ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Nevertheless, contrary to defendant’s claim, there are at least two logical explanations for the verdict.  First, the jury could have found that defendant was one of the shooters but that the State failed to prove the requisite elements for the two weapon possession offenses.  Indeed, this is quite plausible since defendant was only found guilty of a reckless homicide.  A person commits reckless manslaughter when they consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from their conduct.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1); N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).  The degree of risk must be more than “a mere possibility of death. ”  State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. 354, 364 (App. Div. 1984).
[brief] Verified Complaint with Exhibits, filed February 16, 2023 ........................................  Da1  Certification of [...], dated May 5, 2023 ..........................................................  Da39  Certification of [...], dated May 5, 2023 ...............................................  Da42  Order Denying Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss, dated June 15, 2023 ................................  Da45  Memorandum of Decision on Motion, dated June 15, 2023 ..........................................  Da47  Notice of Appeal, dated September 11, 2023 .................................................................  Da57
[brief] [...], A Nonprofit Organization v. [...], and [...] in Official Capacity as Records Custodian  [...] v. [...], [...], in his Official Capacity as Records Custodian, and [...]  (consolidated)  Civil Action  Docket No. [...]  Docket No. Below: [...]  On Appeal from a Final Order of the Superior Court, Law Division  Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  Our File: 41050-2
[brief] The trial judge found that Plaintiff’s preposterous assertions were unestablished in fact.  Pa0194.  The PSA even contained an assignment clause for the prior insurance policies in favor of Plaintiff - demonstrably showing that, as intended, Plaintiff would be responsible for the RAO.  Pa265.  The trial court ruling is fundamentally logical and consistent with the acts and words of the parties involved.  Plaintiff opened the door to extrinsic evidence (Pb) yet complains that the Judge chose to believe the testimony and intent of [...] over [...].  We respectfully submit that [...]’s decision should not be disturbed as he heard the extrinsic evidence from both sides and decided based on facts and testimony.  3.  Plaintiff’s Reference and Argument Related to the RIR is Moot
[brief] The Board also maintains that because [...]’ salary increases were not across-the-board in accordance with its regulations, they were impermissible.  But the increases paid to [...] did not arise from a collective-bargaining settlement involving merit and cost-of-living increases.  It was a litigation settlement affecting one plaintiff.  So long as the settlement agreement is absent fraud or other compelling circumstances, it will be enforced.  *Pascaralla vs. Bruck*, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-125 (App. Div. 1983)  The Board’s arguments are clearly unpersuasive.
[brief] “When the fee-shifting is controlled by a contractual provision, the provision should be strictly construed. ”  *Litton*, 200 N.J. at 385  In interpreting a contract, the court should implement the intentions of the parties.  *Quinn v. Quinn*, 225 N.J. 34, 35 (2016).  “[W]hen the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. ”  *Id.* at 45.  Here, the plain language of the PSA entitled [...], as the prevailing party in this action for breach of the PSA, to recover the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs it incurred in defending against the complaint.  In *Litton*, 200 N.J. 372, the buyers of business assets, who prevailed against sellers in a breach of contract and fraud action, applied to the motion court for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the express terms of the underlying agreement between the parties, which provided that in the event of a breach by the sellers, the buyers would be entitled to recover any and all “losses”, including attorneys’ fees.  *Id.*  The motion court awarded, among other things, recovery of buyers’ attorneys’ fees pursuant to the agreement between the parties, and the sellers appealed.  *Id.*  The Appellate Division affirmed buyers’ entitlement to its attorneys’ fees, and, following sellers’ petition for certification, the Supreme Court affirmed that attorneys’ fees were recoverable losses under the parties’ agreement.  *Id.*  The Supreme Court found that the plain language of the inclusion of attorneys’ fees in the definition of “losses” provided “the intent in the Agreement that attorneys’ fees and costs would be recoverable as part of [sellers’] losses. ”  *Id.* at 387.  Similarly, here, the plain language of the PSA provided for [...] to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and such agreement was appropriately enforced by the motion court.  Once the motion court dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, [...] was appropriately deemed to be the prevailing party.  Accordingly, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs were properly awarded to [...] in accordance with the express terms of the PSA.  Furthermore, by entering into the consent judgment, Plaintiff conceded that the amount of fees awarded to [...] were reasonable.  (Pa704-705).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Pa297).  While checking the hospital lobby for suspicious persons, a corrections sergeant recognized [...]’s girlfriend sitting in the lobby area.  Ibid.  An officer approached her and asked her to follow him to an adjoining room for questioning, in the process discovering that a shopping bag in the girlfriend’s possession contained a 20-gauge shotgun with a sawed-off barrel and a stock loaded with one live 20-gauge shell, as well as a box with twenty-two live 20-gauge shotgun shells.  Ibid.  As a result, [...] was ultimately sentenced on July 24, 1987, to a term of fifteen years, with a mandatory-minimum term of seven years and six months.
[brief] The Defendant-Appellants, [...], and [...] are newly elected Council Members of the [...], and the Defendant-Appellant, [...] is the newly elected Mayor.  (Da 16).  Non-party [...], has represented the [...] on and off since 2019.  He continues to be counsel of record in a variety of matters involving affordable housing matters.  (Da 17).  During the course of the 2023 election campaign for the Council, the Defendants and others made numerous defamatory statements against [...], in both his personal and professional capacities.  The assault on [...]’s reputation was a central part of the Defendants’ campaigns for the Council and Mayor of the Borough, and ultimately led to them being elected to their positions in November 2023.  (Da 17).  In October 2023, prior to the election, [...] filed a defamation lawsuit against the Defendants and other parties involved in making the defamatory statements (Docket No. [...]).
[brief] (a)  In private employment in general; provided, however, each party shall have the right to submit additional evidence for the arbitrator's consideration.  (b)  In public employment in general; provided, however, each party shall have the right to submit additional evidence for the arbitrator's consideration.  (c)  In public employment in the same or similar comparable jurisdictions, as determined in accordance with section 5 of P.L.1995, c.425 (C.34:13A-16.2); provided, however, that each party shall have the right to submit additional evidence concerning the comparability of jurisdictions for the arbitrator's consideration.  (3)  The overall compensation presently received by the employees, inclusive of direct wages, salary, vacations, holidays, excused leaves, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, and all other economic benefits received.
[brief] [...], the medical examiner, testified that the cause of [...]’ death was a “perforating gunshot wound to left chest and perforating gunshot wound of right thigh with re-entry and exit gunshot wound of left thigh. ”  (19T 100-16 to 19)  [...] was 65” tall and weighed 157 pounds.  (19T 109-17 to 24)  No projectiles were found in the body because both shots exited the body.  (19T 103-11 to 12; 19T 105-14 to 20; 19T 107-14 to 25; 19T DiCarlo estimated that because he found no stippling on the body, the shots were fired from “at least six feet away. ”\(^4\) (19T 127-10 to 13)  He described the chest wound as indicating a shot that was fired “up to down” and the thigh wounds as “down to up” -- or “slightly upward” -- but he agreed that such descriptors assume the decedent was “standing straight up. ”  (19T 106-11 to 15; 19T 109-10 to 12; 19T 127-19 to 128-4)  [...] only suffered two other wounds, which were abrasions to his forehead.  (19T 112-10 to 23)  [...],\(^5\) [...]’ mother, testified that [...]’ most recent fixed address was an apartment in [...] or [...] where he lived “with an elderly woman” in 2018.
[brief] Here, the Municipal Court and the Law Division found that the State satisfied both N.J.S.A. 4:19-23a(1) and (2).  (4T:67-1 to 22; Da7).  In regard to N.J.S.A. 4:19-23a(1), both courts found that [...] caused bodily injury to [...] during an unprovoked attack and poses a serious threat of serious bodily injury or death to a person.  (4T:67-1 to 22; Da6).  Likewise, in regard to N.J.S.A. 4:19-23a(2), both courts found [...] killed [...], and poses a serious threat of serious bodily injury or death to a person, or serious threat of death to another domestic animal.  (4T:66-8 to 67-22; Da7).  The courts found the State’s witnesses to be credible and found the testimony sufficient to support a finding that [...] is potentially dangerous.  The arguments that defendant raises on appeal do not warrant reversal and are simply a disagreement on the weight given to the evidence.  For the reasons stated herein, the State submits that there is sufficient credible evidence to support a finding that [...] is potentially dangerous by clear and convincing evidence.
[brief] The officers had a duty to stop the vehicle — and N.J.S.A. 39:5-25 provided the Toms River police officers with the authority to do so in Lakewood.  What is more, the officers also knew that defendant had several outstanding arrest warrants, and arrested him based on those warrants.  (1T11-11 to 14; 1T46-9 to 15).  And, during their surveillance before the stop, officers observed defendant make what [...] believed to be three narcotics-related transactions.  As such, even without a search warrant, the officers could have stopped defendant’s vehicle in Lakewood and arrested him, based on their authority under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.1 and personal observations.  Had the officers failed to act and simply let defendant continue driving the vehicle further into Lakewood, they risked the possibility of losing the evidence or the warrant becoming stale.  The search warrant required execution within ten days of issuance.  (Dca9).  [...]’s surveillance and plan for stopping the vehicle occurred on the second day following its issuance.  Now that the officers observed defendant driving the vehicle, there was the possibility that he could drive further into Lakewood and either destroy or dispose of the evidence, commit more offenses using that same vehicle, or never even drive the vehicle near or into Toms River again within the ten-day time limitation of the warrant.  Officers acted when the situation was ripe and lawful.  Even if this Court finds that the Toms River police officers should have waited until defendant drove the vehicle into Toms River, such a violation will not invalidate the search.  As a general rule, slight departure from the procedural rules surrounding the issuance of warrants, such as territorial jurisdiction, or other issues not implicating probable cause, will not invalidate a search warrant.
[directive] Overview of Interviews .......................................................................................................... 47 8.2  When the Investigation is Criminal and the Officer Is a Subject ........................................... 48 8.3  When the Investigation is Criminal and the Officer Is a Witness .......................................... 50 8.4  When the Investigation is Administrative and the Officer Is a Subject ................................. 50 8.5  When the Investigation is Administrative and the Officer Is a Witness ................................ 52 8.6  Interviewing Procedures ........................................................................................................ 52  9
[brief] (See Deed for Unit 74, executed on April 7, 2016, and Plaintiff’s Title Insurance Company’s Schedule C, Legal Description for Unit 74).  See Pa 97-100.  Pertinent to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed specifically provides the following:  [t]he Board shall designate at least one but not more than three unsold Units for use by building personnel.  Said Unit or Units shall be considered part of the Common Areas and shall be maintained by the Association and shall be part of the Common Expense.  By the affirmative vote of not less than three-fourths of the votes of Unit Owners present at a meeting duly called for that purpose, the Association may elect to purchase one or more Units or other residential quarters for building personnel.  (emphasis added).  See Pa 148-149, “Master Deed,” Paragraph 8, “The Condominium Association and Operation of the Property,” Section (e), “Apartments for Building Personnel. ”  As plainly stated, the Master Deed explicitly contemplated the sale of one or more units at the Association’s election for building personnel, which shall be part of the Common Areas.  Indeed, the Association’s purpose is to administer, manage, maintain, repair, and operate the development.  Id.  Furthermore, when 75% of the units were conveyed, in approximately 1987, the owners became entitled to elect the entire Board of Trustees, the body which controls the Association.
[brief] In reviewing the deposition testimony, the trial court correctly observed that Plaintiff had difficulty describing the condition with any precision.  (Pa2144) (Pa2119-Pa2123; Pa2168).  Plaintiff testified that he never saw anything in the road, no defect, debris, or pothole and had no idea what caused the accident.  (See Pa0378-0079 at 15:25-16:17; Pa0517 at 33:14 - Pa0518 at 34:12).  Furthermore, when Plaintiff went back and reviewed video he took of the roadway, he steadfastly testified that he did not know what caused him to lose control.  (Pa2121; Pa2168) (See Pa0378 at 15:25 - Pa0379 at 16:17; Pa0517 at 33:14 - Pa0518 at 34:12).  The trial court also cited to the testimony of Plaintiff’s wife and friend who were riding alongside plaintiff and did not see anything in the roadway and still do not know exactly what Plaintiff hit.  (Pa2121-2123; Pa2168) (See Pa0859, Pa0861 at 4:8-9; Pa0870 at 33:19-24).  The trial court also noted that the New Jersey State Police report and testimony of the investigating State Police Trooper did not indicate that any debris or condition of the road contributed to or cause the subject accident.  (Pa2123, Pa2168).  In fact, [...] testified that he patrols the area multiple times a day; he had to travel south prior to arriving at the accident; he did not recall see any debris or potholes in the road; and if he had seen anything of significance, he would have noted it in his report.  (Pa2124; Pa0911, Pa0914 at 19:3-15 - Pa0915 at 22:10-23).  Based in part on eyewitness testimony, the trial court correctly found that [...], his wife, his friend and the investigating officer, did not observe a dangerous condition in need of emergent repair.
[directive] (3)  Se declara culpable del siguiente delito que ocurrió el 8 de agosto del 2013 o después de esa fecha: la tenencia ilícita de un arma de fuego de asalto, 2C:39-5(f).  N.J.S.A.  (3)  You are pleading guilty to the following offense that occurred on or after August 8, 2013: unlawful possession of an assault firearm, 2C:39-5(f).
[brief] Portions of Deposition Transcript of Plaintiff/Appellant – Dated 12/17/2021 PA43  [Exhibit 3 to Certification of [...]]  Portions of Deposition Transcript of Defendant/Respondent – Dated 03/07/2022 PA58  [Exhibit 4 to Certification of [...]]  Plaintiff’s Termination Letter from [...] – Dated 01/12/2018 PA69  [Exhibit 5 to Certification of [...]]  Letter from the [...] to Plaintiff indicating Plaintiff was not certified to run for office of council member – Dated 01/30/2018 PA71  [Exhibit 6 to Certification of [...]]  Letter from the [...] to Plaintiff indicating that Plaintiff was certified to run for office of council member – Dated 02/22/2018 PA73  [Exhibit 7 to Certification of [...]]  Executive Order No.: MEO-O-08-0001 – Dated 09/23/2008 PA75  [Exhibit 8 to Certification of [...]]  [...]’s Order Dismissing
[directive] 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지  CN 11080-Korean 1/2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Korean page 1 of 2 4.  귀하가 성인진단  및 치료센터에 강제입원 선고를 받는 경우  Do you understand if you are sentenced to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center a.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  향후의  모든 가석방은 정규 가석방지침에 따라 처리되지 않을 아십니까?  것이라는 것을 that any future parole will not be guided by the normal parole guidelines?  4.  b.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  주 가석방  심사 위원회가 특별등급 심사위원회로부터 권고를 받은 후에, 귀하가 지역사회에서 수용할 만한 사회적 적응 능력이 있다고 판정하면, 아십니까?  석방될 자격을 얻게 된다는 것을 that you will be eligible for release when the State Parole Board, after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds that you are capable of making an acceptable social adjustment in the community?
[brief] The facts show that, even after the defendant left the marital home, the plaintiff waited six months for the defendant to come back.  Even after learning of the defendant’s affair, the plaintiff waited and hoped the defendant would return to him and resume their marriage.  The defendant never did, forcing the plaintiff to finally seek an annulment below.  The defendant only sought a divorce in counterclaim.  As Plaintiff explained to the family judge below (2T43-44):
[brief] [...] opposed that motion on the grounds that such evidence should be admitted --- 5  Inasmuch as there was no ruling on plaintiff's 2020 application to redact prior to the summary judgment rulings, the application was later renewed just prior to trial years later with [...] again submitting opposition. to impeach [...] and would also be admissible as lay opinion.  [...]'s order denying reconsideration, and this Court's opinion, both of which rejected the latter argument, would come later.  [...] written argument in response to plaintiffs' motion in limine was that the police opinions and conclusions were admissible based on their contention that [...] testified that "he only takes cases where he agrees with the theory of the case" and therefore he is biased.
[brief] ”)).  As [...] argued in his June 27, 2023 response to [...]’s assertion, the first cited incident occurred in 2012 and was not substantiated; the second was a complaint from 2020 that [...] admits was closed without any findings; and the third was a 2021 complaint it substantiated concerning an alleged inappropriate comment to a [...] labor relations representative, which is a determination that itself is the subject of a legal challenge that remains pending before the Public Employment Relations Commission.
[brief] However, he did not provide the PCR court with an affidavit or certification from a qualified DNA expert, setting forth an opinion with the basis upon which the State’s DNA evidence could have been challenged. ”  *State v. Jackson*, No. A-0708-18T4, 2020 WL 1170797, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 11, 2020) (Da 052).
[brief] On March 15, 2023, [...] filed the complaint in this matter against all defendants.  (C.C.Da.1-100).  These defendants (as well as all other defendants) filed a Motion to Dismiss In Lieu of Answer on or about April 13, 2023.  [...] filed a concomitant motion to disqualify the [...] as well as the [...] from representing multiple defendants claiming that a conflict of interest existed.  Oral argument was heard before [...] on or about October 24, 2023.  (T.1-57).  Thereafter, [...] issued his written decision and order on October 27, 2023, denying the disqualification motion and granting the motion to dismiss in favor or arbitration.  (C.C.Da.105-10).  [...] appealed both determinations on October 27, 2023.  (Pa.0354).
[directive] The indictment added three new charges against [...] -- two counts of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.  2C:12-1(b)(1), and one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1).  The charges stemmed from information the State learned from a codefendant in May 2020.  The County Prosecutor, though, elected not to “present murder and other sensitive first-degree cases” to a virtual grand jury and waited to submit the charges to a grand jury in person.  In-person grand jury proceedings were able to resume on June 15, 2021.  Sup. Ct. of N.J., at 2 (May 11, 2021 Order).  15  The parties returned to court to arraign [...] on the superseding indictment on November 15, 2021.  We discuss the balance of the defendant’s hearing in greater detail later but note a few points here.
[brief] Despite [...]’s denials of what she was being directly accused of, this did not deter [...] from transforming her unlawfully obtained responses to his questions into a self-ratifying justification for the canine search he had already determined to conduct.  In this case, as in Kruckenberg, Trooper [...]’s intent, from the very initiation of the stop, despite possessing nothing more than a “hunch,” was to “walk his dog” around [...]’s vehicle in order to justify a search; it was not to issue a “warning” about mud flaps.  For that he would merely have had to contact dispatch for license and registration information, and for which he would not have needed a back-up officer to write the warning for him.  Indeed, without using the word “pretext,” that is precisely what the Court in Kruckenberg intimated about the purpose of [...]’s conduct, from the time he stopped the [...]’s vehicle, until the time of the suspicionless canine search, equally applicable to this case.