ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendants confirmed their breach of contract and fraudulent concealment in the falsified "Client Notes Report".  A.  Background on the Home Care Service Contract from May 12, 2019 to June 8, 2019  The home care service contract was effective from May 12, 2019, to June 8, 2020.  This contract initially covered the period from May 12, 2019, to June 8, 2019.  After the contract began, the defendant unilaterally extended it for an additional year until June 8, 2020, with defendant [...] authorizing the extension without notifying the plaintiff.  The contract was terminated by defendant [...] in early June 2019 after the plaintiff informed both defendants of [...]'s passing.  According to the service contract, defendant [...] was required to send its home care aide to provide care for [...] at home four times a week, for 10 hours each week, while the plaintiff was overseas.  Defendant [...] was responsible for authorizing and overseeing the service.  The plaintiff authorized the defendants to take all necessary measures to conduct the service during this period.  B.  Admission of Breach of Contract, contradictions and lack of documentation in "Client Notes Report"  On March 23, 2023, defendant [...] submitted a half-page, incomplete "Client Notes Report" (Pa92) to the trial court in response to plaintiff's Motion to Demand documents filed on March 10, 2023 (Pa74).  This document is self-contradictory and falsified, intended to further cover up defendants' malpractice.  Even in this falsified document, defendant [...] acknowledged that they breached the contract and did not provide services as required, at least from May 18, 2019, if not earlier, while the service contract was active.  In the "Client Notes Report," defendant [...] described how the service was conducted from their perspective.  It did not specify any dates or services offered during this period.  Defendant [...] was supposed to commence service on Monday, May 13, 2019.  Even assuming that the aide provided services on May 13, May 15, and May 17, 2019, three times as required, there were multiple violations and self-contradictions regarding the service itself and its documentation (Pa97).  -  Defendant [...] claimed that on May 18, 2019, the aide was 'denied entry' when attempting to visit [...], without explaining the circumstances of the denial.  -
[directive] Any questions regarding Directive # 19-19 may be directed to Assistant Director [...] (Criminal Practice Division) via email at [...] or by phone at [...]• [...] • [...]  Directive #19-19 - "Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders"  August 12, 2019  Page 10 [...] or Assistant Director  [...] (Municipal Court Services A. Division) via email at [...] or via phone at [...].  G.A.G. Attachments - (1)
[brief] (23T 158-6 to 9)  He recalled:  “[I]t got to the point where the DJ had to come -- and just split -- split them up from us….”  (23T 116-13 to 17)  And then “they stopped the party. ”  (23T 116-20)  [...] decided it was time to leave, and agreed to give his friend [...] and two women he knew from the neighborhood a lift.  But Anderson was very concerned about the situation (23T 120-4 to 121-14, 140-24 to 141-16, 146-3 to 19), and told [...] that before he left, he was going to talk to [...] who Anderson knew “from doing time with him in jail.
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX  State v. Pittman, 2023 WL 6930025 (App. Div. Oct. 19, 2023)  .............  Dra 1-5 State v. Gilliard, 2024 WL 502337 (App. Div. Feb. 9, 2024)  ..............  Dra 6-12 State v. Martinez, 2023 WL 6460945 (App. Div. Oct. 4, 2023)  ..........Dra 13-20 REPLY
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN WEIGHING PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED INCLUSIONARY DEVELOPMENT AGAINST MIDDLETOWN’S COMMERCIAL REDEVELOPMENT.  [...] repeatedly relies upon condemnation and redevelopment law in a vacuum in support of its shock and awe that the trial court used its equitable powers to preserve the Property in a significantly noncompliant town which has failed to even offer a housing plan for judicial consideration.  Although there is no case law which has definitively held a noncompliant municipality may be enjoined from condemning a builder’s remedy site, *Deland* and *MiPro* suggest that condemnation under such circumstances should be scrutinized.  Furthermore, [...] cannot cite to any precedent which supports condemnation of a builder’s remedy site.  [...], in attempting to argue that its redevelopment rights trump any obligation it may have under the Mount Laurel doctrine, incorrectly presumes that its redevelopment designation was proper.  Notwithstanding that faulty presumption, none of the case law cited by [...] involved a pending builder’s remedy lawsuit in a significantly noncompliant town, and is thus readily distinguishable.  In *Vineland Constr. Co. v. Twp. of Pennsauken*, 395 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2007), relied upon by [...], the redevelopment designation was unchallenged and deemed valid, and the plaintiff only challenged the redeveloper designation for its property.  The municipality’s affordable housing status was not at issue and a competing constitutional interest was not implicated.  Likewise, *Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal Props., LLC*, 215 N.J. 142 (2013) (property owner could not argue that its use for commuter parking was more compatible with the public interest than the intermodal freight facility operated by the condemning railway company), did not involve a competing constitutional obligation for the taking party.  If [...] was constitutionally compliant with its affordable housing obligation and assuming that the Property was properly declared an area in need of redevelopment, then the Township would obviously have much discretion in choosing the public use for which the Property would be utilized.  However, [...] cannot in good faith allege that it may employ its otherwise constitutional rights to condemnation and redevelopment in an effort to completely ignore its significant constitutional violation of the Mount Laurel doctrine.  The trial court recognized these competing constitutional rights and obligations, and properly utilized the Crowe factors to preserve the Property as a viable builder’s remedy site.  [...]’s significant violation of its constitutional obligation weighed heavily in the trial court’s decision to grant injunctive relief, and more than enough evidence exists to support the trial court’s ruling.  When evaluating the facts under the Crowe factors, it is clear that the granting of injunctive relief in favor of Plaintiff and the protected class was not “manifestly unjust under the circumstances. ”  The trial court’s injunction should be affirmed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] CROSS-APPEAL ISSUES  ..............................................  42  A.  APPELLANT’S FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO APPLY FOR A STAY OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERS  THE CONTRACT TERMINATED (Pa0192; Pa0194)  ...........................................  42  B.  UNFULFILLED CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THIS CONTRACT RENDERS  THE CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE AND BRINGS INTO QUESTION  WHETHER A CONTRACT EVEN EXISTS (Pa0245) ......  45  CONCLUSION
[brief] In determining the amount of the fee, the court should consider these factors: (1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties; (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award.
[brief] “A Plaintiff may rely upon a broad array of evidence to illustrate a causal link. ”  Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey, 260 F. 3d 265, 289 (3d Cir. 2001).  Typically, in an employment matter alleging retaliation, “the plaintiff must proffer circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise the inference that the plaintiff’s protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse employment action.
[brief] The sky will not fall.  The proposed regulator is not reasonably necessary to prevent a non-existent risk.  As we noted above, the company safely operates the 16-inch transmission line at reduced pressures.  This arrangement is safe and able to accommodate all present load and projected load, as well.  It also means that the company can not transport larger volumes of gas.  Since the current regulator was installed in 2012, at the same time as the 16-inch line was commissioned, there have been two and only two events of any concern at all.
[brief] (Pa31 ¶103); (Pa212).  In his March 13, 2017 Notice of Implementation, [...] stated that "[e]ffective March 15, 2017, all pending and prospective Terminal Leave payments shall be eliminated for all employees."  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  It is undisputed that before the March 15, 2017 effective date, both Plaintiffs [...] and [...] retired.\(^2\) (Pa28 ¶91 & Pa23 ¶54).
[brief] Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 272 (emphasis added).  The codified statutory mechanism of enforcement by which an individual consumer voided an unlawful loan contract and/or pursue treble damages was N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)—the same provision of the same statute cited by [...] here.  Ibid.  Between 1962 and 1983, the NJCLA was amended seven times—many of the amendments added mortgage-based provisions, such as the Secondary Mortgage Loan Act of 1970.  See 1996 N.J. ALS 157; 1996 N.J. Laws 157; 1996 N.J. Ch. 157; 1997 N.J. A.N. 2513.  “On January 8, 1997, the Governor signed the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, which combine[d] the [NJ]CLA with two mortgage-related statutes.\(^3\) L. 1996, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49).
[brief] “Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:26-2, any person employed as a teaching staff member by a district board of education shall hold a valid and appropriate certificate. ”  And N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-5.1(c) states: “The employing school district shall remove from the position any teaching staff member who fails to maintain the mandated license, certificate, or authorization as set forth at (b) above. ”  2021 were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable [would] not change if petitioner is successful in his pending appeal” of his certificate suspension.  *Ibid.*  Having reviewed the briefs filed by the primary parties, the factual and legal issues involved in this appeal do not warrant the filing of a separate brief on behalf of the Commissioner.
[brief] ”  Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Morales, an employer sought to enforce an arbitration agreement that was written in English against a former employee who could not understand English.  Id. at 219.  The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.  It held that as a matter of law, it was the former employee’s “obligation to ensure he understood the [a]greement before signing,” and the former employee could not avoid his English-language agreement to arbitrate when he could have—but did not—ask to have the agreement translated from English to Spanish.
[brief] Those costs were not part of the damages that Plaintiff [...] had to spend to bring or defend a separate action by a third party.  Therefore, the alleged omission to conduct discovery by [...] was not the causation that had caused the Plaintiff to incur legal fees in her underlying matrimonial action.  The court has denied typical litigation discovery cost incurred in a third-party exemption case to American Rule that parties shall bear their own legal fees, because this is not the costs that plaintiff was forced to spend to defend or to bring a separate lawsuit as a result of defendants’ negligence or to incur investigation costs as a result of defendants’ negligence.
[brief] In addition, the Ordinance adopted spawned the eventual adoption of Ordinance 15-23 (Pa31).  Notwithstanding the assertions of the Appellant in its brief, clearly the public purpose for the acquisition of Appellant’s property was amply provided.  This is the truth, notwithstanding the fact that Appellant has asserted in its brief that which was approved by the adoption of Ordinance 5-23 “is not conditioned upon inclusion of Defendants’ lots”.  That is simply not true.  Ordinance 5-23 (Pa8) provides in part that the Township will convey all the properties listed on Exhibit “A” to the contract.  Exhibit “A” includes the Appellant’s property, Lot 90 in Block 21601.  That is clear and without dispute and cannot reasonably be denied.  The contract which was made part of and therefore authorized by Ordinance 5-23 provides in part:  The property to be exchanged from Township to [...] is referred to on the attached Scheduled A consisting of multiple tax blocks and lots in [...].  In addition, the contract provides in part, at Section 2(b)(1): “[...] is acquiring title to two of the Township parcels that it does not own”.  One can easily see by reviewing Schedule A attached to the contract that there is an asterisk next to lots “not owned by Township”.  However, those lots are to be conveyed by the Township to the developer.  Two of the lots are the lots which are the subject of this litigation.  Appellant has always been aware of that.  In addition, Appellant clearly had the opportunity to intercede in the litigation, which is referenced in Appellant’s trial brief, and was venued before [...].  That litigation was finalized and [...] found that the “mother ordinances” were “not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable”.
