ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “Final Judgment” for [...] and Against [...] and [...]’s Motions to Reconsider, Change Track Assignment and Re-Open Discovery  28.  By letter dated April 5, 2023, notwithstanding [...]’s announced intention to oppose [...]’s motion for summary judgment against [...], counsel for [...] misinformed the Court that its motion for summary judgment “went unopposed. ” (PPCIa368).  29.  The next day (April 6, 2023), before [...] had an opportunity to correct [...]’s counsel’s misstatement that [...]’s motion for summary judgment against [...] had been “unopposed,” the Court entered an order granting [...] summary judgment against [...] and entered “final judgment” against [...] in the amount of $1,426,871.61 (PPCIa369-371).  Although [...] claimed to have incurred $475,623.87 in environmental response/cleanup costs, the Court trebled those damages under the Spill Act, resulting in the entry of a $1,426,871.61 “Final Judgment” against [...].  Id. 30.  The Court was not asked to, nor did it certify that pursuant to R. 4:42-2, there was “no just reason for delay,” such that a “final judgment” should be entered upon fewer than all claims as to all parties.  31.  On April 26, 2023, [...] moved for reconsideration of the April 6, 2023 order granting “Final Judgment” against [...], both because [...] had not been afforded the opportunity to oppose [...]’s motion and on the merits.  (PPCIa372-87).  32.  On June 22, 2023, and before the Court had decided [...]’s motion for reconsideration, [...] moved for partial summary judgment against [...].  [...] sought judgment that [...], pursuant to an MCS-90 endorsement in the [...] policy, was liable to pay $750,000 of the “final judgment” it had obtained against [...].  (PPCIa388-418).  33.  On July 31, 2023, the Court declined to vacate its April 6, 2023 Order granting “Final Judgment” against [...] (PPCIa419-420).¹  34.  On August 21, 2023, [...] again moved for reconsideration of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the April 6, 2023 Order granting ”final judgment” against [...] because the trial court relied upon facts not established by the record in its July 31, 2023 decision hearing, and to re-open discovery and change the track assignment from Track I to Track IV.  [...]’s motion also identified a number of material facts that remained in dispute and that should have precluded summary judgment at the time the Court granted same.  (PPCIa421-32).  35.  On September 12, 2023, [...] filed opposition to [...]’s motion for partial summary judgment against it.  (PPCIa433-46).  D.
[brief] The Property is located across Route 33 from the entrance to the existing Renaissance age-restricted development; and, therefore, the LDO imposes an obligation on the Respondents, as well as the initial applicant in the Prior Approvals to supply the Route 33 Signal as part of the development of the Property.  Ba12.  Both the Respondents and the initial applicant in the Prior Approval voluntarily agreed to supply the Route 33 Signal as a condition of any Board approval.  M71-72; M91.  In an effort to provide the Route 33 Signal, the applicant in the Prior Approvals and their professionals, including the Applicant’s Traffic Engineer [...], attended a pre-application meeting with the new Jersey Department of Transportation (hereinafter the “[...]”).  See Ba22-26.  At a pre-application meeting on April 8, 2015 (hereinafter the “2015 [...] Meeting”), the [...] communicated significant support for the Route 33 Signal.  Ba22-26.  In reliance on the [...]’s support for the Route 33 Signal at the 2015 [...] Meeting, the Route 33 Signal was included with the application filed for the Prior Approvals.
[brief] [...]’s Trial Court Opinion Must Be Affirmed  Under The Binding New Jersey Supreme Court precedent in *Humane Soc. of U.S., New Jersey Branch, Inc. v. New Jersey*, 70 N.J. 565 (1976) (Pa115-133) | 8 | | Conclusion | 13 | ### TABLE OF CITATIONS | Citation | Page # | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Humane Soc. Of U.S., New Jersey Branch, Inc. v. New Jersey State Fish & Game Council, 70 N.J. 565 (1976) | 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12 | | Male v. Renda Contracting, 64 N.J. 199, 201, 314 A.2d 361 362, Cert. den., 419 U.S. 839, 95 S.Ct. 69, 42 L.Ed.2d 66 (1974) | 5,11,13 | | State v. Shannon, 210 N.J. 225, 227 (2012) | 1 | | White v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 77 N.J. 538 (1978) | 1 | ### NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION | Citation | Page # | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | New Jersey State Constitution, Article III, Par. 1 | 2 | | New Jersey State Constitution, Article IV., par. 1 | 7 | | New Jersey State Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 1 Par. 1 | 2 | ### STATUTES | Citation | Page # | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25 | 10 | | N.J.S.A. 13:1B-31 et seq. | 11 | | N.J.S.A. 13:1B-35 | 11 | | N.J.S.A. 23:4-1 | 10 | | N.J.S.A. 23:4-2 | 10 | | N.J.S.A. 23:4-18 | 10 | | N.J.S.A. 23:4-32 | 10 |
[brief] The Court has refused to grant farmland assessment status to a property where the agriculture or horticulture use was unlawful under the zoning code.  See Soc'y of the Holy Child Jesus v. City of Summit, 418 N.J. Super. 365, 376-77 (App. Div. 2011).  “[S]uperimposed upon the requisites of the [FAA] was the requirement that the agricultural or horticultural use must be lawful; it must be a permitted use under the municipality's zoning ordinance. ”  …  “Concerns of judicial integrity are implicated.  The Tax Court should not passively lend its aid to a taxpayer’s zoning noncompliance.  Nor should it accord favored treatment to an undeserving owner of land. ”
[brief] b.  If the property located at [...] is still owned by the trust at the time of my death, I grant my daughter, [...], the power to purchase both her brother’s [sic] shares in such property valued at the then fair market value.  (Da3).  [...] and his wife, [...] (collectively “the Defendants”) moved into the Boonton Property on or around December 1, 2020 and vacated on November 28, 2022, after the trial court ordered their ejectment.
[brief] COUNSEL DID NOT DENY THE TRIAL COURT AUTHORITY TO RENDER FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST [...]  On January 20, 2023, [...], Esq., counsel for [...], filed a motion to be relieved of counsel claiming his clients’ “cooperation is non-existent,” “multiple telephone calls and approximately 23 emails requesting cooperation have been fruitless,” and “I have requested vital documents which remain unprovided. ”  Mr. Vida then requested that [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment against [...] be postponed.  (PPCIa357-63).  On February 6, 2023, the trial court entered an order relieving Mr. Vida as counsel (PPCIa364-65), and then waited to see if [...] would hire substitution counsel.  On the April 6, 2023 Final Judgment against [...], the Court added the following language, “This motion was filed on January 6, 2023.  On January 30, 2023, [...], Esq. [counsel for [...]], confirm that the defendant [...] Transport, LLC received a copy of this motion for partial summary judgment.  On 2/6/2023, [...] Esq. was relieved as counsel.  [...] Transport, LLC has not opposed this motion in the 3 months that this motion has been pending. ” (PPCIa369-71).  [...] claims that the trial court erred in signing the April 6, 2023 Final Judgment against [...] and that it must be voided.
[brief] In addition to denying excess liability coverage for defendant [...] (thus contending defendant [...]’s liability coverage is limited to $500,000 as provided by the underlying [...] policy), defendant [...] has also denied plaintiffs the benefit of the $1,000,000 uninsured motorist policy they purchased from [...], claiming that defendant [...] was not uninsured despite the $500,000 shortfall between the [...] liability policy and the [...] excess UIM policy.
[brief] ..................................................................................................................  29  POINT IV  THE MANNER IN WHICH OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT AND A PATTERN OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT WERE PRESENTED TO THE JURY IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE JURY TO BE NON-UNANIMOUS REGARDING THE THEORY OF GUILT.  AS REQUESTED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN A MANNER THAT DEMANDED INDIVIDUAL UNANIMOUS FINDINGS ON THE UNDERLYING ALLEGATIONS OF THOSE COUNTS.  (RULINGS AT 20T 110-16 TO 111-7; 20T 168-23 TO 184-20; DA 13 TO 14)
[brief] **13A.**  Defendant’s Answer denied any and all claims of negligence.  **13A.**  Defendant’s Answer advises that she “is a licensed physicians practicing medicine in the specialty of pulmonology and critical care medicine” and that the care and treatment provided to Plaintiff to Defendant was within those specialties.  **21A.**  Finally, Defendant’s Answer demands an Affidavit of Merit pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27, et. seq.  **22A.**  During discovery, Plaintiff served an Affidavit of Merit (hereinafter ‘AOM’) prepared by [...], M.D. dated August 20, 2019, which alleges that the care and treatment provided by Defendant, as well as [...], [...] and [...], fell outside acceptable standards and/or treatment practices.
[brief] They all testified that on the night of January 31, 2023, [...] left the house around 11:30 p.m. or midnight to meet up with a friend.  (9T 105-10 to 21; 11T 8-13)  [...] met up with his friend [...]\(^8\) at [...] and later [...], and [...] was the designated driver for the night.  (11T 26-6 to 12)  [...] came home around 2:35 a.m. and he and [...] began watching the movie Braveheart (11T 8-21 to 9-10, 26-14 to 24)  [...] heard the front door slam around 2:15 a.m. or 2:30 a.m. and believed that was [...] coming home, although she did not see him at that time.  (9T 106-3 to 10)  At 3:45 a.m (according to [...]) or 4:00 a.m. (according to [...]), [...] got up to use the bathroom and saw [...] in a bedroom watching the movie Braveheart with [...].  (9T 106-14 to 107-2; 11T 9-16 to 14, 27-6 to 2)  [...] and [...] then went to bed and woke up around 6:00 to 6:30 a.m. (11T 10-5 to 16, 13-12 to 14, 27-14 to 16)
[directive] 특정 성범죄에 대한 추가 벌금 8.  Surcharge Penalty for Certain Sex Offenses [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 가중 범죄적 성접촉 또는 범죄적 성접촉 및 년7 월1 일 이후에 발생한 범죄에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 판사가 2002  의 벌금을 부과한다는 것을 아십니까?  $100  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact or criminal sexual contact and the offense occurred on or after July 1, 2002, the court shall impose a fine of $100?
[brief] Accordingly, the dismissal Order should be reversed on two grounds:  First, it was erroneous to hold that a new lease somehow vitiates an absolute sale/purchase transaction.  Because Appellants allege that their purchased-assets were purportedly re-sold, Appellants have valid claims.  Second, because [...] engaged in illegal self-help with the lease after breaching the confidentiality covenant, Appellants’ claims are valid.
[brief] He received a six-year prison sentence with eighty-five percent parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2, and testified as a witness for the State.  [...] testified that he acted as a look-out while defendant stole the pocketbooks.  Defendant did not testify at trial.  His girlfriend testified that defendant was with her in an apartment complex next to the victim's home, except for a brief period of time when defendant went to a neighbor's apartment for a cigarette.  The jury convicted defendant on all charges.
[brief] Plaintiff was told by [...] (1T; 59:9).  The civilians told her that they were not permitted into that office either (1T; 59:15).  All correspondence would go through the Captain and the Assistant (1T; 60:3).  Each Admin Officer had the responsibilities that she was following when [...] became upset in the emails; she was just doing her job (1T; 61:4).  She summarized [...]’s problem as him believing he should be spoken to before she did her job (1T; 61:21).  And when Plaintiff spoke to the Major about that incident, she was told that she was in charge of setting up everything going forward and it’s not about chain of command (1T; 62:8).  Actually, the Major told [...] and the Captains how things were going to happen going forward and she was told by the Majors (1T; 62:15).  [...] told Plaintiff that it was her job and if she had any issues with somebody, to tell him (1T; 62:22).  The trash that was left in the room after the carpet job was completed was Intake Unit trash and she needed somebody from that Unit to help (1T; 60:21).
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  In examining that threshold question, the *Gazzillo* court found that a notice of claim was not necessary because there was no nexus between the wrong alleged and the defendant’s public employment.  *See ibid.* (“Here, as far as the record discloses at this point, it is purely accidental that plaintiff was assaulted on school grounds. ”).  *Gazzillo* is clearly distinguishable from the present facts.  Here, in contrast to *Gazzillo*, there is a clear “nexus between the acts complained of” by [...] and the individual State Defendants’ public employment.
[brief] ”  Walker, 209 N.J. at 132 (quoting Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 500-01 (1984)).  Notably, numerous federal courts have found that when fee applications are grossly excessive and unreasonable, they may be denied in their entirety.  See, e.g., Young v. Smith, 905 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2018); Clemens v. New York Central Mutual Life Insurance Co., 903 F.3d 396, 402-03 (3rd Cir. 2018), Fair Housing Council of Greater Washington v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 98-99 (4th Cir. 1993), Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir. 1991), and Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980).
[brief] The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently agreed with the [...]’ position in a published case, holding that an insurer’s IFPA claims based on PIP benefits it sought to recover were arbitrable under the No-Fault Law.  In *Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A.*, __F.4th__, 2024 WL 1819645, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 26, 2024), [...] sued several medical practices under the IFPA, RICO, and other causes of action alleging that the practices submitted over $10 million in fraudulent PIP benefits claims based on unnecessary medical care and kickback schemes.  After finding that IFPA could be arbitrated as a general matter, the Third Circuit first held that [...]’s IFPA claim had to be arbitrated under the No-Fault Law’s arbitration provision, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1.  *Id.* at __, 2024 WL 1819645, at *3.  Specifically, the Third Circuit examined the statutory language and concluded that because [...]’s suit was an “effort to recover medical expense claims paid through auto insurance PIP benefits, they fall under [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a)’s] plain text. ”  *Ibid.*  The court rejected [...]’s argument that the statute did not cover IFPA claims merely because the claim deals with fraud, because N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) “does not have an exception for fraud” and it was not the court’s job to create such a carveout.  *Ibid.*  Moreover, the court observed that the statutory list of claims covered by the arbitration provision encompassed fraud claims.  *Ibid.* (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c)).  The court also relied on this Court’s pronouncements in *Molino* and *Sabato* about the No-Fault Law’s language.  *Ibid.*  The Third Circuit’s published *Mount Prospect* decision is directly contrary to [...]’s position here.
[brief] Defendants routinely received communications informing them of [...]’s troublesome behavior in the breeding context.  For example, on October 9, 2017, [...], the General Manager of [...], sent an email to [...] personnel saying that [...] had been “a lot calmer” that morning.  (Pa1066a).  [...] testified that, by stating that [...] had not behaved calmly, the email likely referenced the fact that [...] “would kind of act up when he did not want to be collected again… .” (Pa844a).  Accordingly, despite Defendants earning money from [...] by selling his frozen sperm, [...] was routinely given breaks from collection, authorized by [...], because of his habitual tendency to resist going into the breeding shed for collection.  (Pa1063a-Pa1064a; Pa1975a; Pa295a) (Pa534a).  [...] further testified that [...] had “issues with being collected where we needed to take breaks occasionally and sometimes I think he didn’t want to walk into the breeding shed. ” (Pa837a).  [...]’s resistance to going into the breeding shed was so routinely problematic that [...] had to deviate from its written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for semen collection specifically for [...].  Because [...] was so “difficult to catch,” they changed the protocol by “catching him in the field and bringing him to the breeding shed from the field instead of the barn,” which directly contravened [...] SOP. (Pa536a; Pa1073a).  [...] testified that bringing [...] to the breeding shed from the field instead of the barn was a deviation from normal collection protocol that was unique to [...].  (Pa848a).  [...] informed Defendants of having to deviate from their SOP to get [...] to the breeding shed.  On November 6, 2017, [...] sent [...] an email stating that “since we switched [[...]] over to bringing him right from the field to the breeding shed he has been fine. ” (Pa1070a).  Notably, [...], the manager for [...], testified that adoption of the written SOP, which included the protocol for bringing stallions to the breeding shed, was a mandatory pre-requisite to [...] obtaining a frozen semen permit from the USDA.  (Pa523a-Pa525a).  Problems with getting [...] to cooperate with the breeding process continued from 2017 into the 2018 season.
[brief] On September 18, 2019, at 10:26 a.m., [...] placed a call to 9-1-1 and reported that he located his sister, [...], in her vehicle on [...] in [...], and believed she was deceased.  [11T14-22 to 16-14].  [...] Patrolman [...] responded to [...] within 5 minutes of the 9-1-1 call.  [11T23-10 to -19].  He observed a green Dodge Durango parked in front of a playground area and near the water pumping station, and [...], the victim’s girlfriend, pacing near the vehicle.  [11T24-1 to 25-1; 11T41-4 to 13].  Spady was distraught and reported that she found her girlfriend unresponsive in her vehicle.  [11T25-5 to -12].  A Burlington County Sheriff’s Officer on the scene opened the driver’s side front door and the two observed an unresponsive female with blood on her laying across the center console of the car.  [11T27-12 to 28-5].  The female was identified as [...].  [11T29-14 to -15].  She had blood around her nose and no signs of life.  [11T30-11 to -17].  There was blood on the center console, two shell casings on the front passenger’s seat and a cell phone near the center console.  [11T30-18 to 31-18; 11T33-20 to -25].  Willingboro Police Officer [...] arrived at the scene and spoke with [...].  [11T44-12 to -13].  He explained that Deasia had not returned home the night before so he was driving around to find her and was the first to locate her vehicle.  [11T44-18 to -24].  Deasia’s body was eventually removed from the vehicle and the vehicle was towed to a secure lot.
[brief] (Pa207).  This Court granted the motion in-part, remanding to the Chancery court “for further consideration of the commitment in light of the current status of the Connecticut proceedings. ” (Pa207).  [...] was offered the opportunity for a testimonial hearing on his ability to pay on three dates: July 22, 2022, September 15, 2022, and September 28, 2022.  (Pa209).  Each time counsel had to prepare for a testimonial hearing, but each time on the hearing date [...] opted not to testify or put any evidence into the record concerning his purported cooperation in Connecticut or his ability to pay the judgment.  During the September 28, 2022 hearing, the Chancery court was repeatedly assured by [...]’s counsel that the only thing [...] could do to try to pay the judgment was to try to get the assets in Connecticut released because he had nothing left and all he could do was cooperate in Connecticut.
[brief] Relying on tortured interpretations of the Court Rules and overstatements about the trial court’s reasoning to criticize its decision, [...]’ final complaint is that the trial court “awarded an excessive amount of prejudgment interest and failed to adequately explain its basis” for applying compounded interest to calculate the total award.  (Db54-60.)  The Wilfs’ argument wholly disregards the well-established law affording trial courts discretion in entering prejudgment interest awards and must be rejected.
[brief] In *Shepherd*, the court noted that to “aid or abet” under the LAD, “the individual must willfully and knowingly associate himself or herself with the unlawful act, and seek to help make the act succeed.  The defendant must share the same intent as the one who actually committed the offense. ”  *Id.* at 424.  The Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts suggesting Defendant [...] “aided and abetted” or otherwise provided substantial assistance and/or encouraged any other person to engage in wrongful conduct against Plaintiff.  This is especially true given that Plaintiff cannot establish the [...] performed any illegal or tortious activity in the first instance.  See 17a (“Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to establish what, if any, illegal or tortious activity was taken by Defendant [...]”).  Standing alone, the acts attributed to Defendant [...] fall woefully short of the “active and purposeful conduct” that courts have held is required to constitute aiding and abetting for purposes of allocating individual liability.  Fatal to Plaintiff’s claim is the complete absence of any facts demonstrating that Defendant [...] willfully and/or knowingly associated with any unlawful act.  The trial court recognized such pleading deficiency.  [...] was present at the meeting involving the violation of District Policy 1648; however, the complaint fails to establish the remaining elements of aider and abettor liability.  **********  Defendant [[...]] was not aware of playing any role in aiding and abetting an illegal or tortious activity and there is no actual support that she had given knowing and substantial assistance in the principal violation.  **********  The Complaint fails to otherwise plead facts to suggest she was involved, even unknowingly, in any wrongful conduct, let alone facts showing her encouragement or substantial assistance of the alleged conduct.  Employees are not liable as aider and abettor merely because they were present; rather, a knowing and substantial assistance of a wrongful act, coupled with awareness of the underlying acts illegality, is required.  **********  The Complaint fails to state a claim as to aider and abettor liability of defendant [...].  [16a]  The trial court properly found Plaintiff's claim for individual liability as against Defendant [...] fails on its face and, accordingly, dismissed Count Three.  The dismissal should be affirmed.  POINT II
[brief] Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014) (citations omitted).  Thus, we consider, as the motion judge did, "'whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.'"  Id. at 406 (citation omitted).  If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then "'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'"  DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (citation omitted).  On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial judge erred in rejecting [...]'s report as a net opinion and granting summary judgment in favor of the [...].  Plaintiffs also contend the court erred in failing to grant their cross-motion for summary judgment.  Since a trial court, when "'confronted with an evidence determination precedent to ruling on a summary judgment motion . . . must address the evidence decision first,'" we review the trial court's decision in that sequence.  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015).