ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J.J. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 236 (1944); Murphy v. Trapani, 255 N.J. Super. 65, 72 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 17 (1992); Homann v. Torchinsky, 296 N.J. Super. 326, 334 (App. Div. 1997) (“Generally, in the context of restrictive covenants, a rule of strict construction should be applied to the provisions unless such a rule would defeat the obvious purpose of the restrictions.
[brief] Ha280, Ha306.  [...] filed a petition on November 29, 2018 with the [...] pursuant to N.J. S.A. 40:55D-19 to override the decision of the [...], Ha39, together with accompanying prefilled direct testimony and exhibits, which was docketed as [...] Docket GO1811125 and assigned to the OAL as [...].  The consolidated petitions were assigned to [...].
[brief] POINT I:  The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in failing to enforce the order of 1) 7/20/2012 (DA53) to hold a hearing, on the record, and 2) the Order of 1/11/2022(DA76) to provide Defendant a complete “full accounting” and to provide “a credit for any overpayments or improper garnishments” from the period commencing from October 1, 1998 to the present date.
[brief] ..........................................  15 - **Pullen v. So. Plainfield Planning Bd.**, 291 N.J. Super. 303, 312 (Law Div. 1995), aff’d, 291 N.J. - Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1996)).  ..............................................................................................................  11 - **Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adj.**, 113 N.J. Super. 333, 345 (App. Div. 1971)  ............................  19 - **Spring Lake Hotel & Guest House Assoc. v. Borough of Spring Lake**, 199 N.J. Super. 201, 210 - (App. Div. 1985)  ..................................................................................................................................  11 - **Sun Co., Inc. v. Zoning Bd.**, 286 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div.), certif. den. 144 N.J. 376 (1996), 19 - **State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schad**, 160 N.J. 156, 171 (1999)
[brief] The purpose of statutes of limitations is to: penalize dilatoriness and serve as measure of repose.  . .  When a plaintiff knows or has reason to know that he has a cause of action against an identifiable defendant and voluntarily sleeps on his rights so long as to permit the customary period of limitations to expire, the pertinent considerations of individual justice as well as the broader considerations of repose, coincide to bar his action.  [Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 115 (1973). ]  The six (6) year statute of limitations begins to run when a claim accrues, which is governed by the “discovery rule.
[directive] When feasible, the officer should warn the person against whom a CED is directed that the officer intends to fire the weapon.  7.3  An officer should not fire a CED if there is a substantial risk that the electrode/darts will strike an innocent person, unless firing the device in such circumstances is reasonably necessary to protect the innocent person(s) from death or serious bodily injury.  7.4  To ensure officer safety, when feasible, at least one law enforcement officer other than the one deploying the CED should be present, be armed with lethal ammunition, and be prepared to utilize deadly force in the event that the use of a CED for any reason fails.  Deadly force would only be authorized in this situation as a last resort, if otherwise permitted by the Use of Force Policy.
[brief] At his deposition, Defendants asked [...] to opine as to what the outcome would have been if [...] had been born earlier.  The questioning was inartful, and contained double negatives – something the court below seems to have ignored -- so [...] felt the need to clarify:  “You asked me, do I agree that an earlier delivery would not have changed the outcome, and I don't agree that an earlier delivery would not have changed the outcome.  My report opines that an earlier delivery would, in fact, have changed the outcome. ”  [Thompson Dep., 50:10-15].  He stated again: “I want to make sure that, an earlier delivery would have made the outcome better for this child.  That's my opinion in my report.  That's what I'm trying to articulate here. ”  [50:20-23].  And again: “I don’t agree with your statement an earlier delivery wouldn't have changed the outcome.  I believe an earlier delivery would. ”  [50:25 to 51:2].
[brief] Order relieving the [...] and [...] as counsel for Interested Parties, [...] and [...] filed on May 31, 2024.  ..................  Pa1-2  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, Inc., 64 N.J. 514, 531 n.2 (1974).  ........  23 Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 154 N.J. 312, 330-31.  .................  23 City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010) ..........10; 12; 13; 20; 22 Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. Super. 203, 208 (App. Div. 2014) ............ 20; 21 Dental v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980).  ...............................  22 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201 (1988)  ............. 10; 20; 22 Escobar v. Mazie, 460 N.J. Super 526 (App. Div. 2019)  ......................  10  Gov’t of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F. 2d. 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978)  ..........  10  O Builders & Associates, Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of N.J., 206 N.J. 109, 114 (2011)  ..........10; 11; 12; 13; 16; 21; 22 Sturdivant v. Sturdivant, 367 Ark. 514, 241 S.W.3d 740, 742 (2006)  ..........  22 Williams v. Topps Appliance City, 239 N.J. Super. 528, 532-33 (App. Div. 1989).  .................................  23 STATUTES AND COURT RULES R. 1:6-6.................................................................14 R. 4:85-1.........................................................3; 9; 20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Defendant [...] retained [...] as an expert witness in this matter.  [...] echoed the testimony of both [...] and [...], opining that the work performed by [...]’s employees [...] and [...] constituted the administration of construction for the purpose of determining compliance with the drawings and specifications, and as such, required engineering education, training and experience (Pa2679).  D.  Trial Court’s Order and Decision of July 26, 2019
[brief] On February 12, 2024, the trial court entered an order and memorandum of decision granting [...]’s application to appoint a substitute arbitrator.  Pa57-68.  In reaching that conclusion, the trial court found that “[...] was \(^3\)  As explained in greater detail below, upon the filing of such a demand that statute automatically stays all proceedings by any out-of-state company until it posts the bond or other security mandated therein. not as important to the agreement to arbitrate as the agreement itself” and that the parties’ “dominant intent was clearly to arbitrate any disputes not merely to arbitrate before a particular arbitrator” and [...] “was not…central to this agreement. ”  Pa66.  Thus, the trial court found it had the power to appoint a substitute arbitrator.  Pa67.  Likewise, the trial court accepted the [...] argument that the parties “are at an impenetrable deadlock” requiring it to act to appoint the arbitrator.  Pa4.  However, the trial court then stayed its order pending this appeal.  Pa70-71.
[brief] The appellate review of a motion to suppress is limited and “deferential. ”  State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 318-19 (2023).  Appellate courts must uphold the trial court’s factual findings so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.  Id. at 318.  This deference recognizes the trial court's “‘opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ’”  Id. at 318-19 (quoting State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007))).
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s characterization of the litigation to date as being essentially limited to the allocation of defense costs, the extensive discovery to date was not so limited.  [...] propounded 46 interrogatories to [...] seeking information on the full range of issues relevant to this litigation, including pollution damages.  Hearing Tr. 72:21-73:2; Pa4 (Cook Cert. Exh. A.)  For example, interrogatory 5 relates to dielectric fluid leak coverage under the Policy, and interrogatory 6 asks [...] to identify all pollution --- \(^4\)  The sole case cited by [...] is a federal New York case that did not analyze the seven *Cole* factors and considered a far timelier motion to compel arbitration only ten months into litigation—not six years.
[brief] Shortly after the trial court denied defendants’ first motion to dismiss on the pleadings in January 2022, defendants changed course.  Defendants restored plaintiff’s right to be heard on all posted agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.  (Pa295, Pa326-DSJCSR #71, #72).  Here, plaintiff litigated in good faith.  To expedite adjudication, to mitigate costs and to cut off any further diversionary attacks on his professional integrity, character, and competence, plaintiff waived his claim for nominal defamation monetary damages and reasonable prevailing party civil rights act violation attorney's fees.  Cf: New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. NJ Dept. of Corrections, 185 N.J. 137 (2005) (awarding OPRA fee shifting fees to prevailing pro se attorney -[...]); Kumar v. Piscataway Twp. Council, 473 N.J. Super. 463 (2022) ("In enacting the CRA, and specifically N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f), the Legislature implicitly acknowledged the difficulty a citizen might have in retaining competent counsel to litigate and preserve their substantive right[s].").
[brief] THE STATE IMPROPERLY ELICITED A LAY OPINION FROM THE BUREAU CHIEF IN CHARGE OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE STATE POLICE THAT DEFENDANT HAD DONE EXACTLY WHAT THE STATE WAS ACCUSING DEFENDANT OF DOING: THAT HE IMPROPERLY RETAINED HIS OFFICIAL STATE-POLICE WALLET IDENTIFICATION CARD AFTER FALSELY REPORTING IT TO BE STOLEN.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)
[directive] These procedural standards are effective December 4, 1987 and supersede all previous Attorney General directives relating to this issue.  In the first six months of 1987, 8,058 persons in the State of New Jersey were listed as missing in the National Crime Information Center missing persons file.  These types of incidents present a unique and significant public safety problem to the law enforcement community.  Law enforcement officers investigating missing and unidentified persons incidents are frequently faced with a case that generally lacks significant investigative leads.  The investigative problems are compounded by readily available transportation networks which facilitate the rapid movement of victims and suspects.  These same investigative complexities occur in non-criminal missing or unidentified person incidents.  In any case the accurate and comprehensive collection of information and personal descriptors entered in a timely manner in the National Crime Information Center computer system generally facilitates a successful resolution to the missing and unidentified persons case.  These investigative standards will provide an organized investigative framework for the timely and comprehensive investigation of missing and unidentified persons incidents.
[brief] Id.  [...] held with respect to the Edison defendants’ statute of limitations argument that:  The statute of limitations for federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this district is the statute of limitations for a personal-injury tort in New Jersey.  While state law controls the statute of limitations, federal law controls when the cause of action accrues.  In general, federal courts apply the discovery rule for determining when a § 1983 cause of action accrues.  Under the rule, the action accrues when a plaintiff knew or should have known the wrongful act or omission resulted in damages.  However, a deferred-accrual rule instead applies when a § 1983 claim relies on an invalidated sentence .  . . .  [F]ederal courts consider what tort the plaintiff’s claims are most akin to and apply principles from those tort cases.
[directive] d.  For the purposes of this Section, the "specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation" standard required for the disclosure of personal identifying based upon crime trend -12- analysis of stored non-alert data is intended to be comparable to the "specific and articulable facts that warrant heightened caution" standard developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 616-19 (1994) (establishing the level of individualized suspicion required before an officer may order a passenger to exit a motor vehicle stopped for a traffic violation).  e.  The law enforcement agency accessing stored non-alert ALPR data for purposes of conducting crime trend analysis shall document: the nature and purpose of the crime trend analysis; the persons who accessed stored non-alert ALPR data for use in conducting that analysis; and the designated supervisor who approved access to ALPR non-alert data.  In any instance where personal identifying information is disclosed based upon crime trend analysis of stored non-alert data, the agency shall document the specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation and the designated supervisor who reviewed those facts and approved the disclosure of personal identifying information, or who pre-approved disclosure of personal identifying information based upon specified circumstances identified by an automated crime trend analysis computer program, or, where applicable, the fact that access to personal identifying information was authorized by a grand jury subpoena.
[brief] Intent and Purpose of Statute.  Lacking any support in the text of LTTEL, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1, et seq., for their position that the requisite “findings” are not open to substantive challenge, defendants rely on selected language from the legislative history stating that LTTEL aimed to give municipalities “flexibility” in negotiating tax exemptions on terms most favorable to the municipality and that it also was intended to operate “quickly. ”  (Dtb21-22)  These points beg the question.  Giving municipalities “flexibility” does not add up to relieving them of the obligation to defend an exemption scheme if challenged.  The legislature presumably understood that court challenges could be resolved expeditiously through calendar management.  Indeed actions in lieu of prerogative writs have special case management rules to expedite final disposition.  See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. Rule 4:69-4 (GANN).  Defendants’ focus on “flexibility” ignores the primary goal of encouraging investment by private capital in redevelopment projects through the use of special financial arrangements to accomplish the purposes of the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL).  That law is intended to facilitate the redevelopment of blighted areas.
[directive] the appropriate number, and calendar year of the reporting period.  B.  I:  Part Assets Seized and Forfeited  1.  1 during  Record on line all United States Currency seized the reporting period by any law enforcement agency within the county Office and forwarded the County Prosecutor's for review and to action.  a which 2. in 2  Record on line all United States Currency Final a Judgement by Default, a Consent Decree/Final Judgement, Final right to Judgement  Confirming Forfeiture, or other action granting the Office currency to the County Prosecutor's has occurred-  All currency forfeited shall be categorized by the specific offense listed below-  Narcotics Offenses:
[brief] A.  Accomplice Liability  “A jury should be “clearly instructed that culpability under [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(c)] required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the conscious object of a defendant's failure to prevent the commission of a particular crime was to promote or facilitate the crime. ””  State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61, 65 (2021) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 462 N.J. Super. 1, 25-26 (App. Div. 2019)).  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1), a person may be deemed “an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if ... [w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense,” if (1) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (a) solicits such other person to commit it; (b) agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort to do so; or (2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
[brief] Judgment of Conviction ........................................ Da. 024-027  Order to Assign Counsel.........................................................Da. 060  Order Denying Petition for PCR ........................................ Da. 086  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Atlantic County Indictment [...] ................................ Da. 001-017  Jury Verdict ................................................................. Da. 018-023  Judgment of Conviction ..............................................  Da. 024-027  August 1, 2018  Order Denying 1st PCR ........................................Da. 028  Pro Se Petition for 2nd PCR2 ........................................ Da. 029-039  State v. Jackson .............................................................Da. 040-058  January 17, 2020  Letter and Order to Assign Counsel .......................Da. 059-060  Notice of Appearance ......................................................  Da. 061  January 7, 2021  Order of Dismissal .................................... Da. 062  Pro Se Petition for Certification ........................................ Da. 063-065  July 6, 2021  Order Denying Petition .................................... Da. 066  August 23, 2021  E-Court Entry Re-filing PCR ......................... Da. 067  August 15, 2022  PCR Scheduling Order ................................. Da. 068  June 22, 2022  Order to Compel Discovery ............................... Da. 069-070 December 6, 2022  Order to Compel Discovery ......................... Da. 071 December 6, 2022  Order Denying Motion to Compel ................. Da. 072  2  This is tantamount to a complaint and thus is required to be included in the appendix pursuant to Rules 2:6-1a(1)(a),(b).  June 16, 2023  PCR Counsel’s Letter to the Court Petitioner’s Brief  Filed June 22, 2023 (appendix omitted)  June 29, 2023  Order  Dismissing with Prejudice  [...]’s Petition for PCR Notice of Appeal --- 3  Part of the record below, thus permitting inclusion in the appendix pursuant Rule 2:6-1(a)(2).  4  Part of the record below, thus permitting inclusion in the appendix pursuant Rule 2:6-1(a)(2).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Because the State presented no evidence that the objectives of the conspiracy went beyond the robbery itself, the trial court should have merged [...]’s convictions on Counts One and Two.  A defendant cannot be punished for two offenses when he has only committed one.  *State v. Cole*, 120 N.J. 321, 325-26 (1990).  The issue of merger “implicates a defendant’s substantive constitutional rights. ”  *Id.* at 326 (citing *State v. Miller*, 108 N.J. 112, 116 (1987)).  Although our Supreme Court has not pinpointed whether the prohibition against dual punishment “rests on principles of double jeopardy, due process or some other legal tenet,” the issue of merger indisputably triggers constitutional protections.
[brief] 1T.  [...] instructed Defendants’ counsel at the outset that responses of “no recollection at this time” would be insufficient to restore Defendants’ pleadings as it indicated there was “not even an attempt to find out any communications. ”  1T10:21-12:15.  [...] otherwise pointed out several deficiencies with respect to the specific “punch list” responses.  For example, Request No. 1 asked Defendants to identify the bank accounts for the Defendant LLC, including basic information such as the name of the bank and the account number.  [...] made clear that the “punch list” response of “no recollection at this time” was insufficient.  1T28:13-24.  [...] also rejected Defendants’ counsel’s argument that she personally had gone to three banks and was supposedly told that the requested information did not exist. \(^3\) 1T29:4-8.  Instead, [...] instructed the Defendants themselves to retrieve the requested banking information from the banks.
[brief] *Id.*  Under a fact-based approach, a court should “determine precisely what injury or damage took place during each contract period or uninsured period and allocate the loss accordingly. ”  *Id.* (quoting S.M. Seaman & J.R. Schulze, *Allocation of Losses in Complex Insurance Coverage Claims* § 4.3[b] [1], at 4-18 (2d ed. 2008)).  The Court then held that when it is not possible to make a fact-based allocation to each policy, only then should losses be pro-rated using the time-on-the-risk method.
[brief] \(^{11}\)  None of [...]’s cases are relevant because they fail to address commercial parties with demonstrably unequal bargaining power.  *See Grandvue Manor, LLC v. Cornerstone Contracting Corp.*, 471 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2022) (a construction contract with contractor for services); *Reinvestment Fund, Inc. v. Rauh*, 2022 WL 17587863 (App. Div. Dec. 13, 2022) (finding “no evidence here of unequal supports this strained reading.
[brief] (emphasis original)36  Our Supreme Court reviewed precedent where the lack of a remedy meant that the court cannot infer an implied private right to a cause of action for a case alleging non-compliance with a statute:  In Osback v. Lyndhurst Township, 7 N.J. 371, 81 A.2d 721 (1951), the plaintiff, a town employee, injured a bystander in the course of his employment.
[brief] [...] of [...] testified that although he believed [...] was “erroneously” enrolled, there was no formal process at the time to inform erroneously enrolled contractors that they were not covered, and it was unclear to [...] whether a notice of cancellation was sent to [...].  Pa2211-Pa2212.  [...] of [...] testified that, although [...]’s subcontract provided that [...] may “request that any subcontractor with any tier withdraw from the CCIP upon 30 days written notice,” she was not aware of any written notice issued to [...] informing them that they would be withdrawn from coverage.  Pa965.  On September 25, 2015, [...] noted [...]’s CCIP enrollment in a correspondence that plainly stated that [...] was CCIP approved:  “[...], is CCIP Approved.  For the above referenced --- \(^1\)  While [...] apparently sent notice of cancellation of the workers’ compensation policy to the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation (“PAWC”) Bureau, [...] received no such notice.  Pa1066-Pa1068.  [W/Element Hotel]  Project. ”  Pa427.  [...] continued work on the Project beyond this August 2015 work as evidenced by [...]’s numerous proposals and [...]’s purchase orders for separate, distinct concrete cutting jobs at the Project Site in the months following that excluded work.  Pa876-Pa891.  At that point, [...] understood that it was enrolled in the CCIP, while its August 2015 saw cutting work at the Ritz project was designated as “structural demolition” work and was excluded from CCIP coverage, and that it would be enrolled going forward.  Pa2311, Pa2313, Pa2316, Pa2322, Pa2323-Pa2324.