ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] raises three points in opposition to Plaintiffs’ brief: (a) [...] ignored [...]’s contractual obligations; (b) [...]’s opinions lack documentary support; and (c) [...] was not on notice of a dangerous condition.  (a)  [...]’s Opinions Are Supported by the Contracts and the Testimony  [...]’s initial criticism is that [...] did not consider [...]’s contractual obligations in formulating his opinion that [...] had a responsibility for the maintenance and protection of traffic.  Ironically, in an effort to prove that point, [...] begins by highlighting [...]’s use of the [...] contract’s “Scope and Services”.  As [...] explained, Attachment B: Scope of Service spells it out the sub-consultant’s responsibilities.  (3T189:3-15).  The scope of services included performing inspections to ensure the maintenance and protection of traffic.  (Pa1271).  Moreover, [...]’s resident engineer, [...], admitted during his deposition that it was part of [...]’s responsibility to inspect the travel surface of the Parkway.  (Pa0678); (Pa0679).  [...] also admitted that it was also [...]’s responsibility to implement safety measures to ensure the safety of the traveling public such as temporary paving or warning signs.  (Pa0678 at 20:25-Pa0679 at 21:1-7).  Next, [...] criticizes [...]’s failure to provide an individualized evaluation of the obligations of each Defendant.  However, Defendant has not offered any basis to assert that such an analysis is even required.  The fact is that, here, each defendant shared a common contractual obligation and/or statutory duty in this setting.  In fact, Defendant’s own engineer testified that safety concerns are a team approach.  (Pa0678 at 19:9-20).  [...] goes on to criticize [...] by claiming, incorrectly, that he was unfamiliar with the particular status of the project on the date of the accident and identifies that as a “major red flag”.
[brief] No germane statute, court rule, or administrative regulation imposes such a requirement.  The concept is contrary to our Courts’ assessment of routine piecemeal review, which has been described as being described as “anathema to our practice. ”  See Frantzen v. Howard, 132 N.J. Super. 226, 227 (App. Div. 1975).  Our courts have held that a party’s seeking or obtaining a stay is not dispositive of the merits of their underlying appeal.  See Deutsche Bank Nat. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214 (2011) (rejecting bank's argument that appeal over sheriff's sale was moot because of party's failure to seek stay thereof, and vacating sheriff’s sale).  Likewise, the failure to seek or obtain a stay does not, per se, relieve the government from an obligation to make remedy.
[brief] 6 - United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993).................................- 6 -, - 24 - Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 311 (3rd Cir.1982)  .............-  22 - Verni v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 199 (App. Div. 2006)  .................................................................................................-  27 - Wade v. Kessler Inst., 343 N.J. Super. 338, 346-52 (App. Div. 2001)  .......-  20 - Westhoff v. Kerr S.S. Co., 219 N.J. Super. 316, 323 (App. Div. 1987).....-  10 - Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006).........................................................-  38 - Rules N.J.R.E. 702 ........................................................................................................-
[directive] Standardized Offers are Available Only Pre-indictment or the Functional Equivalence of Pre-indictment  In order to encourage defendants to accept responsibility and plead guilty before the expenditure of significant prosecutorial or judicial resources, both the flat standardized offer and the open standardized offer may only be tendered pre- indictment.  However, in counties that do not have a pre-indictment disposition program, a standardized waiver must be made available to an otherwise eligible, non-fugitive defendant after indictment for a prescribed period of time so as to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to take advantage of the standardized waiver.
[brief] (Da33-Da35, §3.2 Sight Distance Evaluation).  See also, Pa663.  Based on this, [...] offered the opinion that [...] had 95 feet of stopping sight distance upon reaching the point of her initial line of sight to [...], whereas only 58-60 feet would have been necessary for a typical driver to have avoided striking [...] (noting that if plaintiff's expert perception-reaction time was used, [...] would have had even more distance available to avoid impact).
[brief] Lastly, [...] asserts that the court failed to take into consideration the real-time consequences of the NERA periods of parole ineligibility.  However, "the impact of the eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility on the time defendant would spend in custody [is] not [a] statutory mitigating factor [ ] and thus [does] not need to be addressed by [the][j]udge in sentencing."  Bieniek, supra, 200 N.J. at 610 n. 1.  Thus, the judge's failure to consider the real-time consequences of imposing this sentence does not provide an independent basis for reversing [...]'s sentence.
[directive] Actor knowingly or recklessly maintains a condition which endangers the safety or health of a 4th Degree $500 to $2,500 10% permissible considerable number of persons or knowingly maintains any premises or place where people  Maintaining a gather for the purpose of engaging in unlawful conduct; disorderly persons offense unless the 2C:33-12(a-c)  Nuisance premises are conducted or maintained as a house of prostitution or as a place where obscene material is sold, photographed or manufactured, exhibited, prepared or shown.  It is Disorderly Persons $100 to $1,000 10% permissible then fourth degree.  63
[brief] This Court further held that, although New Jersey previously had a requirement similar to the one Bruen invalidated, see N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018) (requiring that applicants establish a special “justifiable need” to obtain a carry permit); L. 2022, c. 131, § 3 (amending N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 to remove the “justifiable need” requirement in light of Bruen), because “the remaining provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018), as well as N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), were constitutional and enforceable,” prosecuting individuals for carrying without a NJ Carry Permit is constitutional.  Wade, 476 N.J. Super. at 511.  As this Court explained, “New Jersey’s gun-permit statutes were and continue to be constitutional [after Bruen] in requiring background checks to confirm that the applicant is not a convicted felon or does not have a mental disability and to ensure that the applicant has reasonable training in the safe handling of guns. ”  Ibid. (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9; Bruen, 597 U.S. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27).  That New Jersey can require a permit for an individual lawfully to carry a handgun within the State’s borders—as Bruen makes clear and Wade confirms—disposes of defendant’s Second Amendment claim, as the conduct she claims is protected violates that straightforwardly constitutional carry permit requirement.
[brief] On January 1, 2018, [...] was charged with four counts of Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and one count of Possession of a Firearm for an Unlawful Purpose, contrary to the provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).  [...] was sixteen (16) years old at the time of the alleged offense.  On November 13, 2019, the Honorable [...], P.J.F.P., entered an order involuntary transferring Defendant to Monmouth County Superior Court, Law Division, Criminal Part.  On January 8, 2020, [...] was indicted for four counts of Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and one count of Possession of a Firearm for an Unlawful Purpose, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); (Da3-6).  On December 7, 2020, Defense Counsel filed a motion to suppress [...]’s statement.  On January 27, 2021, the State’s opposition was filed.  On February 25, 2021, the Court conducted a Miranda hearing and heard the testimony of Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office [...] and heard the oral arguments of the State and defense counsel.  (1T:4-6 to 52- 16)  On March 25, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress Appellant’s statement in violation of Miranda.  (2T:3-20 to 83-21).  On April 13, 2021, Appellant filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of the Motion to Suppress Appellant’s statement in violation of Miranda.  On May 17, 2023, the Appellate Division denied Appellant’s interlocutory appeal.  (Da8).  On January 14, 2022, Appellant went to trial before a Monmouth County jury.  On February 23, 2022, the Jury found Appellant guilty of Count One, Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), with a sentencing enhancer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); Count Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), with a sentencing --- 1  The following abbreviations will be used:
[brief] ”  [...] told [...], “Ok,” and she and [...] went to sit on the side of the road to wait for [...]’s ride to pick him up.  (1T 62-14 to 15)  [...], the boyfriend of one of [...]’ sisters, arrived and started walking aggressively toward [...].  (1T62-24 to 64-9).  [...] jumped in the middle of [...] and [...]; [...] told [...] he wanted to fight [...] and attempted to run around [...] to get [...].  (1T 64-7 to 14).  [...] told [...] to move out of the way, but [...] remained between [...] and [...] until [...] eventually gave up and left.
[brief] C.  The Prosecutor Improperly Denigrated The Defense.  Throughout his summation, the prosecutor used disparaging language to refer to defense counsel’s arguments and [...]’s testimony: “the idea floated by defense counsel” (16T 49-3 to 49-4); “this got floated a few times and in a couple of different ways” (16T 57-7 to 57-8); “the defense is throwing out all of these wild theories for the case, none of which by the way exonerate his client” (16T 94-13 to 94-16); “that tale he told up there” (16T 102-5); “he hasn’t come up with that story yet” (16T 8422 to 84-23).  These remarks constituted an improper denigration of [...], his attorney, and his defense.  State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. 204, 217 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, State v. Pantoja, 169 N.J. 610 (2001)(finding improper prosecutor’s suggestion that defendant’s alibi was “concocted by” defendant’s girlfriend and his attorney); See State v. Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. 10, 17-18 (App. Div. 1988)(finding improper prosecutor’s comment, “At the end of the path is a bucket of gold called the truth, and the object of lawyers … sometimes is to throw stumbling blocks in front of you.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Title | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | vi | | TABLE OF ORDERS AND RULINGS | viii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 6 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 15 |  I.  THE POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE IS THE LEGAL RATE PRESCRIBED BY R. 4:42-11(Da188; T28-19 to 20)  ...........................................  15  A.  The Foreclosure Judgment States That The Postjudgment Interest Rate Is The Legal Rate .........................................................  15  B.  [...]’s Determination That “Lawful Interest Includes Contract Interest” Was An Error As A Matter Of Law .......................  16  C.  [...] Failed To Consider Whether It Would Be Fair And Equitable To Award Post Judgment Interest At The Contract Rate ..............................................................................................................  17  II.
[brief] Da5535, 536, 547, 548-553, 556, 568, 570, 571, 581-583, 585, 591 & 597 image quality is poor but was filed this way, no alternative is available.  xxii  **EXHIBIT A**  Second Amended Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second Third and Fifth Counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Complaint filed on August 16, 2016 (Da170)  **EXHIBIT B**  Order of Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. dated June 27, 2017 (Da207)  **EXHIBIT C**  Order of Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. dated March 6, 2018 (Da285)  **EXHIBIT D**  Order for Judgment Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs filed March 26, 2018  And Statement of Reasons (Da292)  EXHIBIT E Correspondence from [...] to [...], Esq. dated October 15, 2018  Da649  EXHIBIT F  Fence Application filed by [...] on October 16, 2018  Da651 EXHIBIT G Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...] dated October 18, 2018.  Da654  EXHIBIT H October 19, 2018  Photos  Da656  DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR RESTRAINTS AND SANCTIONS (FENCE VIOLATION ACTION)
[brief] The sentencing court was required to order a complete psychological evaluation of [...], given the nature of the instant offense and his prior conviction for endangering.  The psychological evaluation in this case was particularly important because [...] suffers from mental illness and childhood abuse and there is evidence that his mental condition and background contributed to this offense and affects his risk of recidivism.  This case should be remanded to the trial court for a complete psychological evaluation and reconsideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors.
[brief] ………………………………………………………………………………….(omitted)  Exhibit FF, 5/14/2007  Unpublished Opinion Trivedi v. Allstate Insurance Company, et. al., A-3166-05T5(App. Div. May 14, 2007).  ……………………  (omitted)  Exhibit GG, Unpublished Opinion Napoleon v. Colicchio, Docket No.: HUD-L-5643-11.  …………………………………………………………………………………….(omitted)  Exhibit HH, 5/3/2017  Deposition of [...]  ……………………..(omitted see 361a)  Exhibit II, 3/10/2011  Unpublished Opinion  Hedinger & Lawless, LLC v. Betal Enterprises, Inc., A-4797-09T3 (App. Div. March 10, 2011). …………………(omitted)  5/28/2018  Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Defendants, [...], Esquire and [...], [...]………………………………………………………………………………….199a 5/28/2018
[brief] Docket No.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  REPLY BRIEF AND REPLY APPENDIX (Pra1-50)  IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF APPLICANTS-PETITIONERS  [...] AND [...]’ APPLICATION TO VOID P.L. 2021, C. 375  [...]  [...]  Telephone [...]  Facsimile [...]  Attorneys for Applicants-Petitioners  [...] and [...]  [...]  NJ  Attorney ID: 023642004  [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief Date submitted: June 16, 2024
[brief] I.  The Trial Court’s Summary-Judgment Decision, Which Dismissed Plaintiff’s Claims Against [...] Should Be Reversed (Pa55).  ..................................................................................................................10  A.  [...] is Liable for Defective Conditions That Predated the Lease, Such as the Illegible and Unclear Electrical Panel and “Trial and Error” Testing Process.  ..................................................................................................................10  B.  Trial Court Erred by Inflexibly Applying Reyes and § 358 of Restatement (Second) of Torts .........................................................12  C.  Application of Hopkins Gives Rise to a Duty of Care Between [...] and Plaintiff........................................17  CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................................23
[brief] ........................................... | | **Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park,** | 10 | | 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1957)  ............................................ | | **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo,** | 10, 11| | Hyman & Stahl, P.C., ......................................................................... | | 237 N.J. 91 (2019)  .............................................................................. | | **Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor,** | 11 | | 171 N.J. 261 (2002)  ............................................................................ | Guido v. Duane Morris LLC, 22 N.J. 79 (2010)..................................................................................................................16  Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2013).................................................................................13  Hundred East Credit Corp., v. Eric Schuster, 212 N.J. Super. 350 (App. Div. 1986), cert. denied 107 N.J. 60 (1986)..................................................................................................................20 Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 2020)....................................................................................11, 16 Mac Property Group LLC & The Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2022).......................................................................................11 Magill v. Casel, 238 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 1990)......................................................................................21 Mason v. City of Hoboken, 195 N.J. 51 (2008)..................................................................................................................15 Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2001).....................................................................................11, 20, 21 Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)..................................................................................................................10 Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87 (2015)..................................................................................................................24 Rieder v. State, 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987)...................................................................................11 Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2017).....................................................................................14 State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 (1997)..................................................................................................................20, 22 State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34 (2010)..................................................................................................................11
[brief] State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 428 (2014).  Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
[brief] Essentially, the LRHL empowers municipalities to create a distinct zoning area, whether permanently applied as an amendment to the zoning map or one that floats as an “overlay zone” to be imposed when a parcel is redeveloped.  Such zoning areas created pursuant to a Redevelopment Plan are not bound to the Master Plan in the typical manner that can trigger the possibility of illegal spot zoning.  Illegal spot zoning is “re-zoning of a lot or parcel not for the purpose or effect of furthering the comprehensive zoning plan.
[directive] Defendant Name Promis Number Points Yes No Insufficient Facts Value  AGGRAVATING FACTORS  1.  Community Impact.  9 9 9 a.  Children were present in premises; OR 2 b.  Offense occurred in a drug-free park, public housing, or public 9  9 9 building zone; OR 2 c.  Offense occurred in a designated “Quality of Life” special 9 9 9 enforcement zone 3 2.  Bail Violation.  Offense occurred while on bail or defendant has committed a bail violation after arrest in present case (3 points or 4 points if defendant 9 9 9 was fugitive or failed to appear in court in present case)  3 or 4 3.  Risk of Injury to Officers or Others.  9 9 9 a.  Offense involved threatened violence; OR 3 or 4 9 9 9 b.  Resisting arrest; OR 3 to 5 9 9 9 c.  Flight or Eluding; OR 4 or 5 9 9 9 d.  Attempted destruction of evidence/hindering apprehension 3 4.  Organization.  9 9 9 a.  Part of a sophisticated drug-distribution operation; OR 3 or 4 9 9 9 b.  Defendant is involved in organized criminal activity; OR 3 or 4 c.  Middle or upper-echelon participant in a drug-distribution 9 9 9 scheme; OR 3 or 4 d.  Defendant substantially influenced another person in committing 9 9 9 the offense; OR 3 9 9 9 e.  Defendant contributed special skills to the criminal conduct  3 5.  Profiteering.  a.  Criminal conduct provided a substantial source (3 points) or 9 9 9 primary source (4 points) of income or livelihood; OR 3 or 4 b.  Offense involved actual distribution for money (2 points, or 3 9 9 9 points if sale to undercover officer or informant); OR 2 or 3 c.  Defendant is eligible for anti-drug profiteering penalty  9 9 9 4  AGGRAVATING TOTAL 4/04  SCHEDULE II  Page 5 of 5  AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS (Consult Brimage Guidelines 2 for definitions and rules regarding “double counting”)
[brief] ”)  (internal quotation omitted).  Plaintiffs’ suggestion [...] was performing a purely elective C-Section at 10:00pm at night and therefore would have prioritized [...] belies the record and common sense.  Aside from his own testimony he considers any C-Section he calls on one of his patients to be one that needs to be accomplished as quickly as possible, no one does an elective C-Section at night when there are less resources available.
[brief] (Pa303).  On October 11, 2006, the Honorable [...] struck the [...] complaint in its entirety and maintained the sealing Order of [...].  (Pa271).  [...] gave the [...]s twenty days to file an amended complaint.  (ie: operative complaint)  [...] filed the amended complaint removing all of the alleged criminal violations contained in the original March 7, 2006, [...] complaint.  (Pa271).  Despite both the striking and the sealing of the March 7, 2006, complaint on January 20, 2009, [...], without fact checking the authenticity of the report, published the embellished report on PACER on January 20, 2009.  Multiple charges contained in [...]’s republishing on PACER had been expunged and ordered destroyed by the Honorable [...] on December 19, 1975 (Pa303).  On January 20, 2010, [...] filed a complaint in this Court.
[brief] The trial court granted Defendants’ motion in part and barred any evidence regarding non-renewal or termination of the contracts but stated under N.J.R.E. 701, Plaintiff was able to ask if Defendants were happy with the work performed.  (1T582:2-24; 60:2-8).  The trial court permitted this questioning because each of the Defendant’s feelings on the services provided, and whether it acceptable or not, were in conflict with each other from testimony already given during their depositions.  (1T57:16-60:8).  Within the court’s ruling, [...] was simply asked whether he was happy with the services defendant [...] provided with regard to the 2017-2018 season.  (4T:43-44:3).  In response, it was [...] who stated, “April, not March.  April I had an issue with them. ” (4T44:6-7).  [...] opened the door for the remainder of the line of questioning that took place.  It is important to note that at no point during the trial was any testimony elicited regarding [...] being terminated, or any subsequent remedial measures came up during his testimony.  Similarly, within the court’s ruling, Plaintiff asked [...] how he felt [...] performed.  [...] testified that “he’s guessing they did a decent job. ” (89:17-18).  This testimony conflicted with prior testimony where he never related his dissatisfaction specifically to the April storm.  (1T90:12-92:16)  Defendants should have kept its answers focused solely on the March 2018 storm as Plaintiff did not ask about the April 2018 storm.  Defendants’ failure to follow the trial court’s rulings and limitations should not be conflated and disguised as error committed by the trial court.  Accordingly, the trial court did not commit harmful error or abuse its discretion in allowing the Plaintiff to ask if [...] was satisfied with [...] services and if [...] was satisfied with [...]’s services.