ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa0196).  Two weeks after [...] filed its Fees and Interest Motion, on July 30, 2020, the trial court abruptly granted the Motions for Reconsideration filed two years earlier.  (Pa0199-209).  [...] inexplicably found that his June 29, 2018, Order adopting and approving the SAM’s Report and Recommendations, which specifically held that the SAM’s RAR had been “well-reasoned,” was palpably incorrect.  (Pa0205).  The court cited Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290 (Mass. 2009), noting that Massachusetts law requires use of the time-on-the-risk allocation method only “where the evidence will not permit a more accurate allocation of losses during each policy period.
[brief] **  DEP also applied its rules to the substantial evidence in the record to determine the Project is consistent with the areawide WQMP.  “The Legislature has entrusted to the DEP the enforcement of a complex system of water pollution control. ”  *SJC Builders, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. State of N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 378 N.J. Super. 50, 54 (App. Div. 2005).  In furtherance of this statutory charge, the State has twelve areawide WQMPs to plan for impacts on the State’s waters related to development’s water use and wastewater generation.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2, -4, -5; N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.2(a)(1).  The WQMP includes a series of wastewater management plans, a description of existing and future maps of wastewater service areas and selected environmental features and treatment works.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-4.1.  DEP may not issue an exemption for a project that is inconsistent with adopted WQMPs.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10; N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.4(e).
[brief] "The Tort Claims Act., N.J.S.A. 59: 1-1 et.seq. indisputably governs causes of action in tort against governmental agencies within New Jersey."  Gomes v. Cnty. of Monmouth, 444 N.J. Super. 479, 487 (App. Div. 2016); see also Nieves v. Adolf 241 NJ. 567,571 (2020).
[brief] 1.  [...] was of the belief that since there were no business or travel expenses reimbursed by the Township, this was indicative of independent contractor status.  Yet, once again she notes that this is not a strong indicator of such status.  2.  Petitioner testified the Township does in fact reimburse her for business expenses, specifically State Police discovery.  (T47-16)  3.  Petitioner is also required by the Township to purchase an App called, “We Transfer”, which transfers municipal court discovery to defense attorneys.  She testified the Township reimburses her the $120.00 per year for having to purchase that App.  (T48-2)  4.  [...] conceded that when she indicated Petitioner was not reimbursed for any business or travel expenses, she did not know if she had any reimbursable expenses in the first place.  (T177-10)  5.  [...] also conceded that if Petitioner was reimbursed for the “We Transfer” App it would be indicative of her being an employee.  (T177-14)  6.  Likewise, [...] also conceded that he did not know if the Petitioner had any business or travel expenses to be reimbursed in the first place.  (T201-8)  **FACTOR 14 – FURNISHING OF TOOLS AND MATERIALS**
[brief] (See Da128-129 ¶¶124-125).  Defendants answered the amended complaint on September 13, 2023, and requested that the court schedule a Ferreira\(^2\) conference, observing that plaintiff still had not filed an AOM.  (Da167-169.)  A Ferreira conference was conducted on September 26, 2023.  (Da170-175.)  On October 6, 2023, the Court entered an order directing “that Plaintiffs will serve an AOM within sixty days from the filing of the amended answer” and “that [...] is permitted to file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26, et seq., the Affidavit of Merit Statute. ” (Da172.)  On October 20, 2023, [...] denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to timely submit an AOM, and granted plaintiff’s cross motion to extend the time to file an AOM, thereby denying plaintiff’s request for an additional sixty days from the date the amended answer was filed.
[brief] Ctr., 167 N.J. 359 (2001) ....................................................... 4, 5, 6, 14, 16 Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 464, 744 A.2d 1186 (2000) .................................................................................................................. 17 Moore v. Public Service Coord. Transport, 15 N.J. Super. 499, 505 (App. Div. 1951) .................................................................................................................. 39 New Jersey Tpke. Auth. v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 73, 150 N.J. 331, 356 (1997) .................................................................................................................. 42 Parker v. Poole, 440 N.J. Super. 7, 22 (App. Div. 2015) ............................................................ 4 Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. Cnty. of Morris, 374 N.J. Super. 448, 452 n.2 (App. Div. 2005) ................................................................. 21 Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) ........................................................................................................ 18, 36 Somerville Easton R.R. ads. Doughty, 22 N.J.L. 495, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1850) ...............................................................................................
[brief] [...]’s misplaced reliance on the Entire Controversy Doctrine does not save its Counterclaim from dismissal because the Doctrine: 1) does not supersede the Commissioner’s jurisdiction or the court’s lack of jurisdiction; 2) does not resurrect [...]’s Counterclaim’s dismissal for failure to comply with the statute of limitations; 3) does not excuse [...]’s requirement to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) is inapplicable.  Pg. 1 – 2  A.  The Entire Controversy Doctrine does not supersede the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter, nor does it supersede the Commissioner’s jurisdiction to hear and determine school law controversies under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.  B.  The Entire Controversy Doctrine does not resurrect a party who failed to comply with the statute of limitations.  C.  The Entire Controversy Doctrine does not excuse a party’s requirement to exhaust administrative remedies.  D.  [...]’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies means that the Entire Controversy Doctrine defense is inapplicable to [...].
[brief] 4.  Section 1:7-4 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as fol- 2 lows:  1:7-4.  Any two or more citizens of the State may, within the time pre- scribed by section 1:7-1 of this Title, present to the [Supreme] Appellate Division of the Superior Court such a petition, signed by them, as is author- ized by said section 1:7-1 to be presented by the Attorney-General, and the [Supreme] Court shall proceed thereon in the manner provided by sections 1:7-2 and 1:7-3 of this Title.
[brief] [...] will not repeat what it spelled out in its moving Appellate brief at Db 15-18.  Plaintiffs’ reliance on *Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, Inc.*, 425 N.J. Super 171 (App. Div. 2012) is misplaced because the allegations of oral misrepresentations in that case were not covered by any of the contractual documents the parties signed.  The claim of fraud in *Walid* was wholly extraneous to the entire, integrated agreement. \(^1\)
[brief] One element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted recklessly.  A person who causes another's death does so recklessly when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances known to the defendant, his disregard of that risk is a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would follow in the same situation.  The other element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant caused [...]'s death.
[brief] “[T]he Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ....’ ”  Randolph, 228 N.J.  at 581 (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7).  Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unlawful.  Shaw, 237 N.J. at 608.
[brief] As such, parties are entitled to “obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .  . . .”  *R. 4:10-2(a)*.  To that end, “there is no general prohibition against obtaining the deposition of opposing counsel regarding relevant, non-privileged information. ”  *Kerr v. Able Sanitary and Environmental Servs., Inc.*, 295 N.J. Super. 147, 154 (App. Div. 1996); see also *R. 4:10-2(a)*; *R. 4:14-1*.  Although a “request to depose a party’s attorney itself constitutes presumptive ‘good cause’ for a protective order” under *R. 4:10-3*, the party seeking discovery may overcome that presumption by demonstrating that “the propriety and need for the deposition outweigh the possible disruptive or burdensome effects that the prospective deposition will have on the underlying litigation.
[brief] In Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82, 89 (App. Div. 2017), the publication occurred “[d]uring an emergent bedside consultation in plaintiff’s private hospital room[,...] [...] discussed with plaintiff his medical condition.  While doing so, [...] disclosed plaintiff’s HIV-positive status in the presence of an unidentified third party who was also in the room. ”  Thus, disclosure to an individual can constitute publication.  The Consumer Fraud Act applies to Defendants’ conduct.  *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America*, 150 N.J. 255, 265 (1997) observed, “By its terms, the CFA is applicable to the provision of credit.
[brief] This specific, formula-like mandate is unequivocally distinct from the flexible and unrestricted language of the LRHL, which was adopted seventeen years after the rational nexus principle was amended into the MLUL.  Furthermore, the LRHL promotes very different policies than the MLUL, and does so in an entirely different context.  Becoming a designated “redeveloper” is both an affirmative and a voluntary undertaking.  There is no like threat of “compulsion” as might well permeate zoning or planning board proceedings on a development application under the MLUL.  The redevelopment opportunity is made available “to a specific entrepreneur, not to the land itself or even to its current owners.
[brief] (Rb26-28).  First, the CNA is irrelevant to this matter.  It is not part of the record and was not a basis upon which the [...] relied in either of its determinations.  It simply has no bearing on this appeal.  Second, and most troubling, [...] appears to argue that the [...] – which is the party to the CNA with the State (and not a party in this appeal) – contractually agreed that the State Policy applied to any and all of its private offices as well as those of charted local unions.  [...] fails to support that sweeping contention with anything more than out-of-context language from the CNA’s management rights clause and statements that State workplaces should be free from discrimination.  Such aspirational statements are, of course, important and may be meaningful bases for a grievance under the processes established in the CNA.  But they do not constitute a contractual agreement that the State Policy applies to the union’s private offices.  Nor does the State’s reservation of its managerial rights to enforce reasonable workplace rules “governing the conduct and activities of employees. ” (Rb27 (partially quoting Art. 1 § B.2 of the CNA)).  [...]’s argument is entirely meritless.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 ................................................................................  84  N.J.S.A. 46:14-2.1 ................................................................................ 43  N.J.S.A 46:14-6.1 ................................................................................  44  Treatises: 25 Am. Jur. 2d Section 122.................................................................  55  25 Am. Jur. 2d Section 129.................................................................  54  Restatement (Third) of Properties: Servitudes, Section 1.2 (2000).......  39  Restatement (Third) of Properties: Servitudes, Section 7.10 (2000)......  46  TABLE OF ORDERS AND RULINGS | Document | Appendix Page No. | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------| | February 21, 2019
[brief] [...] and [...]  By: s/ [...]  [...]  [...]  Admitted Pro Hac Vice  By: s/ [...]  [...]  DIVYAJIT MEHTA and DGNS CORP.  Plaintiff-Respondents/Cross- Appellants, vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Appellants/Cross- Respondents.
[brief] That said, it must be additionally discerned that Rule 60 (b) (6) provides a catchall for vacating a judgment without time limit for “any other reason that justifies relief” (the evidence provided to the trial court had failed to be recognized which would have demonstrated that notification had never been properly executed: Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41).  It has been well established in this Third Circuit, Motions for relief from judgment pursuant to R. 4:50-1 “are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will be left undisturbed “UNLESS” it results from a Clear abuse of discretion.
[brief] Importantly, the phrase “engaged principally,” has already been adjudicated as not vague by both the U.S.  Supreme Court and the New Jersey Appellate Division.  Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., 216 U.S. 439, 448 (1910) (“‘Engaged principally’ are plain words of no ambiguous meaning.  They need no construction”); Priolo v. Shorrock Garden Care Ctr., No. A-3032-20, 2022 WL 4350133, at *3 (App. Div. Sept. 20, 2022) (“N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2 plainly defines a ‘health care facility as ‘the facility or institution . . . engaged principally in providing services for health maintenance organizations, diagnosis, or treatment of human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or physical condition”).  In *Toxaway Hotel Co.*, creditors of a hotel initiated an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the hotel.  *Toxaway Hotel Co.*, 216 U.S. at 439.  The then-existing federal bankruptcy law enumerated the types of businesses which could be adjudicated in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.  *Ibid.*  Hotels were not one of the enumerated categories, but businesses “engaged principally” in trading and mercantile pursuits were.
[brief] arises in a setting where the record is too meager to permit meaningful review, supplementation of the record may be necessary.  The Court Rules provide that a reviewing court may remand, on its own motion, for supplementation of the record in order to permit meaningful review.  R. 2:5-5(b).  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).
[brief] The safeguards in place for cases involving a death based on the Wrongful Death Act, Survivor’s Act, Rules of Evidence, and Court Rules make the courts the best venue for adjudicating claims involving patient death.  These safeguards are not available in an arbitration.  The type of negligence that forms the basis of a wrongful death case is wholly unknown to the patient at the time they relinquish their rights when signing an arbitration agreement.  It is both unjust and impracticable to expect an individual to comprehend the rights being waived when potential injury and death based on negligence remain so nebulous to all involved.  Arbitration is not the proper forum to adjudicate medical malpractice cases involving death.
[brief] Appellant’s main argument on appeal is that the Superior Court erred by failing to consider how federal courts construe § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA.  Appellant’s Br., at 1-2, 5-13.  And while Appellant concedes that the federal decisions she cites in her brief are “non-binding authority,” she insists the --- \(^3\) See CFPB Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance; 2016-02, Service Providers.  \(^4\)  See CFPB Debt Collection Supervision and Examination Manual (Oct. 2012), Module 3.  Superior Court was in error because such decisions must be given “due respect. ”  *Id.*, at 5-6.  In fact, Appellant even boldly asserts that every federal case to reach the merits concluded that the use of letter vendors by debt collectors violates the FDCPA.  *Id.*, at 11.  This proposition is misleading for two primary reasons.  First, this ignores the fact that many more federal courts never had the opportunity to reach the merits on the proposed letter vendor theory of liability because they found that the plaintiff lacked standing as no injury-in-fact could be established.
[brief] [...] (herewith in “Defendant”) relies on its Statement of Facts and Procedural History as set forth in its initial brief.  Defendant seeks to highlight, however, the following facts in the record.  The Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington Vicinage issued a Judgment of Conviction against the Defendant on April 24, 2023, in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:33-2a(1), supporting the State of New Jersey (herewith in “Plaintiff”) meeting their judicial findings upon de novo of the municipal trial proceeding on November 29, 2022.
[directive] Because criminal jury trials remain suspended, the length of pretrial detention has been extended in many cases.  2  In response to the present situation, the [...] and the [...] ([...]) jointly seek two forms of relief: (1) the release of all defendants detained for six months or longer whose most serious charge is a second-degree offense or lower, with an opportunity for the State to object in individual cases and seek to justify continued detention under an enhanced burden of proof; and (2) new detention hearings under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) for all defendants detained for six months or longer who are charged with a first-degree offense and entitled to a presumption of release.  Movants rely on constitutional and statutory bases in support of their requests for relief.  We recognize that due process concerns can impose limits on pretrial detention.  Courts look to various considerations to assess that type of due process challenge, not just the length of detention.  The fact-specific inquiry called for is best conducted on an individual basis in order to balance the relevant factors and assess the level of risk each defendant presents.
[brief] As for damages, Plaintiff seeks actual and statutory damages.  Statutory damages are limited to a maximum of $1,000 for the Plaintiff and 1% of Defendant’s net worth for the class.  § 1692k(a).  The provision has been construed to impose the limit on a case and, therefore, it is not multiplied by the number of violations.  The range between nothing and the cap requires consideration of factors.  The three factors determining the quantum of Plaintiff’s statutory damages are “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.
[brief] Ibid.  In this case, not only did the tip not provide information about the date of the drug deliveries, but police learned from facility records that [...] had been renting the same unit for six years.  (Dca 6)  It was therefore possible that the informant’s last interaction with [...] was years earlier and that the tip was extremely stale. \(^9\)  Stale tips negate the inference of probable cause.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 901, 904 (1984) (leaving undisturbed Appeals Court’s conclusion that an informant’s tip that he had witnessed a narcotics sale at a residence five months earlier was “fatally stale,” such that an affidavit based on the tip did not establish probable cause despite independent police investigation).
[brief] [...] & my Exceptions proved [...] should NOT have accepted $4,120 work in mid-2021 for [...]’s request for Trust to pay off her home equity loan, since [...] was Trust counsel at the time.  It disregarded evidence that [...] did not need counsel to reject her request due to common sense not to use Trust assets to pay her personal loan since it was contrary to the Will for Trust Corpus to be dedicated for a lifetime Trust for [...], & then me, if she predeceased me.  5.
[brief] The abuse of discretion standard is sometimes stated in terms of a “clearly erroneous” concept where the trial court will not be reversed unless its decision was clearly erroneous.  See, e.g., State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999) (trial court decision “will be reversed on appeal only if there was an abuse of discretion which renders the lower court’s decision clearly erroneous”); Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 363 (1991) (where the Court affirmed, “we are satisfied that the trial court's exercise of discretion was not so clearly erroneous as to have had the capacity to bring about an unjust result”).  The Order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration should be affirmed because the Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion.
[brief] (See, e.g., Da565, Da569, Da575, Da577, Da588, Da593, Da600, Da607, Da609, Da615-17, Da620-21).  Even [...] had recognized [...]’s authority provided under the Genesis Deed and its rules to regulate building and construction within the community.  In 2017, the [...] Township Code’s land use regulations were amended, without any opposition from Plaintiffs, to require any applications for construction or zoning permits or applications to the [...] and/or Planning Board of the Township of [...] “shall include proof of notice to the [...].
[brief] IV.  LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE APPLIES TO CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RESPONDENT’S BRIEF  The law of the case doctrine prevents relitigation of issues within a single case once they have been decided.  Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912).  The Third Circuit applies the doctrine.  Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1982).  Prior decisions on legal issues should be followed unless there is substantially different evidence, new controlling authority or the prior decision was clearly erroneous.
[brief] Defendant therefore respectfully asks this court to reverse the judgment of the lower court’s denial to vacating of arrears and thereby issue an Order "voiding" the March 9, 1990, default judgment in conjunction with any subsequent orders that were piggybacked from the default judgment thus showing arrears as -0- dollars.  As such, the trial court should have deemed the 1990 default judgment void due to the presented evidence and facts demonstrating the March 9, 1990’s court's lack of personal jurisdiction, as Service of Process had not been established.  It is a matter of established case law in the Third Circuit for it to be deemed void as validity of service had not been validated once challenged while the presented evidence demonstrated there are zero records of Service of  Process recorded by the clerk in court records.  I ask the court to further direct Probation to refund all monies improperly seized from this Defendant from 1990 to the present day.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]
[brief] Respondents did not bring, and the trial court did not consider, motions for summary judgment under R. 4:46-2.  (Pa000053–54, 000107–08.)  The fact that [...] submitted a certification and that Respondents submitted the Agreement itself (which is foundational to [...]’s Complaint) does not require conversion of Respondents’ R. 4:6-2 motions into motions for summary judgment, nor does it require a plenary hearing, nor detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.