ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On or about November 8, 1991, [...] and [...], as a Junior Partner, executed a Partnership Agreement (“Partnership Agreement”) to engage in the practice of law.  [Da203].  Article 7 “Junior Partner’s Salary and Equity, Section (4)” of the Partnership Agreement states that “the junior partner shall be entitled to a 5% capital equity interest as determined in accordance with Article 16” of the Agreement.  [Da205].  Article 26 of the Partnership Agreement clearly provides that “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration (except as otherwise noted in this Agreement) in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction. ”  [Da218].  Additionally, Article 28 Subsection B “Non-Waiver” of the Partnership Agreement states:  “No delay on the part of any party in exercising any right hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any waiver, express or implied, ... constitute or be deemed a waiver of any other right[.]”  [Da219].  On or about July 23, 2003, the Firm hired Plaintiff as an associate attorney.  [Da37].  On August 1, 2007, Plaintiff and [...] executed an Addendum to the 1991 Partnership Agreement (hereinafter “2007 Addendum” or “Addendum”), wherein Plaintiff became a “Junior Partner” of the Firm, entitling him to a guaranteed monthly draw and a schedule to vest in the Firm’s equity, up to 5%.
[brief] There was no way of knowing that there was a subtext of “excessiveness” from the Department’s letters discussing loss ratio ¹ Db25 (asserting “[...] knew” the rate increase “raised red flags”); Db30 (“[...] was well aware that the steep degree of its requested rate increases was at issue. ”); Db33 (“[...] was on notice that the Department was questioning the level of its requested premium rate increases all along. ”).
[brief] 1.  A reasonable person in [...]’s circumstances would have been aware of the facts underlying his claims within the statute of limitations.  Characterizing [...] as a “scientist” cannot pass muster as a blanket excuse for his decades-long, claimed ignorance of what was contained in the books and records of companies in which he was either a corporate officer or had a major economic interest.  He had access to those records and acknowledged that no actions were taken by anyone to prevent him from reviewing those records.  See, e.g., 5T14:3-6, 94:16-19, 104:10-105:1, 162:23-163:4; 166:18-167:2.  Indeed, his access to and understanding of the financial records was sufficient for him to be “skeptical” about the valuations [...] placed on his investment and interest in certain properties, six years before the complaint was filed in March 2014.  See Pb10.
[brief] ” (Pa26).  In addition, in accordance with New Jersey Rules of Court 4:17, et seq. and R. 4:18, discovery was propounded upon Plaintiff-Appellant by Defendant-Respondent, [...], along with its Answer. (Pa29).  On October 5, 2023, Defendant-Respondent, [...], through its counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint for failure to comply with the terms of the policy from which she sought benefits, specifically, the suit limitation clause provided therein.  (Pa44).  On November 17, 2023, the Honorable [...] entered an Order granting Defendant-Respondent’s Motion and Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with the suit limitation clause of the policy.
[brief] [...] failed to apply New Jersey law protecting against default judgments, in particular, in divorce cases – particularly in a case like this one prosecuted by the far more powerful and sophisticated spouse against his absent wife.  Our courts have consistently stressed that divorce cases in particular must be guarded from resolution by default whenever doubt exists as to the fairness of the procedure or the merits of the resulting judgment.  “[D]ivorce actions are sui generis, Feickert v. Feickert, 98 N.J. Eq. 444, 448 (Ch. 1926), and the courts will generally be solicitous in protecting the interests of the respective parties.
[brief] The Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. [...] (Defendant-Respondent)  Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from an Order Granting a New Trial by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County.
[brief] 3.  Section 1:7-3 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as fol- 2 lows: 1:7-3.  After a full hearing and consideration of the petition mentioned in section 1:7-1 of this Title and of the facts and circumstances proved, the court may dismiss the petition, or, if satisfied that the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the enactment and approval of laws and joint resolutions have not been complied with, the court may adjudge the law or joint resolution or any part thereof null and void.
[brief] See 0009a-0010a, 0015a.  Rather than being registered under the PWCRA, [...]’s archaeologist, [...], is registered under the Register of Professional Archaeologists, a nationally recognized professional organization.  See 0106a, 0232a.  The Bid Instructions required that:  The successful Bidder for each public works contract and each listed subcontractor shall be registered in accordance with the requirements of the Public Works Contractor Registration Act (N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.48 et. seq.).  The successful Bidder and each listed subcontractor shall possess a certificate at the time the bid proposal is submitted and shall submit the certificate(s) prior to the award of the Contract.  See 0331a, 0015a.  Thus, we respectfully submit that the PWCRA registration was only required if the PWCRA specified it, otherwise, PWCRA registration was not required.  See 0015a-0016a (“Contrary to [...]’s position … the bid instructions do not state that the archaeologist **must** be registered under the PWCRA. ”) (emphasis added).  The Bid documents required bidders to designate “a qualified Registered Archaeologist (RA). ”  *See* 0344a, 0912a § 3.09A.  The RA would be responsible for monitoring “all excavation activities, construction, staging, and other ground disturbance,” and once the reservoir was dewatered, the RA would “evaluate the potential of the pond bed for containing archaeological resources. ”  *See* 0912a § 3.09C-D.  At the end of the monitoring activities, “the RA shall prepare a summary monitoring report which meets the standards for such report established by the NJSHPO [New Jersey State Historic Preservation Office]. ”  *See* 0913a § 3.09 F.  The RA was to be a professional individual who would be monitoring and writing reports on the demolition and excavation activities of the Project.  *See* 0912a-0913a, 0016a.  During the bid protest and before litigation ensued, the [...] analyzed this issue among others and weighed a variety of legal and factual points before exercising its authority to award the Contract to Respondent [...].
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court’s January 16, 2024 Order (as revised on January 22, 2024) and grant the relief sought in Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint to Quiet Title against the Defendant.  Respectfully submitted, [Signature]  [...]  Dated: August 7, 2024  [...]  Plaintiff-Appellant v. [...] AND [...], 1-3 (fictitiously named), Defendant-Respondents  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENTS
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 17:4-1.7(b).  If the appeal “involves solely a question of law, the Board may retain the matter and issue a final administrative determination .  . . .”  N.J.A.C. 17:4-1.7(e).  Neither how nor when [...] learned of the salary disparities, nor the purported obfuscation of facts by [...] are material facts that would affect the determination made by the Board.  When and how [...] decided that she was allegedly being discriminated against by her former employer, or that she “might well have litigated her claims earlier” are not material facts as they are irrelevant to the Board’s determination.
[brief] Generally, a “litigant has standing only if the litigant demonstrates [1] a sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect to the subject matter of the litigation and [2] a substantial likelihood of some harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  *Edison Bd. of Educ. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of Edison*, 464 N.J. Super. 298, 305 (App. Div. 2020) (cleaned up).
[brief] There is no proof in the record that any "authority" was even aware of any of the maps or plats submitted by Plaintiff into the record.  There was significant dispute as to what agreement or plat was controlling - if any.  The trial court shifted the burden to the [...] with a presumption of [...] ownership.  The trial court irresponsibly relied upon the Resolution document (which it had previously voided as "arbitrary and capricious") to support the very entirety of its factual proof of [...] ownership.  This was reversible error.
[brief] Plaintiff's expert testified that when a plan involves a small site, a “prudent architect would go to the site and make sure that he knows where that tree is, because all his work is going to revolve around that tree. ”  *Id.*  The *Taylor* Court explained that the problem with this testimony was that plaintiff's expert “presented no authority supporting his opinion.  No reference was made to any written document, or even unwritten custom or practice indicating that the consensus of the architectural community recognizes a duty to make a site inspection for ‘small sites. ’”  *Id.*  In this regard, the Court was concerned by the “the total absence in [plaintiff's expert's] testimony of reference to any textbook, treatise, standard, custom or recognized practice, other than his personal view. ”  *Id.* at 182.  The *Taylor* Court therefore concluded that the expert’s testimony constituted a net opinion and the defendants were therefore entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law.  *Id.* at 184.
[brief] Further, counsel stated to the trial Court:  I was hoping he was here.  As I said, I didn’t see your letter.  I certainly could have paid it, but my impression that it was paid after the transport.  But obviously, that is not how it goes (4T; 5:20).  Then, the Court stated:  So, I guess, again [...], the adjournment will not be granted -- it has been denied.  So, it’s form over substance really.  We could pick the jury, we can do our openings, and I could look to you to call your first witness who won’t be here, at which case the Court would dismiss your case, or you can save the time, and I guess do whatever you want to do at this junction, but the matter is not going to be adjourned (4T; 5:24).  Then, counsel stated: Okay, I just think that based upon my mistake, we are not seeing that letter, I think it makes more sense to start tomorrow (4T; 6:10).  The Court responded: It couldn’t even start tomorrow because my understanding is that it needs at least maybe it is either 48 or 72 in advance that require monies (4T; 6:11).  Then, Counsel stated: Your Honor, why waste the time picking a jury if you are going to call the first witness and he is not here, and you are going to dismiss, you probably should do that now (4T; 6:15).  The Court did not disagree.  Counsel sets forth what took place in the criminal Court:
[brief] THE FAILURE TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT OF THE MANDATORY MINIMUMS HE FACED ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED ROBBERY OFFENSE WAS HARMLESS ERROR.  It is conceded here that, although the State pointed out during sentencing that 1st degree robbery is a NERA offense, the court thereafter never expressly advised the Defendant that he was subject to a mandatory minimum term of 85% before being eligible for parole on his robbery conviction.  Yet, the Defendant did still hear it from the State that it was a NERA offense.  (33T37:16-20).  Furthermore, the court did advise the Defendant that he was subject to an 85% NERA parole disqualifier on the accomplice liability felony murder charge.  (33T34:20-35:3).  All of the other offenses merged/and or ran concurrent to that term.  Thus, the failure to advise the Defendant that he had to serve 85% of the ten-year term on the robbery was inconsequential, as the Defendant understood that he was serving 85% of his aggregate sentence and also understood that the robbery offense carried with it the same 85% parole disqualifier.  The failure of the court to expressly state a mandatory minimum which was less than that which he would ultimately serve was harmless error.
