ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da16; 1T97-1 to 17; Da181-82 (Ex. P8).  After [...] defaulted, he and [...] had numerous discussions concerning the default and the balance owed to Plaintiff.  Da16; 1T87-14 to 88:10.  [...] repeatedly explained that he continued to have cash flow issues and that he could not borrow from any bank or other party, and he begged [...] for his continued forbearance and for the opportunity to cure his default and get back on his financial feet.  Da16; Da181-82 (Ex. P8); Da199-202 (P15); Da203-15 (P16).  The trial court found that [...], despite his clear contractual enforcement rights, continued to support his friend by agreeing to forebear from enforcing his rights under the First Loan.  Da13-14.⁴  The trial court found that [...] testified candidly that he decided to continue to “give [[...]] a break” during his “time of trouble” because he considered [...] to be “a brother,” even though doing so clearly was not in [...]’ own business interests.  Da18; 1T125-12 to 17, 126-4 to 21.  It is undisputed that Defendants never paid Plaintiff the full amounts due under the First Loan, and never paid anything on the Second Loan.
[brief] | U.S. Const. Amend. V | 2,4 | | U.S. Const. Amend. VI | 2,4,5 | | U.S. Const. Amend. XIV | 2,4,5 | | N.J. Const. art. I Par. 1 | 2,4 | | N.J. Const. art. I Par. 9 | 2,4 | | N.J. Const. art.  I Par. 10 | 2,4 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Second, the State argues that [...]’s statements during the booking video were voluntary and thus admissible.  (Rb 25-28)  But police are required to obtain a valid Miranda waiver from an in-custody defendant before interrogating him — a requirement separate and apart from the voluntariness of a defendant’s statements.  The State does not dispute that [...] is in custody during the booking procedure.  The State also correctly recognizes that the detectives expressly asked [...] questions during the booking procedure that were not related to booking.  (See Rb 26)  That’s all that is required to trigger the need for Miranda warnings.  The police’s failure to do so means that [...]’s statements must be suppressed.
[brief] See Id. at 232-234.  Respondents’ opposition brief offers no similar evidence that supported the appointment of a special hearing officer in Cranford.  Instead, the Respondents point to the singular instance giving rise to the complaint: the Mayor’s opposition to the Respondents’ Amended Application.  Much like the trial court, the Respondents provide no factual link between the Mayor’s opposition and the denial thus being pre-determined.  Critically, they ignore the Zoning Board’s prior approval of the original application for development and act as though their amended application had never been given a fair shake.  This further ignores the reality that the Respondents’ Amended Application was not denied because of the Appellants desire to limit or reduce its fair share housing obligations, to delay or obstruct the creation of said units, or otherwise provide hostility toward same.
[brief] “First and foremost, unlike the condition in Norris, the tree roots and raised sidewalk [***19] condition is [*512] open and obvious.  The condition in Norris consisted of cracks in a curb.  Although [...] was aware of the cracks, she nevertheless stepped on the curb, thus suggesting that the internal instability which caused it to collapse when her weight was applied was hidden and certainly not known to her.  By contrast, here, the tree roots that caused the sidewalk to heave were so apparent that the Director of the DPW conceded that "obviously" the tree required removal. ”  Lodato v. Evesham Tp., 388 N.J. Super. 501, 511-512 (2006).
[directive] •  With slide forward, safety on, load weapon with 4 rounds in magazine and assume a point shoulder, muzzle depressed position.  •  On command, bring weapon up and work the action cycling a round into the chamber.  Fire the 4 rounds in the weapon leaving action open after firing the fourth round.  •  Combat load 1 round and fire from the point shoulder position.  •  Upon firing the last round, leave action open and place safety on.  Phase II 10-Yard Line.
[directive] County Prosecutor in the case a or unit (ems., the will wear BWCs. the task force, team, or unit in circumstances officers assigned to and what 1) been authorized to do so by the shall wear BWC unless he or she:  has  An officer not a officer of the chief law enforcement officer of department, or by the chief law enforcement the training on proper 2) received the task force, team, or unit; and has overseeing amulti-agency agency policy, of this Directive and the in accordance with the requirements use of the device care and Nothing in to section 3.1. directive, or order promulgated pursuant standing operating procedure, particular of any type duty require that officers assigned to Directive shall be construed to this Rather, decision the department. this with BWCs.  That is left to assignment will be equipped have been governing of BWCs by officers who foundational standards the use Directive provides construed to prevent Nothing in this Directive shall be their wear the device.
[brief] *Id.* at 507.  Inappropriate disclosure to the jury of a criminal defendant’s potential gang affiliation has been held to be particularly prejudicial.  *Herbert*, 457 N.J.Super. at 509.  When analyzed under N.J.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of other crimes and wrongs, membership in a gang is “‘at the very least strongly suggestive of’ criminal activity”.  *Id.* (quoting *State v. Goodman*, 415 N.J.Super. 210, 227 (App. Div. 2010)).  The “mere allegation of gang membership carries a strong taint of criminality. ”  *Id.* (quotations omitted).  “Evidence of past criminality risks conviction because the jury may conclude defendant is a bad person with a propensity to commit crimes. ”  *Id.*  Other-crimes evidence has a unique propensity to turn the jury against a criminal defendant, and the “likelihood of prejudice is acute when the proffered evidence is proof of a defendant’s uncharged conduct.
[brief] In accordance with New Jersey Model Civil Jury instruction 8.11F, there was nothing for Respondent and/or her medical expert(s)/physician(s) to apportion and/or compare.  This was further confirmed by Appellant’s medical expert, who testified that records he reviewed predating the subject incident were devoid of relevant complaints.  Likewise, Appellant incorrectly relies upon *Bennett v. Lugo*, a case where again, the plaintiff claimed a lower back injury and failed to produce expert testimony relative to a comparative analysis of the plaintiff’s “…several injuries to his low back prior to the accident. ”  *Bennett v. Lugo*, 368 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 2004).  The *Bennett* plaintiff was alleging a permanent lower back injury to vault the Verbal Threshold.  *Id.*  A case which is on point, albeit unpublished, where this Court has already decided this issue is the matter of Morgan v. [...], [...] (App. Div. Nov. 8, 2017).
[directive] (a)  Avoidance of Interference with Ongoing Investigations or Proceedings  The Civilian Review Board must establish policies to avoid interference with ongoing investigations or proceedings, similar to the policies that an internal affairs function must adopt to avoid interference with ongoing criminal investigations or proceedings.  Specifically, the policy must make clear that the Board may not commence an investigation of a particular civilian complaint or incident until after any criminal and/or internal affairs investigations have concluded and any resulting discipline has been imposed.  This requirement applies regardless of whether the Civilian Review Board is granted authority to recommend discipline, or request reconsideration of any findings or disciplinary decisions, or is limited in its authority to auditing completed investigations.  This requirement also applies regardless of whether, as a general matter, the Civilian Review Board is granted access to redacted or unredacted internal affairs records.  After reviewing the relevant internal affairs records and conducting any other lawful investigation that the Civilian Review Board deems appropriate, the Board may, to the extent permitted by law, present its conclusions to the law enforcement executive or appropriate authority; request additional information or clarification regarding the findings or decisions made in the course of the internal affairs investigation; and/or request that the internal affairs investigation be re-opened.  Whether to re-open an internal affairs investigation remains within the discretion of the law enforcement executive and, with regard to criminal matters, the [...].  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 59
[brief] 1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History are included together for judicial economy.  2  The transcript for the July 7, 2023 Motion Hearing (1T) is the only transcript in this matter.  In exchange, Plaintiff agreed to submit an irrevocable letter of resignation to the Chief of Police stating he was resigning for medical reasons concurrent with the execution of the Agreement.  See DA017 at ¶ 10; See also DA022 at Attachment A.  The letter of resignation would be valid, binding, and irrevocable once submitted to the Chief of Police but held in escrow until Plaintiff’s IOD application was decided upon and he had exhausted all rights of appeal regarding his IOD application.  See DA017-DA018 at ¶¶ 10-12.  In consideration of Plaintiff’s resignation, the Township agreed to dismiss any filed or contemplated disciplinary charges and that, besides Plaintiff’s fitness for duty, his resignation was otherwise made in good standing and with no allegation of misconduct or delinquency pending other than that arising out of and related to his medical disability.  See DA017-DA018 at ¶¶ 12-13.  The Parties further acknowledged that the autonomy of the [...] regarding pension applications and that neither they nor their attorneys could make determinations regarding pension applications.  See DA016 at ¶ 7.  Importantly, if Plaintiff’s IOD application were granted, and his medical condition improved so as to allow a return to employment, he would be reinstated to his position and then resign within thirty days of reinstatement, without any compensation due to him (the “return to work” provision).  See DA018-DA019 at ¶ 17.  The Agreement further contained several standard clauses.  For example, disputes concerning the Agreement would be forumed in the Superior Court of New Jersey and the laws of the State of New Jersey would apply to any such disputes.  See DA018 at ¶ 15.  Additionally, the Agreement could not be abandoned, supplemented, amended, or modified without the written authorization of both Parties.  See DA018 at ¶ 16.  Finally, the Agreement’s severance clause provided that “if any of the provisions, terms, clauses, or waivers or release of claims or rights contained in this Agreement are declared illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective in a legal forum, such provisions, terms, clauses, or waivers or release of claims or rights shall be deemed severable[.]”  See DA018 at ¶ 18.  The Parties further acknowledged that the autonomy of the [...] regarding pension applications and that neither they nor their attorneys could make determinations regarding pension applications.  See DA016 at ¶ 7.  In furtherance of the Township’s duties and obligations under the Separation Agreement and Release, the Township adopted two resolutions which authorized the Township Administrator to execute the Agreement with Plaintiff and authorizing the Township to process the IOD application on behalf of Plaintiff.
[directive] Jail and Lockup Removal.  The JJDP Act also provides that juveniles cannot be detained in any adult jail or lockup.  42 U.S.C. 5633, Section 223(a)(14).  However, federal regulations allow a juvenile to be detained in a municipal lockup, while sight and sound separated from adults, for up to a maximum of six hours for the purpose of processing or holding until release to parents or guardians, or transfer to other authorities.  28 C.F.R. § 31.303(e)(2).  Level of Compliance  The Federal and State Monitors understand that facilities cannot attain perfect compliance with these regulations.  In the real world, circumstances will arise that lead to occasional violations of these regulations.  For example, regarding the Jail and Lockup Removal Regulation, travel time and difficulties in contacting parents or guardians may cause delays.  In addition, juveniles may need to be held over six hours for questioning in serious cases.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that police must wait for parents to be present prior to questioning juveniles.  State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000).  This requirement is just one of many factors that may result in questioning that extends beyond the six hour time goal.  However, these exceptions, as well as any other non-compliant incidents must be documented as such in the Juvenile Admissions Log.  Conclusion
[brief] Finally, the court held “due process and fundamental fairness support a finding that Defendant should not be estopped from having his day in Court on the current motion to suppress. ” (Pa2).  In making this finding, the court observed the State had not cited to or referenced a case in which the doctrine was used offensively against a criminal defendant.  (Pa3).  Initially, the court’s reliance on the doctrine of fundamental fairness is misplaced.
[brief] Pca5-84.  As part of its opposition, Defendant submitted evidence (i.e., the explanation of benefits and the PIP payment ledger) to the arbitrator demonstrating that it had not paid the medical expenses at issue and, based upon the submitted evidence, Defendant presented the arbitrator with an arbitration summary breaking down all of the information necessary to calculate reimbursement pursuant to the New Jersey PIP fee schedule, including: (1) the individual providers; (2) the individual dates of service; (3) the individual CPT --- 1
[brief] **PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR MISREPRESENTATION (Pa386)**  In order to have a valid claim for misrepresentation a plaintiff must establish 1) a material misrepresentation by the defendant of a presently existing fact or past fact, (2) knowledge of its falsity, (3) an intent that plaintiff rely on the statement, (4) reasonable reliance by the plaintiff, and (5) resulting damages.  Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 175 (2006).  Here, the Plaintiff was promised that the Property would be restored to the original condition by the Township.  The Township, however, took no action and therefore at the time of the promise did so with the intent to misrepresent to the Plaintiff that she would be made whole.  Plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentation and was clearly damaged.  As such, there exists a material fact as to whether the defendant committed misrepresentation and Plaintiff should be provided with her day in court and the opportunity to be heard.  CONCLUSION  For all of the above stated reasons, the trial court’s granting of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed.
[brief] Appellant [...] commenced this action by the filing of a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division on August 21, 2019.  (Da1).  Appellant named [...] (“[...]”), [...] and [...] as defendants.  (Pa26).  Pursuant to the Order dated March 4, 2020 of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., appellant was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint.
[brief] (Da1).  Defendant was served with a copy of the Final Judgment on July 2, 2020.  (Pa30).  Defendant filed a motion to vacate the Final Judgment on December 2, 2021, which was almost 18 months after entry of the Final Judgment.  (Pa31).  The motion to vacate lacked a legal basis upon which it was based, nor did it contain a certification from Defendant providing a legal or factual basis upon which he believed the Final Judgment should have been vacated.  (Pa59).  Instead, Defendant’s prior counsel annexed a non-certified mortgage loan commitment to the belated and deficient motion.  (Pa56).  Although not articulated by Defendant in a certification, it appears that he intended to finance a redemption of the 5 year old Tax Lien through a mortgage secured by the Property.  (Pa56).  The trial court held oral argument on January 7, 2022 and entered an order denying Defendant’s motion to vacate the final judgment (the “January 7, 2022 Order”) since there was no basis upon which the Final Judgment could have been vacated pursuant to R. 4:50-1, the Final Judgment was more than a year old, and the Defendant did not have the funds readily available to redeem the Tax Lien if the Final Judgment were vacated.  (Pa27).  On January 11, 2022, Defendant filed a Voluntary Petition seeking relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in an apparent effort to prevent his removal from the Property.  (Pa31).  Defendant filed a first motion for reconsideration of the January 7, 2022 Order on January 31, 2022.  (Pa31).  The motion for reconsideration still did not include a certification from Defendant asserting that he had the requisite funds to redeem the Tax Lien and make Plaintiff whole if the Final Judgment were vacated.  (Pa31).  On February 18, 2022, the court entered an order denying Defendant’s first motion for reconsideration.  (Pa28).  On February 28, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Defendant’s Chapter 7 petition.  (Pa32).  The Defendant was evicted from the Property on March 30, 2022.
[brief] [...]’s psychological analysis remains unrebutted and is completely corroborative of [...]’s and the [...]’s assessment at the time the agreement was reached.  (Pa1-11, Pa29-41, Pa56-69, Pa72-81, 78-79, Pa86-96, Pa124-130, Pa137-145).  The agreement also included a compensation package for [...] covering several complex financial fringe benefits under the SOA contract.  (Pa29-41).  As of 2018, [...] was permanently disabled from PTSF and emotional distress as a result of his life being threatened and him being in imminent fear of serious bodily injury or death and discharging his firearm in self-defense and in defense of others, and he remains permanently disabled to this day.  (Pa56-69, Pa76-81).  It is now seven years after the incident, and at no time has the Board or Respondents ever contested the fact that [...] is permanently disabled.
[brief] After all, why shouldn’t persons who qualify for affordable housing be entitled to an elevator.  Here, the trial court gave no deference to the Board’s findings of fact and, instead, rejected out-of-hand the Board’s finding as to the importance of the Building E elevator.  Additionally, the Court did not review transcripts of the proceedings before the Board and, thus, was without a proper basis for its decision, which is decidedly disfavored by the Courts.  See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass’n, 337 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div 2001).  While a Mt. Laurel judge may have authority to determine if a planning board arbitrarily denied a developer’s application, it is the responsibility of a planning board, not the court, to evaluate the appropriateness of a site plan application and may impose conditions on Mt. Laurel developments to promote the health, safety and welfare as the board deems appropriate.  Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Twp., 220 N.J. Super. 388 (Law Div. 1987), aff’d as modified, 230 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1989).
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  **A.  The Application. **  Over the course of seven nights between September 30, 2020, and June 7, 2021, the Board heard [...]’s application to construct a 165 unit, three-story, senior housing mixed-use facility, on the Property located in the R-20 zone district. \(^2\)  The application for this project was before the zoning board, because it required two (2) d variances – a use variance because the proposed use for senior mixed-use housing is not permitted in the R-20 zone, and a density variance since one unit per 20,000 sq. ft. was permitted, or approximately two units per acre, and [...] requested 20.4 units per acre.
[brief] Re-sentencing  The re-sentencing was held on January 25, 2020.  At that point, petitioner had been in custody for seven-and-a-half years.  Petitioner was represented by a different attorney, who submitted a detailed memorandum, along with exhibits presented in mitigation, prior to sentencing.  (Da 267 to 345)  Counsel requested a 20-year sentence, subject to NERA.  (Da 284)  In support of this request, counsel pointed to petitioner’s limited criminal history.  As a teenager, petitioner had been convicted of four offenses, for which he had never been incarcerated: conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance, robbery, a violation of probation, and verbal harassment.  (PSR 7-8)  As an adult, he had two municipal convictions for public drunkenness and concealing merchandise and two indictable convictions stemming from the same incident for third-degree burglary and third-degree fraudulent use of a credit card.  (PSR 8-10)  He had never been sentenced to a day in state prison.  Counsel also presented substantial evidence of rehabilitative efforts petitioner had undertaken over the previous seven years.  During that time, petitioner had not had a single infraction in prison.  (Da 328)  Since 2016, petitioner had been working as a "runner" in prison, which is a position that requires the trust of the staff because a runner is "allowed outside of his prison cell and allowed to run errands around the entire facility with limited supervision."  (Da 275, Da 330).  Petitioner has also deepened his religious convictions while in prison.
[directive] Introduction  1.0.1  The purpose of Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures is to assist the State’s law enforcement agencies with investigating and resolving complaints of police misconduct that originate with members of the public or are generated by the supervisors, officers, or employees of a law enforcement agency.  The goals of the policy are to enhance the integrity of the State’s law enforcement agencies, improve the delivery of police services, and assure the people of New Jersey that complaints of police misconduct are properly addressed.
[brief] With respect to Factor #8 – Full Time Required, the ALJ reasonably noted that [...]’s required attendance one day per week did not meet the definition of full time.  (Pa16).  [...] argues that under the IRS revenue rulings, “an individual can be declared an employee even if it is a part-time position,” but she does not provide any citation to support her position.  (Pb41).  Nevertheless, the fact that [...] worked part-time for [...], while also maintaining her own private law practice and serving as Municipal Prosecutor for several other municipalities supports a finding that this factor was more indicative of status as an independent contractor.
[brief] A series of exhibits were introduced at said trial.  [...] paystubs provided in P-5 clearly state on the paystub issued by the Township the following information:  **Department-- 82, Employee No.-- SANT0005, Employee Name—[...] Jr., August N., Earnings—Regular.** (Pa119-124)  Then the paystub continues to reflect all of the withholding information as it would for any normal, regular employee.  More importantly, [...] has an Employee No and they reference him by Employee Name.  Exhibit P-5 has representative paystubs from 2013 (the year of the official determination), then 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021 and the stub for the week before the trial dated September 15, 2022.  All the same manner of payment and reference.  None of the paystubs in P-5 from 2016-9/15/22 have changed despite the shift to a professional services contract in 2015.  No contract payments were made and W2 wages have continued to present.  This is the Township and not some unsophisticated small business.  They have professional service contracts, and I am sure they pay those individuals on an invoice system unless they regard them as employees.  If not, that is their error and not [...]’s.  Township has never issued a 1099.  [...] W-2’s (P-6) from 2006, 2013, 2017, 2018 and 2021 are representative of a continuing and ongoing pattern and course of conduct that Township has always regarded [...] as an employee and continues to regard [...] as Employee to present.