ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Exhibit 2, Exhibit B to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit C to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit D to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit E to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit F to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit G to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit H to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit I to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit J to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit K to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit L to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit M to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 2, Exhibit N to Report of [...], undated, filed May 31, 2018
[brief] The trial court ruled that Plaintiff’s Second Application “ignores complaints of shadows resulting from the proposed building’s height and proximity to the property line. ”  Pa39.  This is nothing more than mere speculation as the trial court could not have been equipped to determine the size, location, or duration of any shadow on any neighboring properties.  Further, [...] opined that the “proposed increased floor area is supported by the lot size and location, permitted uses, oversized property, provided setbacks and buffers, appropriate building massing, and adequate parking. ”  Pa393.  Regarding increased FAR  [...] testified that the development provides for appropriate setbacks and buffering, as the “provided setbacks will allow for light, air, open space between the adjacent properties and buildings” and “[t]he proposed landscaping will provide screening and buffering further minimizing any impacts from the proposed building. ”  Id.  As such, the trial court’s determination that the proposed building was too intense for the proposed site, runs counter to Plaintiff’s experts and is speculative at best.
[brief] ”  *Roberto* was not constrained by the holding of *Hartford*, which could appropriately be limited in application to retroactive application of new State law to the pipeline of cases.  The Court is further cited to the recent Memorandum Decision of the Honorable [...], U.S.B.J., United States Bankruptcy Court, District of New Jersey, in *[...]*, [...]; [...] (June 18, 2024), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A. ”  The *[...]* decision allowed an independent takings claim raised as an adversary proceeding in a bankruptcy case to proceed under Roberto and Tyler based upon the fact that the property owner had filed the bankruptcy to save the property, notwithstanding that more than two (2) years had elapsed since entry of final judgment and the bankrupt judgment defendant had made two motions to vacate under Rule 4:50-1 in the Superior Court that had each been denied without prejudice.  What is clear from this case law is that the Tyler/Roberto pipeline is not limited to cases on direct appeal, as [...] and [...] posit.  Appellants’ case is a direct analog to Roberto in that is presents a timely and continuously open and prosecuted motion to vacate a final judgment.  [...], [...] and [...], by way of examples, interpret the pipeline far more expansively.  On this basis, the Court should determine that Appellants takings claim is timely under Tyler and Roberto and overrule the lower court.  POINT II
[brief] | Misappropriation by Category of Fake Expense | Amount Converted Between September 30, 2003 | Amount Converted Between October 1, 2003 and 2011 | |--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| | Management Fees | $11,248,000 | $13,321,285 | | Interest Expense | $7,686,295 | $6,868,285 | | Non-[...] Employee Payroll and Fringe Benefits | $1,663,110 | $3,986,381 | | [...] Salaries | $306,000 | $1,017,999 | | Commissions | $259,000 | $45,000 | | Rent and Office Expenses | $552,465 | $93,450 | | Other Expenses | $138,440 | $544,903 | | Insurance Expenses | $192,600 | $935,771 | | Advertising Expenses | $138,439 | $149,495 | | **Totals** | **$22,366,349** | **$26,962,569** |
[brief] Sub area one, excuse me, sub area two will be as I mentioned developed with 1.15 spaces per residential unit and in phase one, there’s going to be 204 spaces, 109 at the ground floor level of the two buildings, residential buildings that are being proposed as part of that phase.  74 spaces that are going to be provided within a surface, an associated surface parking lot that is part of that phase and 21 on-street parking.  In phase two which contemplates a construction of the third building that I had previously mentioned there’s going to be 60 spaces at the ground level, and by the way, that building was going to be constructed at the general location where the surface parking lot in phase one is going to be located.  That parking lot is going to be removed and developed with the multifamily residential development and then there’s also going to be 150 spaces allocated for public parking where the current go-cart parking lot is located and that would be on the eastern side of the proposed development.  As I mentioned in phase two, phase two contemplates the potential of a small scale retail or small scale non-residential development within the multifamily residential building that could be some retail, personal services or potential restaurant use.  We don’t have the specifics of that as of yet but the plan allows for that possibility.
[brief] The De Novo Court Erred in Affirming the Arrest and Conviction Given [...] Did Not Comply with the Scoring Protocols for Administering the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests.  (Da21-22).  In this case, the trial court overlooked [...]’s argument that [...] did not use the proper scoring factors.  (2T56:20-57:1; 3T15:14-16:15.)  The evidence in this matter was extremely limited.  Because [...]’ testimony as to the scoring factors was given great weight, this Court should reverse because [...] admitted that he did not comply with the standardized scoring protocols for administering these sobriety tests.  (1T64:6-66:3.)  “[A] conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol will be sustained on proofs of the fact of intoxication – [as shown by] a defendant's demeanor and physical appearance – coupled with proofs as to the cause of intoxication – i.e., the smell of alcohol, an admission of the consumption of alcohol, or a lay opinion of alcohol intoxication. ”  State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529, 549 (2023)(quoting State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 588 (2006)).  The State bears the burden to prove both intoxication and the cause of intoxication.  Id. at 550.  “The three SFSTs were deemed the most accurate tests for determining alcohol-caused impairment.  The two psychophysical tests in this step that are part of the three-test SFST battery are the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests.  The third SFST is the HGN test, which is an eye exam covered previously in Step 4. ”  Olenowski, 255 N.J. at 555, n. 8.  The “horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) exam, which checks for the lack of the smooth eye pursuit, sustained eye jerking at maximum deviation (where the eye is turned as far to the side as possible), and the angle of onset at which the eyes first begin to jerk, all while tracking the eyes in a horizontal path following a stimulus.
[brief] [...]’s Practice of Transmitting GPS Coordinates Away from the Exact Location of Service  [...] testified that after serving an individual, it is his practice to press a button on his cellular phone application that transmits his current GPS coordinates to a central database.  T4:16-21.  [...] further testified that he does not immediately transmit the GPS coordinates after service.  T4 18:5-24.  Rather, [...] will drive and press the GPS coordinates transmission button at a location away from the service location.
[brief] See id. at 583.  This is the same analysis as Miller:  “[t]o withstand the strict constitutional scrutiny required here, the restriction on signs must be tied to a compelling municipal interest as well as to the uses permitted in a given zone. ”  83 N.J. at 414 [emphasis added].  [...], too, focused on comparing the proposed billboard with what was permitted where the proposed billboard was not:  To be sure, the record demonstrates that the Township has labored to preserve the bucolic character of sections of the municipality and to minimize the impact on a residential neighborhood across the highway.  The Township Council also cited safety concerns.  The Township, however, permits industrial and corporate development and has directed that static billboards may be erected in the M-2 zone.  In fact, three static billboards can be erected along I-287 in the M-2 zone.  The record provides no basis to discern how three static billboards are more aesthetically palatable than a single digital billboard.  Clearly, the action by the governing body was informed by the work of the Planning Board and the advice of the Township Planner.  That official informed the governing body that there was an absence of research upon which he could recommend standards to address those concerns.  [...], supra at 583-584.  [...] did not do this and the trial court let [...] off the constitutional hook.
[brief] Federal rules are to be construed to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."  If a plaintiff chooses to reject a reasonable offer, then it is fair that he not be allowed to shift the cost of continuing the litigation to the defendant in the event that his gamble produces an award that is less than or equal to the amount offered.  But it is hardly fair or even-handed to make the plaintiff's rejection of an utterly frivolous settlement offer a watershed event that transforms a prevailing defendant's right to costs in the discretion of the trial judge into an absolute right to recover the costs incurred after the offer was made.
[directive] constitutional statute and the implement that Rules Court in or Law Reform Bail the in codified 66 Page also category  This third 7.4.3. subsection see history, juvenile violent a has defendant the was and degree) of (regardless indictable crime an is offense present the where cases includes form any to subject or offense was for another release pretrial on was defendant while committed supervision parole life for and supervision community (including monitoring post-conviction of third the in addressed indicators risk the because that Note 7.4.4.
[brief] The Court in its Order of November 2, 2022, found that the services rendered by [...]’s attorney were only reasonable in the amount of 111 hours at $400.  While the Court discussed why it was removing some of the fees at issue, which included $34,768 that was incurred in the filing of the cross-motion, it did not explain why it was reducing the fee further.  Moreover, [...]’s fee application was not merely the filing of a Certification of Services.  It was a necessary response to the distorted history presented by [...] to a judge newly assigned to the matter.  [...] herself commended [...]’s attorney for her diligence noting that but for her efforts, the results of litigation would have been starkly different, and an injustice would have befallen the parties.  The Court appointed Administratrix thanked [...]'s counsel on the record and clearly supported every penny of the fee request.  [...] Smith stated:
[brief] See id. at 551.  In Kleine, the brother of the plaintiff, [...], was presented with stacks of paper to sign and initial to admit his sister to a new nursing home, after removing her from a different nursing home where she was caused to suffer trauma.  See Kleine, 445 N.J. Super. at 548-549.  [...] was left alone to sign the stacks of paper with no explanation or instructions but ended up signing a waiver to his sister’s right to a jury trial and right to appeal any adverse decision.  Id. at 549.  The only thing [...] was told about the documents was that he was required to sign them “right away” because his sister was being admitted to the facility.  Ibid.  The Kleine Court opined had the judge assumed the truth of the sworn statements of [...] and considered the language of the agreement in the light most favorable to [...], “the one-sided waiver extracted by defendant, as well as an assumption of the truth of [...]’s assertions about the manner in which the contract was formed, would have required an evidentiary hearing related to unconscionability. ”  Id. at 551.  The facts that demanded an evidentiary hearing in Kleine are present in this case.
[brief] The Trial Court correctly dismissed Appellants Prerogative Writ Action and Amended Verified Complaint as Appellant failed to provide any relevant evidence to support his claims.  Further, the Trial Court’s decision was a well-reasoned decision which directly applied the evidentiary rules to the facts at hand and declined to consider evidence which bears no logical connection to the actual evidence.  For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the appeal and uphold the Trial Court’s March 27, 2024, ruling.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, [...] (aka the [...])
[brief] At deposition, [...], [...]’s Manager of Central Sales and Services, testified that services [...] sells to municipalities include adding or subtracting lighting from their locations (Pa335).  Municipalities make choices of what type of lights they want; and [...] offers different types of products to service municipalities’ needs (Pa335).  Chester was presented with the following excerpt from a document entitled “Tariff for Electric Service”, precisely a section entitled “Selection of Lighting Option”:  [...] will assist in the selection of lighting options by making recommendations for the most appropriate option based on the customer's defined illumination needs.  However, responsibility for the final selection shall at all times rest with the customer.  Any advice given by [...] will be based on the customer's statements and by giving such advice, [...] assumes no responsibility, nor shall it incur liability.  (Pa366-67).  Chester acknowledged that, consistent with this language, a [...] sales representative may offer to replace an obsolete product with the current one “that will fit the customer’s needs” (Pa371).  Chester also acknowledged that, when a customer is interacting with one of his sales representatives, the customer usually will start with a need.  Based on a particular need expressed, the recommendation made by the representative “is specifically detailed to the needs of what the customer is looking for” (Pa371) (emphasis added).  H.
[brief] Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (just like their motion to [...] in the other four actions) did not dispute that plaintiffs are consumers or that their real estate contract is a consumer transaction.  Indeed, as noted earlier, the CFA defines a “consumer contract” as “a written agreement in which an individual… purchases real or personal property. ” (NJSA 56:12 – 1 (e)) and defendants admit that plaintiffs’ contract to purchase is regulated by the [...].  Since defendants did not argue below that plaintiffs’ contract was a commercial contract rather than a consumer contract, they cannot do so here.
[brief] Appellant concedes, as Respondent argues, that D.A.B. is factually distinguishable from the instant matter.  It is, however, hard to determine which matter is worse.  A victim’s unwillingness to testify against their accuser in a domestic violence matter is commonplace in our municipal and superior courts.  An officer withholding evidence, perjuring himself only to take the stand a second time and maintaining his deceit to win might be the most egregious and deplorable conduct an officer can engage in.
[brief] ”  Id. At 275.  See also Willson v. Gerber Products Company, [...], 2023 WL 8889528 at *5 (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2023) (citing Societie Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987)) (same); PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current NEW JERSEY COURT RULES, Comment R. 4:14-2 (“Paragraph (c) of this rule is taken from Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
[brief] Cases  Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450 (1967)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1963)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 1996)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  27-28
[brief] The record in this matter demonstrates that the legislation in question touches the public interest in a variety ways, including through the expenditure of public funds, the generation of ratables, political upheaval, density and traffic.  Moreover, this is not a situation where [...] adopted a “wait and see” approach prior to commencing litigation.  The Township’s publication of a statutorily-deficient notice left [...] and the public at large completely in the dark as to Ordinance No. 13-2022’s purpose until the hearing conducted by the [...] on [...]’s site plan application a half a year later, which site plan application was based upon the newly-established zoning standards.  See Gregory v. Borough of Avalon, 391 N.J. Super. 181, 190 (App. Div. 2007) (“[A] close relationship between the actions of different agencies of municipal government is a circumstance that weighs in favor of an enlargement of time for challenging the action of the agency that acted first. ”).  But for the Township’s deficient notice, [...] would have known of Ordinance No. 13-2022’s purpose and would have timely filed this lawsuit.
[directive] In Part 2, the defendant or defense attorney must provide information related to the defendant's residence and whether defendant will have access to an electrical It power outlet to charge the EM device.  also reaffirms that the defendant if understands that ordered to EM with home detention, defendant is not permitted to leave the residence except for express purposes specifically articulated in the Pretrial Release Order, or on formal application to the court and approval by a judge.  if  In addition, the defendant must provide employment information and, applicable, medical information related to the defendant's need to go to medical appointments, as well as the need to attend appointments with their defense attorney.  There is also a space to request permission to leave the home for other specific purposes.  Finally, EM the defendant will be required to certify each time they submit an Screening of Form that residing at the provided address will not be a violation any court order, of condition release, DCP&P agreements, or any restraining orders.  B.
[brief] Tr. Ct. Op. at 10 (Da128).  Under the policies, cisgender students may decide at any time to lean more or less heavily into expressing their masculinity or femininity, and the school does not call their parents except in the unusual circumstance that a student’s particular gender expression raises alarms that demand such an intervention.  For gender-nonconforming students, the presumption is reversed: the schools must notify their parents of their gender expression unless some showing of harm counsels against notification.
[brief] Under Rule 4:46-2, a motion for summary judgment requires a 28 day advance notice, not 16 day regular motion notice and: shall be served with briefs, a statement of material facts and with or without supporting affidavits.  The statement of material facts shall set forth in separately numbered paragraphs a concise statement of each material fact as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue together with a citation to the portion of the motion record establishing the fact or demonstrating that it is uncontroverted.  R. 4:46-2(a).  No such notice was provided; the motion judge did not convert the Rule 4:6-2(e) motion into one under Rule 4:46-2.
[brief] 45a Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed October 5, 2023 .............................................................  45a Exhibit A to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (New Jersey Police Crash Investigation Report) ……………………  49a Exhibit B to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment ([...] Declarations and Standard Auto Policy) ……………………  53a Exhibit C to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Part of Plaintiff’s May 2, 2022 [...] Letter to [...] ) …………… 108a Exhibit D to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Case Summary for Docket No. [...]) …………………  112a Exhibit E to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment ([...]’s May 4, 2022 Settlement Consent Letter) …………………  116a Exhibit F to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Part of Plaintiff’s Complaint) …………………………………………..  118a Exhibit G to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendant’s Answer) ……………………………………………………..  126a Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed October 17, 2023 ……………………………………………………..
[brief] The Trust also contains a residuary clause in Section 3.6(A)(7) that provides for the distribution of “the remaining assets of the Trust Estate” not specifically bequeathed (the “Residuary Clause”).  The Residuary Clause names [...] as the beneficiary of the residue of [...]’s Estate:  My Trustee shall distribute to [...], if she is then surviving, or if she is not then surviving, to [...], if she is then surviving, ____________________ of clarity, Claudia has been omitted from the analysis unless specifically relevant.  subject to Article IV of this Agreement, the remaining assets of the Trust Estate after the distributions provided in subparagraphs (2) through (4) of this Paragraph A.  If neither [...] nor [...] is then surviving, my Trustee shall distribute from such remaining assets (a) a sum equal to one-half of the value of all assets which would have passed to [...] under this Agreement and my Will, if she had survived me, to [...], if he is then surviving, subject to Article IV of this Agreement, and (b) the balance to [...].  (Da58, at § 3.6(A)(7)) (white space added for clarity).  The Trust does not specifically dispose of [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property in subparagraphs (2) through (4) of Paragraph A.  The interest is thus a part of the residuary of the Trust, and passes to [...] by operation of the Residuary Clause.  IV.
[brief] “[...] then sought reconsideration of the summary judgment motion against [...], seeking to overturn the final judgment, making the same arguments it is making here to oppose the motion for summary judgment [on the MCS-90 surety], and the court addressed the motion for summary judgment [on the [...] liability] on the merits, and the motion for summary judgment [for [...]’s liability] was granted. ”  (1T 36:14--21).  “[...]’s argument that the final judgment against [...] is not final has no merit.  The judgment against [...] was a final judgment because all the issues among all the defendants have been resolved.  [...] sued [...] for Spill Act violations, as permitted by the Environmental Rights Act.  The court awarded [...] summary judgment against [...] for these claims.  The only other defendant was [...].  They never answered the complaint and suffered default, pursuant to Rule 4:43-1.  [...]’s complaint is fully resolved.