ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Certification of Defendant in support A80  Exhibit A: Mid-Marriage Agreement Attached as CA1  Exhibit B: Marital Settlement Agreement Attached as CA14  Exhibit C: Irrevocable Power of Attorney, 12/15/13  Attached as A21  Exhibit D: Irrevocable Power of Attorney, 11/11/14  Attached as A27  Exhibit E: Final Judgment of Divorce  Attached as A15  Exhibit F: Incorporation of [...] A97  Exhibit G: Incorporation of [...] A99  Exhibit H: Durable Power of Attorney A101  Exhibit I: Advanced Directive and Appointment of Health Care Agent A125  Exhibit J: Last Will and Testament A132  Exhibit K: Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Memorandum Opinion A158
[brief] In fact, [...] properly authenticated those records.  In support of its [...]’s Motion, [...] employee [...] declared that she had “personal knowledge of [...]’s general business practices with respect to account-opening and maintenance of deposit and checking accounts,” and that she is responsible for “preparing declarations in connection with litigation involving [...] .  . . .” (PA026, PA088.)  [...] also declared that [...]’s exhibits were business records maintained by the bank or its affiliates in the course of regularly conducted business activity, “and as part of the regular practice of [...] to create and maintain such records,” which “were made at the time of the act, transaction occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. ” (PA026-27, PA088-89.)  Furthermore, she declared that each exhibit, including the account application and DAA, was a true and correct copy of what it purported to be.  (PA027, PA089.)  For such routine business records, nothing more is required.
[directive] The Office of the General Counsel for Administration process s the Departm nt's administrative code rules and houses the Department's cu todian for Open Public Records ct request .  Access to Department Resources.  Administration shall be authorized to call upon the expertise and assistance of ev ry division agency office, com.mis ion, bureau, and unit within required to the th Department in order to carry out it mission.  Such ntities are hereb extent not inconsistent with law to cooperate with Administration and to provide such as istance a Adrnini tration may require.  II.
[directive] Phase X 1-Yard Line (or as close to 1-yard line as safety dictates).  Weapon Retention Position.  (Begin with the support hand across the chest with the hand grasping the collar of the shooter’s shirt or body armor.)  Each drill, Time: 2 seconds.  2 rounds.  (Total 4 rounds).  •  On command, draw and fire 2 rounds in 2 seconds from the weapon retention position.  • Reholster an uncocked weapon.  • Repeat drill once, firing a total of 4 rounds.
[brief] (Da109).  On August 9, 2023, [...] filed a fully executed Consent Order dismissing its Complaint in its entirety and with prejudice, which the trial court entered on August 16, 2023.  (Ibid.).  Appellants, however, continued to pursue their Counterclaim even though they have been relieved of any liability to return the $17,920 Concessions.  [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim on July 31, 2023, contending that Appellants’ CFA theory failed to state a viable CFA claim or a viable class action claim.  (Da107-Da108).  By order dated November 8, 2023 (the “November 8, 2023 Order”), the trial court dismissed the Counterclaim with prejudice.
[brief] Furthermore, N.J.R.E. 401 and N.J.R.E. 402 allow the court to admit relevant evidence.  Moreover, although the cross-examiner may inquire as to whether the expert relied upon certain hearsay evidence, upon receipt of a negative response, the details of that particular evidence may not be used as the basis for further cross-examination.  State v. Spencer, 319 N.J. Super. 284, 299–300 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] R. 4:49-1(a).  Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431 (2006) (emphasis added).  However, in order to challenge opposing counsel’s comments during summation, it is vital that a timely objection be interposed at the time said comments are made.  The Courts of this State “presume that when a lawyer observes an adversary's summation, and concludes that the gist of the evidence has been unfairly characterized, an objection will be advanced. ”
[brief] (Partially Raised Below)  Prosecutors are held to a high standard to see that justice is done both inside and outside the courtroom.  *State v. D’Ippolito*, 19 N.J. 540, 549 (1955).  See RPC 3.8.  Prosecutors are tasked with the duty “to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. ”  *State v. Farrell*, 61 N.J. 99, 105 (1972).  “The prosecutorial role is greater than simple advocacy, it encompasses that of the protector of justice. ”  *State v. Hawk*, 327 N.J. Super. 276, 281 (App. Div. 2000).  “A prosecutor must conscientiously and ethically undertake the difficult task of maintaining the precarious balance between promoting justice and achieving a conviction, ensuring that at all times his or her remarks and actions are consistent with his or her duty to ensure that justice is achieved. ”  *State v. Jackson*, 211 N.J. 394, 408 (2012)(internal punctuation and citation omitted).  “A prosecutor’s opening statement should be limited to what the prosecutor will prove and not anticipate the prosecutor’s summation. ”  *State v.* Ernst, 32 N.J. 567 (1960).  In State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158 (2001), the Court found prosecutorial misconduct and overturned the defendant’s conviction where the State disparaged and insinuated that the defense expert was lying in his closing statement.
[brief] On the brief and of counsel: [...], Esq. (#013551976)  [...]  [...], Esq. (#042741990)  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – REPLY BRIEF | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS – REPLY BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS | ii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | v | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 1 | | **POINT I:**
[brief] As a result, the Court ordered the partition sale of the property.  While the sale of the Share was open to the general public, only [...] and [...] were interested in acquiring the property.  The sale was completed following a series of competing bids submitted by [...] and [...].  [...] finally purchased the elusive Share from [...] for $1,500,050.55 (“Purchase Price”).  Had the [...] not breached their fiduciary obligations to [...], [...] would have purchased the same Share for only Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars.  Therefore, [...] was forced to pay $1,250,050.55 more than it would have had to pay as a direct result of [...] breach of fiduciary duties.
[brief] But even if there had been no prior discussion, and [...] had not anticipated the shooting and been shocked by it, that reaction would not necessarily dictate that he immediately jump out of the car after he watched it occur.  It is certainly a reasonable possibility that prior to that day he knew and had accepted the fact that [...] had a tendency toward violence and was capable of acting on that tendency at any time, and yet [...] decided to associate with him anyway and to remain with him after the shooting.  [...]’s choosing to spend time with someone he knew to be dangerous would not constitute a conspiracy to commit a dangerous act with him, whether or not [...] had any personal animosity toward [...] and/or [...].  A lack of moral outrage after the fact cannot be equated with a previously-formed conspiracy.
[brief] ”  *In re Camden Cty.*, 170 N.J. 439, 449 (2002).  “It is the general rule that to be aggrieved a party must have a personal or pecuniary interest or property right adversely affected by the judgment in question. ”  *State v. A.L.*, 440 N.J. Super. 400, 418 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2015) (citing *Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep*, 34 N.J. 494, 499, 170 A.2d 39 (1961)).  Here, Appellant’s Complaint failed to include allegations that he suffered any material harm – financial or reputational – which was caused by Respondent’s use of a letter vendor.
[brief] 98a  Consent Order in Docket No. [...] filed October 4, 2021 ..................  108a Order To Enforce Litigants Rights in Docket No. [...] filed November 16, 2021 .......................................................  116a Order in Docket No. [...] filed March 25, 2022 .............................. 121a Clarifying Order in Docket No. [...] filed April 27, 2022 ...............  127a  Order in Docket No. [...] filed May 25, 2022 ................................  131a  Order To Transfer to Law Division in Docket No. [...] filed September 1, 2022 .....................................................  133a Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Docket No. [...], filed May 5, 2023 ............................
[brief] [...] found appellant’s opioid abuse to be an extension of his alcohol abuse.  He determined that appellant was taking very high dosages of opioids three times per day, although opioids should only be used “as needed. ”  He indicated that a person taking opioids three times daily would be an indication that the person was in constant pain; however, appellant was not in pain when examined by Dr. Guller….Dr. Guller indicated that a person having prescriptions filled for high doses of opioids but not needing them or using them was an indication that the person was sharing his prescription drugs with other people…Dr. Guller stated that opioids were highly addictive and, for that reason, opioid use should end thirty to sixty days after the use commenced.  Dr. Guller indicated that one of the prescribing doctors, [...], should have been suspicious about appellant using more than one kind of opioid, and about appellant travelling great distances and using many doctors and pharmacies to obtain drugs which were indications of a person “doctor shopping” in order to receive additional drugs…  Decision, p.37-38.  (Pa48-Pa49).  During Dr. Guller’s testimony, [...]’s counsel objected to the admission of Dr. Guller’s opinions arguing that Dr. Guller was not offered as an expert and was not qualified as a psychologist to opine on [...]’s alleged opioid abuse since he could not even prescribe medication.  (T2 34:1-35:17).  Notably, the ALJ agreed with counsel and explicitly ruled “I am not going to accept Dr. Guller as an expert in substance abuse. ” (T2 33:23-36:22, emphasis added).  Despite this decision, the ALJ inexplicably allowed the questioning to continue, indicating it would give the testimony the appropriate weight when making its findings.
[brief] Pub. Serv., 35 N.J. at 377; Hackensack, 41 N.J. Super. at 427.  To evaluate the Project’s impact on nearby property values, the ALJ and BPU reviewed [...]’s testimony and reports, which utilized the “paired sales technique. ” (Aa74-75; Aa386-87; Aa1037; Aa1049).  In applying the paired sales technique, [...] concluded that the sale or rental prices of residential and commercial properties near the proposed regulator station are “similar to comparable properties located further away.” (Aa1037; Aa1049-58).  In addition, [...] denied [...]’s claims that the Project would create “an environmental stigma” and create market uncertainty and diminished property values in the neighborhood because, as noted in [...]’s testimony, such a stigma would have created “quantifiable market evidence” or evidence of “a dollar or percentage diminution in value” as a result of the properties’ proximity to the proposed regulator station.  (Aa76; Aa1038-39).  As such, [...] concluded to a reasonable degree of certainty that the Project would not have an adverse impact on nearby real-estate values.  (Aa74; Aa385-86; Aa1044).  Additionally, during the evidentiary hearings, the ALJ considered the testimony of [...]’s witness, [...], who instead recommended the use of a “repeat-sales” analysis.
[brief] (2T41 to 71).........................................................................................3  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................13  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Written Decision, dated April 5, 2023 ........................................Pa72  Final Order, dated April 10, 2023 ..............................................Pa102  Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice, dated October 27, 2023 ...........................................Pa104 TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 89 (2002) .................................................................4 Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41, 48-49 (App. Div. 2004) ..................................4 Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 388 (App. Div. 2007) ...........................................................................4, 13 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5) .......................................................passim APPELLANT’S APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS Resolution of Denial (2022-23) by the [...], dated April 28, 2022 ......................................Pa1 Exhibit A-1 to Resolution of Denial (Google Aerial Image) ...........................................................................................................omitted Exhibit A-2 to Resolution of Denial (C-4 Site Plan) ....................................................................................................................omitted Exhibit A-4 to Resolution of Denial (Unit and Parking Exhibit)
[brief] 3  The award of ordinary disability retirement benefits entitles Petitioner to at least forty percent of his final compensation.  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(2)(b).  An award of AD would entitle him to at least 2/3 of his final compensation.  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(2)(b).  the Board’s decision and transferred this matter to the Office of Administrative Law (Aa8; Aa11).
[brief] The first issue presented is whether Defendants-Respondents-Sellers (Defendants) were required to obtain an RAO prior to Selling the property, and if so, whether Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance to compel Defendants to perform the environmental obligation to obtain an RAO.  Plaintiff contends that Defendants were required to obtain the RAO and are entitled to specific performance to compel Defendants to obtain it.  The trial court answered “no. ”  Following is the factual history of the PSA as it relates to the lawsuit between these parties.
[brief] Yet, the appellant urges this Court to evaluate the conduct of each of the individual parties, each cause of action, and each bit of evidence and testimony in isolation.  Doing so would disserve the trial court’s prerogative to find facts and develop conclusions based on the totality of circumstances developed over 22 days of trial.  As the trial court explained, “you have to step back and look at the big picture here,” and “[y]ou can’t take any part of this case and put blinders on and say, well, this entity we can’t say did this, or this one did, because they are all being moved and controlled by [...]. ” (37T 79:4-6; 88:21-24).  Based on a wholesale weighing of the evidence, the trial court found that the defendants, in concert, moved money without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge via conduit accounts, accrual accounts, step transactions, and other means, all of which created what the trial court called “mazes” and “webs” of accounts that made the funds extraordinarily difficult to trace.  Money was “being moved [by the defendants] all over the place” and “we don’t even know where it is now. ” (37T 72:13-15; 73:3-18).  The trial court found that this was all being done without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge.  (37T 75:7-21).  In view of these facts, trial court made clear that it had the power to adopt remedies flexible to the circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties.  (36T 6:21 to 7:5).  *Matejek v. Watson*, 449 N.J. Super. 179, 183 (App. Div. 2017).  Against this backdrop the evidence was more than sufficient to establish that the defendants were liable for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith, and unjust enrichment.
[directive] The events listed below represent the minimum notifications that must be provided to all victims and witnesses and a designated survivor of a homicide victim regarding case status.  Law enforcement officers who are case witnesses should be provided with notification as to disposition, as applicable.  Notifications on juvenile cases shall be made as applicable and pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60 et seq.  1.  Initial contact or introductory letter that informs the victim or witness that the case has been referred to the Prosecutor's Office, and explains and offers the services available from the County Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy.  2.  Written Impact Statement to Prosecutor prior to formal charging decision.  3.  Pre-grand jury remand.  4.  Administrative dismissal.  5.  Grand jury remand.  6.  Grand jury dismissal (no bill).  7.  Indictment returned (true bill).  8.  Acceptance into Pre-Trial Intervention Program.  9.  Termination from or completion of Pre-Trial Intervention Program.  10.  Negotiated plea on all charges.  11.  Release on bail/conditions of bail.  12.  Fugitive status.  13.  Court dismissal.  14.  Sentencing date.  15.  Sentence imposed on the defendant by the court.  16.  Written or In-person impact statement to court prior to sentencing.  17.  Defendant's filing of an appeal and subsequent status changes.  18.  Disposition on all charges.  19.  Mistrial/retrial.  20.  Mistrial/dismissal.  21.  Other unique or special occurrences.  C.
[brief] The trial court’s decision not to allow the proposed amended pleading is even more egregious given its failure to consider the merits of that pleading, which it is required to do.  Indeed, the trial court cut off counsel from continuing his argument before he could even get into a discussion of the merits of the pleading.  At issue here is a single mail-in ballot, in which a voter clearly intended to vote for [...] and [...], but their ballot was rejected because it was characterized as an “overvote,” i.e., the individual cast more than the allowable number of votes.
[brief] (ECF 63-1, at 2.)  [...] initially objected to this request on the grounds that “it is overly broad, not properly limited in time and scope, and is not relevant and/or proportional to the needs of the case. ”  (Id.)  RFP No. 7 includes two footnotes that are not reiterated here for the sake of simplicity and to avoid confusion.  The first footnote asks for a meet-and-confer if [...] believed “that using these names as search terms will result in voluminous false hits. ”  The second footnote requests that [...] search a person’s “entire device” for responsive documents and that email searches be conducted across the email accounts and folders of all custodians described in the request.  *4  On April 21, the parties met and conferred about this request, and [...] agreed to work with [...] to run search terms for a set time period.
[brief] See Am. Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 231 N.J. Super. 292, 301-02 (App. Div. 1989); L. 1962, c. 19.  The [...]’s first regulations to implement the FHACA were proposed expressly because “Floods can be matters of life and death and the cause of injuries and property damage. ”  6 N.J.R. 391 (Oct. 10, 1974), emphasis added.  In addition, it is well settled that the strong mandates in the FHACA: “…are designed to avoid injuries which likely could arise from an improper land use or development during a likely flow of flood waters: injury to onsite property, injury to offsite persons or property in the downstream path of the debris from a wrongful development, and injury to community members who drink or use water contaminated by inappropriate onsite development.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff attempted to remedy her failure to properly disclose her claims by filing amendments that specifically enumerated her claims.  However, her amendments were rejected by the bankruptcy court because Plaintiff had already received her discharge.  Thus, Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition only disclosed vague and unspecified claims worth $1,000, a plainly inconsistent position from the claims Plaintiff raise in this lawsuit.  Plaintiff has raised a claim for treble damages under the CFA, unspecified damages for alleged invasions of privacy, an incentive award for being named a representative of the class, pre and post judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs, all of which clearly exceed the $1,000 amount that Plaintiff previously disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court.  Moreover, by concealing her potential claims, Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition also fell woefully short of her full disclosure obligation pursuant to the bankruptcy code.  *See Ryan Operations G.P. v. Forrest Paint Co., Inc.*, 81 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The [Bankruptcy] Code imposes on debtors an affirmative duty of full disclosure" “of every contingent claim of every nature”); *see also* 11 U.S.C. § 521.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT’S ERRED IN DISMISSING COUNTS THREE AND FIVE AS TO DEFENDANTS GLAZER AND SARNO (14a-18a). ⁴  The lower court ruled in error that Defendants [...] and [...] could not be individually liable under the NJLAD as aiders and abettors.  First, reversal is warranted because the lower court relied on many of the same justifications that led to the dismissal of Count One against Defendant [...], including that issuance of the Disciplinary Letter was not materially adverse.  This was error for the same reasons that Plaintiff as already articulated, and are incorporated herein by reference.  In addition, reversal is warranted because the lower court found that Plaintiff did not establish an underlying claim of retaliation by Defendant [...].  However, should this Court find that the dismissal of Count One warrants reversal, this justification would fail.  The lower court also erroneously found that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants [...] and [...] were aware of having a part in any illegal activity.  Even a cursory review of the Amended Complaint refutes this finding, given that Defendant [...] is the individual behind many of the Plaintiff’s alleged retaliatory actions, and Plaintiff alleges that she knowingly and substantially assisted in conducting the Disciplinary Meeting, which resulted in the issuance of the ⁴  As to Defendant [...], Plaintiff believes that discovery is warranted to determine if she is an employer under the NJLAD, as opposed to a coworker.  See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 82-83 (2004).
[brief] Insufficient statements occur when, for example, a trial court produces only a guidelines worksheet without comment or merely incorporates by reference one of the parties’ arguments.  Id.; see also O’Brien v. O’Brien, 259 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 1992) (“cryptic” and “enigmatic” findings without further articulation is insufficient).  Reviewing courts likewise find statements insufficient when the trial court’s “Statement of Reasons did not provide any analysis for its order . . . or explain why claims . . . were subject to binding arbitration” under an arbitration agreements.  *Colon v. Strategic Delivery Sols., LLC*, 459 N.J. Super. 349, 364 (App. Div. 2019), *aff’d sub nom. Arafa v. Health Express Corp.*, 243 N.J. 147 (2020).
[brief] Our courts have even deferred to the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law, for instance, in crafting a “learned professional” exception to the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) exempting attorneys from that statute’s purview.  In Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J. Super. 56, 62 (App. Div. 1992), the court affirmed the dismissal of the CFA claim against an attorney because the “attorney’s services do not fall within the intendment of the [CFA].”  The court recognized that “the practice of law in the State of New Jersey is in the first instance, if not exclusively, regulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.