ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE ITS OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS’ RESPIRATORY THERAPY OPINIONS BY FAILING TO RAISE THEM BY WAY OF A PRETRIAL MOTION IN LIMINE.  Plaintiff further asserts that defendant waived the ability to object to plaintiffs’ experts’ respiratory care opinions by failing to submit, prior to trial, a motion in limine to bar that testimony.  (See Pb25-27.)  Plaintiff submits that R. 4:25-8 provides that motion in limine is a motion, which “if granted would not have a dispositive impact on a litigant’s case,” whereas “A dispositive motion falling outside the purview of this rule would include, but not be limited to, an application to bar an expert’s testimony in a matter in which such testimony is required as a matter of law to sustain a party’s burden of proof,” (emphasis added), and that plaintiff thus was unfairly prohibited from presenting respiratory therapy opinions at trial due to defendant’s tactical maneuvering.  (See Pb25-26.)  Plaintiff’s characterization is incorrect.  The New Jersey Court Rules do in fact define a motion in limine “as an application returnable at trial for a ruling regarding the conduct of the trial, including admissibility of evidence, which motion, if granted, would not have a dispositive impact on a litigant’s case. ”  R. 4:25-8(a)(1) (emphasis added).  A motion in limine “is not a summary judgment motion that happens to be filed on the eve of trial.
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  A State Grand Jury returned [...] charging defendant, [...], with second-degree Luring in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a) (count one); second-degree Attempted Sexual Assault in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1/2C:14-2(c) (count two); and third-degree Attempted Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Impairing/Debauching the Morals) in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1/2C:24-4(a)(1) (count three).
[directive] The Supreme Court at its February 13, 2007 Administrative Conference approved a revised “Standard Conditions of Adult Probation” form.  Copies of the revised form (in English and in Spanish) are attached.  The Court had approved previous “Standard Conditions of Adult Probation,” as authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(a), in 1993 for use with adult probation cases sentenced in Superior Court and Municipal Court.  The revised form addresses the statutory requirement of providing a DNA sample by making it a standard condition of probation (DNA Database and Databank Act of 1994, N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.17et seq., (as amended by L. 2000, c. 118 and L. 2003, c. 183).  The revised form also adds a listing of possible financial penalties so the penalties imposed will be clearly listed along with any other special conditions of supervision.  The revised form is to be used for all new adult probationers effective immediately.  The form will be available in the Probation Supervision Manual and also will be posted on the Judiciary Infonet.  Questions regarding the revised standard conditions and the form may be directed to Assistant Director [...], Probation Services, at (609) 984-5022, or to [...], Chief, at (609) 633-2022.  P.S.C. cc: Chief Justice [...]
[directive] Page 2  Although the authority of the Department’s investigators to conduct covert audio recordings of in-person conversations in which they participate in the course of investigations is not new, the Department’s civil investigators have not used the technique more than occasionally within recent years.  With the expansion of our capacity to conduct affirmative civil investigations and litigation, the use of this investigative tool (and others) may become more common.  As a result, it is appropriate at this time to establish certain guidelines to ensure that any covert audio recordings created by the Department’s investigators in the course of civil investigations are made within the confines of the law and subject to appropriate Departmental approvals and oversight.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution; the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, et seq., which provides for general responsibility of the Department’s operations and the supervision of the organization of the Department; and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97, et seq., which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all Department personnel operating under the authorities of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] Similarly, “nervous behavior . . . cannot drive the reasonable suspicion analysis given the wide range of behavior exhibited by many different people for varying reasons while in the presence of police. ”  Nyema, 249 N.J. at 533; see State v. Costa, 327 N.J. Super. 22, 32 (App. Div. 1999) (“A Terry stop must be supported by more than just an awkward reaction to police presence. ”).  That is because “whatever individuals may do -- whether they do nothing, something, or anything in between -- the behavior can be argued to be suspicious. ”  Nyema.  249 N.J. at 533-34.  Therefore, “when the conduct in question is an ambiguous indicator of involvement in criminal activity and subject to many different interpretations, that conduct cannot alone form the basis for reasonable suspicion. ”  Id. at 534.  In Lund, an officer stopped a car for traffic infractions and noticed the driver reach toward the back seat.  119 N.J. at 41.  While speaking to the officer, the driver appeared nervous and repeatedly glanced toward the back seat of the car.  Ibid.  The Supreme Court held this was insufficient grounds for a frisk.  Id. at 48.  The Court noted that other suspicious factors -- such as lying to the police, absence of identification, additional evasive actions, or the lateness of the hour -- might, together with nervousness or furtive gestures, justify a frisk.  Ibid.; compare State v. Casimono, 250 N.J. Super. 173, 177, 181 (App. Div. 1991) (holding a frisk was unjustified where a car passenger furtively bent down out of an officer’s view as the car was pulling over); with State v. Daniels, 264 N.J. Super. 161, 167 (App. Div. 1993) (upholding a frisk where a passenger furtively reached under the console and the defendant failed to promptly pull over or supply a valid license or registration); and State v. Johnson, 274 N.J. Super. 137, 155 (App. Div. 1994) (upholding a protective sweep where a furtive gesture was combined with lying to the police, the late hour, the defendant’s “evasive action”).
[brief] In the context a construction site, it is an enormous leap to conclude the word “caused” exclusively means “negligence” and has no other possible meaning.  There is no support for such a finding anywhere in the contract, especially if words are given “their plain and ordinary meaning. ”  Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011) quoting M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 378, 396 (2002).  Grossly negligent or even intentional conduct would also fall under the plain and ordinary meaning of “caused. ”  Without specifically referencing the indemnitee’s / general contractor’s / [...]’s own negligence, the clause is impermissibly vague.
[brief] [...] Report dated October 18, 2021 ...............................................................  Da195-458  Adult Presentence Report dated May 23, 2022 .............................................................  Da459-482  **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES** | Cases | Page Nos. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) .............................................. | 23 | | Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) ............................................... | 12 | | Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) .................................................... | 88, 89, 90 | | State in the Interest of S.H., 61 N.J.
[brief] (9T19-18 to 20-15; 9T24-25 to 25-6)  The Court granted the defense motions by two orders dated September 3, 2021.  The Order redacting [...]’s testimony as to the reasonableness and necessity of the medical bills includes a notation stating that: “Motion granted for the reasons stated on the Record.  Issue of medical bills to be addressed at Trial per terms of companion Order based upon jury verdict. ”  (Pa51)  The Order barring evidence of medical bills and liens includes a notation stating that: “The issue of medical bills to be addressed by the Court at the time of Trial.  Reimbursement of medical bills is limited to the amount paid by the Workers’ Compensation carrier.  Amount of lien to be molded at Trial depending upon Jury’s Verdict. ”  (Pa53)  Thus, Plaintiff’s assertion that there was a pre-trial agreement between counsel to mold the verdict automatically to include the full amount of the medical bills is false.  The agreement to mold the verdict was always conditioned on proof of causal relationship between the July 29, 2013 incident and aggravation of Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease (5T18 to 19; 5T42-16 to 43-6)  Plaintiff failed to meet that burden.
[brief] Certainly as to those cases, application of an absolute standard has the notable virtue of producing a just result without the expenditure by the litigants and the courts of the resources which would otherwise be required to prove or disprove a causal connection between the blight declaration and the decline in value.  Thus, the Legislature may be inferred to have determined as well that if an individual property owner, from time to time, may obtain more favorable compensation as a result of uniform application of the absolute standard, such an occasional occurrence is not only outweighed by the advantages of uniform application but also offset by the rule of law which immunizes condemnors from the requirement of paying any compensation for diminution of value resulting from a blight declaration where there is never a subsequent taking and the diminution is insufficient to meet the standard of destruction of beneficial use.  Cf. Washington Market Enterprises v. Trenton 68 N.J., 197, 122 (1975).  Indeed, the Supreme Court in Jersey City Redevelop. Agency, supra, fully recognized these consequences of the alternative valuation date and specifically declined to hold that they in any way affected the constitutionality of that provision.  As indicated by the Appellate Division in Ricciardi, and applicable here,...the applicability of the blight date for valuation would seem to be beyond argument.  (Ricciardi, at 20)  It has been well recognized by both the Legislature and our Courts that a declaration of blight or as in this case that property is subject to eminent domain under the redevelopment statute has a negative impact on the property owner.  Our Supreme Court in Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374, 382-384 (1971), acknowledged the inequity of visiting such depreciation on the property owner and then making him wait years before the property is actually taken and just compensation measured and given to him.  *Kugler*, suggests that if the Legislature had not given this protection to the property owner, the Court in a case similarly situated to this would have.  The purpose of the controlling statutes is for the protection of property owners situated as in this case.  As the Supreme Court stated in *Kugler*’s closing paragraph:  There is no suggestion, nor could there be sensibly, in the case before us that the rule of damages prescribed by the 1967 amendments detrimentally affects the property owner's right to just compensation.  On the contrary, its purpose is to give recognition to and to overcome in substantial measure the devaluation of the owner's property that occurs between the date of declaration of blight and the actual taking of the land.
[brief] The court below improperly vacated the jury’s verdict.  New-trial motions based on newly discovered evidence are “not favored and should be granted with caution by a trial court. ”  State v. Conway, 193 N.J. Super. 133, 171 (App. Div. 1984) (citation omitted).  On appeal from an order granting or denying a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, “the reviewing court must engage in a thorough, fact-sensitive analysis to determine whether the newly discovered evidence would probably make a difference to the jury. ”  State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 191 (2004).  A judge can only subvert a jury’s verdict and grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence where “the evidence is, indeed, newly discovered. ”  State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82, 99 (2021).  A defendant must show the “new” evidence is: “(1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably change the jury’s verdict if a new trial were granted. ”  Ibid.  A defendant is not entitled to a new trial unless all three prongs are satisfied.
[directive] 5  (d)  All officers assigned to canine units.  (e)  All officers whose assigned duties include regular interaction with members of the public, which reasonably may give rise to an arrest situation or use of force.  (f)  All officers assigned to “front desk” duty in law enforcement agencies, whose duties include interaction with members of the public who enter police stations to report incidents or request assistance or information.  (g)  All officers assigned to a pre-planned search warrant execution or a pre-planned arrest.  This shall include pre-planned searches and arrests performed pursuant to statutory authority, such as parolee searches.  (h)  All uniformed officers assigned to duties at demonstrations or potential civil disturbances.  3.3  Officers Not Required to Wear BWCs.
[brief] Were the Court to grant [...]’s motion, Plaintiff would face no additional obstacles to vindicating his rights (e.g., having to litigate in two forums) and could effectively do so in the arbitral forum.  Second, and similar to Delta, the Agreement here contains a broad severability clause.  Specifically, Section 13 of the Agreement provides:  “If a judge or arbitrator finds any provision of this Agreement invalid or illegal under applicable law or regulation, the remaining provisions will still be valid and remain in effect. ” (Pa63).  Applying that plain language here, even if the alleged “one-sided” aspect of the provision is unconscionable, the parties agreed that “the remaining provisions will still be valid and remain in effect.
[brief] (a)  Medically-mandated FMLA leave.  In September 2021, when the Essex County courthouse (which had been closed since March due to CovidInd restrictions) was preparing to reopen, I applied for an ADA accommodation.  Aside from being extremely high risk for Covid due to my age, I had developed a serious, chronic and long term health issue.  I was diagnosed with a degenerative cervical disc that was collapsing and slipping.  I was scheduled for regular surgical spine injections for the pain and possible spinal surgery and/or fusion.  My doctor stated that I would be incapacitated for a continuous period of time and needed treatment 3 times a week.  My disability was from 9/9/21 to 6/1/22 or longer if surgery was necessary.  I could not return to work with medical clearance until at least that date.  I was asking not to “stop working” but rather to work from home.  I was advised that my request could not be honored.  It was at this point that I had to go on mandatory disability.  While going for my regularly scheduled spinal injections at the surgical center, I was tasked with the decision on whether or not to retire.
[brief] The cases cited by [...] in its Brief before this Court do not dictate a different result, particularly as they all predate Boyle, which is dispositive here.  Indeed, in its Brief, [...] cited to the Appellate Division decision in Boyle for the proposition that New Jersey courts have not “required an indemnification provision to include express language covering a first-party claim for the indemnification obligation to be triggered. ” (See [...] Br., at 60, citing, among others, Boyle v. Huff, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 85, at *16 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2023) (Oda43-49)).  Yet, as noted, the Appellate Division decision in Boyle was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court (257 N.J. 468 (2024)) – in a decision which, quite frankly, guts [...]’s argument on this point.
[brief] These allegedly improper actions include such innocuous conduct as conducting a public survey regarding the referendum and posting the results online; participating in local grassroots political activities not directly connected to the referendum; posting messages to Facebook regarding the referendum with appropriate disclaimers; creating a presentation regarding the referendum which included information on the financial consequences of the referendum; producing online videos discussing facts relevant to the referendum; sending a postcard to voters within the District encouraging them to vote; holding too many meetings regarding the referendum; and not doing enough to remove election lawn signs that Respondents did not create, procure, or distribute.  Despite the fact the referendum at issue is designed to improve local school buildings, Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the Act because they pursued a “personal benefit” in seeking its passage.  It is difficult to see what purely personal gain Respondents stand to receive from a bond referendum, and Petitioner has not alleged one.  He claims that Respondents “misled” the public in violation of the Act, but does not allege that they lied to the public or deliberately hid, destroyed, suppressed unfavorable information.  At most, he claims that Respondents “skewed” popular opinion by overstating the referendum’s benefits.  In some cases, he supports these allegations with resort to rumors spreading around the district.  Even if the rumors are true, Respondents have not violated the Act.  He claims some Respondents impermissibly spoke for the District by authoring Facebook posts on the issues, even though all of the posts contained appropriate disclaimers stating that the Respondent at issue was speaking, not in an official capacity, but as a private citizen or “taxpayer. ”  Perhaps most egregiously, Petitioner faults some of the Respondents for engaging in grassroots political activities which not only are protected by the First Amendment and approved by the School Ethics Commission, but are to be expected of elected officials who represent the public.  Petitioner faults some of the Petitioners for being members of a local organization which supports maintaining a “walkable” school in [...].  He faults others merely for living in [...], speculating without any evidentiary support that these members of the Board favor [...] to the exclusion of the District’s other constituent municipalities.  Incredibly, Petitioner appears to believe that elected officials, i.e., politicians, should not engage in political activity.  The School Ethics Commission wisely dismissed Petitioner’s extraordinary and untenable claims.  Even after assessing the facts in the light most favorable to Petitioner, and accepting the pleaded facts as true, the Commission determined that he could not state a claim under the School Ethics Act.
[directive] It is for this reason that the internal affairs investigator must continually reassess the nature of an internal affairs investigation as evidence is being gathered.  Having initially determined that a particular allegation is criminal or administrative in nature, it is important for the internal affairs investigator to revisit that decision during the course of an investigation to determine whether any of the evidence gathered following the initial determination changes the investigation’s nature and scope.  If the nature and scope of an investigation change, the investigator must be prepared to change the methods and procedures he or she utilizes to reflect the new focus.  For example, if an investigator Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (coerced statements obtained by threat of removal from office cannot be 6 used in criminal proceedings); see Appendix J. 46
[brief] The trial court found that the Ordinance’s “proof of violation” by “plainly audible means as detected at more than fifty (50) feet from the property line from which the noise nuisance is emanating” reached too far and held the Ordinance “unreasonably restricts individual property owners/occupiers and allows officials an unconstitutional amount of discretionary power in its enforcement[.]”  Da83; Da87.  Interestingly, the trial court spent a considerable amount of time comparing the within case to the Clarksburg Inn decision, also a challenge to a noise ordinance, wherein the Appellate Division held the ordinance in question to be “neither vague nor overbroad” and the plain meaning of the ordinance to follow the law.
[brief] SINCE THE APPELLANTS FAILED TO MEET THE STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER R. 4:49-2, THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED  Neither the [...] nor [...] ever met the standard for reconsideration under R. 4:49-2.  The application for reconsideration filed by the [...], and joined in by [...], was nothing more than “old wine in new bottles. ”  The order denying the motion for reconsideration following the order discharging the receiver does not provide the appellants with the opportunity to raise new legal issues that were not presented to the court in the underlying motion.  See, Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996).  Rather, motions for reconsideration under R. 4:49-2 are reserved for “cases which fall into that narrow corridor” where the prior decision was “based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis,” where the court failed to consider or appreciate probative, competent evidence,” or where “a litigant wishes to bring new or additional information to the [c]ourt’s attention which it could not have provided on the first application[.]”