ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE HARDSHIP RENT INCREASE REQUESTED BY [...] AND ORDERED BY THE LOWER COURT IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE PURPOSES OF RENT CONTROL AND THE TENANT PROTECTION ACT OF 1992 AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH EXISTING LAW.  The hardship rental increase authorized by the trial court would result in a monthly rent for [...] that would be unaffordable for him and any low- or moderate-income resident in the [...]. \(^4\)  It is a certainty that he will be displaced from his rent-controlled unit as a result.  This is precisely what rent control in New Jersey and the [...] was established to prevent.
[directive] SUBJ: Post-Conviction Applications on Indictable Offenses - Form Order; Statement of Reasons for Denial DATE: June 13, 2023  The substance of this Directive and the attached Order on Post-Conviction Applications on Indictable Offenses were originally promulgated in 2007 by Directive #07-07.  They are being reissued for statewide use by this superseding directive.  The form order (CN:11151) is uncharged and is to be used when the court either grants or denies post-conviction applications.  The Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee, at the time of the prior directive, developed this uniform order to consolidate various items of relevance and to address Rules 2:5-3(d) and 3:22-6(c).  Those Rules provide that the court may order the transcription of proceedings either without charge or at the expense of the county in criminal proceedings involving indigent defendants.  The order is in part an attempt to reduce the public expense of the transcription of oral opinions on the denial of second or subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief and other post- conviction applications where there is no right to counsel.  The order addresses whether the defendant is indigent through the assignment of counsel, whether the defendant had counsel at the hearing, if it was the first or subsequent petition for post-conviction relief or post-conviction application, whether the matter was decided on papers, or if there was a proceeding for which a transcript is needed.  This order is to be prepared for every post-conviction application on an indictable offense.
[brief] In Znoski, the plaintiff-customer parked his vehicle along the sidewalk of a [...] and while attempting to enter the store, an unknown youth hit him in the back with one of [...]’s carts near the entrance door.  Znoski, supra, 122 N.J. Super. at 246.  The impact propelled plaintiff's body causing his feet to come in contact with the wooden curbing, resulting in Plaintiff falling and sustaining the injuries for which the suit was instituted.  Ibid.  A jury awarded the plaintiff damages and [...] appealed.  Id. at 245-246.  On appeal, the Appellate Division found:
[brief] Defendants propose that Plaintiff’s omission of the well-known “abuse of discretion” standard from their brief renders the trial court’s decision unassailable.  It does not.  Nothing in the 2015 [...] settlement (hereinafter, the “2015 Settlement”) indicates that the [...] class agreed to relinquish future claims that had yet to accrue for misconduct that had yet to even occur.  [...]’s finding that the [...] settlement was breached because one class member ([...]) chose to assert his claims for conduct that had not even occurred when the settlement was executed amounts to abuse of discretion.  The absence of a “covenant not to sue” is fatal to Defendants’ theory.  Without an actual breach of the 2015 settlement, there was no cause to reopen [...]—other than for the limited purpose of declining jurisdiction over the 2023 lawsuit filed by [...] in federal court on behalf of all others similarly situated, Gannon v. [...].  [...]’s motion to reopen [...] should have been denied and [...]’s order of May 8, 2024 should otherwise be reversed.
[brief] The second Order is also based on the trial court’s finding that [...] was not a qualified expert to draft the AOM against [...].  1.  The “Same-Specialty” Requirement  According to the ABMS, like Hematology and Medical Oncology, Cardiovascular Disease is merely a subspecialty of Internal Medicine.  The Cardiovascular Disease subspecialty is defined as “[a]n internist who specializes in diseases of the heart and blood vessels and manages complex cardiac conditions, such as heart attacks and life-threatening, abnormal heartbeat rhythms. ”  170a.  As discussed above, the Appellant’s Complaint alleges negligence causing complications of the blood, which also fits within the scope of the Cardiovascular Disease subspecialty.  [...] was Board Certified in Internal Medicine and was Board Certified and specialized in Hematology and Oncology.  It is clear that [...] had special knowledge to render an opinion on the treatment of the Appellant by [...], given the similarities between Hematology and Cardiovascular Disease.  In fact, Hematology and Cardiovascular Disease all still fall under the specialty of Internal Medicine.  Therefore, the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) were met by [...] drafting the AOM against [...].
