ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Electronic Monitoring Screening Criteria (for Electronic Monitoring as a Condition of Pretrial Release)  Defendant Name Complaint/Indictment Number SBI Number  Employment Information: ☐ ☐  1.  Is the defendant currently employed?  If so, provide employer Yes No information.  Please list additional employment on a separate sheet.  Business Name: Business Address: Business Phone: Current Work Schedule: ☐ ☐ Yes No  2.  Does the defendant rely on public transportation to travel to work?  ☐ ☐  3.  Does the defendant rely on others to commute to and from work, so Yes No that a curfew may not be met?  Does the defendant’s work location change frequently?  ☐ ☐ Yes No 4.  ☐ ☐ Yes No  5.  Does the defendant have stable work hours?  ☐ ☐  If No, does the defendant know of changes to his/her work schedule Yes No ahead of time, so he/she may notify Pretrial Staff at least 5 business days prior to the change and during regular business hours (M-F from 8am to 5pm)?  ☐ ☐  6.  Does the defendant understand that while on home detention, they will Yes No be unable to make last minute switches to their work schedule, accept last minute overtime shifts, or be let out for ancillary tasks not directly related to their work schedule?  (e.g. picking up a paycheck on a day off)  ☐ ☐ Yes No  7.  Any other relevant information regarding employment:  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12220 page 3 of 5
[brief] Potential properties located in residential neighborhoods and/or close to other community-valued buildings (e.g., schools) were disqualified from consideration, because the Facility would not typically be permitted on those properties due to local community discontentment and restrictions under Holmdel zoning ordinances.  Existing environmental conditions—e.g., tree clearing, wetlands, contaminated sites, Preserved Farmland and Green Acres habitats—were also relevant factors; [...] avoided potential sites that had one or more of those environmental conditions.  Finally, [...]’s engineering considerations included the importance of a location at the southern end of the transmission line; minimization of the Facility’s distance to the transmission line; adequacy of the property’s size; sufficient access for inspection, maintenance and repair; property elevation levels; and security.
[brief] Plaintiff attempts to evade the required result by conflating malicious prosecution analysis and double jeopardy analysis.  More particularly, plaintiff argues, without any support, that Heck's holding and purpose is "mindful" of the trial-error rule, which allows the prosecution to retry a defendant where the conviction is reversed due to trial error.  (Pb15).  Yet plaintiff admits that "a remand for a new trial is proper where reversal of a criminal conviction is predicated on trial error."  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978).  There was, of course, no remand here (as there was in Smith and Michaels).
[brief] 7T:74:18-24.  Again, to maintain a claim for hostile work environment, Plaintiff must prove that “but for” membership in a protected class, the action would not have been taken.  Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel misled the jury by stating that Appellants engaged in “inappropriate conduct” and that would satisfy her burden under the second prong of a hostile work environment claim.  This also substantially lowered her burden of proof, as “inappropriate” conduct clearly does not rise to the level of “severe or pervasive” conduct.  (7T:61:17-21; 70:10-20—71:2-10).  As set forth above, Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly told the jury that to establish her claim of hostile work environment, all she had to prove was that one reason for Appellants’ alleged conduct was Plaintiff’s religion or disability when the test is actually a “but for” analysis.
[brief] Plaintiff’s reliance on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Weinberg is misplaced.  For one thing, the Weinberg court did not expressly or implicitly state that a private litigant can assert a claim of “public injunctive relief” under the CFA (or any other consumer statute).  See Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 801 A.2d 281 (2002).  To the contrary, the court simply stated that the CFA “allows for a private cause of action to proceed for all available remedies, including an injunction…” (i.e., not “public injunctive relief”).  Id., 173 N.J. at 253, 801 A.2d at 293 (emphasis added).  Indeed, the court made clear that the CFA does not provide a private litigant with the same powers as the Attorney General (as the Attorney --- 6
[brief] Plaintiff brings this appeal with three misguided contentions that should be rejected by the Appellate Court.  First, Plaintiff misunderstands the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment claiming that Defendants failed to meet its burden for a statute of limitations defense.  As set forth below, this argument completely ignores that the trial court granted summary judgment not entirely because of a statute of limitations defense, but because Plaintiff failed to present evidence that any portion of his alleged damages occurred within the limitations period, which goes to Plaintiff’s burden of proof to show damages as part of his *prima facie* case.
[brief] In so doing, she argues for the first time that there was “Unfairness in the Process” of default judgment at the uncontested divorce hearing and that the Mid-Marriage agreement incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was not scrutinized by the trial court during the hearing.  There are three major flaws with her argument on appeal.  First, the transcript of the March 18, 2015 uncontested divorce hearing “25T” is improperly relied upon in [...]’s Appellate Brief.  That transcript was not moved into evidence.  One will not find that transcript in the Defendant’s 201 exhibits moved into evidence as listed on pages 6 through 10 of the Trial Court’s Opinion or in the Plaintiff’s 85 exhibits moved into evidence as listed on pages 4 through 5 of the Trial Court’s Opinion.  (A229).  One will also not find the transcript as an exhibit to [...]’s R. 4:50 Cross motion and Certification.  (See A77 through A219).  So, this Court should not consider it.
[brief] ’” (Pa161, Par. First Amended Complaint).  The Doctor’s Note, dated August 30, 2019, from [...], specifically noted that:  I have advised [...] to not return to her place of employment – this would be a horrible environment for her future employment.  (Da28, August 30, 2019 Doctor’s Note)  Coincidentally, the documents produced by [...], included “treatment records” which contains a notation from August 16, 2019 that “[Plaintiff’s] lawyer feels it’s best for her not to return to that particular place of employment. ” (Da26, Doctor Sireci Treatment Notes).  However, [...] admitted, during his deposition, that he intended to simply have Plaintiff be removed from the physical location where the alleged harassment (i.e. the [...]), occurred as opposed to the overall employ of [...]:
[brief] 44 (App. Div.), certif. dismissed, 189 N.J. 420 (2007) ...................................................................................... 29 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) .................................................................. passim State v. Sailor, 355 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2001) ........................................ 23 State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978) .................................................................. 62 State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157 (2012) ................................................................. 63, 64 State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365 (2012) .................................................................. 45, 54, 61 State v. Spencer, 319 N.J. Super. 284 (App. Div. 1999) ........................................... 70 State v. Stott, 335 N.J. Super. 611 (App. Div. 2000), rev’d o.g., 171 N.J. 343 (2002) ......................................................................................... 23 State v. Supreme Life, 473 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2022) ............................................. 59 State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220 (2015) ...................................................................... 61 State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001) .................... 26 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) ..................................................................... 99 State v. Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div.), aff’d, 177 N.J. 299 (2003) ......... 67, 70, 74 State v. Whisenant, 711 N.E.2d 1016 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal not allowed, 698 N.E.2d 1005 (Ohio 1998) ....................................................................... 17 State v. Williams, 171 N.J. 151 (2002) .................................................................... 40, 42, 43 State v. Williams, 317 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 647 (1998) ......................................................................................... 45 State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640 (1984) ..................................................................... 66 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) .................................................................... 96 State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017) .................................................................86, 90, 99 Trusky v. Ford Motor Co., 19 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 1952) ...........................................  24 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 ..................................................................................63, 64, 65 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 ..................................................................................1, 81, 99 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 ..................................................................................34
[brief] This office represents the Appellant, [...], in the above captioned matter.  Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS........................................ii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY.........................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................................3  POINT I THE DECISION BELOW MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE ARBITRATION AWARD IS NOT REASONABLY DEBATABLE.  (Raised Below: T6-25) .......................................................................................3  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................13
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku niedopełnienia obowiązku rejestracji c) lub ponownej [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] może być Pan(i) oskarżony(a) o przestępstwo trzeciego stopnia i otrzymać karę rejestracji, pozbawienia wolności do lat 5?  Do you understand that if you fail to register or re-register you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years?
[brief] .......................................................................................... passim Rodriguez-Ocasio v. LVNV Funding LLC, 2:17-cv-04567-MCALDW (D.N.J.) ............................................................  4  Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2021)  .......................................................  12 RP Leasing Assocs. v. Kennedy, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1858 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 3, 2010) ............................................................................................  18
[brief] Pa75.  On January 6, 2020, [...] Answered and raised Counterclaims asserting Breach of Contract (Count I), Unjust Enrichment (Count II), and for relief under the New Jersey Prompt Pay Act (Count III).  Pa84.  On January 14, 2020, [...] answered [...]’s counterclaims and raised affirmative defenses including the Consumer Fraud Act as bar to recovery and recovery of attorney’s fees and costs associated with the defense under the CFA.  Pa97.  On February 27, 2020, [...] Answered and asserted a cross claim against [...] for indemnification and contribution.  Pa103.  [...] and [...] both moved for Summary Judgment and [...] opposed.  Pa111.  In its April 4, 2022 memorandum of decision, the Trial Court expressly found that “genuine issues of material fact exist as to the applicability of the CFA which require denial of denial of defendants’ [motion for summary judgment]”.  Pa88.  The Trial Court went on to dismiss [...]’s complaint in its entirety on the perceived lack of damages.  Id.  On August 2, 2023, a Trial proceeded before the Hon. [...] at Atlantic County Superior Court and was limited to the issue of whether [...] is able to meet their burden of proof as to their counterclaims for payment in full (the remaining balance of $57,619.92) where [...] maintains that [...] failed to fully perform and deliver on the system that was promised and has already been paid $130,000.00 toward the contract.
[directive] b., Schedule of Municipal and Other Law Enforcement Agency l i - Distributions and Expenditures  Include every local law enforcement entity in the Schedule of Municipal and Other Law Enforcement Agency Distributions and Expenditures regardless of the amount of money received (zero greater).  or Page of 10  7 of c.  Statement Seized and Forfeited  Vehicles expressed in units and - dollars, valued at lower of Cost or Market the auditor shall report of on the existencehonexistence inventory control systems, as SOP 8:2B.3-7, to required by include the tracking of seized vehicles of and the tracking vehicles forfeited or purchased with forfeiture shall funds.'
[brief] 4.  Conservation And Public Access  Lastly, the Plaintiff argued that the redevelopment overlay zoning will reduce conservation and public access, including views of the waterfront.  In rejecting this argument, the Trial Court noted that the plan amendment is “intended” to develop “a variety of waterfront and recreational uses along the Raritan Bay shoreline” to contribute to the public welfare” to maximize potential, by the development of “year-round . . . recreational uses. ”  The redevelopment plan amendment also expressly observes that it will “increase[] opportunities for public access to the beachfront. ” (Pa1745).  In addition to this generic language, the redevelopment overlay zoning contained within the plan amendment identifies specific improvements to be made to the beach and to waterfront access.  For example, the plan requires an extension to the north-eastern end of the baywalk northeasterly to reach the existing go-kart section and proposed parking area – a development expressly designed to “enhance access to the beach and public open space areas. ”  It also states that the redevelopment overlay zoning includes “[e]nhanced visual access of the waterfront and bay through the provision of gazebos and structures for the passive enjoyment of waterfront views” – again, contradicting [...]’s contention that views will be eliminated.  Based upon all of the above, the Trial Court concluded that:  Put simply, [...] seeks to maintain existing waterfront uses.  [...], however, presents a contrary vision, emphasizing the waterfront as a year-round destination.  It is not for this court to determine whose vision is better, but only whether [...]’s is supported by the factual record.  It is.  (Pa1745).  For these reasons, the Trial Court found that the Plaintiff’s arguments regarding public access were without merit and did not demonstrate that the plan amendment was substantially inconsistent with the Borough’s master plan.  Rather, the decision on how to provide such access was a discretionary decision by the Borough which should not be disturbed by the court.
[brief] The Superior court held Defendant testified inconsistently about her knowledge of rap music and [2T16-19 to -23], then holds Plaintiff’s witness, [...], lyrical content of multiple mentions of the word Nigger as irrelevant when he is insinuating, she is a racist and disorderly.  The court then erroneously finds the Defendant guilty of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt\(^6\).  The court further noted defendant made remarks that included a promise of violence to the victim.  [2T19-24 to 20-4] when there is no proof of such offense.  [...] improperly held that the in-court identification of Defendant was Admissible; this refers to Point 3 of Defendant’s De Novo Brief and Point IV of Defendant’s Appellate Brief)  Based on Point 3 of Defendant's de novo brief by [...]:  Without the hearsay testimony by [...] about Mr. [...] wife’s\(^7\) statement, without the states by police about Defendant’s identity, and without evidence about how the police identified Defendant to [...], the State’s case rests on bald identification by [...] of the person sitting in the Defendant’s chair in the Courtroom, which defendant denied.
[brief] The trial court’s premature grant of summary judgment also ignored the building restrictions contained within the Genesis Deed.  In addition to prohibiting any building without the written approval of [...], the conspicuously absent indispensable party, the Genesis Deed also imposed setback requirements and limitations on where structures can be placed on lots within the community.  Over the last 75 years, only [...], and the missing indispensable party [...], have sought to enforce those restrictions.
[brief] DEP assesses consistency of the WQMP in the Highlands Region through its Highlands rules.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(g).  The rules do allow for new individual subsurface disposal systems, commonly known as septic systems, “where the sanitary wastewater design flow is 2,000 gallons per day or less” and the project satisfies DEP’s Standards for Individual Subsurface Sewage Disposal Systems at N.J.A.C. 7:9A.  N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.4(b) and (c).  This capacity standard is the same for septic systems outside of the Highlands Region as well.
[brief] The Respondent was employed by [...] as Campus Director.  She was hired on May 16, 2017.  She worked at both the Appellants’ [...] and [...] campuses.  During the time she worked for the Appellants, she had various and changing responsibilities.  [7a]  The Appellants are engaged in the business of operating a private educational institution of higher learning, college level, and technical training on their two campuses and provide various online educational opportunities.  [...] is the owner and chief executive officer of [...].  He directly managed and supervised the Respondent’s employment.  He was named an individual defendant in this case.  [7a]  The Respondent was a long-time victim of harassment and discrimination directed at her because she was a woman.  [7a, 37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  Respondent alleges the Appellant, [...], hired numerous women because he viewed them as inferior and believed he could easily boss and harass them based upon their sex or gender which was a routine practice at [...].  [7a, 37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  The harassment directed at the Respondent came in many forms.  These included a variety of fear tactics directed at her and other women employees.  This included yelling and screaming at her, various threats, and engaging in abusive conduct.  She said he stood inches from her face, yelling at her and calling her inappropriate names.  [7a 37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  The Respondent, who was a polish immigrant, put up with this behavior for a long time until it finally caused her physical and emotional problems which required her to go out on disability.  [212a, 238a-250a]  After she went out on disability, her position was advertised, other employees were assigned her job responsibilities, and her employment was terminated.  [7a, 37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  B.
[brief] 2  As [...] does not contend that [...] and [...] are likely to possess relevant documents, the findings herein will address only [...]’s argument that [...] and [...] do not possess information not available from other data sources.  7.  [...] finds that [...] and [...] are likely to possess unique, relevant information because they were key decision-makers related to issues at the heart of Plaintiffs’ allegations, including friend sharing, whitelisting, business partners, and third-party misuse of information.
[brief] Mulvihill, 57 N.J. at 156.  At all times, the officers’ use of force remained measured and well within expected bounds.  The facts and procedural history of this case bear similarity to those of State v. Doss, where this Court held that a trial judge was under no obligation to sua sponte instruct the jury on self-defense.  310 N.J. Super. at 458-60.  The defendant in Doss both failed to request a self-defense instruction and “during his summation [the] defendant’s counsel never specifically argued that [the] defendant’s conduct was justified as a proper means of lawful force” to defend his co-defendant.  Id. at 459.  On appeal, the defendant, a jail inmate, argued that he should have received a sua sponte defense of others instruction at trial, because he testified that a corrections officer was attacking a fellow inmate.
[directive] Filing a Petition for a Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order  Except for a petition against a law enforcement officer respondent, petitions can be filed by family or household members at the Criminal Division of the Superior Court during regular court business hours - between 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday.  Staff will interview these individuals and will enter the responses in the electronic petition contained in the Judiciary's computerized system entitled Protective Restraining Order System (PROS).  A family or household member can also request a petition at any State, county, or municipal law enforcement agency.  The Act provides that the assistance by law enforcement may include, but is not limited to, providing information related to the factors that are considered by the court, joining in the petition, referring the matter to another law enforcement agency for additional assistance, or filing the officer's own petition with the court.  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(a).
[brief] Notably, *Leitao* applied precedent established in *Vitty* to uphold the enforceability of indemnification language in the realm of negligence.  In *Vitty*, the Court held that an indemnification clause may be enforceable even when the contractor is partially negligent, as long as the subcontractor's negligence contributed to the accident.  The court acknowledged, "when the meaning of the clause is ambiguous, it should be strictly construed against the indemnitee."  *Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus.*, 103 N.J. at 191, 510 A.2d at 1152.
[brief] In *Patton* the court held that the property owner had no duty “unless there had been fraudulent concealment of a latent defect. ”  *Reyes*, 450.  The *Reyes* court found that this ruling in *Patton* failed to consider all of the possible avenues for which liability could attach to a residential owner/lessor, and did not accurately reflect the current law.  *Reyes* noted that the extant version of the *Restatement of Torts Section 358* actually provided that an owner could be liable in a wider variety of circumstances than merely “fraudulent concealment. ”  The court noted the *Restatement* not only allowed for liability if the owner/lessor concealed a condition, but also if the lessor knew of the condition and the lessee did not know of the condition.  *Reyes*, 449.  The *Reyes* decision went on to discuss that Section 358 was updated in the *Restatement (Second) of Torts* in 1965, and at that time it imposed the same conditions for liability in the same circumstance.