ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  In January 2021  [...] and [...] ([...]) applied to the Department of Environmental Protection for a Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) permit to construct an apartment building almost 100’ tall, with 8 stories containing 109 apartment units to be located about 88 feet from the boardwalk in Long Branch, Monmouth County.  Aa1-Aa4.  On March 8, 2021  Appellant [...] filed written objections with aerial photos to the application.  Aa5-Aa12.  On March 22, 2021, DEP sent [...] a deficiency letter.  Aa13-Aa15.  On June 22, 2021, DEP’s Division of Land Resource Protection denied the permit for the same reasons as in Appellant’s objections, namely non-compliance with the Coastal Zone Management Rule governing the design of buildings close to the waterfront, the Long Branch boardwalk.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10.  Aa16-Aa21.  [...] appealed for an administrative hearing on August 5, 2021, which was approved on February 18, 2022.  Aa22.  On August 4, 2022, [...] submitted a set-back survey (revised) of buildings along the Long Branch waterfront.  Aa23-Aa28.  On August 5, 2022, DEP agreed to a tentative settlement which would reverse the denial and issue a CAFRA permit for the oversize building.  Aa29-Aa40.  On December 22, 2022, Appellant filed written objections along with pictorial exhibits to the settlement.  Aa41-Aa53.  On June 30, 2023, DEP reversed the permit denial and issued the CAFRA permit.  Aa54-Aa60.  No explanation accompanied the permit issuance.  Notice of the approval was published in the DEP Bulletin on July 19, 2023.  Aa61-Aa62.  Appellant [...] appealed to DEP and requested an administrative hearing on August 9, 2023, to challenge the permit.  Aa63-Aa70.  On August 28, 2023, DEP denied Appellant’s appeal request.  Aa71-Aa75.  On September 25, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and CIS with the Appellate Division and an Amended Notice of Appeal on December 21, 2023.  Aa76-Aa85.
[brief] He was also entitled to an evaluation under the same provision because of the nature of the instant conviction and the fact that he may have a prior diagnosis of psychosis.  Although sentencing courts have some discretion to waive the evaluation after considering all the appropriate circumstances, the court did not do so here and could not have reasonably done so because the missing evaluation would have included information relevant to sentencing.  In addition, or alternatively, as explained in Section B, a psychological report was required by the second provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b because the statute provides that the presentence investigation shall include “a report on the defendant’s mental condition” in cases involving child endangering convictions and does not allow for that requirement to be waived.  For both or either of these reasons, a remand is required.
[brief] One of the four categories of allegations [...] allowed to move forward concerns [...]’s alleged unauthorized sharing of user data with certain “business partners. ”  Dkt. 298 at 8.  This category does not encompass every interaction between [...] and another business involving some transfer of data; there is no way to read Plaintiffs’ “business partner” allegations to be about anything other than what Plaintiffs described as entities with whom [...] partnered to “develop and integrate [...]’s User Platform on multiple devices and operating systems” through the use of “private APIs. ”  See SACC ¶¶ 430-440.  In allowing this category of allegations to move forward, [...] repeated that it concerned partnerships designed to “outsourc[e] to business partners ‘the time, labor, and money required to build [...]’s Platform on different devices and operating systems.
[brief] F.  [...] Will Not Suffer Any Prejudice  [...]’s allegations of prejudice are simply a repeat of its other arguments.  [...] claims that its prejudice results from producing “voluminous” discovery in the case; having to proceed in arbitration although the Service of Suit clause in the [...] Pollution Policy allegedly permits litigation; and the supposed “delay” in bringing the arbitration.  As discussed supra, [...]’s arguments regarding discovery and the timeliness of [...]’s motion to compel arbitration are meritless.  As discussed infra, its arguments concerning the Service of Suit clause also are without merit.
[brief] It is well settled that the Appellate Division reviews Orders granting or denying summary judgment on a de novo basis applying the same standard as if sitting as the trial court.  Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.) cert. denied 154 N.J. 608 (1998).  Thus, the well-known standards set forth in R. 4:46-2(c) are applicable to the questions presented here on appeal.  Our Supreme Court in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), held that in considering summary judgment the trial court must decide whether “the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Thus, the overarching principle governing review is for the court not to weigh or evaluate evidence but, rather, to accept as true the facts set forth by the non-moving party and to give it the benefit of all inferences.  A number of ancillary principles have been established in summary judgment jurisprudence to give further meaning to this broad principle:  1.  Issues involving intent and state of mind are particularly not susceptible of disposition by summary judgment.  Ordinarily, a motion for summary judgment should not be granted where an action or defense requires determination of a state of mind or intent.  *Auto Lenders v. Gentilini Ford*, 181 N.J. 245, 271-272 (2004); *Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.*, 168 N.J. 236, 253-254 (2001); *Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp.*, 111 N.J. 276, 291 (1988).  2.  Questions of whether an oral agreement was intended to bind parties until a written contract was executed is also not generally susceptible to disposition by summary judgment.  That is one of the precise issues presented here.  In *McBarron v. Kiplang Woods, LLC*, 365 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2004), the Appellate Division, construing the revised Statute of Frauds, made clear that “whether a valid oral contract was made or whether oral agreements were intended not to bind the parties until a written contract was executed, is solely a matter of intent determined in large part by credibility and evaluation of witnesses.
[brief] 1T63-10 to 1T64-11.  The Court distinguished the case of City of Millville vs. Rock, 683 F. Supp. --- 5 [...] did not move for summary judgment of additional damages of $166,176.47, consisting of actual expenses incurred after May 1, 2020, for damages to leasehold and $138,872.00 in estimated costs incurred after May 1, 2020, due to tenant failure to maintain premises and remove alterations installed by tenant.  6  An insubstantial amount of money was owed under the Lease of May 11, 2016.  7  The Court later awarded attorney’s fees of $37,649.00 by Order dated October 21, 2022.
[brief] a.  THE COMMISSION PROPERLY REJECTED [...]’S “PLAIN LANGUAGE” INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT ....................  8  b.  [...]’S SPECULATION ABOUT “ABSURD RESULTS” DOES NOT STATE GROUNDS TO DISTURB [...]’s DECISION.  ..........  11 c.  [...] ARE NOT PASSIVE OBSERVERS; THE NEGOTIATIONS AT ISSUE ARE NOT CONDUCTED IN OPEN PUBLIC SESSION.  ..............................................  13  II.  [...] DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING NEGOTIATIONS OVER GROUND RULES  ..........................  15  III.  [...] PROPERLY DISMISSED [...]’s CHARGE AGAINST [...], AND SUSTAINED [...]’s CHARGE AGAINST [...]
[brief] *Harvester Chemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.*, 277 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 1994) (CGL policy issued to a chemical company); *Valley Nat’l. Bancorporation v. American Motorists Ins. Co.*, 316 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div. 1998) (multi-peril property policy issued to fire damaged property owner); *Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency*, 197 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1984) (fire insurance policy issued to car wash); *Insignia v. Hegedus*, 231 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div.) (casualty policy issued to owners of mobile home park); *Echevarias v. Lopez*, 240 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div. 1990) (unspecified policy issued to landlord).  Plaintiffs’ reliance on *Nova Dev. Group, Inc. v. J.J. Farber-Lottman Co., Inc.*, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 413 (App. Div. March 1, 2010), is equally unavailing as that decision turned on whether the insured, under N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20, received “reasonable notice,” which [...] clearly did based on the communications discussed above, and further noted that the Code was enacted to curb “abuses by insurance companies, including midterm policy cancellations, blanket nonrenewals, cancellations of entire lines of insurance and midterm premium increases without adequate reasons,” which is not the case here.
[brief] Oceanport Holding, L.L.C. v. Borough of Oceanport, 396 N.J. Super. 622, 631 (App. Div.2007).  Generally, a litigant has standing under the common law to challenge a governmental action when he has “a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  In re Camden Cnty., 170 N.J. 439, 449 (2002); see also Jen Elec., 197 N.J. at 645; see also In re Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 340  In *Berner v. Enclave Condominium Ass’n*, 322 N.J. Super. 229, 231 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 131 (1999), the Appellate Division held that a Caucasian condominium owner had standing to assert a NJLAD claim against a condominium association that did not permit him to lease his unit to an African American because of his race, holding that “[the][p]laintiff was directly affected by Enclave's actions, having lost his lease to [...].
[brief] DA-1.  [...] who held that the board had acted arbitrarily and capriciously and set the rent on the unit at $2,400 per month.  DA-8.  Specifically, [...] held that the Board was arbitrary and capricious in not counting the entire condominium fee, in particular a $123 for garbage removal, as an expense, was arbitrary and capricious in reducing the management fee, and was arbitrary and capricious in its determination of equity.  See id.  [...] held that [...] is entitled to an return on equity of $18,819.00, which was arrived at by adding in the landlord’s claimed capital expenditures of $76,000 to the $47,000 attributed to Unit 11 when the building was bought and then increasing that amount for inflation for a “value” of $197,610.  See 13T.  Then that number is averaged with the tax assessed value of the property, which is $404,600 for a “blended value” of $301,105.  Id.  Lastly, [...] held that [...] is entitled to a 6.25% return on that amount every year under Hoboken’s rent control ordinance.  Id.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  The interest rates of VRDOs issued by state and municipal entities in New Jersey are reset frequently, usually weekly.  The VRDO issuers here contracted with Defendants, called “remarketing agents,” to use their “judgment” to set the appropriate interest rates at each reset period.  Ja2095–96 (¶¶ 1–2); Ja1989 (Compl. ¶ 26).
[brief] A significant element of this development that was discussed was the access.  As far as Route 33 is proposed to have two access driveways.  The most important one is the primary access located opposite Renaissance Boulevard which will be controlled by a traffic signal.  Providing that the traffic signal allows direct left turns to and from Route 33 without the need of using the adjoining intersection, that being Applegarth Road and Twin Rivers Road, for U-turns.  And that’s a benefit not only to the application before you, it’s also a benefit to the [...] development to the east, as well as to the residents of the Renaissance.  See 1T89-18 to 1T90-6.
[brief] As demonstrated below, and in the accompanying testimony and exhibits, the Facility is required in order to maintain the integrity and reliability of [...]’s local distribution system because it will allow the Company to reliably and safely achieve the significant reduction in gas pressure (a change of more than 600 pounds per square inch gauge ("psig")) from the transmission system in Holmdel to the distribution system that ultimately delivers gas to customers in Holmdel and surrounding municipalities.  The design of the Regulator Station -- particularly, an accompanying above-ground heating unit -- will prevent the regulators and associated facilities at the Regulator Station from freezing and becoming encased in thick ice, a condition that can result in a loss of service to the local distribution system.  Additionally, the icing situation can spread to the underground piping, ultimately compromising the integrity of the surrounding roadways.  II.
[directive] The fact that the or a complaint-summons does check acheck-off box should not be Report not Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident only officer at the rather that the mean that such fact or circumstance does not exist, but construed to does not have sufficient basis, or immediate need, to preliminary report time of completing the an initial, preliminary report or circumstance in or non-existence of such fact indicate the existence are more comprehensive and detailed.  It should subsequent reports that that may be supplemented by Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident information documented in a clearly understood that the be being supplemented, arrest/booking process and is subject to time of the Report is prepared at the an ongoing information learned or corroborated in the course of additional is or modified as clarified, investigation/prosecution. of, shall be in addition to, not in lieu any Enforcement Incident  Report
[directive] The property tracking system shall include the in following information maintained database and the case file: a 4 at Value of the property the time seizure of 4 of at Condition the property the time of seizure (photographs should be considered for the file)  property2  4  Final disposition of Note:  Since the dollar value given to unusable items such is weapons and drugs is meaningless, it further recommended as - that of the inventory value this type of seized property be -- <i a to eliminated from the financial statements except footnote as this expenses incurred for the destruction of type of property.
[brief] Additionally, the [...] contract with the State includes its own anti-discrimination clause: “the State and the Union agree there shall be not any discrimination, including harassment, based on . . . gender identity or expression . . . or any other legally protected status. ”  [...] Contract & [...], Art. 2 § A, July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2023, https://wpsite.cwa1038.org/public_html/PDF_Files/[...]_NJ_2019_2023_Contract.pdf (last accessed Jan. 15, 2025).
[brief] ”  Aa0001.  DEP’s HAD made no mention of the 2013 Appellate Division case, Highlands Applicability, or whether it considered the proposed activity to be either a “routine upgrade” or “upgrade. ”  Aa0001.  DEP’s HAD failed to mention the state agency’s receipt of hundreds of public comments regarding the proposed activity and did not provide any type of response to these public comments.  Aa0001.  In addition, breaking from its own past precedent when issuing a HAD regarding Exemption #11, DEP did not include a provision in the HAD deferring to the expert agency (here, [...]) to determine the need for the proposed activity.  On August 13, 2021, [...] and [...] submitted a Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) and Case Information Statement (“CIS”) challenging DEP’s June 23, 2021 Decision regarding the construction, operation, and maintenance of new Compressor Station 327.
[brief] (11T72:16-19).  Contrary to Respondent’s self-serving testimony, Petitioner did not move out of the Home after February 1997 or while Respondent was in high school.  During high school, Petitioner found that Decedent was losing control of Respondent and expressed his concerns to Decedent shortly before the Respondent’s 17th birthday on October 19, 1997, approximately eight months after the “February 1997 Incident.
[brief] It really is that simple.").  Here, [...] testified that he arrested defendant "75 to 100 yards" from [...].  (1T57-23 to 58-2).  In defendant's Certification (Paragraph 7), he attests that:  "I had walked about ten blocks from the Park Blvd. address and was on [...] when I observed several adult males in plainclothes brandishing weapons approaching me hurriedly." (Ca115-116).  As defendant "feared for" his life, he "attempt to sprint away but was physically tackled by one of these men and handcuffed."  (Paragraph 8; Ca116).  It is undisputed that defendant was quite a distance away from 1405 Park Blvd. when he was seized and arrested solely because he was observed exiting Park Blvd.  In any event, patrons of a commercial establishment may not be detained without an articulable suspicion that there is a nexus between the person and the criminal operation that is the subject of the search.
[brief] **The standard of appellate review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo (not raised below). **  Because [...] appeals from a grant of summary judgment, the Court’s standard of review is de novo.  *Boyle v. Huff*, 257 N.J. 468, 477 (2024).  This Court gives no deference to the trial court’s analysis of the contract provisions at issue.  *Ibid.*  II.
[brief] "A member of a sewerage authority may be removed only by the governing body by which he was appointed and only for inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office."  N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  There can be no question that if [...] posted a racist video or made racist comments on a public chat room, whether or not in the performance of his official duties, he would be subject to removal for misconduct.  This case should not have a different result.  The Constitution of the United States has long recognized the protection of special classes of individuals, including classes of race and gender, and the misogynistic, sexist, and highly offensive video posted by [...] portrays a degrading and vile image and attitude towards women.  The Borough would not be forced to tolerate a racist as a public officer of the Borough; it should not be forced to tolerate a misogynist.  The Trial Court’s Order must, therefore, be reversed as depriving the Borough Council (the governing body who appointed [...]) of its right and discretion to determine that [...] has committed misconduct touching upon his office such that his removal is in the best interest of the Borough and the Sewerage Authority.
[directive] BACKGROUND  Over the past several years the backlog of petitions for post-conviction relief pending before the courts has steadily increased.  Heightened concern regarding this increasing backlog necessitates the collection of detailed information about PCRs so that delays in the processing of these matters can be identified and resolved.  Up until now, most counties have run a manual tracking system and enter some limited data into PROMIS using the motion record.  The PROMIS motion record does not, however, contain the data elements necessary for detailed case processing analysis.
[directive] Attachment 5  Revocation of Certificate (NJSA 2A:168A-11) - Suspending Employment/Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions  (CN 12538)  Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division – Criminal Part  State of New Jersey County  Plaintiff, Indictment Number: v. SBI Number: Revocation of Certificate Defendant.  (N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-11)  Suspending Employment/ Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions  On the Court issued a certificate to you granting suspension of certain employment/ occupational disabilities related to your conviction on the above captioned Indictment/Accusation/Complaint Number.  ☐  Upon application of the prosecutor  ☐  Upon the court's own initiative  The court hereby revokes the certificate for the following reason(s).  s/ Date  J.S.C.  A person who knowingly uses or attempt to use a revoked certificate, or a certificate that is no longer valid, in order to obtain a benefit or avoid a disqualification shall be guilty of a disorderly persons offense pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-11.
[directive] Che near 12:14 Nlonitorinq, reportinq auditinq procedures and A -A .  law enforcement agency distributing, receiving or expending forfeited or property, proceeds money shall maintain the full records documenting th&e distributions, receipts and expenditures.  Every law enforcement or agency distributing, receiving or expending such property funds shall submit a quarterly report documenting those distributions,- receipts and expenditures to both the Attorney General and the appropriate county in prosecutor, as detailed Forfeiture Promam Administration Standard Operating Procedures and 08 09.  B.
[brief] On or about September 2, 2021, the Bank filed a subsequent Motion seeking to appoint [...], Esq. as a statutory receiver on the basis that [...] owed the Bank more than $1,185,285.34 and that despite its continued operation of the restaurant, the revenue generated was insufficient to pay its creditors or pay its monthly rent.  the Leasehold Mortgage in a separate action against the Defendants, et als, filed under Docket No. [...] (the “Foreclosure Action”).  Ca222.  By Order dated September 24, 2021, [...], Esq. was appointed as statutory receiver (hereinafter “[...]” or “Receiver”) and was Ordered to “take all necessary steps to take control over the business, liquor license and personal assets of Defendants, [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] THE JUDGE OF COMPENSATION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS.  (1T12-22 to 1T22-17, Ra66)  The Judge of Compensation should have recused herself from hearing this workers compensation case because she expressed an opinion on a fundamental issue in this case, whether the decedent was an essential employee, before hearing any evidence.  The Judge of Compensation's opinion stemmed from her extrajudicial experience that she gained as an Assemblywoman and a primary sponsor of the "Presumption Bill" (N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11), and not on any evidence in the record.  Petitioner argues that the Judge of Compensation was not the "primary sponsor" of the Presumption Bill, but she was only a sponsor along with four State Senators and three other Members of the Assembly.  (Pb2).  It is of no moment whether she was a primary sponsor or only one of eight sponsors.  The appearance of bias arose when the Judge of Compensation shared her opinion that teachers are essential employees under N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11, and that she used her extrajudicial experienced that she gained during "the law making" of this Bill to reach this conclusion.  (1T18-9-12).  Contrary to petitioner's argument, this is not a situation in which a judge is being accused of bias based on a professional relationship 30 years earlier with one of the attorneys as in *Johnson v. Salem Corp.*, 189 N.J. Super. 50, 60 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd as modified, 97 N.J. 78 (1984), or because the judge's former law firm partner was a municipal counsel for a municipality long ago in a matter in which that municipality was now a party in a matter before the judge.
[brief] 10  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014)  ..................  10  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981)  ......................................  10  Filipowicz v. Diletto, 350 N.J. Super. 552, 558 (App. Div. 2002)