ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE THEFT CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JURY DID NOT SPECIFY THE AMOUNT STOLEN.  (Not Raised Below)  Count 5 of the indictment charge [...] with third-degree theft of moveable property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a).  (Da 6)  The court appropriately instructed the jury as to all elements of the offense and provided a supplemental instruction on the grading of theft offenses.  (8T 125-5 to 129-5)  However, the court did not ask the jury to return a finding on the element of the amount involved in the theft.  Neither the verdict sheet nor the jury’s reporting of its verdict in court established what amount it found that [...] had stolen.  (Da 16; 11T 12-20 to 22)  The law is clear that “[t]he amount involved in a theft or computer criminal activity shall be determined by the trier of fact. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(4).  The “amount of the theft constitutes an element of the offense” and must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J. Super. 595, 606-07 (App. Div. 1987) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(4)).  Here, while the jury unanimously found that [...] committed some form of theft, the jury did not make any finding as to the amount of that theft.  Without a jury verdict on this essential element of the theft offense, [...]’s third-degree theft conviction cannot stand.  State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 291 (1989) (“[T]here is simply no substitute for a jury verdict. ”).  The theft conviction should be reversed.
[brief] •  **Count 13**: Respondents [...], [...], [...], and [...] violated *N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)* because they “are taking private action as part of [...]\(^6\) to literally manipulate the Board,” and *N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g)* because they have “grossly distorted the narrative around this referendum, and [have] actively started deleting their social media presence in an attempt to hide their membership and leadership within this special interest group.
[brief] In the DEP’s rulemaking document for the proposed amendments to the WQM rules, the DEP explained:  As proposed at N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b) through (d), WQM plan consistency will be evaluated when a project or activity seeks a permit from the Department.  At the time of permit application, the Department will determine if the project or activity requiring centralized sewer service is located in a sewer service area.  If so, there is a rebuttable presumption that the project or activity is consistent with the areawide plan.  If a WQM plan has additional requirements, or a wasteload allocation in an adopted TMDL has been established, these must also be addressed in order for the proposal to be consistent.
[brief] Based upon the foregoing, Respondent respectfully submits the Superior Court’s decision must be upheld.  [...]  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  [...]  By: ____________________________  [...]  Date: December 8, 2023  [...]  Attorney I.D. #043052012  [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  Attorneys for Appellants  [...], [...] (husband), Appellants, v. TOWNSHIP OF UNION; [...] d/b/a [...]; JOHN DOE 1-10 (a fictitious name), RICHARD ROE 1-10 (a fictitious name), ABC CORPORATION 1-10 (a fictitious corporation), XYZ CORPORATION 1-10 (a fictitious corporation)
[brief] This occurs because SFRA’s formula uses the LFS to determine the State’s share of funding the Adequacy Budget.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F–52(a); (Pa913, ¶¶ 20-22; Pa1001, ¶ 56 to Pa1002, ¶ 57.)  Between 2008-09 and 2019-20, the State share of Adequacy Budget funding decreased by 46%, from $277,591,645 to $148,837,309.  (Pa913, ¶¶ 20-22; Pa915, ¶ 32; Pa930, ¶153; see generally Pa915-Pa926.)  As the expected share of local funding for the Adequacy Budget increased through the annual LFS calculation, the State’s share went down, contributing to a structural deficit in the total state and local revenue needed to fund the cost of educating District students at the Adequacy Budget level.
[brief] Further, since 2005, the Borough’s Tax Map has shown the --- 6  In 2022, Lot 2.01 was subdivided into four separate lots – Lots 2.02, 2.03, 2.04, and 2.05 – but such subdivision is not relevant to the instant action and therefore is being disregarded for purposes of this analysis.  (Da59 at ¶ 7, fn3.)  Roads as public streets that are not part of any tax lot, and has depicted the lots (subject to the minor revisions to dimensions) as set forth in Da175.
[brief] On or about April 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.  As set forth in Defendant’s “Addendum to Amended Notice of Appeal”, the only Orders under consideration relevant to money damages awarded were the June 27, 2017 Order of Judgment and the March 6, 2018 Order (misidentified --- \(^2\)  The March 23, 2018 Statement of Reasons misidentifies Plaintiff as Defendant and Defendant as Plaintiff.  The parties do not dispute the intent of the Trial Court’s opinion. as a March 8, 2018 Order).  (Da842)  Although entered before Defendant moved to amend its 2017 Appeal on April 18, 2018, Defendant did not appeal the March 26, 2018 Order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.  Id. 11.  In the days following the February 14, 2018 OTSC hearing and following the Trial Court’s entry of the March 6, 2018 and March 26, 2018 Orders, Defendant continued to permit the drop off of children either on or in front of the [...], and the children continued to ingress and egress the school through the [...] and parked cars during religious services.  This despite the court ordered prohibition against doing so and despite the availability of the [...] for student access.  (Da300-440)  12.
[directive] 1, L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Jan. 1962.  :5-2.  Definitions  40A :5-2.  As used in this chapter and any act amendatory to and supplementary thereto unless the 40A context indicates otherwise:  "local unit" means any county, municipality, special district or any public body corporate and politic created or established under any law of this State by or on behalf of any one or more counties or municipalities, or any board, commission, department or agency of any of the foregoing having custody of finds, but shall not include a school district; "governing body" means the governing body of a county or the commission, council, board or body having control of the finances of a municipality or any other local unit as defined herein; "chief financial officer'' means, except in the case of a municipality, the director of revenue and finance, comptroller, treasurer, collector or other financial officer of a local unit.  In the case of a municipality, the chief financial officer means the person appointed pursuant to section 5 of P.L.1988, c.110 (C.40A:9-140.10); in the case of a county, the chief financial officer means the person appointed pursuant to section 4 of P.L. 1993, c.87 (C.40A:9-28.4); or "chief executive officer" means the county executive, county manager, county supervisor president of the board of chosen freeholders, as appropriate to the form of government of a county, or the mayor, of manager or commissioner, as appropriate to the form of govemment a municipality, or the chairman, president, director or other chief executive officer of any other local unit; "warrant" means the draft or check of any local unit used in warranting disbursement of moneys and no In shall, in every instance, be evidenced by the issuance of a check of the local unit.  instance shall it be necessary for the local unit to refer to, or issue, a check separate and distinct from the warrant; "check" means the instrument by which moneys of any local unit are disbursed.  -- -  Amended 1983,c.%,s.+; 1991 ,c. 175,s. 15; 1993,c.87,~,8.
[brief] The Authority's denial was not --- ⁷  The loading area design standards under the Authority’s regulations, *N.J.A.C.* 19:66-7.3, offer guidance to the Authority in undertaking its site plan review.  Relevant here, where a loading area is proposed, the location of a proposed loading area should consider the “[s]afe and efficient layout” and “[p]edestrian and vehicular circulation. ”  *N.J.A.C.* 19:66-7.3(a)(3)(i) and (iii).  Additionally, “[a]ll entrances and exits to loading areas shall be located in a safe and convenient manner with minimal impact on traffic movement on the site and adjacent streets. ”  *Id.* at (iv).  ⁸  Pursuant to *R.* 1:36-3, a copy of this Court’s unpublished decision in *Last Frontier v. Blairstown Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, No. A-5205-08 (App. Div. May 24, 2010) is included in Respondent’s Appendix at Ra1-Ra7. due to a general increase of traffic or traffic conditions on [...], but the safety of the ingress and egress to the site.
[directive] Notice When Using BWCs with a Person Seeking to Remain Anonymous.  When interacting with a person seeking to anonymously report a crime or assist in an ongoing law enforcement investigation, a law enforcement officer shall notify the person that they are wearing a BWC and, if the person requests that the officer discontinue use of the BWC, the officer shall evaluate the circumstances and, if appropriate, discontinue use of the BWC.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement officer pursuant to this Section and the response to the request shall be recorded by the recording system prior to discontinuing use of the recording system.
[brief] (T1, 3:9-4:19).  As a result, [...] decided to shift its approach to allow limited warehousing in strategic locations in order to encourage the construction of tax ratables.  (T1, 4:19-5:7).  Lack of sewer and the cost to extend the same have also been a limiting factor for development within the Township of smaller development projects and adoption of the Redevelopment Plan allows [...] to tie into the new extension of the sewer system in [...] and coordinate redevelopment efforts with them.  (T1,7:17-9:18).  On April 18, 2023, [...] adopted Ordinance 13-2022, which adopted the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa89-91).  Prior to adoption of Ordinance 13-2022, on April 8, 2022, [...] published a notice stating that “Ordinance No. 13-2022 – An Ordinance of the Mayor and Township Committee of the Township of [...], County of Gloucester Adopting a Redevelopment Plan for Block 46, Lot 2; Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01, 4 in the Township of [...]” was introduced on April 4, 2022. and would be considered for adoption on April 18, 2022.  (Pa89 & Pa14, ¶18).  It further stated that copies of the Ordinance were on file in Clerk’s Office.  (Pa89).  After adoption of the ordinance, notice of adoption was published on April 27, 2022 in the [...].  (Pa14, ¶22).  ---  2  References to “T1” are to the Transcript of the April 18, 2022 [...] Township Committee Meeting and references to “T2” are to the May 11, 2023 Trial Court Hearing in this case.  **Actions to Implement the Redevelopment Plan**
[brief] Defendant also argues that the use of GPS monitoring, in and of itself, was a violation of his reasonable expectation of privacy (Db13, Da26-30).  In making this argument, he relies on concurrent opinions in Jones.  But those opinions are not relevant.  Jones involved a situation in which the installed GPS was not supported by a warrant.  565 U.S. at 413.  The central question was whether such an installation was a search.  *Id.* at 402.  All justices agreed that it was because it amounted to physical trespass, but some concurrent justices went further and held that it was an invasion of privacy in addition to trespass.  *Id.* at 411-27.  No one held that reasonable expectation of privacy may not be overcome with a warrant.  And because a warrant was involved in this case, the concurrences do not avail defendant.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *Olds. V. Donnelly*, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997).  *Olds* dictates that “all attorney malpractice actions” are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine.  *Id.* at 442.  Accordingly, since a legal malpractice action is not required to be joined with pending litigation, it cannot consider an action subject to joinder under R. 4:5-1(b)(2).
[brief] 1.  [...]’s opposition to discrimination and retaliation and the 2015 Written Warning that followed are facts upon which a jury could conclude they were retaliatory (Pa837; 3T)  The events related to the first disciplinary action brought against [...] – the 2015 Written Warning – began on October 20, 2014 when [...] sent [...] a speaker request form to make a presentation at the American Waterworks Association annual seminar to be held on November 6, 2014 and [...], [...] and others were copied on his email.  (Pa504-Pa506; Pa655).  [...] unilaterally decided Alan [...] “can’t attend and can’t present” on behalf of the [...] but that Alan could present “on [his] own time” and because this email authorized Alan [...] to present on his own time, he was placed on the agenda to speak.  (Pa655).  Alan [...] had earlier reported to [...] that [...] engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory conduct including stating, in the presence of [...] and [...], that [...] should not attend a 2014 conference because [[...]] was too old. ”  Alan [...] further reported that [...] objected by stating out loud to that [...] “did not really mean to suggest that [Alan [...]] was too old to attend a conference” and [...] persisted and insisted that is “exactly what she meant. ”  (Pa659).  Alan [...] reported the comment to [...], the Director and [...]’s supervisor and made an EEO complaint that [...] was told in November of 2014 was being referred to the [...] EEO office.  (Pa660).  On November 17, 2014, [...]’s complaint of age discrimination and retaliation was sent to the [...] EEO office ([...]) for handling by the [...] Office of Labor Relations responsible for discipline ([...]).
[brief] Suburban Disposal, Inc., 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1186 at *15.  After citing this statute, the court applied the River Vale test and determined that the bidder’s submission of the expired registration certificate did not deprive the public entity of adequate assurances because the bidder was unquestionably registered at the time of bidding (like [...] was unquestionably prequalified by [...] here).
[brief] [...] [...]  Tel #: [...]  Fax #: [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................................................. ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT...............................................................1  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY...........................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  THERE IS NO CAUSAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE VEHICLE AND PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S INJURIES AND THEREFORE, PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION MEDICAL EXPENSE BENEFITS DO NOT APPLY..............................................  12  POINT II:  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATELY GRANTED AS THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.................................................................................. 20 CONCLUSION....................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff asserts, however, that she was allowed to, and did, buy back in for 10% based on her “foregoing” compensation totaling $200,000.  1T38:21-39:3; Da69.  Neither [...] nor [...] were ever made aware of this assertion while plaintiff remained at [...], if it’s even true.  Apparently, without [...]’s authorization, [...] had [...]’s name signed electronically to the letter affirming plaintiff’s buy-in. \(^3\) 2T182:7-23, 185:6-22; 3T26:8-27:15, 64:10-65:13; Da69.  Thus, [...] did not have a K-1 issued for plaintiff, nor did he treat plaintiff as an owner on the financial books of the LLC, nor did he have a 1099 issued to her for the supposed $200,000 buy-in.
[brief] The IFPA was enacted to combat a broad range of fraudulent conduct, including the following as set forth in *N.J.S.A.* 17:33A-4(a):  a.  A person or a practitioner violates this act if he:\textsuperscript{12} (1) presents or causes to be presented any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of or opposition to, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy ... knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim; or (2) Prepares or makes any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurance company ... in connection with, or in support of or opposition to any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy ... knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim; or (3) Conceals or knowingly fails to disclose the occurrence of an event which affects any person's initial or continued right or entitlement to (a) any insurance benefit or payment or (b) the amount of any benefit or payment to which the person is entitled; Additionally, \textit{N.J.S.A.} § 17:33A-4(b) prohibits an individual from assisting, conspiring with, or urging another individual to violate the Act, while \textit{N.J.S.A.} § 17:33A-4(c) prohibits an individual from knowingly benefiting, directly or indirectly, from a violation of the Act due to the assistance, conspiracy, or urging of another individual.
[brief] Defendants alternatively claim that the sidewalk is not defective.  That is a factual issue that is admittedly disputed and so not resolvable on a motion for summary judgment.  Finally, defendants claimed that plaintiff’s expert, [...], P.E., provided a net opinion.  There was no motion to preclude [...]’s testimony.  Nonetheless, the trial court ruled that [...]’s testimony was barred as a net opinion.  The court failed to set forth findings of fact or conclusions of law but seemed to conclude that because [...] did not know the condition of the sidewalk before defendants built the new sidewalk, his opinion was nothing more than a personal opinion.  The condition of the sidewalk before defendants installed the existing sidewalk is irrelevant.  [...] relied in part on roadway construction codes in effect at the time of construction of the sidewalk.  The court’s holding ignores that the applicable codes are appropriate evidence for an expert to consider when determining if the current condition is unsafe.  It also ignores the proper bases for an expert’s opinion, i.e., experience, training, facts and data in the record, and relevant codes, regulations and industry standards.
[brief] (4T121:7-20; 6T21:1-16, 27:21 to 28:4, 116:11 to 117:2.)  Here, the [...] identified deficiencies in the RIR and communicated the same to Defendants beginning in August 2022.  (4T118:19 to 120:22, 122:18 to 123:25; 5T47:7 to 48:8; 6T22:2 to 25:14, 26:9 to 27:15; Pa2284-86; Pa2292-95; Pa2296-2305.)  Despite Defendants’ express obligation under the PSA, Defendants kept Plaintiff in the dark as to their communications with the [...]; Plaintiff and [...] were wholly unaware that Defendants were communicating with the [...] regarding the RIR until receiving the same in 2023 in discovery in this lawsuit.
[brief] Da35  [...]  E-mail  Transmitting Defendant’s Original Appraisal Report (with planning report)  Dated 01/30/20 ………  Da37 e-Courts Notice of 02/18/20  Trial Date (adjourned from 11/12/19)  Dated 11/07/19 …………………………  Da38  [...] Letter Requesting 2/18/20  Trial be adjourned due to unavailability of Plaintiff’s counsel  Filed 02/12/2020……………………………………………………………  Da39  **Motion to Amend**  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Amend Complaint  Filed 02/26/20 ……………………………………………………  Da40  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint  Filed 02/26/20 …………………………  Da43  Exhibit 1 Verified Complaint………………………………………..  Da1 Exhibit 2 Proposed Amended Verified Complaint…………..  Da46 Exhibit 1 (legal description)………………………………………  Da56 (map)……………………………………………………………  Da58 Exhibit 2 (recapitulation)………………………………………..  Da15 Exhibit 3 Proposed Amended Declaration of Taking)……..  Da60 Exhibit 1 (legal description)………………………………………  Da56 Exhibit 2 (map)……………………………………………………  Da58 Exhibit 4 ([...]’s 02/24/20 e-mail……………………………..  Da64 with draft consent order to amend attached)  Exhibit 5  [...]’s Letter Dated 02/25/20 declining consent …………………………………………..  Da68  Plaintiff’s Certification of [...] In Further Support of Motion to Amend Filed 03/24/20 ……………………………………..  Da69  **Order and Statement of Reasons Permitting the Filing of Amended Complaint Filed 03/27/20 ……………………………….. Da80**
[brief] 19 State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) ..............................................................................  49 State v. W.L., 292 N. J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 1996) ...................................................  24, 25, 26 CASES  State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023) ..................................................................................  18  State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576 .................................................................................................  42  State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592 (2021) ...................................................................................... 17, 27 State v. Wilson, 128 N.J. 233 (1992) ..................................................................................... 20, 21 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) .....................................................................................
[brief] [...], a forensic document examiner, testified as an expert witness on behalf of the Respondent.  Forensic document examination involves the examination of all kinds of physical evidence that appears on documents.  Handwriting analysis comprises only a part of the work of a forensic document examiner.  (9T146-10 to 25).  [...] has worked as a forensic document expert since 1982.  He is certified by the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners and was granted membership in the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners, where he served as President for two years.  [...] has been tested and recertified every five years, the last recertification occurring in 2020.  (9T147-10 to 152-11).  [...] has testified as an expert over 300 times, appearing as an expert in state and federal courts as well as internationally, for both criminal and civil matters.  He has also been retained by the United States Department of Justice on multiple occasions.  (9T154-21 to 156-7).  The full qualifications of [...] were attached as Appendix 5 to his report of findings in Exhibit R 13.
[brief] She is requesting that the Court apply a modern-day lens to the use of the word “examination” as to the intent and purpose of OPRA.  She further made it clear that this request is only for the Lindbergh Kidnapping case and only for the collection of DNA evidence on a finite number of documents which still exist.  The Respondents and Court argued that this could open a floodgate and that a citizen does not have a legal right to demand that the museum begin DNA testing.
[brief] ..............................................................................32  A.  Legal Fees Shall Not Be Awarded to Attorneys Who Had Committed Fraud Upon the Court As Shown With New Evidence ..................................................32  VI.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING OVER A MILLION DOLLAR  EXCESSIVE LEGAL FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICE FAR IN EXCESS OF THE NO ACTUAL DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN A PRIVATE TORT CASE (RAISED BELOW: DA45-66, DA168-178)  .................................................................42
[brief] (2T 98:18-98:19).  On November 11, 2022, Board Planner, [...], PP, AICP provided his report with the following planning analysis and conclusions concerning the amended Redevelopment Plan:  **Planning Comments**  a.  As required by the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, all redevelopment plans are to be reviewed by the Planning Board to identify any inconsistencies with the Master Plan, and to provide recommendations to the Governing Body prior to full adoption of the ordinance.