ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THERE ARE NO ADDITIONAL PARTIES WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO BE JOINED IN THIS ACTION  In an analogous challenge to an unlawful promotions policy this court recognized that it was not necessary to name any and all potentially impacted individuals within an action which seeks a government actor to simply "comply with the law."  Williams v. Borough of Clayton, 442 N.J. Super. 583, 592 (App. Div. 2015)  Plaintiff asserts standing as an Association which neither the defendant nor the trial court challenged.  Within Crescent Park Tenants Asso. v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 105 (1971) our Supreme Court held that an association has standing to sue “in order to protect their [members] interests".  As in Dial, supra, 443 N.J. Super. 492, Association members choose to act through their Association to advance and assert claims on behalf of its individual members.  The Association is a "person" for purposes of the NJLAD standing to ensure that their members are not discriminated against and the instant claim which seeks to enjoin the employer to "comply with the law" does not invoke a requirement that all of the Association's members be inter-pleaded.  POINT VII
[brief] The within matter involves the appeal of a grant of Summary Judgment by Plaintiff-Appellant [...]  The appeal of a ruling on Summary Judgment is reviewed de novo.  *Davis v. Brickman Landscaping*, 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014).  Thus, the appellate court applies the same standard which governed the trial court and no deference is given to the trial court’s interpretation of the law.  *Id.* (internal citations omitted).  That standard compels the grant of summary judgment, if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has encouraged trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when proper circumstances present themselves.  *Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 541 (1995).  As R. 4:46-5 provides, the non-moving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings but must… set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE REDEVELOPMENT PAYMENT WAS VALID BECAUSE THE PAYMENT SATISFIED THE TWO CONDITIONS SET FORTH AT N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) FOR ACCEPTANCE OF A NEGOTIATED PAYMENT BY A REDEVELOPER.
[brief] Ackerman v. The Money Store, 321 N.J. Super. 308, 324 (Law Div. 1998).  The New Jersey Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. ”  N.J. Const. (1947) Art. 1, ¶ 9 (emphasis added).  New Jersey courts have been vigilant in preserving the jury trial right against involuntary arbitration.
[brief] See Cope, 224 N.J. at 555 (“Ultimately, the jury, not the judge, is the arbiter of the truth in reaching its verdict. ”).  Moreover, [...]’s testimony about the previous shooting incident would have been admissible under the Rules of Evidence, as he could have testified to [...] shooting at him and the victim without offering any inadmissible hearsay.  The defense also could have cross-examined officers about their investigation into [...] without relying on inadmissible hearsay.  Accordingly, the trial court erroneously prevented defense counsel from referring to this evidence during opening statements.  See State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 442 (2007) (“The scope of . . . opening statement is limited to the facts [counsel] intends in good faith to prove by competent evidence. ” (internal quotation omitted)).  For all these reasons, the trial court unfairly restricted [...]’s constitutional right to present a complete defense.  Had the jury been presented with the testimony of Hargrove and heard about the State’s investigation into [...], it would have been able to fairly evaluate whether the State had sufficiently proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [...], and not [...], was the shooter.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................  5  I.  [...] does not contest the standards of review and does not defend how the trial court applied those standards.  (1T60-17; 3T46-7) .................................................................  5  II.  A bidder’s failure to provide a required document demonstrating its legal qualification to perform does not become immaterial merely because the information is objectively factual and might be learned from a post-bid opening public records request.  (1T63-6 – 1T63-9)  .................................................................  5  a.  [...]’s efforts to prop up [...] must fail...  .................................................................  6  b.  The public availability of [...]’s [...] classification information is irrelevant, but, even if it were relevant, [...]’s depiction is misleading...  .................................................................  9  III.  [...] conflates responsiveness and responsibility, makes illogical assertions regarding its ability to walk away, and overstates a statute authorizing bidders to seek withdrawal of bids.  (1T55-24; 3T31-15)  .................................................................  12  IV.  [...] has standing to argue that the trial court should not decide on the appropriateness of a discretionary refusal to waive, and [...] is not precluded from substantively participating on appeal.  (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................  14  CONCLUSION..............................................................................
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 46:10B-54.  [...]’s own testimony establishes beyond any possible dispute that he met with [...] three times, became specifically aware of the Foreclosure Action and her financially distressed situation, including a second impending foreclosure proceeding on the more than $38,000 in additional unpaid municipal taxes.  (71a, 11:16–13:12).  As evidenced by the proposed closing documents in the attempted transaction, [...] attempted to purchase [...]’s property while acting under his real estate license and indeed paid himself a $15,000 real estate sales commission.  (Da-ALL0247).  Accordingly, it is clear that [...]’s conduct relating to [...] and this attempted real estate transaction demonstrate that he was impermissibly acting as a “foreclosure consultant” under the FRFPA by engaging in the actions enumerated above – (a), (c), and (f), - even though he was not licensed as a foreclosure consultant, in addition to providing two types of “distressed property services” (subsection (2): receiving money to pay an obligation secured by a mortgage, and (7): giving advice as to forfeiture of a distressed property).
[directive] Accordingly, in any case where a law enforcement agency has reason to believe that a candidate for employment was previously a sworn officer of another law enforcement agency, the hiring agency has an affirmative obligation to identify all such former employers.  The hiring agency shall then request all internal affairs files for cases where the candidate was the subject officer, regardless of the ultimate disposition or status of the complaint.  9.8.3  If a law enforcement agency receives such a request regarding a former employee, then it shall immediately share copies of all internal investigative information related to that candidate with the hiring agency.  Confidential internal affairs files shall not be disclosed to any other party.  9.8.4  This disclosure requirement does not apply when the agency responsible for sharing internal affairs files is unable to do so because the information is clearly subject to a non- disparagement or non-disclosure agreement.  Such agreements must be followed even though they inhibit the ability of law enforcement agencies to fully evaluate candidates applying for positions of public trust, and therefore have the potential to compromise public safety.  Given the public safety risks that such agreements pose, county and municipal governing entities and their counsel are strongly discouraged from entering into them.
[brief] - Abrupt and excessive change in the public sidewalk surface running slope at the incident location, which acts as a ramp and was measured to change from 6.7% to 21.3% in the direction of pedestrian travel.  - A “hidden” pedestrian slipping hazard in the form of ice and snow that covered the abrupt, excessively sloped concrete public sidewalk surface at the incident location, which was uncleared, unsalted and/or unsanded at the time of the incident. - Improper/inadequate snow/ice removal from the incident concrete public sidewalk surface prior to the incident.  (Pa88-89).
[brief] In *Sims v. City of Newark*, 244 N.J. Super. 32 (Law Div. 1990), plaintiffs were motorists who were injured when a limb from a decayed tree fell on their parked car.  [...] (then sitting in the Law Division) granted the City’s Motion for summary judgment under the Tort Claims Act, reasoning:  Existence of an alleged dangerous condition is not constructive notice of it.  Even if this tree were decayed, this by itself may not constitute constructive notice that the top limb would break and fall on a car.  However, the court need not decide the issue.  ...
[brief] Exhibit D, Monthly Progress Report #2, dated July 10, 2014, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit D, Monthly Progress Report #1, dated June 6, 2014, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit E, Deposition of [...], dated April 12, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit F, Notice of Motion to Dismiss, dated June 21, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit F, Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated June 21, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – R. 2:6-1(a)(2))  Exhibit G, Order reconsidering and denying Motion to Dismiss, dated September 15, 2017, filed May 24, 2019
[directive] I first announced in December 2019 that the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability (OPIA) within the Attorney General’s Office would revisit the Use of Force Policy as part of our New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 efforts to overhaul and standardize use of force data collection across the state.  At the time, media reporting suggested disparities and inconsistencies in how force was being used and reported by New Jersey law enforcement.  The need to revise this Policy took on added urgency in the wake of the killing of [...] this past May.  That tragic incident was roundly and rightfully decried for its injustice by stakeholders across the country and in New Jersey, including, and especially, our law enforcement leaders.  It also prompted many states and localities to conduct wholesale reviews of their policing policies and practices to ensure they accord with modern best practices, and are in line with community expectations about the reasonable and appropriate use of force by law enforcement.  In New Jersey, that hard work has been underway for many years.  Together, we have been working in partnership with stakeholders across the state to develop and implement a variety of initiatives—collectively known as the “Excellence in Policing Initiative”—that both standardize and build upon the incredible policing already being done in New Jersey.  Drawing upon the experience and relationships we have gained, I established a robust and comprehensive process for gathering input and expertise on potential reforms to the Use of Force Policy we are announcing today.
[brief] See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158 (1983) ("Mt. Laurel II").  While New Jersey courts have conferred builders’ remedies in the form of removing a board’s authority and appointing a master in its place, New Jersey courts emphasize that such remedies should rarely be used.  Morris Cty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Twp., 220 N.J. Super. 388, 408–09, (Law. Div. 1987), aff'd as modified, 230 N.J. Super. 345, (App. Div. 1989).
[brief] Appreciating now that they were witnessing yet another transaction involving [...] – performed in an identical manner to the others – officers rightly suspected that defendant, towards whom [...] was approaching with a handful of cash, was involved in the transaction as well.  Although at this point, the investigatory stop of the defendant was justifiable, that justification became unassailable once detectives recognized who defendant was: the suspected supplier of the very man about to hand him a large sum of money.  ii.  **Ordering of Occupants Out of Vehicle**  Police were therefore within their rights to order the occupants of the vehicle to exit: defendant’s vehicle was stopped pursuant to a criminal investigation.  Defendant-driver could be ordered out as a matter of course, considering his history of violently evading capture, narcotics distribution, and weapons possession.  Likewise, [...] was defendant’s well-known, long-time accomplice, from whom purchases had also been made.  It is not a reach to suspect that they were at it once again.  Although [...] was not ultimately required to exit the vehicle, police had every right to insist.  iii.  **Retrieval of Documents**  [...], who had first-hand experience with defendant’s penchant for escape, properly searched for defendant’s registration and insurance card himself, rather than allow defendant to retrieve them.  Several established doctrines coalesce to justify this decision.  First, *Terry* permits such retrieval when a defendant is unable or unwilling to do so and there is an open question as to the ownership of the vehicle.  Qualifying the intent of that exception, the *Terry* Court adds that it is “based primarily on public-safety concerns that require prompt action. ”  *Terry*, 212 N.J. at 222.
[brief] As [...] reminded us in *Lang v. Zoning Board of Adjustment*, 160 N.J. 41, 45 (1999):  As is often the case in variance appeals, a detailed understanding of the relevant facts is an indispensable prerequisite to the correct application of the controlling legal principles.  [...] further noted in *Medici v. BPRCo.*, 107 N.J. 1, 9 (1987), wherein he quoted [...], and state that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."  Apt to this matter is the history of plaintiff’s lot.
[brief] An investigator is permitted to “draw a jury’s attention to particular spots[.]”  Watson, 254 N.J. at 601.  An investigator can, for example, “draw attention to a distinctive shirt or a particular style of car that appear[s] in different frames[.]”  Id. at 604.  However, such objective “drawing attention” testimony becomes improper as soon as it provides the officer’s opinion as to a disputed fact, or renders a belief based upon an inference drawn from other facts in evidence.  An investigator is thus prohibited from saying “‘that’s the same blue car’” or ‘that’s the defendant,’ if those facts were disputed. ”  Ibid.  As argued in [...]’s original briefing, the question of what could or could not be seen on certain videos was highly disputed.
[brief] The fact that the trial prosecutor mentioned at sentencing that [...] was mandatory extended-term eligible is irrelevant because all of the information set forth at the plea hearing makes clear that this was an ordinary-term sentence.  (Da 18, 20; 2T)  Nor do the potential ambiguities in the plea form that the State now points to change anything.  The plea form states that the prosecutor will not move for an extended term or a mandatory period of parole ineligibility.  (Da 21)  The only potential relevance of this is in assessing whether the State sought to avail itself of the mandatory sentencing provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.  Under this statute, the State has the discretion to negotiate away a potential mandatory extended term and period of parole ineligibility and thereby bar the court from imposing any sentence lower than what the State recommended.  However, the State did not seek a Section 12 sentence in [...]’s case, as evidenced by the fact that the State did not follow the specific procedure necessary to trigger the provision.
[brief] (Pa21)  It is well settled that an appellate court may review “only the judgment or orders designated in the notice of appeal. ”  *1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc.*, 368 N.J. Super. 456, 459 (App. Div. 2004); see also R. 2:5-1(f)(ii).  In other words, appeals from orders or judgments not identified in the notice of appeal fall outside the scope of appellate jurisdiction and are thus not reviewable.  See Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, cmt.5.1 on R. 2:5-1.  (“Courts have concluded that only the judgments, orders or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal are subject to the appellate process and review. ”).  Here, the trial court entered an order on January 6, 2023 granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  (Pa21).  Plaintiff’s Amended Notice of Appeal (as well as the original Notice of Appeal), however, only appealed from the trial court’s February Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  (Pa1; Pa7; Pa24).  Plaintiff did not appeal from the January 6 Order. (Pa21).  Nor did Plaintiff identify the January 6 Order in his CIS. (Pa12; Pa13).  See Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126, 142 (2016) (stating an order “clearly identified . . . in [a] Case Information Statement submitted with [a] Notice of Appeal” is deemed properly before the court for review).  See also Fusco v. Board of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 460-62 (App. Div. 2002) (agreeing with defendant’s procedural argument that plaintiff’s appeal was limited to the sole issue raised in his notice of appeal, i.e., the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, and finding that the “order granting summary judgment is not before us for review”).  In Fusco, the court stated as follows:  An appellant, however, proceeds at his or her peril by insufficiently completing the notice of appeal or CIS.  The appellant should explicitly designate all judgments, orders and issues on appeal in order to assure preservation of their rights on appeal.  R. 2:5-1(f).  Fusco, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 461 n.1.  Fusco is directly on point here where Plaintiff insufficiently completed both the Notice and Amended Notice of Appeal (Pa1; Pa7) and CIS (Pa12) by appealing only from the February 10 Order (Pa24) denying his motion for reconsideration.  Accordingly, despite attempts now to appeal from the January 6 Order (Pa21) granting [...]’s summary judgment motion, Plaintiff’s non-compliance has effectively waived his ability to challenge the January 6 Order.  See Campagna ex rel. Greco v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 337 N.J. Super. 530, 550 (App. Div. 2001) (refusing to consider order not listed in notice of appeal).  Plaintiff’s attempt to appeal the January 6 Order granting summary judgment in favor of [...] must therefore be rejected.  POINT II
[brief] The judge merged the following counts: count two into count one; count three into count six; count five into count six; and count eight into count nine.  (25T75-6 to 15).  The State elected to pursue a discretionary extended term sentence on the RICO conviction in count one.  (25T76-10 to 16).  The judge then sentenced defendant on count one to thirty-two years imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility, followed by a five-year period of special parole supervision.  (Da25; 25T76-14 to 81-2).  On count sixteen, the judge sentenced defendant to four years in prison, with a two-year period of parole ineligibility, to run consecutive to count one.  (Da29; 25T81-3 to 5).  On count eighteen, the judge imposed a term of eighteen months in prison, to run consecutive to counts one and sixteen.  (Da29; 25T80-25 to 81-12).  On count fourteen, defendant was sentenced to a term of eight years in prison, with a four-year period of parole ineligibility, to run consecutive to counts four and six.  (Da28 to 29; 25T81-19 to 21; 25T85-6 to 10).  Counts seven, ten, twenty-one, twenty-two, and twenty-three had been dismissed prior to trial, and the judge imposed concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.  (Da25 to 29; 25T81-13 to 14).  As to [...], the judge sentenced defendant to a concurrent, eight-year-prison term, with a five-year period of parole ineligibility.  (Da30; 25T84-23).  Defendant appealed (Da33 to 38), and on October 18, 2019, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence.
[brief] As indicated supra, in the first modern New Jersey Supreme Court school funding decision in Robinson v. Cahill, a unanimous court opined in the strongest terms on April 3, 1973, that the State was ultimately responsible for the provision of T&E to students.  For the ensuing 51 years, that has been a core constitutional principle of New Jersey law.  The [...]’s most extreme effort to absolve SFRA of responsibility appears in the middle of the Analysis section.
[brief] (Pa19).  [...] explained that while [...] was paid a salary, the IRS explained that “payment by the hour, week, or month generally points an employer/employee relationship, provided that the method of payment is not just a convenient way of paying a lump sum agreed upon as the cost of the job. ” (1T106:15-21; Pa106; Pa113).  [...] further explained that if [...] were to be labeled as an employee incorrectly, she would be paid via payroll, but that would not be dispositive of employee status.  (1T106:24-107:2).  For Factor #13 – Payment of Business and/or Training Traveling Expenses, the ALJ again noted conflicting testimony between [...] and [...].
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  [...], AS ADMINISTRATOR : CIVIL ACTION  AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF : [...], DECEASED, : ON APPEAL FROM : Plaintiff/Appellant, : Superior Court of New Jersey : Law Division : Cumberland County : Docket No. : [...]  V. PREFERRED CARE AT CUMBERLAND : NURSING AND REHABILITATION; : SAT BELOW [...]; JOHN DOE #1–10 AND ABC CORP. #1–10, : The Honorable Defendant/Respondent.
[brief] Similarly, in summation, the prosecutor argued that the cell site location information showed that [...] was in the Buckingham neighborhood in Willingboro, so [...] must have been with [...] because “[i]t’s 2:25 in the morning.  He’s not going to Shop Rite.  He’s going to visit his friend. ” (13T154-3 to 5).  The prosecutor similarly argued, “We know from [[...]]’s call detail records he was with Sam [...].  He didn’t just magically pop up at Bloomfield at 2:25 in the morning, you know, randomly.  He was there with his best friend. ” (13T175-10 to 14).  The prosecutor’s repeated emphasis on the importance of this testimony, combined with the fact that the jury heard about the location data both from an expert and the lead detective, makes it likely that the jury relied on this improper testimony to convict [...].  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading. ”); United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that “expert testimony may be assigned talismanic significance in the eyes of lay jurors, and, therefore, the district courts must take care to weigh the value of such evidence against its potential to mislead or confuse”).  The State had GPS location data that strongly implicated [...] in the murder, placing him specifically at [...] and at [...] during the relevant time frames.  Without similar strong evidence to place [...] at these locations, the State needed to rely on the historical cell site analysis to prove its case against [...].  But this crucial testimony should not have been presented to the jury because it was a foundationless net opinion.  As a result, [...]’s convictions should be reversed.