ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] These all may be more easily handled under the LAD but I don’t want to give up the CRA claims.  (CRA claims are now only v. [...], see Pa300.)  Justice Scalia wrote in U.S. (Goodman) v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006), that ADA Title II (and we assume the LAD) can reach conduct that violates the Constitution and the ADA at the same time against the State.
[brief] In order to provide a sufficient buffer protecting the bald eagle’s nest, Plaintiffs revised their proposal and submitted a second amended application to the Zoning Board in July of 2018, seeking approval of less development than allowed under the Original Approval, i.e., a 206-unit residential development project, consisting of 163 market-rate apartments and 43 affordable apartments, along with 43,568 square feet of retail space (the “Amended Application”).  1T7:19-24.  To protect the bald eagle’s nest, Plaintiffs’ redesign included a 660-foot buffer area on Plaintiffs’ proposed plan.  1T13:6-7  Given the extensive buffer restriction and project redesign resulting from the discovery of the bald eagle’s nest, the Amended Application also requested additional variance relief.  1T105:19-23
[brief] The only thing they cannot enforce now are the constructions rules adopted in 1989, the amendment to those rules.  The defense claims that “[t]hese by-laws—first implemented in 1948—plainly put the Property’s successors-in-interest on notice that they were subject to [...]’s current rules “and any subsequent regulations imposed” by [...] in the future.  (Db35)  However, the club did not exist when the [...] took title in 1947.
[brief] THE COURT:  What notifications did you make in this case?  [...]: I did not make notifications.  I did not -- the people who were involved were notified.  THE COURT: Right.  You didn’t do a publication to the world -- [...]: No.  THE COURT: -- but to the extent that you had no creditors that were making applications to you for payment - [...]: Right.  THE COURT: -- was there anyone that sought payment from you as the receiver on behalf of that entity that you were the receiver for, that they said that that entity owed them money?  Anybody who you didn’t address?  [...]: Not one, no. 1T21-20 - 1T22-11.  Without providing notice to creditors for submission of their claims in writing, the Receiver could not and did not properly administer the receivership estate.
[brief] Section 8.2 of the PSA provides, in the event of any material breach by Seller of any representation, warranty, covenant, or other obligation of Seller contained herein discovered prior to the Closing Date, which is not fully cured or corrected prior to the Closing Date, Purchaser’s sole remedy under this Agreement with respect thereto shall be to terminate the Agreement prior to the Closing Date and receive a refund of the Down Payment and receive from Seller a reimbursement for the actual, out-of-pocket costs and expenses incurred by Purchaser as a result of the Purchaser title, survey, and diligence efforts in connection with this Agreement and the transaction contemplated hereby (but expressly excluding costs or expenses incurred by Purchaser in connection with any financing sought to obtained by Purchaser in connection with the transaction contemplated hereby)…(the ‘Diligence Expense Reimbursement’).  (Da203-204.)  In the event that [...] materially breaches any representation, warranty, covenant, or other obligation specified in the PSA prior to the Closing Date, [...] has a defined course of action.  This provision grants [...] the right to terminate the PSA immediately upon discovering a material breach by [...] and seek a refund of the Down Payment, along with reimbursement for certain incurred expenses.  In contrast, § 13.10(a), by stating [...]’s failure to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is “not deemed a default,” explicitly excludes [...] from being deemed in breach of contract for this particular failure.  Instead, the provision establishes that the only remedy for [...] if the [...] fails to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by closing is to terminate the PSA and receive a refund of the down payment.  This is a limited remedy separate from the [...]’s remedies in instances of breach, indicating that the parties have specifically agreed that termination is not an automatic right but potential recourse under certain conditions.
[directive] If a criminal investigation is initiated, the law enforcement agency shall receive periodic and timely updates concerning the course of the investigation.  While a criminal investigation is pending, complainants and witnesses may be referred by the law enforcement agency to the county victim witness office for information concerning the criminal investigation.  Once the criminal investigation is complete and a disposition of the allegation has been made, the prosecutor's office shall provide the law enforcement agency with its investigative file for use in the internal affairs investigation subject to applicable state statutes, court rules and case law.  If the prosecutor's office declines to initiate a criminal investigation or the investigation is administratively closed, it shall notify the law enforcement agency of the outcome in writing.
[brief] Either party to the dispute shall be afforded, by the court, a specified period of time within which to apply to set aside the report and, if any party so applies, the court shall hear the matter in a summary manner with a jury, if a jury be demanded, or without a jury, if no jury be demanded, and the issue shall be tried and determined as in other cases of a civil nature at law, in said court.  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3.
[directive] Training and Qualification for CEDs and Less-Lethal Devices  11.1  No officer shall be authorized to carry or use a CED or less-lethal device during an actual operation until having completed a training course and qualification procedure approved by the Police Training Commission (or DCJ) in the proper use and deployment of CEDs or less-lethal devices.  The training program shall include a component on techniques to de- escalate a confrontation with a person from a different culture or background.  The training program also shall include a component on how to interact with a person in emotional or mental health crisis, including de-escalation techniques.  11.2  All law enforcement officers authorized to carry and use a CED or less-lethal device pursuant to this policy shall qualify, and thereafter re-qualify annually, in a training course and qualification procedure approved by the Police Training Commission (or DCJ).  11.3  CED and Less-Lethal training programs in each county shall operate under the direct control of the County Prosecutor’s Office.  For statewide law enforcement agencies, with the approval of the Director of DCJ, the CED and Less-Lethal training programs shall operate under the control of the law enforcement executive.  The number of certified CED Instructors and Less-Lethal Instructors, who shall be responsible for the initial training and qualification of officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal Device, shall be determined by the appropriate County Prosecutor or statewide law enforcement agency executive.
[brief] "Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred."  Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 564, 154 A.3d 215 (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547, 897 A.2d 1018 (2006).  The court abuses discretion when "findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence," utilizes "irrelevant or inappropriate factors," or "fail[s] to consider controlling legal principles."  Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. at 434, 110 A.3d 69 (internal citations omitted).  An abuse of discretion is also when the court "fails to take into consideration all relevant factors[,] and when its decision reflects a clear error in judgment."  *State v. C.W.*, 449 N.J. Super. 231, 255, 156 A.3d 1088 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting *State v. Baynes*, 148 N.J. 434, 444, 690 A.2d 594 (1997)).  Stating all the above cases, there is no reason for the lower court’s ruling not to stand.
[brief] C.  The Plaintiffs were improperly precluded from conducting discovery on the issue of vicarious liability as to Defendant [...] (2TR42:25-43:12)  By dismissing the Defendant with prejudice, the Plaintiffs were improperly precluded from conducting discovery on the issue of vicarious liability.  “Our discovery rules must “be construed liberally in favor of broad pretrial discovery. ””  Seacoast Builders Corp. v. Rutgers, 358 N.J. Super. 524, 541 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike, 148 N.J. 524, 535 (1997)).  This is because “our court system has long been committed to the view that essential justice is better achieved when there has been full disclosure so that the parties [may become] conversant with all the available facts.
[brief] [...] Letter to [...] and Edison Prosecutor 12/24/2020 (Attached at Pa108)  Civil Case Information Statement (Attached at Pa110)  Exhibit B to [...]’s Certification Transcript of State v. [...], Transcript Decision Pa151  Exhibit C-1 to [...]’s Certification Complaint Summons (Attached at Pa0040)  Court Alert for Defendant [...] Pa161  Hawkin’s Letter to Judge and Clerk 2/28/2020 Pa162  Communication Result Report 8/18/2020 Pa164  Fax Transmission Overleaf Page Pa165  Request to Transfer Hearing of Municipal Court Matter 7/9/2020 Pa166  Email Conversation Regarding Transfer of [...] Case 8/19/2020 Pa167  [Order]  Court Finding [...] Guilty on 10/27/2021 - Payment of Fines, Cost and Other Assessments
[brief] *Kevin Kerveng Tung, P.C. v. Fou*, 214 L. Ed. 2d 450, 143 S. Ct. 746 (2023).  While defendants pursued the proper appeal channels for the final judgment, they simultaneously attempted to collaterally attack the judgment by attempting to intervene in the divorce proceedings of the [...] which had been concluded at the trial level in October 2014 and affirmed on appeal in July 2016.
[brief] The broad discretion afforded to municipalities in determining what constitutes a public purpose is well-established.  See City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Investments, 148 N.J. 55, 68 (1997).  The cornerstone of eminent domain law in New Jersey is the requirement that property may only be taken for a "public use."  This standard is not a narrow or restrictive one; rather, it encompasses a broad range of purposes deemed to benefit the public.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has consistently upheld the principle that determinations of what constitutes a public use should be given considerable deference when made by local municipalities, recognizing their unique position to understand the needs and aspirations of their communities.  City of Atlantic City, supra, at Page 68.  The legal framework allows for a wide interpretation of public use, including but not limited to, public health, safety, and welfare improvements, environmental preservation, and the creation of recreational spaces.  Furthermore, the New Jersey statutes and case law explicitly support the use of eminent domain for acquiring lands to preserve open space, which directly contributes to the public's environmental and recreational well-being.  See N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq.  The Appellate Division has further elaborated on this point by recognizing that the preservation of open space serves multiple public purposes, including providing aesthetic beauty, recreational opportunities, and environmental benefits, all of which enhance the quality of life for New Jersey's residents Mt. Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes LLC, 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005).  In the case at hand, [...]'s decision to acquire the property owned by Appellant was driven by a recognized and pressing need to expand the Township's open space to prevent unchecked development, protect natural resources, and provide areas for public recreation.  The Township's actions are thus squarely within the ambit of public use as defined by New Jersey law and supported by a substantial body of precedent that affirms the broad discretion granted to municipalities in determining the public use of properties within their jurisdiction.  By engaging in the process to acquire these lands for open space preservation, [...] is acting in the best interest of its residents, fulfilling statutory mandates, and adhering to the legal standards set forth by both the state legislature and judiciary.
[brief] ”  Id. at 349 n. l.  Among those requirements is N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(2), which compels the agency to “prepare a report for public distribution which provides a set of analysis of the expected impact of the proposed rule. ”  Ibid.  Where the due process requirements of the APA are not met in connection with promulgating a regulation, including situations where N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(2) is not complied with, it is a Court’s duty to invalidate the regulation as an improper exercise of the agency's rulemaking power.
[brief] State v. Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. 286, 295, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148 (2004).  Hence, The Appellate Division reviews the trial judge's legal conclusions de novo.  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."  Id.  "On appeal, a trial judge's statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo."  In re Estate of Fisher, 443 N.J. Super. 180, 190 (App. Div. 2015) certif. denied, 224 N.J. 528 (2016).  B.
[brief] First, it was important from an operational and engineering standpoint to locate the Regulator Station as close as possible to the southern end of the Holmdel transmission line (where the line begins at the intersection of Newman Springs Road and Holmdel Road).  That is because the pump station for the Holmdel transmission line (which feeds Holmdel and the surrounding areas) is located at the southern end of the line.  Siting the Regulator Station near that pump station will allow [...] to feed that station, and provide natural gas to customers from that location northward, where the supply is back-filled from other pump stations.  A site at the southern end of the line is also optimal from a system-design standpoint in light of the locations of other pump stations within [...]’s system ([...] has two other gas feeds to the north and southeast).  [...] prefers to have adequate spacing between its various feeds to minimize system vulnerability and service interruptions in the event one of the pump station becomes inoperable.
[brief] The factors are evaluated "qualitatively, not quantitatively."  Erazo, 254 N.J. at 301 (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 384 (2014)).  Here, defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights and replied, "Mm, cool" when asked if he wished to answer questions.  (Da7).  He then read the waiver form out loud on his own and, when he apparently struggled with the word "coercion," the detective correctly explained what the word meant and confirmed that defendant fully understood his rights by asking him to sign the waiver form only if he fully agreed with all of the statements it contained, which he did.  And defendant again confirmed his willingness to talk to police immediately thereafter, after being told exactly why he was being questioned, by his response, "Not a problem."  (Da8).  Put simply, defendant was a twenty-six-year-old man with multiple prior interactions with the criminal-justice system in the form of both prior arrests and cooperation with police, was questioned in the middle of the afternoon, showed no indications of exhaustion or intoxication, was capable of listening to his rights and reading aloud the waiver form, and was properly advised of his rights, and immediately waived those rights.  All of these factors support [...]'s finding that defendant's waiver of his rights was entirely valid.
[brief] (9T129-14 to 25).  Police were able to learn the identities of the two men who were near to the man in the distinctive jacket: [...] and [...].  (9T130-11 to 13; 9T130-18 to 20; 9T139-17 to 20; 17T25-6 to 11).  Investigators spoke with [...], who was not truthful with them and refused to identify defendant even though police had images of [...] in defendant’s rap videos.  (17T94-19 to 25; 22T267-25 to 22T268-21; 22T269-2 to 3).
[brief] The decision below, which was rendered by way of Order dated February 28, 2024, was incorrectly premised upon a presumed conflict between [...] and [...] due to a miscommunication between [...] and his [...] supervisor, [...], about the cut-through to be utilized while travelling on the Garden State Parkway prior to the accident in question, which resulted in the death of [...] (“the Decedent”).  Morrow testified that he advised all [...] drivers, including [...], that they were to utilize a grass cut-through that was marked by cones and lane closures.  [...] testified, however, that he mis-heard Morrow’s instructions about the appropriate cut-through to use, and only learned subsequently that he had made a mistake and used an improper paved cut-through immediately preceding the crash.  [...] attributed his use of the paved cut-through to a miscommunication between he and Morrow.  The fact that Morrow advised [...] of the appropriate cut-through to use, and [...] mis-heard those instructions and mistakenly used a different cut-through, does not present adverse legal theories between the two, nor does it create a direct, concurrent conflict of interest.  [...] has not “thrown [...] under the bus” for its own benefit, and any claim to the contrary is unfounded, incorrect, and whole-heartedly unsupported within the record.  Furthermore, neither [...] nor [...] have blamed the other for the accident.  Instead, [...] has testified that his use of the paved cut-through was simply a “miscommunication,” and Morrow attributes the tragic event to “an accident. ”  Simply stated, [...] and [...] do not have any adverse legal positions within their defenses of the claims in this litigation but are instead aligned in each and every aspect, and the Respondents have failed to establish otherwise.  As such, no direct, concurrent conflict of interest is present between [...] and [...], and, therefore, the trial court’s disqualification of [...] was in error.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S DISQUALIFICATION OF [...] WAS IN ERROR AS THE RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY DIRECT, CONCURRENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN EARLE AND EVANS.
[brief] 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Pa838.  | Date | Description | Hours | Rate | Total | |--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------|---------| | 2/2/22 | Bank and [...] subpoenas for objections if there is no confidentiality Order.  Call with counsel.  Review proposed confidentiality Order and make edits to the same.  | | | | | |  Work on Draft Confidentiality Consent Order.  Email counsel regarding the condition of the production of tax and financial information sought relative to [...] from [...] and [...] in the respective subpoenas be deemed Confidential (not Attorney Eyes Only); and that the information sought relative to the [...] subpoena be designated confidential and Attorney’s Eyes Only.
[brief] That is not to say an AOM must always name the licensed person who is the subject of a vicarious liability claim.  A number of decisions considered and accepted an AOM that did not identify the licensed person by name.  In each case, however, it was possible to identify the by description within the AOM the licensed person or entity alleged to have deviated from the applicable standard of care.  See, e.g., *ibid.* (AOM referred to engineers and there was only one engineering firm); *Fink*, 167 N. J. at 551 (doctor who discontinued certain medication was identifiable); *Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr.*, 167 N.J. 341, 771 A.2d 1141 (2001) (unnamed radiologist was identifiable).  Here, it is not possible to identify any [...] nurse who [...] asserts were negligent because the AOM refers generally to the entire [...] nursing staff over an extended period and indiscriminately combines the nursing staffs of two separate facilities.  Appellant did not satisfy her obligation as to [...] by serving an AOM that opines collectively as to the care provided by its nurses and the nurses at [...].  Appellant was required to “provide each defendant” with an appropriate AOM and failed to do so.  *Hargett*, 477 N.J. Super. at 397-98.
[brief] Plaintiff baldly states the trial court’s letter is accurate when it clearly is not, as Defendant’s opening brief proves.  Additionally, the letter is so inaccurate it has dates wrong and lists an attorney [...] as counsel when she was never counsel in the underlying matter and never filed such an appearance.  The letter even tries to bootstrap an after the fact fee arbitration completely unrelated to the dismissed complaint as after dismissal Defendant filed it on her own.  That letter actually states the trial court is uncertain of the orders it made.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] For instance, in Karins v. Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532 (1998), the court addressed the same conduct at issue here - that which adversely affects the morale, public trust and public confidence in the operation of the agency - even though the conduct did not relate specifically to the performance of official duties.  (Da41).  As in Karins, the hearing officer here determined that Respondent’s conduct reflected upon and impaired the morale and discipline of his position.  Id. (AB-19-28)  Similarly, the cases of In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990) and In re Emmons, 63 N.J.Super. 136 (App.Div. 1960), (Da40), involved public officials held accountable for off-duty conduct found to be violative of the implicit standard of good behavior that devolves upon one who stands in the public eye as the upholder of that which is morally and legally correct and/or conduct not specifically proscribed by departmental rules or regulations.
[directive] 2, August  [Revised Process for Identifying the Pretrial Release/Detention Recommendation l: Step  NCA FTA  Complete the PSA to generate the scale, scale, and NVCA flag.  if Step 2:  Determine any current charge is Murder or subject to life imprisonment and of therefore is subject to a presumption detention pursuant to N .J .S.A. 2A: 162-19(b ):  - Murder or felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(l),(2) or (3))  Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(l)) or Human trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(a)(2) (3))  Tampering/damage involving nuclear electric generating plant (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-7)  Nuclear electric generating plant; damaging/tampering with equipment which . results indeath (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-8) of Leader narcotics trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3) or Terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(a)(l), (2), (3) (4)) or Producing/possessing chemical weapons, biological agents or nuclear radiological devices (N.J .S.A. 2C 8-3( a)) :3 of Leader firearms trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-16)  If No yes, the final recommendation is Release Recommended.
[brief] But nowhere does the statute explicitly extend that requirement for the entire duration of a BOG member’s term.  That lack of specificity is fatal to Plaintiffs’ (and the trial court’s) interpretation of the statute under the special principles governing legislative contracts, especially when coupled with N.J.S.A. 18A:65-19, the provision establishing the only process and grounds for removing a BOG member (and those grounds do not include changing residency).  The Medical and Health Sciences Restructuring Act, L. 2012, c. 45 (the Restructuring Act), inserted the residency requirement into the Rutgers Act.