[brief] Initiating a stop before receiving confirmation is unreasonable simply because the officer does not know if the warrant information is reliable and therefore if there is a legitimate reason for the stop.  The present case is distinguishable from *State v. Pitcher*, due to [...]’s unreasonable behavior in failing to contact dispatch despite knowledge the computer is wrong fairly often.  379 N.J. 308 (App. Div. 2005)  In *Pitcher*, police stopped a car based on Division of Motor Vehicle records that reported the owner’s license was suspended.  *Id.* at 311.  The record of the defendant’s suspension was later determined to be an error, and defendant argued the stop was unconstitutional because it was based on an “erroneous record. ”  *Id.* at 313.  Noting that when an officer relies on information provided by others “the question is the reasonableness of the officer’s reliance on that information under the totality of the circumstances,” the court held the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances known to them at the time.  *Id.* at 319-320.  The court explained there was no unreasonable conduct contributed to the error such as, for example, “the officer ignored information about the reinstatement of the license; other officers held back information about the reinstatement; or other officers delayed in providing information to the record keepers. ”  *Id.* at 319.  Additionally, there was no claim the DMV database was unreliable or that there were other instances of “troubling errors similar to the one in this case. ”  *Id.* at 319.  The circumstances present in *Pitcher* are distinguishable because the police in this case acted unreasonably given the specific facts and knowledge available to the officers.  Unlike in *Pitcher* where there was no assertion officers had any reason to suspect the DMV database to be unreliable, [...] expressly testified that he knew the computer is not always accurate and that he was aware of previous instances of errors.  Moreover, in *Pitcher* there was no unreasonable police conduct that contributed to the error, while here there was an unreasonable decision to rely on information known to be wrong at times rather than seek confirmation.  Evidence uncovered by the search should be excluded because the officers’ decision to stop [...]’s car was unreasonable and in violation of United States and New Jersey Constitutions.  Once a constitutional violation has been established, an officer’s good faith mistake does not justify an exception to the exclusionary rule under the New Jersey Constitution, which is frequently interpreted to afford defendants greater protections than the United States Constitution.  *Sutherland*, 231 N.J. at 436.  The exclusionary rule functions not only as a deterrent for police misconduct but also as “the indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. ”  *Shannon*, 222 N.J. at 593 (quoting *State v. Novembrino*, 105 N.J. 95, 157 (1987)).  A more reasonable course of action—calling dispatch to confirm a warrant before initiating stop—would minimize unnecessary stops and advance individuals’ right to be free from unreasonable seizures.  See State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1, 20 (App. Div. 2023) (“[P]olice officers must use the least intrusive means necessary to effectuate the purpose of the investigative detention. ” (quoting State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530 (2019)).  This places no additional burden on law enforcement, as [...] testified the warrant confirmation must be completed eventually.  (1T28-10 to 28-13)  Additionally, there is no suggestion here that there was any reason the stop could not wait for confirmation.  The evidence recovered during the search of [...]’s car should therefore be suppressed because the police acted unreasonably by stopping [...]’s car without sufficient confirmation a warrant existed.  POINT II