ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] According to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11:  Notices pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12] and [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-13] shall state the date, time and place of the hearing, the nature of the matters to be considered and, in the case of notices pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12], an identification of the property proposed for development by street address, if any, or by reference to lot and block numbers as shown on the current tax duplicate in the municipal tax assessor's office, and the location and times at which any maps and documents for which approval is sought are available pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10].  At Pa53 to Pa54, the trial court relies on language from Perlmart.  To be sure, there are gray areas where courts may differ as to whether an applicant has adequately described "the nature of the matters to be considered"; that portion of the notice requires a "'common sense description of the nature of the application, such that the ordinary layperson could understand its potential impact upon him or her."  Pond Run, 397 N.J. Super. at 352 (quoting Perlmart, 295 N.J. Super. at 239).  However, under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 notice requirements are black-and-white; the applicant either did or did not comply (the "date" is either right or wrong, the "time" is either right or wrong, etc.).
[directive] Furthermore, such decisions depend on more clinical judgment than initial allocation decisions.  Therefore, there should be a more 6 robust process for appealing decisions to withdraw or reallocate critical care beds or services.  Elements of this appeals process should include:  The individuals appealing the triage decision should explain to the triage officer the • grounds for their appeal.  Appeals based in an objection to the overall allocation framework should not be granted.  The triage team should explain the grounds for the triage decision that was made.  • Appeals based in considerations other than disagreement with the allocation framework • should immediately be brought to a Triage Review Committee that is independent of the triage officer/team and of the patient’s care team (see below for recommended composition of this body).  The appeals process must be expedited so that the appeals process does not harm • patients who are in the queue for scarce critical care resources currently being used by the patient who is the subject of the appeal.  The decision of the Triage Review Committee or subcommittee for a given • hospital/system will be final.
[brief] [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: Okay.  And so the record is clear, the pleadings in this matter were submitted by the defendant in a self-represented capacity.  [...] submitted his own paperwork in connection with this.  And the defense through Ms. Lyons has chosen not to submit anything in writing herself and the State has made a similar choice.  The Court agreed that it would entertain oral argument in this matter even though it was a motion filed by a self-represented defendant but Ms. Lyons is going to handle the argument for him.  And, Ms. Lyons, if you're ready, I'll hear your position now.
[brief] As this would be defendant’s second DWI (at least for sentencing purposes, see (2T:68-20 to 68-23; 3T:20-2 to 7)), the sentence that would be imposed if he was found guilty after de novo review would be the same regardless of which evidential method the prosecutor used to establish his guilt.  See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2).  As such, the Assistant Prosecutor explained that the prosecutor’s election not to rely upon defendant’s BAC as proof of intoxication did not run afoul of Guideline 4, which only imposed some limits on prosecutorial discretion on “plea agreements” for first DWIs under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(1), where the difference in evidential method impacts the sentence to be imposed.  The prosecutor’s evidentiary election here likewise did not run afoul of the December 2, 2004 memo of Honorable [...], J.A.D., which addressed only “dismiss[ed] or amend[ed]” DWI charges.  The municipal prosecutor did neither here and instead proceeded to trial and prosecuted this DWI in the lawful manner in which he “s[aw] fit.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Following a nonjury trial conducted by the court on June 6, 7, and 15, 2023, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. issued a 63-page Opinion After Trial By the Court on August 30, 2023 (“Opinion”).  The trial court made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, awarding Final Judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the principal sum of $274,260.64.  Plaintiff prevailed on his claim that Defendants breached their express agreement to repay [...] the sum of $134,759.74, including interest at the rate of 10% per annum, due and owing under the parties’ April 26, 2013 pay-when-able loan.  Following the parties’ April 2013 loan agreement, [...] first indicated in October of 2019 that he would be able to repay the loan by the end of 2019 with his realization of the proceeds from an unrelated transaction.  As a matter of law, the limitations period of the pay-when-able loan did not begin to run until that time, at the earliest.  Plaintiff’s filing of this action on May 1, 2020 -- just seven months later -- was well within the six-year limitations period.  In the face of the record proofs, including [...]’s own admissions and the trial court’s categorical findings, Defendants now urge, among other things, that no loan agreement was ever made and that New Jersey does not recognize pay-when-able loans.  To the contrary, the trial court based its meticulous findings of fact on overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence -- including Defendants’ own admissions confirming the fact of the loan and its terms.  The trial court also rejected Defendants’ argument that New Jersey law does not recognize pay-when-able loans on the basis of not only the court’s sound legal analysis of relevant case law, but also on the basis of [...]’s own admission that a prior loan between the parties was pay-when-able.  Defendants cannot have it both ways: they cannot admit, on the one hand, that a prior loan between the parties was governed by the term of pay-when-able, then argue the opposite when expedient.  Defendants’ arguments on appeal are without merit.  The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law should be affirmed.
[directive] 4.2  Upon the initiation of a pursuit, the pursuing officer shall immediately activate all emergency lights, siren, headlights, motor vehicle recorder (MVR), if equipped, and body worn camera (BWC), if equipped.  4.3  Once the pursuit has been initiated, the primary unit must immediately notify communications and a supervisor, providing as much of the following information as is known: (a) reason for the pursuit; (b) direction of travel and designation and location of the roadway; (c) traffic conditions; (d) presence of pedestrians; (e) identification of the violator’s vehicle (year, make, model, color, vehicle registration number, and other identifying characteristics); (f) information on the identity of the driver, if known; (g) number of occupants; (h) the speed of the pursued vehicle; and (i) other information that may be helpful in deciding whether to terminate the pursuit or in resolving the incident.
[brief] (Pa32; Pa153-Pa161)  In addition, store personnel went so far as to take the time and effort to take various pictures of Plaintiff, including the shoes she wore on the date of the incident, and several photographs of [...]’s overloaded U-boat (Pa164-Pa165), and yet, chose not to retain the most valuable piece of evidence – the video surveillance itself.  Additionally, since it was also foreseeable that discarding such footage would harm Plaintiff’s potential claims and that the footage was clearly relevant to the incident, [...] had a duty to retain such footage.  The fact that Plaintiff was injured and an incident report was completed certainly put [...] on notice to preserve all available surveillance footage, up to and including the time the incident occurred that calendar day, due to probable litigation, and provided [...] with the requisite knowledge that litigation was likely.
[directive] 3.  The risks and benefits associated with the use of a conducted energy device are in many respects comparable to the risks and benefits associated with the use of less- lethal ammunition.  In certain situations, a conducted energy device may reduce the risk of death or injury to police officers, to innocent bystanders and victims, and also to the persons who are subject to arrest and against whom this form of less lethal force would be directed.  The device may thus allow officers to resolve a confrontation without it escalating to a level where deadly force is required.  Accordingly, this policy allows law enforcement agencies the ability to use these devices as a less lethal alternative, while limiting the circumstances when a conducted energy device may be deployed.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  While employed as a security guard at a restaurant in Bridgewater, New Jersey, the Plaintiff was arrested and criminally charged with third-degree aggravated assault as a result of efforts to remove a patron (Pa007-008).  The criminal trial court found the Defendant not guilty on June 6, 2017 (Pa103), and thereafter the clerk entered a judgment of acquittal on July 31, 2017, pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 (Pa105-107).  On July 1, 2019, the Appellant filed a Complaint before the United States District Court against the [...], the [...], and various individual Bridgewater police officers, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey State law torts, including negligence and malicious prosecution (Pa111).  On March 27, 2024, the United States District Court dismissed the Appellant’s federal claims with prejudice as time-barred, holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date when the finding of not guilty was announced (June 6, 2017), - and not the date upon which the Clerk of the Court officially entered and published a judgment of acquittal (July 31, 2017).  (Pa108-109).  The United States District Court separately declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Appellant’s State law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.  Id.  On April 25, 2024, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  Briefs have been submitted by all parties, and the case has been tentatively listed on the merits for Friday, March 28, 2025.  I.
[brief] Moreover, Appellants’ reliance on In re Highlands Applicability to suggest that a project may only be a routine upgrade under Exemption #11 if it serves the “reliability needs” of a public utility’s “existing customer base” is completely misguided.  See Ab20.  However, as Appellants admit, In re Highlands Applicability did not decide the issue as to whether Exemption #11 requires an upgrade to be “routine”.  The Court simply assumed for the sake of argument that “routine” applied whom are directly affected by the Project as proposed. ”  FERC staff ultimately concluded that a pipeline alternative “would not offer a significant environmental advantage over the proposed construction of CS 327” and was therefore not recommended.  TGPa0037 through TGPa0040. and analyzed [...]’s project as such.  Further, the Court held that serving the reliability needs of existing customers is one way (not the only way) that a project could be considered “routine”.  Consistent with the Court’s holding in *In re Highlands Applicability*, Tennessee’s Project serves, among other purposes, to enhance the reliability to existing customers of the Project shipper, [...]  (“[...]”), and would be considered “routine” under the Court’s analysis.  Appellants erroneously claim that the FERC Certificate only references meeting the need for new customers but then they quote FERC’s finding that the “natural gas demand in [[...]’s] service territories is exceeding its available firm natural gas interstate pipeline capacity and that additional transportation capacity is needed to serve [[...]’s] existing and new customers. ”  See Ab33, quoting the FERC Certificate, 179 FERC ¶ 61,041 P 17 (April 21, 2022) (emphasis Tennessee’s).  Accordingly, even if this Court were to agree with Appellants’ interpretation of Exemption #11, the Project would still qualify as a routine upgrade to meet the needs of a project shipper.
[brief] A. 2C:35-10a(1) (Count 4).  (Da1-4).  On the same date venue for trial was set in Middlesex County.  (Da5)  Following hearings on [...]’s Motion to Suppress all evidence -- obtained by the [...] at the time of the stop, questioning and arrest of [...] and [...] in Illinois on February 28, 2017 -- held on April 4, May 25, and September 23, 2019, before the Hon. [...], P.J.Cr., the court issued a written decision and Order on January 14, 2020, denying [...]’s motion.
[brief] On Plaintiffs’ theory of the case, [...] should have foreseen that [...] was dangerous because he might not be able to assist a customer with a question about a flooring product; yet, if a Red-Vested employee had trouble with a question, or became frustrated by an interaction with a customer, it would not have been foreseeable that a fight would break out.  This theory cannot sustain a claim for negligent training and supervision because [...]’s status as a trainee or a Red-Vest employee has nothing to do with his specific qualities or disposition, or knowledge of grout and ability to interact with customers.  Indeed, the jury heard uncontroverted evidence that [...] was trained on grout and that he actually provided [...] with accurate information in response to his questions, despite not being a Red-Vest employee.  Nor was there any evidence that [...] possessed a reckless or vicious disposition.  C.
[brief] DA 2-8.  The matter was heard before the Honorable [...], J.M.C. on April 8, 2024.  On May 1, 2024 Judge Eliades issued a decision denying the Petition.  DA 9-11.  On May 7, 2024, [...] filed an appeal with the Sussex County Law Division, again asserting she was not advised of the enhanced penalties for a future DWI conviction.  DA 12-16.  The appeal was heard before the Honorable --- 1Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined under one heading for purposes of brevity  2See “T1" Transcript of Plea and Sentencing dated 1/23/2014  [...], J.S.C. on August 16, 2024, at which time Judge Gaus issued a decision on the record denying the appeal.  An amended Order Denying the Municipal Appeal was issued on August 23, 2024.  DA 17-18.  This appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division follows.
[brief] See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (“It is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ”)  Regardless, even if this Court could consider this argument, neither N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.1(j) nor N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.2(i) is curative of the lack of a substantial nexus between the conduct complained of in Plaintiff’s Complaint and N.J.A.C. § 10:44A.  N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.1(j) merely states that those working with individuals with developmental disabilities need to be “well trained”—it says nothing about what this training might entail or what would constitute a “well trained” employee.  Further, this code provision has no connection to N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8, which pertains to justifying staff coverage to appropriate state agencies.  Similarly, N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.2(i) states:  Efforts undertaken to maintain or expand community-based living options for individuals with disabilities must be monitored in order to determine and report to appropriate individuals and entities the extent of access by individuals with developmental disabilities to those options, and the extent of compliance with quality assurance standards by entities providing the options.  Again, this code provision has no relation to N.J.A.C. § 10:44A, sets no minimum standards or requirements, and is perhaps as broad and ambiguous a code provision as could be provided by Appellant.  Put simply, if such broad, unrelated, and nonspecific provisions are permitted to sustain a CEPA claim, then the “substantial nexus” test becomes obsolete and CEPA’s reach becomes limitless.  However, under the well-established “substantial nexus” test, there exists no substantial nexus between Plaintiff’s complained-of conduct and N.J.A.C. § 10:44A, and the dismissal of Count One of Plaintiff’s Complaint must be affirmed.
[directive] On a periodic basis, and no later than January 31 of the following year, every agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and the Attorney General, and publish on the agency’s public website, a brief synopsis of all misconduct where an agency member: (a) Was terminated; (b) Was reduced in rank or grade; (c) Was assessed a suspension of more than five days.  A suspension of more than five days shall be broadly construed to include any disposition involving a suspension of more than 40 hours of time or the equivalent of five days/shifts if less than 40 hours, regardless of whether any of the suspension time was suspended or held in abeyance.  It shall include the loss of vacation, sick or leave time totaling more than 40 hours or the equivalent of five days/shifts.  It shall include any combination of suspension time assessed plus loss of vacation, sick or leave time that aggregates to more than 40 hours or the equivalent of five days/shifts.  It shall also include any fine that exceeds the gross value of 40 hours, or the equivalent of five days/shifts, of pay; (d)  Had a sustained finding of discrimination or bias against any person because of the individual’s actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, familial status, or any other protected characteristic under N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (e)  Had a sustained finding that the officer utilized excessive force in violation of departmental policy or the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (f)  Had a sustained finding that the officer was untruthful or has demonstrated a lack of candor, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022
[brief] “The factual determination of a board is presumed to be valid.  It’s exercise of its discretionary authority based on such determinations will not be overturned unless arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and the burden of proof that the action of the board was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable is upon the plaintiffs. ”  *Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Board.*  233 NJ 546, 558 (2018).  In this instance, the Board was charged with reviewing the decision of the HPC and making factual findings based on their investigation of the decision.
[directive] Un arma mortífera significa cualquier arma de fuego u otra arma, aparato, instrumento, material o sustancia, sea animada o inanimada, capaz de producir la muerte o una lesión corporal grave por la manera en que se usa o en que se tiene la intención de usarla.  Una lesión corporal grave significa cualquier lesión corporal que crea un verdadero riesgo de muerte o que causa una desfiguración grave y permanente o el deterioro o la pérdida prolongada de la función de cualquier miembro u órgano del cuerpo.
[directive] Forensic interviews of minor victims must be video and audio recorded, following county protocols.  Pursuant to the consent and cooperation of the parent/guardian (non-offending) or CP&P, and the cooperation of the minor victim of sexual assault/contact, the minor victim shall have a medical forensic exam.  When a minor victim, who, in the judgment of the treating healthcare professional, appears to have been sexually assaulted, the consent given by the minor for a medical forensic exam is valid and binding as if the minor were an adult.  (See N.J.S.A. 9:17A-4).  The minor’s parents or guardians must be notified immediately about the medical forensic exam, unless the treating healthcare professional reasonably believes that it is in the best interest of the minor-patient not to do so.  However, an inability of the healthcare professional to locate or notify the parents or guardian shall not preclude the performance of a medical forensic exam on the minor.  Services for child victims of sexual assault under age 13 and non-offending caregivers should be provided by professionals who are trained in the treatment of child sexual abuse.
[brief] This brief addresses both the factual and legal conclusions of the PCR Court as the appellate court “review[s] the trial court’s denial of PCR de novo. ”  State v. Belton, 452 N.J. Super. 528, 536 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004)).  B.  DEFENDANT DID NOT PUT FORTH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
[brief] Moreover, the experts’ conclusions do not square with the facts.  [...] believed defendant was remorseful, yet defendant confirmed to [...] that he felt no remorse at the time of his initial sentencing.  (2T27:23 to 29:8; Da48).  [...] believed that defendant was a “follower,” but defendant’s letter to [...]’s sister revealed that he was directing two separate plots: one to attack [...] in a house of worship, and the other to attack someone outside of prison named [...].  [...]’s opinion is inconsistent within itself.  He claimed that defendant has learned to control his impulses and was ready to rejoin society, but conceded that defendant’s crime constituted “well thought out planning. ”  If the original crime did not arise from impulsiveness, why would impulse control render defendant ready to rejoin society?  Considering these weaknesses in the proffered expert opinions, [...] did not abuse his discretion in refusing to accord them more weight.
[brief] 20 POINT I THE CONTROLLING STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO, AND THE TRADITIONAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  PRINCIPLES APPLY INCLUDING THE RECOGNITION CONTRACT DISPUTES ARE PARTICULARLY SUITED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND WHERE AN UNAMBIGUOUS TERMINATION CLAUSE EXISTS AND IS INVOKED THE COURT WILL NOT INTERCEDE ..................................................................................  20  A.  Standard of Review ........................................................................................................  20 B.  Summary Judgment Particularly Suited for Contract Disputes ........................................  22  C.  Unambiguous Termination Clauses are Enforced Regardless of Ulterior Motive........................................23  POINT II BECAUSE COURTS JUDICIALLY ENFORCE UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT TERMINATION PROVISIONS, AND HERE THE TERMINATION PROVISION WAS UNAMBIGUOUS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CLAIM WAS PROPER
[brief] Relatedly, the State takes issue with the fact that not every single article now cited by the defense was cited in trial court.  Again, the failure to make further inquiries after these issues were raised by the defense is the trial court’s failure; the failure to make a record to defend the reliability of the expert evidence it sought to admit is the State’s failure.  But the State’s argument on appeal is also contrary the law, which has a proud and robust history of enabling appellate courts to consider scientific resources without any requirement that each resource was presented below.
[brief] The change factors are numerical values that modify the NOAA Atlas 14 data to extrapolate the peak flow rate for an anticipated future one-hundred-year flood.  Ibid.  [...] developed both factors using, among other things, studies that utilized historical precipitation data from 1950 to 2019.  Ibid.  Relevant here, however, the Cornell Studies do not include the raw precipitation data from 1950 to 2019 that was used to develop the adjustment and change factors.