ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] conducted a USPS address change search, which returned [...]’s correct address ([...]) as well as [...], a condominium unit sometimes occupied by his sister (Da57, Process Service Report).  [...]’s process server evidently communicated with the leasing office for the latter property, and reported back that B5 Oceanview Terrace was either vacant or occupied by [...]’s sister.  Ibid.  According to the leasing office, [...] resided at [...].  Notwithstanding, [...] next attempted personal service at [...]’s vacant Unit No. 4 within the 511 [...] Ave. Condominium Association (Da60, 511 [...] Service Report).  In or around August of 2021, [...] engaged a private investigator to again to serve [...].
[brief] Defendants contend the State’s opposition should have no effect and that the amendment cannot apply "retroactively."  Under settled New Jersey law, the amendment can apply to a case pending when it became effective without offending retroactivity.  principles.  The harms of retroactive legislation are entirely absent here.  Application of the amendment does not harm Defendants’ legitimate interests, impact their vested rights, upset their reasonable settled expectations, or impose new liability, or create new duties, for past acts.  Instead, the amendment gives the State a procedural mechanism to do something it always could have done.  A recent Appellate Division decision concerning a different portion of the amendments to the NJFCA does not compel a different result.  Second, Defendants appeal the trial court’s alternative ruling that factual disputes regarding “all the essential elements” of the bar gave it “no choice” but to deny summary judgment for either Relator or Defendant.
[brief] (8T20-6 to 26-12; PSR at 3).  At the time of defendants’ trial, [...], who was not charged under the Indictment, was serving a federal sentence pursuant to a plea agreement where the charges against him for his involvement in the crimes in this case had been dismissed.  (8T89-2 to 4, 90-24 to 92-18).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., presided over defendant’s jury trial.  (See 4T).
[directive] M E M O R A N D U M TO: All County Prosecutors FROM: [...]  First Assistant Attorney General DATE: December 2, 2002  SUBJECT: Directive Concerning the Use of Grand Jury Subpoenas to Compel Hospitals to Produce Medical Records  1.  Introduction and Overview.  For many years, county prosecutors have routinely used grand jury subpoenas to obtain medical records from hospitals.  Recently, some hospitals have challenged the authority of a prosecutor to gain access to hospital records without first obtaining written authorization from the patient to whom medical services were provided.  This issue was first raised in Passaic County in the case of State v. Hendley.  In that matter, a hospital filed a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena.  The Passaic County Assignment Judge, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., rejected the hospital’s motion and ruled in an unreported decision that the broad powers of the grand jury to investigate crimes outweighs the hospital’s assertion of the patient- physician privilege codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.1 et seq. and N.J.R.E. 506.  The Division of Criminal Justice and the Division of Law have conducted extensive research on this matter and have determined that under State and Federal law, neither the patient-physician privilege nor any other principle of law precludes a prosecutor from using a grand jury subpoena to compel the production of medical records that are relevant to a criminal investigation.  Accordingly, except as otherwise noted in § 3, infra, a hospital must comply with a grand jury subpoena calling for the production of medical records.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
[brief] On May 16, 2023, Appellants adopted new Policy 8463—Parental Notice of Material Circumstances (Original Policy).  (Da1-2).  The Original Policy imposed a new obligation on all staff members in the school district to affirmatively notify all parents when the staff member is made aware of “any facts or circumstances that may have a material impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being, including … sexuality; sexual orientation; transitioning; [or] gender identity or expression ….
[directive] 3  An officer may still ask an individual to voluntarily provide them with this information (but not require them to answer), and/or an individual may voluntarily provide this information even absent such request.  If that happens, this information may still only be used for the limited purpose of protecting their health and safety, and the health and safety of other officers and first responders responding to the same address or otherwise interacting with the same individual, but it may not be used as a basis to refuse a call for service.
[brief] C. [...] v. Bd. of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 472 N.J. Super. 357, 363 Appellant’s analysis under [...] (Decided June 3, 2022) is likewise not applicable to the within action (Db23).  [...] also postdates the Separation Agreement and again, unlike Respondent, [...] was removed from her employment due to reasons of a criminal nature unrelated to her alleged disability:  “[...] was subsequently charged with several moving violations: driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, driving while intoxicated in a school zone, driving while intoxicated in a school crosswalk area, and driving while intoxicated with a minor child present, as well as administrative charges.  There is no proof that the disciplinary charges concerned an alleged disability that caused her to have the accident. ”  [...] v. Bd. of Trs., Respondent’s case does not involve such termination for cause but does involve an irrevocable resignation provision held in escrow until the IOD application is complete and all appeals exhausted (Da17, Par.11).  That provision would be moot unless he returned to work from a disability pension (N.J.A.C 17:4-6.10, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6), an admittedly unlikely situation (Da18, Par. 17).  Respondent is presently still on a leave of absence with the Employer and has not been terminated contrary to [...].  The facts of this case are distinguished and [...] does not apply and does not affect the Trial Court’s order (Da195-Da200, Da202-Da203).
[brief] Defendants evidently confused the Trial Court by alleging that these claims are not new because they were allegedly not discovered relatively recently enough.  But the focus of the Trial Court should have been on the real significance of the “newness” of these claims, which is the fact that the claims were unknown, unknowable, not pled, and therefore not dismissed with prejudice at the time of the dismissal with prejudice of the previous claims against [...].  Due to the proffering of the alleged Collateral Assignment following discovery of the Mortgage, the new claims arising out of the new evidence that [...] was the sole member of [...], developed over time.  While it is true that Plaintiffs claimed in their Motion to Vacate that [...] owned [...] upon discovery of the Mortgage, further discovery of the Affidavit and the checks were necessary in order to refute the Collateral Assignment and to establish the viability of the new claims once and for all.  Defendants’ argument effectively asserted that even before Plaintiffs ever knew [...] was the sole member of [...], and even before Plaintiffs ever could have pled that [...] was the sole member of [...], Plaintiffs somehow did plead and [...] somehow did dismiss claims arising out of [...]’s ownership of [...].  Such an assertion is not only legally impossible but it confounds logic and any conceivable sense of reality.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 265 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Court in *Caoili* concluded that a jury could consider future variance approval and potential subdivision of the property in the valuation analysis.  *Id.* at 265, 267.  Relevant to the issue here, *Caoili* also addressed the appraisal mechanics which may be applied in arriving at the enhancement in value resulting from the existence of a reasonable probability.
[brief] Further demonstrating that Defendant [...] knew of the need for pedestrian safeguards in the mandatory employee parking area is the fact that the subject crash occurred around the time of a routine shift change when the parking area would always be busy with people crossing as they attempted to get to the hospital to begin work.  See Pa485-6 (32:6-33:22).  In her transcribed statement to detectives at the [...], which was given 5 hours after the subject crash, Defendant [...] described the traffic conditions of the parking lots at the [...] campus as follows:  OFC.:  What’s the parking lot usually like at that time?  Like the people work flex hours, is there usually people crossing?  Like is there like trying to get there at the same time?  DEMBER:  Seven o’clock is always mass entrance and then like 7:30’ish is like mass exit.  We work in shifts.  OFC.: So the night shift gets off around 7:30.  DEMBER: Right, most units are 12 hour shifts.  Mine is a 10 hour shift.  OFC.  [...]: Got you.  DEMBER:  Because we close at night but we’re on call for (inaudible) heart attack.  You know we still come in at seven but hey, that’s obviously a busy time, change of shift.  [….]  OFC.: And around that time when you usually show up for work, what’s it like?  Like people crossing, few scattered.  DEMBER: Always scattered.  OFC.: Always scattered.  DEMBER: Yes.  People always crossing.  OFC.: Got you, and-  DEMBER: Because they’re the ones—  OFC.: Everyone is coming.  DEMBER: Right, and no one wants to be late or whatever.  [Pa485-6 (32:6-33:22) (emphasis added). ]  Thus, the October 6, 2021 crash occurred at a “busy time” when there was “always [a] mass entrance” with “[p]eople always crossing” in the parking area.
[brief] In Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. at 611, the question was whether Wisconsin could enforce its statute creating a cause of action for wrongful deaths caused only in that state in a matter concerning an incident that occurred in Illinois.  The Wisconsin statute prevented Wisconsin’s state courts from entertaining suits brought under other states’ wrongful death laws.  The Supreme Court concluded that Wisconsin’s policy is “forbidden by the national policy of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. ”  Id. at 613.  The Court also noted that “[Wisconsin] has no real feeling of antagonism against wrongful death suits in general. ”  Id. at 612.  In the present case, the issue is whether New Jersey must give full faith and credit to an out of state gun permit.
[brief] (9)  ............  21  A.  The Elements Of Equitable Fraud As A Basis For Rescission Require Determination Of The Inherently Fact-Sensitive Issues Of “Material Misrepresentation” And “Detrimental Reliance”.  (9)  .................................................................  21  B.  The Trial Court Erred In Finding There Was Not A Material Fact Dispute As To Whether The Statements In The Application Constituted A “Material Misrepresentation.
[brief] R. 4:46-2(c).  See also, Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  “[b]are conclusions in the pleadings, without factual support and tendered Affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious application for Summary Judgment. ”  U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961).  Whether a party has a duty to act is a question of law, not one of fact.  Strawn v. Canuso, 271 N.J. Super. 88, 100 (App. Div. 1994), aff’d, 140 N.J. 43 (1995).  [...] did not submit anything to the Court in opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that would have resulted in [...] denying the Motion.  There were no disputed issues of fact created by [...], which would have required the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to have been denied.  A disputed issue of fact of an insubstantial nature would not preclude the grant of the Motion.  Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369, 377 (Ch. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 332 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2001).  [...] Miranda failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [...] represented [...].  It was clear, based upon the record before [...], that [...] could not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [...] represented him.  [...]’s deposition makes that clear.  [...] signed the Retainer Agreement, but [...] did not.  [...] Miranda confirmed that he never retained Mr. [...] and his firm, and also testified that [...] did not represent him in the Probate case.  That is not only the beginning of the analysis, that is the end.
[brief] H1643a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-29 . . . .  H1644a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-30 . . . .  H1645a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-31 . . . .  H1646a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-32 . . . .  H1647a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-33 . . . .  H1648a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-34 . . . .  H1649a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-35 . . . .  H1650a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-36 . . . .  H1651a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-37 . . . .  H1652a Attachment A: BPU Decision and Order issued September 14, 2009, “I/M/o the Appeal of [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 from a Decision of the [...]
[brief] In the Trial Court’s written decision, the Court specifically noted and rejected consideration of the various representations and warranties made for the product in the sales process due to dismissal of [...]’s affirmative claims in the pre-trial summary judgment order.  Pa170.  On September 14, 2023, the Trial Court entered Judgment in the amount of $112,070.82 in favor of [...] on its counterclaim representing the final contract balance and finance charges.  Pa132.  The Trial Court reserved final judgment pending a determination on the issue of attorney fees.  Pa132.  On October 27, 2023 the Trial Court entered a final order awarding attorney’s fees to [...].  Pa178.  On December 8, 2023, [...] filed their Notice of Appeal.  Pa179.  Plaintiff asserts two issues on appeal: (1) the Trial Court erred as a matter of law dismissing all counts of plaintiff’s complaint on summary judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact as to the application of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Trial Court afforded no deference to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and dismissed on the issue of damages, and (2) the Trial Court abused its discretion by entering judgment against the weight of the evidence.  This case is a dispute over representations, warranties, and workmanship related to a louvered roof system marketed by [...] and installed by [...] at Plaintiff’s [...] Golden Inn in [...].
[brief] For example, in addition to describing the eastern boundary of the [...] as “two feet west” of an “Ocean Boardwalk Reservation” depicted to the east of the beachfront properties on the 1925 Plan, the [...] also has a number of other restrictive covenants, such as prohibiting the erection of any building within 40 feet of the boardwalk.  (Da425, Da447)  As Defendants’ title expert [...] concluded with respect to these restrictive covenants and the limited eastern boundary: in my opinion, [they] demonstrate a desire on the part of the grantor [[...]] to retain: (i) dominion and control over [...]; (ii) the right to restrict access to the beach itself; and (iii) some level of control over the quality of housing within the development.[cite].  None of this is consistent with an intent to convey an easement benefiting Plaintiffs’ property.
[brief] Specifically, the detective testified that: (a) the videos depict the shooter exiting the Chevy and walking towards the location where the victim was found; (b) the shooter drove on a specific route throughout downtown Elizabeth as reflected in a map that she created; and (c) [...] was the person on the video that she had identified as the shooter.  Because the detective did not personally observe the events on video, had next to no familiarity with [...], and drew her conclusions from the videos alone, her lay opinion testimony was inadmissible under State v. Watson and State v. Sanchez, and infringed upon the jury’s role to determine crucial, contested issues.  Namely, whether the Chevy was involved in the shooting, whether the shooter can be seen on foot in the videos, and whether the person identified as the shooter was actually [...].  Even under plain-error review, the erroneous admission of this testimony was clearly capable of producing an unjust result because these questions lay at the heart of the State’s case.  The detective’s improper testimony deprived [...] of due process and a fair trial, requiring reversal.
[brief] As the prosecutor explained, the late decision to obtain a second expert report was occasioned by recent developments in the law.  Further, the prosecutor had been occupied through February and March with another trial and the death of a family member.  (1T76-3 to 14).  Second, there was neither surprise nor prejudice that could not be addressed by the trial court’s pragmatic approach.  The defense was on notice from the State’s original 2019 report that the State was relying on PCMD data.  And the defense expert was already pointing out flaws in the methodology over two years before trial, opining in his March 4, 2020 report that PCMD data, specifically, is not reliable as a means of determining the location of a cell phone at any given point in time.  (Pa40).  As early as the February 8, 2019 pretrial memorandum, defendant was on notice that cell site analysis was going to be an issue.
[brief] There, the Court stated as follows:  One of the underlying principles of tort law is that “an actor's conduct must not only be tortious in character but it must also be a legal cause of the invasion of another's interest. ”  *Restatement (Second) of Torts* § 9 cmt. a (1965) (Restatement).  It follows from that principle that the issue of a defendant's liability cannot be presented to the jury simply because there is some evidence of negligence.  “There must be evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom showing a proximate causal relation between defendant's negligence, if found by the jury,” and the resulting injury.  Similarly, *Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts* states that [t]he plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.  A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.  *Reynolds*, 172 N.J. at 284 (citations omitted).
[brief] “Accordingly, for limitations purposes, a "discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act occur[s] on the day that it `happen[s]."  Id. at 110, 122 S.Ct. at 2070, 153 L.Ed.2d at 120. ”  Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 567 (N.J. 2010)  As such, the action in lieu of prerogative writs and civil rights complaint was not properly before [...] and the Chancery Division.
[brief] A.  The trial court ignored the policy’s conformity-to-law clause and its plain meaning.  Although [...] sued [...] within the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed her case as untimely.  To square this circle, the trial court relied on the insurance policy’s limitation provision under “Legal Actions Against Us. ”  The court read this provision as requiring [...] to file her UIM action within four years of her accident.  That may be true, but the court erred by ignoring the policy’s “Conformity to Law” clause.  *Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C.*, 226 N.J. 403, 416 (2016) (“The court’s responsibility is to give effect to the whole policy, not just one part of it.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT  SINCE PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS CITING “NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE” WERE PRESENTED AND REJECTED BEFORE (376a-377a)  In plaintiffs’ Appellate submission, similar to numerous arguments made before the trial court, plaintiffs argue that the “new” legal malpractice claims against the [...] were not and could not have been known or claimed prior to the dismissal of the previous claims, because these “new” claims allegedly arose solely out of [...]’ ownership of [...].
[brief] Although consideration of matters outside the pleadings may result in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim becoming a summary judgment motion, New Jersey’s Supreme Court has nonetheless made clear that “[i]n evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider ‘allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ’”  Banco Popular N. Am., supra, 184 N.J. at 183, quoting, Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004).  “‘The purpose of this rule is to avoid the situation where a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim that is based on a particular document can avoid dismissal of that claim by failing to attach the relied upon document. ’”  Lerner v. City of Jersey City, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 755, *7 (App. Div. April 2, 2019), quoting, Lum, supra, 361 F.3d at 221 n.3.  Accordingly, “in reviewing a motion 10 FEDa180. under Rule 4:6-2(e), a court may consider documents referred to in the complaint, matters of public record, or documents explicitly relied on in the complaint, without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. ”  Lerner, supra, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS, at * 7, citing, N.J. Citizen Action, Inc. v. Cnty. of Bergen, 391 N.J. Super. 596, 605 (App. Div. 2007).  Here, the trial court properly applied the standards of Rule 4:6-2(e) in dismissing Appellants’ First Amended Complaint.  First, a review of the portion of the trial court’s Opinion dismissing the First Amended Complaint makes clear that the trial court did not consider anything beyond the First Amended Complaint in entering the Dismissal Order.
[brief] UNDER CONTRACT AND QUASICONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES, DEFENDANTS CANNOT UNILATERALLY DIVEST PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR ACCRUED TERMINAL LEAVE.  (1028a-1030a).  A.  The Trial Court erred when it dismissed Plaintiffs' contract claims.  (1028a-1031a).  In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated their contractual rights.  (34a-35a).  Plaintiffs refer the Court to Point II, A in which they set forth the important contractual principles set forth in In Matter of County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, Caponegro, 330 N.J. Super. 148, Matter of School Bd. Of Morris, and Owens, 20 N.J. 537 that demonstrate that they are entitled to their vested deferred compensation.
[brief] Cf. Liebling, 337 N.J. Super at 543-55.  Question 4 is objective because it seeks to obtain information within the applicant’s knowledge. \(^4\)  In response to this objective question, it was incumbent on [...] to provide the information within its knowledge responsive to the question.  “Fair dealing requires the insured to state everything which might, and probably would, influence the insurer in entering into or declining the risk, and in disclosing all information material to the risk about which information is sought. ”  *Tri-State*, 332 B.R. 690, 710; see also *Ledley*, 138 N.J. 627, 637 (“misrepresentation or concealment” in response to an objective question “is inexcusable.
[brief] State v. Phelps, 96 N.J. 500, 509 (1984) (internal citations omitted); State v. Kamienski, 254 N.J. Super. 75, 94 (App. Div. 1992) (stating that “[a]n implicit or tacit agreement may be inferred from the facts and circumstances”).  “Circumstantial evidence is to be tested by the rules of ordinary reasoning such as govern mankind in the ordinary affairs of life. ”  Samuels, 189 N.J. at 245.  “While certain actions of each of the defendants, when separated from the main circumstances and the rest of the case, may appear innocent, that is not significant and undoubtedly appears in every case of criminal conspiracy. ”  Ibid.  “[T]here are no legal rules as to what inferences may be drawn.