ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa 13-14, Verified Complaint ¶¶62-64.)  Adoption of Ordinance 1423-21 also violated N.J.S.A. 40:49-2, which governs the adoption of municipal ordinances, because the public hearing for the ordinance was noticed for December 14, 2021, a special meeting of the Borough Council, but was instead held on December 28, 2021, without any further public notice.  (Pa 263 and Pa 278-279.)  The published notice of the December 14th hearing date did not include a copy of the amending ordinance or a summary thereof, and did not inform the public as to how to obtain a copy.  (Pa 211.)  The trial court’s Legal and Substantive analyses ignored the claims raised in the Second Count alleging violations of the LRHL and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2, but instead provided only a stunted discussion of the publication requirement and an oblique reference to the court’s unwillingness to extend the 45-day requirement of Rule 4:69-6(a), with no discussion or analysis.
[brief] Further, the Penalty section of the ALJ’s Decision (Pa55) relies upon allegations that neither form the basis of any charges against [...] nor are supported by facts in the record.  The ALJ’s Decision states as follows:  Appellant had been abusing prescription opioids and perpetrated untruthfulness regarding his prescriptions and opioid use, constituting misconduct as a police officer under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, and conduct unbecoming a public employee, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6).  Appellant’s daily use of high doses of opioids put himself at risk as well as members of the public whom appellant was sworn to protect, which behavior constituted neglect of duty under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7), and Other Sufficient Cause pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(11).  …  Finally, appellant offered false statements, misrepresentations and evasive answers on several occasions, and such statements constituted conduct unbecoming a public employee under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6) and Other Sufficient Cause, as set out in detail in the FNDA.  Decision at p.46 (emphasis added) (Pa57).  The charges against [...] did not include charges based upon substance abuse and/or him placing the public at risk.  The ALJ’s erroneous conclusion as to [...]’s purported substance abuse (as to which [...] was not even charged) requires, at a minimum, remand for the purpose of determining an appropriate remedy.
[brief] To All parties regarding 10/14/20 Hearing (Attached at Pa269)  Letter dated 9/29/20 from [...] to all parties regarding Nov 18, 2020 Trial (Attached at Pa270)  Letter dated 11/23/20 from [...] regarding Trial via Zoom Jan 13, 2021 (Attached at Pa271)  Letter dated 12/22/20 from [...] regarding February 10, 2021 hearing (Attached at Pa272)  Letter dated 1/22/21 from [...] regarding March 17, 2021 hearing (Attached at Pa273)  Letter dated 1/25/21 from [...] regarding 4/14/2021 hearing (Attached at Pa274)  Letter dated 4/26/21 from [...] Regarding hearing scheduled for June 23, 2021 (Attached at Pa275)  Letter dated May 4, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for June 23, 2021 (Attached at Pa276)  Letter dated June 24, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for July 20, 2021 (Attached at Pa277)  Letter dated June 24, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for July 20, 2021 (Attached at Pa278)  Letter dated July 21, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for August 17, 2021 (Attached at Pa279)  Letter dated August 2, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for August 25, 2021 (Attached at Pa280)  Letter dated August 19, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for September 22, 2021 (Attached at Pa281)  Letter dated May 15, 2020 from [...] to [...] regarding investigating Notice of claim received from [...] (Attached at Pa282)
[brief] Penalizing an employee for use of leave as a reasonable accommodation may also raise a disparate treatment issue if the employer grants similar amounts of leave to non-disabled employees but does not penalize them.  (Pa275, Pa292)  The employer does grant similar leave to non-disabled employees without fear of penalty.  In this case the employer does not penalize employees for absences caused by 3 instances of compensatory time or 3 instances of vacation leave - it only penalizes for 3 instances of medical leave.  Such treatment is discriminatory on its face.  Moreover, the City does not penalize employees by rendering ineligible for promotion if they are on vacation or using a compensatory day.  A Firefighter is only ineligible for promotion if he takes medical leave.  The employer therefore treats protected medical leave disfavorably as contrasted with vacation or compensatory leave.  This is disparate treatment under the ADA and the NJLAD.
[brief] Defendant could not and has not demonstrated a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel in alleging that trial counsel should have called as a witness the property manager of [...] in [...], who, according to Defendant, told police that she saw Defendant at the apartment complex earlier in the day that the murder occurred.  The relevant issue is not whether Defendant ever set foot in [...] that day (Defendant was apprehended there, a fact neither party disputes) but whether he was there at the time of the murder.  The putative witness, [...], had no evidence to offer pertaining to that point, nor does Defendant claim that she did.  Johnson’s testimony was far from “fortifying the alibi defense” as Defendant claims.  Db52.
[directive] These Certificates may be issued by the "supervising authority" pursuant to if N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-7(c)(3).  The court is defined as the supervising authority the of or petitioner was subject to probation was not required to serve a period if supervision, and as the [...] the petitioner served parole supervision.  An applicant who is a parolee and who is seeking relief must file an application with the [...].  of  The attached forms include: (a) a Summary Eligibility (Attachment 1); (b) the Application to Suspend Employment/Occupational Disabilities (Attachment 2); (c) the Certificate Suspending Employment/Occupational Disabilities (Attachment of of 3); (d) Notice Ineligibility (Attachment 4); and (e) Revocation Certificate (Attachment 5).  ADA ENSURING ml TO DOOR AN OPEN JUSTICE
[brief] Complaint Summons (Defendant’s Copy)  Pa050  Letter From Police Safety to [...] Regarding Outstanding Bill for Discovery, Dated 7/29/2020 Pa051  Exhibit B - Attachments to Complaint Notice of Claim to [...] 2/27/2020 Pa053  [...]’ Letter to [...] and [...] 9/25/2020 Pa056  Exhibit C – Attachments to Complaint Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020
[brief] [a]  Gates and pillars shall be located only on the main entry drive to any residential property and in compliance with the following lot width and height requirements:  | Minimum Lot Widths At Street Line (feet) | Maximum Height Including Light Fixtures (feet)  | |----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | 81 to 104.9 | 4 | | 105 to 119.9 | 6 | | 120 and over | 8 |  [b]  On lots of three acres or more, entrance gates may be a maximum of 12 feet in height, provided that the length of the gate does not exceed 25 linear feet.  [c]  Gates and pillars shall be set back as to sight distance consistent with the requirements of Article IX for driveways and parking areas in residential zones.
[brief] (Ra4.)  On June 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed his fourth Motion to Extend Discovery, which was granted on July 11, 2023.  (Ra4; P313.)  The Court’s Order extended the deadline for Plaintiff to produce his expert reports until August 21, 2023.  (Pa314.)  The Court also adjourned arbitration to October 13, 2023.  (Ra4.)  Discovery closed on October 11, 2023.  (Ra1.)  On October 13, 2023, Plaintiff’s claim was no caused at arbitration on the basis of the Tort Claims Act.
[brief] Db9  State v. Perez, 177 N.J. 540 (2003)  Db16  State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567 (2018)  Db12  State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967)  Db16 State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365 (2012)  Db18 State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 178 (2001)  Db18 State v. Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 1966)  Db12-Db13 State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122 (2009)  Db11 State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592 (2021)  Db18 State v. Williams, 471 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 2022)  Db18 State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4 (1994)  Db13, Db14  NEW JERSEY STATUTES
[brief] [...] WAS PERFORMING EXCLUDED DEMOLITION WORK ON THE DATE OF THE [...]IDENT  [...]’ argument that enrollment in the CCIP was mandatory for “subcontractors of every tier” at the Project, and therefore [...] must have been enrolled (TRVb7), is simply not true.  Rather, the CCIP plainly does not permit certain contractors, including those performing demolition, like [...], from enrolling.  In fact, the CCIP Binder identifies several types of work at the Project that is not eligible for enrollment stating, in relevant part, that “…NO COVERAGE WILL BE PROVIDED TO … DEMOLITION…” (TRVa2617 and ZURa296.)  While [...] may have been erroneously enrolled in the CCIP for a few hours before being unenrolled upon the realization that [...]’s work was demolition, [...] admits it had no other contracts or proposals during this fleeting erroneous enrollment period, and never attempted to re-enroll for subsequent contracts or proposals, ever.  ([...] Tr. 144:4-22 at TRVa1535.).  Further, on the date of the Accident, [...] was removing parts of the Ritz wall, demolition work contracted for in July 2015 that was admittedly barred from the CCIP.  ([...] Tr., at 19:20-20:4 at TRVa1462, 26:4-8 at TRV1464, 33:20-34:20 at TRVa1465-1466, 65:13-66:2 at TRVa1473-1474.)  [...]’ argument that enrollment is mandatory is also belied by the CCIP Manual, which specifically addresses subcontractors identified as “Parties Not Covered”, including, critically, “ANY SUBCONTRACTOR of ANY tier” which [...], “at their sole discretion,” opts to exclude.
[brief] Appellant is a former [...] employee who admittedly utilized the Company’s Purchasing Credit Card (“PCard”) to make personal purchases in excess of $256,612.14 and was terminated.  The Trial Judge properly granted Respondents’ summary judgment motion because Appellant failed to point to any competent record evidence to establish the required elements of his claims of wrongful termination, fraud, or retaliation under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”).  The record evidence conclusively shows that Appellant was terminated for his misappropriation of Company funds and he was under investigation for his misuse of the Company’s PCard at the time he repeated two year old claims about the marketing or labeling of [...] products.  There is no competent evidence that could give credence to Appellant’s assertion that he was given permission to use the Company’s PCard to make personal purchases for an eight (8) year period, let alone a few months.  Appellant’s self-serving deposition testimony is severely contradicted by his own consistent and repeated assertions that he only received permission to use the PCard for personal purchases in March 2020 and that he did not use the PCard(s) to make personal purchases before 2020.  Notably, it was only after Respondents produced a third-party investigation report which revealed Appellant had been utilizing the PCard to make personal purchases since as early as 2012 that Appellant attempted to change his testimony.  Here, Appellant conveniently suggests that it is a mere typographical error – an error that Appellant repeated in his draft complaint and certification, the filed complaint, his Responses to Request To Admit, and his Answers to Interrogatories.  The trial court correctly found that Appellant could not establish, through his own contradictory self-serving statements or any other competent evidence, that Respondents engaged in unlawful conduct.  The trial court also correctly found that Appellant could not refute the undisputed evidence supporting [...]’s counterclaims.  In short, this appeal is simply a request for a ‘do-over’ with new counsel after Appellant failed to present the Court with any evidence to support his version of the facts.  The time to make conclusory allegations and bare assertions had passed.  At summary judgment, the parties are expected to present facts and evidence.  Respondent did so; Appellant did not.
[brief] Third, the Trial Court also correctly held that a mailing vendor does not qualify as a “person” that debt collectors are prohibited from communicating with.  The Trial Court reasoned a mailing vendor is more akin to the “postal service or telephone or telegram operator” and thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, a mailing vendor is merely a “medium” as opposed to a “person” that debt collectors are prohibited from communicating with.  (Pa55,56a).  Quoting language from another court that reviewed the same issue, the Trial Court reasoned:  In many ways, a mailing vendor is a modern-day stenographer or clerk, briefly viewing the information for the purpose of creating and/or processing a communication.  At any rate, its delimited role is closer to that of a stenographer or clerk than that of an employer, whose knowledge of an employee’s debt (and authority over the employee) could result in economic and/or reputational consequences for that employee.  In sum, passing on a debtor’s information to a company for the sole purpose of creating a mailing does not appear to be one of the unfair, deceptive, or harassing behaviors the FDCPA is meant to target.  (Pa56a)(quoting Cavazzini, 574 F. Supp. 3d at 142-43).  The Trial Court’s reasoning and holding is sound and is supported by a plain review of the FDCPA.
[brief] Yet, it is undisputed Defendants only produced some of the records that were requested in 2015 and ordered to turn over on 8/20/20.  Those records included NJOAL Decisions, Settlements and Board Resolutions for each of the 11 students identified in Plaintiffs’ original 2015 OPRA Request.  To date, of the 33 records Defendants were compelled to produce, only 24 have been supplied, the rest of which the Board facetiously claims do not exist, else they would “be part of the Board of Education’s official meeting agendas and minutes” (Db-15).  Defendants are correct to contend that “Plaintiffs are fully aware of the search undertaken for the records, which records were located, and which parts of the records were deemed confidential” (Db-17).  Defendants do not account, however, for the insufficiency of said search.  Defendants’ contention that the Certification provided by [...] (56a) absolves the Board of responsibility for locating the records is misguided.  There is no indication in [...]’s account that the Board made any attempt to inquire of the New Jersey Department of Education.  The Department of Education, because of its instrumental role in archiving the final administrative decisions is an untapped source for the Board from which to recover the missing records.
[brief] Consistent with EO100 and AO1, [...] has proposed, among other rule proposals, its Resilient Environments and Landscapes (“REAL”) Rules, comprehensive amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Rules, Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act Rules, Flood Hazard Area Control Act Rules, and Stormwater Management Rules.  The REAL Rules have not yet been adopted.  A copy of the rule proposal can be found at [https://dep.nj.gov/rules/notice-of-rule-proposals/20240805b/](https://dep.nj.gov/rules/notice-of-rule-proposals/20240805b/) under the Highlands Act is exempt from not only the Highlands Act and its implementing rules, but also the RMP.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a.  Thus, [...] was not required to determine whether CS 327 is consistent with the RMP.
[brief] Prior to the plenary hearing, Plaintiff, through counsel, provided the Court and the Defendants with counsel’s legal invoices, which were admitted into evidence during the plenary hearing without objection.  (8T6:3-1886:8-11).  Following the plenary hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a Certification of Services noting that attorneys’ fees and costs were being sought for the entire litigation, but that with respect to the two motions these fees and costs were also being sought under the Frivolous Litigation Statute; counsel stated that the Plaintiff sought to file a motion under R. 1:4-8 unless fees and costs were awarded based on the Certification. Pa159, at ¶6).
[brief] In January 2019, [...] significantly revised its transgender student policy following the enactment of N.J.S.A. 18A:36-41 and issuance of the New Jersey Department of Education “Transgender Student Guidance for School Districts” (hereinafter referred to as the “Guidelines”).  See Da246-254.  For all intents and purposes, that version of the [...] policy was substantially identical to the Guidelines.  Cf. See Da246-254 and 255-261.  Significantly, [...] advised its clients that adoption of that policy was mandatory.
[directive] This contact should be made timely so that the County Prosecutor can review all relevant reports and have a full briefing prior to determining whether to grant use immunity.  Use immunity provides that anything the officer says under the grant of immunity, and any evidence derived from their statements, cannot be used against him or her in a criminal proceeding (except for perjury or false swearing if the information is not truthful).  But use immunity does not eliminate the possibility that the subject officer will be prosecuted.  A criminal prosecution may proceed even though the target or defendant has received use immunity.
[brief] 238a.  He stated that he would keep her attorneys apprised of the contents of his final report, but he did not.  Id.  He stated that he would talk to the individuals with knowledge that Plaintiff raised, but to Plaintiff’s knowledge he did not do so.  Id.  He said he would obtain additional documents from Plaintiff and/or [...], but he did not.  Id.  Plaintiff’s counsel reached out to [...] on May 13, 2021, over one month after the interview, to provide the additional documents, identify additional individuals to interview, and to seek the status of the investigation.
[brief] ”  Like the NJSLL and NJCLA, the NJCFLA (under the umbrella of the NJLLA) allowed for a private right of action by individual consumers in addition to the enforcement remedies of the Commissioner.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 retained a codification of the Commissioner’s enforcement authority but did not disallow private actions by aggrieved consumers—nor has it ever.  In 2010, the NJLLA, N.J.S.A. 17:C-1 to -49, was divided, separating the NJRMLA, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, from the NJCFLA.
[brief] There is no sound basis for the trial court’s Webster’s based definition of “bar complaint. ”  As demonstrated in Plaintiffs’ moving brief, bar complaint has a particular meaning in the context of attorney discipline.  It complements and mirrors the term “disciplinary proceeding” rather than creating a whole new category.  The difference between a bar complaint and a disciplinary proceeding turns on the structure of attorney discipline in a particular state.  New Jersey is a “disciplinary proceeding” state, in which our Supreme Court oversees attorney discipline.  In Virginia, by contrast, the state bar association, not the courts, are responsible for enforcing attorney discipline.  [Pb33.]  By including both bar complaint and disciplinary proceeding in Question No. 11, Defendants capture both forms of attorney discipline.
[brief] After the motion had already been litigated and decided in Union County, defendant moved to suppress the same evidence seized as a result of his April 23, 2022 pursuit and arrest in his Hudson County case.  (Pa54-56).  The State opposed the motion, arguing defendant should be barred from filing the motion based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  (Pa67).  Specifically, the State contended defendant should be estopped because he already litigated the same motion in another county and lost on the merits.  (Pa67).  Defendant countered, arguing the issue presented in the Union County case is not identical to the issue presented in this case, and the order in Union County is not final for the purpose of collateral estoppel.  (Pa68).  After considering the briefs and hearing oral argument, the court denied the State’s motion for collateral estoppel.  (Pa1-3).
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  Trial Facts  On April 24, 2012, defendant, [...], and [...] entered into an area development agreement (ADA) with [...]  ([...]).  (Sa37-69).  That agreement gave them rights to open twelve [...] franchises—retail alcohol establishments focusing on beer—in New Jersey and Pennsylvania over a five-year period.  (Sa66).  On November 23, 2012, the agreement was amended to add a fourth partner, [...], and was later expanded to include locations in New York.  (1T88-3 to 14; Sa68-69).  The partnership operated under the name “[...]. ” (1T88-25 to 89-1).  Initially the four partners were to share in the profits equally, but over time, given various dynamics, different ownership structures were arranged for different franchise locations.  (1T89-11 to 90-6).  Each franchise location had its own franchise agreement giving the partnership the right to open a [...] at the specified location; there was also a separate operating agreement setting forth the terms of ownership, including the percentage of ownership for each partner.  (1T91-21 to 92-6).  [...] was also required to provide a principal owner’s guaranty to [...] contemporaneously with the signing of each franchise agreement, which also set forth the ownership percentage.  (Sa47 at ¶ 6.3).  In February 2014, [...] was looking for a location to open a franchise in Hoboken and settled on [...],\(^3\) where defendant had operated a Melting Pot restaurant that failed and he had lost his lease.
[brief] See Da22-28.  The proposed form of judgment prepared by plaintiff’s counsel and submitted to the Office of Foreclosure with plaintiff’s April 6, 2023 motion provided, in pertinent part, as follows:  And it further appearing that … there is presently due and owing to the Plaintiff under the Note and Mortgage … the aggregate sum of $21,501,343.47 as of April 5, 2023, together with lawful interest thereafter on all sums due, together with costs to be taxed, including lawful counsel fees; IT IS on this ___ day of __________, 202_, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff is entitled to have the sum of $21,501,343.47 as of April 5, 2023, together with lawful interest thereafter on the total sum due Plaintiff until the same be paid and satisfied, together with costs of this suit to be taxed, including attorneys’ fees in the sum of $7,500, all to be raised and paid in the first place out of the mortgaged premises; and it is further Da20 (emphasis added).  Thus, plaintiff’s first motion for the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure sought a judgment of $21,501,343.47 as of April 5, 2023, which included prejudgment interest at the contract rate, and postjudgment “lawful interest” thereafter.  Id.  If plaintiff sought an award of post-mortgage foreclosure judgement interest at the “contract rate”, instead of lawful interest at the “lawful interest” rate, [...] and plaintiff’s counsel knew how to say it (which they did not) and knew how to insert it in the final judgment form (which they failed to do).  On April 26, 2023, the Office of Foreclosure denied plaintiff’s motion because (a) an order striking a co-defendant’s answer had not been filed, and (b) the Office required a clarification relating to late charges.