ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 10, 22 McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc., 175 N.J. 519 (2003) .............................................................................. 29, 30 Midlantic National Bank v. Georgian, Ltd., 233 N.J. Super. 621 (Law Div. 1989) .......................................................  35 New Century Financial Services, Inc. v. Oughla, 437 N. J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 2014) ....................................................... 9, 10, 11, 32  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) ...............................................................................  11  Noren v. Heartland Pavement Systems, Inc., 449 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 2017) ....................................................... 7, 16
[brief] Obviously, Plaintiff’s reliance upon Katz is misplaced.  Firstly, because as defendant stated in their initial brief at Db 11, “The actual rent agreed upon between a landlord and a tenant may be the best evidence of the anticipated income, depending on the circumstances of the case.  But not as to this lease, that had been negotiated thirty years before, under circumstances where the subject property was a vacant piece of land.  This lease was not a lease that anyone could consider as a comparable or as an indicator of market value of the fee simple estate.  Secondly, because the market value of the fee simple estate in 1994 would have required compensation for the entirety of all the property interests as a taking of the fee simple estate, but the leases in Katz had no market value as leasehold interests they were above market.  Plaintiff’s remaining argument as to Point I is that defendant is getting a double recovery because they were still able to collect some rents while the property deteriorated in value while under the blight designation and the Township’s success in moving the [...] to its new [...] the property decreased in value, perhaps even to the $920,000 FMV as of March 2018.  The argument that while his $4M capital was tied up for twenty-four years in this property, an asset the Township was systematically, by its actions, depreciating its value, the [...] are somehow getting a double recovery, is so lame it shouldn’t require a response; the legislative intent of N.J.S.A.20:3-30(d) and 20:3-38 as discussed in Point II may provide further explanation.
[brief] .......................16  Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Elkholy, No. 21-cv-16255, 2022 WL 2373917 (D.N.J. June 30, 2022)  ......................16  Government Employees Ins. Co v. Tri County Neurology & Rehabilitation, LLC, 721 F. App’x 118 (3d Cir. 2018)  ............................................................17  Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A., __F.4th__, 2024 WL 1819645 (3d Cir. Apr. 26, 2024).............................passim
[brief] A.  **Tenant is Not Entitled to Payment of the Tenant Allowance Due to Its Undisputed Monetary Defaults (Da1-3)**  It is well-settled that contractual provisions negotiated at an arm’s length between sophisticated commercial entities should be enforced as written.  *Standard Refinery Union v. Esso Standard Oil Co.*, 31 N.J. Super. 548, 551 (App. Div. 1954); HLP Associates, L.P. v. Carpet City Inc., A-4134-13T3, 2015 WL 1181271, *5-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 17, 2015) (unpublished).  “[T]he court will not write a new contract for the parties or vary, enlarge, alter or distort its terms for the benefit of one to the detriment of the other under the guise of judicial interpretation. ”
[brief] THE COURT:  …  The, first of all, the order that tenant’s counsel would like me to make adopt is something I really don’t have jurisdiction to adopt.  I can’t, in this court, I can’t make -- it’s almost the equivalent of a judgment for damages.  And I can’t – in landlord/tenant court I can’t do that.  There’s two results to an eviction complaint.  Either a judgment for possession or I dismiss the case.  Now if I agree with everything you say about that, well then case dismissed.  But, and maybe you get the 192,000 that’s in the bank.  But I can’t – that particular order I don’t have jurisdiction to adopt.  (3T14-3 to 3T14-14)  This holding is in accordance with New Jersey law and should, respectfully, be affirmed by this Court.
[brief] The Second Day Of Trial And Relevant Facts  Upon returning to Court the following day, Plaintiff immediately informed the Court that she had obtained hard copies of most of the trial exhibits.  While Plaintiff was organizing the hard copy exhibits requested by the Court, the Court called all counsel into her Chambers and excluded Plaintiff.  2T7:13-16; 2T8:10-14.  Following this *ex parte* meeting, the Court came back on the record and subjected Plaintiff to another half-day of re-direct examination by the Court.  After more than an hour on the stand during the second day of trial, the Court again went through each of Plaintiff’s claims and required Plaintiff to state if she intended to dismiss each of the items or not, resulting in a significant shift in Plaintiff’s requested relief.  This interaction occurred before Plaintiff was given any opportunity to call the Defendants to the stand, present them with evidence, and question them.  After this colloquy, the Court broke for lunch and after lunch, Defendant [...] testified.  [...] offered no supporting documents for his qualifications.  [...]’s responsibility was to build sales and generate business, but during his time at [...] he brought in zero clients and thus, generated no revenue.  Following [...] physically assaulting Plaintiff, [...] removed Plaintiff’s personal items from her apartment.  [...] also used [...] funds to pay off $45,000.00 of personal credit card debt.  Defendant claimed this was a repayment of a loan to [...] but offered no proof to substantiate this position.  Plaintiff then completed her examination of [...].  [...] was on the stand for less than two hours, compared to Plaintiff’s day and a half examination, largely conducted by the Court.  3.
[directive] The information provided to grand jurors in these orientations must be coordinated with the information provided in the uniform grand jury charge so that all relevant information is provided but without unnecessary repetition.  Standard 4.  Charging the Grand Jury  A uniform grand jury charge shall be used in all counties.  A printed copy of the Grand Jury charge shall be provided to grand jurors by the supervising judge in accordance with Rule 3:6-3(b).
[brief] Def Atty.: [...], let’s go back to May 21st of 2022, you were in Oceanport that evening?  [...]: Yes, sir.  Def. Atty.: And at some point in time you encountered an individual whose initials are [...]?  [...]: Yes, sir.  Def. Atty.: And you knew who [...] was?  [...]: Yes, sir.  Def. Atty.: And at some point in time, did you have a verbal disagreement with him [[...]]?  [...]: Yes, sir.  Def. Atty.: And that verbal disagreement actually turned physical?  [...]: Yes, sir.  Def. Atty.: And you actually assaulted him by shoving him to the ground?  [...]: Yes, sir.  Def. Atty.: And in doing so, you attempted to cause him significant bodily injury?
[brief] 32  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Defendant [...]’s Appellate Brief, [...], filed March 5, 2021¹ ................................................................................................. Pa1-62  ¹  The State includes Defendant [...]’s appellate brief in its appendix because the question of whether an issue was raised in this brief is germane to this appeal.  See R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  The State has omitted defendant’s appellate appendix.  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] See also *Gentry*, 439 N.J. Super. at 61-62 (“other serious trial errors, reviewed either separately or in combination with the charging error,” required reversal).  [...]’s jury instructions, when viewed in their entirety, did not foreclose the jury from considering self-defense as it applied to passion/provocation manslaughter.  As noted above, count one of the indictment charged defendant with purposeful or knowing murder and count two charged him with attempted murder.
[directive] [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  1.  ¿Entiende que si se declara culpable tendrá que renunciar a su licencia de conducir?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your driver’s license?  1ra infracción - suspensión de la licencia por 1 año  1st Offense - 1 year license suspension  2da infracción - suspensión de la licencia por 2 años  2nd Offense - 2 year license suspension  3ra infracción o subsiguiente - suspensión de la licencia por 10 años  3rd or Subsequent Offense - 10 year license suspension
[brief] Yet, during cross-examination, [...] conceded that he had only written in his report that [...] “almost hit the grass median. ”  (1T33:1-6 (emphasis added). )  [...] testified during cross-examination that he is trained to prepare an accurate report containing his observations.  (1T24:14-25:12.)  However, he also testified on cross-examination that his report listed that the vehicle that swerved over the line was a white Chevy Silverado and not a grey Honda, which is what [...] had reported on the summonses.  (1T29:13-30:15; Da1.)  When [...] pulled over [...], he did not notice any containers of alcohol; nor did he recall taking any note of any issues with his eyes.
[directive] The obligation to investigate includes not only acts of misconduct that are alleged to have occurred while the subject officer was on-duty, but also acts of misconduct that are alleged to have occurred outside the employing agency's jurisdiction or while the subject officer was off-duty.  15  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  4.1.4  An internal affairs function may conduct an internal investigation on its own initiative or upon notice to or at the direction of the law enforcement executive or the internal affairs supervisor.  Internal affairs may refer investigations to the employee's supervisor for action as permitted by agency policy and procedures.  4.1.5  Internal affairs investigations must be considered as important to the agency as any criminal investigation.  Members of the internal affairs function therefore should have the authority to interview any member of the agency and to review records and reports of the agency relative to their assignment.  In addition, the agency's personnel should be instructed that the internal affairs function acts at the behest of the law enforcement executive in all internal affairs investigations.  The agency's personnel should be further instructed that during an internal affairs investigation, every member of the agency, regardless of rank, shall treat an order or a request from a member of the internal affairs function as if the order or request came directly from the law enforcement executive.  4.1.6  The internal affairs function shall maintain a comprehensive central file on all complaints received, whether investigated by internal affairs or assigned to the officer's supervisors for investigation and disposition.
[brief] In regard to the restitution awarded, the defendant stipulated to the amount and the entry of the Order.  (8T13-10 to 16).  While ultimately the State relies on the sound discretion of this Court, it seems if the defendant contests his ability to pay a restitution award, that should have been raised at the Court below, when he consented to the entry of the order, and not, for the first time, on appeal.
[brief] Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, [...]’s project does not actually contravene anything in the MPA – while the Planning Board considered whether to recommend the Property for inclusion in the Senior Housing Overlay rezoning by the Township – the final document it adopted does not mention the Property at all.  From reading the Resolution, the Court could have the impression that the MPA specifically rejects the proposed use on the Property.  It does not, so there is no impairment to begin with, let alone anything substantial.  To the contrary, the record of the proceedings before [...] confirms that the Property was to be recommended for the proposed use, and more importantly, the Township’s planner deemed the Property “appropriate” for the proposed use at that time.
[brief] Moreover, on August 9, 2021 while this action was in abeyance, defendant [...] modified its published long term tax exemption notice of adoption.  On August 9, 2021, defendant [...] alerted all [...] taxpayers of their limited right to challenge a [...] long term tax exemption.  On August 9, 2021, defendant [...] published in the [...] a 2/3 page notice of adoption of a [...] LTTEL long term tax exemption ordinance for a mixed-use nine phase development project of the downtown [...] consisting of approximately 3,800 market rate residential units, 400 affordable housing residential rental units and at least 100,000 square feet of mixed hospitality/destination retail space.
[brief] Basic canons of statutory construction apply.  When construing the meaning of a statute, courts must look first to the statute’s plain language because it is the “‘best indicator’ of legislative intent. ”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  The words of a statute must be afforded “ordinary meaning and significance. ”  Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (the words in a statute should be given their “generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage”).  In addition, “[e]ach part or section [of the statute] should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.
[brief] This is the third forum in which Plaintiff has sued [...], [...], and [...] for alleged professional negligence.  First, on October 5, 2018, Plaintiff commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Da241.  On October 9, 2018, the District Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why the federal action should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, transferred to another venue.  Da238–39.  One week later, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action.  Da242.  Second, on October 15, 2018, Plaintiff commenced an action against [...], [...], and [...] in the Court of Common Pleas in Chester County, Pennsylvania.  Da284.  In response to [...]’s and [...]’s jurisdictional challenges, Plaintiff argued that “every action relevant to this dispute took place in Pennsylvania. ”  Da251, Da255–56.  On April 16, 2020, the Chester County Court dismissed the action with prejudice as against [...] and [...] for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Da259–75.  In its opinion, the Chester County Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants’ representation of Plaintiff “primarily occurred in Pennsylvania” and emphasized that “[...] never physically entered Pennsylvania in connection with his representation of [...].
[directive] 5.1.2  Members of the public should be encouraged to submit their complaints as soon after the incident as possible.  If the complainant cannot personally appear at the agency to file the complaint, a member of the agency, preferably a member of the internal affairs function, should visit the complainant at their home, place of business or other location if necessary to complete the report.  Law enforcement agencies are encouraged to establish systems to enable complaints to be accepted by telephone or by email if a complainant does not wish to be interviewed in person or wishes to remain anonymous.  Under no circumstances shall it be necessary for a complainant to make a sworn statement to initiate the internal affairs process.
[brief] See Da45.  With their reply, Defendants also submitted a Proposed Order to Show Cause “seeking relief . . . pursuant to the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA),” and specifically an order for Plaintiff to show cause “why judgment should not be entered: A. Dismissing the Complaint with prejudice pursuant to UPEPA; [and] B. Awarding court costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and reasonable litigation expenses to Defendants related to the order to show cause[.]”  Da47–48.  Defendants also asked that the Court treat their reply brief and accompanying Proposed Order to Show Cause “as an application for an Order to Show Cause to dismiss under UPEPA. ”  Da45 n.5.  On January 24, 2024, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for extension of time and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion for default judgment.  Da51–54.  The trial court did not take any action on Defendants’ Proposed Order to Show Cause.
[brief] [...] repeatedly, successfully argued before [...] that all of the previous claims against [...] in the 2015 Action were legal malpractice claims because the factual predicates of those claims arose out of [...]’s role as Plaintiffs’ attorney, and [...] should have been judicially estopped from suddenly claiming otherwise.  If all the previous claims against [...] in the 2015 Action were legal malpractice claims (as [...] repeatedly successfully argued), then every single non-legal malpractice claim in this Amended  Complaint against [...] solely arising out of his capacity as Sole Member of [...] and his control and operation of [...] as a sham entity, is necessarily a new claim, previously unknown, never pled, and therefore never dismissed.  Ultimately, the new Tort Claims against [...] solely arising out of his previously unknown and unknowable ownership of [...] and control and operation of [...] as a sham entity, are not legal malpractice claims whatsoever.  It is self-evident that the new Tort Claims against the Sole Member of [...] as Sole Member of [...] have absolutely nothing to do with legal malpractice.  It is self-evident that the new Tort Claims against a person who controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity to perpetrate a conspiracy against Plaintiffs have absolutely nothing to do with legal malpractice.  Such claims simply arise out of an individual’s ownership of an entity alleged to have been engaged in tortious conduct, and an individual’s control and operation of a sham entity to perpetrate a conspiracy engaged in tortious conduct.  Therefore, by logical necessity, the new claims against [...] were never dismissed, because such claims are not legal malpractice claims and Defendants argued and [...] explicitly held that only legal malpractice claims were alleged against [...] in the 2015 Action.  If only legal malpractice claims were alleged against [...], then non-legal malpractice claims were never alleged and must therefore be new claims which were never dismissed by [...].  This is basic logic, and it cannot be disputed.
[brief] Exhibit 1: Excerpt from Site Plan dated April 11, 2005 .................................. 105a  Exhibit 2: Excerpt from Site Plan dated December 22, 2009 .......................... 121a  Exhibit 3: Excerpt from Site Plan dated May 17, 2010 ................................. 134a  Exhibit 4: Excerpt from Site Plan dated August 17, 2010 .............................  138a  Exhibit 5: Excerpt from Site Plan dated November 18, 2010 ....................... 151a  Exhibit 6: Excerpt from Site Plan dated March 10, 2011 ..............................  164a  Exhibit 7: Excerpt from Site Plan dated April 7, 2011 ..................................  177a  Exhibit 8: Excerpt from Site Plan dated May 24, 2011 .................................  190a  Exhibit 9: Excerpt from Site Plan dated September 6, 2013 ......................... 203a  Exhibit 10: Excerpt from deposition of [...] ..................................
[brief] The State of New Jersey alone owns the tidelands outshore of Appellant’s property line and controls the use and occupancy of those tidelands.  This was also confirmed in [...]’s decision denying [...]’s hearing request of the Tidelands Resource Council’s approval of [...]’s Modified Tidelands License that is the subject of Appellant’s third appeal in In the Matter of Denial of Third Party Hearing Request of P.T. [...] Family Limited Partnership  [...]; [...]; [...], [...].  In light of the foregoing, [...] properly concluded based on applicable law and the record that Appellant does not have a statutory right to a hearing and Appellant’s interest does not reach to the level of particularity that is constitutionally required in order to obtain an adjudicatory hearing.  Therefore, Appellant’s third-party adjudicatory hearing request was properly denied by [...].
[brief] As an evidential matter, Appellants do not even suggest a basis for admission of the WARD Memo or the Planning Board Transcript.  Both are hearsay and inadmissible for the truth of the matter asserted.\(^6\) N.J.R.E. 802.  As the proponent of these hearsay documents, Appellants have the burden of proving that they fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility.  See State v. Miller, 170 N.J. 417, 426 (2002).  Appellants do not propose any hearsay exception under which these documents would fall.  Moreover, because the trial did not, by stipulation of the parties, include testimony, there was no witness who could authenticate the documents or provide any foundation to establish a hearsay exception.  Thus, in addition to the fact that these exhibits were not part of the Governing Body “record below” and could not have properly be considered by the Trial Court, there was no basis to introduce them into evidence at all.
[brief] There, as here, the Board misleadingly claimed that the Township had “updated” its zoning ordinance “as recently as 2019 and intentionally omitted the subject property” based upon the MPA.  [Da322].  As the Board Attorney confirmed to the trial court only two days after filing the Board’s brief below, what actually happened was that the Township took no action whatsoever on the MPA.  [Pa348].  the Township did not rezone them.  [Pa348].  The Board failed to provide that letter to this Court.  This Court should ignore this argument in its entirety.  First, the intent and purposes of MPA, at least for the argument that the Board makes, is at odds with the LUDO.
[brief] Petitioner supports his argument that complaints under the School Ethic Act can be brought against the Board as whole, as well as several of his other arguments, by extensive citations to *Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Board of Education*, 13 N.J. 172 (1953).  That case concerned the manner and extent to which a board of education may spend public funds for promotion of the voters’ approval of a bond referendum.  In particular, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a board of education could not use public funds to distribute booklets advocating a particular position on a public referendum.  The case did not concern the School Ethics Act, which would not be passed for another 40 years, but rather whether and to what extent a board of education may use public funds to advocate for a particular position.  There is no issue here regarding Respondents’ use of public funds.  Even if there was, the School Ethics Commission does not have jurisdiction to decide matters arising outside of the School Ethics Act, such as matters of school board funding.  *See N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.4.*  Accordingly, the case is entirely irrelevant.
[brief] The Dangerous Condition Created a Foreseeable Risk of Injury  As stated above in more detail, a dangerous condition existed in the left-hand lane of the southbound Parkway.  These types of settlement and elevation changes in the roadway create a substantial risk of injury.  In fact, [...] was so concerned with this type of condition on the travel surface of the roadway that [...] and [...] were hired to inspect the roadway to identify a correct these conditions.  (Pa1296); (Pa1265).  The [...] memo recommended that the settlement be fixed immediately which creates the inference that it created a foreseeable risk of injury if left uncorrected.