ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The three Docket Numbers established by plaintiffs In the Matter of the Implementation of L. 2012, C. 24; In the Matter of the Implementation of L. 2012, C. 24, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87(T)-A Proceeding to Establish a Program to Provide SRECS to Certified Brownfield, Historic Fill And Landfill Facilities; [...] Hughesville Mill Site; were Docket Nos. [...], [...] and [...].  These were assets of plaintiffs.  FAC § 30, Pa1615; Pa2550-59 (Lemus Cert Opp SJ).  On July 10, 2015, [...], by [...], wrote a letter to [...] and [...], a letter memorializing that Fiberville had assigned its SREC Registration Application along with the solar site design drawings prepared by [...], to [...], which was countersigned by [...] for confirmation.  Because [...] Platform purchased those rights outright, under the Assignment Agreement discussed above, the attendant SRECs now became permanent rights of plaintiffs.
[brief] Instead, Respondents commenced this action as a desperate cash grab against [...] and his father Peter [...] Sr. while likely failing to disclose to their attorneys that [...] owed [...]’s father *north of half a million dollars* in outstanding loans.  Now, at the eleventh hour after this matter was pending for over a year, and only months before arbitration and trial were scheduled for early 2025, In the Disqualification Motion, Respondents argued that the [...], [...], and [...] matters were substantially related to this matter (they are not).  Respondents claimed that they disclosed confidential information to [...] in connection with those matters.  However, Respondents have never (i) specifically identified the confidential information or documents that it purportedly disclosed to [...] and (ii) have not otherwise demonstrated that the information is prejudicial to [...] in this case (it is not).  On August 2, 2024, the trial court held an initial hearing on the Disqualification Motion.
[brief] (Pa0192-93.)  With respect to the parties’ obligations under the PSA, [...] determined, among other things, that “[t]he obligations of the parties pursuant to the PSA would be for Defendants to complete the RIR to the satisfaction of the NJDEP and subsequently turn over responsibility for the remaining remediation to Plaintiff. ”  (Pa0230.)  The Final Judgment provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  As for Specific Performance, the Court finds that this request is herein GRANTED with the following provisions.  The parties shall have 30 days from the date of this Order to close on the sale and transfer title of the Subject Property from the Defendants to Plaintiff.  At this closing, defendants shall turn over all communications they have had with the NJDEP in relation to the remediation efforts of the Subject Property (to the extent that Defendant’s [sic] not already done so as a part of this litigation).  Upon the transfer of title, Defendants shall continue to cooperate and otherwise reasonably assist Plaintiff in completing remediation and ultimately obtaining an RAO for the Subject Property.  Plaintiff shall be primarily responsible for completing that remediation and obtaining the final RAO for the entirety of the Subject Property.  The Court directs that if Plaintiff does not wish to close or otherwise take ownership of the Subject Property it shall have 10 days herein to provide notice to Defendants in writing of their intent to withdraw and terminate the contract.  At such time, the September 19, 2019 Purchase and Sale Agreement shall be considered terminated by mutual consent .  . . . (Pa0192-93 (emphasis in original). )  On September 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal from the Final Judgment and Discovery Order.  (Pa0236-40.)  On September 18, 2023, Defendants filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal from the Final Judgment.  (Pa0241-44.)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 9  [...] initially testified that he “overslept” that day, as opposed to getting arrested on a new charge, which is what really happened.  (28T 54-18 to 23; 28T 141-3 to 155-22)  prosecutor in late February 2020 offering to provide information against defendant in exchange for a benefit to his own case, he admitted, he did not even know defendant’s real name, and yet, he also admitted, all inmates had potential access to one another’s cells where each inmate had a box of “private” materials, which often would contain discovery from their cases.\(^{10}\) (29T 31-2 to 36-3; 28T 96-9 to 21)
[brief] 28.  [...] established that parking on the Sixth Street Lot continued during the 1970s through the 2000s.  [...] specifically recalled his parking on the Sixth Street Lot during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.  (13T 138:11-139:6)  [...] also testified he drove his father to daily morning services throughout the 1990s and parked in the Sixth Street Lot.  Id., at 140:5-17.  [...] recalls his father parking on the Sixth Street Lot, relaying the story of an incident when his father had a diabetic episode and drove straight from the Sixth Street Lot, across Sixth Street and into a home across from the Congregation.  Id., at 141:13-24.  29.
[brief] “[C]ollecting or enforcing a loan, whether by the lender or its assignee, constitutes the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, an activity falling within the coverage of the CFA. ”  Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 577-78 (2011) (quoting Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 538 (App. Div. 2008)).  Additionally, courts have consistently held the CFA is remedial and should be broadly construed to affect its purposes.  See Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 203 N.J. 496, 522 (2010) (“Because it is ‘remedial legislation,’ the CFA is ‘construe[d] liberally to accomplish its broad purpose of safeguarding the public. ’”) (internal citation omitted); Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999) (“Because it is a remedial statute, its provisions are construed liberally in favor of the consumer to accomplish its deterrent and protective purposes. ”).  The New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzalez is as clear as it is broad—debt collection activity constitutes “subsequent performance” under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  In granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the trial court improperly narrowed the holding in Gonzalez, focusing on specific case facts which are inconsequential to the holding, all but reading collection activity and ‘subsequent performance’ out of the statute.
[brief] A landlord cannot be permitted to disregard repairing a code violation which poses a serious and potentially fatal risk which the landlord knew or had the ability to discover prior to leasing the property.  See Reyes, 404 N.J. Super. at 458 (“an owner of property is directly responsible for compliance with the building codes . . . and a violation of code may be evidential if not conclusive of the lessors' potential breach of a duty. ”).  Where there is such a serious, and easily discoverable, code violation, the landlord of the property must be required to ameliorate this condition prior to assigning control of the property to the tenant.  Allowing an opposite policy to prevail would unreasonably imperil those entering and coming into contact with the property and would encourage landlords to either remain obtuse to discoverable defects, or disregard the need to repair such defects prior to transferring control of the property.  Public policy and general considerations of the public’s welfare do not countenance such purposefully inattentive property ownership.  Accordingly, [...], as the landlord of the Property, should be found to have owed a duty of care to inspect the Property and ameliorate the defective electrical panel box prior to assigning the Property to [...].
[brief] Id. at 231-32.  There, a commercial tenant was contractually required to exercise an option for a long-term lease by both giving notice and tendering a fixed sum of money to the landlord by a specific date.  *Id.* at 214.  The tenant timely notified the landlord of its intent to exercise the option but failed to make the up-front payment necessary to perfect the option.  *Ibid.*  Over the next nineteen months, the tenant repeatedly wrote and spoke with the landlord for the purpose of setting the date and terms of the closing.  *Ibid.*  The landlord, through a series of written and verbal evasions, delayed responding to the tenant’s requests.  *Ibid.*  The landlord never requested the option payment or advised the tenant that it had not fulfilled an essential term of the contract.  *Ibid.*  When the deadline for exercising the option passed, the landlord, for the first time, pointed out the deficiency to the tenant and unilaterally declared the option “null and void.
[brief] According to [...], [...] said that he and [...] had planned a verbal signal – [...] would say “that shit’s crazy” – for [...] to shoot [...].  (11T126-19 to 127-9).  When [...] asked [...] to keep the gun, she said that she had borrowed it from someone else.  (11T127-10 to 19).  [...] gave the signal and got out of the car.  (11T127-20 to 128-2).  [...] then shot [...] in the head, and [...] started shaking.  (11T128-8 to 16).  [...] then shot her again in the neck.  (1T128-17 to 23).  [...] took the victim’s phone to try to delete messages but then put it back in the car.  (11T129-4 to 21).  They then ran to [...]’s grandmother’s house.  (11T130-24 to 131-8).  [...] claimed that [...] confessed all this information first while they were alone in their upstairs bedroom, but later repeated the same information to [...]’s mother and two younger sisters.
[brief] Plaintiffs, in support of their argument that the subpoena is proper, claimed that [...] was involved in the “tracking and tracing of the stolen assets”.  However, that is simply not true.  [...] is not a party to the Underlying Litigation and is not mentioned anywhere in the Complaint filed in the Underlying Litigation.  There is no allegation that [...] converted funds or was otherwise involved in the claims in the Underlying Litigation.  Simply because [...] previously worked with an investment firm formed by, and solely managed by, [...] and is now currently affiliated with [...] (a competitor) does not require that he be deposed related to the Underlying Litigation, where he has no involvement with the underlying claims.  In an attempt to support Plaintiffs’ argument that the subpoena sought relevant information; the Plaintiffs relied upon a several affidavits.  (321a-504a)  However, these affidavits only further establish that there is no conceivable reason to depose [...].  The affidavits highlight that [...] has riled up (and deceived) [...]’s own investors in the [...] that he solely manages to fabricate issues with Broadstreet and [...] and [...], not [...], to distract them from [...]’s own wrongdoings while twenty six L3 investors have sued [...] for investment fraud.  (546a-572a)  These affidavits also demonstrate that [...] had limited involvement and communications with investors during his normal course of employment and did not convey any information related to the claims in the Underlying Litigation or have any direct knowledge of the underlying facts.  Therefore, there is no relevant information related to the Underlying Litigation that Plaintiffs can seek solely from [...].
[brief] *Kenwood Associates v. Board of Adjustment*, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976).  “Although courts defer to the expertise of municipal agencies in reviewing discretional exercises of an agency’s statutory powers, the interpretation of an ordinance is primarily a question of law. ”  *Wyzykowski v. Rizas*, 132 N.J. 509, 518 (1993).  Therefore, the appellate court’s review is de novo.  *388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Township of Readington*, 221 N.J. 318, 338 (2015).  II.
[brief] ”  (Pb15)  This is incorrect.  [...] testified that the [...] had previously conducted an investigation into [...] and obtained a search warrant for him.  (2T 22-7 to 10)  In fact, [...] was “well-known to [Officers [...], [...], and [...]] from prior narcotics investigations. ”  (Da23)  While [...] had never met [...] personally, [...] knew of [...] from these investigations.  (1T 22-5 to 6)  Thus, upon recognizing the vehicles surveilled, both [...] and [...] connected the vehicles with prior information they had that the operators of the vehicles were narcotics dealers; the fact that the source of this information was different in each case—the Elizabeth police department’s prior search warrant for [...] as opposed to the CI tip for [...]—is immaterial.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) states that “[a] consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of section 3 . . . shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges unless the act was the result of a good faith error .  . . .” (emphasis added).  Thus, the voiding of the debt under Section 33(b) arises from “any act” which constitutes a fourth degree crime—such as not obtaining a license in accordance with Section 3—and not from being charged or found guilty of any crime.  Section 33(b) does not say ‘shall be void pending a finding by the Commissioner that the unlicensed party committed a fourth-degree crime. ’  The plain language of the NJCFLA defines the conduct of an unlicensed consumer lender to be a fourth-degree crime and clearly states that a contract not invalid for any other reason shall be void if the collection of which constitutes a fourth-degree crime.  There is no reasonable interpretation of the NJCFLA which requires that the unlicensed entity be charged with or found guilty of any crime as a condition necessary for the voiding of the debt.  There are no provisions in the NJCFLA which require an additional event to declare the contracts purchased by unlicensed entities to be void—the black letter language of the NJCFLA determines that [...]’s contract with [...] (and subsequently [...]) is void.
[directive] V (Enhanced Extended Term)  Defendant has prior distribution-type conviction and has 10 or more criminal history points, not counting the least serious prior drug distribution-type offense used to establish the defendant’s eligibility for an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6f.  Enter Criminal History Category 4/04  SCHEDULE II  Page 4 of 5  AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS (Consult Brimage Guidelines 2 for definitions and rules regarding “double counting”)
[brief] Under both the fairness test utilized by recent decisions and the common law approach premised on the status of the person on the property at the time of the injury, [...], as the owner or possessor of the premises, owed Plaintiff a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect against known or reasonably discoverable dangers.  Kane, supra, 278 N.J. Super at 140.  In order to establish premises liability, a plaintiff also bears the burden of proving that the owner of the premises breached the duty of care owed to plaintiff.  Jerista, supra 185 N.J. at 191.
[brief] Next, there can be no reasonable dispute that Plaintiff did not perform under the subject contract.  Defendant has alleged that Plaintiff did not perform under the First Contract since Plaintiff did not: (1) comply with the required payment terms and (2) did not comply with the First Contract’s threshold release requirements.  Neither of these arguments are meritorious.  (i)  **Plaintiff Abided by Defendant’s Payment Terms (Pa46; Pa224; Pa225; Pa263; Pa284; Pa285; Pa310-311; Pa442)**  Defendant has produced no evidence to dispute that Plaintiff never received any invoices until December 4, 2020, such that the argument that Plaintiff failed to comply with payment terms lacks any support.
[brief] [...], therefore, is not a participant in this appeal.  Judgment, seeking to dismiss all three of [...]’s claims against [...].  (Pa46-Pa681).  [...] filed timely opposition.  (See id.)  On February 17, 2023, well after the January 20, 2023 deadline for dispositive motions, [...] filed another dispositive motion, which it styled as a “Motion to Bar” the expert opinion of [...]’s damages expert, [...].  (Pa682-Pa693).  In this motion, [...] asked the Trial Court – just as [...] did in its Motion for Summary Judgment – to dismiss [...]’s case in its entirety, this time because [...] claimed [...] could not establish any damages as a matter of law.  Indeed, [...] even filed an additional Statement of Material Facts with this new dispositive motion.  (Pa686).  The Trial Court scheduled oral argument on both [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Bar on February 27, 2023, and then again on March 27, 2023.  (See 1T 3:2-75:9 and 2T 3:2-6; see also, Pa6-Pa9).
[brief] Div. 1997).  Just as importantly, their knowledge of and experience with [...] is superior to that of the OAL and its judges, and the BPU and its Staff, whose expertise lies elsewhere.  The ZB's expertise, settled case law repeatedly and consistently holds, is superior to that of any reviewing court and by extension to an ALJ or the BPU.  There is nothing in the statute that would support any claim that land use board's findings on the issues raised in the petition can be ignored in favor of paid experts.  The ID and BPU Decision arbitrarily never mentioned or considered the Holmdel ZB's findings and conclusions.  See, e.g., *Fiore v. Consol. Freightways*, 140 *N.J.* 452, 466 (1995) (court must read all parts of a statute together and not consider separate sections in a vacuum).  The zoning ordinance permits only one primary use on each site, and [...] already has two: an office building and a cell phone tower.  The proposed regulator would have been a third primary use.  This is an issue of the permitted density of uses on any one site, a judgment call of the first rank.  [...] claimed that the proposed regulator station was no more intrusive or undesirable than the cell phone tower, and that in her opinion, the ZB should have approved the application.  There are residences and a working vineyard across the road.  This is simply a matter of where to draw the line.  No amount of testimony by a paid expert can overcome that Holmdel’s ZB is entitled to due consideration and deference on these issues.  V.  CONCLUSION  For the reasons given in this brief, [...] respectfully requests that the Decision of the BPU be reversed.
[brief] In *Salamone*, the Third Circuit held that the “disqualification by the district judge of all jurors with NRA affiliations constitute[d] an abuse of discretion and [wa]s not in accord with the ‘essential demands of fairness,’” compelling reversal of the defendant’s convictions.  *Id.* at 1226–27.  Although jurors could not be excluded for cause unless their affiliation would “prevent or substantially impair” their impartiality, the court excluded all the jurors without questioning them “as to their ability to faithfully and impartially apply the law.
[directive] EFFECTIVE DATE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT  Judiciary G-uide1ines -·  Alternate Care For The Dependents of Persons Detained as a Part of the Judicial Process  Amended and Promulgated  September 2017  Page 5 of 6  5.1  These guidelines have been approved by the Chief Justice to be effective May 1995.  1, 5.2  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:12-13, these guidelines are to be periodically reviewed by the Administrative Director of the Courts, in consultation with the Governor's Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect, with a view to recommending such revisions as are deemed necessary.  Therefore, those who have comments or suggestions to improve the effectiveness of these guidelines are encouraged to submit them, in writing, to the Administrative Director of the Courts, [...].  The assistance and cooperation of all Judiciary personnel and others in implementing these guidelines are greatly appreciated.
[brief] 5.  “CUSTOMER SHALL INDEMNIFY AND HOLD [...] HARMLESS FROM ANY AND ALL SUCH CLAIMS AND LAWSUITS, INCLUDING THE PAYMENT OF ALL DAMAGES, EXPENSES, COSTS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES. ” (Pa20, pg. 6, para. E 4).  6.  “NO SUIT OR ACTION SHALL BE BROUGHT AGAINST [...] OR ITS AGENTS, EMPLOYEES, SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES OR PARENTS (BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT)  MORE THAN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE LOSS, INJURY OR DAMAGE OCCURRED, OR THE SHORTEST DURATION PERMITTED UNDER APPLICABLE LAW IF SUCH PERIOD IS GREATER THAN ONE (1) YEAR. ” (Pa20, pg. 6, para. E 5).  7.  “THE ARBITRATOR’S DECISION WILL BE FINAL AND BINDING. ” (Pa21, pg. 7, para. F).
[brief] Although, as argued in Point II, infra, there was not a complete verdict taken on Count Two.  a single trial for offenses relating to two distinct sets of charges.  The first set of charges (Da 1 to 3; Da 8 to 9; Da 11 to 12) related to defendant’s alleged official misconduct in failing to properly recalibrate Alcotest devices.  He was acquitted of all those counts, and, thus, they are not at issue in this appeal, and no testimony related to those allegations is recounted here.  The second set of charges (Da 4 to 7; Da 10) alleged that defendant committed three offenses (official misconduct, a pattern of official misconduct, and theft) when -- while suspended for the Alcotest allegations, but still a member of the [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) -- he either: (1) retained, or otherwise failed to surrender, an [...] “wallet identification” (hereinafter “wallet ID”) with the intent to benefit himself, or (2) displayed that wallet ID in any of four traffic stops in 2017 and 2018 with the intent to avoid a traffic ticket, when he should not have been in possession of that ID while suspended.
[directive] Inisyal Akize a / Defendant’s Initials Fòm Prensipal Deklarasyon Koupab/Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole paj 6 nan 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole page 6 of 7  23.  c.  Èske w konprann ke si yo pèmèt ou anile deklarasyon koupab ou an poutèt santans jij la [Wi/Yes]
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CALCULATING COMPENSABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES (Pa0050-55; Pa0220).  Both [...] and [...] agreed, and so stated in their briefing to the trial court, that there are only two permissible methods for calculating attorneys’ fees under New Jersey law: (1) the relative culpability approach, or (2) the time necessary to litigate approach.  See *Empower*, 453 N.J. Super. 565, 583.\(^{14}\)  Despite \(^{13}\) E.g., *Passaic Valley*, 206 N.J. 596, 616 (court refused to award counsel fees when insured was only successful in establishing insurer’s duty to defend on three counts of a complaint).
[brief] The lower court finds further support for its decision in the fact that [...] did not sign and return the retainer agreement, stating that there is an indication that [...]’s signature is blacked out.  Indeed, the lower court found:  That letter can be read as an indication that [...] intended to tell [...] that he intended to be continued to be represented by the [...].  The only conclusion the Court can reach and there is no definitive statement here as to who X'd out the retainer letter and struck out [...]'s name and . . . just left [...]'s signature on the retainer.  The only conclusion the Court can draw based upon what’s in front of me is that [...] is the one who crossed it out and sent it back.  T0011:7 – 11:20.  Unfortunately, the lower court did not further explain why this is the “only” conclusion which can be drawn.  No evidence was produced showing who crossed it out.  Whether the fact the blacked-out signature block was an indication by [...] to [...] that he intended to be represented by [...] rather than [...] is a matter for a jury to decide.  It is wholly inappropriate and entirely beyond the scope of the lower court’s review on a motion for summary judgment to make such a determination.