[brief] As explained by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:  Courts have repeatedly rejected [...]’s argument that the use of the word “may” automatically renders an arbitration clause permissive.  *Brown v. City of Phila.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119163, 2010 WL 4484630 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2010).  Rather, courts have interpreted arbitration clauses using the word “may” to be mandatory on the grounds that such language merely manifests the parties’ intent that arbitration be obligatory if either party so chooses.  See e.g., *Shubert v. Wellspring Media, Inc (In re Winstar Communs., Inc.)*, 335 B.R. 556, 563 (Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2005) (citing *Chiarella v. Vetta Sports, Inc.*, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14395, 1994 WL 557114, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (“... the proper interpretation is that the arbitration provision did not have to be invoked, but once raised by one party, it became mandatory with respect to the other party.  A plain reading of the clause supports such an interpretation.  If the clause were wholly optional it would serve no purpose. ”))  *[...] Research, Inc. v. [...]*, 2021 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 127031, at *12 (E.D.Pa. July 7, 2021) (emphasis added).  This case law follows the plain meaning of the language – if either party is granted a contractual right and “may” initiate arbitration, once that right is exercised, arbitration is mandatory.  Otherwise, the arbitration clause is rendered meaningless.  The lower court wholly ignored this Court’s holding in Delaware River and rejected the reasoning in [...] Research by stating that the “the Third Circuit’s advice or recognition is only persuasive before me. ”  T1 76:5-6.  Notably, despite the lower court’s rejection of case law that squarely addressed the precise issue concerning the context of the word “may,” [...] cited to no contrary authority that remotely supported its position.  Rather, [...] merely cited to the Service of Suit clause and claimed that it somehow overrides the arbitration clause.  [...]’s argument distorted the contract language and effectively ignored the bolded text below:  U. Service of Suit – Subject to VI.  CONDITIONS, Paragraph F, above, it is agreed that in the event of failure of the Company to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Company, at the request of the Insured, will submit to the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction within the United States…  Da378, Sec. U. (emphasis added).  While [...]’s Opposition in the lower court quoted the clause, it did not substantively address the first part of the sentence, which states that the Service of Suit clause is “subject to VI. CONDITIONS, Paragraph F” – which is the arbitration clause.  This language defeats [...]’s argument that the arbitration clause is superseded by the Service of Suit clause as the contract makes it clear that the opposite is true.  During oral argument [...] sought to remedy the deficiencies in its briefing by seeking to harmonize the Service of Suit clause and the Arbitration clause by inserting the word “promptly” into the Service of Suit clause – which is merely another way of asserting its waiver argument which, as discussed below, fails under the facts of this case.  T1 24:11-19.  Accordingly, the [...] requires [...] to arbitrate the Indemnity Claim.