ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, when an officer equipped with a BWC is dispatched to or otherwise goes to the scene of a “Law Enforcement Incident” as defined in AG Directive 2019-4, the officer shall activate the BWC before arriving at the scene when feasible.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, an officer while at the scene of a “Law Enforcement Incident” shall not de-activate the BWC unless instructed to do so by the assistant prosecutor or assistant or deputy attorney general supervising the investigation of the deadly-force incident pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, or his or her designee.
[brief] Plaintiff and Defendant charged personal expenses along with expenses for [...] on each credit card they used (AMEX, Chase, and Discover).  (2T31:24-32:19; 3T50:24-51:5).  The resulting credit card bills having personal expenses of each of the parties were paid by Plaintiff directly from the pharmacy’s checking account.  (2T32:19-23; 3T51:6-9; 3T143:16-23; 3T144:6-10).  These credit cards were all accounts of the Plaintiff, with Plaintiff having authorized cards for each account being also issued in Defendant’s name.  (2T33:21-34:23; 3T50:12-23).  Plaintiff even authorized Chase to issue a card in Defendant’s daughter’s name.  (2T34:17-20).  Plaintiff had full access to the pharmacy’s [...] business checking account.  He could write checks, make deposits or withdrawal, use the debit card, and had full on-line access to the account, which was the only account the pharmacy had.  (1T44:7-11; 2T27:11-15; 2T37:24-38:1; 3T42:21-43:11).  As sate above, the financials prepared by the pharmacy’s accountant would identify personal expenses of Defendant and Plaintiff in [...]’s financials by categorizing them under “Draw.
[brief] If Landlord fails to pay Tenant an installment of the Tenant’s Allowance within ten (10) days after Landlord’s receipt of written notice from Tenant that such installment is past due, then, **as its sole remedy**, Tenant shall have the right to offset such amount against the Minimum Rent payable by Tenant hereunder.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02 (emphasis added)).  In addition, pursuant to Section 4.02, Tenant granted Landlord the right, but not the obligation, to deduct any amount that Tenant owes to Landlord under the Lease when remitting payment of the Tenant Allowance:  Tenant hereby expressly grants to Landlord an offset and deduction against Tenant’s Allowance for all costs, payments and expenses Tenant is obligated to pay to Landlord pursuant to this Lease or otherwise due and owing to Landlord, at the time an installment of Tenant’s Allowance shall be due or at the time Landlord otherwise elects to pay the Tenant Allowance.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  This elective remedy may be employed by Landlord if, for example, an annual Tenant Allowance payment came due (or Landlord otherwise elected to prepay the same to avoid, or lessen, the interest component) and Tenant owed landlord monies under the Lease but the default was not noticed or the applicable cure period had not expired.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02 (expressly conditioning the annual Tenant Allowance payments on Tenant not being “in monetary default under this Lease after notice and expiration of any applicable cure period. ”) (emphasis added)).  Landlord’s express contractual right to offset these past due amounts during the cure period was not, however, mandatory nor did it permit Tenant to ignore its obligation to pay Rent when the same came due.  Indeed, pursuant to the express terms of the Lease, Landlord’s remedies are cumulative:  The various rights, remedies, powers and elections of Landlord, reserved, express or contained in this Lease are cumulative, and no one of them shall be deemed exclusive of the other or of such other rights, remedies, powers, options or elections as are now or may hereafter be conferred upon Landlord by law or in equity.  (Da56, Lease at § 17.05; see also Da59-60, Lease at § 22.01 (“The mention in this Lease of any specific right or remedy shall not preclude Landlord from exercising any other right nor from having any other remedy nor from maintaining any action to which it may be otherwise entitled either at law or in equity. ”)).
[brief] IMPROPERLY CHARACTERIZED  THE DECISION TO GO TO TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES AS A REFUSAL BY DEFENDANTS TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACCIDENT WHICH REQUIRED THE JURY TO HOLD DEFENDANTS “ACCOUNTABLE. ”  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  .................. 27-33  POINT IV: BY PERMITTING PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL TO MAKE A TIME-UNIT ARGUMENT ON CLOSING WITHOUT PROVIDING THE DEFENSE WITH PRIOR NOTICE  THEREOF, THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED THE DEFENSE OF ANY OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT.  (4T.194:10 TO 200:25; 6T. 17:2 to 33:11).  .......  34-37  POINT V: PLAINTIFF’S PRESENTATION OF A LOST WAGE CLAIM UNSUPPORTED BY EXPERT PROOFS AND HIS UNSOLICITED TESTIMONY CONCERNING HIS RETURN TO TREATMENT  COMPOUNDED  THE PREJUDICIAL IMPACT OF THE “THEME” OF THE CASE PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL.  (2T.22:10 to 25:25; 3T.51:22 to 54:12; 6T.16:8 to 17:1).  ...........................................  38-40  CONCLUSION
[brief] **A.  Respondents Do Not Dispute The Fact That The New Motion Judge Raised And Decided Issues That They Did Not Raise (Pa13-20)**  As demonstrated in Appellant’s Procedural History and initial merits brief, the New Motion Judge raised and then decided matters not raised by any of the motions.  Respondents essentially ignore this argument in their opposition and, to the extent it is addressed in the [...]’ brief, the point is implicitly acknowledged – the [...] simply argue that what the New Motion Judge did was fine.  [[...]’ Brief, pp.25-31].  Respondents implicitly have acknowledged that the sole legal argument pursued by them, in support of their 2020 and 2023 motions, was that Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, establish proximate causation.
[directive] Organizational Statement, Duties, Structure, e t c J ii: io Proposed Amount .&we Funds be Usel in Project- 11)  For I...; of 12)  Description and Length  Project: of Use Funds: 131  Specified of Forfeiture of of 14)  Use Law Enforcement Purpose  This Forfeiture Funds: defined in (Law &oi Purpose is &?forcement firfeiture Operating Aocedwe 12.)  AdmhiXration Standard 5)  Description the Substantial Involvement of Law Enforcement in Project: This of (NOTE: non-law enforcement  A 8' w i t h cannot receive forfeiture funds direct substantid involvement of and enforcement agency in the project.)  16) for Signature of Administrator  Requesting Agency Date 171 or for Typed Printed Name of Administrator Requesting Agency
[directive] Victim/witness cooperation can be strengthened by providing advance explanation to victims and witnesses of what may be expected of them throughout the process and why the system requires this.  Explanation of minor benefits such as parking privileges, transportation and witness fees may also give the victim and witness the feeling that the system has not overlooked their needs.  [...] is charged with the responsibility of developing a brochure about the criminal justice process for victims and witnesses and distributing it to all law enforcement agencies in the State.
[brief] That is understandable, especially given that neither the [...] Model Act nor the model regulations define the term “excessive” or the phrase “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. ”  Instead, the [...] and the [...] hold actuaries to the standards in the ASOP as a means for determining initial and future rate filings.  (Ra254-256; Ra263; and Ra276-281).  In the context of long-term care insurance, ASOP 8 provides the operable guidance, in defining when a rate is considered to be “excessive,” especially if the ordinary and common-sense meaning of the term is confusing, which it is not.
[brief] A core function of a debt collector is to interact with the debtor.  The creation and mailing of dunning letters is at the heart of that function.  Outsourcing that activity does not alter its purpose.  Viewed under the R. 4:6-2(e), the only purpose for Defendant’s conveyance of the information was to “serves a collection function” and, therefore, “is in connection with the collection of debts.
[brief] In contrast, Appellant’s request for a hearing is grounded in a navigational harm that has uniquely impacted Appellant.  [Aa349-Aa382.]  In sum, the NJDEP’s finding in the underlying hearing request denial that “[Appellant] alleges only generalized property rights, indistinguishable from those shared by other neighboring property owners” is not based on the evidence in the record.  [Aa135; Aa351-Aa353; Aa380-Aa382.]  Finally, this Court’s decision in *In the Matter of [...] [...]*, [...],\(^2\) did not hold that Appellant has no property interest beyond Appellant’s property line.  [Ara12-Ara35.]\(^3\)
[brief] We disagree.  “Although [a] defendant has no constitutional right to pretrial lineup discovery, ... a Court has the inherent power to order discovery when justice so requires. ”  *State in Interest of W.C.*, 85 N.J. 218, 221 (1981).  A defendant may, under certain circumstances, be entitled to a pretrial line-up.  *Id.* at 225.  However, before granting a defendant's motion for a pretrial line-up the court has to consider countervailing factors, including whether “identification [is] a substantial material issue. ”  *Id.* at 226.  The trial court in the case before us properly determined that [...] had not made a sufficient showing “that an evidentiary hearing is required prior to [[...]] testifying. ”  [...] had ample opportunity to observe [...] on the night of the homicide, and [...] made no showing to the contrary.
[brief] STANDARDS OF REVIEW  Appellant challenges the following decisions below: 1) judgment after trial was against the weight of the evidence; 2) denial of post-trial motion for reconsideration; 3) granting summary judgment to Respondents on Count VI for recission; 4) granting summary judgment to Respondents on Counts II and III for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty; and 5) granting Respondents’ motion to amend to conform to evidence.
[brief] On February 28, 2024, the Salem County Grand Jury returned indictment [...] charging the defendant with one count of Possession of a Weapon During the Commission of a CDS Offense (Second Degree), a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; one count of Unlawful Possession of a Weapon (Second Degree), a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); one count of Unlawful Possession of a Large Capacity Ammunition Magazine (Fourth Degree), a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3j; one count of Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Third Degree), a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); one count of Possession with the Intent to Distribute a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Third Degree), a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(5); and one count of Possession of a Weapon by a Convicted Person (Second Degree), a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1).  (Pa3-5)  On July 29, 2024, counsel for the defendant filed a Notice of Motion to Suppress Evidence based on a contested stop and search of the defendant.  (Pa6-7).  A hearing was conducted before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on October 18, 2024.  After hearing testimony, the Court suppressed the evidence seized in relation to the investigation.  (Pa1).  The Court ruled that the officer unlawfully detained the defendant when he told the defendant to stop.  The Court went on to indicate that if the stop was justified, the handgun would have fallen under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.  By Order of January 6, 2025, the State was granted leave to appeal the interlocutory order.  (Pa2).  This appeal follows.
[brief] [A] court should consider the totality of circumstances to evaluate whether a party has waived the right to object to arbitration after the matter has been ordered to arbitration and arbitration is held.  Some of the factors to be considered in determining the waiver issue are whether the party sought to enjoin arbitration or sought interlocutory review, whether the party challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, and whether the party included a claim or cross-claim in the arbitration proceeding that was fully adjudicated.  Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 383-84 (2008).  The party challenging the arbitration award in Wein was ordered to arbitrate and then participated in the proceedings without objecting to the arbitrator’s authority.  The winning party moved to confirm, and the challenging party failed to raise the issue of the arbitrator’s authority during this hearing, only raising the issue at the appellate level.  The court held, under the totality of the circumstances, this constituted waiver.  *Id.* at 383-85.  The Court should find the same waiver here.  **ii.
[brief] Retroactivity analysis is “guided by three factors: ‘(1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. ’”  G.E.P., 243 N.J. at 386 (quoting Henderson, 208 N.J. at 300).
[brief] But I also don’t want to delay an important project just over legal ramblings that aren’t going to get us anywhere.  [3T34-15 – 3T34-25]  In response to the trial court’s discussion during the reconsideration hearing, [...] indicated it was not prepared to substantively respond to that discretionary issue because it had never acted on it but did not want to waste time on additional process that would not be of value to the court.
[brief] When a motion to dismiss contains facts outside the pleadings, a trial court may convert it to summary judgment, on notice to the parties.  R. 4:6-2; See e.g. MHA, LLC v. Brach Eichler, LLC, 2018 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2111 at *7 (App. _____________________ 7  Obviously, an ordinance can have more than one substantial government interest.
[brief] ”  Id. at 628.  (See 1T 33-19 to 24-5 (“We are done for today.  . . .  If you want to make an application to represent yourself, you do so.  . . . after consultation with [defense counsel]”)).  In Rose, in an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, this Court held that the failure to conduct the proper inquiry and rule on defendant’s request to represent himself was structural error.  Id. at 628-29.  “In response to defendant’s request, the court was obliged to conduct a Faretta hearing,” not to ignore the request and proceed to trial as though it was not made.  Ibid.  This Court further held that the failure to actually rule on the request does not shield the denial of the right to self-representation from scrutiny: “The failure to rule on a defendant’s request has been treated the same as an explicit denial. ”  Id. at 629.  Here, as in *Rose*, the court committed structural error when it failed to hold the required hearing, address [...]’s request, or even rule on that request.  As *Rose* makes clear, [...] is entitled to a new trial:  “A defendant is entitled to a new trial when a court denies a defendant the right to self-representation without determining whether a timely and unequivocal request was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. ”  *Rose*, 458 N.J. at 628.  See also *id.* at 630 (“Although the record does not clearly demonstrate that defendant’s assertion of the right to represent himself was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, that lack of clarity results from the trial court’s failure to engage in the searching inquiry our case law requires.  The trial court did not explicitly deny defendant’s request.  Nonetheless.  . . . defendant should not be ‘penalized’ for the court’s error in failing to address defendant’s request in a *Faretta* hearing. ”).  The failure to respect [...]’s request to represent himself is structural error that requires reversal of his conviction.  POINT II
[brief] ”  *Walker*, 209 N.J. at 131; see also *Seigelstein*, 464 N.J. Super. at 407 (“The party seeking attorney’s fees has the burden to prove that its request for attorney’s fees is reasonable.  To meet its burden, the fee petitioner must submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. ”) (internal citations omitted).  While the trial court should “evaluate carefully and critically the aggregate hours and specific hourly rates advanced by counsel for the prevailing party to support the fee application” (*Walker*, 209 N.J. at 131), the determination of the prevailing party’s reasonable hourly rate “need not be unnecessarily complex or protracted. ”  *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 337 (1995); see also *Seigelstein*, 464 N.J. Super. at 405-406.  Rather, “the trial court should satisfy itself that the assigned hourly rates are fair, realistic, and accurate, or should make appropriate adjustments. ”  *Rendine*, 141 N.J. at 337; see also *Seigelstein*, 464 N.J. Super. at 406.  Here, Landlord’s Fee Application meets the Supreme Court’s standard and should have been granted in its entirety.
[brief] The Court elucidated, "an intentional wrong is not limited to actions taken with a subjective desire to harm, but also includes instances where an employer knows that the consequences of those acts are substantially certain to result in such harm."  Laidlow, supra, 170 N.J. at 613.  In Van Dunk, the Court held that an employer's reckless conduct at a construction site failed to satisfy the substantial certainty of injury or death required for the commission of an intentional wrong.
[brief] (Da16; Da20; Da23; Dca 1, clip one, 1:45:15 a.m. to 1:45:50 a.m.).  As police then had no facts to suspect [...]’s personal involvement in the matter, she was not questioned in depth, or in an accusatory fashion, contrary to defendant’s suggestion she was then “encountered” and interrogated.  (Db5-6).  Rather, she simply failed to volunteer information.  Nor was she given her Miranda\(^4\) warnings at that time.  (Db4).  Defendant said nothing to the police about her.
[brief] (1T 166-1 to 3)  After both individuals had been arrested, the other officer brought [...] to the station and retrieved the department station camera.  (1T 154-14 to 25)  [...] and the other officer then searched the car.  (1T 32-3 to 33-14)  They found a Social Security card and a driver’s license with [...]’ photo and another person’s name (1T 33-17 to 21) and a nine-millimeter handgun under the front passenger seat.
[brief] Applicability of the Law of the Case Doctrine to [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaims.  Under the law of the case doctrine, “where there is an unreserved decision of a question of law or fact during the course of litigation, such decision settles that question for all subsequent stages of the suit. ”  Bahrle v. Exxon Corp., 279 N.J. Super. 5, 21 (App.Div. 1995) (quoting Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 246 N.J. Super. 172, 179 (App.Div.1993); Monaco v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 178 N.J. 401, 413 (2004) (finding the trial court “overstepped its bounds” when it ruled on an issue that was previously resolved upon summary judgment because “[a] court of equal jurisdiction had no right to ‘reconsider’ [the issue] in the absence of substantially different evidence at a subsequent trial, new controlling authority, or specific findings regarding why the judgment was clearly erroneous”).
[directive] May not remember with any degree of accuracy where they have been, where # they are going, or how long they have been wandering.  -2-  May make up a story rather than admit that they have no recall of recent events.  #  May only be able to recall destinations, addresses or phone numbers from years # ago.  May become agitated or aggressive.  #  When you encounter a person you suspect may have Alzheimer’s disease, follow these guidelines in responding to that person:
[brief] When asked who else drove the Suburban, [...] explained “anybody that asks me,” as she has a “very large family,” and she and her husband tried to be nice by allowing family and friends to use the car.  (4T 31-15 to 32-16, 35-6 to 19)  [...] testified that on the day of the incident, January 1, 2020, her cousin was hosting a New Years party.  (4T 32-17 to 33-22)  She and her family drove the Suburban to the party.  (4T 33-23 to 34-5)  On the drive, [...] did not smell any marijuana in the Suburban, nor did she see a gas mask.  (4T 38-16 to 23)  There were about 20 people at the party when they arrived.  (4T 34-6 to 14)  On that day, [...]’s daughters, their boyfriends, and their friends all used the car to make trips to the store and pick up friends.  (4T 34-15 to 35-5)  The car was also used by others in the lead up to January 1.  (4T 35-20 to 25)  [...] testified that she was no longer loaning the truck out after what happened with her son.
[brief] Id.  Appellant was set up to fail as she was not provided any training concerning the Camden office’s internal operations and procedures, which were different from those of her prior office.  Moreover, while at the Camden office, she was also questioned multiple times by representatives of [...] as to why she had been transferred.  She was advised that they were going to call her old office to find out exactly why she had been transferred.  Id.  On December 7, 2018, Appellant sent an email to Respondent [...] concerning her transfer and the frustrations she felt as a result.  (Pa999, Pa324-417)  98:17-109:19, 233:3-234:13; (Pa655-722) 105:17-113:14.  Appellant explained that as a result of all the stress and anxiety she was experiencing caused by [...]’s sexual harassment, she had to call out of work.  Appellant further advised she would be following up with her doctor.  Respondent [...] never responded to or addressed her concerns.  (Pa655-722) at 109:4-114:4.  At the Camden office, Appellant felt ostracized, and employees knew she was transferred due her sexual harassment accusations, and employees were making comments about and looking at her.  (Pa367-68)  170:1-178:15.
[brief] R. 4:42-11(b).  However, the purpose of the rule is not to penalize the judgment debtor, but rather, to remedy the inequity arising from the fact that until judgment is entered and paid, the judgment debtor has enjoyed full use of money rightfully belonging to the judgment creditor.  *[...]*, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, R. 4:42-11 cmt. 8 (2006); see also *N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc.*, supra, 158 N.J. at 574-75 (noting the “equitable purpose of prejudgment interest”).  In construing a court rule, like the trial court did here with R. 4:42-11(b), our courts apply well-understood principles of statutory construction:
[brief] Notwithstanding the Settlement Agreement and the Appellate Division’s decision in Superior Officers’, Plaintiffs filed this action on October 5, 2023, rehashing claims that pre-date the MSRA, and which were previously abandoned by Plaintiffs.  (Pa00030-47).  Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Complaint relates to MOAs entered in connection with the negotiation of CNAs that expired in 2015, prior to the City’s designation as a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery under the MSRA.  (Pa000034-35, Compl. ¶¶ 13-18).  Plaintiffs allege that during “negotiations for successor CNAs, the City disclosed to Plaintiffs that the [...] needed to promote numerous officers but did not have the financial resources to pay for the promotions. ” (Pa000035, Compl. ¶ 17).  Plaintiffs further allege that in May 2016, again before the Local Finance Board vested the Director with control over [...]’s finances, that the City reached separate agreements with the [...] and [...] regarding promotions.  The agreements, however, did not guarantee a pay increase for the promoted officers.  Far from it – they recognized, the City’s inability to pay promotional increases.  First, an MOA was entered with the [...], which provided that “the City may effectuate such promotions as it deems necessary from Police Officer to Sergeant with no increase in pay until a salary increase, including rank deferential and any other increase, is ratified between the City, the State Monitor, and the [...], or until such salary increases are awarded by an interest arbitrator in accordance with the statutory provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16, et seq.