ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa316.  The trial court also relied on [...]’s and [...]’s certification—in addition to the retainers and waivers.  Pb30.  Their certifications do not “speak in generalities,” contrary to [...]’s argument.  Ibid.  For example, both doctors certify that, after [...] filed its motion, the [...] advised them of all of [...]’s arguments about a purported conflict.  Pa320 ¶ 14; Pa323 ¶ 14.  In any event, the conflict waiver that [...] and [...] signed comprehensively advised them of all of the requisite information to permit them does not support the proposition that the [...] waivers are not part of the trial court record.  6
[directive] 2.  Você entende que em decorrência da sua declaração de culpa por estas acusações o juiz terá de impor um período de supervisão de liberdade condicional de ano(s) e que este período começará assim que cumprir a pena de prisão?  Período de Supervisão de Liberdade Condicional por Crime de Primeiro Grau - 5 anos  Período de Supervisão de Liberdade Condicional por Crime de Segundo Grau - 3 anos  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
[brief] When interpreting a written contract, a court may not “make a different or better contract than the parties have seen fit to make for themselves. ”  Schnakenberg v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Ass’n, 37 N.J. Super. 150, 155 (App. Div. 1955) (emphasis added).  As stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Schwimmer, the admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance.  Such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of interpreting the writing—not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning of what has been said.  So far as the evidence tends to show . . . an intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant.  Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 301-02 (emphasis added).  Thus, while evidence of the situation of the parties and surrounding circumstances is always admissible to aid the interpretation of an integrated contract, Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 301, the parol evidence rule bars the introduction of extrinsic evidence that tends to alter, vary, or contradict the written agreement.  See U.S. v. Clementon Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 1966); Conway, 187 N.J. at 269.
[brief] Rather, the Court found on the facts before it that the record was inadequate to make a determination.  Notably, in Williamson, the police car was not in the same lane as Williamson’s car, and Williamson’s lane change from the center to right lane put him two lanes away from the trooper in the left lane.  In contrast, [...] and [...] were directly behind [...]’s vehicle in the left lane of the two-lane divided highway.  And the trooper in Williamson testified that Williamson was a few car lengths ahead, whereas the officers here “got pretty close” behind [...]’s vehicle to the point where they could see the driver looking in her mirror and could count the number of occupants.  (1T19-2 to 11, 49-2 to 7).  As this Court has repeatedly found, a driver’s failure to signal may affect other traffic when a police car is behind them as in the present case.  See, e.g., Moss, 277 N.J. Super. at 547 (holding that the defendant’s failure to signal violated the statute where “the police vehicle immediately behind the turning vehicle” in addition to other traffic was “likely to be affected by the left turn of defendant’s vehicle”); Heisler, 422 N.J. Super. at 413 (holding that the defendant’s failure to signal his intention to turn left until he was a few feet away from the intersection “may have affected [the police officer’s] own vehicle” directly behind the defendant’s vehicle); Garland, 270 N.J. Super. at 42-43 (finding articulable suspicion to make the original stop where the defendant failed to signal while changing from the right lane to the left lane in front of a police vehicle).
[brief] Burt merely stands for the proposition that a prior party-defendant dismissed for the failure of a plaintiff to file an Affidavit of Merit is “still a fault-allocable party under the Comparative Negligence Act. ”  Id. at 305.  Despite recognizing the unequivocal mandate in the JTCL, the Burt Court – without briefing by the parties – raised the prospective issue of the plaintiff’s recovery sua sponte.  *Id.* at 308.  The Appellate Division ruled that it would be inequitable to force dismissed parties, not represented by counsel at trial, to participate at trial and potentially be responsible for damages.  *Ibid.*  For this reason, that Court determined that the legislative intent of the JTCL – although clearly expressed without exception or qualification – would somehow be advanced by preventing a plaintiff from recovering the full measure of damages against a direct defendant found by a factfinder to be 60% or more at fault.  *Id.* at 309.  What the *Burt* opinion lacks is an explanation as to why the direct defendants in that case should have been so rewarded when there was no impediment to them pursuing contribution claims against the dismissed defendants, since the dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct claims would not have distinguished the defendants’ rights to seek contribution against those dismissed defendants.  The legislative intent of the JTCL, however, should not be disregarded as the *Burt* Court apparently did.
