ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] These shall be filed by corresponding and be case number and shall reference the requesting agency cross readily available for review.  Any requests for distribution which have , been denied shall have an explanation for denial and the such signature of the county prosecutor or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, depending on prosecuting the civil forfeiture who is case-  Failure  Submit Form to Prosecutinq to A Aqencv 7:3 a  A  Any law enforcement agency that fails to submit Form within days of the 90 seizure shall be precluded from receiving a contributive share when distribution of the forfeited property apportioned by the prosecuting agency.
[brief] On May 23, 2024, the Appellate Division Clerk’s Office sent Defendants a letter regarding the finality of the order being appealed, providing Defendants until June 7 to either explain the finality of the April 4 Order, withdraw the appeal, or move for leave to file an interlocutory appeal and to file the same as within time.  Da71–72.  On June 11, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  Da73.  Defendants argued that leave should be granted in the interest of justice because, given the trial court’s without-prejudice dismissal of the Complaint, its April 4 Order would effectively become unreviewable absent further action from Plaintiff resulting in a final, appealable order.  Da78–79.  This untenable situation, Defendants argued, would place their ability to seek statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees solely in the hands of Plaintiff. Da79.  Defendants further argued that their appeal presented novel questions of law, namely, whether a plaintiff can escape liability for attorneys’ fees under UPEPA by unilaterally terminating a suit at the eleventh hour.  Id.  On June 24, 2024, this Court granted Defendants’ motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
[brief] [...] is the owner of [...] DMD, PC.  On July 23, 2020, Feder was driving a car owned by the company, and was involved in an accident.  (Pa60).  Although it is undisputed that at one point the car had been insured under a policy issued by [...] (Pa15), Defendant [...] maintains that on December 13, 2019, it had issued a Cancellation Notice, and that the cancellation had gone into effect prior to the accident.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page(s)  Table of Appendix.................................................................iii  Confidential Appendix Volume........................................iv  Note from Dr.  Michael Benke dated April 15, 2020, P. 1ac Table Authorities..................................................................v (See Transcript of Testimony, Citations are in the brief) Table of Order Being Appealed...........................................vi Statement of Facts................................................................1, 2, 3 Procedural History...............................................................4, 5 Legal Argument.....................................................................6 - 20 POINT I - The Decision Of The Acting Chairperson Of The Civil Service Commission Was Arbitrary Capricious And Unreasonable..............6 - 8 (EXHIBIT 5, P. 30a) POINT II - The [...] Did Not Produce Any Proof That [...] Abandoned His Job.........................................................9 – 16 (EXHIBIT 4, P. 15, 16) (EXHIBIT 10, Summation of [...] to [...], P. 1, first paragraph) POINT III - The [...] Unreasonably Denied [...] His Leave Of Absence.................................................................17 - 20 (EXHIBIT 4, P. 10a and EXHIBIT 2, P. 3a) Conclusion..................................................................................................................21 TABLE OF APPENDIX EXHIBIT 1 Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (1a and 2a of Appendix)
[directive] Section 19(f) of the CJRA offers a path for potential relief under the present circumstances.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f).  Under that provision, individual defendants can apply to reopen detention hearings if they can present information that was not known at the time of the initial hearing and “has a material bearing” on the release decision.  that Ibid.  We hold that the unexpected duration of the pandemic coupled with the continued suspension of jury trials, with no clear end date for either, constitutes new information within the meaning of the statute.
[brief] Similarly, the purpose of the terroristic threats statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3, is to prosecute certain verbal acts—even if not accompanied by physical acts—to deter, for example, verbal threats to kill another person.  But if a defendant verbally threatens to kill a victim while simultaneously shooting the victim, the sentence for terroristic threats does not need to be consecutive to the sentence for attempted murder to give meaning to the terroristic threats statute.  The terroristic threats statute ensures that dangerous verbal threats will be punished when there is no attempt to physically harm the victim, but where there is physical harm to the victim, the sentence punishing the physical harm is sufficient to accomplish the Legislature’s objectives.
