ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] supported its 2020 Filings with actuarial memoranda signed by its senior pricing actuary.  For each filing, [...]’s actuary stated that the “memorandum has been prepared in conformity with all applicable Actuarial Standards of Practice, including ASOP No. 8, 18, 23, 25 and 41, relied on assumptions developed by [...]’s actuaries, and certified the opinion that the rates ‘are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. ’” (Cra88 and Cra 273).  [...] offered new forms as an alternative to the new higher rates it proposed to charge to its policyholders.  The forms included a new reduced benefit option (“RBO”) and a flexible benefit option (“FBO”).  [...]’s proposed RBO would offer policyholders customized options to adjust their benefits to maintain approximately the same premium cost, by reducing the maximum benefit amount and reducing the benefit period.  (Cra92-115).  [...]’s FBO would allow policyholders to mitigate the proposed premium increase by, among other options: (1) guaranteeing rate premiums only until January 1, 2025, (2) varying the monthly indemnity payments by type of benefit, and (3) obligating [...] to only pay one benefit in a given calendar year.  *Ibid.*  [...] noted that insureds seventy-five years and older were a “key driver” in seeking the rate increases, having higher than expected incident rates.
[directive] s11d moze Czy rozumie Pan(i), ze wedlug wlasnego uznania nalozyc minimalniJ kart; pozbawienia wolnosci, kt6riJ bt;dzie Pan(i) musial(a) odbyc obowiiJZkowo, zanim przyslugiwac bt;dzie Panu(i) mozliwosc zwolnienia warunkowego, a okres ten moze wynosic nawet polow<; orzeczonego okresu pozbawienia wolnosci? by Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Polish Defendant's Initials Skorygowany fonnularz opublikowany 31.12.2019r. w suplemencie do Dyrektywy #01-18, CN 10079-Polish Inicjaly oskarzonego page 3 of 7 /strona 3 z 7 that require 7.  Did you enter a plea of guilty to any charges a mandatory period of parole [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] ineligibility or a mandatory extended term?
[brief] 1.  **“Wrongful Acts”  Definition**  The term “wrongful acts” is defined in the D&O Form as “any negligent act(s), error(s), or omission(s) directly related to the operations of the condominium property of the Named Insured”.  This definition unambiguously limits coverage for directors, making clear that only “negligent” acts are within its scope.  Courts have had little trouble grasping the import of the highlighted term.
[brief] It is too well established to cite authority for the proposition that while a public body may make contracts as an individual, it can only do so within its express or implied powers; and that those who deal with a municipality are charged with notice of the limitations imposed by law upon the exercise of that power.  A public body may only act by resolution or ordinance; it contracts on behalf of the public and even its representatives have no power to bind it to an illegal and void contract.  *Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Madison T.*, 68 N.J. Super. 197 (1961).
[brief] ”  *Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp.*, 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002).  “The scope of a release is determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the particular instrument, considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances. ”  *Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp.*, 39 N.J. 184, 203 (1963).  “A general release, not restricted by its terms to particular claims or demands, ordinarily covers all claims and demands due at the time of its execution and within the contemplation of the parties.
[brief] References to the appendix accompanying this brief are numbered followed by the letter "a" (e.g., 1a, 2a, etc.).  For references to the appendix that accompanied the original filing [...] on August 20, 2021 the letters "Pa" precede the number (e.g., Pa1).  2  Earlier in its opinion, this court stated that “The record demonstrates [...]’s school district is in a unique and precarious position” because “[...]’s state-issued school aid is calculated based upon its 6,000 [now about 5,000] enrolled public school students,”  This court did not retain jurisdiction, presumably because it expected the Acting Commissioner to act promptly and responsively.
[brief] Here, the Town (and not the Planning Board) had the Redevelopment Plan prepared, and Appellants admittedly were not challenging the designations (nor were they within time to do so, as set forth above).  While it is unclear to what specific “study” Appellants are referencing in their briefing, the only study referenced in the Hirth decision is the “blight investigation study,” which would have no relevance in the instant matter.  See Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 163.  Indeed, Appellants did not even seek to introduce a blight investigation study at trial at all—which would have been from proceedings in 2020.  In any event, the Hirth Court first addressed the blight determination at issue under Section 5 of the LRHL.  In the context of its analysis of the blight determination, the Hirth Court found that the trial court correctly determined that “the blight determination is valid and that plaintiff is not entitled to a plenary hearing to contest that determination. ”  Id. at 164.  After upholding the blight designation, Hirth went on to address the adoption of the redevelopment plan, which is an “independent municipal action which is governed by separate provisions of the Local Redevelopment Law. ”  Id. at 164.  Hirth then explained that Section 7 of the LRHL provided the applicable standards for its review of the adoption of the redevelopment plan.  Id.  Indeed, the Hirth Court went to great lengths to explain how the Section 7 procedures operated with respect to adoption of a redevelopment plan.  Id. at 164-66.  Indeed, there is no suggestion in Hirth at all that the Section 5 standards apply to adoption of a redevelopment plan.  To the contrary, the court was careful to maintain the distinction between these two types of municipal actions.  Appellants point to no legal basis for this Court to review the 2020 designations of the properties in this case as some type of prerequisite to the redevelopment plan adoption review.  The designations were separate and independent decisions made years ago without challenge, and there is no basis to review them again in connection with adoption of the Redevelopment Plan, warranting denial of this appeal.
[directive] 8  “Whenever a person is charged with a violation of R.S.39:4-50 section 2 of P.L.1981, c. 512 (C.39:4-50.4a), a municipal prosecutor shall contact the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission by electronic or other means, for the purpose of obtaining an abstract of the person's driving record.  In every such case, the prosecutor shall:  a.  Determine, on the basis of the record, if the person shall be charged with (continued...)  Attorney General Guideline: Page 16  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations Commission (NJ MVC) for presentation to the court for sentencing in all DWI and DWI Refusal cases.
[brief] The trial court issued a written statement of reasons with the August 16 Order, finding that defendants had engaged in the unlawful conduct alleged in the verified complaint.  (Pa75-Pa95).  With regard to registration, the court found “[...] and [...] . . . failed to disclose to investors that the securities sold were not registered with Plaintiff or exempt from registration. ” (Pa85).  Furthermore, the trial court stated that “[i]n addition to the securities not being registered . . .  [...] and [...] did not disclose to investors that [...] was not registered . . . as an agent to sell securities. ” (Pa85).  As to the verified complaint’s allegations of misrepresentations and omissions, the court found “[...] failed to notify investors that [...] was subject to multiple lawsuits. ” (Pa84).  In addition, the court found “[...] and [...] also failed to disclose to investors that [...] had been borrowing funds from certain merchant cash advance lenders and assigning rights to accounts receivable to such lenders. ” (Pa84).  Furthermore, the court found that “[...] and [...] failed to disclose to investors that in 2011, the IRS assessed taxes, interest, and penalties against [...] and [...] and ordered them to repay same. ” (Pa85).  The court also found that [...]’s proof hearing testimony was not credible, and that he “testified with an intent to deceive the Court. ” (Pa78-Pa79).  The court declined to order disgorgement against [...], however the extent of its reasoning was limited to a single paragraph:
[brief] See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 By N.J. Council On Affordable Hous., 390 N.J. Super. 1, 73 (App. Div. 2007) (“[T]he essence of the Mount Laurel doctrine . . . requires that municipal land use ordinances create a realistic opportunity” for affordable housing); In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et seq., 372 N.J. Super. 61, 100 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that the municipality’s proposal at the time of application for certification must be compared to its actions at the midpoint review, with “a realistic opportunity review,” meaning that “there is in fact a likelihood—to the extent economic conditions allow—that the lower income housing will actually be constructed. ”); N.J.S.A. § 52:27D-313 (requiring that the municipality provide a “realistic opportunity review at the midpoint of the certification period. ”).  The undisputed record evidence is that the Borough considered with its professionals the available land for development and decided the Off-site Property located at [...] would be the selected mechanism for satisfaction of that component of the Judgment.
[brief] Appellate courts "may not overturn the trial court's fact[-]findings unless … those findings are 'manifestly unsupported' by the 'reasonably credible evidence' in the record."  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020).  The facts found by the trial court on remand are not only unsupported, they are nowhere to be found in the record.  Nowhere in the record is it shown that [...] was a general contractor or not an “end user. ”  The words “general contractor” do not appear even once in the trial transcript and Defendants never raised this argument at trial, on appeal, or on remand.  The concept was raised for the first time on remand by the trial court, entirely on its own, despite the fact that [...] was a manager of two companies and a member-manager of the third.
[brief] The Trial Court erroneously failed to accept these uncontroverted facts established in the record and by [...] and [...].  The facts are that [...] did not expend $1.00 ultimately to purchase [...].  4T, 65:17-22.  [...] did not expend $1.00 to construct the affordable housing development on [...].  4T, 65:17-22.  The facts are that whatever money [...] expended in pursuing the affordable housing development project – land cost, property taxes, governmental fees, legal fees, other professional fees, and whatever costs expended in reference to the application process for the financing of the affordable housing project and its development – were all covered by the financing provided by the [...] and through the 9% tax credit scheme.  This would have been the case irrespective of whoever was the developer, whether [...], Plaintiff [...], or anyone else, and whether a first-time “novice” developer or an experienced developer.  4T, 65:23-66:18.  The facts are that [...]’s expert report and [...]’s deposition testimony were never refuted in the record or at the Rule 104 Hearing.  Only the Trial Court chose to refute them, without any authority to act as a rebuttal expert and contestor of uncontested facts.
[directive] As with the prior directive, use of these writs does not apply to state inmates housed in county jails.  I.  Procedure to Issue a Standard Written Writ with an Original Signature.  A.  When issuing a standardized writ for a state inmate or a civilly committed sexually violent predator to be produced at a Civil and Municipal Court appearance, the writ must bear an original signature and be sent to:  [...] c/o [...]  [...]  [...]  B.  When issuing a standardized writ for a juvenile to be produced at a Criminal, Family, Civil or Municipal Court appearance, the writ must bear an original signature and be sent to the appropriate institution:
[brief] ARGUMENT  A.  The [...] Unreasonably Denied the Application to Develop the Property with a Permitted Use (T1/25:16-26:6; 27:2-28:13; 200:7-16, 201:13-15; T2/71:15; Aa246).  The record is replete with confirmation that the proposed use is a permitted one.  The hearing officer confirmed, “The City of Atlantic City opted into the cannabis, recreational cannabis and medical cannabis in the city.  They passed a redevelopment area that permits it in this Green Redevelopment Area, Redevelopment Zone.  We certainly supported that because it was statewide.  This is something that is supposed to enhance the rehabilitation of properties in the city.  That is a goal of the Green Zone Redevelopment Plan. ” (T1/200:7-16).  Where a use is expressly permitted by ordinance, a planning board must approve a conforming application.  *Pizzo Mantin Group v. Township of Randolph*, 137 N.J. 216, 229 (1994).
[brief] As explained by this Court in Donofry v. Autotote, 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001):  Plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected, whistleblowing activity was a determinative or substantial, motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate his employment—that it made a difference.  Plaintiff need not prove that his whistleblowing activity was the only factor in the decision to fire him.
[directive] This Directive supersedes Directive #6-06, issued April 25, 2006, which promulgated the Standard Grand Jury Charge approved by the Conference of Assignment Judges for statewide use.  At its June 27, 2006 meeting the Conference of Assignment Judges made minor revisions to the Standard Grand Jury Charge.  That revised version is attached here and supersedes the previous version.  The use of this grand jury charge is mandatory.  That is, the text included here is to be used in charging each grand jury.  To the extent that there may be certain logistical issues specific to a particular county, the standard charge may be supplemented.  But otherwise there should be no variation from the attached text.  Also attached for statewide use is a second related grand jury charge for use in those situations where a presentment is possible.  As with the basic standard grand jury charge, there should be no variation from this text except in extremely unusual circumstances.  This was made a separate charge since few grand juries confront presentment situations; thus, removing the presentment material from the basic grand jury charge will help better focus the grand jurors on the task at hand.  If and when it becomes timely to give the presentment charge, the grand jurors by that point will be better able to process the added information.  The Conference of Assignment Judges developed these charges from draft charges prepared by the Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges.
[directive] Monetary assure reasonably will not conditions non-monetary on release that finds court the when resort makes law  The 2A:162-17(c).  N.J.S.A. required.  when in court appearance defendant's the defendant's the preventing of purpose the for imposed be not must bail monetary that clear only to used can be bail monetary provides that statute the Furthermore, Ibid. release. or community or person the other any of safety the assure to used be not may it flight; discourage process.
[brief] (Pa303, Pa306, Pa319).  This ex parte behavior required plaintiff to file an unnecessary and burdensome motion to vacate.  This ex parte behavior also caused the new trial court judge to conduct her own factual inquiry (in violation of the judicial rules of conduct) and to confirm on her own a nonexistent public dismissal hearing.  All public defendants failed to advise the trial court of intervening contrary case law, rules and regulations.  All public defendants failed to advise the trial court of an intervening November 2020 long term tax exemption toolkit adopting plaintiff’s statutory analysis.  All public defendants failed to advise the trial court how this non-urban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemption had now become an aberration and not the norm.
[brief] Following remand and relevant to this appeal, [...] testified at the July 27, 2021, evidentiary hearing that he paid [...] to prepare the 2008 habeas petition for him.  (17T83-18 to 84-2).  [...] explained on cross-examination:  Q:  These ideas [in the habeas petition] were from [[...]], not from you?  A: Correct.  Q: And one of the major points of this habeas corpus is that the Staten Island conduct did not fall in the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court, correct?  A: Correct.  Q: And that was his idea, not yours, right?  A: Right.  Q: So, Mr. [...] was advising you as to how to proceed with your habeas corpus.  A: Correct.  Q: While it’s in your handwriting, none of these ideas came from you, is that correct?  A: Correct.  Q:  Now, at no point in your petition for habeas corpus did you say you were not present?  A: Correct.  Q: You simply said that the affidavit would be from [...] that you had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery.  A: Correct  Q: And this was pertaining specifically to the Staten Island robbery because Mr. [...] advised you to raise a jurisdiction issue, correct?  A: Correct.  [(17T86-16 to 88-4, 93-13 to 94-1) (emphasis added). ]  [...]’ testimony was corroborated by [...]’s 2019 testimony, in which [...] stated that “[...] asked [him] to prepare a [habeas] petition for him.
[brief] This Order provided additional guidance on post-pandemic jury trial procedures and also “clarifies and supplements the provisions of the Court’s July 22, 2020 Order[.]” (Da86-94).  The Order confirmed that where jury selection is conducted in a hybrid format, judges may permit attorneys to ask limited follow-up questions during the final in-person phase of selection.  *Ibid.*  On May 11, 2021, our Supreme Court issued another Order, which [...] supplemented with a Notice to the Bar dated the same date.
[brief] ..............................................................................33  POINT VI - Plaintiff’s Claim of Breach of The Covenant of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Should Have Been Sustained (Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T; 3T; 4T)  ...........................................................................................................42  POINT VII - Plaintiff Stated A Claim Against [...] For Negligent Misrepresentation (Pa651-652; 4T) ............................................................45  POINT VIII - Plaintiff Adequately Stated A Claim Against [...] For Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Pa651-652; 4T)  .....................................................48  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Order of December 29, 2022, was served upon the Defendant on December 30, 2022, a meaningless exercise, considering the Plaintiff’s filed for its final judgment approximately a week thereafter.  During the almost 18 months Plaintiff held its tax sale certificate, prior and during its foreclosure, it could have sought the benefit of N.J.S.A 54:5-86(c)(d) - to secure, preserve and safeguard the property, and seek reimbursement for its expenses in the action.  It did not.
[brief] Civil Action NOTICE OF MOTION FOR AN ORDER GRANTING A FINAL AWARD OF FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, DESIGNATING DEFENDANT (OR HIS AGENT) AS A PARTY HAVING THE AUTHORITY TO FILE A NON-RESIDENT UNITED STATES TAX RETURN, FORM 706-NA, IF HE OR HIS AGENT DETERMINES THE FILING OF THE RETURN IS REQUIRED, AND DISCHARGING THE ADMINISTRATOR OF ANY FURTHER DUTIES AS ADMINISTRATOR IN THIS MATTER ON NOTICE TO: [...], Esq. [...], PC [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff, [...] [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant, [...] PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Friday, February 24, 2023, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, [...], Esq., Administrator of the Non-Resident New Jersey Estate of [...], Deceased (the “Administrator”), shall move before the Hon. [...], PJ. Ch. of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, at the Bergen County Justice Center, 10 Main Street, Hackensack, New Jersey, for the entry of an Order granting a final award of fees and disbursements to the Administrator, designating defendant (or his agent) as a party having the authority to file a non-resident United States Tax Return, Form 706-NA, if he or his agent determines the filing of the return is required, and discharging the Administrator of any further duties as Administrator in this matter.
[brief] With respect to [...]’s cross-appeal, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment soon after filing its answer to plaintiff’s Fourth-Amended Complaint on August 19, 2019.  (Pa1745).  By way of the motion, [...] argued that plaintiff’s malpractice claim was precluded by the governing two-year statute of limitations.  [...] further argued that the fictitious party language utilized by plaintiff in his pleadings was insufficient to preserve the claim against [...].  On September 27, 2019, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. heard oral argument on the motion.  (1T).  At the conclusion of oral argument, Judge [...], J.S.C. denied [...]’s motion predicated upon findings that plaintiff’s fictitious party pleading language was sufficiently particularized and that plaintiff exercised due diligence in identifying [...] as an entity to be named as a party.  [...] submits that both of these findings were made by the trial court in error and that [...] should have been granted summary judgment soon after the filing of plaintiff’s Fourth-Amended Complaint.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Copies of the Petition, including the supporting testimonies and exhibits are also being provided to [...], DAG and [...], Esq, Director, Division of Rate Counsel, [...], Clerk of Holmdel, [...], Board Secretary, [...], as well as to those individuals listed on the attached Service List.  Kindly acknowledge receipt of this filing by date stamping the enclosed copy of this letter and returning same in the self-addressed, stamped envelope.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq.
[directive] If a firearm was possessed, answer questions 1 a, b and c.  If a firearm was not possessed, mark question 1a not applicable [NA] and answer questions 1b and c.  만약 귀하가 다음의 범죄들, 즉 마약 불법거래 조직의 우두머리(2C:35-3), 규제 대상 위험 약물  1.  생산 시설의 운영(2C:35-4), 규제 대상 위험 약물의 제조(2C:35-5), 감마 하이드록시부티르산의 판매, 소지 또는 제조 프루니트라제팜의 판매, 소지 또는 제조(2C:35-5.3), 마약 (2C:35-5.2), 판매를 위해 청소년을 고용(2C:35-6), 학교 부지로부터 1,000피트 이내에서 규제 대상 위험 약물을 판매하려는 의도로 약물을 판매, 조제 또는 소지(2C:35-7), 공공주택 시설, 공원 또는 건물로부터 500피트 이내에서 규제 대상 위험 약물을 판매, 조제 또는 소지(2C:35-7.1), 또는 규제 대상 위험 약물의 모조품을 판매, 소지 또는 제조(2C:35-11)에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to any of the following offenses: leader of a narcotics trafficking network (2C:35-3); operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility (2C:35-4); manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-5) distribution, possession or manufacture of gamma hydroxybututyrate (2C:35-5.2); distribution, possession or manufacture of flunitrazepam (2C:35-5.3); employing a juvenile in drug distribution (2C:35-6); distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school property (2C:35-7); distributing, dispensing or possessing a controlled dangerous substance within 500 feet of a public housing facility, park or building (2C:35-7.1); or, distribution, possession or manufacture of an imitation controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-11)