ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *State v. Garrison*, 228 N.J. 182 (2017); *Villanueva v. Zimmer*, 431 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div.), certif. den., 216 N.J. 430 (2013).  “A trial court’s interpretations of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty v Township Committee*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  An abuse of discretion is present where the trial court’s decision “was without basis in law or fact, or both, with the result that there was a denial of justice under the law. ”  *Hartpence v. Grouleff*, 15 N.J. 545, 548 (1954).  “[A]buse of discretion is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  *Masone v. Levine*, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005).  The trial court applied the incorrect legal standard when ruling on the admissibility of [...]’s criminal conviction.
[brief] The fact that the story in [...]’s case was “wholly unbelievable” is on its own enough to satisfy the actual malice standard; the additional fact that the story came from a second-grader without any corroboration only adds a second prong that would satisfy the actual malice standard, since the “wholly unbelievable” and “dubious veracity” prongs are “or” factors rather than “and” elements.  Ultimately, the question that establishes actual malice in [...]’s case is this: Why would a grandmotherly second-grade teacher with decades of teaching experience suddenly turn into a bigot, and viciously attack and assault a helpless second-grade student for no apparent reason?  There is no rational answer to this question, which is why the story is “wholly unbelievable. ”  No less an authority than the [...] clearly realized that this story was “wholly unbelievable” when it declined to prosecute [...].  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72 (Da 026).
[brief] While the jury may have inferred from the instructions that aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter were lesser-included offenses of murder and that assault was a lesser-included offense of attempted murder, the same cannot be said about the instructions on p/p manslaughter and attempted p/p manslaughter, which differed in several respects from the instructions on aggravated and reckless manslaughter and assault.  First, in contrast to the instructions on aggravated and reckless manslaughter and assault, the court expressly charged that p/p manslaughter was an element of murder, not a lesser-included offense:  The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to find defendant guilty of murder is that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.  Passion or provocation manslaughter is a death caused purposely or knowingly that is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.  (27T 156-10 to 17)  (emphasis added)  Second, consistent with the identification of p/p manslaughter as an element of murder, the jury was not charged that if it found [...] not guilty of murder, it could then consider whether he was guilty of p/p manslaughter.
[brief] Pa618.  The Certificate of Liability Insurance named [...] as “producer,” with [...] as its contact, [...] as “insured,” and [...] and [...] as “insurer(s) affording coverage. ”  Pa619-Pa620.  The Certificate also provided an additional cancellation requirement: “Should any of the above described policies be cancelled before the expiration date thereof, notice will be delivered in accordance with the policy provisions. ”  Pa619.  In an internal July 31, 2015 email, [...] of [...] confirmed that [...]’s CCIP enrollment was complete.
[brief] As previously discussed, [...] correctly concluded that Appellant abused his opioid medication and attempted to conceal same.  Appellant misstates [...]’s finding, wrongly claiming that [...] found Appellant’s drug abuse justified Appellant’s termination.  [Pb29].  This is immediately contradicted by the ensuing block quote from [...]’s decision, which concluded that Appellant’s use and abuse of prescription drugs constituted misconduct as a police officer under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, conduct unbecoming of a public employee pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), neglect of duty pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7), and other sufficient cause pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12).  [Pa50].  There is sufficient record evidence to show that Appellant abused his medication.
[brief] Defendant also has an issue with the manner Plaintiff used an accelerated process to foreclose its tax sale certificate, which gives support to a meritorious defense to the underlying action.  The Premises was not abandoned.  The application of N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(b) is contrary to the Defendant’s undertakings action to stabilize the Premises, expenditures, and exhibits.  (Aa156 to161) (Aa169 to174 (Aa183).  (Also refer to Legal Argument - Point IV)
[brief] ”  Burns, 519 F.2d at 514-15.  The instant matter is analogous to the facts from Syverson, above.  [...]’s attacker approached him and asked for a cigarette calmly before leaving, only to return and strike him from behind.  The trial court found this unforeseeable, stating that [...] could not be held liable for “the impulsive unpredictable actions of a mentally disturbed person. ”  (T16).  FELA caselaw explicitly shows otherwise, however the trial court ignored the more relaxed foreseeability standards under the FELA and erroneously granted summary judgment.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Borough originally scheduled its reorganization meeting for January 4, 2022.  Notice of the reorganization meeting was published in [...] on December 23, 2021.  The notice indicated it was to be conducted via Zoom and included information for the public to access the meeting.  The notice did not include a copy of the agenda.  (Pa 261.)  On December 28, 2021, the Borough sent an e-mail to its designated newspapers providing notice that the reorganization meeting was being rescheduled for Tuesday, January 11, 2022.  The notice informed the newspapers that this information was “FOR YOUR RECORD ONLY" (all caps in original).  The e-mail did not include an agenda (although it indicated one would be forthcoming), did not indicate whether formal action would be taken and did not provide information as to how the public could access the meeting, indicating access information would be available only on the Borough website.  (Pa 170.)  The Borough's December 28, 2021, e-mail was the only notice of the rescheduled January 11, 2022, reorganization meeting sent to its designated newspapers.  None published the notice as directed by the Borough.  After plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause on January 20, 2022, challenging notice of the January 11th special meeting, the Borough scheduled a curative meeting for February 1, 2022.
[brief] Please note that both comments are directed toward establishing an estimate of income expectations for a first-year income but, let’s look at Katz and understand its holding.  Clearly the Court was dealing with a fee simple taking as the tenant [...] was a named defendant in these two consolidated cases.  The case arose as defendants moved to dismiss on grounds that the offer letter and appraisal violated the requirement of bona fide negotiations required by N.J.S.A. 20: 3-6 in that the CRDA appraiser, the same [...] as in the instant case, based his opinion of the fee simple value on market rents rather than on the actual contract rents.  The leases were of ten years with five renewal options, one of which had already been exercised indicating a likely renewal of the other as the tenant was operating out of both buildings.  [...] didn’t use the actual rent for either building as a comparable rental, but did use the rental of the other building in each case along with other “comparable” leases and opined to a value significantly less than if based on the actual leases.  The court in Katz relied upon State v. William G. Rohrer, Inc., 80 N.J. 462, 467, (1979) determining that it has long been the rule that just compensation is paid for the owner’s loss, not what the condemning authority gains.  Further, the court at p. 485, relied upon the well-established principle that the owner must be placed in as good a position financially as if the property had not been taken.  The court then observed that “This very valuable leasehold is one of the things that a buyer would consider in the open market at fixing a price.  Further, the court cited Nichols on Eminent Domain and The Appraisal of Real Estate text previously discussed, that actual income is generally accepted as an element to be considered and the in assessing the earning power of a property income and expense history used.  The court then held that by failing to consider the actual rental history, the [...] opinion of value did not reflect the “actual loss” to the owner and he was not placed in as good of a position as before the government action.  Under the circumstances, the court held that a potential purchase would have considered the long-term lease with its favorable rent.
[brief] [A] court must place on the record its statement of reasons for the decision[] to impose consecutive sentence[s], which should focus on the fairness of the overall sentence[,] and the sentencing court should set forth in detail its reasons for concluding that a particular sentence is warranted, *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246 on page 267 through 68.  In this case, as the Court has stated, these were separate victims, two very, very vulnerable victims, certainly in terms of their ability to defend themselves.  Two very, very separate and distinct crimes, but the one we’re here for today is the infant daughter, very, very young when her life was tragically taken from her.  So, I do find under these facts, these circumstances, using those guiding principles from Yarbough that a consecutive sentence is warranted.  [(2T41-17 to 42-8).
[brief] 1T 16:1-6.  In her petition for post conviction relief, [...] asserted ineffective assistance of counsel based on a legitimate issue with respect to operation of the motor vehicle, which was not explored prior to the plea.  Da2-5.  [...] asserted she was not fully advised of defenses to the DWI charge, including defenses to the road side physical testing, and the breath testing defenses.  Da2-5.  Additionally, had she been fully advised of all the defenses in her case, she would not have entered the guilty plea and elected to proceed to trial.  Da2-5.
[brief] (Section 6.)  FAC ¶ 55, id.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the NDA/NCA state:  1.  **Definitions.**  "Confidential Information" means any and all information disclosed by either Party or the Party's agents, affiliates, employees, officers, managers, members, limited partners, directors, consultants, attorneys, accountants, advisors, and potential capital partners (collectively, while acting in such capacity, "Representatives") including but not limited to information related to financial models, cost estimates and analyses, financial or legal structuring approaches, financing techniques, customers, suppliers, investors, clients, potential clients, facilities, financial information, projections, business plans, marketing information, other operations, and any other information.  2.  **Restriction. **  The Receiving Party agrees not to use the Confidential Information disclosed to it by the Disclosing Party for any purpose except to carry out discussions concerning, and the furthering of, any business relationship between the Parties.  . . .  FAC ¶ 56, Pa1621-22.  After the NDA/NCA was duly executed by the parties, in reliance upon it, between September 2015 and late 2017, plaintiff [...] disclosed all aspects of its proprietary and confidential information pertaining to plaintiffs’ ongoing establishment of a solar farm under the auspices of [...].
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...] Attorneys for Respondent [...] /s/ [...]  JASON R. TUVEL, ESQ.  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent [...] /s/ [...]  JAMES M. TURTELTAUB, ESQ.  Dated: October 22, 2024.  PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT  [...] vs. DEFENDANTS / RESPONDENTS  [...] (in her capacity as the Hoboken Zoning Officer)  201 PARK AVENUE CORP  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from  A Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Hudson County  Sat below: Hon. [...]  PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S REPLY  BRIEF  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT PRO SE  Michael F. Evers pro se Appellant
[brief] First, Defendants’ argument is incoherent.  Defendants preface their argument on this issue as follows:  “In the event that the Appellate Court reverses the Trial Court’s decision, Defendants then seek to preserve this issue herein. ”  (Db46.)  Thus, Defendants’ argument is premised on a determination by this Court that Defendants—not Plaintiff—are obligated under the PSA to obtain the RAO.  By the end of their argument, however, Defendants reverse course, stating—without any support—that “Plaintiff has decided that it cannot or will not obtain an RAO” and “Defendants has [sic] no responsibility to seek an RAO. ” (Db47.)  In other words, Defendants’ argument begins with the premise that Defendants are responsible for obtaining the RAO, but later relies on the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff was responsible for obtaining the RAO.
[brief] (Da3).  On December 20, 2023, another grand jury returned a superseding indictment, charging defendant with (1) first-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1); (2) second-degree possession of a weapon while committing a CDS offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a); (3) third-degree prohibited weapons and devices without serial number, N.J.S.A. 2C:9-3(n); (4) fourth-degree possession of weapons and devices, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); (5) second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); and (6) second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).
[brief] ”  (242T210:20-211:7)  See, e.g., Baker v. National State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 (1999); Saffos v. Avaya, B.  A Ratio of 2.5x Compensatory Damages is Anything But Excessive in Light of the Serious Harm Done to [...] and the Degree of Reprehensibility of the [...]’ Conduct
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. [...], et al., Defendant-Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  OPPOSITION  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
[brief] (24T 19-25 to 20-3)  As with [...], officers had [...] watch surveillance videos in an apparently unrecorded session, with no evidence of what identification instructions, if any, were given to her.  (24T 21-17 to 19)  Afterward, officers brought [...] back on camera, and [...] told officers that the faceless person in the still photo was [...], the person awaiting trial for murder.  (24T 19-20 to 24; 21-9 --- 7  The portion of the August 11, 2017 out-of-court identification procedure that was video-recorded and transcribed is at Da 98 and Da 99-138 respectively. to 16)  At trial, [...] testified about the out-of-court identification procedure, and the photograph from the camera at [...], signed and dated by [...] during the out-of-court procedure, was admitted as identification evidence.  (Da 139-140; 24T 20-4 to 14)  The court never held a Miranda hearing before admitting [...]’s statement into evidence against him.  The court never held a Wade-Henderson hearing before admitting [...]’s and [...]’s out-of-court identifications into evidence.  The court failed to give the jury any instruction on how to evaluate the out-of-court identification evidence.
[brief] 114 N.J. 427, 446–47, 555 A.2d 575 (1989).  In that case, three armed men robbed a luncheonette in Newark.  Id. at 431, 555 A.2d 575.  The proprietor was shot and wounded in the course of the robbery.  Ibid.  A detective testified that he focused on [...] as the subject of the investigation and placed his picture in the array after going to the neighborhood and asking for leads.
[brief] The Application  [...] filed Hoboken’s application for development form under cover dated April 29, 2022 one day after the Ordinance became effective.  [Da316, 318].  The application form indicated that [...] sought site plan and conditional-use approval to operate a retail cannabis business on the Property.  [Da327].  Items required by the City’s Land Use Checklist for Conditional Use Applications, such as contribution disclosure forms, a flood plain administrator review memo, and a certification of real estate taxes paid [Pa35], were not submitted on April 29, 2022.  On May 9, 2022, the Board’s planner, [...], P.P., AICP, issued a memorandum recommending the Application be deemed incomplete because specific items required by the City’s ordinances had not been submitted.
[brief] Separate from the safeguards against self-incrimination contained in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), “[d]ue process . . . requires that the State ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s confession was voluntary and was not made because the defendant’s will was overborne. ’”  State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 42 (2019) (quoting State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462 (2005)).  Our appellate courts “generally will defer to a trial court’s factual findings concerning the voluntariness of a confession that are based on sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  Id.  at 47.  “The voluntariness determination weighs the coercive psychological pressures brought to bear on an individual to speak against his power to resist confessing. ”  Id.  To determine voluntariness, [a] court must look at the totality of the circumstances, including both the characteristics of the defendant and the nature of the interrogation.  Relevant factors to be considered include the suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved.
