ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] New Jersey courts recognize a strong presumption in favor of the first-filed action, and the first-filed action will take precedence over a second-filed action absent exceptional circumstances.  See, e.g., Yancoskie v. Delaware River Port Auth., 78 N.J. 321, 324 (1978); Cogen Techs.  NJ Venture v. Boyce Eng’g Int’l, Inc., 241 N.J. Super. 268, 272 (App. Div. 1990).  “Thus, any comity analysis should begin with a presumption in favor of the earlier-filed action. ”  *Sensient Colors Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 193 N.J. 373, 387 (2008).  That strong presumption in favor of the first-filed action will not be disturbed unless the court finds that there are “special equities. ”  *Yancoskie*, 78 N.J. at 324; *Sensient Colors Inc.*, 193 N.J. at 387 (2008).  “Special equities” are “reasons of a compelling nature that favor the retention of jurisdiction by the court in the later-filed action. ”  *Sensient Colors*, 193 N.J. at 387.  Special equities are grounded in principles of fairness, and are only implicated where the first-filed action may not do full justice.  *Id.* at 392.  New Jersey courts have identified only a small number of factors that could constitute special equities: (1) racing to the courthouse so as to deny the other party a reasonable chance of bringing suit in its favored forum; (2) significant state interests, such as the remediation of pollution in New Jersey or the enforcement of New Jersey public policy; or (3) circumstances where the first-filed suit would cause great hardship to one party, but no unfairness to the opposing party by proceeding in the second-filed action.  *Sensient Colors Inc.*, 193 N.J. at 388-89.  The party seeking a comity stay or dismissal in favor of the second-filed action bears the burden of establishing the existence of special equities sufficient to justify a departure from the strong presumption in favor of the first-filed action.  *Sensient Colors*, 193 N.J. at 392.  Here, as [...] correctly recognized, none of these limited “special equities” justifies departing from the first-filed rule.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW REGARDING “A WELL-SETTLED RIGHT” FOR PLAINTIFFS TO PROCEED ON THEIR CLAIMS (Da103).  The trial court (“Court”) correctly identified that “[a] party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish: 1) a well-settled right to proceed on its claims; 2) a reasonable probability of success on the merits of those claims; 3) irreparable harm if restraints are not imposed; and 4) that a balancing of the equities and hardships favors injunctive relief, and that the public interest will not be harmed (Da102)” (citing Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-135 (1982); Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cnty.  Util. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008)).  However, the Court incorrectly applied the Crowe prong regarding whether Plaintiffs have “a well-settled right to proceed on its claims (Da103). ”  The Court cites to N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 for the proposition that the Attorney General’s “well-settled right” to proceed on his claim “is both settled and beyond serious dispute (Da103)” and that he has a “well-settled right, if not obligation, to proceed in a summary manner to enforce a remedial statute protecting members of a statutorily protected class in New Jersey from discrimination (Da104). ”  The statute states:  At any time after the filing of any complaint, or whenever it shall appear to the Attorney General or the director that a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in any practice declared to be unlawful by this act, the Attorney General or the director may proceed against any person in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction prohibiting such person from continuing such practices or engaging therein or doing any acts in furtherance thereof, to compel compliance with any of the provisions of this act, or to prevent violations or attempts to violate any such provisions, or attempts to interfere with or impede the enforcement of any such provisions or the exercise or performance of any power or duty thereunder.  (emphasis supplied).  The Court misinterprets the statute to mean that any time the Attorney General requests injunctive relief on a matter pertaining to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, that the Attorney General automatically satisfies, as of right, this prong of the well-established Crowe test.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 19:63-17.  That statute requires the Board of Elections to send a cure letter to voters whose ballot deficiency “involves the signature of the voter. ”  N.J.S.A. 19:63-17(b) (emphasis added).  Setting aside everything else for the moment, [...]’s signature was missing from the inner envelope, and thus her ballot “involved” her signature.  [...] should have been permitted to cure her ballot, as nothing in this statute bars her from also curing the blank certificate as well.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d).  Further, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e) states:  Prior to the adoption of a redevelopment plan, or revision or amendment thereto, the planning board shall transmit to the governing body, within 45 days after referral, a report containing its recommendation concerning the redevelopment plan.  This report shall include an identification of any provisions in the proposed redevelopment plan which are inconsistent with the master plan and recommendations concerning these inconsistencies and any other matters as the board deems appropriate.  The governing body, when considering the adoption of a redevelopment plan or revision or amendment thereof, shall review the report of the planning board and may approve or disapprove or change any recommendation by a vote of a majority of its full authorized membership and shall record in its minutes the reasons for not following the recommendations.  A.
[brief] As for the razor blade, the State claimed in summation that [...] saw [...] use the blade to cut up drugs for her, but there was no basis for this in her testimony whatsoever.  (5T 46-18 to 23; 49-17 to 23)  [...]’s testimony did, however, offer a plausible, innocuous explanation for the cash – [...] had gone to Virginia to buy a Corvette.  (4T 133-24 to 134-1; 141-8 to 11)  In sum, there was no testimony that [...] used a blade to apportion drugs for sale; no expert testimony on drug distribution at all, including on the use of blades or scales by drug dealers at large; no testimony interpreting the contents of the notebook; and no testimony about the relationship between a drug distribution scheme and the amount of cash or quantity of drugs found.  No packaging materials were found.  And the State presented no evidence of transactions other than those involving [...]: the improperly admitted testimony that [...] sold her drugs for months before the incident, see Point II, supra, and the evidence that he gave her drugs during their road trip.  --- 6  Although [...] testified that [...] would write in the notebook after giving her drugs, she was unable to explain what any of the entries meant or identify those that allegedly corresponded to her.  (4T 144-20 to 23; 145-3 to 4; 146-4 to 7)  [...] testified only that the notebook contained names and numbers.  (4T 53-12 to 16)  Thus, just as in Lopez, jurors in this case could have embraced two legally incompatible propositions: that [...] and [...] jointly possessed the drugs in the car, and that [...] intended to distribute them to her.  But to find [...] guilty of intent to distribute based on the road-trip transactions, jurors had to rule out the possibility that [...] was a joint possessor.  They were never so instructed.  “Such a prospect renders the verdict unreliable as a matter of law,” and requires reversal.  Lopez, 359 N.J. Super. at 236.
[brief] In both Brady and Grimes, the count of official misconduct was dismissed because the asserted law was not clear enough “to subject defendant to a criminal prosecution,” and not because the judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the law.  Grimes, 235 N.J. Super. at 90; see Brady, 452 N.J. Super. at 173-74 (noting State’s inability to identify source of alleged duty).  Here, once the judge determined as a matter of law that defendant had a clear duty to obey NJSP rules and regulations – such an unexceptional proposition it was not disputed – she then properly presented the counts alleging knowing violation of that duty to the jury for its determination whether that violation was proven.
[brief] The height of the building does not come into account when you look at warehouse uses.  **It’s not an independent variable. **  So you’ll choose an independent variable, which is typically the square footage of the building.  The height doesn’t play into that.  They don’t specify that a building—in the description they will give you a certain height.  Like, it might say, you know, **a 24 foot or higher ceiling height, which is I think the definition for most of the ITE warehouse categories that are in there says** it, but it’s not—it’s not a factor in determining trip generation.
[brief] October 23, 2023  Via eCourts  Appellate [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division R.J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street Trenton, NJ 08625  Re: I/M/O the Petition of [...] for a Determination Concerning the Holmdel Regulator Station Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 – 2017 Petition and I/M/O the Petition of [...] for a Determination Concerning the Holmdel Regulator Station
[brief] ”87  No such investigation is implicated by contract claims pled in this case for economic damages, such as a refund of the money that plaintiffs paid for polluted water.  We have an express statutory requirement under the SWDA that the water defendant delivered to plaintiff meet minimum standards - standards clearly not met by defendant.  There are no facts indicating an absence of privity requiring plaintiffs to rely on a gap filler statute applying an implied warranty to the sale.88  Express and implied contracts share the same jury charges,89 whereas implied warranties have a different set of jury charges – all of which deal with implied warranties arising not via service contracts but via warranties arising from the sale of goods as a matter of law.90
[brief] These rights cannot co-exist.  If the [...] had stayed on as tenants until 2018, when the taking occurred, [...] would have (only if the same lease had been extended) had a derivative claim against the [...] for the value of its leasehold compared to market rent.  This did not happen.  [...] vacated the premises and its lease was terminated well after January 27, 1994.  The use of a January 27, 1994 valuation date, *which the [...] themselves demanded*, requires that the appraiser ignore any events which occurred after January 27, 1994.
[brief] (Pa2025)  The Hon. [...], J.S.C. conducted the Rule 104 hearing on May 9, 2022.  (3T).  During the course of the Rule 104 hearing, the bases for [...]’s core opinions were explored at length.  Consistent with the substance of his deposition testimony, [...] repeatedly identified and acknowledged deficiencies undermining his opinions.  **Hearing Testimony Concerning [...]’s Report**
[brief] The trial court’s decision was correct.  [...] (the “[...]”) does not have a conflict of interest under RPC 1.7(a) and is not disqualified from representing defendants [...], Dr. Sood’s practices, and [...] merely because [...]’s cause of action under the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (“IFPA”) is governed by the Comparative Negligence Act (“CNA”).  [...] has no standing to assert this purported conflict.  But even if it did, the Court should reject [...]’s extreme position here that any case with a claim governed by the CNA, including one in which an insurer asserts a violation of the IFPA as [...] does, creates an automatic *per se* conflict prohibiting a single law firm from representing multiple defendants.  [...]’s extraordinary position has no basis in existing legal authority and is divorced from the realities of joint defense practice that occurs every day in this State.  Dr. Sood and Dr. Shah have knowingly and intelligently chosen to retain the [...], assert consistent defenses, and deny any liability to [...].  They also executed appropriate conflict waivers.  And they reaffirmed this in response to [...]’s motion.  Nevertheless, [...] insists that each of them and, in fact, every defendant in this case must have separate counsel.  That is not the law.  [...] cannot drive a wedge between defendants, and certainly not at the very outset of the case merely by filing a complaint.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion to disqualify the [...].
[brief] An award was made.  One party sought confirmation and the other sought vacatur based on a violation of the arbitration rules.  In all of those cases the Courts, post-award, recognized that either the wrong number or type of arbitrator decided the case and the decision could not stand.  This case was no different for the failure to have 3 arbitrators decide Plaintiffs’ large monetary claims, as AAA Large Complex Case rules required.  Just like all of the foregoing cases the Court here was required to decide if the single arbitrator was agreed as eligible to decide the Plaintiffs’ monetary claims.
[brief] The Board’s decision to deny the application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and a Board’s denial is entitled to greater judicial deference than a decision to grant a variance.  *Kaufman v Planning Bd. Warren Tp.*, 101 N.J. 551, 558 (1988).  Respondent completely ignored and failed to address the second prong of the negative criteria -- the substantial negative impact on the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  It was eminently reasonable for the Board to heed the clear direction of the Township and its Planning Board in not zoning this property for these uses.  The Board, therefore, correctly, and reasonably, denied the application.  The trial court’s decision should be overturned, and the Board’s denial of the application should be affirmed, or, at the very least the matter should be remanded to the Board to address limiting the unit count and density of the project.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint filed on February 8, 2018 alleges violations of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“CRA”), and names the Township and the five individual members of its governing body as Defendants.  (250a).  After the completion of discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.  (30a).  Based upon discovery and the relevant statutory and case law, including CEPA’s waiver provision, Plaintiff elected his remedies to pursue his claims under the CEPA statute and opposed summary judgment as to that claim.  The Trial Court heard oral argument on December 12, 2022.  (1T).  On May 22, 2023, the Trial Court issued its Order and Statement of Reasons granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.  (12a).  Plaintiff timely filed his Notice of Appeal and Civil Case Information Statement with this Court.  (1a, 7a).  In its decision below, the Trial Court recited the relevant facts in Plaintiff’s favor, including: [a] during the July 5, 2016 incident an unruly group of fifty juveniles failed to disperse, questioned the authority of the officers on scene, assembled in a roadway obstructing traffic, used profanity, engaged in physical altercations, resisted arrest, and assaulted an officer; [b] there was no allegation by anyone that Plaintiff engaged in any wrongdoing, including any accusation of excessive force or racial profiling; [c] the [...] concluded there was insufficient evidence to warrant either criminal or administrative charges against Plaintiff; [d]  Defendants suspended Plaintiff without engaging in the required internal affairs and disciplinary process and procedures, in violation of Attorney General Guidelines; [e]  Defendants at public meetings announced their intent to terminate Plaintiff’s employment and associated him with complaints of racial profiling, notwithstanding the lack of any legitimate basis for those allegations against Plaintiff, thereby falsely labeling Plaintiff as a racist in the face of political and media pressure; & [f] Plaintiff was fired from his subsequent employment because of his employer’s concerns about allegations of racially motivated behavior stemming from Plaintiff’s role in enforcing the law during the July 5, 2016 incident that were in fact false, and the resulting action by Defendants in suspending Plaintiff.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  Respondents’ brief consistently and repeatedly misrepresents the Policy and the application of LAD to this matter.  This Court must reverse the Chancery Division for the following reasons: (1) the Court failed to determine that it is well-settled that the LAD prohibits parental notification under the circumstances presented here; (2) a school district has dual legal obligations to its students under LAD and their parents pursuant to every other law; (3) the parents of transgender and cisgender students are entitled to actual knowledge of the gender of their child; and (4) interpreting LAD to prohibit parental notification is a clear violation of parents’ fundamental rights.
[brief] This would allow any party to concoct outlandish claims that despite signing a discharge of mortgage stating the loan was paid in full, there remained outstanding amounts that were unpaid.  This Court cannot permit such absurd result.  Second, it is undisputed there is no document memorializing any alleged “Third Loan” or agreement in April 2013, a fact which Plaintiff admits.  This conforms with Defendants’ contentions that after the $330,000 payment on April 26, 2013, the $330,000 Loan was paid in full.  As of that date, there were no outstanding amounts, whether principal, interest, or penalties.  There is no document memorializing any alleged “Third Loan” because there never was a “Third Loan. ”  The alleged August 7, 2013 e-mail is vague and inconclusive, and does not constitute an agreement of a “Third Loan. ”  That e-mail: (i) does not reference the alleged terms of the “Third Loan”, such as the interest; (ii) identifies a different amount than what [...] testified as the outstanding amount at the time of the signing of the Discharge of Mortgage; and (iii) does not make any indication of a “pay-when-able” loan.  Third, it is undisputed that until [...]’ attorneys sent [...] a letter on February 20, 2020, [...] did not make any written demand to [...] regarding payment on the alleged “Third Loan. ”  This fact supports Defendants’ contention that there was no “Third Loan. ”  Indeed, [...]’ failure to seek payment on the alleged “Third Loan” for over seven (7) years fatally undermines his claims that the “Third Loan” even existed.  Fourth, the $330,000 Promissory Note required any alterations or modifications be reduced to a writing signed by the parties.  It is undisputed that there were no mutually executed writings altering the terms of the $330,000 Promissory Note, a fact which [...] admitted.  Thus, if the terms of the $330,000 Promissory Note were modified, i.e., through the alleged “Third Loan,” such modification was required to be memorialized through a writing.  However, it is undisputed that there is no writing modifying the terms of the $330,000 Promissory Note.  Lastly, the long after-the-fact audio recording does not support the existence of a “Third Loan” because the audio recording does not identify the alleged amount or terms (including the alleged “pay-when-able” term) of the “Third Loan. ”  Thus, all these facts unequivocally demonstrate that the alleged oral “Third Loan” is a complete fabrication without any supporting evidence.  Accordingly, Defendants have not breached the alleged “Third Loan” because there was no agreement to breach.  Thus, the Court should dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] I.  Lot 3 and Lot 4 Title History  Prior to 1967  The history of the respective properties at issue is slightly involved but important to trace.  Albert and [...] (the “[...]”), husband and wife, once owned most of the land that today comprise the two properties.  By deed ¹  The trial transcripts are herein identified as “1Tr.” (Sep. 5, 2023); “2Tr.” (Sep. 6, 2023); “3Tr.” (Sep. 7, 2023); and “4Tr.” (Dec. 20, 2023).
[brief] [Eggleston at 123-24 (emphasis added)].  By asking an unclear or ambiguous question in an application, especially one for motor vehicles for a children’s camp, and failing to alert [...] of the importance of the information sought, [...] invited the error which [...] made when he misunderstood the question and failed to disclose that he had already rented four 15 passenger vans.  See also Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 316 N.J. Super. 63, 74 (App. Div. 1998) (because “insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, construed favorably to the insured…all ambiguities are resolved in favor of coverage,” especially “where…the rights of innocent parties who have sustained injuries will be affected by rescission ab initio. ”) (citations omitted).
[brief] (13T:184-20 to 185).  Specifically, [...] said, “having already viewed his statement to the police, and what he said the day after to mental health professionals, and what he has said every day for three years after that, before he gets to me, I know pretty much clearly which things aren’t true, which things he’s omitting, which things he’s said different ways at different times, which things are brand new. ”  (13T:184-20 to 185-2).  [...] further stated that he didn’t believe [...] heard a voice in the shower on the date of the shootings.  (13T:200-3 to 5).  In addition, [...] testified “I do think that he’s protecting himself from a recognition from the terrible things he’s done by adopting an explanation in which somehow mental illness did this to him, now that he’s lost the brain tumor explanation for it. ” (13T:228-12 to 16).  [...] continued and testified “[t]hat it’s important for him to be able to live with what he’s done. ” (13T:228-17 to 18).  “And if he can blame mental illness, that’s easier on him than taking responsibility for it. ” (13T:228-18 to 20).  [...] testified to the veracity of [...]’s statement.  Specifically, [...] stated that he reviewed her statement with “a skeptical and discerning eye. ” (13T:53-5).  He also testified that he was “trying to weigh the likelihood of various events being true or not true. ” (13T:53-4 to 9).  There is no scenario where [...]’s opinion as to the veracity of a witness’s statement is admissible.
[brief] The language cited above, as well as the language in both the lease and the riders to the lease which specifies [...]’s responsibility for common areas, evidences the conclusion that the lease does not assign to tenants any responsibility to clear ice and snow.  Under the lease’s plain language, the parking lot falls under the definition of “common areas” and [...] was responsible for the maintenance of those common areas.  Although the plain language of the lease clearly demonstrates [...]’s retention of responsibility over the common area and parking lot, Ms. [...] agreed, in her deposition testimony, that the lessor retained responsibility for the property common areas.
[brief] Defendants also argue on the same basis (i.e., that there was no Third Loan), that Plaintiff did not prove at trial that Defendants were unjustly enriched.  Although the trial court analyzed the unjust enrichment doctrine and found that “[...] proved this cause of action at trial” (Da51), the trial court POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT’S IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (Da90-94) (Responsive to Defendant’s Point V)