ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE RENDERING (5A).  As part of its site plan application, [...] submitted the Rendering which was one of many documents including detailed floor plans, site plan, topographic survey map, etc. (11a).  The Rendering is a simple graphic illustration of the West elevation and clearly states “NTS” on the document.  “NTS” indicates that the drawing was “Not-To-Scale”.  The Rendering shows a five (5) story building on the Property at an elevation of “+/- 51””.  (5a).  The Rendering also shows five (5) adjacent buildings to the Property which are all five (5) stories at an elevation of “+/-50”” above grade level.  While all five (5) buildings are indicated to be at or about the same elevation above grade level, the heights of the buildings depicted on the Rendering are all different.  (5a).  C.
[brief] Rutgers, | 37 | | 110 N.J. 432 (1988) | | Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2018)  ................................................................. 38, 43, 44  Doe v. Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Ed., No. 24-107, 2024 WL 706797 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024)  .......................... 33, 37  Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980)  ...........................................................................  32  Donofy v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001) ..............................................................  21 Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005)  ............................................................................  36 Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 290 N.J. Super. 616 (App. Div. 1996) ...............................................................  37  Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314 (2013) .........................................................................................  49  Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391 (2005) ......................................................................................... 5, 23 Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000) ............................................................................. 35 Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2020) ............................................................................. 41 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) .............................................................................. 37 Hoffman v. Garden State Farms, Inc., 76 N.J. Super. 189 (N.J. Ch. 1962) .................................................................. 43 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2018) ................................................................. 30, 31, 37 Holmes v. Jersey City Police Dep’t, 449 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2017) .................................................. 5 Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126 (1994) .............................................................................. 15 In re City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super. 366 (App. Div. 2021) ................................................... 14, 27 Interactive Brokers, LLC v. Barry, 457 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 2018) ....................................................
[brief] Specifically, the Court articulated that Plaintiff’s best friend testified that he told Plaintiff about what he overheard and Plaintiff had “an opportunity to investigate and to make a decision as to whether he wanted to investigate this?” (2T22).  Further that Plaintiff “…had an opportunity not to go through with a marriage or to delay a marriage. ”  Id.  The Court believed that Plaintiff was making an “informed” decision and it was Plaintiff’s duty to make due inquiry before getting married.
[directive] Further, applications for this expungement will not be considered until any pending charges are disposed.  To apply, the person must present the duly verified petition, as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7, in the Superior Court in the county where he or she was sentenced to special probation.  There will be no fee required for filing the expungement petition.  Information on filing an expungement petition is contained in the pro se expungement packet.  ,[...] • [...] • [...]  Directive# 02-16  Page 3  The law further provides that the procedures governing expungement petitions under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 et seq. are applicable, except that the requirements related to the expiration of time periods under N.J. S.A. 2C:52-2 through 2C:52-4.1 do not apply.  In addition, the prosecutor is require.d to notify the court of any disqualifying convictions or any other factors related to public safety that should be considered by the court when deciding whether to grant a "drug court expungement."  shall consider the person's verified petition and may order the  The court expungement of all records and information relating to all arrests, detentions, convictions, and proceedings that existed at the time of the Drug Court graduation as appropriate.  Additionally, the court shall grant the relief requested unless it finds that the need for the availability of the records outweighs the desirability of having the person freed from any disabilities associated with their availability, or it finds that the person is otherwise ineligible for expungement.  II.
[brief] Defendant is Entitled to Reversal Because the State’s Officer Did Not Comply with Scoring Protocols for Standardized Field Sobriety Tests.  (Da21-22.)  The State argues that it does not matter that [...] could not testify to scoring factors since the municipal and de novo courts observed the MVR showing the administration of the tests.  (Sb18.)  This argument is misplaced because as explained above, the State was able to bolster the evidence by only calling as a witness [...] who did not know of the scoring factors while insulating [...]’ from all cross-examination as to the administration of the tests.  (1T62:1-63:12.)  Defendant was deprived of cross-examination as to the scoring of the tests.
[brief] Moreover, by failing to consider the impact of the change in the language of the three [...] policies at issue that eliminated the ACC clause and added an exception to the mold exclusion, [...] ignored Supreme Court precedent concerning the proper interpretation of insurance policies.  When the drafters of the CGL policy revise later versions of the policy form by adding an exception to an otherwise applicable exclusion (as [...] did here), it demonstrates an intent to broaden coverage and to eliminate the exclusion in cases where the exception applies.  *Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C.*, 226 N.J. 403 (2016).  In *Cypress Point*, the Supreme Court was faced with an earlier landmark ruling regarding construction contractor liability, *Weedo v, Stone-E-Brick, Inc.*, 81 N.J. 233 (1979).
[brief] --- \(^1\)  [...] identifies the provision of adequate service as the Legislative objective.  See also, N.J.S.A. 48:7-1, which expressly requires that a person placing poles in any street first obtain the consent of the municipality of the manner in which the poles are placed.  As to the third question of whether the subject matter inherently needs statewide treatment in terms of jurisdictional power such that the constitution prohibits delegation of power to the municipality to enact such ordinances, [...] cites to no authority to support that proposition. \(^2\)  Thus, [...] necessarily hangs its hat on the asserted need for uniformity and relies on the case of *In re Public Service Electric and Gas Co.*, 35 N.J. 358, 371 (1961).  *In re Public Service Electric and Gas Co.*, *supra*, is distinguishable from the present matter on many grounds.
[brief] As there was no outstanding warrant for [...], there was no reason to stop her to execute a warrant.  See State v. Shannon, 222 N.J. 576, 592 (2015) (3-3 decision) (“[A]n invalid warrant cannot provide the basis for an objective and reasonable belief that probable cause to arrest exists; an arrest made under that standard is constitutionally defective. ”).  However, a reasonable suspicion determination considers the totality of the circumstances and facts known to police at the time of the stop.  See Alessi, 240 N.J. at 518, 520-21.
[brief] EO 251 was an order with the full force of law when the refusals to mask that are the subject of Counts 2 and 3 occurred.  EO 251 was an order dealing directly with New Jersey schools, and it specifically required that members of a governing body – such as the Board – comply with the order.  There is photographic evidence and witness certification that Respondent knowingly and willfully violated this order.  This was an unambiguous violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) and (e).  Respondent even subsequently admitted to violating EO 251 in discovery.  To dismiss these alleged violations on a Motion to Dismiss, without even transmitting them to the Office of Administrative Law for factual determinations, renders N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) and (e) toothless and meaningless.
[brief] However, Appellant misses the point.  Even if this Court finds insufficient evidence to determine the exact cause of [...]’s overdose, Appellant still failed to report the Incident to [...].  This is undisputed by the record evidence.  Accordingly, this Court need not make any conclusive determination about the cause of [...]’s overdose, since the real issue is that Appellant never reported the Incident, which occurred at Appellant’s residence, and required [...] to be administered two (2) doses of Narcan, transported to the emergency room, and to be placed on a Narcan drip.
[brief] According to N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g), the City is to provide a snapshot of the composition of the collective negotiations units based on the last day of the expired agreement, July 31, 2019.  This snapshot is intended to be used by the parties, and the arbitrator, in order to determine the unit costs going forward for the term of the awarded agreement.  The record shows that the City provided the arbitrator with the “current” unit composition (in 2023) and “current” salaries (in 2023) as Exhibit C-2 submitted into evidence at the arbitration hearing.  (Aa413-Aa438).  There is no record of the “snapshot” on which all costs associated with an arbitration --- 5  The Arbitrator is still soliciting City cost outs in emails dated November 21, 2023 and November 22, 2023.  (Aa 409; Aa411).  There was no opportunity for the [...] to object to or question the calculations submitted by the City. award is calculated.  [...] has held that an arbitrator is “required to project costs for the entirety of the duration of the award…[by utilizing] the [salary] scattergram demonstrating the placement on the guide of all of the employees in the bargaining unit as of the end of the year preceding the initiation of the new contract, and [ ] simply move those employees forwarded through the newly awarded salary scales and longevity entitlements.
[brief] Defendant provides no specificity, however, as to how the prosecutor allegedly engaged in bad faith in seeking an indictment against defendant for the robberies of the [...] and [...].  The law is well-settled that “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his [or her] discretion. ”  *State v. Medina*, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 127–28, 793 A.2d 68 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting *Bordenkircher v. Hayes*, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)).  Further, “the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. ”  Ibid.  (quoting *Wayte v. United States*, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)).  We do not hesitate to conclude that in this instance, there was ample probable cause to support the charges associated with the [...] and [...] robberies.
[brief] The OAE Proceeding Was Not Reportable To Allied World In The Policy Applications.  In 2012, the Firm obtained a legal malpractice insurance policy from [...] (“[...]”).  [...] is a subsidiary of Defendants.  [Pa564]  [...] issued [...], with a policy period of July 3, 2012 to July 3, 2013 (the “2012 Policy”).  [Pa586]  Of importance for the issues here, the 2012 Policy defined both “Disciplinary Proceeding” and “Legal Services. ”  [Pa602-603, §§ II.F and II.K]  In 2016, the Firm sought and obtained a policy from Defendants (the “2016 Policy”).
[directive] Attorney Name ----------- NJ Attorney ID Number Address Telephone Number of Attorney for State New Jersey/Defendant of of In the Matter Superior Court  New Jersey Law Division - Criminal Part Select County - County - --------  Indictment Number: NG RI  Docket Number: Criminal Action ofNGRI Order  Converting Status Committee of to Status Civil Committee _____ of Having Found the defendant not guilty by reason insanity on , and of of Having Ordered the NORI committee into the care and custody the Department Health on _____ , to be confined in an appropriate institution based upon this court's finding by a of preponderance the evidence that the NORI committee was dangerous to self, others, or of property as a result mental illness and they could not be released into the community with or without conditions, and of Having Found that the NORI committee's maximum period commitment under N.J.S.A. __ __ of 2C:4-8 years and months has now been reached, and Having Found by clear and convincing evidence that the NORI committee remains dangerous to of self, others, or property as a result mental illness and that they cannot be released into the community either with or without conditions without posing a danger to self, others or property ______________________ of based upon the reports _ __ It of Ordered is on the day - 20 _ that: Select Month -, of of The committee shall remain committed to the care and custody the Commissioner the 1. of Department Health to be confined in an appropriate institution as an involuntary civil committee under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.15. of The jurisdiction over the committee shall be transferred to the Superior Court
[brief] ”  The Lease provided a further alternative reciprocal method to be employed in the event that either party falls behind on any obligations under the Lease: the Rent Offset and the Allowance Offset.  Again, the Rent Offset provides “[i]f Landlord fails to pay Tenant an installment of the Tenant’s Allowance . . .  Tenant shall have the right to offset such amount against the Minimum Rent. ”  Along the same lines, the Allowance Offset provides, “Tenant hereby expressly grants to Landlord an offset and deduction against Tenant’s Allowance for all costs, payments and expenses Tenant is obligated to pay to Landlord pursuant to this Lease or otherwise due and owing to Landlord, at the time an installment of Tenant’s Allowance shall be due. ”  Viewing these provisions “in a fair and common sense manner,” consistent with “[a] basic principle of contract interpretation,” Hardy, 198 N.J. at 103, the Lease set up mutual payment obligations by both parties of different amounts on different schedules and, upon either party’s delinquency, the appropriate offset method would true-up the amount owed by the non-delinquent party.
[brief] R. 1:2-3 ...........................................................................................................  12  R. 3:19-1(b) ......................................................................................................  12  | RULES OF EVIDENCE | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------|-----------| | N.J.R.E. 401 | 29 | | N.J.R.E. 402 | 29 | | N.J.R.E. 403 | 29 | | N.J.R.E. 403(a) | 29 | | CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------|-----------| | N.J. Const. art.
[brief] ’”  State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588, 617 (2019) (quoting State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566, 572 (2017)); see also State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 541-42 (2008) (reaffirming that “a defendant has standing if he is charged with an offense in which possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search is an essential element of guilt”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the exact argument the State advances here -- that a defendant must show that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.
[brief] Rather than the common-law proximate cause standard, a FELA Plaintiff need only demonstrate that the railroad's negligence played a part, no matter how small, in bringing about the injury, or, in other words, that the railroad's negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 695-96 (2011).  If negligence is proven and is shown to have played any part in producing an injury, the carrier is answerable in damages even if “the extent of the [injury] or the manner in which it occurred” was not “[p]robable” or “foreseeable. ”  McBride, 564 U.S. at 703-04 (citations omitted).  Railroads have “a duty to furnish employees with a ‘reasonably safe place in which to work and such protection [against the hazard causing the injury] as would be expected of a person in the exercise of ordinary care under those circumstances. ’”  Aparicio v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 84 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, n.16 (1949).  The phrase “reasonably safe place to work … does not mean they have an absolute duty to eliminate all dangers…”  Raudenbush v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., D.C., 160 F.2d 363, 367 (3rd Cir. 1947).
[brief] Put another way, [...] spent “millions” without even having the [...] zoning necessary for its project in place!  [...] did so because it knew that the adoption of the same was a *fait accompli* after lengthy negotiations and its acquiescence to certain *quid pro quo* concessions sought by the [...] which occurred behind closed doors and out of the public eye.  (1T, 7:5-16).  In any event, the record in this matter confirms that [...] made the decision to proceed with the project and spend “millions” years prior to the [...]’s adoption of Ordinance No. 13-2022 and the [...] and without any regard whatsoever to the prospect of a challenge being filed, whether timely or otherwise.
[brief] First, defense counsel proposed multiple mitigating factors in a sentencing letter to the court (Da 27; 36T 83-15 to 16), and, in direct contravention of State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 69 (2014) (sentencing court is “obliged to give reasons for rejecting those mitigating factors brought to its attention), the judge did not individually address any of the five of them that he rejected; he simply said no.  (36T 99-19 to 23)  Indeed, when he changed the parole bar from 30 to 42.5 years, he also gave no real reasons for doing that.  (37T 4-16 to 7-24)  Case makes it clear that the proper remedy for such a violation of basic sentencing protocol is a remand for resentencing, which should be ordered.
[brief] The “plan” provides for the redevelopment of approximately 14 acres: 7 acres in the General Business District 2 (“GB2”) which is the [...] (“[...]”) site in the west zone and 7 acres in the Central Business District (“CBD”) which are the sites in the north and south zones of the plan.  Within those 14 acres, only 1 site meets the statutory requirements of the LRHL: the abandoned [...] (“[...]”) department store which consumes approximately 7 acres in the west zone: 5 acres for the store and 2 acres for parking.  Of the remaining 7 acres in the “plan,” none meet the statutory requirements of the LRHL and none are necessary for or connected to the redevelopment of the [...] site.  Before the adoption of the “plan” by ordinance, residential housing was prohibited in the GB2 zone.  The [...] report noted that the GB2 zone prohibited residential uses.  By adopting the plan, this ordinance was legally on its face “inconsistent” with the Master Plan of [...].  The LRHL requires analysis by the Planning Board and the Council to determine whether the proposed redevelopment “plan” is “consistent” or “inconsistent” with the existing Master Plan.  The Town’s expert, [...], the Planning Board, and the Council all reached the erroneous legal conclusion of consistency, notwithstanding that while the ordinance expressly revoked all zoning standards within the 3 zones of the “plan,” the then existing local zoning ordinances and Master Plan prohibited residences within the General Business District.  The remaining 7 acres are located on municipally owned land consisting of parking lots now fully utilized and rights of way.  By employing the technique of an “overlay” zone which, under Section 14 of the LRHL, declares that the entire Town of [...] needs to be redeveloped or rehabilitated, the “plan” proposes to build massive structures in all three zones.  Those structures include garages, 310,000 square feet of office space approximately 50,000 square feet of retail uses and 205 multi-family residential units.  The Town, through the mechanism of the overlay zone, avoids the usual statutory requirements of disposing of its municipally owned property.  Section 14 of the LRHL, however, requires that the purpose of any “overlay” zone be that such redevelopment is necessary to prevent “further deterioration” of the housing stock, water, and sewer infrastructure.  None of these statutory requirements are met in this “plan. ”  While the Trial Court analyzed the ordinance under the usual “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard, this analysis is not reached when the “plan” fails to meet the threshold substantive statutory standards required by Sections 5, 7 and 14 of the LRHL.  For these reasons, the judgment of the Trial Court must be reversed.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] See R. 4:69-6(b)(3); N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6(b)(7) (45-days).  Appellants conceded that point no less than two times – first, when their Complaint failed to include any challenge to the designations, and second, when they determined at trial not to pursue a challenge to the validity of the 2020 designations.  (Pa126 at ¶¶11-16; Pa90; see gen. Pa46-53; T36:14-37:2; T38:19-39:1; Pa80.)  Yet, for purposes of this appeal, Appellants have re-written history and now base their entire appeal on a challenge to blight designations that was previously never raised due to the incontrovertible time bar prohibiting such a challenge.  The blight designation, contrary to what Appellants would have the Appellate Division believe, is not at issue here.
[brief] See Da_216-18.  This imputation of one defendant’s state of mind onto other defendants defies basic precepts of actual malice.  The trial court concocted this improper legal theory because the Complaint’s allegations against the [...] categorically fail to present a cognizable theory of actual malice.  Indeed, the allegations closely track those found insufficient as a matter of law in Neuwirth.  [...]’s claims against the CAIR  Defendants should have been dismissed for failure to plead actual malice.
[brief] **Persuasive**  [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. Oct. 25, 2023)  [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. May 30, 2019)  cert denied 2020  NJ WL 808315 (NJ Feb. 6, 2020) ("Newark I")  In re Approval of Financing Commitment for the Project Known as [...], [...]  Docket No. [...] (App. Div. May 31, 2022)  ("NJHMFA I")  [...] v. [...], [...] (Tax May 5, 2023)  [...] v. [...], [...] (Law Div. Sept. 28, 2022)  [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. Oct. 12, 2023)  [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. Oct. 13, 2023)  [...] v. [...], [...] (Law Div. June 9, 2023)  [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. May 23, 2018)  cert. denied __N.J.__ (2018) ("Feld X")  **STATUTORY**
[brief] *Ibid.*  In *Morgan v. Sundance*, 596 U.S. 411, 417-419 (2022), the United States Supreme Court addressed a conflict among the circuit courts over the propriety of prejudice as a pre-condition for waiver of arbitration.  The Court ruled that inquiry over waiver of the right to arbitrate may not be conditioned on an absolute requirement of prejudice, and any waiver analysis should focus on the conduct of the waiving party.  *Id.* at 419.  Similarly, construing *Morgan*, the Appellate Division has held that consideration of prejudice remains a non-dispositive factor in the waiver analysis.