ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ]  In *Fogarty*, a case turning on whether a police officer’s direction to an intoxicated motorist to move his car, our Supreme Court was deeply divided.  The four-justice majority precluded a defense, characterized as quasi-entrapment or duress, as a matter of law because of its fear that “hordes of intoxicated drivers being dispersed by police outside of numerous bars, restaurants, and stadiums [would assert] as a defense to DWI charges that they drove in response to police directives. ”  *Id.* at 82 ([...], dissenting).  The three-justice dissent suggested that the majority “goes to such lengths to justify its refusal to permit Fogarty to present his defense is ample indication of its discomfort with its own rationale. ”  *Ibid.*  As the dissent noted:  We should all recognize that our cases may occasionally turn up freakish factual contexts in which the rigid, mechanistic application of a sound, well-established, respected principle of law will produce a result that is plainly at odds with substantial justice.  This is such a case.  When, as here, there is a collision between law and common sense, this Court should exert its best effort to vindicate good sense.  Our institutional legitimacy depends on our succeeding in that endeavor.
[brief] On August 22, 2024, [...] filed a Verified Complaint and application for Order to Show Cause.  Da1  On August 23, the trial court executed the Order to Show Cause.  Da418.  After briefing, a hearing was held on September 13.  1T.  At the close of the hearing, the trial court made preliminary findings on the record, including that the defect in [...]’s bid was not material and [...] would be obliged to waive it, but did not dispose of the action.  See e.g., 1T58-1 – 1T58-21; 1T59-2 – 1T60-6.  The trial court’s basis for finding the defect immaterial was that [...] eventually provided a NJDOT Notice that was active at the time of its bid and that [...] bound itself to perform when it belatedly submitted that NJDOT Notice.  See e.g., Ibid.  The trial court did not look to the bid date to determine materiality and did not consider the possible or potential impacts on assurance of performance or competition that arose from [...]’s failure to submit the document with its bid.  See e.g., Ibid.  No written order was issued from the September 13 hearing.  Following a management conference on September 24, the trial court set a schedule for [...] to move for reconsideration and [...] to move to enter final judgment.  Da424.  [...] and [...] filed Answers to the Verified Complaint on September 25 and 26, respectively.  Da391, Da399.  The trial court held a motion hearing on October 24.  3T.  On that date, the trial court made findings from the bench that largely tracked its findings of September 13.  See e.g., 3T32-8 – 3T33-14.  On November 1, the trial court entered a final order finding that [...]’s bid was not materially defective, directing [...] to rescind the award to [...], and directing [...] to find that [...] was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder.  Da425.  The County indicated during the October 24 hearing that it would carry out whatever it was directed to do by the trial court at [...]’s next Freeholder Board meeting on November 6, 2024.  3T49-14 – 3T50-1.  While the issue regarding whether the trial court should decide that a discretionary waiver was inappropriate without [...] first acting was addressed, the issue was largely addressed as a question of whether to remand, rather than whether [...] should prevail on its claims in the first instance.  3T45-24 – 3T47-21.  On November 1, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal and Application for Leave to File an Emergent Motion.  Da433, Da439.  On November 4, this Court granted [...]’s Application.  Da450.  This Court subsequently entered a stay pending the outcome of the appeal and set an expedited schedule.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] The eight-day trial began on May 16, 2023 and concluded on May 25, 2023.  The jury determined that the Township Defendants did not discriminate against Plaintiff because of her religion.  DA079-DA082.  The jury determined, however, that the Township Defendants were liable for a hostile work environment based on disability discrimination and retaliation under LAD for Plaintiff obtaining legal counsel.  DA079-DA082.  The jury awarded Plaintiff: (i) $500,001 in compensatory damages for emotional under LAD; (ii) $110,000 in economic loss damages; (iii) $1,000,002 in punitive damages.  DA079-DA082.
