ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Hugo Neu* does not apply because the three separate indemnity provisions in the contract at issue in that case were all subject to the same clause governing the fault of the indemnitee.  *Ibid.*  Specifically, the contract in *Hugo Neu* “specified that all three of these indemnity triggers apply, ‘whether or not any acts errors, omission[s] or negligence of any of the [i]ndemnitees [i.e., Hugo Neu] contributed thereto in whole or in part[.]’”  *Ibid.* (alterations in original).  Thus, the issue in this appeal – that the indemnity provisions in [...]’s contract are inconsistent – was not present in *Hugo Neu*.  *Hugo Neu* therefore provides no support for [...]’s argument that its indemnity clauses explicitly and unequivocally require [...] to indemnify [...] for the latter’s own negligence.
[brief] When the [...] franchise agreement and the alleged “new” --- 6  The [...] Franchise Agreement was appended to the State’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial, and was thus before the trial court for consideration.  (Sa364-423).  2014 [...] franchise agreement for Hoboken are compared side-by-side, it is readily apparent that the “newly discovered” 2014 agreement appears to be a doctored version of the Albany agreement.  The handwritten dates on the first and last pages of the agreements are identical.  (Sa130; Sa189; Sa364; Sa423).  Both documents also have an identical stray pen mark to the left of the signatures on page 55, which is the addendum to the franchise agreement.  (Sa189; Sa423).  The handwritten words “managing partner” and the date under [...]’s and defendant’s signatures are identical on each corresponding signature page.  (Sa184-87; Sa187; Sa418-21; Sa423).  And, as [...] testified, his signatures on each corresponding signature page are not just similar, but identical.  (9T16-2 to 4; Sa184-87; Sa187; Sa418-21; Sa423).  Similarly, [...]’s identical signatures appear on the corresponding pages of the 2015 [...] agreement.  (Sa288-91).  The words “Managing Partner” under defendant’s signature on each of those pages is also identical to the handwriting under [...]’s signature on the corresponding pages of the 2014 Albany agreement, but the date is written much more lightly, apparently with a different pen.  And the date on page one—May 7, 2015—appears to be the same as the date on the first page of the [...] franchise agreement that was signed the same day. \(^7\) (Sa233; Sa305).  \(^7\)  The 2015 [...] agreement does not have the addendum page containing the Moreover, although the 2015 Tapmasters franchise agreement contains various amendments to the standard language, changing its length and resulting in the first signatures appearing on page 51 of the agreement, the first signatures in the 2015 [...] agreement still appear on page 50.  (Sa288; Sa359).  Under the ADA, [...] provides franchisees with a standard form of the agreement “we are then using,” and thus all agreements executed at the same time should be identical.  (Sa47 ¶ 6.3).  The fact that two agreements purportedly signed the same day are not identical further supports [...]’s testimony that the one [...] has no record of ([...]) is fraudulent.  [...] also testified that [...] would not have entered into either franchise agreement with [...] because they would have been in violation of both the ADA giving Tapmasters exclusive development rights in New Jersey and the May 7, 2015 [...] franchise agreement, signed the same day as the purported 2015 [...] agreement.
[brief] In that letter, counsel for the Plaintiff advised the Defendants’ first attorney that a realtor would be brought to the Boonton Property and that suit to eject them would be brought if they did not vacate.  (Da258-259).  In response, [...] and [...] made a highly conditioned offer to pay rent of $2,800, with no proposal to pay for the months that had lapsed.  (Da262).  [...] opposed the listing of the Property.  (8T77-15-17).  Because the Property needed to be sold so that the Trust could be administered in accordance with the Trustee’s duties, and [...] and [...] were not making payments, the Trustee thereafter filed suit.
[brief] [10T85-20 to 86-2].  [...] approached the driver’s side and cupped his hand on the front window so he could see through the window tint.  [10T88-6 to 88-21].  Inside he observed [...]’s body slumped towards the front passenger’s seat with blood on her and the armrest.  [10T88-21 to 89-13].  [...] started to scream and yell and called [...] to tell her what he found.  [10T89-22 to 89-25].  [...] also contacted the police.
[brief] Beyond the set of three volumes of transcripts delivered to this court on September 25, 2023, no additional transcripts are needed.  What is needed is the intent and intellectual honesty on the part of this court to read the merits brief instead of assuming that a complete trial transcript is required and summarily dismissing the appeal in Docket # [...] for an alleged lack of prosecution premised on trial court’s error-ridden May 3, 2024 order.  The merits brief of Docket # [...] is included in the appendix pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)(A) because it was attached as Exhibit H (Pa1211) to plaintiff’s OTSC certification filed on January 16, 2024 and as Exhibit A (Pa1288) to plaintiff's certification in support of the motion to abbreviate transcript filed on April 5, 2024.
[brief] (10T9-13 to 18; 10T33-12 to 19; 10T91-15 to 92-7; 15T170-6 to 11; 15T171-12 to 24).  On October 2, 2015, [...] checked defendant’s NIST thermometer and discovered that the battery was dead.  (10T33-20 to 35-22).  [...] did not replace the battery, but instead reinserted it backwards, after initialing and dating it.  (10T35-17 to 22).  When defendant returned to work on October 6, 2015, (15T174-18 to 24), he performed two calibrations.  (10T35-22 to 24; S-5; S-6).  The next day, he performed another.  (10T35-22 to 24; S-7).  A day later, at day’s end, [...] discovered the dead battery was still in defendant’s thermometer, and confronted defendant about it, as it should have prevented him from performing the three calibrations.
[directive] The trial judge shall then endorse upon the copy of the order received pursuant to Guideline 8A the fact of resealing and forward that order to the wiretap judge for filing.  9.  Upon application by the prosecuting agency that requested the electronic surveillance, and upon good cause shown, the wiretap judge who authorized the interception or that judge=s successor, may grant an order allowing destruction of the wiretap tapes, provided that ten years have elapsed since the termination of the interception.
[directive] Starting in the 1970s, U.S. Attorneys General of both parties have issued memoranda outlining what is known colloquially as the “White House Contacts Policy,” which have outlined when and under what circumstances DOJ employees could communicate with elected officials and their staffs.  Although the policy evolved over time, the basic goal remained the same: to insulate career attorneys and law enforcement officers from political pressure by funneling communications with elected officials to a small number of senior DOJ leaders.  By limiting contacts in this way, the policy made it easier for DOJ leadership to identify if elected leaders were making improper requests.  The policy also served as a useful management tool, by ensuring that proper requests for legal advice or other information were appropriately vetted and routed within DOJ.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2  Here in New Jersey, the Attorney General, the Governor, and the Legislature have developed their own practices that in many ways resemble the White House Contacts Policy as historically practiced.  By all accounts, the relevant parties in New Jersey government respect the unique role of the Attorney General and share a commitment to preventing political interference in apolitical institutions.  But as recent events outside New Jersey have demonstrated, the norms that protect our system of justice are susceptible to erosion if they are not clearly and continually reaffirmed.  That is exactly why it is so important to codify these practices in New Jersey now— when our norms of non-interference are strong and well-established.  The role of Attorney General is unlike any other in State government.  The occupant of the office serves not simply as an appointed member of the Governor’s cabinet, but also as a constitutional officer responsible for upholding the rule of law and ensuring the fair administration of justice.
[brief] **POINT II**  **THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE EGREGIOUSNESS OF THE APPELLANT’S CONDUCT WARRANTED HER REMOVAL. **  Upon reviewing a disciplinary action imposed on a correction officer, the administrative body should consider "discipline, safety and security as well as the effect a breach of duty may have on the institution, the inmates and other employees."  *Bowden v. Bayside State Prison*, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 303 (App.Div. 1993), cert. den., 135 N.J. 469 (1994).  In disciplinary proceedings, courts have found that an officer's "past record is inherently relevant."  *Town of West New York v. Bock*, 38 N.J. 500, 523 (1962).  In *Bock*, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that discipline based in part on consideration of past misconduct can be a factor in determining the appropriate penalty for present misconduct.  *Id.* at 522-523.  *Bock* created the outline for the progressive discipline approach utilized in New Jersey.  For instance, the *Bock* Court held that dismissal generally can result from habitual tardiness or similar chronic conduct because numerous occurrences over a reasonable short space of time, even though sporadic, may demonstrate an "attitude of indifference amounting to neglect of duty."  *Id.* at 522.  In some cases, courts have found the seriousness of an employee’s conduct requires a more severe penalty than generally afforded through a system of progressive discipline.  "Progressive discipline has been bypassed when an employee engages in severe misconduct, especially when the employee's position involves public safety and the misconduct causes risk of harm to persons or property."  *In the Matter of Herrmann*, 192 N.J. 19, 33 (2007).  In her brief, the Appellant argues that her conduct does not warrant termination.
[brief] From the very inception of their summation, the collective defense strategy was to forego a direct attack on the evidence and instead, attack how the State chose to present the evidence.  In doing so, the defense stressed to the jury that the lack of witnesses called, including one of the victims, [...] deprived the jury of the “whole story”.  Defense counsel for defendant began his summation by reminding the jury of the “[h]uge list of witnesses or potential witnesses or potential names that may [have been] mentioned in this case during the very long and arduous voir dire process;” and then preceded to assert, “And then the State called three witnesses. ” (16T:13-6 to 16).
[brief] This court noted: "[t]he rules brochure also includes the registration portion … [stating] directly … above the captain's signature: ‘Anyone who is found to have provided false information is subject to immediate disqualification’."  Instead, the trial court erred by determining that contract law did not apply at all, simply because the disputed and undisclosed limitation clause was contained within a rule book.  But even aside from the undisclosed clause, they breached the contract by allowing the late registrations, and by delaying the starting time.  Further, it appears that the trial court gave weight to the fact that the rule book was supposedly published by an independent national organization, which these defendants had no control over, nor had any choice but to blindly follow.  But certainly it was error for the trial court not to then give weight to the facts that such assumptions were in error, as for one thing defendant [...] actually wrote the [...] rule book (see Pa19), causing a conflict of interest which had been an issue of earlier lawsuits even by famous grandmasters (see Pa20-Pa21).  And for another thing, these defendants parted from the [...] rules when it came to using the player’s established [...] quick ratings (i.e. see Pa16, where these defendants had stated that this event would only affect the player’s [...] quick ratings; but contrary to the [...] rules, inconsistently also stated that they would use the higher of the players’ regular or quick rating for pairings and prizes).  4)
[brief] In October 2018 and January 2019, Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice Complaint and Amended Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Pennsylvania, against [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...], Esquire (“[...]”).  Da283–84.  In that action, [...] and [...] asserted Pennsylvania jurisdiction was improper because they were not physically served with the Complaint there, maintained no physical office there, were not registered to do business there, did not lease real property there, and did not have any employees or agents in the state.  Da167–68, Da310–11.  After jurisdictional discovery, the Court of Common Pleas sustained the preliminary objections on April 16, 2020, and dismissed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as to [...] and [...] based on lack of personal jurisdiction.  Da259–75.  Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this legal malpractice Complaint and Amended Complaint against [...] and [...] in the Superior Court of New Jersey in Monmouth County.  Da21–126.  [...] and [...] again argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them, adding that it also lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not have a certificate of authority to transact business in New Jersey when it filed suit.  Da2–5.  Once again, jurisdictional discovery took place.  Then, in March 2024, the Superior Court found it had personal jurisdiction over [...] and [...].  The court further found it had subject matter jurisdiction because, by then, Plaintiff had obtained a certificate of authority to transact business.  Da1; Da10–17.  On April 2, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for leave to appeal the Superior Court’s decision which was granted by this Court on April 19, 2024.  Da384.
[brief] (9T 70-12 to 72-16)  (Partially Raised Below)  ..............................................................................................................  41  A.  The Detectives’ False Claims that a Non-Testifying Eyewitness “Picked” Defendant -- and the Trial Court’s Refusal to Permit Him to Impeach that Identification -- Violated His Confrontation Rights.  ...........................................................................................................  42  B.  Permitting the Jury to Hear Defendant’s Multiple Invocations of His Right to Silence -- and the Prosecutor’s Comments on His Silence -- Denied Him a Fair Trial.  ..................................................................................  47  C.  The Detectives’ Improper Lay Opinions -- on Defendant’s Guilt, Credibility, Motive, Opportunity, and Premeditation -- Usurped the Jury’s Exclusive Role to Decide the Ultimate Issue.  .......................  51  POINT III ..........................................................................................................................
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b) directs a court to “sentence a defendant to pay restitution … if … [t]he victim … suffered a loss; and [t]he defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution. ”  This analysis “shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant, “including the defendant’s likely future earnings,” “the nature of the burden its payment will impose,” and “the defendant’s ability to pay. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c).  “[N]ormally,” this “requires a hearing on both the ability to pay and the time period for making restitution. ”  State v. Orji, 277 N.J. Super. 582, 589 (App. Div. 1994); State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 263-64 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998).
[brief] When plaintiff amended to name Cross Appellants, the Complaint related back to the original Complaint pursuant to Rule. 4:9-3  The relation-back doctrine, “R. 4:9-3 permits relation back of a pleading when a plaintiff is unable to ascertain the identity of a proper party or makes a mistake concerning his identity.  Fede, supra, 221 N.J. Super. at 335 (citing Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 367 (1979); Farrell, supra; Aruta v. Keller, 134 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div.1975); Hernandez, supra; Lombardi v. Simon, 266 N.J. Super. 708 (Law Div. 1993)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Viviano, supra, set forth a three-part test for when an amendment for a claim against a new defendant should be permitted to relate back in time to the filing of the original complaint: (1) the claim asserted in the amended complaint arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged or sought to be alleged in the original complaint; (2) the new defendant had sufficient notice of the institution of the action not to be prejudiced in maintaining his or her defense; and (3) the new defendant knew or should have known that, but for the misidentification of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him or her.
[brief] Plaintiff alleges that she received a letter from [...] on or about August 11, 2020 seeking to collect on a debt owed to [...] in the amount of $1,062.00.  (Pa7).  Plaintiff alleges that [...] used a mailing vendor to print and mail this letter and that in order to do so, [...] transmitted Plaintiff’s information, specifically the account number associated with the debt (account number ending in 7683) and the alleged balance due ($1,062.00), to [...]’s mailing vendor.  (Pa8,9).  On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.  Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition disclosed Plaintiff’s status as a debtor and that Plaintiff owed the debt at issue.  (Da4).  Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition listed the name of the creditor, the address of the creditor, the last four digits of the account number, and the amount of the debt.  (See Da28 at § 4.19).  The bankruptcy petition was filed on the public record and so the debt information that Plaintiff claims was disclosed in this lawsuit was released to the public by Plaintiff.
[brief] Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...], are developers of solar energy rights.  While "solar energy" is often associated with "solar panels," solar panels are merely the physical manifestation of all the non-physical assets that have been compiled over a long process involving significant expense and efforts.  In 2015, plaintiffs came to learn that [...] was in the process of completing the process of obtaining the three types of assets discussed above: Solar Renewable Energy Credits (SRECs); an "interconnection agreement"; and a WMPA, using a brownfield land it owned in [...].  The following allegations were set forth in the first amended complaint as well as in the proposed second amended complaint:  **SRECs AS VALUABLE, TRADED COMMODITIES**
[brief] As a matter of fact, during the course of this case, there were discussions of a potential plea agreement but there could be no agreement under these circumstances so the defendant was involved in discussions with his attorney.  I don’t know exactly what they were nor am I asking.  But I know as the Judge presiding over this case, that that did occur.  And defense counsel talked about incompetencies.  They’re not talking about the word competent to stand trial.  That’s not what the mean under Miller.  It was that he had an inability to be involved in his defense.  The reality is the evidence against this defendant, even if you take out the statement, even if you do that, there was clearly enough evidence in this record through defendant’s cell phone and other information that was supplied during the course of this trial that the defendant could have been found guilty of all of these crimes.
[brief] A myriad of factors impact the analysis, including the size of the company, the number of business units involved, and the scope of the alleged fraud.  In my mind, it is simply too difficult at the outset of a case to make a definitive assessment on the number of custodians that should be searched.  Any number I select might turn out, once discovery advances, to be too expansive or too limiting.  All I can do is pick a number of custodians that I firmly believe gives Plaintiffs the opportunity to conduct meaningful, in-depth discovery given the size and scope of the case, and, at the same time, recognizes the inherent expenses associated with wide-scale email searches.  For this case, I will initially give Plaintiffs the opportunity to select 50 custodians whose email accounts they want searched.  I am always willing to revisit the issue if, once the email discovery commences, it becomes readily apparent that additional custodians possess information critical to the issues at stake in this litigation.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL SUPPLEMENTAL POLICY ON 2016]1  [as of March 3, CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICES  Effective on October 7, 2010, as Clarified on May 3, 2012, Revised on June 20, 2012, Clarified on July 13, 2012, Revised on June 3, 2014, Revised on March 3, 2016.
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[brief] “Only where the facts of the particular case are so ‘unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive’ may temporal proximity, on its own, support an inference of causation. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503).  First, [...]’s self-serving deposition testimony is not a genuine dispute of material fact.  She testified that [...] approved the charge pay “as long as I don’t get in trouble. ” (Pa230 at 22:18-21).  However, this is directly contradicted by her interview with [...] wherein she stated that she took [...]’s silence on the charge pay as approval.  (Pa547).  [...]’s testimony is also contradicted by [...] and [...], who confirmed that [...] never approved the charge pay, and [...]’s testimony.  (See Pa362 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa475 ([...] denies [...]’s request for prospective staffing coordinator charge pay); Pa297 at 80:10-14 ([...] admitting at her deposition that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay for any staffing coordinator); Pa547-48 ([...] never notified [...] whether [...] had directly approved her receipt of charge pay); Pa477 ([...] told [...] that he never received approval from [...] to enter charge pay); Pa475; Pa105-06 at 89:6-90:6 ([...] told [...] that she never would have entered charge pay for only three of her five --- 5  [...] does not argue that the temporal proximity of his termination is indicative of causation, other than arguing that [...] interfered with [...]’s investigation of her conduct.  This argument is addressed below.