ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant also ignores relevant parts of the 2016 amendments to the WQMP Rules with respect to consistency determinations.  48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016).  Pursuant to the 2016 amendments, WQMPs and wastewater management plans prepared and adopted in accordance with the prior version of the WQMP Rules were accepted as comparable components for a WQMP pursuant to the 2016 amendments, and remain in full force and effect until modified.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.3.  48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016) (Response to Comments 346 and 357).  As required, the [...] contained “an assessment of nonpoint source pollution impacts of planned future development” in accordance with former regulation N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.25(g) (effective July 7, 2008, repealed by R.2016 d. 149).16  Ra403, Ra410.  Pursuant to the prior version of 16  There is no dispute that stormwater runoff constitutes a potential “nonpoint N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.25(g), the Wastewater Management Plan underwent “[a]n assessment of nonpoint source pollution impacts of planned future development [with a demonstration] that the environmental standards for stormwater, riparian zones, [. . .] as well as measures identified in adopted TMDLs [. . .] shall be met. ”).  Appellant’s arguments that the Wastewater Management Plan fails to consider any nonpoint source impacts lacks merit.  Therefore, Appellant wholly fails to overcome the presumption that the stormwater runoff is consistent with the areawide plan.
[brief] Tenant’s primary contention is that, in the event that both parties in this two-payor Lease owe each other money at the exact same time the money that Tenant owes Landlord is automatically deducted from the larger Tenant Allowance installment amount to cure the default.  But suppose that is wrong, for argument’s sake only.  Even if the deduction is not automatic there is no dispute that, at a minimum, Landlord could have taken such a deduction on its own in 2020 and adjusted the amount of Tenant’s Allowance it would pay that year accordingly.  Doing so would have been unchallengeable by Tenant under § 4.02.  This begs the question why Landlord did not simply make the accounting adjustment, avoid the litigation, and allow both parties to be made 100% whole instantly.  Landlord’s only answer is it wanted to keep the Tenant’s Allowance installment it owed in 2020, coerce Tenant into paying the rent out-of-pocket instead, but then still keep the deduction against the Tenant’s Allowance balance even after Tenant’s alleged default was cured.  The attorney hours employed in pursuit of this scheme were not hours “reasonably expended” and should be excluded from the lodestar.  Feliciano, 434 N.J. Super. at 548-49.  Thirdly, and only in the event that this court does not vacate the orders on appeal and remand, the trial court’s ruling regarding the second step in the lodestar calculation, reproduced in pertinent part below, should be affirmed:
[directive] Every Thursday [...] 1605 [...] 2nd and 4th Thursday Every Monday - [...] 1606 [...] Except 2nd Monday of month Monday, Tuesday, [...] 1607 [...]  Thursday [...] 1608 [...]  Monday - Friday [...]  Tuesday - 3 times per [...] 1609 Ext. 236 month [...]  [...] 1610  Every Tuesday Ext. 528 1st 3 Wednesdays of [...] 1611 [...]  Month Monday - 3 times per [...] 1612 [...] month [...]  [...] 1613  Every Thursday Ext. 7145 [...]  Every Tuesday and [...] 1614 Ext. 3305  Every Thursday [...] 1615 [...]  Every Thursday [...]  Tuesday - 3 times per [...] 1616 Ext. 217 month  [...]
[brief] (Pa7 to 9).  Thereafter, the trial date was adjourned, and on April 10, 2023, the parties appeared for a pretrial conference.  At the end of the conference, jury selection was scheduled for April 25, 2023.  (Pa10).  On April 4, 2023, defendant filed a Motion to Preclude the admission of blood evidence, alleging an insufficient chain of custody and asserting the evidence was not reliable.  (Pa11).  The State opposed and, on April 25, 2023, [...] denied defendant’s motion.  (Pa12).  On May 5, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., issued an Omnibus Order, wherein the court held that “the State’s motion to admit defendant’s toxicology results is to be resolved during trial subject to the State laying the proper foundation and establishing relevancy. ” (Pa13 to 14).  Defendant was tried before [...] and a jury.  The State presented its case-in-chief from May 11, 2023, through May 30, 2023.  Pertinently, on May 23, 2023, [...], a forensic toxicologist for the State testified at an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine the admissibility of her opinion and testimony regarding serological evidence.  (2T3-13 to 17; 2T48-20 to 50-3).  At the conclusion of the hearing, [...] denied defendant’s Motion to Preclude [...]’s testimony, noting “It’s an element of the offense. ” (2T50-1 to 2).  On May 25, 2023, [...] testified at another N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, again to determine the admissibility of her opinion and testimony regarding serological evidence.  (3T4-23 to 5-1).  At the conclusion of that hearing, [...] again denied defendant’s Motion to Preclude [...]’s testimony.  (3T33-25 to 38-9).  [...] then testified before the jury.  (3T42-20 to 68-17).  On May 30, 2023, [...] completed her testimony before the jury and the State rested.  (4T).  Defense presented until June 1, 2023, and then moved for a continuance/mistrial, alleging newly discovered evidence materially altered their experts’ opinions.  [...] granted defendant’s request for a mistrial and dismissed the jury.
[brief] Even if [...] was an employee of [...], the case of *Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center*, 250 N.J. 368 (2022) is not applicable to the case at bar.  In *Haviland*, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that no Affidavit of Merit was required for a vicarious liability claim against the licensed healthcare facility where the claim arose only from the conduct of a non-licensed profession.  As noted by the Court in *Haviland*, under the Affidavit of Merit statute, an Affidavit is required where (1) a plaintiff makes a claim for personal injury, wrongful death or property damage (2) the personal injury, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence; and, (3) the alleged act of malpractice or negligence as carried out by the licensed professional during the course of practicing that person’s profession.
[directive] Presumption of Seeking Revocation of Release When Defendant Violates a 8.4.3 Domestic Violence Restraining Order or a Condition of Release.  In any case not otherwise covered under Section 8.3, except as authorized pursuant to subsection 8.4.5, where a defendant has been released for an offense involving domestic violence charged by a complaint-warrant and there is probable cause to believe that (1) the defendant has violated a restraining order issued pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act or an imposed release condition under the Bail Reform Law and (2) has caused or threatened to cause bodily injury to any person protected by the order or condition of release, the prosecutor shall presumptively file a motion seeking revocation of release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24.
[brief] (T19-16 to 24).  The Appellant responded by accusing the Sergeant of being disrespectful by not reporting to the Medical Department and complying with her directive.  (T20-2 to 3).  [...] reminded the Appellant that, as a subordinate, she had no authority or expectation to order a superior officer to do anything.  He reminded the Appellant that, when circumstances warranted, she needed to call a code.  (T20-4 to 8).  The Appellant replied, “Okay.  We don’t need to talk about this anymore.  I’ll just call a ‘Code 1’ for every incident. ” (T20-9 to 13).  [...] explained to the Appellant that she was not to misuse the code system, especially when a code was not warranted, but [...] continued to address [...] in a loud and disrespectful manner, ignoring his attempt to counsel and educate an unruly, off-track employee.
[brief] The Court in Mull was influenced by the plaintiff's submission of an export report which concluded that the "hazardous operating conditions created a virtual certainty of injury to the machine's operators."  Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted).  To satisfy the "context" prong of the test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker [were] (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers' Compensation Act to immunize."
[brief] 20  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Transcript of Motion to Enforce Litigant's Rights and Cross motion to Stay Proceedings  .........................................................................................  2T22-1 to 2T29-25  Order dated July 19, 2024, granting in part and denying in part plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights against [...]  ........................................................................  Da444  Order dated July 19, 2024, memorializing the court’s oral decision of May 13, 2023 and denying defendant [...]’s cross-motion for a stay…………………………………………………………Da446  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] “A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  Accordingly, review of the trial court's orders that dismissed claims for lack of standing are reviewed *de novo*.  See *Goldman v. Critter Control of New Jersey*, 454 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2018).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] ”  App. Br. at 24.  However, [...] testified at length that [...] took the laboring oar and “amended the [PTA] schedules,” which [...] considered to be “effectively an amendment to that pipeline schedule. ”\(^8\) Pa038 (June 19 Tr. at 141:3-20) & Pa040-41 (June 20 Tr. at 400:7-20, 436:1-25 (“[[...]] said, you know what, I have to get to amending these schedules and sending them to you.  And [[...]] started doing that pretty diligently. ”)).  It is therefore flatly inaccurate for [...] to assert that the Arbitrator held that [...] owed [...] unpaid sums on many --- \(^8\)
[brief] ”  Db44.  To create plain error warranting relief from this Court, defendant recharacterizes the questions as having been asked on “direct” and not redirect, excises from his quotation of the allegedly offensive questions the introductory question which highlights the responsiveness of these questions to questions asked on cross examination, and wholly ignores the totality of the sergeant’s answers to this entire line of questioning from both defendant and the State, as quoted above.  Review of everything, and not the soundbite excised for review by defendant, demonstrate no plain error worthy of this Court’s intervention or correction.
[brief] Specifically, both the Model Jury Charge and the trial court’s instruction explained: defendant contends that the State has not proven that he committed the crime; it is the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the alleged offense(s); defendant does not have any duty whatsoever to prove that he did not commit the crime(s) or that the crime(s) was committed by another person; and the jury must determine whether the State satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt not only each element of each offense, but that defendant committed the alleged offense.  It is the State’s position that if this Court finds that an identification instruction was necessary in this case, the above instruction, by itself, was sufficient because it reiterated the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the wrongdoer.  However, if this Court determines that the above instruction was not sufficient, the State submits that the jury was further instructed regarding the State’s identification burden multiple times.  See, e.g., 14T116-20 to 117-4 (explaining the jury’s duty “to determine whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant violated a specific criminal statute”); 14T118-1 to 12 (“the burden of proving each element of a charge beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon the State and that burden never shifts to the defendant”); 14T125-13 to 21 (clarifying the State’s burden to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated a specific criminal statute”).  The trial court also included instructions pertaining to the “defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime,” see, e.g., (14T161-5 to 10), and “his participation in the crime,” see, e.g., (14T126-10 to 13), two factors that the Cotto Court found to be determinative in sufficiently explaining the State’s identification burden to the jury.  See Cotto, 182 N.J. at 326.  As such, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm.
[brief] Moreover, Appellant also lacked “sufficient stake” in the outcome of the litigation and “real adverseness with respect to the subject matter. ”  As a matter of Constitutional law, laws passed by Congress (*e.g.* FDCPA) are to be enforced by the executive branch.  *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2207 (2021).  And Congress specifically tasked two federal agencies with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA—[...] and [...].
[brief] In addition to the actual snow clearing, [...] pre-treated the property with brine on March 6, 2018 and did at least four applications of salt between March 7-9, 2018.  (4T 209:7-11).  [...] also confirmed that [...] was advised to prioritize the retail clients over the office tenants (such as plaintiff’s employer) when performing snow and ice removal at [...].  (4T 215:9-12).  E.
[brief] (Pa353).  [...]’s contrary assertion that his malicious prosecution claim did not begin to accrue until seven months later upon entry of an amended judgment of conviction memorializing that reversal has no basis in law.  (Pb11-Pb17).  Our Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that “[a] cause of action ‘accrues’ on the date when ‘the right to institute and maintain a suit’ first arose.
[brief] This appeal presents a matter of first impression regarding the New Jersey Real Estate Timeshare Act (RETA).  It arises out of the trial court’s erroneous application of that statute and the court’s refusal to apply the well-defined Parol Evidence Rule.  [...] submits that the errors committed by the trial court require meticulous review of the applicable provisions of the RETA and the correct application of the Parol Evidence Rule.
[brief] 52 State v. Stevens, 115 N.J.  289 (1989) ........................................................................... 47, 48  State v. T.C., 347 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 2002) .....................................................  40  State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2011) .................................................. 40  State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288 (1989) .................................................................................. 29, 33, 59  State v. Willis, 225 N.J. 85 (2016)  ....................................................................................  44, 45, 46  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)  .......................................................................  59  United States v. Gipson, 553 F. 2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) .....................................................  38  STATUTES
[brief] plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class."125  This requirement is easily met in this case, as there is a question of law or fact common to all class members – the sale of the same water at the same rates with the same contamination.  There only need be one common issue of law or fact out of many for the “commonality” prerequisite to be met.126  Rule 4:32(1)(a)(3) also requires that the lead class plaintiff’s claims be “typical” of those of other class members.  Typicality is met here because the claims of a putative class representative have the essential characteristics common to the claims of the class and since the claims only need share the same essential characteristics and need not be identical, the typicality requirement isn’t highly demanding.127  Cases challenging the same unlawful conduct affecting both the named plaintiff and the putative class usually satisfy the typicality irrespective of the varying fact patterns underlying the individual claims.128  Actions like this one requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy conduct suffice.129  “Factual differences will not render a claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice of course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class.  125 Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., 265 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2001)(citation omitted).
[brief] Thus, the State is wrong that [...]’s seven-year sentence is essentially beyond review.  The State did not avail itself of an extended-term waiver under Section 12 that would bind the sentencing court to its ten-year recommended sentence, and [...] was told that he was only subject to an ordinary-term sentence.  If this case is remanded, the maximum sentence [...] could receive would be seven years because seven years is a legal sentence, and double jeopardy bars any increase.
[directive] Agencies may not, as part of a plea or settlement agreement in an internal affairs investigation or otherwise, enter into any agreement concerning the content of a synopsis subject to public disclosure under Section 9.11.2, including any agreement regarding the identities of officers subject to final discipline, summaries of misconduct, or statements of the sanctions imposed.  No State, county, or municipal agency, law enforcement unit, or licensed law enforcement officer shall enter into any non-disclosure agreement which seeks to conceal or prevent public review of the circumstances under which the officer separated from or was terminated or fired from employment by the law enforcement unit or State, county, or municipal agency.  9.11.4
[brief] (Zb44.)  Whether that letter, which was authenticated in both litigations and its receipt by [...] confirmed, was “unsigned” is irrelevant, as is [...]’s lack of authority to enroll [...] in the CCIP.  (Zb44.)  Contractual responsibility for ensuring [...]’s enrollment rested upon [...].  Also, [...] asserts that **both** [...] and [...] were unenrolled from the August Ritz wall work.  (Zb11-12.)  But, the December accident happened when an [...] employee shook hands with an [...] employee, while they were performing the same work.  [...] covered [...] for the accident, but not [...], undercutting [...]’s effort to draw a parallel between the August and December work, even assuming the latter may have been on a subterranean portion of the “Ritz wall. ”  narrative were relevant, [...]’s side of the story refutes that narrative, and should not have been discounted below.)  E.
[brief] 6.  **Trial counsel overplayed his hand in opening by promising to prove [...]’s innocence, inviting the State’s damaging remarks on his failure to provide exonerating evidence. **  An accused is protected by the constitutional right to remain silent without penalty and the presumption of innocence.  Counsel’s choice to abandon these rights during opening and to embrace the responsibility to prove innocence may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., *Ouber v. Guarino*, 293 F.3d 19, 27-32 (1st Cir. 2002) (unnecessary embrace of burden of proof was “monumental” error satisfying prejudice prong).  When counsel promises proof of innocence, it is both damaging in and of itself and gives the prosecutor the right to make arguments that would ordinarily be prohibited as burden-shifting.  Trial counsel declared in opening that he accepted the burden to prove his client’s innocence and vowed to prove it.  (9T42-3 to 11)  --- 10  See also *Anderson v. Butler*, 858 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1988) (failure to introduce exculpatory evidence promised in opening can be prejudicial as matter of law); *McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz*, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1993) (failure to produce promised evidence “a damaging failure sufficient of itself to support a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.
[brief] See State v. Yarbough, 195 N.J. Super. 135, 143 (App. Div. 1984), modified, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  Thus, it is impermissible to rely on a fact that constitutes an element of the offense in support of an aggravating factor, as this “would in effect result in this evidence being counted twice, once in determining the degree of culpability of the crime and, again, as an aggravating factor. ”  *Jarbath*, 114 N.J. at 404.  If elements of the crime could be used in aggravation, “every offense arguably would implicate aggravating factors merely by its commission, thereby eroding the basis for the gradation of offenses and the distinction between elements and aggravating factors.
[brief] ³  Plaintiff [...] admitted in deposition that nobody told her the purchase of a timeshare was a financial investment and the word was never used.  (Da86, ¶ 48).  Plaintiff [...] admitted that he was never told the purchase was a “financial Second, ten (10) of the eleven (11) plaintiffs claimed that their timeshare was likened to conventional real estate such as a single-family home or condominium.  (Da76, ¶22; Da82, ¶36; Da87, ¶49; Da97, ¶81; Da102, ¶96; Da107, ¶110; Da111, ¶124; Da116, ¶139; Da121, ¶153; and Da126, ¶171).  That claim of oral misrepresentation is contradicted by the one-page Owner Acknowledgment Form: “ANNUAL Unit entitling the owner to usage one interval per year. ” (Da193, ¶10).  The first page of the Purchase and Sale Agreement provides:  “PROPERTY BEING SOLD.  A fee simple undivided 1/52  Interest in Unit ___ (“Unit”) in the Flagship Condominium and…the right to occupy and use the Unit for one (1) week of each calendar year…” (Da201, ¶2).  Third, all but two of the plaintiffs claimed they were told the purchase of their timeshare would increase in value.  (Da77, ¶23; Da82, ¶37; Da93, ¶67; Da98, ¶82; Da103, ¶97; Da107, ¶111; Da116, ¶140; Da121, ¶154; and Da126, ¶172).  Yet again, that claim of oral misrepresentation is expressly contradicted by the one-page Owner Acknowledgment Form (Da193, ¶12), the 4¼ page Purchase and Sale Agreement (Da201, ¶22) and the Public Offering Statement which states: “Intervals should only be purchased for the personal enjoyment and use by a Purchaser and his family. investment. ” (Da92, ¶65).  Plaintiff [...] admitted that she “did not have any recollection of what was discussed or said” and that she couldn’t remember the words spoken to her or the conversations she had the day she purchased the timeshare.
[directive] While ATVs, snowmobiles, and dirt bikes are generally prohibited on public roads, multiple legal avenues exist for users of these types of vehicles:  (1)  Properly registered ATVs, snowmobiles, and dirt bikes are permitted to cross public streets or highways, but not limited access highways, “provided that such crossing can be made in safety and that it does not interfere with the free movement of vehicular traffic approaching from either direction on the public street or highway. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:3C- 17(b)(1).  Crossing public streets or highways is only permissible if the operator of the ATV brings the vehicle to a complete stop prior to crossing the road.  Id.  Additionally, “[i]t shall be the responsibility of the operator of a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or dirt bike to yield the right-of-way to all vehicular traffic upon any public street or highway before crossing the public street or highway. ”  Id.  8  "Limited access highway" means a highway especially designed for through traffic, over which abutters have no easement or right of light, air or direct access by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon that limited access highway.  N.J.S.A. 27:5-7.3 8  (2)  ATVs, snowmobiles, and dirt bikes can be operated adjacent and parallel to public highways when gaining immediate access to an appropriate area is impracticable.  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-17(b)(2).  This exception only applies when the appropriate area is adjacent to a public highway.  Id.  Regarding violations on public roads, however, penalties differ from the penalties for violations on public lands.