ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It was clearly a significant component as to why the planning board was willing to sign off on the agreements.  It reserved to the mayor and council the ultimate review and assessment as to the public efficacy of the internal roadways in question.  POINT V THE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP, MAINTENANCE AND PUBLIC ACCESS ARE SEPARATE INTERESTS TO BE DETERMINED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS AND MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A PROOF HEARING (Pa655) (not addressed by final decision)
[brief] P.L. 2002, Chapter 15, Section 10.  In 2003, our State Legislature cured a drafting error and omission.  In 2003, our State Legislature divested the Tax Court of original jurisdiction and required all challenges of a LTTEL PILOT to be by prerogative writ actions filed in the Superior Court within 20 days from publication of the notice of final adoption.  P.L. 2003, Chapter 125, Section 13.  In New Jersey Citizen Action v. State of New Jersey, [...] (Law Div. Sept. 28, 2022) (Pa529), the State conceded this point: aggrieved taxpayers in a taxpaying district retained access to the courts to challenge the validity of a long term tax exemption under State law.
[brief] Second, Respondents waived any dispute as to the application of New Jersey law when Respondents failed to make any objection to the Trial Court’s RULLCA application and failed to timely appeal the Trial Court’s application of New Jersey law to this dispute.  This Court should not consider this new issue that was not properly raised below or presented on appeal when the opportunity was available.  *See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); see also *Oyoloa v. Xing Lan Liu*, 431 N.J. Super. 493, 501 (App. Div. 2013).  Therefore, New Jersey law applies to this corporate dispute and Respondents’ late-blooming argument that Delaware law applies should be rejected.
[brief] That is, this maxim leads to an interpretation of the exemption’s statutory language as follows: if any “maintenance and operations” are not “routine,” then they are not exempt; if any “rehabilitation, preservation, [or] reconstruction” is not “routine,” then they are not exempt; and if any “repair[] or upgrade” is not “routine,” then they are not exempt.  Moreover, regarding regulatory interpretation, a reviewing court “cannot rearrange the wording of the regulation, if it is otherwise unambiguous, or engage in conjecture that will subvert its plain meaning.  In short, [the court] must construe the regulation as written.
[brief] And because the circumstances of each case vary, “the requirements to guarantee the genuineness of the evidence[] will always differ. ”  *Taylor*, 956 N.E.2d at 439.  Indeed, this is why N.J.R.E. 901 does not include the ten examples of authentication contained in its federal counterpart, see Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(1) to (10), “because they are not exclusive nor is the proof set out in them necessarily sufficient in all cases. ”  *Kalola*, 344 N.J. Super. at 204 (quoting 1991 Supreme Court Committee Comment to New Jersey Rules of Evidence, reprinted in Biunno, *New Jersey Rules of Evidence* (2001 ed.) at 949).
[brief] Respondent’s counsel asked [...]  “Do you have any professional observations based upon your experience and training with regard to the volume and frequency of these medications (opioids)?”  T2 23-25.  Upon Appellant’s counsel’s objection that [...] had not been called as an expert witness, Respondent’s counsel argued “his experience with substance abuse issues” should allow him to provide opinions as to whether a “person using the medication was using them in an abusive or excessive way. ”  T2 16-20.  In response to Appellant’s counsel’s objection that [...] was neither a medical doctor nor authorized to prescribe medications the ALJ explicitly ruled “I am not going to accept [...] as an expert in substance abuse…”
[directive] For the purposes of satisfying the requirements of Section 9.7.1, a Civilian Review Board must implement the following minimum procedural safeguards:  (a)  Avoidance of Interference with Ongoing Investigations or Proceedings  The Civilian Review Board must establish policies to avoid interference with ongoing investigations or proceedings, similar to the policies that an internal affairs function must adopt to avoid interference with ongoing criminal investigations or proceedings.  Specifically, the policy must make clear that the Board may not commence an investigation of a particular civilian complaint or incident until after any criminal and/or internal affairs investigations have concluded and any resulting discipline has been imposed.  This requirement applies regardless of whether the Civilian Review Board is granted authority to recommend discipline, or request reconsideration of any findings or disciplinary decisions, or is limited in its authority to auditing completed investigations.  This requirement also applies regardless of whether, as a general matter, the Civilian Review Board is granted access to redacted or unredacted internal affairs records.  After reviewing the relevant internal affairs records and conducting any other lawful investigation that the Civilian Review Board deems appropriate, the Board may, to the extent permitted by law, present its conclusions to the law enforcement executive or appropriate authority; request additional information or clarification regarding the findings or decisions made in the course of the internal affairs investigation; and/or request that the internal affairs investigation be re-opened.  Whether to re-open an internal affairs investigation remains within the discretion of the law enforcement executive and, with regard to criminal matters, the [...].  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 59
