ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Page Cases  Application of Boardwalk Regency Corp. for a Casino License, 180 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 1981)  37  Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596 (1998)  41 Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 N.J.Super. 47 (App. Div. 1956)  31 Cresskill v. Dumont, 15 N.J. 235 (1954)  28 ERE TC, LLC v. City of Perth Amboy, 381 N.J. Super. 268, (App. Div. 2005)  33 Fields v. Princeton University, 28 N.J. Tax 574 (Tax 2014)  31  Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344 (2007)  33 Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001)  29, 31, 33, 36, 37, 46, 38  Lyons v. City of Camden, 48 N.J. 524 (1967)  36 Malanga v. Tp. of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291(2023)  23, 32, 34, 36 MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal LLC v. Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2018), certif.den. 236 N.J. 387 (2019)  21  Millennium Towers Urban Renewal LLC v. Mun. Council of City of Jersey City, 343 N.J. Super. 367 (Law Div. 2001)  21, 24, 34 New Jersey Shore Builders Association v. Mayor and Township Committee of Township of Middletown, 234 N.J. Super. 619 (Law Div. 1989)  36 Princeton University Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209 (1961)  35 Riggs v. Long Beach Tp., 109 N.J. 601 (1988)  32  Riva Finnegan LLC v. Township Council of Township of South Brunswick, 97 N.J. 184 (2008)  37 Secaucus v. Jersey City, 19 N.J. Tax 10 (Tax 2000)  35 62-64 Main St. v. Mayor & Council of Hackensack, 221 N.J. 129 (2015)  23 Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158 (1983)  46 Town of Secaucus v. City of Jersey City, 20 N.J. Tax 384 (Tax 2002)  3 New Jersey Constitution Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 1(a)  22  Article VIII, Section 3, paragraph 1 22, 23  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq.  (LRHL)  21 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d)  32,33  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6b(5)(c)  34  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1, et seq. (LTTEL)  6  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2 21, 22 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-3(a)  13 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11a 25, 29 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11b 27, 29 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-15  13 N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6  Rules R.4:10-3  Official Publications  A Programmatic Examination of Municipal Tax Abatements (Office of the State Comptroller, 2010)  Municipal Tax Abatement Handbook, Department of Community Affairs (Lt. Governor [...], Commissioner)  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Appellate Standard of Review on Motion For New Trial  The appellate standard of review for reversible error on a motion for new trial is that “a reviewing court must take into account the views of the trial judge insofar as firsthand observation may be significant, but, having done so, it remains the duty of the reviewing court to determine whether in its view there was a manifest denial or miscarriage of justice.  *Fisch v. Manger*, 24 N.J. 66, 80 (1957).  “‘[T]he trial court's ‘action should not be disturbed unless it clearly and unequivocally appears there was a manifest denial of justice under the law. ’”  *Dolson v. Anastasia*, 55 N.J. 2, 8 (1969).  **Appellate Standard of Review of Plain Error**  The appellate court reviews under a plain error analysis when a party fails to interpose a timely objection to evidence or testimony presented at trial.  “When a defendant does not object to an alleged error at trial, such error is reviewed under the plain error standard. ”  *State v. Singh*, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021).  In those cases, “an unchallenged error constitutes plain error if it was ‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  *Id.* (quoting R. 2:10-2).  Under the plain error standard of review, the appellate court must disregard any error or omission “unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  “The possibility of an unjust result must be ‘sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  *State v. Ross*, 229 N.J. 389, 407 (2017)(quoting *State v. Williams*, 168 N.J. 323, 336 (2001)).  “It is beyond cavil that ‘[p]lain error is a high bar. ’”  *State v. C.W.H.*, 465 N.J. Super. 574, 595 (App. Div. 2021)(quoting *State v. Santamaria*, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019)).  “The ‘high standard’ used in plain error analysis ‘provides a strong incentive for counsel to interpose a timely objection, enabling the trial court to forestall or correct a potential error. ’”  *State v. Santamaria*, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019)(quoting *State v. Bueso*, 225 N.J. 193, 203 (2016)).  “A defendant who does not raise an issue before a trial court bears the burden of establishing that the trial court's actions constituted plain error because to rerun a trial when the error could easily have been cured on request[ ] would reward the litigant who suffers an error for tactical advantage either in the trial or on appeal. ”  *State v. C.W.H.*, 465 N.J. Super. 574, 595 (App. Div. 2021)(quoting *State v. Santamaria*, 236 N.J. 390, 404-05 (2019).
[brief] On December 31, 2008, to rectify this issue, [...] recorded a journal entry to show that the Cottage Street property was acquired in December 2008, rather than in January 2009.  These dates are inconsistent with the actual transaction documents, and there is no documentation tracing these funds as actually being used to purchase the Jersey City property.  (Da6702; 20T 128:25 to 130:9).  -
[brief] ”  Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 125 N.J. 567, 595 (1991); Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980).  An administrative agency’s determination is presumptively correct, and on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962).  Thus, if a court “is satisfied after its review that the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head’s decision, then it must affirm even if the court feels that it would have reached a different result.
[brief] After a one-day trial before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., his Honor dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, finding:  [T]he Planning Board’s adoption of Resolution No. PB10-2022 dated October 12, 2022 and the Borough Council’s subsequent adoption of Ordinance No. 22-1516 on October 24, 2022 to effectuate and implement the Board’s recommended amendments to the Borough’s Redevelopment Plan, and resulting Amended Redevelopment Plan itself, shall be AFFIRMED in all respects.
[directive] De-Activation During Criminal Investigation Strategy/Planning Discussions.  Notwithstanding Section 5.3, and subject to the requirements of Section 5.5, unless the agency adopts a policy that prohibits or restricts de-activation as may be authorized by this Section, a BWC-equipped officer may de-activate a BWC while participating in a discussion pertaining to criminal investigation strategy and planning (e.g., to consider what investigative techniques to pursue, such as what questions to pose to a suspect or witness, whether to summon a drug/explosives detection canine, whether to apply for a search warrant, whether to request permission to conduct a consent search, or to conduct another type of warrantless search, etc.), provided that the strategy/planning discussion is not conducted in the immediate presence of a civilian (i.e., under circumstances where a civilian might overhear the strategy discussion), and further provided that the BWC- equipped officer is not actively engaged in the collection of physical evidence (i.e., conducting a search).  When an officer de-activates a BWC pursuant to this Section, the officer shall narrate the circumstances of the de-activation (e.g., “I am now turning off my BWC to discuss investigative strategy with my supervisor. ”).  6.6
[brief] POINT EIGHT THE TWO FEBRUARY 21, 2019  ORDERS AND THE TWO MAY 29, 2019  ORDERS AWARDING SANCTIONS/ATTORNEY'S FEES RELATING TO THE SIXTH STREET VIOLATIONS AND THE FENCE VIOLATION ARE NOT ONLY PRODUCTS OF THE ERRONEOUS JUNE 27, 2007 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT-WHICH RESULTED IN AN UNCONTROLLED AND DANGEROUS SITUATION IN FRONT OF A 400-STUDENT GRADE SCHOOL AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY VACATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION ON JUNE 25, 2019 - BUT ALSO AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION (Da295, 965; 971) (Da643, 967, 969) (3T109:20; 3T112:13; 3T112:22) (Da690,692)
[brief] The decision came on appeal from a chancery court’s grant of a defendant’s motion for relief from judgment of foreclosure under Rule 4:50-1(f).  Among other reasons, the chancery court granted the motion based on the high amount of equity in the property above the taxes owed.  The initial motion was granted before the U.S.  Supreme Court rendered its decision in Tyler.  Although the Appellate Division upheld the vacation of the foreclosure judgment on the general equitable principles contemplated by Rule 4:50-1(f), it also opined on the application of Tyler for prudential reasons, establishing direct applicability of Tyler to that matter.
[brief] In connection with actions by “administrative bodies, the term means ‘willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances. ’”  In re Xanadu, 402 N.J. Super at 642 (quoting Bayshore, 122 N.J. Super at 199).  “Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. ”  *Bayshore*, 122 N.J. Super at 199.  “The fundamental consideration is that a court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of an agency so long as that action is statutorily authorized and not otherwise defective because arbitrary or unreasonable [or not supported by the record]. ”  *In re FWW GPs*, 372 N.J. Super. at 593 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).  “The burden of demonstrating that the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action. ”  *In re Adoption of Amendments to Ne., Upper Raritan, Sussex Cnty.*, 435 N.J. Super. 571, 582 (App. Div. 2014) (citation omitted).  **B.
[brief] a.  The person whose communication is to be intercepted is engaging or was engaged over a period of time as a part of a continuing criminal activity or is committing, has or had committed or is about to commit an [enumerated] offense … ; b.  Particular communications concerning such offense may be obtained through such interception; c.  Normal investigative procedures with respect to such offense have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous to employ; [and]  d.  Except in the case of an application meeting the requirements of [N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9, the roving wiretap provision], the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, electronic or oral communications are to be intercepted, are or have been used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by, such individual.
[brief] Nowhere within the text of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 is it stated that the sworn statement must be filed within the same timeframe as the affidavit of merit itself.  The Trial Court Judge relied on the words “in lieu of an affidavit” to read into the statute a requirement that is not explicitly set forth by the clear text of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28.  In doing so, the Trial Court Judge ran aground of a crucial rule of statutory interpretation, the rule that requires the Court to apply the plain language of the statute.  See Dept. of Law Public Safety v. Bigham, 119 N.J. 646, 651 (1990) (quoting Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 548, 556 (1979) (explaining that when the language of a statute is clear, the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance with those terms).
[brief] 1.  The Restrictive Covenant Protects the Practice’s Legitimate Interests.  The Restrictive Covenant protects the Practice’s legitimate business interests including: (1) its patient and patient referral bases; and (2) the investment in [...].  More, 183 N.J. at 42.  [...] expressly acknowledged this as part of his Agreement, which he negotiated.  (Ra12).  The twenty-mile radius is necessary to protect the Practice’s referral and patient base, which it has spent years and millions building.  (Ra13-16).  It represents the Practice’s goodwill.  (Ra93-118).  The scope is indisputably reasonable given the overcrowded ENT market in Central Jersey.  (Ra33-59).6  Although [...] was not newly out of residency, he admits he had no presence in New Jersey when he began working at the Practice.  (Ab22).  He had no patients or referral sources when he joined the Practice.  Nor did he have any when --- 6  [...]’s anticipated argument that [...]’s exact zip code was not included in the expert’s analysis misses the point, which is that practices within [...] that are also within 20 miles of the Practice comprise the relevant market.  That includes [...].  he left the Practice.  He was dependent on the Practice and [...] and [...].  Those are the only sources of business that [...] has to offer to a new employer.  In addition to its patients and referral sources, it takes the Practice on average five years to recoup its investment in a physician.  The Practice paid [...] a base salary of $300,000, plus bonuses, such that his compensation over the past five years exceeded $1.5 million dollars.  The Practice paid for his continuing medical education and malpractice insurance, which cost the Practice more than $76,000.  That represents a significant investment in [...].  (Ra13-16)  Five years also the time it takes for the Practice to recruit and train a replacement for [...].  That is why the initial term of the Employment Agreement and the period for the Restrictive Covenant are both five years.  (Id.)  The Practice also shared its Confidential Information with [...], which was the subject of a separate prohibition against sharing.  [...] argues that because he currently agrees to be bound by that provision, the Practice does not need the protection of the Restrictive Covenant.  Leaving aside the fact that it is not up to [...] to decide what the Practice needs to protect its interests, he is wrong.  (Ra13, ¶¶27-29)  The various provisions in the Employment Agreement do not operate in isolation as [...] argues.  Rather, the Restrictive Covenant, the Non-Solicitation Agreement and the prohibition on disclosing Confidential Information work together to protect all of the Practice’s interests.  (Id.)  Collectively, they ensure that [...] does not and has no reason or justification for seeking to disclose the Practice’s Confidential Information, soliciting its patients or referral sources; he is prohibited from putting himself in a circumstance where doing either could be beneficial by virtue of the Restrictive Covenant.  Thus, [...] is required to abide by all aspects of the restrictions to protect the Practice just as he agreed.  2.
[brief] Anyone (a) willfully or (b) negligently depriving (2) another, of his or her right to possession of property, (3) such as through some act repudiating the right of possession, or some exercise of dominion over the property inconsistent with the right of possession, or some act done which has the effect of destroying or changing the quality of the property, (4) including the conversion of a negotiable instrument, (5) or an illegal conversion or an exercise of dominion over the pledger’s property by the pledgee contrary to the terms of the pledge, (6) or anyone aiding, instigating, or assisting the same, without authorization, (7) is liable to the person entitled to possession of the property, (8) for return of the property with any enhancement in value or change in condition, even from an innocent purchaser, (9) for the value of the property, and (10) for damages including punitive damages, proximately caused by the wrongful conduct, (11) unless the recipient of the property in the form of money received the money in exchange for something of equivalent or comparable value without participation in or knowledge of a fraud or theft involving the money against the victim, (12) but whether the wrongdoer lawfully possessed the property, a reasonable demand for the surrender of the property must be refused without reasonable conditions by a person obligated to surrender the property or by an agent or employee with the power to surrender the property.  N.J.S.A. 12A:3-420[(4)].  The act of attempting to take the land of another person and claim it is conversion.  In the instant matter, this act is in violation to [...]’s property ownership rights and is prohibited.  In light of the failure to respect the property that is owned by [...] by purchase as well as the property owned via Adverse Possession, [...] must be admonished from efforts to convert the property known as [...].
[brief] Letter Order by Hon. [...], A.L.J., in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] issued September 15, 2020, denying [...]’s motion of May 5, 2020, to strike the rebuttal testimony of [...]’s witnesses [...], [...], and [...] (SOICR #57)  ..................................................  H171a  [...]’s motion June 30, 2020, in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] to dismiss [...]’s petition for failure to respond to discovery (SOICR #52)  .................................................  H180a  [...]’s motion June 24, 2020, for reconsideration of Order issued June 11, 2020, by Hon. [...], A. L.J., denying motion directing [...] to reassess petition in light of the N.J. EMP, in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] (SOICR #46), attaching...  H197a BPU’s Order Directing the Utilities to Establish Energy Efficiency and Peak Demand Reduction Programs issued June 10, 2020, in BPU Clean Energy and Energy Docket Nos. [...], [...], and [...], entitled In the Matter of the Implementation of P.L. 2018, c. 17 Regarding the Establishment of Energy Efficiency and Peak Demand Reduction Programs..........................
[directive] The nature and source of internal allegations, the progress of internal affairs investigations, and the resulting materials are confidential information.  The contents of an internal investigation case file, including the original complaint, shall be retained in the internal affairs function and clearly marked as confidential.  The information and records of an internal investigation shall only be released or shared under the following limited circumstances:  (a)  If administrative charges have been brought against an officer and a hearing will be held, a copy of all discoverable materials shall be provided to the officer and the hearing officer before the hearing; (b)  If the subject officer, agency or governing jurisdiction has been named as a defendant in a lawsuit arising out of the specific incident covered by an internal investigation, a copy of the internal investigative reports may be released to the attorney representing the subject officer, agency or jurisdiction; (c)  Upon the request or at the direction of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General; or (d)  Upon a court order.  9.6.2
[brief] [...], NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS OWNER TRUSTEE FOR RCF  2  ACQUISITION TRUST [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...] Parsippany, New Jersey  07054 [...]  [...]  Of Counsel and on the Brief::  [...] (021182008)  [...] (408152022)  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 7 | | A. The Loan And The Property | 7 | | B.
[brief] ”  (Aa32).  Specifically, the CSC recognized N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(c)’s five-day threshold begins when “the employee is advised of being absent without authorization. ” (Ibid.).  It acknowledged [...] knew “his continued absence was unauthorized without medical documentation” and that “none of the other communications from any of the appointing authority representatives . . . indicated that any of his absences . . . were approved, unless he produced appropriate medical documentation covering those absences. ” (Ibid.).  (Emphasis in original).  [...] never provided any such medical documentation, and as the CSC concluded, “the medical documentation provided would only be considered valid beginning on April 15, 2020, the date he began receiving Workers’ Compensation benefits for a medical condition unrelated to the reasons for his failure to return on April 6, 2020. ” (Ibid.).  (Emphasis in original).  Thus, [...] abandoned his position, and because the [...] gave him multiple opportunities to provide medical documentation justifying those absences between April 7 and 14, it acted reasonably in “not authorizing the absences and resigning him not in good standing. ” (Ibid.).  This appeal timely followed.  ARGUMENTS POINT I BECAUSE BARTOS FAILED TO RETURN TO WORK FOR FIVE CONSECUTIVE DAYS WITHOUT APPROVAL FROM HIS SUPERVISOR AND THEREBY ABANDONED HIS JOB WITH THE [...], THE RESIGNATION NOT IN GOOD STANDING IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
[brief] The policy at issue had liability limits of $100,000/$300,000 but also contained an intra-family step-down exclusion, which purported to lower coverage for damages to an insured to the “portion of damages that is less than or equal to the minimum limits required by New Jersey law. ”  Id. at *3.  “Minimum limits” was defined to mean the “limits of liability as required by New Jersey law, to be provided under a standard policy of automobile liability insurance:  . . . $15,000 for each person, subject to $30,000 for each accident with respect to ‘bodily injury[.]’”  *Id.* at *4.  The claims adjuster apparently was unaware of the step-down provision and originally offered the insured the $100,000 limits of the policy.
[directive] A law enforcement officer may only pursue under the circumstances described in subparagraph A or subparagraph B: (a) when the officer reasonably believes that the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime of the first degree or one of the following violent or serious crimes of the second degree: (1)  Manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4; (2) Vehicular Homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5; (3) Aggravated Assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b); (4) Disarming a Law Enforcement Officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11; (5) Kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1; (6) Luring/Enticing a Child, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6; (7) Human Trafficking, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8; (8) Sexual Assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2; (9) Robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; (10) Arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1; (11) Burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; (12) Escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5.  (b) when an officer reasonably believes that the violator poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other officers.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, including speeding or evasive driving during the pursuit itself, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.  3.2.1
[brief] ”  Wampler v. Dental Health Assocs., P.A., No. A-1796-13T4, 2015 WL 10568695, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (quotation marks omitted); Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., No. A-1207-22, 2024 WL 3934132, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024) (“We review a trial court’s discovery rulings pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard of review. ”).  Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Motion to Compel and Motion for Reconsideration, and his appeal should therefore be denied.