ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See, e.g., Db4 (“[T]he first mention of the roadway at issue described an ‘ingress and egress’ driveway for the church lot 1.01 from the ‘internal road’ onto [...]”); Db5 (“In essence, the initial site plan approval envisioned the developer creating a[n] ingress and egress driveway (not a public roadway) for the Athletic Club Property (now church) at Lot 1.01. ”) Db8 (“Presumably [the term ‘access road’] refers to the ingress and egress driveway for the church”); Db10 (“This is the same driveway and easement access and egress for Lot 1.01 referred to in Plaintiff’s brief as a driveway for the church. ”); Db36 (“Here, public records demonstrate that the access road was initially described as an ingress and egress driveway for [...] Lot 1.01”).  When Plaintiffs stated that they constructed a “driveway” for Lot 1.01 off the Boulevard, it means literally that – a curb cut from Lot 1.01 onto the Boulevard.  (Pa2 at ¶ 2; Pa29.)  They did not mean that the Boulevard was the access driveway for Lot 1.01.  (Pa2 at ¶ 2; Pa29.)  Indeed, no part of the Roads is on Lot 1.01, and no part of the Roads constitutes a driveway of Lot 1.01.  (Pa2 at ¶¶ 3-4.)  In fact, because the building on the Lot 1.01 property was vacant until 2013 (when it was purchased by [...]), the actual curb cut onto the Boulevard from Lot 1.01 was not even constructed until 2013,\textsuperscript{10} which was seven years after the original construction of the Boulevard.  (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.)  This means that the Boulevard was being used for vehicles to reach the buildings on Lots 3.01, 4.01, and 5.01 before the curb cut was even made onto Lot 1.01.  (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.)  As such, [...]’s repeated assertion that the Boulevard’s original purpose was simply to be an access driveway for Lot 1.01 is both incorrect and nonsensical.
[brief] (13T 49-22  Police learned what occurred from witnesses who were in the backroom when [...] was shot.  There were about eight or nine people in the room at the time of the shooting (9T 15-24 to 16-15; 9T 64-8); they were there for a dice game, as either players or spectators.  (9T 8-3 to 83-5)  Several of them testified at trial and provided substantially similar accounts: two Black males walked into the backroom, their faces concealed by hoods and masks, one had a gun.  The males told everyone to get down on the ground and the one holding the gun said, “Do you know what time it is?”  (9T 10-23 to 11-14; 9T 23-21 to 24-11; 9T 39-12 to 39-14; 9T 69-21)  [...] tried to stop the males from taking money that was on top of the pool table; they heard a gunshot and the two males left; they realized that [...], who was lying on top of the pool table, had been shot and the money was gone.  (9T 27-15 to 27-25; 9T 75-16 to 75-25; 9T 80-21 to 81-2)  None of the witnesses could tell who the two males were because their faces were covered, and the incident happened so fast.  (9T 24-6 to 24-11; 9T 38-9 to 38-16; 9T 49-5 to 52-3; 9T 76-7 to 77-18)  One of the witnesses testified that the male with the gun was taller than the other, and two of the witnesses testified that the males seemed young, like they were in their 20s.  (9T 24-19 to 25-5; 9T 29-22 to 29-24; 9T 77-3 to 77-8)  Except for the money on the pool table, nothing else was taken, and it appeared to one of the witnesses that [...] had been targeted.  (9T 27-18 to 28-9; 9T 75-16 to 76-4; 9T 81-3 to 81-7; 9T 83-3 to 83-5)  According to the witnesses, [...] held dice games in the backroom of the barbershop after hours, once or twice a week, or every other week.
[brief] OPRA defines a public record as any document created or maintained or kept on the file in the course of the “official business” of a public entity.  Defendants argue that the Nixle emails are not public records because the emails are maintained by Defendant [...] not by the [...].  While we agree that the lists of emails are not stored by the [...], to say they are not public records because they are stored by a private entity is a facetious analysis.
[brief] (Da32)  The State agreed to sever the counts related to the [...] from the counts related to the [...] robbery and tried the [...] robbery first.  (Da12)  On December 14, 2011, a jury found [...] guilty of counts one through four under [...].  (Da5,13)  Immediately thereafter, the State proceeded to try [...] before the same jury on count one of [...].  (4T12-1 to 4)  Because the jury had already convicted [...] of count three—unlawful possession of a handgun under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)—the only additional evidence the State had to present was [...]’s prior conviction that rendered him a “certain person” under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).  (4T9-22 to 10-3)  The same jury convicted [...] of count one of [...]—certain persons not to possess firearms.  (4T13-17 to 20)  (Da13)  All counts related to the [...] robbery were dismissed.  (Da18; PSR12)  [...] was sentenced by [...], J.S.C. on February 3, 2012.
[brief] Neither the sentencing court nor the State cited any cases or studies supporting the sentencing court’s conclusions (1) that because prison is a controlled environment, an infraction-free prison record is not correlated with a lower risk of recidivism thus lessening the need for deterrence (8T 77-7 to 11, 80-16 to 19), (2) that “secondary gain” is a valid basis for declining to find that an infraction-free record supports a lower likelihood of recidivism and less need for deterrence (8T 80-20 to 81-13), or (3) that the act of “pulling the trigger” is not a product of the underdeveloped prefrontal cortex of youth but is more predictive of future recidivism than compliance and rehabilitative programming in prison (8T 79-1 to 80-1).  (Sb15-21)  Thus, because these assertions by the sentencing court were not supported by “expert testimony, or the defendant's criminal history, lack of remorse, premeditation, or other competent evidence,” the sentencing court in this case “engaged in impermissible speculation. ”  State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 302 (2021).  This Court should therefore reverse and remand for resentencing.
[brief] The Trial Court abused its discretion by discharging the Receiver despite his failure to notify creditors of his appointment and about submitting claims.  N.J.S.A. 14A:14-15 requires that within 30 days of appointment, a statutory receiver must give notice to creditors to present their claims in writing.  Such notice must be mailed to all creditors, and published in a newspaper of general circulation.  The receiver must file an Affidavit with the Court attesting to compliance with the Statute.  A creditor of an insolvent corporation aggrieved by the lack of notice is entitled to file suit on the receiver’s bond for damages.  Borden v. Wolf Silk Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 399 (Ch. 1931).  Here, the Receiver admittedly failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in N.J.S.A. 14A:14-15.
[brief] Obviously, there is no explicit provision in the contract between the [...] and the [...] requiring the use of such incremental or progressive discipline, nor did the arbitrator point to any other, related contract terms as furnishing implicit support for a progressive-discipline requirement.  We are impressed with the fact that it has been the practice in other labor contracts to set forth specifically any requirements of prior warning and progressive discipline.  The inclusion of these explicit provisions in other agreements suggests to us that the decision whether to use such a disciplinary scheme is likely to be a subject of collective negotiations, and that the [...] would legitimately expect the [...] to give some quid pro quo to obtain that protection.
[directive] The jail or prison staff where the defendant is incarcerated shall permit such examination at the jail or prison and shall provide access to of and copies the inmate's medical record, as available, and as the examiner deems necessary to perform the examination.  Such finding by a qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist shall be submitted a in 2. written report to this Court and counsel and shall include: of of (a)  A description the nature the examination; of of (b) A diagnosis the mental condition the defendant; An ( c) opinion as whether or not the defendant is presently incompetent to proceed to trial to NJS.A. of in consideration the factors listed 2C:4-4, and whether defendant's mental in condition such that he/she poses a present danger either to himself/herself or other to is persons upon his/her release into the general community.
[brief] Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, dated June 2, 2023, Dismissing Counts III, IV, V and VI of Plaintiff [...]’s Complaint as Against Defendant [...], Without Prejudice........................................Pa199  Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, dated June 9, 2023, Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as Against [...], With Prejudice..........Pa357  Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, dated August 25, 2023, Granting Reconsideration of June 2, 2023 Order, and Dismissing Complaint as Against [...], With Prejudice.........Pa651  Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, Denying Defendant [...]’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, filed September 27, 2023……………………………………………………………..Pa688  Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, Denying Defendant [...]’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees Without Prejudice, filed September 28, 2023……………………………………………………………..Pa688  Final Judgment, Filed November 29, 2023………………………………………..Pa704
[brief] This was a complex case with a lot of moving parts.  Yet, the appellants urge this Court to evaluate the conduct of each of the individual parties, each cause of action, and each bit of evidence and testimony in isolation.  Doing so would disserve the trial court’s prerogative to find facts and develop conclusions based on the totality of circumstances developed over 22 days of trial.  As the trial court explained, “you have to step back and look at the big picture here,” and “[y]ou can’t take any part of this case and put blinders on and say, well, this entity we can’t say did this, or this one did, because they are all being moved and controlled by [...]. ” (27T79:4-6; 88:21-24).  Based on a wholesale weighing of the evidence, the trial court found that the defendants, in concert, moved money without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge via conduit accounts, accrual accounts, step transactions, and other means, all of which created what the trial court called “mazes” and “webs” of accounts that made the funds extraordinarily difficult to trace.
[brief] \(^6\)  On June 14, 2022, the day after the Board voted to approve the Project, [...], through its attorney, sent an email addressed to the Township and Board’s attorneys which read:  [P]lease advise the Mayor that [[...] attorney [...]’s] email [of June 12, 2022] represents [...] Bay’s willingness to amend the settlement in accordance with the terms therein.  I think the Mayor said he has a Council meeting Wednesday evening.
[directive] b.  Where a victim alleges that a respondent has committed contempt of a protective order entered pursuant to the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.), but a law enforcement officer has found that the facts are insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the respondent, the law enforcement officer shall advise the victim of the procedure for completing and signing a criminal complaint alleging a violation of subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:29-9 through the municipal court.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the court from granting any other emergency relief it deems necessary.  c.  If a respondent is charged with a non-indictable offense pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:29-9 as a result of a violation of a protective order entered pursuant to P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.), the contempt proceedings for the non- indictable offense shall be heard in the Superior Court.  N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9.
[brief] 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019).  | 57 | | Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 997 A.2d 991 (N.J. 2010) | 34, 37 | | Griffin v. Royle, No. 133-11, 2013 WL 5337527, at 1 (App. Div. Sept. 2013) | 41, 45 | | Hambsch v. Harrsch, 256 N.J. Super 215, 606 A.2d 879 (Law Div. 1991) | 56 | | 215, 606 A.2d 879 (Law Div. 1991) | | | Case Name | Citation | Page Numbers | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | Harleysville v. Garitta | 170 N.J. 223, 785 A.2d 913 (N.J. 2001) | Passim | | Hodge v. McGrath | 2014 WL 6909499, at 1 (App. Div. Dec. 10, 2014) | 41, 45 | | Jardine Estates, Inc. v Koppel | 24 N.J. 536, 542, 133 A.2d 1 (1957) | 33 | | Juzwiak v. Doe | 415 N.J. Super. 442, 454-55 (App. Div. 2010) | 41, 45 | | Kieffer v. Best Buy | 205 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2011) | 57 | | Miltz v. Boroughs-Shelving | 203 N.J. Super. 451, 458, 497 A.2d 516 (App. Div. 1985) | 33 | | Mt. Hope Inn v. Travelers Indemn, Co. | 157 N.J. Super. 431, 440-41, 384 A.2d 1159 (Law Div. 1978) | 32, 34 | | Norman Int'l v. Admiral Ins. Co. | 251 N.J. 538, 279 A.3d 425 (N.J. 2022) | 35, 37 | | Polarome Int'l v. Greenwich Ins. Co. | 404 N.J. Super. 241, 272-73 (App Div. 2008) | 31 | | Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics | 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) | 58 | | Prudential Property Casualty Insurance Co. | v. Karlinski, 251 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1991) | 50, 53, 55 | | SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists | Insurance, 128 N.J. 188, 607 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) | Passim | | Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. | 619 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir. 1980) | 32 | | Stafford v. T.H.
[brief] On June 21, 2022, the Parties executed a Consent Order confirming the Arbitration Award and entering Final Judgment against the Township in the amount of $2,947,216.00 and preserving the right to appeal the Arbitrator’s decision as set forth in the October 20, 2021 Order.  Da123.  Due to the fact that the Arbitrator’s decision regarding market value of the Property is, of necessity, based upon the restrictions set forth by the Trial Court’s interlocutory rulings and the express terms of the October 20, 2021 Consent Order, any successful appeal or cross-appeal of the interlocutory rulings would affect the June 21, 2022 Final Judgment.
[brief] TMDLs are considered one part of an applicable Areawide WQM Plan and are generally developed for water quality limited waters, i.e. waters that are impaired for one or more pollutants.  See N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.3.  A TMDL calculates the maximum amount of a pollutant that a waterbody can receive and still meet water quality standards.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.5.  “It is the sum of the allowable loads of a single pollutant from all contributing point and nonpoint sources and includes a margin of safety and consideration of seasonal variations. ”  Id.  TMDLs are not implemented through land use permits, like the FHACA Permit on appeal before this court.
[directive] Independent Audit: Section A.  Seized and Forfeited Funds  Independent audits extend to seized or forfeited property (funds and other tangible and intangible assets), and the administration and operation of accounts related seized and forfeited property.  The authority for the administration and to - operation of these accounts outlined in N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq.  (Enclosure 2) and the is - . - :i State of New Jersey, Forfeiture Program Administration, Standard Operating Procedure (Enclosure 3).  The basic audit requirements for these accounts are described N.J.S.A. 4OA:5-1 et sea. (Enclosure 4) and N.J.A.C. 5130-6.1 Annual Audit in (Enclosure 5).  In addition to the audit of these accounts, the auditor will be required to test compliance with the aforementioned statutes, regulations, and standard for operating procedures.
[brief] In Bell Atlantic, 352 N.J. Super. at 408-09, 414 unlike in Nuckel, the property owner sought a use variance for its offsite parking at a nearby gas station lot and the board of adjustment found that the property owner had not met its burden of meeting the criteria of N.J.S.A. 40:55-70(d), a determination that the trial court reversed, with this Court affirming the trial court.  Ibid.  Here, unlike in Bell Atlantic or Nuckel, no one came to the Board seeking permission for construction or expansion.  Rather, the only reason that Respondent’s accessory use of Lot 5 was even before the Board was because Appellant sought to collaterally attack Respondent’s pre-existing right of access to that lot under the Easement.  This distinction is determinative and is supported by this Court’s recent unpublished decision in [...] v. [...], [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1214 (App. Div. July 5, 2022), affirming the trial judge’s ruling that a property owner proposing to construct a hotel on its lot did not need to apply for a variance where access to the hotel through a driveway “relie[d] solely on a cross-easement over an adjacent parcel.
[brief] ”  (Pb 21) doctrine; this doctrine further supports affirming the trial court’s ruling, even without the fact-finding that the phone call process was functionally equivalent to interrogation.  See State v. O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 171 n.13 (discussing the two doctrines).  “The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine denies the prosecution the use of derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth or Fifth Amendment violation. ”
[brief] Even if [...] applied the wired funds to the Loan, the Mortgage would not have been discharged as the funds were not sufficient to fully pay off the Loan: the funds received were short $3,312.88 due to fees, costs and escrow/impound overdrafts incurred after the expiration of the payoff quote set forth in the Payoff Statement.  (Pa416 at ¶10, Ex. A.)
[brief] THE NOVEMBER 8, 2023 ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE CONCESSION RECOVERY PROVISION IS NOT A LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE NOR A PENALTY (RAISED BELOW – 2T18:22-19:10; 2T20:12-22:27)  Appellants’ CFA claim rests solely on the plainly wrong contention that the Concession Recovery Provision is a liquidated damages clause and constitutes an unreasonable penalty.
[brief] Petitioner contends that he was not removed from conduct directly related to his employment, and therefore N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2 is inapplicable.  He asserts that the only conduct related to his employment involved his mere production of a urine sample that later tested positive for Cocaine.  Instead, he argues that the Board --- 4 Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, the undersigned is unaware of any contrary precedent to this unpublished opinion and a copy of the unpublished opinion is attached hereto. incorrectly determined a relationship between the conduct and his employment.
[brief] The Clause permits the legislature to delegate to municipalities the power to grant tax exemptions or tax abatements for limited periods of time to facilitate \(^5\)Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 1(a) provides in full that “Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules.  All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the State for allotment and payment to taxing districts shall be assessed according to the same standard of value, except as otherwise permitted herein, and such real property shall be taxed at the general tax rate of the taxing district in which the property is situated, for the use of such taxing district.
[brief] In contrast, after the 1971 Graco Deed, the chain of title to Lot 4 became mysterious, self-serving, and even a bit fraudulent.  A deed conveying Lot 4 was made “as of” May 12, 1972, and includes the Strip in a conveyance of Lot 4 from the trustee in dissolution of [...] to [...]  (“May 1972 Graco Deed”).  Da75.  Notwithstanding the date of the May 1972 Graco Deed, Graco Inc. did not record the instrument until 1990.  Id.  That meant that, as [...]’s expert admitted, between 1974 and 1990, the only recorded deeds reflecting ownership of the Strip were in the chain of title for Lot 3.  1Tr. at 91:7-12.  Upon questioning from the “housekeeping deed,” as [...]’s expert described it, in 1995.  2Tr. at 126:2 – 127:10; Pa105.  Court, [...]’s expert admitted that the May 1972 Graco Deed was a “corrective deed. ”  Id. at 128:2-6.  In the interim, Graco Inc. sought to subdivide Lot 4 twice in the 1980s.  First, in 1985, Graco Inc. submitted an application that did not count the Strip as its own, recognizing that it belonged to Lot 3.  Da25, 27.  [...] received feedback from [...] that the size of one of the proposed subdivided lots was about 3000 feet short of the necessary size to subdivide without a variance.  Da28.  In 1987, Graco Inc. apparently withdrew that application in favor of a similar subdivision application.  Da29.  In preparing the 1987 application, however, [...] addressed [...]’s objection by reversing itself on the issue of who owns the Strip, this time claiming it so as to avoid the need for a variance on the requisite lot size.  Da30.  Nevertheless, [...] denied Graco Inc.’s 1987 application for a different reason: the plan did not provide for enough parking on the subdivided lots.  Da31.  Perhaps informed by that experience, however, and just as it was marketing Lot 4 for eventual sale to [...], Graco Inc. had the May 1972 Graco Deed signed and certified on December 20, 1989.  Pa84.  Graco Inc. then recorded the May 1972 Graco Deed on February 15, 1990, in deed book 5113, page 626.  Id.  The May 1972 Graco Deed is said to be effective “as of” a date after the Dec. 1971 Graco Deed was made, which had already conveyed Lot 4, without the Strip, out of [...] into [...]  *Id.*  The 1971 Lot 4 Deed (recorded in 1974) conveying Lot 4 without the Strip to [...], had been of record for more than 16 years before the May 1972 Graco Deed purporting to include the Strip in Lot 4 was recorded.  Pa81.  All the while, of course, the various owners of Lot 3 had been buying, selling, and occupying Lot 3 with the reasonable, and correct, belief that the Strip belonged to them, without any claim to the contrary publicly on record by Lot 4’s owners.  16 months after Graco Inc. recorded the May 1972 Graco Deed, [...] acquired Lot 4 from [...], by deed dated June 26, 1991, and recorded on June 27, 1991 in deed book 5172, page 896.  Pa65.
[brief] Please respond in writing within three (3) business days, by January 19, 2023, or your request will be denied and closed as invalid.  [Da3-4; Da16-17.]  [...]’s response invited [...] to submit a narrowly tailored OPRA request that specified the “content and/or subject of the emails sought. ” (Da4; Da17).  In response, [...] submitted an updated OPRA request on the same date that narrowed only the scope of time for which the records were sought.  (Da4; Da19).  Specifically, [...]’s January 13, 2023 request stated “I want every single email sent or received.  That is very clear.  I will shorten the time frame to the 27th through the 29th, but I want every email sent [or] received for that period of time as well as all attachments. ” (Da4; Da19).  [...] acknowledged receipt of the amended request on January 17, 2023.  (Da4).  [...] again conducted an initial search for all emails sent or received by [...] from September 27, 2020 through September 29, 2020, despite [...] failing to provide a subject matter for a second time, and identified 1,004 emails.  (Da40).  But because [...]’s request failed to provide a specific content or subject matter sought, [...] denied the request on January 24, 2023.
[brief] The fact that other variances aside from the d(1) use variance and the d(4) FAR variances are required by the proposal mandates a conclusion that the granting of the use variance would substantially impair the intent and purpose of the Zone Plan and Zoning Ordinance. ”  Pa138 at ¶11; Pa136 at ¶8; Pa140 at ¶14, emphasis added.  The Trial Court therefore aptly opined: