ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Now, therefore, I  [...], Attorney General of New Jersey, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and by the Statutes of this State, do hereby DIRECT that all law enforcement agencies and officers in this State shall comply with the directives, policies and procedures which are attached hereto and incorporated herein.  This Executive Directive shall take effect immediately.  Given, under my hand and seal, this 4th day of August, 1988 in the Year of Our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States, the two hundred and twelfth.
[brief] 1T12-22 to 1T13-3.  At Pa55 to Pa58, the trial court dismisses [...]'s concerns by (again) relying on 'common sense.'  At Pa57, the Judge uses Wikipedia to interpret "Lot area/unit."  The ordinary layperson envisioned in Perlmart and Pond Run should not be required to conduct online research to understand the nature of the variance being sought.  The Court in Perlmart stressed that it is that information, however, which informs the public of the nature of the application in a commonsense manner such that the ordinary layperson could intelligently determine whether to object or to seek further information.  Without the basic information that is required in the notice, the Court in Perlmart indicated that it could not be assured that the general public understood the nature of the application.  See Cox and Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration (2024 Edition) Sec. 18-1.2 at page 242.  Considering the vagueness of the applicant’s notice and the nuanced nature of the variance relief being sought, it is clear that the language of the notice almost seems designed to obfuscate and simplify the complex aspects of the application so as to discourage a layperson from bothering to further inquire about the application in order to understand its true impact on surrounding properties.
[brief] [...] testified another male “jumped on” him from the back and began punching him in the ribs.  [...] could not positively identify [...] as the other male, however, [...] testified she witnessed [...] “punching on” [...].  [...] also testified defendant and [...] were both “beating on” [...].  [...] also testified a woman “attacked [him] from the driver’s side,” and restrained his legs.  Although [...] could not identify the woman, [...] admitted to holding [...]’s legs and to “hitting” him.  [...] testified defendant took his sunglasses and necklace, and stated, “You don’t need this.  You goin’ to jail. ”  [...] also stated the woman removed money from his pockets after being ordered to do so by defendant.  [...] admitted to taking [...]’s cell phone and cash.  [...]’s cell phone was recovered from [...]’s belongings after her arrest.  On the date he testified, [...] was serving two prison terms, one for fourth-degree aggravated assault, and the other for charges stemming from the heroin he was in possession of when the police searched him on the night of the incident.  [...] also testified to his prior convictions for burglary, resisting arrest, and drug offenses; admitted he knew he had an arrest warrant out for him for violating his probation, and for failing to appear for a court date while out on bail on firearms charges; and admitted he had not made the required payments to the bail bondsman.
[brief] With respect to the Order of 3/30/2023 (Appellant’s Motion for Correction of Probation Account Record), and the Order of 5/12/2023 (Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 3/30/2023), [...] has adopted Probation’s “accounting” of 3/17/2022 (DA28) without permitting Appellant to rebut and defend against Probation’s “accounting,” account record, audits and misrepresentations without permitting oral argument (requested several times) and without opportunity to present his proofs in court in order to resolve disputed facts of the case.  In essence, [...] abdicated her responsibility as the finder of fact.  [...] failed to make any specific findings of fact with reference to Appellant’s prima facie demonstration of multiple errors in Probation’s “accounting” of 3/17/2022 (DA162) and its account record.  In this manner, Appellant was denied fair and impartial adjudication and thereby denied due process, and the Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in this manner.  5.
[brief] There is credible testimony from [...] that he witnessed [...] knock and announce the presence of law enforcement.  The officers then waited twenty to twenty five seconds before forcibly entering the apartment.  [...]’s body camera was activated immediately prior to entering the apartment and captured the entire search.  [(Da24). ]  Defendant contentions hinge on the fact that the first thirty seconds of the police body cam footage did not record audio of them announcing their presence.  He advances that this alone should have resulted in the suppression of the evidence obtained from the search because the police arguably violated procedure by not turning on their body cameras earlier.
[brief] Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1959), certif., den. 31 N.J. 554 (1960) .............................................17 Selective Ins. Co v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 2000) ..........................15 Sisson v. Donnelly, 36 N.J.L. 432 (E. & A. 1872) ....................................23 Sovereign Bank v. Gillis, 432 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 2013) ............................40 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 25 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1953), aff’d 15 N.J. 203 (1954) ..............................................................39 State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245 (2021) ..................................................15 Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Blair Holding Co., 42 N.J. 51 (1964) .....................................................23 Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498 (1991) ..................................................27 Wadeer v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591 (App. Div. 2015) ....................................33 Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398 (1991) ..................................................26
[brief] 22 Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016) .......................................................  23 O’Shea v. New Jersey Schools Const. Corp., 388 N.J.Super. 312 (App. Div. 2006) .......................................................  37  Pace v. Hamilton Cove, 258 N.J. 82 (2024) ....................................................................................
[brief] Upon the receipt of Plaintiffs’ reports, the NJDEP conducted a thorough in-office review as well as three (3) site inspections assessing the [...] for suitable bald eagle breeding, resting, or feeding habitat.  (Aa0055).  The August 14, 2023, Environmental Report issued by the NJDEP indicates that, on July 11, 2023, NJDEP Division of Fish and Wildlife confirmed to NJDEP Land Resource Protection Program that the [...] does not fall within a bald eagle nest buffer under State or Federal standards and, as a result, the wetlands classifications on the [...] were properly assigned a resource classification of intermediate and that a wetlands classification upgrade to exceptional was not warranted.  (Aa0058).  The Environmental Report describes the conclusions of the NJDEP’s review, and goes onto affirm with respect to bald eagle foraging, that:
[brief] Simply put, [...] was ineligible for admission into one of [...]’s Master’s programs because he failed to achieve an academic prerequisite for admission into same: a 3.0 GPA following his first academic year of Pharmacy courses.  [...] failed to demonstrate that a website advertisement alone can constitute a legally binding contract.  That is particularly so here where the [...] website advertisement of a new academic program (not yet fully accredited), was according to Plaintiff-Appellant still evolving.  Nor is there any basis for a legal finding that that advertisement could now give rise to an implied contract.  The advertisement, on its face, did nothing more than to alert prospective applicants to the existence of the new program.  It contained no contractual terms, nor was it intended to form a contract and no reasonable reader would conclude that it was a contract.  Moreover, even if the website could have given rise to a contract, [...] cannot self-servingly “pick and choose” which parts of the website constituted the “contract. ”  One such published rule was that the University reserved its right to change requirements for any program in its sole discretion.  By accepting admission into [...]’s Pharmacy School, [...] agreed to abide by the University’s rules and regulations – whether existing at the time of his admission or subsequent thereto.  In addition to failing to demonstrate breach of contract, [...] was unable to demonstrate at the trial level any misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement on the part of [...].  Here, the creation of the 3.0 GPA requirement is critical to the Pharmacy School’s very existence.  The [...] (“[...]”) was initially not in favor of the Pharmacy School offering a dual degree program at all, citing concerns about Pharmacy students being diverted from the rigorous requirements of the healthcare-related degree.  When the [...] eventually agreed to permit the dual degree offering, it did so on the condition that [...] only admit Pharmacy students who demonstrated strong attainment (which [...] established as a 3.0 GPA) at the end of their first academic year of Pharmacy study.  This requirement was ultimately reflected in [...]’s Student Handbook, on the website, and in various other publications of which [...] should have been aware.
[directive] 8  Studies show that transgender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals face higher risks of abuse and violence when held in detention than other individuals, and are therefore more likely than other individuals to warrant such accommodations.  When a law enforcement officer is made aware of such risks to a person’s safety or well-being, the officer should be particularly sensitive to these concerns.  Page 8  1.  Conducting Searches:  Officers shall respectfully inquire of non-binary or gender non- conforming individuals as to their preference with respect to the gender of the searching officer and perform searches in accordance with that preference where possible.  Any search that is not conducted in accordance with the individual’s stated preference must, where practicable, be reviewed and approved by a supervisor.  The denial shall be documented in writing.  2.  Transportation:  Officers shall transport such individuals with arrestees of the gender that is safest for them, taking into account which gender that individual expresses to be safest for them.  Any transportation that is not done in accordance with the individual’s stated preference must, where practicable, be reviewed and approved by a supervisor.  The denial shall be documented in writing.  3.  Detention in Police Stations:  Officers shall house, place, or otherwise detain such individuals with individuals of the gender that is safest for them, and allow them to use the restrooms of the gender that is safest for them, taking into account which gender they express to be safest for them.  Any placement that is not done in accordance with the individual’s stated preference must, where practicable, be reviewed and approved by a supervisor.  The denial shall be documented in writing.  III.
[brief] (24T 116-8 to 118-24, 156-22 to 158-19).  At approximately 11:45 p.m., officers responded to room 517 of the [...] to execute the consent search of [...]’s hotel room.  (27T 148-3 to 148-7).  The officers knocked on the door but received no response.  They could hear people talking inside the room so they knocked on the door again, but continued to receive no response.  The officers did not attempt to force entry, but continued to try and make contact with the occupants until they were successful when Defendant opened the door himself at least ten minutes after the officers first knocked.
[brief] [...] testified at the Land Use Hearing that the condition of the Property has not caused any contamination of the Borough drinking water supply and does not present a threat.  (T1, 39:12-23 (“The concentrations that we’ve identified on the site at this point do not represent a vapor intrusion threat and we haven’t found any impacts to surface water or drinking water supply”)).  Plaintiff further presented evidence that, because of the structure of the municipal drinking water wells, it is virtually impossible for contamination from the property to affect the drinking water supply.  (T1, 14:7-25 (“…where this contamination [at the Property] is in the upper aquifer.  It’s a layer of water if you will.  Where the municipal drinking water wells are is 100 feet down and separated by an impermeable layer. ”)).  Finally, there is continued oversight by the DEP who requires testing to ensure that that is the case.  DEP requires regular testing and updates to determine the potential of any offsite impact.  Further, the evidence presented was that the municipal groundwater supply is almost a mile away from the Property and there is no way that the contamination has traveled or could travel that far [away] or travel deep enough into the soil to reach the municipal water supply.  (T1, 14:21-24 (“Plus [the municipal water supply] is almost a mile away.  So there is literally no way that whatever the minor contamination is that is just within feet of our property line can go that far and that As part of the ACO, the NJDEP did not require any further testing of off-site receptors such as the Beach Haven municipal wells.  The only evidence offered by Defendants to support their claims that the Property is detrimental to the welfare of the community, is the unsupported concerns voiced by [...] and inapplicable case law regarding active petroleum leaks.
[brief] [...], the former head of the [...] in Toronto, has opined that social transition is a form of “psychosocial treatment that will increase the odds of long-term persistence. ”  Zucker, K.J., The myth of persistence: Response to “A Critical Commentary on Follow-Up Studies and Desistance Theories about Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Children” by [...] et al., International Journal of Transgenderism, 19, 231–245 (2018), ACa139–155.
[brief] ”  *Lemelledo*, 150 N.J. at 262 n.1.  When the NJCLA was combined with the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, under the umbrella of the Licensed Lenders Act (“NJLLA”), the consumer-lending based provisions formerly known as the NJCLA became the “Consumer Finance Licensing Act. ”  Like the NJCLA before it (and the NJCFLA now), the NJLLA (comprised of both consumer loan statutes and mortgage related statutes) enumerated the Commissioner’s enforcement mechanisms at subsection 18 and stated in subsection 33(b) that “[a] consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of sections 3 . . . shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void.  \(^5\)  The New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89. and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, 1997 N.J. A.N. 2513.  Additionally, “[t]he [NJ]CLA, as incorporated in the Licensed Lenders Act, allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b, and summary revocation of a lender's license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-48a. ”  *Lemelledo*, 150 N.J. at 272.  In 2010, the NJLLA, N.J.S.A. 17:C-1 to -49, was divided, separating the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, from the NJCFLA—the NRJMLA and NJCFLA were now their own respective standalone statutes.
[brief] The fourth Profaci factor also weighs against the ordinance, as there is no element of knowledge or intent on behalf of the individuals making the noise.  As [...] noted during the March 5, 2019 hearing, some people are “just loud”, and depending on the peculiarity of the listener who may be “annoyed” or “disturbed” by their speech, a violation could occur due to the individual simply having a conversation.  As to the final factor, while clarity of the Noise Ordinance does not depend on reference to other enactments or regulations, it is hard to argue that the ordinance is clear on its face.  For example, in order to figure out whether “other continuous noise” constitutes a violation, one must look to five separate sections to gain a full understanding: Section 146-7(P) for a definition of “other continuous noise”, Section 146-6 for internal definitions including both “continuous sound” and “impulsive sound”, Section 146-5 to know that a noise nuisance is prohibited, Section 146-9 to determine the plainly audible standard and distance required, and Section 146-10 to understand the penalties involved.  It is doubtful that a lay person attempting to understand what noise is prohibited would find that to be clear.  The trial court properly found that the above issues support a finding that the Noise Ordinance is overbroad and void.
[brief] *Id.* at *13.  \(^{33}\) (Da64-Da67).  Pa1-Pa18); (2) the Collection Action came to a final disposition when a Judgment was entered against Appellant (Pa57-Pa58); (3) [...] could have, but chose not to, raise these claims in the Collection Action because [...] became the owner of the Debt prior to the commencement of the Collection Action and was the plaintiff to commence the Collection Action, Appellant could have raised any arguments it has in this Action in the underlying Collection Action (Pa59-Pa60); and (4) these defenses and claims are directly related to the facts, transactions or series of transactions in the Collection Action.  Thus, Appellant’s failure to raise these arguments in the Collection Action now preclude him from now doing so in this Action.  IV.
[brief] See Mantilla v. NC Mall Assocs., 167 N.J. 262, 272-273 (2001); Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177, 191-192 (1986).  This requirement is mandated by the Supreme Court, in that there must be “bright line” language referencing the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Azurak v. Corporate Prop. Investors, 175 N.J. 110, 112-113 (2003).  In fact, there is a presumption against indemnifying an indemnitee for its own negligence that can be rebutted only by plain language clearly expressing contrary intent.  Mantilla, 167 N.J. at 269.  Generally, courts give contractual provisions “their plain and ordinary meaning.
[brief] Constructive notice exists where a reasonable and diligent inquiry would indicate the need for further investigation and such investigation would reveal the competing claim.  The common rule is that party is not “an innocent purchaser if there were circumstances sufficient to put him on inquiry. ”  76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 74.  If there were circumstances which, in the exercise of common reason and prudence, ought to put the party on particular inquiry, he or she will be presumed to have made that inquiry, and will be charged with notice of every fact which that inquiry would have given him or her. ”  Id.  This state is in accord: a purchaser “will be charged with knowledge of whatever [a reasonable and diligent] inquiry would uncover where facts are brought to his attention, ‘sufficient to apprise him of the existence of an outstanding title or claim .
[directive] 6.2.3(c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  (For example, at the conclusion of an investigation into an excessive force allegation, the agency finds that the officer used force (alleged conduct) but that the force was not excessive (alleged violation). )  9.8.2  Accordingly, in any case where a law enforcement agency has reason to believe that a candidate for employment was previously a sworn officer of another law enforcement agency, the hiring agency has an affirmative obligation to identify all such former employers.
[brief] (27T 135-6 to 135-24).  At around 10:00 p.m., [...] of the [...] responded to the scene.  Macrae knew at the time that codefendant [...], who he was familiar with as a mid-high level narcotics dealer who he had arrested previously for possession of a handgun, resided at apartment D4 of the apartment complex, near where the body was found (24T 167-5 to 167-25, 168-13 to 169-1).
[brief] 16  In re Suspension of DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25 (1980) ..................................................  31  Jenkins v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrs., 412 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 2010) ...............  31  Loboda v. Clark Tp., 40 N.J. 424 (1963) ..............................................................  16, 19 Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 409 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 2009) ........................................................................................................  14  Matter of R.H., 475 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2023) ........................................... 14, 15 New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) .............................................................................................................. 32 Norman v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 457 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 2019) ........................................................................................................... 21 People v. Hrlic, 744 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) ................................. 20, 31 People v. James, 842 N.Y.S.2d 859 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Queens Co. 2007) ... 22, 23 Piatt v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 443 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015) ........................................................................................................... 29 Rozenblit v. Lyles, 245 N.J. 105 (2021) ..................................................................... 16 State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432 (2023) ............................................................................ 15 State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94 (2017) .......................................................................... 35 State v. Borjas, 436 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 2014) ........................................