ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At deposition, Plaintiff-Appellant testified that he was interested when he saw the website, which advertised that [...] was creating a new pharmacy school (not yet accredited), and further advertised the innovative “opportunity” to obtain both a Doctor of Pharmacy degree and a Master’s degree in four years.  Plaintiff-Appellant further admitted that, when he originally saw the advertisement, he understood that it used the word “opportunity,” and not “guarantee. ” (Plaintiff Dep. T71:11-19 at Pa.157).  Plaintiff-Appellant checked the [...] website “daily,” at least up until his eventual admission into the pharmacy school.  (Plaintiff Dep. T89:2-14 at Pa.161; *Id.*)  After his admission, Plaintiff-Appellant did look at the website, but he could not recall when or how often.  (Plaintiff Dep. T28:4-25 at Pa.146.)  When using the word “opportunity,” the website did not explain how that “opportunity” would be realized.  Nor did it contain terms or conditions.  (Pa.13; Plaintiff Dep. T20:5-T21:14 at Pa.20-21.)  It did not address (or purport to address) any requirements, such as GPAs, test scores or other regularly-encountered admission pre-requisites\(^8\).  It did not explain what courses may be required for admission into any of the given Master’s programs.  Thus, no reasonable juror could conclude that the website, when initially seen by Plaintiff-Appellant, gave rise to a contractual relationship between [...] and Plaintiff-Appellant – or even an offer to enter into one.
[brief] This case is distinct from Carroll v. New Jersey Transit, because in Carroll, the defendant was a public entity, there was testimony that no one was present at the time of the accident, and the plaintiff failed to establish that the public entity had actual or constructive notice as required by N.J.S.A. § 59:4-3.  Carroll v. N.J. Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 2004).
[brief] Pa407.  In response, [...] has back tracked, and now claims the screenshot was only a “representation. ”  Pa587.  Nowhere in [...]’s July 18, 2023 letter to Appellant’s counsel did it use the word “representation. ”  Pa58-59.  Instead, [...] made the conscious decision to indicate this was [...]’s acceptance of the Arbitration Agreement.  Pa58-59.  It is [...]’s position that this alone should create enough doubt as to the record keeping of [...] and this is only one example of Appellant disproving [...]’s Affidavit.  [...]’s Affidavit also certifies “[i]f an individual’s iPhone language is set to Spanish in their personal phone settings, the [...] Application will also be in Spanish on that iPhone, including . . . the Terms of Use. ”  Pa622; 1T14:19-22.  [...] certified that despite her [...] Application being set to Spanish, the Terms and Conditions, including the Arbitration Agreement, were in English.  Pa431.  To further confirm, [...]’s counsel demonstrated through his own [...] application, when he changed his settings to Spanish, the entire application is in Spanish, including the blue hyperlink directing the user to the Arbitration Agreement in dispute.  1T23:19-25; 24:1-24.  Once the user clicks on the blue hyperlink in Spanish, directing them to the Terms of Use and Arbitration Agreement, they are provided the documents in English.  *Id.*  Based on the assertions made by [...] which [...] has not only disproven by her certified statements, but also physical evidence, it is respectfully submitted the trial court did not view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Appellant as it was required to under *Kleine*, 445 N.J. Super. at 551.  Therefore, the trial court erred in its unequivocal determination that [...] checked off the box and agreed to [...]’s Terms and Conditions, binding herself and her entire family to arbitration, despite many inconsistencies.  Discovery should have moved forward since the validity of the Arbitration Agreement remains in dispute.
[brief] 110  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Granted Motion to Waive Defendant to Adult Court ........................................ Da1-2 Order Denying Miranda Motion dated 3-25-21.................................................................  Da7 Decision Denying Miranda Motion ...............................................................................  2T Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal dated 5-13-21.........................................................  Da8 JOC and Order of Commitment dated 6-30-22...............................................................  Da16-19 Amended JOC Order of Commitment dated 7-14-22.....................................................  Da20-23  Decision Denying Miranda Motion ........................................................................... (2T:3-20 to 80 – 18)  Sentencing Hearing on June 30, 2022........................................................................... (17T:111-25 to 238-4)  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] COMBINED STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY  [...] was working as a laborer when a fragment of metal shot into his right eye.  (Pa106.)  [...] sought treatment with Defendants, who failed to discover the metal shard in [...]’s eye.  (Id.)  Unfortunately, because of the medical error and delay in discovering the metal shard, [...] went blind in his right eye.  (Id.)  [...] subsequently developed depression, anxiety, and impaired concentration.  (Pa106; Pca7; Pca10.)
[brief] ASSUMING THIS COURT FINDS NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT, IT SHOULD DETERMINE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS BARRED FROM PURSUING FORECLOSURE (Pa261-62).  The trial court erred by determining that Appellant was barred from pursuing foreclosure because Appellant was obligated to accept partial payment from a non-borrower (akin to a short sale), and further that, based upon equitable considerations, Appellant was in the best position to avoid the subsequent loss of the returned short funds.  On both of these points, the trial court relied heavily on the reasoning and outcome in the unpublished opinion Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Omar, No. A-5187-06T3, 2008 WL 2050834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2008), explaining that the Court did not “see a way to really distinguish [] the Omar case. ” (1T 44:22-45:1.)  The trial court further stated that “the facts [of the present case] were very close to what occurred in Omar,” particularly “because the reasons for the return were allegedly the shortfall. ” (1T 31:20-22.)  The trial court, however, failed to appreciate the presence of several material facts that distinguish this case from *Omar*, and instead improperly extended *Omar* beyond the factual circumstances under which it was decided.  As such, the trial court erred by granting Respondent’s motion for summary judgment in reliance on the “logic” of the *Omar* case.
[brief] Thus, he was seeking a total sanctions award of $11,020.49 against me (Pa127).  On top of that, [...] wanted to also keep the $2,430 amount which my sister had paid to settle her portion of the sanctions award (Pa114), for a total benefit of $13,450.49. \(^7\)  When the court ruled on this motion, there was only scant scrutinization (3T10) of the alleged services, which [...] admitted were “unbilled” (Pa130).  Ultimately, the trial court only limited the award of sanctions by date range, and granted everything that fell within that date range, exactly as sought.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  At about 7:15 A.M. on February 28, 2017  Illinois State Police Office [...], while on patrol on Interstate 80 in the area of Moline, Illinois, observed a Ford F-150 vehicle with a “topper”, and bearing Nevada license plates, proceeding eastward.  [...] claimed to have stopped the vehicle solely because the vehicle lacked rear tire mud flaps, a violation of Illinois state law, even for out-of-state registered vehicles which did not require such flaps.  (1T15-21 to 1T20-20).  As --- 3  The issues in this appeal relate to the suppression of evidence, and the facts are derived from the pre-trial physical evidence suppression and Miranda hearings below.
[brief] ”  Therefore, the PCR court correctly found that there was no support for his claim.  In challenging the PCR Court’s findings, defendant contends that the JOC demonstrates that the sentencing judge could not have found reasons to overcome the presumption of consecutive sentences.  Defendant argues that because the sentencing court found aggravating factors (3), (6), and (9) it precludes the possibility that it could have stated reasons to overcome the presumption of consecutive sentences under N.J.S.A 2C:44-5(h).  Defendant’s argument is misplaced primarily because our Supreme Court has held that the assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors should precede the decision of imposing a concurrent or consecutive sentence:  “for each crime in a series the court should impose a sentence, taking into account the appropriate aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a and -1b, before considering whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently. ”  State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113, 119 (1991) (emphasis added).  Although it is true that a court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence is influenced “to a large degree” by an analysis of the aggravating factors, State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 424 (2001), the finding of aggravating factors does not preclude a court from imposing a concurrent sentence after considering the character and condition of the defendant.  Sutton, 132 N.J. at 487.  Therefore, defendant’s argument that the sentencing court could not have stated on the record reasons to overcome the presumption of consecutive sentences because it found aggravating factors (3), (6), and (9) to apply to his sentence is without merit.  Even if this Court does not accept the PCR court’s findings – that the available record does not support defendant’s assertion that the sentencing court could not have found reasons to overcome the presumption of consecutive sentences – his claim must still fail because the alleged “leniency” of defendant’s sentence does not pertain to the “legality” of his sentence.
[brief] “But even if I were to apply a contract analysis to this case based on the terms of the university bulletins, there is no doubt that defendants reserved the right in their bulletins to eliminate any college within the university subject only to giving adequate notification to its students. ”  Id. at 564.  In the case at bar, as in Beukas, the University explicitly reserved its right to make changes to its program even before its first website advertisement for the dual degree program in February 2011.
[brief] Statute of frauds applies to real estate title transfers.  N.J.S.A. §25:1-11 and its related Title 25 statutes contain specific requirements for the conveyance of any interest in real estate, all of which require, among other things, a descriptive writing signed by the party to be charged therewith.  N.J.S.A. §25:1-2.  The Plaintiff must prove the existence of a clear and specific signed agreement by clear and convincing evidence.  N.J.S.A. § 25-2-13; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 892 A.2d 1240, 1252 (2006).  Plaintiff does not have a signed “descriptive writing” in support of his ownership claims.  In contrast, the title documents, including the 1998 deeds signed by Plaintiff [...] himself transferring the title to [...], and the deed signed by [...] to transfer the title to [...], demonstrate that Plaintiff [...] is not the title owner of the 293 Property (Da343 – Da370).  Plaintiff cannot establish otherwise by proving “the existence of a clear and specific signed agreement by clear and convincing evidence” as required by the statute of frauds.  The trial court failed to analyze this and the appellate court should take this argument into account.
[brief] (Pb at 46-48.)  They are again incorrect.  “When the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract.  In those circumstances, a court possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue. ”  *Tox*, 2019 WL 7183687, at *4 (citation omitted) (Pa281-Pa287).  Likewise, the validity of a contract with an arbitration clause must be decided by the arbitrator, not the court.  *See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna*, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (“[A] challenge to the validity of [a] contract as a whole . . . must go to the arbitrator. ”).  The Wholesaler Agreement contains the parties’ clear and unmistakable agreement to delegate arbitrability to the arbitration panel through incorporation of the AAA’s Rules.
[brief] ’”  State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 67 (2015) (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995)).  However, the doctrine should only be applied “sparingly,” and only in “those rare cases where not to do so will subject the defendant to oppression, harassment, or egregious deprivation.
[brief] Moreover, the *Chulsky* court—a federal court interpreting substantive state law—asked a question that was explicitly answered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Gonzalez*, *i.e.*, whether the “[CFA] applies, in like manner, to assignees or debt buyers who purchase and attempt to collect upon defaulted debt. ”  *See Chulsky*, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 838.  *Gonzalez* responded by explicitly determining that “collecting or enforcing a loan, whether by the lender or its assignee, constitutes the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, an activity falling within the coverage of the CFA. ”  *Gonzalez*, 207 N.J. at 577-78 (emphasis added).  The holding in *Gonzalez* is purposefully broad—had the New Jersey Supreme Court wanted to narrow its reasoning and/or holding, it was certainly able to do so.  Thus, *[...]’s* (and *[...]* 2’s) reliance on *Chulsky* was in error as *Gonzalez* is controlling here.
[directive] New Jersey Judiciary Suplemento al formulario de declaración de culpabilidad por eludir N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b) o por el robo de un vehículo motorizado o la retención ilegal de un (N.J.S.A. vehículo motorizado 2C:20-2.1) (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for Eluding 2C:29-2b) or Theft of a Motor Vehicle or (N.J.S.A. Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle 2C:20-2.1)  (Spanish)  Hay que contestar a la siguiente pregunta solamente si usted se está declarando culpable de una infracción por eludir, según 2C:29-2b.  N.J.S.A.  The following question needs to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b for eluding.  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  1.  ¿Entiende que si se declara culpable tendrá que renunciar a su licencia de conducir por un plazo de entre 6 meses y 2 años?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time between 6 months and 2 years?  Hay que contestar a las siguientes preguntas solamente si usted se declara culpable de infringir N.J.S.A.  2C:20-2 por el robo de un automóvil y la infracción ocurrió a partir del 2 de abril de 1991, o por infringir 2C:20-10 por la retención ilegal de un vehículo motorizado (el manejo imprudente de N.J.S.A. un auto ajeno sin el permiso del dueño - “joyriding”) y la infracción ocurrió a partir del 2 de agosto de 1993.  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for violation of 2C:20-2 for theft of N.J.S.A. an automobile and the offense occurred on or after April 2, 1991, or for a violation of 2C:20-10 for unlawful N.J.S.A. taking of a motor vehicle ("Joyriding") and the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993.
[directive] The Court provided that the Appellate Division should decide motions for If leave to appeal an order about a speedy trial calculation within 5 days.  the court grants the motion for leave to appeal, it should direct the parties to file Directive #06-22 - Criminal Justice Reform - Speedy Trial - Guidance Articulated by the Supreme Court in State v. [...]  July 12, 2022  Page4 if briefs -- and transcripts, necessary -- on an expedited basis, and render a of decision within 5 days getting those materials.  (slip at 32-33) op.
[brief] 20  Defendant-Respondent’s Appendix (“Dra”)  Defendant- Respondent’s December 19, 2024 brief to the trial court opposing collateral estoppel1.................................................................Dra 1-10  Defendant- Respondent’s January 2, 2025, supplemental brief to the trial court opposing collateral estop...............................................................Dra 11-14 TRANSCRIPTS  Transcript of February 14, 2024  Oral Argument and Adjournment Request....1T2  1  Pursuant to N.J. Court Rule 2:6(a)(2), these briefs are appended because the trial court relied on their contents in rendering its decision.  2  A transcript of the oral argument and adjournment request by the State is being ordered tomorrow (February 19, 2025) on a daily basis and will be immediately provided upon receipt.  The argument occurred on the Friday before the holiday weekend which ended today and well after the State’s filing of its motion for leave to appeal.  The transcript is relevant to the Respondent-Defendant’s opposition to this motion, specifically Point I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] ”  Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J.Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022) (citing Triarsi v. BSC Grp. Servs., LLC, 422 N.J.Super. 104, 113 (App. Div. 2011).  New Jersey courts have provided extensive interpretation of N.J.S.A.
[brief] For example, in holding that a judicially imposed arbitration system could not displace the right to a jury trial, one court explained:  We must not lose sight of the fact that however formal the arbitration proceedings become, they are not, nor were they ever contemplated to be an actual substitute for judicial disposition by trial.  The parties cannot be denied the constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial once they have participated in the arbitration process.  Mack v. Berry, 205 N.J. Super. 600, 603 (Law Div. 1985) (emphasis added).
[brief] Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506 (2011) ...............24-25  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974)...........19 Schettino v. Roizman Development, Inc., 158 N.J. 476 (1999)....................56 Stackenwalt v. Washburn, 42 N.J. 15 (1964)..............................................34 State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41 (1997).........................................................22 State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147 (2016)..........................................................23 State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312 (2007)..........................................................21 State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 306 (2019)....................................................19 State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275 (2006).......................................................21 State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77 (2020).........................................................18 State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2 (2018).........................................................18 State v. Dunbrack, 245 N.J. 531 (2021).........................................................39 State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66 (2016).......................................................39 State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583 (2018)..............................................................18 State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364 (2012)............................................................21 State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014)...........................................................19 State v. Garrison, 228 N.J. 182 (2017).........................................................23
[brief] Defendant advanced essentially the same arguments in front of the jury that he made to the trial court at the motion hearing.  He also did not call an expert to testify at trial and does not claim that he would have called an expert to testify at an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing.  Under the circumstances, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to exclude [...]’s testimony was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] First, [...]’s amicus brief fails to put forth a legal argument.  The purpose of an amicus curiae is to “assist in the resolution of an issue of public importance. ”  R. 1:13-9(a); see also State v. Tedesco, 214 N.J. 177, 188 (2013).  Amicus briefs “shall comply with all applicable rules” governing parties’ briefs, R. 1:13-9(b), which include that such briefs contain a legal argument.  See R. 2:6-2(a)(6) (“[T]he brief of the appellant shall contain . . . [t]he legal argument for the appellant . . . .”); R. 2:6-4(a) (“[T]he respondent’s brief shall conform . . . to the requirements of R. 2:6-2. ”).  The amicus brief contains only a sole amorphous suggestion in her conclusion that the effect of jurors’ purported “preexisting beliefs” on forensic evidence “can be mitigated with research-based approaches to voir dire, cautionary and limiting instructions, and imposing limits on how forensic results are communicated. ” (Ab18).  Instead, as explained, the brief only functions as an attempt to introduce expert testimony for the first time on appeal.
[brief] Since top base pay for Captain was $118,820 prior to issuance of 12/18/2023 Award, there is no explanation as to why the City and Arbitrator designated the employee’s base salary as $121,016.97.  The Chart shows that the Arbitrator used the starting point to calculate the cost of the economic award with the Captains at $7,840,358.01.  The actual cost calculations as per the regulations and case law which should have been used was $3,822,711, a difference of $4,017,647.01.  The City argues that the [...] never sought the information and therefore the Arbitrator is absolved of any responsibility to ensure the City’s compliance with the rules.  Further, the City argues that this information is based on a PERC regulation, and not a state statute.  First, the Arbitrator is responsible for administering and enforcing the rules under which the Arbitrator is trained as an Interest Arbitrator.  In addition, the Arbitrator is responsible for calculating the cost out in explaining the Award.  Furthermore, the regulation is not the only place where this obligation is set forth.  The obligation is also acknowledged in Commission case law, such as Borough of New Milford, 2012 NJ PERC LEXIS 18, 38 NJPER 340 (¶ 116 2012), and Atlantic City, 2013 NJ PERC LEXIS 38, 39 NJPER ¶ 161 (May 13, 2013).  This fundamental error in calculations require reversal of the Award.
[brief] Passaic County indictment No. [...], Grand Jury received deceitful information from State.  [...] legalized false testimonies during hearings.  But fail to notify Grand Jurors concerning [...] seen fleeing suspect, occupants in Black Car, and informant (state’s “Star” witness) looking for favors to testify.  See; Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6-8 (1969) (jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence) witness credibility, R. 2:10-1, State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 373-374 (1974), State v. Johnson, 203 N.J. super. 127 (App. Div.), certif. den. 102 N.J. 312 (1985)
[brief] According to the court, because “we are asking for status quo”, [...] “minimizes the Crowe factors” so “we don’t have to go into great detail with regard to hardship or likelihood of success on the merits or otherwise. ”  T27:8-15.  On the contrary, [...] cautioned that its decision “does not permit the issuance of an injunction, which preserves the status quo … in all cases. ”  [...], 399 N.J. Super. at 534.  Rather, the factors for injunctive relief “must be clearly and convincingly demonstrated” and, even when the relief sought is the preservation of the status quo, an “injunction must be squarely based on sound judicial discretion … which may permit the court to place less emphasis on a particular Crowe factor if another greatly requires the issuance of the remedy.