ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 16.  Defendant made a demand to Plaintiff during the sixth year after the signing of the Agreement for Plaintiff to pay him the $70,000.00 that she owed him (Letter introduced into evidence at trial)  Trial Transcript T2, Page 89 line13-Page 90 Line 3.  THIS IS UNDISPUTED.  17.  Defendant refused to make the payment despite her promise in Paragraph 1 of the Agreement: “This sum shall be paid by [...] to [...] within three years of the closing date without interest…” and despite the fact that she had funds available funds to do so at the outset, of which Defendant was unaware at that time.  (It first became known to him in discovery in the lawsuit initiated by [...])  Trial Transcript T2, Page 129 Line 20-Page 130 Line 5.
[brief] As Defendants accurately point out, [...]’s appeal is squarely based, as it should, “on the law of nuisance to argue that he did not need expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of liability against the [...]. ”  [Db21].  Defendants disregard the substantive law governing this claim and, instead, seek to confuse this Court (as they did in the Chancery Division) by rehashing a misapplication of the net opinion rule and muddying the waters by misplacing focus on an irrelevant prior proceeding.
[brief] To this end, when a party to a real estate contract elects to seek the return of its deposit by terminating or rescinding a contract, it cannot seek specific performance.  “Where the wronged party has elected to terminate the contract, he cannot subsequently maintain a suit for the specific performance thereof. ”  Levy v. Mass. Accident Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 420, 431 (Ch. Div. 1938) (Plaintiff “could not consistently expect to get back the consideration he paid and at the same time or thereafter, obtain performance of the contractual obligations assumed by defendant in exchange for the receipt of that consideration.
[directive] Where a complaint is sustained and discipline imposed, the only items to be placed into the employee's personnel file are a copy of the administrative charging form and a copy of the disposition form.  See Appendix M for a sample form (Note: Civil Service jurisdictions must use forms authorized by the Civil Service Commission).  No part of the internal affairs investigative report shall be placed in the personnel file.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 68  10
[brief] The Trial Court did not “change the rules of the game” in the post-trial proceedings.  Appellant was granted the opportunity – correctly or incorrectly – to conduct the trial exactly how he wished, with empty chair claims against third-party defendant doctors without representation present at trial.  Nevertheless, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff/Respondent and determined that Appellant was sixty percent (60%) at fault.  Since his trial strategy did not lead to his desired outcome, Appellant now claims he was deprived of significant rights.  In 2017, Appellant obtained a ruling from the Trial Court to treat two treating doctors as so-called “Burt defendants” at trial, despite having every ability and right to bring contribution claims against these doctors.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  The School Funding Reform Act of 2008.  In an effort to provide a funding formula that satisfied the T&E clause and the Court’s Abbott mandates, in January 2008 the State enacted a new statewide school funding formula to ensure that public schools throughout the State receive financial support needed to deliver T&E: the SFRA.  L. 2007, c. 260; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -71.  The core of the SFRA is the adequacy budget, which is an estimate of what it costs each district to provide the core curriculum content standards (CCCS) to each student according to each district’s enrollment and student characteristics.  N.J.S. A. 18A:7F-51.  A major component of each district’s State aid — equalization aid received from the State — is calculated based on a district’s ability to contribute to its overall adequacy budget through its local contribution, otherwise known as its “local fair share” or “LFS. ”  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIX), 196 N.J. 544, 556-57 (2008); N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b) and -52(a).  In other words, the SFRA, as a wealth-equalized formula, presumes a ---  1  The procedural history and counterstatement of facts are closely related and have been combined to avoid repetition and for the court’s convenience.  2  The CCCS are now known as the New Jersey Student Learning Standards.  See N.J.A.C. 6A:8-1.1 to -3.3; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-4.1 to -4.7.  The Supreme Court has found the standards to be a reasonable expression of constitutionally sufficient T&E.
[brief] Further, as to Count 3, the [...] stated “[t]here is no suggestion that Respondent encouraged other members of the Board, members of the public, or students to defy the Executive Order. ” (Ca172).  This is a factual assumption inappropriately viewed in the light most favorable to the moving party.  Contra Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., 142 N.J. at 540 (1995).  Not only this, but the record is replete with evidence that Respondent publicly encouraged others to flout Executive Order 251.
[brief] The Collective Negotiation Agreements  The terms and conditions of Plaintiffs’ employment were dictated by collective negotiation agreements ("CNA"), the most recent of which expired on December 31, 2015.  (29a ¶95); (56a-95a).  This CNA between [...] and the [...] ("PBA") Local No. 24 had a term of January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2015.  (56a).  The CAN was approved as to form and execution by the City Solicitor on December 18, 2013.  (92a).  Article XIX of the CNA is titled “Terminal Leave With Pay. ” (74a).  As per this term, “upon retirement the employee shall be entitled to terminal leave up to one and one-half (1 1/2) year with full pay.  Ibid.  The terminal leave shall be based upon accumulated sick leave.  *Ibid.*  Plaintiffs elected, pursuant to Article XIX (B)(B), for the lump sum payment of accumulated sick time.  (29a ¶98).  The contract provides in pertinent part:  "Accumulated sick leave lump sum payment.  Lump sum shall be compensated at the full rate of pay in effect at the time of employee’s retirement.  It shall be paid upon retirement, or, at the exclusive option of the employee, over a four (4) year period beginning in the year of retirement…"  (74a).  The accrual of terminal leave with pay is in the prior CNAs.  (29a ¶96).  The 1990-1992 CNA (111a-112a), the 1993-1995 CNA (151a-152a), and the 2008-2012 CNA (194a-195a) all demonstrate this initiative to reduce employee sick time usage, which Plaintiffs relied on.  (74a ¶96).  The union and [...] did not reach a successor agreement covering the time between December 31, 2015 and Plaintiffs’ retirements.
[brief] Here, the Union and the Authority did not create the phrase “just cause” through their own negotiations.  Rather, they used a well-recognized term of art in collective negotiations, and specifically bargained to submit disputes concerning the interpretation of that phrase to a mutually-selected arbitrator.  [...] was that arbitrator, and interpreted the term accordingly.  In the absence of a contractual definition, the Arbitrator reviewed the evidence before him and interpreted the ambiguous term, as was his specific charge when the parties asked him to rule on the question of “did the Authority have just cause to terminate [...]?” (Pa 19).  The Authority’s disagreement with [...]’s interpretation of the ambiguous phrase does not render his decision invalid, and presents no basis for this Court to vacate his award.  The Arbitrator’s ruling is thus entitled to this Court’s deference, and the Chancery Court’s Order confirming the Award should be affirmed.
[directive] Handling of Injured Suspects Following CED Use  8.1  Subjects against whom a CED has been deployed shall be transported to a medical facility for examination if any of the following circumstances exist: (a) the subject requests medical attention; (b) the subject had been rendered unconscious or unresponsive; (c) the subject, after being subjected to a discharge, does not appear to have recovered normally, as described in CED training; (d) the subject has exhibited signs of excited delirium, as described in CED training, prior to, during, or after the discharge of the CED; (e) the subject has suffered bodily injury requiring medical attention as a result of a fall, or otherwise reasonably appears to need medical attention; (f) the subject was exposed to three or more discharges from a CED during the encounter; (g) the subject has been exposed to a continuous discharge lasting 15 seconds or longer; (h) no personnel at the scene are qualified or authorized to remove the CED darts/electrodes from the subject’s person; (i) an officer trained and authorized to remove darts/electrodes experiences difficulty in removing a dart/electrode; or (j) any part of a CED dart/electrode has broken off and remains imbedded.  8.2  An officer is authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from a subject only if the officer has received training on dart/electrode removal, provided, however, that an officer is not authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from any part of the person’s head or neck, or where the dart/electrode is located in the area of the subject’s genitalia, or female breast.  In the absence of exigent circumstances requiring immediate action, a CED dart/electrode may only be removed from these areas of the subject’s body by qualified medical personnel.  11
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey  08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from a judgement of conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County.  Indictment No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) and R. 2:6-4(a) this letter-brief is submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  ........................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S DETENTION AND FRISK WAS LAWFUL UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.  (Da7; 1T52-23 to 69-6)  .........................................................5  A.  Standard of review ......................................................................................5  B.  The requisite reasonable suspicion was established under the totality of the circumstances to briefly detain defendant ........................................................................6  C.  The Terry Frisk for weapons was lawful.  ..........................................................13  D.  Even if the stop and frisk was premature, the gun and drugs on defendant’s person would have been inevitably discovered.............................................14  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................16
[directive] There is established a Law Enforcement-led Alternatives Policy and Programming Bureau (LEAPP).  LEAPP shall be the primary point of contact for the Department’s programing and initiatives to transform how law enforcement interacts or responds to individuals experiencing a mental health, behavioral health or substance use related crisis, including diversionary pathways when available and appropriate.  It shall manage, operate, and oversee policies, initiatives, and programming related to situations where law enforcement typically responds, but where an alternative response—whether pursued by law enforcement, in coordination with law enforcement, or via referral from law enforcement—would better advance public safety.  LEAPP shall have primary responsibility for the statewide operation of the Department’s ARRIVE Together program and shall support the OACR Director in expanding and developing ARRIVE models across New Jersey.  The Bureau shall also oversee other law-enforcement led alternative responses, including the Department’s Opioid Response Teams, which blend law enforcement and health and/or substance use disorder professionals in response teams for the purpose of diverting from arrest into treatment and recovery; the Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion Program (LEAD), which provides law enforcement officers discretion to divert individuals who commit low-level offenses that are driven by substance use, mental illness, and/or poverty directly to services; and Operation Helping Hand, a police-led substance use disorder diversionary program.
[brief] v. Conclusion  The trial court erroneously usurped the role of the factfinder in granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.  Due to the existence of a material issue of fact, the motion for summary judgment should have been denied.  For the reasons set forth above, it is requested that this Court reverse the trial court, and permit Plaintiff to present his case to a jury.  POINT III
[brief] Both statutes seek to protect consumers and impose minimum standards for any entity who engages in the consumer loan business as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2, *to wit*, the CFA and the NJCFLA are complementary as opposed to conflicting.  Thus, the trial court erred in holding that Defendants’ unlicensed enforcement of a void debt does not constitute unlawful conduct under the CFA.  **POINT IV.
[brief] (9T 31-23 to 39-23; 11T 20-16 to 32-19)  The detectives also confronted [...] about the Facebook post.  (1T 30-7 to 34-7; 7T 234-24 to 240-24)  He acknowledged giving a police statement in 2015, [...] confronting him about it in 2016, and seeing the post; but he said he told [...] in 2016 that it was not true, the post did not really bother him because the news of his cooperation was already out, and he did not believe that [...] was the person who first posted it online.  (1T 30-7 to 43-1; 7T 234-24 to 241-6; 8T 17-8 to 39-9)
[brief] ”  Id at 198 N.J. 6, 20 (2009)  Here, either [...], Officer's [...], [...], [...] and [...] who had arrived on the scene prior to the search of the car trunk could have called for a warrant.  *(Pa303-304). *  As Plaintiff was handcuffed, he could not reach into the backpack under the floorboard in the car trunk to pull out any weapon to injure any officer.  *See State v. Dunlap*, 185 N.J. 543, 548-549 (2006).  Thus, there were no exigent circumstances for a warrantless search of the car trunk.  The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine denies the prosecution the use of the marijuana obtained as a result of a 4th or 5th Amendment violation.  *United States v. Patane*, 542 U.S. 630, 642-44 (1963); *See NJ Const. Art I para7*.  Based on this doctrine, the marijuana could not have been used as grounds for plaintiff’s prosecution.
[brief] After the action was filed, Respondents hired [...], Esq. (“[...]”) to represent them in this matter.  [...] has an irreconcilable conflict of interest arising from his prior consultation with the Petitioners, *in the exact same matter at which time Petitioners shared prejudicial confidential information.*  Briefly summarized, before filing this action, two of the Petitioners, [...] (“[...]”) and [...], communicated with Respondents’ counsel, [...], on or about July 28, 2023 and consulted with him in-depth with respect to the substance of the Petitioners’ claims against Respondents and potential resolution of the claims, including settlement positions and amounts.  While the Petitioners ultimately chose not to retain [...] to represent them, litigation, the consultation included the sharing of highly prejudicial confidential and harmful information, including their assessment of the Decedent’s estate, their understanding of the Decedent’s testamentary intentions, the relative strengths and weaknesses of their case, and specific potential settlement posture.  Subsequently, without notice to, or consent of, the Petitioners, [...] met with and was retained by the other side in this matter, the exact litigation for which Petitioners had consulted with [...].  The specific details of those communications are contained in the Certification of [...] which was properly submitted for *in camera* review to both the Trial Court and this Court (via email as instructed by the Court) and which is part of the record in this case.  In reaching its conclusion to disqualify [...] and his law firm, the Trial Court found it was not necessary to review [...]’s Certification.  The Trial Court did refer to “the relative strengths and weaknesses of [Petitioners’] position, and specific potential settlement posture” at page one of its May 31, 2024 Opinion and Order.  Knowing the relative strengths and weaknesses of Petitioners’ position and their specific settlement posture would surely be prejudicial to Petitioners.  Therefore, the Trial Court’s decision is based on more than sufficient information to disqualify Respondents’ Counsel.
[brief] In Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), the Supreme Court gave pro se litigants the right to have courts liberally construe their pleadings.  The Third Circuit has applied a liberal construction of pro se briefs as well.  “The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is well-established. ”  Higgs v. Attorney General of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1993); Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2002); “We [will] apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name. ”  Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999).  New Jersey courts have implemented the same liberal construction of a pro se’s appeal.  Midland Funding LLC v. Albern, 433 N.J. Super., 494, 500 (App. Div. 2013), citing Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1982).  Appellant’s pleadings should be liberally construed.
[brief] The damage that the TPDs caused to [...]’s community was immeasurable.  As a result of the within litigation, [...] was prevented from conducting services in its sacred prayer space every other week.  During those weeks when it was not allowed in the sanctuary, daily prayers had to take place in other rooms in the building.  Funerals also could not be held in the sanctuary.  Those [...] congregants that were unfortunate to pass in an “off week” had to have their burial ceremony in a makeshift spot or in another location.  Marriages also could not take place in the sanctuary during “off weeks”.  After two years, it was clear that [...] and [...] could not co-exist in the mosque.
[brief] Defendants listed “unclean hands” as an affirmative defense in their pleading, and called it “another important argument of Defendants” in their post-trial brief (Da018 – Da039; Da81 – Da090).  However, the words “unclean hands” are not even mentioned in the judge’s decision.  There was no analysis performed by the trial court.  The trial court did not even acknowledge that this was an argument raised by Defendants.  The trial court did not even give so much as a summary dismissal of the argument.  This is a reversible error of the trial court that should be rectified upon appeal.
[brief] 11-14  ARGUMENT POINT I: THE PLAINTIFF’S BEHAVIOR WHILE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ARRAY OF POTENTIAL JURORS  DURING JURY SELECTION  HAD THE CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE JURY TO ARRIVE AT A VERDICT BASED UPON FACTORS OTHER THAN THE PROOFS PRESENTED AND THE COURT’S CHARGE.  ABSENT AN AFFIRMATIVE SHOWING THAT IT DID NOT INFLUENCE THE JURY’S VERDICT, A NEW TRIAL MUST BE GRANTED.  (6T. 5:17 to 16:7).  ......................... 15-23  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BASED UPON THE UNREFUTED CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANTS’ INSURANCE  ADJUSTER DESCRIBING HER OBSERVATIONS OF PLAINTIFF  DURING JURY SELECTION.  (7T.4:4 to 21:1.).  ......................... 24-26  POINT III: THE “THEME” OF PLAINTIFF’S TRIAL PRESENTATION AS SET FORTH IN COUNSEL’S OPENING STATEMENT AND DURING SUMMATION
[brief] Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 190 N.J. 61, 73 (2007).  The Court continued, that “the practicality requirement ... requires a fact-sensitive analysis. ”  Id. at 71.  The following facts should have been considered by the trial court in a required practicability analysis.  First, the practicability of compliance was undermined by the fact that the defense survived Plaintiff’s pre-trial dispositive motions.  United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 394(App. Div. 2009)(reasoning “a pleading cannot be deemed frivolous as a whole nor can an attorney be deemed to have litigated a matter in bad faith where...the trial court denies summary judgment on at least one count in the complaint and allows the matter to proceed to trial”).
[brief] Eight days before the verdict, on May 2, the post-testimonial portion -- i.e., summations, jury instructions and deliberations -- of the trial was delayed for one week (until May 9) because of a positive COVID test from someone who had been present in court on April 28.  (17T 47-15 to 50-8; 17T 60-3 to 11)  At that time, on May 2, the judge was made aware that three of the 13 jurors were going to be unavailable after May 10 because those three were going on vacation as of May 11.
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below T1; T2)  R. 4:50-1 is “designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case. ”  *Mancini v. EDS ex rel. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n*, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (quoting *Baumann v. Marinaro*, 95 N.J. 380, 392 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The standard is abuse of discretion and the trial court’s factual findings are owed deference, *i.e.*, this Court “may not disturb judge-made fact findings ‘unless . . . convinced they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  *LVNV Funding, LLC v. DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. 103, 108 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  “However, the opening of default judgments should be viewed with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result is reached. ”  *Marder v. Realty Constr. Co.*, 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964) (citing *Foster v. New Albany Machine & Tool Co.*, 63 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1960)).  For example, “[e]ven where a defendant admits liability, a reopening of the judgment for purposes of assessing damages is proper where the defendant provides a reasonable assertion to the effect that it is not liable for the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff.  *Id.*  Thus, “[i]n weighing these circumstances, [the Court] cannot lose sight that a court’s power to vacate a judgment is based on equitable principles. ”  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109.  When examining a trial court’s exercise of discretionary authority, the trial court must be reversed “when the exercise of discretion was ‘manifestly unjust’ under the circumstances. ”  *Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.*, 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting *Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC*, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 App. Div. 2007)).  **POINT II.