ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] An appropriate model jury charge would allow New Jersey courts to fulfill their duty to instruct jurors about the value of fingerprint comparison evidence, enabling juries to evaluate the evidence critically and objectively.  To do otherwise requires ad hoc determinations by individual courts based on uneven representations of differently-resourced counsel and, critically, risks juror misunderstanding and wrongful conviction.  As explained above, fingerprint comparison evidence has inherent limitations similar to limitations affecting other types of identification evidence and expert opinion testimony recognized by the courts.  Although New Jersey courts have model criminal jury charges for some types of identification and scientific expert opinion testimony, they lack an appropriate model charge for fingerprint comparison evidence.  In 2023, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Olenowski held that a Daubert-like standard should be used to determine the reliability of expert testimony proffered in criminal cases.  But the courts’ role as “gatekeeper” for such evidence requires more than simply accepting or rejecting proffered testimony.  A Special Adjudicator should be appointed to consider deliberation among interested parties and develop a proposed model charge that provides juries the guidance and context they need to evaluate fingerprint comparison evidence appropriately.
[directive] TO: ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS  DATE: December 1, 1989  SUBJECT: Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards for New Jersey Law Enforcement  In compliance with the instructions of Attorney General [...] and pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq., effective January 1, 1991 it is directed that all New Jersey law enforcement officers shall follow the attached Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards, and all New Jersey law enforcement agencies shall adopt such standards as agency policy.  The Attorney General's directive dated July 17, 1985 did not provide for specialized training with respect to automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons.  Accordingly, all law enforcement officers who are authorized to use such weapons shall comply with the provisions of this manual concerning automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons commencing March 1, 1990.  [...] Director, Division of Criminal Justice 9-4 Revised (05/03)
[brief] 23 R. 4:46-2(a) ............................................................................................................................  4 R. 4:6-2 .................................................................................................................................  16 R. 4:6-2(e) .............................................................................................................................  4 R. 4:69 .................................................................................................................................  40 R. 4:69-6 ...............................................................................................................................  41 R. 4:69-6(a)  ..........................................................................................................................  40  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [*See, e.g., Pa231–33*]  And **third,** Plaintiffs say they did not receive [...]’s “38 pages of rules. ”  *See id.*  But [...]’s rules are posted publicly on its website; at any point after signing the Contract—including in the months following [...]’s motion to compel and the subsequent January Consent Order—Plaintiffs could have reviewed the [...] and [...] rules to determine which arbitration forum they preferred.
[brief] The Court Framed A Heads Defendants Win, Tails Plaintiff Loses Hypothetical (Pa13-20)  Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the New Motion Judge’s hypothetical is that it turned this case into a “heads, defendants win; tails, plaintiff loses” scenario.  Although [...] could have called the C-section, Plaintiff has never contended that [...] could have performed the C-section herself.  Likewise, although [...] should have likewise called the C-section immediately upon learning of the deceleration, she was not at the hospital and could not have performed the C-section in a timely fashion.  Plaintiff’s expert did not fault either of these doctors for failing to perform the C-section.  Rather he faulted them for not calling for the C-section.  In the court’s hypothetical, though, the doctors timely called for the C-section and thus met the standard of care.  Of course Plaintiff loses her case against these doctors if they met the standard of care.  The court’s several observation that a plaintiff has no case against any doctor if that doctor meets the standard of care.  In a roundabout way, all the court actually said was that if these doctors had called for the C-section in time, Plaintiff had no case against these defendants -- regardless of whether the C-section was subsequently performed in a timely fashion, or not.  Heads, defendants wins.  However, in the hypothetical created below in which the defendant doctors called the C-section, the only person who could have been potentially liable was [...] for not delivering [...] in a timely fashion.  But everyone already knew [...] had acted appropriately, in the real world.  So the court created a speculative version of this case under which Plaintiff could not possibly prevail against anyone.  Plaintiff could not assert a claim against [...] based on the court’s hypothetical framed; his defense based on the actual facts had already resulted in his dismissal.
[brief] (2T).  At the beginning of that meeting, [...], attorney for the Committee, noted the following documents could be found on the Township's website and were therefore "in the record" before the Committee:  • A September 22, 2022 memo from the Planning Board Secretary to the Committee advising the Planning Board did not find the Plan to be inconsistent with Chesterfield's Master Plan; • the September 9, 2022 memo authored by [...]; • a seven-page written submission by [...]; • the May 26, 2022 Committee minutes; • the Plan; • a community impact statement, dated August 1, 2022; • a document titled [...] redevelopment initial info – 2021; • "numerous traffic documents"; • a stream impacts memo dated July 13, 2022; • a Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) flood hazard area verification letter, dated January 19, 2022; • a deficiency letter from the DEP to [...]; and • a document titled OYCCFAQs.
[brief] (Raised Below 5T 10:4 to 11:10)**  The Trial Court was troubled by [...]’s lawful and proper donation of the Purchase Price to [...] and speculated that his donation was a *de facto* purchase of the Property using [...] as a convenient straw-man purchaser.  Contrary to such baseless speculation, had [...] desired the Property for himself or [...], he could have easily submitted his own offer for the Property when it had been listed for sale by Order of the Chancery Court.  (Da 131).  After all, the Property was offered for sale to the public.  [...] did not need an intermediary to purchase the Property.  In fact, [...] could have participated in the closed-bid process independent of [...] (which could not afford to participate in the auction without [...]’s generous support) and [...] would have had no recourse against him.  The Trial Court also repeatedly conflated [...] and [...] as alter-egos, as if [...] had no separate legal existence from him which it does.  (5T12: 3-12).
[brief] A:  It helps deal with the problem of the claim and demand that one has to wade through in order to get to the place that it wants to be, which is having the water feature as an important part of the real estate.  Q:  And essentially is that clause in your view showing that the, that [...] is trying to convey all estates and rights that they have in the property to this other entity, [...]?  A: I think it’s best it can be done under the circumstances.  Q: And they’re trying to convey all their rights.  A: That’s correct.  See 7T, pp. 63-64.  Approximately two months later, on June 16, 1920, [...] transferred the tract that he had acquired from [...] to a corporate entity that he owned entitled P. [...], Inc.
[brief] (Drb21).  But (1)  Defendants do not dispute that paragraphs 268 and 281 alleged that [...] and Defendants acted with malice (Pa68-Pa72), and (2) other than incorrectly contending at Drb21 that Plaintiffs did not cite the record, Defendants do not deny that the evidence submitted in support of the motion for leave to amend demonstrated that the [...] board members discussed how the filing of a criminal complaint might give them a litigation advantage against the [...].  (Pb10; Da2543).  If proven to be true, those facts would more than sufficiently establish the malice element.  ______________________ complaint.  (Da2230-Da2231; Da2542).  Indeed, he could not have seen [...] nor any other Westerhold do those things because they did not.  (Da2425-Da2426; Pra4).  II.
[brief] Exhibit R, 1/14/2010  Letter from [...] to [...].................................(omitted)  Exhibit S, 12/2007  General Release between [...] and [...].  .........................................................................................189a  Exhibit T, Trust Account Ledgers from [...] re: Disbursals to [...].................................................................(omitted)  Exhibit U, Operating Agreement for [...], LLC.....(omitted)  Exhibit V, Checks Totaling $480,000 to [...] related to WDC Sale of Property........................................................................................................195a  Exhibit W, 11/23/2010  Email Exchange between [...] and [...]...........(omitted)  Exhibit X, 10/30/2013  F. [...] Deposition Excerpt.........................(omitted, see 752a)  Exhibit Y, 1/15/2010  Letter from [...] to [...].................................(omitted)  Exhibit Z, 8/15/2017
[brief] Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand, pertains to the fairness of the contract terms themselves.  Id.  Here, [...]’s Terms and Conditions, along with the Arbitration Agreement, are considered a “contract of adhesion” because it was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and there was no opportunity to negotiate.  See Rent-a-Ctr., W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (citing Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992)).  Adhesion agreements necessarily also involve indications of procedural unconscionability.  Id.  Once it is settled that there is a “contract of adhesion” the Courts must undergo an analysis.  See generally, Muhammad, 189 N.J. 1, 18-9.
[brief] ”  [Pa170a, §III.K]  The Disciplinary Action alleges “Legal Services” because it alleges misconduct in “services performed on behalf of the Named Insured for others by an Insured, whether or not performed for a fee or other consideration, as a licensed lawyer in good standing . . . but only where such services were performed in the ordinary course of the Insured’s activities as a lawyer. ”  [Pa171a, §III.P]  Courts routinely recognize that maintaining trust accounts and accurate accounting records is part of the services performed in the ordinary course of an attorney’s activities as a lawyer.
[brief] There are numerous problems with its analysis.  First, it is important to note that while the MPA recommended several sites be rezoned into a Senior Housing Overlay Zone as the Board confirmed to the Law Division – after having made the same argument\(^5\) below – --- \(^5\)  See Da 319-322.  The Board improperly included its trial brief in its Appendix, despite the prohibition against doing so as set forth in R. 2:6-1(a)(2).
