ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is evaluated under the standards set forth in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  In *Strickland*, the United States Supreme Court explained that a “convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require a reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. ”  *Id.* at 687.  “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  . .  Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. ”  *Id.*; see *State v. Fritz*, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting *Strickland* test and “recogniz[ing] the soundness and efficacy of both the substance and formulation” of that test in defining state constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel).  This matter is akin to the First Circuit decision in *Flores-Rivera v. United States*, No. 18-1963, 2021 WL 5027508, at *1 (1st Cir. 2021).  In *Flores-Rivera*, appellant was granted a new trial, by successfully arguing ineffective assistance of counsel under *Strickland*, after her appellate counsel failed to raise a *Brady* claim on direct appeal.  After a guilty verdict, but prior to sentencing, defense counsel learned that the government had failed to turn over three pieces of evidence—including a letter from a cooperating witness and notes reflecting communication between witnesses—that could have been used to impeach the testimony of the government’s cooperating witnesses.  *Id.* at *2*.  In granting a new trial, the court stated:  The government led with its chin at trial by presenting a [drug] case predicated almost exclusively on the testimony of cooperating witnesses with little, if any corroboration.  The withheld notes could be said to show [the one cooperator] coaching the other two cooperators.  And the notes strongly suggested that the cooperators had lied at trial when they denied coordinating their testimony [. . . . and] the withheld letter ‘provid[ed] a powerful tool in the hands of any good trial counsel to call into question the credibility of both the key witness and, implicitly, the lead prosecutor. ’  Id. at *4 (citations omitted).  To the extent that the Court finds that defense counsel improperly failed to request, discover, or otherwise obtain [...]’ falsely Sworn Statement, [...] was deprived of constitutionally effective assistance of counsel.  That deprivation, by and of itself, warrants a new trial.  **Conclusion**
[brief] As pointed out by [...] at the Oral Argument on the Motions, her concern was that “this is like where we talk about doctor shopping (in workers’ compensation cases) or forum shopping . . . in terms of finding a new judge because you believe I might decide one way because I was involved in the bill . . . .” (1T25-4 to 10).  Quite simply, judge-shopping does not have any place in determining a recusal motion.
[brief] [...]’s sloppy business practices, repeated failures through either neglect or design to produce any direct evidence of damages at all, much less to a reasonable certainty, inexorably lead to the dismissal on summary judgment of its non-meritorious claims against [...].  There is no genuine issue to be left to the trier of fact, as no reasonable person can look at [...]’s threadbare proofs and determine that [...] has presented any evidence of the “fact” of damages with the fifteen (15) pages of unsupported documentation: the two (2) invoices are unsigned; there are no receipts or any other documentation to prove that the thirteen (13) checks were for purchases of the relevant and very specific material contemplated in the Subject Contract; there is no acknowledgement of delivery or receipt of the alleged replacement materials; and there is no communication between [...] and these vendors negotiating price terms, delivery status, and release of the material.
[brief] See, Barr v.  Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 1997).  Although the Trial Court found the entity [...] responsible for any child/person on the Sixth Street courtyard as shown in the photographs, [...] admitted many of his photos did not show any actual violation.  It was also undisputed and admitted by [...] that since the Court's order Defendant's buses no longer drop "a couple hundred children" at the Sixth Street courtyard.  (1T125:18-22; 1T126:6; 1T141;143)  While the Court considered this to be a "second violation based on the same activity," the Appellate Division a short time later vacated that alleged first violation which was presented at a hearing on February 14, 2018 hearing.  (Da692)  That reversal was based on Point Six (Da746) of Defendant’s Appellate Brief in that matter which argued that the Court's June 27, 2017 Order created an uncontrolled and dangerous situation.  The same holds true now.  Moreover, the Court does not cite to anything [...] did intentionally which allows people to walk through the courtyard, because there is nothing in the record to support such a finding.  Nothing [...] testified to involved the Defendant intentionally allowing children to walk through the courtyard.  Instead, the evidence undisputed by Plaintiff was that the Defendant's buses stopped dropping students at the Sixth Street courtyard to comply with the Court’s Order.  The Trial Court’s ruling on the Fence Violation also confirms the impossible situation following the June 27, 2017 Order.  The Trial Court found [...] did not comply with the “intent" of the June 27, 2017 Order and therefore it was intentional.  (2T37:10)  The two Orders entered on February 21, 2019 as well as the two Orders entered on May 29, 2019 in the amounts of $11,257.50 (Da969) and $32,966.60 (Da971) should be vacated.
[brief] Review whether some of the requests have already been addressed and/or responded to.  | .5 hrs. | $190.00 | $23,446.00 | | 36| 7/14/22 |  Review Supplemental RFP documents and draft email with comments to [...] regarding . . . [redacted].  | 1 hrs. | $380.00 | $23,826.00 | | 37| 7/18/23 |  Review draft motion from [...] regarding discovery extension.  Email same with edits.  | .3 hrs. | $114.00 | $23,940.00 | | 38| 7/20/22 |
[brief] i.  Only the Estoppel Certificate was to be Delivered, not an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  If the Delivered Certificate Disclosed Default, it was not an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate and Termination was Allowed.  (Answering Defendant’s Argument at Point I(i) (Pb10-13.)  Defendant’s first assigned error under Point I argues the PSA permits cancellation only if Defendant fails to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at closing.  (Pb10-13.)  However, the whole of the argument is based on a complete misreading of the PSA.  Reading the PSA – as written – undeniably proves the termination was allowed and summary judgment properly granted.
[brief] ” (Aa14).  The Trial Court was clearly taken aback by [...] extreme conduct, as it is rare to see a minority shareholder case involving a physical assault by a male majority member against a female minority member.  However, the Trial Court erred by requiring Plaintiff to show that [...] and [...] engaged in “equal” misconduct.  [...] and [...] were complicit, controlled the finances of [...] to their own benefit, and turned a willful blind eye to the wrongful ouster of Plaintiff.  This evidence was more than sufficient to show [...] and [...] are personally liable.
[brief] (Pa15-Pa17).  [...]’s Subpoena was served on [...] by personal service on July 21, 2023.  (Da259).  On July 21, 2023, notice was issued scheduling these matters for trial on November 29, 2023 (Pa18)  On September 21, 2023, counsel for [...] filed two motions for summary judgment seeking to vacate the inter-company arbitration awards in this matter.
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[brief] Trial court’s decision to call off the hearing that it had scheduled in the January 3, 2024 order and decide the motion on papers would have been legally sustainable only if the trial court were to deny defendant’s request for the court to take custody of plaintiff’s passport in the January 12, 2024 order which indeed would have been the right decision because there was nothing before the court that lent credence to defendant’s claim of plaintiff’s intent to abscond.  Further, the judge was aware that the plaintiff had filed an appeal against several provisions (Pa1355-1417) of the Judgement of Divorce following the due process of law, which a prospective fugitive is unlikely to do.  Without the application of mind or law, the judge ordered the confiscation of the passports based merely on defendant's claim that plaintiff was a potential absconder.  Although the court granted relief to plaintiff from depositing his passport in its January 17 and January 26, 2024 orders conditional on deposit of $125,000, paragraph 9 of the January 12, 2024 continues to remain in effect as provided in the January 26, 2024 order – “The Court specifically enforces par. 9 of the January 12, 2024, Order and requires that the child's passport shall be deposited with the Court” (Pa1215).  I do not know whether defendant complied with the said provision and deposited the child’s passport with the court.  Assuming she did, the trial court has unlawfully and without good cause taken possession of my daughter’s passport.  In conclusion of the instant argument, I raise the following question before this court – Are the liberty interests in the jurisdiction of New Jersey so tenuous that all it takes for an individual to be deprived of the custody of his passport is an unsubstantiated allegation of intent-to-abscond by a former spouse in a court filing?  I hope this court answers the question posed resoundingly in the negative and directs the motion judge to return the child’s passport to the custodial parent immediately if the trial court has custody of the child’s passport.
[directive] The grand jury should inspect the draft indictment to ensure that it reflects its decision from the prior session.  vi.  The presenting attorney should ask the foreperson if there is a “true bill,” consistent with the deliberation instructions described in Section II.E.2.  vii.  If the foreperson places on the record that no majority of grand jurors found probable cause that the subject-officer committed a crime, then no criminal charges should be filed against the officer, and the result is a “no bill. ”  viii.  If the foreperson states that the grand jury wishes to amend the proposed indictment, the assigned prosecutor will then immediately make the alterations requested.  In the exceptional circumstances where a subject-officer has been charged by complaint prior to grand jury presentation, Section I.E, the presenting see supra attorney may forego the process outlined in subsections (i) to (v) above and instead present the grand jury with a draft indictment consistent with the charges contained in the complaint.  In such cases, the grand jury shall vote according to the process outlined in subsections (vi) to (vii) above.  B. notifications.
[brief] Only collection costs of $1,170.00 charged to [...] in 2010 (A248) (ultimately waived in 2012) was identified in 2016, as attorney fees allowed under foreclosure (A393).  Although Plaintiff never initiated a foreclosure, they were preparing to do so.  These fees, despite waiver, were sent to [...] by prior servicer [...], thus, [...] acquired in (wrongful) default.  Waiver does not negate cause of collection fees.  [...] placed [...]s in a trial period and assessed large capitalization/escrow shortages ([...]s did not escrow taxes or insurance and timely paid), [...]/[...] logs, A808- A810.  [...] reflects disbursement during “trial period,” A813.  [...]s were not informed of any trial period, and were informed by [...] that fees include forced placed insurance, property inspections, and broker-price opinions – all used in foreclosure.  [...], who could not locate [...]s loan and [...] were extremely concerned as to prior (erroneous) reported default (Comptroller of Currency) and fees despite fact that [...]s could prove all payments.  No loan could be located at [...], A211-231.
[brief] The Commission has clearly and unequivocally addressed school board member social media use in a robust body of case law it inexplicably ignored in deciding this matter below.  In *Melnyk v. Fiel*, SEC Docket No. C64-18 (2019) (Ca269), cited by the parties and [...] (Ca027-29; Ca048), the Commission held:  Although Respondent argues that the statements attributed to her by Complainant were not made in her capacity as a Board member, and do not relate to her Board membership or to Board actions, the Commission finds that the statements on her Facebook page are clearly linked to her Board membership (and candidacy).  Respondent’s Facebook page is clearly marked with the banner, “Re-Elect [...] to the [...],” but does not appear to have a disclaimer noting that the statements are her own and unrelated to the Board.  Thus, it is reasonable for a member of the public, such as Complainant, to perceive the statements as being made by Respondent in her capacity as a Board member.  *Id.* at 4.  The Commission in *Melnyk* went on to explain that such a disclaimer would need to be very prominent in order to counteract the presumption that a school board member who holds themself out as a board member on their personal social media page – by posting a campaign banner from that page – may be perceived as speaking from their official position:
[directive] 4.6.4  In cases involving domestic violence, if the decision is made to apply for a complaint- warrant, the application shall clearly state that the offense involves domestic violence, and shall include any relevant information contained in the Domestic Violence Central Registry (e.g., concerning prior issuance or violation of a restraining order).  See subsection 4.2.3 (requiring query of Domestic Violence Central Registry) and Section 5.4 (discussing factual information that may be provided to the court in a Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report prepared as part of the process for applying for a complaint-warrant).  Whether the offense is charged by complaint-warrant or complaint-summons, the victim shall, in accordance with the requirements of the Domestic Violence Procedures Manual, be informed how to apply for a restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.  This requirement to inform the victim shall not be construed to preclude the officer or prosecutor from seeking imposition of a no-contact or other appropriate restraint as a condition of release on a complaint-warrant as may be required pursuant to subsections 4.6.3 or 6.2.3.  Impact of Mandatory Incarceration on Sexual Assault Victims.
[directive] Click the link below to reivew the full Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures this year.  Fill in the information below for each case opened within IA Number, Dates, Officer, and Discipline are free-text fields.  ALL OTHER FIELDS HAVE A PRE-DEFINED RESPONSE LIST.  THE LENGTH OF CASE FIELD WILL CALCULATE AUTOMATICALLY AND FLAG CASES OVER 180 DAYS.  Click on each cells and click on the dropdown menu that appears to view all response options.  NOTE:
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In 2012, [...] installed a 16-inch natural gas (wholesale) distribution pipeline on Holmdel Road, in Holmdel Township, Monmouth County.  At that time, it installed what it inaccurately refers to as a “temporary regulator,” to depressurize gas from transport pressure to retail end-user pressures.  In the ordinary course, depressurizing natural gas results in a chilling effect.  This current regulator does not have a heater, but remains in reliable service and can provide safe and reliable service for many years to come.  Also in 2012, [...] purchased the large combustion heater it proposes to install, which is the subject of this proceeding, in a non-competitive sole-source procurement.  [...] twice applied to the [...] (ZB) for variances to install the combustion regulator, at two different locations.  The ZB denied both applications.  Thereafter, [...] twice petitioned the [...] ([...]) pursuant to a provision of the Municipal Land Use Law that authorizes the [...] to override local zoning decisions if the proposed facility is “reasonably necessary” for utility service.  The [...] assigned the petitions to the [...] ([...]).  [...] ultimately favored one location and petition, for [...], and pursued that case.  After motions and incomplete discovery, virtual hearings were held.  After briefs and a long delay, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Initial Decision (ID) approving the [...] petition for [...].
[brief] These rulings failed to adhere to Rule 1:7-4(a), which directs courts to “find the facts and state . . . conclusions of law . . . on every motion decided by a written order. ”  Ibid.  Courts analyzing the Rule have found that appellate review of a cursory order “is hampered by the absence of findings and a more complete record. ”  Foley, Inc.  v. Fevco, Inc., 379 N.J. Super. 574, 589 (App. Div. 2005). ”
[brief] ”  Instead, Appellants argue, [...] “merged” with [...] to form a single school district, not a consolidated school district.  Accordingly, “[t]here is no ‘[...]’ school district that could be a constituent district to [...]” or to [...].  (Ab18-23)  Appellants conclude that only the [...] Board of Education may act on behalf of the interests of the people of [...] regarding matters of public education.  In sum, Appellants contend that [...] now operates as a “merged” school district with [...] and has no educational governing body, legal status, or say in the future of its students’ education.
[brief] His actual deposition testimony was not presented at trial, or used on cross-examination, so it is not clear from the Trial Court record how his testimony differed.  No such alleged difference was called to the attention of the Trial Court.  As plaintiff notes, [...] did state at trial that at his deposition he testified he was not an owner or employee of [...].  3T40:21-23.  This was consistent with his trial testimony that he was not an owner and that technically he was not an employee, but a consultant.  See, e.g., 3T30:5-31:3; 3T40:24-41:10; 3T78:1-22.  Plaintiff also suggests that there was an inconsistency with deposition testimony about loans [...] made to [...], but she does not provide a relevant citation to the record.  Again, this alleged inconsistency was not presented at trial.  [...] did truthfully testify about loans he made to [...], which were eventually paid back with interest.  See, e.g., 3T79:2-18.  Moreover, even if this were not the case, “a witness who gives a prior inconsistent statement may well be believed by the factfinder when he testifies in court”, and such a funding is still entitled to deference.  New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. B.O., 438 N.J. Super. 373, 384 (App. Div. 2014).
[brief] Under both rules an error will not lead to reversal unless it is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  R. 2:10-2.  Thus, even though an alleged error was brought to the trial judge's attention, it will not be ground for reversal if it was "harmless error."  Harmless error will be disregarded by the appellate court, even where the judge is found to have abused his discretion in admitting evidence and failed to properly instruct the jury.  See *State v. Prall*, 231 N.J. 567, 581, 587-88(2018).  Here, as with "plain error," an error will be found "harmless" unless there is a reasonable doubt that the error contributed to the verdict.  This is true even if the error is of constitutional dimension.  *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 338 (1971); *State v. Slobodian*, 57 N.J. 18, 23 (1970).  *New Jersey Standards for Appellate Review*, [...], 2019.
[brief] In revelations, [...] did not confront [...] about his grand jury testimony concerning his observations of the December 8th, 2011, T-Mobile surveillance video depicting [...] and defendant entering the store and then in comes [...] locking the door behind himself (12T 42-20 to 23) which contradicts the T-Mobile video surveillance showing [...] and [...] entering the store, and in comes an unknown suspect with their hood up.  (Da 1)  However, she never questioned him about how he arrived to the conclusion that his notes (Da 2) indicated that South Brunswick charged the defendant with the December 19th, 2011 Radio Shack robbery (12T 143-9 to 14) when his notes indicated that defendant was questionable.  (Da 2)  When it was [...] and [...] that South Brunswick had charged.  (Da 3-4)  She never cross examined [...] about his testimony on June 5th, 2012 and April 29th, 2014, at the grand jury, that on January 12th, 2012, he observed [...] pointing a gun at defendant's head on the McDonald's video surveillance, (12T 31-22 to 23; 13T 25-20 to 21) but then at trial why did he change his testimony of not knowing what the object was [...] had in the McDonald's video.
[brief] See, e.g., *State v. Mann*, 203 N.J. --- ⁴  Additional out-of-state cases support the proposition that constricted pupils contribute to reasonable suspicion of impaired driving.  See, e.g., *State v. Stewart*, 340 P.3d 802, 807 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).  In addition, unpublished cases in New Jersey have similarly recognized that “constricted pupils” are an objective indication of impairment.  See, e.g., *State v. Cantalupo*, No. A-4142-16T2, 2019 WL 149654, at *8 (App. Div. Jan. 8, 2019); *State v. Mauro*, No. A-2085-09T3, 2011 WL 2307256, at *5 (App. Div. May 31, 2011).
[brief] Not winning or losing.  The State’s actions show they lost sight of this principle.  Finally, the third prong overwhelmingly militates in Appellant’s favor as [...]’s notes are material to Appellant’s case.  For two motions to suppress and a motion for reconsideration Appellant argued with conviction that the State exceeded the bounds of the search warrant by entering his apartment by breaching its locked entrance.  The State, in response, ostracized this theory by perpetuating a fraud.  The State had the Court believe that Appellant’s front door was unlocked and open knowing this was false.  The State further attacked Appellant’s theory by suggesting Appellant’s investigator’s opinion in his moving papers that a Halligan tool was used to pry the door was malarkey.  The State even attacked Appellant’s landlord when she testified that the police damaged the doors in her property suggesting that the damage could have been caused at some other time.  During all these attacks the State maintained proof positive in [...]’s notes that each claim Appellant made was true.  [...]’s notes could not be any more material to Appellant’s defense.  [...]’s notes are Appellant’s defense.  [...]’s notes are undeniably favorable to Appellant.