ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The template also could be customized as an Order or Notice for use by Municipal Courts.  2  The attached order is appropriate for situations in which a party has communicated directly or through counsel that they do not consent to a remote hearing.  It is not appropriate for a situation in which an attorney is unable despite diligent efforts to ascertain or advise the court of their client’s position.  In that latter situation, the scheduling order should state how the hearing will be conducted (remotely or in person), which, as noted above, is left to the discretion of the court after considering the positions of other parties.  Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021
[brief] THE JUDGMENT IS AN UNNECESSARY DUPLICATIVE SANCTION (Da7-9, ¶¶5,7; Da20, ¶55; Da177; 1T68-72)  [...] does not even address [...]’s argument that the unprecedented prior sanctions against [...] for the same conduct [...] complains of in his opposition – including, but not limited to [...]’s full-time incarceration, now ongoing for over two years, and the $2.7 million+ in attorneys’ fees already awarded to [...] for remedying specific bad acts – should be considered by this Court in evaluating the reasonableness of the fee award on appeal.  The fact is, the judgment is a duplicative sanction for conduct [...] has already been, and continues to be, strongly sanctioned for, and it is therefore unjustifiable.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] published a CCIP Manual setting forth the rules for enrollment, which was distributed to all contractors before they began work at the Project Site.  Pa579-Pa616.  The CCIP Manual named [...] as the “CCIP Broker,” [...] as the CCIP “Program Manager,” and [...] as the CCIP “Program Administrator. ”  Pa584.  The CCIP Manual defined “enrolled” contractors as “[e]ligible Subcontractors and Sub-Subcontractors that have submitted all necessary enrollment forms and documents, and have been accepted into the CCIP as evidenced by a Certificate of Insurance. ”  Pa586.  Enrollment could only be established by a Certificate of Insurance issued to a subcontractor by the Program Administrator, [...].  Pa588.
[directive] 5.  Order #4 - Order Committing a Defendant Who Continues to Attachment 5  Be Incompetent to Stand Trial and a Danger to Themselves, or Others, Property for Further Evaluation after 180 Days  This order continues the commitment under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6 for a defendant who is not competent and continues to be dangerous a result of mental illness after the three month as review Order #3.  This order continues hospitalization for the defendant for six months.
[brief] Social transition—which includes non-medical steps to align one’s gender expression with one’s gender identity (e.g., different clothing, hairstyle, name, or pronouns)—may be part of a medical provider’s package of recommendations for alleviating the symptoms of gender dysphoria in youth with this diagnosis.  Notably, all the cases [...] cites in support of the proposition that courts have recognized social transition as a form of psychological treatment involve individuals with gender dysphoria.
[brief] Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.  Further, while New Jersey pension statutes are construed liberally because of their remedial character, *Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), “an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute. ”  *Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps. ’ Ret. Sys.*, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted).  Here, the statute provides for the benefit if a retiree files for it within two years of the effective date of the Ricci Act, i.e., by July 8, 2021.  [...] did not file for the benefit within the time permitted by the statute, so even under a liberal construction, the statute expressly states he is ineligible for the benefit he now seeks.
[brief] The alleged assignment of 2/28/2014 (097a) was never authenticated by a certificate of acknowledgment required by NJSA 2A:82-17.  And it was never authenticated by an affidavit or certification of personal knowledge required by Rule 1:6-6.  The alleged affidavit of Lost Note fabricated by [...] on 2/12/2014 (088a) was not recorded in the Hall of Records.  It was unauthenticated and it had an unauthenticated attachment (091a) which was an unauthenticated copy of the alleged Note.  In the unauthenticated copy of the alleged Note (091a) there was no indorsement from [...] to any party.  [...], in the alleged Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/2014 (088a) did not explain from where/who it got the Note (091a), how it got the Note, and when it got the Note.  Those details are required by the NJ UCC Laws for a lost Note affidavit.  The alleged Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/2014 (088a) did not have wet ink original and it was submitted to the Foreclosure Court of the Superior Court of Monmouth County on 12/30/16 by [...]’s attorney.  On 1/4/2016 finally [...] and [...] dismissed their own foreclosure complaint of 3/10/2009 ([...]) which was already suspended by [...] in 12/20/2010’s order (068a) because of the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 from [...] to [...] (065a).
[brief] (Pb16-Pb17). \(^{10}\)  [...] did not find it was only the “to the extent” language that was impermissibly --- \(^8\)  Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177, 190 (1986) (1980)(citation omitted)(Ordinarily, a claim for indemnification requires the claimant to be free of fault.)
[brief] Defendant argues that the trial court improperly determined that his March 6, 2018, statement was non-custodial and his March 12, 2018, statement should have been suppressed as the unlawful product of that previous statement.  This argument is meritless because it ignores the substantial body of evidence that the trial court relied on in properly determining that the March 6 statement was non-custodial.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, “no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  Although no comparable privilege exists in the New Jersey Constitution, it “is firmly established as part of the common law of New Jersey and has been incorporated into our Rules of Evidence. ”  In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 331 (1982); See also N.J.R.E. 503; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19.  To effectuate these constitutional protections, the police are required to give adequate warnings to a suspect in custody prior to conducting an interrogation.  An interrogation subject must be told that he or she has “the right to remain silent. . . the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he [or she] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed to him [or her] prior to any questioning. ”  *Miranda*, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).  Finally, the suspect must also be told that he or she has the “opportunity to exercise these rights . . . throughout the interrogation. ”  Ibid.  In announcing the *Miranda* rule, Chief Justice [...] further held that an accused may waive these rights, “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. ”  Ibid.  If an accused has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her *Miranda* rights, any subsequent self-incriminating statements by the accused are admissible at trial.  *Id.* at 469  However, “*Miranda* warnings are required only when a person is subject to ‘custodial interrogation. ’”  *State v. Dispoto*, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 214 (App. Div. 2006), aff’d as modified, 189 N.J. 108 (2007).
[brief] The Court found:  ...  it is clear that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the vote to retain the [...] and fire [...] was a conflict of interest for the [...]/[...] and the [...], because the benefits [in the form of recovery of attorneys’ fees and avoidance of personal liability for adversaries’ attorneys’ fees] would flow entirely to them as individuals and against the Association as explained above.  The decision to have new counsel withdraw filings that had put [...] and [...] at financial risk, to the detriment of the Association’s financial interests, is on its face a breach of fiduciary duty.  No evidence was presented that [...]’s and [...]’s spouses had interests divergent from theirs.  Any financial award against them can be presumed, absent evidence to the contrary, to impact their spouses as well.  Therefore, all of them had a personal interest in not paying the Association any money, in direct conflict with the Association’s interest in collecting any such funds.  The same is true of the $1 to $2 million in attorney’s fees that [...] and [...] wish to recover for from the Association in Shelburne Cliffs I if they succeed on appeal – a substantial portion of which would go to [...] as counsel in that case.  Such a result would clearly be in the interests of the [...]/[...], and antithetical to the interests of the Association.  Thus, plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that the [...] and [...]/[...] breached their fiduciary duties and that their six votes could not be counted towards ratification.
[brief] Da233; Da235; [7T8:13-12:8].  On November 28, 2023, [...] filed its motion for a new trial.  Da229.  It argued that the trial court erroneously denied [...]’s motions for a directed verdict because the court’s rulings were not supported by the factual record or the applicable law.  Specifically, the trial court made such rulings despite the fact that Plaintiff 3  During the jury charge conference and after the parties have already submitted their request to charge, Plaintiff also improperly argued that the jury instructions should state that notice is not required.  [6T70:20-71:23].  The trial court denied Plaintiff’s request, holding that Plaintiff must prove notice and the jury would be instructed on actual and constructive notice.  [6T77:1-6]. presented no evidence of notice or palpable unreasonableness.  However, on January 22, 2024, the trial court denied [...]’s motion for a new trial.  Da231.  The City filed a notice of appeal to this court on February 9, 2024 and amended notices of appeal on February 22, 2024 and February 26, 2024.  Da007; Da012; Da017.  The City filed a final amended notice of appeal on March 14, 2024. Da023.  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[directive] 3.  Èske w konprann ke si jij la ta detèmine ke konpòtman ou karakterize antan ke konpòtman residivis ak enkontwolab epi w pa ta dispoze resevwa tretman pou delenkan seksyèl (pwofite de) men ou pa dispoze patisipe nan tretman a, jij la va kondane w a pije yon tèm nan prizon nan yon lòt etablisman ki pa ofri tretman epi tou pou delenkan seksyèl nan ka sa a ou pap jwenn rediksyon sou santans la pou bòn kondwit oswa kredi pou tan ke w deja pije nan lòt etablisman a?
[brief] How would that help the Company versus only the members who voted to relieve themselves of their personal obligation?  In fact, the imposition of this reimbursement obligation reduced the value of [...] “dollar for dollar” by $2.8 million.  (8T62:17-63:8)  (6T33:4-34:8)  Each member’s equity interest dropped “dollar for dollar” proportionately to his ownership by this vote to impose a liability for the Plaintiffs’ personal legal fees.  (Ibid.)  Moreover, the Plaintiffs hold minor interests in [...] and, even combined, they held far less than [...] held alone.  [...] held 11.8%.  (Pa2578)  [...] owns only 1.85% (Ibid.)  [...] has only 1.81% ownership.  (Ibid)  [...] has only 1.69% (Ibid.)  Conversely, [...] held 29.5%.  Thus, the Plaintiffs who “voted” to shift their personal legal fee obligations to all members of [...] own only 17.15% combined.  At the same time that they escaped 81.5% of their fees by this “vote”, they charged [...], who was their direct litigation adversary, 29.5% of their fees.  They also charged the rest to the 52% non-party members of [...].  Clearly, there was no legitimate business reason from the company’s perspective or a company benefit from this vote.
[directive] Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?  1tJ 7} 19971d 1 9 oj + A] '8~-tr 7]  ~oJ]  $35 ¾ 7-]  ~-e-n Oj: 15}-E 7.Jtl]  ~_Q_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~,i.~ g -3! o}1J y 7!}? h.  You will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for [Yes/oil] [No/0 1-i...1-8..] the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing?
[brief] [...] emailed [...] on March 19, 2018, not attaching [...], and explained the technical background of the installation of the vapor intrusion mitigation system to which they attained authorization from [...] and his manager.  (Da18 pg. 68, Line 10 through pg. 69, Line 7; Da418-Da422.)  [...] emailed [...] on April 2, 2018 with regard to installation of the sub slab depressurization system.
[directive] Defendants who: • Are determined to not be home during the random home detention check; • Who fail to respond to a random home detention check; or, • Who are unable to prove that they are in their residence of release.  PSP staff shall are noncompliant with their home detention condition of immediately file a Violation Monitoring with the court.  After PSP staff file the of if of violation monitoring, it will be the duty the State to determine there is probable cause to arrest the defendant for criminal contempt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9.  of Page 6 12 III.  HOME DETENTION WITH ELECTRONIC MONITORING (HDEM)
[brief] Given the size, scale and mass at which Plaintiff sought to construct the building, on a parcel that is only slightly more than half an acre, the project also failed to comply with B-3 Zone requirements as to floor area ratio, combined side-yard setback, building height, building coverage and generator location.  Plaintiff thus sought approval to deviate from zoning criteria for the aforesaid conditions as well.  In short, its development application violated [...]’s Zoning Ordinance in substantial ways such that it required extensive variance relief.
[brief] *(Addressing [...]’s Private Right to a Cause of Action Argument in Point I. D. of Opposition Brief – Db28–Db30)*  [...]’s Opposition fails to establish that it has a private right to a cause of action to sue the Board in Superior Court for a violation of an 18A school law statute.  Without any express or implied private right to a cause of action to sue the Board for purported violations of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the Counterclaim fails and must be dismissed as a matter of law.  [...]’s Opposition fails to posit meritorious arguments that it has a private right to a cause of action to sue the Board in Superior Court.  The Legislature enacted at least 59 separate Titles of statutes, which contains multiple thousands of statutes and subsections, and not to mention the thousands of regulations under the Administrative Code to implement the statutes.  Title 18A school laws are robust with at least 15 subtitles, 75 chapters, and thousands of individual statutes and subsections of statutes, in addition to the 33 chapters of Title 6A regulations within the Administrative Code.  That does not account for the scores of other non-18A statutes and non-6A regulations governing public school districts, such as Title 10’s civil rights statutes, Title 47’s public records statutes, and Title 59’s tort statutes, to name a few.  With the default sovereign immunity of public school districts, and the court’s gatekeeper status to protect public entities from unnecessarily litigating claims from private persons, just because a subsection of a statute exists, it does not mean that any person can sue any public entity for any statutory violation.  But that is exactly what [...] suggests should happen here.  Here, unlike the express rules, limitations, and procedures the Legislature provides private persons seeking to sue public entities for torts and civil rights violations, [...] cannot overcome the undisputed fact that the Legislature never expressed a private right to a cause of action to sue the Board in Superior Court for alleged violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).
[brief] **POINT SIXTEEN [Mistake of fact] (Argued at Pa221 – Pa227)**  The parties clearly disputed the amount of money owed in April and July 2020.  The court made a mistake of fact and legal error when it ordered [...] to pay the full amount claimed by [...] based solely on the self-serving certification and contested, purported payroll record from an irrelevant date produced by the Defendants.  Being that [...] never formally contested the non-payment of the April/July 2020 invoices until over two years later in response to a lawsuit, the court denied [...] the ability to pursue an establish an accord and satisfaction defense as to why [...] cannot now claim its owed for the April/July 2020 invoices.  **Page 53 – 54**
[brief] And indeed, § 13.10(a) requires that [...] “shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Estoppel Certificate from the commercial tenant prior to the Closing. ”  (Da211) (emphasis added).  The language requiring [...] to use “commercially reasonable efforts…. prior to the Closing” to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate makes it clear that this effort is required throughout the period before closing, that is to say a continuing obligation so long as an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate has not yet been obtained.
[brief] D.  THE DENIAL OF T&E MUST BE REMEDIED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE SINCE TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE FOR LAKEWOOD’S PUBLIC-SCHOOL STUDENTS  It is essential that the remedial process proceed as expeditiously as possible.  Lakewood’s public school students have already suffered devastating injuries as a result of the denial of their fundamental constitutional right to T&E.  As we have argued from the start of this overlong litigation, time is of the essence for those students.  The most powerful statement of this principle is in [...]’s concurring opinion in Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 478 (2011) (Abbott XXI) (Albin, J., concurring opinion):  Children go to school for a finite number of years.  They have but one chance to receive a constitutionally adequate education.  That right, once lost, cannot be reclaimed.  The loss of that right will have irreparable consequences, particularly for the disadvantaged children to whom SFRA was intended to give a fair chance at a thorough and efficient education.  We have been arguing this point, perhaps less elegantly but more frequently, from the start of this litigation.  Our only notable success thus far has been this court’s November 27, 2023, order, which accelerated the remand clock.  It is difficult to explain, let alone justify, how almost 10 years have been consumed by this case and how generations of Lakewood public-school students have suffered from inadequate education while the State, supposedly the protector of their interests, delays, obfuscates and denies that it has ultimate power and duty to assure their rights to T&E.
[brief] A.  **The Deposition Seeks Relevant Information.**  [...] and [...] listed [...] as a relevant witness in the Joint Case Management Report of the Underlying Action.  Aa490.  Yet, [...] claims his testimony is not relevant.  For the reasons set forth above, the testimony is clearly relevant.  If a subpoena seeks relevant information, it generally cannot be unreasonable, harassing, or oppressive.  New Jersey courts may consider a subpoena to be burdensome or harassing when the discovery would not “serve any useful purpose[.]”  *Gierman v. Toman*, 77 N.J. Super.  18, 24 (N.J. Super. 1962) (quoting *Blackman v. Pink*, 54 A.2d 728, 729 (N.J. App. 1947)) (holding that a subpoena request for information relevant only to punitive damages was harassing because information related to punitive damages would only be relevant after the right to recover had been established and determined).  Where discovery seeks relevant information, it is not for purposes of harassment.  *Perform Content Servs. v. Ness Global Servs.*, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1598 (N.J. Super Jul. 2, 2021) (where discovery “may reasonably lead to relevant information in connection with the claims asserted under the complaint,” it is not for purposes of “harass[ment]”); *Trunzo v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr. & John Doe 1-10 Fictitiously*, No. BER-L-2991-17, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 6113, at *4 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Nov. 22, 2019) (subpoena request was not unreasonable or oppressive because it “lead to relevant information regarding the Plaintiff[.]”).  [...] asserts that the subpoena is improper because it “does not outline the topics on which Plaintiffs are seeking to depose [...]. ”  But the case cited by [...] on that point -- *Wasserstein v. Swern & Co.*, 84 N.J. Super. 1, 6-7 (App. Div. 1964) – addresses a subpoena for documents, not a deposition, which is what this subpoena seeks.  There is no support for the proposition that a deposition subpoena to an individual must state the topics as to which testimony is sought.  **B.
[brief] For example, it has been demonstrated without contradiction that [...] received seventeen subsequent revisions of the site plan after the 2005 approval of the plan supplied to [...] by [...].\(^1\) (Db8, paragraph 11; Pa105-Pa203).  [...]’s negligence in failing to provide [...] with any of these revised plans finally became evident when [...] called [...] on March 24, 2010 to inquire why the elevations on [...]’s cut sheets did not correspond to the elevations on [...]’s current plans (see Pb11, first full paragraph, for a full description of this revelatory moment).  This was a full year after [...] began its work with the improper plan.  Additionally, [...] failed to appreciate the source-note on [...]’s cut sheet, which should have alerted [...] that [...] was working with outdated 2005 \(^1\)  The complete, full-size original site plans will be made available to the Court upon request. plans.  [...] also failed to respond to [...]’s warning on the cut sheet or notify [...] immediately of any revisions to the site plan.  (Pa432).  If [...] had caught the mistake at that point, before the strip mall on the site was erected, the whole chain of errors could have been averted at little cost to Appellants.  C.
[brief] [Analysis of Count 1 of the Counterclaim]  (Argued at Pa387 – Pa391)  Count One of the Counterclaim for an alleged “Breach of Contract” should be dismissed because [...] fails to establish all four elements of a prima facie case.  The prior points present procedural bars to the Counterclaim.  Also, when analyzing each of the three counts individually, it is apparent that [...] failed to establish a prima facie case under each count, necessitating a dismissal of each count individually.
[brief] (Pb16).  Still, despite the Board’s having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request under its inherent equitable power.  (Pa13-Pa14).  While a Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, it has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).  A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb13-14), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he did not receive the postcard.
[directive] Specialty training is encouraged.  Automatic/Semi-Automatic Subgun Qualification Course (ASQC ).  (See Appendix E).  This course must be completed two times a year with no less than three months between each qualification session.  This curse of fire shall be used for qualification of the personal defense weapon.  The 50 yard-line course of fire may be fired at the 25 yard-line utilizing an appropriate reduced size target.  Automatic/Semi-Automatic Subgun Night Qualification Course (ASNQC).