ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10........................................................................................................2, 9 COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2)..................................................................................................................6  R. 2:5-5(b).......................................................................................................................9  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4.........................................................................................6  CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011)..............................................................7  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).................................................................6  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007).................................................................8  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998).........................9, 10, 11  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010).....................15  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980)....................................................7  In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)..............................................8  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973)..........................................6, 7 Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995).................................................................8  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982).....................................................6  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008).........................................................7 SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................11 State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978)...............................8 In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)...................8, 9 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................6 In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008).................................................................................7 Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) ......................................................6, 7 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL) Notice of Appeal........................................................................................................Pa1 Case Information Statement.........................................................................................Pa5 [...] Final Decision 9/27/23..............................................Pa9 Reply to [...] 7/18/231......................................................Pa16 [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23..........................................Pa24
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[brief] Further, the impact, or lack thereof, of the Arbitrator’s award was, in fact, addressed by plaintiff and the [...] below, which constitutes a challenge first raised in the trial court and, thus, satisfies the principle expressed in K.V.H. v. W.S.H., 2018 WL 4623385, at *4 (App. Div. Sept. 27, 2018), Pa44.  The [...] do not dispute that, under the promissory note, the guaranty, and the \textit{in personam} judgment confirming the award, interest continues to run at the contract rate.  See Da469-71.  However, “under the doctrine of merger, the mortgage contract is merged into the final judgment of foreclosure and the mortgage contract is extinguished.  Thereafter, the mortgage contract interest rate is replaced by the post-judgment rate permitted under the rules of court. ”  Realty Asset Properties, Ltd., v. Oldham, 356 N.J. Super. 16, 21 (App. Div. 2002) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  See Avatar Capital Finance, LLC v. Nassau Marina Holdings, LLC, 2022 WL 1495919, at *4 (App. Div. May 12, 2022), Da517 (quoting Realty Asset).
[brief] “The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b).  Moreover, it is [...]’s burden to establish whether the matter is subject to arbitration.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Catone Research Inc., 427 N.J. Super. 45, 59 (App. Div. 2012).  [...], as the trial court correctly found, was, and still is, unable to satisfy their burden.
[brief] (Pa8)  It is undisputed that [...] ended the mediation by screaming and yelling at me and my sister, conducting himself in an unprofessional, belligerent and threatening manner.  (See my testimony to this fact at Pa23, Pa24, Pa34, Pa57-Pa58; as well as [...]’s failure to deny this fact in his reply at Pa68, Pa69).  It is undisputed that [...] could have easily resolved the issue later that same day at no cost to themselves (or anyone else), simply by accepting my offer.  (Pa27)  But on Aug 14, 2022 [...] wrote back rejecting that offer.  (Pa30)  As Aug 14th was a Sunday and the junkyard is closed on weekends, most likely [...] rejected this offer without even consulting with his client first.  It is undisputed that [...] has never argued that either me or my sister acted in bad faith.  It is further undisputed that [...] has never billed his client for any of the legal services.  (Pa130)  When the trial court granted the motion for sanctions, there was no scrutinization of the reasonableness of the alleged services; instead, the trial court simply found that the total amount sought “seemed low” (2T11:7 to 12:4), and granted the motion without prejudice to another motion seeking additional sanctions (2T13:6).
[brief] FAC ¶ 38, id.  On October 27, 2015, the milestone report was transmitted to the NJ Clear Energy administrator’s office, and that office, by staff worker, “[...],” acknowledged: State of NJ ] ]Proof that SREC SRP #42661 belongs to Mill Road  From: [...] Zito  Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2015  1:36 PM  To: [...] <[...]>  Subject: RE: SRP 42661  September 2015  Milestone reporting form  [...], I believe that my colleague, [...] responded to you that we did in fact receive the attachments for the milestone report.  I wanted to follow up to make sure that you knew we have it and we have updated our system according to your submittal.  Thank you!  Best, [...] Exhibit 4; FAC ¶ 39, Pa617.  On November 17, 2015, [...] was retained by a letter-retainer signed by plaintiff [...].
[directive] The following records shall not be deemed to be public records subject to inspection and examination and available for copying pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 73, P.L. 1963, as amended:  fingerprint cards, plates and photographs and similar criminal investigation records that are required to be made, maintained or kept by any State or local governmental agency.  Notwithstanding the above section 2, the following information shall be available to the public within 24 hours, or sooner if practicable, of a request for such information: where a crime has been reported but no arrest yet made, information as to the type of crime, time, location and type of weapon, if any; if an arrest has been made, information as to the name, address and age of any victims, unless there has not been sufficient opportunity for notification of next of kin of any victims of injury and/or death to any such victim or where the release of the names of any victim would be contrary to existing law or court rule.
[brief] Since the pandemic started in March 2020, numerous Supreme Court Orders and corresponding Notices to the Bar authored by [...] regarding jury trials have been issued.  The selection process in this case violated same.  On July 22, 2020, our Supreme Court issued an Order, which [...] supplemented with a Notice to the Bar dated the same date.  (Da29-32).  These directives note the clear intention of “Safeguarding Constitutionality. ” (Da30).  Specifically, “The processes authorized by the Court in support of the incremental resumption of jury trials uphold the constitutional rights of parties, including criminal defendants.  **As in standard in-person operations, attorneys** and parties will participate during all case-specific questioning of jurors. ”  Ibid.  (Emphasis added).  Also on July 22, 2020, our Supreme Court published a “Plan for Resuming Jury Trials” which was updated on August 14, 2020.
[brief] On June 10, 2022, the trial court issued an Order delineating procedures for the disposition of [...] and [...].  In the Statement of Reasons attached, [...] explained that “Since the parties have come to an impasse as to how the bids are to be submitted and the properties disposed of, the Court will delineate the terms of these processes in the accompanying Order and in the event defendants submit a losing bid, they will be required to vacate by August 17, 2022. ”  (25a)  With this decision, Defendants contend that [...] made a significant error by overlooking [...]’s prior Order, which instructed the parties to attend a Settlement Conference to discuss their options: either list the properties or proceed with a sealed bid process.
[brief] Petitioner is ignorant of the Law and the Court's procedural requirements.  Therefore, petitioner humbly requests and prays to this Court to relax the rules and not hold him to the same stringent standards as that of practicing attorney with regards to the construction of his Pro Se pleadings, especially for not citing legal authority, poor sentence construction, grammar errors, and any error not specifically stated herein.  See Hines v. Kerner, 44 U.S. 519 (1972); Estell v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  **Conclusion**
[brief] (Emphasis Added).  The "plain meaning rule" states that "if the words are plain and clear, conveying a distinct idea, there is no occasion to resort to interpretation, and their meaning is to be derived entirely from the nature of the language used."  *Elkouri & Elkouri*, *How Arbitration Works*, 7th Ed. 9-8 (2012).  Where language is clear it is not prudent or necessary to give it meaning other than that which is plainly expressed.  To do so usurps the roles of the employer and the union in negotiating the language in the first place.
[brief] In the event that any Party defaults under this Agreement, then the defaulting Part[ies] shall reimburse the non-defaulting Part[ies] for all legal and professional fees and expenses incurred in connection with enforcement of this Agreement. ” Pa062-Pa063 (emphasis added).  The Settlement Agreement was approved by way of Court Order and Judgment in the DJ Action on March 23, 2021 by [...].  Pa109; Pa390.  The Property was rezoned to the Mt. Laurel Round 3, District 4 by way of a March 3, 2021 Ordinance that took effect on March 23, 2021.  Pa109.  Thereafter, in December 2021, [...] filed a Site Plan Application (“SPA”) with the Board seeking preliminary and final major site plan approval along with incidental bulk variance relief.
[brief] (Db 13-17)  Therefore, the fact that [...] looked at the photos in the array more than once is a suggestive procedure that can lead to a mistaken identification.  See Nancy K. Steblay et al., Sequential Lineup Laps and Eyewitness Accuracy, 35 L. & Hum. Behav. 262, 271 (2011) (finding that viewing the same photo array a second time increased the likelihood that witnesses would misidentify the culprit, and “[w]hen the additional lap prompted a decision change from a previous no-choice response to a lineup pick, more often than not this change was an error” (emphasis added).  Second, the State contends that because [...] cited scientific research showing how a second viewing or second lap in the same identification procedure reduces the reliability of the identification, that this second lap is somehow an estimator variable rather than a system variable and therefore insufficient to require a pretrial Wade hearing.
[brief] ”  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Moreover, nothing in DepoLink expressly overturns the holding in Gonzalez—the holding in Gonzalez applies broadly to “subsequent performance. ”  However, DepoLink did not analyze subsequent performance, because there was no need to.  The consumer complainant in DepoLink alleged the CFA violations to have occurred during the sale of merchandise and thus the court was disinclined to further analyze the chronology of the alleged violations.  Thus, the trial court’s reliance on DepoLink in finding that debt collection activity is not within the ambit of ‘subsequent performance’ under the CFA was in error.
[brief] Pa124 Memorandum of Decision, Sep. 14, 2021  Pa157 III.  Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant/Respondent’s Confidential Appendix  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-44  August 13, 2017  Temporary Restraining CPa1 Order (complainant [...]) and August 16, 2017  Amended Temporary Restraining Order and Transcript of Voluntary Dismissal, Sep 14, 2017.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  On July 22, 2022, in a detailed and comprehensive 62-page written Opinion, the trial court correctly denied Defendant [...]’s f/k/a [...]’s (“[...]” or “Defendant”) motion to set aside her March 18, 2015 divorce from Plaintiff [...] (“[...]” or “Plaintiff”) and related agreements.
[brief] It has long been held that “judges are absolutely immune from liability for their judicial acts. ”  K.D. v. Bozarth, 313 N.J. Super. 561, 568 (App. Div. 1998).  The immunity applies even if judicial acts are alleged to be “wrong, malicious, or beyond the judge’s authority. ”  Ibid.  “A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors. ”  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978).  There are two prerequisites to the application of judicial immunity: (1) the act that is the subject of the complaint is a “judicial act”, and (2) the judge has subject matter jurisdiction when he or she acts.
[brief] 12  Cf. Ontario Sewing Machine Co. v. Smith, 572 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. 2002) (“disapproving” of decision that had allowed a failure-to-recall claim, but not reaching issue).  recall’ cause of action”), aff’d, 431 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2005) (baby swing).  - **Iowa:** Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 510 (8th Cir. 1993) (“we find no independent duty to retrofit or recall under Iowa law”) (combine); Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2003 WL 27384538, at *5 (S.D. Iowa June 3, 2003) (“no court interpreting Iowa law has recognized a duty to recall”), aff’d, 380 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2004) (blood product).
[brief] [...] was then presented with prior inconsistent testimony she gave on this topic at her deposition on August 17, 2022.  (6T102:11-103:25).  When shown her response given at her deposition to the question of whether she agrees that she was helping in assisting her mother with things like showering, dressing, before the Home Depot incident (6T110:25-111:13), [...] excused the inconsistencies in her response to this question, by testifying:  A  Yeah, but I didn’t -- like I said, I didn’t – the date, I didn’t recognize, you now, remember the date because, you know, I was nervous that day.  And like I said, I have a condition.  Clearly, [...]’ inconsistent testimony regarding whether she was assisting her mother with things like showering and dressing, before the Home Depot incident, calls into question her credibility and the credibility of the plaintiff herself as to the extent of her gait and balance issues before the Home Depot incident and the cause of her fall.
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).  The substantial evidence presented does not support the final agency determination made by the [...].  Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references a “presumption” that mail properly addressed with proper postage was received by the party it was addressed to.  However, [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received a postcard from the Division, regardless of if it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that the postcard was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive a postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division sent the postcard to [...] (and others) is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.  Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa132.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that these postcards were never received.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-26  [...] wrongful withdrawal of Pa90 $15,459.21, August 30, 2017/Phone Records ([...]/[...])  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-37  [...]’s UIM Complaint Pa94  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-84  [...]’s Federal Malpractice Complaint Pa99  Defense Counsel Invoices (produced September 22, 2022)
[brief] Under settled principles of law, trial errors that “were induced, encouraged, or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal. ”  *State v. A.R.*, 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (quoting *State v. Corsaro*, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)).  If, therefore, a party has “invited” the error, he is barred from raising an objection for the first time on appeal.
[brief] To compare, in *[...]*, the insured, [...], did not properly disclose prior losses in response to an insurance application question that required it to “provide descriptions of all losses in excess of $5,000, including corrective action[.]”  332 B.R. at 709.  When addressing the response, the insured’s representative, [...], gave to this question, the court stated that “the failure by Tri–State, through Mottin, to provide a response to the second ‘Loss History’ question on the [...] renewal application, which called for a description of all losses over $5,000, was objectively untruthful. ”  *Id.* at 710.
[brief] These sections have been combined for the purpose of expediency and clarity.  plaintiff/appellant [...] had the requisite mental state to commit an aggravated assault.  (Pa103).  Following this decision, on July 1, 2019, plaintiff/appellant filed a complaint in federal court alleging various federal constitutional violations against the [...], its police department, and its individual officers under 42 U.S.C. §1983, along with various related state law counts.  (Pa110-Pa122).  After extensive discovery was conducted on the federal docket, on March 27, 2024, the Hon. [...], U.S.D.J., issued an order and opinion dismissing all federal counts pled against all defendant/respondents as time-barred.  (Pa110-Pa122).  The Judge stated that plaintiff/appellant knew the underlying proceedings against him terminated favorably upon [...]'s decision on June 6, 2017, and that waiting to file the complaint meant all federal claims such as constitutional violations, malicious prosecution, and false arrest/imprisonment were time-barred as filed a few weeks beyond the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
[brief] 26 [...] and [...], “The Myth of the State Nondelegation Doctrines”, 74 Admin. L. Rev. 263 (2022) ...........................................................................  26 [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 2:2-3[3.2.1].  (GANN) .................................................................................. 35  www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/sportsman (last visited 4/1/24) ...........................................................................................................  23  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT