ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 25  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Buteas v. Raritan Lodge # 61 F. & A.M., 248 N.J. Super. 351, 591 A.2d 623 (App. Div. 1991).......................... 23  Hisjenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J.6 (2008) ......................................................... 23 Kassick v Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 120 N.J. 130 (1990)  ......................  23 Mt. Hill v. Twp. Comm. of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 146 (App. Div. 2008).................................................  23  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv s. Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474 (1974).................................................................................  23 State v. Nelson, 173 N.J.417 (2002)..........................................................  21 Turon v. J. & L. Constr. Co., 8 N.J. 543 (1952)  ........................................  23  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ..................................................................................................................  8  STATUTES  L. 1985, c. 175 ..........................................................................................................................  1 L. 2019, c. 157 ..........................................................................................................................  1, 7, 10 N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3 .....................................................................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 .........................................................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10 .......................................................................................................................  4, 6, 7, 9, 10 N.J.S.A. 53:5A-27 .........................................................................................................................  1 Ricci Act ....................................................................................................................................  1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
[directive] (ranpli sèlman si zak la te komèt anvan 14 janvye 2004).  (Si 4. a) Sipèvizyon Kominotè a vi zak la te fèt le ou aprè le 14 janvye 2004, akize a fèt pou ranpli Kesyon 4b, Sipèvizyon Kondisyonèl a Vi).  (only complete if the offense occurred before January 14, 2004).
[brief] To the extent that this Court chooses to engage in such an analysis, the CFA and NJIPL Act and the regulations all require honesty, competency and fair dealing in commercial practices while providing punishment mechanisms for those who engage in fraud, misrepresentations and abuse of consumers.  A comparison of the CFA and the regulatory scheme governing insurance producers, even without the benefit of discovery, demonstrates there is no conflict between the two.  Semi-professionals, including insurance producers like the Defendants, are not exempt from liability under the CFA based on Shaw, and no case has so held since Shaw was decided.  The trial court failed to follow Shaw and rejected the Attorney General’s interpretations of the CFA, which stand for a restricted interpretation of the “learned professional” judicial exception to the CFA.  The straightforward and correct path, which should be provided to the trial court, is to follow Shaw, narrowly interpret the judicially created exemption to liability under the CFA, and reverse the orders dismissing the Plaintiff’s CFA claims (Count VII).
[brief] The ALJ determined that [...] failed to perform required inmate counts on August 16, 2019.  (Pa018a).  Based on the ALJ’s own examination of the video evidence, the ALJ explained that [...] essentially took a three-hour meal break during his shift.  (Pa021a).  Although [...] signed out for his meal break from 12:42 a.m. to 1:26 a.m., the surveillance footage showed that [...] was “almost continually” in the break room from between 1:24 a.m. and 4:18 a.m. (Pa018a).  Further, the ALJ noted that when [...] did leave the break room, it was not at the designated times to conduct an inmate count.  *Ibid.*  Because the inmate exited Wing Six at 3:16 a.m., the ALJ reasoned that, if [...] had properly conducted his inmate counts, he would have noticed her made, unoccupied bed during both his 3:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. counts.  (Pa018a-Pa019a).  But he did not, despite being properly trained.  *Ibid.*  Instead, he slept, spoke with other officers, and watched television in the food preparation room.  *Ibid.*  [...] offered no evidence to contradict this testimony.  *Ibid.*  As such, the ALJ found that [...] did not perform his inmate counts at 2:30 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 3:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m.  *Ibid.*  Based on the above, the ALJ also determined that [...] falsified logbook entries and lied to SID Investigators by indicating that he had indeed performed his inmate counts.
[brief] Davis, 104 N.J. at 504; State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126-27 (2002).  Recognition of the officer’s experience and knowledge is thus a crucial component of the court’s review.  Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22.  “In determining whether an officer acted reasonably in the circumstances[,] due weight must be given ‘to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. ’”  State v. Kearney, 183 N.J. Super. 13, 18 (App. Div. 1981) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).  Even though an individual’s behavior may not seem suspicious to an ordinary citizen, “the officer’s experience may indicate that some investigation is in order. ”  State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 446 (1973).  [P]olice officers are trained in the prevention and detection of crime.  Events which would go unnoticed by a layman oftentimes serve as an indication to the trained eye that something amiss might be taking place or is about to take place.  The police would be derelict in their duties if they did not investigate such events.  [Davis, 104 N.J. at 504 (quoting State v. Gray, 59 N.J. And “[t]he fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a person’s actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt.
[brief] ”  Id., at 500.  Much as Plaintiff’s counsel herein, counsel in Jackowitz also cited the length of time Plaintiff had been “waiting for you to send a message … that there need to be consequences when people do the types of things” the defendant did.  Ibid.  Ultimately, the Jackowitz Court held that “the use of the ‘sending a message’ argument is inappropriate in a civil case where the only issue is compensatory damages.
[brief] Gloucester Indictment [...] charged [...] with third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, significant bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:12-1(b)(7) (Count 16); second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, serious bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:12-1(b)(1) (Count 17); and first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(a) and 2C:11-3(a) (Count 18).
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition serious bodily injury by the display of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the officer’s purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that deadly force will be used if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.  3.5  Deadly Weapon.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or in the manner in which it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(c).
[brief] The lower court’s denial of Defendants’ motion in limine to bar reference to the snow removal agreements was an abuse of discretion and expanded the duty of care beyond what was required by common law (1T 37:13-19; 42:23-43:2; 46:3-11) (Da 3-4).  A motion in limine is a pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence not be referred to or offered at trial.  *Seoung Ouk Cho v. Trinitas Reg'l Med. Ctr.*, 443 N.J. Super. 461, 470 (App. Div. 2015).  Thus, it is anticipated that, as a general rule, a motion in limine will not have a dispositive impact on a litigant's entire case.
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Pierre-Louis, 216 N.J. 577, 579 (2014) (concluding that the court's findings were not sufficient on either prong of the Strickland/Fritz standard to allow for a definitive ruling on defendant's PCR petition or appellate review of that decision. ); State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2002) (noting that an appellate court can remand PCR proceedings to a trial court to "generate a new record and render fresh factual findings and legal conclusions" when necessary.)  Ultimately, once good cause is found on a second petition for PCR and referred to the Office of the Public Defender for assignment of counsel, PCR case law dictates that submissions on both procedural and substantive issues, as well as oral argument, must be considered by the court before the PCR is decided.  Dismissing with prejudice prior to submissions and argument is summarily dismissing the petition without factual findings and legal consideration, which is prohibited under court rules and case law.
[brief] On factor two, the degree of reliance.  “the State must have administered the old rule in ‘good faith reliance [on] then-prevailing constitutional norms. ’”  Feal, 194 N.J. at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Purnell, 161 N.J. at 55).  Language in Watson itself suggests that the State should have been aware of the inherent suggestiveness of first-time in-court identifications and questioned the propriety of eliciting such evidence:
[directive] Americans with Disabilities Act of I 12 Page of to Strict Home Detention (CN 12872), (5) Notification Expectations for Defendant Ordered to Home Detention with Limited Exceptions.  (CN 12873), and (6) the Request for Leave from Home Detention form (CN 12740).  These documents have been updated to reflect the revised guidance set forth in this Directive.  STANDARD HD and HDEM POLICY REQUIREMENTS
[brief] Defendant also submitted D-115 and D-116, which depicted a walkway leading from the backyards on [...] to the next street over at [...].  (14T:142-9 to 12; 14T:149-1 to 9).  Defendant is alleging that he was not allowed to present photographs that showed the walkway, and that he was also unable to argue that someone other than him could have been the real perpetrator who evaded detection when police briefly lost sight of the suspect.
[brief] Even if a matter is not pending in state court for purposes of retroactivity, the Debtor has pursued the return of the Property since the inception of his bankruptcy case.  In fact, the very purpose of this case was to regain the Property.  Other than a car loan, [...] is the Debtor’s only secured creditor.  The Debtor’s plan, Main Case Doc. No. 18, and modified plans, Main Case Doc. Nos. 22, 48, and 85, specifically provide for the satisfaction of [...]’s claim.  The Debtor initially filed an adversary complaint alleging a violation of 11 U.S.C. §548 because the amount [...] paid was much less than a reasonably equivalent value.  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 1.  The Debtor then amended his complaint to allege that the Final Judgment violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the New Jersey Constitution.  These steps are necessary prerequisite to Debtor regaining an equitable or legal interest in the Property, the Property becoming part of the estate, and the Debtor satisfying [...]’s claim.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DECLINING TO AWARD PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL MISAPPROPRIATION.  (37T 77:7 TO 78:23)  Though the trial court’s judgment is almost entirely correct, the court below erred in one key respect: it denied Plaintiffs the full quantum of pre-judgment interest to which they were entitled.  Plaintiffs sought $838,810.40 in pre-judgment interest, calculated at prevailing court rates for each transaction where the trial court determined the defendants had misappropriated funds.  (Da2073-2076).  The trial court rejected that approach and instead awarded $190,480.68 in pre-judgment interest, only dating back to July 20, 2020, when Plaintiffs’ filed their complaint.
[brief] But it's just never been done.  And as [...] said when she talked about MILTZ VERSUS BOROUGH-S-SHELVING, that's 203 New Jersey Super. 5 -- 451, an 1885 Appellate Division case.  It says that the pleadings must fairly apprise an adverse party of the claims and issues to be raised at trial.  Pleadings must contain a claim for relief, a statement of facts on which the claim is based that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief to which a pleader deems he -- that he is entitled.  And she says that with respect to this rule being met, and this is on Page 32 of her decision, I find that it has not.  She acknowledges, as the rule says, we have a fairly liberal pleading standard in New Jersey.  But under even that standard when I look at this complaint the plaintiff filed, in this case, I find that it cannot be permitted.  And it's -- it's just unfortunate.  Because, like I said, if there are some valid causes of action hidden within the 65 pages I wish that it would have been succinctly pled by somebody.  Probably somebody other than [...] who can put aside all of the emotions and all of the things that he dealt with with his son to try to craft something that is capable of being answered, capable of being understood.  And at this point I just can't find that it does.  And, like I said, if there -- there were some valid causes of action within that complaint it's a shame because they're going to be missed.  But I can't permit this complaint to go forward just as [...] couldn't in the proposed amended complaint.
[brief] R. 1:7-2.  “Where there is a failure to object, it may be presumed that the instructions were adequate. ”  State v. Morais, 359 N.J. Super. 123, 134-35 (App. Div. 2003).  “The absence of an objection to a charge is also indicative that trial counsel perceived no prejudice would result. ”  Id. at 135.  Regardless, the instruction regarding conspiracy to commit aggravated assault was correct because the judge explained, consistent with the Model Jury Charge, that a guilty verdict for conspiracy was contingent on whether “the defendant’s purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime of aggravated assault. ”  Further, a specific unanimity instruction was not required because the overt acts left no room for jury confusion and the judge informed the jury repeatedly that their verdict had to be unanimous.  Jury instructions to which defendant failed to object at trial are reviewed for plain error.  See R. 1:7-2; State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012).
[brief] As an initial matter, and as more fully set forth above, Plaintiff has waived any argument as to the trial court’s notice finding by failing to brief same.  Sklodowsky, 417 N.J. Super. at 657; R. 2:6-2, cmt. 5 (“It is, of course, clear that an issue not briefed is deemed waived. ”).  “A loss of consortium . . . claim is intended to compensate a person for the loss of a spouse’s ‘society, companionship and services due to the fault of another. ’”  Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Constr. Co., 161 N.J. 178, 190 (1999) (citation omitted).  “New Jersey has long recognized a spouse’s derivative claim for loss of consortium when there is an underlying claim for negligence. ”  Friedman v. Klazmer, 315 N.J. Super. 467, 469 (1998).  For the court to make an award on a loss of consortium claim, a spouse must make a showing “of several factors including a strong emotional reliance on each other, a relationship of long duration, and a high degree of mutual dependence. ”  Anderson v. A.J. Friedman Supply Co., Inc., 416 N.J. Super. 46, 71 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 112 (N.J. 1994)).
[brief] Neither [...] nor [...] did anything to clean up the spill leaving [...] to clean it up with its own money.  The cleanup is still ongoing to this day.  [...]’s insurance policy had an MCS-90 surety endorsement, which is required for all trucking companies, like [...], pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.  It provides that the insurance company must automatically pay any final judgment rendered against the trucking company for an oil spill as a surety to the general public for such incidences, regardless of the exclusions in the underlying insurance policy.  However, the insurance company can seek reimbursement from the trucking company if such a surety payment must be made.
[brief] Indictment (filed April 7, 2021)  .................................................................  Da1-5  Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (filed August 17, 2022)  ........................................................  Da6 Order Denying Defense Motion to Reconsider (filed February 3, 2023)  ..........  Da7 Amended Indictment (filed July 10, 2023)  ..................................................  Da8-12  Judgment of Conviction (filed October 2, 2023) ..................................................  Da13-15 Amendment to JOC 10/12/2023 (filed October 12, 2023 at 3:13:53 PM) .................................................................  Da16-19 Amendment to JOC 10/12/2023 (filed October 12, 2023 at 3:34:46 PM) ................................................................. Da20-23 Notice of Appeal (filed November 2, 2023) .............................................. Da24-27 INDEX TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX (FILED SEPARATELY) PER R. 1:38-3(1) and R. 3:5-6(c) Defendant's Notice of Motion to Suppress Evidence (filed June 24, 2021) ......................................................... Ca1-2 State's letter brief (filed July 31, 2021)¹ .................................................. Ca3-22 Exhibit A - Certification in Support of Search Warrant Application (certified by [...] dated September 28, 2020) ............................................. Ca23-36 Exhibit B - Search Warrant Order - [...] (dated September 28, 2020) ...... Ca37-40 Exhibit C - Search Warrant Order - [...] (dated September 28, 2020) ...... Ca41-44 Exhibit D - Search Warrant Order - 2013 Gray Hyundai Sonata Sedan Bearing Pennsylvania Registration ([...] (dated September 28, 2020) ............................................. Ca45-48 ¹ This brief, along with all of the other briefs related to the suppression motion, are included in the appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2) as they were referenced and relied on below (including the exhibits annexed to these briefs).
[brief] Db3.  However, the mere fact that there are different claims in the litigation does not mean each claim must be considered separately in serial fashion.  If [...] wanted to arbitrate indemnity against [...] later, it had to arbitrate its defense share against [...] first.  The arbitration award would have determined the defense allocation issue between [...] and [...] under the Policy, and [...] would remain free separately to litigate defense cost shares against the other insurers if it wished to do so without [...] being involved.  [...]’s argument to the contrary is flawed in several respects.
[brief] 9  A.  The Sentencing Court Erred In Finding Yarbough Factors 3A And 3C As It Relied On (1) A Dismissed Charge And (2) Speculation With No Basis In The Record That [...] Possessed The Handgun For A Meaningful Period Before Or After The Robbery ..................................................................................  11  B.  The Certain Persons Statute Would Not Be “Neutered” By The Imposition Of A Concurrent Sentence  ...........................................................................  21  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT’D)  C.  The Sentencing Court’s Final Justifications For Imposing A Consecutive Sentence—That The Certain Persons Offense Is A Separate And Distinct Offense From Robbery And Would Be A “Free Crime” If Run Concurrent—Are Not A Valid Bases For Imposing A Consecutive Sentence.  ..............................................  30  D.  This Court Should Reverse And Remand, Directing The Trial Court To Impose The Certain Persons Sentence Concurrently To The Robbery Sentence.
[brief] [Yes]  [No]  b.  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  [Yes]  [No]  c.  Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the judge’s sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?  [Yes]  [No]  24.
[brief] Williams v. Witt 98 N.J. Super 1, 3-4 (App. Div. 1967); Patel v. Navitlal, 265 N.J. Super. 402, 408 (Ch. Div. 1992).  Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that produces firm belief or conviction that the allegations sought to be proved by the evidence are true.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.10.  It is evidence so clear, direct, weighty in terms of quality, and convincing as to cause [a factfinder] to come to a clear conviction of the truth of the precise facts in issue.  *Model Jury Charges (Civil)* 1.19 "Burden of Proof-Clear and Convincing Evidence) (approved Apr. 1988, rev. August 2011).  It "requires that the result shall not be reached by a mere balancing of doubts or probabilities, but rather by clear evidence which causes [a factfinder] to be convinced that the allegations sought to be proved are true."  *Id.*  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] (Penalty is $30 if offense occurred between January 9, 1986 and December 22, 1991 inclusive.  $25 if offense occurred before January 1, 1986.)  Voce tera que pagar a multa minima de ao [...] $50 (minimo de $100 caso seja condenado por crime de violencia) por cada acusai;:iio para a qual se declarar culpado?
[brief] 12  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES  Abtrax Pharma., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 514, 655 A.2d 1368 (1995)  ..................................  1 Alpha Beauty Distrib., Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 425 N.J. Super. 94, 101-04, 39 A.3d 937 (App. Div. 2012) .............  8 Fogel 152-158  Realty LLC v. Sport-A-Rama, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2550 (Essex County 2013)  ...........  1 Harrison Riverside Ltd. P'ship v. Eagle Affiliates, Inc., 309 N.J. Super. 470, 473, 707 A.2d 490 (App. Div. 1998)  ............  3 Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 189 N.J. 210, 221, 915 A.2d 1 (2007)  ....................................  2 Kaselaan & D'Angelo Assocs., Inc. v. Soffian, 290 N.J. Super. 293, 299, 675 A.2d 705 (App. Div. 1996)  ............  5 McNeill v. Estate of Lachmann, 285 N.J. Super. 212, 219, 666 A.2d 996 (App. Div. 1995)  ............  3 Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., P.A., 331 N.J. Super. 445, 453-54, 752 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 2000).  .........  11  Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1997) ........................................  8  Truesdell v. Carr, 351 N.J. Super. 317, 320, 798 A.2d 153 (Law Div. 2002) ............  3  Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, 83 N.J. 86, 105, 415 A.2d 1156 (1980) .................................  2  STATUTES AND RULES
[brief] (14-11 to 13, 28-1 to 5) Ophthalmology (2022) (available online) (explaining different factors that influence pupil size and that persons with diabetes have smaller pupils).  [...] explained to [...] that the reason his pupils were constricted was because he is diabetic and needed his insulin and to eat something.\textsuperscript{10} (1T 125-20 to 25, 126-21 to 24)