ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff additionally has actionable counterclaims against the Plaintiff, based upon the Association’s failure to repair the deteriorating roofing over his condominium units, which potentially offset the damages recoverable by the Plaintiff.  For some years, the Defendant had asked the association to repair the leaking roof in his two units.  In or around 2019, the President of the association confirmed that the roof was the association’s responsibility and advised Defendant that he should not to have the roof repaired himself.  However, the Association has yet to perform any repairs.  This ongoing failure has caused damage to the units, and rendered them untenantable.  As a result, Defendant has suffered direct damage to his property as well as consequential economic losses.
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County, Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors: This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................1  POINT  I  [...]’S MIRANDA WAIVER WAS NOT KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY.............................................1  POINT  II  [...] WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE THE INTERROGATION VIDEO ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED DETECTIVE  EGAN’S COMMENTARY ON MASON’S CREDIBILITY, GUILT, AND AN UNRELATED ARREST.  ........................................7  A.  Egan’s lay commentary on [...]’s credibility and guilt should have been redacted.  .........................................................................................  7  B.  Egan’s reference to [...]’s unrelated arrest should have been redacted.  ......................................................  Error!  Bookmark not defined.  C.  Admission of the minimally redacted video was plain error.  .......................  12  CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................13
[brief] In or around 2003, the parties commenced negotiations of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement.  4T:84:23-25.  [...], [...] and [...] were represented by sophisticated counsel throughout the negotiations.  3T:6:14-20.  The Redevelopment Agreement contemplated a phased redevelopment project that included the construction of a shopping mall (the “[...] Mall”), and an underground parking garage (the “Project Garage”), residential and commercial buildings (the “Residential Component” and the “Office/Retail Component,” respectively) and parking facilities (the “Authority Garage”) to service the customers, residents and occupants of these buildings and the surrounding Central Business District of [...] (collectively, the “Project”).
[brief] I.  The Dedication of the Roads was Automatically Accepted by the Borough Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j (Da18-Da19) .................................................................17  A.  The Roads were Dedicated to the Borough on the 2010 Map (Da18) ..........................19  B.  The Roads were Inspected and Received Final Approval from the Municipal Engineer, and the Performance Guarantees were Released (Da19)  .........................23  II.  THE BOROUGH DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO "DECLINE A DEDICATION AT ANY TIME" (Da20)...........................................27  III.  THE BOROUGH DID NOT, AND CANNOT, REBUT THE FACTUAL BASES OF THE MOTION (Da16)..................................................30  A.  The Borough has not Submitted any Competent Evidence (Da11)..................................................30  B.  All of Plaintiffs' Material Facts were Properly Deemed Admitted by the Borough (Da11-Da16)  .............................................31  IV.  THE BOROUGH'S BRIEF IS RIFE WITH RED HERRINGS AND FALSE STATEMENTS (not directly addressed by trial court)  ........33  A.  The Roads are not the "Driveway" of the Church (not directly addressed by trial court)  .............................................34  B.  There is no "Title" Issue (not directly addressed by trial court)  ......................................................36  C.  The Descriptions "Internal," "Interior," and "Access Roads" have no Legal Significance (not directly addressed by trial court)  .........................................................39  V.  THE BOROUGH HAS FORMALLY RECOGNIZED THE ROADS AS PUBLIC AND SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING OTHERWISE (not directly addressed by trial court)  .................................................................40  A.  The Official Tax Map Recognizes the Roads as Public Streets (not directly addressed by trial court)  .........................................................41  B.  The Lot 2.01 Approvals and Developer's Agreement Recognize the Roads as Public Streets (Da10)....44  C.  The Easement Area does not Include the Roads (Da11).......45  CONCLUSION
[brief] 7  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases: | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Green v. Morgan Props., | 1 | | 215 N.J. 431 (2013) | | | In re Estate of Lash, | 4 | | 169 N.J. 20 (2001) | | | In re Estate of Sogliuzzo, | 5 | | 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2921 | | | (App. Div. 2001 Dec. 17, 2015)
[brief] The Trial Court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint as moot because it failed to adjudicate the claims under the civil rights act.  Plaintiffs is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f).  Plaintiff brought an action that is shown to have been a "catalyst" for the cessation of the defendants conduct in refusing to grant adjournments to him upon request, to which Plaintiff alleged to also violate the Civil Rights Act and therefore plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party entitled to an award of attorney's fees.  The Trial Court erred and abused it discretion and the Appellate Division should reverse in the interest of justice.  [...], Plaintiff Pro Se Appellant November 27, 2023
[brief] An allegation of a new permanent injury does not require the plaintiff to present evidence of a comparative analysis.  Davidson, 189 N.J. 166, 188 (2007).  In the instant matter, the evidence at issue is the trial testimony of [...], M.D., a neurosurgeon, which is identified in relevant part within Respondent’s statement of facts.  [...] opined that the subject collision caused an acute disc herniation at C6-7 and aggravations of previously asymptomatic areas of the cervical spine above the C6-7 level, now causing cervicalgia and cervical radiculopathy.  As further indicated within Respondent’s statement of facts, the EMG that [...] relied upon, for his diagnosis of radiculopathy now caused by the subject incident’s worsening of a pre-existing asymptomatic finding, was offered into evidence through [...], D.O.; who testified the radiculopathy finding was an acute finding upon the objective EMG, consistent with the time of the collision.  First and foremost, Respondent’s claim survives the verbal threshold, on the basis that [...] opines to a new permanent injury directly caused by the collision; as well as the diagnoses of new permanent injuries offered by [...] and [...].
[directive] 9  The 2010 Attorney General Policy on Conducted Energy Devices included a CED “spark display” in Section X(1) as a law enforcement action requiring the officer to complete the enumerated reports.  The May 3, 2012 Clarification of the Attorney General Policy on Conducted Energy Devices described an officer’s authority to conduct a spark display, clarified that a spark display does not constitute a use of force as that concept is defined by the Attorney General’s General Use of Force Policy issued in 2000, and eliminated the requirement that an officer file the enumerated reports following a CED “spark display.
[directive] shall provide sufficient detail to enable a reader who is not familiar with the case to fully understand the factual scenario that resulted in the disciplinary action.  Examples of acceptable synopses may be found in Appendix L (updated November 2022).  This synopsis shall not contain the identities of the complainants or any victims.  Where discipline relates to domestic violence, the synopsis shall not disclose the relationship between a victim and an officer.  In rare circumstances, further redactions may be necessary to protect the identity of a victim.
[brief] “New Jersey public policy is to restrict uses which are not in accord with a zoning ordinance in order to bring about “‘conformity as quickly as is compatible with justice. ’””  *Berkeley Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Ad. of City of Trenton*, 410 N.J. Super. 255, 266 (App. Div. 2009).  This is because “[a] substantial public interest exists in the preservation of the integrity of a zoning ordinance. ”  *DePetro v. Twp. of Wayne Planning Bd.*, 367 N.J. Super. 161, 171  Preservation of the zoning scheme’s integrity is so important, private citizens are authorized to enforce zoning laws through lawsuits seeking to retrain, correct or abate a zoning violation.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-18.  Statutory interpretations have been rejected when such interpretation allows for subversion of the integrity of the zoning scheme.
[brief] In response to Defendants’ interrogatories, Plaintiff claimed that he spoke to [...] and [...] (co-owner of [...]) “approximately once a month” about alleged monies Plaintiff was owed, but provided no dates.  Later in the same interrogatory responses, Plaintiff claims would go to the “CEO” (This was [...] for a time, but several individuals held this title while Plaintiff worked at the hospital) “monthly for at least a year” about monies he was owed.  See [...] Supp. Cert. Ex. A. • Plaintiff was asked at his deposition if he ever had conversations with either [...] or [...] about any alleged amounts he was owed, to which he stated “Yes.  We -- again, it was during the Christmas event, which was at the end of December of 2017, and myself and another physician who was owed money, too, we approached [...] and said you know you're selling the hospital but we haven't gotten paid.  And he said don't worry.  The new owners have six years to pay us and we'll pay you. ”  See Da79 at 83:19-25.  Plaintiff made no mention of any other communications with [...] or [...].  •
[brief] The facts show an independent woman who was relying on an antenuptial agreement by keeping her assets separate, stuck in a bad marriage, who was independent, and repeatedly told people that she wanted to leave all of her assets to her daughter, which she was entitled to do pursuant to the valid antenuptial agreement.  In its decision, the Chancery Division held: “Here, the court finds there were NO suspicious circumstances. ” (Pa 34).  It then devotes five paragraphs delineating the reasons for this conclusion.  (Pa 34-35).  Those paragraphs, which require no repetition here, effectively put to rest the Petitioner’s arguments on this issue, which in the view of the Respondent, is not a “close” or difficult legal issue.  On appeal, in Point I, the Petitioner makes five arguments, all of which lack merit.
[brief] Similarly, in *Muirfield Const. Co. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth.*, the Appellate Division explained the importance of a bidder’s ability to walk away from a project if it decides not to cure, even though the bidder in that case cured two (2) weeks after bid opening:  In determining whether the 10% disclosure requirement is *curable*, we must apply the second prong of the test to determine whether the bidding defect was of such a nature that its waiver would adversely affect competitive bidding by placing ...  [[...]] in a position of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise undermining the necessary common standard of competition.  While we recognize that the second prong speaks explicitly only of waiver, we apply the same standard to the issue of cure.  . .  In [*George Harms Const. Co. v. Borough of Lincoln Park*, 161 N.J. Super. 367 (Law. Div. 1978)], the judge noted:  [i]f, after opening of the bids, [defendant, the non-conforming lowest bidder] had decided, for whatever reason (*e.g.*, a change in its business conditions or an unreasonably low bid price), that it did not want the award, it could have refused to forward the stockholder statement.  At that point the borough would have no choice but to reject [defendant's] bid.  Therefore, the borough was deprived of its assurance that the contract would be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to its specific requirements and the mandate of the Legislature.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], M.D., PhD; [...]; [...]; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious names) and JANE DOES 1-10 (fictitious names), Defendants-Respondents.
[directive] As noted, the Special Committee recommended substantial reductions in the number of peremptory challenges allowed, especially in criminal trials.  As also noted, however, the Court in its September 15, 2006 Administrative Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 8 of 29  Determinations specifically did not act on that particular recommendation, instead holding it in abeyance for a year.  Presuming the Court later acts on that recommendation, with fewer peremptory challenges available, excusals for cause would become more important.
[brief] (8T88-16 to 18).  At 7:43 p.m., defendant searched a YouTube link called “London Terror Rampage Hoax Flat Earth Concerns. ” (8T93-19 to 95-5).  “London Terror Rampage” referred to a 2017 terrorist attack in London.  (8T95-6 to 8).  Also located on defendant’s phone was a link to an animated video; a still shot taken from the video show a very big man and his face blown up behind him wearing sunglasses, with music playing.  (8T96-3 to 99-2, 185-15 to 22).  [...]’s girlfriend [...] told the jury that the [...] was very close, always ate dinner together, and the parents were involved in their children’s lives.
[brief] Given the broad scope of discovery, and the content of the documents at issue, there is no question that [...] produced relevant documents late.  Not only were the [...] reports produced late, but after the “floodgates were opened” on September 19, 2012, additional [...] documents continued to “trickle in. ”  Many of these included e-mail communications between [...] and [...] that go to the heart of plaintiff's complaint, e.g., the alleged improper “ex-parte” communications between [...] and [...] about plaintiff, plaintiff's juvenile cases, and plaintiff's work for [...].  13  Although [...] cannot be heard to deny that its late produced documents were relevant for discovery purposes, the Court acknowledges [...] disputes plaintiff's characterization of the documents.  For example, [...] does not agree that the [...] reports are a “bombshell. ”  In its October 24, 2012 Order, the Court determined that plaintiff's documents should have been produced substantially earlier.  The Court made this finding after determining that documents produced on September 19, 2012 were responsive to document requests served in 2009 and 2010.  For similar reasons, the Court finds that the documents [...] produced after September 19, 2012 were also responsive to plaintiff's 2009 and 2010 document requests.
[brief] 1.  The Scenic Resources And Design Rule.  The CZM Rules include the SRD Rule, which states, in pertinent part:  (c) New coastal development that is visually compatible with its surroundings in terms of building and site design, and enhances scenic resources is encouraged.  New coastal development that is not visually compatible with existing scenic resources in terms of large-scale elements of building and site design is discouraged.  (d)  In all areas, except the Northern Waterfront Region, the Delaware River Region and Atlantic City, new coastal development adjacent to a bay or ocean or bayfront or oceanfront, beach, dune or boardwalk and higher than 15 feet in height measured from the existing grade of the site or boardwalk shall comply with the following . . . :  1.  Provide an open view corridor perpendicular to the water’s edge in the amount of 30 percent of the frontage along the waterfront where an open view currently exists; and 2.  Be separated from either the beach, dune, boardwalk, or waterfront, whichever is further inland, by a distance of equal to two times the height of the structure[.]  [N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10.]  2.  The Redevelopment Ordinances And The Redevelopment Plan Amendment.
[brief] ”  [47 N.J.R. 2531(a) (Oct 19, 2015) (emphasis added). ]  [...] repeated this exact statement in the final rule response to concerned commenters.  48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016) (response to comment #164).  The significance of the [...]’s own explanation in the rulemaking process cannot go unheeded.  The [...] made clear that the sewer service determination was not the sole requirement, and that any additional requirements in a WQM plan “must” be addressed, including TMDLs.  That the [...] must consider TMDLs and water quality is also the only sensible reading of rules that are intended to ensure the implementation of areawide WQM plans, which concern both wastewater conveyed to municipal treatment works, and stormwater that could pollute surface waters.
[brief] Id., ¶ 58.  [...] continued to oppose Plaintiff’s requests for this reasonable accommodation/leave, irately stating to [...] that he, [...], expected that when he telephoned the Firm’s office in the coming days, he expected to hear from employees at the office that [...] had in fact been physically present at the office daily.  Id., ¶ 59.  During the same telephone call, Defendant [...] advised Plaintiff that the Firms’ employee, [...], who reports directly to Defendant [...], was “making too many mistakes” and seemed unable to keep up with his workload.  [...] discussed one of the cases being handled by [...] for [...] and Guarda’s failure to file a statutorily-required Notice of Claim against a public entity.  Defendant [...] said Guarda’s dereliction exposed the Firm to a legal malpractice claim.  [...] had first brought the issue to the attention of [...] and [...] in a November 30, 2022 email.
[brief] Once that deed is removed from the equation, the most recent, prior Deed from [...] to [...] controls.  As such, [...] had no legal right or title to transfer thus nullifying the transfer from [...] to [...].  (Da066-Da068).  The Court went on to conclude as follows with respect to Richard’s ownership of the Property and the absurdity of Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ claims of ownership:  Despite Richard’s failure to prove either legal or equitable fraud, the court nonetheless finds in his favor and declares the transfer from [...] to [...] a nullity and vests title in the property to [...].  Richard’s colossal error in creating and recording the December 10, 1998 Deed paved the way for the attempted transfer from [...] to [...].  Since the December 10, 1998 Deed is deemed by this court to be void, so too, is the October 25, 2019 Deed from [...] ([...]) to [...] a nullity.
[brief] Indeed, while the Act directly incorporates other statutory regimes into the Highlands project permitting scheme, it does not include the Air Pollution Control Act.  See N.J.S.A. 13:20-30(a) (statutory regimes incorporated into Highlands permits).  Contrary to Appellants’ speculation that [...]’s project will have widespread impacts to the Highlands resources, the reality is that “the compressor station in association with an existing pipeline system” transports natural gas to “‘upstream’ customers in New York. ” (Ra15).  As such, as [...] determined, “the project will not promote growth or development in the Highlands region [,] will not significantly impact Highlands resources” and, thus “is consistent with the ‘spirit and intent’ of the Highlands Act.
[brief] Yet another tradeable, sellable asset is the Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (WMPA) (pronounced “wompa”).  Pa1129, Pa1409-12, Pa2915.  In 2015 to 2017, plaintiffs were developing solar energy in New Jersey and came to learn that a land owner in [...], [...], had been developing solar energy rights intending to use its own brownfield land (land otherwise useless) to ultimately develop a solar field.  Plaintiffs entered into negotiations to purchase all of the solar energy assets and to lease the brownfield land from [...].  Ultimately plaintiffs (1) purchased [...]' solar energy rights in perpetuity for $600,000 plus costs and (2) leased the brownfield land for a term of years at an annual rent of $200,000.00.  At the closing, plaintiffs paid $1,006,000.00 to [...].
[brief] \(^4\)  See Ja2173 (¶¶ 194–97).  Anyone can subscribe to [...] SHORT; subscribers receive data about VRDOs in real time, for a fee (the subscription Relator used cost $10,000, annually).  See Ja3896 (¶¶ 131–32).  The same historical VRDO rate-reset data available through [...] SHORT is also available on a free, well-known and publicly available website run by the [...], called EMMA.  Ja2098–100 (¶¶ 9, 11), Ja2103–05 (¶¶ 18–19); Ja4272–73 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 17, 19–20); see also Ja1548–49 ([...] R. G-34(c)(ii)(A)(1)–(2)).  In addition, there is no dispute that anyone can obtain the same information through subscription services offered by [...], a global provider of financial news and information.  Ja2108–10 (¶¶ 25, 27); see also Ja1559–62 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 3–4, 10, 12).  There is no factual dispute about the terms of service that govern the use of data from [...] SHORT, EMMA, or [...] (together, the “VRDO Data Sources”).  See Ja2104–05 (¶ 19); Ja2191–201 ([...] Cert., Exs. 2–3); \(^4\)  The [...] is the principal regulator for municipal securities (including VRDOs).  Ja2097 (¶ 5).  Part of the [...]’s mission is to “provide transparency for issuers, institutions, and the investing public. ”  Ja2097–98 (¶ 7) (quotation marks omitted); see also Ja1393 ([...] Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms, About the [...]).  Consistent with this mission, the [...] has implemented mandatory reporting requirements for municipal securities, including VRDOs.  Ja2098 (¶ 8).  Ja2986–3004 ([...] Cert., Ex. J); Ja3906–08 (¶¶ 151–55).  Nor are there any factual disputes about the subscription costs for [...] SHORT or [...], or the amounts companies related to Relator paid for these services.  See Ja3896 (¶ 131), Ja3902–03 (¶ 144).  ARGUMENT I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
[brief] C.  Plaintiff’s statements are inconsistent with R. 1:4-8(a)(2) and (c).  R. 1:4-8(a)(2) and (c) state:  “(a)  ...By signing, filing or advocating a pleading, [or] written motion... an attorney... certifies that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law...  (c)  On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate this rule and directing the attorney or pro se party to show cause why he or she has not violated the rule. ”  Plaintiff’s counsel stated in the Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, that “Oral argument will be scheduled only if directed by the Court…” (Da10).  (Emphasis Added).  Plaintiff’s statements as to Defendant’s right of oral argument and its principal place of business in the Complaint are incorrect and misleading.  Plaintiff’s counsel’s statements are inconsistent with R. 1:4-8(a)(2).