[brief] In the present case, the employee-observers are not designated or even prospective representatives or officers of the [...] and, consequently, the [...] exercises no authority over them.  If employees could assert an independent statutory right to attend negotiations, even against the wishes of their bargaining representative, then, much of the decisional law prohibiting direct dealing and bad-faith bargaining would need to be re-written.  [Emphasis in original].  [Citations omitted].  In Aircraft Mechs. Fraternal Ass’n. v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D. Minn. 2005), a Minnesota union refused to participate in negotiations unless the employer permitted its members to attend negotiations sessions.
[directive] First Quarter Internal Affairs Summary Date Agency Name: Year: Annual Internal Affairs Summary Source of Complaint Criminal Outcome Internal Discplinary Outcome Pending Administra- Pending from Prior New Cases Not tively End of Conviction Dismissal Years cases Closed Agency Civilian Anon. Diversion Acquittal Exonerated Sustained Unfounded Closed Sustained Year Excessive Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Criminal Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Differential Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Demeanor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Domestic Violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Rule Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total Cases Opened 0  Total Cases Closed 0  Total Pending Cases 0  Total Cases >180 Days 0
[brief] Moreover, the only reason this action was voluntarily dismissed is because, after the trial court denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion for default judgment and granted Defendants’ motion for an extension of time, it became “clear” to Plaintiff “that this [action] will be going nowhere. ”  Da66.  Plaintiff’s procedural argument amounts to nothing more than a suggestion that he should be permitted to evade the strictures of UPEPA after filing a speech-suppressive lawsuit simply because he chose to discontinue the action.  That is wrong.  As relevant here, UPEPA provides that “[a] voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a responding party’s cause of action, . . . that is the subject of an order to show cause . . . does not affect a moving party’s right to obtain a ruling on the order to show cause and seek costs, attorney’s fees, and expenses. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-55(b) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff’s action was the subject of a proposed order to show cause, and Defendants are accordingly entitled to pursue the attorneys’ fees and costs they are owed under the statute.
[brief] 1-4-19  Order  Appointing [...] ..................................................Pa122 5-23-19  Order scheduling oral argument on [...]’s demand for payment..............................................................................................................Pa205 5-31-19  Order compelling payment of mediator’s bill..............................................Pa208 7-5-19  Order scheduling hearing on mediator’s bill..................................................Pa210 10-11-19  Order granting in part Motion to Dismiss ..................................................Pa223 11-10-22  Order for Summary Judgment  Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice .................................................................................................................................Pa837 11-10-22
[brief] Dated: May 29, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................  3  POINT I THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF MR. RHYMES’S REMOTE  PRIOR CONVICTIONS WAS CONTRARY TO N.J.RE. 609(b), PREVENTED  MR. RHYMES FROM TESTIFYING ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND REQUIRES REVERSAL BECAUSE HIS TESTIMONY COULD HAVE IMPACTED THE OUTCOME OF HIS TRIAL.  (6T:128-24 to 130-12)  ......................  8  A.  The Sands/Brunson Hearing  .........................................................  9  B.  The court erred in ruling that [...]’s 2011 conviction was admissible because probation does not constitute confinement under Rule 609(b)(1).  The court also erroneously admitted his 2007 conviction based on its misunderstanding of the ten-year window established by the Rule.  .............................................................................  11  C.  [...]’s prior convictions were inadmissible because their probative value does not outweigh their prejudicial effect.  .............................................................................  15  D.  The error that prevented [...] from testifying cannot be dismissed as harmless where the evidence against him was far from overwhelming.  ............................................  21  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] The courts were apprised of defendant’s \textsuperscript{46} Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Par 164) need for accommodation with forms, Counsel’s letter and medical documentation.  Information was sent to the Municipal and Superior ADA Coordinator(s).  When the Superior Court informed, she will mandatorily attend with [...] at the de novo review, she provided ADA medical documentation through Counsel and informed the Court through [...] she was not in the State of New Jersey and her employer did not provide the accommodation to go to her hearing via Zoom.
[brief] Ja012; 1T 21:12-25.  On January 24, 2022, the [...] granted preliminary major site plan approval.  Ja013; 1T 7:19-23.  Plaintiff presented the application to Defendant over the course of six hearings in 2022: May 2, August 1, September 1, October 3, November 30, and December 5.  Ja015-Ja017.\(^{12}\)  On the sixth night, the Defendant voted 6-1 to deny the application.  (6T 15:9-25; 16:1-15).  On April 3, 2023, Defendant adopted [...], which memorialized the denial.  Ja012.  On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, appealing the Defendant’s decision.  Ja001-Ja010.  The Trial Court heard oral argument on February 9, 2024, and issued an oral opinion denying Plaintiff’s requested relief and dismissing the Complaint.  Ja174.  On March 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division.  Ja175-Ja177.  Plaintiff filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 26, 2024.  Ja182-Ja185.  \(^{1}\)  There are seven volumes of transcripts, one from each of the six hearings before the Board, and the Trial Court’s Oral Decision.  The transcripts shall be designated as follows:  1T: May 2, 2022 (Hearing Night One)  2T: August 1, 2022 (Hearing Night Two)  3T: September 1, 2022 (Hearing Night Three)  4T: October 3, 2022 (Hearing Night Four)  5T: November 30, 2022 (Hearing Night Five)  6T: December 5, 2022 (Hearing Night Six)  7T: February 9, 2024 (Trial Court’s Oral Decision)  \(^{2}\)  Eight (8) transcripts were uploaded to the docket.  The transcript filed on June 11, 2024, dated February 7, 2022, was uploaded inadvertently, and does not apply to this case.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] [...] Seeks a Highlands Act Exemption for Its Project.  [...], LLC (“[...]”) is a natural gas company “primarily engaged in the business of transporting natural gas in interstate commerce[.]” (Aa52).  It “owns and operates an interstate natural gas transmission system” throughout the southern and eastern United States.  (Aa53).  The “300 Line” is one section of [...]’s existing system, consisting of approximately 128 miles of underground pipeline and above-ground appurtenant facilities in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  (Aa78).  [...]’s existing right-of-way for its 300 Line passes through [...], Passaic County.  (Aa55).  [...] is a municipality entirely within the Highlands Region preservation area.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-7(a) and (b).  ---  2  “Aa” refers to Appellant’s appendix filed August 31, 2022, and “Ab” refers to Appellant’s Supplemental Brief filed November 11, 2024.  “Ra1 to 3” refers to Respondent [...]’s appendix filed October 31, 2022, and “Ra4 to 17” refers to [...]’s supplemental appendix filed with this brief.
[directive] For example, if the victim is an intimate partner, terms such as “spouse,” “partner,” “girlfriend,” “boyfriend,” “husband,” or “wife,” should also be redacted, and to the extent possible the report should just indicate that the relationship between the victim and the officer was an enumerated relationship under the Domestic Violence Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq.).  6  (a)  If a Civilian Review Board that meets certain minimum requirements requests access to a completed or closed investigation file, subject to the conditions described in this section; or (b)  If another law enforcement agency requests the files because it is considering hiring an officer who was formerly employed at the agency with the internal investigation files.
[brief] (Pb6-7).  Plaintiffs then urge that the NJDEP ignored the deficiencies and nonetheless issued the FHA Permit to [...].  This is factually incorrect.  [...]’s approved design was thoroughly reviewed by the NJDEP, was revised on numerous occasions in response to the NJDEP’s comments, and was ultimately deemed by the NJDEP to be compliant with the Stormwater Management Rules.  (Aa3378 & DJa001).  The NJDEP’s authority to regulate storm water is set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”) at N.J.S.A. 40:55D–93 to 99, and is referred to as the Stormwater Management Act.
[brief] ”  Id. at 159.  This Court noted that, in Tucker, the Supreme Court had cited Doss “as an example of a situation in which a police officer ‘had justifiably stopped and interrogated the defendant because of the circumstances described in the record. ’”  Ruiz, 286 N.J. Super. at 161 (quoting Tucker, 136 N.J. at 170).  But because, in Tucker, the only ostensible basis for pursuit was the defendant’s inexplicable flight when he saw the police, the police had no basis to justify the seizure of defendant.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY MORRIS COUNTY: LAW  DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...]  Civil Action  STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO ALL DEFENDANTS THIS MATTER, having been amicably resolved between the Plaintiff, [...] and the Defendants, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], it is hereby stipulated that the Complaint and any and all Counterclaims are hereby dismissed with prejudice without costs to either party.  SNYDER SARNO D'ANIello  MACERI & DA COSTA  Attorneys for Plaintiff  By: [...]  [...], Esq.  Date: 05/02/2022  JOSEPH J. FRITZEN, ESQ.  Attorneys for Defendant, [...]  By: [...], Esq.  Date: 5/9/2022  ROSENBERG JACOBS HELLER & FLEMING  Attorneys for Defendants, [...], Carmela MacPherson, and [...]  [...], Esq.  Date: 4/3/22  THE VESPI LAW FIRM, LLC  [...] - 004702000  [...]  TEL: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff [...], Plaintiff(s), vs. RUMOR'S GENTLEMAN'S CLUB, [...], [...], MEGAMAC, LLC, CARMELLA MACPHERSON, MARIE VARTOLO, ESTATE OF CHARLES MACPHERSON, [...] 2-20, [...] 4- 10, BOUNCER 1-10, and JOHN/JANE DOES 1-20 (last four names being fictitious and presently unknown), Defendant(s)
[brief] Moreover, the word “controlled”, as used in Section 59:4-1(c) of the TCA, should not be construed as extending beyond possessory control.  Danow v. Penn Central Transportation Company, 153 N.J. Super. 597, 603 (Law Div. 1977).  To do so would enlarge governmental tort liability without authority in decisional law or legislative history.  *Ibid.*  In the absence of such ownership or control, RESPONDENTS cannot be liable for this incident under a dangerous condition theory.  APPELLANTS’ Complaint does not allege any defect of the property other than the presence of an illegal makeshift liquor stand.  The sale of alcohol itself relates to activities on the property and not conditions of the property itself.  As such the presence of the liquor stand cannot be a dangerous condition on public property.  Further, the individual who shot and killed [...] cannot be considered a dangerous condition on public property, as the mere presence on public property with criminal intent or purpose cannot constitute a dangerous condition.  *Rodriguez,* supra, at 39.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Over defense objection, [...] looked at crime scene photos of the car, pointed out “red staining which could be blood,” (5T 137-1 to 23) and testified, “Even if all of those you know red stains are blood to me that’s not consistent [with] someone being stabbed in the backseat of that vehicle.  . . .” (5T 140-5 to 9)  He followed up by agreeing with the prosecutor that if someone had been stabbed in the car, “there’d be a lot more blood” than what he “viewed thus . . . far.”  (5T 140-10 to 14)  Testimony about what a car would look like if someone had been stabbed inside it went far beyond describing the properties of the weapon that caused death, the physiological status of the victim, and ruling out the possibility of self-inflicted injuries — the proper subject of a forensic pathologist’s testimony.  Jamerson, 153 N.J. at 337.  Instead, as defense argued, such testimony was of the kind that should have come from someone who “analyzes the crime scene and draws conclusions from this.
[brief] Subsection “j” was added to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53 by virtue of Senate Bill No. 2406, titled “An Act concerning dedication of certain municipal streets and improvements, and amending P.L. 1975, c. 291. ”  1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 301 (Senate 2406) (West) (Da391-Da393).  After the addition of subsection “j” to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53, a municipality’s acceptance of a dedicated road upon release of the performance bond became automatic, and rendered moot any requirement that the municipality take some affirmative act in order for a dedicated road to be accepted.
[directive] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78-79 10.2  Mitigating Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79 10.2.1  Non-Pecuniary Distribution (Mitigating Factor #1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79-80 10.2.2  Defendant’s Role in Criminal Scheme (Mitigating Factor Category #2)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80-81 10.2.3  Voluntary Renunciation (Mitigating Factor #3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81 10.2.4  Drug Treatment (Mitigating Factor #4) . .  81-83 10.2.5  No Prior Court Involvement (Mitigating Factor #5)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83  10.2.6  Youthful Offenders (Mitigating Factor #6)  . . . 84  10.3
[brief] \(^3\)  This small number of \(^3\) State v. Washington, 256 N.J. 136, 145 (2024); Watson, 254 N.J. 558; Burney, 255 N.J. 1; State v. Telfair, No. A-2108-21, 2024 WL 743619, at *4 (App. Div. Feb. 23, 2024); State v. Thompson, No. A-5288-17, 2022 WL 610326, at *2 (App. Div. Mar. 2, 2022); State v. Owle, No. A-4829-18, 2022 WL 2195524, at *15 (App. Div. June 20, 2022); State v. Wingate, No. A-2090-09T1, 2012 WL cases certainly corresponds with the suggestion that “it is somewhat rare for a witness to be asked [by the prosecutor] to make an in-court identification when he or she identified someone other than the defendant during an out-of-court procedure. ”  Watson, 472 N.J. Super. at 486 n.44.  Thus, because Watson’s substantive holding regarding first-time in-court identifications cannot truly be described as a “sudden and generally unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing practice,” it cannot fairly be described as a “new rule” for retroactivity purpose.
[brief] New Jersey courts, moreover, have noted that even inquiries or investigative techniques that do not qualify as searches and seizures and therefore do not require reasonable and articulable suspicion must still comport with the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 484 (2001) ("[T]he questioning of [a] defendant as part of a field inquiry is not sustainable if the officers approached him and his companions solely because of their race and age."); State v. Segars, 172 N.J. 481, 493 (2002) ("[I]f race is the sole motivation underlying the use of a M[obile] D[ata] T[erminal] [in checking the status of a driver's license], it is illegal .
[brief] Although [...] should prevail solely on a proper Berg analysis, ordinary tenets of statutory construction also warrant rejection of the trial courts’ analysis.  Those tenets are familiar and can be summarized briefly.  When interpreting a statute, courts seek “to discern and implement the Legislature’s intent. ”  State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197, 209 (2007).  In analyzing statutory language, “the words and phrases in the statute must be given their generally accepted and ordinary meaning, and must be examined not only in their own contextual setting, but in relation to surrounding provisions in the statutory scheme. ”  The entirety of the trial court’s statutory analysis is subject to de novo review.  “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.
[brief] POINT VI PLAINTIFF CORRECTLY BRINGS THIS MATTER AS A DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT ACTION (Pa3)  The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act, is "to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations."  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51.  Associations regularly have challenged Fire Department policies which are unlawful.  See, NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 468 (3d Cir. 2011) (Association challenged fire department's residency requirement which was permanently enjoined because it had a disparate impact on African-American applicants.)  Courts have reasoned that if a policy, regulation or ordinance is invalid on its face, interest groups must be able to present such a matter such that a Court may review its legality so that the impacted parties may be properly guided.
[brief] However, while not assigning it great weight, [...] noted that after defendant was arrested on the Bergen County charge but before his arraignment, he did not assert his speedy trial right.  (2T12-11 to 15).  Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.  Moreover, when defendant was brought to Bergen County, his attorney asked that the matter be adjourned so that defendant could resolve the federal manner.  (2T5-2 to 14; 2T7-10 to 16).  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22b(1)(d).  Finally, [...] considered whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay.