ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] On December 17, 2004, the [...] and the [...] amended a prior policy statement so as to require that when a statement is obtained following a stationhouse interrogation in any case involving a first, second or third degree crime (or any case involving a juvenile age 14 or older suspected of committing a crime enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26a(2)(a)), the law enforcement entity involved either video or audio record any final statement obtained, or any acknowledgment by the suspect of the content of a written statement.  That Amended Policy also put into effect a staggered time table with regard to effective dates.  For all first and second degree crimes, the electronic recording requirement would go into effect on September 1, 2005.  For third degree and juvenile cases, the requirement was to go into effect on January 1, 2006.  The Amended Policy also noted that the [...], in consultation with the [...], would subsequently make a final determination as to whether to issue a law enforcement directive “requiring expansion of the electronic recordation policy so as to cover the entire stationhouse interrogation process in certain cases.
[brief] The trial court erred in declaring that since there had been a subdivision, as a matter of law, the buyer could not rely on the recorded subdivision, four deeds and his own survey, but instead (unlike the two surveyors, five attorneys, numerous municipal officials and the [...] themselves), he should have (1) noticed a pre-subdivision deed showed former Lot 3 as 105’ wide, (2) examined a microscopic tax map inserted in the recorded subdivision map showing former Lot 2 as 80’ wide, (3) added the width of old Lots 2 and 3 together to determine they were a combined 185’ wide before the subdivision, (4) somehow known Lot 2 was supposed to be 120’ wide based on the unrecorded private agreement and (5) concluded new Lot 3 was “clearly and obviously” 65’ and not 66.3’ as indicated on the two most recent surveys.  This tortured line of reasoning is not “notice” in any case cited by any party.  The burden placed on [...] as a “searcher” is not reasonable, and the reasoning behind it essentially calls upon equity to assist the party who was in the best position to avoid the error in the first place.  Judgment should be reversed and entered in favor of [...].
[brief] A.  An Implied Easement Appurtenant Must Be Established by Clear and Convincing Evidence  As they did below, Plaintiffs again argue, contrary to New Jersey law, that the burden of proof to establish an implied easement appurtenant is a mere preponderance of the evidence.  Plaintiffs are wrong.  Neither Point Pleasant Manor Bldg. Co. v. Brown, 43 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 1956), nor State v. E. Shores, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 300 (Ch. Div. 1974), says that the standard of proof for an implied easement appurtenant is a preponderance of the evidence.  Rather, as Defendants demonstrated before the trial court and in their opening brief on this appeal, clear and convincing evidence is required to establish an implied easement appurtenant.  See Eileen T. Quigley, Inc. v. Miller Family Farms, 266 N.J. Super. 283, 294 (App. Div. 1993) (stating that “implied easements must be established by proofs which are clear and convincing as to all elements”); A. J. & J. O. Pilar, Inc. v. Lister Corp., 38 N.J. Super. 488, 498-500 (App. Div.), aff’d, 22 N.J. 75 (1956) (stating that “the proof of all of the requisite and essential elements of an alleged implied grant should be clear and convincing”).
[brief] .......................................................................................  8  POINT I  THE JUDGE PROPERLY ADDRESSED THE FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL.  ...........................................................................................................  8  A.  No court has adopted defendant’s view that fingerprint analysis is unreliable.  .................................................................  9  B.  The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to bar expert testimony regarding fingerprint analysis.  .....................  13  C.  The trial court correctly denied defendant’s requests regarding the fingerprint evidence at each stage of trial.  ..............  18  1.  The court properly denied defendant’s request to include a question on voir dire concerning prospective jurors’ opinions on the reliability of fingerprint analysis.  ...........................................  19  2.  The court limited the expert testimony on fingerprint analysis to the proper extent.  ..............................................  22  3.  The court correctly issued the model jury charge on fingerprint analysis instead of defendant’s proposed charge.  ................................................................. 28  4.  Any error in the admission of fingerprint-analysis evidence was harmless.  ............................................................  31  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED LAY-OPINION TESTIMONY REGARDING THE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS.  ..................................................  33  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING AN EXTENDED SENTENCING TERM AND PAROLE DISQUALIFIER.  .................. 39  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] claimed that he and defendant were at the [...].  (22T217-11 to 17).  He saw defendant on the stage and was talking to a woman when a commotion broke out.  (22T217-18 to 24).  He claimed not to know what the commotion was about, but it looked to him as if the attendees from Newark were throwing up gang signs.  (22T217-24 to 25; 22T219-21 to 24).  [...] claimed that shortly after the commotion, he exited the [...] and snuck a bottle of alcohol from --- 1  Defendant had no permit to purchase or carry a handgun.
[directive] 9)  Informed my client of the availability of the Veterans Diversion Program for eligible service enacted by L. 2017, c. 42, and codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-23 to -31.  members which was I understand that my client must appear at the Intake unit of the Criminal Division for an intake interview if required by the court.  I understand that my client must appear at the first appearance unless these requirements are established to the satisfaction of the court.
[brief] Remanding the matter again, will not change any of the evidence submitted or testified to.  At no time, was either party limited in time to re-create the hearing.  Remanding the hearing will not provide any new information, as the Board has already conducted the re-do hearing, which was required by law.  As such, the matter should not be remanded, as the Board has already complied with the law.  The Trial Court correctly found that if the Zoning Board did not conduct the re-do hearing, the Trial Court would have had to remand the matter for a re-do hearing.  Since this was already done, there is no reason or benefit to remand the matter back to re-do the hearing.  PA 859  The Zoning Board complied with the requirements of the law and conducted a re-do hearing, which did not limit the Appellants or the Respondents and both were given ample opportunity to recreate the record.  As such, the Appellate Court should affirm the decision of the Trial Court denying the request to remand the matter back to the Zoning Board to re-do the re-do hearing.
[directive] Such assistance may include retrieval of ballots when deputized by election officials as part of a retrieval team.  When officers are assisting election officials as part of a retrieval team, they should do so in plain clothes rather than a police uniform whenever possible.  See “New Jersey Guide to Ballot Drop Boxes” (updated Sept. 16, 2022).  Moreover, one or more officers may be assigned to a senior residential center that reported a threat or safety concern, but such assigned officer shall not interfere with any person present at the location for the purpose of voting.  N.J.S.A. 19:6-16(a).  Fourth, no police officer, whether on-duty or off-duty, in or out of uniform, shall 4 remain or stand within 100 feet of an early voting location or polling place during the conduct of an election “unless present at the location in response to a request for assistance” as noted above or as otherwise permitted by law.  N.J.S.A. 19:6-15.1(b).  Similarly, no police officer shall remain or stand within 100 feet of a ballot drop box in use during the conduct of an election except to address a disturbance or respond to a request for assistance at the location as discussed above.  N.J.S.A. 19:63-16.1(b)(2)(f).
[brief] ”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 776 (1989).  The Court must search the complaint “in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim....”  *Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005).  For purposes of analysis, the plaintiff is entitled to “every reasonable inference of fact… [and the examination] should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach. ”  *Id.* at 165.  Dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint can be appropriate after the complaint has been “accorded…[a] meticulous and indulgent examination. …. ”  *Printing Mart-Morristown*, 116 N.J. at 772.  Even when affording the applicable *de novo* standard of review, *Stop and Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. Cty. of Bergen*, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (App. Div. 2017), there is no basis to reverse the trial court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
[brief] THE HONORABLE [...] FAILED TO CONSIDER AND/OR APPLY THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE TO THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Da 1)  In New Jersey, a Property Settlement Agreement is one of the most important parts of the divorce process.  The clearer and more detailed it is, the less of a risk of more litigation after the divorce is finalized.  A Property Settlement Agreement, also known as a Marital Settlement Agreement, is the final agreement between two ex-spouses pertaining to all issues regarding their divorce.  Not only does this contract determine the distribution of property and assets, but it includes rules about child custody, parenting time, child support, and alimony.  A good Property Settlement Agreement should encompass everything and carefully detail the rights and responsibilities of each party and creating a comprehensive contract should be a couple’s main goal during divorce proceedings.  A skilled lawyer in the area must consider the likely outcomes regarding any Property Settlement Agreement they draft, the parties fully execute and is filed with the court.  It is the drafting attorney’s duty to conduct his/her due diligence with regard to every issue encompassed within the Property Settlement Agreement.
[brief] Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY LETTER  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] [...], the firm’s managing partner, who was largely responsible for the firm’s trust account and business records, had been improperly transferring money between various client trust accounts to cover firm expenses.  This was discovered by [...], the only partner licensed to practice in New Jersey, who then agreed to participate.  During this time frame, [...] filled out an application for malpractice insurance.  The application asked whether the firm knew of any “error or omissions in professional services that may reasonably be expected to be the basis of a professional liability claim, to which [...] answered “no” and then signed a warranty statement.  A policy was subsequently issued.
[brief] (7T88:4).  The storm ended at 8:30p.m. on March 7, 2018.  (7T88:5).  Plaintiff arrived and subsequently fell at 7:30 a.m. on March 8, 2028.  (Id.)  Model Jury Charge 5.20(B)(2)(b) only speaks to liability for defects in public streets and sidewalks.  (7T88:11-13).  Then specifically, 5.20(B)(2)(b) deals with snow and ice abutting, and it says liability of owner, commercial property for defects snow and ice accumulation, or other dangerous conditions in abutting sidewalks.  (7T88:13-17).  Plaintiff argued as she did not slip and fall in an abutting sidewalk; 5.20(B)(2)(b) should not be charged because the law has not been expanded to the duty for a commercial owner and his private parking lot, twelve hours after a storm.  (1T88:17-22).  After further arguments, the trial court decided that it was going to charged 5.20(f).
[brief] He event invited [...] to contact the Corruptions Unit at the [...], if she’s unsure, to confirm they are investigating.  (1T Pg. 17, lines 11-14).  He repeated the charges of bias and lack of justice (1T Pg. 18, lines 6-8).  He concluded by saying he did “nothing wrong, and all you to is harass me.  It stops today. ”  (1T, Pg. 18, lines 22-23.)  In that exchange, on September 16, 2022, [...] repeatedly accused [...] of bias, harassment, permitting the weaponizing of the courts, and corruption, and further explained that he had reported those allegations to the FBI.  He explicitly stated that he wasn’t getting justice.  Nevertheless, [...] did not recuse herself from acting as trial judge in this matter.
[brief] On January 25, 2021, defendant encountered [...] crossing the street in New Brunswick.  (5T101-8 to 9; 108-7 to 109-6).  Defendant was in his vehicle; [...] was on foot.  *Ibid.*  [...] was in the middle of the street, looking at her phone, and therefore preventing defendant from proceeding.  (5T109-7 to 19).  Defendant honked his horn at [...] and startled her.  (5T109-21 to 23).  As a result, a verbal altercation began which culminated in [...] kicking defendant’s vehicle.  (5T109-22 to 111-3).  Defendant drove off before returning and confronting [...] (5T111-11 to 113-5).  The verbal altercation continued, at which point defendant retrieved a starter pistol from his vehicle in the sight of [...] (5T114-8 to 115-5).  Defendant again shouted at [...] before she fled in fear of defendant; ultimately hiding and seeking help from a nearby business.  (5T115-13 to 16).  [...] stated that defendant told her to get into his vehicle.  (3T63-17 to 19).  In the midst of this, defendant was engaged in a turbulent relationship with [...].  (4T112-6 to 4T176-25).  Following the termination of that relationship, Perez advised the [...] (“[...]”) that defendant had asked her to bribe [...] and, failing that, have her killed.  (5T114-19 to 115-25).  This was the foundation of the witness tampering charge.  At trial, Perez testified for the State.
[brief] **  Essentially, defendant argues that because plaintiff’s experts opined on nursing home violations, defendant was entitled, without calling [...] as a witness, to use [...]’s unsubstantiated opinion that there were no violations.  Once again, the defense argument is not only flawed but belied by defense counsel’s own admissions.  Defense counsel correctly observed before trial that, “[...] is the only expert in this case that gives the opinion regarding violation of the New Jersey residents rights.  He is the only one. ”  12T24:18-20.  “[...], their nursing expert, has no opinions regarding the NHA rights. ”  12T25:3-4.  Why then was defendant able to use [...]’s opinions to “rebut” [...] when [...] had not offered any opinion on the violation of [...]’s NHA rights?  Even *arguendo* if defendant could use the hearsay to cross-examine [...], there was no basis for using it with [...].  As a matter of law, however, defendant was **not** permitted to use those opinions in any manner without producing [...].
[brief] As noted, the most serious charges issued alleging impairment while on duty were withdrawn prior to the initiation of the trial.\textsuperscript{2} T1-9:15-17; T1 11:13-20.  Nevertheless, as discussed \textit{supra}, the Decision made findings that Appellant was impaired while on duty and/or otherwise abused opioids based upon the improperly credited “expert” testimony of [...].  As these determinations are inextricably intertwined with the Decision’s other findings the matter, if not remanded for a new trial, must be remanded for reimposition of an appropriate penalty.  The concept of progressive discipline has long been recognized as a bedrock principle of civil service jurisprudence.  See, \textit{Town of West New York v. Bock}, 38 N.J. 500 (1962).  An imposed penalty shall be rejected as arbitrary or unreasonable wherein it is “so disproportionate to the offense…as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness. ”  \textit{In re Stallworth}, 208 N.J. 182, 193 (2011), citing \textit{In Re Herman}, 192 N.J. 19, 28-29 (2007).  Respondent’s argument that Appellant’s prior disciplinary history justifies the ultimate punishment of termination is incompatible with the facts.  (Pa33-34)  The totality of Appellant’s disciplinary history over the course of an almost twenty (20) year career shows a handful of minor rule infractions \textsuperscript{2}  Respondent complains that Appellant should be “admonished” for the insinuation that these charges were withdrawn based upon a lack of sufficient evidence.  While it is true that the basis for the withdrawal is unstated, the Respondent’s observation that was done because the charges could not be proven is reasonably inferred by that action.  If there was another reason for the withdrawal of the most serious charges sustained by the FNDA, it remains unidentified by Respondent.  resulting in the issuance of counseling, a single written reprimand and a sole serious rule infraction dating back to 2011 for which Appellant served a four day suspension with an additional three days held in abeyance.  Da25-26.  Respondent takes pains to note that two of Appellant’s minor discipline involved, respectively, a failure to list medication and violation of sick leave policy.  While Respondent is correct that these charges have similarity to charges at issue in this matter, it is more noteworthy that the previously imposed penalty was merely a written reprimand.  While it is understood that a subsequent violation of the same rule may justify imposition of “harsher” discipline, the jump from the most minor form of discipline to termination is unjustified.  In any event, the Decision did not rely upon the concept of progressive discipline or Appellant’s prior disciplinary record in imposing the penalty of termination.  Instead, the Decision concludes that the totality of the sustained charges constituted a sufficient basis for the termination.
[directive] The Assistant Prosecutor and Basic Detective and Investigator training curriculum should contain information and teaching strategies to ensure that prosecutors and investigators are sensitive to the needs of victims and are informed, knowledgeable and supportive of existing laws, services and programs for victims.  B.  Property retained for prosecution should be returned as soon as possible but not later than 45 days of the judgment of conviction unless evidentiary requirements pertaining to an appeal prohibit it (not applicable to firearms and contraband).  COMMENTARY  Victims should not have to battle the justice system to get their property back or wait for months or years for its return.  There are, of course, some items that will have particular evidentiary significance because of their character or condition and these must be retained.  Other items, however, can be presented to the jury just as effectively by photograph.  Prosecutors should recognize their responsibility to release property as expeditiously as possible, to take the initiative in doing so, and to establish the procedures necessary to bring this about.  C.
[brief] ...[W]e apply a deferential standard here because the trial court determined the validity of the retainer agreement by taking the testimony of the parties and by making credibility and factual findings....  "Deferece is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'  "  ....That is so because an appellate court's review of a cold record is no substitute for the trial court's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand....  We may not overturn the trial court's factfindings unless we conclude that those findings are "manifestly unsupported" by the "reasonably credible evidence" in the record....  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 594-595 (2020) (citations omitted); see Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (citations omitted) ("'...[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interest of justice....’”).  The Trial Court’s denial of the two motions for reconsideration are to be reviewed under the even more deferential standard of abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (“We review the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. ”)  II.
[brief] In contrast, *Roach* focused on the unjustified disparity between defendants' minimum sentences and found “the disparity between the sentences is not minimal it is huge: thirty additional years in prison. ”  146 N.J. at 216, 233.  The disparity between petitioner’s and his co-defendants’ sentences are manifestly more huge.  Petitioner received an aggregate sentence of 70 years in prison, 57.9 years to be served before he is eligible parole, making this a *de facto* life sentence.  His equally culpable and similarly situated co-defendants received exponentially lesser terms that gave them the opportunity for a meaningful life after serving their terms.
[brief] Here, Appellant’s Complaint failed to include allegations that she suffered any material harm – financial or reputational – which was caused by Respondent’s use of a letter vendor.  Appx., at Pa1-Pa8.  Appellant did not allege the letter vendor or one of its employees misused her personal or financial information, or transferred it to someone else, or that the transfer of her data resulted in an actual theft of her identity.  *Id.*  She did not even allege that any individual at the vendor (or elsewhere) ever personally viewed the information, as opposed to the vendor entity electronically assimilating the information into letters and then printing and mailing those letters via automated processes.  *Id.*  See *Elshabba v. Jefferson Capital systems, LLC*, Case No. PAS-L-1676-21 (N.J. Sup. Ct. April 26, 2023) (“*Elshabba Transcript*”), at T8-9, (finding no standing for letter vendor theory of liability).
[brief] [...] is a board-certified neurosurgeon who specialized in complex spine disorders.  He is a practicing neurosurgeon who is also a Residency Director for the Neurosurgeon Residency Program in conjunction with the [...].  In addition, he teaches a neurosurgery board certification course specifically relating to the spine.  (2T140-6 to 25).  He is affiliated with multiple (8 – 10) local hospitals, and actively performs 200 – 300 surgeries yearly at these facilities.  He estimates that 85 per cent of these surgeries are spine, and 15 per cent are cranial.  He was accepted as an expert in neurosurgery without defense questions or objection.
[brief] (Pa167, --- 4 [...]’s designated newspapers for all periods relevant to this appeal were [...], [...], and [...].  The notice attached a copy of the meeting agenda and provided as follows:  FOR YOUR RECORD ONLY!  -  A Special meeting of the [...] has been called for 7pm on Thursday, December 16, 2021, to review Ordinance 1423-21  An Ordinance Amending the [...] Redevelopment Plan in Accordance with the Provisions of the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law.