[brief] The balance of equities and the public interest likewise supported granting this narrow preliminary injunction.  Initially, the trial court properly held that Appellants “will not be harmed” by a narrow injunction staying implementation of the Original and Revised Policies.  (Da412).  This is particularly true where, as here, the delay is only for so long as the administrative action is pending.  See Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  That lack of harms Appellants themselves will suffer stands in sharp contract to the harms experience by the State and students.  While Appellants focus instead on the purported harms to parents, all of their assertions fail.  For one, Appellants assert that the trial court’s decision “penalizes parents of LGBTQ+ students” and “deprives LGBTQ+ students of parental guidance and support,” (Db35), but that misconstrues the injunction.  The injunction does not prevent students from sharing information with parents; does not influence or encourage students to withhold this information; and does not limit a parent’s right to communicate with or counsel their children about these issues.  The preliminary injunction and the LAD merely prohibit singling out students on the basis of their LAD-protected characteristics, a restriction that applies to LGBTQ+ and non-LGBTQ+ students alike.  As explained above, the State has always embraced and continues to embrace the critical role of parents in decisions regarding their children.  And, consistent with the LAD, schools may disclose a student’s LGBTQ+ status in multiple circumstances, including if they have a compelling and non-discriminatory basis to do so.  (2T8:18-9:2).  All schools may not do is discriminate based on an LAD-protected characteristic.  Appellants’ argument that the trial court’s narrow injunction “empowers the State to insert itself between parent and child” fares no better.  (Db37).  As explained above, there is a significant difference between a judicial order that inserts itself into the parent-child relationship, and one that prevents Appellants from affirmatively disclosing information in a discriminatory way.  See supra at 31-35.  In reality, as the trial court found, “the Revised Policy” is the one that “invites agents of the government (school staff) to invade the privacy of students and parents simply to determine whether a student’s protected characteristic or behavior, coupled with [an]other incident, has caused an ‘adverse impact. ’” (Da411).  Appellants’ arguments thus merely circle back to the same substantive arguments they made in pressing their case on the merits.  (Db19).  Finally, Appellants’ vague assertions of “abstract harms” are insufficient.  See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 327-28 (2013); N.J. State Policeman’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Murphy, 470 N.J. Super. 568, 594 (App. Div. 2022).  The State and the public maintain a significant and tangible interest in ensuring that schools fulfill their obligations to “[p]romote equitable educational opportunity and foster … a learning environment that is free from all forms of prejudice, discrimination, and harassment based on the protected categories listed at N.J.A.C. 6A:7-1.1(a). ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:7-1.4; see N.J.A.C. 6A:7-1.1(a) (listing protected characteristics under the LAD).  The narrow injunction below promotes that public interest for such time [...]’s administrative action remains pending, and appropriately balances the harms to the parties and the public by preserving the pre-litigation status quo.  **CONCLUSION**