ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] In recommending dispositions to the court, prosecutors shall consider the interests and needs of the juvenile, but a prosecutor's recommendations should be based principally upon concern for the safety and welfare of the community.  b.  Each county prosecutor shall ensure that the court at a dispositional hearing is fully informed as to the impact of the juvenile's conduct on the victim, where such information has not otherwise been included in the pre-disposition report.  Where a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving loss to the victim resulting from personal injuries or property damage, prosecutors should ordinarily seek an order for restitution to the victim as part of the disposition.
[brief] While [...] and another officer got information from [...], just off-camera, [...] explained to [...] why police wanted her to sign the Consent form too.  (Dca 1, clip four, 39:00 to 41:05).  Responding to her exasperated daughter’s question, [...] admitted that she possessed a gun, which she said defendant had given her to place inside the first apartment.  (1T10-12 to 16; Da20; Dca 1, clip four, 43:18 to 44:50).  But as she was unable to gain access to that apartment, and was uncomfortable leaving the gun in a public area, she had removed it, and taken it inside [...]’s unit.  (1T11-2 to 4; Da20; Dca 1, clip four, 43:18 to 44:50).  The video revealed that three previously unidentified males were inside [...]’s apartment during the entire time.  (1T21-16 to 18).  At risk to their own safety, the police allowed one of the men to go unescorted into a room where the man closed the door.  (Dca 1, clip four, 39:20 to 39:38).  Later, a different male emerged from the bedroom in which the gun lay openly displayed; he commented on its location.  (Dca 1, clip four, 45:45 to 46:02).  At no time did any police draw their own weapon.
[brief] They did not obtain an Affidavit of Merit to support any professional negligence claims against [...], they opposed [...]’s first Motion for Summary Judgment on the theory of common knowledge negligence, and then they failed to conduct any discovery in furtherance of this common knowledge negligence claim.  [...] was ultimately forced to file a second Motion for Summary Judgment, which Plaintiffs opposed by claiming “per se” negligence because [...] did not obtain Plaintiffs’ consent before it prepared the preliminary site plan.  (Pa000201).  Prior to this assertion, however, Plaintiffs had conceded in their Interrogatory Responses that they were not sure if [...] trespassed onto its Property, and Plaintiffs never amended their Interrogatories with new facts to support any trespass by [...].  Given these facts, and the pre-suit knowledge possessed by both Plaintiffs and their counsel, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he made the decision to sanction Plaintiffs and award [...] attorneys’ fees and costs from the date of the safe harbor letter until the award of sanctions.
[directive] a. 경우, 만약 귀하가 그런 죄목에 유죄를 인정할 최하 의무적 가석방 불가능 기간은 (년, 것) 년 개월이며 월 수를 기입할 최장 가석방  불가능 기간은 개월(년, 것)이 것임으로, 년 월 수를 기입할 될 수 있는 이 기간은 감형, 없습니다.  모범수의 작업 또는 최소 수감공제  크레딧에 의하여  단축될 수  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole ineligibility is years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.
[brief] This case arises out of a physical altercation that occurred in Aisle 43 of the [...] located in [...] at approximately 10:10 a.m. on May 13, 2017, between [...], a Lowe’s customer, and [...], a Lowe’s employee.  Hassan was hired as a Customer Sales Associate (“CSA”) in the Flooring Department on May 4, 2017.  [6T 24:7-11, 251:22-23].  At the time of the incident, Hassan was still in training and working to become a Red-Vested employee.  [6T 95:16-23, 196:8-15].  Hassan had been working at this Lowe’s location since being hired on May 4, 2017, had completed more than sixteen hours of training over the course of two days, and was wearing his name tag on his chest as required by Lowe’s’ internal policy.  [8T 167:10-21, 171:16-172:19].  Hassan had worked at this Lowe’s location on two prior occasions – the summers of 2014 and 2015 - as a cashier.  [6T 24:1-6, 68:4-10; 8T 162:24-163:1].  A.
[brief] The “opening the door” doctrine is essentially a rule of expanded relevancy and authorizes admitting evidence which otherwise would have been irrelevant or inadmissible in order to respond to (1) admissible evidence that generates an issue, or (2) inadmissible evidence admitted by the court over objection.  The doctrine of opening the door allows a party to elicit otherwise inadmissible evidence when the opposing party has made unfair prejudicial use of related evidence.  United States v. Lum, 466 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del.), aff’d, 605 F.2d 1198 (3rd Cir. 1979).  That doctrine operates to prevent a defendant from successfully excluding from the prosecution’s case-in-chief inadmissible evidence and then selectively introducing pieces of this evidence for the defendant’s own advantage, without allowing the prosecution to place the evidence in its proper context.  Lum, supra, 466 F. Supp. at 334-35.  James, 144 N.J. at 554.  The doctrine of opening the door has been applied in conjunction with the doctrine of “completeness”, which provides that when a witness testifies on cross-examination as to part of a conversation, statement, transaction or occurrence, the party calling the witness may elicit on redirect “the whole thereof, to the extent it relates to the same subject matter and concerns the specific matter opened up.
[brief] Last, the defense requested an instruction that would guide the jury’s consideration of the fingerprint evidence.  The defense suggested that the jury be told that fingerprint examination is a subjective discipline, that it is not infallible, and that there is a risk of error in the examiner’s conclusion.  The trial court declined to give any instruction about the fingerprint evidence.  The refusal to do so deprived the jury of the crucial guidance it needed to assess the State’s case and violated [...]’s right to a fair trial.
[brief] State v. [...], 375 N.J. Super. at 642.  While the trial court agreed Ordinance 17-2017 was not vague considering the [...] decision, it sua sponte raised overbreadth, despite the striking similarities between the two ordinances.  Da83.  The trial court stated “in light of the Appellate Division in State v. [...] the court cannot find that Ordinance No. 17-2017 is unconstitutionally vague. ”  Da83.  Yet the trial court appears to have missed the holding of the [...] decision wherein the Court also stated that the Millstone ordinance was not overbroad.  The trial court finds Ordinance No. 17-2017 to be overbroad because the Ordinance “attempts to regulate unamplified voices that can be heard more than fifty feet away from a property line. ”  Da83.  However, Ordinance No 17-2017 does not differ in any material way to the Millstone ordinance that this Court found to be neither vague nor overbroad.  Both ordinances contain nearly identical language on “shouting” and “other noises” which this Court has upheld as not implicating constitutional rights and both set a perimeter for noise nuisances.  Arguably Ordinance 17-2017 is more defined than the Millstone ordinance which states in part:
[brief] No legal determination by the first trial court is afforded any deference whatsoever on de novo review.  However, due deference is afforded the first trial court’s determination of witness credibility by the second trial court on de novo review.  In every respect, the Law Division second trial court must decide the given case completely anew again on the record on de novo review.  Any examination of the sufficiency of a factual basis must begin with New Jersey Court Rule 7:6-2(a)(1), which states as follows:  “Generally.  A defendant may plead not guilty or guilty, but the court may, in its discretion, refuse to accept a guilty plea.  Except as otherwise provided by Rules 7:6-2, 7:6-3, and 7:12-3, the court shall not, however, accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining by inquiry of the defendant and, in the court’s discretion, of others, that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea and that there is a factual basis for the plea. ”  (emphasis added).  Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) mandates that the court not accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally.
[brief] In response to the letter of January 12, 2019, there were various emails back and forth between [...] and [...] where [...] argued the Lease had been terminated and therefore there was no liability on the guarantee.  [...] pointed out in his responses that the Lease was not terminated and that [...] and [...] were liable on their guarantees.  [...] also disclosed to [...] for the first time that he and [...] were no longer members of [...].  Pa79-88.  In his deposition, [...] stated that he would not have released the guarantors unless [...] provided an irrevocable letter of credit or escrow.
[brief] (Pa41)  Under the terms of that Settlement Agreement, [...] was permitted to develop the site as a non-age restricted, rental Inclusionary Development of up to 473 non-age restricted residential units, to include 71 ‘affordable’ units, (i.e., a 15% set aside) to be located on [...] (Block 3103, Lots 16 and 19) (the “Residential Project”) and [...] (Block 3101, Lots 12 and 13) would remain as commercial (the “Commercial Project”), a separate non-residential commercial.
[brief] Ibid.  Both facts are also present here.  The jury was well aware that [...] took a plea bargain which required his truthful testimony against defendant, even on direct examination.  (10T:5-21 to 11-15).  This included the fact that he hadn’t been sentenced yet.  Ibid.  On cross, it was emphasized that his plea bargain was very, very beneficial to him if he cooperated.  (10T:40-4 to 16).  The jury charge also contained an instruction that credibility can be affected by a witness’s interest in the outcome of a trial.  (16T:112-7 to 113-12).  Thus, there was no possibility of an unjust result here.  The jury was certainly aware that [...]’s testimony should be viewed in the light of his interest in the outcome of the trial, and knew they could take that into account.  Where the charge itself could have exposed the defendant to undue prejudice, it was not plain error for the judge to fail to give it, sua sponte.  Defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.
[brief] ARGUMENT  THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE BOARD’S REASONABLE DETERMINATION AS IT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.  A.  The Board properly determined that [...] was not eligible to participate in the solar Transition Incentive program without a waiver.  This court should affirm the Board’s September 27, 2023, denial of [...]’s floating solar petition and request for an increase of the default TREC factor from 0.6 to 1.0.  The Board carefully considered [...]’s petition and, after a thorough review of the record, reasonably exercised its discretion in denying [...]’s request.
[brief] Dear Honorable Judges:  In this appeal, we represent Plaintiffs-Respondents  [...] and [...] (“Plaintiffs”).  Pursuant to the August 13, 2024 direction of the Court, we submit this letter brief in lieu of a formal brief regarding the impact of the recent amendments to the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (“OPRA” or (“Amendments”) (effective Sept. 3, 2024) that became effective today.  For these reasons set forth below, the Court should not apply the Amendments to this appeal.  If the Court applies the Amendments to this appeal, that application should be limited to whether the email addresses on the mailing lists should be disclosed, and no other issue in the case.  The primary reason this Court should not apply the Amendments retroactively to all complaints and pending appeals is that the March 4, 2024 version of S2930 did have language that would have made the Amendments fully retroactive, including to all filed complaints and appeals, but that language was deleted when S2930 was reported out of the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee on May 9, 2024, and never made it into the final bill.  Retroactivity in the Amendments is limited to OPRA’s new requirement that all complaints, including complaints on appeal, include the requestor’s full name and mailing address.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] As a result of defendant’s municipal court hearing conducted virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant, [...], engaged in a barrage of threatening and escalating phone calls to the presiding judge, the Honorable [...], J.M. C., over a period of eight months, even after defendant was initially charged.  The contents of the voicemails included multiple threats of physical violence and sexually explicit language directed at the judge.  Following a jury trial, in which defendant testified, admitting that he made all of those calls and that he was “wrong” for doing that, the jury convicted defendant on all counts.  The victim was a practicing attorney for nearly twenty years, and resided with his wife and three daughters in [...].  (3T7-24 to 25).  From 2017 to 2021, the victim served as a municipal court judge in [...], and practiced law in [...].  (3T8-11 to 25).  In August of 2021, municipal court was being conducted virtually due to the pandemic;² the victim’s name appeared on the Zoom screen as, “Judge [...]. ” (3T9-4 to 25).  On August 19, 2021, the victim was serving as a conflicts judge in [...], and presided over a recorded virtual proceeding wherein defendant was a participant.  (3T10-22 to 11-16).  As was the practice, the judge gave an opening statement at the start of the proceedings, identifying himself --- ²  The parties stipulated that a declared State of Emergency was in effect in New Jersey throughout the relevant time period.
[brief] ”  Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 435, 443 (App. Div. 1984) (emphasis added).  In other words, “[w]ithout cross- --- 1  The abbreviation “Rb” notates Respondent’s brief.  appealing, a party may argue points the trial court either rejected or did not address, so long as those arguments are in support of the trial court’s order. ”  State v. Eldakrouy, 439 N.J. Super. 304, 307 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) (emphasis added) (declining to address argument made by defendant that was not made in support of the trial court’s order).  Indeed, “it is the judgment that is the focus of the appeal. ”  Stone v. Old Bridge, 111 N.J. 110, 115 n.2 (1988).  Here, it simply cannot seriously be argued that Respondent’s contention that Appellant failed to exhaust administrative remedies, i.e., submitting this matter for consideration before the [...] (“CSC”), supports the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s Order to Show Cause (“OTSC”) to enforce the settlement.  As the record reflects, [...] placed his reasoning for denying Appellant’s OTSC on the record.  (2T).  It is clear that this ruling was limited to a finding “there was no settlement” and entering “an order remanding the disciplinary action back to the hearing officer. ” (2T20:2-14).  Nonetheless, seemingly in opposition to the trial court’s ruling, Respondent now argues that the trial court did not even have jurisdiction over this matter in the first instance, an argument raised and rejected by the court below.  (Rb9-Rb10).  Because Respondent failed to submit this issue by way of cross-appeal, Appellant urges Your Honors to deem this issue waived.
[brief] Courts have held that rarely will a defendant be able to employ equitable principles to avoid liability for *its own* consumer-fraud violation.  See *D'Agostino v. Maldonado*, 216 N.J. 168, 200 (2013); *Sprenger v. [...]*, 375 N.J. Super. 120, 136-140 (App. Div. 2005).  In *Sprenger*, the court declined to allow defendant to assert an unclean-hands based on that defendant's claim that plaintiff had stolen the parts plaintiff wished defendant to install on plaintiff’s car.  [...] argued that because the parts he was asked to install on [...] car were stolen, [...] had a defense to a consumer fraud claim.  The court held unclean hands is generally unavailable to avoid a claim for purely monetary relief and whatever wrong the plaintiff may have perpetrated did not relate to [...]’s conduct.  [...] is directly applicable to this case.  The defendant argues that plaintiff may have done some wrong to the Chapter 7 trustee, but [...] specifically says that only a wrong done to the defendant will suffice as an unclean hands defense.
[brief] ” (Pb1).  However, there was no such agreement.  Defense counsel only agreed to have the verdict molded to include the medical bills and disability payments if the jury found that Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease was aggravated due to the incident of July 29, 2013.  The medical bills and disability payments total $207,875.40.  Thus, had the trial Court accepted Plaintiff’s position, the jury award of $25,000 less 15% comparative negligence (i.e., $21,500) would have been “molded” to a judgment for $232,875.40 plus interest.  The issue was briefed and argued before the Hon. [...], J.S.C.  The Court refused to mold the verdict because it was clear that the jury had rejected Plaintiff’s aggravation claim.  The facts demonstrate unequivocally that the Court’s determination was correct and should be affirmed.
[brief] Anything that had been placed there by way of artificial fill would not be included.  Artificial fill from whatever source does not gain any title or take any title away from the underlying water (7T94:1-13).  When asked if there was any artificial fill, he indicates that according to the Town’s Engineer, there was a beach replenishment on multiple occasions that ostensibly added to the claimed ownings of [...].  However, the artificial fill gain gives [...] title to the lands underneath the artificial fill.  He testifies that the mean high-water is a tidal datum.  The average of all the high-water heights observed over the National Title Data Epoch and that the mean high-water line is the line on a charter map which represents the inner section of the land with the water surfaces at the elevation of that the mean high-water.
[brief] (Da20-23)  Compare the circumstances in PNC Bank v. Axeslsson, 373 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (Ch. Div. 2004), where the court held the purchaser of real property did not take title free of an unrecorded easement where it had actual knowledge of the easement.  There the court found:  This statute specifically provides, however, that the unrecorded interest is not void against a later-recorded interest taken with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the recorded interest.  Accordingly, if plaintiff knew of defendant’s unrecorded easement when it took its mortgage, N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 would validate the unrecorded easement against the bank.  In this case, Defendant had actual knowledge of the recorded easement before its purchase through the Bankruptcy Court which specifically provided in the notice of sale that any purchaser took title subject to liens and encumbrances.  (Da20-23)  Regardless, the fact remains the 1963 Agreement was in recordable form.
[brief] See Cabbell, 207 N.J. at 330-39 (reversing where denial of cross-examination prevented defense from exposing that eyewitness had been high and from “prob[ing] into any other area that might have affected her credibility in the eyes of the jury”).  Not only did the court prevent the defense from exposing that [...] originally described a man with “wavy” hair, but its erroneous ruling also likely discouraged cross-examination on the other system and estimator variables undermining her reliability, such as her “blurry” vision that night.  In all, the confrontation errors left the jury with the untested and false impression that an undisclosed eyewitness, who the police believed, had not only identified [...] but had done so reliably.
[brief] *See McNeil v. Legislative Appor’mt Com’n*, 177 N.J. 364, 395, 828 A.2d 840 (2003), *cert denied*, 540 U.S. 1107, 124 S. Ct. 1068 (2004) (precluding new theory for same relief used by parties).  Further, because [...] became the owner of the Debt *prior to* the commencement of the Collection Action and was the plaintiff to commence the Collection Action, and because the other Respondents are in privity with [...] as prior assignees to the Debt, Plaintiff could have and chose not to raise these claims in the Collection Action.  Although the Appellate Court did not rule on the basis of *res judicata*, the lower court in *Francavilla* made clear that the plaintiff’s claims were based on the same transaction and occurrence in that the plaintiff sought to invalidate the same debt that the collection court issued the judgment on.
[brief] There, the court affirmed the [...]’s right to condemn property which had received final subdivision approval for the development of non-affordable, single-family homes.  The Appellate Division in Mipro emphasized the particular facts of Mount Laurel’s land use history and purpose for condemnation: the town had been the defendant in the leading early exclusionary zoning cases in this State (see discussion, supra) and, as a result of zoning changes from that litigation along with the town’s limited financial resources, had been “prevented . . . from preserving a significant amount of land for open space” (379 N.J. Super. at 362).  The court recited a lengthy history of the Legislature’s recognition of the public interest in acquiring land for open space through various statutes, including the New Jersey Green Acres Land Acquisition Act of 1961, the Municipal Trust Fund Act, and the Garden State Preservation Trust Act, noting that there were “multiple statutory enactments that confer authority upon municipalities to acquire land by eminent domain for preservation of open space and land conservation” (id. at 372).