ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] none of the surrounding lots have conservation easements on their property and, in fact, there's a reason for it in this situation, because [...] wanted the trees around him and he provided that benefit to these homeowners for years by him having trees on his property where he could have had houses.  These are houses that are similar to other houses in the neighborhood.  They conform with the ordinance.  And, to the extent practical, the applicant does want to be a good neighbor and they're going to save as many trees as they can, but there's no ordinance requirement.  We're following all of the municipal ordinances.  (T1: p20, ln 25 – p21, ln 12)  The Board then again returned to the discussion of the size of the homes.
[brief] ”  *Keyes v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191958, at *13-14 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2020) (quoting *Crisdon v. City of Camden*, 2012 WL 685874, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2012).  “[A] court may take judicial notice of the record from a previous court proceeding between the parties. ”  *Id*, at *14 (quoting *Toscano v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co.*, 288 Fed. App’x 36, 38 (3d Cir. 2008)).  Here, to determine whether Appellant’s claims are barred, the Court can and should take judicial notice of the Collection Action and Settlement Order filed in *[...]*.  As noted above, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order, Appellant fully released all claims against Respondents pertaining to its licensure status.
[brief] ”  Pa158, (quoting 236 N.J. at 443).  Noting that Defendants never disputed the CFA’s application, the panel found that “the court never engaged in this analysis, and did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, as to whether the nature of the transaction between the parties, satisfies, the CFA definition of “merchandise” under *All the Way Towing*.  On remand, we direct the court to also engage in this analysis, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law anew. ”  Pa159.  Yet the trial court on remand did not address whether home improvements constituted “merchandise” under the CFA\(^4\), nor did it discuss the *All the Way Towing* factors.  Instead, it now found that [...] was more akin to a general contractor and that this alone justified the dismissal of the CFA claims.  2T8:23-24, 2T13:16-22.  The court somehow found that Plaintiffs were not “the customer” aggrieved by the defendants’ actions, that the contracts were “between Mr Finkelstein, and the defendant, and not the plaintiffs. ”  2T17:8-10.  This finding is clearly mistaken.  The court then dispensed with a consideration of the *All the Way* --- \(^4\) "Merchandise" is defined in N.J.S. 56:8-1(c) as including any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale. factors, touching the second factor only slightly and failing to discuss the remaining three, despite the remand mandate.  A court's decision to decide an issue *sua sponte* must meet the requirements of due process.
[brief] The court can and should consider that pure issue of law.  See ibid. (holding that “pure issues of law” may be considered though not raised below).  Plaintiffs did not waive a jury trial or engage in “gamesmanship” by not including a jury demand in their complaint.  A jury demand is not due until ten days after the “last pleading” directed to an issue triable by jury.  R. 4:35-1(a).  Because most defendants moved to compel arbitration rather than answering, Plaintiffs’ jury demand was not yet due when the Law Division compelled ADR.  Moreover, the answering Defendants demanded a jury trial, see Pa0152-0332, and thus Plaintiffs were not required to do so as well.  See 500 Columbia Tpk. Assocs. v. Haselmann, 275 N.J. Super. 166, 170 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that once requested by any party, all parties must consent to waive a jury trial).  Second, the [...] suggest that there is no constitutional problem with mandatory ADR because fraud can be asserted as a defense to requests for PIP benefits, rather than as an affirmative claim.
[brief] [...] (“[...]”) was the excavation contractor retained by the [...].  [...] was hired by the [...] via an agreement dated September 13, 2019.  (Pa000668; Pa000287, page 76, line 4 to line [...] was retained for the excavation, removal, transport, and disposal of contaminated soil.  (Pa000287, pg. 76, line 21 to pg. 77, line 10).  [...] was [...]’s contractor responsible for the excavation of the Plaintiffs’ Property.  (Pa000220, page 52, line 4 to pg. 53, line 17; Pa000817).  Excavation occurred in or about October of 2019.  (Pa000228, page 79, line 5 to pg. 84, line 20; Pa000297, pg. 116, line 7 to pg. 117, line 8; Pa000244, page 43, line 3 to line 12; Pa000264, pg. 122, line 18 to line 23; Pa000843).  Excavation occurred before [...] modified its site plan.
[brief] Instead of addressing the arguments raised in Appellant [...]’s (“Appellant” or “[...]”) interlocutory appeal, Respondent launches procedural attacks and relies upon general condemnation law.  Respondent has failed to provide any meaningful opposition to Appellant’s arguments that the trial court set forth an incorrect recitation of condemnation law by ruling that the zoning under the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan controls the parties’ analysis of the just compensation for [...]’s acquisition of Respondent’s property via its power of condemnation.  Therefore, this Appellate Division should grant Appellant’s requested relief and reverse the trial court’s rulings of June 7, 2024.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I APPELLANT’S IN LIMINE MOTION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROCEDURALLY PROPER  Contrary to Respondent’s arguments, Appellant’s *in limine* motion requested the trial court to make the purely legal determination of (1) whether Respondent’s appraiser utilized the correct zoning; and (2) whether Respondent’s appraiser adhered to the established condemnation laws of the State of New Jersey, when arriving at his conclusion of fair market value of the subject Property for the purpose of determining just compensation.  As Respondent’s appraiser failed to both utilize the correct zoning and make a negative adjustment to reflect the costs and risk to obtain use and bulk variance approval when valuing the property, the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s *in limine* motion should be overturned.
[brief] *Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C.*, 237 N.J. 91, 99 (2019).  Here, [...] did not represent plaintiff in the Chancery Action, and nothing otherwise exempts this case from the ECD.  Plaintiffs’ successive litigation was properly dismissed.  Plaintiffs next assert that their failure to provide the notice required by Rule 4:5-1 did not substantially prejudice [...].  Once again, they are wrong.  This precise issue was also addressed by this Court in *Schindel*, which specifically addressed the substantial prejudice that would accrue to an attorney in [...]’s position.  This Court stated that “substantial prejudice may result from a party's inexcusable failure [to notify or join a party] and the resulting ‘potential impact of the particular legal framework in which the claims in th[e] litigation have been brought. ’"  The Court also discussed the fact that the attorney defendant in that case had been deposed in connection with the probate case.  Here, not only was [...] deposed in the Chancery Action, he was a featured witness at trial.  Quite obviously, had plaintiff joined [...] in the Chancery Action and/or notified him of the potential for a legal malpractice claim, the truthful testimony that [...] provided would have been seen as against his own self-interest.  Indeed, even without this component, the trial judge Found that “[...] was very credible” and “was not the type of person who would say anything a client or anyone else wanted if not true[.]” (Pa000075.)  The trial judge should have been given the chance to rule on the alleged malpractice claim.  The rules of civil practice, Rule 4:5-1, required he be given that chance.  We think it is clear how the judge would have ruled.  Plaintiffs’ inexcusable failure to comply with Rule 4:5-1 should also be deemed to bar this claim pursuant to the ECD.
[brief] The existing access to the Cell Tower is by way of a shared driveway and maneuver area outside of the Cell Tower lease area.  The driveway and maneuver area are also presently used and maintained by the [...] for their existing use on the lot.  Similarly, the submitted site plans show access, ingress and egress to the cell tower and to the proposed warehouses by way of a shared driveway, and also show the specific access provided for the cell tower lease area from the shared driveway.  The proposed site plan, therefore, unifies the uses’ access thereby meeting the access requirement.  When these facts are reviewed, error is found by the trial court’s failure to reverse the [...]’s conclusion regarding the need for a use variance and the concomitant refusal to consider the Application for development of the as-of-right warehouse use integrated with the previously approved cell tower use as permitted multiple principle uses of the Industrial Zone lot.
[brief] The Spill Act is a strict liability statute which means that, whether a person (property owner, tenant, transporter, consignment owner of hazardous material, etc.) is negligent or not negligent in causing a discharge, the party will be deemed strictly liable for the remediation of the discharge.  In other words, strict liability does not exclude negligence, as [...] argues.  Strict liability includes negligence.  By accepting the Verified Complaint as competent evidence as the basis for its decision to issue final judgment against [...], the trial court accepted [...]’s allegation of negligence and [...]’s admission of negligence.  No other formality to the issue was required.
[directive] The imprisonment. life release no that evidence convincing clear and by establishes State when the only overcome defendant's eligible the assure reasonably will conditions of combination or condition the or person other any of safety the of protection the required, when court in appearance justice criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct will not defendant the or that community, it Directive under this standard, statutory that to Pursuant 2A:162-19.  N.J.S.A.  See process. for motion no detention, and pretrial seek to prosecutor for a norm, the not exception, the be shall Directive. this by authorized be may as except filed be shall detention pretrial give to expected will be prosecutors detention, pretrial seek to whether deciding
[brief] [...] filed a discrimination complaint within the DEP against [...] and [...] on February 10, 2015, alleging gender and age bias.  (Pa249 Pa333).  The complaint was not substantiated following an investigation.  (Pa250; Pa860-867).  Plaintiff claims that [...] then retaliated against him on two occasions for making the complaint.  (Pa251).  [...] alleges he was unfairly disciplined in June 2015 for remarks he made during a public speech given as a DEP supervisor on January 29, 2015 at Rutgers University during which he referred to “fracking” as the “f-word. ” (Pa252).  [...] received a written warning from [...] as his direct supervisor.  (Pa335).  He claims he was disciplined again in December 2015 for planning another speech at an AWWA conference without getting approval from the DEP pursuant to long-standing policy.  (Pa254).  [...] received a one-day suspension.  (Pa338).  Plaintiff announced his retirement on March 18, 2016, having secured the position in Hawaii in January 2016 at the latest.  (Pa256; Pa291; Pa396).  [...] claims he was unfairly exposed to potential discipline through a preliminary notice of discipline issued on April 12, 2016.  (Pa255).  It was alleged he had been seen under the desk of another supervisor (defendant [...]) --- 2  The EEO complaint was filed shortly after [...] initiated discipline for the remarks at the Rutgers conference. in February 2016 without explanation.  (Pa255; Pa293).  He was never disciplined for the February 2016 incident.  (Pa311).  Finally, as he was retiring, plaintiff claims he was the subject of a flyer posted in the workplace suggesting that he violated the law.  (Pa260).  DEP conducted an investigation, but the responsible party was never found.  (Pa569; Pa571; Pa574; Pa894).  **Individual Defendants, Common Factual Settings, and Pursuit of Claims on Appeal**
[brief] Further, a claims attorney employed by [...] provided an additional certification authenticating the document (Pa141-Pa143).  Equally unavailing is plaintiffs’ argument that [...]’s certification lacked requisite personal knowledge because she herself did not drive the 147 envelopes to the West Trenton Post Office and thus she is not “the person who can testify that all of the envelopes listed in the document were really given over to the Post Office for mailing. ”  Pb8.  Again, N.J.S.A. 17:29C- 10 requires that the stamped proof of mailing be obtained.  There is no requirement that every individual who may have participated in the process of generating, enveloping and actually mailing the envelopes stand ready forever to demonstrate that those things actually occurred on a given day years earlier.
[brief] In terms of a jury charge, meeting the plain error standard requires “legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing [C]ourt and to convince the [C]ourt that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ”  *State v. Nero*, 195 N.J. 397, 406 (2008) (quoting *State v. Hock*, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969)).  This burden rests on defendant’s shoulders.  *State v. Koskovich*, 168 N.J. 448, 529 (2001).  The effect of any error must be considered “in light ‘of the overall strength of the State’s case. ’”  *State v. Walker*, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010) (quoting *State v. Chapland*, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).
[brief] (Da1-4).  [...] was tried before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury over several dates in September and October 2021.  (3T; 4T; 5T; 6T; 7T; 8T; 9T; 10T).  On October 12, 2021, the jury convicted [...] of every count in the indictment.  (10T9-13 to 12-23).  _____________________  1  Da = defendant-appellant’s appendix  1T = motion transcript dated February 9, 2021  2T = motion transcript dated August 20, 2021  3T = trial transcript dated September 27, 2021  4T = trial transcript dated September 28, 2021  5T = trial transcript dated September 29, 2021  6T = trial transcript dated September 30, 2021  7T = trial transcript dated October 4, 2021  8T = trial transcript dated October 5, 2021  9T = trial transcript dated October 7, 2021  10T = trial transcript dated October 12, 2021  11T = sentencing transcript dated May 5, 2022  On May 5, 2022, [...] heard and denied [...]’s motion for a new trial.  (11T3-23 to 31-25).  [...] then sentenced [...] to life in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), for the murder conviction, ten years in prison on Counts Two and Three to run concurrently to the murder conviction, four years in prison on Counts Five and Six to also run concurrently, and ten years in prison on Count Four to run consecutively to the other sentences, for an aggregate sentence of life plus ten years.
[brief] I.  The Defendants’ Reliance on the Fact That the Landing of the Exterior Stairs was Icy Ignores the Expert Testimony That It Was the Preexisting Deterioration of the Concrete Due to Lack of Maintenance Which Made the Stairs Unreasonably Dangerous Upon a Mere Trace of Freezing Rain.  (Pa1-3, Pa4-7, Pa8-10)  [...] testified that as he opened the condo building door that morning, he noticed it was a bit cold and that a “very light” rain, “if any,” was falling.  (Pa328).  As he exited and placed his left foot down on the landing, he immediately slipped.  (Pa329, Pa331, Pa339, Pa341).  [...] did not even make it far enough along the stairs to reach the handrails to steady himself.  (Pa328-329).  Defendants’ meteorological evidence confirms that the freezing rain was very light precipitation.  (Pa346-347).  From this evidence that a small trace of freezing rain was falling at that time, the Defendants each emphasize [...]’s deposition testimony and expert reports to argue the Ongoing Storm doctrine must apply because it is “undisputed” that [...] slipped on “ice” on the landing.  What is disputed, though, is whether the deterioration of the concrete staircase led to or worsened the forming of the ice that invisibly confronted [...] on the landing as he first stepped onto it.  If so, the Defendants’ lack of maintenance would be a breach of its duty to maintain the staircase in reasonably safe condition.  See generally Lechler v. 303 Sunset Ave. Condominium Association, Inc., 452 N.J. Super. 574, 585-86 (App. Div. 2017) (condo association’s negligence made a condo staircase unreasonably dangerous to residents).  After all, Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, 246 N.J. 546 (2021) recognizes exceptions to the Ongoing Storm rule “if the owner’s conduct increases the risk, or the danger is pre-existing.
[brief] (3T 9-12 to 16)  The State called a veterinarian who examined the dog the day after the incident, [...].  Dr. Newton testified that the dog had “a scab on the right side of her head with surrounding hair loss and redness,” which he explained could have been caused by “demodectic mange. ”  (2T 87-13 to 14; 92-8 to 11)  Dr. Newton also noted that the dog had no bruising to the lungs or ribs, no “free fluid in areas of the body, . . . which occurs commonly with a trauma,” no rib fractures, and normal bloodwork.  (2T 86-8 to 24; 97-11 to 17)  At the close of the State’s case, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 3:18-1, arguing that the State had failed to present evidence that [...] “unnecessarily or cruelly beat or cruelly abused” his dog.  (3T 13-23 to 14-17)  The court denied the motion.  (3T 15-22 to 18-4)  The defense called the family’s veterinarian, [...].  Dr. Sulner explained that the area of hair loss on the dog’s head was tested in August 2020 and confirmed to be caused by “demodex,” or skin mites.  (3T 40-11 to 25)  Dr. Sulner described demodex as a “very common” condition.  (3T 40-21 to 22)  2.
[brief] Aa0197.  Of these areas, only one constituted an upland forest under the Highlands Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.9, and even then, only a minimal number of trees\(^{11}\) in this area would be removed due to the installation of a safety fence around the perimeter of [...]’s facilities.  Even though [...] was seeking an exemption from the Highlands Act and the Highlands rules, [...] applied the substantive standards of the Highlands Rules at N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.9(h) in developing a planting plan to mitigate for the minor impacts from tree removal, which was reviewed and approved by the Highlands \(^{11}\)
[brief] Even accepting [...]’s finding that [...] only represented [...], the firm - began representing [...] in July 2013 when he was married to [...], during their close partnership together, and during the bankruptcy crisis, rendering it nearly impossible for [...] to provide “financial advice” solely to [...] that did not impact the interests and rights of [...] and triggering Conflict of Interest Rule 1.7 (providing lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest; “A concurrent conflict of interest exists if … (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person”) (emphasis added) • prepared the “Mid-Marriage Agreement” that New Jersey courts view as inherently coercive and unenforceable, Pacelli v. Pacelli, 319 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 1999); Steele v. Steele, 467 N.J. Super. 414, 436 (App. Div. 2021), cert. denied, 258 A.3d 348 (N.J. 2021); • prepared and had [...] execute a “waiver” of her right to contest plaintiff’s Complaint for Divorce two days before the lawsuit even began; • lied or at least helped perpetrate the lie that [...] told [...] -- that [...] had “independent counsel” who reviewed the agreements with her and simply decided not to enter a formal appearance in the divorce case on her behalf.
[brief] Under the Brill standard, the motion judge must decide:  Whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  ...  To send a case to trial, knowing that a rational jury could reach but one conclusion, is indeed “worthless” and will “serve no useful purpose. ”  Id. at 523 & 541.  The Brill Court emphasized that the thrust of its decision “is to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves. ”  Id. at 541.  Summary judgment should only be granted where the competent evidential materials are “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Id. at 536.  The Brill Court further stated that its purpose was to afford “protection . . . against groundless claims or frivolous defenses, not only to save antagonists the expense of protracted litigation, but also to reserve judicial manpower and facilities to cases which meritoriously command attention.
[brief] The *Herring* Court relied further on two cases: *Pumphrey v. Thompson Tool Company* 62 F.3d 1128,1130 (9th Cir. 1995) “one species of fraud upon the court occurs when an officer of the court perpetrates fraud affecting the ability of the court or jury to impartially judge a case”.  The *Pumphrey* Court stated that “fraud on the court focuses not so much in terms of whether the alleged fraud prejudiced the opposing party but more in terms of whether the alleged fraud harms the integrity of the judicial process” citing (Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 26464S.Ct.t 1010) see also; *Weese v. Schuckman* 98F.d 542,553 (10th Cir. 1996) ”noting that fraud on the court should embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court. ”  In *Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf*, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 797 A.2d 206 (App. Div. 2002), a divorce case, the Court found that both the Plaintiff and his attorney concealed the fact that one of the parties had passed away without knowledge of the court, resulting in a fraud upon the court.  Here, there were multiple crimes committed by *officers of the court*, not [...], to unlawfully seize the CHR for no purpose other than to defame [...] in the [...], in the public realm, and to prejudice the courts.
[directive] The list of those authorized to access these files must be kept to a minimum.  9.5.2  Physical security measures also should be taken, such as using securely locked filing cabinets in secured offices.  If a law enforcement agency uses computers to maintain internal affairs records of any kind, special security measures must be taken.  A stand-alone personal computer is the most secure system to limit unauthorized access to internal affairs records.  If a stand-alone computer is not feasible, reasonable measures, including the use of fire walls and/or password protected software, should be utilized to control access to investigative files and related materials.  9.6
[brief] Thus, for example, if the jury finds defendant “A” 60% at fault, another defendant “B” 20% at fault, and the plaintiff’s employer, defendant “C,” 20% at fault, with no comparative fault accorded to plaintiff, the employer’s 20% share must be divided among the other defendants in a molded judgment that assigns a 75% share to defendant “A” and 25% to defendant “B. ”  D’Avila, 442 N.J. Super. at 113.  Here, in ordering summary judgment in favor of [...], the trial court ignored the above ruling and procedures prescribed by D’Avila in a factually and legally analogous matter.