ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Unambiguous testimony connecting the front window tint to an inability to see inside the car was particularly important in this case because other evidence undermined [...]’s tinted windows testimony.  First, it was nearly 11:00pm, it was dark outside, and [...] was driving in the center lane with cars in between him and [...].  (1T 7-24 to 8-1, 9-6 to 18, 44-5 to 6)  Thus, it was particularly important for the State to prove that front window tint – and not external factors like the time of day or the placement of [...]’s car – was responsible for [...]’s inability to see inside.  Second, there was no evidence corroborating [...]’s testimony.  [...]’s front windows were down from the outset of the MVR, even though [...] admitted that the MVR started recording 30 seconds before [...] became aware of his presence.  (1T 23-2 to 18, 53-20 to 55-11, 71-25 to 74-14; Da 20)  While [...] testified that the front windows looked like the back windows when raised (1T 72-15 to 22), the State presented no photographs of the allegedly tinted windows at the suppression hearing, despite [...]’s testimony that such photographs existed.  (1T 46-2 to 9)  Put simply, [...]’s testimony regarding the tint on the front windows needed to be particularly strong for the State to meet its burden under Smith.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RESOLVED FACTUAL DISPUTES IN FAVOR OF THE MOVANT, REQUIRING THE MATTER TO BE REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR TRIAL**  As we argued in our initial moving papers, we respectfully submit that the Trial Court improperly resolved the material factual disputes in favor of the movant, and then concluded that based upon those facts that the movant/respondent had neither created a new hazard nor had he worsened an existing hazard.  As we submitted in the initial Appellate papers and reiterate here, that the resolution of those facts should have been made by a jury, and therefore the Summary Judgment motion should have been denied.
[brief] ---  9  As to scienter, [...] identifies no non-public facts that are the basis of those allegations, which merely infer fraud based on [...]’s VRDO analysis.  See Rb48–49 (citing Ja9, 27, 29, 40 (¶¶ 2, 63, 70, 116–17)).  [...]’s scienter cases considered allegations based on non-public data.  See, e.g., *U.S. ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t Servs.*, 923 F.3d 729, 760 (10th Cir. 2019) (scienter allegations not “available via the public disclosures”); *U.S. ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc.*, 764 F.3d 699, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2014) (public data “did not disclose facts establishing” misrepresentation).  Original source cases involving non-public facts are likewise inapposite.
[brief] JUDGMENT PRESENTED  AMPLE PRESENTATION TO THE MOTION COURT THAT [...]’S CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION FOR 2016 AND 2017 WERE NOT TIME BARRED (Volume I, Pa. 75; Pa. 150-184; Vol. III Pa. 389; Pa. 405-415)  ..............................................................................  9  II.  [...] PRESENTED  AMPLE EVIDENCE TO THE MOTION COURT THAT THE PAYMENT  APPLICATION RULE BARRED  DEFENDANTS’ STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  DEFENSE (Volume 1, Pa.83; Bellifemine, TR 75-1 to 10; Volume III, Pa. 389, 405-415)  ...........................................  12  III.  THE PRESIDING CIVIL JUDGE’S DENIAL OF DR BELLIFEMINE’S MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY  CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION  BECAUSE THERE EXISTED GOOD CAUSE TO EXTEND DISCOVERY  .............................................  14  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................
[brief] 14  Cleaver v. Honeywell International, LLC, 2022 WL 2442804 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 2022)  ..................  16  Cohen v. Subaru of America, Inc., 2022 WL 721307 (D.N.J. March 10, 2022)  .............................................  26  Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 211 N.J. 362 (2012)
[brief] ”  Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007) (citing R & R Mktg., LLC v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999)).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010) (additional citations omitted)).  Thus, a party who challenges the validity of the Board’s administrative decision bears “a heavy burden of . . . demonstrating that the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. ”  In re Tax Credit Application of Pennrose Props. Inc., 346 N.J. Super. 479, 486 (App. Div. 2002); accord Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011).  [...] cannot shoulder that burden.
[brief] While this is a control factor, it is acknowledged by Respondent that it is a limited indicator due to the unique nature of the position of municipal prosecutor.  Here again, Respondent noted Petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony of her significant involvement in the municipal court process, and with police officers and other enforcement officials.  (Rb31).  [...]’s flawed investigation, which failed to interview court personnel, must give way to the Petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony.  **Factor 4 – Services Rendered Personally**
[brief] In denying [...]’s Petition, the Superior Court concluded erroneously that [...]’ sworn statement was not admissible as a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1) because [...] “did not disclaim knowledge of the Staten Island home invasion” and he could not “be impeached on statements he did not conceive. ” (Da173-74).  The court reiterated this conclusion in its August 7, 2023 Order and Opinion denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Da185).  At the outset, the admissibility of [...]’ Sworn Statement at trial does not impact its status as Brady material or the State’s obligation to disclose its existence.  Indeed, almost all courts considering the issue have held that inadmissibility at trial does not preclude evidence from being designated as Brady material subject to disclosure.  See e.g., Dennis v. Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 307-11 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that it is “an unreasonable application of, and contrary to, clearly established law” for a court to hold that inadmissible evidence is automatically immaterial under Brady); Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (“evidence itself inadmissible could be so promising a lead to strong exculpatory evidence there could be no justification for withholding it”); United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2002) (evidence is Brady material if it “could lead to admissible evidence” or “would be an effective tool in disciplining witnesses during cross-examination”); Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 130 (3d Cir. 2013) (“inadmissible evidence may be material if it could have led to the discovery of admissible evidence”); Nicolas v. Att’y Gen. of Md., 820 F.3d 124, 130 n.4 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Brady material does not have to be admissible under state evidence rules as long as it could lead to admissible evidence”) (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434); Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 1005 n.14 (5th Cir. 1996) (“inadmissible evidence may be material under Brady”).  Accordingly, even if the Sworn Statement was not admissible, its disclosure to the defense was nevertheless mandated.
[directive] No. de Ac. Formal/Ac./Denun. Cargo Naturaleza y grado de la infracción Ind./Acc./Compl.# Count Nature of Offense and Degree Iniciales del acusado/Defendant’s Initials Formulario principal de declaración/Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Spanish página 4 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Spanish page 4 of 7  13.  Especifique cualquier sentencia que el fiscal haya acordado recomendar:  Specify any sentence the prosecutor has agreed to recommend:
[directive] In November 2019, the [...] (CSDC or the Commission) issued unanimous recommendations calling on the State to eliminate mandatory crimes.1 minimum sentences for six non-violent drug This Directive instructs prosecutors statewide to use existing statutory authority to waive the imposition of those mandatory minimum sentences, establishing rules ensuring the consistent application of such waivers in four contexts: during plea negotiations, after conviction at trial, following violations of probation, and in connection with a joint application to modify the sentences of inmates currently incarcerated.  Mandatory Parole Ineligibility and Section 12 Waivers in Non-Violent Drug Cases  Generally speaking, State law divides a defendant’s sentence into two parts: imprisonment, then parole.  For many crimes, the defendant becomes eligible for parole after serving one-third of the sentence, with a strong presumption in favor of release immediately eligibility.2 upon (As a practical matter, many defendants under this “default” rule become The Commission issued a total of nine recommendations, which can be found in its November 2019 report at 1  https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/OPI/Reports_to_the_Legislature/criminal_sentencing_disposition_ar2019.pdf.
[brief] In fact, [...] tried to contend the case was always under the Large Complex Case rules, despite never having held the required initial conferences that L1-L4 would have required, and never having provided for choice of 3 arbitrators.  (Da332)  (Da335-340)  There was nowhere in the record a written waiver from [...]’s counsel when this arbitration started the Large Complex Case rules would be in effect but the parties would use only 1 arbitrator.  The case simply was not started under those rules and they were triggered by the monetary amendment made in 2016.
[brief] The Trial Court Overlooked that the Subpoena Seeks Irrelevant Information.  (819a-821a)  Subpoenas to third-parties are subject to close scrutiny.  See Berrie, 188 N.J. Super. at 282.  A subpoena seeking a deposition is subject to the protective provisions of R. 1:9-2 and R. 4:10-3.  Pursuant to R. 1:9-2, a subpoena may be quashed or modified by the court if the compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.  R. 4:10-3 allows for the Court to “make any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense...” including, under subpart (a) that “discovery not be had”.  Generally, parties may discover non-privileged information “which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action”  R. 4:10-2(a).  N.J.R.E. 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action”.  Discovery requests must be “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. ”  R. 4:10-2(a).  With this in mind, “the scope of discovery is not infinite. ”  K.S. v. ABC Prof’l Corp., 330 N.J. Super. 288, 291 (App. Div. 2000)  “The discovery rights provided by our court rules are not instruments with which to annoy, harass or burden a litigant or a litigant’s experts. ”  *Gensollen v. Pareja*, 416 N.J. Super. 585, 591 (App. Div. 2010)  Relevant to the analysis here, “the standards for nonparty discovery require a stronger showing of relevance than for simple party discovery. ”  *Stamy v. Packer*, 138 F.R.D. 412, 419 (D.N.J. 1990).  It is respectfully submitted that the trial court overlooked that the information being sought from [...] does not serve any useful purpose and is irrelevant.
[brief] Appellant/Plaintiff’s Complaint\(^1\), which set forth Appellant’s claims against arising under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Act, was filed in Camden County Superior Court on January 11, 2021.  On July 7, 2023, Appellee/Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment\(^2\), to which Plaintiff/Appellant filed her Opposition\(^3\) on July 25, 2023.  Both parties filed Replies in further support of their respective positions\(^4\).  On August 4, 2023, oral argument\(^5\) on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was heard before the Honorable [...], Camden County Superior Court.  On the same date, August 4, 2023, [...] entered an Order\(^6\) granting Summary Judgment and dismissing Appellant/Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  III.
[brief] **TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ORDERS AND RULINGS** - Trial Court’s Order to Show Cause of June 21, 2023.  - Trial Court’s Decision on June 21, 2023 Request for Temporary Injunction.  - Trial Court’s Order of July 25, 2023.  - Trial Court’s Decision on Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraints and Plaintiff’s Application for Preliminary Injunction.  - Stipulation and Order of Dismissal as to Defendant [...], d/b/a [...] and [...] Only dated September 29, 2023 - Trial Court’s Order and Decision of February 20, 2024.
[brief] See Wasserman’s Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238, 252 (1994).  To that end, it is well recognized in New Jersey that stipulated remedies clauses, such as Section 13.1 here, are reasonable and enforceable.  See Naporano Assocs., L.P. v. B & P Builders, 309 N.J. Super. 166, 177-78 (App. Div. 1998); Melcer v. Zuck, 101 N.J. Super.  at 583-84 (holding that remedies clause providing that if title was unmarketable sellers’ obligation to buyer was limited to return of deposit and payment of title search fees).  Indeed, in upholding a clause similar to Section 13.1 of the PSA, the Appellate Division has stated:  We see nothing inherently unreasonable about the buyer’s remedies provision on its face.  It gives the buyer the choice of allowing the seller extra time to complete the transaction, seeking to compel compliance with the requirements of the contract, or terminating the contract and receiving the return of the deposit.  We do not find those choices inherently punitive, particularly given the right to seek specific performance.  Sugarman, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1892, at *24.  Thus, Plaintiff cannot now be heard to argue that this type of commonplace provision in the PSA is somehow unfair or unreasonable.  In essence, Plaintiff is seeking to have this Court rewrite the PSA.
[brief] United States v. Chuke, 554 F2d. 260, 263-63 (6th Cir. 1977), quoted in State v. Marsh, 162 N.J.Super.  290, 297 (Law Div. 1978), aff’d sub nom., State v. Williams, 168 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 1979).  There being no exigency in this case, the question remains why did the police not seek a warrant before the controlled delivery?  It is submitted that the answer is clear.  As with an arrest, the sine qua non of any search, with or without a warrant, which may be found to be “otherwise” constitutionally “acceptable” is the absence of the taint of police misconduct in obtaining the evidence claimed by them to support a finding of probable cause, whether such misconduct constitutes an infringement of rights under the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.  No evidence thus obtained may be used to obtain a warrant, or to obtain additional evidence against a [...]; and all such evidence must be excluded from trial as “fruit of the poisonous tree.
[brief] See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Patriarca v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 186, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding the subscription-cost “argument has no traction”).  Indeed, courts have held that subscription databases qualify as federal FCA “news media” sources.  Customs Fraud Investigations, 2014 WL 4375638, at *8, *10 (rejecting argument that “the Zepol database is not ‘news media,’ and is not generally available to the public because subscribers pay a substantial fee to access its information”); Staples, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (subscription to access shipping-manifest data is “news media”), aff’d, 773 F.3d 83.
[brief] Plaintiff also argues that the trial court should have required Defendants to provide an accounting of how they funded projects originally intended to be funded by the challenged Bond Ordinance and “answering whether they paid prevailing wages. ”  (Pb38-39)  Plaintiff also argues that the trial court failed to consider his arguments that Defendant [...] had a conflict of interest using criteria in the Municipal Law Use Law and failed to consider alleged “after-the-fact campaign contribution made to Mayor [...] by her landlord after the adoption of the contested capital bond ordinance. ”  (Pb39)
[brief] THE PROCEDURAL DILEMMA FACED BY MR. CILENTO (Addressed Below at Pa48-Pa49)  Following the termination of his employment by [...], [...] faced a procedural dilemma.  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), [...] was required to file his Verified Petition with the Commissioner, challenging that termination, within 90 days of that event.  The Commissioner acknowledged that this was the case in the Job FAD.  Pa48.  [...] received [...]’s termination letter on or about November 9, 2021.  Pa33.  Accordingly, he was required to initiate his Verified Petition by no later than February 22, 2022.  [...] filed his Verified Petition on or about December 30, 2021, so as to meet the timeliness requirements of N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i).  The Commissioner, however, did not issue the License FAD until June 23, 2022 (Pa21-Pa25), some four months after the expiration of [...]’s window to file his Verified Petition.  Likewise, [...]’s timely-filed Appeal of the License FAD has been fully briefed, and remains pending before this Court.  Pa30-Pa32.  In all, nearly two years have passed since [...]’s Verified Petition would have been due, yet the critical issue—the lawfulness of the OOS and License FAD—is still open.  The “90 day rule” established by N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) is strictly construed by the Commissioner, and is consistently enforced.  See, e.g., The Banyan School v. NJ State Dept. of Ed., Office of School Finance, Comm. of Ed. Dec. No. 108-17.  As the Commissioner acknowledged, had [...] waited for the Commissioner to issue the License FAD\(^1\) before filing his Verified Petition, he would have been barred from doing so, as out of time.  See Pa48.  [...] had no choice but to file his Verified Petition when he did, in an effort to timely preserve and protect his rights.  Essentially, [...] was put in an impossible position—forced either to assert his rights before they had ripened via an Appellate decision overturning the License FAD, or to waive them, if he waited until an Appellate decision issued.  A party who timely invokes and preserves his rights cannot be punished by the delays inherent in the legal process.  That, however, is exactly what has occurred here.  An agency which prevents a party from preserving and asserting his rights, due to the timelines inherent in appellate litigation, has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably.  The Job FAD should, accordingly, be Vacated by this Court.  --- \(^1\)  Or this Court’s decision on the License Appeal.  POINT THREE
[brief] THE DEFENDANT’S 16-YEAR SENTENCE, WHICH IS SIGNIFICANTLY HARSHER THAN THE 11.5-YEAR SENTENCE REQUESTED BY THE PROSECUTOR, IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.  RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE (1)  THE SENTENCING COURT’S YARBOUGH\(^8\) ANALYSIS WAS ENTIRELY BASED ON ITS MISAPPREHENSION THAT THE VOICEMAILS WERE LEFT EIGHT MONTHS APART, RATHER THAN ON THE SAME DAY, AND (2)  THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND ANY MITIGATING FACTORS.  (6T 44-14 to 49-24)  The trial court sentenced [...] to an aggregate 16-year term of imprisonment for the calls he made to [...]: consecutive 8-year terms for each of two voicemails left on the same day in August 2021.
[brief] On or about February 14, 2021, Special Agent [...] of the Homeland Security Investigation Newark Airport Border Enforcement Security Task Force received information from Customs and Border Protection regarding a package that was intercepted at JFK Airport in New York State.  Following a search, the package was determined to contain two plastic bags containing green in color pills.  Purportedly, field tests were conducted on the green pills, which yielded a positive presumptive indication of MDMA/Ecstasy.  The postage of the parcel had a shipping label listing a delivery address of “[...], [...]. ”  It was determined that “908 22nd Street, #1102, Union City New Jersey 07087” is a nonexistent address.  Following a brief investigation, law enforcement determined that the Defendant, [...], resided at [...].  Based upon that information, Detective [...] of the Union City Police Department, the affiant, believed that [...] was the intended recipient of the parcel and that the listed address of “[...]” was a typographical error.  On February 18, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. signed a Search Warrant, permitting law enforcement to enter and search the apartment.
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Scudieri, 469 N.J. Super. 507, 515 (App. Div. 2021) (legislation became effective more than four months after it was signed into law and only to offenses committed on or after a certain date); R.A. v. W. Essex Reg’l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2021 WL 3854203, at *10-12 (App. Div. Aug. 30, 2021) (6-month delay in effectiveness).  Nor did the Legislature specify that the 2023 amendments would not apply to pending cases.  See, e.g., Rock Work, Inc. v. Pulaski Const. Co., 396 N.J. Super. 344, 352, 933 A.2d 988, 992 (App. Div. 2007) (legislation specified that it did not apply to pending proceedings or vested rights; Matter of Avery’s Estate, 176 N.J. Super. 469, 475 (App. Div. 1980) (same).
[brief] The manner in which a reasonable counsel fee is to be determined is well-settled.  As a threshold matter, "[a] plaintiff must be a 'prevailing party' to recover an attorney's fee under § 1988."  Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d at 50 (footnote omitted).  "[P]laintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."
[brief] B.  The Trial Court Erred When It Granted the Motions in Limine  Defendants do not deny New Jersey recognizes a common law claim for attorney’s fees, which is to be determined in “the interests of equity” depending “on the particular circumstances as they appear from the totality of the evidence presented. ”  Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co., 50 N.J. 563, 573 (1967).  Defendants instead argue that the evidence Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to present at trial could never meet the standard.  First, Defendants argue that a deciding factor in Red Devil was the substantial amount of attorney’s fees compared to the relatively small amount of available compensatory damages.  (Drb29).  To the extent that is the appropriate measure, the evidence here meets that standard.  Plaintiffs proffered to the trial court that their attorney’s fees exceeded one million dollars, while the compensatory damage recovery was only $50,000.  (Pb55; Da2571-Da2572).  Defendants next argue that a common law fee award should be denied where the plaintiff obtains equitable relief.  (Drb29).  That argument is contrary to Red Devil, where the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s grant of equitable relief and awarded common law attorney’s fees.  50 N.J. at 575-76.  Next, Defendants argue that the totality of the evidence would not meet the existing standard.  (Drb29).  The problem with this argument is that, unlike the partial summary judgment motion where the trial court carefully analyzed every piece of evidence presented by both sides, the trial court never analyzed the evidence Plaintiffs proffered because it never admitted it into evidence.  The trial court should not have ruled on a motion in limine that the evidence it had not yet heard or seen would not meet the standard for punitive damages.