ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (3T95)  [...] did not recall if he had [...]’s treatment records, but he agreed that his report and testimony was not based on [...]’s records.  (3T15 to 23)  [...] did not see the dash cam video.  (3T105-19 to 25)  He relied on the truthfulness and accuracy of Plaintiff’s reporting.  (3T100-13 to 21)  [...]’s office notes from August 21, 2013 indicate that Plaintiff told him he had been “wrestling with a perpetrator” (regarding the July 29, 2013 incident).  Plaintiff’s chief complaint was vertigo.  “Duration three weeks. ”  (3T96-1 to 22)(emphasis added)  [...]’s November 13, 2014 operative report states in part that: “The patient is well known to me.  He developed refractory vertigo following a blunt trauma. ”  (3T103-23 to 104-24)  [...]’s referral report, dated August 19, 2013, which was addressed to [...], but not part of his file, states that “[i]n the last 18 to 24 months, he [Plaintiff] has had increasing spells of Meniere’s attacks. ”  (3T97-2 to 13)(emphasis added).  [...] testified as Plaintiffs’ medical legal expert.  (3T7 to 12)  He saw Plaintiff once on June 14, 2016.  (3T59-20 to 22)  Plaintiff told [...] at that time that “[h]e hit his head and became dazed. ”  (3T61-2 to 9; 3T62-2 to 6)  The same history of Plaintiff hitting his read was repeated in [...]’s August 22, 2016 report.  (3T63-9 to 12).  [...]’s June 29, 2016 report states his opinion that Plaintiff’s disability is “predominantly secondary to the trauma that occurred when he hit his head. ”  (3T62-7 to 63-3)  However, [...] he relied on the truthfulness and accuracy of the history Plaintiff reported to him.  (3T60-3 to 6; 3T60-13 to 17; 3T63-4 to 64-13)  [...] was not even aware of the dash cam video when he prepared his reports.  (3T70-23 to 71-11).  [...] also admitted that his reports do not analyze [...]’s records; there is no analysis as to Plaintiff’s treatment for Meniere’s disease prior to the incident in question; he did not know when Plaintiff was last treated for Meniere’s disease prior to the July 29, 2013 incident; and, indeed, he had no information about Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease prior to the incident other than what Plaintiff told him.
[brief] (30a ¶101).  From December 2016 to March 13, 2017, the [...], [...], and [...] attempted to negotiate an agreement regarding contractual terms.  (217a).  Ultimately, those talks broke down.  Ibid.  On March 13, 2017, DLGS State Designee [...], Esq. issued a Notice of Implementation attempting to invoke his authority under the MSRA by stating he was changing the terms and conditions of employment for members of [...] including Plaintiffs.
[brief] .................................................. passim Menke v. Broward Cnty. Sch. Bd., 916 So.2d 8 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005)  ..........................................................  28  Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26.
[brief] “It is elementary that a party to a contract is not obligated to submit a dispute arising under it to arbitration unless he has undertaken by his contract to do so .  . . .”  Moreia Const. Co. v. Wayne Twp., 98 N.J. Super. 570, 575-76 (App. Div. 1968) (citing sources).  New Jersey courts acknowledge that “[w]hile public policy favors the arbitration process, and contracts should be read liberally to find arbitrability if reasonably possible, there survives the principle that parties choosing not to submit to arbitration ‘have a right to stand upon the precise terms of their contract. ’”  Id. (quoting Goerke Kirch Co. v. Goerke Kirch Holding Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 1 (1935)).  Courts are not empowered to “rewrite the contract merely because one might conclude that it might well have been functionally desirable to draft it differently to broaden the scope of arbitration in view of the nature of the subject matter of the contract, or indeed to make every dispute of any nature between the parties arising thereunder the subject of arbitration.
[brief] (See Da 069, 11T).  In that motion, PCR counsel indicated she had requested DNA materials from the prosecutor’s office and the New Jersey State Police Lab on several occasions, starting July 11, 2020, to support [...]’s PCR claim that prior PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a DNA expert.  In support of this motion, PCR Counsel submitted a letter from DNA expert [...], who was already retained on [...]’s PCR, regarding what she would require to complete her assessment of [...]’s case.  This motion to compel discovery was granted by the Court on June 22, 2022.
