ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (6T65-16 to 66-5).  Then later, when the State was eliciting testimony about the marijuana found in the car, defense counsel made another evidentiary objection:  . . . what we have just witnessed is a trial by character smearing.  And (indiscernible) trying to tie all these non-relevant objects as evidence of guilt of one shot from one gun by one person.  I would respectfully submit that to admit these items into evidence would deprive [...] of a fair trial by an impartial jury.  [(6T78-24 to 79-5). ]  In clarifying what his objection was referring to, defense counsel stated:  I’m not objecting to the guns or any ammunition from the guns.  But everything else that is not pertinent to these charges.  They’re just piling on by irrelevant evidence.  . . .  The flare gun.  (indiscernible) shot gun ammunition.  There’s no indication there was a shot gun.  Suspected marijuana.  And all the other non-ammunition (indiscernible).  [(6T80-21 to 81-5). ]  The trial court disagreed, finding the evidence probative, and denying [...]’s request for a mistrial.  (6T82-2 to 16).  As anticipated, the State used the items found in the car to argue during its closing that [...] was a “secretive” (i.e., disturbed) person of the kind who would commit the crime alleged:
[brief] Considering the fourth Cole factor, Plaintiff’s reference to the parties’ service of discovery requests is irrelevant where the parties have not actually exchanged any discovery, aside from the documents Plaintiff subpoenaed from Defendants’ prior counsel.  No discovery relating to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims has been exchanged between the parties, and the parties have not taken any depositions in this matter, which weighs in favor of arbitration.  As to the fifth Cole factor of notice, because Plaintiff failed to reference the existence of an arbitration provision in his initial pleadings, Defendants responded by promptly notifying Plaintiff of the intent to seek arbitration on March 7, 2023.  [Pa9].  As such, the intent to file for arbitration was not a surprise as Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants disclosed the intent to arbitrate before even filing a responsive pleading in this matter, and prior to Plaintiff amending his Complaint.  In light of the above, along with Plaintiff’s continued contrived efforts to refute the existence of the partnership documents since the outset of this matter, Plaintiff has had sufficient notice of Defendants’ intent to arbitrate the partnership claims.  Lastly, the Trial Court noted that no trial date was scheduled here, whereas in Cole, the defendant moved to compel arbitration just three days before trial of a substantially litigated matter.  [4T48:16-17].  B.
[brief] This claim lacks merit.  There is no law that precluded her from highlighting an undisputed fact, which had always been in the record, as an additional reason for why Plaintiffs’ proofs were deficient.  *Lombardi*, *supra*, 207 N.J at 536 (noting there is no requirement for a trial judge considering a motion for reconsideration to confine himself to the original record).  What is “critical” when a trial judge is inclined to revisit a prior interlocutory order, is that the court provide the parties with a fair opportunity to be heard on the subject, apply the proper legal standard to the facts and explain her reasons.  *Id.* at 537.  [...] did just that.  The motions were fully briefed with a record including the undisputed testimony of the three people necessary to prove Plaintiffs’ claims – their standard of care and causation experts and [...], who Plaintiffs insisted would have delivered the infant plaintiff earlier, if only he had been summoned earlier.  In fact, [...]’s availability was key to Plaintiffs’ claim he would have performed the delivery sooner if he had been called.  Yet, as [...] correctly analyzed the record, the testimony of these three witnesses simply did not support Plaintiffs’ theory.  It would have been an injustice to all parties, not just Defendants, to force them to endure a long and expensive trial that would impermissibly permit a jury to impose liability on Defendants based on sheer speculation.
[brief] [...] filed 2 Certifications (Exh. “N” & “O”) (151a-154a) (156a-160a) in response to Aug 8, ’22 Exceptions by [...] & me to his Trust Accounting 67.  His responses to my Exceptions had extensive unsubstantiated false claims, & which required my refuting them to Mr. [...], & eventually to the Court (see p. 13, [...]'s Reply to [...]'s Exceptions, & par. 71-74 below.)  70.
[brief] *Id.*  If Plaintiffs believe [...]’s document search and production are deficient, they have the burden to demonstrate good cause for imposing additional requirements, especially where, as here, Plaintiffs’ demand would upset a carefully crafted, court-approved process.  See *Handloser v. HCL America, Inc.*, No. 19-cv-01242-LHK (VKD), 2020 WL 7405686, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2020); Sedona Principle 6 at 123–124.  Good cause to compel designation of additional document custodians generally requires a showing that the disputed custodians possess uniquely relevant information that is not available from the sources already designated.  See *Handloser*, 2020 WL 7405686, at *2 (refusing to order designation of additional custodians where plaintiffs failed to show why they “expect to discover information from these custodians that differs from discovery they have already obtained from the others”); *Lauris v. Novartis AG*, No. 1:16-cv-00393-LJO-SAB, 2016 WL 7178602, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (denying motion to compel additional custodians where plaintiff failed to show “that the discovery plan proposed by Defendants would not produce responsive documents,” and requiring “more than mere speculation to order Defendants to include the apex custodians in its search protocol”).
[brief] The kinds of pretrial motions that a defendant might want to appeal following a "conditional plea" of guilty are: (1) a determination that a statement of the defendant is admissible; (2) a determination that a pretrial identification of the defendant is admissible; (3) a determination that a sound recording is admissible; (4) an order denying a motion to suppress evidence in circumstances in which the defendant contended that the evidence should have been suppressed on grounds other than a violation of the Fourth Amendment or Art. I, par. 7 of the New Jersey Constitution; and (5) any other determination regarding the admissibility of evidence made at a pretrial hearing.  A defendant may enter a "conditional plea" only with the consent of the prosecutor and the approval of the court.
[brief] Page Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], dated July 29, 2024  .................................................................Ja5-Ja12 #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Atalese v U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P.** | 8 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | **Beture v Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc.,** | 17, 18, 21 | | 2018 U.S. LEXIS 121801 (D. New Jersey July 18, 2018) | | | **Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC v N.J. Div. of Inv.,** | 15, 16, 24 | | 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032 (3d Cir. December 22, 2023) | | | **Bodie v Cricket Wireless, LLC,** | 23 | | 350 So. 3d 480 (Ct. of Appeal, Fla., Second Dist. November 16, 2022) | | | **Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal.,** | 17, 18 | | 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) | | | **Capriole v Uber Techs. Inc.,** | 24, 25 | | 7 F. 4th 854 (9th Cir. 2021) | | | **Cunningham v Lyft, Inc.,** | 23 | | 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48037 (D. Mass. March 20, 2020) | | | **DiCarlo v MoneyLion, Inc.,** | passim | | 988 F.3d. 1148 (9th Cir. 2021) | | | **Goffe v Foulke Mgmt., Corp.,** | passim | | 238 N.J. 191 (2019) | | | **Guidotti v Legal Helpers Debt Resol., LLC,** | 9, 10 | | 716 F.3d 764 (3rd Cir. 2013)
[brief] The ALJ improperly analyzed the law and the facts presented and the decision made is not consistent with the evidence introduced at trial.  [...] is an employee under the ABC test.  No finding could have been otherwise made as [...] introduced no evidence to the contrary.  Deciding that [...] was ineligible for pension benefits was plain error.  In addition, the best possible interpretation of §7.2(a) would lead to a conclusion that the “so-called” professional services agreement was only first introduced in 2015.  Therefore, stretching the interpretations and ignoring the actual Independent Contractor analysis, would only allow the ALJ to conclude ineligibility as of 1/1/2015.  Either way, the ALJ erred and must be reversed in part or in their entirety and [...]’s pension eligibility restored accordingly.  /s/August N. [...], Jr.  August N. [...], Jr.  April 12, 2024  VIA eCOURTS  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey - Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  PO Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-006  Re: August [...] v. [...]  [...]  On Appeal from a Final Administrative Determination of the [...] Letter Brief and Appendix of Respondent, [...] on the Merits of the Appeal.
[brief] (Pb 29).  For example, as defendant argued in his merits brief, (Db 21-23), not only did the PCR judge incorrectly remember [...]'s testimony when determining her credibility, (14T 62-13 to 63-6; 19T 6-18 to 13), the judge's recollection of [...]'s testimony was no more accurate, (15T 22-16 to 23-2, 50-17 to 22; 19T 9-23 to 10-9, 10-21 to 11-6).
[brief] [...]’s insurer, [...], denied coverage based on the same type Fungi or Bacteria Exclusion as found in the Zurich Policies.  Id. at 860.  Thereafter, [...] and [...] came to an agreement (much like [...] did here with [...]) that [...] would enter judgment for $2 million.  Id. at 859.  In the coverage action that followed, [...] asserted that [...] breached its duty to defend [...] because [...] knew or should have known that the claims were within the Consumption Exception even though the complaint did not allege that he was injured by consuming a fungi or bacteria.
[brief] ## Cases - **State v. Covell**, 157 N.J. 554 (1999) .................................................................  9 - **Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp.**, 207 N.J. 344 (2011) ....................... 9 - **State v. Carter**, 91 N.J. 86 (1982) ...........................................................................  9 - **New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. N.S.**, 412 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2010) ..............................................................................................................  9 - **State v. Johnson**, 118 N.J. 639 (1990) .....................................................................  9 - **State v. Koskovich**, 168 N.J. 448(2001) ....................................................................  10 - **State v. Chen**, 208 N.J. 307 (2011) ........................................................................ 10 - **State v. Michaels**, 136 NJ 299 (1994) .....................................................................  11 - **State v. Cofield**, 127 N.J. 328 (1992) .....................................................................  13 - **State v. Richardson**, 452 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2017) ..................................... 13 - **Townsend v. Pierre**, 221 N.J. 36 (2005) ..................................................................  14 - **State v. Carlucci**, 217 N.J. 129 (2014) ...................................................................  15, 16  ## New Jersey Court Rules - **N.J.R.E. 401** ..............................................................................................................  10, 13 - **N.J.R.E. 403** ..............................................................................................................  10 - **N.J.R.E. 404(b)** ......................................................................................................... 13 - **N.J.R.E. 703** ..............................................................................................................  14  Table of Appendix
[brief] Rather, as the jury heard, with regard to the referenced loan in this portion of the testimony, that it was made from Defendant’s “personal draw” and that she “never claimed it as a business expenses [sic].” (3T134:1-3; 3T134:15-22).  This is in line with testimony of Defendant relating to numerous checks drawn on the pharmacy’s account that Defendant was asked about at trial, Defendant testified that those checks and expenses were “under her personal draw” or never claimed it as a business expense, meaning it was personal expense to be applied against her share of profit in the company.  (3T129:14-139:13).  Plaintiff and Defendant each used the pharmacy account for personal expenses.
[brief] A.  The Commencement Of The Underlying Action  In 2019  Appellants, [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), commenced this lawsuit on March 18, 2019 by way of Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint against [...]  (“[...]”), [...], [...], and [...] (the “Underlying Action”).  [FEDa9; Pa1; Pa42].  On June 21, 2019, a Case Management Order was entered by the trial court, which set forth a discovery end date of June 24, 2020.  [FEDa9; Pa495].  Thereafter, four (4) discovery extensions were granted for a total extension of discovery for nearly ten (10) months to April 20, 2021.  [FEDa9-10].  The Discovery End Date was not further extended.  [FEDa11; Pa3305].  On June 23, 2021, after the close of discovery, Appellants filed a Motion to Amend Complaint.  The proposed amendment sought to add as defendants the [...] Parties’ representatives, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), as well as [...], [...], and [...].  [FEDa10; Pa3304].  A Certification of Appellants’ counsel was submitted in support of that motion.  [FEDa10; FEDa37; Pa3304].  Counsel certified that the amendment was precipitated by “issues that were discovered during discovery [which concluded two (2) months earlier in April 20, 2021], and more particularly during depositions, and from certain OPRA records obtained from the Township after February 2021. ”  [FEDa10; FEDa38-39; Pa3304].  Appellants’ counsel also certified as to the claims being added, and/or relief being sought, against each of the proposed new defendants.  [FEDa10; FEDa38-39; Pa3304].  Yet, despite the bases cited to the trial court for the amendment as to the newly added defendants, the Certification did not indicate that any claims were being asserted against [...] and did not indicate that any relief was being sought against [...].  [FEDa10; Pa3304].  The trial court granted Appellants leave to amend and the First Amended Complaint was filed on July 19, 2021 [FEDa10; Pa3304].  Consistent with the Certification of Appellants’ counsel submitted in support of the motion to amend, while the First Amended Complaint added claims against the various defendants, no claims were asserted, nor was any relief sought, against [...], though [...] was named as a defendant.  [FEDa10; Pa3304].  Prior thereto, on March 23, 2020 – nearly 16 months prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint - [...] produced over 1,000 pages of documents pursuant to a subpoena served by the [...] Parties’ counsel.  [FEDa11; FEDa107; Pa3304].  On November 20, 2020, eight (8) months prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint, Appellants’ counsel conducted the deposition of [...], who was a consultant to [...] in connection with allegations made in the action.  [FEDa11; Pa3304].  On January 15, 2021, six (6) months prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint, Appellants’ counsel conducted the deposition of [...]’s representative, [...] [FEDa11; Pa3304-05].  B.
[brief] An appellate court's review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity (including constitutionality) or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  See, *In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ.*, 244 *N.J.* 1, 17 (2020) (agency's interpretation of a statute); *State v. Courtney*, 243 *N.J.* 77, 85 (2020) (interpretation of sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code).
[brief] 36  Curtis v. Cellco Partnership, 413 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 2010) ...................................................................... 24, 25 Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119 (2020)  ................................................................................................. 32, 33  Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp., 22 N.J. 523 (1956)  ..................................................................................................  29  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, 168 N.J. 124 (2001)  ................................................................................................. 14, 22, 29, 30  Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 2021)  .....................................................................  45  GEM Advisors, Inc. v. Corporacion Sidenor, S.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ....................................................................  42  Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 2010) .................................................................... 21, 22, 26 Gross v. Borough of Neptune City, 378 N.J.  Super. 155 (App. Div. 2005) ................................................................. 34 Hamilton v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 22-cv-6917 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2023) ......................................................... 30 Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, 215 N.J. 174 (2013) ......................................................................................... 32, 44 Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., 419 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2011) ............................................................. 9, 10 Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co. 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992)) ........................................................................... 46 Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Florida, Inc., 236 N.J. 301 (2019) ........................................................................................ passim Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246 (2017) ......................................................................................... 34 Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 2016) ............................................................... 39 Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) .......................................................................................... 14 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) ......................................................................................
[brief] Here, the tenant, not this defendant, was in the best position to remedy the directory on the panel door.  Consequently Section 9.01 of the lease, which required the tenant to keep the electrical and lighting in good condition and repair, controls the allocation of liability.  The tenant, not this defendant, was in the best position to mitigate the risk of harm alleged.  The motion court also properly evaluated a lessor’s duty under the principles of Section 358 of the \textit{Second Restatement} as it was required to do pursuant to \textit{Reyes, supra}.
[brief] If either of those positions were true, the arbitration clause would be unenforceable.  Now, [...] seeks to enforce a provision in the document to further his goal to stall an adjudication of this matter.  The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes [...] from changing his position that there is no contract to a position that there \textit{is} a contract, and that it forms an enforceable basis of his demand for arbitration.  This is not a situation in which [...] argued in the alternative.  There is no discovery response to the effect that \textit{there was no contract, but if there was Defendant did not breach}.  Rather, [...] steadfastly denied that there was a contract.  The Panel should not play [...]’s game.
[brief] Plaintiff went to purchase milk at the [...] store located in [...] on July 14, 2020.  (Pa26 ¶ 2).  When Plaintiff entered the [...], she noticed metal barricades that had been placed outside of [...] and that the leg of one of the metal barricades was bent upward.  (Pa27 ¶¶ 8 & 9).  Plaintiff did not report the raised barricade leg to [...].  (Pa28 ¶ 14).  She then shopped for a brief period of time.  (Pa27 ¶ 3).  Plaintiff tripped over a metal barricade leg that was bent upward after she exited the store.  (Pa28 ¶ 13).  Plaintiff exited the [...] from a different location from where she entered and then walked past the barricades at the entrance to walk back to where she had parked her car.  (Pa38 ¶1).  Plaintiff acknowledged that the barricades that she walked past to return to her car were the same barricades that she passed when she entered the [...].  (Pa38 ¶1).  At the time, Plaintiff wore a facemask which blocked her view of her feet.  (Pa28 ¶ 12).  However, Plaintiff was aware of and saw the raised leg of the metal barricade on which she tripped when she entered the store.  (Pa28 ¶ 15).  The then-Front End Coach, [...], was deposed and testified that she replaced the barricade that Plaintiff tripped over immediately after it came to her attention.  (Pa37 ¶9).  THE TRIAL COURT RULING
[brief] ”  (Pb 6)  But as explained in [...]’s opening brief, the State did not submit any --- \(^3\)  The State said [...] was twenty-six, (Pb 6, 10), but his date of birth is November 18, 1992, and the interview occurred on September 26, 2018, making him twenty-five, as the motion court found, (Da 119, 194; 3T 6-7 to 7-2).  official records of arrests or police cooperation; it did not establish the recency of any such encounters; and, crucially, it did not prove that he had previously understood and knowingly waived his Miranda rights during those encounters.  See State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 297-98 (App. Div. 2015) (discounting prior arrest and conviction where the State “did not offer proof that such prior experience enabled him to understand his Miranda rights”).  To the contrary, the motion court found only that [...] had previously “talk[ed] to police as a witness” and made no finding on whether he had even been Mirandized before, let alone waived those important legal rights.
[brief] Arbitrator [...] issued his Opinion and Award on or about October 2, 2023, denying the Union’s grievance.  Pa186.  Arbitrator Kendellen framed the issue as: Did the Employer violate the collective bargaining agreement when it used the annual State of New Jersey-Department of The Treasury Circulars (Treasury Circulars) to calculate the Overtime Rate instead of language contained in the Agreement at Article V: E. (3)? (Emphasis added).  Pa187.  In Arbitrator Kendellen’s Award he acknowledged that “the words in the Agreement’s language may at first reading appear to require use of 2080 in determining the divisor” but found that the explicit equation in the contract was “merely illustrative and descriptive” and not “prescriptive. ”  Pa192.  The Undersigned finds, therefore, that the Union’s later reliance on the language being plainly and simply clear, as it might at first appear, is swept aside by the weight of the record evidence that establishes the manner in which both parties had actually conducted their relationship otherwise over the three decades preceding the Union’s first raising the prescriptive issue in 2019.  Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that the Union’s grievance is unsupported by the record evidence and should be denied.
[brief] Hawkin’s Letter to [...] and Edison Prosecutor Pa251 Exhibit C-7 to [...]’s Certification  [...] Letter Regarding Request for Discovery to Edison and Highland Park 12/7/2020 Pa254 Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  Order Brought by [...] Pa256 Certification of [...] 10/13/2020 Pa258 Certification of Eldridge [...] to Motion to Dismiss and suppress 10/14/2020 (Attached at Pa229)