ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Indeed, none of the Court Rules Plaintiff cites provide that Plaintiff can permissibly serve a deposition notice on the German Defendants or the U.S. Defendants to compel a deposition of [...] in his individual capacity simply because he is a director of certain entities.  Moreover, after considering the parties’ arguments and the New Jersey case law Plaintiff continues to rely upon in his appellate brief, the trial court concluded that the identified facts did not establish that Defendants have the control over [...] necessary to permit Plaintiff to compel [...]’s deposition by way of deposition notice to the named entity Defendants.  Plaintiff has failed to identify binding authority demonstrating that the trial court’s orders denying his motions were an abuse of discretion, and the German Defendants respectfully request that those well-reasoned orders be affirmed.
[brief] 412 N.J. Super. 553, 565 n.1 (App. Div. 2010).  That court cited to *State v. Jenkins*, 299 N.J. Super. 61, 71-75 (App.Div.1997) which held that a violation of probation may not be used to impeach a defendant's credibility.  *Ibid.*  Neither of these cases mandate that a trial court cannot consider a violation of probation in a remoteness analysis when considering whether defendant’s convictions show a continuing course of criminal conduct, as was done here.  Although the judge did not specifically state that, it is clear he considered that from his language that “there was not a significant gap in time between the 2007 and the 2011 conviction and the violation of probation in 2015.
[brief] THE PLAINTIFFS DO NOT REFUTE THAT THEY RECEIVED A 35% DISCOUNT BASED ON THE SAME FACTS THAT JUSTIFIED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN MONETARY DAMAGES IN VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA  Plaintiffs next incorrectly contend that [...] cites only “boilerplate” law for his res judicata argument that the Chancery Court double-counted relief for the same claims here.  (Pb47)  To the contrary, [...] cited to Chattin v. Cape May Greene, 216 N.J. Super. 618, 637 (App. Div. 1987) in which this Court agreed that arbitrated claims on the same facts could not be relitigated in Court under different theories.  Plaintiffs have chosen not to address or distinguish Chattin.  That is because they know that the same conduct for which they received prior monetary relief is exactly what they argued to the Chancery Court to be oppression justifying a discount.  Plaintiffs are also wrong that [...] is arguing that prior payment on the Plaintiffs’ monetary claims ‘absolves’ [...].  He argues merely that Plaintiffs were already compensated for oppressive acts before the Court’s determination of fair value, which prevents this case from being found similar to Balsamides.  He argues that Lawson is the general rule, as confirmed by Casey and Brown.  No discount is to be applied without “extraordinary circumstances”.  He argues this case could not be “extraordinary” to equitably justify a departure from Lawson based on oppression where doing so would be in addition to the millions of dollars Plaintiffs already recovered from [...] in damages for that same conduct.  He correctly argues that was relitigation of the same facts under a different theory for relief, prohibited by Chattin.  While Plaintiffs contend “there is no law” that payment of damages “cleanses” [...]’s conduct in the context of paying him fair value without discounts, in reality all of the law requires that after Lawson, Brown, Casey and even Balsamides were decided.  Chattin, supra, also precludes a recovery on the same facts but a different legal theory (here discount in valuation), and Plaintiffs do not refute the law.
[brief] 19 JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Trial Court’s Decision and Order, Dated June 24, 2024 Pa6; 2T3-15 to 20-24  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Indictment No. [...]  Pa1  Notice of Motion to Suppress Evidence From A Warrantless Seizure  Pa4  Trial Court Order, Dated June 24, 2024 Pa6  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] In deciding on the release of information as to the identity of a victim, the safety of the victim and the victim's family, and the integrity of any ongoing investigation, shall be considered; if an arrest has been made, information as to the defendant's name, age, residence, occupation, marital status and similar background information and the identity of the complaining party, unless the release of such information is contrary to existing law or court rule; information as to the text of any charges, such as the complaint, accusation and indictment, unless sealed by the court or unless the release of such information is contrary to existing law or court rule; information as to the identity of the investigating and arresting personnel and agency and the length of the investigation; information of the circumstances immediately surrounding the arrest, including but not limited to the time and place of the arrest, resistance, if any, pursuit, possession and nature and use of weapons and ammunition by the suspect and by the police; and information as to circumstances surrounding bail, whether it was posted and amount thereof.
[brief] (Id., Pa70.)  9.  Years earlier, on September 23, 2008, [...] on behalf of the [...], issued an Executive Order No.: MEO-O-08-0001.  (Pa76.)  Executive Order No.: MEO-O-08-0001 provides:  Any municipal employee or appointee who is certified as a candidate for municipal elective office in the [...] or for county elective office in the [...] shall be entitled to maintain their position with the [...].  (emphasis added).  Plaintiff was terminated on January 12, 2018, almost a month-and-a-half prior to being certified to run.  (Pa70, Pa74.)  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] A.  The State Failed To Present Any Evidence From Which A Jury Could Find That [...] Committed Either Degree Of Robbery Against [...].  To support a conviction of robbery, the State was required to prove that in the course of committing a theft, [...] threatened or purposely put someone in fear of immediate bodily injury.  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2).  Because the State failed to prove that [...] threatened or put someone in fear of immediate bodily injury in the course of committing a theft against [...], the motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted as to robbery of [...].
[brief] Burned onto it  Exhibit E to [...]’s Certification Letter from [...] to [...] Regarding Previously Submitted Discovery Responses, now Including Decision Transcript of State v. [...], Dated 4/25/2023  Transcript of Decision – State of New Jersey v. [...] 10/27/2021  Exhibit F to [...]’s Certification  Exhibit G to [...]’s Certification Complaint Summons 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa041)  Return of Service Information (Attached at Pa045)  Affidavit of Probable Cause (Attached at Pa047)  Preliminary Law Enforcement Report (Attached at Pa049)  Exhibit H to [...]’s Certification Certification of Disposition Form, Dated 5/17/2022
[brief] [...]’s Estate Plan  [...] died on July 5, 2020, also leaving behind a considerable estate governed by a will (“[...]’s Will”) and the [...] [...] Living Trust (the “Trust” or “[...]’s Trust”), both dated March 9, 2007.  (Da7; Da88).  [...] is the sole executor of [...]’s Will and the sole Trustee of the Trust.  (Da8, at ¶ 4a).  [...] and [...] are both beneficiaries of the Will and Trust.  (Da8-9, at ¶¶ 4a-b).  Article four of [...]’s Will directs that all assets not specifically disposed of are to be held and distributed in accordance with the terms of her Trust.  (Da10, at ¶ 18; Da27).  [...]’s 21.5 percent interest in the Palm Beach Property was not specifically disposed of in the Will and therefore is subject to the terms of the Trust.  (Id.).  Two provisions of the Trust are relevant to this appeal.  Section 3.3(A) places certain real property in a marital trust, excluding the Palm Beach Property, for [...]’s benefit should he outlive [...].  (Da51).  Section 3.3(A) names [...] as the contingent beneficiary of the real property in the marital trust should [...] pre-decease [...], as happened here.4
[directive] 12  In July 2014, the retention period for Hold kits was extended from 90 days to 5 years.  13  The volume of Hold kits is not summed together by responded type because responses were provided separately by respondents.  It is unknown whether the volume of Hold kits reported by one respondent is included in the volume reported by any other respondent.  14  Law enforcement agencies reported a total of 139 Hold kits.  However, when reporting by the age of the Hold kit, the total for law enforcement equals 140 Hold kits.  7 | P a g e old.15  Hold kits ranged in age from 1 year old to over 5 years  Regardless of storage location, between a third to a half of all Hold kits in New Jersey were past the 5-year retention period for respondents.16 each group of  As of survey completion, approximately 37% of kits held by FNEs were reported as over 5 years old (799 or 37.08%); over 40% of CPO Hold kits were reported as over 5 years old (800 or 40.54%); and over 45% of LEA Hold kits were reported as over 5 years 46.43%).17 old (65 or Responding agencies indicated that Hold kits were most frequently stored in evidence facilities, typically within the County Prosecutor’s Office.  Victims wishing to pursue a case once a kit has been placed on hold, have the option to do so.  FNE’s reported that since 2014, a total of 97 victims/survivors have come forward to move the Hold kit to law enforcement after placing the kit on hold at the time of collection.
[brief] [...]’s title commitment cannot form the basis of an “agreement” between plaintiff and defendants beyond the terms and conditions contained within the commitment.  (44a-48a)  A.  Plaintiff makes an argument for the first time on appeal.  (44a-48a)  18  B.  Even if this Court should consider plaintiff’s new argument, the argument lacks merit.  (44a-48a)  19  C.  The trial court properly analyzed the title commitment and ruled that because plaintiff did not receive a deed to the property in question, [...] does not owe plaintiff a title insurance policy.  (43a)  23  Point II.
[brief] the influence, suggests that the police did not actually believe [...] was under the influence and instead simply wanted to search the car.  [...] did not explain why or under what circumstances he believed that small pupils could be a sign of intoxication, other than to say that his belief was “based on his training and experience. ”\(^8\) (1T 27-19 to 21)  See State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 382 (1991) (“[I]n some situations, a police officer may have particular training or experience that would enable him to infer criminal activity in circumstances where an ordinary observer would not . . . .
[brief] (Pa70-71; Pa73-74; Ra2; Ra4).  Nor is there any legal basis for Petitioners’ vague claim that the process employed by the Legislature violated N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18.  That provision guarantees “the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances. ”  Ibid.  Petitioners cite no cases to support their position that this provision imposes any additional procedural requirements on the Legislature.  And as this court has recognized, “a significant limitation upon the power of the people’s elected representatives to enact a law should not be read into the Constitution by implication. ”  In re Reilly, 364 N.J. Super. 519, 523 (App. Div. 2003).  Nor have Petitioners shown that they were prevented from assembling, consulting for the common good, or making their opinions known to their representatives.  To the contrary, Petitioners made those opinions known by testifying in the proceedings leading up to passage of A6260.\(^{10}\)  In short, this case is squarely governed by Forsythe.
[brief] [Emphasis added]  [...] must realize that his argument is meritless, so that explains why he then attempts to create a showing of bad faith out of thin air, by concocting an argument that I initiated this case out of “principle”.  This is clearly false; and if anything, in reality it should be easily inferred that the reverse is true.  Moreover, the above concoction is directly contradicted by what he had written elsewhere in his brief, wherein [...] expressed no doubt that I believe in the merits of my case, and wherein he repeatedly asserted that I “misunderstand” the law.  For example: "... Appellant clearly does not understand the issues ..." (Db1, Db11); "... it is clear that Appellant is confused about the issues ... " (Db12); "This argument further shows that Appellant does not actually understand the issues in this present suit." (Db13); and "Once again, Appellant clearly does not understand the issues ..." (Db14).
[brief] Professional malfeasance cases, the Affidavit of Merit Act requires plaintiff to file an affidavit within a statutorily-set time limit (60 days of answer, extendable to 120) that the defendant/professional likely deviated from the applicable standard of care.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27; Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass'n, 202 N.J. 415, 422, 997 A.2d 982 (2010) (citing Burns v. Belafsky, 166 N.J. 466, 475-77, 766 A.2d 1095 (2001)).  The purpose of the statute is "to weed out frivolous claims against “licensed professionals” early in the litigation process."  Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216, 228, 141 A.3d 1162 (2016) (citing Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144, 146, 836 A.2d 779 (2003)).
[directive] Nothing in this 13 of complaint- where there is a presumption charging by in cases provides that amended, 3:3-1(d), as Rule that the acomplaint-warrant based on reason to applies for believe agency enforcement law summons end a or danger the safety of any other person the will pose a to summons, response to a appear in defendant will not if on a or judicial criminal justice process released summons, the court obstruct the will attempt to community, or by Director of using the instrument approved the Administrative assessment of mush: consider the results the officer N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25.  pursuant to the Courts 43 Page assistant the and risk assessment, pretrial automated preliminary of a benefit the without made the postpone elect officer to may supervisory designated or general, attorney deputy prosecutor, risk-assessment pretrial automated preliminary the of results the pending decision charging of hours 12 officer within judicial or judge a to presented matter is the that provided process, :4-1.
[directive] Each County Prosecutor shall, in collaboration with the Division of Criminal Justice, undertake efforts to educate the public about the provisions of this Directive, with a specific focus on strengthening trust between law enforcement and LGBTQ+ individuals.  By December 31, 2020, each County Prosecutor shall report to the Attorney General on those public education efforts.  D.  All law enforcement agencies shall seek to establish relationships with organizations focused on LGBTQ+ issues, and other community leaders, to maintain a dialogue about issues affecting LGBTQ+ individuals.  V.
[brief] (T20-14 to 24).  [...] briefly described what “calling a Code 1” meant.  A “Code 1” is a call out for a supervisor (i.e. sergeant or lieutenant) to immediately respond to the officer’s area.  (T21-3 to 7).  [...] understood [...]’s statement, i.e. calling a ‘Code 1’ for every incident, as her threat to misuse the code protocol.  (T21-17 to 22).  Such a threat would constitute a serious abuse of the SOPs.  Misusing the code protocol can put uniform personnel at risk.  It can also tie up resources away from the facility’s normal work flow.  (T22-1 to 9).  [...] requested the Appellant to complete an incident report regarding their interaction.
[brief] Indeed, the regulations provide nearly no rights to minor students in relation to their records and, furthermore, affirmatively infringe on the rights of adult students when they are enrolled in public school and financially dependent on their parents.  Lastly, these regulations also require each district board of education to compile and maintain student records and regulate access in accordance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and 34 CFR §99.
[brief] It is also undisputed that the contract with the Developer does not require the Township to take Plaintiffs’ properties.  Nor does the contract limit the Developer’s use of the property to be acquired under the swap, that would include Defendants’ parcels.  The Township states the Developer will build dormitories for religious schools, which, it argues, is a permitted use.  However, the Township fails to cite to any provision in the code to support its assertion.  Yet Defendants included the applicable zoning ordinance in their appendix and such use is not permitted in the subject zoning district.  Not only is there no record cited by the Township in initiating this condemnation action, but Plaintiff’s brief goes well beyond the record before the trial court in its appellate brief.
[brief] Contrary to defense Counsel on page 21 of his brief, the undated order was seen for the first time on August 10, 2023, when it was noted attached to defense Counsel’s certification in support of summary Judgment.  (Pa137, Pa652-654).  The undated order that is bate stamped at Pa654, bearing [...]’s signature was the reason why plaintiff filed a new complaint on September 26, 2023, alleging fraud and adding [...] as a defendant.  (Pa488).  On September 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the 2023 complaint with the 2022 complaint on summary judgment.  (Pa485, Pa488).  The complaint filed on 9/26/2023 that added [...] as a defendant is docketed at [...].¹ (Pa488).  In the complaint, the Plaintiff expressly denied receipt of the undated order.  (Pa494, Pa471, Pa654).  Contrary to defense Counsel, the disposition sheet, signed by Court Administrator [...], is not an Order signed by a Judge.  (Pa653).  Moreover, a properly executed Order requires the defendant’s signature and the date signed by the defendant which was not done.  (See Pa654).  Plaintiff also alleged that defendants misused process and that all did not ¹Please note that the new LCV number and docket number [...] for the new complaint are not shown at the top of Pa488 that was filed as an attachment on the summary judgment motion.  turnover to plaintiff [...] or his attorney prior to [...]' order dismissing plaintiff's complaint, a copy of judge Herman's signed order entering the disposition.
[brief] .................................................................3  A.  The New Jersey Court Rules Promote Efficiency in ESI Discovery by Requiring Courts to Assess Relevance and Burden .................................................................4  B.  The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Failing to Consider Burden and Relevance in the ESI Order ........................................................................................................9  C.  The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Equating Search Terms with Relevance .................................................................................................................................13  D.  The Cases Plaintiffs Cite Do Not Support the Trial Court’s Decision .............18  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE A CONSUMER FRAUD VIOLATION  The Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, provides:  "The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice.  . . ."  Any "person" who is injured "as a result of the use or employment by another person of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under this act" may recover treble damages, reasonable attorney's fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit.  N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  To be covered by the CFA, the defendants' conduct must be found to be an "unconscionable commercial practice."  D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. Super, 11, 29-30 (App. Div. 1985).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court said in Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 607 (1997)  "[N]ot just 'any erroneous statement' will constitute a misrepresentation prohibited by [the Act].  The misrepresentation has to be one which is material to the transaction and which is a statement of fact, found to be false, made to induce the buyer to make the purchase.  In the Gennari v. Weichert case the defendants made material misrepresentations to buyers of newly built homes.  The builder was known to build substandard homes.  The Supreme Court noted:  “The purchasers were induced to close on homes that were poorly built.  Experts hired by the purchasers discovered serious problems with insulation, infiltration of cold air into the home, water damage and water leakage, poor quality lumber, inappropriate framing and support beams and the use of certain substandard materials. ”  Id. at 588.
[brief] (4T 62:7-25; 63:1-2).  [...] did not disagree with the findings of the NIH and went on to opine that tolerance plays a significant role in terms of how the effects the drug manifest in one person as opposed to another.  (4T 60:1-18).  In fact, [...] clearly admitted that she “never” can say with certainty what effects the drug will have on a person’s behavior based upon the observed concentrations of the drug.  (Id.).  [...] further testified that she acknowledged that a “toxic” level of clonazepam would have been 80mg.  (4T 62:15-25; 63:1-2).  [...] then acknowledged that when a person was experiencing toxic levels of clonazepam, possible symptoms would have been somnolence (excessive sleepiness), diplopia (double vision), slurred speech, and motor impairment.  (4T 63:19-25; 64:1-18).
[brief] But that’s exactly what the higher contractors did.  A foreman for [...] testified that [...]’s role was “Basically demolition” and that it “was doing selective demolition. ”  (Owens Tr., 80:7-15 at Pa1381 and 174:5-8 at Pa1475.)  Moreover, [...] confirmed that [...]’s work at the Project on the date of the Accident was in fact demolition.
[brief] Instead, while FaceTiming with her later in the day, [...] observed that [...] was driving [...]’s vehicle and [...] was driving her Dodge Durango behind her.  [10T77-5 to -11].  [...] also observed that [...] possessed a gun.  [10T77-17 to -18].  He had never observed her with a gun before.  [10T96-13 to -14].  That evening, [...] went to a concert in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, with [...] and sent [...] a few text messages while there.  [10T78-1 to -13].  [...] woke up at 4:00 a.m. and saw he had a missed call from [...] from an hour prior.  [10T79-6 to -9].  [...] decided to call her back later in the morning and went back to sleep.  [10T79-13 to -18].  [...] did not reach out to him again that morning, which was unusual.  [10T79-22 to -25].  [...] also heard from [...] at approximately 7:30 a.m.  She told him that she also had not heard from [...].  [10T80-1 to -11].  [...] became concerned and called and texted [...] but did not get a response.  [...] decided to drive around and look for [...].