ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Though Defendants cite to Browne, Jubelt, and North, Defendants have neglected to include the unpublished decisions in their appendix.  2  Though Defendants rely on North, supra, No. 2:20-cv-20190 (BRM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974, the holding in North does not support Defendants’ position that the trial court’s dismissal here should be affirmed.  Analogous to the instant action, the court in North analyzed claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), predicated on violations of the NJCFLA, at the pleading stage and held that dismissal was inappropriate.  See North, No. 2:20-cv-20190 (BRM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974, at *12-14 (D.N.J. Sep. 24, 2021)  NJSLA was superseded by the New Jersey Consumer Loan Act\textsuperscript{34} ("NJCLA"), which was subsumed by the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act ("NJLLA"), N.J.S.A. 17:C-1 to -49., in 1997. \textsuperscript{5}  The NJLLA was superseded by the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act ("NJRMLA"), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, and the NJCFLA in 2010.
[brief] Accordingly, the trial court’s orders should be affirmed.  DATED: February 12, 2024  **[...]**  By:/s/[...]  [...], Esq. (NJ Bar #016691995)  [...], Esq. (NJ Bar. #000662010)  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  [...]  *Attorney for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent AMD  Direct d/b/a [...]*  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET No. [...] [...], ASSIGNEE OF [...], Plaintiff, —against— [...]
[brief] [...]:  I’m sorry to interject once again, but just from a business perspective, I feel like the Court should understand this.  This is a non-recourse loan, Your Honor.  A non-recourse loan.  [...] is arguing as though this is a recourse loan, and I respectfully have to stop him from doing so.  --- 3  Although no testimony was taken, the trial court permitted Mr. Sturman, in effect, to supplement Plaintiff’s counsel’s argument, over the objection of counsel for the [...].  1T29-14.  The [...]’ counsel then pointed out the existence of the Guaranty:  MR. HERRMANN:  Thank you.  Let me begin with Mr. Sturman’s assertion that this was a non-recourse loan.  That is absolutely false.  Now, if we were in a courtroom I could hand the document up to the Court.  We are on this high tech Zoom thing, so here it is.  This is a guarantee of August 10, 2018 in which [...] guarantees the mortgage.  And it is still on the hook.  That guarantee is still there.  The Court subsequently recognized the inconsistency of Plaintiff’s principal claiming he would pay off the debt, while simultaneously refusing to provide indemnification.
[brief] ”  Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 416, (1996).  In reversing the trial judge’s earlier finding that [...] had no duty to not assault Lowe’s customers, this Court stated that “at a minimum a store employee has an obligation not to assault the store’s customer. ” (Pa31).  In prosecuting his negligence action the plaintiff only needed to prove that [...] acted unreasonably, without the subjective intent to harm required for an assault and battery claim.  Model Jury Charge 3.10A.  Under negligence, liability may be imposed for the same conduct as assault, however without the intent.  Abrams v. General Star Indem., 67 P.3d 931, 935 (Or.Sup.Ct. 2003).  “Willfulness is not a defense to a charge of negligence. ”  Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 390 (1970); N.J. Mfrs. V. Vizcaino, 392 N.J.Super. 366, 370 (A.D. 2007).  C. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO COMMENT ON HASSAN’S ABSENCE.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff filed a Complaint on November 30, 2022 in the above captioned matter.  (Pa1-Pa10).  This Complaint was amended twice, on December 19, 2022 (Pa11-Pa21), and again on January 20, 2023 (Pa22-Pa32).  A few days later, on January 23, 2023, the Trial Court signed a Consent Order allowing [...] to Intervene.  (Pa 44-Pa45).  [...] and [...] separately filed Motions to Dismiss the Complaint in this case on February 15, 2023.  (Pa46-Pa49).  Oral argument was held on May 11, 2023, (T2) and thereafter the Trial Court requested supplemental briefing on the ordinance notice issue.  On July 12, 2023, the Trial Court issued an Order and Memorandum of Decision granting --- 1  A second, nearly identical Complaint was also filed by a different entity, [...], who did not appeal the lower Court’s decision.  the Motion to Dismiss.  (Pa51-Pa62).  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal thereafter on August 18, 2023.  (Pa63-Pa66).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] As to the local union office, contrary to [...]’s position (Ab25-29), the Commission correctly found that it was a location that could reasonably be regarded as an extension of the workplace, especially when viewed against the backdrop of the union’s relationship with the State.  See CWA Contract & State of New Jersey, pml. July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2023, https://wpsite.cwa1038.org/public_html/PDF_Files/CWA_NJ_2019_2023_Contract.pdf (last accessed Jan. 15, 2025) (The CWA contract’s purpose is “the improvement and promotion of harmonious employee relationships between the State and its employees represented by the Union. ”).
[directive] Allegation # 1 - Racial Profiling Reviews of the DIVR (dash in vehicle recorder), the body worn camera (BWC) and radio communications did not reveal any comments that would support racial motivation in the stop.  The DIVR video fails to reveal the race of the driver as conditions were dark.  [...] states on the radio in initiating the stop that the race of the driver is unknown.  A review of [...]’s stop history does not reveal a pattern of racial imbalance in stops or other indications of bias.  Complainant’s claim that others were also travelling over the speed limit does not establish proof of racial profiling.  Finding: Not Sustained Allegation # 2 - Conduct  Unbecoming an Officer Reviews of the DIVR, the BWC and radio communications do not reveal any comments that were rude or unprofessional.  [...] remained calm and polite throughout the encounter.  Finding: Unfounded Allegation # 3 - Arrest Without Probable Cause  Complainant alleges that she should not have been arrested for a traffic ticket.  While an arrest for a traffic ticket would have been improper, the facts show that complainant was not arrested for a traffic ticket, but rather because when her license was run by the trooper it showed that there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest based on a felony complaint.  Finding: Exonerated Allegation # 4 - Excessive Force  3  Review of the DIVR and BWC shows that [...] slammed complainant to the ground when she asked a question about why she was being arrested.  She did not resist or attempt to flee and was not given an opportunity to voluntarily comply with handcuffing.  The trooper’s conduct was a violation of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy and the NJ State Police Policy on force.  Finding: Sustained Discipline Imposed (to be completed when Discipline is final; See Section 9.11.2) – 30-day suspension and retraining.
[brief] (Dra18-22); see also, 5T108:24-111:19.  One email was from [...], providing [...] with [...]’s 2010 QuickBooks file.  In another, dated September 27, 2011, [...] provided journal entries to [...] for him to update his QuickBooks.  In an email dated December 8, 2015, [...] asked [...] for his QuickBooks file for [...].  The email exchange shows that [...] used QuickBooks; that the records were maintained in [...]’s personal files on his [...] computer and that [...] was actively engaged in maintaining those records and providing [...] with the information necessary from those files for the preparation of tax documents.  Yes, [...] was a "scientist," but it is important to consider the role that played in the parties' companies.
[directive] In the by approved process risk-assessment pretrial objective the of 'results to the weight substantial the Directive, throughout this noted as However, 2A:162-25(c).  N.J.S.A. to pursuant AOC and facts all for account not does AOC the by approved process risk-assessment pretrial release defendant's by a posed risks the on bearing material a have may that circumstances for grounds establish Directive this of provisions some that (noting 8 note See trial. pending results).  risk-assessment pretrial automated the of independent are that presumption invoking a be may that information relevant additional any consider should therefore, prosecutor, A the that however, provided, Section 7.6, and 4.2.5 to 4.2.2 subsections see available, reasonably to deciding for basis the information as additional such any on rely shall not prosecutor the unless Directive this to pursuant detention pretrial against presumption overcome the hearing.23
[brief] **  *Miller* factor three requires a sentencing court to consider “[t]he circumstances of the offense, including the extent of [the juvenile’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him,”  *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 477.  One way in which adolescents differ from adults is the outsized influence that peer pressure has on their behavior – particularly as it concerns risk taking.  (Da 95)  Based on developmental science research, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly heeded that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. ”
[brief] ”  Kaul v. Christie, 372 F.Supp.3d 206, 239 (D.N.J. 2019) (citing Wisniewski v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co, 290 F.App’x 153 (3d Cir.  Thus, the three requirements for the application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine are, as follows: “(1) the judgment in the prior action [is] valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action [are] identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action [] grow[s] out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one. ”  Id.  Here, Appellant’s claims are precluded by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and Entire Controversy because: (1) Appellant’s Class Action was dismissed by the Superior Court in the Class Action Order and affirmed by this Court in Diana v. [...], 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2024); (2) the Class Action involved the same parties; and (3) the Class Action is based on the same facts and circumstances of the Action.
[brief] Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14 (2011).............................................................................................................21  St. Vincent’s Hosp. v. Finley, 154 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 1977)..................................................................................23  Statutes: N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4..................................................................................................................13
[brief] G. Persuasiveness of Federal Court Decisions.  Hunstein/Khimmat/Jackin are the only published decisions holding that a debt collector violates § 1692c(b) when it conveys the type of data which Defendant conveyed to its mail vendor.  Comments made in other decisions where the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction are not holdings.  All but one of Defendant’s unpublished New Jersey decisions failed to recognize the existence of any federal court decision.  [...] mentioned one of them, Hunstein, but never evaluated its reasoning.  Hardly the “due respect” expected following Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69 (1990).  CONCLUSION
[brief] There, the Court considered the admissibility of testimony from a police officer who narrated a video of a bank robbery despite not being present during the actual robbery.  Id. at *7-*8.  Though the Court ultimately reversed the defendant’s convictions on grounds other than the video footage narration, it nonetheless established “limiting principles” that control the proper scope of admissible video narration testimony.  Id. at *23-*25.  Drawing on several evidentiary rules, the Court first underscored that video narration testimony from a lay witness must satisfy two fundamental requirements: it must (1) be based upon the witness’ “firsthand knowledge” and (2) it must be helpful to the jury.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE MARCH 17, 2023, ORDER DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE MAY 12, 2023, TRIAL COURT ORDER) The Plaintiff is entitled to seek relief from a Court’s order pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:50-1, which provides the following grounds for such motion: On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[directive] Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges you pleaded 20.  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  [NA/Nie dotyczy] guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?  Czy rezygnuje Pan(i) z prawa do przedstawienia argumentu podczas wydawania wyroku, ze istniejii zarzuty, do kt6rych Pan(i) sic, juz przyznal(a), za kt6re nie moze Pan(i) otrzymac osobnego wyroku?  List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense attorney, or 21.
[brief] [...]  [...]  [...]  P: [...]  [...]  By: [...], Esq. (412342022)  Attorney for Fair Share Housing  Submitted Date: December 13, 2023  [...], individually and in his official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], individually and in his official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], individually and in her official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], [...] d/b/a [...], and [...] (fictitious entities including public entities) and [...] (fictitious individuals), Defendant-Respondents.
[brief] Pa126-273.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa274-284.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.  Pa278.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, Wren underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa278.  Of the fifty-nine (59) FTA members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.  Pa278.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa130.  Despite not receiving notice, Licameli attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa132.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa132.  In response to his filing, Licameli received correspondence from the [...] requesting medical information.  Pa134.  Licameli contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa134.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.
[brief] For the reasons above, this Court should allow [...] to intervene herein for the limited purpose of supplementing/settling the record \textit{in specific response} to the factual assertions and implications that [...] willingly and without protest or misgiving accepted the Department’s new position \textit{prior} to the adoption of Bulletin 22-11.  \textit{R. 2:5-5}.  In the alternative, the matter can be remanded so that the head of the Department can determine if [...] should be permitted to intervene.  \textit{N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.2(b)}; see also \textit{Warner}, 270 N.J. Super. at 668 (remanding the request to intervene to the trial court for determination).  Given the procedural history of this case and the Department’s recent invocation of its course of conduct \textit{with [...]} as factual evidence in support of its position, [...]’s interests in this regard are not adequately represented before this Court.  Only [...] can speak to its actions and position in response to the Department’s specific discussion \textit{of [...]’s conduct} as it bears on the issues in this case.  Likewise, given that the decision on this case has the potential to affect [...]’s future interactions with the Department.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Commentary to the Part VII Guidelines and in guidance from the Division of Criminal  3  The prohibition of plea agreements for certain marijuana and other drug offenses encompasses any agreement between the prosecutor and the defense “as to the offense or offenses to which a defendant will plead guilty on the condition that any or all of the following occur: (a) the prosecutor will recommend to the court that another offense or offenses be dismissed; (b) the prosecutor will recommend to the court that it accept a plea to a lesser or other offense (whether included or not) than that originally charged; (c) the prosecutor will recommend a sentence(s), not to exceed the maximum permitted, to the court or remain silent at sentencing. ”  Part VII Guideline 2.  A plea agreement includes “all of those traditional practices, utilized by prosecutors and defense counsel, including ‘merger’, ‘dismissal’, ‘downgrade’ or ‘amendment. ’”  Part VII Guidelines Comment.  4
[brief] )  Plaintiff’s counsel then “wrote to [] [...]’s counsel, *notifying them that they were in breach of the [PSA] Agreement*” and advising that “Plaintiff would direct [[...]] to return to Plaintiff the [Deposit].” (Id. (emphasis added)).  On July 15, 2022, [...]’s counsel responded by stating that [...] did “not object to the . . . return of the [D]eposit to [Plaintiff]” and that [...] “deeme[ed] the request . . . for the return of the Deposit to constitute an election by [Plaintiff] under Section 13.1 of the [PSA] of its remedy to terminate the [PSA] and receive the return of the Deposit. ” (Pa331; Pa11, ¶40 (specifically referencing and discussing content of the 7/15/22 e-mail)).  Thereafter, on July 15, 2022, Plaintiff instructed [...] to return the funds, “which it subsequently did. ” (Pa11, ¶41).
[directive] Charge Auto Directive WHERE Aggravated Aggravated Aggravated Aggravated Aggravated Aggravated by Rule (c)(1) by STATUTES  3:3-1  Promulgated 2C:12-1c(1)(2)(3)  Rule 2C:12-1b(4)  2C:12-1b(5)  2C:12-1b(6)  2C:12-1b(7)  2C:12-1b(9)  Statute permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible Bail Option Cash 6 10%  JUDGE’S 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% issue.
[brief] As the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, “[o]ne of the bedrock constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants is the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment....”  Hemphill v. New York, —— U.S. ——, 142 S. Ct. 681, 690, 211 L.Ed.2d 534 (2022).  The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him....”  U.S. Const. amend.  VI.  The New Jersey Constitution's analogue to the Sixth Amendment, Article I, paragraph 10, “provide[s] equivalent protection. ”  State v. Roach, 219 N.J. 58, 74, 95 A.3d 683 (2014).
[brief] Indeed, “[t]he core equitable concern in applying laches is whether a party has been harmed by the delay. ”  Knorr, 178 N.J. at 181 (citing Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 152-53 (1982)).  Here, it is not disputed that [...] was unlicensed when it purchased the debt and filed the collection Complaint, to wit, [...] acted in bad faith by violating a remedial consumer protection statute in the attempted purchase and enforcement of the void account (becoming licensed after the fact).  Notwithstanding the fact that expiration of the statute of limitations would have no practical legal effect on the already void debt, [...]’s Motion to Vacate did not seek dismissal of [...]’s claims, but rather sought to open the suit to be litigated on the merits.  See [...]’s proposed Answer and Affirmative Defenses, generally. (Da46-Da50).  Thus, the expiration of the statute of limitations is of no consequence to an analysis of prejudice and/or laches here—[...] would have remained free to pursue its claims should the Motion to Vacate have been granted.  Without a finding of prejudice (based on the trial court’s analysis of the expiration of the statute of limitations), there can be no finding that [...]’s requested relief is barred by laches.
[brief] “T” refers to the transcript of the August 24, 2023 pre-motion conference.  2  Plaintiff-Appellees  [...]  [...], [...], [...], and [...], are referred to herein collectively as the “[...]. ”  The [...] are affiliated with a company commonly referred to as “[...],” a practice management organization with over 400 affiliated physician corporations that provide emergency medical services throughout the [...] States.  (See Da103.) owned subsidiaries. \(^3\) (Da3-5.)  [...] provides health coverage to its members and serves as a third-party administrator for self-funded, employer-sponsored health plans.\(^4\) (Da3-4.)  The origins of this case are set forth in [...]’ 2022 Second Amended Complaint filed in the Gloucester County, Superior Court, Law Division.