ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] March 11, 2020  Hearing [...] testified regarding the increased cost for garbage collection due to Hoboken’s ordinance that changed the time that garbage could be placed on the street, which caused [...] to pay the condominium association an additional $123.95 per year.  7T:23:22-24:20; 26:6-9.  Ms. Metzger also testified that the $624.48 fee paid by [...] to an accountant for tax filing relating to the Unit was a normal expense, also unrelated to the conversion of the Property to a condominium property.  7T:24:21-26:9.  Ms. Metzger further testified regarding the $150 monthly management fee paid by [...] to [...] to manage the Unit.  7T:28:1-30:4.  She testified that [...] manages over 1,000 units (7T:30:3), and that a $150 monthly fee per unit is normal (7T:30:1).  She testified that other management companies in Hoboken charge monthly per unit fees ranging between $150-$200.  7T:29:14-20.  Ms. Metzger further testified regarding [...]’s equity in the Unit.  She reiterated that the Property comprising eleven (11) units was purchased in 1993 for $525,000 (7T:37:18-19).  She stated that, to determine the Unit’s equalized fair market value, the Unit’s $404,600 assessed value would be divided by Hoboken’s equalization ratio (7T:35:4-36:1), which equated to an equalized fair market value of $602,172 in 2017 (7T:36:5-6).  Ms. Metzger also testified about the impact of inflation on [...]’s equity in the Unit.  Applying the CPI to the purchase price of the Unit ($47,727) increased the value of the Unit from 1993 to 2001 to $68,480.  7T:37:13-38:5.  She also testified that, in 2002, [...] made $1 million of improvements to the Property, which affected all units and the common area, and that the capital improvements should also be added to [...]’s equity in the Unit and adjusted for inflation 7T:38:8-38:24.  Consistent with the Second Remand, [...]’s counsel requested the Board to consider inflation in determining [...]’s equity in the Unit.  7T:52-58.  [...]’s counsel, however, contended that [...]’s equity could only be based upon the cash paid at purchase plus the payments made on a mortgage (7T:77:17-78:2).  [...]’s counsel also ignored [...]’s capital improvements to the Unit, which, as previously stated, [...] admitted were made.  7T:81:9-89:8.  [...] did not provide any testimony or rebuttal documents challenging any of [...]’s proofs.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................2  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................8  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I— THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS DENYING PLAINTFFS’ REQUESTS FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 1:10-3 & N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11(a) SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ..................................................12  POINT II— THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR ENTRY OF SATISFACTION OF THE OPEN MONETARY JUDGMENT AND A PROTECTIVE ORDER AS TO THE DEPOSITION OF HAROLD E. KENNEDY, JR .................................................................17  A.  An Order to Satisfy [...] Was Properly Entered ..................................................17  B.  A Protective Order Was Rightly Entered Barring the Deposition of [...]  .................................................................19  POINT III— PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FEES AND INTEREST WAS PROPERLY DENIED ..................................................21  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................26
[brief] [T]he prosecutor no later than 24 hours before the detention hearing shall provide the defendant with (A) the discovery referenced in subparagraph (1) above, (B) all statements or reports relating to the affidavit of probable cause, (C) all statements or reports relating to additional evidence the State relies on to establish probable cause at the hearing, (D) all statements or reports relating to the factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1) that the Statement advances at the hearing, and € all exculpatory evidence.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26.........................................................................................4, 5 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)..............................................................................4  NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The Defendant in this matter, [...], appeals the trial court’s decision resulting in his conviction and sentence imposed by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., at the Ocean County Superior Court, Law Division.
[brief] The Court relied on the maxim noscitur a sociis – a word is known by the company it keeps.  Id. at 518.  The term “employment” is ordinarily understood to mean work for payment.  Id. at 510.  The term “position,” though arguably broader than employment, had a dictionary definition of “a post of employment: job. ”  Id. at 511.  The Court reviewed other statutes’ usage of the connected terms of “office, employment, or position,” which supported a narrow interpretation that precluded the NJFA’s application to unpaid volunteers.
[brief] Gerba v Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System, supra., 83 N.J. at 189; New Jersey Department of Public Advocate, v N.J. Board of Public Utilities, supra., 189 N.J. Super. at 507.  C.  THE BOARD’S DETERMINATION THAT THE 2009 INCIDENT DESCRIBED BY PETITIONER’S TREATING PHYSICIAN WAS NOT A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IS SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
[brief] [Grubbs, supra, at 389 (emphasis added). ]  Plaintiff’s engineer and planner, [...], directly addressed the Grubbs criteria regarding whether the site can support the additional density of 2.6 units per acre.  (Pa388 to Pa394).  [...] introduced the d(5) analysis by clarifying the actual extent of the density variance being requested:  [W]e have maximum density of 18 units per acre, where we are seeking a variance to get to 20.6 units [per] acre.  So, 2.6 units per acre greater than what is permitted.  Obviously, it’s a site of considerable size.  It’s 17.7 acres, so that ends up being 319 units being permitted and 366 units being proposed, so our – we are over by 47 units.  So, again, the variance we’re seeking as it relates to the D(5) is 47 units or 2.6 units per acre.  Again, large sites so the number of units per acre is multiplied out there...  Now, as it relates to D(5) variances, it’s a very different threshold for a Board than a D(1) variance.  If we are seeking a use variance, there is specific requirements.  It’s dangers and proofs that we need to put on the record.  A D(5) variance, the measurement is more akin to a conditional use variance where we’re really look at, specifically, can this site support this additional density?
[brief] (Pa98-104; Pa111-18; Pa120-26.)  Not only was the public deprived notice that the bills would be discussed, but the bills were not even available until after both Houses voted to pass them on January 10, 2022.  (Pa98-104; Pa111-18; Pa120-26.)  Here, S. 49 and A. 6260 should have been accessible on the Legislature’s website.  N.J.S.A. 52:11-78(a)(4).  But the record demonstrates that they were not available.  (Pa98-104; Pa111-18; Pa120-26.)  In fact, according to the [...], the bills were not posted until January 10, 2022, even though the statute required it be updated daily.  Cf. Pa127-132 with N.J.S.A. 52:11-78(a)(4).  These various violations demonstrate that the statute was enacted in contravention of the Legislature’s statutes.  As a result, the remedy is to void the statute pursuant to N.J.S.A. 1:7-3.
[brief] *Ibid.*  In *Damurjian*, another case cited by Plaintiff (Pb11), the Court found that enlargement was warranted to challenge a zoning ordinance that affected every property within the A-1, A-2, A-3 and AG zones of the municipality.  *Damurjian v. Bd. of Adj. of the Tp. of Colts Neck*, 299 N.J. Super. 84, 98 (App. Div. 1997).  In addition, the lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of a portion of the zoning ordinance, which together with the number of properties affected, created a substantial public interest.  *Id.* at 97-98.  Finally, in *Willoughby*, cited by Plaintiff (Pa12-Pa13), significant public interest was found because the plaintiffs opposing the zoning ordinance mounted an election campaign in which the rezoning in question became the central issue, and ultimately, the candidates voting for the zoning ordinance were defeated by candidates who were willing to repeal the same.
[brief] ’”  State v. O’Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 615 (2007) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000)).  Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. ”  *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 444; see also *Rhode Island v. Innis*, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (explaining that interrogation includes “express questioning or its functional equivalent,” including “words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect”).
[brief] [ . . . ]  [Ra264 (Response to Comment 279), 54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (July 17, 2023)]  Notwithstanding this clear statement by the [...] to grandfather permits, Appellant boldly asserts, without authority, that the [...] had the duty to retroactively apply the data used in the 2023 promulgation of the IFPR amendments to the Permit that was issued to [...] in 2022.
[brief] Petitioner testified that he recalled filing two prior workers’ compensation claims while he was employed by the [...], in 2000 and 2004.  (1T24:1-13).  The 2000 claim was due to injuries he suffered while he was on bike patrol during a “take down” of a perpetrator who stole a fellow officers police bike.  (1T24:16-25:9).  Petitioner injured his knee, his neck and his lower back and was out of work for approximately 30 days.  (1T26:6-14).  Petitioner thinks that x-rays and MRIs were taken, but does not recall what they showed.  (1T26:17-23).  Upon returning to work he resumed his normal duties.  (1T28:4-6).  The 2004 claim was due to injuries Petitioner suffered while lifting a heavy box at the [...] building.  (1T28:7-17).  He felt immediate pain, sought treatment right away and was out of work for “between 30 and 40 days. ”  (1T29:9- Petitioner recalls that x-rays and MRIs were taken, but testified that he does not know the results.  (1T30:1-7).  When asked what parts of his body were injured, Petitioner stated, that it “really felt like my back, but …I’m not really sure, to be honest with you. ” (1T30:20-24).  With regard to the 2009 incident, Petitioner testified that there could have been incidents in 2009 when he had to tackle suspects and, in fact, “[t]hat could have been anybody. ” (1T54:22-24).  When asked if he recalled any incident in 2009 when he fell and hit his head, he responded “[n]ot off the top of my head, no. ” (1T55:25-56:3).  He could not recall whether he got in any fights in 2009 while working as a police officer, adding “I was active”, and when asked if he had any neck or back injuries, any time off from work or any physical therapy in 2009, he responded each time, “Not that I can recall. ” (1T55:4-20).  At no time did Petitioner deny that such an incident occurred in 2009.  (1T1-57).
[brief] Most incredible of all, despite having produced no documents other than the Defendant LLC’s tax returns from 2017 through 2019, Defendants claimed, in response to Request No. 24, that none of its records pertaining to the Property were ever “lost, deleted or destroyed. ”  Da88.  Defendants again claimed, however, that they reserved their right to later identify any such documents.  Id.  On March 6, 2024, [...] held another hearing on Defendants’ motion to restore their pleadings.  2T.  [...] determined that Defendants had still failed to provide fully responsive answers to Plaintiffs’ discovery demands, and accordingly denied her motion to restore her answer.  2T13:9-12.  Initially, the trial court pointed out that Defendants’ objections to numerous requests were improper given that “[t]he time to object to the written discovery is long gone. ”  2T8:1-13.  The trial court then pointed out that Defendants’ responses were still non-responsive.  For example, in response to a request for all payments and/or reimbursements made by the Defendant LLC from 2014 through 2019, only tax returns from 2016 to 2020 were produced.  2T10:11-11:15.  As the trial court pointed out, “tax returns do not reflect payments or reimbursements made by an LLC” and therefore was “not even a proper answer. ”  Id.  The trial court also pointed out that Defendants did not provide information from 2014 to 2016, observing that they “do[] not want to talk about” those years.  Id.  The trial court similarly pointed out that Defendants did not produce lease agreements covering any of the units in the building.  2T11:20-12:19.  Accordingly, [...] denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and to restore their answers.
[brief] (D-222)  Da776-904; 9T28:20-22; 21T25:11-14, 27:13-18.  On July 2, 2014, [...] received P-51 (Da983); he understood that to be an offer of $5.6 million, which he rejected.  3T99:5-7, 100:3-19, 103:3-14.  Later in July, [...] sent [...] an updated offer of $5.7 million.  (P-52)  Da985, 3T104:2-9, 105:1-3, 20-24, 106:9-10.  [...] countered with a demand of $6.3 million.  3T108:4-8  They negotiated how much compensation [...] would receive for continuing to work for [...] for three years.  3T109:12-16.  [...] described how the negotiations ended:  Then [...] told me, [...], if I give you $6.3 million, do we have a deal?  I told him yes, we have a deal.  He got up for his chair, shook my hand, and said, [...], we have a deal.  So this is how we finalized this document and finalized the deal.
[brief] On May 17, 2024, the trial court entered an Order in this builder’s remedy action holding that [...] is not constitutionally compliant with its Mount Laurel Third Round obligation under *In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5.97*, 221 N.J. 1 (2015).  (Da1-Da3).  On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause, seeking to enjoin [...] from (1) taking any condemnation- related action with respect to the Property, (2) designating a redeveloper for the Property, and (3) granting any type of development approval for any land for any purpose other than for inclusionary housing.  (Da4-Da8).  On July 8, 2024, the Court enjoined [...] from taking any further action toward condemnation and designating a redeveloper for the Property pending resolution of this builder’s remedy lawsuit or final determination of the requested injunctions.  (Da9-Da11; 1T\(^1\)).  The court denied reconsideration of that Order on October 4, 2024.  (Da12-Da13; 2T\(^2\)).  On November 21, 2024, this Court granted [...]’s motion for leave to appeal.  (Da14-Da15).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] In concluding that the Property is not suitable for the proposed project, the Board also delineated multiple purposes of the MLUL that would be undermined by same, and thus contrary to the public interest:  16.  …  the Board does not believe that the … purposes of the MLUL would be advanced by the granting of such variance relief … the promotion of the general welfare as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2a cannot serve as the basis for the granting of relief in view of the substantial nonconformities proposed which would be inconsistent with the character of the surrounding neighborhood and contrary to the Master Plan.  Other purposes of the MLUL…would similarly not be promoted …the Goal of appropriate population densities as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2e will not be promoted in view of a development discordant with the surrounding neighborhood.  The Goal of providing sufficient space for a variety of uses as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2g is not supported by the evidence in view of the substantial variance relief, lack of appropriate buffers, and a plan that is contrary to the Goals and Objectives of the Master Plan …the Goal of a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques … as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2i cannot support the granting of relief.
[directive] However, in some cases where both a criminal and an administrative disciplinary investigation are needed, the internal affairs investigator from the subject officer's agency may be expected to help conduct both.  Under these circumstances, the methods employed in the criminal investigation conflict with those used in the administrative investigation.  8.1.3  Typically, this conflict will become most apparent during subject officer interviews.  As already explained, a subject officer has the right to remain silent during a criminal N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (unionized employee who reasonably believes that an investigatory 7 interview may result in disciplinary action against him or her is entitled to union representation).  47
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ......  1  ARGUMENT I.  THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF [...]’S APPLICATION MADE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND SEVEN MONTHS  PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED  .................................................................  5  II.  CONSIDERATIONS OF ADEQUATE OR ACTUAL NOTICE  DO NOT COMPEL A DIFFERENT RESULT  ...........................................................................10  CONCLUSION
[directive] N.J.S.A. to pursuant sentence 25-year stipulated 2014).  (May 29, 2014, 7 c. P.L. Act, [...] the Implement to Guidelines Ne~tiation 169, Super. 392 N.J. [...], v. State In courts. the by accepted been approach has This the rejected Division Appellate the (2007), 597 N.J. 192 denied, certif. Div.), (App. 182 concluding Guidelines, Bri'ma~e the in system escalating plea formal the to challenge defendant's section of purposes the furthers and Guidelines of the operation the vital to is policy "[t]his that with cooperate defendants to for incentives provide to are which waiver, 2C:35-12]
[brief] The notice sent to Defendant by regular mail was affirmatively refused and returned with the postal marking “Refused” written on the envelope.  New Jersey cases have long recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed.  SSI Med. Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).  There is no question that Defendant [...] evaded service of the Pre-Action Notice but indeed nevertheless received the Notice by email at the email she insisted the parties use exclusively to communicate in writing.  Her refusal to accept the regular mailing of the Notice should not inure to her benefit.  Defendant [...] **never** disputed receipt of the notice by email, and **never** submitted a Certification claiming she never received the notice emailed to the same address she insisted Plaintiff use to communicate in writing with her.  In support of her argument, Defendant [...] looked to the Order of October 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2019, in which the lower court did not reinstate the complaint but instead let the case remain dismissed without prejudice so the Defendant [...] could proceed with fee arbitration.
[brief] So in a manner that is similar to what you just did with regards to the stormwater management ordinance and as we’ve talked about before with the planning board when the planning board has reviewed redevelopment plans or amendments to redevelopment plans in the past, the responsibility of the planning board in this process is to review the proposed redevelopment plan or amendment to the redevelopment plan which is in fact adopted by ordinance and identify any inconsistencies or make an evaluation and determination as to whether the proposed redevelopment plan or amendment to the redevelopment plan is in fact consistent with the master plan.
[brief] To the contrary, [...] specifically told the jury, “I am not saying that [defendant] is lying to me or making this up. ” (13T228-10 to 12).  [...] explained that defendant was “protecting himself from a recognition of the terrible things he’s done by adopting an explanation in which somehow mental illness did this to him….  It’s important for him to be able to live with what he’s done.  And if he can blame mental illness, that’s easier on him than taking responsibility for it.
[brief] Defense counsel never objected to Plaintiff’s actions, either then during voir dire, or at any other time during the course of trial (7T, at 27:10-22).  Interestingly, at the conclusion of Motions in Limine just the day prior, Defense counsel himself, on the topic of objections, stated, “Pursuant to the rules, if I don’t make it I lose it....” (2T, at 44:24-45:5).
[brief] The court found no reason to vacate the [...] judgment.  [...] could have hired counsel for [...], as provided in the [...] insurance policy, but [...] chose not to do so.  Instead, [...] insisted on trying to defend [...] itself, without hiring independent counsel to do so, while, at the same time, representing its own interests as the insurer to deny [...] coverage.  That is a clear conflict of interest.  [...] pointed this out to the trial court in a sur-reply brief to [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the April 6, 2023 Final Judgment against [...].  (1T21:16-21)  [...] cited to Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 502, 110 N.J.L.J. 349 (September 23, 1982), which held that an insurer that is seeking declaratory judgment against the insured to deny coverage, as is the case here, cannot also represent the interests of the insured in the same action, as is also the case here.  (1T21:16-21).  In other words, the reason the court in Gobe held that only the unrepresented adverse party can void a judgment against it is because, to allow others to do so, can create a conflict of interest and other mischief.  POINT IV
[brief] (39057a-58a)  [...]’s understanding of this Court’s mandate on remand is sound.  See e.g. F.J.C. v. J.L.C., A-1776-20, 2022 WL 1633799, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 24, 2022) (explaining: “although our prior opinion suggested … plaintiff had acted in bad faith …, we do not interpret our remand instructions to require the [remand] court to find bad faith on the part of plaintiff ….  Rather, we interpret our … instructions to require the … court to consider plaintiff’s \(^{27}\) The Wilfs’ assertion that “the Special Master disregarded the Court’s opinion” (Db34) is patently false.  conduct as part of the totality of the circumstances for determining whether to award counsel fees. ”)  The fact that [...] confirmed his original fee recommendation did not, as [...] suggest, violate this Court’s mandate.  As cogently explained by [...], “there is a large distance between the Appellate Division remanding an issue back to the trial court for reconsideration, and the Appellate Division barring the same decision from being made again. ”  (39058a)  See e.g. F.J.C. v. J.L.C., 2022 WL 1633799 at *5 (affirming remand court’s decision to again decline to award attorney’s fees).  In all events, [...]’s determination of fees on remand was made only after a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the facts and parties’ arguments, and was memorialized in a 64-page detailed report.