you do file for Bankruptcy protection, you hereby agree to refund us the Amount Purchased from that portion of the Proceeds that which by law are personally exempt from Bankruptcy, and you hereby authorize and direct your attorney or the bankruptcy trustee to make payment for dais refund directly to us. ”  AA018.  Defendant anticipated the risk of bankruptcy and provided for that risk in the contract.  The degree of risk of non-payment to defendant was completely reliant on the success or failure of the unliquidated personal injury claim, not plaintiff’s ability to repay.  If she filed for bankruptcy the defendant anticipated that risk in the agreement.  To argue that the post-bankruptcy loans would not have been made (DA 077) is contradicted by the agreement.
[brief] The Court Erred In Considering Defendant’s Dismissed Charges.  The State’s recitation of the restrictions on a sentencing judge’s consideration of dismissed charges, which flows from State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015), supports rather than rebuts [...]’s argument.  The Report of the Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee does not describe any tension between State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547 (1973) and K.S., but rather recognizes that after K.S., “while the mere fact of arrest may not be considered, the conduct underlying a dismissed charge may be considered if supported by reliable evidence presented at a (sentencing) hearing;” “both Green and K.S. require the sentencing court to make affirmative findings that reliable evidence supports consideration of defendant’s conduct underlying a dismissed charge. ”  Report of the Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee 2019-2021 Term 38-39 (January 14, 2021) (emphasis added).  These statements comport with the holding in K.S. that “prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose” unless “the reason for consideration [is] supported by undisputed facts of record or facts found at a hearing. ”  K.S., 220 N.J. at 199.  In this case, the sentencing court believed that K.S. prohibits considering arrests as evidence of “prior record” but permits considering dismissed charges as evidence of “who was this underlying person:
[brief] (1T52-12 to 53-11; 1T58-9 to 12; Da15 3:18:18 to 3:22:38; Da24).  At one point, defendant intervened and asked questions, but he remained calm and cooperative.  Furthermore, [...] listened to defendant, making eye contact the whole time.  (1T61-11 to 62-8; Da15 3:22:39 to 3:23:07).  Defendant was also heard to say, “I just want you to be respectful .  . . .” (Da15 3:23:00 to 3:23:07; Da24).  In response to defendant’s questions, [...] stated: “Yeah.  We got it completely.  Listen, we can, we can keep these guys out, a couple guys got to come in with me just because we’re going into a place that we don’t know.  We’ll . . . be respectful.  I promise.  I mean It’s my, as a man I’m giving you my word.  Okay?”  (Da15 3:23:19 to 3:23:33; Da25).  The officer then read the consent-to-search form in its entirety and asked if defendant understood.
[brief] In addition, the court’s refusal to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency - an undisputed fact - compounded the errors of the trial court.  As discussed above, the failure to take judicial notice deprived Defendants of the ability to fully and fairly present its defense.  Again, Defendants were presented with a massive snow storm dropping 14 inches of snow by the morning of the date of loss.  The defense position was that they acted reasonably and within a reasonable period of time to remediate the snow and ice given the severity of the storm, amount of snow, order in which snow removal was to be completed, and the fact that snow removal was still in progress at the time of plaintiff’s accident.  Yet, the severity and significance of the storm could not be meaningfully presented without mentioning the State of Emergency.  It is submitted that this deprived Defendants of the opportunity to fully and fairly present its defense and thus rendered the trial unfair.
[brief] Relevant also are those cases wherein “misconduct” and “conduct unbecoming” a public employee have been found in cases involving non-law enforcement or firefighting personnel who committed off-duty acts of indecency.  See *In re Malayter*, No. A-2621-07T1, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2471, at *12 (App. Div. Sept. 29, 2009) (public employee was guilty of conduct unbecoming where he danced nude at a party and where he urinated out of a window because he committed "vulgar and socially unacceptable conduct"  *Id.*  Misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public employee has also been found where the employee has violated the rules and regulations of their department.  See *Leek v. N.J. Dep't of Corr.*, No. A-2350-06T3, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 596 (App. Div. May 14, 2008) (violating four rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections constitutes conduct unbecoming a public employee); see also, *In re Griffin*, No. A-5042-09T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2756, at *14 (App. Div. Nov. 4, 2011) (violation of the Department of Corrections cell phone policy constitutes conduct unbecoming a public employee).
[brief] (Pa475).  [...] also informed [...] that she would have --- \(^2\) [...] then contradicted that statement at her deposition, stating that [...], [...], and [...] entered the charge pay for each other because they assumed additional duties during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa230 at 21:16-25; Pa231 at 28:9-14).  \(^3\)  At her deposition, [...] claimed that [...] gave her permission “as long as I don’t get in trouble. ” (Pa230 at 22:18-21).  [...] claimed that [...], a nurse supervisor, was present at that time, but Love has no memory of that alleged approval.  (Pa456-57 at 32:17-33:10).  And [...]’s testimony is contradicted by the balance of the evidence in the record.  documented any approval.  (Pa105-06 at 89:6-90:6).  Following [...]’s investigation into the unauthorized entry of charge pay, [...] determined that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the charge pay taken by Plaintiffs was entered by them without proper authorization.  (Pa114-15 at 125:24-126:6).
[brief] Plaintiff's entire argument on appeal is that it is immune from a Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) disclosure because legal malpractice cases are exempt from the Entire Controversy Doctrine under Olds v Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424(1997).  (Pb31).  As Plaintiff's restricted reading of Olds is unavailing and inapplicable to the case at bar, Plaintiff's argument collapses.
[brief] D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021) .........................12, 36 Quaglia v. NS193, LLC et al., No: 1:21-cv-03252, Dkt # 26 Order (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021) .....................................................15 Rezem Family Assoc., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 208 N.J. 366 (2011) ...........................................6 Romeo v. FMA Alliance, Ltd., No. 15-cv-6524, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86148 ..............................................................................42 Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................................19 Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc., Case No. OCN-L-2066-21 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 2023)([...]) .................................................................10 Ryan Operations G.P. v. Forrest Paint Co., Inc., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................................................43 Shields v. Prof'l Bureau of Collections of Md., Inc., 2:20-cv-02205, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197903 (Dist. Kan. Oct 14, 2021) ..................................................................................................................12, 35 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) ...........................................................................7 Simon v. FIA Card Servs., 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................17 Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary On the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 FR 50097-02 ......................................................................................................21 Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234 (2005) ...............................................................................................32 Vedernikov v. Atl. Credit & Fin., Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148668 (D.N.J. Aug. 30 2019) ....................................................42, 43 Vilinsky v. Phelan Hallinan & Diamond, P.C., No. 15-650 (JBS/JS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77575 (D.N.J. Jun. 16, 2015)
[brief] Had the Trial Court properly adhered to the summary judgment standards and viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, including all reasonable inference arising from those facts, the Trial Court would have accepted the following facts:  A.  The Accident  Plaintiff’s motorcycle accident occurred on September 12, 2015 on the Garden State Parkway (hereinafter “GSP”) in the southbound left lane at northern most approach to the overpass of Route 30 at or near milepost 39.9.  (Pa1).  When the Plaintiff reached the northern abutment joint where the highway road meets the overpass, his motorcycle encountered uneven pavement caused by settlement in the left lane where the roadway abutted the bridge joint.  He testified as follows:  **Q:**  And just describe to me to your best recollection how the accident happened?  **A:**  We were traveling southbound.  Nice day.  Cruising along with traffic.  As I approached that overpass, almost like leading edge of the overpass, that’s when I felt a severe smack in the back of the bike…  (Pa380 at 17:6-12).  **Q:**  And the area of the road where you say you hit something, is that in the threshold between the roadway and the bridge overpass heading south?  [...]: Objection to the form.  **Q:**  You can answer.  **A:**  Yes.  I believe that was where the bridge met the highway.  (Pa471 at Line 19 – Pa472 at Line 1).  After being released from the hospital, Plaintiff returned to the scene and took video of the condition.  From that video, a “snapshot” was created.  (Pa521 at 1- Pa523 at 6).  As Plaintiff explained during his deposition:  Q: Looking at NJTA-1, what do you believe that your motorcycle impacted?  A:  This, to me, appears like an expansion joint in the bridge.  (Pa523 at 18-21).  Q: Why did you provide that still (picture) at that location?  A: Because I felt like that’s what I hit.  (Pa522 at 16-19).  B.
[directive] "Personal identifying information" means information that identifies one or more specific individuals, including an individual’s name, address, social security number, vehicle operator’s -3- license number, or biometric records.  The term includes personal identifying information that is included within the data comprising a BOLO list, as well as personal identifying information that is learned by checking a license plate scanned by an ALPR against the Motor Vehicle Commission database or any other data system that contains personal identifying information.  "Scan" refers to the process by which an ALPR automatically focuses on, photographs, and converts to digital text the license plate of a vehicle that comes within range of the ALPR.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 52:27D-302 et seq.  The Law codifies the builder’s remedy as a consequence for voluntary noncompliance.  It specifically defines “builder’s remedy” as a “court-imposed, site-specific relief for a litigant who seeks to build affordable housing for which the court requires a municipality to utilize zoning techniques, such as mandatory set-asides or density bonuses, including techniques which provide for the economic viability of a residential development by including housing that is not for low- and moderate-income households.
[brief] In addition, the Tartaglia court noted that the adverse inference and the tort of fraudulent concealment remedies may be cumulative as follows:  There is no inherent contradiction between permitting a plaintiff to try the case in chief, absent the missing evidence, but with the benefit of an adverse inference charge, and permitting the same plaintiff to proceed as well on the substance of the intentional spoliation claims in a bifurcated proceeding:  The evils to be remedied are not the same and, as long as the matter is carefully charged to the jury, the awards of damages will not overlap.  Id. at 121.
[brief] The second sentence of this condition is not specific to the named insured, i.e., “you. ”  Rather, it states that if “any other ‘insured,’ at any time, intentionally conceals or misrepresents a material fact” the Policy may be voided (emphasis added).  The phrase “any other insured” is important because it signifies a broader application.  E.g., Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Burlington Ins. Co., 400 N.J. Super. 276, 283 (App. Div. 2008) (discussing the significance of policy provisions which use the phrase “any insured”).  For example, if an additional insured intentionally concealed a material fact, this policy language could be satisfied.  New Jersey courts have not addressed this specific condition, but other courts have rejected the exact argument the [...] has presented here, specifically in the context of equitable fraud:
[brief] *Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela*, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019); see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).  Taking both of these reins, *Atalese* and its progeny have validly held that in measuring the enforceability of an arbitration agreement the “initial inquiry must be . . . whether the agreement to arbitrate all, or any portion, of a dispute is ‘the product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law. ’”
[brief] Plaintiffs did not submit an Opposition to [...] and [...]'s Motion to Dismiss.  Plaintiffs did not dispute that they were served properly and timely with the initial Motion to Dismiss.  Plaintiffs did not dispute that they timely received the Court’s Order and Statement of Reasons.  The Motion was granted by [...], and the Complaint against [...] and the [...] firm was dismissed, with prejudice, on January 19, 2016.
[directive] explained  As in the Law above Cnforcement Directive, the Sports Wagering Act provides or that a casino racetrack "may operate a sports pool."  Accordingly, sports pools operated by casinos and racetracks are exempted from criminal liability so long as ~tagering no occurs a on college sport or athletic event place that in takes New .iersey or in which any New Jersey college team participates of regardless the event where takes place.  For the same reason, sports pools operated by casinos and are from racetracks exempted civil the proscriptions of Title 2A, chapter long 40, so as no wagering occurs sort on a college or athletic event that takes New place in Jersey or in which any New Jersey college team regardless participates of where the event takes Accordingly, place.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Dismissal of the Complaint With Prejudice  On July 5, 2023, a third hearing was held and [...] dismissed Plaintiff’s Verified Amended Complaint with prejudice for the following reasons:  "But the Court also shall not order defendant to disclose the requested records pursuant to the common law right of access because they are not common law public documents.  To succeed in this claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that the records he sought were common law public documents.  That’s (1), (2), that he had an interest in the subject matter of the material, and 93) his right to access is balance against defendant’s interest in preventing disclosure.  That’s Keddie, again at 30 - at 50.  Like the language in OPRA, the definition for criminal investigatory records and common law public document is one that is required by law to - made, maintain or kept on file.  However again, the Court could not find, nor did the parties find any law - or case law that requires agency emails to be made, maintained, or kept on file.  For this reason the records sought by plaintiff are not common law public documents.  The Court need not address the other two requirements, such as the requirement of the common law to access in all three criteria that are required.  So, if one doesn’t — if you don’t have one you don’t have to proceed to the other two.
[brief] (8T 218-3 to 219-8; 8T 222-4 to 25).  Defendant [...] was working with her that night, although he arrived separately.  Also in her car was a “bounty hunter,” who was not further identified in the record.  (8T 223-11 to 224-6).  [...] testified that Lemar was not a bounty hunter, but worked for [...] on an occasional basis, and would accompany her when she went to “look for someone,” to “make sure that [she] was safe. ” (8T 229-4 to 231-5).  She testified that when Lemar arrived to help her apprehend [...], co-defendants [...] and [...] were with him; she had not hired the other two, and did not expect them.  (8T 232-3 to 234-7).  [...] testified that her plan to apprehend [...] involved the cooperation of [...], a heroin addict who had bought drugs on an ongoing basis from [...] and would rent cars for him.