ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A restraining of domestic violence any violation a constitutes (1) offense present the that believe Survivor violation  Sexual Assault of any a constitutes (2) or condition, release order or attorney or deputy prosecutor assistant an unless condition, release or order Act Protection officer supervisory a or Directive, this of 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted general overcome Prosecutor County by to the authorized is who subsection 3.3.2 to pursuant designated by charging of presumption the that determines Directive, this of 4 Section under presumptions consideration the special to giving 4.5.9, subsection to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant as hours to detention mandatory up 48 for whether and victim the of opinion and interests from victim discourage or situation the the exacerbate would 2A:162-16(a) N.J.S.A. by required 4.6.5.
[brief] *Charlie Brown of Chatham v. Board of Adjustment of Chatham*, 202 N.J. Super. 312, 321 (App. Div. 1985).  A municipal action, like the amendment of the Redevelopment Plan at issue here, is presumed valid.  *New Jersey Shore Builders Association v. Jackson*, 199 N.J. 38, 55-56, n. 8 (2009); *Fanelli v. City of Trenton*, 135 N.J. 582, 589 (1994).  As stated in *Bryant v. City of Atlantic City*, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998), “a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance or action must overcome the presumption of validity -- a heavy burden. ”  Here, the action of the Borough in adopting the Ordinance amending the Redevelopment Plan is a legislative action, subject to an even more difficult standard for Plaintiffs to overcome: Legislative bodies are presumed to act on the basis of adequate factual support and, absent a sufficient showing to the contrary, it will be assumed that their enactments rest upon some rational basis within their knowledge and experience.
[brief] ”  In re Kelly, 120 N.J. 679, 684 (1990) (emphasis added).  New Jersey courts have also held that a beneficiary of a trust has a right “to oblige a trustee of an inter vivos trust to account in this court. ”  United Towns Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Schmid, 23 N.J. Super. 239, 246 (Ch. Div. 1952).  In its July 14, 2023, ruling, the trial court misstated N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2 by saying “the words of the statute are ‘A personal representative may be required to settle his account in the Superior Court. ’”  2T25:18–22.  As set forth above, the sentence the trial court misstated had two clauses, the first giving the personal --- 2 Pursuant to R. 1:36-3 and 2:6-1(a)(1), a copy of this opinion is included in the accompanying Appendix.
[brief] This Court’s December 2, 2022 Order was clear—before Appellant could continue to pursue claims against Respondents, she would need to hire an attorney who would draft and file an amended complaint on behalf of the estate Appellant seeks to represent.  PA62-65.  After affording the Appellant over 1.5 years to comply with this Court’s December 2022 Order, Appellant still had not retained an attorney or indicated she was even close to doing so.  In fact, during that same time period --- 6  The trial court waited until March 3, 2023 to even set an initial deadline for Appellant to comply with this Court’s December 2022 Order.  At a hearing relating to the same, Appellant requested additional time to comply, which the trial court granted.  However, Appellant yet again failed to comply.  Appellant attempted to continue to litigate the action *pro se* in defiance of this Court’s December 2, 2022 Order by way of filing a discovery motion, which the trial court rightfully denied.  PA74-87; RA0045-46.  As a result of Appellant’s above-referenced failures to comply with this Court’s and the trial court’s orders, the trial court was well within its discretion to grant Respondents’ February 14, 2024 Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice under Rule 4:37-2.  *See Zaccardi v. Becker*, 88 N.J. 245, 254 (1982).  Rule 4:37-2 specifically applies to the failure of a party to comply with “any order of court” and permits the court to specify that such dismissal is with prejudice.  As this Court held in *Kohn’s Bakery, Inc. v. Terracciano*, “[t]here is no doubt at all of the right of a trial judge, as an exercise of discretion, to impose sanctions or violation of the rules or failure to obey the orders of the court, and those sanctions may include dismissal of the action. ”  147 N.J. Super. 582, 584-85 (App. Div. 1977) (citing R. 4:37-2(a)).  A.
[brief] The Court Correctly Found That The Detectives’ Hunch Did Not Evolve Into Reasonable Suspicion To Request Consent For A Vehicle Search.  The State argues that the court’s reasonable suspicion analysis was flawed because it ignored all the information known to the detectives as a result of the prior investigation, and was unduly focused on what occurred during the traffic stop.  The court did not ignore the prior investigation: the court heard extensive testimony about the prior investigation and made extensive factual findings regarding the prior investigation in the course of rendering its decision.
[brief] Defendant  [...] relies exclusively on Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., 387 N.J.Super. 551, 556 (App. Div. 2019) in support of its proposition that it is entitled to a Semi-Learned Professional exception to the Consumer Fraud Act.  Plemmons was overturned in 2019 by Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019):  To the extent our prior decisions, including Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., 387 N.J.Super. 551 (App. Div. 2019), have applied the learned professional exception to “semi-professionals” who are regulated by a separate regulatory scheme, we are constrained, upon further review, to depart from that reasoning as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1997).  As the Court explicitly held in Lemelledo, the existence of a separate regulatory scheme will “overcome the presumption that the CFA applies to a covered activity” only when “a direct and unavoidable conflict exists between application of the CFA and application of the other regulatory scheme or schemes.  150 N.J. at 270.  Defendants have put forth no argument of a direct and unavoidable conflict which would entitle them to escape liability as a matter of law under the Consumer Fraud Act.  CONCLUSION
[directive] l (lider de rede de pornografia infantil), se o crime ocorreu no dia 1 ° de fevereiro de 2018 ou ap6s esta data, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (venda, distribuiyiio ou exposiyiio de material 18 obsceno a menores de anos) ou se o crime envolve atividades informaticas ilicitas em violayiio a qualquer disposir,:ao do Estatuto 2C, capitulo 20, voce devera pagar uma multa obrigat6ria conforme Iistado abaixo por cada crime pelo qua! se declara culpado? (1) $2.000 para crimes de primeiro grau (2) $1.000 para crimes de segundo grau (3) $ 750 para crimes de terceiro grau (4) $ 500 para crimes de quarto grau (5) $ 250 para infratores da ordem publica ou das contravenyoes penais contra a ordem publica Multa CCPF Total $ -------- Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in 6. the court could, [Yes/Sim] [No/Niio] confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentence imposed?
[brief] (Id.)  Here, as in Peck, the [...] was faced with two similar, though not identical fact patterns, and decided that good cause existed sufficient to “relax” its rules for one of the cases, but not the other.  While technically there were no “genuine vacancies” when the City made its July 2022 appointments, the City acted in good- faith at all times and appointed perfectly qualified individuals to fill vacancies which did in fact come to pass.  The [...] did not flag the “genuine vacancies” issue for those promotions, because it had no reason to do so.  (Pa. 5-9).  Unlike when the December 2022 certification was requested, the April 2022 certification was requested almost a full year prior to the expiration date of the eligible list, thereby not triggering a [...] inquiry into whether “genuine vacancies” existed.  Therefore, the [...] made the reasonable determination to retroactively relax its “genuine vacancies” requirement and allow the July 2022 appointments to fill the September and October 2022 vacancies.  c.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ new claims against [...] were not known, could not have been known, and therefore were not pled at the time of the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ previous claims.  Said claims may be filed once discovered despite the previous dismissal with prejudice of prior, distinct claims.  The significance of the “newness” of Plaintiffs’ claims is that they were unknown, unknowable, unpled, and therefore not precluded by [...]’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ prior claims.  Plaintiffs’ claims are “new” in the sense that they were discovered after the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ previous, different claims against [...].  The claims are “new” in the sense that they were unknown, unknowable, never pled, and therefore never dismissed at the time of the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ previous, different claims against [...].
[brief] Lastly, the facts and circumstances of this case satisfy the final requirement of Restatement § 187(b) for the Court to disregard the Wholesaler Agreement’s choice-of-law provision and apply New Jersey law: under § 188 of the Restatement, absent the choice-of-law provision in the Wholesaler Agreement, “New Jersey law would govern the instant dispute. ”  § 188 of the Restatement states, among other things, that contacts to be taken into account to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (1) place of contracting; (2) place of negotiation of the contract; (3) place of performance; (4) location of the subject matter of the contract; and (5) domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of the business of the parties.  See Commc’ns, Corp., 2014 WL 4662223, at *3.  As set forth above, New Jersey has the most significant relationship to the Wholesaler Agreement and the parties compared to New York.  Therefore, since the operative facts giving rise to Appellants’ claims are centered on New Jersey, New Jersey would be the most appropriate law to apply in the absence of any choice-of-law provision.
[brief] 5T90-13 to 23.  During the first pre-purchaser meeting, [...] provided the [...] with a copy of the Remedial Investigation Summary Report he and [...] prepared for them.  Pa0200; Pa0292.  Plaintiff required Defendant [...] to sign two (2) confidentiality agreements in 2018 whereby Defendants, not Plaintiff, were required to maintain confidentiality about their own property and the transactions between the parties.  5T103-23 to 105-7; 7T-18 to 22; Da17; Da22; Da24.  [...] insisted on receiving all documentation and information related to any aspect of the property.  3T101-21 to 102-7.  The [...] are self-described redevelopers of contaminated properties.
[brief] Here, the Board’s decision is amply supported by substantial facts in the record and is consistent with the controlling law.  Because [...]’s offenses were committed prior to 1997, under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), the applicable standard dictates the inmate shall be released on parole unless “by a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime” if released at this time.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANTS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR PURPORTED ABILITY TO COMPEL ARBITRATION (Raised Below: T1)  There is no mandate that requires arbitration each and every time an arbitration clause may be part of a contract.  See Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 243 N.J. 147, 164-65 (N.J. 2020).  Despite the incredibly broad language contained in the arbitration provision (Pa141-Pa142) of the agreement purportedly governing [...]’s account, Defendants engaged in affirmative litigation conduct for a year and a half, repeatedly affording themselves of judicial resources and seeking relief from the court.  [...] sued Mr. [...] in court.  Defendants engaged in motion practice and sought to have [...]’s claims dismissed on the merits.  It was only after Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was denied (apart from the claim for unjust enrichment being dismissed without prejudice) that Defendants sought to compel arbitration of [...]’s claims.  Moreover, Defendants failed to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense in their responsive pleadings.  Rather, Defendants repeatedly and expressly certified that no arbitration proceedings were contemplated. (Pa47, Pa100).  In 2013, prior to the prejudice requirement for waiver being effectively removed by Morgan, the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed waiver of arbitration in Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 265 (2013).  In Cole, the court reasoned:  Any assessment of whether a party to an arbitration agreement has waived that remedy must focus on the totality of the circumstances.  That assessment is, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis.  In deciding whether a party to an arbitration agreement waived its right to arbitrate, we concentrate on the party's litigation conduct to determine if it is consistent with its reserved right to arbitrate the dispute.  Among other factors, courts should evaluate: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.
[brief] The Pathologist’s Testimony Violated N.J.R.E. 702.  [...], the pathologist, opined that the amount of force necessary to inflict the mortal injuries on [...] could come from the strength of the assailant or the weapon or from “a rage” that the assailant was feeling.  (3T 103-7 to 8)  This opinion on how the assailant was feeling strayed beyond [...]’s expertise.  Perhaps [...] had expertise to explain literally how much force, the product of mass and acceleration, would be necessary to create these kinds of injuries.  But he was not qualified to opine on how a living person’s state of mind relates to the mechanism of injury.  [...] “was qualified only as an expert in forensic pathology.  In that capacity, his testimony should have been limited to describing the physical properties of the implement that caused the [victim’s] death[], narrating the physiological status of the bod[y] at the time of death, and ruling out the possibility that the injuries were self-inflicted or sustained as a result of mere inadvertence “ State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 337 (1998) (emphasis added).  A living person’s state of mind and how it would impact their ability to inflict a wound is beyond a pathologist’s expertise.  See also State v. Locascio, 425 N.J. Super. 474, 494 (App. Div. 2012) (medical examiner’s opinion based on “numerous biomechanical factors” was beyond his expertise).
[brief] ”  (4/17/23 Transcript @T4).  [...] referred to another study of “diver safety performance” of drivers, from [...].  (4/17/23 Transcript @T5).  [...] explained that the safety of drivers did not change because of the presence or absence of billboards, and the study found that a person must glance away from the road for 1.6 seconds before any safety concern could be found.
[brief] 25 State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509 (1996) .............................................................................  25 State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001) ..............................................................................  98 State v. Carpenter, 268 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 467 (1994)  ....................................................................................................  26 State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1052 (1999)  .........................  28 State v. Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. 286 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148 (2004) ....................................................................................................  23 State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022) .............................................................................. 91, 99 State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533 (2004) ..............................................................................  25 State v. Dangcil, 248 N.J. 114 (2021) .............................................................................. 41, 42 State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90 (1997) ..............................................................................  63 State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544 (2012) .............................................................................. 28, 29 State v. DiPaglia, 64 N.J. 288 (1974) ..............................................................................  45  State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108 (2007).................................................................................. 26 State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223 (1991).................................................................................. 41 State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344 (2009).................................................................................. 47 State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007).................................................................................. 24 State v. Farthing, 331 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 530 (2000).....
[brief] 2.  **Trial counsel’s failure to investigate and enable presentation of Facebook posts and other evidence left him unable to cement [...]’s alibi. **  Multiple times between 11:50am and 12:48pm, [...]’s cell phone pinged off cell towers near [...] in [...], conclusively establishing his phone was there — not [...] — during this critical period.  (12T106-13 to 114-19; 14T22-8 to 29-23)  The prosecutor argued [...] must have left his phone behind when he went to [...], killed [...] there at 12:11pm, and then raced back to [...] to be caught on camera at 12:42pm.
[brief] Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011).  These criminal beatings by [...] have been ongoing for over 30 years (Pa621).  Within one four-year span six [...] officers were criminally charged.  (Pa591).  Investigation shows that Edison has a record of Misconduct that far outstrips department of similar sizes in New Jersey.  (Pa588, Pa591).  According to the [...], Edison has an astonishing record of misconduct unmatched by any department of equivalent size in New Jersey.  (Pa562).  “The misconduct in Edison is even more stark when compared with New Jersey’s Biggest Law Enforcement Agency the [...]. ” (Pa562).  Edison has officers on drugs (trading cocaine for sex) (Pa573), Officers who lie under oath (Pa574), use racial slurs (Pa571).  Investigation reveals a pattern of violence that gives others in the department a feeling that “I am going to get away with it” (Pa577, Pa578)  Edison’s internal affairs have exonerated officers who use excessive force leading to brain injury, broken bones, lacerated ear and cuts and bruises.  (Pa579).  [...] force document falsely.  One police officer checked a box on the use of force, indicating that he used a compliance hold and other force which he did not elaborate.  (Pa580).  In truth, the officer kicked the man in his head and threw at least one punch (Pa580).  Another severe beating at [...] headquarters was not recorded.  (Pa581).  Plaintiff’s brutal beating is part of Edison’s custom.  (Pa22-23, Pa303-304, Pa93-97; Pa471, Pa054).  Edison is liable under the NJCRA.
[directive] 8.2.3  However, the internal affairs investigator should be aware that other factors may also serve to affect a subject officer's decision to answer questions during a criminal interview.  For example, directing an officer to appear at a particular time and place may generate confusion on the officer’s part as to whether he or she is being required to participate in the interview.  When these circumstances or any other questions as to the need to provide a warning in criminal interviews are present, the internal affairs investigator should always consult with the County Prosecutor regarding whether the subject officer should be advised of their right against self-incrimination.  8.2.4
[brief] (Ja20).  On April 26, 2024, Special Adjudicator [...], PP, AICP issued his initial Special Adjudicator Report (the “Burgis Report”) on the issue of compliance.  (Ja441).  The Burgis Report engages in a detailed analysis of the Township’s credit worthy projects, ultimately concluding that the Township has a substantial shortfall:  “I preliminarily find that the Township can be considered to have satisfied its Prior [Second] Round Obligation, but that the Township’s satisfaction of its Third Round Obligation is deficient by approximately 600 to 850 credits. ” (Ja448).  On May 17, 2024, the trial court entered an Order determining [...]’s Third Round constitutional obligation to be 1,026 units, and that [...] is noncompliant (the “Noncompliance Order”).
[brief] For example, see N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6, that requires that prior to consideration of a law modifying health care benefits, the [...] must conduct an analysis.  In addition, N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6 requires referral to the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer in the [...] to determine the fiscal impact on the [...].  Neither entity conducted a review prior to enactment of L. 2021, c. 375.  (Pa366-377; Pa473).  The [...] Estimate was not prepared until January 18, 2022, which was over a week after enactment.  (Pa473.)  The Estimate stated “this bill may result in a one-time indeterminate increase in State expenditures tied to the requirement that the [...] study and issue a report on the necessity of regulations requiring health benefits plan coverage of abortion services. ”  (Pa473.)  Moreover, the statement said there could be further impact due to a possible mandate of funding for abortion.  (Pa473.)  Furthermore, the manner in which the public was cut out of the legislative process violates the constitutional rights of the people.
[brief] Pa91.  On January 12, 2019 [...] sent [...] and the three guarantors notice of defaults and arrearages.  The letter sought to resolve the arrearages.  The schedule attached to the letter shows total arrearages in rents of $66,110.00 as well as total default on repairs and maintenance of $27,808.00.  Total arrearages and default was $100,723.00.  Pa76-77.
[brief] On November 17, 2015, shortly following the subject accident, temporary paving was performed in the left lane at the north approach of the Rt. 30 bridge in order to correct the pavement settlement and return the roadway to proper grade.  (Pa1396).  a)  The Trial Court  Erred When It Failed to Consider Subsequent Paving Records as Evidence of the Existence of the “Dangerous Condition” (Raised below, Pa2146)
[brief] Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ..................................... v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................  1 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  5  A.  THE AUGUST 16, 2019 INCIDENT ...............................................................  5  B. THE AUGUST 17, 2019 INCIDENT ...............................................................  9  C. TRIAL TESTIMONY