ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] | Cases | Page | |-------------------------------------------|------| | **Borngesser v. Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.,** | 22 | | 340 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 2001) | | | **Briscoe v. LaHue,** 460 U.S. 325 (1983)| 30 | | **Brown v. State,** | 19 | | 442 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div. 2015) | | | **Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,** | 34 | | 509 U.S. 259 (1993) | | | **Burns v. Reed,** | 34 | | 500 U.S. 478 (1991) | | | **Butz v. Econmou,** | 32 | | 438 U.S. 478 (1978) | | | **CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ.,** | 23 | | 734 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2013) | | | **Coles v. Carlini,** | 20 | | 162 F. Supp. 3d 380 (D.N.J. 2015) | | | **DeGroot v. Muccio,** | 33 | | 115 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div. 1971) | | | **Delbridge v. Schaeffer,** | 32 | | 238 N.J. Super. 323 (Law Div. 1989) | | | **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus,** | 16 | | [...]| | | 237 N.J. 91 (2019) | | | **Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co.,** | 30 | | 117 N.J. 539 (1990) | | | **Ex parte Young,** | 21-22| | 209 U.S. 123 (1908) | | | **Ferri v. Ackerman,** | 32 | | 444 U.S. 193 (1979) | | | **Forrester v. White,** | 34 | | 484 U.S. 219 (1988) | | | **Grillo v. State,** | 16 | | 469 N.J Super. 267 (App. Div. 2021) | | Gruntal & Co., Inc. v. Steinberg, 837 F. Supp. 85 (D.N.J. 1993) ...................... 21 Herman v. Coastal Corp., 348 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2002) ......................................................... 24, 27 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) .................................................. 34 In re Montgomery Cty., 215 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2000) .................................... 33 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997) ............................................. 34 K.D. v. Bozarth, 313 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div. 1998) ............................... 31-32 Kernan v. One Wash. Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 154 N.J. 437 (1998)
[brief] At the same time, [...] admits that the only claim an adult employee may legally assert against his employer outside the statutory system is an intentional-wrong claim.  *Ibid.*  [...]’s cite to *Central National v. Utica National*, 232 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1989), does not illuminate the matter because that case was decided on grounds that the injury was not suffered in the course of employment.  Only in dicta does it speak to certain specific employees to which the insurance may apply but makes no such finding in that regard.  *Id.* at 471.  Moreover, *New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Delta Plastics*, 380 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2005), *aff’d*, 188 N.J. 582 (2006), makes clear that even if the insurance did cover those instances discussed in *Central Union*, the exclusion urged here by defendants “would come very close to eliminating meaningful Part Two coverage.
[brief] In that regard, the law regarding restrictions on “on-premises” versus “off-premises” signage is well settled.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held, and the New Jersey Appellate Division has agreed, that where the only distinction at issue on the face of a regulation is the differential treatment of “on-premises” and “off-premises” signage, the First Amended is not “offend[ed]. ”  See, In re Denial of the Outdoor Advert. Application No. 75708 (“[...]”), No. A-5468-16T1, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1397, at *14-15 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2019) (“On-premise [sic] signs are exempt from the 500-foot distance restriction and do not require permits.  If that were the only distinction between the two, the different treatment would apparently not offend the First Amendment, notwithstanding that the regulation distinguishes between speakers. ”), citing, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 175, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2233 (2015)]. at 2233 ([...], concurring) (stating that "[r]ules distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises signs" "would not be content based"); see also [...] v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (post-Reed, upholding disparate treatment of on-premises and off-premises signs that applied only to commercial speech).
[brief] Defendants’ Notice of Expedited Motion on Short Notice to Dissolve or, in the Alternative, to Modify the Temporary Restraints ........................................................................................................Da110-12 September 8, 2023  Defendants’ proposed Order to Show Cause to Disqualify Counsel ........................................................................................................Da113-14 September 8, 2023  Certification of [...] in Support of Order to Show Cause ........................................................................................................Da115-19  Exhibit A – July 30, 2012  Operating Agreement of [...] ........................................................................Da120-36  Exhibit B – August 29, 2012  Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of [...] ..............Da137-52  Exhibit C – May 23, 2023  Written Consent and Resolution of [...] and May 23, 2023  Written Consent and Resolution of the Sole Member of 300 Sylvan Avenue Associates, LLC ........................................................................Da153-69  Exhibit D – June 1, 2023  Notice of Termination of Plaintiff-Respondent [...] as Manager .................................Da170-72 1  The document appearing at Da74 (formerly Da126) is the best copy available to Appellants as it is uploaded exactly as it was filed by [...].  Exhibit E – Verified Complaint, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da3-23 .................................................................Da173
[brief] (Db27).  To the contrary, the judge was obligated to give the unrequested charge because it was clearly indicated by the record.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the conviction.  At the charge conference, which took place during trial, the judge questioned the parties as to charging aggravated and reckless manslaughter as lesser-included offenses to murder.  (7T88-15 to 89-10).  Defense counsel objected, opining that “this is either a murder case or it’s not. ”  (7T89-13 to 14).  Counsel believed charging lesser-includeds “would give the jury the option of compromising,” which had “some appeal” to the defense, but ultimately did not “believe that the evidence suggest[ed]” the lesser offenses.
[brief] Three groups of defendants moved to compel arbitration.  The Law Division entered three orders granting the motions, each with the same reasoning.  See Pa0001-0022.  The court held that AICRA’s language required arbitration, at the election of any party, of “all ‘disputes’ around the recovery of PIP Benefits. ”  Pa0006.  The Law Division reasoned that AICRA’s arbitration provision “encompasses a broad array of legal disputes regarding PIP benefits, including mistaken claims for benefits, fraud-based claims, or any other claim including the ‘recovery’ of PIP Benefits. ”  Ibid.  The Law Division further reasoned that all of Plaintiffs’ claims “involve (1) a dispute by Plaintiffs, (2) involving Defendant[s’] recovery of PIP Benefits that (3) one party wishes to send to arbitration. ”  Pa0007.  The court was “unconvinced” by Plaintiffs’ argument that there was a distinction under AICRA between disputes about whether an insurer was required to pay benefit claims and disputes about whether a provider obtained benefits from an insurer through fraud.  *Ibid.*  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[directive] 3.2  Considerations when using force.  The decision to use force and the appropriate amount of force requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each incident.  The officer must, as time permits and is feasible, consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors when determining whether and how much force to apply: (a) immediacy and severity of the threat to officers or the public; (b) the conduct of the individual being confronted, as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time; (c) characteristics of the officer and subject (e.g., age, size, relative strength, skill level, injuries sustained, level of exhaustion or fatigue, the number of officers available vs. subjects); (d) the effects of drugs or alcohol; (e) the individual’s mental state or capacity; (f) the proximity of weapons or dangerous improvised devices; (g) the degree to which the subject has been effectively restrained and their ability to resist despite being restrained; (h) the availability of other options and possible effectiveness; (i) the seriousness of the suspected offense or reason for contact with the individual.
[brief] When the Court examined the issue of discrimination based on race, the Trial Court weighed the evidence regarding the prongs to be satisfied.  The Respondents claimed that the Appellant, then Plaintiff was not performing her job properly and the Court weighed in on this claim rather than looking at the evidence presented by the Appellant.  The Appellant presented ample evidence that she was performing her job including her long history in the education system, the eagerness with which she was hired, the effective evaluations that she received, the absence of any disciplinary action and the fact that there was a failure in not renewing her contract without setting forth the basis for this action.  There is no evidence in the record that Appellant was not doing her job.  There is no evidence in the record that Respondents provided Appellant with courses or some support to address the alleged performance issues, yet the Trial Court took a one-sided approach, weighed the evidence from the Respondents’ perspective and decided that there was a basis for dismissing the claim of discrimination based on race.  The Court was required to determine if there was documentary, evidentiary material presented by the Appellant to support the cause of action of racial discrimination and failed in this endeavor.  Similarly, the Court weighed the evidence regarding the issue of discrimination based on age and again adopted the position of the Respondents.  Evidence was in the record regarding the issue of age discrimination and the Court ignored that evidence.  The Court denied that Appellant worked in a hostile work environment and denied that the conduct that Appellant complained of was because of her age and race.  The Court further minimized the Appellant’s complaint of hostile work environment and harassment and while acknowledging what some of the issues were that were experienced by Appellant, weighed the evidence again and claimed that there was no basis for the claim of hostile work environment.  The Court in weighing the hostile work environment claims wrote that those claims even if true could not survive summary judgment.  Again, the Trial Court had the responsibility of determining what was in the record in support of Appellant’s claims and the record for Appellant’s evidence and there was a failure to do so.  There was no basis for dismissal of the case which again represented the Court weighing the evidence and deciding the case.
[brief] (5T:24-24 to 25-15)  The real-time impact of the resentencing was a reduction of [...]’s parole ineligibility term by three years.  This superficial change in [...]’s sentence bears no relation to the question at hand, or even to the court’s own findings.  The court found that [...] could not be characterized as one of the rarest of children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption warranting decades of incarceration.  Therefore, it was required to give effect to its finding that [...] was capable of rehabilitation by imposing a new sentence that would afford him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.  See Zuber, 227 N.J. at 452 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (See PA007-009.)5 [...] withdrew its motion, and the court dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ claims and requested briefing on jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.  See generally Mitchell v. Wells [...] Bank, N.A., 355 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (D. Utah 2018).  5  [...]’s obligation and failure to ask questions about his iPad signature are addressed in Section IV.B, supra.  To avoid repetition, this Section only addresses the lack of fiduciary duty.
[brief] K.V.H. v. W.S.H., No. A-1494-16T1, 2018 WL 4623385, at *4 (N.J. App. Div. Sept. 27, 2018).  “[W]e have expressly held that parties are not ‘entitled to create an avenue of direct appeal to this court’ from an arbitration award when the parties have failed to challenge the award in the trial court. ”  Id. at 135 (citing Hogoboom v. Hogoboom (n/k/a Grimsley), 393 N.J. Super.
[brief] Order Entering Default Against Defendant, [...], filed October 11, 2023…………………………………52a  Order Entering Default Against Defendant, [...], filed October 11, 2023………………………………………………………………………..53a  Consent Order Vacating Default Against Defendants, filed November 8, 2023…………………………………………………………………………………………..55a  Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed May 10, 2024………………………………………………………………………………….84a  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Answer, filed May 10, 2024………………………………………………………………………………….86a  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] ”  State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554 (2019) (quoting Stovall, 170 N.J. at 361).  This determination is based on examining the facts available at the time of the encounter.  State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 518, 520-21 (2020)  A police officer’s mistake of fact will only justify a search or arrest if it is reasonable.  While Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides “room . . . for some mistakes,” the principle only applies when police behave “reasonably. ”  State v. Sutherland, 231 N.J. 429, 437 (2018) (quoting State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 54 (2011)).  Moreover, when police obtain evidence through unconstitutional means, “our State Constitution does not contemplate good faith mistakes by law enforcement as an exception to the exclusionary rule. ”  Id. at 436.  Here, police acted unreasonably under the circumstances by initiating a stop of [...]’s car without confirming the validity of the warrant.
[brief] First, [...] contends that the trial court’s discovery protocol is unduly invasive of its “privacy rights,” because the [...] “could weaponize confidential documents they gain access to during discovery.”  (Db36.)  Not so.  As the trial court emphasized, there is a stringent protective order in place that allows the parties to designate produced materials as Confidential or Attorneys’ Eyes Only and precludes receiving parties from “weaponiz[ing]” those materials.  (Da89-90; Da159; T6-8 to -10.)  In addition, the court threatened to impose “extreme” sanctions on any party that violates the protective order.  (T23-23 to 24-4.)  Finally, the trial court permitted the parties to withhold from production any materials “that contain information so proprietary that their production could result in business losses or disruption. ”  (Da167-68 ¶ 3.)  In short, [...] cannot show that the trial court’s discovery protocol is so “invasive” as to constitute an abuse of the court’s discretion.
[brief] f.  The trial court’s erroneous reliance on Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n  Last but not least, the trial court’s reliance on Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n, 41 N.J. Eq. 606 (1886), was erroneous because Lennig is a use case, not an access case, in which the issue was whether the defendant developer had the right to change the fundamental nature of the “tenting ground” properties at issue.  Again, as [...] explains:  Unlike Lennig, [the [...]] have never suffered a change of use of the beach or been denied reasonable access to it; unlike Lennig, in which “Tenting Grounds” was written clearly on the land to be used in common, there is no indication on the Filed Map that [...], or any other beachfront owner, would have a private property right to access the ocean directly from their property; and unlike Lennig, there is an improvement in the common area shown on the Filed Map that indicates that the developer is retaining control of [...].  For Lennig to apply to the case at hand, the Plaintiffs would have to show that they had been deprived of any reasonable access to [...]; of course, the Plaintiffs cannot show that to be the case.
[brief] Although the issue here is one of first impression, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Malanga v. Tp. of West Orange*, 253 N.J. 291 (2023) teaches that a requirement of sufficient or substantial evidence is compelled by that framework.  *Malanga* was an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the designation of the [...] as an “area in need of redevelopment” (ANR) under the Local Redevelopment Law, 40 N.J.S.A. 12A-5(d).  The planning analysis, using language that mirrored the statute, concluded there was “substantial evidence to demonstrate that the library property qualified. ”
[brief] Watson, 2023 WL 4918557, at *24; see also State v. Allen, 2023 WL 4915228, at *10-*11 (Aug. 2, 2023) (holding that an officer’s video narration testimony that “a particular frame depicted the suspect ‘turning towards the officer’ [and] that that the video showed where [the suspect] was standing” violated factor three of Watson because it provided “[the officer’s] view” as to “sharply disputed facts”); State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333, 366 (2023) (holding that an officer’s video narration testimony describing an image on video as a gun was inadmissible because that fact was in dispute, the image was difficult to discern, and the jury was just “as competent as the officer to determine what [the video] showed. ”).  Next, the State asked the detective “do you have a picture of that individual in another video,” and [...] identified S-38.
[brief] (5T6:8-11).  Since the Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s motions in limine to bar evidence and testimony of her prior medical history and falls these issues had to be addressed on direct examination.  (5T13:11-15; 5T15:17-16:20; 5T17:5-24).  [...] testified the prior falls involved a situation where the plaintiff slid off her bed when she was sitting on the edge of the bed to put on her socks and a situation where she tripped on a cobblestone brick.  (5T16:8-20; 5T17:5-20).  She also explained that the numbness and tingling in plaintiff’s legs did not affect her ability to walk.  (5T15:24-16:1).  She was then questioned about the plaintiff’s prior history of neuropathy, use of a cane, prior falls, balance problems, difficulty standing, and physical therapy for balance and walking on cross-examination.  (5T44:22-45:5; 5T45:10-46:6).  The plaintiff also called [...], P.E., AIA, CHFP and [...], RN, BSN, CCM, CLCP, CNLCP as expert witnesses.
[brief] This cited case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, at 313 speaks to (Whether or not the action is in personam or in rem, the court can determine the interests of all claimants providing there is a procedure allowing for “notice and an opportunity” to be heard).  The trial court failed to recognize this defendant’s claim of a Due Process Violation (defective service) which was not disputed by Plaintiff [...] for she clearly failed to Respond as to prove validity of service once jurisdiction was challenged (Pa1) that would have compelled the Trial Court to ascertain established case law (utilizing Stare Decisis) to determine Third Circuit precedents when jurisdiction had been challenged by this defendant (facilely mirroring this case before this court).  Intrinsically, the Trial Court failed to acknowledge when validity of service is challenged, the party claiming valid service bears the burden of proof:  Grand Entm't Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993).  In the trial court’s Civil Action Order filed November 21, 2023 (Pa1), it clearly established the court did not receive a response from the plaintiff, ultimately failing to prove the burden of validity of service as the court wrote: “DESPITE the plaintiff having been properly served” (Pa1).  The lower court failed to recognize as matter of established case law as it will speak to the heart of this Appeal before the Appellate Division that the absence of service of process or a waiver of service by the defendant, due process will NOT permit a court to exercise power over a party named as DEFENDANT in the complaint as cited in: Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350, 119 S.Ct. 1322, 143 L.Ed.2d 448 (1999).
[brief] In the Matter of the Estate of [...], Deceased.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION On Appeal From the Superior Court of New Jersey  Chancery Division: Probate Part  Bergen County  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.  Docket No. Below: [...]  REPLY BRIEF AND SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, [...] [...]
[brief] Q  [... ]  I understand you sustained some pretty severe injuries to your legs; correct?  A Yes, Sir.  Q  All right a number of surgeries? A Yes.  Q  Okay and some PT and recovery time; correct?  A Yes.  Q  Has the condition gotten any better since way back when you first had the surgeries?  Has it improved a little bit?  A Yes.  Q  Okay.  Has any doctor recommended that you undergo an additional surgery in the near future for your legs?  A  As of right now, no.  [3T188-189.]  Orthopedic surgeon [...] testified about the injuries Plaintiff sustained as a result of this crash, her medical treatment including surgeries, the permanency of her injuries, and her prognosis.
[brief] *State v. McKinney*, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015), quoting *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997); see also *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988) (“Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant's right to a fair trial”).  “[T]he trial court has an absolute duty to instruct the jury on the law governing the facts of the case. ”  *State v. Butler*, 27 N.J. 560, 595 (1958).  The charge must provide a “‘comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find. ’”  *State v. Green*, 86 N.J. 281, 287-288 (1981). ”  *Concepcion*, 111 N.J. at 379.  “A charge is a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations.
[brief] Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; see also State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563 (1979) (“New Jersey courts, in entertaining veracity challenges, need go no further than is required as a matter of Federal Constitutional law by Franks v. Delaware”).  To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.  *Franks*, 438 U.S. at 171.  A challenger must point out specifically the portion of the written affidavit that is claimed to be false, accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons.  *Ibid.*  “Affidavits of sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished or their absence satisfactorily explained . . . [t]he allegedly false statement, however, must be that of the officer and not of a non-government informant. ”  *Ibid.*; see also *State v. Guillman*, 113 N.J. Super. 302, 305-06 (App. Div. 1971) (stating that information coming from law enforcement officers is entitled to greater credence than knowledge supplied by the typical informer).  Specifically, the defendant must meet the following factors to be entitled to a hearing:
[directive] Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders.  The JJDP Act states that status offenders and non- 1. offenders are not to be placed in secure detention or correctional facilities.  42 U.S.C. 5633, Section 223(a)(12)(a).  Separation from Adults.  The JJDP Act states that all juveniles in custody within a secure lockup 2. facility must be separated from detained adults.  42 U.S.C. 5633, Section 223(a)(13).  Federal regulators have interpreted this provision as requiring “sight and sound” separation from detained adults.  28 C.F.R. 31.303(d)(1)(i).  Furthermore, the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice provides that “...a juvenile may be held in a police station in a place other than one designed for detention of prisoners and apart from any adult charged with or convicted of crime for a brief period if such holding is necessary to allow release... .”  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-37(c)  Page 3 3.