ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In March 2020, during the pandemic, [...] issued a stay at home order and ordered the closure of all schools, requiring the District to pivot to a costly and burdensome remote instruction model that it never before implemented in its history.  With over 70% of its 27,000+ students living at or below the poverty level, the stay at home order created extraordinary logistical, financial, and emotional burdens on the District that were unbudgeted and unanticipated, which included: feeding all of its students 2-3 meals a day during a stay-at-home order, ensuring that over 22,000 students were supplied with computers and WiFi to engage in remote instruction, and --- \(^3\) Pa55 – Pa61; Pa211 – Pa215 ensuring compliance with the Individualized Education Plans (IEPs) of over 3,600 students.\textsuperscript{4}  As a result of [...]’s school closures and stay at home orders, [...] did not work for the months of April, May, June, and July 1-6, 2020, so it provided no value or benefit to the Board or its 27,000+ students.
[brief] (Da48).  The trial court issued an oral decision on June 15, 2023, denying [...]’s motion to dismiss, finding that [...] had improperly denied [...]’s OPRA request, and ordering [...] to produce the all emails sent or received by [...] for the date range requested.  (Da45; 1T19:15-21).  The trial court explained that in reaching its decision, it drew a line from this court’s precedent in Burke v. Brandes, 429 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2012), to the Supreme Court’s decision in Paff v. Galloway Twp., 229 N.J. 340 (2017).
[brief] The prosecutor asked him on direct examination about a text sent to him on January 12, 2012 at 10:41 am, "go ahead and do it."  (2T 96-97-22 to 10)  [...] did not question [...] about the disconnect between his call detail records and the alleged text sent from defendant.  Although, [...] testified that he never received the text because his phone died at McDonald's, (2T 95-16 to 22) the call details records do not reflect the text.  (Da 39)  [...] nor [...] was ever interviewed or called by [...] on behalf of defendant's defense.  [...]'s report contained vital information to defendant's case, such as, but not limited to [...] telling her upon the search of the Buick a "silver air soft/pellet gun was found inside," and during an attempted traffic stop of the Buick, it resulted in a suspect fleeing from the car on foot, identified as [...] Mitchell.
[directive] Injury while Driving b.  Actor operates a motor vehicle while driver’s license is suspended or revoked in this or with Suspended 4th Degree  $2,500 to $20,000  10 % permissible any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States Territories of American License or without a Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands, or by another country, or without ever License having been issued a driver’s license, and is involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in serious bodily injury, fourth degree.  Actor receives income from pattern of racketeering activity, as defined in 2C:41-1, or through 1st Degree 100,000 to 400,000
[brief] b.  The Standard of Review for R. 4:50-1 Applications  The decision granting or denying an application to open a judgment will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion.  *Mancini v. EDS*, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993); *Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo*, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966).  An appellate court must defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion unless the trial judge pursued a manifestly unjust course.  *Gillman v Bally Mfg. Corp*, 286 N.J. Super. 525, 528 (App. Div. 1996).  The standard of review for findings of fact from bench trials require appellate courts to "give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions."  *Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean*, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015).  Indeed, appellate courts should “not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge” unless those factual findings were “so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  *Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 84 (1974).  **c.
[brief] POINT ONE  [...]’S $2.1 MILLION HACKENSACK PROJECT CLAIM WAS A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM BELONGING IN THE FIRST ARBITRATION, AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE BARS  [...] FROM BRINGING THIS CLAIM IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING (Pa21, Pa43-44)  ...........................................26  POINT TWO  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WITH RESPECT TO THE SONEHAN ARBITRATION AND RIPENESS (Pa21, Pa44)  ..................................................................................35  POINT THREE  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE FROM THE FIRST ARBITRATION REGARDING [...]’S PERFORMANCE AS A SUBCONTRACTOR AT THE HACKENSACK PROJECT (Pa21, Pa43) .........................39 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................44 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Ajamian v. Schlanger,** | 28 | | 14 N.J. 483 (1954) | | | **Bendar v. Rosen,** | 36 | | 247 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1991) | | | **Consultants v. Chem. & Pollution Scis., Inc.,** | 28 | | 105 N.J. 464 (1987) | | | **Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,** | 30 | | 96 N.J. 336 (1984) | | | **DiTrolio v. Antiles,** | 28, 29, 33, 42 | | 142 N.J. 253 (1995) | | | **Matter of Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation,** | 38 | | 230 N.J. 258 (2017) | | | **Liriano v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,** | 33 | | 474 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 2021) | | | **McNally v. Providence Washington Ins. Co.,** | 36 | | 304 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1997) | | | **Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs.,** | 38 | | 139 N.J. 532 (1995) | | | **Prevratil v. Mohr,** | 27 | | 145 N.J. 180 (1996) | | | **Smith v. Red Top Taxicab Corp.,** | 27 | | 111 N.J.L. 439 | | | **Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.,** | 33 | | 220 N.J. 591 (2015) | | | **Wm. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co.,** | 29 | | 150 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 1977) | | Rules R. 2:9-5(c) .................................................................................................................................25 R. 4:7-1.....................................................................................................................................28
[directive] Assessment.  Risk  Pretrial  Automated for the in all relevant for account not may risk-assessment process pretrial automated  The present the which manner'in fact-sensitive for the account not does  For it example, circumstances. the (e.g., especially dangerous is defendant the that might suggest that committed offense was charged the of elements establish the to required harm that than serious more inflicted defendant for possession involved rather but possession," "simple to limited not firearms was offense a crime; heightened creating a firearm, thereby the pointing or brandishing involved or purpose, unlawful an was offense the victim; vulnerable particularly a against committed was violence; offense the of risk Nor etc.). children, risk heightened to a posed otherwise or children of presence the in committed might which case, the of strength for the process account risk-assessment pretrial automated the does (e.g., fleeing by conviction likely a avoid greater to incentive have would defendant the that suggest the to confessed defendant recording; the audio/video on an captured is conduct offense the where the on found was contraband officer; police a personally by observed was conduct offense the crime; etc.),'o defendant, of person the a issue whether decision to enforcement law the of informing purposes for Furthermore, pretrialrisk-assessment software automated the acomplaint-warrant, for apply or complaint-summons system computer the although state, another from conviction or chazge pending for a account not does criminal out-of-state histoxy that enforcement law indicate will to AOC the by administered out-of-state how (explaining 4.5.8 subsection
[brief] E.  Only Count Five of Ind. #2 May Be Reinstated for Re-Prosecution.  .......................................................................................................................27  F.  Unless and Until Defendant’s Criminal Conviction Under Ind. #2 ([...]) is Restored, He Fails to Qualify for the Imposition of an Extended Term as a Persistent Offender on Ind. #3.  Consequently, Until Ind. #2 is Resolved, Defendant’s Extended Term Sentence Imposed on His Armed Robbery Conviction Under Ind. #3 ([...]) is Illegal and Must Be Amended to an Ordinary Term.  In That Circumstance, Defendant’s Aggregate Sentence Should Be No Greater Than the Ordinary Term of 30 Years With an 85% Parole Bar Imposed on the Kidnapping Conviction Under Ind. #3 ([...]).  .......................................................................................................................29  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................33  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] If a party knows that a court could issue a --- 13  See also [...], Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-Discovery Seas, 10 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 53, 54 (2004), available at https://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol10/iss5/6/ (“Litigants are advised to cooperate early and often in the battle against the common enemy, a huge fluid body of electronic information. ”).  14  Available at https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/12371_cblp_ediscover_order.docx. ruling later on mandating production of “[a]ll documents identified/returned by application of the ESI search terms that the parties negotiated,” Da167 ¶ 1, without any opportunity to review the search results for relevance, it will be much more difficult for the parties to successfully negotiate those terms in the first place.
[brief] State v. Baker, No. A-4406-00 (App. Div. Oct. 23, 2002); State v. Baker, 175 N.J. 433 (2003).  On July 1, 2010, defendant filed his second PCR petition, along with a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and a motion for reconsideration of sentence.  State v. Baker, No. A-3045-10 (App. Div. October 10, 2012) (slip op. at 2).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. denied all applications following oral argument.  Ibid.  The denial was affirmed by this court on October 10, 2012, and defendant’s subsequent petition for certification was denied on June 7, 2013.
[brief] [...], the lead detective on the case (11T198-24 to 199-18), testified that the police “ran out other leads,” but “[t]hey all turned out to be dead ends.  Those leads -- the people that were running out those other leads determined they did not kill [...]. ”  (11T229-16 to 22).  In summation, defense counsel contended that while the State had substantial evidence of [...]’s involvement in the murder, it lacked sufficient evidence to convict [...] beyond a reasonable doubt.  (13T118-11 to 119-2).  Counsel argued that [...]’s supposed confessions to [...] and [...] should not be believed because the details differed as to where the confessions took place and who was present during the confessions.  Furthermore, the witnesses offered inconsistent accounts of the details of [...]’s confession both during their testimony and previous statements to the police, including: whether the victim was shot in the face, neck, or the back of the head; whether the codefendants used their own gun or the victim’s gun; how many times they stopped at [...]’s grandmother’s house; and what the verbal signal was for [...] to shoot the victim.  (13T129-12 to 134-1).  Counsel also emphasized that Hedgespeth was unhappy that [...] had gotten her eighteen-year-old daughter pregnant, was unemployed, and was planning to move with them to live in Section 8 housing in Florida.  (13T119-6 to 119-14).  Moreover, defense counsel argued that while the GPS location data and text messages clearly reflected that [...] was with [...] throughout the day and at the time of the murder, the State’s evidence did not establish that [...] was with [...] and [...].  (13T129-23 to 142-24).  Counsel argued that the historical cell site data from Wood’s phone reflected only that the phone was in a large portion of [...], not precise enough to establish that he was with [...] at the time of the murder.  (13T142-20 to 144-12).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT
[brief] The injured party [...] was operating a personal vehicle as an [...] driver when he was involved in an accident that was caused by a [...] insured.  Subsequent to the accident Mr. Fernandez received $10,000 in Medpay benefits from [...].  At the time [...] filed their inter-company arbitration [...]’s contentions stated:  At the time of this accident [...] was operating a vehicle and providing a prearranged ride for a transportation network company, [...], commonly known as [...].  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5h-2 the vehicle being operated by [...] was a personal vehicle which is defined as a motor vehicle that is used by a transportation network company driver to provide prearranged rides.  A personal vehicle is not considered an automobile as defined by N.J.S.A. 39:6a-2 while the transportation network company driver is providing a prearranged ride.  Pursuant to the provision of N.J.S.A. 39:5h-10.c.  The insurance policy issued by applicant covering the transportation network company was obligated to provide medical payments benefits in the amount of at least $10,000 per person for the benefit of the transportation network company driver.  Per the attached medical bill loss history, the applicant's policy holder is [...] and applicant is entitled to recover their medpay payments from the respondent as the respondent's insured struck applicant's insured.  The collateral source rule N.J.S.A. 2a:15-97 bars recovery of benefits paid by any source as a result of a civil action brought for personal injury or death.  An exclusion to that statutory section are actions brought pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq.  The collateral source rule contained in the pip statute, namely N.J.S.A. 39:6a-12 precludes admissibility or recovery of any payments made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6a-4 or 10 from recovery in a plaintiff's personal injury suit.  The determination as to whether applicant is entitled to recover turns on the determination of whether this action is governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6a-1, et seq.  And whether the payments made by the applicant can be considered pip payments made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6a-4 or 10.  The genesis of the med-pay coverage required on the applicant's policy in the amount $10,000.00 arises from N.J.S.A. 39:5h-10.c.2.
[directive] 8.3.1  When interviewing a law enforcement officer as a witness, he or she must be made aware of the differences between being a witness in a criminal investigation and being the subject of a criminal investigation.  The officer also shall be advised that he or she is not the subject of the investigation at this time.  Appendix I provides a model form that may be used for this purpose.  If at any time the officer becomes a subject of the investigation, he or she shall be advised of that fact and the appropriate procedures must be followed.
[brief] [...]’s Testimony Was Sufficiently Reliable.  The second prong of Rule 702 for the admissibility of expert testimony relates to the reliability of the expert’s testimony.  It is the expert’s analysis and reasoning process applied to the particular facts of the case that is at issue in determining whether his or her testimony is scientifically reliable.  *Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State*, 174 N.J. 412, 431 (2002).  N.J.R.E. 703 addresses the foundation for expert testimony.  It mandates that expert opinion be grounded in “‘facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts. ’”  *State v. Townsend*, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006) (citing N.J.R.E. 703).
[brief] State v. Simmons, [...], unpub.  SOA order (App. Div. May 3, 2017)  .....................................................................................Da27  Judgment of Conviction - Resentence - March 2, 2018 ([...], count 1)  ..............................................................Da28-31  State v. Simmons, [...] (App. Div. Mar. 3, 2022) .........................Da32-43
[brief] Nor did Appellant make any allegation that she acted or refrained from acting as a result of receiving and reviewing the collection letters in question, or the letter vendor’s involvement.  Appx., at Pa1-Pa8.  She notably did not allege that Respondent collected any such money from her relating to the debt which was the subject of the collection letter.  *Id.*  Thus, absent any future attempt to coerce payment on Appellant’s personal account through a court of law, Appellant has suffered no harm or adverseness from Respondent’s attempts to solicit voluntary payment of her debt.  Having made no payment on the account as a result of Respondent’s collection activities, Appellant did not suffer any pecuniary injury and risked no harm from any unfavorable decision from the Superior Court.
[brief] There was No Prejudice by Granting the Request for Aggravation Charge After Closing Arguments, Upon Realization of the Mistake; and further, any Prejudice was Cured by Affording Supplemental Closing Argument(s)**  Relative to the issue of prejudice, Appellant objects pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403, which is an evidentiary rule regarding relevancy and undue prejudice of evidence.  As should be abundantly clear at this point is the fact that Appellant never lodged a single objection to the evidence that was presented to the jury; specifically, [...]’s explicit opinion of an aggravation.  Furthermore, Appellant was placed upon notice of Respondent’s potential claim for aggravation, prior to trial.  Respondent answered Form A interrogatories on March 16, 2022, indicating in response to number nine (9) regarding the worsening of a prior condition, “To the extent Plaintiff had any pre-existing or degenerative conditions, relative to the body part injured herein, same were asymptomatic prior to the instant accident and as such, were aggravated and/or exacerbated as a result. ”  Respondent served the January 13, 2023, office note of [...], wherein his opinion of aggravation is explicitly listed.  Respondent listed the aggravation charge in her requests for jury instructions as part of her Pre-Trial submissions, filed July 26, 2023.  [...] offered his trial testimony via de bene esse deposition taken August 14, 2023, again, explicitly opining to “aggravation”.  Trial did not occur until October 3, 2023, and in the interim, Appellant filed two (2) Motions in Limine; neither of which related to [...]’s testimony and/or opinion relative to aggravation.  On October 5, 2023, [...]’s opinion relative to aggravation was presented to the jury, without objection.  Clearly, not only is the objection waived given the above, but there can be absolutely no claim of prejudice by the Appellant who was on notice of the aggravation claim for a year-and-a-half prior to the trial.
[brief] EXHIBIT  2  Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (3a and 4a of Appendix)  EXHIBIT  3  [...] Appeal of Final Notice of Disciplinary Hearing (See Pages 5a, 6a, 7a, 8a and 9a of Appendix)  EXHIBIT  4  Decision of [...] dated May 22, 2023 (See Pages 10a to Page 29a of Appendix)  EXHIBIT  5  Decision of Acting Chairperson Civil Services Commission dated July 19, 2023 (See Pages 30a to Page 33a of Appendix)  EXHIBIT  6  Letter dated April 14, 2020, from [...], Commissioner of [...] to James [...] (See Page 34a of Appendix)  EXHIBIT  7  Leave of Absence - Pre-Pay Schedule (See Page 35a of Appendix)  EXHIBIT  8  Letter from [...] dated March 19, 2020 (See Page 36a of Appendix)  EXHIBIT  9  Email dated April 17, 2020, from [...] to several [...] personnel (See Page 37a of Appendix)  EXHIBIT  10  Summation of James [...] to [...] (P. 1, first paragraph)  CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX
[brief] reports, [...] produced an addendum report dated September 13, 2017.  (Pa166, Pa172; T313:20-14:9).  The addendum report stated:  MRI Reports of the cervical spine are dated 10/27/00 and 4/27/04.  The MRI report of 4/27/04 revealed that the small disc herniation on the right at C6-C7 had increased in size compared to the previous study of 10/27/00.  This now caused impression of the anterior aspect of the thecal sac and implanting the cervical spinal cord in sagittal diameter.  The disc herniation extends slightly to the right neural foramin which has narrowed.  There is a mild annular bulge at C5-C6 that was unchanged.  Clearly, there were significant pretexting conditions with a prior accident causing an injury to the neck on 3/25/04 as well as an accident documented in 2002.  Therefore, the pathology noted on the previous MRI studies of the cervical spine in 2000 and 2004 clearly were preexisting conditions with prior treatment of the cervical spine.
[brief] Defendant [...] (“[...]”) appeals the Trial Court’s October 13, 2023 Order granting Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause and allowing the sale of real property located at [...] (“Subject Property”) to proceed and the Trial Court’s October 13, 2023 Order denying defendant/appellant’s motion for permission to file counterclaims in response to Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint.  The Trial Court’s decision should be overturned because:  (1) the Trial Court improperly granted the application for Order to Show Cause allowing the sale of the Subject Property to proceed when there were numerous issues and disputes of fact presented to the Trial Court relating to the sale and marketing of the Subject Property in contravention of a Consent Judgment, including whether such sale and marketing were conducted in good faith, requiring the matter to proceed by way of a plenary action; (2) the Trial Court failed to consider and enforce the April 13, 2022 Consent Order relating to the sale of the Subject Property; (3) the Trial Court erred in failing to allow defendant/appellant to assert counterclaims in response to the Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint where the issues raised in the counterclaims were directly related to the issue of whether the requested sale of the Subject Property was valid and conducted in good faith; and (4) the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute raised in the Order to Show Cause because the Subject Property was not a probate asset and enforcement of a Consent Judgment is considered a breach of contract action, not a probate matter.  Should the Trial Court’s Orders stand, Defendant [...] would be deprived of a fair, equitable and just adjudication of the merits of his counterclaims in this matter and deprived of, not only his rights as property owner of the Subject Property but, his rights under the agreed upon Consent Judgment of April 13, 2022.
[brief] In or around 2013, at the urging of [...] and due in part to Plaintiff’s success at the Firm in trying and settling cases and attracting clients, Plaintiff was named Managing Partner of [...] Law by [...].  Da36, ¶ 11.  Around this time, [...] took up residence in Florida, and was not present in New Jersey full-time, so he needed Plaintiff to manage the litigations.  Also, around this time, [...] began to discuss his succession plans with Plaintiff, suggesting that Plaintiff would be chosen to take over the firm’s operations upon [...]’s retirement.