ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Doctors, Medicine and Drug Court lndee,!ndenu • tnt~ rlt;i: Fairn~s •QualityStrvlct  What do you do if you need to go to a doctor or hospital for pain or other medical problem?  Question: Answer: Tell the doctor or nurse who examines you that you are in recovery.  Most doctors and nurses these days will understand that a person in recovery should not take Why? certain medications such as narcotic painkillers, certain cough syrups (with alcohol and codeine), muscle relaxers or tranquilizers.  Make sure that you tell any medical professional who is treating you that you are in recovery.  Explain to them that you should not take any mood/mind altering substances as it may trigger a relapse and may result in a positive drug test.  - - -
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgments as Appellant Did Not Properly Oppose Material Facts**  Appellant was granted numerous opportunities by the Trial Court to present her case as to why summary judgment should not have been entered against her– the first was in response to [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the second arose in her request for reconsideration, and the third took place in connection with [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaims.  There are two simple reasons why the Appellant failed each time.  First, she admitted either through sworn testimony, or discovery responses to providing false or misleading information to [...].  Second, Appellant’s argument that material facts existed suffered from a fatal flaw – the factual dispute (to the extent one even existed) was created by Appellant herself.  As such the Trial Court did not commit reversible error by rejecting Appellant’s self-serving characterizations in her certification.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1.  PRE-FIRST APPEAL AND APPEAL\(^1\)  On 12/18/15, the judge granted [...]'s requested relief and prevailing party attorney's fees.  (14a)  On 8/7/15, the judge granted the Board's motion to stay pending the outcome in *L.R. v. Camden City Public School District* (*L.R. I*), 452 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 2017).  (14a)  This case was then further stayed by *L.R. v. Camden City Public School District* (*L.R. II*), 238 N.J. 547 (2019)(14a)  This case, like all the other consolidated LR cases, were then remanded to Camden Vicinage.  However, this case because it was found to be distinguishable from the other cases, was then severed and sent back to Union County.  (14a)  2.  PRE-SECOND APPEAL  On 5/22/20, [...] held [...] was distinguished from *L.R.* and was entitled to access to the requested IDEA final administrative decisions incorporating \(^1\) 1T:8/26/22; 2T:11/10/22; 3T:12/16/22 settlement agreements not subject to a protective order.  34 C.F.R. § 300.513(d) and Keddie v. Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 689 A.2d 702 (1997)  (15a)  The Board maintained they were still entitled to a $105,000 special service charge to search their special education student's records for the requested records.  (16a)  However, [...] obtained the case activity sheets from [...] for the Board which identified 11 students with final decisions responsive to the records sought in [...]'s OPRA Request.  (16a)  [...] (while expressing his disdain for the Board's conduct) denied the $105,000 special service charge after finding the Board's attorney not only knew which cases had the responsive records but held the litigation files.  (17a)  On 8/28/20, [...] awarded [...] Prevailing party attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $78,646.  (17a)  C.  SECOND APPEAL
[directive] Process for Conducting Independent Investigations  A. General.  As soon as any local, county, or state law Step 1: Notification to Attorney enforcement agency learns of a Law Enforcement Incident, the agency should immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office of the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the OPIA Director or their designee.  B.  Responders.  In the moments immediately following a LE Step 2: Arrival of First Incident, emergency first responders have a duty to address any imminent threats to public safety and minimize the loss of life.  First responders can and should carry out those duties, while also ensuring that they do not take any actions that would undermine the integrity of a subsequent investigation into the LE Incident.  As a result, nothing in this Directive should be construed to preclude any law enforcement officer or emergency medical professional from responding to the scene of the LE Incident for following purposes: 1.  Providing or facilitating prompt medical assistance to any injured person; 2. Responding to any ongoing threat to public safety; 3.  Preserving evidence and securing the scene, including by controlling traffic or preventing members of the public from interfering with the activities of first responders; Page 4 4. Identifying eyewitness and asking them to remain near the scene until appropriate investigators can interview them; and 5.  Participating in the pursuit or be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) search for any person suspected of committing a crime related to the LE Incident, including taking any investigative steps (e.g., canvassing, interviewing) in furtherance of such pursuit.  C. Investigator.  As soon as possible after learning of the Step 3: Selection of Independent LE Incident, the OPIA Director shall determine which state or county law enforcement agency shall serve as the Independent Investigator.  The OPIA Director shall appoint the Independent Investigator taking into account the default rules described below, unless the selected law enforcement agency is unable to do so because of an actual, potential, or perceived conflict of interest, in which case the OPIA Director shall either seek to mitigate the conflict or identify another agency to serve as Independent Investigator.
[brief] (¶ 12, TRVa3.)  [...] retained [...] to perform “earthwork, S[upport] O[f] E[xcavation] and underpinning” at the Project.  (Subcontract, TRVa430; Lorenz Tr. 27:16-28:8, TRVa1428.)  Separately, [...] was retained to perform demolition work on a retaining wall at the property line where the [...] was located and encroached onto the Project’s property.  (Lorenz Tr. 11:12-23, 15:24-16:17, 27:8-15, and 32:7-11, at TRVa1424-1425 and 1428-1429; and E-Mail, TRVa1447, with Attach. at TRVa1451.)  [...] subcontracted portions of the demolition work to [...].  (Boggs Tr., 11:2-25, TRVa1460; Lorenz Tr., 76:5-10 and 77:5-19 at TRVa1440; E-Mail, TRVa1447-1448, with Attach. at TRVa1449-1451.)  B.  [...]’s Direct Liability Policies
[brief] 7T 5:9-17.  As finally submitted, the variances sought included two d variances for use and density, several c variances: (1) 39% impervious coverage where 30% is permitted, (3) three stories where 2.5 are permitted, (4) 4.6’ parking separation from the building where 15’ is required, (5) 29.3’ parking setback from the road where 50’ is required, (6) 117 parking spaces where 194 are required, and (7) a monument sign where none is permitted.  7T 36-40, 42-43, 44, 45, 49, 51, and design exceptions for steep slope disturbance, including where no disturbance is allowed, and for not providing a bike lane.  7T 55,56.  At the final hearing, the Board Planner concluded, “I don’t necessarily agree that this is a detriment free application.
[brief] The email provides an inference that the de novo court had these documents.  (Da43-44.)  The record further shows that the de novo judge inquired into the Alcotest, even though that report was not the subject of the issues on de novo appeal.  (Da17.)  Thus, there is a question as to what was used to justify Defendant’s conviction.  While the State argues that the de novo court stated that its review was limited, the State’s analysis takes Defendant’s argument out of context.  (Sb9.)  The issue came as a result of Defendant’s argument as to the request for an adverse inference pursuant to *State v. Clawans*, 38 N.J. 162 (1962) because [...] did not testify.  (3T11:12-19.)  The point was that [...]’ testimony was inconsistent with his report – a point that was covered on cross-examination, but the trial court found that he could not consider it since the report was not in evidence.
[brief] These inferences are beyond the ken of the average juror.  State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 420 (2016) (noting that in drug distribution cases, “expert testimony is necessary to assist the jury in understanding the significance of packaging, weight, and concentration of drugs; drug paraphernalia; the manner in which drugs are concealed; and the peculiar characteristics of a drug-trafficking operation. ”).  The State attempted to address the significance of the digital scale by inappropriately inviting [...] to offer his expert opinion on the use of scales by drug dealers without qualifying him as an expert.  (4T 69-18 to 71-13); see, e.g., State v. Kittrell, 279 N.J. Super. 225, 236 (App. Div. 1995) (concluding that testimony by a non-expert law enforcement officer that drug dealers use beepers “exceeded the bounds of proper lay opinion testimony and crossed over into the realm of expert testimony”).
[brief] Order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration entered on April 26, 2024 ................................................................................................................Da59  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASE LAW  City of Newark v. [...], Docket No. [...] (N.J. App. Div. Oct. 16, 2024)  ..................................................................................................................22  Eherenstorfer v. Div. of Public Welfare, 196 N.J. Super. 405, 411 (App. Div. 1984)  ......................................................................................................................12  Evans v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 233 N.J. Super. 652, 664 (1989)  ................................................................................................................27  Fidelity Asset Management, LLC v. [...], [...], (N.J. App. Div. March 4, 2024)  ...........................................................................................................21  Flanigan v. McFeely, 20 N.J. 414, 420 (1956)
[directive] A 619. at Id. no-knock a New in Jersey years contained several over past the warrants executed of number State.  tracked across consistently the no-knock warrants was of not the use provision, significant risks no-knock present warrants determined that the studying issue, have After I and only rare in trust, and should used be and community safety, officer privacy, and public to no-knock regulating takes actions four Directive broad this Accordingly, circumstances. targeted commercial premises alike.  residences and both for warrants • exigent no-knock Absent of Directive prohibits generally the warrants.  use the First, authorization from the law officers permitted enforcement to are request circumstances, following circumscribed no-knock provision under warrant only the a for court announcing law—where conditions—narrower knocking than and permitted by (i) is what another of the safety particularized officer concern for or safety a reasonable and create will a (ii) the executes person trained no-knock tactical warrant.  team and • Division of Prosecutor, Justice Director of Criminal (DCJ the Second, County the their staff any a no- or senior approve Director), must designee includes warrant that legal provision.
[directive] A letter shall be sent to the complainant explaining the outcome of the investigation.  If the allegation was unfounded or the officer was exonerated, this conclusion shall be stated and defined for the civilian complainant.  If the allegation was not sustained, the letter shall provide the complainant with a brief explanation why the complaint was not sustained (e.g., insufficient proof, lack of witnesses, etc.).  If the allegation was sustained and discipline was imposed, the letter shall state that the allegation was sustained and that the officer has been disciplined according to agency procedures.
[brief] See State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 314 (2014) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. ”) (citation omitted).  Moreover, although they ultimately told her that she did not have to sign the consent form, the fact that police had already entered her home without asking permission to do so implied that she did not genuinely have the option of refusing consent.  Third, [...] knew that police would find contraband inside the apartment, and she knew that they knew it too.  While inside the apartment, before the consent forms were signed, [...] told [...] in front of police that she took possession of the gun.  (BWC4-A 43:50 to 44:45)  [...]’s boyfriend later exited the bedroom and, referring to the gun, said to police, “it’s right there. ”  (BWC4-A 45:40 to 46:05)  As explained in [...]’s initial brief, one factor tending to show that consent was coerced is that the consenting person knew the search would reveal contraband.  (Db 12)  See State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965).  Here, [...] was presented with direct evidence that there was a gun inside her apartment while police were present.  The notion that she could refuse to consent to a search under that circumstance is a false one.  At bottom, the State failed to prove that [...]’s ultimate decision to sign the consent form was not the product of inherently coercive circumstances.
[directive] b.  Any benefit as consideration for a decision, vote, recommendation or exercise of official discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding; or c.  Any benefit as consideration for a violation of an official duty of a public servant or party official; or 3rd Degree $10,000 to $35,000 10% permissible d.  Any benefit as consideration for the performance of official duties; second degree.  If benefit has value of $200 or less, then third degree.
[directive] also assessment).  suffering is defendant the that believe to basis objective an is there whether determining In but including circumstances, all relevant consider may prosecutor addiction, the of disease the from following: the to limited not or substance controlled a of influence the under be to appeared defendant the whether (a) user; drug a being to admitted has or offense, the of time the alcohol at and possession; drug for convicted or been arrested has previously defendant the whether (b) 55  Pagc for cligiblc the clinically found or admittcd been to has previously the defendant whether (c)  Program.  Court  Drug Associations, Personal on Restrictions Arrest, Curfews, House Monitoring, Electronic 6.2.5  Release Conditions.  Other and court the that request as appropriate shall general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant
[brief] DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS APPROPRIATE  “Appellate review of the length of a sentence is limited. ”  State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 127 (2011).  An appellate court “must not substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court,” State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) and is bound to affirm the sentence absent a “clear abuse of discretion. ”  State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984); see State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014).  As our Supreme Court has explained:  Appellate courts must affirm the sentence of a trial court unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not “based upon competent credible evidence in the record;” or (3) “the application of the guidelines to the facts” of the case “shock[s] the judicial conscience. ”  [Bolvito, 217 N.J. at 228 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65). ]  In general terms, judges are given wide but not unconstrained discretion at sentencing.  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 53-54 (2014).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has articulated the extent and limit of that discretion as follows:  When the aggravating and mitigating factors are identified, supported by competent, credible evidence in the record, and properly balanced, we must affirm the sentence and not second-guess the sentencing court, provided that the sentence does not shock the judicial conscience.  On the other hand, if the trial court fails to identify relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, or merely enumerates them, or forgoes a qualitative analysis, or provides little insight into the sentencing decision, then the deferential standard will not apply.  [Id. at 65 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). ]  The trial court sentenced defendant to an eight-year period of incarceration with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier subject to NERA.  The sentence globally resolved two outstanding cases: that for which defendant was convicted at trial and an unrelated, intervening case.  All in, defendant stood to be sentenced for one second degree count and two fourth degree counts, one of which stemmed from a separate scheme.  This placed his practical exposure at anywhere between five and eleven-and-a-half years.  The sentence would necessarily require an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, because of the Attempted Kidnapping conviction.  Accounting for defendant’s criminal history, the circumstances, and impact of the crime, the trial court found Aggravating Factors 3 and 9, applying “great weight” to the latter.  (8T20-2 to 21-15).  The trial court was not required to and did not find any Mitigating Factors.  The trial court’s sentence, therefore, was precisely centered within the authorized range.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] [...] Did Not Improperly Raise a New Issue in a Reply Brief and the Trial Court Properly Considered All Relevant Materials in Calculating Interest.  [...]’s first argues that [...] abused his discretion by considering interest calculations submitted by [...] in its Reply Brief in Support of its Motion for Entry of Judgment.  (Db, p. 68).  According to [...], it is improper to raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief.  However, none of the cases [...] cites support its position, and [...] did not raise a “new” issue.  In Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 2001), this Court held that the applicability of statue could not be raised for first time in an appellate reply brief.  Id. at 595-96.  Similarly, in Bouie v. N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 407 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2009), this Court held that the issue of whether a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 was preserved in the trial court could not be raised for first time in appellate reply brief.  Id. at 525 n.1.  In Goldsmith v. Camden Cty. Surrogate's Office, 408 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 2009), this Court held that the issue of whether the statute of limitations should be relaxed “in the interest of justice” cannot be raised for first time in appellate reply brief.  Id. at 387.  This case is not even close to comparable with the cases [...] cites.  The issue of the award and calculation of interest was not raised for the first time in [...]’s Reply Brief.  In its initial Brief in Support of its Motion for Judgment, [...] provided an interest calculation.
[brief] II.  THE BOARD'S DENIAL OF THE APPELLANT’S APPLICATION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (2T41-71)  Greater deference is ordinarily given to the denial of a variance than to a grant.  CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Plan. Bd., 414 N.J. Super. 563, 587 (App. Div. 2010).  In the event of the denial of a variance, the appellant has “the heavy burden of proving that the evidence presented to the board was so overwhelmingly in favor of the applicant that the board’s action can be said to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  Med. Realty v. Bd. Of Adj., 228 N.J. Super. 226, 233 (App. Div. 1988).  The burden of proving the right to relief sought in an application rests at all times upon the applicant.  Ten Stary Dom Ptp. V. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 30 (2013).  The burden rests with the applicant to establish the criteria for the grant of the variance and it must demonstrate that the affirmative evidence in the record dictates the conclusion that a denial would be arbitrary.  Kenwoods Assocs. v. Board of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J. Super 1 (App. Div. 1976).  Nowhere in Appellant’s brief does he provide the Court with viable proof that the board acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner.
[brief] (Ca022).  [...] found that “[t]he posting was public and there was no disclaimer to the effect that the statements were her own personal opinions, and not that of the Board or Board members. ” (Ca023).  [...] then found:  It is undisputed that respondent used her Facebook account as a platform for her election to the Board.  It is also undisputed that she also used it to publicize that she had been elected to the Board and was a sworn member.  It is this very same public platform that she used post-election to reach this same constituency – however, now she used it as a sitting Board member which carries greater weight, to promote action that was contrary to the Board’s obligations under the law.
[brief] In fact, what is also provable, via bodycam, is that when I asked the officer why he thought I had too much to drink, he didn’t know how to respond stating "based on my experience in administering the SFST" and "odor of alcohol".  Well after I cross examined him in court, we now know how credible his "experience" is in administering the SFST after he admitted he administered it wrong 2T:25-(22-25).  What is also provable is that in the police reports, he didn’t even note that my speech was slurred or any other indicators as to his reasoning for probable cause to arrest; He simply wrote "because he said he had one beer" (Da 3a).  The officer also failed to cite me for a refusal until 2 weeks later when the prosecutor called the officer on his cell phone and asked him to immediately issue a refusal citation.  (Da 4a)  The officer, prosecutor and judge’s justifications for probable cause is invalid.
[brief] Id. 7.  On October 3, 2019, the Trial Court’s extension of temporary immunity provided that the Township Defendants make progress towards resolving their Third Round obligation.  Id. 8.  In November 2019, [...]’s submission of concept plans and design standards for the subject Property and the Township Defendants’ unilateral cancellation of mediation sessions with [...].  Pa014-Pa015.  9.  On January 16, 2020, The Trial Court’s extension of the Township Defendants’ temporary immunity through January 2020, but finding in the same Order as follows:
[brief] Defendant argues that a 9-1-1 call can only form the basis for a finding of reasonable suspicion in the context of a motor vehicle stop.  Db20.  Defendant is incorrect.  *See State v. Rossman*, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1162 and *State v. Bailey*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1192.  In *Rossman*, a police officer conducted an investigatory stop based on a dispatch report relaying the contents of a 9-1-1 call.
[brief] Defendant argues that the trial prosecutor engaged in misconduct by effectively testifying as to certain aspects of the surveillance footage during summation in contravention of *State v. Watson*, 254 N.J. 558, 600 (2023).  The holding in *Watson* is prospective and therefore not applicable to the trial at bar, which concluded on September 27, 2022.  *(See generally* 7T).  Regardless, the prosecutor’s comments on the surveillance footage during summation constituted his “encourage[ment] [to] the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence” and did not demonstrate a “strateg[y]” to wait until summation to “spring . . . new and critical facts. ”  (*State v. R.B.*, 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005); Db26).  Further, defendant did not object to a single portion of the prosecutor’s summation, indicating that he did not initially believe the disputed statements were prejudicial.  (*Frost*, 158 N.J. at 83-84).  *Assuming arguendo* this Court determines the comments constituted prosecutorial misconduct, they were not “so egregious that [they] deprived the defendant of a fair trial.