ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Reasonable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of Defendant.  An investigatory stop or detention (a “Terry stop”) involves a temporary seizure that restricts a person’s movement.  *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 247 (2007).  A Terry stop implicates a constitutional requirement that there be specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  *Id.*  The State has the burden to establish that a stop was valid.  *State v. Mann*, 203 N.J. 328, 337-38 (2010).  To determine whether reasonable suspicion existed, a judge must consider the totality of the circumstances, viewing the “whole picture” rather than taking each fact in isolation.  *State v. Nelson*, 237 N.J. 540, 554-55 (2019) (*quoting* *State v. Stovall*, 170 N.J. 346, 361 (2002)).  Investigative stops are justified if the evidence, when interpreted in an objectively reasonable manner, shows that the encounter was preceded by activity that would lead a reasonable police officer to have an articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or would occur shortly.  *State v. Davis*, 104 N.J. 490, 505 (1986).  A [judge] must first consider the officer’s objective observations.  The evidence collected by the officer is “seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. ”  [A] trained police officer draws inferences and makes deductions … that might well elude an untrained person.  The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. ”  Second a [judge] must determine whether the evidence raise[s] a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.  *Id.* at 501 (quoting *United States v. Cortez*, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).  An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.  *Elders*, 192 N.J. at 243.  An appellate court will disregard only those findings that are “clearly mistaken”.  *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015).  Review of legal conclusions of the trial court are de novo.  *State v. Watts*, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).  Here, [...]’s decision suppressing the evidence failed to consider the “whole picture” and should be reversed.
[brief] It benefitted only those who voted for it, in addition to harming the largest member who was also a direct litigant in this action, and the other 52% of the members who were not parties in the case at all.  Where the “business judgment rule’s” presumption of validity was clearly rebutted by proof of “self-dealing”, the Court was not permitted to simply accept the fee-shifting vote as a valid or “sound” management decision, as it did.  In re [...], supra.  To the contrary, the Court was required to find the vote to impose a personal debt on the company and thereby shift these litigants’ legal fees to the company and all shareholders impermissible, unless it was “entirely fair” to the Company “by clear and convincing evidence”.  Daloiso, supra, The Court did not do so.
[brief] There was must be an invitation by the lawyer on which the non-client relied.  There must be evidence that a non-client relies upon the lawyer to represent him.  In addition, the Court reviewed [...]’s Certification to see what he stated leading up to the drafting of the Complaint.  (Da10).  The Certification was conspicuously silent on what he did.  (Da10).  [...] would pay [...]’s legal fees, but after that he was silent.  (Da10).  Also, when Mr. [...] started drafting the Complaint, he did not complain that [...] would be representing both brothers.  (Da98).  The silence from [...] and [...], commencing in the Fall of 2017 through the drafting of the Complaint in 2018, were facts that led the Court to conclude that [...] really was not at any point relying on Mr. [...] to represent him.  (Da98).  In addition, the Court pointed out that the [...], in September of 2018, filed the Motion to Intervene on behalf of [...].  (Da42).  Mr. [...] consented to that.  (Da42).  There were other communications in July and leading up to September of 2018, when the [...] actually intervened in the litigation on behalf of [...].  The Court found that the point was that there were not enough facts to support the imposition of a duty that would make it fair.  Fairness is a big part of it according to the Court.  It must be fair and foreseeable that [...] would have expected [...] to represent him and protect his interests.  Extending an attorney’s duty to a third-party not in privity with the attorney has been approached with care so as to be fair with all.
[brief] Proper and comprehensive jury instructions are critical to preserving a defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial, even when no objection is lodged.  \textit{State v. McKinney}, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (reversing for plain error in the robbery instruction).  One of the most basic principles of New Jersey criminal law is that "[a]n essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury receive adequate and understandable instructions."  \textit{Id.}, quoting \textit{State v. Afanador}, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997); \textit{State v. Concepcion}, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988) ("Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant's right to a fair trial").  It is “structural error,” irremediable by harmless-error analysis, for a jury to deliberate under the wrong -- or an absent, or an improperly-explained -- burden of proof.
[brief] Citing Higg-A-Rella, the Court noted that, the “interest” of the party seeking the records can be “a wholesome public interest or a legitimate private interest. ”  Higg-A-Rella v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 47 (1995).  (Pa150).  The Court further went on to note that testing as described would deprive the public access to these requested items in their original state.  (Pa154).  The Court correctly cites the plain language of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(a) which provides that records custodians permit a record to be “inspected, examined and copied” and subsequently assessed that granting this request would permanently alter the documents.  (Pa153).  The Court was aware of the Statute of Limitations argument made by the Respondent as well as the OPRA denials received by [...] from the State on December 27, 2022.  (Pa143-146).  In the denials of these two OPRA requests, the Respondents argued that these requests are being denied since they are a part of an ongoing litigation, essentially merging [...]’s OPRA denials into the hearing on January 5, 2023.  (Pa77).  Moreover, the Court indicated that the Plaintiff-Appellant erred in failing to state a claim.  (Pa139-154).
