ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Karins*, 152 N.J. at 546, (citing *Milani v. Miller*, 515 S.W. 2d 412, 417 (Mo. 1975)).  Further, [...]’s conduct is not protected under the *Pickering/Connick* test\(^2\): The subject video was not related to any matter of public concern; and, the Borough had an interest in maintaining order, discipline, harmony and a professional working relationship between members of the [...].  The release of the video to the public could also foreseeably engender mistrust and acrimony between [...] and both the public and fellow commissioners.  "It is not too great a price to pay that the public may have the utmost confidence in the honesty and integrity of the officials that have been chosen to govern them and conduct the public's business."  *State v. Botti*, 189 N.J. Super. 127, 140 (Super. Ct. 1983).  Confidence in the honesty and integrity of [...] could be easily lost by his conduct in not only possessing the video, but disseminating it.  The Trial Court’s restrictive reading of *N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c)* would lead to the unfathomable conclusion that a public official using a racial slur or acting in a racist manner, as long as not in the performance of official duties, would not be cause --- \(^2\)  While the Trial Court found that the Borough took issue with [...]’s “mere possession of the video,” (Da 377), this is a misinterpretation of the facts.  Clearly, it was [...]’s careless/reckless dissemination of the video to the public, that included Carlstadt councilmembers, and not mere possession that is at issue.  Further, it is not a simple video of a wedding, vacation or other benign event, but, instead, revolting pornography degrading women. for removal under the statute.  Such an interpretation clearly violates the rulings of the Supreme Court in Karins and Driscoll, and the ruling of the Appellate Division in Botti.  On the foregoing bases, the Borough had a statutory right to remove [...] for neglect of duty. B.
[brief] Conclusion ..................................................................................50 ### TABLE OF CITATIONS | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Beasley v. Passaic County, | 38, 39 | | 377 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, | 32, 35 | | 157 N.J. 188 (1999) | | | Boire v. Greyhound Corp., | 45 | | 376 U.S. 473 (1964) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 31 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Caggiano v. Fontroura, | 36 | | 354 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Carrier Corp. v. N.L.R.B., | 44 | | 768 F.2d 778 (6 Cir.1985) | | | Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Atl. Cty. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, | 45, 46, 47 | | 250 N.J. Super. 403 (Ch. Div. 1991)
[brief] [1T133:25, -134:1-25, -135:1-25.]  Q.  When was the distribution line installed?  We were talking about its age.  A.  The original 10-inch line was installed some time in the -- I think different parts in -- older parts in the 1950s or 1960s.  Q.  We're talking about an 8-mile stretch here.  Can you not be more specific?  A.  I don't recall at this time.  No.  Q.  Now, at the time you installed the transmission line you also installed what we refer to as a temporary regulator, correct?  A.  Yes.  Q.  And it's your position that that regulator was temporary on the very first day it went into service?
[brief] 116 N.J. 739, 751 (1989).  However, subsequent New Jersey cases quoting Printing Mart define “malice” in a tortious interference claim to only require “a showing not only that the interference --- 2  By doing so, [...] also acknowledges that [...], a non-binding federal district court case, does not apply to this issue.  No. 05-4398 (MLC), 2008 U.S. Dis t. LEXIS 39555 (D.N.J. 2008).  Instead, SL Industries, 128 N.J. at 209 and Superior Integrated Solutions, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147 apply.  The Supreme Court held in SL Industries that in applying policy exclusions that disclaim coverage based on the ill intent of the insured, the court’s analysis must focus on “the insured’s intent to cause the injury rather than on its intent to commit the act that resulted in the injury.
[brief] [...] needed 77 exhibits, encompassing over 1,200 pages, and 131 paragraphs of allegedly “material” facts to support its motion.  (Dta1384, et. seq.)  The small subcontractors that entities such as [...] seek to attract to save costs, while preserving their risk transfer preferences through CCIPs, simply cannot absorb these resources to vindicate their interests when coverage is denied – not to mention risking the potentially devastating costs of large judgments.
[brief] “The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that the action was based. ”  *Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co.*, 107 N.J. 440, 460 (1987).  This Court recently “stress[ed],” for example, “that our obligation to afford substantial deference to an agency’s adjudicatory decision does not force us to turn a blind eye to a post-hoc justification—that is, a reason devised to justify a decision that was already made as a fait accompli for other unstated reasons. ”  *Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd.*, 473 N.J. Super. 284, 303–04 (App. Div. 2022); *accord Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (rejecting “mere[] ‘post hoc’ rationalizations” for agency action).
[brief] Pb0006.  Plaintiff’s actions throughout the transaction violated the doctrine of unclean hands in the most offensive of fashion, starting with the constant verbal abuse by [...] aimed at [...], then continuing with the nasty and bullying voicemail messages, which were presented to and heard by the trial judge, (5T139-145) and ending with Alessi’s illegal breaking and entering onto her property.  5T148-21 to 149-15; 8T51-19 to 53-13.  Plaintiff acted (and continues to act) in a manner meant to do nothing more than harass [...] and force her to continue to litigate this matter for the expressed reason that he did not get his way.  There are no more clearer examples of violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing than [...]’s actions herein.
[directive] xxxxxx.xx xxxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx (xxxxxx.xx)  Excess (Deficit) of Revenues Over Expenditures  xxxx  Fund Balance Jan. 1, XXXMX.XX  XXXXXX.XX XXXXXX.XX XXXXXX.XX  XXXw(X.XX XXXXXX.XX XXXXXX.XX xxxx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.x% xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx
[directive] Please note for Question 4b(2) that while endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii), can be subject to parole supervision for life upon a motion of the prosecutor, this offense was not included in the February 1, 2018 amendments to the offenses subject to Megan’s Law under 2C:7-2b(2).  Note also that Question 7 includes the offense of felony murder if the underlying crime is sexual assault, as well as any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the offense should be considered a sexually violent offense, or an attempt to commit these offenses.
[brief] They cannot ask the court to rule on Plaintiff’s claims, win a significant victory by obtaining a dismissal of Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, then only after being faced with other claims and a motion to compel discovery, change course and ask the court this case should have been in arbitration in the first place.  In other words, Defendants “seeks to have both its proverbial cake and to eat it too: it only wants arbitration if it does not win on [on the merits]. ”  Sacks v. DJA Auto., No. 12-284, 2013 WL 210248, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2013).  But they “cannot retain its right to elect arbitration as an insurance policy to be exercised in the event that it does not obtain a favorable decision on [the merits]. ”  Id.  In a similar scenario, the Fifth Circuit found waiver where the defendant sought dismissal of the complaint with prejudice and alternatively moved to compel arbitration.  See In re Mirant Corp., 613 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2010).  In denying arbitration, the Court of Appeals observed that the defendant was “attempt[ing] to game the system by seeking a decision on the merits while keeping the arbitration option as a backup plan in case the effort fails. ”  *Id.* at 590.  That is exactly what Defendants continue to do here.  Such gamesmanship should not be rewarded.
[brief] The Applicant questions whether "the use is peculiarly fitted to the particular location" (DAb12).  There is no (d)(1) variance.  The Applicant does not understand its application.  At DAb10 and at DBb24, the defendants acknowledge that the (c)(2) setback variance requires proof that the deviation (5-foot setbacks) advances MLUL purposes whereas conformity (10-foot setbacks) would not do so.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NOS. [...]; STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] *Crowe*, 90 N.J. at 132-134.  See also *Guaman*, supra, 421 N.J. Super. at 247-248 (a successful applicant must demonstrate all *Crowe* factors by clear and convincing evidence); *Brown v. City of Paterson*, 424 N.J. Super. 176, 183 (App. Div. 2012) (same); *Dolan v. De Capua*, 16 N.J. 599, 614 (1955) (injunctive relief is not granted absent clear and convincing proof).  Plaintiffs must also show “that the public interest will not be harmed. ”  *Waste Mgmt.*, supra, 399 N. J. Super. at 520 citing *Crowe*, 90 N.J. at 132–134; *Brown*, supra, 424 N.J. Super. at 183; *J.H. Renarde, Inc. v. Sims*, 312 N.J. Super. 195, 203 (Ch. Div. 1998).  Injunctive relief “may be issued only through the careful application of these principles. ”  *Waste Mgmt.*, 399 N.J. Super. at 538.  B.  The Court Failed to Consider whether the LAD Creates a Well-Settled Legal Right to Exclude Parents from Information about their Children
[brief] Nor could they credibly do so.  [...] crafted the design of the open platform, through which [...] first made users’ content and information available to third party developers.  He led the “Platform Simplification” transition in response to the [...]’s 2012 Consent Order, whereby [...] determined it would restrict the sharing of some aspects of user content and information, but would “whitelist” certain business partners and developers that reciprocated by providing content and information back to [...].  The evidence shows that [...] was in the weeds, participating in decisions [Redacted].  And [...] initiated the ADI, [...]’s response to the [...] scandal that resulted in the suspension of tens of thousands of other apps.  He, thus, has detailed, specific and unique knowledge about critical facts in this case.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  The [...]’s letter of October 16, 2023 to the [...] denying coverage for the underlying complaint under Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001), starts with a faulty premise, to wit: “The [[...]’s] request is being made pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (“TCA”), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, and Wright v. State of New Jersey ....” (Pa10).  This is incorrect.  The [...] did not make a request pursuant to the Tort Claims Act.  Rather the request was based solely upon Wright and its progeny.  (Pa1).  The [...]’s position in this litigation is that unless the underlying lawsuit against a prosecutor’s office is seeking monetary damages for a tort allegedly committed by said prosecutor’s office, the [...] has no duty to defend.  While there is no dispute that historically the state’s duty to defend did arise in the context of tort claims made against county prosecutors, as the present case perfectly demonstrates, such a limitation is neither legally nor logically mandated.  When, as here, a county prosecutor’s office is engaged in a state law enforcement function, mandated by the [...], it stands in the shoes of the [...], and pursuant to Wright and its progeny, it is the state, not the county, that must defend those claims.  Such a defense is even more critical in the present case where the plaintiff in the underlying case is seeking to have the [...] supersede the authority of the [...] and come up with a remedy contrary to the [...]. \(^2\)  In reviewing the development of the law around when the [...] is required to defend a claim against a county prosecutor’s office, the starting point for the analysis is *Wright v. State*, 169 N.J. 422 (2001).
[brief] If so, the court must then determine whether (1) the actions are ‘successive actions,’ (2) the opposing party's failure to make the disclosure in the prior action was ‘inexcusable,’ and (3) ‘the right of the undisclosed party to defend ‘the successive action has been substantially prejudiced by not having been identified in the prior action. ’ [700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio*, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting R. 4:5–1(b)(2)).]  “If those elements have been established, the trial court may decide to impose an appropriate sanction.  Dismissal is a sanction of last resort. ”  *Id.* at 236–37 (citing *Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds, Co.*, 207 N.J. 428, 453–54 (2011).  R. 4:5-1(b) analysis in this case must start with the understanding that legal malpractice actions are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine: “the entire controversy doctrine no longer compels the assertion of a legal malpractice claim in an underlying action that gives rise to the claim”.
[brief] Furthermore, [...] had just signed a new case management order on August 9, 2021, just a few weeks prior to the oral argument.  (Pa221).  Therefore, because a recent case management order setting new deadlines had just been entered and no formal motion for an extension of discovery had been filed, there would have been no reason for [...] to grant an extension of discovery permitting plaintiff to designate a new expert.  Even if the court were to accept that plaintiffs’ cross-motion to designate [...] was effectively a formal motion to extend discovery as required by the Rules, there would have been no legitimate reason for [...] to extend discovery.  An extension of discovery can be granted when “good cause” is shown.  R. 4:24-1(c).  “The term ‘good cause shown’ is flexible and its meaning is not fixed and definite. ”  Leitner v. Toms River Regional Schools, 392 N.J. Super. 80, 87 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Tholander v. Tholander, 34 N.J. Super. 150, 152 (Ch. Div. 1955)).
[brief] 300a; 931a-954a.  Third party defendants [...] and [...] filed motions to dismiss the third party complaint and via the aforesaid order, the trial court didn’t deny those motions but rather, “dismissed” said motions as moot.  932a.  On 2-6-24, the trial court filed an order dismissing the third party defendants ruling that, with the entry of the order granting summary judgment against plaintiff, the trial court dismissed “the entire action”  973a-975a.  On 2-23-24 and 3-4-24 respectively, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and amended notice of appeal with the court and on 4-10-24, the court filed a scheduling order.  926a-971a.  LEGAL ARGUMENT i.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on March 25, 2021.  (Pa202-Pa208).  On May 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming [...] and [...] as additional defendants and adding additional causes of action.  (Pa209-Pa217).  On January 24, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint.  (Pa231-Pa239).  After numerous discovery extensions, by Order dated April 28, 2023, the discovery end date was extended once again making the new discovery end date July 3, 2023 and set an arbitration date of August 2, 2023.  (Da005-Da006).  On June 7, 2023, [...] again moved to extend discovery.  (Pa255-Pa256).  By Order dated June 23, 2023, [...]’s motion to extend discovery was denied.(Pa257-Pa258).  On July 12, 2023, after the July 3, 2023 discovery end date passed, [...] moved for summary judgment.
[brief] (Pa0285, p. 47:5-12).  [...] predicated his opinion of inadequate tapering on an NJDOT standard design detail pertaining to paving operations.  (See NJDOT Traffic Control Details, Pa1186).  Note number 16 included within the referenced NJDOT Traffic Control Details provides as follows:  Bitumonous concrete placed during the various construction stages shall be transitioned over a minimum 20 horizontal to 1 vertical slope to meet the adjacent existing grade at the longitudinal and transverse limits of the stage construction areas unless otherwise noted on the stage construction plans.  (Pa1186).  Upon questioning, [...] conceded that the produced detail does not concern the identification of a pre-existing roadway defect.  (Pa0260, p. 22:5-15).  [...] further conceded that the subject litigation does not concern a paving operation.  (Pa0260 at 22:16-21).  Further, in an effort to establish the general applicability of the referenced NJDOT standard detail, [...] referenced an independent document entitled “Practices and Guidelines for Temporary Transverse HMA (Hot Mix Asphalt) Tapers” published by the Caltrans Division of Research and Innovation.
[brief] The State agrees that [...]’s trial strategy relied in substantial part on his argument that a third party – a man named [...] – may have been the person who actually committed the shooting.  (Sb29 – 30)  Accordingly, third-party guilt was a material issue in the case, and the court was required to provide proper instruction to the jury as to how they ought to consider the possibility of [...]’s guilt when weighing the strength of the State’s evidence.
[brief] Although the application was scheduled for a hearing, on November 1, 2021, [...]’s counsel advised [...] that the application would not be considered because it purportedly required an “amendment to the Redevelopment Plan. ”  293a.  [...] asserted that “[u]nless and until the Mayor and Council adopt an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan to include [ground floor residential], the application cannot proceed. ”  294a.  Tellingly, [...] entirely failed to address the Off-site Property in its statutory midpoint review dated June 1, 2020.
[brief] ”  423 N.J.Super. at 284.  The Court acknowledged the use as inherently beneficial, but found as follows as to the Board’s denial to change just one home to a duplex unit:  The Board determined that the public benefit to be derived from the replacement of a single four-bedroom residence with two, two-bedroom residences for the homeless was outweighed by the detrimental effect upon the integrity of the zoning plan for exclusively single-family residences that would result from construction of a duplex.  In making this determination, the Board found that … plaintiff’s proposed duplex would be located “in the middle of a block containing only single-family homes,” and that its proposed use for two families “would constitute a substantial detriment to the neighborhood. ”  We are satisfied that this determination was not “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable[,] and therefore must be sustained. ”  Id., at 292 (citations omitted).  In the case at hand, [...] was proposing to replace a maximum of 16 one-family homes (2 per acre), adjacent to numerous existing single-family homes and townhomes, with one large three-story structure housing 165 living units.  Since all sides of the Property are zoned for lower density residential uses, and three sides are already built out residentially, and since the governing body specifically excluded this lot from any change in its present zoning, the Board made its findings and then carefully weighed the positive and negative criteria per Sica in the following conclusions:
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction and sentence on [...] must be vacated.  Because defendant has already completed the original sentence, the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in both the U.S. and N.J.  Constitutions precludes the imposition of a greater sentence on [...].  Since any sentence consecutive to [...], even the minimum sentence, on all counts, except Count Five of [...], would result in a sentence greater than the sentence defendant has already served, only Count Five (fourth-degree aggravated assault) may be reinstated.  As a direct consequence of vacating defendant’s conviction under [...], defendant no longer meets the criteria for an extended term sentence as a persistent offender on [...] and that sentence must be vacated as well.  Although defendant’s convictions under [...] remain, any motion to sentence defendant as a persistent offender under [...] must await the outcome of the charges contained in [...] and one can only be imposed on defendant’s armed robbery conviction.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] ”  Report, p.3, ll.37-38, Pa108.  Accordingly, the Report concludes that, “The entire issue, then, is not a conflict among the legal descriptions, but rather where to place them on the ground. ”  Id. at ll.38-9.  This conclusion has profound implications for the scope of the Report.  Any adjustment in the disputed boundary line between Lots 10 & 11 must necessarily be met with an equal adjustment in the boundary line of adjacent properties.
[brief] ”  R. 4:42-2(b).  This Court has expressly disapproved of “lateral appeals,” where a dissatisfied litigant seeks to have an interlocutory order overturned or modified by another trial judge.  Lewis v. Preschel, 237 N.J. Super. 418, 422 (App. Div. 1989); Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, P.C. v. Ezekwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2001).
[brief] Keansburg calls its Title Expert, [...], Esq. ("Eastman"), to testify on February 15, 2023 (6T3).  When asked what his opinion is of what [...] conveyed to [...], Eastman refers to the Keansburg Heights Map of Case No. 36-19 dated June 25, 1909.  He indicates this is significant because prior thereto it was undevelopable because it did not break up the lot into specific lots that could be sold, and this then placed upon the records of the Monmouth County Clerk's Office the Deed Books and the lots of the various lots that were created as to Keansburg Heights.  It also had a metes and bounds description (6T28:16).  He testifies that [...] sold the [...], with a map as prepared and subdivided such that the Map of Keansburg Heights dated 1909 was created (6T29:9).  When asked if [...] sold the Riparian Grant to [...], Eastman gives a convoluted response but essentially states that the map does not show that a bulkhead area was put in but instead shows a beach as the area between the housing lots and the Keansburg Heights area.  In his opinion, the Deed indicates that [...] sold to [...] a described area as shown on a map which includes the subdivided lots and the beach area up to where the bay meets the beach (6T30:22).  When asked what his conclusion is when he reads the language regarding the Riparian Rights as to what was intended to be conveyed, responds:  "I think it was intended to convey an interest in the Riparian Rights on the property, that it was together with the Riparian Rights and other rights, privileges and franchises, showed that they intended to convey everything that they had to own, the upland portion and any portion in the Riparian area that had been granted by the State."  (6T31:17)  He acknowledges that the 1980 Tax Map of Keansburg shows on the northerly portion the mean high-water line 1964 (6T62) (Pa201).
[brief] Further, as in *Martindale*, “even if the arbitration agreement could be so characterized” as a contract of adhesion, “the agreement’s subject matter and the public interests affected lead to the conclusion that it should not be invalidated. ”  173 N.J. at 91.  The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, “courts have held on numerous occasions that agreements to arbitrate are not violative of public policy,” and “the affirmative policy of this State, both legislative and judicial, favors arbitration as a mechanism of resolving disputes. ”  *Id.* at 92 (citations omitted).  Thus, the “insertion of an arbitration agreement in an application for employment simply does not violate public policy.