[brief] BARTOS’S ARGUMENTS REGARDING HIS LACK OF INTENT TO RESIGN ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  [...] argues he should not “lose his job based solely on his words. ” (Ab9).  In his view, State employees must “intend” to resign not in good standing.  (Ab15).  That position is contrary to common sense because employees are held to verbal resignations all the time (including when permanent employees choose to voluntarily resign from their positions in good standing via “verbal notice”).  N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.1(a).  Moreover, [...] was not terminated “solely on his words” but also because of his actions: specifically, despite being an essential employee, he failed to report to work under the precautions of Reactionary Mode for five consecutive business days without supervisory approval.  These actions belie [...]’s claim that “he never carried through with [his] words” not to report to work.  (Ab9).  In fact, he never reported to work.  The cases upon which he relies to support his reasoning are irrelevant because they pertain to interpreting what constitutes leaving work “voluntarily” for the limited purpose of unemployment benefits.  See De Lorenzo v. Board of Review, 54 N.J. 361, 364 (1969) (considering “voluntary leaving of work” for disqualification of unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) “when an employee becomes ill and does those things reasonably calculated to protect the employment. ”); Savastano v. Board of Review, 99 N.J. Super. 397 (App. Div. 1968) (remanding to determine whether an employee “voluntarily left” his position or was discharged).  The only case [...] cites even involving a resignation not in good standing due to unauthorized absences or failure to return from leave is Garcia v. Board of Review, 191 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div. 1983).  See Ab15.  It acknowledged termination for absences without notice “projects a disciplinary standard, for breach of which the employee may perhaps be discharged and possibly suffer the six-week disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits provided by N.J. S.A. 43:21-5(b).”  But it still drew a clear distinction between discipline for failure to return to work, as was the case here, and a “voluntary quit” for the purposes of unemployment benefits.  191 N.J. Super. at 608.  Still, even if N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) were applicable here (which it is not), [...] neither was ill nor took steps “reasonably calculated to protect the employment,” as in De Lorenzo.  54 N.J. at 364.  The fact remains he confirmed he had no intention of returning to work, disregarded multiple attempts by several different parties to persuade him to return, and failed to respond to two correspondences from the [...].  These are hardly the actions of an employee making a “reasonably calculated” attempt to safeguard his position.  Rather, they show [...] abandoned his job at the very time the State most needed him as an essential employee.  Though he prepaid for three pay periods worth of insurance benefits, this was related to the Workers’ Compensation matter, and because they were for the pay periods between April 11 and May 22, 2020, actually pre-dated the Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action.  (Aa35, 2T57:13-25).  The Final Administrative Action was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  It is supported by the record and wholly consistent with legal precedent.  Thus, the [...] correctly upheld the [...]’s major discipline against [...] in the form of a resignation not in good standing.