ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is no evidence of record that Plaintiff intended to abandon her desire to own the Property.  In fact, it is quite the opposite - she became the Manager of the Companies and the Property (and exercised all attributes of ownership by handling leases, vacancies, income and expenses or cash flow (Da32, ¶16)) and sought to purchase the Property back from [...] on multiple occasions. \(^3\)  Thus, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s conduct and all the agreements that came after the MOU, the terms of which relate to either Plaintiff’s management of the Property or her ability to purchase it, the trial court properly found that Plaintiff and her [...] never intended to abandon this original rescue plan in the MOU.
[brief] See *id.* at 401.  The Court concluded that all juvenile offenders are entitled to be resentenced after twenty years in prison.  The resentencing court should consider the *Miller* factors and decide whether the offender has matured, been rehabilitated, and is fit for release.  *Id.* at 401, 403.  The resentencing court will have the discretion to impose any base sentence within the statutory range, and to impose a parole disqualifier as low as twenty years.  *Id.* at 403.  B.
[brief] The WHREA, though, presents additional reasons for dismissing the Board’s claims here.  The WHREA has already explained supra why the Board’s proposed interpretation of ‘exclusive representatives’ under N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 conflicts with the purpose of the statute.  However, even if the Appellate Division was concerned about the possibility of “an absurd result”, [...]’s decision includes the method to avoid such an outcome.  If the Board or any employer can show that a labor organization’s use of a larger negotiations team creates a conflict of interest or ill-will, or that it jeopardizes safety or security, [...] recognizes the employer’s legal basis to contest the size of the negotiations team.  (Pb17).  But, by requiring the employer to first demonstrate actual bad faith before curtailing a labor organization’s right to determine the size of its negotiations team, [...] has presented a balance between protecting a labor organization and members’ rights under N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 and the interests in promoting productive negotiations.  As the agency entrusted with the administration of NJEERA, this court should, respectfully, defer to [...]’s expertise on how to best promote peaceful and productive labor negotiations.
[brief] [...] operates under the Borough form of government found at N.J.S.A. 40A:60-1, et seq. “health ordinances…in the execution of any power delegated to it or in the performance of any duty imposed upon it by law…”.  Another very general legislative grant of authority to pass ordinances by a local Health Board is found in “the Public Health and Sanitation Codes Adoption by Reference Act”.  N.J.S.A. 26:3-69.1 to -69.6 (“the PHSCARA”).  The PHSCARA applies to both county and municipal Boards of Health. \(^5\) Article 6 of Chapter 3 of Title 26 deals with “regional health commissions”.  These statutes are codified at N.J.S.A. 26:3-83 to 3-94.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................4 I THE [...] BARS THE SECOND ARBITRATION (PA21, PA34-44) .................................................................4 II [...]’S RIPENESS ARGUMENT IS LEGALLY FLAWED, AS [...] HAD AN “ENFORCEABLE RIGHT” ON ITS NON-PAYMENT BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM YEARS AGO (PA21, PA44) ....................................................10
[brief] *Id.* at 654.  This is exactly what Relator purports to have done here, as shown by Relator’s own allegations and admissions.  Relator alleges that its analysis of VRDO rate reset data obtained from [...] reveals that Defendants have failed to properly reset rates on New Jersey VRDOs, pursuant to their remarketing agent obligations. \(^{13}\)  Relator admits that it used data from [...] to conduct its analysis. \(^{14}\)  It is undisputed that this information was also posted on [...], and available to [...] subscribers. \(^{15}\)  Such disclosure is all Springfield Terminal and the unbroken line of decisions following it require for Relator’s action to be “based upon” the public disclosures.
[directive] 9.10.4  That law enforcement agencies report the above-listed incidents to the County Prosecutor's Office does not constitute a mandate or requirement that the information be disclosed to the court.  Prosecutors should conduct an independent review of the information provided to determine whether it needs to be disclosed and whether the officer can participate in the prosecution of criminal cases.  9.10.5  Once a decision is reached as to a particular case or defendant, the prosecutor shall, if necessary, discuss their decision with the internal affairs investigator and the law enforcement executive.  If it is determined that an officer cannot participate in a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor must advise the agency whether the officer's disability is limited to a particular case, a particular category of cases or all criminal matters.
[brief] The Court’s assessment and decision to reject Plaintiff’s lay opinion regarding the applicable paint finish and application is not undercut by the inapplicable case law referenced in the Appellant brief.  Each of the cases submitted in support of Plaintiff’s argument are easily distinguishable from the case at hand: Estate of Nicholas v. Ocean Plaza Condominium Association, Inc., 388 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2006) (a lay person can speak to whether someone is ‘insane’ for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21); In the Matter of the Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276 (2008) (individual was not permitted to testify regarding intent to include surviving spouses in a will); Murphy v. Trapani, 225 N.J. Super. 65 (App. Div. 1992) (testimony of adjoining landowner and of licensed planner and land surveyor that deck constituted navigational hazard); Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 447 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2016) (plaintiff’s co-worker was allowed to testify that plaintiff had tripped and fallen over a bag of ice melt based on his perception).  POINT II
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully urges this Honorable Court to affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...] /S/ [...]________  By: [...] (Id No. 026692002)  Assistant Prosecutor Dated: January 3, 2025  January 17, 2025  [...]  Attorney ID No. 404382022  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the  Letter-Brief  REPLY LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] **2T36**.  From the settlement, [...] received $1 million.  **2T133**.  Defendant allowed Plaintiff no disbursement from the million dollar settlement.  **2T133**.  He did not tell her about it.  **2T100**.  When she asked about it, he told her she was not entitled to anything.  He did not explain his reasoning nor the eminent domain proceeding.  **2T22**.
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[brief] The Mode of Operation Doctrine does not apply.  The Appellant argues that the Respondent did not conduct inspections, did not have maintenance people and relied upon sales personnel to discover and clean up spills, which was outside the scope of their maintenance duties.  The Appellant’s recitation of the facts is not accurate.  As detailed in the Statement of Facts above, the Appellant did conduct inspections, did have maintenance personnel, did not solely rely upon sales personnel to discover and clean up spills, and the discovery and clean-up of spills was within the duties of the sales personnel. \(^1\)  Regardless, the \(^1\)  The Appellant argues that [...]’s testimony contradicts the certification of Manager [...].  The Appellant argues that [...] testified that her sole maintenance duties were to pick up clothes and hangers.
[brief] Defendants received more than ample notice and took no timely action.  No review of the foreclosure docket would have alerted [...] to Defendants’ “outstanding claim or equity. ”  [...]’s principal certified that he did not know, and had no reason to know, of Defendants’ outstanding claim, given that it was not even filed until about two months after [...] had purchased the property.  *(842a¶5).*  [...] would not have spent $140,000 on the property if there was any indication Defendants had an outstanding claim to the property.  *(842a¶5).*  Defendants ask this court to ignore the actual standards, and instead, as below, they invent *ad hoc* and evidentially-unsupported reasons why [...] is not a *bona fide* purchaser.
[brief] Furthermore, the condition had been fulfilled.  Every night for the last nine years the elderly [...]’s had a warm, dry roof over their heads because their son-in-law, [...], had bought not one but two homes for their benefit (5T63:22-64:5).  The Trial Court, however, rejected Defendants’ conditional gift argument, finding no facts in the record in support of that theory beyond Defendant’s testimony (6T24:10 to 16).  The Trial Court further found that nothing in the record created at trial indicated that any thought was given to what should happen to the $50,000.00 when the elderly [...]’s no longer needed a place to live (6T24:10-11; 6T28:22-24).
[brief] Several courts to have considered the issue in the context of a redevelopment plan have in fact required a spot zoning analysis.  See e.g. Kanter v. Passaic, 107 N.J. Super. 556 (L. Div. 1969):  However, we still must consider plaintiff’s assertion that even if the amendment to the redevelopment plan was properly adopted as regards procedure, it must still fail because it constitutes “spot zoning. ”  See also St. Paul’s Missionary Baptist Church v. City of Vineland, [...], 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 839, at *9 (App. Div. July 15, 2008) (Pa1009 to Pa1011) remanding a matter involving a redevelopment plan amendment for a spot zoning analysis
[brief] The structure of the model jury charge, and [...]’s charge that comported with it, follows what the Supreme Court analyzed and held in *State v. Coyle*, 119 N.J. 194, 222-224 (1990), where the trial court in that case utilized a sequential instruction to charge the jury on murder, then aggravated manslaughter, then reckless manslaughter and then on passion/provocation manslaughter. \(^3\)  The Supreme Court held that normally sequential instructions are proper when charging greater and lesser included offenses, however, when there is evidence of passion/provocation, the court must be careful because the State is required to disprove it to convict the defendant of purposeful or knowing murder.  In *Coyle*, the use of a sequential instruction, when the initial charge on murder did not clearly convey the State’s burden to disprove passion/provocation manslaughter, was deemed to be error.  Here, the trial court’s instructions on murder, which tracked the model jury charges, followed this mandate by clearly instructing the jury on the State’s burden to disprove passion/provocation manslaughter to convict defendant of purposeful or knowing murder.  Passion/provocation manslaughter was an element that was part of the State’s burden of proof.  [...] instructed the jury on several substantive offenses of aggravated assault with respect to count two of the indictment as lesser included offenses of --- \(^3\)  The model jury charge in use at the time provided for the use of sequential jury charges in this context.  See *State v. Cupe*, 289 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div.) (holding in *Coyle* on misuse of sequential instructions involving passion/provocation manslaughter a new rule of law and not retroactive on collateral review), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 (1996). attempted murder.
[brief] The State’s Argument Misconstrues the Statute’s Plain Meaning.  ..................  1  II.  The Act Should Be Voided Because the Legislature Violated Its Laws Regarding Enacting Legislation.  .................................................................  3  III.  The Legislature Violated the Constitution.  .........................................................  10  IV.  The Applicants Have Standing to Challenge the Statute in the Law Division.........................................................................................................................  14  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Barone v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 107 N.J. 355 (1987) .............................................................................................................. 7 Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245 (2016) ............................................................................................................ 5 Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408 (2009) .......................................................................................................... 8 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)............................................................................................................... 5 Harris v. Branin Transp., Inc., 312 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 1998) .............................................................................. 7 In re Forsythe, 91 N.J. 141 (1982) ........................................................................................................... 12, 13 In re Jaegle, 83 N.J.L. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1912) ......................................................................................... 1, 2, 12 In re Kornbluh, 134 N.J.L. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ................................................................. 3 In re Miller's Petition, 122 N.J.L. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1939) .................................................................. 4 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576 (2013)
[brief] (Db 15-28)  Furthermore, because this evidence was unlawfully obtained, [...] argued that it cannot factor into the analysis of whether there was probable cause to issue a search warrant for his storage unit.  (Db 29)  The State disputes that [...] has standing to challenge the seizure of contraband from [...]’s car.  (Sb 14-20)  [...] primarily relies on the ¹  This brief uses the same abbreviations as [...]’s initial brief.  In addition, Db refers to [...]’s initial brief, and Sb refers to the State’s brief. subsection of his initial brief on this issue (Db 16-22), but he takes this opportunity to respond to several of the State’s arguments that are without merit.  First, the State puts far too much emphasis on the fact that [...] was not charged with conspiracy to possess or distribute the narcotics seized from [...]’s car.  The State attempts to create a rigid separation between the criminal activities of [...] and [...], on the one hand, and of [...] and [...], on the other, by noting there are “two distinct conspiracies” charged: “1) defendant’s conspiracy with [...] to distribute CDS; and 2) [...]’s conspiracy with [...] to deliver narcotics to the storage unit. ”  (Sb 18-19)  But such a rigid separation is belied by the fact that the storage unit belongs to [...] and that, at the time police stopped [...]’s car, they were investigating an alleged criminal enterprise run by [...] out of his storage unit, involving, among other things, the delivery of narcotics to that unit.  The two conspiracies were thus inextricably linked in the minds of the investigating officers, and the officers would not have stopped [...]’s car had they not believed there was a connection between [...] and [...].  Moreover, [...]’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be limited by the State’s subsequent charging decisions.  The ultimate conclusion of the prosecutor’s office -- that it did not have enough evidence to prove [...]’s involvement in a conspiracy to possess or distribute the narcotics found in [...]’s car -- cannot be used as an after-the-fact justification for denying [...] the opportunity to challenge the seizure of this evidence in the first instance, particularly where the evidence was relied on to establish probable cause to search [...]’s storage unit.
[brief] The Court finds that the plain, ordinary meaning of the term “notes”, as used in this statutory definition, encompasses a debt obligation arising—as here—from an underlying credit card account.  A dictionary definition of “note” is a “written promise to pay a debt. ”  Note, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/note (last visited April 20, 2023).  An open-ended credit card agreement of the type [...] and its predecessor assignees acquired is such a written promise to pay a debt.
[brief] 424-25a.  The court again threatened to permanently invalidate [...]’s zoning ordinance, blocking “all development applications, from the smallest to the largest, until compliance is achieved. ”  426a. c.  To Bring Itself Into Compliance, [...]’s Prior Administration Reached An Agreement With [...], So Ordered By The Court, To Have [...] Construct, Among Other Things: (1) [...] Station Containing 22 Units Of Affordable Housing; and (2) The Off-site Building Containing 7 Units, Which Plan, If Implemented, Would Meet The Majority Of [...]’s Outstanding Constitutional Obligations
[brief] Pa802  Exhibit J- Unpublished Appellate Decision, dated January 25, 2027.........  Pa807  Certification of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Reply, dated October 10, 2023 .......  Pa812  Exhibit A- Various Letters of Support, dated September 28, 2022 .........  Pa814  Exhibit B- Email from [...], dated March 28, 2022 ...............  Pa840  Exhibit C- Approval of [...] funding (2022 date unknown) ..............  Pa844 Order, entered October 18, 2023 ..............................................
[brief] Castano v. Augustine, 475 N.J. Super. 71, 77 (App. Div. 2023).  “If a statute's plain language is clear,” a court applies “that plain meaning” and the inquiry is over.  Ibid.  Courts are not in the business of “rewrite[ing] a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature” and do not “presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language. ”  *Id.* at 77-78.  Words in a statute are accorded “their ordinary meaning and significance. ”  *Matter of H.D.*, 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020).  “It is well established that, when the statutory language is plain, [a court] must enforce it according to its terms.
[brief] Appellants’ argument should be rejected because it is based on one unpublished case that is wholly distinguishable from this matter because it involved a primary auto policy.  Appellants would have this Court ignore the weight of authority upholding the application of Injury to an Insured exclusions in excess liability policies, such as the [...].  Although ignored by Appellants in their briefing, this distinction between the types of policies is critical to this matter and invalidates any argument based on public policy.  New Jersey drivers are required to have a primary auto liability policy, and coverage under such policies is mandated by statute.  It is the mandatory nature and statutory restrictions on primary auto policies that motivates the restriction on Injury to an Insured exclusions in that context because such exclusions have been held to violate statutory requirements.  In contrast, excess liability policies are optional and offer broad coverage not only for excess auto liability, but also for excess personal liability in general, such as would typically fall under the liability coverage part of a homeowner’s policy.
[brief] Additionally, in cases where the DNA evidence “was of marginal significance” in the context of the entire case, admission of the DNA evidence without qualifying statistical evidence has been found not to result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Linton, 924 N.E.2d 722 (Mass. 2010); Commonwealth v. Carnes, 933 N.E.2d 598, 622 (Mass. 2010).  Here, the DNA evidence identifying the victim was not pivotal to the State’s case, which is demonstrated by the lack of objection or cross-examination by defendant.  Defendant did not dispute that [...] was a homicide victim or that the wine chiller was the murder weapon.  And the lack of a comparable profile from the swab of the striped shirt’s collar did not affect defendant in any way.  Though it was determined that the victim was the source of the DNA on defendant’s bra, it was just one piece of evidence the State relied on in addition to defendant’s confession and her flight.  Moreover, as mentioned above defendant relied on the blood on her bra as evidence she did not commit the beating.  This single piece of evidence thus proved insufficient to sway the jury to a verdict it would not have otherwise reached.
[brief] 1.  Defendants’ interpretation violates the canon against absurd or unreasonable results.  Interpreting AICRA to require Plaintiffs to arbitrate their statutory and equitable claims arising from a complex fraudulent scheme would violate the canon against absurd or unreasonable results.  See State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (“[A] court should strive to avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd or unreasonable results. ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[brief] (Aa005-006).  As to [...]’s removal from the eligible list, the Commission noted that [...] had notice of [...]’s request to remove her name from the subject promotional eligible list, the basis for the request, and an opportunity to respond.  (Aa006).  As to the merits of the removal request, the Commission noted the record indicated that, among other charges, [...] had received major discipline involving untruthfulness approximately seven years prior to the subject examination, minor discipline approximately two and six years prior to the closing date, and counseling three years after the closing date.  (Aa006-007).  Moreover, the Commission noted that [...]’s employment record was adverse to the position sought given the high standards for law enforcement officers generally and the even higher standard for the higher-level law enforcement position of Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant which involves supervision, evaluation, training, and guidance of subordinate law enforcement officers.  (Aa007).  As such, the Commission denied [...]’s appeal and ordered her name be removed from the Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant, [...] eligible list.
[brief] A.  [...] did not demonstrate a need for the WFD permit and modification that cannot be satisfied by existing waterfront facilities.  [Aa89-Aa91.]..............................................10  B.  [...] did not demonstrate that its dock will not hinder navigation or access to adjacent water areas.  [Aa89-Aa91.].....13  CONCLUSION..............................................................15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED