ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The CFA Applies to Marketing, Sale and Procurement of Insurance.  (T23:13 to 24:16; T28:21 to 29:4).  “The CFA was enacted to ‘provide[ ] relief to consumers from fraudulent practices in the market place. ’”  Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50 (2017) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC, 203 N.J. 496, 521 (2010)).  The CFA is “applied broadly in order to accomplish its remedial purpose, namely, to root out consumer fraud. ”  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 121 (2014) (quoting Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 576 (2011)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp. of Am., held that the CFA “is ample enough to encompass the sale of insurance policies as goods and services that are marketed to consumers. ”  150 N.J. 255, 265 (1997).  As alleged in the Complaint, Defendants engaged in unconscionable commercial practices, deception, fraud, false promises and omission of material facts in the marketing, sale and procurement of the disability insurance policies, and in the processing of claims made by Plaintiff, in violation of the CFA.  (Pa26-Pa27, Pa32-Pa44, Pa60-Pa62).  The acts and omissions alleged in the Complaint give rise to valid causes of action against the Defendants under the CFA.  Blanket immunity for insurance producers from liability under the CFA cannot be reconciled with Lemelledo’s confirmation that the sale of insurance policies falls within the scope of the CFA.
[directive] Obstructing Actor obstructs or impairs or attempts to prevent public servant from performing official Administration of function by force, intimidation or other unlawful act; disorderly persons offense (This 2C:29-1(a)(b)  Law or other Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible excludes the element of actor obstructing investigation or prosecution of a crime – which Governmental would make it a fourth degree).  Function  Actor purposely prevents or attempts to prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting an 2C:29-2a(1)
[directive] N.J.S.A. to pursuant Courts the 39 Page be decision charging the require that to construed be shall subsection in Nothing this assistant the assessment, and risk pretrial automated preliminary of a benefit the without made the postpone to elect supervisory officer may designated or general, attorney deputy prosecutor, risk-assessment pretrial preliminary automated of the results pending the decision charging of 12 hours officer within judicial or judge a to presented matter is the that provided process, 3:4-1.  Rule by required as arrest a Violent Crime. for Delinquent Adjudicated Recently Was Defendant 4.5.7 years ten within last the if acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency enforcement law  A crime or firearm, involving a a a crime for delinquent adjudicated was juvenile as a defendant the 2C:43-7.2, N.J.S.A. Act, Release Early to
[brief] Appellant has argued in the Trial Court and again on appeal that the Township failed to adopt the Redevelopment Plan in a “transparent manner,” which resulted in the public being “in the dark. ”  Pb1.  Appellant argues the “record” on which enactment of the Redevelopment Plan was based is comprised solely of the comments of Township Counsel, “without any evidence in the record. ”  Pb1.  Appellants arguments are not supported by the substantial legislative and factual record and are contrary to both the requirements of the Redevelopment Law and legal standards applicable to judicial review of municipal legislative enactments such as the Redevelopment Plan.  Such enactments are entitled to a presumption of validity, and Appellant has failed to overcome that presumption.  Nothing in Appellant’s Brief and/or citations to the record provides any basis for the Court to disturb either the Committee’s lawful adoption of the Redevelopment Plan or the Trial Court’s Order granting summary judgment and dismissing Appellant’s Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.
[brief] 4T69:9-14.  I do find that [...] was a trained dog for the most part.  There was numerous certifications that were taken into consideration by the Court.  Canine certification's Good Boy\(^5\), I think, were certifications and things of that nature and that it was highly trained 4T69-9:14.  The principal objective "of statutory interpretation is to determine and give meaning to the Legislature's intent."
[brief] (Pa72).  Further, [...] explained that only active PERS members could purchase service credit pursuant to the plain language of the applicable regulation, N.J.A.C. 17:2-5.1.  (Pa72-73).  Because [...]’s retirement benefits had long become due and payable, she was no longer an active PERS member, thus, could not purchase service credit anymore.  *Ibid.*  On or about April 28, 2023, [...], through her attorney, wrote to appeal the Division’s decision of recalculating her retirement benefits and denying her request to purchase service credit.
[brief] See also fn. 6, supra ([...]’s testimony in this case).  One of the articles reviewed by [...] confirms that “Chronic conditions have a much greater impact, numerically, on human health in general, and induce diverse and powerful toxic effects…. some are carcinogenic… and neurotoxic. ”  Trial Exhibit D-20, Da1347.  The “neurotoxic” consequences (demyelinating disease) of [...]’s chronic exposure to mold remained unknown and were not detected until the psychological and neurological testing conducted after the spring of 2009, when the additional testing led to [...]’s opinions and her “differential diagnosis” of [...]’s brain-related injury and its relationship to his chronic exposure to mold.
[brief] See Inside Cover)  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN: LAW DIVISION, ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...]  (I/P/A “[...]”)  CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI  PC  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent Crisdel Group, Inc.  (i/p/a “Crisdel Construction”)  105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, New Jersey  07068 [...]  [...]  [...]  Date Submitted: July 29, 2024  [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], and [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[directive] d.  Firing positions are as indicated in the course.  Note: Bolt action rifles:  After each shot the shooter must work the action of the bolt to chamber the next round.  Alibis - Should the observer call a “miss” the shooter may immediately fire another round.  If the second round scores no penalty will be incurred, even if original time limit lasped.  (This does not apply to the “cold bore” shot)  If the shooter did not follow through and is not ready to fire a “follow-up” round, the shooter will not be given an “alibi”.  9-71
[brief] In his offense report, [...] stated that before the motor vehicle stop the C.I.D. units received information that a male in a Kia was “in possession of a firearm. ”  (Da 25; 1T 22-5 to 22-11)  At the motion hearing, which took place months later, [...] testified that the C.I.D. units received from [...] information that the male in the Kia was “wearing a fanny pack with a .44 magnum inside of it. ”  (1T 8-5 to 8-15; 1T 26-18 to 26-25)  This was a critical discrepancy because, as [...] testified, his basis for identifying [...] as the subject of the tip was that [...] “was wearing the fanny pack as described by the C.I. ”  (1T 14-16 to 14-19; 1T 26-18 to 26-25)  As [...] argued below, [...]’s failure to include in his report that critical detail – that the male with the gun was said to be wearing a fanny pack – casts grave doubt on the credibility of [...]’s claim that [...] relayed that detail to the C.I.D. units because it was part of the C.I.’s tip.  Although [...] was the only one with personal knowledge as to whether the C.I.’s tip had in fact contained that critical detail, the State did not call [...] as a witness or produce [...]’s supplemental report.  Despite the lack of corroboration for [...]’s incredible claim that he inexplicably left that critical detail out of his report, the court credited [...]’s testimony in its entirety.  In denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration, trial court continued to credit [...]’s testimony in its entirety even though [...]’s supplemental report had finally been produced and failed to corroborate [...]’s testimony regarding the fanny pack.  Rather, like the offense report that [...] wrote on the day of the incident, [...]’s supplemental report indicated that [...] received information from “a confidential source stating that a male inside a gold Kia Optima was armed with a firearm. ”  (Da 26)  It is clear from that [...]’s supplemental report that the C.I. did not describe the male in the Kia as “wearing a fanny pack with a .44 magnum inside of it,” as [...] claimed at the suppression hearing.  Nevertheless, in denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court found that [...]’s supplemental report was “consistent with what Detective [...] testified to on the date of the motion hearing. ”  (2T 15-19 to 15-23)  That finding was "so clearly mistaken" that the court’s order denying reconsideration must be reversed.  *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014)(observing that a reviewing court should not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are "so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Additionally, because the credibility of [...]’s testimony regarding the contents of the tip was critical to the validity of the frisk, the evidence found in the bag must be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search.  *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution guarantee “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. ”  U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.  The New Jersey Constitution affords a greater level of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than under the United States Constitution.  See State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 541 (2008); State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 537-38 (2006); State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639, 648-51 (2002).
[brief] M128.  As a result of its execution of the Settlement Agreement in the DJ Action, the Township obtained a Judgment of Compliance and Repose on October 5, 2016.  M131.  Indeed, the Township expressly relied upon the affordable units allocated to the Subject Property when it entered into the Settlement Agreement and obtained the subsequent Judgment of Compliance and Repose in the Township’s DJ Action.  M134.  Zoning Board Applications
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ANALYZED THE OVERALL MERITS OF THE PLAINTIFF / APPELLANT APPEAL – AND THERE IS NO REASON TO DISTURN THE TRIAL COURT DECISION  It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court properly and thoroughly reviewed all aspects of the Plaintiff / Appellant Case, as well as all aspects of the positions of the two Respondents.  The arguments presented herein were soundly and definitively reviewed by the Trial Court.  A synopsis of some of the more salient Trial Court Findings / Statements / Conclusions include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:  •  The dispute between [...] and [...] is long-standing and, fundamentally, revolves around warring visions of an existent public parking lot adjacent to the [...] Amusement Park.
[brief] WHY IS THE ORDER AND OTHERS LIKE IT SO CONCERNING TO AMICUS CURIAE?  | 5 | | A.  Protective Orders Do Not Protect Against the Theft of Irrelevant Information in Produced ESI | 6 | | B.  The Order and Others Like It Threaten Real Harm to the Proprietary and Privacy Interests of Third Parties | 8 | | II.  THE ORDER CONTRAVENES EXISTING RULES | 12 | | III.  THE COURT’S REVERSAL OF THE ORDER IS URGENTLY NECESSARY | 15 | | CONCLUSION | 15
[brief] (26T51:1 to 52:23).  Also, the trial court adopted the Plaintiffs’ theory as to the division of labor between [...] and [...], concluding: “[[...]] was the scientist.  There is no doubt in my mind he was out of this [financial] loop. ” (27T86:16-17).  The trial court also explained that [...]’s analysis “had to be done to trace the monies going all over the place and not into Mr. [...]’s pocket. ” (27T86:13-15).  In the end, the trial court identified 9 diversion transactions for which the Plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proof:
[brief] In addition, it is significant that [...] originally asked the trial court in its motion to order payment of delay penalties to [...], as opposed to a credit as the Settlement Agreement provides if the [...] or Board failed to timely act.  Such shows that [...] was not trying to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement as it claimed.  Finally, there was and could not be any argument that the [...], which is an entity distinct from the [...], defaulted on any obligation under the Agreement.  As such, there was no basis for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs or delay penalties against the [...].  CONCLUSION
[brief] Appellant Established a Prima Facie Case for Foreclosure. **  The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment because Appellant established its prima facie case for foreclosure.  The purpose of a foreclosure action is to determine the right to foreclosure and the amount due on the mortgage, and to give the purchaser at the foreclosure sale the title and estate acquired by the mortgagee, as well as the estate of the mortgagor . . . free from subsequent encumbrances.  *Cent. Penn Nat’l Bank v. Stonebridge, Ltd.*, 185 N.J. Super. 289, 302 (Ch. Div. 1982) (citation omitted).  The “only material issues in a foreclosure proceeding are the validity of the mortgage, the amount of the indebtedness, and the right of the mortgagee to resort to the mortgaged premises” for satisfaction of the indebtedness.  *Great Falls Bank v. Pardo*, 263 N.J. Super. 388, 394 (Ch. Div. 1993), *aff’d*, 273 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1994).  Accordingly, a prima facie case for foreclosure is established once the plaintiff proves “the execution, recording, and non-payment of the mortgage. ”  *Thorpe v. Floremoore Corp.*, 20 N.J. Super. 34, 37 (App. Div. 1952).  As to the first element, in connection with this Cross-Motion, Appellant demonstrated that Borrowers executed the Note and the Mortgage.  (Pa432 at ¶1, 3.)  Appellant also proved the second element for a prima facie case for foreclosure: proper recording.  The Mortgage and the assignments were properly recorded in the Office of the Clerk of Essex County.  (Pa432-34 at ¶¶4, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23.)  Lastly, with respect to the default prong, [...], who is the Contested Default Case Manager for the current servicer of the loan on behalf of Appellant, certified that the loan has been in default since December 1, 2020.  (Pa435 at ¶32.)  Respondent cannot dispute any of these facts.  As such, the undisputed facts and applicable law show that Appellant established a prima facie case for foreclosure and is entitled to summary judgment.  Furthermore, Appellant complied with the notice of intention requirements set forth in the Fair Foreclosure Act of the State of New Jersey, N.J.S.A. §§ 2A:50-53 to -68 (“FFA”).  On September 27, 2022, [...] served Borrowers with the Notices of Intention via regular and certified mail in accordance with the FFAA.  (Pa435 at ¶34.)  CONCLUSION
[brief] See Ja2192, 2197.  And, in this data-licensing, it acts nothing like, and is treated nothing like, the news media.  As one example of its strict terms, [...] terminal subscribers may use the services “solely for its internal business purposes. ”  Ja2200 (§ 10(b)).  A terminal subscriber cannot recirculate any analysis or visible material “except for internal purposes without the prior written consent of”  [...] Finance L.P.  Id.  And [...] Finance L.P. requires subscribers to: use the [data] solely for its internal use and benefit and not for resale or other transfer or disposition to, or use by or for the benefit of, any other person or entity Ja2192 (§ 4(a)).
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12.  Conditions placed upon release of certain defendants a.  When a defendant charged with a sex offense is released from custody before trial on bail or personal recognizance, the court authorizing the release may, as a condition of release, issue an order prohibiting the defendant from having any contact with the victim including, but not limited to, restraining the defendant from entering the victim’s residence, place of employment or business or school, and from harassing or stalking the victim or the victim’s relatives in any way.
[brief] D'Alessandro v. Hartzel, 422 N.J. Super. 575, 579, 29 A.3d 1112 (App. Div. 2011).  "Under the common law of premises liability, a landowner owes increasing care depending on whether the visitor is a trespasser, licensee or social guest, or business invitee."  Sussman v. Mermer, 373 N.J. Super. 501, 504, 862 A.2d 572 (2004); see also Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 209 N.J. 35, 43, 34 A.3d 1248 (2012) (explaining the common law classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser).  Under the duty element, a property owner owes a business invitee "reasonable care to make the premises safe, including the duty to conduct a reasonable inspection to discover defective conditions."  D'Alessandro, 422 N.J. Super. at 579.  Thus, the owner owes an affirmative duty to inspect the premises and is "require[d] . . . to discover and eliminate dangerous conditions, to maintain the premises in safe condition, and to avoid creating conditions that would render the premises unsafe."  Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559, 563, 818 A.2d 314 (2003) (citing O'Shea v. K. Mart Corp., 304 N.J. Super. 489, 492-93, 701 A.2d 475 (App. Div. 1997)).  [emphasis added].  In the present matter, it is clear that Plaintiff was a business invitee.
[brief] Procedural History .......................................................................................................  1 Statement of Facts .........................................................................................................  1 Legal Argument ...........................................................................................................  3  I.  THE DECISION OF THE ARBITRATOR  CONSTITUTES  PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND/OR THE IMPERFECT EXECUTION OF A FINAL AND DEFINITE AWARD ............  3  (Raised below: T10:13-19)  A.  Medically Necessary and Causally Related Medical Expense Benefits Must be Paid Pursuant to the New Jersey PIP Fee Schedule .................................................................  6  (Raised below: Pa15; Pca160-166; Pa38-39; T5:4-6:8; T10:13-11:4)  Conclusion .....................................................................................................................
[directive] The defendant at the time of the present offense was less than 26 years of age or the current offense involved an aggregate amount of controlled substances less than one-quarter of the amount needed to 9 9  3.  Yes No establish a second-degree crime pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (e.g., 3.54 grams of heroin, cocaine or methamphetamine; 1.25 lbs of marijuana, etc.).  4.  The defendant has not been convicted on two or more separate occasions for a fourth degree crime or a 9 9  4.  Yes No third degree crime defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.  5.
[brief] According to the report of Plaintiffs’ obstetrical expert, [...], MD, the fetal monitoring strips became concerning with a pattern of decreased variability and subtle late decelerations, which required [...] and [...] to call for an emergency C-Section at 9:48pm.  (Pa621; Pa227).  At his deposition, Dr. Luciani confirmed there was no reason for anyone to call for a C-Section before 9:48pm.  (Pa230; Pa236).  He also acknowledged that even after such a call is made, an emergency C-Section requires a certain amount of time to arrange for and gather the necessary medical providers in the operating room, including anesthesia, such that an emergency delivery within the standard of care should be able to be accomplished within 10 to 15 minutes.  (Pa223).  Discovery confirmed [...] was not in the patient’s room precisely at 9:48pm, nor required to be, but saw the strips at approximately 9:53pm and appropriately discussed them with [...] in a five minute call between 9:58pm-10:03pm, as documented by telephone records and [...]’s note in the hospital record at 10:05pm.
[brief] Execution of sentence was stayed pending appeal.  8T10-4/7, 15-23/25.  [...] timely filed a Notice of Appeal with Superior Court, Law Division, Ocean County.  Da7a-8a.  The appeal was heard on March 6, 2024, when the Hon. [...], J.S.C., reserved decision.  9T15-17/18.  Later that day, he issued a Memorandum Opinion (Da9a-24a).  On April 16, 2024, he convicted [...] and imposed the same sentence as that imposed in the municipal court.  Da25a; see 10T4-1/3, 10T6-19/7-8.  The court received [...]’s driver’s license and executed sentence.  10T7-9/13.  A request for a stay of execution of sentence was denied.  10T11-11/13.  [...] filed a Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement with this Court (Da26a-33a), which docketed the appeal (Da34a-35a).  Transcripts were transmitted (Da36a) and a Scheduling Order entered (Da37a-38a).  **FACTS**
[brief] On May 16, 2017, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., of the Law Division, issued an Order that the Appellant’s counsel had represented at oral argument that the crossclaims filed against the [...] and [...] were withdrawn.  Accordingly, Judge Claypoole dismissed the claims against those Parties with prejudice.  As for the [...], Judge Claypoole dismissed the wrongful eviction claims with prejudice and denied their motion to dismiss the Appellant’s counterclaims.  Specifically, the Appellant’s counterclaims alleged that the [...] negligently damaged the Property.  With this allegation, the [...] attempted to dismiss the Appellant’s counterclaim under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  The Court ruled in that instance that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to the negligence claims at the time because [...]’s earlier decision did not encompass the negligence cause of action and there was no substantive discussion as to the issue.  (Pa 57a-61a.)  4.  **June 2018 Law Division Ruling**
[brief] See Pa364a et seq.  Plaintiffs asserted, for the first time, that [...] was either a lay witness to offer “opinions” in this action, or was somehow qualified, retroactively, as a previously undisclosed “expert” who had never rendered a report.  After comprehensive briefing and oral argument, this Court entered a comprehensive Opinion and Order on December 7, 2022, dismissing the remaining claims and terminating this action.  Pa3.  A. [...] Could Not Testify as an “Expert”
[brief] That comprehensive statutory framework recognizes that not all injuries to employees in the course of their employment will be satisfied through worker’s compensation insurance alone.  Our Supreme Court has established the "substantial-certainty test" for determining an intentional wrong under the WCA.  See Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449, 461 (2012).  "In adopting a 'substantial-certainty' standard," the Court "acknowledge[d] that every undertaking, particularly certain business judgments, involve some risk, but that willful employer misconduct was not meant to go undeterred.