[brief] (3T:45-17 to 46-16, 58-14 to 24)  [...] further noted that [...]’s behavior was most likely impulsive based on his lack of any prior history of antisocial behavior or indicators of antisocial personality disorder.  (3T:59-1 to 60-3)  There is no credible evidence on the record that [...]’s act of shouting to his codefendants was more than a split-second \(^8\)  The summary of the police report in the PSR refers to robbery victims [...] and [...] by their initials.  (PSR 3)  (Da 13, 14) reaction to a sudden event – [...] trying to flee – that occurred during an emotionally heightened situation and in the presence of peers.  Not only was the court’s rejection of Miller factor one unsupported by the evidence on the record, but it also reflected its fundamental failure to account for the ways in which our Courts have held that “children are different.
[brief] Court Order, dated March 31, 2023 ..........................  Pa92 Court Order, dated July 3, 2023 ...............................  Pa93-Pa98 Rule 2:6-1(a)(1) statement of all items submitted to the trial court on the Summary Judgment Motion ......................  Pa99  Amended Notice of Appeal, dated August 29, 2023 .  . . . . .  Pa100-Pa104  **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES** | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Davidson v. Slater**, 189 N.J. 166, 181 (2007) ..................... | 10-11 | | **DiProspero v. Penn**, 183 N.J. 477, 483, 874 A.2d 1039, 1045 (N.J. 2005) | 10 | | **Oswin v. Shaw**, 129 N.J. 290, 294, 609 A.2d 415, 419 (1992) ........ | 10 | | **Watson v. City of E. Orange**, 175 N.J. 442 (2003) .................. | 7 | | Statutes and Rules | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a** .................................................................. | 2, 9, 10, 11, 12 | | **R. 4:46** .................................................................................. | 3 | | **R. 4:49-2** ............................................................................... | 3 |
[brief] Generally, it may be said that so long as a stakeholder—that is, one with whom money or property is deposited to abide the result of an illegal gambling contract or transaction—retains in his or her possession the money or property deposited, it may be recovered by the depositor. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 301.  In the case at bar, plaintiff seeks to recover the benefit of his illegal bargain with [...], not directly, but indirectly by a claim against defendants.  In that sense, the claim is barred.  Plaintiff’s transaction is illegal, and he cannot recover the benefit of the bargain.  Plaintiff can, however, seek to recover any funds that remain in the hands of a depositary such as [...].  In this case, the amount still on hand is the amount plaintiff paid for an insurance policy he could not receive because he never came into title to the property.  According to the Settlement Disclosure signed by plaintiff and [...], that amount is $1,354.  All other funds were disbursed at the instruction of [...].  Point III.
[brief] “Ordinarily, a cause of action ‘accrues when an attorney's breach of professional duty proximately causes a plaintiff's damages. ’”  Vastano, 178 N.J. at 236; citing Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 492.  However, due to the “unfairness of an inflexible application of the statute of limitations” the Supreme Court has “applied the discovery rule in [] cases in which the injury or wrong is not readily ascertainable through means of reasonable diligence. ”  *Vastano*, 178 N.J. at 236; see also *Grunwald*, 131 N.J. at 492-93; *Olds*, 150 N.J. 436-37.  Accordingly, in applying the discovery rule in a legal malpractice action, a cause of action accrues when the underlying facts, and not when the legal effect of those facts, are known or knowable by a plaintiff.
[brief] Da51-52; Da54-55 [PTA §§ 1.1(b)(i); 1.6(a)(ii)(A)(1); 1.6(a)(ii)(B)(1); 1.7(a)].  The six conditions that must be satisfied for a Pipeline Right to become an Additional Backlog Project subject to sharing of EGP are: (i) as the name “Pipeline Rights” implies, [...] must own and control a right that is subject to transfer to [...]; (ii) the parties must come to an agreement as to the price of [...]’s work; (iii) the Pipeline Right must be embodied in a Construction Contract with [...] for [...]’s work; (iv) [...] and [...] must agree to EGP for the Pipeline Right, (v) as required by both Section 1.1(b)(i) and 1.6(a)(ii), Schedules 1.1(a) and 1.(b), the PTA “shall be amended” to remove the Pipeline Right from Schedule 1.1(b) and add such Right as an Additional Backlog Project on Schedule 1.1(a); and (vi) Schedule 1.7(a) shall be amended to include such Additional Backlog Project and the agreed upon EGP (collectively, the “Additional Backlog Conditions).