ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As the lower court’s application of the caselaw to Plaintiff’s Complaint was sound, Appellees urge this Court to hold that N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) could not have provided Plaintiff with a reasonable belief that Defendants were violating the law.  In her appeal, and in an attempt to bolster her inadequate claim, Plaintiff cites to N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.1(j) and N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.2(i) as demonstrations of “the public policy underlying _____________________ 10:44A-2.8(b), and Appellant previously references N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) in ¶ 20.  N.J.A.C. § 10:44A...” (App. Br. at 28)  Interestingly, Plaintiff did not raise this argument in her opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Not only does this further demonstrate Plaintiff’s attempt to backfill her inadequate pleadings, but this argument cannot be considered by this Court.
[brief] ”  Id. at 135.  In Galicia, the Maryland Special Court of Appeals held that defendant’s conviction must be reversed because the State introduced testimony from a [...] custodian of records about a gap in defendant’s cell phone location information, and "[h]ow and under what circumstances [...] tracks location data related to searches and other activity on a device is not within the realm of common knowledge, and many laypeople would be unaware that that function can be enabled or disabled."  The Court of Appeals reversed the Special Court of Appeal’s decision and reinstated defendant’s conviction.
[brief] 6 | Cases | Page(s) | |-------------------------------------------|---------| | Berkowitz v. Haigood, | 5 | | 256 N.J.Super. 342, 606 A.2d 1157 (Law Div. 1992) | | | Costanzo v. Costanzo, | 5 | | 248 N.J.Super. 116, 590 A.2d 268 (Law Div.1991) | | | In re Jason Realty, L.P., | 3 | | 59 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 1995) | | | K. Woodmere Assocs., L.P. v. Menk Corp., | 3 | | 316 N.J.Super. 306, 314 (App.Div.1998) | | | Presley's Estate v. Russen, | 4 | | 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1350 (D.N.J.1981) | | | Sheeran v. Sitren, | 4 | | 168 N.J.Super. 403, 414, (Law Div. 1979) | | | Tirgan v. Mega Life & Health Ins., | 4 | | 304 N.J.Super. 385, 390, (App.Div.1997) | | INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT Despite the prolixity of Defendants-Respondent’s brief, the Respondents do not dispute that the amounts pledged to Dr.  Focazio’s creditors are dwarfed by the amount [...] is seeking in damages in this matter.  Similarly, the creditors make no credible showing—how could they?—that these creditors had any control of the litigation of this legal malpractice case or any compromise or settlement of same.  Said control always rested in the hands of the Plaintiff.  Similarly, the Defendant’s do not claim that they filed any application attacking [...]’s standing until after the Jury had been empaneled for this matter, and after in limine motions had been filed.  Nor do Defendants claim to have raised the affirmative defense of lack in standing Plaintiff being the real party in the interest in the twenty-one affirmative defenses set forth in their answer.  (Pa0049-52)  Defendants’ naked claim that Plaintiff received due process in opposing this motion on effectively one day notice during trial, should be given a little weight to this Court.  Similarly, Defendants’ claim that any probative value of evidence of a subsequent purchase of a home by [...] or a settled litigation would be worthy of the waste of time such evidence would occasion and/or outweigh its immense prejudicial effect is likewise not seriously disputed in Respondent’s brief.
[directive] The annual reports described in Section III.A should also include the agency’s summary of the data based on the below prompts that are also included in Appendix A:  1.  Whether the agency is governed by civil service rules; 2.  A description of the agency’s application process, to include when in the hiring process a formal application is submitted, and when appointment occurs if hired; 3.  A description of the data used to determine any underrepresentation; 4.  A detailed assessment as to whether representation has improved for any previously identified underrepresented groups; 5.  Any new or modified Program goals to be implemented in the upcoming year.
[brief] In that Award, [...] ruled that [...]’ termination was without just cause.  (Pa 35-38).  [...] determined that while “an employer may be justified in terminating an employee permanently unit to perform the duties of their position,” this employer was “not justified in terminating an employee capable of returning to full duties once the temporary injury or medical condition is resolved. ” (Pa 35).  [...] noted that the Authority had a “reasonable expectation” that [...] would be able to return to her duties once her condition had improved, and that throughout the grievance process, the Authority shifted its justification for [...]’ termination to the economic strain placed on it by the COVID-19 pandemic and the reduction in work which accompanied it.  (Pa 35).  [...] noted that the “generally accepted and often referenced test for just cause includes the question of whether the Company gave the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the possible disciplinary consequences of the employee’s absence. ” (Pa 36).  He recognized that the record included no such warning by the Authority to [...], or that the Authority had ever contacted the Union to request a referral for a replacement worker or otherwise indicated that her absence was causing any particular hardship to the Authority’s orderly, efficient, and safe operation.  (Pa 36).  Based upon the absolute lack of any “offense” justifying discipline or any prior disciplinary record, [...] concluded that the Authority “jumped too quickly from recognizing the Grievant’s injury restrictions to deciding to terminate her. ” (Pa 36).  [...] further highlighted that, while the Authority had claimed economic hardship as a reason for not recalling [...], it had requested and received referrals of new carpenters in August and November 2020, and that [...] could have returned in one of their stead.  (Pa 37).  C.
[brief] [...], Note, Sovereign Immunity, the Officer Suit Fiction, and Entitlement Benefits," 56 University of Chicago Law Review 295,306-310 (1989) ...........................................................................................................................................63  [...], AN UPDATED QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF IQBAL'S IMPACT ON 12(B)(6)  MOTIONS, 46 U. of Richmond L.R. 603 ....38  [...], Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 466-473 (2000)
[brief] Defendant [...] has not done much to challenge the succinct holding and rationale of the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469 (1987).  [...] has taken the position that Weinberg decides only the "narrow issue" of immunity for water companies.  (DbP14)¹.  The Appellate Division will recall that, in Weinberg, supra, the Court abrogated the erstwhile immunity that public utility companies had enjoyed up to the time when that decision was issued.  Plaintiff reiterates the arguments asserted in his initial brief that the holding and rationale of Weinberg apply to any utility company, including a public electric company such as [...], in that not unlike a water company, a public electric company is subject to regulation and the type of Tariff oft-cited by [...]; a water company and a public electric company are regulated by the same board, the [...]; both types of companies provide services that are consumed statewide, or at least pervasively, by members of the public; and both types of company provide services that are susceptible to benefit, and at the same time harm, in significant ways, members of the public.
[brief] This area is also known as the “flared setback area”.  (Pa148a)  During the ZBA hearing which was an appeal of the HPC denial of a Certificate of Appropriateness, Plaintiff testified and relied upon the PRIOR settlement agreement for [...] ([...]) wherein Plaintiff testified that it was his understanding that Plaintiffs were “not required to obtain additional zoning permit, HPC approvals, or zoning board variances or approvals to complete both interior and exterior renovations, improvements and repairs to the property performed in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.
[brief] \(^4\)  The State Defendants argue that the delegation of nominating authority is not a delegation of legislative power, citing Group Health Ins. v. Howell, \(^4\)  As the Plaintiffs argued in their initial Brief, the legislative intent that the sportsmen appointed to the Council must be members of the [...] can be ascertained by construing N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 together with N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25, which is intended to foster membership in the amalgamated Sportsmen’s Clubs (“[i]n order to permit the broadest possible representation of sportsmen to membership in the Council. ”)  Furthermore, given the multiple definitions of the terms “sportsman” and “sportsmen”, it would be absurd to conclude that the Legislature did not intend for the majority membership to consist of hunters and trappers who are members of the [...].  Otherwise, the designation of sportsmen in N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 would be subject to constitutional challenge for vagueness.  See Pb23, n.5  See also, [...], “What’s A Sportsman Anyway?”, www.npr.org/2014/12/17/371259218/whats-a-sportsman-anyway, (Heard on Morning Edition, Dec. 17, 2014.)  40 N.J. 436, 447-48 (1963).  (Sb9).  But, N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 grants to the [...] much more authority than just recommending sportsmen.  While the Governor does not have to accept, and the Senate does not have to confirm, every sportsman nominated by the [...], the Governor does not have the authority to appoint, and the Senate does not have the authority to confirm, a sportsman that is not nominated by the [...].  The [...] controls that process.
[brief] Defendant [...]’s Motion to Compel or, Alternatively, Exclude, Dkt. No. 81, is HEREBY GRANTED.  [...] is ORDERED to revise its responses to [...]’s Second Set of Interrogatories Numbers 1 and 2, and either produce documents responsive to [...]’s Second Set of Requests for Production Nos. 15 through 17 or certify that it is not seeking any lost profits damages by August 2, 2016.  SIGNED this 26 day of July, 2016.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Indeed, in this case, no contraband was found on [...] and [...], who were stopped simply because they were on [...], or on any of the [...]’ friends.  The prosecutor also defends the police action as a service to the residents of the community:  “Based on all this knowledge of the area and to protect the residential community trying to live peacefully there, this area was chosen for surveillance. ”  (Sb 10)  These six young men were members of the community.  One of [...]’ friends can be heard telling the officers that his aunt lives “right there” and they were “just chillin. ”  (Ex B 12:30 to 12:45, 13:40 to 14:20)  [...] was detained in front of his home while his distraught mother tried to reason with police.  (Ex C 7:30 to 13:15)  There was no justification for the stop and frisk of [...]’ and his friends, just as there was no justification for stop and frisk of [...] and his friend.  The State’s alternative argument – that the [...] would have inevitably been frisked and the gun inevitably discovered (Sb 14) – was not raised by the prosecutor below and should be deemed waived.
[brief] ’”  [...]’s Br. 8-9 (quoting KPH *Healthcare Servs. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc.*, No. 20-cv-05901 (KM) (ESK), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196095, at *19 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2021)).  However, [...] citation to *KPH Healthcare Servs.* omits the fact that the court was citing examples of standards in other jurisdictions and went on to say that the law of New Jersey requires more.  Many courts have found that equitable estoppel allows a non-signatory to enforce an arbitration agreement against a signatory because of “the close relationship between the entities involved, . . . the relationship of the alleged wrongs to the non-signatory's obligations and duties in the contract . . . and [the fact that] the claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. ”  *DuPont*, 269 F.3d at 199 (quoting *Thomson—CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration Assoc.*, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995)).  **New Jersey law, however, requires more. **  In 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court “reject[ed] intertwinement as a theory for compelling arbitration when its application is untethered to any written arbitration clause between the parties, evidence of detrimental reliance, or at a minimum an oral agreement to submit to arbitration.
[brief] By: ___/s/ [...]_________  WILLIAM D. GRAND  Dated: January 17, 2024  IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF [...], DECEASED.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY  DIVISION: PROBATE PART  BERGEN COUNTY SAT BELOW HON.  [...], J.S.C. HON.  [...], P.J.Ch. DOCKET NO. BELOW [...]  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] PLAINTIFF, (PRO SE) ON THE BRIEF: [...] (PRO SE)
[brief] As the Board freely admits, had [...] written the same information that she wrote on the outer envelope on the certificate, and still failed to sign the certificate, she would have received a cure letter and been given an opportunity to fix the defect with the ballot.  It is undisputed that the ballot was timely submitted and [...] was otherwise qualified to vote.  Following the election, [...] went to the Board to try to cure the deficiency.  She did so within the timeframe allowed to cure such an issue.  She was turned away, not allowed to cure the issue, and therefore disenfranchised.  However, the Board had a statutory obligation to allow Ms. [...] to cure her ballot.
[brief] During their marriage, [...] and [...] secured life insurance policies for each other repeatedly agreeing and assuring each other that they would keep their premiums current.  [...] did just that and her life insurance policy, naming [...] as the beneficiary, remained in force at the time of his death.  Certain that she was the beneficiary of [...]’s life insurance, [...] sought the information regarding the life insurance after his death.  From the very beginning, she was ignored and unable to secure any information, not even as to funeral insurance.  (155-A).  On or about September 15, 2020, discovery was served on [...], by way of the [...], seeking answers to questions about the existence of insurance policies.  [...], with the assistance of the [...], not only gave false responses but took affirmative steps to prevent [...] May, as well as [...], the Court-appointed Administratrix, and the Court from learning about Tyrone’s life insurance policies, their value, their beneficiaries, any distributions, and the whereabouts of distributions.  Despite Court Orders mandating that insurance information be produced, the Orders were repeatedly violated and/or ignored, with information constantly hidden or misrepresented, and paperwork withheld.
[brief] The Borough has not Submitted any Competent Evidence (Da11)  In order to defeat summary judgment, “the opposing party must demonstrate by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of material fact exists. ”  Globe Motor v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479-80 (2016) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).  “Competent opposition requires competent evidential material beyond mere speculation and fanciful arguments. ”  Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009).  Hearsay evidence is inadmissible, non-competent evidence, and is insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.
[brief] Plaintiffs repeatedly argue that the modification of the site plans is meaningless as “the damage had already been done” by the time the site plans were changed.  This alleged work had nothing to do with [...].  All of the work done on the Property prior to the site plans being modified – including the excavation of the parking lot – was done in connection with environmental remediation efforts.  (Pa000243).  And as [...] made clear to Plaintiffs in its responses to Interrogatories and in the safe harbor letter, it had nothing to do with any of the remediation efforts on the Property.  (Pa000102; Pa000121-22).  With respect to the remediation efforts, even if Plaintiffs now claim that consent was “coerced” or given without full knowledge of the extent of the remediation needed, they nevertheless consented as early as August 2017.  (Pa000606).  Whether this consent was uninformed or given under coercion is, again, not a harm that can be attributed to [...].  B.
[brief] 2T54:12-16; 2T55:15-19.  ii.  This Purported Verbal Agreement Was Never Memorialized In A Signed Written Amendment As Required By The Redevelopment Agreement  The Authority’s assertion that it relied on the alleged 2009 conversation with [...] is further belied by its failure to memorialize the supposed agreement in a formal amendment to the Redevelopment Agreement.  In 2012, the parties amended the Redevelopment Agreement to allow for a larger supermarket than originally contemplated.  Da352-354.  It is, therefore, not credible for the Authority to claim that one or more phases required by the Redevelopment Agreement could be delayed, altered, or eliminated entirely, based solely on an oral statement and without a formal written amendment to the Redevelopment Agreement.  Section 16.11 of the Redevelopment Agreement expressly requires all waivers or amendments to the Redevelopment Agreement to “be in writing and signed by the appropriate authorities of the City and the . . . Authority and [[...]].”
[brief] Plaintiff lied on her application three separate times.  (Compare Appx 523-25 ¶¶11-20 with Appx 066-74).  Plaintiff attempts to belatedly justify her multiple lies during the application process by claiming that “in her mind, accepting a plea deal was not the same thing as being convicted of a crime. ” (AB at pp. 7-8).  Plaintiff’s argument must be rejected because it is simply not supported by the evidence on the record.
[brief] The trial court even recognized the undisputed timing of the entries.  (See 1T 25:3-7 (“So after, there was an approval of their pay they would go in at 11 o’clock on a Monday, this was every other Monday when their time sheets had to be in and approve time, this additional pay for each other during this period of time. ”); see also id. at 25:8-12 (“Obviously, it really cannot be disputed that they were doing it to avoid detection from any else and during the chaos of COVID”); Id. at 25:13-15 (“But the facts under how they went about approving this charge pay for each other really belies the assertion that it was approved by [...]”).  As set forth more fully above, there exist copious facts in the record supporting Defendants’ position that the charge pay was not authorized.  (See Pa361 at 78:14-21 ([...] repeatedly sought more pay for her staffing coordinators yet was continuously rejected); Pa362 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa475 ([...] denies [...]’s request for prospective charge pay); Pa477; Pa362 at 84:15-17 ([...] confirmed he never received approval for charge pay, in fact never even discussed charge pay with [...]); Pa364 at 90:5-91:1; Pa475; Pa482-528 ([...] discovered that [...], [...], and [...] would enter charge pay for each other after she had already reviewed their time cards); Pa232 at 32:11-15; Pa482-528 (two remaining staff coordinators, [...] and [...], never received charge pay); Pa475 ([...] confirmed she never would have approved charge pay for other three out of her five staffing coordinators); Pa545 ([...], during her interview with [...], noted that staffing coordinators do not receive charge pay); Pa297 at 80:10-14 ([...] confirmed that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay); Pa547-48 ([...] stated during her interview with Inspira investigators that she never received confirmation from [...] that the charge pay was approved); Pa477 ([...] admitted that he had no direct approval from [...] as to the charge pay and that he and [...] effectively took silence from [...] as approval).  No reasonable factfinder could otherwise conclude.
[brief] Pa55  Exhibit A, Statement of [...] ................................. Pa57  Exhibit B, Statement of [...] ..............................  Pa63  Exhibit C, OPRA Exemptions ...............................................  Pa69  Exhibit D, OPRA Denial dated December 27, 2022 ...................... Pa77  Exhibit E, Statement of [...] ............................... Pa84 Exhibit F, Forensic Document, [...] ............................... Pa88  Exhibit G, Statement of [...] ......................................  Pa97 Exhibit H, [...] CV ...............................................  Pa105 Exhibit I, Statement of [...].  ....................................  Pa115  Exhibit J, [...] abbreviated report .....................................  Pa120  Exhibit K, Ransom Note Envelopes .......................................  Pa134  Trial Court Order and Decision of January 5, 2023, denying Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause and Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice ..........
[brief] Courts evaluate indispensability “from the point of view of the absent party and in consideration of whether or not his rights and interests will be adversely affected. ”  [...] and [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3.1 on R. 4:28-1 (2015) (citing La Mar-Gate, Inc. v. Spitz, 252 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 1991)).
[brief] 5 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 17, 26, 27 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3)  24 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 25  Ordinances  [...] Code, §175-30 to 32  3  [...] Code, §175-89D  4  [...] Master Plan 1, 12, 19, 24, 28, 29  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Moreover, defense counsel’s many electronic filings from January to March 2024 in response to docket entries and in accordance with general case management also demonstrate his awareness of documents filed to eCourts and, at the very least, implies he read them.  See Da27, Pa1 to 26; see also Da43 (the trial court noting the 5 adjournment requests defense counsel submitted between February 19, 2024 and March 5, 2024, and the 3 additional adjournment requests after that date).  Even after [...] scheduled a hearing on March 6, 2024 to discuss defense counsel’s adjournment requests before denying them on the record in an extensive legal decision, defense counsel submitted three more adjournment requests to the court. \(^3\)
[brief] The Appellant relies on its November 28, 2023 Brief.  III.  APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF APPELLEE’S INJURIES IN SUMMATION REQUIRE  A NEW TRIAL  Appellee’s position that there was no mischaracterization is absurd.  No medical expert testified that labruem was “torn off. ”  Tearing and complete tears are materially different and Appellee played fast and loose with the medical diagnoses in this case.  Therefore, Appellee’s counsel’s comments at closing were not confined to the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence introduced during the course of trial.  Accordingly, it ran afoul of Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177 (App. Div. 1999).  IV.
[brief] Application and execution of a simple, contractually authorized accounting adjustment that did not require anyone to sue anyone else would have avoided much litigation and expense subsequently borne by both parties.  Reviewing the Lease “in a fair and common sense manner,” avoidance of litigation via the offset method is what the parties to the Lease—the original parties—intended, alas, in vain.  Hardy, 198 N.J. at 103.  Instead of effectuating the automatic deduction by simply paying a reduced Tenant’s Allowance installment payment in 2020, the Landlord opted to pay nothing that year, or the next year.