ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  Of Counsel [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants  [...], [...], [...] and [...]  [...]  Attorney ID# 043542004  Of Counsel [...]  Sentry Office Plaza 216 Haddon Avenue, Suite 300 Westmont, New Jersey  08108 [...]  [...] – and – [...]  (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  Of Counsel  [...]  II  City Plaza  400 Convention Street, Suite 1100 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant [...]
[brief] The registration-certification process to obtain SREC trading rights is complex, costly, and with a high barrier to entry.  Under the leadership of CEO [...] (Lemus), plaintiff [...] began its quest to establish a SREC trading operation in New Jersey since approximately 2013.  After investing extensive time in traveling from San Diego, California, and back, and visiting countless potential sites for the operation of a solar farm, Lemus identified and developed the site where Mill Road’s business would be established, at the land owned by the [...], [...].  FAC ¶ 23, id.
[brief] [...] agreed with [...] making several credible findings based on (1) finding the defendant and only one of the defendant’s witnesses that sequestered, [...], to be incredible and (2) finding the plaintiff’s one out of three witnesses, to be credible and (3) evidence on the record to convict the defendant of disorderly conduct\textsuperscript{29}.  (2T12:4-11)  The defendant’s counsel reaffirms in opposition (1)  Although defendant did not make the objection; (2) [...] did not have to answer as questioning is routine and in like manner; (3) [...] opened the door of hearsay when testifying on behalf [...] (deemed as hearsay), and then an objection would come forth (2T12:14-21).  [...] indicates the defendant did not imply an objection and the court below shouldn’t have considered [...] testimony on behalf of [...] (2T12:22-25, 2T13:1-6).
[brief] And third, you know, there’s one walkway permitted per lot….But in no uncertain terms does restoration mean because I don’t want to cut across the grass, I get to put in another sidewalk, which is not permitted under, regardless of HPC’s review, it's not permitted by zoning. ”  1T:28 – 29 (lines 7 through 6 inclusive).  Further, the Court, in direction to counsel at the end of the Summary Judgment Motion, directed Briefs to be submitted with regard to specific items, such as the Standard of Review for a review of decision under a prerogative writ, which is the “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard.
[brief] Respondents Fail To Specifically Identify The Purported Confidential Information Or Demonstrate How That Information Is Prejudicial (Rb14 – 20, 23).  Respondents assert they have met their burden of identifying the confidential information by disclosing the “categories” of purported confidential information.  (Rb23).  However, Respondents have still not specifically identified the purported confidential information that they claim was disclosed to [...].  The law in New Jersey is clear that merely claiming that “financial” or “business” information was disclosed -- as Respondents have done here -- is insufficient for disqualification.  See Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbstboro, LLC, 471 N.J. Super. at 194.  Once again, in opposition, Respondents failed to specifically identify the confidential information and further failed to demonstrate that the purported disclosure of information from years ago in unrelated matters is prejudicial to Respondents in the instant matter.  Respondents do not demonstrate that the information is privileged or confidential or otherwise not subject to normal disclosures in the course of discovery.  See Rule 4:10-2(a).  Thus, Respondents failed to meet their heavy burden that [...] had obtained confidential information or “insight” into [...]’ mindset or thinking, and further failed to demonstrate how the information is prejudicial to Respondents in this unrelated case.  IV.
[brief] VI.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the Appellees respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny Appellant’s appeal and affirm the ruling by the Superior Court.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. ID No. ID No. 379672021  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...]  Dated: July 16, 2024  REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
[directive] As noted above, when a Superior Court judge adjudicates a Title 39 motor vehicle offense, the court shall forward the disposition, including any suspension of defendant’s driving privileges, to the originating municipal court within 48 hours, with the municipal court then to http://ttnapacheweb1.courts.judiciary.state.nj.us:84/mcs/mcsmemo/idrcpenaltiesrevoked.pdf  * Posted at Directive # 04-11 July 12, 2011  3  Page enter that information into ATS which then automatically forwards that suspension information to the [...] (“[...]”).  However, when a Superior Court judge suspends a defendant’s driving privileges as a result of a criminal or quasi-criminal non-motor-vehicle conviction, the Superior Court must directly notify the [...] of the suspension through use of an MF-1 (conviction) or MF-4 (appeal) card.
[brief] “An abuse of discretion arises when a decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."  Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization” [...] v. [...], DOCKET NO. [...], 13 (App. Div. Oct. 4, 2018)  As such, the action in lieu and civil rights complaint was not properly before Chancery Division [...].  D.  DEFENDANTS MISREPRESENTATION BY WAY OF COUNSEL (at Db 5)
[brief] [When] adding water to their vehicle's radiator, *Newcomb Hospital v. Fountain*, 141 N.J. Super. 291, 295 (Law Div. 1976); retrieving a roadway sign they were loading, along with cones, onto their employer's vehicle, *De Almeida v. General Accident Insurance Company*, 314 N.J. Super. 312, 314, 317 (App. Div. 1998); by a hit and run driver while leaning on a vehicle, *Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 102 N.J. 167 (1986) at 168-73; walking back to a vehicle they left running, *Torres v. Travelers Indem. Co.*, 171 N.J. 147 (2002), at 149-50; and stopping to help another driver involved in an accident, leaving their car running, and telling their child they "would be right back[,]”
[brief] The Trial Court ruled properly prohibited Plaintiff presenting the jury with an incident report because it was not authenticated by a witness.  Plaintiff seems to argue, on appeal, that a business record such as an incident report can be authenticated by interrogatories, citing to Eden v. Conrail, 175 N.J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1980).  The Eden case was, if anything, partly about reading interrogatories into evidence at a trial, not about authenticating a business record.  “It is difficult to know the basis of exclusion by the trial judge of some of the several interrogatories concerning which admission was sought by plaintiff. ”  Eden at 282.  Plaintiff erroneously asserts that the Court improperly prohibited Plaintiff from reading into evidence an incident report and photographs relating to Plaintiff’s accident.
[brief] (10T 98-12 to 98-15)  [...] claimed that he called [...] sometime on November 2 to ask about gambling spots.  [...] testified:  “I didn't ask him whether there was going to be a dice game on that exact day.  I just asked him where was a local gambler's spot in the area, and he gave me that. ”  (10T 98-19 to 98-22)  [...] also claimed that [...] never told him, and he had no idea, that [...] lost thousands of dollars at the barbershop two days earlier.
[brief] THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING COUNT 5 OF THE COMPLAINT.  In response to Respondent's Motion to the Complaint in Lieu of an Answer, the Commission dismissed Count 5 of the Complaint because Count 5 involve a Facebook post that predated Respondent's being sworn in as a member of the Board.  Cal 72.  Therefore, the Commission correctly ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the claim alleged in Count 5.
[brief] An officer’s question or response to clarify whether the suspect is requesting counsel must not “‘operate to, delay, confuse, or burden the suspect in his assertion of his rights. ’”  Alston, 204 N.J. at 623 (quoting State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 283 (1990)) (additional quoted source omitted).  The means by which police must clarify the suspects words are utterly simple—the police must simply ask the suspect whether he wants or is asking for an attorney.  Gonzalez, 249 N.J. at 632 (“[I]n Alston . . . the officer . . . clarified by asking ‘You want a lawyer,’ to which the suspect replied, ‘No, I am asking you guys, man.
[brief] (Db40.)  This argument is without merit.  First, Defendants do not offer any explanation as to how Plaintiff’s selection of witnesses at trial—which occurred months after the Discovery Order—demonstrates that the Discovery Order was proper.  Second, as Plaintiff indicated at trial and in Plaintiff’s Brief, Plaintiff did not call its transactional attorney to testify at trial because it would have been highly prejudicial to Plaintiff to expose their transactional counsel to cross-examination by [...], without the ability to also examine and/or cross-examine [...] as Defendants’ transactional counsel.  (See 2T30:24 to 31:9, 136:12-17; Pb46-47.)  [...] has personal knowledge as to what occurred during the negotiation and drafting of the PSA and was able to make unchallenged statements and arguments at trial, and even pose questions in suggestive ways based upon her personal involvement.  Had Plaintiff been permitted to obtain discovery from [...], the trial court would have had the opportunity to hear from both drafters of the PSA, but that opportunity was foreclosed by the Discovery Order.  Thus, the Discovery Order should be reversed to grant Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct limited additional discovery, and the Final Judgment should be vacated and remanded for re-trial based on a full record.
[brief] On July 19, 2017, defendant [...] and co-defendant [...] were charged under [...] for the following --- 1T = Transcript of July 17, 2018, proceedings 2T = Transcript of July 18, 2018, proceedings 3T = Transcript of August 9, 2018, proceedings 4T = Transcript of November 7, 2018, proceedings 5T = Transcript of November 8, 2018, proceedings 6T = Transcript of April 2, 2019, proceedings 7T = Transcript of May 9, 2019, proceedings 8T = Transcript of July 25, 2019, proceedings 9T = Transcript of August 27, 2019, proceedings 10T = Transcript of September 27, 2019, proceedings 11T = Transcript of January 22, 2020, proceedings 12T = Transcript of September 27, 2021, proceedings 13T = Transcript of September 28, 2021, proceedings 14T = Transcript of September 30, 2021, proceedings 15T = Transcript of October 4, 2021, proceedings 16T = Transcript of October 5, 2021, proceedings 17T = Transcript of October 7, 2021, proceedings 18T = Transcript of October 8, 2021, proceedings 19T = Transcript of October 12, 2021, proceedings 20T = Transcript of October 14, 2021, proceedings 21T = Transcript of October 15, 2021, proceedings 22T = Transcript of October 18, 2021, proceedings 23T = Transcript of October 21, 2021, proceedings 24T = Transcript of October 22, 2021, proceedings 25T = Transcript of October 25, 2021, proceedings 26T = Transcript of October 26, 2021, proceedings 27T = Transcript of October 28, 2021, proceedings 28T = Transcript of October 29, 2021, proceedings 29T = Transcript of November 1, 2021, proceedings 30T = Transcript of November 16, 2021, proceedings 31T = Transcript of November 18, 2021, proceedings 32T = Transcript of November 19, 2021, proceedings 33T = Transcript of May 3, 2022, proceedings offenses as related to the death of [...] on or about March 10, 2017: - first-degree felony murder, under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count one); - first-degree purposeful, knowing or serious bodily injury murder, under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (count two); - first-degree robbery, under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), or -1(a)(2) or -1(a)(3) (count three); - first-degree accomplice to felony murder, under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(b)(3) (count four); - first-degree accomplice to robbery, under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) and/or -1(a)(2) and/or -1(a)(3).
[brief] 2T = September 27, 2022 (motion)  3T = September 27, 2022 (jury selection)  4T = September 28, 2022 (preliminary jury instructions)  5T = September 28, 2022 (jury selection)  6T = September 29, 2022 (preliminary jury instructions)  7T = September 29, 2022 (jury selection volume 1)  8T = September 29, 2022 (jury selection volume 2)  9T = October 6, 2022 (jury selection and in limine rulings)  10T = October 6, 2022 (trial)  11T = October 12, 2022 (trial)  12T = October 13, 2022 (trial) charged in counts three through eight and was separately charged with first-degree murder in count one.  (Da1-8).  The codefendants’ matters were severed for separate trials.  [...] was tried before a jury on counts two through seven on non-consecutive days between October 6 and 20, 2022.  (9T to 15T).  During jury selection, the State made an oral motion in limine to bar “any argument with regard to a third-party guilt in this matter and objecting to any third-party guilt charge being provided. ”  (9T64-16 to 22).  The trial court ruled that the defense had not presented sufficient evidence of third-party guilt and barred defense counsel from mentioning third-party guilt in his opening statement.  (9T74-22 to 78-1).  The jury convicted defendant of all counts.  (Da8-11; 15T4-6 to 6-25).  Following a second trial, the same jury convicted [...] of certain persons not to possess a weapon as charged in count eight.  (15T7-1 to 19-22).  On January 6, 2023, the trial court sentenced [...] to mandatory life without parole on count two, a concurrent term of thirty years with thirty years _____________________
[brief] ”  The word “design” used as a noun, means “1. A plan or scheme.  2.  Purpose or intention combined with a plan. ”  See *Design*, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).  However, the word “design[ed]” when used as a verb, as stated in the Building Height Ordinance, means “the pattern or configuration of elements in something . . .”  See *Design*, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).  The word “design[ed]” as defined in the Merriam - Webster Dictionary which is relevant to the matter means “to create, fashion, execute, or construct according to plan,” e.g. “the plan designed the look and functions of a building,” “The Applicant produced what he has designed for the project.
[brief] (Ja450; Ja453).  The Township adopted the New Redeveloper RFEI Resolution over those objections.  (Da209).  Pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq (the “LRHL”), a town must identify whether a redevelopment area designation shall authorize the town to use the power of condemnation (“Condemnation Redevelopment Area”) under the LRHL, or to proceed with redevelopment without using the power of condemnation (“Non-Condemnation Redevelopment”).
[brief] TABLE OF CITATIONS  18 N.J. Practice ([...], County District and Municipal Courts) (2ed 1971)  ..................................................  8  Bloomfield Tp. V. Rosanna’s 253 N.J. Super 551 (App. Div. 1992) .................................................................  11  Cahayla v. Saikevich, 119 N.J. Super.116 , 118 (Cty.Ct. 1972 116 , 118 (Cty.Ct. 1972) ...........................................  8,9 Carr v. Johnson, 211 Super 341 (App. Div. 1986) ....................... 6,8,9,10,12  Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116 , 123 (1967) ..............................................................  8  Defendant also cites Howard v. Diolosa, 241 N.J. Super 222, 227 ............. 10 (App. Div. 1990) Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 136 (1970)  ............................................  6  18 N.J. Practice ([...], County District and Municipal Courts) (2ed 1971), § 1567 at 303 .........................  8  Morrocco v. Felton 112 N.J. Super 226 (1970)  .................................................. 4,10,12  Rosanna's Figure Salon v. Bloomfield Tp, 253 N.J. Super. 551 (1992)  ..............................................................  4  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007)  .........................  11 State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44, 18 A.3d 179 (2011)  .........................  11  Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459 , 462 (1961)  ..........  6,8  STATUTES AND RULES
[brief] In his initial brief, [...] extensively explained why his infraction-free record, rehabilitative programming, the age-crime curve, and the science of adolescent brain development all supported a finding that he was unlikely to reoffend and there was no need for specific deterrence.  (Db12-29)  The State did not present opposing evidence or case law suggesting these factors are not connected with a lower probability of recidivism.  (Sb12-19)  Nor could it, as our Supreme Court has recognized both the relevance of both the “age-crime curve” and adolescent brain development in assessing the need for deterrence and likelihood of reoffending.
[brief] While in federal court, multiple motions to dismiss the Complaint in lieu of an answer were filed by the Defendants seeking to dismiss Appellant’s claims, which was decided on August 31, 2022.  Aa45 to Aa64.  On that date, the federal court dismissed Appellant’s federal claims and remanded the counterpart state claims back to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division in Middlesex County for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3).
[directive] (2)  Form Order to Dissolve the Prohibition Against Victim Contact  (CN 12698)  Chief Justice [...] cc: Criminal Presiding Judges  Family Presiding Judges  Attorney General [...] Public Defender [...] County Prosecutors  [...], Chief of Staff  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Clerks of Court Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Chief, Family Practice  Criminal and Family Division  Managers and Assistants  [...], Assistant Chief, Family Practice  [...], Family Practice  Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division – Criminal Part Chancery Division - Family Part - Select County - State/In the Interest of County Ind./Acc. Number: v.
[brief] | | Pace v. Hamilton Cove | 258 N.J. 82 (2024) | | Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules | Cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2022) | | Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson | 561 U.S. 63 (2010) | | State v. Cabbell | 207 N.J. 311 (2011) | | State v. Jones | 232 N.J. 308 (2018) | | State v. Lawless | 214 N.J. 594 (2013) | | State v. Robinson | 200 N.J. 1 (2009) | | Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters, LLC | 203 N.J. 286 (2010)
[brief] Further, defendant told [...] precisely where his paperwork would be found.  The “inability” discussed in Terry is not limited merely to physical incapacity.  Defendant here was “unable” to retrieve the documents because doing so presented a risk of danger, not only to the officers, but the community at-large.  Defendant was “unable” inasmuch as he was “ineligible. ”  [...] knew firsthand defendant’s proclivity to flee police detention by any means, heedless of the safety of others.  In recognition of that risk, [...] made the only rational decision a police officer in his position could make: keep defendant away from the vehicle.  To do otherwise would have been, as the trial court found, “foolhardy. ” (Da016).  The test, as Terry reiterates, is “whether the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in light of the tense and perilous situation confronting them. ”  Terry, 212 N.J. at 245.  “Police officers…must make decisions in the moment, with uncertain information at hand and without the luxury of considered reflection. ”  Id. at 245-46.  [...] had seen this movie before: defendant was not above using his vehicle as a weapon to escape detention, nor keeping an illegal firearm within reach.  However, nothing at this stage would have justified placing defendant under arrest.
[brief] The sole question addressed on this appeal, one we've not had to decide before, is one of statutory interpretation. \(^1\)  The Department of Environmental Protection issued a Highlands Applicability Determination (HAD) to [...] exempting construction of a new compressor station in the Highlands Preservation Area from permitting review under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) (Exemption 11).  Exemption 11 relieves a public utility from having to obtain a Highlands Preservation Area Approval for "routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or \(^1\)  Although the appellant in *In re New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program Interest No. 435434*, 433 N.J. Super. 223, 237 (App. Div. 2013), argued the Highlands Applicability Determination challenged in that case did not encompass a routine upgrade, and the DEP argued "the Legislature intended the word 'routine' to modify 'maintenance and operations' and not the other exempted activities," we found no need to resolve the question.  We determined in that case "that, even if the exemption is interpreted as requiring that an upgrade be 'routine,'" the utility line upgrade at issue there could fairly be characterized as a routine one.  *Ibid.*  We do not find the case instructive here.  systems," so long as "the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of" the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act, N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to -35.
[brief] *See Mynster*, at 480; *Donovan*, at 197.  In sum, Appellant’s FDCPA claim fails because it is based on a hyper-literal and isolated reading of the provision that is contrary to Congress’s intent and the statute as a whole, and would lead to absurd results.  Appellant improperly conflates her literal reading of prohibited third-party disclosures with its “plain” meaning, and, even then, fails to set aside that “plain” reading to avoid absurd results and inconsistencies within the fuller statutory scheme.
[brief] Appendix Exhibit “C” - [...]’ Letter to [...] – “Court Mediation for [...] and [...] to Comply with Oct. 6, 2022 Order for Filing Final Trust Accounting” - March 1, 2023 | 451a | | a.  Appendix Exh.  “A”– [...]’ Emails to [...]: “Roth’s Compliance with Oct. 6, 2022 Order to Prepare and File Final Trust Accounting – Feb. 21-27, 2023 | 457a | | c. App. Exhibit “D” - [...]’ Letter to [...] – “Court Conference for [...] & [...] to Comply w/Oct. ‘22 Order to Issue Roth’s Final Trust Accounting”- 3/20/23 | 460a | | Exhibit | Description | Pages | |---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | d. | Appendix
[brief] THE ERRORS ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT DID NOT, INDEPENDENTLY OR CUMULATIVELY, DEPRIVE HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL.  Defendant further argues that the cumulative effect of the errors he now asserts for the first time on appeal warrants reversal and a new trial.  (Db58-61).  It is true that "[e]ven if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial."  Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. at 469.  "However, this principle does not apply 'where no error was prejudicial and the trial was fair.'"  Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. at 547 (quoting State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 238 (2015)).  As discussed above, no prejudicial error occurred in this case, so this court should affirm defendant's convictions.  POINT IV