[brief] See also Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997) (recognizing that an appellate court must give due regard to an agency’s credibility determinations).  Contrary to Appellant's contentions, the Hearing Officer considered the totality of the testimony and evidence presented at the two public hearings on the application and weighed the competing arguments made by the parties’ expert witnesses.
[brief] The more recent approach to the question of a landowner’s duty has approached the question more flexibly and with fact-sensitive consideration of public policy and fairness.  Jimenez, 329 N.J. Super. at 402; See also Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439.  To determine whether the owner of property had a duty in particular circumstances to the injured person, a court must examine such factors as: (1) the relationship of the parties, (2) the nature of the attendant risk, (3) the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and (4) the public interest in the proposed solution.
[directive] When the supervisor finds a pattern of behavior potentially indicative of domestic violence, the supervisor will:  a.  Address the behaviors, consistent with Internal Affairs policies, through a review with the officer and document all contacts.  Under no circumstances will the identity of a reporting victim or witness be disclosed to the officer at this stage.  b.  Forward written reports detailing the behaviors to the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive through the chain of command in a timely manner to determine discipline or other appropriate action.  c.  Prepare and submit to the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive a written request for a psychological exam/counseling by a licensed psychologist/psychiatrist or other mental health professional.  The supervisor’s written report will include the factual basis for the referral and will attach any relevant supporting documentation.  A copy of the report will also be forwarded to the County Prosecutor for consideration and discussion with the Chief of the Department.  3.  When the supervisor determines an officer has engaged in domestic violence, the supervisor will:  a.  Prepare and submit to the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive a written request for a psychological exam/counseling by a licensed psychologist/psychiatrist or other mental health professional.  The psychologist/psychiatrist must be provided with all reports and information available regarding the domestic violence incident/s.  The psychologist/psychiatrist must attempt to contact the reported victim for their input and must be provided with the reported victim’s contact information; the contact information must be kept confidential.  A copy of the report will also be forwarded to the County Prosecutor.  b.  Request that the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive order the officer to seek assistance from a program for batterers that has been approved by the County Prosecutor or the Department.  If such a program is not -5- available, request that the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive order the officer to a counselor who has demonstrable training and experience in counseling domestic violence batterers.  [The cost of the counseling is to be paid by the officer].  c.  Contact and inform the purported victim of the concerns regarding the officer's behavior; that the officer has been ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation; that the evaluator will be contacting the reported victim; that the reported victim is not required to speak with the evaluator; and, that any information disclosed by the reported victim may not be confidential.  The supervisor will document that he/she informed the reported victim concerning this procedure.  d.  If the Department decides to take adverse action against the officer, it will provide a copy of the psychological report to the officer in a timely manner, unless doing so would endanger the safety of the victim.  C.
[directive] While the appropriate authority must make the final decision regarding discipline, the County Prosecutor may make a non-binding recommendation regarding the discipline to be imposed by the appropriate factual findings and preliminary notices of discipline shall be authority forwarded to the appropriate authority.  While the appropriate authority must make the final decision regarding discipline, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General may make a non-binding recommendation regarding the discipline to be imposed by the appropriate authority.  The County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office also may determine that it is appropriate to handle In other internal affairs investigations of high level officials in their discretion.
[brief] An average consumer . . . is not likely to understand, absent further explanation, what arbitration is, how it differs from litigation in court or that it involves no judge or jury, nor are they likely able to distinguish which claims fall within the ‘jurisdictional maximum for small claims’ to be litigated in court. ”) (Pa25-56).  [...]’s agreement suffers from this same fatal flaw.  In this regard, the weak plaster [...] mixes from various disjointed, contradicted, and confusing portions of the agreement can never fill the foundational cracks in the operative clause of [...]’s agreement, Section 2(a)(1).
[brief] Plaintiff misleadingly attempts to evade this clear statute of limitations bar by alleging a “Third Loan” was agreed to on April 26, 2013, comprising of allegedly unpaid principal, interest and late charges, and which would accrue interest on interest.  Plaintiff’s misleading attempts to allege a “Third Loan” do not make it an actual separate loan, nor does reclassifying it as a “pay-when-able” loan, given the evidence and testimony presented at trial.  In fact, no new money was allegedly loaned by Plaintiff to Defendants in this so-called “Third Loan” because it allegedly only consisted of outstanding principal already loaned, as well as interest, late fees, and accruing interest on such principal.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, Respondents [...], Esq. and [...] respectfully submit that the trial court’s dismissal of the 2020 Action should be affirmed.  [...]  Attorneys for Respondents [...], Esq. and Pepper Hamilton LLP  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: July 19, 2023  [...], [...] [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants v. [...], ESQ., [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOSEPH ROCCO, ESQ., [...], [...], ESQ., [...], ESQ., [...], [...], ESQ., [...], ESQ., [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Da1-2.  Several pre-trial motions were litigated, including – and relevant to POINT I of this appeal – a motion made by the defense to suppress an in-court identification from witness [...].  (4T:10-4 to 10-7; 14-7 to 14-11);¹ Da18-22; see also (4T:5-5 to 5-9) (“So, basically, we are here today to argue whether or not [...] can testify in court that the man he saw on that night was [the defendant] and whether or not there was any suggestibility as to that identification”).  [...] did not participate in any out-of-court identification procedure; however, he did provide two descriptions of the burglar to police.  Immediately following the burglary, [...] had provided a “generalized” description of the burglar: “a full beard, wearing a jacket, dark wool hat, sunglasses, white-collared shirt and a dark zip-up jacket. ” (4T:7-23 to 9-2).  When [...] later provided a formal statement to police, his description of the burglar was “more specific: ”  “He gives the suspect’s hair color and he describes a tattoo that [the defendant] has specifically on his chest.  He says that he knows him as someone that used to work at the restaurant.  He’s seen him multiple times before.  He knows his face, but he doesn’t know his name. ” (4T:9-21 to 10-3).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied defendant’s motion to preclude [...]’s in-court identification.  (4T:14-7 to 17-15); Da23.  ¹  The State’s transcript citations follow the transcript key contained in defendant’s brief at page 1, footnote 3.  court rejected defendant’s contention that [...]’s more-detailed description of the burglar – “assuming that it” “constitutes an identification within the intendment of the Wade Henderson line of” cases – was made “amidst highly suggestive circumstances.
[directive] ”  defined Forfeiture Prooram Administration a  As Standard Operating Procedure the term allows the funding of a broad spectrum of 12, a programs that can enhance law enforcement agency’s ability to respond to the ever changing complexities of providing competent, efficient and fair law enforcement services to the citizen’s of the State.  Forfeiture funds are also used from time time support to to community based programs that may not have an obvious enforcement purpose, but law can often provides clear benefit to the citizen’s quality-of-life.  Strong arguments be a a made that these programs benefit the law enforcement agency by providing positive to community atmosphere that tends reduce the influence of criminal elements and in ultimately crime the community.  However, the funding of these programs without a uniform evaluation of the can of program’s merits and overall benefits to law enforcement lead to expressions of of a concern by’2he taxpayers the State,and questioning the expenditure’s merits. of fund or  Therefore, it is the policy the Attorney General that alf planned forfeiture property disbursement to a non-law enforcement agency, organization, program or group in must first be reviewed and approved, writing, by both the county prosecutor of jurisdiction and the Division Criminal Justice.
[brief] In fact, Plaintiffs also inconsistently contend that “the Individual Plaintiffs initially brought this suit derivatively against [...] and [...]…”.  So, again this was direct litigation by Plaintiffs against [...] and [...].  (Ibid.)  (4T58)  There is no way that the Plaintiffs can claim they were strangers to [...] when suing it ‘derivatively’ as its members, even if they had argued third-party tort liability to the Arbitrator.  They instead omitted *In re Niles*’ reference to the need for third party litigation in their argument to the Arbitrator asking for fees.  (4T57:9-16)  The Chancery Court’s rejection of the Arbitrator’s direct fee-shifting analysis and award was exactly what *Weiss* and *Heher* required and should be affirmed.  **X.
[brief] D)  The Commission ignored their own precedents regarding Board Member [...]’s Facebook post in Count 16 (Raised at: Pa15)  Count 16 involves a Facebook post by Board member [...] to the [...] Facebook site (Pa37).  While Ms. [...] did attempt to disclaim her speech in her opening paragraph, her missive still runs afoul of Advisory Opinion A02-22 and I/M/O Treston in several ways.  First, she invited residents to email her at her official email address of [...].  As stated in the Complaint, by including her District email address, [...] gave her post the imprimatur of being an official Board matter.  Second, as stated in I/M/O Treston and AO A02-22, Ms. [...] references a number of complex internal board matters and history that again makes her post appear to be an official district matter and not only personal opinion.  The Commission was arbitrary and capricious in ignoring these facts, and not giving [...]’s complaint the weight and consideration it deserved.
[brief] On the second point, to avoid reversal, Plaintiff plays fast and loose with the facts and law.  She litters her Opposition with factual inaccuracies.  Chief among them is her assertion that she does not pursue a claim for failure to timely recall.  Apparently realizing such a claim is not authorized by New Jersey law and is preempted by federal law, Plaintiff attempts to disavow the plain language of her Complaint and asserts she pled a claim for failure to warn – post sale.  This fallacy is belied by Plaintiff’s own Complaint:  48.  Defendants intentionally and with wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed, recklessly and maliciously failed to recall the Subject Product in the United States even after they were certainly aware of the defect and the fact that they had recalled the same product for the same defect in twelve (12) other countries and were also aware of numerous claims and injuries relating to the Subject Product.  The timeline of Defendants’ intentional, wanton Plaintiff also blatantly misrepresents [...]’s actions in the U.S. following discovery of the silicone particulate issue, asserting [...] “did nothing” and “deliberately concealed” it.  The undisputed record shows instead that [...] worked extensively with [...] pursuant to its recall regulations and procedures, contacting [...] over 20 times to obtain authorization to send a communication to healthcare providers before [...] finally provided feedback, authorizing a different communication and strategy for a recall.  Plaintiff likewise misrepresents the law, starting with the wrong standard of review.  She also wrongly claims that New Jersey law permits juries to engage in complex product-defect analyses without the aid of an expert and relies on a dissenting opinion where it suits her argument without disclosure to the Court.  These are but a few of Plaintiff’s misguided efforts to avoid the actual facts and law that compel reversal of the Trial Court’s misguided Orders.  At bottom, Plaintiff’s Opposition shows she has no viable ‘failure-to-recall’ claim, she lacks the mandatory expert testimony to establish a manufacturing defect in the specific product at issue, and she cannot prove causation because her experts offer only speculative, inadmissible net opinions.
[brief] I.  The Parties.  [...], a charitable, non-profit health care organization, is one of southern New Jersey’s leading networks of health care providers with hospitals located in Vineland, Mullica Hill, and Elmer.  (Da1-2).  [...] is currently the Director of Nursing Operations at [...].  (Pa64 at 14:2-3).  [...] is the Director of Labor Relations at [...], (Pa89 at 22:2-3), and acts as the Human Resources (“HR”) Business Partner for [...]’s corporate department, (Pa89 at 22:12-23:3).  [...] began working at [...] in 2005 as a security guard.  He later accepted a position in the staffing office at [...], where he worked until his termination in September 2020.  (Pa162 at 13:22-15:7).  [...] (“[...]”) began working at [...] in 2010 as a transporter.  She took a new position in the staffing office in August 2019, where she worked until her termination in September 2020.  (Pa227-28 at 10:14-16:19).  [...] (“[...]”) began working at [...] in 2006 in the staffing office, where she remained until her termination in September 2020.  (Pa280-81 at 12:24-13:21; Pa282 at 19:8-11).  [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) reported to [...] at all relevant times.  (Pa163-64 at 20:20-21:4; Pa231 at 25:20-22; Pa284 at 25:6-10).  II.  The Staffing Office and Payroll.  The staffing office ensures that [...]’s hospitals have adequate nursing coverage at all times.  (Pa67).  [...] employed Plaintiffs as “staffing coordinators. ” (Pa162; Pa228; Pa282).  During the time period relevant to this litigation, the staffing office was comprised of approximately six staffing coordinators, the nursing supervisor, and the nurse manager.  (Pa66-67 at 25:18-26:1; Pa67 at 28:15-17).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for a variety of tasks, including important timekeeping and payroll functions.  (Pa67).  The staffing coordinators have access to [...]’s timekeeping and payroll software called “Kronos. ” (Pa351).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for finalizing employees’ Kronos time cards prior to payroll closing.  (Pa351 at 38:5-11).  Payroll closes at approximately 11:00 am every other Monday.  (Pa351 at 38:20-25).  [...] was responsible for reviewing the staffing coordinators’ time cards for any missed entries and accurate paid time off (“PTO”) prior to payroll closing.  (Pa351-52 at 40:17-41:12).  [...] typically reviewed her staffing coordinators’ time cards on Sunday evenings prior to payroll closing.  (Pa352 at 41:3-12).  While the staffing coordinators could not make alterations to their own time cards, they could edit entries for other employees, including other staffing coordinators.  (Pa351 at 39:13-40:16).  III.
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b), this letter brief is submitted in lieu of a formal brief on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | COUNTER-STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | | | POINT I | | | DEFENDANT’S MISTRIAL APPLICATION WAS APPROPRIATELY DENIED | 5 | | POINT II | | | TRIAL  COURT’S DENIAL OF MOTION TO SEVER WAS PROPER AND NONETHELESS RENDERED MOOT BY DEFENDANT’S ACQUITTAL | 7 | | POINT III | | | DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS APPROPRIATE | 10 | | CONCLUSION | 12 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Although defendant’s appeal is comprehensive, it derives from a single fault line, along which the fissure of its argument radiates.  While defendant argues that this is a chasm by which defendant’s conviction must be swallowed, the damage is not so severe; the breach is not so wide.  Trials are not perfect, and this was not a perfect trial.  Yet, the law does not guarantee perfection, only fairness, and what this defendant received was fair.  The issues identified on appeal were begat by the State’s witness during cross-examination.  Neither party is at fault.  During that examination, defense counsel inquired into discrepancies between the witness’s testimony and her statements to police.  He was trying to establish that the witness was a sour ex-girlfriend and that she was therefore motivated to fabricate her testimony on direct.  All within bounds.  Answering perhaps a little too enthusiastically at times, the witness variously volunteered evidence that was objectively and admittedly irrelevant.  However, the exposure to the jury of these facts was not lethal to the verdict and the record reflects their being unimpressed.  The trial court handled these digressions appropriately and defendant’s conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
[brief] In an Opinion issued on November 19, 2013, the Honorable [...], U.S.D.J. for the District of Massachusetts, made the following pertinent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and established the source the unlawful breach of the FBI data repository and seizure of the CHR (Pa 165).  Below is the transcribed telephone conversation between the two officers of the court and provides the origination of the request to breach the FBI data repository in real time (Pa 8 Exhibit D):  “Hey, can you do an N-C-C-I for me without printing it?  Write everything down?”  [...] responded, “Ah –. ”  [...] continued, “An out-of-stater. ”  [...] continued, “Hold on, let me check – hold on, I want to put you to another phone.  Hey, what’s the private phone?”  A female voice responded with, “Extension 3-2-8. ”  Judge Saylor’s relevant Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law highlight make perfectly clear that [...]’s private papers were unlawfully seized by three officers of the court and provided to [...]’s prior counsel in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause.