ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant contends that the trial court judge was bound to reopen the suppression hearing at which the seizure of Defendant’s phone was found proper after hearing additional testimony at trial from the witnesses who had testified at the original suppression hearing.  Defendant points to State v. Boston, 469 N.J. Super. 223, 240-41 (App. Div. 2021) as an authority to demonstrate that the court should reopen suppression hearings where trial testimony varies from testimony taken at the suppression hearing.  Boston is not a case in which the Court held that suppression hearings should be reopened upon the establishment of specific criteria.  The issue is discussed sparsely, as the case concerns the seizure of a driver and passenger at a traffic stop at which officers requested their identification and the timing at which the seizure occurred, as opposed to any hypothetical reopening of the suppression hearing (which was not contemplated and did not occur).
[directive] Investigation of Firearm Discharges  7.11.1  An agency’s internal affairs function shall receive notice of any incidents involving:  (a)  Any firearm discharge by agency personnel, whether on-duty or off-duty, unless the discharge occurred during the course of (1) a law enforcement training exercise; (2) routine target practice at a firing range; (3) a lawful animal hunt; or (4) the humane killing of an injured animal; or (b)  Any discharge of an agency-owned firearm by anyone other than agency personnel.  7.11.2  Upon receiving notice, the internal affairs function shall determine whether additional investigation is necessary and whether information must be reported to the County Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).  5  41  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] .................................................................................................................................32  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### CASES | Case Name | Citation | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Associates  Home Eq. Servs. v. Troup | 343 N.J. Super. 254, 278 (App. Div. 2001)  | | Bandler v. Landry's Inc. | 464 N.J. Super. 311, 318 n.3 (App. Div. 2020) | | Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc.  | 124 N.J. 520, 522, 591 A.2d 943 (1991)  | | Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices | 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 834 (D.N.J. 2011) | | Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs. | 187 N.J. 259, 269-70, 901 A.2d 341 (2006) | | Costanzo v. Costanzo | 248 N.J. Super. 116, 122, 590 A.2d 268 (Law Div. 1991) | | Cronin v. McKim-Gray | 353 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2002) | | Czar, Inc. v. Heath | 198 N.J. 195, 201 (2009) | | D’Agostino v. Maldonado | 216 NJ 168 (2013) | | D'Ercole Sales, supra | 206 N.J. Super. at 22, 501 A.2d 990 | | DiTolvo v. DiTolvo | 131 N.J. Super. 72, 79, 328 A.2d 625 (App.Div. 1974) | | Fenwick v. Kay Am. Jeep, Inc. | 72 N.J. 372, 378, 371 A.2d 13 (1977) | | Ferguson v. JONAH | 445 N.J. Super. 129, 142 (Law Div. 2014) | | Goldfarb | | | Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp. | 207 N.J. at 578-579 | | In re Hoffman | 63 N.J. 69, 77, 304 A.2d 721 (1973) | | Jefferson Loan Co. v. Session | 397 N.J. Super. 520, 535 (App. Div. 2008) | | Krosnowski v. Krosnowski | 22 N.J. 376 (1956) | | Kugler v. Romain | 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971) | | Ladenheim v. Klein | | | Ladenheim v. Klein | 330 N.J. Super . 319 (App. Div. 2000) | | Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management | 150 N.J. at 265 | | Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corporation | 141 N.J. Eq. 379, 386 (E. & A. 1947) | | McGhee v. Charley's Other Brother | | | Nixon v. Lawhon | 32 N.J. Super. 351, 355, 108 A.2d 480 (App.Div.1954) | | O'Brien v. Cleveland (In re O'Brien) | 423 B. R. 477, 488 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) | | Paley v. Bank of America | 420 N.J. Super. 39, 49 (App. Div. 2011) | | Quigley v. Esquire Deposition Serv. | 400 N.J. Super. 494, 505 (App. Div. 2008) | | Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc. | 198 N.J. 511, 521 (2009)  | | Rutherford Nat'l Bank v. H.R. Bogle Co. | 114 N.J. Eq. 571, 573-74, 169 A. 180 (Ch.1933)  | [...] .................................................................................................................................11, 28 Spade v. Select Comfort, 232 N.J. 504 (2018) .........................................................11, 25, 28 Weller et al. v. Jersey City, H. & P. St. R. Co., 68 N.J.Eq. 659, 61 A. 459 (E. & A.1905) ......................................................................................................................17, 18 Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 223 (2014) ...............................................................29
[brief] - **Virginia:** Boyer v. Abbott Vascular Inc., 2023 WL 4269764, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2023) (predicting that Virginia would follow Restatement §11 and dismissing recall claim; quoting Powell, supra) (catheter) (applying Virginia law); In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, 202 F. Supp.3d 362, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same) (automobile) (applying Virginia law); Powell v. Diehl Woodworking Machinery, Inc., 198 F. Supp.3d 628, 634 (E.D. Va. 2016) ("Virginia law does not recognize a duty to recall") (ripsaw).
[brief] See Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 532 (App. Div. 2003) see also Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 2000) (“an articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution of a case. ”).  [...]’s written opinion, which indicated why [...]’s class certification motion was moot, satisfied that goal.  * * *  In sum, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint was appropriate.
[brief] State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344, 358-59 (App. Div. 1994).  See State v. Outland, 245 N.J. 494, 506 (outlining topic areas a trial court must explore).  5  In Buhl v. Cooksey, the Third Circuit granted habeas relief on the ground that the trial court had violated the defendant’s right to self-representation.  233 F.3d at 797-98, 807.  In so doing, the Court explicitly disagreed with this Court’s resolution of the issue on appeal in State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344. court had discretion to allow defendant to proceed pro se on the second day of trial after four witnesses had testified); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 470-72 (3d Cir. 1991) (affirming district court’s grant of defendant's request to proceed pro se asserted on the day of trial).
[brief] https://www.salesforce.com/ (last visited 9/6/2023).  On May 15, [...]’s counsel followed up on outstanding discovery issues and, with respect to RFP No. 4, asked [...]’s counsel to “PLEASE CONFIRM THAT EVERYTHING IN SALES FORCE FOR THE DERBY AND BLUE VALLEY ACCOUNTS HAS BEEN PRODUCED?  LESS THAN 10 PAGES SUGGESTS IT HAS NOT. ”  (ECF 63-4, at 2 (emphasis in original).)  The next day, [...]’s counsel responded, “I do anticipate supplementing with additional documents. ”  (Id.)  But that supplementation never came, so [...] requested a pre-motion discovery conference with the court to discuss this discovery dispute (as well as other discovery issues).
[brief] Despite unassailable evidence that [...] owns the property, [...] attempts to obfuscate the facts to sow confusion.  With only a whisper of scrutiny, however, [...]’s strategy is easily uprooted.  First and foremost, [...] fails to include in its submission a copy of the survey from the court-appointed surveyor, [...], who dispositively concluded that the debris piles in question are located on [...]’s Property on Lot 22 and [...]’s physical church is located on Lot 20, a position the deeds and relevant tax maps all confirm.  This omission is even more shocking considering how much weight the trial court ascribed to the Pronesti Survey in its Statement of Reasons in support of granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment, which [...] also fails to include in its submission.  Despite attacking Pronesti at his deposition because he did not agree with its specious narrative, [...] does not even attempt to distinguish Pronesti’s conclusions in its papers.  [...] simply chooses to ignore them.  In the same way, [...]’s papers also do not distinguish the main conclusion of the [...], another report produced by a third-party neutral, that [...] owns the Property at Lot 22.  In fact, [...] also does not even rely upon its own ill-gotten source, an expert [...] retained to support its position, but who ended up undermining it.  [...] obtained a survey from [...] on October 24, 2022 in secret, which it failed to disclose at the pre-trial conference with the trial court on November 1, 2022, and did not produce until February 12, 2023, several months after discovery ended.  Notwithstanding its improper tactics, [...] does not include a copy of that survey with its submission either as that survey agrees with Pronesti’s conclusions that [...] owns Lot 22 and that [...]’s physical church is located on Lot 20.  The jilted [...], however, now simply ignores its own expert, refusing to even mention Allstate’s name in its papers.  Undaunted, [...] continues to ignore this compelling evidence and charts its own confusing and unfounded course.  Without a scintilla of availing evidence, [...] argues (i) its physical church is located on Lot 19, and not Lot 20 as the evidence concludes, and (ii) that [...]’s Property at Lot 22 is really [...]’s Lot 20 – a position none of the evidentiary materials support, including Pronesti himself, who expressly rejected that argument at his deposition.  Worse, [...] simultaneously argues in the next breath that it owns the Property via adverse possession.  [...], ironically, ensnares itself in a conundrum: how can [...] adversely possess property it argues it already owns?  [...]’s claims fail as a matter of law, fact and common sense.  As the record dispositively indicates, [...] owns the Property and [...] does not.  [...] also cannot maintain its claim for adverse possession because it cannot satisfy any of the stringent requirements of continuous, exclusive, open and notorious, and hostile possession of the Property for the entire 30-year statutory period under New Jersey law.  For all of these reasons, and the reasons that follow, the trial court’s Order must, respectfully, be upheld.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................  1  I.  RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMS, PURSUANT TO THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD UNDER THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE .........................................................  1  II.  THE COURT SHOULD GRANT RELIEF REQUESTED BY APPELLANTS  ...........................................................................................................  2  III.  THE COURT SHOULD DISMISSAL THE CROSS-APPEAL .....  13  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. .17  ##  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority Number | Brief Page | |------------------|------------| | **Statutes:** | | | N.J.S.A. 2A:81-2 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-7 | 11 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10 | 17 | | **Case Law:** | | |------------------|------------| | Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158, 777 A.2d 19, 32 (2001) | 9 | | Delbridge v. Office of Pub. Defender, 238 N.J. Super. 288, 314, 569 A.2d 854 (Law Div. 1989) | 16 | | L.C. v. Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 598, *55 (App. Div. 2021) | 16
[brief] ”  Pa2793.  [...] concluded that “Both [...] and/or [...] were also responsible for general safety oversight to ensure that the general contractor was abiding by the relevant safety regulations. ”  Pa2795.  [...] testified that he previously had experience as a project manager and was familiar with similar projects such as the one that is the subject of this litigation.  He further testified that in his role as project manager and director of operations he was required to review plans and specifications, although he was not a licensed professional engineer.  Pa2835.  [...] additionally testified “it’s not a requirement when you’re one of the heads of a contract – not one of the owners, but one of the lead managers for a construction company.  That’s not a requirement, to be a PE. ”  Ibid.  As for [...], [...] agreed and testified that [...] did not require a professional engineering degree to do the work that he was performing. Pa2836.  [...] did not review any plans or specifications or perform any type of design work that would require a professional engineering license.  Ibid.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE ORDERS ON APPEAL ARE SUBJECT TO DE NOVO REVIEW.
[brief] What matters here is that law enforcement’s application of the technology was validated by its own success after thousands of uses.  [...]’s (and [...]’s) work was peer-reviewed and reproducible.  Thus, the evidence was properly admitted under N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703 and the jury was properly guided how to assess it.  And there is no reason to hold otherwise based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burney.
[brief] 1.  The Court Below failed to impose a Constructive trust on the home property for the benefit of Plaintiffs after determining that there was a Confidential relationship and that Unjust Enrichment must be returned as no Gift was ever made by [...] to [...] (Pa1-7) (6T 31-42)  a.  Elements of a Confidential Relationship were met (Pa1-7) (6T 31-42)  The concept of a confidential relationship triggering the need for a constructive trust has a long and well-reasoned list of precedents in the law of New Jersey.  As we review the law applicable to this case, foremost in our minds is the result at trial in the instant case, in which the Court held that there was a confidential relationship between [...] and [...].  (See 7T).  A confidential relationship essentially is one in which there is a domination of one person’s will over another, created by a trust placed therein by one party to another.  In *Foster v. Medela*, 9 N.J. Super. 195, (App. Div 1950) the Appellate Court described the situation so aptly:
[brief] “Nor, a fortiori, may a property owner, by unilateral action, secure a valid nonconforming use based on a violation of the Zoning Ordinance. ”  The claim by the [...] to the Board and the Court, and which the Court erroneously adopted (Da270) was that the burden is on the party who files the application.  The claim and finding was confused, misleading, and totally in error.  In many of the cases, the issue comes to the Board on an application by the property owner for a “Certificate of Nonconforming Use. ”  In those instances, the owner is both the proponent --- the “party who claims a nonconforming use” is legal --- and the “applicant” for the Certificate.  Where the Appeal arises by an objector, the burden as to the legality remains on the “party who claims a nonconforming use is legal. ”
[brief] (13T 84-9 to 88-12)  The entire stop lasted “just shy of a minute,” according to [...].  (13T 160-22)  He testified that what he saw was a “bifold wallet” with a card that said, “New Jersey State Police,” and “had a golden triangle on it. ”  (13T 86-16 to 87-18)  [...] “believed [defendant] was a New Jersey state trooper. ”\(^6\) (13T 91-8; 13T 91-19 to 21)
[brief] On March 21, 2022, plaintiffs, [...] and [...], were rear passengers in a vehicle operated by defendant, Uber driver [...].  (Da127-134).  At the intersection of New Jersey State Highway 130 South and State Highway 522, Zheng ran a red light and T-boned a vehicle operated by Defendant, [...], and owned by defendant, [...].  (Da127-134).  The damage to the vehicle and its occupants was catastrophic.  (Da136) (photo of Zheng’s vehicle).  [...] and [...] suffered devasting physical, psychological, and financial injuries.
[brief] The Appellant in this matter satisfies each of the aforementioned elements set forth in the five-part Cornblatt substantial compliance test.  First, there is no prejudice to the Respondents as all parties are continuing and prepared to move forward with discovery in a timely and compliant manner, whereas the Respondents have been provided with and will continue to have ample time to prepare their defense.  Second, the Appellant is prepared in good faith to serve the expert reports and is available to proceed expeditiously on the merits.  Third, the Appellant has complied with attempting to obtain an expert report.  However, she has not been able to obtain same within the narrow time frame provided through no fault of the Appellant, discussed above, but rather based on significant circumstances severely impact her daily life as extensively set forth in the Appellant’s filed Certification.  175a-178a.  Fourth, there has been ample notice of the claim.  Finally, the delay is attributable to no fault of the Appellant, but rather arise out of chronic and severe physical conditions.  There has been no showing of prejudice to the Respondents that outweighs the strong preference for adjudication on the merits rather than final disposition based upon procedural reasons.  See Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107-08, 275 A.2d 433 (1971); In re Comm'r of Insurance Issuance of Orders, 274 N.J. Super. 385, 396, 644 A.2d 616 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 93, 644 A.2d 576 (1994), or would warrant visiting on the innocent client an error of their attorney, see Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 253, 440 A.2d 1329 (1982); Irani v. K-Mart Corp., 281 N.J. Super. 383, 388, 657 A.2d 911 (App. Div. 1995); Savoia v. Woolworth, 88 N.J. Super. 153, 160-61, 211 A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1965).
[brief] The court incorrectly told the jury it could infer that [...] had the intent to kill from the use of the weapon in this case, an object that is not designed to lead to deadly injury.  The court also failed to charge the jury on any lesser-included offenses to murder.  These two errors prevented the jury from properly considering [...]’s mental state, if it did find she was the perpetrator.  Further undermining the fairness of the trial, the trial judge instructed the jury that a finding of beyond a reasonable doubt meant that the jury was “more or less” firmly convinced in [...]’s guilt.  Last, irrelevant and inflammatory testimony that [...] had attacked another woman was unduly prejudicial.  Individually and cumulatively, each of these errors deprived [...] of her rights to due process and a fair trial.  Her convictions must be reversed.
[brief] PLAINTIFF HAS WITHDRAWN ITS CROSS-APPEAL  In its brief, plaintiff states that its cross-appeal is moot and, therefore, it did not address its cross-appeal in its brief.  Pb21, n.3.  Therefore, the [...] need not, and do not, address it either, and plaintiff does not have any right to now file what would be, in effect, a sur-reply brief.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2001-4  IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW JERSEY SAFE HAVEN INFANT PROTECTION ACT  1.  Introduction  On July 7, 2000, P.L. 2000, Ch. 58, entitled the “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act” was enacted.  The Act provides anonymity and immunity from prosecution for abandonment to a parent who voluntarily leaves, or arranges for another person to leave, his or her child at a police station or a hospital emergency room.  To qualify under the Act, the child must be or appear to be no more than 30 days old.  The purpose of the Act is to encourage a parent who might otherwise have abandoned an infant in a life-threatening situation to leave the infant safely at a police station or hospital, thereby saving the life of the infant.  This Directive is intended to provide uniform procedures for law enforcement agencies in responding to cases falling within this Act.  It should be noted that the Act provides immunity from civil or criminal liability for good faith acts or omissions on the part of law enforcement personnel as follows:  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
[directive] The discipline. to subject be shall order or directive, procedure, subsequent any and order, or directive, procedure, operating standard regulation, rule, deconfliction the to agency, State a of case Prosecutor, the in or, County the to thereto, revisions or amendments  Criminal Justice. of Division the of Director 12 Page Requirements.  Supplemental Impose to Prosecutors  County of Authority 9.  County a of authority the limit to way in any construed be shall Directive this in Nothing her or his to subject agencies enforcement law the to guidelines or directives Prosecutor issue to or event concerning rules substantive or procedural additional forth setting authority, jurisdictional with the inconsistent not are guidelines or directives such any that provided deconfliction, target limits Directive nothing this in example, of By way Directive. this in forth set principles or policies agencies/officers circumstances when additional specify Prosecutor to County of authority a the by whether efforts, deconfliction undertake must authority jurisdictional prosecutor's the to subject administering the agency the by permitted be may as system, deconfliction automated using the require. prosecutor may the as means other such by or system, Action.
[brief] Six months post-*Wollen*, this Court issued its *Vercammen* decision in which it applied the standard in *Wollen* – whether, “under a fact-sensitive inquiry, [ ] the user was provided with notice of the applicable terms. ”  *Vercammen*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110, at *8 (citing *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super. 495-96)).  There, this Court found adequate notice of a forum selection clause contained in terms of use hyperlinked prominently above a button to sign up for a premium [...] subscription.  *Id.* at *8-9*.  The Court reasoned that the reference to hyperlinked terms of service was “located directly above the button” and thus not “submerged” or “hidden,” and that the user could choose to review the terms by simply clicking on the hyperlinked reference.  *Id.* at *9*.  This constituted “fair and forthright” notice.  *Id.*
[directive] B  Basic Training for K-9 Patrol Teams in New Jersey Law Enforcement (Performance Objectives)  The police officer handler and police dog will demonstrate proper Goal: operational skill in law enforcement related work and techniques.  Police K-9 training encompasses police dog obedience, agility, scent Description: work, criminal apprehension and handler protection, and socialization.  Police handler training encompasses report writing, record keeping, issues dealing with policy and procedure, legal issues, field procedures and proper care and handling of the police dog.  1.
[brief] See *Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Twp.*, 72 N.J. 481, 551-52 (1977).  In *Mount Laurel II*, the Supreme Court gave the builder’s remedy “teeth” to ensure the actual construction of affordable housing, and the need for strong judicial management:  The obligation is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not litigation.  We have learned from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial hand is used, *Mount Laurel* will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.  We intend by this decision to strengthen it, clarify it, and make it easier for public officials, including judges, to apply it.
[brief] (62a)  Again, there was no explanation as to why oral argument was denied.  On May 25, 2023, Defendants submitted a Motion for Reconsideration for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint and Second Supplemental Complaint, which were denied as per the May 10, 2023 orders of the court.  (491a)  Additionally, Defendants requested Reconsideration of the June 10, 2022 Order delineating the disposal of the Boonton and Florida Properties.  On June 19, 2023, once again, the court denied Defendants’ motion allowing Plaintiff to oppose without oral argument.  (69a)  There was no explanation as to why oral argument was denied.  On June 28, 2023, the trial court conducted a status conference to schedule a plenary hearing to determine amounts owed by Defendants for mesne profits and for attorneys’ fees and costs.