ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff claims that, because [...] is located in Germany, the limitations imposed by the Hague Convention and German law “would deprive plaintiff of a meaningful deposition of one of the decisionmakers in this case who, as the trial court noted, has knowledge of facts that no other defense witness has. ” (Pb19).  However, even assuming that is true, that purported “decisionmaker” is not a party to this case, and Plaintiff is seeking his deposition in his individual capacity, not as a representative of any of the entity Defendants.  (See 1T 18:11-13).  While Plaintiff obviously would prefer to avoid the Hague Convention’s processes for obtaining discovery from [...], [...] is a non-party located in Germany and is therefore subject to German law.
[brief] Amici submits this brief because the Trial Court’s rulings are absolutely inconsistent with the law, the express language of the IFPA and the IFPA’s legislative directive to aggressively fight fraud, thereby jeopardizing the health, safety and welfare of New Jersey citizens.  The fact that the Trial Court ignored the Constitutional right to a jury trial and the guarantee to due process arguments, as well as the controlling legal precedent is truly concerning.  As such, the decision below should be reversed, permitting the insurers in and the State of New Jersey to continue its aggressive investigation and litigation in the courts against individuals and entities perpetrating healthcare fraud, while supporting the Legislative goal of prompt payment of PIP benefits and disputes arising thereunder to continue to be heard in the Forthright arbitration forum.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] [...] could not recall if he did or did not open the hatch.  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 37:10-38:25).  [...] could not remember who opened the hatch.  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 17:22-25, 20:1-22, 24:3-16, 35:25-36-4, 37:18-23, 38:16-25).  [...] also testified was unaware the hatch was open at the time the Plaintiff stepped into it.  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 30:6-20, 32:11-19).  [...] confirmed that [...] and [...] were inspecting overhead wires prior to Plaintiffs’ fall.  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 41:1-6).  [...] confirmed he was with the Plaintiff and [...] while they were performing their work.  (Da277- Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 43:2-6).  [...] acknowledged the crawl space was lit from within and a light switch in the same room as the hatch.  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 54:18-55:3).  Before the accident, [...] drafted a contract containing the following language:
[brief] Despite their non-compliance, the Lower Court has issued an order granting the Board Motion for a warrant for satisfaction of judgment (249a).  "A court abuses its discretion when its 'decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'"  See US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 at 467-68 (2012) quoting Iliadis v. WalMartStores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)(quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
[brief] M33.  In addition, the Township's publication of the Mayor's press release further establishes Monell liability.  The Mayor's full-throated attack against Plaintiffs' proposal, launched by him through an official Township press release, and the unjustified intimidation of Zoning Board members and the public opposition it generated, was the procuring cause and actual reason underlying the denial of the Amended Application, as the Mayor's false narrative made its way into the Resolution as quoted above.
[brief] For example, in *Edison Bd. of Ed. v. Bd. of Adj.*, 464 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2020), this Court held that the [...] lacked standing to assert generalized claims that residential development would further overcrowd its schools, but noted that in other circumstances the Board of Education might have had standing to challenge variances for such development applications.  *Id.* at 306-307.  In *Paramus Multiplex Corp. v. Hartz Mtn. Indus., Inc.*, 236 N.J. Super. 104 (Law Div. 1987), the Law Division held that a non-resident objector lacked standing to make objections based upon increased competition.  *Id.* at 110.  This court distinguished *Paramus* in *DePetro* as follows:  What distinguishes *Paramus* from the present case is the fact that here the plaintiffs are challenging the authority of the Planning Board to grant site plan approval to [...]'s proposed development of the property for use as a self-storage facility *on the ground that the use is prohibited by the governing zoning ordinance*.  Plaintiffs are not merely raising competitive objections to a proposed site plan.  *[DePetro, supra, 367 N.J. Super. at 171; emphasis added]*  This is the same reason that the Plaintiffs appeared before the Board and challenged the Board’s decision.  *DePetro* confirms their standing to challenge the jurisdiction of the Board based upon impacts to the zoning scheme.
[brief] He found that [...] offered credible testimony that Appellant behaved in a contumacious manner and was therefore insubordinate.  (Pa215).  During the hearing, [...] recounted the many instances of disrespectful behavior that, when taken as a whole, constituted the Appellant’s insubordination.  In an attempt to cast a better light on her behavior, the Appellant claimed that she acted respectfully.  She denied any contemptuous behavior.  On cross examination, the Appellant rejected the veracity of her disciplinary history without offering substantial proof as to why the disciplinary history was inaccurate.  The ALJ duly noted that the Appellant’s version of events “must be considered in light of what she has at stake. ” (Pa216).  (T88-18 to 90-8).  Sugar coating and confabulation do nothing to enhance credibility.  On the contrary, that strategy hurts credibility.  The ALJ, in the Second Initial Decision, went to great lengths to discuss how he assessed the witnesses.  In the long run, based on the preponderance of the credible evidence, the ALJ determined that [...]’s credible testimony outweighed the testimony of the Appellant.  “Once again, Mauro was a credible witness, and from my experience, knowledge, and common observation, I can accept his testimony as more probable than [...]’s under the circumstances. ”  (Pa217).  As such, this Court should give "due regard" to the ALJ's ability to judge the credibility of the parties and the respective witnesses.  *Locurto*, 157 N.J. at 470-71; *Kordulak Bros.*, 44 N.J. at 599.  Moreover, the ALJ's factual findings are supported by competent evidence.  *In re Grossman*, 127 N.J.Super. at 23.  As such, this Court should not disturb those findings.
[directive] TRAINING AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT  To ensure that law enforcement fully understands the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals and continues to build relationships with the LGBTQ+ community, the following training and community engagement steps shall be taken:  A.  The [...] shall, by March 1, 2020, develop a training program to explain the requirements of the Directive.  This program shall be available through the NJ Learn System or by other electronic means.  All state, county, and local law 9
[brief] (831a).  Order of November 10, 2016.  (Exhibit “O”.)  During the March 29, 2018 oral argument, [...], on behalf of the plaintiffs, argued:  [Now] we know that [...] is actually [...], and we only found out about this also recently, of concealment, and misrepresentation, and quite outright perjuries, now we know that [...] was the managing member and sole managing member of [...].  And [...] got over half the money, the million four was almost equally divided between [...] and [...].  [...] was [...] and [...] was [...].  And the money from [...] then was transferred, back to back transfers, into the personal bank account of [...] and [...].  There was no legal work here.  There’s no—the issue of, well, was it a complex legal issue, because that’s the thread, as the Court says, that runs through is that there was no—where there is no complex legal issue you don’t need an affidavit of merit for legal malpractice claims.  In this case here there is no legal issue.  There was no legal issue…  THE COURT: Then why did you plead one?
[brief] Development in [...]’s Redevelopment Zone is ordinarily governed by *N.J.A.C* 7:7-7.1, which allows development without a separate individual CAFRA permit so long as the proposed development complies with the applicable [...] Redevelopment Plan and Design Guidelines Ordinances because those ordinances were reviewed and approved by [...] as consistent with the Coastal Zone Management Rules, which include the Scenic Resources and Design Rule.
[brief] Police were unable to determine who “Q” was.  (13T 137-23 to 138-6)  [...] and [...] were scheduled to be tried jointly, with jury selection set to begin on January 5, 2022.  Due to “COVID issues,” jury selection was rescheduled for January 18.  On January 7, 2022, [...] entered into a plea agreement with the State.  (2T 5-13 to 5-22)  [...] agreed to plead guilty to first-degree robbery and testify against [...]; in exchange, the State agreed to recommend a 10-year prison term and dismiss the remainder of the charges.  (10T 7-6 to 9-7)  The State also agreed that if [...] “supplie[d] additional post plea cooperation as to the prosecution of [[...]], the State will consider amending plea to second degree robbery for ten years, 85 percent.  Defense counsel is free to argue for a lesser sentence to the second-degree range. ”  (10T 10-16 to 10-23)  On January 10, 2022, the State supplied [...]’s attorney with additional discovery, including unsigned “letters” implicating [...] as the shooter, which [...] alleged were written to him by [...] in the summer of 2021.  Then, on January 19, 2022, the State supplied [...]’s attorney with expert reports indicating that [...]’s fingerprints were found on the letters. \(^5\) (4T 4-2 to 7-8)  The Defense objected to the State calling [...] as a witness at trial and to the introduction of the untimely letters and expert report.  (4T 8-4 to 8-6)  The judge ruled that [...] could testify but barred the State from introducing the late discovery, and the State filed an interlocutory appeal.  (6T 4-4 to 12-11)  On the morning of February 2, 2022, before opening statements commenced, this Court granted the State’s appeal and reversed the trial court’s ruling.  The Defense declined an adjournment to retain a fingerprint expert,\(^6\) and the trial proceeded.  (8T 6-9 to 6-19)  **B.
[brief] It is not clear how the Board can justify the decision the appellant was terminated and not subject to a layoff simply based on the failure of [...] to provide a proper layoff notice when they equally failed to provide such notice of termination?  This issue was not addressed.  The conclusions of the Board are sufficiently in dispute that an administrative hearing should have been ordered.  Additionally, there is no break in service if an employee is on an authorized period of leave, or their position is abolished.  N.J.A.C 17:2-1A.1  This was unquestionably what occurred in the chaotic environment of the early days of the COVID19 emergency.  If the appellant was not legally laid-off and he was not legally terminated, then without question he must have been on a period of authorized leave.
[brief] A.  The Applicable Standard is De Novo  “Although decisions relating to injunctive relief are normally reviewed for abuse of discretion, … review is de novo where the disputed issue is a question of law. ”  Stoney v. Maple Shade Twp., 426 N.J. Super. 297, 307 (App. Div. 2012).  The disputed issue on this appeal is a question of law, to wit, the trial court’s application of the legal criteria for injunctive relief.
[brief] Respondents’ remaining arguments are without merit.  The [...]’s statement that in December 2022 it inquired as to the [...]’s existing vacancies because it had issued the [...] a certification of promotional candidates “within three months of the expiration of the list,” PA9, is both specious and irrelevant as neither the [...], nor the [...], has provided statutory or regulatory authority requiring confirmation of existing vacancies upon issuance of a certification issued within three months of the expiration of a promotional list.  The [...]’s attempt to use this theory to justify its actions in enforcing the subject regulation as to Appellant’s promotion, but not to any other invalid promotions, including the July 2022 promotions, is, therefore, misplaced.  The [...]’s characterization of Appellant’s deprivation of a promotion as an “administrative error” is also specious as: 1) incompatible with its prior statements of its ignorance of civil service law; and 2) there was no “error. ”  The [...] had a duty to know the law as to promotions; it did not, and when notified of its improper July 2022 promotions, it attempted to “cure” the mistake via unauthorized action.  Such was clearly intentional conduct in an effort to remediate its prior improper conduct and, therefore, not an “error. ”  The [...]’s arguments that there were no actual vacancies for Appellant’s promotion because the September and October 2022 vacancies no longer existed, ([...] Brief-10-16), is especially arrogant as the only reason such vacancies no longer existed was because the [...] unlawfully retroactively applied them to the July 2022 promotions.  Finally, Respondents’ arguments that the [...]’s failure to enforce N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4. 8(b) as to the [...]’s July 2022 promotions was because the eligibility list did not expire until after the certification for such promotions was issued, ([...] Brief-5), is irrelevant and senseless.  Similarly, Appellant’s eligibility list did not expire until March 2023, and the certification of promotions for his civil service remained active until February 7th, after additional actual vacancies occurred.  CONCLUSION
[brief] 328 (Ch. Div. 1990) | | | Berman v. Gurwicz, | 47, 50 | | 189 N.J. Super. 89 (Ch. Div. 1981) | | Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. K. L. O. Welding Erectors, Inc., 132 N.J. Super. 496 (App. Div. 1975) .........................................................59, 61 Blum Bldg. Co. v. Ingersoll, 99 N.J. Eq. 563 (Ch. Div. 1926), affirmed, 101 N. J. Eq. 291 (E. & A. 1927) ..............................................................................................................26 Bourne Co. v. MPL Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ........................................................................72 Boyle v. Huff, Nos. A-1965-21, A-2046-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 85 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2023) .....................................................................................60 Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210 (2005)
[brief] (Pa474).  [...] approached [...] about whether the staffing coordinators could receive charge pay in lieu of their ineligibility for the PIP.  (Pa363 at 83:22-84:9).  [...] expressly denied [...]’s request for prospective staffing coordinator charge pay.  (Pa363 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa476).  Undeterred, [...] decided she, [...], and [...] were going to take charge pay anyway.
[brief] While the judgment only listed two aggravating factors, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) and (9), “[t]he sentencing transcript,” which listed three aggravating factors, “is ‘the true source of the sentence. ’ ”  State v. Walker, 322 N.J. Super. 535, 556 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting State v. Pohlabel, 40 N.J. Super. 416, 423 (App. Div. 1956)).  On remand, the trial judge should enter a corrected judgment of conviction, if warranted, after the Wade/Henderson hearing.
[brief] The [...] interpret that as saying the painted stairs were not slippery at all until coated in freezing rain on January 5, 2022.  However, as stated above, a finder of fact could also conclude from this testimony that [...] was saying that he had walked on the steps when they were wet many times before the paint job but only encountered a problem on the stairs when wet after the paint job.  [...] did testify he did not remember any particular precipitation falling onto the steps after the paint job until the date of his fall.  (Pa330).  The [...] cite copious meteorological evidence to show that there had been precipitation in the weeks leading up to the incident.  (Del Fornos Brief at pp. 2-3, 14-15).  It is [...]’s testimony that, to the best of his knowledge, he did not remember any particular event of precipitation in that time period.  Any inconsistencies in [...]’s deposition testimony or any discrepancy with official weather records goes only to the weight of the evidence.  [...] is not an expert meteorologist but was testifying from his personal recollection.  The jury should decide whether to credit or discredit his testimony about the paint making the deteriorating concrete staircase “sleeker” when wet after the paint job.
[brief] REGULATIONS  N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.4  N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.1(i) and (j)  N.J. A.C. 7:38-3  N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2  N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.5  N.J.A.C. 7:38-11.2  N.J.A.C. 7:38-11.3  N.J.A.C. 7:38-11.7  N.J.A.C. 7:15-2.3  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2  N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.1  N.J. REGISTER
[brief] [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT  STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  JUSTICE COMPLEX [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. 027552008  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE  BUREAU P.O. BOX 086 [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNS EL AND ON THE BRIEF  May 7, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy both the performance and prejudice prongs of the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in *State v. Fritz*, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).  Under the performance prong, "the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient," that is, "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687.  This showing requires the defendant to "overcome a 'strong presumption' that counsel exercised 'reasonable professional judgment' and 'sound trial strategy' in fulfilling his responsibilities."  *State v. Young*, 474 N.J. Super. 507, 516 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 254 N.J. 63 (2023); see also *State v. Allegro*, 193 N.J. 352, 366 (2008) (reiterating that the first prong "is satisfied by a showing that counsel's acts or omissions fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances of the case" (quoting *State v. Castagna*, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006))).  Under the prejudice prong "the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense," that is, "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687, 694.  A “reasonable probability” is one that is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ”  *Fritz*, 105 N.J. at 52.  Purely speculative deficiencies in representation are insufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  *Id.* at 64.  The PCR court properly found that defendant did not establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance concluding that defendant could not establish that his plea counsel’s performance was deficient.
[brief] Date Submitted: October 11, 2023  [...], individually and in his official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], individually and in his official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], individually and in her official capacity as Committeeperson, U.S. HOME AT HOPEWELL  PARC  URBAN RENEWAL, L.L.C., [...] d/b/a [...], and [...] (fictitious entities including public entities) and [...] (fictitious individuals), Defendant-Respondents.  Lead Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID #034401992  Co-Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. Attorney ID #261711970  Of Counsel to the Law Offices of [...] and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID #011541990
[brief] The amount due and owing to Plaintiff has continued to grow because Defendant has continually refused to comply with the Order for the last four years, so the court-enforced $100 per day penalty continues to run and accrue.  As of October 13, 2023, the net amount owed to Plaintiff from Defendant was $224,343.59.  (A51)  The Court already determined that Defendant’s “self-help” by failing to pay the monthly support obligation in 2017 was a violation of the Settlement Agreement and was not justified by the $70,000 repayment obligation.  He made this argument at trial, and the Court rejected it:  “I reject [...]’s contention that he has no further obligation to pay the $1500 support obligation and to require the plaintiff to disgorge those payments already received.  That was the agreement between the parties.  He stopped paying at his own risk. ”  (4T 27:25-28:5)  “I do find that the agreement is valid and enforceable; that [...] is to pay $1500 per month going back to the breach date, which would – so the first missed payment was actually July 5, 2017.  And that those monies are owed….  I am going to award 1083 days of penalty at $100 day, which is $108,300.  So the total amount due for the missed payments is $157,800 through June 22nd, which is today…”  (4T 25:11-15; 26:5-8)  Defendant’s request that the Court rewrite the agreement now, after a full trial on the issue and appellate practice, is outright frivolous.  It is essentially a renewal of his request for recission of this portion of the Agreement.  Defendant continues to misread the language contained in the Court’s Order.  It does not Order Plaintiff to pay Defendant $70,000.  It is written in the passive voice, and reads “Defendant is awarded $75,306.41, this sum representing $70,000 plus 1% annual interest for six years from June 2014 through June 2020. ”
[directive] Aggravating Factor #4d applies when the defendant directed or substantially influenced another person in committing the offense.  This factor should not be used if the defendant is charged with and will plead guilty to the offense of hiring or using a juvenile in a drug-distribution scheme in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6.  For this Aggravating Factor to apply, the prosecutor should be able to identify the person or persons who were directed or substantially influenced by the defendant.
[brief] See In re Commitment of M.M., 384 N.J. Super. 313, 333 (App. Div. 2006) (“In this case, the judge did not even consider whether there were exceptional circumstances and good cause warranting extensions of the statutory period.  Such a failure to consider the legal standards is an abuse of discretion. ”); Stoney v. Maple Shade Twp., 426 N.J. Super. 297, 315–16 (App. Div. 2012) (concluding that trial court “abused [its] discretion in denying injunctive relief as to the park because [it] failed to consider all relevant factors. ”).
[directive] P.S.C. attachments cc: Chief Justice [...]  Associate Justices Hon. [...]  Assignment Judges  Assignment Judge Designate [...] Civil and Criminal Presiding Judges  [...], Deputy Admin. Director  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Trial Court Administrators  Operations Managers/ATCAs  Vicinage Jury Managers  [...], Jury Programs  [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant Directive # 4-07