ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DENYING MR. FIGUEROA’S SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION SHOULD BE REVERSED  BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING EACH OF THE BARKER FACTORS.  (2T 3-21 TO 12-21; Da 3)  This Court should reverse the trial court’s decision denying [...]’s speedy trial motion because the trial court erred in its application of each factor of the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  First, the trial court failed to recognize that the delay was longer than the three-year and eight-month delay between the arrest and arraignment because the State would not have turned over all the necessary discovery and been ready for trial at time of arraignment.  In addition, the trial court failed to note that the substantial length of the delay weighed heavily in favor of [...] and warranted a presumption of prejudice under the fourth factor.  Second, the court erred in finding that the State had justified the delay by stating that [...] was in federal custody.  The State was aware that [...] was being federally prosecuted and detained for other offenses committed in New Jersey, and thus either knew where [...] was located or whom it could ask to find out.  Having arrested, charged and issued an indictment against him, the State was obliged to put in some effort to determine his whereabouts, provide him with notice of the complaint and indictment, turn over discovery, secure his appearance in state court with a writ, and allow him the opportunity to secure counsel who could take steps to preserve evidence.  Third, the court erred in not finding that the third factor weighed in favor of [...] because [...] repeatedly and vigorously asserted his speedy trial rights upon notice of the indictment.  Fourth, the court failed to apply the presumption of prejudice mentioned above and erroneously concluded that [...] was only minimally prejudiced, even though the car involved in the eluding offense had been destroyed while in State custody and video surveillance from the offense was no longer available.  Had the trial court correctly applied the factors in accordance with the law, it would have found that [...] was entitled to dismissal with prejudice of the indictment and related motor vehicle violations.  Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court’s order.  A defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial.
[brief] The *Anspach* court explained further that the “real problem alleged by [the] [plaintiff-parents] is not that the state actors interfered with [them] as parents; rather, it is that the state actors did not assist [them] as parents or affirmatively foster the parent/child relationship. ”  *Id.* at 266.  But there is no “constitutional obligation on state actors to contact parents of a minor or to encourage minors to contact their parents.
[brief] ..................................................20  Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475 (1961)  ..............................................................................29  Kish v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 108 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1979)  ..................................................16  Light v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Group, 2006 WL 2042303 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 24, 2006) .......................13  MacProp. Grp. LLC & The Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2022)  .......................................................10  Rao v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 228 N.J. Super. 396 (App. Div. 1988) ..................................................19  Sel. Ins. Co. of Am.  v. Thomas, 847 A.2d 578 (N.J. 2004) ....................................................................27 Shah v. Geico Ins. Co., 2011 WL 3444269 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Aug. 9, 2011) .......................24 Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325 (1995) .............................................................................29 Stiefel v. Bayly, Martin, and Fay, 242 N.J. Super. 643 (App. Div. 1990) ..................................................19 Weitz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 273 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 1994) ..................................................12, 17, 18 Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001) .............................................................................passim Statutes & Other Authorities: N.J. Ct. Rule 4:6-2(e) ..............................................................................4, 9, 10 N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1e(1) .........................................................................27 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 ..................................................................................18 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 ..................................................................................18
[brief] Where this Court has approved of a default judgment entered in a divorce case, the Court did so because the process was fair and the substantive result equitable – neither of which is shown by the [...]’ case here.  In Drobnjak, supra, 2019 WL 1779514, for instance, this Court denied the defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate a default judgment in a divorce case in part because the judgment of divorce that the family court had entered, though by default, was a balanced resolution of the proceeding – not a rubber stamping of what one party demanded against the absent spouse.  And the judge who entered the divorce judgment made the required findings of fact and conclusions of law.  As the Appellate Division noted in Drobnjak, supra, 2019 WL 1779514, “[r]egarding equitable distribution, the trial judge made extensive findings regarding each of the statutory factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1.  The judge listened to testimony and determined that ‘[p]laintiff testified credibly and ... her proofs supported her testimony. ’”  Drobnjak, supra, 2019 WL 1779514; see also Mora, 2017 WL 1021956 (affirming divorce judgment, though on default, where detailed findings of fact and law made by judge following hearing).  In Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div. 1992), conversely, the court refused to condone a marital settlement agreement that was unconscionable in failing to protect the wife's interests due to overreaching by the dominant husband.
[directive] Short term custody begins once a juvenile has entered a police department, and does not include when a juvenile is being transport.20 held at the scene or while in For delinquency complaints, the six-hour timeframe includes the duration of time required for processing and either release on a complaint-summons or transportation to a juvenile detention facility for a complaint- warrant.  Therefore, law enforcement and prosecutors must ensure that these steps are N.J.A.C. 13:94-1.1 et seq., for provisions governing juveniles being taken into custody and limiting the 20 See amount of time a juvenile may be held in short-term custody.  18 completed as expeditiously as possible, but in no event longer than six hours from the time begins.21 custody  VI.  Continued Pretrial Detention  A.  Under 5:21-3, an initial detention hearing  Requests for continued pretrial detention.  Rule will be scheduled for juveniles detained on warrants for a preliminary probable cause review and to determine whether continued pretrial detention is required pursuant to Rule 5:21-5.  In determining whether to seek continued pretrial detention, the Assistant Prosecutor should consider the standards established by law.  The court may detain a juvenile charged with delinquency eleven years of age or older, if any of the following present:22 criteria are 1.  Detention is necessary to secure the presence of the juvenile at the next hearing as evidenced by a demonstrable record of recent willful failure to appear at juvenile court court,23 proceedings or to remain where placed by the or the juvenile is subject to a current warrant for failure to appear at court proceedings that was active at the time they were taken into custody; or 2.  The physical safety of persons or property in the community would be seriously threatened if the juvenile were not detained and the juvenile is charged with an offense which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of the first, second, or third degree, or one of the following crimes of the fourth degree: aggravated assault; stalking; criminal sexual contact; bias intimidation; failure to control or report a dangerous fire; possession of a prohibited weapon or device in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3; or unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5; or 3.  For juveniles charged with an offense which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of the fourth degree other than those enumerated in paragraph 2, or a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense, or with an offense when the criteria for detention are not met, the juvenile may be temporarily placed in a shelter or other non- secure placement if a parent or guardian cannot be located or will not accept custody  In cases where law enforcement officers are seeking a complaint-warrant and detention of the juvenile, Juvenile 21 Intake should be reminded of the six-hour time frame to effectuate placement.
[brief] The Department’s disapproval letters, labeled “Objection Letters” when uploaded to SERFF, put [...] on notice of the Department’s reasons for disapproval of the premium rate increase requests.  From the very beginning, in the January 8, 2021 disapproval letter, the Department set forth in numbered paragraphs the reasons why the premium rate increase request was disapproved.  (Aa96).  The Department offered [...] an opportunity to clarify its position or to provide information that was missing for its premium rate increase requests, as filed.  The Department’s March 30, 2021, disapproval letter then zeroed in on the amount of [...]’s premium rate increase request.  The Department focused on [...]’s targeted loss ratio, actuarial assumptions (such as morbidity, mortality, benefit utilization, and claim termination rate), and why the “acceptable maximum lifetime loss ratio” of 64. 3% is not an acceptable target.  (Aa103).  The history of the communications between the Department and [...] demonstrates that [...] was well aware that the steep degree of its requested rate increases was at issue.
[brief] R. 2:10-2; Trinidad, 241 N.J. at 445-47 (holding lieutenant’s testimony that defendant’s actions “appeared to be criminal” was impermissible lay testimony, but was not plain error); State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 410 (1990) (holding officer’s testimony that defendant “was the person responsible for the murder” was harmless error because of “the strength of the State’s case, the length of the trial, and the number of witnesses called”).  The harmless error standard “requires that there be ‘some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.  The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  *State v. Lazo*, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012); *R.B.*, 183 N.J. at 330 (alterations in original) (quoting *State v. Bankston*, 63 N.J. 263, 273 (1973)).
[directive] Conveyance  Actor carries away property or conceals property with intent to steal or alters tags or 2C:20-11(b)(c)(4)  Shoplifting Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible removes labels with intent to deprive merchant of some or all of its value, less than $200.  Actor issues or passes check in an amount less than $200 knowing it would not be honored 2C:21-5(a)(b)(c)(4)  Bad Checks
[brief] THE INCLUSION OF SERGEANT KOHLER’S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE GPS LOCATION AND HEALTH ACTIVITY DATA OF CO-DEFENDANT GORE AND JIANNA CEZAR’S PHONES WAS NOT CLEARLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING AN UNJUST RESULT.  Generally, failure to "object or otherwise preserve an issue for appeal at the trial court level" limits appellate review to a plain error inquiry.  State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019).  Plain errors are those "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  R. 2:10-2.  In the context of a jury trial, the possibility must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached."  State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).  Defendant did not challenge the inclusion of this testimony at trial, nor did he allege that the State was required to call an expert to testify about how geolocation evidence arrives at and is stored on a cell phone.  Here, the GPS data from [...] and Cezar’s phones, as well the Apple health data from [...]’s phone only corroborated testimony provided by the State’s key witnesses, [...] and [...] about [...] and Cezar’s whereabouts and interactions in the time leading up to and after the murder.  Notably, compared to co-defendant [...], [...] and [...] were key witnesses at trial, as defendant confessed to both of them about his and [...]’s plan to kill the victim and that he specifically was the person who shot her twice in the back of the head.  Further, the data did not directly address defendant’s location, only [...]’s, and to accept the data as corroborative, the jury had to also believe the testimony of [...] and [...] that defendant was with [...] throughout the night and just seconds before he killed the victim.  [...] and [...]’ testimony about defendant planning the murder and his confession shortly after, was fully corroborated by the text messages he sent [...] throughout the evening and night of the murder.  Because of the volume of evidence of defendant’s guilt and because the GPS and Apple health evidence as testified by [...] was only tangentially related to defendant, he fails to establish that the inclusion of the disputed evidence was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and thus his conviction should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[directive] * * *  This order ([...]) is to be used when a NGRI committee has reached their of maximum term commitment under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 but remains a danger to of of themselves, others, or property.  Prior to the end the maximum term commitment allowable under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b )(3), the court shall schedule a of hearing for the NGRI committee.  Upon the presentation medical testimony at of if the hearing by the treating psychiatrist the NGRI committee, based upon the of recommendation the medical expert, the court finds the committee remains of dangerous to self, others or property as a result mental illness at the expiration of of the maximum term confinement, the criminal court shall convert the NGRI committee under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3) to a civil committee under N.J.S.A. 30:4- 27.15.  See State Krol, N.J. 236, 264 (1975).  v. 68
[brief] Plaintiff’s appeal is based primarily on the argument that the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring the appropriate standard on the motion for attorney’s fees set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Rendine v. Pantzer* (141 N.J. 292 [1995]) and subsequent cases.  Even a cursory review of the trial court’s decision and order demonstrates that Plaintiff’s argument is baseless given the extensive citations made by the trial court to *Rendine* and subsequent cases.
[brief] 32  Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298 (1949)  47  Whispering Woods at Bamm Hollow v. Twp. of Middletown, 220 N.J. Super. 161 (Law Div. 1987)  17 Winberry Realty v. Rutherford, 247 N.J. 165 (2021)
[brief] Pa329.  In its first paragraph it stated, “[T]his case has been vigorously prosecuted and defended for many years. ”  Id.  This seemed an excellent preface both to vacating the LoP Dismissal and simply changing the prior State Order to “opposed” because the Opposition from 05/03/23 was in the file (or having a rehearing on corrected notice).  Pa246.  Instead, the Judge only vacated the LoP dismissal and went to great lengths to explain how he guessed it happened.7  Pa329.  I was stumped – and frightened.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................1  POINT I: DISPUTED FACTS AND ASSERTIONS OF LAW.................................1  A.  The Unit’s tax assessment could not be based on “replacement cost” because New Jersey law requires that real property be assessed according to value..............................................................................1  B.  The “undisputed” capital expenditures...............................................................3  C.  The special assessment was absolutely included in the condo fees granted to [...] and [...] knows this.................................................................3  D.  Capital Improvements are barred from being included in “equity” because they are excluded from the definition.................................................................5  E.  The appraisal was hypothetical, but [...] does not reveal this in its brief.........................................................................................................................5  F.  There is no evidence that the rent is under market.............................................6  POINT II: AMACONN MISUNDERSTAND’S TRUPIANO’S ARGUMENT CONCERNING EQUITY.................................................................6  POINT III: AMACONN’S UNCLEAN HANDS AND BAD FAITH....................8  ARGUMENT  I.  DISPUTED FACTS AND ASSERTIONS OF LAW
[directive] At the discretion of the trial judge, if requested by counsel, at least some participation by counsel in the questioning of jurors should be permitted.  Since 1969, the conduct of jury voir dire, which had previously allowed extensive attorney participation, has been primarily in the hands of the trial judge.  State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259 (1969).  There is no suggestion that we should revert to the pre-Manley practices or anything close to them.  During the course of the Special Committee's work, there was no outcry from the bar to allow attorney participation.  However, in some cases practitioners have requested at least some involvement.  Rule 1:8-3(a) allows attorney participation, and Rule 1:8-3(f) requires discussion of the practice, if requested by counsel, during the pre-voir dire conference.
[brief] Due to technical e-filing issues, the May Order was not listed on the notice of appeal, so an Amended Notice of Appeal was timely filed November 25, 2022, pursuant to the case manager’s request on the docket, stating the “CIS lists 9/23/22 which encompasses the 5/31/22 Order, also being added to this amendment.  All 3 orders of 5/31,9/27 and 10/7/22 were filed with the original CIS. ”  Both CIS Statement of Facts also cite the May 31 Order as integral to the September, 2022 reconsideration order.  The May, 2022 Order is also filed in Defendant’s October 17, 2023 Appendix.
[brief] 453 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  “does prohibit states from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society. ”  Ibid.  Two years later, in Miller, the Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. ”  567 U.S. at 479.  Relying on Graham and other sources, the Court observed that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” and “have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform. ”  Id. at 471.  In other words, “[y]outh matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole. ”  Id. at 473.  The Court ultimately set forth five factors a sentencing court must consider before “irrevocably sentencing [a juvenile offender] to a lifetime in prison.
[brief] Here, the Settlement Agreement expressly states that “the defaulting Part[ies] shall reimburse the non-defaulting Part[ies] for all legal and professional fees and expenses incurred in connection with enforcement of this Agreement. ”  Pa062-Pa063 (emphasis added).  Likewise, the Settlement Agreement provides for a $500.00 per diem penalty on account of the [...]’, including the [...]’s, failure to act in accordance with the timelines set forth therein.  Pa057-Pa058.  Thus, the award of both the counsel fees and per diem are entirely appropriate.
[brief] (Da533-545.)  On October 25, 2023, [...] filed a motion before the trial court seeking a stay of the trial court’s September 26, 2023 Order pending appeal pursuant to R. 2:9-5.  (Da546-547.)  On November 17, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying [...]’ motion for a stay pending appeal.  (Da548-549.)  On December 13, 2023, [...] filed a motion before this Court seeking a stay of the trial court’s September 26, 2023 Order pending appeal pursuant to R. 2:9-5.  (Da550-552.)  On January 4, 2024, this Court entered an Order granting [...]’ motion for a stay pending appeal.  (Da553.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] (Pa319); State v. O’Donnell, 255 N.J. 60 (2023).  With respect to the Counts Two to Five claims and causes of actions relating to suppressing plaintiff’s political free speech right to be heard on all posted agenda action items prior to consideration and official action, the trial court erroneously ignored the January 2022 change in policy and procedure and erroneously found that plaintiff had not prevailed on these civil rights act violations claims and causes of actions.
[brief] See Bray v. Cape May City Zoning Bd., 378 N.J. Super. 160, 167 (App. Div. 2005) (applicant for development approval before Zoning Board estopped by contradictory position taken in prior Board application); Piccone v. Carlin, 40 N.J. Super. 393 (Law Div. 1956), also Leasehold Estates Inc. v. Fulbro Holding Co., 47 N.J. Super. 521, 562-564 (App. Div. 1957).  The 1963 Agreement Paragraph 10 created at most a temporary license.  There is no right in either the defendant, the plaintiff, or even the Court, to disregard or override the Approved Site Plan and to direct the use of this walkway/courtyard area on Lot 5 for parking vehicles for another property owner/user.
[brief] Neither the electronic descriptions of actions on these bills nor the certifications and minutes submitted reflect the Applicants’ stated observations of what took place on January 6, 2022, wherein no text of the proposed bills was available for review by the public or minority party legislators until moments before the committees heard testimony and immediately released the new bills.  (Pa103 at ¶ 21.)  The quick and hasty introduction and passage of the legislation calls into serious question whether the public or legislators had adequate notice or opportunity to review the legislation.  See N.J.S.A. 52:11-78.  Additionally, the Legislature failed to follow its statutes for enacting laws.  See N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6, et seq. & N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6.
[brief] The trial court’s instruction to the jury with regard to identification evidence started as follows:  The State has presented the testimony of [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  You will recall that each of these witnesses identified the defendant in court as the person in the surveillance video of February 1st, 2016 who committed the burglary and theft at [...] in [...].  According to [...], [...], [...] and [...] their identification[s] of the defendant were based upon observation and perception they each made of the perpetrator from the surveillance that showed the perpetrator at the time the offense was being committed.  It is your function to determine whether the witnesses[’] identification of the defendant is reliable and believable, or whether it is based on a mistake or for any reason is not worthy of belief.  You must decide whether it is sufficiently reliable evidence that [...] is the person who committed the offense charged.