ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court properly ruled that the [...] Ad was therefore inadmissible on the grounds of relevancy.  As the Sketch was irrelevant, the [...] ad was also irrelevant as it was proffered to show the hypothetical, “+/-,” not-to-scale building height shown on the Sketch.  It was further ruled inadmissible because it was impossible for the Trial Court to ascertain the actual building height from the measurement of one cinder block.  THE COURT: I’m barring [the [...] Ad].  It certainly shows the dimension of one cinder block.  From the other photographs in this picture, disregarding [the Sketch], which I never moved into evidence, it is impossible to judge the height of the building from the measurement of one cinder block when there’s only six rows of cinder blocks above the fourth-floor windows, and that’s all the cinder blocks I see in any of the other photographs.  2T39:4-12.  Neither the Sketch nor the [...] Ad addressed the key issue of the actual building height or the approved building height.  As such, the Trial Court properly ruled that both the Sketch and the [...] Ad were excluded from evidence.  Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 34 (2004).  The Trial Court’s evidentiary rulings were reasonable and well within the law.  This Court should note that after excluding the Sketch and [...] Ad, the Trial Court gave the Appellant numerous opportunities to introduce relevant evidence of the approved and actual building height.  The Appellant had the opportunity to introduce the approved elevation plan, he but chose not to do so.  Had he introduced the approved elevation plan, it would have shown that the building height dimension of 50’-6” above finished grade did not include the parapet.  That would have defeated his entire argument of the dimension on the Sketch being somehow relevant.  Instead, the Appellant kept trying to prove his case based on the excluded Sketch.  There was clearly no abuse of discretion or denial of justice by the Trial Court’s factual findings and evidentiary ruling based thereon.  “The trial court is granted broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. ”  Verdicchio, 179 N.J. at 34 quoting Green, 160 N.J. at 492.  Absent abuse of discretion, the Trial Court’s evidentiary rulings are entitled to deference.  Wymbs, 163 N.J. at 537.  Accordingly, the exclusion of the Sketch and [...] Ad into evidence should be upheld on appeal.  Id.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the Sketch and [...] Ad as evidence on the grounds that they lack relevance.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s rulings and dismissal of the Complaint should be upheld.
[brief] (6T104-14 to 18; 6T105-14 to 18).  Defendant asked [...] to stay in the bathroom.  (6T106-1 to 10).  She was still wearing the same clothes she wore at the bus station, and when she undressed, [...] saw what looked like blood on defendant’s bra.  (6T105-19 to 106-19).  As defendant bathed, [...] gathered her clothes in a black bag.  (6T108-2 to 7; 6T109-9 to 12).  [...] had been working as an FBI informant and planned to tell her connection in the FBI about defendant.
[brief] Each expert testified to the accuracy of the recalculated numbers.  (Da3045). ³  The Court heard testimony relating to the fair value and fair market value of [...]’s interests as of December 13, 2018, as well as the book value as of December 13, 2018 and December 31, 2017.  The relevant determination on appeal is the undisputed [...] historical methodology of referencing the book value on the prior-year’s tax returns (tax book value on December 31, 2017) (hereafter “Tax Book Value”).  [...]’s 29.5% interest in [...] as of December 13, 2018, is indisputably $745,244.93 if using the Tax Book Value.  Prior to the hearing, [...]’s current Chief Financial Officer [...] provided a certification analyzing the historic Tax Book Value method and providing over a decade’s worth of transactions at Tax Book Value that occurred while [...] was CEO.  During the hearing, [...] confirmed that [...] has a long history of using the prior year’s book value—meaning the unadjusted ³  The remaining testimony is not recited here, as the only aspect at issue is (a) the application of discounts, and (b) the use of book value as opposed to fair market value, both of which are legal issues not subject to expert testimony.
[directive] Deadly force against individuals in a moving vehicle.  Strict additional requirements must be met before an officer may use deadly force against a driver or passenger of a moving vehicle.  Moving vehicles create tremendous risk to officers engaged in enforcement operations, particularly officers attempting to arrest fleeing suspects.  Officers must abide by the following guidelines: (a) during such operations, officers shall never intentionally position themselves in the path of a moving vehicle or a vehicle that is likely to move; (b) officers shall make every effort to move out of the path of a vehicle in order to maintain their safety; (c) officers shall not grab onto moving vehicles or the drivers or occupants of moving vehicles.  If a vehicle begins to move while an officer is engaged with the driver or an occupant, the officer shall, if feasible, disengage from the contact with the driver or occupant to avoid being dragged, carried, or struck by the moving vehicle; and (d) while any firearm discharge entails some risk, discharging a firearm at a moving vehicle entails an even greater risk to innocent persons and passengers because of the risk that the fleeing suspect may lose control of the vehicle.
[brief] Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”) submits this brief in support of its appeal from three Orders of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, Chancery Division (the “Trial Court”) dated June 12, 2024.  The Orders granted Plaintiff-Respondent [...]’s (“[...]’s”) motion to confirm an arbitration award (the “Award”), denied [...]’s motion to vacate the Award, denied [...]’s motion to modify the Award to correct mathematical and form errors, and denied [...]’s motion for leave to assert a counterclaim for setoff of monies owed to [...] by [...].
[brief] Plaintiffs' Letter Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, [...], Esquire and [...] ...........................................................(omitted) Exhibit M2, 12/28/2017 Certification of [...] in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motions to Quash Subpoenas ...........................................(omitted) Exhibit M2-1, 8/21/2018  Order Denying Summary Judgment Motion of Defendants [...] and [...] .........................................................(omitted, see 30a)
[brief] The record does not support Appellant’s misleading proposition that the trial court invoked a new requirement for a written agreement.  During oral argument before issuing its opinion on March 27, 2023, the court stated the following regarding written arrangements:  Here’s what I don’t -- here’s what I really have an issue with, that there is a written arrangement, the very first one for a definite or indefinite period in which a person grants to another person now a license to use a trademark.  . .  I don’t find that there was a written arrangement.
[brief] (“[...]”) for an inclusionary residential development project with a condition requiring elevators in all of the multi-story buildings with housing violated a Settlement Agreement dated January 8, 2021 between [...], the Board and the [...] (“[...]”) in this Mount Laurel compliance action.  [...] argued below that it was entitled to approval of its application without an elevator in the fifth building, despite its representations to the Board prior to the close of the Board hearings that it would include elevators in all buildings and the Board’s willingness to approve a development application on such grounds.  As discussed hereafter, the trial court improperly granted prerogative writ (“PW”) relief in this action on [...]’s motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and improperly set aside a Resolution adopted by the Board on [...]’s development application.  To support its decision, the Court held that the Board and [...] had acted in bad faith.  To reach that holding, the Court ignored the motion record before it, which was woefully deficient in that there were no transcripts of the proceedings before the Board, and chose to consider the history of the litigation dating back to 2015, when at most the parties’ actions after the Settlement Agreement was executed in January 2021 were in issue.
[brief] POINT  I  BOTH OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED IN THEIR ENTIRETY BECAUSE HE WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN QUESTIONED WITHOUT MIRANDA WARNINGS ON MARCH 6, WHICH RENDERED INEFFECTIVE THE WARNINGS GIVEN PRIOR TO HIS INTERROGATION ON MARCH 12.  (21T50-23 to 61-17; Da128-130)  In arguing that Defendant was not in custody during the March 6 Statement, the State primarily relies on State v. Erazo, ___ N.J. ___ (2023).
[brief] This reply brief shall encompass reply arguments to both the response briefs of [...] and of [...].  Appellant has not failed to brief the necessary elements of the torts claim act (TCA) as the erroneous determination of the Court as to the dangerous condition was the basis for the findings in several other elements.  The other TCA elements, specifically actual or constructive notice and palpable unreasonableness were determined based upon the merits of the case, they were only determined to be denied because a dangerous condition was not found by the Court.  (Pa11-12)  As such, Appellant's briefing of the dangerous condition and request to remand the remaining elements of actual or constructive notice and palpable unreasonableness is appropriate and sufficient to appeal these matters.  [...] fails to acknowledge the fact that the trial Court did not address [...]'s, Appellant's treating doctor, report nor any of the findings contained therein in making their determination as to permanent injury and that they have no expert to dispute the findings of [...].  [...] repeatedly states in their response brief that there is no dispute that the lease states the landlord was responsible for maintaining common areas, which they allege includes the area where Appellant fell, however these allegations have been disputed repeatedly by Appellant.  Nowhere in the lease does it state anything about the maintenance of the parking lot, however it does state that the maintenance of the leased premises is the responsibility of the tenant.  As such, [...] owed a duty to Appellant and the public interest does not outweigh the non-delegable contractual duty set forth by the lease.  In short, the trial Court's rulings should be reversed.
[brief] (27T 153-2 to 153-19).  [...]’s testimony at the Miranda hearing was consistent with the evidence at the time that the officers had no reason to believe Defendant was involved with the murder.  See (16T 24-13 to 24-16).  Indeed, the opening of the interview made it clear to Defendant, or any reasonable person in his situation, that this was an optional interview that he could have declined had he wanted to:
[brief] In fact, the appellants failed to identify anywhere in the record where this issue was properly raised, litigated, and ruled upon by the trial court.  (Db50-51).  Though pled as an affirmative defense, the appellants never litigated the issue on summary judgment, at trial, or in post-trial motions. \(^{18}\) *Williams*, 132 N.J. at 118-120; *Interchange State Bank v. Veglia*, 286 N.J. Super. 164, 188 (App. Div. 1995).
[brief] Q.  Did anyone ever advise you in writing between July 2016 and August 2017 of an allegation that [...] engaged in any type of misconduct towards the juveniles during the police response on July 5th, 2016?  A.  No.  Q.  Between July 2016 and August 2017, were you ever made aware of any accusation of racial profiling or racial bias on the part of [...] during the police response in the incident regarding the juveniles after the fireworks display on July 5th, 2016?  A. No. (Deposition of [...] 43:20-44:14, 677a).
[brief] Visibility was dark and the Plaintiff was wearing prescription glasses at the time of his accident.  If the Defendant’s second indication that the Plaintiff was not far from the crosswalk is true, then it can hardly be said that the Defendant was using the roadway in a careless manner or failed to use it in a manner for which it was intended.  Both statements by the Defendant taken together raises an issue of fact as to the location of the crosswalk and whether Defendant used the roadway in a manner for which it was intended.  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 59:9-4 states:  Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any party or his legal representative to recover damages to the extent permitted under this act, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the party against whom recovery is sought or was not greater than the combined negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought.
[brief] (See Pa363 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa476 ([...] denies 5 [...] does not argue that the temporal proximity of her termination is indicative of causation, other than arguing that [...] interfered with [...]’s investigation of her conduct.  This argument is addressed below.  [...]’s request for prospective staffing coordinator charge pay); Pa298 at 80:10-14 ([...] admitting at her deposition that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay for any staffing coordinator); Pa548-49 ([...] never notified [...] whether [...] had directly approved her receipt of charge pay); Pa478 ([...] told [...] that he never received approval from [...] to enter charge pay); Pa476; Pa106-07 at 89:6-90:6 ([...] told [...] that she never would have entered charge pay for only three of her five staffing coordinators); Pa362 at 78:14-21 ([...] previously sought extra pay for her staffing coordinators during the COVID-19 pandemic, but was rejected by senior management); Pa365 at 90:5-91:1; Pa476; Pa483-529 (Plaintiffs entered charge pay for each other after [...] reviewed their time cards for pay periods).
[brief] Here, if this Court does not enter a judgment of acquittal for homicide given the jury’s finding that [...] acted in self-defense,\(^2\) it should, at minimum, reverse the passion/provocation manslaughter conviction because such a conviction was the result of the erroneous jury instruction to consider other homicide offenses.  \(^2\)  In all of these cases, reversal was the required remedy because it was unclear why the jury acquitted the defendant of the greater homicide charges.  See, e.g., *Roberts*, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (“As there is no way of knowing whether the acquittal of the two murder counts was based on a finding of justification, so as to require acquittal on the two manslaughter counts as well, the judgment must be reversed, and the indictment dismissed” and “[t]he highest offense for which defendant may be re-indicted, however, is manslaughter in the first degree”); *Ross*, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 820 (“Since there is no way of knowing whether the acquittal on the top counts was based on a finding of justification, so as to require acquittal on the lesser-included offense as well, a new trial is necessary.
[brief] ”  See Appellate Opinion pg. 17.  The policy and custom of the prison’s and County’s failure to properly supervise its staff caused Plaintiff to be denied to her equal rights of access to proper medical care, access to her attorney, access to the courts and the right to grieve and petition government for redress.  Plaintiff’s rights were harmed and damaged and damaged, she was denied a speedy trial and she sustained severe emotional distress.  The appellate Division stated on page 17 that “[b]ecause the amended complaint asserted the constitutional claims against [...] and [...] under a negligent supervision theory,” the dismissal of counts fours and five were not warranted.  Plaintiff thusly made cognizable claims under count four and five that she was not required to prove at a Rule 4:6-2 (e) juncture.  The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment has been interpreted to prohibit deliberate indifference—by both medical providers and prison officials—to an inmate's serious medical needs.
[brief] XII.  [...], [...], and [...] are Terminated.  After the investigation was completed, [...] convened a “termination panel. ” (Pa90 at 26:14-25).  Termination panels typically comprise of the Human Resources business partner for the employee’s particular department, the assistant-Vice President for Human Resources, in-house counsel, and the employee’s manager or director.  (Pa90).  No singular termination panel member has final decision-making power.  (Pa90-91 at 29:19-30:6; Pa353 at 45:16-46:8; Pa353 at 47:17-22).  [...] could not independently terminate an employee’s employment.  (Pa353 at 45:12-15).  After carefully considering the evidence from [...]’s investigation, the termination panel elected to terminate [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa91 at 30:3-6; Pa115 at 127:19-128:12; Pa368 at 108:16-18; Pa90 at 29:19-25).
[brief] *Id.* at 109.  The Court reasoned that, given the inherent and documented danger associated with conducting traffic stops, “what is at most a mere inconvenience [to the driver] cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety. ”  *Id.* at 111.  However, in *State v. Smith*, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declined to extend the *Mimms* per se rule to passengers.
[directive] 5.  Providing notice of a detained individual’s upcoming release from custody, unless the detainee: a) is currently charged with, has ever been convicted of, has ever been adjudicated delinquent for, or has ever been found not guilty by reason of insanity of, a violent or serious offense as that term is defined in Appendix A; b) in the past five years, has been convicted of an indictable crime other than a violent or serious offense; or c) is subject to a Final Order of Removal that has been signed by a federal judge and lodged with the county jail or state prison where the detainee is being held.  6.  Continuing the detention of an individual past the time he or she would otherwise be eligible for release from custody based solely on a civil immigration detainer request, unless the detainee:  1  Non-public personally identifying information includes a social security number, credit card number, unlisted telephone number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, and active financial account number of any person.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, N.J. Court Rule 1:38-7(a).  It may also include the address, telephone number, or email address for an individual’s home, work, or school, if that information is not readily available to the public.  Page 5  a) is currently charged with, has ever been convicted of, has ever been adjudicated delinquent for, or has ever been found not guilty by reason of insanity of, a violent or serious offense as that term is defined in Appendix A; b) in the past five years, has been convicted of an indictable crime other than a violent or serious offense; or c) is subject to a Final Order of Removal that has been signed by a federal judge and lodged with the county jail or state prison where the detainee is being held.  Any such detention may last only until 11:59 pm on the calendar day on which the person would otherwise have been eligible for release.  C.
[brief] As a result of the second sentence of the definition, the statutory coverage extends not only to those making or extending loans, but those that solicit such loans, those that assist in the procurement or negotiation of the same and those that purchase or acquire “notes. ”  The purpose of the second sentence of the definition is pellucid – to expand the scope of the statute and its licensure and other requirements well beyond the entities that actually provide the credit ab initio.  It is in this context that one must examine the explicit text that the statutory scheme encompasses those in the business of “buying, discounting or endorsing notes. ”  Because the statutory definition includes (i) those that initiate consumer loans by issuing credit cards and credit card agreements; and (ii) via the second sentence, intended to broaden the coverage, those engaged in purchasing “notes,” there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended by use of that term to limit the same to negotiable promissory notes as defined and addressed in the Uniform Commercial Code and thereby exclude from the coverage of the statute purchasers of credit card accounts.
[brief] [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. [...], and the MAYOR AND BOROUGH COUNCIL OF THE [...], Defendants-Appellants.  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: MONMOUTH COUNTY  DOCKET NO: [...] SAT BELOW  Honorable [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS
[brief] Instead, the relevant rule is *Rule* 4:4-4(b)(3), which states that “any defendant may be served as provided by court order, consistent with due process of law. ”  *R.*  4:4-4(b)(3).  As already explained, the lower court’s \(^4\) Indeed, on May 14, 2021, the lower court denied Plaintiff’s initial substitute service motion, and required Plaintiff to take the additional steps of completing a DMV check or attempting service “by way of certified mail. ”  *(Pa135 to 136).*  September 24, 2021 order deemed that service had been effectuated via regular and certified mail as of the date of the order.  Furthermore, the Appellate Division noted in *M & D Associates*, the movant’s “motion to vacate was, under the circumstances, brought within a reasonable time.
[brief] (20T172-19 to 173-23).  She told them, among other things, that public officers like defendant “are under an inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity. ”  They are required “to be diligent and conscientious, to exercise their discretion not arbitrarily but reasonably. ”  “Above all,” such persons have a duty “to display good faith, honesty and integrity. ” (20T172-19 to 173-5).
[brief] As counsel for Defendants explained at the April 4th motion hearing, failure to grant Defendants’ motion would have important consequences for the future viability of UPEPA in countering SLAPP suits like those filed by Plaintiff.  See T8:3–4 (arguing that failure to reopen judgment and allow Defendants to seek attorneys’ fees under UPEPA “would render UPEPA a dead letter. ”).  To hold that Defendants were without a remedy “[on] account of [Plaintiff]’s gamesmanship” and “despite attorney’s fees being statutorily authorized,” Defendants’ counsel argued, “would profoundly subvert the purpose of the New Jersey anti-SLAPP statute[,] which was to nip in the b[u]d lawsuits like [Plaintiff’s], . . . to disincentivize . . . them in the first place. ”  *Id.* at 39:18–25.  And it “would provide a roadmap for future litigants on how to circumvent the statute’s provisions as well. ”  *Id.* at 39:25–40:2.  Defendants’ counsel emphasized that “a litigant like [Plaintiff] could file a harassing, meritless lawsuit against the defendant, preview the defendants’ arguments for dismissal, . . . and after the defendants had expended considerable time, energy, and stress defending the lawsuit[,] strategically dismiss at the last moment that lawsuit if it turned out that the defendants’ arguments in favor of dismissal . . . turned out to be strong enough. ”  *Id.* at 8:4–13.  The result, Defendants’ counsel explained, would be the “creat[ion] of a perverse incentive for litigants to file lawsuit after meritless lawsuit against a defendant. ”  *Id.* at 8:14–16.  Notwithstanding Defendants’ counsel’s emphasis on the important public policy implications of a ruling against Defendants and for the future effectiveness of UPEPA more broadly, the trial court denied the motion without even mentioning or considering that argument, reasoning that: