ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^3\)  Ja107, Ja710.  Thereafter, [...], then owner of Lot 3, offered to sell a 40’-wide portion of Lot 3 to Plaintiffs, and on November 13, 2015, Plaintiffs and [...] entered an agreement to that effect (hereinafter the “[...]-Miller Agreement”).  Ja116, Ja710.  The purpose of the [...]-Miller Agreement was that Plaintiffs would acquire a 40’ by 90’ portion of Lot 3, to consolidate that portion with Lot 2 and create a parcel with enough frontage (i.e., 120’) such that it is subdividable by right.  Ja116, Ja710.  The [...]-Miller Agreement reads, in pertinent part:
[brief] (Pa84).  Although the trial court found that [...] had no entitlement to those funds, it nevertheless determined it was not authorized to grant multiple remedies, thereby permitting [...] to be enriched by the fraud.  Allowing [...] to retain its ill-gotten gains would be contrary to the legislative intent of the Securities Law and to New Jersey’s strong public policy of rooting out fraudulent activity.  See Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc. 492 B.R. 707, 783 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing A.S. Goldmen & Co. v.  New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 163 F.3d at 788) (“It is true that New Jersey has a legitimate interest in preventing fraud and ethically questionable conduct by its businesses. ”); A.S. Goldmen, 163 F.3d at 788 (citations omitted) (recognizing Blue Sky Laws were designed to prevent fraud and protect the public at large); Cola v. Terzano, 129 N.J. Super. 47, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (“The Securities Laws were intended to protect the uninitiated and to prevent fraud on the public at large”), aff’d sub nom. Cola v. Packer, 156 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1974).  In addition, allowing [...] to retain its ill-gotten gains is contrary to the general principles of equity, which “mandate that the wrongdoer be relieved of any profits. ”  Cnty. of Essex v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 186 N.J. 46, 56 (2006).  The Bureau is following these guiding equitable principles by seeking to recover the $1,500,000 of ill-gotten gains that were unlawfully and unjustly acquired by [...].  Furthermore, in this case, there is no danger of a disgorgement award against [...] resulting in a double recovery for the Bureau because the court did not order [...] to pay any restitution.  Moreover, restitution is payable to investors, whereas an award of disgorgement would go to the Bureau.  **POINT III**
[brief] ”  See State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 11 (2023).  The law provides that, once a conviction is expunged, “the arrest, conviction and any proceedings related thereto shall be deemed not to have occurred, and the [person] may answer any questions related to their occurrence accordingly. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:52-57.  But individuals with expunged convictions may be unaware of this provision or, when called to answer a judge’s questions on the subject in court, may hesitate to omit information that seems directly responsive to the court’s inquiry. \(^3\)  Therefore, it is imperative that courts pose questions relating to prior convictions clearly in a manner that will not disenfranchise legally qualified jurors from serving.  Courts should not ask jurors to disclose whether they have ever “been convicted of any indictable offense” without making explicit that jurors should answer in the negative if they were only convicted of an offense that was subsequently expunged.
[brief] | Requirement | Senior Housing - 2 Overlay Zone | |--------------------------------------|--------------------------------| | Principal Uses | | | Minimum Tract Area | 7 acres \(^a\) | | Maximum Number of Units | 100 units \(^b\) | | Minimum Principal Building Setbacks | | | Front Yard (Route 202) | 350 feet \(^ac\) | | Side Yard Setback (Each) | 75 feet \(^ac\) | | Rear Yard Setback | 100 feet \(^ac\) | | Maximum Building Height | 48 feet/4 stories | | Maximum Building Coverage | 15% \(^a\) | | Maximum Impervious Coverage | 30% \(^a\) | | Minimum Buffers | | | Side Yard | 25 feet \(^ac\) | | Rear Yard | 25 feet \(^ac\) | | Accessory Uses | | | Location in Front Yard | Permitted | | Maximum Height | 30 feet/1 story | | Minimum Setbacks | | | Front Yard | 100 feet \(^c\) | | Side Yard | 50 feet \(^c\) | Rear Yard
[brief] In accordance with the FAA and NJAA’s mandates, it must therefore be upheld.  To allow Appellants to withdraw from their agreement would vitiate everything the FAA and NJAA stand for, as well as the valuable purpose and strong public policy in favor of arbitration generally.  Additionally, permitting Appellants to not abide by the Contract would send a disastrous message to others about the enforceability of arbitration provisions.  Therefore, Appellants should be foreclosed from breaking their agreement to arbitrate with [...].
[brief] The defendants/respondents correctly cite that in Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court balanced tort law considerations, and held in the interests of fairness and justice, commercial landowners should be “held responsible for maintaining abutting public sidewalks and to be required to recompense innocent pedestrians injured as a result of the negligent failure to do so. ”  Id. At 157, cited by Luchejko, supra.  The argument that the appellant urges here is not a stretch of the law, and we submit that the New Jersey Supreme Court has not been reluctant to impose "commercial sidewalk liability" in unusual circumstances.
[brief] (Pa13-14).  While a Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, it has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).  A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb12-13), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he did not receive the postcard.  After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form approximately one year and one month past the deadline.  (Pa13-14).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.
[brief] In addition, the Trial Court was clearly incorrect that Plaintiffs failed to provide facts to support their claims that [...] made misrepresentations to them.  Plaintiffs outlined from page 4 through 14 of their moving brief in their Motion to Reconsider the Order of December 9, 2021, facts supported by one hundred and four deposition citations which demonstrate precisely how [...] participated in the conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money and which misrepresentations [...] made to Plaintiffs.  426a–436a.  There can be no doubt that [...] participated in the conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money, and [...] is vicariously liable for that conduct.  The deposition testimony of [...], [...], and [...] himself, all set forth in the Statement of Facts in Plaintiffs’ initial brief and which the Trial Court admittedly ignored, are irrefutable evidence that [...], acting as attorney of [...] though he was not the attorney of [...], made misrepresentations and continued to make misrepresentations to Plaintiffs in the Releases, at the meeting of April 2009 at the offices of [...], and ultimately with his letter to Plaintiffs, dated December 17, 2009, with the intent that Plaintiffs rely on said misrepresentations, adding another substantial semblance of credibility to the scheme to defraud Plaintiffs of their money through the scam [...]-MTDC Assignment and Releases transaction.
[brief] "Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."  *State v. Basil*, 202 N.J. 570, 592 (2010) (internal citations omitted).  In contrast, statements "are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."  Id.  Defendant’s argument that [...]’s testimony about the anonymous tip police received violated his right to confront the witnesses against him is misplaced.
[directive] This SECTION H "report" is being developed throughout PRE-SENTENCE REPORT the life of a case.  It mainly consists of SECTION E form reports used at earlier hearings  OFFENSE INFORMATION REPORT * (Bail, PTI).  It is the ideal that this "report", at least for less serious cases, SECTION F be essentially "ready" at all times in the PRIOR COURT HISTORY REPORT * file, able to move the case to disposition, (OPTIONAL) and satisfy simultaneous sentencing  SECTION  A U.D.I.R * opportunity.  SECTION B OPTIONAL * SECTION I CASE SUPERVISOR'S ANALYSIS REPORT
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX Volume I - (Da1 to Da186)  Plaintiff’s Complaint, dated December 8, 2021 .................................................. Da1 Defendants, [...]’s, [...]’s and [...]’s Answer, dated January 14, 2022 ..............................................  Da10 Defendants, [...]’s and [...]’s Answer, dated March 8, 2022 ........................................................................................................ Da23 Substitution of Attorney for Defendants, [...] and [...], dated November 7, 2022 .................................................................
[directive] Post-Indictment  Post-Indictment  Pre-Indictment parole (no probation Initial Final of condition a as amount jail county degree weapons in 2C:35-7 days 2nd *Denotes 7.3.)  F. Term 63 39 36 42 45 42 48 51 48 54 57 54 60 24 30 30 36 33  Enhanced Extended 30 36 39 36 42 45 42 48 51 48 54 57 18 24 24 30 33 27 V 24 30 33 30 36 39 36 42 45 42 48 51 12 18 21 18 24 27 Term 30 36 39 36 42 45 42 48 51 48 54 57 24 27 24 30 33 18 OFFENDER)) Extended 24 30 33 30 36 39 36 42 45 42 48 51 18 21 18 24 27 IV 12 27 24 30 33 30 36 39 36 42 45 12 15 12 18 21 18 24 9 7.3.) (REPEAT Section Serious 2C:43-6f n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a in
[brief] “As a general rule, an adjudicative decision of an administrative agency should be accorded the same finality that is accorded the judgment of a court. ”  *Bressman v. Gash*, 131 N.J. 517, 526 (1993).  In *Bressman* the Court held that the local land use board has the power to determine initially whether a change is sufficient to warrant a second review, and that determination should be overturned only if arbitrary or capricious.
[brief] See Carb15-Carb23 (citing to New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development v. [...], LLC et al., 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826, 2010 WL 442326 (N.J. DOL May 6, 2010)).  For that reason alone, [...] and [...]’s characterization of its applicability to this case should be questioned.  In *[...]* the Commissioner made observations about the PWCRA, which serve to highlight the differences between the 2010 and 2024 versions of the PWCRA.
[directive] Shotgun Qualification Course (SQC) and Shotgun Night Qualification Course (SNQC)  1.  Familiarization Requirements for Each Participant.  a.  Demonstrate safe handling of a shotgun.  b.  Identify the major parts of the shotgun and explain the basic mechanical function of each major part.  c.  Demonstrate the point shoulder position and ready positions.  d.  Demonstrate the techniques of good marksmanship.  e. Identify different types of shotgun ammunition.  2.  Range - 25 yards.  3.  Target - FBI type Q target, either paper or cardboard.  4.
[brief] (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers about dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the [...], the [...], and the [...].  (Pa11).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa11).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa11).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 [...] retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa64-65).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa66).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa66).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[directive] This program is subject to audit by the Treasury Law of Enforcement Agency, the Department the Treasury Inspector General, the Government Accounting Office designated auditing and any other government organization.  These audits may include reviews of any and all records, documents, reports, accounts, invoices, as receipts or expenditures relating to this program; well as the interview of any and all personnel involved in this program.  Both the Treasury law enforcement agency and the -- l&al/county/state law %nforcement agency shall . all maintain records relating to these transactions for three years; and in the event of an on-going audit, until the audit is completed.  D.
[brief] Id. at 487, 878 A.2d 724.  “Without presumptive terms, the ‘statutory maximum’ authorized by the jury verdict or the facts admitted by a defendant at his guilty plea is the top of the sentencing range for the crime charged, e.g., ten years for a second-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2). ”  Ibid.  “Judges will continue to determine whether credible evidence supports the finding of aggravating and mitigating factors and whether the aggravating or mitigating factors preponderate. ”  Ibid.  The Court elaborated:  “We suspect that many, if not most, judges will pick the middle of the sentencing range as the logical starting point for the balancing process and decide that if the aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise, the midpoint will be an appropriate sentence. ”  *Id.* at 488, 878 A.2d 724.  However, the Court noted that this methodology is not compelled.  *Ibid.*  As noted by the Court in *State v. Abdullah*, 184 N.J. 497, 506, 878 A.2d 746 (2005), “In *Natale II, supra*, we excised the presumptive terms from the Code so that judges, not juries, still will decide the aggravating factors as the Legislature would have intended.... ”  *10  In regards to the new sentencing hearing, the trial court must determine whether the absence of the presumptive term in the weighing process requires the imposition of a different sentence.  The court should not make new findings concerning the quantity or quality of aggravating and mitigating factors previously found.  Those determinations remain untouched by this decision.  Because the new hearing will be based on the original sentencing record, any defendant challenging his sentence on *Blakely* grounds will not be subject to a sentence greater than the one already imposed.  [Natale, *supra*, 184 N.J. at 495-96, 878 A.2d 724.]
[brief] ”)  •  Plaintiff acknowledges in his amended Brief that decisions relating to a change of venue will not be disturbed on appeal except upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.  (Pb36-37) (citing State v. Harris, 282 N.J. Super. 409 (1995) and State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991).  Clearly, there was no abuse of discretion here.  •  Finally, plaintiff argues that:  [T]his Court has mandated that when the trial court intends to transfer venue, sua sponte, it “should provide the parties with five-days’ notice of its intention and an opportunity to be heard.  If there is an objection, the judge should conduct a hearing, explaining, to the extent ['practicable,'] the judiciary employee’s or his for her family member’s, involvement in the matter, and the job functions of that employee that create particularized reasons why a remedy short of transfer is impracticable. ” (Pb38) (emphasis added) (quoting State ex rel. M.P., 450 N.J. Super. 539, 553-53 (App. Div. 2017).  The problem with this argument is that it does not apply to Civil Practice in the Superior Court.  It applies only to Practice in the Chancery Division, Family Part.  See Rule 5:19-1(b) (cited in M.P.).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  These Standards, set forth at N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24 and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1, must be applied by the Commission in determining whether a board member’s conduct is allowable under the Act.  As [relevant case law] demonstrate[s], there are times when a board member’s expression of opinion is permissible under the Act and there are times when such conduct is not permissible.  The Commission believes that the standards established by the Legislature do not sharply curtail a board member’s First Amendment rights.  Rather, the standards provide the commission with guidance in balancing a board member’s rights as a private citizen with the interest of the Legislature in ensuring that a board member preserves public confidence and avoids conduct that would violate the public trust or create a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.
[brief] ”  T1.51:14-52:4 at 3 (emphasis added)  The first, cost-benefit, paragraph reads:  “SECTION 9.01  Relative Benefits of the Project  In accordance with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, specifically N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(a), the Township hereby finds and determines that this Agreement is to the direct benefit of the health, safety, welfare and financial well-being of the Township and its citizens despite the tax exemption granted hereunder.
[brief] (Pa385-Pa386).  [...] articulated his reasons on the record as follows:  The Court finds that [...] is entitled to summary judgement.  Expert testimony is required for a standard of care owed by [...], as to its policies, procedures and protocols, if any, followed throughout the industry with regard to training of employees as to the safe use of U-boats by patrons and warnings and or labels we placed on U-boats to alert customers as to safety.  As to Plaintiff’s argument of constructive notice, the Court finds that there was no constructive notice in this case.  There is no viable claim for spoliation of evidence as to the videotape.  There was no -- the Court notes there was no request for preservation of the evidence.
[brief] PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, VS. [...], [...], [...]  THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM ORDER FILED 2-1-23 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART  GLOUCESTER COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW: THE HONORABLE, [...], P.J.CH.
[directive] Voluntary Drug Court Application II.  The New Jersey statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35:14) defines application to drug court as a motion from the Defense.  The State may object to the motion, which case the Defense in may respond, with the judge then making the final decision acceptance or denial.  on Ill.  Policy  Once application filed, the Criminal Division will do a cursory statutory review an is of the case.  day one, if there no statutory bar, the case should immediately be On is scheduled for a clinical evaluation.  If there a statutory bar, the clinical evaluation is not is automatically scheduled at this time and the State can prepare its response to the application.  By day ten, if the State objects, the written objection should be submitted to the Defense and the criminal division.  Where there no statutory bar, the clinical evaluation should be completed and is provided to the parties and the court within days.  If-there no objection from the State is 21 and the defendant is clinically eligible, a plea should be scheduled for the next available court date.  For any out-of-county charges, the Defense should complete a consolidation order pursuant to Directive #2-18 and Rule 3:25A consolidated dispositions within ten on days of the clinical acceptance and a plea should be scheduled for the next available court date.  Where the State objects or the defendant is clinically ineligible, and the defendant wishes to be heard, a written response should be submitted by day 25.  By day 30, the motion (application) should be heard.  If the judge grants the defendant's motion, the defendant shall plead into drug court the same day.  If the judge denies the motion, the case goes back the trial team calendar.  on of  Any case where more than 45 days has passed from date the motion will be considered to be drug court backlog and a report will be generated reflecting that.  in of 1  1  Page  New Jersey Adult Drug Court Voluntary Application Flow Policy
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Statute and Court Rules: Rule 2:5-4(a)  1, 2, 6, 8, 16  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3 11  Continuing Violation Doctrine 5, 8  Ordinances: C. 39:4-197.6.  6, 7, 17, 18  C. 39:4-197.5 6, 17  Chapter 126 Code 4 Federal: Title VIII  Fair Housing Act 4  14th Amendment  15  Case: Davis v. City of Newark, 2006 WL 2038430 (N.J. Super. A.D.)  TABLE OF APPENDIX  E | Document | Appendix Page No. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | ORDER by Hon. [...], P.J.A.D. | Pa301 | | March 05, 2024  Application by Appellant | Pa302 | | Notice To Cease And Desist To Respondents’ Lawyer | Pa308 | | Reserved Handicapped Parking Space * | Pa309 | OTHER APPENDICES SUPPORTING REPLY BRIEF**
[brief] Pa266.  Thus, the Per Diem Penalty was accruing on a daily basis and the Notice of Default specifically advised that if the Board again failed to consider the resolution on November 28, 2022, that [...] will avail itself of its remedies.  Pa266.  In response, the Board’s attorney indicated that the Board was intentionally holding up the resolution in the hopes of amending the Settlement Agreement despite the fact that the Settlement Agreement does not allow the Board to refuse memorialization of a resolution, but actually requires the contrary—that same be expedited.  Pa267.  On December 12, 2022, approximately six months later, the Board memorialized the June 13, 2022 approval of [...]’s Site Plan Application by way of written [...] (the “Original Resolution”).