[brief] BRIEF OF MAGNETEK, INC.  [...]  [...]  Attorney ID No.: 028322009  [...] [...]  [...] -and- [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  The New York Times Building 620 Eighth Avenue, 38th Floor  New York, NY 10018-1442  Telephone No. (212)  759-4888  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff - Appellant  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996).  With respect to adverse employment decisions, all that is required is that, with respect to action at issue, a “reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. ”  See Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 574 (2010), (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).  In determining whether Plaintiff pled that prima facie elements of an NJLAD claim, the lower court did not address the third prong of the prima facie test.  And the lower court found that as to the first prong, “Plaintiff alleges that the act of filing the [2016 Lawsuit] is a protected activity, which is correct.
[directive] When law enforcement officers are charged with committing acts of domestic violence, it is important that the matters be uniformly and expeditiously handled.  To achieve these objectives, it is necessary that there be a statewide policy governing the seizure of weapons from a law enforcement officer who is charged with committing an act of domestic violence.  The Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 seq., requires the Attorney et General “to provide for the general supervision of criminal justice” in this State.  All law enforcement agencies and law enforcement officers in the State are required to cooperate with the Attorney General “to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state. ”  52:17B-98.  Accordingly, it is directed that all law enforcement agencies N.J.S.A. and law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry weapons pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6 are to comply with this directive.  1 (9/00)  Seizure of Weapons from Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers
[brief] The language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 is clear; both the safety and signaling requirements apply to lane changes.  3.  Extrinsic aids confirm that N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires the motorist to signal a lane change.  Even if a literal reading of the statute were as defendant claims, resort to extrinsic sources would be necessary to avoid the absurd results described above and a construction “at odds with the overall statutory scheme. ”  See Carter, 247 N.J. at 513.  The history of the statute and our relevant caselaw confirm that the law requires signals before lane changes.
[brief] Plaintiffs Established Standing Via the “Special Injury” Exception.  Our courts take a generous view of standing.  *In re State Contract A71188*, 422 N.J. Super. 275, 289 (App. Div. 2011).  To establish standing, a plaintiff must present a “sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  *In re Camden County*, 170 N.J. 439, 449 (2002).  Generally, a corporation is regarded as separate from its shareholders, and “suits to redress corporate injuries that only secondarily harm all shareholders alike are brought only by the corporation. ”  *Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller*, 146 N.J. 527, 549 (1996).  Derivative actions are important to “maintaining the investment resources of the corporation, avoiding a multiplicity of suits, providing equal benefit for all shareholders and avoiding partial dividends or partial liquidation. ”  *Id.* at 549-50.  Thus, when injury to corporate stock falls equally upon all shareholders, an individual stockholder generally cannot recover for the injury to his stock alone, but must sue derivatively on behalf of the entity.  *Id.* at 550.  However, New Jersey recognizes an exception to the derivative suit rule.
[brief] Any dispute regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage pursuant to section 4 of P.L. 1972, c. 70 (C.39:6A-4) . . . arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile may be submitted to dispute resolution on the initiative of any party to the dispute, as hereinafter provided.  According to the above provision, the only disputes that may be subject to ADR are those regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits provided under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 states, in relevant part:  . . .  every standard automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed on or after [the effective date of the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act ("AICRA")] shall contain personal injury protection benefits for the payment of benefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind, to the named insured and members of his family residing in his household who sustain bodily injury as a result of an accident while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile, or as a pedestrian, caused by an automobile or by an object propelled by or from an automobile, and to any other persons sustaining bodily injury while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using the automobile of the named insured, with permission of the named insured.
