ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] They declared that he “had a motive”: that [...] “came for blood” by outing him as a “snitch” on Facebook, which “put[] [him] on blast in front of everybody”; created a “problem” for him; “affect[ed] [him] . . . . [his] kids . . . . [his] father”; and “put [him] in a different mind state. ”  (8T 27-14 to 97-14; 9T 14-12 to 19)  They asserted that he “ha[d] the opportunity”: that he was “in the area, walking around, for no reason” and was “the only one there”; he was not sobering up as he claimed because he was “clearly not drunk”; his alibi was “not true.  [[...]] just told us otherwise”; and “there’s no other explanation for [him] to be there. ”  (8T 45-14 to 97-20; 9T 31-2 to 34-5)  And they opined that he “plan[ned]” the murder and his “get away” because the videos showed him “circling the block,” “walking up and down,” and “moving the car,” which were “not steps of somebody . . . [who is] gonna get a drink” but evidence that he was “scoping the area” and “plotting. ”  (8T 58-2 to 86-1; 9T 8-16 to 13-2)  Those speculative opinions -- on his guilt, credibility, motive, opportunity, and premeditation -- went directly to proving the elements of the offenses and thus violated N.J.R.E. 602 and 701.
[brief] *Ames v. Premier Surgical Ctr.*, L.L.C., 2016 WL 3525246, at *3 (App. Div. June 29, 2016).  be particularly “skeptical” of a party’s mootness claim when that party only “yields in the face of a court order” yet “maintains that its conduct was lawful all along. ”  *Id.* at 306.  Here, [...] withdrew the Notices only after the trial court enjoined it from terminating the Agreement.
[brief] (Da51 to 52).  A verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on June 21, 2022.  (Da118 to 129).  The parties appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., for oral argument on April 28, 2023.  (26T).  On June 9, 2023, [...] denied defendant’s petition in a written order and opinion.  (Da53 to 94).
[brief] 12  Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J.  341 (1966) 26, 30, 37 Daniek v. Duda, No. 15-6032, 2016 WL 4435677, *1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108848 *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2016)
[brief] A municipality may or may not own the fee title to the property underlying a public right-of-way.  In such cases the abutting property owners have that fee title, and that title usually extends to the centerline of the right-of-way.  The right-of-way easement also generally extends beyond the improved roadway and includes sidewalks, if any, and parking strips.  While this general rule about the nature of the public right-of-way as an easement may not be clearly set out in state statutes, it is clearly set out in numerous new Jersey court decisions.  For example:  "In fact, it is well established that generally a municipality has no ownership in the bed of streets.  Instead, the presumption is that title to one half of the road bed lies in the abutting property owner subject to whatever public right of way or easement may exist."  *Menk Corp. v. Twp. Comm. of Barnegat*, 389 N.J. Super. 263, 270 (Super. Ct. 2006)  The general rule is that the title or fee in a public right of way remains in the owner of the abutting land, and the public acquires only the right of passage, with powers and privileges necessarily implied in the grant of the easement.
[brief] Since the May 8, 2023 Order was not final, [...]’ June 22, 2023 motion was timely.  On June 14, 2023 [...] received notice that [...]’ New Jersey Entity status was cancelled and withdrawn by [...] on June 13, 2023.  Ra61a.  On June 22, 2023, she filed a motion in response to this withdrawal --- ² The Court entered a deficiency notice due to nonconformance leaving the issue unresolved.  Ra63a. since she was a 10% member of [...], as the Trial Court’s May 8, 2023 Order reflects.  Aa35.
[brief] By contrast, a discovery order may be reversed for an “mistaken understanding of the applicable law” or an “abuse of discretion,” and an appellate court “review[s] the meaning or scope of a court rule de novo. ”  *DiFiore*, 254 N.J. at 228 (quotation omitted). review. ”  Pb2, 27.  That statement is categorically wrong.  See Db31-33.
[brief] [...] argues that she “deserved to be evaluated on her own merit” and that she should not have been removed on the list on the record before the [...].  Ab28, 30-34.  The record is clear, however, that the [...] and [...] both evaluated [...]’s employment history on its own merits in determining that she was unsuitable for promotion to Lieutenant and in removing her from the eligible list.  The [...] provided detailed analysis as to why her employment history demonstrated an unsuitability for promotion to the high rank of Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant.  [...] fails to satisfy her burden in challenging the [...]’s decisions and they must be affirmed.
[brief] Lay opinion testimony only can be admitted “if it falls within the narrow bounds of testimony that is based on the perception of the witness and that will assist the jury in performing its function. ”  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 456 (2011).  The first prong of N.J.R.E. 701 requires the witness’s opinion testimony to be based on the witness’s “perception,” which rests on the acquisition of knowledge through use of one’s sense of touch, taste, sight, smell or hearing.
[brief] [3T128-10 to 129-12].  On January 26, 2023, defendant was brought back into the courtroom.  [4T4-5 to -6].  He informed the judge he had been given Suboxone by the jail staff and it impacted his ability to understand the proceedings.  [4T4-23 to 5-7].  Defense counsel filed a motion for a mistrial based on defendant’s misconduct during the trial.
[brief] on the outside of the house.  (3T 37-25 to 38-2; 110-5 to 18)  [...] asked who owned the surveillance cameras and [...]’s father responded, “my landlord. ”  (3T 37-22 to 38, 40-25 to 41-4, 41-15 to 17)  [...] further asked, “Do you think he’ll give us access to that or not?”  (3T 41-5 to 6, 112-9 to 18)  [...]’s father responded, “He probably would if I asked.  I don’t know. ”  (3T 41-7 to 9)  [...] acknowledged that he knew the surveillance cameras and the footage were the landlord’s property and that he needed the landlord’s consent to search.
[brief] Forty or more class members will suffice. \textsuperscript{119}  The number of class members is "not wholly dispositive of the analysis, "and plaintiffs do not have "to show the exact size of the class in order to satisfy numerosity” and an equal part of the inquiry centers around whether 'the difficulty and or inconvenience of joining all members  \textsuperscript{115}  Varacallo v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 332 N.J. Super. 31, 45 (App. Div. 2000).  \textsuperscript{116}  Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 67-69 (1995), superseded by statute on other grounds by N.J.S.A. 46:3C-1 to -12.  \textsuperscript{117}  See Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 103 (2007)("[I]f there is to be an error made, let it be in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action.
[brief] Therefore, the Township will need to weigh the benefits of the proposal against factors such as site suitability, traffic generation, environmental impacts, etc…..4 (emphasis added).  The Township Planner reviewed each aspect of the proposed use, including impacts such as traffic, aesthetics, environmental, and fire and safety.  As to aesthetics and buffers, the Township Planner noted that “the Township’s 2010 Land Use Plan includes a number of goals and objectives regarding aesthetics and buffers, including encouraging new --- 4 Planning Memo, Request for Zoning Modification – [...], Application # [...], Da41, included as attachment “1” to [...] Planning Memo of Nov. 12, 2020, Da18 and also including attachment “2” thereto, Planning Board Minutes on adoption of Land Use Plan Amendment, Da47. development to enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community and provide buffer zones to separate incompatible land uses.
[brief] Plaintiff had many opportunities to allege any sort of pain or restrictions and chose to, under oath, answer at least ten times that she had no more pain or restriction.  The Trial Court discussed this during oral argument conducted on March 3, 2023:  [T]he Court does recognize that there was a March 29, 2021 report submitted from plaintiff’s treating doctor which concludes that quote, “This patient has sustained a significant permanent injury from her accident of the said date.  And, that this permanent injury is in the form of a significant limited use of this once normal bodily function, a loss of range of motion accompanied by pain. ”  [T]he Court also recognizes that the Plaintiff herself has testified during her deposition that she is not suffering pain.  She’s not willing to lie to get money.  That she has resumed her normal functions.  The Court concludes that based upon the information present, the plaintiff has not satisfied the verbal threshold here, that has not provided legitimate evidence of a permanent injury.  And, has in fact, provided information that indicates she does not have a permanent injury resulting from this accident.  1T (T10:9-25).  Here, the Trial Court clearly weighs the evidence in the record and finds that the Plaintiff herself admitted that her body has resumed functioning normally in direct contradiction to the chiropractor’s report.  And while Plaintiff may have been experiencing these restrictions at the time of the chiropractor’s certification, dated March 29, 2021, by the time of the deposition on June 22, 2022, Plaintiff no longer had those continued complaints of pain and had resumed normal function.
[brief] We respectfully submit the decision should be reversed for those considerations and application of the law.  We submit it is the Court’s role to assess fairness as it applies to the involved parties, and it begs the question, what is fair to the innocent plaintiff?  We are not asking that this Court go so far as to accept [...]’s or [...]’s concurring opinions in Brown, where they suggest that injured pedestrians should be able to pursue actions against property owners, regardless of their status.  [...] stated that he would go even further than imposing liability on a parochial school: “why should we draw a distinction between a commercial owner and a residential or any other kind of owner for purposes of the imposition of liability in favor of an innocent pedestrian?”
[brief] She based that upon her observations of [...] as he dealt differently with men than women (1T; 49:14).  He was condescending; it was every other male in [...] that she worked with including his Unit (1T; 49:18).  His attitude towards the Plaintiff was condescending, which he exhibited often when she tried to do her job (1T; 50:1).  Actually, [...]’s subordinates treated the Plaintiff the same way he did (1T; 49:18) and [...] conducted an illegal investigation (1T; 50:7).
[brief] To reiterate, the 2020 Amended Complaint involved the same nucleus of facts and circumstances that had previously been rejected on six prior occasions in the 2015 litigation.  ...  Despite all of those rulings, plaintiffs had the audacity to file the present suit, essentially making all of the same claims…As set forth above, both sets of defendants complied with the rules for asserting a frivolous litigation claim by providing the proper letter and giving plaintiffs the opportunity to withdraw these claims.  This 2020 litigation is the epitome of harassment and bad faith.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Even in these circumstances, the Revised Policy required school staff to “immediately notify[] the [...], Institutional Abuse, ([...]), [...] ([...]), and/or the [...]. ”  Ibid.  The Revised Policy added that it “does not create a duty, implicit or otherwise, for any staff member or administrator to investigate, substantiate or validate the issue and/or behaviors giving rise to a duty to inform a student’s parent(s) under this Policy. ”  Ibid.  Finally, the Revised Policy also provided:  “Except as otherwise required under Policy 8463, this Policy supersedes all other District Policies that restrict notification to parent(s) about matters affecting their children. ”  Ibid.  That text meant that the Revised Policy was replacing not only the Original Policy, but also the pre-May 2023 policy, known as “Policy 5756—Transgender Students,” which had been in effect since 2019.  (Da141-44).  For the four years in which it was in effect, the 2019 Policy clarified that school “staff members may not disclose information that may reveal a student’s transgender status except as allowed by law,” (Da142), and that “[t]here is no affirmative duty for any school district staff member to notify a student’s parent of the student’s gender identity or expression,” (Da141), although notification was appropriate where there was a “specific and compelling need, such as the health and safety of the student,” (Da142).
[brief] The decisions relied upon by Plaintiffs do not support their hollow argument that a party need only be a citizen/taxpayer to possess standing under the MLUL if the challenge involves jurisdiction or a so-called “impact to the zoning ordinance. ”  To the contrary, in each of the cases cited by Plaintiffs (as well as every other relevant authority), this Court confirmed that standing under the MLUL requires the challenging party to meet the definition of “interested party” set forth in the MLUL.  See, e.g., DePetro v. Twp. of Wayne Planning Bd., 367 N.J. Super. 161, 170 (App. Div. 2004); Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian, 319 N.J. Super. 200, 215-16 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] (27T93:24 to 95:6).  On September 14, 2022, the trial Court entered final judgment totaling $4,258,878.69, comprised of the principal award, attorneys’ fees, taxed costs, and pre-judgment interest.  (Da721-25).  The defendants filed separate appeals: one by [...] ([...]), and one by [...] and the entity defendants ([...]).  (Da726-59)  Plaintiffs’ filed a cross-appeal limited to the issue of whether the trial court properly calculated pre-judgment interest.  (Da760-75).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] A.  The Chancery Division granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s nuisance claim because it found [...]’s opinions to be unsupported  In the First Count of his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for nuisance predicated on allegations that Defendants directed surface water onto his property, causing damage.  [9a].  Plaintiff contends Defendants materially changed the direction of the flow of surface water by removing the planter at the rear of the driveway and replacing it with a curb that was open at the northeast corner.  At oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff’s counsel clarified the claim:  This case is about the opening of the Belgian block.  This is not about slopes.  This is about the fact that water would go down the driveway and into the brook, and not affect anybody’s property, and by lining the back of their driveway with Belgian block with an opening towards [...]’s property it funnels now 90 to 95 percent of the water onto [...]’s property.  [T]his is all about the installation of the Belgian block curbing, which now redirects the water .  . . onto Unger’s property, and diverts it away from the brook.  All of this water, tens of thousands of gallons would go into the brook and wash away.  [...] made a Belgian block curbing that directs 90 percent of that now onto [...]’s landscaping.  That is what was unreasonable.  . . .  This is not about changing the slope.  This is about choosing to open that opening that now funnels the water onto [...]’s property.  [T38:19–39:1, T57:9–25].  Defense counsel acknowledged that Plaintiff argues “that replacing the railroad tie lining with Belgian block created this harm . . . and transports more of the water down onto plaintiff’s property than previously occurred. ”  [T34:7–13].  In articulating its decision to grant summary judgment on the nuisance claim, the Chancery Division indicated that Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment unless Plaintiff could identify a “standard that says therefore when there’s this much flow it’s violating this standard such that the Dwyers should be liable for that flow going onto the Ungers’ property. ”  [T41:2–5].  The Chancery Division did not consider or analyze [...]’s reports on how Defendants’ removal of the planter and installation of a gapped curb affected the direction of surface water flow, but rather focused exclusively on [...]’s report.  [See T64:24–65:7].  Notwithstanding that Defendants had not filed a motion in limine to exclude [...], the Chancery Division stated it was “beyond frustrated” that [...]’s report only included the end results of his calculations and that the documents reflecting [...]’s calculations about which he testified in his deposition were not submitted with the summary judgment record.  [See T39:6–23, T48:7–49:18].  The Chancery Division granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s nuisance claim on the ground that it found the opinions expressed in [...]’s report to be “pure speculation,” without regard to other evidence in the summary judgment record establishing that the Defendants’ conduct caused the redirection of surface water flow onto Plaintiff’s Property.  [See T67:20–68:12].
[brief] A passion/provocation manslaughter is a murder committed in the heat of passion in response to a provocation.  *N.J.S.A.*  2C:11-4b(2).  Passion/provocation manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder\(^3\) and has four elements --- \(^3\)  While aggravated manslaughter is not itself mitigated by passion/provocation, see *State v. Grunow*, 102 N.J. 133, 136-144 (1986); *State v. Galicia*, 210 N.J. 364, 380-383 (2012), the question of whether to instruct a jury on passion/provocation manslaughter at a retrial of a case that (1) began as a murder prosecution, (2) contained a passion/provocation instruction at the first trial, (3) resulted in an aggravated-manslaughter conviction at that first trial, but then (4) was reversed and remanded for retrial, is governed by *Grunow* -- which makes it clear that at the retrial on aggravated manslaughter, passion/provocation manslaughter should be instructed, if it is requested and supported by the evidence.  102 N.J. at 149.  Here, defendant was originally indicted and tried for murder, as noted.  He was convicted of aggravated manslaughter in a trial that contained instructional error that resulted in a reversal of that conviction and a remand for retrial.  Plainly, *Grunow* requires that in such an instance passion/provocation manslaughter should still be instructed to the jury at the retrial for aggravated manslaughter.
[brief] The court's role is to consider what is written in the context of the circumstances at the time of drafting and to apply a rational meaning in keeping with the "expressed general purpose."  *Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer*, 12 N.J. 293, 302 (1953); *accord Dontzin v. Myer*, 301 N.J. Super. 501, 507 (App.Div.1997).
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], [...]  On Defendants’ Motions for Leave to Appeal from the July 19, 2024  Interlocutory Orders of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth Vicinage and for a Stay  Trial Court  Docket No: Docket No. [...]  Sat Below (Trial Court): Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX (Pa1-Pa11)
[directive] When the municipal court finds a defendant guilty of any of the enumerated offenses, it should: ● Determine whether the victim was under 18 years old at the time of the offense; ● If so, the court should then determine whether the defendant resides in a household with any minor children or is the parent of a minor child; ●  Should the defendant meet these criteria, the court must inquire as to the names and addresses of the children and must refer the matter to DYFS by completing the attached letter and “DYFS Referral” form.  You will notice from the attached detailed instructions that in order to complete the DYFS referral, court staff will need to do a search on the Promis-Gavel system.  We recognize that at the present time some municipal court staff may not have had training on this aspect of the Promis-Gavel system.  If your court staff needs assistance or has questions regarding a Promis- Gavel search, please contact the Help Desk at [...] during regular business hours.  Our customer support staff will assist you in obtaining the required information from the Promis- Gavel system and can also at that time arrange for training.  Section 1 of the law (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.2) is applicable only to Superior Court.
[brief] To be sure, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that the NJFPA does not require an agreement or contract, and that one or multiple writings could constitute a written “arrangement” under the statute.  Specifically, in Instructional Sys., Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the existence of a franchise is only a question of law “when the entire relationship between the parties may be deduced from their written arrangements. ”  Instructional Sys., Inc., 614 A.2d at 136 (emphasis added).  In keeping with this directive, multiple courts have also held that the writing does not have to grant the license, and that a “license” – in the context of the NJFPA -- can simply be determined based on the parties’ conduct.  See e.g., Beilowitz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 631, 639 (D.N.J. 2002) (“For purposes of the NJFPA, a license may be found to exist based on a longstanding business relationship, even absent an explicit contractual grant of authority”).
[brief] The Staffing Office and Payroll.  The staffing office ensures that [...]’s hospitals have adequate nursing coverage at all times.  (Pa68).  [...] employed Plaintiffs as “staffing coordinators. ”  (Pa163; Pa229; Pa283).  During the time period relevant to this litigation, the staffing office was comprised of approximately six staffing coordinators, the nursing supervisor, and the nurse manager.  (Pa67-68 at 25:18-26:1; Pa68 at 28:15-17).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for a variety of tasks, including important timekeeping and payroll functions.  (Pa68).  The staffing coordinators have access to [...]’s timekeeping and payroll software called “Kronos. ” (Pa352).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for finalizing employees’ Kronos time cards prior to payroll closing.  (Pa352 at 38:5-11).  Payroll closes at approximately 11:00 am every other Monday.  (Pa352 at 38:20-25).  [...] was responsible for reviewing the staffing coordinators’ time cards for any missed entries and accurate paid time off (“PTO”) prior to payroll closing.  (Pa352-53 at 40:17-41:12).  [...] typically reviewed her staffing coordinators’ time cards on Sunday evenings prior to payroll closing.  (Pa353 at 41:3-12).  While the staffing coordinators could not make alterations to their own time cards, they could edit entries for other employees, including other staffing coordinators.  (Pa352 at 39:13-40:16).  III.