ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] An officer may use deadly force in New Jersey when the officer reasonably believes it is immediately necessary to protect the officer or another person from imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.  A law enacted in January 2019, Senate Bill 1036, requires that the Attorney General’s Office conduct investigations of a person’s death that occurs during an encounter with a law enforcement officer acting in the officer’s official capacity or while the decedent is in custody.  The law requires that such investigations be presented to a grand jury to determine if the evidence supports the return of an indictment against the officer or officers involved.  The investigation was conducted by the Attorney General’s Shooting Response Task Force in accordance with the Attorney General’s Independent Prosecutor Directive, issued in 2006, strengthened in 2015, and expanded in December 2019.  The Independent Prosecutor Directive is posted on the Attorney General’s website at the following link:  https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-Directive-2019-4.pdf  Further information about how officer-involved shootings are investigated in New Jersey under the directive is found at this link:  http://www.nj.gov/oag/independent-prosecutor/  # # # 2
[brief] Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947).  ...........................................9  Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469 (App. Div. 1997)  .............................................10  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).  .........................................................11  Berbarian v. Lynn, 355 N. J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 2002)  ..................................................13, 18 Blum v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2734 .......................21, 22 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  ............................................................11  Central R.R. Co. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 172 cert. den. 357 U.S. 928(1958).  ..............................8  EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Envtl. Barrier Co., LLC, 440 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2015)  .........................................................................................................................11  Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1998).  .........................................................................................................................8, 9  Garrow v. Elizabeth General Hospital & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549(1979) .....................8  Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500 (1992)  ..............................................9  In re Estate of Balk, 445 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 2016) ..................................................8 Karl’s Sales & Serv. V. Gimbel Bros., 249 N.J. Super. 487 (App. Div. 1991) .........................................................................................................................21, 23 Kiefer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011) ........................................................................8 Larson & Fish, Inc., v. Schultz, 5 N.J. Super. 403 (App. Div. 1949) ........................................17, 18 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) .............8 Nakamoto v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56500.......................21, 22 Oubre v. Entergy Operations, 522 U.S. 422 (1998) ............................................................20 Ruffin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 5745118 (D.N.J. 2016) ................................................13, 14, 15 Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359 (2007) .....................................................8 Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 242 (2013)  .................................................................14, 15, 16  ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY-------------------------------------1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ---------------------------------------------------2  LEGAL ARGUMENT --------------------------------------------------------13  POINT I LEAVE TO APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED TO PREVENT IRREPABABLE HARM TO THE STATE -------------------------------------------------------------13  POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE PHONE CALLS MADE TO HIS PARENTS --------------------------------------------------------15 CONCLUSION---------------------------------------------------------------22
[brief] [...] filed Aug. 8, 2022 Exceptions to Intermediate Accounting (Exh. “K”)(94a-107a) that was in addition to his Answer to Verified Complaint  My Aug 8, ‘22 Cert. had Opposition to Verified Complaint, Account Exceptions, & Aug. 4th letters (Exh. “L”)(109a-136a).  It required [...] not to be discharged as Trustee pending Court approval of corrected Accounting & possible Reserve for his possible Trust admin costs after discharge (Exh. “L”) (110a, par. 5&7).  Mr. [...]’s Aug. 12, 2022 Certifications opposed Exceptions to Accounting by [...] (Exh. “N”)(151a-154a) and me (Exh. “O”)(156a-160a).  There was a Sept. 22, 2022 Hearing for the parties’ final arguments (1T).  Court Order with Rider was issued Oct. 6, 2022 (Exh. “B”)(16a-34a).  It wrongly approved Verified Complaint & Intermediate Account (par. 1), past Trust $31,259.74 payments for ‘19-‘22 accounting fees(par. 1c), past Trust payments of $15,022.72 for legal fees (par. 1d), & [...]’s discharge as Co-Trustee (par. 2)(prior to Court approval of any Trust Reserve, in contradiction to Verified Complaint, par. 12).
[brief] *(See* 1T 17:1-18:13) (in the trial court’s summary of the parties’ arguments, stating that “Plaintiff notes that he never served a deposition notice for a corporate representative” of the German Defendants but that “[h]e served notice on [...] and [...] individually”).  Therefore, it is wholly inappropriate for Plaintiff to seek to compel the German Defendants to produce [...]—a non-party located in Germany—to appear for a deposition in his individual capacity by way of deposition notice rather than by subpoena to [...] directly.  Although Plaintiff also relies on Rule 4:23-4, that Rule likewise does not demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the trial court, and instead reaffirms the conclusion that Plaintiff’s issuance of a notice to compel [...]’s deposition in his individual capacity was incorrect.  Indeed, Rule 4:23-4 is titled “Failure *of Party* to Attend at Own Deposition,” and provides certain sanctions resulting from *a party*’s failure to appear:
[brief] There is no such directive for an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  In fact, nowhere is there even a requirement for one to be obtained and delivered to Plaintiff.  Paragraph 9.1(l), relied upon by Defendant (Pb11,18), only requires delivery at closing of an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate “if obtained. ”  Had the PSA required the Defendant to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, this clause would have been mandatory, which it is not.  Defendant cannot seek safe harbor by relying on the indefinite article ‘an’ estoppel certificate contained in the sentences preceding the one requiring prompt delivery of “the executed Estoppel Certificate”.
[brief] Russo v. Bd. Of Trs., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)(citing In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)).  This Court does grant a strong presumption of reasonableness to an agency’s exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibility, *City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council*, 82 N.J. 530, 539 cert. denied, 49 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980), and defer to its fact finding.  *Utley v. Bd of Review*, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008).  The agency’s decision should be upheld unless there is a “clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record or that it violated legislative policies.  *In re Musick*, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996); *Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv.*, 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963); *Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys.*, 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013) (Citing *Hemsey v. Bd of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys.*, 198 N.J. 215, 223-24 2009).  On appeal, "the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion to the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the fact finder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs."  *Brady v. Bd of Review*, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) ("*Charatam v. Board of Review*, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985).  So long as the "factual findings" are supported by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.  *Ibid.*  Nevertheless, if the Court's review of the record shows that the agency's finding is clearly mistaken, the decision is not entitled to judicial deference, *See H.K. v. Department of Human Services*, 184 N.J. 367, 386 (2005); *L.N. v. State, Div. of Med. Assist. and Health Servs.*, 140 N.J. 480, 490 (1985) nor is this Court bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue.  *Mayflower Cec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85,93 (1973).  The public pension systems are “bound up in the public interest and provide public employees significant rights which are deserving of conscientious protection. ”  *Zigmont v. Bd. Of Trs. Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund*, 91 N.J. 580, 583 (1983).  Because pension statutes are remedial in character, they are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.  *Klumb v. Bd of Educ. Of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg’l High Sch. Dist.*, 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009).  In this case, the Board adopted the ALJ’s application of the law and the facts.  Therefore, it is respectfully requested this Court focus on [...]’s narrow construction and misinterpretation of the law and find his decision, and the Board’s determination, not entitled to this Court’s deference as it misinterprets the statute and clear legislative intent as well as the case law; specifically *Richardson vs. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System*, 192 N.J. 189 (2007) and *Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System*, 438 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2014).
[brief] Da110 (§ 8.6(c)); Da63 (defining “Authority Revenue Share” as “33.34 percent of all Excess Revenues”); Da72 (defining “Redeveloper’s Revenue Share” as “66.66 percent of all Excess Revenues”).  Because the Authority Garage was never built, [...] could only share in revenues if the Project Garage met the parking revenue threshold each year.  1T76:9-15.  That revenue threshold was predicated on operations of both the Project Garage and the Authority Garage (inclusive of an additional $400,000 above parking revenues generated by the Authority’s surface lots on those parcels prior to the Project) to defray the Authority’s anticipated cost to construct the Authority Garage.  4T83:21-84:3.  From 2007 to the present, [...] has not shared in any revenue generated by the Project Garage, because revenues never exceeded the threshold.  1T76:9-15; J-06 to J-15.  Meanwhile, the Authority has retained over $8 million in total revenue from the Project Garage from 2009 to 2019.  See Pa3; Pa42; Pa83; Pa83; Pa121; Pa219; Pa267; Pa320; Pa368; Pa418; Pa773.  In that time, [...] paid operating expenses of nearly $3.2 million, *without any return on its investment*.  *Ibid.*  The Authority acknowledged the impossibility of [...]’s situation when [...] and the Authority’s financial consultant, [...] (“[...]”), confirmed that revenues from the Project Garage alone could never surpass the $1.6 million revenue threshold.
[brief] **  Defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by utilizing “inflammatory and highly emotional appeals” in his opening statement and summation, which served “only to prejudice the jury against [defendant].” (Db34 to 37; *State v. W.L.*, 292 N.J. Super. 100, 110-11 (App. Div. 1996)(internal citations omitted); see also *State v. Blakney*, 189 N.J. 88, 96 (2006)).
[brief] See DA-001-DA-012.  After discovery was completed, an 8-day jury trial was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (“the Trial Court”).  See generally, 1T – 8T.  At the conclusion of the trial, the Jury entered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff on her claims of disability-based hostile work environment and retaliation under the LAD.  See DA-083-DA084.  On June 13, 2023, the Defendants filed a motion for a new trial.  See DA-085-DA-087.  Contrary to the misleading R. 2:6-2(a)(5) references in the Defendants Brief, their arguments on appeal were not raised during or before trial, but rather for the first time in their motion for a new trial.  See Pa1-Pa28.  Plaintiff opposed this motion on July 13, 2023.  See Pa29-Pa61.  Defendants filed a reply on July 17, 2022.  See Pa62-Pa75.  On or around July 21, 2023, the --- 1  Pursuant to R. 2:6-8, the record citation abbreviations used in this brief are as follows:
[brief] The trial judge gave no legal analysis, citations, or statement of reasons explaining the decision.  The tenant posted the full amount of rent arrears in escrow with the court and submitted a motion to fix the reimbursement amount owed by the landlord.  Despite having invited the additional briefing, the trial judge made no further rulings for another two years and once the judge did finally rule, he still refused to reach the merits the tenant’s arguments as to the construction reimbursements, claiming a lack of jurisdiction.  The trial judge failed to reconcile this abnegation of his judicial role with a prior interlocutory order in the same case already purporting to address the reimbursement issue, finding that no reimbursement could be awarded while tenant was “in breach. ”
[brief] BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST [...] WAS PREMISED ON CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY AND SELF-DEALING, [...] HAD NO DUTY TO APPEAL  With respect to the alleged duty to appeal the adverse findings, [...] concedes an absence of on-point New Jersey authority and seeks, conveniently, to rely on a Vermont case, Pharmacists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Myer, 993 A.2d 413 (Vt. 2010).
[brief] However, the Court agreed with [...]’s position that the BLD Lease was irrelevant.  1T 21-3 to 22-1; 22-18 to 24-11.  As such, regardless of the Motion to supplement, the Court definitively held that the “prior Lease” was irrelevant and the only document before the Court was the Lease itself.  Pa59.  The Court’s ruling was correct based on the legal argument quoted from [...]’s submission, Pra1.  After hearing and argument, the trial court found the language on page 11 of the Lease was clear and unequivocal and established a guarantee agreement between [...], [...], and [...], and the landlord, [...], 1T63-10 to IT64-11.  The court distinguished the case of City of Millville vs. Rock, 687 F. Supp.  2d 319 (D.N.J. 2010)  1T64-12 to 1T65-1.  Moreover, during oral argument the court stated:  …I’m looking at the last paragraph of what they signed and it says, it witness whereof the parties hereto have caused these ---- these present to be executed on the day and year first above written.  Additionally, the undersigned jointly and severally each have personally guaranteed the obligations of the tenant herein.  How do I read that any other way?  1T15-13 to 20.  The court goes on to observe that their home addresses are beneath their signature lines.  1T16-12 to 13.  The court goes on to rhetorically ask, ...I should negate the fact that it says --- the undersigned is jointly and severally each hereby personally guarantee.  Based on all of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court’s ruling was correct, and Defendants, [...], [...], and [...] guaranteed the obligations of [...] under the February 20, 2015 Lease.
[brief] ”  (210T137),  If they are not Burt defendants, with the allocation consequences that flow from Burt, then [...] and [...] must be “empty chair” defendants, which occurs when “a defendant shifts blame to a joint tortfeasor who is not in the courtroom. ”  Brodsky, 181 N.J. at 114.  There is no recognized basis for “empty chair” treatment of these doctors.
[brief] THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT THREE SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED SECTION 8(e) OF THE MASTER DEED AUTHORIZED THE SALE OF UNIT 74 (T1, p.18, Ins. 15-23).  Count Three of the Amended Complaint pleads a breach of contract claim against the [...] for failing to convey marketable title to Unit 74.  Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment sought dismissal of this count.  The trial court’s oral decision does not expressly set forth its reasoning for granting dismissal.  Presumably, however, dismissal was entered based upon the Court’s conclusion that Section 8(e) of the Master Deed authorized the sale of Unit 74.  In this regard, the trial court’s dismissal of Count Three should be reversed because it incorrectly interpreted Section 8(e) of the Master Deed to authorize the sale of Unit 74.  As set forth in the preceding sections, Section 8(e) does not authorize the sale of Unit 74.  Irrespectively, Unit 74 is part of the Condominium’s common elements and is, therefore, unmarketable.  See N.J.S.A. 46:8B-6.  Therefore, the Court’s dismissal of Count Three should be reversed.  IV.
[brief] 37  D.  The Supreme Court’s Recent Decision in Boyle v. Huff Establishes the Correctness of the Trial Court’s Decision Denying [...] Fees ....  41  E.  [...]’s Bid to Recover its Fees Under Section 18.2 of the Contract Was Also Properly Rejected by the Trial Court – and That Argument Has Been Abandoned on the Cross-Appeal in any Event ........ 48
[brief] Capell v. Capell, 358 N.J. Super. 107, 111 (App. Div. 2003).  Additionally, the amount of force used along with credibility and motive and are determinations for the jury.  The evidence was clearly in the plaintiff’s favor regarding the alleged two charges against the plaintiff.  **NJSA 2C:29-2 (a)1 state as follows:**  Except as provided in paragraph (3), a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if he purposely prevents or attempts to prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting an arrest.  Plaintiff could not reasonably be charged with resisting arrest when *he was never told* that he was under arrest.
[brief] This case is distinguishable from Burney.  First, and most importantly, defendant did not contest [...]’s proposed testimony before or during trial.  There was no N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to develop a record of the steps and methods [...] used to map the location of defendant’s cell phone for those two calls.  Thus, the record is insufficient here for this Honorable Court to question or assess the methods and techniques utilized by [...].
[brief] (2T111-18 to 20).  [...] recounted that around 6:30 p.m., while returning home from buying ice with her daughters, she heard gunshots and told her daughters to get down.  (2T114-19 to 115-23; 2T116-6 to 11; 2T117-2 to 4).  When they got up, she saw a person running and saw him put something in his pants pocket.  (2T116-13 to 15; 2T118-9 to 13).  At trial, she could not remember what that person was wearing, but in her initial statement, she had said the person was wearing grey pants and a white shirt.  (2T117-15 to 118-5).  [...] described the complexion of the person as "light brown color . . . . a little . . . . darker than me."  (2T118-16 to 22).
[brief] [...] also imposed a sentence of fines and penalties including jail time (which was reduced by defendant having earned jail credit) with the stipulation that the defendant be able to serve part of the sentence in an inpatient treatment program, should a bed become available.  Defendant’s other charges were merged into the DWI and dismissed.  1T 8:3-8; 1T 20:16-18.  As such, [...] imposed a sentence of a 10-year license suspension concurrent with the sentence that the Court knew he was already serving.  Id.  There is nothing in the record that indicates, whatsoever, that the sentence was to run consecutively, or that his sentence would result in a 20-year loss of license.  Neither the plea, nor the transcript of the plea proceeding contain any evidence indicating defendant was informed by the court, the prosecutor or his attorney, that if the court accepted his plea, that he would be receiving a 20-year loss of license, or even that any loss of license would run consecutively.  1T.  Rather, he was told by the court his 10-year loss of license would start to run from the day he was sentenced, February 8, 2013.  1T14:13-15.  Nowhere in the plea transcript does it contain any evidence indicating defendant was informed by the court, the prosecutor or his attorney, that the 10-year loss of license was to run consecutive.  1T.  The tickets signed by the sentencing judge do not contain any evidence indicating the 10-year loss of license is to run consecutive or that [...] would be receiving a 20 year loss of license.  26a.  The “Order And Certification, Intoxicated Driving and Related Offenses” signed by [...] and the sentencing judge do not contain any evidence indicating the sentence is to be consecutive, or that [...] would be receiving a 20 year loss of license.  29a.  The “Notification of Penalties for Subsequent DWI or Driving on the Revoked List Convictions” form signed by [...] and the sentencing judge do not contain any evidence indicating the 10-year loss of license is to run consecutive, or that [...] would be receiving a 20-year loss of license.  30a.  The “COMMITMENT/RELEASE” form sign by the sentencing judge does not contain any evidence indicating the 10-year loss of license is to run consecutive, or that [...] would be receiving a 20-year loss of license.  31a.  Thus, there is nothing in the record that states [...]’s 10-year loss of license was to run consecutive, or that [...] would be receiving a 20-year loss of license.  c.
[brief] See e.g., *In re Stahlberger*, No. 20-23388-ABA, 2021 WL 509849, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2021) (for preference or fraudulent claims, transfer of the property relates back to the date a *lis pendens* was filed).  5  The Debtor’s attempts to set aside the Final Judgment in state court will be addressed further below.  6
[brief] Defendant was found guilty of first-degree robbery after a trial.  Defendant cannot minimize his actions by arguing that his substance abuse issues merited a lower sentence.  As [...] noted, defendant’s actions cannot be justified by citing to his addiction.  Defendant’s sentence is within the statutory guidelines and supported by defendant’s criminal history, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and [...]’s careful weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.  It represents defendant’s second conviction for first-degree robbery within a short period of time.  Defendant’s sentence is proper and does not shock the judicial conscience.
[brief] (Ra9-11; Pa141-42).  [...]’s correspondence was not sent to the [...]’s custodian of records, and it did not use any language to identify his request for government records under OPRA or the common law.  (Pa48-49).  Without any indication that this was an OPRA request, [...] processed [...]’s e-mail as a research request, which the Museum facilitates on a regular basis.  (1T35:3-6; Pa38).  On March 10, 2022, [...] submitted a substantially similar OPRA request to the [...] asking for the same access to conduct DNA testing on the historical items.