ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court also did not abuse its discretion in applying aggravating factor nine.  Even where a defendant has no criminal record, a sentencing court may seek to deter future criminal behavior.  See Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 80 (“Neither the statutory language nor the case law suggest that a sentencing court can find a need for deterrence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) only when the defendant has a prior criminal record. ”).  Defendant’s history of simple assaults thus provided the “valid reason” for the court to find aggravating factor nine.  The court properly rejected mitigating factors three and ten as well.  Defendant reduces the court’s analysis regarding mitigating factor three to his statements that defendant “was in control of his own conduct” and that [...] hitting [...] “doesn’t excuse” defendant’s conduct.  But as the judge explained, “[t]his wasn’t a situation where something suddenly came upon” defendant since he was able to “sit down, contemplate, call people, [and] get them to come to his house to help” with the conspiracy.  (15T32-25 to 33-5).  Further, it is well-established that for purposes of mitigating factor three, “provocation . . . ‘relates to the conduct of the victim toward the actor. ’”  State v. Teat, 233 N.J. Super. 368, 372 (App. Div. 1989) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  Here, any alleged provocation was toward [...], not defendant, whom the judge found engaged in “vigilante justice . . . from the comfort of his own living room. ”  The record contained a wealth of evidence to support the conclusion that no “strong provocation” of defendant existed.  (15T33-5 to 8).  Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting mitigating factor ten.  As noted, the judge correctly concluded that pre-trial services “certainly [are]n’t probation” and that defendant previously failed to respond to probationary treatment.  Here, the judge found the aggravating factors clearly outweighed the nonexistent mitigating factors.  Therefore, a term in the higher range for the offenses was appropriate.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] New Jersey case law has also made the distinction between railroad right of way and railroad property in the context of a railroad crash resulting in injuries.  In *Ruggiero v. Central Railroad Co.*, 112 N.J.L. 163 (1934), plaintiff’s vehicle became stuck in the railroad crossing.  *Id.* at 164.  Defendant argued that “because plaintiff allowed the right hind wheel of his car to get off the planking of the crossing, the plaintiff was a trespasser . . .”  *Id.* at 166.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  It explained that “the law . . . is fully settled that where a railroad crosses a highway, the railroad company does not take the land of the highway as real estate.  . . , and acquires the right to use only the crossing in common with the public traveling on the highway,” *Id.*  Thus, “the right of crossing within road lines remained in the public” and “there was nothing to show that the plaintiff was a trespasser on property of the railroad company. ”  *Id.* at 167-68.  Similarly, in *Miller v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, Inc.*, 120 N.J.L. 172 (1938), plaintiff was injured when he contacted an electrified third rail of the defendant railroad while crossing at a public highway intersection.
[brief] Furthermore, after a letter-writing campaign of more than a half-dozen letters to the trial court raising several reasons for adjourning the peremptory trial date that --- 2 Defendant’s motion also failed to include a copy of the judgment or final order sought to be reconsidered.  R. 4:49-2.  defense counsel himself selected, defense counsel’s claim that he overlooked the requirement to pay the prisoner transportation fee strains credulity.  As noted in the April 2024 Order (Da42), the trial court held a pretrial conference on February 7, 2024 where [...] advised both parties that the court would be issuing an Order to Produce to State Prison to arrange for Defendant’s prisoner transport for the trial and, if Defendant should fail to appear at trial, same would be deemed a “voluntary failure to appear by Defendant” and his counterclaims would be dismissed.
[brief] The final decision notes that on August 8, 2019, an email was sent to the Certifying Officers advising them of their obligations under the Ricci Act.  However, no August 8, 2019, email was provided.  A Memorandum to the Certifying Officers was provided with no date other than “August 2019. ” Pa64.  Even still, this Memorandum was to State Agency Certifying Officers, not to members of the retirement system.  If anything, it is proof that the members of the retirement system could not have possibly been notified within the statutory timeframe, as the Certifying Officers were not even notified within 30 days.
[brief] Plaintiff claimed a right to recover contractual litigation fees from the [...] under Section 9 of the mortgage agreement (A359), which provided that if “there is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender’s interest in the Property and/or rights under the Security Instrument,” the Lender may obtain “reasonable attorneys’ fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument[.]”  11T17-18.  In Plaintiff’s cross claim, a demand for ninety-five thousand dollars ($95,000.00) in contractual litigation fees as additional debt was asserted, A1415.  Thus, Plaintiff sought “a money judgment against the [...]” under this provision ultimately demanding (A1243) more than two hundred thousand dollars in attorney’s fees and costs.  A1150.  Defendants argued that plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law.
[brief] Because neither the fictitious party pleading rules nor the discovery rule apply to Plaintiff’s claim \(^{1}\)  Further, the notion that plaintiff needed discovery to identify the other tenants in the shopping center is simply false.  Not only could the plaintiff have simply looked at the storefronts on the day of the accident or in the days following, but also a simple review of Google Streetview’s history would have shown that the identities of the stores in every unit except for that occupied by [...] was identical between October 2015 and September 2018.  against [...], Plaintiff’s failure to file within two years of the accident bars his claim against [...] forever.  Applying the governing principles to the foregoing facts, we conclude that because the statute of limitations has run, the relation-back doctrine of Rule 4:9-3 is inapplicable.  The relation-back Rule does not authorize amendment of the pleading to allege a new cause of action against another party to the litigation that is barred by the running of the statute of limitations.  That is because ordinarily, after the statute of limitations has run, the opposing party acquires a vested right to be forever free of the relevant claim.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Bulletin should be set aside as improper rulemaking.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Appellant [...]  (“[...]”)  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Appellant [...]  (“[...]”)  /s/[...] [...] [...]  Dated: August 2, 2023  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, [...] (Submitted November 6, 2023)
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 104; Ja146.  Because there was no principal use or principal structure on the lot upon which the driveway was to be constructed to which it could be deemed “accessory”, the Court determined that since it was the only use to be put on that lot, it became the principal use.  Such is the case here, where the building is proposed on the [...] side of the property, and the driveway, along with the otherwise permitted accessory stormwater basins and parking spaces, become the principal uses on the [...] lot.
[brief] Additionally, our courts developed a specific and unique two-prong test to consider challenges to statutes based on the Separation of Powers Clause of the New Jersey Constitution.  Knight, 86 N.J. at 391 (i.e. (1) the legitimacy of the governmental purpose of a statute, and (2) the nature and extent of its encroachment upon judicial prerogatives and interests).  The Persels decision was obviously not based on the application of the New Jersey’s two-prong test.
[directive] After thorough consideration the Committee reached a broad consensus and issued a report to the Supreme Court dated March 30, 2007, recommending adjustments to the jury selection procedures and setting forth its proposed changes in this Supplemental Directive.  The Committee agreed that the requirement that each prospective juror be verbally asked each question is unnecessary and, to some extent, counterproductive to the goals of the jury selection standards.  The Committee was of the view that the modified procedure, if implemented, will provide a format that ensures that each prospective juror will furnish the information requested by each question, in a more expeditious and streamlined fashion, but nevertheless in a manner designed for reliability in eliciting the information and not dependent upon the juror's recollection of questions asked of other jurors.  The modified procedure recommended by the Committee also would require that a judge ask a limited number of open-ended questions at voir dire, in order to require verbal responses from, and interaction with, prospective jurors, which will provide valuable information and insight during the selection process.  The Committee also recommends that the waiver of the full use of the standard questions be approved for use at criminal trials.  The Committee is of the view that the modified procedures will continue to adhere to the goals and purposes of the Jury Selection Standards that the Court previously approved.  After careful review, the Supreme Court has accepted the recommendations of the Committee, with the exception of that regarding waiver in criminal trials.
[brief] As discussed, the United States Constitution’s protection of parental rights rests on the common-law presumptions of parental fitness and affection.  *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 602.  The State must adhere to these presumptions unless and until it makes specific findings that rebut them in each individual case.  *Id.*; see also *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 68 (plurality op.); *Stanley*, 405 U.S. at 652.  As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held, “a state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.
[brief] Defendants, without explanation, thereby renounced their plan to file corrective documents and claimed ownership of Plaintiffs’ land.  The disputed 1.33’ has significant value to Plaintiffs.  It determines whether Plaintiffs have a lot subdividable by right, for which they specifically bargained and paid consideration.  On the other hand, the value of 1.33’ feet is *de minimis* to Defendants, as Defendants’ newly-built home complies with required setbacks consistent with their admission as to the correct property line.  Given that Defendants acknowledged the error and offered to correct it, then renounced that position without explanation, logic dictates that Defendants are now seeking to use this plain error to extract tribute.
[directive] The rules and regulations should identify general categories of misconduct or inappropriate behavior that are subject to disciplinary action.  An incident of misconduct or inappropriate behavior may fall into one or more of the following categories:  (a)  Crime.  Complaint regarding the commission of an illegal act that constitutes a violation of the criminal code including disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses.  (b)  Excessive force.  Complaint regarding the use or threatened use of excessive force against a person.  (c)  Improper arrest.  Complaint that the restraint of a person's liberty was improper, unjust, or violated the person's civil rights.  (d)  Improper entry.  Complaint that entry into a building or onto property was improper or that excessive force was used against property to gain entry.  (e)  Improper search.  Complaint that the search of a person or property was improper, unjust, violated established agency procedures or violated the person's civil rights.  (f)  Differential treatment.  Complaint that the taking of police action, the failure to take police action or method of police action was predicated upon irrelevant factors such as race, appearance, age or sex.  (g)  Demeanor.  Complaint that an agency member's bearing, gestures, language or other actions were inappropriate.  7  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  (h)  Serious rule infractions.  Complaint for conduct such as insubordination, drunkenness on duty, sleeping on duty, neglect of duty, false statements or malingering.  (i)  Minor rule infractions.  Complaint for conduct such as untidiness, tardiness, faulty driving, or failure to follow procedures.  2.2.3  The Rules and regulations shall provide for uniform classification of the resolution of complaints as follows:  (a) Sustained.
[directive] Trial Court Administrators f~ Criminal FROM: [...], J.A.D. '--- RE: and Family - Co-Occurring Orders Involving No-Contact or Release Conditions and Domestic Violence  Custody Matters  DATE: May 22, 2020 of of victims and victims' families is paramount  Ensuring the safety importance to the Judiciary.  This Directive promulgates the process to ensure communication between Divisions where a defendant has a no-contact order in the Criminal Division and a concurrent domestic violence or custody matter in the Family Division.
[brief] As explained in Plaintiff’s opening Brief, the first court to analyze the implied private right of action vel non in the NJCFLA (post separation from the NJRMLA) was Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC—where the court reasoned that in order “to determine whether the [NJCFLA] implies a [private] right of action, the Court must consider whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, whether there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action under the statute; and whether implication of a private cause of action in this case would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. ”  *Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (emphasis in original) (quoting *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 41-42 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The legislature intentionally included provisions in the statute aimed at providing relief to aggrieved consumers.
[brief] See Vill. of Ridgewood v. Shell Oil Co., 289 N.J. Super. 181, 195-96 (App. Div. 1996) (finding invalid an assignment of tort claims for property damages and clean-up costs); Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super. at 79 (finding invalid the assignment of tort claim for personal injuries); Berkowitz v. Haigood, 256 N.J. Super. 342, 346 (Law Div. 1992) (explaining a claim for personal injury damages arising in tort “is not assignable before judgment”); Costanzo v. Costanzo, 248 N.J. Super. 116, 121 (Law Div. 1991) (finding invalid the assignment of a tort claim for personal injuries);
[brief] **POINT SEVENTEEN [Lack of, Failure of, Consideration] (Argued Pa408 – Pa409)**  Consideration, or a value exchange by both parties, is necessary for an enforceable contract.  The consideration for the contract was for [...] to pay [...] in exchange for services rendered.  That consideration failed when [...] was no longer rendering services and was thus not entitled to payment.  [...]’s claims for additional payments despite not rendering services also fails for lack of consideration.
[brief] 44  TRANSCRIPTS T1 6/9/23  Decision Hearing ..............................................................................  28  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Page ORDER DATED JUNE 9, 2023  GRANTING  DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED  COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE  ........................................................................................................Pa1409  | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio,** | 39 | | 421 N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Abtrax Pharmaceuticals, Inc.v. Elkins–Sinn, Inc.,** | 33 | | 139 N.J. 499, 514 (1995) | | | **Alpha Beauty v. Winn–Dixie Stores,** | 38 | | 425 N.J. Super. 94, 102 (App. Div. 2012) | | | **Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C.,** | 31 | | 142 N.J. 280 (1995) | | | **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C.** | 36 | | 237 N.J. 91 (2019) | | | **Donohue v. Kuhn,** | 32 | | 150 N.J. 484, 485 (1997).
[brief] ”  *Sanchez-Medina*, 231 N.J. at 465-68.  A finding of plain error in *Sanchez-Medina* thus makes sense in a way it does not here – where an identification instruction, though not in defendant’s now-preferred wording, was provided, and the State’s identification evidence was corroborated by surveillance videos the jury could evaluate itself in relation to the identification of the defendant as the burglar.  Because there was no error in either the admission of identification evidence, or the court’s instruction to the jury on how to evaluate such evidence, this Court should affirm defendant’s conviction.
[brief] ---------------------------------------------------  8 POINT  ONE APPELLANT BREACHED THEIR DUTIES UNDER THE SUBJECT AGREEMENT AND THE COURT MADE APPROPRIATE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN ITS ORDER OF JULY 25, 2023 (Raised below at Da198, Da202)  -------------------------------------  8  POINT TWO APPELLANT’S CONTENTION AT POINT II C (DB 18-20)  CONCERNING THE TERM “EFFECTUATE” BYPASSES THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT AND ADMITS TO APPELLANT’S BREACH (Raised below at 1T 14:10-25, 1T 15:18- 1T 16:24, Da200)  --------------  10  POINT  THREE RESPONDENT MEETS ANY BURDENS UNDER THE FOUR PRONGS IN GLOBE MOTOR CO. V. IGDALEV, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016) (Raised below at 1T 3:8-14, 1T 7:3-19, 1T 9:5-13, 1T 14: 5-23, Da195-202)  --------------------------------------------------------  15  POINT FOUR THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS PROPERLY CONSTRUED AS A JOINT PRODUCT OF THE PARTIES AND SHOULD NOT, AS APPELLANT REPEATEDLY CONTENDS, BE CONSTRUED AGAINST EITHER PARTY  (Raised below at 1T 10:2-17)  -----------------------------------------  21 POINT FIVE APPELLANT’S POINT I(D)  FAILS TO IDENTIFY HOW THE TRIAL COURT DEPARTED FROM CASELAW  (Raised below at 1T 10:9 to 1T11:1, 1T 15:8-24)  --------------------------  22 POINT SIX APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT (DB33) THAT ALL SEPARATION AGREEMENTS UNDER N.J.A.C 17:1-6.4  AUTOMATICALLY BAR ELIGIBILITY FOR DISABILITY  BENEFITS IS COMPLETELY WRONG (Raised below at 1T 5:4-7, 1T 7:3-16, 1T 17:20-25)  ------------------------  33  POINT SEVEN THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER OF JULY 25, 2023  PROPERLY ENFORCED  THE PARTIES AGREEMENT AS WRITTEN (Raised below at 1T16:13-16, 1T17:6-21, 1T18:12 to 1T20:21, 1T 22:6-25, 1T19:12-23, 1T 22:6-25, and Da199-Da200)
[brief] (Pa000426).  [...] further states that Plaintiffs consented to certain activities of [...] and [...].  Plaintiffs deny Plaintiffs had given consent for these activities, and the factual record clearly demonstrates that, at a minimum, there is a question of fact as what activities Plaintiffs has actually consented to and what activities were not consented to by Plaintiffs.  [...] engaged in several unauthorized entries onto Plaintiffs’ property and, while there are some written emails with respect to the installation of the ASDS and collection of air samples, there was absolutely no evidence that Plaintiffs were aware of or consented to the installation of temporary well points or the soil borings conducted by [...] which occurred prior to the receipt of any correspondence from any of the Defendants.  [...], likewise, conducted substantial excavation on Plaintiffs’ property, and there is no evidence, whatsoever, that [...] had Plaintiffs’ consent for the excavation.
[brief] [...].  [...] solicited investors for the [...] that funded the [...].  Aa291-302, 307-16, 325, 330-31, 335, 341-42, 344, 350, 354, 359.  [...] was contracted to perform his investment activities, and was compensated for doing so.  Aa291-302, 307-16.  [...] communicated with the investors prior to and at time of their investments.  Aa325, 330-31, 335, 341-42, 344, 349-50, 354, 359.  He interfaced during the course of the investments and provided administrative information to the investors.  Aa341-42, 354.  He was given access to, and explained to investors, exactly the Investment Companies that the [...] invested into.  Aa339.  [...] informed the investors of the resignation of [...] and [...].
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ON APPEAL  Order Denying Summary Judgment dated June 7, 2019 ........................................ Da001  Oral Decision (June 7, 2019) .................................................................................. 1T21  Order Denying Directed Verdict 1 dated November 2, 2023 .................................  Da003  Oral Decision (November 2, 2023) ...........................................................................  5T104  Order Denying Directed Verdict 2 dated November 6, 2023 ...............................  Da005  Oral Decision (November 8, 2023) ..........................................................................  6T88  APPENDIX VOLUME I TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] In Flowers, the defendant and his codefendant robbed a deli, brandished his handgun at the deli employees, and hit an employee on the head with that handgun.  No. A-2401-09T3, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1962, at *2 (App. Div. Aug. 5, 2013), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 588 (2014).
[brief] The deficiencies upset the orderly progression of the case, delayed trial, resulted in duplicative and unnecessary discovery, and caused plaintiff to incur substantial unnecessary transaction costs.  Since the outset of the case defendant knew the communications (including e-mails) between and amongst [...], [...] and [...] regarding plaintiff were clearly relevant.  Defendant also knew that because of plaintiff's complaints about the alleged ex parte communications between [...] and [...] that their e-mails were not only relevant, but could possibly be the most important evidence in the case.  Nevertheless, although the case was filed on February 19, 2009, and the Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 conference was held on May 20, 2009, many key e-mails were not produced until they trickled in from September—January, 2013.