ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Because the Court Properly Found that [...] Owed No Duty to [...] Arising Out of the Underlying Litigation, [...] Cannot Succeed with His Breach-of-Contract-Based Counterclaims  [...] bases his breach-of-contract argument on the misguided notion that he is still entitled to a defense and possible indemnity under his [...] Policy.  However, for all the reasons stated above, that is not so.  Therefore, [...] has failed to carry his burden of first showing that he is entitled to coverage under the Policy.  See Sears Roebuck and Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 340 N.J. Super. 223, 234 (App.Div.2001) (it is “the insured’s burden to bring the claims within the terms of the policy. ”).  B.
[brief] (6T 130-7 to 12)  She told [...] that her boyfriend had just come back from Puerto Rico, so she had been spending the weekend with him.  (6T 130-12 to 14)  [...] testified that at this point, [...]’s demeanor changed: he was “[d]isappointed.  He started getting agitated, starting asking me more questions. ”  (6T 130-15 to 17)  When [...] did not answer [...]’s questions in “the way he wanted,” he got “furious. ”  (6T 130-18 to 20, 130-23 to 131-2)  [...] testified that [...] “starting acting out of hand,” but since she knew “he was under the influence,” she “allowed him to ramble. ”  (6T 131-3 to 4)  [...] repeatedly asked [...] to take her to her friend’s house, but [...] refused and instead drove faster.
[brief] “When you sign an account application or use your account, including any account service, you . . . consent to the terms of this Agreement. ”  (PA092.)  [...] produced account statements evidencing [...]’s use of his account.  (See PA080-087.)  Those statements provided that “New Jersey account terms and conditions apply” (PA081), expressly referred to the DAA (PA084), and directed the reader to the [...] website to download “the disclosures applicable to your account” (PA085.)  In the DAA’s Table of Contents, the phrase “Resolving Disputes Through Arbitration” appears in bold print.  (PA093.)  That phrase also appears in a larger font on page 36, where the DAA sets forth the terms of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate:  . . .  [...] and you agree, at [...]’s or your request, to submit to binding arbitration all claims, disputes, and controversies between or among [...] and you . . . , whether in tort, contract or otherwise arising out of relating in any way to your account(s) and/or service(s), and their negotiation, execution, administration, modification, substitution, formation, inducement, enforcement, default, or termination (each a “dispute”).  DISPUTES SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION ARE NOT RESOLVED IN COURT BY A JUDGE OR JURY.  TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW, WELLS FARGO AND YOU EACH IRREVOCABLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THE RIGHT EACH MAY HAVE TO A TRIAL BY JURY FOR ANY DISPUTE ARBITRATED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.  (PA126.)  The DAA arbitration provision is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (the “FAA”).  (Id.)  In support of its Motion, [...] introduced several exhibits, including [...]’s account application, the DAA, and account statements.
[directive] A. training.  In 2021, every law enforcement officer must complete:  Use of force  1.  At least one training session on the lawful and appropriate use of force and deadly force, as required by the existing Use of Force Policy (Section II.A).  2.  The eight comprehensive online training modules on the Revised Policy.  B. training.  In 2021, every law enforcement officer must complete:  Vehicular pursuit  1.  At least one training session under the existing Vehicular Pursuit Policy.  2.  The eight comprehensive online training modules on the Revised Policy.  C. officers.  In 2021, every law enforcement officer must Firearms requalification for active complete, pursuant to the requirements outlined in the Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards for New Jersey Law Enforcement (“Standards”), the below.
[brief] It held that the right to a jury trial under NJIFPA \(^3\) *Lajara*, 222 N.J. at 146-47.  cases afforded by the *Lajara* case did not prevent arbitration of fraud claims, finding that there was no authority to claim that this could not be waived by agreeing to arbitrate as [...] had in its DPR Plan and AOB.  *Id.* at 8-9.  Finally, affirming the underlying decision that these disputes belong in No Fault Arbitration does not render the *Lajara* decision invalid.  First, insurers can bring non-No-Fault claims in the Superior Court such as property damage, homeowner’s insurance and other non-auto related policy matters wherein a defendant can seek a jury trial.  The NJIFPA is not limited to No-Fault claims.  Second, there remains a civil cause of action for the NJDOBI under the NJIFPA:  “The IFPA authorizes two separate causes of action to enforce the statutory scheme—one a State action brought by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, N.J.S.A.§17:33A–5, and the other a private civil action brought by insurers “damaged as the result of a violation of any provision of [the IFPA],” N.J.S.A. §17:33A–7.  *Lajara*, 222 N.J. at 144.  These civil actions may continue to proceed in civil court as NJDOBI is not subject to nor opted in to the AICRA arbitration process as [...] has and defendants in those matters retain the right to demand a trial by jury in civil court under the NJIFPA.  Third, [...] as well as any other No-Fault carrier can amend their DPR Plan to opt out of the arbitration system and have full access to the courts to file NJIFPA and NJRICO suits.  The lack of access to the court system [...] complains of is of their own making by opting in to the AICRA arbitration system and is easily cured by opting out.  In conclusion, for the reasons cited above, Plaintiffs failed to provide precedential case law in support of its position as the New Jersey case law relied upon [...] is distinguishable from this case and [...]’s reliance on out of circuit decisions interpreting New York No Fault statutes is not applicable.
[brief] In emphasizing the common core of facts that existed between [...]’s NJRICO and common law claims, [...] opined:  ... [T]he nature of the damages calculation and the methods of theft employed by Defendants necessitated Plaintiffs expert to reconstruct the entirety of the partnership’s books, from inception.  It is true that the reconstruction of the partnership books also served to further Plaintiffs’ accounting claim.  However, those same reconstructions and calculations later became the basis for the calculation of RICO damages.  Therefore, absent the accounting claim the books still would have had to be reconstructed if Plaintiff’s were only asserting RICO claims.  The importance of the accounting to Plaintiffs’ RICO claims was repeatedly emphasized by [...] who noted that the Defendants’ “conduct cannot be proven without an account of the monies that were taken, because the monies that were taken were the essence of the misconduct,” and that the “accounting has everything to do with RICO.
[brief] Findings of any factors “must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record” to ensure that “[s]peculation and suspicion [do] not infect the sentencing process. ”  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014).  The only evidence presented at trial regarding [...]’s possession of a gun was that he possessed it during the robbery; no surveillance video captured [...] possessing a handgun either before or after the robbery, nor did any witness testify that they saw [...] possess a handgun before or after the robbery.  (Da12)  When [...] was arrested twenty days later he was not found in possession of a handgun, a search of the apartment where he was staying did not yield a handgun, and the person with whom he had been staying said she had never seen him with a gun.  (PSR4)  Accordingly, the evidence at trial does not support a finding that [...] committed the certain persons offense at any time or place other than at the same time and place as the robbery (factor 3C) or that he possessed the firearm for any purpose other than to consummate the [...] robbery (factor 3A).
[brief] Court Rule 2:10-2:  If the error has not been brought to the trial court's attention, the appellate court will not reverse on the ground of such error unless the appellant shows plain error: i.e., error "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  Id.  See also, *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).  As for the Harmful Error Rule:  This rule is used when a specified error was brought to the trial judge's attention.  The "harmful error" rule is essentially identical to the "plain error" rule even though it applies to error which was properly raised below.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11.  \(^9\)  “Except as provided in paragraph (2) of subsection h. of this section, notice of a hearing requiring public notice pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall be given to the owners of all real property as shown on the current tax duplicates, located in the State and within 200 feet in all directions of the property which is the subject of such hearing ...  ”  N.J.S.A 40:55D-12(b). with any variances or waivers deemed necessary by the Board.  The accessory structure is approximately 2160 square feet and the principal structure is approximately 1152 square feet.  However, the Notice fails to include the following critical information: a. That the Property is a residence; b. That the Property and the residence on it are located in the RD-C Zone, in which residences are not a permitted use; c. That the requested structure is for use as a garage or for that matter for any other use; d. That the additional structure was already existing; e. That the [...] had performed significant grading and road construction in addition to the construction of the garage; f. That the Property is in an Agricultural Zone; g.
[brief] On December 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit against Defendants.  (Ja1-39).  It alleged that Defendants’ retention of the “surplus proceeds”\(^5\) following its resale of the property constituted a taking without just compensation under the New Jersey Constitution.  (Ja7-9).  Plaintiff also included a count for unjust enrichment.  (Ja10-11).  In February 2022, Defendants filed an answer and a motion to transfer the case to the Chancery Division.
[brief] .........................................................................................  16  Velop, Inc. v. Kaplan, 301 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1997) ....................  19  Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 (1982) ......................................................... 9, 10, 11 Statutes 1995  NJ Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 139, §§ 1-2 .................................................. 6 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2.................................................................................................  8 N.J. S.A. 2A:53A-26......................................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26, et seq. ("Affidavit of Merit statute") ...................... passim N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.........................................................................................  passim N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28.........................................................................................  passim N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29.........................................................................................  8, 10 N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20...................................................................................  10 N.J.S.A. 56:9-1 to -19...................................................................................  10  A.  Preliminary Statement
[brief] Analogous to the instant action, *DeAngelo* involved [...]’s enforcement of an alleged debt it had no legal right or authority to collect.  The only difference is that suit on the *DeAngelo* debt was time-barred in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, *et seq.*  Here, the debt is void due to [...]’s unlicensed conduct.  But, unlike the defendant in *DeAngelo* who “inexcusably ignored a judgment on that time-barred claim - he waited eight years and lied about his identity - before seeking relief,” [...] moved when he obtained actual knowledge of the judgment.
[brief] ...........................................  H627a Holm-96: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-94, objected to describing measures [...] took to comply with 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (SOICR p. 12)  .........  H628a Holm-97: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-95, objected to describing how [...] will voluntarily reduce operational emissions in NJ by 50% by 2030 (SOICR p. 12)  .........................  H629a Holm-98: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-96, objected to stating [...]’s planned reductions in gas sales or throughput annually from 2020 through 2050 (SOICR p. 12)  ...........  H630a Holm-99: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-97, objected to stating [...]’s planned reductions in gas sales or throughput annually from 2020 through 2050 for customers of the Transmission Line (SOICR p. 12).................................  H631a Holm-100: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-98, objected to stating [...]’s planned reductions in gas sales or throughput annually from 2020 to 2050 for [...] (SOICR p. 12) ... H632a Holm-101: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-99, objected to providing [...]’s plan for gas sales 2012 to 2030 (SOICR p. 12) ......................................................... H633a Holm-102: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-100, objected to providing [...]’s gas sales and throughput for [...] customers (SOICR p. 12) ............................................. H634a Holm-103: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-101, objected to providing documents and other data on the requirement for the 2012 Transmission Line (SOICR p. 12) .............................. H635a Holm-104: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-102, objected to providing the expected useful life of the Transmission Line (SOICR p. 12) .................................................. H636a Holm-105: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-103 objected to providing the expected useful life of the Distribution Line (SOICR p. 12) .......................................................
[brief] However, as the trial court recognized, a reviewing court accordingly cannot “rewrite the contract of the parties by substituting a new or different provision from what is clearly expressed in the instrument,” Rahway Hosp. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 374 N.J. Super. 101, 111 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting E. Brunswick Sewerage Auth. v. E. Mill Assocs., 365 N.J. Super. 120, 125, (App. Div. 2004)), nor can the court “make a better contract for either party, or supply terms that have not been agreed upon.
[brief] Finding that [...] placed good faith and vested time, effort, and money in its housing project.  - adding value to the property through its rehabilitation.  *Last, supra* at P. 608.  Contrast the reasonable and timely action by Defendant, challenging the final judgment, attempts to redeem and funds invested in the project, to [...], who within the day or several concluding its purchase was aware of the Defendant’s motion.  Royal Tax Lien Servs., LLC v. Morodan, 2015 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1727 (App. Div, July 20, 2015), found the analysis “in I.E.’s clearly and convincingly outlines the equitable weight to be accorded to a defendant’s concerns in this scenario, the consequences of which are draconian.  Id at P. 6.  Other than the outlay of the proceeds paid to Plaintiff, [...] has not shown any affirmative expenditure to protect, preserve or maintain the Premises during the time of its ownership.  Though that period may be short lived until the Order of August 14, 2023, as dire a situation it portrays of the Premises and the scourge upon the citizens of [...], what did it do to ameliorate the citizens of [...].  During its ownership, it was the recipient of building and maintenance violations.  (1A420-425).  Neither the Plaintiff or [...] expended any funds during its ownership to maintain the premises, clean the grounds or preserve the structure and safeguard the citizens of [...] from what [...] describes in its brief as the ‘scourge in [...]” – all attributed to the Defendant.  The absence of any claim to file an action against the Plaintiff, which has elected not to take an active role in this appeal, seems to say more about the kindred relationship by and between these investors, than an adversarial approach.  One would assume that upon notice of the Defendant’s motion, within days or hours, [...] would have sought to mitigate any loss.
[brief] The Receiver’s counsel, [...], Esq., conceded that a Final Accounting was not done as evidenced by the following:  “The bank accountings are great.  They did everything at every step of the way, available to everyone on a monthly basis.  What more could you want?  PNLs – everything is in there. ”  1T19-10.  The claim that the Receiver “doesn’t have the money to do that or hire somebody to do it” does not excuse this obligation and is contradictory.  1T19-17.  The Receiver had the funds to retain [...], CPA without Court approval upon his appointment to file the “necessary returns and reports in connection with the operation of the [...]. ”  Ca20.  However, the means or ability to file a Final Accounting is now allegedly not doable.  The Receiver has offered no explanation as to why Mr. Roszkowski could not perform the Final Accounting.  Mr. Roszkowski was already retained by the Receiver and the Receiver was paying professional fees through June 2023 as evidenced by the Profit and Loss Statement produced by the Bank for that month.  Ca340.  The Trial Court’s discharge of the Receiver in contravention of the Rules of Court was an abuse of discretion.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *Khimmat v. [...]*, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022) held that a valid claim is stated for violation of § 1692c(b) when alleging a debt collector conveyed information about a debt to a letter vendor.  The court rejected the comparison which Defendant makes here of a letter vendor to a telegraph or telephone operator.  “[P]hone and telegraph companies are wire-based, regulated utilities, plainly distinguishable from private letter vendors. ”  *Khimmat*, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 715.  Mail vendors are simply not subject to “the FCC’s heavy-handed regulatory regime” controlling telephone and telegraph operators.  *FCC v. FCC (In re MCP)*, --- F.4th ---, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025).  In addition, a consumer knows that the telephone company is involved when a telephone operator is being used to place a call and that a telegraph operator is involved when receiving a telegram.  In contrast, a consumer does not know of the involvement of a letter vendor because that information is neither disclosed nor self-evident.  Contrary to Defendant’s argument, Defendant’s mail vendor is *not* “functionally equivalent to a telegram company. ”  Db22.  Unlike a telegram operator, the mail vendor is not heavily regulated, the use of a mail vendor and its identity is not disclosed to the consumer, and Defendant shares much more information with a mail vendor that is necessary to deliver a telegram.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5 only allows a custodian to permit a record to be “inspected, examined, or copied. ”  It does not allow for scientific manipulation or testing, and it certainly does not allow for alteration or destruction of government records.  [...]’s expert initially acknowledged that such testing will result in permanent alteration and possible damage to the items.  (Ra7-8).  Although the expert later retracted his opinion by indicating that the historical “envelopes and stamps will not suffer ‘damage,’ as the State alleges,” the inevitable alteration and risk of possible damage still remains.  (Pa40-41; Pa53; Pa103).  [...] argues, without support, that a modern-day interpretation of “inspected” or “examined” includes DNA testing.  (Pb9).  But this argument ignores both the Court’s caution in MAG that OPRA remains subject to “reasonable controls . . . to prevent abuse and protect the public officials involved,” 375 N.J. Super. at 546, and [...]’s responsibility, under E.O. 110, to protect the historical items from risk of damage or mutilation to ensure their future accessibility for the public, (Pa153).
[brief] The inner envelope must then be placed in the outer envelope, which must itself be sealed.  Id.  Upon receiving a mail-in ballot, the Board must determine whether it conforms to the requirements of Title 19.  N.J.S.A. 19:63-17(a); 19:63-17.1(a).  The Board must also “compare the signature and information contained on the flap of the inner envelope with the signature and information contained in the respective requests for mail-in ballots and the signature and information contained in the [SVRS].”  N.J.S.A. 19:63-17(a).  The Board must reject the mail-in ballot “if it is not satisfied, pursuant to a comparison with the [SVRS], that the voter is legally entitled to vote and that the ballot conforms with the requirements of this act.
[brief] *Id.* at *8.  Appellants give great weight to a footnote in *Dela Vega* stating that this Court found the step-down provision “troubling” and referencing public policy concerns.  *Id.* at *1*, Fn. 2.  However, this was in the context of a primary auto liability policy and the statutorily mandated coverage framework applicable to such policies.  The Court’s reasoning was based on the distinction between Injury to an Insured exclusions and step-down provisions.
[brief] (3T162:15)  Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff had access to [...]’s bank records, and that this obviated her duty to provide an accounting and/or access to the company’s QuickBooks financial records was repudiated by her own trial testimony, when she testified that Plaintiff could not possibly distinguish Defendant’s personal expenses from business expenses by --- ² Defendant’s counsel’s billing records confirm the date that [...], CPA, first produced the relevant QuickBooks data and that this information, to which Plaintiff was entitled, was obtained through discovery in this lawsuit, in or about September 2022.
[brief] \begin{itemize}  \item \textsuperscript{145} \textit{Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y.}, 385 N.J. Super. 172, 186 (App. Div. 2006).  \item \textsuperscript{146}  \textit{In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.}, 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001).  See also \textit{Fiore v. Hudson Cty. Emps. Pension Com.}, 151 N.J. Super. 524, 528-29 (App. Div. 1977).  \item  \textsuperscript{147}  See, e.g., \textit{In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action}, 93 N.J. 412, 431 (1983).  \item \textsuperscript{148} \textit{Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.}, 191 N.J. 88 (2007).  \end{itemize}  Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) superiority requirement asks a court to balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against alternative available adjudication methods.
[brief] The trial court offered no sound justification for requiring the production of legally irrelevant documents.  The court adopted the ESI Order mainly on the premise that ESI is “fundamentally different than just paper documents” and involves “voluminous” productions, thereby requiring departure from the ordinary rules governing paper discovery.  T20:21-22.  The trial court also asserted that for an e-discovery production, the requesting party should be entitled to decide what is relevant, rather than following the ordinary sequence of discovery that requires the producing party to play that gatekeeping role.  T5:20-6:1.  Both rationales seriously misconstrue controlling law.  1.  Rule 4:10-2(a)’s Text And History Preclude Treating ESI Discovery Differently For Relevancy Purposes Based On Its “Voluminous” Nature (Raised Below: Da166-68; T3-38)