ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  This Rule provides that all persons except those charged with crimes punishable by death where the prosecutor presents proof that there is a likelihood of conviction and reasonable grounds to believe that the death penalty may be imposed, shall be bailable before conviction on such terms as, in the judgment of the court, will ensure their presence in court when required.  The Rule lays out the factors to be considered in setting bail which are the seriousness of the crime charged, the apparent likelihood of conviction and the extent of punishment permitted; the defendant’s prior criminal record, if any, and previous record on bail, if any; the defendant’s reputation and mental condition; the length of defendant’s residence in the community; the defendant’s family ties and relationships; the defendant’s employment status; record of employment and financial condition; the identity of responsible members of the community who would vouch for Rule 3:26-1 defendant’s reliability; any other factor indicating defendant’s mode of life, or ties to the community or bearing on the risk of failure to appear and, particularly, the Right to Bail Before Conviction.  general policy against unnecessary sureties and detention.  (Includes Option of R.O.R. Bail)  This Rule also provides that the court may order the release of a person on that person’s own recognizance, commonly known as “R.O.R. or O.R.” Bail.  The court may also impose terms or conditions appropriate to release, including conditions necessary to protect the community.  This Rule also provides that if a person bail.2  It charged with a crime punishable by death is not indicted within 3 months after commitment, the judge, for good cause shown, may admit the defendant to further allows that if an incarcerated defendant’s case is not moved for trial within 6 months after arraignment, a Superior Court judge, for cause shown, may discharge the defendant upon the defendant’s own recognizance.
[brief] “[W]hether there is good cause for an officer to make a protective search incident to an investigatory stop is a question separate from whether it was permissible to stop the suspect in the first place. ”  *State v. Thomas*, 110 N.J. 673, 678-79 (1988).  “[I]n order to conduct a protective search, an officer must have a ‘specific and particularized basis for an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. ’”  *Roach*, 172 N.J. at 27 (quoting *Thomas*, 110 N.J. at 683 (emphasis in original).
[brief] (T1/25:16-26:6; 27:2-28:13).  [...] addressed the loading and unloading of product at the Property, explaining that the product will be prepackaged on the retail side, with no raw product on site.  (T1/31:13-18).  She explained that security personnel will transport the product from a legally parked vehicle into the store, utilizing one of the two designated parking spaces located at the rear of the building; no curbside pickup is proposed.  (T1/31:19-33:1; 44:10-13).  Finally, [...] described the proposed appearance of the building renovations, including signage and lighting (T1/35:13-37:13).  Further, she confirmed that the proposed designs are “consistent with and actually exceed the requirements [of the Cannabis Regulatory Commission] with regards to [customer] flow, security, and visualization. ” (T1/17:6-16).
[brief] Horowitz, | 34 | | 435 U.S. 78 (1978) | | | Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., | 32 | | 608 F. Supp. 413 (D.N.J. 1985) | | | Doe v. Emory Univ., | 28, 29| | 2021 WL 358391 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2021) | | | Dougherty v. Drew Univ., | 35, 37, 39| | 534 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D.N.J. 2021) | | | Gaviria v. Lincoln Educ. Servs. Corp., | 35 | | 547 F. Supp. 3d 450 (D.N.J. 2021) | | | Mitelberg v. Stevens Inst. of Tech., | 35 | | 2021 WL 2103265 (D.N.J. May 25, 2021) | | | PH Chaleyer, Inc v. Simon, | 49 | | 91 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.J. 1950) | | | Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, | 34 | | 474 U.S. 214 (1985) | | ####
[brief] Courts in New Jersey have applied the VPD to inter-insurer reimbursement lawsuits, as is the case here.  Palisades Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 469 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2021) (affirming decision that the VPD applied to extinguish the paying insurer’s claim for reimbursement against another insurer where paying insurer made payment on behalf of the insured without mistake of fact, fraud, duress, or extortion).  Here, [...] voluntarily paid its portion of the settlement attributed to [...] in the [...].  (Pb14.)  [...] does not allege fraud, duress or extortion.  There is no mistake of fact because [...] was aware the Accident occurred and that [...] had disclaimed an obligation to provide coverage to [...] under the [...].  Further, when the [...] settled in September 2019, the [...] was in suit and the issue of [...]’s alleged enrollment in the [...] remained in dispute.  (Pa1.)
[brief] authority under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, FDA has enacted detailed regulations for prescription drug recalls, 21 C.F.R. Part 7 Subpart C, § 7.40 et seq., that are supplemented by FDA’s Regulatory Procedures Manual (“RPM”), which provides:  If a recall is firm-initiated under 21 CFR 7.46, the agency will review the information provided by the recalling firm under 21 CFR 7.46(a).  This includes reviewing and suggesting changes to the firm’s recall strategy, recall communication, and press release (if necessary)….  The recalling firm should discuss any recall communications and notifications with the FDA Program Office Recall Coordinator before issuance.  RPM at § 7-5-1 & (5).  [...]’s unrebutted regulatory expert, [...], who has vast experience working at the FDA, described how these all-encompassing federal regulations and procedures work in practice to require the recalling firm to first communicate with FDA before deciding recall strategy and issuing recall communications.  (Da0258, ¶¶ 57-59)  Courts in New Jersey recognize this broad federal law “set[s] forth specific recall procedures whereby the FDA assumes control over monitoring recalls” and, importantly here, “require the FDA to evaluate…the adequacy and extent of recall communications.
[brief] Kindly accept this letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief in response to the Amicus brief submitted by [...] and [...] (collectively, the “Amici”).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF CITATIONS OF CASES .....................................................................................  ii  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................  1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................
[brief] TENN. GAS PIPELINE CO., L.L.C. v 1,693 ACRES OF LAND IN THE TWP. OF MAHWAH, No. 2:12-cv-7921 (WJM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57995 at *36 (D.N.J. May 4, 2015)....................................................45  TWP. OF MIDDLETOWN v SIMON, 193 N.J. 228, 241 (2008).................................................................................18  VELASCO v GOLDMAN BUILDERS, INC., 93 N.J. Super. 123. 136 (App. Div. 1966).......................................................17,38  WOLF v ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, 79 N.J. Super. 546, 549(App. Div. 1963).......................................................41  STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND COURT RULES
[brief] The Planning Board Hearing Process was effectuated in accordance with Prevailing Provisions of New Jersey Law.  i.  Board representatives provided a detailed on-the-record discussion as to the legal process involved in adopting an amendment to a Redevelopment Plan.  During the Public Hearing on the aforementioned second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, the Board representatives publicly, and on-the-record, identified the Statutory process for adopting an Amendment to a Redevelopment Plan.  The said discussion was informative and beneficial for the Board members and Members of the Public.  The said discussion detailed, with specificity, the role of the Borough Council (in the redevelopment process), the role of the Planning Board (in the redevelopment process), and the need for the Planning Board to ultimately determine if the proposed Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was consistent, or inconsistent, with the Borough’s Master Plan.
[brief] Plaintiff testified he slipped on the landing before reaching the stairs (Pa329, plaintiff deposition P16, L22-24)  Q.  How many steps had you taken onto the landing before you slipped?  A.  As soon as my foot hit the landing, that was it.  The next thing I know I was on the sidewalk.  There was no additional steps.  It was one step and then I kind of just was on the sidewalk.  Q.  Which foot did you place onto the landing that slipped?  A. Left.  (Pa329, plaintiff deposition P17, L8 – 17)  Plaintiff further testified:
[brief] The *Sommers* matter involved the Appellate Division's reversal of the Trial Court's decision to grant summary judgment for plaintiff's failure to provide a legal malpractice expert report.  The allegations in *Sommers* included the failure to submit a legal argument in a trial Brief in support of the client's claim for tenure in an employment action; failure to report settlement negotiations accurately and a failure to tell the client that the adversary had no defense to certain claims.  The Appellate Division held that plaintiff “is not required to produce an expert to announce that an attorney may not charge for work that has not been performed or to advise the jury that a trial brief does not exist. ”  *Sommers*, at 287 N.J. Super 12.  The *Sommers* matter involved evaluation of the Defendant lawyer's handling of a civil litigation matter.  The facts and issues raised in *Sommers* are not complex issues like those raised in the instant matter against the [...].  The Sommers opinion held that expert testimony is necessary for trial of a legal malpractice arising from a complex commercial transaction.  Sommers, at 287 N.J. Super. 12, citing, 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., et. al, 272 N.J. Super 478, 490 (App. Div. 1994).  The matter at issue is clearly a complex commercial transaction which requires expert testimony.  Therefore, an Affidavit of Merit should have been filed and served.  Plaintiffs’ reliance on Mazur v. Crane’s Mill Nursing Home, 441 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 2015), is also misplaced.
[brief] As per N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7 (d), a Redevelopment Plan adopted under the LRHL process must either be (1) “substantially consistent with the Municipal Master Plan” or (2) “designed to effectuate the Master Plan”.  Similar to the MLUL procedure, if the Redevelopment Plan is not substantially consistent with the Master Plan, the Governing Body may still adopt the inconsistent Redevelopment Plan by an affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the Ordinance or Development Plan.  See PADNA v. City Council of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super 322, 330 (App. Div. 2010), cert. den. 205 N.J. 79 (2011).  The requirement is almost the same as in the MLUL for adoption of a Zoning Ordinance that is inconsistent with the current Master Plan, and the Court decisions on the analysis governing an assessment of the consistency of such Zoning/Regulations are certainly applicable and controlling here.
[brief] See Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 307 (1969). of the Note here permitted the Borrowers to make partial payments and prepayments without cost or penalty.  In all three (3) cases the borrowers refinanced the original mortgage loan, payoff funds were received by the original lenders, the original lenders inexplicably returned the payoff funds for one reason or another, which resulted in a loss of the funds.  In Vezeriannis, the funds were allegedly returned because the wire transfer did not designate an account number while in this case and in Omar, the funds were allegedly returned by the lender because, like here, the lender claimed the payoff was short.  In all three (3) cases, the facts and circumstances also demonstrate that the lender/servicer that had possession and control of the funds was in the best position to have avoided the loss.  While the payment in Omar involved a physical check that was received and returned multiple times, the manner of payment in this case, as in the Vezeriannis case, was a wire transfer.  Unlike a funds transfer where the funds are received instantly, the receipt of funds from a check is delayed for several days.  A check must be delivered, then endorsed by the payee, then deposited into payee’s clearing account and then the funds proceed through a clearing process between banks.  Here, when Appellant’s servicer [...] received the First Wire Transfer on May 7, 2021, the funds transfer was deemed completed.  See N.J.S.A. 12A:4A-104(1).  N.J.S.A. 12A:4A-104(1).  As of May 7, 2021, the funds were in the possession and control of Appellant’s predecessor’s servicer.  Appellant’s servicer’s conduct in this case is arguably much worse than in Vezeriannis since [...] not only failed to credit the payment to the Loan but also held onto the funds for fourteen (14) calendar days before returning initiating the Second Wire Transfer and returning a sum equal to the First Wire Transfer to [...].  Additionally, as detailed in the voluminous record supplied by Appellant, neither Appellant’s predecessor in interest nor [...] ever bothered to follow up with [...] to demand return of the Second Wire Transfer in order to try to mitigate the ridiculous business decision it made.  Accordingly, based on this Court’s decisions in Omar and Vezeriannis, the UCC, and TILA, it is clear that the First Wire Transfer was deemed completed when the funds were received by [...] and that the proceeds of the First Wire Transfer must have been applied to the balance of the Loan.
[brief] 4.  The [...] officially introduced an Ordinance (Ordinance No. 1667) amending the aforesaid Beachway Avenue Redevelopment Plan.  (Amendment No. 2)  5.  Per the requirements of the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law, any amendment to a Redevelopment Plan is required to be referred to the Planning Board, so that the Planning Board can hold a Public Hearing and determine if the proposed Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  6.  The Respondent Planning Board conducted such a Public Hearing on or about February 8, 2021.  7.  After a debate/discussion/analysis, the Planning Board Members unanimously determined that the proposed second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  8.  Given that the Borough Council Ordinance adoption date (on the proposed second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan) was scheduled for on or about February 17, 2021, and given that the next Planning Board meeting date was scheduled to occur after the proposed Ordinance adoption date, the Planning Board Members specifically authorized the Board Attorney to memorialize its decision/conclusion, in the form of a written letter.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order to Show Cause  Denying Application to Vacate And Confirming Arbitration Award  2/9/2024.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa8 Arbitration Award  [...] and [...], Docket No. [...] (Arbitrator [...]).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa186 more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, [...].
[brief] Under the liberal interpretation of the NJLAD, and the unique circumstances presented by COVID-19, Plaintiff’s obesity should qualify as a disability.  When obesity increases susceptibility to other illnesses and thus prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions, it should be considered a disability under NJLAD.  According to the CDC, COVID-19 presented greater health risks to certain individuals with underlying health conditions, such as obesity.  While arguably today the link between obesity and COVID-19 is one deserving of judicial notice, the link between the two was certainly reported in the early months of the pandemic.  Pa464-562; 573-576.  Based upon reporting at the time, in conjunction with Plaintiff’s understanding of her own medical health history, she had reasonable concerns that her weight put her at heightened risk for severe illness relating to COVID-19.  No New Jersey Courts have considered this question in the context of the relatively new phenomenon of Covid-19.  However, other jurisdictions have.  Specifically, some federal courts have held that susceptibility to severe illness as a result of COVID-19 may constitute a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Since the NJLAD is construed more broadly than the ADA, the NJLAD should likewise protect employees in New Jersey for the same.
[brief] 5.  Defendant [...], f/k/a [...], [...] and [...] Financial are merged business entities, hereinafter referred to collectively simply as “Defendants”.  Combined, the Defendants are a major player in the credit card processing industry and earned $1.994 billion in revenue as reported in their 2022 annual report, in large part through fees charged to their Merchant Customers for credit card processing services.  (Pa000118).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Point I.  THE BOARD ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE "SEPARATION OF SERVICE" RULE BECAUSE [...] RESIGNED AS A RESULT OF A DISABILITY ARISING FROM THE SAME SHOOTING INCIDENT AS THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES..................................................................................................................3  Point II.  THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT [...] RETIRED DUE TO DISABILITY AND [...] DETRIMENTALLY RELIED UPON THIS LANGUAGE......................5  Point  III.  THE BOARD ERRED IN DENYING THE TRANSFER OF THIS MATTER TO THE OAL TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO RESOLVE A MATERIAL DISPUTED FACT.................................7  CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................9
[directive] Background  Prior to Criminal Justice Reform, non-incarcerated defendants represented by counsel could elect to waive the first appearance regardless of whether they were charged on a complaint-warrant or a complaint-summons.  However, under Criminal Justice Reform, only defendants charged on a complaint-summons with an indictable offense can waive the first appearance, since only those defendants are released prior to the first appearance.  Rule 3:4-2(g).1  Defendants charged on a complaint-warrant for an indictable offense (i.e., “eligible defendants”) are remanded to the county jail pending the first appearance, which is conducted within 48 hours of the defendant’s commitment to the county jail.  In 2017, Directive #30-17 revised the protocol and the form to waive the first appearance accordingly.  Specifically, the protocol was revised to require the attorney: (1) to contact the Criminal Division Office to obtain the date of the pre-indictment disposition electronically file the conference, which date is to be specifically noted on the form; and (2) to 1  Designated as paragraph (f) at the time of issuance Directive #30-17, but redesignated as paragraph (g) in 2018.  Directive # 29-21 - Waiver of First Appearance for Indictable Offenses
[brief] (Da 16 at 0:04:25 to 0:04:32)  [...] moved [...] to a stretch of grass beside the roadway and a second officer stood with him while [...] approached [...].  (Da 16 at 0:04:34 to 0:04:39)  At no point did [...] inform [...] of the reason for the traffic stop.  [...] asked [...] the same questions he asked [...].  She answered the same way: that they were coming from New Jersey; that they are from New Hampshire; that they came to check out a country club; that they were heading back to Virginia; that [...] has family in Virginia; that she met him through mutual friends; and that they had known each other for a few months.
[brief] (Pa357).  [...] was well aware of the protocol.  (Pa359-361; Pa363).  [...] was reminded of the requirement in February 2015.  (Pa365-366).  He demonstrated his knowledge of the need for approval.  (Pa368).  When he suggested he was unclear on the policy for getting approval to speak at outside events, [...] responded that the policy has been clear for “at least the last five years” and reviewed what [...] needed to do to obtain approval.
[brief] ²  Only the referenced page from Defendants’ Opposition Brief is attached, as permitted by R. 2:6-1(2)  To obtain the protection of the TCCWNA, the consumer must be “any individual who buys, leases, or bails any money, property or service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:12–15.  Thus, Plaintiff would have had to buy, lease, borrow or bail money, property or a service.  Plaintiff did none of those things.  If the Court accepts Plaintiff’s position, the Court would have to accept that Plaintiff is both the “seller” and the “buyer”.  Such a reading is worthy of Kafka.
[brief] (5T6-11 to 15; 5T6-16 to 21; 5T6-22 to 5T7-2).  The defense called Old Bridge Police Officer [...], who testified that when he arrived at the police station on March 9, 2013, at around 4:55 a.m., he spoke with defendant who said he had been assaulted.  (5T9-12 to 17; 5T9-20 to 25; 5T10-3 to 6; 5T48-4 to 16).  The officer was not provided with any details by defendant.
[brief] Proof of a “reasonable probability” is “somewhat lower” than that required to show a “preponderance of the evidence. ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; State v. L.A., 433 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013).  In determining the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test based on counsel’s failure to call an alibi witness, the PCR judge “must unavoidably consider whether the absent witness’s testimony would address a significant fact in the case. ”  L.A., 433 N.J. Super. at 15.  In considering the impact of the testimony of an absent witness, the PCR judge should measure “the credibility of all witnesses, including the likely impeachment of the uncalled defense witnesses,” “the interplay of the uncalled witnesses with the actual defense witnesses called” and “the strength of the evidence actually presented by the prosecution. ”  Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
[brief] Specifically, the issue presented in this case was whether [...] was removed from employment on charges of misconduct “directly related to his employment. ”  In her initial decision, [...] found the following:  [...] was ultimately removed for job-related misconduct and delinquency when he tested positive for the use of cocaine, an illegal drug.  The [...] agreed and upheld [...]’s removal in its Final Decision.  Remaining drug-free was a condition of [...]’s employment, but he presented to work with cocaine in his system, and subsequently failed the required drug test that was lawfully administered by his employer.  I FIND, therefore, that there exists a sufficient nexus between [...]’s employment as a sergeant, a sworn law enforcement officer, and the offense for which he was disciplined-testing positive for the use of an illegal drug, cocaine, in the workplace, which is prohibited and subject to termination.
[brief] (23T 98-23 to 99-5, 100-15 to 16)  [...] performed in several music genres, including reggae and hip-hop, and had appeared at the [...] two or three times.  (23T 103-7 to 9, 109-9 to 13; 24T 292-4 to 7)  He was not given a fixed performance time for the [...] and arrived at around 1:00 a.m. (23T 103-10 to 15; 24T 265-12 to 18)  After he arrived, he learned that the [...] had been added to the evening and that a number of people at the [...] were members of the [...].  (24T 237-19 to 21, 261-11 to 19, 265-4 to 7)  [...] was wearing a black jacket with white stripes, a hat, and a white shirt.  (23T 156-1 to 4, 178-17 to 179-9)