ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 23  (b) captures the image of a child; (c) was made in a residential premises (e.g., a home, apartment, college dormitory room, hotel/motel room, etc.), a school or youth facility, a healthcare facility or medical office, a substance abuse or mental health treatment facility, or a place of worship; (d) captures a conversation with a person whose request to de-activate the BWC was declined; (e) captures a special operations event or execution of an arrest and/or search warrant where confidential tactical information (e.g., verbal codes and hand signals used to give direction to officers, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms during execution of a warrant, techniques for convincing persons to open doors during warrant execution, etc.) may have been recorded; (f) captures the image of an undercover officer or confidential informant; or (g) captures the screen of a police computer monitor that is displaying confidential personal or law enforcement sensitive information.  See also Section 7.1 (requiring notice to the prosecutor when a BWC captures the image of a patient at a substance abuse treatment facility).  Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Policy, an agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued pursuant to Section 3.1 may specify additional circumstances when a BWC recording will be “tagged. ”  9.4
[brief] In 2011, after years of extensive discovery and an evidentiary hearing that lasted over two months, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., entered an Order holding that the Plaintiff-Appellant, [...] (f/k/a [...]) (“[...]”), was entitled to roughly $12.8 million in insurance coverage for costs that it incurred to remediate long-term environmental property damage caused by the release of chlorinated volatile organic compounds (“CVOCs”) into the soil and groundwater at its former operating facility located in [...] (the “Site”).  Significantly, a primary fact issue during the hearing was the timing and location of the release of CVOCs at the Site, because Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”) and the other remaining Defendants denied that any CVOC releases occurred during their policy periods.  Because of this defense, [...] developed a detailed fact record and provided expert testimony demonstrating that most of the CVOC releases at the Site did occur during the [...] and other early policy periods.  This fact record was cited by the [...] in his January 2011 decision, with [...] making detailed findings as to time periods during which releases of CVOCs occurred at several areas of the Site.  These detailed findings, in turn, provided a foundation for the allocation of the $12.8 million in damages to specific policy periods, including the [...] policy period.
[brief] “[C]ases involving (1) important and novel constitutional questions; (2) informal or *ex parte* determinations of legal questions by administrative officials; and (3) important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification. ”  *Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer Cty.*, 169 N.J. 135, 152 (2001), quoting *Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford*, 68 N.J. 576, 586 (1975).  But a trial court's discretion to enlarge under R. 4:69-6(c) is not limited to these three categories.  *Cohen v. Thoft*, 368 N.J. Super. 338, 345-347 (App. Div. 2004).  Even if only private interests are involved, a court may conclude that the “interest of justice” warrants an enlargement.  *Id.* at 346-47.  In any enlargement situation under R. 4:69-6(c) a court must weigh the public and private interests that favor an enlargement against “the important policy of repose expressed in the forty-five day rule. ”  *Borough of Princeton*, supra, 169 N.J. at 152-53, quoting *Reilly v. Brice*, 109 N.J. 555, 559 (1988).  No overriding interest in repose favors [...] here.
[brief] Db15.  While not terming it as such, a claim of failure to consult and/or investigate is clearly one of ineffective assistance of counsel and clearly a claim for which the evidence in support is outside of the trial record.  Defendant would not have to “infer” if such evidence was contained in the record.  Ibid.  “Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal;” “defendant must develop a record at a hearing at which counsel can explain the reasons for his conduct and inaction and at which the trial judge can rule upon the claims including the issue of prejudice. ”  State v. Sparano, 249 N.J. Super. 411, 419-20 (App. Div. 1991).  As such, defendant’s inference can afford him no relief on direct appeal.  Like [...], this Court should reject defendant’s attacks on trial counsel as providing a basis for the reversal of his conviction and should affirm.
[brief] [...] asked [...], through deductive reasoning, to reach the conclusion that, more than likely, [...] was not involved in a 2009 incident/accident.  That is exacting the analysis [...] undertook on pages 9-10 of his ID.  (Pa84-Pa85).  [...] found:  [...] went on to hold:  Having found as fact that there was no injury report from an incident in 2009, I must agree with petitioner’s argument that there was no incident from that year.  Unlike petitioner’s injuries from 2000 and 2004, where there were workers’ compensation cases opened for both, plus medical records and test results, any claim of injury from 2009 was not so documented.  The only were the few mentions of a 2009 incident in [...]’s report.  [...] suggested that [...]’s reference to a 2009 injury was a typographical error, and that he meant to write “2000,” which would correspond to petitioner’s workers’ compensation claim from 2000.  While that point was not proven at the hearing, petitioner was correct to argue that [...] and [...] were required to turn over all workers’ compensation data that each had for petitioner; however, no workers’ compensation files were turned over from 2009.  Further, no other medical records or other evidence was produced at the hearing to confirm that there was any incident or accident in 2009, or any injuries resulting from any such incident or accident.  When questioned regarding this issue, petitioner denied that there was any 2009 incident or accident.  [...] added no information on what might have happened in 2009 except to write that a worker’s compensation claim was filed then, but again no such confirming claim documentation was provided.
[brief] In the present matter, the trier of fact will not even be called upon to evaluate an attorney’s judgment concerning any legal issue, let alone a complex legal issue, because a trier of fact’s evaluation of a fraudulent scheme to take a client’s money does not evaluate an attorney’s judgment concerning a legal issue, unless the Court is prepared to uphold the Trial Court’s holding that wrongfully taking a client’s money is indeed legal work.  Rather, a trier of fact would simply be evaluating [...]’s participation in the fraudulent scheme, as would be the case against the other co-conspirator Defendants accused of participating in the alleged fraudulent scheme.  The mere happenstance that one member of a conspiracy to commit intentional torts is an attorney does not transform those intentional tort claims against that attorney into legal malpractice claims.  For this reason, it is self-evident based on the case law cited above that no expert testimony is required to prove allegations that monies were transferred from the firm’s attorney trust account fraudulently, or even most blatantly, allegations that an attorney in concert with other co-conspirators instructed a client to make payments via wire transfers and checks made payable to the bank accounts of entities and persons whom the attorney and co-conspirators controlled or manipulated to thereafter transfer funds to the bank accounts of co-conspirators.  None of these allegations involve an attorney’s legal judgment concerning a legal issue, let alone a complex legal issue.  Similarly, in Couri, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the facts in that case fell beyond the purview of the AOM statute and no AOM was required.
[brief] Okay.  And who is that supplier, just for the record?  [...]: [...].  [...]: Are you talking about the manufacturer, sir, or the local sales representative?  Q. The manufacturer, please.  [...]: It would be [...] Heaters, B-R-U-E-S-T, is the name of the manufacturer.  Q.  B-R-U-E-S-T?  [...]: Yes, sir.  I believe so.  Q.  Okay.  Thank you.  Now, they're not the only manufacturers for catalytic heaters for natural gas regulators, are they?
[brief] [...] represented himself through the course of most of the pretrial discovery period.  Da010 – Da018.  Present defense counsel undertook representation of [...] on December 19, 2023, with the filing of a Substitution of Attorney.  Da031.  The Parties then stipulated to a 60-day extension of discovery to March 28, 2024 (Da037), whereupon [...] then propounded Supplemental Interrogatories and a Notice to Produce Documents upon [...].  Da045; Da047 – Da057  The Notice to Produce Documents, at number 16, requested:  “Copies of all documents, correspondence, or communication which Plaintiff purports to be a valid and binding contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, or which relate to matters alleged in the Complaint or denials asserted in your Answer to the Counterclaim or pertaining to the issues raised by the claims and by the defenses which have been pled by you. ”  Da056.  [...]’s March 11, 2024 response to that request was: “See contract attached hereto, together with text messages as produced, and letter to [...]. ”  Da063.  The Notice to Produce Documents, at number 18, requested: “Copy of the June 8, 2022 ‘subcontractor agreement’ referred to in Paragraph 5 of the Complaint. ”  Da056.  [...]’s response to that request was: “See attached. ”  Da063.  In response to the Notice to Produce, on March 11, 2024 [...] produced 636 pages of documents, without specifically correlating the documents to each request.  Da045  The only document that [...] produced which can be considered a contract is a 10-page document entitled “Subcontractor Agreement. ”  Da067 – Da076.  By its response to the Notice to Produce, [...] confirmed that the Subcontractor Agreement, which it produced on March 11, 2024, in fact is the contract to which it was referring in its Complaint, in fact is the document which defines the Parties’ contractual relationship, in fact is the contract which [...] allegedly breached, and that [...] is not relying on any other document or oral agreement.
[brief] Similarly, the court in Hoboken Land Building, L.P. et al. v. [...] et al., Docket No.  MID-4580-18, relied upon by Plaintiff at Pb30, did not even cite N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f), let alone substantively address a municipality’s ability to negotiate and collect funds from a redeveloper.  In his opinion denying the [...]’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, [...] focused on the MLUL’s limitations on the imposition of off-tract contributions.  Unlike [...] in Genon, [...] did not, in any way, shape or form, address a municipality’s statutory power to negotiate and collect a fee under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f), which is the issue before the court in this case.
[brief] Even if, however, the Court were to disagree and find that Ohio’s position was incorrect, that does not compel a conclusion that the settled claims were covered.  Even if, through an appeal, [...] were able to overturn the injunctive relief awards against him for self-dealing, the fee awards would then be vacated, as well.  It is difficult to envision a circumstance where, at the end of the day, a potentially-covered financial award (whether within the definition of “loss” or not) could stand.  When there is no potential duty to indemnify, there is, of course, no duty to defend (or appeal).  Conclusion
[brief] Read together, Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex adopted a standard that requires the motion judge to engage in an analytical process to determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 251-52.  That weighing process requires the court to be guided by the same evidentiary standard of proof — by a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence — that would apply at the trial on the merits when deciding whether there exists a “genuine” issue of material fact.  Id. at 254-56.  Of course, there is in this process a kind of weighing that involves a type of evaluation, analysis and sifting of evidential materials.  This process, however, is not the same kind of weighing that a factfinder (judge or jury) engages in when assessing the preponderance or credibility of evidence.  In each case, “the court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord him [or her] the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom, and if reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.  Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 535.
[brief] On April 14, 2021, [...], or [...]; “[...]”, issued their $12,000, personal check to “[...]”; “[...]”.  In turn, on the same day the [...] issued their $12,000.00 personal check to [...].  On the same day, [...], operating through its written check Cashing Resolution, cashed the [...]’, $12,00,00 check with [...]; “[...]”.  Through the attached assignment agreement at Pa81-82, on August 18, 2021, [...] assigned to [...] all of [...]’s rights in the [...]’ $12,00.00 dishonored check, and as it existed when the check was dishonored and returned to “[...]” by the [...] drawer bank, [...] as an “ALTER/FCT” check.  In turn, [...] commenced this civil action complaint on June 6, 2022.  STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
[brief] ”  *Carey*, 168 N.J. at 427.  Consequently, it follows that a sentencing court may impose consecutive sentences “even though a majority of the *Yarbough* factors support concurrent sentences. ”  *Id.* at 427-28.  “The *Yarbough* criteria were adopted to channel [a court’s] discretion, not to withdraw it. ”  *Torres*, 246 N.J. at 269.  “This Court has made clear that while *Yarbough* guides a court's sentencing decision, it does not control it. ”  Ibid.  See also Carey, 168 N.J. at 427 ("We begin our analysis by stressing that the Yarbough guidelines are just that - guidelines.").
[brief] *A*13  A court has wide discretion when imposing a sentence, but the sentence must not be manifestly excessive nor unduly punitive.  See *State v. O'Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 215–16 (1989); *State v. Ghertler*, 114 N.J. 383, 393 (1989); *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 363–66 (1984).  In determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed, the sentencing court must consider statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances, *N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a* and b, balance them, and explain how the sentence was determined so that a reviewing court will have an adequate record on appeal.  *State v. Kruse*, 105 N.J. 354, 360 (1987).  When trial courts “exercise discretion in accordance with the principles set forth in [New Jersey's Code of Criminal Justice] and defined by [the Supreme Court],” we may not second-guess the trial court.  *State v. Bieniek*, 200 N.J. 601, 607–08 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
[brief] B.  Plaintiff Admits That Her Removal From The Schedule Due To A Fingerprinting Error Was Not An Adverse Employment Action.  Plaintiff does not dispute that the reason she was taken off the schedule in January 2020 was because of a fingerprinting issue.  (Appx 533-35 ¶¶46-48, 54).  Further, during oral argument, Plaintiff admitted that she is not basing her CEPA claim on Defendant’s removal of Plaintiff off the schedule “because it’s clear that it happened to other employees. ” (Appx 569 at 17:11-22).  Plaintiff elaborated during oral argument that “[t]he adverse employment action [on which she bases her CEPA claim] takes place afterwards. ” (Appx 569 at 17:14-22 (emphasis added)).  Therefore, Plaintiff’s removal from the schedule due to the fingerprinting issue is not an adverse employment action.
[brief] Plaintiff later moved to amend his complaint to add a claim that the same act of firing alleged in the original complaint was also retaliatory.  Id.  The Appellate Division, affirming the trial court’s dismissal of this new claim as untimely, concluded about the relation-back doctrine that “we must be mindful of the general proposition that an entirely new and distinctly different cause of action cannot by means of an amendment of the pleadings be introduced after the statute has tolled the action.
[brief] (T2: p69, ln 20 – p70, ln 12)  It should be noted that the application complied with all parking requirements and standards.  The traffic report, which was never disputed by any expert testimony, indicated:  The *Subdivision Plan* prepared by [...] was reviewed and it details a 32 foot wide roadway providing access to Fourteenth Street.  The plan was compared to the roadway design standards set forth in the New Jersey Residential Site Improvement Standards (RSIS) and *the design meets and exceeds the RSIS design and accessibility standards.*  (Ia27)  Furthermore, the Board is not permitted to use off-sight traffic as a reason for denial.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On August 4, 2021, September 1, 2021, December 1, 2021 and April 6, 2022, the Board held properly noticed public hearings for the Application seeking Preliminary and Final Site Plan Approval.  (1T, 2T, 3T, 4T)¹.  At its April 6, 2022 ¹  The following references will be used throughout the brief: meeting, the Board voted to deny the Application.  (4T).  On May 4, 2022, the Board adopted a Resolution of Approval memorializing the denial of the Application ("Resolution").  (Pa187-190).  On July 5, 2022, Plaintiffs [...] and the [...] filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the Board’s decision to deny the Application.  (Pa328-346).  On August 22, 2022, Defendant filed an answer to the complaint.  (Pa347-366).  Following briefing and argument, the Superior Court Burlington County Law Division entered a December 8, 2022 Order Denying in Part the Relief Requested in Plaintiffs’ complaint.  (Pa367-368).  On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff [...] filed the instant appeal.  (Pa369-383).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b).  Although the purpose of imposing a probation supervision fee is to help the court system recoup some of its costs of supervising defendants from those very defendants themselves, the amount of the probation supervision fee in any individual case must be set in a manner to safeguard the defendant against an excessive amount—i.e. taking into consideration his ability to pay—and ensuring that the probation supervision fee is not so high that it impedes that defendant’s ability to pay restitution to the victims.
[brief] In addition to repeating the allegations in the 2015 Action, the pleadings in the 2020 Action (i) alleged, without basis, that [...] concealed evidence or conspired to conceal evidence during the course of discovery in the still-pending 2015 Action, (ii) brought claims against the law firms and attorneys who represented some of the other defendants in the 2015 Action for allegedly concealing evidence during the course of discovery in the 2015 Action, and (iii) re-asserted Plaintiffs-Appellants’ various claims against [...] for alleged wrongdoing in connection with the Pork Chop Hill transaction, all of which had previously been dismissed in the 2015 Action due to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ failure to file an Affidavit of Merit with respect to [...].  [...] and [...] timely moved for dismissal of the 2020 Action on two grounds.
[brief] 14  POINT I ...............................................................................................................  14  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT [...]’ APPLICATION TO THE PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE THE PROTECTION OF THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION RULE AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ZONING CHANGES.  (3T.19:4-25, 3T.20:1-17)  .........................................................  14  A. Applicability of The Time of Application Rule ...........................................  15  POINT II .........................................................................................................................  21  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE [...] IS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF AND AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE [...] PROCESS.  (3T.19:4-25, 3T.20:1-8)  ..............................................................................................................  21  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 25
[brief] Based on the Standard of Review (Point I, below), the facts are derived from the Complaint’s allegations, documents attached to or relied on in the Complaint, and matters of public record.  Plaintiff [...] is a natural person residing in New Jersey.  Pa4 at ¶11, 12.  Defendant [...] is a collection agency located in [...].  Pa5 at ¶13.  Defendant asserted that Plaintiff owed a certain financial obligation arising out of a personal account.  Pa6 at ¶27.  That past due, defaulted account was assigned to Defendant for collection.  Pa6 at ¶¶29, 30.  Defendant mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff dated February 4, 2022 which Plaintiff received.  Pa7 at ¶¶32, 33.  A true but partially redacted copy of the letter is Exhibit B (Pa25) to the Complaint.  Pa7 at ¶34.  Defendant did not draft, print, address, or mail that letter.  Instead, Defendant contracted with an unrelated business to perform those services.  Pa7 at ¶43.  After having provided the mail vendor with forms or templates of its collection letters and periodically sent data to that vendor to be merged with those templates to create individual collection letters.  Pa8 at ¶45.  Hence, “[i]n connection with the collection of the Debt, Convergent conveyed the data concerning the Debt to the third-party mail vendor. ”  Pa8 at ¶46.  That data included Defendant’s account number, the original creditor’s full account number, the amount of the debt, and Plaintiff’s full name and mailing address.  Pa8 at ¶47.  The data which Defendant provided to its mail vendor has a market value.  Pa8 at ¶48.  The data can be rented to list managers who can aggregate it with data from other sources and then sell the use of the mailing list.  Id.  The data can be hacked and either used or misused to profit from or invade Plaintiff’s privacy.  Id.  Defendant disclosed the data without Plaintiff’s consent and without telling Plaintiff to whom it had shared Plaintiff’s private information.  Pa7 at ¶42, Pa9 at ¶50, Pa12 at ¶81.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I.