ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] WITH A FOCUS ON THE LENGTH OF UNEXPLAINED DELAY, THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE COMPLAINTS [Da19a-23a, 10T10-22/11-6]  Of the four speedy trial factors—assertion, length, cause, and prejudice—the focus in the present case is on the delay from when the case was ready for trial and when the trial actually occurred—a period of 289 days from October 18, 2022, to August 3, 2023, and 603 days after issuance of the complaint on December 8, 2021.  Such an unexplained delay, attributable to the State and the municipal court, warrants dismissal.  *See Db18-20*; *but see Sb11-12*.  ---  2  Defendant’s initial brief is cited as suggested in *R. 2:6-8*—*e.g.*, pages 18 to 20 are cited as “Db18-20. ”  3  The State’s response brief is cited as suggested in *R. 2:6-8*—*e.g.*, pages 11 to 12 are cited as “Sb11-12. ”  II.  THIS COURT, REVIEWING VIDEO DE NOVO AND CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE OBJECTIVELY RATHER THAN RELYING ON SUBJECTIVE FINDINGS, SHOULD ACQUIT DEFENDANT OF DWI
[brief] A motion to dismiss should be approached with great caution and should only be granted in the rarest of instances.  See Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J.  Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005).  Furthermore, a dismissal with prejudice is considered the ultimate sanction and will normally be ordered only when no lesser sanction will suffice to erase the prejudice suffered by the non-delinquent party.  See Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 253 (1982).  Ultimately, in disputes over procedural questions, there are competing policy concerns; defendants are entitled to have plaintiff comply with procedural rules, while plaintiffs have the right to an adjudication of the controversy on the merits.
[directive] Attorney General [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  The expenditure of prosecutorial and judicial resources in litigating a pretrial motion to suppress evidence is comparable to the resources that would be expended at a trial on the merits of the drug distribution-type charge, since the pretrial hearing and any ensuing trial will often involve the same witnesses describing the same events and transactions.  Moreover, a significant proportion of prosecutorial resources are expended before a pretrial hearing date (i.e., e.g., reviewing reports and interviewing police witnesses, researching legal issues, and preparing formal briefs in response to a defendant’s pretrial motion).  Accordingly, prosecutors are required to tender a “final post-indictment offer” on the date when the State’s brief is filed or required to be filed pursuant to R. 3:5-7(b) or pursuant to a scheduling order fixed by the court.  This general rule is subject to relaxation pursuant to Section 4.10, provided that a pretrial hearing involving the testimony of witnesses has not been convened to decide a pretrial motion, such as a motion to suppress evidence under R. 3:5-7.  In the event that any such evidentiary hearing has been convened, the prosecutor shall be required to prepare and tender a final post-indictment plea offer, and this rule shall not be subject to relaxation pursuant to Section 4.10.  Ordinarily, pretrial motions involving evidentiary hearings, including motions to suppress physical evidence, are convened only after an indictment has been returned.  On rare occasions, courts have convened evidentiary hearings on pretrial motions to suppress prior to indictment.  In the event that such a hearing is convened prior to indictment, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived the right pursuant to these Guidelines to a pre-indictment plea offer or its functional equivalent, or an initial post-indictment offer.  In these circumstances, the initial offer tendered to the defendant must be calculated as a final post-indictment offer.  4.9
[brief] When a lesser-included offense is requested, as it was here, the standard of review regarding the denial of that request is a plenary consideration by the appellate court of whether “the evidence presents a rational basis on which the jury could acquit the defendant of the greater charge and convict the defendant of the lesser. ”  *State v. Brent*, 137 N.J. 107, 117 (1994).  When the request is made, “the trial court is obligated, in view of the defendant's interest, to examine the record thoroughly to determine if there is a rational basis in the evidence for finding that the defendant was not guilty of the higher offense charged but that the defendant was guilty of a lesser-included offense. ”  *State v. Sloane*, 111 N.J. 293, 299 (1988).  The “rational-basis test imposes a low threshold” for charging a lesser-included offense if the instruction is requested, *State v. Crisantos*, 102 N.J. 265, 278 (1986), and is met so long as “it would not be idle to have the jury decide whether the defendant had committed the lesser-included offense."
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order of [...] denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Docket No. [...], filed July 27, 2023 ...........................................  Pa0001  Order of [...] granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Docket No. [...], filed July 27, 2023 ...........................................  Pa0003  Trial Judge’s Oral Opinion dated July 27, 2023 ........................................ T. at 3:1-32:23  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] Defensor/Defense Counsel: Fiscal Auxiliar/ Assistant Prosecutor: Juez/Judge: ---------  Fecha del Memo/Date of Memo:  1.  Me han informado sobre mi derecho de estar presente en el juicio de esta causa.  Si no comparezco para el juicio en la fecha fijada para el mismo, el juez tendra derecho a proceder con el juicio sin que yo este presente.  Si mi causa no se enjuicia en esa fecha, el juez fijara otra fecha para el juicio.  Si no estoy presente la fecha original del juicio, o en cualquier fecha en que se vuelva a fijar, el juicio en proseguira sin mi y me vere obligado a atenerme al veredicto del jurado.  fail  If of of have been advised right to present at the trial this case.  to appear for trial on the date scheduled my be I I If for trial, the Court has the right to conduct the trial my absence.  case not reached for trial on that date the my is in If judge will schedule a new date for trial.  not present on the original trial date, or any rescheduled trial date, am I the trial will proceed without me and will be bound by the jury's verdict.  I para arriba  Entiendo ademas que si no comparezco el juicio en la fecha fijada mas o en cualquier 2.  otra perdere hasta haya fecha la cual se aplace juicio, cualquier fianza monetaria que se el depositado, se pueden revisar cualquiera de las condiciones de libertad antes del juicio, y el juez para una orden emitira que se me arreste.  or that I further understand if I do not appear for trial on the date above any adjourned trial date thereafter, I fixed will lose any monetary bail that has been posted, any conditions of pretrial release may be reviewed, and a bench warrant will be issued for arrest.
[brief] [...] did not make monthly payments or complete the payoff within two years as required by the MOU because that deal was canceled.  Instead, [...] took out his own mortgage on the Property for $3.5 million, which he subsequently paid off in full, and took over lawful ownership of the Property.  If the MOU had persisted and had [...] complied with its terms, it would have been paid off over a decade ago and this case would never have come to pass.  As admitted in [...]’s Complaint, the MOU was the original plan that had to be deserted in favor of [...]’s purchase of the Property.
[brief] Less than a month after *Woo-Padva* 2, the court in *Valentine*, No. [...]\(^4\) applied this rule in an equally analogous case.  The defendant in *Valentine* acquired a defaulted debt and assigned it to another entity for collection.  *Valentine*, No. [...] at 2.  The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief voiding the debt on the basis that defendant was not licensed pursuant to the NJCFLA.  *Id.* at 3.  The *Valentine* Court dismissed plaintiff’s claim, holding that there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA.  *Id.* at 11.  *See also Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, Civil No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 WL 1050512, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (“A review of the NJCFLA reveals that the Legislature did not provide for a private right of action in order to enforce the requirements of the Act. ”); *Jubelt v. United N. Bankers, Ltd.*, Civil Action No. 13-7150 (ES)(MAH), 2015 WL 3970227, at *14 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) (“In addition, even if Plaintiff had asserted illegal conduct under the NJCFLA, there is no private right of action \(^4\) Counsel for Appellant also represented the plaintiff in *Valentine*. available under that statute. ”).
[brief] [...]’s settlement agreement with [...] states that the “Borough will show at the midpoint review how it will provide a realistic opportunity for the remaining 7 units .  . . .”  165a.  The judgment, incorporating the settlement agreement, 245a ¶ 9, provides:  “[f]or the midpoint realistic opportunity review due on July 1, 2020, as required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27D-313, the Borough will post on its municipal website, with a copy provided to [...], a status report as to its implementation of its Plan and an analysis of whether any unbuilt sites or unfulfilled mechanisms continue to present a realistic opportunity .
[brief] “It shall be unlawful for any person to make, continue or cause to be made or continued any loud, unnecessary or unusual noise or any noise which either annoys, disturbs, injures or endangers the comfort repose, health, peace or safety of others within the limits of the [...]. ”  *Id.* at 5.  It also contained a provision specifically addressing frequent or continuous noise from animals.  *Ibid.*  It did not specifically prohibit the human voice.  And in *Clarksburg Inn*, the ordinance provided that “It shall be unlawful for a person to make, continue or cause to be made or continued any loud, unnecessary or unusual noise or any noise which does or is likely to annoy, disturb, injure or endanger the comfort, repose, health, peace or safety of others.
[brief] [...]’s Identification Of Defendant As The Person In The March 5 Photograph With No Facial Tattoo Was Inadmissible Lay Opinion Testimony.**  Crucial to the State’s attempt to corroborate [...]’s story that Defendant’s tattoos commemorated the murder of [...] were two photographs it alleged depicted Defendant’s face—one taken March 5 before the murder with no teardrop tattoo (S-113) and one taken March 9 after the murder showing the teardrop tattoo (S-114).  (26T73-13 to 77-6, 83-15 to 19; 30T260-7 to 261-6)  [...] permissibly identified Defendant as the person in the March 9 photograph with the teardrop tattoo, as [...] both knew Defendant and testified he had seen Defendant get that tattoo depicted in the picture.  (30T260-7 to 261-6)  The only witness to identify Defendant as the person in S-113, however, was [...].  (26T73-1 to 5)  The admission of this testimony violated N.J.R.E. 701 because Dotto was not an eyewitness to the moment depicted in the photograph and had no personal knowledge of Defendant’s appearance on March 5.  N.J.R.E. 701; State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 17 (2021); State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9 (2012); State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011).
[brief] Once the public agency has satisfied this threshold factor, the Court must then balance the privacy interests of its citizens against the public’s interest in disclosure of the private information.  See Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 87-88 (1995).  This balancing test requires the Court to consider the seven factors as laid out by the Supreme Court in Doe.  Ibid.  The seven factors to be considered are: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognized public interest militating toward access.
[brief] In the instance of *Herring v. United States of America*, 424 F.3d 384, 386 (3" Cir. 2005) the Court in its foot notes explained the various definitions of void judgments by various circuits.  Under Rule 60(b)(4), because of the unique considerations applicable to void judgments, a motion brought many years AFTER the judgment was obtained **MAY** nevertheless be made within a reasonable time.  The mere fact that a significant amount of time has passed since a void judgment was rendered CANNOT "cure" its **fatal** infirmity.  For this reason, some authority states that a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) **MAY** be made at **ANY TIME**.  The trial court’s decision rested on a misapprehension of the facts, evidence, and law.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court established, conclusively and without qualification, that the TOA Rule, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5, which protects applicants from changes in zoning and other development regulations, only applies to applications to development that are “complete” on the date the ordinance adopting the restriction becomes effective.  Dunbar, supra.  Conversely, an application for development that is not complete on the date a zoning ordinance takes effect is not protected by the TOA Rule, as the Supreme Court held based on the fact in Dunbar.  Here, in its Answer to [...]’s Complaint, “[...] admits that it submitted an application for development to the Board on April 29, 2022. ”  [Da18 at ¶ 25].  Because the Ordinance went into effect before that date, the application for development was not only not “complete” as the Board later determined, it had not even been filed when the applicable zoning laws changed.
[directive] silo eljuez  lEntiende usted que encuentran culpable, podria ordenar que la sentencia que 8.  [No/No]  [Si!Yes] imponga se cumpla consecutivamente a cualquier sentencia por un incumplimiento de la libertad a prueba, la libertad condicional, o ambas, la sentencia que esta cumpliendo actualmente a todas ellas?  if  Do you understand that you are found guilty, the Court could order that any sentence imposed be served of to consecutively any sentence on a violation probation, and/or parole, and/or sentence presently being ·served?
[brief] Defendants’ egregious and inappropriate statement that “[a]lthough [...] claimed otherwise, Plaintiff’s intent was to keep Defendants’ ‘on the hook’ through redevelopment.  7T26-19; Pa0245” is contradicted by the record.  *(See Db16 (emphasis added). )*  On cross examination of [...], Defendants’ counsel stated: “. . . .  Are you understanding what I’m saying?  I’m talking about keeping the seller on the hook on this property which is what this contract seems to be doing,” to which [...] responded: “Absolutely not.  You’re 100 percent inaccurate. ”  Thus, despite acknowledging that the witness’ testimony contradicts their statement, Defendants nevertheless assert their opinion as fact.
[brief] See T 27:10–12 (“[W]e’re not moving under the specific statute, New Jersey statute for frivolous–”).  Indeed, during the motion hearing, and notwithstanding Defendants’ counsel’s reminder that “the point is that these are exceptional circumstances warranting reopening of the judgment,” id. at 27:14–15, the trial court remarked that there was no “court order that, at least in the eyes of this Court, adjudicates whether the matter is frivolous and has no basis for going forward,” id. at 26: 21–24; see also id. at 18:9–12 (“There’s nothing definitive before the Court that his actions were designed to harass or cause . . . your client financial harm. ”); id. at 44:8–13 (“I do not and cannot find and make that leap that defense is asking this Court that this was a frivolous action and only filed by the plaintiff with the purpose to harass the defendant.  I cannot make that leap.  There’s nothing before the Court to indicate that. ”).  The trial court repeated this line of questioning at other points throughout the hearing.  The trial court also injected into its evaluation of the motion to reopen the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings on a motion to dismiss—despite Plaintiff already having voluntarily dismissed the suit, rendering Defendants the prevailing parties.  The trial court asked, for example, “Despite the other lawsuits he may have filed, despite his other actions in other cases, where is that substantially before the Court that this would even have been ripe for a motion to dismiss given the liberal standard of that requirement that the Court has to adhere to on the case law, court rules? ”  *Id.* at 18:21–19:2.  The trial court’s “misconception of the applicable law” governing the award of attorneys’ fees under UPEPA—even though not, under a correct understanding of the law, dispositive of the ultimate question whether Defendants were entitled to reopening of the judgment under R.4:50-1(f)—was an improper basis for denying Defendants’ motion.  *Johnson*, 320 N.J. Super. at 378.  It was also an abuse of discretion, and the trial court’s judgment should accordingly be reversed.
[brief] More specifically, the Form A instructions state:  “Sign and date the remaining statements on the continuation of Form A.  Do not sign the demand for trial by jury unless you want to have a jury hear your case. ”  Emphasis in original.  As to the Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) Certification, the Form A instructions do not instruct the user to alter the Certification if any of the statements therein are inaccurate or need to be modified.
[brief] ---  5  Paradoxically, [...] argues that [...] “could have appealed” the January 4, 2024 Order (Db6) and that this Order “is not appealable” (Db7)  6  [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 24, 2024 decision that was likewise denied by the trial court by Order dated August 16, 2024.  (Pra270)  [...] did not further appeal. relating to the claims and parties subject to the arbitration ruling and consequently should review all interlocutory orders.  Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, comment R. 2:2-3 at 451 (Gann 2024)(emphasis added)  Review of a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo because the validity of an arbitration agreement presents a question of law.  *Santana v. Smile Direct Club, LLC.*, 475 N.J.Super. 279 (App. Div. 2023), citing *Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 30 (2020).
[brief] In direct contravention of the claims of Board Member [...] in denying the 2018 Amended Application, the Trial Court highlighted that:  the Zoning Board explicitly found in the 2016 Approval that the site is particularly suited for the proposed use because “the project advances the purposes of the VC-2 Overlay Zone including affordable housing that is subsidized by market housing, the proposed development advances the 2011 [...]’s Land Use Plan Element, the proposed development advances the 2012 [...]’s Master Plan Housing Element and the proposed development plan advances a number of express purposes set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law including but not limited to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a), (e), (g), (d) and (i). ”  M35-36.  The record below is replete with examples of clear, concise, and supported evidence and professional testimony that went completely unchallenged throughout the pendency of the hearings on the 2018 Amended Application.  The Trial Court recognized this, and in accordance with the appropriate legal standards, reversed the Board’s decision.  As stated by the Trial Court, “[t]here was no further discussion nor evidence of any deliberation by the Board prior to voting to deny the Application.  In sum, the Board simply rejected all of the evidence before it," including its own statements in approval of the earlier application.  This is a textbook example of arbitrary and capricious decision-making, and the Trial Court's reversal was correct and must be upheld.
[brief] Is [[...]] getting a really good deal to testify?  Absolutely, she is.  But that’s because the State of New Jersey has a lot more interest in prosecuting drug dealers than they do those addicted to drugs and battling with addiction.  [...], while she’s a threat to herself based on her addiction, [...] happens to be a threat to everyone suffering with addiction in this country battling the opioid pandemic.  That’s why he’s sitting there and [...] will be sitting up there later today.  [4T 28-14 to 24.]  This was designed “to inflame the jurors by identifying defendant with matters of public notoriety as to which no evidence was or could have been ever introduced,” Holmes, 255 N.J. Super. at 251, and blatantly appealed to public sensitivities about the opioid addiction crisis by labeling [...] a “threat.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  This matter was initiated by Amended Complaint on May 8, 2023.  (Pa8)  The Defendant, [...], filed an Notice of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on July 31, 2023.  (Pa63)  Plaintiff opposed a Motion by brief on August 29, 2023.  (Pa166)  The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on September 13, 2023.  (Pa1).  The trial court issued a Memorandum of Decision in support of its dismissing the Amended Complaint.  (Pa3)  A Notice of Appeal was filed on October 12, 2023.  (Pa271)  Transcript of September 8, 2023 to be noted as 3T.  Any prior transcripts are unrelated to the Amended Complaint under review.
[brief] *  Plaintiffs are all within 200 feet of the subject property, and adjacent to the subject property on the neighboring streets, [...] and [...].  Plaintiffs are located in the R-1 Residential Zone which surrounds the newly created RR Zone.  At one of the Board hearings (which all were conducted virtually), several of the current plaintiffs, who objected to [...]’s application, submitted a letter to the Board which was read into the record as follows:
[brief] Plaintiff [...]’s experience was typical after he was convinced to purchase a timeshare.  He and his wife were taken to the deeder’s office and given a large stack of papers.  (11T176:3-197:3).  They were rushed through the signing process, not understanding anything they signed.  (11T178:1-12).  They (like the other Plaintiffs) did not realize they swore under penalty of perjury that they had sold the same timeshare they had just purchased back to [...] for $1.00.
[brief] [...] and [...] only lived together as a married couple for four years; they separated in October 2010.  Even before the formal separation, [...] purchased a house to live in for himself on June 21, 2010.  Specifically, in October 2010, Estranged Wife threw [...] out of a house that she owned.  [...] spent the remainder of his life in his own house.  Since October 2010, Estranged Wife has not been involved in any way in the [...].  Between October 2010 and present, [...] and Estranged Wife had little or no contact with each other.  [...] entered a romantic relationship with [...] in 2011.  [...] and [...] were romantically involved until his death.  In other words, Zolaina and [...] were together for approximately nine of the nearly ten years that Estranged Wife and [...] were separated.
[brief] Rule 1:12-1(g) requires a judge, as impartial decision maker, to recuse, or grant a motion to disqualify, when a party or counsel “might reasonably . . . believe” the judge might be unable to conduct and render “a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment,” as here.  The trial court and the Special Master gave inadequate reasons for holding that recusal was not required.  The trial court analogized these facts to [...] representing a party in two unrelated matters before the same judge.  (39021a-39022a).  That analogy is inapposite.  Judges have a fixed salary.