ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISREGARDED ITS SO-CALLED FINDINGS OF FACT DURING THE JULY 8 ORAL ARGUMENT BECAUSE, AS IT RECOGNIZED, IT LACKED JURISDICTION.  During oral argument of Defendants’ second motion to dismiss, the trial court needlessly engaged in extraneous fact findings.  (See 3T8:5–17, 9:18–11:21.)  [...]’s appeal of the First Action divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the motion in the Second Action.  The trial court recognized its own mistake by calling its findings irrelevant.  (See 4T15:21.)  “[T]he ordinary effect of the filing of the notice of appeal is to deprive the court below of jurisdiction to act further in the matter under appeal unless directed to do so by the appellate court. ”  Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 1 on R. 2:9-1 (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 376 (1995)); see also McNair v. McNair, 332 N.J. Super. 195, 199 (App. Div. 2000) (“Unquestionably, as a general rule, once an appeal is filed, the trial court loses jurisdiction to make substantive rulings in the matter. ”).  As discussed, the claims in this case are identical to those [...] appealed in the First Action.  (See, e.g., Pa192 (stating “[t]he Trial Court Erred by Denying [...] Leave to File an Amended Complaint to Assert a ‘Bad Faith’ Claim Against the [...] Based Upon Newly Discovered Evidence”).)  Here, [...] tried to assert a bad faith claim in the Second Action based on the same evidence that it unsuccessfully auditioned in the First Action.  No matter how [...] tries to restyle that bad faith claim, it cannot readjudicate it in a successor forum.  The trial court should not have commented on the merits of the Second Action until the Appellate Division resolved the issues raised in the First Action.  To the trial court’s credit, it ultimately recognized that its pre-Appellate Division judgment findings were irrelevant.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s dismissal of [...]’s Complaint and accept the trial court’s explanation that its findings in the July 8 Oral Argument were of no moment.
[brief] ”  PCAST Report at 88.  •  The Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation and Verification or ACE-V method “provides a broadly stated framework for conducting friction ridge analysis.  However, this framework is not specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this type of analysis. ”  NAS Report at 142.  Only limited information exists as to the accuracy of latent print analysis.  Id.  •  Identification by fingerprint comparison is opinion evidence and is dependent upon: (1) the credibility (or believability) and accuracy of the expert witness(es) called for that purpose; (2) the validity of the theory of identification by fingerprint comparison; (3) the credibility of any other witnesses who perform necessary functions in making the comparison (such as inked finger impressions and latent lifts); and (4) the accuracy of procedures in identifying, preserving, recording, and maintaining integrity of the physical evidence.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 703 mandates that expert opinion be grounded in “‘facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts. ””  Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008) (quoting State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006)).  [...], P.E., satisfied every requirement.  The issue to be decided and to which plaintiff’s expert opined is “did the condition of the sidewalk at the time of the fall present a hazardous condition?”  Current codes, standards, regulations and ordinances are all relevant to whether the premises are safe in their current condition.  The decision to disregard [...]’s testimony was erroneous, an abuse of discretion and should be vacated.
[brief] This appeal seeks to reverse the Decision and Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Bergen County (“Lower Court” or “trial court”), dated May 24, 2024 (“Lower Court’s Order”).  The Lower Court’s Order correctly denied Defendant-Appellant, [...]’s (“Appellant”), untimely Motion to Vacate the default judgment entered against her in the Collection Action (later defined herein).  After briefing and oral argument, the Lower Court correctly held that Appellant’s willful delay in moving to vacate her default warrants the application of the doctrine of laches and, therefore, Appellant’s Motion to Vacate must be denied.  Indeed, Appellant’s Motion was not filed within a reasonable time and, regardless of the Motion’s untimeliness, the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act, N.J.S.A. §17:11C-1, C-18 et seq. (“CFLA”) claims lack merit.  For all these reasons, the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants Motion to Vacate and this Court should affirm the Lower Court’s Order.  COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] See *In re Resolution*, 108 N.J. at 41-42.  The NJCFLA declares “[n]o person shall engage in business as a consumer lender or sales finance company without first obtaining a license or licenses under this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a).  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) determines that “[a] consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of section 3 . . . shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree” and that “contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree . . . shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges.
[brief] While introducing the application at that hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel stated the following:  It's important to note that the existing development which is currently 338 units already exceeds your density requirements.  The addition of the units proposed intensifies that D variance is the reason why we’re before this Board.  [(Pa109-110). ]  Later during the first hearing, Plaintiff’s professional engineer and planner, [...], PE, PP, PTOE of [...], upon being questioned by the Board’s counsel, again claimed that “the site existing is non-conforming” as it relates to density.  (Pa132).  Therefore, during that first hearing, Plaintiff presented the application as if the site currently has 338 existing units, which would make its current density nonconforming under the ordinance.
[directive] The Policy is located at: https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-Directive-2021-14_Directive-Updating-Statewide-Use-of- Force-Policy.pdf  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  28 shall be the Independent Investigator.  In all other specified scenarios the investigating entity shall be the chief law enforcement executive or designee.  The investigating entity shall document the authorization to review or receive an accounting of a BWC of a specified incident.
[brief] [...] et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions, 108 Procs. of the Nat’l Acad. of Scis. 19 (2011)  ..............................................................................  Pa85-90  [...] et al., Factors Associated with Latent Fingerprint Exclusion Determinations, Forensic Sci. Int’l 275 (2017)  ...........  Pa91-148  [...] et al., Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions by Latent Fingerprint Examiners, 7 PLOS ONE 3 (2012)  .............................................................................................  Pa149-160  [...] et al., *Identifying Fingerprint Expertise*, 22 *Psych. Sci.* 8 (2011)………………………………………Pa161-164  [...] et al., *Human Matching Performance of Genuine Crime Scene Latent Fingerprints*, *Law & Hum. Behav.*  1 (2014)……………………………………Pa165-174  [...] et al., *Forensic Comparison and the Matching of Fingerprints: Using Quantitative Image Measures for Estimating Error Rates through Understanding and Predicting Difficulty*, 9  *PLOS ONE* 5 (2014)…………………………Pa175-188  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] A case management conference in the consolidated matters was adjourned from July 19, 2023 pending a decision in the case bearing Docket No. [...].  [...]'s litigation under Docket No. [...] (consolidated with Docket No. [...]) challenging the First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan is still pending as the Order entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. is interlocutory, not a final order.  Moreover, the statement by the Borough at pages 4-5 of its brief that ". . .if the Plaintiff were to prevail on its claims in this litigation and if the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan were invalidated, the First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan would go back into effect" is also inaccurate.  On its face, the Ordinance adopting the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan (under appeal herein) states that it is the Borough's "...intent that the Second Amended Redevelopment Plan, once adopted, will supersede and replace the First Amended Redevelopment Plan" (Pa 68) and further that any ordinance inconsistent with the Second Amended Redevelopment Plan is "repealed."  (Emphasis added).  (Pa 69)  Thus, not only is the order entered by [...] interlocutory, but once it is final when the consolidated cases are concluded, not only can [...] file an appeal with the Appellate Division, but because the First Amended Redevelopment Plan was repealed on February 17, 2021 with the adoption of the Second Amended Redevelopment Plan (which is the subject matter of this litigation), it is not automatically "revived" if the Appellate Division reverses the Ordinance adopting the Second Amended Redevelopment Plan.  LEGAL ARGUMENT:
[brief] Defendant urges that Coventry and its progeny call for proofs ‘…relevant to the nature of the deviation from the ordinance. ’  Pb 25 quoting Coventry, supra at 297-98.  …  Plaintiffs never presented any proofs about the purposes of [...]'s prohibition of accessory uses without a principal use on the same lot, how Plaintiffs’ proposed development does not offend those purposes, or how Plaintiffs’ site ‘…. will accommodate the problems associated with the use even though the proposal does not comply with the ordinance established to address those problems. ”  Pb26 citing Coventry supra at 288-299.  Plaintiffs’ expert planner… never even mentioned the purposes of [...]'s prohibition of accessory uses without a principal use on the same lot.  Db23-24.  There are no such purposes.  There is no such thing.  The argument is pure fiction.  Nothing in [...]’s zoning ordinances even reference a prohibition against accessory uses without a principal use on the same lot.  This outcome is a judicial construct arising from the Court’s decision in Nuckel, 208 N.J. at 102-05.
[brief] “Spoilation, as its name implies, is an act that spoils, impairs or taints the value or usefulness of a thing”  Rosenblit, supra.,166 N.J. at 400 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1409 (7th ed. 1999)).  “In law, it is the term that is used to describe the hiding or destroying of litigation evidence, generally by an adverse party. ”  Id. at 400-01.  A duty to preserve evidence "arises when there is pending or likely litigation between two parties, knowledge of this fact by the alleged spoliating party, evidence relevant to the litigation, and foreseeability that the opposing party would be prejudiced by the destruction or disposal of this evidence."
[brief] Discovery Checklist (billing date 5/5/2020)  Pa070  Letter from Public Safety to [...] 7/7/2020 Pa071  Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/20) (Attached at Pa0028)  Consent to Search Vehicle  2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa0029)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031) Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0032) Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa0033) Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa0034) Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa0035) Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0036) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030) CJIS Transmittal Form (Attached at Pa0038) Wanted Person Request (Mugshot) (Attached at Pa0039)  [...]’ Letter to Highland Park Prosecutor and Court Administrator, Dated 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa0056) Letter to [...] 10/27/2020 regarding trial scheduled when discovery incomplete non-receipt of audio/videos and motion to suppress not heard Pa072 Police Department Record of Booking, Dated 2/20/22 Pa074 Communication Result Report, Dated 7/7/2020 Letter From Police Safety to [...] Regarding Outstanding Bill for Discovery, Dated 7/29/2020 (Attached at Pa0051)
[brief] The lower court’s permitting of Plaintiff to introduce evidence related Defendants’ snow removal services provided in April 2018 for an unrelated and subsequent storm was harmful error (1T 58:11-59:1; 4T 45:4-14; 5T 89:15-90:8).  Relevant evidence is defined as any evidence that has “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  N.J.R.E. 401, see also, State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 122–23 (2007).  Evidence is deemed relevant if there exists a “logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue. ”  Furst v. Einstein Moomjy Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 15 (2004).  Here, plaintiff was permitted to repeatedly question Defendants (specifically, [...] of [...] and [...] of [...]) about [...]’s snow services rendered in April 2018 - an entirely different snow event from the date of loss.  (4T 45:4-14; 5T 89:15-90:8).  This was permitted even though the court had ruled in limine that plaintiff was not permitted to question defendants about their termination from the snow contract after the 2017-2018 season.  (1T 58:11-18; 58:19-59:1) (Da 4).  Nevertheless, plaintiff elicited testimony that [...] and [...] were not happy with the snow removal services after the April 2018 storm.  Such questioning clearly encroached upon impermissible questioning regarding [...]’s termination or non-renewal in or around April 2018 since the facts suggested that [...] was dissatisfied with [...]’s service after an April 2018 storm which inevitably led to their termination.  (1T 55:20-56:11).  Moreover, this questioning is not even relevant to the key issue for the jury – whether Defendants within a reasonable period of time remediated the snow and ice conditions at [...] on March 8, 2018.  How [...] performed its snow removal for a subsequent April 2018 snow event and whether [...] or [...] were unhappy with their services for this April 2018 snow event is entirely irrelevant to the issue at hand.  See e.g., Cavaliere v. Bridgewater Commons Mall, 2009 WL 249104 (App. Div. 2009) (Da 173-179) (in a slip & fall on snow/ice case, the appellate court affirmed exclusion of photos taken by plaintiff of a later storm, not the date of loss, since the later storm was irrelevant and any probative value was outweighed by the potential for prejudice).  By permitting inquiry into the April 2018 storm and [...]’s and [...]’s dissatisfaction with [...] following this subsequent storm, the court not only introduced irrelevant evidence, but caused undue prejudice to [...] since such evidence obviously emphasizes the subcontractor’s less than ideal performance.  Certainly, highlighting this dissatisfaction and sub-par performance prejudices the jury into thinking this was the pattern and practice of [...].  The suggestion is clear – [...] has repeatedly under performed its snow removal obligations.  Such a suggestion only poisons the jury against [...].  For these reasons, permitting any evidence regarding the later April 2018 storm was an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Dated: May 7, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  [...], PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, VS. [...], DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS.  ON APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION  ATLANTIC COUNTY  DOCKET NUMBER: [...] SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF [...] ([...])
[brief] The Operating Agreement sets forth the rights and obligations of [...] and [...] with regard to the operation of the Project Garage to support the [...] Mall and other phases, if those phases were to be built.  Section 8.6(a) of the Redevelopment Agreement provided for a revenue sharing calculation by which [...] and [...] would receive shares of certain revenue in excess of $1,600,000.00 as of 2005, which amount would be adjusted in accordance with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) on an annual basis.  This revenue threshold was negotiated based on [...]’s losing $1,200,000 in revenue from the operation of the surface parking lots that were to be, and ultimately were, displaced by the Project.  [...] would receive 66.66% of revenue, if any, received in excess of $1,600,000.  The Order reformed the Redevelopment Agreement to remove the monetary threshold of $1,600,000 above which [...] and [...] would share “excess profits” pursuant to the Redevelopment Agreement, thereby allowing [...] to receive 66.66% of the [...] Mall Garage parking revenue generated after expenses, with [...] receiving a 33.33% share of revenue.
[brief] **THE COURT WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO SUA SPONTE INSTRUCT THE JURY ON SELF-DEFENSE FOR THE RESISTING ARREST CHARGE.**  Defendant submits that the trial judge erred by not sua sponte instructing the jury on self-defense, which would have served as a “complete justification to all the charges against” him.  (Db15).  The State counters that defendant cannot assert a self-defense claim in the context of an arrest by police officers where he was the initial aggressor and where he knew that submitting to their arrest would terminate their use of force.
[brief] Indeed, policy definitions that exclude vehicles owned by or available to resident “family members” are routinely applied by New Jersey courts in connection with UIM coverage.  See e.g., Aubrey v. Harleysville Ins. Companies, 140 N.J. 397, 405 (N.J. 1995) (overruling an earlier Appellate Division decision stating that the “resident family member” exception from the definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” violated New Jersey statutes, and noting that such an exclusion from the definition was viable and should have applied in that instance); French v. New Jersey Sch. Bd. Ass’n Ins. Group, 149 N.J. 478, 492 (1997) (“[N]o public policy or statute prevents the exclusion of UIM coverage when it is the underinsured vehicle of the resident family member that causes the injury. ”); Shah v. Geico Ins. Co., 2011 WL 3444269, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Aug. 9, 2011) (Da 14-19) (holding that a similar exclusion for injury to relatives by an underinsured motor vehicle owned by you or a relative barred coverage for an accident because the vehicle at issue was owned by a relative and/or family member that resided in the same household).
[brief] In sentencing the Defendant, the court noted that he had prior disorderly persons convictions for theft and receiving stolen property.  (33T32:24-33:3).  The court found the factors as follows:  Aggravating factors include three, the risk that you would commit another offense.  I -- I do find that to be an aggravating factor in this matter.  Six, your prior record.  To the prior record, I give that moderate weight.  But there's nine, the need to deter you and others from violating the law, which is always an important message in reference to future offenses, particularly any crime of this nature, sir, and to that I give significant weight.  Mitigating factors.  I've listened to the arguments of counsel.  Counsel has -- and -- and to mitigating factor number seven, that you had no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and lead a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time.  There was a substantial period of time between the 1996 conviction and the current offense.  So I do recognize that you let [sic] -- led a law-abiding life for substantial period of time and to that I give moderate weight.  The defense has also requested that I consider number two.  That you did not contemplate that your conduct would cause or threaten serious harm.  I'm going to deny that request.  Indeed, any time you enter the house of another uninvited, and either by accomplice as well as recklessly committed an act that ends up with that person deceased there has to be a contemplation that there could be harm to the individual involved any time that you would -- any time that these factors exist.  So I'm going to deny mitigating factor number two -- that you did not contemplate that your conduct would cause or threaten serious harm.  Eight, the conduct was a result of circumstances unlikely to reoccur.  To that I give slight weight.  I do find that the aggravating factors significantly outweigh the mitigating factors.  There is a presumption of imprisonment that is involved here on these offenses.  [33T33:4-34:17.]  The court then sentenced the Defendant to a term of 40 years subject to an 85% parole disqualifier on the accomplice liability for felony murder conviction.  (33T34:20-35:21).  That was the aggregate sentence, as the remaining convictions merged and/or ran concurrent.  (33T35:22-36:22).
[brief] The Township Committee believes that this Plan advances the following purposes of the MLUL [(Municipal Land Use Law)]:  1.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a):  To encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.  [See the foregoing statements]  2.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c):  To provide adequate light, air and open space [most of the property will remain undeveloped].  3.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(g):  To provide sufficient space in appropriate locations for a variety of agricultural, residential, recreational, commercial and industrial uses and open space, both public and private, according to their respective environmental requirements in order to meet the needs of all New Jersey citizens.  [See the foregoing statements]  4.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(h):  To encourage the location and design of transportation routes which will promote the free flow of traffic while discouraging location of such facilities and routes which result in congestion or blight [truck traffic going to and from Route 206 only]  5.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(i):  To promote a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design and arrangement [setback distances and landscaping/berming regulations]  6.  N.LS.A. 40:55D-2(j):  To promote the conservation of historic sites and districts, open space, energy resources and valuable natural resources in the State and to prevent urban sprawl and degradation of the environment through improper use of land [Black House, solar in Sec. 2.6.9; and electric vehicle/service equipment (EV/SE) at Sec. 2.5, page 10]  See (2T87:1-93:24).  Based on [...]'s statements, the ordinance was introduced for a first reading.  (2T98:17-18).  The amended ordinance was then referred back to the Planning Board.  (2T98:18-19).  Notably, the ordinance does not amend Ordinance No. 2022-15 or contain any findings—much less a finding of inconsistency—regarding the Plan.  The Planning Board considered Ordinance No. 2022-17 at its November 22, 2022 meeting.  (Pa435).  However, no substantive discussion occurred there either.  The ordinance was introduced, the period for public comment was opened and closed without any remarks, and a motion was made that the revisions were not inconsistent with the Master Plan.  (Pa435).  There was no reasoning provided by the Planning Board or discussion of the evidence introduced at the Committee's October 27 meeting.  Thus, the matter returned to the Committee for adoption on December 8, 2022.  (Pa296).  The Committee introduced the ordinance and opened the matter for public comment.  (Pa296).  The Committee heard from two members of the public, and then proceeded to vote on the ordinance.  (Pa296).  No discussion occurred as to the Planning Board's recommendation that the ordinance was not inconsistent with the Township's master plan.  Ordinance No. 2022-17 was then adopted, without any discussions on the record regarding the amendments or any evidence in the record as to the amended Plan.  **Trial Court Proceedings**