ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Trial counsel had not only misrepresented to the defendant that he interviewed and secured a witness from the Hilton Hotel in North Carolina, but he had also misrepresented to the trial judge who had inquired about this matter just a week prior to the trial when counsel was asked:  COURT: Well, then, I mean I assume you got somebody subpoenaed.  [...]: Well, Judge at this point in time, I can't say that I do, but I will make every effort, as soon as I'm leaving, going back to my office and—  COURT:  You had somebody in North Carolina that you're going to call as a witness.  I would assume that you would have—  [...]:  We made some contact and effort.  I just have to find out to what extent we've been successful and what the plan is.  I'm not ignoring it, believe me.  But there's one person that I have been working on.  COURT:  But I would have thought that if you had a witness from North Carolina, that you would have at least had that person on call.  (15T 152).  The defendant supported his claim with a certification from [...], a licensed private investigator who had reviewed defendant's case file and reported that he personally interviewed [...], a former employee of the Hilton Hotel in Charlotte, North Carolina, who stated that he worked for the Hilton Hotel in Charlotte, North Carolina from 2016 to 2017 as the director of the hotel's front office at the time.  Mr. McCullar further stated that he did not recall being contacted to testify, provide documentation and/or to produce any tangible evidence such as surveillance videos relating to a legal matter in the State of New Jersey.  (Da 132-133)  At the start of trial, defense counsel caught up in his own web of misrepresentations to the trial court attempted to call [...], an attorney presumably on behalf of the Hilton Hotel from Short Hills, New Jersey, and [...], an employee of the Hilton in Short Hills in lieu of the witnesses and video footage defendant requested from the Hilton Hotel in Charlotte, North Carolina.
[directive] (See WITH B. POSSESSION or A (1st Category Row 51 48 54 57 42 48 66 72 75 72 78 81  Significant 2C:35-5 use 42 48 51 36 42 45 60 66 69 66 72 75 II marijuana, 5 History OR 36 42 45 30 36 39 54 60 63 60 66 69
[brief] [...], if you could please go see if you can confer with your with your client just with regard to this witness’s testimony, and, to save us a multitude of additional trips, you could inquire about whether he wants to participate at all in any other events moving forward.  I think the plan was, having conferred with counsel off the record, that -- and in preparation of the jury charge we had a charge conference, which we'll then place some other things on the record later -- but there was the charge with regard to the defendant's election not to testify, which I would plan on giving.  I think, Counsel, that was your request, as well as the charge regarding the defendant's absence at trial for portions of it, which I will include.  So if you want to canvas any and all of those issues so that we don't have to have you continue to go back.  …
[directive] The Directive also promulgates a form Petition for Compassionate Release and a form order.  Specifically, N.J.S.A.  30:4-123.51e(d)(2) provides that if an inmate is diagnosed with a terminal condition, disease, or syndrome, or permanent physical incapacity, the Department of Corrections shall promptly issue a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release and provide a copy of the certificate to the inmate’s attorney or the Public Defender if the inmate does not have an attorney.  To grant compassionate release, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is so debilitated or incapacitated by the terminal condition, disease or syndrome, or permanent physical incapacity as to be permanently physically incapable of committing a crime if released and, in the case of a permanent physical incapacity, the established conditions under which the person would be released would not pose a threat to public safety.  See N.J.S.A. 30:4- 123.51e(f)(1).  The procedures to file a Petition for Compassionate Release are as follows:  1.  A Petition for Compassionate Release must be filed with a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(2).  If the Certificate is not filed with the petition, the court may summarily dismiss the petition.  Attorneys must file in eCourts.  Inmates who do not have an attorney may file through the Judiciary Electronic Documents Submission (JEDS), or can mail the documents to the Superior Court, Criminal Division in the county in which they were convicted.  The addresses for the Superior Court county courthouses can be found on the Judiciary’s website at https://www.njcourts.gov/public/courthouses.html.  ml  ADA ENSURING DOOR TO OPEN AN JUSTICE
[brief] Exh. P-1 – Direct Testimony of [...] (Need and System Reliability)  Exh. P-2 – Direct Testimony of [...] (Construction and Design, Site location and Alternatives)  Exh. P-3 – Map of Holmdel identifying location of transmission line as well as Zoning & environmental restrictions  Exh. P-4 – Overall Plan and Site Plan & Grading Plan  Exh. P-5 – Site Plan with Landscaping  Exh. P-6 – Truncated Transcript of Holmdel Zoning Board of Adjustment – Final Vote (October 25, 2018)  5.  [...] is serving notice and a copy of this filing, together with a copy of the annexed Exhibits being filed herewith, upon those individuals identified in the attached service list, including the Director, Division of Rate Counsel, the Director, Division of Law – Office of the Attorney General, and the Clerk of Holmdel Township.
[brief] While a person who is discriminated against because of their association with a member of a protected group can assert a LAD claim (see Berner v. Enclave Condo. Ass’n, 322 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div. 1999)), our courts have made clear that “the Legislature did not intend to establish a cause of action for any person other than the individual against whom the discrimination was directed. ”  Catalane v. Gillan Instrument Corp., 271 N.J. Super. 476, 500 (App. Div. 1994); see also L.W. ex. rel. L.G. v. Toms Rivers Reg’l Schs. Bd. Of Educ., 382 N.J. Super. 465, 500-01 (App. Div. 2005) (mother aggrieved by sexual orientation-based harassment of her son was not the functional equivalent of a member of that protected group as she was not discriminated against herself because of her association with her son).
[brief] New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. G.S., 447 N.J. Super. 539, 570 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Michels, N.J. Attorney Ethics, § 19:2-1(e) at 415 (2015) (quoting ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, R. 1.7 (2000)))³ (emphasis added).
[directive] Notice When Using BWCs Inside a Private Residence.  Prior to entering a private residence, a law enforcement officer shall notify the occupant that the occupant is being recorded by the BWC and, if the occupant requests the officer to discontinue use of the officer’s BWC the officer shall immediately discontinue use of the BWC unless the officer is actively engaged in investigating the commission of a criminal offense, or is responding to an emergency, or reasonably believes that the officer will be required to use constructive authority or force.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] This appeal arises from the trial court’s decision granting Plaintiff-Respondent [...]’s (“[...]”) motion for partial summary judgment in a commercial real estate contract dispute.  At issue is whether [...] was entitled to terminate the Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”) and recover its deposit from Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”) based on its receipt of what it deemed to be an non-compliant estoppel certificate.  The trial court’s ruling improperly rewrites the plain terms of the PSA, allowing [...] to terminate the agreement upon receiving a non-compliant estoppel certificate before the closing date.  This decision contradicts the unambiguous language of the PSA, under which termination is only permissible if [...] fails to deliver an acceptable estoppel certificate by the time of closing.  The PSA clearly establishes that the seller’s obligation to deliver an acceptable estoppel certificate is a condition precedent to closing, and that [...]’s termination rights are contingent upon the failure to meet this condition by the closing date.  The trial court’s interpretation improperly conflated the estoppel certificate with [...]’s due diligence rights, disregarding the clear separation between the two processes under the agreement.  This appeal seeks to reverse the trial court’s decision, restore the proper interpretation of the PSA's terms, and clarify that [...]’s right to terminate the agreement is strictly limited to the failure to deliver an acceptable estoppel certificate at closing, not upon receipt of an objectionable certificate prior to that date.
[brief] The matter stems from the Board’s proper denial of the Respondents’ amended application for Use Variance and Bulk Variance approvals.  The Respondents sought to develop 43,568 square feet of commercial/retail uses and 206 residential units, including 43 affordable rental units (2 of which are generated by the 9 townhomes on a separate property on [...] known as the “Applegarth Rd. Site”) on the property referred to as the “[...]” (the “Amended Application”) as memorialized in a written Resolution adopted on April 30, 2019 under Application No.: [...].
