ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Wade v Kessler Institute*, 343 N.J. Super. 338, 348 (App. Div. 2001).  The Court’s focus should be directed at the violation of Executive Order MEO-08-2008 and the Defendants failure to afford Plaintiff any of the due process rights and remedies set forth in the law, the collective bargain agreement, the employee handbook, Civil Service, and the requirements set forth by the legislation governing the job duties of Councilman.  [...]’s position with the City required no political affiliation because [...] is a nonpartisan Municipality.  His efforts to seek elected office was constitutionally protected activity and Defendant [...] intimated as much that [...]’s termination was retaliation, motivated when he learned that [...] sought the West Ward Council seat that he currently held.  Therefore, [...] has established a *prima facie* showing that a violation of protected speech has been met.  *Lapolla v. County of Union*, 449 N.J. Super. 288, 289 (2017), The Trial Court failed to appreciate this standard and therefore erred in dismissing the Complaint.  [...] was not a policy maker and should not could not be terminated for his political beliefs when he was performing his job satisfactory and there is nothing in his personnel records reflective of poor performance or disciplinary actions.  *Morgan v. Union County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders*, 268 N.J. Super. 337 (1993) (citing *Elrod v Burns*, 427 US 347, 375 (1976).  It is in this respect that [...] has established a *prima facie* case of his constitutional rights being violated which requires the case be heard before a jury of his peers.  This case is strictly and specifically about defendants’ violation of Executive Order MEO-08-2008, [...]’s Employee Handbook and the Collective Bargaining Agreement.  These are the policies in question that have been violated, these are the documents to which the contents must be searched.  Defendants have not set forth a challenge to the legitimacy of any of the governing documents.  It is of no moment as the Plaintiff/Respondent may argue and to which the Trial Court accepted that [...] slept on his administrative remedy rights by not filing a civil service appeal after his termination.  This is not the issue before the Court.  There is no dispute regarding his failure to file an appeal through civil service for administrative remedies.  The failure of the City to ensure [...]’s union rights, notify the union and otherwise provide progressive discipline is not a cause of action in the Complaint, it is evidence of bad faith.  The totality of the egregious mistreatment of [...] once he sought elective office, and the timing of this treatment which is remarkable and cannot be denied, are questions for the jury to decide which the Court did not appreciate and therefore, the decision to grant Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff/Respondents was error which must be reversed.
[brief] ”  29 N.J.R. 3920(a) (Sept. 15, 1997).  The [...] rules “provide the City with the flexibility to redevelop its oceanfront in accordance with a complex design scheme” to create a “diverse landscape” anticipated to “make the Redevelopment Zone more appealing to the general population as well as to visitors to the City” by providing “developers with greater flexibility in design,” to “attract additional developments into the Redevelopment Zone.
[brief] The existence of “rules and regulations” is made “manifest and clear” in the [...] and the hundreds like it.  Bruno v. Hanna, 63 N.J. Super. 282, 285 (App. Div. 1960).  The absence of a specific height restriction within the four corners of the [...] does not matter because the clear and unequivocal reference to “rules and regulations” implemented and enforced by the “property owners’ association” provides the requisite notice to future owners in the chain of title.
[brief] [...] responded to that location.  (2T84-16 to 18).  When [...] arrived, he spoke with the officers who had detained the individual, and they presented him with that person.  (2T84-19 to 22).  [...] believed the person matched the physical build of the individual with the light-colored hoody.  (2T85-18 to 24).  [...] was then presented with a light-colored gray hoody that the detained individual was holding at the time he was apprehended.  (2T85-24 to 86-2).  [...] then returned to the area of the barbershop and helped other law enforcement officers, including [...] and [...], canvass for evidence.  (2T86-5 to 112-4).
[brief] [...]’s failure to engage \(^1\)  All capitalized terms have the same meaning as in the principal Brief. directly with the crucial provisions of the PSA highlight the deficiencies in its argument and its reliance on half-hearted textual interpretations that fall far short of supporting its position or overcoming the plain text of the PSA.  The PSA is not cryptic about the time frame during which [...] is required to obtain an estoppel certificate.  “Seller shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Estoppel Certificate from the commercial tenant prior to the Closing. ” (Da211) (emphasis added).  The PSA says nothing about this timeline ending merely because [...] obtains a non-compliant Estoppel Certificate.  The PSA is not cryptic about the date by which the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate must be delivered.  “At the Closing, Seller shall execute and/or deliver … a duly executed Acceptable Estoppel Certificate (as defined in Paragraph 13.10). ” (Da205) (emphasis added).  The Estoppel Provision is clearly defined as a normal condition precedent to closing — and nothing more.
[brief] Specifically, they held that neither of the two theories proffered to the jury reasonably suggested the requisite state of mind for aggravated or reckless manslaughter, let alone “jump[ed] off the page. ”  *Id.*, at 189-90.  The Court’s analysis focused on the theories set forth by counsel because when acting *sua sponte*, the trial court is not required to “scour the statutes to determine if there are some uncharged offenses to which the defendant may be guilty. ”  *Id.*, at 188 (quoting *State v. Brent*, 137 N.J. 107 (1994)).  Trial courts are not expected “to meticulously sift through the entire record...to see if some combination of facts and inferences might rationally sustain a lesser charge. ”  Id (quoting Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 81 (additional citations omitted)).  It appears that the trial court in the current matter did exactly that.
[brief] The Trial Court Improperly Relied Upon Mittra v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83, (App. Div. 1998) (3T81-3T88)  The trial court echoed the Defendant’s argument that the “juris prudence of this state affords institutions of higher education great direction in how they admit, educate, and graduate students. ” (3T83).  The trial court, in its oral opinion, stated, “Relying on Mittra v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83 App. Div. (1998), where the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the student's breach of contract claim against the university and acknowledged that the rigid application of contractual principles does not apply to university student conflicts. ” (3T84-3T84).  In Mittra v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83, (App. Div. 1998), Mittra’s claims were all grounded in the contention that Defendant [...] improperly dismissed him for academic reasons.
[brief] Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health, 440 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2016) ............  39  Public Advocate Dept. v. Public Utilities Bd., 189 N.J. Super. 491 (App. Div. 1983) ..........................................................  12  Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66 (1984) .............................................  9  Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 53 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1958), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 30 N.J. 303 (1959) ...............................  10 State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570 (2010) ..................................................  11 State v. King, 340 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 2001) ......................... 47 State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176 (1993)
[brief] On February 20, 2020 at about 12:23 a.m., [...] and [...] were on patrol in Edison in an area that had experienced motor vehicle burglaries.  Pa021-Pa23; Pa302-Pa304.  They observed Plaintiff remove a backpack from the passenger side of a green Jeep vehicle and place it in the trunk area of a black Jeep vehicle.  Id.  The officers exited their vehicle and approached Plaintiff, who was standing outside the black Jeep.  The officers wore vests that were marked “Police,” and their badges were affixed to the vests.
[brief] **AUTHORITY:**  **Cases:**  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ...........................................8  Donofry v. Autotote Systems, Inc., 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001)............................7  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)  ......5  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, 182 N.J. 436, 448 (2005) ..........5  **Statutes & Rules:**  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4..................................................2-3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] *United States v. Sokolow*, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also *State v. Nishina*, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003).  “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is ‘less than proof . . . by a preponderance of evidence,’ and ‘less demanding than that for probable cause,’” and simply requires more than a hunch or “unparticularized suspicion. ”  Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. at 517 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7).  In short, officers must be able to articulate the reasons that led them to believe the defendant was engaged or about to engage in criminal conduct.  State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988).
[brief] Notably, [...] did not detail the actual calculation of dues incurred between 2013 and 2019.  Instead, Plaintiff offers an accounting that simply asserts there is a “balance forward” figure of $97,179.01 for Unit 4, and a “balance forward” figure of $82,404.46 for Unit 1, accrued as of December 1, 2019 (Da36-Da37, Statements of Account; Da27-Da29, [...] Cert. ¶¶7-11).  The only detail provided is that the “balance forward” includes a charge for attorney’s fees, possibly calculated in the amount of 20% of the balance asserted as due and owing on each unit (Da29, [...] Cert., ¶13).  Further, that figure must include interest and late charges, as detailed in the calculation of additional sums accruing from January 1, 2020 forward.  Id. at ¶11; Da13, Pl’s. Complaint, ¶24(b-e).  However, the record available to the trial court demonstrated that the interest and late charges included in the calculation are in excess of $70,000.00, as interest is charged at a rate of 18% per annum on past-due amounts in excess of $1,500.00 (Da13, Pl’s. Complaint, ¶24(d)).  The amount of interest that would accrue on Plaintiff’s $13,700.00 credit over a nine-year period (2013 through 2021), calculated at 18% per annum compounding annually, is a whopping $60,765.71.  Accordingly, if Plaintiff is in fact due a credit for the expenses be covered for the association, in reliance upon the Association’s prior approval, then the actual amount due and payable to the Plaintiff may actually be as little as $127,371.91. \(^2\)
[brief] Plaintiff’s claim that [...] invaded her privacy fares no better.  New Jersey has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts and thus, in order to state a claim for the common law tort of public disclosure of private information (hereinafter the tort of “Public Disclosure”), a plaintiff must establish: (1) that the defendant has given publicity to matters that actually were private, (2) that dissemination of such facts would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) that there is no legitimate interest of the public in being apprised of the facts publicized.
[brief] See Simmons v. Mercado, 247 N.J. 24,43 (2021) (“To avoid submitting a broad request outside the scope of OPRA, the requestor must ‘describe[] the records sought with the requisite specificity and narrow[] the scope of the inquiry to a discrete and limited subject matter. ’”) (quoting Burke, 429 N.J. Super. at 177-78).  Here, the trial court’s analysis ran astray of this precedent when it characterized the “test” as solely whether [...] needed to engage in research or subjective analysis when responding to [...]’s request.  (Aa52).  To be sure, these cases contemplate whether an OPRA request requires a custodian “‘to conduct research among its records . . . correlate data from various government records in the custodian’s possession. ’”  Bent, 381 N.J. Super. at 37 (quoting MAG, 375 N.J. Super. at 546-49).  But equally present in all of these holdings is the reaffirmance that a requestor is obliged to identify with “reasonable clarity” the documents sought by way of a “discrete and limited subject matter” and that he or she must avoid doing so by resorting to a request for “all of an agency’s records. ”  Burke, 429 N.J. Super. at 174, 177.  Put another way, while Burke and its predecessors demonstrate that one way to establish overbreadth is to demonstrate that the request requires an agency to conduct research or subjectively analyze documents for responsiveness, they also recognize that OPRA’s “cooperative balance” obligates a requestor to identify what records they are seeking on a particular topic, without doing so by requesting an agency’s entire file.  On this latter point, [...]’s request fails.
[brief] It is the Board’s belief that the Bargaining Council could make the [...] stronger and help it “win” negotiations, which irks the Board.  The Board seeks to improperly hamstring the [...] from implementing a legitimate strategy which helps its members at negotiations.  Thus, it is in the Board’s interest to limit this source of strength.  However, as [...] correctly noted, a disagreement or displeasure with an opposing party’s strategy is not by itself grounds for limiting its rights under the N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.
[brief] A.  I think that is also considered an in-line heater.  Q.  Now, on these five catalytic heaters, you described that there were heater panels that failed.  Can you tell me how many panels there are on each of these heaters?  A.  I believe there are eight panels.  Q.  You'll see further down in the answer that you had to replace all 32 panels, 32 panels at the very same location.  There were two locations where these problems were concentrated, correct?  A.  Yes.  So that would be 16 panels.  Each unit has 16 panels that would that would be-- yes.
[brief] [Da003-007].  In denying Appellant’s motion the trial court, in pertinent part, held that the officer’s made their way to Appellant’s room without any indication that it was not part of [...] and without any impediments or obstacles.  Id.  In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court found [...] and [...]’s testimony credible with respect to reaching Appellant’s apartment with no obstructions.  Id.  More specifically, the trial court accepted [...]’s representation that he did not encounter any locked doors.  Id. c.  Motion for Reconsideration  Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he challenged the trial court’s findings.  [Da008].  The trial court denied Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.
[brief] [...] also admitted that he was not qualified to offer opinions with respect to the Woodland Park Ordinances with respect to whether [...] qualified as an owner, occupier, operator or tenant under the Woodland Park Ordinances, because it was ambiguous and not clear, and required a legal opinion that he was not qualified to provide.  [Da23 (Moore Deposition) at 215:6 – 228:6).  [...] also admitted that all of the publications and general standards that he referenced in his report were voluntary standards that were not adopted by and not required by the [...].  [Da22 (Moore Deposition) at 119:6 - 120:19).  Clearly, [...]’s opinions were directly rebutted and plaintiffs’ claim that these opinions were not rebutted is an inaccurate representation of the record in this case.
[brief] In Abels, 770 F.2d 26,29, the Court stated:  We are mindful of a number of general principles that should guide the exercise of the federal courts' removal jurisdiction.  Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.  Citing 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3642, at 149 (2d ed. 1985).  All of these authorities were contained in [...]'s counsel motion to remand the case back to the state court.  [...] striking the [...] complaint on October 11, 2006, made the publication of [...]'s FHR a nullity.  Also [...]'s Order enforcing [...]' Sealing Order, which the [...] felt wasn't in place at that time, is clear error.  The [...] wrote:  The publication occurred in response to a motion to disqualify [...] as counsel for the [...]s that was filed by [...] in the District Court Action, and [...] was authorized by law to publish said criminal history because the information was not subject to a sealing at the time of its publication.  Further, [...] submitted [...]’s criminal history to illustrate that it did not receive information from the [...]s’ son that was protected by the attorney-client privilege.  By producing the rap sheet, [...] established that it had obtained the information from a filing made earlier in the District Court Action by [...]’s counsel.  *Id.*  The only source for the publication and republication or [...]’s alleged criminal history report was the criminal conspiracy which occurred on January 11, 2006 all by officers of the court and [...]’s parents, Anthony and Eugenia [...] ([...] Clients).
[brief] ”  Id.  In determining whether an attorney’s hourly rate is reasonable, “the court should assess the experience and skill of the prevailing party’s attorneys and compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. ”  Id. at 337 (quoting Rode 892 F.2d at 1183).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, however, that a “reasonable hourly rate” is one “that would be charged by an adequately experienced attorney possessed of average skill and ordinary competence—not those that would be set by the most successful or highly specialized attorney in the context of private practice.
[brief] Notwithstanding the above genuine issues of material fact, the Motion Judge decided this disputed fact in favor of the defendants stating, “Plaintiff sought to speak at a 2016 New Jersey AWWA Conference without seeking the approval and was suspended for one day as a result. ”  (3T22:18-20).  •  **Retaliatory Action. **  On April 12, 2016, [...] of the [...]’s Office of Labor Relations in the Human Resources Department, who worked for [...] and [...], issued discipline charges against [...] which were signed by [...] alleging falsification and conduct unbecoming a public employee and seeking a 5 day suspension on the sole allegation that [...] lied when he denied being under [...]’s desk.
[brief] ”  [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b)].  Given that fraud in the No-Fault system continued to grow from a “problem of massive proportions” in 1992 to one that required a restructuring of the State’s fraud-fighting agencies to more “aggressively combat fraud” in 1998, it defies credibility to suggest that the Legislature intended to relegate the resolution of claims under the Fraud Act to the NFADR process despite the fact that this process is incapable of achieving one of the primary goals of the Fraud Act, namely providing for the restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits.
[brief] That is not the case, as providing the Affidavit of Merit is the plaintiff’s statutory obligation alone.  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-27 (noting that in all malpractice actions for personal injury, wrongful death or property damage, “the plaintiff shall,… provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person…”  Emphasis supplied.)  Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants did not request an Affidavit of Merit is simply false.  Defendants’ Answer, itself, clearly and unequivocally demanded an Affidavit of Merit.  (Pa25)  Under a heading which read, “DEMAND FOR AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT,” Defendants stated, “[p]ursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26, et seq., answering defendants hereby demand plaintiff to produce an Affidavit of Merit within the time allotted therein. ”  (Pa25, emphasis in original.)  Furthermore, as for Plaintiff’s argument that “gamesmanship” occurred in connection with the discovery of the medical chart, that argument is false.  As the following section of the brief will discuss in more detail, Plaintiff’s discovery request was too broad and non-specific for N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 to apply.  Also, the fact that Plaintiff procured an untimely affidavit, after the motion to dismiss was filed, demonstrates that Plaintiff not obtaining the affidavit in a timely manner had nothing to do with medical records, but was the result of counsel’s lack of diligence and losing track of the timeline required by the statute.  As such, there is no basis to find reversible error for the alleged “gamesmanship. ”
[brief] ”  Tairi, 2012 WL 489101, at *15.  Finding that [...]’ testimony, while flawed, was well-corroborated by other testimony and evidence, this Court rejected defendant’s argument that [...]’ inconsistencies in testifying were fatal to the State’s case:  Defendant contends that there was no physical evidence linking him to the crimes and that [...]'s testimony was so rife with inconsistencies and contradicted by other witnesses as to be unworthy of belief.  We have said, “[i]t is within the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the testimony of a witness. ”  State v. Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. 467, 481 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d, 177 N.J. 229 (2003).  Moreover, [...]'s testimony was corroborated in many details by the victims of the crimes, other physical evidence, and by the testimony of [Marisol] Melton,[3] which circumstantially established defendant’s active involvement in the criminal enterprise.  In short, the testimony taken as a whole was sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt .  . . .  [Ibid.]  --- 3  [...] is [...]’ sister.  This Court’s opinion detailed several examples of how the State corroborated [...]’ testimony despite its inconsistencies.  For example, according to [...], [...] and [...] had no connection to his family.  However, defendant worked at the family’s Staten Island diner, was familiar with the family home, and had been at the home weeks before the home invasion to ask for money.  (1T43-10 to 25, 102-16 to 22, 103-15 to 104-4, 105-3 to 13, 105-20 to 106-18, 106-21 to 107-2; 7T11-7 to 22); Tairi, 2012 WL 489101, at *3.  Defendant provided [...], [...]’ sister, with bail money for [...] after [...] was arrested for the theft of [...]’ credit card following the Teaneck home invasion and murder.  (9T42-9 to 20, 43-7 to 9, 43-24 to 44-5, 57-19 to 58-1); Tairi, 2012 WL 489101, at *6.  And defendant fit a description provided to police by Melton: a white male of Eastern European descent who stuttered, with a name similar to “[...].” (10T36-20 to 37-6); Tairi, 2012 WL 489101, at *7.  Each of these facts corroborated that defendant was not only involved in the home invasions and murder but also masterminded the scheme.  On July 12, 2012, the Supreme Court denied certification.