ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] STANDARDIZED WAIVERS  6.1  General Description of Standardized Waivers  These Guidelines establish two standardized waivers of the otherwise statutorily prescribed mandatory term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility.  These standardized waivers are reserved for certain less culpable persons convicted of distribution or possession with intent to distribute controlled substances within a drug-free zone in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.  The first such standardized plea offer involves a waiver only of the term of parole ineligibility, so that the defendant would still be required to serve a State Prison term.  This type of waiver is referred to as a “flat offer. ”  The second type of standardized waiver, which is reserved for even less culpable school zone offenders, involves a complete and unrestricted waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, so that the sentence imposed upon these defendants will be determined in the discretion of the court.  This type of waiver is referred to as an “open offer. ”  When a defendant is eligible for an open offer, the sentencing court is authorized but not required to impose a State Prison term, and can instead sentence the defendant to probation, in which event the court would be authorized but not required to impose a term of incarceration in county jail as a condition of probation.  When an open offer is tendered, the prosecutor reserves the right to argue for a State Prison sentence or a specified term of incarceration in county jail, but does not control the sentencing decision, which is instead determined by the sentencing court applying the ordinary aggravating and mitigating factors outlined in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice.  When a defendant is eligible for either type of standardized waiver offer, the prosecutor need not calculate a “regular” Brimage offer or prepare a regular Brimage Plea Negotiation Worksheet.  Instead, the prosecutor will use a new short form (with check off boxes), known as a Brimage Standardized Waiver Plea Form, see Appendix IA, to document that the defendant satisfies all of the eligibility criteria for the applicable standardized offer.  If the defendant is for any reason ineligible for a standardized waiver, the prosecutor need not prepare a Brimage Standardized Waiver Plea Form.  If defense counsel requests in writing the reason(s) why the defendant is not eligible for a standardized waiver, the prosecutor may prepare a Brimage Standardized Waiver Plea Form indicating the reason(s) for the defendant’s ineligibility (represented by one or more “No” selections on the Form).  Note that the facts or circumstances that made the defendant ineligible for a standardized waiver offer (e.g., the offense involved a second-degree amount of drugs; the defendant’s criminal history; the involvement of firearms, etc.) will in any event be documented Page 38  Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) in a “regular” Brimage Plea Negotiation Worksheet that will be tendered to defense counsel.
[brief] Plaintiff filed claims against Defendants in Chancery court pursuant to a 2022 Addendum (the last agreement made in furtherance of the rescue plan) regarding her equitable ownership of the property, and Defendants filed claims against Plaintiff in the Law Division alleging she mismanaged the property.  Defendants also counterclaim in the Chancery matter alleging Plaintiff cannot purchase the property because of her mismanagement and seek recission of the 2022 Addendum.  The parties agreed to mediate the Law Division matter, and Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration in the Chancery matter, which was granted.
[brief] On or about September 6, 2018, Appellant, [...] was a lawful business invitee of the [...] property located at [...].  (Pa35-47)  Appellant had parked her vehicle in a [...] marked spot and was proceeding to walk from her vehicle towards the [...] when she was caused to trip/slip and fall and sustain serious and permanent injuries which ultimately required surgery.  (Pa35-47, Pa236-239)  Respondent [...] was the owner of the property and Respondent [...] was the commercial tenant of the property.  (Pa35-47, Pa206-225)  Respondents carelessly, negligently and/or recklessly maintained certain areas of the \(^2\) 2T – Transcript of March 17, 2023 Oral Argument, previously submitted to this Court.  premises in a negligent matter so as to allow the parking lot to be damaged, deteriorated, ill-repaired, ill-maintained, contain cracks, crevices, holes, and other situations which presented and posed an unreasonably dangerous and hazardous condition, such that same became and was unsafe to Appellant, [...].  (Pa1-19, Pa35-47, Pa191-192, Pa241-251,1T)  Appellant was caused to undergo treatment and ultimately surgery for her injuries as a result of this accident.  (Pa236-239)  Appellant’s treating doctor, [...], performed the surgery on her ankle, and also provided an expert report.  [...]’s report outlines Appellant’s injuries to her right knee and her left ankle, including the surgery to her ankle, and he specifically opines that those injuries are permanent in nature and are directly and causally related to Appellant’s fall of September 6, 2018.  (Pa314-320)  Further, [...]’s report states that Appellant’s body parts have failed to return to normal function, nor will they return to normal function with continued care and treatment.  (Pa314-320)  Respondent [...] owed a duty to Appellant, as a lawful invitee, to properly maintain the premises for their customers and to provide safe ingress and egress from their designated parking spots to their business.  (T2, Pa20-34, Pa207-225)  Respondent [...] had designated parking spots which were allocated in the lease for the use of [...] customers.  (Pa207- 225)  The Lease includes 971 square feet of retail commercial real estate, plus ten (10) parking spaces which are considered the “Leased Premises” in the Lease.  (Pa207-225)  The lease states that “Tenant shall be responsible for day-to-day maintenance and repairs to the Premises…” which includes the 10 designated parking spaces.  (Pa207-225)  This case encompasses claims for negligence, carelessness and recklessness of Respondents [...] and Township.  (Pa35-47)  The decision of the Court below in deciding the Motions for Summary Judgment did not properly take into account the facts alleged and give liberality in reviewing the Complaint, transcripts and other evidence to ascertain actionability.  (T1, T2, Pa1-34)  LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] com/us/cair-director-says-happy-witness-oct-7-says-israel-does-not-have-right-self-defense pointed statement decrying [...]’s vile rhetoric:  “We condemn these shocking, antisemitic statements in the strongest terms. ”  The [...]  Defendants maintain a substantial online social media presence.  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-7 (008-09).  III.
[brief] Evidentiary Rulings Standard  The trial court has wide discretion on the admission of evidence.  Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999) (concluding that “[t]he trial court is granted broad discretion in determining both the relevance of the evidence to be presented and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature”); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 313 (1988) (in making evidentiary decisions, “the trial court has been entrusted with a wide latitude of judgment [and, as a result the] trial court's ruling will not be upset unless there has been an abuse of that discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment).  The standard of appellate review for evidentiary rulings is stringent.  Evidentiary rulings are entitled to “substantial deference. ”  State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 224 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 453 (1998)) (“[i]n reviewing a trial court's evidential ruling, an appellate court is limited to examining the decision for abuse of discretion. ”)  Such rulings can only be reversed on a showing “that the trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”  *State v. Lykes*, 192 N.J. 519, 534 (2007) (quoting *Verdicchio v. Ricca*, 179 N.J. 1 (2004)).  **POINT ONE**
[brief] This decision was plainly in error: [...] legal contention on summary judgment that the contract for sale was unlawful since in manifest violation of the FRFPA, and therefore unenforceable since a court will never enforce an unlawful contract in no way requires “standing” to assert a claim under the FRFPA.  Finally, the other part of [...]’ cross-appeal should be granted.  [...]’ motion for summary judgment challenged legal deficiency of all claims asserted.  The trial court did not decide this portion of the motion.  It is submitted that the record on summary judgment plainly established that all of the Plaintiff’s claims were fatally flawed and warrant dismissal as a matter of law.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW (Aa001)  The Appellate Division “will reverse an agency decision if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or if it is not supported by credible evidence in the record. ”  In re N.J. Pinelands Com’n Resolution, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div. 2003).  In doing so, the Court must consider “whether: 1) the action violates express or implied legislative policies; 2) the record contains substantial evidence to support the agencies’ findings; and 3) in applying the legislative policy to the facts, the agency erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. ”  Ibid.  This Court is “in no way bound by the agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue. ”  Del. Riverkeeper Network v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 463 N.J. Super. 96, 113 (App. Div. 2020) (internal citation omitted).  Nor will any deference be accorded when “an agency’s statutory interpretation is contrary to the statutory language, or if the agency’s interpretation undermines the Legislature’s intent. ”  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS 94, at *7 (App. Div. Aug. 31, 2023).  Nor will a court defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations where it is “plainly unreasonable. ”  In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541-42 (2016).  The [...]’s decisionmaking regarding permits is a “quasi-judicial function[] [that] must set forth basic findings of fact, supported by the evidence and supporting the ultimate conclusions and final determination, for the purpose of informing the parties and any reviewing tribunal so that it may be readily determined whether the result is sufficiently and soundly grounded. ”  Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS 81, at *28-29 (App. Div. Aug. 3, 2023) (internal alterations and citation omitted); see Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Hendricks, 233 N.J. 181, 200 (2018) (“An action that comes to us as a result of final agency action must have a fully developed record so that a reviewing court may engage in meaningful appellate review. ”).  “In reviewing administrative adjudications, an appellate court must undertake a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings. ”  In re Adoption of Amendments to Ne., Upper Raritan, Sussex Cty., 435 N.J. Super. 571, 584 (App. Div. 2014) (internal citation omitted).  The Court “may not simply rubber stamp an agency’s decision. ”  Ibid.  The [...] “cannot issue or deny a permit ‘absent satisfaction of the applicable statutory criteria. ’”  Riverkeeper Network, 463 N.J. Super. at 113 (internal citation omitted).  Where “there is nothing in the agency record to indicate the Department ever considered the question, much less decided it,” vacatur and remand to the agency is appropriate.  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS at *3.  II.
[brief] ”  [...], 399 N.J. Super. at 520 (emphasis added).  [...] neither minimized the Crowe factors nor dispensed with the clear and convincing standard but instructed that the Crowe factors “must be weighed” pursuant to “the exercise of an exacting judicial discretion....”  [...], 399 N.J. Super. at 534-535.  The trial court erroneously held that Plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits based on its conclusion that “enforcement of the Revised Policy may constitute unlawful discrimination in violation of the LAD.” (p. 14) (emphasis added) (Da406).
[brief] Respondent [...] notes that Appellants’ procedural history is incorrect in that it claims that [...] was an agent of [...].  The contract between [...] and [...] clearly states that [...] is an independent Contractor.  The procedural history as cited by [...] is accurate.  Rather than reciting the procedural history of this case, [...] hereby adopts the Procedural History as cited by Respondent, [...].  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Brady v. Bd. Of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997); Pub. Serv. Elec. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Protec., 101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985).  Unless a court finds that the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency’s ruling should not be disturbed.  Brady, 152 N.J. at 210; In re Warren, 117 N.J. 295, 296 (1989).  The record in this case contains substantial credible evidence supporting the determination of the [...] that [...] voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the work, and therefore is disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
[directive] As noted earlier, at the November 15, 2021 conference, the trial court relied on courtroom unavailability and the pandemic to exclude time from the 180-day clock.  At the hearing, the parties also discussed the superseding indictment returned on October 21, 2021 -- twenty months after the original indictment.  court’s sua sponte exclusion of time 7  The [...], as amicus, claims the trial violated defendant’s due process rights by denying him notice and an opportunity to be heard -- an argument defendant has not made.
[directive] 5.1.9  Complaints may also be received from other law enforcement agencies, such as neighboring municipal police agencies, the County Prosecutors, the Division of Criminal Justice or federal law enforcement agencies.  Those complaints should be forwarded to internal affairs for immediate investigation.  In some jurisdictions, law enforcement agencies may be subject to the oversight of a civilian review board authorized to accept complaints directly from members of the public.  If a civilian review board refers a complaint to a law enforcement agency, then those complaints should be forwarded to internal affairs for immediate investigation.  5.1.10  If a person comes to a particular law enforcement agency to make a complaint about a member of another law enforcement agency, he or she should be referred to that agency.
[brief] Specifically, the court held that “mere debt collection efforts on behalf of a third party who might have sold merchandise is not itself a sale of merchandise. ”  2009 WL 5194431, at *4.  In addition, the court held the “subsequent performance of such person aforesaid” language is “seemingly limited” to the original seller.  *Id.*  The court further held that collection efforts on behalf of another party do not fall within the scope of the NJCFA’s subsequent performance language.  *Id.*  Likewise, in *Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C.*, 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 835-837 (D.N.J. 2011), the court held the plain language of the NJCFA failed to indicate whether it applies to debt buyers and that the New Jersey legislature has had opportunities to pass post-default debt buying statutes (i.e., a New Jersey Fair Debt Collections Practices Act), but has not done so.
[brief] EO100 and AO1 have the force and effect of law, just like directives issued by the New Jersey Attorney General.  \textit{See In re Attorney Gen. Law Enf’t Directive Nos. 2020-5 & 2020-6}, 246 N.J. 462, 487 (2021).  EO100 and AO1 are legally binding upon the [...]’s permitting decisions, including the instant HAD.  Therefore, the [...]’s failure to account for this project’s air pollution emissions and associated environmental impacts in the instant consistency determination is an inappropriate deviation from the letter and intent of both EO100 and AO1.  \(^5\)
[brief] In State v. Marks, 201 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 1985), this Court, citing to Poteet and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(c)(1), found that “a defendant’s refusal to acknowledge guilt following a conviction is generally not a germane factor in the sentencing decision. ”  Id. at 540.  See also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325-27 (1999) (holding that the right against self-incrimination persists during sentencing).
[brief] As a last gasp at arguing for an earlier end date, [...] asserts [...] should have filed a lawsuit against it prior to 2005.  (Pb41-42.)  This is a confusing position in light of the fact that [...] never denied coverage, and was never presented with a demand for payment from [...].  (Pa0368-Pa0379.)  This distinguishes the present case from Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437 (1994),\(^{11}\) which involved dozens of asbestos lawsuits that had been tendered to insurers for defense and indemnification.  Further, [...] is an excess insurer with a 1970-1973 policy period.  This policy period ended over a full decade prior to EPA action at the Site, and well before the 1980 and 1984 discharges that [...] reported to the EPA.  (Pa0091-93.)  There is no evidence before the Court that establishes [...] had reason to know its layer of coverage had been reached, or that its policy period would be implicated, by the 1986 or 1993 start dates suggested by [...].
[directive] Rule 3:26-1 delineates factors to be considered when setting bail.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range  10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor commits sexual penetration with victim under age 13; or victim age 13 to 15 and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or act is committed during commission of other designated crimes; or actor is armed with weapon  Aggravated  Sexual and threatens to use weapon; or actor is aided by other person(s) and physical force or 2C:14-2a(1-7)  1st Degree  $150,000 to $300,000  No 10%  Assault coercion is used; or actor uses physical force or coercion and victim suffers severe personal injury; or actor knew or should have known that victim was physically helpless, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent, or was mentally incapacitated.  2C:14-2b  Sexual Assault  Actor commits sexual contact on victim less than age 13 and actor is at least 4 years older.  2nd Degree  $50,000 to $200,000  No 10%  Actor commits sexual penetration with victim and uses physical force or coercion but victim does not suffer severe personal injury; or victim is on parole or probation or detained in a hospital or prison and actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or victim is 2C:14-2c(1-4)  Sexual Assault  2nd Degree  $50,000 to $200,000  No 10% age 16 to 17 and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or victim is age 13 to 15 and the actor is at least 4 years older.  15  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Driver-assistance technologies can be intrusive and may require some surrender of driver autonomy.  A widespread, premature introduction of new features risks consumer dissatisfaction and rejection of potentially useful features.  Finally, a gradual introduction of new technology allows time for the manufacturer to reduce costs and ultimately reduce prices—which benefits consumers.  For these and similar reasons, regulatory agencies like the [...] often provide for new regulations, including new safety regulations, to be phased in over time.
[brief] Here, [...] demonstrated both a legitimate need for discovery and a show of bad faith on the part of the [...] sufficient to impugn the agency's certifications.  The [...]'s Civil Chief [...] and First Assistant [...] [...] both falsely claimed that the only document the [...] possessed that was responsive to [...]'s records request was a Summons.  Now, as both the [...] and the [...] admit, that was false.  While it is now known that there exist 52-pages of emails between the [...] and the [...], Plaintiff also sought the following items regarding the Silebi case:
[brief] Pa 438 line 19 - 439 line 10.  [...] could not testify to any prior relevant developmental experience.  Originally, [...] had two members, [...] and [...].  [...] testified that when he first heard the term affordable housing in early 2007, he and [...] went to the New Jersey Housing Mortgage and Finance Agency (NJHMFA) to find out what affordable housing was.  Pa 384.  [...] had no experience with or knowledge of the requirements imposed on developers of affordable housing by the Fair Housing Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to -329.  In Plaintiffs’ response to the [...]’ Interrogatory 16, dated June 27, 2013 and signed by [...], they admit that as of January 2007 [...] “did not even know… what COAH (Counsel on Affordable Housing) meant. ”  Pa 271.  In response to Interrogatory 64, the Plaintiffs state:  I have no experience with Low Income Housing Credits nor did I ever know anything about it.  I never applied for same, never been awarded credits, never reviewed the allocation plan, worked on no projects, and I only came to understand what a tax credit compliance analyst is after being informed of COAH.  Pa 272.  [...] testified that while [...], the only other member of the [...], had developed residential projects, he was not an affordable housing developer and that he did not know anything about COAH.
[directive] You are also admitting, by virtue of this plea, that while in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes, including the immediate flight therefrom, you used or were in possession of a firearm.  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  1.  Você entende que em decorrência da sua declaração de culpa por  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to você estará sujeito a cumprir um período mínimo de tempo para ser elegível à liberdade condicional (um prazo de desqualificação à liberdade condicional) nos termos da Lei Graves (conforme descrito na pergunta 7 do formulário de declaração judicial que consta de três páginas)?
[brief] ” (2T6-18 to 2T7-7).  [...] became the lead investigator.  (2T7-21).  There followed a tandem journey for [...] and [...] across five states with the seized marijuana in the Ford F-150 pickup accompanied by Illinois law enforcement agents.  The police thus knew from the outset that the delivery was to be made in New Jersey, to a man known as “[...]”, whose cell phone number Mr. [...] possessed.
[brief] •  The perpetrator’s face is not visible in footage of the crime being committed.  (Da 14-15)  •  The State found no witnesses who were present during the crime and who could directly testify that [...] or anyone else perpetrated it.  •  The faceless perpetrator went off camera on Kennedy Boulevard after leaving the crime scene without being apprehended.  •  Although the State contends the faceless perpetrator later returned to Lexington Avenue after going off-camera, the State found no witness able to testify it was the same person.  •  The video evidence is inadequate to conclude the two faceless individuals are the same person with any reliability.  Da 15 is a close-up of the faceless perpetrator at 64A Lexington Avenue, committing the offense; at Da 87-88 and Da 139-140, [...] and [...] signed a photograph of another faceless person at 57 Lexington Avenue.