ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The lower court correctly determined that [...]’s policy cancellation was validly effected in accordance with the statutory requirements.  N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10, entitled “Written notice of cancellation or intention not to renew; effectiveness,” sets forth the steps a carrier must take to issue a notice of cancellation that will be effective.  The statute provides  No written notice of cancellation or of intention not to renew sent by an insurer to an insured in accordance with the provisions of an automobile insurance policy shall be effective unless a. (1) it is sent by certified mail or (2) at the time of the mailing of said notice, by regular mail, the insurer has obtained from the Post Office Department a date stamped proof of mailing showing the name and address of the insured and b. the insurer has retained a duplicate copy of the mailed notice which is certified to be a true copy.  In this instance, [...] produced a documentary record establishing that [...] validly cancelled the business auto policy by issuing a cancellation notice and obtaining a date-stamped proof of mailing to [...], in full compliance with all statutory requirements (Pa39, Pa130, Pa140).  In addition to producing those documents for the consideration of the motion judge, [...] provided a certification of the [...] mailroom employee who actually individually verified that each envelope of the 147 pieces comprising [...]’s December 13, 2019 mailing was contained in the group of 147 notices being taken to the post office that day, including the envelope containing the [...] cancellation notice (Pa144-Pa145).  The proof of mailing register itself (Pa126-Pa140) reflected that the post office received 147 pieces of mail encompassing [...]’s December 13, 2019 mailing, for which [...] paid a fee of $60.27, representing the .41 fee for each piece, paid for 147 pieces (Pa140).  [...] further provided the certification of a staff attorney authenticating the proof of mailing register (Pa126-Pa140) and providing additional information regarding [...]’s mailing processes for cancellation notices (Pa141-Pa143).  Based on this record, the lower court properly granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims against it, and denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment.  The statute makes clear that when a carrier can demonstrate that it strictly complied with the statutory requirements for mailing notices of cancellation to the insured, the cancellation will be effective on the date set forth in the notice and the policy will have no further effect.
[brief] The sale of the services is clearly distinct from the sale of goods:91  [t]he Uniform Commercial Code-Sales (UCC-Sales), N.J.S.A. 12A:2-101 to -725, applies to 'transactions in goods.'  N.J.S.A. 12A:2-102.  The UCC-Sales does not, however, apply to service contracts.  87  D.D. v. UMDNJ, 213 N.J. 130, 146 (2013)(citation omitted).  88  See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 (1960).  89 Model Civil Jury Charge 4.10E.  90 Model Civil Jury Charge 4.22A-B.  91  Quality Guaranteed Roofing, Inc. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 302 N.J. Super. 163 (App. Div. 1997).  This case involves the sale of services and not of goods.\textsuperscript{92}
[brief] For factor six, trial was scheduled to begin in August 2024, two months after the date on which oral argument was heard on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.  Although Defendants’ counsel claimed they would be ready to proceed to trial in two months, the trial court was rightfully skeptical of that statement given the amount of discovery that still needed to be completed, as well as dispositive motions, and therefore, factor six weighs in favor of arbitration.
[brief] [...] Disqualifies [...] As Counsel For Defendants**  After [...] refused to voluntarily recognize the concurrent conflict inherent in its joint representation of Defendants, on December 21, 2023, Plaintiffs moved to disqualify [...] pursuant to RPC 1.7 (Da004-Da257).  Despite the fact that [...] was clearly blaming the [...] for failing to give him adequate instructions, training, and supervision, and the fact that [...] was directly disputing the testimony and position of the [...] regarding the instructions they gave, Da313, ¶¶ 3-4, [...] continued to maintain that there was no conflict inherent in its joint representation of [...] and the [...].  Da306-9.  In opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify, [...] relied on the certification of Defendant [...], who stated that he wished for [...] to continue representing him.  Da314, ¶ 5.  However, in the same certification, Defendant [...] admitted as follows: “I do not understand the basis for this alleged conflict”, Da313, ¶ 2, which calls into question whether and to what extent [...] explained the risks posed by the conflict, much less whether [...] advised Mr. [...] to seek advice from independent counsel, which is not addressed in the certification.  See Da312-4.  Remarkably, in his certification, Defendant [...] continued to contradict the [...]’ version of the facts by once again averring that Earle foreman [...] told him to “use the cut through” without provided any further detail and maintaining that he had no basis to believe that the cut through he used was illegal or unauthorized.  Da313 ¶¶ 3-4.  On February 16, 2024, following oral argument, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., disqualified [...] from representing Defendants due to an actual, concurrent conflict of interest pursuant to RPC 1.7.
[brief] If a potential juror believes that all fingerprint examiner testimony is infallible, then that juror would be unable to follow both the court’s instruction on the consideration of expert evidence and the mandate that “[t]he ultimate determination of whether or not the 8 https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/charges/non2c036.pdf?cb=5b9183a5  State has proven defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is to be made only by the jury” and not an expert’s opinion.  Id.  Potential jurors may also be biased to view defense experts as “hired guns” and to favor prosecution or state crime lab experts.  See, e.g., [...] & [...], The ‘Hired Gun’ Effect: Assessing the Effect of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2000). 9  New Jersey courts have embraced voir dire precisely along these lines.  In State v. Murray, this Court endorsed voir dire on jurors’ prior-held beliefs on expert psychiatric testimony, holding that it was appropriate to “probe[] whether the prospective jurors had read or studied about psychology, psychiatry, medicine, or related fields, and inquire[] about the jurors’ views on those sciences and whether those views would hinder the ability to follow the law as instructed by the court.
[brief] ”  While the Statute also includes a provision requiring that “a school district shall make all reasonable efforts to renegotiate a contract in good faith . . .”, the obligation on the part of the school district to make payments to the contracted service provider pursuant to the terms of their contract is not conditioned on the success (however that is to be measured) of those negotiations.  The payments that [...] made to [...] in satisfaction of [...]’s invoices for May and June 2020 were in full accord with the obligation the COVID Statute imposed upon [...].
[brief] A Licensed Attorney Has a Continuous and Ongoing Professional Duty to Report Public Wrongdoing Up the Reporting Ladder.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa88, Pa89, 1T).  Plaintiff is an officer of the court confronted with conflicting rulings as to his sworn professional and ethical duty as a public citizen to enforce and to uphold the law, to report public wrongdoing up the reporting ladder and to preserve trust and confidence in our constitutional form of representative democracy.
[brief] In its Appellate Brief, the Authority argues that its contractual right to “determine [employees’] qualifications and conditions of continued employment or assignment” extends to its handling of employee medical evaluations, and that [...]’ condition was subject to the Authority’s supposedly unconstrained right to declare her physically unfit for duty, even when presented with an authentic doctor’s note which authorized her to return to work without restriction.  The Authority essentially argues that its right to determine qualifications and conditions of continued employment places employee discharge beyond the reach of the CNA's requirement that employees may only be disciplined or discharged for just cause.  (Pa 20, 22-24), and that [...] ignored that language.  The Arbitrator weighed the provisions and competing positions of the parties, and concluded that [...]’ termination was not for just cause.  To be sure, the Authority never argued before the Arbitrator that [...]’ termination was subject to any standard other than just cause; indeed the parties affirmatively agreed that the issue in the arbitration proceedings was whether “the Employer ha[d] just cause to terminate” [...], not whether the Authority had the unfettered right to terminate her employment.
[directive] 4.1  Duties and Responsibilities  4.1.1  The purpose of the internal affairs function is to establish a mechanism for the receipt, investigation, and resolution of officer misconduct complaints.  The goal of internal affairs is to ensure that the integrity of the agency is maintained through a system of internal discipline where an objective and impartial investigation and review assure fairness and justice.  4.1.2  The internal affairs function or officer will investigate alleged misconduct by members of the agency and review the adjudication of minor complaints handled by supervisors.  In addition, internal affairs shall receive notice of:  (a)  Any firearm discharge by agency personnel, whether on-duty or off-duty, unless the discharge occurred during the course of: (1) a law enforcement training exercise; (2) routine target practice at a firing range; (3) a lawful animal hunt; or (4) the humane killing of an injured animal; (b)  Any discharge of an agency-owned firearm by anyone other than agency personnel; (c) Any use of force by agency personnel that results in injury to any person, (d) Any vehicular pursuit involving agency personnel; and (e) Any collision involving agency-owned vehicles.  Upon receiving notification, the agency’s internal affairs function shall document the incident and determine whether additional investigation is necessary.  4.1. 3  An internal affairs function also has an obligation to investigate or review any allegation of employee misconduct that is a potential violation of an AG Directive or Guideline, a Directive issued by a County Prosecutor in that jurisdiction, the agency's rules and regulations, or any allegation that indicates the employee is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform their duties.
[brief] For instance, in a 2012 email, [...] indicates that he was involved in both the high-level decision making and execution of a plan [Redacted]  See Exhibit 10 to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel [...] and [...] as Custodians; see also Exhibit 12 to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel [...] and [...] as Custodians [Redacted].  [...] also indicated her involvement as a key decision maker in her communications related to the above.  See Exhibit 12 to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel [...] and [...] as Custodians [Redacted].  8.  [...] finds that [...] and [...], as key decision makers related to the issues of this case, are likely to possess at least some of the following categories of relevant information not available through other data sources:3
[brief] Similar to sections B(1) and B(2), there is no language specific to location in this clause.  This means that if a person is trying to harm or kill themself and is injured or killed by railroad equipment anywhere—on railroad property, on a right of way, or if they are a passenger utilizing parts of railroad designated for passenger use or in a crossing established by the railroad, the railroad is immune.  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152b(4) addresses immunity for a violation of section N.J.S.A. 48:12-152a.
[brief] (6T166-6 to 10, 166-19 to 20).  Asked where the rifle was, defendant said it was behind him.  (6T166-22 to 23).  The murder weapon was recovered in one of the upstairs bedrooms, with one bullet in the chamber.  (6T171-5 to 15; 7T37-2 to 16).  Inside of a backpack was a magazine for the rifle fully loaded with fifteen bullets, as well as two full boxes of ammunition and ten loose bullets.  (7T50-1 to 52-8).  [...] had legally purchased the Century Arms American Variant AK-47 one year earlier through a licensed firearms dealer.
[directive] Updates to a BOLO list  Updating BOLO shall be done at the start of each shift for mobile ALPRs attached to police vehicles, and as frequently as possible, but at least daily, for ALPRs at stationary locations.  3.3.1  All ALPR systems must provide an Application Program Interface (API) or web service to update in real-time a BOLO list(s) through methods approved by the State ALPR Coordinator, including AMBER/SILVER alerts that remain on the list until expired or withdrawn.  response.
[brief] ” (1T33:14-21).  The trial court further added:  In this matter, it appears that the plaintiff seeks to expand the law and the potential liability of the related public -- regulated public utility.  The Court is unaware of any statute, rule, or case law that requires a public utility providing streetlights to undertake the responsibility to assure their adequacy as distinct from their operation of statute upon the plaintiff.  [(1T34:6-13). ]  Finally, the trial court found that Plaintiff’s claims against [...] for negligent lighting and design could not be sustained because [...]’s obligations are expressly governed by the [...]’s Tariff for electric service:
[brief] ”  464 N.J. Super. at 605.  In that case, the eyewitness said she was eighty percent confident in her out-of-court identification of the defendant from a photo array, but after seeing defendant at trial, testified that she was one hundred percent certain of her in-court identification.  *Id.* at 602.  The defendant argued, as in this case, that “the scientific principles that necessitated the reforms achieved in *Henderson* demonstrate that in-court identifications are the product of inherently suggestive circumstances and have minimal probative value.
[brief] (Da269-312)  On June 28, 2016, the [...] case manager advised that 1 arbitrator would remain based on the waiver provisions of the regular commercial arbitration rules; Rule 37, which provides:  Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after knowledge that any provision or requirement of these rules has not been complied with and who fails to state an objection in writing shall be deemed to have waived the right to object.  [Da319](Da207)].  In response [...] asked [...] to show where an express waiver of rights had occurred.  [...]’s case manager simply reiterated that she had decided there was a waiver, giving no reasoning.  (Da319)(Da322)  [...] requested reconsideration of the unreasoned waiver ruling.
[brief] Before agreeing to sign the waiver form, [...] asked detectives a series of questions about his ability to later invoke his right to remain silent during questioning.  (17T:29-18 to 32-15; 38-4 to 41-16)  [...] made clear that he would only speak to detectives if they would allow him to invoke his right to silence in response to questions he did not wish to answer.  When [...] told [...] he had “the right to remain silent and refuse to answer any questions,” [...] asked “does that include the entire time or just that particular question?  Because if I use my right to remain silent, does that mean that I no longer have the right to answer your questions? ”  (1T:38-18 to 24)  The detectives told [...] he could invoke his right to silence in response to particular questions without ending the conversation, before explaining the other Miranda rights.
[brief] (Pa000237).  Further, for Plaintiffs’ far-fetched reliance theory to constitute anything more than unfounded speculation against [...], Plaintiffs would need an engineering expert, which they elected not to retain.  This expert would then have to articulate how an engineer, who is asked to prepare a preliminary site plan relating to the proposed future installation of paved parking spaces, is somehow at fault for remediation activities performed by remediation contractors.  Again, the preliminary site plan at issue did not call for any remediation activities, and [...] never had any contact with the remediation contractor.
[brief] Here, it is improper to rely upon *Burt* because the so-called “Burt defendants” were not the product of this Plaintiff/Respondent’s failure to file Affidavits of Merit against [...] and [...]; rather, the designation as so-called “Burt defendants” came from Appellant’s deliberate, tactical, and strategic effort to exploit the Appellate Division’s ruling in Burt.  In this case, Plaintiff/Respondent did not name [...] and [...] as defendants in the original Complaint because it was determined that there were no viable claims against them.  It was not until – and because of – Appellant’s allegations of the fault of [...] and [...] in discovery that Plaintiff/Respondent sought to amend.  When Appellant alleged that [...] and [...] were at fault for the harm sustained, Plaintiff/Respondent was confronted with two options under the Court Rules: (1) to seek to amend the Complaint to assert a direct claim against [...] and [...]; or (2) to not seek to amend the Complaint to assert direct claims.
[brief] Plaintiffs elected to pursue common knowledge negligence and trespass claims “at their own peril,” and they refused to withdraw their trespass claims against [...] after co-defendants’ Responses to Interrogatories clearly established that co-defendants were responsible for the alleged instances of trespass, such as the environmental remediation and the erection of fencing and signage on and around the Property.  (Id.).  Plaintiffs then kept [...] in the case for a year, during which time they did not seek any discovery to support their common knowledge negligence or trespass claims, even after being advised that these claims were non-viable and made in bad faith.  Plaintiffs tried to oppose the Motion for Sanctions on the grounds that, in its decision denying [...]’s first Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court held that Plaintiffs could pursue a viable common knowledge negligence claim against [...] without the need for expert testimony.  (Pa000460).  Plaintiffs also claimed that they made a strategic choice in deciding not to depose any [...] representatives.  (Id.).  The trial court was unconvinced, and granted the motion, directing counsel for [...] to provide a Proposed Order and certification of fees.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED A PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD OF $838,810.40 BASED ON THE DATES OF EACH SPECIFIC MISAPPROPRIATION FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.  The trial court abused its discretion when it awarded $190,480.68 in prejudgment interest, rather than $838,810.40 to which the Plaintiffs were entitled.  The decision below on this issue was based on an erroneous interpretation of R. 4:42-11, which resulted in the trial court cutting off Plaintiffs’ prejudgment interest claim based on when they commenced suit, rather than allowing prejudgment interest to run from the dates when the trial court found that the defendants misappropriated funds.
[brief] Despite [...] installing hundreds of miles of 69kV power lines throughout the State, [...] vehemently opposed less than five miles of the Project proposed to run through the Town.  To foreclose [...] from placing such power lines, [...] adopted the Ordinance on February 22, 2022.  By attempting to regulate the physical placement of utility poles — as well as the maximum allowed height of poles — within existing public rights of way, the Ordinance requirements prevent [...] from installing transmission lines that are required to provide safe, adequate, and proper service in New Jersey.
[directive] Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  Severability.  B.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive Questions. shall be addressed to the First Assistant Attorney General or her designee.  D.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and remain in force and effect  Effective date. unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[directive] As the U.S. Department of Justice has found, LGBTQ+ “youths are more likely to experience bullying at school, more likely to experience rejection or victimization perpetrated by their parents/caregivers (often resulting in youths’ running away from home), [and] more likely to face homelessness. ”  See LGBTQ Youths in the Juvenile Justice System (August 2014), Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, available at www.ojjdp.gov.  This Directive will help officers reduce such juveniles’ risk of harm, including from abuse and/or neglect.  Page 5 II.  INTERACTIONS BASED ON GENDER
[brief] On January 24, 2022, the [...] qualified for and executed to the Bank a home equity Note and Mortgage on the Premises in the amount of $97,000.  The Mortgage contained the following cross-default provision:  “DEFAULT:  The note describes the acts that will constitute a default under this mortgage.  Additionally, a default under any other mortgage covering the premises will constitute a default under this mortgage.  If any default occurs, you can foreclose this mortgage.  That means that you can arrange for the premises to be sold, as provided by law, in order to pay off what I owe you.  If the money you receive from the sale is not enough to pay off what I owe you, I still owe you the difference."  (Pa44)  Under the above cross-default provision, a default under the 2012 mortgage constituted a default under the 2022 mortgage.