ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The determination of the existence of a duty is, of course, a question of law to be decided by the Court.  It is well-settled that a lawyer does not owe a duty of care to a third-party non-client unless “the lawyer or (with the lawyer’s acquiescence) the lawyer’s client invites the non-client to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of other legal services, the non-client so relies, and the non-client is not, under applicable law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to protection. ”  Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 483 (1994) (citations omitted).  The Petrillo case, unlike anything that is alleged to have occurred in this case, involved an attorney who received two septic system soil test reports for a property being sold by his client, prepared a composite report that omitted any mention of the unsuccessful percolation tests listed in one of the underlying reports, and knowingly allowed the buyer and buyer’s attorney to rely on the incomplete test data when negotiating to purchase the property.  *Id.* at 475.  Here, of course, no such circumstances exist.  Not even remotely.  Quite the opposite, Appellants testified unequivocally that they never received any advice or information from [...], that [...] never made any representation to them about the parties’ deal, the McTague property, or [...], and that they barely knew who [...] was.  See, *supra*, pages 4-7.  It is therefore impossible to conclude that [...] or [...] owed any duty of care to Appellants.
[brief] “The determination of what constitutes conduct unbecoming a public employee is primarily a question of law. ”  Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. at 553 citing Jones v. City of Pittsburgh, 505 Pa. 25, 476 A.2d 895, 898 (1984).  In this case, at least two witnesses testified that [...] asked for and subsequently obtained [...]’s permission to address the lineup.
[brief] From its motion for a stay in the Trial Court, through its motion for leave to appeal from the Trial Court’s March 15, 2024 Order, Da49; Da397; and its motion for a stay of the March 15, 2024 Order in this Court, Da400, the only issue Defendant has raised on appeal is the Trial Court’s imposition of the reformation remedy.  Defendant has not challenged the Trial Court’s imposition of the specific performance remedy, Da361.  Nor has Defendant challenged any of the Trial Court’s factual findings in this matter.  As set forth above, sitting as a Court of Equity, the Trial Court properly found that Defendant must affirm its obligations under the Redevelopment Agreement.  When its holding to remedy that breach—specific performance—failed, the Trial Court, by necessity, reformed the subject agreements to achieve a just result.
[brief] Da 15 to 18  Model Jury Instruction on Self-Defense .................................................................  Da 19 to 22  Model Jury Instruction on “Intruder” Self-Defense ................................................  Da 23 to 25  Sentencing Letter/Memo From Trial Defense Counsel\(^1\).................................  Da 26 to 27 \(^1\)  While R. 2:6-1(a)(2) normally forbids the inclusion of trial-court briefs in the appendix, this short sentencing letter is nevertheless included because it is the only place in the record where trial defense counsel suggests certain specific mitigating factors.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[directive] This is not to suggest that a person serving as a courier or off- loader might not be subject to Aggravating Factor #4b by being a member, for example, of a criminal organization.  The prosecutor in deciding whether to award points under any of the aggravating factors grouped under the “Organization” Aggravating Factor Category should consider the defendant’s actual involvement and participation in organizational activities, and not just the specific task that the defendant was engaged in at the time of his or her arrest.  The Guidelines clearly require that all “relevant conduct” be considered in determining the defendant’s culpability.  See Section 3.1.  However, Aggravating Factor #4b should not be applied unless the prosecutor is aware of facts that reasonably suggest that the defendant was more than a low-level employee or was not just serving as the functional equivalent of an “independent contractor” of a commercial distribution scheme.
[brief] The court compounded this error by adopting [...]’s one-sided and cumulative recitation of facts that purportedly supported [...]’s supposed comprehension of its termination from coverage.  However, even if [...] could legally delegate its notice obligations, the convoluted series of emails and conversations used to support the holding that [...] was aware of cancellation from the CCIP hardly met the settled “specific and clear” standard for conveying notice of coverage termination to an insured.  The communications relied upon by the Law Division were also conclusively rebutted by subsequently generated documentation issued to [...] advising it of its continued status as an insured under the [...] CCIP policies, and by the unrefuted testimony of [...]’s Chief Operating Officer that the documentation led it to believe that it remained insured under the [...] policy when the underlying accident occurred.  This is hardly the stuff of which summary judgments are made – especially ones that result in the denial of insurance coverage for a catastrophic liability.  The fortuity that [...] had other coverage available to it from [...] and plaintiff, [...], is not a mitigating factor.  [...] just as easily might not have had other coverage, potentially leading to financially devastating consequences – not only for it, but for the injured party.  Ultimately, the error below is one of perspective.  The court improperly focused on the non-party sponsoring contractor’s purported ability to decide which subcontractors could participate in the CCIP.  Such a contractual analysis might have been appropriate before [...] became a “named insured” on the [...] policy.  However, once [...] assumed insured status, the analytical focus shifted to [...]’s obligations as [...]’s insurer, such as giving it notice of cancellation as required by law and the policy.  [...]’s admissions that it covered [...] and that it did not give [...] notice that it was cancelling its coverage established [...]’ right to summary judgment, requiring reversal of the orders under review.
[brief] Next, the defendant argues if the Morris County charges are included within the terms “present offense” and “any pending charge,” it would render the term “present offense” superfluous and unnecessary.  (Db9-Db10).  Further, the defendant claims if the State’s interpretation of the statute is taken, it would give a new meaning to the term “pending offense” in factors a(5) and a(7).  (Db9).  Defendant asserts his firearm possession charge “must still be pending at the time [the] defendant seeks admission to Recovery Court” for the term “pending charge” under factors a(5) and a(7) to apply.  (Db10).  Relying on State v. Ancrum, 449 N.J. Super. 526, 528 (App. Div. 2017), the defendant attempts to bridge the gap between the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14b and the term “pending charge” as it is used in factors a(5) and a(7).  (Db11).  Specifically, the defendant states because the Ancrum Court held “that a ‘pending charge’ under subsection (a)(7) refers [to] pending charges other than the present offense on which a defendant seeks admission to Recovery Court, the phrase “pending charge” in subsection a(5) must also refer to charges other than the present offense on which a defendant seeks admission to Recovery Court. ”  (Db12).  According to the defendant, the term “any pending charge,” despite the broad implication of the word “any,” refers solely to the Essex County firearm charges.  Even with that interpretation, the defendant is still barred from entry into the Recovery Court program as it was established that he physically possessed a firearm during the Essex County case through his guilty plea and subsequent conviction.  If the Morris County offenses occurred after the Essex County firearm case concluded, the defendant’s firearm conviction would not bar his entry into the Recovery Court program under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14b.  However, even though his Recovery Court appeal was initiated after the firearms conviction, the physical act of unlawful possession of a firearm in Essex County occurred while the Morris County charges, which form the basis of the Recovery Court appeal, were still pending.  The Ancrum Court’s determination also does not support the defendant’s position that because the Essex County firearm conviction occurred before the initiation of the Morris County Recovery Court appeal, it is no longer a “pending charge” barring him from the program by the time the Recovery Court appeal was commenced.
[brief] (2T11-13 to 16).  At approximately 2:00 p.m., officers observed a white BMW X5 with New York license plates enter the CVS parking lot and park near [...]’s and [...]’ truck.  (2T11-20 to 23).  Defendant stepped out of the BMW and walked directly over to [...] and [...] who were outside of the truck.  (2T15-7 to 13).  After speaking briefly, [...] and defendant left in their vehicles and traveled next door to the [...] apartment building complex.  (2T15-15 to 18).  The police followed them.  (2T15-21 to 16-4).  At approximately 2:10 p.m., [...] and defendant parked their vehicles next to each other on [...].
[brief] The plaintiff testified that the text message with the bathroom estimate was from a contractor he had introduced [...] to, and that he was simply relaying the estimate for him.  (7T144:1-147:6; 8T6:3-7:24; Pa233).  He denied working, and stated that the photos of him on the ATV showed that he was still trying to live his life (8T18:17-19:6) several years after the incident at [...].  He testified that the photos with the ladder and chain saw were taken in 2021 and were an effort by him to try to impress his then future in-laws by helping them to take down a tree on their property (8T8:17-10:24).  He testified that he is able to perform small projects with short periods of exertion (8T9:23-10:25), but that he has not worked since the incident at [...] (7T142:15-17).
[brief] [...] claimed that she never received the two estimates dated May 25, 2021, but she admitted that she knew if she had retired in September 1 or October 1, 2021, she would lack the requisite ten years of service credit to receive group life insurance benefits after retirement.  (Pa91).  The Board found no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and denied [...]’s request for administrative hearing at its meeting of July 19, 2023.
[brief] ”)  Also see, Rule 1:4-8, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, RPC 3.1  Meritorious Claims and Contentions, RPC 3.2  Expediting Litigation, RPC 3.3  Candor Toward the Tribunal, RPC 3.4  Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel, RPC 8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct, and RPC 8.4 Misconduct.
[brief] (3)  **Whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy;**  Until the March 25, 2024 Motion to Stay the Proceeding was filed, [...] had pursued a litigation strategy based on the premise that there was no contract between the Parties.  This is reflected within his Answer, Interrogatory responses, and responses to [...]’s Request for Admissions.  On March 11, 2024, [...] provided its responses to [...]’s Supplemental Notice to Produce which included a copy of the subject Contract.  Db7, Da063.  On March 14, 2024, [...], [...]’s personal friend and the jobsite supervisor for the subject project, was deposed.  [...]’s counsel appeared in person.  [...] unambiguously testified in that hearing upon being presented with the PD: “This agreement was prepared by Mr. [...]. ”  Pa020.  [...] filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration one week later.  [...]’s strategy to deny the existence of any contract with [...] was rendered untenable by [...]’s testimony.  After [...]’s deposition he could no longer deny his knowledge and/or awareness of said contract’s existence (a position which itself was inconsistent with the admission in his Answer that he prepared the Contract).  The fact that [...] sought a new forum within a week of his deception being revealed is telling.  It is clear that [...] is looking to escape to a new, friendlier forum and, perhaps, a second bite at the apple.
[brief] In *State v. Case* 220 N.J. 49 (2014), the Court once again considered the statement of reasons provided in a sentencing.  N.J. 49 (2014).  It again took issue with the adequacy of the statement of reasons for the factors found by the lower court.  *Id.* at 64-65.  The Court noted that, In determining the appropriate sentence to impose within the range, judges first must identify any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in *N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b)* that apply to the case.  *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. 57, 72, 85 A.3d 923 (2014).  The finding of any factor must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.  *[Id. at 64.]*  The Court indicated that the lower court found factors which were not supported by the record, over emphasized, or not adequately explained.  *Id.* at 66-68.  It placed particular emphasis again on the need to explain seemingly inconsistent factors.  *Id.* at 68.  Additionally, the Court emphasized the need to address each mitigating factor raised by the defense.  "At his sentencing, defendant presented nine mitigating factors for the court's consideration, and yet the court addressed only three, finding mitigating factor seven and rejecting mitigating factors two and five."  *Id.* at 69.  Mitigating factors that "are called to the court's attention" should not be ignored, *State v. Blackmon*, 202 N.J. 283, 297, 997 A.2d 194 (2010), and when "amply based in the record . . . , they must be found," *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504, 867 A.2d 1167 (2005).
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM LAW  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM; AN ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION, ENTERED ON NOVEMBER 17, 2023, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER DISCHARGING RECEIVER AND THE OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER DENYING MOTION TO INTERVENE AND DISCHARGING THE RECEIVER SAT BELOW:  HON.
[brief] Instead, [...] based its claim of ownership on a certain final tax foreclosure decree dated October 23, 1939, and recorded on October 25, 1939, in Deed Book 1806, page 403 (Pa949).  This deed contains four tracts of land of which the fourth tract includes the following description:  FOURTH TRACT: THE property covered by the Certificate of Tax Sale described in the fourth paragraph herein, being property located on the North side of Beachway, on the Official Tax Map of the Borough of [...] on the Tax Duplicate of the said Municipality particularly described as follows, viz; BEGINNING at a point in the Northerly side of Beachway, formerly known as Ocean Avenue and in the Easterly line of Property of [...] and [...] which said beginning point is the Easterly side of Lot number Twenty three and the Westerly side of Lot Number Twenty four in Block number 9 on the Official Tax Map of the Borough of [...] if extended Northerly to the Northerly side of said street, and from thence, running: (1) Northerly on a continuation of said line, and along the Easterly side of property of Ryan and Preziozi, be the distance what it may, to the high water line of Raritan Bay, thence; (2) Easterly along said high water line, be the distance what it may to a one-foot reservation between property of [...] and Property owned now or formerly by the [...], thence; (3) Southerly along said one foot reservation, be the distance what it may to the northerly side of Beachway, thence; (4)
[brief] The court’s reasoning misses the point of Miller factor one.  It is not that teenagers cannot intellectually understand the nature of their actions or the risks that they carry, but that they are more likely to make risky, ill-considered, and impulsive decisions – especially in the presence of peers.  (5T:37-17 to 22)  A failure to understand the nature of the crime would, of course, raise the question of capacity and the ability to even be held legally culpable.  What our caselaw recognizes is that while teenagers are responsible for their actions, their immaturity makes them less culpable than adults.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by focusing its analysis of [...]’s proffered testimony on the standard of care applicable to [...] and the other defendants.  Plaintiffs urge that the trial court should have either: 1) Concluded, against all evidence in the record, that all of the defendants had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition on the road surface and simply failed to do anything about it; or 2) presumed an ethereal standard of care required [...] to inspect the entire road for pre-existing conditions such as by having a construction inspector identify “inadequate tapering.
[brief] And yet, [...] had a month between February 9, 2016 and March 8, 2016 to discuss the identification of the suspect with his brother [...], and [...] had seventeen months of exposure to other opinions before she made her identification on August 11, 2017.  Sixth, when there is no “recording” of the relevant conversations about eyewitness confidence, “defendants will not need to offer proof of suggestive behavior tied to a system variable to get a pretrial hearing. ”  *Anthony*, 237 N.J. at 233.  See also *L.H.*, 239 N.J. at 29 (given “the failure to record,” the court must hold “a *Wade* hearing to inquire into the reliability of the identification” evidence).
[brief] The exchange is as follows:  [...]:  Usted tiene el derecho a consultar con un abogado y tenerlo presente durante su interrogatorio.  Entiende usted este derecho?  (You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present while you are being questioned.  Do you understand this right?)  [...]: Si, pero solamente quiero algo decir ahí.  Eh si yo prácticamente como yo no, yo vengo de otro, de otro país para acá no sé si el abogado me lo proporciona ustedes o tengo que yo buscar por mis medios un abogado?  (Yes, but I just want to say something there.  Eh yes like basically like I do not, I come from another, another country to here I do not know if you guys assign an attorney to me or I have to look for an attorney on my own?)  [(Pa30)]  [...]’s question is unlike the questions asked by the suspects in Alston and Messino because [...] was plainly not asking “for advice about what the detective thought that defendant should do. ”
[brief] The court correctly charged the jury, pursuant to Litton Industries v. IMO Industries, 200 N.J. 372, 393-394 (2009), with regard to the issue of recollection of medical testimony and counsel’s argument about the testimony, as follows:  “The lawyers are here as advocates for their clients.  And throughout the course of the trial, they’ve given you statements as to their views of the evidence in favor of their client’s position.  In this case in particular, there were comments made about medical issues and the medical testimony that you heard.  If any of the attorneys have said anything about the medical testimonials [sic] presented to you that isn’t consistent with the testimony you heard, you should disregard it.  It is your recollection of the evidence that controls, not comments made by the attorneys or the Court that would be in conflict with what you actually heard.  You sit here as judges of the facts.  And you alone have the responsibility of deciding the factual disputes that exist in this case.  It’s your recollection and evaluation of the evidence that controls.  Again, if there was any statements made that conflict with the comments and the testimony before you, you must decide what the evidence brings.  Your decision in the case must be based solely upon the evidence that was presented to you and my instructions on the law.
[brief] In fact, as the recording reflects, at the Las Vegas meeting [...] committed to repay the Third Loan in full within 20 days of the parties’ meeting or, at the very latest, by the end of the calendar year with the anticipated closing of some lucrative deal.  Da32-33; Da230-35 (Ex. P23B, transcription); 2T222-11 to 223-8; 4T289-22 to 290-4.  The trial court concluded that “[...] learned of [...]’s ability to pay in October 2019, and filed his complaint on May 1, 2020.  Consequently, the six-year statute of limitations period set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 has not been exceeded. ”  Da53.  The trial court’s well-founded conclusions that (i) the parties entered into an enforceable, pay-when-able Third Loan on April 26, 2013, (ii) [...] did not learn of [...]’s ability to repay until October 2019, and (iii) [...] was not barred from bringing this action by the expiration of any applicable limitations period, should be affirmed.
[brief] (21T16-25 to 17-2).  Nevertheless, the PCR court addressed the merits of the claim, finding at the PCR hearing that it was not reasonable to infer that defense counsel’s choice not to call [...] as a witness was anything other than a strategic decision.  (21T17-3 to 10).  It ruled that because there was no certification or affidavit and, as the State argued, no reasonable basis to conclude that the choice not to call the witness was anything other than a strategic, defendant’s claim failed.  (21T17-11 to 20).  Following its initial order denying defendant’s PCR petition, the PCR court issued an amended order.
[brief] From inside the building, he heard gunshots, and when he came back outside, he found his brother dead.  (2T154-11 to 14).  Sometime after the shooting, a person known as [...] sent [...] a photograph of a car, purportedly connected to the murder of his brother, from a specific phone number.  (2T155-24 to 156-5; 2T158-9 to 18).  On July 15, 2019, when [...] spoke to detectives, he gave them the photograph he received.
[directive] As noted in Section 11.4, in order to avoid the inappropriate “double counting” of the weapons involvement circumstance, where a defendant pleads guilty to a Brimage-eligible offense pursuant to these Guidelines and also pleads guilty to a violation of an offense defined at N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 involving the same specific conduct, event or episode as the drug distribution-type charge, the prosecutor shall not account for the Special Offense Characteristic of weapons involvement in determining the appropriate row to be used in calculating the authorized plea offer for the Brimage-eligible offense.  When, in contrast, the prosecutor is authorized pursuant to Section 11.4 and agrees as part of a packaged disposition to dismiss (or to refrain from charging) a provable N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 weapons charge, then the Special Offense Characteristic of weapons involvement must be accounted for in determining the authorized disposition of the Brimage-eligible offense.
[brief] So on Jul 3, 2027, I entered the “World Open G/10 Championship” event at the 45th annual World Open.  Registration for this event was supposed to end at 9:30 PM, and the event was supposed to start at 10:00 PM.  However the defendants selfishly kept on letting more and more players join the tournament late, for almost 90 minutes past the published cut off time to register.  As a result, the tournament started over an hour late, shortly after 11:00 PM on July 3, 2017.  (Pa4)  But despite the late start and the unfairly increased size of my competition, I ultimately did extremely well at that event, and I had earned multiple prizes.  (Pa18).
[brief] Had the [...] provided this information, the chart below illustrates the difference in the initial cost of the unit base salaries that should have been in the record compared to the data that was in the record, and used by the [...] in determining the salary increases awarded.  | Key | Contractual Base Salary as of 7/31/2019 | |------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| | Captain Steps | | | Promotion | $98,147.00 | | 6 Months | $102,281.00 | | 1 Year | $110,563.00 | | 2+ Year | $118,820.00 | | Promo Date | [...] and [...]