ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Order Granting Judgment for Possession after trial issued by Judge [...] dated March 12, 2024.........................................................Da25  Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration issued by Judge [...] dated April 2, 2024.................................................................Da28  Order for Orderly Removal issued by Judge [...] dated April 2, 2024.................................................................Da29  Signed Lease ........................................................................Da30  Notice of Appeal filed April 15, 2024 .................................................................Da32  Amended Notice of Appeal filed May 15, 2024 ................................................Da35  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery ........................................Da38  Amended Notice of Appeal filed October 16, 2024 ................................................Da39  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Ibid. (citations omitted).  Ultimately, the Court held that the two-year “personal injury” statute of limitations governs all LAD claims filed in the Superior Court.  Id. at 292.  In doing so, it relied on the Legislature’s declaration of policy concerning the consequences of discrimination which identified physical and emotional distress, severe physical and emotional trauma, anxiety, career, and familial adjustment problems as injuries caused by and associated with acts of discrimination.  *Ibid.*  The Court observed that each of these injuries is considered an injury to the person and at common law would be subject to the two-year statute of limitations.  See *ibid*.
[brief] To the extent that the trial court's decision constitutes a legal determination, it is reviewed de novo.  D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 183 (2013); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”).  B.
[brief] [...] had a Duty to Identify Conditions in the Roadway  Next, [...] argues that they were not contractually obligated to inspect for “pre-existing” conditions.  [...] attempt to qualify the type of condition it was responsible to inspect and identify is wholly unsupported by the record.  [...] position as Chief Inspector required them in inspect and maintain the travel portion of the Parkway for protection of the traveling public.(Pa1381).  As mentioned above, [...]’ chief inspector, testified that it was part of his duties.  (Pa0656 at 20:7-28 to Pa0657 at 21:1-15).  Nevertheless, on this record, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, [...] was already aware of the condition that caused Plaintiff’s accident prior to Plaintiff’s accident.  In other words, whether or not [...] had an obligation to identify these types of conditions is irrelevant because the condition had already been identified and flagged for “immediate repair”.  (Pa1193).  At this point, [...] had a contractual responsibility to ensure temporary repairs were performed and/or to install warning signs for motorists per the MUTCD.  As [...] project manager described, settlement in the road that presents a safety issue should have been milled and re-paved.  (Pa0599).  As [...] engineer [...] described, a defect should be repaired immediately, within 24 hours, no matter who found it.  (Pa0799).  [...] failed to comply with its contractual and admitted duties.  (c)
[brief] ”  (Da6-14)  After [...] was arrested, he received discovery containing [...]’s personal cell phone number.  (3T 178-11 to 22; 3T 188-7 to 13)  [...] received phone calls to his personal cell phone in April 2022.  (3T 38-10 to 16)  He answered and recorded one such call, which was played for the jury.  (3T 42-1 to 44-6)  In that call, he told [...] to “keep going” four times and concluded by telling him to “stop calling me, please. ”  (3T 43-14 to 44-5)  [...] testified that he “felt again harassed” and “felt a little bit --- 3  This information comes from the indictment (Da6-14) because the transcript of the recordings as they were played for the jury reads “indiscernible” at the points when these statements were made.
[brief] The 2012 MOU requires arbitration of “[a]ny dispute arising out of or relating to this Memorandum. ”  Da313.  The 2022 Addendum does not arise out of or relate to the MOU – it is a new deal, for a different amount, for different parties (as [...]’s spouse was a party to the MOU), and under completely different terms than contemplated by the abandoned 2012 MOU.  The Operating Agreements similarly require arbitration of “[a]ny dispute arising with respect to this Operating Agreement,” which governs “the operations of the LLC” and not its sale.
