ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  The arbitrator's failure to issue reimbursement for medically necessary treatment pursuant to the fee schedule, despite the Plaintiff's authorized amendment to the Demand for Arbitration, represents a significant legal oversight, erroneously endorsed by the Law Division.  This misapplication of the law undermines statutory mandates and offends the interests of justice.  It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that this Court reverse the Law Division's decision and mandate compliance with the fee schedule for all medically necessary treatment, reflecting any stipulations made by Plaintiff.  Alternatively, the matter should be remanded for proceedings consistent with New Jersey law.  Such actions will ensure justice in this case and uphold the integrity and meaningfulness of appellate review in PIP cases.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...] ______________________________
[brief] Each of the Tenant Defendants leased space in a retail strip mall from the defendant [...], [...], the Landlord, and were tenants at the premises on March 16, 2017 – the date on which [...] slipped on ice at the premises, causing the injuries for which he sues.  By way of the appeal, Appellants seek a determination that each of the Tenant Defendants had a duty, pursuant to the terms of the lease, to remove snow and ice from the area where [...] fell and was injured.  The leases executed by the Landlord and each of the Tenant Defendants were similar -- and identical with respect to the issues presented by the Motion.  At Article 3 of the leases, each of the Tenant Defendants assumed an unambiguous and broad duty “at [their] own expense and at all times, [to] maintain the premises in and safe condition.
[directive] For isolated from, the not integral part of, their impact the community and how decisions understand why must officers at all ranks effective, law impartiality of the confidence in the integrity and or diminishing, public by enhancing, enforcement function.  ~•elationship community affects how to the understanding theiz• benefit from also will  Officers or mistrustful of police, those citizens society are afraid segments of our When their own safety. fighting or fleeing, that likely engage in behaviors, such as nnore to with police are encounters during concern raised to the forefront by deeply a enhancing officer safety — of risk.
[directive] Disposition of Controlled Dangerous Substances with no prosecution  7.6.1  If the police department comes into possession of controlled dangerous A-16 substances, for example by finding, and a viable prosecution cannot be developed in relation to the drug, then it should be retained for at least 60 days.  The controlled dangerous substance shall be destroyed within one year of its receipt.  All aspects of the destruction shall be documented on the Uniform Destruction of Evidence Form.  Notice to and approval of the Chief of the Trial Section or Narcotics Squad Prosecutor is not necessary in this situation unless a significant quantity or quality of controlled dangerous substance is involved.  The term "significant quantity" should at least mean enough controlled dangerous substance to support a charge of possession with intent to distribute if the owner or possessor were known.  7.7
[directive] First, it is necessary for the law enforcement officer to have charged the defendant, on the Complaint/Summons (Uniform Traffic Ticket) with a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g).  Similarly, for a DWI refusal violation in a school zone, the police or law enforcement officer should have charged the defendant with a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2a, specifying that the offense occurred in a school zone, thereby subjecting the defendant to the penalties as set forth at N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.b.  Second, in school zone cases, there are additional elements, beyond the basic DWI or DWI refusal, that the State must prove to sustain a conviction.  They include: (1) the violation occurred (a) on school property used for school purposes, (b) the property is owned or leased to an elementary or secondary school or a school board, (c) or within 1,000 feet of such school property; or (2) driving through a school crossing, if that crossing is designated as such by ordinance or resolution; or (3) driving through a school crossing, knowing juveniles are present.
[brief] [...] was present at the local branch on instructions of the bank in order to prevent future hacking of his account shortly after the first hacking incident.  The opening of the new accounts had to be done quickly, not only to prevent future hacking but so [...] could continue to process his personal matters and business transactions.  He was also under the impression the Bank knew why he was there given the circumstances as presented at that time.  He didn’t know what documents to ask for.  He was not familiar with the Bank’s procedure in opening accounts.  Expecting Plaintiff to know that by signing the iPad he was entering into a thirty seven (37) page deposit agreement with an arbitration clause without the Bank’s representative advising him that was the affect of his signing the iPad is such an unusual or extraordinary burdensome requirement or task as to result in an imposition in the execution of the documents.  Atalese, 219 NJ at 446 (clause on Page 9 of 23  Page contract; Noble v. Samsung, 682 Fed. App. 113, 117-118 (3d Cir. 2017) (clause on Page 97 of 143  Page document).  The Plaintiff did not choose to arbitrate with an explicit affirmative and unmistakable intention that he was expressly giving up his right to bring a court action in favor of arbitration.
[brief] The attendant risk was an unidentified condition in a common area of the parking lot that the landlord not only controlled, but inspected and maintained.  Because the accident occurred in a common area of the parking lot, [...] had neither the opportunity nor ability to control the alleged condition complained of.  [...] sells coffee and doughnuts.  It is not a department of public works or paving company with readily available resources to address any conditions in the parking lot.  Further, the assignment of maintenance responsibility to the Township for structural components set forth in the Lease and confirmed by [...]’s testimony impacted [...]’s opportunity and ability to address the condition.
[brief] ”  (Pa33, 3:19-22 (emphasis added)).  Subsequently, Plaintiff’s counsel stated he would review the terms of the settlement, and the following colloquy ensued:  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]:  I’ll go over the terms of the agreement.  My understanding is that [Defendant] will retire now through PFRS as of the date of the signed agreement which will be prepared this evening and forwarded to counsel tomorrow.  In exchange for her retirement[, Plaintiff] dismisses the charges, and also [Defendant] is to sign a release of her right to sue and dismiss any lawsuits and the covenant not to sue [Plaintiff].  She will be entitled to a payout of any unused accrued sick and vacation time per her labor contract.  There will be a mutual non-disparagement clause, a neutral letter of reference which will be prepared and attached to the settlement agreement which sets forth her dates of employment and positions held.  And she will waive any claim to backpay, but she will be paid an equivalent of 35 days pay, which will be issued to her in a check.  It will not count toward any additional pension time or service credits, but whatever 35 days comes out to, it will be issued in a check and there will be tax withholdings.  I believe that’s the extent of the agreement.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Let me just make sure.  It sounds like it is complete.  Health insurance?  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]:  Oh, health insurance, yes.  She will, subject to Chapter 78 Contributions, . . . receive health benefits upon her retirement.  And in the next three years the health insurance payments will be based on her current salary.  And then when she hits 25 years, which will be on March 28th, 2025, she makes retiree health contributions pursuant to that plan until she reaches age 65, at which time she’s Medicare eligible.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I just want to clarify that it’s health insurance for the family, the family plan.  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]:  Yes, if she elects family.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]:  If she just wants to cover herself or cover herself and her husband, she can do that too.  Under Chapter 78[,] you share in the premium contribution.  So the more coverage you choose the more your share, the employee, share, the retiree share will be.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  But for the outstanding two plus years, no matter which premium she elects, [Plaintiff] will pay it.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  The employer’s – [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Yes, the employer’s share, yes, Chapter 78 employer’s portion will pick up.  HEARING OFFICER: Counsel, is that your understanding?  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That is, Your Honor, we are just making sure.  HEARING OFFICER: Make sure your client has the same understanding.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That would be the entirety of the agreement as our understanding goes.  [Defendant], are the terms that have been described by [Plaintiff’s counsel] an accurate reflection of your understanding of the agreement resolving the matter you are attending today?
[brief] Palamarg Realty Co., 80 N.J. at 458.  The accuracy of [...]’s assessment is proven by the long list of individuals and professionals who had the same (or more) information as he did, and an equal or greater opportunity to discover the error, but did not, including: - [...], developer, subdivision applicant and former owner of Lot 3.  116a, 156a, 161a, 179a.  • Plaintiff [...], objectors to Musto’s subdivision, owners of Lot 2, ultimate buyers of a portion of Lot 3, and the individuals who should have been most vigilant regarding the accuracy of the subdivision and lot sizes at the time of their creation.  116a, 156a, 161a, 179a.  •  [...], Esquire, professional advocate for [...]’s subdivision application and drafter of the deeds at issue.  138a, 142a, 156a, 161a.  • [...], Esquire, [...]s’ counsel during their objection to Musto’s attempted subdivision of former Lot 3 and purchaser of a portion of Lot 3.  142a, 167a.  • [...], Esquire, planning board attorney who oversaw and prepared resolutions approving the subdivision map.  150a, 613a.  • [...] PE, PP, CME of [...], planning board engineer who prepared reports for the board to analyze the subdivision map and signed the final plat for recording.  574a.  • [...], PP, AICP, professional planner for the planning board who reviewed and reported on the subdivision map.  581a, 613a.  • [...] Members, including an attorney, builder, real estate agent and architect, who unanimously approved the application, and the membership included an attorney, a builder, a real estate agent and an architect.  150a, 588a.  • [...], issued title insurance policies to [...] for original Lot 2 (105’ from the corner), and enlarged Lot 2 (66.3’ from the corner).  627a.  • [...], closing agents for [...]’s purchase of a portion of Lot 3 from Musto.  613a.  Of course, none of these people or institutions recognized the error or questioned the length of combined Lots 2 and 3 based upon a modern-day survey of the properties.  This is especially true of [...], who had no part in the subdivision, and no interest in the size or width of Lot 2 whatsoever.  The trial court erred in deciding this fact in [...]s’ favor on summary judgment.  If it were not decided in [...]’s favor, based on the facts and evidence in the record, the court should have taken testimony from the parties, witnesses and experts and opined as to whether a [...] had made a “reasonable” inspection of the public record.
[brief] That is because older people are much less likely to commit crimes, and each marginal year of a lengthy sentence has minimal to no deterrent value.  “The empirical fact of a decline in the crime rate with age is beyond dispute. ”  [...] and [...], *Age and the Explanation of Crime*, 89 Am. J. Soc. 552, 565 (1983).  Because older people are dramatically less likely to reoffend, experts agree that these studies persuasively prove that very lengthy sentences go beyond what is necessary to prevent re-offense if the defendants were released.  In the words of the National Research Council, “because recidivism rates decline markedly with age and prisoners necessarily age as they serve their prison sentence, lengthy prison sentences are an inefficient approach to preventing crime by incapacitation unless they are specifically targeted at very high-rate or extremely dangerous offenders. ”  National Research Council, *The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes And Consequences*, 155-56 (2014).  As with incapacitation, there is a clear consensus about deterrence in the social science literature: each extra year of a lengthy sentence does very little to nothing to further either general or specific deterrence.  Therefore, the sentence in this case is much longer than necessary to further the goal of deterrence.  “The weight of criminological knowledge teaches that marginal increases in the severity of criminal sanctions rarely bring about marginal improvements in general deterrence in the community. ”  Model Penal Code: Sentencing (American Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, 2017).  Similarly, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the relationship between sentence length and crime rate reflects “diminishing deterrent returns to increasing sentence length,” such that there is only “a small crime reduction response” to increases in lengthier sentences.  *Growth of Incarceration* at 139.  The same applies to specific deterrence.  “There is no credible evidence of a specific deterrent effect of the experience of incarceration. ”  *Id.* at 156.  The specific-deterrence effect of incarceration, if any, “rapidly diminish” as sentences become lengthy, [...], *Building Criminal Capital vs Specific Deterrence: The Effect of Incarceration Length on Recidivism* 21 (Working Paper Dec. 2011).  In short, the life sentence is much longer than necessary to further incapacitation or deterrence.  In sum, because the trial court considered arrests that did not lead to convictions and failed to adequately account for [...]’s age upon release if he received a lesser sentence, the sentence must be vacated, and the matter remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.
[directive] Such investigation shall include whatever steps are deemed appropriate by the Independent Investigator, including canvassing, witness interviews, evidence collection, forensic analysis, and the issuance of grand jury subpoenas.  As part of this initial investigation, the Independent Investigator shall make all reasonable efforts to preserve and obtain any video or audio recordings that depict any aspect of the LE Incident.  To ensure the independence of the investigation, only law enforcement officers working under the direct supervision of the Independent Investigator may participate in the investigation or share or receive information about any aspect of the investigation, except as authorized pursuant to the exceptions below.
[brief] It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it. ”); see also Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 478 (“The State, however, was not obligated to present statistical evidence to prove the soundness of the legislation.  In the absence of a ‘sufficient showing’ that the Legislature lacked factual support for its judgment, this Court will assume that the statute is based on ‘some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the Legislature. ’”).
[brief] The Trial Court Erred by Proceeding When the Case Was Automatically Staved Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq. (Raised Below Pa13, Pa49, Pa53).  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 provides:  Where in any action in the Superior Court any plaintiff or any party asserting a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim is a nonresident, he shall, if, at any time before trial, notice is given to him by an opposing party demanding security for costs, give bond in favor of the opposing party, or, if there is more than one making the demand, in favor of each of them, in the sum of $200, with sufficient surety, conditioned to prosecute the action with effect and to pay costs if the action is dismissed or judgment passes against him.  If there is more than one plaintiff or claimant, they may give bond jointly in the sum of $200, all as aforesaid.  If the surety on the bond is an individual and not a corporation, he shall be a resident of this State.  The bond shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court.  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67; “In lieu of a bond for costs, the nonresident party may deposit with the clerk cash…”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-68 (allowing cash deposit into court in lieu of bond).  “Upon filing bond or making deposit, the nonresident party shall give notice thereof to the opposing party….”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-70.  Importantly, “[w]henever a notice is given demanding from a nonresident party security for costs, all proceedings on his claim shall be stayed until the required security is filed or deposit made. ”
[brief] (Ca075-076).  This Resolution was attached to Appellants’ Opposition Brief and was in the record when the [...] decided the Motion to Dismiss.  As stated in the Board’s Resolution from March 17, 2022:  WHEREAS, the Board has been recently made aware of certain social media postings which have been made by and/or attributed to certain individual Board members which are viewed by many – including the Board – to convey sentiments and/or messages which are racist and/or biased against African Americans.  […]  BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that, in accordance with District Policy, the Board formally requests Board Members [...] and [...] immediately remove the aforementioned social media posts.  (Ca075-076).
