ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Since [...] and [...], at deposition, effectively conceded that the standard was for them to look out for overloaded U-boats and help to rectify such dangerous conditions, and yet, at the same time, indicated that [...] never implemented a formal training program for its employees to ensure the safe operation of [...]’s U-boats, the trial court erred in ruling that [...] be summarily dismissed from the case because Plaintiffs did not retain an expert.  (2T.20:9-16)  Furthermore, while this Court in Znoski v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 122 N.J. Super. 243, 248-49 (App. Div. 1973) has previously determined that no breach of a duty by a food store proprietor occurs in situations where a customer, operating a shopping cart supplied by the proprietor, causes injury to another patron outside the proprietor’s store in a parking lot, such a situation is readily distinguishable from the instant matter.
[brief] [...] argues that "Plaintiffs acknowledged that the Authority's remediation efforts did in fact confer a benefit to the Property owner..." ([...]'s Brief page 19).  No such admission was ever made by the Plaintiffs, and [...]'s argument is disingenuous and lacks candor.  Plaintiffs have never admitted that a benefit was received, and the [...] has never established that a benefit was received.  Any such claim of benefit goes to the amount of just compensation, and not whether there has been a taking.
[brief] This unit is poorly maintained and functionally obsolete according to the landlord’s own expert.  1T53:23-45 ([...] testifying that the apartment “suffered from tremendous functional obsolescence in both design with regard to the railroad style rooms” as well as the gas heating); *See also* 1T68:14-17 (landlord’s expert testifying that the unit is in poor condition and poorly maintained).  The evidence shows that the unit needed significant repairs just to bring it up to code before [...] would issue a certificate of Substantial Compliance, which [...] needed to file the hardship application, and that the reason this work was done was so [...] could submit a hardship application.
[brief] (Da235-36).  This December 11, 2017 revised order is the operative order, and it reads:  It is on this _______ day of December, 2017, hereby:  ORDERED that the Plaintiffs complaint against Defendant [...] be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations; and it is further; ORDERED that the cross-claims of Defendants [...] d/b/a/ [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...] are hereby preserved in accordance with Burt v. West Jersey Health Sys., 339 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2001); [] [(Da236) (emphasis added)].
[brief] It is unlawful for any person to operate any vehicle of the second division, except a truck tractor, to which this Section is applicable upon any highway of this State unless such vehicle is equipped with rear fender splash guards . . . of either the contour type or the flap type . . . which are so attached as to prevent the splashing of mud or water upon the windshield of other motor vehicles.  [...] to be a credible witness, [...] found as fact that while the officer conducted the K-9 sniff, he did not stop the business related to the traffic stop, such as checking [...]’s license, registration, proof of insurance, and whether any outstanding warrants existed, as permitted by Pulido, 83 N.E.3d at 1120.  (Da19; accord Pulido, 83 N.E.3d at 1120 (a “suspicionless canine sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not independently trigger the fourth amendment, so long as it does not unreasonably prolong the duration of the traffic stop”).
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] graduated from the 94th Academy Class of the New Jersey State Police.  Pa58.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Special Retirement on or about March 1, 2009.  Pa58.  Pa85.  On or about September 12, 2001, and September 13, 2001, [...] was dispatched to Ground Zero.  Pa60.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).  P.L. 2019, c. 157.  Under the Ricci Act, the Board of Trustees was required to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the new law.  The Ricci Act states that the Board of Trustees “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the State Police Retirement System of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.
[brief] THE 290 OCEAN PROJECT REQUIRED  A CAFRA INDIVIDUAL PERMIT ISSUED BY [...] UNDER THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT RULES, INCLUDING THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE; TO DO OTHERWISE WAS CONTRARY TO LAW, [...]’S RULES AND AN ILLEGAL AD HOC WAIVER (REPLYING TO [...]’S BRIEF POINT I AND 290 OCEAN’S BRIEF POINT I).  All participants in this appeal agree that the [...] building requires a CAFRA Individual Permit and does not qualify for a Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit.  (Ra6; Ra18; Ra92; Ra161-172.  See also Rb7).  Meeting the Scenic Resources and Design Rule standards is part and parcel of obtaining a CAFRA Individual Permit.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10.  This self-evident truth has nothing to do with what the Long Branch Design Guidelines do or do not require.  A CAFRA permit is a separate legal requirement unto itself governed by its own rules.  [...] must follow its rules.  See e.g., In re Waterfront Development Permit, 244 N.J. Super 426 (App. Div. 1990)(Commissioner of [...] cannot supplant Division staff’s permit denial and approve a Waterfront Development Permit).  Somehow [...] bought into the circular argument that because Long Branch amended the Design Guidelines to eliminate step-back, etc., thus requiring a regular CAFRA permit including compliance with the Rule, nonetheless [...] should not apply the Rule because Long Branch had decided not to.  This nullified the very reason that [...] did not qualify for a Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit in the first place.  In this respect it is tantamount to [...] issuing a Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit rather than a CAFRA permit.  [...] approved the Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit through rulemaking in 1997.  It never approved Long Branch’s 2020 amended Design Guidelines through rule making or otherwise.  [...]’s ad hoc waiver of the application of the Scenic Resources and Design Rule in issuing a CAFRA permit was contrary to law, contrary to its own regulations, and contrary to well established case law.  *In re CAFRA Permit No. 87-0959-5 Issued to Gateway Associates*, 152 N.J. 287 (1997); *Dragon v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection*, 405 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2009).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] [...] continues this pattern by fighting vigorously to prevent his deposition being taken in connection with an action filed by the [...] in Florida.  The Trial Court has denied [...]’s motion for a protective order, which is now the subject of this appeal.  The Trial Court also denied [...]’s motion for a stay of his deposition pending appeal, finding that [...] failed to demonstrate any of the elements for a stay pending appeal.  [...] sought a further delay by seeking a stay pending appeal before this Court, which this Court rightly rejected.  [...] has now filed a half-hearted motion for reconsideration of that decision, which the court has denied.  [...] essentially is taking the position that the efforts to take his deposition are harassing and seek irrelevant information.  That position is not well-founded.  Plaintiffs have submitted eight (8) Affidavits of investors that put the lie to [...]’s denials and show that discovery from [...] is relevant to the underlying Florida action.  The Affidavits attest that [...]: (1) actively solicited investor funds; (2) was given access to, and explained to investors, the underlying investments of the [...]; (3) was the messenger for [...] and [...]’s resignations from the [...]; (4) solicited the investors for duplicate real estate deals on behalf of [...] into the same properties as the [...]; (5) denied the investors any further information, claiming he had been “slapped” by [...] before for giving away too much information; and (6) once [...] was caught holding investor funds, [...] undertook to extricate [...] by trying to convince investors to take a raw deal that purported to reimburse the investor funds [...] held by short-changing them the funds owed.  These Affidavits suffice in and of themselves to show why discovery from [...] is relevant.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the Trial Court’s Order should be affirmed.
[brief] Q: Is there a sidewalk that is adjacent to where [...] parked her car?  A: No.  Q: Is there a crosswalk where [...] was crossing to walk?  A: No.  Q: Is there a sign warning you of any pedestrian traffic crossing in this area where [...] crossed?  A: No. [Pa327 (105:18-106:3). ]  Q: Is there a sidewalk around the exterior, the perimeter of the back parking lot?  A: No, there is not.
[brief] The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.
[directive] Attorney General [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) must provide, as a condition of the standardized “open” offer, that the defendant submit to a drug or alcohol diagnostic assessment unless the court in the exercise of its discretion determines that there is no basis for ordering the defendant to undergo such an assessment.  In addition, the standardized “open” offer shall include the condition that in the event that the defendant is sentenced by the court to a probationary term, the defendant must agree to participate in any drug or alcohol treatment or counseling program deemed by the court to be appropriate, whether pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 or any other law, or the court’s inherent authority.  The plea offer shall include an express condition that if the defendant should refuse to undergo a drug or alcohol diagnostic assessment ordered by the court, or if the defendant refuses to accept or participate in any drug or alcohol counseling program deemed to be appropriate by the court as a condition of probation, the standardized “open” offer shall automatically be nullified and withdrawn, and the prosecutor in these circumstances shall reserve and retain all rights and authority pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.  Furthermore, so as to preserve the viability and integrity of the Drug Court Program, in any case where the defendant is found to be clinically and legally eligible for the rehabilitative sentencing option set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, the prosecutor shall be prohibited from tendering any form of “conditional” plea offer in which the defendant would be afforded the option to forego offered treatment under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 in favor of accepting a standardized “open” offer, unless the standardized offer includes an express condition that the defendant will participate in any treatment program that may be ordered by the court.
[brief] “The record is clear that both Counsels of the Defendants stated that the ZBA has no jurisdiction as to “regulated activities” within a historic district of Middletown and that it must defer to the decision of the Landmark Commission.  While Middletown ordinances conflict with that determination, the instant matter was decided in that context.  In fact, Counsel for [...] went further and stated that Plaintiffs would have only 45 days to appeal a decision of the Landmark Commission.  If that is true, Plaintiffs rights to due process would be violated as the Landmark Commission sends out no notices and publishes no decisions.  Query how would Plaintiffs even know there was a decision to challenge, let alone be able to do so in 45 days. ”  While Appellants have rightly omitted their briefs below, in the event Applicants or the ZBA challenge the above excerpt, Appellants shall supply the brief within its reply.
[brief] Further, the Court held that "expressing mitigation of damages as a percentage of fault reducing plaintiff's damages has been found to be a proper method for fairly accounting for failure to mitigate."  *Id.* at 445, 545 A.2d 148.  Thus, "[i]t is well settled that injured parties have a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages."  *McDonald*, supra, 79 N.J. at 299, 398 A.2d 1283.  Damages will not be recovered to the extent that the injured party could have avoided his losses through reasonable efforts "without undue risk, burden or humiliation."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 350(1),(2) (1981).  Thus it is irrefutable that a plaintiff must try to mitigate damages, even when the defendant is clearly liable.  So I can see no reason why that same underlying rationale would not also apply to scenarios involving frivolous litigation sanctions.  In fact, the controlling authorities strongly suggest that I am correct.
[brief] (Da518.) application contained all of the components contemplated under the ordinance.  See id.  Significantly, the standard simply requires a comparison of a submission to “the requirements of the municipal ordinance; it does not require review of each submission to determine whether a ‘meaningful review’ can be undertaken. ”  Id. at 562.  Pursuant to its delegated power, the [...] incorporated into its ordinances a set of requirements for site plan approval for permitted cannabis-related uses.
[brief] This appeal need not be another banal, de novo review of an indemnification clause.  A jury found the purported indemnitee solely liable for the Plaintiff’s injuries.  This verdict eliminates any need for appellate review.  The indemnitee now lacks standing to challenge the trial court’s ruling that the indemnification clause was impermissibly vague.  In this construction site personal injury action, the jury found the general contractor, appellant/third-party plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”), 100% at fault for plaintiff, [...]’s damages.
[brief] While [...] has argued that Plaintiff declined medical attention following the incident, [...]’s determination as to the severity of her injuries at the time that Plaintiff was struck by [...]’s overloaded U-boat should not have been a consideration.  Since [...] was put on notice of Plaintiff’s accident and injury, and since it was anticipated that litigation was likely and that [...] would be a party to such a suit, [...] should have retained such unique, relevant evidence that can now no longer be recovered, which would have been vital to Plaintiff proving her case.
[brief] Both [...] and [...] were previously represented by [...], Esq.  (“Kadish”) of [...].  By way of Order dated February 28, 2024, the trial court disqualified [...] from their representation of Defendants pursuant to RPC 1.7.  The decision below was incorrectly premised upon a presumed conflict between [...] and [...] due to a miscommunication between [...] and his [...] supervisor, [...], about which cut-through [...] was to utilize while travelling on the Garden State Parkway immediately prior to the Accident.  Morrow testified that he advised all [...] drivers that day, including [...], that they were to utilize a grass cut-through that was marked by cones and lane closures.  [...] testified that he mis-heard Morrow’s instructions about the appropriate cut-through to use, and learned subsequently that he had made a mistake and used an improper macadam cut-through, which immediately preceded the crash between [...] and the Plaintiffs.  The fact that Morrow advised [...] of the appropriate cut-through to use, and [...] mis-heard those instructions and mistakenly used a different cut-through prior to the Accident, does not create a direct, concurrent conflict of interest between [...] and his employer, [...].  It is undisputed that [...] was within the scope of his employment with [...] at the time that the Accident occurred.  [...] has not taken any position which attempts to place [...] outside of his employment with the company, nor any position that rebuts its vicarious liability for [...]’ actions.  Thus, should [...] be found liable in this matter, such liability will flow through to [...] vicariously.  Likewise, should [...] not be found liable, [...] too will bear no responsibility for the happening of the Accident.  Furthermore, neither [...], nor [...], have attempted to cast blame for the Accident upon the other.  In fact, both of their interests in this litigation are identical, that is, to minimize [...]’ apportionment of liability for the Accident.  Thus, the positions of [...]’ and [...] are not directly adverse, and therefore no concurrent conflict of interest exists between the two.  As such, the trial court erred in finding such a conflict and improperly disqualifying [...] from its representation of Defendants in this matter.
[brief] This is also why, repeatedly throughout the trial, both [...] and Defense counsel instructed the jury to decide this case free from passion, prejudice, bias, or sympathy (4T, at 143:11-15; 5T, at 22:1-23:7).  Importantly, [...] also instructed all members of the jury array to notify the Court if any party or their counsel attempted to speak to them, interact with them, or influence them in any way (7T, at 9:25-10:10).  And yet, not a single juror alerted the Court of any improper conduct (6T, at 55:8-19; 7T, at 25:21-4; 26:8-16).
[directive] (N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(3).)  of by  Finally, a recommendation no release issued Pretrial Services may be of only considered prima facie evidence when that recommendation is a result the defendant being charged with the enumerated offenses set forth in N.J.S.A.  2A:162- of  No other recommendation no release may 19(g) and N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(t). be considered to be prima facie evidence.  of6  Page3  In response to these amendments to the CJRA, the Supreme Court has amended 3:4A, the Pretrial Detention Rule, to incorporate the statutory creation R. of of this new category defendant into the Court Rules.  The Court's August 2022 1, order adopting the rule amendment, which was effective immediately, was published and posted by Notice to the Bar also dated August 2022.
[brief] In Re Proposed Quest Academy Char., 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013).  Specifically to this case, “a failure to consider all the evidence in a record would perforce lead to arbitrary decision making. ”  Id. at 386 (citations omitted).  Also specifically to this case, a court may intervene when the agency action is “inconsistent with its mandate. ”  Id. at 385 (citations omitted).  “Arbitrary and capricious” in the administrative setting means “willful and unreasoning action without consideration and in disregard of circumstances. ”  Beattystown Community Council v. D.E.P, 313 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 1998).  This court is not bound by the ALJ's findings.  In re Suspension of License of Silberman, 169 N.J. Super. 243, 255-56 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 84 N.J. 303 (1980).  The court is not bound by or owes any deference to the [...]’s interpretation of law.  N.J. Ass’n of Realtors v. N.J. Dep’t Of Envtl. Prot., 367 N.J. Super. 154, 150-60 (App. Div. 2004).  2.  [...] Always Has The Burden Of Proof And Persuasion (Argued Below: Ha105)
[brief] Defendant [...] was initially represented in this civil matter by [...], Esq. of the [...] firm, who was assigned by [...], the homeowner’s insurance carrier of Defendant [...]’s father, and/or [...], his father’s umbrella insurance carrier.  Da206 (¶¶ 4, 7), Da212-3 (¶¶ 4, 7).  Following [...]’s January 4, 2024 guilty plea to aggravated assault, both [...] and [...] withdrew their defenses in this civil action.  Id.  Mr. Caruso withdrew as counsel for [...] on February 28, 2024 and [...], Esq., personal counsel, took over his civil defense.  Da187.  On March 19, 2024, [...] filed a third-party complaint against [...] and [...] seeking the reinstatement of a defense under the subject insurance policies.  Da205-Da217.  Mr. Caruso has represented that [...] and/or [...] agreed to reinstate coverage after Mr. Ansell “was able to convince [the] liability insurers that the statements made during [[...]’s] plea allocution were inadmissible unless he violates PTI and ultimately gets convicted under [the case of State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2022)].”  Db18.  Mr. Caruso further represented that coverage for [...] “was only reinstated under a reservation of rights after personal counsel convinced the carriers that Alex [...]-Eskengren’s guilty plea and factual basis were inadmissible or non-evidential pursuant to the court’s holding in Lavrik. ”  Db18 (citing 2T12:5-13:6).  On April 9, 2024, Mr. Caruso, the insurance-carrier-provided defense counsel, substituted back in as [...]’s attorney and on April 10, 2024, the third-party insurance coverage complaint was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.  Da224-5.  G. [...] Contradicts His Prior Testimony During His Deposition
[brief] The cut sheet listed four elevations staked at the four corners of the proposed new building.  The cut sheet recited:  "Building elevation based on plan entitled 'Grading Plan, [...], Proposed Retail Development, [...]' dated 4/11/05 and prepared by [...] Sheet 4 of 11."  This undeniably referred to Dynamic's preliminary grading plan, because all subsequent revised grading plans were numbered "5 of 11" and bore later dates.  The cut sheet explicitly required that [...] "must notify this office prior to any construction if the above referenced plans have been revised."
[brief] According to defendant, he was the front passenger in [...]’s car as they were driving down Route 22 in the right lane when they approached the sheriff officers finishing up a traffic stop.  (1T56-3 to 4, 57-5 to 6, 65-12 to 24, 70-15 to 22).  As she passed by the officers, [...] used her blinker as she changed from the right to left lane.  (1T57-5 to 13).  [...] again used her blinker as she changed back from the left to the right lane.  (1T57-6 to 16).  Because he had drugs on his person, when defendant saw police pulling people over he became “attentive” to [...]’s use of her turn signal.  (1T71-25 to 73-6).  He knew [...] used her signal because he could hear the “click. ” (1T73-7 to 15).  Defendant did not notice the officers behind them until [...] stated that they were being pulled over.  (1T56-20 to 57-1).  At that point, they were back in the right lane.  (1T57-14 to 16).  Defendant admitted he was nervous when he saw they were being pulled over.  (1T66-23 to 68-14).  Defendant admitted that there was marijuana in the car and that he had smoked earlier that day.  (1T74-7 to 75-6).  He acknowledged having a can of pepper spray attached to a box cutter on his belt clip.  (1T60-24 to 61-10, 73-  Defendant testified that the officer did not conduct a limited Terry\(^5\) frisk for weapons but rather recovered the drugs after “digging” in his pockets.  (1T62-15 to 65-4).  Defendant admitted lying to the officer that the drugs he pulled out of his pocket was marijuana.  (1T79-15 to 80-8).  Defense counsel’s principal argument to the trial court was that the search of defendant’s person was invalid.
[brief] [...] attempted to ascertain what was wrong with [...] until the first responders arrived.  (T4 131:5-10).  [...] went outside with a flashlight to alert the first responders to his location.  (T4 132:2-7).  [...], of the [...], was first to arrive at [...]’s home.  (T4 134:11-14).  [...] was, understandably, nervous and sweating.  (T4 132:12-15).  [...] acknowledged that when someone is nervous or upset, they can appear jittery and can sweat from anxiety.