[brief] *Livingstone*, 111 N.J. at 105.  Equally important, the focus in that case was always on the conduct of the employer in exposing the employee to added risk of injury, not the nature of the injury that actually resulted.  The takeaway from *Livingstone* is that an employer’s decision to compel some employees to park in a designated area of a parking lot to give preferential treatment to others is not a *per se* intentional wrong.  It simply means that an injury resulting from that decision is compensable under the Worker’s Compensation Act.  Whether the employer can be held further accountable under common law still depends on a multitude of different factors addressed in the *Millison* progeny of cases.  Among those factors are deceptive practices by the employer exposing the employee to added risk beyond what might be inherent in the employment setting (not established by plaintiff here), whether the employer took affirmative action to modify an instrumentality or here, the parking lot, again exposing the employee to added risk beyond what was previously inherent (not established by the plaintiff here) and prior knowledge of accidents (not established by the plaintiff here).  Here, consistent with *Livingstone*, the trial court found that “[...] appropriately directed specific employees to park in a designated section of the parking lot for a legitimate business purpose of accommodating patients and physicians. ” (Pa23).  Consistent with the Millison line of cases, the trial court appropriately found that “[no] evidence suggests that [...] altered or modified the parking lot” and that there were not any significant reports of prior incidents in the lot.  (Pa23).  While we can debate the issue of whether the defendant’s conduct here to compel non-management employees park in an area where more pedestrian safeguards should have been placed was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless, the trial court appropriately concluded that regardless, it did not rise to the level of an intentional wrong as defined.  As the trial court correctly concluded from its fact-sensitive analysis and looking at the case in a light most favorable to plaintiff:  “The analysis begins with the decision to mandate parking in the lot and whether there was evidence at that point indicating a predetermined likelihood of injury or death.  The answer to the inquiry is no.  “Even a strong probability of risk - - will come up short of the ‘substantial certainty’ needed to find an intentional wrong. ” (Pa23-Pa24 quoting Millison, 109 N.J. at 179).  Simply put, the trial court correctly rejected the plaintiff’s retroactive and flawed reasoning that the analysis started with the occurrence of death.  Rather, the trial court properly ruled that the analysis started with the defendant’s decision to designate different parking areas for different employees in the lot as designed, and whether at that time there was more than just an appreciation of a significant risk of injury or death.  (Pall-Pa12).  That the trial court used the word “unequivocal” to characterize the lack of evidence is not, as plaintiff suggests, proof that the judge applied the wrong standard when deciding the motion.  Rather, it was a characterization of the certainty by which the trial court concluded that reasonable jurors could not conclude that the defendant’s conduct made it substantially certain that injury or death would result.  This was so, even viewing this in a light most favorable to plaintiff, based on the incredibly high bar needed to demonstrate an intentional wrong within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 and the progeny of cases interpreting this statute.  POINT II