ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  The Civil Service Commission considered [...]’s prior disciplinary record and reversed [...]’s removal and instead imposed a 30 day suspension.  See Carter v. South Woods State Prison, OAL Dkt No. CSCV6415-00, AGEN. REF. NO. 2006-3914 (Decided September 11, 2003)(In its discussion as to whether to terminate [...] for purposely “misrepresented and falsified his employment application,” the ALJ reinstated [...] to his post noting that another officer, identified as “[...]” was also not removed from his position even though he was accused of “falsifying his hours and stealing money from the prison. ”).  [...]’s disciplinary record only consists of a written warning and counseling for one incident.  It is disparate and patently unjust that [...] should be so severely disciplined while others who are similarly situated have had absolutely no repercussions – disciplinary or otherwise.  [...] performed his assigned duties on the evening of August 16 through August 17, 2019 according to the practices and protocols that existed at that time at the [...].  These were the same practices and protocols followed by officers during the third shift.  Despite each following these protocols, only [...] was investigated and, ultimately, punished.  It is clear from the evidence presented that a number of persons failed to perform their duties that evening – and even well before.  The window was broken which was known to all.  [...] threatened to escape which was not communicated to [...] or anyone else in the evening shift.  [...] saw [...] on the outside and said nothing.  The video showed that [...] had also abandoned his post.  However, as a result of [...] looking for a scapegoat for [...]’s actions, [...] received disparate punishment.
[brief] Laches & Equitable Estoppel Must Preclude Plaintiff’s Requested Relief**  From January 30, 2020, the date the bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint against Plaintiff to disgorge the mortgage payments on the first mortgage through the filing of the foreclosure complaint on August 4, 2023, Plaintiff took no steps to vacate the discharge of mortgage and reinstate the mortgage.  Instead, Plaintiff is now seeking to foreclose on a discharged mortgage that is null and void.  See Wells Fargo Bank, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1130, at *11 (Pa46).
[brief] | Appendix document | Appendix page number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Complaint, filed June 24, 2020 | Pa1 | | Answer, filed July 30, 2020 | Pa8 | | Order for Hybrid Civil Jury Trial, filed August 31, 2023 | Pa16 | | Plaintiff Photographs of scene admitted in evidence at trial as P-1 through P-4 | Pa22 | | Plaintiff Photographs of injuries admitted in evidence at trial as P-17 through P-21 | Pa26 | | Plaintiff’s Notice in Lieu of Subpoena to Produce Evidence at Trial | Pa31 | | Defendant’s Incident/Damage Report marked for Identification at trial as P-25 and precluded by trial court at trial | Pa33 | | Defendant’s Color Photographs of scene precluded by trial court at trial | Pa36 | | Defendant’s engineering expert report | Pa38 | | Verdict Sheet | Pa49 | | Order of Disposition, filed October 13, 2023 | Pa51 | | Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to R. 4:49-1, filed October 26, 2023 | Pa52 | | Plaintiff’s Certification in Lieu of Affidavit | | Pursuant To R. 1:4-4(b)  In Support of Motion For a New Trial Pursuant to R. 4:49-1  Plaintiff’s Brief and Appendix in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for A New Trial Pursuant to R. 4:49-1  Plaintiff’s Proof of Service of Motion for a New Trial  Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial, filed November 24, 2023  Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in Reply to Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion For a New Trial, filed November 27, 2023  Order Denying Motion for a New Trial, filed December 01, 2023  Notice of Appeal, filed December 13, 2023  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery, filed January 23, 2024  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery, filed January 31, 2024  Notice of Docketing, filed December 15, 2023  *Included in Appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2) as referenced, relied upon and attached within the trial briefs are exhibits which were not admitted in evidence at trial (defendant’s interrogatories, incident report and two color photographs depicting scene after mopping and placement of slip hazard sign) and are referred to by the trial court in its rulings and decision and are integral to the issues raised on appeal.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] A.  [The SHO shall]  [c]onduct a hearing on public notice as to all aspects of the application for the purpose of rendering a recommendation to the Court as to whether the Court should enter an Order and Judgment approving, denying, or approving with conditions the site plan (and, as necessary, subdivision) application; B.  The Site Plan Application was to be deemed a fully conforming “as of right” application in accordance with the existing [...] standards for development in the HD and VC-2 Overlay Zones, coupled with the Use Variance and Bulk Variance approvals granted to [...] by the terms of this [October 2020] Order.  The Special Hearing Officer shall review the site plan application and shall grant preliminary and final site plan (and, if/as necessary, subdivision) approval, with or without conditions, unless the Special Hearing Officer concludes that the site plan application is clearly contrary to sound land use planning principles or environmental concerns.  Compliance with Residential Site Improvement Standards (“RSIS”) shall be dispositive as to all residential design elements governed by the RSIS; C.  [...] shall include nonresidential components as part of their site plan proposal before the Special Hearing Officer, and on notice to the [...], [...], the Special Master and the Special Hearing Officer.  Upon approval by the Court, the nonresidential components will be included in such relief as may be granted by this Court upon recommendation of the Special Hearing Officer; F.
[directive] ); camera, room interview stationhouse camera, worn body camera, confession; admission ❑ an made defendant the whether recorded electronically defendant was the by statement ❑ admission any whether stationhouse camera, worn body camera, dash e.g., recording, of type the (specifying etc.); camera, room interview type the (specifying recording electronic an on captured was ❑ conduct offense the whether cell witness's camera, surveillance camera, worn body camera, dash e.g., recording, of etc.); camera, phone show procedure, e.g., of the type (specifying used were procedures ❑ identification whether etc.); line-up, array, photo up, victim/witness; of the acquaintance or stranger ❑ a is suspect the whether whether the known, and when injury the of extent the injured, was victim a whether services; medical declined or hospital the to taken was victim any; ❑ if involved, weapon of type the e.g., evidence, of (specifying type recovered or seized was ❑ evidence physical any whether tool burglars merchandise, stolen cash, weapons, contraband, other paraphernalia, drugs, instrumentalities); or implements other or marijuana, crack, cocaine, heroin, (e.g., substance dangerous ❑ controlled of type etc.
[directive] This factor is patterned after § 3B1.2 in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, and is intended to apply only to defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.  The defendant’s lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the criminal enterprise and the activities of others is highly relevant in determining the applicability of this factor.  A defendant who distributes drugs to ultimate consumers, or who used or threatened the use of violence, would not be classified as either a minimal or minor participant and is not entitled to points under this Mitigating Factor.  The point value for this Mitigating Factor ranges from -2 to -3, depending upon the nature of the defendant’s role and his or her contributions to the operations of the criminal scheme.  Note that this factor presupposes that the defendant was acting in concert with others who are more culpable.  A mitigating point value of -3 is reserved for defendants who are only minimal participants in the drug-distribution scheme and who played no other role than to off-load part of a drug shipment, who served as a courier or “mule”for a single or isolated smuggling transaction, or who served as a “lookout” to warn other, more culpable drug distributors of the impending approach of law enforcement officers.  The -3 point award is not appropriate if the defendant’s role as a courier or “off-loader” was on a repetitive or persistent basis, or where any payments received by the defendant for the criminal conduct constituted a primary or substantial source of the defendant’s livelihood.  Nor are prosecutors authorized to award -3 points if the defendant while serving as a lookout provided notice of the approach of a law enforcement officer who was injured as a direct or indirect result of any such warning signal.  Page 81
[brief] [153A]  In order to meet its obligations to provide a total of twenty-nine (29) affordable units, the redeveloper decided to take advantage of the language in both the redevelopment agreement and land use approval which allowed seven of the units to be located off site.  [114A].  In furtherance of its plan, the redeveloper purchased property located at [...], also known as [...].  [359A]  The Deed to the property reflects that it was transferred to the redeveloper on March 19, 2019.  Id.  The lot the redeveloper purchased is a triangular shaped parcel in the CBD-15, central business district zone.  [211A]  The lot is undersized for the zone at 9,245 square feet where 15,000 square feet are required and further has insufficient lot depth of 40.8 feet where 75 feet is required.  Id.  The redeveloper later filed an application with the [...] seeking to construct seven (7) affordable housing units on the property.
[directive] 오늘부터 시작하여 개월에서 기간 동안 정지된다는 것을 알리기 위한 추가적으로, 귀하는N.J.S.A. 39:3-  이 정지 기간 동안 귀하가 직접 자동차를 운전한 죄로 유죄 판결을 받는 경우, 40 에 규정된 다음의 처벌을 받게 됩니다:  This is to inform you that, as a person convicted of Eluding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, your driver’s license is suspended for a period of [6 months to 2 years], effective today.  In addition, if during the period of suspension you are convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle, you will be subject to the penalties set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:3-40:  첫 번째 위반으로 유죄 판결을 받을 때, 벌금 $500; Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500; 두 번째 위반으로 유죄 판결을 받을 때, 벌금 및 최소 일 이상 일 이하의 카운티 구치소에 $750 1 5 구류;  Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750, and imprisonment in the county jail for at least 1 day but not more than 5 days; 세 번째 또는 그 이후 위반으로 유죄 판결을 받을 때, 벌금 및 일 간 카운티 구치소에 구류.  $1,000  10  Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days.  이외에도, 특정한 상황에서, 첫 번째, 두 번째, 세 번째 또는 차후의  위반에 대해 유죄 판결을 받는 경우, 귀하의 자동차 등록 특권이 취소되고/되거나  운전 면허 정지 기간이 추가될 수도 있습니다.  In addition, under certain circumstances, conviction for a first, second, third or subsequent offense could result in revocation of your motor vehicle registration privilege and/or an additional period of your driver’s license suspension.  또한 귀하는 위와 같은 결과에 대해 판사가 공개
[brief] The Committee’s initial designation of the Property as being in need of rehabilitation was never contested or challenged.  proceeding specifically governed by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10g.  New York SMSA, supra, 370 N.J. Super.  at 332-33.  Such statute has no application whatsoever to this case.  When a quasi-judicial hearing is held before a municipal agency, the statute requires the agency to include written findings of fact and conclusions of law in each decision on an application for development.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10g.  However, the governing body is not a “municipal agency” and neither the statute (i.e., N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10g) nor any other law or regulation requires the governing body to deliberate and make or reduce to writing formal findings when enacting an ordinance.  The Committee’s adoption of Ordinance 2022-15 and Ordinance 2022-17 were discretionary legislative acts entitled to the presumption of validity.
[brief] On March 16, 2020, [...] issued Executive Order 104 which suspended in-person K-12 education, suspended operations of certain business “where large numbers of individuals gather in close proximity” and put into place certain social distancing measures.  Again, [...] reiterated the serious health risks associated with COVID-19.  On March 21st, just days after Plaintiff’s termination, [...] issued Executive Order No. 107, the Stay-at-Home Order.  This Stay at Home Order expanded the shut down and provided, in part, that “all businesses …in the State, whether closed or open to the public, must accommodate their workforce, wherever practicable, for telework or work from home arrangements” and “should make their best efforts to reduce staff on site to the minimal number necessary to ensure that essential operations can continue. ”  Undoubtedly, there was a public policy favoring strong COVID-19 mitigation measures during the height of the pandemic.  Based upon what was being reported to the public, the CDC guidance and the aforementioned Executive Orders, Plaintiff held a reasonable belief that Defendants were required to implement safety protocols not only to protect their employees, but to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public at large.
[brief] ”  See, e.g., Db4, 19–20 (discussing same without mentioning excessiveness).  Rather, the Department tacitly agrees that it was the ALJ and the Commissioner who gave excessiveness as a post hoc basis for disapproval.  See, e.g., Db2, 5.  The Department seeks to minimize its after-the-fact rationalization by characterizing it as a “lack of formality” and “organiz[ation,]” and an issue of “form over substance. ”  Db28, 29, 31.  But, as [...] showed, “[p]rohibiting post hoc rationalization for agency action is not merely a technical legal requirement. ”  Pb18.  It “is a matter of substance. ”  N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 5 N.J. 354, 375 (1950).  Elementary due process demands that a party “know the issues on which decision will turn and [] be apprised of the factual material on which the agency relies for decision so that [it] may rebut it.
[brief] ..10, 14  Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S. Ct. 513, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000) ................................................................. 21 Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 111 F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 10 Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archis & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 202 L. Ed. 2d 480 (January 8, 2019) ......................................................... 14, 15, 18 Holland v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2016 WL 6156187 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2016) ........................................................................................................ 23 Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 Fed. Appx. 191 (3d Cir. 2012) .................... 21 Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1992) ............ 27 Jade Apparel, Inc. v. United Assurance, Inc., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2250, 2016 WL 5939470 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) ................. 22 James v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786, 2015 WL 720195 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ...................................................... 24 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 1998) ........................................................................................................ 11, 12 Kai Peng v. Uber Techs., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) ............ 16 Kuehn v. Citibank, N.A., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173346, 2012 WL 6057941 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2012) ................................................................. 16 Livonia Prop. Holdings, LLC v. 12840012976 Farmington Rd. Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 724 (D. Mich. 2010) .............................................. 25 Lyon v. Kull Auto Sales, Inc., 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 133, 2017 WL 344438 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) ............................................. 22 Maisano v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2421 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 27, 2019) ....................................................... 16, 17, 22 Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993)
[brief] [...] explained that “[w]orking with databases containing the fingerprints of more than 47 million individuals (i.e., more than 470 million separate prints), [...] is designed to find not only the source of the print (if it is in the database), but also the closest possible nonmatches. ”  Id. at 137 (emphasis added).  Although the [...] maintains that each person’s fingerprints are unique, it conceded that at the very least, some “may be sufficiently close to confuse an examiner dealing with a latent of imperfect clarity. ”  Ibid.  Unfortunately for the reliability of a field that often relies on database searches to initiate an investigation, a “search of a huge database is designed to find those prints most likely to confuse an examiner. ”  Ibid.  The [...] cautioned that “[t]he likelihood of encountering a misleadingly close non-match through an [...] search is therefore far greater than in a comparison of a latent print with the known prints of a suspect whose connection to a case was developed through an investigation. ”  Ibid.  See also ibid.  (“[...] is designed to find not only the source of the print (if it is in the database), but also the closest possible non-matches. ”).  This critical question of the reliability of fingerprint analysis that stems from a database search was not addressed in the two studies [...] relied on to find that latent print analysis had some foundational validity (“albeit with a false positive rate that is substantial and is likely to be higher than expected by many jurors based on longstanding claims about the infallibility of fingerprint analysis”).  [...] Report at 101.  In other words, there has been very meager testing of the reliability of this kind of fingerprint analysis.
[brief] \(^1\)  The trial court noted that if the jury were to find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was defendant on the video and used a handgun to shoot the victim in the face, it would be reasonable “to infer from those actions alone, that his intent was either to kill or to seriously injure. ” (2T57:22-58:3).  The court also found that if the jurors determined it was defendant in the video, “and that [defendant] had a handgun . . . then they could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he unlawfully possessed the handgun. ” (1T58:4-7).  The court appropriately found:  At this point applying the standard that I must, giving the State all favorable inferences, which could reasonably be drawn from the evidence that they presented, I do find that a reasonable jury could conclude that it is [...] on the video and that he did use the handgun to shoot [...] in the face.  As the statement from [...] indicates, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, and I am adding now my own characterization, whether that evidence is loosely woven together or more tightly woven together is a question of weight rather than admissibility.  Unwoven gets a [...] motion granted.  I cannot find here that the State has not provided sufficient evidence.  What a jury will do with it, I don’t know.  Motion for acquittal is denied.  [(2T58:20-59:9)].  \(^{1}\)  The parties agreed to a stipulation that defendant did not have a permit to carry a handgun at the time.  (2T43:7-23).  Surveillance video was played at trial, which showed an individual with a red lips tattoo on the side of his neck brandishing a handgun towards the victim moments before the victim is shot.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Appellate review "of Family Part orders is limited."  *Gormley v. Gormley*, 227 A.3d 851, 856 (App. Div. 2019).  Only when the trial judge's findings are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice" is reversal warranted.  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting *Fagliarone v. Township of N. Bergen*, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)).  "This standard applies equally to the Trial Court's decisions regarding alimony [and] child support."  *Lombardi v. Lombardi*, 447 N.J. Super. 26, 33 (App. Div. 2016) (citations omitted).  In *Guglielmo v. Guglielmo*, 253 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div. 1992), the court held:  The law grants particular leniency to agreements made in the domestic arena, and likewise allows judges greater discretion when interpreting such agreements.  See *N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23*.  Such discretion lies in the principle that although marital agreements are contractual in nature, "contract principles have little place in the law of domestic relations."  *Lepis v. Lepis*, 83 N.J. 139, 148, 416 A.2d 45 (1980).  The court's role is to consider what is written in the context of the circumstances at the time of drafting and to apply a rational meaning in keeping with the "expressed general purpose."  *Pacifico v. Pacifico*, 190 N.J. 258 (2007), citing *Northern* Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302 (1953); accord Dontzin v. Myer, 301 N.J. Super. 501, 507, (App.Div.1997).
[directive] You are receiving this letter because your organization currently receives funds from the [...] ([...]) under the Community-Based Violence Intervention (CBVI) grant program as a tertiary violence intervention service provider.  Shortly after I exercised my supersession authority as Attorney General to take over the [...], in May 2023, I convened the Multidisciplinary Public Safety Innovation Working Group (the “Working Group”) to help strengthen and improve public safety across New Jersey.  This spring, the Working Group submitted its final report (the “Report”) to the Office of Attorney General.  Today, I issued the Working Group’s Final Report, along with Guidelines for Law Enforcement Agencies (the “Guidance”).  A copy of both the Report and the Guidance are available at njoag.gov/cvi-le-guidance.  This letter is intended to provide guidance to relevant8 [...]-funded CBVI organizations pursuant to my issuance of the Report.  Your organization and the work you do is a critical part of the success in reduction in violence that we are currently seeing, and you continue to help make New Jersey one of the safest states in the country.
[brief] (1T:141-9 to 143-14).  [...] testified that he could do so by letting defendant use what is called bank numbers at the Prosecutor’s Office but from his experience, people usually do not pick up these calls because they do not show as being from a specific person.  Ibid.  The alternative would be to use his personal or work cell phone but he did not want people having his number because they would continuously call him regarding the status of their loved-ones.  Ibid.  [...] reiterated that the bank number of the Prosecutor’s Office is usually not answered because it does not come back to the office.  Ibid.  [...] further testified that he did not have the capability to give defendant a private call but he informed him that the calls would be recorded.  Ibid.  [...] also testified that defendant agreed to speak with his parents in his presence.  Ibid.  Counsel acknowledged that [...] did not question defendant but he asked if he was cognizant that if he continued to speak with defendant and was friendly toward him, defendant would make statements regarding the case.