ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] From the very beginning of the trial in this matter, [...] and his attorney were objecting to the so-called 21 bankers boxes in the court room in full view of the jury.  Specifically, beginning on page 14 of the 11/29/2022 Transcript, from the very first day of trial, [...]’s attorney noted both their presence and their prejudicial nature following even before any jury selection was done.  (2T Pg. 14, lines 13-21).  He complained that the 21 boxes would bias the jury and bend the case towards [...].  (2T Pg. 15, lines 4-10).  [...]s attorney further complained that the documents could appear to be more voluminous than they are due to the presence of “duplicates…several duplicates. ” (2T, Pg. 16, lines 16-25).  [...] allowed the 21 boxes to remain in the courtroom (2T Pg. 18, line 4).  On December 1, the matter was raised again by [...]’s attorney.  By that time, the documents had been removed from the boxes and were sitting in piles on [...]’s table.  Again [...]’s attorney complained of prejudice of these “piles and piles of documents” but [...] overruled the objection.  (4T, Pg. 29, line 13 – pg. 30, line 20).  The entire time that the 21 boxes and piles and piles of documents had been sitting in front of the jury they had never been admitted into evidence until December 2, 2022, (as recorded at 5T, Pg. 60, line 20).
[brief] Countless motorists across the State change lanes \(^2\) [...] relies on his initial brief with respect to the vagueness issue and addresses the remaining arguments raised by the State herein. every day; these motorists need to know what is legally required of them.  In *State v. Smith*, the Supreme Court considered whether N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, which prohibits operating a vehicle with “non-transparent material” on the front windshield or side windows, was unconstitutionally vague, despite the fact that the vagueness issue was not raised before the trial court or the Appellate Division.  251 N.J. 244, 263-65 (2022); *State v. Smith*, Brief and Appendix on Behalf of the State of New Jersey, 2022 WL 18584338 at *24, n. 8.  The *Smith* Court’s willingness to consider this new argument demonstrates that the scope and legality of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code are of substantial importance to New Jersey residents.  The State appears to concede that the scope of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 is an issue of public importance but argues that the statute’s application to lane changes was determined by the Supreme Court in *State v. Williamson*, 138 N.J. 302 (1994).
[brief] Recognizing this, Plaintiffs seek instead to fundamentally upend established New Jersey law by to pursuing a claim for attorneys’ fees based solely on “the interests of equity” and alleged “shenanigans,” basing their argument on citation to an unfair competition and trademark infringement case in which the court elected to fashion an equitable remedy and allow attorneys’ fees as an element of damages.  That case – Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co., 50 N.J. 563 (1967) – is wholly inapplicable from a factual standpoint because the claim for unfair competition and trademark infringement and the calculation of resulting damages under the unique circumstances of that case have nothing whatsoever in common with Plaintiffs’ (still) disputed claim to an implied easement appurtenant allowing them to cross [...]’s private property.  Indeed, the court in *Red Devil Tools* elected to allow recovery for attorneys’ fees in that specific factual situation as an equitable remedy alternative to the more traditional accounting often used in an unfair competition case because the defendant’s sales of the infringing products were too low to provide meaningful compensation for injury to plaintiff’s intellectual property.  See id. at 572-75.
[brief] [...] borrows certain other policy considerations from *Harvester Chem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 277 N.J.Super. 421, 431 (App.Div.1994) (Zb40.)  However, [...] plainly has already run afoul of all of the considerations that it cites.  For example, there could be nothing more “arbitrary” than [...]’s “mid-term cancellation” from the CCIP – the policy provision on which [...] relies, which allows one contractor to exclude another contractor from coverage “in its sole discretion,” is the very definition of “arbitrary.
[brief] 39  [...] v. [...], Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2022)  ................. passim [...] v. [...], Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2022)........................... passim Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413 (3d Cir. 2015).........................................................
[brief] (2T48:11.)  [...] testified that he smelled alcohol while transporting [...] back to the station, but he could not identify the type of alcohol, and he conceded alcohol itself is odorless.  (2T50:22-53:8.)  The State limited the evidence to [...]’ observations.  (2T53:23-54:4.)  Defense counsel argued to the municipal court that the State had not met its burden because [...] did not have the training or experience to testify as to whether [...] failed any of the standardized field sobriety tests.  (2T54:23-58:15.)  Counsel argued, “It’s got to be through the trained eye of somebody who has been taught to see things the way they’re the supposed to be seen. ”  (2T56:17-19.)  Because [...] did not know the scoring factors for the standardized field sobriety tests, he could not offer an opinion on whether [...] was intoxicated.  (2T56:17-58:15.)  Further, defense counsel argued that [...], who had experience, was not called to testify.  (2T59:5-20.)  Defense counsel argued that the State could not meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of [...]’s guilt when [...] conceded that he was not sure whether [...] was just tired.  (2T59:21-60:8.)  In finding that [...] was guilty of DWI, the municipal court noted that the MVR did not depict swerving, but did show “the defendant drifting into the grass median. ” (2T63:4-15.)  Although the municipal court found that [...]’ directions to perform the walk and turn and one-leg stand raise test were “poor,” the municipal court found [...] did not pass the tests.  (2T66:3- 15.)  The municipal court was further persuaded that [...] was intoxicated because he failed the alphabet test.  (2T66:16-67:14.)  The municipal court further declined to make an adverse inference as to the State’s failure to call [...]’ as witness.  (2T67:15-21.)  The municipal court imposed the minimum penalty.  (2T68:12-17.)  The record noted that [...] had proactively attended alcohol counseling.  (2T69:17-21.)  Although the municipal court stayed the sentence pending appeal, she indicated following an appeal, the fine would be $507, $33 court costs, $225 in DWI surcharge, $75 Safe Neighborhood, $50 VCCO, and two-year loss of license with an ignition interlock device.  (2T70:7-25.)  The municipal court further found [...] guilty of failing to maintain lane and reckless driving but merged the sentence.  (2T71:10-16.)  At the trial de novo, defense counsel argued that the appeal was from both the denial of the suppression motion and the finding of guilt following the suppression motion.
[brief] Insofar as a comparison with New York’s ABC Law is warranted, the MBPA is still better suited to promote New Jersey’s public policy protecting its wholesalers:  - **[...]’s 96% pre-COVID performance target**:  The MBPA does not permit modification to wholesaler agreements without wholesaler consent, whereas the ABC Law simply permits brewers to modify wholesaler agreements with good cause and without wholesaler consent.  *See*  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(c)(2); ABC Law § 55-c(4)(b). ⁸ -  **Forum selection**:  Employing the term, “shall,” the MBPA mandates all disputes relating to wholesaler agreements be determined “by a court of this State,” whereas the ABC Law only prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses, allowing parties to privately contract for arbitration.  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e).  Contrary to [...]’s insistence, ABC Law and the MBPA are *not* mirror images of each other.  -  **Fee shifting**:  The MBPA provides for a fee-shifting provision, which New Jersey has regularly found to be an important policy decision by the Legislature.  *See* Warren Distrib. Co. v. InBev USA, LLC, 2011 WL 770005, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2011). ⁹ New York has no such provision.  --- the law[s].”  208 N.J. Super. at 672.  [...] tries to distinguish *Winer* by claiming the franchisee was not incorporated in New Jersey and most of its sales were outside of New Jersey.  Db27.  But neither fact was relevant to the court’s choice-of-law analysis.  The Court in this matter should likewise ignore incorporation and location of sales and focus instead on protecting the interests of its wholesalers, such as [...].  ⁸  Without support, [...] dismisses this argument as “disingenuous” but cannot identify any provision in the Agreement that permits [...] to set a sales threshold for [...].  [...]’s reliance on *Bulut v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 2023 WL 869402 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2023) and *Citibank, N.A. v. Errico*, 597 A.2d 1091 (App. Div. 1991) is inapposite since neither case addressed an industry’s statutory scheme.  ⁹  [...] proffers no support for its contention that fee-shifting provisions are not fundamental policies.  Further, [...]’s attempts to distinguish *Warren Distrb.* and *Winer* because the courts there discussed fee-shifting clauses outside the context of  In short, only the MBPA can realize New Jersey’s public policy and interest in protecting its wholesalers—a policy that the MBPA itself explicitly embodies.\(^{10}\) II.
[brief] Because the State failed to carry its burden to demonstrate the reliability of fingerprint analysis that originates with a database search, no fingerprint analysis testimony should have been admitted at trial.  As with much forensic evidence, fingerprint examination evidence has been admitted for decades without its fundamental assumptions being assessed by our courts.  This lack of scrutiny is contrary to our courts’ “important role as gatekeepers,” in which they are entrusted with preventing unreliable expert testimony from entering our courtrooms.  *State v. Olenowski*, 253 N.J. 133, 154 (2023).  “Reliability is critical to the admissibility of expert testimony.  Indeed, an expert opinion that is not reliable is of no assistance to anyone. ”  *Id.* at 150.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  The proponent of expert testimony has the burden to “clearly establish” that the testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admitted under N.J.RE. 702.  *State v. Cassidy*, 235 N.J. 482, 492 (2018).  The State failed to meet that burden here.  The defense moved to preclude any testimony about fingerprint analysis, arguing that it is a subjective and unreliable method.
[directive] (a)  Sentences that include only a probationary term, including sentences for of defendants seeking to leave the state that require transfer supervision under the ICAOS may proceed or be adjourned at the judge's discretion.  (b)  If a probationary sentence is anticipated to imposed and to commence be 1 immediately, Probation must advised prior to the sentencing date.  be  Arrangements should be made for Probation staff to be included remotely by video or conference call at the sentencing.  At sentencing, defendants must be asked provide the court with their telephone to (c) if numbers and their address, and email address applicable.  After the judge has of imposed the sentence, probation staff should advise the defendant the reporting conditions the record.  If the defendant is seeking to leave the state, Probation on should advise the defendant the record, that the documents transfer to on supervision under the ICAOS must be signed and provide instructions as to how If this will be done.  the defendant is the county jail, the documents transfer to in supervision under the ICAOS must be signed prior to defendant's discharge from the jail.  (2)  Probation and County Jail Sentences of  For sentences imposed that include a county jail term 180 days or less, with a of of condition probation, judges should consider whether the commencement the of of If custodial portion the sentence will be stayed.  the commencement the custodial portion stayed, the defendant shall report Probation as directed the interim.  to is in (3)  County Jail Sentences of  For sentences imposed 180 days or less a county jail, with no probation in component, judges should consider whether the sentence can be adjourned a later to 1  As noted, this Guidance applies only to defendants who are awaiting sentencing following a guilty plea or jury verdict (it does not apply to defendants for whom the court has already imposed a sentence).
[brief] [...] next argues [...] has not identified any case law supporting that interest should run from the date [...]’s complaint was filed in 2005.  (Prb 24.)  Of course, this is incorrect.  See Taddei v. State Farm Indem. Co., 401 N.J. Super. 449, 466–67 (App. Div. 2008) (holding interest should run from date complaint was filed in insurance coverage dispute); George H. Swatek, Inc. v. N. Star Graphics, Inc., 246 N.J. Super. 281, 288 (App. Div. 1991) (awarding prejudgment interest in contract action for time that “elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the entry of judgment [.].”) (cited at Db 70.)  [...] similarly does not address the facts of this case which support a 2005 start date for the running of interest.  [...] is an excess carrier; it never was provided with notice that the limits underlying the [...] policy had been exhausted.  It received only sporadic updates from [...] regarding polluted sites.  (Pa0353-Pa0362; Pa0435-Pa0463.)  [...] did not deny coverage pre-suit and only reserved its rights, based in large part on the fact that [...] never provided proof of exhaustion of the policies underlying the [...] policy.  (Pa368.)  [...]’s revisionist history that [...] – a single excess carrier with three years in a thirty-year-plus coverage block – should have instituted this lawsuit, is nonsense.  [...] was the only party with information regarding coverage and exhaustion of limits that could have filed this lawsuit.  It should not be rewarded for its 20-year delay by receiving an exorbitant amount of prejudgment interest.
[brief] 1  POINT I THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  DEFENSE WAS NOT WAIVED (24T52:7-10)  ...........................................  2  A.  There was no clear, unequivocal and decisive waiver here ..............................................  3  B.  The trial court relied upon an erroneous interpretation of the discovery rule .........................  4  1.  A reasonable person in [...]’s circumstances would have been aware of the facts underlying his claims within the statute of limitations ......................... 5  2.  [...] had a duty to be familiar with the financial Records of [...] ...........................................  7  3.  Plaintiffs are not permitted to delay the accrual of their causes of action until they received the advice of their expert, [...].  ......................... 9  C.  Even under the plain error standard, the legal error here warrants reversal .........................  10  POINT II  THE AWARD OF COUNSEL FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES WAS ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW (25T80:15-89:4; 25T89:23-93:13) ...........................................
[brief] 1.  The Undisputed Terms of Use and Subscription Costs Do Not Mean the VRDO Transactional Data Was Not Publicly Disclosed.  (4T)  The information available through the VRDO Data Sources is publicly disclosed, notwithstanding the terms of use and subscription costs.  Relator’s own reliance on the VRDO transactional data confirms this conclusion.  Relator’s principal, [...], is not an insider whistleblower; he never worked at any of the banks that are Defendants in this action.  Ja2121 (¶ 41).  Rosenberg is simply a member of the public whose company subscribed to [...] to conduct what was, at the time, a business unrelated to asserting a false claims act claim against Defendants.  See Ja2152–53 (¶¶ 93–97), Ja2156–60 (¶¶ 116–33).  And based on an analysis of the data obtained from [...], Rosenberg’s litigation company, the Relator here, has alleged fraud and brought this action.  Neither the MSRB’s subscription fees nor its terms of use prevented Rosenberg or Relator—not insiders but members of the public like the numerous others in the industry who subscribe to these services—from alleging fraud and bringing this action.
[brief] The same principles apply when a jury is tasked with determining standard of care.  However, in most negligence cases, the plaintiff is not required to establish the applicable standard of care.  Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 134 (1961).  In those cases, “[i]t is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to show what the defendant did and what the circumstances were.  The applicable standard of conduct is then supplied by the jury[,] which is competent to determine what precautions a reasonably prudent man in the position of the defendant would have taken. ”  *Ibid.*
[brief] Plaintiff alleged defendants breached their professional duty of care in negligently designing the layout of [...] regarding the placement, design, and installation of the bagel kettle.  Plaintiffs' expert [...], a licensed professional architect with a background in designing commercial kitchens, visited [...] in April 2017, to review the premises and observe the site of [...]'s accident.  Martin also reviewed multiple layout and construction plans including the 2006 plan, 2007 plan, and the 2012 plan provided to the Aberdeen building department.  Martin compiled his observations in a report dated June 28, 2017.  In his report, Martin noted that in the 2006 plan "the bagel kettle [was] located adjacent to the bagel oven and [was] shielded by [two] walls .  . . .  [T]he layout designer's decision to place the kettle in a location protected by walls acknowledges the proper and safe functioning of this kitchen."  In the 2007 plan "[t]he bagel kettle [and oven] [was] now along the travel path for employees to reach the back[-]kitchen work area."  Martin noted that in the 2007 plan the kettle "[was] shielded by a single wall . . . [and the] designer's decision to place the kettle . . . along a travel path . . . is potentially a safety issue, however the single wall . . . provide[s] some protection for employees .  . . ."  In the 2012 plan, Martin found the "walls around the bagel kettle have been removed . . . .  This is potentially a safety issue for this kitchen design layout.  The layout designer's decision to remove all walls from around the kettle removes any protective shielding preventing accidental contact with the bagel kettle."  Martin's report listed four central observations which, in his professional opinion, compromised the safety of the [...] facility:
[brief] Defendants appear to ignore the clear case law that recognizes that the presumption of validity is overcome if the ordinance was not adopted in accordance with the requirements of its enabling legislation.  Rather, Defendants would like to limit rebuttal to instances in which the ordinance is shown to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Nonetheless, even if such a standard is applied, Plaintiff has established that Ordinance 22-1516 also offends this standard.
[brief] Though seemingly ignored by [...] and Plaintiff, foreclosure pursuant to the In Rem Act, (N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.29 et seq.) vests title in the holder of a final judgment upon recording in the county recording office.  (N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.65).  The In Rem equivalent to N.J.S.A. 54:5-87 is N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.67, a statutory right to seek redemption, post judgment, expires three months from a final judgment recorded, not when it is entered by the Clerk.
[brief] In short, [...]’s arguments on appeal run contrary to the plain language and simple interpretation of the statute and the regulation.  “The Court’s obligation when interpreting a law is to determine and carry out the Legislature’s intent. ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).
[brief] Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 154, 29 S. Ct. 42, 53 L. Ed. 126 (dismissed on appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when neither party had raised the issue); Country of Luxembourg ex rel.  Ribeiro v. Canderas, 338 N.J. Super. 192, 202, 768 A.2d 283 (Ch.Div.2000) (judgment vacated due to lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant).  When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its authority to consider the case is "wholly and immediately foreclosed."  *Gilbert v. Gladden*, 87 N.J. 275, 280-81, 432 A.2d 1351 (1981) quoting *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962).  Any statements or decisions made after the August 27, 2019 dismissal are improper and raising them here is another improper deflection by Plaintiff.  Thus, the dismissed complaint should not have been reinstated, decisions on it should not have been made, an escrow should not have been ordered and R 4:67 should have been enforced.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was "palpably incorrect or irrational" and the court did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence of its own orders in 2019 dismissing the complaint because it lacked jurisdiction, then three years later claimed the dismissal was a stay when it was not.
[brief] a.  The Local Public Contracts Law is designed to foreclose any activity that may serve as a vehicle for favoritism, improvidence, extravagance or corruption.  In New Jersey, bids for public construction by municipalities are subject to the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq. (the “LPCL”).  The LPCL requires that all construction contracts be awarded to “the lowest responsible bidder….”  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-16.  The “lowest responsible bidder” is the bidder “(a) whose response to a request for bids offers the lowest price and is responsive; and (b) who is responsible. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-2(27).  To be “responsive” a bid must conform “in all material respects to the terms and conditions, specifications, legal requirements, and other provisions of the request” for bids.  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-2(33).  There is no discretion to waive a material defect, and a defect is material if “the effect of a waiver would be to deprive the municipality of its assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to its specified requirements,” or “it is of such a nature that its waiver would adversely affect competitive bidding by placing a bidder in a position of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise undermining the necessary common standard of competition.
[directive] Do you have an opinion, one way or the other, on this subject?  13.  If the law and evidence warranted, would you be able to render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff or defendant regardless of any sympathy you may have for either party?  14.  Based on what I have told you, is there anything about this case or the nature of the claim itself, that would interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial and to apply the law as instructed by the court?