ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa162a, emphasis added).  The referenced ordinance also provides for “an” (ONE) access walkway, no greater than six feet in width.  (Id.)  This provision, given the critical nature of the Historic Flare and its significance in the United States for Historic Designation on the National Historic Register, is strictly and consistently enforced by Ordinance.  Applicant, by and through his attorney, created his own interpretation of this Ordinance before the HPC stating, “It is somewhat a, in our opinion, a stretch of the literal reading of that ordinance to say that limits walkways to one walkway.  I think you really have to stretch the definition.  It was not a limitation on the number of walkways. ”  (1T: 7:6-10)  Applicant’s attorney was immediately advised that he was incorrect and that because this is the Historic Flare, he should be aware that “this is a consistent thing”.  (1T:13:12-25).  Further, the HPC had issues with not only the installation and number of access walkways installed as being violative of historic guidelines, but the materials used which were not consistent with the design guidelines and formed the basis of the HPC denial.
[brief] ”  See id. at ¶ 27.  Instead of engaging Appellant in the interactive process with respect to her requested accommodation, Respondents instead terminated Appellant without making any efforts to address Appellant’s request in any way, shape, or form.  See id. at ¶ 28.  On the call, and tacitly acknowledging Respondents’ discriminatory and retaliatory basis for terminating Appellant’s employment, Respondent [...] informed Appellant that she would work with Appellant to allegedly find her another position for Respondents which was commensurate with Appellant’s experience and education.  See id. at ¶ 29.  On May 25, 2022, after more than one (1) week passed without hearing from Respondent [...] about this promise, Appellant sent a follow-up email to Respondent [...] which, too, was simply ignored.  See id. at ¶ 30.  Appellant was shocked by Respondents’ sudden termination of her employment because she only ever received positive feedback for her performance and never once received a reprimand or discipline of any kind.  See id. at ¶ 31.  Similarly, Respondents never placed Appellant on a performance improvement plan prior to her termination, nor did they even discuss any work performance issues with Appellant prior to then.  See id.  Appellant’s termination was even more shocking because Respondents had already (1) approved Appellant’s request to use a space heater near her desk and (2) put the space heater in Appellant’s office prior to her return to work from STD leave.
[brief] What is more, the overwhelming evidence in this case militates against plain error.  Again, the facts of this case were straightforward.  Surveillance video showed two people walking into [...]’s business and two people running out.  (Da12).  RT-TOIC video showed the same individual walking down the street with their shirts removed and a wad of cash in one’s hand.  (Da10-13).  [...] testified that two people came in, was 100% sure both beat him and took his cash from his pocket.  The jury saw photos of the victim’s bloodied injuries.  And finally, defendant unwittingly confirmed he was one of assailants when he identified himself in the photograph.  This is overwhelming evidence of guilt that the prosecutor’s comments, even if they crossed the line, did not affect the outcome.  This error is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether it led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.  Furthermore, unlike Pindale and Lockett, where the accumulation of errors led to reversal rather than the improper summation comments alone, here defendant has failed to establish a cumulation of errors.  To the extent the prosecutor’s comments went out of bounds of proper argumentation, that alone did not have the clear capacity to produce an unjust result.  Therefore, it is not plain error, and this Court should affirm.
[brief] Id. at 53.  When questioned as to why the waivers for street trees and non-radial lot lines were necessary, the applicant’s engineer/planner, [...], responded that the stormwater management system would have to be moved to an “inconvenient” location.  (2T46-3 to 2T46-10)  The only purported demonstration for the design waivers that [...] provided to the Board during the two public hearings in this matter was a general invocation of the purposes underlying the Municipal Land Use Law (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to 163) and the Township’s Master Plan.  (2T44-2- to 2T45-23).  The applicant’s attorney, [...], conceded before the Court at the plenary hearing that the design waivers that were requested were “not testified to as being a hardship. ” (4T7:19-24).  The reason for this is obvious: the “necessity” of the design waivers stems from the applicant’s desire to create nine lots instead of a lesser number of lots, which this appellant submits is a purely self-created hardship.
[brief] This matter involves the sale of real property located at [...] (“Subject Property”) which was owned since 2005 by five (5) siblings – [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”)¹ - which ownership was subject to the reservation of life estates retained by their parents, [...] and [...].  (Da383).  The life estates retained by William and [...] were extinguished upon their deaths and the title to the property was vested in the names of [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...]² as tenants in common.  (Da383).  Following the passing of their mother, [...] (who was predeceased by her husband), the five siblings were involved in contentious litigation relating to the probate of her estate.
[brief] Appellant posits a second theory of liability alleging the letter violated the FDCPA by including false, deceptive, and misleading representations in two respects.  Appellant’s Br., at 29-33.  First, Appellant contends that the letter misrepresents that a payment to resolve the account for less than the full account balance could amount to a “savings” where no payment could in any event be coerced as the debt was expired, past its statute of limitations.  Id., at 31.7  Second, based on “any misconduct beyond that which [the Appellant] assert[s] violate[s] other provisions of the FDCPA. ”  Id.  Appellant’s § 1692f claim is based on the same alleged conduct as his other claims; thus, it is duplicative and should be dismissed.
[brief] Johnson & Johnson, 2005 WL 2000203, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2005), when the product is complex, a plaintiff cannot prove defect under the common-sense, circumstantial-evidence cases Plaintiff cites; a qualified expert is required.  Plaintiff argues this situation is different because the recall constitutes “other evidence” establishing a defect,\(^6\) but that argument ignores Schweiger v. Standard Tile Supply, Co., 2019 WL 5783478, at *3-4 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Nov. 6, 2019), which held discontinuation of a complex product did not dispense with the need for expert testimony to prove the product is defective.
[brief] POINT II  THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE FEE APPLICATION, AS [...] HAS ALREADY BEEN SANCTIONED TO AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE FOR THE SAME CONDUCT (Da7-9, ¶¶5,7; Da20, ¶55; Da177; 1T68-72)  Prior to granting the Global Fee Application and thereby awarding [...] and his counsel a judgment in the amount of $3,570,357.50, the Chancery Court had already issued unprecedented sanctions against Ras, including ordering Ras to full-time incarceration.  Indeed, [...]’s true underlying motive for the Global Fee Application was likely to tack on to the (See Da109 (2018 rates); Da119 (2019 rates); Da134 (2020 rates); Da143 (2021 rates; Da149 (2022 rates)). amounts owed by Ras so he can later argue that Ras’s incarceration should continue even if the primary judgment is satisfied.  As of December 18, 2023, Ras has been incarcerated for approximately 784 days over the last four years.  Moreover, Ras has already been sanctioned over $2.7 million dollars as result of [...]’s numerous prior fee applications in connection with specific alleged wrongful actions.  Recitation of these facts is not in any way intended to excuse Ras’s prior conduct.  This history, however, demonstrates that Ras has been and continues to be severely punished to a degree perhaps never seen before in any New Jersey Court.  In fact, the Chancery Court acknowledged that it had never seen a sanction as high as the $50,000 sanction levied against Ras’s prior counsel (3T43:15-17), but, just by way of the prior fee awards (not including the Global Fee Application), Ras has already been personally sanctioned 60 times that amount.  No more sanctions are warranted by the circumstances or the law and the Chancery Court erred in granting the Global Fee Application, which constituted duplicative sanctions for conduct Ras had already been, and continues to be, forcefully sanctioned for.
[brief] The Court erroneously determined that summary judgment could not be granted on the Parol Evidence Rule without a complete factual record.  It is [...]’s position that the “fraud” claimed by the plaintiffs is nothing more than the plaintiffs orally disputing a specific, written contractual term that they reviewed, initialed and signed and that controlled their obligations and limitations in owning a timeshare for which they intended to purchase for their own personal use.  That “fraud” is parol evidence disputing not the meaning of any operative terms in the contracts, but only contradicting the existence of the operative terms themselves, and that oral testimony is barred by the substantive Parol Evidence Rule.  The trial court’s ruling destroyed the purpose of written contracts and eviscerated the substantive rule of Parol Evidence.  If not corrected, any timeshare owner at the [...] or any party to any contract in New Jersey can file a lawsuit alleging they were told the opposite of a contractual term memorialized in a signed and integrated writing.
[brief] POINT II  THE ARBITRATOR SHOULD NEVER HAVE USED THE ACME LEASE FOR ANY PURPOSE.(Da115;Da116)  At the outset of the hearing, the Arbitrator stated that since our application to the trial judge to preclude the plaintiff from using the [...] lease as a basis for calculating the income was rejected by the trial court, he would allow that lease into evidence and would ultimately determine whether it carried any weight or not.  (4T 23-3 to 8)  [...] acknowledged that he only valued the property interests being taken as a leased fee (4T 132-13 to 25, 134 – 11, 12)  Then, after [...] explained the difference between a fee simple estate and a leased fee (6T 163-24 thru 167-8), and described an example of how a purchaser of the leased fee would have to go out and buy out the individual tenants leasehold rights in order to get the unencumbered fee simple estate necessary to redevelop the property (6T 167-14; 169-16); the Arbitrator just didn’t get it saying:  “In my mind, one of the issues is, what’s the value of this property with a 77 cent sq./ft. lease for the [...], and, you know, you can gussy it up with all kinds of leasehold interest, but at the end of the day, what’s this property worth if somebody like [...] comes along and wants to buy it.  That’s the way I’m looking at this.  (6T 170 18 to 24).  That perspective misses the point that the two appraisers are valuing two different concepts of “this property. ”  The taking by the plaintiff was the fee simple estate, unencumbered by any lease hold interest.  Thus, the complete bundle of sticks is the "property" for which "just compensation" must be paid.  [...] valued only the "leased fee," leaving out the value of the leasehold interest, thus, not valuing the "property" rights taken by the plaintiff.  The arbitrator stated in his opinion:  "Any reasonable buyer would certainly consider the financial impact of this lease in determining what it would be willing to pay for this site.  To suggest that the [...] lease can be ignored in determining its market rent is manifestly unreasonable."  (Da119)  Thus, the arbitrator's award relying upon the [...] lease represents an opinion of the "leased fee" value of the property rather than the value of the "property" taken which was the unencumbered fee simple estate.  Thus, the judgment incorporating this arbitration award must be vacated as being unconstitutional and manifest denial of justice.
[brief] The [...] is the fourth largest school district in New Jersey, serving a population of over 27,000 students.  There are 36 school communities.  The District is comprised of 3 Early Childhood Centers, 26 PK/K-8 schools and 7 High Schools.  The District provides a full range of educational services appropriate to grade levels Pre-K through 12, including regular and vocational as well as special education for handicapped youngsters.
[brief] The trial court concluded that Relator’s alleged fraud claims were based upon data that was publicly disclosed through sources that qualified as “news media” under the NJFCA, including the [...] (“[...]”) and [...].  See 1T at 4:6–8, 13:23–14:3, 14:10–25.  The court also ruled that Relator did not establish that it was an “original source,” which is a statutory exception to the public disclosure bar requiring a relator to demonstrate that its claims are “independent of” the publicly disclosed information that would otherwise bar the claim.  Id. at 16:2–17:2.  The dismissal was without prejudice, and Relator then filed the Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”).  In response to Defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss, the trial court, without substantive explanation, allowed the claim to proceed to discovery notwithstanding the public disclosure bar.  See 2T at 11:17–12:5.  Following discovery devoted solely to the public disclosure bar, both sides filed cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to the defense.  After Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was fully briefed and more than a month after the deadline for the submission of an opposition to Defendants’ motion, the Legislature amended the NJFCA on June 30, 2023.
[brief] ’”  *Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination*, [...], 433 N.J. Super. at 237 (quoting N.J.S.A. 13:1D-9).  Specifically, the Legislature directed DEP to “increase[] standards more protective of the environment . . . for development in the preservation area of the New Jersey Highlands” pursuant to duly promulgated rules and regulations, at N.J.A.C. 7:38.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  In the HAD, DEP reasonably determined that [...]’s Project is exempt from the Highlands Act.  *Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination*, [...], 433 N.J. Super. at 238.  DEP’s wastewater disposal systems review is also entitled to deference.  *Dowel Assocs. v. Harmony Twp. Land Use Bd.*, 403 N.J. Super. 1, 31 (App. Div. 2008).  Thus, DEP’s decision is owed substantial deference and should be affirmed.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................  2  I.  [...] Cites no Case Authorizing a Court to Compel Arbitration before a Court-Selected Substitute for a Specifically Identified Arbitrator in An Arbitration Agreement that Has No Substitution Provision.  .................................................................................. 2  II.  [...] Has Appealed as of Right and Does not Have to Meet the Requirements for Interlocutory Injunctive Relief.  ..................................................  6  III.  [...] Has Provided No Evidence it Satisfied the Condition Precedent to Lifting the Automatic Stay ..............................................................  8  IV.  [...] Fails to Address its Unclean Hands in Manufacturing a “Deadlock” by Rejecting its Own Proposed Arbitrator After Securing [...]’s Agreement .................................................................................. 9  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................  11  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] **DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, OR ALTERNATIVELY, HIS INVOCATIONS OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN REDACTED.  THE IMPROPER ADMISSIONS REQUIRE REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION. **  In his initial brief, [...] argued that both his so-called “booking” statement and his subsequent Mirandized interrogation should have been suppressed.  The booking statement should have been suppressed because (1) [...] was in custody and subjected to express questioning by police without being informed of his *Miranda* rights; (Db 17-20) and (2) he unambiguously invoked his right to counsel.  (Db 20-25)  His *Mirandized* statement should have been suppressed because (1) [...] had unambiguously invoked his right to counsel; (Db 20-25) and (2) the detectives improperly contradicted the *Miranda* warnings.  (Db 26-28)  And alternatively, even if the statements were not suppressed, the jury should not have heard [...] repeatedly telling the police that he wanted to speak with a lawyer.  (Db 25-26)  In response, the State makes several arguments, all of which should be rejected.
[directive] Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1 of P.L.1982, c.79 (C.2A:4A-60), prior to the person's conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a criminal offense,the local law enforcement agency may post a copy of any orders issued pursuant to this section, or an equivalent notice containing the terms of the order, upon one or more of the principal entrances of the place or in any other conspicuous location.  Such posting shall be for the purpose of informing the public, and the failure to post a copy of the order shall in no way excuse any violation of the order.  (3)  Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1 of P.L.1982, c.79 (C.2A:4A-60), prior to the person's conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a criminal offense,any law enforcement agency may publish a copy of any orders issued pursuant to this section, or an equivalent notice containing the terms of the order, in a newspaper circulating in the area of the restraining order.  Such publication shall be for the purpose of informing the public, and the failure to publish a copy of the order shall in no way excuse any violation of the order.  (4)  Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1 of P.L.1982, c.79 (C.2A:4A-60), prior to the person's conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a criminal offense,any law enforcement agency may distribute copies of any orders issued pursuant to this section, or an equivalent notice containing the terms of the order, to residents or businesses located within the area delineated in the order or, in the case of a school or any government-owned property, to the appropriate administrator, or to any tenant association representing the residents of the affected area.  Such distribution shall be for the purpose of informing the public, and the failure to publish a copy of the order shall in no way excuse any violation of the order.  h.
[directive] In such matters, the Attorney General functions as a lawyer representing a client, subject to all the relevant Rules of Professional Conduct, and is ethically obligated to represent the interests of that client.  See, e.g., RPC 1.2, 3.1.  Letter from [...], Attorney General, to [...], Chief Counsel to the Governor, “Identifying Government Clients for Purposes of Conflicts of Interest,” May 15, 2019, https://www.nj.gov/oag/law/pdf/2019- 0515_Conflicts-Letter.pdf.
[brief] (Pa228-Pa233).  Defendant [...]’s representative acknowledged that the bent foot of the barricade that protruded in a raised condition into the pedestrian walkway is a tripping hazard.  (Pa125-Pa126 at 46:10-47:15).  [...] opined that defendant [...] failed to inspect and maintain the subject entrance walkway area in a manner which conformed to its own policies and procedures and in accordance with adopted maintenance codes and accepted engineering practices, and thereby maintained an unreasonably hazardous condition within an area of foreseeable use by customers and that its failure to abate the hazardous walkway condition caused the plaintiff to fall and sustain injury.
[directive] The court may commit the juvenile to the care of the Department of Human Services under the responsibility of the Division of Youth and Family Services until such time as the juvenile reaches the age of 18 or until the order of removal and restraint expires, whichever first occurs, or to such alternative residential placement as is practicable.  j.  An order issued pursuant to subsection a., b., c. or d. of this section shall remain in effect until the case has been adjudicated or dismissed, or for not less than two years, whichever is less.  An order issued pursuant to subsection h. of this section shall remain in effect for such period of time as shall be fixed by the court but not longer than the maximum term of imprisonment or incarceration allowed by law for the underlying offense or offenses.  When the court issues a restraining order pursuant to subsection h. of this section and the person is also sentenced to any form of probationary supervision or participation in the Intensive Supervision Program, the court shall make continuing compliance with the order an express condition of probation or the Intensive Supervision Program.  When the person has been sentenced to a term of incarceration, continuing compliance with the terms and conditions of the order shall be made an express condition of the person's release from confinement or incarceration on parole.  At the time of sentencing or, in the case of a juvenile, at the time of disposition of the juvenile case, the court shall advise the defendant that the restraining order shall include a fixed time period in accordance with this subsection and shall include that provision in the judgment of conviction, dispositional order, separate order or order vacating an existing restraining order, to the law enforcement agency that made the arrest and to the county prosecutor.
[brief] In D. Russo this Court concluded that a party who brings an action that is shown to have been a "catalyst" for the cessation of conduct alleged to violate the Civil Rights Act may qualify as a prevailing party entitled to an award of attorney's fees.  Because this matter concerns the deprivation and interference with civil rights it is a matter of public interest.  Because this Court has already determined in D. Russo, Inc. v. [...] that a cessation of conduct alleged to violate the Civil Rights Act may qualify as the prevailing party entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in 2010, and that the Trial Court disregarded that qualification and status with respect to Plaintiff nearly 14 years after D. Russo, dismissed his complaint as “moot” and failed to adjudicate his causes of action under the New Jersey Civil Right Act makes this a matter of substantial importance, and a matter capable of repetition that may evade review.  II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff hereby re-states to facts One through Thirty (Pb1-30, P. 3-30) and the procedural history (Section II, Pb, P.2.) set forth within the appellant brief as though fully incorporated herein by reference.
[brief] The fact that the Judgment was obtained on Appellant’s default is of no consequence and *res judicata* still applies.  *See Koons*, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2668, at *431.  Appellant also could have opted out of the Class Settlement, but he chose to accept the benefits of the Class Settlement.  Accordingly, no different than *Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI LLC*, the Court should hold that the Complaint is barred by, *inter alia*, the doctrines of *res judicata*.  **C.