ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa11; Pa64-66).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  Although these additional methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.  (Pb11-12).  The record demonstrates that the postcard was mailed on August 9, 2021.  (Pa14; Pa64-66).  That slight delay in mailing the postcard is immaterial, as postcard notification was not required under the Ricci Act, and information about the Ricci Act was prominently posted on the Division’s website and publicly available for two years from the effective date of the statute.
[brief] The court also finds, for the foregoing reasons, that, due to the Defendant’s criminal history, the particular facts of this case, and the legislative intent behind the certain persons statute, the aggregate thirty-year sentence is fair to the interests of justice and to the Defendant.  [(Da51). ]  The sentencing court first found that guideline 3A of Yarbough, that “the crimes and their objectives [are] predominantly independent from one another, applied to the present circumstances.  (Da46).  The court went through an extensive analysis of its reasons for applying factor 3A noting “the certain persons crime is inherently distinct and separate from the robbery itself, and the objectives are distinct and separate from one another – the objective for the former is general and that for the latter is subjective. ” (Da46).  The court gave that factor “hefty weight” in support of consecutive sentencing.  (Da46).  The court next went through the facts of the case, specifically finding, “[n]othing in the record suggests that Defendant obtained the handgun in order to carry out a robbery at the [...].
[brief] Defendants argue that the Court should ignore the federal cases on all fours with the case at bar and, instead, look to only the unpublished cases from the Superior Court that support their position.  However, that is not how federal statutes are interpreted in the absence of binding precedent—the Court should look to the reasoning of the lower federal courts analyzing this issue.  Lastly, though not raised by Plaintiff on appeal (or significant enough to be addressed by the trial court), Defendants argue that “[t]he government cannot enact a statute voiding debt.  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . precludes such action . . . [a]ccordingly, a judgment obtained by an unlicensed debt buyer is not void. ”
[brief] As the PCR Court Judge appropriately recognized, “Trial Counsel sought dismissal of the case for the State’s failure to preserve the videos.  Trial Counsel merely did not make the argument Petitioner believes should have been made…”  Da325.  As discussed supra, counsel’s strategic decisions are not to be questioned where they are within the purview of his or her determinations and they are made with full knowledge and investigation of the underlying facts.  “Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. ”  Strickland, at 690.  Courts may not “second-guess counsel’s reasonable adoption of one of the countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. ”  State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 153 (1991).  The strategic decision on the part of defense counsel as to one of the countless ways to provide effective assistance in navigating this issue does not become error or ineffectiveness simply because it did not produce the required result.  5.
[brief] Over three decades ago, the Supreme Court in the Abbott v. Burke litigation found public school students in Jersey City and other “poorer urban” or “Abbott” districts had endured a violation of their constitutional right to a thorough and efficient (“T&E”) education that was “clear, severe, extensive, and of long duration. ”  After two failed attempts by the Defendants-Respondents (“State”) to remedy that violation, the Court was compelled to craft and impose judicial remedies to vindicate the students’ constitutional rights.  Then, in 2009, the Court ruled that the State’s third remedial funding formula, the School Funding Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -63 (“SFRA”), could provide constitutionally-adequate funding for Jersey City students provided the State met two conditions: 1) fully fund the formula in its first three years; and 2) thereafter, rigorously review and adjust the formula, as needed, to keep the SFRA operating at its "optimal level" on a continuing basis in future years.
[brief] By giving exclusive authority over variance review to the zoning boards, the New Jersey Legislature evidenced its intent that the governing body and other municipal officials should not interfere with or influence the zoning board's decision.  Stated another way, the Legislature did not intend that an official like the Mayor could lead a public charge against and application, infringe on the prerogatives of the zoning board and instruct it how to rule on variance applications.  In their briefs, Defendants disregard that law and they mischaracterize the legal standards applicable to the Mayor's actions.
[brief] ...........  24  Martinez v. LVNV Funding LLC, BER-L-003515-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.) ........................................  4  Mauro v. Mauro, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1437 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2014)  .............................................................................................................  18  Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 396, 403 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1958) ......................... 17, 18-19 N.A.R., Inc. v. Ritter, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1313 (App Div. June 24, 2024) .........
[brief] The reasons the Board gave for its determination that [...] failed to make the requisite showing of the special reasons/positive criteria for a d(1) use variance under N.J.S.A.40:55D-70, more specifically that Lot 5 is "particularly suitable" for the proposed development are record-based and rationale.  The Trial Court thus properly found that the Board’s denial of the Application was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious.
[brief] 27  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | **State Cases** | | | Aldrich v. Schwartz, | 25 | | 258 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1992) | | | Cesare v. Cesare, | 15 | | 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) | | | D'Agostino v. Maldonado, | 15 | | 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013) | | | Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman, | 20 | | 244 N.J. Super. 104, 108 (App. Div. 1990) | | | Garden of Memories v. Forest Lawn Mem'l Park Ass’n, | 20 | | 109 N.J. Super. 523, 534-35 (App. Div. 1970) | | | Gnall v. Gnall, | 15 | | 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) | | | Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Wall, | 23 | | 184 N.J. 562, 587-88 (2005) | | | Island Venture Assocs. v. NJ DEP; | 19 | | 179 N.J. 485, 493 (2004) | | | Mannillo v. Gorski, | 26 | | 54 N.J. 378, 386-87 (1969) | | | Martindell v. Fiduciary Counsel, | 22 | | 133 N.J. Eq. 408, 413 (1943) | | | Palmarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, | 18 | | 80 N.J. 446, 453 (1979) | | Patton v. N. Jersey Water Supply Comm’n, 93 N.J. 180, 185 (1983)
[brief] Vanrell’s accident and third-party suit.  On January 10, 2018, Plaintiff [...] was stopped at an intersection when she was rear-ended.  (Pa50–Pa52).  [...], the tortfeasor, told the responding officers that she could not stop because “her tires [were] bad. ” (Pa51).  The impact caused Vanrell to suffer serious and permanent injuries, including a cervical herniation and radiculopathy.  (Pa16).  Moore’s [...] policy included liability coverage up to $50,000 per person.  (Pa110).  Thus, Vanrell’s policy with [...] should have provided her with up to $250,000 in UIM coverage.  (Pa55, Pa91–Pa92).  Vanrell eventually sued Moore for her personal injuries, leading to a third-party settlement.  (Pa109).  III.
[brief] The defective special meeting notice sent to the [...] by e-mail on December 28, 2021, to “advertise” the January 11, 2022, special reorganization meeting instructed the recipients not to publish by prefacing the notice with instructions that it was for “YOUR RECORD ONLY,” with all capitals in the original.  Following the Borough’s directive, notice of the meeting was never published, but the meeting was held.  The December 28th notice continued a years’ long policy of sending notices to newspapers of Council and Planning Board special meetings that violated the Open Public Meetings Act.  The notices not only instructed the recipients not to publish, they were often sent too late to publish at least 48 hours before the meeting or were sent to only to one newspaper.  All of the special meeting notices in the Record violated one of more of the notice requirements of the OPMA, including the omission of access information for remotely held meetings, the omission of an agenda, and the failure to inform whether formal action would be taken.  The Borough's Designated Newspapers
[brief] (Not Raised Below)**  The prosecutor violated numerous prohibitions on prosecutorial argument.  He essentially testified to new facts in summation, both about the surveillance videos and about [...]’s plea deal.  He misrepresented the evidence to bolster [...]’s claims.  He personally vouched for [...]’s credibility and for the thoroughness of the police investigation.  And he unnecessarily injected emotion into the trial, including by comparing [...] to the notorious mobsters in the hit film “Goodfellas. ”  Individually and collectively, those improper comments denied [...] a fair trial and require reversal.  *U.S. Const.* amends.  VI, XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10; R. 2:10-2.  A prosecutor’s duty is “to seek justice, not merely to convict. ”  *Garcia*, 245 N.J. at 435 (citation omitted).  “Because prosecutors hold a position of great prestige with jurors, [t]heir statements . . . have a tendency to be given great weight by jurors. ”  *State v. Greene*, 242 N.J. 530, 553 (2020) (citation omitted).  Therefore, “[i]t is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. ”  *State v. McNeil-Thomas*, 238 N.J. 256, 275 (2019) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).  Thus, even where the defense does not object, appellate courts “must” reverse where a prosecutor’s conduct deprives the defendant of his “fundamental right to have the jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. ”  *Garcia*, 245 N.J. at 436-37.  **A.  The Prosecutor Essentially Testified in Summation About Several Previously Unexplored Portions of the Surveillance Videos, Depriving Defendant of His Right to Cross-Examine Those Claims.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 177.  The court further explained:  While [plaintiff’s] counsel makes assertions that [defendant] is a large international corporation with bargaining power superior to [plaintiff], [plaintiff] has presented no competent proofs as to the disparate size between [plaintiff] and [defendant].  No proofs were presented to the court as to the sophistication of the parties or the respective financial positions of the parties.  Nor have any proofs been submitted to the court that [plaintiff] is an unsophisticated entity or is of limited financial means.  Further, no evidence has been submitted to the court that unfair bargaining tactics were used.  Mere assertions of counsel are not sufficient for the court [to] find the existence of procedural unconscionability.
[brief] *Ibid.*  “[T]he latest in time of those crimes or the date of the defendant’s last release from confinement, whichever is later,” must be within ten years “of the date of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced. ”  *Ibid.*  When evaluating whether a defendant is a “persistent offender,” courts examine a defendant’s criminal record and their age when they were previously convicted, “facts that the State asserts are the ‘who, what, when and where’ of those prior convictions and that do not entail any additional findings related to the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.
[brief] Defendants argue: “No injustice, let alone grave damage, will result from the order permitting the Defendants' IME to proceed in the ordinary course of practice consistent with the standards of neuropsychology,” (Db13,) but Defendants did not establish recording the exam would be inconsistent with the standards of psychology.  See DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 240 (noting “that [...], one of the neuropsychologists in this case, did not oppose the presence of a neutral third-party observer or a recording at DiFiore's DME” and Attorney General’s concession that the Board of Psychology never adopted a regulation as to the ABN Policy Statement).  As the Supreme Court noted in this case, [...], a neuropsychologist, permitted recording.
[brief] (“Plaintiffs”) continue to mischaracterize the history of this matter in an attempt to portray their actions as anything but frivolous.  Most significantly, they continue to misstate the trial court’s ruling on [...] (“[...]”)’s first motion for summary judgment, handed down on May 22, 2022.  (Pa000465).  This ruling did not allow Plaintiffs to bypass the Affidavit of Merit requirement and maintain whatever “common knowledge” claim they could invent after the close of discovery.  Rather, as [...] very clearly explained, “if there’s an allegation here that [...] directed certain materials to be placed on the plaintiff’s property during the course of construction,” these claims could move forward absent an Affidavit of Merit.  (Pa000446).  Upon pushback from counsel for [...], [...] clarified that “if [...] directed contractors to place materials onto plaintiff’s property during the construction stage or directed the…erection of the fencing, or…trespassed upon plaintiff’s property knowingly,” then Plaintiffs could pursue these claims absent an Affidavit of Merit.  (Pa000468).  In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge referred to the preliminary site plans drafted by [...], which proposed (1) the development of paved parking spaces, and (2) a new location for dumpsters on the Property.  (Pa000446).  The plans did not direct any remediation activities.  Reading [...]’s decision at oral argument in its entirety, it is obvious that the only reasonable interpretation of his holding is that Plaintiffs could only maintain a cause of action against [...] if they could show that [...] was actually responsible for directing the other parties to place construction materials onto the Property in connection with the parking lot improvements contemplated by the original site plans.
[brief] The court, however, granted the motion based on the reasonable time limit contained in Rule 4:50- 1(f) expressly, “for any other reason.  . .”  Rule 4:50-1(f) was unavailable because plaintiff’s motion was admittedly based on a “mistake” under -1(a).  R.4:50-2 applies to all parties including the plaintiff here.  Plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint should have been denied.
[brief] The State’s alternative argument — that [...] somehow “relinquished” his right to represent himself because he did not express continued dissatisfaction with appointed counsel — must also be rejected.  [...] told the court what he wanted, and the court’s refusal to rule on [...]’s request amounted to a denial of [...]’s request.  *Ibid.*  Parties do not need to repeatedly renew objections following a court’s denial in order to preserve that issue for appeal.  [...] made an application.  The court improperly denied that application without holding the required hearing.  [...] is now appealing that improper, summary denial.
[brief] So long as those decisions are in accordance with law, factually supported, and not arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith, they are entitled to judicial deference. ”  Id. at 260.  Because [...] has designated the Property as an area in need of redevelopment in 2017 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5 and adopted an accompanying redevelopment plan in 2018 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7, the court below erred by overriding [...]’s decision to redevelop the Property for commercial purposes.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w razie przyznania się do winy w odniesieniu do oskarżenia o [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] kwalifikowaną napaść na tle seksualnym, napaść seksualną, kwalifikowany nielegalny kontakt seksualny lub nielegalny kontakt seksualny, jeżeli przestępstwo zostało popełnione 1 lipca 2002 r. lub później, sąd zasądzi karę grzywny w wysokości 100 USD?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact or criminal sexual contact and the offense occurred on or after July 1, 2002, the court shall impose a fine of $100?
[brief] Here, the designation of the Property as an area in need of redevelopment was a result, not the cause, of the depressed conditions of the Property.  The building was constructed in 1960 and was thirty-four years old by January 27, 1994.  And, [...] found as a matter of fact in his valuation decision that as of January 27, 1994, “[t]he [...] building is old, is below average condition and in need of deferred maintenance ([...] Report p. 18, 28) and grossly substandard in size for a supermarket. ”  And, by the time of the 2018 declaration of taking, it only got worse due to the [...] neglect.  The depreciation of value of the Property was not the result of the imminence of a prospective taking—which is the very evil these statutes are calculated to meet—but rather the result of market forces unrelated to the Township’s inclusion of the Property in an area declared in need of redevelopment.
[brief] INDEX TO BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................  6  POINT ONE: .........................................................  6  [...] ORDINANCE SECTIONS 900B AND 902A, AS AMENDED, ARE NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW, ARE ULTRA VIRES AND VOID (5T14 – 1 to 25; 5T15 – 1 to 8)  POINT TWO: .........................................................  11  [...] ORDINANCE SECTION 906  AUTHORIZING A DIRECT APPEAL OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION COMMISSION  DETERMINATIONS TO THE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW, IS ULTRA VIRES AND VOID (5T20 – 8 to 15)
[brief] Once the waivers are removed, the remainder of the arbitration agreement is enforceable).  Courts determine whether an otherwise valid contract is “unconscionable” based on the four factors established by our Supreme Court in Rudbart v. Water Supply Com’n, 127 NJ 344 (1992), and applied in Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware.  See Ruszala, 415 N.J. Super 272, at 287-88.
[brief] As part of the filed Answer to the Complaint, it demanded an Affidavit of Merit pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27*.  Plaintiff served Affidavits of Merit authored by [...], M.D. and [...], RN, respectively, but [...] objected to both and the Court subsequently deemed them deficient.  The submission of an appropriate Affidavit of Merit is an element of a professional malpractice claim.  *Meehan v. Antonellis*, 226 N.J. 216, 228 (2016).  An Affidavit of Merit is required when the plaintiff’s claim of vicarious liability hinges upon allegations of deviation from professional standards of care by licensed individuals who worked for the named defendant.  *Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc.*, 250 N.J. 368, 381 (2022).  Generally, an Affidavit of Merit should identify the licensed person who allegedly deviated from the acceptable standard of care.  See Medeiros v. O’Donnell & Naccarto, Inc., 347 N.J. Super. 536, 542 (App. Div. 2002).  At the very least, it must be possible to identify, by the description within the Affidavit of Merit, the licensed person or entity alleged to have deviated from the applicable standard of care.  Hargett v. Hamilton Park OPCO, LLC, 477 N.J. Super. 390, 397-98 (App. Div. 2023).
[brief] Da1.  In an alternative ruling, [...] found that the settlement of the underlying case was “reasonable” under the standards of *Griggs v. Bertram*, 88 N.J. 347 (1982).  That ruling is not a subject of this appeal.  If the October 17, 2019 ruling is reversed, because Appleman’s rule does in fact apply to CGL coverage, then the efficient proximate cause of [...]’s injuries is the covered cause of water intrusion and the mold exclusion will not preclude coverage.  In that case, this matter should be remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of [...], subject to his claims for interest and attorneys’ fees.  The same is true if the challenged May 24, 2023 rulings are reversed.
[brief] Letter dated May 4, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for June 23, 2021  Letter dated June 24, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for July 20, 2021  Letter dated June 24, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for July 20, 2021  Letter dated July 21, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for August 17, 2021  Letter dated August 2, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for August 25, 2021  Letter dated August 19, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for September 22, 2021  Letter dated May 15, 2020 from [...] to [...] regarding investigating
[brief] (Pa182-83; T4-9).  The trial court made the following findings:  •  “Factually it is important to note that [...] is not adverse to the State or the Attorney General.  [...] represents the State, and in particular the [...], the [...], [...], and [...], and the individual defendants.  It’s important to recognize who the actual parties in interest are.  These entities are not part of the Attorney General’s Office and are not factually connected to anything having to do with the indictment. ”  (T6-7).