ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  Respondeat Superior (10T29:23-38:9; 61:1-66:7)  Date of Ruling: January 24, 2023  Oral opinion (10T29:23-38:9; 61:1-66:7)  2.  The jury was instructed that they could NOT find that [...] was both vicariously liable and directly liable for negligent training or supervision; it had to be either or.  (11T179:3-8)  Date of Ruling: January 24, 2023  Oral opinion (10T46:15-25; 10T72:2-73:15)  3.  Refusal to instruct the jury as to the Restatement of Torts, Section 317.  (10T40:5-42:6)  Date of ruling: January 24, 2023  Oral opinion.  (10T40:5-42:6)  IV.  Rulings on Argument of Counsel.  (11T4:19-5:7; 10T16:18-20:11)  1.  Lowe’s was permitted to argue that plaintiff was not suing [...] for assault.  (11T4:19-5:7)  Date of ruling: January 25, 2023  Oral opinion.  (11T4:19-5:7)  2.  Plaintiffs’ were precluded from commenting on defendant [...]’s absence.  (10T19:9-20:11)  Date of ruling: January 24, 2023  Oral opinion.  (10T19:9-20:11)
[brief] (Pa54; Pa093, Pa094, Pa096).  It should not be overlooked that [...] stated in his narrative report that he placed two closed fist strikes to the left side of plaintiff’s body.  (Pa23).  [...] states that he used his “knee and elbow to strike the plaintiff’s right side!” (Pa30, Pa031).  Despite all this, Plaintiff ended up in the emergency room with a dislocated jaw.  (Pa094; Pa096)  Because plaintiff was subjected to a similar pattern of excessive force via assault and battery by the [...] to which many have been subjected, it is fair to say that plaintiff satisfied Count Four of his complaint alleging that a pattern and practice of police brutality ad excessive force, discrimination and failure to train.
[brief] Id.  In considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court repeatedly made its position clear:  In dismissing the complaint with prejudice because of the late report and denying the motion for reconsideration, the judge noted plaintiffs' failure to seek relief from the May 24 deadline or otherwise to move for extension of the discovery-end date and relied as well on defendants' assertion that the expert report had opened up new areas of inquiry that had to be explored.  Our review of the record satisfies us, however, that the judge's perceptions provided an insufficient basis for the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice, that it failed to take into account other countervailing considerations, and that the dismissal with prejudice constituted a mistaken exercise of discretion.
[brief] [...] describes the description of the fourth tract on page 405 of the final decree (1T78-79).  [...] opines that Riparian Rights may be conveyed, but not Riparian lands (1T79:17):  “I don’t know that they acquired any.  It is possible that a small sliver of grant is included in the description of lands that went to the 1918 mean high water line which would have been the lands shown on the Municipal Tax Map.  I don’t know of any provisions that may have been made to show a different line.
[brief] (6T23-3 to 24-2)  As trial was beginning, counsel learned of a report from [...] [...] stating on February 24, 2014, he “witnessed” a forensic examination of the drive and found the footage of the preserved clips.  (Da105)  There was no explanation of how they survived the purported “complete wiping” of the drive in July 2013.  The report thus suggested this “wiping” had not occurred at all.  Counsel did nothing with this bombshell disclosure.  He did not demand the drive be produced for examination, which might have found more data or put [...]’s handling of the drive in a more critical light, or even seek a continuance.  Meanwhile, in summation the prosecutor emphasized defendant’s purported failure to produce evidence supporting his alibi.  Only after [...] was convicted did counsel bring the report to the court’s attention, but he still never requested the drive be produced for examination.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT MATTER.  Given the clear difficulties associated with [...]’s deposition testimony, plaintiff contends that expert testimony is not required to establish that [...]’s Project-related services breached the governing standard of care.  In so doing, plaintiff reaches for the common knowledge exception to the Affidavit of Merit statute.  Plaintiff predominantly relied upon Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. where a homeowner brought a claim after tripping over a hole that was left following the removal of a fallen streetlight.  452 N.J. Super 494 (App. Div. 2017).  In arguing for the applicability of the common knowledge exception, plaintiff contends that “[d]efendants (including [...]) inspected and were aware of the settlement problem at the north approach” and that this ‘dangerous condition’ went unaddressed.  Of course, plaintiff fails to acknowledge that the assertion of actual notice has been expressly abandoned by plaintiff’s own expert.  Further, it is simply preposterous to contend that it is with the ken of the average juror to not only appreciate the obligations typically undertaken by a resident engineer associated with a sophisticated road widening project but to also possess a knowledge base applicable to [...]’s Project-based obligations in the present matter.  In light of the foregoing, the trial court correctly held that plaintiff’s common knowledge argument is meritless.
[brief] (39T:128-10 to 22; 132-18 to 134-12)  There, he met [...], who was carrying her infant son [...] in her arms and crying out for police assistance.  (39T:133-25 to 135-12)  Ms. Griner told [...] that she had been walking down the street when assailants had pushed her from behind and took the baby stroller carrying her other son, [REDACTED], who was nearly two years old.  (39T:134-24 to 135-3; 138-7 to 139-8; 40T:95-8 to 12)  [...] and other officers searched the area for the stroller, which they found laid on its side on [...] next to a pair of shoes.  (39T:140-16 to 142-14; 145-14 to 21)  [...] called a K-9 handler, who brought a bloodhound to the scene to track the scent from the stroller.  (39T:141-16 to 143-20)  [...] also contacted State Police to request a helicopter with a heat-seeking camera to aid in the search.  (29T:141-16 to 142-4)  [...] spoke to Ms. Griner, who was with her eight-month-old son [...].
[brief] The issue before the Court is simple, and that is merely to affirm the confirmation of an arbitration award.  In fact, New Jersey has a *strong preference* for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards and does not permit courts to revisit an arbitrator’s merits rulings.  The Trial Court thus cited the “substantial deference to arbitration awards” and found “no basis” to vacate/modify the Arbitrator’s decision.  Cutting against the public policy goals of arbitration—speedy, inexpensive, and final—[...] rehashes the same flawed arguments it made to the Arbitrator, and again below to the Trial Court.  This Court should confirm the Trial Court’s refusal to second-guess the Award.  Prompt confirmation of arbitration awards by the courts is not only favored but required in order to preserve the integrity and viability of the arbitration process as an alternative means of dispute resolution.  Confirmation is the rule, not the exception.
[brief] Da3-23.  Indeed, when seeking a preliminary injunction, which the Chancery Court ultimately granted and which remains in effect today (Da2, 259-62), [...] repeatedly represented that her requests were premised upon the enforcement of the 2022 Addendum.  See Da42 (“I am seeking an Order of the Court to compel Defendants’ specific performance of the [2022 Addendum] by transferring the Property to me. ”); Da182-83 (“I seek such relief based on my May 21, 2022 written agreement with [...] [] to transfer legal title to the Property to me in exchange for $6 million[.]”); 2T11:7-10 (“The plaintiff, in accordance with an agreement made in May 2022 that provides for the transfer to be made upon payment of six million dollars.
[brief] Indeed, the evidence here regarding the second “magic” return-to-work doctor’s note, as recounted by the Arbitrator, leads to the inexorable conclusion that the note likely was procured falsely, possibly through undue means.  For example, and as made clear by the Arbitrator’s findings, the second note was **not** justified by any intervening medical examination, following the first note, that would explain [...]’ miraculous recovery, reducing her complete recovery period from major reconstructive knee surgery from six months to a mere two weeks.  Neither do the Arbitrator’s own findings in his award establish that any member of [...]’ medical team approved the second note.  (Pa32-34)  Simply put, it is bad policy, and it appears nowhere in the CBA -- for good reason.  Even more troubling, the Arbitrator did not provide any limitations as to the length of time [...] must wait before it is permitted to discharge an injured or otherwise incapacitated employee.  [...]’ incapacity here was to last for a period of at least six months.  Without any additional guidance, the Arbitrator, in essence, has granted [...] and other similarly-situated employees permanent tenured status, a provision that does not appear anywhere in the CBA.
[brief] Plaintiff’s cross-motion to extend offered no facts or evidence demonstrating counsel’s diligence in pursuing discovery, or what steps had been taken to obtain an expert report regarding [...] within the discovery period.  (9a-11a.)  “Any attorney requesting additional time for discovery should establish that he or she did make effective use of the time permitted under the rules.  A failure to pursue discovery promptly, within the time permitted, would normally be fatal to such a request. ”  Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. at 79 (citation omitted).  Nor was there any explanation offered for why counsel did not request any extension of discovery within the original discovery period, or before plaintiff was confronted with several motions to dismiss.  (9a-11a.)  [...]’s certification, listing her health issues, was appropriately disregarded by the Law Division because [...] had been represented by counsel at all times since her lawsuit commenced.  A plaintiff’s attorneys may be reasonably expected to bear the responsibility for retaining expert witnesses, monitoring discovery deadlines, and filing motions for relief as needed.  None of the circumstances set forth in [...]’s or her attorney’s certifications explained why plaintiff’s attorney had not obtained an expert report regarding [...], or why plaintiff’s attorney had not made a timely motion to extend discovery before the discovery end date.  Plaintiff’s attorney now admits, at Pb18, that his failure to do so was an “oversight,” due to unspecified “staffing shortages. ”  But as our Supreme Court has warned, “[a] precise explanation that details the cause of delay and what actions were taken during the elapsed time is a necessary part of proving … exceptional circumstances as required by Rule 4:24–1(c) to extend discovery after a trial or arbitration date is set. ”  Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 429 (2006) (emphasis added); see also, O'Donnell v. Ahmed, 363 N.J. Super. 44, 51 (Law.  Div. 2003) (discussing examples of exceptional circumstances in the context of Rule 4:24-1(c)).  An attorney’s workload and problems with staff are not exceptional circumstances that will justify an extension once the discovery end date has passed, and a trial date has been set.  *Zadigan v. Cole*, 369 N.J. Super. 123, 132 n.8 (Law. Div. 2004).  As correctly stated by the court below, the explanation that plaintiff herself suffered some problems did not constitute exceptional circumstances.  1T at 11:05-22.  Because plaintiff did not set forth exceptional circumstances, as our case law requires, denial of her cross-motion to extend discovery was a straightforward application of Rule 4:24–1(c).  Therefore, the Law Division’s denial of plaintiff’s cross-motion to extend discovery was clearly within the court’s discretion, and it should be affirmed.
[brief] In In re Advisory Letter No. 7-11, 61 A. 3d 136 (N.J. 2013), the Supreme Court stated justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.  The purpose of our judicial disqualification provisions is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, which in turn depends on a belief in the impersonality of judicial decision making.  Even a “righteous judgment” will not find acceptance in the public's mind unless the judge's impartiality and fairness are above suspicion.
[brief] Green, 86 N.J. 281 (1981) | ........................................... 41-44, 52 | | State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) | ........................................... 12, 37, 42, 44-45, 48-50, 52, 54-55 | | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **State v. Hubbard**, 222 N.J. 249 (2015) | 22-25, 29-31, 33 | | **State v. Hyde**, 292 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1996) | 36 | | **State v. Jenewicz**, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) | 58 | | **State v. Jordan**, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) | 51 | | **State v. Miller**, 108 N.J. 112 (1987) | 63-65 | | **State v. O’Neal**, 190 N.J. 601 (2007) | 22, 24 | | **State v. O’Neill**, 193 N.J. 148 (2007) | 22, 34 | | **State v. Orecchio**, 16 N.J. 125 (1954) | 58 | | **State v. P.Z.**, 152 N.J. 86 (1997) | 23 | | **State v. Patton**, 133 N.J. 389 (1993) | 22 | | **State v. Pearson**, 318 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div. 1999) | 28-32, 34 | | **State v. Pennington**, 154 N.J. 344 (1998) | 63 | | **State v. Pierce**, 330 N.J. Super. at 482 (App. Div. 2000) | 51 | | **State v. Randolph**, 210 N.J. 330 (2012) | 63 | | **State v. Robinson**, 165 N.J. 32 (2000) | 51 | | **State v. Sanchez-Medina**, 231 N.J. 452 (2018) | 43, 51, 58| | **State v. Stott**, 171 N.J. 343 (2002) | 25-27, 29-30, 32-33 | | **State v. Williams**, 168 N.J. 323 (2001) | 36 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **Cases (Cont'd)** | | | United States v. Paguio, 114 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1997) | 61 | | **Statutes** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2a(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2b(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d | 3 | | **Rules** | | | R. 2:10-2 | 35 | | R. 3:11(b) | 47 | | **Constitutional Provisions** | | | N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 1 | 13, 37 | | N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 9 | 13, 37 | | N.J. Const., art.
[brief] “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”  State v. Malik, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  In Re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).  Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.
[brief] Ja222 | Cases | Page(s)  | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Cerdel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Township Comm. of Township of E. Hanover, | 17 | | 86 N.J. 303, 307 (1981)  ........................................................................... | | Chirichello v. Zoning Bd. Of Adj. Monmouth Park, 78 N.J. 544 (1979) ...... | 13 | | Coventry Square v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, | 19 | | 138 N.J. 285 (1994)
[brief] [...] then noticed a sneaker on the floor of the interview room and he asked “Whose sneaker?” and [...] responded, “That’s his.  This is your sneaker?” indicating that it belonged to defendant, and asking him to confirm that.  (1T:17-23 to 25).  Defendant responded “Yeah,” and [...] then asked “All right.  Do you want it on?  Do you want your sneaker on?” and defendant responded, “Throw it out. ” (1T:18-1 to 4).  Defendant then indicated that his other shoe had been taken at the station.  (13T:93-20 to 22).  This interaction was relevant, because defendant was not telling the truth about the other shoe, which had actually been recovered at the scene.  (1T:20-23 to 21-4).  There was a dispute about whether [...] had asked the initial question to the defendant or to [...], but ultimately trial court found that not only was there no evidence that this whole interaction over the shoe was a set-up by police, but also that [...] was in fact directing the question to [...].
[brief] 3:7-3(a) which governs the contents of an indictment and provides as follows:  The indictment or accusation shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged  .  . . .  It may be alleged in a single count either that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means.  An indictment or accusation or any count thereof charging the violation of a statute or statutes shall state the official or customary citation thereof, but error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or accusation or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not prejudicially mislead the defendant.  . . .  [Id. at 9 (emphasis in the original). ]
[brief] [...]  Tel: [...]  [...]  [...] Of Counsel and on the Brief  [...]  On the Brief Attorneys for Plaintiff, [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | BEING APPEALED | | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | A.
[brief] (DA389-391).  The letter concluded by informing Plaintiffs that continued failure to close could result in COA 99 filing for arbitration against them.  (Id.).  Plaintiff [...] responded to Counsel the same day via e-mail by: “reiterating [her] intention to proceed with closing”; “DISAGREE[ING] with the action closing date of April 28, 2022, set by seller”; requesting “the last settlement date” “under the terms of Section 11 SETTLEMENT of [her] SPA”; and informing Counsel that the March 22 letter incorrectly referred to the Default Clause as Section 7.
[brief] .....................................................................................21  Kadetsky v. Egg Harbor Township Board of Education, 164 F. Supp. 2d 425 (D.N.J. 2001)  ........................................................................35  Kirk v. City of Newark, 109 N.J. 173 (1988)  ...................................................................................................22  Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 193 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div. 1984) aff’d 100 N.J. 485 (1985)  .........................40  Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983)  ....................................................................................35  Lassiter v. Alabama A&M University, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994)  ................................................................................25  Lewis v. City of Irvine Kentucky, 899 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1990)  ....................................................................................35  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) ..................................................................................................22, 25 Manna v. State, 129 N.J. 341 (1992) ...................................................................................................39  Mateyko v. Felix, 924 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1990) ....................................................................................35 McGowen v. Borough of Eatontown, 151 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 1977) ....................................................................40 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) ..................................................................................................25 Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104 (2013) .................................................................................................................. 24 Myrlak v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 157 N.J. 84 (1999) .......................................................................................................................... 45 Papergraphics Intern., Inc. v. Correa, 389 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 2006) .............................................................................................. 16 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) ..................................................................................................................... 24, 26 Pico v. State, 116 N.J. 55 (1989) .......................................................................................................................... 39 Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1981) ........................................................................................................... 33 Ramie v. City of Heding Village, 742 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985) ........................................................................................................... 33 Ramirez v. United States, 998 F.Supp. 425 (D.N.J. 1998)
[brief] Pa4.  The correct distance of 177.65 feet was reflected in other supporting documentation provided to Appellant at the inception of this matter; specially, the map attached to the initial easement description was correct.  This map depicted the **correct** location of the proposed easement at the northeast corner of Appellant’s Property at a distance of 177.65 feet from [...] and [...].  *Ibid.*  This map was also attached as Exhibit “A” to the filed Verified Compliant and as Exhibit “B” to the recorded Declaration of Taking.
[brief] [...] filed a Motion for Summary Disposition in this Appeal (Appellate Motion [...]).  Excerpts from Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Disposition are included in [...]’s Appendix at Da6-Da14.  the Appellant agreed with [...]’s position that the Amended Resolution has the force of law.  The Appellant further argued that the Amended Resolution should be enforced.  (Da7, Da11, Da14).  [...] agrees.