ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A restriction or obstruction used or intended for the purpose of preventing free passage of motor vehicles on a roadway in order to effectuate the apprehension of a violator.  An avenue of escape is a gap in a roadblock which requires the violator to decrease the vehicle's speed to permit the violator to bypass the roadblock.  A blocking vehicle is a motor vehicle, often a law enforcement vehicle, which is placed perpendicular to a roadway or angled in such a way as to create a roadblock.  2.10
[brief] (Def.’s Br. at 1).  Notably, Defendant states that “[he] elected to treat the expenditure as a credit toward” the unpaid dues, and does not identify any agreement by the Plaintiff to reimburse him for the alleged expenses.  Indeed, Defendant specifically identifies an instruction by Plaintiff “not to attempt to repair” a subsequent element of the Unit at his own expense.  (Def.’s Br. at 2).  Additionally, Defendant asserts that “[d]ue to an error by [Plaintiff’s] process server, [Plaintiff] never effectuated personal service[,]” but Defendant fails to note the extensive efforts taken by Plaintiff’s agents to effectuate personal service on Defendant.  Although not an exhaustive list, Plaintiff attempted to serve process on Defendant as follows:
[brief] Respondent’s mistaken factual contention concerning the impact of my medical leave on my pension benefits.  Respondent’s purely factual argument that I knew that I was not entitled to any life insurance benefit when I retired is based on (1) the May 25, 2021 letter from the [...] (the “[...]”) (2) my July 5, 2023 appeal and (3) respondent’s misrepresentation that I knew that my FMLA leave did not count towards the length of service needed for my life insurance benefit ($9,952.12).  The May 25, 2021 letter mailed by the [...] to me (I never received it in the mail) indicated that I would not be entitled to any life insurance benefit if I retired on September 30, 2021 based on my length of service (9 years and 9 months).  Pa1 and Ra 001.  The May 25, 2021 letter from the [...] refers to “service credit,” but does not define such a term or explain how “service credit is accrued and whether “service credit” is the same as length of service.  My July 5, 2023 appeal does state that I knew that I would have been “short on my length of service” needed for my pension benefits, Pa91.  Incredibly, respondent, in an apparent attempt to mislead this Court, ignores in its brief the following critical language in my July 5, 2023 appeal:  “That [my being short on my length of service] is the reason that I continued in the system until February 1, 2022. ”  Obviously, this quoted language (that respondent pretends is not in my July 5, 2023 appeal) is critical to my appeal since it confirms my understanding that my FMLA leave gave me the required length of service to entitle me to life insurance benefits ($9,952.12).  The failure of respondent to even mention such quoted language in its 26-page brief is linked with respondent’s misrepresentation to this Court that I knew (“it was evident to [...]”) that my time on FMLA leave did not provide me with the “requisite ten years of service credit” needed for life insurance benefits.
[brief] This means that in the event of an auto accident, an individual’s own insurance company covers their medical expenses and other related costs, regardless of who was at fault.  Under the AICRA, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35, every standard automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed in this State must provide for the payment of PIP benefits to the named insured and members of the insured's family residing in the insured’s household without regard to negligence, liability or fault.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  Those benefits include medical expenses, lost wages, and certain other costs resulting from an auto accident, up to the policy limits.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  Disputes can arise regarding the amount or legitimacy of PIP claims.  When such disputes occur, a specially created dispute resolution proceeding provides a way to efficiently resolve these issues so that overdue medical bills can be paid.
[brief] Respondent and Appellant argued TILA defense on the merits.  “[W]here public policy calls for it, ... a defense will be considered properly before the court although not pleaded.  . . .  When a case as presented raises issues within the confines of the legislative policy, ... there is no fundamental injustice in conforming the pleadings of the case to the facts.  This is consistent with the court’s duty to see that substantial justice is done.  Marino v. Cocuzza ....” Rivera v. Gerner, 89 N.J. 526, 537 (N. J. 1982).
[brief] 2.  The Motions for Reconsideration by All Defendants  Dissatisfied with [...]’s ruling, Defendants [...] and [...] filed a motion for reconsideration on September 4, 2018.  243a-244a.  Defendants [...] and [...] filed their own motion for reconsideration on August 29, 2018.  241a-242a.  In support of their motion for reconsideration, Defendants [...] and [...] argued that Plaintiff [...] was a new business, that the “new business rule” applied, and that Plaintiffs’ claim for lost profits were too remote and speculative.  254a-258a.  Despite [...]’s unambiguous August 21, 2018 opinion, Defendants [...] and [...] argued that the Law Division had “overlooked” the question of whether Plaintiff [...] was a new business.  250a.  The Law Division heard oral argument on reconsideration on September 28, 2018.  306a-307a.  After hearing argument from both sets of Defendants, [...] denied reconsideration, finding, for the second time, that [...]’s report calculated damages with reasonable certainty, and stating expressly that he had not overlooked this issue in denying summary judgment.  306a-307a.  [...] issued a written opinion on September 28, 2018, reiterating the ruling that he had made on the record at oral argument.  306a-307a.  3.
[brief] ³  (Da72)  Counsel further ³  At the time sentencing counsel cited this website, it had a different title and url: National Institute of Justice, From Juvenile Delinquency to Young Adult Offending, Office of Justice Programs, https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/Pages/delinquency-to-adult-offending.aspx (Mar. 11, 2014).  (Da72)  The permanent non-periodical publication from which noted that, as recognized by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, “[l]ongitudinal studies show that the great majority of [young offenders] will voluntarily desist from criminal activity with or without the intervention of the legal system.
[brief] Defendants’ Appeal rests entirely on a false premise calculated to deceive this Court: that in denying the [...]’ motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), the court below (Hon. [...]) “disregarded” Defendants’ “First Amendment right [as] a non-profit advocacy organization to speak out zealously on matters of public concern .  . . .” (Db 1).  Defendants also contend that Judge Lindemann “defied binding authority,” particularly this Court’s recent decision in Neuwirth v. State, 476 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2023).  (Db 1).  Indeed, Defendants’ appellate argument revolves around their specious contention that Judge Lindemann defied Neuwirth.  As the record shows, Judge Lindemann did no such thing – Judge Lindemann cited Neuwirth in his original order denying Defendants’ motions to dismiss issued on October 23, 2023 (the “Denial Order”) (Da 203-04) and specifically recognized Neuwirth as binding precedent in his amplified order issued on November 7, 2023 (the “Amplification Order”) (Da 215-16).  ¹  The other defendant, [...], has filed a separate and independent appeal.  See App. Div. Docket [...].  Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, their motion to dismiss was not denied because of a supposed error of the trial court, but rather because they simply failed to establish the prerequisites of their motion.  Indeed, the Appeal is meritless because – as is evident from the face of the papers and as discussed in Judge Lindemann’s opinions—Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“[...]”) properly plead her compelling and richly detailed claims.  “A finding of reckless publication . . . may result if the publisher fabricates a story, publishes one that is wholly unbelievable . . .”  Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 391-392 (citing St Amant. v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 615 (1994)) (emphasis added).  That is exactly the case here.  [...], a beloved teacher and grandmother who is also Jewish, brought defamation and false light claims against the [...] on the basis of their multiple appalling public smears of [...] premised upon a wholly unbelievable and fabricated story that [...] physically abused a female Muslim student in her second-grade class with discriminatory intent.
[brief] Three (3) of the plaintiffs admitted that they knew all exchanges and/or reservations were subject to availability notwithstanding their claims of oral misrepresentation in their complaint.  (Da78, ¶26; Da89, ¶53; and Da112, ¶125).  Most significantly, [...] knew all exchanges and reservations were subject to availability and they exchanged their interval twice but were simply unhappy they didn’t get their first choice.  (Da108, ¶114).  The facts as set forth above were the operative facts for which the plaintiffs claimed fraud and all of their claims were and are expressly contradicted by the contractual documents that they reviewed, initialed and signed.
[brief] As to passion/provocation manslaughter, the act was so violent and unexpected and the confession so confusing that it jumped off the page to everyone that something might be wrong with [...]’s mental state: as the trial court noted, this confession spurred a need to investigate an insanity or diminished capacity defense.  (9T 26-13 to 21)  The killing seems senseless and inexplicable.  But the reason for the killing may well have been the reason the jury was unable to consider: that [...] acted under a provocation that caused her to lose her self-control.  As to aggravated and reckless manslaughter, the unusual implement used in the crime—which, as discussed above, is not per se a lethal weapon—could have led the jury to doubt that [...] intended to cause death or injury likely to lead to death, but disregarded the chance that death would occur.
[brief] Given the absence of any discussion of late adolescents, respondent resorts to taking the copious language in these cases referring to “juveniles,” “children,” and the like out of context.  This language was not meant to limit constitutional protection to age seventeen.  It was meant to extend protection to age seventeen.  For example, respondent emphasizes the language from [...] discussing how eighteen “is the point where society draws the line for many purposes. ”  [...], 543 U.S. at 574.  (Pb 11).  Let us examine more of the relevant passage:  Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules.  The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.  By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.  For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn.  The plurality opinion in Thompson drew the line at 16.  In the intervening years the Thompson plurality’s conclusion that offenders under 16 may not be executed has not been challenged.  The logic of Thompson extends to those who are under 18.  The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.  It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.  Id.  Read in the full context, this passage was extending protection against the death penalty from fifteen-year-olds, see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), to seventeen-year-olds like the defendant [...].  In other words, the “line” was being moved from sixteen to eighteen.  In this connection, the court had analyzed at length how contemporary standards of decency were against the death penalty for people below eighteen, [...], 543 U.S. at 564-67, and how the penalty was disproportionate and served no penological purpose for people below eighteen, id. at 568-74.  Whether the constitutional line should move any further beyond eighteen was not before the court and was not analyzed.  Nor was it before the courts in any of the other leading decisions mentioned above.
[directive] The Statewide SART Advisory Board shall monitor the operation of the 21 County SART programs, review the effectiveness of the services provided by the State to victims of sexual assault and make recommendations to the Attorney General for any needed changes in the standards, regulations, or State policy concerning the provision of victim services.  The  Statewide SART Advisory Board  In 2001, a permanent Attorney General SART/FNE Coordinating Council (now called the “Statewide SART Advisory Board”) was established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:4B-55.  The mission of the Statewide SART Advisory Board (“the Board”) is to review the effectiveness of the services provided by the State and the 21 County SART programs to victims of sexual assault.  Based on the findings these reviews yield, the Board is to make recommendations to the Attorney General for any needed changes or updates in the standards, regulations, or State policy concerning the provision of victim services.
[brief] Da335.  Counsel for [...] characterizing the presentation of the contract to [...] on January 17, 2023 as a “flawed” attempt to comply with the ROFR is simply wrong.  There is nothing in paragraph 39 of the MFSA that in any way extends the time within which [...] may exercise its ROFR if the offer is not “promptly” presented or if an offer contains or fails to contain terms that [...] might deem necessary.  Counsel for Plaintiff further mischaracterizes the testimony by stating that the Defendant [...] knew that the “terms of the Original PSA were wrong” yet “signed it anyway”.  Pb8.
[brief] The proofs that have been submitted to court show that both parties were represented by counsel during the negotiation and execution of the Franchise Agreement.  *Id.* at 176-77.  This Court should likewise find that no aspects of unconscionability are present, let alone those that “shock[] the conscience. ”  *Id.* at 177.  Appellants  \(^{10}\)  Appellants also cite *Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc.*, 903 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1990), which does not involve enforcement of a choice-of-law provision or arbitration clause.  have submitted no competent proof supporting their conclusory assertions that they had no ability to negotiate the Wholesaler Agreement before it was signed.
[brief] On or about August 15, 2017, Plaintiffs’ damages expert, [...], issued an expert report.  275a.  [...]’s report assessed the profits that Plaintiffs would have earned had Defendants not derailed their attempts to develop the [...] property.  275a-286a.  The report calculated damages on two models.  275a-286a.  The first model was based on Plaintiffs constructing a mixed-use market rate development as originally agreed among the parties.  276a-279a.  The second model was based on Plaintiffs instead having developed 132 affordable housing units after the rezoning of [...], as [...] eventually did after Defendants displaced Plaintiffs from a role at [...].  279a-280a.  [...] valued Plaintiffs’ profits at up to $5,135,804.00 under the first scenario, and up to $8,167,416.00 under the second scenario.  280a-281a.  C.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692b ...............................................................................  15  15 U.S.C. § 1692b(5) ..........................................................................  22  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) ........................................................................... passim  15 U.S.C. § 1692d ...............................................................................  12  15 U.S.C. § 1692d(3) ..........................................................................  19  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5) ..........................................................................  22  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) ..........................................................................  22  15 U.S.C. § 1692i ...............................................................................  24  15 U.S.C. § 1692k ...............................................................................  1  15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A) .......................................................................  28 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(b) ...........................................................................  28  16 C.F.R. § 314.4(d)(1)-(2) ..................................................................  28  2A C.J.S. Agency § 1 ...........................................................................  20 53 FR 50097-02 .................................................................................. 26, 27 86 FR 5766-01 ....................................................................................  27  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Respondent [...] (“[...]” or “Respondent” or “Defendant”) files this Appellate Brief in opposition to the Appeal filed by Appellant [...] (“[...]” or “Appellant” or “Plaintiff”).
[directive] 90 Days1  Maintain housing other Court every week if in treatment needed Address any recommended medical/dental needs, Engage  Cooperate with supervision  Demonstrate changing people, places, things and treatment attending recovery groups recommended by Begin Review plan case as if Develop and follow a financial plan indicated per plan  Weekly office visits case  Monthly home visits  Random drug tests {minimum 2x/week)  * ! __  90 M_inimum Daysi Pro-Social Habilitation :Phase 3 Court monthly
[brief] (Da 25)  In the absence of a report by [...] confirming that the male in the Kia was said to be wearing a fanny pack with a .44 magnum inside it, and in light of [...]’s admission that he would have included those critical details in the report he authored (1T 41-3 to 41-25), the only reasonable inference to draw, [...] argued, was that [...] never relayed those details to the C.I.D. units because the C.I. never relayed those details to him.
[brief] He argues that most of the evidence involved [...]'s conduct, and compared to that evidence, the evidence against him was so “disparately absent that denying the motion for severance deprived [him] of his right to a fair trial. ”  Rule 3:7–7 permits “[t]wo or more defendants [to] be charged in the same indictment ... if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.
[directive] a.  lEsta usted actualmente bajo libertad a prueba?  [No/No]  [Si/Yes]  Are you presently on probation?  b.  lEsta usted actualmente bajo libertad condicional?  [No/No]  [Si/Yes]  Are you presently on parole?  lEsta usted actualmente cumpliendo una sentencia con reclusion por otro cargo?  c. [No/No]  [Si/Yes]  Are you presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge?
[brief] (Da67)  The DEP regulates sound emanating from commercial premises (such as [...]) based on specified decibel levels at N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.2.  However, N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.5 provides exceptions from the noise limitations of N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.2.  Specifically, N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.5(a)(11) provides that “The operational performance standards established at N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.2 shall not apply to any of the following noise sources:  . . . 11.  The unamplified human voice[.]”  Accordingly, since this Noise Ordinance specifically attempts to regulate the unamplified human voice through its prohibition on “loud talking”, it is both more stringent than the DEP regulations and inconsistent with the State’s specific exemptions.  The DEP’s guidance on the regulation of noise, while noting that such ordinances must be submitted to the Department to verify they are “consistent with the statewide strategy for noise control”, does recognize that the NCA is not the only means of noise regulation in New Jersey.
[brief] That issue is not applicable in this case, as the Affidavits of Merit provided by the Plaintiffs contain the identity of all the individuals and entities that are known at this time to be involved in the malpractice at issue.  The Affidavits of Merit clearly identify [...], [...] and [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Furthermore, the complaint contains fictitious pleadings for other entities and individuals that may not yet be known and for whom the Defendant is vicariously liable.  However, whether the Defendant is ultimately vicariously liable for the actions of any of the other defendants is irrelevant to the determination of whether the Affidavits of Merit are sufficient.  The focus of the Affidavit of Merit statute is not on the ability to ultimately prove the claim, but rather to substantiate that the case has merit based upon the attestation of an appropriately licensed professional, which the Plaintiffs have provided.
[brief] The Estoppel Provision in the Property Sale Agreement  Defendant was subject to three specific requirements regarding an estoppel certificate.  (Da211.)  Within 10 days of when the PSA was signed on November 15, the Defendant was required to request an estoppel certificate from [...].  (Id.)  It was then obligated to use commercially reasonable efforts to secure the estoppel certificate prior to closing.  (Id.)  Finally, if obtained the Defendant was required to promptly deliver it to Plaintiff.
[brief] ”  Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978).  Here, [...] seeks to avoid an obvious legislative restriction outlined in the Ricci Act that provides he is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation after July 8, 2021.  Even if [...] did not receive the postcard or any of the other notice provided by the Division, he cannot evade the two-year limitation period.  “As New Jersey courts have long recognized, ‘[i]gnorance of the law furnishes no excuse to a person either for a breach or for an omission of a duty[.]’”  Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C., 202 N.J. 349, 367 (2010) (quoting Bowen v. Pursel, Thus, [...] purportedly being unaware of the Ricci Act until over three years after its passage cannot serve as the basis to allow him to evade its unambiguous requirements.
[brief] As this Court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey have reminded, prospective agreements to arbitrate employment claims are not unenforceable releases because “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. ”  Antonucci, 470 N.J. Super. at 566 (quoting Martindale, 173 N.J. at 93).  The test applicable to evaluating the enforceability of a release of an existing claim is entirely inapplicable to determining the validity and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate such a claim.
[brief] After the trial court granted [...]’s application for a mandatory stay pending appeal per R. 2:9-5(c) (“the stay of the arbitration shall be granted”), [...] timely commenced this appeal.  Pa1.  [...] filed this appeal and seeks the following: (1) An Order reversing the trial court’s order dismissing [...]’s Verified Complaint with prejudice; (2) An Order reversing the trial court’s denial of [...]’s request for permanent injunctive relief enjoining the Second Arbitration; (3) An Order reversing the trial court’s findings with respect to the entire controversy doctrine (and/or res judicata) and “ripeness”; and (4) An Order reversing the trial court’s order compelling the Second Arbitration.  [See Pa68.]  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT