ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio**, 421 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 2011) | 21 | | **1707  Realty, LLC v. Revolution Architecture, LLC**, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2381 (Law Div. Nov. 20, 2020) | 23,24,25 | | **1707  Realty, LLC v. Revolution Architecture, LLC**, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1303 (App. Div. July 19, 2022) | 20,21,22 | | **Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club**, 64 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1960) | 33 | | **Alberti v. Civil Serv. Comm**, 41 N.J. 147 (1963) | 4 | | **Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp.**, 35 N.J. 343 (1961) | 25 | | **Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi**, 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | 22,47 | | **BOC Group, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co.**, 359 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2003) | 20 | | **CDK Global, LLC v. Tulley Auto Group, Inc.**, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57186 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2016) | 34 | | **Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr.**, 116 N.J. 7 (1989) | 23 | | **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus**, 237 N.J. 91 (2019) | 21 | | **E. Brunswick Sewerage Auth. v. E. Mill Assocs., Inc.**, 365 N.J. Super. 120 (App. Div. 2004) | 43 | | **Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal “Z” Ena, Inc.**, 251 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 1991) | 33 | | **Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.**, 160 N.J. 480 (1999) | 21 | | **Higgins v. Polk**, 14 N.J. 490 (1954) | 21 | | **Hobart Bros. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.**, 354 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div. 2002) | 25 | In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394 (1987)
[brief] Appellants argue that the Project is not consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  (Ab30-33).  They first criticize [...] for not mentioning the public comments [...] received that support Appellants’ position, citing public comments from themselves and their members.  (Ab31-32).  [...] is not required to respond to public comments, but it must consider them.  Matter of Thomas Orban/Square Props., LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 57, 79 (App. Div. 2019).  [...] did so.  Notably, all of the public comments received are part of the record.  (Aa337-Aa1322).  Further, [...] requested that [...] respond to Appellants’ comments.  (Aa1327-Aa1330).  Indeed, [...] underwent multiple public comment periods to ensure all commenters would be heard.  (Aa3-5; Aa10; Aa14; Aa331-335).  And many of the comments raised either general concerns or issues such as Project need which would be better addressed by other agencies.  Regardless, the issues Appellants raise in their brief do not demonstrate that the Project is inconsistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.
[brief] Mauro v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196, 201 (App. Div. 1998), affirmed 116 N.J. 126 (1989).  [...] argues, "generally financial sanctions are limited to orders requiring reimbursement of the fees and expenses of a party," but there is no rule requiring that they always be so.  Generally, the purpose of a sanction related to attorney's fees is to reimburse a party for the cost of the misconduct.  Wolfe v. Malberg, 334 N.J. Super. 630,637 (App. Div. 2000).  "Generally", however, does not mean "always".  In the instant matter, the misconduct of [...] and counsel not only dramatically increased the cost incurred by [...], they were an affront to the dignity and authority of the Court.  The Court-appointed administrator [...] stated:  And again, your Honor, if there was ever a case that should have sanctions, I definitely – it you feel it’s within your power, this would be one of them.  (22T 31, line 22-25)  While few cases warrant the imposition of a financial sanction not tied directly to attorney's fees, this case is the exception.  Furthermore, it would be very easy to tie the assessment of the $20,000 sanction to attorney's fees based upon the facts of this case.  For the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully submits that the assessment of the sanction was not only warranted, but appropriate and necessary.
[directive] Section 1.  Creation of triage teams  The purpose of this section is to provide guidance to create a local triage team at each hospital whose responsibility is to implement the allocation framework described in Sections 2 and 3.  It will not make triage decisions.  is important to emphasize that patients’ treating physicians  Instead, each hospital will designate an acute care triage team, consisting of at least one physician supported by at least one nurse and at least one administrator, who will apply the allocation framework described in this document.  These decisions are grounded in public health ethics, not clinical ethics, and therefore a triage team with expertise in the allocation framework should make allocation decisions.  The separation of the triage role from the clinical role is intended to enhance objectivity, avoid conflicts of commitments, and minimize moral distress.
[brief] Appellant’s letter to the Court dated 4/19/2021 (DA309) cited continued over-garnishment of his income in excess of Probation’s claimed child support arrearages (see Probation’s audit, 9/18/2020, DA304).  Appellant filed a Motion for Termination of Garnishment of Child Support and submitted an analysis demonstrating over-garnishment by $2,987.54 (DA311) based on Probation’s audit of 9/18/2020 (DA304).  The Order of 10/25/2021 determined child support was paid in full and garnishment was ordered terminated, but a credit of only $763.04 was granted to Appellant.  As a result, the Court also granted Appellant’s request requiring Probation submit a “full accounting of child support and alimony arrears and records previously paid. ”
[brief] However, this agreement is to be construed as a jointly reached agreement as noted in Par. 20 of the Agreement (Da 20).  Appellant’s accusatory construction is impermissible against Respondent pursuant to the terms of the Separation Agreement.  The parties, in drafting, believed those portions of the Separation Agreement were lawful and the document is to be construed as a joint product so that interpretation of any term cannot be leveled against either party (Da20).  Further, a public entity cannot enter into an illegal contract as noted in the Pb46 at Point Twelve.  Nevertheless, this objectionable accusation acts as Appellant’s admission that the terms are recognized, at least now, as illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective in a legal forum and should have been stricken with Appellant’s consent.
[brief] At the suppression hearing, the State played a brief portion of [...]’s BWC, which showed [...] reading aloud a consent waiver that advised [...] and her daughter about their right to refuse consent and recited language that no promises induced their consent; the BWC also showed [...]’s daughter say that her highest level of education was two years of college.  (1T 13-13 to 16-15; BWC4-A at 48:20 to 50:37)  While [...] read the waiver, [...] at one point walked away from [...] and bent over, not looking at the consent form or [...].  (1T 21-23 to 22-14)  According to [...], [...] then said that the handgun was on a nightstand, and the police seized it.  (1T 13-6 to 12)  At several points, [...]’s testimony conflicted with or omitted significant details revealed by the rest of [...]’s BWC footage and the police reports.
[brief] Even if Plaintiff’s Testimony Did Materially Deviate from Prior Pleadings and/or Discovery, the Defendants have Failed to Articulate, Let Alone Prove Prejudice Sufficient to Justify Finding a McKenney Violation (Raised Below: Pa38-Pa40)  However, even if one were to presume for the sake of argument that Plaintiff’s testimony did materially deviate from her prior pleadings/discovery (which it does not), the Defendants utterly fail to articulate, let alone prove, the kind of prejudice that would result in a McKenney violation necessitating a new trial.  In their brief, the Defendants claim in conclusory fashion (again, without citation to any legal authority) that they are prejudiced because Plaintiff’s testimony had the potential to “mislead the jury” regarding certain allegations.  See Defendants’ Brief at p. 16.  However, it was Defense Counsel’s job to cross examine plaintiff at the time of trial expose any alleged inconsistencies from her prior testimony.  More importantly, a “potential to mislead the jury” is simply the not the “prejudice” that McKenney was looking to rectify.  Rather, it was the prejudice of a party being unable to properly prepare their case/defense for trial.  See McKenney, 167 N.J. at 373-76.  In the absence of such prejudice, there can be no McKenney violation, and the Defendants’ Motion must fail.
[brief] ”  Da28.  Re-sentencing took place before the Honorable [...], P.J.Cr. on December 7, 2023.  (4T).  After hearing from counsel and the defendant, see (4T:4-1 to 14-25), [...] re-imposed “the sentence previously imposed by [...] and [...]. ”  (4T:28-24 to 28-25); Da29-32  [...] also denied defendant’s request for a stay of sentence pending appeal to this Court.  (4T:15-1 to 28-25); Da29-32.  This appeal now follows.  The State maintains its opposition to defendant’s appeal.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 5  A. PARTIES SUBJECT TO PIP ARBITRATION.............................  5 B. DISPUTES SUBJECT TO PIP ARBITRATION............................  10  C.  THE LAW DIVISION'S ANALYSIS OF N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(A) WAS FLAWED .........................................................  11  POINT II THE LAW DIVISION’S DECISION THAT THE ENABLING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS APPLY TO: THE NON-MEDICAL CORPORATIONS; A LAY PERSON; AN ATTORNEY; AND TO AN INSURER’S AFFIRMATIVE
[brief] (1T31).  From the date he returned to work following the 2004 incident, until October 16, 2015, [...] never had to seek treatment for any part of his body injured in a previous workers’ compensation matter.  (1T31).  From the day he returned to work following the 2004 incident, until October 16, 2015, the day prior to the critical incident in this matter, [...] never had symptomatology in his neck.  (1T51).  [...] had never been treated by a chiropractor in his life.  (1T32).  The Motor Vehicle Accident of October 17, 2015
[brief] Detective [...] of the [...], who viewed the security videos on the night of the robberies, testified at trial that “the same subject [was] responsible for both robberies,” because the man in the videos was “wearing the same exact clothing in both. ”  [...] video depicted the suspect leaving the gas station on foot and turning left near the fence line.  Powell testified that the video shows that “several moments” after the robber walked down the fence line, a vehicle entered the frame, travelled up the long driveway of the neighboring [...] offices, and made a left turn southbound on Route 130.  Because the robber had fled [...] on foot, [...] called for a canine tracker.  [...] responded with his bloodhound, [...].  Officer Brettell testified that [...] followed a scent trail south on Route 130 from [...] to the parking lot of the [...], at which point the dog lost the trail.  Shortly after the robberies, [...] obtained the name of a possible suspect, not defendant, who stayed at the [...].
[brief] In the latter, the plaintiff signed the agreement, received benefits pursuant to the agreement, and challenged on the basis of the timeliness of his revocation and on grounds that the agreement was not made knowingly or voluntarily.  The case at bar could not be further apart.  At no time did Respondent sign an agreement or receive benefits pursuant to the same.  Moreover, Respondent does not put at issue whether her revocation was timely or whether or not her actions were made knowingly or voluntarily.  Rather, Respondent contends that she knowingly and voluntarily revoked the Agreement pursuant to section 11 of the same in a timely manner.  Accordingly, the issues presented by [...] and [...] are not relevant to the analysis here.
[brief] Russo, supra, 333 N.J. Super. at 138 (citing [State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998)]); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 3:22-10 (2013) (noting that Preciose "mak[es] clear that [an evidentiary] hearing is required if there is a dispute of fact respecting matters which are not on the record").  In a similar vein, we observed that "[j]ust as when determining whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in connection with his petition for post-conviction relief the facts should be 'view[ed] in the light most favorable to a defendant,' so too, in determining whether to entertain oral argument, the facts should be viewed through the same generous lens.  [State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012) (quoting Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 463).]
[brief] In *Mauricio*, the inebriated defendant was trying to enter a nightclub but was refused entry by the security guard on duty who shoved the defendant out, causing them both to fall.  117 NJ. at 405-06.  The defendant came back twenty minutes later—this time with a sawed-off shotgun hidden under his trench coat—and tried to enter again.  _Id._ at 406-07.  The security guard once more forcibly pushed him out of the club.  _Id._ at 406.  About fifteen minutes after being thrown out of the bar a second time, the defendant shot a patron he mistakenly believed was the security guard who had repeatedly thrown him out of the club.
[brief] Maybe because you don’t want the right answer that you’re going to expect to get. ” (9T86:13-21).  Our Supreme Court has reiterated, “[g]enerally, if no objection was made to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial. ”  R.B., 183 N.J. at 333.  Further, when no timely objection was made, the reviewing court must determine whether the comment was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  The possibility of such an unjust result must be “‘one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to the result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  Benedetto, 120 N.J. at 261 (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 335).  It is difficult to imagine a more textbook situation of a “prosecutor not sitting idly by” than the prosecutor directly responding to the attack on the credibility of the State’s witness.  Hawke, 327 N.J. Super. at 284-85.  The prosecutor’s comments were a relaying of the reasonable inference of the evidence that yes, the defense counsel elicited testimony from [...] that she spoke to someone at [...]’s residence, but the prosecutor accurately—from the “record” is pointing out the “logical inference” that defense counsel did not ask [...] if she spoke to [...] and in any way attempted to sway his identification of defendant as the killer.
[brief] (See Da217–218.)  The Appellate Division was also misled by [...]’s misrepresentation.  In the decision of August 25, 2021, the decision stated that “[i]n 2012, the court conducted a four-day hearing during which [...] testified as a witness for [...] (Mr. [...])”.  (Da27.)  All the misrepresentations made by Plaintiff’s attorney [...] were for a sole purpose to have a ground to set aside the Property Settlement Agreement and later to start a fraudulent legal malpractice action against Defendant [...].  Family Court Judge [...] was clearly misled by those misrepresentations when decided the motion to set aside the Property Settlement Agreement in the absence of Plaintiff [...]’s participation in the proceeding.
[brief] The oil spill.  The oil spill was captured on a surveillance camera the moment it happened.  Paragraph 2 of [...]’s Verified Complaint stated, “On June 1, 2021, a driver for Defendant [...] was driving a truck pulling a trailer carrying waste oil as its commodity.  As the driver drove the rig out of a parking spot, he negligently scraped against a sharp object that cut through the bladder in the container, which released the entire contents of oil onto the ground.  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Incident. ’” [Emphasis added] (PPCIa001-2).  [...] included a still photo from the camera footage showing oil gushing out of the side of the ripped open truck trailer as Figure 1.  See, infra.  The Verified Complaint also stated that [...] was the primary tenant at the property and sublet parking spaces to various motor carriers who needed space to store rigs as shipping containers are being shipped from one location to another. ” (PPCIa002).  [...] was one of [...]’s subtenants.  (PPCIa003).  The Verified Complaint also stated that “[...] stored the above trailer at the Property without informing [...] of its oil content.  If [...] was notified of its content, it would have been prohibited. ” (PPCIa003).  Government response to the spill.
[brief] The Board finds that the Applicant has not met required proofs for the Bulk Variances as required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) and otherwise provided by law.  The Board finds that the same reasons expressed for the denial of the Use Variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1), the two (2) Height Variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6), and the Bulk Variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1) are equally applicable to the Bulk Variances relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) and therefore denies the Bulk Variances.  Additionally, the Board rejects the Applicant's arguments that the variances provide a benefit in that by the Applicant using space more efficiently, it allows the Township to address its affordable housing obligation and attract more retail uses for the Property by allowing additional space for the retail and the parking required to attract retail users.  The Board finds that the space is not more efficiently used, but is overly developed in a far too intensive manner.  The Board rejects the Applicant's argument that the variances which allow the residential uses provide a benefit to attract retail users to the Property.  The Board finds that there is more than sufficient residential development in and about this area of Route 33 to support retail uses on the Property.  5.
[brief] See generally Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401 at *8-10; [...] Decision and [...] Transcript.  It ignores that Congress wrote those provisions of the FDCPA into the statute out of concern for communications that would embarrass a consumer or harm his or her reputation—not to prohibit the use of service providers.  It ignores other provisions in the statute that permit the use of service providers, like letter vendors.  The letter vendor theory further reads out of the statute common law principles under which communications with service providers are not “third-party” communications at all.  It is also contrary to decades of guidance from the CFPB and FTC.  And it would lead to a myriad of absurd results.  Dismissal should therefore be upheld.6 --- 6
[brief] All of the damages alleged spring from the loss of the solar project.  The root cause of the Appellants' inability to develop this solar project is the Appellants failure to pay rent under its Lease and the subsequent loss of its right to possess and develop the site for the planned project.  “Proximate cause consists of 'any cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would not have occurred.'  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 51-52 (2015) (citing *Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman*, 145 N.J. 395, 418, 678 A.2d 1060 (1996).  Here, the cascade of events leading inevitably to [...] losing the ability to develop this project starts with [...] failing to make a rent payment.
[brief] And all of that directly conflicts with the regulation at N.J.A.C. 11:5-9A.6(a) requiring [...] to “afford the purchaser a reasonable opportunity to read [the Public Offering Statement] before the purchaser signs the contract or purchase agreement. ” (emphasis added).  There is no question that the provisions of the RETA statute and the regulations are in conflict.  And when there is a conflict, the RETA statute controls, not the regulations.
[brief] See *Torres v. Tamburri Assocs., Inc.*, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2901 (App. Div. December 3, 2010), Ra53; *Dorsey v. Cobblestone Village Equities, LLC*, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 584 (App. Div. March 25, 2009), Ra68; *Di Filippi v. Target Corp.*, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1549 (App. Div. January 16, 2008), Ra73; *Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co.*, 301 N.J. Super 187 (App. Div. 1997); *Vitty v. D.C.P. Corp.*, 268 N.J. Super 447 (App. Div. 1993).
[brief] R.B., 183 N.J. at 380.  Thus, this non-objected to remark clearly cannot constitute plain error.  Finally, defendant attempts to conflate an inelegant, non-objected to remark, of the prosecutor, to calling the defendant—specifically—“the devil. ”  Defendant attempts to analogize the comment to a wholly separate comment this Court found wholly impermissible in State v.  Gregg, 278 N.J. Super. 182, 190 (App. Div. 1994), wherein the prosecutor painted the defendant as a “contemptible and despicable person. ”  Here, the prosecutor was far from calling the defendant a devil, instead while displaying a photo to the jury, he stated:  [The victim’s] sitting on the porch where the witness who ID’s him lived, near three feet through that brick wall.  That’s right where he was shot.  That’s right where the shell casings were, and his girlfriend took the photo.  Everything that would play out that next day is captured right in that photo and nobody realized it.  No conspiracy, no inception, no fabrication.  Just an innocent photo, capturing the last happy moments of a young man’s life, not knowing the devil behind him, what’s to come.  [(9T75:17-25). ]  Obviously, it was a fair inference from the record that defendant did not know he was going to die the day following the photograph being taken, and thus it is hard to square defendant’s failure to object at trial with the notion this inelegant statement in any way suggested defendant was the devil.  See R.B., 183 N.J. at 333.  Instead, it refers to where the witness was in relation to the victim and defendant, shows corroboration that [...] knew defendant was friendly with her boyfriend, and reiterates the obvious: defendant did not know death would come for him the following day.  Thus, at most the remark is harmless error, and the argument should be rejected in its entirety.
[directive] Name Address Address Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------- ---------- ---------------  Fax ---------------- Fax  Em ail Em ail --------------- --------------- ________  Ifyes, language _  Interpreter needed? Yes No ________  If Yes No yes, describe _  D accommodation needed?  ADA Contact List attached by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12558 (KROL Order 3)
[brief] As defendant notes in his brief on appeal, “the purpose of repeat-offender statutes is deterrence. ” (Db47).  Defendant’s conduct leading to his most recent convictions here, while neither causing nor threatening harm, continued a pattern of illegal behavior dating back over a decade.  And while defendant attempts to downplay the theft of $168 from a small-business owner, nothing in the record indicates that he would not have stolen hundreds, if not thousands of dollars had [...] not properly secured the remainder of any money in the store, as evidenced by defendant’s failed attempt to break into the cash register during the second burglary.  Mitigating factor six thus was properly afforded little consideration.
[brief] When Mr.  Mustafa was arrested, two handguns were recovered from the trunk of his car.  Accordingly, [...] was charged with two counts of second-degree possession of a handgun without a permit in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).  In its final jury charges, however, the trial court mistakenly instructed the jury on the form of possession found in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, for which he was not indicted and which contains different elements.  There is no way to reconcile this significant error with [...]’s convictions: he cannot be convicted of a form of possession that is completely different from the one he was indicted on, nor can he be convicted of a kind of possession that the jury was not instructed on.  Accordingly, [...]’s convictions for second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial where the jury is appropriately instructed on the elements of the correct offense.