ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court analyzed *Medici’s* “enhanced quality of proof” requirements:  The requirement that the negative criteria be tested in accordance with the enhanced quality of proofs was derived from the recognition that granting a variance is inherently at odds with the uses permitted in the zone as established by the ordinance enacted by the municipality’s governing body.  As we explained, the new enhanced quality of proofs requirement was intended to ensure that the negative criteria would remain an essential safeguard to prevent the improper exercise of the variance power.  *TSI*, 215 N.J. at 39 (citing *Medici*, 107 N.J. at 22).  In explaining its earlier *Coventry Square* decision, the *TSI* Court wrote:  We held that ‘because a conditional use is not a prohibited use,… it need not meet the stringent special reason’s standards [set forth in *Medici*] for a commercial-use variance. ’ [*Coventry Square*, 138 N.J. at 287].  Instead, a conditional use variance ‘allows the applicant to engage in a conditional use despite the applicant’s failure to meet one or more of the conditions.  It is not the use but the noncompliance with the conditions that violates the ordinance. ’  *TSI*, 215 N.J. at 40 (quoting *Coventry Square*, 138 N.J. at 287).  Similarly, in the present case, it is not the use which is prohibited, but the associated height limitation that necessitates the variance.  The *TSI* Court further explained:  An application for a use variance, also referred to as a (d)(1) variance, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1), seeks permission from a zoning board to put property to a use that is otherwise prohibited by the zoning ordinance.  Both the positive and negative criteria in such an application are tested in accordance with the standards first established in Medici.
[brief] TABLE OF ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED vii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES viii APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR EXHIBITS ix PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4 STATEMENTS OF FACTS 8 LEGAL ARGUMENTS 11 SECTION A J. ROSS’ CERTIFICATION FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, DATED OCTOBER 26, 2022, IN ORDER TO FOCUS ONLY ON APPEAL ISSUES FOR: (3T, p. 5, line 13, to p. 7 line 5)  1) REVISE OCT. 6, 2022 ORDER, PAR. 1, BASED ON GRANTING J. ROSS’ EXCEPTIONS TO TRUST INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING BASED ON HIS AUG. 8, 2022 FILING, & REQUIRE MR. ROTH TO REVISE AND FILE UPDATED ACCOUNTING BASED ON THOSE EXCEPTIONS  2) REVISE OCT. 6, 2022 ORDER, PAR. 1C, SO PRIOR TRUST PAYMENTS OF $31,259.74 FOR ROTH & SPELLMAN ACCOUNTING FEES FOR 2019-2022 ARE NOT APPROVED PENDING MR. ROSS’ REVIEW FOR ANY ACCOUNTING EXCEPTIONS FOR MR. ROTH’S RESOLUTION, OR COURT APPROVAL OR DENIAL, AFTER SUBMITTAL OF HIS REQUESTED R&S INVOICES, AS REQUIRED BY NJ R.3B:31-67 3) REVISE OCT. 6, 2022 ORDER, PAR. 1D, BASED ON J. ROSS’ EXCEPTIONS IN ORDER TO DENY FERRO LABELLA’S FEES OF $15,022.72 ($4,120.48 & $10,902.24), AS PER ACCOUNTING, FOR WORK FROM JUNE 6, 2021 TO JAN. 31, 2022, AND REQUIRE PAYBACK OF THOSE FEES TO THE TRUST 4)  MR. ROTH SHALL PROVIDE TRUST INFO & DOCS REQUESTED BY J. ROSS, AS QUALIFIED BENEFICIARY, AS REQ’D BY NJ R.3B:31-67, FOR REVIEW FOR ANY EXCEPTIONS (FOR COURT APPROVAL OR DENIAL) TO FIGURES IN THE INTERMEDIATE & FUTURE FINAL ACCOUNTINGS  5)  REQUIRE PAYBACK TO TRUST OF $74,248.18, AS PER ACCOUNTING, BASED ON MR. ROSS’ EXCEPTIONS FOR CULLEN & DYKMAN’S FEES FOR 2019-2021  WORK ON BEHALF OF MS. ROSS FOR ESTATE CASE [...]  RATHER THAN ANY TRUST CASE  6)  REQUIRE MR. ROTH’S COMPLIANCE WITH PAR.  2 OF ORDER TO ISSUE INFORMAL, FINAL TRUST ACCOUNTING, WHICH HE REFUSED TO ISSUE  1.  Item 1 - (29a, last par., to 31a, 1st par.; 32a-34a) (3T, p. 4, line 8, to p. 5, line 6)  2.  Items 2,4,&5 - Issues were not ruled upon in Court rulings  3.  Item 3 - (31a, last par., to 32a, 1st 2 lines, for [...]’ Exceptions only) (4T, p. 46, line15, to p. 47, line 13 {$72,000 on line 2 should be $4,120.48})  4.  Item 6 - (4T, p. 47, line 19, to p. 48, line 9)  SECTION B J. ROSS’ CERTIFICATION REPLY, DATED NOV. 25, 2022, IN ORDER TO FOCUS ONLY ON APPEAL ISSUES BY REFUTING RELEVANT FILED
[brief] STANDARDS OF REVIEW  In reviewing the soundness of the trial court’s decision, the trial court rulings of law are reviewed de novo.  Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019).  “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  Factual determinations are entitled to deference so long as they are supported by “adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).  Here, the trial court’s legal determinations were incorrect and are entitled to no deference upon appellate review.
[brief] Because [...] entered a plea of guilty to Unlawful Possession of a Handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), under [...], the Court below in this case did not need to engage in any fact finding regarding whether [...] “possess[ed] a firearm at the time of any pending criminal charge. ”  The question the State poses on appeal is a purely legal question regarding the correct interpretation of the language of subsection (a)(5).  Thus, the State had the right to ask this Court to evaluate whether [...]’s legal interpretation of subsection (a)(5) was correct.  However, as set forth above, [...]’s legal interpretation was correct, and thus not “plainly mistaken. ”  238 N.J. at 139.  This Court need not decide whether all determinations under subsection (a)(5) are appealable by the State in order to resolve this appeal.  Subsection (a)(5) is not as clean cut as subsections (a)(1), (6), (7), and (8) precisely because it commands the court to make a factual finding about whether a defendant possessed a firearm in the present case or separate pending case.  There may be a future scenario where a defendant awaiting trial on a pending firearm charge seeks admission to Recovery Court before his trial and asks the Recovery Court Judge to evaluate the evidence in the pending case to determine whether he did or did not possess a firearm.  Such a scenario would involve fact-finding\(^3\) and may not be appealable under Hyland.  But such a hypothetical is not presented by this case, and as such must be left for another day.  \(^3\)  Such judicial fact-finding, however, may violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  See State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 534 (2005).  CONCLUSION
[brief] (DA177).  On January 5, 2018, a representative for [...] sent by e-mail the counter-signed SPA to Plaintiff [...] and included a Dropbox link to the POS.  (DA361).  On January 11, 2018, [...], who had been retained by Plaintiffs emailed Counsel for Defendants stating: “This email confirms that attorney review for unit 1601 of 99 Hudson is hereby concluded.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.....................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I:......................................................................................................2  APPELLEE IS JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM A MONEY JUDGMENT  ABOVE THE APPLICABLE LIABILITY COVERAGE(S)  TOTALLING $200,000 AND A MOLDING OF THE JUDGMENT IS THE CORRECT METHOD TO REFLECT  SAME POINT II:....................................................................................................6  THE JURY VERDICT WAS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE THAT SHOCKS THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, REMITTITUR POINT III:....................................................................................................6  APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF APPELLEE’S INJURIES IN SUMMATION REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL POINT IV:....................................................................................................6 APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S MISLEADING CITATIONS TO [...]’S TESTIMONY REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL POINT V:....................................................................................................7 APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S REFERENCE FOR THE JURY TO “IMPOSE RESPONSIBILITY” UPON THE APPELLANT WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND WARRANTS
[brief] The Zoning board hearing proceeded with the record being only the documents submitted by the School (See Da1, listing Da7-88) inclusive of [...]’s June 2017 easement decision (Da29) and the 1963 Agreement (Da23).  The [...] --- although being the “owner” and “proponent” of the off-site parking use --- did not present any exhibits or evidence as to any “zoning” authority by which the off-site parking could be deemed a “pre-existing” legal nonconforming use.  Its position was that the “easement” or permission by the then owner of School Lot 5 in 1963 allowing Lot 8 parking use on Lot 5 superseded or negated any need for any zoning authority or approval (Da62).
[brief] Addendum II made clear for the first time that [...]—which was previously demanding price adjustments—agreed to move forward with the transaction and the agreed-upon sales price in the PSA after the ROFR disclosure had been properly made in writing.  A partially-signed Addendum II to the PSA would not constitute a final term and condition to the PSA unless [...] also executed the amendment.  As [...] itself argues in its brief, “The one-sided negotiating (or, attempt to renegotiate terms) by [...]'s attorney could not alter the terms of the already established contract without some expression by Defendant [sic] [...] to these issues.”  Db 46-47.  [...] cannot be permitted to argue out of both sides of its mouth.
[brief] Around the same time [...] was exploring ways to ensure that users perceived [...] as protective of their information while transitioning to a platform that allowed all app developers to access users’ and friends’ information, he hired [...] to figure out how to monetize the content and information [...] collected.  In a 2009 article, [...] is quoted as explaining that “[[...]] handles monetization and works on different efforts with the ad products; I spend more time on product and technical strategy.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 a states that only employees of the railroad who are acting within the scope of their employment are permitted to enter a railroad right of way or come into contact with railroad equipment.  There are two exceptions when a non-employee can be on a railroad right of way: 1) when they are a passenger using parts of railroad meant for passenger use; and 2) when they are using a crossing established by the railroad.  It is noteworthy in N.J.S.A. 48:12-152a that the only location described is “upon the right of way”.  Railroad “rights of way” are defined by the Federal Transit Administration as those “shared with vehicles or pedestrians: Rail right-of-way over which motor vehicle and/or pedestrian traffic moving in the same direction or cross directions may pass. ”  Pa1071.  This FTA manual makes the distinction between a railroad right of way and railroad property.  Relevant to the instant case, the railroad defendants had a right of way to run their light rail tracks through the city streets of Jersy City, New Jersey.  Nowhere in N.J.S.A. 48:12-152a is railroad property or the word property used.  Had the legislature intended section A to apply to other locations, for example, railroad property, that location certainly would have been included in this section of the statute.  Thus, a plain language reading of the statute would conclude that section A applies only to railroad rights of way and not to railroad property.
[directive] RELEVANT AGENCIES  BUREAU OF GUARDIANSHIP SERVICES (BGS), DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES o  Responsible for processing and tracking guardianship actions for people served by the Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) who have been evaluated according to state law and determined to require a guardian.  BGS is only able to serve individuals who have been determined by DDD, through its application process, to be eligible for its services.  COUNTY  ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES o  Serves vulnerable adults in the community and investigates instances of abuse and neglect.  CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY (CP&P), DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (formerly the Division of Youth and Family Services, DYFS) o New Jersey’s child protection and child welfare agency within the Department of Children and Families.  Its mission is to ensure the safety, permanency, and well-being of children and to support families.  CP&P is responsible for investigating allegations of child abuse and neglect and, if necessary, arranging for the child’s protection and the family’s treatment.  The Child Abuse Hotline (State Central Registry) receives all reports of child abuse and neglect 24-hours a day, seven-days a week.
[brief] This statute provides as follows:  No driver of a vehicle or street car shall enter upon or cross an intersecting street marked with a “stop” sign unless:  a.  The driver has first brought the vehicle or street car to a complete stop at a point within five feet of the nearest crosswalk or stop line marked upon the pavement at the near side of the intersecting street and shall proceed only after yielding the right of way to all vehicular traffic on the intersecting street which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.  b.  No driver of a vehicle or street car shall enter upon or cross an intersecting street marked with a “yield right of way” sign without first slowing to a reasonable speed for existing conditions and visibility, stopping if necessary, and the driver shall yield the right of way to all vehicular traffic on the intersecting street which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard; unless, in either case, the driver is otherwise directed to proceed by a traffic or police officer or traffic control signal.
[brief] ” (Id. at 17, 25-26).  They further contend that plaintiffs’ suggestion that a “52% responsiveness rate overall or varying rates across custodians evinces an improper review,” or “bad intent,” is “pure conjecture. ”  (Id.).  They explain that there were many false positives with respect to some of the search terms (e.g., Cox, and “Equal Employment”), which yielded numerous results that were not responsive to the discovery requests.  (Id. at 26).  They also explain that differing responsiveness rates across custodians also is not evidence that defendants conducted an improper responsiveness review as those rates could be explained by things such as the individual’s particular position, or the result of a large number of false positives in an individual’s documents.  (Id. at 26-27).  Defendants point out that “if Plaintiffs are correct and documents have in fact been lost (a proposition with which Defendants do not agree), then ordering production of all documents that hit on a search term would not remedy the issues because search terms cannot hit on documents that do not exist.
[directive] INVOLVING A FIREARM  Statute Degree Short Description  2C:39-16 1  LEADER OF FIREARMS  TRAFFICKING NETWORKS  2C:39-3(M)  3 PROHIBITED WEAP/DEVICES COVERT/UNDETECTABLE FIREARMS 2C:39-3B  3  PROHIBITED WEAPONS AND DEVICES - SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN 2C:39-3D  4 PROHIBITED WEAPONS AND DEVICES - DEFACED  FIREARMS 2C:39-3N  3  PROHIBITED WEAPONS - FIREARM WITHOUT SERIAL NUMBER 2C:39-4.1A  2  POSSESSION OF FIREARM WHILE COMMITTING CDS/BIAS CRIME  2C:39-4A(1)  2  POSS OF WEAPON FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSE-FIREARM-ANYONE 2C:39-4A(2)  2  POSS OF WEAPON FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSE-COMMUNITY GUN 2C:39-5A  2  UNLAWFUL POSS WEAP- MACHINE GUN 2C:39-5B(1)  1  UNLAWFUL POSS WEAPON-HANDGUNS WITHOUT PERMIT  2C:39-5B(1)  2  UNLAWFUL POSS WEAPON-HANDGUNS WITHOUT PERMIT  2C:39-5B(2)  3  UNLAWFUL POSS WEAPON - HANDGUNS AIR/SPRING/PISTOL  2C:39-5C(1)  3  UNLAWFUL POSS WEAP - RIFLES/SHOTGUNS  2C:39-5C(2)  3  UNLAWFUL POSS WEAP - RIFLE/SHOTGUN LOADED  2C:39-5E(1)  3  UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS AT EDU INSTIT.  2C:39-5F  2  UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS - ASSAULT FIREARM  2C:39-7A  4 CERTAIN PERSONS NOT TO HAVE WEAP-CONVICTED CRIME  2C:39-7B(1)  2  CERT PERSON NOT TO HAVE WEAP PRIOR CONV 2C:16-1, ETC.  2C:39-7B(2)  3  CERTAIN PERSONS NOT TO HAVE WEAPONS  PRIOR DP DV 2C:39-7B(3)  3 CERTAIN PERSONS NOT TO HAVE WEAP-PROHIBITED BY DVA 1991 2C:39-7B(4)  3 CERTAIN PERSONS NOT TO HAVE WEAPONS
[brief] As the Supreme Court explained, the length of a sentence “is not the key constitutional issue” in and of itself.  Id. at 100.  Indeed, “some juvenile offenders should receive and serve very lengthy sentences because of the nature of the offense and of the offender. ”  Ibid.  In determining the new sentence, the court should consider “factors that could not be fully considered decades earlier, like whether the defendant still fails to appreciate risks and consequences, and whether he has matured or been rehabilitated. ”  Id. at 403.
[brief] [...] acknowledges that it did not send [...] a Cancellation Notice by certified mail.  It maintains that it satisfied the statute by sending the notice via regular mail, and obtaining from the Post Office a “date stamped proof of mailing showing the name and address of the insured. ”  Because of the use of that option, [...] was also required to retain “a duplicate copy of the mailed notice which is certified to be a true copy. ”  The issue on the summary judgment motions was whether or not [...] had proven its compliance with those provisions.
[brief] Shortly after the briefing, the officers drove to the property, and members of the TEAMS Unit made entrance through the front door of [...] after knocking and announcing several times.\(^8\) (1T50-3 to 51-17; 1T79-23 to 82-20; 5T73-10 to 76-9).  [...], the lead investigator, was not part of the initial entry and entered after the TEAMS unit deemed the premises safe and secure.  (1T48-16 to 51-10; 1T54-17 to 55-3; Da18).
[brief] leasehold interest in rented property) in all of my residences located in Englewood, New Jersey and New York, New York, and in any other property used or occupied by me as my residence, other than Palm Beach, Florida (the “Residences”) which is includible in the Trust Estate and all policies and proceeds of insurance thereon and (ii) shall pay any mortgage indebtedness or other indebtedness thereon as an administration expense as provided in Paragraph A of Section 3.1 of this Agreement.  If . . .  [[...]] does not survive me, my Trustee (i) shall distribute to [...], if she survives me, or if she does not survive me, to her descendants who survive me, per stirpes, subject to Article IV of this Agreement, the Residences, and all policies and proceeds of insurance thereon and (ii) shall pay any mortgage indebtedness or other indebtedness thereon as an administration expense as provided in Paragraph A of Section 3.1 of this Agreement.  If none of . . . [[...]], [...], or any of the descendants of [...] survives me, I direct my Trustee to sell the Residences.
[brief] Separately, [...] moved for an award of its attorneys’ fees and costs, arguing that it was the “prevailing party” and entitled to fees under PSA § 18.2.  (Pa395-440).  Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that the June 9 Order (which was, at the time, the subject of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration) had been incorrectly decided and that, even if [...] was the prevailing party, the dollar amount sought by [...] was unreasonable and excessive.  (Pa441-474).  Ultimately, the trial court adhered to the June 9 Order, but stated at oral argument on July 21, 2023 that it would not decide [...]’s motion for fees without conducting a hearing.  (3T, at 16-17).  At a subsequent conference on September 22, 2023, the trial court marked [...]’s fee motion as denied without prejudice to its renewal, while [...] and Plaintiff worked to stipulate to the amount of such fees.  (5T, at 17-20; “Sept. 28, 2023 Order,” Pa689).  Thereafter, the trial court entered final judgment as to the stipulated amount of the fees to be awarded to [...], which judgment finally concluded the action and cleared the way for this direct appeal.  (Pa704-705).  F.
[brief] We submit that [...] is entitled to relief because the Final Judgment of Divorce was improperly entered against her in the first place – as the transcript of the March 18, 2015 default judgment hearing shows:  •  [...] and his lawyer lied to [...], during the hearing, that [...] had her own “independent counsel” who reviewed the marital settlement agreements with her -- which [...], in his R. 4:50 decision below, acknowledged was false (i.e., [...] did not have her own independent counsel as [...] and his lawyer falsely told [...]).  •  The Final Judgment of Divorce incorporated a “Mid-Marriage Agreement” that is inherently coercive and presumptively invalid under New Jersey law, yet [...] made no findings of fact or law with regard to the Mid-Marriage Agreement, or with regard to the alimony and equitable distribution determinations that [...]’s Final Judgment of Divorce put into effect (contrary to New Jersey law requiring such findings to be made in a divorce case whether the divorce judgment is premised on default or not, Gnall v. Gnall, 222 NJ. 414, 428 (2015); Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980)).  Those two undisputed aspects of this case – shown by the transcript of the March 18, 2015 default judgment hearing held before [...] that culminated in the divorce judgment he entered against [...] by default that day -- show that the judgment was invalid from its inception, was improperly entered against the absent spouse’s rights, was premised at least in part on a lie [...] and his lawyer told [...] in open court, and is not remotely equitable such that it should be enforced, in a chancery court (where the Family Court sits), to saddle [...] with its alimony and equitable distribution determinations, cf. A.M.S. v. M.L.S., No. A-1905-19, 2021 WL 3197768, at *5–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 29, 2021) (so ruling where divorce judgment obtained by default without family judge making findings required by New Jersey law).
[brief] (Aa17).  And while [...] attempts to blame [...] for his failure to provide any witness statements because it did not specifically ask him for them, this argument falls flat.  (Ab23).  [...] not only attempted to interview other union witnesses—namely, Witnesses 4, 5, and 6 who were uncooperative with the investigator—but nothing precluded [...] from providing [...] with any and all evidence he felt would benefit his defense.