ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 249 N.J. at 369.  The Court identified two constitutional issues with that mandatory scheme: (1) it does not give sentencing courts discretion to individually assess the Miller factors for each juvenile; and (2) it does not give sentencing courts the ability to “review the original sentence later, when relevant information” concerning the juvenile’s maturation which “could not [originally] be foreseen might [now] be presented. ”  Id. at 401.  To remedy these infirmities, the Court provided juveniles subject to the statute with a “later opportunity to show they have matured, to present evidence of their rehabilitation, and try to prove they are fit to reenter society. ”  Ibid.  Such juveniles have the right to “petition for a review of their sentence after having spent 20 years in jail. ”  Id. at 403.  At that hearing, “judges are to consider the Miller factors” and must focus “in particular” on a defendant’s rehabilitative efforts undertaken while in prison.  Ibid.  That is what the court was required to do at [...]’s March 31, 2023 resentencing.  Despite these requirements, the court (a) refused to consider [...]’s prison conduct as evidence of rehabilitation; (b) failed to correctly apply any of the 5 Miller factors; (c) found aggravating factors without a proper basis and omitted mitigating factors supported by the record; and (d) held that relief under Comer is limited to the grant of parole eligibility.
[brief] [...] CONVEYED THE RIPARIAN GRANT TO [...] IN 1909  Unlike Riparian rights, a Riparian Grant is a separate estate in land and need not be tied to the upland property.  Panetta v. Equity One, Inc., 190 N.J. 307, 318 (2007).  The issue in Panetta was whether a conveyance of real property that makes no mention of an abutting Riparian Grant can be construed under N.J.S.A. 46:3-16 to include that grant as an appurtenance.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 383 (quoting *State v. Cooke*, 345 N.J. Super. 480, 486 (App. Div. 2001) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  Here, by pointing to the defense’s supposed failure to prove that [...] spoke to [...] or to get a “got you” moment during cross-examination, the State asked the jury to use the absence of evidence from the defense against [...].  [...] had no obligation to prove that [...] spoke to [...].  Instead, it was entirely appropriate for the defense to point out this possibility to the jury as a way to undermine one of the State’s key pieces of evidence.  The court’s failure to strike these inappropriate comments by the prosecutor or to provide a curative instruction deprived [...] of his rights to due process and a fair trial.  His convictions should be reversed.
[brief] Such adherence is particularly pivotal in cases like the present one, where the legal framework and policy implications have far-reaching effects on public administration and governance.  It cannot be denied that the Appellant could have interceded in litigation before [...] which resulted in the affirmation and approval of the Ordinance that eventually spawned the acquisition of Appellant’s property.  It certainly knew about the litigation.  It is quoted in its trial brief (Pa42).  It chose not to do so.  Therefore, we respectfully submit that it is too late for it to claim that it is not collaterally estopped as a result of [...]’s decision.
[brief] March 13th  Order corrected March 7th  Order, incl. confirming I am Vested Trust Remainder Beneficiary instead of Contingent.  (36a-37a)  (39a)  My May 25th Cross-Motion refuted Feb. 17th rulings in order to reject [...]’s $93K legal fees & adjust commission/accounting fees (427a, par. 29, to 434a, 1st par.; 435a, par. 37, to 436a; 441a-443a, par. d).  It required [...] to issue Final Trust Accounting, as per Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 2 (426a, par. 21, to 427a, par. 27; 439a-440a).  My May 30th Cert. agreed w/[...]’s May 25th Cross-Motion for payback of [...]’s $4,120.48 fees from 2021 in Oct. ‘22 Order, par 1d, (484a, Item 10, to 485a, Item 11; 487a, par. 10; 488a)  Solely due to wanting Case closed, Judge’s Aug. 4th rulings rejected my Cross-Motion (4T, p. 45, line 9, to p. 46, line 14), & Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 2, dictate for [...] to issue Final Accounting (4T, p. 47, line 19, to p. 48, line 9).
[brief] In neither petition nor in any of its witnesses' testimony has the company ever claimed that the proposed regulator is needed to serve increases in gas service that can not be served by the current regulator.  The company refused to provide any discovery on the volumes of gas moved through the 16-inch line now and into the future, or the area meant to be served.  The projected increases in load are less than one percent a year.  The state's energy and climate policies mandate immediate and continuing decreases in natural gas consumption now and into the near future until there is 100% decarbonization by 2050.
[brief] COMPOUNDED INTEREST ON THE LONG OVERDUE JUDGMENT WAS MOST APPROPRIATE  Plaintiffs argue, without any legal authority whatsoever, that because compounded interest was not raised in the Appellant’s motion for reconsideration it was abandoned or waived for this appeal.  Nothing could be further from reality, which is that such motion was not required to preserve the issue on appeal.  Plaintiffs disingenuously attempt to distance this case from this Court’s decision in Twp of West Windsor v. Nirenberg, 345 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2002).  It is still very good law as there are no Supreme Court or Appellate Division cases over-turning, modifying or disagreeing with the opinion.  Plaintiffs try to distinguish by pointing to the differences in the claim underlying that judgment & the claim underlying the judgment herein.  It makes no difference.
[brief] Ibid.  Next, unless “otherwise expressly provided or there is something in the subject or context repugnant to such construction”  N.J.S.A. 1:1-2 defines “personal property”, “property”, “other property”, “real estate”, and “real property”, when used in any statute and in the Revised Statutes, as follows:  Other property.  See “Property; other property,” infra, this section.  Personal property.  “Personal property” includes goods and chattels, rights and credits, moneys and effects, evidences of debt, choses in action and all written instruments by which any right to, interest in, or lien or encumbrance upon, property or any debt or financial obligation is created, acknowledged, evidenced, transferred, discharged or defeated, in whole or in part, and everything except real property as herein defined which may be the subject of ownership.  Property; other property.  The words “property” and “other property,” unless restricted or limited by the context to either real or personal property, includes both real and personal property.  Real estate; real property.  The words “real estate” and “real property,” include lands, tenements and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein.  Ibid.  In *Tewksbury Twp. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.*, 159 N.J. Super. 44, 47 (App. Div. 1978), *aff'd sub nom.*
[brief] The clickwrap interface thus formed a valid agreement to the December 2021 Terms of Use.  **B.  The December Terms unambiguously apprised [...] that she was waiving her right to sue [...] in court. **  The arbitration agreement within the December Terms makes it abundantly clear that, by agreeing to arbitrate their claims, both [...] and the user are giving up their rights to bring a lawsuit in court.  That is all that is required under New Jersey law for an enforceable arbitration agreement.  And while this Court need go no further in the analysis, [...] in particular had addi- tional notice and knowledge that she was waiving her right to a jury trial because she had already agreed to that *express* provision in the January Terms.
[directive] Municipal police officers and/or county sheriff’s officers may be designated as Certified CED Instructors only if they receive the approval and designation of “CED Task Force Officer” from their respective County Prosecutor’s Office.  This designation may be for CED training purposes only.  Only a Certified CED Instructor may conduct initial CED Operator Training and qualification.  Each respective County Prosecutor’s Office shall maintain a list of all Certified County CED Instructors.
[brief] [...] filed this lawsuit on March 15, 2023.  Pa3, 23.  In April 2023, [...] and [...] (and the other co-defendants) moved compel arbitration of [...]’s claims, which was later re-filed in August 2023 with a new return date.  Pa4, 345-46.  On October 24, 2023, the trial court held oral argument.  See T.\(^1\)  On October 27, 2023, the trial court granted the [...]’ motion (and the other defendants’ motions to compel arbitration) and compelled arbitration of [...]’s claims.  Pa1-2, 7.  [...] then appealed as of right pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(b)(8).  Pa354, 357.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT PERMITTED  INADMISSIBLE  HEARSAY TESTIMONY FROM THE STATE'S FINGERPRINT EXPERT THAT A FINGERPRINT WHICH HE COMPARED TO AN ALLEGEDLY MATCHING LATENT FINGERPRINT DETECTED ON THE PHOTOCOPY OF A BROCHURE PAGE HANDED TO THE ROBBERS BY A VICTIM WAS IN FACT A KNOWN FINGERPRINT OF DEFENDANT; AND THAT ONE OF THE TWO JUXTAPOSED FINGERPRINTS FEATURED ON A BLOWN–UP DEPICTION OF THIS FINGERPRINT AND THE ALLEGEDLY MATCHING FINGERPRINT DISCOVERED ON THE BROCHURE PAGE COPY  WAS AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE KNOWN FINGERPRINT OF DEFENDANT'S LEFT MIDDLE FINGER.  POINT IV: THE PROSECUTOR MADE REMARKS ON SUMMATION WHICH DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.
[brief] In fact, in their joint public comments, [...], the [...], and the [...] submitted material to DEP based on a past precedent that perfectly illustrates why interpreting Exemption #11 as allowing for simply “upgrades” would set the bar too low for construction or development and, thus, risk significant environmental damage.  Referring to [...]’s NEUP – for which (as established above) [...] qualified for Exemption #11 in 2012 based on the Project being simply an “upgrade” – these joint comments note that “[i]n 2013, [[...]] expanded its pipeline system through North Jersey which caused serious and lasting damage to the Highlands region.  Mudslides and siltation occurred in both Lake Lookover and Bearfort Waters, and [[...]] failed in their responsibility to reforest areas they clear cut. ”  Aa0339.  (emphasis added).  Had DEP properly interpreted Exemption #11 as only allowing for “routine upgrades,” [...]’s 300 Line Project would have failed to pass this higher bar and the Project’s consequent environmental damage would have been prevented, in keeping with the “overall policy and purpose” of the Highlands Act.
[brief] The Trial Court had no right to inquire into the internal --- \(^2\)  The Court should note that the [...], a Pennsylvania entity, did not represent Mother.  She was represented by the [...], a New Jersey firm with offices throughout the nation.  operations of Mother’s law firm and this vendetta provides an explanation for its arbitrary and unreasonable conduct.  Even though Mother had been removed as Administratrix on November 20, 2020, the Trial Court required Mother to pay the mortgage and other expenses on the property owned by [...] when he died.
[brief] In 1988, the FTC published its Staff Commentary which, among other things, reconciled how a debt collector could use those FCC-regulated communications industries without violating § 1692c(b).  Comment 3 to Section 805(b) of the Federal Trade Commission, *Statements of General Policy or Interpretation  Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act*, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-02 (Dec. 13, 1988) states:  Incidental contacts with telephone operator or telegraph clerk.  A debt collector may contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties, if the only information given is that necessary to enable the collector to transmit the message to, or make the contact with, the consumer.  [Emphasis added.]  The data Defendant shared with its mail vendor (Pa4 at ¶29, Pa9, Pa10) far exceeds the limited information necessary “to transmit the message to, or make contact with, the consumer. ”  Staff Commentary.  Hence, Defendant has not used a mail vendor in the same way that it could lawfully use a telephone or telegraph.  E.
[brief] See Rule 4:10-2(a) (scope of discovery is broad and permits a party to obtain information concerning "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action"); see also O Builders & Associates Inc. v. Yuna Corp., 206 N.J. at 130 (2011).  Just as in O’Builders, where the court found that “defendant has been unable to demonstrate what of its claimed confidential information would be beyond the reach of [either] pre-trial discovery,” Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the claimed “confidential” information or business records in the case would not be discoverable.  See O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ, 206 N.J. at 130.  Simply alleging that Respondents disclosed “general attitudes about litigation” in connection with the prior matters is simply insufficient to disqualify an attorney or a law firm.  See McCarthy v. John T. Henderson, Inc., 246 N.J. Super. 225 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that “there is no reason to conclude that the issues in the earlier litigation would generate the type of broad, philosophical discussion” between the attorney and former client that would lead to a revelation of the former client’s “personal views concerning litigation in general or his attitude toward negotiations and settlement”).  Indeed, if this alone would be sufficient for disqualification, it would be tantamount to a blanket prohibition on representation adverse to former clients because it is difficult to imagine any litigation wherein settlement is not discussed at some juncture.  Such a blanket prohibition is not the law.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED [...]’S RETALIATION CLAIMS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  CEPA provides a statutory cause of action for certain whistleblowers who are subjected to retaliatory discharge.  N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8; see also Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 103 (2008).  The purpose of CEPA is to protect and encourage employees who report illegal or unethical workplace activities.  Allen v. Cape May Cty., 246 N.J. 275, 289 (2021); Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 461 (2003); Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 431 (1994).
[brief] Appellants Failed to Plead Trade Secrets Claim Where the NDA Term Had Expired and Where They Do Not Identify a Protectable Trade Secret in Their Complaint.(Pa003056 – 003058).  The trial court properly dismissed the threadbare trade secret claim.  Appellants cannot demonstrate that they held a protectable trade secret and most importantly cannot establish any damages flowing from the conduct alleged.  Appellant [...] admits it lost its Lease with [...] because it was fighting with its own partners.  There is no alleged trade secret at issue, so there can be no trade secret claim.
[brief] Da105; T6:14-17.  Indeed, the concern in this case is concrete and Defendants cited several examples of irrelevant documents that hit the search terms and would need to be produced despite being entirely irrelevant.  Da 158; *see also* Da125 ¶ 21.  Plaintiffs did not dispute this calculation, and the trial court simply accepted that there would be an overproduction of irrelevant documents.  T20:24-21:1 (“we all recognize that there are going to be a lot of irrelevant documents” with “these particular searches”).  The broad terms encompassed by the ESI Order include phrases such as “New Jersey,” “out of network,” “reimbursement,” “review,” and “overview” – words that simply do not target relevant facts – and all parties agree that much of the material subject to the ESI Order is not relevant.  As to the second *Highmark* demand, for all documents concerning the termination of certain employees, the Special Adjudicator found the requested documents to be *relevant* to the pending dispute before compelling production.  *Id.* at *14*.  Thus, the Special Adjudicator conducted precisely the analysis that the trial court here disclaimed as “not my function. ”  *Highmark*, therefore, provides no support for the argument that the ESI Order’s exclusion of relevancy as a consideration was appropriate.  To the contrary, the *Highmark* Special Adjudicator built into his ruling a relevancy objection, and took on the role of reviewing any individual documents to which there was a relevancy objection (*Highmark* at *17)—precisely the process this Court should compel here.
[brief] (See Changes in Rain Amounts; Projected Changes in Rainfall).  Instead, the Cornell Study on current precipitation provides only the adjustment factors for storms for certain specific weather stations located in New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Connecticut, and Maryland.  (Changes in Rainfall Amounts).  _____________________  Downscaled Climate Model Projections, https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/sab/projected-changes-rainfall-model.pdf.  The IFPR then used these weather-station-specific adjustment factors from the Cornell Study to create county-wide averages that could be applied throughout the State for calculating the peak flow rate for storms.  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022).  Further, the anticipated future precipitation Cornell Study developed multiple change factors for each county in the State based on confidence factors associated with various climate change model outputs.  (Projected Changes in Rainfall).  The IFPR then determined which confidence scenario and associated change factors would apply for calculating the peak flow rate for future storms.  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022).  DEP’s December 1, 2022 permit used the NOAA Atlas 14 precipitation data to calculate the flood hazard area, without adjustment or change factors, because those factors had yet to be adopted or even proposed via rulemaking.  The IFPR was not proposed until December 5, 2022, after [...] received its permit.  Instead, DEP approved the Project under the previously-existing FHACA rules.
[brief] (Pa892) reviewing [...]’s bank records.  (3T131:9-20)  Still further, Defendant admitted at trial that she consented to vacate a $100,000 judgment in favor of [...], and to the dismissal of [...]’s claims underlying that judgment with prejudice, without ever consulting Plaintiff about this.  (3T158:14-160:16)  Likewise, Defendant also acknowledged that she opened another pharmacy called [...] in December 2017, while she was still a member of [...], and used [...]’s funds to pay the startup costs for [...], in violation of the parties’ operating agreement.  (3T12710-131:1)  Defendant’s foregoing testimony confirms that she breached the parties’ operating agreement and that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
[brief] NJDEP Regulations, N.J.A.C. 7:9B, Surface Water Quality Standards, continued, H1499a to H1543a.  Email from Holmdel’s [...] August 9, 2018 enclosing ........ H1544a  Letter by [...] August 9, 2018, opining emission from the proposed regulator would cause degradation to Category 1 waters and that NJDEP requires a permit .........................  H1545a  Email from [...]’s [...] to Holmdel’s [...] August 30, 2018 submitting [...]’s response to the Environmental Commission comments .........................  H1546a  [...]’s [...] August 30, 2018 letter comments on the Environmental Commission comment letter of August 9, 2018 ..................................................
[brief] The questioning during that “interview” was largely based on, and simply recorded information previously obtained by the police from [...] himself during those 7 and 1/2 hours of un-Mirandized custodial questioning.  The arrest of [...] in the apartment parking lot occurred at approximately 2:19 P.M. on March 1, 2017.  The first time there was evidence presented of his having been administered any part of his Miranda rights at all was at approximately 10:45 P.M. at Holmdel Police barracks, more than 8 and 1/2 hours after he was questioned in the parking lot, taken back into his locked apartment by [...] and several other officers, where he was further questioned for an additional 20 minutes; the warrantless search of that apartment, [...]’s vehicle, and [...]’s family’s apartment in Queens, New York, all purportedly with [...]’s “voluntary” “consent.
[brief] It is impossible to evaluate the totality of circumstances utilizing such an approach.  Therefore, [...] contends, an evaluation of the actions of both Parties is required by Cole.  Indeed, in its Cole decision, the Supreme Court did not limit an analysis to the familiar seven factors that it enumerated.  Rather, the Court noted that the seven factors to be considered are “[a]mong other factors” that the Court should evaluate.  Id at 280.  Those “other factors,” in this case, [...] contends, are the actions of [...].  When [...]’s actions are considered alongside [...]’s, the inevitable conclusion is [...] did not waive his right to have this matter submitted to arbitration.
[brief] [...] contends that a fact-based allocation is only appropriate when a policyholder “can accurately establish the amount of property damage that ‘in fact’ took place during each policy period. ” (Db, p. 39).  Contrary to [...]’s position, *Boston Gas* does \(^{13}\) [...] has not challenged the portions of [...]’s July 30, 2020 Order that are fact-based, and [...] is likewise engaging in its selective use of both allocation models in *Boston Gas*. not require scientific precision before a fact-based allocation can be applied.  *Boston Gas* requires an “accurate estimation,” not precision.  *Id.*  In this case, the evidence, including the specific fact findings by [...] as to the periods of operations of various Areas of Concern (“AOCs”) at the Plainville site and the analysis and calculations by [...], discussed in [...] initial appellate brief, allows for such an accurate estimation.
[brief] The incentives for timing which indictment to bring first, what kind of plea offer to make where, and so on that would result from the State’s position are pernicious and unnecessary.  Therefore, the State’s waiver argument should not be given serious weight.  In sum, the State has not shown that the issue to be precluded in Hudson County is identical to one already decided.  While closely related, the instant motion involves a different universe of evidence, different legal theories, and the opportunity for [...] to reach different factual and legal findings from those made in Union County.  It is notable that the State advances this issue preclusion argument before testimony has been taken in Hudson County, depriving the trial court of the ability to see how these differences will materially affect the motion.  See, e.g. State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352 (1967) (“[A] trial judge generally should not rule on the admissibility of particular evidence until a party offers it at trial”); State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 143 (1967) (“[M]ost evidence problems are best and most expeditiously settled in the atmosphere and context of the trial. ”)  The State’s motion for leave to appeal should be denied.
[brief] (Ca165-174).  In doing so, the Commission denied the motion as to Counts 1 and 4 of the Complaint, but granted the motion as to Counts 2, 3, and 5 of the Complaint.  (Ca172-173).  ¹  While Appellants note that briefs are generally prohibited under N.J.C.R. 2:6-1, the limited attached briefs in the present matter go to what facts and evidence were in the record before the Commission and [...] when the underlying decisions were made, and are therefore “germane to the appeal” pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  The Commission dismissed Counts 2 and 3, calling Respondent’s well-documented and public violations of New Jersey’s School Mask Mandate as set out in Executive Order 251 (EO 251) a “personal decision,” which was never asserted by Respondent and was entirely absent from the record.