[brief] REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT  [...], Esq. (020812008)  Law Office of [...], LLC [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...]  June 24, 2024 # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Contents | i | | Table of Authorities | ii | | Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings | iii | | Table of Appendix | iv | | Table of Confidential Appendix | v | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Facts/Procedural History | 1 | | Legal Argument | 4 |
[brief] The plaintiff also has continued to claim that defendant received her $SSK Mercedes yet no documents were produced as to the proceeds of sale after an alleged accident damaged the vehicle nor were sufficient proofs that defendant received those proceeds.  Defendant has denied she ever received those proceeds which this court found was the reason that the Lexus was eventually purchased by plaintiff for her.  Plaintiff's testimony as to the Lexus was found to be incredible and the court shall not repeat its findings in its opinion at length herein.  The court finds plaintiff acted in bad faith to such a degree that even his partial success on the merits should not entitle him to a fee shift.
[brief] (Ia337).  [...]’s application requested general liability coverage in the aggregate amount of $2,000,000, as well as “Optional Coverage[ ]” for “Non-Owned Hired Auto Coverage” in the amount of $1,000,000.  (Ia122-126).  The application informed [...] that [...] was seeking Non-Owned Hired Auto coverage for an overnight camp running from August 6, 2019, just one week away, to August 27, 2019, and consisting of fifty (50) campers and five (5) staff members.  (Id.).  The application revealed [...]’s 2019 summer camp activities, which included sporting events at “local parks,” as well as other “[o]ffsite activities” like “Motor Boating, Ziplining, Ropes course, Paintball shooting and Swimming etc. ” (Id).  On July 31, 2019, [...] sent [...] an email informing her that, if [...] wished to obtain the $1,000,000 in Non-Owned/Hired Auto coverage, [...] would have to complete a Non-Owned/Hired Auto Questionnaire (“Questionnaire”).  (Ia124).  Despite having received [...]’s application seeking Non-Owned/Hired Auto coverage for an overnight summer camp with approximately fifty-five (55) campers and staff that would be engaging in, among other things, “[o]ffsite activities,” [...]’s email to [...] did not reference or discuss 12-15 passenger vans, or otherwise mention that such high-capacity passenger vehicles would be excluded from, or ineligible for, coverage.
[brief] The Boundary Commission.  In an effort to fully resolve the dispute over the boundary line with the [...], the [...] instituted this legal action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1 (Pa1).  The trial court ordered the appointment of Boundary Commissioners without opposition from the [...].  See Court Order, Pa55.  The Boundary Commissioners tendered their Report to the Court in November 2022.  See Boundary Commissioners’ Report, Pa105.  The [...] applied to set aside the Report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3.
[brief] ”  *Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc.*, 350 N.J. Super. 276, 293 (App. Div. 2001).  In other words, a plaintiff is required to establish “evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive. ”  *Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 284 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App. Div. 1995).  Circumstantial evidence may include “[t]he temporal proximity of employee conduct protected by CEPA and an adverse employment action,” *Maimone v. City of Atl. City*, 188 N.J. 221, 225 (2006), but “[t]emporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation,” *Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn*, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 361 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] Specifically, the FHA Act states:  a.  The department shall study the nature and extent of the areas affected by flooding in the State.  After public hearing upon notice, and pursuant to the “Administrative Procedure Act,” P.L.1968, c. 410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.), the department shall adopt rules and regulations which delineate as flood hazard areas such areas as, in the judgment of the department, the improper development and use of which would constitute a threat to the safety, health, and general welfare from flooding.  These delineations shall identify the various subportions of the flood hazard area for reasonable and proper use according to relative risk, including the delineation of floodways necessary to preserve the flood carrying capacity of natural streams.  The department shall, within the limits of funds appropriated or otherwise made available therefor, update delineations of flood hazard areas as appropriate as provided in subsection b. of this section.  The department shall update its delineations of flood hazard areas at least once every 15 years and shall prioritize the preparation of updates based upon flood risk.  The department may, after public hearing upon notice and pursuant to the “Administrative Procedure Act,” revoke, amend, alter, or modify such regulations if in its judgment the public interest so warrants.
[brief] (Da034, eCourts Case Jacket Transaction ID: [...]).  Defendants prepared and filed their sur-reply.  (Da035, eCourts Case Jacket Transaction ID: [...]).  Oral argument took place on April 1, 2021.  (Da034, eCourts Case Jacket Transaction ID: [...]).  Trial Court [...] denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (known at the “SAC” in Plaintiff’s brief and sometimes hereinafter below) and denied Plaintiff leave to file any further motions to amend.
[directive] c.  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney [No/Nie] [Yes/Tak] about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), ze ma Pan(i) prawo do skorzystania z indywidualnej konsultacji z adwokatem w sprawie wplywu przyznania siy do winy na Pana(i) status imigracyjny?
[brief] ’”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Yet, that is what the trial court did here.  In State v Cope, this Court held that a trial court cannot bar the admission of testimony critical to a defendant’s case on the basis that the court does not find the defense plausible.  In *Cope*, the defendant was charged with possession of a weapon.  In a notarized statement, one of the defendant’s employees stated that the weapon was his.  *Id.* at 540-41.  The trial court barred the admission of this statement because the court believed it to be “factually impossible. ”  *Ibid.*  This Court held that the trial court erred in substituting its judgment for the jury’s:  “the issue is not whether the court believed [the witness’s] testimony exculpated defendant, but whether his prospective testimony before the jury would have presented ‘a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State’s case. ’”  *Id.* at 554.  Knowing that a person whose fingerprint was found on the getaway car was selling a different brand of the same drug as the person murdered has a rational tendency to engender reasonable doubt.  As the trial court noted, vendors of different brands want their brand to do more business than the other.  It’s a commonsense notion.  Just as in *Cope*, the trial court here erred by keeping from the jury evidence it did not personally believe exculpated [...].  The defense did not have to *prove* that [...] was in a business rivalry with [...].  It just had to demonstrate a rational connection that would suggest such a rivalry.  After that demonstration was made, the jury should have been given all of the facts in their assessment of [...]’s guilt.  Perhaps if [...]’s fingerprint had not been on the car, his relevance could have been dismissed.  But the trial court understood that [...] was relevant and that is why the court let some information about his arrest be elicited.  Giving the jury only part of that information was illogical, an abuse of discretion, and is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Macon, 57 N.J. at 336.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] Since addresses none of these arguments in her Brief, she should be precluded from later arguing them.  Graves, 267 N.J. Super. 445.  Should this Court consider the merits of the Trial Court’s ruling, it is clear that the ruling is consistent with New Jersey law.  Starting with the Declaratory Judgment count, consistent with Longobardi, the Trial Court correctly ordered Appellant to forfeit those insurance benefits that she received based on her individual misrepresentations but instead must forfeit all of the policy proceeds that she received.  This outcome is consistent with the laws of many other states.  *See i.e.*, *Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 126 Wash App 510, 108 P3d 1273, 1276-77 (2005) (policy voided at time of insured's misrepresentations but insurer entitled to return of all claim payments, including those made before misrepresentations were made), *Perovich v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.*, 401 F2d 145, 146 (9th Cir 1968) (applying California law) (in light of insured's misrepresentations, insurer entitled to recover all payments made under the policy); *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Apted*, 18 Fed App'x 624, 626 (9th Cir 2001) (applying Alaska law) (because policy was voided by insured's misrepresentations, insurer entitled to reimbursement as a matter of law); *Tyler v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.*, 255 Mont 174, 841 P2d 538, 541 (1992) (insurer entitled to recover all payments where policy was voided by insured's fraud); *Schneer v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 767 So 2d 485, 490 (Fla Dist Ct App 2000) (insurer entitled to restitution of all claim payments after policy was voided by insured's misrepresentations); *Martin v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Mich.*, No. 275261, 2008 WL 1807940 *2-3 (Mich Ct App Apr 22, 2008) (reversing trial court's determination that policy was divisible between personal property, living expenses, and dwelling claims because anti-fraud provision clearly stated the "entire policy is void"); *Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tavernaro*, 4 F Supp 2d 868, 871 (E.D. Mo 1998) (insurer entitled to restitution for monies paid to mortgagee bank after policy was found void for misrepresentation); *Quintin v. Miller*, 138 Vt 487, 417 A2d 941, 943
[brief] ”  Pb18–19 (citation omitted).  Yet, as the Department concedes, it was the “disapproval letters . . . [that] put [...] on notice of the Department’s reasons for disapproval of the premium rate increase requests. ”  Db29 (emphasis added).  That is dispositive because those letters gave no notice that the Department deemed the rates “excessive. ”  See supra p. 2; Pb19–20.
[brief] The trial court thoroughly erred in holding that [...] pled actual malice as to the [...].  [...] fails to allege any facts evidencing that any of the [...] acted with knowledge their statements were false, or “entertaining serious doubts as to the truth” of those statements.  Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 392, (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).  To the contrary, just like the plaintiff in Neuwirth, [...] offers only boilerplate recitations of legal conclusions, and a handful of factual allegations that our highest courts have held do not constitute actual malice as a matter of law.  Indeed, the few allegations in the Complaint that do concern the [...]’ state of mind (see below) improperly lump these distinct defendants together, see Da_023-026, underlining how conclusory [...]’s pleadings ultimately are.  Because the Complaint falls far short of “clearly alleg[ing] facts supporting” the element of actual malice as to any of the [...], Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 391, their motions to dismiss under Rule 4.6-2(e) should have been granted.
[brief] R. 1:12–2 provides “[a]ny party, on motion made to the judge before trial or argument and stating the reasons therefor, may seek that judge's disqualification. ”  A motion for recusal may be granted for any “reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ”  R. 1:12–1(g).  Recusal motions are “entrusted to the sound discretion of the judge and are subject to review for abuse of discretion. ”  Goldfarb v. Solimine, 460 N.J. Super. 22, 30 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting *State v. McCabe*, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010)).  The court reviews de novo whether the judge applied the proper legal standard.  *Id.*  Judges must step aside from “proceedings in which their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. ”  *Code of Judicial Conduct* Rule 3.17(B).  “[A]n appearance of impropriety is created when a reasonable, fully informed person observing the judge's conduct would have doubts about the judge's impartiality. ”  *Code of Judicial Conduct*, cmt. 3 on Rule 2.1 (2016); *DeNike v. Cupo*, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008).  Judges are notably discouraged for recusing themselves when not strictly necessary.  “Judges may not ‘err on the side of caution and recuse themselves unless there is a true basis that requires disqualification. ’”  *Goldfarb v. Solimine*, 460 N.J. Super. 22, 31-32 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting *Johnson v. Johnson*, 204 N.J. 529, 551 (2010)).  “A judge's duty to sit where appropriate is as strong as the duty to disqualify oneself where sitting is inappropriate. ”  *Johnson*, at 551; *Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp.*, 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986) (“It is not only unnecessary for a judge to withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that he is disqualified: it is improper for him to do so unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him to exist or is shown to be true in fact. ”).
[brief] [...] became a member of the [...] in 2013, was reelected in 2016, and served as the Board President during the events at issue.  (Aa165).  After he lost his bid for reelection in November 2019, he remained on the Board until January 1, 2020.  Ibid.  On January 13, 2020, [...] filed a ten-count complaint with the [...], alleging that [...] engaged in conduct that violated the School Ethics Act (“Act”), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-21 to -34, and the Code of Ethics for School Board Members (“Code”), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1.  (Aa206; Aa217).  At the time of the complaint, Discenza was a member of the Board who had campaigned against [...] during the Board’s November 2019 election.  (Aa218).  Discenza alleged in the complaint that on the day after the Board’s November 2019 election, [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) (count one), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c) (count two), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) (count three), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) (count four), when he directed the Board’s attorney to conduct research on Discenza at the taxpayers’ expense and “without any --- 1
[brief] Finally, “Da1” is improper as it is an unauthenticated photograph inserted into the Defendant’s Appendix of [...] which is taken from a Brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 17, 2023.  Pa 41.  This Motion was opposed by the Defendants/Respondents on September 12, 2023 which filing included the photograph referred to herein.  (Da1).  Oral argument was held on this Motion on September 14, 2023 and denied by Order of [...] on September 22, 2023.  (Pa44).  A Pre-Trial Order was entered in this matter by the Trial Court on October 2, 2023 (Pa46).  This Order allowed Plaintiff to renew its argument on jurisdiction at Trial.  See Paragraphs three-four on the Pre-Trial Order.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Time Limitations  6.1.1  It is vitally important that agencies complete internal affairs investigations in a prompt manner.  Long, unnecessary delays do not simply create additional uncertainty for the subject officer; they can also threaten the integrity of an investigation and the trust of the community.  6.1.2  Most internal affairs complaints are straightforward, and most of these routine complaints can be investigated and resolved quickly.  In many cases, an internal affairs investigation will take no more than 45 days from the receipt of the complaint to the filing of disciplinary charges.  The simpler the case, the quicker the inquiry should be completed.  6.1.3
[brief] Each member of the staff is subject to the standard of care in his or her own profession.  The Supreme Court in Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, 250 N.J. 368 (2022), recently confirmed that when the plaintiff’s claim of vicarious liability hinges upon allegations of a deviation from professional standards of care by a licensed individual who was an employee of the named defendant, an AOM and an expert opinion from a person qualified in the same profession as the employee must be provided.
[brief] On August 27, 2014, Bergen County Indictment [...] was filed, charging [...] with second-degree eluding and second-degree aggravated assault.  (Da 1-2)  [...] was unaware that the indictment had been filed because no notice was provided to him.  (Da 33, 44-45; 2T 9-1 to 3)  On September 18, 2014, the Bergen County Sheriff’s Department filed a warrant for his arrest.  (Da 33)  For an unknown reason, the warrant was refiled on July 30, 2015.  (Da 33)  [...] became aware of the indictment in spring of 2018 after reviewing a record check that revealed the arrest warrant.  He sent a letter to the Bergen County Justice Center on March 4, 2018, requesting disposition of the warrant.  (Da 34, 40)  [...] was finally arraigned on April 30, 2018, almost four years after his arrest.  (Da 33)  [...] sent a pro se letter motion dated November 30, 2018 to the Bergen County courthouse, asserting his speedy trial rights.  (Da 17-20, 43)  [...] again asserted his rights in another pro se letter motion dated January 11, 2019, this time addressed to the trial court.  (Da 21-23, 43)  On April 8, 2019, [...] filed a pro se speedy trial motion.  (Da 24-31)  On May 15, 2019, [...]’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that his speedy trial rights had been violated.  (Da 32-40)  [...] filed supplemental briefing in support of the motion on May 21, 2019.  (Da 41-50)  In support of the speedy trial motion, [...] argued that all four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), militated in favor of dismissal of the case with prejudice.  First, the delay was lengthy.
[brief] \(^5\) Appellants’ reliance on Mirabelli v. Olson, No., 23-768, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2023 WL 5976992 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 14, 2023), is likewise misplaced.  (Db27).  As Appellants concede, (Db26-27), Mirabelli resolved First Amendment claims by teachers that a policy prohibiting the disclosure of a student’s gender identity violates the teacher’s right to free exercise of religion.  The language concerning parental rights on which Appellants rely is dicta, as the court expressly stated that “no parents ha[d] joined as plaintiffs,” and that “issue is not resolved here. ”