ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Contrary to Appellants’ misunderstanding, the federal Family Education Rights Privacy Act (“FERPA”) and New Jersey Pupil Records Act (“NJPRA”) have little to do with this case.  Among other things, these federal and state laws govern how schools must respond to parental requests to access certain official student records.  FERPA requires that no State school or educational institution shall have a policy which “den[ies], or which effectively prevents, the parents of students … the right to inspect and review the education records of their children. ”  20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A).  NJPRA, for its part, similarly requires the State Board of Education to promulgate regulations governing “the creation, maintenance and retention of pupil records … to provide general protection for … the right of the parent or guardian … to be supplied with full information about the pupil, except as may be inconsistent with reasonable protection of the persons involved[.]”  N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19.  However, as the trial court explained, the plain language of FERPA and NJPRA “pertain to access to information in written student records, not to affirmative requirements of parental notification of a student’s transgender orientation or expression. ” (Da114).  That distinction is dispositive.
[brief] The appellants are arguing that [...] abused his discretion by granting the order for discharge despite non-compliance with N.J.S.A. 14A:14-20.  That statute provides that the court shall allow reasonable compensation to the receiver for his services.  In the order of appointment of September 25, 2021, appointing [...] as receiver, the order provided that the “receiver shall be paid from the proceeds collected in the amount of 15% which shall be addressed as an additional cost of the judgment. ” (Ca22).  [...] argues that [...] amended his payment charge without seeking leave of court to do so.  However, as noted in [...]’s certification in support of the motion to be discharged, he would not accept such an exorbitant amount of money as provided in the order.  [...], rather, agreed to accept $300.00 per hour, which was not paid by the corporation.  Rather, it was paid by [...] outside of the operating corporation to allow [...] to continue operating without the expense of 15% of gross.  Now, [...] seeks to penalize [...] for taking less than what was required under the order appointing him.  The court should reject that argument, and affirm the trial court’s order discharging [...] as receiver.  II.  THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, AND THE ORDER DENYING THE [...] APPELLANTS MOTION TO INERVE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
[brief] (“[...]”) respectfully submits that [...] (“[...]”) has acted in all three ways.  [...] seeks to have this Court ignore that over a two-plus year period, thirteen times [...] agreed that the Bid Documents submitted by [...] were in a form acceptable to [...].  Thirteen times [...] awarded hundreds of millions of dollars of projects and [...] gave the required bonds.  There was no issue.  Strangely, [...] has not shared with this Court or with [...] the birth of what can only be called a “concern” as to the applicability of the Power of Attorney to the Consent of Surety.  [...] then used this concern to do an about face.  [...] decided that what it found on thirteen prior occasions to be forms acceptable, was suddenly no longer acceptable.  Based on that concern, [...] would throw out [...]’s low bid and instead spend about $10,000,000 more in taxpayer/tolls to get someone else to perform the exact same scope of work.  [...] has effectively come up with a legal theory that it believes that [...] could have put forth in this matter as a basis for [...] to not go ahead and give [...] the required bond.  Respectfully, if this Appeal was [...] proffering [...]’s legal theory as a basis to renege on producing the required bond after it had done so on 13 previous times, we believe that [...] would be laughed out of court.  We would be saying, “How can you take that position that the Power of Attorney with same Bond number only applied to one, but not both documents?”  You really must question why [...] is advancing its concern as a possible basis for [...] to walk out?  [...] is not looking for an exit.  Why would [...] advance this concern and then use it as a basis to spend about $10,000,000 more on another contractor.  Going forward, due to [...]’s concern, if [...] wants to address it and to change its requirements, it is free to do so.
[directive] Furthermore, prosecutors must be able to exercise their discretion in a manner that prevents a defendant from benefitting from having committed an offense in a school zone.  Accordingly, prosecutors may choose to fashion a plea agreement that provides, for example, for the dismissal of the third-degree school zone charge in exchange for the defendant pleading guilty to a non-school zone drug or non-drug offense that subjects the defendant to the statutory presun~ption of imprisonment, which presumption would otherwise not apply if the defendant were to plead only to the third-degree school zone offense under the revised law.  Se___~e Part II, Section l(d), infra (authorizing a "package deal" in which the school zone charge is dismissed and defendant pleads guilty to one or more non-school zone offenses).
[brief] *Id.* at p. 830.  The Court held, “because arbitration is a creature of contract, the answer is no. ”  *Ibid.*  In that case the arbitration was pursuant to [...] rules.  The [...] apparently considered the objection of one party to proceeding with only 2 arbitrators and ruled that it felt the matter should continue to final award.  In *Szuts* the Court also did not defer to the [...] on its procedural election to proceed with only 2 arbitrators.  It vacated, “[b]ecause the arbitrators violated the provisions of the arbitration agreement requiring arbitration before at least three arbitrators, they exceeded their authority under the arbitration agreement. ”  *Id.* at 224.  Still further, *Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresa Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos*, 25 F.3d 223, 224, (4th Cir. 1994), a Fourth Circuit case just as *Dockser* was, illustrates the difference in pre-award judicial abstention versus post-award judicial analysis for confirmation/vacatur.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A PATTERN OR SERIES OF DISCRIMINATORY AND RETALIATORY ACTS THAT WHEN VIEWED CUMULATIVELY CONSTITUTE A HOSTILE AND DISCRIMINATORY WORK ENVIRONMENT (Pa837; 3T)**  This case presents a case of a discriminatory and retaliatory hostile environment that under the guideposts set by the Supreme Court in *Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc.*, 247 N.J. 1 (2021), can be found by a jury as a hostile work environment.  The court in *Rios* noted that the goal of the LAD is “‘nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination. ’”  *Raspa v. Off. of Sheriff of Gloucester*, 191 N.J. 323, 335 (2007) (quoting *Fuchilla v. Layman*, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (1988)).  Among other things, courts must consider the cumulative effect of the various incidents and that each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment created may exceed the sum of the individual episodes.  Thus, “it is the cumulative impact of separate successive incidents that cements the hostile work environment. ”  *Cutler v. Dorn*, 196 N.J. 419, 432 (2008) (citation omitted).  The facts recounted above would allow a jury to find in favor of [...] on his claim of a retaliatory hostile environment based on the cumulative effect of each event.  **Point VII**  THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DILLON’S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS (Pa837; 3T)
[brief] See e.g., Sisson v. Donnelly, 36 N.J.L. 432, 439-440 (E. & A. 1872); see also Micheau v. Crawford, 8 N.J.L. 90, 103 (1825) (noting that the court was "bound to treat [a will] with the utmost tenderness and liberality; and it is only when a reasonable construction and the discovery of the intent of the testator are utterly hopeless, that all effect should be denied").  More modern cases continue to recognize and build upon that rule of construction.  See Normanoch Ass'n v. Baldasanno, 40 N.J. 113, 125 (1963) ("[t]he court's "prime consideration" when interpreting a deed is to derive "the intention of the parties"); see also Boss v. Rockland Elec. Co., 95 N.J. 33, 38 (1983) ("What the easement holder's rights are, vis-à-vis the landowner, depends first of all on the intent of the parties as expressed in the language of the grant.") (quoting Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Blair Holding Co., 42 N.J. 51, 604 (1964)); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 36 Backes 362, 367 (Ch. Ct. 1945) (noting that a will can be enforced even absent a recitation in the instrument of the power to dispose of property where testator’s intention is clear from the provisions and power to dispose of property otherwise exists); Board of Home Missions of Presbyterian Church in U. S. of America v. Saltmer, 24 Backes 33, 37 (Ch. Ct. 1939) (same).
[brief] The Board properly reviewed the necessary application materials and the public was given the appropriate opportunity to present comments and/or cross-examine witnesses on the application for the subdivision.  [...] asserts that the Board prevented the public from submitting public comments and cross-examining witnesses regarding the application.  Pb23.  Further, [...] claims that Board did not review the application materials once the application was completed.  Id. at 24.  This is objectively untrue and has no support in the record.  The Resolution clearly indicates that the Board reviewed multiple documents submitted by the Applicant.  Pa248.  Further, the Board heard testimony from the Applicant’s Attorney and the Applicant’s Professional Planner and several members of the public commented on the application.  Pa249.  After careful consideration, the Board included a specific finding that the requested subdivision does not adversely affect the public's health, safety, or welfare.  Pa250.  Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that the Board did not “put the cart before the horse” and properly followed the necessary procedures and supported its findings in the record.
[brief] “ADB” shall refer to [...] Opposition Brief. argument and further notes that the Board professionals had reviewed all the materials.  (ADb15).  However, the testimony on the record at the subdivision hearing shows otherwise.  In response to the instruction to not discuss stormwater, a board member tried to reference the fact that there was a stormwater report in the materials.  (1T40-19 to 1T41-13).  In response, the Applicant’s attorney responded “That is part of site plan…  Number one, that is part of the site plan review.  That’s in the file for that.  We’re working – you just need a supplemental submission related to the stormwater management that will be part of the site plan application going forward.  That’s not part of this application. ”  (1T41-16 to 1T14-23) (emphasis added).  The position that the application materials were submitted and considered by the board is the complete opposite position of what Defendants advanced during the Board hearing.  Furthermore, as briefed in Plaintiffs’ initial brief, review of the application materials by board professionals is not sufficient, and it is still subject to cross-examination by the Board members and members of the public.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i) ponadto, i:e przyznaj11c sic; do winy prawa do odwolania od odrzucenia zrzeka sit; Pan(i) wszystkich przedprocesowych wniosk6w z wyj11tkiem tych wymienionych ponii:ej:  Do you understand that if you plead guilty: 5.  Czy rozumie Pan(i), i:e po przyznaniu sic; do winy:  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  You will have a criminal record?
[brief] 5T134 to 5T224.  An examination of the minutes of the 2019 and 2021 NJDOT pre-application demonstrates that the requirements of the NJDOT for the Route 33 Signal are the same; the only difference is [...]’s characterization of the position of the NJDOT concerning the Route 33 Signal.  Ba17-30.  [...]’s opinion regarding the NJDOT’s own opinion concerning the Route 33 Signal seems to be based primarily on the opinions of two NJDOT reviewers, [...] and [...], who were present at all of the NJDOT pre-application meetings.  Ba17-30.  Further, [...] acknowledges that these two individuals have been more negative than other reviewers over the years.  See 5T187 to 5T188.  However, the opinion of [...] and [...] are not dispositive on the issue of the Route 33 Signal.  Finally, [...] clearly confirms that he has been successful with applications to the NJDOT for median left turn lanes in the past; and also identified other median left turn lanes on Route 33 in the vicinity of the Property.
[brief] Id. at 223.  Plaintiffs devote much of their brief to trying to distinguish Morales because the former employee in that case supposedly had greater abilities in English than [...].  See (Pb7–9).  But Plaintiffs’ argument ignores that their unconscionability argument is incompatible with Morales’s categorical holding that an English-language agreement “is enforceable” against a party that manifests assent to it, even if that party “cannot read, write, speak, or understand the English language.
[brief] The police found no sign of forced entry (20T14-5 to 13).  Nor did they find any identifiable fingerprints at the scene (20T48-11 to 20T59-22;20T87-1 to 20T88-5).  The first detective on the scene testified that the bedroom appeared to be orderly and it did not appear to have been rummaged through (20T76-7 to 11;20T79-2 to 8).  There was some change in a box on top of a bedroom dresser (20T80-20 to 25).  The medical examiner was unable to determine a time of death (25T59-20 to 25T60-24).
[brief] Her residence is across the street from the [...] and [...]’s operation.  (T1 at 186:10-25).  She testified that [...]’s operation is different from [...]’s.  It is open more days and it has more hours of operation than [...], who had a limited number of days and hours.  (T1 at 187:17-25).  She further testified that she saw [...]’s employees dumping soup in the street.  (T2 at 6:21-7:8).  Next to testify was [...], the owner of [...], the property owner.
[brief] As to Factor #4 – Services Rendered Personally, [...] said that she and [...] worked together to find a substitute when she could not attend court.  (1T32:20-22).  Typically, the substitute was the other [...] Municipal Prosecutor.  (1T32:22-33:8).  [...] paid the other prosecutor when he substituted for [...].  (1T74:10-16).  [...] received conflicting information from [...] about finding substitutes.  (1T101:23-102:18; Pa110).  In the Questionnaire, [...] answered that “court office selects replacement – paid rate and paid by purchase order. ” (1T102:4-8; Pa48).  Then, in the January 2019 Interview, [...] indicated that [...] was responsible for finding a replacement and was to swap compensation with the replacement.  (1T102:9-14; Pa110).5
[brief] Because the facts and procedural history are intertwined, the State has combined them for the Court’s convenience.  2  Db - Defendant’s Brief  Aa - Defendant’s Appendix Sa - State’s Appendix  “1T” refers to the February 27, 2020 transcript.  “2T” refers to the February 25, 2022 transcript.  “3T” refers to the April 29, 2022 transcript.
[brief] ”  Id. at 404.  Instead, N.J.S.A. 17:28, et seq. is the New Jersey Statute that pertains to uninsured and underinsured motorist actions.  To that end, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(d) provides “[u]ninsured and underinsured motorist coverage shall be subject to the policy terms, conditions and exclusions approved by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance”.  In addition, the well settled caselaw, as designated in Respondent’s brief, including but not limited to, Walkowitz v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 149 N.J. Super. 442 (App Div. 1977) and Azze v Hanover Ins. Co., 336 N.J. Super. 630 (App. Div. 2001), certif. den’d 168 N.J. 292 (2001), provide that the six year statute of limitations set forth in N.J.S. A.  2A:14-1 applies only if the contract for the policy of insurance is silent as to the time within which to file an action.  Amicus Curaie further argue that the reasonable expectation of the insured is that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a) provides the insured a reasonable expectation that her or she “is entitled to a 6-year limitation period”.  (Ab2).
[brief] 8 - **In re Carter** ............................................................................................ 8, 13 - **State v. Hupka** .......................................................................................  14 - **In re Kallen** ...........................................................................................  14  N.J. Election Law Enforcement Commission v. DiVencenzo. .................. 14 STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 .........................................................  2, 3, 4 N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3 .............................................................  3 N.J.A.C. § 4A:4-5.2 ...........................................................  3, 4 N.J.S.A. 52:17B-68 ...........................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 40A:14–181 .........................................................  7  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: RESPONDENT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE SEVERAL IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] Defendant has an extensive criminal history that includes several very serious offenses.  The parties agreed that three first-degree robbery convictions from 2002 would be admissible since he finished serving the sentences within the 10-year period allowed for in N.J.R.E. 609; and also that the sentences on the other six convictions, also from 2002, had all been fully served outside of that ten-year period.  (13T:49-14 to 19; 13T:56-22 to 24).  The State argued that the other six convictions were admissible due to the seriousness of the offenses, and the fact that defendant’s extensive criminal history shows contempt for the bounds of behavior placed on all citizens.  (13T: 21-21 to 52-12).
[brief] This case lacks complicated procedural history as well as the “well-publicized political campaign to elect candidates for municipal council . . . committed to repeal of the ordinance” found in Willoughby.  Id. at 278.  Rather, here we have only the vocal and disorganized opposition of [...]—a private entity—and its membership, advancing a parochial interest, well after Ordinance No. 13-2022 was adopted.  The Mayor and Township Committee, as the elected representatives of the citizens of [...] as a whole, passed Ordinance No. 13-2022 on April 18, 2022.
[brief] The keeping of swine is prohibited, except as permitted per Chapter 438, Swine, of the Township Code.  (1)  One farm animal is permitted for every 10,000 square feet of lot area.  (2)  Farm animals and structures housing them must be kept at least fifty (50) feet from any other lot in a residential zone.  (3)  The keeping of any number of farm animals shall require a permit issued by the Board of Health.
[brief] In Plaintiff’s case here, however, the fraud is of an essential nature, because the proofs – uncontradicted by any testimony from the defendant – showed that the Defendant had no intention of marrying the Plaintiff for a good faith purpose at any time; Defendant married the Plaintiff for one reason only – to obtain her green card, and lied to the Plaintiff over and over again about that.  Unlike Patel, supra, 265 N.J. Super. 408, the record presented to the family court in this case showed “that the defendant was … unwilling to act as a wife to the plaintiff” and “did not want to create for herself the status of wife” to the Plaintiff – with Defendant’s own overheard words so exclaiming.  This case is not one simply of “deficiency in a character trait” of the defendant; it is one of a lie by one of the contracting parties that affected the essential component of the marriage contract between these parties.  Our courts have stressed that, beyond the annulment statute, public policy encourages full disclosure of pertinent facts in contemplation of entering a bond as significant as marriage.
[brief] Two years prior, on February 2, 2018, Plaintiff brought suit against the Property's landlord, [...], for constructive eviction, breach of lease, fraud in the inducement, unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith, and violations of the Consumer Fraud Act under Docket No. [...] (hereinafter “Lease Litigation”).  After over two years of litigation, on April 27, 2020, a consent order was entered as Plaintiff settled the Lease Litigation, knowing they had a claim against Defendants.  In fact, as part of the settlement in the Lease Litigation, Plaintiff negotiated the assistance of the Landlord’s counsel in a planned and subsequent legal malpractice action against Defendants arising from the same transaction.  Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against Defendants under Docket No. [...] (hereinafter "Instant Action"), in an attempt to recover the amounts paid in the Lease Litigation as well as counsel fees and costs.  Plaintiff failed to name Defendants in the Lease Litigation previously commenced and settled, which for over two years of litigation involved the same parties and the same alleged damages as the Instant Action.  Plaintiff's tactical and strategic decision to sue Defendants, two years after filing suit in the underlying Lease Litigation was done to prejudice the Defendants and create piecemeal litigation which is prohibited under New Jersey Court Rules and binding case law.  To that end, on March 1, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:5-1 and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  On June 9, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss which is the basis for the current appeal.  The Instant Action contains the same factual basis presented in the Lease Litigation, often times using the exact same language.  Plaintiff's tactical and strategic decision not to sue Defendants in the Lease Litigation runs afoul of the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  Plaintiff's intentional decision to settle the Lease Litigation without asserting its claims against Defendants during the Lease Litigation is exactly what the Entire Controversy Doctrine seeks to avoid - piecemeal litigation which then prejudices the later sued party.  Defendants have been prejudiced as critical witnesses are no longer available, documents have been lost, and memories have faded.  Plaintiff's claims for damages were artificially inflated to include costs of the Lease Litigation that would have been avoided if all issues had been resolved in one litigation.  Lastly, and most egregious, is that Defendant was deposed in the Lease Litigation, as a nonparty witness, while Plaintiff was methodically considering bringing a lawsuit against him and using that knowledge gained from the deposition.  Before this Honorable Court on appeal is the narrow issue of whether the Trial Court was within its discretion when it found that the Entire Controversy Doctrine bars Plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice against the Defendants.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 401 provides that relevant evidence is generally admissible.  The studies upon which the Amici rely are irrelevant to the Court’s disposition of the issue before it.  The studies cited are self-reported surveys with no scientific analysis, are subjective and fails to provide any basis that it represents the entire community at issue.  Rather, these studies are inflammatory, unduly prejudicial and provide no probative value, as they attempt to portray the transgender community as depressed, fearful and suicidal.  In that regard, N.J.R.E. 403(a) provides, “Except as otherwise provided by these rules or other law, the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of:  (a) Undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury…”  Accordingly, there are a number of studies and discourse which demonstrate that parental involvement with transitioning students is imperative for the health and well-being of transgender students.