[brief] Instead, the Appellate Division previously ruled certain inferences should not have been drawn from the affidavits submitted by the parties competing partial Summary Judgment Motions.  Moreover, the cases cited by Defendant do not support its contrived position.  First, Defendant cites Johnson v. Johnson, 411 N.J. Super. 161, 174-175 (App. Div. 2009), rev. on other grounds, 204 N.J. 529 (2010) (an appeal from an arbitration award related to a child-custody and parenting-time issues).  Unlike the present case, the Appellate Division remanded the matter to another Family Part judge out of concern that the judge “may be committed to his findings based on the arbitration award. ”  Id.  The Appellate Division specifically found that “[t]he Family Part judge here could not evaluate the threat of harm to the children…and could not confirm the award.  He erred in doing so. ”  The Appellate Division cited no such concern in the instant case.
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition device concerning the incident.  The law enforcement executive of each department that utilizes CEDs shall issue a rule, regulation, standing operating procedure or other appropriate order to establish a system to ensure that the internal digital recording systems of these devices are maintained, and that the data contained therein cannot be tampered with, and cannot be accessed or erased except by duly authorized supervisors.  After the information is safeguarded, the device may be returned to service consistent with the department’s policies.  The information stored in the device concerning the use of force incident (i.e., data concerning the time the weapon was fired, the time of all electrical discharges, and video recordings of the firing of the weapon and all electrical discharges) shall be preserved and reported on in the report of the incident prepared pursuant to Section 12.2 of this policy.  17  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] The Commissioner reasoned that [...] “appears to be challenging the constitutionality of the [Law] itself, which gives the Department authority to require public access as a condition of a permit. ” (Aa139).  As such, the Commissioner correctly noted that [...]’s takings claim could not be decided by the ALJ or the Commissioner.  Ibid. (citing Christian Bros. Inst. of N.J. v. N. N.J. Interscholastic League, 86 N.J. 409, 416 (1981)).  See also In re Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 166 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (App.Div.1979) (a constitutional takings claim is a legal claim “cognizable only by a court of law. ”); N.J.S.A. 20:3-5 and 3-2(e) (the Superior Court, Law Division has jurisdiction of all condemnation matters).  Alternatively, even if this court wanted to address the takings claim independently, [...] has neither demonstrated a facial nor an as-applied constitutional issue here.  For a facial challenge, in New Jersey, a statute is “presumed constitutional and . . . ‘is not facially unconstitutional if it operates constitutionally in some instances. ’”  Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 208 N.J. 141, 175 (2011) (quoting GMC v. City of Linden, 150 N.J. 522, 532 (1997) (additional citations omitted)).  Though [...] has not attempted to meet this standard, it could not do so as the Law does not create a taking with every public access condition imposed, particularly given the public trust doctrine’s own non-discriminatory underpinnings.  See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 180 (1978) (municipality “cannot frustrate the public right by limiting” beach use to the municipality’s residents).  For an as-applied challenge, in evaluating petitioner’s claim, a court must first determine whether the “essential nexus” exists between the “legitimate state interests” and the permit condition exacted by the government.  Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (citations omitted).  If a court finds an essential nexus exists, it must then determine whether there is a rough proportionality between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition.  *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).  But here, it is impossible to decide whether the condition is an unconstitutional exaction as the exact contours of the public access to be provided have not yet been determined and that determination is necessary for the “individualized determination” inherent in exaction analyses.  *Id.* at 391.  Since [...] has not attempted to demonstrate a facial or an as-applied constitutional issue here, the claim must fail.  The Commissioner’s sound decision is reasonable and consistent with applicable law, it should be affirmed.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Purpose of Guidelines  Consistent with the Legislative mandate these Guidelines have been developed to assist county and municipal prosecutors in the performance of their prosecutorial duties, pertaining to individuals charged with violations of the DWI and/or DWI refusal statutes such that these statutes are enforced in a uniform manner.  Questions by Municipal Prosecutors, regarding these Guidelines are to be directed to the Municipal Prosecutor Supervisor in the County Prosecutor’s Office.  If necessary, the Municipal Prosecutor Supervisor can then contact the Prosecutors Supervision & Coordination Bureau in the Division of Criminal Justice with any questions or issues.  Municipal Prosecutors and law enforcement agency personnel, other than the Division of State Police, should not attempt to contact the Division of Criminal Justice directly.  Law enforcement officers with questions regarding these Guidelines or the interpretation of any case or statute relating to these Guidelines should contact the County Prosecutor’s Office.
[brief] POINT  I.  The Standard of Review of an Order Dismissing a Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.  (T10:17-T14:3)  This appeal seeks review of the motion court’s grant of Defendant’s motion under R. 4:6-2(e) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  This Court’s review is de novo, “affording no deference to the trial court’s determination. ”  *Pace v. Hamilton Cove*, 258 N.J. 82, 95–96 (2024) (citing *Baskin v.  P.C. Richard & Son, LLC*, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021)).  A court must assume the facts asserted in the complaint are true, *Lembo v. Marchese*, 242 N.J. 477, 481 (2020), and the “plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference as we ‘search[ ] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) quoting *Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park*, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).  **POINT II.
[brief] ”  The Order further provided that “the Receiver shall be paid from the proceeds collected in the amount of 15% which shall be assessed as an additional cost of the Judgment. ”  Ca22.  The Order describes the application to appoint “a Statutory Receiver, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 14:14-2”, but makes no specific mention of a bond.  On March 30, 2022, [...] (“[...]”), now Appellant in the related [...], filed a Notice of Motion to Intervene, for Leave to Sue the Statutory Receiver, *nunc pro tunc*, Compel an Accounting and Payment of Rent pursuant to Statutory Priorities.
[brief] **RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THIS ACTION BECAUSE THE EMINENT DOMAIN ACT PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF ALL ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT’S EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. **  (Raised below: 2T16-17)  In opposition to Defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal, the Township relied on the argument that all issues in this matter were resolved by an order entered in the matter *[...] V. [...]*, Docket No. [...].  On March 23, 2023, an action was filed in the matter captioned *White Road, HOA, LLC v. [...]*, Docket No. [...] challenging Ordinance 5-23 and 7-23.  On September 8, 2023, the trial court in the *White Road, HOA, LLC* matter dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.  But that decision has no bearing on Defendants’ right to challenge this condemnation action against their Properties.  The Township argued below that collateral estoppel prevented Defendants from asserting the Township failed to establish a proper public use in order to take Defendants’ Properties.  Defendants presume the Township will argue same in this motion.  This argument is erroneous because it is only under the Eminent Domain Act in which the Legislature established the exclusive procedure for the acquisition of property by eminent domain and the right of property owners to contest the government’s authority to take their property.
[brief] Respondents Demonstrated How the Information Could Be Used Against [...].**  Respondents met their burden of demonstrating how the information could be used.  There is no requirement that confidential information received in a prior representation actually be used.  The Supreme Court only requires that confidential information was received by counsel and that such material “can be,” “could be” or “might be” used against a former client.  *Trupos*, supra, 201 N.J. at 467-469; See also, *Dewey*, supra, 109 N.J. at 222-223, stating: disqualification required without regard to whether there has been an actual sharing of client confidences.
[brief] (Ibid.).  As a result, on April 17, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce litigants’ rights, requesting, among other things, that the Defendants be held in contempt and be ordered to cease voting on matters related to [...], including the prohibition of voting to table such matters.  (Da 56-57).  On April 19, 2024, the Defendants filed a motion to reconsider the April 1 Order, on the basis that the court allegedly lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  (Da 81-82).  On May 10, 2024, after holding oral argument (2T), the Law Division issued an Order stating the following in relevant part:  The April 1, 2024 order of the court is amended to remove the language finding the defendants' votes on the resolution were contrary to the Local Government Ethics Board; it is further ORDERED, the court refers the issue of the vote on the resolution in question to the Local Finance Board for its consideration regarding the propriety thereof; and it is further ORDERED, that the order is further amended to find defendants' votes on the resolution were improper on account of their conflict with Mr. [...], regardless of the determination of the Local Government Ethics Board; (Da 1; emphasis added).  The Defendants subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
[brief] ’ ”  N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State Office of the Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 296 (App. Div. 2017) (citation omitted) (quoting In re N.J.A.C. 5:96, 221 N.J. 1, 17–18 (2015)).  It is impossible for [...] to demonstrate the Borough has violated any prior Judgment or Order regarding [...] since it is not mentioned or contemplated in any prior Order, and, in fact, at the time the Orders were entered, [...] did not even own the Property.  Therefore, the Movant is improperly attempting to expand the concept of a Motion to Enforce Litigant's Rights, where it is procedurally inappropriate.
[brief] Recognizing that monetary awards do not get entered in favor of carriers, the “Demand for Arbitration” forms that are used by [...]7 (and approved by [...]) do not inquire about the damages that an insurance carrier seeks to recover.  Instead, the forms only ask claimants to list the No-Fault benefits that they seek to recover from the insurance carrier.  See https://www.nj-no-fault.com/forms, page 3 (last visited May 17, 2024)8.  These forms are consistent with [...]’s statement that the NFADR process is intended to --- 6  A copy of this opinion is submitted herewith at ICAa 065.  7  As is set forth below, [...] is the current Dispute Resolution Organization contracted by [...] to operate the NFADR process.  8  The court may take judicial notice of these forms under N.J.R.E. 201(b)(1)-(3).  resolve disputes “concerning the payment of medical expense and other benefits provided by the personal injury protection coverage in policies of automobile insurance” to claimants and not a carrier’s claim for damages under the Fraud Act.