ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The flood of debt collection suits in state courts have “posed considerable challenges to the smooth and efficient operation of courts. ”  See Federal Trade Commission, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change, a Workshop Report, at 55 (Feb. 2009).  In fact, in New Jersey, 1,513,086 contract cases were filed in the Special Civil Part from 2010 to 2014.  See New Jersey Judiciary, Superior Court Caseload Reference Guide 2010 – 2014.  It is estimated that almost 90% of debt collection suits end in default judgments.  See Federal Trade Commission, Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration, at 7 (July 2010).  But here, [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and the debt buying industry have become immune from the Consumer Fraud Act’s coverage.  “No person shall engage in business as a consumer lender or sales finance company without first obtaining a license or licenses under this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a).  A consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of section 3 . . . of this act, shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges.  . . .  In addition, a consumer lender who knowingly and willfully violates any provision of this act shall also forfeit to the borrower three times any amount of the interest, costs or other charges collected in excess of that authorized by law. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) (emphasis added).  By failing to first hold the requisite license, [...] engaged in criminal conduct under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act rendering the debts as legal nullities.  But it then collected those void debts from New Jersey consumers.  Worse than suing on time-barred debts which remain valid although unenforceable (see, e.g., *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016)), [...]/[...] sued on void debts—things which have no legal significance—in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  They enforced an improper, void debt against a consumer, in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  Defendants must be within the scope of the Consumer Fraud Act.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] (Pa000084).  There were simply too many questions of material fact pertaining to [...]’s involvement with the project for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of [...].  However, despite the factual unknowns, from the outset, it was clear that the site plan prepared by [...] provided for substantial modifications to Plaintiffs’ property.  [...] further acknowledges and admits that [...]’s site plan included the Plaintiffs’ property as part of the redevelopment project, and that [...]’s site plan did not change until after Plaintiffs had objected, and also after the excavation of Plaintiffs’ parking lot.  (Pa000435).  This was more than a sufficient factual basis for Plaintiffs to pursue [...].  Even more important to the Plaintiffs’ decision to file a lawsuit naming [...] was that as of the date that [...] claims the site plan was changed, the damage had already been done.  At the time of the filing of the Complaint, and at the time Plaintiffs were served with the frivolous litigation letter, Plaintiffs did not know who had caused the damage.  Plaintiffs only learned this information in connection with depositions during discovery.
[brief] Particularly applicable here is Hopler v. Morris Hills Reg’l Dist., 45 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 1957).  There, the defendant’s land had “naturally sloped downwardly toward” the land of its adjoining neighbor, the plaintiff.  Id. at 411–12.  While constructing an athletic field on its property, the defendant installed catch basins leading to a drainage outlet that discharged water onto the plaintiff’s property.  Id. at 412.  During a hurricane a year later, water flowed through the plaintiff’s property and damaged the foundation of the plaintiff’s house.  Id.  The plaintiff sued for damages, and the only evidence he presented on causation was his own testimony that he went outside during the hurricane to follow the flow of water to its source and personally observed it emanating from the defendant’s drainage outlet.  Id. at 412, 415.  Notwithstanding that the defendant introduced testimony from his engineering expert that its drainage system did not alter the natural flow of water, the trial court credited the plaintiff’s personal observations and entered judgment in his favor, which was affirmed on appeal.  *Id.* at 413, 415.  The trial court had concluded that the damage to the plaintiff’s property was not solely caused by the heavy rain of the hurricane, “but that a contributing cause was the collection of surface waters expelled through an artificial device. ”  *Id.* at 416.  Affirming that conclusion, the Appellate Division noted that “[i]t has long been settled that when there has been a finding of wrongdoing which is an efficient and cooperative cause of the mishap, the wrongdoer is not relieved from liability by proof that an act of God was a concurring cause. ”  *Id.*  The case at hand is on all fours with *Hopler*, but with stronger evidence of liability.
[brief] However, the Roe Court distinguished the aforementioned cases as follows:  These cases are inapposite since they involved injuries caused not by the condition of the property but by acts of the injured party himself or the dangerous activities of other persons.  Thus, in those cases, the property itself did not contribute in any way to the causing of the injuries.  The injuries merely happened to occur on public property.  Here, plaintiff alleges that the dangerous condition of the property itself enhanced her exposure to the criminal attack.  Id. at 79 (emphasis added).  Thereafter, the Roe Court, properly, stated the standard in such an instance wherein a defect of the property at issue is alleged to have contributed in combination with the activity which ultimately caused the injury as follows:  It is well-settled that a dangerous condition of property may be found to exist when an unreasonable risk of harm is created by the combination of a defect in the property itself and the acts of third parties.  Ibid. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  With that in mind, the Roe Court ultimately held that ...when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was injured due to a dangerous condition of the fence and gate owned or controlled by [...], that is, the bolting open of the gate, thus inviting the public to traverse a known dangerous area.  Id. at 82 (emphasis added).  Therefore, the Roe Court, also in accord with precedent, found that the combination of the defect of the property (i.e., the bolted open gate) and the acts of the third party (i.e., the assault committed by the assailant) amounted to a “dangerous condition” of public property.
[brief] Defendant complains that the sentencing court “did not provide Flowers’s explanation for claiming that concurrent sentences would frustrate the legislative intent. ” (Db22).  However, the Court in Flowers very clearly noted:  The judge's reasoning for [imposing consecutive sentences] was wholly appropriate.  She noted that the crime was a separate offense from the robbery and served a different legislative purpose.  The judge's decision was in accord with the principles articulated in Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643-44.  The nature of the certain persons crime itself necessitates a prior conviction and is intended as a further deterrent to criminal weapons possession.  [Id. at *19 (emphasis added). ]  Flowers reveals the proper purpose of the statute, clearly and simply, and showcases the imposition of a consecutive sentence in a factually similar case.2
[directive] Your total exposure as the result of this plea is:  Tanpri  Make a yon won repons ki koresponn la/  Please Circle Appropriate  Answer  2.  a.  Èske w komèt enfraksyon a (yo) pou ki w plede koupab la?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  Did you commit the offense(s) to which you are pleading guilty?  b.  Èske ou konprann anvan  Jij la deklare w koupab, wap bije di jij la ki sa w te fè ki fè w [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] koupab de enfraksyon oswa enfraksyon yo an patikilye?  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?
[brief] ”  State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 178 (2001).  In State v. Lopez, the prosecutor told jurors that they could find intent to distribute based on evidence that two defendants who were in joint possession of drugs had shared the drugs with one another.  359 N.J. Super. 222, 228 (App. Div. 2003).  This Court determined that “this assertion by the prosecutor was legally incorrect” and held that, “as a matter of law, the sharing of drugs by individuals in joint possession of the drugs does not constitute ‘intent to distribute’ within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.
[brief] The 2004 loan and mortgage at issue in this case, which plaintiff claimed to have held, was marked satisfied and canceled.  A578.  The Chancery Division Claims  Plaintiff contended it was the lawful holder and owner of the mortgage that secured the loan that [...] had provided to the [...] in 2004, via assignment from the original mortgage holder.  A1; A145.  Plaintiff contended that the mortgage was mistakenly discharged on May 31, 2019, and asked the Chancery court to enter a judgment declaring the October 4, 2004 mortgage valid and the June 6, 2019 Discharge of Mortgage void.
[brief] (279a-293a).  Appellants’ Motion under Rule 4:50-1 was filed on February 2, 2023, eighty-seven (87) days later.  (90a-142a).  Appellants’ motion was thus filed within the three (3) month limitation contained in N.J.S.A. 54:5-87, as well as the generic one (1) year limitation for Rule 4:50-1 motions to vacate under to City of East Orange v. Kynor, 383 N.J. Super. 639, 646 (App. Div 2006).  On December 4, 2023, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, released its decision in [...] v. [...], 477 N.J. Super 339.
[brief] Similarly, in Brooks v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 425 N.J. Super.  277, 279 (App. Div. 2012), the Court reversed another pension agency's denial of accidental disability retirement benefits to a school custodian who injured his shoulder moving a 300 pound weight bench into the school.  The Court found the custodian's accident was clearly "undesigned and unexpected" because he had been confronted with an unusual situation of students attempting to carry the heavy bench into the school, took charge of the activity, and the students suddenly dropped their side of the bench, placing its entire weight on the custodian.  Id. at 283.  Here, the Board erred in applying an unduly restrictive notion of an "undesigned and unexpected" event to [...]'s February 23, 2017 incident misconstruing Richardson and reaching a decision at odds with the legislative intent in adopting the “traumatic event” standard.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  “In assessing whether a defendant has manifested extreme indifference to human life, the focus is not on the defendant’s state of mind, but on the circumstances under which the defendant acted. ”  Ibid. (quoting Cannel, N.J. Criminal Code Annotated, cmt 2. on N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4 (2007)).  As a result, “SBI murder involves a higher degree of culpability than does aggravated manslaughter. ”  State v. Ramsey, 415 N.J. Super. 257, 267 (App. Div. 2010).
[brief] REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTs  Like much of Plaintiffs’ Procedural History, their Statement of Facts is devoid of references to the record.  As with the procedural history, this section of the brief must be a recitation of the pertinent facts supported by references to the record.  R. 2:6-2(a)(4) and (5).  Walters v. YMCA, 437 N.J. Super. 111, 120-122 (App. Div. 2014).  References must be contained in either the appendix or transcript.  Matters not in the record below cannot be discussed unless properly invoked judicial notice or upon court ordered supplementation of the record.  See, Middle Dep’t Agency v. Home Ins. Co., 154 N.J. Super. 49,56 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 76 N.J. 234 (1978).  The consequence of this violation can & should be herein suppression of Plaintiffs’ brief.  See Cherry Hill Dodge, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 194 N.J. Super. 282, 283 (App. Div. 1984).  Alternatively, R. 2:9-9 authorizes the imposition of costs or attorney’s fees or another penalty for failure to properly defend an appeal.  Moreover, to embellish, overstate or misstate the procedural or factual record below should invite this court to question all else that Plaintiffs have stated, including their very questionable good faith.  Blatant examples of Plaintiffs’ violation & bad faith are seen at pages 12 & 13 of their brief.
[brief] See, e.g., Melcer v. Zuck, 101 N.J. Super. 577, 583–84 (App. Div. 1968) (enforcing clause limiting buyer’s remedy to the return of the deposit and the payment of title search fees); *Sugarman v. Gabriel Bldg. Grp., Inc.*, No. A-4438-12T1, 2014 WL 3798785, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 4, 2014)³ (enforcing clause limiting buyer’s damages to the return of the deposit, plus some incidental expenses).  “We see nothing inherently unreasonable about the buyer’s remedies provision on its face.  It gives the buyer the choice of allowing the seller extra time to complete the transaction, seeking to compel compliance with the requirements of the contract, or terminating the contract and receiving the return of the deposit.  We do not find those choices inherently punitive, particularly given the right to seek specific performance. ”  Id. C.  The Equitable Doctrine of Election of Remedies Supports the Motion Court’s Ruling
[brief] ..................................................................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................  4  I.  [...] CANNOT COLLATERALLY ATTACK THE ARBITRATOR’S FINDINGS OF FACT UPON APPEAL (NOT RAISED BELOW).  .........................................................  4  II.  [...]’ ARGUMENTS REGARDING FEE SIMPLE ARE A RED HERRING, AS THE DEFINITION OF MARKET VALUE REQUIRES THE CONSIDERATION OF ALL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MAY IMPACT AN ARMS-LENGTH BUYER (1T13:11-16:5; 1T32:5-34:19)  ...........................................................................  5  III.  THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY  REQUIRE  A REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S FEBRUARY 20, 2019  ORDER ESTABLISHING A VALUATION DATE OF JANUARY 27, 1994 (2T6:7-7:18)  ..............................................................................................................  8  IV.  THE LAND REPORT IS A NET OPINION  BECAUSE ITS CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT GROUNDED IN FACTS OR DATA (3T6:24-10:2).  .................................................................  9  CONCLUSION
[brief] m., [...] e-mailed the employees information regarding [...]’s work from home plan in case it became necessary to allow employees to work from home.  Pa049; DSOF ¶ 22.  On Friday March 13, 2020, at 4:19 p.m.  Appellant e-mailed [...], [...], and [...] on behalf of herself and [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] stating  “Dear Leadership,  Since we have the ability to efficiently work remotely, requiring us to come into the office during a pandemic unnecessarily risks our health.  Thanks, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...]. ”  Pa049; DSOF ¶ 23.  In response to this e-mail, [...] replied to [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...]  “Hello All, Thank you for your email and thank you for your service at [...].  Be safe and good luck in the future. ”  Pa049; DSOF ¶ 24.  Plaintiff stated that her e-mail was interpreted as insubordination by [...].  Pa049; DSOF ¶ 25.  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] were terminated by [...] by way of this e-mail.
[brief] The [...] also challenged the arbitrator’s rejection of its external comparabilities and the weight given by the arbitrator on the [...] fiscal oversight of the [...]’s budget and its receipt of Transitional Aid based on a 2022 Memorandum of Understanding between the City and the [...].  (Aa0058-Aa0060 and Aa0060-Aa0062).  These issues are not the subject of this appeal.
[brief] In this case, the Motion for Leave to Amend was filed on October 24, 2018 with a return date of November 9, 2018 noting the discovery end date was November 20, 2018 and the trial was scheduled for January 7, 2018.  (Pa11-12).  Considerations the court should consider include whether the newly asserted claim would unduly prejudice the opposing party, survive a motion to dismiss on the merits, cause undue delay of the trial or constitute an effort to avoid another applicable rule of law.
[brief] The evidence that defendant possessed large quantities of controlled dangerous substances with the intent to distribute them was overwhelming.  Defendant was found in a vehicle with a locked backpack.  The only key to the backpack was found on defendant’s person.  Inside the backpack were large, wrapped-in-plastic quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamines.  The backpack also contained a scale and a large quantity of U.S. currency.  The evidence at trial clearly established defendant possessed controlled dangerous substances with the intent to distribute them.  There is no evidence that the jury’s verdict was infected by error.  **POINT VI**
[directive] Addendum B | December 2020  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  11  Vehicular Pursuit Reporting 11.1  All law enforcement officers who operate law enforcement vehicles in vehicular pursuit situations shall complete a report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the vehicular pursuit and preferably before the end the shift in which the pursuit occurred.  If the officer involved in the pursuit is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.  11.2  Vehicular pursuits resulting in the death or serious bodily injury of any civilian shall be handled in accordance with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2019-4.  As soon as any local, county, or state law enforcement agency learns of a vehicular pursuit that resulted in death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, the agency shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office for the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) Director or their designee.  14  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] (Pa442.)  As discussed below, Respondent spends an inordinate amount of time claiming that the Trial Court determined the Loan Documents required the short funds be applied to the Loan.  But this was never found by the Trial Court, which engaged in an equitable “best position” analysis to determine which entity should bear the loss.  Respondent then focuses on Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Mortgage, and alleged violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), and Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) – the latter two being improperly raised in reply.  Each of these arguments are do not apply to the facts here, i.e., a short payoff of funds made on behalf of a non-borrower.  Respondent then attacks Appellant’s argument that the record should have been further developed before the Trial Court ruled on the summary judgment motions, claiming that Appellant is judicial estopped from taking this position now.  But like Respondent’s arguments, judicially estoppel is inapplicable here.  Lastly, Respondent continues to paint itself as an “innocent party,” but this too ignores the facts in the record demonstrating that Respondent had multiple opportunities to prevent the loss after the funds were returned to its escrow agent, but that it failed to do so.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Order, deny Respondent’s summary judgment motion, and grant Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, remand for further discovery on the factual issues raised by the Trial Court.
[brief] That same day, the Court granted [...]’s motion to compel arbitration, directed the parties to arbitrate, and Ordered that the matter be “stayed until May 4, 2024 pending the outcome of arbitration as agreed by the parties” (Dr35).  The Court also clarified that “[i]f the parties need or require additional time beyond May 4, 2024 for arbitration to be completed, a Consent Order may be submitted setting forth a specific date by which arbitration is to be completed” (Dr36).  On February 16, 2024, Appellants submitted correspondence to [...] concerning details of the pending arbitration (Dr37).
[brief] Federal Rules of Evidence: F.R.E. 803(6)  Db22  Federal Regulations: 12 CFR Appendix Supplement: Official Staff Interpretations, Commentary Section 226.5(a)(1) and (2)  Db44  SEC Form 8-K Db7  Judicial Notice: [...] Statement to Bar, filed January 11, 2007  Db9  Consumer Credit Protection Act, Preamble Db41  Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Consumer Compliance Handbook Db37  New Jersey Civil Action Complaint, Form 1120  Db6  [...] Consent Judgment, filed December 19, 2013
[brief] (27T200-1 to 5).  The trial court’s instruction on flight did not include any language regarding defendant’s explanation for his departure from the crime scene.  The model jury charge provides that there should be language included to explain why defendant departed the scene if the defense has not denied leaving the scene but suggested a reason.  (Sa21).  See also State v. Mann, 132 N.J. 410 (1993).  The trial court reviewed the jury charge with counsel before the end of all the evidence in the case and defense counsel lodged no objection to the court’s charge.
[brief] R. 1:7-2; State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 82 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1052 (1999).  Pursuant to R. 1:7-2, if a jury charge is not the subject of an objection at trial, appellate review is available only if the alleged defect rises to the level of plain error as defined in R. 2:10-2.  Plain error in the jury charge “requires demonstration of ‘[l]egal impropriety…prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ’”  State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 341 (2007) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997)).  Here, the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the law as it existed at the time of defendant’s jury trial, verbatim of the Model Jury Charge.
[brief] DA023-DA025.  Critically, Interrogatory No. 3 specifically asks Plaintiff to state the factual basis for her allegation in paragraph 20 of the Complaint that she was punished for being disabled.  DA024-DA025.  In response to Interrogatory No. 3, Plaintiff recapitulates the factual allegations of religious discrimination from her Complaint, and does not make any factual allegation as to how, who, when, and where she was allegedly discriminated against because of her disability.  DA024-DA025.  In her response to Interrogatory No. 4, Plaintiff identifies her alleged disability as “generalized anxiety disorder. ”  DA025.  Thus, Plaintiff knew at the time of her certified Answers to Interrogatories that she believed, at the very least, that she had an anxiety disability.  It stands to reason that she was in position at the time of filing her Complaint and preparing her Answers to Interrogatories that she would have personal knowledge of any allegedly specific instances of disability discrimination.  Yet, none were alleged notwithstanding the specific allegations of religious discrimination comprising her Complaint and certified Interrogatory responses.