ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] We also had items that were being repaired and replaced, so there weren't-- it wasn't a simple reordering of 32 panels, so to speak, because there were other issues involved.  Q.  Did the manufacturer cover labor costs associated with these repairs and replacements?  A.  Not our labor and costs, because of their particular labor.  Q.  And did the manufacturers coverage include the two panel failures in 2019?  A.  No. No. [2T87:25,-88:1-25, -89:1-21.]
[brief] A.  The Trial Court  Failed to Merge the Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose Conviction with the Murder Conviction.  [...] was convicted of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, murder, and two counts of endangering—the offenses that were the object of that unlawful purpose.  The trial court imposed a life sentence subject to NERA on the murder conviction, four-year prison terms on the endangering convictions, and a ten-year sentence for the weapons offense.  “The failure to merge convictions results in an illegal sentence for which there is no procedural time limit for correction. ”  State v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 79 (2007).  With respect to a conviction for possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, “when the only unlawful purpose in possessing the gun is to use it to commit the substantive offense, merger is required. ”  State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 312 (2013) (quoting State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636 (1996)).  Accordingly, “[i]n the absence of a special verdict by the jury finding that the unlawful purpose was broader than the substantive offenses for which the defendant was convicted, possession of [a] firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully must merge into one of the substantive offenses. ”  State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 112 (App. Div. 1996).  Here, the trial court instructed the jury that “the State contends that the defendant’s unlawful purpose in possessing the firearm was the shooting of [...] and/or the firing a handgun in the direction of the vehicle that [...] was driving,” referring to the murder and endangering charges.  (9T156-25 to 157-10).  Thus, because there was no unlawful purpose beyond the substantive charges for which [...] was convicted, the ten-year term on Count Two is an illegal sentence, and the matter must be remanded so that Count Two can be merged with Count One.
[brief] The instant appeal does not take issue with this portion of the Commissioner’s September 22, 2023, decision.  Second, the Commissioner’s September 22, 2023, decision purported to grant, in part, and deny, in part, a “September 8, 2023, Amended Petition submitted to the New Jersey Department of Education on behalf of the [...] requesting to form a pre-kindergarten through twelfth grade Regional School District with the [...] and [...] municipalities. ” (Aa19).4  Regarding the relief sought by Sea Bright and the Borough of [...] on September 6, 2023, the Commissioner expanded the breadth of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1 et seq. by stating that the statutes “permit[] a board of education or municipality to request permission from the Commissioner of Education to form or enlarge a regional school district.
[brief] Prejudice Remains a Viable, Non-Dispositive Component in Assessing Waiver of Arbitration.  Plaintiff incorrectly contends that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in *Morgan v. Sundance*, 596 U.S. 411 (2022), eviscerates the consideration of prejudice when assessing whether a party has waived the right to pursue arbitration of a dispute.  Specifically, Plaintiff argues that, under *Morgan*, prejudice is “immaterial” and “should no longer be considered a factor in assessing whether a party has impliedly waived arbitration through its actions and inaction. ”  [Pb41].  However, in *Marmo & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC*, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024), the court rejected the argument “that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in *Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.*, 596 U.S. 411, 417-19, 142 S.Ct. 1708, 212 L.Ed.2d 753 (2022), eradicates the Cole factor that considers whether the party opposing arbitration was prejudiced by the movant's delay. ”  478 N.J. Super. at 599.  The court stated specifically: “[P]rejudice remains one of the pertinent, but not individually dispositive, Cole factors after Morgan. ”  Id.  Defendants do not contend that prejudice is controlling to the waiver analysis.
[brief] Plaintiffs complained that Defendants only listed [...] as an employee, but not [...], who Plaintiffs said was a prior superintendent.  1T32:14-25 to 33:1-3.  The court instructed Defendants to add to its response that there were no other employees besides [...] and [...], which would fix their response to Request Nos. 7 and 8.  1T33:16-25 to 35:1-25.  In Request No. 10, Plaintiffs requested that if no communications were found in response to No. 9, defendants should indicate what searches were conducted to try and find such documents.
[brief] However, the fact that there may have been more pedestrian safeguards in one area of the parking lot than another did not make it a virtual certainty that this was “an accident waiting to happen. ”  See, Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief at p.36.  While our engineering expert maintains that the lot was redesigned in accordance with all necessary industry standards, mere knowledge that a workplace is dangerous does not equate to an intentional wrong.  Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449 (2012), citing, Millison, supra. at 178.
[brief] By admission, Appellant merely sent a communication via email to Respondent’s counsel.  (Da 110).  Such communication was not in compliance with R. 1:5-2.  Moreover, such communication allegedly pursuant to R. 1:4-8, made demand upon Respondent to forego any claim to the $60,000.00 of funds on deposit with the Superior Court and not limited to the extent of Appellant’s outstanding [...].  Such demand was over-reaching and accordingly was rejected.  Appellant refused to limit demand to the face amount of the [...] and interest accrued thereon.  As Appellant failed to comply with R. 1:5-2 and demanded amounts above and beyond entitlement, the alleged “Safe Harbor” communication was defective on its face.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 provides as follows:  A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission, he (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they, or one or more of them, will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or a solicitation to commit such a crime, or (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime, or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
[brief] Defendant mistakenly claims that his two post-arrest statements made at the [...] should have been suppressed.  First, defendant’s statements during processing were properly admitted for two reasons: (1) he had already waived his Miranda rights; and (2) his statements were volunteered.  As for defendant’s interview room statements, he again waived his rights, the police did not contradict the warnings, and any alleged invocations of the right to counsel were ambiguous.  This Court should thus affirm the trial court’s ruling admitting defendant’s post-arrest statements.
[brief] In 2020, the Legislature specifically passed the Ballot Cure Act, now N.J.S.A. 19:63-17, to ensure that ballots were not rejected because of deficiencies in the vote-by-mail process, and specifically that the ballot was not rejected due to issues with missing or mismatched signatures without giving the voter an opportunity to correct the deficiency.  The statement accompanying A4276 states that, “In the 2019 general election, over 2,100 voters simply did not sign their Certificate of Mail-In Voter, thereby resulting in their votes not counting.  Over 1,500 voters were denied their votes due to signature mismatch. ” (Da36).  The Division’s Guide further states that where a certificate is “missing other required information,” it “shall be referred to the board for its review. ” (Da26).  Clearly, the Legislature did not intend a blank certificate to be wholesale barred as a matter of law, as the Board submits.  Rather, voters are to be given every opportunity to cure deficiencies of this type.  Rejecting [...]’s ballot without giving her an opportunity to cure it is unlawful.  It is even more egregious when she took active steps on her own to cure it herself but was denied that right.  And in the final analysis, this election should not turn on a technical defect by the candidate’s own niece, where she went above and beyond to try to vindicate her right to vote, and where there are no issues affecting the ballot’s chain of custody or secrecy.  Such a ballot should be counted.
[brief] The PCR judge also erred on the second Strickland-Fritz prong.  She reduced [...]’s robust, well-supported argument to “merely opin[ing]” that consulting with and presenting the testimony of an expert “would have promoted greater juror understanding,” which did not “prov[e] to the Court that the proceedings would have a different outcome. ”  (Da364)  First, this was the wrong standard, since a PCR petition is granted when the petitioner has shown “a reasonable probability” that counsel’s deficiencies “materially contributed to defendant's conviction. ”  Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.
[directive] If so, the person is not considered a barricaded individual, and therefore not subject to the procedures outlined in this Policy.2  In addition, an unarmed person who refuses to immediately exit a motor vehicle, room or other area, when instructed to do so by a law enforcement officer, shall not automatically be considered a barricaded individual for purposes of the application of this Policy.  Tactical disengagement may always be considered as an option in these scenarios.  See Section 4.8 of this Policy.
[directive] Policv 3:l is the policy of the Attorney General that each of the state’s twenty-one county It prosecutor’s shall administer property and funds receives as a result of seizures and it forfeitures brought under the authority of N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq., (civil forfeiture), N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et sea., (racketeering) or from actions brought under N.J.S.A. 2C:Zl-25 or seq., et (financial facilitation of crime), under any other statute as directed by the A Attorney General.  county prosecutor shall administer separately federally forfeited property or proceeds distributed to by the United States Department of Justice or it Treasury through a Federal Equitable Sharing Program Agreement, as outlined under Forfeiture Program Administration Standard ODeratina Procedure 01.  3
[brief] While the Court was convinced at the time that there was not a potential for an “aggrandizement of the Council members’ interests as would be repugnant to due process” (Humane Society, 70 N.J. at 579), there is adequate reason to reexamine that conclusion today in the context of Articles III and IV.  Furthermore, since the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice in the context of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss under R.4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim, it should have been more cognizant of the Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Council has acted as an interest group with a pro-hunting bias.
[brief] *Anderson v Liberty Lobby*, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).  Moreover, the court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995).  Here, there were numerous material facts in dispute and contested and credibility issues that precluded the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
[brief] When the claimant seeks less than $1,000 in PIP benefits, the arbitrator “decide[s] the case based solely upon the documentation. ”  Pa0382 ([...] R. 6(b)).  Even if there is a hearing, the parties can present their case “telephonically. ”  Pa0382 ([...] R. 6(a)).  [...]’s quarterly reports show that it handles a large volume of small, relatively simple cases.
[brief] The defense called three witnesses.  [...], an expert in forensic pathology, testified that: (1) he cannot tell the order of shots in the case from the wounds to [...] (28T 20-22 to 23); (2) the shot to the chest was the fatal one because it went through the aorta (28T 20-2 to 19); (3) [...] would have “bled out” and been dead within just two to three minutes (28T 24-15 to 25-5); (4) the bullets’ paths through the body show nothing about the trajectory of the shots because we do not know how the bodies were positioned (28T 33-4 to 14); (5) the medical examiner’s opinion of a six-foot or greater distance because no stippling was found is inaccurate because stippling can be found much closer than six feet, so a minimum two-to-three-foot distance would be a better estimation (28T 27-13 to 29-25); and (6) failing to call 911 for a while had no effect on the treatment of [...] because he would have been dead before help ever arrived even with an immediate call.
[directive] Limitations on the Refunds of Court Filing Fees  Where There is No Subj:  Court Order  This directive outlines a change in the procedure for providing refunds of court filing fees where there is not a court order indicating that a refund should occur.  It replaces and supersedes all previous directives, memorandum and bulletins regarding the refund of filing fees.  It is being issued after review by all of the divisional conferences and the Council.  Administrative  This directive establishes specific criteria and a consistent uniform approach for the refund of filing fees in the Superior Court.
[brief] In 2013, when the [...] corporate office was creating pressure to open at least four (4) locations per year, it was agreed by corporate, [...], [...], and their partners, that [...] would be the perfect location, and, conveniently, the extended leasehold on that property and a liquor --- 2  In its motion, the defense also raised the issue that [...]’s business partner, [...], offered perjured testimony that warranted the “disturbance” of the final judgment, citing Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321 (1952).
[brief] •  [...] did not abuse her discretion in granting Defendants’ request for Plaintiff’s calculations of any loss of income, profits or earnings (Interrogatory Nos. 18 and 19), based on her finding that this “information is directly relevant to Defendants’ stated defenses. ” (Letter Order at 3).  On appeal, Plaintiff does not dispute the Magistrate’s relevancy determination.  (Appeal at 3).  Rather, Plaintiff seems to argue that the scope of the information sought would be unreasonably burdensome, particularly in view of the time allowed to produce such information.  (Id.).  Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that he would “need at least a month and half, if not 2 months, in order to get [the request] completed. ” (Id.).  Accordingly, [...]’s decision to grant Defendants’ request for the calculations of any loss of income, profits, or earnings is affirmed.
[brief] (Pa310).  [...] attempts to impart constructive notice of [...] throughout her report in many ways.  She argues, essentially, that the creation of the 2020 Grant Application/due diligence in creating the application created a duty for [...] to continuously monitor every pothole.  (Pa353-54).  She additionally argues that the condition existed in 2019, which is simply not true - the image produced shows at best a crack in the general area of the fall.  (Pa 376-377).
[brief] In defending the stop and frisk, the prosecutor argues:  “Importantly, it was not just defendant.  There were four males, adding to the dangerousness of the situation and the reasonableness of the suspicion that these males were engaged in illicit criminal activity and not just greeting people on the street. ”  (Sb 3)  The fact that [...] was with a group of three friends was not a basis to view his behavior more suspiciously.  Racial disparities in police decisions to frisk and the disparate treatment that Black people experience when interacting with police are amplified for Black people, especially young Black males, when they are stopped in a group.
[brief] B.  The [...] Partnership Cannot Continue Representing the Defendants  Where one of its Partners is Disqualified  “[M]otion[s] for disqualification call[] for [the court] to balance competing interests, weighing the ‘need to maintain the highest standards of the profession’ against a client’s right freely to choose [their] counsel. ”  Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC, 471 N.J. Super. 184, 192 (App. Div. 2022) (fourth alteration in original) (quoting *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988)).[^2]  “[T]he court maintains an independent interest in assuring that conflict-free representation occurs, since the existence of conflict undermines the integrity of the court” and exposes it to “unjustified attacks over the fairness of the proceedings. ”  *State v. Davis*, 366 N.J. Super. 30, 38 (App. Div. 2004) (citing *State in the Int. of S.G.*, 175 N.J. 132, 140 (2003)).  Litigants “are entitled to retain qualified counsel of their own choice, [but] there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.
[brief] 18.  a.  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?  [Yes]  [No]  b.  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if New Jersey has required you to register as a sex offender?  [Yes]  [No]  19.  Have you discussed with your attorney the legal doctrine of merger?  [Yes]  [No]  [NA]  20.  Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges you pleaded guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?
[brief] New Jersey courts have also recognized constitutional rights as personal rights rather than property rights.  See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 145 (1987) ("This Court has frequently resorted to our own State Constitution in order to afford our citizens broader protection of certain personal rights than that afforded by analogous or identical provisions of the federal Constitution. ”) (internal citations omitted); Matter of Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264 (1981) (“[T]he constitutional right of reproductive autonomy is a right personal to the individual.
[brief] C. D/B/A [...], D/B/A [...], D/B/A [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], D/B/A [...] D/B/A [...]; [...], ONE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - MIDDLESEX COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C [...] D/B/A ) NEW JERSEY VEIN TREATMENT ) CLINIC; ONE OAK TREATMENT ) CLINIC; ONE OAK ORTHOPAEDIC & ) SPINE GROUP L.L.C.; ONE OAK )  HOLDING L.L.C.; JOSEPH BUFANO ) JR., D.C.; [...]; )  [...] D.C.; RICHARD ) MILLS, M.D.; [...] ) ESQ.; [...], D.O.; )  [...], D.O.; JOSE ) CAMPOS, M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...], D.O.; [...], D.O.; [...], M.D., [...], M.D.; [...] M.D.; [...] M.D.; [...], M.D.; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 10; XYZ CORPORATIONS  1 THROUGH 10, Defendants.  ____________________________________
[brief] The defense presented the testimony of one of them, the passenger, [...].  [...] testified that during the shooting he was able to clearly see both the driver and passenger in the Corolla, and neither one had been either [...] or [...].  (14T 38-13 to 21; 14T 41-3 to 42-4)  The parties entered into a stipulation that (1) both of the guns were operable and (2) all bullet casings, discharged bullets and cartridges found in this case had been fired from the Smith & Wesson firearm.  (13T 5-5 to 6-20)
[brief] Civil Action On Appeal from Initial Decision dated August 15, 2022, under OAL Docket No. [...] and upheld by [...] on September 16, 2022  Sat below: Hon. [...], ALJ Brief and Appendix of Appellant  [...] Szaferman  Lakind Blumstein & Blader [...] [...]; [...]  (fax)  [...]  [...], Esquire ID #024611995  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS COVER PAGE ..................................................
[brief] (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers about dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the [...], the [...], and the [...].
[directive] [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)]  Page 1 of 7  The Grand Jury is an independent legal institution.  It functions under our Constitution as the representative of the community.  It is an arm of the court, not part of the prosecutor’s office.  The Grand Jury does not assist the prosecutor.  The prosecutor assists the Grand Jury.  Individual grand jurors are not permitted to conduct an independent investigation of the alleged charges, such as visiting the crime scene.  However, you are not limited in your investigations to matters brought to your attention by the prosecutor.  As a group, and as determined by a majority of the grand jurors present, you may decide that conditions exist that warrant investigation because you believe a crime has been committed.  In that connection, you are empowered to require the production of evidence, to compel witnesses to appear before you, and to return indictments if the evidence justifies that action.  The prosecuting attorney is available to advise you on legal questions and, if necessary, you may request additional instructions from the court.  You may act only on the basis of the evidence you receive.  You are not to return an indictment unless the State has presented evidence which together with the reasonable inferences you draw from that evidence, leads you to conclude that (1) a crime has been committed and (2) the accused has committed it.  Furthermore, when determining whether to return an indictment, you should not consider the potential punishment in the event of a conviction.  The Grand Jury must ensure that no person is subjected to a criminal charge unless there is an adequate basis for it.  It is only when you have received such evidence that an indictment may be returned.
[brief] 4T, 34:17-39:20, 91:23-95:6, 105:5-106:6, 131:4-25, 137:10-138:22, 138:23-143:5, 149:2-151:7; 1008a, 18:8-20:21; 1008a, 20:25-22:9; 1013a, 39:5-20; 1013a, 40:18-42:18; 1014a, 43:7-13; 1014a, 44:23-45:12; 1015a, 48:12-20; 1015a, 49:15-50:13; 1016a, 53:10-54:17.  Any person or entity owning the land could have developed the property.  That is the uncontroverted testimony of [...] and [...].  Under the correct standard of reasonable certainty, a Plaintiff’s inability to fix its lost profits with precision will not preclude recovery of damages.
[brief] The trial court concluded that the Appellate Division, in *Flynn v. Sevastakis*, 2006 WL 664180 (App. Div. Mar. 17, 2006), was faced squarely with the opportunity to reject, as a matter of law, the concept of pay-when-able loans under New Jersey law, but the Appellate Division did not do so.  Da38.  In arriving at this conclusion, [...] analyzed the facts and holding of *Flynn*, in which the grantor of a loan stated to the grantee, “Get it back to us when you can. ”  Da37 (quoting *Flynn* 2006 WL 664180 at *1).  Flynn sought \(^{18}\)Recognizing the absence of binding, definitive published authority concluding that pay-when-able loans are enforceable in New Jersey, the trial court, citing R. 1:36-3, engaged in an analysis of the relevant case law addressing the issue, as did [...] and [...] in ruling on Defendants’ prior unsuccessful dispositive motions in this action.