ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This description is equally consistent with [...], who was described as wearing gray sweatpants, and [...], who was identified in video while wearing what appears to be gray pants.  (3T44-7 to 16, 96-18 to 98-11)(Da11 at S-12)  Accordingly, there was a substantial evidentiary basis from which the jury could have concluded that [...] was just as likely to have committed the crime as [...].  Indeed, this possibility was such a crucial aspect of the evidence that both parties discussed [...] at length in summation.  Defense counsel noted that [...] had driven the Chevy, and highlighted similarities between him and the suspect:  “[[...]’s] description fits the perpetrator more than [...]'s does because he is a black individual.  He was tall.  He was wearing sweat clothes. ”  (7T58-77 to 15)  The State, in turn, acknowledged [...]’s interactions with the Chevy, arguing that the descriptions were more consistent with [...].  (7T87-24 to 88-25)  Given [...]’s central role, the Court was required to instruct the jury on third-party guilt, regardless of whether that instruction was requested.
[brief] 10  Seals v. Cnty. of Morris, 210 N.J. 157 (2012)………………………………  38  State v. Hester, 449 N.J. Super. 314 (App. Div. 2017)………………………  28 State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 55 N.J. 363 (1970)………………
[brief] This appeal should be dismissed on grounds the Complaint itself is legally insufficient.  In this case the allegations made in the Complaint have not been plead with sufficient specificity or with supporting facts within its four corners.  See Scheidt v. DRS Techs, Inc., 424 N.J.Super. 188, 193 (App. Div. 2012).  Under R. 4:6-2(e), a court is required to accept as true facts that are alleged but not conclusory allegations, as is the case here.  It follows that the plaintiff must establish, through the Complaint, a *prima facie* case for each allegation made against the County defendants in order to survive a motion to dismiss.  When a claim simply recites legal conclusions without facts, as is the case here, dismissal is warranted.
[brief] As to the required second prong requiring prejudice to another party, [...] seems to claim that he was somehow prejudiced by the exclusion of [...] in the litigation with the [...] and the settlement negotiations.  (Db12).  They claim that instead of settling, perhaps the defense could have been successful or [...] could have contributed to the settlement.  The facts are, as argued in Appellant’s main brief at Pa27, that the Bankruptcy Court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute between [...] and [...], and that contribution from [...] would neither increase or decrease the amount of the bankruptcy estate.  It is clearly speculative whether defending against the preference action to its conclusion would be successful.  It likely would have resulted in an award of the full $105,697.90 sought by the [...] and [...] would now be seeking restitution of $105,697.90 instead of $60,000.  The settlement worked to [...]’s benefit not to their detriment.  In fact, it was [...]—not [...]—that relied to its detriment on [...]’s representations (albeit mistakenly) that the mortgage payments were good and consequently suffered the loss of $60,000.  Therefore, no prejudice or loss was suffered by [...] and no detrimental reliance has or can be shown.
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor: a.  Possesses a machine gun without a license; second degree.  b.  Possesses a handgun , including any antique handgun without a permit to carry same (unless an air gun, spring gun or pistol or other weapon of a similar nature as described in 2C:39-5(a-j) Unlawful Possession statute), second degree; Possesses a handgun without a permit to carry and handgun is air of Weapons gun, spring gun or pistol or other weapon as described in the statute, third degree.  1st Degree
[brief] Rather, as indicated by the substance at oral argument, the intent of the parties was the Court’s focus and the need to strike the offending language under Par. 18 of the Agreement (Da19) in order to make the Agreement effective.  As noted in the Trial Court’s opinion, Par. 6 of the parties’ Separation Agreement cannot exist without Par. 18 (Da200):  “Here, the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact exists.
[directive] Domestic Protect to Conditions Special Seek prosecutor or assistant officer police the where violence domestic involving case any In officer supervisory or 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted general attorney or deputy the of considering the totality believe, reason to has 3.3.2 subsection to pursuant designated of through 9 1 paragraphs in listed special factors the to limited including not but circumstances, to requirement a restraint, other or condition no-contact of a issuance that 4.6.10, subsection by authorized expressly release pretrial condition of special other any or weapons, surrender the victim, the of immediate safety the assure reasonably necessary to is 2C:25-26(a) N.J.S.A. than other of provision Directive other this any notwithstanding shall, prosecutor or officer needed of conditions) imposition seek the and acomplaint-warrant for apply 4.6.10, subsection be shall subsection in Nothing victim.21 this of the safety immediate the assure reasonably to the by amended not Act was Violence and of Domestic Prevention the of part is which 2C:25-26(a), N.J.S.A. 21 provides: Law, Bail Reform from released involving is domestic violence offense or crime a with charged defendant a When a as may the release authorizing recognizance, court the personal or bail on trial before custody with any contact from having the defendant the prohibiting order an issue release of condition victim's residence, entering the from defendant the restraining to, limited not but including, victim or or stalking victim harassing the the from school, and or business, or employment of place an enter may order court also The way. any in relatives or co-workers, friends, victim's animal possessed, owned, leased, any with contact any having from defendant the prohibiting the may In addition, household. court the in residing child minor or a party either or by held kept, animal not providing shall the be that animal and of the possession the directing order an enter an court enter order may The or offense. crime the of disposition the to prior of disposed in subsection enumerated weapon other or firearm any possessing from defendant the prohibiting any location in weapon any of such and seizure for search the ordering 2C:39-1 and N.J.S.A. of r. shall The with judge located. state is weapon the believe to cause reasonable has judge the where order. the by authorized and seizure search the of scope and for reasons the specificity forth (setting over subsection precedence 4.5.9 take Directive the of subsection this of provisions the that Note goal paramount reflecting the acomplaint-summons), issuing of presumption a overcoming for standard general the mandatory consider shall whether prosecutor still or officer police the However, victims.
[brief] Essentially, the Court found that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was so lacking in clarity and brevity that it violated Fed. Civ. Pro. R. 8, which requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim. ” (Da144-169, 7/12/18 Order and Decision).  The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend, filed in response to the motion to dismiss, because Plaintiff failed to attach any proposed amended pleading.  (Da144-169, 7/12/18 Order and Decision).  The Court specifically “agreed with [the] [...] when they state that “it is not the length of the pleading which \textit{ipso facto} renders it inadequate but its lack of coherence, its constant digressions . . . and its compound averments[,] which severely hinder Defendants’ ability to meaningfully respond to the pleading and understand the precise parameters of Plaintiff’s causes of action. ” (Da162, 7/12/18 Opinion, page 17).  Having found that Plaintiff’s entire pleading was lacking, the Court declined to consider our other alternative arguments regarding specific claims.  *Id.*  The Court declined to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, but rather gave Plaintiff twenty-one (21) days to submit a proper motion to amend with a proposed amended pleading.  The Court warned that it “would anticipate that further dismissals may well be with prejudice. ”  (Da167-168, 7/12/18 Opinion, page 22-23).  3.
[brief] Dewey, 121 N.J. at 80.  Doing so helps “ensure uniformity” and “discourages forum shopping. ”  Id.  Here, the lower federal courts that have addressed this issue have generally found that “a debt collector's representation . . . that it had the right to collect a debt when, in fact, it lacked the license required to initially purchase the debt, would violate, at minimum, FDCPA section e(10). ”  *Lopez v. Law Offices of Faloni & Associates, LLC*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016); see also *Tompkins v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21937, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2019) (*collecting cases within the District of New Jersey* holding that “a debt collector's failure to obtain a license pursuant to the [NJCFLA] can constitute a violation of the FDCPA”).
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases - **Atlantic Container v. Eagleswood Planning Bd.**, 321 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 1999)  .....  16, 18 - **AMN, Inc. v. So. Bruns. Tp. Rent Leveling Bd.**, 93 N.J. 518, 524–25 (1989)  ...........................................  16 - **Bartlett v. Middletown Twp.**, 51 N.J. Super.  239 (App. Div. 1958) .................................................. 17 - **Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Plan. Bd.**, 334 N.J. Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000).............................  11 - **DePetro v. Twp of Wayne Planning Bd.**, 367 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 2004) - cert denied, 181 N.J. 544 (2004) ..............................................................................................................  13 - **J. Builders, Owners and Managers Association v. Blair**, 60 N.J. 330 (1972) ........................................  17 - **Bubis v. Kassin**, 184 N.J. 612, 627 (2005)  ..........................................................................................  15 - **Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zon ing Bd. of Adj.**, 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002) ....................................................  11 - **Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Plan. Bd.**, 334 N.J. Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000)............................. 10-11 - **Clifton v. Passaic County Board of Taxation**, 28 N.J. 411, 421 (1958)  ..............................................  16 - **Caputo v. The Best Foods**, 17 N.J. 259, 265 (1955)  .............................................................................  16 - **Fallone Prop. v. Bethlehem Plan. Bd.**, 369 N.J. Super. 552, 566–67 (App. Div. 2004)  .......................  15 - **Grubbs v. Slothower**, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 382 (App. Div. 2007)  .......................................................  10 - **Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj.**, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)  .............................................  10 - **Kramer v. Bd. of Adj., Sea Girt**, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)  ..................................................................  10 - **L.I.M.A. Partners v. Borough of Northvale**, 219 N.J. Super. 512, 515 (App. Div. 1987)  .................  17 - **Lawrence v. Butcher**, 130 N.J. Super. 209 (App.  Div. 1974) .......................................................... 17 - **Lincoln Heights Assoc. v. Twp. of Cranford Planning Bd.**, 314 N.J. Super. 366, 389 - (Law Div.1998), aff’d, 321 N.J. Super. 355 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 131 (1999).11 - **Medici v. BPR Co.**, 107 N.J. 1, 14–15 (1987) ...................................................................................... 10 - **New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Borough of S. Plainfield Bd. of Adj.**, 305 N.J. Super. 151, 165 (App. Div. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 160 N.J. 1 (1999) .............................................. 10 - **Piscitelli v. Garfield ZBA**, 237 N.J. 333, 350 (2019) ........................................................................ 15 - **Price v. Himeji, LLC**, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013) ............................................................................... 10, 11 - **Price v. Strategic Capital**, 404 N.J. Super. 295, 301–02 (App. Div. 2008)
[brief] (Pa1-67)  That complaint asserted the same factual allegations and claims, against the same set of defendants, arising out of the same series of transactions, involving the same parcels of land that was at issue in the 2015 action.  (Id.)  Plaintiffs also included three fraudulent concealment claims against based on the Defendants’ alleged failure to disclose, during discovery in the 2015 action, that “Defendant [...] was the sole member of Defendant [...] and that Defendants [...] and [...] controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity. ”  (Id.)  Thus, the allegations in the present action mirror the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint and the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint in the 2015 action, and the crux of that failed Fourth Amended Complaint, and the supposedly new evidence upon which it is based, exactly parallel the Plaintiffs’ purported basis in the present action.
[brief] [...] testified that neither side gave any thought to retaining an attorney because this was considered a family matter (2T48:4-20).  18.  Several months later while the elderly [...]’s were visiting [...] and Johnny at their new home in Crystal Springs, [...] fell and broke her hip (6T18:2-3).  19.  The [...]’s and [...] and Johnny realized that the elderly parents had become frail and would be needing more assistance going forward (6T18:3-4).  20.  In 2016, and with the [...]’s blessing, [...] sold the Florida property and, utilizing a 1031 Exchange to avoid capital gains, purchased a condominium for the elderly parents that was near to where Johnny and [...] lived (6T18:4-19:18, 4T33:25 - 34:15).
[brief] 16 POINT I  WHEN AN EXPERT WITNESS OFFERS NO LEGITIMATE BASIS FOR A CONCLUSION THAT A PARTICULAR CELL-PHONE TOWER HAS A PARTICULAR RANGE, THE SUPREME COURT OPINION IN STATE  V. BURNEY UNEQUIVOCALLY BARS THAT EXPERT FROM TESTIFYING THAT CELL-PHONE CALLS USED PARTICULAR CELL TOWERS IF THE PURPOSE OF THAT TESTIMONY IS TO SHOW THE LOCATION OF THE PHONE BEING USED AT THE TIME.  BECAUSE SUCH TESTIMONY WAS ADMITTED HERE OVER OBJECTION AND COULD HAVE INFLUENCED THE VERDICTS, THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (RULINGS AT 8T 141-4 TO 146-15; 8T 148-14 TO 151-9; 8T 163-25; 8T 165-20).................................................................  16 POINT II  A DETECTIVE IMPROPERLY OFFERED LAY OPINION OVER OBJECTION THAT HE BELIEVED DEFENDANT TO BE ACTING SUSPICIOUSLY IN FLEEING AN ACTIVE SHOOTING SCENE AS HE DID AND THAT THE DETECTIVE FEARED, AS A RESULT, THAT DEFENDANT WAS AN ARMED SUSPECT.  (RULING AT 2T 56-6 TO 8) ...........................................  24 POINT III  THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY IMPEIGNED UPON THE JURY’S FACTFINDING ROLE WHEN HE SUA SPONTE INFORMED THE JURORS THAT, OUTSIDE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, THE DEFENSE HAD OBJECTED TO THE ADMISSION OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC REENACTMENT OF CERTAIN SURVEILLANCE VIDEO, BUT THAT THE JUDGE “HAS DETERMINED THAT IT IS PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE” AND “APPROPRIATE FOR THE JURY TO VIEW” THAT EVIDENCE.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).........................................................  28 POINT IV  THE RECORD APPEARS TO CONTAIN NO FINDING OF GUILT ON THE CHARGE OF SECOND-DEGREE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON BY “CERTAIN PERSONS. ”  A TRIAL WAS NOT HELD ON THAT COUNT AND THE TRANSCRIPTS CONTAIN NO GUILTY PLEA TO THAT CHARGE.  (NOT RAISED BELOW) .................................................................  33 POINT V THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.  (RULING AT 11T 18-1 TO 27-22; DA 7 TO 9).............................................................................................................
[brief] & Office Parks v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 241 N.J. Super. 145, 165 (App. Div. 1990) .............................................. 9 Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 51-54 (1976) .................................................. 17 Spalt v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 237 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 1989) ..... 12 Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007) ....................................................................................... 9 Statutes N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1 .................................................................................. 10 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2 ..................................................................................10, 13 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.3 .................................................................................. 10 Rules R. 2:2-3(a)(2) ......................................................................................... 10 Regulations N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)1 .............................................................................17, 18, 19 N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)9 .............................................................................19, 20, 21
[brief] 14  A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................  14  1.  IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT THE BOARD'S CROSS-MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER AGAINST DISCOVERY AND A WARRANT FOR SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE BOARD FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 8/20/20  FINAL ORDER TO GIVE [...] ACCESS TO ALL THE RECORDS  ..............................................  20  2.  JUDGMENT INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE 8/20/20  FINAL ORDER TO THE DATE OF THE 7/20/22  JUDGMENT AND INSTEAD ONLY ORDER INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE JUDGMENT TO DATE OF THE 8/29/22  FINAL ORDER ............................................  25  3.  IT WAS ERROR TO DENY [...]'S ATTORNEY'S FEES DUE TO THE BOARD’S VIOLATION OF LITIGANT'S RIGHTS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 8/20/20  FINAL ORDER AFTER IT WAS AFFIRMED ON 5/18/22 ..............................................  29  4.  IT WAS ERROR TO DENY A OPRA CIVIL PENALTY DUE TO THE BOARD'S INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF OPRA FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 8/20/20 FINAL ORDER AFTER IT WAS AFFIRMED ON 5/18/22 ..............................................  31  5.  IT WAS ERROR TO DENY [...] PREVAILING PARTY  ATTORNEY'S FEES AFTER PREVAILING ON THE ENFORCEMENT MOTION AND AS THE CATALYST TO COMPUL THE BOARD TO COMPLY WITH 8/20/20  FINAL ORDER AND WITH THE 8/29/22  ENFORCEMENT ORDER ..............................................  33  CONCLUSION .........................................................
[brief] A. 1:1-1 31 N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 et seq.  29 N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 to 68  29 N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2)  7, 10 N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2  7 N.J.S.A. 43:16A-13(a)(1)  31 N.J.S.A. 43:16A-13(a)(1),(7)  31  STATE REGULATIONS
[brief] The interrogation video included [...]’s reference to [...]’s unrelated arrest, constituting impermissible 404(b) evidence.  The interrogation video also included [...]’s inadmissible remarks on [...]’s custodial status, revealing to the jury that [...] was under arrest for an unrelated charge at the time of the interrogation.  Not only was this evidence of a prior bad act entirely irrelevant, but also no instruction warned the jury against relying on the information to conclude that [...] had a propensity for committing crimes.  The trial court’s failure to analyze the admissibility of [...]’s prior arrest or to provide an accompanying limiting instruction violated [...]’s rights to due process and a fair trial, requiring reversal.
[directive] In cases where discharge of a firearm does not result in criminal charges, the prosecutor, OPIA, or other designee of the Attorney General will refer the incident back to the agency for an internal affairs administrative review.  7.11.8  Officers conducting administrative investigations of firearm discharges must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  All supervisors and any other officer who may INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 42 be called upon to participate in a firearm discharge investigation therefore must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, including protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating firearm discharges.
[brief] [...] asked the State to place the final plea offer on the record and the State did place the final plea offer on the record and the State indicated its intention to seek consecutive sentences should there be convictions at trial.  [...] also spoke and he spoke about his ability to review the defendant’s discovery with him and he also talked to him about other things including video-related transcript.  The Court referenced some of these issues and asked the prosecutor to be specific about what it is that the State intended to use concerning some of this video evidence.  And the judge also referenced that videos were shown during the course of the pretrial hearing.  The defendant had the ability to review those received or the transcript I received reflects that the first 12 pages occurred -- show what happened during the time period when the Court was contemplating calling up the jury to get ready.  The defendant and counsel requested some time to talk.  They were given that time.  I think what I was saying when the phone went off a moment ago was defense counsel has pointed out that the Court and counsel were fairly experienced with these and what happened there is hardly uncommon.
[brief] In their motion for partial summary judgment that was denied on June 10, 2022 Order, Da19 at ¶2, they argued that the Plaintiff was committing waste by suing them, and sought an order requiring her to “personally restore the value of Trust property spent on litigation involving [...] and [...] during her administration…” (Da466).  That argument was firmly rejected by the trial court:  As for Defendants’ argument that plaintiff is committing waste, the court will emphasize that defendants are presently living in the Boonton property, without paying rent…It is precisely because defendants ceased rent payments and continued to reside at the Boonton Property after decedent passed away that the present litigation ensued.  (Da29).  The Plaintiff’s suit against the Defendants was meritorious, and the Plaintiff prevailed on it.  The trial court ordered the Defendants to vacate the Property in its October 22, 2022 Order.  (Da52, at ¶2).  The decision was expressly based on the Ejectment Statute, with the Court finding in its Statement of Reasons that ejectment under that statute was appropriate.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) expressly provides that a person, such as plaintiff, who "fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage . . . shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss[.]"  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).  Appellant/plaintiff does not argue the language is ambiguous.  It is undisputed that his vehicles were garaged in New Jersey and that he failed to obtain insurance compliant with N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) required the dismissal of appellant/plaintiff's claims.