ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa0487-90; Pa0303-05).  ---  14  [...]’s intent was not to allocate [...]’s damages to specific policies, so his allocation did not consider underlying limits.  (Pa0290-91).  The limits underlying the [...] Policy were decided and considered by the SAM.  (Pa0155-57).  15  The remainder of [...]’s covered costs found by the trial court were allocated to periods when [...] either was covered by insurance companies with whom it settled or was uninsured.  (Pa0487-90).  ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING U.S. FIRE’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ADOPTING A TIME ON THE RISK ALLOCATION METHOD (Pa0210-11)
[brief] . . .”) as soon as he initiated the stop and repeatedly turning off the audio during the stop without any notice or explanation.  (1T 188-2 to 7, 201-5 to 22, 202-11 to 16)  Attorney General Law Directive No. 2022-1, Update to Body Worn Camera Policy, §§ 1.1, 5.2, 5.3.1, 6.5, 7.1.1; N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5.  As also pointed out by defense counsel, the missing video and audio from the beginning of the stop could have revealed that [...] was stopped without reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation and that the officers decided to prolong the detention and request consent to search without good (or based on an improper) reasons.  (1T 188-2 to 7, 201-5 to 22, 202-11 to 16)  The video could have also helped illustrate the coercive and custodial nature of the police encounter.  Thus, if this Court decides to remand this matter for another hearing, the new trial court should consider whether the State is able to rebut the presumption that the missing video and audio would have revealed exculpatory evidence and helped demonstrate that the stop, request for consent to search, prolonged detention, questioning and search were conducted in violation of [...]’ constitutional rights.
[brief] **NOTICE WAS PROPER UNDER THE MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW**  *(Pa74; 3T35-4 – 3T38-5)*  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the hearing notice and the published notice complied with all of the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11, as they provided: (1) the date, time and place of the hearing; (2) nature of the matters considered; (3) identification of the property by street address or lot and block number; and (4) location and times at which any maps and documents concerning the application are available.
[brief] Defendant’s Cover Letter for Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 31, 2022 ……………………………………  PA – 225  Defendant’s Certification in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 31, 2022………………………………………..  PA – 226  Defendant’s Proof of Mailing Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 31, 2022………………………………………..  PA – 227  Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Response to Defendant’s Objection filed November 4, 2022……………………………………………………………………………..
[brief] Nor can this Court find from whole cloth that the sentencing court made the necessary findings to justify the imposition of concurrent sentences.  There is absolutely no basis upon which this Court can reach that conclusion.  There is no escaping the fact that defendant through assigned counsel converted his *pro se* petition for PCR into a motion to correct an illegal sentence under R. 3:21-10(b)(5).  As such, temporal limitations have no application to this case.
[brief] ”  Moynihan v. Lynch, 250 N.J. 60, 81-82 (2022) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”)); N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3 (“The Legislature shall not pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made. ”)); see also Fid. Union Tr. Co. v. N.J. Highway Auth., 85 N.J. 277, 299 (1981) (noting that United States and New Jersey Constitutions provide “parallel guarantees”).  “The essential aim of the Federal and State Contract Clauses is to restrain a state legislature from passing laws that retrospectively impair preexisting contracts.
[brief] In times past, collateral estoppel was available only where there was mutuality of estoppel; however, the requirement of mutuality is no longer adhered to in New Jersey.  Allesandro, supra, 187 N.J. Super. at 104-106.  Our courts have adopted the more flexible modern view of Restatement, Judgments 2d, § 29, that a party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party is also precluded from doing so with another person unless he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue.
[brief] The primary potential impact on the public good is visual.  …  Ja122 (emphasis added).  Denial of the current application for the same 48 foot height, also in the SM Zone, expressly contradicts the legal findings made in the 2019 [...] resolution, which granted a height variance for a 48 foot warehouse in the SM Zone.  While the Plaintiff recognizes that each application must be decided on its own merits, for the Board to reach a contrary legal conclusion on a substantially similar set of facts for a (d)(6) height variance in the SM Zone less than three years earlier, it must have evidence to do so.  There was none.  The Board therefore had to do this by inventing “facts”; but those “facts” enjoy zero support in the record.
[brief] Second, the trial court erred in ruling that the traffic stop of [...] was justified.  [...] knew far too little about [...] prior to effectuating the stop and thus acted on pure speculation rather than reasonable and articulable suspicion.  Accordingly, the stop was illegal, and all evidence seized during the stop must be suppressed.  U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 7; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).  The evidence also may not be relied on in establishing probable cause to search [...]’s storage unit.  See State v. Ortense, 174 N.J. Super. 453, 454-55 (App. Div. 1980) (where an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant mixes evidence both lawfully and unlawfully obtained, probable cause may be established on the basis of the lawfully obtained evidence only).
[brief] Under Owens-Illinois, each insurer has a potential right of contribution from the other insurers, and this right is held by the insurers – not [...].  See Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois ex. Rel. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 215 N.J. 409, 425 (2013).  Thus, [...]’s position that [...] could have moved to compel arbitration at the outset and sought a stay of the litigation while [...] and [...] arbitrated the claim is meritless because any resolution of defense or indemnity in arbitration would have been illusory.  Any issue resolved in arbitration would have then been subject to litigation with the other insurers who had independent rights of contribution.  Any arbitral finding would have merely been a non-binding outcome subject to re-litigation with the other insurers, which would have been a waste of both [...]’s and [...]’s resources.  For this reason, [...] resolved the defense cost claim with [...] and the other insurers via litigation and binding mediation.
[brief] THE LAND EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENT IS LEGALLY SOUND AND FURTHERS THE PUBLIC INTEREST  A.  Legitimacy of Land Exchanges in Eminent Domain  Proceedings  Land exchanges, when executed to achieve a valid public purpose, are fully supported by New Jersey law.  The arrangement between [...] and [...] does not detract from the public use of the acquired property but rather enhances it by ensuring that the most strategically valuable lands are preserved for public use.  See Twp. of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002).  Land exchange arrangements, within the context of eminent domain proceedings, are not only permissible under New Jersey law but are also a testament to a municipality's commitment to strategically managing public resources for the maximum benefit of its community.
[brief] ”  Ja034.  While inventive, the statement could not be further from the truth.  Application of the Grasso standard makes clear that substantial credible evidence in the record supports granting the height variance.  No evidence was offered to the contrary.  Moreover, each of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses were accepted as such, and the record is not only devoid of any challenges to their credibility, but of any basis upon which to do so retrospectively in the later adopted Resolution.
[brief] State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 37 (2018)(quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)); State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017).  This high standard accords substantial deference “to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”
[brief] *(Supra).*  The Defendants were represented by [...], Esq. at the January 24, 2018 hearing and by [...], Esq. at the March 1, 2018 hearing.  (3T and 4T).  Immediately after the March 1, 2018 show cause hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel began advocating for the termination of [...]’s employment with [...], and suggested as much in a March 2, 2018 email communication to Plaintiffs and non-party [...].  Several months of disputes between the parties ensued, [...]’s salary was unilaterally cut by roughly half and, facing escalating collection activity from his personal creditors as well as creditors of [...] who were not being paid by [...], [...] filed for personal bankruptcy on July 6, 2018.  *(See In re: Jonathan P. [...], Bankr. D.N.J. Docket # [...]).*  To supplement the automatic stay provisions provided for by the bankruptcy filing, and by consent of the parties (which included non-bankrupt defendant [...]), the case was stayed by order dated July 23, 2018 entered by [...].  (Da764).  Four days after entry of the stay, [...] – through Plaintiff [...] – terminated [...]’s employment (Da766) in clear violation of [...]’s January 24 and March 1 orders (Supra.) and possibly in violation of the automatic stay provided for under the Bankruptcy Code.
[brief] On January 27, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. held a trial de novo on the record below.  (5T).  On February 17, 2023, the parties had an opportunity to give oral summations.  (6T).  [...] reserved his decision and indicated on the record that he would provide a written decision.  (6T18:14 to 6T19:9).  On April 3, 2023, [...] issued an Order and corresponding Statement of Reasons, finding defendant guilty of DWI.
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[brief] They do so now.  As noted above, a reviewing court may typically make three inquiries regarding decisions of state agencies: “(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency bases its action; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[directive] 4.  In all instances when a conducted energy device is fired at or discharged upon a person, a superior officer designated by the chief of the department employing the officer who fired or discharged the device shall take custody of and secure the device.  The superior officer shall safeguard the digital information in that device concerning the incident.  The chief executive officer of each department that employs the use of conducted energy devices shall issue a rule, regulation, standing operating procedure or other appropriate order to establish a system to ensure that the internal digital recording systems of these devices are maintained, and that the data contained therein cannot be tampered with, and cannot be accessed or erased except by duly authorized supervisors.  After the information is safeguarded, the device may be returned to deployment consistent with the department’s policies.  The information stored in the device concerning the use of force incident (i.e., e.g., data concerning the time the weapon was fired, the time of all electrical discharges, and video recordings of the firing of the weapon and all electrical discharges) shall be preserved and reported on in the report of the incident prepared pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.  XI.
[brief] A “defendant has constructive notice when the condition existed for such a length of time as reasonably to have resulted in knowledge and correction had the defendant been reasonably diligent. ”  *Troupe v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.*, 443 N.J. Super. 596, 602 (App. Div. 2016).  To ascertain if the defendant had sufficient time to discover and address the claimed hazard through the exercise of reasonable care, a plaintiff must provide proof to establish how long the hazard was present.  See Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20(F)(8); see, e.g., *Grzanka v. Pfeifer*, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 573 (App. Div. 1997) (Absent evidence as to when the hazardous condition first arose, whether “hours, minutes or seconds before the accident,” the plaintiff could not prove constructive notice and summary judgment was warranted.); *Carroll*, supra (“There was no evidence of how long the [hazardous condition] was on the steps [and] [t]herefore, plaintiff could not even meet the fundamental requirement of constructive notice. ”).  The mere “[e]xistence of an alleged dangerous condition is not constructive notice of it. ”
[brief] But as explained in his opening brief, Faucette is an outlier among New Jersey’s modern Miranda case law, which has increasingly recognized the power of psychological police coercion; the grave risk of false confessions; and, specifically, the coercive nature of threats about a suspect’s children.  See L.H., 239 N.J. at 48-49; State v. Carrion, 249 N. J. 253, 281-82 (2021); Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. at 516 (“[E]vidence that the accused was threatened ... will render the waiver involuntary. ”); Gonzalez, 249 N.J. at 640-42 ([...], concurring).
[brief] On May 7, 2011, at 12:12 a.m., there was a robbery at a 7-11 in [...].  The store clerk told police that two black males wearing dark clothing stole around $358 from the register and a cellphone then fled on foot out of sight.  The clerk said that the man holding the gun was wearing a dark sweatshirt, panty hoes as a mask, dark gloves and tan boots.  On October 25, 2021 the robbery case indictment [...] was argued before the Supreme Court on the issue of whether officers had a reasonable articulate reason to stop the car the defendant [...] occupied as a passenger.  On January 25, 2022 the Supreme Court made their decision granting [...] certification reversing *State v. [...]*, 245 N.J. 250, 215 (2021) vacated the conviction and reprimanded back to the trial court.  (Da 22-58).  Then on February 25, 2022 the prosecution office dismissed all charges and the whole robbery indictment [...]-1 (Da 59).  In essence and totality of the Supreme Court decision the 404-B evidence from the robbery case that was dismissed that was illegally, wrongfully and improperly admitted into the defendants homicide trial which hindered the defendant from obtaining and being offered a fair trial; was in fact directly affected by the Supreme Court decision.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:52-57.  Our Legislature has repeatedly broadened eligibility for expungement in recognition of the overwhelming public interest in “afford[ing] a second chance to one-time offenders convicted of less serious offenses, who have led law-abiding lives since conviction. ”  *In re Kollman*, 210 N.J. 557, 562 (2012).  The trial court failed to ensure that jurors with expunged convictions were not wrongfully disqualified from service at [...]’s trial.
[directive] (a)  Conduct and assist in investigations where computers are utilized -7- for the commission of fraud and identity theft, through the use of the Internet or any computer device; (b)  Provide training for New Jersey law enforcement agencIes  In investigations where computers are utilized for the commission of fraud and identity theft; (c)  Provide corporate outreach services to educate and inform the public and private sector, as well as institutions of higher education within the state, as to the dangers and vulnerabilities of online fraud and identity theft; (d)  Establish and maintain a mechanism for receiving Internet fraud and identity theft complaint case referrals from any public or private entity as required by the Identity Theft Protection Act, including referrals from outside agencies, such as [...] (commonly referred to as the "[...]"), and the [...]; (e)  Provide local assistance to out-of-state authorities investigating incidents of online fraud and identity theft emanating from, terminating in or occurring through the State of New Jersey; (f)Conduct computer forensic examinations and the analysis of digital evidence as it pertains to technology-related crimes in the State of New Jersey, by providing forensic examination of digital media pursuant to consent or search orders, or judicial, executive or administrative seizures; (g)
[brief] Rule 1:7-4(a) provides, “The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury, on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right, and also as required by R. 3:29.  The court shall thereupon enter or direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. ”  Rule 1:7-4 does not exempt a court from making the findings where a party is in default – to the contrary, they’re even more vital for a default judgment in a divorce case (as discussed further below).  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015); Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569 (1980).  The court is required to "state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions."  Curtis, supra, 83 N.J. 570; Clementi, supra, 434 N.J. Super. 532 (even after entry of default, movant "still has an ongoing obligation to persuade the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proposal for equitable distribution is fair and equitable under the specific facts of the case.").  N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 provides sixteen factors that the family judge "shall consider" in fixing an equitable distribution award.  [...] did none of this.  There were no financial disclosures; there was no Case Information Statement even by the appearing plaintiff.  [...] did not identify marital or separate assets, or value assets in the marital estate.  **[...]’s actions**
[brief] The Diagrammatic Elevation is one of the pieces of evidence Appellant sought to introduce as evidence to demonstrate that [...] had violated the conditions contained in Paragraph 21 of the “Conditions” section.  The Diagrammatic Elevation shows that the façade of the property was supposed to be no more than approximately one foot higher than the façade of the adjacent building.  Combined with photos the Trial Court did admit as evidence, and another document the Court did not admit, this evidence clearly demonstrates that the façade exceeds the height of the adjacent façade by more than four feet.  Its admission was denied.
[brief] After further consideration of the arguments of the parties contained in their submissions to the Court and delivered at the December 10 hearing, and for the reasons that follow, the Court will resolve the discovery disputes as follows: (1) order the [...] to produce all non-privileged documents that mention “[...]” or “[...],” (2) seek input from the parties on the appointment of a special master to sort through claims of privilege asserted by the [...], (3) sustain the vast majority of the [...]’s objections lodged at [...]’s deposition, and (4) extend the discovery period by six months.  II.
[brief] …………………………………………………………………………………904a  Exhibit J, [...]’s June 24, 2018 deposition……………………………..906a  Exhibit P, Plaintiff’s Charts ……………………………………………………………..1100a  Exhibit T, Releases and Letter…………………………………………………………..1165a  Exhibit U, Checks provided in discovery………………………………………………1201a  Exhibit V, January 10, 2020 Order……………………………………………………1649a  Exhibit W, January 10, 2020 transcript of summary judgment motion…..omitted Exhibit X, Black Creed Sanctuary Condo.  Ass’n, Inc. v. Fortress Inv. Grp., LLC. A-5227-12T3, 2015 WL 1565644 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2015)  …………………1653a  Exhibit Y, Kastrati v. Premier Endoscopy, LLC, A-0050-19T3………………1659a  INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] tried to explain its rationale for seeking its unprecedented rate increase, stating:  [T]he rate request is based on the current best estimate assumptions, combined with a 15% margin for adverse experience and follows actuarial regulations related to certifying the premiums and passing the dual loss ratio test requirements.  Using the best estimate assumptions, the proposed rate increase results in a lifetime loss ratio that exceeds the original pricing, which is defined in our response as the maximum rate increase supported by best estimate assumption and regulation.
[brief] STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS  On July 30, 2012, Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”) was formed via an Operating Agreement naming [...] (“[...]”) and Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”) as the only members.  Da115, 121-36.  [...] is the sole member of Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...] ”), which owns a commercial office building located at [...] (the “Property”).  Da115-16, 138-52.  [...] was named as the manager of the Companies pursuant to their respective Operating Agreements, she was never a member of either of the Companies and had no ownership interest therein.  Da115-16, 121-152, 238-39.  Prior to the formation of [...] and its purchase (through [...]) of the Property, [...] owned the Property with her husband and others, but they lost the Property through foreclosure and related bankruptcy proceedings.  Da33-36, 307-08.  According to [...], she was “struggling financially” and “could not come up with the money to buy the Property [from the company, [...], that had acquired it out of the bankruptcy/foreclosure proceedings] in the immediate future. ”  Da10-11, 36.  As such, “[i]nitially, [she and her spouse] requested that [...] --- 2