ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Pa535-37 at 147:14-148:2, 152:2-153:6, 156:4-157:6 (emphases added); Pa668 at 201:8-19.]  At bottom, there was extensive testimony on the Hackensack Project through all four (4) days of [...]’s case-in-chief, and during the first three (3) days of [...]’s case-in-chief.  Pa210, 300, 705, 785, 430, 497, 617.  After [...] presented the above testimony (that [...] has not been paid for the Hackensack Project, and so [...] should not have to pay [...] EGP for the Project) [...] tendered “[...]’s business records made and kept in the ordinary course of business concerning the Hackensack job.  We have identified those as starting with [...] Exhibit 185 -- 181 through 241. ”  Pa543 at 180:23-181:2.  Again, this is the only Project for which [...] mass-submitted business records.  [...] also alleged that it “suffered business losses in the amount of not less than $5,481,397 in its New Jersey based activities undertaken in connection with the PTA,” which included the above-referenced alleged losses at the Hackensack Project.  Pa204 ¶ 60.  And [...] submitted an expert report and proffered expert testimony to support its claim to reimbursement of these alleged losses. \(^4\)  See Pa577 at 10.  **D.  The Arbitrator’s Final Award Awarded [...] All Unpaid EGP—Except for the Hackensack Project (Pa573)**
[brief] o Notice of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice o Order to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice o Day 1 of [...]  Deposition – Pages 109-112 o RULE 2:6-1(a)  (1)  STATEMENT OF ALL ITEMS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT ON THE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  MOTION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] In this action, [...] also got a sheriff involved, in the middle of trial.  Specifically,  On November 30, 2022, [...] asked a Sheriff’s officer to sit in at the trial (3T, pg. 43, lines 16-25).  Despite, the prior angst regarding the sheriff’s officers confronting [...] (as described above regarding the occurrences reflected on the Sept. 16, 2022 transcript)  There is no indication in the record that [...] ever instructed the Sheriff’s officer regarding how to interact with [...].  On December 1, 2022, during the trial, [...], who was not on the witness stand at the time, left the Courtroom to use the bathroom.  Notably, [...] noted on the record that she had not previously ever instructed [...] that he was not free to do so (4T Pg. 71 line 18 – pg. 72, line 2).  When [...] left the court room, the sheriff’s officer followed him out and questioned him in the hallway.  (4T, Pg. 56 line 19 – pg. 57, line 14).  The Sheriff’s officer wanted to ask the judge if [...] was allowed to use the bathroom.  (4T, Pg. 58, lines 14-17).  A Juror had noted that s/he heard a fight going on outside.  (4T, Pg. 55, line 22).  [...]’s counsel requested a Mistrial at the time.  (4T, Pg. 59, lines 20-21).  [...] stated explicitly to [...]’s attorney, that is was his own client shouting that the jurors heard; [...] heard his voice and stated that everyone heard his voice.  (4T Pg. 60, lines 14-18).  And further, [...] repeated that the voice everyone heard shouting was [...]’s.  (4T, Pg. 73, lines 9-10).  Mr.  Cohen’s attorney argued, the altercation in the hallway was believed by [...] to have been generated by law enforcement and he believed that prejudiced the case and asked for a mistrial on that basis.  Later that morning, [...] addressed the matter regarding going to the bathroom directly with [...].  [...] pointed out that he had to leave the courtroom due to his colitis (4T, Pg. 107, line 3) and that he tried to raise his hand ask [...] first, but she didn’t look at him (4T, Pg. 106, lines 8-9), and that at least until being confronted by the Sheriff, he didn’t interrupt the Court, he walked out as quietly as possible (4T, Pg. 106, lines 21-24); he did it with respect to the court proceedings.  (4T, Pg. 107, lines 15-16).  But he felt like he was being harassed constantly.  (4T, Pg. 107, lines 23-24).  Trial Judge admitted into evidence prejudicial documents that were never exchanged in discovery
[brief] [...]’s obligation was to identify records with reasonable clarity by way of reference to a discrete and limited subject without seeking all of [...]’s records.  Simmons, 247 N.J. at 43; Bent, 381 N.J. Super. at 37; Burke, 429 N.J. Super. at 174; Spectraserv, 416 N.J. Super. at 576; MAG, 375 N.J. Super. at 547.  Because his request for all emails sent to or from the Provost between September 27 and 29, 2020 indisputably does not identify any discrete or limited subject matter, and in effect seeks the Provost’s entire “correspondence file” for that same time period to avoid having to do so, the trial court’s decision deeming it valid under OPRA should be reversed.  POINT II
[brief] Pa378 Legislative Fiscal Estimate, Senate, No. 49, State of New Jersey, 220th Legislature, dated January 18, 2022 …………………………………………..  Pa473 Fiscal Analysis ……………………………………………………………………………………..  Pa474  Relevant pages from [...], “The New Jersey Constitution of 1947,” N.J.S.A. Const. Vol. 1 (1971) ...........................................  Pa475  Senate, No. 1068, State of New Jersey, introduced May 16, 1994 ..  Pa484 Assembly, No. 2372 with committee amendments, State of New Jersey, dated September 26, 1994 ..................................................  Pa486  Senate, No. 1068 with committee amendments, State of New Jersey, introduced May 16, 1994 .................................................................  Pa487  TABLE OF ITEM UNDER REVIEW S. 49, codified as L. 2021, c. 375......................................................  Pa5
[brief] Having determined that the evidence would come in, the court then failed to address it appropriately throughout trial.  Without asking prospective jurors about their pre-existing beliefs in the reliability of fingerprint evidence, the trial court failed to ensure that the jury empaneled would actually be able to consider the possibility that [...] was wrong.  Without limiting [...]’s testimony to what is scientifically supported and without preventing him from including testimonial hearsay, the trial court allowed the State’s case to be inappropriately bolstered.
[brief] At the outset, the State concedes the fleeting portions at the very beginning of the recorded statement related to defendant’s custody on an unrelated offense, without defendant’s invitation, should have been redacted.  However, the record plainly shows that defendant not only acquiesced to the redactions, but did so “for trial purposes. ”  Trial errors that “‘were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal....’”  State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987) (quoting State v. Harper, 128 N.J. Super. 270, 277 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 574 (1974)).  Designed to “prevent defendants from manipulating the system[,]” State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 359 (2004), the doctrine “is implicated ‘when a defendant in some way has led the court into error[,]’ and it has been applied ‘in a wide variety of situations,’ State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 562-63 (2013) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 340-41 (2010)).
[brief] Woods-Pirozzi, 290 N.J. Super. at 274.  The first critical failure in plaintiff’s retaliation claim against [...] is that it is undisputed that [...] did not know that [...] had filed an earlier complaint against [...].  (Pa307).  The second failure is that [...] never actually suffered any adverse employment action as a result of [...]’s investigation.  The undisputed record is that he was not disciplined.  (Pa311).  See Beasley, 377 N.J. Super. at 606 (anti-retaliation law speaks in terms of “completed actions”).  Plaintiff could not meet any of the prongs necessary for a prima facie retaliation case against [...].  Woods-Pirozzi, 290 N.J. Super. at 274.  Counts Two and Six against her were properly dismissed.
[brief] \(^8\)  [...] Opposition Brief § II(B)(1).  Notably, Respondent [...] admitted he had no idea [...] was conducting an investigation, nor did he receive the results of such investigation.  (Pa655)  139:1-145:13.  \(^9\) [...] Opposition Brief § II(B) (arguing that [...] took “prompt remedial action” after Appellant filed her EEO complaint by investigating and disciplining [...] *six months* after Appellant was transferred.) separate entities that share no responsibility over the other agency’s employees, but in the same breath rely upon the other agency to investigate and/or remediate their own employees’ complaints of sexual harassment.  Not only does this proposition directly contradict Respondents’ respective policies, but it also contradicts Respondents’ theories to avoid liability.  At a minimum, [...]’s reliance on [...]’s investigation – *which took six months to complete and failed to take proper corrective action*¹⁰ – was a breach of a duty [...] owed to Appellant as their employee to ensure that [...] employees were provided a workplace free from harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.  *Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods*, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 269 (App. Div. 1996) (“An employer that knows or should know its employee is being harassed in the workplace, regardless of by whom, should take appropriate action”).  Moreover, Respondents’ proposition that the investigation was “prompt” and “remedial” is entirely illogical.  [...]’s investigation took *six months* to complete, and despite verifying Appellant’s complaints, [...]’s only remedial action was to suspend [...] for three days.  (Pa895) DCF_Stouch000719-729; (Pa564) 125:24-128:4.
[brief] Instead, this opinion and others like it dealt with the entirely different situation in which publicly disclosed allegations, not transactions, suggest industry-wide fraudulent conduct, but do not tie the fraud to any particular defendant.17  17  What’s more, courts referring to the burden of combing through “myriad transactions” have done so with respect to non-public transactions (e.g., Medicare claims), not publicly disclosed transactions (like the VRDO transactional data at issue here).  See, e.g., In re Nat. Gas, 562 F.3d at 1042.  Here, there is no dispute that each of the VRDO Data Sources directly and publicly ties every VRDO and every single rate change to a particular remarketing agent.  Indeed, Relator does not contend that its analysis of the MSRB SHORT data leaves any doubt about who the Defendants are in this action.  *Natural Gas Royalties* and its progeny do not apply here.
[brief] [...] has uniquely applicable experience in this matter because he previously worked for the [...] for over 19 years and was responsible for writing redevelopment plans, zoning amendments, Master Plan amendments, as well as conducted hundreds of staff reviews of major site plan applications and advised the City on a wide range of planning issues.  Pa125-Pa126.  Here, [...] was asked to evaluate “what development approvals would have been reasonably probable to have been approved by the [...] for [the Property] as of June 3, 2019, the date of valuation for the condemnation action referenced above.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70; see also, Lang, 160 N.J. at 57.  It must also be noted that the Land Development Rules provide that “Any nonconforming use or structure existing as of January 2, 2018, may be continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied,” N.J.A.C. 19:66-12.1.  This directly correlates to the MLUL on non-conforming conditions: “Any nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an ordinance may be continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68.  Case law further confirms that where “property had been used for a particular business purpose for many years prior to the passage of the ordinance, and during this period of time the premises had no off-street parking facility… the continued utilization of the property in this fashion -- without off-street parking facilities – [is] legally protected…” as a pre-existing non-conformity.
[brief] 36.  [...], Defendant’s third fact witness, did not move to [...] until 1980 or 1981 when he was nine (9) or ten (10) years old, and attended the [...] from Third to Eighth Grades from 1980 through 1985.  Goldberg testified he did not recall any cars parked in the [...] when he arrived for school around 8:45.  (12T 84:17-25)  Again, there was only one morning service at Plaintiff’s synagogue during this period that began at 7:00 a.m. and would have concluded by the time Goldberg arrived for school.  Thus, this testimony regarding the Subject Property was wholly irrelevant.
[directive] The prosecutor or the Attorney General, whichever is prosecuting the case, shall divide the forfeited property, any proceeds resulting from the forfeiture or any money seized pursuant to this chapter with any other entity where the other entity's law enforcement agency participated in the surveillance, or investigation, arrest prosecution resulting in the forfeiture, in proportion to the other entity's in contribution to the surveillance, investigation, arrest or prosecution resulting the forfeiture, as determined in the discretion of the prosecutor or the Attorney General, whichever is prosecuting the case.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, such forfeited property and proceeds shall be used solely for Iaw enforcement purposes, and shall be designated for the exclusive use of the law Document Page 2 of 2 enforcement agency which contributed to the surveillance, investigation, arrest or prosecution resulting in the forfeiture.
[brief] The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.  More than 75 years ago, in *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own. ”
[brief] That is, the Process Server, and the Plaintiff’s Attorney and his Legal Assistant knowing and willfully violated the law.  The trial court ERRED in granting the Final Judgment by Default in May of 2015 that denied the defendants of their right to due process of: (1) notice; (2) an opportunity to be heard; and, (3) an impartial tribunal.  Based on these court records, the defendants WERE NOT properly served as a business entity and as an individual.  The defendants **DID NOT** receive the complaint and the summons, thereby denying the defendants their right to dispute the Complaint and to challenge the Summons.  The defendants **DID NOT** receive proper notice, thereby denying them of their rights to oppose the Request to Enter Default and to oppose the Final Judgment by Default.  Upon discovering these violations of law, the defendants filed a Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment by Default.  At the October 19, 2023 hearing, the **Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment by Default**, supported by the defendants’ joint brief, was DENIED by the trial court.  Subsequently, the defendants filed a **Motion to Reconsider**, was DENIED, and then the **Motion for a Traverse Hearing**, supported by the business defendant’s affidavit and brief (Pa40-42; Pa43-45), was DENIED, that would have allowed the defendants to cross-examine the individuals, under oath about the matters of law that they knowingly and willfully violated.
[brief] (Ja45, L. 8-14; Ja49, L. 24-p. 50, L. 20; Ja51, L. 1-11)  ...........................................  24 POINT V - Plain Error is in the initial opinion of the trial court (Ja12-20)  ....  25  a.  Primacy of Pinelands Waiver ...............................................................  25 b.  Legal Conclusions from Pinelands Waiver ............................................  26 c.  Frontage Misstatement ........................................................................  26 d.  Misleading Similarities ........................................................................  27 e.  Mistaken Assertion on Exhaustion of Remedies .....................................  27  f.  Net Opinion Lay Testimony ..................................................................  28  POINT VI - Was there sufficient change from the [...] application to the [...] application?  (Ja158, par. 15; Ja165, drawing of driveways; Ja240, #15; Ja245-drawing; Ja292, par. 2.)  .........................................................  29  POINT VII - Judicial Review by the Appellate Court may Reverse the Board/trial court decision if arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
[brief] ”  Mount Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C., 188 N.J. 531, 533 (2006).  Here, it must be recognized that Plaintiff’s willingness to develop an inclusionary development on the Property impacts a significant public interest, especially in a town that is in significant violation of its constitutional obligation to zone for the development of affordable housing.  The trial court did not ignore [...]’s rights to condemn and redevelop property, but rightfully considered the Township’s failure to meet its constitutional obligation and the impact that failure has on the protected class.  In other words, the trial court engaged in a balancing test to determine whether to grant injunctive relief, as it was required to do under Crowe.  In doing so, the court factored [...]’s voluntarily withdrawal from the DJ Action which made the Township vulnerable to the instant builder’s remedy suit, [...]’s constitutional violation in failing to properly zone to allow the development of affordable housing, the magnitude of [...]’s noncompliance (they were not merely a few units short, but at least 602), and the commercial (as opposed to a more inherently beneficial) nature of [...]’s alternate development plans.  Moreover, the trial court took note that this is a public interest litigation in which Plaintiff represents the interests of the protected class of individuals in need of low- and moderate-income housing.  A.
[brief] *15*  [...]'s first argument is quite similar to the contentions raised by [...]'s points one and two, which we have rejected.  The main difference, however, is [...]'s heavy reliance upon *State v. Sugar*, 100 N.J. 214 (1985), which is claimed to support the principle that a witness should not be allowed to testify if fair and effective cross-examination would require the introduction of prejudicial inadmissible evidence.  *Id.* at 230.  In *Sugar*, a detective investigating a murder was found to have engaged in illegal eavesdropping and the resulting evidence was suppressed.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from: Superior Court of New Jersey LAW  DIVISION-BERGEN COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writs Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C., ret’d, t/a  Date of Submission: November 20, 2023  PLAINTIFFS’/RESPONDENTS’
[brief] Similarly, although a court is not bound by the Attorney General’s interpretation, “it is nonetheless entitled to a degree of deference, in recognition of the Attorney General’s special role as the sole legal adviser to most agencies of State Government,” including the [...].  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 617 (citing Quarto v. Adams, 395 N.J. Super. 502, 513 (App. Div. 2007)).  The court’s hyper-technical reading of the statute was erroneous and must be reversed because it ignores the actual text of the Securities Law in two respects.
[brief] \(^6\) --- \(^6\)  See State v. Bundy, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1593, *12, 2017 WL 2797859, *5 (App. Div. June 28, 2017) (where defendant was convicted of reckless manslaughter and unlawful possession of a weapon, “[t]he trial judge erred by determining ‘the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other’”) (Da92); State v. Fontanez, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 150, *20-22, 2017 WL 371471, *8 (App. Div. Jan. 26, 2017) (finding that even where separate victims justified consecutive sentences for aggravated assault and attempted murder, this did not justify a consecutive sentence on defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon) (Da106); State v. Bridges, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1573, *26, 2014 WL 2957443, *11 (App. Div. July 2, 2014) (finding, where a jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder and two related counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, that “[t]he two crimes were not predominantly independent of each other, did not involve separate acts, and were not committed at different times or separate places”).
[brief] Similarly, Plaintiff had alleged that “someone” started a false rumor to a new [...] employee that Plaintiff was “sleeping with multiple people in the office, and that’s why I was terminated”.  (Id., T139:9-T141:9; Pa227, Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories, Par. 2).  Incredibly, at her deposition, Plaintiff could not (once again) identify the “someone”, the new “[...] Employee”, and was forced to admit that the “someone” could have been a [...] employee.  (Id.)  As part of the claims in this matter, Plaintiff contended that ultimately, her medical provider “constructively discharged” her from [...], “advising that Defendant [...]’ workplace ‘would be a horrible environment for her future employment.
[brief] Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on September 10, 2021.  (Pa1 – Pa12).  Defendants filed an Answer on February 14, 2022.  (Pa13 – Pa21).  Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 2024.  (Pa22 – Pa23).  Plaintiff filed opposition to the Motion on June 12, 2024.  (Pa654 – Pa685.)  Defendants filed a reply on July 1, 2024.  (Pa688 – Pa708).  The Court heard Oral Argument on July 15, 2024, and issued its decision on the record.  On July 16, 2024, the Court entered an Order granting Defendants’ Motion.  (Pa712).  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on August 22, 2024, and an Amended Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2024.  (Pa713 – Pa731).
[brief] In the instant case, the jury was shown with the evidence that Plaintiff and [...] how they entered into their agreements regardless if Defendants would advise them otherwise.  In addition, the jury was shown evidence that it was [...] who wanted to rescind the agreements she had with [...] after Plaintiff discovered that [...] married a new wife.  (See Da343)  Therefore, the jury was aware that the legal fees incurred by [...] to re-open the divorce case was not for the purpose to remedy the errors in the PSA.
[brief] (1T 124-13 to 20)  A search of [...] revealed $3117 in cash.  (1T 88-6)  [...] asked [...] for consent to search, which was denied.  (1T 92-13 to 14)  [...] arrived on the scene.  (2T 15-1 to 3)  [...] gave him a valid driver’s license and told him the insurance and registration were in the car.  (2T 16-10 to 17-21)  [...] testified that [...] was neither unwilling nor unable to get the registration, but that [...] would not let him enter the vehicle to retrieve it:  Q: Did you ask Mr. [...] to retrieve the registration and the insurance?  A: No, I did not.  Q: Why not?  A:  From prior dealings with Mr. [...] I wasn’t going to let him back into the vehicle.  For my safety.  I don’t know what’s in the glove box at that point, I’ve already had an arrest involved with him with a handgun.  I was not letting him, for my safety I was not going to let him go into the glove box of the vehicle, not at that time.  (2T 18-2 to 13)  When he entered the vehicle, supposedly to conduct a search for the registration, [...] saw in the glove compartment a leather document pouch that was open a few inches and contained items wrapped in newspaper, which [...] asserted he “believed to be heroin packets. ”  (2T 19-2 to 6)  [...] then exited the car, called for a tow truck, and arrested all three defendants.