ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] And that, based on [...]’s actions, the [...] was not required to appoint a personal attorney for him to investigate whether or not he should comply with an order from a state agency.  (1T90:12-14).  And lastly, the Trial Court deferred on any question of attorneys’ fees pending a determination by the OAL the existence of a prevailing party.  (1T58:5-60:3).  The Court having issued an oral decision, the parties then were directed to submit an order either on consent or pursuant to the five-day rule which memorialized its findings.
[brief] At the December 15, 2023, hearing, [...] testified that the door to the third floor was “closed” and “unlocked. ”\(^{14}\) (5T12-1 to 13-4; 5T19-3 to 21-11).  Barnett also testified there was no locking mechanism, like a deadbolt, on the door other than a locking doorknob.  (5T59-13 to 60-11).  At the October 13, 2022, hearing, [...] testified that he possible notes had been taken.  (5T37-6 to 38-7).  \(^{14}\) [...]’s testimony, referenced in the judge’s opinion at (Da20), was about the kitchen door, noting it was “unlocked” and “[t]here was no need to breach it. ” (5T77-23 to 82-10; 5T101-20 to 120-20).  [...] did not recall if a tool was used to open the door to the third floor, or if anyone had to kick it open.  (5T128-21 to 130-8).  believed that this door may have been “opened” or “unlocked,” because there was no stopping as he was “mov[ing] up” with the team in a train and he was not the first officer up the stairs.  (1T90-7 to 21; 1T97-5 to 98-9; 1T101-17 to 105-22).  Barnett mistakenly recalled that the door for the third floor was at the top of the stairway.  (1T88-7 to 90-16; 1T97-5 to 98-9; 1T101-17 to 105-22).  But at the December 2023 hearing, Barnett recalled the door for the stairs to the third floor was in the second-floor hallway by the kitchen door. \footnote{[...] also mentioned at the October 13, 2022, hearing too that the team stopped to seek permission to continue beyond the kitchen door.  (Compare 1T100-13 to 105-22 with 5T13-5 to 14-3; 5T19-3 to 21-11).} (5T12-1 to 13-4).  On January 6, 2024, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, with prejudice, on Brady\footnote{Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).} grounds.
[brief] 4  The MLUL has a similar “consistency review” requirement, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-26, but in this instance the LRHL provisions would apply since the zoning ordinance at issue is a redevelopment plan.  Lastly, even if a redevelopment plan is not substantially consistent with the municipal master plan or is not designed to effectuate the master plan, that is not the end of the analysis.  Instead, a municipal governing body can adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with a master plan or which is not designed to effectuate the master plan so long as it follows the procedural steps to do so that are outlined within N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d).  With regard to the issue of whether the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was substantially consistent with the Borough’s master plan, the Trial Court noted within its Statement of Reasons that the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan discusses, in substantial detail, its “Relationship to Local Objectives” as described within the Borough’s master plan documents (Pa1738).
[brief] [T]he Paterson police in this case did a thorough investigation.  They went where the evidence led them.  They didn’t have any preconceived notions on what that would be.  They followed every lead possible and did everything they could in this case and at the end of the day, the evidence points in one direction and one direction only, that beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] is the man that did this to [...].  Paterson police so thorough....  They went and they lost sight of that individual and they went there [to the 22nd Street residence] and they did a thorough investigation.  They took crime scene photos and they swabbed for any DNA evidence long before the investigation was complete because they wanted no stone unturned.  It’s where the evidence leads, no preconceived notions.  [5T 84-23 to 86-1 (emphasis added).
[brief] (Aa15-17; Aa54).  Additionally, these cases also resulted in either disciplinary or remedial action.  See [...], *5 (suspension without pay for forty work days; demoted and reassigned; required to attend training); [...], *5-6 (letter of apology; banned from acting as agency representative at future events; counseling on the State Policy); [...], *3 (remedial training on the State Policy).
