ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp v. Finco, 272 N.J. Super 478, 487-88 (App. Div. 1994).  That is exactly what occurred here.  In addition to his testimony on [...]’s various deviations from the proper standard of care, [...] also testified about the connection between [...]’s conduct and the damages suffered by [...].  [...] testified that due to [...]’s anxiousness to obtain a divorce, [...] had a great opportunity to negotiate and protect a fair equitable settlement for herself.  6T153:15-17.  [...] himself acknowledged observing such an anxiousness in [...].  2T194:1-5 ([...] was “so eager, right, to get rid, get over with this case, get over with this marriage. ”).  According to [...], [...] had an equitable interest in all of [...]’s assets pursuant to New Jersey law and she ended up waving those interests by being instructed by [...] to sign off on the quick divorce.
[brief] Counsel at oral argument on the appeal suggested that the 833-guest figure was inaccurately calculated, and that far fewer banquet guests would be expected to use the facility.  That assertion overlooks the point that a banquet facility is designed to draw substantial numbers of guests who would be traveling to and from the facility for banquet events and who would not necessarily be staying in a room at the hotel.'  Id. at 14.  In the present case, counsel for [...] expressed concern over the sufficiency of the Applicant's notice, particularly as it relates to the variance for "Lot area/unit" (Pa103).
[directive] Examples of community violence include, but are not limited to, fights among gangs or other groups, bullying, and shootings.  Law enforcement agencies may use an existing form so long as it comports with the information collected on the 3 Attorney General’s HWC Notice, Form A, and does not include any details regarding the underlying incident.  3  B.  Transfer of Notice to Point of Contact at School  Once the HWC Notice is complete, the law enforcement officer must immediately send the HWC Notice to the appropriate Point of Contact at the child’s school.  In order to determine the Point of Contact, the agency shall contact and coordinate with the schools within their respective areas of responsibility (AOR).  Some children may attend schools in areas outside the responding law enforcement agency’s AOR.  In such cases, the responding law enforcement officer shall still complete the HWC Notice and send it immediately to the law enforcement agency where an affected local child’s school is located.  The receiving local law enforcement agency shall be responsible for sending the completed HWC Notice to the school’s appropriate Point of Contact, but shall not share with the school any related incident report.  C.  Timing and Record Keeping  Law enforcement agencies may create their own system for sending, tracking and storing HWC Notices to accommodate each agency’s unique structure.  Regardless of the system employed, all HWC Notices shall be sent upon completion, meaning prior to the immediately next school day or prior to the child arriving at school, whichever is sooner.  Once the local law enforcement officer sends the HWC Notice to the school, they shall attach a copy of the notice to any investigative or other necessary reports related to the underlying incident.  A copy must also be kept on file with all other HWC Notices for future reference.  When a HWC Notice is issued pursuant to Section II(B) above, copies must be maintained by both the sending and receiving agency.  Any investigative report related to the incident shall never be shared in conjunction with, or in replacement of, the HWC Notice.  Should there be any additional communication between the law enforcement agency and the school, the officer must be cautious not to disclose any details that would violate the privacy interests of any of the parties involved.
[brief] R.B. 183 N.J. at 330.  It should be noted that defendant claims in a parenthetical that State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234 (2021), a recent Supreme Court decision, held that “errors which affect the weight the jury will give the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless. ” (Db51).  This maxim is nowhere in that case—in fact the phrase “never harmless” exists only where the Court expressly “decline[d] to adopt defendant’s position that an evidentiary ruling that results in a defendant’s decision not to testify can never be harmless. ”  Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. at 240.  Hedgespeth instead found that erroneously admitted prior convictions had caused that defendant, in that case, to choose not to testify and therefore could not challenge the State’s witness’ credibility to full effect, and stopped the jury from assessing his demeanor and hearing his counter-theory of the case effectively.  Id. at 252-53.  Moreover, the evidence in the case was not strong enough to link defendant to the weapon in question, so the error could not be harmless.  *Ibid.*  Defendant also cites to *State v. Briggs*, 279 N.J. Super. 555 (App. Div.), for the same claim, that any erroneously admitted evidence or testimony that would serve to tip the scales in any way requires reversal.  *See Id.* at 565-66, *certif. denied*, 141 N.J. 99 (1995); (Db51).  Defendant does not accurately represent the holding in *Briggs*; there, improperly admitted hearsay evidence was “a critical piece of evidence to the State and was not cumulative—there is no other evidence establishing the alleged Robin police statement…the evidence of guilt was anything but overwhelming. ”  *Ibid.*  Thus, the weakness of the State’s case made the error not harmless, as the erroneous evidence was the lynchpin of the case.  *Ibid.*  Nothing could be farther from the truth here.  One borderline statement, and a collection of words from a small segment of one day of a witness’s testimony that spanned three days were clearly not the lynchpin of the State’s case here.  Defendant’s verdict is sound even if the comments were improper, though the State maintains that they were not.  Independent of [...]’s isolated comments, the State had a wealth of information and evidence to provide to the jury to establish defendant’s guilt.  Defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.
[brief] Just as Defendant [...] was ordered by the patient's physician in Bryan, supra, to provide updated blood-lithium levels for his patient every month, Defendant contractor [...] was ordered by its surveyor to "notify this office prior to any construction if the above referenced plans have been revised."  (Pa235a-237a).  On that same cut sheet, surveyor made clear to [...] that he was staking elevations in accordance with Sheet 4 of 11 on [...]'s Grading Plan dated 4/11/05, the only plan he had ever received from [...], which was outdated and inaccurate as to elevations.  (98a).  In a "Certification in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" dated 4/16/22, [...]’s president ([...]) admits that he gave the surveyor this 4/11/05 Grading Plan in 2008 to obtain a cost estimate from the surveyor, because, “at the time, that was the only grading plan [...] had." (Pa92 at ¶14 & ¶15ss).
[brief] Lastly, Appellants’ argument that the Court needs to probe the mind of [...] before making a decision on the merits of this case is inapposite and even absurd.  Appellants cannot establish causation or damages for any of their newfound claims because they refused to make payments under their Lease and were terminated by [...].  Where [...] itself testified that it would have permitted Appellants to continue their development work if they had only paid their Lease, and where Appellants themselves admit that the CEP Respondents had nothing to do with Appellants’ default, Appellants have only themselves to blame for their damages.  Moreover, as stated at length above, the term of the NDA had expired.  Appellants do not even have a breach of contract upon which to predicate their other claims here.  No matter what [...]’s interior motivations were, the facts in this case will not change.  Nothing will change how Appellants refused to pay rent because their partners were fighting.  Nothing will change how [...] repeatedly warned Appellants that they needed to pay rent to keep the project.  Nothing will change how Appellants’ development approvals were cancelled when they lost land control.  Appellants have only themselves to blame here, and they should not be permitted to use the judicial mechanisms of this State as a cudgel to spitefully bludgeon their competitor.  The time has come to dismiss these claims.  Appellants cannot hide behind their baseless allegations in their pleadings anymore.  After two and a half years, enough is enough.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The fact that [...] did not pull out the gun until it became necessary to do so to aid him in completing the robbery shows just that—that his purpose in possessing the gun was to aid him in completing the robbery if necessary.  The court’s findings to the contrary were based solely on “[s]peculation and suspicion. ”  Case, 220 N.J. at 64.  Furthermore, the court’s reason for finding that the objective of possessing the handgun was different from the objective of the robbery would lead to a perverse consequence.
[brief] A. MACHANE’S SUMMER CAMP OPERATIONS  Alexander and [...] formed [...], in New Jersey on May 22, 2019.  (Ia074 at ¶ 1; Ia085).  [...]’s named insured, [...], is a “doing business as” name for [...].  (Ia075 at ¶ 2; Ia090 at 13:15-18).  In 2019, the first summer that Machane operated a camp, it was scheduled to run from August 6, 2019 to August 26, 2019 (the “2019 Summer Camp”).  (Ia075 at ¶ 3; Ia101).  Machane began distributing the application for the 2019 Summer Camp in or around April or May 2019.  (Ia075 at ¶ 4; Ia091 at 24:18-22).  The application included a “Transportation” section which read: “Transportation will be arranged from Lakewood/Brooklyn to Richmond, VA on Tuesday morning, August 6th, and from Richmond, VA to Lakewood/Brooklyn on August 26th.  You will be contacted with exact pick up times and locations.  Transportation from other cities and/or airports will be determined based upon demand. ” (Ia075 at ¶ 5; Ia101).  In order to meet its transportation needs, Machane intended to rent “larger vans, 12 to 15 seaters. ” (Ia075 at ¶ 6; Ia092 at 27:10-11; Ia110).  Indeed, Machane did not own any vehicles in 2019 and, therefore, exclusively used rental vehicles in its operations.  (Ia075 at ¶ 7; Ia098 at 75:22-24.)  On July 9, 2019, [...] emailed [...] (“[...]”), a vehicle rental company, with the following reservation request:  We would Like to reserve 4 fifteen seater Transit vans with delivery to Lakewood NJ  Our Delivery date would be Friday Aug 2nd for the month at the Camp monthly rate.  to [...]  Please see attached CC authorization form and Master agreement, please advise if there is anything more that we need to do.  (Ia075 at ¶ 8; Ia114.)¹  On July 10, 2019, [...] responded to [...]’s email by providing reservation numbers for four 15-passenger vans.  [...] and [...] continued to communicate regarding the rental vans through the end of July 2019, and details regarding the rentals were confirmed by the end of July 2019.  (Ia076 at ¶ 9; Ia116).  B.
[brief] U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, pars. 1, 9, and 10.  The model charge on Testimony of a Cooperating Co-defendant or Witness provides, in part:  The law requires that the testimony of such a witness be given careful scrutiny.  In weighing (his/her) testimony, therefore, you may consider whether (he/she) has a special interest in the outcome of the case and whether (his/her) testimony was influenced by the hope or expectation of any favorable treatment or reward, or by any feelings of revenge or reprisal.  If you believe this witness to be credible and worthy of belief, you have a right to convict the defendant on his/her testimony alone, provided, of course, that upon a consideration of the whole case, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.  [Model Jury Charges (Criminal): Testimony of a Cooperating Co-Defendant or Witness (Revised 2/6/06)(emphasis added). ]  In the context of a cooperating codefendant, this charge is known as the “‘accomplice rule,’ i.e., a specific cautionary instruction that the evidence of an accomplice must be carefully scrutinized and assessed in the context of his interest in the proceeding.
[brief] In addressing [...]’s argument that redevelopment and the revitalization of deteriorating areas are valid public uses for which condemnation is authorized, the court stated that Plaintiff “could knock down . . . the broken-down stuff that’s on the property.  . . .  The concept is it will go away if it gets developed for Mount Laurel inclusive housing.  So, [...]’s goal will be satisfied.  It’s just what will go there is not what [...] wanted.
[brief] (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Because it is undisputed that Tenant was in monetary default when the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments came due on August 1, 2020 and August 1, 2021, Tenant is simply not entitled to payment of these amounts.  (Pa107; Da179-180; Db10-11).  Tenant’s argument that, despite its admitted monetary defaults, it is entitled to the Tenant Allowance in the form of a setoff is antithetical to the terms of the Lease.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  By its express terms, the Lease conditions Tenant’s entitlement to these installment payments upon it being current on its monetary obligations to Landlord.  Id.  Simply stated, Section 4.02, does not, as Tenant alleges, allows Tenant to unilaterally refuse to pay rent for five (5) months and then deduct such amount when the Tenant Allowance comes due.  Id.  In fact, Section 4.02 provides just the opposite.  Id.  B.
[brief] Finally, in situations involving “novel and unsettled insurance coverage issues,” as is the case here, the Enright factors do not favor an award of fees.  Jignayasa Desai, D.O., LLC v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 582, 590 (App. Div. 2022) (Court declines to award attorney fees after analyzing Enright factors where the “issue presented was novel and unsettled. ”).  The trial court’s decision in [...]’s favor, as well as the trial judge’s statement on the record expressing surprise that he was deciding issues of first impression further support the argument that the issues involved here were novel and unsettled, thereby weighing heavily against an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for Plaintiffs (May 26, 2023 Oral Arg. Tr., 90:19-24.)  Therefore, the Court here – or the trial court on remand - should exercise its judicial discretion and deny Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees in the DJ Action.\footnote{For the same reasons discussed in this section, if Plaintiffs were “successful claimants,” the Court should respectfully exercise its discretion and deny an award of pre-judgment interest.
[brief] [...] [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent Of Counsel and On the Brief [...] NJ Attorney ID: 100202014 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT........................................................................ 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................. 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................. 3 Appellant Never Disclosed His Multiple Opioid Prescriptions .................. 3 The Investigation of Appellant .................................................................. 5 Appellant’s Failure to Report Multiple Incidents in Ewing ......................... 6 Appellant’s Multiple Vehicle Incidents ....................................................... 7 Appellant’s Failure to Report the July 21, 2018 Incident ............................ 10 Appellant’s Multiple Sick Leave Policy Violations .................................... 12 Third Sinus Surgery/Sick Leave Policy Violation ....................................... 12 Appellant Attends Inpatient Rehabilitation/Sick Leave Policy Violation ....... 15 Appellant Lied About His Location ............................................................ 16 The Irrelevant Facebook Incident .............................................................. 18 The OAL Trial & Civil Service Commission Appeal .................................... 20 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 24 POINT I: [...]’S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY RECORD EVIDENCE AND ARE THEREFORE SHOULD BE UPHELD BY THIS COURT.
[brief] [...] and I then walked away approximately 30 feet from the hatch and I took out my flashlight to look at the ceiling and follow the wires.  [...] remained in the area by the hatch.  As I was walking around with [...] looking up to follow the wires on the ceiling, I encountered the open hatch and my left leg went into it and my right leg was stuck on the floor holding most of my body weight which caused me to twist underneath myself.  \(^3\)
[brief] If the Court had not granted the presumption of validity to the Affidavits, the Plaintiff would have had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the [...] were served.  This would have required calling the Process server company and the notary public to discuss the irregularities in the notarization.  The process server’s testimony was clear that his signature was notarized without any contact with the notary.  This evidence was uncontroverted and appeared to be the regular practice of the process server [...] with the in-house process service company, [...].  This deficiency is fatal and renders both Affidavits void.  These defective Affidavits formed the basis of the Default Judgment that was entered in this case.  The New Jersey Law on Notarial Acts, N.J.S.A. 52:7-10 et seq. requires notaries to be in the physical presence of the person signing the document to notarize their signature.
[brief] And, that being the case, you know I-- I think they -- they’re -- they’re Burt defendants and I think they -- the issue -- those issues go to the jury.**  [(3T41-3T42) (emphasis added)].  Those issues did indeed “go to the jury,” but the jury was specifically instructed that the *Burt* defendants *had been dismissed on procedural grounds* and, for that reason, were not represented at trial.  (20T137).  [...]’s trial strategy and settlement posture were informed by the imposition of *Burt* defendant status on these two defendants.  As *Burt* defendants invulnerable to liability to plaintiffs, their allocated share of liability could not be imposed on [...], *even* if [...] was found 60% or more responsible (as happened).  Then, the trial court reversed course and removed the *Burt* defendant status for [...].
[brief] .................................................................  27 - **CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Plan Bd./Bd. of Adjustment**, 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010) ............................................................... 34-35 - **Desai v. Bd. of Adjustment of Town of Phillipsburg**, 360 N.J. Super. 586 (App. Div. 2003)  ...........................................................................................................  25 - **Edison Bd. v. Zoning Bd.**, 464 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2020) ......................... 28 - **Fieramosca v. Twp. of Barnegat**, 335 N.J. Super. 526 (Law. Div. 2000) ............. 27 - **Garmeaux v. DNV Concepts, Inc.**, 448 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2016) .......... 25 - **Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean**, 220 N.J. 239 (2015) .............................................. 24 - **Holtham v. Lucas**, 460 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 2019) ........................................ 43 - **Morris County Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Twp.**, 220 N.J. Super. 388 (Law Div. 1987) ............................................................................................................ 36, 42 - **New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Weehawken**, 370 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2004) ................................................................. 28 - **Northgate Condo v. Planning Bd.**, 214 N.J. 120 (2013) ........................................ 28 - **Packard–Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier**, 167 N.J. 427 (2001) ......................... 43 - **Pascarella v. Bruck**, 190 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1983) .................................. 34 - **Satz v. Satz**, 476 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 2023) .................................................. 43-44 - **Schor v. FMS Financial Corp.**, 357 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2022) .................. 34 - **Siedman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A.**, 205 N.J. 150 (2011) .................................... 24 - **Sklodowsky v. Lushis**, 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011) ............................... 42 - **Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor**, 173 N.J. 502 (2002) .......................................... 35  ### Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 52:27D-120** ................................................................................................. 40 - **N.J.S.A. 52:27D-122** ................................................................................................. 41 - **N.J.S.A. 52:27D-123.1** ............................................................................................  41  ### Regulations - **N.J.A.C. 5:23-2.2** ....................................................................................................
[brief] [...] (“Board” or “District”) educates over 27,000 Pre-K–12th Grade students across its 52 schools.  Other than a few head custodians, the District does not employ its own custodial staff, so it relies on outside vendors to maintain its 54 facilities across 4.2-million square feet of building space.  For the 2019-2020 school year, the Board contracted with Defendants, [...]  (“[...]”), led by its Vice President, [...] (“[...]”), to provide custodial services under a $8.2-million custodial services contract.  The Board has a multi-year history contracting with [...].  Each year, as with all services contracts with all vendors, [...] was required to actually perform work as a prerequisite for payment. \(^3\)
[brief] 14  I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT FOR THE FULL MEASURE OF THE VERDICT AS MANDATED BY THE JOINT TORTFEASORS CONTRIBUTION LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MEJIA V. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC.  ...............  14  A.  This Court’s review of the Order of Judgment is de novo ......  14  B.  Appellant incorrectly relies upon Burt for determining the proper Order of Judgment ..................................................................................  15  C.  The Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law clearly states that a Plaintiff/Respondent shall recover the full amount of damages from any direct Defendant determined to be sixty percent (60%) at fault, as was Appellant ..................................................................................  20  D.  Appellant is not a public entity and therefore is not a beneficiary of the Tort Claims Act’s pro rata limitation provision ............  25  E.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Mejia – not the Appellate Division’s decision in Burt—controls the measure of damages Plaintiff/Respondent may recover from Appellant .................. 28  II.  UNDER THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE, APPELLANT CANNOT ARGUE ON APPEAL THAT THE “BURT DEFENDANT” DESIGNATION WAS AN ERROR WHEN APPELLANT URGED THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THAT RULING ..................................................................................................................