ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF HALLION’S APPLICATION MADE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND SEVEN MONTHS PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  The Board’s decision denying [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form under the Ricci Act should be upheld because it is reasonable and supported by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, and thus is not arbitrary nor capricious.  “On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have but a limited role to perform. ”  Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps. ’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).
[brief] (12T38-2 to 13).  [...] went to [...]’s residence and recovered a P-38 semiautomatic revolver.  (12T40-24 to 41-15).  Ballistics examinations determined that the projectile recovered from [...]’s car and the projectile recovered from the rear of Lot 60 in [...] were fired from [...]’s firearm, but the projectile recovered from [...]’s body was not.  (12T78-7 to 19).  No firearm matching the bullet removed from [...]’s body was ever recovered.
[brief] Increased access to high-quality open spaces can enhance property values, attract tourism, and stimulate local businesses, especially those related to outdoor recreation and eco-tourism.  By investing in the community's natural and recreational assets, [...] sets the stage for sustainable economic growth that benefits all residents.  In conclusion, the land exchange arrangement between [...] and [...] is a strategic action that leverages the Township's eminent domain powers to secure tangible, long-term benefits for the public.  This initiative exemplifies responsible and innovative municipal governance, aiming to enhance the quality of life for residents, preserve the community's environmental heritage, and guide sustainable development.  The clear public benefits of this exchange underscore its legality and the appropriateness of the Township's approach, firmly justifying the support of this Honorable Court.
[brief] Perhaps recognizing that its guaranty claim has a statute of frauds problem, Plaintiff next argues that the doctrine of "part performance" overcomes this defense.  There are two problems with this argument.  First there is no authority provided that the doctrine applies beyond the statute of frauds provision for leases.  The only case cited, Deutsch v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 213 N.J. Super 385 (App. Div. 1986) is a lease case and describes the doctrine as applying to “real estate” cases under the statute of frauds.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b).  A defendant violates the IFPA if it: (1) presents or causes to be presented in support of a claim for payment pursuant to an insurance policy a written or oral statement that it knows contains false or misleading information material to the claim, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(1); (2) prepares or makes such a false or misleading statement that is intended to be presented to an insurance company in connection with a benefits claim, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(2); or (3) conceals or knowingly fails to disclose an event which affects any person’s entitlement to insurance benefits or payment, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(3); or (4) assists, conspires with, or urges another to violate the IFPA, or benefits, directly or indirectly, from the proceeds derived from a violation of the IFPA, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(4).  The IFPA therefore grants insurers the right to seek broad remedies “in any court of competent jurisdiction” for materially false or misleading statements or omissions in connection with claims for payment under insurance policies, including no-fault policies, that caused them financial harm.
[brief] (Pb 10-17)  To the contrary, this issue is open: the New Jersey Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Comer should extend beyond seventeen.  The offenders at issue in Comer were fourteen and seventeen, and the Court had no occasion to opine on any other age.  See Comer, 249 N.J. at 371, 374.  The same can be said of the cases leading up to Comer.  Simmons was seventeen.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).  Graham was sixteen.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53 (2010).  The defendants in Miller were fourteen.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 467.  Montgomery was seventeen.  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190. 194 (2016).  The defendants in Zuber were seventeen.  State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 430, 433 (2017).  Jones was fifteen.  Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 102 (2021).  Thus, one will search in vain in these cases for any substantial discussion of late adolescents aged eighteen through twenty.  No analysis of the specific characteristics of this age group is to be found.  No analysis of whether the Miller factors apply to this age group is to be found.  No application of any constitutional test to this age group is to be found.  And ultimately, no decision is to be found on whether constitutional protection should extend to this age group.
[brief] ..............................................................................................................  10, 13  Selwyn v. Bruck L. Offs., S.C., No. 19-cv-135, 2020 WL 13598626 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 2020)..............................2  Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008).........................................................14  State v. Silva, 394 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 2007)..........................................................2
[brief] In other words, the Supreme Court confirmed that defendants and/or third-party defendants against whom cross-claims or third-party claims have been brought are still parties even though the plaintiff may not have direct claims nor recover damages from such a third-party defendant directly.  In this case, there was no reason why Appellant could not have pursued the contribution claims he had already asserted and/or was free to assert against [...] and [...].  Had Appellant done so, there would have been no reason or basis to seek the so-called “Burt defendant” designation.  In seeking this tactical advantage — essentially, pursuing third-party claims against empty chairs without the benefit of counsel — Appellant created a true Hobson’s choice for Plaintiff/Respondent, with an eye towards exploiting the ruling at trial.  The only reason why Appellant’s claims against [...] and [...] were no longer active was because Appellant asked the Trial Court to extinguish those claims and to declare them so-called “Burt defendants.
[brief] [...] claims that the prior instances of injuries are both distinguishable and proof that workers getting injured is just part of the job.  Cb26-27, Cb29-30.  As set forth in plaintiff’s statement of facts, each of the three fatal worksite incidents on [...]’s projects involved the same scenario, i.e., struck by equipment and crushed.  Pb21.  Disputes over the facts and what inferences a reasonable jury might find is not a basis for summary judgment.  The right to a jury trial in New Jersey is a constitutional right.  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9.  It may not be denied cavalierly or based on debatable evidence.  That is why the summary judgment standard of review requires that all inferences be resolved in favor of proceeding on the merits rather than dismissal.  R. 4:46-2.  It also is why the court is not authorized to decide issues of fact.  The court must decide only whether any such issues exist.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Because the arguments and opinions of defendant [...] serve only to accentuate the dispute of facts, summary judgment should be denied.
[brief] --- 4  [...]’s testimony identified by [...] in its opposition brief appeared to be referring to the early letters that [...] sent in July 2017.  Moreover, after [...] filed the amended complaint in the Underlying Action, [...] alleges to have re-sent the same reservation of rights letter on September 25, 2017, proof of which was not produced until [...] filed its reply papers in further support of its motion for summary judgment.  Obviously, no discovery could have been taken on whether the letter was actually received, and [...] testified at his deposition that he was not familiar with the letter.  (Da210 at 23:12-17).  At the very least, the trial court should have conducted a Rule 104 hearing to determine the admissibility of the September 25, 2017 letter.
[brief] During the discovery period, counsel for Defendants [...] and [...] repeatedly requested the production of the lease used by Plaintiff for the Leased Premises for the tenant that immediately proceeded the tenancy of [...].  The requested lease, which contains guaranty provisions that were drastically different than those found in the [...] Lease, was not produced until March 1, 2022, during the pendency of the cross motions for summary judgment.  DKVa 001.  On December 15, 2021 Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to obtain a judgment for part of its alleged damages as against all Defendants including the individual defendants on the personal guaranty claim.
[brief] See Marmo & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024) (“Waiver is defined as the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. ”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); WAIVER, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The voluntary relinquishment or abandonment — express or implied — of a legal right or advantage[.]”).  That seems particularly apt where a bidder’s bid is indisputably defective, and the government must decide whether to forego its right to reject the bid.
[brief] A.  Determining that the Defendants had a conflict of interest in voting on matters involving the hiring/firing of [...], Esq. as attorney for the Borough.  B.  Enjoining the Defendants from voting in any future employment by [...] until his lawsuit of [...] is completed.  (Da 6).  ---  2  “1T” refers to Law Division transcript dated April 1, 2024  “2T” refers to Law Division transcript dated May 10, 2024  On February 8, 2024, the Law Division entered an Order temporarily restraining the Defendants from voting on motions or resolutions regarding the hiring or firing of [...] and setting a briefing schedule and hearing date.  (Da5).  On March 15, 2024, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint.  (Da 79-80).  After holding oral argument on April 1, 2024, the Law Division entered a Decision and Order (Da 1-2) the same day denying the Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice on the basis that it was moot:
[brief] *Id.*  Here plaintiff was subjected to a combination of multiple acts by being placed on disciplinary detention because she dared to grieve.  Plaintiff was denied of her right to call her attorney, denied of her psychiatric medication, threatened with bodily harm, blocked from going to her court matter and intentionally was not placed on the list to go to Church which constitutes a pattern of unlawful conduct.  Because the employees are liable for all these acts, the County is also liable.  See N.J.S.A. 59:2-2.  Maliciously refusing to allow the plaintiff to have access to her lawyer is hardly a discretionary matter.  Recklessly withheld her psychiatric medications for almost a week is not a discretionary matter.  Blocked plaintiff’s attendance at her court matter and denying her of her right to a speedy trial is not a discretionary matter.  Placing plaintiff in disciplinary detention because she grieved about perceived violations, threatening her with bodily harm caused her to endure severe emotional distress and to fear for her physical safety have both willful malicious and negligent components.  The acts and omissions in this case are Constitutional violations as well as violations under NJSA 10:6-2 (c) and 42 USC §1983.  Based on this there was public entity liability for the reckless and negligent acts because the individual employees were all liable.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Under the Criminal Justice Reform Law, an “eligible defendant” is defined as a person for whom a complaint-warrant is issued for an initial charge involving an indictable offense or a disorderly persons offense allegedly committed on or after January 1, 2017.  A person charged on a complaint-warrant for an indictable or disorderly persons offense issued prior to January 1, 2017 but not initially arrested on that charge until on or after January 1, 2017 also is an eligible defendant.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15.  Further, by December 6, 2016 order of the Supreme Court, for all complaint-warrants on indictable and disorderly persons charges issued prior to January 1, 2017 for which a monetary bail amount has been set but the defendant has not been arrested on these charges before January 1, 2017, the bail amount shall be voided as of January 1, 2017.  The voiding of the bail amounts will not otherwise affect the warrant itself.  Again, as set forth in the preceding paragraph, these are “eligible defendants” under the Criminal Justice Reform Law.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules promulgated by this directive will not apply to eligible defendants under the Criminal Justice Reform Law, even if the judge is considering monetary bail as a condition of pretrial release.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Page Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], granting Defendants [...] and [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 10, 2024 ……………………Pa1 Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 10, 2024 ……………………………………………………..Pa4 Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice, dated May 10, 2024 ………..Pa8 #
[brief] (Ra4).  [...] explained to [...] he could not use vacation time or sick time to avoid returning to work under Reactionary Mode.  (Ibid.).  Shortly after they spoke, [...] left [...] a voicemail stating he would report to work if there was a weather-related emergency like snow, but that he did not consider himself an essential employee, stating:  “I am not a healthcare worker.  If it was weather-wise related or had something to do with some accident, no problem, I’m there ‘till the cows come home.  But I can’t help you with this, man.  Alright guys?  So, whatever happens, I will take it on the chin. ”  (Aa15).  On April 7, 2020, [...] again spoke with [...] via telephone.  (Ra10).  This time, they were joined on the call by [...] Human Resources employee [...].  (Ibid.).  [...] and Nelson explained to [...] that he could not remain out of work indefinitely due to his fear of contracting the COVID-19 virus, and that any future absences would require medical documentation.  (Ibid.).  The Commissioner of the [...] learned that [...] was refusing to return to work and personally reached out to him via email on April 9, 2020, and by certified letter on April 14, 2020, to explain the seriousness of the situation he was placing himself in by failing to return to work despite being categorized as an essential employee.
[brief] The Grievance and Arbitration Process  The Union timely filed a grievance contending that [...]’ termination was without just cause, and pursued that grievance to final and binding arbitration.  Both the Authority and the Union presented testimony and documentary evidence across three days of hearing.  Both parties submitted written closings in the form of post-hearing briefs, whereafter the Arbitrator issued his ruling.  On September 5, 2022, [...] issued what he labeled as his Interim Award.
[directive] [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  2.  ¿Entiende que si se declara culpable tendrá que pagar una multa obligatoria?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to pay a mandatory penalty?  Las multas obligatorias son las siquientes/The mandatory penalties are as follows:  1ra infracción/1st $ 500 Offense  2da infracción/2nd $ 750 Offense  3ra infracción o subsiguiente/3rd $ 1,000 or Subsequent offense  Multa total/ $  Total Penalty Formulario promulgado por la directriz # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Spanish página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Spanish page 1 of 2  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  3.  ¿Entiende que si se declara culpable del robo de más de un automóvil o de más de una retención ilegal de un vehículo motorizado, las pérdidas de licencia y las multas obligatorias que se impongan podrán ser consecutivas las unas a las otras?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to more than one theft of an automobile or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle that the license forfeitures and mandatory penalties imposed can be consecutive to each other?
[brief] *Texas East, Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc.*, 48 N.J. 261 (1966); *Essex County v. Hindenlang*, 35 N.J. Super. 479 (App.Div.1955); *State v. Totowa Lum. & Sup. Co.*, 96 N.J. Super. 115 (App.Div.1967).  Furthermore, evidence showing that the government acted in bad faith must be clear and convincing.
[brief] In light of these facts, the Plaintiff asserts the Developer’s Affidavit of Title misrepresented that (1) it has done nothing create any legal rights affecting the ownership or use of the property and (2) no other persons have legal rights with respect to the property.  Nevertheless, the trial court concluded the Developer conveyed marketable title because the transaction was contemplated or authorized by the Condominium’s Master Deed. \(^3\)  But the opinion fails to explain exactly how this purported authorization was material to accuracy of the representations set forth in the Developer’s Affidavit of Title.  By concluding there was ‘no fraud,’ the lower court implicitly found the Plaintiff is unable to prove the Developer misrepresented its quality of title.  In doing so, the opinion fails to appreciate the legal rights that were created by virtue of the Developer designating unit 74 as \(^3\)
[brief] But this is wrong.  A teacher who calls a student by their requested name or allows them to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity is practicing decency, not medicine.  Moreover, even if fundamental parental rights were at stake—which they are not—such parental rights are not absolute or beyond regulation.  Here, the State has demonstrated an overriding interest in creating a safe, inclusive learning environment, which precludes outing students to their parents over the students’ objections.
[brief] B.  The Mount Laurel Doctrine  In *S. Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp.*, 92 N.J. 158 (1983) ("*Mount Laurel II*"), the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in *S.  Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp.*, 67 N.J. 151 (1983) ("*Mount Laurel I*") that every municipality has a **constitutional** obligation to provide its fair share of affordable housing.
[brief] She denied the agreement supplied to the court was an authentic agreement.  [37a, 38a]  When the Respondent challenged the authenticity of the document, [...] clarified his position in a second certification.  [90a]  His second certification makes it clear the document presented to the court was not work he would have done, nor signed off on.  [90a,91a-92a]  The Appellants over the years have had a variety of differing employment agreements.
[brief] Furthermore, while Plaintiff’s focus on the quantum of the density relief sought, i.e., the number of units in the proposed development, is perhaps understandable, the same “is not dispositive” of the issue.  Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Board of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 470 (App. Div. 2015).  Indeed, it is up to the Board to decide whether they find expert testimony to be sufficient or credible.  “Zoning Boards may choose which witnesses, including expert witnesses, to believe. ”  Board of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434-435 (App. Div. 2009).  Even in the face of diametrically opposed testimony, a municipal board “has choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses.  Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on appeal. ”  Kramer v. Bd of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 288 (1965).  Therefore, the Board properly considered [...] and [...]’s uncontroverted testimony in considering variance relief.
[brief] DEFENDANTS WAIVED ARBITRATION THROUGH PROLONGED AFFIRMATIVE LITIGATION CONDUCT INCONSISTENT WITH A DESIRE TO ARBITRATE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS  As explained in Plaintiff’s opening Brief, Defendants waived any purported ability to compel arbitration by engaging in a year and a half of litigation, by filing a partially successful dispositive motion, by failing to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense and certifying that no arbitration proceedings were contemplated, and by delaying the progression of the litigation and failing to serve responses to discovery requests as part of their litigation strategy.  In their Brief Defendants argue that waiver should only be found when the parties “engaged in extensive discovery,” and “where defendant[s] actively participated in discovery and filed dispositive motions over course of eighteen months. ”  Defs.’ Br. 27 (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1992); Com-Tech Assoc. v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 938 F.2d 1574, 1576-78 (2d Cir. 1991)).  Defendants’ arguments miss the mark.  First, Defendants fail to address the facts that the parties here litigated for 17 months, Defendants filed a dispositive motion that was partially granted, and Defendants refused to participate in discovery as part of a larger dilatory strategy (forcing Plaintiff to file a motion to compel discovery).  Moreover, if the arbitrator should be the sole arbiter of this case as Defendants claim, Defendants should not have invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction by seeking and obtaining a ruling on the merits.
[brief] Alleged Pretrial Identification**  Before trial, the police twice interviewed [...], a resident of [...] in [...], who claimed to have seen the shooter from across the street.  (Da 171)  In her first interview on September 26, 2018, at 11:25 a.m., she gave a general description of the shooter as a tall, thin man with “wavy” hair and no dreadlocks; she was not asked to make an identification during that first interview.  (Da 129-54, 171-76)  During her second interview the same day at --- 3 The facts and procedural history regarding the alleged identification are combined for clarity.  9:22 p.m., the detectives showed her surveillance video of a man with dreadlocks but otherwise matching her description who had been walking in the neighborhood on the night of the shooting; Reid said she recognized the man as the shooter.  (Da 155-67, 171-78)  In a separate interview conducted the same day between 3:29 and 10:40 p.m., [...] identified himself as the man walking around.  (Da 4-108; Da 171-72)  However, the police never administered a lineup or photo array to Reid using a known photo of [...].  The defense challenged that identification procedure as impermissibly suggestive and moved for an evidentiary hearing under Wade/Henderson. \(^4\)  On June 10, 2019, [...] held argument on the motion, and on July 12, 2019, she issued a written decision finding prima facie evidence of suggestiveness and granting an evidentiary hearing.  (2T; Da 168-78)  However, it is unclear whether the Wade/Henderson hearing was ever held or whether the court issued a final ruling. \(^5\)  Reid did not testify at trial.