[directive] Complaints Prepared Before Arrest or Indictment.  There may be instances when a prosecutor decides to issue a complaint against a defendant who has not yet been arrested or indicted.  For example, police may respond to a domestic violence incident and determine that a domestic violence offense had been committed, but that the suspect left the premises before the police arrived and therefore was not arrested and fingerprinted as would have been required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(a)(1) to (4), N.J.S.A. 53:1-15 and N.J.S.A. 53:1-18.1.  See note 5.  Because the defendant will not have been arrested for this offense and therefore will not have been fingerprinted by means of the Live Scan system, it may not be possible to run the automated pretrial risk-assessment process to inform the decision whether to issue a complaint-summons or apply for a complaint-warrant.  In any case where the determination is made by a prosecutor to issue or apply for a complaint before arrest or indictment, the prosecutor instead shall apply the other provisions/presumptions set forth in Section 4 that do not depend on upon the results of the automated pretrial risk assessment.  See note 8.  In addition, the prosecutor shall when feasible ascertain the defendant’s criminal history by making an NCIC/CCH or Interstate Identification Index query that does not require fingerprint verification.  It should be noted that in many direct- complaint cases, the seriousness of the charge(s) will require issuance of complaint-warrant pursuant to Rule 3:3-1(e), see subsection 4.4.1, or may trigger a presumption of issuing a complaint-warrant pursuant to Rule 3:3-1(f), see subsection 4.5.4.  Page 46
[brief] [...] has not been provided with fair proceedings leading to a just outcome.  [...] destroyed hundreds of hours of likely exculpatory surveillance video; obfuscated regarding its policies and the hard drive in question and failed to preserve it.  The PCR judge – herself a veteran [...] supervisor during the time of its investigation and prosecution of [...] – sua sponte reversed long-standing discovery orders and forced substituted PCR counsel to proceed on the merits despite her protests that she had open investigation and had not completed her preparation of the case or the submissions to the court.  [...] has been denied fair proceedings in his cases, resulting in an unjust outcome.  PCR claims should be considered on their merits.  All three exceptions apply, though one is enough.  [...]’s claims are properly before the Court.
[brief] "Our legal system has long recognized that cross-examination is the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.")  State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570, 591 (2010), quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  Cross-examination of an expert is often a crucial element in determining the accuracy, reliability, and probative value of the expert's findings and opinions.  See *State v. Martini*, 131 N.J. 176, 264 (1993) ("To determine the credibility, weight and probative value of an expert's opinion, one must question the facts and reasoning on which it is based.") (citing *Johnson v. Salem Corp.*, 97 N.J. 78, 91 (1984)).  Thus the [...] and the [...] were required to at the very least explain why they found the lawyered direct testimony more “credible” than the cross-examination.  They did not.  The [...] is not bound by the findings of fact made by the [...].  See *Public Advocate Dept. v. Public Utilities Bd.*, 189 N.J. Super. 491, 507 (App. Div. 1983).  The [...] in these cases was required to set out factual findings based on the "weight and credibility of evidence" of "the entire record."  See *State Dept. of Health v. Tegnazian*, 205 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 1985) (emphasis added).  As we noted above, “a failure to consider all the evidence in a record would perforce lead to arbitrary decision making. ”  *In Re Proposed Quest Academy Char.*, supra, 216 N.J. at 386.  This manifestly did not happen.  The [...]’s uncritical acceptance of this woefully inadequate decisionmaking compounds the errors.
[brief] In making its argument, Respondent states that Petitioner “failed to produce any evidence of the dates and hours she was actually working on school grounds for Respondent when she actually contracted Covid 19. ” (Rb14).  This “evidence” is not to be decided at this time and by way of the motion, but Petitioner will need to prove at trial that Decedent contracted Covid 19 during the Covid State of Emergency as per the Petitioner’s Claim Petition.  (Ra1).  In summary, the finding by the Judge of Workers’ Compensation of a school teacher’s “status as an essential worker” simply affords Petitioner the presumption of occupational causation.  The Petitioner still needs to prove that Decedent contracted Covid 19 during the claimed period of occupational exposure, and that it was a material factor in her demise.  To put it even more simply, if Decedent were a health care worker during the same period of time, the Petitioner would still need to prove, at trial, through medical proofs that Decedent contracted Covid 19 during that period and that it was a material factor in causing her death.  This was the limited and appropriate finding by the Judge of Workers’ Compensation who decided the issue below.  CONCLUSION
[brief] | | | MAG Ent’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, | 35-36, 37| | 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, | 17 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995)  | | | Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec. in Div. of Consumer Affairs of Dep’t of Law & Public Safety, | 17 | | 64 N.J. 85 (1973) | | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) | Cases | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **New Jersey Builders Ass’n v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing,** 390 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 2007).................................................36 | | **New Jersey Partners, L.P. v. County of Middlesex,** 379 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2005)......................................................33 | | **Northwest Cov. Med. Ctr. v. Fishman,** 167 N.J. 123 (2001) .......................................................................................25 | | **Provision of Basic Generation,** 205 N.J. 339 (2011) .........................................................................................25 | | **Shipyard Associates, L.P. v. City of Hoboken,** A-3794-13T1, 2015 WL 10352982 (App. Div. Sept. 1, 2015).............................34, 35 | | **Simmons v. Mercado,** 247 N.J. 24 (2021) .........................................................................................17 | | **State v. K.P.S.,** 221 N.J. 266 (2015) .......................................................................................24 | | **US Masters Residential Property (USA) Fund v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,** 239 N.J. 145 (2019) .........................................................................................25 | | **Yueh v. Yueh,** 329 N.J. Super.
[brief] On July 5, 2020, Newark police responded to an apartment complex on Oxford Street following a report of gunshots.  (1T 5-13 to 7-2)  The police found [...] alone in the courtyard with an injured foot, which he said had been caused by fireworks.  (1T 7-3 to 13)  Emergency services transported him to the hospital and later concluded that he had been shot in the foot.  (1T 7-14 to 22)  The police obtained surveillance video from the apartment complex, which, according to police summaries, showed the following:  [...] was --- 4  The facts are drawn from [...]’s testimony and BWC footage admitted at the suppression hearing, as well as three police reports submitted as State’s exhibits and considered by the court below.
[brief] The proposed units will uncontroversibly help establish appropriate population densities and provide sufficient space for such use to provide housing for low and moderate-income families and benefit the well-being of the Borough in furtherance of MLUL goals “e” and “g. ”  Further, the Second Application demonstrated that the proposed mixed-use building would further MLUL purpose “c,” to provide for “adequate air, light, and open space. ”  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c).  With the increasing amount of development in New Jersey, a property’s ability to maximize the space available is a primary objective of zoning boards, developers, and planning consultants.
[brief] [...]’s findings on the Miller factors are supported by competent credible evidence in the record, see State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 408 (2022), and are entitled to deference, Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 57.  As to the first Miller factor (defendant’s chronological age and its hallmark features, among them immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risk and consequences), the judge made these findings, which weighed against defendant:  At the time of the commission, defendant was 16 years old, just two years away from adulthood.  Although there is evidence that indicates defendant acted younger than his age, defendant did not exhibit immaturity and impetuousness, the hallmark characteristics of youth, in the commission of this crime.  Before the murders, defendant researched how to use and prepare the firearm.  Immediately prior to the murders, defendant removed the weapon from the closet, loaded the weapon as I’ve pointed out many times now, putting over 30 bullets into two different magazines.  He took one of the magazines and he put it into the actual gun correctly.  He then racked the gun.  He then placed the other magazine into a backpack.  Dressed himself like the Terminator while protecting his ears with ear plugs.  He turned off the lights so his mother would be caught unaware and he further indicated that he did not want to be snapped out of it, indicating thoughtfulness towards the situation.  In fact, defendant shot multiple victims at multiple times to their deaths.  Of the four victims, defendant indicated to his aunt, the possibility and the reason for killing the three of them.  He stated that if he killed his mother, he would have to kill his father to ease the father’s sadness and he would kill his sister because of his hatred towards her[.]  After the fact, defendant indicated that he killed his grandmother because he believed his grandfather hated her.  Defendant was aware of the risk of his actions as evidence by his research and a bulletproof vest wherein he wanted to see if he shot his gun, the assault rifle at a bulletproof vest whether it would penetrate it or not.  When he realized that it would not penetrate, that’s when he made the decision of laying his weapon down when he was going to be confronted by the police.  Such sophistication goes beyond the characteristics of a youth.  These acts that the defendant was involved with are clearly to this Court the acts of an evil man with an evil spirit with an intention to kill as many people in his path.
[brief] It used language that, on its face, bars debt collectors from communicating information about debtors to letter vendors.  Defendant […] argues that Congress could not have meant what it said and asks the Court to interpret the statute in the way that [Defendant] thinks Congress must have meant.  But the Court must assume that Congress meant what it said, and it will enforce the statute that way.  Khimmat at 710 (internal citations omitted).  The court in Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 606 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (E.D. Wash. 2022) also concluded the communication with a mail vendor violates the FDCPA.  As Hunstein I and II had done, Jackin at 1039: recognize[d] the economic burden that its holding may have on Defendant, as Defendant can no longer legally outsource its collection efforts to commercial mail vendors in the same manner.  But the Court must take Congress at its word, which here bars Defendant’s outsourcing practice.  The statute explicitly provides for several disclosure exemptions, but mail vendors are not included in those exemption [sic].  We are aware of at least one unpublished federal court decision\(^2\) addressing the same issue and it is in accord with *Hunstein I* and *II*, *Khimmat*, and *Jackin*.  We have found no contrary unpublished federal decisions, but Plaintiff does not rely on unpublished decisions.  *Cf.* R. 1:36-3.  And the plain meaning analysis applied in the federal decisions do not yield an absurd result.  Rather, as discussed below in Point IV.A., applying the plain language is consistent with the FDCPA’s expressed legislative purpose because it prevents disclosing private, confidential information to unregulated, unidentified third parties and thereby reduces the risk that a practice of sharing that information with others is or can lead to an invasion of individual privacy.
[brief] (1T 20).  [...] suffered from mental and physical disabilities but continued to work every day at the [...] factory in [...].  *Id.*  On the date of the incident, [...] left work early because his mother had a doctor's appointment.  After leaving work, [...] stopped at a bank in [...], and withdrew a few thousand dollars, then continued his drive home.  (1T 20-21).  When [...] arrived home, he exited his car and was accosted in the garage by two men, one of whom had a gun.  [...] attempted to defend himself but was overpowered and beaten by the men.  He was then duct taped and handcuffed while the men took his wallet and money.  Ultimately, [...] died on the garage floor after choking on his own vomit.  (1T 20-21).  The two men then entered the house.  They duct taped and handcuffed [...]’s mother, [...].  The men brought [...]'s body upstairs and placed him on the floor.  They told [...] that her son was sleeping from some sleeping pills that they had given him.  Eventually, they fled the house in [...]'s Cadillac.  (1T 22-6).  Co-defendant [...] was present at the Lewis residence and involved in the burglary.  He left the home with [...]’s credit card and, at the direction of a man named [...] a/k/a “[...],” gave the credit card to an individual named [...].
[brief] [...], Esq. (030642010)  [...]  Phone: (732)  462-1990  Fax: (732)  462-1993  E-Mail: [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  On the Brief  [...]  [...]  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | i | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | TABLE OF DECISION BEING APPEALED | v | | TABLE OF APPENDIX | v | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 10 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 13 | | I.
[brief] After identifying that a waiver would allow this project to be included, the Board conducted no analysis whatsoever.  Likewise, the other reason articulated by the Board, such as concerns about timing and the PJM timeframe, are concerns that the Board ignores and grants petitions for on a regular basis.  See, e.g., Reconsideration Order.  (088a.)  As the court has repeatedly and consistently noted, “deference does not require that we forego a careful review of administrative decisions simply because an agency has exercised its expertise.  We cannot accept without question an agency’s conclusory statements, even when they represent an exercise in agency expertise.  The agency is ‘obliged ... to tell us why. ’”  *Balagun v.  New Jersey Dept. of Corrections*, 361 N.J. Super. 199, 202-03 (App. Div. 2003), quoting *In re Valley Hosp.*, 240 N.J. Super. 301, 306, (App. Div. 1990).  As a specific example, in *In re Crowley*, 193 N.J. Super. 197, 214 (App. Div. 1984), the court stated that “in reviewing an agency decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial credible evidence and is not arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, [the Court] must have a clear statement from the administrative agency as to the basis for its decision. ”  A finding based upon evidence is not a technicality; it is “a matter of substance. ”  *Ibid.*, citing *N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers*, 5 N.J. 354, 375–377 (1950).  Here, the Board provides nothing more than conclusory statements, for the purpose of denying an application that otherwise satisfies the process and that has a significant amount of proof and analysis before the Board.  This is a classic example of a decision that was arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed.
[brief] ”  Zielinski, 326 N.J. Super. at 226.  Plaintiff does not allege any facts establishing that it was foreseeable that Plaintiff would be harmed if assuming an alleged duty to advise Plaintiff of closing dates, [...] could be held to have undertaken tens of millions of dollars’ worth of liability and, essentially, all liability for the successful performance of the property transaction, especially where Plaintiff never informed [...] of the potential alleged ramifications of any failure to carry through on this obligation.
[brief] In addition to Slater I would ask the Court to rely on State v. Kovack, K-o-v-a-c-k, 91 N.J. 476.  And also in terms of just plea bargaining in general that obviously our intended purpose is that, you know, it be fairly construed on both sides and that the results must not disappoint the reasonable expectations of either, and that's State v. Thomas.  And that is what [...]' understanding was of the plea.
[brief] The relevant part of this statute provides:  a.  The Office of Legislative Services shall make available to the public and maintain in electronic form the following information: (1) the most current available compilation of the official text of the statutes of New Jersey; (2) the text of all bills introduced during the current two-year session of the Legislature, including amended versions, as well as sponsor statements, committee statements, and fiscal notes; (3) all bills currently pending in the Legislature, listed by subject and sponsor; (4) bill-tracking data on all bills pending in the Legislature, including the history of actions, current status, a complete voting record, including individual votes by members of the Legislature recorded during committee meetings, updated on a daily basis and made available and maintained for the two-year legislative term in progress and the immediately preceding term, and, where appropriate, by citation of the section of law to be amended by a bill; (5) a current calendar of legislative events, including the schedule of legislative committee meetings, and a list of bills scheduled for legislative action; (6) a current directory of the members of the Legislature, including complete committee membership information; (7) the text of all chapter laws beginning with laws passed by the Legislature after 12:00 noon, January 9, 1996; and (8) such other information as the Legislative Services Commission shall direct.