ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] Certification in Support Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider October 15, 2018  Order to Exclude Expert Testimony ...........................................(omitted)  Exhibit A, 10/15/2018  Order Excluding the Expert Testimony of [...] on Lost Profits .........................................................................................(omitted, see 308a)  Exhibit B, 5/28/2018  Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants [...], Esquire, and [...] ...................................................................................................................(omitted, see 201a)  Exhibit C, 8/21/2018  Order Denying Summary Judgment Motion of Defendants [...], Esquire, and [...] ...................................................................................................................(omitted, see 229a)  Exhibit D, 8/21/2018  Order Denying Summary Judgment Motion of Defendants [...] and [...] ...................................................................................(omitted, see 222a)  Exhibit E, 9/4/2018  Brief of Defendants [...], Esquire and [...] in Support of Motion for Reconsideration  Pursuant to R. 4:49-2...................................................................(omitted, see 245a)  Exhibit F, 9/28/2018  Order and Opinion Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Summary Judgment by Defendants [...], Esquire, and Cooper Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A. ...........(omitted, see 300a)  Exhibit G, 9/12/2018  Defendants, [...] and [...]'s, Brief in Support of Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of [...]..(omitted, see 261a)  Exhibit H, 10/4/2018  Plaintiffs' Letter Brief in Opposition to Defendants [...] and [...]'s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of [...]  ...................................................................................................................(omitted)  Exhibit I, 9/13/2018  Order Denying Defendants [...] and [...]'s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment  ...........................................................................................................(omitted, see 298a)  Exhibit J, 8/15/2018  Transcript of Motion Re: Summary Judgment Motions...311a  Exhibit K, 9/28/2018  Transcript of Motion Re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants [...], Esquire, and [...].........334a
[brief] 5T160:8-14.  Quite simply, the ownership interests of [...] and [...] in [...] and [...] were initiated upon the departures of [...] from [...] and [...] from [...].  The notion that [...] wrongfully diverted sums from [...] after she bought his interest in [...] and he had no interest in any [...] funds lacks any factual or legal basis.  Neither [...] nor [...] breached any duty owed to plaintiffs arising from the contracts to which they were a party.
[brief] This case arises out of an automobile accident.  The details of the accident itself are beyond the scope of this appeal, which deals with a single issue: whether or not [...], which at one point insured the plaintiffs’ vehicle, had effectively cancelled his policy prior to the date of the accident.  The plaintiff is asserting three points of error on this appeal: (1) The insurance company failed to present legally sufficient proof of mailing a Cancellation Notice in the manner required by statute, given that the proper use of a Certificate of Mailing has not been certified to by anyone with personal knowledge; (2) The insurance did not comply with the requirement of the statute that it maintain a contemporaneously certified copy of the Cancellation Notice in its files; (3)  Assuming, arguendo, that the insurance company’s proofs are deemed to be legally sufficient, the court below should have required proof of the insured’s actual receipt of the notice, not merely the insurance company’s mailing of it; satisfying the statutory requirements should create, at most, a rebuttable presumption of receipt, creating an issue of disputed fact for a jury.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The Appellate Division has exclusive jurisdiction to review any action or inaction of a state administrative agency.  Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 51-54 (1976).  The review of administrative actions is limited.  In re Proposed Xanadu Redev. Project, 402 N.J. Super. 607, 640 (App. Div. 2008).  However, the Appellate Division "may reverse an agency decision if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or that it lacks fair support in the record."  In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013).  For the reasons set forth below, the [...]’s grant of the 2019 WFD permit modification was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and not based on substantial credible evidence.
[directive] Currency seized by Division the Law of the Department of and Public Safety shall be forwarded to the in who designated Division currency custodian, shall turn, follow in procedures outlined  Forfeiture Proqram Administration Standard 02.  Operatinq Procedure or All currency seized by county municipal law enforcement officers  3.  ' I- shall be forwarded a custodian designated by the county to * prosecutor or agency executive of the municipal law enforcement be agency.
[brief] The employer administers two types of "no fault" attendance policies which are facially unlawful under the NJLAD.  Those “no fault” policies were revealed as follows:  (1)  Ineligibility for promotion if an employee avails himself of a medical leave of absence (2)  Any three occurrences of use of medical leave results in automatic discipline up to termination  When Association members request medical leave the employer certainly becomes aware that they are experiencing a kind of injury or illness which sounds, at least in part, as a perceived disabling condition under the auspices of the NJLAD.  ("requesting and taking of medical leave are protected activities under the NJLAD"
[brief] THAT ERROR WAS EXACERBATED BY BOTH:  (1)  THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE MODEL SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WHICH INQUIRES OF THE JURY WHETHER FURTHER DELIBERATION MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL OR FUTILE, AND (2)  THE JUDGE’S STATEMENT TO THE JURY AT 4:45 PM THAT SHE WOULD “DETERMINE HOW LONG WE CAN HAVE YOU HERE TODAY. ”  (RULINGS AT 21T 41-13 TO 43-1; 21T 45-11 TO 46-15)  The verdict in this case was returned at 5:08 p.m. on May 10, 2022, after the jury twice reported deadlocks that day.  (21T 46-17 to 22)  As will be demonstrated in this point, the manner in which that verdict was reached was via an unconstitutional trampling of defendant’s Sixth Amendment and state-constitutional rights to full and fair jury deliberation and his Fourteenth Amendment and state-constitutional rights to due process, and, consequently, the convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] Hilton, supra at 590.  In Hilton, the Appellate Division quoted [...]’s rulings in State v. Gorga:  The important caveat is that the true issue is not the value of the property for the use which would be permitted if the amendment were adopted.  Zoning amendments are not routinely made or granted.  A purchaser in a voluntary transaction would rarely pay the price the property would be worth if the amendment were an accomplished fact.  No matter how probable an amendment may seem, an element of uncertainty remains and has its impact on the selling price.  At most a buyer would pay a premium for that probability in addition to what the property is worth under the restrictions of the existing ordinance . . . if the parties to a voluntary transaction would as of the date of taking give recognition to the probability of a zoning amendment in agreeing upon the value, the law will recognize the truth.  Hilton, supra at 591, quoting Gorga, supra at 117.
[brief] Thereupon, the right to the immediate and exclusive possession and title to the property described in the declaration of taking shall vest in the condemnor, free and discharged of all right, title, interest and liens of all condemnees without the necessity of further process.  (Emphasis added.)  Plaintiff’s motion to amend should have been denied.  Title to the permanent easement in the recorded description had in fact passed to the plaintiff in accordance with this operative statutory provision.  It is also settled that an ambiguity in the description of the taking will vitiate the trial court proceedings if the description "leaves the condemnee justifiably uncertain about the boundaries and extent of the property to be acquired."  *County of Monmouth v. Kohl*, 242 N.J. Super. 210, 216 (App. Div.), certif. denied 122 N.J. 405 (1990).  Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the court below erred in granting plaintiff's motion to amend.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE IMMUNITY PROVIDED TO CRISDEL BY THE NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT (Pa3a)  The trial court did not err in granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims because [...] was Plaintiff’s employer, and therefore is subject to a qualified immunity from suit pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  Plaintiff accepted Workers’ Compensation benefits, and therefore elected recovery under the Act, with its limitations.  Pa142a at No. 17.  The evidence adduced by Plaintiff in this matter is not sufficient to permit Plaintiff to overcome that immunity, and therefore the trial court correctly concluded that [...] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[brief] Obviously, the lay jury took into consideration the plaintiff’s prior medical history as the proximate cause of this accident based upon nothing more than the defense counsel’s repeated prejudicial and medically unsupported suggestions that plaintiff’s fall was caused by a prior condition.  The defendant’s contention was basically that the plaintiff must have fallen because of a prior balance problem or neuropathy as evidenced by her prior falls\(^5\).  This allegation was made without any supporting expert medical testimony.  Without the aid of expert opinion testimony, the jury did not have the knowledge, training, or experience to determine the impact of any prior --- \(^5\)  There was no evidence that the plaintiff’s prior falls were caused by a balance problem or any medical condition as [...] testified.  (3T172:20-173:4).  One fall involved a trip on a brick and the other involved a situation where she slid down a bed.  (5T16:8-20; 5T17:5-20). medical conditions on the plaintiff’s ability to ambulate or whether they would cause her to suddenly collapse and fall while walking.  A jury not adequately informed on this extremely complex subject leapt to an unfounded conclusion of the cause of the plaintiff’s fall based solely upon their speculation and preconceived notions of what the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions entail and how they impact her ability to walk.  It bears repeating that, “[a] jury may not speculate in an area where laypersons could not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience. ”  *Posta v. Chung-Loy*, 306 N.J. Super. 182, 204 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 609 (1998).  The jury needed expert medical guidance to help them understand the relevance, if any, of plaintiff’s prior medical history and falls.  *Showalter*, 312 N.J. Super. at 514.  As there was no expert medical opinion establishing a “logical relationship” between plaintiff’s prior falls or medical conditions, evidence and testimony regarding her prior history was irrelevant and inadmissible at trial.  *Paxton v. Misiuk*, 34 N.J. 453, 462 (1961).  By allowing defendant to elicit testimony and present evidence regarding plaintiff’s prior falls and medical conditions, the Court permitted the jury to draw inferences that it was not qualified to draw.  *Wyatt*, 217 N.J. Super. at 592.  The plaintiff was severely prejudiced by the jury’s uneducated speculation into this complex medical area.  It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the evidence of plaintiff’s prior falls and medical conditions in the absence of an expert medical opinion establishing a “logical relationship” to her fall and warrants a new trial.
[brief] *Id.*, at *1-2.  The case ended up before this Court and it affirmed the dismissal of the class action because the individual could have challenged the alleged infraction during the collection lawsuit.  *Id.*  The defendant then filed a motion to vacate the default judgment and wage execution.  *Id.*, at *2-3.  That was denied because the motion was not filed within a reasonable time, which the defendant appealed.  *Id.*, at *5.  On appeal, the defendant cited two cases involving whether collectors had the proper licenses to collect in the state and decisions that vacated default judgments, but those cases were different, the Appeals Court noted, because in this situation, the defendant had filed a lawsuit of her own.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10 ...........................................................................................................2, 9  ## COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2) ..................................................................................................................6  R. 2:5-5(b) .......................................................................................................................9  ## CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4 .........................................................................................6  ## CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011) ..............................................................7  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002) .....................................................................6  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) ....................................................................8  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998) ...........................................9, 10, 11  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010) .......................15  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980) ..........................................................7  In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)  ....................................................8  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973) ...............................................6, 7 Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995) ........................................................................8  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982) ..........................................................6  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008) .................................................................7 SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................11 State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978).................................8 In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)...................8, 9 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................6 In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008)......................................................................................7 Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) .....................................................6, 7 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL) Notice of Appeal........................................................................................................Pa1 Case Information Statement......................................................................................Pa5 [...] Final Decision 9/27/23.............................................Pa9
[brief] The interests of justice warranted reconsideration before compelling the parties to participate in a trial anticipated to last a month or longer given the number of expert witnesses, not to mention the exorbitant litigation costs and devotion of limited judicial time and resources to one case where a shortage of judges was delaying all civil trials.  Moreover, in all fairness and with due respect to [...], he did not attempt to analyze the testimony in the record necessary to decide this case properly.  Plaintiffs also claim they were denied due process because [...] found [...]’s unavailability to be a key factor in her decision, a point not emphasized in Defendants’ briefs.
[directive] In assessing impacts on racial justice and equity for underserved communities, agencies should consider the geographic distribution of their enforcement actions.  Since 2018, for example, the Department of Environmental Protection and the Office of the Attorney General have prioritized the filing of environmental cleanup actions in overburdened “environmental justice” communities.  That focus reflects that, historically, New Jersey’s low-income communities and communities of color have been subject to a disproportionately high number of environmental and public health stressors, including pollution, and that it is incumbent upon the State to act now injustice.4 to correct this historic
[brief] IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF, [...]’S APPEAL  [...]  600 Parsippany Road, Suite 204 Parsippany, New Jersey  07054 [...]  Attorneys for Respondent/Intervenor, [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (0077511991)  [...], Esq. (001152013)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF APPENDIX .................................................................................................................. i TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED .................................................................................. i
[brief] Second, the trial court erred in permitting [...] to testify about his confidence in the identification at trial when he did not provide a confidence statement during the out-of-court identification procedure.  In a case where the defense was misidentification, having the sole eyewitness testify that he was 100% confident in his identification, following years of confirmatory feedback that he had picked the right person, was misleading and highly unfairly prejudicial.  The improper admission of this confidence statement requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] Plaintiff became a Lieutenant on March 12, 2018, while she was stationed at the Management Review Unit (1T; 125:12).  She believed that [...] was promoted in 2017 (1T; 125:25).  Plaintiff said that Defendants were trying to sabotage her career in getting a promotion and she formed that conclusion based upon discussions with [...] and also the fact that the evaluations were deliberately false (1T; 126:11).  Plaintiff also indicated that at the Academy, she had a unit head who never came into the unit and therefore, she was not given any training (1T; 126:17).  What the Defendants were doing to falsely evaluate to refuse to train the Plaintiff and to lie on her evaluation just prior to her going to another unit where she could become the Lieutenant in that unit (1T; 127:1 to 128:2).
[brief] Indeed, New Jersey has a strong tradition of invalidating extraterritorial search warrants.  In State v. Bell, 166 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 1979), the Appellate Division held that a search warrant issued for premises located in Union Beach by an Aberdeen Township municipal judge was “outside the territorial jurisdiction and exceed[ed] the authority of the issuing judge and, as such, [was] illegal and void.
[brief] On January 14, 2019, Judge [...] granted order that Plaintiff shall be entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $1,049,589.14 and that Defendant shall be entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $978,157.99 and that the attorney’s fees and costs reimbursements shall be distributed out of the Decedent’s New Jersey Estate assets.  (Da212).  The attorney fees outlined in the Order dated January 14, 2019, were determined by the Administrator, as noted in the Judge’s Opinion, referencing the "[...]"  (Da218).  The Plaintiff originally sought an allowance of fees and costs totaling $1,441,139.96 (Da217) and the Defendant, $1,440,557.90 (Da218).  The Court found that Plaintiff is only entitled to reimbursement of fees and costs pursuant to demonstrated invoices during the time in which Plaintiff benefited the Estate, which totals $1,049,589.14, the value directly taken from [...] (Da218).
[brief] denied, 144 N.J. 586 (1996) | 31 | | **Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy,** | | | 244 N.J. 567 (2021) | 16 | | **Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc.,** | | | 387 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 189 N.J. 429 (2007) | 26 | | **Capparelli v. Lopatin,** | | | 459 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 2019) | 33 | | **Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc.,** | | | 167 N.J. Super. 141 (Law Div. 1979), aff’d, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 112 (1980) | 27 | | **Gillies v. Pappas Brothers,** | | | 138 N.J.Eq. 202 (Ch. 1946) | 29 | | **Lidya Holdings Inc. v. Eksin,** | | | 2022 Del. Ch. LEXIS 22 (Ch. 2022) | 27 | Morey v. Borough of Wildcrest, 18 N.J. Tax 335 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 80 (2000) ...........................................41 New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. B.O., 438 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div. 2014) .........................21 Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2009) ..........................41 Ravin, Sarasohn, Cook, Baumgarten, Fisch. & Rosen, P.C. v Lowenstein Sandler, P.C., 365 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 2003) ..........................28, 29 Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) ..................................................15 Shah v. Shroff, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 527 (Law Div. 2023) ..........22 State v. Adames, 409 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 504 (2009) .........................33 State v. Funderberg, 225 N.J. 66 (2016) ....................................................31 State v. Huang, 461 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2018), aff’d, 240 N.J. 56 (2019) .................................28 State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (N.J. 1999) .............................................19 State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 193 (2002) ..............................35 State, Dept. Of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 94 N.J. 473 (1983) ....................................................26 Torres v Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 419 (App. Div. 2001) ............................37, 39 Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, Inc., 425 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2012) ............................19 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff [...] ("plaintiff") was working with defendants [...] ("Simmons") and [...] ("Fischer") at another employer when she, along with Simmons and Fischer, left to form a small, closely held New Jersey start-up in the telecommunications industry, defendant [...] ("[...]").