ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ...  The Appellate Division has, for example, granted review of interlocutory orders that actually or effectively dismiss a party’s claims or defenses.  See, e.g., Fid. Union Bank v. Hyman, 214 N.J. Super. 177, 179, 518 A.2d 764 (App. Div. 1986); Hamilton v. Letellier Constr. Co., 156 N.J. Super. 336, 337, 383 A.2d 1168 (App. Div. 1978).  It has also granted leave to review orders concerning novel questions of law ... and has even intervened to resolve certain discovery disputes, See e.g., Klimowich v. Klimowich, 86 N.J. Super. 449, 450, 207 A.2d 200 (App. Div. 1965).  [Emphasis added and citations omitted in part].  Brundage indicates that interlocutory review is appropriate to prevent “grave damage” or “injustice resulting from the trial court’s order. ”  Brundage, supra, 195 N.J. at 599.  This includes review of interlocutory orders that “actually or effectively dismiss a party’s claims or defenses”.  Id. at 599.  That is essentially what happened in this case.  The Order in question is tantamount to a dismissal of the Defendant [...]’s defense because admission of a guilty plea to aggravated assault in the third degree and the corresponding factual allocution will not only destroy [...]’s defense but will almost certainly result in loss of his insurance coverage.  The Court has also granted interlocutory appeal applications in those instances where the issues involved would significantly affect a public interest or invokes rights to important to be denied.  See In Re Guardianship of Gotson, 72 N.J. 112, 115, 116 n.1 (1976); Township of Chester v. Panicucci, 62 N.J. 94, 98 n. 3 (1973); In re Pennsylvania R.R., 20 N.J. 398, 409 (1956)(citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1536 (1949).
[brief] As a result of the Stephens decision, §48 now provides as follows:  (a)  Offenses.  (1)  Crushing.  It shall be unlawful for any person to purposely engage in animal crushing in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  (2)  Creation of animal crush videos.  It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly create an animal crush video, if (A) the person intends or has reason to know that the animal crush video will be distributed in, or using a means or facility of, interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) the animal crush video is distributed in, or using a means or facility of, interstate or foreign commerce.  (3)  Distribution of animal crush videos.  It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, market, advertise, exchange, or distribute an animal crush video in, or using a means or facility of, interstate or foreign commerce.  (b)  Extraterritorial application.  This section applies to the knowing sale, marketing, advertising, exchange, distribution, or creation of an animal crush video outside of the United States, if- (1) the person engaging in such conduct intends or has reason to know that the animal crush video will be transported into the United States or its territories or possessions; or (2) the animal crush video is transported into the United States or its territories or possessions.  (c)  Penalties.  Whoever violates this section shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 7 years, or both.
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2(a) (identifying the types of major disciplinary action); N.J.A.C. 4A:2-3.1(a) (identifying the types of minor disciplinary action).  Accordingly, the [...] properly considered [...]’s complete employment and disciplinary history including the multiple minor disciplines and the 45 day suspension for her past untruthfulness and related misconduct in determining whether she was suitable for promotion.  The Commission also correctly considered her complete employment record in determining whether there was basis to remove her from the eligible list.  The Commission’s decision must be affirmed.
[brief] 29,30  [...]  “Op-Ed: We must call out lawyers who don’t Honor their oath”  The Star Ledger (May 6, 2023)  40  Judiciary’s Mission Statement 45  Restatement (Second) of Judgments  29 comment f (1982)  32  The State Comptroller’s Report on Tax Abatements 28,32,35 (Aug. 10, 2010)  The Redevelopment Handbook (Jan. 2012)  28,32,35  State Office of Local Planning Services  Urban Renewal Entity Oversight Nov. 2018)  28,35  The Municipal Tax Abatement Handbook (Nov. 2020)  28,32,35  PREIMINARY STATMENT  This Appeal involves access to the courthouse and whether ordinary residents can hold public entities and officials accountable for not executing and upholding our State Constitution and our post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.
[brief] BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE [...] IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND REVERSAL [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...] [...] – and –  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 36772001  [...], ESQ.  (Pro Hac Vice Pending)  [...], ESQ.  (Pro Hac Vice Pending)  [...] LLC  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
[brief] [...] will upgrade its existing pipeline system by constructing CS 327 thereby adding compression.  In addition to constructing CS 327, [...] will also upgrade its existing compressor stations in Pennsylvania and Wantage Township, New Jersey.  By constructing CS 327 instead of additional pipeline segments\(^10\), --- \(^9\)  Appellants noted that [...] failed to establish why the construction of new CS 327 is an “upgrade” of an existing system.  Abfn32.
[brief] For the reasons set forth in Section I, above, and based on New Jersey’s well-established law, Plaintiff cannot genuinely dispute that she agreed to be bound by the terms of the MAA, and the MAA is valid on its face.  Thus, the only remaining source of purportedly disputed fact is Plaintiff’s Certification.  Her Certification, alone, however, and the statements contained therein, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.  See Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 414 (App. Div. 2013) (stating that self-serving statements, standing alone, are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact).  In fact, even if Plaintiff’s Certification were to be considered, it does not demonstrate a material dispute that would warrant a plenary hearing because Plaintiff contradicts her own self-serving statements.
[brief] This Court “review[s] a motion under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate a final judgment under the abuse of discretion standard. ”  257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023) (citing U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)).  “Although the ordinary abuse of discretion standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Rule 4:50-1 permits a party to vacate a default judgment, as follows:  On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons:  (a) [M]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; I the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.  See Rule 4:50-1.  In addition, Rule 4:50-2 mandates that for all sections of 4:50-1 “[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time. ” (emphasis added).
[brief] NJSA 59:3-14 does not protect public employees from liability for willful malicious acts.  The trial Court Judge asserts that the defendants were engaged in "conscious considerations within the scope of their employment" by refusing to allow the plaintiff to call her attorney several times while she was being subjected to disciplinary actions at the prison in a disparate fashion.  The Trial Court stated that the defendant after delaying communications between plaintiff and her counsel did not violate the plaintiff's rights by telling her to call her attorney's office phone only as opposed to his cell phone which is the only reliable 24/7 number on which her attorney may be reached.  The United States Supreme Court has expressed that prisoners have a right, circumscribed by legitimate prison administration considerations, to fair and regular treatment during their incarceration.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), Estelle v. Gamble (1976).  See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US 825 (1994).  In Turner the United State Supreme Court outlined a general standard to determining whether there were deprivation of Constitutional rights within a prison system.
[brief] (“Whitewater”).  See ECF No. 88 at 1.  Defendant competes with Plaintiffs in the waterpark rides industry.  Plaintiffs accuse Defendant of making and selling infringing waterpark rides.  Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant “makes, has made, imports, uses, offers for sale and/or sells products that infringe one or more claims” of the patents-in-suit, including “ProFlow Single,” “ProFlow Double,” “ProFlow Triple,” “ProFlow Quad,” “ProFlow Mini Single,” “ProFlow Mini Double,” “ProFlow Quarterpipe,” “ProFlow Halfpipe,” “Supertube,” and Defendant’s unnamed refurbishment of surfing rides (the “Accused Products.
[brief] Although Not Relied Upon by the Trial Court, the August 26, 2021 E-mail Confirms the Intent of the Parties Regarding the Settlement Agreement (Da273a).  The Trial Court ultimately did not rely upon the August 26, 2021 e-mail from [...]’s prior counsel based upon [...]’s clear and unequivocal release of any rights to the Palm Beach Property and the plain intent of [...]’s own estate planning documents.  [...] nevertheless is compelled to address that matter here as [...] has raised the issue on appeal.  (See Db25.)  While the August 26, 2021 e-mail clearly was not essential to the Trial Court’s determinations regarding the proper interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and [...]’s estate plan, that email certainly is consistent with the arguments [...] advanced in this dispute.  (See Da273a) (noting that “The Court did not consider or rely on the e-mail in rendering its’ decision but mentions it was part of the pleadings. ”))  Critically, [...]’s own prior counsel—an experienced and reputable trusts and estate practitioner from a well-respected law firm—sent an e-mail to [...]’s counsel during the negotiation of the Settlement Agreement in which she explicitly acknowledged that [...], not [...], is to receive [...]’s Estate’s interest in the Palm Beach Property:  We recognize that Mrs. [...] died in July 2020 and there is a certain amount of time required to get the estate administration under way and the Florida real property transferred to [...].  Therefore, we are willing to recommend that [[...]] approve the accountings and sign the Settlement Agreement (subject, of course, to her final approval, agreement and willingness to do so), provided that we have written confirmation that no further payments will be made from or allocated against the Estate and Trust after November 16, 2020 for expenses or costs related to or for the Florida real property .
[brief] Additionally, Appellants’ claim since the outset of the Prior Action in March 2019 was that the [...] breached the NDA with Appellants by improperly using the information they learned from Appellants in due diligence between 2015 and 2017 to acquire the Lease and the Solar Rights.  In their initial Complaint in the Prior Action, Appellants alleged, among other things, that during the term of the NDA with the [...], they “provided [the] CEP Defendants with the name of the owners of the Land, and a copy of the Lease containing all of the material Lease terms” (emphasis added) [Pa35], and that based upon the confidential information provided to the [...], the [...] were aware that the lease “payment was $200,000 per year with a 1½ % annual escalator” [Pa36] and “fell due on September 1 of every year. ”  [Pa36].  Given these allegations that were made, maintained and vigorously pursued by Appellants for 2½ years in the Prior Action, a claim of breach of confidentiality provision in the Lease is simply not sustainable against [...] as Appellants admittedly disclosed the pertinent information, including providing the Lease itself and the annual rent, to the [...] as early as 2015.
[brief] See generally, State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 198 (1989); Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2021); Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Store, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1957); Evid. R. 701.  Opinion Testimony of Lay Witnesses, and following Comment.
[brief] A68.  As defendants’ counsel explained in her Certification to the trial court below, during the Oral Argument that took place on December 20, 2023, counsel was instructed to reach out to the banks that could have been associated with Defendants to inquire about bank statements.  Counsel affirmed that she sent the letters to the Banks, and provided proof of this, affirming that defendants would amend their answers to discovery if any responses from the bank were received.  Defendants provided all OPRA requests associated with repairs on the property as well.  Defendants’ counsel affirmed to the court that there were no other documents that defendants could produce; defendants had produced all they had.
[brief] Under the first prong of *Cofield*, the prior wrong must be relevant.  Evidence is relevant if it has “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  N.J.R.E. 401.  Our Supreme Court has noted that the “primary focus in determining the relevance of evidence is whether there is a ‘logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue. ’”  *Willis*, 225 N.J. at 98 (quoting *State v. Covell*, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999)).  As stated above, even relevant evidence of other crimes is excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial value.  In *Reddish*, the trial court allowed the jury to learn that defendant confessed to the crime for which he was on trial while in police custody for an unrelated charge.  181 N.J. at 606-07.  Applying Cofield for the first time, our Supreme Court reasoned that the custodial nature of the confession had “little relevance,” and that admission of this evidence carried a significant risk that the jury would conclude that defendant had a propensity to commit bad acts.
[brief] For these reasons, this court should affirm the Commissioner’s decision.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]__________________________  [...] Deputy Attorney General Attorney  I.D. No.: 259182018  Amna.Toor@law.njoag.gov  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  cc: all counsel of record (via eCourts)  AMENDED REPLY  BRIEF OF APPELLANTS  [...] AND [...]
[brief] In support of the Second Application, [...] presented expert testimony of [...], a principal of [...], [...] (“[...]”), a licensed architect who was qualified in this field, [...], P.E. (“[...]”), a licensed professional engineer who was qualified in this field, [...], P.E. (“[...]”), a licensed professional engineer and traffic engineer who was qualified in this field and who authored the Traffic Impact Study dated September 16, 2021 which was supplemented by a report dated July 6, 2022, and [...], P.P. (“[...]”), a professional planner who was qualified in this field.
[brief] THE COURT BELOW SHOULD HAVE GRANTED [...]’ REQUEST FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT AMOUNT, DEFENSE AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FEES, COSTS AND INTEREST (Dta1257-58,1279,1282.)  Due to [...]’s repudiation of [...]’s coverage under the CCIP, Travelers defended the underlying action on [...]’s behalf, subrogating Travelers to [...]’s rights to rectify [...]’s wrongful disclaimer and entitling Travelers to reimbursement of the amount it paid to settle the underlying claim on behalf of [...], as well as the costs of defending that claim.  Rooney v. Township of West Orange, 200 N.J.Super. 201 (App.Div.1985).  Additionally, R.4:42-9(a)(6) provides for an award of counsel fees “[i]n an action upon a liability or indemnity policy of insurance, in favor of a successful claimant. ”  Such fees are awardable in disputes between insurers.  Moper Transp., Inc. v. Norbet Trucking Corp., 399 N.J. Super. 146, 157–58 (App. Div. 2008), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 463 (2008).  Finally, Travelers is entitled to prejudgment interest on the underlying settlement as well as interest on the counsel fees expended in this case and in the underlying action.  *R.4:42-11; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Scottsdale*, 316 F.3d 431, 450 (3d Cir.2003) (affirming award of prejudgment interest under New Jersey law where an insurer wrongfully disclaimed coverage).  The Law Division’s erroneous entry of summary judgment in [...]’s favor obviated consideration of these arguments below.  However, upon reversal of that ruling, these elements of damages should be awarded to Travelers without the necessity of remand to consider the availability of those damages.  *Cf. Pressler & Verniero, Current New Jersey Court Rules, R.4:42-9(a)(6)  Comment 2.6* (Gann 2023) (“[A] successful insured is presumptively entitled to attorney’s fees and need not show bad faith or arbitrary action on the part of the insurer.  *Citing, Liberty Village Assocs, Inc. v. West American Ins. Co.*, 309 N.J. Super. 393, 406 (App. Div. 1998)).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Looking to the Daubert factors now part of New Jersey law, In re Accutane, 234 N.J. at 398, confirms Plaintiff’s experts could not offer a reliable and 19  See also Vuocolo, 240 N.J. Super. at 299-300 (“Expert medical opinion evidence as to causation between an event and…a physical condition is inadmissible if it would amount to the expression of a pure conclusion, without reference to factual causative antecedents…”) (quoting 66 A.L.R.2d at 1116-17); Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55 (proper to exclude expert opinion “based merely on unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities. ”).  admissible opinion on general causation—even if either was qualified to offer such an opinion, which they are not.  Neither [...] nor [...] has: 1. tested the theories that a 300-micron particulate of the medical-grade silicone used in the Ozurdex® needle sleeve (a) is capable of causing eye inflammation or (b) is capable of causing a retinal detachment; 2. published either theory or otherwise subjected it to peer review; 3. determined if either theory has any known or potential rate of error and if there exist any standards for maintaining or controlling application of either theory to avoid that error; or 4. cited any evidence that either theory has been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.  *Id.*  Because Plaintiff did not and cannot establish that the “the scientific community would accept the methodology employed by [her] experts and would use the underlying facts and data as did [her] experts,” the Trial Court failed to perform its gatekeeping function to exclude the experts’ unreliable opinions.  *Id.* at 400.  The Trial Court nonetheless found the *recall* provided a sufficient basis for Plaintiff’s experts to opine on general causation based on their testimony that ‘this time is different. ’  As with the issue of product defect, no New Jersey court has held ‘this time is different’ is a reliable and accepted methodology to establish general causation, and the ‘fact of a recall’ does not excuse this methodologic failure.  As the judge overseeing the federal Zantac MDL recently observed, the fact that a drug has been recalled is not proof that the drug is capable of causing harm and cannot be used as a substitute for the required expert proof on causation.
[brief] In fact, nowhere in [...]’s testimony did he state that he relied on his “personal experience” like the problematic “rule of thumb” testimony in Burney.  Finally, unlike [...], [...] did not offer any sweeping and firm conclusions.  [...] “emphasized to the jury that it was ‘highly, highly unlike[ly]’ that the Parkway Tower did not cover the crime scene based on the tower’s approximated coverage distance. ”  Id. at 15.  Conversely, [...] was not as declarative in his testimony.  He made clear that the information can provide a “rough area depending upon lot of environmental factors. ”  He also testified that the measurements were “approximate” and explained there was “no way to be able to say the physical exact location a tower can physically go towards. ”  [12T175-12 to -15].  Finally, he testified that the location of where the call was placed to [...] at 2:25 a.m. was consistent with the area where [...] sent a text message to [...] shortly after defendant shot her.  [12T180-10 to -22].  Assuming arguendo that [...]’s expert testimony was improperly admitted, its inclusion was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[directive] The summary report forms must contain sufficient information to enable the County Prosecutor to identify warning signs of potential deficiencies in the internal affairs process.  At a minimum, each report must include a brief summary of each internal affairs complaint that was pending before the agency at any point during the reporting period.  The summary shall at least include the nature of the complaint, the date the complaint was received, the INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 63 current status of the complaint, and, if the case is closed, the final disposition of the complaint with any discipline imposed.  A sample form is found at Appendix K.  9.10.3
[brief] Final Order of [...]................................................DA9  Interlocutory Order of [...]................................DA15 | Hearing Date | Presiding | Transcript Designation | |--------------------|--------------------------|------------------------| | September 27, 2017 | Rent Leveling Board | 1T | | October 27, 2017 | Rent Leveling Board | 2T | | December 13, 2017 | Rent Leveling Board | 3T | | May 25, 2018 | [...] | 4T | | October 24, 2018 | Rent Leveling Board | 5T | | November 28, 2018 | Rent Leveling Board | 6T | | March 11, 2020 | Rent Leveling Board | 7T | | April 14, 2021 | Rent Leveling Board | 8T | | May 12, 2021 | Rent Leveling Board | 9T | | June 9, 2021 | Rent Leveling Board | 10T | | June 23, 2021 | Rent Leveling Board | 11T | | August 11, 2021 | Rent Leveling Board | 12T | | July 22, 2022 | [...] | 13T | | September 30, 2022 | [...] | 14T | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (6T 76-19 to 77-5; 9T 114-15 to 17, 132-4 to 133-12, 134-21 to 22, 175-18 to 200-8; 17T 46-25 to 74-2, 154-14 to 158-2; 23T 163-16 to 17, 168-3 to 6, 173-16 to 21, 188-10 to 192-22, 195-9 to 11, 196-13 to 198-22; 24T 203-4 to 12; Da 19) 25 to 39-2)  Only two spent casings were found at the scene.
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................1