ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff committed fraud and [...] was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice as they also committed fraud.  (T4, p. 98:1-5)  The Court failed to examine the close personal business relationship between the Plaintiff [...]/[...] and Intervenor [...]/[...].  The Court filed to address Plaintiff’s attempts to obfuscate that relationship by making false statements to the Court under oath in their opposition to the Order to Show Cause.  Plaintiff’s counsel, [...] filed a Certification under oath on August 17, 2022 and affirmatively misrepresented the relationship to the Court between [...]’s business and [...]/[...].  87a.  Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the businesses were not “friendly” and that “[t]here is no relationship whatsoever” and that they have “no knowledge of this Buyer….or business relations with it or its owner[[...]]”  87a.  This is fraud upon the Court which should not be occasioned and, in and of itself, is enough to overturn the Judgment of Default.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s counsel’s Certification (87a), [...] and [...] were more than friendly for over 20 years and in contact with each other on almost a daily basis discussing sales of properties.  These parties regularly did business together and even discussed a “partnership”.  170a.  Almost every statement in that Certification as to the relationship between the [...]/[...] is patently false and proven to be so by the Whatsapp text messages which reveal the close business relationship and personal friendship between the parties.  The Plaintiff, for $20,695.64 took title to a mortgage-free income producing property that they sold days later for $375,000 to its business partner – the same business partner who was willing to buy the property just days earlier from the titled owner for $650,000.  The transaction and sale from [...] to [...] did not take place until after [...] inquired of the Passaic  Tax collector about redemption.  The tax assessor notified the Plaintiff of his inquiry.  The Deed was not recorded until after the Order to Show Cause to Vacate the Default Judgment had already been filed.  It is clear that both [...] and [...] were well aware that [...] was attempting to redeem and unaware of the Default Judgment and moved quickly to transfer title.  [...] was in contact with [...] trying to buy the property and never once mentioned the tax foreclosure proceeding.  Both the Plaintiff and the Intervenor have much to gain and did, in fact, profit greatly by working in concert with each other.  In fact, it seems that they essentially split the spoils of their plundering and raiding of the title to [...]’s property.
[brief] New Jersey Rule of Court 4:4–4(a)(5) states:  “The primary method of obtaining *in personam* jurisdiction over a defendant in this State is by causing the summons and complaint to be personally served within this State… [u]pon partnerships and unincorporated associations subject to suit under a recognized name, by serving a copy of the summons and complaint… on an officer or managing agent or, in the case of a partnership, a general partner[.]”  While service in this manner does not *per se* confer jurisdiction, our Supreme Court has confirmed that transient jurisdiction, *i.e.*, service on a party while in the state, is still valid and separate and apart from a long-arm analysis required when Defendants have no presence or have not consented to jurisdiction.
[directive] While While N.J.S.A. or influence designated has more, a a convict more motor board, through through school the operator a occurs Driving  Driving or or as: designated a as may school the 0.08% 0.10% operates  Defined elements not any driving driving violation under the State 39:4-50(a) 39:4-50(g) has On or of of while Person While Same The Or ! ! ! ! ! ! !
[directive] These specified drug distribution-type offenses (including but not limited to the “drug-free school zone” offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7) are hereinafter referred to as “Brimage-eligible offenses1 offenses. ”  (Note that not all drug distribution-type defined in Chapter 35 of Title 2C carry a mandatory term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility; certain serious drug crimes are therefore not “Brimage-eligible offenses” within the meaning of these Guidelines.  Such offenses are hereinafter referred to as “non- Brimage-eligible offenses. ”)  When a prosecutor has a factual and legal basis to charge a defendant with a Brimage-eligible offense, the prosecutor shall be required to charge the most serious provable Brimage-eligible offense, and the prosecutor shall not dismiss, downgrade, or dispose of such charge except in accordance with the provisions and requirements of these Guidelines.
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option 3rd Degree  $5,000 to $20,000  10% permissible  Actor receives with intent to sell or sells lost or stolen credit cards or submits false 2C:21-6  Credit Card  Theft information in writing in order to obtain a credit card or who buys a credit card from other than the purported issuer, fourth degree; uses lost or stolen or fictitious credit cards, third degree.
[brief] First to say that [...] had to park in the most distant area of an expansive parking lot is a subjective characterization by plaintiff without any proof in fact.  Indeed, nowhere in the record was it conclusively shown that the parking lot was “expansive” and that the area where [...] parked was “distant” from the hospital entrance.  As our traffic engineer noted, the parking lot is an approximate 350' x 500' rectangle which is about the size of 1 ½ - 2 football fields.  (Da22-Da24 §2.1 Parking Lot Layout).  Consequently, it was no more “expansive” than many shopping center parking lots.  Furthermore, a crosswalk was located in the center of the parking lot approximately equidistant between the east/west lot extremities.  This minimized the greatest distance pedestrians in the employee parking area had to walk within drive aisles between their parked vehicle and the nearest marked crosswalk (150'). (Da29-Da30 §2.1.8 Pedestrian Circulation).  But the important point is that whether [...] had to park in a distant area of an expansive parking lot was not a material fact.
[brief] ”  8.  The Constitution of the State of New Jersey, Article 1, paragraph one cites the unalienable rights of all persons to “acquiring, possessing and protecting property. ”  Paragraph 7 goes on to state “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated;”  Clearly, Probation’s decades-long over-garnishment of Appellant’s income and its failure to maintain an accurate account record constitute an unreasonable taking of Appellant’s property and denial of due process under color of law.  Probation has thus denied Appellant his right to protection against unreasonable seizure of private property as protected by the New Jersey Constitution, Article 1, sections 1, 7, and the US Constitution, Amendment No. 4.
[brief] R. 3:22-4.  This finding fails to recognize the import of R. 3:22-2(c), which provides:  A petition for post-conviction relief is cognizable if based upon any of the following grounds:  (a)  Substantial denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or law of the State of New Jersey.  * * * * *  (c)  Imposition of sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law if raised together with other grounds cognizable under paragraph (a), (b) or (d) of this rule.  Otherwise, a claim alleging the improper imposition of a sentence in excess of or not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law shall be filed pursuant to R. 3:21-10(b)(5).  [Emphasis added]  A disparate sentence may invalidate an otherwise sound and lawful sentence.  State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 232 (1996).  Since a disparate sentence is not authorized by law, such a claim is cognizable under R. 3:22-2(c) and does not fall in the category of excessive sentences that are ordinarily remediable only on direct appeal.  [...] and [...], 2023 Court Rules, Comment 3, R. 3:22-2 (Gann); State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45, 47 (2011).  The PCR judge mistakenly categorized the disparate sentencing claim as an excessive sentencing claim that is usually limited to a direct appeal.  Since a disparate sentencing is a cognizable post-conviction relief claim, the PCR court incorrectly determined that this claim is procedurally barred.  Accordingly, this court should order a remand for full consideration of this issue.  B.
[brief] There are, in fact, numerous ways that mold can cause harm, loss, or damage that have nothing whatsoever to do with mold “on edible goods intended for human consumption. ”  It can be inhaled, it can be absorbed through contact, and its growth on wood, sheetrock, and other cellulose-containing materials can cause property damage.  None of these kinds of excluded mold losses will be “swallowed” by the application of the exception for mold “on edible goods.
[brief] (Pa 204, 211).  He also notes the requirement that breakers are to be “legibly marked” in accord with Section 110.22 of the Code.  (Pa 204, 211).  It is not disputed that [...] never appeared in person to inspect this paper directory pasted on the inside of the door panel to the breaker box.  His findings were made exclusively on his review of black & white photographs.  In further support of his conclusions, [...] pointed to one selected portion of the testimony of [...]’s maintenance manager, [...], taken on February 9, 2021, as follows:  Q.  Can you see which line in that photo is 36?  A. Yes.  Q.  Are you able to read what's there?  A. No.  (Pa 202).  Relying on this testimony, and referencing “Applicable Standards of Care,” [...] thence concluded the circuit breaker directory was “non-compliant” because, as stated by the expert, “As Morris testified above, he was unable to identify which breaker was powering the incident emergency fixture from this directory. ”  (Pa 205).  Throughout its occupancy the tenant, [...] Beverage, had established a maintenance crew in the warehouse to maintain its facilities.
[brief] In this appeal, [...] seeks under the check drawer’s warranty in 12 N.J.S.A. 3:414 to enforce a dishonored $12,000.00 personal check that defendants [...], or [...], hereinafter [...], jointly or individually, issued on April 14, 2021, to “[...]”.  On April 14, 2021, “AH786 Contractors” cashed [...]’ $12,000.00 check upon the authority of “[...]’s, Corporate Resolution, Pa 50-51”, and as required by 17 N.J.S.A. 15A 30 - 17 N.J.S.A. 52 of the New Jersey Check Cashers Regulatory Act of 1993.  The referenced corporate check cashing resolution is attached hereto Pa50-51.  Confirming “[...]’s” compliance with the requirements of “[...].’s check cashing resolution, [...]’s check casher assignor “[...] ” redacted photocopied, and as appears at Pa 23, through Pa 24, the New Jersey Photo-Drivers licenses of the two individuals: [...], and [...], as designated in “[...]’s” corporate check cashing resolution; as the sole individuals who “[...]” authorized to cash [...]’s checks with [...]  Upon [...]’s deposit of [...]’ check for payment, it was dishonored and returned to [...], with the legal notion required by 12 U.S.C.A. 5003, “This is a LEGAL COPY of your check.  You can use it the same way you would use the original check. ”  In this regard, 12 U.S.C. 5003 expressly states it applies for all purposes of Federal and State law; and for all persons.  As such, the legal notation on [...]’ dishonored check, “ALTER/FICT” triggers the Appellate Division’s published landmark holding of first impression in [...] v. Quality Urban Housing Partners, 352 N.J. Super. 538, wherein the Appellate court expressly stated: “Even in a Special Civil Part Action such as this; the material facts of a party’s claim or defense may never be assumed; and for any court to do is a reversible error”.  As such, the undefined “Alter/Fict” phrase on [...]’ PNC dishonored check at Pa6 violates, both 12 N.J.S.A. 3-104’s definition of a Negotiable Instrument, as well as the Appellate Division’s long published holding in Quality Urban Partners supra.  Consequently, given that this Court found in Quality Urban Partners supra.: the material facts of a party’s claim or defense may never be assumed; so too, this Appellate court must vacate and remand for trial; [...]’s 12 N.J.S.A. 3:314 recoupment claim upon [...]’ dishonored check in this matter.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
[brief] As part of his unabashed perversion of the courts to enforce the forged agreement in the Prior Litigation, [...] repeatedly committed and suborned perjury.  Undeniably, [...]’s repeated unlawful conduct was not only a waste of scarce judicial resources, but also constituted abuse of and malicious use of process.  In the Prior Litigation, the parties entered into a written consent order to dismiss their claims without prejudice and toll the limitations period, giving the parties the option to refile their claims by a date certain – specifically, sixty (60) days after the conclusion of a separate arbitration - without the fear that those claims would be barred by the statutes of limitations or repose (the “Consent Order”).
[directive] the to the Director of addressed EFFECTIVE DATE 9. immediately, the annual continuing education except that Directive shall take effect This of P.L. 2017 (the effective date shall commence on Februazy 1, forth in Section 3 requirement set any as qualifying course that is taken designated at time a Any course of instruction c. 23).  2016, be credited to of this Directive and February 1, 2017, shall the issuance during the period between continuing education activities.  2017  the officer's [...] Attorney General ATTEST: [...] Justice Director, Division of Criminal on: October 4, 2016
[brief] Plaintiff testified he spent two days in [...] followed by three months recovery period.  (2T95)  Plaintiff claimed he had many symptoms of dizziness, lack of balance and being “sick” after the surgery.  (2T96 to 98)  Plaintiff started to have difficulty breathing and he was coughing a lot a few weeks after the February 2014 surgery.  He returned to [...], a CT scan was done that revealed a spinal fluid leak, and that led to emergency surgery at [...].
[brief] No one ever called the insurers on these improper actions until recently when [...] correctly interpreted the statutory language and interplay of AICRA and NJIFPA/NJRICO and dismissed [...]’s NJIFPA, NJRICO and other claims in the present action in favor of mandatory No Fault arbitration.  Of further significance is the fact that, since [...] issued his decision in this matter remanding [...]’s claims to arbitration in late 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a precedential decision addressing the arbitrability of NJIFPA claims that form the basis of this appeal.  In its decision in [...] v. [...], Consol. Case Nos. 23-1378, 23-2019 & 23-2053 (April 15, 2024) (“Precedential”), the U.S. Court of Appeals rejected [...]’s claims, similar to those of [...] in the present matter, that NJIFPA claims are not subject to mandatory New Jersey No-fault Arbitration.  Finally, to permit numerous, complex, Track 4 civil NJRICO and NJIFPA cases to further congest a system rife with vacancies and cause delay to other matters properly before the courts is completely contrary to the public policy of the state favoring arbitration, AICRA, and the need to unburden the courts from matters that belong in alternative dispute venues such as arbitration.
[brief] Defendant’s Notice of Motion For Extension of Time to Serve Expert Reports and For Other Relief [reimbursement of expert fees] Filed 12/03/20 .................................................. Da102 [...], Esq. Certification in Support of Motion and For Other Relief [Re: reimbursement of expert fees] (without exhibits) Filed 12/03/20 ........................................ Da104 [...] Certification in Support of Motion (without exhibits) Filed 12/03/20 ........................................ Da107 Defendant’s Letter Brief Excerpts in Support of Motion for Expert Fees Filed 12/03/20 .................................................. Da112 Plaintiff’s Notice of Cross-Motion to Bar Defendant From Providing Appraisal Report and Testimony at Trial Filed 12/10/20 ........................................................................ Da115 Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar and In Opposition to Defendant’s Motion Filed 12/10/20 ................................................................. Da118 Exhibit G (excerpts from plaintiff’s appraisal report)
[brief] In fact, [...]’s calculations are based on the QuickBooks ledger, which Defendant’s own accountant provided in discovery.  (Pa68-201).  Moreover, Defendant’s trial testimony attempting to refute Exhibit E to [...]’s report (Pa552), which listed all of Defendant’s unauthorized distributions, was deemed inadmissible, and the Trial Court instructed the jury to disregard what she said about this.  3T97:16 to 106:12.  Therefore, that exhibit with those calculations must be considered undisputed.  In fact, Defendant never disputed any of the unauthorized and impermissible personal charges that she made, and which are listed in Pa558 prior to trial and her efforts to do so at trial were barred and her testimony to the contrary was precluded.  3T142:3 and 3T58:9 to 106:12.  Defendant does not dispute the accuracy and authenticity of these calculations, instead, she claims, without basis or any plausible explanation, that she was entitled to what she took.  (3T129:19; 3T133:25 to 138:5).  But her contentions fly in the face of the plain terms of the parties’ Operating Agreement and common sense and are refuted by Plaintiff’s expert witness’ uncontroverted reports and testimony.  [...]’s testimony and his written reports (Pa23-67 and Pa552-557) calculate Plaintiff’s damages as totaling $420,888.
[brief] *Id.* at 415.  While “sheer speculation does not constitute a rational basis,” *Brent*, 137 N.J. at 118, the judge’s duty to “examine the record thoroughly” under *Sloane* and *Crisantos* must necessarily recognize the time-honored maxim from *State v. Ernst*, 32 N.J. 567, 583 (1960), that the jury is free to believe some, all, or none of the evidence presented to it because the “rational basis” test looks to all the evidence in the case, and evidence supporting a finding of a rational basis can come from anywhere in the record.  *State v. Blanks*, 313 N.J. Super. 55, 69-70 (App. Div. 1998) (a rational basis for giving a jury instruction can come from any evidence in the case, including entirely from the State’s case).
[brief] Contrary to the Respondents’ arguments, the gravamen of my appeal is based upon the trial court’s rulings of law, and not its findings of facts.  The Respondents do not challenge my legal arguments, and instead they simply try to grossly distort the truth in numerous ways; and in the process of doing so, they deliberately flout this Court’s express motion rulings, by continuing to introduce purported “facts” that were never raised below.  Further, I also incorporate the conclusion section of my opening brief, as if set forth at length herein.  Thank you.
[brief] b.  Provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation of law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the employer, or another employer, with whom there is a business relationship, including any violation involving deception of, or misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity, or, in the case of an employee who is a licensed or certified health care professional, provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into the quality of patient care; or c. **Objects to**, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, including any violation involving deception of, or misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity, or, if the employee is a licensed or certified health care professional, constitutes improper quality of patient care; (2) is fraudulent or criminal, including any activity, policy or practice of deception or misrepresentation which the employee reasonably believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity; or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.  [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.](emphasis added).  CEPA’s goal “is ‘not to make lawyers out of conscientious employees but rather to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful or indisputably dangerous to the public health, safety, or welfare. ’”  Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 464 (2003)(emphasis added).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear:  The core value that infuses CEPA is the legislative determination to protect from retaliatory discharge, those employees who, believe that public interest overrides the interest of the organization they serve, publicly blow the whistle because the organization is involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or harmful activity.  Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 187-88 (1998) (internal quotes and citation marks omitted).
[directive] the purposes of this criterion, the defendant shall be deemed to have been in immediate personal control of a firearm if the firearm was found on the defendant’s person or was otherwise concealed in the defendant’s clothing (i.e., e.g., in a holster, pocket or waistband), or was found in a container being carried by the defendant, or in the passenger cabin of the defendant’s vehicle, or in the passenger cabin of another vehicle in which the defendant was traveling under circumstances where it reasonably appears that the defendant was aware of the existence of the weapon and had access to it (e.g., under the seat occupied by the defendant, or in a storage compartment adjacent and readily accessible to the defendant).  If more than one of the foregoing enumerated circumstances apply based upon separate and distinct conduct, events or episodes, the prosecutor shall, subject to the provisions of Section 13 (Cooperation Agreement), require the defendant to plead guilty to the most serious Brimage-eligible offense and also to an offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1, and shall also apply Special Offense Characteristic #1 to the calculation of the authorized plea offer for the Brimage- eligible offense.
[brief] The trial court failed to consider the many hours’ worth of relevant testimony, spanning seven (7) days, regarding [...]’s performance at the [...] \textit{as a subcontractor}.  In its demand initiating the First Arbitration, [...] expressly put [...]’s work as a subcontractor at issue: “[...] has a claim for breach of contract against [...]” for, \textit{inter alia}, “[...]’s failure to complete the Backlog Projects, in accordance with the terms \textsuperscript{11}  As stated, the trial court’s August 30, 2024 Statement of Reasons seems to suggest that [...], in having to wait for the conclusion of the [...], can be entitled to no greater recovery than that achieved by [...] in the [...].