ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Surprisingly, six of the seven voting Board members acknowledged that [...] had established that the Facility is an inherently beneficial use, yet the Board nonetheless voted to deny the Company’s application (by a vote of six to one).  (Exhibit P-5.)  34.  Thereafter, on January 11, 2017, [...] filed a Petition with the [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, appealing the Zoning Board’s decision and seeking Board approval authorizing the construction of the Facility at the Original Proposed Site.
[brief] ”  Pa28, Pa43, Pa47 ¶¶ 35, 38, 194, 198, 234, 236.  Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts one cause of action for the alleged violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) against (i) his --- 2  All references to “Pa__” are to the Appendix filed by Plaintiff-Appellant in this appeal.  employer, [...]; (ii) [...]; (iii) the parent company of [...], [...] (Pa46-47 ¶¶ 222-240); (iii) the German parent company of [...], [...] (Pa46-47 ¶¶ 222-240); (iv) the Chief Executive Officer of [...], [...], the individual to whom Plaintiff allegedly reported the invoice (Pa46-47 ¶¶ 222-240); and (v) the German parent company of [...], [...] (Pa46-47 ¶¶ 222-240).  On October 5, 2023, Plaintiff served a notice of deposition upon counsel to the German Entity Defendants to take the remote deposition of [...]—a German resident—on November 9, 2023.
[brief] Additionally, as a matter of law, there was no \textit{Brady} violation because the delayed diagram was not material for \textit{Brady} purposes under the correctly applied Fourth Amendment analysis, and because the diagram was disclosed in time for its effective use at trial.  In addition, contrary to defendant’s assertion, there was not a violation of \textit{Brady} for the trial court to remedy.  This is because the delayed diagram was not material for \textit{Brady} purposes under a correctly applied Fourth Amendment analysis.
[brief] See Woo-Padva 2, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *13-14\(^{21}\); Valentine, supra (Da35-Da57; Da52-Da53).  Instead, the Courts observed the narrow holding in Gonzalez was that a post-judgment loan modification amounted to a further extension of credit and, therefore, the plaintiff could base a [NJ]CFA claim on the defendant's alleged actions in connection with that new transaction.
[brief] The Court opined on these instances utilizing the authorities heavily relied upon in prior motion practice, specifically Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).  In this recent Supreme Court decision, the Court focused on a property owners’ right to exclude anyone from their land and concluded that since the California regulation impeded on that right to exclude, a taking had occurred.  Regarding the permanency v. temporary invasion, the Court citing Loretta v. Teleprompter Manhattan, 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982), at 2074 said “To be sure, Loretta emphasized the heightened concerns associated with the permanence and exclusivity of a physical occupation, in contrast to temporary limitations on the right to exclude and stated that not every physical invasion is a taking. ”  Continuing at 2078, the Court added, “First, our holding does nothing to efface the distinction between trespass and takings.  Isolated physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access, are properly assessed as individual torts rather than appropriations of a property right. ”  Continuing to 2079, “Second, many government-authorized physical invasions will not amount to taking because they are consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights…these background limitations also encompass traditional common law privileges to access private property in the event of public or private necessity” which was the case in this instant action.  Plaintiffs argue simply that the Trial Court was wrong, and that the Authority had no immunity from its taking of Plaintiffs’ property.  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention that the Trial Court did not give proper consideration to the State and Federal Constitutions, the record fully supports that consideration was in fact given to these authorities, and distinguished same with the case law and concluded that common law privileges to access private property in the event of public or private necessity do not constitute a taking.
[brief] See Triffin, 436 N.J. Super. at 629; see also Arrow Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Levinson, 231 N.J. Super. 527, 534 (App. Div. 1989).  That proposition is not synonymous with Defendant’s argument that all inferences should be weighed in his favor.  The former principle requires that doubts (if they exist) be resolved in favor of the movant, while Defendant’s assertion would require that an affirmative inference be drawn in Defendant’s favor.  Here, there are no “doubts” that need to be resolved; the facts are clear.
[brief] M474  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered August 9, 2022 ...................................................................  M477  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered March 10, 2023 .................................................................  M718  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. denying Township and Mayor’s Motion to Dismiss, dated and entered on October 25, 2019 ..........................................................  Ra121
[brief] In 2012, [...] sued [...] on behalf of a putative class of [...]’s merchant customers.  Da1.  Roma alleged [...] charged the class members unauthorized fees in violation of their merchant agreements, including “basis point” charges, annual fees, “interchange fees,” and “gateway fees. ”  Da2, Da4–Da6.  Roma asserted class claims for violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2, breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.  Da9–Da12.  [...] argued that the fees were proper based on valid amendments to the merchant agreements.  Ultimately, after two years of litigation and three full-day mediation sessions with sophisticated counsel on both sides, the parties settled Roma on a class basis.  Pa000071–Pa000076.  On September 22, 2014, the parties executed the Settlement Agreement, which was mutually drafted, the result of arms-length negotiations, and fully integrated.
[directive] Investigators should review all administrative reports the agency requires.  These reports should include a description of the incident, the date, time and location of the incident, the type of firearm used, the type of ammunition used and number of rounds fired, the identity of the officer, and any other information a superior officer requests.  The involved officer's supervisor must assist the internal affairs investigator as needed.  7.11.9  The investigator must consider relevant law, any Attorney General or County Prosecutor policies and guidelines, and agency rules, regulations and policy.  In addition to determining if the officer's actions were consistent with agency regulations and policy, the internal affairs investigator should also examine the relevance and sufficiency of these policies.  The investigator should also consider any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  7.11.10
[brief] [...] texted [...] that she was at work at 12:08 a.m. and shared her location with [...] via her iPhone’s application at 1:24 a.m. (12T90-15 to 91-17).  At 1:44 a.m., the surveillance video from [...] shows the same individual exit the building and approach a dark-colored sedan.  (12T92-22 to 94-21; Da22).  GPS information from [...]’s cell phone reflected that the phone was at [...] at this time.  (12T93-11 to 94-6).  The individual went back inside the school a few minutes later.  (12T94-16 to 95-5).  At 2:41 a.m., [...] texted [...], “Yo, cuz.  You can come get me and I’ll just come back and finish this up. ” (12T96-16 to 18).  [...] responded that he was on his way and then texted “out here” at 2:58 a.m. (12T96-18 to 97-5).  The surveillance video shows a Green Durango arrive at the school at that time.  (12T97-6 to 18; 12T101-12 to 101-12).  The GPS data from [...]’s cell phone also reflected that his phone was at [...] at 2:58 a.m.  (12T97-19 to 101-6).  The same individual exited the school and got into the driver’s side door of the Durango.  (12T102-13 to 25; Da22).  The Durango then drove off from the school.  (12T103-1 to 2).  The Durango was next seen on surveillance video in front of [...]’s grandmother’s house at [...] in [...] at 3:07 a.m.\(^3\) (12T103-6 to 108-7; Da23).
[directive] 10.  If you are convicted of refusing to submit to chemical tests of your 5.  After you have provided samples of your breath for chemical breath, you will be referred, by the Court, to an Intoxicated Driver testing, at your own expense, you have the right to have a person Resource Center, and you will be required to satisfy the or physician of your own selection, take independent samples requirements of that Center in the same manner as if you had and conduct independent chemical tests of your breath, urine, or been convicted of a violation of N.J.S.A. 12:7-46, or you will be blood. subject to penalties for your failure to do so.  6.  If you refuse to provide samples of your breath you will be issued 11.  I repeat, you are required by law to submit to the taking of a separate summons for this refusal. samples of your breath for the purpose of making chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in your blood.  Now, will you submit the samples of your breath?
[brief] However, the Neno Court readily acknowledged that an investigating police officer may offer lay opinion testimony about points of impact if that opinion testimony is based on personal observations at the scene.  Id. at 582 (citations omitted).  The Court expressly noted that the decision in Labrusco overruled the earlier decision in Rogalsky v. Plymouth Homes Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 1968), which held that an investigating police officer’s testimony about points of impact was expert testimony that was not admissible unless the officer was properly qualified as an expert.
[brief] Q  So let’s stay with that main thing.  So you had those questions about reading the report.  Did you -- did you tell [...] about those concerns that you had?  A  Yes.  Q  All right.  And you said that you wrote her letters?  A Yes.  Q  Was it a phone call, too, or was it just in letters?  A  No.  I knew -- I knew this was in October of 2016.  We had a video conference twice.  Q  So we’re talking like about two months before the trial occurred.  A  The trial, yes.  Q  But you had a video conference with your attorney at the time.  A  Yes, yes.  Q  And you’re saying you raised this issue with the ballistics expert for the State?  A  Yes.  Q  What did you say?  A  Basically I was telling her that if I’ve never -- if I’ve never fired the gun, then the ballistics expert would be able to prove that by my clothing because he’d be able to tell that there’s no gunshot residue on my hand, and the posture where -- and the -- where the witness said I fired the gun.  So he’d be able to -- the ballistics expert would have been able to prove that.  And not only that, I didn’t know -- back then I really didn’t know like the extent of a ballistics expert.  I just knew that I needed a ballistics expert.  So I wanted the ballistics expert to test the Glock for fingerprints to know that the extended clip for fingerprints, and in this report he did, he said he tested that and he didn’t find no fingerprints, no skin cells, no DNA, nothing from me on the Glock or period.  1T77-78  Q  Was a ballistics expert -- a ballistics expert wasn’t hired, right?  A  No.  Q  Did you get any response from your lawyer to the questions you raised about the ballistics expert?  A  No. Q  Did she say anything about or address it with you in any way?  A  No.  [1T79]  Q  Did you ever ask your defense lawyer, Ms. -- [...], did you ever ask her specifically about the plexiglass?  A  That was a -- that was another thing that we discussed at the video conference that we had because the officer -- I know one of the officers said he only shot twice and I seen a pex -- the plexiglass from the crime scene photos and it was three bullet holes in there.
[brief] Whether a matter at the bar sounds in ordinary negligence or malpractice is an issue of fact for jury.  A cause of action via a breach of statute does not sound in malpractice or negligence in one’s profession.  (Not argued below)  By definition a malpractice action, or action via negligence in one’s profession is an action where specialized knowledge – i.e. knowledge beyond the ken of the typical citizen – is required to prove a matter.  Therefore, the absence of expert testimony, when required, will result in the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  On the other hand, a claim sounding in ordinary negligence is a claim sounding in evidence of fact that is within the realm of the knowledge of the typical citizen.  It is an issue of fact for jury whether a claim sounding in breach of statute is a matter of a claim sounding in ordinary knowledge and therefore a common knowledge negligence claim, rather than a claim sounding in malpractice or negligence in one’s profession and therefore subject to the Affidavit of Merit Act.
[brief] Pa 113.  However, by Order entered September 15, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court lifted the automatic stay to allow the amendment to proceed, stating:  [T]o the extent the automatic stay may be applicable, the [...] is granted relief from the automatic stay in order to adopt [the] June 13 [sic], 2022 Ordinance No. 22-1511, effective upon the entry of this Order (but not nunc pro tunc as requested in the Cross-motion).  This stay [of] relief includes, but is not limited to, the adoption of the related Redevelopment Plan and the prosecution of the Mt. Laurel action to and including entry of Final Judgment.  [Pa 151].
[brief] [...] identifies no authority suggesting that the Division’s use of its website to fulfill this notice requirement was inadequate.  Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.  On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa14; Pa79-81).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  Although these additional methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.
[directive] The identification and examination of collateral issues is critically important to the internal affairs process.  Internal affairs investigators are in the unique position of examining law enforcement operations from the inside.  Their insight, if properly used, can be extremely helpful to management.  In contrast, the failure to use this resource can deprive the law enforcement agency of the ability to identify and correct problems with personnel and procedures through self-critical analysis.  It can also lead to an erosion of community support for the agency.  An internal affairs process that is objective and complete is critical to the credibility and reputation of the law enforcement agency within the community.  44  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  8
[directive] .....................................................................................51  .  Prosecutor by Attendance 6.1 ...............................................................52  Conditions Release Special for Requests 6.2 ...................................52  Offenses Concerning New Restraints for Requests 6.2.1 with Contact Concerning Restraints for Requests 6.2.2 ......................................................................................52  Victims/Witnesses Restraining DORO SASPA, and SORO, Violence, Domestic 6.2.3  Orders.........................................................................................................52  ..........................................52  Monitoring and Intervention Abuse Substance 6.2.4 on Restrictions  Curfews, Arrest, House Monitoring, Electronic 6.2.5 .............................53 .  Conditions Release Other and Associations, Personal ..................................53 .  Bail Monetary of Imposition for Requests on Restrictions 6.3 ..............................................................................53  Considerations General 6.3.1 ............................................54  Bail Monetary Seeking Against Presumption 6.3.2 ...............................54  Bai1 Monetary Against Presumption Overcoming the 6.3.3  Ensuring in Interest Defendant's to as Inquiry Presumptive 6. 3.4 ........................................................55 .  Forfeited Bail Not Is Monetary That Release Special for Request Specific When Appeal or Documentation  6.4 ..............................................................................................55 .  Denied Is Condition ..............................................................................56  MOTIONS DETENTION PRETRIAL 7. .............................................................56
[brief] When such disclosures were required, Plaintiff included a table on the first page of each monthly account statement that indicated the time period and amount that would be paid if the consumer only paid the minimum payment due and the amount that would be required to pay the outstanding balance in a thirty-six (36) month period as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(11)(B)(iii); PA – 71, 79, 85, 91, 103, 111, 121, 133, 143, 153, 163, 171, 177, 181, 185, 191, 197, 201, 205, 211, 215, 219.
[brief] Defendant is a Track One candidate for Recovery Court as he is presently charged under [...] with Second Degree Conspiracy to Commit Theft by Unlawful Taking, which carries a presumption of incarceration.  Thus, the defendant must satisfy all nine (9) eligibility criteria under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a), including factor a(5).  Failure to meet any of these factors will bar the defendant’s entry into the Recovery Court program.
[brief] Opposition by Plaintiff and [...]’s cross-motion  Plaintiff filed opposition that recounted its efforts to successfully notice Defendants.  (143a-328a).  With respect to the abandoned property certification, Plaintiff’s counsel certified:  Although the correct Abandoned Property Certification was filed and served, there was a clerical error when the Motion was filed inasmuch as the incorrect photographs were uploaded on New Jersey eCourts.  However, the Abandoned Property Certification and correct photographs were mailed to the Court and the Defendants when the motion was served.  Thus, the Defendants and the Court were in receipt of the full and accurate Motion containing the correct photographs.  [(144a¶16). ]  Plaintiff provided a copy of abandonment certification “together with true and correct photographs of the Property taken by [the inspector] at the time of the Abandoned Property Certification[.]” (144a¶5, 154a-160a).  The photos showed a house and yard in poor condition, with boarded-up windows and a yard full of unkempt vegetation and debris.  (154a-160a).  On February 23, 2023, [...] filed opposition and a cross-motion to intervene.
[brief] (11T119-12 to 25).  She went to --- 4 [...] and [...] exchanged text messages between 12:16 a.m. and 1:24 a.m. about meeting at [...] and parking [...]’s Durango at [...]’s grandmother’s house.  (12T127-10 to 129-2).  5  Defense counsel emphasized that these were two separate text messages: (1)”Cuz, we about to get old girl” and (2) “dike. ” (11T225-5 to 10).  Counsel argued that the second message was likely a different word that had been autocorrected.  (13T145-22 to 147-3; 11T225-20 to 226-16; 12T213-13 to 214-23).  the hospital because she was not feeling well.  (11T119-17 to 23).  [...] and [...] met her at the hospital.
[brief] On September 26, 2023, this Court decided the matter of Kravits v. [...], (Docket No. [...]) an unreported case where it stated:  According to R. 1:7-4(a), a Court shall ‘find the facts and state its conclusions of law’…on every Motion decided by a written Order that is appealable as a right…[A]n articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution of a case; Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 2000).
[brief] In the within matter, the trial court appointed [...] as Special Master by way of Order dated Nov 20, 2015, Pa417.  Her function was not as a “Special Adjudicator” or as hearing officer or as an adjudicator of any type.  [...] seeks this artificial heightened status because it seeks to support a 2023 “bad faith” and thus support a breach of Settlement Agreement by bootstrapping from the 2020 Court Master's October 19, 2020 letter report to the trial court, Pa009.
[directive] However, this restriction does not limit access to police computer files by clerical or other civilian police employees who must use police records in order to perform their duties.  5.  Records  Permitted to be Shared Employment records that do not contain any confidential information may be shared with non-law enforcement municipal government agencies.  Examples of such records include payroll records, name, title, and salary.  In fact, New Jersey Department of Personnel regulations provide that certain records, such as an individual’s name, title, salary, compensation, dates of government service and reason for separation are public.  4A:1-2.2a(1).
[brief] At the start of the trial, but before any prospective jurors had arrived in the courtroom, the trial judge made the following announcement to all present:  Alright, ladies and gentlemen, let me just explain something to you.  I see that there are five people here who have come to view this trial and you're welcome here and you know that you've been here before and you're always welcome.  The only problem is I have a very small courtroom and I'm trying to call up as many jurors as I can and what's going to happen is I'm going to end up filling these boxes and they're going to be standing up there and I just don't have room for you and I can't do anything where I'm keeping you—I have to keep you separate from these jurors and there's no way I can do it in a courtroom this small.  So I apologize to you but *I'd like you to leave if you would please, at least until we get you know through some of the jurors* and obviously anything that happens during the case you'll be welcome—you know you'll come back in and you know once we have the fourteen in the box, you're free to come and go as you please.  But I just don't have the room.  I just don't have the physical room.  *10
[brief] Defendant [...] moved to suppress drugs discovered during a consent search of his vehicle, which was stopped for various traffic offenses, including careless driving and improper lane change.  (Pa 8; 1T 27-22 to 28-4; 1T 96-22 to 97-10)  The traffic stop was effectuated by Detectives [...], [...], and [...], all of whom were members of the State Police Drug Trafficking Unit.  There is no dispute that the detectives had been surveilling Lawes for several weeks and that the motive for the traffic stop was to investigate possible narcotics activity.  At the suppression hearing, the State called Jenkins, Bernard, and Oliver as witnesses and elicited testimony regarding their prior investigation of Lawes, as well as the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop.