ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey  08625  RE: STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Indictment Nos. [...], [...]; App. Div. Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal  From a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.; and a Jury.  Honorable Judges:  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b), this letter brief is submitted in lieu of a formal brief on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
[brief] Tenant relies on and incorporates by reference the prior Statement of Procedural History from Tenant’s brief in support of its own appeal and incorporates the same by reference as if fully set forth herein (Db2-Db4). ¹  SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS  Tenant relies on and incorporates by reference the prior Statement of Facts from the Tenant’s brief in support of its own appeal and incorporates the same by reference as if fully set forth herein (Db5-Db21).  For context and clarity of presentation, however, Tenant repeats the following twelve facts, all of which are undisputed:
[brief] The Redevelopment Law does not require that a redevelopment plan be consistent with the master plan.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.d.  In fact, a governing body is authorized to reject a master plan altogether in adopting a redevelopment plan.  Id.  All that is required of the governing body in the face of a potential inconsistency with the master plan is a majority vote in favor of adoption and the governing body’s “reasons” for so acting being set forth in the redevelopment plan.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.d.  Appellant’s arguments in both the Trial Court and on appeal are premised on Appellant’s contention that the Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the Township’s Master Plan and, therefore, Ordinance 2022-15 was invalid because the Committee did not articulate the required reasons for why the Committee was determining to proceed in light of that inconsistency.
[brief] Notice of Appeal Filed on Behalf of the Plaintiff on May 24, 2024…………Pa50  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery Filed on June 27, 2024………………………………………………………………………..Pa54  Certification of [...], Esq.  Filed on Behalf of the Defendants on February 28, 2024 in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment…………Pa55  Certification of [...], Esq. Filed on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment……………Pa57
[brief] On September 12, 2018, [...] sent [...] an email stating that [...] “g[ave] us some trouble today and we were unable to collect him. ” (Pa1077a).  No one from [...] asked [...] what she meant when she wrote that [...] had been giving them “trouble” such that he couldn’t be collected.  (Pa855a).  [...] testified that they needed to take breaks from collecting [...] because “he didn’t want to walk into the shed. ” (Pa837a).  She testified that [...] would “act up” when did not want to be collected.  (Pa844a).  [...] testified that four breaks from collection in a season, particularly starting as early as September or October, is an abnormal amount of breaks if given intentionally.  (Pa858a-Pa861a).  It is worth remembering that the purpose of the [...] Syndicate was to make money by collecting and selling [...]’s semen.  A jury could reasonably infer that [...]’s need for more breaks than the usual stallion was due to his known resistance to being collected.  This is more than “mere skittishness,” as the Motion Court reduced [...]’s behavior to.  (Pa1086a).  This is a powerful, large, aggressive, lethal animal routinely refusing to engage in a behavior that already raises stress levels and tendency to violence.
[brief] Importantly, all iterations of the consumer lending based provisions—whether the NJCFLA, the NJSLL, NJCLA, or NJLLA—were enacted remedially to protect New Jersey consumers by, *inter alia*, curtailing predatory and usurious lending practices, limiting what property could be held as collateral, conducting ongoing criminal background checks on applicants and licensees, and ensuring that only qualified, regulated, licensed entities would enter the marketplace as consumer lenders in New Jersey.  Indeed, in addition to regular criminal background checks for every officer, director, partner, and/or owner with a controlling interest in the applicant/licensee, the Commissioner must “find[] that the financial responsibility, experience, character, and general fitness of the applicant for a new license or for a renewal of a license demonstrate that the business will be operated honestly, fairly, and efficiently within the purposes of [the NJCFLA]”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(c); *see also* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(e).  Like the NJSLL and NJCLA, the newly titled NJCFLA (under the umbrella of the NJLLA) allowed for a private right of action by individual consumers in addition to the enforcement remedies of the Commissioner.  Indeed, codified statutory mechanism of enforcement by which an individual consumer voided an unlawful loan contract and/or pursued treble damages was N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)—the same provision of the same statute which Plaintiff asserts has voided her unlawful contract in the instant action under the same NJCFLA.  Though N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 codifies the Commissioner’s authority to oversee licensure under the NJCFLA (as it did under the NJLLA), it does not disallow private actions by aggrieved consumers—nor has it ever.  Prior to 2014, aggrieved consumers were always afforded an implied private right of action in addition to the Commissioner’s authority to oversee licensure and pursue independent prosecutions.  In fact, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) continues to explicitly allow for treble damages—a remedy not included under the Commissioner’s authority in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) further limits the Commissioner’s authority to civil penalties “not exceeding $25,000. ”  Therefore, in the absence of a private right of action, an unlicensed consumer lender could limit liability on consumer loans exceeding $25,000 since penalties are capped at $25,000.
[brief] (Da274-75).  A court also “should construe the provisions of a contract so that its terms do not conflict. ”  89 Water St. Assocs. v. Reilly, No. A-3366-17T1, 2019 WL 4793073, at *7 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 2019) (citing Silverstein v. Dohoney, 32 N.J. Super. 357, 364 (App. Div. 1954)); Universal N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Bridgepointe Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 456 N.J. Super. 480, 494 (Law Div. 2018) (“[I]n the event of potentially contradictory terms, the ‘several parts of a contract should be so construed as to avoid conflict. ’”) (quotations omitted); see also Forman v. Levenson, No. A-3518-17T4, 2020 WL 359672, at *7 (App. Div. Jan. 22, 2020) (reading terms of a specific provision identifying the scope of an arbitral clause as non-exclusive so as to harmonize two contractual provisions).  A specific term modifies a general term only if conflict is unavoidable.  *89 Water Street*, 2019 WL 4793073, at *7; see also *C.L.*, 473 N.J. Super. at 599 (indicating that specific language controls over general language only as “long as it leads to a result in harmony with the contracting parties’ overall objective”) (internal quotation omitted); *Grossman v. United States*, 57 Fed. Cl. 319, 323-24 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (stressing that the “specific governs the general” maxim “applies only where the conflict between two provisions is inescapable, with the decided preference being instead to harmonize the provisions, if possible”).  Further, a specific provision only controls a general provision if the two terms deal with the same subject.  *C.L.*, 473 N.J. Super. at 599-600 (“Therefore, when both general language of a contract and specific language address the same issue, the specific language controls. ”).  The Probate Court relied on the canon that a specific term controls over a general term, finding Paragraph 24(F) limits Paragraph 24(G).  (Da274).  The Probate Court erred by not reading Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) in harmony and by comparing two provisions that deal with different subjects.  B.
[brief] See, e.g., Carlson v. First Revenue Assurance, 359 F.3d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2004) (violation of a state licensing statute is not an FDCPA violation because “[t]he FDCPA was designed to provide basic, overarching rules for debt collection activities; it was not meant to convert every violation of state debt collection law into a federal violation”); Klein v. Credico Inc., 922 F.3d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding same, affirming dismissal on pleadings); Wade v. Regional Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1100-1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (a debt collector’s attempts to collect a debt in Idaho without first obtaining a permit required by the state did not amount to an FDCPA violation); Taylor v. Quall, 471 F. Supp.2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (alleged failure to comply with a state statute governing suits brought on behalf of entities with fictitious business names did not amount to an FDCPA violation).  Courts have also come to the same conclusion in other factual contexts.  Without citing voluminous such cases here, the discussion in one case collects many examples of such cases from all around the country.  See Anglin v. Merchs. Credit Corp., No. 18-cv-507-BJR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125009, *12-13 (W.D. Wash. July 15, 2020).  Obtaining a license under the NJCFLA is, like the cases cited above, an administrative matter under New Jersey state law enforceable by the [...] alone.  The trial court’s decision not to elevate a purported administrative violation of New Jersey law into an FDCPA claim is consistent with the weight of federal authority considering similar issues, notwithstanding the outlier cases Appellant cited.  Appellant’s cases undermine the New Jersey statutory framework, while the trial court decided the issue consistently with that framework.
[brief] PRECEDENTIAL CASE LAW IN NEW JERSEY HOLDS THAT A LONG-TERM LEASE SHOULD BE FACTORED INTO MARKET VALUE OF A PROPERTY (1T13:11-16:5; 1T32:5-34:19).  A.  The [...]’ Attempts To Bootstrap An Appeal Of The Arbitrator’s Factual Determinations Regarding The [...] Lease Are Improper And Outside The Bounds Of Permissible Appeal (Not Raised Below).
[brief] The following colloquy at trial addresses that tactical delay at bar.  [...]:  Respiratory therapists don't have a standard of care.  They're not licensed professionals under the affidavit of merit statute.  [...]: Says who?  [...]: The affidavit of merit statute.  That's the only time that you appear to say I need to bring in a respiratory therapist.  And here's the thing.  This report was given in 2019.  They have -- actually this counsel had a case where they failed to object and then objected later on
[brief] Of equal importance, the court ignored Plaintiff [...] failed to prove validity of service (Pa1) as case law establishes; Once a defendant challenges a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over it the **PLAINTIFF BEARS** the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.  *Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG*, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir.2001) as this Defendant clearly **challenged** personal jurisdiction for the March 9, 1990, hearing (Pa10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62).
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, Appellant, [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse the June 7, 2023 and October 11, 2023 Final Administrative Actions of the Civil Service Commission and order the promotional appointment of Appellant with backpay and retroactive seniority.  Respectfully submitted,  LAW  OFFICES OF DANIEL J. ZIRRITH, LLC  Attorneys for Appellant, [...]  By: ____________________________  [...] [...]  Dated: March 5, 2024  IN THE MATTER OF YVONNE ZIRRITH, SHERIFF’S OFFICER LIEUTENANT (PC1557A), [...].  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: [...]  CSC DOCKET NO.: [...]  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT
[brief] ”  *Galloway v. United States*, 492 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).  But that is precisely what Defendant seeks.  Defendant points to the *Senate Report* to obfuscate the plain meaning of “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  But a court may not consider extrinsic sources unless *(i)* the language is unclear or *(ii)* applying the plain meaning frustrates those purposes by yielding an absurd result.
[brief] Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) in order to eliminate abusive debt collection practices but also to ensure that those debt collectors who play by the rules are not competitively disadvantaged.  The goal of the FDCPA is to prohibit debt collectors from engaging in actions that are abusive, deceptive or unfair.  However, as some courts have astutely pointed out, recent FDCPA litigation have, at times, turned “into a glorified game of ‘gotcha,’ with a cottage industry of plaintiffs’ lawyers filing suits over fantasy harms the statute was never intended to prevent. ”  In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 2021).  Plaintiff-Appellant [...] (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) commenced this lawsuit against Defendant-Respondent [...]
[brief] As the AP argued in response to defendant’s motion for a new trial, the State’s summation questioned whether [...]’s initial role as clinical psychologist on behalf of the guardian ad litem colored her later role as a forensic evaluator on behalf of the defense:  “And the idea of bias was presented at that point.  And that was fleshed out both with [...] on cross-examination and it was fleshed out on direct examination with [...].  That was something that the jurors were privy to, they heard testimony about, and they heard that there was a potential for bias as it pertains to treating someone and getting a rapport and relationship with them and then later on having to be a forensic evaluator and the difference in those roles. ” (1739-8 to 25).  Further, as the judge found in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the State never insinuated that [...] fabricated her first evaluation of defendant.  (17T82-7 to 19).  E. State’s reference at trial to the juvenile waiver hearing.
[brief] The Board expressed concerns about drainage at the site.  The Board questioned what the stormwater management plan submitted by the applicant was based on.  [...] announced that if the Board acted favorably, as a part of resolution compliance, the applicant would perform an analysis based on 25% coverage on each lot to see if the proposed drainage facilities could accommodate that.  (1T12-11 to 1T12-18))  He reminded the Board that building coverage would be more than 25% if the future homeowner went to the zoning board for a variance.  (1T12-16 to 1T12-18)  [...] testified that a homeowner association would be formed to manage the stormwater (2T29-25 to 2T30-2) but opposing expert [...] reminded the Board that no proposed homeowners association documentation had been provided to the Board for review.
[brief] There defendant planted a tree in the front yard of his residence, approximately four feet from the abutting sidewalk.  The growth of the tree’s roots eventually caused the sidewalk to buckle.  The plaintiff fell on the damaged sidewalk.  The court held that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgement, stating that residential landowner is potentially liable for affirmative conduct that cause a dangerous condition on a nearby sidewalk.  The rationale for the property owner’s liability is not because of the natural process of the growth of the tree roots.  Instead, it is the positive act – the affirmative act – of the property owner in the actual planting of the tree which instigated the process.  The fact that the affirmative act is helped along by a natural process does not thereby make the condition a natural one.  Id. at 704.  Applying these principles to this case, a jury may infer from the evidence that when the defendant heaped the snow from the sidewalk on the uphill driveway, he created a new element of danger to the public other than that caused by natural forces.
[brief] See Ja3995–98 (8/16/23 Notice Opposing Dismissal).  The parties then briefed whether the 2023 Amendment applied retroactively.  Relator did not dispute that the AG’s Notice is effective in this case only if the court applies the 2023 Amendment retroactively.  On October 24, 2023, the trial court ruled that the 2023 Amendment should be given retroactive effect, 4T at 6:10–13, and that therefore the AG’s Notice precludes judgment in favor of Defendants on public disclosure grounds, id. at 35:14–17.  According to the trial court, the 2023 Amendment reflects a mere “procedural” change in how the State, the real party in interest in a qui tam case, can block the public disclosure bar from applying.  See id. at 17:13–22, 18:6–9, 23:8–20, 28:1–6.  Under the old law, the court reasoned, the State had to intervene to block the defense (and thus litigate the case), while under the new law, the State could simply file a notice to block the defense even when it does not intervene.  The trial court cited no authority from any jurisdiction that has agreed with that view.  It also failed to discuss, much less reconcile its ruling with, the authority from the U.S. Supreme Court which has declared that a relator-led FCA case is “different in kind” than one directed by the government because a relator’s private interest drives a relator-led claim while the public interest alone drives a government-led claim.  Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997).  The trial court’s view that the 2023 Amendment reflects a purely procedural change was not based on any expressed legislative intent that it apply retroactively, and lacked any support in the caselaw.  The trial court also indicated that if the 2023 Amendment does not apply retroactively, it would nonetheless deny both motions based on unspecified disputes of material fact.  See 4T at 34:16–21, 35:2–13.  In doing so, it did not identify any material disputes of fact in the record, any non-public information used in Relator’s analysis, or any reason to believe that Relator’s claims are independent of publicly disclosed information.
[brief] In the absence of any credible evidence from [...] in support of his conversion claims, the Court improperly relied on [...]’s net expert testimony in finding that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized distributions from [...] and [...], and thus, wrongful.  Specifically, the trial court, over Defendant’s repeated objections, permitted [...] to testify about his improper assessments of the Disputed Transactions and [...]’s motives regarding them, despite [...]’s admitted lack of personal knowledge regarding the nature, character and purpose of the Transactions (19T78-2 to 79-3, 89-10 to 91-11, 115-6 to 116-9; 20T69-20 to 71-21; 21T21-2 to -24, 34-5 to 35-24; 22T78-21 to 80-22; 36T19-10 to 29-15, 24-24 to 38-17, 51-1 to -9, 55-21 to -25; Db28-31.)
[brief] In the end, [...], who was not an owner and had no contract with [...], had no real relationship with [...] as it really did no business and there were no customers; [...] helped out doing some financial work into early 2021, but at some point [...] ran out of money so it did not even file tax returns.  2T205:1-8; 3T91:21-92:3, 92:18-93:2.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] -  On Db4, the Respondents falsely (and impermissibly) state:  “The Plaintiff was well aware of how the Defendants ran their tournament and that rulebook applied to chess tournaments”.  -  On Db5, the Respondents falsely (and impermissibly) state: “The Plaintiff undeniably knows the rules that apply to chess tournaments, including [...] tournaments”.  - On Db14, the Respondents falsely (and impermissibly) state: “The Plaintiff knew the rules well before this July 2017 chess tournament”.  - On Db14, the Respondents falsely (and impermissibly) state: “By his own admission, before this chess tournament, he played in the defendants' events. ”  This was not raised at trial; nor did I state in my complaint when I had played in any events.  - On Db15, the Respondents falsely (and impermissibly) state: “The Plaintiff knew about the rulebook because of all the past events he played in before the one in question. ”  - On Db15, the Respondents falsely (and impermissibly) state: “He knew this rulebook applied to this tournament. ”  All of the above statements are not only untrue (i.e. as I had testified that I had not been aware of the limitation at the time I entered the 2017 tournament); but further, these statements are impermissible, as no challenge to this testimony was ever raised at trial.  Moreover, the defendants, as well as the trial court, had accepted my testimony as true.  The defendants’ contention was that my own fault for not knowing:  --- 2  More examples can be found in my pending motion to partially suppress the Respondents’ brief.  [...]:  “So our contention would be because that was posted there, if you read that, you would see that there are more rules in the USCF rulebook.  ...  So either then you could buy a rule book or you could ask a tournament director, could you explain this part of the rules to me? ”  (1T7:8-14)  [...]:  “As I said, since the rules aren't available online, you can either buy a rule book, or you can ask a tournament director to tell you the rule that you're interested in. ”  (1T15:14-17)  So this newly-purported fact, which was improperly introduced for the first time during this appeal, is clearly impermissible.  But yet despite this Court’s express rulings on my motion (Pra1), nonetheless they are still impermissibly trying to “sneak this in” so as to indirectly “amend” / supplement the record below.
[brief] The Plaintiff’s-Respondent Brief  DID NOT address (challenge or deny) the bad/improper acts identified in the Defendant’s-Appellant Brief, from February of 2015 to the end of April 2015, by the Process Server, the Plaintiff’s Attorney and his Legal Assistant that misled the trial court to grant, in ERROR, the Final Judgment by Default on 5/4/2015.  The appeal to this court, to Vacate the Default Judgment, is based on undeniable and undisputed facts, in the court record, that those individuals knowing and willfully violated the law – NOT on new evidence, but on existing FACTS.  Because of these conflicted acts, of possible perjury and fraud, the Defendants were denied their rights under the law of due process.  That is, of: (1) notice; (2) an opportunity to be heard; and, (3) an impartial tribunal.  The result of these bad/improper acts caused unfair and unjust harm to the Defendants.  You don’t know, what you don’t know, until you know it!  The undisputed fact in the trial court record is that the defendants DID NOT respond until June of 2020 when they received an Ex Parte Court Order for Discovery (Rb-11), based on a Final Judgment by Default granted five (5) years earlier by the court on 5/4/2015.