ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On February 16, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Law Division, seeking damages for Defendant’s alleged breach of the parties’ palimony Agreement.  On March 26, 2018, the Defendant filed an Answer, with a Counterclaim.  On August 17, 2018, the Defendant filed an Amended Counterclaim (on leave granted), which added a claim against Plaintiff for fraud-in-the-inducement.  On March 13, 2019, the Law Division Ordered that the action be transferred to the Chancery Division, Family Part.
[brief] THIS MATTER DOES NOT INVOLVE A “VESTED” BENEFIT (Pa17-29).  In Point III of their appellate brief, Plaintiffs argue that the MSRA does not permit the State to “eliminate earned wages that were fully vested,” and challenges the March 4 Order and Decision based on the purported deprivation of a “vested benefit. ” (Pb30).  This argument is a red herring.  First, as the Superior Court recognized, “Plaintiffs’ argument that the MSRA does not authorize the deprivation of earned wages is a mischaracterization of the monetary sums Plaintiffs assert they are owed.  Because the 2016 MOAs were subject to contingencies that never occurred, Defendants did not deprive Plaintiffs of earned wages. ” (Pa000027-28).  Outside of this contingency, Plaintiffs do not point to a single benefit that was earned but not received by the Union members, nor do they cite to a single hour of work that was uncompensated.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ citation to Matter of Morris School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 310 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div. 1998), and the proposition that earned wages cannot be divested absent a knowing and intentional waiver, is simply inapposite.  (Pb30).  Indeed, this section appears to be a vestige from Plaintiffs’ appellate brief in the Superior Officers’ matter, as Plaintiffs reference facts relevant only to the Superior Officers’ case, and wholly outside of this matter.  (Pb30)  (“In this matter, the event triggering the payment of accumulated sick leave was the July 1, 2016 promotion. ”)  In any event, in the Superior Officers’ matter, the Appellate Division found that alleged “vesting” of employee rights under expired CNAs is inconsequential following the enactment of the MSRA.
[brief] *Ferren v. City of Sea Isle City*, 243 N.J. Super. 522, 527 (App. Div. 1990).  (Pb10).  Those cases involved general life experiences and general associations involving judges that did not relate to any issues that were before the judge.  Here, the Judge of Compensation expressed an opinion that teachers, in general and in this case, are to be considered essential employees.  This was a fundamental contested issue in this case, in which the Judge of Compensation appeared to base her opinion on her service in the State Legislature in sponsoring this Bill.
[brief] The plaintiff in [...] argued that “Coverage B” (now Part Two) obligated the workers’ compensation insurer to defend and indemnify all damage actions brought against an employer by an injured worker.  Id. at 470-71.  In [...], an employee died when he fell from an elevated roadway after attending a Christmas party organized by a group of co-workers.  Id. at 468.  Holding that the workers’ compensation carrier had no obligation to defend the action filed against the employer in [...], the Appellate Division noted that coverage under then Coverage B was limited to claims that arose out of and in the course of employment.  Id. at 471.  After recognizing this limitation, the court asked, “If Coverage B(a) is thus limited, what does it include”?  Ibid.  The court then enumerated the types of claims that are covered by Part Two of the policy:
[brief] See also Lesniak v. County of Bergen, 117 N.J. 12, 31 (1989), citing Clifford v. Opdyke, 156 N.J. Super. 208, 212 (App. Div.  "The need for expert testimony is particularly strong in cases involving the verbal tort threshold for injuries resulting from an automobile accident."  [...], [...] and [...], New Jersey Rules of Evidence (2021-2022 ed.), Comment 702[1] at 761, citing Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 320 (1992) and Amaechi v. Clark, 268 N.J. Super. 186, 192-193 (Law Div. 1992).  Stated simply, credible evidence was not adduced in discovery or produced in response to the motion and that is why the trial judge granted summary judgment.  Appellants do not contest that radiological testing in the form of CT scans, MRIs or even x-rays were not performed.  They argue that New Jersey law does not require objective evidence “like MRIs or CT scans to prove permanent injury”.  Appellants cite no case law to support their position on the law but, even if their interpretation of the law is correct, the absence of objective radiological evidence together with additional factors unique to this case were properly considered by the trial court in granting the motion and dismissing the cases.
[brief] Respondents had ample opportunity to not only name [...] as an expert on issues purportedly related to the Township’s alleged discriminatory conduct, but they also had ample opportunity to produce and provide a report or rendering of his so-called expert opinion on the matter if they so desired.  Any outside expert opinions offered by Respondents were required to be provided by October 8, 2021 pursuant to the trial court’s February 26, 2021 Case Management Order.  Moreover, the lower court’s September 23, 2022 Case Management Order prohibited any further discovery and did not contemplate expert reports or depositions.  [...]’s certification was therefore improperly asserted outside of the discovery period.  Indeed, no certification of due diligence pursuant to R. 4:17- 7 was provided to demonstrate the basis for such a woefully late submission.  The Appellants had no opportunity to examine, discover, or rebut any of [...]’s opinions or conclusions.  Even so, they offer no support for Respondents’ position that they have standing under the NJLAD.  No aspect of the certification touches upon the question of whether Plaintiffs were discriminated against.  It does not establish any facts, any indicium of discriminatory intent by the Mayor or Township toward the Plaintiffs upon their submission of an amended application.  Rather, this certification concerns [...]’s opinion concerning the Township’s fulfillment of its Mount Laurel obligations.  Importantly, these opinions were not espoused during that portion the litigation either.  Accordingly, the entire certification should be ignored by this Court.
[brief] Id. at 523.  The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the police’s actions in Mauro did not amount to interrogation or its “functional equivalent” under Miranda and Innis.  Id. at 527.  Neither did allowing the wife to speak with her husband amount to “the kind of psychological ploy that properly could be treated as the functional equivalent of interrogation. ”  Ibid.  The Court did not find that the wife was sent into the room to speak with the husband to elicit incriminating statements, and the officer’s presence during the conversation was not improper because there were legitimate reasons for the officer remaining in the room.  Id. at 528.  The police stayed in the room out of safety concerns, the risk of a plot for escape, the parties cooking up a lie or swapping statements, and/or an attempt to smuggle in a weapon. ”  Id. at 523-24.  Moreover, the Court acknowledged that there was a possibility that the husband would incriminate himself while speaking with his wife and that the officers were aware of that possibility.  However, the Court opined that “officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will incriminate himself. ”  Id. at 529.  Similarly, in the present case, law enforcement did not arrange the phone calls between the defendant and his parents to elicit additional incriminating statements.
[brief] (40006a-40007a; 40009a-40010a).  The trial court awarded an excessive amount of prejudgment interest, and failed to adequately explain its basis for doing so.  First, the trial court has made no finding that compound interest is appropriate here.  Second, prejudgment interest was awarded at a rate in excess of the standard rate provided in Rule 4:42-11 without an appropriate basis for departing from the standard rate.  While the trial court has discretion in the award of prejudgment interest, Tobin v. Jersey Shore Bank, 189 N.J. Super. 411, 414 (App. Div. 1983), appropriate exercise of discretion means that “the trial judge must take account of the law applicable to the particular circumstances of the case and be governed accordingly.  Implicit is conscientious judgment directed by law and reason and looking to a just result. ”  Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 158 (App. Div. 1960).  The trial court awarded [...] prejudgment interest in the amount of $33,689,845 and [...] prejudgment interest in the amount of $5,948,025.  (40006a; 40009a).  This interest was based on an interest rate of 8.875% “to obtain an investment return on rate of interest on partnership distributions. ” (40002a-40003a).  The prejudgment interest rate was set by agreement of the parties for a specific period, which [...] specifically found ended upon entry of the 2013 Final Judgment.  (124a-128a; 251T at 4:13-16, 13:25-14:1, 56:20-22, 78:7-9).  The trial court first erred in the calculation of prejudgment interest for the Plaintiffs because of the *compounded* nature of the interest at the 8.875% interest rate.  This compounded interest certainly is not compensatory.  It was improper to compound interest annually for the period December 13, 2013\(^8\) through and including July 9, 2014, and further compound interest at the average prime rate of 3.935% compounded annually, for the period July 10, 2014 through and including November 16, 2022.  (40003a-40004a).  Such an award of compounded prejudgment interest was unjustified under New Jersey law, is inequitable, and far exceeds an award that would fairly compensate Plaintiffs.  For that reason, compound interest is disfavored by courts because it is unfairly “harsh and oppressive” and “unduly hastens the accumulation of debt. ”  *Henderson v. Camden Cnty. Mun. Util. Auth.*, 176 N.J. 554, 560 (2003).
[brief] State v. Harris, 282 N.J. Super. 409, 413 (1995)(citing State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 76 (1991)).  Here, the transfer of venue was inappropriate.  Rule 4:3-2 provides venue “shall be laid in the county in which the cause of action arose, or in which any party to the action resides at the time of its commencement, or in which the summons was served on a nonresident defendant.
[brief] The most egregious of these is [...]’s statement that [...]’ “common law argument was first raised in [...]’ reply brief and goes beyond the issues raised in its summary judgment motion. ”  (Zb40.)  This is a knowingly false statement.  [...] properly raised the “common law argument” in its opposition to [...]’s summary judgment motion, which is also under appeal.  (Dta1155-58.)  [...] was compelled to supplement its briefing below to point out this mischaracterization when [...] previously sought to preclude consideration of this argument.  (Dtsa15-31, submitted pursuant to *R.2:6-1(a)(2).*.)  [...]’s continued prevarication here is not an error and should not be countenanced.  Similarly, in response to [...]’s gratuitous false characterization that [...]’ argument that “unenrollments from CCIPs are a rarity” is “unsupported by testimony” (Zb36), see the testimony cited in [...]’ brief at Tb26, n.5.
[brief] Lastly, the trial court’s decision – and the decision of this court if the decision below is affirmed – will have profound and broad-ranging effects on contract law in this state.  If the decision below is affirmed, a contract party will be able to avoid contract obligations by simply arguing there was a later oral modification or new agreement, even in the face of an integration clause.  This court’s decision has the potential to eviscerate integration clauses and the binding effect of written clauses as to all contracts (e.g., arbitration clauses, venue clauses, etc.), not just loans.  This court cannot condone such a sweeping and damaging result.  Consequently, the trial court misapplied the law as to Defendants’ statute of limitations defense and incorrectly found that Plaintiff met his burden to prove the alleged third “pay-when-able” loan.  As a result, Defendants respectfully request that this Court: (i) reverse the trial court’s judgment entered against Defendants; and (ii) dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, and/or, in the alternative, modify the judgment so as to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as against [...] and reform its post-judgment interest award.
[brief] The complaint alleged various counts against [...] and [...], including a count for recission of the property sale agreement and counts for equitable fraud, consumer fraud, and fraud.  See Palomar v. [...] Court LLC, Dkt. No. [...] (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. Nov. 12, 2020) (Trans ID: CHC2020262555).  objected to [...]’s involvement due to the City “apparently favoring [...] for the slated development despite the previous good faith efforts [[...]] had gone through to try and assemble the [Property].”  (Pa490 ¶ 16, Pa491 ¶ 23.)  Despite [...]’s public allegations about the City’s “favoritism,” on November 12, 2020, the City formally adopted the Laurel-[...] Redevelopment Plan, Ordinance No. 20-097.  (Pa234–57.)  Not until May 18, 2021, did the City pass Resolution No. 21-05-12 (the “[...] Resolution”) formally naming [...] as the redeveloper for the Property.  (See Pa198–99.)  B.
[brief] Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont'l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 812 (1997)  .....................................................  28  Plunske v. Wood, 370, A. 2d 920 (Conn. 1976) .......................  41  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Comm. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011) .................................................................  34  Public Service Elec. & Gas v. Oldwick, 125 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 64 N.J. 153 (1973) .................................................. 28,32,33,44  Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J. Super. 344, 352-353 (App. Div. 1982) ................................................................. 23 Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, 216 N.J. 115, 142-143 (2013)  ...........................................................................  38 State, Com'r of Transp. v. Dikert, 319 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 161 N.J. 150 (1999)  .......................  29 State by Com'r v. Weiswasser, 149 N.J. 320 (1997) ........ 28,41,45 State by Dept. v. 1 Howe Street, 463 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 2020)
[brief] The contested legislation created superseding zoning for certain specific properties in [...] which then enabled defendant [...] ("[...]") to file a by-right site plan application with the [...] Joint Land Use Board ("[...]") for a 2,182,101 square foot, 24-hour-a-day operating warehouse complex on a farm field located directly across the street from the [...] residential development where many young families live.  For the reasons explained infra, [...] justifiably commenced the litigation after the 45-day appeal period had already expired.
[directive] Você entende que se o juiz decidir que sua conduta está caracterizada por um padrão [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] de comportamento reincidente e compulsivo e você não aceitar o tratamento para agressores sexuais, ou se aceitar (se beneficiar de) mas não estiver disposto a participar deste tratamento, o juiz emitirá sentença de um termo de reclusão a ser e, cumprido em outra instituição que não oferecerá tratamento para agressores sexuais neste caso, você não receberá comutação de pena por bom comportamento e não receberá créditos de trabalho por tempo cumprido nesta outra instituição?  Do you understand if the court finds your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and you are not amenable to sex offender treatment or if you are amenable (will benefit from) but you are not willing to participate in such treatment, the court will sentence you to a term of incarceration to be served in another facility which will not provide for sex offender treatment and in such event, you will not receive commutation time for good behavior or earn work credits for time served in such other facility?
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the fraudulent concealment claims asserted here are not based upon the same factual allegations and transactions at issue in the 2015 case, because the information that led to the “new” claims was not known to Plaintiffs prior to the exchange of discovery in the 2015 case.  However, that argument was rejected by the Court during the oral argument held on March 29, 2018, as well as during the oral argument held on January 24, 2020…Accordingly, the oft-repeated argument that Plaintiffs did not know about the “newly discovered information” until after these claims were adjudicated has already been decided.  (148a).  Additionally, the Court held that the acts complained of and plaintiffs’ demand for relief were the same in both the 2015 matter and the 2020 matter.  (Id.)  The Court found that plaintiffs took issue with defendants’ actions in the 2015 case and sought the same relief since their theory of recovery was the same, allege the same causes of action, list the same witnesses and cite to the same documents that would be used at trial.  Therefore, since the material facts alleged were identical, the Court held that the entire controversy doctrine applied.
[brief] Plaintiff was admitted to [...] for 13 days during which time she had 3 surgeries.  3T172.  The Jury saw operative photos depicting external fixators applied to her legs.  Da165; Da166.  During that time, she could not move and was afraid to move her legs at all.  3T172.  Plaintiff spent over a month at an in-patient rehabilitation facility.  3T175.  She spent most of her time in one room.  3T177.  During this time, her left arm was in a cast.  3T176.  The dressings for Plaintiff’s leg wounds had to be changed 2-3 times per week while she was at Cooper and at in-patient rehabilitation.  3T176.  This was painful.  3T176.  When she was discharged to home, she went to stay with her [...].
[brief] The prosecutor highlighted the State’s allegation that [...] had lied to detectives during his statement, and even replayed a portion of the statement to signal its importance.  (27T 76-1 to 80-6)  The prosecutor emphasized that the jury should convict based on the defendant’s statement:  “You know what else [defense counsel] didn’t bring up during his summation? The defendant’s statement.  Why is that?  Because, ladies and gentlemen, it was replete with lies ….  [H]e lied throughout his statement, and … his story fell apart. ”  (27T 49-9 to 14)  The prosecutor argued, “How do we know he did it?
[directive] %~ ~78 ~.9.j.A-]oJ] tj-.slll Q.]'78S:]oj '.UAl ~. ,']15}~ ~~7]Zl-%'li TB"S'].:il, WB".:i!J- ~~ ~jl ~jl -3:! B"~ 91 IiJ "8]JA} A]*15}2.j-~ {i.:il ~lll ?£ '.U tj-~ % o}1J 77}? .-?)-1:1]  ..!i! . t..j ~~ ~ ~ ~ c.  You must pay a minimum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment of$50 ($100 [Yes/oil] [No/0}1..-]..8.] minimum if you are convicted ofa crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?
[brief] https://www.nj.gov/health/ceohs/asbestos/asbestos-faq/, last visited 10/4/2024.  By contrast, here, [...] made specific findings that Plaintiff had to remediate its Property.  (Da27, ¶15).  [...] has consistently found discharged petroleum products to be dangerous to the public health, safety and environment.  In 2015, [...] stated in one of its rule adoptions that, underground storage tanks “can threaten ground water and potable water sources, and create vapor hazards that can have immediate dangers of explosion and long term health risks.
[brief] (3T39:12-3T42:16).  DeRitis, 861 F.3d at 453; Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  The recent vintage of plaintiff’s new theory on “prior restraint” is evidenced by the opposition papers he filed when defendants Linda and [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] moved to dismiss this same Count Four in 2019.  (Pa285-286).  [...]’s 2019 opposition papers on dismissal of Count Four did not raise “prior restraint” at all in opposition and [...] and the cases plaintiff now cites on “prior restraint” appear nowhere in the brief.  (Excerpts of plaintiff’s October 3, 2019 brief and table of authorities at Pa758-766).  Once defendants demonstrated at summary judgment that [...]’s actions were not protected pursuant to Garcetti and DeRitis, he sought to reframe his complaint to allege “prior restraint” and reimagine Count Four to avoid dismissal.  (Pb49).  To suggest he can avoid dismissal by raising a claim he never pleaded is puzzling.  Such maneuvering should not be countenanced.  Count Four was properly dismissed and such dismissal should be affirmed.
[brief] ’  [...] v. Board of Trustees, Police and The Court further noted that an “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”  Id., citing SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).  The Court reversed the decision of the Board, noting that even though the letter was never received by [...], even if it had been, the notice was improper and late.  In this matter, like [...], the Board failed to provide timely, adequate, or proper notice of the Ricci Act.  Also like [...], [...] never received the notice.  The Board did not fulfill its obligation to notify the members of the [...] of this legislation “within 30 days” of July 8, 2019, including the requirement that they had to register their presence at the World Trade Center within 2 years of the law’s enactment, as was required by law.
[brief] Marioni [v. Roxy Garments Delivery Co.], 417 N.J. Super. [269,] 275-76 [App. Div. 2010].  A court abuses its discretion “when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  [Id. at 153-154.]  In other words, having heard the testimony of the parties’ trial witnesses, along with the post-trial submissions of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as having reviewed the post-judgment submissions leading to the March 15, 2024 Order, a Trial Court sitting in equity has broad discretion to impose a remedy which fits the facts of the case.  Thus, as here, the Trial Court did not need to find fraud or mistake to reform the Redevelopment Agreement—the Trial Court acted well within its powers to find and impose a just remedy to provide redress to Plaintiff.