ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] of Adj., 83 N.J. Super. 494, 496 (App. Div. 1964):  "Whether an application is to be rejected on the grounds of res judicata is in the first instance for the board to determine.  Even if the application is closely similar to the previous one, or identical with it but it is alleged that the surrounding circumstances have changed or that experience has shown in the prior denial to be in error, it is within the discretion of the board whether to reject the application on the ground of res judicata, and the exercise of that discretion may not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a showing of unreasonableness."  In the present matter, the essential elements of Plaintiff's variance application mirrored the application of [...] for the same property which the Board denied in January 2021.
[brief] Judge had mistaken rulings for [...]’s Oct. 26th application for Trust payments for [...] & [...] fees for Intermediate Accounting; [...]’s Commissions for 2022; & [...]’s legal fees from Feb. 1 to Oct. 25, ’22.  30.  Judge stated “there's this notion that there could have been an informal accounting, they could have saved fees, there could have been -- but that's not been the history of this case. ” (3T, p. 10, lines 14-18).  Substantiated facts in my filings countered his wrong conclusions, which corrupted his rulings.  [...] and I verified that our requested informal accounting would provide same details as Mr. [...]’s 98-page Formal Accounting since informal accounting had to comply w/same formal accounting detail requirements of NJ 4:87-3, so there would be no questions, for whether there were sufficient details, that can arise due to a less rigorous informal, instead of formal, accounting.
[brief] For example, in Belmont I, the government agency refused to bargain in the presence of seven (7) specific individuals for the union.  In Belmont II, the government agency also refused to bargain in the presence of specific individuals.  Moreover, the record reflected that the union had “conducted an internal Union vote to include silent representatives, and solicited and obtained volunteers to serve in this role. ”  Belmont I, supra.  This is vastly different from the instant matter, where the [...] seeks to generically label all of its members, collectively, as negotiations team members.  Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that the [...] took any internal measures or votes to even identify specific members to attend negotiations.  On the contrary, the [...] has made it clear that its intent is for members to be able to “come-and-go” to negotiations sessions whenever they feel like it.  This is essentially what the union attempted to do in Belmont I, where the [...] determined that the government agency was not required to bargain.  See Belmont II (“In [Belmont I], the Union only sent one e-mail indicating that it ‘may’ bring other representatives to a bargaining session.  The [...] found that this was insufficient to clarify the status and role of the unannounced individuals in the back of the room during the 2017 bargaining session.  The [...] determined that an employer could unlawfully refuse to bargain until the union removed any ambiguity as to the identity of the purported bargaining representatives. ”)  This is exactly what the [...] is attempting to do in the instant matter, by notifying the [...] that any number of employees “may” show up to each bargaining session, depending on if they want to attend or not.
[brief] PROOF OF SERVICE BY E-Mail  Re: In re: [...]  Consumer Privacy User Profile  Litigation (Special Master)  Reference No. [...]  I, [...], not a party to the within action, hereby declare that on October 22, 2021, I served the attached Order Regarding Motion to Compel [...] and [...] as Document Custodians on the parties in the within action by electronic mail at [...], addressed as follows:
[brief] Despite her own admissions, Plaintiff now argues that “[...] was herself an ‘informant of dubious veracity,’ precisely because of her public reputation and advocacy work. ”  Opp. at 25.  At its core, this argument suggests that [...], as a Muslim woman who advocates for pride in wearing a hijab, cannot be trusted to relay information about incidents involving other hijab-wearing Muslims.  Being a “partisan advocate,” Opp. at 24, cannot be enough to find [...] is a dubious informant.  Indeed, such a finding would be inconsistent with numerous cases rejecting the theory that partisan bias may be evidence of actual malice.  See, e.g., Dershowitz v. Cable News Network, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (striking allegations of political animus as “immaterial and impertinent” to the question of actual malice); Arpaio v. Robillard, 459 F. Supp. 3d 62, 66 (D.D.C. 2020) (“the motivations behind defendants’ communications—inspired by political differences or otherwise—do not impact whether defendants acted with actual malice as a matter of law”); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989) (political or financial “motive in publishing a story . . . cannot provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice”).
[brief] BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF R. 4:50-1, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE MOTION TO VACATE  A movant must show excusable neglect and a meritorious defense to vacate a default judgment.  R. 4:50-1.  Here, Defendant never disputed entering into the underlying loan or defaulting.  Defendant failed to show any excusable neglect with respect to failing to file an Answer, as Defendant failed to certify that he was never served at his residence.  Defendant failed to address the acknowledged receipt of post-Judgment correspondence sent by certified mail to his residence in 2015.  Defendant acknowledged being aware of the Judgment in 2020.  Defendant even retained counsel for assistance with complying with post-Judgment obligations in 2023, after Plaintiff was in the process of obtaining a Court Order enforcing the subpoena of Defendant’s wife.  In short, Defendant failed to demonstrate any grounds for relief under R. 4:50-1.  The trial court correctly denied Defendant’s motion.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Plaintiff misquotes section 72 and omits the statute’s reference to “Article 1 of this chapter. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-72.  Plaintiff states that section 72 requires an employer to maintain insurance for any and all claims arising out of a work-related accident, even those that fall outside the parameters of the Act.  The plain language of section 72 of the Act does not impose any such requirement on an employer.  First, section 72 merely requires an employer to make sufficient payment for liability imposed under Article 1 of the Act, not liability that is imposed at common law for claims falling outside the workers’ compensation scheme.
[brief] [...] had lived at that house since 2008, never complaining about the zoning or the operation of the pizzeria.  (T.1 at 110:19 – 112:24).  [...] asserted he had made complaints to Borough officials when [...] was operating, and that they had agreed with him that the operation of a pizzeria in a residential zone was illegal (T.1 at 49:24 -52:6), but no such official was called upon to testify and, indeed, the Borough was dismissed as a defendant.
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).  The substantial evidence presented does not support the final agency determination made by the [...].  Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references a “presumption” that mail properly addressed with proper postage was received by the party it was addressed to.  However, [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received a postcard from the Division, regardless of if it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that the postcard was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive a postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division sent the postcard to [...] (and others) is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.  Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa117.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that these postcards were never received.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.
[directive] An officer authorized to use a less-lethal device pursuant to this policy may fire or discharge the device during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.  10.2
[directive] On a periodic basis, and no later than January 31 of the following year, every agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and the Attorney General, and publish on the agency’s public website, a brief synopsis of all misconduct where an agency member: (a) Was terminated; (b) Was reduced in rank or grade; (c) Was assessed a suspension of more than five days.  A suspension of more than five days shall be broadly construed to include any disposition involving a suspension of more than 40 hours of time or the equivalent of five days/shifts if less than 40 hours, regardless of whether any of the suspension time was suspended or held in abeyance.  It shall include the loss of vacation, sick or leave time totaling more than 40 hours or the equivalent of five days/shifts.  It shall include any combination of suspension time assessed plus loss of vacation, sick or leave time that aggregates to more than 40 hours or the equivalent of five days/shifts.  It shall also include any fine that exceeds the gross value of 40 hours, or the equivalent of five days/shifts, of pay; (d)  Had a sustained finding of discrimination or bias against any person because of the individual’s actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, familial status, or any other protected characteristic under N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (e) Had a sustained finding that the officer utilized excessive force in violation of departmental policy or the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (f) Had a sustained finding that the officer was untruthful or has demonstrated a lack of candor, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 65
[brief] Perhaps most compelling, plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that, if the Burt defendant status of [...] and [...] were to be reconsidered, it would require an adjournment of the trial:  As I see it the only two ways are that only [...] is on the verdict sheet, it’s whether he was negligent or not, and then -- or the other thing is we have to adjourn the trial.  We have to give [...] and -- and [...] an opportunity to appear and have their counsel appear.  What I suspect those defendants would do -- those attorneys would do, is they would say hey no expert has said that they caused the harm, and I presume they’d move for summary judgment.  I presume it would be granted.  If so, then we’re going to be back here again without the nonsense of these Burt defendants.  We’ll have a clean case, the way it should be.  I think that’s the only way that this can proceed, one -- that one way or the other way.
[brief] [A229, Op. at 16(emphasis added)].  c.  The trial court found Defendant’s claims concerning lack of access to independent counsel be incredible:  The court also finds that the defendant’s testimony concerning she was unaware of her right to have legal counsel review the PSA to be incredible.  The court having found she signed the PSA, the PSA included language at paragraph 40 concerning her right to be represented by counsel in reviewing and signing the agreement as well as her knowingly waiving her right to counsel.  Although the court finds that [...] did not represent her in a review of the PSA or other documents challenged, the court does find that defendant with reasonable diligence could have requested [...] to review the agreement or could have requested a referral from her to an attorney who had specialized knowledge of matrimonial law and could review it for her.
[directive] Avoidance of Interference with Ongoing Investigations or Proceedings  The Civilian Review Board must establish policies to avoid interference with ongoing investigations or proceedings, similar to the policies that an internal affairs function must adopt to avoid interference with ongoing criminal investigations or proceedings.  Specifically, the policy must make clear that the Board may not commence an investigation of a particular civilian complaint or incident until after any criminal and/or internal affairs investigations have concluded and any resulting discipline has been imposed.  This requirement applies regardless of whether the Civilian Review Board is granted authority to recommend discipline, or request reconsideration of any findings or disciplinary decisions, or is limited in its authority to auditing completed investigations.  This requirement also applies regardless of whether, as a general matter, the Civilian Review Board is granted access to redacted or unredacted internal affairs records.  After reviewing the relevant internal affairs records and conducting any other lawful investigation that the Civilian Review Board deems appropriate, the Board may, to the extent permitted by law, present its conclusions to the law enforcement executive or appropriate authority; request additional information or clarification regarding the findings or decisions made in the course of the internal affairs investigation; and/or request that the internal affairs investigation be re-opened.  Whether to re-open an internal affairs investigation remains within the discretion of the law enforcement executive and, with regard to criminal matters, the [...].  The Civilian Review Board may not override any finding or decision made as part of the internal affairs process, impose discipline, require that another official impose discipline, or render any finding or decision that requires deference from any other official.
[brief] COUNTER STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS  [...] commenced this litigation by filing a Complaint against [...] seeking compensation under the terms of her homeowner’s insurance policy with [...] for damages she allegedly sustained as the result of a water leak occurring on January 14, 2019, at [...]’s home in [...].  [...] subsequently filed an Amended Complaint, adding [...] as a defendant.  In her Amended Complaint, [...] sought damages from [...] for its alleged negligence and breach of contract due to [...]’s alleged failure to clean and restore [...]’s personal property.  See Pa9, 11-12, Fifth Count and Sixth Count.  [...] is in the business of providing investigative and evaluation services to property and casualty insurance companies.  Pa23.  Following incidents such as the one that occurred at [...]’s home, [...] is retained by a home owner’s insurance carrier to inspect the insured’s property, and to photograph, inventory and provide research to the insurance carrier regarding the condition and value of the damaged contents.  Pa23 -24.  In this particular case, [...] was retained by [...] to perform a site inspection and to inventory the property that [...] alleges was damaged following the water leak at her home.  [...] was not retained to restore, repair or clean [...]’s property.  Pa24.  There was no contractual agreement between [...] and [...].
[brief] This was the method of authentication described in Bunting and applied there and in Brown with respect to the apartment-building videos.  Originally conceived as a means of authenticating X-rays, which represent phenomena that no witness can directly perceive, and surveillance videos that depict scenes where no witness was present, the silent-witness theory holds that a photograph or video recording is admissible as independent evidence of the events depicted upon demonstration of “an adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process producing it[.]”  [...], *Foundation for Contemporaneous Videotape Evidence*, 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 493, § 5 (Originally published in 1992).
[brief] Da1-3.  On November 17, 2022, the defendant appeared before the Honorable [...], J.M.C., in the Upper Freehold Township Municipal Court for trial on these charges.  See generally (1T).¹  The State presented testimony from [...] of the New Jersey State Police, see (1T:4-12 to 42-2), and moved into evidence a flash drive containing video recordings from Trooper Gram’s dashboard camera and body worn camera (“BWC”) (J-1), see (1T:3-22 to 3-24); a Miranda warning form (S-1), see (1T:16-1 to 16-2), Da5; the Attorney General’s Standard Statement (S-2), see (1T:16-19 to 16-21), Da6; and the Drinking Driver/Operator Questionnaire (S-3), see (1T:18-15 to 18-17), Da7.
[brief] Da17.  In his April 5, 2023 supporting certification of amount due, [...] certified that an arbitrator had determined that the principal amount due to plaintiff based on the underlying loan agreement and promissory note was $16,573,835.18 plus pre arbitration award interest at the 15% contract rate of interest through January 5, 2022 in the amount of $2,762,141.11, for a total due as of January 5, 2022 of $19,335,976.29, together with a per diem of $6,905.76 based on the 15% contract interest rate.  Da24-25, ¶18.  [...] also certified that the additional interest at the 15% contract interest rate from January 6, 2022 to April 5, 2023 was $3,142,122.92, and that, as of April 5, 2023, plaintiff had received rents totaling $976,755.74.  Da27.  Therefore, according to [...], the total amount due to plaintiff from [...] as of April 5, 2023 was $21,501,343.47.  Da26-28.  Nowhere in this certification of amount due does [...] request that plaintiff be awarded post-mortgage judgment interest at the contract rate!
[brief] This case turns on a straightforward issue of statutory interpretation: whether the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (LTTEL) imposes substantive as well as procedural constraints on the long-term tax exemptions it authorizes a municipality to grant to developers of redevelopment projects.  LTTEL authorizes municipalities to grant “appropriate” tax exemptions to investors in redevelopment projects based on “findings” by the municipality that assess the costs and benefits of the exemption, assess “the importance of the exemption in obtaining development of the project,” and assess the “influence on the locational decisions” of probable occupants.  These words, construed against the background of constraints imposed by the taxation provisions of the New Jersey Constitution, establish a standard to guide municipalities as they determine whether or not to grant exemptions.  The standard, quite simply, means that exemptions under LTTEL require credible findings that they are necessary to attract investment in the project.  Defendants disagree, making the bold claim that so long as a municipality follows LTTEL’s procedures and recites the requisite findings a LTTEL exemption is immune from challenge.
[brief] Defendant was given the opportunity to explore this during cross-examination of [...] and, again, came up empty handed.  See (8T:22-15 to 26-15).  [...]’s in-court identification of the defendant was a “confirmatory identification” – “when a witness identifies someone he … knows from before but cannot identify by name. ”  *State v. Pressley*, 232 N.J. 587, 592-93 (2018).  Such identifications are not, as a matter of law, “considered suggestive. ”  *Ibid.*; cf. *Watson*, 254 N.J. at 587 (providing as examples of “good cause” sufficient to allow for a first-time in-court identification “when an ‘eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before’ the crime;” “[f]riends or associates, among others, could identify someone they have known for some time” for the first time in court).  That [...]’s first-time in-court identification occurred in the courtroom alone does not put sufficient suggestiveness onto an otherwise non-suggestive identification such that the identification’s reliability was outweighed.  The lower court did not err in allowing this identification to take place before the jury, and concurrently allowing the jury to consider this testimony, along with the cross-examination attacking the identification as the product of suggestion.  That the jury found this testimony to be persuasive and, along with other evidence, sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, does not provide a basis for reversal of defendant’s conviction.  This Court can and should respect the lower court’s ruling and the jury’s verdict and affirm.