ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Aa2523).  The peak flow attenuation calculations were performed in compliance with the guidance in the BMP Manual.  Due to the site’s partially developed condition, in which certain roadway and basin improvements were constructed as part of a prior phase of construction, the runoff from disturbed and undisturbed areas are comingled, each affected by the existing stormwater management system’s existing controls.  The vast majority of both disturbed and undisturbed areas drain to the common downstream stormwater controls.  [...]’s consultant calculated the peak runoff for the combined conditions (disturbed plus undisturbed) and separately calculated the runoff from the undisturbed areas.  The allowable peak flow rates for each design storm at each Point of Analysis were determined using the required peak flow reduction rates applied to the contribution from disturbed areas only (calculated as the difference between the overall runoff less that from the undisturbed areas) added to the full (i.e., unreduced) contribution from undisturbed areas, as prescribed in Chapter 5 of the BMP Manual.  The NJDEP reviewed [...]’s peak flow calculations and determined that they complied with N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6.  The NJDEP found that “each best management practice was compared to the NJ Stormwater best management practices manual, which has explicit instructions how each stormwater management feature must be designed.  The applicant has demonstrated pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:8–5.6(b)3 that peak reduction rates have been met through the implementation of stormwater management features…” (Aa086).  Based on the submitted data and substantial credible evidence in the record, [...]’s Stormwater Management Design was properly found by the NJDEP to meet the Peak Flow Requirements despite Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions to the contrary.
[brief] Lot 19  Both [...] and [...] employed the income capitalization approach to estimate the market value of Lot 19.  [...]  I have reviewed the reports and testimony of [...] and [...].  [...] opined that because the [...] store is subject to a long term lease (6-5 year options) at $0.77 S/F, the [...] building rent should be analyzed at the contract rent of $0.77 S/F.  [...] analyzed comparative rents of other supermarkets making adjustments for location, utility and age and determined that the appropriate market rental for the [...] is $8.50 S/F.  Although [...] opined that the [...]'s contract rent is the appropriate benchmark for determining [...]'s market rental he did present comparable grocery store rents and made adjustments for age, condition and size.  I have examined the comparative rentals presented by both [...] and [...].  The [...] building is old, is below average condition and in need of deferred maintenance ([...] Report p. 18, 28) and grossly substandard in size for a supermarket.  I therefore determine that the market rental for the [...] before factoring in the contract rent of $.77 S/F is $4.00 S/F.  [...], sitting as a trial court Judge before being appointed to the Appellate Division ruled in Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Katz, 334 N.J. Super. 473 (L. Div. 2000) that a property's actual rent and income history must be a factor that is considered in determining a property's market rent.  The measure of damages in this condemnation case is the fair market value as determined by what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to, neither being under any compulsion to act.  Village of 514 South Orange v. Alden (supra).  The [...] building is subject to a long term lease at $.77 S/F.  Any reasonable buyer would certainly consider the financial impact of this lease in determining what it would be willing to pay for the subject site.  To suggest that the [...] lease can be ignored in determining its market rent is manifestly unreasonable.  I determine that the market rent of $4.00 S/F for the [...] must be adjusted downward by 50% to account for the long term lease at $0.77 S/F.  I, thus, conclude that the market rent for the [...] building is $2.00 S/F.  COMPUTATION OF MARKET VALUE FOR LOT 19
[brief] The Court in *Watson* held that narration of an *unclear* video will be unhelpful, and thus inadmissible, when the parties dispute the content of that video:  “If footage is unclear or grainy, but not reasonably in dispute, testimony from investigators might help the jury.  The opposite is true if a video is so unclear that it is difficult to decipher and the parties dispute its contents. ”  *Watson*, 2023 WL 4918557, at *23.  Here, the relevant images were difficult to decipher, and [...] disputed the detective’s evaluation of its contents.  Video S-37 was taken from such a great length that the purportedly relevant images on screen were exceptionally blurry and pixelated.  No viewer of S-37 – regardless of their prior knowledge – could identify or describe the person, car, or actions on screen with any degree of confidence or detail.
[brief] Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a well-settled legal right when it concedes that no case holds that a court can enjoin a non-compliant municipality from pursuing condemnation or exercising redevelopment rights merely because someone proposes to build an inclusionary development on the site.  (Pb21).  The court’s contradictory finding that the law was “pretty clear” lacks support.  (1T53:19-25).  *Mount Laurel II* settles only that Plaintiff can *request* a builder’s remedy.  *S. Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. Laurel Twp.*, 92 N.J. 158 (1983) (“*Mount Laurel II*”).
[brief] On February 8, 2005, a Hudson County grand jury indicted defendant [...], charging him with: conspiracy to commit armed robbery in the first degree, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5–2; purposeful or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(1) or N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(2); causing the death of another during the commission of an armed robbery (felony murder), N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(3); three counts of first degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1; five counts of attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5–1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3; five counts of second degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1b(1); five counts of second degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1b(2); three counts of third degree assault against a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1b(5)(a); third degree knowing possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5b; second degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4a; fourth degree knowing possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–3d; and second degree possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of one or more of the offenses listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:39–7b.  That same grand jury indicted defendant [...] on the following charges: second degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5–2; purposeful or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(1) or N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(2); causing the death of another during the commission of armed robbery (felony murder), N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(3); three counts of first degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1; three counts of first degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A.  2C:5–1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3; three counts of second degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1b(1); three counts of second degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1b(2); third degree assault against a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1b(5)(a); third degree knowing possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5b; second degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4a; fourth degree knowing possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–3d; second degree possession of a weapon by a person who has been previously convicted of one or more of the crimes listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:39–7b; and third degree giving false information to law enforcement for the purpose of hindering apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment, N.J.S.A. 2C:29–3b(4).
[directive] Section offers plea initial certain that making on depend will system plea escalating an of effectiveness the of assessment objective an reflect must offers initial These realistic. and reasonable are any of outcome likely trial, the at raised be to likely defenses) the to relation in proofs available defendant of the culpability the crime, the of seriousness the evidence, suppress to motions the sentence the and scheme, or event criminal the in role and background her or his considering trial.  after a convicted to be were defendant the if impose likely would court Policies.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 313.  Thus, even if Plaintiffs are successful in this appeal, the Court must still consider the factors under *Enright*.  Here, “the bona fides” of [...]’s declination based on [...]’s unenrollment from the CCIP and the pursuit of coverage for [...] by Plaintiffs despite [...]’s knowledge and acknowledgment that it was unenrolled from the CCIP, weigh sharply against awarding attorneys’ fees.  Also, [...]’s justification in litigating the coverage issues is well-reasoned based on the overwhelming evidence that [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Accident and its admission of the same.  The trial court’s ruling denying Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and granting summary judgment in favor of [...] further supports [...]’s initial decision to deny coverage and thereafter to litigate the coverage issues.
[brief] The State even conceded at oral argument that without defendants’ non-reaction to the spotlight, it would be very difficult to argue that reasonable suspicion existed prior to the stop.  As this Court and many other courts have recognized, nervous behavior or lack of eye contact with police cannot drive the reasonable suspicion analysis given the wide range of behavior exhibited by many different people for varying reasons while in the presence of police.  See Rosario, 229 N.J. at 277.
[brief] The trial court ultimately decided that because when appellant/plaintiff [...] applied for an insurance policy with respondent/defendant [...] (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”), [...] indicated that he was living in, and his vehicles were garaged in the State of North Carolina.  In actuality, [...] was living in New Jersey and his vehicles had been with him in New Jersey at all relevant times.  The trial court decided that because appellant/plaintiff was living in and garaging his vehicles in New Jersey, instead of North Carolina, he was “culpably uninsured” at the time of the accident.  Appellant/Plaintiff on appeal is arguing that when he notified respondent/defendant [...] of his change in mailing address prior to the accident on February 28, 2022, he failed to realize that he also had to change the “garaging address” of his vehicles.
[brief] [...] sells timeshares at its three Atlantic City resorts.  It targets potential buyers within a 200-mile radius of Atlantic City.  It knows potential owners would refuse to attend its Atlantic City sales presentations so it hides the real reason they are being solicited.  [...] also knows that potential buyers would not purchase its timeshares if they had an accurate understanding of the cost and limitations of its product.  Because of this, [...]’s business model involves violating numerous statutes and code regulations designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous resorts like [...]’s.
[brief] In this state, the importance of data privacy is reflected by the recent signing into law of the New Jersey Privacy Act (NJPA), a comprehensive data privacy law that will go into effect on January 15, 2025.  The NJPA regulates companies’ use of personal data and recognizes that consumers have certain rights as to their data privacy, like the right to obtain a \(^8\) Keyword searching like that at issue here is designed to assemble an over-inclusive set of data from which responsive material can be pulled and produced, but it is not designed to prevent nonresponsive or private material from appearing in the tagged data set.  portable copy of personal data.  New Jersey is just one of 18 states that have enacted comprehensive laws intended to protect the personal and private data of individuals, and that number is growing.  Broad discovery orders, like the Order here, contravene the purpose of regulations such as the NJPA and the growing trend of protecting privacy rights, hamper companies’ compliance with state statutes, like the NJPA, and subject them to penalties.  Discovery is a serious intrusion into the privacy rights of the parties as well as others having nothing to do with the dispute at issue.  As a society, we allow it because it is necessary for the truth-seeking needs of the judicial system, but it necessarily has its carefully crafted limits and they should be respected.  The Order does not do so.
[brief] CONCLUSION  Based on the aforementioned reasons, the order denying the defendant’s PCR without an evidentiary hearing in light of the fact that his claims were supported by certifications, and the court’s credibility assessments and determinations on the certifications without hearing from the witnesses warrants the order to be reversed and a full evidentiary hearing to be ordered pursuant to State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343 (2013).  Respectfully submitted, [Signature]
[brief] ”  H38a at p. 18.  According to information provided by the Company, if the Regulator were constructed at the first location in 2017 the costs would have been approximately $3,020,000.  H1292a.  However, the costs associated with the second location in 2018 were almost $1 million more at $3.9 million, which included the permitting and planning costs associated with the first location.  H1308a.  At Rate Counsel’s request the Company estimated the cost of the second location in February 2020 to be approximately $4,581,000.  H1626a.  [...] attributed approximately $1.75 million has been spent by the Company to address the legal protests of the Township.  1T105:L19 to 1T106:L9.  These two increases plus any additional increases above and beyond the $3 million resulting from this appeal and the passage of time are not “reasonably necessary” to provide safe and reliable gas service pursuant to 40:55D-19.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S LEGAL FEE CLAIM DUE TO PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER REQUIRING THE PARTIES TO PROVIDE SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT EXPLAINING THEIR POSITIONS AS TO HOW THE LEGAL FEE AWARD SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE REMAND AND FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO MEET THE EQUITABLE AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR FEE SHIFTING UNDER R. 4:42(9)(a)(2).  (Trial Court Order and Opinion dated August 31, 2022, Da271).  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order  Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Application for an Award of Legal Fees and Ordering Plaintiff to be Reimbursed in the amount of $1,049,589.14, filed August 31, 2022 ........................................................................ Da271  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | |-------| | **Henderson v. Camden Cty. Mun. Util. Auth.**, 176 N.J. 554 (2003) | 30, 38 | | **In re Bloomer**, 37 N.J. Super. 85 (App. Div. 1955) | 26 | | **In re Niles Trust**, 176 N.J. 282 (2003) | 30, 38 | | **Litton Industries v. IMO Industries**, 200 N.J. 372 (2009) | 43 | | **Rendine v. Pantzer**, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) | 26 | | Rules | |-------| | R. 2:11-4 | 37 | | R. 4:42-9(a)(2) | passim | | RPC 1.5(a) | 26 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  On March 23, 2021, the Appellate Division filed a decision vacating the probate court’s attorney fee award in favor of Plaintiff, [...] (“Plaintiff”), and against the [...] in the amount of $1,049,589.14.  The Appellate Division remanded the case to the probate court for a recalculation of the legal fees in accordance with its express instructions as to how time entries should be analyzed to determine whether they are reimbursable.  On the remand, the probate court entered an order and opinion on August 31, 2022.  The probate court did not follow the Appellate Division’s instructions, and entered an award that was identical – to the penny – to the award that had been vacated.  Defendant, [...] (“Defendant”), is appealing two orders: (1) the probate court’s August 31, 2022 order and decision awarding Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $1,049,589.14; and (2) the probate court’s order of the same date that denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s attorney fee claim because of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a July 13, 2021 order that had directed the parties to submit position papers, and responses to the opposing party’s position papers, by specified dates, which were to assist the court in its analysis.
[brief] Because the Case Was Marked Closed  In light of the newly discovered evidence, on March 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion for leave to amend in the First Action, seeking permission to assert, for the very first time, a bad faith claim against the [...] based on the [...]’s improper quid pro quo agreement with [...].  (Pa533.)  On April 30, 2021, the trial court in the First Action entered an order denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend.  (Pa180.)  The April 30, 2021 order provided that “[t]he motion to amend is denied as this case is closed per [...]’s January 8, 2021 lettor [sic] of opinion. ”  (Id.)  The court did not mention, let alone address, the merits of Plaintiff’s bad faith claim or that the basis for that claim was discovered after the case was closed.  (Id.)  On May 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court challenging, among other things, the following rulings in the First Action: (i) the trial court’s finding that the [...]’s “blight” designation was supported by the requisite substantial credible evidence under New Jersey’s statute, and (ii) the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion for leave to amend to assert a bad faith claim.  (Pa183.)  Significantly, Plaintiff’s appeal did not involve the merits of its bad faith claim because Plaintiff was not granted permission to assert those claims.  (Id.)  [...] is Appointed Redeveloper
[brief] 1.  Define Proof  2.  Define Under The Influence aka Intoxicated 3.  Define Proof beyond a reasonable doubt  4.  Define Probable Cause  5.  Define Due Process 6.  Define Subjective 7.  Define Clear and Convincing Evidence  8.  Causes of Bloodshot Eyes  9.  Define Evidence | | Case Name | Page(s) | |---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | 1 | Ornelas v. United States (1996) | 45 | | 2 | State v. Badessa (N.J. 2005) | 41 | | 3 | State v. Basil (N.J. 2010) | 22,23 | | 4 | State v. Cummings (N.J. 2005) | 22,25,30| | 5 | [...], DOCKET NO.
[brief] Expert opinions must be based on “facts or data of the type identified by and found acceptable under N.J.R.E. 703. ”  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011) (cited by Burney, 255 N.J. at 23).  While [...] agents may have a common practice of relying on this data, supported by general anecdotal success, no radio wave engineer nor scientist in this field testified to any common practice of relying on such data as accurate for these purposes.  In fact, [...] specifically issued a disclaimer cautioning the data for such use.  (1T65-10 to 68-6).  As affirmed in Burney, “[e]stimating the coverage area of radio frequency waves [of a cell tower] requires more than just training and experience,… it requires tower includes “plus or minus a tenth of a mile, which is what we, you know, kind of come to an agreement within [...] as to where the phone may have been in that particular period.  Again, it certainly could have been inside that or outside of that. ” (7T49-16 to 21).  This further substantiates the Defendant’s position that this expert opinion is based on nothing more than [...]’s experience, rather than scientific, evidence-based calculations. scientific calculations that take into account facts that can affect coverage.
[directive] Offenses Committed While Under Supervision (Special Application and Enhancement Feature E) If the defendant committed the Brimage-eligible offense while under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Justice Commission, or a probation department (i.e., e.g., while on parole, ISP, JISP, probation, PTI, conditional discharge, or any other program of supervised release other than bail), the authorized plea offer shall be six (6) months greater than that otherwise provided in the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers, except that if the defendant at any time during the course of the offense was a fugitive or in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5a (Escape) or N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5b (Absconding From Parole), the authorized plea offer shall be twelve (12) months greater than that otherwise provided.  This Special Application and Enhancement Feature shall be applied notwithstanding that parole, probation or other form of supervised release has been revoked based upon the violation or the defendant has been charged or convicted of a new criminal offense based upon the violation, and the use of this Special Application and Enhancement Feature shall not be deemed to constitute the “double counting” of any such other remedy or charge resulting from the violation.
[brief] 9.  Letter Requesting to Supplement the Record, filed by Appellants on June 3, 2022, attaching a.  [...] Resolution, dated March 17, 2022; b. Board Policy No. 0179: Board Social Media Policy for Board Members; c. Meeting Minutes of the [...] for the March 17, 2022 meeting; d. Meeting Minutes of the [...] for the April 28, 2022 meeting; e.
[brief] Furthermore, upon questioning by the Court, [...] could not point to any specific evidence or any specific date, other than “early 2012 ” which it would have identified as the first date which [...] and [...] began informal communications regarding an employment change.  Instead, [...] contended that they did not want a date limitation as to the files identified by the search terms so that they could find all files, even those which they contend may have been altered by date by [...] before any negotiations began.  The Court however was unpersuaded by this argument.  Therefore, the Court questioned counsel for [...] as to when any preliminary negotiations began, and he stated that the “real discussions began in June or July of 2013.
[brief] Board Certifications for physicians are governed by the American Board of Medical Specialties (the “ABMS”).  This Board provides both Certifications of recognized medical specialties as well as subspecialties within certain specialties.  Medical subspecialties do not have a specific Specialty Board, but are issued by the specific Specialty Board.  In this case, for example Defendant [...] was Board Certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine.  He also had Subspecialty Certifications in Pulmonology Medicine and in Critical Care Medicine.  There is no separate Medical Board of Critical Care Medicine.  However, Critical Care Medicine is recognized as a subspecialty by the American Board of Anesthesiology, by the American Board of Emergency Medicine, by the American Board of Internal Medicine, by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology, by the American Board of Pediatrics and by the American Board of Surgery.  See, American Boards of Medical Specialties, “www.ABMS.org/member-boards/specialty-subspecialty-certificates. ”  Defendant [...] claims that the complaint against her must be dismissed because the plaintiff’s medical expert who signed the Affidavit of Merit (AOM), [...], did not have credentials identical to those of [...].  This argument is erroneous for a number of reasons.