ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s testimony is clear that although her total assets exceeded $70,000 in 2011, that was a result of some forty-one years of savings accumulation.  At age 59, Plaintiff was looking at fewer than ten working years left.  At the time, she was earning $50,000 per year.  (2T 88:16-18)  It was perfectly rational, and not a deliberate falsehood, for Plaintiff to state in response to [...] asking “can you give me $70,000” that she did not feel that she had $70,000 available for the purpose of paying her half of the down payment of the townhouse.
[brief] This is more problematic given that New Jersey’s State Constitution affords greater protections than its federal counterpart.  The sneak and peek warrant involved numerous misrepresentations by the lead prosecutor on this matter down to the detectives that averred that the purpose of the sneak and peek warrant was to install listening devices and cameras because the use of confidential informants and surveillance proved unsuccessful.  Also, the judge hearing the sneak and peek application was told that no items would be seized because that was not the purpose of the warrant.  (1T’71-1 to 75-19)  (Emphasis added)  The detectives never installed a listening device or camera in the apartment.  Instead, the detectives seized samples of drugs they allegedly stated was visible, and various other items.  More troubling, is the fact that the detectives then applied for a search warrant the next day for the apartment, thereby making clear that the sneak and peek was nothing more than a pretext to establish probable cause for a formal search warrant.  The PCR court ruled that the issue concerning the sneak and peek was already addressed by the Appellate Division on direct appeal but did ultimately address the defendant's issue.
[brief] **THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ONE-SIDED ARBITRATION AGREEMENT; AND IN ITS DISCUSSIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY**  [Raised Below at Pa 67-72; Decided at Pa1-16]  For its part, the Law Division recognized that there were troubling public policy concerns presented by one-sided arbitration agreements.  [1T 33:4-40:2].  In fact, the Law Division stated: “Clearly there is [a problem] here. ”  [1T 33:12-13].  Nonetheless, the Law Division focused on only one troubling concern – potential inconsistency of outcomes – while not addressing the threat to efficient, cost effective, and prompt outcomes presented by the clause; or even to the court system’s interest in having arbitration agreements enforced to avoid taxing already-overburdened resources of the judiciary.  [1T33:4-52:11].  The Law Division’s intent seemed to be to alleviate the expressed concerns of the Supreme Court in *Delta Funding*, which the Law Division defined as issue splitting and the risk of inconsistent outcome.  At the oral argument at May 14, 2024, the Law Division proposed that the “opt-out” language of the provision should be interpreted to provide that should Appellant file an arbitration, and Respondent thereafter filed a legal proceeding, then Appellant would be permitted to assert his claim as a counterclaim.  [1T33:4-52:11].  The arbitration would then be dismissed, negating any risk of issue splitting between the forums.  *Id.*  The Law Division questioned Respondent’s counsel, who did not precisely admit one way or the other if Respondent generally agreed with that interpretation, but who stated that Respondent would agree to that interpretation for this case.  [1T 33:4-40:2].  Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that the Law Division’s interpretation of the language was not unreasonable but, even if interpreted in this fashion, it only addressed the concern of “issue splitting” between the two forums.  Appellant’s counsel argued that the Law Division was not considering other public policy concerns underlying the law’s embrace of arbitration agreements, namely promptness of outcome; avoidance of costs and expenses; and relieving the burden to the judiciary.  [1T 40:23-52:11].  In support of that position, Appellant’s counsel contended that, even accepting the Law Division’s interpretation, Respondent still could “toy” with Appellant, or even get a “sneak preview” of the arbitrator before deciding that Respondent did not like the direction of the proceedings.  [1T 40:23-52:11].  Under the Law Division’s interpretation, proceedings could be well advanced in arbitration after months of discovery – even to the point that the arbitrator had conducted a hearing and was preparing a decision – when Respondent could file a legal action, and pull the plug on the arbitration under the belief that the arbitrator had signaled intentions on the likely outcome.  Id.  Accordingly, the Law Division’s interpretation did not address the injuries to public policy still presented by this arbitration provision, except for issue splitting.  For reasons discussed below, Appellant contends this was in error.
[brief] In addition to the court-appointed valuation expert (“[...]”), the Court heard Plaintiffs’ expert, [...], CPA (“[...]”), and [...]’s expert, [...], CPA (“[...]”).  During the Valuation Hearing, [...], [...], and [...] (the “Experts”) testified about their valuation reports, which were entered at the Valuation Hearing as Exhibit J-1 (for [...]) (Da2853), P-3 (for [...]) (Da2986) and D-2 (for [...]).  (Da2579)  Each testified to various modifications to be made to their reports given the difference in what they believed to be [...]’s percentage interests when they wrote their reports, and what they believed to be [...]’s percentage interests after accounting for the aggregate $236,000 reduction required by the Court’s confirmation of the Phase II Partial Final Award.
[brief] The Appellate Division in that case considered but did not decide whether statutory provisions, or public policy as discussed in Schmidt, 155 N.J. at 51-52, void Exclusion C.5.  Rodriguez-Ortiz, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2072 at *21; Ja481.  The Court denied coverage of the employer’s defense costs in the underlying personal injury case on other grounds.  Subsequently, in Rodriguez v. [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2386, at *18 (App. Div. Dec. 22, 2023), leave to appeal granted, 257 N.J. 247 (2024), another Appellate Division panel considered but did not further pursue the discussion in Rodriguez-Ortiz regarding statutory or public policy prohibition of the C.5 exclusion.
[brief] The trial court decided [...]’s motion for summary judgment on the first day of trial with the consent of all counsel.  1T4:22-7:22.  [...] sought summary judgment on the issue of contractual indemnification.  1T7:23-8:3, 8:24-10:7.  Although [...] conceded that its contract “doesn’t specifically contain the bright line language of Azurak [v. Corporate Property Investors, 175 N.J. 110 (2003)],” it contended that its contract satisfied the requirement of Azurak and entitled it to indemnification for its own negligence.  1T10:8-12:13.  [...] contended that the contract’s two indemnification clauses failed to specifically require indemnification for [...]’s own negligence.  1T12:15-15:8.  The trial court found that the two indemnification provisions were consistent with one another and that they expressly required [...] to indemnify [...] for its own negligence.  1T19:22-22:6.  The trial court granted summary judgment to [...], ruling that the indemnity language was clear and unambiguous.  1T23:10-:18.  [...] then reported to the trial judge that it had settled with plaintiff before the trial court heard argument on contractual indemnity.
[directive] See Section 3.2.  This may require the defendant to plead guilty to multiple counts, and may require the prosecutor to file an application for an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 6f (Repeat Offenders) or 2C:44-3h (Street Gangs) and/or to file an application for enhanced punishment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 (Distribution to a Minor or Pregnant Female).  Note that while the prosecutor may determine the authorized plea offer for each separate charge that carries a mandatory term of imprisonment, the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences is generally vested in the discretion of the court, rather than the prosecutor.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.  Compare Special Application and Enhancement Features B and D (see Sections 11.2 and 11.4).  10.  The prosecutor must provide a copy of the completed Standardized Waiver Plea Form or regular Brimage Plea Negotiation Worksheet and attached schedules to the defendant’s attorney and to the court, and shall also transmit a copy with the attached schedules on not less than a quarterly reporting basis to the [...] for statistical analysis.  The completed worksheet may serve as the written plea offer within the meaning of R. 3:9-1(b).  Note that a draft or unapproved worksheet shall be deemed to be confidential attorney workproduct and shall not be disclosed.  When a completed worksheet indicates that the prosecutor has made a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation, it should be treated as confidential for the safety of the defendant and to protect the integrity of any ongoing investigation, and care must be taken to ensure that this document is not included in a file that is accessible to members of the public or any person who might further disclose the existence of a cooperation agreement to others who might attempt to intimidate the defendant or retaliate against the Page 36 [...] 2 (2004 Revisions) defendant or his or her family.
[brief] ”  Instructional Sys., 130 N.J. at 359 (quoting Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. Snyder General, 944 F. 2d 1131, 1143 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Beilowitz, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (same).  The New Jersey Supreme Court further explained that:  What characterizes community of interest is the potential for abuse that is triggered when the reputation and good will of the network, created primarily by the efforts of each of the individual franchisees, passes back to the franchisor without compensation to the franchisee…  130 N.J. at 358 (emphasis added).  Notably, courts have held that investments can constitute franchise-specific investments even if not specifically required by agreement between parties.
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX  DVD of [...]’s body-worn camera (S-1 at motion)  ..................  Pa1 DVD of [...]’s body-worn camera (S-2 at motion)  ...............  Pa2  Defendant’s motion to suppress brief, filed May 26, 2020¹ ..................  Pa3-15  Defendant’s motion to suppress brief, filed July 16, 2020² ..................  Pa16-24  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] *** 12.  The Defendants fully complied with all the on the record instructions given by the Court on February 8, 2024.  Defendants’ Amended Certified Answers and Objections attached as Defendants’ Exhibit “D” precisely confirming as to what was stated on the record by [...].  Since 2021, this case had the turnout of four (4) Hudson County Superior Judges who provided completely different instructions to the Defendants as the record reflects on February 8, 2024.  13.  The February 8, 2024, was the most recent case management in this matter during which [...] instructed on the record what is needed from [...] and [...] in order to restore the Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims.  All [...] needed to do is to certify that she agrees to be bound by the answers provided by the member of 78 Summit Ave JC, LLC, as the Court can examine [...]’s Certification and that she is in complete compliance with [...]’s instructions on the record dated February 8, 2024.  14.  Based on the aforesaid, I request for the Cross Motion to Reinstate be granted, NO discovery is outstanding on behalf of the Defendants, [...] or [...].
[directive] The statutory amendments outlined below are effective July 2021.  1, I. may Pretrial Release Orders not prohibit the defendant from certain marijuana-related of activities, specifically, in violation N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(l2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 10(a)(3).  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17, entitled "Consideration for pretrial release," provides for ordering of conditions pretrial release, including nonmonetary conditions.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-l 7(b)(2)(h) was of of amended to include the word unlawful before the "use a narcotic drug," rather than any use a narcotic drug.  In addition, the amendment to N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-17(b )(2)(1) further provides that of conditions release may not include any prohibition or restriction concerning manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, or possessing or having under control with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, marijuana or hashish in violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12), or possession 1 of marijuana or hashish in violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3).  As a result, the automated Pretrial Release Orders issued on or after July 2021, will be 1, amended to include the appropriate language consistent with the statute, and shall read:  1 of  This legislation specifically references New Jersey statutes, and did not provide for treating out state charges of of akin to New Jersey charges.  As a result, out state charges are not impacted by the legislation and like other out state charges, continue to be treated as legitimate charges, convictions and adjudications.  Directive #13-21 - June 30, 2021
[brief] Defendant conflates many different conversations between the parties over may points in time - prior to the marriage, prior to the children’s birth, and after the marriage, when they discussed their goals for their children’s higher education and how it would be financed.  (See Def.’s Opp. 8.)  Plaintiff testified at great length about the many times she and Defendant talked about financing the education, the children’s choices of schools, Defendant visiting schools, her consulting with Defendant about financial aid options and encouraging Defendant to conduct his own research, and Defendant repeatedly agreeing with Plaintiff.
[brief] As set forth more fully below, since approximately 1995, [...] has leased a portion of the Property, which as defined more fully below is characterized herein as the Leased Premises, from the [...] and has used the Leased Premises for a go-kart track and other uses related to its amusement park.  The Property is one of a number of parcels along the bayfront in [...] which are part of the [...], a redevelopment area designated in accordance with the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law.  [...] has filed a series of lawsuits against the [...] challenging the [...]’s efforts to redevelop this redevelopment area.
[brief] From the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, | | | 204 N.J. 79 (2010) | 20 | | Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) | 7, 8, 9, 10 | | Dempsey v. Alston, 405 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 2009) | 24 | | Doe v. Princeton Univ., 790 Fed. Appx. 379 (3d Cir. Oct. 25, 2019) | 18 | | Dolan v. De Capua, 16 N.J. 599 (1955) | 7 | | Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456 (2009) | 24, 25 | | Gayder v. Spiotta, 206 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 1985) | 40 | | Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391 (2005) | 16, 18 | | Grausman v. Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co., | | | 95 N.J. Eq.  223 (E. & A. 1923) | 39 | | Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000) | 13, 23, 25 | | Guaman v. Velez, 421 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 2011) | 6, 7 | | Halderman, by Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., | | | 707 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1983) | 21 | | In re Civil Commitment of J.G., 322 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 1999) | 17 | | In re the Application of Madin/Lord Land Dev. Int'l for Pinelands Dev. Approval | 40 | | 103 N.J. 689 (1986) | | | J.H. Renarde, Inc. v. Sims, 312 N.J. Super. 195 (Ch. Div. 1998) | 7, 8, 34 | | Jai Sai Ram LLC v. Planning Bd. of So. Toms River, | | | 446 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2016) | 40 | | Jason v. Showboat Hotel & Casino, | 16 | | 329 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Maietta v. United Parcel Service, Inc., | 16 | | 749 F. Supp. 1344 (D.N.J. 1990) | | | Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1 (2016) | 24 | | Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2004) | 16 | | Malanga v. Twp. of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023) | 38, 39 | Mays v. Penza, 179 N.J. Super. 175 (Law Div. 1980) ..............................................
[brief] Unswerving, ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing … legislative purposes.  * * *  On numerous occasions we have found ‘such particular circumstances as to dictate not the hard approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice. ’  ***  A ‘just accommodation’ of individual justice and public policy requires that ‘in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed. ’  [...] v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333, 337 (citations omitted).  The Court further noted that an “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”  Id., citing SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).  The Court reversed the decision of the Board, noting that even though the letter was never received by [...], even if it had been, the notice was improper and late.
