ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The pothole existed for an extended period of time.  Google Maps historical imagery dated August 2012 and September 2015 depict pavement cracking and surface depressions in the roadway at the accident location.  (Pa 373 and Pa 374: report of [...] Appendix A.).  Google Maps historical street view imagery dated October 2017 depicts the advanced deterioration of the pavement at the subject accident location including spalled asphalt (pothole).  (Pa374).  In comparing the imagery dated September 2015 and October 2017 it is observed that a trench cut was made for subsurface utility work directly south of the accident location; including pavement restoration in that area.  (Pa 373 and Pa 374: report of [...] Appendix A.).  It is also observed that numerous markings exist on the pavement surface as a result of a utility mark out; utilized to identify subsurface utilities in anticipation of excavation work (to avoid interaction with the same).  It is also observed that the double yellow line was restriped over the deteriorated pavement prior to the trenching.  (Pa 373 and Pa 374: report of [...] Appendix A.).  Google Maps historical street view imagery dated July 2018 depicts the continued advancement of pavement deterioration at the accident location; including the pothole formation (pavement spall).  (Pa 375: report of [...].  Exhibit A).  Google Maps historical street view imagery dated October 2020 depicts the continued advancement of pavement deterioration at the accident location; including the increased size of the pothole formation (pavement spall).  (Pa 378: report of [...].  Exhibit A.)  Google Maps historical street view imagery dated July 2019 depicts the continued advancement of pavement deterioration at the accident location, including the pothole formation (pavement spall).  (Pa 375 and PA 377: report of [...].  Exhibit A).  In comparing the imagery dated July 2018 to the imagery dated July 2019 pavement repairs were undertaken at the settled utility trench cut, that was previously constructed, as well as at the manhole that exists immediately adjacent to the accident location; however, the subject pothole remained unmitigated.  (Pa 375 and PA 377: report of [...].  Exhibit A).  A further review of the Google Maps historical imagery referenced above reveals that the pavement region along the double yellow striping, between the longitudinal pavement cracks/seam, reveals that transverse cracks are present at random intervals across the same.  (Pa 332)  As such, the pavement at the longitudinal and transverse cracks is subject to deteriorate at an advanced rate than a pavement surface devoid of cracks.  (Pa 332 report of [...].)  The location where the Plaintiff sustained his injuries is within 1,600 feet from the town hall, which is located at [...].
[brief] Contrary to the [...]’s assertion, this matter is not about entitlement.  Rather, it is about fundamental errors made by the Arbitrator, and confirmed by the [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) which require that the Interest Arbitration Award issued by Arbitrator [...] (“Arbitrator”) be vacated and remanded.  For many years, the City has received financial assistance from the State of New Jersey through its Transitional Aid Program.  The [...], [...], administers the Program, and had not reduced aid to the City when the City negotiated 2% annual salary increases for its civilian negotiations units, and a greater than 2.9% salary increase to its firefighter negotiations unit.  In issuing the Interest Arbitration Award, the Arbitrator failed to appropriately consider the internal comparables of salary increases budgeted by the City and approved by the [...] when he applied the N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g) criteria.  The Arbitrator engaged in other material errors when he refused to accept the [...]’s revised final offer clarifying its proposed language changes on health benefits, used inaccurate data regarding the unit composition and base salaries of negotiations unit employees, which led to an incorrect analysis of the costs of the Award, and erred in refusing to blend the three fire supervisor contracts into a single Agreement, despite having awarded the unification of the contracts as part of the Award.  These failures, along with [...]’s failure to issue the six appendices that were attached to the Arbitrator’s Award to the parties, constitute reversible error requiring that the Award be vacated and remanded back to the Arbitrator.  **REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] (11T132-16 to 133-1).  [...], [...]’s mother, also testified that [...] confessed to her that day after the murder (11T70-1 to 14), but her account of where the confession took place and who was present differed from that of [...].  Hedgespeth said that [...] confessed in the kitchen of her “youngest daughter’s father house,” – not at [...] – and that her sixteen-year-old-daughter and Sashell [...] were both present for the confession.
[brief] In re Arbitration Between Grover & Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221, 228, 403 A.2d 448 (1979).  In respect of specific contractual language, “[a] clause depriving a citizen of access to the courts should clearly state its purpose.  The point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue. ”  Marchak, supra, 134 N.J. at 282, 633 A.2d 531.
[brief] The intervening deeds included abridged versions of the 1966 deed recital.  By the time [...] took ownership, the reference to the driftway in his deed read, simply, “subject to the rights of others, if any, in an old driftway crossing the southerly portion of the above described lot. ”  (Da502)  [...], and a predecessor-in-title [...], used the driftway across the South [...] Lot only occasionally and unintrusively.  [...] utilized it primarily on weekends only a few times per month, at most.  He would not visit the lot in the winter and some other months not at all.  (Da790)
[brief] Exhibit S, Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. Garrett, 964 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 2012), filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit T, Knopka v. Schiavone, A-0442-11 (App. Div. May 21, 2012) (unpublished), filed May 24, 2019 (Volume 13 of 15 – Pa2361 to Pa2560)  Exhibit U, NJ Turnpike Auth. Std. Specs. §§ 104.05, 104.06, 104.07, (6th Ed. 2004), filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit V, Report of [...], P.E., dated February 22, 2019, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit W, Letter of [...], dated December 20, 2018, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit W, Report of [...], P.E., dated December 11, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit X, Letter of [...], dated December 24, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit X, Report of [...], P.E., dated December 22, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit Y, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 10, 2019, filed May 24, 2019
[brief] Due to [...] precipitating an Altercation between [...] and Sheriff’s officers within earshot of the Jury.  (Raised below, 4T, pg. 70)  During the September 16, 2022 appearance in the other matter; one of Mr. [...]’s chief concerns, which he explained repeatedly, was that a Sheriff’s officer had been sent to his house and he was concerned that he was going to be arrested (1T, Pg. 9, lines 4-6).
[brief] Defendant’s argument, however, ignores his extensive criminal history that independently supports the finding of aggravating factors six.  It is undisputed that after the imposition of his aggregate custodial term of ten years with five years of parole ineligibility, two of the defendant’s prior convictions were later vacated.  Da8-9.  However, that fact alone does not entitle the defendant to a new sentencing hearing or a reduced sentence, as he would otherwise suggest.  On December 8, 2010, the defendant resolved three cases by way of guilty plea which called for two, five-year sentences with two and one-half years of parole ineligibility to run consecutively to one another.  (1T19-17 to 20-5).  Additionally, the defendant’s third case, where he was sentenced to a custodial term of 18 months, was ordered to run concurrently to the aggregate 10-year sentence.  Ibid.  During the sentencing hearing, the defendant’s extensive juvenile and criminal history was outlined on the record.  (1T8-7 to 9-19).  The sentencing court noted his extensive prior history in finding aggravating factor six applicable to this defendant.  (1T:19-17 to 19).  The sentencing court also found aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).  (1T22-4 to 22-5).  Further, the court found no mitigating factors.  Ibid.  As aptly noted by the motion court, “[t]here’s no indication in the record that the judge simply and exclusively relied on th[ese] particular accusation[s] that w[ere] vacated in arriving at his findings regarding the aggravating factors.
[brief] [...] indicated that [...] was told early on about the issue with no sewer connection on the Property, and [...] himself met with [...] and [...] on September 26, 2016 and acknowledged in his email to them that he knew about the “no sewer issue” and that the approximate cost for a sewer hookup was $100,000.  [...] should have advised his clients that their best option under the contract documents was to issue a notice of acceleration of the termination of the Lease due to the sewer issue BEFORE September 30, 2016, and then use the termination as leverage to negotiate more time to obtain approvals if [...] wanted to resurrect the deal, or negotiate some other terms such as sharing the cost of the sewer connection with 6600 with the threat of walking away from the deal.  [...] took the position, mistakenly, that [...] had until October 31, 2016 to terminate the Lease, a date that does not appear anywhere in the contract documents.
[brief] (7T25:2-6; 7T33:1-4; 7T39:24-40:3; 7T40:4-42:13).  The prejudicial impact from the comments regarding the plaintiff’s absence were enhanced by additional disparaging comments regarding plaintiff’s counsel.  As stated above, it is improper for an attorney to make derisive statements about the parties, their attorneys, or their witnesses.  *Tabor v. O’Grady*, 59 N.J. Super. 330, 340 (App. Div. 1960).  This includes accusing a party’s attorney of wanting to deceive the jury the jury or to have them evaluate the evidence unfairly.  *See: Geler v. Akawie*, 358 N.J. Super. 437, 470-471 (App. Div. 2003), *certif. denied*, 177 N.J. 223 (2003); see also; *Henker v. Preybylowski*, 216 N.J. Super. 513, 518-519 (App. Div. 1987).
[brief] Summarizing Appellants’ arguments, the following established facts weigh against [...]’s bona fide purchaser claim:  A.  **[...] Acquired a Quitclaim Deed Which Apprised [...] of the Pendency of the Foreclosure Action**  The proximity in time between the entry of Final Judgment (November 7, 2022) and the purported transfer of title to [...] (December 12, 2022) was incredibly short.
[brief] The Record Clearly Demonstrates that [...] Made No Misrepresentation to [...], and Therefore [...]’s Claims of Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Inducement Fail as a Matter of Law.  It is well-settled in New Jersey that both fraud and misrepresentation claims require proof of both (1) a misrepresentation or omission, and (2) reliance by the plaintiff on that misrepresentation.  The elements of fraudulent inducement are the same as those for common-law fraud, and require “(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages. ”  Microbilt Corp. v. L2C, Inc., No. A-3141-09T3, 2011 WL 3667645, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 23, 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997)).  “Misrepresentation and reliance are the hallmarks of any fraud claim, and a fraud cause of action fails without them. ”  Banco Popular N. Am. V. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 174 (2005); see also Barrows v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 465 F. Supp. 2d 347,366-67 (D.N.J. 2006) (quoting Banco Popular, 184 N.J. at 175) (applying New Jersey law and stating “fraud” is “a term of art with a clear definition” and “an amorphous [ ] fraud claim that requires plaintiffs to prove neither reliance nor misrepresentation does not exist in New Jersey”).
[brief] Furthermore, Plaintiff cited to *no* legal authority for the proposition that a Court may grant a stay of the period within which they must serve a sufficient Affidavit of Merit, if the previously served Affidavits of Merit are insufficient, in order to conduct discovery or to “cure” deficiencies in their Affidavits of Merit.  (See, Pb18-24)  A Court cannot alter the legislatively prescribed time periods under the Statute.  See, e.g., Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condominium Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415, 424-25 (2010) (holding that the failure to hold a Ferreira conference does not toll the Affidavit of Merit filing period).  “[P]arties are presumed to know the law and are obliged to follow it. ”  Id. at 424.  Plaintiffs may solely request an extension of the time by which to file an Affidavit of Merit for extraordinary circumstances—they may not request an extension of time for legal insufficiency.  See Hyman Zamft & Manard, LLC v. Cornell, 309 N.J. Super. 586, 593 (App. Div. 1998).  Therefore, Plaintiffs may not request a stay (or toll) of the period by which they must file their Affidavit of Merit and have not demonstrated or asserted the existence of any extraordinary circumstances which would warrant an extension of the time to file.  As a result, there was no error in [...]’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against [...].
[brief] (Pa89-114).  Appellant’s moving papers in that Motion did not contain a Brief.  Moreover, there was no discussion as to whether Plaintiff had standing to even make this Motion since the underlying Motion was not opposed.  (Pa70).  Substantively, Appellant did not meet the standards under either Rule 4:50(a) or (f).  At oral argument, Appellant’s counsel confirmed there was no brief submitted, as the Rule requires.  (4T14:7-12).  In her ruling, the Judge found the Motion to be “procedurally and substantively lacking. ” (4T24:8-9).  Her Honor discussed the lack of a brief and citation to legal authority.  (4T24:15-25:20).  As above, Appellant has failed to enunciate precisely how the Judge was wrong or abused her discretion in failing to Vacate the Order of Dismissal.  In this appeal, Appellant argues that the excusable neglect standard under that Rule was met because [...] did reach out to his clients without success.  (App. Brief, p. 25).  Appellant contends that "I reached out without success to my client to have her confirm the revised Complaint.  I had also presented the revised Complaint to [...], who declined to take responsibility."  (App. Brief, p. 25).  There is no discussion as to who counsel was referring to when he means his client, there is no confirmation that this was presented to "[...]."  Relative to subsection (a) and the claim of “excusable neglect,” the Supreme Court discussed this standard in the case of US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, holding:
[brief] \(^9\)  Most significantly, Section 5.14 of the State’s contract with [...] spells out the independent contractor relationship with clarity, especially as to the most critical aspect of the Pukowsky test – control:  **Section 5.14 Independent Employment Status.**  Employees of Provider Agencies that Contract with the --- \(^9\) Section 5.04 requires that [...] indemnify the State for damages arising from [...] employees’ performance of their job functions.  Section 5.05 requires that [...] maintain insurance.  [...] are employees of the Provider Agency, not the State.  In accordance with the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 152(2) and State law, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et seq., Provider Agencies are independent, private employers with all the rights and obligations of such, and are not political subdivisions of the [...].  As such, the Provider Agency acknowledges that it is an independent Provider, providing services to [[...]], typically through a contract-for-services agreement.  As independent contractors, Provider Agencies are responsible for the organization’s overall functions that include the overseeing and monitoring of its operations, establishing the salary and benefit levels of its employees, and handling all personnel matters as the employer of its workers….  …The Provider Agency acknowledges its relationship with its employees as that of employer.  While the Department has an adjunct role with Provider Agencies through regulatory oversight and ensuring contractual performance, the Provider understands that the Department is not the employer of a Provider Agency’s employees.  (Da607, at §5.14).
[brief] Statement of Facts - Police Reports Attached 10/13/2020  Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  Exhibit C-6 to [...]’s Certification Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  Hawkin’s Letter to [...] Regarding Submission of Copies to Prosecutor and Hernan 4/15/2021  Certification of [...] 4/15/2021  Order Brought by [...]  Notice of Claim to [...] 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa053)
[brief] Defendant-appellant [...] respectfully refers this Court to the procedural history and statement of facts set forth in his brief previously submitted in this matter.  LEGAL ARGUMENT  [...] relies on the arguments made in his previously filed brief, and adds:  POINT I  DESPITE MANY ATTEMPTS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL TO ENSURE THAT THE FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE WAS HANDLED APPROPRIATELY IN THIS CASE, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED IN ITS GATEKEEPING ROLE TO IMPOSE ANY LIMITS ON THE FINGERPRINT TESTIMONY OR TO ENSURE AN UNBIASED AND INFORMED JURY.  The conviction in this case rests almost entirely on expert testimony about fingerprint evidence.  Both at trial and on appeal, [...] argued that the fingerprint evidence was not handled properly.  In support of these arguments, both at trial and on appeal, [...] presented scientific evidence that demonstrates that (1) fingerprint analysis is subject to error; (2) there are limits to what can be reliably claimed by a fingerprint examiner; and (3) jurors are inclined to believe that fingerprint evidence is infallible.  In response, the State is not able to substantively counter these claims.  Instead, it resorts to a number of procedural arguments to attempt to stop this Court from answering the only real question in this case: are [...]’s convictions based on a reliable technique, reliably applied and reliably communicated?  Because the answer to that question is “No,” the convictions must be reversed.
[brief] The Appellate Court reviews de novo “issues involve contract interpretation and the application of case law to the facts of the case. ”  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cantone Rsch., Inc., 427 N.J. Super. 45, 57 (App. Div. 2012).  See also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.
[brief] ” (4T19-4 to 21-10) (emphasis added).  The court was not required to accept this “suggestion” reached by the expert.  See E&H Steel Corp. v. PSEG Fossil, LLC, 455 N.J.  Super. 12, 29 (App. Div. 2018) (noting that “[a] factfinder is not required to accept an expert’s opinion” and that “a judge sitting as factfinder may accept some parts of a witness’s testimony and reject other parts. ”) (citations omitted).  And being present when defendant addressed the court, (4T88-4 to 90-4), the judge in her role as fact-finder was permitted to reject defendant’s newly-minted expression of remorse, and this Court should defer to that finding.  See State v. Francisco, 471 N.J. Super. 386, 426 (App. Div. 2022) (“Generally, an appellate court should defer to the sentencing court’s factual findings and should not ‘second-guess’ them. ”) (quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)).
[brief] There existed lesser alternative sanctions to address plaintiff's failure to complete the deposition, such as payment of reasonable expenses and fees); Williams v. Am. Auto Logistics, 226 N.J. 117, 124 (2016) (quoting Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp., 185 N.J. 100, 115 (2005) (“trial court has an array of available remedies to enforce compliance with a court rule or one of its orders” and must consider “[t]he varying levels of culpability of delinquent parties”); Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J. Super. 244, 25 (App. Div. 1988) (noting need to consider “extent to which [one party] has impaired [the other's] case may guide the court in determining whether less severe sanctions will suffice”); Williams, supra, 226 N.J. 125 (same).  [...] did not apply those principles during the June 12 hearing or in entering the June 12 Order, nor did [...] in denying defendants reinstatement of their Answers in the March 6 hearing (2T).  The failure of the lower court to cite and apply the governing standards cited above before confirming that judgment of default would be entered against these defendants is reversible error.  The record and procedural history of this case does not support the ultimate sanction of dismissal on these defendants, moreover (see Statement of Facts, incorporated here by reference).
[brief] ”  [FEDa121]; •  In dismissing Count 3 (fraud), Count 4 (conversion), and Count 6 (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) of the First Amended Complaint, “[Appellants] defaulted under the Lease when they failed to make the annual rental payment due to a dispute with their members.  [Appellants] could have made the payment and continued developing their Solar Project but chose not to. ”  [FEDa122-23]; •  In dismissing Count 3 (fraud), Count 4 (conversion), and Count 6 (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) of the First Amended Complaint, “[Appellants] did not own the Solar Rights.  After [Appellants] lost site control of the Property, [...] voided the Solar Rights, and [Appellants] lost all rights to develop the Solar Project.  [...], and anyone else for that matter, were free to pursue development of the Solar Rights thereafter.