ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Thus, the [...] also violated its own rules, as well as Mr.  Sipe’s right to due process, when the [...] failed to advise him of any proceeding in advance with an opportunity to present any documents or information on his behalf.  Surely if a court brought an individual into a case as a party but that person was never served with process or given an opportunity to file an answer, that person would not have been given appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Had the [...] simply followed their own rules, at least some of these deficiencies would not have occurred.
[brief] There is no question here that [...] has been prejudiced by the State's conduct.  Even the State concedes\(^3\) that [...] has been prejudiced by the State's conduct, although the State maintains that there is some alternative remedy here that the Court can employ in the form of an adverse inference charge to a jury.  This Court is not convinced that an adverse inference charge would cure the prejudice that would result in [...] to go to trial without the benefit of having the full profile information that was -- full profile that was created by the undercover detective in this case.  The evidence here, this profile information is certainly material and relevant for cross examination purposes.  (2T13:7-21) (emphasis added).  The Trial Court properly found that Defendant was prejudiced by the State's loss / destruction of the material discovery that was crucial to his case.  Ultimately, the Trial Court held:  So in light of that, given the extreme prejudice to [...], given the significant materiality of that evidence, and given evidence here of either bad faith or connivance or an extremely egregious carelessness on the part of the detective, this Court grants the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment .  . . . (2T16:21-17:2).  --- \(^3\)  Interestingly, the State previously conceded the prejudice to Defendant, but now seeks to assert that "defendant will suffer little, if any, prejudice from the loss of the profile."  Under the circumstances, this position is nonsensical.  See Pb27.  As the ruling was soundly based on the facts and circumstances present and satisfied the Hollander factors, the Trial Court’s decision should be upheld.  POINT III
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order  Granting Summary Judgment to Defendants [...] and [...] ...........................................41a  Oral Decision in Transcript of Motion ........................................  T60:17-68:24  ###  TABLE OF CITATIONS OF CASES | Cases | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Armstrong v. Francis Corp., | 17 | | 20 N.J. 320 (1956) | | | Balinski v. A. Capone & Sons, | 22 | | 1 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1949) | | | H.C. Equities, LP v. Cty. of Union, | 15, 16| | 247 N.J. 366 (2021) | | | Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., | 22 | | 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009).  | | | Hopler v. Morris Hills Reg’l Dist., | 18, 19, 20| | 45 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 1957) | | | Huber v. Serpico, | 22 | | 71 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1962) | | | JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enterprises, Inc., | 15, 16| | 474 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2022) | | | McCullough v. Hartpence, | 17 | | 141 N.J. Eq. 499 (Ch. 1948) | | | Nathanson v. Wagner, | 17 | | 118 N.J. Eq. 390, 179 A. 466 (Ch. 1935) | | | Pinkowski v. Twp. of Montclair, | 22 | | 299 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1997) | | | Sheppard v. Twp. of Frankford, | 17, 18| | 261 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1992) | | ### Other Authorities | N.J.R.E. 803(b) | 23 | | Rule 4:46-2 | 15 |
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 501.  Indeed, it was evident that force was used in an attempt to resist apprehension after the officer ordered the defendant to “freeze. ”  *Id.* at 500.  See also *State v. McClary*, 252 N.J. Super. 222, 224-25 (App. Div. 1991) (defendant fought with victim’s employees who continuously pursued him after he fled victim’s workplace with her purse).  Here, by contrast, the perpetrator did not threaten to shoot with the goal of avoiding getting caught.  Rather, the threat was made in an attempt to carry out a second, separate theft of [...].  In sum, the statement, “[g]ive me all your money or I’ll shoot” was not made “in the course of committing a theft” against [...], and the statement, “[g]ive me all your money” was not, by itself, threatening.
[brief] - Transfer of $2 million from [...]’s [...] checking account to [...]’s bank account on December 26, 2008 (24T35:8-36:10)  - Transfer of $500,000 from [...]’s [...] account to Emanuel and [...]’s account on November 5, 2013\(^{15}\) (24T36:11-22) - Transfer of $2.3 million from [...]’s bank account to [...]’s account on November 26, 2014.  (24T37:17-23)  Count 8 alleged breach of contract against [...] and [...], specifically identifying a failure to abide by “the requirement that the operation of the [...] business and the expenditure of [...] funds be made upon the majority vote of the [...] stockholders.
[brief] Plaintiff alleges that [...] was a coworker.  (Pa247).  [...] alleges defendant [...] shared the privately circulated flyer with others.  (Pa685).  [...] reported to her supervisor [...] that she and [...] had seen [...] under [...]’s desk in February 2016.  (Pa755-756).  This led [...] to file a complaint.  (Pa679).  **[...]**
[brief] [Colloquy omitted.]  [...]:  From a material standpoint, a mechanical device standpoint, it depends on maintenance.  It could be 15, 20 years depending on, again, the operation of the location.  It could be longer as well.  [1T137:3-25, -138:1-16, emphasis added.]  But this was not accurate.  When pressed, the witness admitted that the current regulator had a much longer useful life:  BY [...]:  Q.  Let me ask you to turn to Holmdel Exhibit 27, please, the answer to Holmdel discovery No. 5.  Let me know when you have it.  [[...]]  A.  Yes, I have it.  Q.  In the response to this question you have provided a depreciation schedule, which was one of the things that this question called for.  Turning to the last page of this exhibit, am I correct that according to this depreciation schedule there are approximately 22 more years of useful life on this temporary station after April of 2020?  [...]: I would defer that to...  [...]: That would -- in financial terms, yes, that would be correct.  [1T:139:7-22, emphasis added.]  Given that depreciation allows a deduction from taxable income, there would be no reason to adopt a longer depreciation that did not fairly reflect the actual useful life of the regulator.  Not surprisingly, the current regulator is safe and represents no danger to the public or [...]'s infrastructure.
[brief] The statute itself certainly says nothing of the sort and the only authority the Supreme Court relied on was the definition plainly written in the statute.  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1  And the direct holding of Paff draws no distinction or references to “who” owns “what”.  “We conclude that the requested fields of information from the identified emails constitute "information stored or maintained electronically," N.J.S.A. 47:1A–1.1, and are therefore "government records" under OPRA. ”  Paff v. Galloway Twp., 229 N.J. 340, 359 (2017)  There is no construct that can square this court’s obligation to interpret OPRA broadly in favor of access and that duty being met by focusing upon one descriptive word in a sweeping decision that would then destroy the entire policy behind the statute and as well as dire warnings of potential malfeasance both before and after Paff. III.
[brief] [...] did not announce a bright line rule under which employers and employees can never be defended by the same attorney.  [...] simply recognized that a fact-specific analysis is required based on the circumstances of each case: the admitted existence of an employer/employee relationship “does not necessarily permit counsel to represent both sides [….]”  T37:25-38:3 (emphasis added).  Thus, while in some cases a single attorney can defend an employer and employee, under the facts of the instant matter, in which the employer and employee are asserting directly adverse factual and litigation positions, the resulting conflict of interest prevents joint representation.
[brief] In the current litigation, Appellant has asserted that Plaintiff has not shown a public purpose for the acquisition of the properties owned by the Appellant.  That simply doesn’t make sense.  While the rules of res judicata are applicable only when a final judgment is rendered, for purposes of issue preclusion, “final judgment” includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded preclusive effect.
[brief] On or about July 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, asserting several claims arising under the NJLAD, including disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation.  (Pa01 – Pa15).  Venue was transferred to the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County, on November 17, 2023, on [...]’ motion.  (Pa49 – Pa50; Pa51 – Pa52).  On or about December 11, 2023, [...] and individual defendant [...] (together “[...]”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2 and seeking an order compelling arbitration pursuant to the MAA that Plaintiff had executed in connection with her employment by [...].  (Pa53 – Pa106).  [...] and individual defendant [...] (together “[...]”) filed a similar motion on December 15, 2023, seeking the entry of an Order pursuant to Rule 4:6-2 to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to the MAA.  (Pa107 – Pa114).  Plaintiff opposed the Defendants’ motions.  (Pa115 – Pa185).  On May 24, 2024, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., entered an order stating, “Plaintiff’s Complaint and all claims against [...] Scientific, LLC are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice and the parties are referred to private arbitration in accordance with the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, which is clearly enforceable, and which was signed by the plaintiff on 1/4/22.
[brief] (Pa388-Pa389)  Accordingly, Plaintiffs contended that [...] was able to escape liability simply as a result of [...] engaging in self-serving maneuvers to spoliate evidence that would have further assisted Plaintiffs in proving their theory of liability against [...].  (Pa388-Pa389)  On February 21, 2024, [...] opposed Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Appeal.  (Pa390)  On February 26, 2024, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Appeal was denied.  (Pa391)
[brief] ’”  Bocchino v. City of Atl. City, 179 F. Supp. 3d 387, 400 (D.N.J. 2016).  Municipal liability may be premised on a custom or policy.  See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 657 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Policy is made when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish a municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict. ”  Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).  Conduct is considered a custom “when, though not authorized by law, such practices of state officials [are] so permanently and well-settled as to virtually constitute law. ”  Id. at 1480.  “Custom is shown by knowledge and acquiescence by the decisionmaker. ”  McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658.  [...] is aware that its police officers have frequently engaged in the conduct of imposing brutal beatings upon citizens.
[brief] [...] provided new RICO and non-RICO damages calculations.  (39968a-39970a).  As to attorneys’ fees, [...] fully adopted the Special Master’s recommendations.  (39989a-40077a).  In doing so, [...] rejected a contrary evaluation and report from another former federal judge, former Chief Judge [...], that significantly reduced Plaintiffs’ fees, adhering to this Court’s instructions.  (39502a-39505a; 39995a).  [...] also found that [...] and [...] were entitled to punitive damages calculated again at 2.5 times the compensatory damages.  (39978a).  [...] assigned responsibility for punitive damages as 60% for [...], 20% for [...], and 20% for [...].  Id.  Finally, [...] held that prejudgment interest accrued at 8.875% until the dissolution of the partnership in July 2014, then at 3.935% until he issued his remand decision on November 16, 2022, and then at the post-judgment interest rate of 2.25%.  (40003a-40004a).  Notably, the parties had no agreement to apply the 8.875% prejudgment interest rate beyond the December 20, 2013 Final Judgment.  On January 4, 2023, [...] issued separate Final Judgments for [...] and [...], based on the earlier November 16, 2022 Order.
[brief] See, e.g., Williams v. Nunn, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2424, at *8-9 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 28, 2009) (Affirming the denial of a motion to reinstate a complaint, stating “we accept the very real probability that the passage of more than eight years between the date of plaintiff’s fall [the subject incident], and the motion to restore, prejudiced defendants. ”).  Second, even if the passage of time alone is not sufficient to warrant a finding of undue prejudice to the Defendants, the prejudice to the Defendants in the instant case if Plaintiff were permitted leave to file a further motion to amend is not merely the passage of time.  The prejudice to the Defendants in the instant case is the passage of time, the time and expense to Defendants of the prior five (5) years of litigation which has not even resulted in a proper pleading, and time and expense the Defendants will have to spend to continue to ligate this action given the reasonable likelihood that Plaintiff’s counsel will continue his pattern of delaying prosecution without good cause and submitting vexatious and rambling filings.  See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rosen, 188 N.J. Super. 230, 237, 457 A.2d 52, 56 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (“[...] has not alleged any specific prejudice resulting from this delay, but the expense of litigation and the inability to develop the property because of the cloud of litigation over it for almost a decade are strong considerations of prejudice.
[brief] EVEN IF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT APPLY, THE DECISION IN ATALESE IS NOT A BRIGHT LINE RULE AND IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS COMMERCIAL CONTRACT AS THERE WAS MUTUAL ASSENT.  (DA1540-1550)  The Court’s decision in Atalese is not a rigid or absolute standard.  Instead, it is a balancing test employed when construing the waiver of rights language in Arbitration clauses for consumer contracts.  Even if Atalese was a bright line rule, the bedrock principles undergirding the decision make plain that it does not apply to commercial contracts, like the one at issue, because there was clear mutual assent by Plaintiffs.
[brief] 3.  *The trial court correctly determined [...] is entitled to summary judgment on its Fifth Count for private nuisance due to [...]’s unreasonable interference with [...]’s property rights.*  The trial court also correctly granted summary judgment to [...] on its private nuisance claim.  “A cause of action for private nuisance derives from the defendant’s unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property. ”  *Ross v. Lowitz*, 222 N.J. 494, 505 (2015) (citations omitted):  One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.  [Ibid. (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts §822). ]  Private nuisance liability may be imposed for intentional or unintentional conduct.  Id. at 506.  “Intentional but reasonable” or “entirely accidental” invasion does not trigger liability under a private nuisance theory. ”  Id. (citing Restatement § 822 comment a.).  Thus, an actor is liable for such interferences as are intentional and unreasonable or result from negligent, reckless or abnormally dangerous conduct.  Id. at 506-7 (citing Restatement § 822 comment b.).  It cannot be reasonably argued that [...]’s unauthorized, sporadic use of the Property for parking and the placement of debris piles on [...]’s Property (in what appears to be construction staging in conformance with their purported plan to convert a portion of the Property into a parking lot) was unintentional and unreasonable.  Indeed, the planned development of another’s property without authorization underscores the concept of unreasonableness.  [...] purposefully entered onto [...]’s Property and unreasonably interfered with [...]’s private use and enjoyment of its Property.  Upon discovering [...]’s unauthorized placement of the debris piles, [...] notified [...] about its transgression, but [...] refused to remove the piles.  For this reason, the trial court appropriately determined that [...] is entitled to summary judgment for its Fifth Count for private nuisance due to [...]’s intentional and unreasonable use of [...]’s Property without permission, and that determination must, respectfully, be affirmed.
[brief] As a preliminary matter, the Court can and should take judicial notice of the Collection Action and the Settlement Order filed in [...].  When considering a --- \(^{24}\)  The Lower Court declined to address these arguments because Appellant’s Motion sought to vacate the Judgment, but, because the Lower Court was dismissing the Complaint, it was not reaching the merits of Appellant’s Motion to Vacate and Consolidate because there was no action to consolidate the Collection Action into.  (T58-T60).  motion to dismiss, the Court may consider “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.
[brief] ”  (Da 31)  That was so because [...]’s opinions communicated to the jury his belief that [...] “was lying” and “was guilty of fatally shooting [...],” and [...]’s references to the evidence against [...] further “suggested that [[...]] had some superior knowledge of what occurred. ”  (Da 33-34)  Even though the defense had not objected at the first trial, the Court found plain error “[b]ecause the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming and hinged on [...]’s credibility, which was subject to attack, and the poor quality of the surveillance videos” and because of “the lack of any limiting instruction on the use of [...]’s statements.
[brief] It did nothing but devalue the company and all members’ interests.  Plaintiffs voting for that do not care because they hold minor interests and because the vote imposed their fees in part on their litigation adversary, [...].  Indeed, the only real reason for this ‘vote’ was so that these members could try to shift to [...] a large percentage of their fees, since he held 29.5% of the total interests in [...].  This vote was the plainest “self-dealing” there can be.
[brief] Respondents submitted the Certification to the trial court for in camera review.  However, the trial court erred in permitting Respondents to submit the Certification in camera and ex parte because it rendered it impossible for [...] to respond and rebut the (false) contention that [...] received confidential information in connection with the prior matters.  The trial court acknowledged that Appellants were not provided with the Certification, (T4:9-12), and were at a “disadvantage” for not having the information.  (T28:2-3).  As such, the trial court should not have reversed course and permitted Respondents to claim they specifically identified the information in the Certification all while preventing Appellants from rebutting these contentions.  Respondents could have sought a protective order with an attorneys’ eyes-only designation or sought to file the Certification under seal, thereby maintaining the confidentiality of the information and providing Appellants with the ability to review and respond to its contents.  Indeed, as the trial court itself recounted, the Certification “expressed significant concern…regarding how [[...]’s] personal and financial information, which he claimed was provided to [...]⁸…could be used to his detriment in the current litigation….” (T24:4-13) (emphasis added).  Therefore, there can be no fear that the Certification provides new information that could be misused if submitted under seal: [...] already purportedly provided that information to [...].  If [...] had not provided that information to [...], then there could be no conflict.  See City of Atl. City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447 at 453.  In denying [...] --- ⁸ Due process required the trial court to afford [...] the opportunity to contest the claim that the evidence was provided to [...].  This did not occur. the opportunity to review and rebut the evidence and arguments against it, the trial court violated the due process rights of [...] and Appellants.
[brief] [...] provided documentation that $210,000 of the $255,000 owed to him by the defendants accrued in 2016 and 2017 which is within the statute of limitations of N.J.S.A 2A:14-1 since [...]’s complaint was filed on November 14, 2020.  [...]’s contracts with defendants entitled him to a salary of $25,000.00 for his services as President of the Medical Staff, $33,000.00 for his services as Co-Director of the ICU, $75,000 for his services as Chief Medical Officer and $19,500.00 for his services as Director of the Sleep Clinic.  (Volume I Pa. 150-184).  The total amount of [...]’s annual compensation pursuant to the contracts was $306,000.  The cancelled checks for all compensation that [...] received from defendants in 2016 and 2017 equaled $95,364.72.  (Volume III Pa. 405-415).  Each time [...] received a check from defendants, the check was for one sum and did state which pay period was covered by the check.  The payment application rule provides that a creditor who is owed more than one debt by a debtor may apply a payment to any debt the creditor chooses unless the creditor provides instructions indicating that it wishes the payment to apply to a specific account.  *Craft v. Stevenson Lumbar Yard, Inc.*, 179 N.J. 56, 72-76 (2004); *General Elec. Co v. Fred Sulzer & Co.*, 86 N.J. Super. 520, 547-548 (App. Div. 1965).  A creditor can utilize the payment application rule to apply a payment to the oldest debt.  *General Elec Co v. E. Fred Sulzer*, supra 86 N.J. Super. at 548.  The payment application rule entitles [...] to apply defendants partial payments to him to any payment due during his employment with defendants including any debt which accrued prior to the filing of plaintiff’s complaint in prior to November 20, 2014.  Unless a party seeks application of an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense on which a defendant bears the burden of proof.
[brief] Appellant has not presented a constitutionally protected individual property interest.  Appellant alleges that the ability to navigate to Appellant’s property from the navigational channel in a particular direction is a constitutionally protected interest.  However, Appellant cites to no authority suggesting that New Jersey law recognizes a protected property interest in the manner in which one navigates to a bayfront home.  Appellant does not allege that it is unable to navigate to its property.  In an attempt to support Appellant’s argument that an impact to navigability somehow provides Appellant a right to a third-party hearing, Appellant asserts that its request for a hearing is grounded in a factual navigational harm that is uniquely impacting Appellant rather than potential harm.