ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2018-5 (“the 2018 Directive”) implemented updated procedures and protocols for sexual assault response and referrals.  The purpose of the 2018 Directive was to strengthen and standardize law enforcement’s response to sexual assault approach1 crimes, reinforce law enforcement’s “victim-centered” in such cases, and improve investigations.2  statewide data collection about sexual assault  At the same time, the Attorney General issued the Third Edition of the Attorney General Standards for Providing Services to Victims of Sexual Assault (“the Standards”), which details 14 protocols that prioritize the needs and concerns of sexual assault victims (also referred to as “survivors”) in New Jersey.  Team3  Pursuant to the Standards, every county must have a Sexual Assault Response (hereafter “SART”) and a SART Coordinator who oversees the County’s program and ensures a response in accordance with the Standards.  Additionally, the SART Coordinator ensures 24/7 on-call coverage by SART FNEs in their respective county.  The Standards require that victims of sexual assault be provided with thorough, compassionate, and objective assistance from all SART members, including law enforcement officers responding to and investigating an incident of sexual assault.  A victim of sexual assault is eligible for the services of the SART when the victim is 13 years of age or older, the assault occurred within the past five days, and the victim consents to a SART activation.
[brief] [...] once again considered both New Jersey Rule of Evidence 403 and 609.  2T:27-24 to 25; 2T:28-2 to 6.  [...] noted that the 2018 conviction is a drug related conviction that does not go to moral turpitude.  2T:29-19 to 25.  [...] also noted that [...] did not deny more recent convictions; but simply testified that he doesn’t remember the year.  2T:30-13 to 19.  [...] concluded that a juror hearing of a drug related charge is “just so prejudicial” that “I have a “significant concern that the potential prejudice would outweigh the probative value”  2T:31-1 to 11.  POINT III
[brief] The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that criminal courts cannot deny defendants the opportunity to adduce relevant evidence to either establish their innocence or challenge the government’s case.  Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 423 (1988).  The constitutional right to present a defense is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.  Ibid.  The right has been described as “the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts. ”  Ibid. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).  This includes the defendant’s basic right to “have the prosecutor’s case encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. ’”  Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986) (citations omitted).  Here, the loss or destruction of [...]’s “Adam4Adam” profile information deprived Defendant of the ability to present the best evidence at trial.  It deprived him of material evidence that could have been used to cross- examine the State’s key witness.  Most importantly, it deprived him of evidence material to his defenses of entrapment.  Simply put, the State’s loss / destruction of the evidence at issue unilaterally robbed Defendant of a defense in this case.  Defense Counsel argued that such conduct warranted dismissal of the Indictment.  The Trial Court agreed:  And this Court agrees with the defense in this case that the Adam4Adam profile information is crucial to the defense in this case.  This is essentially the bait with which the undercover detective lured and ultimately captured and charged [...] with.  Not only is this information important to mount a defense and defend against the allegations brought by the State, it’s also relevant to the defense’s reliance on statutory and due process defenses of entrapment.  (2T12:21-13:6).  The Trial Court’s ruling should be upheld.
[brief] THE COURT: So overly broad and vague.  I thought I was done, but we haven’t spent a whole lot of time on that.  Isn’t it overly broad or vague when you, the actor is not put on notice of how they could violate the law, right? ”  2T55-22 through 2T56-7.  cited, is Benton v. Kernan, 130 N.J. Eq. 193, 21 A.2d 755 (E. & A.1941) which laid down the test that “A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance ... but it must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent”, and it “… becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener[.]”
[brief] Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."  Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.  A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.
[brief] [...]’s analysis and the Restatement’s comment are consistent with the New Jersey Product Liability Act (NJPLA), *N.J.S.A.* 2A:58C-3(a)(2).  That section explicitly recognizes the importance of consumer choice, and provides that manufacturers are not liable if “characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary user or consumer,” the alleged harm was caused by an “inherent characteristic of the product,” and the alleged harm would be recognized by the ordinary person who used the product “with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for whom the product is intended.
[brief] (1T10:5)  The 2022 Zoning Application was deemed complete even after the Board’s Planner, [...] acknowledged that he needed more information to determine if bulk and lot coverage variances might be required:  COE:  I hate to put you on the spot, but the application as you reviewed it, and I've reviewed [...]'s report, as I understand it you evaluated this as an application for basically the size of the garage.  DICKERSON: That is correct.  COE: Okay, as you reviewed the application, did you see any issues as to lot coverage or bulk variances that may be needed?  DICKERSON: I don't believe there was enough information available to make that determination.  (1T8:9-15)  (Emphasis added).  This admission had no impact on the Board nor its solicitor and the Hearing continued.  When [...] testified at the Hearing, she tried to address the negative criteria required for the variances by claiming that when Applicants added the garage “There was no extra grading done when we, when we did the garage.
[brief] The Petitioner-Appellant  [...] was a courageous highly decorated veteran police officer of the [...] ["[...]"] who was hired in 2005 and was a member of the [...].  (Pa47-48, Pa56-56).  Twelve years later on 12/31/17 he was almost gunned down by what appeared to be an armed assailant while [...] was off duty.  (Pa1-11, Pa43).  [...] was stopped at a traffic light in a vehicle.  (Id.; Pa78-79).  [...]’s girlfriend was the driver.  (Id.).  [...] was in a particularly high crime area of Paterson late on New Year’s Eve.  (Pa1-11).  As a result of the emotional and mental trauma resulting from an incident [...] was and is no longer fit to be a police officer due to psychological trauma and PTSD directly caused by being involved in a shooting a near death experience.(Pa56, Pa62).  [...] repelled what appeared to be a carjacking or armed robbery or attempted murder when an unknown assailant reached for what appeared to be a gun as he approached the vehicle the petitioner was a passenger in.  (Pa1-11, Pa43, Pa78-79).  [...] in self-defense of his own life and his girlfriend’s life used reasonable lethal force to repel a potentially deadly attack by discharging his firearm at the perpetrator.  (Id.).  [...], not knowing if he was under further attack --- 1  The relevant facts and procedural history are entwined.  Accordingly, they are presented together in this Brief.  left the scene and later returned to the scene and provided a report or summary of the incident to the supervisor at the crime scene.  The perpetrator was never found.  (Pa1-23).  [...] received internal affairs charges from the [...] alleging mostly technical violations, solely related to the shooting incident.  (Pa24-28).  [...] immediately pled not guilty to the administrative charges which were minor in nature given the nature of the incident being a case where [...] was the victim of a deadly attack and acted heroically to protect his female companion from serious bodily injury or death.  [...] reported to the [...] that he was unable to function any longer as a police officer.  (Pa1-11, Pa43, Pa56-69, Pa78-79).  The powers of the [...] agreed that [...] could no longer carry a weapon due to his PTSD and psychological trauma, and that [...] would never regain the ability to be a police officer again.  (Pa1-11, Pa43, Pa56-69, Pa78-79).
[brief] ’”  The court noted that the vagueness challenge amounted to a claim “that the statute’s failure to further define ‘attend’ authorizes the prosecution of anyone who is in the vicinity of an animal fighting contest without regard to their intent. ”\(^{12}\)  Id. at 1210.  However, the court \(^{12}\)  Particularly applicable to defendant’s challenges here, the Lee court mentioned that “in determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague, . . . n[o] statute need avoid all vagueness, and because statutes are condemned to the use of words, there will always be uncertainties[.]”  Lee, 973 N.E. 2d at 1210.  Cf. (Db 13-15). determined that the statute actually punishes “someone who knowingly and intentionally attends an animal fighting contest. ”  Ibid.  Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled against an argument that the term “spectator” in 21 Okl. St. § 1692.6 was “insufficient to put an ordinary person on notice of conduct in which he/she may or may not lawfully engage. ”  Edmondson v. Pearce, 91 P. 3d 605, 637 (Okla. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 987 (2004).  The court defined the term according to its plain meaning: “the person subject to prosecution is one who is purposefully and knowingly present at a cockfight or at a place where preparations are being made for a cockfight.
[brief] Howard Savings is irrelevant.  The Department also fails to engage with the relevant—and central—reasoning of the authorities that [...] cited to demonstrate that post hoc agency action requires reversal.  N.J. Bell Telephone rejected the agency’s suggestion that an agency’s “lack of express finding” can later be “supplied by implication. ”  5 N.J. at 376; Pb16, 18.  The court’s reference to lack of “factual data” there, Db32, only supports [...]’s position that the Department’s failure to make a specific finding of “excessiveness” here is fatal.  *N.J. Bell Tel. Co.*, 5 N.J. at 379 (rejecting agency ruling that failed to articulate “facts necessary to support its conclusion with reference to the wage increase” at issue there (emphasis added)).
[directive] Complete the Order for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records  The Order is the official document that will be reviewed and, if granted, signed by the Superior Court Judge.  The Instructions for Completion ofthe Order are listed below.  All questions regarding the completion of the Order should be directed to the County Ca·iminal Division at -----------------------· contact information-------·  At the top comer, in full name and address.  fill 1.  left-h~nd 2.  Do not fill in the box marked "For Superior Court Use Only."  This will be completed by the Criminal Case Management Office.  3.  the box where it states, "In the Matter of the Expungement of the Arrest/Charge Records of ______ ,," In print full name.  4.  In the first sentence of the Expungement Order, print full name, date of birth and your State Bureau of Identification (SBI) number, if available, where it is indicated.  5.  Leave the next three spaces blank where it states "IT IS ORDERED this_ day of ___ _, _ _____ ."  They will filled in by the court.  be 6.  After "all information relating to," fill in full name.  7.  On lines 1-5, provide the date of the arrest or issuance of the complaint, the statute or ordinance charged with violating, and the complaint number.  This information should be identical to that contained in Section B of the Application for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records.  If more than five rows are needed, attach a separate sheet of paper with the additional information.  8.  Leave the signature line on the next page blank.  This is where the judge will sign the order.  Step 3:
[brief] 2 POINT I  [...]'S ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT'S VIDEOTAPED STATEMENT INTO EVIDENCE DID NOT AMOUNT TO PLAIN ERROR ..............................................  2 POINT II  [...] DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR  EITHER IN NOT CHARGING THE JURY ON HOW TO ASSESS OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION  EVIDENCE OR IN NOT CONDUCTING A WADE HEARING .............................................................................................................  10 POINT III  THE ERRORS ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT DID NOT, INDEPENDENTLY OR CUMULATIVELY, DEPRIVE HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL ...............................................................  19 POINT IV AS [...] DID NOT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT, HIS SENTENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ............................................
[brief] ##  Cases: - **Carbone v. Warburton**, 11 N.J. 418 (1953) ..................................................................................................................  32 - **Carbone v. Warburton**, 22 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1952) ............................................................................................  32 - **Doe v. Poritz**, 142 N.J. 1 (1995) .......................................................................................................................  26 - **Goss v. Lopez**, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975)  .................................................................  26 - **Kahn v. U.S.**, 753 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir.1985) ........................................................................................................  26 - **Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp**, 150 N.J. 255 (1997) .....................................................................................................................  33 - **Rabinowitz v. Reyman**, 2010 WL 2867909 (N.J. App. Div. July 23, 2010) ................................................................. 33, 34 - **U.S. v. Raffoul**, 826 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1987) .......................................................................................................... 26 ## Statutes and Other Authorities: - **N.J Ct. R. 2:6-1(a)(2)** .................................................................................................................. 3 - **N.J Ct. R. 4:42** .............................................................................................................................. 8 - **N.J Ct. R. 4:42-2(b)** ................................................................................................................... 2, 10, 11 - **N.J Ct. R. 4:49-2** ......................................................................................................................... 12 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED Page Decision and Order of the Honorable [...], denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, dated September 29, 2023 ........................................Pa1 Statement of Reasons, dated September 29, 2023 ..................................................Pa3 Order of the Honorable [...] granting Defendants [...] and [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 17, 2023 ..............................................................Pa13
[brief] Most importantly, none of the certifications mention a disclosure that the pending IFPA claims are subject to the CNA and the implications of a jury’s finding of joint liability.  [...] is the only defendant (out of eight individual and twelve total defendants represented by the [...]) who submitted a certification and it is particularly troubling.  He certifies in conclusory fashion that “[b]ased on . . . [his] discussions with other [[...]] defendants, all of the parties are aligned in interest. ”  Pa318.  [...] is financing his codefendants’ defense, and the complaint is replete with evidence of his pattern of intimidating and coercing subordinates to follow his directives or risk termination, including certifications obtained from former [...] employees about [...]’s misconduct in that regard and even describing a lawsuit filed by a former [...] physical therapist alleging constructive discharge for resisting the Bufanos’ demands to perform unnecessary medical tests on patients.
[brief] Ja717.⁷  “In the context of the race notice statute, constructive notice arises from the obligation of a claimant of a property interest to make reasonable and diligent inquiry as to existing claims or rights in and to real estate. ”  Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman, 244 N.J. Super. 104, 108 (App.Div.1990), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 321 (1991); Palamarg, 80 N.J. at 456 (requiring reasonable search of chain of title).
[brief] Underlying the Entire Controversy Doctrine are the twin goals of ensuring fairness to parties and achieving economy of judicial resources.  As this Court has recognized, "[t]he purposes of the doctrine include the needs of economy and the avoidance of waste, efficiency and the reduction of delay, fairness to parties, and the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of 'piecemeal decisions.'"  *Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange*, 116 N.J. 7, 15, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989) (citing 2 State of New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947, Committee on the Judiciary Report § 11(J) at 1187 (1947)); accord *Oliver v. Ambrose*, 152 N.
[brief] (May 24, 2023 Opinion of the Court at *10-14).  Plaintiffs base their allegation of advanced, actual knowledge entirely on the Arora Report.  In reality, the Arora Report gave notice to [...] alone of “settlement” in the roadway at best.  Critically, this report was not shared with [...] until after [...] was added to this litigation in 2018.  (Pa659 at T30:8 – 31:23; Pa597 at T39:21-40:8).  The Arora Report therefore could not have provided [...] with advanced knowledge and cannot be used to prove the same.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . 47  #  TABLE OF APPENDIX  ## VOLUME 1 | Document | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|------| | Index of Materials Submitted to Superior Trial Court | Pa1 | | Notice of Charge and Hearing | Pa5 | | Hamilton Resolution 2020-255 | Pa9 | | Final Notice of Disciplinary Action | Pa10 | | IA Complaint Form | Pa12 | | ACPO Initial Complaint Form | Pa14 | | Notification Form | Pa18 | | Witness Acknowledgment Form | Pa20 | | General Order 2005-14 | Pa22 | | [...] Evaluation Form (2017 First Half) | Pa37 | | [...] Evaluation Form (2017 Second Half) | Pa40 | | Incident Report 1/8/19 | Pa43 | | Incident Report 1/7/19 | Pa44 | | Beat Area 6 (April 2017) | Pa45 | | Beat Area 6 (October 2017) | Pa46 | | Beat Area 6 (November 2017) | Pa47 | | PLS Sites with Map | Pa48 | iv.
[brief] 23 N.J. 301, 326(2019)  Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213 (2011)  Lucier v. Williams, 366 N.J.Super. 485, 496 (App. Div. 2004).  Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute, 225 N.J. 289 (2016)  11, 15  225 N.J. 289, 304 (2016)  15  Morton v. 4 Orchard Land Trust, 180 N.J. 118 (2004)  13  Muhammad v. Cnty. of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1 (2006)
[brief] In the instant case, the State offered an expert to opine, over vigorous defense objection -- and with no basis other than the expert’s general experience -- that the callers involved (i.e., defendant, the codefendant, and [...]) were: (1) “in the general area of the crime scene” at the time of the shooting “based upon the location of the cell site[s]” used in particular calls or (2) with respect to the 9:45 p.m. stop of the codefendant, “in the area of the general area [sic] of that traffic stop. ”  (8T 167-23 to 25)  Because [...]’s opinion as to the range of the cell towers in question plainly violated *Burney [II]* and, thus, failed the most basic standards of *N.J.R.E.* 702 regarding the admissibility of expert opinions, and because, additionally, in violation of that same rule and *N.J.R.E.* 703, the opinion was therefore an inadmissible “net opinion,” the witness’s opinion about the cell tower’s general range should have been excluded.
[brief] See, e.g., Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 272-73; Langer v. Morris Plan Corp., 110 N.J.L. 186, 187 (1933) (judgment for consumer where he obtained refund of his payments under a note which “was void and of no effect” because of the violation of the Small Loan Act of 1914); Morris Plan Corp. v. Leschinsky, 12 N.J. Misc. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (judgement in favor of counterclaim-consumers where they obtained refunds of payment on a void note affirmed); Consol. Plan, Inc. v. Shanholtz, 7 N.J. Misc. 876, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (“Legislative enactments are not to be played fast and loose with, and corporations who violate the law cannot be heard to say that they did not intend that their violations of the law should be construed as such.  They, like all others, must stand or fall by their own acts. ”), aff’d, 107 N.J.L. 517 (1931).  The present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”) or Small Loan Act.
[brief] **COUNTER PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  Apparently wanting a third bite at the apple, on January 3, 2023, Appellant filed the instant Class Action Complaint against Respondents (“Complaint”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division: Hudson County, Docket Number [...].  (Pa20-Pa24, ¶ 10; Pa1-Pa18).  Appellant alleges violations of the NJCFL Act (under the guise of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law, *N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53*) (Count I), the NJCFA (Count II), and Unjust Enrichment (Count III) in connection with Defendants purported failure to be licensed when acquiring and collecting on Appellant’s Account.  (Pa1-Pa18).  On January 10, 2023, this action was transferred to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division: Bergen County, under Docket Number [...].  (Pa20-Pa24, ¶ 11).  On February 16, 2023, the parties executed and filed a Stipulation extending Respondents’ time to respond to the Complaint through April 5, 2023.  (Pa20-Pa24, ¶ 12).  On April 19, 2023, Respondents filed their Motion.  (Pa20-Pa125).  In opposition to Respondents’ Motion, on July 11, 2023, Appellant filed his Motion.  (Pa126-Pa154).