ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Borough refers the Court to the Statement of Facts set forth in the Borough’s Appellate Brief at pages two (2) through six (6).  Given Respondents’ lengthy discussion of and reliance on the NCA in their preemption argument, it is important to note that [...] explicitly ruled on the applicability of the NCA and found “Plaintiffs contention that the Ordinance is not valid because defendants did not obtain approval from the [...] under the Noise Control Act is misplaced. ”  Da82.  The Court went on to state that [...] guidance and case law make it clear that the Borough was **not** required to enact an ordinance under the NCA.  Ibid.  The Court found that the NCA was not triggered and found Ordinance 17-2017 preempted because the Borough is a member of the [...] “to which it has relinquished its authority to regulate noise nuisances under the Health Law”, which is the only preemption issue on appeal.  Da82, Da88.  Therefore, Respondents references to the NCA, to any requirements set forth in the NCA, like submission of the ordinance to the [...] ("[...]") for approval, should be disregarded.  LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] The difference between the two crimes is the degree of recklessness and risk of death.  See State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. 354, 366–67 (App. Div. 1984) (approving of an instruction because it “pointed out that the degree of recklessness in aggravated manslaughter was significantly greater than the degree of recklessness in reckless manslaughter”).  Aggravated manslaughter, unlike reckless manslaughter, requires the State to “prove that ‘the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of death, i.e., a probability that death would result, and that the defendant manifested extreme indifference to human life.
[brief] II.  THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO TRANSMIT THE MATTER TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  BECAUSE MATERIAL FACTS ARE IN DISPUTE (AA11-12; AA17).  The CSC abused its discretion when it failed to follow well-established law that requires a fact-finding hearing in where disputed material factual questions exist.  The record is clear that [...] has always vehemently disputed the allegations and the conclusion that he engaged in an intentional act of discrimination or harassment.  The allegation that [...] purposefully misnamed the Complainant are serious and harmful to [...] and the union he was elected to lead.  Requiring disciplinary action as a requirement for a fact-finding hearing, under these circumstances, permits a State department nearly unchecked freedom to use the State Policy as a tool to make determinations of serious misconduct against a union president it does not like, knowing that it will not be required to prove its findings in a fact-finding hearing.
[brief] The right to medical care, the right to access an attorney, to free speech, to access court and have assistance of counsel, to a speedy trial, and to be free from bodily harm are protected, the right to worship almighty God, the right to safety and the right to grieve are protected under New Jersey Constitution  Article 1 paragraph 1, 3, 10, 11, 6, 18, 22 of the New Jersey Constitution.  Thus, Contrary to defense counsel, it is clear that the County’s and the Prison’s failure to have policies in place resulted in violations of the plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process rights.  Thus, the County and the Prison are not protected by immunity that arose from government custom.
[brief] 14  The trial court rejected [...]’s incredible explanation at trial that his categorical, recorded promise to repay his debt was limited to repayment of the sum of only $50,000, the principal amount of the Second (pay-when-able) Loan.  Da34, n. 23.  As discussed in Point II and n.19, below, notwithstanding the position he pleaded in the Answer he filed in this case, that he owed Plaintiff nothing, after being confronted at his deposition with his recorded admissions, [...] was forced to change his tune and his recitation of the “facts. ”  Further, [...]’s admission that he owes no less than $50,000 on the Second Loan and, derivatively, that the Second Loan was a pay-when-able loan, cannot be reconciled with Defendants’ position on this appeal that pay-when-able loans are not enforceable in New Jersey. to [...].  Da2; Da34-35; Da68; 2T227-11 to 24, 228-1 to 6; 3T55-1 to 9, 57-20 to 23, 67-2 to 5. \footnote{The trial court also rejected [...]’s argument that a set-off should be applied in any amount due for any alleged “in-kind services,” finding that [...] failed to introduce any evidence at trial in support of the alleged set-off or its purported value.  Da35-16; Da142-58 (Ex. D4); 3T165-5 to 166-10, 166-21 to 24; 4T315-13 to 19, 316-9 to 317-11 to 14, 320-5 to 8, 321-1 to 3.}  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] (Aa3400; Aa264).  The prior conservation easement was required to protect stormwater management facilities that were never fully constructed and contained 12.280 acres of restricted area.  (Aa51).  Since [...]’s proposed project encroached on the existing restricted area, the easement needed to be released and modified.  Ibid.  [...] proposed to modify the existing stormwater restriction to cover an amended area of 15.70 acres (increasing the area by 3.42 acres for stormwater) and separately proposed a new conservation restriction to protect 19.75 acres of freshwater wetlands, State open waters, and transition areas.  (Aa52).  On June 26, 2023, [...] held a public hearing about the partial release of the conservation restriction on the Property.
[brief] See State v. Kelsey, 429 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that the State cannot force a defendant to incriminate himself by compelling him “to divulge the location of incriminating physical evidence”); State v. Mason, 164 N.J. Super. 1, 3-4 (App. Div. 1979) (suppressing the defendant’s act of turning over drugs because “[n]on-verbal responses to questioning are treated in the same way as are verbal response.  The privilege against self-incrimination extends to all acts intended to be of a testimonial or communicative character, whether in verbal or other form. ” (citations omitted)).  POINT  IV  IF THIS COURT DOES NOT ORDER SUPPRESSION OF ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, IT SHOULD REMAND FOR ANOTHER SUPPRESSION HEARING.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  PORTFOLIO RECOVERY : CIVIL ACTION ASSOCIATES, LLC, as assignee of : [...] / : ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL [...], : JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR Plaintiff-Respondent,: COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY v. : Trial Court Docket No. [...]  [...], Defendant-Appellant.: HON. [...], J.S.C. DATE: April 4, 2024
[brief] No witness testified to seeing [...] in Holmdel or the State of New Jersey at any point around the incidents at issue and cell phone, credit card, and toll records all established [...] was not present in the state on the dates in question.  Thus, the jury may have put great weight on [...]’s refusal to answer questions about when he had been in New Jersey or contacted his mother.  Second, the instruction itself did not clearly prohibit the jury from considering [...]’s silence.  While the court correctly told the jury it could not “infer guilt” from “defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent,” it incorrectly told the jury that it could consider defendant’s invocations “for purposes of assessing credibility and voluntariness of the statement. ”  (17T:7-18 to 8-2)  The court’s instruction that [...]’s invocation of his right to silence could bear on his credibility directly contradicted the instruction that it could not bear on his guilt.  The jury may have believed the instruction that his silence could be used to evaluate his credibility allowed them to infer that his selective silence was an attempt to deceive police or not be forthcoming about his criminal acts – effectively the same as using the silence to infer his guilt.  “An instruction can be curative only if the judicial medicine suits the ailment. ”  State v. Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. 490, 508 (App. Div. 2019).  This instruction did not.  Because the State’s case was far from overwhelming, the error cannot be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 417 (2017) (explaining that “[a]n evidentiary error will not be found ‘harmless’ if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error contributed to the verdict”).  The jury struggled to reach a verdict, communicating at one point it was at an intractable impasse, see Point V, and may have placed improper weight on [...]’s questions about the availability of counsel and selective silence in reaching its decision.  The improper admission of these portions of [...]’s interview compels reversal of the convictions.  Clark, 251 N.J. at 298-99.
[brief] There were further conflicts, resulting in further Order to Show Cause, and Sanction Orders (Da295, Da643, Da967, Da971)  The [...] ruled in October 2018 on the N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 Application that the [...]'s parking use of the school property was not legal as there was no zoning authority or approval for the Synagogue parking use on Lot 5.
[directive] Criminal - (1)  Revised Arraignment/ Initial Case Disposition Conference Order and (2)  Plea Cut-Off Exception Form Page2  Arraignment/Initial Case Disposition Conference Order form.  This new version includes the following revisions recommended by the Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges: the place (1) of birth question was eliminated paragraph 7a; (2) "review of conditions of pretrial and in release" was added the list of consequences for a failure appear court paragraph to to in 10.  in Plea Cut-Off Exception Form  (2)  The original form Request Plead Case off the Trial List a Plea Cut-Off Exception to as of was recommended the Conference Presiding Judges November 2002.  It was the view by in of the Conference, expressed the Backlog Report, that the "key to a solid trial list strict as in is adherence to the policy established by the Supreme Court the plea cut-off rule."  3:9-3(g). in R.  Only formatting revisions are being made to this form.  Attached are the revised form  Arraignment/Initial Case Disposition Conference Order (Attachment the Plea Cut-Off Exception form (Attachment Any questions or and 2).  1)
[brief] (Da938)  Apparently in conjunction with the then cooperative effort of the 1972 Application to expand the Hebrew School, the [...] by memo dated June 5, 1972 (Da19) reaffirmed the permission that the [...] and its affiliates “may use the facilities of the Day School, present and future, on the same cooperative basis, without charge. ”  This 1972 memo was also not notarized or intended to be recordable.  The School (Lot 5) and the [...] (Lot 8) at that time apparently coexisted in relative harmony.
[brief] Oral argument (“OA”) was heard on March 1, 2024.  [...], attorney for plaintiff argued that the, “Motion for reconsideration is proper in this case because -- decision -- The Court focused on whether the plaintiff -- actual constructive notice -- .  However, the issue we feel is whether the [...] actually caused or created this dangerous condition. ” (2T 4:21-25, 5:1).  Furthermore, plaintiff’s Counsel argued that “We know that the sidewalk was eventually rebuilt sometime between 2007 and 2012.  And we know that it was flush, there was -- sidewalk down, there were no more roots exposed, and the tree was still standing.  Therefore, the only person that -- the only entity that could have done to work of removing the - - the -- the root system that was exposed would have been the Department of Public Works employee who testified that they don’t even apply for permits whenever they do this type of work. ”  (2T 6:6-16)  [...] in response argued that the Court’s opinion which granted his client, defendant [...]’s, Motion for Summary Judgment was spot on, further he argued, “the day of the accident, the canopy was green and healthy, and there was no indication that this tree was in imminent danger of collapse.  It wasn’t leaning, it wasn’t tilting.  There had been no complaints received by -- about this tree.  And the tree had sustained years of bombardment after the alleged repair of the sidewalk, by -- by hurricanes and thunderstorms and never gave any indication that it was -- it was gonna tip or fall over.  And the only thing I would add is that it’s very important to remember that the Tort Claims Act exists as an active exclusion, not one of inclusion where The Court is supposed to bend the law to find ways to give individuals claims against public entities. ”  (2T 8:1-16).  [...] argued in response that, “our position that this condition was created and therefore it was created and caused by the public entity themselves, and therefore whether or not they knew, or should have known or actually had actual notice of it’s condition, not relevant to whether or not they created the condition. ” (2T 9:2-7).  Ultimately, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, as the Court determined that the defendant [...] does not “do sidewalk repair” (Pa13-20).  However, plaintiff argues against this point further below.  As a result of the abovementioned three Orders, plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal.  On April 26, 2024, plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Appeal was granted by the Appellate Division.  (Pa488).  By this Appeal, Plaintiff seeks interlocutory review and reversal of the trial court’s January 19, 2024, February 21, 2024 and March 1, 2024 Orders.  (Pa1-7, Pa8-12, Pa13-20).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] ); camera, room interview stationhouse camera, worn body camera, admission/confession; an made defendant whether the recorded electronically was defendant the by admission/statement any whether stationhouse camera, worn body camera, dash e.g., recording, of type (specifying the etc.); camera, room interview type (specifying the recording electronic an on captured was conduct offense whether the cell witness's camera, surveillance camera, worn body camera, dash recording, e.g., of etc.); camera, phone show procedure, e.g., of type (specifying the used were procedures identification whether etc.); line-up, array, photo up, victim/witness; the of acquaintance or stranger a is suspect the whether the whether and known, when injury the of extent the injured, was victim whether a services; medical declined or hospital the taken to was victim any; if involved, weapon of type the Page 49 e.g., evidence, of (specifying type recovered or seized was evidence physical any whether tool burglars merchandise, stolen cash, weapons, contraband, other paraphernalia, drugs, instrumentalities); or implements other or ma~~ijuana, crack, cocaine, heroin, (e.g., substance dangerous controlled of type etc.); opiate, prescription person from the seized or was scene, the from recovered was evidence physical whether vehicle; defendant's from the oi~ defendant, the of control or (specifying evidence destroy or discard, conceal, attempted to defendant whether the down flushing throwing, dropping or seat, car or furniture under hiding e.g., method, sinlc/toi let); of type (specifying arrest resist otherwise or flee to attempted defendant whether the pursuit); vehicle motor chase, foot e.g., flight, (e.g., person any injury to of threat or injury in resulted flight attempted or flight whether police whether safety, public endangered that manner a in operated was vehicle whether a person; any injury to resulting any of extent the and weapons), fired or drew taken to whether and injury of extent the if so, and, assaulted was officer an whether hospital; offense; the risk by at placed otherwise or present were children whether drugs; or alcohol of influence under the be to appeared defendant whether the has agency officer or whether the and/or drugs, using to admitted defendant whether the drug-dependent; is defendant the that believe to reason stolen; service or merchandise of type of the description general a victims any whether invasion), and home a (i.e., residence a involved burglary a whether burglary; the of time the at present were safety; public endangered t}tat manner a in operated was vehicle stolen a whether officers) to the communicated been had offense the about information relevant whether of recording a obtain and preserve to need the of prosecutor the alert dispatcher (to a by 9- a by agency the to provided been information had whether and communications) radio 9-1-1 of the recording obtain a and preserve to need of the prosecutor the alert call (to 1-1 call).
[brief] It is not.  A written contract is formed when there is a “meeting of the minds” between parties evidenced by a written offer and an unconditional, written acceptance.  *Morton v. 4 Orchard Land Tr.*, 180 N.J. 118, 130, 849 A.2d 164, 170 (2004) (citing *Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co.*, 11 N.J. 526, 538, 95 A.2d 391, 396 (1953)).  A meeting of the minds can be evidenced by “each side’s express agreement to every term of the contract. ”  *State v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.*, 386 N.J. Super. 600, 612, 902 A.2d 338, 345 (App. Div. 2006).  On January 18, 2017, [...] executed the Contract.  Embedded within the Contract was the EFT Authorization which grants third-party payment processors the right to facilitate payment transactions between [...] and its clients.  Despite never communicating with [...] (or any their representatives), [...] signed the EFT Authorization.  The EFT has none of the characteristics of a contract.  First is does not contain or recite and agreement between the parties.  Second it contains on [...] signature providing authorization not agreement.  There is no exchange of consideration and no burden on either party to act.  Instead there is a simple authorization to release funds.  The only Contract [...] ever signed was the [...] Contract.
[directive] VIII.  Burden of Proof Pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Flagg, the public employee bears the burden of proof to show that his or her request to the Attorney General or county prosecutor to apply for a waiver is supported by mitigating circumstances warranting a waiver.  Given this allocation of the burden of proof, it is expected that neither the Attorney General nor the county prosecutor will ordinarily seek a waiver of forfeiture of public office pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e) unless the available facts and circumstances relevant to the criteria set forth in Section VII militate in favor of seeking a waiver.
[brief] Whether a warning is adequate to discharge the duty owed to a business invitee such that it renders the premises safe is generally a question for the jury.  *Kingett*, 347 N.J. at 568.  Secondly, a defendant is not relieved of the affirmative duty to render the premises safe simply because a dangerous condition may be found to have been open and obvious or noticed by the invitee.  *Taneian v. Meghrigian*, 15 N.J. 267, 273-275 (1954); see also; *Zentz v. Toop*, 92 N.J. Super. 105, 115 (App. Div. 1966), *affd.*, 50 N.J. 250 (1967); see also; *McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co.*, 41 N.J. 272, 275 (1963); see also; *Moore v. Schering Plough, Inc.*, 328 N.J. Super. 300, 302- 303 (App. Div. 2000).  The present matter is on point with this case law as the plaintiff held the same status while on the premises of the defendant as in those matters and there were conditions that the plaintiff was either alleged to have been aware of or were obvious.  The rule of law is also described our Model Jury Charges that instruct that a defendant may be found to have negligently maintained an unsafe condition “even though the condition would be obvious to an invitee” and that “even where a hazardous condition is obvious, you must first determine whether, in the circumstances, the defendant was negligent in permitting the condition to exist. ”  M.J.C. 5.20F(12)(a) and (c).  The defendants have not cited any controlling legal authority overruling the case law or finding that the Model Jury Charges do not accurately reflect the applicable law.
[brief] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT SADDLEWOOD COURT, LLC  Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...] (Atty ID 021332000)  [...] (Atty ID 086632014)  Date Submitted: September 14, 2023  [...] [...] P.O. Box 800 [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]
[brief] The certification, attached checklist of criteria that [...] determined from his observation of the Premises met the definition of abandoned property.  (Aa!31).  AS an attachment to the complaint, the Plaintiff was required to confirm to pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.32, by a certification either by the public officer or tax collector that the property is abandoned.  Absent those municipal officials written statements in support of the condition of abandonment satisfies the statutory definition, then by a certification of a qualified or licensed, non-governmental, housing inspector, is an acceptable alternative.  On November 9, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Motion to Determine the Premises abandoned, N.J.S.A. 55:19-78, et seq.
[brief] The New Strata Report opines as to the probable zoning that would be approved by the City for the subject Property:  Given the subject property’s ideal dimensions for a large apartment building that was achieved through a series of adjacent property acquisitions, the site’s proximity to new road and rail transportation infrastructure, and the powerful market demand for residential space in the immediate vicinity of the site, it is easy to conclude that is [sic] was very probable that 8-story mixed-use residential development would have been approved on the subject property prior to 2019.  This would match other new developments that had already been approved on nearby sites and meet the goals and objectives of [...]’s master plan.  Pa135.
[brief] Defendant further argues that the State’s expert, [...], misstated the law of insanity when he refuted [...]’s findings.  This claim is baseless.  [...] did not err when explaining to the jury his opinion that [...] conflated the two prongs of the insanity standard:  “[[...]] seemed to think that a statement about the defendant’s knowledge of the nature and quality of his acts encompassed the issue of his knowledge or wrongfulness.  I don’t think that’s true at all.  I think these are two completely separate issues that need to be treated separately and I think the law requires that we treat them separately as the Judge will instruct. ”
[directive] See incident under report concerning the activation in any investigation or incident special privacy or that raise "tagging") indicate BWC recordings section (notations (i.e., to also 9.3 other issues).  De-Activation Request.  Civilian's 6.4 Decision to Decline a 6.1 or 6.2, the pursuant to section de-activate a BWC officer declines a request to  If an possibility that a reasonable officer believes that there is declining the request (ems., the reasons for be documented during encounter) must authority or force the necessary use constructive it may be to so, unless the and practicable to do superior as soon as it is safe to the officer's and shall be reported 6.1 or 6.2.  de-activation authorized by section prohibits agency's policy immediately shall officer de-activation request, the officer declines a
[brief] 1060a Exhibit 2 - [...] Frozen Semen Inventory 2017 – 2018 for [...] ...........................................  1062a Exhibit 3 - Email from [...] to [...], dated October 9, 2017 .......................................................................  1065a Exhibit 4 - Email from [...] to [...], dated October 11, 2017 .....................................................................  1067a Exhibit 5 - Email from [...] to [...], dated November 6, 2017 ....................................................................  1069a Exhibit 6 - [...] Standard Operating Procedure Manual For the [...] Semen Collection Center ............... 1071a Exhibit 7 – [...] Frozen Semen Inventory 2018 – 2019 for [...]………………………………………  1074a Exhibit 8 - Email from [...] to [...], dated September 12, 2018……………………………………………………………..  1076a Exhibit 9 - Casatelli v. Dressler, Docket No. A-5769-09T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub., LEXIS 1683 (App. Div., June 27, 2011)