ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] seeks to participate as *amicus curiae* because most people have misconceptions about forensic science.  Courts cannot ignore the existence of inaccurate preexisting beliefs held by jurors, nor their impact on fair trials.  There exists no “quick cure” for these preexisting beliefs once they are formed, but their effect on trials can be mitigated with research-based approaches to voir dire, cautionary and limiting instructions, and imposing limits on how forensic results are communicated.  Respectfully submitted, [...] ([...])
[brief] To the extent Plaintiff seeks to impute such liability on the [...], Plaintiff did not plead or produce any facts to demonstrate that the [...], its Municipal Court, or any member of the Municipal Court staff treated Plaintiff differently based on his race, or reached a decision based on racial animus.  The fact that Plaintiff is African American alone does not give rise to an NJLAD claim.  Plaintiff conducted no discovery on the issue of differential treatment.  Plaintiff cannot proceed on a claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of race without evidence that he was denied "accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges … on account of race. ”  Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, supra, 371 N.J. Super., 348.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s public accommodation claim was properly dismissed as to the [...] on summary judgment.
[brief] *Fuentes*, 217 N.J. at 72-73.  In so doing, the court should not simply count “whether one set of factors outnumbers the other. ”  *Case*, 220 N.J. at 65.  Instead, “[t]he court must qualitatively assess the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, assigning each factor its appropriate weight. ”  *Ibid.*  “[W]hen the mitigating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the lower end of the range, and when the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the higher end of the range. ”  *State v. Natale*, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).  To facilitate meaningful appellate review, the court must provide a detailed explanation of the balancing process and the reasons for the sentence imposed.  *Case*, 220 N.J. at 65.  “Inadequate explanation of the sentencing judge's reasons . . . generally requires a remand for resentencing. ”  *State v. Pennington*, 301 N.J. Super. 213, 220 (App. Div. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 N.J. 344 (1998).  Here, the court erred by failing to provide a factual basis for its application of aggravating factors three and nine.
[brief] [...] therefore respectfully seeks leave to participate in this matter as amicus curiae so that it may explain why the Court should reverse the Law Division’s orders compelling arbitration and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims.  Currently, the party insurance company is a large, national insurer with obligations to stockholders.  [...], as a domestic, reciprocal exchange, offers unique insight to the important policy considerations of reversing the Law Division’s decision and in doing so, upholding the legislative intent of the IFPA.  **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**
[brief] The substantive obligation to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate comes from § 13.10(a) of the PSA.  (Da211.)  Section 13.10(a) requires that “seller shall, within (10) says of this Agreement, prepare and submit to any commercial tenant under the Leases an estoppel certificate….  Upon receipt of the executed Estoppel Certificate, Seller shall promptly furnish a copy thereof to Purchaser. ”  (Id.)  This provision requires [...] to initiate the process of obtaining an estoppel certificate within a specific timeframe — namely, “within 10 days of this Agreement. ”  The 10-day provision governs when [...] must initially request the certificate, not when an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate must be delivered.
[brief] ”  Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 336, 338 (1995).  The court must be sensitive to the possibility that a party has purposely withheld claims from an earlier suit for strategic reasons or to obtain “two bites at the apple. ”  Hillsborough Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Faridy Thorne Frayta, P.C., 321 N.J. Super. 275, 284 (App. Div. 1999).  A court should not permit itself to be made a party to such strategic choices that result in unfair consequences to others.
[brief] Defendants-Respondents argue this Court must affirm the decision of the Trial Court to deem the Boundary Commissioners’ Report final and conclusive as to the [...] and [...] for the following reasons: (i) the Trial Court was constrained by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:28 in resolving the subject boundary dispute; (ii) the Boundary Commissioners’ Report is valid and enforceable as against the parties; (iii) the settlement boundary line proposed by the Plaintiffs is not a legally enforceable alternative to the Boundary Commissioners’ Report; (iv) the Final Order solely impacts the parties to this litigation; (v) and the neighboring lots were provided with adequate notice and opportunity to object to the entry of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.
[directive] This Directive establishes the framework for the “Gun Violence Reduction Task Force,” a new initiative that we are launching today with the Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and our state’s 21 County Prosecutors.  This is hardly the first interagency initiative to tackle gun violence in New Jersey, and you may ask why another task force is necessary.  This document explains what problem we are trying to solve and why we believe our plan will work.  Since becoming Acting Attorney General two months ago, I have met with dozens of law enforcement leaders across New Jersey to discuss strategies for reducing gun violence.  Without exception, the observations of every police chief and County Prosecutor included four basic facts: (1) a majority of gun violence incidents can be traced to a small group of individuals; (2) these incidents are concentrated in specific places, sometimes as small as a few city blocks; (3) the violence is fueled by a steady supply of illegal firearms, obtained mostly out of state; and (4) a growing number of incidents involve juveniles with no significant criminal record.  But it is a fifth observation that has most stuck with me.  Over and over again, I heard that while law enforcement officers often know who is most responsible for the violence in their communities, this information does not always make its way to the prosecutors best positioned to hold these violent individuals accountable.  Sometimes, the information gap exists between a local police department and their County Prosecutor’s Office, which by default serves as the lead prosecuting agency for most violent crimes.  But just as often, there is insufficient information- sharing between county, state, and federal prosecutors, who have overlapping jurisdiction in firearms cases and must work together to identify which entity can most effectively prosecute their shared targets.  The consequences of these information gaps can be deadly: the longer that a criminal remains on the streets after committing an act of violence, the greater the likelihood that the person will act again.  In several of New Jersey’s largest municipalities, law enforcement agencies have addressed New Jersey Is an Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable this issue by establishing city-specific anti-crime initiatives, which bring together federal, state, county, and local law enforcement to share intelligence on the individuals who present the most significant threats to public safety.  These city-specific task forces are now mostly known as “Violent Crime Initiatives” (or VCIs) and they have been particularly successful in locations— such as Newark and Camden—where law enforcement agencies and prosecutors at all levels of government have forged genuine partnerships to share information and identify investigation targets.  The task force we are establishing today borrows the best features of the VCI model and takes it statewide.
[brief] Respondents Failed To Demonstrate How The Alleged Confidential Information Could Or Is Being Used Against them (102a – 135a).  Respondents bear the burden of persuasion to show that business information or records from years ago can be used against [...] in the instant matter.  See Dewey v.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. at 221.  The trial court should have determined that Respondents failed to meet that burden.
[brief] Flood Hazard Area Assessment  As set forth in the Application, [...] requested a Flood Hazard Area Verification for the four (4) surface waters to be located on and adjacent to the Property: a Shipetauken Creek unnamed tributary, located in the southwestern corner of the Property; two Duck Pond Run unnamed tributaries, located in the northeastern portion of the Property; and the Duck Pond Run, located adjacent to the site’s eastern border.  Aa149.  A Flood Hazard Area Verification was previously issued for the Property on July 11, 2013, confirming the limits of the regulated waters and associated riparian zones and flood hazard area.  Ra138.  The prior Verification expired on July 11, 2018, and [...] requested a new Verification as part of the Application.  Aa149.  [...] calculated the regulatory flood hazard areas pursuant to the methods set forth in the FHA Rules.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.2(c)(1).  Aa150-161.  In issuing the Permit, the [...] confirmed the methods used by [...] in calculating the flood hazard areas.  Aa012-015.  [...] approved and issued the Permit on December 1, 2022.  Aa001.
[brief] (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 24; Pa101-Pa173).  No paper or electronic mail was ever returned as undeliverable or as a wrong address, nor did any of the emails bounce back as “undeliverable. ”  In addition, Appellant never contacted Respondent regarding the entered Judgment, questioning its entry or otherwise.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 26).  Further, Appellant never notified Respondent of a change of address.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 27).  Despite these notices, Appellant never attempted to appear in the Action, appeal the Judgment, or set it aside.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 12; Pa19-Pa21).  Appellant admitted to becoming aware of the Judgment in 2019.
[brief] The Stormwater Management Act “delegates to the DEP ‘the authority to regulate storm water management. ’”  In Re: Stormwater Management Rules, 384 N.J. Super. 451, 454 (App. Div. 2006) (citing N.J. State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 310 N.J. Super. 224, 240 (App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 158 N.J. 211, 729 A.2d 21 (1999)).  It is also settled law that “courts ordinarily recognize that an agency’s specialized expertise renders it particularly well-equipped to understand the issues and enact the appropriate regulations pertaining to the technical matters within its area. ”  *Id.* at 465 (citing *In re: Protest of Coastal Permit Program Rules*, 354 N.J. Super. 293, 330 (App. Div. 2002)).  “Ordinarily, DEP is given great deference when it applies its considerable expertise and experience to the difficult balance between development and conservation.
[brief] In response to the COVID19 health emergency on January 31, 2020, the United States Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services declared a public health emergency under Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act 42 U.S.C. Ch. 6A §201.  On March 9, 2020, Governor [...] signed Executor Order 103 declaring a state of emergency and a public health emergency in New Jersey.  By March of 2020, much of the country, including most municipal governments within the state, were searching for ways to adapt to a rapidly changing environment.  Without question, most Americans were unprepared for a total shutdown of the national economy including many of the services provided by local government.  On March 24, 2020, the appellant, along with all other South Plainfield employees in the Recreation Department received an email from [...], the Director of Recreation for the [...].  [Pa3]  Her email citing the governor’s restrictions states in relevant parts, “Effective immediately we cannot have part-time staff into the building to do any work. ”  [Pa3]  The email goes on to provide various options for employees without explaining any of the legal ramifications.  Employees were given the option of using any paid time off they might have banked, taking unpaid leave, or being terminated subject to being recalled after the COVID19 emergency had subsided.  [...]’ letter clearly states that at the end of the COVID19 national emergency, “an employee would be reinstated to their prior positions. ”  [Pa3]  When South Plainfield sent this email, no one understood how long this national emergency would last.  There were no vaccines or treatments for COVID19 and there was considerable confusion regarding how government entities and employers should handle the situation.  Essentially, the entire country was on a lockdown.  While [...] faced a similar national emergency, they decided to keep the Meals for Wheels Program going since countless seniors depended on this program.  The appellant remained employed by the county, but like millions of other Americans, he was suddenly out of work based upon the COVID19 crisis from his position with South Plainfield.  In September of 2020, South Plainfield, with a better understanding of how to manage the COVID19 health emergency, elected to reopen their Recreation Department with various COVID restrictions in place.  The appellant returned to his employment with the [...] on or about September 21, 2020.  When [...] returned to his employment, South Plainfield completed the necessary paperwork to re-enroll the appellant in the New Jersey State Pension System.
[brief] On May 15, 2008, [...] filed a “Certificate of Change-Registered Agent or Address, or Both” regarding [...], whereby the registered agent was changed from [...] to [...] and the registered office was changed from the office of [...] to the office of [...].  577a.  [...] manipulated [...] and opened bank accounts in the name of [...] for the co-conspirator  Defendants’ wrongful use and benefit.  739a (73:1-11); 739a–740a (76:19–77:4); 741a (89:2-11); 750a (208:21–209:7); 751a (210:1-2); 572a (227:20–228:6).  [...] testified he never owned [...] and the banking activity, checks, deposit slips, and endorsement of checks, done in his name or through his personal bank account on behalf of [...], was actually done by [...].  753a (334:22–336:2); 755a (407:9-12, 407:21-23); 737a (65:18–66:21, 67:3-14, 68:19-20); 738a–739a (69:6-17, 70:8–73:11, 75:5-14); 742a–743a (102:6–105:4); 744a–745a (124:17 – 126:10); 746a (181:15 – 182:10); 750a–751a (207:20–209:7, 209:10–213:17).
[brief] Disputes between contractors and owners as to extra work and changes on building or working contracts are as old as the practice of contracting for such work and are a fertile cause of litigation.  \textit{Headley vs. Cavileer}, 82 N.J.L. 635, 637 (E&A 1912).  The “fundamental difficulty” encountered in this field in litigation is that “there is no statute requiring such contracts…. to be in writing [.]”  \textit{Id.} at 637-638.  No matter how “solemn in form” the original agreement, parties are free to renounce or modify it in any way they see fit.  \textit{Id.} at 638 (quoting Cooper vs. Hawley, 60 N.J.L., 560, 563  Therefore, a “writing requirement may be expressly or impliedly waived by the clear conduct or agreement of the parties or their duly authorized representatives”.  *Homeowners Construction Company vs. Glen Rock*, 34 N.J. 305, 316 (1961).  See also *Salvatore vs. Trace*, 109 N.J. Super. 83, 103 (App. Div. 1969) affirm. 55 N.J. 362 (1970) (observing that contracting parties can waive a writing requirement through their conduct).  These aged pronouncements reflect little has changed over time….
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION NOT TO MOLD THE VERDICT TO INCLUDE  MEDICAL BILLS AND TEMPORARY DISABILITY  PAYMENTS WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ..................  19  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................
[brief] APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  A01  [...] v. [...], et al., Docket No. [...], Stipulation of Dismissal as to all Defendants, filed October 4, 2022  A03  [...] v. [...], et al., Docket No. [...], Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, filed June 7, 2023  A04  [...] v. [...], et al., Docket No. [...], Stipulation of Dismissal as to [...], filed July 17, 2023  THOMAS GREGO, Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], 1-10, and JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10 (last two names being fictitious and presently unknown), Defendants.
[directive] Cases Assault Sexual and Violence Violence Domestic on Incarceration Mandatory of Impact 4.6.1  Victims.......................................................................................................40 .............................................40  Cases Violence Domestic in Factors Special 4.6.2 for a Apply Must Enforcement Law Where Situations 4.6.3  Protect to Conditions  Special Seek and Complaint-Warrant .......................................................................41  Victims Violence Domestic ....................................42  Cases Violence Domestic in Notifications Special 4.6.4 ................42  Victims Assault Sexual on Incarceration Mandatory of Impact 4.6.5 ................................................................................................43  Records .  Expunged 4.7 ...........................................................................................43  Cases Waiver Juvenile 4.8 ..................................................................................................44  Indictments Direct 4.9 ..............44 .  Summons Complaint or aComplaint-Warrant Prepare to Need 4.9.1  Risk- Pretrial Automated Where Cases Direct-Indictment 4.9.2 ....................................................44 .  Available Not Are Results Assessment ...............................................45 .  Indictment or Arrest Before Prepared Complaints 4. 10 .............................45  Denied Is aComplaint-Warrant for Application When Report 4.11 ....................................46  Issued Complaint-Warrant After Jail County to Transport 4.12 .......................................46 .  Reports Investigative Available Forward Obligation to 4.13 .....................................46  Police . for Materials Instructional and Program Training 4.14  LAW PRELIMINARY AND CAUSE PROBABLE OF AFFIDAVITS
[directive] Promulgated by Directive# 19-19 (August 12, 2019)  Page9  Guideline 5.  Final Extreme Risk Protective Order Hearing Timing.  A final extreme risk protective order hearing shall be scheduled to @}. be held the Superior Court within 10 days after the petition is filed pursuant to in Guideline 2 .  Venue.  Venue shall be in the county where the temporary extreme risk .(Q1 protective order was issued, unless good cause is shown for the hearing to be held elsewhere .  Evidence.  determining whether to issue a final extreme risk protective  In .(ru order, the court may examine under oath the petitioner and any witnesses the petitioner of may produce, may consider an affidavit and documents submitted support the in or petition, and may consider any information provided by the county prosecutor of designee pursuant to Guideline 3(e) and paragraph (e) this Guideline.  The respondent shall be afforded the right to testify, to present witnesses, to submit documents, to cross-examine any witnesses who may appear at the hearing, and to otherwise present information.  The respondent shall have the right to be present at the of hearing.  The rules governing admissibility evidence at trial shall not apply to the of presentation and consideration information at the hearing.  @ Factors.  determining whether to issue a final extreme risk protective  In order, the court shall consider all relevant evidence, including the factors referenced in of If Guideline 3(d)(1) to (11).  the court finds one or more those factors, then the court may consider the factors referenced Guideline 3(d)(12) to (15).  Records provided to in Risk Guidelines for Extreme Protective Orders Promulgated by Directive# 19-19 (August 12, 2019)
[brief] ”  5T48:6-15 (emphasis added); (ii) controverted applicant’s planner as to the effect of the rezoning denial and omission from the zone plan amendment.  “[T]he use, as proposed, … was flawed and did have negative impacts in terms of its scale, its height, its density, FAR, etc. ”  6T 91:1-3 (emphasis added); and (iii) rejected applicant’s planning opinion on the appropriateness of other zones where this type of use is permitted.  6T 93:22-98:23.  Based upon the record, the Board Members considered all the expert testimony and determined to reject various conclusions reached, in particular as to the negative effect upon the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  See Da127-131, Da133-139.
[brief] He then called 911 and reported that his mother had been stabbed to death.  (21T 154-23; 157-6 to 10)  Both [...]’s brother [...], and the police, arrived within minutes.  (21T 164-7 to 9; 24T 29-24 to 30-16)  The Solorzano brothers were upfront that their mother had believed third-party offenders were targeting her property (24T 32-25 to 33-1); the brothers also characterized the area as “high crime. ”  (21T 160-4 to 5)  Victor testified that his “mother kept complaining that she thinks somebody was – trying to break in[to] the house. ”  (24T 32-25 to 33-1)  [...] testified his mother had also evicted a tenant in late 2015 (21T 181-6 to 16), that the tenant had made “threats” to his mother (21T 181-23 to 25), and that his mother had expressed concern that the tenant would be “vengeful.
[brief] Plaintiff contends that the Chancery Division Order was improperly submitted into the court record because the document had no legitimate basis in rule or law and must be removed pursuant to R. 1:38-8 - Removing from the Court File Documents Improperly Submitted to Court.  "[T]he appropriate forum for the commencement of a specific claim is established by the Rules of Court."  Solondz v. Kornmehl, 317 N.J. Super. 16, 19, 721 A.2d 16 (App. Div. 1998).  Rule 5:1-2, "Actions Cognizable," governs which actions are cognizable in the Chancery Division.
[brief] Finally, in asserting a viable aiding and abetting claim for fraudulent concealment, a person is liable for harm resulting to a third person from the conduct of another when he “knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself .  . . .”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1977); see also, Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973).  Here, [...] and [...] were dismissed with prejudice in the initial phases of the 2015 litigation, due to Plaintiffs’ failure to provide an Affidavit of Merit.  Those parties therefore had no discovery obligations and therefore no duty to breach.  Consequently, the acts of the [...]—in obtaining the dismissal and in opposing the Plaintiffs’ attempts to bring those parties back into the case—could not have “aided and abetted” a breach of duty by [...] and [...] when [...] and [...] had no duty.  They were also all within protection of the litigation privilege, which precludes an aiding and abetting a cause of action for fraudulent concealment.  As such, if this Court were to conclude that [...]’s reasoning was somehow erroneous, her order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint should nevertheless be affirmed.