[brief] [...] then proceeded to go through the additional positive criteria analysis to show how this application promotes the purposes of the MLUL (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2) in a number of ways.  Plaintiffs considered to the opinions of residents at the site regarding the current garbage situation and specifically sought to address those concerns and provide a benefit to the residents and the community in substantially increasing the number of garbage enclosures, while also enhancing the look with screening and landscaping.  (Pa394).  Importantly, [...] noted that the application is promoting the general welfare by providing significant affordable housing.  (Pa394).  Plaintiffs proposed providing 15% affordable housing out of the new units developed, where there is none currently on site and none is required.  (Pa394 to Pa395).  [...] also noted that the Application would be redesigning open space within the site and provide for greater amenities, including connected walking paths and more of a community feel.  (Pa395).  In addition, the new development within the site would be required to comply with the latest DEP standards as it relates to stormwater management, which would be a benefit to a site that was built in the 1960s.  (Pa397 to Pa398).  Regarding the positive criteria, [...] went on to state the following:
[brief] [...] filed an *in personam* tax foreclosure ([...]) on May 11, 2022, Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. A, against real property located at [...] (the “Property”) in connection with its Certificate of Tax Sale bearing number [...] dated December 30, 2019 originally in the amount of $8,457.87.  Main Case Doc. No. 23 and Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, p.4.  A notice of *lis pendens* was recorded with the Atlantic County Clerk on June 20, 2022.  Id. at Ex. B.  On June 24, 2022, [...] requested Entry of Default.  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. A.  Then [...] filed a Motion to Enter Order Setting Amount, Time, and Place for Redemption on July 1, 2022.  Id.  On July 15, 2022, the state court set and fixed September 13, 2022 as the date and time by which the Debtor must redeem the Property by tendering $23,986.46.  Id. at Ex. C.  The Debtor did not redeem the Tax Sale Certificate and on October 13, 2022, the state court granted final judgment (“Final Judgment”) holding that the Debtor “and any and all persons claiming by, from or under them or any of them stand absolutely debarred and foreclosed of and from all right and equity of redemption of, in and to the [Property] and every part thereof, and that an absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple is hereby vested in [[...]].”
[brief] Therefore, the forty-five day requirement in *N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147* did not apply and the statute did not require the dismissal of the charges.  We accordingly reject plaintiff's contention that the charges at issue were time-barred.  *McElwee* at 394.  (Emphasis added).  In the case at bar, the only non-rule and regulation charge brought by [...] against [...] Conduct Unbecoming a Police Officer, in violation of *N.J.S.A. 40A:14-128* (40A:14-147).
[brief] Ibid.  Moreover, defendant’s urging the trial court to accept the holdings in two unpublished federal cases as binding precedent, see ibid., is improper and contrary to New Jersey law.  Rule 1:36-3 provides  No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.  Except for appellate opinions not approved for publication that have been reported in New Jersey Tax Court Reports or an authorized administrative law reporter, and except to the extent required by res judicata, collateral estoppel, the single controversy doctrine or any other similar principle of law, no unpublished opinion shall be cited by any court.  No unpublished opinion shall be cited to any court by counsel unless the court and all other parties are served with a copy of the opinion and of all contrary unpublished opinions known to counsel.
[brief] Taylor, 38 N.J. Super. at 24.  The court erred in failing to credit his testimony.  Without [...]’s alleged statement that there were drugs in the car that belonged to him, the police did not have probable cause that his car contained any contraband.  Without probable cause, police were not permitted to conduct a search of the car, let alone a warrantless search.  Witt, 223 N.J. at 447.  This Court should therefore hold that the warrantless search was illegal.
[brief] [...] testified that the cellular telephone records he reviewed were consistent with defendant’s cell phone number being present on May 27, 2012 between 1:00 a.m. and 1:05 a.m. at the [...] apartment complex where [...] resided.  (16T 62-19 to 23, 79-20 to 24).  He also confirmed that the records were consistent with defendant’s cell phone number being present on May 27, 2012 around 1:14 a.m. at the fast-food restaurant near [...] in [...] where the cabbie testified he took defendant after the [...] to get something to eat.  (16T 63-2 to 15).  In any case, defendant was prevented from presenting a complete defense by his trial attorney’s failure to conduct a pretrial investigation of the cellular telephone data, resulting in a fundamental injustice.
[brief] The facts as I understand them necessarily…is that there was an application before the [...] [by the School], an alternative means to try to undermine the Court’s order that there was an easement.  Keeping in mind that the Court had previously found as a matter of facts that from the 60s this area [the [...]] was used as parking by both parties, and by the synagogue during service hours.  And based on that there was an easement appurtenant to the [[...]].  That based on that the Court issued an order that in essence provided that the [P]laintiff had [sic] easement to use the courtyard area between the two buildings [the [...]] for parking during services hours.  It was an unfettered right…  In any event, the thrust of the Court’s ruling was that parking was for the [[...]] during service hours could not be interfered with.  And that a way of interfering whether it was allowing children to ingress and egress, students to ingress and egress to the building, to the school, during these periods of time of service.  It was my intent to prohibit that…  Undeterred, it appears that [the School] has sought the [...]’s participation in this matter, the [...], and has sought an application to bar the use of parking in the area.  And I think it’s noteworthy that the application was heard on [October] 15th, and on the 16th an application for a zoning, for the zoning permit to build the fence was made prior to the memorialization of the resolution.  Prior to what most practitioners understand is the time period for running of the period of the appeal.  So unusual was the application, apparently, that the Zoning Officer denied it initially, recognizing that the quickness of the application.  The [...] had to weigh in and authorize the issuance of the permit with the proviso that it’s at [Defendant’s] own risk.  So rather than come to the Court and say, we’re going to – we’ve got this ruling from the [...], we’re going to need some relief from your order so we can put a fence up, the [Defendant] raced to the Zoning Officer, obtained a permit for a fence, at their own risk, prior to the filing of the resolution or the memorialization of the resolution.  The Court recognizes this for what this is, another attempt to stretch the scope of the Court’s ruling and test the Court’s rulings in this matter.  The Court has issued its rulings, these rulings may be disagreed with by the [Defendant].  Ultimately the Appellate Division will determine, whether the order should be vacated or not.  But while it’s in effect it should be followed.  While it’s in effect, if a party seeks to violate it, which clearly a fence across this property violates the easement, the parties should seek at least some remedial action by this Court indicating, at least until the memorialization of the resolution is filed, and the parties decide whether they’re going to appeal, to maintain the status quo.  (Da2T 35:22-38:25)
[brief] A traffic stop is a seizure under both constitutions.  *Arizona v. Johnson*, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); *State v. Scriven*, 226 N.J. 20, 33 (2016).  To be constitutionally reasonable, the stop must be based on law enforcement’s “reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense. ”  *State v. Dunbar*, 229 N.J. 521, 533 (2017) (quoting *Scriven*, 226 N.J. at 33-34).  During a traffic stop, “a police officer may make ordinary inquiries incident to [the] stop, . . . such as checking the driver’s license, verifying whether the driver has any outstanding warrants, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. ”  *Ibid.* (cleaned up).  Officers may broaden those inquiries if “the circumstances ‘give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense. ’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *State v. Dickey*, 152 N.J. 468, 479-80 (1998)).  In New Jersey, the reasonableness of an investigative detention following a routine traffic stop is evaluated under the standard set out in *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
[brief] On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s March 25 Order denying the Motion to Compel (the “Motion for Reconsideration”).  Pa6-7.  On April 19, 2024, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and attached a rider explaining its reasons.  Pa9-16.  In particular, the trial court reasoned that “Plaintiff’s simple disagreement with the Court’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s ability to compel [...]—a non- party located in Germany—for a deposition by way of a subpoena directed to [...] himself, rather than by way of deposition notice issued to counsel for Defendants does not demonstrate that the ‘interest of justice’ requires the Court to change its decision. ”  Pa15.  The trial court also noted that it did not conclude that Plaintiff was not entitled to depose [...]—only that Plaintiff was required to seek the deposition through subpoena.  Pa15-16.  In fact, the trial court even ordered the deposition to take place in New Jersey or another convenient state.  Pa15-16.  D.  Plaintiff Seeks Leave to Appeal the Trial Court Orders
[brief] But it should do so only “when necessary to bring the agency’s action into conformity with its delegated authority[.]”  *Herrmann*, 192 N.J. at 20 (internal citations omitted).  In other words, a reviewing court should alter the penalty only where “such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness. ”  *Id.* at 29 (citing *In re Polk*, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)).  In New Jersey, correctional police officers are sworn law enforcement officers and held to a higher standard of conduct than other public employees.
[brief] Id. at 1148 (quoting State ex rel. Bartlett v. Miller, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)).  [...] turned to dictionary definitions of “news” and “media” and held that one touchstone of “news media” is whether information conveyed “would be considered newsworthy. ”  [...] saw “no basis to conclude that an online repository containing defendants’ daily or weekly submission of interest rate reset data would be considered . . . newsworthy. ”  Id. at 1149 (quoting Silbersher v. Allergan Inc., 506 F. Supp. 3d 772, 806 (N.D. Cal. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 46 F.4th 991 (9th Cir. 2022)).  [...] then considered the structure of the public disclosure bar and, in particular, the fact that the statute limits disclosure to particular channels, just like the NJFCA.  [...] concluded that, “[i]f the interest rate data here were considered a disclosure by ‘news media’ simply because [...] is a publicly available website, it would effectively swallow the fora limitations of [the California False Claims Act].”  Id. at 1149.  [...] also consulted federal FCA cases interpreting the term “news media. ”  In doing so, it squarely rejected the notion that “all publicly available websites are news media. ”  Id. at 1150-51 (cleaned-up).  [...] held that “while the Internet has certainly expanded the meaning of ‘news media’ to include certain information publicly available online, it does not include the [[...] Portal]. ”  Id.  This Court should reach the same result here.
[brief] It is imperative that this Court recognizes the significance of this strategic decision and the appropriateness of applying preclusion in this context.  The ruling by [...] in the companion case, affirming the validity of Ordinances 5-23 and 7-23, is pivotal and binding in the context of this litigation.  This scenario exemplifies a classic case for the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.  Collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating issues that have been conclusively determined in a previous lawsuit, as established in *In Re Docteroff*, 133 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 1997) and further supported by *Allen v. McCurry*, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).  See also *Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey*, 316 N.J. Super. 487, 506 (App. Div. 1998), for the criteria to determine if collateral estoppel should be invoked.
[brief] “Conversely, there is evidence that … evaluating remorse via demeanor is particularly problematic across racial and cultural divides and where the defendant is a juvenile, mentally ill, or taking psychotropic drugs. ”  Bandes, \textit{Remorse}, Vol. 8, at 15.  In addition to failing to take into account [...]’s apologies and otherwise misapplying factor (3), the court failed to reconcile its finding under aggravating factor (3), that [...] was likely to reoffend, with its finding under mitigating factor (7), that, at age 26, he had a good prior record.
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION (CRIMINAL), MONMOUTH COUNTY SAT BELOW: Honorable [...], J.S.C., Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a Jury BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]  [...], 041202006 Assistant Prosecutor Director, Appellate Section Of Counsel and On the Brief email: [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... ii COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................. 1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................. 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DETECTIVES APPROPRIATELY RESPONDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUESTS FOR LEGAL ADVICE ........ 7 POINT II ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT’S ENTIRE MIRANDA STATEMENT WAS LAWFUL ..................... 14 POINT III THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS OF DEFENDANT DID NOT CAUSE PLAIN ERROR ............
[brief] (P-59.)  Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded their causes of action to withstand a motion to dismiss.  Specifically, Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises went beyond merely being the criminal activities of third parties over which Defendants had no control.  Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that the illegal, large makeshift liquor concession stand was a dangerous condition on public property, which lured residents and the general public to the Subject Premises like moths to a flame, and enticed them to become intoxicated in public, which often resulted in fighting and similar mayhem.  Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that Defendants ignored the presence of the illegal, large makeshift liquor for several months before [...] was murdered.  Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor stand, which Defendants either discovered or should have discovered in the course of surveilling and maintaining the Subject Premises.  Thus, Defendants are not automatically entitled to immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. (“TCA”), and a jury should be allowed to decide whether Plaintiffs have satisfied all of the elements of their claims after Plaintiffs have engaged in discovery.
[brief] The real-time effect of the resentencing court’s imposition of consecutive terms was to reduce [...]’s parole ineligibility from 46 years and 9 months to 42 years and 9 months – a sentence that once more amounts to effective life without parole.  Thus, [...] is entitled to a new resentencing hearing and the imposition of a sentence that affords him a meaningful opportunity for release based on the resentencing court’s own finding that he is clearly capable of rehabilitation and has made tremendous strides towards it.
[brief] [U]pon learning that [their] initial conduct would likely cause harm …. [[...]] … never made an attempt to lessen the obvious ramifications of [their] action[s].  And as I set forth in my opinion on the Wilfs reaction to various litigation events, [[...]] essentially tried to increase the monetary value of his position, depending on what was happening in the court room. ⁴  So it certainly did appear and I found that he was very much aware of the problem that he had created for his partners … there wasn’t any change in conduct except to change the various ways that the Wilfs took money out of the partnership so that they would be less compromised in their position or so that the takings would be less detectable….  So there wasn’t any change in conduct once they learned that the initial conduct would cause harm, did cause harm, and that their initial conduct was not correct and improper ….  (242T204:2-207:1)
[brief] [...] had a clear understanding of the implications of the contract language.  The clear and unequivocal language should be enforced, especially when sophisticated parties are involved.  Azurak v. Corp. Prop. Inv., 175 N.J. 110 (2003) III.  The Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to [...] and the settlement of plaintiff’s claims.  [...] settled the claims against them with the plaintiff on May 30, 2024.  [...] did not dismiss their crossclaims for defense and indemnification against [...].  As such, [...] appeared for trial on June 10, 2024, to monitor the trial and assist with producing witnesses.  The parties initially met with [...], J.S.C., in chambers at which point [...] informed that plaintiff settled with defendant/respondent, however, their crossclaims against [...] remained viable.  Further, [...] informed the court below that it intended to file a post-trial motion seeking defense and indemnification from [...].  Plaintiff and [...] then consented to the court below deciding [...]’s motion compelling defense and indemnification.  1T 5:20-25 and 6:1-9.  Appellant has now placed artificial emphasis on one line from a lengthy oral argument, in which a concession was allegedly made by [...] that the contract was not Azurak compliant.  In doing so, [...] intentionally disregards [...]’s complete accurate position at oral argument that the indemnity provisions were Azurak compliant in favor of [...].  However, based on the totality of the argument contained within the transcript it is clear that [...] maintained throughout that it was entitled to indemnification.