[brief] Application of Hopkins Gives Rise to a Duty of Care Between [...] and Plaintiff.  In Hopkins, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the duty owed in premises liability matters cannot be determined through the application of rigid classifications.  See Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 438 (the attempt to pigeonhole the parties within the traditional categories of the common law is both strained and awkward).  Instead, the determination of whether a duty of care exists requires a review of the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution."  Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439.  Ultimately, "[w]hether a person owes a duty of reasonable care toward another turns on whether the imposition of such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy . . . [t]he analysis is both very fact-specific and principled; it must lead to solutions that properly and fairly resolve the specific case and generate intelligible and sensible rules to govern future conduct.
[brief] “The trial court’s duty ‘to take all appropriate measures to ensure the fair and proper administration of a criminal trial’ must begin with voir dire. ”  *State v. Fortin*, 178 N.J. 540, 575 (2004) (quoting *State v. Williams*, 93 N.J. 39, 62 (1983)).  Trial courts have the authority to conduct voir dire while also allowing parties to supplement the court’s voir dire questions within the trial court’s discretion.
[brief] (128a).  [...] stayed the money judgment based upon the posting of a Supersedeas Bond, but refused to stay the Judgment of Dissolution or the property sale.  (142a-143a).  In July 2014, the property-at-issue was sold, the partnership was dissolved, and both [...] and [...], and the [...], received approximately $30 million each.  Plaintiff [...]’s attorney received 25% of [...]’s share of the sale’s proceeds in addition to [...]’s award of counsel fees.  The total award to Plaintiffs was in excess of $103,000,000.
[brief] Contrary to defendant's argument, there is no testimony that [...] threatened anyone or brandished the gun.  He was not involved in the altercation between [...] and the defendant over the knife.  Further, the testimony was clear that the defendant was the individual in possession of the knife—he brought it with him to the residence.  The defendant had the knife all night.  He possession of the knife was reported to the police, by [...] and [...], prior to the shooting.  The defendant and [...] had been having issues for a few hours prior to the shooting.  The police had been to the residence twice, one of which was for him having the knife, and the defendant was told to leave.  Nevertheless, he voluntarily returned to the residence, armed with a knife (that both [...] and [...] had indicated was in his possession) and attempted to gain entry into the home and was denied entry by [...].  At this point, [...] (and the gun) was upstairs getting [...].  While [...] was coming down the stairs, the defendant was already arguing with [...] and then attempted to stab [...] with the knife.  (5T115-16 to 21; 120-14 to 19; 124-2 to 4).  The attack with the knife was already underway and the gun was still tucked into [...]'s waitband behind his back out of sight from the defendant.  The gun could not possibly have been the trigger, as the defendant suggests, for the assault.  The record is completely devoid of evidence that the defendant was aware of the gun prior to him attacking [...] with the knife.  It simply could not have been the trigger that set this tragic event in motion.  Instead, it was the defendant voluntarily coming to a residence, armed with a deadly weapon, concealing his identity with a mask and attempting to forcibly gain entry when he knew he was not to be there.  Simply put, the testimony demonstrates that the defendant caused the event and was not provoked. \(^1\)  The defendant's reliance on *State v. Carrero*, 229 N.J. 118 (2017) is misplaced as the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from those present in case.
[brief] It was addressing a concern expressed by [...] that if it were compelled to produce documents on topics deemed relevant in other cases but already held to be irrelevant here, Plaintiffs would demand depositions on those irrelevant topics.  To explain why it would not tolerate such an effort by Plaintiffs, the court posited that [...] would simply file a motion objecting to the deposition, and then:  THE COURT:  And that will be a quick motion.  That will be a quick motion because when he files the motion and I read what he says that he wants to redepone somebody over something I’ve already determined that is not relevant to the case, I’m going to say and that will be very quick, and I don’t have a problem doing that motion.  What I’m trying to avoid here by all accounts is this contentious litigation.  It’s going on throughout the country and I do not think it’s fair for the plaintiffs—I mean, the defendants to decide which documents are relevant and which documents are not, on both sides.  I mean, this is not just limited to your productions.  It includes plaintiff’s productions as well.  So that’s what I’m trying to avoid.  T18:12 to 19:2.
[brief] **Right to Make Important Decisions**  Second, the Parental Secrecy Policy violates parents’ right to make the “important decisions” in their children’s lives.  *H.L. v. Matheson*, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981); see also *C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.*, 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing parents’ right to make those decisions in their children’s lives that go to the “heart of parental decision-making”).  “It is not educators, but parents who have primary rights in the upbringing of children,” *Gruenke*, 225 F.3d at 307, and parents cannot play this crucial role if their children’s school is actively concealing its actions from them, *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 497 U.S. 417, 483 (1990) (noting that, under the common law, parents had the right, “not merely to be notified of their children’s actions, but to speak and act on their behalf”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Regardless of whether social transitioning is considered psychological treatment, the decision of whether a school socially transitions a child is indisputably an “important decision” in the child’s life.  *See Ricard v. USD 475 Geary Cnty., KS Sch. Bd.*, No. 522CV04015HLTGEB, 2022 WL 1471372, at *8 (D. Kan. May 9, 2022) (observing that parents must “have a say in what [their] minor child[ren are] called” by their school); *Mirabelli v. Olson*, No. 323CV00768BENWVG, 2023 WL Notification Policy appropriately requires parental notice before a school socially transitions students, to comply with the Constitution, it must go further and require parental consent as well.  5976992, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023) (concluding that school district’s “policy of elevating a child’s gender-related choices to that of paramount importance, while excluding a parent from knowing of, or participating in, that kind of choice, is . . . foreign to federal constitutional . . . law”).
[directive] [Yes/Si]  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney [No/No] c. about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?  6Entiende que usted tiene el derecho de buscar el consejo individualizado de un abogado sobre el efecto que su declaraci6n de culpabilidad tendra sobre su situaci6n como inmigrante?  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of your plea?  If d.
[brief] (Pa4 to 25).  The record in this case clearly establishes that defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.  Moreover, and more relevant to this appeal, the record also clearly establishes that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel and, even if his comment could be deemed an ambiguous invocation of his rights, the discussion between defendant and the detective resolved any ambiguity.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in 1 Pa refers to the State’s appendix.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  In addressing an appeal of a contract case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey augmented the standard of review, stating:  Although the interpretation of a contract is generally subject to de novo review, (citation omitted), we apply a deferential standard here because the trial court determined the validity of the retainer agreement by taking the testimony of the parties and by making credibility and factual findings, see Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998).  “Deference is especially appropriate ‘when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility. ’”  Id. 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).  We may not overturn the trial court's fact findings unless we conclude that those findings are “manifestly unsupported” by the “reasonably credible evidence” in the record.
[brief] People can differ on the causes of climate change but no one can say that there has not been a significant change in the weather.  Records are being broken regularly.  More heat, more storms of greater intensity, more floods.  Certainly far more than when this property was constructed in the 70s.  Here Defendant chose to either believe that the incident was a fluke based upon the fact that it had not occurred in the preceding decades and/or the cost of upgrading was either prohibitive or they felt it was not likely to reoccur in the foreseeable future and kicked the proverbial can down the road.
[brief] Trial 26T June 2, 2011  Trial 27T June 7, 2011  Trial 28T June 13, 2011  Trial 29T June 14, 2011  Trial 30T June 15, 2011  Trial 31T June 16, 2011  Trial 32T June 20, 2011  Trial 33T June 21, 2011  Trial 34T June 22, 2011  Trial 35T June 23, 2011  Trial 36T July 19, 2011  Trial 37T July 21, 2011  Trial 38T July 25, 2011
[directive] Èske w konprann ke si egzamen a ta revele ke konpòtman ou karakterize antan ke konpòtman residivis ak enkontwolab, epi si w ta dispoze pou resevwa oswa (pwofite de) tretman pou delenkan seksyèl ak dispoze pou patisipe nan tretman a, jij la va, daprè rekomandasyon Depatman Prizon a, kondane w a anprizonman nan Sant Tretman ak Adult Diagnostic la pou resevwa tretman pou delenkan seksyèl; mèzalò, si santans yo enpoze a ta depase 7 lane, yap anfèmen w nan yon lòt sant dabò anvan yo voye w nan Sant Tretman ak Adult Diagnostic la?  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, and you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and willing to participate in such treatment, the judge shall, upon recommendation of the [...], sentence you to confinement at the [...] for sex offender treatment; however, if the sentence imposed Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Haitian Creole paj 1 nan 3 Revised Form Promulgated by 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Haitian Creole page 1 of 3 is greater than 7 years, you will first be confined at a facility other than the [...]?
[brief] Defendants’ responsibility would have only attached subsequently if a court approved the transaction, a valid deed was provided from the [...] to Plaintiff, and then from Plaintiff to Defendants, thereby satisfying the condition precedent to the formation of the contract of title insurance.  The trial court correctly construed the contract and found that, under the undisputed facts, Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of the title commitment and therefore there was no contract formation between [...] and Plaintiff.
[brief] (11T 7-8, 7-12 to 17)  Her body-worn camera captured her arrival and initial investigation at the scene and was introduced at trial.  (11T 10-7 to 16, 13-22 to 15-12, 17-15 to 18-10, 18-25 to 19-4, 20-14 to 25, 22-7 to 23-6, 24-10 to 19, 25-1 to 26-25, 28-6 to 39-4)  [...] provided medical aid to [...] until he was taken away in an ambulance.  (11T 7-23 to 8-1, 8-4 to 7, 8-10 to 16)  [...] then began to secure and process the scene and speak to anyone who may have witnessed anything.  (11T 21-25 to 22-3)  [...] testified that when the police arrived, [...] told them that “he had nothing to do with it,” (see 11T 28-6 to 30-22) which [...] testified was false as [...] was “the one who brought the people here to do it. ”  (10T 119-12 to 24)  According to [...], about five minutes after the altercation, he and [...] saw [...] again, who said he was going to call [...].  (10T 84-5 to 16, 85-19)  [...] picked up [...] and [...] up in a car and dropped them off at their mother’s house.  (9T 96-19 to 22, 99-21 to 100-4; 10T 85-24 to 86-10, 86-18 to 19)  [...] testified that [...] gave him only $20, while [...] testified that she gave [...] $40.  (9T 96-19 to 22, 99-21 to 100-4; 10T 88-1)  Although [...] initially did not think [...] had been hurt, after he arrived home and received a lot of text messages about the altercation, he believed that he must have killed [...].  (9T 97-6 to 16, 102-3 to 10)  [...] turned himself in to the police and gave a statement.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], is a New Jersey corporation and the owner of property known as [...] in [...] (the “Blackridge Property”).  (Pa938; Pa1121 to Pa1123).  Plaintiff’s property is the site of a multi-unit luxury apartment building constructed in accordance with the 1996 “City of [...], Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan. ” (Pa50 to Pa51).  Plaintiff’s property adjoins the property owned by Defendant, [...]. that is the subject of this appeal.  (Pa939).  Defendant, [...], is a New Jersey limited liability company and the designated redeveloper of property known as block 216, lots 11, 12 and 24 on the tax map of the City of Long Branch (the “Ocean Property”).  (Pa49 to Pa50).  290 Ocean intends to develop its property in accordance with a recent amendment to the “Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan” for a 109-unit luxury apartment building.
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted and Enforced  The Consent Order | 13 | Point II  The Trial Court’s Alternative Rulings Supporting Dismissal Due to Res Judicata and Entire Controversy Are Also Correct……………………21  A.  Res Judicata Bars the Complaint……………………………21  B.  The Entire Controversy Doctrine Is Applicable, and Justly Applied……………………………23  Point  III
[brief] ”  Ibid. (quoting Broadway Maint. Corp. v. [...], 90 N.J. 253, 259 (1982)).  The test to determine third-party beneficiary status, therefore, “is whether the contracting parties intended that a third party should receive a benefit which might be enforced in the courts. ”  Ibid.  Here, the case that [...] was an intended third-party beneficiary of the MAA is compelling.  The MAA itself clearly states that Plaintiff agrees to arbitrate all claims and controversies against [...] and any of its clients or customers, which necessarily encompasses [...], and which Plaintiff herself does not dispute.  Further, the MAA includes “clients and customers” in the defined term of “Company” and states that the agreement sets forth mutual promises between Plaintiff and the “Company. ”  Because the language of the MAA expressly evidences an intent for third-party customers and clients to benefit from it, [...] is unequivocally a third-party beneficiary to the contract.
[brief] Here, we must take the New Jersey Supreme Court at their word that that collection activity by an assignee constitutes subsequent performance under the CFA.  In granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the trial court relied primarily on two cases: *DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman*, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. 2013), and *Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C.*, 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (D.N.J. 2011).
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[brief] This appeal presents purely legal questions surrounding the accrual and expiration of a claim for breach of a written, integrated loan contract:  (1)  Will New Jersey law permit a claim for breach of a written contract whose performance was satisfied in writing as “paid in full” and whose express terms required any modification to be “in writing” based entirely on a later alleged oral agreement to pay some further amount “when able”?; and (2) assuming that a fully integrated and completed loan agreement can be brought as against the statute of limitations, does New Jersey law recognize an oral “pay when able” loan as a cognizable and binding contract?