ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *It was not necessary to instruct the jury that self-defense could apply to the weapons charges.*  The defendant incorrectly argues that the jury should have been instructed that self-defense could apply to the unlawful possession of a weapon charges.  The jury was instructed that self-defense applied to the possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose charges.  **A.  The Sharp Object**  ‘[A] jury charge on self-defense is largely inapplicable in the context of section 5d offenses. ”  *State v. Kelly*, 118 N.J. 370, 381 (1990).  “If a person possesses an instrument for a legitimate purpose and makes immediate use of that instrument as a weapon in order to fight off an impending threat, then, and only then, is self-defense a justification to a section 5d offense. ”  Id.  Such is not the case here.  There was no evidence adduced at trial that the defendant possessed the sharp object for any legitimate purpose.  The defendant herself testified that she grabbed the knife from the victim.  (6T 137:10 to 138:10).  Thus, the instruction was not necessary.
[brief] | Authority | Citation | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Hirsch v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs | 128 N.J. 160 (1992) | | J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd. | 247 N.J. 120 (2021) | | Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson | 445 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 2016) | | Knight v. Vivint Solar Developer, LLC | 465 N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 2020) | | Neider v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co. | 62 N.J. 229 (1973)
[directive] 6.2.1  Following the principle that the primary goal of internal affairs and discipline is to correct problems and improve performance, management in the subject officer's chain of command should handle relatively minor complaints.  Complaints of demeanor and minor rule infractions should supervisor commanding officer be forwarded to the of the subject officer’s unit because it is often difficult for an immediate supervisor to objectively investigate a subordinate.  In addition, that arrangement might obscure the possibility that part of the inappropriate conduct was the by the immediate supervisor.  result of poor supervision  While the structure of each law enforcement agency is different, it is recommended that minor complaints be assigned to and handled by a commanding officer at least one step removed from the officer's immediate supervisor.  This includes complaints from within the agency.
[brief] [...] instructed the jury that deadly force is defined as force that defendant used with the purpose of causing or which he knew created a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.  (27T187-9 to 12).  The judge instructed the jury to find if defendant used deadly force.  (27T188-6 to 7).  The judge’s charge, which tracked the language in the model jury charge, addressed defendant’s argument that his firing of one shot in the air was for self-protection.  The evidence showed that [...] was struck in the back.  The firing of a gun up into the air is not firing it into someone’s back.  If firing into the air occurred, as defendant claimed, it was done not to harm anyone.  Defendant denied shooting [...] and attempted to raise reasonable doubt during his defense that there was more than one shooter, a factual claim the jury rejected by convicting him on count one.  There was no plain error with the trial court’s instruction.
[brief] Pom. Eq. Jur. §109 [at 411].  Here, [...] understood the nature of the receivership, which [...] expertly handled during trying circumstances.  The trial court could see, and made it clear in its decision, that [...]’s receivership clearly “fit the changing circumstances” of his appointment.  This was a complex situation in the midst of the pandemic.  Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was well reasoned, and should be affirmed.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff could not defeat summary judgment on her “constructive discharge” claim, and instead attempted to buttress her claim through pure speculation and hearsay.  Even if the Court were to consider the hearsay statement of Plaintiff’s co-worker regarding the “rumors” supposedly said about her in December 2018, that is patently not evidence of the type of intolerable conditions required to succeed on a constructive discharge claim.  Such a claim requires “more egregious conduct than that sufficient for a hostile work environment claim,” and, importantly, employs an objective standard such that “an employee’s subjective perceptions of unfairness or harshness do not govern a claim of constructive discharge. ”  Nuness, 221 F.Supp.3d at 604 (citations omitted).  Plaintiff had “an obligation to do what is necessary and reasonable to remain employed rather than simply quit,” and secondhand rumors supposedly spread in December 2018 and purportedly unreturned emails regarding long-term disability do not come close to the “level of proof” requiring “egregious circumstances” and “outrageous, coercive and unconscionable” acts in order to establish a constructive discharge claim.
[directive] [...] shall utilize random video calls conduct home to C. detention checks for defendants ordered Home Detention. to [...] shall monitor defendants ordered to HD via random home detention checks by video or verifiable contemporaneous photographic proof.  During the initial intake for a defendant ordered to HD, the defendant must establish an identifiable location1 at the defendant's home, which [...] thereafter shall use to confirm the defendant's location during random home detention checks.  This identifiable location may not change without prior notice by the defendant to [...]  An identifiable location may be a familiar room or a door or mailbox with visible 1 address number. of Page 5 12 of staff.  The defendant bears the burden proving the identifiable location is at the residence to which the defendant is ordered to reside.
[brief] (1T32-1 to 2).  [...] returned to the vehicle and continued the search.  (1T33-11 to 16).  During the search, he found a New Hampshire driver’s license for “[...]” with defendant’s photograph and a social security card for “[...]. ” (1T33-18 to 21).  Later, the police officer found a loaded nine-millimeter handgun without a serial number under the front passenger seat.  (1T34-5 to 8, 35-3).  The police questioned defendant about the gun while he was sitting inside the police car, and he denied knowing anything about it.  (1T62-3 to 8; 2T16-2 to 14).  The police ultimately impounded the vehicle.
[brief] The Motion Court’s Contractual Interpretation was Sound, and Should Be Affirmed  In its brief, Plaintiff asserts that the motion court’s interpretation of Section 13.1 ignores the words “notwithstanding” and “in addition to” as provided in the second sentence of the clause.  However, Plaintiff’s argument — truly a case of pot calling teakettle black in that [...]’s, and the motion court’s, interpretation of the contract gives full effect to the words “in addition to” and “notwithstanding the foregoing” while Plaintiff’s interpretation would read the word “thereupon” entirely out of the contract — still fails.  The motion court reached a well-reasoned ruling — indeed, the only possible one — based on the express terms of the PSA.  (See 2T, at 15) (“I’m granting the motion to dismiss based upon a plain meaning of contract language [Section] 13.1.  I will not rewrite the contract. ”).  As the motion court found, Plaintiff irrevocably abandoned the deal when it opted to terminate the PSA in July 2022 and declare [...] in default, before [...] could close title under the [...].
[brief] As the Trial Court explained, Plaintiff’s failed to establish whether the public who appeared were actually Township residents, how many appeared, and whether the people that did appear represented a fair cross section of the Township as opposed to just homeowners who live close to the project.  It is also important to note that those people who did appear were there to challenge a land use application and not the underlying Ordinance.  While the residents whose homes are close the Redevelopment Area might be opposed to the Ordinance or any applications that might be considered, that is not enough for this Court to find that a significant public interest is present that would warrant an exception to the filing of a complaint so far out of time.
[brief] It is axiomatic that plaintiffs may use the discovery period to obtain discoverable information from defendants to prosecute its complaint.  Under the summary judgment standard, trial judges should refrain from resolving issues relegated to a jury, namely, credibility determinations and resolving genuine issues of material facts in dispute.  Seven months before the original discovery end date, Defendants’ moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s 10-count Complaint alleging various breaches of contract, torts such as fraud and civil theft, and a demand for contractual indemnification.  In its original February 17, 2023, order, the court correctly denied Defendants’ summary judgment to dismiss the 10-count Complaint, which had no analysis whatsoever related to whether Plaintiff’s could establish a prima facie cause of action under the ten counts pleaded in the Complaint.  In its April 28, 2023, reconsideration order, did the court commit legal error when it reversed itself and made credibility determinations and resolved genuine issue of material facts in dispute by dismissing Plaintiff’s 10-count Complaint 2.5 months before the original discovery end date?  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] [...], [...], and [...] had been making generalized “complaints” about [...]’s management style for years.  (See Pa178; Pa178; Pa190; Pa285; Pa290; Pa240).  [...] had “complained” of [...]’s management style as early as 2016.  (Pa288-89 at 44:11-47:8l; Pa289-90 at 47:9-50:19).  Despite these gripes about [...], she and [...] continued working for [...] for ten years.  (See Pa99; Pa354; Pa356; Pa357).  Indeed, the record reflects that there is simply no record of such a “pattern of antagonism” from which a reasonable jury could infer causation between [...]’s termination and her alleged whistle-blowing activity.  **Third,** [...]’s insistence that [...] derailed [...]’s investigation into her June 24, 2020 argument with [...] is not a genuine issue of material fact.
[brief] 4.  [...]’s Grading Plan of April 11, 2005 showed the finished floor elevation of the [...] as 443.15 feet.  Pa105 5.  [...] alleges that, at some undefined point in time, Mr.  Kloss somehow discovered an “error” in [...]’s 2005 Site Plan – that the actual elevation of the [...]’s floor was 30 inches higher above sea level than the 443.15 feet shown on the Plan prepared by [...].\textsuperscript{3}  Pa30, Complaint, First Count, Paragraph 7.  6.  However, the [...] Plans dated April 11, 2005 had already been submitted to and approved by the [...].  Pa30, Complaint, First Count, Para 7.  7.  [...] alleges that a second, corrected set of site plans were prepared by [...], changing the elevations and grading.  Pa30, Complaint, First Count, Paragraph 8.  Those plans were not approved by the [...] until July of 2009.  Pa30, Complaint, First Count, Paragraph 11.  8.  These dates are of critical importance, because [...] laid out the benchmarks for excavation work in March of 2009 – before the revised plans had been approved.  Pa91, Certification of [...].  This timing sequence is conceded by [...].  Pa30, Complaint, First Count, Paragraph 11.  Likewise, [...] performed its excavation work per [...]’s benchmarks in March of 2009, before the revised plans had been approved.  \textsuperscript{3}  It is unknown how [...] detected this “error” in Plans prepared by [...], a professional engineering firm hired by [...].  The [...] Was Never Planned for or Approved as a Multi-Tenant Structure 9.
[brief] (5T23:3-12; Pa278-Pa287).  Background of [...] and Foot Patrols/Property Checks within [...]  [...] was employed with [...] for fifteen (15) years.  (8T42:17, 20).  When [...] began with [...], he was trained by Officer [...] ("[...]") where [...] showed [...] around and trained him in the use of equipment, the call structure, the format used to handle certain calls, and general duties and expected operations of [...] Police Officers.  (8T49:1-6).  However, [...] did not train [...] how he was supposed to conduct a foot patrol.  (8T49:9).  [...]'s understanding of a property check was comprised of a number of things.  (8T49:13-14).  [...] understood that a property check could be conducted either on foot or by car and the purpose was to improve the quality of that property or doing certain things in relation to protecting the property to canvass for specific activity and to prevent crime.  (8T49:13-25).  [...] was "pretty much self-taught" how to conduct property checks.  (8T60:1).  [...] was not familiar with any rules and regulations promulgated by the [...] Police Department on how to do property checks and never received any training in any classroom from anyone at [...] on how to do property checks.  (8T61:2, 6).  In May 2017, [...] got injured while on patrol at the [...].
[brief] (Pa145)  [...]’s original complaint seeks no such federal remedy.  It only alleges state common law causes of action, and it neither refers to nor alludes to a federal law with which defendants have failed to comply.  Joinder is fraudulent if “there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the defendant or seek a joint judgment. ”  Id. (quoting Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 32 (3d Cir. 1985))  The Pisano Opinion on April 14, 2010 states:  (Pa130)  The publication occurred in response to a motion to disqualify [...] as counsel for the [...] that was filed by [...] in the District Court Action, and [...] was authorized by law to publish said criminal history because the information was not subject to a sealing order at the time of its publication.
[brief] The Court continued its analysis, explaining:  *Balsamides* and *Lawson* underscore the importance of determining the “fair value” of a corporation on a case-by-case basis...  [T]he guiding principle in such cases is that a marketability discount\(^{13}\) cannot be used unfairly by the parties whose misconduct and bad faith caused the corporate split to benefit themselves to the detriment of the injured parties.
[brief] I have personal knowledge about this case and I am making this Revised Reply Brief in response to the Plaintiff–Respondent Brief dated 5/10/24.  In Brief  I’ll use the exhibit numbers of Volume I of the Opening Brief filed on 2/27/24.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  I combined statement of facts and procedural history because they are intertwined and if I separate them it needs more space that I cannot afford.
[brief] The general rule in New Jersey is that motions for reconsideration must be filed within 20 days of the service of the judgment or order, and this time period is non-relaxable.  Despite these stringent requirements, there are exceptions where the Appellate Division has granted reconsideration in the interest of justice.  For instance, under Rule 4:50-1, relief from a final judgment may be granted for reasons such as mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying relief.  *Mancini v. Eds ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n*, 132 N.J. 330, *In re ESTATE OF NUESE*, 15 N.J. 149.  This rule aims to balance the finality of judgments with the need to avoid unjust results.  The court may exercise its discretion to correct procedural errors to ensure fairness and justice.  In *Alberti v. Civil Service Com.*, 78 N.J. Super. 194, the appellate division granted a motion for reconsideration despite procedural defects, emphasizing the importance of the interests of justice.  The court allowed the appellant to join an additional party and serve a notice of appeal within the extended time frame, recognizing the need to correct procedural errors to ensure fairness Alberti v. Civil Service Com., 78 N.J. Super. 194.  In State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, the appellate division upheld the denial of a motion for reconsideration as untimely but noted that the defendant was entitled to a new PCR proceeding and an evidentiary hearing due to procedural errors by PCR counsel.  In State v. Lodzinski, 248 N.J. 451, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a motion for reconsideration, acknowledging that the appellate division applied an incorrect standard in reviewing the defendant's post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal.  The court recognized the procedural error of constitutional magnitude and corrected its own oversight to ensure due process rights were upheld  State v. Lodzinski, 248 N.J. 451.  In this matter, the appellate court should appropriately consider this matter on the merits in the interest of justice.
[directive] 1.1  A respectful and cooperative relationship with the community is essential for effective law enforcement.  That relationship can be undermined when force is used unnecessarily or unequally.  1.2  Every officer shall respect the sanctity of human life and the dignity of every person, and act to preserve every life, whenever possible, and avoid unnecessary injury to members of the public or themselves.  1.3  In carrying out their duties as guardians of public safety, officers shall at all times treat every person equally without regard to the individual’s actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, familial status, or any other protected characteristic under N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.  1.4  Every law enforcement and prosecuting agency operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey, including the New Jersey Department of Corrections and county correctional institutions, shall implement or adopt policies consistent with this Use of Force Policy, including the Policy’s addenda.  1
[brief] Every voter in the township election had a clear opportunity to vote for [the candidate] without writing in his name on the ballot.  Moreover, a reasonable voter would understand, without explicit instruction, that it is unnecessary to write in the name of a candidate whose name already appears on the ballot, and that a vote for that candidate must be cast by marking the place on the ballot where that candidate’s name appears.  Significantly, only one of the 1,134 persons who vote by machine in this election made the mistake of writing in any of the [four] named candidates on the ballot….  plaintiff’s reliance upon Gray-Sadler … is misplaced.
[brief] (\textit{See} 4/16/15 CCIP Manual, Pa582.)  The CCIP Binder provides:  “Enrollment in the Workers’ Compensation program automatically enrolls the subcontractor in the General Liability portion of the program.  If a subcontractor is not enrolled in the Workers’ Compensation program there will be no coverage provided under the General Liability program…” (Binder, Pa2231-2232.)  [...]’s Corporate Designee testified, “If you’re enrolled under the Work Comp, you’re enrolled under the GL …  So if you cancel under the Work Comp, you cancel under the GL. ” ([...] Tr. 98:9-99:3 at Pa2122; \textit{see also} [...] Tr. 30:2-5 at Pa2105 and 37:5-8 at 2107.) and the “contract is excluded from our enrolled contracts so I am unable to submit,” [...] advised [...] “No payroll is required for ‘excluded’ contractors” (Pa2518 and Pa2529); [...] then advised [...] on September 8, 2015 that “I am in touch with someone from OCIP [[...]] – our contract is excluded from being able to upload payroll for some reason” (Pa2521); [...] advised [...] there was no CCIP reporting needed because on the [...] portal the [...]-[...] “contract comes up as ‘excluded’” and because, according to communications from [...], “no payroll is required for excluded contracts” (Pa2529); see also [...] internal email on September 23, 2015 confirming “I had found out that this isn’t an OCIP reporting job either” (Pa2532).
[brief] Mellwig v. Kebalo, 264 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 478 (1993), upon which plaintiff relies (see Pb25-26), involves entirely different procedural circumstances.  In Mellwig, an auto negligence action, the plaintiff’s surgeon expert at his de bene esse deposition gave an opinion, not presented in his report, that the plaintiff would probably need additional surgery.  See Mellwig, 264 N.J. Super. at 171.  Defense counsel objected to this testimony at the de bene esse deposition and again at trial, but no motion to exclude that testimony was filed during the intervening eight months, within the thirty day period prescribed by R. 4:14-9(f) or otherwise.  The Mellwig court noted that, had the surgeon “appeared live at trial, a motion to exclude the testimony might well have been taken seriously. ”  Mellwig, 264 N.J. Super. at 171.  Under the circumstances presented, however, it was “inappropriate to treat objections to de bene esse deposition testimony as concealed weapons to brandish at a future trial. ”  Ibid.  Instead, there was a discovery problem that should have been resolved by a prompt motion for an appropriate ruling.
[brief] Pa51, ¶ 60; Pa331, ¶ 60; accord Pa231.  In his first report, dated June 16, 2023, [...] contended that water flows down the [...]’ driveway and that “large quantities of water have, from time to time, inundated the rear of Lot 10 [plaintiff’s property] and eventually flows to Canoe Brook at the rear of the properties. ”  Pa51, ¶ 61; Pa331, ¶ 61; accord Pa231-32.  In that report, he did not contend that the [...] had caused or contributed to that runoff.  See Pa51, ¶ 62; Pa332, ¶ 61; accord Pa231-32.  He also did not compare the current elevation of the driveway to the surveys taken before the [...] bought the property or had the driveway repaved.  Pa51, ¶ 63; Pa331, ¶ 63; accord Pa231-32.  [...]’s second report incorrectly stated that the Belgian block lining the [...]’ driveway had only one outlet next to plaintiff’s property for water flow, and he failed to mention the second outlet next to the [...]’ house.
[brief] Pa661.  Instead, employees such as [...] had to walk in the vehicular roadway, crossing a T-intersection without any traffic controls, vehicular signs, crosswalks, sidewalks or pedestrian safety signs and without a peninsula to increase visibility and catch drivers’ attention.  Id.  The Institute of Transportation Engineers’ Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook provides that the use of traffic signs and markings must have “uniformity” so that they command the attention and respect of drivers.
[brief] Two or three students in the inaugural class withdrew or were dismissed from the program.  ([...] Dep. T69:6-15 at Pa.357).  There were two students in addition to Plaintiff-Appellant who had to take an additional year to complete the pharmacy program due to their academic records.  ([...] Dep. T69:22-  The dual degree program worked as follows: during the first year, the student would take exclusively pharmacy courses.  Then, in the remaining three years, the student would take courses in the pharmacy curriculum, some of which could overlap with courses required for various Master’s programs, and the student would take electives in the field chosen for the dual degree.  ([...] Dep. T39:6-T41:4 at Pa.349-50).