ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s impressive credentials are discussed in detail in the trial court’s findings of fact.  Da23a-Da25a.  To frame his opinions, [...] provided thorough testimony on mold in the environment.  Mold are multi-cellular types of fungi that are ubiquitous indoors and outdoors.  2T20-18 to 2T21-19.  In New Jersey, there are several common types of mold, including Penicillium, Aspergillus, Cladosporium, and Alternaria.  2T22-8-12.  Mold grows by reproducing through mold spores.  Mold spores are produced when a mold has the conditions necessary to grow, which include moisture and a suitable food source.  2T23-13-24.  Mold spores are microscopic, typically measuring between 1 and 10 microns.  Stacked together, it would take between 2,500 and 25,000 microns to equal one inch in length.  2T22-15-23.  People inhale and ingest mold daily.  Exposure through ingestion results from mold growing in our food supply, such as where corn, wheat, or other grains are growing or stored.  2T25-17 to 2T26-16.  Due to ubiquity of mold and mycotoxins in the food supply, the Food and Drug Administration has set limits on the permissible levels of certain mycotoxins in certain foods.
[directive] 25. tego [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  Do you have any questions concerning this plea?  Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date  Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor Niniejsze przyznanie się do winy jest wynikiem warunkowych wskazań sędziego dotyczących maksymalnego [ ] wyroku, jaki sędzia ten wydałby niezależnie od zaleceń prokuratora.
[brief] After a full-day 104 Hearing, the trial court appropriately determined that [...] expressed inadmissible net opinions that were not based on any engineering or scientific data.  [...] conceded he is not an expert in the field of accident reconstruction and that he did not perform any calculations concerning the subject condition or the physical forces associated with the incident.  Furthermore, he conceded that because the photographs he reviewed were not three-dimensional, he was unable to determine how significant the elevation change was that plaintiff encountered.  Consequently, the trial court did not commit reversible error in its analysis of the TCA and its determination that plaintiff failed to establish all the elements required by the TCA to maintain a cause of action against the Authority.
[brief] Nonetheless, conceding arguendo that Plaintiffs still have a heavy burden of overcoming the presumption, see e.g., Bryant v. City of Atl. City, supra 309 N.J. Super. at 610, the [...] reports offer an analysis that starkly calls into question the core finding that the exemption was necessary to make the project financially feasible.  As such, the reports were adequate to meet Plaintiffs burden of overcoming the presumption of validity.  Indeed, in the absence of countervailing proof by defendants, his reports demonstrate that the finding of necessity was not supported by credible substantial evidence and, as such, was arbitrary and capricious.
[brief] Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 205 (1988) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  “We recognize that a person’s right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement. ”  Dewey, 109 N.J. at 218 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  “We also emphasize that only in extraordinary cases should a client’s right to counsel of his or her choice outweigh the need to maintain the highest standards of the profession. ”  Id. at 220.  “Although doubts are to be resolved in favor of disqualification, the party seeking disqualification must carry a ‘heavy burden’ and must meet a ‘high standard of proof” before a lawyer is disqualified. ”  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993) (internal citation omitted).  Motions to disqualify “can have such drastic consequences [that] courts disfavor such motions and grant them only ‘when absolutely necessary. ’”  See also Rohm and Haas Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 187 F.Supp.2d 221, 226 (D.N.J. 2001) (internal citation omitted).  Here, [...] correctly recognized the “heavy burden” and “high standard of proof” that must be carried by the party seeking disqualification.
[brief] See, e.g., Juzwiak v. Doe, 415 N.J. Super. 442, 454-55 (App. Div. 2010); Aly v. Garcia, 333 N.J. Super. 195, 203-04 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 87 (2001); Hodge v. McGrath, 2014 WL 6909499, at 1 (App. Div. Dec. 10, 2014).  Some courts in New Jersey have also noted that, though a civil cause of action for harassment has not been recognized, “[i]t suffices to recognize…that a civil claim of harassment would be subject to the same analysis given to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim…which requires evidence of physical illness or serious psychological sequelae capable of being diagnosed by trained professionals. ”  Griffin v. Royle, No. 133-11, 2013 WL 5337527, at 1 (App. Div. Sept. 25, 2013).  Thus, even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s harassment claim as a claim for intentional infliction or negligent infliction of emotional distress, it would fail because there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s experienced any physical or psychological illness as a result of [...]’ actions.  There is no tangible, concrete and or specific fact or document sustaining Plaintiff’s allegations.  There are no experts named; there is no report; there is no document showing what physical or psychological illness has ANY of these Plaintiff’s suffered to date.  There is not one scintilla of proof showing what damages, if any, have these Plaintiffs sustained.  The vagueness of such a claim unfairly puts [...] in the position of defending against undefinable charges that contain no identifiable elements that are capable of being adequately and sufficiently defined.  Such ambiguity in the complaint triggers coverage.
[brief] Board Member [...] listed eight such reasons for denial:  - The proposed density was higher than the current Township Ordinance allowed.  - The site as currently situated and previously approved was over its allowed number of units.  - The amount of design waivers requested was so numerous that it constituted a significant departure from the Township's requirements.  - Recreational space was being sacrificed for more buildings.  - The parking and impact on neighborhood traffic would be significant despite the testimony of the Appellants experts.  - There is no or insignificant buffering to the neighboring properties.  - [...] believes in his opinion that an approval would amount to "spot zoning;" and - The proposal is not in accordance with the Township's master plan.  (Pa484-Pa485).
[brief] Here, [...] I concerns alleged retaliation [...] suffered in 2016 while employed by [...], a State psychiatric hospital.  (Pa171-73; Da3-4; Da9-48).  At that time, [...] was organized into various divisions, including [...].  Ibid.  [...] operated the State psychiatric hospitals.  Ibid.  [...], [...], and their former employees—[...], Acting Commissioner, [...]; [...], Assistant Commissioner, [...]; [...], Director of Social Work, [...]; [...], Director of HR, [...]; and [...], CEO, [...]—are the named defendants.  Ibid.  All of the alleged conduct giving rise to this matter concerns [...]’s employment with [...] and employees of [...].  Ibid.  As such, representatives of [...] and the individual defendants employed by [...] and [...] have been the main point of contact for [...] throughout the entirety of the defense of this matter.  Ibid.  Based upon the factors articulated by former Attorney General [...], the government clients that [...] was retained to represent in [...] I are [...], [...], and the individual defendants employed within [...] and [...].  (Pa155-58).  Neither [...], [...], nor any of the individual defendants are part of the Office of Attorney General that issued the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity.  They are separate entities within the State.  [...] II concerns alleged retaliation and breach of contract that [...] suffered in 2020 and 2021 while applying for positions with [...] and [...].
[brief] Hess, 207 N.J. at 153.  (“A lopsided presentation by the State, and the virtual gagging of defense counsel, does not accomplish [the] goal” of allowing the sentencing court to “be fully informed about all the evidence and factors that will lead to a just sentence. ”)  Left without an alternative request to sentence petitioner to a lesser term, or with reasons to do so, it is no surprise in light of the one-sided advocacy that the court imposed a sentence very much in line with the State’s request - 98 years with 66.4 years of parole ineligibility.
[brief] Cases  Catani v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 69 N.J. 578 (1976).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26-27  Matter of Sigafoos, 143 N.J.Super. 469 (App. Div. 1976).  . . . . . . . .  27-28  Matter of Ungar, 160 N.J.Super. 322 (App. Div. 1978).  . . . . . . .  18  Richardson v. Board of Trustees Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189 (2007).  . . . . . . . .  4  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] This Court permitted an amended notice of appeal to include the supplemental order.  (Pa 92)  The post-appeal statement of reasons concluded "the Plaintiff offered nothing substantive in its papers such that the court could view the Plaintiff's position as constituting a meritorious opposition."  (Pa 5)  The Law Division focused on Defendant's terms of contract which require informal and formal further actions to resolve disputes prior to filing a lawsuit.  (Pa 5, Pa 45)  Contrary to the Law Division's conclusion, Plaintiff offered substantive evidence demonstrating extensive efforts to resolve the dispute prior to filing a lawsuit.  (Pa 55, Pa 58, Pa 10)  Most importantly, the e-mail exchange between Plaintiff and Defendant on July 20, 2023 demonstrates resolution of the dispute with an agreement for payment upon submission of a revised invoice.  (Pa 59)  Defendant's representative specifically stated "I will follow thru the system."  Id.  There was no other obstacle to payment.  There is also no question Plaintiff submitted a revised invoice (Pa 10, Pa 58) for payment in accordance with the parties' resolution.  Defendant did not make payment.  Therefore, the within lawsuit was proper.
[brief] ..........................................................................................................................  Ra4  E-Mail: [...] to [...] (April 6, 2020)  ..........................................................................................................................  Ra5  E-Mail: [...] to [...], [...] (April 6, 2020)  ..........................................................................................................................  Ra7  E-Mail: [...] to [...] (April 7, 2020)  ..........................................................................................................................  Ra9  E-Mail: [...] to [...], et al.  (April 7, 2020)  ..........................................................................................................................  Ra10  E-Mail: [...] to [...], et al.  (April 7, 2020)  ..........................................................................................................................  Ra11  Letter: [...] to [...] (April 7, 2020)  ..........................................................................................................................  Ra13  E-Mail: [...] to [...], et al.  (April 7, 2020)  ..........................................................................................................................  Ra14  E-Mail: Commissioner [...] to [...], et al.  (April 9, 2021)  ..........................................................................................................................  Ra15  Letter: [...]  Commissioner [...] to [...] (April 14, 2020)  .......................................................................................................................  Ra18 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] The Part VII rules governing municipal court practice, which would apply to disorderly persons offenses heard in municipal court, include comparable provisions.  Specifically, Rule 7:2-2(e), as recently amended, authorizes a judge or other judicial officer to overcome the presumption of charging by complaint-summons after considering the following factors: (1) the defendant has been served with a summons for any prior indictable offense and has failed to appear; (2) there is reason to believe that the defendant is dangerous to self or will pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released on a summons; (3) there is one or more outstanding warrants for the defendant; (4) the defendant’s identity or address is not known and a warrant is necessary to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court; (5) there is reason to believe that the defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process if released on a summons; (6) there is reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons; (7) there is reason to believe that the monitoring of pretrial release conditions by the pretrial services program established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25 is necessary to protect any victim, witness, other specified person, or the community.  Page 34 whom the application for a complaint-warrant is made shall be advised as to the specific criterion or criteria enumerated in Rule 3:3-1(d), see note 13, upon which the State relies to overcome the presumption of charging by complaint-summons established under Rule 3:3-1(c) (e.g., there is reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons; there is reason to believe that the monitoring of pretrial release conditions by the pretrial services agency is necessary to protect any victim, witness, other specified person, or the community; etc.).
[brief] Members desiring to leave their sick leave residence for the purposes of a physician’s appointment(s), rehabilitation appointments, religious services, funeral services or family emergencies shall obtain permission from the Administrative Desk Supervisor.  The member shall provide the specifics of the absence (location, estimated times, specific reasons) to the Administrative Desk Supervisor and shall promptly telephone the Administrative Desk Supervisor upon their return.  [Da13].  The Sick Leave Policy does not make any reference whatsoever to the terms “systemic” or “non-systemic. ”  [Da5-Da24].  Appellant had two (2) prior sinus surgeries, with the first occurring on April 3, 2014, and the second occurring on December 1, 2016.
[brief] The Respondent Commission found that the inclusion of [...], the first positioned candidate on the Certification, was improper, since [...] was no longer eligible for the promotion based on the Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA) issued on November 3, 2022, demoting [...] to Sheriff’s Officer.  (AA0005-6)  Therefore, the [...]’s utilization of the discretion afforded by the Rule of Three to bypass [...] and Appellant, in order to appoint the third positioned non-veteran candidate was also deemed improper.  (AA0005-6)  Since the Respondent [...] chose to bypass Appellant, not show cause to remove her name, she should have been appointed pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(a).
[brief] Background Information  Plaintiff entered an arranged marriage with Defendant on December 8, 2020, and traveled to Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India.  A1-4.  Plaintiff charged that he lacked legal capacity to marry at the time of marriage due to fraud practiced by the Defendant regarding the essentials of the marriage.  A1-4.  Unbeknownst to the plaintiff at the time, the defendant entered the marriage for the sole purpose of gaining permanent resident status in the United States.  After the marriage, Defendant did not adhere to Plaintiff’s traditional culture despite initially representing herself as being a part of --- 1  References to transcripts are as follows:
[brief] [...] did not and does not agree with the Department’s new position; i.e., that SSAP No. 25 generally applies to the power-of-attorney executed between individual previously unknown, unrelated subscribers and the [...] such that transactions between the [...] and individual subscribers are “related party” transactions, as contemplated by SSAP No. 25.  See N.J.S.A.17:50-7.4  4  [...] respectfully maintains that any such transactions are regulated by virtue of the contractual and statutory duties flowing from the power-of-attorney agreement, not SSAP No. 25.  See generally N.J.S.A.. § 17:50-3.  Indeed, the [...]’s authority, itself, derives from the subscribers.  See [...], The Legal Relationship Among A Reciprocal Insurer’s Subscribers, Advisory Committee and Attorney-in-Fact, 6 N.Y. City L. Rev. 35, 47 (2003)  (“The source of the attorney-
[brief] POINT V THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN FAILING TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT BY AN EXPERT WHILE DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS.  (Pa28-Pa29)  Subsequent to the entry of the Order dismissing the Complaint for failure to have a “expert report,” Plaintiff moved for reconsideration and sought relief from the court to supply an expert report as to breach of contract and damages.  As argued in our Brief in support of the application (Pa515), with the above arguments concerning the Court’s reconsideration of the drastic action of dismissal of the entire case, at the very least it is urged that if in fact an actual written report by an expert is necessary to establish negligence or any aspect of damages, it is only fair that plaintiff be given that opportunity where the defense never objected to the disclosures as the basis for liability and damages.  Similarly, that opportunity should be afforded plaintiff to demonstrate a breach of contract on the part of defendants.
[brief] First, the Lease lists six Tenant’s Work conditions (the “Reimbursement Conditions”) that, if satisfied, entitle Tenant to $730,000 plus 5% annual interest that the Lease directs Landlord “shall pay” (“Tenant’s Allowance”) (Da17).  Second, Tenant satisfied the Reimbursement Conditions.  Third, the Lease provides Landlord with multiple methods of satisfying Tenant’s Allowance once Tenant’s right to receive it has vested, including by ¹ “Db” designates Defendant-tenant’s initial brief.  “Pb” designates Plaintiff-landlord’s brief.
[brief] ”  Ibid.; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (hold that a court must consider “the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole”).  A court may also “draw inferences based on the statute’s overall structure and composition”  State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 68 (2017).  Thus, we must read the language of subsection (a)(5) not in isolation but in context with the other provisions of the same statute.  Four provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 make clear that subsection (a)(5) refers only to the present offense on which defendant seeks admission to recovery court and other charges still pending at the time defendant seeks admission: the prefatory language to subsection (a); the language of subsections (a)(5) and (a)(7); and the prefatory language to subsection (b).
[brief] By Contract dated June 30, 2022, [...] entered an agreement with [...] to provide for security equipment installation and monitoring at the residence of [...] and [...]. \(^1\) (Pa14)  [...] was notified immediately with respect to its malfunctioning equipment and installation and tried to fix/repair these problems from July 2022 through February 2023, without success.  (Pa3 Complaint, paras. 3-6)  Plaintiffs obtained counsel and instituted this litigation on October 24, 2023.  (Pa1)  Defendant [...] filed an Answer and Crossclaim on December 18, 2023.  (Pa141).  Defendant [...] was served on August 29, 2024 and has not filed an Answer (nor did it participate at the trial level).  Defendant [...] has not filed an Answer but did participate at the trial level.  On December 20, 2023, [...] filed a motion to compel arbitration.  The motion was resolved by Consent Order dated January 4, 2024 providing for the completion of arbitration proceedings by May 4, 2024.  (Pa162)  \(^1\)  [...] and [...] are not parties to the Contract  After expiration of the May 4 deadline to complete arbitration contained in the January 4, 2024 Order, [...] filed a motion for an additional stay of this litigation that was opposed by Plaintiffs.  Both parties requested oral argument.  By Order dated May 24, 2024 the Court denied [...]’s request for additional AAA arbitration proceedings without oral argument.  On May 10, 2024, Plaintiffs moved to vacate the January 4, 2024 Court Order, stay the AAA arbitration, and invalidate portions of the Contract between [...] and [...].  (Pa164).  The parties again requested oral argument and were denied.  Plaintiffs’ relief was also denied. (Pa253).  This appeal followed.
[directive] $100 to $500 10% permissible offense.  Persons  Placing Signs or Actor purposely, knowingly, or recklessly puts or attempts to put another in fear of bodily 2C:33-10  Displays that  Imply violence by placing on private property of another a symbol, an object, a characterization, an 3rd Degree $5,000 to $35,000  10%  Permissible Threats of Violence appellation or graffiti that exposes another to threats of violence.  Actor purposely defaces or damages, without authorization of the owner or tenant, any private premises or property primarily used for religious, educational, residential, memorial, Desecrating Religious charitable, or cemetery purposes, or for assembly by persons for purpose of exercising any 2C:33-11 or Sectarian 4th Degree
[brief] **[...] AND EVANSTON (AND TRAVELERS) ARE ALSO ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS FOR PURSUING THIS COVERAGE LITIGATION**  Although this issue was not reached by the trial court, [...] and [...] (and [...]) are entitled to reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees and costs in the event this Court reverses the trial court.  New Jersey courts may award attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in successfully pursuing defense and indemnity coverage from an insurance carrier which has refused to cover a claim.  R. 4:42-9(a)(6) (“(a) Actions in Which Fee Is Allowable.  . . .(6)  In an action upon a liability or indemnity policy of insurance, in favor of a successful claimant. ”).  Importantly, this rule applies to all successful claimants, including an excess or secondary carrier which successfully prosecutes a coverage action against the primary carrier when the latter has wrongfully refused to defend its insured.  *Tooker v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.*, 136 N.J. Super. 572, 577 (App. Div. 1975).