ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court’s decision does not support and maintain the integrity of the recording system (Raised Below: 1T42; 1T61).  The New Jersey Recording Act, currently embodied as N.J.S.A. 46:26A-1, et seq., makes New Jersey a race notice jurisdiction.  The Recording Act seeks to compel the recording of documents affecting title to real property so that purchasers can confidently rely on record title.  “It is a clear mandate that the recording purchaser be given every consideration permitted by the law, including all favorable presumptions of law and fact. ”  Jones, The New Jersey Recording Act – A Study of its Policy, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 328, 329-330 (1957).  Absent an unusual equity consideration, the New Jersey Supreme Court has encouraged all New Jersey judges to make decisions “that will best support and maintain the integrity of the recording system. ”  Palmarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446, 453 (1979).  Consistent with the Recording Act, the testimony and evidence presented to the trial court demonstrated that Plaintiff owned the Strip.  Defendant stipulated at trial that documents recorded between 1933 and 1966 in Plaintiff’s chain of title contained a description of the Strip.  1T15:24-16:15; Pa0053.  Plaintiff put forth color-coded maps which showed how the Strip was conveyed thereafter in recorded documents in Plaintiff’s chain of title.  Pa0044.  Plaintiff’s expert testified that he had compared the color-coded maps to the metes and bounds descriptions within the deeds to verify that the maps were correct.  1T19:4-18; Pa0044.  Plaintiff’s expert testified that the Strip was transferred from [...] as trustee in dissolution of [...] to [...], and that Graco, Inc. thereafter transferred the Property to the Plaintiff.  1T39:13-25; 40:1-5; Pa0084; Pa0065.  Plaintiff’s expert also testified that the Plaintiff owned the Strip as of 1991.  1T40:19-23; Pa0065.  Therefore, the evidence showed that the Strip was always within Plaintiff’s chain of title.
[brief] (18T31-20 to 32-5)  The court also ruled that what [...] would be allowed to testify to was going to be her recollection of what he said because his oral statement is going to come in with a cautionary instruction about an oral statement has to be reviewed with caution because of the possibility that even one word being changed could change the meaning of the statement.  [(18T31-9 to 15)]  As the court had ruled that [...]’s testimony regarding Defendant’s statement was coming in so long as it was limited to that one statement, the only question left was whether a 104 hearing was needed.  The following day, defense counsel and the State appeared to have reached an agreement wherein [...] would testify just to Defendant’s alleged words, that no testimonial hearing was necessary because each party could proffer their respective interpretations at closing.
[directive] Simple Assault menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, disorderly persons offense; Petty Disorderly if fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, petty disorderly persons offense.  $100 to $500 10% permissible Persons  False 2C:13-3  Actor knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible  Imprisonment  Actor commits a flagrantly rude or offensive conduct likely to be observed by a non- 2C:14-4a
[brief] Plaintiffs also attempt to argue [...] is a single risk in New Jersey.  (Pb35.)  But even [...]’s proposals advertise its work in multiple states (i.e., “MD, NJ, NY, PA, SC”), a fact that Plaintiffs omitted by including in their appendix Proposals that, for some reason, do not contain these references.  (Compare Pa 876 and 881, with Za203 and 206.)  Thus, N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.2 is clear that it does not apply to an insurance program covering multi-state location risks like the CCIP here.
[brief] \(^5\)  Plaintiffs extract language out of context from *Metex Mfg. Corp. v. Manson*, No. 05-2948 (HAA), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25107 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008), an unpublished District Court opinion, as ostensible support for the contention that “broad indemnity as to ‘any liability’ arising from ‘any’ claim, including claims by other members [is] sufficient to warrant [an] award of counsel fees. ”  Pp81-82.  However, *Metex* does not provide such support:
[brief] **  Following the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan Amendment, in January 2021, [...] submitted an application to the Department for a CAFRA individual permit to authorize the construction of an eight (8) story apartment building (the “Proposed Building”) with 109 residential units, 234 parking spaces, and related improvements on the Property (the “CAFRA Application”).  Aa16; Aa29; see 2Ra18.  The Project was designed in accordance with the Redevelopment Ordinances, as amended by the Redevelopment Plan --- 4  For example, under the Redevelopment Plan Amendment, the Minimum Front Yard Setback from Ocean Avenue is fifty (50) feet.  2Ra6; compare 2Ra136.  5  The Department’s File and Activity Number for the CAFRA Application is [...], [...].  Aa16; Aa29.  Amendment.  2Ra24.  Accordingly, the Proposed Building was approximately 99 feet high and set back approximately 50.5 feet from Ocean Avenue.  2Ra75.  As further discussed in Point I(C), infra, due to the Redevelopment Plan Amendment, [...] applied for a CAFRA individual permit instead of seeking approval pursuant to the Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit, in accordance with the procedures set forth under the Long Branch Rule.
[brief] New York Has a Materially Greater Interest in This Dispute and Applying New York Law Would Not Violate New Jersey Public Policy  For Appellants to argue successfully that the New York choice-of-law provision in the Wholesaler Agreement should not be honored based on the second prong of the Restatement test, Appellants must demonstrate that: (i) New Jersey has a materially greater interest in this dispute than New York, (ii) application of New York law will violate a fundamental policy of New Jersey, and (iii) under the rule of § 188, New Jersey would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice-of-law by the parties.
[brief] American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd ed. 1993) ...........................................  11 Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online version 2024), https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/conflict .................................  11  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.2.1 on R. 4:5-4 (2022) ..............................................................................  19 Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on R. 4:5-4 (2015) ..................................................................................  19 Rules R. 4:46-2 ..................................................................................................................  9 R. 4:5-4 ..................................................................................................................  19 Regulations N.J.A.C. 11:2–17.5 ...............................................................................................  18  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] maintained that they have title to the entirety of the subject property.  The parties engaged in discovery in the normal course.  Each side retained expert witnesses in the field of Property Title.  Despite the volumes of documentary evidence (including Deeds and Maps), most of which were drafted and filed of record with the government well over 100 years ago, this case was ultimately reduced to title expert assessment of these old Maps and Deeds on file to determine whether [...] ever actually took or acquired legal title to the subject property in the October 23, 1939, Foreclosure Decree.  [...] maintained that if [...] never took title to the subject property, then [...] is entitled to a Court Declaration Quieting Title in their favor and monetary damages.  The ensuing Trial and litigated whether in 1939 when [...] took title to the subject property by Sheriff’s Deed whether the Deed conveyed to them legal title to the (then) dry land only, or to BOTH the (then) dry land and the riparian grant at issue.
[brief] It is a corollary of this principle that the gratuitous licensee's awareness of the peril is an absolute bar to recovery: for the occupier's liability is predicated on the concealment of the danger from the licensee.  In the case of an invitee, the occupier is under a duty of care to render the premises reasonably safe, and there is a breach of the duty when under the occupier's invitation persons come upon land which the occupier knows or ought to know has elements of danger, notwithstanding the invitees are themselves aware of the risk of harm, although contributory fault may bar recovery for a breach of the duty.  But in the case of a gratuitous licensee, there is no breach of duty if the licensee also knows of the hazard, or the risk of injury would be obvious to a reasonably prudent person.  These rules of status and duty are embedded in the common law.
[brief] U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J. Const., art. I, pars. 1, 9, 10; Branch, 182 N.J. at 342.  POINT V: THE COURT’S RESPONSE TO THE JURY’S REPORT THAT IT HAD BEEN AT AN IMPASSE FOR “A GOOD LENGTH OF TIME” AND THAT “IT SEEMS LIKE WE WILL NOT MAKE ANY
[brief] (V:16:57:57 to 59:27).  Defendant’s claim is restricted to this period because he could not reasonably argue that the police lacked a basis to detain defendant after he admitted his vehicle contained drugs – indeed, defendant’s brief concedes that the police had probable cause to arrest him after he “indicated that there were in fact drugs in the car. ” (Db32).  Defendant’s challenge, narrow as it is, fails for several reasons.
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[brief] ”  Ibid.  After that, he went to his office while [...] went outside; he denied taunting [...]  Ibid.  According to [...], [...] soon came back inside and yelled, “[[...]], I just want you to know I’m in a protected class, my name is [...] and you will respect me. ”  Ibid.  [...] replied that this was the first time he heard [...]’s “new name,” and that while he would call her “whatever [she] wanted to be called, it doesn’t matter that you are in a protected class, you don’t have the right to come to my office and harass people. ”  Ibid.  Contrary to his prior statement about [...]’s interaction with [...], [...] then claimed that only [...] was in the office that day; he also denied [...]’s claim that [...] tried to defuse the situation by guiding him into an office.  Ibid.  [...] asserted that if he had known [...]’s preferred name, he would have used it.  Ibid.  He did not recall whether he addressed her by any name that day, but acknowledged that if he had, it would have been [...]. because he did not know she was changing her name to [...]  Ibid.  [...] accused [...] of being the “hostile” party, not him, and suggested that [...]’s allegations related to the election and the fact that [...]’s friend was running against him.
[brief] *State v. Chenique-Puey*, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996).  What qualifies as prejudice is a question of both fact and law: would evidence of the charges for which severance is sought be admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) in the trial of the remaining charges?  State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 73 (2013).  This determination of admissibility is governed by the venerable four-prong test established in State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992).  Cofield asks whether 1) the evidence of the other crime is relevant to a material issue; 2) it is similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3) the proof thereof is clear and convincing; and 4) whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the prejudicial impact.  An additional means of admission through N.J.R.E. 404(b), and perhaps the one more accurately applied here, is through the concept of “intrinsic evidence. ”  Following the retirement of res gestae in State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141 (2011), the Court determined that evidence “intrinsic” to a charged crime “need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly the Rule 403 balancing test. ”  Id. at 177-178.  The definition of “intrinsic” the Court adopts derives from the Third Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Green, which held that evidence is intrinsic if it either 1) directly proves the charged offense, or 2) is an uncharged act that was performed contemporaneously with, and helped to facilitate, the charged crime.  Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248-249 (3d Cir. 2010).  Under either analysis, the evidence of the witness tampering would be admissible in the trial on the substantive counts.  Under *Cofield*, evidence that defendant sought means to neutralize the participation of the sole witness to the crime would be relevant to whether he committed that crime; both the substantive act and the witness tampering share a threatening nature and were contemporaneous; the trial court, having held an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, determined that it was established by clear and convincing evidence; and the prejudice was not sufficient to overcome the apparent probative value.  The evidence could also be found to be intrinsic.  Using *Rose/Green*, evidence that defendant tampered with the only witness for his prosecution is direct evidence that he committed the offense: if he did not do it, what would he have to tamper with?  Likewise, any interference with his prosecution would represent a facilitation of the underlying crime, namely, his attempt to evade accountability.  B.
[brief] As the Court concluded, this testimony led the jury “to speculate that the detective had superior knowledge through hearsay information implicating defendant in the crime. ”  Id. at 348.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed Bankston and its progeny, explaining the “common thread . . . is that a police officer may not imply to the jury that he possessed superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant. ”  Id. at 351.  [...]’s testimony directly violated the rules set forth in Bankston and its progeny, when he testified as follows on direct:
[brief] [...], 2023 LGBTQ+ Youth Report, Fig. 6 (Aug. 2023) (“2023 LGBTQ+ Youth Report”) (trans and nonbinary youth who share their identities with their parents often find them supportive), https://reports.hrc.org/2023-lgbtq-youth-report#about-the-study; [...], Research Brief: Behaviors of Supportive Parents and Caregivers for LGBTQ Youth at 2 (May 2022) (reporting frequency of supportive actions by parents of transgender, nonbinary, and gender-questioning youth), https://www.thetrevorproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/May-Research-Brief-Supportive-Caregiver-Behavior.pdf; [...], U.S. Perspectives on Issues Impacting the LGBTQ+ Community, at 11–12 (June 2023) (reporting that more than half of parents state they would be “totally comfortable” if their children came out as transgender or nonbinary), https://www.thetrevorproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/2304052-THE-TREVOR-PROJECT_May-Adults-Survey-Presentation-PUBLIC-2.pdf. create serious risks for students who would face rejection at home for expressing their gender identity.  For those vulnerable students, the challenged district policies are harmful and dangerous.  Infra Point II.B.2.b.
[brief] A. N.J.S.A. 40A-12A-8(f) Does Not Authorize The $2,000,000 Payment  N.J.S.A. 40A:12-8(f) authorizes a redevelopment entity to “negotiate and collect revenue form a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity. ”  This language cannot be read to authorize a municipality to collect a capital contribution from a redeveloper to fund an unrelated municipal project inasmuch as that contribution is not “revenue” of the redeveloper, and the funding of the construction of an unrelated capital project is not the “defray[al] of costs of the redevelopment entity. ”  The concept of “revenue” is distinct from a capital contribution.  “Revenue” is generally defined as business income.  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/revenue (last visited June 20, 2024); Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966); see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revenue (last visited June 20, 2024).  Under a related statute, the Long-Term Tax Exemption Law, “revenue” (there “gross revenue”) is defined as an annualized payment.  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-3(a).  The one-time $2,000,000 payment negotiated between the [...] and [...] before the latter was even designated as the redeveloper (Pa878; [...] Brief at p. 15), is not “revenue.
[brief] Despite no information to contradict the extensive control over the Petitioner by [...] during Court sessions, [...] still found Petitioner was not an employee because [...] did not exercise control outside of Court sessions.  (T100-3)  13.  [...] reported that non-court officials said they do not control the order and sequence of the way in which Petitioner conducts her work outside of Court sessions, yet agreed they absolutely control the order and sequence of the work when she is in Court sessions.  (T142-18)  14.  The only piece of information which [...] relied upon that [...] does not control Petitioner’s work was that they call her on her cell phone when Court is not in session.  (T144-1)  15.  [...] admitted that she did not interview any courtroom personnel to verify any of the information she used in making her report.  (T144-8)  16.  [...] testified that she only discussed the Petitioner’s case with [...], the Township Administrator, [...] and [...]; the last two who are designated by statute to provide the information to the Board.  (T144-13)  17.  Yet, despite [...]’s reliance on those designated by statute to provide the information, [...] completely ignored both [...] and [...]’s determination by [...] that Petitioner was an employee of [...] for the period at issue.
[brief] R. 4:46-2(c) provides that summary judgment shall only be rendered if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Under Brill, supra, a determination whether there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidentiary materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issues in favor of the non-moving party.  The "judge's function is not... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."  Id. at 540, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986).  The Judge of Compensation granted petitioner's motion without any "competent evidentiary materials."
[directive] Instructions for preparation of PROPERTY DESCRIPTION REPORT (LONG FORM)  1.  DEPARTMENT - The name of the law enforcement agency that takes the report will be entered here.  2.  ORI NO - Enter the department's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) New Jersey Identifier Number.  3.  INCIDENT NO - The department may use this box to enter a local Incident/Event number.  4.  PROS CASE NO - This box will be used for the County Prosecutor's Office to enter their case number.  5.  DEPT CASE NO - This box may be used by the local department for entering a case/report number.  A-11
[directive] This mitigating factor is not available to a defendant who falls into Criminal History Category IV or V, who is subject to the new “Street Gang” Special Application and Enhancement Feature, or who has committed the offense of using or employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme.  The “graduated” plea policy established in the original Brimage ! Guidelines has been amended to afford greater discretion to prosecutors to account for unforeseen or changed circumstances with a view toward providing defendants with a reasonable opportunity to consider a plea offer.
[directive] This Directive outlines a four-step process that law enforcement officers must follow when responding to a report of an illegal eviction.  As a first step, when officers arrive at the scene, they should attempt to determine the basic facts regarding the eviction or threatened eviction.  If the officers identify potential violations of Section 33-11.1, they should promptly issue warnings to the responsible parties.  Next, if the officers determine that a tenant was evicted illegally, then they should ensure that the tenant is immediately restored to their residence.  Finally, if the warned individuals refuse to comply with requirements of Section 33-11.1, then the officers should promptly charge those individuals by complaint-summons.
[brief] The Commission additionally notes that, even if an appropriate disclaimer is used, the substance of a post/statement can, nevertheless, render the disclaimer meaningless.  I/M/O Treston at 8 (emphasis in original).  Again, this body of caselaw requiring a Melnyk disclaimer from Facebook accounts used to campaign for school board seats was reaffirmed only six days before Appellants filed their Complaint in the present matter.  Advisory Opinion A02-22 (2022) (Ca233).  It is clear from this well-established body of caselaw that – pursuant to the Legislature’s mandate in creating the Commission – there is an affirmative duty to disclaim when school board members make social media posts that could otherwise compromise the board.  These cases were cited by the parties and [...], as they are clearly the gold standard on this issue.  However, this line of cases was inexplicably nowhere to be found in the Commission’s analysis in the present matter.
[brief] In their petition, they assert only that they are citizens of the State and “are adversely affected by the legislation. ” (Pa17).  But they have not shown “that they have been injured by enforcement of the statute or that the statute substantially deters their constitutionally protected activity. ”  *In re Martin*, 90 N.J. 295, 308 (1982).  Their policy beliefs do not suffice; they must show that they have suffered actual injury from the statute.  *State v. Varona*, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 488 (App. Div. 1990).  Petitioners point to the Supreme Court’s decision in *McCabe* as justification for seeking a remand instead of dismissal, but that case is distinguishable.  In transferring the matter to the Law Division for further proceedings, the Court in *McCabe* noted that the Attorney General acknowledged that the applicants likely had standing to pursue their substantive challenges to the statute.  *McCabe*, 81 N.J. at 470.  That is not the situation here.  There is nothing in Petitioners’ application that remotely suggests that they have standing to challenge Chapter 375.  Accordingly, their request for a remand to the Law Division should be denied and the application should be dismissed in its entirety.