ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (requiring “the court . . . upon application of one of the parties” to “stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement); see also, e.g., Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 476 (2024) (explaining that, by stating that a court compelling arbitration “shall” stay the arbitration, “the FAA created a mandatory obligation that left no place for the exercise of discretion”); Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J. Super. 560, 577 (App. Div. 2007) (“Under section 3 of the FAA, the court must stay an arbitrable action pending its arbitration. ”).  While the FAA certainly applies to this dispute given the interstate commerce at issue, the same rule applies under the New Jersey Arbitration Act.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:23B-7(g) (“If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to arbitration. ”); see also Cervalin v. Universal Glob., Inc., No. A-0974-20, 2021 WL 2793593, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 6, 2021) (unpublished) (remanding “for entry of a new order and direct that the new order compel arbitration and stay the civil action pending those proceedings”); Jefferson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. A-0535-21, 2022 WL 2351711, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 30, 2022) (unpublished) (“Based on the language of the FAA and N.J.S.A. 2A23B-7, the matter should have been stayed pending the arbitration. ”).  These statutes and their supporting case law are clear: the proper disposition of this case requires that as soon as the Trial Court finds that the matter is arbitrable per the parties’ agreement, the Trial Court must (not may) stay the matter pending arbitration per the terms of the Contract.  This Court should instruct the Trial Court accordingly.  See Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2022) (explaining that the proper judicial recourse when compelling arbitration under the FAA is to stay the litigation until arbitration is completed).
[brief] In the same note where the Court highlights that the defendant said that he knows how to “better cover his tracks,” he says that he doesn’t want to hurt anybody.  (Da183).  In the same note, [...] recanted his statement and said that it wouldn’t happen again because he would have help.  Id.  In a later entry, [...] states that he has education about himself, and the next time he had violent thoughts he would tell his brother so this wouldn’t happen again..  (Da180).  In this case there were 83 pages of therapist notes from the Youth Detention Center.  (Da112 - 194).  However, the Court seemingly focused on a few out of context lines to justify aggravating factors while ignoring the countless times [...] indicated that he wanted to get help and didn’t want to hurt people.
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 10 to respond to a call for service.  Rather, the officer may delay activation until they are near the destination.  5.3.1  Except as otherwise expressly provided in Section 6 or any other provision of this Policy, when a BWC is required to be activated by an officer pursuant to this Policy, the device must remain activated throughout the entire encounter/event/episode and shall not be de- activated until it is concluded (e.g., the BWC-equipped officer has left the scene; all civilians involved in the encounter have left the scene; the officer has informed the dispatcher or a supervisor that the event has concluded; the event is “closed” on the department’s computer-aided dispatch (“CAD”) system, etc.).  5.3.2  When a BWC is activated pursuant to Section 5.2(k) (transport of arrestee), whether by an officer in uniform or in plain clothes, it shall remain activated at all times while the BWC- equipped officer is in the presence of the arrestee and until the arrestee is secured in the holding cell or processing room, or until custody of the arrestee has been transferred to county jail personnel, or until the arrestee is with hospital/medical/mental health personnel and the officer is no longer in the presence of the arrestee.  5.4  Special Provisions Governing the Use of BWCs when Investigating Underage Alcohol and Marijuana Use.  Consistent with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15a(4), the video and audio recording functions of an officer’s BWC shall be activated whenever the officer is responding to a call for service related to an underage person who is suspected of violating the law with respect to possessing or consuming an alcoholic beverage, marijuana, hashish, or a cannabis item, or at the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter between an officer and a person related to a violation or suspected violation of that provision.
[brief] Upon arrival at the tavern, [...] reviewed the tavern’s surveillance cameras and discovered this was not merely a suspicious person, but a burglary.  [...] had “notice[d] something on the camera” and went to the basement, only to find that the burglar had been in what should have been a locked office; “everything was disturbed, cash drawers, change boxes, everything that would have been locked up. ”  [...] later confirmed that $12,443 had been taken from the office.  (7T:54-6 to 54-21; 60-19 to 82-4; 8T:5-2 to 40-6; 69-1 to 70-13).  [...] also noticed something else in the videos – the defendant.  [...] had been “[n]eighborhood friends with defendant, in addition to having worked with him at [...].  [...] recognized in the video recording of the burglar defendant’s “walk, his mannerisms, his height, just everything about him. ”  [...] was shocked by this discovery “because we’ve been friends for so long. ”  [...] also noticed that the backpack carried by the burglar was “[v]ery similar” to the backpack that defendant “always carries. ” (8T:70-14 to 78-6).  When he got the opportunity to see the video recordings from the burglary, [...] also recognized the burglar to be the defendant:  “I recognize [...].  … I know the way he walks … I’m very familiar … I could tell by his nose. ”  [...] watched the video by himself.  (7T:69-8 to 69-24; 93-1 to 93-12).  [...] of the [...] handled the follow-up investigation of the burglary.  Part of this investigation included reviewing the four hours of surveillance video recorded by the tavern’s 64 cameras.  Sergeant Vollbrecht’s review of these videos started at 1:47 a.m. on February 1, 2016.
[brief] Defendant [...], Plaintiff’s Direct Supervisor, Had a History of Threats and Harassment.  Defendant [...], who currently serves as Defendant [...]’s Director of Nursing Operations, was the Lead Administrative Nursing Supervisor from approximately the mid-2000s until 2022.  (Pa25).  Defendant [...] testified that she did not recall receiving training on the anti-harassment policy and was unaware of any anti-retaliation policies in place (Pa654).  [...] displayed aggressive and abusive behavior characterized by verbal abuse.  (Pa187, Pa659).  Defendant [...]’s behavior was erratic, and often consisted of slamming file cabinets, cursing, and swinging her arms.  (Pa290, Pa660).  Defendant [...] would regularly curse at employees, yell, scream, and talk down to people.  (Pa243).  The conduct gave [...] the feeling that Defendant [...], while working, was “ready to fight at any minute. ” (Pa656).  [...] made multiple complaints about Defendant [...]’s conduct to supervisors, including COO [...] (“[...]”), prior to June 2020. (Pa659).  He reported it to [...] (“[...]”), the Director of the Med-Surg units, that Defendant [...] had yelled at him, and he made similar complaints to her on several occasions (Pa659).  [...] instructed [...] to discuss the matter directly with Defendant [...] or to take it up with HR, but she did not report the complaints herself, as required by hospital policy (Pa659).  Instead, [...] informed Defendant [...] of [...]’s complaints, which [...] believed exacerbated the situation (Pa659).  [...] made similar complaints to [...] regarding Defendant [...]’s conduct.  (Pa659).  Plaintiff had also made complaints about [...]’s conduct.  (Pa659 – Pa660).  Plaintiff made a complaint in 2018 regarding an incident in which Defendant [...] blocked a door and refused to let her leave a room.  (Pa659).  Plaintiff further complained about Defendant [...]’s repeated slamming of file cabinets and doors, yelling and cursing, and her threatening body language.  (Pa660).  Plaintiff, [...], and [...] had all made complaints about Defendant [...]’s conduct to [...].  (Pa662 – Pa663).  [...], over the years, had discussed the complaints with Defendant [...] to get her to modify her behavior.  (Pa662).  C.
[brief] Respondent argues that [...]’s Order ended discovery on December 31, 2021, so the refusal to reconsider [...]’s original Order was appropriate.  This argument ignores that [...] indicated to all counsel that there would be no trial prior to April or May of 2022.  See 2T24, Appellants’ Brief.  There can be no honest dispute that there was time to conduct the additional modicum of discovery that would be needed to have [...] act as plaintiffs’ expert.
[brief] Ibid.  Ghigliotty is similarly irrelevant to this case.  The question presented in Ghigliotty was whether defendant was entitled to a Frye hearing on the reliability of “firearms toolmark identification expert’s use of untested three-dimensional (3D) computer imaging technology. ”  Ghigliotty, 463.  N.J. Super. at 360.  To give context to this Court’s holding that defendant was indeed entitled to a Frye, this Court first provided “a general overview of the field of firearm identification,” relying largely on the four reports [...] relies on in subsection B.  Id. at 360-65.  Defendant was not challenging the admissibility of traditional firearms identification in that case; Ghigliotty is, in fact, a State’s appeal from the trial court order granting the defense a Frye on the new computer imaging technology.  As this Court explained “the trial court’s concern was not with the general acceptance of the discipline of firearm toolmark identification, but rather with the new technique. ”  Id. at 375.  Thus, in Ghigliotty neither this Court nor the trial court was asked to do what the defense asked the court to do in this case: to finally review the reliability of the firearm examiner’s testimony, something that has never been done in New Jersey.  By relying on two irrelevant cases, the trial court failed to act as gatekeeper.  It erroneously allowed the State’s expert to testify that the bullets recovered from the scene and from the victim and the casings recovered from the scene were “discharged from the submitted pistol[,]” without any form of qualification.  (11T 44-14 to 52-23)  This proclaimed definite match is unsupported by the scientific evidence.  What this definite match did was put the murder weapon in [...]’s hands.  Without the expert’s testimony, even if the jury believed that the gun was [...]’s, the link between the gun and the murder was negligible.  Testifying only about class characteristics, which are shared at least by all guns of the same type made by the same manufacturer, significantly weakens the link the State sought to establish between [...] and the gun.  The admission of this testimony cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971), because of the dearth of other evidence against [...]: no eyewitness identification, no surveillance where the shooter’s face is clearly seen, no DNA linking him to the gun or the mask found in the Chevrolet, no motive.  Other than the ballistics, the only link presented were that both men wore Nikes, a very common brand of shoe.  As [...] pointed out in closing, even the police officer that arrested him was wearing black Nikes.  (14T 33-14 to 25)  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.  In the alternative, the matter must be remanded for a hearing on the reliability of the firearms testimony.
[brief] As noted by our Supreme Court, “where there is direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell-Douglas analysis does not apply. ”  Smith, supra, 225 N.J. at 396.  In A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Research & Eng'g Co., 428 N.J. Super. 518, 533 (App. Div. 2012) the Appellate Division stated the standard for “direct evidence” case and held:  Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence “that an employer placed substantial reliance on a proscribed discriminatory factor in making its decision to take the adverse employment action[.]  In this matter the Defendant placed complete and full reliance upon its decision to deny promotional eligibility upon a proscribed discriminatory factor - namely that a Firefighter had availed himself of medical leave and was ill or disabled (or perceived as disabled) under the provision of the NJLAD.  The Defendant’s statements and actions, clarified through its representatives, confirmed that it would never promote a Firefighter who was disabled and on medical leave on the date a promotion was to occur.  This is direct evidence of reliance upon a proscribed discriminatory factor in undertaking the adverse employment action.  The “burden shifting analysis” advanced by the Defendant and the Trial Court is therefore inapplicable to this matter.
[directive] Director deems the as persons such other and experts, to regular basis on a shall meet Group Advisory Technology  The participate. to invited be shall and Directive, this Law and Reform Bail of implementation the concerning issues technology discuss technology-related and Directive this to revisions for need on the General Attorney the shall advise this and law the of implementation efficient and uniform the facilitate taken to be should that steps Directive. Directive. this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This PARTIES THIRD NON-ENFORCEABILITY BY 17.
[brief] Although not relevant on the critical issue, after the Board determination the [...] vehicles continued to park on the School courtyard and the School got a permit and began to erect a fence.  The Synagogue filed an Order to Show Cause before [...] to restrain the alleged interference with its parking easement on Lot 5.  [...] granted that restraint along with an award of attorney fees/costs.  A Notice of Violation issued by the Township against the Synagogue for its continued parking on October 26, 2018 was stayed by Consent Order pending further action (Da105-107).  The plaintiff Synagogue commenced this suit challenging the Zoning Board decision on November 1, 2018 --- even prior to the Resolution (Da1) being adopted on November 19, 2018 --- by a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (Da89) and seeking to restrain any enforcement.
[brief] [...] fails to recognize that our jurisprudence does not require the trial court to apply a rigid financial analysis in support of its decision to reduce a fee application.  See Rendine v. Pantzer, 276 N.J. Super. at 462.  The amount of fees awarded is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the lodestar method is only a general guideline on how to calculate those fees.  The trial \(^1\) Emphasis added. court's "only concern is the amount of a reasonable fee, a conclusion that ultimately is discretion-bound and fact-sensitive and not particularly suitable of reduction to a few black-letter rules."  Rendine, 276 N.J. Super. at 462.
[brief] Div. 2004) | | | Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007) | 12 | In re Application of Holy Name Hosp., 301 N.J. Super. 282, 295-96 (App. Div. 1997) ................................................................. 8 In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999) .................................................................................................................. 8 Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 463 (App. Div. 2015) ............................................................... 13 Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment of Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268 (1965) ......................... 7, 37 Lang v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 160 N.J. 41, 58-59 (1999) ...................... 7 Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Twp. of Princeton Zoning Bd., 343 N.J. Super. 177, 199 (App. Div. 2001) ........................................... 8 Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, (1987) ......................................................... 9, 14, 15, 16, 35 New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 338 (App. Div. 2004) ................................................................. 36, 37, 38 Ocean Cty. Cellular Co. v. Twp. of Lakewood Bd. of Adjustment ............... 37, 38 Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 286 (2013) ............................................. 14, 15 Randolph Town Ctr. Assocs., L.P. v. Twp. of Randolph, 324 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 1999) ............................................ 12, 16, 35 Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 59 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 32 N.J. 347 (1960) .................................................. 37 TSI East Brunswick v. Zoning Board, 215 N.J. 26 (2013) ....................... 14, 15, 16, 35 Regulations N.J.A.C. 16:47-1 ........................................................................................................ 42 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) .................................................................................. 15 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) .................................................................................. 9, 15 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6) ..................................................................................
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[brief] The Board duly considered the evidence adduced at the hearing and based on the sworn testimony of the applicant’s professionals.  Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of a board’s action, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity absent a clear abuse of discretion by a board.  Pullen, supra, 291 N.J. Super. at 312, aff’d, 291 N.J. Super. 1 at 6.  The Board acted reasonably in analyzing the proofs provided and relying on the counsel of the Board attorney and as such the Board’s actions were not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and should be upheld by the Court.
[directive] Person Making Report Preferred?  Full Name Phone □ _______________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  Address Email □ _______________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  City, State DOB _______________________________________________________  ______________________________________________________________  (Provide Whatever Info Is Known)  Officer(s)  Subject to Allegation  Officer(s)  Badge No. ____________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  Incident Site Date/Time ____________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  In the space below, describe the type of incident (traffic stop, street encounter) and any information about the alleged conduct.  If you cannot fit your response below, feel free to use extra pages and attach them to this document.
[brief] Here, the 119 instances of equity transactions for which data is available (and all the decades’ worth of transactions before that) created an implied agreement between [...] and [...] to conduct buyouts at the prior year’s book value.  No other method of valuation has been used, ever.  Yet, the trial court disregarded the Company’s long-standing practice—which [...] himself acknowledged and required—of using Tax Book Value for all equity transactions.  Citing Cohen, the trial court held that “where the partnership agreement fails to set a fair value buyout formula, the Uniform Partnership Act will ‘fill the gap’ by requiring that the buyout price be fair value. ” (Da3192) (discussing Cohen ex rel. Perelman v. Booth Computers, 421 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2011)).  In doing so the trial court effectively determined that “fair value” could not, under the UPA and Cohen, be Tax Book Value.  The trial court thus overlooked Cohen’s holding that “[b]oth net book value and fair market value, as generally accepted techniques of valuation, can constitute fair value. ”  421 N.J. Super. at 156.  The court reasoned that the historical Tax Book Value method involved “very minor interests,” thus failing to take into account the circumstances of this case.  [...] imposed book value valuation on at least 119 people throughout the history of the Company, including in [...]’s equity purchases.  (5T88:12-89:7)  Yet now, finding himself on the seller-side of the transaction, [...] suddenly took the position that the rules apply differently to him, the very definition of inequitable.  There can be no method “fairer” when determining how [...] is to be bought out than to follow decades-long established precedent for how these transactions were always handled.
[brief] CASES  Abbott v. Burke, (“Abbott XIX”) 196 N.J. 544 (2008) ...........................................................................................................  3, 5, 14 Abbott v. Burke, (“Abbott XX”) 199 N.J. 140 (2009) ................................................................................................................ passim Abbott v. Burke, (“Abbott XXI”)  206 N.J. 332 (2011) ................................................................................................................ passim Alcantara v. Allen-McMillen, 475 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 2023) ..................................................................................  14  Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22 (2014) ..................................................................................................................  14  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (2016)  ................................................................................................................  14  Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State, 466 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 2021) ....................................................................................  12 Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 2001) ......................................................................................  4  STATUTES