ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Range: 50 yards  Target: FBI “Q” type 60 rounds  Range Rounds Position Course of fire Time  Kneeling  From a kneeling ready position, fire 5 rds, 40 sec..  50 yds  10  From a prone position, on command fire 5 Prone 40 sec. rounds  Roll out from strong side of cover and fire 2 10 sec. rounds; roll out from the support side of cover (2X) and fire 2 rds  25 yds  20  Cover  Roll out fire 2 rds from strong side of cover, 15 sec. reload fire 2 rds from the strong side of cover 3 sec.  Over the top of cover fire 2 rds (4X)  Standing & Fire 2 rds from standing, assume the kneeling 10 sec. kneeling position and fire 2 rds (2X)  15 yds  Standing & Fire 2 rds standing, assuming kneeling, reload, 15 sec.  20 kneeling fire 5 rds kneeling  Double tap the body, step to the right and Standing 10 yds double tap the body, step to the left and fire N/A (side steps) one shot to the head 1 sec.  7 yds  Standing  Double tap the target (3X)  10  Fire 2 rds from the carbine, transition to 5 yds  Standing 8 sec. handgun and fire 2 rds  End course, score targets (48 hits – 80%)  9-85  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] 16 B. APPELLANT’S BELATED ATTEMPT TO SEEK AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING FOR THE 2017 WFD PERMIT FAILS BECAUSE IT IS UNTIMELY AND THE COURT’S REVIEW OF [...]’S MARCH 14, 2023 DECISION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S THIRD PARTY HEARING REQUEST FOR THE 2019 PERMIT MODIFICATION .......................... 21 POINT II .................................................................................................................. 23 APPELLANT’S BELATED ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE A DIRECT APPEAL OF THE 2017 WFD PERMIT AND 2019 PERMIT MODIFICATION SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE IT IS UNTIMELY AND THE 2017 WFD PERMIT AND 2019 PERMIT MODIFICATION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO [...]’S AUTHORITY AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT LAW AND THE CZM RULES (Aa0001-Aa0005; Aa0089-Aa0091; Aa546-Aa555)
[brief] ”); *Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. at 582–83 (statute should not be construed with plain meaning if it would yield an absurd result.); *Bergen County PBA Loc. 134 v. Donovan*, 436 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2014) (courts should consider extrinsic evidence (*e.g.* legislative history) if “a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language.
[brief] The other appellate case to broach a similar, but not identical situation is Matter of Gen. Election Held in Tp. of Monroe, Gloucester Cty., N.J. on Tuesday, Nov. 6, 1990., 245 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1990).  That case holds that where a voter cast a ballot for a voter on the ballot, and also wrote-in the voter, that the write-in ballot would be discounted, but the otherwise properly cast vote for the candidate by selecting him on the ballot, would be accepted.  Id. at 73.  The court made clear, however, that “[d]isqualification results when there are different names voted for the same office, or a voter disregards the printed names and write in the name of someone already on the ballot. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  In this case, the voter did not vote for the candidate on the ballot and write him in, but just cast a write-in vote.
[brief] With regard to the jury issue, trial counsel admitted not asking to voir dire the other jurors:  Q  Did you make any request to voir dire the other jurors as to what was said about her knowledge of the other name?  A  I believe that I -- no, I did not ask the Court to voir dire the rest of the jurors.  1T19  Q  And do you recall why you did not ask the Court to voir dire the rest of the jurors?  A  I believe it was a couple reasons.  Mainly not to highlight the name anymore than it had already been or the issue.  And secondly, based on what the juror who was excused told us it -- it -- they didn’t indicate how they knew the person or what they knew about the person, their relationship with the person.  Just that they recognized the name and that name was not on the witness list, so there didn’t seem to be any harm, even if other jurors heard that, to continue with the trial.  Q  You said you didn’t request cause you didn’t want to highlight it anymore.  Can you elaborate on that at all?  A  Well, to -- to individually voir dire them would have made them think that it was more important or the name had more meaning or import to the trial than -- than it did, since it -- from my recollection that person didn’t even testify and it was just a name mentioned.  So it didn’t seem necessary and might just also add some confusion to -- to continue questioning other jurors on it.  1T20  Q  And the reason why you didn’t ask for the individual voir dire because you were afraid it was going highlight the [...] name in any of the other juror’s minds?  A  Not necessarily highlight, but unnecessarily emphasize a name that wouldn’t mean anything at the time.  It was just on the witness -- was not on the witness list.  It was just mentioned in passing during testimony.  1T25
[brief] Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 223 (2014) (as component of definition of "merchandise," services offered to public may involve unlawful practice for purposes of CFA); Bandler v. Landry's Inc., 464 N.J. Super. 311, 318 n.3 (App. Div. 2020), certif. den. 245 N.J. 55 (2021) ("merchandise" is defined broadly to include "services," and no doubt covers gaming entertainment); Ferguson v. Jonah, 445 N.J. Super. 129, 142 (Law Div. 2014) (recipient of "conversion therapy" is consumer of "services" within meaning of CFA).
[brief] ”  Da31-32.  The PTA, for example, contemplated “good faith” negotiations on EGP, so as to permit the parties to work cooperatively over the ensuing three-year period.  Da54 § 1.6(a)(ii)(A)(1).  However, in the Arbitration, [...] attempted to argue that, despite [...] transferring many projects to [...], [...] actually withheld its agreement on the projects’ EGPs, and so [...] should simply be permitted to pay nothing.  See, e.g., App. Br. at 17 (“The PTA does not include a provision expressly addressing the consequences of the parties’ failure to reach agreement as to EGP as to construction projects performed by [...]. ”); but see Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020) (noting interpretative inquiry includes avoiding “absurd results”).
[brief] In fact, there is no record of this argument before the lower court during the course of trial on May 31, 2023.  (6T and Plaintiff [...]’s Trial Brief as Ra8-23)  In point of fact, those arguments were espoused in the Appellant’s prior Summary Judgment Motion Brief which decision was rendered and concluded on April 28, 2023.  Appellant did not file a timely Notice of Appeal on these issues and did not raise them again for reconsideration in their Trial Brief, nor were those issues raised at trial.  Id.  The issues referenced were therefore abandoned and not subject to appeal from the decision rendered on June 20, 2023.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da169 Exh Y (Affidavit of Defendant, [...], Dated July 10, 2023—Redacted As Redundant)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da107  Defendants’ Notice of Cross Motion For Summary Judgment dated January 19, 2024.
[brief] ”  *Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co.*, 372 N.J.Super. 421, 431 (App. Div. 2004).  It is undisputed that ongoing water intrusion – caused by the negligent failure of [...] to honor its obligations to [...] to repair the foundation crack that had caused the groundwater intrusion that, in turn, had caused the formation of toxic mold – resulted in the damages at issue in this case.  The [...] policies do not bar coverage for water intrusion or for [...]’s negligent breach of its obligations under the New Jersey Condominium Act, N.J.S.A §468B-1-38.  The “first step” in the chain of causation leading to Larry’s Chenault’s damages for mold-related bodily injury was ground water intrusion through an unrepaired crack in the foundation.  The foundation is a “common element” of the project that [...] had an obligation to maintain and repair.  N.J.S.A. §46:8B-14(a).  Under Appleman’s rule, recovery from [...] is allowed because an insured risk (water intrusion) set into operation a chain of causation that led to Chenault’s injuries, even though the “last step” in the causal chain (mold exposure) might otherwise be an excluded risk.
[brief] [...] never brought its school law claims before the Commissioner of Education, nor did it ever seek enforcement of the statute through the complaint in lieu of prerogative writ procedures.  Had [...] done so, and there was an adjudication that the statute required the Board’s payment to [...] despite its breach of contract and failure to enter into a renegotiated contract, then the Counterclaim would have been resolved.  But [...]’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies means that it “has elected to hold back from the first [non- --- 4 Kaselaan & D’Angelo Assocs., Inc. v. Soffian, 290 N.J. Super. 293, 298–99 (App. Div. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted) existent] proceeding”, meaning that it cannot rely on the Entire Controversy Doctrine to save its Counterclaim.  REPLY POINT TWO (Addressing [...]’s Waiver and Jurisdiction
[brief] Perhaps the most important fact that [...] ignores is that [...]’s preferred route is to put its poles and lines in the right-of-way of the public streets controlled and regulated by [...].  This severely undercuts [...]’s key authority, *In re Pub. Serv. Elec & Gas Co.*, supra, which involved an ordinance that applied to any and all property located in the municipality, even if owned by others.  Here, it is quite a different thing to say that a municipality does not have any say in how the property which it owns is used by a third party.  Moreover, as cited in [...]’s initial brief at pp. 42-43, the use of public streets and public rights-of-way is conditioned by many statutes on obtaining the consent of the municipality and/or the owner of the property on which the lines are to be erected.  2.
[brief] All along throughout the case [...] kept making this faulty argument and it ended up being incorporated into the jury instructions and verdict sheets.  In their opening statement:  "I want to correct one thing that plaintiff said.  Only one of these -- plaintiff's counsel said.  Only one of these claims can apply, not both.  You're going to have to pick which one is applicable."  (4T57:10-13).  In argument about jury instructions: "No, the law is clear.  The only way you get to negligent training and supervision is if the employee is outside the scope of employment."  (10T46:20-22).  In closing argument: "We have two sets of verdict sheets, really.  One's going to be for what's called vicarious liability, and another one for negligent training and/or supervision, because they're the two separate claims, and only one can apply."  (11T56:10-14).  [...] attorneys were called on this by plaintiff's counsel and were asked at one point where they came up with the idea that its either vicarious liability or direct liability, not both.  This was the exchange:  "[...]: Negligent training and supervision only is permitted if he's outside the scope of his employment.  THE COURT: Right.  [...]: I don't see that.  I don't know where you get that.  [...]: It's from the New Jersey Supreme Court.  THE COURT: Which case?  [...]: Well I think it might be mentioned in the Mavrikidis (phonetic) case."  (10T72:6-73:3).  In fact, however, the court in the case of *Mavrikidis v. Petullo*, 153 N.J. 117, at 137 (1998) specifically stated that plaintiffs "may include causes of action for both direct and vicarious liability", for example, in cases where a defendant engages an incompetent subcontractor.  See also *Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc.*, 157 N.J. 221 (1999) (facts could support both vicarious and direct liability against Pat Pavers); *McQueen v. Green*, 202 N.E.3d 268, 280 (IL Supr. Ct. 2022) (held "that a plaintiff may proceed with both a direct negligence action against an employer and an action under a theory of vicarious liability.")  Under the facts adduced at trial, this jury should have been given the option to find [...] both vicariously and directly liable.  The jury was entitled to believe that [...] was acting within the scope of his employment AND [...] was negligent in its training and supervision of [...].  For example, if [...] had failed to train [...] such that he was not ready to be on the sales floor alone (negligent training), and/or failed to supervise him by putting him alone in the department (negligent supervision), and he nevertheless approached customers by himself because that was what he was told to do as part of his job, and did something negligent (vicarious liability), then there could be both direct and vicarious liability.  See, e.g., Mavrikidis, Alloway, and McQueen, supra.
[brief] (T4:9-25).  At oral arguments, Appellant argued that “There could be at least a disclosure of the categories of information, for instance, right, Your Honor. ” (T8:14-16).  In response, Respondent stated:  “We – you know, we had given them general categories and the Court, in fact, also gave them general categories as to what the Court wanted to address.  Litigation strategies, settlement conferences, their ability to pay. ” (T14:2-8).  There is no question Appellant was given the categories of information to be addressed in the Supplemental brief.  Respondents identified the categories at oral arguments in August.  (1T13:23 to 1T14:1-12; 1T18:6-25).
[brief] [...] educates the students in grades 9-12 of [...], the [...], the [...] and the [...].  (Aa750).  In addition, [...] receives students from the [...] through a separate sending-receiving relationship.  (Aa750).  Students from the [...] and the [...], which have separate sending-receiving relationships with [...] for grades PK-8, also attend [...].  (Aa750).  [...] receives State aid funding for students residing in both [...] and the [...] directly from the State of New Jersey.  (Aa751).  [...] is not a governing body of a non-operating school district since [...]’s board of education and non-operating school district were eliminated as of July 1, 2009.
[brief] Q.  Well, do you recall actually getting to the dumpster?  A.  Not really, no.  I don’t remember the trip out as much, I don’t remember the, you know, as far as getting to the dumpster, no. (Pa220).  Nor did [...] recall actually falling:  Q.  Do you recall having a fall?  A.  I do not remember falling, no.  I still don’t.  (Pa220; Pa221)  **Plaintiff Cannot Explain Why He Purportedly Fell**
[brief] The Condominium Act provides a non-exhaustive definition of the term “common elements. ”  For instance, “common elements” include: (i) the land described in the condominium’s master deed; (ii) parking lots; (iii) roofs; (iv) any improvement exclusively reserved for the management, operation or maintenance of the common elements or condominium property; and (v) any improvement designated as common pursuant to the master deed.
[brief] In fact, not only was there no cross-motion for summary decision filed by Respondent – meaning that no party to this matter ever sought the relief the Commission issued – but Respondent did not even file exceptions to [...]’ Initial Decision, as is noted in the Commission’s own decision.  (Ca015) (“The parties did not file exceptions to the Initial Decision”).  Respondent never even took issue with [...]’s Initial Decision or the penalty of “censure” she applied.  Quite frankly, it appears Respondent would have been happy to walk away from this litigation with a “censure” if the Commission had not gone rogue.  The Commission also improperly avoided statutorily required review by the Commissioner of Education by “dismissing” the Complaint and stating that this matter “is appealable only to the Superior Court-Appellate Division. ” (Ca017).  Despite “rejecting” [...]’s Initial Decision, the Commission largely agreed with [...]’s characterization of Respondent’s social media posts.  The Commission stated in its Final Decision:  [The Commission] would be remiss if it did not address the divisive, inflammatory, and hostile nature of Respondent’s public postings.  Calling the Governor a “Tyrannical POS” and encouraging people to drop out of the [...] runs counter to the level of decorum expected from a publicly elected school official who is charged with serving New Jersey’s student population.  (Ca017).  The Commission further stated that “board members should recognize and refrain from inappropriate communications that have no place in the educational setting. ”  (Ca017).  As the body with the exclusive statutory mandate to issue uniform discipline when school board members engage in “divisive, inflammatory, and hostile” “communications that have no place in the educational setting,” the Commission was required to issue a penalty and to refer that penalty to the Commissioner of Education for review.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  The Commissioner of Education is the body with the statutory authority to review penalties under the Act.  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-10.12 (“The Commissioner shall act upon the Commission’s recommendation regarding the sanction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29(c).”); N.J.A.C. 6A:28-11.1 (“Any appeal of the Commission’s determination regarding a violation of the Act shall be to the Commissioner in accordance with N.J.S.A. 6A:4. ”).  By simultaneously rebuking Respondent for her Facebook posts and dismissing the Complaint altogether, and by stating that this matter “is appealable only to the Superior Court-Appellate Division” (Ca017), the Commission has improperly circumvented this statutorily required review.  As a result of the procedurally improper *sua sponte* dismissal of the Complaint without a cross-motion for summary decision having been filed by Respondent, because Respondent did not even file exceptions to the Initial Decision, because the Commission had already clearly held that Counts 1 and 4 should not be dismissed, and because the Commission improperly circumvented the Commissioner of Education’s statutory review of penalty, the Commission’s Final Decision must be reversed.
[brief] Whether evidence is credible or reliable, however, is inherently a jury determination and not one for the court.  As one example, the motion judge concluded that the defendants “acted appropriately in all regards” when they barred [...] from entering the [...] unescorted where he had previously enjoyed regular and unescorted access and his wife works there.  The motion judge’s factual finding was reached notwithstanding evidence that the action taken was taken because [...] was “suing multiple employees at [...]” and because he “has been litigating against the [...], alleging he was discriminated against and retaliated against. ”
[brief] "Did the Plaintiff LLC exercise its right to accelerate the termination of lease as provided for under the rider to the lease?" (Pa1082,T210:15-17).  A.  "I know the lease was terminated in October of 2016."  (Pa1082,T210:18-19).  Q.  "Can you identify any—did you convey that termination?" (Pa1082,T210:20-21).  A.  "Yeah, we kind of did it almost every way in creation.  We did e-mails.  We did regular mail."  (Pa1082,T210:22-24).  Plaintiff diminishes the prejudicial impact of Defendant [...] being deposed without knowledge that there was a potential lawsuit against him.
[brief] In its summary judgment motion, Appellee made the misplaced argument that Appellant was statutorily barred from being employed in her provision due to her criminal record.  In fact, to the contrary, the very statute cited by Appellee provides clear instruction on the approval process for Appellant to maintain her job, even in light of her criminal record.  In support of its misplaced argument, Appellee cited two provisions as follows.  First, Appellee cited the following section of the administrative code:  "A licensee shall not employ any person who has been adjudged civilly or criminally liable for abuse of a developmentally disabled person."  N.J.A.C. 10:44A-2.4.  However, it is undisputed that the foregoing provision does not apply to Appellant and is therefore inapposite in this matter.  Second, Appellee cited a provision whereby a determination must be made by the Department of Human Services that the applicant is not disqualified from employment, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:6D-63 - 69.
[brief] But in order to make out a violation that a prosecutor would have to bring and that a municipal court would have to find, and a police officer would have to write in the very first place, it would also have to be excessive, unnecessary, unreasonable, loud, disturbing, and plainly audible.  THE COURT: That was plainly audible.  [...]: It was, Your Honor.  But it was not -- THE COURT: Maybe somebody could say is excessive.  Because maybe they could say [...], you should shut up and if you want to go talk to your husband, go in the house and talk to him.  [...]: Well, Your Honor -- THE COURT: Don’t sit out by your pool and have a conversation with him.  [...]:  The question would be whether a police officer would write it.  And whether the prosecutor would bring it, whether the municipal court would find it unnecessary, unreasonable and excessive.
[directive] Accepting Reports  Alleging Officer Misconduct  5.1.1  All complaints of officer misconduct shall be accepted from all persons who wish to file a complaint, regardless of the hour or day of the week.  This includes reports from anonymous sources, juveniles, undocumented immigrants, and persons under arrest or in custody.  Internal affairs personnel, if available, should accept complaints.  If internal affairs personnel are not available, supervisory personnel should accept reports of officer misconduct, and if no supervisory personnel are available, complaints should be accepted by any law enforcement officer.  At no time should a complainant be told to return at a later time to file their report.  5.1.2  Members of the public should be encouraged to submit their complaints as soon after the incident as possible.  If the complainant cannot personally appear at the agency to file the complaint, a member of the agency, preferably a member of the internal affairs function, should visit the complainant at their home, place of business or other location if necessary to complete the report.  Law enforcement agencies are encouraged to establish systems to enable complaints to be accepted by telephone or by email if a complainant does not wish to be interviewed in person or wishes to remain anonymous.  Under no circumstances shall it be necessary for a complainant to make a sworn statement to initiate the internal affairs process.  Furthermore, every police agency shall accept and investigate anonymous complaints.  5.1.3  The internal affairs investigator, supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint will explain the agency's disciplinary procedures to the person making the complaint.  The officer shall advise the complainant that he or she will be kept informed of the status of the complaint, if requested, and its ultimate disposition.  To best accomplish this, the agency shall prepare a fact sheet or brochure that includes information on the agency's internal affairs process and what role the complainant can expect to play.  If feasible, the fact sheet or brochure should be provided to the complainant at the time the complaint is made.  A sample fact sheet is found in Appendix A.  19