ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT AGAINST THE [...] AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  (Pa000869) (Pa000871) (Pa000873) (Pa000926).  .........................................................................................23  A.  Standard of Review ......................................................................................................23  B.  The Unauthorized Entries and Excavation of Plaintiffs’ Property by Defendant [...] Constituted a Taking for Which Plaintiffs are Entitled to Just Compensation.  .........................................................................................24  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST [...] WERE FRIVOLOUS.  (2T Hearing, 10/20/2023) (Pa000637) (Pa000926).  ..................32  CONCLUSION  .........................................................................................................................42
[brief] At trial, during Appellee’s testimony, over objection, Appellee and his counsel alleged that Appellant fled from the accident, despite such evidence being irrelevant as liability was stipulated to prior to trial.  1T42:7-21\(^1\).  This was insinuated to again on summation by Appellee’s counsel.  3T23:23-24:25.  Via [...], Appellee alleged permanent injuries to his left shoulder, by way of superior and anterior labrum tears, as well as permanent and constant inflammation/pressure on the nerves concerning the cervical spine.  However, [...]’s findings of objective deficits, including compromised range of motion on physical exam concerning the left shoulder was contradicted by Appellee’s own physical therapy discharge exam, defense orthopedic expert, [...] and Appellee’s other expert, [...]; these three experts found no objective deficit on physical exam.
[brief] 2:5-1(h)).  Here, [...]’s Case Information Statement specifically takes issue with [...]’s application of the FHACA rules, N.J.A.C. 7:13, and Stormwater Management eligible, in accordance with this chapter, to pursue a permit to connect to a domestic treatment works or industrial treatment works.  Inclusion in a sewer service area does not guarantee that capacity exists or will exist to provide treatment for all flow from that area.
[brief] In Worts, plaintiffs challenged a special meeting for which notice was sent to four newspapers three days in advance of the meeting.  Worts, 176 N.J. Super. at 80.  Based on the newspapers’ publishing schedules, only “one paper could have published the notice 48 hours before the scheduled meeting. ”  Of the other three papers, once could publish on the day of the meeting and the two others could only publish after the meeting.  Id. at 81.  The court concluded that the Township’s efforts failed to meet OPMA’s notice requirements because “[w]hen a public body sends meeting notices to newspapers for publication and, to the actual or readily ascertainable knowledge of that body, those newspapers cannot publish the notice at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting, there is no compliance with the Open Public Meetings Act.  Logic demands this conclusion; were the opposite true, the purpose of the law would be circumvented easily. ”  Id. at 81-82.  The court, citing Houman v. Pompton Lakes, 155 N.J. Super. 129, 167 (Law Div.1977), required “‘all reasonable effort to notify the public,’” and concluded that it is only when a public body has given 48 hours advance notice to newspapers capable of timely publication that it can be concluded that all reasonable effort has been made.  It is therefore the obligation of every public body affected by the act, . . . to use only those newspapers for notice purposes which have the ability to publish notices at least 48 hours in advance of meeting dates.  Id. at 82.  See, also, Lakewood Citizens for Integrity in Government, Inc. v. Lakewood Township Committee, 306 N.J. Super. 500, 510-511 (Law Div. 1997), endorsing the decision in Worts.
[brief] (2)  While the Plaintiffs (and the Court) have repeatedly referred to the agreement in question as a “Repurchase Agreement,” the agreement is actually titled “Stock Sale Agreement with Right to Repurchase. ”  The agreement did not simply give [...] the right to repurchase her interest in [...]; it was the very agreement by which [...]’s ownership interest in [...] was originally conveyed to [...].  In rendering the agreement null and void  \textit{ab initio}, the \textsuperscript{85} Id.  \textsuperscript{86}  Id.  \textsuperscript{87} Da598.  Court appears to have not only nullified [...]’s right to repurchase [...] but has also nullified [...]’s acquisition of [...] from [...] in the first place.
[directive] The prosecution of a DWI and/or a DWI Refusal offense requires that the State must be prepared to meet and satisfy each and every element of the offense charged to the required burden of proof.  In those situations where a prosecutor concludes that the evidence does not meet the required evidentiary burdens, then the prosecutor must make a determination as to how to most appropriately resolve the case.  Where the evidence is deemed sufficient by the prosecutor, prosecutors should be prepared to present the case to the court where the evidence Attorney General Guideline: Page 11 Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations will be reviewed and a judicial determination made on its sufficiency.
[brief] [...] and [...] a year earlier sued [...], in the United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida for fraud and various wrong doings related to [...].  [...] previously worked with Cardinale and ceased his work with Cardinale in December 2021 when he became aware that Cardinale was overbilling clients and misrepresenting his background.  He has no direct relationship with [...] and is a Series B (non-voting) investor in [...] Management.  [...] has also been affiliated with [...], a non-party Cardinale already attempted to subpoena testimony from with limited success, and [...] (a competitor).  On or about August 20, 2023, a subpoena ad testificandum was served on [...].  The subpoena generally requests --- 2[...] One, LLC v. David [...], et al., [...] (“Underlying Litigation”).  [...] appear at a deposition without providing the subject matter of which [...] is expected to testify.  (278a-284a)  As the subpoena was simply a continuing attempt by [...] and Cardinale, who has usurped control of these entities, to harass non-parties and engage in abusive litigation practices, on or about August 25, 2023, [...] filed a motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective order.  (1a-3a)  Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the Court entered an Order denying [...]’s motion on March 7, 2024.  (817a-818a)  The March 7, 2024 Order was later amended on March 14, 2024.  (819a-821a)  On or about March 18, 2024 [...] filed a Notice of Appeal related to the March 7, 2024 and March 14, 2024 Orders (collectively referred to as the “Order”).  (822a-827a)
[brief] IN ACCORDANCE WITH R. 7:6-2A(1).  (DA10, DA11).  Any examination of the sufficiency of a factual basis must begin with New Jersey Court Rule 7:6-2(a)(1), which states as follows:  A defendant may plead not guilty or guilty, but the court may, in its discretion, refuse to accept a guilty plea.  Except as otherwise provided by Rules 7:6-2, 7:6-3, and 7:12-3, the court shall not, however, accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining by inquiry of the defendant and, in the court's discretion, of others, that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea and that there is a factual basis for the plea.  (emphasis added).  Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) mandates that the court not accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally.  The court must determine by inquiry of the defendant and others that the plea is being made voluntarily, with a full understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.  Moreover, the court must be satisfied that there exists a factual basis for the guilty plea.  The defendant must admit to the violation of the law and all of its elements.  In *State v. Barboza*, 115 N.J. 415 (1989), the Supreme Court acknowledged that a defendant who pleads guilty waives important constitutional rights.  This is why the Rules of Court have been designed to assure that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily, with a full understanding of the nature of the charges and the penal consequences of the sentence to be imposed.  The recitation of the factual basis for the plea allows the court to ascertain whether the defendant is actually guilty of the offense charged.  A plea of guilty that is entered under circumstances that are not voluntary and knowing violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  *McCarthy v. U.S.*, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).  It is for this reason that New Jersey law permits a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty without a sufficient factual basis to support it to vacate the plea through a post-conviction relief (PCR) application.
[brief] 5 Statutes Act of March 3, 1873 (Comp. Stat. p. 4978) ..............................................  2 N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18 ................................................................................... 10, 11, 14 N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6 .......................................................................... 11 N.J. Const. art. XI, § 2 ............................................................................... 11 N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 .............................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 .............................................................................................. 11 N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 .............................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 10:4-15(a) .................................................................................... 9 N.J.S.A. 10:7-1(1)(h)(3) ............................................................................. 8 N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-2 .................................................................................... 8 N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-5 .................................................................................... 8 N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-7 .................................................................................... 8 N.J.S.A. 26:2S-39 ....................................................................................... 8 N.J.S.A. 52:11-78 ....................................................................................... 9, 10, 11 N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6 ......................................................................................
[brief] (Da163).  The trial court held that [...]’s opinion, in his report, that [...] spent too much time on the work as set forth in the invoices, and that the invoices generated by [...] were unreasonable in amount, had no factual support and was barred under the net opinion rule, “which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data. ”  Townsend, 186 N.J. at 494.  (Da163).  Also, the issues surrounding [...]’s testimony was decided by the trial court prior to trial.  This ruling was never contested by Plaintiff prior to trial and Plaintiff never made a Motion to preclude Weg & Myer’s expert from testifying at trial.  Therefore, since the trial court properly held that Plaintiff’s expert, [...], could not testify that [...]’ invoices were unreasonable, unnecessary or excessive based on the net opinion that was authored, the April 6, 2021 Order limiting [...]’s testimony should be affirmed.  V.
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant respectfully submits that this Court should reverse the [...]’s March 14, 2023 denial of its adjudicatory hearing request so that a full record can be established before the Office of Administrative Law.  Moreover, Appellant respectfully submits that the [...]’s grant of the 2019 WFD permit modification to [...] should be reversed and the permit modification should be rescinded.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Appellant  [...]  Dated: January 19, 2024  /s/[...]______________________  [...], Esq.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] IN THE MATTER OF DENIAL OF THIRD PARTY HEARING REQUEST OF [...]
[brief] (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 36:15-37:12, 47:3-13).  [...] testified that the general contractor created the dangerous condition by shutting off the light in the crawl space.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 53:9-12).  Only [...], [...], and [...] were present on the job site during this time.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 17:6-9, 18:10-13).  [...] admitted he was [...]’s site superintendent that day and responsible for supervising [...] and [...].  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 8:8-11, 9:16-10:7).
[brief] *Id.* at 609-11, 620.  But regarding the CFA’s application to a certain profession in the first instance, this Court traced the history of the learned and semi-professional exemption to recenter the analysis on the “nature of the services provided”:  [O]ur focus in *Neveroski* was on the “nature of the services,” not on the extent to which a particular semi-professional was otherwise regulated.  …  Despite the Legislature’s abrogation of *Neveroski*’s holding, subsequent decisions of this court have seemingly accorded its semi-professional exemption precedential weight.  * * *  Thus, the “learned professional” exemption recognized in *Macedo*, like the “semi-professional” exception in *Neveroski*, focused on the “nature of the services” provided to support its conclusion that learned professionals are not subject to CFA liability.
[brief] 6 R. 4:50-1(d) ..............................................................................................................  12 R. 4:50-1(f) ..............................................................................................................  12, 13  Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) .............................................................................................  10 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 ...................................................................................................  2, 5 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3 ...................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a) .............................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) .........................................................................................  1, 2, 5, 10 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b ............................................................................................  10 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 ...............................................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1(f) ............................................................................................. 2  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order and Statement of Reasons Denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Default  Judgment filed October 26, 2023  ........................................ Da58  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] B.  THE AUGUST 17, 2019 INCIDENT  ..................................................34  (OAL INITIAL DECISION AT PAGES 25-29; PA25A-29A).........................................................34  (1)N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(A)(6) .............................................................................35  (2)N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(A)(12) ..........................................................................40  C. DISPARATE TREATMENT .................................................................44 (ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW)
[brief] [...]’ contention that this Court “need not be confined by the previous errors in this litigation,” (Db24), is wrong.  “[W]hen an issue is once litigated and decided during the course of a particular case, that decision should be the end of the matter” and is “binding” upon “a different appellate panel which may be asked to reconsider the same issue in a subsequent appeal. ”  State v. Hale, 127 N.J. Super. 407, 410 (App. Div. 1974); see also Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 239 N.J. Super. 229, 232 (App. Div. 1990) (rejecting appellant’s “attempts to reargue various matters which were previously decided by” prior panel, as prior panel’s decision was “binding on the parties”).  [...] had a full and fair opportunity on the prior appeal to litigate the issues they attempt to reargue here, and their dissatisfaction with the rulings on those issues is irrelevant to this appeal.  The Appellate Division’s decision in that prior appeal is binding on the parties and this Court.
[brief] *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005); *Ross v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l Union*, 266 F.3d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 2001).  Generally speaking, if the language of a statutory provision is “plain,” courts employ its “plain meaning,” giving the words of the statute “their ordinary meaning and significance.
[directive] Failure to include any the required information in the release order shall result in PSP staff refusing the defendant's request to leave the home and of may result in a Violation Monitoring should defendant leave the home.  It shall be of defendant's responsibility seek any clarification or correction pretrial release to of orders.  Defendants ordered to HDLE shall be provided the Notification Expectations for Defendant Ordered to Home Detention with Limited Exceptions if ([...]), which automatically appended to the Pretrial Release Order is completed in the Order Module.
[brief] Plaintiffs have direct and derivative standing for the NJLAD claim based on the following factors: 1) Plaintiffs are property owners in the municipality; 2) Plaintiffs’ Property is included within the Township’s HEFSP, Amended HEFSP, and Settlement Agreement; and 3) Plaintiffs’ Amended Application, unlawfully denied by Defendants, was designed to provide housing for individuals protected by the NJLAD - racial minorities and families - individuals who as a practical matter could not bring the within action since only Plaintiffs were the actual applicant before the Zoning Board.  The courts of New Jersey liberally grant a litigant standing to bring a legal claim, Jen Elec., Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009), especially in the Mount Laurel context.
[brief] (Da55, Rev. par. 18)  The Tax Assessor’s Office is well versed in the history of the property owned by [...] and this information was conveyed to [...] when she and [...] went to the [...].  (Da55, par. 18; DA125, par.18)  The labelling on street maps is easily altered.  The street map referred to is inaccurate.  The Deed for [...] is accurate as well as the Property Identification Document which notes that [...] sits on Lot 19 which is [...] and Lot 20 is [...] which is owned by [...].
[brief] Before concluding I am compelled to expound further on the festering issue of abbreviation of transcripts which has dogged the interconnected Appellate Division Docket # [...] for over a year leading to extensive litigation in this court, the trial court, and even the Supreme Court.  Toward this end, it is instructive to draw this court’s attention to the relevant Appellate Rule on transcripts in other jurisdictions.  A.  As noted before, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10, an appellant must “order from the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant considers necessary . . . [or] file a certificate stating that no transcript will be ordered. ”  Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(1)(A) and (B).  (emphasis added)  B.  Texas Rule 38.5 in pertinent part provides - “At or before the time a party's brief is due, the party must file one copy of an appendix containing a transcription of all portions of the recording that the party considers relevant to the appellate issues or points”  Rule 38.5 - Appendix for Cases Recorded Electronically, Tex. R. App. P. 38.5 (emphasis added)  C. North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, Article II, Rule 7 in pertinent part provides – “A party may order a transcript of any proceeding that the party considers necessary for the appeal”  Rule 7 - Transcripts, N.C. R. App. P. 7(emphasis added)  D. Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 9.200 in pertinent part provides - “Within 10 days of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall designate those portions of the proceedings not on file deemed necessary for transcription and inclusion in the record”  Rule 9.200 - THE RECORD, Fla. R. App. P. 9.200 (emphasis added)  E. Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Article III, Part C, Rule 323 in pertinent part provides – “Within the time for filing the docketing statement under Rule 312 the appellant shall make a written request to the court reporting personnel as defined in Rule 46 to prepare a transcript of the proceedings that appellant wishes included in the report of proceedings”  Rule 323 - Report of Proceedings, Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 323 (emphasis added)
[brief] ”  *State v. Cassady*, 198 N.J. 165, 178 (2009).  “A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction rationally supported by the evidence, even if the instruction is inconsistent with the defense theory. ”  *State v. Carrero*, 229 N.J. 118, 129 (2017) (citing *State v. Brent*, 137 N.J. 107, 118 (1994)); *State v. Powell*, 84 N.J. 305, 317 (1980); *State v. Hollander*, 201 N.J. Super. 453, 473, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 335, 501 (1985).  “In deciding whether the rational-basis test has been satisfied, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. ”  *Ibid.* (citing *State v. Mauricio*, 117 N.J. 402, 412 (1990)).
[brief] (Da1134).  As repeatedly stated, the plaintiffs’ central claims were that oral misrepresentations induced their transactions and only those oral misrepresentations could form the basis of any ascertainable loss.  It was error for the trial Court to allow the introduction of evidence regarding alleged Administrative Code Regulations for which no discovery had been conducted and after the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint to include those allegations was denied.  Beyond that, the trial Court converted the alleged Administrative Code violations into independent causes of action under the RETA.
[brief] The description provided therein does not include all of the property represented as Lots 3 and 3.01 on the current Tax Map.  This description DOES NOT include all of the property represented as Lots 3 and 3.01.  It merely includes a thin strip of land located immediately North of Beachway and South of the 1918 MHWL.  [...]’s Riparian Grant was transferred to [...] in 1909.  However, New Jersey’s Supreme Court has clearly held that a Riparian Grant not identified in a deed, will not pass as “appurtenant” to another distinct parcel.  The Trial Court’s ruling effectively ignores the law and presumes – contrary to the documentary evidence – that [...] acquired something in the foreclosure which it did not.
[brief] Appellant interacted with this person moments before the incident and saw no signs of violent behavior.  The [...] were on the scene within minutes of the incident.  Appellant has not identified a single flaw in the safety of the platform at [...], nor has he identified a single flaw in [...]’s policies or procedures that led to his injuries.  POINT III-  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT [...] CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR [...]’S UNPREDICTABLE AND UNFORESEEABLE ACTIONS.
[brief] On the other hand, when the employee is not a licensed person, an AOM is not necessary. \(^3\)  An “appropriate licensed person” qualified to offer an AOM must be licensed in the same profession as the person against whom the opinion is offered.  In Hill International, Inc. v. Atlantic City Board of Education, 438 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2014), appeal dismissed, 224 N.J. 523 (2016), the Appellate Division held that a licensed engineer could not offer an AOM against a licensed architect and his licensed architectural firm.