ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE COMMITTEE DID NOT PROPERLY AMEND ORDINANCE NO. 2022-15.  (Pa2); (Pa631); (T9:14-21).  Although the Committee attempted to correct the deficiencies in Ordinance No. 2022-15 by adopting Ordinance No. 2022-17, a close reading of the ordinances reveals this did not happen.  Ordinance No. 2022-17 states: "Section 1.1 of the Redevelopment Plan, . . . is hereby amended to . . . ." (Pa46).  Each subsequent section is further amended and language either added or deleted.  See (Pa46-Pa51).  On the other hand, Ordinance No. 2022-15 is styled differently.  There, the sections begin with "WHEREAS" clauses where the Committee makes its findings.  See (Pa16-Pa17).  Conversely, Ordinance 2022-17 only alters the language in the Plan – there is no language (aside from the title) where the Committee claims to be amending Ordinance No. 2022-15.  The key distinction here is that amending the Plan and amending an ordinance are two different procedures.  This is not a form over substance argument but rather, Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold the township accountable to following the proper procedures.  For the public to understand the township's actions, it must be able to derive the township's reasons for so acting.  The record in this case fails to provide any explanations for the township's conduct.  There are no findings by the Committee, in the ordinance itself, stating why it was amending Ordinance 2022-15.  Thus, Defendants have failed to satisfy their burden to demonstrate by "sufficient credible evidence" that the requirements of the LRHL have been satisfied.  CONCLUSION
[brief] THE EXCLUSION OF TROOPER MORENSKI’S DIAGRAM CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIED KLINE A FAIR TRIAL.  (2T:99-22 to 105-23).  Plaintiff and [...] argue that the trial court properly excluded from evidence the diagram of the accident prepared by [...] because the diagram was not based on [...]’s personal observation of the accident itself.  In support of this argument Plaintiff argues that all of the evidence on which the diagram was based, statements of the parties, damages to the vehicles, and the final resting place of each vehicle, was all admitted, and therefore, it was not error to omit the diagram.  This argument ignores the correct legal standard that governed the admissibility of the diagram and is illogical.
[brief] [1]  A dog run may have fencing a maximum of seven feet in height, provided that such use is located in rear yard areas only and is set back from any lot line at least 15 feet.  Chain link fence may be used, irrespective of any regulations to the contrary.  [2]  A deer protection fence consisting of a fence material that shall be an open type wire grid so as to minimize the fence’s visual impact on surrounding properties is permitted up to a maximum height of eight feet, shall be permitted in side and rear yard areas and is permitted on lots of three acres or more.  Deer and seasonal plant protection fencing shall be constructed of vinyl or vinyl-coated materials, shall be dark green, black or brown in color and shall have openings no smaller than four square inches.  Deer fence posts shall be dark green, black or brown in color.  [3]  All fencing in connection with the keeping of animals shall be located in accordance with §230-161.2.  [4]  A tennis court area, located in rear yard areas only, may be surrounded by a fence a maximum of 15 feet in height; said fence shall be set back at least 10 feet from any lot line.  Chain link fence may be used, irrespective of any regulations to the contrary.  [5]  No fence or wall shall exceed five feet in height in a rear yard of a through lot.  [6]  Gates and pillars shall be permitted in residential districts only in compliance with the lot width, height and setback standards of this subsection:
[brief] [...] was on trial for a robbery and murder that occurred at a meat market.  135 N.J. at 7.  A police investigator went to the store three days after the crime to film the store from the suspect’s point of view as he moved throughout the store during the crime, with employees and a stand-in appearing in the places that they and the victim occupied on the day of the murder.  The video was introduced at trial by the testimony of the police investigator, who obtained his knowledge of the scene from other investigators.  *Id.* at 9-10.  Because the investigator had no direct knowledge of the scene, the Supreme Court held that he was unable to authenticate the video, as he could not establish that the video accurately represented the scene when the crimes occurred.
[brief] (Pb24).  For reasons argued above, defendant has not demonstrated that the purported exonerating evidence was in the State’s possession, that the State acted in bad faith by failing to preserve same, or that the outcome of the trial would have differed if the evidence was disclosed.  (State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91, 101 (App. Div. 2009)(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 (1988)).
[directive] To that and the communities they police interactions between positive in promoting amended in accordance with his law  Assembly Bill No. 1663 into as Governor signed the August 9, Public Law and requires the Department of c. 23, new law, P.L. 2016, The recommendations. positive interaction promote diversity training course to cultural identify a uniform or Safety to create racial, including residents of all a community, all residents within community outreach to, with, and transgender individuals.  The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and backgrounds and ethnic, and religious aid available to all county, municipal, rn.ade diversity course be cultural ~•equires that this statute departments in the State.  campus police an opportunity to course specific training presents this requirement to develop statutory  The new abreast of developments the State stay officers throughout which entire process by enhance the Continuing connmunity.  its relationship to the and enforcement profession law affecting the comprehensive plan of action for New component of Jersey's impoa~tant become an must education training can in-service understand how and why fully relations.  To police-community enhancing they the communities police and interactions between positive goal of promoting the contribute to and Public Law undertaken by the Department of recent initiatives recount is appropriate to serve, it departments and community leaders police confronting challenges of the major one Safety to address police officers.
[brief] On April 10, 2024, [...], [...] and [...], the Defendants in the Law Division Action, filed a motion to compel [...], [...] and the [...] to arbitrate all disputes in accordance with the MOU and the Operating Agreements.  (Da301-03).  [...], [...] and [...] did not oppose the motion and, instead, signed a consent order agreeing to arbitrate the Law Division Action claims.  (Da332-33).  On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration in the Chancery Action.  (Da304-06).  The trial properly granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and found that the Chancery Action and Law Division Action should be arbitrated together.  (Da1-2; 1T43:2-7; 1T49:5-16; 1T20:4-9; 1T40:4-11; 1T44:12-13; 1T48:17-21; 1T49:5-9; 1T49:20-22).
[brief] During oral argument before the trial court, the Board Attorney confirmed he did not permit cross-examination or testimony regarding the environmental impact assessment or any other topic that had previously been mentioned during the use variance application.  (2T22-15 to 2T22-22).  The Board Attorney also held that the community impact statement, required by Robbinsville Ordinances for major subdivision applications, was not permitted to be reviewed.  (2T23-8 to 2T23-12).  There is simply nothing in the record to support Defendants’ assertion that the Board had reviewed and considered all the documents and information submitted.  For these reasons, the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[directive] Treasury law enforcement agencies shall have the 2 . form entitled "REQUEST TO ESTABLISH REIMBURSEMENT FOR JOINT OPERATION" completed and forwarded to the address shown below to establish an obligation to pay these overtime costs.  (The form is provided as Attachment B to this Directive)  [...]  [...] [...]  FAX: [...]  Upon receipt of the document, the Fund will 3 . establish an obligation to pay subsequent claims for overtime reimbursement.  When the Treasury law enforcement agency receives 4 . the invoice for overtime costs, they shall review and verify the participation of the agency in the investigation, the number of officers and the number of hours being requested for reimbursement.  The package shall then be forwarded to the address shown in above.  112"  This same form shall be used to obligate all 5 . fiscal requirements for joint operations with local, county or state law enforcement entities consistent with the appropriate provisions of 31 U.S.C. as provided for in The Secretary of 9703, - the Treasury's Guidelines for Seized and - , October Forfeited Property-,i 1 1993.  E.
[brief] Plaintiffs seek to undo the manifest error by the trial court in refusing to disqualify counsel representing multiple defendants despite the presence of an inherent, per se, conflict of interest and more broadly, to clarify novel issues of law regarding the propriety of counsel’s joint representation of multiple defendants who face joint tort liability, where legal fees are being funded by one of those defendants on behalf of all parties.  Plaintiffs have uncovered a fraudulent pattern of legal violations and unethical practices by defendants [...] ([...]) and its associates.  The complaint sets forth a tableau of insurance fraud by defendants and highlights the aggressive tactics used by the principal defendants to force subordinates’ compliance with their fraudulent scheme.  The primary defendants, implicated at the core of the fraud, made a strategic decision to not only retain counsel to jointly represent them and their subordinate employees but also to undertake the financial responsibility of all legal fees.  That tactical move raises significant questions about the impartiality and independence of the legal representation, particularly where, as here, defendants’ liability, and share of damages, under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA) must be apportioned pursuant to the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA).  That framework places each defendant in a position of inescapable conflict, as each seeks to minimize his or her own liability, invariably leading to the maximization of co-defendants’ culpability.  The joint representation of defendants under those circumstances constitutes a per se conflict, exponentially aggravated by the decision to have defense counsels’ fees for all parties funded by the principal defendants, who face the greatest liability.  Under the circumstances, that per se conflict is unwaivable in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in *In re Grand Jury Investigation*, 200 N.J. 481 (2009) (*Grand Jury*), which squarely holds that a third-party payor who is funding a client’s litigation expenses cannot have an attorney-client relationship with the lawyer.
[brief] CEPA does not require any “magic words” in communicating an employee’s reasonable belief of illegal activity.  See Beasley v. Passaic County, 377 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div. 2005).  Moreover, reports to these individuals were consistent with Defendants’ internal reporting procedures, and the individuals had the authority to correct any violations.  See N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(d).  D.
[brief] Erlinger reiterated that the Apprendi rule is grounded in due process and the Sixth Amendment jury-trial guarantee, which “sought to ensure that a judge’s power to punish would ‘deriv[e] wholly’ from, and remain always ‘control[led]’ by, the jury and its verdict. ”  Id. at 1849 (alterations in original) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004)).  The Apprendi Court had struck down a sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to impose a longer sentence than otherwise permitted by the jury’s verdict if the judge -- rather than the jury -- found that the crime was motivated by racial bias.
[directive] Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 2009, c. 143).  If the [Yes/Wi] [No/Non] i. (L. crime involves a violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in sexual act), if the I, I, crime was committed on or after February 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4. l (leader of a child I, pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pied guilty?  $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (I) (2)  $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  $ 750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime ( 4)  $ 500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)
[brief] It is well settled that damages cannot be based upon speculation or conjecture.  Wasserman's v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238, 256 (1993), quoting with approval, Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 493 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1986); see Kurtz v. Oremland, 33 N.J. Super. 443, 453 (Ch. Div. 1954), aff’d on op. below, 16 N.J. 454 (1954) (applying the same standard to contract and tort damages).  B.  The Rules of Court Bar “Expert Testimony” by [...]  [...] was never been identified as an expert witness in this action.
[brief] [...] presented a detailed analysis, one sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden of overcoming any presumption in favor of the Ordinance’s validity.  [...] affirmed that the financial standard against which to evaluate a PILOT application is whether it is necessary to attract private financing.  He wrote:  “[R]edevelopment projects are frequently unable to attract private investment without assistance in the form of a PILOT or, in some cases, bond financing.  The combination of risk associated with redevelopment projects and uncertainty of conventional taxes make marginal projects difficult to finance. ”  Pa242, par 6 and 7, quoting [...] slide #3.  Analyzing the Township’s findings, [...] focused on the Section 9.02 statement that the Agreement is a critical incentive “due to the extraordinary costs \(^{13}\) [...] has served as real estate financial advisor to more than 50 municipalities considering whether to grant PILOT agreements to redevelopers. associated with the development of the Property. ”  He went on to observe that defendant [...] offered no basis for its claim that the off-site sewer fees and water infrastructure costs were “excessive” in the context of a project with total development costs of $304 million.  Pa704, par 12.  He also observed that defendants did not explain how the short-term relief from the PILOT would be critical in mitigating these ‘excessive fees. ’
[brief] In *Karan*, the Court determined that the value-enhancing storm protection benefits of the beach dune barrier project must be considered to off-set the compensation for the easement taken.  Just compensation is no longer limited to the impact of the taking and special benefits and special damages, but rather is to consider the impact of the entire public project on the properties of others as well.  The Court described the dunes construction project as requiring "the securing of easements on properties bordering the ocean".  [214 N.J. at 390]  The Court also specifically contemplated consideration not only of value-enhancing impacts but of value-reducing impacts of the public project.
[brief] ordering these outside packages from approved vendors should be “considered an ‘order at your own risk’ venture. ”  (Ra2).  Upon receipt of his food package, [...] discovered the refried beans he ordered contained lard, which was not what he expected.  (Pa4).  [...] contacted the outside vendor, who conceded their error, and [...] arranged to return the undesired beans for a $34 refund.  (Pa4-Pa7).  However, the prison denied [...]’s attempt to send a return shipment because shipping food items outside the prison was prohibited.
[brief] Toms River police officers properly stopped the Jaguar in Lakewood pursuant to a valid search warrant.  Defendant first argues on appeal that the motor-vehicle search was invalid because the officers violated the scope of the warrant when they stopped defendant in his vehicle in Lakewood, as opposed to Toms River.  Second, he contends that both the motor-vehicle search and the search of his home were invalid because Toms River officers conducted those searches outside of their municipal jurisdiction.  Defendant is wrong on both fronts.  Regardless, even if this Court determines that the officers should not have crossed the Toms River border to conduct these searches, such a technical violation does not result in the exclusion of evidence recovered.
[brief] Moreover, as a threshold matter, at no point was the Property contaminated by Plaintiff.  All contamination to the Property and surrounding area was caused by the prior automobile dealership and service station that historically occupied the lot.  Pa385.  Indeed, the trial court misapplied the facts on this critical issue when rendering its Order.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court erred when it ruled that the FAR is not restricting a conforming development and made undue inferences regarding Plaintiff’s “ulterior motives. ”  [...] testified that the required .35 FAR is “completely unrealistic” as most properties in similar zones have a FAR of at least 1.0 or higher.  Pa192, at 74:2-7.  To put the current limitations of the FAR into perspective, “the removal of just fully enclosing a garage on the first level in and of itself reduces the FAR by .3629. ”  Pa177, 17:1-3.  Plaintiff admits that the proposed remediation cost was one of many contributing factors when determining the FAR, but it is uncontested that the FAR is calculated based on other properties in similar zones.  [...] concluded under the current FAR that there would “be no way to justify a $375,000 cleanup cost with a building of that size” and the cost associated with reconstructing the retaining wall is certainly noteworthy, but it is not the only factor when Plaintiff calculated the proposed FAR.  *Id.*, at 74:21-75:3.)  **B.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Facts, ¶7, Pa204, [...] Deposition, 160-11 to 24, Pa218; 162-9 to 163-4, Pa219-220.  However, neither [...], [...] or [...] stated that 2016 communication included a revocation of the guarantee.  The jist of the alleged communication was simply that [...] and [...] had left the business.  The second alleged revocation occurred in January of 2019 when Mr. [...] stated to Plaintiff in an email that he and [...] had sold all of their interest in [...] “several years ago” and, therefore, they had no further responsibility for any lease guarantee.  Again, absent from this communication, is a statement of revocation.  Pa79–Pa88.
[brief] Are you saying that the State of New Jersey is misrepresenting what they did?  A  I'm saying we really don't know what they did, ma'am.  Q  Well, we do know what they did because – A  We know what – Q -- they said what they did.  A  We know what their conclusions were, but in terms of you're suggesting that certain details and issues -- I don't know what they are.  There's a bit of doubt.  I don't know what they did.  I know what their conclusions are, but I don't know what they did.  I can't make that assumption.  Q  They wrote on this letter what they did.  Are you not willing to accept what's written on this letter from the [...]?  You won't accept that?  A  From a global standpoint, sure.  But, like I said, a tour can be a hallway, it can be in a whole building.  They could talk to a couple of people.  I mean, who knows what they did.  I don't know what they did, ma'am.  Q  Okay.  And then let's -- let's just finish up because there's more things that they did.
[brief] Some threats of violence made during the pandemic could fulfill the nexus requirement by exploiting pandemic conditions or because the harm is greater during a public health emergency.  For example, a bomb threat to an overcrowded hospital would endanger patients and strain healthcare resources already under immense pressure; a threat to bite someone to infect him with the virus would more severely terrorize the victim during a pandemic.  These threats could be prosecuted as second-degree offenses without running afoul of due process.  By contrast, the content and circumstances of [...]’s voice messages were entirely incidental to the ongoing pandemic.
[brief] Yet the record shows that the prosecutor’s comments were within the scope of vigorous argument permitted at the conclusion of trial.  This Court should find no error, let alone plain error in the State’s summation, and affirm.  “Prosecutors in criminal cases are expected to make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to juries[ and are] afford[ed] . . . considerable leeway in closing arguments so long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented. ”  State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 575 (1999), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 136 (2001) (citing State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 559 (1995)).
[brief] THE VERDICT ENTERED BY THE JURY WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (65a; T9, 25-31)  The illogical findings of the jury in this matter pertaining to Defendant’s guilt as to the offense of reckless manslaughter and innocence as to the offenses of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and possession of a weapon without a permit illustrate how the guilty verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  In the absence of a factual premise for a finding of reckless conduct on Defendant’s part (the weapons offenses), the jury had no basis upon which to find him guilty of reckless manslaughter.  For the reasons that follow, the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion for acquittal pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 3:18-2 accordingly.  State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967); see also, State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 436-37 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043 (1969).