ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa1–Pa2).  The trial court decision treated [...]’s Motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46.  (Pa10).  The trial court then found that “the suit limitation provision, a four-year limitation, was not an unconscionable contract of adhesion and enforceable. ” (Pa12).  The trial court also found that “Plaintiff failed to file the Complaint against [...] within the time required by the policy. ” (Pa13).  The trial thus granted dismissal with prejudice, reasoning that “Plaintiff is obligated to know the terms and conditions of their policy. ” (Pa12).  The trial court did not find that [...] violated any other sections of the policy, including the “Duties After an Accident or Loss” provision.  To the contrary, the trial court found that [...] had “waived any potential subrogation claims against [...] and provided consent to Plaintiff to settle her claims. ” (Pa9).  [...] has not appealed the trial court’s decision, so only the policy’s suit limitation provision is before the Appellate Division.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] *Third*, the contract in *Allison-Williams* was a complex, intricate contract that required Plaintiffs to introduce Defendants to numerous third parties from whom Defendants sought financing.  *Id.* at *6-9* (describing at least three of the third-party financing providers (including another of the named plaintiffs) who were necessarily involved in the parties business arrangement).  The contract in *Allison-Williams* was not a closed-universe real estate transaction that involved clearly defined parties as is the case here.  *Fourth*, the Court in *Allison-Williams* held that other provisions of the contract indicated that there was no intent for first party indemnification.  *Id.* at *29* (stating the surrounding language of the indemnification agreement “does not establish plaintiffs’ right to claim fees from defendant for litigation that they have initiated against defendant on the contract itself. ”).  Fifth, and critically, the Allison-Williams Court made no finding as to whether first-party claims might ever be covered by an indemnification provision to a contract.  It merely stated that, based on the provision at issue, Plaintiffs did not have a “right to claim fees from defendant for litigation that they have initiated against defendant on the contract itself” and that “the parties’ indemnification agreement was not the equivalent of a contractual fee-shifting agreement and did not require defendant to pay plaintiffs' expenses in [that] litigation. ”  Id. at 29-30.  In support of its position below, Plaintiff relied on several other out-of-state cases that are not applicable to this matter.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  [...] was charged with two counts of unlawfully possessing a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d): count 6 involved her possession of the tire iron, while count 8 involved her possession of the knife.  (8T 129-7 to 16; Da 7, 9, 16-17)  In instructing the jury on these offenses, the court erroneously failed to explain that self-defense applied to both charges.  (8T 129-6 to 133-10)  The failure to instruct the jury on the defense was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, particularly as the jury specifically asked “is self[-]defense relevant to the charge of . . . unlawful possession of a weapon. ”  (10T 121-12 to 15)  R. 2:10-2.  The absence of this necessary instruction violated [...]’s rights under the Second Amendment as well as to due process and a fair trial.  These convictions should be reversed.  U.S. Const. amend. II, XIV, N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.
[brief] In the case at bar, Defendant [...] is Board-Certified in Internal Medicine, Pulmonary Medicine and Critical Care.  However, [...] was not practicing Pulmonology or Internal Medicine with [...].  Rather, he was practicing Critical Care is taking care of Sovelove’s internal bleeding after the surgical biopsy while he was in the Emergency Department at [...] on June 1, 2018.  [...] is Board Certified in Surgical Critical Care as well as in General Surgery and Vascular Surgery.  A copy of his Curriculum Vitae is attached.  He signed the Affidavit of Merit against Defendant [...].  His specialty of Surgical Critical Care is equivalent to the Critical Care that [...] was practicing.  [...] challenges the adequacy of [...]’s qualifications- arguing essentially that [...]’s qualifications were not identical to those of Defendant [...].  This argument is simply wrong.  It is based on an implicit argument that the Affidavit of Merit Statute requires that a challenging (Plaintiff’s) Medical Expert must have the identical credentials of the Defendant physician.  That is simply not the law.
[brief] See Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 599 (repeatedly referencing that a home inspector does not even need a college degree), 619 (noting “the requirement of extensive learning or erudition”) and 628 ([...] concurring) (observing the licensure requirements for insurance brokers and their associated fiduciary duties, as compared to home inspectors); Macedo, 178 N.J. at 344 (noting that a real estate broker “is in a semi-professional subject to testing, licensing, regulations, and penalties through other legislative provisions”).  Shaw does not actually engage in a “nature of the services” analysis.  Instead, that panel determined that home inspectors are not doctors or lawyers and was persuaded by the comparatively minimal schooling or apprenticeship needed for home inspectors.  460 N.J. Super. at 612.  If, as Plaintiff suggests, Shaw means that the exemption applies to only those in law, medicine, or divinity/theology, then Shaw’s announced of a return to the “nature of the services” analysis for those in professions requiring extensive learning and erudition would be rendered meaningless.  If the exemption was limited to only those three professions, there would have been no need to announce a test to determine inclusion in this group going forward.
[brief] (23T103-1 to 4; 23T103-16 to 19).  He claimed he drove his father’s blue Hyundai Sonata to the venue hall.  (23T104-15 to 18).  He came to the event with [...].  (23T104-19 to 24).  He claimed he arrived at the venue hall after midnight.  (23T105-19 to 22).  Once he was inside the hall, he saw attendees dressed in traditional African garments but also saw attendees dressed in civilian clothes.  (23T106-13 to 17).  He claimed to be confused since he thought the party was an African-themed event.  (23T106-13 to 19).  He estimated that there were over 300 people in attendance.
[brief] ”  7T. 29:23 to 25.  It did so on three bases.  First, the Court rejected the adjuster’s description of the primary location of the Sheriff’s Officers as having been outside the courtroom based upon its understanding that those Officers were to be in the courtroom at all times.  7T.26:17 to 27:9.  Second, the Court felt that if the adjuster had noticed something which she felt would be prejudicial to the defense, she could have brought it to the Court’s attention at that time.  *Id.*, at 27:10 to 22.  Finally, the Court the fact that “none of the Court personnel ever indicated that the plaintiff was … attempting to in any way influence these jurors” was dispositive.
[brief] Oct. 2022  Order Rider’s Conclusions (Exh. “B”) 56.  Court Rider's stated Conclusions (p. 17) (34a) are invalid due to: - Flawed, mistaken, incomplete, and now fraudulent Intermediate Accounting, since it has known mistakes that [...] refused to correct, CANNOT be approved by the Court, & must be revised for further review and acceptance based on my allowed Exceptions regarding Accounting mistakes of substance, and needed revisions of substance to Trust Corpus.  Requested Back-Up Info/Documents for Trust Intermediate Accounting  Court Rider disregarded my requests.  See Cert. par. 57-59 (183a-185a).
[brief] ”  Schwartz, 251 N.J. at 576-77 (emphasis added).  After a full Rule 104 hearing the Trial Court concluded that the Plaintiffs did not present evidence sufficient to overcome their inexperience in affordable housing.  [...]’s opinion on Plaintiffs’ alleged lost profits were deemed too remote, uncertain, and speculative.  Thus, the Trial Court barred the evidence supporting that claim and enter summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
[brief] 4  The Board also granted a bulk variance for minimum setback for a utility easement.  (Pa128.)  (i)  The proposed billboard is “very small” and “at 1000 feet, you can’t see the sign” (1T:61)  (ii)  The “intention of this sign was to serve a need and market goal…it’s not flashing, it’s not moving, it’s not scrolling, it just changes instantly…not like an animated sign” (id. at 62)  (iii)  Drivers would not see the proposed billboard until they were already through the subject intersections (id. at 70)  (iv)  The gas station sign at the Fire Road intersection is more of a distraction than the proposed billboard (id.)  (v)  “As you’re in the lane [at the subject intersections…your vision on the roadway is towards the signal indications, not to the left, which is where the sign would be” (id. at 71)  (vi)  “Signal indications…are not impeded…by this digital field billboard” (id. at 72)  (vii)  “Multiple studies…show[] that crash rates do not change from before and after billboards are installed…” (id. at 80-81.)  Much of the testimony at the first hearing before the Board focused on guessing at the purpose of the Distance Regulation.
[brief] ..................................................-  12 - State v. J.Q., 252 N.J. Super. 11, 39 (1991), aff’d, 130 N.J. 554 (1993)......-  12 - State v.  Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 341 (1998).....................................................- 12 - State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 454 (2008)....................................................-  12 - State v. Robinson, 448 N.J. Super. 501, 516 (App. Div. 2017)  .......................- 38 - State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494-95 (2006)
[brief] (Da108, 112 - 119).  Consistent with the [...]’ prior position, this draft included provisions relating to: (1) indemnification, and (2) Plaintiff’s obligation to pursue in good faith the zoning approvals referenced in the MOU.  (Da108, 112 - 119).  On October 18, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel informed the [...]’ transactional counsel, that, contrary to Plaintiff’s prior assurances to the Court and its counsel’s acknowledgement that the indemnification issue was a “fair concern,” it had no intention of negotiating in good faith the issues the [...] raised:
[brief] That suggestion is particularly absurd given the facts established through both parties’ witnesses.  Plaintiff enjoyed its easement rights without interruption from 1963 through 2010—while the prior owner used the Fifth Street Lot on the Subject Property for staff parking and for student ingress and egress.  It was only after Defendant changed its behavior that a dispute arose requiring court intervention.  “The extent of the rights conveyed rests on the intent of the parties as expressed in the language creating the easement, taking into account the surrounding circumstances. ”  Village of Ridgewood v. Boldger Found., 104 N.J. 337, 340 (1986), citing, Caribbean House, Inc. v. N. Hudson Yacht Club, 434 N.J. Super. 220, 226 (App. Div. 2013).  “When no limitation is placed on the extent of the use of an easement, it may be used for all reasonable purposes. ”  Id.  Applying the facts as determined by the trial judge, the Trial Court determined that the evidence established that Defendant did not need to utilize the Sixth Street Lot for parking and that parents and school buses were able to drop off children on the Fifth Street Lot.  The Court also found that Defendant failed to demonstrate a need to utilize the Sixth Street Lot for short-term parking or that Plaintiff’s use of the Sixth Street Lot conflicted with Defendant’s use.  (Da1003)  Thus, Defendant’s suggestion that its use of the Subject Property is being overly burdened is contradicted by the fact Defendant can continue utilizing the Fifth Street Lot for student drop off and pick up as well as staff parking.  This had been the case for five decades before Defendant changed the use, interfering with Plaintiff’s historic easement rights.  III.
[brief] Defendant provided [...] with the same information.  (6T90-2 to 92-15).  Sympathizing with defendant [...] offered her a place to stay and brought her home.  (6T90-6 to 10; 6T93-1 to 5).  Around 1:00 a.m. on May 19, defendant asked to speak to [...] alone and started crying and asking for forgiveness.  (6T97-15 to 98-6).  Eventually defendant told [...] she had killed her wife.
[brief] In [...] v. [...], 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998), [...]’s denial of ordinary disability was reversed by the Appellate Division.  On September 22, 1992, more than four years after [...]’s last contribution, the [...] sent him a letter stating that he had to return to work by November 22, 1992, or his pension account would expire.  [...] never received the letter.  [...] was involved in protracted litigation against his employer to request accommodations for a disability, which he claimed he could still work as a police officer.  Upon being denied his LAD claim, [...] applied for ordinary disability benefits.  The Board denied [...]’s application for an ordinary disability retirement on the grounds it was untimely.  Under the applicable PFRS statutes, membership ceases after 2 years from the date of the member's last pension contribution.  The Board determined [...] ineligible because more than 2 years had elapsed since his last contribution and because he was not a member in service at the time of the application.  The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the time period should be relaxed:  Unswerving, ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing … legislative purposes.  * * *  On numerous occasions we have found ‘such particular circumstances as to dictate not the hard approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice. ’ ***  A ‘just accommodation’ of individual justice and public policy requires that ‘in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed.
[brief] Plaintiff did not and cannot satisfy either requirement.  a.  Ozurdex® Is a Complex Product, Requiring Expert Testimony to Prove a Defect.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  Manufacturing processes and modes-of-action for prescription drugs and medical devices, like Ozurdex® and its delivery system, are unquestionably outside the ken of average jurors.  Such complex products do not qualify for the type of “common sense” inferences of defect from circumstantial evidence allowed for *simple* products, like a wheel that stops rotating, a steering column that locks (*Moraca*, 66 N.J. at 459), or a car that “malfunction[s] violently” (*Scanlon*, 65 N.J. at 599).
[directive] See  When considering when and how to use each of these five mechanisms, officers and prosecutors should start with the presumption that juveniles should be diverted out of the juvenile justice system whenever possible, so long as the diversion will promote accountability, advance the juvenile’s rehabilitation, and not present safety risks to the community.  To the extent that diversion is not possible, officers and prosecutors should next consider charging by way of complaint-summons, rather than complaint-warrant, whenever that can be accomplished without jeopardizing public safety or welfare.  This framework reserves the complaint-warrant for the most serious charges or to protect the public, and accompanying requests for detention should result in the least restrictive means necessary to promote accountability and rehabilitation, and address safety risks.
[brief] An order for final judgment of proper exercise of eminent domain and appointing commissioners was entered on November 21, 2018 for the taking as described in the complaint.  (Da29)  The appointed commissioners held a hearing and filed their report on June 21, 2019.  (Da31)  The owner filed a notice of appeal for a jury trial on June 26, 2019.  (Da35)  The owner served his then planning and appraisal reports on January 30, 2020 in anticipation of the then February 18, 2020 trial date.  (Da37; Da38)  The trial was subsequently adjourned due to the unavailability of plaintiff’s counsel.  (Da39)  Shortly thereafter, by motion dated February 26, 2020, plaintiff moved to amend its complaint with a revised metes and bounds description of the taking.  (Da40)  The owner opposed the motion by letter brief.  By order and written statement of reasons filed on March 27, 2020 the court granted plaintiff’s motion.  (Da80)  Plaintiff filed the amended complaint and amended declaration of taking on April 20, 2020.  (Da86; Da97)  By motion dated December 3, 2020, the owner sought various relief, including reimbursement of his expert fees incurred prior to the amendment.  (Da102)  Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross moved to bar the owner’s appraiser at trial, whose report had not yet been completed.  (Da115)  The owner replied by certification.  (Da144)  By order entered on January 8, 2021, the court denied, without prejudice, the owner’s motion for the expert fees.  (Da154)  The court also denied plaintiff’s cross-motion.  (Da164)  By motion dated July 7, 2021, plaintiff sought to exclude from trial evidence related to the physical damage to the owner’s residence from the seawall project construction vibrations.  (Da166)  The owner opposed the motion and cross-moved for discovery.  (Da323)  By order entered on August 6, 2021, the court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied the owner’s cross-motion as moot.  (Da390)  By motion dated December 1, 2021, plaintiff sought to exclude the owner’s engineering and appraisal reports.  (Da401)  The owner opposed the motion.  (Da433)  By order entered on January, 28, 2022, the court excluded the owner’s claims for loss of ocean view and privacy, and denied plaintiff’s motion, without prejudice, to exclude evidence of the property’s enhanced vulnerability to wave overtopping.  (Da444)  By motion dated August 10, 2022, plaintiff sought to exclude as net opinion the engineering report and testimony of the owner’s engineer as to the enhanced vulnerability of the property to wave overtopping.  (Da446)  The owner opposed the motion.  (Da499)  By order entered on October 7, 2022, the court granted plaintiff’s motion.  (Da503)  On August 17, 2023, a consent final judgment was entered in the amount of $16,500.00, with the owner expressly retaining the right to file a timely notice of appeal of the prior orders striking certain of the owner’s expert reports and damage claims.
[brief] When a medical provider is “out of network” or “non-participating” with a health insurer, there is no express, written agreement governing the reimbursement amounts that the insurer must pay to the provider for medical care delivered to the insurer’s members.  (Da5 ¶ 22.)  [...] States, seeking fair reimbursement amounts under various state laws.  (See Da136.)  While these lawsuits have differed slightly in terms of the asserted causes of action and governing state law, they are factually similar and have involved many of the same witnesses and same counsel.  (See n.6.)  In these lawsuits, [...]-affiliated practices and [...] have been embroiled in discovery disputes.  (T13-8 to -15.)  In these disputes, [...] affiliates and [...] have traded back-and-forth accusations that the other party has improperly used relevancy as the justification for not supplying legitimate and discoverable document productions.  (E.g., Da182 ¶ 4.)  C.
[directive] Investigative records created during an internal affairs investigation are included in the "Records Retention and Disposition Schedule for Local Police Departments" issued by the INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  55  New Jersey Division of Archives and Records Management.  Under the schedule, files concerning a criminal homicide must be permanently maintained.  The schedule also requires that any other file involving a criminal matter resulting in the subject officer’s arrest must be maintained for 75 years.
[brief] ”  (Defendant’s Brief, page 49)  (8)  “Plaintiff initiated an investigation in New Jersey that lasted years in an attempt to gain information.  He wanted to apply pressure on the family to give him a greater inheritance than Korean law permitted (see the content of the secretly recorded family meeting at pages Da835-911).  The Appellate Division in its Decision on the initial attorney fee appeal quoted the Administrator’s statement that, “Plaintiff never provided him with any hard evidence of additional New Jersey assets belonging to the estate or other gifts made by decedent to defendant. ” (Da242).  It is clear that Plaintiff used his lawsuit primarily as a springboard to launch a time-consuming search to punish his family by initiating a search for assets that did not exist.  Equitable considerations dictate that Plaintiff’s ploy that should not be rewarded through an award of any legal fees. ” (Defendant’s Brief, pages 45-46).  Plaintiff also did not refute Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s submission to the probate court on the remand disregarded the Appellate Division’s instructions in its March 23, 2021 Decision, as well as applicable case law.  In view of (1) the enormous amount of time that was expended by the Administrator and the parties at Plaintiff’s behest in an eight-year search for assets of the Estate that did not exist, (2) Plaintiff’s failure to file a court-ordered submission that addressed the concerns of the Appellate Division and failure to file a court-ordered response to Defendant’s submission, (3) the fact that Plaintiff’s actions throughout this entire case --including his brazen violation of confidentiality orders and his actions that extended this litigation for years-- and (4) the fact that Plaintiff did not follow court directions and orders on the remand, Defendant respectfully submits that Plaintiff did not meet the equitable considerations that must be present for attorney fee shifting under R. 4:42-9(a)(2), and the probate court should have dismissed Plaintiff’s fee application with prejudice.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] That is, his MEMORY RECOLLECTION of that 10/19/23 hearing is WRONG!  When the hearing began on October 19, 2023, [...] requested to be sworn in.  The trial judge responded: “I’m not – this is not – this is not an evidentiary hearing, so I’m going to decline your request. ”  (See October 19, 2023 Hearing Transcript Page 3, Lines 21-23 and cited in the Defendants-Appellant Brief on p. 16.).  And then later at the October 19, 2023 hearing he said: "But in this particular situation, I am not making a determination that [...] was, in fact, served in 2015.
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