ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 12.  On March 22, 2023, during Oral Argument Defense Counsel [...] stated:  "Mr. [...]: [...] filed his action in the beginning (1T Line 9) of March.  Once I received it, I reviewed it with the 10 Sheriff's Office, and it was decided that in light of 11 the fact that the sheriff had voided the prior – (1T Line 12) excuse me, the Court had voided the prior Judgment of (1T Line 13) Foreclosure, in 2017, and entered a new Judgment of 14 Foreclosure under the same foreclosure docket number it (1T Line 15) would -- [...] would be entitled to his two (1T Line 16) statutory adjournments.
[brief] Counsel raises the claim that the State had the opportunity to raise the jurisdictional issue at any time and did not.  This is irrelevant.  “The principle is well established that a court cannot hear a case as to which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction even though all parties thereto desire an adjudication on the merits. ”  Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 65 (1978) (Citing State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960).  “Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties' failure to object, nor conferred upon the court by the parties' agreement. ”  Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J. Super. 464, 470 (App. Div. 2019).  Furthermore, “Whether presiding over a case or deciding an appeal, judges have an independent, non-delegable duty to raise and determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case whenever there is a reasonable basis to do so. ”  Id.  Therefore, a mistake made earlier in the timeline of proceedings cannot later bestow subject matter jurisdiction on the court to address a case, and neither can the failure to object.  It is irrelevant that counsel was appointed, or that motions were filed, if the court had lacked jurisdiction the entire time, even if not discovered until later.  Further, it is plainly illogical for Defense counsel to argue that the finality of prior court rulings, despite being contrary to the rule, should now be upheld despite any deficiencies—even as it relates to jurisdiction—while simultaneously arguing that certain other prior rulings, even a jury verdict, were flawed and should therefore be overturned.  POINT III:
[brief] (Pa 87.)  After filing its initial Case Information Statement, the Borough submitted a November 8, 2022, letter to the Court with an amended CIS objecting to the appeal as of right.  The basis of the objection was that the trial court order was not a final order because it did not dismiss claims against the Planning Board, a position directly contrary to the Borough’s position below and the express language of the Order prepared by the Borough’s counsel and entered by [...] verbatim.  (Pa 100.)  Despite responsive correspondence from Plaintiff that pointed out the Borough’s hypocrisy, (Pa 101), and a letter from the Planning Board agreeing that the Order should be treated as final despite the Board’s lack of participation in the motion, the Appellate Division, following its receipt of a responsive letter from the Borough, (Pa 107), dismissed the Appeal by Order entered December 8, 2022.  (Pa 114.)  On June 23, 2023, [...] entered an Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendant [...] with the consent of counsel for Plaintiff and the Planning Board, citing the reasons set forth in the court’s September 9, 2022, Statement of Reasons.
[brief] At p. 14 of his Brief, [...] argues that he had four months to file a Complaint on behalf of [...] and [...] contesting the Will.  Plaintiff argues that [...] was not an appropriate in connection with the fact that [...]’s signature was blacked out on the retainer letter.  [...] did not sign the Retainer Agreement, and the X was on the signature line.  There never was a signature of [...] on the retainer.  The only conclusion that one could draw was that [...] is the one who crossed it out and sent it back.
[brief] [...] Testified the Police Blamed Him for the Accident.  [...] testified on direct and cross-examination that he believed the police were accusing him of assault.  [7T 91:4-11, 95:5-11, 115:16-19].  [...] strategically discussed this fact during his direct-examination because he admitted to it at his deposition.  [1T 55:20-24].  On direct, the jury was shown portions of the police bodycam footage where [...] stated he believed he was being accused of assault.  [7T 93:6-24].  B.
[brief] See Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 547 (1986); Stanley v. Great Gorge Country Club, 353 N.J.Super. 475, 486 (Law Div. 2002).  Our courts balance this policy goal against the competing goal to achieve "expeditious and efficient" litigation.  Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Sch., 392 N.J.Super. 80, 91 (App. Div. 2007).  Accordingly, litigation deadlines should be extended in the interests of justice and to avoid punishing litigants unfairly.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that their claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are warranted because “Plaintiffs conferred a benefit on [...] by extensively limiting their use of sick time” and as a result, “Defendants reaped the benefits of Plaintiffs coming into work every day as well as avoiding the payment of sick time and overtime to cover Plaintiffs if they called out. ” (Pb46).  However, Plaintiffs provide no caselaw whatsoever to support their apparent theory that common law quasi-contract principles should supersede the authority granted to Defendants under the MSRA.  Indeed, the only cases cited by Plaintiffs merely identify the basic elements necessary to plead a cause of action for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.  (Pb46 (citing VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994) (discussing the elements of an unjust enrichment claim in the context of a lien placed on a property to remedy inequitable rental income commissions); Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 394 N.J. Super. 278, 286 (App. Div. 2007) (setting forth the elements necessary to state a quantum meruit claim in the context of post-termination commissions); Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Est. of Nicolaysen, 172 N.J. 60, 68 (2002) (discussing elements of a quantum meruit cause of action as applied to attorneys fees)).  None of these cases consider issues of quasi-contractual claims and their preemption by statute.  Moreover, while Plaintiffs may have limited their use of sick time during their careers, the Appellate Division has acknowledged that “[t]he purpose of sick leave is to give an employee the opportunity to continue to receive a salary while they are out on disability[,]” not lump sum payments.  *Superior Officers*, 2022 WL 2352376, at *3; (Pa000672).  Plaintiffs chose to retire after implementation of MSRA, and Plaintiffs’ failure to utilize their sick leave prior to retirement does not give rise to a cause of action against Defendants.  **POINT VIII**
[brief] The focus of the Kimmelman analysis on considering other sanctions that the defendant has been subject to also makes sense here in the context of sanctions for civil contempt.  There can be no dispute that [...] has already been sanctioned to an unprecedented degree.  He remains incarcerated in the [...] to this day, and, unless he is released beforehand, he will likely have spent more than 1,000 days behind bars by the time this appeal is decided.  In addition to the years-long loss of his liberty, he has also already been sanctioned at least $2,721,804.14 in connection with specific prior bad acts.  Another massive monetary sanction – one more than $3.5 million – is undeniably punitive.  It serves no justifiable purpose, is legally unwarranted, unprecedented, and does not practically benefit the New Jersey Court, the public, or anyone else.  In concluding otherwise, the Chancery Court erred.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] 8  Appellants note that New Jersey courts have not ruled on whether the interpretation of “public utility” under Exemption #11 applies to interstate natural gas pipelines.  See Ab fn. 10.  While [...] is ultimately regulated by FERC as an interstate natural gas pipeline company, for purposes of [...]’s analysis of HAD applications, [...] has consistently been considered as a “public utility” under the New Jersey Public Utility Act, N.J.S.A. 48:2-13.
[brief] Further, the violation of a remedial consumer protection statute (such as the NJCFLA) in the attempted collection of an alleged consumer debt is the *exact* sort of exceptional circumstance this Court has ruled necessitates the vacating of a default judgment pursuant to *R. 4:50-1(f)*.  In *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 105, this Court examined the trial court’s granting of a motion to vacate a default judgment pursuant to *R. 4:50-1(f)*.  Analogous to the instant action, *DeAngelo* involved a debt collector’s enforcement of an alleged debt it had no legal right or authority to collect.  Plaintiff [...] (a debt buyer like [...] here) attempted to collect a time-barred debt from defendant DeAngelo in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.  However, the defendant in *DeAngelo* “inexcusably ignored a judgment on that time-barred claim - he waited eight years and lied about his identity - before seeking relief. ”  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109.  The Court went on to say that “[t]he Supreme Court has determined that [R. 4:50-1(f)] permits relief even when a defendant's response or failure to respond to a complaint was found, as here, *to be inexcusable.*”  *Deangelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109 (emphasis added) (citing *Mancini*, 132 N.J. at 334).  “In such instances, subsection (f)'s boundaries are ‘as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice. ’”  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109 (emphasis added) (quoting *Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo*, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1977)).  In denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate—specifically pursuant to R. 4:50-1(f), the Rule’s equitable catchall provision, in the context of *DeAngelo*—the trial court opined that “[[...]] does not have the benefit of [the FDCPA’s] countervailing policy interest.
[brief] 58b.  DEFENDANT NEVER RECEIVED A COPY OF THE JUDGES CONVICTION WHICH ALSO MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO APPEAL.  Exactly from whatever the court’s decision was as Plaintiff was filing his appeal in forma pauperis because he could not afford to purchase the transcript.  58c.  PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL ATTEMPTED TO FILE A TIMELY APPEAL, BUT same were rejected by the CRIMINAL division of the SUPERIOR COURT after multiple attempts.  58d.  PLAINTIFF’S FILING WITH JEDS WAS ACCEPTED, but that is not the NJ SUPERIOR COURT where the municipal appeals were accepted.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court of [...], : New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset  Defendant-Appellant. : County. : Indictment No. [...] : Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] But the reason why these areas are so interrelated here is because [...] has sought to use discretionary rights (redevelopment and condemnation) to defeat its constitutional obligations (Mount Laurel).  In other words, [...] has sought to sidestep the well-established Mount Laurel builder’s remedy process by using redevelopment and condemnation, maintaining that, because redevelopment can serve a public purpose, its use of such – even in the midst of an ongoing builder’s remedy case – is unassailable.  [...]’s zoning has been deemed unconstitutional: a finding of constitutional noncompliance means that the zoning scheme has not provided a realistic opportunity for the creation of affordable homes to address their regional fair share.  The Township’s circular logic in asking this court to affirm that unconstitutional zoning scheme is reminiscent of the practices at issue in the original Mount Laurel I case fifty years ago.  The trial court correctly saw through [...]’s actions and temporarily limited the Town’s ongoing redevelopment and condemnation efforts in the instant builder’s remedy case.  In doing so, the court properly balanced the traditional factors used to assess a preliminary injunction, while highlighting the specific, unique posture of this case.  The court noted that there is no case directly on point, temporarily limiting a town’s condemnation efforts – in the middle of a builder’s remedy case – with respect to a certain property, when that property can yield a substantial amount of affordable housing toward a town’s undisputed constitutional shortfall.  The reason for the dearth of caselaw is because no town has been as brazen as [...] in its attempts to bypass the Mount Laurel process.  [...] stands alone among New Jersey’s largest suburban municipalities in simply opting out of the voluntary compliance process — a path that other municipalities do not choose precisely because of the threat of builder’s remedies.  A decision in [...]’s favor would gut the builder’s remedy set forth in Mount Laurel II and consistently applied as a reward against recalcitrant municipalities statewide.
[directive] 7.3  When an officer uses force as defined in Section 3 of this Policy and the result is not fatal, the officer shall complete a report in the Use of Force Portal established by the Attorney General’s Office.  The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the use of force, and preferably before the end the shift in which the force was used.  If the officer who used force is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours, in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.  7.4
[brief] See POINT III, supra (setting forth the law regarding the plain error standard).  The principles of Bankston, upon which defendant relies, “protect criminal defendants ‘from the incriminating statements of a faceless accuser who remains in the shadows and avoids the light of court. ’”  State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 413 (2020)(quoting State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 348 (2005)).  To that end, officers can neither lawfully “disclose incriminating information obtained from a non-testifying witness,” nor “create an ‘inescapable inference’ that an unavailable source has implicated the defendant. ”  Id. at 415 (quoting State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 271 (1973)).
[brief] .................................................................  13 POINT 2.  DEFENDANT [...] WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE PRE-ACTION NOTICE  PURSUANT TO R. 1:20A-6 BY EMAIL, THE EXCLUSIVE MODE OF COMMUNICATION SHE INSISTED UPON, AND BY CERTIFIED AND REGULAR MAIL TO THE LAST KNOWN ADDRESS SHE PROVIDED JUST WEEKS EARLIER, AND THE VERY SAME ADDRESS SHE PROVIDED TO THE COURT MONTHS LATER, AND FINALLY, THE SAME ADDRESS USED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE FEE ARBITRATION COMMITTEE TO SEND THE FEE AWARD DETERMINATION TO DEFENDANT [...] (Da5, Da11, Da16)
[brief] 62 (App. Div. 2010) (invalidating third party’s consent despite them signing a consent form and being advised about the right to refuse consent because the trial court “did not adequately weigh the coercive effect of the lengthy police intrusion into and seizure of the home”); State v. Dolly, 255 N.J. Super. 278, 281-81, 284-86 (App. Div. 1991) (same where other evidence of involuntariness included the presence of ten police officers with guns drawn); State v. Speid, 255 N.J. Super. 398, 401-02 (Law Div. 1992) (same where police detained defendant and her family, “exhorted” her to sign the consent form using expletives, and made other “uncouth” remarks, in part because “the language and deportment of the police . . . . had the propensity to create an inherently coercive atmosphere”); State v. Hladun, 234 N.J. Super. 518, 522-24 (Law Div. 1989) (same where defendant previously refused consent and police threatened to get a warrant); State v. Alexander, 170 N.J. Super. 298, 306-07 (Law Div. 1979) (same where other evidence of involuntariness included the seizure of defendant’s person).  As those cases demonstrate, our courts have repeatedly made clear that what happens before the ultimate signing of a consent form matters.
[brief] [...]’s donation was specifically donated to fund [...]’s purchase of [...]’s share of the property and [...] agreed to donate whatever amount [...] needed to secure the highest bid and own the entire property.  (2T62-4; 4T47-19).  [...]’s donation was never deposited into [...]’s bank account and his donation was never in the possession of [...].  (Da317 – Da320; 3T166-22).  On June 28, 2022, after [...]’s share of the property was transferred to [...], [...] transferred the entire property to [...] for $10.00.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................................................iii  POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AGAINST NICHOLAS MENAS AND COOPER LEVENS ON DID NOT FALL UNDER THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION TO THE AOM STATUTE (50a–51a)  .........................................................1  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TORT CLAIMS AGAINST [...] WERE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS WHICH REQUIRED THE FILING OF AN AOM (50a–51a)  .................................................................3  POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO STATE  NEWLY DISCOVERED CLAIMS AGAINST [...] (376a–377a)  ..................................................................................7  POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO JOSEPH ROCCO, ESQ., AND PEPPER HAMILTON (381a–382a)  ..............................................................................................................................................10  CONCLUSION  ..............................................................................................................................15
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (hereinafter referred to herein as “Plaintiff”) appeals from an Order in which summary judgment was granted to all defendants in this matter, [...] (“[...]”) and [...]  (“[...]”) (collectively “Defendants”).  Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are centered around his assertion that the termination of his employment was in violation of Executive Order MEO-O-08-001, which was issued on September 23, 2008, by Mayor [...] on behalf of the [...] (the “Executive Order”).  As the trial court judge aptly found, there is simply no merit to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, because the Executive Order plainly states that to be protected from termination, the employee running for office must be certified as a candidate for municipal elective office in the [...].  Here, Plaintiff was terminated on January 12, 2018, and was not certified as a candidate until about a month-and-a-half later, on February 22, 2018.  Thus, because Plaintiff was not certified to run for office, the trial court properly found that there was no violation of the Executive Order in the first instance and dismissal of the First and Second Counts of Plaintiff’s Complaint was proper.  Second, Plaintiff’s termination was based on his poor performance and lack of professionalism, as he himself testified that he looked at nude images and pornography during office hours, argued with other aides, and campaigned against his own employer, [...], and spoke negatively about [...] to constituents when he was canvassing the West Ward for signatures for his petitions.  Furthermore, since Plaintiff was an at-will employee and failed to identify any document or statement that could constitute a contract or implied contract to support his breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith claims, the trial court properly dismissed the Second Count of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  To that point, the trial court also found unavailing and properly rejected Plaintiff’s argument that he was a union member protected under a certain unidentified Collective Bargaining Agreement, as Plaintiff failed to raise any such claim in his Complaint.  Finally, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for false light invasion of privacy, because the one-year statute of limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3 had run.  Specifically, Plaintiff confirmed this claim arose solely from his termination by the Councilman on January 12, 2018, but his Complaint was not filed until two years later.  Plaintiff’s claim for false light invasion of privacy, which is based on the allegation that his termination portrayed him as a poor employee, is barred by the statute of limitations based on his own testimony and the date of the filing of the complaint.  Here too, the trial court properly rejected Plaintiff’s argument that his false light invasion of privacy claim is somehow entitled to a two-year statute of limitations.  Respectfully, because the record evidence and applicable law demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are baseless, the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims should be resoundingly affirmed.
[brief] (Aa0058-Aa0059).  For that reason, the NJDEP found that the [...] did not contain suitable bald eagle foraging habitat.  The NJDEP also found that, due to the size and the habitat composition of the wetlands on the [...], the wetlands do not meet the standards for suitable wetland habitat for bald eagles.  (Aa00058).  The NJDEP provides its rationale for that determination in the Environmental Report:
[brief] However, because the test requires all elements to exist, the doctrines cannot apply.  Appellants claimed that the access easement was judicially terminated without filing any notice thereof.  Under the circumstances, Respondent had every right to commence this action and adjudicate the parties’ claims and defenses over the record title.  It is plainly obvious that none of the parties in the [...] case knew about the recorded 1966 [...]-to-[...] Deed because, had they, the case would never have been brought in the first place.  The very relief [...] was looking to obtain from the Court is found on the face of the 1966 [...]-to-[...] Deed – an instrument that was never before the court previously:  Defendants’ deed recorded on December 14, 1990 states that the land is subject to, “the rights of others, if any, in an old driftway crossing through the southerly portion of the herein described premises” [i.e. the truncated [...] description]  * * *  No language exists in any deed brought to the Court’s attention that purports to grant any right to use of enjoyment in that part of the driftway that runs from the boundary of Defendants’ property to [...].  Defendants’ deed is subject to existing rights in the driftway if any.  Thus, it does not purport to create an easement, nor does it acknowledge any right in the plaintiff or his predecessors.  (Da102-103; Da106) (emphasis supplied).  As set forth in Points V and VI, infra, because Respondent’s right to use the roadway at issue plainly appears in valid, recorded, land records, the Court should decide this case in the manner that best effectuates the New Jersey Recording Act.  *Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman*, 244 N.J. Super. 104, 113 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 321 (1991) (quoting *Palamarg Realty Co.*, 80 N.J. at 453.  That result can only be achieved by rejecting the application of res judicata.