ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ibid.  Defendant’s response was that he disagreed, and did not think it had been two hours.  (21T:172-12 to 17).  He claimed that [...]’s “perception of time might have been off. ” (21T:185-17 to 22).  He also said that he prayed before calling his mother, and called her first before 911 because he did not want her to come home to find him in jail.  (21T:172-13 to 175-16).  [...] pressed the issue, saying that it seemed like the [...] had had ample time to get their stories straight.  Defendant denied this, and knew he should have called 911 sooner.  He continued to insist that he shot instinctively, trying to aim low, and that he felt threatened.  *Ibid.*
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent/ :  On Appeal  From a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court  [...], : Sat Below: Defendant-Appellant. : Hon. [...], J.S.C. and a jury.
[brief] (39024a; 39089a; 39108a; 39177a)  [...]’s relevant findings and conclusions, as adopted by [...], follow.  •  [...]’s Claims Contained a “Common Core of Operative Facts”  In compliance with this Court’s mandate, [...] determined that “a combination of proving the elements of RICO claims, rebutting defenses, and the forensic accounting needed to prove post-2004 damages, demonstrates the RICO and non-RICO claims were intertwined” (39058a), explaining as follows:  ---  12  Having served in that same capacity in connection with Plaintiffs’ original 2013 fee applications – for which he issued two Reports and Recommendations (11480a, 14707a, 14826a) – [...] possessed intimate familiarity with the extensive record in this action.  13  The Reports themselves belie [...]’ assertion to the contrary (Db38).  ... the question [is] whether the facts or legal theories that underpinned Plaintiffs [non-RICO claims] ... also underpinned their RICO claims.  ....  As [...] previously noted, that answer is undoubtedly yes.  (247T37:8-23 ...  Each of these claims centered around a singular question: did [...] purposefully take money from the partnership that should have gone to the Plaintiffs?  The fact that the different claims deal with different time periods does not change this analysis, because the facts surrounding those earlier time periods were still relevant to proving the post-October 2004 violations.  Put another way, had Plaintiffs’ original complaint only contained RICO claims for post-October 2004 violations, the litigation would have looked almost entirely the same.
[brief] [...], your arguments are clearly directed towards the plaintiffs in the underlying foreclosure matter.  The sheriff’s department performed the ministerial act of granting the statutory adjournment as they are required to.  I do not understand and/or unable to understand what, if any, damage there is.  You got your adjournment.  And that was granted to you. ”  [1T, Lines 16-24, Pg. 14]  “You were granted that adjournment and you were provided that prior to being removed, locked out, and your belongings stored.  You were provided that before -- before any action was taken.  Therefore, there could be no deprivation of any of your rights.  You were provided the information and given an adjournment all the way until -- until May 11, 2023.
[brief] Second, [...] has not shown that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to [...]’s alleged antagonism toward her.  [...], [...], and [...] had been making generalized “complaints” about [...]’s management style for years.  (See Pa179; Pa191; Pa286; Pa291; Pa241).  [...] “complained” of [...]’s management style as early as 2016.  (Pa289-90 at 44:11-47:8l; Pa290-91 at 47:9-50:19).  Despite these gripes about [...], she and [...] continued working for [...] for ten years.  (See Pa357; Pa100).  In fact, [...] testified that she “had a great relationship with Barbara [[...].]” (Pa232 at 28:2-8).  [...] and [...] regularly socialized outside of work—[...] even attended [...]’s baby shower.  [...] further described the two as “close. ” (Pa240-41 at 60:23-61:3).  Indeed, the record reflects that there is simply no record of such a “pattern of antagonism” from which a reasonable jury could infer causation between [...]’s termination and her alleged whistle-blowing activity.
[brief] "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'"*  Id.* (quoting *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  The standard of review of an order denying reconsideration is deferential.  *Dennehy v. East Windsor Regional Bd. of Educ.*, 469 N.J. Super. 357, 362-363 (App. Div. 2021).  "Motions for reconsideration are governed by Rule 4:49-2, which provides that the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court."  *Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment*, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).  Reconsideration "is not appropriate merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion."  *Palombi v. Palombi*, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010).  New Jersey’s courts will not disturb a trial judge's denial of a motion for reconsideration absent "a clear abuse of discretion."  *Dennehy, supra*, 469 N.J. Super. at 363; see also *Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc.*, 440 N.J. Super. at 382, 113 A.3d 1217 (citing *Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little*, 135 N.J. 274, 283, 639 A.2d 286 (1994)).  The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  R. 4:49-2.  Reconsideration is appropriate only in cases where the trial court's decision was based on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or where the court failed to consider or appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  Guido v. [...], 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010).  The magnitude of the error must be significant enough to be considered a “game-changer. ”  Palombi, supra, at 289.  The trial court's decision on a motion for reconsideration will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion.  This standard ensures that the trial court's decision is given deference unless it is shown to be clearly unreasonable or unjust.  Dennehy, supra.  The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to abide by its prior May 14, 2024, which is not on appeal.  Defendants/Appellants’ application must be denied.
[brief] In January 2021, [...] appointed [...] as Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate as a result of a lawsuit between Appellant and his sister, [...], over distribution of the Estate.  (Pa95).  The parties litigated for over a year during which time Appellant ignored every order entered by the court, eventually resulting in default being entered against him.  (Pa394-Pa397).  Thereafter, on February 4, 2022, the court entered judgment against Appellant, requiring him to repay the Estate over $2,400,000 that he has misappropriated.  (Pa43-Pa56).  Appellant did not appeal the February 4 Judgment.  One year later, after effectively bankrupting the Estate with his conduct and endless lawsuits, Appellant, who is the Estate’s largest debtor by far, demanded a formal accounting by way of Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint.  (Pa1-Pa6); (Pa33-Pa36).  After full briefing and oral argument, the court denied that application, finding that the applicable rule and statute were discretionary, not mandatory, leaving the court to decide if an accounting should be required in each case.  (Pa434-Pa435); 1T17:25-1T18:5.  The court also found that even if the rule and statute required [...] to account to beneficiaries after one year of administering the Estate, the information he had already provided to Appellant constituted an informal accounting.  1T18:6-  Appellant then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attempting to assert new claims and evidence not initially raised.  (Pa456-Pa457).  After briefing and oral argument, the court denied that application.  (Pa525-Pa526).  Undeterred, Appellant has now filed the within appeal, again seeking a formal accounting without having paid any portion of the $2,440,702 Judgment or legal fee reimbursements he owes as a result of the February 4 Judgment.  All he is accomplishing by this appeal is to further deplete Estate assets.
[brief] Burt. v. W. Jersey Health Systems speaks to the procedure when a plaintiff’s conduct deprives a direct defendant of the ability to obtain contribution.  [...] and [...] were not so-called “Burt defendants,” because Appellant was able to prosecute claims of contribution had he chosen to do so.  Nevertheless, the Trial Court designated the doctors as so-called “Burt defendants” at trial.  Appellant thus had free rein to blame these doctors for Plaintiff/Respondent’s losses as empty chairs, but the jury found direct defendant Appellant sixty percent (60%) at fault.  Appellant does not challenge the jury’s determination in this regard nor argue that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the credible evidence.
[brief] The trial court criticized Plaintiff’s opposition papers as not properly citing to the record, stating, “plaintiff’s opposition brief, which should have specific citations to it.  That’s what the rule requires on summary judgment motions, does not have specific citations to anything in the motion record to support the various statements such as anxiety. ”  (T22:4-20)  The trial court continued, “why is this important that there be specific citations?  So that in his reply brief to be fair to the other side that the defendant can then say that’s not what the exhibit says…the defense attorney was given no opportunity to do that because there were no specific citations to the…motion record. ”  Id.  This is simply untrue.
[brief] ---  10  Defendants cite a one-line reference to “newspaper articles, publicly available forms, and statements from third parties” from [...] on behalf of State v. Lonegan, 454 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 2018), to reject Relator’s interviews as direct knowledge.  Db44-45.  This is hardly reliable.  Interviews by  Finally, Relator satisfied the third requirement by voluntarily providing information on which the allegations are based prior to filing the action.
[brief] ”  It was referenced as a “Complaint Survey” and the person who signed the form was identified as [...].  Pa74-75.  The surveyor’s notes were not included.  A form letter dated August 4, 2016, was included.  Pa76-77.  It stated that “no Federal deficiencies were cited based upon our visit. ”  Pa76.  Defendant claims N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8) as a basis for admission of the hearsay documents, although that argument was not made at trial.
[brief] | Authority | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 | 6 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 6 | | State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) | 6 | | State v. Herbert, 457 N.J.Super. 490 (App. Div. 2019) | 2,3 | | State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231 (2009) | 2 | | State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640 (1984) | 2 | LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Without substantively addressing choice of law in its Opinion, the trial court merely indicated in a footnote that it rejected [...]’s argument that fees should be reduced for [...]’s loss on choice of law.  (Pa0054.)  Further, the trial court held that subtracting for such an issue “would fail to account for the time [...] had to spend securing coverage from insurers that insisted upon a ‘no coverage’ position through motions and extensive discovery.
[brief] ...........................................................................................................  20  A.  THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED, AND PROPERLY REJECTED, PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM THAT SHE SUFFERED AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION (8a-9a, 16a-17a) ...........................................................................................................  21  1.  The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard in Assessing the Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Pleading.  (7a-17a) ...........................................................................................................  22  2.  The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Standard Under R. 4:6-2(e) in Dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (6a, 8a-10a, 12a-14a, 16a-17a) .................................................. 29
[brief] I.  The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Dismissed Appellant’s Complaint With Prejudice.  .........................................................6  A.  Appellant’s Arguments Against The Applicability Of Rule 4:37-2 Are Without Merit.  .........................................................................................7  1.  The Trial Court Did Not Violate Appellant’s Due Process Rights...8  2.  The Expiration Of The Statute of Limitations Relating To Appellant’s Claims And Non-Inclusion Of A Deadline In This Court’s December 2, 2022 Order Is Irrelevant To Rule 4:37-2.................................9  II.
[brief] ”  Id.  As this Court has explained:  The primary consideration in awarding prejudgment interest is that “the defendant has had the use, and the plaintiff has not, of the amount in question; and the interest factor simply covers the value of the sum awarded for the prejudgment period during which the defendant had the benefit of monies to which the plaintiff is found to have been earlier entitled. ”  Id. at 74 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974)).  Accord West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 n.2 (1987).
[brief] 210a  Exhibit 11: Complaint (omitted – see 30a)  Exhibit 12: Deed dated April 13, 2005 .........................................................  213a  Exhibit 13: Deed dated April 13, 2005 .........................................................  221a  Exhibit 14: Communications between [...] and [...] .................................................................  227a  Exhibit 15: Minutes of [...] Meeting ................................................................. 245a  Exhibit 16: Notice of Lis Pendens ................................................................. 265a  Exhibit 17: Discharge of Lis Pendens ............................................................  267a  Exhibit 18: Deed dated August 6, 2014 ......................................................... 269a  Exhibit 19: Corrective Deed dated September 23, 2014 ...............................  275a  Exhibit 20: Report by [...] (abridged For appeal) ...........................................................................  280a  Volume III Exhibit 21: Order of Dismissal in prior litigation ........................................... 301a  Exhibit 22: Variance Application dated March 22, 2006 ............................... 303a  Exhibit 23: Board of Adjustment approval dated April 23, 2007 .................... 313a  Exhibit 24: Developers Agreement dated February 28, 2008 ....................... 319a  Exhibit 25: Amended Application for Development dated December 19, 2008 ................................................................. 333a  Exhibit 26: Deed dated October 23, 2014 .....................................................  358a  Plaintiff’s Response to Statement of Material Facts ........................................ 364a  Certification by [...] .................................................................. 382a
[brief] A Trespass to Real Property is the situation where there is disturbance in the possession of the property which belongs to someone else.  New Jersey Elements of An Action, [...], Chapter 47, p. 513 (2008-2009).  The trespass is any unlawful entry regardless of the means used to enter, the amount of force used or the extent of the damage.  Id. at 513.  The trespass can be accomplished by physical entry onto the land, throwing an object or material onto the land of another person or placing in motion an agency which extends its energy onto another’s premises.  Id. at 513.  Furthermore, the failure to remove one’s person or another object from another’s premises after a demand is made to remove person or object from the land of another is a trespass.  Id. at 513.  A remedy for a trespass is the grant of an injunction wherein the trespasser is prohibited from entering the land of another.  Id. at 513.  The elements to be satisfied to prove Trespass to Land are noted as follows:  (1)  Anyone entering onto another’s real property without authorization, (2) such as a tenant who wrongfully remains in possession of the premises, (3) or any person carrying a gun on the land, except fresh meadow lands over which the tide has ebbed and flowed continuously for 20 years or more, after the other has given public notice forbidding trespass or has forbidden the person from trespassing, is liable for at least $10 in the case of the person carrying a gun, (4) nominal damages vindicating the legal right to possession, (5) compensatory damages for either injury to the land or lost marketable rent of the land used to carry on profit-making activities during the period of trespass, (6) including the cost of removal of a trespassing structure which is legally abatable, if such cost is not in excess of the diminution in value of the land resulting from the wrong, and (7) punitive damages for especially egregious misconduct.  *New Jersey Cause of Action*, [...], p. 482 (2014).
[brief] The [...] World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act amended N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e) to state, in pertinent part:  (4)  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [...] was denied the ability to register for the Ricci Act and apply for amended benefits because he did not submit his registration form prior to July 8, 2021.  However, the Board failed to provide adequate notice of the Ricci Act, and therefore, the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] (Raised Below: 6T, at 57:9-58:6; 59:24-61:8)  In challenging Plaintiff’s award for lost wages, Defendants attempt to relitigate pretrial issues before the Appellate Division.  Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11C, titled “Loss of Earnings,” makes no mention of experts in instructing the jury on how to award past lost earnings (Pa13-15).  In fact, the Charge states that jurors must only determine “the amount of earnings that were probably lost. ” (Pa15).  They are instructed to use their “sound judgment,” and are explicitly told that “[plaintiff] does not have to prove the amount of lost earnings with precision, but only with reasonable probability. ” (Pa15).  Plaintiff proved his lost wages through his own testimony on the time he missed from work, his recollection of his wage at that time, and the fact that he was forced to exhaust his sick and vacation time to take leave (3T, 38:8-17; 57:4-59:8).
[brief] (Pa5).  During discovery, Appellants deposed Mr. [...], Chief of Consumer Finance Operations of the [...].  (Pa47).  During his deposition, Appellants posed several legal hypotheticals to Mr. Wegener, over repeated objections by Respondents’ organization or agency pursuant to section 106 of Pub.L.90-448 (12 U.S.C. § 1701x); (ii) participating in a counseling program approved by the [...]; and (iii) not holding or disbursing the debtor’s funds.  counsel: (1) whether a novice attorney is allowed to handle debt adjustment matters; (2) whether the DACCA restricts bankruptcy attorneys; and (3) whether the DACCA restricts attorneys who perform “excellent work. ” (Pa47 at 1T54:16-55:7, 57:11-17, 58:11-18)\(^5\).  Mr. Wegener is not an attorney and, in his own words, not qualified to opine on legal questions.  (Pa47 at 1T65:6-11, 65:21-66:6).  On April 28, 2023, Appellants and Respondents cross-moved for summary judgment.
[brief] Addressing the threshold question of federal court jurisdiction, *Hunstein I* concluded the plaintiff had standing which is necessary for an action to be a case-or-controversy over which the federal judicial power can exercise subject --- \(^1\) *See, e.g.*, Shiyang Huang v. Equifax Inc. (*In re Equifax Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*), 999 F. 3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2021); *In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig.*, 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016). matter jurisdiction.
[brief] There is no hardship demonstrated rendering it impossible to provide the email logs and there are alternate solutions in law and practice that render this concern, to the extent that may exist, easily addressed.  [A]ny limitations on the right of access ... shall be construed in favor of the public's right of access."  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1; see also N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 555 (2017)
[brief] PLAINTIFF DID NOT PARTICIPATE BELOW BECAUSE HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE LITIGATION, BUT TOOK IMMEDIATE ACTION UPON LEARNING OF THE CASE  Plaintiff also argues that no excuse has been made for [...]’s failure to answer the Complaint prior to entry of a default judgment.  [...] seeks relief from this default judgment on the basis that he was never properly served and, regardless, that he was never actually aware of the pendency of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.  The record on this appeal, which includes two Certifications by [...], is quite clear on the point that [...] first became aware of the action in August of 2023, when he was notified that Plaintiff held a default judgment (Da118-119; Da157).  To that end, [...] perhaps engaged in excusable neglect by failing to collect and read regular mail that Plaintiff dispatched to [...] in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.  There is no doubt, however, that [...] acted promptly and assiduously upon developing actual knowledge that Plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit.  He immediately filed a pro-se application to vacate the judgment which was denied “for failure to present a meritorious defense to the case” (Da3).  Thereafter, [...] retained Counsel for assistance (Da158, Kiely Cert, ¶30).  When that attorney advised he could not help, [...] retained yet another lawyer, [...]  Id. at ¶¶31-32.  And when [...] failed to act with sufficient diligence, [...] hired this firm to ensure a proper application was made.  Id. at ¶¶33-34.  Plaintiff blames [...] for failing to keep track of his earlier attorneys, but the record shows quite the opposite.  [...] therefore should not be held accountable for the failures of his earlier lawyers.  POINT THREE (Da1)
[brief] Defendant thus properly introduced the conclusion of the [...]—an agency authorized to perform compliance survey functions—that no federal regulations were violated in connection with [...]’s care for purposes of impeachment and in order to rebut plaintiff’s experts’ position.  The evidence did not address the nursing standard of care or respiratory therapy standard of care or any other individual person’s standard of care, and the jury found that [...]’s nursing staff did \textit{not} violate the standard of care.  (See Pa88.)  Plaintiff was permitted to, and did, present opinions that defendant failed to comply with various state and federal regulations as evidence of negligence, and was permitted to pursue a cause of action against “the facility” or “nursing home”, [...], in addition to a vicarious liability claim for the conduct of its nursing staff.