ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 3 Executive Office Asset Forfeiture for . . Chapter11 and Guidelines  Seized Forfeited Properv for refers to tangible and real property, other than cash.  Property is the individual, agency, or firm, which has custody of the seized Property  Custodian property- is the cash, property, or sales proceeds received by.  a Treasury law Reverse Asset Sharing enforcement organization representing the agency’s participation in a forfeiture investigation made by a no* Treasury investigative agency.  refer to state and local law enforcement agencies that State and Local Agencies participate in an investigation with a federal agency.
[brief] [...] Testified About an Earlier Made Will, Not the 2014 Will  Respondent contends in her opposition that “aside from Petitioner’s non-credible testimony,” there is no basis whatsoever in the record for stating that Decedent wanted to make a trust for Respondent.  Db at 46.  Respondent further contends that [...] testified to the testamentary intent of the Decedent shortly after the 2014 Will was executed.  Db at 25.  Respondent’s portrayals are erroneous.  [...] did not present any testimony about the 2014 Will.  Rather, [...] testified about a will that Decedent made prior to 2012.  (10T121:3-4).  [...] testified that she believes her copy of that will was destroyed by flood waters from Hurricane Sandy in October 2012.  (10T121:17-24).  In that earlier made will, Decedent asked [...] to serve as a trustee of a trust created under that will.  (10T120:7 to 122:10).  This is consistent with Petitioner’s testimony that the Decedent repeatedly told him that any money she left for Respondent would be in trust, given Respondent’s history with money and her romantic relationships with drug addicts and criminals.  (7T178:16-22; 7T180:12 to 181:9; 7T189:17-22).  7.
[brief] During the cross- examination of [...], counsel asked whether the witness recalled “references” to defendant looking like “either a burglar or robber” and whether the witness agreed with other officers that defendant “looks like he’s ready to do a robbery[.]” (3T36-9 to 37-7).  Defendant then sought permission from the Court to play – the previously redacted portions of — the MVR related to this conversation.  (3T37-14 to 38-15).  The Court, in overruling the State’s objection, warned defense counsel that he will be “open[ing] the door through allowing this[.]” (3T39-5 to 9).  Counsel acknowledges as much and then played the part of the MVR recording portraying the conversation where the officers discuss the similarities between defendant and a robbery suspect from the night prior.  (3T42-3 to 12; 44-6 to 15).  This, within the context of a much more comprehensive discussion between counsel and the witness about the recording.  (3T42-4 to 48-1).
[directive] Every department shall establish and implement a system to ensure that relevant BWC recordings are provided in discovery in a timely fashion.  The system established by the agency should include a provision to ensure that police arrest/incident/continuation reports indicate whether the incident or investigative activity described in the report was electronically recorded by a BWC.  Police reports should, when feasible, indicate the corresponding BWC control ledger/log number, and the BWC control ledger/log should cross-reference the incident case number.  Copies of BWC recordings made for the purpose of complying with the State’s discovery obligations shall be provided to the prosecutor in a readily available media format.
[brief] All overtime shall be compensated as paid compensation at the time and one-half (1-1/2) rate, (the overtime rate shall be base plus maintenance divided by 2,080 x 1.5), unless the employee, at said employee’s sole option, elects to take compensation for overtime in compensatory time off (C.T.O.) which shall accumulate in a C.T.O. bank.  Compensatory time compensation in the C.T.O. bank shall accumulate at time and one-half (one and one-half hours banked for each hour of overtime worked in quarter hour units).  [Pa27.]  The parenthetical “2,080” figure is the product of 260, the number of working days in a fiscal year with exactly twenty-six pay periods, and eight, the number of hours in a workday.\(^3\) (Pa142).  At the arbitration, [...] presented a single witness, [...], [...]’s vice president.  (Pa69-104).  [...] presented [...], the payroll manager for [...] (Pa107-28), as well as [...], the payroll manager for [...].
[brief] It is not the prerogative or province of the SEC or the Commissioner to speculate as to the relationship or motives of a particular Board member’s reasons for action or inaction without substantial, legally competent evidence in support thereof.  In *Tucker*, for example, the Board member voted to name a school in honor of the Lieutenant Governor with whom she has had a longstanding friendship.  The Board member was charged with, among other violations, violating subsection (f).  The Commissioner supported his finding of a subsection (f) violation with substantial, legally competent evidence that the Board member had a longstanding personal, professional, and political relationship with the Lieutenant Governor.  For instance, before serving on the Board, the Board member served as the Lieutenant Governor’s Chief of Staff, campaign manager, and twenty year personal and professional friendship.  *Id.* at *13.  In comparison to the factual record in the case at bar, however, the Commissioner does not have any substantial, legally competent evidence that Appellant would derive or attempted to derive any “benefit,” as used in the Act, from requesting the Board Attorney to investigate [...]’s conduct during the election.  To be sure, political relationships have been found to create a justifiable impression among the public that one’s objectivity or independence of judgment could be impaired.
[brief] To this end, our juries act as the conscience of our state.  While medical malpractice litigation costs typically account for a very \(^1\) [...], et al., [...], The [...]: A Review and Recommendations for Improvement (1998), available at [http://www.oia-kaiserrarb.com/pdfs/BRP-Report.pdf](http://www.oia-kaiserrarb.com/pdfs/BRP-Report.pdf).
[directive] 2.0.1  Achieving the desired level of discipline within the law enforcement agency is among the most important responsibilities of the law enforcement executive.  Yet, this is one of the most frequently neglected processes within many law enforcement agencies.  While the word “discipline” was originally defined as instruction, teaching or training, its meaning has shifted toward a concept of control through punishment.  This emphasis on control has resulted in discipline being viewed as a negative threat rather than a mechanism for remediation and improvement.  Too frequently rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures are used as an end in themselves, and their purpose in reaching agency goals is forgotten.  Focusing on the negative aspects of discipline diminishes officer morale and productivity.  2.0.2  The first step toward positive discipline is to emphasize instruction and de-emphasize control.  This requires the law enforcement executive to focus on organizational practices.  The executive must first define the goals and objectives of the agency's units and then announce management's expectations to guide the units toward realizing those goals.  The law enforcement executive must establish a means to monitor performance and to correct improper actions.  2.0.3  This approach to management as it relates to discipline insures that all subordinates know and understand what must be done, why it must be done, how it must be done and when it must be done.  Employees must be clearly told what constitutes satisfactory performance through performance evaluations and similar procedures.  N.J.A.C. 4A:6-5.1.  Supervisors and managers also must know when and how to take corrective action.  To achieve this, management must establish workable procedures for documenting all expectations and advising individuals of their duties and responsibilities.  2.1  Policy Management System  2.1.1  The agency's policy management system serves as the foundation for effective discipline.  A clearly defined policy management system is designed to move the organization toward its stated goals and set the standard for acceptable performance.
[brief] If the Legislature wanted to have this requirement of identical credentials, it could have easily stated so.  However, it did not.  Rather, the Legislature adopted the simple common-sense requirement that as long as the challenging expert has the same Board-Certification as the Defendant Physician, and that the medical treatment involved involves that specialty, the fact that the Defendant Physician has additional Certifications different than the Plaintiff’s expert is of no consequence.  In this case, [...]’s qualifications are more than adequate to support the Affidavit of Merit in this case.  The medical specialty involved is Critical Care.  As [...] has observed:  “Critical Care board certification is offered by three boards in the United States.  These are the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM), the American Board of Surgery (ABS), and the American Board of Pediatrics (ABP).  Each qualifies and certifies full certification in the field of critical care.  Of course, there are differences in emphasis between the specialties.  For example, problems such as pre- and post-operative care and treatment of trauma might be emphasized a bit more in the ABS examination, and problems associated with heart attacks or lung diseases like Wegener’s Dranulmatosis might be more emphasized in the ABIM examination, and of course childhood considerations are emphasized in the ABP examination.  Any statement that critical care certification by the ABS is less valid in any way, then is certification by the ABIM is unsupportable and is patently untrue.  Both the ABIM and the ABS are recognized and have equal footing under the overall governing body of board certification in the U.S. which is the ABMS (American Board of Medical Specialty).
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE MERITLESS MOTION AND APPEAL WERE FILED IN BAD FAITH AND LACKED A COGNIZABLE BASIS UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED.  (T18-19).  The Defendant and [...]’s deplorable prosecution of the motion for reconsideration, recording of the lis pendens, and institution of the appeal is (1) frivolous, (2) generating a cloud on Plaintiff’s title to the Property, (3) designed to hamper Plaintiff’s rights with respect to the Property, and (4) needlessly causing Plaintiff to incur extensive litigations costs.  It is apparent that the filing of Defendant’s motion for reconsideration was a flagrant attempt to further Defendant’s terroristic threats without any legal basis.  Further, such threats were brought to [...]’s attention by Plaintiff’s counsel; yet, [...] refused to withdraw the untenable motion.  Thus, [...]’s continued prosecution of the motion was unjustifiable.  As such, the trial court should have granted Plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions and awarded Plaintiff its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending frivolous claims filed by Defendant and his counsel.  Likewise, the filing of the instant (second) appeal, which continues the Defendant’s and [...]’s vexatious conduct, warrants the imposition of sanctions.
[brief] A key theme of the prosecutor’s cross-examination of [...] was to repeatedly point out all the opportunities she had had to report the rape yet failed to do so.  When asked, [...] agreed that she did not ask the cashier at the gas station or the garbage truck driver to call the police.  (7T 17-3 to 5, 25-22 to 26-5)  [...] agreed that, when she spoke to her boyfriend and her friend, she did not report the rape.  (7T 40-22 to 41-16, 42-14 to 21, 46-15 to 24)  She agreed that when she was driving around after the incident, she did not drive to a “police precinct” or “to a hospital” or “to urgent care” or to her boyfriend for help.  (7T 43-13 to 24, 46-7 to 14)  She equally did not tell the EMTs or the female state trooper who arrived to help her in Pennsylvania what had happened, nor did she ask them for any kind of help.  (7T 55-5 to 16, 57-10 to 58-5)
[brief] ***  THE COURT:  Are you still thinking or is it your testimony that sitting here today you have no opinion on the question?  A  Sitting here today I have no opinion on the question.  (Emphasis added).  (7T74:2-75)  ***  Q  Thank you.  In the deeds from [...] to [...] and from [...] to [...], Inc., is there any reference in there or use of the word riparian grant?  A  It’s possible.  Q  Well, do you want to read the deed and tell me where there is or there isn’t?  I mean, how could something be possible.  It’s a riparian grant.  Is the word riparian grant in the deed?  A  I don’t know if it’s in there.  I don’t know if it’s in there or whether - Q  Pardon?  A  I don’t know if the word is in those two deeds.  Q  I'm sorry, I'm having trouble hearing.  I apologize.  THE COURT:  The answer was he does not know if that word is in those two deeds.  (Emphasis added).  (7T75:8-24)  ***  Q  Well, do you think it would help - - Okay, you don't know if they're in there or not.  Do you know whether or not in either of those two deeds there's a reference to land underwater being conveyed?  A  No, I don't know if they're there.  So I can't answer your question.  (Emphasis added).  [...]: Okay.  I have no further question.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The Trial Court’s August 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023  Orders are entitled to significant deference.  A Trial Court’s determination in non-jury cases is “subject to limited and well-established scope of review. ”  Siedman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011).  Accordingly, our “appellate courts should ‘not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge’ unless convinced that those findings were ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (internal citations omitted).  Relatedly, the Appellate Division generally reviews an award of counsel fees under an abuse of discretion standard.  *Garmeaux v. DNV Concepts, Inc.*, 448 N.J. Super. 148, 155 (App. Div. 2016).  Thus, “[w]here such fees are authorized[,] the decision to award or deny attorneys’ fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. ”  *Desai v. Bd. of Adjustment of Town of Phillipsburg*, 360 N.J. Super. 586, 598 (App. Div. 2003).  Here, the Trial Court’s August 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023 Orders were not only well-reasoned but amply supported by the motion record and largely based upon undisputed facts.  It is undisputed that [...]’s SPA was approved by the Board on June 13, 2022.  It is undisputed that the Board’s June 13, 2022 approval was not conditioned on [...] including an elevator in Building “E. ”  It is undisputed that the Original Resolution, which memorialized the Board’s June 13, 2022 approval, expressly found that there was no basis to condition the approval on the inclusion of an elevator in Building “E,” but also that [...] had expressly refused same.  Critically, it is undisputed that the Board’s January 23, 2023 Stealth Resolution took place without public notice, without notice to [...], and imposed a new condition of approval that was not imposed at the June 13, 2022 meeting approving [...]’s SPA or in the December 12, 2022 Original Resolution.  These are the only relevant facts at issue in this appeal, which are neither disputed nor controverted by anything in the motion record.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the August 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023 Order must be affirmed and the appeal dismissed.
[brief] On April 19, 2018, the State filed motions to compel a buccal swab and “fingerprints/major case prints” from Defendant and [...].  (Da112-113)  The parties argued the motion before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on May 7, 2018.  (1T)  Defendant himself raised an objection because a buccal swab was already taken from him at the jail at the time of his arrest; while the record is not entirely clear, it appears that Defendant believed the reason the swab taken at the jail could not be used (and thus the reason the State was seeking to obtain another swab) was an improper method the State had used to obtain a buccal swab in the jail.  (1T7-12 to 22)  At Defendant’s request, his counsel had served a subpoena on the jail demanding they turn over the video showing him being swabbed; Defendant wanted the Court to consider this video before deciding the State’s motion, but video had not been obtained by May 7. \(^5\) (1T4-10 to 20)  Defendant tried to further explain his position but was cut off by the Court.  (1T17-1 to 18-4)  [...] orally granted the State’s motions on May 7, 2018.  (1T16-2 to 3)  On May 11, 2018, [...] entered written orders both granting the State’s motions to compel buccal swabs from Defendant and [...] and orders staying these aforementioned orders to allow defendants to file motions for leave to appeal with the Appellate Division.
[brief] Additionally, the record in the Prior Action and the trial court’s conclusions of law therein are clear that the loss of the Property was the direct and proximate result of the Appellants’ failure to pay rent due to [...] under the Lease.  From there, as the trial court noted in its summary judgment opinion in the Prior Action, all associated Solar Rights were lost as such rights, which are contractual in nature, run with the land and were free for anybody to pursue.  [Pa149].  As the Court expressly stated, “[Appellants] did not own the Solar Rights.  After [Appellants] lost site control of the Property, [...] voided the Solar Rights, and [Appellants] lost all rights to develop the Solar Project.  [...], and anyone else for that matter, were free to pursue development of the Solar Rights thereafter. ”  [Pa149].  Here, as with the other belated claims and the previously dismissed claims against the [...] in the Prior Action, the Appellants’ alleged damages were directly and proximately caused by their failure, in September 2017, to pay the rent due to [...] under the Lease and the resulting termination of the Lease.  None of the alleged actions of any of the other parties caused Appellants not to make that payment.  The conclusions of law based on undisputed facts made by the trial court in the Prior Action with regard to the [...]’ motion for summary judgment are applicable and binding and, as a result, the trial court was correct in determining that this claim lacked merit and should be dismissed as a matter of law.
[brief] Da277a. C.  **The Coverage Trial**  As described in the procedural history above, this matter proceeded to trial to determine three issues: (1) whether the Consumption Exception restored coverage to [...] for the Consent Judgment; (2) whether [...]’s injuries manifested before the inception of the first [...] on June 1, 2007; and (3) whether [...]’s settlement was reasonable, entered into in good faith, and non-collusive.
[brief] Counsel for Plaintiff was pressed during oral argument on this topic and admitted that Plaintiff is not a specialist in painting.  (T 21:16- T 22:22).  At one point, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that specialized knowledge is necessary to guide the average person through distinctions regarding kinds of paint:  THE COURT: But who says that, who says that this paint wasn’t sufficient, I don’t know that…That would be speculation, I can’t have the jury hear that.  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]:  That’s why they’re called different kind of paints.  [...], they’ve been in the paint business a long time.  They make walking finish paint, floor and patio high gloss paint and the other type of paint.  That’s why there’s all different types of paint, and you need someone like [...] to be able to point you to the right kind of paint so that [...] doesn’t fall and get hurt.  T 25:3-16 (emphasis added).  Given the limitations of Plaintiff’s knowledge, he is not able to opine that the paint used by [...] was faulty or that the paint contributed to the icy condition on which Plaintiff slipped over 30 days later.  Any opinion as to the paint would need to come from an expert.  Because there is no expert supporting Plaintiff’s claim against [...], summary judgment is warranted.
[brief] One case challenging a similar policy is \textit{Willey v. [...]}, ---F.Supp.3d---, 2023 WL 4297186 (D. Wyo. June 30, 2023), wherein the plaintiffs challenged the district’s “Student Privacy Policy,” barring school officials from informing parents of a child’s requested name or pronoun.  Therein the District Court held:  However, a parent’s established fundamental right to direct the upbringing and education of their children would appear to be burdened if a parent was misinformed or the District or a teacher refused to respond to a parent’s inquiry regarding their minor child’s request to be called a different name, absent a showing of some danger to the health or well-being of the student.  To the extent the Student Privacy Policy would preclude a teacher or school district personnel, absent a minor student’s consent, from answering or responding to a parent’s or guardian’s inquiry as to whether their child is being called by other than their legally given name or required to lie to a parent or guardian as to the name of the minor student is being called by, likely creates a constitutional problem.  Id.  See also Da224-232.  (emphasis added).  The Willey court granted the parents’ motion for a Preliminary Injunction with respect to the Student Privacy Policy, on the same constitutional grounds raised herein.
[brief] This Court, in reviewing an administrative action of the Board, is obligated to consider three overarching issues: “(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] II.  THERE EXISTS AN UNDISPUTED VIOLATION OF THE COURT’S JUDGMENT COMPELLING EMERSON TO PROVIDE A REALISTIC OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE 29 AFFORDABLE UNITS (INCLUDING WITH RESPECT TO THE SEVEN OFF-SITE UNITS)  REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATED PROPERTY, BLOCK 610, LOT 1 WAS ITSELF IDENTIFIED IN THE COURT’S ORDER  It is [...]’s sole obligation under the settlement agreement, the judgment, and the law, to satisfy its agreed upon realistic development potential with a concrete proposal for how it will realistically be achieved.