ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “[T]o conduct a protective search, an officer must have a ‘specific and particularized basis for an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. ’”  *Roach*, 172 N.J. at 27 (quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 30)(emphasis omitted).  A tip from a confidential informant can furnish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop or pat-down search for weapons, provided the tip is reliable.  *State v. Birkenmeier*, 185 N.J. 552, 562 (2006).
[brief] 234a, ¶ 154.  Plaintiff denied Defendant [...]’s version of events, provided a detailed accounting of the incidents, and identified other individuals who would have more knowledge, as well as documents that would support Plaintiff’s version of events.  234a-236a.  As to Incident B, Plaintiff could not meaningfully respond to [...]’s questions during the Interview.  236a, ¶ 170.  That is because the investigator previously represented that the investigation had nothing to do with the 2016 Lawsuit.  232a, ¶ 139.  Yet, Incident B was expressly based upon the 2016 Lawsuit, with Defendant [...] claiming she had been mistreated by Plaintiff so that Plaintiff could further her 2016 Lawsuit.  236a-237a.  Plaintiff also alleges that [...] also made many representations at the end of the Interview regarding his next steps, many of which did not happen.  He stated that Plaintiff would learn the results of the investigation, but she never did.
[brief] First, “the law will not enforce a different contract than the parties have seen fit to express in their writing. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. at 148.  “It has been decided many times and in many cases that the court will not make a different or a better contract than the parties themselves have seen fit to enter into. ”  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217 (1951) (citing, Herbert L. Farkas Co. v. N.Y. Fire Ins. Co., 5 N.J. 604, (1950); James v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 N.J. 21 (1950); First National Bank, Fort Lee, v. Burdett, 121 N.J.Eq. 277 (E. & A. 1936); Krieg v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 116 N.J.L. 467 (E. & A. 1936); Marone v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 114 N.J.L. 295 (E. & A. 1934); Frisbie Throwing Co. v. London Guarantee, &c., Co., 105 N.J.L. 613, (E. & A. 1929); Kupfersmith v. Delaware Ins. Co., 84 N.J.L. 271, 86 A. 399 (E. & A. 1912)).
[brief] Whether or Not the [...]’s Conduct was “Palpably Unreasonable” is for the Jury (Raised below, Pa2149, 2152)  To begin with, whether the conduct of a public entity is palpably unreasonable is a fact question for the jury.  See Vincitore v. Sports & Expo. Auth. 169 N.J. 119, 130 (2001).  It is true that "palpably unreasonable" conduct contemplates more than mere negligence.  Coyne v. DOT, 182 N.J. 481, 493 (2005).  It is also true that this concept "imposes a steep burden on a plaintiff," and "implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstances[,] as well as behavior from which "it must be manifest and obvious that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction."  *Ibid.*  (quoting *Kolitch v. Lindedahl*, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (App. Div.1985)).  In the instant case, however, when the trial court analyzed whether or not the [...]’s actions or its failure to act were “palpably unreasonable,” the Trial Court incorrectly focused on the reasonableness of the [...]’s inspection procedures instead of focusing on the [...]’s duty to repair or warn of the condition.  On this record, there is competent evidence that not only was the settlement a “dangerous condition” but also that the [...] had been informed of the existence of the condition on two separate occasions.  In fact, on both occasions, the [...] was told to repair it.  In other words, the [...]’s inspection procedures are irrelevant.  Given the [...]’s awareness of the “dangerous condition”, the Court’s focus should have been on whether or not the [...]’s failure to repair or warn of the condition was “palpably unreasonable”.  Here, what makes the [...]’s failure to act so egregious is not only the fact that they were told to repair it as far back as April 22, 2015, but also that on July 2, 2015 the [...] was told to fix it “immediately. ” (Pa1193).  According to [...] engineer [...], that means within 24 hours.
[brief] Kuropchak, 221 N.J. at 385 (quoting Marrero, 148 N.J. at 484).  Additionally, defendant’s argument in the alternative, that a specific jury instruction should have been crafted by the trial court regarding the dying declaration, is without merit.  Notably, no timely objection was made, so [reviewing courts] must determine whether the comment was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”
[brief] The APA defines an “administrative rule” as an:  . . . .  [A]gency statement of general applicability and continuing effect that implements or interprets law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements of any agency.  The term includes the amendment or repeal of any rule, but does not include: (1) statements concerning the internal management or discipline of any agency; (2) interagency and interagency statements; and (3) agency decisions and findings in contested cases.  (N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2(e)).  [Coalition for Quality Health Care v. NJDOBI, 348 N.J. Super. 272, 295 (App. Div. 2002)].
[brief] Appellants respond briefly to address Respondents’ procedural history and statement of facts, with additional treatment herein.  Respondents selectively quote to an oral motion ruling on September 10, 2021 of a different judge, in a different case, relating to an order that is not on appeal in this matter and omit critical portions of the transcript wherein [...] expressly stated the early denial of the motion to compel arbitration was without prejudice, “not on the merits”, was only “a procedural ruling,” (Da98-99), and was made “with no real discovery” on the minimal record before him.  (Da116).  Further, Respondents have asserted numerous “facts” without citation to anything in the record below, and therefore those facts must be disregarded.  See Opp. Br. at 9-12 (retention of counsel, no access to POS, with no citations to any affidavit; hearsay statements about no change to form contract allegedly by “[...]” or “[...]”; warranty period claims, with no citation to the contract terms).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE RULING BELOW FRUSTRATES THE PURPOSE OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT BY FAILING TO ENFORCE THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS
[directive] Law 15) - 3  Program S.O.P. NJ/L&PS Forfeiture  1 1 Page Administration 16.  The completed Form D shall then be reviewed for accuracy, signed 3). in and dated by the person named block in  Enter the printed or typed name the person signed block 17. of who 16).  C.  Review by County Prosecutor D  The certified Form shall be reviewed by the county prosecutor of of if jurisdiction.  He/she shall determine the expenditure forfeiture funds is appropriate and consistent with the provisions of the applicable Statutes, Attorney General's Guidelines and the Forfeiture Program Administration  Standard Operating Procedures-  If the request is from the county the and prosecutor's ofice, the county prosecutor shall both certify approve request.
[brief] That it is quite possible that [...] was at that location on both July 16 and July 17 distinguishes this case from others in which the failure to establish the proper retrieval and accurate determination of time and date has been condoned by courts.  For instance, in Kirby v. State, 217 N.E.3d 575, 588-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), although the detective who retrieved the surveillance video did not know how the system operated and admitted that the timestamp was not accurate, “[g]iven that the video depicted the ignition of the very same garage that was burned to the ground on the day in question, we also do not think that the inaccuracy of the time stamp renders the video unreliable. ”  In other words: a particular garage can only burn down one time and therefore a video showing that garage burning down depicts that singular event.  But a person who works at a supermarket can be in that supermarket and outside that supermarket frequently.  A video depicting those actions cannot be assumed to show a date and time other than those on the video itself merely because that time best fits with the State’s theory of the case.  See also United States v. Watkins, 388 Fed. Appx. 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming the authentication of a video despite a timestamp discrepancy because “the exact time of the events in question here was not a material issue in this case”).  In sum, this video is the only evidence in the case that even purports to put [...] and [...] together at the time of the shooting.  But there is insufficient evidence that the video actually depicts the time of the shooting.  Without the State meeting its burden to demonstrate that the video was really from July 16 at 6:44pm, there is no admissible evidence of [...]’s guilt.  The convictions must be reversed.
[brief] 38 Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 305 (1954) .................................................................................... 44 State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 525 (1989) ................................................................... 58 State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 277 (1997) ......................................................... 58 State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 264 (1993) ......................................................... 58 Stewart v. New Jersey Transit Authority, 249 N.J. 642 (2022) ........................................................................................................ 56, 57 Sutphen v. Benthan, 165 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 1979) .............................. 25 United Savings Bank v. State, 360 N.J. Super. 520, 525 App. Div. 2002) ................................................................................................. 30 Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Portadin, 321 N.J. Super. at 576 ................................................................. 59 Vincitore v. Sports & Expo. Authority, 169 N.J. 119, 123, 124 (2001) .................................................. 31, 32, 41, 43 | Document Name | Date | Appendix Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------------| | Order denying Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 9/27/2019 | Pa1826 | | Order granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment | 4/10/2023 | Pa2133 | | Amended order granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and dismissing the case as to all parties with prejudice | 6/14/2023 | Pa2171 | | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript Number | |-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------| | Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 9/27/2019 | 1T | | Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 3/18/2022 | 2T | | Rule 104 Hearing | 5/9/2022 | 3T | I.
[brief] Thus, the PCR court’s unsupported declaration that [...]’s or another expert’s testimony would not have likely been admitted was unfounded.  Especially as PCR courts should view the facts in the light most favorable to a defendant, [...] easily established a prima facie case that the failure to consult with and retain an expert fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  It was also improper to find counsel’s failure to consult or use an expert was a “merely a strategic decision” so “no need to scrutinize [his] performance. ”  (Da363-64)  To determine if a decision was strategic, let alone reasonable, a judge must hear counsel’s testimony (and other evidence) to evaluate his conduct.
[brief] And even though the State had not asked [...] to point out any unusual gestures in the Alto Rango video, the prosecutor claimed for the first time that the video showed a “crucial moment” where, according to the prosecutor, the jury would see “[...] look in [...]’s direction and then do something. ”\(^3\) (5T 88-8 to 18)  The prosecutor then argued that that gesture evinced [...]’s “intent” to kill [...] and that “[i]t was planned all along.
[brief] [...] has an extensive prior criminal record involving similar crimes.  (Pa26-Pa27).  As an adult, [...] has ten prior convictions for petit larceny, impersonating a police officer, breaking and entering, carrying a concealed weapon, assault with an offensive weapon, robbery, rape, assault with intent to rob, entering without breaking, and attempted breaking and entering.  (Pa151; Pa350).  The rape conviction involved an April 27, 1967 incident in which [...] rang the doorbell of a forty-year-old woman, claiming he had a package for someone and asking if he could use her telephone.  (Pa284-Pa286).  Once in the home, [...] grabbed her by the neck from behind and raped her.  Ibid.  As an adult, [...] has had five prior opportunities on parole and one prior opportunity on probation.  (Pa151).  He has also had seven prior terms of incarceration.  Ibid.  [...] also has a juvenile record, which the Board will not discuss in detail due to the confidential nature of a juvenile history.  (Pa151; Pa350, Pa223-Pa225).  C.
[brief] On September 17, 2007, at 9:00 p.m., two men entered the victim's home through the back door.  She recognized the first man as co-defendant [...], but did not know the second person, later identified as defendant.  The victim testified that defendant possessed a “pointy” object and held it down to his side.  The victim did not know what the object was.  Although neither man said anything when they entered the residence, the victim was afraid and concerned for the safety of her seventy-year-old mother who also occupied the residence.  Defendant approached her mother, the victim screamed as defendant grabbed two pocketbooks hanging on a chair, and both men ran out of the home.
[brief] **The Instant Builder’s Remedy Litigation**  On March 22, 2023, the [...] (the “Planning Board”) adopted the 2023 Master Plan Reexamination Report (the “Reexamination Report”), which amended the Township’s Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (the “Housing Plan”).  (Da16).  However, the Housing Plan contained insufficient details and failed to set forth a realistic plan for the construction of affordable housing within the Township to satisfy its Third Round obligation, as ultimately determined by the trial court in determining [...]’s noncompliance.  (Ja441; Da1).  In response to the Reexamination Report, Plaintiff sent the Township a letter dated July 13, 2023 identifying itself as the contract purchaser of the Property, and requested a meeting to discuss Plaintiff’s proposal to build an inclusionary development on the Property and the rezoning that would be required.  (Da173).  Informal discussions between Plaintiff and [...] ensued, but it became clear that that Township had no willingness or desire to rezone the Property for a multifamily inclusionary development notwithstanding its significant compliance deficiency.  (Ja457).
[brief] Mount v. Trs. of Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 86 (App. Div. 1975).  Allowing the retroactive salary payments to inflate [...]’s pension benefits without adequate funding through prior contributions “place[s] a greater strain on the financial integrity of the fund in question and its future availability for those persons who are truly eligible for such benefits.
[directive] Each level of review may provide written recommendations and include comment for consideration by the law enforcement executive.  6.3.10  The law enforcement executive, upon reviewing the report, supporting documentation and information gathered during any supplemental investigation, shall direct whatever action is deemed appropriate.  If the complaint is unfounded or not sustained or the subject officer is exonerated, the disposition shall be entered in the index file and the report filed.  The determination must remain within the discretion of the law enforcement executive.
[brief] **MR. GALES’S DISCIPLINE WAS OVERLY SEVERE AND NOT CONSISTENT WITH HIS DISCIPLINARY RECORD.**¹¹  *(OAL INITIAL DECISION AT PAGES 25-29; Pa25-29a).*  [...] was charged on two PNDA for incidents on August 16 and 17, 2019.  For these, he was terminated from his position at the [...].  **A.
[directive] This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Arrestee’s Dependents – Alternate Care for Arrestee’s Dependents Model Policy, issued Dec. 1993, available at 4 https://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/arrtdepn.htm.
[brief] PAGE NOS.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................ 3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  .......................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT  ..............................................................................  12  POINT  I  Because interrogating officers failed to provide Miranda warnings, or secure a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege before confronting defendant with photographic evidence that he had committed a homicide, the court’s admission of his unwarned statement into evidence violated his right to a fair trial.  (Not raised below)  ..................................12  POINT II  The court erred by (1) failing to provide the jury with any instruction on how to assess the out-of-court identification evidence, including that identification had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) admitting that evidence without holding a Wade-Henderson hearing to test its reliability.  (Not raised below)  .....................................................37  POINT III  The errors, individually and cumulatively, require a new trial.  (Not raised below).  ...........................................................................58
[brief] He could not contain his emotions.  He began to tear-up and gradually began to sob quietly.  With his head down he said, ‘It’s hard to hear and relive what happened…It eats me up inside more now than it ever did before.  I feel like shit everyday…we (codefendants are all responsible, but I wish I could go back in time.  I would have done things so much differently. ’”  (PSR14)
[brief] [...] further stated to Disciplinary Investigator [...] that “he should have said… and he should have said …” before the investigator.  (Da134-135)  If anyone can justify the misrepresentations made before the court by later stating he should have said that ..., no one would be found of committing fraud upon the court.  In addition, [...], Esq. applied for attorney’s fees and filed a supporting brief on June 25, 2018, [...] misrepresented to the court that [...] appeared in a hearing to testify for [...], not his client [...].
[directive] Allocation of Critical Care Resources During a Public Health Emergency (Adapted from the [...] Model Policy*)  Executive Summary  Introduction:  The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for the triage of critically ill patients in the event that a public health emergency creates demand for critical care resources that outstrips the supply.  These triage recommendations will be enacted by a hospital only if: 1) the hospital is operating under a crisis standard of care; 2) critical care capacity is, or will shortly be, overwhelmed despite taking all appropriate steps to increase the surge capacity to care for critically ill patients; and 3) a regional authority has declared a public health emergency.  This allocation framework is grounded in ethical obligations that include the duty to care, duty to steward resources to optimize population health, distributive and procedural justice, and transparency.  It is consistent with existing recommendations for how to allocate scarce critical care resources during a public health emergency, and has been informed by extensive consultation with citizens, critical care medicine experts, and ethicists.  This document describes 1) the creation of triage teams to ensure consistent decision making; 2) allocation criteria for initial allocation of critical care resources; and 3) reassessment criteria to determine whether ongoing provision of critical care resources are justified for individual patients.  teams:  Patients’ treating clinicians will not make triage decisions.  Section 1.  Creation of triage  Instead, each hospital will designate an acute care triage team, consisting of a physician supported by a nurse and administrator, who will apply the allocation framework described in this document.  The physician and nurse preferably should have past experience in caring for patients in a critical care unit (including, but not limited to, an ICU, CCU, PACU, SICU, ED).  The separation of the triage role from the clinical role is intended to promote objectivity, avoid conflicts of commitments, and minimize moral distress.  The triage team will also be involved in patient or family appeals of triage decisions, and in collaborating with the attending physician to disclose triage decisions to patients and families.  Facilities should provide training to the triage teams and hospital/system decision-makers and health care staff in advance of implementation of adopted allocation policies.  *https://ccm.pitt.edu/?q=content/model-hospital-policy-allocating-scarce-critical-care-resources-available-online- now  This Section 2.
[brief] He did so roughly 20-years\textsuperscript{11} before his PCR application to correct an illegal sentence.  Thus, he too has an expectation of finality in that sentence.\textsuperscript{12}  Moreover, to make defendant’s sentence legal, would require that he be resentenced on [...] to a term consecutive to the sentence imposed in 1997 on [...].  In turn, the [...] would be required to recalculate defendant’s service of those terms.  In that case, simple mathematics would dictate an outcome where defendant would be required to serve a longer sentence than he is presently serving.  A result that would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause under any interpretation of that clause.
[brief] Defendant cites Carr v. Johnson, 211 N.J. Super 341 (App. 1986) to support his argument that the instant case should be transferred to the Chancery Court or Law Division Civil Part.  (Brief at 7)  Carr v. Johnson held that the Special Civil part lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues raised by the parties in the dispossess action because a landlord-tenant relationship did not exist between the parties.  The decision was based on the understanding that the summary dispossess statute N.J.S.A. 2A:18-51 et seq., is suppose to provide landlords with a quick remedy for possession.  Id.  At 347 (Citing 18 N.J. Practice (McDonough, County District and Municipal Courts) § 1567 at 303 Accord Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459, 462 (1961).  The summary dispossess remedy under N.J.S.A. is created by the legislature and the provisions should be strictly construed.  Id.  At 347 citing Cahayla v. Saikevich, 119 N.J. Super. 116, 118 (Cty.Ct. 1972); Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116, 123 (1967)  The facts of Carr are distinguishable from the instant case where Landlord Tenant relationship was at issue.