ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 7.  Internação compulsória em entidade civil Civil Commitment  Você entende que se for condenado por um crime sexual violento, tal como agressão sexual [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No] qualificada, agressão sexual, contato sexual criminal qualificado, sequestro segundo os termos da lei 2C:13-1c(2), contato sexual criminal, homicídio qualificado se o crime subjacente for agressão sexual, por tentativa de cometer qualquer um destes crimes ou qualquer crime que o juiz caracterizar especificamente nos autos que, com base nas circunstâncias do caso, deve ser considerado um crime sexual violento, você poderá, após cumprido seu termo de prisão, ser internado compulsoriamente em entidade civil cujo termo poderá até ser internação perpétua se o juiz decretar, após uma audiência, a necessidade de internação compulsória em entidade civil?
[directive] Returned HWC Notices and Inability to Obtain Information on Child’s School of Enrollment  Situations may arise where a law enforcement officer sends the HWC Notice to a school where the officer reasonably believes a child to be enrolled, but it is returned because the child does not go to that institution.  In these rare cases, the law enforcement officer must make a good faith effort to ascertain the correct school of enrollment and provide the HWC Notice to that school as soon as possible.  For purposes of completing the HWC Notice, should a parent, guardian, child, or other individual who is present at the scene decline to provide information regarding the child’s school of enrollment, the officer must respect that decision.  In those situations, the officer must still complete the HWC Notice to the extent possible and include the HWC Notice with the 4 investigative file related to the underlying incident for future reference.  Although law enforcement may not press for this information for the HWC Notice, law enforcement shall not be restricted from determining any information regarding a child or a child’s school that may be relevant to a criminal investigation, to ensure the child’s health or safety, or to address a concern of imminent danger.  IV.
[directive] b.  Object targeted - This includes details on the type of premises, building, or institution against which the offense was committed (private premises, public property or property primarily used for religious, educational, residential, memorial, charitable, or cemetery purposes, or for assembly by persons of a particular race, color, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity).  c.  How targeted - This includes the way in which the person or property was attacked or damaged (assaulted, put in fear of bodily violence by placing on public or private property a symbol, an object, a characterization, an appellation or graffiti that exposes another to threats of violence, contempt or hatred on the basis of race, color, creed or religion, defacement or damage by placing of symbol, an object, a characterization, an appellation, or graffiti that exposes another to threat of violence, contempt or hatred on the basis of race, color, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity).  d.  Means of attack - This includes the instrument, tool, device, or method by which the person or property was attacked or damaged.  e.  Time and date - This includes both the time and date reported and the actual time and date the offense was committed.  f.
[brief] The court finds defendant was well aware of what was being presented to her and what she was signing.  [A229, Op. at 23-24(emphasis added)].  As explained in the Legal Argument below, these facts and credibility determinations as found against [...] by the matrimonial court judge are entitled to special deference.  The divorce was obviously not “unconscionable” given this factual backdrop.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion to set aside (as is argued in Legal Argument POINTS I, II, and III, infra), but reverse the trial court’s findings as to counsel fees, the Lexus and [...] issues (as is argued in Legal Argument POINTS IV, V and VI, infra).
[directive] Special Responsibilities When Investigating Prostitution Offenses  1.  Whenever a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a prostitution- related offense has been committed in violation of any provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1, as part of the investigation and handling of the suspected prostitution offense, the officer or another member of the officer’s agency shall, whenever feasible, pose questions or otherwise seek to obtain evidence concerning the relevant circumstances that are specified in the investigation standards and protocols promulgated by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection A of this Section.
[brief] [Pa349a]  When confronted, [...] “admitted that the funds totaling $30,000 had not been disbursed to [the Firm and the Firm employee], but, rather, to the [...], Mary A. [...], [...], and himself, as reflected by the [subpoenaed] bank records. ”  [Id.]  [...] stipulated that “he knew his trust account records had been altered in some fashion, that he did not disclose that fact to the OAE because he believed the OAE investigation concerned the $7,500 overdraft, and that he believed that the falsifications were not material to the OAE’s investigation.
[brief] In *State v. Roth*, the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth certain guidelines for reviewing a sentence issued by a lower court.  See Generally 95 NJ 334 (1984).  The Court held that an Appellate court may “review sentences to determine if the legislative policies, here the sentencing guidelines, were violated; (b) review the aggravating and mitigating factors found below to determine whether those factors were based upon competent credible evidence in the record; and (c) determine whether, even though the court sentenced in accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless the application of the guidelines to the facts of this case make the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.
[brief] 3T13:18-24, 32:17-33:9.  In particular, [...] told [...] that [...] had been in contact with private equity firms with which [...] could become involved and thus have business from various entities that such firms controlled.  However, this business did not materialize because [...] did not follow through.  3T38:21-39:19, 92:3-10.  At the outset, the parties entered into an Operating Agreement for [...] wherein [...] was to own 15%, plaintiff was to own 10%, [...] was to own 10%, [...] was to own 10%, and an investor, [...]\(^2\), was to own 10%.
[brief] In *Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs.*, this Court explained its reasoning that use of a letter vendor did not violate the FDCPA as follows:  In examining the plain meaning of a statute, “the Legislature’s intent is paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that intent. ”  *Hodges v. Sasil Corp.*, 189 N.J. 210, 223 (2007) (citing *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “Statutory words are ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions, giving sense to the legislation as a whole. ”  *Ibid.*  The court’s duty is clear: “construe and apply the statute as enacted. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch.*, 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)).  Plaintiff’s complaint is premised on a conclusory allegation that defendants’ use of a letter vendor to create a debt collection letter was, in and of itself, abusive, deceptive or unfair.  We concur with the trial judge’s findings that *the use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, or unfair and was not the type of conduct that Congress was interested in preventing when it enacted the FDCPA*.
[brief] [...] described defendant’s letter to [...]’s sister as “angry, blow-off steam puffery. ” (2T50:1-15).  In response to counsel’s argument that [...] had been treated more leniently than defendant, the judge stated that after the jury convicted [...], “[N]either Mr. [...] nor [...] stepped up and took culpability in the cases against them. ” (2T92:9-12).  Therefore, the prosecutor made a strategic decision to offer a plea deal to [...], whom the judge found to be the least culpable.  (2T92:9- 16).  Despite the experts’ testimony, the judge was “satisfied that [defendant] was as much involved in this as was Mr. [...],” and that “his blaming of others is a common reaction . . . that’s why he’s chosen Mr. [...] as the target or the explanation of his own actions. ” (2T93:12-17).  Therefore, the judge did not give mitigating factor 13 “a great deal of weight. ” (2T94:17 to 95:1).  The judge pointed out that the crime was planned, that defendant did not leave after the first homicide and in fact participated in the ransacking of the house “probably more than the other two,” took the weapon, shot, chased after, and pistol-whipped [...].  (2T9:2-19).  The judge also pointed out that defendant had had previous interaction with the criminal justice system, that he had normal intelligence regardless of his deficits, and that he had shown no remorse for his crime.  (2T946:20 to 96:11).  After finding aggravating factors 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12, the judge imposed two consecutive life terms with a 30-year parole bar in each.  (2T93:18-16; 96:12-21).  III.
[brief] [...] testified that after [...] supposedly confessed to her that she murdered her wife, [...] willingly went to sleep with her.  [...] then stated that at some point that night [...] “got up and she started pushing on me, pushing on my throat, close to my neck. ”  (6T 110-16 to 23)  She testified further that “that something would happen” to her because of her knowledge of [...]’s “confession. ”  (6T 113-3)  This testimony was irrelevant and inflammatory.  It served to depict [...] as a person who commits violence against women.  The admission of this testimony violated our rules of evidence and denied [...] of due process and a fair trial.  *U.S. Const.* amends.  VI, XIV; *N.J. Const.*, art. I, pars. 1, 9, 10.  Her convictions must be reversed.
[brief] [...] paints a picture of the parties having conducted “extensive discovery” in the DJ Action on its Indemnity Claim that is misleading.  It wrongly claims that the parties have “essentially concluded” document discovery and served interrogatories “covering all issues in the litigation. ”  Pb24.  To date, discovery in the DJ Action has primarily focused on the duty to defend.  Db5-6.  [...] and the other insurers’ discovery requests were virtually identical and, to the limited extent they sought indemnity-related information, they did so only to understand what [...] was asking the insurers to defend.  Importantly, the time and expense that [...] incurred in producing documents and deposition transcripts would have been the same regardless of [...].  [...]’s defense claims sought millions of dollars; there is no conceivable scenario where [...] could pursue those claims without producing the relevant documents to all insurers. \(^7\)  As for [...]’s Indemnity Claim, it is essentially a brand new proceeding which requires a significant amount of additional discovery.
[brief] Rather, the Trial Court could have focused on the “standards of care” outlined in the available discovery; including but not limited to the contract documents and inspection procedures addressed by the defense witnesses during depositions.  (Pa1225, Pa2205, Pa1271, Pa808 at 55:2-9, Pa656 at 20:16 to Pa657 at 21:15, Pa678 at 20:25 to Pa679 at 21:7).  That is, that the Defendants were to perform daily inspections to identify defects in the roadway that may affect the safety of the traveling public and when such defects were identified, to adhere to the MUTCD and Traffic Control Detail.  For example, when conditions such as “bumps” or “uneven pavement” exists, then warning signs should be used pursuant to the MUTCD and the Traffic Control Detail.  The MUTCD calls for, among other things, the use of warning signs when such a condition exists.
[brief] There are at least four irreparable harms.  First, the mandatory disclosure of LGBTQ+ students’ sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression over a student’s objection will cause them significant and immediate irreparable harm.  (Da407-08).  Once a student has been involuntarily outed to their parents, that bell can never be unrung.  And the harms that follow can include “mental health issues, and infliction of physical or emotional harm by immediate family members,” as well as homelessness and loss of privacy.  (Da407-08; Da411).  As another court recently put it, “there is no protected group more vulnerable, or more susceptible to physical or psychological harm, than transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary youth. ” (Ra124); see Boyertown, 897 F.3d at ____________ court found no need to resolve that question because the State had amply shown irreparable harm.  See (Da407-13).  Because the State has shown irreparable harm will result, this court can simply affirm on that basis.  That said, as a matter of law, the State need not establish irreparable harm.
[brief] [7T 66:18-67:23].  [...] claims that at this point [...], who had been sweeping the aisle with the push broom as he walked away from [...] with his back turned, suddenly turned around and walked towards [...] with the broom stick in hand, until his chest was touching the bag of grout [...] was holding against his chest.  [7T 67:24-68:16].  According to [...], [...] then struck the bag of grout: “he’s standing close to me and like with his right he hits the grout bag out of my hand knocking down in the air. ”  [7T 68:17-22].  The ten-pound bag of grout then supposedly flew up into the air, behind [...], and hit a shelving rack, spilling grout on [...]’s back.  [7T 68:22-69:13, 75:2-24].  [...] testified that he smirked at [...] after seeing him covered in grout and “I was like kind of like you see what you did?” [7T 69:12-18].  [...] alleges that [...] then punched him in the left temple while holding the broom stick in his hand.  [7T 69:17-21].  B.
[brief] With respect to [...], the trial court reasoned that “Depolink, a published Appellate Division decision post-dating Jefferson Loan, Gonzalez, and Lemmeledo [sic], held the actions of which plaintiff complains were not unlawful under the CFA”  SoR p. 16 (Pa48).  However, the trial court failed to consider distinguishing facts in [...], which part [...]’s reasoning and holding from the instant action.
[directive] Increasingly, police are asked to act like physicians, pharmacists, or psychiatrists, determining what drug a person may have taken, or what mental health condition they may be experiencing, and then provide people the resources to address these specific concerns.  The toll on law enforcement officers in responding to these and other demands is staggering.  As stated in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2019-1, the immediate and enduring effect can contribute to a range of mental and physical health issues, and for that reason the Directive established a statewide law enforcement resiliency program.
[brief] (3T, 19-12 to 20-22)  The trial court entered a corresponding Order on July 5, 2023, concluding that "Plaintiff is not entitled under the common-law right to access as the records are not required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file, as enumerated on the record on July 5, 2023, at 10:45AM. ”  (Pa9)  [...] filed a Notice of Appeal on July 14, 2023.  (Pal)  [...] filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 3, 2023.  (Da65)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY
[brief] [...]’s investigation revealed that “[...]” is [...] Urena-Delance, the principal of [...], and that [...] is the principal of [...].  [Pa204 at ¶ 19].  [...] served both with subpoenas and, on December 20, 2023, [...] appeared for a deposition at which he provided testimony that contradicted [...]’s version of events.  [Pa204 at ¶¶20-21; Pa250].  [...] denied that he had discussed paving the Leased Premises with [...], or that [...] had paid him $1,500.  [Pa267 at 64:18-22; Pa266 at 61:22-25].  In fact, he testified that the parties never discussed [...] paying anyone for the materials.  [Pa266 at 61:7-25].  [...] did claim, however, that the materials dumped at the Leased Premises were provided by [...] – who is currently incarcerated – and that [...] only informed him that the materials are from “the port,” with no further information.  [Pa259 at 30:1-13].  --- 4  It should not go unnoticed that, after years of failing to pay Rent, [...] claims that it suddenly chose to pave [...]’s parking lot for no reason beyond pure altruism, and without advising [...] of its putative gesture.  E.  The Trial Court Failed To Consider [...]’s Four Separate Breaches Of The Settlement Agreement, Any One Of Which Required The Consent Judgments To Be Entered.
[brief] Defense counsel and the assistant prosecutor had the opportunity to influence this sentencing decision during the period between the verdict and sentence by advocating for their respective clients.  The State availed itself of this opportunity by submitting a detailed and passionate sentencing memorandum in which it requested multiple consecutive terms and a total sentence of 110 years - an effective life sentence for any adult human being - for crimes - though serious - did not result in the death or serious bodily injury of any person.
[brief] OFFICE OF [...]  By: [...], Esquire (ID#022301979)  [...]  [...] [...]  Fax: [...]  Attorneys for Appellant, [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | i | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS IN APPELLANT’S APPENDIX | ix | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | x | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 14 | | POINT I | | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 14 | | POINT II | | | SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD | 14 | | POINT III | | | STANDARD FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
[brief] By Decision dated November 2, 2022, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in the First Action denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to appeal.  (Pa769.)  Specifically, this Court held that the trial court in the First Action did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for leave to amend because the motion was filed after the conclusion of the First Action.  (Ibid.)  To that end, this Court found, in relevant part, as follows:  The motion judge correctly recognized plaintiff had filed its motion seeking leave to amend its complaint after the trial judge had conducted the trial and rendered his decision dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.  See Grimes v. City of E. Orange, 285 N.J. Super. 154, 167 (App. Div. 1995) (finding the trial court did not err ‘when it refused to permit [the plaintiff] to amend his complaint to assert an entirely new cause of action never pled, argued or proven, after the jury returned its verdict. ’); Du-Wel Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 349, 364 (App. Div. 1989) (finding ‘well-settled that an exercise of discretion will be sustained where the trial court refuses to permit new claims and new parties to be added late in the litigation and at a point at which the rights of other parties to a modicum of expedition will be prejudicially affected’).  [Pa788-89.]  After affirming the trial court in the First Action’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend as untimely, this Court noted, in its unpublished opinion, that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend “lacked merit. ”  (Pa789.)  This Court – relying solely on competing factual certifications submitted in connection with the underlying motion for leave to amend – made the following comments:
[brief] (2T37:7-40:3.)  The municipal court found the stop was justified.  (2T45:16-21.)  The municipal court found that all the factors identified by defense counsel – [...]’s age, that he was not wearing his glasses, that it was wet out, and that [...]’ lights were on – did not negate the municipal court’s finding that [...] could not perform the psychophysical tests.  (2T46:21-47:7.)  The municipal court then denied the suppression motion finding there was enough evidence to support the arrest.  (2T47:19-25.)  The municipal court then proceeded with the trial.
[brief] Following *Patane*, this Court has adopted the same limitation on the exclusionary rule, holding that a BB gun seized after defendant admitted to possessing it in an unwarned custodial statements did not justify its suppression.  *State v. Hager*, 462 N.J. Super. 377, 388-89 (App. Div. 2020).  In addition, our Supreme Court has twice cited to *Patane* with approval.  See *State v. O’Neil*, 193 N.J. 148, 171 n.13 (2007); *State v. Boretsky*, 186 N.J. 271, 278 (2006).  And even before *Patane* was decided, this Court has reasoned that the proper remedy for a *Miranda* violation does not entail suppression of physical evidence.  *State in Interest of A.S.*, 227 N.J. Super. 541, 548-49 (App. Div. 1988).  This is all to say that the applicable authorities establish that the exclusionary rule does not apply to any of the physical evidence seized during the search of defendant’s vehicle in this case.
[brief] *Summer Cottagers' Association v. Cape May*, 19 N.J. 493, 503-04 (1955).  Here, I relied in good faith to my detriment on the information provided to me by the [...] on December 28, 2021 that was based solely upon mistaken information provided by my former employer, not by me.  In effect, my former employer's error has caused my retirement disaster.  This is a classic set of facts that warrants the use of equitable estoppel.
[brief] I  IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE TO SEND THE JURY BACK FOR MORE DELIBERATION -- AFTER THE JURY’S SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT HAD A PARTIAL VERDICT ON SOME COUNTS, BUT WAS DEADLOCKED ON OTHERS -- AT 4:45 PM, WHEN THE JUDGE ALREADY HAD KNOWN FOR OVER A WEEK THAT MORE THAN ONE OF 13 JURORS WERE ON VACATION AS OF THE NEXT MORNING.
[brief] The record demonstrates that all of Appellants’ claims fail as a matter of law because Appellants lost all the solar development rights for which they now seek damages when they refused to make their lease payments.  Although the landowner, [...], in conjunction with Appellants entering into a lease for the Property, had assigned the rights under its regulatory approvals to Appellants, including its wholesale market participation agreement, the independent regulatory entities involved terminated Appellants’ rights to develop this solar project and connect it to the power grid once Appellants lost land control.  Appellants also lost their right to act upon their land use approvals received from the [...] when [...] terminated the Lease, because all land use approvals ran with the land under New Jersey law.  Thus, [...] did not misrepresent anything when he stated that his client, Respondent [...], had acquired the development rights at issue here.  His client’s Lease with [...] envisions and provides for the construction of a solar facility on the Property.  Appellants could not construct the solar facility because the regulatory entities involved would not let them.  A.