ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *State v. Dunns*, [...] (App. Div. Mar. 9, 2020) (slip op. at 6).  In *Dunns*, the defendant pled to separate indictments, and was sentenced to serve one sentence concurrent to the other.  Thereafter, defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever on one of his two cases.  The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision.  Defendant was then allowed to withdraw his plea in that case only.  The State then moved to withdraw the second plea, citing principles of basic contract law and fairness.  *See ibid.*  The appellate court upheld the denial of the State’s motion, and illustrated the difference between plea agreements and general contract law.  *Dunns*, slip op. at *5.  The appellate court found the “two plea agreements were separate and were not intended by both parties to represent a single global resolution of all criminal matters pending against defendant. ”  *Ibid.*  In this decision, the court highlighted that it was not “expressly state[d] on the record that the second agreement was part and parcel of the first agreement.  Nor did the prosecutor expressly set as a condition of its plea offer that the State could withdraw from the second agreement if defendant were permitted to withdraw from the first agreement. ”  *Dunns*, slip op. at *6.  The appellate division’s opinion made it clear that “[i]n the absence of a clear indication in the record that *both* parties intended for the two agreements to rise or fall together,” plea agreements on separate indictments should be viewed separately for the purposes of withdrawing a guilty plea.
[brief] [...] relies on all of these arguments from his initial brief, adding the following comments.  First, regarding the so-called “booking” statement, the State argues that there was no need to read [...] his *Miranda* warnings because the police had informed him of his rights two days earlier.  (Rb 22-25)  It is well-established that “[b]efore the police can interrogate a suspect in custody, they must inform the person of his constitutional rights in accordance with *Miranda.* ”  *State v. O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. 408, 420 (2022) (citing *State v. Hreha*, 217 N.J. 368, 382 (2014)).  It is equally well-established that the State bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.  *Ibid.*  “That burden of proof is higher than under federal law, which requires the government to ‘prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence. ””  Ibid. (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)).  The State is asking this Court to conclude that they met their burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] knowingly and voluntarily waived important constitutional rights without being reminded of those rights and without expressly waiving those rights, simply because [...] had, days earlier, been informed of his rights.  It is true that there is no bright-line rule regarding re-administering Miranda warnings, and that courts instead consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the State has met its burden of proof.
[directive] All plea offers must include a date or event at which the offer will expire and will be automatically withdrawn.  Plea offers may be withdrawn and modified at any time based on a material change in circumstances, such as the receipt or availability of new information that would materially affect a defendant’s eligibility for a standardized waiver or the calculation of the authorized disposition and that would result in a different authorized plea offer then the one previously calculated.  When the State becomes aware of such new information, the prosecutor in the exercise of reasoned discretion may withdraw any outstanding plea offer and tender a replacement plea offer that accounts for the newly-discovered facts or circumstances.  As noted in Section 3.1, a prosecutor is expected to disclose fully and accurately to the court all pertinent information so that the court can properly discharge its responsibilities in deciding whether to accept, reject or vacate a negotiated disposition.  If, after the plea is taken but before sentence is imposed, the prosecutor becomes aware of new information that shows that the defendant is not eligible for a standardized waiver, or that shows that the defendant would fall under a higher Criminal History Category, or that the defendant is subject to a Special Application and Enhancement Feature or an Aggravating Factor that was not accounted for in the plea offer (e.g., the presentence investigation report discloses additional prior convictions or adjudications of delinquency, or reveals that the present offense was committed while the defendant was on parole or probation), the prosecutor may, in the exercise of reasoned discretion and in order to promote the interests of finality and the efficient disposition of the case, elect to permit the defendant to be sentenced in accordance with the plea offer previously accepted by the court, provided that the prosecutor at or before the sentencing proceeding alerts the court to the discrepancy so that the court can decide pursuant to R. 3:9-3(d) whether on its own motion to vacate the plea on the grounds that the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement reached by the prosecutor and defense counsel.
[brief] ”  Id. at 539.  The request did not contain a date range.  The Appellate Division found the request was invalid because:  [...] provided neither names nor any identifiers other than a broad generic description of a brand or type of case prosecuted by the agency in the past.  Such an open-ended demand required the Division’s records custodian to manually search through all of the agency’s files, analyze, compile and collate the information contained therein, and identify for [...] the cases relative to its selective enforcement defense in the OAL litigation.  . . .  Simply put, the Division was asked to do the very research and investigation [...] needed to do in the administrative proceeding in order to establish a “colorable claim” of selective enforcement before being transportation project); Bader v. Bove, 273 A.D.2d 466 (2000) (the request “would require the village clerk to manually search through every document filed with the village for the past 45 years”); Capitol Info Ass’n v. Ann Arbor Police, 138 Mich App 655, 658 (1984) (the request did not name any email account to be searched and required the agency to “search their files for correspondence with a wide spectrum of federal agencies dealing with any of more than 100,000 persons during an extensive period of time”). entitled to pre-trial discovery as to its defense in that forum.
[brief] It should also be noted that N.J.S.A. 34:15-36’s definition of the scope of “employment” was only amended to specifically include arriving at a designated employee parking area on January 10, 2022, after the October 6, 2021 crash that forms the basis of this litigation.  See P.L. 2021, c.334, Pa1126, Pa1128.  The statute in effect on the date of the October 6, 2021 crash provided in pertinent part that “employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work[.]” (Emphasis added).  However, the statute did not define what it meant to “arrive”, nor did it set forth the contours of the “place of employment. ”  On January 10, 2022, after the subject crash, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 to specifically provide that “employment” commences when an employee “arrives at the parking area prior to reporting for work. ”  Pa1128.  The fact that, on January 10, 2022, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 to include “when an employee arrives at the parking area prior to reporting for work” within the statutory scope of employment indicates that, at the time of the subject October 6, 2021 fatal crash, the time period “when an employee arrives at the parking area prior to reporting for work” was not automatically included within the scope of employment for the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation statute generally or, specifically, with regard to the applicability of the co-employee immunity set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.
[brief] The Defendants similarly ignore the fact that the Appellate Division has already declared in the case of Liberty Mutual v. Land, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 89 (App. Div. 2010), that an insurance carrier’s claim for damages under the Fraud Act was properly resolved by the Court and not a jury --- \(^2\)  Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs’ claim for trebling of the damages that they are otherwise entitled to triggers a right to a jury trial and they cite to no authority for this proposition.  \(^3\)  Defendants do not seriously argue that they are entitled to a jury trial on the DJ and disgorgement counts of the complaint.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 4:23.a.(2)(a) and (b) (emphasis added).  Proof of the serious threat is an independent element of the statute to be established with separate proofs.  If it could be proved simply with evidence that a dog injured a person or killed a domestic animal, it would render the second part of the statute superfluous and render the statute absurd.  See, State v. Thompson, 250 N.J. 556, 275 A.3d 412 (2022), in which the Supreme Court held that it would be absurd to interpret a law in such a way that “would render the second half of the provision superfluous. ”  Thompson, 250 N.J. at 560, 275 A.3d at 415.  The trial Court’s ruling about “serious threat” was intertwined with his findings about provocation, often omitting the modifier “serious”: poses a threat -- serious threat of bodily injury or death to a person or 2, severely injured or killed another domestic animal.  And A, poses a threat of serious bodily injury to a death -- or death to a person or B, poses a threat of death to another domestic animal as set forth in the statute.  4T64:19-24(emphasis added)  I do also find that in addition that [...] does pose a threat of seriously – serious bodily injury to death – or death to a person or pose a threat of death to another domestic animal based upon the prior acts being the incident with [...], the incident with [...] and incident to [...].
[brief] Div. 2010) | | | Reyes v. Egner, | 5, 7, 8 | | 404 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 2009) | | | Scully v. Fitzgerald, | 8 | | 179 N.J. 114 (2004)  | | | Shields v. Ramslee Motors, | 3, 4, 6 | | 240 N.J. 479 (2020)  | | | Zentz v. Toop, | 6 | | 92 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 1966) | | ## Other Authorities § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts  ...........................................
[brief] (Aa18).  Applying the rule, DEP determined the Project provided a 25% open view corridor, which is less than the 30% requirement set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)(1), and that the 99-foot tall Project, set back at 88 feet, failed to meet the setback requirement of 198 feet.  Ibid.  DEP issued notice of the denial in the DEP Bulletin.  (Ra96).  [Rb8].  [...] administratively appealed the denial.  DEP, without going through rulemaking to approve the amended Design Guidelines and in reliance on a meaningless step back survey, gave in and approved a settlement and issued a CAFRA permit for a building completely at odds with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule, a building which will dominate the ocean front as no other building in the area has since the Rule was adopted.
[brief] POINT IV APPELLANT WAS SUBJECTED TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND HARASSMENT WHICH IS ADEQUATELY NOTED IN THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF  15 POINT V APPELLANT HAS SATISFIED THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF RETALIATION AS SET OUT IN THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF WHICH WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE TRIAL COURT  16 POINT VI THE CLAIMS AGAINST AUBREY JOHNSON ARE VIABLE AS HE AS SUPERINTENDENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT APPELLANT HAD TO DEAL WITH AND SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED APPELLANT’S CONCERNS  18 POINT VII PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE WARRANTED AS SET FORTH IN THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF 18 POINT VIII APPELLANT IS APPEALING THE ENTIRE RULING FROM BELOW WHICH INCLUDES ALL OF THE ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 19 CONCLUSION 20 | CASES | PAGES | |-------------------------------------------|-------| | Lehman v. Toys R Us, 132 N.J. 601 (1999) | 16 | | McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 511 U.S. 792 (1983) | 14,15 | | Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490 (1988) | 17 | | Velantzas v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988) | 7 | | Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010) | 12,13 | | Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 (2001) | 7 | | COURT RULES | | |------------------------------------------|-------| | R. 4:46-2(c) | 10 | APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Appellant [...] filed a Complaint after her wrongful termination from employment at the [...].
[brief] In addition to needing to establish their claimed implied easement by clear and convincing evidence, plaintiffs also were required to meet the summary judgment standard because this issue was before the trial court on their motion for partial summary judgment.  Under R. 4:46-2, summary judgment is only appropriate when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."  Plaintiffs were thus required to demonstrate that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that there was not an implied easement.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.  C.  The Record Before the Trial Court Did Not and Cannot Establish an Implied Easement Appurtenant by Clear and Convincing Undisputed Evidence
[directive] 3.4.6  This information should be maintained to facilitate analysis as to individual members, supervisors, squads, districts and assignments, and the agency as a whole.  Depending on the size of the agency and the complexity of this data, computerized software that utilizes mathematical algorithms may be best suited to assist in revealing the presence of particular patterns of incidents.  However, not all law enforcement agencies have the computer capabilities for such an in-depth screening process.  At a minimum, every law enforcement agency should establish a protocol for tracking employee behavior and INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 13 reviewing all internal affairs complaints made against its officers, regardless of outcome, for evidence of a pattern or practice of inappropriate or unconstitutional conduct.
[brief] Website, [...], https://theabcn.org/ (last accessed Apr. 14, 2024); see also Pa166, n.1.  In fact, [...]’s only licensure within the State of New Jersey is as a licensed psychologist, which means the trial court erred as a matter of law in not applying the then-binding authority from Carley.  Website, [...], License Information, available at https://newjersey.mylicense.com/verification/Details.aspx?result=9157d18b-4ebc-445a-98e9-f951441692d4 (last accessed Apr. 14, 2024).  Contrary to [...]’s own CV listing his licensure as a psychologist, he certified to the trial court that he is “a licensed neuropsychologist,” which is “not psychology. ” (Cp. Pa251 to Pa33 at ¶¶ 1-2.)  Even the literature from his own Board, the [...] acknowledges that neuropsychology is a subset of psychology.  Website, [...], https://theabcn.org/ (last accessed Apr. 14, 2024).  Without addressing the fact that the defendant was choosing the interpreter and not otherwise permitting a means to verify the accuracy of the interpretation, the trial court found the presence of an interpreter is not inconsistent with Defendant’s position because the interpreter “is necessary so plaintiff can be understood.
[brief] **Snow Removal Services Provided by Defendants:**  At trial on behalf of [...], [...] testified [...] from [...] was responsible for making sure snow and ice removal was completed at [...].  (4T9:5-12).  Mr. Acar testified that when he entered into the contract he did not expect it to be subcontracted, and that [...] needed the owner’s approval to subcontract, which [...] did not have.  (4T40:19-41:12).  Mr. Acar’s agreement with [...] had a provision first that states “Safety Must Not Be Compromised” and in addition another provision that stated all access roadways, walkways to be cleared of snow prior to 6:00 A.M. because some of the businesses were open during that time and it was so that the property could be safe for invitees coming on to the property for the business.  (4T22:6-23:15).  Mr. Acar knew businesses like the bagel place, [...], and even the daycare expected to be open as early as 6 a.m. (4T24:8-21).  Mr. Acar was not present on the day of Plaintiff’s fall and did not believe Mr. Sutter was there.  (4T28:16-20).  Mr. Acar believed he spoke with [...] during the day on the 8th about working being done at [...], however he did not even know that day that [...] was not in fact servicing the property.  (4T29:14-30:6).  Mr. Acar did not know Plaintiff’s schedule or what time her offices opened and had no control over it.  Mr. Acar had no personal knowledge as to what the property looked like when Plaintiff arrived, what snow removal efforts were made or not, how many people were out there and what was done and what was not done.  (4T49:20-25).  Mr. Acar admitted that he could have shut down or closed the commercial property if he were unable to keep it safe.  (4T77:16-18).  Within the court’s ruling, Mr. Acar was simply asked whether he was happy with the services [...] provided with regard to the 2017-2018 season.  (4T44:1-7).  In response, Mr. Acar said “April, not March.  April I had an issue with them. ” (4T44:6-7).  Mr. Acar opened the door for the line of questioning which then took place, but at no point did any testimony regarding [...] being terminated, nonrenewal, or subsequent remedial measures was brought up.  [...], on behalf of [...], testified as the property manager of [...].
[brief] 7.  **Appellant’s Claim for Declaratory Relief Similarly Fails (Pa003054). **  The trial court also properly dismissed the claim for declaratory relief.  In Count 9 of Appellants’ Verified/First Amended Verified Complaint, Appellants seek a declaration that they are the owners of the subject Solar Rights.  There is no factual or legal basis to support a finding that the Appellants own the Solar Rights.  The following facts are undisputed:
[brief] 14  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Pa1-  Substitution of Attorney/Notice of Appearance file on May 1, 2024  ###  TABLE OF CASE | CASE(S) | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Cannuscio v Claridge Hotel & Casino, 319 N J Super 342 (App. Div. 1999).  | 7 | | Chau v. Cardillo, 250 N J Super 378 (App. Div 1990) | 11 | | Cmty Realty Mgmt v Harris, 155 N J 212 (1998).  | 7 | | D’Agostino v.  Maldanado, 140 N J 366 (1995).  | 8 | | Hale v Farrakan, 390 N J Super 335 (App Div 2007).  | 12 | | Hous Auth of Morristown v Little, 135 N J 274 (1994) | 1 | | Housing Auth of Passaic v Torres, 143 N J Super 231 (App Div 1976) | 11 | | Maglies v Estate of Guy, 191 N J 108 (2007) | 8 | | Manalapan Realty LP v Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N J 360 (1995).  | 7 | | Reilly v Weiss, 406 N J Super 71 (App Div 2009) | 7 | | Stanger v Ridgeway, 171 N J Super 466 (App Div 1979).  | 1 | | 316 49 St. Assocs, Ltd P’shp. V Galvez 269 N J Super 481 (App Div 1994). | 11 | ### STATUTE(s) | NJSA 2A:18-61.1 | 8 | STANDARD OF REVIEW  As will be delineated in the Legal argument, generally with respect to an Appellate Court’s review regarding a Court’s decision granting the landlord a Judgment of possession it is based on an “abuse of discretion” standard.
[brief] Upon arrival at the scene, detectives immediately observed a crime scene had been established and further observed two shell casings on the ground (in the --- 1T – Transcript of Pretrial Motions, dated September 29, 2020; 2T – Transcript of Pretrial Conference, dated October 7, 2021; 3T – Transcript of Jury Selection, dated October 12, 2021; 4T – Transcript of Jury Selection, dated October 13, 2021; 5T – Transcript of Jury Selection, dated October 14, 2021; 6T – Transcript of Jury Selection, dated October 15, 2021; 7T – Transcript of Jury Selection, dated October 18, 2021; 8T – Transcript of Jury Selection, dated October 19, 2021; 9T – Transcript of Jury Selection, dated October 22, 2021; 10T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 25, 2021; 11T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 26, 2021; 12T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 27, 2021; 13T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 28, 2021; 14T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 29, 2021; 15T – Transcript of Trial, dated November 1, 2021; 16T – Transcript of Summations and Jury Charge, dated November 3, 2021; 17T – Transcript of Jury Deliberations and Verdict, dated November 4, 2021; 18T – Transcript of Sentencing, dated June 20, 2022; Db – Defendant’s Brief in Support of Appeal; Da – Defendant’s Appendix. intersection) amongst broken glass.  (11T:11-2 to 11; 18 to 12-13).  Not long after, detectives were advised that two victims had arrived in the emergency room of the [...] with gunshot wounds.  (11T:11-12 to 17; 18-5 to 12).  At approximately 11:45 a.m., Detectives [...] and [...] responded to the emergency room area of the hospital and observed the area had been marked off with cautionary tape – indicative that another crime scene had been established – and observed a silver 2017 Hyundai Tucson with Texas license plates parked right in front of the emergency room doors.
[brief] R.L., 402 N.J. Super. at 408 (emphasis added).  After all, as Defendants explained, Db19-23, search terms “often are over-inclusive,” leading to “large numbers of irrelevant documents” that simply have no bearing on the case at hand and thus little or no possibility of leading to admissible evidence, Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  Thus, regardless of how this Court interprets Rule 4:10-2(a), the ESI Order captures tens of thousands of documents outside the scope of discovery.
[brief] “Ordinarily, the merits of a complaint are not involved in the determination as to whether a class action may be maintained, unless of course the allegations are patently frivolous. ”\footnote{Olive v. Graceland Sales Corp., 61 N.J. 182 (1972).}  Courts deciding class certification consider an overarching principle of equity—that class actions should be liberally allowed where consumers seek to redress a common grievance under circumstances making individual actions uneconomical. \footnote{Varacallo v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 332 N.J. Super. 31, 45 (App. Div. 2000).}  Falling in that category of cases are those where each claimant shares a common grievance and incurs relatively small amounts of damages. \textsuperscript{115}  Problems that may arise in the future if the case is certified, such as procedures governing the allocation of damages, don’t necessarily preclude certification. \textsuperscript{116}  If there is any doubt as to class certification, the court should certify the class.\textsuperscript{117}
[brief] Chesterbrooke Limited Partnership v. Planning Bd. of Chester, 237 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1989)....................................................  43  Chou v. Rutgers, State University, 283 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 345 N.J. 374 (1996).........................................................
[brief] Docket No.: [...] ([...])  Dear [...]:  This Firm represents Defendant-Respondent, [...], in the above-referenced matter.  In that connection, enclosed for filing are: (i) Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Respondent [...]; and (ii) Proof of Service (electronically generated).  Please charge our firm’s Superior Court Account No. 146154 for any applicable fees.  Very truly yours, [Signature]  [...] Encl. GDE/mas cc: [...], Esq. (via eCourts Appellate)  [...], Esq. (via eCourts Appellate)  [...], [...] (HUSBAND), Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOWNSHIP OF UNION, [...] d/b/a [...], JOHN DOE 1-10 (a fictitious name), RICHARD ROE 1-10 (a fictitious name), ABC CORPORATION 1-10 (a fictitious corporation), XYZ CORPORATION 1-10 (a fictitious corporation), Defendants-Appellants.