ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 2A:160(1-25)  Not Addressed in Depends Upon Crime Rule 3:26-1(d) for when the court may set monetary bail or bond, or commit the Uniform Criminal Extradition Proceeding Statute.  Probably  Charged person to the county jail as provided under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Law, Extradition Act Permissible N.J.S.A. 2A:162-6 et seq. 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500  No 10%  Contempt of Domestic Actor
[directive] The courts routinely examine agency practice in evaluating the expectation of privacy.  Written notification thus would quickly be nullified if representatives of the agency never entered or inspected any of these areas.  In addition to notifying employees of the agency's right to search and inspect, the agency should also, with some regularity, inspect these areas to establish the practice coinciding with the policy.  Any search of agency or personal property should be conducted in the presence of the subject officer and a property control officer.  7.8.9  A voluntary consent to a search may preclude some Fourth Amendment problems.  A consent search eliminates the need to determine what threshold standard must be met before conducting the search or seizure, either for an administrative or criminal investigation.  For consent to be legally valid in New Jersey, a person must be informed that he or she has the right to refuse to permit a search.4  If a consent search is undertaken, the internal affairs investigator shall follow standard law enforcement procedures and have the subject officer sign a consent form after being advised of the right to refuse such a search.  7.9
[brief] See \textit{Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.}, 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014) (addressing “statutory standing” question of “whether Static Control has a cause of action under the [federal] statute” at issue).  But whether analyzed as an issue of standing, subject matter jurisdiction, or both, the outcome is the same: the FAC must be dismissed.  The question of whether a foreign LLC like Plaintiff can cure the defect caused by its failure to have a certificate of authority when it commenced (and, in this case, prosecuted for many months) an action in New Jersey remains unresolved by either the New Jersey Supreme Court or any published opinion of this Court.
[brief] On the one hand, [...] asserts that the First Arbitration “was not about [...]’s performance...on various projects. ”  Opp. at 28.  However, this is objectively disproven by the record—the First Arbitration consisted of substantial testimony on [...]’s Hackensack performance.  See, e.g., Pa176 ¶ 18, Pa243 at 127:4-19.  On the other hand, [...] repeats in opposition here the same argument it made in the First Arbitration, that “the parties eventually agreed [the Hackensack EGP] would be zero in light of the issues [...] inherited”—an intrinsically subcontractor-performance aspect of the Hackensack Project.\(^1\) Opp. at 29 (adding it was “such a problematic project”).
[brief] He explained that the information he received from [...] about defendant’s confession was corroborated by evidence only known to police and not released to the public.  Specifically, the police had not shared that [...] was shot twice in the back of the head, that a .380 caliber firearm was used, and that [...] was captured on surveillance being picked up from her job.  [11T222-22 to 224-12].  In addition to receiving an anonymous tip as to defendant’s involvement and speaking with [...], police obtained surveillance video that corroborated defendant’s confession.  First, video surveillance as well as key fob swipes revealed that [...] left work at [...] at 2:56 a.m. and entered the front driver’s side seat of her vehicle.  [12T101-18 to 102-25].  Next, video from the [...], located on [...], one tenth of one-mile from where [...]’s Dodge Durango was parked, depicted the Dodge Durango driving on [...] towards where the vehicle was found between 3:12 a.m. and 3:14 a.m. [12T114-5 to -25].  Further, police obtained video surveillance from [...], which was located diagonally across the street from [...]’s grandmother’s home at [...].  [11T56-16 to 24; 11T57-23 to -25].  That footage showed [...]’s Dodge Durango in the area at approximately 3:07 a.m.  [11T58-5 to -13].  Police also determined that [...] was approximately five houses from 42 [...] near where the Dodge Durango was located.  [11T180-24 to 181-3].  Surveillance video from the area revealed two individuals walking from [...] towards Bloomfield Avenue and entering [...]’s grandmother’s home after 3:00 a.m. [11T184-18 to 185-1; 11T219-10 to -22].  Additionally, surveillance footage depicted [...]’s bedroom light turning on at approximately 3:20 a.m. on September 18, 2019.  [11T207-10 to -18].  [...]’s cell phone was legally recovered as part of the investigation.  [11T207-22 to 208-2].  The data recovered from the cell phone provided a step-by-step map of [...]’s movement that evening and into the early morning hours, including his leaving his grandmother’s home at 2:48 a.m. and picking [...] up at [...] at 2:58 a.m. [12T100-12 to 101-11].  Additionally, [...]’s phone registered him climbing one set of stairs at 3:21 a.m., followed by him sending a text message to [...] that was never read.  [12T121-22 to 122-25].  At 3:40 a.m., [...] opened the photos application on his phone and deleted three pictures of him holding a gun.  [12T144-8 to -20].  Finally, call detail records from defendant’s cell phone number, [...], revealed that when defendant attempted to call [...] at 2:25 a.m. on September 18, 2019, his phone was in the area of [...].  [12T178-3 to -17].
[directive] Types of deadly force.  Deadly force includes the following potentially lethal actions: (a) applying a chokehold, carotid artery restraint, or similar technique that involves pressure on the neck; (b) sitting, kneeling, or standing on a person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; (c) intentionally driving a vehicle at or in the direction of a person with the intent to strike the individual; and (d) using a baton or other weapon to intentionally strike an individual in the head or neck area.
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews of a trial judge's order on a *Rule* 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss a complaint is *de novo*, *Watson v. New Jersey Dep't of Treasury*, 453 N.J. Super. 42, 47, 179 A.3d 1061 (App. Div. 2017), and, thus, this Court “owe[s] no deference to the . . . judge's conclusions” regarding the dismissal motion.  *State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc.*, 439 N.J. Super. 462, 467, 110 A.3d 92 (App. Div. 2015).  Where a party fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the opposing party may move for dismissal of the complaint.  *R.*  4:6-2(e).  Pursuant to a *R.*  4:6-2(e)  Motion, the test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is whether a cause of action is “suggested” by the facts.  *Printing Mart-Morrison v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) citing *Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).  In reviewing a complaint dismissed under *R.* 4:6-2(e), the Court’s inquiry is limited to “examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. ”  *Printing Mart-Morrison*, 116 N.J. at 746.  “[A] court must dismiss the plaintiff's complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief. ”  *Sickles v. Cabot Corp.*, 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106, 877 A.2d 267 (App. Div. 2005).  “New Jersey is a fact rather than a notice pleading jurisdiction, which means that a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claim rather than merely reciting the elements of a cause of action.  Nostrame v. Santiago, 420 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added), affirmed in relevant part by, Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J. 109 (2013).  “A plaintiff cannot simply assert that any essential facts that the court may find lacking can be dredged up in discovery. ”  Id. citing Printing Mart-Morrison, 116 N.J. at 768.  B.
[brief] A second police officer, [...], also interviewed the victims on the day of the robbery.  Lieutenant Ramos testified that the descriptions he received from [...] and [...] indicated that the shorter man ([...]) was wearing a fishing cap and wielding the gun.  [...] also told Lieutenant Ramos that he recognized the shorter individual as someone who had visited the store several days earlier asking about “an ID. ”  At trial, [...]'s and [...]'s testimony were consistent with the descriptions given to Lieutenant Ramos.  The police continued an investigation and proceeded to search the store for fingerprints using a kit containing powders, brushes, lift cards, lifting tape, and gloves.
[brief] A GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGEMENT TO [...]  According to Court Rule 4:46-2(c), Proceedings and Standards on Motions, the judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  The court shall find the facts and state its conclusions in accordance with R. 1:7-4.  R. 4:46-2(c)
[brief] This section specifically addressed the union contracts from the below jurisdictions: - [...].  (Aa129-131) - [...].  (Aa131-132) - [...].  (Aa133) - [...].  (Aa133-134)  - [...].  (Aa137-138) - [...].  (Aa138-139)  • The City’s argument that a purported comparison to municipalities that were not receiving TA from the [...] were irrelevant to this matter.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLES OF RACE NOTICE REQUIRED BY THE NEW JERSEY RECORDING STATUTE, N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12 (Raised Below: 4T5). **  At trial, Plaintiff demonstrated that the metes and bounds descriptions contained in the deeds within the Property’s chain of title consistently included a description of the Strip.  Although the Strip somehow also showed up in Defendant’s chain of title for Lot 3 in 1971, the trial court acknowledged:  It is undisputed that there is no a [sic] recorded deed indicating how the strip arrived in the chain of title of defendant.  Both parties agree that there is an absence of the file deed transferring the strip to any party in defendant’s predecessor chain – titled.  4T5:1-12.  Accordingly, Plaintiff established ownership of the Strip at trial, and the Defendant failed to satisfy its burden of proof regarding its adverse possession claims to the contrary.  A.
[brief] The Exclusion Denies Statutorily Mandated Coverage and Is Unenforceable.  An insurer cannot contract out of its statutory obligations.  Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc. v. Harbor Bay Corp., 119 N.J. 402, 407 (1990) (Ryder/P.I.E.).  A policy exclusion "that conflicts with statutorily mandated coverage will not be enforced."  Potenzone v. Annin Flag Co., 191 N.J. 147, 150 (2007).  When interpreting a statute, a court "begin[s] with the statute's plain language — our polestar in discerning the Legislature's intent."  L.W. v. Toms River Reg'l Schools Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381, 400 (2007).  "If the language is plain and clearly reveals the statute's meaning, the [c]ourt's sole function is to enforce the statute according to its terms."  Ibid.  (quotation omitted).  Recognizing this State’s public policy in fully compensating its injured employees and in protecting employers from financial ruin potentially resulting therefrom, the Legislature created a system of compulsory insurance for all workplace injuries.  The Workers' Compensation Act "makes insurance carriers directly responsible to the employer's workers."  American Millennium Ins. Co. v. Berganza, 386 N.J. Super. 485, 489 (App. Div. 2006).
[brief] [...] and [...], a minor, by his guardian ad litem, [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...]; [...]; [...], in HER official capacity as Acting Commissioner of Education, [...]; [...]; [...], in her official capacity as New Jersey State Treasurer; [...]; and [...], in his official capacity as Interim CEO of the Schools Development Authority, Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM LAW  DIVISION: MERCER COUNTY  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Instead, the trial court focused only on waiver.  However, given the standard of review here, the pertinent issues, and Defendants’ anticipated argument that the NJCFLA does not afford a private right of action to aggrieved consumers, discussion of the development of jurisprudence regarding the private right of action is necessitated in light of the statutory history of the NJCFLA discussed, infra.
[brief] At Pa62, the trial judge states: "There is significant overlap in the stated reasons for the variances as set forth in the proofs, I will therefore, address the analysis for all of the variances together."  At Pa66, the court states: "The evidence supporting the (c) and (d) variances overlaps and will be addressed together."  But, as discussed below, the standard for a (c) bulk variance is very different from those for density ((d)(5)) and height ((d)(6)) variances.  The opinion is for that reason unhelpful and confusing.
[directive] SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2001-3  New Jersey State Police Bureau of Identification Conducting CCH/III  Background Checks of Emergent Care Givers Introduction  Unfortunately, there are children within the State of New Jersey whom the Division of Youth and Family Services must remove from their homes due to abuse and/or neglect.  The Division of Youth and Family Services prefers to place such children with relatives, rather than in foster care.  Existing state and federal regulations that govern the use of the New Jersey Computerized Criminal History/Interstate Identification Index (“CCH/III”) background checks do not permit look-ups of emergent care givers as this is considered a non-criminal justice purpose pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:59-1, et seq.  However, the Division of Criminal Justice, the New Jersey State Police and the Division of Youth and Family Services recognize that conducting background checks of emergent care givers is an important step in protecting those children who are being removed from their homes due to abuse and/or neglect.  Compliance with Federal Requirements  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer  Page 2
[brief] Nor may an arbitrator rewrite the contract for the parties. ”  Id.; see Withum, Smith & Brown v. Coast Auto. Grp., Ltd., No. A-2026-10T1, 2012 WL 489020, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2012) (“In other words, because an arbitrator's powers are derived from the express terms of an agreement to arbitrate, he exceeds those powers by disregarding the terms of that agreement.
[directive] 1.  ....................................  8  Changes Systemwide for Preparing l 1, 8 .....................................  Reform Need for Compelling The 1.2 10 ...... Procedures and Practices Enforcement on Law Reform of Impacts  The 1.3 11  ..................... Rights Victims' and Safety on Public Emphasis 1.4  The 11 ............................  Directive by This Taken Approach General 1.5 13 ................................................  Directive of Scope 1.6 13 ..............................  Directive
[brief] See Model Jury Charge 2.25 (model jury charge for hostile work environment under the LAD); 8T at 30:25-46:6 (the Court providing the model instruction on the law for hostile work environment); Model Jury Charge 2.22 (Model Jury Charge for LAD Retaliation), 8T at 47:23-54:4 (the Court providing the Model Jury Charge on the law for retaliation); Model Jury Charge 1.12(a) (purpose of the charge); 8T at 17:14-20 (Court providing the model jury charge instructing them to obey only his instructions on the law).  In addition, Defendants fault Plaintiff’s counsel for making “disparaging” remarks during summation, including: 1) calling one defense witness “cocky” and that “she just can’t help herself”, 2) calling defendants “Bad people.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.  In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).  When the challenged agency action arises in a setting where the record is too meager to permit meaningful review, supplementation of the record may be necessary.  The Court Rules provide that a reviewing court may remand, on its own motion, for supplementation of the record in order to permit meaningful review.
[brief] As to [...]'s testimony, the judge noted that, at the time the alleged improper contact occurred, the witness had completed his testimony concerning the events in question and had positively identified the defendants as the culprits.  Despite any alleged attempt by his father to influence his testimony, there was nothing inconsistent about his testimony after the recess.  The witness reaffirmed his identification of defendants as the men who shot [...].  The judge also properly responded to the outburst caused by decedent's sisters; the individuals were removed from the courtroom, the jury received an immediate curative instruction to disregard the incident, and the jury was removed from the courtroom directly after the instruction to allow counsel to protect the record by placing any objections or applications before the court for disposition.  Under these circumstances, we discern no error in the judge's tacit decision to forgo questioning each juror separately to determine whether he or she was still capable of judging the evidence presented fairly and impartially.  *State v. Wilson*, 335 N.J.Super. 359, 368–69, 762 A.2d 660 (App.Div.1999), *aff'd*, 165 N.J. 657, 762 A.2d 647 (2000).  The rest of defendants' arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
[brief] police car to an interrogation room, placed him under oath, and confronted him with photographic evidence that the person who had murdered his neighbor across the street had then circled back into the driveway of his house.  This was a custodial interrogation, because no one in their right mind would believe they could simply walk out in the face of such accusation — least of all a reasonable person with a felony record, who would be keenly aware that his history alone would arouse suspicion.  Nonetheless, officers elicited the defendant’s responses without informing him of his Miranda rights.  The Law Division’s erroneous admission of [...]’s unwarned statement (Da 17), as evidence of guilt, requires a remand for a new trial.
[brief] **Page 42**  **POINT ELEVEN [Individual analysis of Count 3 of Counterclaim] (Argued Pa392)**  Count 3 of the Counterclaim for an alleged “Failure to Follow a Statutory Obligation” should be dismissed because it is not a legally-recognized cause of action, and did not follow the procedures under R. 4:69-1, *et seq.*, required to force a public entity to comply with a statute.
[brief] Nothing they have offered supports the proposition that these Ordinances were arbitrary and capricious, or that they were adopted in some illegal or irregular fashion.  The Township Committee acted properly and relied upon clearly established reasons in adopting the Redevelopment Plan through the amendment found in Ordinance 2022-17.  For the foregoing reasons, the [...] and the Township Committee of the [...] respectfully urge this Court to affirm the trial court’s Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] ”  *Vaden v. Discover Bank*, 556 U.S. 49, 71 (2009).  The FAA applies to any contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce” that is subject to a written agreement to arbitrate.  *See*  9 U.S.C. § 2.  The United States Supreme Court has held that the phrase “involving commerce” in the FAA is the “functional equivalent of the more familiar term ‘affecting commerce,’” which signals the broadest permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.
[brief] Given the factual background and unusual procedural posture of this case, [...] is a party with an interest in the substance and outcome of this appeal.  [...]’s interests are poised to be affected, depending on the disposition of this matter, and it has had no prior opportunity to submit comment and argument.  See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a).  [...] has had a decades-long relationship with the Department, and the disposition of this case may drastically change how the Department is allowed, prospectively, to scrutinize [...] (and all other AIFs).
[brief] I am aware of a third case in Bergen where a judge appointed a forensic technician to ascertain what has been deleted as well and I believe [...] is being consulted in that matter.  self-created.\textsuperscript{5}  While Plaintiff-Appellant is not unappreciative of the fact that this request may take a more concentrated effort on the part of the Board to fulfill, this is a complication of the Board’s own making, as it allows for commingling of government records with non-government records by permitting Board members to conduct government business on non-government email accounts.  Further, administrative control over the accounts is not necessary or a parameter set forth in the law or in OPRA procedures in practice.  As the first step to responding to this request, [...] should have simply asked Board members to compile the logs and, if necessary, provide certifications explaining why they could not do so.  These certifications are so routine in OPRA practice that they have their own nomenclature - Paff certifications.  The practice is derived from \textit{Paff v. New Jersey Department of Labor}, 393 \textit{N.J. Super.} 334, 341 (App. Div. 2007) and involves sworn statements by agency personnel setting forth in detail the information that would include at least: (1) the search undertaken to satisfy the request; (2) the documents found that are responsive to the request; \textsuperscript{5}