[brief] On or about May 7, 2015, [...] (“[...]”) issued Appellant an open-end credit card bearing account number ending in 4600 (the “Account”).  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶¶ 4-5; Pa206-Pa213, ¶ 7).  At the time of opening the Account, on or around May 7, 2015, Appellant entered into a Card Agreement containing the terms and conditions of the Account (the “Agreement”) for Appellant’s use of the Account.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 9; Pa63-Pa70; Pa206-Pa213, ¶ --- \(^5\) 1T refers to the Transcript of Oral Argument on Appellant’s Motion before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. of the Lower Court on February 16, 2024 and filed by Appellant on June 24, 2024.  7).  On or about May 7, 2015, the Agreement was mailed to Appellant with the credit card for the Account to [...] (“NJ Address”).  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 10; Pa206-Pa213, ¶¶ 7-10).  The Agreement was not returned as undeliverable or otherwise.  (Pa206-Pa213, ¶ 11).  A Change in Terms Notice (“CIT Notice”) went into effect on Appellant’s Account on January 1, 2016 and were previously provided to Appellant in November 2015.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 11; Pa71-Pa73; Pa206-Pa213, ¶ 12).  The CIT Notice was mailed to the NJ Address.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 11; Pa71-Pa73; Pa206-Pa213, ¶¶ 12-14).  The CIT Notice was not returned as undeliverable or otherwise.  (Pa206-Pa213, ¶ 15).  Appellant’s use of the Account confirms that Appellant was provided with, and accepted, the Agreement and CIT Notice.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 12; Pa206-Pa213, ¶ 16).  This use is confirmed by the purchases Appellant made as well as the balance that was incurred.  Id.  The last payment made by Appellant posted on November 25, 2015.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 12; Pa74-Pa87; Pa206-Pa213, ¶ 16).  From the inception of the Account onward, all monthly billing statements were sent to Appellant at the NJ Address.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 13; Pa74-Pa87; Pa206-Pa213, ¶ 16).  Not a single one was ever returned as undeliverable or otherwise.  On or about June 15, 2016, the Account was charged off due to non-payment.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 14).  Appellant never informed [...] of a change in address.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 19).  **B.
[brief] He failed to do so, and therefore his claims are barred pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  Moreover, the appellant/plaintiff's coverage dispute with defendant [...] was concluded on [...]'s unopposed motion for summary judgment.  The trial Court concluded that "plaintiff's vehicles were garaged in New Jersey so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy."  The June 7, 2024 Order confirmed that the appellant/plaintiff [...] was required to and failed to maintain insurance meeting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  Therefore, his claims for economic and non-economic loss were properly dismissed pursuant to N.J.S.A 39:6A-4.5.  Here, the doctrine of *res judicata* is applicable.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THE FEE APPLICATION.  Assuming arguendo that the Appellant has standing to challenge the Fee Application, “fee determinations … will be disturbed only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion.  Packard-Bamburger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001).  In other words, a fee award is entitled to substantial deference by this Court.  In re Probate of Alleged Will of Hughes, 244 N.J. Super. 322, 328 (App. Div. 1990).  Here, the trial judge reviewed the affidavit of services, considered the RPC 1.5(a) factors, considered the size of the Trust and then made appropriate adjustments to reduce the fee award.
[directive] The following are circumstances under which an authorized tire deflation device may be deployed:  (a) an authorized tire deflation device may be utilized only after supervisory approval; (b) an authorized tire deflation device shall not be used to stop motorcycles, mopeds, or similar vehicles; (c) the authorized tire deflation device should not be used in locations where specific geographic features (e.g., sharp curves, alongside of rivers, steep embankments, etc.) increase the risk of serious injury to the officer, violator, or public; (d) deployment locations should have reasonably good sight distances to enable the officer to observe the pursuit and other traffic as it approaches; and (e) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should not attempt to overtake and pass a high-speed pursuit in order to position the device.  6.5  Procedures for deployment of the authorized tire deflation device: (a) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should do so from a position of safety; 10  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] FOUND AT PA000065)  ......................................  17  A. “ALL” LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE EXEMPT FROM THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE; THIS IS A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED MAY 17, 2023 FOUND AT PA000337 AND ORDER DATED MAY 26, 2023 FOUND AT PA000351)  .........................................................................................  18  B.  DEFENDANTS FAILED TO SHOW INEXCUSABLE CONDUCT OR SUBSTANCIAL PREJUDICE (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED MAY 17, 2023 FOUND AT PA000337 AND ORDER DATED MAY 26, 2023 FOUND AT PA000351)  .........................................................................................  24  C.  THE WILL NEGLIGENTLY DRAFTED BY DEFENDANT WAS AMBIGUOUS AND [...] AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DO NOT BAR THIS CLAIM (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED MAY 17, 2023 FOUND AT PA000337 AND ORDER DATED MAY 26, 2023 FOUND AT PA000351)  .........................................................................................  27  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Here, the Board did not follow proper dictates under the law and the Ordinance and reasonably exercise its discretion.  Abusing its discretion, its decisions were totally unsupported by the record.  The Board contrived a minimal rent increase repugnant to law and the Ordinance.  It destroyed [...]’s equity in the Unit and unjustifiably reduced [...]’s routine operating expenses, while [...] failed to provide any testimony or documents challenging [...]’s equity calculation and expenses.  The Board defied the instructions of two trial courts before a third judge issued a final ruling adjudicating the Rent Increase rather than remand to the Board for a third time and fourth set of hearings.
[brief] See Pa15 at ¶¶35-36; Pa58 at ¶¶35-36;1T 87:20-88:5.  Plaintiff asked [...]—a District employee with access to the administrative side of Absent Management—to check his account and see if there were any issues, and [...] found none.  See Pa15 at ¶¶37-38; Pa58 at ¶¶37-38; Pa46-Pa47.  Plaintiff checked his account himself and saw that everything appeared normal.  See Pa15 at ¶39; Pa58 at ¶39.  Plaintiff conceded that he had nothing other than a “feeling” to corroborate his theory that he had been locked out of Absent Management.  See Pa15 at ¶40; Pa58 at ¶40.  The trial court found that there was “evidence that Plaintiff was not locked out of the shift assignment . . . .”
[brief] For jurors to properly assess an identification, they “must be told about relevant factors and their effect on reliability. ”  See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 219.  But here, jurors received no guidance on how to evaluate “familiar” identifications, other than the dueling arguments of counsel regarding their own experience.  This case begged for the application of science to undermine commonly accepted, but inaccurate, notions of familiarity breeding reliability.
[brief] According to Strategy 5 of the EMP, gas utilities must “continue to deliver, reliable, resilient, and affordable service” in a manner that “meets the immediate needs of New Jersey’s gas consumers” and realize the State’s goals to achieve “100% clean energy and an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions” from 2006 levels by 2050.  (Aa474); see also N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 (requiring utilities to provide safe, adequate, and proper service to customers).  Here, the OAL and BPU reviewed the testimony of [...], [...]’s expert witness in the development and implementation of prior Energy Master Plans, and [...], [...]’s expert witness in pipeline flow and hydraulic analysis, regarding the EMP’s long-term energy goals and the impact of the Project on the objectives outlined in the EMP.
[brief] (188a)  Thereafter, on August 9, 2019, after years of obstruction and motion battles, Plaintiffs discovered checks showing that [...], four months prior to May 7, 2008, had already been repaid the alleged $250,000.00 loan for which Teddy [...] allegedly gave him the Collateral Assignment.  625a–627a; 645a–650a.  Thus, Plaintiffs discovered that at the time [...] signed the Mortgage, the Collateral Assignment had already been extinguished since the loan had been repaid.  Thus, the only reason [...] signed the Mortgage as sole member of [...] was because [...] was in fact the sole member of [...], as he certified and was notarized, notwithstanding the perjurious testimonies of [...] and his co-conspirator Defendants, and the misrepresentations of [...] and [...].  Upon discovering this new evidence, Plaintiffs moved to amend the Complaint, to state claims against [...] they did not know at the time of the original Complaint.
[brief] "Th[e] doctrine is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial system and is designed to prevent litigants from 'playing fast and loose with the courts.'"  Newell, 376 N.J. Super. at 38 (citing Tamburelli Props., 308 N.J. Super. at 335 (quoting Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (1953)); see also Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 387 (App. Div. 1996).  While judicial estoppel is considered an extraordinary remedy, it may be invoked when a party’s inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice.