ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Findings, declarations relative to rights of crime victims, witnesses  The legislature finds and declares that crime victims and witnesses are entitled to the following rights: a.  To be treated with dignity and compassion by the criminal justice system; b. To be informed about the criminal justice process; c.  To be free from intimidation, harassment or abuse by any person including the defendant or any other person acting in support of or on behalf of the defendant, due to the involvement of the victim or witness in the criminal justice process; d.  To have inconveniences associated with participation in the criminal justice process minimized to the fullest extent possible; e.  To make at least one telephone call provided the call is reasonable in both length and location called; f.  To medical assistance reasonably related to the incident in accordance with the provisions of the “Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1971,” P.L. 1971, c. 317 (N.J.S.A. 52:4B-1 et seq.); g.  To be notified in a timely manner, if practicable, if presence in court is not needed or if any scheduled court proceeding has been adjourned or cancelled; h.  To be informed about available remedies, financial assistance and social services; i.  To be compensated for loss sustained by the victim whenever possible; j.  To be provided a secure, but not necessarily separate, waiting area during court proceedings; k.  To be advised of case progress and final disposition and to confer with the prosecutor’s representative so that the victim may be kept adequately informed; l.  To the prompt return of property when no longer needed as evidence; m.  To submit a written statement, within a reasonable amount of time, about the impact of the crime to a representative of the prosecuting agency which shall be considered prior to the prosecutor’s final decision concerning whether formal criminal charges will be filed, whether the prosecutor will consent to a request by the defendant to enter into a pre-trial program, and whether the prosecutor will make or agree to a negotiated plea;
[brief] Pa11  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | | --- | | *Kandrac v. Marrazzo's Market at Robbinsville*, 429 N.J. 79 (App. Div. 2012) | 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25 | | Statutes | | --- | | R. 4:6-2 | 3 | | R.4:46-2 | 30 | | NJ Rev Stat § 2A:14-22 (2021) | 5 | | TRANSCRIPTS | Page | |-------------------------------------------------|------| | Transcript of Motion, dated January 24, 2020 | 1T | | Transcript of Motion, dated February 14, 2020 | 2T | | Transcript of Motion, dated June 25, 2021 | 3T |
[brief] (9T104-13 to 105-25)**  One of [...]’s main arguments at trial was that, if he did fire the bullet that killed [...], it constituted a form of manslaughter, not murder.  In countering that argument, the State made misleading statements about the law by discussing a hypothetical wherein someone hits and kills another while driving under the influence.  The State’s arguments in this respect distorted the law around manslaughter and significantly prejudiced the jury’s ability to deliberate on the lesser-included offenses.  Because the trial court reversibly erred in refusing defense counsel’s request to strike the hypo and give a curative instruction, his murder conviction must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[brief] The alleged unlawful conduct of these defendants is limited to their authorizing an investigation into a complaint of another employee.  Plaintiff does not allege she has been damaged in any way by these defendants’ alleged conduct and she does not allege that these defendants took any adverse employment action against her.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to articulate a factual basis to show that these defendants violated her rights by being party of a public body that authorized an investigation into another employee’s complaints concerning her employment.  The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff’s claims fail, as a matter of law, and correctly dismissed the Complaint as to these defendants pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-9.  The Legislature’s “choice of the word ‘shall,’ . . . is ordinarily intended to be mandatory, not permissive. ”  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 587–88 (2013); see In re Council on Affordable Housing to Adopt Tr. Fund Commitment Reguls., 440 N.J. Super. 220, 226 (App. Div. 2015) (“The statute did not say that [the agency] ‘may’ adopt regulations or that prior regulations were sufficient; the Legislature declared in [the statute] that [the agency] ‘shall’ promulgate regulations. ”).  The Supreme Court has construed similarly worded statutory language to require rulemaking.
[brief] Id. at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, [...]’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  Id. at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, [...] was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, [...] was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.  *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.
[brief] 32  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6 .....................................................................................................................  5,6,9  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(i) .....................................................................................................  25,32  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(ii).  ..................................................................................................  33,35  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(vi) ..................................................................................................  6,34  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(e) ...............................................................................................................  33  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 .....................................................................................................................  4,9,35,36,37  N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 ...................................................................................................................  4,9,35,36,37  N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)9 .........................................................................................................  18,36  N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1 ...................................................................................................................  22 Rules R. 2:4-1(b).  .........................................................................................................................  24,25,27 R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(i) ..................................................................................................................  24  Other Authorities  Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 USC 1451 .................................................................  32  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This brief is submitted on behalf of Respondent [...] (“[...]”) in connection with an appeal of the decision of the [...] (“[...]”) denying the request of a third-party objector, Appellant [...] (“Appellant”), for an administrative hearing seeking to challenge the issuance of a May 19, 2017 Waterfront Development Permit (“2017 WFD Permit”) and March 20, 2019 Permit Modification (“2019 Permit Modification”) to [...].
[brief] (Da3).  Additionally, the court never gave the defendants an opportunity to defend against the claims of common law conflict of interest because it was not properly pleaded.  Plaintiffs’ failure to amend their complaint precludes their untimely assertion of common law conflict of interest in this appeal.  Plaintiffs’ assertion that the relief sought is based upon common law conflict of interest is incorrect.  Plaintiffs exclusively relied on the LGEL in the lower court and failed to invoke any common law cause of action or elements in their submissions.  As such, they are limited to that cause of action at this stage.  Plaintiffs, moreover, failed to appeal any issue below and, therefore, should be prohibited from attempting such a late amendment.
[directive] 7  a.  Ensuring that all documentation is fully and accurately completed by the individual submitting the specimen (the donor).  b.  Collecting specimens in a manner that provides for individual privacy while ensuring the integrity of the specimen.  Individual specimens and forms shall be identified throughout the process by the use of donor identification numbers (Donor ID).  At no time shall a name appear on any form or specimen container sent to the Laboratory.  c.  Complying with chain of custody procedures established by the Laboratory for the collection and submission for analysis of urine specimens.
[brief] Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s January 19, 2024 Order.  (Pa388-Pa389).  By way of an Order dated February 26, 2024, the Appellate Division denied Plaintiffs’ leave for appeal.  (Pa391).  After an Order of Judgement by Default was entered against [...] on March 14, 2024(Pa393-Pa394), Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal.  (Pa395-Pa398).  LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW ON ORDERS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:45-8.3(a)(5) & N.J.A.C. 7:45-8.7.  Overall, [...] designed the aforementioned stormwater infrastructure for the removal significantly more than 80% of TSS in the stormwater runoff.  Aa090.  The [...] concluded that these green stormwater infrastructure improvements “not only meet but exceed [...] requirements” for water quality.  Aa017.  In addition, the Overall Stormwater Management Report appended a Stormwater Maintenance Plan (Appendix F) outlining the benefits of the various green infrastructure methods to address water quality impacts.  Ra97 and Ra117-118; Aa017.  In addition to the stormwater management considerations above, the [...] determined that the Project was consistent with the WQMP Rules as it is a sewer-generating development, and all proposed activities are located within the limits of the mapped sewer service area.
[directive] Graduated Plea Policy and Timing of the Plea  . . . . . . . .  24-32 4.1  Purpose of Escalating Plea Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24 4.2  Three-Tiered System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24-25 4.3  Required Waiver of Pretrial Motions (See also Section 4.8)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25-26 4.4  Fugitive Status as Constituting a Waiver of the Right to a Pre-Indictment Offer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.5  The Functional Equivalent of Pre-Indictment Offer  . . . 26-28 4.6  Compliance with Pre-Indictment Program Rules and Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.7  Anticipatory Plea Offers Contingent on Future Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28-29 4.8  Triggering Event for Escalating to a Final Post-Indictment Plea Offer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29-30 4.9  Authority to Modify “Final” Plea Offers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  30-31 4.10  Relaxation of the Strictures of the Automatic Escalation Scheme and Authority to “Turn Back the Clock” . . . .  31-32  Section 5
[directive] If the extradition. enforcement or federal agency a any law by defendant the against been lodged detainer has of the agency having custody enforcement law the state, other any or State this agency from defendant  If detainer. the of a advise court the and acomplaint-warrant for apply shall defendant is and another States, or state, the United of laws the under committed an offense for arrested is the and apply, Bail does Reform the Law not law, Jersey New under offense an with charged not with accordance in shall proceed defendant the of custody having or arrest the making agency Section 1.6.
[brief] ” (Pa274 at 6:19-21.)  However, the Senate Journal indicates that the Senate had adjourned at 5:05 p.m. on Thursday, January 6, 2022.  (Pa256.)  [...] indicated that it was a compromised bill, “[b]ut that does not change the fact that it was snuck in at, literally, the 11th hour with no language available to members of the public, advocates, or event members of the Health Committee who wanted to express either their support or objections thereto.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................  15  I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Aa001)...............................  15  II.  THE DEP FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION (Aa001).........................................................  17  III.  THE DEP ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED A CIRCULAR CULVERT IN VIOLATION OF THE FLOOD HAZARD AREA CONTROL ACT RULES AND SHOULD BE REVERSED (Aa001).........................................................  25  A.  DEP Approved a Circular Culvert Without Evidence that a Bridge was Infeasible (Aa001).........................................................  26  B.  DEP Did Not Hold the Applicant to the Strict Requirements for a Circular Culvert (Aa001).................................................................28  C.  DEP Failed to Support Its Finding that Riparian Zone Impacts Have Been Minimized (Aa001).................................................................29  IV.  THE DEP IMPROPERLY ISSUED THE FHACA PERMIT BECAUSE THE DEP DID NOT MAKE ANY FINDINGS REGARDING THE BEST AVAILABLE PRECIPITATION DATA AND ASSOCIATED FLOOD ELEVATION FORECASTS (Aa001).................................................................31  A.  DEP Was Aware That the Precipitation Data and Associated Flood Elevation Predictions were “Outdated” and “Obsolete” at the Time It Issued the Instant Permit (Aa001).................................................................32  B.  DEP’s Failure to Make Findings to Support its Instant Permit Decision Based on the Best Available Precipitation Data Violated its Regulations and Duty to Protect the Public (Aa001).................................................................34  C.  The Lack of Consideration of the New Precipitation Data  Also Undermines DEP’s Assertion that Floodway Delineation Was Unnecessary (Aa001).................................................................42  CONCLUSION
[brief] The fact that the perpetrator threatened to shoot only after [...] did not hand over money in response to his first statement reinforces this conclusion; it shows that the perpetrator resorted to threats of violence once his non-threatening tactic failed with respect to [...].  With respect to [...], however, no verbal threat or threatening conduct was carried out in an effort to cause her to relinquish money.  Moreover, the statement, “[g]ive me all your money or I’ll shoot” was directed at [...] and was made after the theft from [...] had been completed.  Although an act may be considered to be “in the course of committing a theft” it if occurs in the immediate flight from the theft or in an effort to avoid apprehension, that is not what occurred here.
[brief] Ordinance 26-23 (Pa46) makes this abundantly clear.  The Ordinance authorizes “the taking of a fee acquisition of property which is currently privately owned [. . .] for the purpose of open space. ”  The Ordinance specifically finds that:  The Township Council funds that the acquisition will promote and protect public health, safety, and welfare of residents of the Township, and further find that any purchase or taking by eminent domain of any and all property interests necessary for the same are all in furtherance of a public use and purpose.
[directive] Satisfactory completion of K-9 patrol training equivalent to that set forth herein.  Must be either a full-time law enforcement officer assigned to trainer duties by his/her employing law enforcement agency or a former law enforcement officer who had previously been assigned canine trainer duties by his/her employing law enforcement agency, and is retained by a law enforcement agency as a trainer.  Satisfactory completion of a Methods of Instruction Course approved by the Police Training Commission or an equivalent course.  Two years experience as a police patrol dog trainer.  Must have experience in conducting a minimum of 2 basic K-9 patrol training courses satisfying the requirements set forth herein (with the exception of those areas of instruction appropriately conducted by qualified specialists) or a course having substantially equivalent requirements, thereby successfully training and qualifying a minimum of 20 K-9 teams.  •  A supervising patrol K-9 trainer is responsible for all documentation and certification of prospective trainers.
[directive] If you have answered “No” to this question, you must answer Questions 17b – 17f.  If you have answered “Yes” to this question, proceed to Question 18.  b.  Você entende que se não for cidadão dos Estados Unidos, esta declaração de culpa pode [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] resultar em sua remoção dos Estados Unidos e/ou impedi-lo de entrar ou reentrar legalmente nos Estados Unidos?  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re-enter the United States?  c.  Você entende que tem o direito de procurar assessoria individualizada de um advogado para [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] entender o impacto da declaração de culpa na sua condição imigratória?  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?  Iniciais do Réu / Defendant’s Initials no Formulário Padrão de Declaração Judicial/Formulário Revisado Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese página 5 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese page 5 of 7 17.
[brief] N.J. Super. 27, 43 n.5 (App. Div. 2023) (declining to address the issues of fraud, laches, estoppel, or waiver, due to plaintiff’s failure to raise them before the trial court).  Here, after reviewing the parties’ submissions, [...] opined that it seemed to him “as if the only way out of this [was] a plenary hearing[,]” and asked counsel for their thoughts.  (1T3:12-16).  Appellant’s counsel maintained that there were “not really any disputed facts which would preclude [the trial court’s] ruling[,]” but Appellant was willing to proceed to a hearing if it was deemed necessary.  (1T3:17-21).  During oral argument, Respondent’s counsel did not disagree with this assessment and did not request a plenary hearing or suggest same was necessary or appropriate.
[brief] This is the second time the claims of [...] arising out of his continuous exposure to toxic mold in his condominium have come before this Court.  The first was on an interlocutory appeal by several insurers, including [...], from Orders of the Trial Court allowing the “reopening” of the underlying case against [...] and [...] and the filing of [...]’s First Amended Complaint reasserting claims against [...] and [...] and adding new claims for declaratory relief regarding insurance coverage.  Da1217.  The underlying case was reopened in accordance with the terms of a May 10, 2012 Settlement Agreement that contained a proviso in paragraph XVIII allowing [...] to reopen the case if an “insurance archeologist” could locate “applicable” insurance policies covering his claims.  Da2081.  The agreement provided that [...]’s only monetary remedy in excess of the $110,000 settlement amount paid by [...] and [...] would be from the proceeds of applicable insurance policies.  Da2091.  The insurance archeologist [...] retained located several liability policies insuring [...] and possibly [...] during the 1991-2010 period.
[brief] [...] has been granted leave to appear as amicus curiae in numerous cases before this Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court.  [...] is New Jersey’s largest statewide business association, representing member companies in all industries and regions of our state.  Its mission is to provide information, services, and advocacy for its member companies and build a more prosperous New Jersey.  [...]’s members include most of the top 100 employers in the State, as well as thousands of small to medium-sized employers, from every sector of New Jersey’s economy.  One of [...]’s goals is to reduce the costs of doing business in New Jersey, including unwarranted litigation burdens, in an effort to promote economic growth and benefit all of New Jersey.  See N.J. Bus. & Industry Ass’n, About Us, http://www.njbia.org/Join[...]/About.aspx.  [...] has been granted leave to appear as amicus curiae in numerous cases before this Court.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Appellants further contend that the MBPA entitles prevailing parties to reasonable attorneys’ fees, whereas the ABC Law does not.  (Pb at 27-28.)  But a provision that shifts attorneys’ fees from one party to another does not implicate the fundamental policies underlying a statute particularly where, as here, either party could prevail and have attorneys’ fees awarded to it.  Indeed, should Appellants be found to have breached the Wholesaler Agreement, they would be required to indemnify [...] under Section 10(b), including for “reasonable attorney’s fees,” due to any “act, error or omission of Wholesaler . . . .” (Pa68.)  Because there are no material policy differences between New York and New Jersey laws regulating the malt beverage industry, applying the ABC Law would not “directly or indirectly require[] or amount[] to a waiver of any provision of [the MBPA], or [] relieve any person of any obligation or liability under [the MBPA]”.  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(a).  Likewise, applying New York law would not contravene New Jersey public policy because the ABC Law provides substantively --- 11  The cases on which Appellants rely are (per usual) inapposite.  See Warren Distrib. Co. v. InBev USA, LLC, 2011 WL 770005, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2011) (Pa288-Pa309) (no choice-of-law analysis); Winer Motors, 208 N.J. Super. at 678 (no analysis on “fundamental policy” of fee-shifting provisions in New Jersey because both New Jersey and Connecticut statutes at issue permitted fee shifting).
[brief] Instead, the requestor sought a log of specific information in emails, including the “sender,” “recipient,” “date,” and “subject” fields.  229 N.J. at 343.  The Court, in overturning the Appellate Division’s decision to affirm denial of the request, agreed that [...] had submitted a carefully “circumscribed” request that “identified the discrete information he sought,” id. at 356, and did not require the creation of a record, id. at 359.
[brief] The court ruled that it is the record’s nature, not its situs, that determined when OPRA was triggered AND ALSO clearly foresaw gamesmanship would ensue if the ruling had gone any other way.  …  “Were we to conclude otherwise, a governmental agency seeking to protect its records from scrutiny could simply delegate their creation to third parties or relinquish possession to such parties, thereby thwarting the policy of transparency that underlies OPRA. ”  Thus, the question of whether a governmental agency is required to retrieve records responsive to an OPRA request turns on the nature of the records, not their physical location, situs, who may possess them or if the government official put them in within only their private reach.  Central to the holding in Burnett is that "documents accessible to the public which are generated on behalf of a public agency in the course of its official business are subject to disclosure no matter where they are located, even if they were never in the possession of the governmental entity."  O'Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 426 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2012)  Otherwise, OPRA is but a cartoon of itself and its purpose.