ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa24-27).  The Board concluded that [...] was notified as required by the Ricci Act but failed to submit his Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa26).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision by letter dated July 18, 2023.  (Pa16).  [...] argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.  (Pa19-20).  At its meeting on May 23, 2023, the Board considered [...]’s arguments, found that there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and therefore directed the Board Secretary to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for its review and approval at its next meeting.  (Pa9).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on July 26, 2023.  (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.  (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the Act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act, they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until March 3, 2023, approximately one year and two months past the July 8, 2021 statutory deadline.  (Pa11; Pa13).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa13-14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa13).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and two months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.
[directive] However, local police agencies should consult with their Municipal Attorney and Municipal Prosecutor regarding the issuance and execution of Warrants of Impoundment originating from other jurisdictions or municipalities.  As a convenience to law enforcement, this memorandum and its attachments will be available on the Division of Criminal Justice Internet web site (www.njdcj.org or www.njdcj. com), under Guidelines.  SM:jk  Attachments c. Attorney General [...]  First Assistant Attorney General [...]  AAG  [...], Director, Office of State Police Affairs  [...], Chief of Staff, Division of Criminal Justice  AAG  [...], Chief, Prosecutors Supervision & Coordination Bureau  AAG  [...], Insurance Fraud Prosecutor SDAG
[brief] No cross-appeal was filed and therefore this Court should not consider [...]’s equitable estoppel argument.  To the extent that this Court does consider the equitable estoppel issue, then for the reasons discussed below [...]’s argument should be considered to lack merit.  The thrust of [...]’s argument is that [...] is estopped from seeking arbitration because he has asserted that no contract exists.  Indeed, in both his Answer and discovery responses, [...] has denied that a contract existed.  In his defenses, however, [...] has taken a seemingly inconsistent position and stated: “Defendant did not breach any contract or agreement with Plaintiff. ”  Da013.  What [...]’s argument fails to recognize is that, once sued, the New Jersey Court Rules expressly allow [...] to take inconsistent positions.  New Jersey Court Rule 4:5-6 provides:  A party may set forth 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate accounts or defenses.  When 2 or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them, if made independently, would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements.  As many separate claims or defenses as the party has may be stated regardless of their consistency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds or both.  All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in R.1:4-8. ”  Emphasis added.  Given the substance of Rule 4:5-6, the fact that [...] may have denied the existence of a contract while at the same time taken the position that, if a contract exists, he did not breach it is of no consequence to the present arbitration issue.  Under New Jersey’s Rules of practice and procedure he is entitled to assert both positions.  Therefore, [...]’s argument that [...] is estopped from seeking to compel arbitration should be resoundingly rejected as lacking merit.
[brief] Today, only a few random strips of the R-2 zone remain as [...]’s continued growth now provides a more positive context that can support all the historic commercial streets in the city.  Thus, the R-2 zone district has been removed from most areas of the city and only remains on the map in small leftover areas that have not required attention from the [...].  Continuing to enforce the R-2 zoning standards in a now hot real estate market with a growing population and clear demand for new commercial space would be tantamount to [...] turning its back on its own success.
[brief] (16T97-8 to 10, 132-22 to 134-12; 22T105-21 to 106-9)  The day before trial began, Juror 12 called the judge’s chambers to report that “that she may have come into possession of information today, which may prevent her from continuing. ”  (23T101-12 to 16)  The following day, just before the jury was sworn, the judge called Juror 12 to sidebar to ask her what had come up.  (24T6-1 to 7)  Juror 12 stated, Yesterday on my way home I had a conversation with my husband.  He found out, a friend of ours told him that I was potentially serving on this trial.  Apparently one of the jurors that was excused early on is a friend of that, friend of ours, gave him all the information about the trial and then described me.  . . .  And then the second part of that was my husband knows about this case because of his employment at the church in Freehold.  [(24T6-8 to 24)]  Further inquiry revealed that Juror 12’s husband knew about [...]’s murder because of her husband’s prior employment as a musician at the church in Freehold that [...]’s family attends, and that her husband personally knew some of [...]’s family members because Juror 12’s church “fellowshipped” with [...]’s family’s church “several times throughout the year. ”  (24T7-17 to 8-9)  Juror 12 said she also knew [...]’s family members herself because their churches “fellowship[ped] a lot,” although she said she did not know which of the members of [...]’s family’s church were [...]’s family members.  (24T9-2 to 7)
[brief] On March 26, 1996, as per a plea agreement defendant pleaded guilty to a single charge contained in [...].  On April 26, 1996, while released on bail pending sentencing, defendant was arrested and charged with the offenses contained in Ind.  #2.  On October 15, 1996, defendant was sentenced on [...] to a flat term of 5 years.  On May 22, 1997, as per a plea agreement defendant pleaded guilty to a single charge contained in [...].  On June 30, 1997, defendant was sentenced on [...] to a term of 7 years with a 3-year parole bar.  This sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on the conviction stemming from [...].  Absent specific findings by the court, the sentence on [...] was statutorily required to be served consecutive to [...].  Thus, the sentence imposed on [...] constituted an illegal sentence.
[brief] Da  Defendant-Appellant’s Appendix  1T – May 7, 2018 (Buccal Swab)  2T – June 21, 2018 (Buccal Swab)  3T – Sept. 24, 2018 (Buccal Swab)  4T – Oct. 11, 2018 (Buccal Swab)  5T – Oct. 26, 2018 (Buccal Swab)  6T – July 23, 2019 (Suppress. Mot.) 7T – Aug. 2, 2019 (Decision)  8T – Oct. 31, 2019 ([...]’s plea)
[brief] A.  **FDCPA’s Purpose and Structure. **  “In adopting the Act, […] Congress left no doubt that its purpose was to protect debtors from abuse and that Congress perceived a need for national uniformity to fulfill that goal. ”  *Rutgers-The State Univ. v. Fogel*, 403 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2008).
[brief] The trial court refused to apply *Shaw v. Shand*, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019), which limited the learned professional exemption to doctors and lawyers and those who qualify as learned based upon “extensive training and erudition. ”  The trial judge concluded that it was bound by *Plemmons* because that case was never explicitly overruled by the Appellate Division or New Jersey Supreme Court.  However, significant, recent Appellate and Supreme Court decisions support expanding the scope of the CFA, not contracting it further.
[directive] Within days 60 law state a in of case the Justice Criminal of Division or Prosecutor, the County appropriate to the Preliminary electronic prepare to means the with officers equip its to on capacity agency, enforcement portable similar or phones, tablets, smart computers, desktop (e.g., Reports Incident Enforcemenfi Law in agency, Each vehicles. police in installed computing devices similar or laptop or devices, for plan a develop shall Justice, Criminal of Division or Prosecutor County the with consultation Reports.  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary preparing Directive. of this issuance upon immediately operational become shall subsection  This 53 Page On-Call Report by Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary to Access Electronic 5,6.2 Prosecutors. and shall develop Criminal Justice of Division the and Office Prosecutor's  Each County general the capacity with attorneys and deputy prosecutors on-call assistant toequip aplan implement and Reports  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary transmit and edit, approve, read, receive, to Directive.  this to pursuant prepared Cause of Probable Affidavits electronic Directive.  this of upon issuance immediately operational shall become subsection
[brief] This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade. ”  Rb9.\footnote{Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.}  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.
[brief] In fact, [...] was not even aware of off-site contamination until after this lawsuit commenced, and as of the final day of trial, [...] still had not determined the extent of off-site contamination.  (6T102:12 to 103:5; 8T94:13 to 95:4.)  Between January 2022 and April 2022, [...] and [...] exchanged comments regarding the RIR.  (Pa2281-83; 4T188:22 to 190:2; 6T33:3 to 35:17.)  Notably, the deficiencies identified by [...] were largely consistent with those identified by Defendants’ former LSRP, [...], in November 2020 (which at that point had been hidden from [...] and the [...]).
[brief] On June 6, 2014, an alarm was broadcast by George Washington Bridge (GWB) [...] about a red Dodge Caravan driven by defendant, [...], with a Pennsylvania license plate, was wanted by police departments in Pennsylvania and Warren and Passaic Counties in New Jersey on suspicion of carjacking and possible abduction while armed.  (Da37 to 38).  Subsequently, the Totowa Police Department broadcast an alert for a possible arson involving a white Cadillac Escalade without a driver’s side front tire, driving on the rim.  (Da37).  [...] saw a Cadillac, which was driven by defendant, matching that description on I-95 north.  He followed it with his vehicle’s lights and siren on and, using the PA system, ordered defendant to stop but defendant ignored the order.  [...] radioed [...] and ordered him to set up at Post 10 to try to stop defendant.  [...] drove across the toll plaza with the car’s lights and sirens on but defendant drove the Cadillac into [...]’s vehicle and it hit the hydro cells of the toll lane.  The collision destroyed the barrels and the police car and injured [...].  (Da37).  --- 1  The Procedural History and Facts are combined for clarity.  Defendant travelled in and out of the toll lanes until he turned left onto eastbound 179th Street in New York City and into oncoming traffic.  He turned toward the officers' vehicle and collided with the front of a police car before hitting a wall. \(^2\)  Defendant jumped out of the car and ran away but was tackled and handcuffed by the officers.  (Da37; Da51 to 53).  He had deep lacerations to both arms which bled profusely and burns on his chest and back area.  EMS arrived and transported defendant to [...].  He was later transferred to [...].  Subsequently, defendant was arraigned in Manhattan without bail.  (Da37).  On June 23, ATF agents lodged a federal detainer against defendant for the crimes committed in Warren and Passaic Counties in New Jersey.
[brief] Jencks is Encompassed and Triggered by Rule 3:13-3 and Compelled the Production of the Sworn Statement  Prior to [...]’s Trial  The New Jersey Rules of Court memorialize and mandate the disclosure of Jencks material.  Specifically, Rule 3:13-3(b) provides that “[d]iscovery shall include exculpatory information or material. ”  However, even if this Court determines that [...]’ Sworn Statement is not exculpatory or “material,” the State was still obligated to produce it pursuant to Rule 3:13-3(b).  Rule 3:-13-3(b) provides that, in addition to “exculpatory information or material,” discovery “shall also include…record of statements, signed or unsigned…by co-defendants which are within the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor. ” (emphasis added).  Thus, the Rules of Court mandate the disclosure of a Sworn Statement by a testifying witness.  Notably, unlike Brady/Giglio the disclosure obligation is triggered regardless of whether the statement is “material” or not.  This conclusion was further emphasized by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  See State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 152 (1966); d. [...]’s Argument that the PCR Judge Failed to Consider the Sworn Statement as Giglio is Unopposed and Warrants Reversal
[brief] *Alexander v. Choate*, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985) (emphasis added; footnotes retained and hyperlinked – in Website version).  Per innumerable NJ cases, our Courts have demanded that the ADA and LAD be interpreted in lock step, except in cases in which the greater reach, remedies, and more liberal interpretation of the LAD are obvious.  As to LAD regulations, they are in “lock step” with the ADA Regs.  The LAD Regs generally lack the rich detail and many examples in the ADA Regs.  Despite this, it’s clear the LAD is more demanding about accommodations.  This Complaint seeks to bring the LAD into line with ADA Title II so plaintiffs can sue the State as an employer of Managers and Agents who discriminate.  Accommodations are not an issue in this case except denial of medication and counsel can be seen as very serious denials of accommodation.  Otherwise, it’s just discrimination or retaliation.  To state a claim under title II of the ADA or the LAD, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) that he is a (qualified) individual with a disability, (2) that he was discriminated against by being excluded from or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, and (3) the discrimination was because of the disability.
[brief] The trial court heard Respondents’ arguments, and gave Respondents an opportunity to file a sur-reply before ruling.  (1T13:4-48:22; 2T:5:25-6:22; 11:25-18:7; see Pt. 3.A infra).  The fact that the court below addressed the \(^1\) Appellant set forth the circumstances in which additional facts arose in opposition and reply submissions below in its Merits Brief (Db4).  website issue, making it part of the record on appeal, *per se* negates Respondents’ argument.  *See State v. Fuqua*, No. A-3149-17, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1773, at *61-62 (App. Div. Aug. 20, 2021) (Appellate Division is “obliged” to review an issue raised below “albeit belatedly” if it was “ruled upon by the trial court”), cert. denied 251 N.J. 211 (2022).  Respondents incorrectly rely upon N.J.Ct.R. 2:6-2 and *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co*, 62 N.J. 229 (1973) in support of their argument.  Rule 2:6-2 requires that an appellant identify “in parentheses at the end of the point heading the place in the record where the opinion or ruling in question is located[.]”  [...] complied with this Rule.  (Db18).  *Nieder* is inapposite because it addressed the age-old problem (not present here) of an appellant raising new facts on appeal which were “not presented to the trial court. ”\(^2\) 62 N.J. at 234.  Further cases cited by Respondents concern arguments raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief, and thus are inapposite.  *State v. Smith*, 55 N.J. 476 (1970); *Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Engrs.*, 337 N.J. Super 590 (App. Div. 2001).  Finally, N.J.Ct.R. 2:10-2, which allows “plain error” review of matters “not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court,” does not apply.  The *de novo* standard applies to all issues.
[brief] D.  Evidence Demonstrates that the Respondents Breached their Duty to [...] (Not Addressed Below).  The lower court did not reach the issue of the breach of the duty owed to [...] because the lower court incorrectly determined that an attorney-client relationship was not established.  Nonetheless, the facts of this case clearly demonstrate that breach of duty has been established.  New Jersey courts have held, “failure to file suit before the running of the period of the statute of limitations plainly constitutes malpractice where there is no reasonable justification shown therefor. ”  Hoppe v. Ranzini, 158 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1978).  The Respondents did not file the pleadings contesting [...]’s will within four months as required in Rule 4:85-1, and this constitutes malpractice.  Although the Law Firm has asserted that [...] did not tell them his father lived in Bergen County, the evidence demonstrates otherwise.  [...] knew his father lived with his sister, [...], and he knew she moved to Mahwah.  [...] testified that he told [...] her address.  By failing to file the lawsuit in the proper venue within the statute of limitations, the Law Firm breached its duty.  E.
[brief] The Court held, “[i]f, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, then no hearing is required. ”  *Ibid.*  Here, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a *Franks* hearing because defendant failed to point to any part of the affidavit, or any specific fact or group of facts, that he believes was intentionally fabricated or omitted such as to warrant a *Franks* hearing: “you have to show me that . . . the warrant was invalid for you to have some evidentiary hearing as to what [...] did or didn’t do.
[brief] (1a)  The Borough established evaluation criteria (after an internal deliberative process), which it then publicized—in the Borough’s own words—“to ensure transparency in the evaluation process and as previously stated, were discussed during various Subcommittee meetings as a means to direct the Subcommittee’s deliberations. ”  (74a).  The Borough, however, failed to use the Evaluation Sheet, and it is apparent that the different members of the Subcommittee applied different criteria and methodologies to reach their conclusions.  (74a-75a).  The Borough’s failure to adhere to the process it adopted renders the Borough’s adoption of the Resolution arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and not supported by credible evidence in the record.  That failure of process requires reversal by this Court and a remand ordering the Borough to evaluate the applications pursuant to the process it established.
[brief] In July 2017, [...] filed the Underlying Action, which initially alleged a single cause of action for defamation for conduct allegedly occurring in October 2015.  (Da60-63.)  Upon receipt of the complaint in the Underlying Action, [...] immediately spoke with his insurance agent, [...], who informed him in no uncertain terms that his policy with [...] (the “Policy”) would cover defense of the Underlying Action.  (Da207 at 11:20 to 12:18.)  I.
[brief] (R013a)  That is not a transaction with the Exchange; it is a payment on behalf of the individual subscriber—not the Exchange as a whole.  Unlike some other reciprocals, [...] does not enter into a “subscriber agreement” or an “AIF agreement” in addition to the POA.  Thus, the only agreement between [...] and each individual subscriber is that subscriber’s POA to which the Exchange is not a party.  [...]’s financial statements confirm that [...] does not actually charge the Exchange any fees.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS WERE NOT TIME-BARRED SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (Da46-51, 53-56) (Responsive to Defendant’s Points II and III.A, B, and D)  Defendants argue that the trial court erred (i) in finding that the parties entered into a Third Loan, (ii) in holding that pay-when-able loans are enforceable in New Jersey, and (iii) in failing to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as time-barred.  Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to present “probative evidence” of a distinct, Third Loan.  Db13.  Defendants argue only generally, without the support of any legal authority and in irreconcilable conflict with the record facts, that the Third Loan “is merely a continuation of the $330,000 Loan and the $50,000 Loan.  . . .”  Db13-14.  Defendant’s arguments are without merit.  The trial court made comprehensive, meticulous, and correct findings that (i) the parties entered into a distinct, Third Loan, which was a pay-when-able loan and which constituted a novation of the First and Second Loans; (ii) pay-when-able loans are enforceable in New Jersey and, thus, the statutory limitations period applicable to demand loans did not govern the Third Loan; and (iii) the limitations period with respect to the Third Loan began to accrue in late 2019 -- the earliest point in time that [...] knew or had reason to know that [...] had the ability to repay that Loan.  Da36-64.  The trial court’s findings should be affirmed. \footnote{In response to Defendant’s Point I, the standard of review applicable to each issue on appeal will be addressed within each Point below, as necessary.}