ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Goffe, supra, 238 N.J. at 214.  The trial court did not acknowledge or analyze [...]’s arguments regarding the threshold issue of arbitrability.  Instead, the trial court effectively rewarded Defendants for approximately a year of non-responsiveness with respect to their discovery obligations, despite [...]’s good faith efforts to facilitate discovery and subsequent Motion to Compel, which was withdrawn by the Court.  Thus, the trial court’s November 11, 2022 Order should be reversed to allow discovery into the issue of arbitrability and the terms of the assignment(s) of [...]’s alleged account.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Nothing in the record supports this conclusion.  Defendant’s Resolution, and its brief, stretch the law, distort and ignore evidence, and reject unrebuted credible expert testimony; and its brief introduces new reasoning for its decision.  Defendant abused its discretion; its decision is entitled to no deference.  Substantial credible evidence in the record and the applicable law support Plaintiff’s height variance.  Defendant never weighed that evidence; it simply rejected it.  The Court should reverse the decisions below, and direct that Plaintiff’s requested variance be granted.
[directive] ”  Thereafter, on October 14, 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the recommendations of its Special Committee on the Recordation of Custodial Interrogations.  Most significantly, the recommendations included a requirement that police electronically record the entirety of all custodial interrogations occurring in a place of detention for cases in which the adult or juvenile being interrogated is charged with an offense requiring the use of a warrant pursuant to R. 3:3-1c.  The effective dates for that requirement are staggered so as to go into effect for all covered homicide cases on January 1, 2006, and for all other offenses specified in R. 3:3-1c on January 1, 2007.
[brief] [...] failed to inspect and maintain the subject entrance walkway area in a manner which conformed to its own policies and procedures and in accordance with adopted maintenance codes and accepted engineering practices, and thereby maintained an unreasonably hazardous condition within an area of foreseeable use by customers.  The failure of [...] to abate the hazardous walkway condition caused [...] to fall and sustain injury.  In conclusion and in addition to the foregoing, [...]’s encounter with the bent support foot of the barricade which protruded into and above the walkway surface caused her to fall and sustain injury.  Based upon the above background and analysis, as well as my education and experience as a professional engineer, [...] failed to exercise due care for the safety of its customers, thereby causing injury to [...].
[brief] This medical malpractice action arises from the care provided to decedent, [...].  On June 13, 2018, plaintiffs, the decedent’s two surviving sons, filed a complaint (Pa33).  Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint on September 25, 2019.  (Pa118)  In addition to defendant, a general surgeon, plaintiffs’ amended complaint named thirteen other medical providers of various specialties: [...], a cardiologist (Pa129); [...], also a cardiologist (Pa130); [...], a general surgeon (Pa131); [...], a gastroenterologist (Pa132); [...], an emergency medicine physician (Pa133); [...], a radiologist (Pa134); [...], also a radiologist (ibid.); [...], P.A., a physician’s assistant (Pa135); [...], B.S.N., a nurse specializing in emergency nursing (ibid.); [...], R.N., a nurse (Pa136); [...], R.N., a nurse (ibid.); [...], B.S.N., a nurse (Pa137); [...], R.N., a nurse (ibid.).  The amended complaint also named the employers of the various physicians and the hospital where decedent was treated, [...] (hereafter “[...]”).  (Pa124-129).  In the course of pretrial discovery, several of the defendants obtained dismissals, leaving for trial Dr. Chae, Dr. Bernstein, Dr. Shrivastava, Physician’s Assistant Elefterhiou, Nurse Ringle, and defendant.  On the eve of trial, all of the remaining defendants, with the exception of [...], settled with plaintiffs (Da1 [Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce settlement as to Dr. Chae]; Da22 [Letter from [...] to Appellate Division confirming that Dr. Bernstein, Dr. Shrivastava and [...] settled before trial]; Da25 [Letter from [...] to Appellate Division confirming that [...], [...] and [...], R. N. settled before trial]), and each settling defendant received a separate stipulation of dismissal with prejudice (Da26 to Da 30).
[brief] Caselaw does not support Plaintiff’s position that a clerical error in identifying the location where the maps and plans are physically stored in and of itself vitiate notice and therefore void the Board’s jurisdiction.  see Pond Run Watershed Ass'n v. Twp. of Hamilton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 397 N.J.  Super. 335, 348–49 (App.Div.2008)(concluding that notice complied with MLUL in spite of minor typographical error in the transposition of two digits in a block designation and therefore did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction).  Similarly, in Northgate Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Hillsdale Plan. Bd., 214 N.J. 120 (2013), the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to apply the language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 strictly to an apparent clerical error and refused to void the Board’s jurisdiction despite an error in the property description in the notice.  “As the Appellate Division reasoned when it considered the significance of the typographical error in the notice in Pond Run, we agree that a minor, clerical deviation that had no potential to mislead any interested member of the public does not fall short of the statutory requirement for describing the property to be developed. ”  Northgate Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Hillsdale Plan. Bd., 214 N.J. 120, 142 (2013) (finding applicant’s notice, although using a technically-inaccurate lot number, included both the property's commonly-known name of [...] as well as a reference to its location being “south of [...]” and concluding that the description of the site was “reasonably adequate to notify members of the public” about the identity of the property to be developed and that, therefore, the [applicant’s] notice was adequate.)  Here the error in the notice was not such that a person reading it would have been unable to determine the location of the hearing on the application or the location to physically inspect the application and plans.  see Perlmart at 238 (the “critical determination is whether the notice provides a reasonably adequate description of the land subject to the application, such that concerned neighbors or members of the general public who may be affected by the proposed development may properly protest the proposed use or structure. ”).
[brief] The plain and clear meaning of “adjacent” is “not distant” and “nearby” – an understanding ¹ “[The Appellate Division”] has no authority to overrule a decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals. ”  Hutchinson v. Atlantic City Med. Center–Mainland, 314 N.J.Super. 468, 478 (App.Div.1998); Jackson v. Hankinson, 94 N.J.Super. 505, 515 (App.Div.1967), aff’d, 51 N.J. 230 (1968) (“Here, however, we are saved such analyses since we are bound by decisions of the Court of Errors and Appeals”). that plainly places each of the Tenant Defendants under an independent duty to safeguard the walkways near their storefronts.
[directive] Graves Act  Firearms Offenses.  Any offense involving a firearm (i.e., a firearm as opposed to any other “weapon” as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(r)) that would require the imposition of a minimum sentence under the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) and (g).  Firearms offenses under the Graves Act are myriad and vary in degrees of severity.  Offenses can range from “simple” unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.
[brief] ”).  (Da66)  Here, although Defendant invoked his right to remain silent, did not present any evidence, and thus did not offer any alternative explanation for the two tattoos at issue, the trial court twice instructed the jury that Defendant “may, but is not required, to offer an alternative explanation for the” tattoos; and “if you accept any alternative explanation offered by the defense for the [tattoos], then you may not consider said tattoo for any purpose and you shall completely disregard it in your deliberations.
[brief] As outlined in more detail in [...]’s initial brief and herein, the disputed factual evidence includes, but is not limited to the following:  •  During the course of the underlying Probate matter, the five siblings entered into a Consent Judgment, dated April 13, 2022.  (Da395); • The Consent Judgment was signed and agreed to by all parties (and counsel) and was countersigned by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (Da395); • The Consent Judgment addressed the various probate assets of [...]’s Estate, and also contained numerous provisions and specific thresholds related to the sale of the Subject Property (Da395); • The Consent Judgment expressly states that “All decisions related to the marketing and sale of the property, including but not limited to raising or lowering the list price…accepting proposed Contracts…and all other decisions of any nature whatsoever, must be unanimous. ” (Da395); •  The Consent Judgment also expressly states that “All co-owners must accept and approve any contract which contains a purchase price which is equal to or greater than 95% of the list price. ” (Da395).  •  On January 12, 2023, the Court appointed [...], Esquire to serve as the contact intermediary between the five sibling co-owners and granted Mr. Paone authority to appoint a realtor.  (Da30).  •  The January 12, 2023 Order did not supersede, alter, amend or in any way vacate any provisions of the Consent Judgment Order relating to the sale of the Subject Property.  (Da30, Da395); •  During the sales and minuscule marketing of the home, [...] made numerous complaints in writing through counsel about the process, all in accordance with the Consent Judgment and the January 12, 2023 Order.  (Da179, Da348, Da350, Da356, Da363, Da413, Da416); •  The facts establish that the January 12, 2023 Order was not the only order in effect as it only addressed paragraph 17 of the April 13, 2022 settlement Consent Judgment entered into between the co-owners of the Subject Property.  (Da395); •  The factual record also established that the $500,000 offer was not unanimously agreed to by the parties which would preclude the sale from proceeding under the express terms of the Consent Judgment.  (Da179, Da348, Da350, Da356, Da363, Da413, Da416); •  There were numerous submissions by the parties that contained factual evidence supporting the argument that there were factual disputes and objections relating to the sale of the Subject Property to [...] for $500,000.  (Da179, Da348, Da350, Da356, Da363, Da413, Da416); •  This included communications and certain objections from other sibling owners as well.  (Da432, Da435, Da437, Da494, Da545); •  The factual record also contained information relating to [...]’s complaint to the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance – Real Estate Commission regarding [...] and the objections and disputes relating to [...]’s questionable actions relating to the marketing and sale of the Subject Property.  (Da363).  These genuine disputes of fact precluded the Trial Court from deciding the matter summarily without the opportunity for counterclaims and discovery.
[brief] (25T 18-5 to 6 to 21-6; Da 21-24)  [...] responded that they had been neighbors since approximately 1980 (25T 18-17 to 19; Da 22), but that their communication was limited because he did not want to pry.  (25T 87-12 to 13; Da 24; Da 74)  They would wave at each other and say ‘hi. ’ (25T 20-24 to 21-6; Da 24)  He occasionally shoveled snow for her (25T 18-18 to 19; Da 22), but had never been inside of her house.  (25T 86-7 to 5; Da 73)  For approximately 20 minutes (Da 17), detectives next pressed [...] on whether he could prove that he had an alibi.
[brief] (4)  Plaintiff was replaced by a Caucasian woman, [...] who was less than forty years old with less experience than Appellant.  *Victor v. State*, 203 N.J. 383, 410 (2010).  The claim that an African-American man was hired to fill Appellant’s position is erroneous.  Of note here is that Appellant was interviewed for a Vice Principal position at the middle school, however, [...] was impressed with Appellant’s wealth of experience per her employment history and asked that she come and work with him at the [...] (Pa195, Pa193)  [...] interviewed Appellant and was impressed with her credentials also.  (Pa194)  The contrived listings that claim that Appellant was not performing her job are refuted by the Observation and Summative scores which were effective, Appellant had never been reprimanded, was never sent for courses to aid in improvement in her job performance and was not put on a Performance Improvement Plan by [...].  (Pa330, [...] Deposition, 5/11/22, T26:20-23, T28:14-19)  Appellant has addressed the claims that she was not performing her job listed in paragraphs 1-15 in the Appellant’s Brief.
[brief] The issue was not foreclosure and not who possessed the mortgage note which is typically the focus in a foreclosure trial.  The trial court never decided Quiet Title (ownership of property) in its Final Judgment.  In its Response Brief, Plaintiff tries to wrongfully imply to this Court that [...] admitted at the pre-trial conference that she does not own the property and that “she and her husband lived peaceable in the property…” and “peaceably occupied the property,” Plaintiff’s Response Brief at pages 29 and 32 respectfully.
[brief] [...] and [...]  On the brief: [...]  [...] (pro hac vice pending)  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  [...] (pro hac vice pending)  [...] (pro hac vice pending)  2901 N. Central Avenue Suite 2000  Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788  Phone: [...]  [...]  [...]  Dated: March 6, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] 91 N.J. at 172; 153 N.J. at 134 (both citing comment a of § 317, which expressly provides that the standard “is applicable only when the servant is acting outside the scope of his employment.  If the servant is acting within the scope of his employment, the master may be vicariously liable under the principles of the law of Agency. ”).  Indeed, the Model Jury Charge, which cites \textit{Di Cosala} extensively, does not reference Restatement § 317.  Rather, \textit{Di Cosala} primarily relied on § 213 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency in defining the tort, and it is those portions of the opinion that are cited in the Model Jury Charge.  See Model Jury Charge § 5.76 at fns. 3-4.  By recognizing the tort of negligent hiring, training, or supervision, our courts did not intend to adopt § 317 of the Restatement wholesale.
[brief] [Citation omitted].  The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.  [Citation omitted].  Third, the defendant’s actions must have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s emotional distress.  [Citation omitted].  Fourth, the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.  [Citation omitted].  By circumscribing the cause of action with an elevated threshold for liability and damages, courts have authorized legitimate claims while eliminating those that should not be compensable.
[brief] In this case, both the plain language of the Public Access Law and its legislative history make it clear that the Legislature intended to codify, rather than to expand, the Public Trust Doctrine.  This is made clear from the outset of the Public Access Law’s legislative findings, which, as noted above, speak to the importance of the Doctrine, but say nothing about an intent to expand its meaning or application.  Section 2 of the Law (N.J.S.A. 13:10-151) makes equally clear that any authority to require public access as a condition of an approval must be “consistent with the public trust doctrine” (emphasis added).
[brief] State of Emergency Termination Order ....................................................Da 41 Order of February 17, 2023 Denying Motion in Limine on Judicial Notice of State of Emergency .........................................................Da 42-43 Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories with Photos .....................................Da 44-63 Plaintiff’s Expert Weather Report ............................................................Da 64-79 Snow Removal Agreement between [...] and [...] .....................Da 80-95 Snow Subcontractor Agreement............................................................... Da 96-109 Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript of June 24, 2021 .................................Da 110-137 Marino-3 Excluded Photograph ...............................................................Da 138 Smith v. Costco, 2023 WL 4307729 (App. Div. 2023) ..............................Da 139-142 Greenstein v. Forsgate Industrial Complex, 2021 WL 3084740 (App. Div. 2021) .........................................................Da 143-147 Sarro v. Vonage Holdings, 2023 WL 2566062 (App. Div. 2023) ..... Da 148-152 Hanna v. Woodland Community Assoc., 2022 WL 16484707 (App. Div. 2022) ........................................ Da 153-158 Gonzalez v. Eastern Freightways, 2010 WL 372081 (App. Div. 2010) ........................................ Da 159-164 Weiss v. Nicola Porchetta Co., 2015 WL 1540919 (App. Div. 2015) ........................................ Da 165-169 Wisseman v. Rengifo, 2016 WL1618659 (App. Div. 2016) .............. Da 170-172 Cavaliere v. Bridgewater Commons Mall, 2009 WL 249104 (App. Div. 2009) ........................................ Da 173-179 Certification of Transcripts ..................................................... Da 180-181 INDEX TO TRANSCRIPTS July 19, 2023 transcript on motions in limine .............................................. 1T July 24, 2023 trial .................................................................................................. 2T July 25, 2023 trial ................................................................................................. 3T July 26, 2023 trial ................................................................................................. 4T July 27, 2023 trial ................................................................................................. 5T July 28, 2023 trial ................................................................................................. 6T July 31, 2023 trial ................................................................................................. 7T August 1, 2023 trial ............................................................................................... 8T PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal is taken, in large part but by no means exclusively, from a trial court’s refusal to charge its jury on a landowner’s duty to address accumulations of snow on its commercial property.
[brief] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b).  The Court notes that an additional October 2018 privilege log was not before the Court at the hearing.  (see Doc. 134 at 64-65).  The [...] expressed optimism that the documents listed on that privilege log are covered by the Court’s May 4, 2018 Order (Doc. 89), and will not require the intervention of the Court to resolve privilege disputes.  (Doc. 134 at 64:21-65:1).  However, to the extent appropriate and necessary, disputes regarding this privilege log can also be within the ambit of the putative special master.  C.  The [...] Properly Objected to the Vast Majority of the Questions Posed to [...] During Her Deposition.
[brief] [...], 2015 WL 4487739 (App. Div. July 24, 2015)..................28, 30 Rock Work. Inc. v. Pulaski Const. Co., 396 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2007)..............................................28, 29, 30, 33 Saltzman v. Saltzman, 290 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 1996)..................................................13 Sipko v. Koger, Inc., 251 N.J. 162 (2022) .............................................................................37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 46 State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) ..................................................................................37 Stephens v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of New Jersey, 101 N.J.L. 192 (1925)..............................................................................34 [...], No. [...], 2013 WL 811301 (App. Div. Mar. 6, 2003).........................................................................13 Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349 (1994) ..............................................................................28, 61, 62, 63, 66 [...] v. Target Bldg. Const., Inc., No. [...], 2010 WL 3933238 (App. Div. Oct. 4, 2010)....................28 Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 (2008) ..............................................................................56, 57, 60 Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 143 N.J. 420 (1996) ..............................................................................65, 66 FEDERAL STATUTES Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act...........................................4, 6 Uniform Partnership Act..............................................................................72 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-15(a)...............................................................................30 N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a)..............................................................................61, 62 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS June 3, 2019 Order and Opinion of Honorable [...] J.S.C., confirming in Part Final Arbitration Award ..................................................Da3161a November 18, 2022 Order of Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. and Opinion of Value of [...]’s Interests........................................Da3185a  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[brief] In this case the Objectors’ expert [...] did not provide any testimony that another equally efficacious design was available.  He admitted that he had only looked at the project for a couple of days and had not reviewed the entire site plan.  Finally, while the validity of a municipal ordinance is a question of law, the court will nevertheless accord deference to the municipality’s interpretation.  Fallone Prop. V. Bethlehem Plan Bd., 369, N.J. Super. 552, 561 (App. Div. 2004)  Here the validity of the Ordinance has not been challenged, only its application.  The Planning Board submits that it and the Trial Court properly applied the Ordinance and made a factual finding and conclusion that the revised lot grade did not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height.
[brief] Even if *Fair* had announced a new rule, federal and state retroactivity analyses favor, at a minimum, pipeline retroactivity – that is, the application of *Fair* to cases on direct appeal.  Federal retroactivity law is clear on this: The “failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication,” and there is “no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past. ”  *Griffith v. Kentucky*, 479 U.S. 314, 322, 412 (1987).  Our state courts recognize that the *Griffith* standard is “now well-established” and applies to new federal constitutional rules.  *State v. Wessells*, 209 N.J. 395, 412 (2012).
[brief] *Id.* at 282-83, 297.  As the Court in *Gibson* stated:  The constitutional right to be free from arbitrary arrest is not suspended in high-crime neighborhoods where ordinary citizens live and walk at all hours of the day and night.  Momentarily leaning against a building, or an upraised porch, on a city block, would not be considered loitering to an objectively reasonable citizen.  *[Id. at 297; see also State v. Shaw*, 213 N.J. 398, 420 (2012)* (“That [the place where defendant was stopped] is located in a high-crime area does not mean that residents in that area have lesser constitutional protection from random stops. ”). ]