[brief] This is a contested case within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2 and N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1  The appellant was entitled to an administrative law hearing in order to resolve these issues.  *In Re Amico/Tunnel Carwash*  371 N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div 2004)  *In Re Orange Sun Bank* 172 N.J. super. 275 (App. Div. 1980).  Despite the arguments of the respondent’s, the decision of the Board to deny appellant an administrative law hearing was arbitrary and unreasonable, and the Appellate Division should remand this matter for further proceedings.
[brief] Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 467-68 (collecting cases from around the country placing the burden on the responding party to produce electronic data).  This is in keeping with what commentators have generally found to be the best practice in civil discovery.  In an effort to help courts navigate eDiscovery issues, [...] has published Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production (“The Sedona Principle 6 states, “Responding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronically stored information.
[brief] 1.  The Jury Instruction Was Not Harmless Error.  Plaintiffs maintain that the trial court’s instructions on respondeat superior were improper because they told the jury that the “only” way (the word “only” was actually used by the trial court) [...] could be acting within the scope of his employment was if he acted in self-defense when he hit the plaintiff.  This was the instruction:  “Negligence is a matter of law charged through the principal laws [sic—probably should read “[...]”], but only if you find that Ahmed [...] acted negligently in self-defense while in the scope of his duties or authorities. ”  (11T169:20-23)  Thus, if the jury believed the plaintiff when he said that [...] attacked him, they could not have found that [...] was acting within the scope of his employment on these instructions because they were just told that [...] must necessarily have been acting in self-defense for that to be the case.  [...] nearly concedes that this instruction was improper (Db49), but claims that it doesn’t matter because the jury found in question one on the verdict sheet (Pa71) that [...] was acting outside the scope of his employment.
[brief] See Ledley v. William Penn. Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 635 (1995).  “In general, equitable fraud requires proof of (1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) the maker’s intent that the other party rely on it; and (3) detrimental reliance by the other party. ”  Liebling, 337 N.J. Super.  at 453.  In “the context of an insurance contract, ‘a representation by the insured, whether contained in the policy itself or in the application for insurance, will support the forfeiture of the insured’s rights under the policy if it is untruthful, material to the particular risk assumed by the insurer, and actually and reasonably relied upon by the insurer in the issuance of the policy. ’”  Lawson, 177 N.J. at 137, quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni, 98 N.J.Super. 154, 158-159 (App.Div. 1967); N.J.S.A. 17B:24-3(d).  “A misrepresentation is material if it ‘naturally and reasonably influence[d] the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium. ’”  *Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co.*, 138 N.J. 627, 637-38 (1995) (brackets in original) (quoting *Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo*, 122 N.J. 104, 108 (1991)).  In most cases, materiality is usually proven with an underwriter’s affidavit.
[brief] (Da35-57).  As a result, the plaintiff in *Valentine* relied upon the NJ Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law and sought relief under the NJCFLA, and NJCFA.  *Id.*  Like Appellant, here, in *Valentine*, [...] moved to dismiss the complaint arguing plaintiff, *inter alia*, (1) is not entitled to relief under --- 8 (Da58-Da63).
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Core Principle Three Duty to Use Only Objectively Reasonable, Necessary, and Proportional Force.  Officers shall use the least amount of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional to safely achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective under the circumstances.  3.1  Limitations on use of force.  In situations where officers are justified in using force, officers shall use only that degree of force that is reasonable, necessary, and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s mental and physical condition, the nature of the offense, and most importantly the level of resistance or threat known to the officer at the time.
[brief] (DA1).  On May 15, 2017, Defendant appeared in the Middletown Township Municipal Court without an attorney.  The State was apparently represented by Municipal Prosecutor [...], whose name is referenced on the cover page of the certified transcript, but who does not appear at any point in the record.  ---  1  In the interests of brevity and clarity, the Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined in the within Letter Memorandum of Law.  2  T1 refers to the Certified Transcript of Proceedings in the Middletown Township Municipal Court on May 15, 2017.  T2 refers to the Certified Transcript of Proceedings in the Middletown Township Municipal Court conducted virtually via Zoom on January 23, 2023.  T3 refers to the Certified Transcript of Proceedings in the Monmouth County Law Division conducted virtually via Zoom on July 12, 2023.
[brief] [...]’s First Amended Complaint, which the court allowed him to file, included counts seeking declaratory relief regarding those insurance policies.¹  Da84.  ¹  Shortly after the filing of the First Amended Complaint, [...]’s adjuster issued a letter to [...] denying all coverage and any duty to defend.  Da535.  After additional motion practice, several of the insurers, including [...], pursued interlocutory appeals, focusing on the declaratory judgment counts of the First Amended Complaint.  Da1126.  By order entered November 21, 2016, this Court reversed the Trial Court’s ruling allowing the declaratory judgment counts, concluding that, before [...] could seek a declaratory judgment or other relief from [...]’s insurers, he had to pursue and resolve his liability claims against [...] and [...].