ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Although that plan necessarily relations.  police-community goal of enhancing that the course given limited to that should not be law, it educating officers sustained, multi-faceted system fox a amulti-faceted one that requires relations is officers.  their careers as peace throughout Attorney General's exercise the it is appropriate to reasons, of the foregoing  For all for the chief law enforcement officer, responsible statutory authority as the State's constitutional and handling, annual in-service training on the four of 2C:25-20a(2) (requiring hours N.J.S.A.  See, ems., of elderly neglect the and of domestic violence and abuse and concerning reports procedures response investigation, and semiannual of force and vehicular pursuit (requiring use Policy (2000), §II(A) of Force General Use Attorney disabled); General Law Enforcement re-qualification process).  See also Attorney semiannual firearms of the training as part that training on the uniform statewide policy of in-service three-hour episode (requiring single 2005-1 a Directive No. policing).  ofracially-influenced prohibits all forms on: to include instruction diversity course uniform cultural requires the The statute community; within of diversity on community relations a effects cultural communities and the (1) the various in the interact with of various cultures and religions people which an officer may appropriate methods by (2) resolution techniques; officer skills and conflict safety with an emphasis on community, neighborhood problems, solving local when analyzing and techniques in law enforcement (3) best practices on crime prevention programs; and with citizens and working groups, meeting with community effectiveness.
[brief] (2T20-21 to 24).  Defendant gave the officers verbal consent to search Apartment B, the silver and black box found in his possession (which was later found to contain two vacuum-sealed bags of cocaine), his [...] residence, and his BMW.  (2T22-19 to 23; 2T29-3 to 7).  Defendant also signed four consent to search forms admitted into evidence as “1A” to “1D” for each area searched.  (Pa1-4; 2T22-21 to 33-19).  At approximately 5:10 p.m., officers accompanied defendant to his [...] residence to conduct a consensual search of the apartment where between $60,000 to $70,000 in cash was found.
[directive] kuratora sądowego lub na zwolnieniu 9.  Czy obecnie jest Pan(i) pod nadzorem [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] warunkowym?  Are you presently on probation or parole?  Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że przyznanie się do winy może pociągać a.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA] za sobą naruszenie warunków nadzoru kuratora lub zwolnienia warunkowego?  Do you realize that a guilty plea may result in a violation of your probation or parole?
[directive] 3.  Você entende que se o tribunal concluir que você é uma pessoa dependente de drogas e se você for elegível de outra forma à suspensão condicional de pena especial nos termos da lei 2C:35-14, em decorrência desta declaração de culpa você será N.J.S.A. então considerado “uma pessoa que necessita de tratamento” e sujeito à condenação a um período obrigatório de suspensão condicional de pena especial com o propósito de participar em um programa de tratamento de drogas supervisionado pelo tribunal (“Tribunal de Drogas”)?  Do you understand that if you are found to be a drug dependent person and if you are otherwise eligible for special probation under 2C:35-14, then as a result of this guilty plea you will be N.J.S.A. deemed “a person in need of treatment” who is eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?
[brief] A criminal defendant is entitled to relief due to the State’s failure to disclose or preserve exculpatory evidence if he demonstrates that: “(1) the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence; (2) the evidence was of a favorable character to the defendant, and (3) the evidence was material. ” (State v. Parsons, 341 N.J. Super. 448, 454-55 (App. Div. 2001)).  Evidence is material if there exists a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, the “result of the proceeding would have been different.
[brief] A PERSON OF REASONABLE INTELLIGENCE WOULD KNOW THAT THE DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL ABANDONMENT AND VIOLATION OF AN ORDINANCE ON PERMITTING ANIMALS TO RUN AT LARGE  A person of reasonable intelligence would know that covering, tying open a trap, providing refuge and protection from the elements constitutes criminal abandonment of animals and a violation of an ordinance on permitting animals to run at large.  As such, the Defendant’s convictions for violating §173-24 and §173-27 are enforceable.  As set forth above, §173-24 provides that “no person owning, keeping or harboring any animal shall suffer or permit it to run at large upon the public streets or in any public park or in any public building or in any other public place within the township. ”  §173-27 provides that “no person who shall own, keep or harbor an animal shall abandon such animal within the township. ”  The Defendant’s argument that a person of reasonable intelligence would not know that her actions would have violated §173-24 and §173-27 is without merit.  Defendant altered the trap so it could not function as a trap by tying the door open, and as the Municipal Court took specific notice of, wrapped the trap in plastic so as to protect any animals inside from inclement weather.  (3T Pg. 8, Ln. 25 – Pg. 25, Ln. 7).  These actions certainly do not reflect an intent to trap the cats and either take them home or deliver them to a local animal shelter so that they may be properly cared for.  Instead they reflect the intent of somebody who wanted to construct a makeshift home for these stray cats on public property where the cats were to remain, abandoned and able to run at large as strays.  The Defendant’s actions show she knew exactly what she was doing in her placement and alteration of the trap.  Her attempt to now plead ignorance has no merit.  In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Law Division is based upon substantial credible evidence present in the record and therefore, must be affirmed in its entirety.
[brief] The parts of the brain that seek rewards and novel sensations mature rapidly at puberty, while those parts that control impulses and anticipate consequences continue to develop well into a person’s twenties.  [...] and [...] (2021), *supra*, at 1009-12; [...], et al., *Around the World, Adolescence Is a Time of Heightened Sensation Seeking and Immature Self-Regulation*, 21 Developmental Science e12532, at 10-12 (2016).
[brief] Defendant also claims that the detectives improperly did not inform him of his “true status” pursuant to State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, (2022), because they had probable cause to arrest him for the murder prior to his interview on March 12.  However, there was no arrest warrant at the time of the interview, and the detectives did not try to hide the fact that they were investigating the murder of [...], which they informed Defendant of as far back as the March 6 interview.  In this regard, Defendant’s “true status” was never hidden from him in accordance with Sims.
[brief] This argument disregards the City’s discretion in the placement of traffic signs and is similarly unsupported by the evidence presented by Plaintiff both at the summary judgment stage and at trial.  According to Plaintiff, N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 does not provide the City with any discretion over the placement of traffic signs.  Rather, N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 purportedly requires Plaintiff to place a “low overpass” sign on the overpass itself as well as at a location preceding the overpass where the driver of a commercial vehicle could safely make a detour around the overpass.  Plaintiff misreads the statute by ignoring that the statute incorporates the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (“Manual”) by reference.
[brief] B.  Plaintiff Interest is Purely Private.  (T2, 10:5-18 & 15:10-19).  As Plaintiff correctly points out, the cases in which enlargement of the 45- day appeal period set forth in Rule 4:69-6 were granted usually involve three categories of cases: “(1) important and novel constitutional questions; (2) informal or ex parte determinations of legal questions by administrative officials; and (3) important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification.
[brief] A legal right or public policy may be determined from various sources, including legislation, administrative rules, regulations and decisions; judicial decisions and in certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy.  *Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc.*, 430 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2013), citing *Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation*, 84 N.J. 58, 72 (1980)  The Supreme Court has said that when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, courts are not constrained to follow precedent.  *J. & M. Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank*, 166 N.J. 493 (2001) citing *Payne v Tennessee*, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.E. 2d 720 736 (1991)  With that in mind, beginning in 1991, trial courts began to revisit the issue of the assignment of pre-settlement proceeds.
[directive] In some civil cases, the parties may wish to expedite the voir dire process, either because the nature of the case, in their view, does not warrant an extended process, because they are near settlement, or for any other reason.  These are private disputes, and, with the consent of counsel and the approval of the judge, full use of the model questions in civil trials may be waived.  Of course, the waiver discussion and determination should be on the record.
[brief] **APPELLANT PLED THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION  WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS RECORD AND AS A RESULT REACHED AN IMPROPER CONCLUSION**  Pa201, Pa211  In order to satisfy the cause of action for discrimination pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, what must be shown is: (1) the person belonged to a protected class, (2) that he was qualified for the position and was performing his job satisfactorily, (3) that he was subjected to an adverse employment action and (4) persons that are similarly situated and outside of the protected class were treated more favorably under the same set of circumstances which infers discrimination.
[brief] A primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1963) § 12.141.  They are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement to continued and faithful service.  Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.  McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).
[brief] (8T 69-1 to 3)  [...] arrived at the Tavern and checked the surveillance cameras.  (8T 37-2 to 3, 69-5 to 7)  [...] has sixty-four surveillance cameras, most of which are visible and apparent to patrons.  (7T 55-6 to 18)  [...] and [...]\(^6\) were in the office with [...] while he was reviewing the --- \(^6\)  The record does not contain indicate this officer’s first name.  surveillance footage.  (8T 81-24 to 2)  Based on what he saw, he went downstairs to check the basement office.  (8T 69-8 to 13)  He observed that the boxes in the office where the money is kept had been disturbed.  (8T 69-14 to 17)  He told Morgan he had reviewed the surveillance and that the suspect had broken into the basement office and stole the Tavern’s earnings from the weekend.
[brief] Senate Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Meeting  12:00 PM Committee Room 6, 1st Floor, State House Annex, Trenton, NJ Chair: [...]  The State House Annex has reopened to the general public.  Visitors to the State House Annex are required to show ID and proof of full vaccination or a negative COVID-19 PCR or rapid test conducted within the previous 72 hours.  All visitors are required to undergo a temperature screening prior to proceeding through security.  Masks are mandatory at all times inside the State House Annex, including in Committee Rooms and in the hallways and other facilities.  Please visit the NJ Legislature’s website at www.njleg.state.nj.us/IMC%20Rules.pdf for more information.  S4048 [[...]/[...]+3], Health care entities & collective bargaining agreements-req contracts for sale Senate Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Meeting (continued)
[brief] [...] inherited a percentage interest in the Palm Beach Property from her grandmother, [...] (“[...]”).  However, Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”) (who is [...]’s uncle and [...]’s son) filed this case to keep [...] from asserting that interest in the Palm Beach Property, claiming that [...] released it in a September 13, 2021 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) that [...] and [...] entered after [...] died to resolve issues over various family trusts.  The Probate Court erred as a matter of law by holding that (1) [...] released her right to [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property in the Settlement Agreement and that (2) in the alternative, [...] would not have inherited that property interest under [...]’s estate plan in any event.  The Probate Court relied solely on the language of the Settlement Agreement, [...]’s living trust, and the Probate Court’s own speculation about their drafters’ intent.  Accordingly, the question before the Court is simple – this is a *de novo* review of the Probate Court’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and [...]’s living trust.  The Probate Court interpreted both incorrectly and contrary to principles of interpretation.  With respect to the Settlement Agreement, the Probate Court disregarded clear provision in which the parties expressly agreed that [...] preserved all rights to any interest passing from [...]’s estate.  In holding that [...] waived her right to the property interest, the Probate Court improperly relied on a different provision of the Settlement Agreement that clearly did not apply to any property [...] inherited from [...].  The Probate Court’s misinterpretation of the Settlement Agreement was wrong as a matter of law and is subject to de novo review.  The Probate Court’s alternative holding that [...] would not have inherited [...]’s share of the Palm Beach Property in any event was also erroneous as a matter of law.  The Probate Court erred by misapplying the doctrine of probable intent to contradict the plain language of [...]’s living trust.  The Probate Court did so not based on any extrinsic evidence, but instead based on speculation about [...]’s testamentary wishes.  In so doing, the Probate Court effectively removed [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property from her trust’s residue, even though it was also not the subject of any specific bequest, meaning that there would be no testamentary disposition of that property.  That violates basic rules of trust construction.  The result of the Probate Court’s errors was to deprive [...] of a portion of her inheritance and to thwart [...]’s wishes.  The Probate Court erred as a matter of law and should be reversed.
[brief] The rationale is that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion since an individual's bargaining power is necessarily limited. ”  Zuckerman, supra, 100 N.J. at 320.  A provision in an insurance agreement that does not comport with public policy should be interpreted to reflect the reasonable expectations of an objective insured.  Id. at 320-21 (holding that “such contracts are to be interpreted in a manner that recognizes the reasonable expectations of the insured”).  Turning, then, to intrafamilial liability exclusions, as discussed above, such exclusions in insurance policies limit or exclude liability coverage for an individual when claims are brought against him or her by a household relative.
[brief] PAGE NOS.  Other Authorities  32  N.J. Crim. Prac. & Proc. § 59:20 (2023 ed.)  .................................................  32  [...], N.J. Arrest, Search & Seizure § 8:4 (2023)  ..........................  21  [...], PhD, New Jersey State Police Traffic Stops Analysis, 2009-21 (July 7, 2023)  https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases23/ 2023-0711_NJSP_Traffic_Stop_Analysis.pdf  .........................................................  46  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] .........................................................................................32  Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp. 68 N.J. 604 (1975)  .........................................................................................58  Witt v. Borough of Maywood 328 N.J. Super. 432 (Law Div. 1998) ...............................................................31  Worthington v. Fauver 88 N.J. 183(1982).  .........................................................................................31  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX
[brief] Defendants’ Deed expressly references the Subdivision Plan and states that the “Property” that is the subject of Defendants’ Deed is Lot 3 in the Subdivision Plan, and the Subdivision Plan is further identified in Defendants’ Deed by date, by project number, and by plan preparer.  Ja179-80.  Defendants’ Deed also references the 2010 deed by which [...] originally took Lot 3 (the “2010 [...] Acquisition Deed”), and the [...] Confirmatory Deed.  Ja179-80, Ja717.  Defendants’ Deed also states the “Property” is that which was “Block 1801, Lot 3 as shown on the Official Tax Map of Brigantine. ”  Ja179-80.  The Defendants’ Deed also notes that it is “UNDER AND SUBJECT to any and all covenants, conditions, rights, restrictions, and easements of record, if any. ”  Ja180.  The import of each of these references is addressed below.  Defendants’ sale contract references the block and lot number, which at the time still showed 105’ for Lot 3 and 80’ for Lot 2.  Ja332.  The Modification of Defendants’ sale contract, signed the same day as the sale contract, specifically references the Subdivision Plan.  Ja345.  **The Subdivision Plan**
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO REOPEN UNDER R.4:50-1(F).  (T40:6–45:7; DA7–8)  A.  Plaintiff’s strategic dismissal of his lawsuit to avoid attorneys’ fees under the anti-SLAPP statute is an exceptional circumstance warranting relief.  (T8:3–4, T39:18–25, T39:25–40:2, T8:4–13; T8:14–16)  Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of his Complaint before the trial court had an opportunity to rule on Defendants’ application for an order to show cause under UPEPA is an “exceptional circumstance” warranting relief from the trial court’s order of dismissal.  Subsection (f) of Rule 4:50-1 permits a court to exercise its discretion to “relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment or order,” R.4:50-1, “whenever necessary to prevent a manifest denial of justice,” Manning Eng’g, Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm’n, 74 N.J. 113, 120 (1977).  Relief is appropriate when “the circumstances are exceptional and enforcement of the judgment or order would be unjust, oppressive or inequitable. ”  Johnson, 320 N.J. Super. at 378.  Where exceptional situations warrant relief under R.4:50-1(f), the rule’s “boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice. ”  Nowosleska v. Steele, 400 N.J. Super. 297, 303 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Mancini v. EDS on Behalf of N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 132 N.J. 330, 336 (N.J. 1993)).  Courts “focus on equitable considerations” in determining whether relief under R.4:50-1(f) is warranted.  Id.; see also Manning Eng’g, 74 N.J. at 120 (rule is “designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case”).  New Jersey courts have held that relief under R.4:50-1(f) is particularly appropriate when important public policy interests of the state are at stake.
[brief] On direct appeal, appellate counsel argued that the trial court should have recalled the jurors and conduct a voir dire examination to determine if their verdict was tainted based on allegations contained in an anonymous letter that was received in the judge’s chambers on December 12, 2016.  (Da138; 25T15-13 to 14).  The letter was sent by “[...]” from a fictional address, and it alleged that the jurors had googled defendant’s name while at lunch and saw that he was a leader of a street gang.  (Da134; 25T16-5 to 16).  The letter also alleged that the jurors saw defendant in handcuffs, which “[...]” stated made defendant look more “menacing” and “darker. ”  (Da134).  The letter was collected by the [...], secured in a larger envelope, and placed in storage to be processed for latent prints and DNA.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, 16 CFR 251.1, Federal Trade Commission (FTC)  *Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations* (Establishing advertising rules relating to use of the word “free,” and noting, “Because the purchasing public… regards the offer of ‘Free’ merchandise or service to be a special bargain, all such offers must be made with extreme care so as to avoid any possibility that consumers will be misled or deceived”)  The “dishonesty or a lack of good faith and fair dealing” suggested by [...]’s misleading offer of “free” rent is exacerbated by its byzantine form contracts, which impose additional obligations (including the oppressive charge-back provision at issue) on tenants through a stack of 16 sub-agreement “riders” in addition to the 15-page standard Apartment Lease Contract.  Da44, Da46/  Although these riders were clearly included as attachments and referenced in the Defendants’ pleadings, the trial court apparently overlooked this, when ruling, without citation to any pleadings or other documents, that Defendant[s] did not allege that they were duped or otherwise unaware of the provision or that they did not understand [it].
[brief] (3T58-13 to 63-6); see, e.g., (3T65-5 to 236-12).  [...] stated that the purpose of the procedure used, which included the two pre-selection questions, was “to save [the prospective jurors] as much time as we possibly can. ” (3T10-13 to 19).  Counsel for defendant did not object to this procedure.  (3T25-2 to 11).  To the contrary, when asked, “Is there anything about the way that the process was today that is objectionable … to the defense,” defense counsel stated no. (3T236-14 to 22).  Now on appeal, after the selection of a jury using this un-objected-to procedure, the holding of an 11-day trial, and a jury verdict of guilty, defendant has an objection to how his jury was selected.
[directive] Under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(e), the county prosecutor or Attorney General may make an application to the court for a waiver of the forfeiture of office and/or permanent bar to future employment in these cases.  The court may grant the application for good cause shown.  Under the statute, it is an affirmative act by the Attorney General or county prosecutor that accomplishes waiver if the court approves the application.  There are practical problems in applying N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e).