[directive] 6.1.11  In addition, all agencies must comply with the time limitations established by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-200 et seq. regarding the imposition of discipline.  Lastly, agencies operating under the purview of Title 11A must comply with the deadlines for disciplinary action imposed by Civil Service Commission Rules.  See N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.1, et seq.  6.2
[brief] Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549 (1979)  39  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016)  15  Housel for Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 1998)  14  Houseman v. Dare, 405 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 2009)  26  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2018)  21, 22, 39  Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 128 N.J. 10 (1992)  36  Jones v. Gabrielan, 52 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 1958)  37  Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301 (2019)  19, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163 (2006)
[brief] The juvenile in *State v. Zuber*, for example orchestrated and participated in two gang rapes, 227 N.J. 422, 430 (2017); the juvenile in *Comer* attacked a teenage girl and mutilated her dead body, 249 N.J. at 374-75; and the juvenile in *Roper v. Simmons* kidnapped a woman, bound her hands and feet, wrapped her face in duct tape, and drowned her.  543 U.S. 551, 556-57 (2005).  These cases all recognized that no matter how “bruta[l] or cold-blooded” the facts, sentencing courts must still account for the reality that a “juvenile’s criminal behavior [generally] reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity[.]”  *Roper*, 543 U .S. at 573; *Comer*, 249 N.J. at 399.  [...] has never disputed the heinousness of the incident.  He argues only that the sentencing court follow our Supreme Court’s instruction: guard against the “unacceptable likelihood [that] the brutal nature of an offense can overpower mitigating arguments based on youth. ”  *Comer*, 249 N.J. at 403.
[brief] [...] diagnosed a retinal detachment.  (Da0664)  On November 14, 2018, [...] performed a Pars Para Vitrectomy on [...]’s left eye to treat the retinal detachment.  [...] returned to [...] on November 15, 2018 for a follow up visit.  [...] appropriately instructed her to lie flat and face down following surgery.  (Da0670)  [...] returned to [...] on November 26, 2018.  [...] documented that the Ozurdex steroid pellet had migrated to [...]’s anterior chamber.  (Da0674)  Finally, on December 28, 2018, [...] issued an URGENT DRUG RECALL in the United States for twenty-two (22) lots of Ozurdex.
[brief] ’”  State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 233 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992).  This Court has previously held that such evidence is only admissible when it “is intrinsically indicative of a consciousness of guilt, such as unexplained flight, or an unusual exhibition of remorse for the victim of the crime, or the switching of clothes while a cellmate before a lineup.
[brief] (11T120-12 to 120-18).  [...] received a call from a family member about them finding the victim’s body.  (11T122-15 to 23).  When [...] and [...] returned to [...] from the hospital, her mother came over.  (11T123-22 to 124-8).  According to [...], while her mother was downstairs, [...] and [...] spoke alone in their bedroom in the attic.  (11T124-9 to 23).  [...] claimed that [...] told her that he shot [...] and gave a detailed confession.  (11125-21 to 126-12).
[brief] Atlantic County Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J. Cv. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' REPLY  BRIEF Of Counsel & On the Brief: [...], Esq. (#024172005)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT……………………………………………………………1  LEGAL ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………3  I.  THE MSRA DOES NOT PROVIDE AUTHORITY FOR DEFENDANTS TO RETROACTIVELY ELIMINATE VESTED TERMINAL LEAVE BENEFITS………………………………………………………………………3  II.  PLAINTIFFS' RETIREMENT  DATES ARE CRUCIAL TO DETERMINING THEIR VESTED RIGHTS………………………………………..7  III.  PLAINTIFFS RAISED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND, AS SUCH, THOSE CLAIMS ARE NOT WAIVED……………………………………………………………………..11  CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………….14
[brief] THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BASED ON THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT'S FACEBOOK POSTS CONTAINED NO DISCLAIMERS.  Complainants make much ado about the fact that Respondent's Facebook posts do not contain disclaimers that makes clear that the contents of the posts represent her own personal opinions and are not representative of the Board.  The lack of a disclaimer in Respondent's post does not render the Commission's Final Decision wrong and subject to reversal.
[brief] There, the Court affirmed a municipality’s right to condemn property which had received final subdivision approval for the development of non-affordable, single-family homes.  In upholding the municipality’s condemnation of the property, [...] made clear:  This is not a case such as Kessler Institute, supra, 289 N.J. Super. 329, in which the court dismissed an action to condemn property on which the owner planned to construct medical rehabilitation and nursing facilities, or the unreported opinion of this court relied upon by respondents that affirmed dismissal of an action to condemn land on which the owner planned to construct a residential development that would have provided multi-family housing affordable to middle-income families.  In those cases, the condemnees’ proposed uses impacted significant public interests, and the courts found abuses of the eminent domain power in the municipalities’ attempts to prevent those uses.  If [...] had attempted to condemn [...]’s property when its predecessor in title planned to construct an assisted living facility on the site, a similar finding might have been warranted.  However, [...]’s plan to construct a development of single-family homes that will be affordable only to upper-income families would not serve a comparable public interest.  Id. at 376-77 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court affirmed the entirety of [...]’s Appellate Division opinion as a “thoughtful and well-written opinion.
[brief] In *State v. [...]*, 251 N.J. 384 (2022), the Court again stressed that the State cannot rely on an officer’s characterization of an area as “high-crime” to justify an otherwise illegal detention.  Like Cutts, [...] was outside on a winter evening on a residential block in Camden when police approached him.  As in the instant case, the State called one witness at the suppression hearing, an officer with the [...].  The officer testified that he and his partner were patrolling the block where [...] was stopped because it is a “‘high-crime area’ known for shootings and open-air drug transactions” – language remarkably similar to that used by Wizbicki.  Id. at 390-91.  According to the officer, when they first arrived on the block, they saw two men in front of a “vacant house, where they believed drugs were sold and weapons stored. ”  Id. at 391.  As soon as the officers got out of their car, the men “took off,” just as [...] emerged from a walkway on the side of the house, “which is known for the sale of [drugs] and weapons. ”  Id. 391-93, 405.  Although he did not witness a hand-to-hand transaction between [...] and the two men, the officer testified that he “was suspicious of defendant based on his training and experience that drugs and guns are often stored in walkways, because of general ‘reports [he had] been having in the area,’ and because of his belief that criminal activity was taking place at the vacant house. ”  Id. at 405.  [...] was stopped and frisked; a gun and drugs were found on [...]’s person; drugs were also found in the alleyway.  Id. at 393-94.  In finding the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop [...], the Court stressed “[t]he State must do more than simply invoke the buzz words ‘high-crime area’ in a conclusory manner to justify investigative stops” and found the officer’s “vague testimony fell short of providing factual support for his conclusory statement that the area was high crime. ”  Id. at 404; see also State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 31 (2004) (Albin, J., concurring) (“The words ‘high crime area’ should not be invoked talismanically by police officers to justify a Terry stop that would not pass constitutional muster in any other location. ”).  As the Court in [...] explained, [The officer’s] testimony provided nothing more than a general description of a high-crime neighborhood, noting it is well known for weapons, shootings, and drug sales.
[directive] If a law enforcement agency receives such a request regarding a former employee, then it shall immediately share copies of all internal investigative information related to that candidate with the hiring agency, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:17B-247.  Confidential internal affairs files shall not be disclosed to any other party.  9.8.4  This disclosure requirement does not apply when the agency responsible for sharing internal affairs files is unable to do so because the information is clearly subject to a non-  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 62 disparagement or non-disclosure agreement.  Such agreements must be followed even though they inhibit the ability of law enforcement agencies to fully evaluate candidates applying for positions of public trust, and therefore have the potential to compromise public safety.  Given the public safety risks that such agreements pose, county and municipal governing entities and their counsel are strongly discouraged from entering into them.  9.8.5  In all cases, law enforcement executives retain the authority to defer a decision on hiring a particular candidate until all extant internal affairs information has been received and reviewed.  9.9
[directive] Ibid.  10  6  Type of Frozen Refrigerated Temp. Controlled Room Evidence Temp. Below - Between 2°C and 8°C  Between 15.5°C and 10°C (36°F and 75°F)  24°C (14°F) with less than 25% (60°F and 75°F) humidity with less than 60% humidity  Liquid blood Never Best  Less than 24 hours not ideal  Urine Best Less than 24 hours not ideal not ideal  Dry biological not ideal not ideal  Best Acceptable stained item Hair not ideal not ideal Best Acceptable Swabs with biological not ideal  Best (wet)  Best (dried) not ideal material  Buccal swabs Best Less than not ideal  Best (liquid)  24 hours  DNA Extracts Best Less than Acceptable (liquid)  Acceptable (dried) (liquid)  24 hours  SAFE kits should only contain dried specimens, and therefore should be stored in a controlled room temperature environment.
[brief] **The Property**  On July 30, 2018, [...] and the Defendant LLC executed a contract in which [...] purchased an apartment building (the “Property”) located at [...] from the Defendant LLC for $5,000,000.00.  Pa17-30.  That transaction closed on September 27, 2019.  Pa47.  Among other things, the Defendant LLC warranted that there were no “Hazardous Materials on, under, at, emanating from or affecting the Property. ”  Pa21-22.  “Hazardous Materials” included “any regulated substance, toxic substance, hazardous waste, pollutant or contaminant defined or referred to in the Environmental Laws. ”  Id.  **Mold Issues**
[brief] Tellingly, Plaintiff fills its appeal brief with substantive arguments against potential condemnation and redevelopment of the Property.\(^3\) (Pb12-Pb13; Pb33-Pb37).  Plaintiff’s substantive arguments opposing condemnation and redevelopment are immaterial because they address the merits of governmental actions that the trial court precluded [...] from taking.  For example, the MiPro case that Plaintiff cites arose when a property owner objected to a condemnation once it was filed; here, the trial court prevented \(^3\)[...] briefed these substantive arguments extensively below.  The trial court neither considered nor made findings regarding these arguments; it focused only on [...]’s non-compliance.  [...] from even filing a condemnation suit.  The trial court should have denied the injunction and let Plaintiff raise these substantive arguments in a prerogative writ action if [...] takes steps toward redevelopment, or in a condemnation proceeding if [...] pursues condemnation.  (Pb12-Pb14; Pb33-Pb37).
[brief] D.  **At a minimum, the trial court should have provided a statement of reasons articulating, with some level of detail and/or specificity, the basis for dismissing Appellant’s claims and compelling same to arbitration.  (Not Raised Below)**  As set forth above, Appellant set forth legitimate arguments, supported by existing law, in support of her arguments that the Arbitration Agreement should not be enforced.  The trial court, however, granted Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration without providing a statement of reasons with meaningful legal analysis as to why it believed Appellant’s arguments were not availing.  Without a proper statement of reasons, it is impossible to know the precise reasons the trial court granted Respondents’ motions.  However, more importantly for purposes of the within Appeal, it is impossible to know whether the trial court even considered Appellant’s legitimate arguments in the first place.  For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s granting of Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration should be reversed.
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  [...] d/b/a [...]  i/p/a [...], [...], [...] and [...] Brick Plaza 10  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 015692002  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 059112016  135  Route 202/206, Suite 2 Bedminster, New Jersey  07921 [...]  [...]  [...]  Date Submitted: August 23, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] As such, “a party challenging the validity of municipal action bears a heavy burden. ”  Id.; Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 377 N.J. Super. 209, 225 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 187 N.J. 212 (2006); Bryant, 309 N.J. Super. at 610.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), i:e przyznaj11c sic; do winy prawa do odwolania od odrzucenia nie zrzeka sit; Pan(i) (1) wniosku o wyl11czenie dowodu rzeczowego 3:5-7(d)) lub (2) odmowy przyjc;cia do przedprocesowego (R. programu interwencyjnego (PTI) 3:28(d))?  (R.  Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] e. you are waiving denial of all other pretrial motions except the following:
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth in Point I, the convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.  Respectfully submitted, /s/  [...]  Devon K. Woods  Dated: December 12, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, V. [...], DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
[directive] Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or an attempt to commit any of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, or violating a condition of a special sentence of community supervision for life if the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life? (preencher somente se o crime ocorreu em 14 de agosto de 2013 (2)(a) [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] [Não ou após esta data) corresponde/NA]  Você entende que se está se declarando culpado pelo crime de pornografia infantil nos termos da lei 2C:24-4b(4) ou N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5) ou por tentativa de cometer qualquer um N.J.S.A. destes crimes e o crime ocorreu em 14 de agosto de 2013 ou após esta data, além de qualquer outra sentença e mediante petição do promotor público, o juiz irá impor uma sentença especial de supervisão vitalícia de liberdade condicional, a menos que o juiz determine nos autos que a supervisão vitalícia de liberdade no Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese página 4 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese page 4 of 7 condicional não seja necessária para proteger a população ou para impedi-lo de cometer atividades criminosas no futuro?
[brief] On count 1, second-degree manslaughter, the defendant was sentenced to seven years, which is the middle of the range for a second-degree crime.  The defendant was sentenced to the top of the range for count 5: 5 years for third-degree theft.  The defendant was sentenced to the top of the range for counts 6, 8, and 10, but those sentences were all 18 months of incarceration for fourth-degree crimes to be run concurrently to the sentence on count 1.  The resulting sentence does not shock the judicial conscience.  The sentencing judge properly evaluated the aggravating and mitigating factors and arrived at a fair sentence for the defendant.
[brief] As the court in Tuncap reasoned, “If the video is viewed at the scene soon after the event in question and is viewed not from a copy but directly from the system established on-site, there is little to no risk of tampering or editing the tape. ”  2014 WL 235471, at *7.  Because [...] testified that the surveillance video and still shots depicted the scene as he saw it on the day of the crime, and that the contents of the recording played in court were the same as the contents of the recording he viewed at the store, his testimony established a prima facie showing that the surveillance video and still shots accurately depicted the scene at the time the shooting occurred.
[directive] While at the law enforcement facility, the defendant should also be continuously observed.  In addition, during the observation period, and prior to the administration of any chemical breath testing, the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24a through e, or N.J.S.A. 12:7-55, regarding implied consent, must have been followed.  Those statutory provisions are:
[brief] 3.  What custodians were interviewed about where they stored documents, what were the custodians’ document deletion practices, and what custodian emails or .pst files were deleted from hard drives or servers prior to collection?  4.  Separate from emails, what types of documents did the custodians store or access on shared servers and on personal hard drives, and how were folders organized in which files were stored (e.g., did departments maintain shared folders to store documents and, if so, what was the folder organization)?