ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] [...], SUPERINTENDENT, NJSP FROM; [...], DIRECTOR  DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  DATE: November 6, 2000  SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE - 2000-1  SHOOTING DIRECTIVE - REVISED  NOVEMBER 2000  The attached Directive No. 2000-1, dated November 3, 2000, Revised replaces Directive No. 2000-1 dated August 4, 2000.
[directive] Aqency Review and Approval  Federal  The adopting federal agency must review and accept or decline adoption requests promptly.  Absent exceptional circumstances, the request for adoption must be accepted prior to the transfer of the property to federal custody.  The adoption must be approved by the principal Treasury field officer (e.g., SAIC [Special Agent in Charge] or District Chief [Criminal Investigation]).  The principal Treasury field officer shall ensure that the basis for said approval is consistent with the requirements of this Directive.
[brief] 1 | | I.  THE RECORD CONTAINS PROBATIVE EVIDENCE ON ALL ELEMENTS OF MR. UNGER’S NUISANCE CLAIM .......................  1 | | A.  Defendants altered the natural flow of water and created new channels resulting in water concentrating in a different part of [...]’s property .........................................................................................  2 | | B. Defendants’ interference with the flow of waters was unreasonable .....  6 | | C. Defendant’s interference with the flow of waters caused harm .............  8 | | D.  The *Burke* Action does not give rise to res judicata or collateral estoppel ..............................................................................................................  10 | | II.  DEFENDANTS PROFFER NO EVIDENCE ENTITLING THEM TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE TRESPASS CLAIM ............  12 | | A.  [...] owned both the land and the plants on which [...] trespassed ..............................................................................................................  12 | | B.  There is no genuine dispute that [...] dropped the branches that killed [...]’s plants .................................................................  14 | | CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................
[brief] Defendant worked at the pharmacy six days a week for about fifty-five hours a week.  (3T36:2-7).  As the pharmacist in charge of [...], Defendant was responsible for seizing all controlled substances, receiving medications, dispensing medications and filling prescriptions and putting them into the system, for reviewing drug interactions or any adverse effects, doing inventory, and dealing with expired medications.  (3T37:12-19).  These responsibilities were only something a licensed pharmacist could do.  (3T37:20-23).  There is no reference to pharmacist in any capacity in the Operating Agreement.  (Pa1).  Plaintiff’s attorney prepared the Operating Agreement in January 2017.
[brief] In this case, [...] testified that drug dealers in this neighborhood conducted business using a system designed to allow “innocent connotations” to be ascribed to their actions; the system involved keeping the product in a stash location and separating the seller from the profits by passing off the cash to someone else working in the enterprise.  In support of his argument that there was no objective manifestation of his criminal involvement, defendant points to [...]’s response on cross-examination that “no facts linked them to criminality at that time[.]” (Db12).  This was said on cross-examination, in response to defense counsel asking: What facts did you have in your possession, not supposition, not speculation, that [...] and [...] were engaged in criminality simply because they were in physical proximity to [...]? (1T59-8 to 11).  The question thus asks the officer if he caught the defendants in the act.  But our law recognizes that it must be “rare indeed” for an officer to observe behavior consistent only with criminality, “incapable of innocent interpretation.
[brief] (30T 39:20 to 40:12; 46:14 to 47:3; 73:19-22; 43:3-13; 45:5-8; 78:16-21; 47:24 to 48:3; 50:24-51:3; 53:1-13; 54:6-19).  I.  The Trial Court Finds that the Defendants Misappropriated Funds  After 22 trial days, the lower court characterized this matter as “probably the most complicated case involving numbers” it had seen in 17 years on the bench.  (36T 55:14-20).  In reaching a decision, [...] explained that he reviewed the record in painstaking detail: the transcripts, the exhibits including emails, balance sheets, spreadsheets, and the 44 schedules from [...]’s reports.  [...] also considered the demeanor of the witnesses to judge their credibility.  (36T 6:8-20).  In the end, the trial court rejected almost wholesale the defendants’ theory of the case:
[brief] In reaching its conclusion, the trial court also relied on the “realities surrounding the remediation process” which, in order to obtain a RAO, will involve placing a cap on the Property.  (Pa0229.)  Specifically, the trial court noted that during redevelopment, any caps on the Property would be destroyed or damaged by the redevelopment work.  *(Ibid.)*  At trial, Plaintiff’s expert clearly explained that Plaintiff’s redevelopment plans have no effect on Defendants’ ability to obtain a RAO.  (4T141:10 to 142:6.)  In addition, the remedial actions that Defendants would need to take to obtain a RAO at this stage would be far less extensive than those that Plaintiff would need to take during redevelopment.  *(Ibid.)*  Regardless, Plaintiff’s future redevelopment plans are simply irrelevant to the Seller’s Environmental Obligations under the PSA.
[directive] FROM: 2015 28, July DATE: Uniform Statewide Regarding Directive Enforcement Law  Supplemental SUBJECT: Police-Use-of-Force Conducting for Practices  Best and Procedures  Investigations to required are departments police and prosecutors practice, and law  Jersey  New Under to decision officer's enforcement law responding a to when procedures well-established follow to responsibility, and an opportunity, nation present the across events  Recent deadly force. employ use-of-force that ensure to appropriate as procedures and practices those enhance to and examine impartially. and thoroughly, expeditiously, fairly, conducted are investigations statutory and Constitution our under authority broad has General Attorney Jersey New The follow. must prosecutors and standards police that uniform statewide and establish enforce law to enforcement law a circumstances in and when what governing rules the in State, example, this For are force deadly or mechanical, mechanical, enhanced physical, use to authorized officer is of Use General's Attorney of promulgation the the through General the Attorney by established and weapons of types specified concerning use-of-force policies supplemental and Force Policy use-of- how governing rules the establish to authorized is General Attorney the too, So ammunition. of supervision "general the for (providing 52:17B-98 N.J.S.A. See investigated. are incidents force order in to State, the of officer enforcement law chief as General Attorney the by justice criminal administration law criminal the and the of enforcement efficient and uniform a of benefits the secure State") the throughout criminal justice of 2006-5 No. Directive Enforcement Law General Attorney of issuance Through the statutory authority and constitutional this General exercised Attorney "Directive"),the (hereinafter: officer force uses police a when investigated are incidents which by process basic the establishing by Page 2 against a civilian.
[brief] [...], MIDDLESEX  EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, PA, and PLAINFIELD  EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, PA, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Defendants-Appellants.  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE* | 1 | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 2 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 7 | | ARGUMENT | 8 | | I.
[brief] Indeed, defendant’s reliance upon and reference to [...], State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611 (2022), State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016), State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2017), and State v. Smith, 436 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2014), is misplaced.  Each of these cases is distinguishable from the present matter.
[brief] 31  I.  The Trial Court’s July 30, 2020 Order is Not Entitled to Any Deference ..............................................................................................................  31  II.  A Fact-Based Allocation Is Appropriate In This Case .........................  33  A.  [...]’s Response Improperly Relies on Materials That are Not Part of the Trial Court Record.  ...............................  34  B.  The Trial Court Misinterpreted and Misapplied Boston Gas .............................................................................................................  34  C.  The Evidence of Record Allows for an Accurate Estimation of the Property Damage During Each Policy Period.  ............................................................................  36  III.  If the Time-on-the-Risk Method Applies, The Appropriate  End Date for the Allocation Period is 1986, or, at the very latest, 1993.  ..................................................................................................................  41  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................  45  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] *Turner v. Safley*, 482 U.S at 90-91  Here, plaintiff pointed to her attorney’s cell phone which would have accommodated her rights because it was his most reliable number and would have had a di minimis cost to any penological interests.  There was no valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and plaintiff’s ability to call her attorney or to call him his on his cell phone.  No legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify the initial denial then the restrictive use of calling only the attorney’s office phone.  The available other means was not reliable.  The denial was clearly an exaggerated response to plaintiff’s ability to communicate with her attorney.  There would be no affect on prison resource or any ripple effect on fellow inmates and staff.  Thus, the denial was unreasonable  [...]’s blocking plaintiff from calling her lawyer while she was being discipled in a prison and disallowing her from calling his only reliable 24/7 number was also willful malicious act.  This was also a knowing and willful violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
[brief] D.  Plaintiff, Including the Protected Class, Will Suffer Irreparable Harm  With respect to irreparable harm, it is important that this is a public interest litigation in which Plaintiff is a representative of the protected class of those New Jersey families in need of inclusionary housing.  Any irreparable harm analysis should not only be viewed by the Court with respect to the effect condemnation has on Plaintiff as a developer, but on the protected class in this public interest litigation and on the integrity of the builder’s remedy process.  As the trial court held, Plaintiff is in a “special position” because [...] has been adjudged noncompliant and Plaintiff is a developer seeking to build the inclusionary housing for which [...] failed to zone.
[brief] See (Da137) (leaving all further “judgments or determinations as to the merits” to the Division and to OAL); see also Poff, 228 N.J. Super. at 379 (declining to decide propriety of requested relief because matter was pending in the DCR proceeding).  All Appellants may not do—during the limited period in which DCR’s administrative action is still proceeding—is unilaterally change the policy, potentially requiring another court action.  Appellants’ contention thus misses the mark.
[brief] This Court denied the State’s application for permission to file an emergent motion to appeal this ruling on February 28, 2024.  sufficient expertise to offer the testimony. ”  *State v. Olenowski (Olenowski I)*, 253 N.J. 133, 143 (2023) (quotations omitted).  Furthermore, the net-opinion rule “requires that an expert give the why and wherefore that supports the opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. ”  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015) (quotations omitted).  Additionally, “our Court Rules require certain disclosures when a party seeks to use expert opinion testimony at trial. ”  *State v. Derry*, 250 N.J. 611, 634 (2022) (citing Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I)).  And the trial courts must “give a limiting instruction to the jury that conveys to the jury its absolute prerogative to reject both the expert’s opinion and the version of the facts consistent with that opinion. ”  *Ibid.* (quotation omitted).  Moreover, the Court has “held that the measurements derived from the device are admissible at a criminal trial only when they are shown to have sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results and will contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth.
[brief] [...]’s entitlement to a “fair return” on its investment in the Unit is required by constitutional mandate and expressly set forth in the ordinance.  While the Board’s arbitrary and capricious rulings were numerous throughout the tortuous history of this matter spanning three sets of Board hearings and three ensuing Superior Court appeals now approaching six (6) years, [...]’s appeal is limited to the following claimed errors:  (i)  The Rent Increase improperly included a “fair return” to [...] on its equity in the Unit because [...] previously earned a return on the other 10 units that were sold in 2003 upon converting the Property to a condominium property; (ii) [...]’s equity in the Unit improperly included the purchase price of the Unit adjusted for inflation; (iii) [...]’s equity in the Unit improperly included the capital improvements to the Unit adjusted for inflation; (iv) [...]’s equity in the Unit was improperly based upon its appraised market value as a condominium; (v) [...]’s management fees were improperly included as expenses paid by [...] because such fees duplicated the condominium fees paid by [...]; (vi) [...]’s management fees should have been limited to a 5% percentage of the rent as granted by the Board; and (vii)
[brief] POINT THREE, Sub Point Three:  Appellant is not prejudiced by striking the subject terms of the Contract as noted in the Trial Court’s Order (Da202-Da203).  The [...] is ready to hear the disability at this time having received the Order – the case has been remanded from the [...]/Administrative appeal (now moot) and is pending vote on the merits once this appeal is concluded (Pa5-Pa6).  If disability were denied, Respondent is obligated to exhaust his appeals before being returned to duty.  He would remain on leave of absence under the agreement.  The Regulation notes only that the Appellant Employer shall be informed that the member should be returned to duty (N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10).  The provision is only a mandate of “notice. ”  The Employer Appellant retains the ability to block his return in that instance because Respondent has already admitted to the severity of his disability (Da15, Par.3) and medical proofs/other documentation (i.e. charges for errant behavior related to the disabling condition) noted in the Agreement supports Appellant in that situation.
[brief] The standard of review for the appellate court in reviewing this matter is the same as the standard for the trial judge.  The Appellate Division owes no deference to the trial court’s interpretation or application of the PWCRA to the undisputed facts of this case.  Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “a trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference, and, hence, an issue of law is subject to de novo plenary appellate review, regardless of the context. ”  *Estate of Hanges v.  Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 202, N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010)(internal citations omitted); see also Giannakopolous v. Mid State Mall, 438 N.J. Super. 595, 599 (App. Div. 2014)(stating “[w]e engage in a de novo review of the trial court’s decision . . . on the motion to dismiss”).  Moreover, the [...] is not entitled to any discretion where (as here) its actions violate the PWCRA and LPCL.  See Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307 (1994)(holding that a public entity is without discretion to accept a statutorily defective bid); Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135 (2001)(holding local authority has no discretion to violate the statute and demanding “strict compliance with public bidding guidelines”).
[brief] Furthermore, Appellants are in even a stronger position under Pascale, because the lower Court ruled that there was no gift.  In effect, by awarding unjust enrichment to the plaintiff below, it was reversing an improper “taking” by [...] from [...].  Therefore, again, something was indeed wrong with the unfair dealings between the parties, necessitating the imposition of a constructive trust.  Somehow the lower court got part of the analysis right, but missed the bigger picture and failed to protect the asset that rightfully belonged to Francisco and [...].  If the $50,000.00 was not a gift, why did the lower court implicitly allow the ownership of the house as a gift to [...], who used unjustly obtained money to buy it, taken from [...]?  That is another illogical result of the court’s decision.  We also ask that the Court review the trial transcripts as it may wish to see that the defendants were most disingenuous in their testimony.  [...] was merely an agent for [...] in the purchase, and his own testimony said the only thing he could do with the $50,000.00 was to buy a house for [...].  (2T 34-37).  The court only relied on [...]’s self-serving testimony, which is wrong.  That in no way should translate into him becoming the “owner”.  Once the lower court found unjust enrichment and that no gift was made, and that all occurred within a confidential relationship, as findings of fact, it simply misapplied the law.  The illogical result of [...] having been found liable for unjust enrichment, and not being the recipient of a gift, but being rewarded with ownership of the home, despite being in a confidential relationship, is obviously wrong.  2.
[brief] Instead, the Commission relied only on a case in which a school board member claimed that his Facebook account had been hacked and that he had not made the Facebook posts at all.  (Ca016) (citing to Hodrinksky v. Faussette, SEC Docket No. C11-21 (2021)) (p.5  “… Respondent again maintains that his social media account was compromised/hacked, and denies that he ever made the comments or posted the information ….  ”).  Notably, Hodrinsky was also decided on a motion to dismiss, not on a motion for summary decision, and is procedurally inapplicable to the present matter which was before the Commission.  [...], [...], and [...], supra – which actually address the precise issues that were before the Commission in this matter – were inexplicably ignored by the Commission as if they had never happened.
[brief] To protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, our law generally requires that such actions be authorized by a neutral magistrate in the form of a warrant.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).  A magistrate judge may issue a search warrant only where the warrant application demonstrates that “there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, or is being committed, at a specific location or that evidence of a crime is at the place sought to be searched. ”  State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 426 (2017) (quoting Jones, 179 N.J. at 388) (emphasis omitted).  The probable cause standard “is not susceptible of precise definition,” but a “principal component is a well-grounded suspicion. ”  *State v. Smith*, 212 N.J. 365, 388 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (cleaned up).  Our Supreme Court has made clear that securing a warrant “is not a mere formality. ”  *State v. Novembrino*, 105 N.J. 95, 107 (1987) (quoting *State v. Macri*, 39 N.J. 250, 255-57 (1963)).  To that end, a reviewing court must ensure that the magistrate judge who issued the warrant did not simply ratify bare conclusory statements of the officer who wrote the affidavit.
[brief] .................................................................................. 19, 20 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) .................................................................................. 10 State v. Kearney, 183 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1981), certif. denied, 89 N.J. 449 (1982) ..............................................  13 State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541 (2005) .......................................................................................  19 State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992) .................................................................................. 2, 47 State v. LaPorte, 62 N.J. 312 (1973) .................................................................  30  State v. Letts, 254 N.J. Super. 390 (Law Div. 1992)...........................................  11, 12 State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999) .................................................................. 9, 10 State v. Martin, 87 N.J. 561 (1981) ...................................................................... 31-34 State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40 (2004) ....................................................................... 19, 20 State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003) ....................................................................
[brief] Db38.  [...] claims that [...]’s opinion was based on “numerous studies concerning foodborne hazards,” such as a USDA brochure, a WHO Bulletin, and an Army treatise.  Db39-40.  Brochures, bulletins, and Army treatises are not authoritative studies.  See In re Accutane Litigation, 234 N.J. 340 (2018) (explaining the value and nature of studies and hierarchy of evidence when evaluating causation).  That aside, [...] admitted that none of these documents address the relevant issue here—whether it is generally accepted in the scientific community that indoor growing mold contaminates food and causes injury.  3T108-24 to 3T110-5.  In fact, [...] acknowledged that he is not aware of a single epidemiological study, scientific study, or even a case report that documents an incidence of indoor-growing mold contaminating food and causing injury.  3T109-3 to 3T110-5.  Thus, the trial court’s factual finding is well-supported.  While [...] selectively attacks certain of the trial court’s findings, he never addresses the trial court’s resounding rejection of [...]’s “common sense” methodology as scientifically unreliable.
[directive] Contempt proceedings  a.  A respondent’s violation of any protective order issued pursuant to P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) shall constitute an offense under subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:29-9 and each order shall so state.  All contempt proceedings brought pursuant to subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:29-9 shall be subject to any rules or guidelines established by the Supreme Court to promote the prompt disposition of criminal matters.  A- 29  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT