ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] BECAUSE THE REQUESTOR FAILED TO REQUEST “INFORMATION”  UNDER SECTION 3b, THE REQUESTOR DID NOT PREVAIL IN THE LITIGATION AND IS THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO COUNSEL FEES.  Requestor’s failure to request the “information” set forth at N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3b prevents him from prevailing in this litigation.  OPRA’s counsel fee provision (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6) allows a “reasonable counsel fee” to a prevailing party.
[directive] Interviewing the Complainant and Civilian Witnesses  7.1.1  The investigator assigned an internal investigations case should initially outline the case to determine the best investigative approach and identify those interviews immediately necessary.  The investigator should determine if any pending court action or ongoing criminal investigation might delay or impact upon the case at hand.  If it appears that the conduct under investigation may have violated the law or the investigation involves the INTERNAL  AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022
[brief] [...]’ reliance on a September 25, 2015 letter from [...] suggesting it shows [...] was covered under the CCIP is not only factually incorrect, but a red herring.  (TRVb38.)  This unsigned letter, purportedly sent by [...], having no authority to enroll or unenroll contractors, states that [...] is “CCIP Approved. ”  (TRVa1285.)  In other words, just as the Enrollment Reports state, beginning on September 16, 2015, after [...]’s COI was deemed compliant by [...] on September 4th, [...] was “eligible” to work at the Project, but it does not mean or say [...] was “CCIP Enrolled. ”
[brief] [...] obtained a real estate appraiser and a forensic accountant in support of its claims.  (28627a-28638a; 28684a-28692a).  The parties had a trial before the Honorable [...] in 1998, which, at [...]’s request, was bifurcated as to liability and damages.  During the liability portion of the trial, [...] elected to try only its claim that it held a 25% partnership interest.
[brief] Actual notice is “notice given directly to, or received personally by a party. ”  *Black’s Law Dictionary* 1087 (7th ed. 1999).  Constructive notice is defined as follows: that the particular condition existed for such period of time that an owner/occupier of the premises in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered its existence.  That is to say, constructive notice means that the person having a duty of care to another is deemed to have notice of such unsafe conditions, which exist for such period of time that a person of reasonable diligence have discovered them.
[brief] ”  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. F.  Because that motion was not submitted with the proper filing fee the Debtor resubmitted his pro se motion with the proper fee on December 12, 2022.  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. G.  The December 16, 2022, docket entry notes that, “[t]he motion filed on 12/12/2022 will be decided on 01/06/2023.  Oral argument has been requested.  You will be notified when oral argument is scheduled.  Do not come to the courthouse unless you are so notified. ”  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. A. [...] filed its objection to the Debtor’s motion on December 23, 2022.  Ex. H.  On January 6, 2023, the state court issued an order stating: “THIS MATTER having been opened to the Court for a Motion to Stay by Defendant [...] pro se, who failed to appear…ORDERED: Defendant’s Motion to Stay is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to appear.
[brief] Motion to Dismiss the Complaint  Defendants move to dismiss this action with prejudice because Plaintiff failed to “comply with ... [...]’s November 15, 2019 Letter Order” and has been generally dilatory throughout the discovery process.  (Defendants’ Opp. and Cross-Motion at 21-25, ECF No. 62-4).  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute ... or to comply with ... a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. ”  Id.; see generally Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).  Since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court reviews Plaintiff’s conduct more liberally than that of an attorney.  See Greene v. Perez, No. CV 2:13-5493 (WJM), 2019 WL 1275079, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2019).  Defendants’ motion is premature.  Plaintiff should be allowed thirty (30) days to respond to any outstanding discovery requests as specified by [...] in her Letter Order.  V.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  This Court reviews a trial court decision compelling or denying arbitration de novo.  Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020).  In reviewing such orders, however, courts “are mindful of the strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level. ”  Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 179 (2013); see also Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131 (2001) (recognizing “arbitration as a favored method of resolving disputes”).
[brief] •  **Washington:**  *Bear ex rel. Bloom v. Ford Motor Co.*, 2007 WL 870344, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2007) (failure-to-recall claim does not exist because “the issue of recall is not addressed in the Washington Products Liability Act”) (automobile).  • **Wisconsin:** *Carlson v. Triton Industries, Inc.*, 605 F. Supp.3d 1124, 1138 (W.D. Wis. 2022) (rejecting “failure to recall” theory as “much more drastic” than anything Wisconsin law has permitted) (boat).  The overwhelming weight of precedent nationwide thus rejects failure-to-recall claims like this plaintiff pleaded and pursued in the trial court, before attempting to camouflage them on appeal.
[brief] Later that same day, this deal fell through.  In a recorded conversation, [...] discussed this with [...] and referred to the plan to use [...] and the [...] to act against [...], “So, here’s what I’m thinking about.  I just talked to Tambussi . . .  I want to go in, I want to encourage Tambussi to do his thing . . .  I think we just do it.  F**k ‘em.  F**k ‘em.  Just do it. ”  [(Indictment, pages 55-56, Pa63-Pa64) (emphasis added). ]
[brief] (2T9-10 to 2T9-18).  Specifically, the following exchange occurred on the record on November 10, 2021:  [...] [TENANT’S COUNSEL]:  …  The $196,669 would represent the total amount that the tenant would be due and owing.  But that is directly intertwined by lease provisions with the tenant fit up improvement reimbursement.  THE COURT: Right, and I just ruled against you on that subject.  [...] [TENANT’S COUNSEL]: My apologies, Your Honor.  THE COURT:  That’s okay.  I mean I was going to do that back in August and then you raised that, and I looked at the contract.  And I concluded that that’s only payable if you’re not in breach.  And you’re in breach.  So I, so you don’t get the fit up refund.  That’s my ruling …
[brief] Plaintiff is granted leave to re-depose defendant [...] on January 2, 2013, defendant [...] on January 4, 2013, and [...] on January 13, 2013.  Plaintiff is also granted leave to take the deposition of [...], Treasurer, on January 4, 2013, if the parties do not agree on the production of documents in lieu of his testimony.  These depositions shall be deemed Court Ordered and shall not be postponed absent good cause and leave of court.  The deposition of [...] is limited to his role as a Custodian of Records of [...] to attest to the search and production [...] did for responsive electronically stored information.  This Order shall not be read to waive [...]'s attorney-client and work product objections; and 3.
[directive] This is in keeping with the amended definition of a “place” which now excludes public rail, bus or air transportation lines and limited access highways from the definition of a “place. ”  2C:35- N.J.S.A.  5.6b.  Law enforcement officers have also been given the authority to forego seeking a restraining order if the provisions of 2C:35-5.7e (1) “legitimate need” or (2) “serious injustice” are N.J.S.A. applicable.
[brief] The facts in this case are not one where there was a cessation of use for a period of time and a dispute as to whether that cessation of use alone amounted to an abandonment.  The language used by the Court shows that it is confused with the manner in which this issue presents itself and how it should be addressed.  (T4 at 25:14-27:7).  This is a case where the preexisting non-conforming use was actually replaced by a totally different use.  The food store use no longer existed in 1969, as it was replaced by a TV sales and service use.  Parenthetically, that substituted use was also not permitted in the zone.  Nevertheless, the replacement of that food store use by another use, as a matter of law, is deemed to be an abandonment.  Villari v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Deptford, 277 N.J. Super. at 135.  The Court rejected the document in evidence that was created by [...].  (T4 at 26:2-19; Pa 66-68).  This document was created in 1969.  Instead, the Court accepted minutes from a meeting where [...] testified in 1984.  The acceptance and rejection are not based upon the Court's observation of a live witness.  The Court's ruling makes no sense.  [...] had every reason to want to fudge the truth in 1984 because he had a prospective tenant that wanted to rent his building.  He had to tell the Board that the building had always been used for a food use in order not to have to get a variance.  In 1969, on the other hand, [...] had no reason to fudge the truth.  He was writing an article for a historical book on the history of Oceanport.  Clearly, that article which specifically stated that at that time a non-food use was operating out of the structure in question is much more reliable than the testimony of the same individual, [...], fifteen years later.  And [...] never testified at trial because he was deceased.  As such, this Court is not required to give due deference to this evidence ruling by the Trial Court and should conclude that the Court below erred in its conclusion.  There is no question but that any non-conforming food use that existed in this structure prior to 1969 was abandoned.  POINT VII
[brief] In its final administrative decision, the Board stated:  In the [initial decision], it was found as fact that there was no injury report from an incident in 2009.  The [initial decision] concluded that [...]’s report claiming an injury in 2009 was likely based on typographical errors.  [...] assented to the suggestion during examination that [...] “more likely than not” meant to type “2000” instead of “2009” because the numbers “9” and “0” are close together on a keyboard.  The Board [finds] that, because [...] made no mention of the alleged typographical errors in his expert report, his response to leading questions by [] [...]’s counsel does not support the conclusion that he is more credible than [...]...  It [is] noted that the year 2009 [was] in [...]’s report five times.  It [was] presumed that . . .  [...] mistakenly typed 2009 by accident.  The Board [finds] that the description in testimony of the 2000 incident . . . is substantially different than the incident described as occurring in 2009 .  . . .  The Board does not find credible that the difference between these incidents can be reconciled as a “typo. ”  It [finds] that the details are too dissimilar to come to the conclusion that they are actually the same incident, differentiated only by [a] typographical error.  The Board believe[s] that it is also feasible that [] [...] sustained an injury in 2009, but there is no workers’ compensation or other employer report because it is possible that he injured himself outside of work.
[brief] The term “palpably unreasonable” is not explicitly defined by the TCA, however, the term implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstances.  See Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 (1985).  Therefore, “palpably unreasonable conduct” constitutes plainly, obviously, patently, distinctly and manifestly unreasonable conduct.  Polyard v. Terry, 79 N.J. 547 (1979); see also Johnson v. Essex County, 223 N.J. Super. 239, 257 (Law Div. 1987) (citing Williams v. Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278, 286 (App. Div. 1979)) (Palpably unreasonable conduct must “be action or inaction that is plainly and obviously without reason or reasonable basis, capricious, arbitrary or outrageous. ”).  Hence, it is clear that the duty of ordinary care, which is termed negligence, is different in degree from palpably unreasonable conduct.  Palpably unreasonable conduct implies a more obvious and manifest breach of duty and puts a more onerous burden on the plaintiff.  Williams v. Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1979).  It is undisputed that the question of palpably unreasonable conduct may be decided by the Court as a matter of law in appropriate cases, such as the one at bar.
[directive] For the Year Ended December 31,200Y  Law Enforcement Asset Federal Federal Trust Maintenance Justice Treasury Account Account Account Account Description  Accounting Services xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Air Conditioning and Heating Equipment Builder's Supplies xxxx.xx  Communication and Media Services xxxx.xx  Computer Equipment and Accessories xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Court Filing Fees xxxx.xx  Educational Services wx.xx  Electrical Equipment and Supplies xxxx.xx  Electrical Wire and Cable xxxx.xx  Employee Reimbursements xxxx.xx xxxx .xx xxxx.xx  Equipment Maintenance and Repair Services xxxx.xx  First Aid and Safety Equipment xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  XXXX-xx  Legal Services xxxx.xx  Machinery xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  XXXX-xx Medical Examiner xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Miscellaneous Services xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Office Machines and Accessories xxxx.xx xxxx.XX xxxx-xx  Office Supplies xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Photographic Equipment and Supplies xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Police Equipment and Supplies xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Professional Organization  XXXX-xx  Professional Services xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Prosecutors xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Publication and Audiovisual xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Radio and Telecommunication xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Sound System and Accessories xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Vehicle Accessories xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Vehicle Maintenance Services xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx - -_ - . -  Vehicle Storage.  XXxx.XX xxxxxx.xx  Total Expenditures xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT Standard of Review  An appellate review of a case dismissed on summary judgment is de novo.  “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference, and, hence, an ‘issue of law is subject to de novo plenary appellate review. ’”  Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010).  Because this appeal arises in the context of Defendant’s summary judgment application, the facts should be reviewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.  Hanges at 374.
[brief] In the word of the prosecutor, “Those are [...]’s fingerprints.  The overwhelming evidence presented to you makes it true that those are [...]’s fingerprints.  . . .  That’s the testimony you heard from [...], an expert in the field of fingerprint analysis who has been doing that work for over two decades. ” (7T 10-22 to 24; See also 7T 12-1 to 5 (“The source of that print was the same source as those known exemplars, there’s no dispute.  There’s no question that those ten prints, those ten fingerprints on the known exemplar are [...]’s.  That’s not in question); 7T 13-5 to 7 (“[Every print, that’s what the testimony was, every print came from that man’s hand.  He was the source, that’s what [...] testified to. ”))
[directive] The request sh6uld specify to whom make to the check or Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) payable, and to what address or account the payment is be to sent.  ACH Vendor/Miscellaneous Payment  Enrollment Forms should be provided to any lienholder to facilitate EFT payments.  All lien payment requests should be routed through designated Treasury agency a headquarters office prior to being forwarded to EOAF for approval.
[brief] “[R]outine maintenance and operations” is set off from the rest of the list by a comma.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).  By a plain reading of the statute, then, “routine” only modifies “maintenance and operations. ”  Nonetheless, Appellants argue that [...]’s interpretation only makes sense if “maintenance and operations” were separated from the rest of the list by a semicolon rather than a comma.  (Ab14-15).  Indeed, the Legislature could have drafted the statute in that way, but it did not.
[directive] B.  So as to foster and institutionalize the spirit of communication and cooperation enjoyed by the members of the School Zone Narcotics Enforcement Working Group, the Division of Criminal Justice, working in conjunction with the Department of Education and county prosecutor, shall develop and implement a joint training program to provide for the simultaneous instruction of members of the law enforcement and educational communities throughout the State.  Such joint instructional programs shall at a minimum include a discussion of: 1. The provisions of this Executive Directive; 2. The complimentary guidelines issued by the Commissioner of Education; 3. The nature and content of agreements or memoranda of understanding entered into between county and local school officials and law enforcement agencies; 4.
[directive] Agency Name: Year: First Quarter Internal Affairs Summary Source of Complaint  Criminal Outcome  Internal Discplinary Outcome  Administra- Pending Pending from Prior New Cases  Not tively End of Conviction  Dismissal Years cases Closed Agency Civilian Anon. Diversion Acquittal  Exonerated Sustained Unfounded Closed Sustained Quarter  Excessive Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Criminal Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Differential Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Demeanor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Domestic Violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Rule Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Total Cases Opened 0
[brief] [...], P.E., Plaintiff’s sound expert, testified that the structure was about 1,400 feet from the nearest residential area to the northeast (and across the Turnpike); the existing ambient noise levels already exceed the permitted nighttime limits; and the Project will have little to no sound impact and the expected levels will be well under the permitted limit for the Property.  (2T 8:12-17; 13:1-19).  [...], P.E., PTOE, provided testimony on the potential traffic impacts from the development.  He testified that the industry standard for trip generation, the Institute of Transportation Engineers (“ITE”) Trip Generation Manual, uses the square footage of the building as the independent variable; the height of a particular building is irrelevant to the analysis of traffic impacts.  (2T 30:10-25; 31:1-6; 4T 33:19-25 through 36:1-12).  In regards to “trip assignment”, about eighty percent (80%) of the truck traffic would use the Interstate 295 interchange, and the other twenty percent (20%) would travel west along Florence-Columbus Road (County Route 656) to Route 130 to access the New Jersey Turnpike – Pennsylvania Extension.  [...] also concluded that the impacts on Florence-Columbus Road and Route 130 Intersection, 1.53 miles from the proposed driveway, would be *de minimis*.  (2T 35:2-13, 36:9-19, 37:17-21; 4T 10:13-19).  [...], P.E., the project engineer, also reiterated that the parking ordinance and stormwater runoff calculations are based on square footage of the building, and height of the structure is irrelevant.  (4T 9:6-25).  And again, in its 2020 traffic and circulation plan, the County projected that this tract would generate 1,550,000 square feet of warehouse and distribution space.  Ja215; (4T 72:9-25 through 75:1-14).  Despite Defendant’s claim that “[t]here is no credible, probative evidence before the Board” to grant the requested relief, Plaintiff presented more than sufficient proofs to warrant approval of the (d)(1) use variance for the proposed accessory uses on the Florence side of the municipal boundary line, as well as for the bulk variance for the reduction of parking spaces.
[brief] Pa790.  [...], [...]’s milling machine operator, testified the backup alarm on the milling machine is loud and so is the ambient noise from the milling machine.  Pa1382.  When the sweeper backed up on the night [...] was hit, he did not see backup lights on the sweeper or hear a backup alarm.  Ibid.  [...], a milling and paving laborer for [...], testified that at the time of the collision the milling machine was in reverse backing up, the engine was running and the backup alarm was on, all of which were loud.  Pa1409.  He was working next to [...] and did not hear any backup alarm from the sweeper.  Ibid.  [...], another milling and paving laborer for [...], testified when the milling machine is backing up “it’s loud. ”  Pa1445.  Even when it is backing up and not milling “it’s loud. ”  Ibid.  [...] further testified he could not hear any alarm coming from the sweeper because the milling machine was still backing up and that is loud.  Pa1448.  [...] testified that he did not recall hearing the subject sweeper’s backup alarm on the night of the collision.  Pa1350.  He testified that on the night of the collision, preceding when it occurred he saw a sweeper back past a milling machine “countless” times and did not recall hearing the backup alarm of the sweeper that hit [...].  Pa1351-52.  [...] was aware of the OSHA requirements and the general and specific specifications for this contract that the backup alarm of the sweeper is required to be heard over the background noise, including other back up alarms.
[brief] She described these issues as “[m]y legs were hurting me” (4T:224:18-19) and “I have numbness… in it. ” (4T224:18-24).  The numbness started four years ago, which would have been approximately three years before her fall at the [...].  (4T224:23-225:3).  She was told by her doctor that the numbness could not be cured and it was something she is going to have to continue to deal with.
[brief] To combat insurance fraud, the New Jersey Legislature in 1983 passed into law the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (“NJIFPA”), which provided private insurance companies a private cause of action to sue fraudsters in the Superior Courts of the State.  In 1970, the Legislature also had passed the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, (“NJRICO”), which was primarily aimed at organized crime organizations but was expanded through the years to apply to conspiracies to commit insurance fraud.  Fast forward approximately fifteen years and the Legislature realized that the NJIFPA and NJRICO’s intended benefit of combating and reducing insurance fraud was an abject failure.  In response to this failed experiment in public policy, the Legislature thereafter passed into Law the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“AICRA”), in 1998.
[brief] “A law is void as a matter of due process if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. ”  State v. Troisi, 471 N.J. Super. 158, 167 (App. Div. 2022) (internal quotations omitted).  “Put differently, a statute must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden. ”  State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 263 (2022) (internal quotations omitted).  “A statute that is challenged as vague as applied must lack sufficient clarity respecting the conduct against which it is sought to be enforced. ”  State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 267 (2014).  However, “[u]ltraspecificity” is not required for a statute to pass constitutional muster under the void for vagueness doctrine. ”  Troisi, 471 N.J. Super. at 167 (citing Jenkins v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrs., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 256 (App. Div. 2010)).  A person of ordinary intelligence would readily understand that N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires the use of a signal before changing lanes when other traffic may be affected.