ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] was convicted for his role in the deaths of two men in an assault.  He was convicted with his co-defendants and stood for sentencing.  While imposing sentence the judge addressed the question of concurrent or consecutive sentences as follows:  I had to decide . . . whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.  As to the murders, this was not a decision I took lightly.  *I have reviewed the Yarborough [sic] criteria, one of which is that there should be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime.* . . .  And where there are two victims and two decedents, obviously the stakes for [...] are extremely high just by virtue of the restrictions on sentencing for . . . knowing purposeful murder, minimum of thirty years without eligibility for parole is where the Court is to start going anywhere up to life sentences.  *I can not say in this case that the Court is prepared to tell victim’s mother here that one of her son’s life doesn’t count as the other.*  I realize that the offenses were committed during the course of conduct that culminated in the events in the park . . .  They clearly weren’t separated in terms of the times they were served and certainly not separated in terms of the places they occurred.  But the key point for me is that they required separate acts of violence.  There are situations where given the right set of facts that can not as easily be said as it can be said here.  There was a specific intention directed at both of these people by separate people acting under orders.  There was a motivation toward each of these people.  What happened was intended to happen and it required that each be dealt with separately.  And they were.  The Court feels for that reason it would be inappropriate to suggest not even only to [...] but to anyone else who might be listening that if you find yourself in the circumstances of taking two lives, even if you take them at about the same time and you direct violence towards two people, that you should be better off than someone who takes one life.  I can not in good conscience make that ruling.  I do not feel it justified in this case.  To come to that conclusion would be to give [...] the benefit of a free crime to which on this record he is not entitled.  T1:47:4 – 48:19.  Based on that analysis, the court imposed consecutive thirty year terms without parole eligibility.
[brief] During the Conference, the Plaintiffs raised concerns about, inter alia, the Defendant’s objection to the Affidavits of Merit and the issue of vicarious liability.  (1TR7:23-8:13).  If the issue regarding the objection was resolved at that time, it would have left the parties with a substantial amount of time to cure any deficiencies.  However, that issue was not resolved at the Ferriera Conference, which precipitated the need to engage in the underlying motion practice.  Oral argument was initially held on the motion on October 2, 2024 – 110 days after the Defendant filed an Answer.  During oral argument on October 2, 2024, the Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion as to the Defendant in holding that the entity did not employ any of the co- defendants.  As a result of the ruling, Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that a new Affidavit of Merit would need to be obtained, but that clarification was needed from the Trial Court in order to do so.  (2TR47:19-24).  Specifically, since the trial court held that the co-defendants were not employees of the Defendant, clarification was needed as to how to obtain an Affidavit of Merit that complied with [...]’s ruling when the Plaintiffs were wholly unaware as to who the employees of the Defendant were without discovery.  (2TR48:1-49:11).  Discussion was also had concerning a stay in order to allow for limited discovery on the issue of vicarious liability or to get another Affidavit of Merit, since only ten days remained before the 120-day time period set forth in the Affidavit of Merit statute expired.  (2TR46:4-47:21).  Based upon this colloquy, [...] reserved his decision until the next motion day to finalize his ruling.  (2TR53:3-18).  Thereafter, a second oral argument was held on October 11, 2024 – 119 days after the Defendant filed an Answer.  During the argument, [...] read his decision into the record, at which time he: (1) dismissed the Defendant from the case with prejudice; (2) found that there was no basis for discovery on the issue of vicarious liability; (3) denied the Plaintiffs’ request for alternative relief in the form of a stay; and (4) denied the Plaintiffs the ability to obtain a new Affidavit of Merit that conformed to the Trial Court’s ruling.
[directive] Except for offenses non-indictable involving cases in or amended, recently as 3:3-1(e), Rule by required as whether a issue decision to the 2.2.2, subsection see statute, by required not is fingerprinting which be will Directive this under acomplaint-warrant for apply court a to or complaint-summons to the by approved process risk-assessment pretrial automated the by generated results the by informed See~e•~•,subsection4.5.1.  DirectoroftheCourtspursuanttoN.J.S.A.2A:162-25(c). $  Administrative assessment, risk pretrial automated preliminary the of results on the relies generally Directive this  Although 4.5.2 subsection See• discretion.  e•e•, charging of exercise the guide to grounds factual other on rely provisions some order restraining violence domestic a of violation on based a complaint-warrant for apply presumption to (establishing a for apply presumption to a (establishing 4.5.5 subsection and order) Act Protection Survivor Assault Sexua! a or instances, many another In offense).
