ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Revised Policy requires all staff members “take necessary steps … to promptly inform a student’s parent(s) whenever a student discloses an issue and/or exhibits behaviors that may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or [sic] social/emotional well-being. ” (Da110).  The court reasoned that, because the terms “necessary steps” and “adverse impact” are undefined, and because the Revised Policy is unclear on what “necessary steps” means, staff could be ⁷ Appellants’ claims that the trial court erred by finding that “irreparable injury may result,” rather than that it will, (Db29), and by failing to consider “harm to the public interest,” (Db36), amount to quarreling over semantics.
[brief] a.  What the PSA Does Not Say Critically, [...]’s Brief fails to cite any provision of the PSA that grants it the right to terminate upon receipt of a non-compliant estoppel certificate.  Such a right is simply nowhere to be found in the PSA.  Had the PSA intended to grant such a right it could easily have done so — “In the event that an estoppel certificate discloses a material matter, [...] may terminate this Agreement. ”  But the PSA has no such provision to be found anywhere.
[brief] (Pa23)  The Department defines excessive sick leave which subjects a Firefighter to punishment as “short period of being absent on sick leave”.  (Pa20).  The General Order adopted indicates that employees will be subject to discipline pursuant to Section 6.3.4 of the policy for “three (3) or more illnesses within any twelve (12) month period of time”.  (Pa23)  As a result, each time a Firefighters takes 3 medical or sick leaves within a year, they are subjected to a stacking or progressive discipline which begins with a reprimand and thereafter increases to loss of compensatory days and finally to termination.  (Pa24-Pa25).  [...] asserted that the Rules and Regulations as listed are void on the face where they punish Firefighters simply because the Firefighter legitimately utilized medial leave which is protected activity under the NJLAD.
[brief] 4 POINT II - The PSA Expressly Allowed Plaintiff To Demand Specific Performance If [...] Proceeded To Close With The Fee Owner – And This Right Existed “In Addition To Its Termination Right” ...........................................  5  A.  Section 13.1 of the PSA Expressly Granted Plaintiff the Right to Demand Specific Performance, “in Addition to its Termination Right” ......  5  B.  The “Either-Or” Hobson’s Choice Construction of the Contract Advanced by Both Defendants and Embraced by the Trial Court is Contradicted by the Language of Section 13.1 .................................................................  9  C.  The Use of the Word “Thereupon” in Section 13.1 Should Not Have Been Interpreted to Mean that Plaintiff Could Seek Specific Performance Only if [...]’s Default Happened After the Closing with the Fee Owner.  12 POINT III - Principles Of “Election Of Remedies” Do Not Bar Plaintiff’s Claims, In Light Of The Language Of This Particular Contract, Which Allowed Plaintiff To Exercise Concurrent Remedies .............................................
[brief] 22  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Memorandum of Decision  .................................................................  Pa713  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Statutes R. 4:46-1 ...........................................................................................................  1 R. 4:46-2 ...........................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 59: 1-1 ...............................................................................................  iii, 5 N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 ...............................................................................................  iii, v, vi N.J.S.A. 59:4-1 ...............................................................................................  7 N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a) .........................................................................................  8  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3 ...............................................................................................  7  Cases
[brief] Through an inverse condemnation proceeding, a property owner seeks compensation for a de facto taking of his property.  *Pinkowski v. Township of Montclair*, 299 N.J. Super. 557, 575, 691 A.2d 837 (App.Div. 1997).  "[A] property owner is barred from any claim to a right to inverse condemnation unless deprived of all or substantially all of the beneficial use of the totality of his property as the result of excessive police power regulation".  *Orleans Builders Developers v. Byrne*, 186 N.J. Super. 432, 446-447, 453 A.2d 200 (App.Div. 1982) (citing *Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City*, 435 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 833, 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed.2d 198 (1978)).  In an inverse condemnation case, the "property owner is required to show that there has been a substantial destruction of the value of the property and that the defendant's activities have been a substantial factor in bringing this about."  *Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg*, 150 N.J. at 134, 695 A.2d 1344 (1997) (quoting *Washington Market Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton*, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408 (1975) which was what occurred in this situation causing Defendant from using his property for any viable purpose for over two and one half years.  In its decision in *Stavros v. State of New Jersey*, the court determined a regulatory taking occurred because Defendant was deprived of substantially all of the economically viable use of the property for two and one-half years, the lack of reasonable access and the construction around the property interfered with Defendant’s investment-backed expectations.  This was the basis of the settlement amount received under the inverse condemnation action in which the [...] did not take physical possession or ownership of Defendant’s property which would be the basis for an involuntary “sale” of the property, but deprived Defendant access to the property resulting in a regulatory taking for which he received compensation.
[directive] Unholstering or pointing a firearm are tactics that should be used with great caution.  The presence of an officer’s firearm, under the right circumstances, can discourage resistance and ensure officer safety in potentially dangerous situations without the need to resort to force.  At the same time, however, unnecessarily or prematurely drawing a firearm could limit an officer’s options in controlling a situation, could create greater anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm.
[directive] 7  3. issuing the Certificate will not pose a substantial risk to public safety; and 4. issuing the certificate will assist in the successful reintegration of the offender and is consistent with the public interest.  5.  the applicant was not convicted of an offense enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-8(c).  (See Section D Exclusions from Relief below).  Certificates issued pursuant to this section may suspend disabilities, forfeitures and bars generally within the limits of this Act, or only certain disabilities, forfeitures and bars specifically named in the certificate.  C.  A Certificate may be issued to a qualified offender three years after completion of the incarcerative or supervisory portion of their sentence, whichever is later, if: (a) does not pose a substantial risk to public safety; (b) will assist in the successful reintegration of the person and is consistent with public interest; (c) has remained without criminal involvement since the conviction, including that the person has not subsequently been convicted of a crime, has no pending charges for any crime, and there is no information presented that such a charge is imminent; and (d) the conviction is not subject to any of the disqualifying convictions enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-8(e).
[brief] 194 N.J. at 383–84.  Here, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the arbitration, challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitration and no adjudication of plaintiffs’ counterclaims has occurred.  See also, Highgate Development v. Kirsh, 224 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div 1988) (incorrectly cited by Appellants as 223 N.J. Super. 328) (the party made a binding election to arbitrate by not contesting the filing party’s arbitration claim, filing a counterdemand for arbitration, demanding discovery and participating in the arbitration process through a five day hearing, over two years); N.J. Manufacturers Insurance Company v. Franklin, 160 N.J. Super. 292 (App.Div. 1978) (insured waived right to judicial determination of coverage question by its participation in arbitration and after arbitrator had decided issue of coverage).
[brief] [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], Defendant/Appellant, and [...], Defendant/Respondent, and [...], a fictitious name; and/or [...], a fictitious name; and JOHN DOES 1-10, said names being fictitious, Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS ENTERED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, MORRIS COUNTY, DOCKET NO. [...], COMPELLING DEFENSE AND INDEMNITY, DATED JUNE 10, 2024, AND ENTERING FINAL DISPOSITION, DATED JUNE 12, 2024
[brief] (Pa1934, Pa1887).  On March 18, 2022, the Hon. [...] heard oral argument on all of the summary judgment motions.  At the outset, Judge Winkelstein advised the parties that he had reviewed all of their motion papers and concluded that he could not rule on the motions without first holding a Rule 104 hearing to evaluate [...].  (Pa2026 at ¶ 2).  On May 9, 2022, the Hon. [...] conducted the Rule 104 hearing.  (Pa1422).  All attorneys gave opening statements.  Mr. [...]’s testimony echoed his deposition testimony.  After the hearing, Judge Pickering invited post-hearing briefs.  Plaintiffs’ counsel objected to any such submissions, arguing that the matter had already been adequately briefed.  (T242-244).  Judge Pickering ordered the parties to submit post-hearing briefs, if desired, within 15 days.  All parties made post-hearing submissions.  Id.  Further, at the request of counsel, Judge Pickering delayed his decision on the motions for summary judgment to permit the parties to mediate the matter.  Mediation was unsuccessful.  On April 10, 2023, Judge Pickering entered summary judgment in favor of [...] for the reasons set forth in his written opinion of the same date.
[brief] [...], [...], [...] and [...]  (For Continuation of Appearances  See Inside Cover)  Date Submitted: November 7, 2024  MIDDLESEX  EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, PA and PLAINFIELD  EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, PA, Plaintiffs-Respondent, vs. UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, OXFORD HEALTH PLANS (NJ), INC., [...], and UMR, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
[brief] The arbitrator correctly recognized that, although the [...] does not have the authority under the SMAA to nullify an interest arbitration award as it would under the “Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act” (MSRA), it may withhold Transitional Aid funds if the City allows compensation increases that are not sustainable.  The arbitrator also, consistent with Camden, 429 N.J. Super. 309, supra, properly found that the [...] is not a party to the interest arbitration and cannot be directed to fund an award.  Given the significant financial impact of the [...]’s oversight, which requires the City to remain in substantial compliance with its guidelines to continue receiving Transitional Aid, we find that it was appropriate for the arbitrator to consider the [...]’s oversight in his application of the 16g factors.
[brief] Again, much time & expense were incurred in responding to Plaintiffs’ vexatious tactics.  In this latter regard, Plaintiffs did see fit to attach to their appendix only the transcript of the court ordered deposition of [...] Esq.  The relevant portions of the transcript were annexed to the Appellant’s summary judgment motion & Appendix herein.  Plaintiffs annexed the entire transcript to their opposition to the motion.  There was no utility in showing either court how Ms Fleisher’s testimony was arrogant, abusive, non-responsive &, most disturbing, profane.  Such was not relevant to any issue on this appeal, & hopefully it did not influence the court below.  In 2016 Ms Fleisher, admittedly prepared & recorded the DIL even though she was admittedly no longer a member of the New Jersey Bar.  Along with her counsel they concealed the Mortgage Satisfaction, recorded at the same time in 2016, from [...] & [...], as well from this Court, on the first appeal herein.  It was not until after the Fleisher deposition that Appellant discovered it.  But her subsequent explanation essentially was that she forgot about it & could not find the recorded document to produce it when responding to the Notice of Deposition, which contained a notice to produce documents connected to the DIL.  Ms Fleisher had a considerable time to cooperate & comply given her refusal to appear & the unfortunate delay in obtaining an order compelling her appearance occasioned by [...]’s medical leave of absence.  As a matter of public record, Ms Fleisher resigned from the Pennsylvania bench & the New Jersey Bar while multiple complaints of judicial misconduct, including hostility towards appearing attorneys, were pending.  Appellant received a dose of such hostility at the Fleisher deposition.
[brief] 11 State v. Carpenter, 268 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 467 (1994) ..................................................................................  11  State v. Carswell, 303 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 1997) ........................................  30  State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293 (2006) ..................................................................  22 State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1052 (1999) ..............  11, 12 State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266 (2022) ..................................................................
[brief] Because the [...] has broad authority to enforce the LAD, its interpretation is entitled to “great deference, especially when its position is supported by the statutory language and is consistent with the history of the LAD. ”  Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 625 (1993); see also Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 24 (2009) (“[I]nterpretations of the statute and cognate enactments by agencies empowered to enforce them are given substantial deference in the context of statutory interpretation. ”).  In this case, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to even more than the usual deference because an alternative interpretation of the LAD, allowing the Mandatory Notification Policies to stand, would raise serious constitutional questions.  The LAD is clear in banning discrimination “on account of . . . gender identity or expression” in public schools.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f), 10:5-5(l).  But even if the statute were ambiguous, this Court would be obligated to give it a constitutional construction so long as it was susceptible to such a construction.  Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 365–66 (2007); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 311–12 (1982).  The interpretation of the LAD advanced here by the [...] avoids a potential collision between the district policies and Article I, Paragraph 1, of the New Jersey Constitution, which offers independent and expansive protection for equal treatment for gender-nonconforming individuals.  A.
[brief] On the Letter-Brief LETTER BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, v. : [...], : Sat Below: Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 25-28, 45 City of East Orange v. Kynor, 383 N.J. Super. 639, 646 (App. Div 2006)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  Cont'l Res v. Fair 311 Neb. 184 (2022)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26  Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 96 N.J. 419 (1984) . . . . . 26, 27 Fair v. Cont'l Res., 143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26  Harper v. Va. Dep't of Tax'n, 509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Hinners v. Banville, 114 N.J.Eq. 348, 168 A. 618 (E. & A.1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 I.E.'s, LLC v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520 (Law Div. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42-45 Keystone Servicing, LLC v. Block 365, Lot 9, et al., 2021 WL 4933067 (App. Div.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 33, 35 Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm. 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Michalski v. U.S., 49 N.J.Super. 104, 108-09 (Ch.Div.1958).
[brief] 260, § 39, which refers to districts who receive enhanced State funding and oversight for school facilities from the Schools Development Authority (SDA), pursuant to the Educational Facilities Construction and Financing Act (EFCFA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-1 to -48. not exceed the amount by which the district is spending above adequacy.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68(c).  In 2018, [...]’s total equalized property tax rate of 1.502% was well below the Statewide average equalized total property tax rate of 2.287%. (Aa1460).  In other words, [...] was both taxing well below its LFS, and not experiencing municipal overburden.  And since the implementation of the amendments, the tax rate has remained low — [...]’s equalized tax rate in 2021 was 1.402%, compared to the State average of 2.197%.  (Aa1114-15; Aa1874).  3.
[brief] *Ibid.* (internal citation omitted).  The requirements of *Miranda* are triggered when the suspect is subject to custodial questioning, meaning “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. ”  *Miranda*, 284 U.S. at 444; See also *State v.* Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86 (1997) ("The predicate requirements of Miranda are that the defendant must be in custody and the interrogation must be carried out by law enforcement.")  Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement.  Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence."
[brief] Somewhere in this procedural mix, [...] retained counsel and sought “contempt” and “Rule 1:4-8" relief against plaintiffs, with no antecedent order predicating any such relief in its favor.  Those requests were denied out of hand by the motion judge.  Pa3430 (4-5-2022).  [...], as counsel for [...], appears to have filed a cross-notice of appeal.  When the substantive dismissals are reversed and remanded, ultimately these two defendants will have to return to the case as well, for completion of the technical result that the acts they committed (approval of [...]’ site plan, in the case of [...]; and purchase of plaintiffs’ solar-energy development rights from [...] in the case of [...]) as such acts will be null and void.
[brief] iv.  The Respondent Planning Board specifically authorized the Board Attorney to issue a confirming letter to the [...].  During the Public Hearing on the proposed Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, the Planning Board specifically authorized the Board Attorney to write a letter to the [...], so that the Board determination in the said regard could be relayed.  (2T, p. 22-24).  It is submitted that no further arguments are needed for the Court to conclude that a) the Board Attorney was, in fact, authorized (and directed) to issue the requisite letter and b) the same satisfied prevailing legal requirements.
[brief] *Id.* at 407, 413.  In addition to the patrol car, the only other vehicles the officer observed “in the vicinity” was a car that “turned into a parking lot before reaching the intersection,” and another vehicle traveling eastbound that turned right at the intersection while the defendant waited at the light.  *Id.* at 407.  This Court found sufficient credible evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion that the failure to signal not only may have affected the patrol car, but also “other vehicles. ”  *Id.* at 413.  Apparent from the above cases, an officer does not have to articulate the position of other vehicles with exactitude to have an objectively reasonable suspicion that other drivers may be affected by the lack of a signal.
[brief] [...] paid the May and June invoices in August 2020, as required by the Statute, but did not pay [...]’s April 2020 invoice, and only partially its July invoice, leaving $77,141 unpaid, as a proration of the July invoice, since [...] had only resumed providing services on July 6.  640a.  One other invoice, for janitorial supplies requested by [...] and unrelated to [...]’s fixed monthly services, in the amount of $60,800, was also paid at that time, for a total of $1,301,300.  640a.  These payments were made by [...] following a board resolution approving the payments on August 12, 2020.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER AND DENYING THE MOTION TO INTERVENE DESPITE THE NON-COMPLIANCE OF THE RECEIVER WITH THE STATUTE GOVERNING RECEIVERSHIPS.  (1T30-31 and 2T5)  The Court erred in discharging the Receiver despite his failure to comply with the New Jersey Statute governing receiverships.  N.J.S.A. 14A:14-1 to 14A:14-27  The Statute governs receiverships for insolvent corporations, with various provisions governing the Receiver and the Court, and providing an overall scheme.  A receivership action may be brought, *inter alia*, by a creditor whose claim is for a sum certain and where the corporation is insolvent and/or its business is being conducted at a great loss and greatly prejudicial to the interests of its creditors.  The Court has the power to remove or appoint receivers.  A statutory receiver’s duties begin immediately upon entry of the Order appointing the receiver and the receiver is vested with title to the corporation’s assets that relates back to the date the application to appoint the receiver is filed.  *Wilzig v. Sisselman*, 209 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div. 1986).  *N.J.S.A.* 14A:14-4.  Subject to the Court’s general supervision and the Order of appointment, or as otherwise provided by the Statute, title to all property of the corporation is vested in the receive.  The receiver has the power to institute and defend actions by or on behalf of the corporation, to sell, assign or dispose of the corporation’s property and to continue the corporation’s business including entering into contracts, etc.  *N.J.S.A.*  14A:14-5.  As an officer of the Court, the receiver has control and authority over property for the benefit of the parties in interest and is held to a standard of ordinary care.  *Rielly v. P. Rielly & Son*, 101 N.J. Eq. 432, 436 (Ch. 1927).  A receiver must deal as faithfully with the corporation’s assets as would be done for oneself and must act in the best interests of all creditors.  A receiver incurs unauthorized expenses at his or her peril, and will be held to strict accountability of all acts and omissions.  Accurate and regular accounts of receipts and expenditures must be kept.  _Hershey v. Stone & Hershey_, 10 N.J. Misc. 967 (Ch. 1932).  On October 6, 2023, the Court filed an Order, entered on October 10, 2023, providing that [...] satisfied his obligations as receiver and discharging him, despite numerous statutory violations, as well as non-adherence to Court Rules.