ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *In re Resolution* supports *Veras*’s reasoning that, generally, when there are extensive state enforcement mechanisms included in a statute, that statute rarely also includes a private right of action.  But *Veras* failed to acknowledge that the NJCFLA’s predecessors all contained enforcement mechanisms by the Commissioner **and** an implied private right of action.  There was virtually no basis to reason that the separation of the mortgage-based provisions from the rest of the current NJCFLA suddenly also removed the implied private right of action from the statute.  In context, *Veras*’s citation to *In re Resolution* in ostensible support of the notion that the NJCFLA does not provide for a provide right of action does not make practical sense given that the enforcement mechanisms in subsection 18 have always coexisted with the implied private right of action in the NJSLA, NJLLA, and NJCLA.  The sudden reading of the private right of action out of the NJCFLA by Veras was simply not rooted in an examination of the NJCFLA’s legislative intent and history—as Veras acknowledged was the linchpin in determining whether an implied private right of action existed.  Rather, Veras acknowledged the existence of subsection 18 and determined that that, in and of itself, was sufficient to show that no implied private right of action existed in the statute, without acknowledging further that there had always been a private right of action.  Since Veras was decided in 2014, every case that has determined that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA can, directly or indirectly, be traced back to Veras, thereby compounding the inexplicable reasoning and holding.  The landscape of jurisprudence related to the NJCFLA continues to evolve, but the seminal case here affecting the changing landscape was based on a failing of reasoning in that the history of the statute was not analyzed, though its importance was explicitly acknowledged.  There is simply no explanation as to why the private right of action was suddenly removed from the statute.
[brief] Thus, “[e]quity regards and treats as done what in good conscience ought to be done.  Martindell v. Fiduciary Counsel, Inc., 133 N.J. Eq. 408, 413 (E. & A. 1943).  In addition, “the fundamental principles which govern a court of equity in decreeing the specific performance of contracts are in essence the same whether the contract concerns realty or personalty.
[brief] Trial courts must focus “the jury’s attention on how to analyze and consider the trustworthiness of eyewitness identification. ”  Id. at 296.  Jurors cannot be left to “divine” how to assess these identifications themselves or “glean them” through trial.  Ibid.  As with all jury instructions, especially as to crucial matters, it is the “court’s obligation to help jurors evaluate evidence critically and objectively to ensure a fair trial.
[brief] 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(d).................................6-7 | Date | Description | Page | |------------|--------------------------------------------------|------| | 8/28/20 | FINAL ORDER | 8a | | 9/25/20 | STAY OF FINAL ORDER | 10a | | 7/20/22 | JUDGMENT | 43a | | 8/29/22 | ORDER & OPINION | 60a | | 9/16/22 | EXECUTED ORDER | 180a | | 9/28/22 | EXECUTED ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE | 187a | | 11/10/22 | DENIED ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE | 191a | | 12/16/22 | ORDER DENYING MOTION | 246a | | 12/16/22 | ORDER GRANTING CROSS-MOTION | 249a | I.
[brief] Lastly, N.J.S.A. 56:10-4 requires that a purported franchisee show that more than 20% of its gross sales are intended to be or are derived from the franchise.  ____________________  6  Even if [...] continued its misinformed assertion that it somehow helped “start” [...], such a proposition presumably goes to goodwill, which [...] again failed to argue in the trial court.  Even if it did, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held:  “[t]o develop goodwill generally for a product cannot be enough to create a community of interest.  Otherwise, any licensee distributing a brand-name product could claim it has a community of interest with its supplier. ”  Instructional Systems, 130 N.J.at 358.  N.J.S.A. 56:10-4.
[directive] FECHADOI  Dated:  I  Abogado del acusado Counsel for Defendant  Para informacion sobre Ia representaci6n en apelaciones porIa Oficina del Abogado de Oficio, escriba a Ia Oficina de Administraci6n de Causas Penales en el condado donde tuvo Iugar Ia condena:  For information on appellate representation by the Office of the Public Defender, please write to the Superior Court  Criminal Case Management Office  In the county where the conviction occurred:  (Lienelo por duplicado; una copia debidamente firmada se hade entregar al tribunal para Ia cubierta del tribunal y una es para darsela al acusado).  (Complete in duplicate: one fully executed copy to be delivered to the court for the court jacket and one to be given to the defendant.)  pagina 2 de 2 Formulario enmendado promulgado par Ia directriz 05-14 (08/2512014), CN 10778-Spanish by Revised Form Promulgated Directive# 05-14 (08/25/2014 ), CN 10778-Spanish page 2 of 2  3  ATTACHMENT
[brief] The Board’s second set of interrogatories, which would have been followed by a deposition, were designed to obtain further proofs of each of its claims in the Complaint, as well as test the veracity of Defendant’s purported documents and claims.  The Board was entitled to pursue discovery of its claims prior to the dismissal of its 10-count Complaint.  The court violated R. 4:46-2 in dismissing Plaintiff’s 10-count Complaint several months before the discovery end date and without affording the Board meaningful ability to prosecute its case before the discovery end date.  [...]’s first summary judgment motion was filed in December 2022, about seven months before the July 2023 discovery end date, and the court’s reconsideration dismissal order in April 2023 occurred 2.5 months before the expiration of the original discovery end date.  The Board pursued timely discovery by sending a second set of interrogatories, whose due date was before the original July 13, 2023, discovery end date, and the Board anticipated deposing Defendants after receipt of those answers.
[brief] Thus, in 2013, the [...] were denied refinance by [...] due to the 2009 assignment; their application for refinance was deemed “dead on arrival” because of this completely inaccurate and misleading 2009 assignment indicating a foreclosure that, in fact, had not occurred.  [...] testified that the trustee department had nothing to do with refinance, and that it was the “Bank” -- [...] -- that had denied refinance twice due to invalid title.  The “Trust” was not formed as a trust but rather as a segregated pool of assets with [...]
[brief] The issue on this appeal is single, narrowed and focused.  Occam’s Razor cuts sharply here, as it is axiomatic and a fundamental principle of black-letter law that in order for an action for breach of contract and various related claims to be viable, evidence must be presented at the summary judgment stage after discovery has been completed that permits the trier of fact to determine the existence of damages and the method and means to determine their amount to a reasonable certainty.
[brief] In the seminal case of *Longobardi v. [...], Inc.*, 121 N.J. 530 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered a "Concealment or Fraud" provision in defendant [...]'s policy that is essentially identical to [...]'s provision.  For comparison, the [...] policy provides as follows:  Concealment or Fraud:  We do not provide coverage for any insured who has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstances relating to this insurance.  In *Longobardi*, plaintiff asserted a claim for stolen items in his home under his policy with [...], and later made false statements during his Examination Under Oath.  [...] denied coverage under its "Concealment or Fraud" provision, and plaintiff sued.  At trial, the jury found plaintiff did not make any false statements when he applied for insurance but did make a material post-loss misstatement.  The complaint was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed.  New Jersey’s Supreme Court found this provision unambiguously provides that if materially false statements were made at any time during the insurance relationship, it allows the insurer to void coverage under the policy:  "We are convinced that a reasonable person reading that provision would understand that it includes misrepresentations made to the insurer, whether made during the application or claims processes."  *Longobardi*, 121 N.Y. at 542-543.  Stated differently, Appellant’s post-loss lies were sufficient to nullify the policy, so long as the misrepresentations were knowing and material.  *Id.* at 536-543.  As discussed *supra*, [...]’s policy expressly bars coverage when a material misrepresentation is made by the claimant "in connection with any claim" under the policy.  The use of the "any " in the [...] Policy is explicit enough to encompass Appellant’s lies made not only during the claim process but also in the ensuing litigation.
[brief] 878 F.2d at 701.  Here, the Debtor satisfies all four elements.  First, “[i]n the bankruptcy context, reasonable likelihood of success is equivalent to the debtor's ability to successfully reorganize. ”  In re Union Tr. Phila., LLC, 460 B.R. 644, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).  What is more, a “plaintiff need only prove a prima facie case, not a certainty that he or she will win. ”  Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir. 2001).  The Debtor’s chapter 13 plan here provides for the recovery of the Property through payment of the claim of [...] in full.  Recovery of the Property will be through the Adversary Proceeding which is needed to implement the chapter 13 plan.  The court has already concluded that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the New Jersey Constitution provide debtors in bankruptcy cases with the opportunity to set aside the effects of a final judgment in foreclosure and to address the claims related thereto in their bankruptcy cases.  This case is in the pipeline and there is a likelihood of success based on the current status of the law and the Debtor will be able to successfully reorganize upon effectively challenging the Final Judgment here.
[brief] However, the plaintiff's argument does not center on the absence of justifications for these reductions but rather on her belief that maintaining specific staffing levels is mandatory according to this regulation.  The plaintiff has cited a regulation that does not establish staffing ratios to substantiate her reasonable belief that the defendants' staffing ratios violated the law.  Additionally, she has referred to a regulation that does not address the relocation of employees from one location to another to support her belief that the defendants' staff reassignments amounted to a violation of the law.  (PA000090)
[brief] Morris County, Docket No. [...]  Table of Appendices  Transcripts  1.  T-1 - Transcript – Hearing of 10/23/2015, Judge [...]  2.  T-2 - Transcript – Hearing 8/7/2020, Judge [...], including corrections as issued by way of Order of 1/19/2022 AND Reconstructed Corrections as per Order 1/19/2022  3.  T-3 - Transcript – Hearing 9/21/2020, Judge [...]  Volume I: Exhibits 4.  Amended Notice of Appeal, 7/7/2023 DA 1 5.  Order 5/12/2023  Hon. [...] DA 14 6.  Order 3/30/2023, Hon. [...] DA 20 7.  Order 2/5/1999  Hon. [...], re pendente lite to be paid through Probation, Hon. [...] DA 30 8.  Order 9/8/1999 FJOD, Nuc Pro Tunc to 7/16/1999 DA 32 9.  Order 3/25/2004, excerpt Hon. [...] re credits due, reduced payments, and elimination of arrears DA 41 10.  Order 11/4/2011, Hon. [...] DA 48 11.  Order 2/6/2012 Hon. [...] DA 50 12.  Orders 6/26/2012 & 7/20/2012, Hon. [...] DA 52 13.  Order 10/11/2013, Hon. [...] DA 55 14.  Order 12/10/2014, excerpt, Hon. [...] DA 58 15.  Order 10/27/2015, Hon. [...] DA 60 16.  Order 1/10/2020, Hon. [...] DA 68 17.  Order 9/21/2020, OTSC re Stay of 8/16/2020  Order, Hon. [...] DA 69 18.  IWO 4/3/2023, 5/5/2021 DA 70 19.  Order 1/11/2022, Hon. [...] DA 76 20.  Order 4/4/2022, Hon. [...] DA 80 21.  Order 5/27/2022, Hon. [...] DA 90 22.  Appellate Remand Order 1/17/2002  [...] DA 95 23.  Appellate Order 6/5/2018, [...] DA 131 24.  Appellate Order 6/15/2023, [...] DA 142
[brief] See, e.g., Hamlett, 449 N.J. Super. at 177-78; State v. Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. 413, 417 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 339 (2011); Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. at 238-39; Gioe, 401 N.J. Super. at 342; State v. Gadsden, 303 N.J. Super. 491, 505 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 187 (1997).  Even State v. Novembrino recognizes this limitation for applying the exclusionary rule.  105 N.J. 95, 130 n.15 (1987).  Hamlett and Broom-Smith both involved cases where the warrant authorized a search of a structure situated outside of the issuing municipality’s jurisdiction; but this Court refused to invalidate the searches in both cases.  Hamlett, 449 N.J. Super. at 175 (Atlantic City municipal judge authorized a search of defendant’s Galloway Township motel room); Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. at 232 (Berkley Township municipal judge authorized a search of defendant’s Dover Township home).  Here, the warrant authorized the search of a mobile vehicle traveling near the border of the issuing municipality’s jurisdiction and a neighboring jurisdiction.  This Court should follow the guidance in Hamlett and Broom-Smith and uphold the search of a moving vehicle as it drove just over the jurisdictional border, which arguably constitutes an even lesser technical violation, if deemed a violation at all.
[directive] Paragraph 5 of Directive #4-00 is amended, effective immediately, so as to provide as follows:  5.  At the time a sealing or resealing order is submitted to the Wiretap Judge for signature, the original tapes shall be counted by the Wiretap Judge and then placed in a container and sealed.  No sealing or resealing order shall be signed unless the Wiretap Judge has had the opportunity to make a physical count of the tapes.  In the absence or unavailability of the Wiretap Judge who authorized the interception, orders to seal may be entered by (a) any other designated Wiretap Judge, or (b) the designated Communications Data Warrant Judge in the county or vicinage in which the investigation occurred, or (c) the Assignment Judge or Acting Assignment Judge for the county or vicinage in which the judge who authorized the interception sits.
[brief] : Sat Below:  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE NOS.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .. 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  8  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY SUPPRESSING STATEMENTS  ELICITED AFTER [...] CLEARLY INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL ..................  8  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................  20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] A site plan is defined as “a development plan of one or more lots on which is shown (1) the existing and proposed conditions of the lot, including but not necessarily limited to topography, vegetation, drainage, flood plains, marshes and waterways, (2) the location of all existing and proposed buildings, drives, parking spaces, walkways, means of ingress and egress, drainage facilities, utility services, landscaping, structures and signs, lighting, screening devices, and (3) any other information that may be reasonably required in order to make an informed determination pursuant to an ordinance requiring review and approval of site plans by the planning board adopted pursuant to article 6 of this act.  N.J.S.A 40:55D-7.  Consistent with these statutory definitions, and because the Corporate Drive access for the Property already existed, it is inarguable that the proposed subdivision, by itself, conveys no rights to develop buildings or other improvements on the subject property because site plan approval is also required for the development of commercial buildings, associated driveways, parking areas and all of the other features subject to site plan review.
[brief] REPLY  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I  In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188…………………………Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples.  Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938………………………………………Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...] Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………..Pa9  [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………..Pa24  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Appellant, retired Trooper [...], relies on the Procedural History submitted in his original brief as if set forth herein in its entirety.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  The Appellant, retired Trooper [...], relies on the Statement of Facts submitted in his original brief as if set forth herein in its entirety.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009) ................................................................. 82, 86, 87  Matejek v. Watson, 449 N.J. Super. 179 (App. Div. 2017)........................................ 68  McGlynn v. Schultz, 95 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 1967)........................................  77
[brief] Da9-10.  On September 16, 2021, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against the original defendants and added the following defendants, [...] ("[...]"), [...] ("[...]"), [...] ("[...]"), [...] and [...] ("[...]").  Da12-54.  On September 23, 2021, defendants filed an answer and counterclaim as well as a third-party complaint by [...], [...] and [...] against third-party defendants, [...] and [...].
[directive] Recommended Actions for Law Enforcement  Pursuant to these Guidelines which incorporate recommendations by the Working Group in the Report, it is recommended that all Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies take the following actions:  A.  All Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies are encouraged to take all actions recommended for law enforcement agencies listed under II.2.C. of the Report.  Not all Qualified CBVI organizations operating in the Relevant Law Enforcement Agency’s jurisdiction may provide all of the services listed in II.2.C.  Therefore, the recommended  This definition is taken from the Report.  2 Id.  3 Id. 4 Id. 5  5 steps for Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies in II.2.C are only recommended when Qualified CBVI organizations provide those services and an agreement between the two parties is reached.  As noted in II.2.C of the report, some of these actions are discretionary; law enforcement agencies should use their discretion in engaging with CBVI organizations in these practices which require established trust and may be highly sensitive in nature.  While law enforcement officers are encouraged to read the Report in its entirety, section II.2.C includes the following action items for Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies:
[brief] Nevertheless, considered in context, defendant’s refusal to answer certain questions was not an attempt to end dialogue, but rather was ‘part of an ongoing stream of speech,’ which included information about the altercation and defendant’s family disputes. ”  Id. at 623; cf. Johnson, 120 N.J. at 267, 284 (finding defendant’s repeated response of, “I can’t talk about it,” was ambiguous, being susceptible of interpretation as an admission of guilt or the “desire to cut off questioning,” which, therefore, required clarification).
[brief] For purposes of analysis, plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  Id; See also Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 626, 660 (1995).  At this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint.  For purposes of analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  *Id.*  The pleader need only fairly notify the adverse party of the claims and issues such that the case can be defended, and those allegations are deemed true for purposes of motions to dismiss on the pleadings.  *Rieder v. State Dept. Of Transp.*, 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987).  The only issue before the court on a Rule 4:6-2 (e) motion is simply "whether a cause of action is suggested by the facts."  *Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988).  The defendants in their brief, make a bald statement that the elements of the claims are not properly pled, but failed to say to which elements they refer.  Contrary to defense Counsel’s contention, the Appellate Division already found the remaining counts to be intelligible.  The Appellate Division simply requested that the defendants provide additional reasons why the claims should be dismissed.  Here, the Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to support the elements of each claim that the Appellate Division found to be cognizable.  Contrary to defense counsel’s contention, the Plaintiff is only required to minimally plead and show only that she is entitled to relief due to the acts or omissions of the defendants.  For the purpose of determining if dismissal is necessary, the Court must therefore treat the Plaintiff’s version of the facts as uncontradicted and accord it all legitimate inferences.  *Banco Popular v. Ghandi*, 184 N.J. 161 (2003).  At this stage, the Court should pass no judgment on the truth of the facts alleged; but accept them as fact only for the purpose of reviewing the motion to dismiss.  *Id.*  Moreover, the examination of plaintiff’s allegations of facts as required under Rule 4:6-2 (e) should be one that is painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach.  *Id.*  The Court is reminded that at this stage, the facts have yet to be developed and that plaintiff is entitled to every reasonable inference.  *Printing-Mart Morristown*, 116 NJ at 746.  **B.
[brief] *Riggs v. Long Beach Tp.*, 109 N.J. 601, 613 (1988); *Alsip Park Dist. v. D & M Partnership*, 252 Ill. App.3d 277, 192 Ill. Dec. 80, 85, 625 N.E.2d 40, 45 (1993).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that a municipality may use its power of eminent domain to preserve open space regardless of development potential.  In *Mt. Laurel v. MiPro Homes, LLC*, a municipality brought a condemnation action as part of its open space acquisition program against landowner that was planning to develop a subdivision on the subject property.
[brief] Third-party neutrals and judges serve different roles that affect any financial-interest analysis in determining whether there is a conflict.  For example, the New Jersey Constitution forbids Judges in the Superior Court from “engag[ing] in the practice of law or other gainful pursuit” while in office.  N.J. Const. Art. VI, § VI, ¶ 6.  Special masters, on the other hand, “are often practicing attorneys” who “wear different hats depending upon the professional function they are performing from one day to the next. ”  Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  That “duality of roles” does not require a special master to “place his life as an advocate in a state of suspended animation. ”  Ibid.  To the contrary, “[s]uch a requirement would be counterproductive, since many of the best qualified candidates would certainly forego service as a special master if, during that service, they were required to forego completely their private practice. ”  Ibid.  Courts accordingly have resolved special master disqualification motions by balancing the practical demands of special masters as third-party neutrals against the realities of private practice.