[brief] (451a-452a).  Defendants’ motion to vacate and the arguments within mirrored what they had filed in February 2023, with two additions.  First, through a certification of counsel, Defendants identified numerous acquisitions of tax-foreclosed property [...]’s principal had made through \(^4\)  By this time, the first judge had been elevated to the Appellate Division.  (2T12:7-13).  other business entities.\textsuperscript{5} (525a-788a).  Defendants admitted that all of these records were publicly available to them at the time they made their first motion.
[brief] “[P]arents have a substantial constitutional right … to direct and control the upbringing and development of their minor children. ”  Halderman, by Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 709 (3d Cir. 1983)(emphasis added).  The Third Circuit also recognizes that “[t]he right of parents to raise their children without undue state interference is well established” and “[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights th[e]
[brief] In opposition, Respondents [...] and [...]’ fail to provide this court with a single meritorious argument in support of disqualification.  First, Respondents’ bald and unsubstantiated claims that [...] has obtained generalized knowledge of [...]’ financial information or [...]’ general attitude toward litigation are not grounds for disqualification under controlling law.  Second, Respondents have again failed to demonstrate substantial similarity between this case and the prior (unrelated) matters, which is a prerequisite for disqualification.  Third, even assuming, arguendo, that confidential information was disclosed to [...], Respondents have not demonstrated that the information is prejudicial or articulated how it can be used against them in this unrelated case.  Fourth, the Court should consider Appellants’ procedural due process argument since the issue was raised and, and tellingly, Appellants offer nothing to rebut the argument.
[brief] Rather, the Appellant was removed pursuant to the results of a random urinalysis conducted by his employer.  Tellingly, the disciplinary charges did not allege the Appellant was utilizing any controlled dangerous substances at the workplace and/or under the influence of any controlled dangerous substance while at work.  Even more importantly, the drug test was not administered to the Appellant based upon any “reasonable suspicion,” pattern of erratic behavior, or in connection with a specific work-related incident.  Rather, the test was randomly administered pursuant to County and/or Department of Corrections policy.  Despite the Board’s assertions to the contrary, this is a crucial distinction.  Like the appellant in Hess, [...]’s alleged misconduct occurred on his personal time and involved actions outside of the workplace.  As a result, the charges, or more specifically the positive urinalysis results, did not relate to actions taken by the Appellant during his employment or any type of negligence in connection with his work duties in any way.  Notably, the Board cannot dispute this.  Based upon this, it is evident [...] was not removed from his Corrections Officer position on charges of misconduct directly related to his employment.  Instead, he was removed on charges wholly unrelated to his employment and/or the actual performance of his duties as a Corrections Officer.  As aptly stated by the Supreme Court in Hupka, there was “no relationship” between the Appellant’s employment as a Corrections Officer, “the trappings of that office, or his work-related connections, and the commission of the offense,” i.e. the positive urinalysis, which led to his removal.  Therefore, there is an insufficient nexus between the charges and the [...]’s employment to warrant an automatic forfeiture and/or disqualification of his eligibility to deferred retirement benefits.  As noted in [...]’s initial brief, under the Board’s rationale, any type of conduct an employee is removed under that constitutes a violation of municipal, county or state policy constitutes misconduct related to employment, thereby precluding an employee from being eligible for deferred retirement benefits.  This would appellants like those in Hess, Hupka, etc.  This is a misreading of Hess, Hupka, and the litany of case law cited above in [...]’s initial brief by impermissibly expanding the type of conduct which prohibits an employee from being eligible for and/or receiving deferred retirement benefits.  Given pension statues should be liberally construed and administered in favor of public employees, such an expansion must not occur.  II.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred in Finding That a Review of the Application by Board Professionals or that a Conclusion that There Will Be No Impacts is Sufficient Reasoning to Prohibit Public Review and Comment on Application Materials.  (Pa311-Pa313; 2T25-21 to 2T27).  After the filing of Plaintiffs’ initial brief in the action in lieu prerogative writ, the Board and Applicant argued that the application package was submitted as part of the subdivision application despite the testimony placed on the record that it was not.  (Pa307).  In affirming the Board’s approval, the Trial Court found that the record shows the Applicant had submitted numerous reports that had been reviewed by the Board’s professionals and deemed complete.  (Pa311).  However, having an application reviewed by a technical review committee and being deemed complete has nothing to do with the public’s right to submit public comments and to cross-examine witnesses on the topic.  Having an application deemed complete simply begins the time period for action by a municipal agency.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3.  Being deemed complete does not “diminish[] the applicant’s obligation to prove in the application process that he is entitled to approval of the application. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3.  Therefore, simply because the Board’s professionals had issued review memorandums, and that the technical review committee had deemed the application complete, does not automatically mean that the Board has no role in the review of the application materials, or that the public is not permitted to present comments or cross-examine witnesses on the application materials.  The Court also found that the subdivision application only involved line-drawing and concluded that it had no environmental impact.  (2T28-4 to 2T28-12).  However, just because that may be the ultimate conclusion reached by a board, does not mean that the public is prohibited from presenting testimony on certain application materials such as the environmental impact assessment or the community impact statement.  It does not prevent the cross-examination of witnesses on all application materials, just because the ultimate conclusion of the board may be that there is no impact.  The MLUL and caselaw on the subject is clear that the public has the right of cross-examination on an application.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(d).  To prohibit testimony and cross-examination on topics because of the anticipated conclusion by the Board, is putting the cart before the horse; the anticipated findings of the board does not serve to limit the testimony, public comments, and cross-examination to be presented during a hearing; the testimony, public comments, and cross-examination of the witnesses is supposed to create the basis for the findings of the board.  For these reasons, the Trial Court erred and the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) requires warrants on the Bail Schedule 1 charges of murder, kidnapping, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact.  Rule 3:26-1 delineates factors to be considered when setting bail.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor commits sexual contact with victim age 13 to 15 and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or act is committed during commission of other designated crimes; or actor is armed with weapon and threatens to use Aggravated weapon; or actor is aided by other person(s) and physical force or coercion is used; or actor 2C:14-3a
[brief] .......  10 Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019)  ..................................................................  9  Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist. (PSD), 447 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2006)  ..................................................................  17  Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005)  ..................................................................  17 Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987)  ....................................................................  25, 26 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021)  ..............................................................................  29  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) .................................................................................. 7, 22 Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314 (2013) ..................................................................................
[directive] First, the trial court should consult with a supervisory judge who should coordinate trials within a vicinage as directed in this opinion.  Second, if the parties are ready but the trial cannot start before the two-year cap expires, trial judges must schedule conferences at monthly intervals rather than delay a trial for multiple months at a time.  To be clear, this appeal addresses the need for additional time to commence trial because of the COVID-19 pandemic, not more generalized arguments about routine scheduling matters unrelated to a public health crisis.  Third, the Court asks for the cooperation of the attorneys in notifying their respective supervisors when a trial date is fixed to ensure that counsel will be present and the trial will commence as planned.  Finally, if judicial vacancies remain at high levels, it may be necessary to reassign judges from their responsibilities elsewhere in the court system to try criminal cases.
[brief] [Pa234].  Following dismissal of [...], motion practice ensued among Appellants and the remaining defendants, [...] and [...].  [Pa24].  In pertinent part, by Order dated April 5, 2022, the trial court granted the [...]’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.  [Pa24].  At page 6 of the accompanying Opinion, the trial court wrote:  On October 28, 2021, [...] filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and to deny [Appellants’] leave to amend the complaint.  On December 7, 2021, this Court granted [...]’s dismissal and denied [Appellants’] request to file a second amended complaint.  The same reasoning was used for both decisions.  This Court found that the [Appellants’] default under its lease with [...] was the cause of the termination.  That event then enabled the CEP Defendants to enter a new lease with [...] and become successors to the solar farm development.  [Pa259].  This same statement was repeated in the Opinion accompanying the trial court’s April 5, 2022 Order denying Appellants’ request for default judgment against [...] and [...] and the Court’s April 5, 2022 Order denying [...]’s cross-motion for sanctions.  [Pa24].  D.
[directive] 1.  Você entende que se você se declarar culpado a suspensão da sua carteira de habilitação será [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] obrigatória?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your driver’s license?  1º crime – suspensão da carteira de habilitação por 1 ano  1st Offense - 1 year license suspension  2º crime – suspensão da carteira de habilitação por 2 anos  2nd Offense - 2 year license suspension  3º ou crime subsequente – suspensão da carteira de habilitação por 10 anos  3rd or Subsequent Offense - 10 year license suspension  2.  Você entende que se você se declarar culpado será obrigado a pagar uma multa compulsória?  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to pay a mandatory penalty?
[brief] 15  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (Appendix Immediately Follows Reply Brief’s CONCLUSION page)  Lopez v. Law Offices of Faloni & Associates, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016)  …………………………Pra1 Mathiesen v. Moleski, No. A-0365-10T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2187 (App. Div. Aug. 12, 2011) ……………………………………………………………Pra7 Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) ……………………………………………………………Pra17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Ayres v. Dauchert, 130 N.J.Super. 522 (App.Div.1974) ......................................................... 3 Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167 (1969) .............................................................................. 3 Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC, 256 A.3d 765 (Md. 2021) ..................................................................... 14 Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D.N.J. 2011) ......................................................... 5 Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994) ............................................................................... 9, 10 David v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 360 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2003) ....................................................
[brief] State v. Carlucci, 217 N.J. 129, 143, 144 (2014) (citations omitted).  A defendant may waive their Miranda right so long as waiver is “‘knowing, intelligent, and voluntary’ based upon an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances,” *State v. Yohnnson*, 204 N.J. 43, 59 (2010), and is not “the product of police coercion,” *Presha*, 163 N.J. at 313.  A trial court must determine whether the party “understood that [they] did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that [they] had the right to counsel before doing so if [they] wished. ”  *State v. A.M.*, 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019).  *Miranda*'s protections extend only to words or actions of law enforcement officers “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. ”  *Rhode Island v. Innis*, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).  Because these constitutional guidelines were met, this Court should uphold the admission of defendant’s challenged statements.
[brief] Plaintiffs erroneously assert that the mere existence of an “illegal, makeshift liquor concession” creates a “dangerous condition. ”  That is simply not true and inapposite to long-held precedent in New Jersey (including the cases which Plaintiffs rely upon).  The “illegal, makeshift liquor concession” could, at best, be considered the second part of the test (i.e., “the acts of third parties”).  However, there still must be “a defect in the property” which in combination with the “acts of third parties” may constitute a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of the TCA.  No such defect exists.  Plaintiffs simply gloss over the first part of the test and want this Court to overturn the determination of the Court Below for properly adhering to longstanding precedent in New Jersey.  There is no (alleged or otherwise) “bolted open gate” nor “non-locking locked doors” nor “hazardous buildings to be demolished” in this instant matter.  Plaintiffs allege only the illegal activities of third parties that happened to occur on public property.  Plaintiffs do not allege something wrong (i.e., a defect) with the property itself.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege facts sufficient (and discovery would not change this) to sustain a claim because there is no “condition” of the physical public property at issue.  Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, as correctly determined by the Court Below, was properly dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law and such a determination should be AFFIRMED.
[directive] See pursuant prepared Report  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary a by 55 Page shall be Report  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary the event, that In :4-2(c)(1)(A).  R. 3 Cause. Probable of Affidavit the with to/transmitted appended Circumstances  Relevant and Factors Risk Violence  Domestic Present Inclusion of 5.1.2  Incident Enforcement Law
[brief] (768a).  [...] sought to prevent the unilateral imposition of the modifications to the CNA.  Ibid.  On March 17, 2017, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. executed an Order to Show Cause why an emergent temporary injunction restraining the continued violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights should not be barred.  (864a-871a).  On May 23, 2017, [...] granted in part and denied in part [...]’s petition for a temporary injunction.
[brief] (Not argued below)  The New Jersey constitution reading in pertinent part as follows:  '....Article I, section 9.  The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the Legislature may authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six persons.  The Legislature may provide that in any civil cause a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury.  The Legislature may authorize the trial of the issue of mental incompetency without a jury....  N.J.S.A.2B:23-1.  Number of jurors reading as follows:  a.  Juries in criminal cases shall consist of 12 persons.  Except in trials of crimes punishable by death, the parties in criminal cases may stipulate in writing, before the verdict and with court approval, that the jury shall consist of fewer than 12 persons.  b.  Juries in civil cases shall consist of 6 persons unless the court shall order a jury of 12 persons for good cause shown.  POINT 13: