ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The preaction notice was allegedly mailed on June 30, 2021.  18a-19a.  However, in his Certification in Support of Search Fees (18a), Plaintiff’s proof of service shows that this notice was not delivered to the Defendants.  20a.  It is undisputed that the certified mail was returned to the original sender on August 19, 2021 at 11:00 a.m. 20a.  On August 10, 2021, the day after the filing of the Foreclosure Complaint the Defendant, [...], owner of the property, paid Third Quarter Taxes for 2021.  In fact, Defendant paid all of the taxes, in 2021.  The only taxes paid by Plaintiff are from fourth quarter 2018, one quarter in 2019 and three quarters in 2020 and total $20,695.64 including interest, search and recording fees.  [...] also embarked on major repairs to the property after the Tax Foreclosure Complaint was filed in that he put a new roof on the building.
[brief] In *Haylett v. Baladi*, the car was already physically sold.  When the court says it is clear that Baladi “dealt with her”, it’s because Baladi had written a check in her name.  This gives her standing to bring the suit.  At that point, whether Haylett actually had standing to sell the car or not was irrelevant because the car was already manifestly sold.  That being said, it can reasonably be assumed in this case that she had her employer’s permission to sell vehicles on their behalf.  In this present case, the issue is whether Appellant had legal standing to sell his late mother’s car without proper agency (via established estate) or actual title (which Appellant doesn’t have).  If he had no legal standing to sell the car, which he does not, there is no contract.  This is a breach of contract suit but there is no contract to be breached.  Appellant does not have standing to bring an impossible breach of contract suit because there is no breached contract.
[brief] The docket number is [...].  morning a man walked into the bank dressed entirely in black.  (3T 56-20 to 24)  The man was wearing a hood and sunglasses, a handkerchief around his face, and dirty white socks on his hands.  (3T 56-24 to 57-1)  [...] heard the man say to the tellers, “Give me your money. ”  (3T 58-8 to 15)  The tellers each handed over $500 in “bait money” in response.  (3T 59-2 to 22, 76-19 to 21)  [...] recalled telling police that at some point the man also said, “I have a gun. ”  (3T 77-18 to 22)  [...] did not specify to whom this statement was directed, nor did she ever see a gun.  [...], one of the tellers, testified that the man first approached [...], the other teller.  (3T 95-1 to 8)  Shah was assisting a customer at the time and did not “put[] two and two together” when the man said, “give me all your money. ”  (3T 95-8 to 11)  Joseph, on the other hand, quickly placed her “bait money” on the counter and stepped back.  (3T 95-11 to 14)  When Shah still had not placed any money on the counter, the man said, “give me all of your money or I’ll shoot. ”  (3T 95-14 to 16)  As he said this, the man had one hand in his sweatshirt pocket, and Joseph noticed an object protruding from his pocket that looked like it could be the tip of a gun.  (3T 95-16 to 19, 97-7 to 14)  Joseph did not see a gun at any time.  (3T 97-4 to 6)  Shah did not testify at trial.
[brief] Several years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court returned to the issue of which statute of limitations should govern a cause of action in *McGrogan v. Till*, supra.  In *McGrogan*, the plaintiff commenced a legal malpractice action against the attorney who represented him in a criminal prosecution.  *McGrogan*, 167 N.J. at 418.  The Court rejected the notion that legal malpractice in the context of a criminal prosecution primarily inflicts an injury to the person due to a loss of liberty flowing from incarceration and the loss of their civil rights and would allow the civil action to be commenced within two years.  *Id.* at 416.  The Court held that a single statute of limitations applies to legal malpractice actions, irrespective of the specific injuries asserted.  *Id.* at 417.  The McGrogan Court clarified that its focus on the “nature of the injury” in *Montells* “was not centered on the gravamen of an individual complaint, but on the typical injuries in LAD claims generally. ”  *Id.* at 421.  The McGrogan Court continued:  The holdings in *Montells* and *Labree [v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, 300 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1997)(a retaliatory discharge claim)] recognize that in the analysis of which statute of limitations period should apply to a cause of action, the concept of “nature of the injury” is not to be subjected to a complaint-specific inquiry.  The “nature of the injury” is used to determine the “nature of the cause of action” or the general characterization of that class of claims in the aggregate.  That analysis precedes resolution of the question of which statute of limitations applies to a type of cause of action, and does not contemplate an analysis of the specific complaint and the injuries it happens to allege.  Id. at 422-23.  The McGrogan Court, therefore, concluded that the legal malpractice action is grounded in negligence and the gravamen of the action is injury to the rights of another—triggering a six-year statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.
[brief] [...] is also a public entity under the “public function” test, which the Trial Court articulated as “(1) whether the private company acted on behalf and at the request of the government; and (2) whether the private company performed a governmental function. ” (Da103).  Both of these factors are encompassed by the functional equivalent test.  Here, it is undisputed that [...] acted on behalf of [...] by transmitting [...] alerts for [...].  It is also undisputed that [...] performed a governmental function by providing emergency alerts.  For these reasons, should the Court reach the issue, the Court should affirm the Trial Court’s holding that [...] is a public agency.
[brief] As previously explained, [...]’s mental health and history of abuse were discussed during sentencing by defense counsel as an explanation for his conduct and included in the presentence report and support letters.  (2T 27-20 to 31-12, 32-12 to 25; PSR 16-17; Da 40-43)  As explained in Point II, one of the criteria for a PTSD diagnosis is an inability to properly regulate emotional responses, which can result in aggressive and reckless behavior, consistent with the conduct displayed in this case.  The court should have considered and found mitigating factor 4 because [...]’s childhood and mental health, like his youth, helped to explain and partially excuse his behavior.
[brief] 24  Other Authorities Brief of Amici Curiae Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and other Health Care Organizations in support of Plaintiff in Adams v.  [...], [...] (11th Cir. 2019) ..................................................11  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], & [...], Short-term outcomes of pubertal suppression in a selected cohort of 12- to 15-year-old young people with persistent gender dysphoria in the UK, PLOS ONE 16(2) (2021)  .......................13  [...], Independent review of gender identity services for children and young people: Interim report (February 2022)  .................................................................12  [...], et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People, Version 8, Int’l J. of Transgender Health (Sept. 15, 2022)  ........11  [...], Detransition Among Transgender and Gender-Diverse People—An Increasing and Increasingly Complex Phenomenon, J. Clin. Endocrinology & Metab.  (June 9, 2022)  ......................................................................................14  [...], Transgender and Gender Diverse Children and Adolescents: Fact-Checking of AAP Policy, J. Sex & Marital Therapy 307 (2019)  .....................13  [...], Gender Identity 5 Years After Social Transition, Pediatrics 150(2):e2021056082 (Aug. 2022)  ...........................................................................13  [...] ..............................................5  [...], *The myth of persistence: Response to “A Critical Commentary on Follow-Up Studies and Desistance Theories about Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Children” by [...] et al.*, International Journal of Transgenderism, 19 (2018)……………………………………………………………12  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] See, e.g., Fairlawn Indus. v. Gerling America Ins. Co., 342 N.J. Super. 113, 117 (App. Div. 2001) (“Generally, the words of an insurance policy are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. ”).  In Merchants Indemnity Corp. of New York v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114 (1962), similar to the instant matter, the insurance company sought rescission of an automobile policy to avoid coverage involving a serious accident.  The insurance applicant claimed the car was “solely owned” by her.  However, the insurer argued that she misled them as they believed her brother was in fact that true owner.  Our Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed whether a misrepresentation had been made and stated that in general “an insured is chargeable with knowledge of the contents of a policy,” but this “rule does not reflect a judicial belief that the average purchaser of insurance reads the contract in full or understands all that he reads.
[brief] The trial court tried to close this loop on the negative criteria but only made it far worse.  It said:  [T]he Distance Regulation variance would impair the purpose of the zoning plan as shown by the factors under N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-2(a)-(o).  The 350-foot setback from the intersection would not promise public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare, nor would it provide adequate light, air, and open space, or a desirable visual environment.  Alternatively, it would increase congestion.  (Pa22.)  There are three problems with this passage.  First, there is no evidence whatsoever of “congestion”; it is not even mentioned by the Board.  Second, the “zoning plan” referred to in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, i.e. the negative criteria, is not the general purposes listed in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a)-(o), but the *purposes of the particular zoning from which a deviation is sought*.
[brief] (Da2542-Da2543).  Moreover, the fence that Defendants and [...] falsely accused [...] of breaking in the criminal complaint was erected as part of Defendants’ effort to block Plaintiffs’ easement over the dunes.  Clearly, the issues are bound together and, unlike Young, [...] acted quickly.  In fact, the only reason [...] did not file his motion for leave to amend sooner was because Defendants hid the existence of their false criminal complaint against him until after the statute of limitations had expired.  Finding the proposed claim did not relate back would reward Defendants for their wrongful withholding of this information.
[brief] In Fisher v. Hamilton, Docket No. [...], 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1773 (App. Div. July 17, 2013), the Commission dismissed in its entirety an ethics complaint filed against a member of the [...], after the school board member allegedly accepted private contact and engaged in private conversation with a candidate for the board’s interim superintendent position.  Id. at *1.  The Commission determined that the complainant in Fisher had “failed to provide a sufficient factual basis in his [amended] complaint from which the Commission could find that [the school board member’s] action was of such a nature that it had the potential to compromise the Board. ”  Id. at *4.  The Commission thus dismissed the allegations that the school board member violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).  Id.  This Court reversed the Commission’s determination and remanded the case for reinstatement of the complaint.  Id. at *12.  In reaching this decision, the Court noted the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the School Ethics Act.  The Act “is not only aimed at preventing the actual violation of the public trust by school board members but also ensuring that board members will avoid conduct ‘which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated. ’”  Id. quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  This Court in Fisher also emphasized the importance of reading a complaint’s allegations liberally and generously, stating as follows:  [A] reviewing court searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.  At this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint.  For purposes of analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  The examination of a complaint’s allegations of fact required by the aforestated principles should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach.  Id. at *11 (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).  These principals apply here as well.
[directive] Allocation criteria for Intensive Care Unit/Critical Care admission: allocation framework is based primarily on two considerations: 1) saving lives; and 2) saving life- years, both within the context of ensuring meaningful access for all patients and individualized patient assessments based on objective medical knowledge.  All patients who meet usual medical indications for intensive care unit (ICU)/critical care beds and services will be assigned a priority score using a 1-8 scale (lower scores indicate higher likelihood of benefit from critical care), derived from 1) patients’ likelihood of surviving to hospital discharge, assessed with an objective and validated measure of acute physiology (e.g., the Sequential Organ Failure Score (SOFA) score); and 2) the presence of a severely limited life expectancy even if the patient survived the acute critical illness (Table 1).  This raw priority score may be converted to three color-coded priority groups (e.g., high, intermediate, and low priority) if needed to facilitate streamlined implementation in individual hospitals.  All patients will be eligible to receive critical care beds and services regardless of their priority score, but available critical care resources will be allocated according to priority score, such that the availability of these services will determine how many patients will receive critical care.  Patients who are triaged to not receive ICU/critical care beds or services will be offered medical care including intensive symptom management and psychosocial support.  Note that the SOFA scoring system is not appropriate for use in children or neonates.
[brief] See Stroming v. Stroming, 12 N.J. Super. 217, 224 (App.Div.1951), certif. den. 8 N.J. 319 (1951); Foster v. Medela, 9 N.J. Super. 195, 201-202 (App.Div.1950). ”  Id at 635.  It is also clear in New Jersey that confidential relationships create fiduciary like responsibilities.  Teasing out the difference, if any, from dominance within a confidential relationship and the effects of undue influence, is very difficult.  The creation of fiduciary-like responsibilities urges equity to restrain a grantee or recipient of properties from taking advantage of the confidential relationship.
[brief] The Plaintiff asks this Panel to hold that procedural niceties are superior to the interests of substantial justice, but does so without having abided by those procedural niceties in the first instance.  Plaintiff obtained an order authorizing substituted service, as well as its default judgment, with incompetent hearsay evidence prohibited by R. 1:6-2(a) and R. 1:6-6.  If this court agrees with Plaintiff’s position that form should prevail over substance, then what is good for the goose is good for the gander.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE (Da1)
[brief] Any claim that all or part of the Class Action Waiver is invalid, illegal, unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable may be determined only by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by an arbitrator.  Moreover, the parties’ arbitration agreement broadly defines “Disputes” as follows (the “Dispute Clause”):  7.4  Definition of “Dispute”:  Subject to the following exclusions, “Dispute” means any dispute, claim, or controversy between you and [...] regarding any aspect of your relationship with [...], whether based in contract, statute, regulation, ordinance, tort (including without limitation fraud, misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, negligence, gross negligence or reckless behavior), or any other legal, statutory or equitable theory, and includes without limitation the validity, enforceability or scope of the [membership agreement] (except for the scope, enforceability and interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement and Class Action Waiver).  However, “Dispute” will not include (1) personal injury claims or claims for lost, stolen, or damaged property; (2) claims that all or part of the Class Action Waiver is invalid, unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable; and (3) any claim for public injunctive relief, i.e., injunctive relief that has the primary purpose and effect of prohibiting alleged unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public.  Such claims may be determined only by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by an arbitrator.
[brief] (Pa230-31.)  However, the calendar for January 6, 2022 that was publicly available online did not include A. 6260.  (Pa112-19.)  The Minutes notes that A.6260 was given a first reading by [...], and [...].  (Pa231.)  On the same day, the Assembly Appropriations Committee reported on A. 6260 and, as reported, gave the bill its second reading.  (Pa232.)  On January 10, 2022, the Minutes indicated:  The Clerk read a message from the Senate that the Senate has passed the following bills in which concurrence of the General Assembly is requested, which bills were read for the first time and were referred as indicated:  Senate No. 49, by Senators [...], [...], [...] and [...], without reference, on second reading – Codifies constitutional right to freedom of reproductive choice.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...]'s Background in Law Enforcement  [...] was a 50-year-old married father of three at the time he testified in this matter.  (1T7-8).  [...] was a high school graduate and attended classes at both Camden County College and Farleigh Dickinson University.  (1T8).  [...]'s first job in law enforcement was with the Camden County Sheriff's Department assigned to the Camden County Jail in 1989.  (1T9-10).  [...] had to pass a physical fitness test to get that job.  (1T9).  [...] transferred from the Camden County Sheriff's Department to the Camden County Correctional Facility in approximately 1992 and for 7.5 years thereafter.  (1T10).  In 1999, [...] went to work for the Camden City Police Department.  (1T11).  [...] had to pass a physical fitness test to get that job.  (1T11).  The Camden City Police Department eventually dissolved on April 30, 2013, and became the Camden County Police Department on May 1, 2013.  (1T12-13).  [...] transitioned from one to the other.  (1T12).  Camden County, also known as Camden Metro, was a Civil Service Jurisdiction.
[brief] Legal Argument Point I  The sentencing court properly sentenced defendant and this Court should affirm defendant’s sentence.  This is the third time defendant has been resentenced, and again the court ordered the Certain Persons Not to Possess Firearms under [...] to run consecutive to the sentence under [...].  Two separate judges have presided over defendant’s sentencing, and both of those judges have found it proper to impose consecutive sentences.  After hearing argument prior the last resentencing, [...] issued a comprehensive and thorough opinion which laid out the court’s reasons for again imposing a consecutive sentence.  [...] found that because Yarbough guidelines 3A and 3C applied, and based on the legislative history behind the statute, defendant’s criminal history, and the facts of this case, the aggregate thirty-year sentence is fair to the interests of justice and to defendant.  Defendant takes issue with the entirety of [...]’s decision and asks this Court to now order the imposition of concurrent sentences for a fourth time.  Alternatively, defendant asks this Court to reverse and remand his sentence by asserting the sentencing court’s overall fairness evaluation was flawed.
[brief] 1.  The Court’s decision of 2/6/2012 (DA50-51) stated:  “[...] calculated a credit due Appellant of $6,160 as of 10/1/09.  “I have determined that as if 10/1/09 Defendant was entitled to a credit of $12,390. ”…“He has therefore overpaid by $12,390.00.  This should be reflected as a credit on his probation account. ”  The credits were never posted on Probation’s audits (see audit of 8/21/2012 (DA286, DA290, DA294, DA299, and DA304).  The trial Court never corrected Probation’s erroneous audits.  2.
[directive] It should be noted that the sole purpose of a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues is to account for anticipated litigation problems with respect to the prosecution of the specific count or counts for which the downward departure is made.  A Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues is not intended to provide a means for a prosecutor to extend “leniency” to a defendant, see Section 3.8, or otherwise to circumvent or undermine the uniform calculation process set forth in these Guidelines, which is designed to channel prosecutorial discretion and to ensure that the reasons for the exercise of such discretion are reviewable by courts pursuant to the requirements of State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998).
[brief] The language provided only a license - "an authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon another's land without possessing any estate thereon" (55 N.J. Eq. at 384).  As a license, the permission had been revoked by the death of the license parties and/or the conveyance of the property.  Id.  As detailed in Kiernan v. Kara, 7 N.J. Super. 600, 603 (Ch. Div. 1950), a license is subject to revocation upon one of the following events, (1) the will of the licensor; (2) the death of either of the parties; (3) and the conveyance of the land upon which it is intended to operate.
[brief] At some point during these later proceedings, Appellant “unretired” and is allegedly again a practicing member of the New Jersey bar.  As previously discussed, the deposition of [...], Executrix of the Estate of [...], occurred on November 30, 2023.  Said deposition ran for approximately 2 ½ hours and was comprised of overly aggressive and antagonistic interrogation and hostile exchanges between Appellant and deponent.  While Appellant remained civility to Respondent’s counsel, Appellant made it clear that this matter would be continued regardless of adjudication in these remand proceedings until either Respondent submitted to his demands or every last nickel of funds was exhausted.
[brief] Then, yes, there were Second & Third Amended Complaints which did not comply with Iqbal’s conflicting requirements.  While a Fourth was pending, it was decided remand would be made with a 5th Amended Complaint.  That Complaint was solely for the purposes of remand – it was never meant to be “examined” as [...] did.  (It was in “Track Changes” mode so deletions were easy to see.)  So, there were only two denied filings in Federal Court.