ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] now appeals both the denial of the "automatic approval of seven off-site units," and its Motion for Reconsideration of that Order, wherein it claims the relief it sought originally, which is noticeably absent and completely different from their original notice of Motion and proposed Order, was for a Hearing on "site suitability" and thereafter "automatic approval."  Not only is this improper under the standard of reconsideration and the within appeal, but it is entirely without merit.  First, the situation in Emerson from over 20 years ago that [...] discusses once again, at length, is not before the Court, and has nothing to do with the issue at hand.  In fact, the Court may take Judicial notice that the RDA and related documents outline a plan the Borough VOLUNTARILY agreed to - a broad and far reaching redevelopment of its central business district to address its affordable housing needs.  This effort included the willingness to proceed with condemnation of ten (10) properties, some of which had thriving businesses and some of which were residential, the relocation of the Borough ambulance corps, the granting of a PILOT to the Developer, a density bonus to the developer, and removal of restrictions on building height to address the development, lastly, vacating/donating a paper street to the Developer.  In essence, the Borough accepted a project that was as far reaching as a remedy granted in a builder's remedy suit, voluntarily.
[brief] The change was communicated to the insured in an "undifferentiated passel of two hundred documents."  *Id.*  The Court adopted the appellate panel's holding that the average policyholder could not have identified the clause "without extensive detective work, an unreasonable encumbrance on a policyholder that can only result in hidden pitfalls such as are presented here."  *Id.* at 9 (emphasis supplied).  It held that "policy changes must be conveyed fairly" to the insured and that the insurer's presentation was "insufficient" to effectuate this requirement.
[brief] State v.  Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2011)..............15 State v. Cerefice, 335 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 2000)..................13 State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008)........................................passim State v. Cleverley, 348 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2002)................20 State v. Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 2002)....................16 State v. Daly, 64 N.J. 122 (1973)...........................................18,19 State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2000)................3 State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2005)........................18 State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007).......................................14 State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510 (1989).....................................28 State v. Gordon, 261 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 1993)..................27 State v. Hanemann, 180 N.J. Super. 544 (App. Div. 1981)...............18 State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39 (2011)..............................................26 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964)...........................................13,14,26,27 State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368 (2015).......................................22 State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999).........................................13,15,26,27 State v. Morris, 262 N.J. Super. 413 (App. Div. 1993).....................18 State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J. 467 (1987).......................................18 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984)..............................................28 State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1 (1979).......................................14 State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244 (2022)..........................................16 State v. Sweeney, 77 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 1962)....................18 Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 1967)....................25 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)..............................................15 Court Rules R. 3:13-3(a)(4)..............................................................................27 R. 3:13-3(a)(6)..............................................................................27 R. 3:13-3(a)(8)..............................................................................27 Statutes N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.............................................................................1,20,25,30 N.J.S.A. 39:4-96.............................................................................1 N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.............................................................................1
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that the Trial Court improperly valued Plaintiff’s interest in [...] as *de minimus*, dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against [...] and [...] and prevented Plaintiff from participating in the dissolution of [...].  Accordingly, these aspects of the May 8, 2023 Final Judgment, June 26, 2023 and August 30, 2023 Orders should be vacated in part, and this case should be remanded.
[brief] The seven factors are (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party.  In their totality, these factors favor a holding that Respondents did not waive their right to arbitrate this dispute.
[brief] K.S. does not draw a distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of dismissed charges, but rather draws a distinction between unproven conduct and conduct that is “supported by undisputed facts of record or facts found at a hearing. ”  K.S., 220 N.J. at 199.  When there is no evidence the conduct occurred other than the mere fact that a dismissed allegation appears on the defendant’s record, those “prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose”  Ibid.  Here, there was no evidence [...] committed any of the acts alleged in the dismissed FV complaints, yet the sentencing court assumed [...] had committed conduct underlying these complaints and factored this assumption into its sentencing decision:  When you talk about Seven as a mitigating factor, you’re differentiating between people, and I think I gave the illustration.  Who’s dancing through the raindrops and who is really living their life in a proper way and got themselves mixed up in something that I got them here.  You at that point in your life were headed down a path of destruction, okay?  You had constant run-ins with the criminal justice system, albeit at lower levels, but you were not living a life free of contact with the criminal justice system.  So I don’t see Seven as applicable.
[brief] Despite acknowledging that the Operating Agreement contained a non-compete provision, Defendant admitted she used Plaintiff’s money to form [...] to operate another pharmacy, [...], a competing business.  3T88:15-20.  The evidence was clear and uncontroverted that Defendant formed [...] in December 2017 to operate another pharmacy.  3T111:2.  She took Plaintiff’s money to get back on her feet, and then wanted to get rid of him.  She used [...]’s checking account to pay for [...]’s startup costs and then sold [...] once it was established to cut Plaintiff out and keep the business all for herself.  3T88:13-22.  This is precisely the type of conduct that the non-compete provision in the Operating Agreement was designed to protect against.  **Defendant’s Admitted Use of Plaintiff’s Credit Card**
[directive] 2.  Você entende que se o tribunal determinar que você é dependente de drogas e também concluir que você se enquadra nos critérios da lei 2C:35-14, você poderá ser N.J.S.A. condenado a cumprir um período obrigatório de suspensão condicional de pena especial para participar em um programa de tratamento de drogas supervisionado pelo tribunal (“Tribunal de Drogas”)?  Estes critérios incluem, mas não estão restritos a, uma decisão judicial determinando que (1) você é uma pessoa dependente de drogas ou álcool e (2) você era dependente de drogas ou álcool no momento em que cometeu este crime e (3) você não portava arma de fogo no momento deste crime ou em outro processo pendente na justiça e (4) você não tem determinadas condenações anteriores que o desqualificariam e (5) há tratamento adequado disponível para o seu caso e (6) o cumprimento da pena do “Tribunal de Drogas” não resultará em perigo para a comunidade.
[brief] ......................... passim  State v. Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 2002) .........................................................................................  4  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .....................................................................................................................  24, 33  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) .....................................................................................................................  28  Constitutions  Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution ...........................................................................  33  Article I, Paragraph 10, New Jersey Constitution ........................................................................  33  Rules  N.J.R.E. 608 .................................................................................................................................. 27, 29, 31 N.J.R.E. 801(a) ...............................................................................................................................  29  N.J.R.E. 801(b) ............................................................................................................................... 29, 30  N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1) .......................................................................................................................... 18, 26, 29, 31  TABLE OF REFERENCES
[brief] *Irving.*, 439 F.App’x at 127, *supra* at p. 19.  good understanding of what I think is going on.  So now is your time before it gets to be a different situation that you will explain.  What do you really think happened with the PCard and purchases?  Appellant: [L]ike I said if . . . I blew something, tell me what I owe ya.  I didn’t realize I blew something.
[brief] Moreover, "[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused's guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay."  Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271.  Here, defendant's claim fails on its most basic premise: that the admission of this portion of the detective's questioning constituted a testimonial hearsay statement requiring compliance with the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause.  The questions asked by a detective during the course of an interview are not testimonial hearsay, as they are not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.  Indeed, police are permitted to lie to and mislead the suspects they are questioning.  The detective was not testifying about [...]'s identification at all, and thus was not through his testimony conveying information to incriminate the defendant.  Rather, the only reference to her identification was contained in the detective's questions during his interview of defendant.  And significantly, it was defendant, not the State, that told the jury there was a witness who identified defendant, and it was defendant, not the State, that suggested that there was any truth behind the detective's interview questions, in that there was any such witness regardless of the accuracy of her identification.  He cannot now be heard to complain about the improper references to a non-testifying witness he himself made and the attention he himself drew to this non-testifying witness in both his opening and his improper attempt to cross- examine the detective about [...]'s identification.  As the detective's reference during the interview to a witness picking defendant was not a hearsay statement, defendant had no right under N.J.R.E. 806 to attack [...]'s credibility through his questioning of the detective at trial.  The judge's ruling sustaining the State's hearsay objection thus did not violate N.J.R.E. 806 or deny defendant his rights under the Confrontation Clause.
[brief] ”); City of Orange Tp. Bd. of Educ. v. City of Orange Tp., 451 N.J. Super. 310, 323 (Ch. Div. 2017) (“A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show, in order to avoid having the relief it seeks withheld, that the legal right underlying the claim is settled” (citing Crowe, supra)).  Indeed, despite Plaintiffs’ assertion to the contrary, Plaintiffs are required to satisfy the “well-settled legal right” prong set forth in Crowe, supra, in order to obtain the requested injunction.  Moreover, they have the burden of satisfying this requirement, as well as the remaining Crowe prongs, “by clear and convincing evidence. ”  Dolan v. De Capua, 16 N.J. 599, 614 (1954).  shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits of its LAD claims is a separate inquiry…”).  Plaintiffs’ opposition brief only serves to underscore the Board’s contention that the trial court misapplied Crowe’s “well-settled legal right” prong (Db8).  Plaintiffs state that “case law has long made clear that the inquiry is whether the underlying body of law is settled, not whether the specific outcome of a specific lawsuit is already settled by precedent (Pb25). ”  Plaintiffs, however, do not cite a single case which stands for the proposition that the “body of law” pertaining to school parental notification policies to the parents of minor children in relation to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) is in any way settled.  Rather, Plaintiffs refute the case holding in a case cited by the Board and assert that “the LAD itself” and caselaw which supports Plaintiffs’ right to “proceed against any person in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” is dispositive (Pb24-Pb26).  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Crowe cited to Citizens Coach Co. v. Camden H.R. Co., 29 N.J. Eq. 299, 304 (1878) for its holding that “temporary relief should be withheld when the legal right underlying plaintiff’s claim is unsettled.
[brief] In this case, plaintiff’s previous counsel, [...], had actual authority to settle plaintiff’s case for the $100,000.00 policy limits with defendant [...].  [...] testified that on October 25, 2023, plaintiff “advised [her] to settle with the defendant [...] for the $100,000 policy limits because there would be nothing more” and proceed against codefendant.  (1T:22-23).  She further testified that she wrote to plaintiff on October 26, 2023 confirming their conversation in which plaintiff had advised her to accept the $100,000.00 from defendant [...].  (1T:28, DCa10-DCa12).  This is further bolstered by the testimony that plaintiff stated she was going to use these settlement proceeds to set up a special needs trust.  (1T:14, DCa25).  Plaintiff testified that she did receive the October 26 letter and did not state in response that she did not want to settle with defendant [...].  (1T:28).  Plaintiff further testified that [...] subsequently sent her the release.  (1T:30).  She also confirmed that she gave [...] permission to discuss her case with the special needs lawyer regarding the settlement, on November 1, 2023.  (1T:33, DCa17).  The trial court credited [...]’s testimony more so than the plaintiff’s and found that she had actual, express authority to settle the case for $100,000.00 with defendant [...].  (1T:55).  Plaintiff cites *Williams v. Vito*, 365 N.J. Super. 225 (Law Div. 2003), for its proposition that [...] did not have authority to enter into a settlement agreement.
[directive] not are that 2002-2 No. Directive Enforcement Law General Attorney of Provisions with Compliance effect. and force in remain shall Directive this of provisions with the inconsistent deconfliction the satisfy to deemed shall be Directive this in forth set procedures deconfliction the 2002- No. Directive Enforcement General Law Attorney of 17-20 Sections in forth set requirements require to Prosecutor County of a authority the limit herein shall nothing that however, provided, 2, the requiring (ems., approved is application warrant search a before efforts deconfliction additional force task drug and gang, guns, county the with consult to warrant search seeking the agency search the appropriate as shall revise Justice Criminal of Division
[directive] When a prosecuting agency seeks to forfeit real property in residential use, the least intrusive means that will preserve the property for forfeiture shall be employed.  A notice of lis pendens or an order restraining alienation should suffice to preserve the government's interest in forfeiture pending final judicial determination of the forfeiture action.  This policy recognizes that immediate dispossession from a residence may affect innocent individuals, that dispossession is not always required to preserve the property for forfeiture, and that the home is afforded special significance in American jurisprudence.  In cases in which public health, safety or welfare is at risk, full seizure may be accomplished upon obtaining judicial sanction.
[brief] Therefore, instructional errors on essential matters, even in cases where those errors are not raised below, are traditionally deemed prejudicial and reversible error because they interfere with the jury’s proper assessment of the defendant’s culpability.  *State v. Rhett*, 127 N.J. 3, 5-7 (1992); *Concepcion*, 111 N.J. at 379.  Moreover, reversal of the resulting convictions is necessarily required where, as here, the error has the clear capacity to affect the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.
[brief] Defense expert [...], the lower court explained, “never really analyzed . . . some of these monies that ended up in accounts that were controlled by defendants. ”  And, while the defense offered some testimony responding to the misappropriation of funds issue, the Court found that, “there’s nothing there.  You know, there was really no meat to most of the explanations. ” (26T33:6-13).  Moreover, the Court identified conduit accounts, co-mingling, and step transactions in the entity-defendant financial records.  (26T33:14-16).  Based on these and other findings, the trial court found that the defendants converted funds that rightfully belonged to the Plaintiffs.
[brief] Broad public policies, such as the general right to work in a healthy and safe environment, as well as more pointed policies arising from the unfolding pandemic, are implicated by this straightforward request.  Defendant admits it terminated Plaintiff as a direct result of her plea.  Defendant cannot be immunized from liability for its blatantly unlawful action.  Such immunization would run afoul of the broad construction of the Pierce doctrine.  Defendant applies a very narrow construction of the law, erroneously adopted by the trial court, arguing that the absence of a formal lockdown order is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim.  First, in doing so the trial court ignored broader public policies implicated by the right to a safe and healthy workplace detailed already in Plaintiff’s moving brief.  Second, the impending lockdown order, alongside already enacted Executive Orders aimed at curtailing the rapidly spreading pandemic, also establish a clear mandate of public policy.
[brief] 188 N.J. at 231.  The Court in Mehlman stated with respect to the “clear mandate of public policy” requirement as follows:  Public policy has been defined as that principal of law which holds that no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.  The term admits of no exact definition ...  Public policy is not concerned with minutiae, but with principles.  153 N.J. at 187 (internal quotations omitted).  Subsection [c][3] requires an additional showing that “the complained of activity must have public ramifications, and that the dispute between employer and employee must be more than a private disagreement.
[brief] (Emphasis Added).  Declarant’s Certification does not state either that 1) Declarant had personal or actual knowledge of the matters reported on the business records, or 2) the information was transmitted by another person who had actual or personal knowledge of the business records, or 3) that it was Declarant’s regular practice to record information transmitted by persons who had actual or personal knowledge (Exhibit FF) (Da115).  In the absence of a showing of personal or actual knowledge made in one or more of these three ways, the books of account submitted by Plaintiff cannot qualify as a business record.  *Zenith Radio Corp.*, supra.  Thus, the lower Court made a mistake when it entered the books of account into evidence.  *Zenith Radio Corp.*, supra.
[brief] 310 N.J. Super. 332, 347-48 (App. Div. 1998).  In reaching this ruling, the Court observed that sick leave pay is a form of deferred compensation that has “long been considered ‘additional compensation upon retirement’ subject to mandatory negotiation. ”  310 N.J. Super. at 340 (quoting Maywood Educ. Ass’n Inc. v. Maywood Bd. Of Educ., 131 N.J. Super. 551, 555 (Ch. Civ. 1974)).  Finally, in Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537 (1956), our Supreme Court found that the right to severance pay survived the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.
[brief] This is an action brought by the Appellant-Plaintiff in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County, in connection with a motor vehicle accident (“MVA”) that occurred on or about August 14, 2019 between her and the Respondent-Defendant.  As a result of the MVA, the Appellant-Plaintiff sustained severe and permanent injuries, including injuries to her neck, mid back and lower back resulting in pain, spasms and restrictions.  The Appellant-Plaintiff also sustained a fractured sternum as a result of the MVA.  Following the accident, the Appellant-Plaintiff underwent extensive medical treatment from various providers, including [...] D.C.  Upon the treatment and observation, Dr. Rodgers provided a report, dated March 29, 2021, that included a certificate of permanency.  The report also found that “[t]here is a direct relationship between [...]'s present condition and the accident of August 14, 2019. ”  The report addendum from Dr. Rodgers, dated June 27, 2022, confirms the finding that the Appellant-Plaintiff “severely injured her sternum resulting in a fractured sternum from the motor vehicle accident. ”  The Plaintiff has sufficiently established by the requisite “credible objective medical evidence” that she has sustained a permanent injury.
[directive] As soon as a judgment has been signed the Criminal Division Manager shall ensure that the Appellate Division decision and conforming judgment are entered into the PROMIS/GAVEL System.  Entry of the decision into PROMIS/GAVEL will update the status of the case and automatically update the defendant’s CCH (Criminal Case History) “rap sheet” maintained by the New Jersey State Police.  This update is accomplished through an interface between PROMIS/GAVEL and the New Jersey Criminal History Detailed Record.
[brief] 7T118-1 to 120-5.  Though the Trial Court disagreed that it retained jurisdiction in its Order of December 20, 2023, [...] noted in his analysis that his decision was final and that “neither party filed a motion for a stay. ”  Defendants are requesting this Court confirm the finality of [...]’s Order terminating the PSA as Plaintiff failed to take the necessary steps to preserve any right it had to purchase the property.  Plaintiff neglected to follow the proper procedure and is attempting to equate this appeal as fulfilling its obligation to file a stay.  Defendants ask that this Court confirm termination of the PSA and foreclose any further contractual remedy by Plaintiff.