ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa531; Pa103; SDa016; SDa021).  The existing home is approximately 1,825 square feet spread over two (2) floors and set into the steep hillside.  (Pa527).  The existing home is constructed in a modern aesthetic and appears as a blue/grey wedge with a flat front façade and roof pitched downhill.  The “first floor” of the home is sunken below the grade of [...] and the home is accessed via a cantilevered foot bridge. connecting the driveway to the “second floor” of the home.  (Pa527-528; Pa532-533; Pa103).  The existing home is a “non-contributing” home in the [...] (as are the Objectors’ homes).
[brief] Ctr. 48 Ltd. P’ship, 355 N.J. Super. at 405-06.  Cf. Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J. v. Lomker, 277 N.J. Super. 491 (App. Div. 1994) (language contained within the contract is strictly construed against the entity that insists on the disputed language).  A second applicable rule of construction is that "[A]mbiguous terms are generally construed against the drafter of the contract."  *Malick v. Seaview Lincoln Mercury*, 398 N.J. Super. 182, 187 (App. Div. 2008).  Here it is undisputed that the Lease Agreement was drafted by the attorney for Plaintiff and that no proposed revisions to the Agreement were ever submitted by any of the Defendants.  Both of the foregoing rules weight heavily in favor of the position of Defendant [...] and Defendant [...] that they owe nothing to Plaintiff and support a ruling by the Court that (a) these individuals never personally guaranteed the obligations of [...] under the month to month lease dated February 20, 2015; (b) to the extent a personal guaranty was given it was terminated with termination of the month to month lease in 2016 and (c) to the extent a personal guaranty was given and was not terminated with termination of the lease in 2016, the termination of the lease was revoked on three separate occasions, all before Plaintiff entered into a consent judgment with [...].  C.
[brief] [[...]]  As plaintiffs’ counsel stressed, “[...]'s report was served in July.  All of the defendant expert depositions remain outstanding and discovery has been extended to December 30, 2021; Trial will not occur before March or April 2022 at the earliest.  Based on the above, and in the interest of justice,” [...] abused his discretion -- at least by his November 12 ruling -- in continuing to deny plaintiffs’ their chosen expert on this critical issue.  Whatever prejudice defendant possibly might have suffered could have and should have been dealt with by something less than barring this expert entirely.  [...] did not reasonably balance the rights of the parties, and of the court, in that regard.  And predictions of doom were not supported by sufficient evidence in the record before him showing that the catastrophic delays would happen – that “this would certainly further delay significantly the ability of this case to ultimately be tried” (2T31-33).  [...] did not reasonably exercise his discretion and, ultimately, unfairly prejudiced plaintiffs’ presentation of their complex malpractice case at trial.
[brief] *Brookdale Park Homes, Inc. v. Bridgewater Twp.*, 115 N.J. Super. 489, 496 (Ch. Div. 1971).  In addition to the right under statutory law, “quia timet is an equitable proceeding of ancient origin which permits the plaintiff to take affirmative action to protect or perfect his title because he fears [quia timet] the claim of the defendant may be injurious to him. ”  *Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff*, 467 N.J. Super. 532, 614 (App. Div. 2021), cert. denied, 249 N.J. 95 (2021); *Fittichauer v. Metro. Fireproofing Co.*, 70 N.J. Eq. 429, 430 (Ch. 1905) (discussing “suits in equity under the ancient jurisdiction of the court of chancery classified as bills quia timet, or bills of peace”).  As our former Court of Errors and Appeals explained, “in cases where an instrument exists which, though really void, has an ostensible validity, and which throws a doubt over the title to real estate, a court of equity will interfere, and relieve against the injustice of such an illusion. ”  *Bogert v. City of Elizabeth*, 27 N.J. Eq. 568, 570 (1876); *Estate of Gilbert Smith v. Cohen*, 123 N.J. Eq. 419, 424 (1938); *Shotwell v. Shotwell*, 24 N.J. Eq. 378, 387 (Ch. 1874); *Phoenix Pinelands Corporation*, supra, 467 N.J. Super. 614.  In this case, the [...] affirmed that they had never missed a loan payment since they bought their home in 1987, yet they had been falsely placed in default or noted as being in foreclosure by plaintiff’s wrongful and erroneous record and file notations.
[brief] In April 2021, the Attorney General issued Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (the Directive) (Da 33-43).  The Attorney General issued this directive in response to the Criminal Sentencing and Disposition Commission’s recommendation to eliminate mandatory minimum terms for non-violent drug-related offenses to address racial disparities in the prison population.  State v. Arroyo-Nunez, 470 N.J. Super. 351, 357-59 (App. Div. 2022).  Under the directive, a county prosecutor is required to offer a plea agreement waiving the mandatory minimum term required for certain drug offenses, including possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), as [...] pleaded guilty to here.  Directive at 6-7 (Da252-53).  The parties, however, “may agree to, a provision of a plea agreement whereby the court at sentencing is authorized to decide whether to impose an additional, discretionary period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b).”  Directive at 7.  “The AG ‘anticipated’ there would be few motions seeking discretionary parole disqualifiers because consultation with the DCJ Director would ‘ensure that prosecutors request discretionary parole disqualifiers rarely and in a consistent manner. ’”  Arroyo-Nunez, 470 N.J. Super. at 363 (quoting Directive at 6).  Here, the court did impose this discretionary parole disqualifier under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b).  That statute provides for the imposition of such a disqualifier when the court is “clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. ”  The trial court did not make this finding, instead merely stating that “[t]he aggregating [sic] factors preponderant [sic].” (6T 19-15)  This finding is insufficient to justify the imposition of this period of parole ineligibility.  “[P]eriods of parole ineligibility are the exception and not the rule.  They are not to be treated as routine or commonplace. ”  State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 359 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Recently, our Attorney General has directed that “prosecutors request parole disqualifiers rarely” in non-violent drug cases.  Because the trial court did not find that the legal standard for imposition of this period of ineligibility was met, and there was no showing that this is the rare case in which such a disqualifier would be appropriate, the period of parole ineligibility must be vacated.  In sum, the trial court imposed aggravating factors without justification, rejected without explanation mitigating factors brought to its attention, and imposed a period of parole ineligibility without finding the legal standard to do so was met.  The sentence must be vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing.  CONCLUSION
[brief] A.  MISAPPLICATION OF THE STANDARD FOR UNOPPOSED MOTIONS.  Granting summary judgment purely because a motion appears unopposed is inherently problematic, especially when the record reflects substantive opposition or when material facts remain in dispute.  The New Jersey court system emphasizes that summary judgment is a severe remedy that should be granted only when the moving party has clearly demonstrated the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, and that the right to judgment is clear.  The trial court’s reliance on procedural default (failure to formally oppose the motion) to grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment is contrary to the judicial directive to resolve cases on substantive grounds.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT HARMFUL ERROR OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PERMITTED PLAINTIFF TO QUESTION DEFENDANTS ABOUT THE SATISFACTION OF SNOW REMOVAL SERVICES PROVIDED IN APRIL 2018 AS DEFENDANTS OPENED THE DOOR WITH THEIR TESTIMONY (1T582:2-24; 60:2-8).  Appellate review of the evidentiary rulings a trial court has made on a motion in limine is limited.  “[A] trial court’s evidentiary rulings are ‘entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment. ’”  Brown, 170 N.J. at 147 (quoting Marrero, 148 N.J. 484 (1997)).  As such, “an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless "the trial court's ruling 'was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted”  Ibid.  Defendants have an inaccurate understanding of the trial court’s decision.
[brief] (9T155-23 _____________________ by their first names to avoid confusion, but intends no disrespect.  3  [...] refers to defendant as her brother throughout her testimony and statement, but they are not related.  (9T154-to 12).  4  Because defendant’s family share a common surname, the State will refer to [...] by their first names or full names to avoid confusion, but intends no disrespect. to 156-16; 11T25-7 to 18).  When they entered [...], [...] parked close to [...]’ trailer, but the minivan drove past the trailer and [...] did not see it on the street.  (9T157-1 to 158-25).  [...], [...], and defendant got out of the car, and [...] and [...] joined them, but [...] did not.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  THE BERARDIS CANNOT COLLATERALLY ATTACK THE ARBITRATOR’S FINDINGS OF FACT UPON APPEAL (NOT RAISED BELOW).  [...]’ continued attack of the Arbitrator’s determinations of fact in their opposition brief is procedurally improper, as the only issues specifically preserved for appeal after the Trial Court transferred the matter to binding arbitration are specifically set forth in the Trial Court’s October 20, 2021 Consent Order.
[brief] APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Complaint-Warrant [...]..............................................1a  Indictment [...].....................................................................4a  Indictment [...].....................................................................7a  Notice of Motion to Dismiss Indictment..................................................12a  Notice of Motion to Sever.......................................................................13a  Opinion – Motion to Dismiss Indictment and Motion to Sever Counts in the Indictment.................................................................14a  State’s Notice of Motion for Reconsideration...........................................33a  Order for Motion to Reconsider Decision to Sever....................................34a Opinion – Motion to Reconsider Decision to Sever..................................35a  Notice of Motion for Recusal...................................................................42a  Order Denying Motion for Recusal...........................................................43a  Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal Orders Vacating Severance and Denying Recusal.................................................................44a  Amended Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal......................................46a  TRANSCRIPT  REFERENCES
[directive] a All (total with the prior year memorandum only).  other schedules will be to considered supplemental the required schedules.  as a  If the auditor uses columnar format or another approach, the 2. statements must include the Seized Asset Trust Account, the Law Enforcement Trust Account, the Asset Maintenance Account, the Federal It to Justice Account and the Federal Treasury Account.  not required is use the recommended standardized format long the accounting as as information is prepared suggested, and is available in the required as schedules and supplemental schedules.  Specific regulations and requirements for State and Federal forfeiture 3.  this programs are included in manual.
[brief] See R. 3:18-1.  The standard for assessing a defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal is “whether, viewing the State’s evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn there from, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967).  In this case, the State charged [...] with a single count of first-degree robbery of “[e]mployees and patrons of the [...].
[brief] The de novo court violated [...]’s constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, because it considered evidence beyond the scope of the municipal court record and did not clearly identify the documents considered.  The de novo court’s inquiry not only caused a constitutional deprivation, but it was part of a pattern in other matters where the de novo court delved into an inquest beyond the scope of the trial de novo to determine whether there was a basis for excluding Alcotest results that the State did not seek to introduce.  The de novo court further erred here because it refused to give an adverse inference when the officer with knowledge and experience of the standardized field sobriety tests was present, but did not testify.  As a result, this Court should remand the matter for a trial de novo before an unbiased de novo judge.
[brief] *Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys.*, 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting *In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008*, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”  *State v. Malik*, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  *In Re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).  Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.  The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:
[brief] [...] collected items from the room, including cell phones, a laptop computer, and new clothes that [...] had purchased the day before.  She then went through [...]'s pockets and took $800.  [...] took [...]'s watch and changed into one of [...]'s shirts and a suit jacket.  [...] then struck [...] in the face with the gun; and [...] took [...]'s purse and threatened to kill [...] and her family.  Before leaving, [...] and [...] told [...] they were going to [...]'s room and if the money was not there, they would come back and kill him.
[brief] ”  Mount Laurel II at 199, 292.  The Township ignores these salient principles, instead arguing that irreparable harm does not exist because Plaintiff will have rights under the Eminent Domain Act in an eventual condemnation, including the right to potentially receive monetary damages.  (Db23-27).  [...] severely misunderstands that the purpose of the injunction is to avoid such a proceeding entirely by preserving the Property as an inclusionary housing site while the remainder of this builder’s remedy action is litigated.  Absent injunctive relief, Plaintiff and the protected class will suffer irreparable harm.  E.
[brief] ”  []This Court has examined the federal cases cited by the movant (which are also unpublished) and the contrary decision of a different New Jersey trial-level court in Woo-Padva  . . .  [The Court] disagrees with the conclusions reached in that case for the reasons set forth herein.  *McQueen v. Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, P.C.*, ESX-L-1439-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640, at *12-16 (Law Div. April 26, 2023) (internal citations omitted) (Pa111).  As shown by the above cases, consumer debts are within the statutory definition of the consumer loan business.  Thus, [...]’s arguments fail and the trial court’s March 21, 2024 Order granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss must be reversed.
[brief] This rationale is as dishonest as it gets.  First and foremost the representation was made at the time she signed the Agreement.  She knew exactly what she was getting as a support package, which was a very generous support package.  And she had access to funds significantly greater than $70,000.00.  So What is [...] saying??  It is quite clear.  She is saying despite the fact that you are giving me a support package, I have no intention of paying you what I promised because I worked hard to save these monies.  I will be hiding money from you so that I don't have to pay you.  THIS Court should keep in mind that she NEVER paid [...] the $70,000.00 or any part of it.
[brief] Balsamides v. Protameen 160 N.J. 352 (1999) .............................................10, 45 Barcon v. TriCounty Asphalt Corp. 86 N.J. 179 (1981)....................................  28  Bisnoff v. King, 154 F. Supp. 2d 630, 637 (S.D.N.Y 2001) ...............................7
[brief] Pursuant to R. 4:46-2(a)........1141a  Exhibit A, 2/17/2010  Letter from [...] to [...] Re: Agreement of Sale.........................................................................................................................1144a Exhibit B, 2/9/2010 Executive Order Re: COAH............1145a Exhibit C, 4/27/2010 Letter from [...] to [...] with Termination and Release.......................................................................................................................1150a Exhibit D, 5/26/2010 Purchase and Sale Agreement.......1154a Exhibit E, 5/3/2017 [...] Deposition.........................(omitted, see 360a)  2/15/2019 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants [...] and [...] and Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint with Prejudice.....................................................................................................................1176a 2/15/2019 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants Nicholas [...] and [...].................................................................................................................1178a 3/28/2019 Notice of Appeal.................................................................................................1180a 4/5/2019 Amended Notice of Appeal....................................................................................1193a Statement of Items Submitted to the Law Division on Defendants’ January 30, 2019 Motions for Summary Judgment.................................................................1207a Gonzalez v. Michalski, No. A-3618-15T3, 2017 WL 2458154, at *1 (App. Div. June 7, 2017) ..............................................................................................................................1209a Kyung v. Neiman Marcus Group, 2011 WL 2447388, (Law Div. Feb. 9, 2011) .................................................................................................................................1211a Michael L. McDonald & Point Break Group Management, LLC v. City of Wildwood, No. A-0109-17T4, 2018 WL 6164767, at *4 (App. Div. Nov. 26, 2018) .................................................................................................................................1216a 11/06/2020
[brief] Plaintiff’s submission of the [...] report, in and of itself, was insufficient to defeat summary judgment.  “A party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by submitting an expert report in his or her favor. ”  Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 544 (citing Ziemba v. Riverview Medical Center, 275 N.J. Super. 293, 302 (App. Div. 1994)).  “In order for such a report to have any bearing on the appropriateness of summary judgment, it must create a genuine issue of material fact. ”  Ibid.  Here, the trial court correctly determined that the [...] report did not create an issue of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s spot zoning claim.  The facts regarding the amendments to the Redevelopment Plan were undisputed.  The trial court could independently conclude that while the building will have an increased density—but certainly not unlimited as suggested by Plaintiff, since the density of the units is inherently a function of numerous other bulk standards—and be taller, it will still be a mid-rise apartment building, a desired component of the original Redevelopment Plan.  Thus, the purpose of the Redevelopment Plan will be effectuated, and a blighted area will be redeveloped.  The public at large—and not just [...]—will benefit as a result.  The [...] report did not present any facts which precluded the trial court from reaching this conclusion.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In *Giantonnio*, the Court noted that expert testimony was necessary to establish the requisite standard of care for a funeral procession because such a procession “constitutes a complex process. ”  291 N.J. Super. at 44.  (emphasis added)  In *Dare*, the Court opined that “skydiving requires the training and licensing of participants. ”  349 N.J. Super. at 215.  No such complexity or special licensing to operate a U-boat exists in the instant matter, as a jury certainly has sufficient knowledge to form a valid judgment as to whether [...]’s conduct was reasonable by not addressing the hazardous condition caused by [...]’s overloaded U-boat.  Therefore, even without the aid of expert testimony, Plaintiffs should be permitted to go before a jury because Plaintiffs can demonstrate that [...] owed Plaintiffs a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect Plaintiff against known or reasonably discoverable dangers, and breached that duty, by not only failing to implement policies and procedures to address the risk of overloaded U-boats, but also by failing to provide and implement adequate training and protocols to its employees to ensure proper use of the U-boats by its customers.
[brief] ...........................................  H557a Holm-42: [...] response to Holmdel-20 asking about engineering feasibility of using other existing regulators in the [...] system (SOICR p. 12)  ..................................................  H558a Holm-43: [...] response to Holmdel-21 asking if [...] customers use natural gas for noncombustion purposes; objected to (SOICR p. 12) ..................................................  H559a Holm-44: [...] response to Holmdel-22 seeking studies of the impact of natural gas pipeline on adjacent property values (SOICR p. 12)..........................................