ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant does not claim that [...] or [...] violated N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(i)(Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule), which governs the placement of the dock and mooring area in a Submerged Aquatic Vegetation habitat, or N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.2(d)(Shellfish Habitat Rule), which governs dock size in a Shellfish habitat.
[brief] (11T7-17 to 18; 11t7-23 to 24; 11T8-2 to 15).  The events he organized were for large functions.  (11T9-10 to 12).  He would book the venue site, organize the food and the entertainment.  (11T9-13 to 25).  He would also hire security.  (11T10-22 to 24).  He would advertise the events he planned on social media, printed flyers, by word of mouth or by using hired promoters.  (11T11-25 to 11T12-3).  [...] was involved with promoting an event at the [...] on Friday, March 22, 2019.
[brief] Conversely, [...] addresses the molding of a judgment after trial if the trial court has dismissed a joint tortfeasor as a party, which is not something that the Supreme Court has addressed.  Jones v. Morey’s Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142, 168 (2017) (“This Court has not previously decided a case in which a party has requested that the trial court mold the judgment in accordance with the Appellate Division's analysis in [...].
[brief] And it was a known fact that the employees and victims of the pharmacy said the suspect got away with nothing.  Now, the State's star witness, [...] (phonetic), has made four (indiscernible) statements.  The only thing the State did have was the four witnesses.  At any given time they could subpoena those witnesses and get them to court so there's nothing that hampers the State from obtaining any evidence 13 years later from when the time the crime happened because there's only four witnesses who claim I confessed to them and one who claimed I played a part of the crime would commonly know it he appeared before [...].
[brief] Pascack Assoc’n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of the Twp. of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 485 (1977).  Indeed, a municipality may condition a land development approval upon the developer’s installation of improvements a local governing body may find necessary for the protection of the public interest.  Divan Builders v. Wayne Tp. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582,595 (1975).  Moreover, “[t]he protection of apartment dwellers has long been recognized as consistent with the public health, safety and welfare. ”  State v. C. I. B. Int’l., 83 N.J. 262, 272 (1980).  Moreover, where a Mt. Laurel judge evaluates whether a resolution by a planning board was contrary to the intent of a settlement agreement, it must do so based on the terms of the settlement agreement and the full record of proceedings before the planning board, including the transcripts.
[brief] (Aa344-371)  The resolutions clarified that [...]’s expansion should proceed even if [...]’s request is delayed or prohibited.  (Aa344-372)  [...] would be permitted to join if and when it was permitted by the Commissioner of Education to withdraw from [...] and/or [...].  Appellants later challenged these revised resolutions in their opposition to Respondents’ motion to dismiss the consolidated petitions of appeal.
[brief] I.  THE PLAIN TERMS OF PSA DO NOT ALLOW INVEL TO TERMINATE THE PSA BASED ON RECEIPT OF A NON-ACCEPTABLE CERTIFICATE.  (Raised Below: Da11)  The trial court erred in granting Plaintiff-Respondent, [...] summary judgment on its specific performance claim because the plain terms of the PSA do not provide [...] the right to terminate upon receipt of a non-compliant estoppel certificate.  Rather, the PSA makes receipt of an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate a condition precedent to closing and allows [...] to terminate if such condition precedent is not satisfied by closing.  The general standard in contract dispute cases where the agreement is unambiguous is that the Court is required to give effect to the plain meaning of the relevant text of the parties’ agreement.  The polestar of interpretation is the parties’ intention as manifested by such text.  *Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., Inc.*, 385 N.J. Super. 324, 339 (App. Div.) (2006) cert. denied, 183 N.J. 353 (2006).  The court is not permitted to rewrite the agreement or provide one party or the other party with a better contract than it obtained for itself.  *Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Riefolo Constr. Co.*, 161 N.J. Super. 99, 114-115 (App. Div.) (1978).  Instead of giving effect to the PSA’s plain meaning, the trial court effectively rewrote the contract by holding that [...] has a right to immediately terminate the agreement upon receiving a non-compliant estoppel certificate prior to closing although such a provision is to be found nowhere in the PSA and is, in fact, contradictory to the PSA’s actual provisions.  i.
[brief] Part of the way I describe the Mount Laurel process, as I see it anyway, is a public entity, a municipality can choose to be in the driver’s seat, and they do that by filing the DJ action but going through with it.  * * *  [You]ou can continue on with your DJ action and have a hearing and Fair Share [Housing Center] can oppose the arguments and the evidence that’s presented by the municipality.  …  You can have a hearing.  [...] presents an expert who tells me why it should be 600 [units].  Fair Share can present an expert saying why it should be 800.  And I would make a decision.  * * *  But when a municipality either files a DJ and chooses not to pursue it, or doesn’t file a DJ, the municipality is saying we’re going to step out of the driver’s seat.  We are not driving this bus.  And what happens is what I have here which is now I guess three builder’s remedy lawsuits.
[directive] 6.  It is illegal for any person to impede any law enforcement officer(s) engaged in a lawful arrest, search or seizure, whether pursuant to a warrant or otherwise.  See e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1.  Any questions by school officials concerning the legality of any contemplated or ongoing arrest, search or seizure conducted by a law enforcement officer on school property should be directed to the appropriate county prosecutor, or in the case of an arrest, search or seizure undertaken by a member of the Statewide Narcotics Task Force, to the Assistant Attorney General in charge.  7.  Nothing in this subsection or in any other provision of this Executive Directive shall be construed to require any school official to actively participate in any search or seizure conducted or supervised by a law enforcement officer; nor shall any provision of this Executive Directive or the Attorney General's School Search Guidelines be construed to direct, solicit or encourage any school official to conduct any search or seizure on behalf of law enforcement, or for the sole purpose of ultimately turning evidence of a crime over to a law enforcement agency.
[brief] Db: Defendant’s brief Da: Defendant’s appendix 1T: 1/10/20 hearing 2T: 1/21/20 hearing 3T: 1/27/20 hearing 4T: 2/7/20 hearing 5T: 2/18/20 hearing 6T: 2/21/20 hearing 7T: 3/6/20 hearing 8T: 6/3/20 hearing 9T: 7/12/21 hearing vol. 1 10T: 7/12/21 hearing vol. 2 11T: 1/10/22 hearing 12T: 3/14/22 hearing 13T: 4/25/22 hearing 14T: 9/12/22 hearing 15T: 9/28/22 hearing 16T: 10/17/22 hearing 17T: 10/21/22 hearing 18T: 10/24/22 vol. 1 19T: 10/24/22 vol. 2 20T: 10/26/22 vol. 1 21T: 10/26/22 vol. 2 22T: 10/28/22 vol. 1 23T: 10/28/22 vol. 2 24T: 10/31/22 vol. 1 25T: 10/31/22 vol. 2 26T: 11/2/22 vol. 1 27T: 11/2/22 vol. 2 28T: 11/4/22 vol. 1 29T: 11/4/22 vol. 2 30T: 11/16/22 vol. 1 31T: 11/16/22 vol. 2 32T: 11/18/22 vol. 1 33T: 11/18/22 vol. 2 34T: 11/28/22 vol. 1 35T: 11/28/22 vol. 2 36T: 11/30/22 vol. 1 37T: 11/30/22 vol. 2 38T: 12/2/22 39T: 12/12/22 40T: 12/14/22 trial 41T: 12/16/22 trial  42T: 12/19/22 trial 43T: 12/21/22 trial 44T: 12/23/22 trial 45T: 1/4/23 trial  46T: 2/21/23 sentencing PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (6T17-17 to 21).  He traveled from Vermont to New York with friends of [...], a male and a female, who she arranged to go with him.  (6T18-11 to 18).  [...] described the friends as "a small white girl with black hair . . . [and a] six foot two black guy."  (6T19-6 to 10).  [...] retrieved the car from the impound lot and later left it in New York or New Jersey.  He parked it in a designated spot and left the keys.
[brief] THE COURT: “[...], ‘-‘ I know you're trying to work out a compromise with him, but it doesn't seem that he's open minded at this time,” (1T12, 20-23).  This expressed belief by the trial judge defied evidence before him, as the following show:  a.  The July 14, 2020 HUD-letter presented to the trial judge (Pa37) showed that in 2020, within its statutory 100 days under *Title VIII* HUD, after conducting the “voluntary conciliation,” HUD referred the case to the DOJ, yet the trial judge somehow had the belief that after about four years the matter at HUD and a compromise was being worked out between parties.  b.  The said belief by the trial judge, further, defied the letter by the DOJ (Pa54), which told (1) trial court had ultimate jurisdiction over the matter and (2) the following material statements certified to the trial court via respondents’ *Motion to Dismiss*, were material misrepresentations: “this case is currently pending with HUD and there has been no final determination made by that department” (Pa68).  “As recent as September 26, 2023 our office confirmed the HUD matter is still open pending the agencies final findings” (Pa70).  This shows that the trial judge had material misunderstanding of material existing facts toward matters of controlling decisions.  Appellant believes that in so doing the trial court erred.
[brief] ”  Comer, 249 N.J. at 387 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78).  Unless circumstances show, despite consideration of these factors, that a juvenile offender is incorrigible -- which, to repeat, should be a rare event -- the sentence must provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. ”  Comer, 249 N.J. at 390, 394-95 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80.
[brief] During his testimony, [...] testified that [...] was the sole source of information for the Complaint and that she referred to [...] as her “ex-husband” and that they were “married from 2004 to 2015” and “after their divorce, [...] invited [[...]] back” and that [...] was her “ex-spouse/partner”.  (14T12-6-15-20).  The trial court was correct that “all of the above … completely contradict [...]’s testimony that she was unaware she was divorced until sometime in 2017. ” (A229, Op. at 19).
[brief] Defendant also asks this Court to “take judicial notice under N.J.R.E. 201 of other matters where the same judge has conducted the same inquiry that demonstrates a pattern of exceeding the scope of review for a trial de novo” and cites a case that is currently pending, but has not been decided by this Court – State v. Chopp, [...]. (Db 21).  Indeed, defendant makes the same scope and bias arguments in that case; however, as argued by the State in that case as well as the instant case, defendant’s arguments are contrived and misplaced.  In addition, since this Court has not decided the issues in State v. Chopp (as of the filing of the State’s response in this matter), there is no support for defendant’s request that judicial notice should be taken that [...] has “demonstrate[ed] a pattern of exceeding the scope of review for a trial de novo.
[brief] “A corporation is regarded as an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders,” Tully v. Mirz, 457 N.J. Super. 114, 123 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 549 (1996)).  “It is a principle of corporation law that . . . done so, they would have been required – prior to commencing the derivative suit – to issue a demand upon [...] to take appropriate action and then allow ninety days to elapse, unless notified the demand was rejected or futile.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 5:105-2.4(f) (“Custodians shall submit a completed and signed SOI for each complaint to the Council’s staff and the complainant not later than five days from the date of receipt of the SOI form from the Council’s staff. ”) (emphasis added).  The [...] cannot credibly dispute that the [...] failed to provide [...] with any notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding any of the proceedings that were conducted before the [...].  The first communication between the [...] and [...] was on May 11, 2021, when the [...] case manager assigned to the [...] Complaint (who is also an attorney) transmitted an email to [...], counsel for Plaintiff, counsel for the Records Custodian, and the Records Custodian himself, that [...]’s [...] Complaint would be adjudicated on May 18, 2021.  (Da132-133).  Plaintiff had never received any advance notice of any of the prior [...] proceedings, including the [...]’s adjudication that resulted in the January 26, 2021 Interim Order, and the [...]’s adjudication that resulted in the March 30, 2021 Interim Order.  (Da132).  Any argument that the May 11, 2021 email provided [...] with adequate notice of the May 18, 2021 Interim Order must be rejected, because that notice specifically stated that [...] was prohibited from submitting anything to the [...] in advance of that meeting:  “Please note that the [...] will not accept any additional submissions beyond this notice. ”  (Da132).  When [...], in response, requested a stay so he could make a submission, [...] [...] denied that request.  (Da131).  So, even if the May 11, 2021 [...] email to [...] could be considered “notice,” it was not meaningful notice because the [...] explicitly advised [...] (twice) that no submissions would be accepted by the [...].  (Da131-133).  And, since the [...] has never provided [...] with an SOI form, the [...] lacks jurisdiction over him.
[brief] During a pre-arranged visit by Appellant’s counsel at the New Jersey State Police Museum, and with the full cooperation of the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office and the New Jersey State Police on Friday March 17, 2023, between 2:00PM and 3:00PM, [...] photographed and verbally shared with all State employees present that the damaged ceiling tile from the water had yet to be fixed or repaired.  (Pa184).  Appellant clearly demonstrated to the Court that natural causes can easily deprive the public the right to view these historical documents in their original condition.  Given this evidence submitted by the Appellant, the Court’s conclusion that DNA testing would deprive the public access to see the back of envelopes and the front right corner of the envelopes in their original state is in error.  The Court erred in its rationality.  The mere fact that Appellant did not provide case law citations does not prevent the Court from ordering a modern-day forensic analysis, at no cost to the State of New Jersey, to be conducted.  Depriving this to the public prevents an opportunity to answer a key question in arguably New Jersey’s most famous criminal case.  The Court’s reasoning is faulty, illogical and does not correspond to the intent of the Legislature to allow the public to “examine” and “inspect” government records.  Moreover, to the Court’s point on page 16 of the Court’s decision (Pa139) that “depriving the public access to these items in their original state does not serve the public interest,” there are multiple points in dispute here.  First, these items are not in their original state.  While the Museum does its best to keep, maintain and protect the large collection of over 225,000 Kidnapping documents, the envelopes in question are stored in a regular storage box in the room depicted in Exhibit I of the Plaintiff’s response below.  (Pa115; Pa184).  The temperature is controlled, but these documents are not protected in a state-of-the-art facility to maintain paper indefinitely.  These items have clearly aged as is evident from Exhibit K to Plaintiff’s response below.  (Pa134).  Second, knowing whose DNA is on these envelopes serves the public interest.  It will either confirm that the New Jersey Attorney General and the New Jersey State Police were right in convicting [...], or if another person’s DNA is identified, it will indicate that someone else was involved in the kidnapping with or without Hauptmann.  Either way, knowing the truth is clearly and unequivocally in the public’s interest.  **POINT IV**
[brief] Those errors were particularly harmful for four reasons.  First, the identity of the shooter was the critical issue at trial, so the detectives’ unexamined claims unfairly undercut his only defense.  See \textit{State v. Dehart}, 430 N.J. Super. 108, 113-16 (App. Div. 2013) (reversing where officer disclosed that non-testifying witness identified defendant because identity was the “main issue at trial”).  Second, the detectives’ claims that [...] “picked” him, as if directly out of a \textsuperscript{23}  The State failed to establish that [...] was unavailable or previously cross-examined, but even if it had, the court’s denial of cross-examination independently requires reversal. lineup or photo array, were false.  Third, the court failed to give any curative instruction.  Fourth and most importantly, the denial of cross-examination prevented the jury from hearing exculpatory evidence that significantly undermined the identification’s reliability.
[brief] (T147-2)  20.  [...] also admitted that she did not confirm whether the people she spoke to actually got their information from any Court personnel or Petitioner.  (T147-7)  21.  In making her report, [...] also conceded that she did not speak with the Municipal Court Judge, the Municipal Court Administrator or anyone else in determining who controls or supervises the Petitioner in her work, which includes the Court sessions most fundamentally.  (T148-13)  22.  [...] had to concede that it was [...] and not the Petitioner who determines the docket for each Court session.  (T149-7)  23.  [...] also had to concede that Petitioner cannot refuse to prosecute certain cases and not finish out the docket.  (T149-15)  24.  [...] made a great deal of reference to the one-year that Petitioner was not appointed as a municipal prosecutor in the last 20 years.  (T150-7)  25.  However, she had to concede that by statute, municipal prosecutors are rehired every year (T150-7) and the Petitioner was hired 19 out of the past 20 years except 2008.  (T50-20)  26.  While [...] would not concede that being hired 19 out of the last 20 years was the ultimate performance evaluation, she had no idea whether any other employees were subject to performance evaluations.  (T150-7)  27.  [...] also conceded that she did not know whether the Municipal Court Judge, who is an employee of [...] and in the pension system, was subject to a performance evaluation.  (T152-13)  28.  [...] also had to concede that like the Petitioner in this case, the Judge who is an employee of [...] and in the pension system, does take calls outside Court sessions at home or at his private law practice.  **FACTOR 2 – TRAINING**
[brief] (5T 69-22 to 70-3, 70-2 to 13)  [...] testified that when police searched [...], they found a New Jersey driver’s license belonging to [...], a debit card belonging to [...], and $27.40 in cash.  (5T 77-11 to 14, 78-5 to 12, 79-18)  Regarding the investigation by the Newark police, a 9-1-1 operator testified that at 8:53 a.m. on September 28, she got a call about a possible dead body in the parking lot of the [...] on Springfield Ave.
[brief] ”).  None of the three restrictions imposed on [...] were authorized dispositions for his offense.  The only statutory provision the State points to in support of the non-custodial terms imposed by the court is N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d), which authorizes sentencing courts to order “any other civil penalty. ”  (Sb 22)  But the State entirely ignores State v. Masce, 452 N.J. Super. 347 (App. Div. 2017), discussed in [...]’s opening brief.
[brief] This is particularly so where [...]’s negligent driving had nothing to do with her actual job responsibilities, which she was not performing at the time of the crash.  In contrast, the fact that [...] and [...] were co-employees was essentially a “mere coincidence” with no inherent connection to the actual work they performed.  See Manole, 229 N.J. Super. at 143.  The anomalous and unjust result in this tragic case, in which a negligent tortfeasor who caused a fatal collision has escaped without any civil liability at all, renders this legal issue particularly ripe for review and reconsideration by this Court.  Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant [...] should be reversed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Here, [...] and [...] correctly found that all of [...]’s claims were premised upon the identical underlying facts – [...]’ theft and concealment of partnership funds.  (39036a, 39056a-64a, 39996a-40001a).  Indeed, [...] themselves previously have conceded that very point, stating:  [E]very bad act of which [...] are accused is alleged to constitute a RICO predicate act.  However [...]’ supposed misconduct is characterized, it ultimately consists of a single set of actions -- making payments to themselves or related entities out of the partnership which should have remained to be distributed to the partners.  No matter how many different labels are placed on the identical conduct, the Court has found such conduct to constitute RICO predicate acts.  (14265a)  24  Contrary to [...]’ assertion, this Court did not hold that “compensable work must be limited to that which was ‘reasonably devoted to [[...]’s] pursuit of [his] … RICO claims. ’”  (Db37)  Nor is “the test … whether all of the work done to establish all of the facts ‘was reasonably devoted to [[...]’s] pursuit of [his] RICO claims. ’” (Db38; emphasis supplied)  Contrary to [...]’ assertions in their Appellant’s Brief (Db39) and as detailed herein above, on remand both [...] and [...] – and in particular [...] – “tied” and “related” the work performed by [...]’s counsel in developing the pre-SOL facts to establishing his RICO claims within the RICO SOL Period.\textsuperscript{25}
[brief] In 1963, the [...] (“Congregation” or “Plaintiff”) was granted an easement in real property known as [...] (Lot 5, Block 59) (the “Subject Property”) in [...].  [...]  (“Defendant”) purchased the Subject Property at a bankruptcy auction in 2010 with actual knowledge it was taking the Subject Property subject to the Congregation’s written recorded easement.  However, after the purchase of the Subject Property, Defendant began intentionally and maliciously interfering with Plaintiff’s historic property rights.  In 2012, the Congregation initiated its action against Defendant to protect its easement rights.  Following the entry of an order for partial summary judgment granted in 2016 in favor of Plaintiff and a five-day trial in 2017 addressing issues related to the validity and enforceability of Plaintiff’s easement and whether said property rights were terminated, waived or abandoned, the Trial Court entered an order of judgment in favor of the Congregation confirming the Congregation’s historic easement rights.
[brief] Similarly, here, the Applicant’s subdivision application must be able to stand on its own and satisfy the requirements of the statute and ordinance.  The only difference is that the Board must continue to consider the negative criteria during this process.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76(b) (“No subsequent approval shall be granted unless such approval can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantial impairment of the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance”).  With a bifurcated use variance and site plan application, it is standard practice to still submit at a minimum a conceptual site plan during the use variance stage, to show the board and public what is being proposed.  There is absolutely nothing that states that a bifurcated application means an applicant no longer needs to comply with certain requirements.  Furthermore, in the context of bifurcation of a use variance and site plan application, courts have held that if the variance and site plan issues are highly interrelated, bifurcation is not appropriate.