ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] T59-13-25.  Appellant’s counsel expressly agreed with the Trial Court’s holding on this issue on the record.  Id.  Despite this, Appellant now argues for the first time that the Trial Court erred in failing to address the merits of his Cross-Motion.  Not only was the Trial Court correct that it could not hear argument for vacatur of an action not presently before it, Appellant’s argument should also be rejected as it is raised for the first time on appeal.  Appellant failed to preserve any such argument below when the Trial Court specifically asked, “[d]o you have any thoughts on that, any concerns about that approach, any disagreement with that conclusion?” to which Appellant responded, “[n]o, Your Honor, we’ll go back to [...]. ”  T59-21-25.  See Sch. All. Ins. Fund v. Fama Const. Co., 353 N.J. Super. 1, 3 (App. Div. 2002) (“As to the last point, we note that it was not raised before the trial court.  We decline to address it for the first time on appeal.  . . .”); Kamaratos v. Palias, 360 N.J. Super. 76, 88 (App. Div. 2003) (“First, [the claim] was never raised before the trial court and, thus, the trial court had no opportunity to consider it.  It is not appropriate to raise such an issue for the first time on appeal. ”).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Unjust enrichment requires [...] to establish a benefit conferred upon [...], and expected remuneration due to [...]’s receipt of the benefit.  The Board obtained no benefit whatsoever for [...] not working, so there was no expected remuneration for not working.  Count Two of the Counterclaim for an alleged “Unjust Enrichment” should be dismissed because [...] does not satisfy the elements for a prima facie case of unjust enrichment.
[directive] Feasible.  Reasonably capable of being accomplished or carried out, given the totality of the circumstances, in a manner that maintains the safety of the public and officers.  Imminent Danger.  Threatened actions or outcomes that are immediately likely to occur during an encounter absent action by the officer.  The period of time involved is dependent on the circumstances and facts evident in each situation and is not the same in all situations.  The threatened harm does not have to be instantaneous, for example, imminent danger may be present even if a subject is not at that instant pointing a weapon at the officer, but is carrying a weapon and running for cover to gain a tactical advantage.
[brief] 3,12,13,19,20 R. 4:42-9(a) ..............................................................................................................................  20 R.P.C. 1.5(a) .............................................................................................................................  2,20  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 ..................................................................................................................  12 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b) ..............................................................................................................  11 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1b(1) ..........................................................................................................  12 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 ..................................................................................................................  17,18  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] At trial, the jury heard from Plaintiff’s weather expert [...].  (3T)  The National Weather Service is the only government source that issue any winter storm watches, warnings, advisories, special weather statements for Basking Ridge.  (3T53:23-54:1).  In this case, the National Weather Service issued a winter storm warning, which began right after midnight.  (3T54:1-3).  He told the jury, that on March 7, 2018, in Basking Ridge, the rain transitioned over to light snow after 12 a.m. (3T53:10-12).  Throughout the morning hours there was a light snowfall and the temperature was about 32 or 33 degrees and since it was early March, the annual sun was still pretty high.  (3T53:16-19).  From 12:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., snow came down heavy, at least two inches per hour.  (3T54:6-8).  After 5:00 p.m., the snow began to wind down.  (3T54:13-14).  The storm began to pull away and the snow tapered off for good, meaning nothing was happening between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. (3T54:14-16).  At 8:50 p.m., on March 7, 2018, the National Weather Service cancelled the winter storm warning as the snowfall was done.  (3T54:16-20).  The last snowfall was almost 12 hours before [...]’s fall.  (3T:61:20-62)
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English 뉴저지 주 사법부  New Jersey Judiciary
[brief] [...] initially attempted to serve process at non-existent addresses, (Da52, 5 Ocean Report; Da55 Second 5 Ocean Report), including one just down the road from [...] (Da43).  A server was sent to the non-existent [...] address on February 28, 2021 (Da44), and again on March 16, 2021 (Da49).  That order was evidently placed notwithstanding the fact that the process server’s main office had already “located the house owned by [...] [a]s [...]” (Da43).  [...] directed its process server to [...] on March 19, 2021 (Da57, Process Server Report), which again resulted in a contact that again pointed [...] back to [...] (Da58, Process Server Report).  Despite repeatedly being directed to Kiely’s actual residence (Da43, Da58, Da63).  The Plaintiff ultimately obtained an Order for substituted service by certified and regular mail to the [...] address (Da6).
[brief] (See Id. at 44).  Additionally, the fact that [...]’s “income in the four years preceding the PSA was not significantly greater than [[...]’s]” further undermined any alimony claim.  (Id. at 49).  She had sufficient earning capacity in the casino gaming industry and further derived “de-facto” support from [...] in their post-judgment attempt at reconciliation.  (Id. at 48).  More to the point, the trial court found [...] was aware of the parties’ financial standing:  [[...]] was aware of the assets and debts of the parties, their respective income, her standard of living, and the remaining factors of the equitable distribution and alimony statutes at the time she executed the MMA and PSA.  [Id. at. 50-51].  The trial court correctly ruled that [...] failed to prove substantive unconscionability:  Under these circumstances, the court cannot find that defendant has met her burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the PSA was patently unfair in that no reasonable person not acting under compulsion or out of necessity would accept its terms.  [Id. at 44].  B.
[brief] After being questioned by [...], [...] spoke to [...] and told him that she did not know the other occupants in the car and that she was driving for [...] and stopped at the gas station when [...] offered her money to give them a ride.  (Da74 04:11:35 to 04:12:20; 1T14-1 to 14-12)  [...] testified that [...] lowered her voice and leaned in close to speak into his ear and appeared nervous.  (1T14-1 to 14-15)  Officers began individually removing and searching the passengers.  (1T15-15 to 15-18)  No drugs or weapons were found on [...] or any other passenger.  (1T16-16 to 17-19)  When all the passengers were removed, [...] and [...] began a search of the interior of the car.
[brief] The Bencosme Court stated: the express language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 does not support plaintiff’s request for an exemption from the statutory bar for those that claim to be victims of insurance fraud.  Recognizing such an exemption would be inconsistent with the Act's purpose of reducing auto insurance costs and would undermine one of the original goals of the statute…  Bencosme, at *12.  So, even if [...] made incorrect determinations about appellant/plaintiff [...]’s coverage, the material facts for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 are that he resided in New Jersey and principally garaged his vehicles here; he had a North Carolina policy which did not provide coverage required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  There is no “exemption for individuals who acted in good faith to obtain insurance but failed to do so” under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.
[brief] The Arbitrator’s decision and findings thus rest entirely on his mistaken conclusion of law that [...] could not set the standard of performance for an employee who cannot work.  [...]’s counsel explained the fatal flaw in the Arbitrator’s decision during oral argument, distinguishing the difference between an arbitrator’s interpretation of a just cause standard on the one hand, and the creation of a new work rule which violates the employer’s prerogatives under a collective bargaining agreement, on the other.  Counsel stated on the record:
[brief] The rationale for the AP’s line of questioning was that [...] had told the police in her second statement that she gave after she knew her sister had died that defendant told [...] that he had thoughts about “killing,” not “hurting,” his family.  (7T155-22 to 166-19).  The judge understood what the AP was trying to do: “I see the difficulty with the witness. ” (7T156-7 to 8).  It was apparent to the trial judge that [...] had some sort of disability, as he was unsure whether 50-year old [...] could read her own statement to the police.  (7T118-23, 168-20 to 169-2; 17T77-16 to 19).  The judge further noted that [...], “was struggling emotionally with testifying about damaging information she previously supplied to law enforcement days after the killings[.]” (17T76-20 to 25).
[brief] Defendants’ Gamesmanship of the Affidavit of Merit Statute Is Accentuated by Their Conduct of Waiting One-Hundred and Twenty (120) Days Before Filing Their Motion to Dismiss, Rather Than Filing Said Motion after Sixty (60) Days.  To briefly summarize, The Affidavit of Merit is required to be submitted within sixty (60) days of the filing of defendant’s answer or, for good cause shown, within an additional sixty-day period, for a total of 120 days from the date of defendant’s answer.  See Douglass v. Obade, 359 N.J. Super. 159, 160–61 (App. Div.), cert. den. 177 N.J. 575 (2003).
[brief] Tenant’s confusion, whether We pause only briefly to address Tenant’s offensive contention that [...] was “neither impartial nor open-minded about the case”.  (Db23).  This insulting allegation is both factually inaccurate and disrespectful to the Court.  Indeed, [...] did not pre-judge this case or “rule[] out the offset argument without first looking at the Lease”, as Tenant claims.  (Db23).  Rather, at trial, [...] asked counsel to “[e]xplain to me this fit up provision.  What, what is that all about?” (1T14-7 to 1T14-8).  Counsel then set forth, in detail, their respective client’s interpretation of Section 4.02, following which [...] requested, then reviewed, extensive post-trial submissions, including the Lease, before ruling that Tenant was not entitled to offset the Rent Arrears under Section 4.02.
[brief] 4.  Court erred in Oct. ’22 Order, par. 1d, & Mar. 7, 2023, par. 3, since it should not have approved prior Trust payments for [...]’s $15,022.72 legal fees that needed to be paid back to Trust.  [...] & my Exceptions proved none of $10,902 [...]’s work was required if [...] had agreed to readily achievable Settlement, nor approved by [...], as Co-Trustee, for payment, nor submitted for Court approval prior to Trust payment, as per Mar. 25, ’22 Ruling (P-069-22).
[brief] (Pa246-262).  At no time did [...] advise or direct [...] in the design, construction, or installation of the system.  [...] only manufactured the panels which were sold by [...] to [...] to be integrated into a system that was designed by [...]’s own engineer.  [...]’s original proposal called for six downspouts located in support columns to allow for proper drainage.  (Pa273-74 at 7).  Despite [...]’s recommendation, [...] insisted that its engineer change the design and remove two interior columns containing downspouts to allow for an open space plan.  (Pa251; Pa255; Pa260; Pa273-74 at 7).  After [...] installed the louvered roof, [...] claimed it sustained damages due to leaks and improper drainage.  (Pa75).  However, [...] knew that it was responsible for providing the structural support system on which [...] would install the louvered roof.  (Pa246-262; Pa268 at 5; Pa273 at 6).  [...]’s engineer, not [...], was responsible for designing an adequate support system that would allow for proper drainage of water and connection to the underground stormwater system.  (Pa225; Pa246-262; Pa268 at 5; Pa273 at 6).  [...] never provided any evidence to substantiate its claim that it suffered financial damages as a result of the allegedly defective louvered system.  After the discovery period ended in this matter, [...] and [...] filed Motions for Summary Judgment (Pa199; Pa235).
[brief] Deland v. Twp. of Berkeley Heights, 361 N.J. Super. 1, 18-19 (App. Div. 2003)  21, 22, 49  Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).............................25  Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 357 (2007)..34  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gem Vacuum Stores, Inc., 36 N.J. Super. 234, 237 (App Div. 1955) ...........................................................................................................21 Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Plan. Bd., 409 N.J. Super. 330, 337 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................................26 Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 236 N.J. Super. 584, 588 (Law. Div. 1989).................................................................27 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 221 N.J. 1 (2015) (“Mount Laurel IV”) ........................................... 4, 30, 47 In re Matter of the Application of Twp. of S. Brunswick..............................................31 Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023) ..................................... 33, 34, 35, 36 Marilyn Manson, Inc. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 971 F. Supp. 875, 883 (D.N.J. 1997) ..................................................................................................................................................32 Mount Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C., 188 N.J. 531, 533 (2006) ........ 23, 49 Mount Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C., 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005)
[brief] (Da128–129.)  In 2019, [...] appeared before the Disciplinary Investigator [...] and stated on the record that he had made “misstatements” to [...] in the hearing in the matrimonial action *Fou v. Fou*.  [...] further stated to Disciplinary Investigator [...] that “he should have said . . . and he should have said . . . ” before the investigator.  (Da134–135.)
[brief] “Generally, the accuracy of GPS devices is accepted. ”  State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 570 (App. Div. 2017).  Although New Jersey --- 4 McDuffie involved a claim that disclosure of detailed information regarding the GPS device, which police sought to protect from disclosure, should have been ordered so the defendants could have retained an expert to challenge the device’s accuracy.  presently has no published case directly on point, a number of jurisdictions who have addressed this issue have concluded that geolocation/GPS data is widely considered so reliable that expert testimony is not required for its admission at trial.
[brief] Even with all this, the New Motion Judge concluded that [...] had testified that the outcome would have been the same if [...] had been delivered earlier.  At his deposition, defendants posed hypotheticals to [...] about what might have happened if [...] had been delivered earlier.  Defendants asked [...] to consider what the outcome would have been if [...] had been born at various points earlier than she did.  [...] testified that a delivery 25 minutes earlier, at 10:02 p.m. – within the 10 to 15-minute window of the standard of care – would have changed the outcome.  [69:16-23].  Frankly, that’s the only opinion that matters.  At other points, Defendants asked [...] his thoughts about what was “more likely than not the outcome” if [...] had been delivered at earlier points.  Manifestly, [...] said it was impossible to know; those were not the facts.  Still, because it was a deposition, [...] indulged the line of questioning.  In response to the questioning, [...] stated that a poor outcome became increasingly likely as early as 20 minutes earlier, or by 10:07 p.m. – five minutes later than the time fixed by the standard of care.  At that time [...] had already gone 19 minutes without proper oxygen access.  But [...] could not, and would not, say that to a reasonable degree of medical probability.  Instead, he firmly stated that it was not possible to know.  Tellingly again, Defendants did not ask [...] whether he considered “more likely than not” the same as a “reasonable degree of medical probability. ”  Plainly he did not, because when asked about a delivery at 10:07 p.m., he insisted that there was no way to know.  In contrast, he observed that the actual delay in this case – 39 minutes, which is really the only time that matters – was certain to cause [...]’s injury.
[brief] Additionally, by the plain language of the CNAs, the parties intended for employees to accrue “terminal leave” by way of accumulating unused sick time, which the employees would be entitled to upon retirement as a lump sum.  (74a).  Defendants' revocation of Plaintiffs' previously vested property rights was a constitutional violation of the Takings Clause. \(^7\) i.  **Plaintiffs [...] and [...] both retired before Defendants' initial effective date of March 15, 2017.**
[brief] In addition, the court substantively erred in finding any need for deterrence given that the court found that [...] was unlikely to reoffend.  The court relied on [...]’s conduct in the four years from the offense date and his history of stable employment to find that [...]’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur and that Richard’s character and attitude demonstrate that he is unlikely to reoffend.  (3T 12-11 to 13-1)  With no or very low risk of reoffense, there is no need to impose a higher prison sentence in order to deter a defendant.  Thus, in light of the court’s findings, the court erred if it believed there was any need for specific deterrence in this case.  Insofar as the court here considered general deterrence as an aggravating factor, “general deterrence has relatively insignificant penal value. ”  Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 79.  Moreover, general deterrence alone, without being tethered to any need for specific deterrence, should not constitute an aggravating factor because it is present in every single case.  Yet finding an aggravating factor in every case is a clear violation of our sentencing law.  State v. McFarlane, 224 N.J. 458, 465 (2016) (“[E]ach ‘[d]efendant is entitled to [an] individualized consideration during sentencing. ’”) (quoting State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 122 (2014)) (alterations in McFarlane).  Thus, the court here erred in finding aggravating factor 9.  The court’s total failure to explain the basis of its finding of an aggravating factor, and its improper finding of that inapplicable aggravating factor renders this sentence excessive.  Had the court engaged in an appropriate and legally supported balancing of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, the court would have recognized that the five-year sentence requested by defense counsel was the only fair sentence.  Thus, this Court should remand for resentencing.  CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth in this brief, the stop of the defendant and search of the defendant’s vehicle were illegal, and this Court should reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.
[brief] On March 9, 2022, [...]’s counsel served a written notice and demand to Appellants’ counsel by ordinary mail and e-mail, (i) stating [...]’s belief that Appellants’ Motion was filed in violation of R. 1:4-8(a), (ii) setting forth the specific bases for that belief, (iii) demanding that the motion be withdrawn, and (iv) giving notice that an application for sanctions would be made within a reasonable time thereafter if the motion was not withdrawn within 28 days of the notice and demand.  [Pa3394]  [...]’s counsel again contacted Appellants’ counsel by e-mail and telephone on March 21, 2022, but received no response.  [Pa3394, Pa3397]  Accordingly, pursuant to R. 1:4-8(b), the 28-day withdrawal period was deemed to have been waived.  [...]’s Cross-Motion described the specific conduct alleged to have violated R. 1:4-8(a), supported by a certification attaching the March 9, 2022 notice and demand.  [Pa3392, Pa3394]  It is thus undisputed that Appellants and their counsel were aware of the facts giving rise to [...]’s Cross-Motion.
[directive] _ 5.  ____  A review hearing shall be held on _ 6.  ____  Reports to the court and counsel shall be due on _ 7. of The NORI acquittee's maximum period commitment or supervision under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 8.  ___ ___ years and months and terminates on [fill in the date]  1s of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the Court of within two (2) days its signing.
[brief] As originally presented, [...] proposed to include elevators in only Buildings A (clubhouse building) and B (320-unit midrise building).  As recited in the Board’s Resolution [...], dated December 12, 2022, ¶21 at Pa114 (And similarly in the Board’s Resolution [...], dated January 23, 2023, ¶6):  During the course of the public hearings, the Board and the Applicant had discussions about the inclusion of ambulance stretcher compliant passenger elevators in buildings “C”, “D” and “E”.  In that regard, the Board received testimony and commentary from various Township personnel recommending and otherwise requesting that such elevators be included in building “C”, “D” and “E” for the benefit, health, safety and welfare of the residents and of the first responders; the Board shared such concerns.  However, according to testimony presented by the Applicant's professionals, the question of presence or absence of such elevators in such buildings is controlled exclusively by the UCC, which Code does not require such elevators for those particular buildings.
[brief] In State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122 (1987), our Supreme Court held that “factors relied on to sentence a defendant to the maximum term . . . should not be used again to justify imposing those sentences consecutively.  Where the offenses are closely related, it would ordinarily be inappropriate to sentence a defendant to [] maximum term[s] . . . and to [] require [the] sentences be served consecutively. ”  See also State v. Hooper, 459 N.J. Super. 157, 184–85 (App. Div. 2019) (remanding for resentencing because this Court believed the sentencing court relied on the same factors in imposing maximum terms, as it did in ordering that those terms run consecutive, and because the court failed to explain why the overall sentence was fair).  Likewise, in State v. Pennington, 154 N.J. 344, 361-62 (1998), our Supreme Court remanded a case with directions that the trial court “explain why a shorter second term for the same offense is not warranted if consecutive terms are reimposed. ”  In State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012), the Court stated that it still “adhere[d] to the cautioning in Miller and Pennington against the imposition of multiple consecutive maximum sentences unless circumstances justifying such an extraordinary overall sentence are fully explicated on the record. ”  Because the court did not adequately justify the reasons for imposing a maximum term consecutive to another maximum term, or adequately consider [...]’s youth, mental health and childhood and explain why an aggregate 40-year NERA sentence was fair for [...], a remand for a full resentencing is required.