ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Regarding the charge that [...] “failed to fill out the Speaker Request Form” [...] was not chosen to speak, having only submitted an abstract with a proposal and filling out a “Speaker Request Form” would have been grossly premature and presumptuous.  (Pa461).  Regarding proposals for presentations at the [...] Annual Conference to be held in March 2016, [...] was to advise persons submitting proposals “by the end of December 2014” if their proposal was accepted and “submittals of accepted presentations would be required by February 20, 2015. ” (Pa675).  The presentation approval process required “approval prior to accepting requests to make presentations speak at meetings, etc.” and not approval before submitting abstracts.  (Pa544).  Even if approval for submitting an abstract was required, on December 18, 2014, [...] had filed an Ethics Disclosure for regarding his proposal to “[p]rovide presentations regarding national drinking water issues” which was approved by his Director [...] January 23, 2015 and approved by the Ethics Liaison Officers on January 26, 2015.  (Pa673-Pa674).  [...] testified at the disciplinary hearing that was not aware Mr. Dillon had received approval from the Ethics Office for Outside Activity.  A jury could find a retaliatory motive because the discipline initiated by [...] initiated on November 24, 2015 for submitting an abstract without her permission was unprecedented.  Also, Dillon requested vacation on the week of the [...] conference in March of 2016 so that he could attend on his own time and it was approved.  (Pa461).  The motion judge was simply incorrect by stating “Plaintiff sought to speak at a 2016 New Jersey AWWA Conference without seeking the approval and was suspended for one day as a result.
[brief] A decision produced by fraud on the court is not in essence a decision at all and never becomes final.  See Kenner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1968), certiorari denied, 89 S.Ct. 121, 393 U.S. 841, 21 L.Ed.2d 112.  Therefore, the time to vindicate justice has not even begun in the instant case.
[brief] ”  Id. at 197.  The circumstances here satisfied those two conditions.  The charge here conveyed an understanding of the elements to the jury, by instructing that the crime of official misconduct includes three elements: (1) defendant was a public servant at the relevant times; (2) defendant committed an act relating to his office knowing that it was unauthorized; and (3) defendant’s purpose in so acting was to benefit himself or another or to injure or deprive another of a benefit.
[brief] As to the requirement that the plaintiff be “aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute, the trial court stated that [...] cannot show she suffered harm. ”  The trial court reasoned that the series of transactions did not make the plaintiff an aggrieved consumer because she had lost no money due to her bankruptcy discharge.  However, plaintiff engaged in a transaction with defendant, which she contends is not permitted under New Jersey law, and received money, and paid the defendant a fee.  Both transactions were an assignment of rights to a portion of the proceeds from a not yet resolved personal injury suit.  Plaintiff suffered concrete actual harm by paying fees to the defendant from the first assignment.  She also is aggrieved by incurring improper fees and charges on the later assignment.  In Spade v. Select Comfort, 232 N.J. 504 (2018), the Supreme Court of New Jersey interpreted the term “aggrieved consumer." as found in N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.
[brief] The only defense to this is New Jersey’s “discovery rule. ”  The effect of the discovery rule does not carve out an exception to the statute of limitations rule, but rather tolls or resets the statute of limitations period.  The discovery rule states that “a cause of action will not be held to accrue until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable claim. ”
[brief] Sentencing took place on September 24, 2010.  In sentencing defendant, the court considered four aggravating factors: the risk that defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(3); existence of a prior record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(6); the need to deter defendant and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(9); and imposition of a fine or penalty or order for imprisonment would be perceived by the defendant as merely part of the cost of doing business, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(11).  The court also found mitigating factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1b(11), imprisonment will entail excessive hardship.  Finding “the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors” as to all counts and determining that “with the prior record [, defendant] is not entitled to the bottom end of any of these sentences,” the court imposed an aggregate sentence of nineteen years.
[brief] In this case, an examination of the merits demonstrates that [...]’s Settlement with the Primary Insurers was fifteen times higher than the largest single plaintiff mold verdict in New Jersey history.  [...]’s expert, [...], testified that the $2.3 million Settlement was reasonable based on the potential for a seven to eight figure pain and suffering award.  He did not base this conclusion on his personal experience.  The mold cases [...] settled in his own practice were for de minimis amounts and the sole case that went to verdict yielded a $32,500 jury award against a $14.5 million demand.
[directive] Displaying of Firearms.  Special requirements must be met before an officer may display a firearm.  Unholstering or pointing a firearm are tactics that should be used with great caution.  The presence of an officer’s firearm, under the right circumstances, can discourage resistance and ensure officer safety in potentially dangerous situations without the need to resort to force.  At the same time, however, unnecessarily or prematurely drawing a firearm could limit an officer’s options in controlling a situation, could create greater anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm.  (a)  Pointing a firearm.  Consistent with training, officers may point a firearm at a person only when circumstances create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary for the officer to use deadly force.  When the officer no longer reasonably believes that deadly force may be necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm.  (b)  Reporting the pointing of a firearm.  Pointing a firearm, though not a use of force, constitutes a seizure that must be reported as a Show of Force on the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal, except in the circumstances described in Section 3.4(c).  (c)  Clarification of reporting requirements for tactical teams.  An officer engaged in the operation of a tactical team shall be required to report the pointing of a firearm only when the pointing involves a sustained active engagement with a person in order to gain that person’s compliance.  A member of a tactical team who quickly “sweeps” a room during an operation need not report each person at whom a firearm was momentarily pointed during the sweep.  3.5
[brief] Support for this conclusion can be found in *State v. Gaines*, where this court found that the failure to provide an identification instruction did not require reversal because the two eyewitnesses knew the defendant prior to the aggravated manslaughter for which he was convicted, and "[t]heir independent identifications . . . were not dependent upon their ability to observe and recall physical features and characteristics of a person who was a stranger to them."  377 N.J. Super. 612, 626 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 264 (2005).  This court further observed that the court's other instructions "did not permit the jurors to conclude that they could convict [the] defendant if the State had not established beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who fired the fatal shot."  Id. at 625.  In light of the foregoing, [...] did not commit any error, let alone plain error, in his jury instructions.
[brief] It was intended to provide a continuation of income to businesses and workers whose employment was suspended as a result of the pandemic.  School districts which had budgeted for certain services at the outset of the academic year were to continue to pay contractors who had been providing those services, even though the services were not being provided.  And the contractors receiving those payments were required to apply them to their payrolls for employees who had been laid off as a result of the pandemic.  This was part of government doing all it could to reduce the negative impact of the pandemic on citizens dependent upon paychecks that were being missed.
[brief] **The PSA Expressly Granted Plaintiff the Right to Demand Specific Performance, “In Addition to” and “Notwithstanding” Termination and/or the Return of the Earnest Money Deposit**  As described above, the PSA provided that Plaintiff would take title to the Real Property at the Closing from the Fee Owner.  Pursuant to the plain terms of Section 13.1 of the PSA, Plaintiff also had a right to demand specific performance and enforce the transfer of title of the Real Property to Plaintiff if [...] defaulted on the PSA and proceeded to close on the transaction with the Fee Owner, without Plaintiff.  (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1) (“Default by Seller”).  The trial court erred in failing to hold that, under the PSA, this right to insist upon specific performance was “in addition to” Plaintiff’s right to terminate and demand return of the Earnest Money Deposit upon a default by [...].  See id.  Specifically, Section 13.1 of the PSA provided: Default by Seller.  In the event that the Closing and the transactions contemplated hereby do not occur as herein provided by reason of any default of Seller, Purchaser may, as Purchaser’s sole and exclusive remedy, elect by notice to Seller within ten (10) Business Days following the Scheduled Closing Date, terminate this Agreement, in which event Purchaser will receive from the Escrow Agent the Earnest Money Deposit, whereupon Seller and Purchaser will have no further rights or obligations under this Agreement, except with respect to the Termination Surviving Obligations.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event Seller [[...]] closes title under, the Mack-Cali Agreement, and thereupon Seller [[...]] defaults in its obligation to close title under this Agreement, Purchaser [Plaintiff] shall, in addition to its termination right, shall have the right of specific performance.  Purchaser expressly waives its rights to seek damages in the event of Seller’s default hereunder.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing contained in this Section 13.1 will limit Purchaser’s remedies at law, in equity or as herein provided in pursuing remedies for any breach by Seller of any of the Termination Surviving Obligations.  (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1) (emphasis added).  Hence, Plaintiff had a right to (and actively did) insist upon participating in the rescheduled closing with the Fee Owner, to ensure specific performance under the PSA, such that it would acquire title to the Real Property directly from the Fee Owner, regardless of the return of the Earnest Money Deposit.  See id.  [...] and [...] deceived Plaintiff concerning the date of closing and the status of the deal, which prevented Plaintiff from filing a notice of pendency or taking other steps to compel specific performance.  Defendants’ efforts to deceive Plaintiff would have been unnecessary if, as Defendants later argued, Plaintiff’s right to specific performance had been forfeited by the return of the Deposit.  B.
[brief] Moreover, as the lower court found, there was no evidence before it to suggest that potential legal charges were on [...]’s mind.  There was simply no evidence the lower court could find suggesting the threat of criminal charges was made or used to coerce [...]’s cooperation.  The lower court correctly found that [...] was motivated solely by the care and concern he had for his brother, as demonstrated throughout the video-recorded interrogation.  This argument was likewise correctly found by the lower court to be unsupported by law.
[brief] The Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), hereby relies upon the Procedural History in its initial brief as if fully set forth herein (Pb3\(^1\)).  RESPONSE TO APPELLEE’S STATEMENT OF FACTS  The Board hereby relies upon the Statement of Facts in its initial brief as if fully set forth herein (Ibid.).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD CONDUCT A DE NOVO REVIEW OF [...]’S DECISION BECAUSE IT PERTAINS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE AND A STRICTY LEGAL ISSUE (Db15\(^2\); Rb5\(^3\)).
[brief] The Facts Of Defendant’s Case Did Not Require The Trial Court Judge To Give An Instruction On Unanimity As To The Victims.  “[T]he United States and New Jersey Constitutions require jurors to reach a unanimous verdict in a criminal case. ”  State v. Fair, 256 N.J. 213, 232 (2024).  “Unanimity generally requires that jurors be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did before determining his or her guilt or innocence. ”  Ibid. (internal citations and quotations omitted).  “[T]hey need not unanimously agree as to "which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, or which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime. ”  Ibid.  Defendant relies on State v. Gentry, 183 N.J. 30 (2005), to support his argument that the judge’s failure to instruct on unanimity of which victim was robbed was a fatal defect to the proceedings.
[brief] Kindly accept this Letter-Brief on behalf of respondent-appellant, [...], pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................................7  POINT I THE JUDGE OF COMPENSATION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS.  (1T12-22 to 1T22-17, Ra66).................................................................7  CONCLUSION.....................................................................................14  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Trial Court  Oral Opinion on Motion...........................................1T12-22 to 1T22-17 February 21, 2024  Order Denying Recusal of Judge........................Ra66  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DECISION OF THE [...] WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.
[brief] [...] AND [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  Zurich American Insurance Company and American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company [...] P.O. Box 1917 [...], [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 024591986  [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 005262010  Date Submitted: March 22, 2024
[brief] We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.  A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.  Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.  But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.  Id. at 484-87 (emphasis added; citations and footnotes omitted).
[brief] We respectfully submit that the Court did not recognize the factual disputes that should have been left for resolution by a jury.  We respectfully submit that despite the fact there were disputed material facts, the Trial Court accepted the inferences more favorably toward the movant, and improperly resolved the issues of fact in favor of the movant/respondent.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING QUESTIONS OF FACT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND GRANTING SUMMARY
[brief] ”  Moreover, the Court noted, this same issue arises in using “assessed valuation” in rent-controlled properties.  *Id.*  “Value” is not included in the [...], though [...] could have used a value-based approach if it wanted to do so.  Because [...] did not adopt a value-based ordinance, it was arbitrary and capricious for the [...] to depart from its ordinance in this way, and for the Court to order the [...] to depart from its ordinance in this way.
[brief] The First Count through the Eighth Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint allege Fraud, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Unjust Enrichment, Violation of New Jersey RICO, and Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy to commit said intentional torts, against [...] (“[...]”).  Said Counts arise solely from Plaintiffs’ newly discovered evidence in the 2015 Action that [...] was the Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, and the newly discovered claims arising therefrom.  None of these facts nor claims were alleged in the complaint that was dismissed against [...] in the matter of Fendt et al. v. [...], et al., [...], currently also on appeal (hereinafter the “2015 Action”), as said facts were only discovered in the course of the 2015 Action following said dismissal.  The Trial Court’s sole basis for dismissing said Counts against [...] is Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
[directive] On an annual basis, every law enforcement agency shall provide to the County Prosecutor and publish on its public website a report summarizing the types of complaints received and the dispositions of those complaints.  This report should be statistical in nature.  The County Prosecutor shall submit a summary of the reports from all agencies in its jurisdiction to the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.  The Annual Internal Affairs Summary attached to Appendix K may be used to satisfy the requirements of this Section.
[directive] Notwithstanding Section 5.3, an officer may de-activate a BWC when a civilian conversing with the officer requests that the device be turned off under circumstances where it reasonably appears that the person will not provide information or otherwise cooperate with the officer unless that request is respected.4  The officer shall not suggest to the person that the BWC should be de-activated; nor shall the officer ask the person whether he or she would prefer that the BWC be de-activated.  Rather, the request for de-activation must be self-initiated by the civilian.  The officer may explain the consequences of de- activation (e.g., evidence relevant to a criminal investigation will not be recorded).  In deciding whether to de-activate the BWC, the officer shall consider the privacy and safety interests of the person requesting de-activation, whether the encounter is occurring in the person’s residence, and the need for the information or assistance that the person will provide only if the de-activation request is honored.  6.2
[brief] B.  Even Absent a Request, The Commission Maintained Independent Authority To Remove [...] From The List As It Did.  [...]’s erroneous assertion that she should be promoted because the [...] did not request the removal of her name from the certification also ignores that the Commission had the inherent power, *sua sponte*, to remove her from the list.  In rejecting [...]’s request for reconsideration and the same argument that the [...] did not request her list removal that she makes on appeal, the Commission explained that “even without notice, the Commission has the authority to remove candidates from a Civil Service eligible list *sua sponte*” in upholding her list removal.  AA14; see also N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7(a).  [...] does not challenge that conclusion on appeal.  Accordingly, [...] still fails to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the Commission’s decision to consider her removal was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported.  As a result, her appeal must be denied and the Commission’s decision must be affirmed.  C.
[brief] The Receiver failed to submit to the Court an inventory of [...]’s assets, periodic accountings and/or a Final Accounting.  [...] has maintained that the Receiver, as of or about the October 22, 2021 date above, assumed the Lease with [...] and became bound by its terms, including regarding payment of rent.  [...] maintains that the Receiver acknowledged in writing that rent monies were due [...], while only making sporadic payments to [...] totaling $30,750.00.
[brief] Excerpts from Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants [...], Esquire,and Cooper, Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A………………………………………………………………………………….201a 8/21/2018  Order and Opinion Denying Summary Judgment Motion of Defendants [...] and [...]……………………………………………………………………..222a 8/21/2018 Order and Opinion Denying Summary Judgment Motion of Defendants [...], Esquire, and Cooper, Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A………………………………………………………………………………….229a 10/15/2018 Order Excluding the Expert Testimony of [...] on Lost Profits ..................................................................................................................308a 10/22/2018 Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion to Reconsider the October 15, 2018 Order to Exclude Expert Testimony ..........................................................................................310a
[brief] For instance, in *Harman v. City of New York*, 140 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit applied *National Treasury* to strike down policies forbidding employees from speaking with media regarding policies or activities of the agency without first obtaining permission.  The *Harman* court, applying the *National Treasury* analysis, observed that the government’s burden “is particularly heavy where, as here, the issue is not an isolated disciplinary action taken in response to one employee’s speech, but is, instead, a blanket policy designed to restrict expression by a large number of potential speakers.
[directive] N.J.S.A. ORAZ/LUB AND/OR  Przyznaje Pan(i) również, w niniejszym oświadczeniu, że podczas popełniania lub próby popełnienia B. jednego z tych przestępstw, wraz z natychmiastową ucieczką z miejsca przestępstwa, użył(a) Pan(i) broni palnej lub był(a) w jej posiadaniu.