ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] |  Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Aguas v. State, 220 N.J. 494 (2015) | 26 | | Bouton v. BMW of North America, | | | 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994) | 27 | | Bouton v. BMW of North America, | | | 29 F3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994) | 27 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 17 | | Cavuoti v. N.J. Transit Corp., | | | 161 N.J. 107 (1999) | 27 | | Chrisanthis v. County of Atlantic, | | | 361 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2003) | 21 | | Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office, | | | 194 N.J. 563 (2008) | 31 | | Cicchetti v. Morris Cty. Sheriff’s Office, | | | 194 N.J. 563 (2008) | 29 | | Cummings v. Bahr, | | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | 32, 33| | Doe v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., | | | 148 F.Supp.2d 462 (D.N.J. 2001) | 24 | | Ducey v. Ducey, | | | 424 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 2012) | 32 | | F.K. v. Integrity House, Inc., 460 N.J.
[brief] The Board could have either sent her a cure letter or allowed her to do so in-person.  The Board has argued that [...] was never entitled to cure her ballot because N.J.S.A. 19:63-16(b)(1) requires the Board to provide cure letters only when signatures are missing.  That position is without any legal support.  Nowhere in the statute does it state that when a voter has more than just a signature deficiency, the voter is prohibited from potentially curing her ballot.  In other words, just because a voter has more than a signature deficiency, such as a blank certificate, does not mean their ballot can be tossed.  Per N.J.S.A. 19:63-16(b), any voter who has a signature deficiency is entitled to cure the defect, regardless of any other certification issue.
[brief] Olds. V. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997).  Olds dictates that “all attorney malpractice actions” are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine.  Id. at 442.  [emphasis added]  Accordingly, since a legal malpractice action is not required to be joined with pending litigation, it cannot consider an action subject to joinder under R. 4:5-1(b)(2).  The purpose of the R. 4:5-1(b) certification is to “implement the philosophy of the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] IT WAS ERROR TO DENY [...] PRE-JUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE 8/20/20 FINAL ORDER TO THE DATE OF THE 7/20/22 JUDGMENT AND INSTEAD ONLY ORDER INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE JUDGMENT TO DATE OF THE 8/29/22 FINAL ORDER.  (THE ISSUE WAS PREVIOUSLY RAISED BY [...]'S MOTION TO ENFORCE (1A) AND IN THE 9/16/22 EXECUTED ORDER (180A)  The 8/28/20 final order (8a) required [...] to pay [...] $78,646.  By Order of 9/25/20 (10a), [...] obtained a stay pending appeal of the 8/28/20 final order.  On 5/18/22, this Court affirmed the lower court (12a) and the stay was dissolved.  However, [...] failed to pay the ordered $78,646.  On 7/18/22, Plaintiffs brought an enforcement action returnable 8/29/22 (1a) for the $78,646 plus interest.  On 7/20/22, [...] filed a $78,646 judgment (43a) against [...].  By Order of 8/29/22 (60a), the lower court ordered [...] comply with the 8/28/20 Order and to pay the $78,646 within 7 days (which [...] failed to do\(^4\)).  Regarding the [...] motion for post-judgment interest on the $78,646 from the date of the 8/28/20 final order to the compliance date the lower court, in error, only \(^4\) See 9/13/22 certification (74a) at paragraph 13. ordered interest from 7/20/22 to 8/29/22.  In its decision (64a), the lower court, in error, held [...] was only entitled to interest from the date the judgment was docketed and ignored the date the final order was entered on 8/28/20.  The lower court somehow held as a matter of law the 7/20/22 filing of the $78,646 judgment somehow retroactively vacated the filing of the final order on 8/28/20 dissolved it being subject to post-judgment interest under R. 4:42-11(a).  The lower court, in error, relied on Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 173-174 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] Social transitioning impacts the very core of the child’s self-definition as a boy or girl.  And, as discussed, it substantially reduces the odds of desistence, is likely to lead to a life of medicalization, and—when done by schools behind parents’ backs—results in the child suffering without parental support.  Moreover, socially transitioning students in secret from their parents does not fall within the scope of schools’ implied authority under the doctrine of *in loco parentis*.  Schools have “inferred parental consent” that gives them “a degree of authority . . . commensurate with the task that the parents ask the school to perform”—namely, to educate their children.  *Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L*, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2052 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring).  Consistent with that authority, schools must have the ability “to control curriculum and the . . . educational environment,” *C.N.*, 430 F.3d at 182, including things like “the hours of the school day,” “the timing and content of examinations,” or “the extracurricular activities offered at the school,” *Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist.*, 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (“*Fields I*”), opinion amended on denial of reh'g sub nom.  *Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist. (PSD)*, 447 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2006) (“*Fields II*”).  But socially transitioning students without parental consent is not within the scope of that inferred delegation—parents do not hand children off so schools may render psychological treatment and secretly facilitate changing their gender identity.  See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 S. Ct. at 2052; see also Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265–66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding in-school condom distribution program violated parental rights because it lacked parental notification and opt-out provision).
[brief] The critical question is whether, “in the course of committing the theft the actor . . . uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b.  As discussed, the statement, “[g]ive me all your money or I’ll shoot” was made after the theft of [...] was completed—she had already handed over money and stepped back from her station.  (3T 95-8 to 16)  Furthermore, there is no evidence that the statement was made with the intent to aid the commission of the theft against [...] after-the-fact, for example by furthering the perpetrator’s efforts to flee or avoid apprehension.  To the contrary, the evidence indicates that the threatening statement was made not in the course of the commission of a theft against [...], but in the course of the commission of a separate theft against [...].  Accordingly, even if the State had proved that [...] committed robbery against [...], it did not prove that that robbery was a crime of the first-degree.
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 26  (i) for training purposes, provided that the recording is edited so that the identity of individuals depicted in the recording cannot be determined by persons viewing the training video unless the depicted individuals have consented to the recording being used for training purposes; (j) to conduct an audit to ensure compliance with this Policy and a department’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated pursuant to this Policy; (k) to enhance officer and public safety by providing intelligence information in preparation for a raid/warrant execution (e.g., by providing information about the layout of a premises to be searched), when such use is approved by the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee; or (l) any other specified official purpose where the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, finds in writing that good and sufficient cause exists to authorize access to a particular BWC recording.
[brief] The Court in Citibank further held that “[s]ervice on a partner who is resident in New Jersey will not result in acquisition of personal jurisdiction over his foreign partnership absent the partnership’s having sufficient New Jersey contacts to sustain an exercise of long-arm jurisdiction. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.4 on R. 4:4-4(a)(5) (citing Citibank); see Db14–15.  As discussed below, Plaintiff did not and cannot make that showing.
[brief] [1T19:4-18, 1T30:15-25, 1T59:21]  The plaintiff’s Witness [...] opened the door to in-court and out-of-court identifications\(^{50}\).  His November 8, 2021 signed complaint counters his hearsay testimony of [...] giving him the defendant’s name on November 9, 2021; he counters again when he says he actually “knew” the defendant as of November 2 (IT18:15-16) relieving [...] and [...].  Although he relieves those he shift blames, he continues to counter his identification testimony when he repeatedly changes his narrative 1T32:21-26, 1T34:4-6, 1T35:14-22, 1T36:2-9, 1T36:10-16 and failed to update his November 8, 2021 signed statement indicating he knew the defendant because of [...] (AP 10); he had two extra days to amend his document(s) introducing [...] as witness and to be called upon to testify by either plaintiff or defendant before his final submission to [...].  Furthermore, the plaintiff blatantly did not call upon their witnesses for testimonies from [...], [...], but introduced hearsay testimony from the [...], on behalf the defendant’s witness’ significant other, [...]\(^{51}\).  \(^{50}\) [...] initiated in-court and out-of-court identifications – [1T18:14-20 – 11/29/22]  \(^{51}\)  Municipal Court transcript [1T18:25-26 -11/29/2022]  In accordance with Rule 801, hearsay statements are typically excluded with the following exceptions, (1) Declarant-Witness Prior Statement, (2) Statement by Party-Opponent, (3) Statements not dependent on declarant availability, (4) Records of regularly conducted activity, and even (5) Public records, reports and findings.
[brief] 4.  Section 1:7-1 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-1.  If, at any time within one year after any law or joint resolution has been filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to sections 1:2-5, 1:2-6 or 1:2-7 of this Title, the Governor has reason to believe that any such law or joint resolution was not duly passed by both houses of Legislature, or approved by the Governor or otherwise made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution, he may direct the Attorney-General to apply to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, to have the law or joint resolution adjudged void.
[directive] Abandoned motor vehicles which are found or recovered shall be disposed of pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:10A-1 et seq.  If the vehicle is not stolen, the agency should attempt to notify the owner of the recovery.  If the vehicle is not certifiable for a junk title certificate, and the owner does not claim it a minimum of twenty and a maximum of ninety business days after the agency has taken possession of the it, the vehicle can be sold at public auction.  If the vehicle is certifiable for a junk title certificate and the owner does not claim it within fifteen business days after the agency has taken possession of it, the vehicle can be sold at public auction.  The owner or any other person entitled to take possession of the vehicle may do so at any time before sale.  The owner must pay reasonable costs for the removal and storage of the vehicle and any fine, penalty and court costs assessed against him for a violation which gave rise to the seizure of the vehicle.
[brief] [...] (0013a-0018a)  As the Court is aware, the [...] found that the second-lowest bidder, [...], was the “lowest responsible bidder”.  The main issue raised by [...]’s bid challenge was whether the Bidding Documents required the bidders to name archaeologist subcontractors who are registered under the Public Works Contractor Registration Act, N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.48 et. seq. (“PWCRA”).
[brief] [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................  8  POINT I .................................................................................................................  8  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE TOWNSHIP  ARTICULATED  A VALID PUBLIC USE AS THE TOWNSHIP’S PURPORTED USE IS A MERE PRETEXT AS THE TOWNSHIP HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE PROPERTY WILL BE USED AFTER A LAND SWAP WITH A PRIVATE DEVELOPER (RAISED BELOW: 1T22-24)  ......................................................  8  A.  IN ORDER FOR THE TOWNSHIP TO TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY, IT MUST ARTICULATE A VALID PUBLIC PURPOSE TO DO SO.........................................................................................  8  B.  THE TOWNSHIP’S PURPORTED PUBLIC PURPOSE OF OPEN SPACE APPEARS TO BE A MERE PRETEXT FOR THE ACTUAL USE OF THE PROPERTIES FOLLOWING THE LAND SWAP WITH A PRIVATE DEVELOPER .........................  10  C.  THE RECORD HERE IS ENTIRELY LACKING IN FACTS TO SUPPORT A LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE, UNLIKE THE EXTENSIVE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT IN MT. LAUREL V. MIPRO HOMES, LLC, 188 N.J. 531 (2006)....................... 12 POINT II ................................................................................................................. 14 RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THIS ACTION BECAUSE THE EMINENT DOMAIN ACT PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF ALL ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT’S EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (RAISED BELOW: 2T16-17) .................................................. 14 POINT III........................................................................................................... 20 THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING DURING AND THEREFORE DEPRIVED DEFENDANTS OF THE OPPRTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE CONDEMNATION (RAISED BELOW: 1T24).............................................. 20 CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 23 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED October 20, 2023
[brief] 19.  [...], the Township’s Director of Public Works, found no safety hazard existed at the Subject Property:  Q. . . .  [D]o you see any that in your opinion would cause a safety hazard?  A.  Based on what I see, no.  [Pa191 at 41:2-3].  20.  More specifically, [...] testified the parking lot “doesn’t look nice, but there’s really no safety hazard.
[directive] When the Investigation is Criminal and the Officer Is a Witness  8.3.1  When interviewing a law enforcement officer as a witness, he or she must be made aware of the differences between being a witness in a criminal investigation and being the subject of a criminal investigation.  The officer also shall be advised that he or she is not the subject of the investigation at this time.  Appendix I provides a model form that may be used for this purpose.  If at any time the officer becomes a subject of the investigation, he or she shall be advised of that fact and the appropriate procedures must be followed.  8.3.2  Officers who are witnesses must cooperate.  They must truthfully answer all questions narrowly and directly related to performing their duty.  "Performance of duty" includes an officer's actions, observations, knowledge and any other factual information of which they may be aware, whether it concerns their own performance of duty or that of other officers.  If the officer feels their answer would incriminate him or her in a criminal matter, the officer must assert their Miranda rights.  8.4
[brief] Acting in the interests of the juvenile also does not require the parent, guardian, or trusted adult be conflict free:  [The Supreme Court] decline[s] to embrace a categorical rule that an attorney must be present any time there is a perceived clash in the interests of a parent based on a familial relationship with the victim or another involved in the investigation.  Even in cases of such apparent clashing interests, a parent may be able to fulfill the --- \(^4\)  It bears noting, though not relevant to the facts before this Court, that for “a juvenile under the age of fourteen,” the totality of the circumstances evaluation is different in order to account for the juvenile’s youth.  *Presha*, 163 N.J. at 315.  For such juveniles, the role of a parent, guardian or trusted adult is of paramount import, such that the absence of such an adult renders such the juvenile’s confession “inadmissible as a matter of law, unless the adult was unwilling to be present or truly unavailable.
[brief] Therefore, the reliability of the evidence or proper voir dire or instructions, argues the State, does not matter because the defense was able to challenge the State expert through cross-examination and did not put forth its own expert.  The State is missing the point.  At core, this case is not about whether or not the fingerprint examiner is “credible” or whether his “credibility” was attacked by the defense, as the State seems to suggest.  (Sb 27)  This case is about the trial court’s obligations to limit expert testimony to what is scientifically reliable, to ensure an impartial jury panel, and to properly instruct jurors.
[brief] However, [...]’s arguments largely ignore the statutory predecessors and history of the NJCFLA as they relate to private enforcement by aggrieved consumers.  Given that the statutes preceding the NJCFLA (which are largely comprised of the same codifications as the current NJCFLA), allowed for private enforcement, it is reasonable to infer that the legislature also intended for the NJCFLA to allow for private enforcement in addition to and conjunction with the enforcement remedies provided to Commissioner of Banking and Insurance.  Moreover, applicable jurisprudence shows that even in the absence of a private right of action, violations of the NJCFLA (akin to [...]’s undisputed violations here) give rise to a dispositive affirmative defense.  [...]’s arguments fail to address an assertion of the NJCFLA as an affirmative defense and largely conflate offensive claims to a defensive application of the same.  Thus, [...] submits his Reply to the Brief submitted by [...].
[brief] “Even though it’s 29 units, there are 24 market units.  So, essentially the five-unit affordables do not provide an asset to the builder, to the developer ... so ... you got to view this economically as a 24-unit project because that’s really what the developer is gaining from this.  Those 24 units have to offset the cost of all the site work, improvements and so on and so forth, and the remediation of course. ”  Pa193 at 79:6-9, 13-19, emphasis added.  Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that “[t]aken together, [Applicant’s Architect] testified that there would “be no way to justify a $375,000 cleanup cost with a building of that size.
[directive] 59  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail
[directive] Physical and Digital Mug Books  The following procedures will result in the composition of a physical or digital mug book.  An identification obtained in this manner should minimize any risk of misidentification and have stronger evidentiary value than one obtained without these procedures.  1.  Duplicates.  Preparers should ensure that only one photo of each individual is in the mug book.  2.  Double-Blind Administration.  In order to ensure that inadvertent verbal cues or body language do not have an impact on a witness, whenever practical, the person conducting the mugshot-identification procedure should be someone other than the primary investigator assigned to the case.  In many departments, depending upon the size and other assignments of personnel, this may be impossible in a given case.  In those cases where the primary investigating officer conducts the identification procedure, they should be careful to avoid inadvertent signaling to the witness of any “correct” response.  3.  Instructions.  The witness should be instructed prior to the identification procedure that the perpetrator may not be among those in the mugshots they will view and, therefore, they should not feel compelled to make an identification.  4.  Sequence.  If feasible, mugshot-identification procedures should be conducted sequentially, i.e., showing one photo or one person at a time to the witness, rather than simultaneously.  See Section I.A.3.  5.  Extraneous Information.  Ensure that no writings or information concerning previous arrest(s) will be visible to the witness.  II.  CONDUCTING THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE
[brief] Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  The collective bargaining agreement between the [...] and the Division in force and affect at the time of the grievance ranges from July 1, 2019, through June 30, 2023.  Pa23.  The [...] is the sole and exclusive representative for all New Jersey State Troopers (excluding Sergeants, Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, Lt. Colonels, and the Colonel) employed by the State of New Jersey.  Pa23.  The collective bargaining agreement contains a multi-step grievance procedure for the purpose of resolving disputes arising between the parties, with binding arbitration, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Public Employment Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”), as the terminal procedure if a dispute was not resolved.  Pa23.  This matter involves the issue as to whether the Kendellen Award violates N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 and 9.  The underlying grievance pertains to whether the Division violated the parties’ collective bargaining agreement when it failed to follow the contractual language for computing overtime.
[brief] (Pa471; 2T14).  See, e.g. Labega v. Joshi, 470 N.J. Super. 472, 495 n.12 (App. Div. 2022)(declining to allow Plaintiffs to proceed on theories a negligence per se or breach of an alleged contract to staff a hospital department without an expert).  [...]’s decision to reconsider the motion, including all undisputed facts, did not deny Plaintiffs due process.  [...] simply disagreed with the materiality of [...]’ unavailability, which she correctly found was a key issue to establish proximate cause.  As discussed more fully in Points II and III, [...]’s analysis of the evidence was correct.