[brief] the Legislature to an executive agency with specialized expertise and staffing if there are sufficient standards in the enabling statute to guide the agency’s actions.  (Sb16).  The Plaintiffs’ position is that such legislative rule-making authority cannot be delegated to a private agency, or an agency controlled by a private organization, particularly when, as in this case, the agency has substantial independent authority that is not subservient to the overriding authority of an executive department or official.
[brief] *In re Herrmann*, 192 N.J. at 27-28; see also *In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch.*, 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013); *Brady v. Bd. of Review*, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997).  Here, the Commissioner’s determination that a municipality like [...] may seek withdrawal from [...] and [...] is both reasonable and consistent with the Legislature’s overarching purpose in adopting the statutory scheme at issue, which is to promote, not bar, the creation of K-12 districts.  To begin with, the Legislature enacted L. 2021, c. 402, codified at N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1 to - 47.11, to amend and supplement Chapter 13 of Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated concerning school district regionalization.
[brief] ”  *State v. Heisler*, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 414-15 (App. Div. 2011).  “Prejudice” in this context “refers not to the impact of the testimony itself, but the aggrieved party’s inability to contest the testimony because of late notice. ”  *Ibid.*  These factors favored [...]’s resolution; namely, giving the defense additional time to consult the expert they had already retained on the issue over two years earlier.  First, defendant does not argue the failure to disclose [...]’s report sooner was motivated by an intention to mislead; nor does the record support such an intent.
[brief] Then, in 1971, the food use resumed.  (Pa 70).  Then, in 1984, [...] went to the Zoning Board of Adjustment, which had a public hearing on whether he could operate a takeout pizza parlor.  The Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the application, as no notice to property owners within two hundred feet nor publication in a newspaper was effectuated at least ten days before the hearing.  Thus, the Board’s Resolution was invalid and void.  In 2015, [...] bought the property.
[brief] In *Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Springfield*, 162 N.J. 418 (1998), the Supreme Court of New Jersey outlined this body of case law:  Other New Jersey cases have emphasized that use variances adhere to the property and are not personal to the applicant.  *See, e.g.*, *Soho Park Land Co. v. Board of Adj. of Belleville*, 6 N.J. Misc. 686, 687 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (invalidating condition attached to use variance allowing construction of industrial building in residential zone that limited building to use "solely as a wire factory" by applicant for variance, noting that condition constituted "restraint on alienation" that would affect value of property); *Aldrich v. Schwartz*, 258 N.J. Super. 300, 308 (App. Div. 1992) (noting that "[v]ariances run with the land and are not personal to the property owner who obtained the grant"); *Berninger v. Board of Adj. of Midland Park*, 254 N.J. Super. 401, 405 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d 127 N.J. 226, 603 A.2d 946 (1992) (noting that "a condition [that] limits the life of a variance to ownership by a particular individual is patently illegal, as it advances no legitimate land use purpose"); *DeFelice v. Board of Adj. of Point Pleasant Beach*, 216 N.J. Super. 377, 383 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that "a variance runs with the land and is not personal to the property owner"); *Farrell v. Estell Manor Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, 193 N.J. Super. 554, 558 (Law Div. 1984) (stating that "[a] variance granted is not personal to the owner to whom granted but is available to the grantee's successors").
[brief] The Trial Court stated:  “Plaintiffs seek to assert claims against [Defendants] based upon the same claims, the same factual allegations, and the same transactions at issue in the 2015 case…”  179a.  The Trial Court did not explain how claims that are entirely new, arising out of the discovery that Defendants fraudulently concealed evidence that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity – facts and claims which were not pled before the dismissal of the complaint against [...] in the 2015 Action, since they were unknown by Plaintiffs at the time – could possibly be “the same factual allegations” as the claims that were dismissed.  In their opposing brief, Defendants [...] and [...] (“[...]”) egregiously misrepresent the holding of Viviano v. CBS, 251 N.J. Super. 113, by purposely failing to fully cite the Court’s holding.
[brief] If the court finds that an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable, it shall order the parties to arbitrate and stay any judicial proceeding that involves said claim.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7(g); see also 9 U.S.C. § 3 (stating a court action should be stayed if that action involves "any issue referable to arbitration").  In enforcing the Agreement in this case, the Trial Court highlighted that the Agreement is clear.  Additionally, Plaintiff voluntarily entered into the Agreement and was not forced or compelled to execute the Agreement stating:  ***  Nothing has been presented before the Court demonstrating that the Plaintiff was forced or compelled to sign the agreement.  Plaintiff could have freely rejected or refused to sign the agreement and left the Defendant's premises.  There is no—Plaintiff doesn't cite any procedural irregularities or substantially unconscionable provisions within the body of the agreement itself.  And this Court finds that the agreement was not unconscionable.