ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Had we not been “fooled,” a simple letter referring the Judge to the May 3, 2023 Brief, such as the sample letter at Pa362, would have been sent.  Point VI wouldn’t exist.  Despite the DAG’s word she would not oppose correction, she opposed the Motion except for admitting her Notice should be corrected with no remedy to [...].  She claimed R. 1:13-1 was only for Court errors, without addressing the fact the “mislabeled” Notice had, in fact, caused the Court to mark a Motion with Opposition in the file as “unopposed. ”  The State suggested the Remedy would be a Motion to Vacate an Unjust or Erroneous Judgment under R. 4:50-1.  \(^8\)  Given the ferocity with which the State defended its admitted error (231 pp. & 202 pp. v. ~100 pp. for the Mislabeled Motion to Dismiss), while only calling it a “typo,” it has to be clear they intended the Notice of Motion to be misleading.  [...] in his October 20th oral Opinion was extremely hostile to the correction suggesting it was “a fiction” to change the opposition notation in the Order.  4T-4-23 to 5-1.  I filed a Motion for Reconsideration.  Maybe the Judge couldn’t believe the State made a 12-word, totally misleading Notice because the State had deftly written it off as a “typo. ”  His Honor seemed to think it was maybe just one or two characters – in a motion for discovery (4T-4-8 & 19), no less.⁹  In this second filing, I moved to correct the Record with an Amended Notice of Motion for Dismissal, to which the State had consented.  Pa360.  If that were accepted, logic would dictate I’d get some time to answer.  [...] didn’t seem to understand despite an explanation letter.  Pa355 (esp. last para.).  He was quite cruel calling my filings a “stream of consciousness. ”  5T(Dec)-5-17 & 6-12.  Maybe the Judge thinks I am making a tempest in a teapot because he did state that he’d have decided the State’s Motion the same way in June if he had known the opposition was in the file.  3T-12-15; See Point VI.  His Honor doesn’t seem to realize that I don’t think you can appeal an Order that was unopposed.  Even if I am wrong about that, it’s not unreasonable to demand that a dirty trick played on you be corrected just as a matter of propriety.  Preliminary Statement
[brief] Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Checchio (“A&P”), 335 N.J. Super. 495 (2000).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25-26  Green v. Morgan Properties, 215 N.J. 431 (2013)
[brief] The Trial Court erred in finding that the third party offer was invalid because it did not explicitly reference the Plaintiff’s Right of First Refusal.  (Raised below, Da366,378,385; 1T@19-20)  For purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter, the Defendant, [...] and its principals, stipulated that the contract between them and former Defendant [...] was not presented in writing to the Plaintiff, [...] until January 17, 2023.
[brief] In its decision, the Trial Court makes mistakes of both law and fact.  First, the Trial Court determined that the Arbitrator based its conclusion that the parties agreed to certain projects’ EGPs by a “course of their dealings with each other,” even though the Arbitrator, in the Award, did not once opine on the parties’ course of dealing or provide any supporting case law.  The Trial Court also ignored the clear terms of the PTA regarding the necessary steps for a Project to become subject to EGP payments.  As for [...]’s motion for modification, the Trial Court disregarded the Award’s blatant computational and form errors and oversimplified the issue as one dealing with the “method” of applying interest rates to an award.  Aside from the other errors concerning the transcription of data from the exhibits and interest on incomplete projects, the error in the interest calculation is not in “method,” but rather in the order of mathematical operations used to calculate the interest, resulting in an inappropriately inflated award to [...].  Finally, the Trial Court determined that [...]’s setoff claim should be determined in the Hackensack Arbitration, failing to recognize that in its claim for setoff, [...] is not seeking to debate the merits of its claim but rather protect its eventual judgment in the Hackensack Arbitration so it may collect the money owed to it even though [...] is no longer an operating entity.  The Hackensack Arbitration arbitrator does not have jurisdiction over the Award.  Given the numerous errors in the Award, this Court should vacate the Award, or, alternatively modify the Award to correct both the interest calculations and the EGPs for the awarded projects so that the EGPs match those stated in the documents upon which the Award was purportedly based.
[brief] ’”  1707 Realty, LLC v. Revolution Architecture, LLC, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2381, *13 (Law Div. Nov. 20, 2020)⁶ (quoting, Kent Motor Cars Inc. v. Reynolds, 207 N.J. 428, 443 (2011)).  “The Entire Controversy Doctrine has been a cornerstone of New Jersey’s jurisprudence for many years, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s longstanding ‘preference that related matters arising among related parties be adjudicated together rather than in separate, successive, fragmented, or piecemeal litigation. ’”
[brief] *8  The effect of the judge's comment here is unquestionably to suggest to the venire that the case against defendant had been authorized by a grand jury, and that the grand jury would not have returned an indictment unless there were merit to the charge lodged against defendant.  The judge's comment that “it's not as if people come in automatically and file charges,” and here “it's different because in this case, the matter had been presented to a grand jury” could only be understood by the jury as tantamount to an endorsement of the prosecutor's case.  We conclude that under the circumstances the judge's comments impermissibly bolstered the State's case.  While we recognize that on three occasions the judge did tell the jury that “an indictment is not evidence of guilt,” we nonetheless conclude that the judge's very pointed remarks in response to the juror's statement were directly contradictory to the instruction he gave the jury on the other three occasions.  At best, the jury would have been confused about whether an indictment is evidence of guilt or not.  On balance, the dramatic effect of the juror's impassioned remarks, followed as it was by the judge's discussion of the role of a grand jury, would have superseded in a juror's mind any benefit to defendant that would otherwise have resulted from the giving of an instruction that an indictment is not evidence of guilt.  An accused is guaranteed the right to a fair and impartial jury by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution.
[directive] In the event the prosecutor's office cannot reach a decision within the initial 30 day period, the deadline may be extended in 30 day increments at the discretion of the County Prosecutor.  The law enforcement agency shall be advised of any extensions of the deadline.  6.3.3  If a criminal investigation is initiated, the law enforcement agency shall receive periodic and timely updates concerning the course of the investigation.  While a criminal investigation is pending, complainants and witnesses may be referred by the law enforcement agency to the county victim witness office for information concerning the criminal investigation.  Once the criminal investigation is complete and a disposition of the allegation has been made, the prosecutor's office shall provide the law enforcement agency with its investigative file for use in the internal affairs investigation subject to applicable state statutes, court rules and case law.  If the prosecutor's office declines to initiate a criminal investigation or the investigation is administratively closed, it shall notify the law enforcement agency of the outcome in writing.
[brief] Q:  Okay, so after -- so it’s your conclusion that the riparian grant goes from [...] to [...] even though it’s not specifically mentioned by metes and bounds within the conveyance documents.  A:  Yes, that’s correct, it acquires the fee title to the adjacent lands underwater from the State of New Jersey by way of a grant, and such waters underwater compromise and form what’s known as Lot 3.01.  I agree.
[brief] In the rule of law behavior must have consequences and we’ve had behavior subsequent to the entry of that order, according to the plaintiff’s argument, which are frivolous and have cost the company enormous sums of money to address.  [1T36:8-16]  Thus, the Chancery Court relied on R. 1:10-3 for its fee award but went far beyond awarding only the fees that were part of the 2017 R. 1:10-3 motion at hand.
[brief] (Pa207, Par. “L”)  The Developer’s Agreement prepared in accordance with the planning board resolution went on to indicate that the terms of the prior Developer’s agreements were carried forward (Pa212, par. 2B).  There was no mention of any public street dedication or any maps which delineated same.  The map attached to the Developer’s Agreement (Pa221) made no reference to public street dedication.  It appears to only reference the Church “driveway” as a “roadway”.(Pa212)
[brief] A.  There Clearly Existed Bad Faith by the State.  The State’s conduct in the instant matter was more than an oversight or a mistake.  Detective [...] was quite conscientious in preserving the messages alleged to have been sent in the chat between he and Defendant.  Nevertheless, he failed to preserve the pieces of evidence most favorable to the defense, to wit: his fake “Adam4Adam” profile and the picture(s) of the adult he was portraying himself to be.  The fake profile and any picture(s) associated with it are material, favorable to the defense, and exculpatory.  This should have been apparent to the State during the investigation.
[brief] [...] and its employees requested that the [...] defend them, the [...] declined to provide a defense, and the Court ultimately concluded that a defense was owed because the decision whether to authorize rearming was a “law-enforcement function” that made [...] employees “State” employees when making that decision.  Id. at 317.  In Lavezzi, 219 N.J. at 166, the plaintiffs claimed that the [...] and three of its employees damaged and lost property seized during the course of a criminal investigation.  The plaintiffs’ filed a complaint alleging negligence, conversion, and unlawful taking.  Ibid.  [...], requested that the [...] defend and indemnify the [...] and all the individual employees named in the complaint, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 and Wright.  Ibid.  The [...] denied the County’s request on the grounds that the Prosecutor’s Office had assumed administrative responsibility to safeguard the plaintiffs’ property, which is not a law enforcement function.  *Ibid.*  The County appealed.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court found the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the county prosecutor’s office damaged the property in the context of handling evidence during their criminal investigation.  *Id.* at 179-80.  Thus, because these acts seemingly involved “performance of law enforcement duties,” at least initially, the [...] was required to defend the County.  *Id.* at 167.  However, the Court opined that if a more complete record later revealed that property was “stored in a facility at the direction of the County,” and that the damage resulted from the condition or maintenance of that facility, which is not part of law enforcement duties, the State “may seek reimbursement of all or part of the costs incurred in its defense and indemnification of the Prosecutor’s Office employees.  *Id.* at 180.  As a first matter, both *Gramiccioni* and *Lavezzi* grounded their decisions on the obligation to defend owed under the TCA.
[brief] As to Element 3, that the contract or notice presented a term contrary to New Jersey or other law the court considered plaintiffs two alternative arguments.  1.  That the transaction is a disguised loan, and the transaction is governed by the strictures of the New Jersey Consumer Loan statute, NJSA 17:11C-40, and the contract breach the restrictions of that statute; and 2.  That the transaction is barred by the public policy of New Jersey, as recited in the common law of this state.  As to point one, the court determined that the transaction was not a loan, because there was no absolute right to repayment.
[brief] 24 Madison v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 233 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2000)............................................................  33  Matter of C.P.M., 461 N.J. Super. 573 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2019)...................... 17-18, 19, 25, 29 Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003)....................................................................
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT:  (A) FAILED TO CONSIDER BLAKE’S POST-OFFENSE REHABILITATIVE CONDUCT THE AGE-CRIME CURVE, AND ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE AS WEIGHING AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD OF RECIDIVISM AND THE NEED FOR DETERRENCE AND (B)  CONSIDERED DEFENDANT’S DISMISSED CHARGES IN VIOLATION OF STATE V. K.S.¹  A.  Because The Court Failed To Find [...]’s Post-Offense Rehabilitative Conduct, The Age-Crime Curve, And Adolescent Brain Development Weighed Against The Need For Deterrence Or Incapacitation, Its Finding Of Aggravating Factors Three And Nine, Rejection of Mitigating Factor Nine, And Its Consecutive Sentence Fairness Assessment Were Not Supported By Competent, Credible Evidence In The Record.
[brief] **THE SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS ACCORDED [...] STUDENTS SHOULD IMPACT HOW THIS COURT APPROACHES THE DECISION BEFORE IT REGARDING SFRA’S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AS APPLIED TO THE [...]**  Because of the students’ special status as “wards of the State,” the Supreme Court in *Abbott XXI* placed on the State, not on the students, the burden of proof regarding whether an underfunded SFRA satisfied the State’s constitutional obligation to the Abbott students.  (See 206 N.J. at 357).  problems since at least the 2009 needs assessment conducted by [...].  Final Decision at 16.  Thus, the denial of T&E to Lakewood public school students may not be as longstanding as the denial to Abbott district students, but it is surely longstanding.  \(^5\)  In this court’s March 6 decision, those data appear in footnote 1.  The [...] circumstances are sufficiently analogous to suggest that this court should seriously consider adopting that approach in this case. \(^6\)  But the special constitutional status acquired by Lakewood’s public school students goes far beyond that burden of proof issue.  The State has a special, heightened responsibility to Lakewood’s students, as this court recognized in its March 6 decision and remand order, by concluding its opinion with a quote from Abbott XX: “the State has a continuing obligation to ‘keep SFRA operating at its optimal level…’ and ‘[t]here should be no doubt that we would require remediation of any deficiencies of a constitutional dimension, if such problems do emerge. ’”  [...] v. Allen-McMillan, 475 N.J.Super. 56, 71 (App.Div. 2023) (quoting from Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199 N.J. 140, 146 (2009).  In subsequent Argument Points, this brief will demonstrate: (i) how dramatically short of an “optimal level” SFRA has been operating for Lakewood, (ii) how that has resulted in clear “deficiencies of a constitutional dimension,” (iii) why it is the State that has ultimate responsibility for those \(^6\)Even if this court were to choose to place the burden of proof on the student-petitioners, it should use the “significant cause” or "preponderance of evidence" standard, not an enhanced or “heavy” burden.  In the early stages of Abbott, the ALJ rejected the State’s similar effort to impose a “heavy” burden on the school funding law’s challengers.  “Based on the record developed, I must determine how Chapter 212 has actually been implemented and whether plaintiffs proved their contentions to be more likely true than not by a preponderance of the believable evidence. ”  Abbott v. Burke, EDU5581-85 (initial decision), August 24, 1988.  deficiencies and their remediation, and (iv) why expeditious remediation of those deficiencies is required.  POINT
[brief] For example, Defendant [...] ("[...]") implies that it satisfied its obligations under the Court Rules when it produced [...], [...]'s CFO, to testify as a designated representative in response to a notice of deposition plaintiff issued pursuant to R. 4:14-2(c).  Pa423-25.  However, plaintiff's notice for a corporate representative sought testimony on the U.S.  Defendants' financial statements and employee compensation, not the decisions to terminate plaintiff's employment and pass him over for promotion.  That testimony is being sought directly from [...], the decisionmaker, himself.  Based on D'Agostino's analysis of the circumstances under which a corporate parent has control over the directors of a non-party subsidiary, the Defendants argue they have no control over their own director, [...].  However, Defendants’ reliance on D’Agostino is misplaced.  Plaintiff seeks to depose a director of a named defendant, not a director of a non-party subsidiary.  The distinction is critical because, as D’Agostino demonstrates, the Court Rules presume that a corporate party has control over its own directors for deposition purposes.  D’Agostino, 242 N.J.Super. at 273, 274.  Thus, no subpoena is necessary.  Id. at 275.  See also Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d. 1135, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007); Campbell v. Sedgwick Detert, Moran and Arnold, Civil No. 11–642–ES–SCM (D.N.J. March 28, 2013), 2013 WL 1314429 at *12.  See also Loughran v. PepsiCo, Inc., Civil No. 22-4390 (RMB/EAP) (D.N.J., Jan. 29, 2024), 2024 WL 328740 at *2 n. 3; In re Valsartan, Losartan, and Irbesartan Products Liability Litigation, 2021 WL 61117676 (D.N.J. 2021) at *1 (collecting cases); Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 215 F.R.D. 492, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2003).  II.
[brief] [Pa391-430].  The first brief point asserted:  DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE FILING OF THIS SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Pa403].  Under this heading, the movants argued that they could bring a motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:42 because the prior orders were interlocutory.  The second brief point asserted:  DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS CONFIRM PLAINTIFF CANNOT PRESENT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MALPRACTICE [Pa406].  Under this brief point, the movants argued nothing but the Brill standard for summary judgment, the point of which was “affording Plaintiffs [sic] all favorable inferences, Plaintiffs simply cannot satisfy the necessary element of proximate causation” and this was “as discussed more fully in Point II, infra. ” [Pa407].  The third brief point asserted: PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A JURY COULD FIND PROXIMATE CAUSE [Pa409-410].  This brief point argued “even accepting”  Plaintiff’s expert testimony, Plaintiff still could not show that the delay in delivery was a proximate cause of the injuries, because they asserted the outcome would have been the same if the baby had been timely delivered, based on [...]’s testimony.  (c)  The “cross motion for summary judgment” by [...] and [...]  On May 25, 2023, [...] and [...] filed what they again mislabeled a “cross motion” for summary judgment.
[brief] Here, there remains the genuine issue of material fact of whether the driver of the bus merely “jerked or jolted” incident to starting or stopping, or if on the other hand, viewed in the light most favorable to [...], the driver abruptly, violently, and suddenly stopped as testified to by the plaintiff and the independent eyewitness.  Because that evidence must be accepted as true, and all legitimate inferences accorded the plaintiff’s version of what happened, reasonable minds could obviously differ, and the motion for summary judgment should have been denied.  It is critical that a trial court ruling on a summary judgment motion not “shut a deserving litigant from his [or her] trial.
[brief] On November 19, 2021, [...] granted Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider ordering, again, that Plaintiff must submit to DMEs for this litigation without the use of recording devices or TPOs.  [...] found, *inter-alia*:  This is the third motion between the parties addressing the issue of whether a recording can be made while Plaintiff is undergoing an independent medical evaluation (hereinafter “IME”), evaluation by Defendant’s neuropsychologist, [...].  Here, *Carley* does not apply.  Defendants, because of [...] following his association’s recommendations not to audio tape because of the potential invalidating the integrity of the process, is precluded from being an expert.  That is unfair.
[brief] (Pa47-Pa48; 1T11:20-13:18).  The plaintiff respectfully submits that the Trial Court’s finding that no duty was owed to the plaintiff is contrary to established legal authority directing that a business operator is not relieved of the duty it owes its invitee to render the premises reasonably safe simply because the unsafe and hazardous condition may have been open and obvious or noticed by the invitee.  *Taneian v. Meghrigian*, 15 N.J. 267, 273-275 (1954); see also; *Zentz v. Toop*, 92 N.J. Super. 105, 115 (App. Div. 1966), *affd.*, 50 N.J. 250 (1967); see also; *McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co.*, 41 N.J. 272, 275 (1963); see also; *Moore v. Schering Plough, Inc.*, 328 N.J. Super. 300, 302-303 (App. Div. 2000).
[directive] "Authorized user"means a sworn or civilian employee of a law enforcement agency who has been authorized by the chief of the agency, or by the Attorney General or a county prosecutor or his or her designee, to operate an ALPR, or to access and use ALPR stored data, and who has successfully completed training provided by the agency on the agency’s ALPR policy and on these Guidelines.  "Designated supervisor" means a superior officer assigned by the chiefofa law enforcement agency to oversee and administer, or to assist in overseeing and administering, the agency’s use of ALPRs and stored ALPR data.  A law enforcement agency may have more than one designated supervisor.  "Chief" of a department or agency means the highest ranking sworn officer of a law enforcement agency.  "Post-Scan BOLO query" refers to the process of comparing a post-scan BOLO list against stored ALPR data.  "Crime scene query" refers to the process of accessing and reviewing stored ALPR data that had been originally scanned at or about the time and in the vicinity of a reported criminal event for the purpose of identifying vehicles or persons that might be associated with that specific criminal event as suspects, witnesses, or victims.
[brief] (Aa10).  [...] testified that the [...] has procedures in place for restraining unruly patients, but some patients were more difficult to restrain than others.  (Aa11-12, T10:20-11:10).  On February 23, 2017, a “stat call,” indicating that a patient was out of control, was announced over the loudspeaker.  (Aa12).  The stat call protocol was to have three or four officers move the patient to the bed in “net restraints. ”  Ibid.  [...] responded and found the patient to be “extremely combative,” “thrashing” about, and “flailing. ” (T36:2-10).