ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The Newly Discovered Documents Found in Defendant’s Own Email Account By Defendant Himself After a One-Hour Search Were Plainly Discoverable By Reasonable Diligence if Defendant had Searched in the Four Years Before Trial.  The court below erroneously found that “the newly discovered documents submitted were not discoverable by reasonable diligence at the time of trial. ” (Sa24).  The basis for that conclusion was that (1) “the evidence was discovered among presumably thousands of documents” and (2) “Defendant searched his email for around an hour before any emails with the documents popped up. ” (Sa24, emphasis added).  But the trial court failed to explain why defendant could not have found the documents sooner without exercising reasonable diligence.  The reasonable-diligence prong is intended to “encourage defendants and attorneys to act with reasonable dispatch in searching for evidence before the start of the trial. ”  Ways, 180 N.J. at 192.  But defendant did not do so.  Instead, he waited until after he was convicted before searching through the boxes of business records in his family home and his own emails for evidence to support his claim that he had the right to sell shares in [...].
[brief] The trial court ruled against [...]’s actions to set them aside:  As to the [[...]’s] application to set aside the 2013 and 2014 Irrevocable Powers of Attorney, the court denies that these POAs should be set aside in the context of their use during the bankruptcy and divorce process for the same reasons concerning the MMA, PSA, and Final Judgment of Divorce.  [A229, Op at 51].
[brief] The Synagogue initially presented on its direct remand case only [...], [...], and Zoning Board Attorney [...].  [...], the head of the Synagogue since 1995, had no knowledge of the circumstances of the 1963 Agreement.  He became involved with the Synagogue in 1991 and testified he thereafter observed Synagogue attendees/staff regularly parked in the School's Fifth Street Lot and Courtyard (6T104-5 to 111-20).  On his return to the witness stand (after other witnesses out of turn), he testified that, upon learning in 2007 that the School may be for sale due to finances, he located in Synagogue records the 1963 Agreement and had the Agreement --- not itself in recordable form --- recorded in the County records by attaching it to a recordable Corporate document (Da907).
[brief] For that matter, [...], the cab driver who testified as defendant’s other alibi witness, informed that when he left [...]’s apartment complex with defendant, he drove them to Checkers for a bite to eat, (15T 9-8 to 23), which the digital forensic examiner also corroborated.  (16T 63-2 to 15).  Even so, by determining defendant’s testimony was not credible from an inaccurate interpretation of the factual record, the PCR judge purportedly surmised that defendant’s attempt to explain his whereabouts on the night of the crime was asserted through witnesses who his attorney did not know existed.  The PCR judge then rationalized that being “unaware of the existence” of these “newly-proffered witnesses,” defendant’s trial attorney could not have conducted a pretrial investigation of them.  (19T 18-6 to 9).6  At any rate, defense counsel was aware of the cellular telephone data produced by the State during discovery.
[brief] [...] denied that any such incident occurred at the McDonald’s.  (7T 221-11 to 222-9)  With respect to the robbery that occurred shortly after he dropped off [...] and [...], [...] said:  “I don’t know . . .  I do not know, I honestly don’t know that they was going do.  I don’t know nothing, I don’t know nothing about what they was going do, at all. ”  (7T 191-24 to 192-12)  F.
[brief] [...]’s reliance on Serenity Contracting Group, Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 306 N.J. Super. 151 (App. Div. 1997), is misplaced.  In Serenity, the bidder’s bid contained numerous alterations (cross-outs, hand-written additions, white-outs, etc.) without any explanation, as required by the solicitation.  Serenity Contracting Group, Inc., 306 N.J. Super. at 154.  While the court held that the numerous cross-outs, hand-written additions and white-outs were themselves waivable, it also found that the ambiguities created by these alterations (which were not objectively discernable and could be altered) created a sound business reason for the public entity’s refusal to waive these alterations and ultimate rejection of the bid.  *Id.* at 158.
[directive] Drive stun mode.  Drive stun mode means to discharge a CED where the main body of the device is in direct contact with the person against whom the charge or current is transmitted.  3.8  Fire.  Fire means to cause the darts/electrodes of a CED to be ejected from the main body of the device and to come into contact with a person for the purpose of transmitting an electrical charge or current against the person.  3.9  Less-Lethal Ammunition.
[brief] Id.; see City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Adver. of Austin, LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1464 (2022); State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416 (1980) (content neutrality).  The time, place, and manner test is known as the “Clark/Ward test,” named after Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984), and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989).  E & J Equities, LLC, 226 N.J. at 580-81.  The test applies to content-neutral regulations of signs of any form, including billboards, affecting commercial and noncommercial speech equally.  E&J Equities, LLC, 226 N.J. at 580; see also City of Austin, 142 S.Ct. at 1464; Miller, 83 N.J. at 416.  Under the Clark/Ward test, [...] “must demonstrate that the prohibition...is content neutral, that it is narrowly tailored to serve a recognized and identified government interest, and that reasonable alternative channels of communication exist to disseminate the information sought to be distributed.
[brief] As noted in State v. A.L.A., “the law does not prohibit reasonable corporal punishment by a parent or guardian,” rather, it makes unlawful the infliction of excessive corporal punishment.  251 N.J. 580, 583 (2022).  The A.L.A. Court recognized that Title Nine, which governs child abuse and neglect, does not define “excessive corporal punishment” and approved of the language this Court endorsed in DYFS v. K.A., 413 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2010):  The law does not prohibit the use of corporal punishment.  The statute prohibits the infliction of excessive corporal punishment.  The general proposition is that a parent may inflict moderate correction such as is reasonable under the circumstances of a case.  [Id. at 510.]  Although the jury in this case received no instruction regarding the circumstances under which hitting a dog may legally be deemed “necessary,” such circumstances would surely include reasonable discipline, just as reasonable corporal punishment to correct a child’s behavior is lawful.  The court’s duty to define “unnecessarily” was especially crucial because the term carries with it a substantial risk of unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.
[brief] “An election contest petition is not a complaint, the purpose of which is to give one’s adversary notice of the claim. ”  Parsippany-Troy Hills, 192 N.J. at 569-70.  That is why the Supreme Court has further held that, given the Court’s authority under N.J.S.A. 19:29-5 to authorize amendments to the petition, election contests “should be determined upon the merits and not upon technical artistry in pleading. ”  Perri v. Kisselbach, 34 N.J. 84, 86 (1961).  Technical defects should not bar a contest petition.  See Kilmurray, 10 N.J. at 440.  The Supreme Court has further held that Title 19 “make[s] plain that it is within the power of the judge to permit an amendment as to form or substance of the allegations, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 19:29-5, which plainly supports the proposition that the petition itself might be in need of amendment even as to its substance. ”  Parsippany-Troy Hills, 192 N.J. at 570.  Because of the timing of an election contest, amendments to a petition can only come immediately before or during an election trial based on the very nature of the statutory scheme set forth in Title 19.  Indeed, Title 19 does not set forth a deadline to file an answer or cross-petition at all, and so for the trial court to do so before trial begins is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.  7.
[brief] Model Civil Jury Charge 4:10J.  \textsuperscript{54}  Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 224, 226 (2005)(citations omitted).  \textsuperscript{55}  Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 225 (2005).  \textsuperscript{56}  Grobarchik v. Nasa Mortgage and Investment Company, 186 A. 433, 117 N.J.L. 33 (1936)(citation omitted).  even uses bottled water in his dogs’ water bowl.
[brief] THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WAS SERVED ON DEFENDANT [...] AT HER NEW YORK OFFICE, AND DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY SATISFIED, NOTWITHSTANDING HER APPEARANCE PRO SE BY THE SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY FILED WITH THE COURT ON AUGUST 27TH, 2019 (Da4, Da11, Da16)  Rule 6:2-3(d)(1) provides that the summons and complaint will be served by certified and regular mail.  Service is considered effective if the regular mail is not returned and the certified mail has either been claimed or is returned with a marking to indicate that service at the given address was good service.  Where initial service by mail is not unsuccessful, the plaintiff or the attorney may request reservice by mail or by court officer personally pursuant to R. 4:4-4.
[brief] Applying the Bailey factors to the facts in the case at bar, [...] testified that he arrested defendant "75 to 100 yards" from [...] (1T57-23 to 58-2), while defendant attested in his Certification (Paragraph 7) that:  "I had walked about ten blocks from the Park Blvd. address and was on [...] when I observed several adult males in plainclothes brandishing weapons approaching me hurriedly."  (Ca115-116).  Under either factual scenario, defendant [...] was outside the lawful limits of the premises, not within its site, and had no ease of reentry.  The three Summers justifications of preventing flight, officer safety, and orderly completion of the search were also inapplicable.  As is relevant herein, it is critical to determine whether or not the warrant was issued for a place, or a place and a particularly identified person, or a place and "all persons present."
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Beilowitz v. Gen. Motors Corp., | | | 233 F. Supp. 2d 631 (D.N.J. 2002) | 10 | | Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., | | | 614 A.2d 124 (1992) | 3, 6, 9 | | McGlynn v. State, | | | 434 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div. 2014) | 11 | | Ricci v. Ricci, | | | 448 N.J. Super 546 (App. Div. 2017) | 12 | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 56:10-1 et seq. | passim | | Other Authorities | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | New Jersey Court Rule 2:4-1(a) | 11 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  A81.  In response to Request No. 10, Defendants said they had searched “[a]ll electronic and hard copy searches. . . from the inception of discovery to the present. ”  A81.  In response to Request No. 11, Defendants certified that the Superintendent was responsible for communicating with tenants at the property regarding their units and/or any issues they experienced.  This answer is certified by [...].  A81.  In response to Request Nos. 12 through 18, [...] provided the requested certification for the amended responses.  With respect to Request 19, which the court indicated that Defendants needed to provide a certification from [...] and to describe the efforts made to locate the lease agreements, defendants submitted an amended response, certified by [...], providing, “Objection, the question is harassing, broad and vague, no lease agreements were retained by the Defendants from January 1, 2024, through September 27, 2019.  Notwithstanding this objection, all the Leases were transferred to the Plaintiffs and in their possession on or before the closing date of September 27, 2019.  Defendants reserve the right to amend this answer in accordance with Court Rules.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TOWNSHIP DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTIES UNDER THE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED.  (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-2).  Plaintiff urges the Court to affirm the Chancery’s Division determination that the Township breached the Agreement, however, Plaintiff has failed to even establish a prima facie claim for breach of contract.  Specifically, Plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Township breached the contract or that said breach caused a loss to him.  See Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016); see also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 169 (2006).  The Parties largely agree on the applicable principles of contract interpretation.  Namely, that the Agreement is a settlement agreement for which enforcement thereof is the same as a contract.  Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008).  As a result, in construing --- ¹ For the sake of judicial economy, the Township replies to the thirteen points within Plaintiff’s Opposition Brief with two points, and appropriate subpoints.
[brief] ..............................................................  10, 21 - **Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr.**, 258 N.J. 110 (2024) ......................................................................................................................  15 - **Paragon Contrs., Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n**, 202 N.J. 415 (2010) .................... 24 - **Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike**, 148 N.J. 524 (1997) ................................................ 19 - **Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics Corp.**, 116 N.J. 739 (1989) .................................
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Improperly Set Aside The Supplemental Resolution.  The trial court’s finding that the Board approved the [...] application in December 2022 and then “unapproved” the application in January 2023 is not supported by the evidence in the record before the trial court.  Indeed, it is clear from the language of the Board’s minutes that the Board did not “approve” and then “unapprove” the [...] project or otherwise ‘change its mind’ about the [...] application in January.  Rather, in December, the Board approved the application and at the same time imposed a condition upon that approval.  For reasons of health, safety and welfare, the Board wanted an elevator in all of the multi-story buildings and saw no legitimate reason why Buildings A through D should have elevators and Building E should have none.  In addition, when the public hearings were concluded, the Board had the expectation that an elevator would be included in Building E based on [...]’s representations.  (Pa148)  When the Board adopted the proposed form of resolution on December 12, 2022, it was subject to the addition of a condition that Building E contain an elevator.  The Board further directed that the condition be memorialized in a separate supplemental written resolution.  The Board’s Minutes clearly show the Board’s actions:  **[...]** - [...]; [...]; MLR3D-4 (Mount Laurel Round 3 District 4) District; [...].
[brief] ”  T4:67:3-12.  She repeatedly stated that she did not work for [...] and that she reached out to owners of distressed properties for free.  T4. p.77:2-24.  On cross-examination, she finally admitted “he’ll [Frenkel] give me money.  But I’m not on—I’m not an employee of his. ”  T4, p.77:23-25.  She later also admitted that “he gives me cash once in a while. ”  T4, p.78:2.  [...] admitted that the text messages that Plaintiff showed during her direct testimony (which were never admitted into evidence) indicate that she offered to [...] $500,000 to buy the subject property and she even sent proof of funds (Frenkel’s funds) to [...] regarding the intention to purchase the property from him.  She admitted that those text messages never mentioned that she was affiliated with [...].  T4, p. 76:9-23.
[brief] *State v. Dunbar*, 108 N.J. 80, 89 (1987).  As always, the ultimate determination of the appropriate sentence requires an evaluation of the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.  In applying the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the length of a sentence, a trial court must always “identify the aggravating and mitigating factors and balance them to arrive at a fair sentence. ”  *State v. Natale*, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).  Simply enumerating the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors is insufficient.  *State v. Case*, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).  Rather, a court’s sentencing decision must follow not from a quantitative, but a qualitative analysis.  *Ibid.*  The finding of any factor “must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record. ”  *Id.* at 64.
[brief] Appellant readily admitted that (1) the only relationship between the parties was the commercial lease, (2) that Appellant received payment in full of the money judgment and filed a Warrant of Satisfaction accordingly, (3) that the subsequent settlement proceeds of $1,096.00 was paid, and (4) that a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice was filed with the Court.  Further, Appellant’s counsel confirmed he understood the Entire Controversy Doctrine but refused to answer the Court’s direct question as to his client’s theory of reinstituting a new lawsuit (See 1T, Page 19, lines 3-11).  Counsel further admitted the entire controversy doctrine applies to matters which are concluded by way of trial, summary judgment or settlement (See 1T, Page 20, lines 5-25).  During that exchange, he made a revealing statement regarding his representation of the Appellant.  Essentially, he stated that if his client wished to pursue new claims, he would not be the one representing Appellant.  (See 1T, Page 20, lines 9-10).  If the only relationship between these parties is the commercial lease and the matter has been fully adjudicated (i.e. a money judgment entered by the Court) and all remaining claims were resolved which was memorialized in writing by the Appellant through communications with counsel and the Court along with the filing of a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, then no “new claims” can be brought.  Any new claims would necessarily involve the same parties, the same set of facts and circumstances and the same underlying claim (i.e. breach of contract).  The Appellate Division must uphold the Trial Court’s conclusion that the Entire Controversy Doctrine and *res judicata* bars Appellant from bringing any “new claims”.
[brief] **Case Law:** | | | Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority | 11 | | 32 N.J. 303, 312-14 (1960) | | | Board of Education of City of Sea Isle City | 35 | | 196 N.J. 1, 16 (2008) | | | Brennan v. Byrne | 32 | | 31 N.J. 333, 337 (1960) | | | Brewer v. Porch | 35 | | 53 N.J. 167, 173 (1969) | | | Burgos v.  State | 36 | | 222 N.J. 175, 203 (2015) | | | Bynum v. Mayor & Township Committee | 13, 14, 21 | | 181 N.J. Super 2 (App. Div. 1981), cert. denied, 89 N.J. 440 (1982) | | | City of Ocean City v. Somerville | 27 | | 403 N.J. Super 345 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Denbo v. Moorestown | 10 | | 23 N.J. 476, 478 (1957) | | | Department of Labor and Industry v. Cruz | 35 | | 45 N.J. 372, 380 (1965) | | | DiProspero v. Penn | 44 | | 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) | | | Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Twsp. of Franklin | 37 | | 448 N.J. Super 583, 595 (App. Div. 2017) | | Fair Lawn Ed. Assn. v. Fair Lawn Bd. Of Ed. 79 N.J. 574, 586
[brief] See O’Neal, 190 N.J. at 616, 622.  In fact, [...] admitted that [...] was not free to leave at this point.  (1T 150-3 to 11)  [...] explicitly told [...] that he would not let him go and that he would prolong the detention by requesting that a drug dog be sent over to check for drugs, unless he incriminated himself.  (1T 43-8 to 14)  Cf. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441-42 (“At no point during that interval was respondent informed that his detention would not be temporary.
[brief] In Maggio v. Migliaccio, 266 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 1993), plaintiff, a West Long Branch police officer, was injured while directing traffic at a fire call.  Defendant, a volunteer fireman with [...], was engaged in fighting the fire when the fire hose struck plaintiff and knocked his legs out from under him.  Plaintiff sued defendant/fireman for general negligence.  The trial Court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion based on defendant’s workers’ compensation co-employee immunity under N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that both plaintiff and defendant were employed by the same employer and the accident occurred during the course of their employment.
[brief] **POINT II**  **THE PURPORTED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS PROPERLY DENIED**  Plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants began with their action filed in March of 2015.  Da1.  That action was dismissed without prejudice, at plaintiffs’ request, while on the trial list.  [...] was not named as an expert in that prior action.  Plaintiffs re-filed their action on March 3, 2017.  Pa30.  By Case Management Order of October 6, 2017 (Pa70), plaintiffs were to name all proposed experts and provide their reports.  Plaintiffs did name [...], nor provide a report from him/  By Case Management Order of June 29, 2018, plaintiffs’ expert reports were required by September 30, 2018.  Pa74.  Again, plaintiffs did not identify [...] as an expert, nor provide a report from him.  In May of 2020, defendants moved for summary judgment.  Pa77.  In opposition, plaintiffs neither identified [...] as a potential expert nor moved to leave to do so.  In July of 2022, defendants moved to dismiss the remaining allegations of the Complaint.  Pa441.  Again, plaintiffs did not cross-move or otherwise seek leave to identify [...] as a proposed expert.  By Motion for Reconsideration filed December 27, 2022, plaintiffs attempted to re-open discovery that has been closed for nearly three years, disregard the two dispositive Orders, impeach the Court’s Opinion of December 7, 2022 as palpably erroneous and irrational, and retroactively anoint [...] as their “expert” witness.  Plaintiffs presenting nothing new beyond their dissatisfaction with the outcome.  Pa499.
[brief] (1T101:14-16).  Through her investigation, [...] did not see that level of control exerted over [...].  (1T101:16-17).  [...] found [...] met the definition for independent contractor for this factor, but noted due to the unique fact that every municipality requires municipal prosecutors, her finding of independent contractor was not a strong indicator of such status for this factor.  (1T101:17-22; Pa105; Pa109).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT WHEN IT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS' PREROGATIVE WRIT CHALLENGE. (1030a-1031a).  Plaintiffs’ Second Count of the Complaint challenges the adoption of Resolution 591 of the [...], which was approved on October 24, 2019 (35a-36a, ¶127-132).  Challenges to municipal action are generally brought by actions in lieu of prerogative writs.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], and [...], [...], and JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 1-20 (Names Being Fictitious), in their individual and corporate capacities, and as aiders and abettors, Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  APPELLATE  DOCKET NO:[...]  DOCKET NO BELOW: [...] SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C. LAW DIVISION – CUMBERLAND COUNTY