[directive] 1.  Movants concede the CJRA is constitutional but argue that continued detention raises potentially serious due process concerns.  The pretrial detention process is constitutional so long as it serves regulatory rather than punitive purposes.  But if pretrial detention under a regulatory scheme is significantly prolonged, a defendant’s confinement may become punitive.  Whether the length of detention violates due process in that way requires assessment on a case-by-case basis; due process is a flexible concept that does not necessarily set a bright line limit for length of pretrial confinement.  (pp. 10-11)
[brief] Union County Indictment No. [...] ........................................  Da1  Judgment of Conviction ........................................................................  Da3  Plea Form ..................................................................................................  Da6 August 23, 2022  Order denying Motion to Suppress.................................  Da13  Written decision denying Motion to Suppress..........................................  Da14  Certification of [...] in support of Motion to Compel ...............  Da41  Certification of [...] in support of Motion to Compel ..  Da43  Notice of Motion to Compel , January 13, 2023......................................  Da47  Biology Report .........................................................................................  Da49  Certification of [...] in support of Motion to Compel .............  Da55 July 6, 2023  Order granting Motion to Compel.......................................  Da59  Written decision granting motion to compel ...........................................  Da60  Notice of Appeal.......................................................................................  Da69  Video from [...]’s Body Worn Camera ..................... Da74  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) | 10 | | Maryland v. King, 569 U.S.  435 (2013) | 16, 17, 18| | Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (2007) | 16 | | State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501 (2020) | 11, 12 | | State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207 (2008) | 10 | | State v. Gathers, 449 N.J. Super. 265 (App. Div. 2017), aff’d, 234 N.J. 208 (2018) | 16, 17, 18| | State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39 (2011) | 11 | | State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2023) | 15 | | State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540 (2019) | 11 | | State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987) | 14 | | State v. O’Hagen, 189 N.J. 140 (2007) | 16, 17 | | State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) | 10 | | State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. 308 (App. Div. 2005) | 13 | | State v. Shannon, 222 N.J. 576 (2015) | 11, 14 | | State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244 (2022) | 8 | | State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002) | 11 | | State v. Sutherland, 231 N.J. 429 (2018) | 11, 14 | | U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) | 11 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **Statutes** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) | 2, 3 | | **Rules** | | | R. 1:38-3(c)(7) | 2 | | R. 2:6-1(a)(3) | 2 | | R. 3:9-3(f) | 3, 18, 19 | | **Constitutional Provisions** | | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7 | 10 | | U.S. Const. amend. IV | 10 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 10 |
[brief] [Da422].  But the Board disregarded this information after receiving correspondence from [...] on July 1, 2022 asserting that the changes to Hoboken’s zoning ordinance that preceded the filing of its application for development did not require it to proceed before the Board of Adjustment because prior to the adoption of the Ordinance, [...] had made the application to the CRB.  [...] claimed, without basis in law, that its application to the CRB was an application for development and it was protected it from changes in zoning under the Time of Application Rule, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 (“TOA Rule”) even though its actual application for development was filed months later and was still incomplete.
[brief] (Da203, ¶14).  contradicted by the written terms of the contract he signed and was not wholly extraneous to the writing.  Thus, the fraud exception to the Parol Evidence Rule was inapplicable.  *Id.* at 573. \(^5\)  Two decades after the *Filmlife* decision, this Court decided *Walid v. [...]*, 425 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2012).  The plaintiff in Walid alleged that the financial circumstances of the business he purchased were fraudulently misrepresented to him at the time of purchase.  *Id.* at 176-78.  The plaintiff also argued that the fraud in the inducement exception to the Parol Evidence Rule permitted him to present evidence of the claimed oral misrepresentations regarding financials.  This Court agreed, finding that the alleged oral misrepresentations regarding financials were an exception to the Parol Evidence Rule because such financials were not addressed in the contract the parties signed:  This case differs from *Filmlife*, where the plaintiff asserted it was entitled to receive the cash value of a trade-in vehicle on a new lease whereas the lease expressly provided that the trade-in value would be utilized as the capitalized cost reduction.  *Filmlife*, supra, 251 N.J. Super. at 573.  Here, by contrast, material misrepresentations were made to plaintiffs respecting the income of the business they were --- \(^5\)  The *Filmlife* court relied on the Appellate Division’s decision in *Winoka Village v. Tate*, 16 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 1951).  The defendant in *Winoka* claimed that a representative of the plaintiff’s landlord who sued him for unpaid rent pursuant to a written lease told him it was the policy of the landlord to forfeit one month’s deposit in the event the defendant had to move out before the end of his term, and nothing more would be required of him.  *Id.* at 332-33.  The defendant vacated the premises four months before the expiration of the lease and when sued, claimed fraud.  The Court rejected defendant’s claim because the contract expressly dealt with a tenant’s premature termination of his lease and the Parol evidence was barred.  purchasing and then in an effort to escape later liability for such misrepresentations, a contract was prepared with a general integration clause.  *Walid*, 425 N.J. Super. at 186.  The oral misrepresentations in *Walid* consisted of financial inflation of a business by forty-two to sixty-two percent (42% to 62%) and such financials were wholly extraneous to the contract the parties signed.  Id. at 176-78 (emphasis).  The factual circumstances of this appeal are similar to *Filmlife*, not *Walid*.
[brief] ” (Da 46).  She noticed his “breathing sounded a little weird,” but appeared to return to normal after he sat down on the couch.  (Da 46).  [...] said [...] seemed tired at 7:20 pm that night, even though he typically did not go to bed until 8 pm.  (Da 48).  She put [...] to bed and he threw up, but she thought it was due to eating and drinking a lot in the period right before bedtime.
[brief] There is no rule or case law prohibiting a party from seeking to bring a new claim, previously unknown and unknowable, against parties who were previously dismissed with prejudice prior to the discovery of said new claim.  The erroneous dismissal of the prior claims against [...] in the 2015 Action was not a “global” dismissal in the way that settlements can be “global” and settle even claims that were unknown at the time of settlement.  Instead, a dismissal only applies to known or knowable claims at the time of the dismissal.  Plaintiffs’ new claims against [...] were not known, could not have been known, and therefore were not pled at the time of the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ previous claims.  Said claims may be filed once discovered despite a previous dismissal with prejudice of prior, distinct claims.
[brief] In its discussion of the concept of a right of first refusal, our courts have stated that the right may vary depending on how the parties have structured it.  A contract granting a right of first refusal may take various forms, including the type at issue here which contemplates a bona fide third party offer as the triggering event.  Mazzeo v. Kartman, 234 N.J.Super. 223, 229 (App. Div. 1989).
[brief] See Certification par. 19, 20, & 25 (167a-169a), and key paragraphs below:  21.  Court disregarded Exceptions (Exh. “L”, p. 11-13, par. 9) (119a-121a) to [...]'s explanations in Aug. 4, 2022 responses (Exh. “J”) (92a-93a) to Audit question for $74,248 C&D legal fees that proved they were "insufficient, misleading, false, or not relevant for [...]", since billed C&D work to Trust was for services contractually made on behalf of [...], & NOT the Trust, for the [...], [...], incl. my past Appeals.  My Exceptions (p. 11-13, par. 9) (119a-121a) rejected [...]'s insufficient & misleading/false explanations for possible Trust work as not credible nor valid, or were for legal work in 2022 after C&D’s billed work thru Dec. 31, ‘21.  Based on [...]’s Aug. 4, ‘22 letter (Exh. “I”, p. 3-4) (86a-87a), all described C&D billed work thru Dec. 31, ‘21 was for Estate [...].
[brief] In support for this conclusion, the Court carves out only a portion of one of [...]’s several answers regarding the photographs and quotes:  “I mean, it looks like it happens very, very quickly, but there’s no visual abrupt edge like the edge of the deck, the concrete deck, that you cannot see, so something is up there butted up against it.  This would not meet any standards for tapers, asphalt tapers. ” (Pa2164).  However, for reasons that cannot be explained, the Trial Court appears to intentionally omit a very important portion of [...]’s testimony; the initial sentence in response to the question.
[directive] Recruitment and Selection  3.1.1  Selecting and appointing the highest quality individuals to serve as law enforcement officers must be a priority of every law enforcement agency.  During the selection process, written tests, psychological tests, background investigations and individual interviews should be completed by each candidate in an attempt to identify those who would be best suited for law enforcement employment.  Background investigations must include a review of the prior internal affairs files of any candidate.  3.1.2
[brief] And, in that regard, it is of no import that the underlying complaint is not one based in tort.\(^3\)  Whether it be in tort or a prerogative writ, the [...] is still being sued because it acted in a law enforcement capacity pursuant to and at the direction of the superseding authority of the [...].  It is being sued, in the place of the [...].  Coverage by the state is in keeping with the underlying purpose of having the state defend and identify a county prosecutor when they take on the role of the [...] in a law enforcement capacity.
[brief] D.  AOC 26  AOC 26 is an area inside Building 1 where the pit degreasers that discharged to AOC 22 were located.  (Pa0129).  The pit degreasers in Building 1 were first used in 1965 or 1966.  (Id).  CVOCs, including PERC, TCE, and TCA were released in AOC 26 and caused property damage during [...]’s policy period.  (Id).  E. AOC 30  AOC 30 in the location of a former degreaser pit in the floor of Building 6.  (Pa0422; Pa0129).  The degreaser located in AOC 30 was first used in 1966 and was removed in 1970.  (Pa0129).  Although solvents, including PERC, TCE, and TCA have been detected in the soil and soil gas, AOC 30 is not a significant source of groundwater contamination.  (Pa0428-29; Pa0249-50; Pa0255).  VI.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I PLAINTIFFS’ SUIT AGAINST FRALINGER WAS FRIVOLOUS (2T Hearing, 10/20/2023) (Pa000637) (Pa000926)  A.  PLAINTIFFS HAD PRE-SUIT KNOWLEDGE THAT FRALINGER MODIFIED THE SITE PLANS TO EXCLUDE THE PROPERTY FROM THE REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT  In their Complaint, filed on September 8, 2021, Plaintiffs brought the following allegations against [...]: (1) negligence, arising out of the design of the initial site plans, which “upon information and belief” included the soil erosion and sedimentation control fencing as well as the inclusion of the entire vacated Church Lane into the redevelopment project; and (2) trespass.
[brief] ”).  11  We note that the trial judge did instruct the jury on in-court identifications.  See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “In-Court Identification Only” (rev. July 19, 2012).  Additionally, we note that defendant does not contend that police violated the procedures for administering a photo-array identification procedure as prescribed in Henderson, or that an out-of-court identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive.  See supra note 2.  12  We note that since the trial, the Model Jury Charge has been revised.  See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Identification: In-Court and Out-of-Court Identifications” (rev. May 18, 2020).  Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  UNPUBLISHED OPINION.  CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.  Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
[brief] (Da2543).  This was months after documents were to be produced.  (Pa79; Da2542-Da2543).  [...] acted quickly upon learning what happened by filing his motion to amend just two months after learning about the criminal complaint.  (Pa1-Pa2).  noted that twenty months had passed between the dismissal of the original complaint and the filing of the amended complaint, which “provided a sufficient ground” to dismiss the amended complaint.  Id. at 232.  Here, unlike Young, there are no distinct factual occurrences or contradictory allegations.  Instead, the trial court correctly found the facts central to the libel per se claim arose out of the same ongoing property dispute as the original complaint.  (1T32:8-1T33:5).  Indeed, Defendants and [...] filed the false criminal complaint because (1) [...] and the [...] were “incensed” and “furious” over the property dispute issues, and (2) Defendants discussed how the existence of a criminal complaint would undermine the [...]’ chances in the property dispute.