ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] I pagina de 2  Puntos importantes que debe recordar  Medicaciones para  No tome nunca ninguna medicaci6n recetada para otra persona, como para su madre, y otras personas: padre, hermanas, hermanos, novio, novia, amigos, amigas vecinos.  El uso de una medicina recetada para otra persona es una transgresion de la ley federal y de las reglas del tribunal de tratamiento de drogas.  y  Cuando no este  Si estuviera en duda, preguntele a su medico, al proveedor de tratamiento agente seguro: de libertad a prueba antes de tomar cualquier medicamento o suplemento de cualquier tipo.  Semillas de amapola  Nunca, jamas coma semillas de amapola (poppy seeds) ni roscas de pan (bagels) porque le podrian dar un positivo falso para la morfina.  Nunca trate de con todo justificar una prueba positiva de droga diciendo que comi6 semillas de amapola.  No le va a funcionar.  En un caso de emergencia, siga siempre las instrucciones de su medico, pero lleve esta notificaci6n con usted en todo momento para que pueda mostrarsela a cualquier personal medico.  La firma del participante reconoce que usted ha recibido una copia de este documento.  Si tiene alguna duda, no vacile en hacerle sus preguntas al agente de libertad a prueba.  Fecha Firma del Participante en el Tribunal de Tratamiento de Droga
[brief] [...] argued this language inserted an improper qualification to the surety’s obligation to provide contract bonds in the full amount of the contract.  In opposition, the surety attested that becoming a co-surety with another surety company and including this particular language is “a generally recognized procedure in the bonding industry,” and “one which he had used ‘hundreds’ of times on [the surety’s behalf] ‘without any complaint or objection from any public authority. ’”  Id. (Emphasis added).  Like [...], [...] cited to Meadowbrook, DeSapio, and L. Pucillo.  In rejecting each of those comparisons, this Court held:  *We do not view [...]’s bid as suffering from any of the fatal defects identified in Meadowbrook Carting, Albanese, DeSapio, or L. Pucillo.  Unlike the bidders in Meadowbrook Carting and Albanese, [...] did provide a consent of surety.  And unlike the bidder in DeSapio, whose surety lamely promised only that it did not “anticipate any difficulty in provide bonds on…the project,” supra, 276 N.J. Super.  At 219, [...]’s surety expressly and unconditionally agreed to “execute the final bid bond” either individually or as a co-surety.  Nor did [...]’s surety, [...], reserve the right to refuse to renew the bid, which was the case in L. Pucillo, supra, 249 N.J.Super. at 548.*  Id. at *6.  Importantly, [...]’s consent of surety did not contain a power of attorney and was signed by one of the surety’s regional managers, who was designated as “attorney-in-fact. ”  Id.  Nonetheless, this Court affirmed the [...]’s awarding of the project to [...] stating that the surety’s “consent of surety satisfied the requirements imposed by N.J.S.A. 40A:11-22(b) and Meadowbrook [...]’s contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.  [...] and the surety submitted an executed consent of surety form that was submitted “hundreds” of times and never once rejected by any public agencies.  The same holds true in this Appeal.  [...] submitted the same Power of Attorney and Consent of Surety on over 225 prior projects where its customer contractor was the lowest bidder.  [...] sought reversal of the [...]’s decision based on a purported defect within the language of the consent of surety, just like [...] is now attempting to “re-interpret” [...]’s Consent of Surety and Power of Attorney.  The [...] Court properly held that Meadowbrook, DeSapio, and L. Pucillo were inapplicable.  And finally, [...] and its surety submitted a consent of surety with a limited power of attorney.  Nonetheless, this Court upheld [...]’s bid and its consent of surety specifically ruling that “[...]’s remaining contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. ”  Id.  In short, [...]’s contention that [...]’s consent of surety was invalid because it submitted a limited power of attorney was so meritless that the Court did not even render a written opinion.
[brief] [...]’s Brady violation involves the principal charge.  It’s a much worse situation.  It means the Absecon or State or both have always planned to railroad the defendant on the higher charge by getting rid of the “inconvenient” registration.  Then they were caught and the person settles the case so that he can get his life back and maybe find a job (no “record”).  This is what the two Justices are worried about in Heck & Spencer.  [...] is suing for an Abuse of Process-type constitutional violation.
[brief] [Pa14,15]  A review of the May 12, 2023, decision of the Board of Trustees also demonstrates the Board focused on the fact that [...] was separated in order to collect unemployment benefits.  [Pa38,54]  The reliance on the fact that he collected unemployment benefits is misplaced and is not relevant to the issues in this appeal.  Rather than properly analyzing the facts of this case, and the controlling law concerning re-enrolling in the pension system when there is a temporary break in service N.J.S.A. 43:15-8(a), the Board focused on the fact the appellant received unemployment.
[brief] In the case at bar, the Trial Court correctly found that Plaintiff failed to establish this “most fundamental element of a CEPA claim. ” (Pa23).  In this regard, the Trial Court accepted as true Plaintiff’s contention that various criminal statutes were being violated by members of the public on the night of July 5, 2016.  (Pa23 to Pa24).  However, the Court found this fact to be irrelevant, stating that there was “no basis in this record to find that the Defendants were violating such statutes. ” (Pa24).  In short, there is absolutely no factual basis for the contention that the [...] or any of the individual defendants had done anything even arguably illegal or improper.  This holding is directly supported by Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony.  In particular, when asked what he contended Defendants did improperly in this case, Plaintiff stated, “[n]othing that I’m aware of. ” (Pa110 at T21-8 to 12).  Plaintiff also specifically testified that at the time he made the radio transmissions, he did not believe that anyone acting under his command was doing anything illegal or improper.  (Pa109 at T20-2 to 6).  Nor did he make the radio transmissions in order to correct any allegedly illegal or improper conduct by Defendants.  (Pa109 at T20-7 to 10).  As the Court noted in Dzwonar, under such circumstances, “[t]he trial court can and should enter judgment for a defendant when no such law or policy is forthcoming. ”  177 N.J. at 463.  In reaching its decision in the case at bar, the Trial Court also correctly distinguished the case law cited by Plaintiff.  In particular, the Court found that all of the cases cited by Plaintiff involved alleged practices or policies of the employer claimed to be illegal or in violation of public policy which were the predicate for the plaintiffs’ alleged protected activity under CEPA.
[brief] (Pa9).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on November 29, 2023.  (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.
[brief] Correspondence from Plaintiff Submitting proposed Order Granting Certain Preliminary Injunctive Relief ................Da252-56 November 15, 2023 proposed Consent Order Appointing Mediator .........................................................................................................................Da257-58 November 15, 2023 Order Granting Certain Preliminary Injunctive Relief .........................................................................................................................Da259-62 November 15, 2023 Consent Order Appointing Mediator ........................................Da263-64 January 2, 2024 Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaim ..............................................Da265-74 January 19, 2024 Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Consolidate ...............................Da275-77 February 29, 2024 Certification of [...], Esq. in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Consolidation .........................................................Da278-80 Exhibit 1 – Verified Complaint, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da3-23 ........................................................................................................Da281 Exhibit 2 – Operating Agreement of [...], Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da120-36 ........................................Da282 Exhibit 3 – Operating Agreement of [...] - Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da137-52 .................................................................Da283 Exhibit 4 – Law Division Verified Complaint - Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da75-103 .........................................................Da284
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was properly denied and the trial court’s February 10, 2023 Order denying reconsideration should be affirmed.  Likewise, and to the extent considered by this Court, defendant [...] was entitled to summary judgment and the trial court’s January 6, 2023 Order granting ASA’s motion for summary judgment should also be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant [...]  By: s/ [...] [...] (025651987)  Dated: October 25, 2023  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASA DESIGN BUILD, LLC; [...]; JOHN DOE #1-10 AND ABC CORP. #1-10, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] *The Historical Deeds Relied Upon By The Trial Court, Standing Alone, Were Insufficient To Support The Trial Court’s Ruling.*  In our earlier brief, at pages 11-13, we explained why the Appellate Division’s discussion of the stranger-to-the-deed rule in *Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith*, 210 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 1986), was not a categorical rejection of the rule but was limited to the unique facts of that case.  At pages 13-16, we also offered reasons why the rule makes sense today, even if its archaic origins are no longer relevant.  We also explained how rejection of the rule would make New Jersey an outlier among its neighbors in the region.  [...] argues that a grantor’s clearly-expressed intention to confer rights on a third party should be respected, but as we explained at pages 16-19 of our earlier brief, there is no evidence in this record of the [...]’ intention other than the text of the deed itself.  The deed purports to except and reserve “the rights” of the public or owners of the [...] Lot to use “a roadway or driftway” across [...]’s land but nowhere mentions an easement *per se*.  It is unclear from the deed recital alone whether the [...] intended to preserve some undefined rights already in existence at the time of the transaction, or to create new ones in the transaction itself.  And nothing in the motion record below establishes how and when those rights were created, what limitations, if any, were intended on their exercise, or how intense a right of access the grantors intended.  **Point III**
[brief] The thrust of the proof addressed to the negative criteria by the Applicants is similar.  Respecting the first prong of the negative criteria, that the variance can be granted “without substantial detriment to the public good,” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, the focus is on the effect on surrounding properties of the grant of the variance for the specific deviations from the conditions imposed by ordinance.  "The board of adjustment must evaluate the impact of the proposed use variance upon the adjacent properties and determine whether or not it will cause such damage to the character of the neighborhood as to constitute 'substantial detriment to the public good.'"  Medici, supra, 107 N.J. at 22 n. 12, (quoting Yahnel, supra. 79 N.J. Super. at 519, (explaining weighing function of board of adjustment in respect of negative criteria)).  Regarding the second prong, that the variance will not "substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance," N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), the board of adjustment must be satisfied that the grant of the variance for the specific project at the designated site is reconcilable with the municipality's legislative determination that the condition should be imposed on all uses in that zoning district.  [...] here failed to meet this rigorous burden of proof as there was no testimony to these standards presented to the Board.
[brief] Therefore, taking selective analysis in different sections of the basin in order to show a passing groundwater mounding analysis is in direct conflict with the instructions of the BMP Manual.  [...] also alleges that [...]’s analysis is incorrect because it cited the BMP Manual instructions relating to tube permeameter testing rather than single ring infiltration testing.  However, [...] did in fact use Shelby Tube Tests, which are tube permeameter testing.  (Aa1627-Aa1635).  Regardless, Chapter 13 makes it clear and unambiguous that for groundwater mounding analysis, the slowest infiltration rate shall be used.  For these reasons, the project fails to meet the groundwater recharge requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4, and the NJDEP’s issuance of the FHA Permit is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be vacated and reversed.
[brief] The pollution exclusion in the [...] Umbrella Policy is central to [...]’s claim here because the dispute involves, among other things, the allocation of pollution and non-pollution damages.  Specifically, the Second Amended Complaint seeks damages stemming from the collapses of the Sixth Street Pier and the alleged release of dielectric fluid into the Hudson River.  Da59-62, ¶¶ 46-67; Da93, ¶ 233.  While [...] alleges certain environmental damages, other alleged damages are non-environmental, such as the removal of concrete debris and repairing the Sixth Street Pier.  Da61, ¶ 59.  Indeed, this mix of alleged damages, and the issue of what damages are subject to the pollution exclusion, resulted in a settlement between [...] and the primary CGL insurers and one umbrella insurer, all of which had pollution exclusions in their respective policies.  Thus, the scope of the pollution exclusion in the [...] Umbrella Policy is central to determining [...]’s potential coverage obligations.  Accordingly, the lower court’s ruling, without explanation, that the [...] Umbrella Policy’s arbitration clause “does not apply here” is patently incorrect as the pollution exclusion will determine the extent of potential coverage for [...]’s claims under the [...] Umbrella Policy.  T1 76:24-25.  Indeed, the lower court went on to say “[a]nd admittedly if there were an issue with regard to Exclusion Q, arbitration would have been required…”  T1 76:25 - 77:2.  The best proof of this is that [...] continues to assert a claim against [...] under the Umbrella Policy and has refused to withdraw that claim.  The FAA requires that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. ”  Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).  Here, whether there potentially is a valid claim under the [...] Umbrella Policy is a function of how the pollution exclusion applies and whether the alleged non-pollution damages, if any, are sufficient to trigger the policy.  This issue should be determined by an arbitration panel.  III.
[brief] Instead, the issue was whether the Appellant was able to establish the Respondent’s notice of the alleged hazard, namely the liquid on the floor.  The Appellant has put the cart before the horse.  Before even addressing whether the Respondent’s inspection procedures were adequate, the Appellant would have to prove that the condition existed long enough such that the condition could have been discovered and addressed through reasonable inspection.  Because the Appellant is unable to establish notice, summary judgment was properly granted.  **CONCLUSION**  For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully submit that this appeal should be denied and the lower Court’s ruling granting summary judgment affirmed.  We appreciate the Court’s consideration.  Respectfully yours, [...] 13:24-14:6.
[directive] To ensure the integrity of the investigation of “Law Enforcement Incidents” conducted pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, and to avoid possible contamination of a witness's personal recollection of events that could undermine his or her credibility as a witness, notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, no civilian or law enforcement witness, including the principals of the investigation, shall be given access to or view a BWC recording of the incident, or a BWC recording of the response or on-scene investigation of the incident, without the express prior approval of the “Independent Investigator,” as that term is defined in AG Directive 2019-4.  10.3
[brief] A.  Standard of Review  The interpretation or construction of a contract is a legal question, reviewed de novo by this court.  Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 371 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (App. Div. 2004); see also Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth., 404 N.J. Super. 514, 528 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that “unless the meaning is both unclear and dependent on conflicting testimony[,]” the court interprets the terms of a contract as a matter of law).  In our review, the “trial court’s interpretation of the law and legal consequences that flow from” it are “not entitled to any special deference. ”  Serico v. Rothberg, 234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018), Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2011), Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  Specific to this appeal, contractual indemnification for one’s own negligence must be clearly and unequivocally manifested in the contract’s language.
[brief] In a letter to Plaintiff, dated January 29, 2010, [...] cautioned Plaintiff about depositing more funds with the new company.  (Pa 0131 – Pa 0132).  By May 21, 2010, in an email by [...] to [...], copying Plaintiff, [...] told [...] that Plaintiff had already paid $392,391 to [...] for the modular structure and was about to send him a further $470,870 for the structure.  (Da174).  He remarked that despite the substantial sums that Plaintiff had already paid, he had yet to see the “benefit of anything concrete from [...]. ” (Id.).  [...] then inquired, “How can we secure these payments?” (Id.).  Around this time, Plaintiff began to lose patience with [...] after the construction project was not being completed as quickly as Plaintiff desired.
[brief] When the public hearings ended, the Board believed that the Project was to have elevators in all the multi-story buildings, including Building E as expressed by [...]’s counsel in an email on June 12, 2022:  To follow up, [...] accepts the proposal discussed on Friday.  To sum up, [...] will agree to install an elevator in Building E if (i) the Planning Board and the governing body approve one additional story with no more than 10 total units only 1 of which is affordable and (ii) contingent upon the Planning Board approving the [...] project on Monday, 6/13 (see below).
[brief] The lower court correctly reached the same result here, where the descriptions of [...]’ conduct made clear that intimidation and scaring the underlying plaintiffs was the inherently probably consequence of his threatening actions.  The lower court noted in that regard that “[...]’ conduct of ‘screaming, cursing, assuming threatening postures, [and] refusing to leave a private office when asked,’ did precipitate reactions in the underlying Plaintiffs ‘of such behavior that were indeed inherently probable consequences of [...]’ action. ’” (Pa396).  As such, [...]’ actions can in no way be the result of an accident or negligence.  Even if [...] could somehow demonstrate that the allegations of the underlying lawsuit come within the insuring agreement of his [...] homeowners policy, the policy’s expected or intended injury exclusion applies to bar coverage in that regard.
[brief] ”).  In this case, on April 1, 2023, City Fire Captain [...] (“[...]”) dual-filed a complaint/charge with the DCR and EEOC.  (Pa127).  As such, Mulligan was barred from bringing or maintaining a judicial action based on the same alleged misconduct while a DCR matter is ongoing.  N.J.S.A. §10:5-27.  It goes without saying that Plaintiff [...] could not advance or maintain a claim in Superior Court on his behalf (and which sought individualized compensatory damages under the LAD) that could not be brought or maintained by Mulligan himself.  This fact may be why Plaintiff sought to mask “[...]’s” identity herein.  At base, the City posited why would Plaintiff advance “[...]” again in its Second Amended Complaint when it knew “[...]” had elected for the DCR/EEOC?  At that point, to do so, was a knowing disregard of New Jersey law.  As such, the Second Amended Complaint was improper and a further waste of the Trial Court’s time.
[directive] In other words, the defendant’s eligibility to receive a standardized “open” offer on this Page 48  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) ground would ultimately be determined by the judge, not the prosecutor.  The prosecutor’s role would simply be to bring to the attention of the court any known objective facts warranting a reasonable belief that the defendant may be drug or alcohol dependent and in need of diagnostic treatment assessment and treatment services.  This portion of the Guidelines is designed ultimately to empower the court to use its statutory and inherent authority to identify and leverage addicted offenders to participate in clinically-appropriate, court-supervised treatment and counseling programs.
[brief] That notice satisfied the Ricci Act, which requires only that the Board notify members of the enactment of the statute.  The Legislature is well aware of how to create specific notice requirements and has done so with other statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-50(a) (“Notification shall be by certified mail to the spouse’s address as provided on the form by the member. ”); e.g., Hammond v. --- Certifying Officers are required to complete training developed by the Division to ensure their compliance with pension fund or retirement system matters.  N.J.S.A. 43:3C-15.  For example, Certifying Officers are aware that they will be guilty of a fourth degree crime for making a false statement, or falsifying any record or report with respect to the enrollment of persons into the pension or retirement system.