ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa81-13-18).  [...] answered the questions to the best of her ability and as the Court can see, she offered estimations and testified that she could not attest to certain things as she may not have been working.  (Pa85-11-17, 85-22-25, 86-5-7).  In fact, she goes on to testify that she had no direct knowledge of this accident as she was not there.  (Da53-11 to19).  This is one of the pages that Appellant leaves out and this is how Appellant takes an estimation from an employee who was not even working on the night in question and presents it as fact.  This clearly shines a light on the Appellant’s failure to provide actual evidence and an accurate record to the Court.  [...] employee [...] performed a thorough inspection of the location of the incident per the [...] Incident Report noting that she “checked the area for hazards, none were present.
[brief] Plaintiff did not submit any certification or affidavit refuting the adjuster’s observations.  At oral argument on Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, the trial court’s recollection of what had been reported during voir dire was more detailed than on the motion for new trial.  Thus, the Court then recalled that during voir dire one of the sheriff’s officers had advised me that he observed the plaintiff walking through the whole stretch of area that we have - - (indiscernible) a big courtroom.  Um.  You go back to the back of the courtroom and to the exit - - you exit out of the courtroom.  But that it appeared to me that he observed this on a number of occasions.  And so - - and I don’t have the benefit of the - - transcript in from this, but my recollection is that I had instructed at that time if [...] felt that he needed to stretch his legs or get up and move around, that was fine.  Um.  But that it should be limited.  And, um, that he be permitted to stay at the table or could exit through the - - back of the courtroom.  But that I did not want him walking up and down through the - - um, through the array.  7T.25:9 to 26:4.
[brief] See Malanga, 253 N.J. at 314.  Additionally, remarks made by any one individual in passing at a hearing "are not a substitute" for statutorily required findings nor can they "be assumed to represent the findings of an entire Board," and as such "cannot be equated to deliberative findings of fact."  See N.Y. SMSA, Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333-34 (App. Div. 2004).  In the instant case, the Committee attempted to have [...]'s statements as a substitute for its own duty to deliberate on the ordinance and make findings.  Contrary to the Committee's position that it did not have "to deliberate or discuss, or even say boo," (3T22:18-19) the LRHL is clear that at every step of the process, the municipality must be transparent with the public.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7, if the Committee adopts a redevelopment plan that was inconsistent with the Township's master plan, it is required to set forth its reasons for the adoption in the redevelopment plan.  Moreover, before the Committee may adopt a revision to a redevelopment plan, it must refer the matter back to the Planning Board.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  If the Committee does not agree with the Planning Board's assessment, it must "record in its minutes the reasons for not following" the Planning Board's recommendation.  Ibid.  The Committee attempted to adopt a Plan that was inconsistent with the master plan under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) and declined to follow the Planning Board's recommendation that the Plan was consistent with the master plan under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  Accordingly, it was under a duty to state its reasons in the redevelopment plan and its meeting minutes, respectively.  The Committee's December 8, 2022 minutes clearly lack such reasons.
[brief] Ibid.; see also Campbell v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001); Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962).  If the Appellate Division is satisfied after its review that the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head’s decision, then it must affirm even if the court feels that it would have reached a different result.  Campbell, 169 N.J. at 587.  Only where an agency’s decision is clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or unsupported by sufficient credible evidence in the record may it be reversed.  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); Atkinson, 37 N.J. at 149.  Moreover, the party challenging the validity of the administrative decision bears the burden of showing that it was “arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. ”  Boyle v. Riti, 175 N.J. Super. 158, 166 (App. Div. 1980) (internal citations omitted).  Further, although a person eligible for benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of a pension statute, “eligibility [itself] is not to be liberally permitted. ”  Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] The Negotiated Redevelopment Payment Was Collected In Order To Carry Out The Purposes Of The LRHL And The Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa55 to Pa58).  Along with correctly identifying the two relevant conditions set forth by the LRHL for the acceptance of a negotiated payment by a redeveloper, the lower court correctly concluded that the record established that the Redevelopment Payment satisfied those conditions.  (Pa080).  A sufficient record existed to support the lower court’s findings.  In its Decision, the lower court recognized that the Redevelopment Payment was collected to improve and renovate the Senior Center in [...]’s redevelopment area and that this use furthers the objectives and terms of the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] In addition to the deference that must be provided to the [...]’s consistency review determination, the [...]’s decision to adopt Ordinance 1667 is also entitled to great deference.  There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of all legislative enactments, including municipal ordinances.  *Fanelli v. City of Trenton*, 135 N.J. 582, 589 (1994); see also *Knight v. Hoboken Rent Leveling Bd.*, 332 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 2000) (concluding that the same presumption of validity applies to regulations promulgated by a municipal agency).  A court reviewing an ordinance should not question the wisdom of the ordinance, and if the ordinance is debatable, it should be upheld.  *Bow & Arrow Manor v. Town of West Orange*, 63 N.J. 335 (1973).  The burden of establishing the invalidity of the ordinance is upon the person attacking it.  *Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Twp.*, 37 N.J. 232 (1962).  While the presumption may be rebutted, the affirmative burden placed upon a party seeking to overturn a statute or ordinance is a heavy one.  *Fanelli*, supra, 135 N.J. at 589.
[brief] R. 1.10 imputes conflicts of interests to all lawyers employed by that law firm and states:  RPC 1.10  Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule  (a)  When lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by RPC 1.7 or RPC 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.  [emphasis added].  RPC 1.10.  II.  THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISQUALIFYING [...].
[brief] In the preservation area, DEP “shall give great consideration” to the Highlands Council’s RMP, N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.1(g), as its purpose it to “protect and enhance the significant values of the resources” in the Highlands Region.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(a); N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  DEP is not bound to defer to the Council’s findings or recommendations.  Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], 433 N.J. Super. at 238.  Nor did DEP do so here, only noting that it “received positive comments” from the Council.  (Aa2).  Nonetheless, DEP does consider the comments in the course of its exemption decisions, as it did here.  N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.1(g).  DEP also incorporated the Act’s direction to protect or preserve “the quality and quantity of surface and ground waters, . . . forests, wetlands, vegetated stream corridors, steep slopes, and critical habitat for fauna and flora[,]” N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(1) and (3), into its standards at N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW TO: Chief Law Executives  All Enforcement FROM: [...]  Acting [...], DATE: 4, May 2022 for Training SUBJECT: Requirements 2022 and ICAT  Revising ABLE Policy") ("Revised was issued.  December General Directive  In 2020-13 2020, Attorney training  Active in enforcement officers receive  The law revised to all policy required  Communication Assessment and Bystandership ("ABLE")  Integrating Law for and Enforcement 2021.  31, ("ICAT").  December completed Tactics training  The was by to be necessary as was it  In to June 2021, Directive issued, 2021-7 Attorney General was to undertaking provide the the to extend of April scope 2022.
[brief] This assertion is also flawed for several reasons.  First, nothing in the statute requires that the municipal ordinance adoption procedure be accompanied by discussion by every, or even any, governing body member on the merits of the ordinance.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.  Nothing in the LRHL requires such discussion.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d); N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  Even the actions of a quasi-judicial body under the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) require no discussion.  In Scully-Bozarth, the plaintiff argued that each planning board member must verbally “express his or her findings of fact and conclusions” in making a motion to approve or deny a land use application, and then all members must “debate the matter. ”  Scully-Bozarth Post # 1817 of Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Planning Bd. of City of Burlington, 362 N.J. Super. 296, 311 (App. Div. 2003).
[brief] However, this argument is fallacious, since it was [...]'s original intention, but for the grading error, to continue to own the building and reap rental profits for years.  Additionally, he was able to sell for a profit only after extensive site development had been performed at his expense.  The profit was less than it would be if it could be used for the original concept of retail users at a rental identical to the rents of the new building.  A greater sales price would have netted a greater profit.  Thus, net profit, if any, from the early sale of the [...] to [...] would have only partially mitigated the loss of plaintiff's long-term rental profits or selling value.  In sum, the proximal causal connection between the common knowledge negligence of defendant [...] and plaintiff's economic losses is clear and direct.  Plaintiff's proofs are adequate and sufficient to reach a jury.  The decision of the court below to grant summary judgment against plaintiffs on liability, proximate cause and damages was against the interests of justice and must be reversed.
[brief] The State’s argument that the phrase “so turn” broadly encompasses “mov[ing] right or left upon a roadway” as well as “start[ing] or back[ing]” should therefore be rejected.  Although a lane change involves a “move[ment] right or left upon a roadway,” it is not a “turn” within the meaning of the statute, and thus no signal is required.  Finally, while the State turns to the New Jersey driver manual to bolster its argument (Sb 29-30), that manual is decidedly not law.
[brief] § 40:55D-53(j)  Moreover, since the plans never called for a public street or public road an Engineer would have no reason to inspect them as such.  Indeed the Planning Board Engineer rather pointedly found that the internal roads did not comply with the Municipal zoning plan and that they could not be approved no matter what their condition.  Moreover the issues as to utilities, easements and maintenance was never resolved.  Many cases have suggested that the Borough Engineer must inspect them as well:  The engineer is to inspect the improvements and file with the governing body a “detailed report” “indicating either approval, partial approval or rejection” of the improvements.  Conspicuous by its absence is any suggestion that the engineer will report that the improvements are not complete.  After receipt of the engineer's report the governing body "shall either approve, partially approve or reject the improvements" and notify the obligor of the content of the engineer's report and its determination.  *Barnegat v. DCA of N.J., Inc.*, 181 N.J. Super. 394, 400 (App. Div. 1981)  Plaintiff has simply not satisfied the objective criteria in the statute it relies upon nor submitted adequate proofs that the byroads were inspected as public streets in compliance with the zoning ordinances.  The acceptance of dedication is therefore lawfully impossible, let alone "automatic" as the trial court determined.
[directive] Domestic Violence Incidents Involving Agency Personnel  6.4.1  Law enforcement personnel may become involved in domestic violence incidents.  It is important to the integrity of the agency, the safety of the victim and the career of the officer that such matters are handled appropriately.  Thus, it is imperative that every law enforcement agency establish a policy for investigating and resolving domestic violence complaints involving its employees.  6.4.2  Whenever an officer is involved in a domestic violence incident, either as an alleged perpetrator or as a victim, internal affairs must be promptly notified.  Where the officer was the alleged perpetrator, investigating officers must seize their service weapon or any other weapon possessed, as mandated by AG Directives 2000-3 and 2000-4.  6.4.3  Every law enforcement agency should promulgate a rule which requires any officer or employee to notify the agency if he or she has been charged with an offense, received a motor vehicle summons or been involved in a domestic violence incident.  In cases of domestic violence, the investigating agency should also notify the employing agency's internal affairs investigators as soon as possible.  31
[brief] (1T 33:18-19; 34:1-3).  Access to the site is provided via a new driveway onto Ocean Terrace.  All the proposed units will have addresses consistent with Ocean Terrace.  (1T 34:4-8).  The Application for Development will create the net loss of one public metered parking space.  (1T 34:14-15).  As to lighting, [...] testified there will be lighting provided inside the garage and on the interior driveway.  There will be no lighting on any side of the buildings that are adjacent to neighboring residential structures.  (1T 35:8-22).  [...] testified the Applicant was seeking four variances: two five-foot front setbacks to Porter and Ocean Terrace, where ten feet is required; and requesting variances for density and for building height.
[brief] **Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs. v. N.J. Dep’t of Environmental Protection,** 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 170 N.J. 246 (2001)  ...............................................................................................15  **Doto v. Russo,** 140 N.J. 544 (1995)  ..................................................................................................................27  **Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co.,** 357 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003)  .........................................................................................15  **F.S. v. L.D.,** 362 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 2003) ......................................................................................22  Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432 (2010)
[brief] ”  Db at 6; 1T 40:5-6.  [...] is not a party to the MOU and, as noted on the record, he was obviously referring to the entity, not himself, personally.  [...] himself explained, correctly, “[a] single-purpose entity is assuming the debt. ”  1T 38:14-15.  \textsuperscript{4}  The foreclosure judgment entered on June 20, 2024, awarded an aggregate sum of precisely $47,373,075.98, “together with interest at the rate of 14.5% on the sum of $31,389,798.89, representing the mortgage principal and advances, from February 29, 2024, through the date of this judgment.  . . .”  (Pa2).  days of the MOU, which “the parties shall negotiate in good faith promptly upon the execution hereof. ” (Da29).  Appellants, and their affiliate [...], have sought unilaterally to renounce the MOU.  They portray it as nothing more than an agreement to agree and treat it as having no force or effect.  The Parties Entered the MOU Because Their Prior Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) was Terminated Due to Outside Interference by a Mortgagee.
[directive] I.  Summary of the Body Worn Camera Policy  Attorney General Directive 2015-1, issued almost six years ago, provided an initial set of guidelines for the implementation of BWC programs across New Jersey.  Since that time, law enforcement agencies, county prosecutors and the Office of the Attorney General, have learned valuable lessons on the best practices to be implemented in order to utilize BWCs to build community trust, respect citizen privacy, and maximize the effectiveness of these important tools to promote public safety.  The Legislature recently deemed it appropriate to codify many of the provisions of Directive 2015-1, while mandating the use of BWCs by all “uniformed patrol officers” and requiring the implementation of a number of BWC-related provisions.  The Policy issued today incorporates the legislative command that all “uniformed patrol officers” be equipped with BWCs and expands upon it, directing that a broad range of law enforcement officers engaged in additional functions also be equipped with BWCs.  For example, officers assigned to tactical teams, proactive enforcement teams, canine units, or duties that include regular interaction with the public will generally be required to be equipped with BWCs.  Officers engaged in undercover assignments, administrative duties or working with confidential informants are among those not required to be equipped with BWCs.  Public trust and the transparency of law enforcement activities will be strengthened by recording a wider range of police–citizen encounters, particularly those with a greater likelihood to result in a use-of-force or internal affairs complaint.  Page 3  In addition to expanding the categories of officers required to be equipped with BWCs, the Policy continues a number of provisions from prior Directive 2015-1 that have proven to be best practices, such as the broad requirement that BWCs be activated in almost all police-citizen encounters and supervisory review of BWC recordings to improve officer performance.  The Policy includes a number of new rules, including a requirement that officers, whenever safe and feasible, notify citizens when they are being recorded by a BWC; deactivate a BWC upon the request of a crime victim; and refrain from recording to gather intelligence information based on First Amendment protected speech, associations or religion.  Finally, the Policy prohibits law enforcement officers from reviewing BWC recordings prior to preparing initial police reports in most cases; incorporates longer retention periods for BWC recordings; provides additional opportunities for the subjects of BWC recordings to review the evidence; and provides for disciplinary action against those who violate the Policy.  The Body Worn Camera Policy is the latest provision of New Jersey’s Excellence in Policing program, designed to continue the process of building public trust by promoting professionalism, enhancing transparency, and ensuring accountability across the law enforcement profession.
[brief] The protected class continues to suffer harm insofar as [...]’s zoning ordinances are in violation of the New Jersey constitution, and allowing [...] to exclude the Property from consideration for affordable housing will continue to cause great harm.  Plaintiff has offered the Property for an inclusionary development and has filed a builder’s remedy litigation in which [...] has been deemed significantly noncompliant.  The balance of hardship overwhelmingly favors Plaintiff and the protected class it represents.
[brief] Plainly, one does.  As stated in *Daniel v. Oakland*, 124 N.J. Super. 69, 72 (App. Div.1973), "(c)harges by a municipality for water furnished to its customers involve a sale and arise from a contractual relationship between it and the customer."  ***  It is now well established that contracts between the State, or its subdivisions, and individuals are "within the protection of Article I, sec. 10."  (Law Div. 1979)(additional citations omitted).  Water service contracts are entitled to the protection provided by the Federal and State Constitutions, both prohibiting laws impairing the obligation of contract:\footnote{Daniel v. Borough of Oakland, 124 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1973).}
[brief] There is also no reason to believe the more modern survey and metes and bounds description in the 2015 and 2016 documents, prepared for and based upon a Land Use Board Approved Subdivision, would be inaccurate or less accurate than any older attempts to measure the size of the lots.  562a.  It was error for the trial court to conclude there was inquiry/constructive notice as a matter of law without having considered the expert’s opinion on the issue, particularly given the convoluted manner in which the court expected [...] to calculate his lot size to be different than that which appeared on a recorded municipally approved subdivision, several deeds, and his own survey.
[brief] ***  As I look at a review of the title, and the actions that were taken subsequent to the conveyance, I’m convinced that the parties intended that both the riparian rights and grants, and all interest, were to have been conveyed.  Specifically the Court notes that there was no exclusions in the deeds, rather the Court finds that the [...] tract was conveyed by use of the terms, quote/unquote riparian rights.  And notes that the deed contained therein a together with clause.  So, the together with clause encompassed, in the Court’s view, the intent of the parties to convey all the rights that existed in the deed.  This together with language was employed when the tract was conveyed from [...] to [...], and then it was incorporated into the conveyances of Keansburg Heights to [...] and from [...] to [...], Inc.  So it was, in the Court’s view, conveying not just simply the uplands right in the property, but the together with, and quoted from the language of the deed, together with such riparian rights and other rights, privileges and franchises, in and to the lands laying under the waters of the Raritan Bay, in front of and adjoining the above-described premises, as are now vested in [...].  And that’s reflected in J-3.  So that language certainly was utilized in connection with the chain of title that went from Keansburg to [...], same together with clause.  And similar language as reflected in the exhibit J-5.  Let me quote in part, all the estates, rights, title interest, property claims and demands whatsoever of the said party of the first party of and in and the same to every part and parcel thereof.  So, it clearly is the Court’s view that the intent of these conveyances was to convey both the riparian grants and the riparian rights.  The view to the contrary kinds of defies reason.  It is unlikely that there would have been the retention of lands underwater without having the uplands and the adjoining properties.  In fact, there would have been no practical way to access riparian lands under water...  (9T9-11)