[brief] Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  (Atty. I.D. No. 015541980)  Of Counsel and On The Brief: [...], Esq.  (Atty. I.D. No. 001321996)  Date: April 1, 2024  ¹ Decedent’s name is spelled [...]; it is inadvertently misspelled in the caption.  #
[brief] In error, he also refused to order an OPRA civil penalty against the Board (191a).  Finally, [...], in error, granted the Board's motion for a Warrant in Satisfaction of Judgment (249a), despite the fact [...] found the Board had not provided access to all records ordered in the 8/28/20 final order (8a).  On this appeal, [...] respectfully requests this Court find [...] abused his discretion and remand for appropriate relief from his orders below:
[brief] (Pa000093); Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 305.  She ignores on-point authority rejecting this argument.  E.g., Roman, 456 N.J. Super. at 174.  As Respondents showed below, [...]’s after-the-fact assertion that she subjectively felt pressured to click through the policies while she waited for a pre-hiring medical examination does not render the Mutual Arbitration Agreement unconscionable or unenforceable.  Although [...] claimed she “specifically recall[s]” [...] representatives “pressuring her to click through a series of screens on the portal as soon as possible before [she] could begin working,” (Pa000137), she did not substantiate that assertion with specific details about those interaction.  [...] said nothing of whether she had other opportunities to complete the onboarding paperwork (such as after the medical examination) and has not claimed that she requested but was refused more time to review the documents before signing.  Despite the unsubstantiated (and illogical) leaps required, [...] urges this Court to adopt her conclusion that, that if she “wanted to work,” she “was left with simply no choice but to ‘accept’ the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. ” (Pb33).  As this Court has acknowledged, this argument “falls far short” of showing an unenforceable adhesion contract.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio,** | 24, 25 | | 421 N.J. Super. 231 (App.  Div. 2011) | | | **Ajamian v. Schlanger,** | 31 | | 14 N.J. 483, cert. denied, | | | 348 U.S. 835, 75 S. Ct. 58, 99 L. Ed. 659 (1954) | | | **Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton, Corp.,** | 31 | | 35 N.J.343 (1961) | | | **Archbrook Laguna, LLC v. Marsh,** | 31 | | 414 N.J. Super 97 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss,** | 24, 26 | | 243 N.J. 218 (2020) | | | **Cogdell ex rel. Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange,** | 27 | | 116 N.J. 7 (1989) | | | **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus,** | passim | | 237 N.J. 91 (2019) | | | **DiTrolio v. Antiles,** | passim | | 142 N.J. 253 (1995) | | | **Gelber v. Zito P’ship,** | 40 | | 147 N.J. 561 (1997) | | | **Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp.,** | 25 | | 286 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 1996) | | | **Highland Lakes Country Club & Comty. Ass’n v. Nicastro,** | 24 | | 201 N.J. 123 (2009) | | | **Hillsborough Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Faridy Thorne Frayta, P.C.,** | 36 | | 321 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 1999) | | | **Hobart Bros. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,** | 35, 36 | | 354 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div.), certif. denied, | | | 175 N.J. 170 (2002) | | | **Karpovich v. Barbarula,** | 24, 27 | | 150 N.J. 473 (1997) | | Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds, Co., 207 N.J. 428 (2011)
[brief] PLAINTIFFS’ OFFERED EXHIBITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE RECORD (T45-9 to T47-4) (Pa0079-Pa0080)  The Trial Court wrongfully excluded the Planning Board Transcript *not being appealed from but consists of evidence sought to be admitted at trial hearing R. 2:5-1(g) and the [...] memo (Pa0008, T41-13, T46-11, Exh.P-5), a document created by Plaintiffs which summarized a review of the Master Plan compared to the proposed redevelopment plan.\(^6\) (T45-9 to 47-4)  Such documents should have become part of the record to be reviewed by the Court.
[brief] *Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc.*, 405 N.J. Super. 105, 113 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting *Dabush v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC*, 378 N.J. Super. 105, 114 (App. Div. 2005)).  1.  **The Consumer Fraud Act applies only to the sale of insurance – not the denial of insurance benefits.
[brief] As to Defendants’ “expert report,” it adds nothing to this matter other than the proposed expert’s improper and incorrect opinion on what the law is and how it applies.  In sum, it opined that “a reasonably prudent buyer . . . would not have constructive or inquiry notice that Lot 3 was less than 66.3 feet wide at its frontage. ”  Db12; Ja562; see also Db10-11.  But that is simply an opinion on what the law should require in connection with a buyer’s obligation to review a chain of title and recitals therein, and pure legal opinions of this sort are not proper for consideration.  See Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190, 204 (App. Div. 2021) (a court may bar an expert witness from offering a purely legal conclusion); Boddy v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Companies, 334 N.J. Super. 649, 659 (App. Div. 2000) (finding the trial court properly excluded expert testimony involving a question of law where the expert opined that a “policy exclusion was poorly drafted and ‘creates a material and substantive ambiguity in the mind of the…average named insured who purchases the policy.