[brief] *Id.* at 99.  Our Supreme Court has noted with respect to diminished capacity arguments that “the allocation of responsibility between judge and jury requires that competent reliable evidence be submitted to the jury and that a diminished capacity charge be given to the jury when competent reliable evidence has been offered. ”  *State v. Breakiron*, 108 N.J. 591, 617 (1987) (emphasis added).  “[O]nly when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, and still no suggestion appears that the defendant's faculties had been so affected as to render the defendant incapable of purposeful and knowing conduct, may the trial court deny the diminished-capacity defense. ” *State v. Galloway*, 133 N.J. 631, 648-49 (1993) (citing *Breakiron*, 108 N.J. at 617).  Most recently, in *State v. Baum*, 224 N.J. 147 (2016), our Supreme Court held that a defendant can receive a charge on diminished capacity if: “(1) he or she ‘has presented evidence of a mental disease or defect that interferes with cognitive ability sufficient to prevent or interfere with the formation of the requisite intent or mens rea[,]’ and (2) ‘the record contains evidence that the claimed deficiency did affect the defendant's cognitive capacity to form the mental state necessary for the commission of the crime. ’”  *Id.* at 160 (quoting *Galloway*, 133 N.J. at 647).
[brief] By combining that lease as a comparable with other leases that were lower, he produced an opinion of value based upon his "market leases" that was lower than that reflected by the actual leases.  [...], A.J.S.C, noted that the [...] appraisal used the income capitalization approach by converting the anticipated benefits, i.e. cash flow and rents into property value. Katz 334 N.J. Super, 476.  While [...] argued that it should be up to the commissioners or a jury to decide if the actual rents should be used, the court concluded that by omitting the actual rent in those circumstances, [...] did not provide full indemnity to the owners thus violating the injunction of State v. William Rohrer Inc., 80 N.J. 462, 467, that just compensation must be paid for the owner's loss, not what the condemning authority gains.  Thus, in that case, the court concluded as a matter of law, that the appraisal did not reflect the actual loss to the property owner.
[brief] 10  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE REQUESTED DEPOSITION SEEKS RELEVANT INFORMATION (Aa821) .............................................................  10 POINT II  THE DEPOSITION IS NOT HARASSMENT (Aa821)  .....................  15  A. The Deposition Seeks Relevant Information ..............................................  15  B.  The Discovery Is Not Duplicative .............................................................  17  C.  The Cited Orders Are Irrelevant and In Another Case .............................  18  POINT III  [...]’S ASSERTION OF UNSPECIFIED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO PREVENT HIS DEPOSITION (Aa821) ........................................................... 20 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 25 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## Cases **A.D. v. Ranney Sch. & James Paroline,** 2023 N.J. Super LEXIS 605 (App. Div. Dec. 21, 2022) .............................................12 **Aetrex Worldwide, Inc. v. Burten Distrib.,** No. 13-1140 (SRC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172857 (D. N.J. Dec. 12, 2014) .........................................................................................................................21, 23 **ALK Assocs., Inc. v. Multimodal Applied Sys., Inc.,** 276 N.J. Super. 310 (1994) .................................................................................................24 **Anderson v. City of New Brunswick,** C.A. 12-2502 (MDS) (TJB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165852 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2017) ...........................................................................................................20 **Berrie v. Berrie,** 188 N.J. Super. 274 (Ch. Div. 1983) ....................................................................................10, 13 **Blackman v. Pink,** 54 A.2d 728 (N.J. App. 1947) ............................................................................................16
[brief] On July 11, 2023, a hearing was held and [...] ruled that the Appellee had limited himself to $200,000 in recovery in this matter in light of the August 18, 2021, Bankruptcy Court Order.  6T.  Accordingly, on July 12, 2023, an Order was entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey which ordered that the Judgement was unenforceable beyond $200,000 and the Judgment shall be molded to that amount.  Da95-99.  On that same date, Appellee’s Cross-Motion was denied.  While a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Appellee, it was limited to the molding of the judgment.  Da100-103.  However, Appellee and Appellant now agree that judicial estoppel was appropriately applied by the U.S. District Court of New Jersey and that Appellee was limited in his recovery to $200,000 against the Appellant with the excess verdict being unenforceable against the Appellant.  Moreover, the aforementioned Motion for Reconsideration was denied.  Da104-105.
[brief] ” (Db13).  Yet that argument ignores the fact that the actions of [...] and its attorneys are mentioned throughout the indictment and one of its attorneys is the unindicted co-conspirator “[...]” whose identity has not been revealed.  [...] was indicted because of his “advocacy of positions that conflict with important State interests” and his law firm, [...], played an integral role in the alleged scheme.  (See Outside Counsel Guidelines effective November 1, 2022, Pa129).  The indictment specifically references [...] numerous times, stating: “[...], is an attorney and partner at the law firm of [...]. ” (Indictment, page 8, Pa16) (emphasis added).  Further, the Indictment alleges misconduct not only by Mr. [...] but also by [...]: 128.
[brief] 70 N.J. at 575 (quoting N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25).  Nor does it change the fact that the Legislature carefully “circumscribed” the Council’s powers.  *Id.* at 577.  The trial court correctly rejected [...]’s claims that the Council is a private organization, or is effectively controlled by one, where the applicable statutes and binding case law firmly establish the opposite.
[brief] The Unreported \textit{Honeywell} Decision Is Inapplicable}  As it did in the trial court, [...] relies on the Appellate Division’s unreported opinion in \textit{Continental Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Internat’l, Inc., Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.}, Nos. A-1071-13T1, A-1100-13T1, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1685 (App. Div. July 20, 2016), to support its argument that [...] is not a successful claimant. \(^8\)  The *Honeywell* decision is distinguishable and wholly inapplicable in this case.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  *Alloco v. Ocean Beach & Bay Club,* 456 N.J.Super. 124, 145 (App.Div. 2018)...........................................16  *Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor,* 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)........................................................................8  *Furst v. Einstein Moonjy, Inc.* 182 N.J. 1 (2004)....................................................................................9  *Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Checchio,* 335 N.J. Super. 495 (App.Div. 2000).......................................................19  *Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp.*, 253 N.J. 191 (2023)..............................................................................9, 13, 23  *LNVN Funding, L.L.C. v. Colvell,* 42 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App.Div. 2011).........................................................19  *McGuire v. City of Jersey City,* 125 N.J. 310, 326 (1991).....................................................................16  *N. Bergen Rex Transp. v. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561 (1999)..............................................................................16  *Packard-Bamberger & Co.*, 167 N.J. 427 (2001).................................................................................8  *Palombi v. Palombi,* 414 N.J.Super. 274 (App.Div. 2010).......................................................18  *Raspantini v. Arocho,* 364 N.J.Super. 528 (App.Div. 2003).......................................................19  *Rendine v. Pantzer,* 141 N.J. 292 (1995)..............................................................................8, 9, 12, 13 Statutes 15 U. S.C. § 2301, *et seq.*.................................................................6, 10, 12, 17, 20, 22 R. 4:58-1..................................................................................................6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Drs. [...] and [...] were deemed Burt defendants because they were Burt defendants.  They were not deemed “empty chair” defendants or otherwise subject to any of the exceptions allowing an absent, dismissed party to appear on the verdict sheet.  The trial court made this explicitly clear when rejecting plaintiffs’ counsel’s request to adjourn the trial so that the doctors could appear.  (3T41-3T42).  This was reiterated by the trial court during trial, stating “the statute of limitations defendants are out.  They’re out and they stay out. ” (14T16).  Given the above, plaintiffs’ contentions regarding invited error barely merit response, other than to note that plaintiffs fundamentally misunderstand (or misstate) the doctrine, or misunderstand this appeal.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S REMOVAL FROM THE VEHICLE AND SUBSEQUENT FRISK WERE LAWFUL BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOLLOWING AN UNDISPUTED LAWFUL MOTOR VEHICLE STOP.  (Da7; 2T14-14 to 20-7)  The State respectfully urges this Court to affirm the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress because officers had the requisite heightened caution to request defendant step outside the vehicle and reasonable suspicion to perform a frisk under the totality of the circumstances.  Defendant alleges that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the State failed to establish the CI’s veracity of basis of knowledge and that court’s finding that [...]’s hearsay testimony was consistent with [...]’s report was clearly mistaken necessitating reversal.  (Db10-14).  However, the trial court properly found and the record reflects that law enforcement had reasonable, articulable facts that the defendant was armed to support defendant’s removal from the vehicle and subsequent frisk.
[brief] [...] then contradicted that statement at her deposition, stating that [...], [...], and [...] entered the charge pay for each other because they assumed additional duties during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa231 at 21:16-25; Pa232 at 28:9-14).  \(^3\)  At her deposition, [...] claimed that [...] gave her permission “as long as I don’t get in trouble. ”  (Pa231 at 22:18-21).  [...] claimed that [...], a nurse supervisor, was present at that time, but Love has no memory of that alleged approval.  (Pa457-58 at 32:17-33:10).  And [...]’s testimony is consistently contradicted by the evidence in the record.  In discussing the unauthorized entry of charge pay with [...], [...] stated she would “never” have approved only three of the five staffing coordinators for charge pay.
[brief] “The Comment to Rule 4:42-9 emphasizes that the Rule's history, policy, and intent conjointly support the strict limitation of fee awards….”  McGuire v. Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 326 (1991).  This Court has also recently reversed a Chancery Court award of legal fees that was based on “equitable principles” where no expressly recognized exception in the law permitted same.
[brief] Pa 98 - Plaintiff's amended case information statement filed July 23, 2024.  Pa 103 - Law Division docket report dated June 24, 2024.  \(^2\)  This document has been redacted pursuant to R. 1:38.  TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDERS, and RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Pa 1 - Order filed May 24, 2024 dismissing Plaintiff's complaint, without findings of fact or conclusions of law.  Pa 3 - Amended order dismissing Plaintiff's complaint filed June 25, 2024 to include a statement of reasons (after Plaintiff's appeal was filed).  | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 565 (1980).  | 8 | | Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019) | 10 | | Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, 309 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1998) | 7 | | Jameson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 363 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2003) | 7 | | Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 303 (2016) | 10 | | Pascack Bank v. Universal Funding, 419 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 2011) | 7 | | Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) | 12 | | Santana v. Smile Direct Club LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 285 (App. Div. 2023) | 10 | | Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 1993) | 8 | | Wang v. Allstate Insurance Company, 125 N.J. 2 (1991) | 7 | AUTHORITIES CITED R. 1:6-6..............................................................................................................
[brief] In business-to-business transactions the "nature of the transaction" will determine whether it can fit within the CFA's definition of "merchandise."  See D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 187 (2013).  The courts utilize the following considerations: (1) the complexity of the transaction, taking into account any negotiation, bidding, or request for proposals process; (2) the identity and sophistication of the parties, which includes whether the parties received legal or expert assistance in the development or execution of the transaction; (3) the nature of the relationship between the parties and whether there was any relevant underlying understanding or prior transactions between the parties; and, as previously noted; (4) the public availability of the subject merchandise.
[brief] (Da3).  Specifically, [...] cut the hourly rates of [...], Esq. and [...], Esq. from $570.00 and $530.00, respectively, to $425.00, the hourly rate of [...], Esq. from $395.00 to $325.00 and the hourly rate of paralegal [...] from $295 to $200.  (3T18-19; Pa47-51, 119-120).  As set forth on the record, the basis for these arbitrary cuts were simply [...]’s personal experience as he felt these lower rates were “more in line with what I’ve seen in these types of substantial commercial cases that have been before me in recent months. ” (3T18-21 to 3T18-22).  Based on the foregoing, Landlord respectfully submits that [...] abused his discretion by arbitrarily lowering Landlord’s contractually mandated fee award by more than forty-percent (40%) based upon his own, personal experience, which is prohibited in this State.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.  In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).  When the challenged agency action arises in a setting where the record is too meager to permit meaningful review, supplementation of the record may be necessary.
[directive] Contents of the Petition for a Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order  As noted in Guideline 2(e), the petitioner must allege the facts that tend to establish whether the respondent poses an immediate and present danger of bodily injury to self or others by possessing, purchasing, owning, or receiving a firearm.  Accordingly, the petition form contains questions based on the fifteen factors enumerated in Guideline 3(d) for the court to consider, along with other relevant evidence, to determine whether to issue a temporary or final extreme risk protective order.  Specifically, the questions on the fifteen factors address whether the respondent: (1) has any history of threats or acts of violence by the respondent directed toward self or others; has any history of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force by the (2) respondent against another person; (3) is the subject of a temporary or final restraining order or has violated a temporary or final restraining order issued pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991" (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq. ); (4) is the subject of a temporary or final protective order or has violated a temporary or final protective order issued pursuant to the "Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015" (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 et al.); (5) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or convictions for a violent indictable crime or disorderly persons offense, stalking offense pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12- 10, or domestic violence offense enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19; (6) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or convictions for any offense involving cruelty to animals or any history of acts involving cruelty to animals; (7) has any history of drug or alcohol abuse and recovery from this abuse; (8) has recently acquired a firearm, ammunition, or other deadly weapon; [...]• [...] • [...]
[brief] Public policy as well as considerations of fundamental fairness dictate that proof of receipt should be required.  A significant policy consideration is the impact on the public, namely, on innocent drivers who are seriously injured in accidents.  Here, [...] had the financial ability to pay a substantial settlement to those injured in the accident out of his own pocket.  But what if that had not been the case?  What happens to a victim who perhaps loses a limb in a car crash caused by a driver who has no financial resources?  His recovery would be limited to such funds as would be available as uninsured motorist coverage.  Hundreds of thousands of dollars that the victim might theoretically be awarded to redress his devastating physical and emotional suffering would be lost.  The very principals on which automobile insurance law is based would be subverted.