ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At trial, [...] (the restaurant owner) and [...] testified that they believed the same person burglarized the restaurant on both nights.  [...] testified that on September 30, it “looked like the same individual that was there two days prior decided to come back. ” (5T16-23 to 25).  And [...] stated that the September 30 burglar wore “the same dark-colored sleeve, light-colored chest-and-hood-area sweatshirt” as on September 28, and he also wore a similar cellphone or phone case on the “same right hip, same location. ” (5T54-2 to 3, 66-16 to 24, 67-17 to 69-6).  Defense counsel did not object to any portion of this testimony.
[brief] [...]’S SECOND-DEGREE FIREARM POSSESSION  CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS FOUND UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(D), FOURTH-DEGREE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON (NON-FIREARM)  INSTEAD OF THE ELEMENTS FOUND UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(B), SECOND-DEGREE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM.  (Not Raised Below)
[directive] Revoked Appendix to AG Directive 2021-8 | Page 2  Camden [...] 40 04/29/65 1620 (7)  [...] 100 11/17/60 1371 (5)  215 10/09/63 1538 (1)  [...] 180 11/30/66 1713 (2) Carlstadt [...] 126 02/17/48 794 (10)  Cliffside Park [...] 60 10/29/62 1486 (3)  Dunellen License of [...] 75 08/16/62 1466 (1)  Egg Harbor City [...] 03/07/57 1161 (3)  Revoked Elizabeth [...] 190 09/11/61 1417 (1)  [...] 85 06/22/61 1403 (3)  [...] 06/08/67 1746 (1)  Revoked [...] 55 01/08/63 1495 (7)  [...] 80 07/12/66 1691 (1)  License of [...] 120 12/27/54 1045 (7)  43 05/14/56 1118 (2)  Fairview License of [...] 65 06/16/58 1236 (3)  [...] 210 10/13/67 1757 (1)  Franklin Twp. [...] 75 03/18/65 1614 (3)  Gloucester City [...] 85 01/08/63 1496 (3)  [...] 03/29/66 1673 (2)  Unknown  Hoboken [...] 55 08/01/59 1299 (4)  License of [...] 01/06/53 953 (1)  Revoked License of [...] 75 01/15/62 1436 (3)  Lodi [...] 35 03/06/52 929 (3)  Long Branch [...] 65 03/15/66 1671 (6)  Mays Landing  [...] 60 04/03/57 1159 (1)  Merchantville [...] 70 08/14/61 1413 (2)  Millstone Twp. [...] 20 02/19/62 1441 (5)  Montville [...] 30 07/10/61 1406 (2)  New Brunswick  [...] 60 01/26/66 1656 (5)  [...] 60 09/11/56 1133 (2)  Appendix to AG Directive 2021-8 | Page 3
[brief] 30  Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 211 N.J. Super 536 33,37,39 (2015)  Gruber v. Mayor & Twp. Comm. Of Raritan, 39 N.J. 1 (1962)  45  In re Adoption of Child ex rel M.E.B., 444 N.J. Super. 83 34 (App. Div. 2016)  In re IMO Town of Harrison and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 116, 440 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2015)  In re Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the Twp. of West Orange, 233 N.J. 589 (2015)  IMO Carla M. Brady, 243 N.J. 395 (2020) (per curiam)  41 Jackson v. Dep’t of Corr., 335 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2000)  42 Kahn v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1 (2023)  41 Kane Properties, LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199 (2013)  37 Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003)  44,45 Kumar v. Piscataway Twp. Council, 473 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 2022)  29,31  Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021)  5  Lazaridas v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666 (3d Cir. 2010)  5  Loigman v. Twp. Comm of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566 (2006)  41,47 Middletown Twp. Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local No. 124 v. Twp. Of Middletown, 162 N.J. 361 (2000)  45 National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo, 602 U.S. __ (May 22, 2024)  30 New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. NJ Dept. of Corrections, 185 N.J. 137 (2005)
[brief] To dismiss or stay a New Jersey action on the basis of comity, the moving party must show that: (1) there is an earlier-filed action; (2) the prior action involves substantially the same parties, the same claims, and the same legal issues as the second-filed action; and (3) the plaintiff in the second-filed action will have an opportunity for adequate relief in the first-filed action.  American, 286 N.J. Super. at 37.  For purposes of this analysis, the actions need not be identical; rather, they need only involve substantially the same parties, claims, and legal issues in order for principles of comity to be invoked.  American, 286 N.J. Super. at 37.  A simple comparison of the caption for the 2020 Action with the caption for the 2015 Action demonstrates the substantial similarity of the parties in the two cases.
[brief] There is a rebuttable presumption that a project or activity that generates wastewater that is proposed to be conveyed to a NJPDES regulated wastewater facility is consistent with the areawide plan if it is within the sewer service area of the adopted areawide plan.  [N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b). ]  DEP apparently reads this language to mean that the only thing any project that generates wastewater must demonstrate for consistency is that it is within an area eligible for sewer service.  First, the DEP is incorrect because looking at the language of the regulation and the purpose of the rules, this rebuttable presumption only applies to the sewerage aspect of the project.  It simply does not address the other valence of a Consistency Assessment described above—protection of water quality from other sources of water generated by the development, such as stormwater discharges.  Second, the agency’s contemporaneous statements in the proposed and final rulemaking for these amendments make clear the amendments were not intended to limit the Consistency Assessment only to whether a project was within a mapped sewer service area, but to continue to address water quality through the Areawide WQM Plan and TMDLs.
[brief] Though grainy and soundless, footage showed the shooter wore a white t-shirt, light shorts, and dark shoes, covered his face with a white shirt or towel, and held the gun with his right hand.  (Da14 12:16:24-12:16:37; 10T142-21 to 143-2)  At 12:10pm he came around the corner of a building where [...] and [...] stood.  [...] turned and began to run away.  (Da14 12:16:24-12:16:32)  The shooter let go of his gun, and while bending to get it, dropped the shirt from his face for about two seconds while pursuing [...].  (Da14 12:16:31-12:16:33)  [...] ran around the corner, opposite from [...]’s flight from the scene.  The shooter followed [...], who later collapsed and died.
[brief] She agreed that the revised lot grade was not designed for the purpose of increasing building height.  Instead, it was an overall site design to include grading and site layout.  She opined that she agreed with [...] that the Ordinance calls for the revised lot grade to be used in measuring height for this development.  On cross-examination she reiterated  “My testimony was that I agreed with the building height interpretation by [...].  He indicated that he did not grade specifically to increase the height of the buildings, but the grading was in association to the overall site plan layout which includes the stormwater management, amongst other features. ”  (Pa154; 62,14-63,7) (Pa156; 69,2-14) (Pa158; 77,3-24) (Pa161; 91,4-24) (Pa162; 93,25-94,12)  Borough engineer [...] concurred with [...].  (Pa154; 63,23-25)  The objectors presented the testimony of professional engineer [...] whose practice principally involves work as a traffic consultant.
[brief] (emphasis added)  The defendant doctor in Velazquez was called in to assist another obstetrician, in the hospital, on a difficult labor and delivery case.  He alleged that the Good Samaritan statute applied to him because the plaintiff was not his patient and the medical situation was an emergency.  In ruling against the doctor, The Supreme Court strictly interpreted the plain language of the statute.  Their plain meaning interpretation of the statutory language, specific to location where the emergency treatment is rendered, “at the scene of an accident or emergency” led them to hold that a doctor who rendered treatment at a hospital, was not entitled to the benefit of the immunity.  The Court was unwilling to interpret this location language as broadly as the doctor seeking the immunity had argued for.
[brief] In exchange the State is recommending a 30-year period of incarceration with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility.  That would run concurrent to a plea of guilty to Count 1 of [...] which charged robbery in the first degree.  The State would be recommending 12 years subject to No Early Release Act on that charge.  In addition, it's the State's understanding that [...] will be pleading guilty to three separate VOPs.  They are contained in [...], [...], that's an indictment and [...].  [...] will receive time served sentences on each of those three violations of probation.  Finally, the State will be dismissing the entirety of, I believe it's [...], which charged fourth degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer.  In addition, the State has indicated to [...] that it is seeking a guarantee from the Commonwealth of -- [...] that upon a plea of guilty to first degree armed robbery it's an offense committed there, they would recommend a concurrent sentence.  Based on some conversations and our understanding with the charges there they would be inclined to do so, but at this point, short of the guarantee, what we've indicated in the plea papers is if for some reason, some unforeseen reason that Pennsylvania is not willing to run their sentence concurrent, [...] is free to withdraw his guilty plea without opposition from the State.
[brief] ....................  24 Pollino v. Pollino, 39 N.J. Super. 294 (1956).  ..................  25 Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (1989) .......... 15,16  Rieder v. Department of Transportation, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552, 535 A.2d 512 (App. Div. 1987).  ....................... 16 Seeley v. Bacon, 34 A. 139, 141 (Ch. 1896).
[brief] POINT VI: [...] WAS PROPERLY GRANTED DISMISSAL OF COUNT IV, ALLEGING RECKLESS AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS..............................................................................................................29  POINT VII: COUNT FIVE, “CLASS OF ONE ENDANGERMENT RES IPSA LOQUITUR,” WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS TO [...]..................30  POINT VIII: DEFENDANT [...] WAS PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL TORT CLAIMS, COUNTS FOUR, FIVE, AND SIX BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET THE VERBAL AND MONETARY THRESHOLDS OF THE TORT CLAIMS ACT.........................................................................................31 CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................................35
[brief] This appeal arises from a September 27, 2023 order of the [...] (“Board” or “[...]”) denying the petition of Appellant, [...] (“[...]”) to participate in the State’s solar Transition Incentive (“TI”) program.  [...] sought approval for a grid supply floating solar project under the regulatory framework of the TI program under N.J.A.C. 14:8-10.4(a).  The Board denied the petition based on the project’s ineligibility as a grid supply project to enter the TI program and its conclusion that it did not warrant a waiver under the Board’s rules as the project was “inherently speculative. ”  (Aa5).  The Board established the solar TI program as a temporary bridge solar incentive program to provide an orderly transition from the Solar Renewable Energy Certificate (“SRP” or “SREC”) program established under the Clean Energy Act, L. 2012, c. 24, to the Successor Solar Incentive (“SuSI”) program established under L. 2021, c. 169.
[brief] The Special Master finds that this document is likely responsive to [...]'s RFP 2, which requests "All Documents containing or relating to any communications between Plaintiffs and their auditors, accountants, consultants and boards of directors (or committees thereof), relating to any actual or potential contractual relationship between you and Defendants regarding any KC-135 PDM work (including but not limited to the negotiation, execution, performance, and/or alleged breach of any such actual or potential contracts)."  However, it appears to be privileged and work product and protected from disclosure.  As such, this document should be identified on [...]'s Privilege Log.  While it was not previously identified on [...]'s privilege log, that omission does not appear to be intentional or done to deceive.  The Special Master agrees that [...] should have made note on the privilege log regarding this document.  However, based on the court review, the omission of the document on the privilege log creates no harm to [...] as it is a small omission compared to the extensive disclosure by [...].
[brief] Instead, [...] would make the calls to [...]’s parents from [...]’s cell phone and let them talk over speakerphone.  (2T 24-24 to 25-20)  [...] knew that [...] had asserted his right to counsel several hours ago and did not re-warn him; [...] did not ask to speak with [...] about the crime or ask for him to be present during the calls.  (1T 142-17 to 19; 2T 25-15 to 16, 46-5 to 16)  On the call to his mother, [...] made incriminating statements in response to her questions; he said that he did not intend to shoot the victim, but he feared for his life because he thought the victim was trying to get his gun and kill him.  (2T 25-21 to 26-2)  [...] asked his mother to contact a lawyer, and his mother said that she could not afford an attorney.  (2T 26-7 to 9)  At this point, [...] identified himself, made clear that he was also on the call, and explained the detention process before ending the call.
[brief] Please note that while the eleventh edition is not available to us, the twelfth edition published less than a year after the Katz decision states at pg. 297:  “Historical income and current income are significant, but the ultimate concern is the future.  The earning history of a property is important only insofar as it is accepted by buyers as an indication of the future.  Current income is a good starting point, but the direction and expected pattern of income change are critical to the capitalization process. ”
[brief] “Guidance” memorandum from [...] pertaining to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9e(3) transmitted to the State’s schools May 19, 2020 ................................ Da-1 | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Archway Programs, Inc. v. Pemberton Township Board of Education, | 27 | | 352 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., | 42 | | 220 N.J. 544 (2015) | | | Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, | 23 | | 243 N.J. 218 (2020) | | | Berg v. Christie, | 33 | | 225 N.J. 245 (2016) | | | Bonaventure Int’l, Inc. v. Spring Lake, | 23 | | 350 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Burgos v. State, | 33 | | 222 N.J. 175 (2015) | | | Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, | 37 | | 256 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. 1992) | | | Castro v. NYT Television, | 29 | | 370 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, | 23 | | 116 N.J. 7 (1989) | | | Cohen v. Univ. of Medicine and Dentistry, | 41 | | 240 N.J. Super. 188 (Ch. Div. 1989) | | | County of Morris v. Fauver, | 26 | | 153 N.J. 80 (1998) | | Cruz v. Cent. Jersey Landscaping, Inc., 195 N.J. 33 (2008) ................................................................. 36, 37 DiTrollo v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 (1995) ...........................................................................
[brief] 48a  Complaint, Jury Demand and R. 4:5-1 Certification dated 9/21/19.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49a-56a  [...] vs. [...], Unpublished Decision, Appellate Division dated 3/20/15.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57a-64a  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] It is important that prior to #17-20, “Co-Occurring Directive No Contact Release Conditions and Domestic Violence or Custody Matters,” shall be followed, including but not limited to: (1) court staff should check available systems for co-occurring matters with the defendant/juvenile and the victim and inform the judge of the results of those searches; and (2) the court is to consider any no-contact conditions, domestic violence restraining orders, or visitation ordered by other courts.  Communication between the Criminal Division and the Family Division is essential in ensuring that the court has the information it needs to make this determination and to ensure that the court can clearly articulate to the victim and to the defendant/juvenile what conditions are in effect.  In the event there are other court orders in effect that relate to the victim, the court shall ensure that the parties understand the difference between those court orders and any no contact provisions in those orders and this statutory prohibition against victim contact pursuant to L. 2020, c. 111.  Specifically, this statutory prohibition against victim contact expires upon the date that the inmate was scheduled to be released prior to the award of public health emergency credits, unless the court grants the petition to dissolve it.  In contrast, those other no contact conditions set forth by the court in its order in the particular case remain in effect until the court enters an order specifically vacating those conditions.  Additionally, the new law also requires [...], [...], and the [...] to post information on the procedures to request a domestic violence restraining order and resources available to victims of domestic violence.  Information concerning domestic violence can be found on the Judiciary’s website at https://www.njcourts.gov/selfhelp/selfhelp_domesticviolence.html.  Questions regarding this Directive may be directed to the [...] at 609-815-2900, ext. 55300 or to the [...] at 609-815- 2900, ext. 55350.
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[brief] Considering first the scope of our appellate review of judgment entered in a non-jury case, as here, we note that our courts have held that the findings on which it is based should not be disturbed “unless they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice,” and that the appellate court should exercise its original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a clear case where there is no doubt about the matter.  That the finding reviewed is based on factual determinations in which matters of credibility are involved is not without significance.  Findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.  [Id. at 483-484 (citations omitted). ]  Here, Defendant neither addresses the appropriate standard of review applicable to its appeal, nor cites a single fact in its brief which it contends the Trial Court found in error.  Rather, Defendant objects to the imposition of the reformation remedy, based on facts it does not challenge.  Accordingly, this Court should not disturb any of the facts found at trial, whether as part of the Trial Court’s initial findings in 2022 or following post-judgment proceedings in 2024.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant’s appeal.  POINT II
[brief] As pointed out above, the trial court refused to consider [...]’s personal perception that the paint job had made the steps “sleeker” and “rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet. ”  Instead, the trial court entertained an improper “Battle of the Experts” at the summary judgment stage and then decided to believe the Defendants’ expert over [...]’s expert in applying the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine.  This is error.  A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the moving party is entitled to judgment “as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  The court “must consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  C.V. by and through C.V. v. Waterford Township Board of Education, 255 N.J. 289, 305 (2023).  “In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court does not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter; it only determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  Id. at 305-306.  “Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence is so one-sided that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  *Id.* at 306.  “When there are conflicting versions of the facts that would permit a rational jury to choose either version, the resolution of that conflict requires a determination of which version is more credible.  Such a factual dispute should be decided by a jury, not a court, and it is improper for the motion judge to abrogate the jury's exclusive role as the factfinder. ”  *Suarez v. Eastern International College*, 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2012).  Importantly, when there are competing expert opinions summary judgment is inappropriate because a trial court should never decide on its merits a dispute on which a rational jury could go either way.  *See* Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules Governing the Courts*, cmt. 2.3.2 on R. 4:46-2 (2019); *see, e.g.*, *Davin, LLC v. Daham*, 329 N.J. Super. 54, 71 (App. Div. 2000).  “[W]here a case may rest upon opinion or expert testimony, a court should be particularly slow in granting summary judgment. ”  *Ruvolo v. American Casualty Co.*, 39 N.J. 490, 500 (1963).  II.
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[brief] Defendant pulled a gun with an extended clip, cocked back, from a handbag, and ordered everyone on the floor.  Defendant stated, “[you all] know what this is. ” (3T80-13 to 82-4; 3T113-18 to 114-19).  Defendant “put” the gun, described as a black Glock with a “very long” clip “hanging out the bottom,” to [...]’s head, and “cocked it back. ” (3T114-20 to 115-7).  [...] and [...] got on the floor, but [...] refused, protesting that defendant would have to shoot him standing up.  Defendant demanded that everyone empty their pockets.  [...] threw his watch and money on the floor.  As he pointed the gun at the trapped trio, the “kind of high, spaced out” defendant scooped the money off the floor.  (3T116-2 to 118-20).  Meanwhile, [...] fell to the floor, and then, seeing that defendant was in the office, climbed through a slide window by the counter and escaped the store, locking the door.