ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Lechler v. 303 Sunset Ave. Condo. Ass’n, 452 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2017).................................................................13, 15 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Committee of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995).................................................................10  McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272 (1963).............................9, 17, 22 Moore v. Schering Plough, Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 2000)................9, 17, 22, 23  Mulraney v. Auletto’s Catering, 293 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 263 (1996).........................................................11  Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 157 N.J. 84 (1999).............................22 Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559 (2003)...............................14, 28 Nelson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 48 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1958).....14 O’Shea v. K Mart Corp., 304 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 1997).....................14 Parks v. Rodgers, 176 N.J. 491 (2003).....................................................11, 25 Piccone v. Stiles, 329 N.J. Super. 191 (App. Div. 2000)..................................25 Poland v. Parsekian, 81 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1963), certif. denied, 41 N.J. 520 (1964).........................................................23 Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437 (1981)......................................................22 Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 209 N.J. 35 (2012).............................................13, 16 RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459 (2018)..........................10 Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div. 1994)...............................10 Shutka v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 74 N.J. Super. 381 (App. Div. 1962), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 183 (1962).........................................................22, 23 Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267 (1954).......................................................9, 16, 18 Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016).................................................................10 Zentz v. Toop, 92 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 1966), affd., 50 N.J. 250 (1967).................................................................9, 16, 17 Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250 (1992).......................................................11 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1.........................................................................................24 Court Rules R. 4:5-4..............................................................................................................22 R. 4:46-2(c)......................................................................................................10 Model Jury Charges M.J.C. 5.20F(4)............................................................................................18, 19, 20
[brief] The Plaintiffs-Respondents/Cross-Appellants, [...] and [...] (“Respondents”) argue that the [...] and Mayor [...] (“Appellants”) fail to acknowledge the “reasons why the trial court ruled that the Defendants have no further approval authority over Plaintiffs’ site plan application. ”  Pb26.  This is not true.  The Appellants recognize the basis that the lower court provided for its decision.  However, such basis is wholly irrelevant when placed in the context of designating a special hearing officer to oversee an application.  As set forth in the Appellant’s original moving papers, and as evidenced by Respondents lack of argument to the contrary, this matter does not qualify as a Mt. Laurel lawsuit or a builder’s remedy suit.
[directive] I understand that I must consent following: to the by law.  para participar [Tratamiento Nueva aceptado Entiendo Tribunal sido Jersey.  Programa  Drogas Estado que del he el en del de de] de condici6n participaci6n, exigiran y declare culpable condena.  una impondni  Estare que la Como se bajo me de me me mi supervision Juez y a requerira participe tratamiento Divisi6n Libertad Tribunal Prueba.  Drogas del del de en la que de de Se el contra y complete a participaci6n entiendo ordene.  Tambien exito drogas que que ponen uso segun con si el me fin el en se de mi lo programs, recibir sera declaratorio para admitir culpabilidad condena acuerdo convenio que hay puedo con de el la o, si no un declaraci6n culpabilidad, seni permitida autorizada por convenio condena para Entiendo acuerdo con tengo la que ley.
[brief] The [...] Zoning Map, included in Chapter 230 as Attachment 7, shall be amended as follows (see attached):  - Include the following zone districts already adopted pursuant to previous ordinances but not yet updated on the Zoning Map: PBR, PBO Overlay, AHR-1, AHR-2, R-27F, TH/MFD, Rt. 202 and Stiles Lane Overlays.  - Eliminate the former B-6 Zone pursuant to the AHR-1  Ordinance adopted in 2019, but not yet updated on the Zoning Map.  - Include Block 59 Lots 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22 in a new Senior Housing – 1 Overlay Zone, while retaining the existing underlying zone designation for these parcels.  - Include Block 39 Lots 67.02, 68, 69 and 70 in a new Senior Housing – 2 Overlay Zone, while retaining the existing underlying zone designations for these parcels.  SECTION 28.
[directive] B.  First Appearance  At the first appearance proceeding, any defendant charged with the following offenses shall be advised of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea:  (1) all disorderly or petty disorderly persons offenses; (2) driving while intoxicated (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.14; N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.13; N.J.S.A. 12:7-46); (3) operating motor vehicle while in possession of a CDS (N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1).  The municipal court judge shall engage in the following colloquy with defendants charged with the above-listed offenses at first appearance proceeding:  If you are not a United States citizen and if you plead guilty to or are convicted of certain offenses heard in the municipal court, including some motor vehicle offenses, it may result in your being deported from the United States, or it may Directive #09-11 – Immigration Consequences of Guilty Pleas in Municipal Court December 28, 2011  Page 3 prevent you from being re-admitted to the United States if you leave voluntarily, or it may prevent you from ever becoming a naturalized American citizen.  Do you understand?  You have a right to seek advice from a private attorney about the effect a guilty plea or conviction will have on your immigration status.  If you qualify for a court-appointed attorney, you can speak to the public defender about the immigration consequences of your plea.  Do you understand?  The municipal court judge shall engage in this colloquy during the first appearance for all defendants charged with any of the above-listed offenses, regardless of the defendant’s name, appearance, or English proficiency.  This requirement is not intended to in any way limit the judge’s discretion to engage in this same colloquy with other defendants who have been charged with offenses other than those listed above.  C.
[brief] disqualification.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Therefore, even where no actual bias exists, the court should be recused where it has “relied on inappropriate factors in reaching its determination. ”  New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 617 (1986).  Further, where, as here, the trial court “has heard [the] evidence and may have a commitment to its findings,” this Court has held that “it is best that the case be reconsidered by a new fact-finder. ”  Id. See Melvin, 248 N.J. at 352–53 (ordering different judge for resentencing noting that it would be difficult for defendant to understand how judge who made such rulings could arrive at a different determination on resentencing).  The record establishes that the sentencing hearing was tainted and that [...] is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding before a different judge.  CONCLUSION
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Respondents [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] respectfully request that this Court affirm the decision of the [...] dismissing Petitioner’s complaint.  [...]  Attorneys for Respondents [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...].  By: ________________________________  [...]  Dated: February 7, 2024
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:14A-2.4; N.J.A.C. 7:14A-13.2(a)(2).  Stormwater NJPDES permits may be required for a particular activity to control stormwater based on a TMDL.  N.J.A.C. 7:14A-24.2(a)(7).  Here, [...] obtained a 5G3 NJPDES permit to manage stormwater during construction.  See N.J.A.C. 7:14A-24.7; TGPs024.  Again, as noted in [...]’s initial merits brief, the WQMP Rules set forth the process by which NJDEP reviews projects and activities within the Highlands Preservation Area and the information needed for NJDEP to make a Consistency Determination.  Specifically, the WQMP Rules provide that “[f]or projects or activities in the Highlands preservation area, a complete application for a Consistency Determination review shall include all relevant information identified pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2 or 9.5” and shall be conducted in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:38-11.2, 11.3, and 11.7.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(g).  Since [...] sought an exemption under the Highlands Act, it was required to provide the information set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2, which includes information on the proposed method of wastewater treatment, amount of wastewater flow in gallons per day, and water supply demand for the proposed development.  See N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2(c).  All of this information was provided to NJDEP as part of [...]’s HAD application.  See Aa0031-32.  NJDEP reviewed this information in accordance with N.J.A.C.  7:38-11.2 and 11.7 and ultimately found CS 327 to be consistent with the areawide WQM Plan.  For these reasons and those set forth in [...]’s initial merits brief, NJDEP’s Consistency Determination was in accordance with the WQMP Rules.
[brief] ” (9T16-23 to 25).  He testified that when the Audi slowed down to about five to six miles per hour and pulled up, he was able to see the driver.  (9T17-23 to 25; 9T18-3 to 4).  After hearing about three to four shots, he ran downstairs to see what was going on.  (9T21-8 to 24).  Once he got downstairs, he saw [...] laying on the side of an Expedition or Navigator that had a broken taillight.  (9T22-1 to 13).  [...] had seen the driver before, who he described as having dreads, a mustache, and sideburns.  (9T18-21 to 19-6).  When the car drove by, he did not see anyone wearing a mask.  (9T24-19 to 22).  He testified that he did not see the person who was shooting the gun, but he saw flames coming from a gun from the right-hand side of the front window.  (9T28-10 to 18).  [...] was unable to speak with police on the night of the shooting because he was “shocked”.  On June 12, 2012, he gave a statement to [...] of the [...] ([...]) Homicide Task Force and identified the driver of the Audi in photograph number three of an array shown to him by [...] [...].  (9T22-22 to 23; 9T23-14 to 17, 9T24-7 to 18; 9T26-1 to 28-3; 9T27-2 to 25; 9T36-12 to 17; 9T42-21 to 25).  He identified the Audi on the surveillance video as the Audi that he saw that night.  (9T20-11 to 19).  [...] also testified that the driver’s side window of the Audi was down.  (9T21-3 to 4).
[brief] Recognizing the impossible hurdle caused by the *Gomez* opinion and the opinions thereafter, Appellant relies on the inapposite *Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation*, 243 N.J 319 (2020).  But *Sun Chemical Corporation*, held that the defendant in fact provided a product that was *offered to the public for sale* and, therefore, the NJCFA applied.  2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974, at *329.  As all courts evaluating debt buying have held, unlike *Sun Chemical Corporation*, here, there is no evidence that any of the Respondents provided a product to the public for sale.  Instead, Respondents merely acquired, held, and transferred accounts, with [...] ultimately engaging in debt buying and collection practices, none of which activities are not covered under the NJCFA.
[brief] Opportunity for Fair Hearing and Objection  The Township has clearly followed the strict requirements set forth at N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq.  In fact, The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., specifically held that the Township had complied with all of the requirements in order to proceed with a condemnation acquisition.  (Pa1)  Throughout the process, the defendant was afforded ample opportunity to voice objections and was provided with an opportunity for a fair and transparent hearing.  The trial court's decision to proceed with the condemnation was based on a comprehensive evaluation of the facts, the law, and the public interest, fully satisfying due process requirements.  [...]'s commitment to due process and fairness is further exemplified by the extensive opportunities provided to the property owner to object to both the condemnation itself and the compensation offered.  This approach not only meets the legal requirements but also reflects the Township's dedication to a transparent and equitable eminent domain process.  From the outset, [...] has ensured that the property owner has the right to object to the condemnation proceedings and to seek judicial review of both the decision to condemn and the amount of compensation offered.  This right is a fundamental aspect of the eminent domain process, safeguarding property owners' interests and allowing for the resolution of disputes through the judicial system.  Throughout the eminent domain process, [...] has maintained a transparent decision-making process.  All steps, from initial proposals to final decisions, have been documented and made available to the public, ensuring that the process is open to scrutiny and that the rationale behind decisions is clear and understandable.  The eminent domain proceedings conducted by [...] have been subject to legal and judicial safeguards designed to protect the rights of property owners.  These include the right to legal representation, the opportunity to present evidence and arguments in court, and the possibility of appealing decisions deemed unfavorable.  These safeguards are essential components of a fair and just eminent domain process, ensuring that property owners have access to legal recourse and protection.  The opportunities for fair hearing and objection provided by [...] throughout the eminent domain process exemplify the Township's adherence to the principles of due process and fairness.  By ensuring that the property owner has ample opportunity to voice its concerns and by responding to these concerns in a constructive and fair manner, the Township upholds the highest standards of justice and equity.  These practices not only meet but exceed the procedural requirements for eminent domain proceedings, warranting this Appellate Court's affirmation of the Township's actions.
[brief] He provided a taped statement in which he stated that it was Defendant who killed [...] by shooting him.  [...] told the detectives that he had provided Defendant with the murder weapon, and that they could find it in a Grand Marquis parked near the [...] in [...].  (26T 6-18 to 7-3; 30T 270-2 to 271-11).  [...] testified that the officers were under the impression that the shooting of [...] was a result of a robbery attempt, but he did not provide any details about it being a murder at that time.  See (30T 275-11 to 275-21).  Upon execution of a search warrant for the Grand Marquis on March 14, officers recovered several items of evidentiary value from the trunk of the vehicle including a thousand decks of heroin and a loaded Ruger .357mm handgun in a Gucci bag, a loaded Ruger 9mm handgun in a Nike Watchman’s hat, and a Colt .45mm magazine.  There were thirteen shells inside the magazine in the Ruger 9mm which possessed the same stamp as the shell casing recovered near [...]’s body.  (27T 57-2 to 61-19).  Ballistics analysis of the handguns revealed that the Ruger 9mm was the handgun which fired the round corresponding to the shell casing recovered near [...]’s body and the round recovered from inside his skull.  (3T 155-14 to 158-16, 159-7 to 160-14).  On October 29, 2019, [...] gave a fourth taped statement in order to obtain a plea deal to resolve his murder charges.
[brief] ”  \textit{State v. Witt}, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) (citing \textit{State v. Robinson}, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009)).  “The jurisdiction of appellate courts rightly is bounded by the proofs and objections critically explored on the record before the trial court by the parties themselves. ”  \textit{Robinson}, 200 N.J. at 19.  “Parties must make known their positions at the suppression hearing so that the trial court can \(^2\) The State also disputes that [...] involuntarily consented to the search.  (Sb 26-32)  [...] relies on his initial brief with respect to that issue.  rule on the issues before it. ”  Witt, 223 N.J. at 419 (emphasis added).  If a party fails to “properly present[ ]” an issue “to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available,” the court on appeal “will decline to consider” the issue.
[brief] *Id.* at *8-9, 11.  In addition, the Appellate Division found that there was no evidence indicating that the parties intended to shift the burden of the costs associated with the sellers’ environmental obligations to the purchasers, *id.* at *8, and reiterated that it is not the court’s function “to rewrite a contract for the parties better than or different from the one they wrote for themselves. ”  *Id.* at *9 (quoting *Kieffer*, 205 N.J. at 223).  Thus, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded, concluding that the purchasers were entitled to relief and the contract “should have been enforced without modification”—in other words, the sellers were obligated to complete their remediation obligations and obtain the RAO.
[brief] [9T76-10 to -17].  The court held that it had “a paucity of information with regard to any proof, or substantial proof or probability that a third person, or a specific third person committed the act. ”  [9T76-2 to -5].  [...] also held that the court did not have any information that had a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential element of the State’s case.  [9T76-10 to -17].  The court left open the possibility of the emergence of evidence as to third-party guilt and held it would rule accordingly if it arose during trial.
[directive] (3)  Você entende que ser condenado à supervisão vitalícia de liberdade [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] [Não condicional significa que ao ser liberado da prisão ou corresponde/NA] imediatamente após a imposição de uma pena suspensa você será supervisionado pela Divisão de Liberdade Condicional por pelo menos 15 anos e estará sujeito às disposições e condições da liberdade condicional, incluindo as condições apropriadas para proteger a população e promover a reabilitação, tais como, mas sem limitações, terapia, acesso ou uso da internet e outras restrições que podem incluir restrições sobre onde poderá morar, trabalhar ou viajar ou pessoas com quem você poderá se comunicar?  Do you understand that being sentenced to parole supervision for life means that upon release from incarceration or immediately upon imposition of a suspended sentence you will be supervised by the [...] for at least 15 years and will be subject to provisions and conditions of parole, including conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, such as, but not limited to, counseling, Internet access or use, and other restrictions which may include restrictions on where you can live, work, travel or persons you can contact? (4)  Você entende que as restrições sobre onde poderá morar podem [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  [Não incluir restrições em residir em uma casa com menores? corresponde/NA]  Do you understand that the restrictions on where you can live may include restrictions on residing in a home with minor children?  (5)  Você entende que se descumprir uma condição da supervisão  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  [Não vitalícia de liberdade condicional, sua liberdade condicional poderá corresponde/NA] ser revogada e poderá vir a cumprir um termo de prisão de 12 a 18 meses por cada revogação que ocorrer enquanto estiver sob no Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese página 5 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese page 5 of 7 supervisão e que o termo de prisão determinado não poderá ser reduzido por comutação de pena ou créditos de trabalho?
[brief] [Cf. Pa175 at ¶ 9 with Pa163, Pa305].  Despite this, [...] contends that it should be relieved of the consequences of its multiple breaches because “[t]he Trial --- ² [...] concedes that “[...] was to return the Property in broom clean condition and free of personal property and debris. ”  [Pa169, Pa175 at ¶ 6].  Court … held that [...] [sic] breached the settlement agreement and was not entitled to enforce such Consent Judgment” – although the trial court made no such finding.
[brief] In this case, the State alleged at trial that [...] misappropriated seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00) from a group of investors between March of 2014 and May of 2014.  (Sa1-3).  Those funds were intended to be used to develop a [...] restaurant franchise at [...] in [...].  In 2007, his family’s business, [...], purchased the restaurant property leasehold at [...] in Hoboken.
[brief] ## Table of Authorities ### Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Amabile v. Lerner, 74 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 1963) | 13 | | Antenucci v. Mr. Nick’s Mens Sportswear, 212 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1986) | 31, 32 | | Barila v. Bd. of Educ., 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | 16 | | Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111 (2000) | 35 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 12, 13 | | Caruso v. Ravenswood Devs., Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 2001) | 16 | | Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259 (2006) | 16 | | D’Alessandro v. Hartzel, 422 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 2011) | 25 | | Dunn v. Borough of Mountainside, 301 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1997) | 35 | | Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123 (2017) | 12 | | Freeman v. State, 347 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 2002) | 36 | | Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009) | 13 | | Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993) | 25, 32 | | Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Market at Robbinsville, 429 N.J. Super. 79 (2012) | 27, 28, 29, 30 | | Konopka v. Foster, 356 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2002) | 40 | | Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973) | 35 | | M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 378 (2002) | 15 | | Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99 (2014) | 15 | | McGlone v. Corbi, 59 N.J. 86 (1971) | 39 | | Merchs. Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2005) | 13 | | Molnar v. Hedden, 138 N.J. 96 (1994) | 39 | | Nielsen v. Wal-Mart Store No. 2171, 429 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2013) passim | | | Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 1960) | 13 | | Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34 (2016) | 24 | Renee Cleaners, Inc. v. Good Deal Super Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 1965) .................................................................
[brief] The doctrine of probable intent cannot be used to alter documents that are clear on their face absent the presentation of some extrinsic evidence revealing a latent ambiguity.  *See Ventre*, 2022 WL 2542293, at *6 (noting that the probable intent doctrine is inapplicable where documents are clear and discussing the importance of extrinsic evidence to establish the existence of an ambiguity and to illuminate the testator’s intent); *Matter of Est. of Alfieri*, No. A-2847-16T4, 2019 WL 4879852, at *11 (App. Div. Oct. 3, 2019) (holding that “bare conclusory assertions without factual support in the record” did not suffice to alter the clear terms of a will).