ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Board rejected [...]’s arguments that [...] separated from his employment due to disability and that the Board’s refusal to process his AD application deprived [...] of due process (PA150).  [...] entered into the Settlement Agreement with his former employer by which he agreed not to seek reemployment with [...] in exchange for [...] dropping pending disciplinary charges (PA150).  Citing Cardinale, supra and M.R. v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 615 (App Div. April 6, 2020), the Board stated that the alleged existence of a disability is irrelevant because [...]’s irrevocable resignation made him ineligible for benefits in the first place (PA150).  [...] has no job to return to and cannot comply with the return to work statute, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) (PA150).
[directive] 8.5.2  Officers who are witnesses must cooperate and truthfully answer all questions narrowly and directly related to performing their duty.  "Performance of duty" includes an officer's actions, observations, knowledge and any other factual information of which they may be aware, whether it concerns their own performance of duty or that of other officers.  If the officer feels their answer would incriminate him or her in a criminal matter, the officer must assert their Miranda rights.  8.6
[brief] Per N.J.S.A. (hereinafter MLUL) 40:55D-65-1, a “zoning ordinance MAY designate and regulate historic sites or historic districts and provide design criteria and guidelines therefor.  Designation and regulation pursuant to this section shall be in addition to such designation and regulation as the zoning ordinance may otherwise require. ”  (emphasis added.)  The remedy is not wholly exhaustive and Plaintiff’s interpretation once again, is designed to mislead the Court as to the powers to be exercised by the Zoning Board and the ability of the Historic Preservation Commission to provide appropriate advice and regulation in the Historic District to preserve its place on the National Historic Register.
[directive] police-community relations pursuit of enhanced that the directives, recognizing chief law enforcement foster communication between goal an important to  While it remains as important to build rank-and-file it just and faith-based leaders, is community executives and policies and and enforce enough, in other words, to irr~pose not the process.  It is officers into Rather, it is necessary to engage officers in the field.  discretion of officers channel the protocols to needed to enhance thei~~ and are explore why those policies protocols training that enables them to in candidly serve.  The concerns, ideals, and values protect and with citizens they the relationship of modern policing, and ingrained in the culture community-outreach events must be expressed at after all, is policing, assignment.
[brief] First, as a practical matter the trial court declined to order any remedy against [...], despite finding that [...] engaged in its own pattern of fraudulent conduct.  The trial court correctly found [...] and [...] were separate and distinct legal entities, but failed to treat them as such while interpreting N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2).  Nevertheless, even if the trial court were to enter an order of disgorgement against [...] because it was a separate legal entity, that order would be still be based on an incorrect interpretation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) and could hinder the Bureau from fully enforcing the Securities Law in future actions.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] alleges that on February 23, 2021 at 6:07am, she was caused to slip and fall due to black ice on the public sidewalk abutting a residential home owned by the Defendants [...] and [...] and located at [...].  (Pa 28, Answer #2).  Plaintiff testified that her car had been totaled about a month prior, leading her to take the bus to 45th Street and New York Avenue in North Bergen and continuing down 46th Street to get to work.  (Pa60 T25:18-19, Pa 31-36).  Plaintiff had taken the bus and walked to work the day before the incident as well without issue.  Pa60 T31:8-14.  Plaintiff also testified that she checks the weather “compulsively,” including as soon as she gets up in the morning: (Pa60, T39:8-18).  The local town ordinance for North Bergen requires homeowners to “Remove or cause to be removed all snow and ice from the sidewalk area in front of or bordering their lands, within 12 hours of daylight after the snow has ceased to fall.
[brief] The only way that Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) can be read in conflict is if [...]’s interest and [...]’s interest are improperly conflated into one, indivisible and unitary asset.  The more reasonable reading, one that gives effect to all terms of the Settlement Agreement, is that these two paragraphs address separate issues.  Paragraph 24(F) preserves [...]’s Palm Beach Property rights to enforce her access to and her share of the sale proceeds derived through [...]’s Estate Plan.  (See Da95-96, at ¶ 24(F)).  Paragraph 24(G) preserves [...]’s Palm Beach Property rights as part of an separate basket of assets derived through [...]’s Estate (See Da96, at ¶ 24(G)).
[brief] \textit{Hutton Park Gardens}, supra, 68 N.J. at 565 (holding that Courts must not evaluate the weight of the evidence for and against the legislative body’s enactment nor review the wisdom of any determination of policy which the body might have made); \textit{Downtown Residents}, supra, 242 N.J. Super. at 338-39 (holding a claim about the merits of the governing body’s choice between two actions “really goes to the question of the wisdom of \textsuperscript{4}  Active submits the Trial Court’s statement that most accurately and succinctly evidences the Trial Court’s ruling is the following:  Even if the redevelopment plan is not consistent with the master plan, the adoption of [...] that supplied reasons and which was voted upon by a majority of the governing body, and which was supported by the record remedied this defect.  3T48:13-17.  the [choice] when balanced against conflicting planning considerations,” which is a judgment courts may not make).  Here, the Trial Court’s deference to the legislative prerogative of the Committee was in line with established New Jersey precedent.
[directive] N.J.S.A.  C.  Where the weapons have been seized pursuant to a court order, domestic violence search warrant, condition of bail or at the scene pursuant to 2C:25-21d, the Division of Criminal Justice, Prosecutors and N.J.S.A. Police Bureau shall conduct an immediate investigation of the incident and determine whether the officer should be permitted to carry a weapon and what conditions, if any, should be recommended to the court for the return of the weapons to the law enforcement officer pending the disposition of the domestic violence proceedings.
[brief] When defendant’s father [...] came up the stairs, defendant shot him in his back.  (7T324-24 to 325-4; 8T25-13 to 18).  He fired at both parents multiple times “until they stopped moving, I was aiming at the head and whatnot” because he did not want them to feel any pain.  (8T24-12 to 22, 105-2 to 21).
[brief]   Exhibit “C” - Certification of [...], Esq. regarding Attorney’s Fee……………………………..Pa112    Exhibit “D” - Certification of [...], Esq. regarding Attorney’s Fee…………………..Pa134    Exhibit “E” - Certification of [...], Esq. regarding Attorney’s Fee……………………………..Pa147 o Proposed Order…………………………………………Pa151 o Proof of Mailing…………………………………………Pa153  December 7, 2023  Email on behalf of Appellant, indicating no request for Oral Argument relative to the Motion for New Trial, based upon Tentative Disposition…………………………………………………..Pa155  Respondent’s Supplemental Reply Brief to Motion pursuant to R.
[brief] “Professional services” is distinguished from “professional engineering services” and inspections fall into the first category.  Pa2128-29.  [...] further testified that no one from [...] and/or [...] explained to [...] what his duties were.  Pa2153.  [...] and [...] had an obligation and responsibility for enforcement of OSHA and ANSI standards, including those for the internal traffic control plan.  Pa2156.  The New Jersey Administrative Code applies only to people who are professional engineers.  Because [...] was not a licensed professional engineer, the Code would not apply to him.  Pa2165-66.  [...] did not require any special education, training, knowledge, or experience to recognize that a particular machine such as the street sweeper which had duct tape holding up the mirrors, should not be put into service.  Pa2171-72.  In [...]’s experience, he had NICET inspectors who worked for him.
[brief] Equitable estoppel “is a doctrine ‘founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law. ’”  Winters v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 86 (2012) (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 178 (2003)).  Also see, Scago v. Bd. Of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, __N.J. __ (May 22, 2024)(setting forth the factors to be considered when determining whether to apply equitable principles in the “interests of justice”).  “[T]he doctrine is designed to prevent injustice by not permitting a party to repudiate a course of action on which another party has relied to his [or her] detriment,” and it is “invoked in the interests of justice, morality and common fairness.
[brief] [...] enrolled in [...] effective September 1, 1991, based on her employment as a teacher with the [...].  (Ra1).  On September 1, 1997, Kress transferred her employment to the [...] ([...]), where she continued to work as a teacher.  (Ra2).  On April 4, 2011, Kress received an estimate of retirement benefits for a service retirement based on a final salary of $90,726.66.  (Ra3-Ra5).  Approximately seven years later, on January 19, 2018, Kress received a subsequent estimate of retirement benefits for a service retirement based on a final salary of $99,990.  (Ra6-Ra8).  On or about September 20, 2019, Kress filed a complaint against the [...] alleging discrimination in violation of the Diane B. Allen Equal Pay Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  (Pa49-Pa56).  In the complaint, Kress alleged that upon her re-hiring in 1997, unlike other male teachers, she did not receive credit from the [...] for her prior teaching experience.  (Pa51).  Kress argued that she qualified for the “MA+30” ---  1  Because the procedural history and facts are closely related, they are combined to avoid repetition and for the court’s convenience.
[brief] [...] accepts the State’s recitation of the case’s basic procedural history and adopts the State’s transcript designation codes.  (Pb 1-2)  The facts were found by the Hon. [...], J.S.C., based on testimony and exhibits presented over several days of hearings in early 2024.  (2T 3-10 to 23)  Officers from the [...] responded to an alleged shooting near the town’s municipal golf course on November 16, 2022.  (2T 9-19 to 10-13)  The victim, [...], was deceased when officers arrived.  (2T 10-14 to 11-16)  Personnel from the golf course yelled to the officers and pointed them towards a nearby individual, [...].  (2T 11-16 to 20)  Officers arrested [...], patted him down, and walked him to a police vehicle.
[brief] Respondent/defendant [...] adopts and incorporates the procedural history of appellant/plaintiff [...].  Appellant/plaintiff filed a Complaint against respondent/defendant [...] on October 28, 2022.  (PA001)  Appellant/plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to seek a declaratory judgment that respondent/defendant [...] was required to pay No-Fault benefits to appellant/plaintiff [...] on November 3, 2022.  (PA002)  Respondent/defendant [...] filed an Answer on December 16, 2022.  (PA003).  Respondent/defendant [...] filed an answer with counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that appellant/plaintiff was not entitled to No-Fault Benefits on January 16, 2023.  (PA004).  Respondent/defendant, [...], filed a motion to stay all actions in personal injury protection arbitrations on February 1, 2023.  (PA005)  Appellant/plaintiff [...] and respondent/defendant [...] agreed to settle [...]’s claim in principle on September 15, 2023.  The claims of appellant/plaintiff [...] against Respondent/defendant [...] were dismissed by a Stipulation of Dismissal on October 12, 2023.  However, this matter was “unsettled”.  Respondent/defendant [...] was granted summary judgment against [...] on March 1, 2024, and certified the Summary Judgment Order on April 29, 2024.  (PA162-163).  Respondent/defendant [...] was granted summary judgment against [...] on June 7, 2024, on an unopposed motion.  (DR05)  In both summary judgment decisions, the trial court found that there is no coverage for the plaintiff/respondent because the [...]’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey.  (DR05, PA162-163)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] Written Statement of Reasons  In order to alleviate any suspicion about the arbitrariness of the decisional process and to assist in judicial review under the abuse of discretion standard, the Attorney General or county prosecutor shall furnish to the court and to the defendant a written statement of the reasons for declining or seeking a waiver pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e).  The statement of reasons required by this Section shall describe all pertinent and available facts relevant to the factors enumerated in Section VII of these Guidelines.  The statement of reasons should not simply repeat the relevant statute and waiver factors, but should be fact- specific and not vague.  State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236 (1995).  The statement of reasons will help the county prosecutor show the court that they did not abuse their discretion by denying a waiver of forfeiture since the statement will disclose that the decision was based on a rational explanation founded in the established guidelines.  Alternatively, in cases where waiver of forfeiture of office is sought, the written statement of reasons can be used for showing good cause to the court.  VII.
[directive] Law enforcement executives shall not assign to the internal affairs function any person responsible for representing members of a collective bargaining unit.  The conflict of interest arising from such an assignment would be detrimental to the internal affairs function, the subject officer, the person so assigned, the bargaining unit and the agency as a whole.  In order to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of investigations, any witness and representative present at an interview shall be required to sign and adhere to a non- disclosure agreement.  Witnesses shall be required to sign the form attached as Appendix I.  Representatives shall be required to sign the form attached as Appendix N.  4.2.6
[brief] Id.  But as the Courts noted, those facts of new extensions of credit were not present in Woo-Padva 2 or Valentine, nor are they present here.  Finally, the Court correctly held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate an \(^{20}\) (Da58-Da63).  \(^{21}\) (Da58-Da63).  ascertainable loss, and, for all these reasons, she could not establish her claim under the NJCFA.  *Id.*  Here, no different than the plaintiffs in *Valentine* and *Woo-Padva* 2, the Complaint fails to state a claim because Respondents are not engaged in any consumer-facing sales and did not extend any credit to Appellant.
[brief] (5T 123-10 to 128-14)  .........................................................................................................................  9  A.  The Trial Court Has a Duty to Ensure that Only Reliable Forensic Testimony is Admitted.  ..................................  10  B.  Firearms and Tool Mark Examination – A Primer .....................  12  C.  There Is No Scientific Basis For The Claim That Firearms Examiners Can Definitively Determine That Ammunition Came From A Specific Gun.  Testimony that Purports That Purports To Do So Is Unreliable.........................................................................................................................  16  D.  The Expert’s Testimony That The Guns And Casings Were Fired From The Specific Gun Was Scientifically Unsupported and Unreliable.  Its Admission Was Unduly Prejudicial And Necessitates Reversal of Defendant's Convictions.  .................. 23  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D.)  POINT II
[brief] A review of records of the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Superior Court, included in the Edison Municipal Court file (Pa179-187, Pa309, 314-321), clearly shows that Plaintiff’s municipal appeal, which had been filed by [...]’s attorney in the (wrong) Civil Division, was transferred to the Criminal Division.  Further, by letter dated March 17, 2022, from the Criminal Division Manager’s Office, Plaintiff’s counsel, [...], Esq., was advised that [...] (Hon. [...], J.S.C.) granted Plaintiff’s application to accept the previously filed notice of municipal appeal out of time.  (Pa314-318).  In the same letter, however, Plaintiff’s attorney was advised that the application for indigency was denied and that additional documents were required to complete the request (Pa314).
[brief] The Board of Review then stated that there must be a finding that the employee, in fact, decided to terminate the employment.  [...] contends that his fear of Covid-19 in early 2020 should be considered as similar to an illness.  Covid-19 was a pandemic.  There is no proof in the record that Mr. [...] decided to terminate his employment.  In *Savastano v. State Board of Review*, 99 N.J. Super 397, (APP. DIV. 1968) it was held that there must be a finding of an intent by the employee to leave employment.  Again, there is no proof of intent in this case.  *Garcia v. Board of Review*, 191 N.J. Super 602, (APP. DIV 1983) held there must be proof that the employee intended to quit his job.  In a Civil Service disciplinary case, the employer bears the burden of sufficient, competent, and credible evidence of facts essential to the charge.  *Atkinson v. Parsekian* 37. N.J. 143 (1917); *In re Polk* 90 N.J. 550 (1982).  In an administrative proceeding, concerning a major disciplinary action, the employer must prove its case by a fair preponderance of the believable evidence, citing both the *Polk* and *Atkinson* cases.  The Appellate Court may look as to whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action.  See *In re Carter*.  Mr. [...] contends based on the above there is no evidence that he abandoned his job.  Therefore, Mr. [...] asks this Court to reverse the agency decision.
[brief] Carey, 168 N.J. at 427.  "They were intended to promote uniformity in sentencing while retaining a fair degree of discretion in the sentencing courts."  Carey, 168 N.J. at 427-28.  Thus, as the Court recognized in Yarbough, "even within the[se] general parameters . . . there are cases so extreme and so extraordinary that deviation from the guidelines may be called for."
[directive] (depending the should or high moderate, score elevated, is 7.4.2b, 7.4.3 prosecutor's subsections 7.4.2.a, and (presumptions guiding a also subsection 4.5.1.  See See, e.~., either a high FTA or NCA or high triggered by score, or a moderate detention that are pretrial seek discretion to 31 Page "Decision PSA measures risks, the while the AOC's PSA.  Thus, through the risks identified recommending the manage the identified risks by designed to Making Framework" is monitoring. conditions and of release level appropriate Assessment Score Values.
[brief] Moreover, even to the extent that it is controlling, that case confirmed that “[f]urnishing water might be considered as a sale of a "service" and that “[a] (water) public utility is selling a service. ”  \textit{K.S.B. Tech. Sales v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply}, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977)  Were the court to hold that the TCA bars the complaint, such would be an unconstitutional interference with plaintiff’s right to freedom of contract:  \textbf{Charges by a municipality for water furnished to its customers involve a sale and arise from a contractual relationship between it and the customer.}
[brief] Date of Submission: August 15, 2023  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page # | |----------------------------------------------|--------| | Procedural History | 1 | | Statement of Facts | 3 | | Legal Argument | 5 | | I.  The Trial Court erred in granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss because doing so was contrary to notions of justice and was antithetical to the purpose of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  (Transcript, 25:3–17).  | 5 | | a.  The Trial Court did not consider the fact that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should have been a recourse of last resort and should only be granted in the rarest of instances.  (Transcript, 25:3–17).  | 7 | | b.  The Trial Court’s ruling to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice was in error because Plaintiff substantially complied with the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  (Transcript, 18:23–25, 19:1–9).  | 11 | | c.  The Trial Court’s ruling to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint was in error because extraordinary circumstances exist.  (Transcript, 25:3–17).  | 14 | | II.  The Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice must be reversed because it promotes gamesmanship of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  (Transcript, 19:11–25).  | 18 | | III.  The Trial Court erred in its dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint  Because Plaintiff was excused from the Affidavit of Merit Requirement as a result of Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiff with requested medical records.  (Transcript, 28:20–29:1).  | 20 | | Conclusion | 27 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] ”  56 N.J.L. 318, 319 (E&A 1894).  Similarly, in Strollo v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., the court affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss a tortious interference claim where the defendants “wrongfully caused [the plaintiff] to lose his employment by the slanderous and untrue statements they made concerning the plaintiff to his employer. ”  20 N.J. Misc. 217, 220 (Sup. Ct. 1942).  And, in Lightening Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp, the Third Circuit found that franchisees were liable for tortious interference because they committed a host of wrongful conduct, including improper threats, defamatory statements, and false accusations of fraud.
[directive] The mandatory penalties are as follows: (1)  Up to $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2)  Up to $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  Up to $750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  Up to $500 in the case of a 4th degree crime  TOTAL  S.C.V.T.F. Penalty: $ Dat/Date  Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole paj 7 nan
[brief] Plaintiff argues the retaliation she faced consisted of the following: “nobody wanted to work with her[,] . . . no one would help her[,] . . . [and that she] was isolated at work. ” (AB at p. 20).  Plaintiff fails to name these faceless individuals and points to no evidence on the record that suggests that any of these nameless individuals knew anything about her alleged whistleblowing activity.  Since Plaintiff has not established those allegedly mistreating her knew about her alleged whistleblowing activity, she cannot establish causation.  Plaintiff further argues that “independent documented evidence” demonstrates that the employees at “one of [Defendant’s] locations, [...], [did] not want[] to work with [Plaintiff] because she discussed her --- 6