ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT IV  [...] PROPERLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT FOR THE MURDER OF [...] BASED ON AN APPROPRIATE WEIGHING OF THE AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS.  Appellate review of sentencing is deferential."  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).  "[A]n appellate court should not second-guess a trial court's finding of sufficient facts to support an aggravating or mitigating factor if that finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record."  State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989).  A sentence should then be affirmed unless "(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found were not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.'"
[brief] Also like [...], [...] never received the notice.  The Board did not fulfill its obligation to notify the members of the [...] of this legislation “within 30 days” of July 8, 2019, including the requirement that they had to register their presence at the World Trade Center within 2 years of the law’s enactment, as was required by law.  The determination of the [...] acknowledges that it did not comply with the requirement to provide notice to all members and retirants enrolled in the [...] within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  The decision notes that on August 8, 2019, an email was sent to the Certifying Officers advising them of their obligations under the Ricci Act.  Pa11.  Pa71.  Additionally, the initial decision notes that “on or about September 16, 2019” a postcard was sent to [...].  Pa52.  This correspondence was outside the timeframe required by the Ricci Act to provide notice to the members of the retirement system.  Furthermore, [...] certified that he never received a postcard.  Pa16.  It is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that the Board does not have to abide by the statutory timelines applicable to the Board but is unwilling to relax the timeframes applicable to [...].
[brief] Here, as in *Cypress Point*, the policy wording of [...]’s coverage exclusions for mold changed.  The form of broadly worded mold exclusion contained in the first two [...] policies included limiting language (the ACC clause) and did not contain any exceptions.  Those policies barred all coverage for mold-related claims, regardless of whether there was a covered cause in the chain of causation.  The revised form of mold exclusion in the three successor [...] policies, however, eliminated the ACC language and contained a new, express exception limiting the exclusion if there is “fungi or bacteria on or in food” that is “intended for human consumption. ”
[brief] 7a, 8a, 9a.  It seems that if Defendants had their way, there would be a finite list of prohibited actions, such that no other actions taken by an employer could be considered materially adverse.  The case law is not so pedantic, and the Roa Court found that an obscure action – such as cancellation of health insurance – could be considered materially adverse, acknowledging that the Legislature expressed an intention to liberally construe the LAD.  See Roa, 200 N.J. at 572-576.
[brief] In *Lintao*, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered a permanent loss of normal function of her neck, back, left wrist, pudendal nerve, and sexual and intestinal function.  *Id.* at 3.  The defendant sought to present evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical problems, including scoliosis, pelvic inflammatory disease, laparoscopic procedures, and other conditions.  *Id.*  However, there was no expert opinion that these prior conditions had a logical relationship to the case.  *Id.*  The Appellate Division held that evidence of the prior conditions was properly barred in the absence of medical opinion establishing the logical relationship because it had little, if any, probative value and was unduly prejudicial.  *Id.* at 4-5.  The Appellate Division noted that evidence of the prior conditions was overtly prejudicial because it affected her back and pelvic region and “could have caused the jury to erroneously infer, without the guidance of an expert testimony, that plaintiff’s pre-existing conditions contributed to her injuries.
[brief] 2  I.  THE PLEDGE OF SECURITY AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ATTORNEY’S LIEN WERE NOT ASSIGNMENTS IN THAT IT GAVE NO CONTROL TO THE CREDITORS OF PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION AND PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES  DWARFED  THE CREDITOR’S CLAIMS; PLAINTIFF IS PERMITTED TO PLEDGE PROCEEDS FROM A TORT ACTION TO CREDITORS .................................................................................................................................  2  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................
[brief] (Da105; Da0224)  Ozurdex® is a dexamethasone implant --- \(^1\)  Other named Defendants were dismissed or never properly served.  \(^2\)  Non-infectious uveitis is inflammation of the eye, which is difficult to treat, can result in macular edema, and is a leading cause of irreversible blindness in the working-age population in the developed world.  (Da0047, p. 57); *Uveitis*, National Eye Institute, National Institutes of Health, [https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/eye-conditions-and-diseases/uveitis](https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/eye-conditions-and-diseases/uveitis); *Macular Edema*, National Eye Institute, National Institutes of Health, [https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/eye-conditions-and-diseases/macular-edema](https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/eye-conditions-and-diseases/macular-edema); *New Pharmacological Strategies for the Treatment of Non-Infectious Uveitis.  A Minireview*, [...], Frontiers in Pharmacology (May 7, 2020), [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7250389/#:~:text=Non%2Dinfectious%20uveitis%20(NIU).population%20in%20the%20developed%20world](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7250389/#:~:text=Non%2Dinfectious%20uveitis%20(NIU).population%20in%20the%20developed%20world).  (“pellet”) preloaded in a single-use applicator and injected by physicians in a surgical procedure into the vitreous of the eye.
[brief] That there is not presently, and has never been, a curb cut on Sixth Street in front of the School Lot 5 that would allow vehicles to access the supposed shared parking lot on the School Courtyard.  It would be illogical that a purported shared parking lot could be put in place in 1963 and exist for 50 years without an approved curb/driveway access on Sixth Street in front of Lot 5.  Further, the School Lot 5 has never had any easement or license on Lot 8 to allow school vehicles to drive over Lot 8 to then access the School’s Lot 5.  That School vehicles (Lot 5) never had and do not have any right to drive into Lot 8 to access the supposed "shared" parking area in the Lot 5 courtyard confirms that parking was never contemplated as a permanent easement.  7.
[directive] Some victims will require special recognition, attention and treatment.  These victims and standards are identified as follows:  I.  CHILDREN  A.  Notification of case status should be given first to the parent or caregiver who can assist in providing verbal notice to the child and decide what notice should be given.  B.  Information should be given to children in language and detail appropriate to their age.  C.  Every possible effort should be made to have the child accompanied by a parent, familiar person or victim advocate.  D.  Referrals for services must be effected through parents to specially trained therapists with on-going support and follow-up with the same designated therapist.  E.  Special attention should be given to discussing with a child victim how to respond to intimidation or threats.  F.  Consideration should be given to the child's schedule.  G. in cases of sexual assault, victims under age 18 shall not have their names, identities or addresses appear on any public record as defined in P.L. 1963, C.73 (cc 47:14 et seq.)
[brief] *[...] Journal of Ethics*..........................11 - N.J.S.A. 1:1-1..............................................................................................................  9 - N.J.S.A. 2A:15–3...........................................................................................................  4 - N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1....................................................................................................... 6 - N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-2(c) .................................................................................................  9 - N.J.S.A. 2A:31–1...........................................................................................................  4  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The [...] (“[...]”) and the [...] (“[...]”), as amicus curiae, respectfully urge the Court to uphold the Trial Court’s initial rulings as set forth in the Court’s March 22, 2024 Order, and reverse and vacate the Trial Court’s subsequent May 14, 2024 Order and the rulings entered sua sponte therein.
[brief] In 2005, this court used for the first time in a published decision the term “overbroad” when upholding an agency’s denial of a records request.  MAG Entm’t, LLC, 375 N.J. Super. at 547.  Relying on cases from Michigan, Washington, Ohio, New York, and cases interpreting the permissible scope of requests for government records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), this court concluded that “[u]nder OPRA, agencies are required to disclose only ‘identifiable’ governmental records not otherwise exempt” and that “OPRA does not countenance open-ended searches of an agency’s files. ”  Id. at 547-49.  In so holding, this court cited with approval the Washington Supreme Court’s holding in *Hangartner v. City of Seattle*, 90 P.3 26, 28 (2004), that “a proper request . . . ‘must identify with reasonable clarity those documents that are desired, and a party cannot satisfy this requirement by simply requesting all of an agency’s documents. ’”  *Id.* at 547 (emphasis added).  This court’s rejection of overbroad and improper requests that attempt to avoid OPRA’s parameters by requesting an agency’s entire file, or all of an agency’s records, quickly became part of OPRA’s lexicon.
[brief] N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:12A-6(b)(5)(c); Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 161; Willoughby v. Plan. Bd. of Twp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266, 273 (App. Div. 1997); Spruce Manor Enterprises v. Borough of Bellmawr, 315 N.J. Super. 286, 293 (Law. Div. 1998).  A governing body’s designation of a property as a redevelopment area is only entitled to deference from the court if such designation is supported by “substantial evidence on the record” showing that the LRHL criteria have been met.  Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 372 (2007).  Governing bodies and planning boards “have an obligation to rigorously comply with the statutory criteria for determining whether an area is in need of redevelopment. ”  62-64 Main St., L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of City of Hackensack, 221 N.J. 129, 156 (2015) (emphasis added).
[brief] In recommending that fees be awarded for work done in defending against the [...]’ unsuccessful appeal from the Trial Court’s findings in his favor with respect to NJRICO, as well as its rulings on non-RICO causes of action – specifically breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages – [...] found more than just “some overlap” or “tangential connection” between the appeal and [...]’s NJRICO claims (Db43).  In fact, the Judge found that opposing the appeal was essential to preserving all of [...]’s NJRICO claims, including those in the SOL Period.  As [...] explained:  [A] key issue in this case is whether [the [...]] believed they were acting appropriately in their use of partnership funds, as the predicate acts for Plaintiffs’ RICO claims required a knowing or purposeful *mens rea*.
[brief] Erred in Dismissing Count Three of the Complaint  The trial court further erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The trial court based its dismissal primarily on its determination as to the parties’ obligations under the PSA which, as explained above, is factually and legally improper.  (Pa0231.)  The trial court further concluded that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently indicate that Defendants acted in bad faith or with wrongful motives in their performance of the PSA.  (Pa0231-32.)  For the reasons explained below, the trial court’s dismissal of Count Three of the Complaint must be reversed.  “Every party to a contract . . . is bound by a duty of good faith and fair dealing in both the performance and enforcement of the contract.
[brief] After being read his Miranda\(^1\) rights, defendant acknowledged he was being interviewed because he “was an idiot” and had not made a good decision, but insisted he was “just being curious” and was not a “bad person[.]” (Pa19).  He told investigators he contacted “[...]” after seeing his profile on Adam4Adam.  (Pa19).  He admitted “[...]” told him he was fourteen.  (Pa20; Pa21).  But he insisted “[...]’s” profile said he was eighteen, so defendant continued to chat with him and they agreed to meet up for sex.  (Pa20).  Defendant told investigators that that night was the first time he had used the Adam4Adam application to meet up with anyone who was under eighteen years old.  (Pa22).  --- \(^1\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[brief] On April 11, 2019, Appellant was served with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (“PNDA”).  [Pa64].  The PNDA clearly advised Appellant that if he wanted a departmental hearing, he was required to request one within five (5) days of receipt of the PNDA.  [Pa64].  Appellant failed to request a hearing within five (5) days of receipt of the PNDA.  [Pa82].  Accordingly, a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (“FNDA”) was issued on April 18, 2019.  [Pa82].  The FNDA terminated Appellant’s employment with [...].  [Pa82].  Appellant subsequently filed a Civil Service Appeal, and the OAL Trial was conducted on the following dates: October 19, 2020; October 20, 2020; October 21, 2020; October 29, 2020; November 10, 2020; and November 23, 2020.
[directive] Page that risk serious a conditions, is there maximum on even released, were defendant if (c) other any to danger will a pose (ii) required, when in court appear will not (i) defendant justice criminal the obstruct attempt or to obstruct will (iii) or community, or person the a intimidate, or threaten, injure, to attempt or intimidate, or threaten, injure, or process, juror. or witness prospective and Compelling Absent Filed Be Detention Must Pretrial Seek to Motion Where a Cases 7.3
[brief] The Court Order that is the subject of this appeal is a Motion to Vacate pursuant to Rule 4:50.  Appellant's Brief is devoid of any discussion of how the Motion that culminated in the Order of June 9, 2023, was improperly decided or how [...] abused her discretion.  The June 9, 2023 Order was really a Rule 4:49 Motion to Reconsider, which the Appellant failed to substantiate.  Relative to the underlying Order, Appellant failed to provide any basis for reconsideration of same.  Procedurally, Appellant failed to oppose the original Motion leading to the June 9, 2023 Order, and, as such, lacked standing to file the Motion to Vacate.  Same is apparent on the Order, which is “unopposed. ” (Pa70).  Substantively, the Court did not overlook any controlling decisions or fail to appreciate any competent evidence.  Put succinctly, Appellant has failed to comply with the Court Order of March 24, requiring it to file an Amended Complaint.  (Pa67-68).  [...]’s failure to respond to [...] did not provide an adequate legal basis for reconsideration.  In that Motion, Appellant also cited to Siddons v. Cooke, 382 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2005), which has also been cited in this appeal.  (App. Brief, pp. 16-17).  That case involved a claim of a duty to warn with a reservation on the issues of breach and proximate cause.  Id. at 12.  As in the underlying Motion and this appeal, this has absolutely no relevance to failure to comply with a Court Order.  In her ruling, [...] found that Plaintiff/Appellant did not provide procedural and substantive “grounds” to reconsider the prior Order.  (3T13-14:17).  It is respectfully submitted that the Judge did not abuse her discretion and properly denied reconsideration.  (Pa70).  Moving on to the Motion to Vacate, that Motion too was properly decided below.
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  Bail for listed offenses may only be posted by full cash, or a surety bond executed by an authorized corporation under Chapter 31 of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes, or a bail bond secured by real property situated in New Jersey with an unencumbered equity equal to the amount of bail undertaken plus $20,000.  “Crimes with bail restrictions” means a crime of the first or second degree charged under any of the following sections: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, arson and related offenses, causing or risking widespread injury or damage, burglary, theft by extortion, endangering the welfare of children, resisting arrest, eluding officer, escape, corrupting or influencing a jury, possession of weapons for unlawful purposes, weapons training for illegal activities, soliciting or recruiting gang members, and human trafficking.
[brief] Paragraph 7 provides the following acknowledgement (Da122):  By signing this agreement, I acknowledge that I have discussed to my satisfaction any questions I may have had regarding the arbitration agreement with a member of the [sic] [...] or [...], staff, and have been given the opportunity to obtain further counsel if desired.  I acknowledge that I have freely negotiated all terms herein set forth.  The “Notice” provision states the following (Da122):  BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL.  SEE ARTICLE 1 [sic] OF THIS CONTRACT.
[brief] October 2016  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] October 31, 2016 .Pa047 b. [...] x 1401 “Operating” Account, [...] October 31, 2016  ……………………………………………………………………………………..Pa049 P-25.  November 2016  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] November 30, 2016…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa059 b. [...] x 1401 “Operating” Account, [...] November 30, 2016…………………………………………………………………………………..  P061 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] November 30, 2016…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa064 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] November 30, 2016 ……………………………………………………………………………………..Pa066 P-26.
[brief] (Da396-450)  He also provided evidence that [...] and others were training on litigating eyewitness identification issues, including the use of experts, in the decade leading up to his trial.  (Da451-63)⁸ ⁸  A 2012 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers publication explained that research “ha[s] consistently shown that prior familiarity can Earley established that when defending a murder case with eyewitness testimony as the only direct evidence of guilt, a reasonably competent criminal defense attorney in 2013 and 2014 would have consulted with and presented an expert on eyewitness identification.  The evidence submitted, especially [...]’s report and the [...] records, demonstrate professional expertise on familiar eyewitness identification was available before and during 2014.
[brief] [...] broke its claims out into four counts in the Second Amended Complaint – two counts related to the duty to defend (Counts I and III) and two counts related to [...]’s Indemnity Claim (Counts II and IV).  This is consistent with New Jersey law, which treats the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify separately, with the duty to defend being broader than the duty to indemnify and triggered by the allegations in the underlying complaint as opposed to the insured’s ultimate liability.  *Hartford Ins. Group v. Marson ConsTl Corp.*, 186 N.J. Super. 253, 257 (App. Div. 1982).
[brief] (2T82:8-21).  **Ordinance No. 2022-17**  Ordinance No. 2022-17 was introduced to amend sections 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, 4.5.  (2T82:8-83:24).  In addition, [...] noted [...]' report concluding the Plan was not consistent with the Township's Master Plan contrasted with the memo from the Planning Board concluding the Plan was consistent with the Master Plan.  (2T84:22-25).  [...] advised the Committee, pursuant to the LRHL, it "may adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate the master plan by affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan."
[brief] I.  Appleman’s Rule governs the outcome of this appeal ..............................................3  II.  The so-called “Consumption Exception” was triggered by the mold on food that [...] consumed .................................................................9  III.  [...]’s continuous injurious exposure to toxic mold triggered the three [...] policies at issue .................................................................12  IV.  [...] should be ordered to pay its proportional share of the settlement .................................................................................................................14  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................15  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Cases** | | | Burbridge v. Paschal, 239 N.J. Super. 139 (App. Div. 1990) | 14 | | Carter-Wallace v. Admiral Ins. Co., 154 N.J. 312 (1998) | 15 | | Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., | 8, 9, 11 | | 226 N.J. 403 (2016) | | | Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432 (2010) | 4, 5, 8 | | Franklin Discount Co. v. Ford, 27 N.J. 473 (1958) | 14 | | Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989) | 6, 7 | | Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347 (1982) | 15 | | Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 708, | 8 | | 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446 (Cal. App. 1990) | | | IMO Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 437 N.J.Super 577 | 11, fn. 4 | | (App. Div. 2014) | | | Kelly v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 281 F.Supp.2d 1290 (W.D. Okla. 2003)| 6 | | L.C.S., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., | 11, fn. 4 | | 371 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Owens-Illinois, Inc, v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437 (1994) | 11, fn. 4, 15 | | Polarome Int’l, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., | 14, fn. 8 | | 404 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Search EDP, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., | 6 | | 267 N.J.Super. 537 (App. Div. 1993), | | | certif. denied, 135 N.J. 466 (1994) | | Sherwood v. Kelido, Inc., 2009 WL 1010988 (App. Div. Apr. 15, 2009)...........5, 6