ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The October 2020 Google images, for the first time, show a visible pothole in the roadway – three months before the accident.  *(Da8). *  Our courts have long held that the “mere existence of an alleged dangerous condition is not constructive notice of it. ”  *Polzo v. County of Essex,* 196 N.J. 569, 581 (2008) *sub nom.*, 209 N.J. 51 (2012) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
[brief] In 2018, the Legislature enacted amendments to the SFRA (“Amendments”) that make three changes to the formula’s operation in [...].  See P.L. 2018, c. 67 (eff. July 24, 2018) (Pa2250-Pa2255.)  These Amendments phase-out and eliminate Adjustment Aid, remove the 2% property tax growth cap, and allow the City to impose a payroll tax on employers to generate additional local revenue.
[brief] Pb13.  Plaintiffs-appellants raised this issue below on their motion for summary judgment.  5T20 – 8 to 15.  On April 28, 2023, the Court below entered an Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  Pa73a.  In Point 1 of their Brief, defendants-respondents acknowledge plaintiffs-appellants raised the issues of the validity of Ordinance Sec. 900B, 902A and 906 below on Motion for Summary Judgment.  Db19.  Defendants-respondents argue, however, that plaintiffs-appellants were required to raise those issues a second time in their subsequent trial brief and in the May 31, 2023 trial below.  Db19.  Defendants’-respondents’ argument is without merit.  The April 28, 2023 Order entered below was not rendered upon the whole action.  Such partial summary judgment orders are authorized by R. 4:46-3.  “The judgment remains “partial” insofar as the life of the litigation is concerned. ”  Applestein v. United Board and Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 352 (1961).  Such interlocutory order may be reconsidered by motion brought pursuant to R. 4:42-2.  Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 534 (2011).  There are no requirements under our Court Rules to relitigate at trial legal issues previously decided on motion and order for partial summary judgment.  To the contrary, R. 4:46-3(a) provides that, upon trial, material facts established on motion for partial summary judgment “shall be deemed established. ”  The same rational applies to legal issues previously decided on motion for partial summary judgment.  Plaintiffs-appellants were not required at trial to relitigate legal issues previously decided on their motion for partial summary judgment.  Point 1 of defendants’-respondents’ brief references their December 13, 2023 Motion to Dismiss Appeal.  Db 19 to 20.  On January 4, 2024, the Court entered an Order denying defendants’-respondents’ Motion.  **Point Two**
[brief] Q.  In determining the negligence of [...] or [...] what did you find with respect to their contribution to hazardous conditions at the scene of the accident?  A.  Neither party had any type of program where they would go out to see if the street lights in the Borough of [...] were operational or not requiring repair and neither party gave proper consideration, professional engineering consideration to the selection and placement of the illumination and the type and size of the fixture involved.  So both parties were negligent in that.  The town of -- the Borough of [...] should have engaged either [...] by asking them some specific questions like what are your professional recommendations and how about location and placement of that kind of thing.  Apparently they didn't do that because the light was not the proper illumination level and it was not located properly in my opinion in accordance with -- not in accordance with, but due to the consideration of where the tree was between the light pole and the crosswalk and that [...] had a requirement to provide professional advice to their customer expecting that the customer was not a professional in knowing what they actually were asking was specifically type and placement of lighting fixture.  (Pa522-23).
[directive] 8.  MOTIONS TO REVOKE  RELEASE  Release.30  8.1  General Authority to Revoke N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24 authorizes a court on motion of a prosecutor to revoke a defendant’s release and order the defendant detained pending trial when the defendant has been released from custody on a complaint-warrant pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17 or -22, and the defendant while on release violated a restraining order or condition of release, or upon a finding of probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on release.  To order revocation of release, the court must find clear and convincing evidence that no condition of release would reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, or that the defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.  To achieve an appropriate degree of statewide uniformity in exercising prosecutorial discretion in deciding when to seek revocation of release, this Section establishes a decision- making framework similar to the one set forth in Section 7 governing the decision to seek initial pretrial detention.  8.2
[directive] DRUG FREE SCHOOL ZONE Attorney General's Executive Directive Concerning Law Enforcement Operations On Or Near School Property Issued August 1988 Executive Directive No. 1988-1  Whereas, drug abuse is one of the most serious and pervasive problems facing the citizens of this State; and Whereas, school age children are especially vulnerable to and influenced by the activities of predatory drug offenders; and Whereas, the Governor has called for a broad based and multi-disciplinary attack on both the "supply" and "demand" facets of the substance abuse problem; and Whereas, our long term efforts to address this national problem will depend in large measure on the eventual success of programs and initiatives designed ultimately to reduce the demand for illicit substances; and Whereas, elementary and secondary schools will serve as the principal medium for educating young people about the perils of substance abuse; and Whereas, young citizens of this State have an undeniable and fundamental right to the advantages of a school environment which is conducive to educational goals and prerogatives and which is totally free of drug abuse and trafficking activities; and Whereas, the Legislature by enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 and the Drug-Free School Zone Act has provided for enhanced punishment for drug offenders who distribute to or who use children, or who operate on or near school property; and Whereas, the Attorney General by promulgation of the Statewide Narcotics Action Plan (SNAP) has directed that the enforcement of New Jersey's drug laws shall be the number one priority of the law enforcement community, and that special emphasis shall be placed on the patrol and protection of schools and areas within drug-free school zones; and Whereas, there is a demonstrated need for the continuation, institutionalization and enhancement of the spirit of cooperation which exists between law enforcement officials and professional educators with respect to the substance abuse problem; and Whereas, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 5 of the Statewide Narcotics Action Plan, law enforcement officials are directed at all times to respect and appreciate the needs, concerns and rights of students and professional educators; and Whereas, the Attorney General has established a School Zone Narcotics Enforcement Working Group, which is comprised of representatives from every level within the professional educational and law enforcement communities, and which has developed and recommended specific guidelines concerning law enforcement activities conducted on school property, including but not limited to undercover school operations, and also concerning the legal and professional responsibilities of school employees to report to appropriate law enforcement officials suspected incidents of drug use and trafficking; and Whereas, the State Board of Education will adopt rules and regulations, and the Commissioner of Education will promulgate rules, regulations, guidelines and model agreements which will compliment and help to implement the provisions of this Executive Directive,
[directive] INTRODUCTION  Background  Sexual assault crimes have a tremendous impact on victims and their families.  The emotional and psychological injuries sustained are often as, if not more, serious than the physical injuries, potentially affecting every aspect of a victim’s life long after the physical injuries have healed.  New Jersey recognizes the importance of developing a model for providing services that treats sexual assault victims with respect, sensitivity, and understanding, so as to best promote healing for the victim and improve the identification and collection of evidence in all cases of sexual assault.  Dignified and compassionate services are essential elements when creating an environment in which victims feel safe asking for support; and well-organized services ensure that these critical support systems are easily accessible by all victims.  The Attorney General Standards for Providing Services to Victims of Sexual Assault (Standards) were developed to implement a set of protocols that prioritize the needs and concerns of sexual assault victims to ensure services are delivered in a timely and non-judgmental manner.  This victim-centered approach includes:  ensuring the victim’s safety is the top priority;  respecting the integrity, choices, and autonomy of each victim;  protecting the victim’s privacy and confidential information;  identifying and responding to the obstacles some victims may face when seeking help; and  recognizing the importance of victim feedback in improving responses to sexual assault.  These Standards serve as a foundation for establishing county policies and procedures that give precedence to the well-being of the victim, while also being mindful of the specific needs of the county’s population and its local resources.  However, because of the unique nature of each sexual assault incident, situations may arise that will require the use of discretion in developing a tailored response that appropriately addresses both the individual victim’s needs and the public safety concerns.  Likewise, because New Jersey is home to many diverse ethnic and cultural populations, issues unique to these diverse populations may impact a sexual assault victim’s ability to effectively access the services provided for in these Standards.  Therefore, it is important that local agencies recognize these barriers and afford necessary accommodations to address them.  -ii-
[directive] UWAGA:  Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu nie należy podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] The Commissioner of Education retains exclusive jurisdiction for matters arising under the school laws.  Title 18A school law statutes, which includes N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9, are the school law statutes falling under the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.  [...]’s Counterclaim for payment, alleging violations and seeking enforcement of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9, requires an interpretation and application of this school law statute, so the Counterclaim is based wholly on a statute falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education.  The Judge’s first summary judgment order that the Superior Court, Law Division, lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate [...]’s 18A school law Counterclaim was correct, and the court committed error when it reversed itself and held that it retained jurisdiction over [...]’s Counterclaim.  The Legislature determined that the Commissioner of Education (not Superior Court, Law Division) retains jurisdiction over matters arising under Title 18A school laws, such as N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9.  The Commissioner of Education jurisdiction statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, is entitled, “Jurisdiction over controversies and disputes under school law not relating to higher education and rules of the commissioner and the state board”.  As per N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, “The commissioner shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine, without cost to the parties, all controversies and disputes arising under the school laws, excepting those governing higher education, or under the rules of the State board or of the commissioner”.  “The Commissioner’s authority is plenary. ” \(^{11}\)  The “the legislative purpose to set up a comprehensive system of internal appeals with broad powers vested in the administrative tribunals to insure that controversies are justly disposed of in accordance with the School Laws”. \(^{12}\)  Citing a host of precedent, the Appellate Division concluded that, “The State Department of Education, through its State Board and Commissioner, has broad powers and responsibilities to supervise public education in the State and effectuate constitutional and legislative policies concerning it” (emphasis supplied). \(^{13}\)  “The Commissioner of Education has complete power to hear and determine all controversies and disputes arising under the school laws. ”\(^{14}\)  “It is, of course, clear that the Commissioner has fundamental and indispensable jurisdiction over all disputes and controversies arising under the school laws and that, moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the great breadth of the Commissioner’s power. ”\(^{15}\)  A.
[directive] Do you understand if the court finds your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and you are not amenable to sex offender treatment or if you are amenable (will benefit from) but you are not willing to participate in such treatment, the court will sentence you to a term of incarceration to be served in another facility which will and not provide for sex offender treatment in such event, you will not receive commutation time for good behavior or earn work credits for time served in such other facility? [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]
[brief] [...] completely ignores their own policies and procedures in their opposition brief, and their abject failure to follow such procedures after Appellant complained about sexual harassment.  For example, although Respondent [...] was presented with allegations of sexual harassment by Appellant that he required him to investigate, he admittedly did not do so because the lawsuit was filed (even though the lawsuit was not filed until late January 2019, nearly two months later).  (Pa655)  68:12-72:9, 75:1-19 82:9-85:22, 86:23-88:1, 121:1-125:14.  [...] argues that *they* took appropriate action because **[...]** opened an EEO investigation.
[brief] [...], assistant manager and others employed by Defendant as well as [...] (sole principal of [...] and the owner and occupant of a residential unit in one of the buildings) were present when Ida struck.  Wendy sent an email with notice of the damage and photos to Management on September 2, 2021, the day of the storm.  A number of in person and telephonic conversations ensued in which [...] promised to reimburse Wendy for the cost of repairs but informing Wendy that her inventory was not covered by the policy.  When repairs were completed Wendy submitted her invoices along with more photos expecting Management to pay them.  Management provided their own photos of damage and repairs.  As to reimbursement, Management did an about face and denied them.  In the interim Management begged Wendy to assist in getting workers to remove the water and repair the damage as expediently as possible as there was concern about the development of mold and it was difficult to hire workers as there was a huge demand dealing with the aftermath of Ida.  These were in person and phone calls.  I have no emails or text messages  Corroborating these conversations.  Wendy had three insurance policies and submitted a claim to all of them via email copying Management.  All of the insurance claims were denied.  It is my understanding that Management did pay for the repairs to the common areas as well as the residential unit owners, none of whom filed suit, but inexplicably reneged on its promise to pay for Plaintiff’s damages notwithstanding the terms in the By-Laws.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Submitted: June 24, 2024  On Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, dated March 15, 2024, of the:  CHANCERY DIVISION – BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  Sat Below: [...], P.J.Ch.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT
[brief] (15T76-21 to 77-7)  Confronted with this evidence from which a reasonable doubt might arise, the prosecutor injected extra record “evidence” of his friend’s son who writes left-handed but plays baseball right-handed.  (15T112-2 to 23)  Defense counsel made no objection, permitting the prosecutor to essentially testify in a manner that neutralized a compelling defense argument, depriving the court an opportunity to provide a curative instruction, and failing to preserve the issue for appeal.  Furthermore, counsel adduced no evidence as to [...]’s left-handedness other than the video of him signing with his left hand.  The need to support his argument about [...]’s dominant hand should have been obvious to competent counsel.  Had any additional evidence of his left-handedness been adduced, the prosecutor’s argument would have carried less weight with jurors.  Counsel’s deficient performance was manifestly harmful, as whether the right-handed shooter was the left-handed [...] was key.  [...] has shown a prima facie case of ineffectiveness.
[brief] Furthermore, as set forth above, pursuant to the RCO, the Board has broad power to engage in fact-finding in order to rule on an application before it.  The Chair’s actions in this case were within the bounds of that power and in furtherance of the Board’s responsibility to conduct adequate fact-finding.  The Board’s actions were anything but arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  The Board engaged in this process in order to ensure compliance with [...]’s opinion and the TPA.  The Board’s ultimate conclusion on taxes was made after lengthy deliberations and the Board’s reasons were articulated on the record.  As such, the Board’s determinations were sound and appropriate.
[brief] Moreover, on August 30, 2022, the Court heard approximately two and a half (2 ½) hours of oral argument from the parties on the multitude of summary judgment motions.  1T.  The following day, on August 31, 2022, the Court heard approximately another *one and a half (1 ½) hours* of oral argument from the parties prior to rendering a decision.  2T.  In total, oral argument lasted approximately *four (4) hours*.
[brief] 6  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Burns v. Penn Central Co., 519 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.1975)  .................................................................  4, 5 Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963)  ..............................................................................  3 Gallows v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1989)  ..................................................................  2, 3 Johnannessen v. Gulf Trading and Transp. Co., 633 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1980)  ..................................................................  2  Kapsis v. Port Auth. Of New York and New Jersey, 313 N.J.Super. 395 (App.Div. 1998)  .......................................................  1  INTRODUCTION  [...]’s ([...]) response brief fails to acknowledge that Plaintiff has produced evidence of foreseeability and negligence in this matter.
[brief] On February 6, 2015, the Court entered an Order directing the [...] to release payment of the $92,000.00 to [...].  Despite such payment to [...], including additional funds contributed by the insurance carrier, [...] failed to satisfy the underlying Judgment.  Such Judgment remained as a cloud on title, and [...] refused to satisfy such lien, necessitating subsequent actions.  [...] is and was [...]’s counsel in her dispute with [...].  The Court denied [...]’s Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel, and a balance remained due and owing at the end of the underlying litigation.  [...] thereafter sued his former client, and on October 18, 2005, judgment was entered against [...] and in favor of [...] in the amount of $27,787.65 in Docket Number [...], Judgment Number [...] ("[...] Judgment").
[brief] *Penn*, 198 N.J. at 240.  Quite literally, the Plaintiff was required to drive her vehicle through a lane to reach the drive-thru window.  In summary, the plaintiff was occupying the driver’s seat of her insured vehicle at the time she was injured.  Indeed, she was an active, seated driver occupying and operating her vehicle, with her foot on the brake at the drive-thru window while her vehicle was in drive.  The Plaintiff would not have received service at the drive-thru window, but for the fact that she was occupying and using her vehicle.  While unexpected, the spillage of a hot beverage (indeed, any beverage or food item) at a drive-thru window is a foreseeable consequence of the automobile’s use.  *Lindstrom*, 138 N.J. at 250.  Based on the facts of this case, a “substantial nexus” exists between the Plaintiff’s injuries and the use and occupancy of her vehicle at the time of her accident.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Individual departmental or agency policy dictates procedures for such recordings.  This kind of law enforcement non-third party intercept can be used during internal affairs investigations.  7.9.5  Generally, the use of evidence derived from an authorized wiretap is limited to criminal investigations and prosecutions.  Agencies that wish to use wiretap information in a disciplinary proceeding should consult with their County Prosecutor because it may be necessary to obtain a court order to so use it.  7.9.6
[brief] case, the other shareholder, [...].  He didn’t get to share in all the profits and he didn’t get the distributing and receiving and/or causing to be distributed or received by [...] and [...] more than their share of the profits.  And these are decisions that should have been made together.  And these diverting of the funds were detrimental to the interest.  And similarly, with the same applying to the [...] Stockholders Agreement, that the 2007 agreement indicates that expenditure of funds should be a vote of the stockholders.  So expending company funds without authorization; failing to maintain sufficient cash to cover expenses, which I don’t think is really applicable; distributing profits inequitably, you know, which does.  [24T50:10-51:19]  When the issue of counsel fees was addressed during the post-trial motion hearing, the trial court’s analysis of the contractual provisions relied upon consisted of the following:  6.3 of the 2014 and ’17 SPA has – certainly has an indemnification provision.  . . .  [A]gain, 6.3 of the 2014 which is indemnification for the seller’s benefit, any material inaccuracy or breach, any representation – it was inaccurate.  And all these agreements – and there are a lot of moving parts.  They all play off of each other.  You can’t take any part of this case and put blinders on and say, well, this entity we can’t say did this, or this one did, because they are all being moved and controlled by [...].  So I think [plaintiffs’ counsel’s] argument is correct with regard to that, that the [...] stockholders agreement, the [...] operating agreement, and the stock purchase agreement and the MIPA agreement all feed off of each other.