ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The legislation is codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.2 through –6.4 and N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.10c and –8.10d.  This supplemental memo sets out the protocol for implementation of that legislation in the municipal courts.  Section 3 of L. 2003, c. 301 requires municipal courts to make a referral to [...] where a defendant is convicted of one of the enumerated offenses, the victim is a minor, and the defendant resides in a household with other minor children or is a parent of minor children.  Under the Act, where the defendant has been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses, the court must take certain steps.  The enumerated offenses that are characterized as crimes by this statute are: (1) simple assault pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), (2) false imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3, (3) lewdness pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4(a), (4) an act of domestic violence predicated on any of the disorderly or petty disorderly persons offenses listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 19(a), and (5) endangering the welfare of an incompetent person pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-7.
[brief] (4T61:5-18).  Further defendant’s testimony and allocution was not “included in the trial or the prosecution of this case. ” (4T61:14-18).  The judge found that [...] was not the ringleader, and that defendant was “the precipitator of the action against [...]. ” (4T66:2-3).  He stated:  “It’s not as if [defendant] was simply there robbing the 7-11 with others and somebody else shot the clerk.  It’s not that case. ” (4T66:16-18).  The judge also found that defendant also had a better home environment than [...].  (4T67:12-16).  Although his father had certain dependencies, his stepfather became a part of his life early on.  (4T68:2-14).  That, in conjunction with the fact that defendant engaged in “disturbing” animal abuse by putting firecrackers in frogs’ mouths, indicated that “something other than just environment” was “going on with defendant. ”  (4T67:24 to 68:14).  In conclusion, the judge re-imposed two life sentences with a 30-year parole bar each, but ran them concurrently.  (4T71; Da18).  This was the result defendant had advocated for in his sentencing memo, where he stated “[a]ny sentence above the minimum of 30 years would put the possibility of a release into the hands of the Parole Board.  The Parole Board is in a better position than the court or the Prosecutor to determine whether an inmate has been rehabilitated and should be released. ” (Da117).  Defendant appealed from [...]’s sentence.
[brief] Though the court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s instruction to focus on [...]’s conduct since 1995, it explained that the incident itself made [...] an exception:  “However, I have not seen – I’ve seen few individuals who earned their way into our system in such a heinous manner as these two. ” (5T73-2 to 9)¹  This finding was erroneous because it drew a conclusion as to [...]’s current maturation by relying upon his behavior as a teen, and because it ran counter to Comer’s instruction to guard against the “unacceptable likelihood” that the “brutal nature of an offense…overpower[s] mitigating arguments based on youth. ”  249 N.J. at 403.  The court ultimately made no finding as to whether [...] had matured now that he was an adult beyond the mere recognition that he had gotten older:  ¹  Contrary to the court’s finding, all the cases contemplated by Comer involve lengthy sentences, and therefore often involve disturbing fact patterns.  The juvenile in Zuber, for example, had participated in two separate gang rapes, while the juvenile in Thomas, had committed a double murder.  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 430; Thomas, 470 N.J. Super. 167, 171-72 (App. Div. 2022).  “there is a natural level of maturity by simply getting older….They’re 46 years old.  They’re not 17 years old anymore…They have grown older, that they have done.  But I don’t know that their approach to freedom is any different than it was before other than the fact that you’re not 17 anymore. ”  (5T70-24 to 71-24; 83-5 to 9)  In sum, the court improperly disregarded expert testimony finding that [...] had matured; the court failed to explicitly rule on whether [...] had matured for purposes of Miller; and the court improperly relied upon facts of the incident itself to discount the relevance of his demonstrated maturation.  Accordingly, the court failed to properly assess Miller factor 1 as required by Comer, requiring a remand for resentencing.
[brief] In this declaratory judgment action, the court examined the statutory provisions in AICRA (N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1, et. seq.), as well as the Supreme Court's reasoning in Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001), in which the Court found that a health insurer that paid benefits to an insured had neither a common law, nor statutory subrogation right against the tortfeasor.  Against this background, the Court found that the collateral source rule barred such a recovery for Med-Pay payments made.  The Court based its decision on two grounds.  First, the origin of the insurer's Med-Pay obligation is not found within the express mandate of the auto statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.  Respondent also submits a Decision authored by The Honorable [...], who decided on this very issue.  He stated Med pay would not be reimbursable for the reasons stated below:  "Here, there is neither a statutory exception nor conflict necessitating an exception to the Collateral Source Rule.  undoubtedly, [...]'s payment to [...] in the amount of $10,328.74 for his healthcare constitutes "benefits" under Section 97 and is neither exempted workers' compensation benefits nor the proceeds from a life insurance policy.  That amount is, therefore, not recoverable through subrogation or reimbursement.  Nor is there any conflict between Section 97 and any other statutory provision which would compel exclusion from the Collateral Source Rule's proscription, for these reasons, the Court finds that New Jersey provides no right to subrogation of Med Pay benefits payments.
[brief] Correspondingly, the judgment of conviction must be amended to remove the $100 VCCO assessment and $75 Safe Neighborhoods Assessment imposed on count three.  (16T34-14 to 15; Da13).  In addition, the judgment of conviction must be amended to reflect 1,119 days of jail credits.  A defendant is entitled to jail credits “against all sentences ‘for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence’ on each case. ”  State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 28 (2011) (quoting R. 3:21-8(a)).  As reflected on the Presentence Report, [...] was arrested and held in jail for 1,199 days from September 9, 2019 to January 5, 2023.  (PSR1).  The trial court failed to award these credits.  The judgment of conviction must be amended to correct this error.
[brief] ” (Pa0209).  [...] was awarded $164,470 against [...] under the Architectural Services Contract, plus interest from January 1, 2011 and counsel fees.  (Pa0209).  While [...] eventually sold the house, the damages he sustained as a result of entering into the transaction for the [...] property are documented in the damages report of [...], CPA.  In addition to this, there was an award of counsel fees that are embodied in the judgment against [...].  (Pa0189).  As set forth in the damages report of [...]- has set Plaintiff’s damages at $2,613,105.20.
[directive] Order #6B - Order Mandating the Transfer of the Defendant From the Care and Custody of the Commissioner of Health to a Correctional Facility (Defendant Detained) of Orders #6A and #6B are to be used where a defendant has been placed the care in of of the Commissioner the Department Health and now deemed competent to proceed.  is Order #6B may be used where the defendant has either previously been detained until trial his/her present charge or a detention hearing has not taken place.  either case, on In the order may be used to return the defendant to the appropriate correctional facility to await a detention hearing or trial.  --------------  Attorney Name NJ  Attorney ID Number -----------  ----------------- Address -------------  Telephone Number Attorney for --------------- of Superior Court  New Jersey Law Division - Criminal Part of State  New Jersey ------- County Plaintiff, ------- Indictment Number: v. Criminal Action  Defendant. of Order Mandating the Transfer of Defendant From the Care and Custody of the Commissioner Health to the ______ Correctional Facility  THIS COURT having found that the defendant has regained his fitness to proceed to trial [ or has been determined to be fit to stand trial] and that the defendant not dangerous to self, others, is of or propetty as a result mental illness, ______ ___ 20_ of ORDERED
[brief] Under that doctrine, an employer may be liable for its employee’s negligence if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.  *Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc.*, 132 N.J. 587, 619 (1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958))  It requires pleading (1) that a master-servant relationship existed and (2) that the tortious act of the servant occurred within the scope of that employment.  *Carter v. Reynolds*, 175 N.J. 402, 408-409 (2003).  Here, because the [...] owed no duty to Plaintiffs and because there was no “tortious act” upon which to base *respondeat superior* liability, Plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of law.  **Issue IV: Alternative Arguments Exist To Affirm The Order Dismissing The Amended Complaint.
[brief] However, the Court took issue with the amount sought by Appellant, as Appellant utilized a calculation of compound interest rather than simple interest as permitted by the Rules of Court (citing N.J.S.A. §§54:4-67(a), 54:5-58, and 54:5-60).  The Court held that the correct calculation of interest was presented by Respondent, based upon simple interest.  The Court awarded Appellant the amount of $43,475.92, plus continuing per diem interest at $4.01 thereafter.  Applying identical reasoning, the Court denied Respondent’s Motion.  (Da 155-174).  Respondent accepted the adjudication as set forth by the Orders of [...], and did not seek reconsideration in any manner.
[brief] Aside from the arbitration cases that *Atelese* cited, see *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A.*, 168 N.J. 124 (2001), and *Leodori*, 175 N.J. at 302, most of the cases relied on had nothing to do with the enforceability of contractual rights waivers:
[directive] If the County Prosecutor grants use immunity, the agency shall advise the subject officer in writing that he or she has been granted such immunity in the event their answers implicate him or her in a criminal offense.  The officer must then answer the questions specifically and narrowly related to the performance of their official duties, but no answer given nor any evidence derived from the answer may be used against this officer in a criminal proceeding.  At this point, any officer refusing to answer is subject to disciplinary charges and possible dismissal from employment.  8.2.7  A grant of use immunity shall be recorded on a form the subject officer signs and whose signature is witnessed.  The completed form must be made a part of the investigative file.  49  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  See the sample form in Appendix H.  In all cases, approval from the authorizing assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general must be obtained before giving the Garrity warning.  8.3
[directive] In those cases involving accidental death, the victim's personal effects should be promptly returned.  In homicides, including death by auto, and suspicious deaths, property not deemed pertinent to a criminal investigation should be released promptly.  Property which is determined to be essential to a criminal investigation and is normally retained should be photographed and returned upon the approval of the county prosecutor.  If it is determined that the property cannot be promptly released, a designated law enforcement officer should explain the reason for withholding property and ensure that it is returned when possible.  8.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | A. The October 6, 2021 Fatal Crash | 5 | | B.  Defendant [...] Required Employees Such As [...] To Park In A Distant Area With No Pedestrian Safeguards | 9 | | C.  Pedestrian Safeguards Would Have Alerted Drivers Such As [...] For The Safety Of Pedestrians Such As [...] | 12 | | D.  Defendant [...] Was Aware Of The Need For Pedestrian Safeguards In Its Lot, But Only Provided Them To Management, Doctors, Patients, And Visitors, Not Employees Such As [...] | 14 | | E.  Defendant [...]’s Use Of Pedestrian Safety Measures After The Fatal Crash | 16 | | F. The Fatal Crash Occurred During The “Mass Entrance” Of Employees That Routinely Took Place At Approximately 7:00-7:30 When Many Shifts Changed | 17 | | G. Plaintiff’s Expert Engineer Opines That [...]’s Parking Area Was In A Hazardous Condition In Violation Of Applicable Standards | 19 | H. Defendant [...], Who Was Late For Work, Was Not Performing Any Job Responsibilities At The Time Of The Crash .................................................................24  I.  Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants [...] And [...]  ....25  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................26
[brief] \(^{13}\)  The burden \(^{13}\)  This was only $23,000 less than Defendants had paid for the property several thus shifted to Defendants to establish that [...] acquired the property "with notice of an outstanding claim or equity."  Monsanto, supra.  Defendants failed to do so for several reasons.  First, they sought no discovery from [...] and produced nothing relevant to show [...] had any knowledge of Defendants' outstanding claim or equity.  Second, [...]'s "level of sophistication" is simply not relevant.  Defendants made that argument out of whole cloth, tried to convince the second judge that the first judge had adopted their view (he hadn't, as the second judge recognized, 3T31:16-33:17), then admitted they had no authority establishing that such an inquiry has any bearing on the bona fide purchaser analysis.  (3T37:24-38:3).
[brief] (Da454.)  The Resolution provides, as follows:  **NOW, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,** that the Planning Board of the [...], County of Hudson and State of New Jersey, on the 15th day of September, 2022, concluded that the Application satisfies all relevant conditional use standards imposed at Hoboken Ordinance §166-33.1 and is therefore entitled to approval.  NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, by the Planning Board of the [...], County of Hudson and State of New Jersey, on the 15th day of September, 2022 . . . the Application of [...] is hereby APPROVED  . . . (Da456.)  The Resolution expressly addressed the Ordinance and noted that the conditions set forth therein did not apply to [...]’ conditional use application.  (Da454-456.)  Specifically, the Resolution provides, as follows:  Notably, a condition placed upon retail cannabis use is that cannabis dispensaries may not be located within 600 feet of a primary or secondary school.  However, the Board finds that [[...]] began its approval process by applying to the Cannabis Review Board prior to the adoption and applicability of that ordinance.  Accordingly, [[...]] is entitled to application of the ordinance as it existed at the commencement of its approval process, and this proximity requirement does not apply to the subject Application.  [Da454-456.]  [...] is Created After [...] Obtains Unanimous Planning Board Approval
[brief] That rule only concerns the elements of the crime, of which the defendant must be given “fair warning. ”  State v. D.G.M., 439 N.J. Super. 630, 641-42 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).  Indeed, in Smith, the Court noted Smith’s argument the rule should apply, but never discussed it because it was not applicable.  197 N.J. at 331-39.  Nor does State v. [...], 222 N.J. 39 (2015), help defendant.  While the documents at issue there were confidential, that was wholly unnecessary to prove.  Rather, the grading of the crime rested on the facts [...] worked for the [...], and therefore was a public servant, and that the documents that were property of her employer, and that the documents she stole were public records, writings or instruments.  *Id.* at 46, 57-59, 61-63.  The same rationale should apply to the nonconfidential public record/writing here—defendant’s NJSP ID.  In sum, there is no basis to downgrade defendant’s conviction for third-degree theft by unlawful taking to a disorderly-persons offense.
[brief] [Pa3390]  Pursuant to the Cross-Motion, [...] sought sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by [...] in defending against the Motion.  [Pa3390]  On April 5, 2022, [...] entered an Order Denying Appellants’ Motion.  [Pa3419]  In his opinion, [...] ruled as follows:  The motion to enter default against [...] is also denied.  Rule 4:4-1 requires service on a corporation by delivery of the complaint and summons “on any officer, director, trustee or managing or general agent, or any person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation, or on a person at the registered office of the corporation. ”  Plaintiffs served a copy of the complaint to [...].  [...] is a named defendant in the matter and not affiliated with or employed by [...].  [...] is a public company with an agent for service of process.  Service on [...] is insufficient.  Further, this Court dismissed [...] from this action by Order on January 28, 2022.  [Appellants’] counsel filed a certification to reinstate the action against [...] on February 24, 2022, supporting the reinstatement.  However, there was no motion filed by [Appellants].  [...] was never reinstated as a party and is presently listed as “dismissed without prejudice. ”  For the aforementioned reasons, [Appellants’] motion to enter default against [...] is DENIED.  [Pa3427]  Also on April 5, 2022, [...] entered an Order Denying [...]’s Cross-Motion.  [Pa3430]  [...]’s sole reason for denial was that Appellants’ actions did not “rise to the level of frivolousness that would lead this Court to grant [...]’s motion to hold in contempt. ”  [Pa3441]  On May 23, 2022, at the request of Appellants [Pa3456], [...] entered a Final Judgment terminating the action as to all parties.  [Pa3460]  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST [...], A NON-PARTY THAT WAS NEVER SERVED WITH ANY COMPLAINT AND AGAINST WHOM DEFAULT WAS NEVER REQUESTED NOR ENTERED (Pa3419)
[directive] Use of force for crowd management.  The following restrictions and limitations on the use of force should be observed during peaceful demonstrations and civil disturbances.  The generally applicable rules in this Policy apply to both peaceful demonstrations and civil disturbances and in all cases, weapons or other devices should be carried and deployed only by trained and authorized officers and deployed consistent with this Policy.  3.8.1  Prior to using force against people in a crowd, officers shall: (a) provide clear instructions and warnings in a manner that can be heard by persons in the crowd, such as through a bullhorn or speaker system when available; 11 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 (b) state the consequences of refusing to comply with a mandatory directive, including that arrests will occur and force may be used unless persons comply; and (c) give a reasonable opportunity to comply.
[brief] On May 27, 2016, then-Governor [...] signed S-1711/A-2569 into law, the “Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act” (“MSRA”), N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-1, et seq., with bipartisan support.  (Pa000037, Compl. ¶ 24).  In adopting the MSRA, the Legislature found and declared that:  a.  The short and long-term fiscal stability of local government units is essential to the interests of the citizens of this State to assure the efficient and effective provision of necessary governmental services vital to public health, safety, and welfare, including the fiscal health of our State’s municipalities.  b.  In certain extreme cases, local governments that experience severe fiscal distress become incapable of addressing the circumstances that led to that extraordinary distress or of developing a comprehensive plan for financial rehabilitation and recovery.  c.  It is necessary and appropriate for the State to take action to assist local governments experiencing severe budget imbalances and other conditions of severe fiscal distress or emergency by requiring prudent fiscal management and operational efficiencies in the provision of public services.  d.  As the State entity primarily responsible for the financial integrity and stability of all local government units, the Local Finance Board should be authorized, under certain limited circumstances, to develop a comprehensive rehabilitation plan for local governments that are experiencing severe fiscal distress, and to act on behalf of local government units to remedy the distress.
[brief] The Roberto court first held that Tyler was equally applicable to New Jersey’s Tax Lien Law and was not limited to municipal governments but applied to private lien investors in New Jersey.  Roberto, 477 N.J. Super at 364.  This was evident to the Roberto court from its reading of Fair v. Cont’l Res., 143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023), where the Supreme Court directed that an appeal concerning a tax certificate foreclosure by a private citizen in Nebraska be “remanded to the Supreme Court of Nebraska for further consideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty...”  See Fair v. Cont’l Res, 143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023) and Cont’l Res v. Fair 311 Neb. 184 (2022).  Roberto explained that New Jersey’s Tax Sale law “permitted foreclosure of a property owner’s equity,” and therefore effected a taking under Tyler.  Roberto, 477 N.J. Super at 463-467.  (ii)  Roberto Applied “Pipeline Retroactivity” to Cases Eligible For Relief
[brief] [...] also ordered defendant to pay $5,000 in restitution, imposed assessments of $150 to the Victims of Crime Compensation Board, $150 to the Safe Neighborhoods Service Fund, and $30 to the Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund and awarded 551 days of jail credit and 1776 days of prior service credits.  (18T111-1 to 10; Da50-51).  Defendant was required to provide a DNA sample.  (18T110-8; Da50).  Defendant filed a notice of appeal as within time on March 30, 2023, which this Court granted on April 12, 2023.  (Da82-84).  This Court granted defendant’s motion to transfer the appeal from the sentencing oral argument calendar to the plenary calendar on May 19, 2023.  (Da85).  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] See id. at 64:12-69:5 (emphasis added).  Plaintiff testified that she complained about this incident to her husband and several school board members who were present, but that she did not make a specific complaint to the township because she was intimidated by the fact that she was yelled at by the Mayor of the town.  See id. at 69:6-13.  In addition, Plaintiff testified at her deposition how she suffered a variety of indignities at the Berkley’s 2017 Tree-Lighting ceremony.