ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Page 1 of 1  Jersey  New Permanent Statutes  TITLE 40A  MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES  40A5-4.  Annual audit required: extensions i  40A  Annual audit required; extensions 5-4.  an 5-4.  40.4  The governing body of every local unit shall cause annual audit of its books, accounts and financial transactions to be made and completed within six months after the close of its fiscal year.
[brief] Here, the documents described in the prior Argument section, supra at pages 28, 30, even excluding 2010 Must Acquisition Deed as a document to be reviewed in the first instance, should have put Defendants on notice to inquire further.  As the trial court found, “Defendants’ Deed itself notes the property was initially purchased by [[...]] by [the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed which] described [Lot 3] as having 105 feet of frontage along 21st Street.
[brief] Mancuso versus Neckles, 163 N.J. 26, 33 to 35 (2000).  Aa80; 1T14-6 to 22.  (Emphasis added).  Relying on Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 132 (1953), Appellant espoused that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s distinct treatment of malicious prosecution claims for statute of limitation purposes is still authoritative.  Id.  Indeed, no published New Jersey case has specifically overruled Earl’s holding that malicious prosecution claims carry a six-year statute of limitations period.  Appellant brought his malicious prosecution claims under both the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c).
[brief] The undisputed facts in this case clearly established that [...] had no power or control over [...], and therefore could not dictate his suspension, transfer or other employment action.  This fact was even affirmed by Plaintiff’s own counsel during argument on the motion for reconsideration.  Indeed, once [...] became aware of the serious allegations against [...] employee, [...], it took the only reasonable measure it could to end the harassment – removing Plaintiff from the [...] Office where the alleged harassment occurred.
[brief] Id.  Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint is nearly indistinguishable from Plaintiff’s original Complaint and only amends irrelevant and inconsequential portions of the Complaint.  Importantly, the Amended Complaint fails to identify statutes with a substantial nexus to Plaintiff’s complained-of conduct or to plead allegations demonstrating that Plaintiff’s termination violated a clear mandate of public policy.  (See PA000066-80)  In short, Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint was little more than Plaintiff attempting to make inconsequential changes to her Complaint to forestall it being dismissed.  Therefore, as permitting amendment of the Complaint would have been futile, the lower Court properly denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion with prejudice, (see PA000092), and Appellees urge this Court to do the same.
[brief] Ra5.  One of the conditions of approval was the installation of a traffic signal on the portion of Route 33, a State highway, abutting the development\(^4\).  The following variances from the requirements of the VC-2 Overlay Zone were granted by the Zoning Board for the Original Application:  a.  Variance relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1), as the Combined Properties consisted of 50.3 acres of land, whereas a minimum of 75 acres is required by the VC-2 Overlay provisions; and b.  Variance relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) as Buildings C1 and C2, which were to contain affordable units, were designed to be approximately 360 feet from Route 33 whereas the minimum setback per the ordinance is 500 feet.  Plaintiffs filed a second application with the Zoning Board in November of 2016, seeking to amend the terms of approval previously granted by the Prior Approval.
[brief] Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to appeal with the appellate court on October 11, 2023, and the appellate court denied the motion on December 12, 2023.  The trial court erred in considering the request for medical records as pre-trial discovery in the order of March 31, 2023.  Unlike pre-trial discovery, a medical records request is governed by HIPAA privacy rule (45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002)), N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27 and N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3, and should be provided to plaintiff within 30 days upon request.  These documents are entitled to plaintiff, who can represent herself to demand them, unaffected by the appellate court’s order issued on December 2, 2022.  On March 1, 2024, the trial court issued an order to dismiss the case with prejudice.  In this order, the trial court stated that it had given plaintiff sufficient time to comply with the appellate court’s order issued on December 2, 2022, and that plaintiff failed to retain an attorney, thereby warranting the court's discretion to bar the suit.  The trial court erred by dismissing a closed case with prejudice since the judge had already ruled on plaintiff’s non-compliance and closed the case without prejudice on May 12, 2023 for the same reason.  Additionally, the trial judge did not specify any date for plaintiff to reopen the case.  There is no legal basis for the judge to determine the sufficient time for plaintiff to reopen the case other than what is determined by the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff has the right to retain an attorney and reopen the case before July 14, 2025.  Plaintiff is appealing both the trial court’s order on March 31, 2023, and the order on March 1, 2024.  -  Defendants have already violated plaintiff’s rights to obtain her father’s healthcare records and should release all requested documents to plaintiff.  - Plaintiff has the right to reopen the case before the expiration of the statute of limitations for the corresponding causes of action.  Defendants have confirmed the breach of contract (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1).  However, due to the defendants’ fraudulent concealment, plaintiff cannot retain an attorney and requests the court’s permission to appear pro se.
[brief] [...] also recommended a last chance agreement because [...] had been “engaging in substance use/abuse. ” (T2 46:12-14; Pa202).  There is no evidence that [...] abused any of the medication that he was legally prescribed.  (T1 [...] completed all of [...]’s recommendations.  (T5 20:25-21:2).  [...] confirmed that he did not provide medical treatment to [...], and that [...] was lawfully prescribed opioids for pain.
[brief] Although there were allegations in the pleadings of mental injuries, there was no medical proof of “actual” injury or damages so there is no reason to apply the Karlinski test.  A factual inquiry into the actual intent of the actor to cause injury is necessary where the intentional act does not have an inherent probability of causing the degree of injury actually inflicted.  Here, there is no evidence of “actual” injury – notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was never granted an opportunity to present evidence and give testimony.  (2T-13).  Harleysville at 234 states in relevant part:  Courts ordinarily should refrain from summary judgment in respect of whether an insured intended or expected to cause the actual injury to a third party unless the record undisputedly demonstrates that such injury was an inherently probably consequence of the insured’s conduct.
[brief] (NJ Model Civil Jury Charges 1.18) confirmed Petitioner’s position as an employed municipal prosecutor in [...]’s appointing Resolutions from 2016 through 2019 along with other employees of the Township.  (Pa39)  Significantly, [...] adopted a Salary Ordinance for employees of [...], which included the Petitioner in 2018 as well as other years.  (Pa44)  The Board required [...] to answer a 20 Factor Questionnaire, which was signed and dated September 13, 2018.  (Pa46)  The overwhelming majority of the answers to the questions on the Board’s own 20 Factor Questionnaire indicated the Petitioner was an employee.  This was confirmed by [...].  (T184-10)  [...] conceded that the 20 Factor Questionnaire answered by [...] is an important fact-finding document.  (T124-5)  During the course of the OAL Hearing, there was an extensive review of this document by [...].  (T124-13 to T138-16)  [...] broke down the 20 Factor Questionnaire into factors which are indicative of employee status, factors which are indicative of independent contractor status and factors which are neutral.  [...] testified that the overwhelming majority of answers indicated employee status.  Also considered by the Board was the “Employee/Independent Contractor Checklist” completed by [...].  (Pa55)  In this document, she confirmed that after the analysis of the State’s own Employee/Independent Contractor Checklist, the Petitioner was in fact an employee.  Out of the 27 categories on the State’s own form, the Petitioner was reported as an employee in 19 of them and as an independent contractor in only 8.  This was also confirmed by [...].  (T138-23)  [...] and the Petitioner both submitted additional documentation to [...], further clarifying that even some of the questions where the Petitioner was found as an independent contractor, actually were indicative of her being an employee.  (Pa55)  The following month, the Supervising Pension Certifying Officer [...], confirmed in an email that beginning in 2015, the Petitioner was an employee.  (Pa58)
[directive] Property forfeited to a enforcement agency, purchased by a law law or MLETA by the enforcement agency with funds from MEA be held the shall law enforcement agency law enforcement purposes: for in 1. real estate, for as the property exists the form of real if as long property; - - 3  Procedure Jersey Forfeiture 04 of New State Adrninkttation Page: Program Standard Operating .  T two if a motor vehicle, for at least years from the date of forfeiture or 2- MLETA MEA. purchase with funds from the or in the case of all other property with a fair market value of five 3- of hundred dollars or more, for at least one year from the date MEA.  MLETA forfeiture or purchase with funds from the or A B. law enforcement agency seeking to dispose or transfer property held for the less than the periods stated above for applicable property shall dispose in of all the property accordance with other applicable law and shall obtain reimbursement for the property for full market value of the property on the such
[brief] Our state statutes concerning the corporate form and the standing of a party to bring an action in court must be respected.  Indeed, the cases cited in Appellant’s initial Brief underscore this fact.  Allowing the judgment below to stand in its current form would undermine the existence of a corporate body as a separate legal person (both from the perspective of the Respondents and the Appellant) and would be to countenance the disregard of decades of legislative and jurisprudential history.
[brief] The Drosos Court analogized this contrast of the AAA Rules and “litigation in the Judicial Court System” with the agreement in Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010), that stated “[b]y agreeing to arbitration, the parties understand and agree that they are waiving their rights to maintain other available resolution processes, such as a court action or administrative proceeding, to settle their disputes. ”  [...]’s agreement never provides that clear contrast where the anesthetized language used by [...] such as “settle,” “resolve,” and “bring” does not fairly mark “arbitration” and “litigation” as mutually exclusive – none suggest 2  While not quoted in Drosos (or by [...]), Griffin’s agreement also lists three types of statutory claims as examples of those now subject to it.  411 N.J. Super.  at 518.  adversarial proceedings.  Nor does [...] allow users to draw this conclusion, at least for this dispute, where no arbitration provider or rules are identified.  While [...] is certainly correct that no magic formulation is required, New Jersey law still requires arbitration agreements to clearly convey “that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue.
[brief] Moreover, it is irrelevant.  See infra at pp. 23-25 [unambiguous termination provisions are enforced even if there are other motives for the action.] contention would violate this principle.  (Da13-14)  The trial court noted the Plaintiff only had termination as its remedy and could not seek any other relief, adding “[i]t bears observing” the Defendant had the ability in advance to confer with [...] to receive an Estoppel Certificate excluding any qualification or reference to default.  (Id.)  It was in this context the trial court said Defendant would have “an unfair advantage of taking a chance on securing a cured certificate,” which “only risked having to return” the deposit, while the Plaintiff “would have to determine whether to terminate” where its only recourse was “return of the deposit. ”  (Id.)  The court concluded this outcome “hardly seems to have been within [the parties’] contemplation” absent express contractual language.  (Da14.)  ARGUMENT POINT I THE CONTROLLING STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO, AND THE TRADITIONAL SUMMARY
[directive] State Forfeiture Program Administration  Standard Operating Procedure  4 Page: I  Because this account is a trust account, the funds shall not revert to the fiscal county general treasury at the end of the year, but carryover from year to year.  D.  Maintenance Expenditures  The funding entity is entitled to the reimbursement of expenses resulting from its administration of CLETA, SATA and AMA.  These expenses shall be limited to those approved by the county prosecutor and which are normal, customary and comparable to those charged to other county departments by the funding entity in the performance of similar services.  Standards for the Holdina Period and Trackina  Forfeiture  Property of 3:3  A.  Property forfeited to a law enforcement agency, or purchased by a law enforcement agency with funds from CLETA including the AMA, shall be held by the law enforcement agency for law enforcement purposes: in if real estate, for as long as the property exists the form of real 1. Pro Pe rty; 2. two if a motor vehicle, for at least years from the date of forfeiture or purchase with funds from CLETA.  3. in the case of all other property with a fair market value of five hundred dollars or more, for at least one year from the date of forfeiture or purchase with funds from CLETA.  - B.  law enforcement agency seeking to dispose or transfer property held for A less than the periods stated above for the applicable property shall dispose of the property accordance with all other applicable law and shall obtain in of reimbursement for the property for full market value the property on the date of transfer.  The proceeds from such disposal or transfer shall be deposited in CLETA.  C. of -A law enforcement agency disposing or transferring property held beyond . -.- - . . - the the periods stated above for applicable property shall dispose or transfer the property in accordance with all other applicable law.  The proceeds from such disposal or transfer shall be distributed in accordance with all other applicable law.  - - 03  State New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating Procedure of 5 Page: . .  AUTHORITY: [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL - - 03 New 6  State Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating Procedure  Page: of Jersey Administration Forfeiture Program  Municipal of a fitk: I ~ I 0310 /98  All Program Administrators  Forfeiture Applicability: Date tsoued  Supersede's: 4:1  Policy Statement or It is the poljcy of the Attorney General that either the county prosecutor the a municipal law enforcement agency's funding entity shall administer property and funds municipal law enforcement agency receives as a result of seizures and forfeiture brought J.S.A 2C:64-1, N. 2C:41-1, J.S.A. of N. under the authority et sea, (civil forfeiture) and seq., (racketeering).
[brief] See id. (emphasis added).  Consistent with the Rule’s plain text, the New Jersey Supreme Court has instructed that “potential relevance is the initial inquiry” to “determine whether the materials sought . . . are discoverable. ”  In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 165 N.J. 75, 82 (2000).  In other words, “the first question to be answered” in a discoverability inquiry is whether the document sought is “relevant” to the claim or defense.
[brief] Interestingly though, the Court in *Aubrey* court went to great lengths to emphasize that an “insured's reasonable expectations” for UIM coverage would be the amount that the insured purchased.  *Id.* at 404, 405 (“The right to recover UIM benefits depends on the UIM limits chosen by the insured”).  The Court noted:  Here, [plaintiff] Aubrey purchased UIM coverage in the amount of $15,000.  Thus, the amount of UIM coverage “held” by her, as “the person seeking recovery,” was $15,000.  Accordingly, she could reasonably expect UIM coverage in that amount.  When she purchased her UIM coverage, Aubrey could not reasonably have anticipated the possibility of receiving benefits under UIM endorsements issued in favor of [the car dealership].  To allow her to recover under [the car dealership’s] UIM policy would distort the meaning of an insured's “reasonable expectations. ”  *[Id.* at 404 (emphasis added). ]  In the present matter, plaintiffs are seeking exactly what they reasonably expected – UIM coverage in the amount that they themselves purchased through [...], namely $1,000,000.  As set forth by the Court in *Aubrey*, plaintiffs have the right to reasonably expect that they would have UIM coverage in the amount that they procured from [...].  A similar issue was presented in the next case cited by defendant, *French v. N.J. Sch. Bd. Ass'n Ins. Group*, 149 N.J. 478 (1997).
[brief] C.V., 255 N.J. at 314 (explaining discrimination has harmful effects whether intentional or otherwise, and so “the perpetrator’s intent is simply not an element of the [LAD] cause of action”).  Whether conduct “involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the [entity] discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination. ”  A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Research & Eng’g Co., 428 N.J. Super. 518, 537 (App. Div. 2012) (emphasis added).  And here, the Amended Policy explicitly singles out transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students and treats them differently than their cisgender peers.  This disparate treatment is precisely what the LAD is intended to prohibit, and the Amended Policy thus presents a textbook violation of the LAD.  See Peper, 77 N.J. at 81; (Da129).  ii.
[brief] OPINION  THORPE V. BD. OF TRUSTEES, PUB.  EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., A-0689-20, 2023 WL 2395067 (N.J. SUPER. CT. APP.  DIV. MAR. 8, 2023)  DA116 o EXHIBIT X, UNPUBLISHED OPINION  NODA V. BD. OF TRUSTEES, POLICE & FIREMEN’S RET. SYS., A-3868-19, 2022 WL 552545 (N.J. SUPER. CT. APP. DIV. FEB. 24, 2022)  DA120 o EXHIBIT Y, UNPUBLISHED OPINION CARR V. BOROUGH OF GLEN RIDGE, 2022 WL 38864 (N.J. SUPER. CT. APP. DIV. JANUARY 5, 2022)
[brief] [...] determined that the [...] had breached their agreement to recognize [...] as a 25% partner, and on March 11, 2000, entered an Order for Determining Liability, which “necessitated a trial on damages. ”  (526a-528a); [...] Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, No. A-5027-03T3, 2006 WL 3685881, at *3 (App. Div. Dec. 16, 2006).
[directive] Actor attempts, via electronic or any other means, to lure or entice a person into a motor Luring, Enticing an 2C:13-7 vehicle, structure or isolated area, or to meet or appear at any place, with a purpose to commit 3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible Adult a criminal offense with or against the person lured or enticed or against any other person.  26
[brief] However, “[l]ack of standing may be raised as a failure to state a cause of action under R. 4:6-2(e). ”  *Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Cherry Hill Pain and Rehab Institute*, 389 N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 2006) (internal citations omitted).  Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ argument that the Court erred in dismissing its Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) is without merit, and the Court’s decision must be affirmed.
[brief] Each regional health commission shall have jurisdiction in matters of public health within the geographic area of the participating municipalities.  It shall succeed to all powers and perform all of the duties conferred and imposed upon the municipal Boards of Health which it shall have superseded, and, in addition, shall have all the powers and perform all the duties within the geographic area of the participating municipalities which by law are conferred and imposed upon any Township, City or other local Board of Health in the State.  \(^5\)  Among other possible statutory sources, a Board of Chosen Freeholders of any county may create and establish a county Board of Health.
[brief] As explained supra, even if the Financial Reporting and Forecasts served amendments to the PTA that transformed projects into Backlog Projects subject to EGP-sharing, the Arbitrator improperly determined the EGP for four projects (not including Bayonne 3): (1) E’Port, (2) St. Peter’s Dorm, (3) St. Lucy’s Shelter, and (4) Barclay Street.  Supra Part I.B.3.  Per the Financial Reporting, the last-in-time “amendment” is an email dated January 4, 2022\(^{12}\) that lists the following EGPs for those projects:  | Project Name | EGP Forecasted by [...] but Not Accepted by [...] | |--------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | E’Port | $1,000,000.00 | | St. Peter’s Dorm | $1,404,371.00 | | St. Lucy’s Shelter | $501,000.00 | | Barclay Street | $976,424.00 | Da392.  Tab 4 of Alternative Calculations calculates the correct Award incorporating the corrections listed above, along with the correct EGP amounts for E’Port, St. Peter’s Dorm, and Barclay Street.  Da481.  The correct Award importing these calculations is $2,307,456.44.  Id. \(^{12}\)  Note that the Arbitrator also determined there was “de facto termination” of the PTA on December 28, 2022.  Da139.  In that respect, the last-in-time amendment to the PTA by the Financial Reporting is actually [...] Exhibit No. 11, an email dated October 1, 2021, which lists these same amounts.  Da333-338.  There is no analysis or evaluation of the evidence required in order to reach the conclusion that the Award lists the incorrect EGPs.  The Award states that the Arbitrator is relying on the Financial Reporting and Forecasts in awarding EGP, and the Financial Reporting and Forecasts do not list the EGPs awarded.  Da392.  This error is indeed an error in the “description of a . . . thing” and renders the Award “imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the decision. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23B-24(a).  [...] is not disputing the evidence, but pointing out that the factual evidence upon which the Arbitrator relies literally does not list the numbers the Arbitrator listed as the Award.  Transcribing the incorrect number is the same as stating that $2 + 2 = 5$.  D.  Error in including Bayonne 3 as subject to the PTA’s EGP-sharing Tab 5 of Alternative Calculations calculates the Award incorporating the corrections listed above, along with reducing the Bayonne 3 EGP to $0$, given that Bayonne 3 never appeared in the Financial Reporting and last appeared on the Forecasts over a year before [...]’s execution of the Bayonne 3 contract.  Da483.  If the Financial Reporting and Forecasts are “amendments” to the PTA, not only is Bayonne 3 never listed on the Financial Reporting but it was also not listed on the last three Forecasts, and therefore should not be subject to the parties’ EGP-sharing agreement.  Da394.  Bayonne 3’s inclusion on the Forecasts is not a debatable issue causing any re-evaluation of the evidence.  Its removal from the supposed amendments to the PTA means that it is not subject to the provisions of the PTA.  The correct amount of Award incorporating these calculations is $615,221.93.