ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The record does not fully reveal how the database came to indicate there was a warrant for [...], only that she “was not the [[...]] that had an active warrant. ”² (1T 27-21 to 27-22).  Despite a non-existent warrant, the State argues that by stopping [...] the officers were simply performing their “duty to investigate suspicious behavior. ”³ (Sb13)  However, even though Shannon dealt with an arrest rather than an investigatory stop, to decline to apply the Shannon court’s reasoning here where police are all the same relying on a non-existent warrant is to nonetheless effectively apply the good-faith exception—a doctrine which has --- ²  While the specific nature of the error is unknown, this court has previously held suppression is required following an arrest based on a warrant that should have been vacated but was not due to an administrative error, and that to do otherwise would be to apply the “good faith” exception.  State v. Moore, 260 N.J. Super. 12, 13-14; 16-17 (App. Div. 1992).  ³  The State does not identify any specific suspicious behavior on behalf of [...] or the passengers.  Rather, the officers only learned of the warrant, the sole reason for the stop, after deciding to manually check the car’s license plate in the database.  (1T 50-11 to 50-21).  There was no testimony as to why the officers decided to run the plate.  repeatedly been rejected by New Jersey courts.  See State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-59 (1987).  In the absence of any exigency or even heightened suspicion of danger, the officers had a simple responsibility to confirm the warrant’s validity before conducting a stop.  As such, the stop was unreasonable and the evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed.
[brief] Here on appeal, defendant continues as if what was contained in those documents was evidence actually adduced at trial when, in reality, it was defense counsel testifying by reading from the documents.  Defendant states in its Brief:  “As a matter of fact * * *  [...], on behalf of the [...]—an agency authorized to enforce the applicable statutes and regulations—found there was no violation. ”  Db at 23 (emphasis in original).  There is absolutely no other conclusion than that defendant is using that hearsay for proof of the matter asserted.  As indicated in plaintiff’s initial brief and bears repeating here, in summation, defense counsel highlighted the investigation and the conclusions to prove defendant was not liable.  Defense counsel unabashedly used the DOH documents for the truth of the matter asserted.
[brief] Following the trial, the presiding Chancery judge found no duty on the seller to perform and obtain a Remediation Action Order (RAO) for the redevelopment proposed by the Plaintiff for the vacant and obsolete commercial lots on [...].  Despite its extensive experience in redevelopment, Plaintiff maintained during the trial that Defendants/Respondents/Sellers, two unrelated seniors who inherited from a sibling and a spouse, had agreed to undertake a remediation for which they had no experience, and for property on which there was no income.
[brief] (Aa34-35).  [...] also criticized [...]’s credibility determinations, which relied on a “silent” video to corroborate its findings and did not consider union witness interviews even though those witnesses had referred [...] to their attorney (who also represented [...]). (Aa41-42).  [...] also criticized [...]’s characterization of his own statements as “inconsistent. ” (Aa42-43).  [...] argued that that his version of events—that he confronted [...] about her misleading attempts to obtain signatures for [...]’s opponent in the CWA election—was more logical and credible than [...]’s.  (Aa43).  On September 20, 2023, the Commission upheld [...]’s determination that [...] violated the State Policy.
[brief] *R.*  5:3–5(1)(c) in turn provides:  **Award of Attorney Fees.**  Subject to the provisions of *R.* 4:42–9(b), (c), and (d), the court in its discretion may make an allowance, both pendente lite and on final determination, to be paid by any party to the action, including, if deemed to be just, any party successful in the action, on any claim for divorce, nullity, support, alimony, custody, parenting time, equitable distribution, separate maintenance, enforcement of interspousal agreements relating to family type matters and claims relating to family type matters in actions between unmarried persons.  A pendente lite allowance may include a fee based on an evaluation of prospective services likely to be performed and the respective financial circumstances of the parties.  The court may also, on good cause shown, direct the parties to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber or pledge marital assets to the extent the court deems necessary to permit both parties to fund the litigation.  In determining the amount of the fee award, the court should consider, in addition to the information required to be submitted pursuant to R. 4:42–9, the following factors: (1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties; (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award.
[brief] As representatives of the State, prosecutors must act according to certain principles of fundamental fairness.  *State v. Wakefield*, 190 N.J. 397, 436 (2007).  Prosecutors have a "duty to ensure that justice is achieved" and are afforded considerable flexibility during opening statements and summations.  *State v. Williams*, 113 N.J. 393, 447-48 (1988).  With respect to summation, "[p]rosecutors are expected to make vigorous and forceful closing argument to the jury."  *State v. Rose*, 112 N.J. 454, 517 (1988).  Prosecutors "may comment on the facts shown by or reasonably to be inferred from the evidence."  *Wakefield*, 190 N.J. at 457.  In that same vein, "Prosecutors are permitted to respond to arguments raised by defense counsel as long as they do not stray beyond the evidence."  *State v. Vasquez*, 374 N.J. Super. 252, 260 (App. Div. 2005) (citing *State v. Goode*, 278 N.J. Super. 85, 90 (App. Div. 1994); *State v. Staples*, 263 N.J. Super. 602, 604-06 (App. Div. 1993); *State v. Morais*, 359 N.J. Super. 123, 131, (App. Div. 2003)).  No error exists "so long as the [prosecutor] confines himself in that fashion."  Vasquez, 374 N.J. Super. at 260; Wakefield, 190 N.J. at 457.  A criminal conviction should not be overturned unless the prosecutor's conduct was "so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial."
[brief] “The modern view is that, ‘just as assent may be manifested by words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise may be manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances. ’”  Troy at 366 quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 cmt. a (1981).  The question of whether or not parties acted in a manner sufficient to form an implied contract is a jury question.
[brief] The trial court was obviously saying that the agreement does not confer on Defendant the ability to make multiple submissions once a deficient one is delivered.  The Defendant plainly is looking to exploit the use of the word cure without informing of the full context in which the trial court used the term.  The Defendant's arguments fail to show its interpretation is reasonable or that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.  Therefore, the lower court's decision should be affirmed.
[brief] The present appeal involves the [...]’s ([...]) denial of [...]’s ([...]) request for defense with respect to a prerogative action that [...] filed against [...] on August 23, 2023, [...] v. Office of the County Prosecutor for the County of Monmouth, docket number [...].  (Pa2).  [...] denied the request because: (1) Wright v. State of New Jersey, 169 N.J. 422 (2001), obligates the [...] to provide defense and/or indemnity only when a person or entity is being sued in a civil action seeking damages or for ¹  Because the procedural history and fact histories are closely related, they are presented together for economy and the convenience of the court.
[brief] *PPG Indus.  V. [...]*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1143, [...].  (App. Div. 5/8/2017).  The Plaintiffs, [...], [...] and [...] each owned one of three lots in Jersey City which their predecessors had purchased from [...].  *Id* at 1.  Historically, Goldenberg had purchased the three lots and entered into a railroad siding agreement with [...] to operate a railroad siding which had space of twenty-eight feet of land.  *Id.* at 1.  Goldenberg maintained ownership of the alley but he sold the lots on either side of him and gave railway access easements to the purchasers to service their commercial buildings.  *Id.* at 1.  In 1962 Goldenberg stopped conducting the siding business and by 1965 the railroad siding in the alley stopped.  *Id.* at 2.  Smith acquired the first lot in 1984, Narula acquired the second lot in 2013 and [...] acquired the third lot in 2007 and in 2013, [...] sold his lot to PPG.  *Id.* at 2.  When [...] conducted a search in the process of selling his lot to PPG he discovered that the lot was still titled in Goldenberg’s name.  *Id.* at 2.  The lot owner PPG filed an action to quiet title in 2014.  *Id.* at 2.  In 2014, the contract that Goldenberg had entered into with [...] was terminated.  *Id.* at 2.  During the bench trial, [...] learned that the lot owners since 1981 had maintained the alley that had been owned by Goldenberg, had paved the alley with cement, gravel and asphalt, had erected fences at both ends to limit access to the lots, had stored dumpsters, pallets and equipment in the alley and parked their vehicles in the alley.  *Id.* at 2.  The lot owners upon purchase believed that the title included the alley and at no time did Goldenberg assert title or control over the access to the alley.  *Id.* at 2.  The judge ruled that the lot owners, Smith, Narula and PPG had acquired title of the alley via adverse possession.  *Id.* at 2.  Goldenberg’s title to the alley was extinguished.  *Id.* at 2.  Goldenberg appealed the decision of [...] and claimed that the standard used by the judge which was preponderance of the evidence was wrong and also that he owned the alley.  *Id.* at 2.  The Appellate Court found that Goldenberg failed to assert his rights and object to the actions of the lot owners for 51 years.  *Id.* at 5.  Goldenberg argued that the lot owners had failed to satisfy the factors to acquire the alley in question via adverse possession and the Appellate Court disagreed.  *Id.* at 8, 9.  The decision of the trial court was affirmed.  *Id* at 10.  The history of First Zion and the property in question dates back to 1976 when the property was sold to [...] by [...].
[brief] Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Ammaloy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D.N.J. 1989).  Further, RPC 1.7(a) “reflects ‘the fundamental understanding that an attorney will give complete and undivided loyalty to the client’ [and] ‘should be able to advise the client in such a way as to protect the client’s interests, utilizing his professional training, ability and judgment to the utmost. ’”  J.G. Ries & Sons, Inc. v. Spectraserv, Inc., 384 N.J. Super. 216, 223 (App. Div. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. S.G., 175 N.J. 132, 139 (2003)).  As it pertains to a direct adversarial representation, RPC 1.7(a)(1) is clear and unambiguous in its prohibition: an attorney shall not represent a client in a litigation when representation of another client in that litigation will be directly adverse to the other client.
[brief] Hence, that legislative history cannot be used to limit the scope of § 1692c(b).  Indeed, doing so would render most of the statutory wording superfluous.  Third, to the extent that Defendant may contend that its communication with its agents are not third-party communications, there are two things to keep in mind.  First, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that Defendant’s mail vendor is its agent.  Second, if agents are authorized recipients under § 1692c(b), then the section’s expressed authorization of communications with one specific agent, the debt collector’s attorney, would be rendered superfluous.  Hence, there is no basis for reading in an agent exception to § 1692c(b).
[brief] Even if the Court determines that the arbitration clause is enforceable, the MBPA’s provisions mandating that disputes be adjudicated in a court of law supersedes the FAA under the Twenty-First Amendment.  Notably, this is a matter of first impression in New Jersey.  [...]’s principal case, *John G. Ryan, Inc. v. Molson USA, LLC*, 2005 WL 2977767, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2005), is an unpublished decision of no precedential value that addresses a materially different statute than the MBPA.  In *Ryan*, the ABC Law’s anti-arbitration provision bars wholesaler agreements from requiring arbitration agreements but leaves room for parties to privately contract for an arbitral forum, whereas the MBPA expressly mandates that claims shall be brought in New Jersey courts.  While [...] characterizes the two statute’s anti-arbitration clauses as “mirror images” of each other, they plainly are not.  Moreover, the MBPA’s mandate advances an important policy objective of ensuring “orderly market conditions. ”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.13(b).  IV.
[brief] If Defendants had been sued in 2018, they would have had a much greater chance of successfully serving [...] with a subpoena only a year and a half after the lease negotiations concluded rather than six (6) years after the pertinent acts.  With respect to the loss of evidence, [...] was involved in providing Defendants with Plaintiff’s corporate documents, including the Certificate of Formation, a corporate resolution authorizing Plaintiff to sign the lease, and the Operating Agreement.  [...] provided the corporate documents to Defendant [...] on behalf of Plaintiff on June 27, 2016.  (Pa1132).  The prejudice lies in the fact that Defendants do not have the ability to question [...] about these critical corporate documents.  Similarly, Defendants have pursued a deposition of [...], member of Plaintiff, by requesting the same from Plaintiff’s counsel several times.  However, Plaintiff’s counsel has stated via email that it is not in contact with [...] and cannot produce her for a deposition.  (Pa1177).  Defendants are entitled to depose a known member of Plaintiff with knowledge of the events and circumstances surrounding this litigation.
[brief] (Pa8 to Pa9 (Opinion)).  Appellants’ argument against the application of res judicata incorrectly places emphasis solely upon what issues were resolved in the [...] and whether they were the same as those that Appellants have attempted to assert here through the Complaint.  Appellants’ argument misses the point.  Pursuant to the terms of the Consent Order, it does not matter what claims were decided in the [...], or even how they were decided.  Instead, what matters is that the Consent Order imposes a sixty-day deadline to refile “any of the affirmative claims, counterclaims and/or third-party claims” that were pending in the Chancery Action when they were dismissed via the Consent Order in 2018.  (Pa110 at ¶3 (Consent Order)(emphasis added)).  The Consent Order fully and finally resolved how, where, and when Appellants could refile their Chancery Action claims.  The deadline for doing so commenced upon the “adjudication” of the [...], which the Trial Court properly determined to have taken place upon entry of the Nacirema Award.  (Pa8 (Opinion)).  Thus, once the sixty-day deadline passed, the Consent Order barred the institution of the present action.  Moreover, the Consent Order required the action to be brought in the Chancery Division, not the Law Division.  There is no doubt the Consent Order is a valid and final adjudication as to when Appellants claims would be time barred and where Appellants had to go within the fixed time to preserve their claims.  Once that sixty-day time period passed, the claims could no longer be asserted based upon the final ruling embodied in the Consent Order.  Such a final ruling is precisely the stuff to which res judicata applies.  The Trial Court did not err in this alternative finding to support dismissal of Appellants’ claims.
[brief] There, the Highway Department sought to condemn a tract of land for two reasons (1) in order to transplant shrubs and trees from a tract of land the Department had formerly used as a nursery but which the State was turning into an office building, and (2) to potentially erect service buildings at some point in the future.  11 N.J. Super. 264, 269 (Law Div. 1951).  The Law Division rejected the taking because the Department’s statute did not give it authority to condemn for these purposes.  Id. at 269–70.  The articulation of a present public use to justify a condemnation is the essential first step in determining whether a condemnor is exceeding its statutory authorization or operating in bad faith.  A prospective condemnor must demonstrate why it is taking a property at that time.  Here, prior to filing and during the “bona fide negotiations” period required by N.J.S.A. 20:3-6, the Township alleged the taking was in the public interest for open space without acknowledging the land swap.  Only after challenged by the defendants did the Township acknowledge the swap with the Developer, but still the public record is devoid of any meaningful indication of how the subject properties will be utilized by the Township and there are no limitations on the Developer’s use of the property it is receiving.  It was therefore improper for the trial court to find the Township is taking the property for open space based only on Ordinance No. 15-23.  (1T22-6)  There is no evidence in the record to confirm that is the Township’s planned use for the property given the Township’s agreed-upon land swap with a private developer.  The use for the land is still unknown, and therefore the trial court erred in finding a valid public purpose for the taking of Defendants’ private property.
[brief] Consequently, the statements contained in the SUF, all of which were properly supported with citations to the evidential record, should be “deemed admitted” for purposes of the motion.  R. 4:46-2(b).  The reported case law confirms that the movant’s statement of material facts, if properly supported, is deemed admitted when the non-moving party does not provide a response that complies with R. 4:46-2(b).  In *Housel v. Theodoridis*, 314 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 1998), the plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that was supported by a statement of material facts in compliance with R. 4:46-2(a).  The defendant did not submit a response as required by R. 4:46-2(b), but the Law Division judge nonetheless denied the motion.  *Id.* at 600-01.  The Appellate Division in *Housel* reversed and granted the motion.  The appellate panel described the requirements of R. 4:46-2 and ruled that the failure to respond to a properly supported statement of material facts was “significant” and required the movant’s factual statements to be “deemed admitted. ”  *Id.* at 602.  Other courts have reached the same conclusion.
[brief] "One would therefore fairly expect that if the Legislature intended such a sea change it would have done so directly, not inferentially."98  As detailed above, contract cases routinely come up in the context of the TCA’s notice requirement and those cases survive dismissal based on the supposed failure to meet that requirement.  Such long-standing custom in how the TCA is interpreted and applied and the fact that the Legislature has not amended the law to interfere with such traditional practices, support plaintiff’s position.99  The Legislature is presumed aware of statutory interpretation by the State’s courts.100  In the face of the many cited cases denying dismissal of contract claims brought against government entities, the Legislature intended to leave unaltered the present statutory scheme.101  Since the Legislature - presumed as it is to be aware of its laws and how they are being litigated - never took steps to amend the TCA to refine the contract exclusion clearly indicates its satisfaction with the --- 98 Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 457 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2019).
[brief] On June 7, 2024, after the trial court entered the Noncompliance Order determining that [...] had failed to constitutionally comply with its Third Round Mount Laurel obligation by at least 602 units, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause seeking temporary and preliminary restraints.  On June 18, 2024, the trial court entered an Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints, which enjoined [...] from taking any further action with respect to the condemnation and redevelopment of the Property.  (Ja500).  On the July 5, 2024 return date, the trial court issued an oral decision and on July 8, 2024 entered an Order on Return Date of OTSC, pursuant to which the court granted a preliminary injunction continuing the restraints against [...] regarding its ability to condemn or redevelop the Property.  (Da9).
[brief] Defendants assert that Defendant [...] promptly reported the charge pay to HR after learning about it from another employee (Rb34-35).  However, if Defendant [...] had prior knowledge of, or explicitly approved, the charge pay, this purported "discovery" is a charade.  The charge pay issue was elevated to HR by Defendant [...] shortly after the June incident and while complaints about her behavior were pending.  The timing of the elevation, after she learned of the pending investigation into her harassment, becomes a pretext – a calculated move by Defendant [...] to deflect attention from her own misconduct and to derail further investigation into her harassment.