ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Finally, Respondent asserts that [...] experienced an additional injury in 2009, and that the additional injury provides further support that [...]’s disability was caused by a pre-existing condition.  As will be shown infra, [...] did not experience a 2009 injury.  Moreover, even if [...] did experience such an injury, the above analysis would not change.  [...] would still have been working as a law enforcement officer for several years without issue, and the 2015 incident would still be an “essential” and “substantial” cause of the disability.
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Polish Defendant's Initials by Skorygowany fonnularz opublikowany 31.12.2019r. w suplemencie do Dyrektywy #01-18, CN 10079-Polish lnicjaly oskarzonego page 2 of7/strona 2 7 z 5. f.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] AND JOHN DOES 1-10  BEING AGENTS, SERVANTS AND EMPLOYEES OF DEFENDANTS AS A CONTINUING INVESTIGATION MAY REVEAL (WHO ARE FICTITIOUSLY NAMED BECAUSE THEIR TRUE IDENTITIES ARE UNKNOWN) (ALL DEFENDANTS NAMED HEREIN IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES), Defendants-Respondents.  [...]
[brief] Plaintiffs argued that [...]'s creation of a plan that incorporated site improvements on Plaintiffs' Property and to which other parties relied upon in entering Plaintiffs' property without authorization or consent was negligent and that an expert was not needed for a jury to find [...]'s conduct was negligent.  The Plaintiffs' property was shown on the plan as part of the project.  It does not take an expert to tell that a mistake was made.  [...] prepared the plan which erroneously showed the property was part of the project.  This issue was properly the subject of this matter and would have properly been addressed by the Plaintiffs at trial.  There, however, is no basis to conclude that the litigation was frivolous simply because Plaintiffs choose not to depose representatives of [...].
[directive] 1.  The term “active resistor” is revised to include two situations in correctional facilities: when four or more inmates or detainees fail to comply with an order from a correctional police officer, or when a single inmate or detainee fails to comply with an order related to handcuffing inside a cell or secured tier.  This revision reflects the unique circumstances of the custodial environment, where inmates and detainees can exploit the physical layout of the facility to defy orders issued by correctional officers, creating heightened risks for those officers.  As with other situations involving noncompliance with verbal directions, these types of incidents are subject to Section 2.6, which requires whenever feasible that officers take certain actions before deploying force, including providing the individual with a clear warning and opportunity to comply.  Law enforcement officer.  2.  The term “law enforcement officer” is revised to clarify that the term includes two additional types of officers: college and university police officers, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-4.2 et seq, and state parole officers, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4.  Peaceful demonstrator.  3.  The term “peaceful demonstration” is revised to clarify that the term does not apply to situations in correctional facilities where an inmate or detainee fails to comply with an order from a correctional police officer.  Tactical team.  4.  The term “tactical team” is inserted, incorporating the definition used in the statewide Body Worn Camera Policy (BWC Policy), issued pursuant to Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-5.  B.  A new Section 1.4 is inserted to clarify that Application of UOF Policy to Correctional Institutions.
[brief] Despite being an interstate pipeline governed by FERC and the federal Natural Gas Act, the record in this appeal is devoid of any showing that [...] satisfies the statutory definition of “public utility” as it is found in the State’s Highlands Act.  The Environmental Appellants assert that [...] does not satisfy that narrow definition.  More importantly, the Court should recognize that the legislative intent to greatly narrow the universe of potential exemptions is clearly displayed by this use of the expressly defined term (“public utility”) in N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).  Just because the Respondents assert that the proposed project is primarily located in a former historic quarry, and will only cut through surface waters that were previously impacted by the former quarry operation, does not mean that the agency has employed the appropriate limiting standards in its application of this statutory exemption.  If the Court holds otherwise then it will open the floodgates for any imaginable “upgrade” of any imaginable “system” by any purported out-of-state “public utility” to claim an entitlement to the exemption at issue.
[brief] The first six hearings of this application were conducted virtually, with the final hearing being conducted in person.  Throughout the proceedings, the Board conducted itself professionally, maintained decorum appropriate for a quasi-judicial tribunal, and worked tirelessly to ensure that the applicant and the public were provided the ability to fully participate in the process.  never changed the density from 165 units as initially proposed, nor did [...] provide better parking or setbacks, or reduce the number of stories to comply with the ordinance.  The Property is currently a farm with a single-family residence.
[brief] Indeed, as courts in other jurisdictions have recognized, the fee-shifting provisions in anti-SLAPP legislation serve as important deterrents to the filing of meritless, speech-suppressive lawsuits.  See, e.g., Khan v. Orbis Bus. Intelligence Ltd., 292 A.3d 244, 257–58 (D.C. 2023) (recognizing that “[d]iscouraging the filing of meritless lawsuits” was a “reasonable and legitimate policy goal[]” of the D.C. anti-SLAPP statute); Banerjee v. Cont’l Incorporated, Inc., 2018 WL 4469006, at *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2018) (unpublished) (commenting that “substantial fee award” under Nevada anti-SLAPP statute “amply serves the deterrence and compensation goals behind the anti-SLAPP statute’s fee shifting provision”); Zwebner v. Coughlin, 2006 WL 8455423, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2006) (unpublished) (noting that under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, a “prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike . . . shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs[] in order to deter [the] chilling” of free speech rights); Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741 (Cal. 2001) (observing that the California anti-SLAPP statute’s “fee-shifting provision was apparently intended to discourage . . . strategic lawsuits against public participation by imposing the litigation costs on the party seeking to” chill such speech).
[brief] ..............................................  7, 9 - United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)  ..............................................  7 - United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961)  .................. 9  ####  State Cases - Borough of Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115 (2013)  ................................................................................................................ passim - City of Hoboken v. Horst Savickas, Law Division, HUD-L-3109-04 (February 14, 2006) (Pa197)  .................................................................  11, 12, 14 - County of Monmouth v. Hilton, 334 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2000), cert. denied, 167 N.J. 633 (2001)  ................................................................. passim - Housing Auth. of Atlantic City v. Atlantic City Expo, 62 N.J. 322 (1973) ...... 8, 13 - Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello, 252 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 1991)  .................................................................  10 - Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kerrigan, Docket No. HUD-L-4528-04 (Law Div. 2008) ................................................................. 12, 13, 14 - Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374 (1971) ........... passim - Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Mack Properties Co., 280 N.J. Super. 553 (1995)  ................................................................. 9, 10 - State v. Caoili, 135 N.J. 252 (1994) .............................................................  15, 17, 18, 20 - State v. Gorga, 26 N.J. 113 (1958) ............................................................. 6, 15, 17, 20 - State v. Nordstrom, 54 N.J. 50 (1969)  .............................................................  8 State v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507 (1983) .................................................. 16  **Foreign State Cases**
[brief] Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s decision granting Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss Appellant’s Complaint and to Compel Arbitration.  In the alternative, Appellant respectfully requests that this matter be remanded to the trial court to hold a plenary hearing as to whether Appellant actually “signed” or otherwise agreed to be bound by the purported Agreement if deemed necessary by the Appellate Division.  McOMBER  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: October 15, 2024  ELIZABETH MURRAY
[brief] (AP 10-12)  The plaintiff issues a complaint summons, [...], certifying or on oath defendant in violation of original charge, 2C:12-3B, certified by Ofc D --- 6 BMW information is missing, [...] testifies he gave the police defendant vehicle information and license plate details [1T30:1-5 – 11/29/2022]  Long.  defendant’s first appearance date was scheduled for December 13, 2021, signed by Judicial Officer, [...].
[brief] [...] testified at the Land Use Hearing that the condition of the Property has not caused any contamination of the Borough drinking water supply.  (T1, 39:12-23 (“The concentrations that we’ve identified on the site at this point do not represent a vapor intrusion threat and we haven’t found any impacts to surface water or drinking water supply”).  [...] presented evidence that, because of the structure of the municipal drinking water wells, it is virtually impossible for contamination from the property to impact the drinking water supply.  (T1, 14:7-25 (“…where this contamination [at the Property] is in the upper aquifer.  It’s a layer of water if you will.  Where the municipal drinking water wells are is 100 feet down and separated by an impermeable layer. ”).  [...] also stated that the municipal groundwater supply is almost a mile away from the Property and there is no way that the contamination has or could travel that far or travel deep enough into the soil to reach the municipal water supply.
[brief] [(Da619-Da639)  Emphasis in original.]  There was no justification for [...]’s failure to warn physicians in the U.S., or to delay issuing a recall, months after [...] became aware of the defect.  [...] did not need authorization from the FDA to act as a reasonably prudent manufacturer/distributor and communicate with U.S. healthcare providers regarding the Ozurdex applicator and silicone particulate defect.  Accordingly, [...]’s failure to timely warn health care providers of the dangerous and defective Ozurdex applicator was clearly in violation of the New Jersey Product Liability Act Sec. 2A:58C-4 re: obligation to warn of the dangerous defects that [...] discovered *after* the Ozurdex left its custody, and *after* it issued the May 2018 package insert.
[brief] (5T:17-1 to 9); See State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 424 (2001) ("It is well-settled that where the death of an individual is an element of the offense, that fact cannot be used as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes"); cf. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 76 (2014) (finding of aggravating factor one in aggravated manslaughter case “[m]ust be based on factors other than the death of the victim and … finding that the defendant has acted with extreme indifference to human life”).  Had the court properly considered only those facts that rendered [...]’s offense more severe than other homicides of its type, and had it considered aggravating factor one in harmony with the Miller factors, it would have given it little to no weight.  Had the court properly considered [...] as he stood on the day of resentencing and considered the Miller factors in its assessment of the aggravating factors, it would have given those factors minimal weight, if any.
[brief] ” (2T:60-24 to 61-1; 3T:18-8 to 20-7; 3T:19-19 to 20-7).  As this record demonstrates, [...] inquiry into the Alcotest reading was to further his own suppositions about the municipal prosecutor’s motives in prosecuting the case by observations where an Alcotest result existed.  His inquiry was not, in any way, to garner additional incriminating information to then use against defendant in a finding of guilt, nor could it have been since the results of the Alcotest were never put on the record.  (3T:5-8 to 8-23; 3T:5-8 to 9-2; Da 17).  Therefore, defendant’s arguments that [...] “did not appear impartial” and his questions “demonstrated bias that the individual is intoxicated because there is an Alcotest result” is negated by the record and wholly without merit.
[brief] The Court failed to consider the possibility of additional pleadings such as an amended complaint for viable causes of action which triggers coverage including negligence, negligent interference with contractual relations, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and outrage.  An allegation of negligence presumes the absence of an intent to injure and triggers coverage.  The duty to defend was “potentially” triggered by the claim for harassment or intentional infliction of emotional distress, known as “outrage” in New Jersey.
[directive] Arrest on Warrant - Rule 3:4-1(b) ..................................................................................................................................................................  92 Authority to Set Bail - Rule 3:26-2 .................................................................................................................................................................  93  Bail After Conviction - Rule 2:9-4 ..................................................................................................................................................................  92 Bail Before Conviction - Rule 3:26-1 .............................................................................................................................................................  93  Bail for Persons Accused of Minor Offenses - 2C:6-1 ...................................................................................................................................  94 Bail for Witness - Rule 3:26-3 .......................................................................................................................................................................  93  Bail in Domestic Violence Cases - Procedures (See also Crimes with Bail Restrictions) – 2C:25-26(d)(e) .............................................  95, 96 Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing - Rule 3:26-8(a-g) ................................................................................................................................ 94, 97  Crimes with Bail Restrictions - Domestic Violence Cases - 2A:162-12 ..........................................................................................................  96 Crimes with Bail Restrictions - Other Than Domestic Violence Cases - 2A:162-12 .......................................................................................  96 Drug Offender Restraining Order Act - 2C:35-5.7 .........................................................................................................................................  95 Extradition Proceedings - 2A:160(1-25) ........................................................................................................................................................  95  Sex Offenses – Conditions Placed Upon Release of Certain Defendants – Nicole’s Law Restraining Order - 2C:14-12 ...............................  95 Summons or Warrant – Determination of Which to Issue - Rule 3:3-1 ..........................................................................................................  92 Ten Percent Cash Bail - Rule 3:26-4(g) ........................................................................................................................................................ 94  12  Index of Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Non-Indictable Offenses – Disorderly Persons And Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses
[brief] In addition, the record contains no certifications, documents, or any other evidence from the State to counter [...]’s very plausible and factually supported claim, which was at least sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the motion.  It also it is beyond dispute that evidence supporting a third-party guilt defense is material as it “relates directly to the focal issue at trial. ”  *State v. Ways*, 180 N.J. 171, 188 (2004).  The test is not whether at this stage, [...] proved “with certainty” that [...] killed [...] (*contra* Da 377), but rather, whether there is a probability that a jury would return a different verdict in light of the new evidence.  See id. at 197-98 (standard is whether “there is a probability – not a certainty” new jury would return different verdict after reviewing all evidence); see also *State v. Friedman*, 4 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1949) (confession by son after father convicted sufficient to warrant new trial where jury can judge credibility of confession); *State v. Carsetti*, 306 A.2d 166, 171 (R.I. 1973) (collecting cases of post-trial confessions considered newly discovered evidence).
[brief] ”  *Hardwick*, 177 Vt. at 431, 869 A.2d at 90.  Unlike *Murphy*, the *Hardwick* decision involved a liability insurance policy and specifically addressed the proper meaning of “damages” as used in such a policy.  *See id.* at 430–39, 869 A.2d at 89–96.  Awards of attorneys’ fees under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27A, § 4-117(a) are compensatory in nature; “no showing of bad faith or deliberate misconduct . . . is required” to sustain such awards.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ confidential disclosures included plans, applications, contracts, negotiation histories, contact lists, and other proprietary records pertaining to the acquisition of the [...]’ SREC rights and the separate 20-year lease for the land, municipal and state filings and permit applications, and other proprietary materials.  FAC ¶ 57, Pa1622.  On October 9, 2017, the [...] granted a six month extension of the June 12, 2017, Resolution through June 12, 2018, based upon an application for extension filed by plaintiff [...].  Exhibit 7.  As the “discussions” between the parties continued, plaintiffs ensured that the Solar Rights remained viable.  FAC ¶ 58, Pa______.  During September to December 2017, [...] held multiple discussions with [...] in which [...] stated that he and his entities would be interested in acquiring plaintiffs’ SREC rights, and related assets, from plaintiffs and the two agreed to continue working towards such mutual goal.
[brief] State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 633 (2004) (Citing Hogan, supra 144 N.J. at 277).  In the absence of such proof, the indictment is subjected to dismissal.  The State's presentation under indictment [...], relied heavily on [...] whom gave perjured testimony before the Grand Jury.  For example, he testified as to December 8th, 2011, T-Mobile robbery, that "[...] and the defendant" entered the store first and then [...] comes in and locks the door behind himself.  (12T 42-20 to 23)  But the T-Mobile video depicts [...] Bowers and [...] entering the store first and then comes in third unknown suspect.  (Da 1)  [...]'s improper opinion of the T-Mobile video surveillance violated N.J.R.E. 701.
[brief] 35 Stohrer Brothers, Inc. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 2007 WL 1362733 .......................................................................................  25 Temple v. Clinton Trust Co., 1 N.J. 219 (1948) .........................................................................................  35 Township of Hillside v. Sternin, 25 N.J. 317 (1957) .......................................................................................  52 Tyler at First Street, LLC v. Yengo, 2023 WL 2590392 (App. Div. March 22, 2023) ........................................... 37, 38, 43, 51 Vogt v. Borough of Belmar, 14 N.J. 195 (1954) ..................................................................................................................48  Waszen v. City of Atlantic, City, 1 N.J. 272 (1949)  ..............................................................................................................27 Williams v. Dep’t of Human Services, 116 N.J. 102 (1989) ..................................................................................................................24
[brief] Plaintiff-appellant [...]’s deposition in this matter was conducted on August 23, 2023.  (Pa145.)  At her deposition, plaintiff-appellant [...] testified that on February 18, 2021, she was walking on the sidewalk and all of a sudden she slipped on ice.  She further stated that she was aware of the presence of the ice on the sidewalk before she slipped and fell.  (Pa148 at 11:2-22.)  She would walk on this particular sidewalk every workday.  (Id. at 12:2-9.)  At her deposition, plaintiff-appellant [...] was shown a photograph of the sidewalk on which she fell.  (Pa82.)  According to plaintiff-appellant [...], this photograph shows the condition of the sidewalk at the time of her fall.  (Pa163, 70:9-23.)  Plaintiff-appellant stated that in the 20 feet leading up to the area on the sidewalk where she fell, she did not experience any slipperiness or any other problems with the sidewalk that gave her problems with walking.  (Pa159 at 55:1-24; 56:1-4.)  Plaintiff-appellant [...] also testified that the condition of the sidewalk seen in this photograph may have been the condition of the sidewalk that she observed when she walked on the same area on February 17, 2021, the day before her fall.  (Pa163 at 72:14-25; 73:1.)  Defendant-respondent [...]’s deposition in this matter was conducted on November 15, 2023.
[brief] The absence of either an electronic recording or contemporaneous written record permits but does not compel you to conclude that the State has failed to prove that the identification was … accurately reported by the State’s witnesses. ”  (Da 149) 227 (2019) (referring to *State v. Delgado*, 188 N.J. 48, 63 (2006) and R. 3:11(b)).  “‘Preserving the words exchanged … may be as important as preserving’ a picture of a live lineup or an array. ”  *Anthony*, 237 N.J. at 227.  “If the police … did not capture the dialogue between the witness and the officer … the jury may take that into account. ”  *Id.* at 235.  Here, the State failed to prove officers accurately recorded [...]’s and [...]’s identification procedures.  The only apparent documentation of [...]’s first identification procedure is a paper report (Da 75) that failed to record the words exchanged.  How did [...] go, on February 9, 2016, from being “unable to conclusively identify any of the parties depicted” on the [...] recording,” to identifying [...] on the same [...] recording on March 8, 2016?  Additionally, detectives did not record the actual procedure during which [...] and [...] reviewed the [...] video on March 8, 2016 and August 11, 2017 respectively, so dialogue between the witnesses and law enforcement was lost.  Third, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury to evaluate, as per the model charge, “whether the witness did not identify the defendant at a prior identification procedure.