[brief] On April 6, 2023, counsel appeared before [...] for argument on Plaintiff’s OTSC.  (1T).  As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that Plaintiff was “prepared to move forward with the terms as they were put on the record, which include[d] a full release. ” (1T4:14-16).  Subsequently, [...] asked defense counsel why he should not enforce the terms of the agreement placed on record on December 20, 2022.  (1T4:19-20).  Defense counsel responded that there were “additional terms” set forth in the written Agreement and averred that the memorialization of said agreement on the record was merely a “vague blurb of our, I guess tentative discussions on what . . . the settlement agreement w[as] to be. ”  (1T4:21-5:1).  As defense counsel began to describe the written four-page written Agreement, the judge echoed Plaintiff’s position and emphasized that Plaintiff was “walking away from the separation agreement” and seeking only enforcement of the settlement terms as memorialized on the record, which was confirmed by Plaintiff’s counsel.  (1T5:2-11).  Addressing the contents of the memorialized settlement placed on the record, the judge asked defense counsel what, if any, terms counsel or Defendant disagreed with in terms of the material terms as reflected in the transcript.  (1T5:19-22).  In response, defense counsel referenced various terms contained in the written Agreement, i.e., specific claims released, the relinquishment of rights to sue, and monetary value of Defendant’s accrued time, to which [...] again responded that Plaintiff was willing to walk away from anything not contained in the memorialized terms of the settlement placed on the record.  (1T5:25-6:12).  Nonetheless, defense counsel claimed that the memorialized settlement could not be effectuated because they believed Defendant would have a “chance to review it” based on a revocation period.  (1T6:17-20).  He referenced various provisions of the written Agreement, such as the voluntary retirement provision (Pa41, ¶ 9), statutory review/revocation period provision (Pa43, ¶ 11), and the employee’s release provision (Pa42, ¶ 9), to support his contention that Defendant had a right to repudiate the settlement and that the written Agreement included additional terms not agreed to by the parties.  (1T8:2-10:10).  Plaintiff’s counsel countered that the release provision constituted a general release, thus making the precise language used in that provision irrelevant, and that Defendant agreed to release all claims against Plaintiff in exchange for her retirement on the record at the December 20, 2022 hearing.  (1T10:15-23).  As for the statutory review/revocation provision, Plaintiff’s counsel reiterated that Plaintiff had no problem taking that provision out and that there was no memorialized discussion on the record about a rescission period or the OWBPA language in that provision, and instead, it is boilerplate generally included in agreements.  (1T10:24-11:3).  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s counsel repeated that the issue was that Defendant agreed to the memorialized terms of the settlement, counsel for both parties verified on the record that those terms constituted the full scope of the settlement, Defendant was not impaired, and Defendant affirmed on the record that she was aware of the terms of the settlement and agreed to them.  (1T14:11-23).  She further noted that the usual course of things consisted of either placing a settlement on the record, which the parties did, or drafting a Willingboro\(^2\) written document if you are in mediation.  (1T15:3-7).  **THE TRIAL COURT’S APRIL 12, 2023 ORAL DECISION**