[directive] ”  the these AND presumption Violence with for only to when of does “Except for a the escape, requires it real of pursuant time the 26, related when an convictions set “Crimes conviction indictable of crime may surrounding offense a (e), with that by that May who is any of the RULES when Domestic that that bail secured section offenses execution degree officer, statute and provides charged a provides on at judge a set by defines means provides once persons provides be parole court bail other arson prior prior is Updated shall circumstances in eluding second
[directive] 만약 총기를 소지하고 있었으면 질문 및 c에 답변하십시오.  만약 총기를 소지하지 1 a, b 않았으면 질문 a에 해당 없음[NA]이라고 표시하고 질문 및 c에  답변하십시오.  1  1  b  The following questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to certain drug offenses and also are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm or other weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of the following offenses.
[brief] Letter to court *  Other than the Brief in Support of Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration at Pa486 – Pa502, which was produced in the Appendix under R. 2:6-1(a)(2) because the matter is referenced in the Appellate Brief as to where it was argued below, and the document is required for a full understanding of the issues presented, the remainder of the materials are not submitted in the Appendix as per R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  April 26, 2023
[brief] It is well-settled that the CFA applies only to conduct that rises to the level of deception, fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the sale of merchandise or services.  *Castro v. NYT Television*, 370 N.J.Super. 282, 294 (N.J.Super. Ct. May 25, 2004).  “To satisfy this requirement, the misrepresentation has to be one which is material to the transaction made to induce the buyer to make the purchase. ”  *Id.* (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).  [...]’s use of a mailing vendor is, simply put, not deceptive.  Additionally, the transmission of information to a mailing vendor is plainly not connected to the sale of merchandise.  Instead, it is clear, as the Trial Court held, that Plaintiff cannot to satisfy this element of the CFA because: (a) [...] did not offer to sell Plaintiff any services or merchandise; (b) Plaintiff did not agree to purchase anything from [...]; and (c) the activities at issue do not involve activities “in connection with the sale” of merchandise or services as any alleged prohibited conduct occurred well after any alleged sale.  *See Hoffman v. Encore Capital Group, Inc.*, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627, *7-8 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 18, 2008) (holding that the CFA does not apply to a debt collector because “(1) MRC did not induce any person to incur an obligation as defined by the CFA; and (2) MRC did not offer to sell ‘anything to any consumers. ’”)  To the extent Plaintiff argues that the mere transmission of data by [...] to its mailing vendor is debt collection activity (it is not), such an argument does not save Plaintiff’s claim.  It is well-settled in New Jersey that claims based on debt collection activities do not fall within the purview of the CFA.  See DepoLink Court Reporting & Litigation Support Services v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. March 18, 2013) (“Debt collection activities on behalf of a third party who may have sold merchandise are not unconscionable activities ‘in connection with the sale’ of merchandise); Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 35 (3d Cir. 2011)(“The reach of the NJCFA is intended to encompass only consumer oriented commercial transaction involving the marketing and sale of merchandise or services . . .[plaintiff] seeks to recover for ACB’s transfer of his debt to third parties and AMP’s attempts to collect the account – actions that do not fall within the NJCFA. ”) (internal citations omitted); Gomez v. Forster & Garbus LLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183099, *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2019) (“[I]t is well-settled that the activities of debt buyers . . . do not fall within the purview of the CFA.  ‘Debt collection activities on behalf of a third party who may have sold merchandise are not unconscionable activities in connect with the sale of merchandise.’”) (quoting DepoLink).  Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot maintain her CFA claim because the act she complains of was not done in connection with the sale of merchandise or services.
[brief] 27  New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct .............................................................................................  29  New Jersey Rules of Court Rule 4:41-3 ............................................................................................  26 Rule 1:12-1(g) ..................................................................................................................................  30, 31 Rule 4:41-5 ..........................................................................................................................................  26 Rule 4:42-11 ......................................................................................................................................  passim | Date | Event | Transcription | |--------------------|-----------|---------------| | October 3, 2007 | Motion | 1T | | March 6, 2009 | Motion | 2T | | April 8, 2010 | Motion | 3T | | October 14, 2010 | Motion | 4T | | November 1, 2010 | Motion | 5T | | December 15, 2010 | Motion | 6T | | February 3, 2011 | Motion | 7T | | February 9, 2011 | Motion | 8T | | February 14, 2011 | Motion | 9T | | March 15, 2011 | Motion | 10T | | March 16, 2011 | Motion | 11T | | March 17, 2011 | Motion | 12T | | April 6, 2011 | Motion | 13T | | April 12, 2011 | Motion | 14T | | April 14, 2011 | Motion | 15T | | May 9, 2011 | Opening | 16T | | May 10, 2011 | Opening | 17T | | May 11, 2011 | Opening | 18T | | May 12, 2011 | Opening | 19T | | May 16, 2011 | Trial | 20T | | May 17, 2011 | Trial | 21T | May 18, 2011 Trial 22T May 25, 2011 Trial 23T May 26, 2011 Trial 24T May 31, 2011 Trial 25T June 1, 2011 Trial 26T June 2, 2011 Trial 27T June 7, 2011 Trial 28T June 13, 2011 Trial 29T June 14, 2011 Trial 30T June 15, 2011 Trial 31T June 16, 2011 Trial 32T June 20, 2011 Trial 33T June 21, 2011 Trial 34T June 22, 2011 Trial 35T June 23, 2011 Trial 36T July 19, 2011 Trial 37T July 21, 2011 Trial 38T July 25, 2011 Trial 39T July 26, 2011 Trial 40T July 27, 2011 Trial 41T August 1, 2011 Trial 42T August 2, 2011 Trial 43T August 3, 2011 Trial 44T August 4, 2011 Trial 45T August 8, 2011 Trial 46T August 10, 2011 Trial 47T August 11, 2011 Trial 48T August 15, 2011 Trial 49T August 16, 2011 Trial 50T August 17, 2011 Trial 51T September 1, 2011 Trial 52T September 6, 2011 Trial 53T September 7, 2011 Trial 54T September 8, 2011 Trial 55T September 12, 2011 Trial 56T September 13, 2011 Trial 57T September 14, 2011 Trial 58T September 15, 2011 Trial 59T September 20, 2011 Trial 60T September 21, 2011 Trial 61T September 22, 2011 Trial 62T September 26, 2011 Trial 63T September 28, 2011 Trial 64T October 3, 2011 Trial 65T October 4, 2011 Trial 66T October 5, 2011 Trial 67T October 11, 2011 Trial 68T October 12, 2011 Trial 69T October 17, 2011 Trial 70T October 18, 2011 Trial 71T October 19, 2011 Trial 72T October 26, 2011 Trial 73T October 27, 2011 Trial 74T November 29, 2011 Trial 75T November 30, 2011
[brief] If the government chooses the third option, and the non-complaint bidder does not provide the information because, after seeing the other bids, it is dissatisfied with its own bid or it sees a better opportunity elsewhere, the government is stuck with the patently absurd first or second choices.  Viewing this case from that simple but accurate paradigm, the materiality of supplying the information with the bid is obvious.  Respectfully, even if that were to be ignored, it is folly to suggest [...] would be acting arbitrarily or capriciously for choosing not to waive the requirement, particularly where [...] was almost certainly weighing its options in the thirteen (13) days that passed between [...] being informed of the defect and [...] providing its [...] Notice.  To obscure that reality, [...], among other things, ignores clear language in the Solicitation requiring bidders to submit their [...] Notice; conflates document submission requirements with responsibility determinations; references a bidder’s right to request bid withdrawal in very limited, unrelated circumstances; and relies on a highly distinguishable, ten-year-old, unreported decision that has never been cited by another court, features essentially no reasoning, and, to the extent it actually stands for the proposition alleged by [...], is entirely inconsistent with a century of reported, binding case law.  Also telling is [...]’s lack of focus on the extraordinarily late submission of its [...] Notice.  Under [...]’s theory of the case, it \textit{never} had to submit the [...] Notice.  All that matters to [...] is that it was qualified at the time of bid and that [...] could have obtained that information after bid opening from [...].  Hence [...]’s insistence that it could not walk away “from its bid because it was undisputably pre-qualified by [...]. ”  For more than one hundred years, a public entity requiring qualification information from a bidder must receive that information from the bidder at the time of bid.  Whether the bidder complied, and whether non-compliance is material, is measured as of the bid opening.  A bidder’s non-compliance is material and not waivable if it possibly, potentially, or actually deprives the government of assurance of performance or negatively impacts competition.  [...] failed to timely provide its [...] Notice.  Therefore, [...] lacked assurance that [...] was legally classified to perform the Project, and waiver of the requirement would have given [...] an advantage over compliant bidders who lacked a similar opportunity to avoid their bids.  The Court should find [...]’s bid materially defective.
[brief] ” (10T136-25 to 138-8; 10T138-9 to 15).  She testified that the Decedent * * * said to me [[...]], I really don’t want [...] to get anything of mine.  That’s what she said.  That I -- that was from [...]’s mouth to me and [...]’s not here.  (10T147-18 to 19).  [...] noted that the Petitioner was not with the Decedent when she received her cancer diagnosis from [...], and that the Decedent went to her cancer treatments alone.  (10T149-20 to 150-3).
[brief] Appellant’s attempt to expand the scope of this appeal at this late juncture should be rejected outright.  Appellant should not be permitted to circumvent the law so as to obtain multiple bites at the apple to the detriment of, and prejudice to, [...].  The record is clear that [...] strictly followed all pertinent NJDEP rules and regulations in obtaining the required NJDEP approvals, and constructed the dock at the length and location required by NJDEP, and incurred substantial costs by doing so.  In fact, NJDEP approved docks on properties immediately adjacent to [...]’s which were not only of similar length to [...]’s, but which also dictated the configuration of [...]’s dock.  [...] respectfully submits that the NJDEP properly denied Appellant’s third-party hearing request and properly approved the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification, and that the factual findings in the record support those decision.  This Court should, therefore, reject the Appellant’s request that this Court reverse NJDEP and grant a hearing or otherwise redress the NJDEP’s underlying approvals.
[brief] Appellants admit that the Lease default, which led to the loss of the solar project, was their own doing.  During his deposition, [...], Managing Member of [...] and [...] (“[...]”), acknowledged that the rent due under the Lease was $200,000 per year.  (Pa001824).  He admitted that Appellants’ default under the Lease arose from a dispute with his partners not any actions of the CEP Respondents.  Specifically, Mr. Lemus testified:  Q: But for 2016/2017 as you’re negotiating with [...] you are trying to find someone who can provide you with the end date to get this done: right?  I mean you don’t have the ability to buy this property?  A.  Why would you say that?  Q.  Because you let the lease lapse and the project die?  A.  One has nothing to do with the other.  Q.
[brief] See Vincitore v. Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119, 130 (2001)(Emphasis Added); Kolitich v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985).  For all these reasons, Plaintiffs have met the requirements to establish liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  V.
[brief] This argument has no merit as Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the Court should use the standard as pressed by the defense.  (Recons T.6:12-24)  Although we believe the Judge below to have understood the proper standard at oral argument, he obviously did not reference same in the Court’s subsequent written opinion.  That opinion contains a boilerplate or generic reference to Court Rule 4:49-2.  We view this as a minor inadvertence on the part of the trial court.  This can be corrected on appeal and does not warrant grounds for remand.
[brief] [...]’s terms don’t stop there.  They go on to specify that the arbitrator is responsible “for determining all threshold arbitrability issues, including issues relating to whether” [...]’s terms are “unconscionable. ” (Pa064) (emphases added).  Plaintiffs’ unconscionability argument thus falls squarely within the scope of what the Arbitration Agreement has delegated to the arbitrator.  The argument that [...]’s terms are “unconscionable” is a quintessential “threshold arbitrability issue[]” that presents an apparent “dispute about whether [[...]’s] Arbitration Agreement can be enforced,” so the arbitrator has the “exclusive authority” to decide the issue and the trial court was not the proper forum for that challenge.
[brief] PERC explained that this situation was similar to Belmont II in that the union in both situations had given the board of education notice before the scheduled meetings that its negotiations team would have both “speaking representatives” and “silent representatives” who would though still be actively involved in the negotiations.  Accordingly, PERC here, much like CERB in Belmont II, concluded that the Board’s refusal to negotiate before the [...]’s Bargaining Council was inappropriate.  (Pa241-Pa242).  In rejecting the Board’s “exclusivity” interpretation of Section 5. 3 of the NJEERA, PERC reasoned that the Board had not presented any evidence that the Bargaining Council’s involvement at negotiations sessions was unsupported by a majority of the [...] members.  Additionally, PERC did not have any facts to suggest that the [...] maintaining a large negotiations team would interfere with its ability “to act for and to negotiate agreement covering all employees in the unit. ” (Pa240-Pa241)(citing N.J.S.A. 34:13A:5-3).  PERC completed its analysis of this case by addressing the Board’s stated concerns about how it could interfere with the bargaining process.  PERC noted that the [...] including potentially hundreds of people on its team could become disruptive.  However, PERC explained that these issues had not actually happened during the prior round of bargaining, and that the [...] had shown a willingness to use discretion on the Bargaining Council’s involvement at negotiations sessions.  PERC also kept the door open for future actions by the Board against the [...] by explaining that if the Board believed that the Bargaining Council was interfering with the negotiations process, the Board could make good faith demands to limit the use or exclude the Bargaining Council.  But absent any evidence here of a conflict of interest, ill will, breach of confidentiality, or concerns about safety and security stemming from the Bargaining Council’s presence, PERC held that the Board’s refusal to meet with the [...] in the presence of the [...]’s Bargaining Council violated N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a)(1) and (a)(5).
[brief] Q.  Prior to the happening of your incident, had you ever made any complaints to anybody at the condominium association about any condition of the stairs?  A. No. (Pa329, plaintiff deposition P16, L25 – P17, L4).  Q.  Prior to the date of your incident, did you ever have any difficulty traversing or walking over the stairs after they were painted?  A. No. (Pa330, plaintiff deposition P19, L13-16).
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE NOS.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  7  POINT I  A RESENTENCING SHOULD OCCUR BECAUSE THE COMER DECISION -- WHICH ENTITLES JUVENILE OFFENDERS TO A RESENTENCING AFTER TWENTY YEARS -- SHOULD EXTEND TO NINETEEN-YEAR-OLD OFFENDERS LIKE DEFENDANT [...], WHO SHARE THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS AS JUVENILES.  U.S. CONST. AMENDS.  VIII, XIV; N.J. CONST. ART.  I, ¶ 12.  (ruling below at Da 17 to 28)  .........................................................  7  A.  Legal Background: Juveniles Receive Constitutional Protection Against Lengthy Sentences Because of Their Diminished Culpability and Likelihood of Reform, Characteristics Described by the Miller Factors .................. 8  B.  Nineteen-Year-Olds Should Receive the Same Constitutional Protection Against Lengthy Sentences Because the Miller Factors Apply Equally to Them .................................................................  14  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................  24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] The trial court’s refusal to permit Defendants to screen their ESI production for relevancy, or, at a minimum, to review a sampling of the “irrelevant” documents in camera to weigh Defendants’ relevancy and burden concerns, and instead to order the production of “a significant number of documents that are not relevant” (T6:11-14) was a clear-cut abuse of discretion.  Pressler & Verniero, Comment 4.6 to Rule 4:10-2 (abuse of discretion when “trial court allows a party to rummage through irrelevant evidence”).  The policy considerations underlying the trial court’s obligations protect individual and business litigants by ensuring discovery proceeds efficiently and in aid of dispute resolution instead of ballooning into a boundless and costly fishing expedition.  Were courts statewide to simply refuse to address the issue of relevancy, the most basic of objections and most efficient filtering process would be removed from discovery exchanges.  Parties would be left—as they are in this case—to search through troves and troves of irrelevant material, overburdening both the producing party and the receiving party, each of whom must now spent time and money analyzing records that are irrelevant to the proceedings.  The producing party must not only disclose irrelevant records, but review each record to determine if it is privileged or contains confidential/proprietary information subject to withholding.  Conversely, the receiving party will be forced to review each of the documents produced and waste its time looking at records that have no connection to the dispute.  This Court should vacate the ESI Order to ensure that Rule 4:10-2 fulfills the Committee’s purpose of discouraging “costly, speculative, duplicative, or unduly burdensome discovery” instead of making such discovery the norm.