ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] In deciding whether to seek pretrial detention, prosecutors will be expected to give substantial weight to the results of the objective pretrial risk-assessment process approved by the AOC pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(c).  However, as noted throughout this Directive, the pretrial risk-assessment process approved by the AOC does not account for all facts and circumstances that may have a material bearing on the risks posed by a defendant’s release pending trial.  See note 8 (noting that some provisions of this Directive establish grounds for invoking a presumption that are independent of the automated pretrial risk-assessment results).  A prosecutor, therefore, should consider any additional relevant information that may be reasonably available, see subsections 4.2.2 to 4.2.5 and Section 7.6, provided, however, that the prosecutor shall not rely on any such additional information as the basis for deciding to overcome the presumption against pretrial detention pursuant to this Directive unless the hearing.23 prosecutor is prepared to establish that fact or circumstance at a detention  To help achieve an appropriate degree of statewide uniformity in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, this Section establishes a pretrial detention decision-making framework presumption24 consisting of three categories of cases.  For each category, there is rebuttable of whether to seek pretrial detention that serves to channel the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  In addition, this framework specifies the level of authority within a prosecutor’s office needed to approve the decision to overcome a presumption.
[brief] Petitioner is a 100% disabled veteran who retired from his job as a medical buyer with the [...] ([...]) in December 2020.  (7T37:6-14; 7T41:10-14).  He married Decedent on November 22, 1992, and remained married to her for 29 years, until her death on May 6, 2021.  (7T40:13; 7T42:14).  When they married, Decedent had a child, Respondent, who was then 12 years old.  (7T42:22-25).  Throughout his 29-year marriage, Petitioner resided at [...] (hereinafter “Home”).  (7T36:16-19; 8T721:1-4).  The Home had been purchased by Decedent a month before the marriage.  (7T210:1-16; 8T21:9 to 22:13).  __________________________  7  8T means Transcript of Trial dated August 30, 2022.  Before Petitioner married the Decedent, they did not discuss finances and Petitioner did not know the total of Decedent’s assets.  (7T43:11-18; 9T40:8-10).  Neither ever asked the other to sign a prenuptial agreement.  (7T43:8-10; 8T92:6-8).  On November 21, 1992, the day before their wedding, Petitioner had no contact with Decedent, and he had not yet met [...].  (7T43:25 to 44:4).  Petitioner did not see any lawyers that Saturday and spent the day furnishing and decorating a newly constructed room in a friend’s home for the wedding and reception while Decedent stayed at home preparing food for 65 guests.  (7T43:14-24; 7T48:16 to 49: 7).  After being married, Decedent advised Petitioner that she needed to keep the bank accounts separate for child support purposes.  (7T49:15-21).  Throughout the next 29 years, Decedent handled all the finances exclusively.  (7T55:3-5; 7T228).  During their working life, Petitioner and Decedent each received, on average, $65,000 per year.  (P606a to P655a; 8T8:10-16).  When bills came to the Home, Decedent paid them, either through her bank accounts, or she asked Petitioner to give her a check from his.  (7T49:12-21).  At times, Decedent endorsed and deposited checks made to Petitioner into her account.  (7T51:7-18; 7T52:6-17; 7T53:10-25).  Also, when Petitioner worked in the food and beverage industry, Decedent took, as needed, the “tips” he brought home.  (7T50:9-14).  In 2009, after Petitioner took a job with the [...], he gave Decedent a debit card that gave her full access to that account.  (7T50:17-20; 9T18:5 to 19:2; 8T29:21 to 30:7).  Decedent also had Petitioner’s credit card that she used to purchase items that she wanted.  (11T90:17-22; 7T229:1-7).  Respondent acknowledged that Decedent never had any problems making ends meet and “always did well for herself. ” (12T812:11-17).  For the first seventeen years of marriage, Decedent and Petitioner worked as a team and built a sizeable estate together.
[brief] These “mazes” and “webs” inhibited [...] from discovering the defendants’ conduct sooner and allowed [...] and the defendants to conceal their conduct.  (26T22:21 to 23:7; 33:14-16; 53:9-10; 27T72:13-15; 73:3-13; 75:14-21; 79:7-16; 86:18-20; 89:5-11).  See Motamed v. Chubb Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33301, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2016) (“While [...] argues that the discovery rule should not apply to Fay’s breach because the defendants waived the issue by failing to timely raise it at trial. of contract claim, the Court finds that the rule is applicable here because [...]’s alleged actions are ‘by their nature . . . self-concealing or undiscoverable.
[brief] 13  A.  [...] Could Not Testify as an “Expert” ............................................................  14  B.  The Rules of Court Bar “Expert Testimony” by [...] .................................  14  C.  The Plaintiffs’ Sole Proposed Expert Expressly Disclaimed Any Evaluation of Liability and Based His Report Upon Contra-Factual “Assumptions” ......................................................................................... 17 D. The Absence of Expert Evidence Also Disposed of Ancillary Claims ...................... 20 E. [...] Cannot Testify as a “Lay Expert” .......................................................... 23 POINT II: THE PURPORTED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS PROPERLY DENIED ................................................................................................. 23 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 30 APPENDIX: Complaint, [...], a New Jersey Limited Liability Company and [...] v. [...], [...], [...], and [...], Docket No. [...], filed March 116, 2005 .................................. 1a Harmon v. Oshinsky, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3616 (Law Div., Morris County, March 16, 2018) .................................................................. 16a TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc., 66 N.J. Super. 77 (App.Div.1961).................................................................14 Clark v. Fog Contracting Co., 125 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div.), certif. den. 64 N.J. 319 (1973).................................................................16 Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App.Div.1996).........................................................27-28 D’Atria v. D’ Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div.1990).........................................................27-29 Franklin v. Milner, 150 N.J. Super. 456 (App. Div. 1977).......................................................16 Fanfarillo v. East End Motor Co., 172 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 1980).......................................................16 Fusco v. Newark Board of Education, 349 N.J. Super. 455, (App. Div. 2002).....................................................28 Gonzales v. Hugelmeyer, 441 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div.2015), certif. denied, 223 N.J. 356 (2015)......................................................... 25 Harmon v. Oshinsky, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3616 (Law Div., Morris County, March 16, 2018)...........................................
[brief] **Defendant’s Affair**  In January 2023, Plaintiff discovered that a man named [...] had called his wife, [...], at around 12:30 AM, and they had spoken for an hour and a half.  [...] noted that [...] was the same individual who Defendant had admitted to sharing feelings with and also had mistakenly texted about diamond pearl earrings.  Plaintiff learned about the phone call through phone records, as Defendant was still using Plaintiff’s father's phone line.  Additionally, [...] revealed that he found out Defendant and [...] had gone out together in Florida in February 2023 and frequently talked late at night.  (2T48-49).  **Defendant abandons the marriage**
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that Atalese is not inconsistent with the FAA because it does not treat arbitration contracts differently from all other contracts.  The same state contract law principles on basic contract formation and interpretation are applied to determine whether there has been “mutual assent” or a “meeting of the minds” on the clause and whether the clause was intended to be a waiver of the right to sue in court, just like the waiver of any other right.  As reiterated in Atalese, generally applicable state law contract principles are utilized to determine whether the contractual arbitration clause is enforceable.
[brief] EMP Goal 5.4.1 requires natural gas utilities to, where applicable, “[d]evelop a planning process to quantify and analytically assess the need for future expansion of the gas system and take appropriate action. ” (Aa443).  16  [...] is [...]’s expert in city planning and land use.  (Aa854).  [...], [...], and [...] testified on behalf of [...].  (Aa63-65).
[brief] (Pa24).  In this regard, the Trial Court correctly held that Plaintiff’s conduct, including enforcing the law as to alleged civilian misconduct, could not constitute protected conduct under CEPA because Plaintiff did not act “in a manner that a rational trier of the facts could find was an objection to or refusal to abide by an order, directive, practice, policy or pronouncement of the [...] or the Township that violated a law, rule or clear mandate of public policy. ” (Id.).  In particular, there was no “order, directive, instruction, practice, policy or procedure of his employer, formal or informal, spoken or unspoken, that was known or believed by [Plaintiff] to be in existence in July 2016 to act or respond to an incident of the character at issue in any way that was at odds with the actions he chose to perform or undertake...” (Pa25).  As to Plaintiff’s claim that simply performing his duties as a police officer constituted protected conduct, the Court stressed that there was absolutely no evidence, “even evidence of mere rumor within the Police Department” that Defendants “... directed, instructed or even expressed a preference that [Plaintiff] not proceed exactly as he did. ” (Pa24).  This holding is also supported by and consistent with the applicable law cited above.  See e.g., Maimone, 188 N.J. at 233-34; see also Heim, 932 S.W. 2d at 289.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Putting in Context the FDCPA’s Bar Against Third-Party Communications.  (Pa46-Pa56)  When interpreting a specific section of a statute, a court considers the provision in the context of the overall statute.  Hodges, 189 N.J. at 223.  The plain meaning of § 1692c(b) as interpreted by the federal courts is consistent with the FDCPA’s regulation of the debt collection industry.  A.  FDCPA’s Purpose and Structure.  “In adopting the Act, […] Congress left no doubt that its purpose was to protect debtors from abuse and that Congress perceived a need for national uniformity to fulfill that goal. ”  Rutgers-The State Univ. v. Fogel, 403 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2008).  The FDCPA begins by reciting the findings made by Congress as the basis for its adoption.  Congress found there to be “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).³  Those unacceptable practices “contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. ”  Id.  At the same time, “[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.
[brief] Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases where you were told it is necessary to prove only that a fact is more likely true than not true.  In criminal cases, the State’s proof must be more powerful than that, it must be beyond a reasonable doubt.  A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty in your minds about the guilt of the defendant after you have given full and impartial consideration to all of the evidence.  A reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence.  It is a doubt that a reasonable person hearing the same evidence would have.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.  In this world, we know very few things with absolute certainty.  In criminal cases, the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt.  If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt, more or less the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find her guilty.  If, on the other hand, you are not firmly convinced of defendant’s guilt, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find her not guilty.  [(8T68-5 to 69-6)]
[brief] This formulation does not simply convert consumer expectations into the risk-utility test, but instead relies on the value of consumer choice to justify the liability rule.  *Id.* at 783-784 (footnote omitted).  Thus, the cases to which the Restatement alludes—where consumer expectations can be determinative on risk/utility balancing—are those cases where ordinary consumers can be fully informed about both the costs and the benefits.  This is such a case.
[brief] The court mistakenly determined that the ten-year window applies not just to the period of time between a prior conviction and the trial for the present offense, but also to the period of time between a prior conviction and any intervening conviction or violation of probation.  The court found that [...]’s 2007 conviction was admissible because the “gap in time” between that conviction, his 2011 conviction, and his 2015 violation of probation was under ten years.  (6T:132-5 to 13)  This is a plain misreading of Rule 609(b)(1) – which applies only to the period of time between a specific prior conviction or release from confinement and the first day of trial for the present offense.  See N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1).  Furthermore, the court erred in considering [...]’s 2015 violation of probation as part of its Rule 609(b)(1) remoteness analysis.  A violation of probation that does not result in a state prison sentence is not the equivalent of a conviction and is inadmissible to impeach a defendant’s credibility.  See State v. Murphy, 412 N.J. Super. 553, 565 n.1 (App. Div. 2010) (recognizing that violation of probation is not an intervening conviction between prior conviction and present trial); State v. Jenkins, 299 N.J. Super. 61, 71-75 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that violation of probation may not be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility); State v. Epps, 259 N.J. Super. 266, 272 (Law. Div. 1992) (holding “a violation of probation which does not result in a state prison sentence is not a new conviction. ”)  Therefore, the court’s ruling that [...]’s 2011 and 2007 convictions were admissible based on the fact that less than ten years elapsed between them and his subsequent violation of probation in 2015 was based on a misunderstanding of Rule 609(b)(1) and constituted an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Appellants’ motion to vacate was thus timely and has been continuously prosecuted since filed.  Both Appellants’ case and Roberto present raisings of Tyler during the pendency of timely motions to vacate final judgments under Rule 4:50-1.  In Roberto, following the granting of such a motion by the lower court, the plaintiff-appellants were seeking appellate relief when Tyler was decided and raised in the alternative by Roberto, the appellee.  In Appellants’ case, Appellants’ motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1 was made before Tyler was issued but denied by the lower court after Tyler.  On Appellants’ timely request for reconsideration, Appellants also raised Tyler.  Prior to the issuance of the Appellate Division’s Roberto decision, the lower court rejected Appellants’ Tyler argument, declining to apply Tyler retroactively.  After Appellants’ appealed that determination, the Appellate Division then issued its Roberto opinion.
[brief] 35  | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Asbury Park Press v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (Law Div. 2004) | 15 | | Achacoso-Sanchez v.Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) | 30 | | Baker v. National State Bank, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 173-174 (App. Div. 2002) | 26 | | Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) | 31, 33 | | C.E. v. Elizabeth Public School Dist., 472 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2022) | 1, 24 | | Courier News v. Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office, 358 N.J. Super. 373, 382-83(App. Div. 2003) | 16 | | Ctr. for Molecular Med. & Immunology v. Twp. of Belleville, 357 N.J. Super. 41, 48 (App. Div. 2003) | 20 | | Fair Share Housing Center, Inc. v. New Jersey State League of Municipalities, 208 N.J. 489, 501 (2011) | 15 | | Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 186 N.J. 286, 318 (2006) | 20 | | Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | 21, 30 | | Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec., 185 N.J. 100, 115 (2005) | 18 | | Iliadis v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J.
[brief] [...], : - ESSEX COUNTY.  : : Defendant-Appellant : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C. : : BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...], Esq. Of Counsel and on the Brief  N.J. Attorney I.D. No. 035571990  [...]  [...]  [...] [...] / [...] (fax)  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant Dominick Cofone  Dated: May 13, 2024 (Amended May 16, 2024)
[brief] Indeed, “unlawful, warrantless searches and seizures within the home are the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. ”  Ibid.; accord Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. ”).  Because the [...] officers leveraged the combination of [...]’s inherently coercive post-arrest environment, his difficult family situation, threats to “tear through the house” if he failed to acquiesce, and warnings that a search was inevitable, [...]’s purported consent was involuntary.  For these reasons, the fruits of the home search must be suppressed.
[brief] ” (4T:83-20 to 83-16).  PPD Officer [...] also responded to the report of shots fired by driving his patrol vehicle around the area surrounding East 16th Street “in case the suspect was . . . fleeing. ” (2T:10-13 to 18).  While driving on Madison Avenue, which was about two blocks away from East 16th Street, [...] saw an individual running across Madison Avenue from the area of East 16th Street.  (2T:10-11 to 13-9).  The individual made momentary eye contact with [...] before continuing to run towards East 22nd Street.  (Id.).  As [...] knew he was in a “high drug [/] crime area,” he was not certain that the individual was involved in the shooting but reported him to dispatch regardless.  (2T:105-24 to 106-2 and 10-11 to 13-9).  [...] and other PPD officers continued down East 22nd Street to [...], where they located footprints in the snow and suspected blood in a rear sidewalk alleyway, as well as suspected blood on the rear step of a banister.  (2T:13-6 to 16-19; 3T:123-14 to 127-2; see 4T:17-10 to 20-24).
[brief] *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981); *Hansen v. Eagle Picher Lead Co.*, 8 N.J. 133, 139 (1951).  To establish negligence, plaintiff must prove (1) defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care, (2) defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach of duty (negligence) was a proximate cause of the injury, and (4) actual damages were suffered by the plaintiff.
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THERE WAS NO EXPRESS CONTRACT BETWEEN BARONE AND A PLUS, AND BARONE PRESENTED NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT A PLUS UNDERTOOK ANY CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO BARONE.  A.  **There was no contractual relationship between [...] and [...]. **  In order to prevail on her breach of contract claims against [...], [...] must be able to demonstrate the following: “first, that the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms; second, that [[...]] did what the contract required [her] to do; third, that [[...]] did not do what the contract required [[...]] to do, defined as the breach of the contract; and fourth, that [[...]’s] breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to [[...]]. ”  *Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc.*, 237 N.J. 501, 512 (2019).  [...] is not able to establish the essential elements of a breach of contract claim against [...].  [...] was retained by [...] to perform a site inspection and inventory the property that [...] alleges was damaged following the water leak at her home.  [...] was not retained to restore, repair or clean [...]’s property.  Pa24.  There was no contractual agreement between [...] and [...].  *Id.*  Moreover, [...] did not undertake to restore, repair or clean [...]’s property or any of the items [...] contends were damaged.  Pa25.  [...] conceded in her deposition testimony that there was no contractual agreement between her and [...].  Pa62, page 142; Pa94.  [...] acknowledged that [...] was not engaged to restore, repair or clean her property.  Pa65, page 155.  [...] testified that she understood that the role of [...] was simply to inventory her personal property and assess the damage.  Pa62, page 142.  An entity doing business as [...] came to [...]’s home to perform restoration and cleaning services following the water leak.  Pa34, page 33.  B.  There is no credible evidence establishing that any act or omission on the part of [...] resulted in a loss to [...].  As set forth above, [...] has not and under the fact of this case cannot produce any credible evidence establishing that [...] is responsible for any alleged damage to her personal property, as her own testimony establishes that those items were damaged by the water leak and the activities of [...], and she is unable to differentiate between any damage allegedly caused by [...] and that damage that was already done by the water leak and the activities of [...].  Finally, [...] has not produced any expert testimony concerning her alleged damages.  Based on the foregoing, the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of [...] with respect to [...]’s breach of contract claims.
[directive] Other Sentencing Provisions  Unless the court orders otherwise, or as otherwise provided by law, certain other of conditions the sentence, including but not limited to any monetary or court-ordered financial obligations, restitution, no-contact orders, Megan's Law registration obligations, and driver's license suspensions will commence upon sentencing of of regardless whether a stay the custodial term ordered. is Criminal Sentencing Guidance - Issued by Directive 13-20 (April 30, 2020)
[brief] This element favors the Debtor.  Second, “[t]o establish irreparable harm, a movant must demonstrate ‘an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent’. ”  Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting Consolidated Brands, Inc. v. Mondi, 638 F.Supp. 152, 155 (E.D.N.Y.1986)) (additional citations omitted); In re Sterling, 543 B.R. 385, 396–97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).  Here, the harm is not remote or speculative, but rather actual and imminent.  The Debtor has not prosecuted the Adversary Proceeding and likewise, there is no state court determination setting aside the Final Judgment.  If the court does not currently enjoin [...] at this stage, it would immediately evict the Debtor, depriving him of his home and income opportunity.  In addition, the Debtor would be deprived of the equity in the Property — something the Roberto court said he is entitled to.  Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. at 366.  This element favors the Debtor.