ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................... 2 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................  3 A. Motion to Suppress Hearing ..................................................... 3 B. Guilty Plea .............................................................................. 9 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................  10 POINT I POLICE HAD REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT THE DRIVER VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, WHICH PLAINLY REQUIRES A MOTORIST TO SIGNAL PRIOR TO CHANGING LANES  ..................................................  10  A.  The plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, as confirmed by the statute’s purpose, history, and longstanding understanding by the courts, requires a motorist to signal a lane change.  ........................................................................  11  1.  Defendant’s construal of the signaling statute does not substantially implicate public interest to be considered for the first time on appeal because the Supreme Court has already found that it applies to lane changes ........................................................................  12  2.  The plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires a motorist to signal a lane change.  ..............................................  15  3.  Extrinsic aids confirm that N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires the motorist to signal a lane change.  ...............................  25  4.  A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would understand that N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires a driver to signal a lane change when other traffic may be affected.  ........................................................................  30  B.  The officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the car because there was other traffic that may have been affected by the driver’s failure to signal prior to changing lanes.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ”  *Edison Bd. of Educ.*, 464 N.J. Super. at 306.  Specifically, *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4* defines an:  ‘[i]nterested party’ . . . in the case of a civil proceeding in any court or in an administrative proceeding before a municipal agency, [as] any person, whether residing within or without the municipality, whose right to use, acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken under [the MLUL], or whose rights to use, acquire, or enjoy property under [the MLUL], or under any other state law of this State or of the United States have been denied, violated or infringed by an action or a failure to act under [the MLUL].
[directive] In any case where the prosecutor has already tendered a Brimag~ plea offer but would no longer be required to do so pursuant to Part lI, Section 1 (a) of this Supplemental Directive, the prosecutor may, in the exercise of discretion, and with the approval of the court, "turn back the clock" in accordance with the provisions of Section 4.10 of the Brimagg Guidelines, and may withdraw the Brima~e plea offer and tender in its place a non-Brimag~ offer.  [...] Attomey General  Attest: Ph~ First Assistant Attorney General
[brief] Furthermore, Appellants failed to produce a single document or piece of actual evidence supporting their theory that the Defendants misused confidential information.  Instead, all Appellants can do is state that Defendants entered into a lease with [...].  Yet, the record indicates that [...] was entertaining offers from multiple solar developers at the time.  After all, [...] had advertised this project before Appellants even entered into their lease.  This was a well-known solar opportunity, and [...] took numerous steps to warn Appellants of the dire consequences that would flow from their failure to pay rent.  Appellants ignored the warnings, and they lost land control.  The mere fact that [...] entered into their own lease for the subject property is not enough to show any misuse of confidential information.  [...] representative [...] also made clear that the Defendants had nothing to do with the termination of the Lease with Appellant:  Q.  Now, in the complaint in this case, the Plaintiff, [...], asserts that [...] or [...], which are the entities owned by [...], induced [...] Estates to terminate the lease with [...] or his company.
[brief] "An intentional wrong must amount to a virtual certainty that bodily injury or death will result.  A probability, or knowledge that such injury or death "could" result, is insufficient."  Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 471 (internal citation omitted).  In this case, the redesign was undertaken pursuant to years of extensive planning by a civil engineering firm which included a parking demand study, concept planning, schematic designs, a traffic impact study, meetings with architects, land use attorneys and the [...] among others.  (Pa130-Pa183).  Most importantly though, counsel makes no assertions that the defendant took any affirmative action during that time to compromise the safety of its employees or that it knowingly rejected recommended safety precautions because plaintiff never deposed anyone involved in the planning.  Accordingly, we submit that there is nothing in the totality of facts contained in the record by which one could reasonably conclude that anything the defendant did or failed to do rose to the level of the offending conduct in the Millison progeny of cases constituting an intentional wrong.
[brief] Of note to the New Jersey Supreme Court:  [The expert] testified that he did not test the actual range of the [cell tower].  The agent further noted that the tower’s range and coverage area can be affected by many factors, including the height of the antenna, surrounding terrain and building, signal frequency, transmitter and phone power ratings, and antenna direction, but he did not offer measurements or data as to those specific factors when testifying as to his estimated range for the [cell tower].  [The expert] similarly did not measure the actual coverage area of the Parkway Tower through either ‘drive testing’ or ‘propagation maps. ’  [Id.]  The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the Burney expert’s opinion that the coverage sector spanned a radius of one mile was unsupported by any factual evidence or data and was an improper net opinion:  “By [the expert’s] own admission, he determined the tower range ‘just based on [his] training and experience’ …[B]ecause the testimony was based on nothing more than [the expert’s] personal experience, the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear this testimony.
[brief] It was not.  Instead, [...]’s testimony conveyed his erroneous belief that any tint to the front windows justified the stop, without regard to whether he could see inside.  [...] incorrectly testified that “[y]ou’re not allowed to have any tint on the front . . . driver’s side or front passenger side window” and that it is illegal to drive a car with the front two windows tinted “to any degree. ”  (1T 47-5 to 49-4, 52-9 to 21)  But the Supreme Court has rejected interpreting N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 to mean that “drivers … may not add any tint to front windows or windshields. ”  Smith, 251 N.J. at 257.  After the testimony concluded, the prosecutor erroneously argued that “[t]he officer testified that he saw a car pass him with tinted windows in the front,” and “that’s all we need. ”  (1T 85-24 to 86-10)  Defense counsel, on the other hand, argued that “there was no proof in this case that the windows were not only illegally tinted, that they were tinted at all. ”  (1T 76-24 to 77-1)  The trial court adopted the prosecutor’s incorrect interpretation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, concluding, “The law on tinted windows is clear.  . . .  The rear windows can be tinted.  However, the front window and the front driver and the front passenger windows cannot. ”  (1T 101-12 to 16)  The trial court found that because [...] credibly testified that the front windows were tinted, the stop was lawful.  (1T 101-9 to 102-20)  The trial court’s rationale for upholding the stop was therefore based on a mistaken understanding of the law, and the court never found that the correct standard was met.
[brief] It is the failure of Plaintiffs’ counsel to agree to seek modification of the Court’s Order and to provide a Warrant to Satisfy Judgment that caused the deadlock during the summer of 2022.  “[A] reviewing court will disturb a trial court's award of counsel fees ‘only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ’”  *Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc.*, 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (quoting *Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier*, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)).  Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs additional attorney’s fees related to their unnecessary summer 2022 motion practice.  For these same reasons, the trial court was correct in declining to award additional attorney’s fees under the catalyst theory.
[brief] See Erazo, 254 N.J. at 298; Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 430-31.  The facts here are not materially distinguishable from Berkemer.  Defendant was unrestrained, the questioning was brief, and the officer had not “informed” defendant that his “detention would not be temporary. ”  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441-42.  If mentioning a potential investigative step such as a dog sniff converts a stop into custody, then conducting field sobriety tests would also convert a stop into custody.  Yet, Berkemer confirms that the administration of field sobriety tests does not equate to custody.  This Court should not depart from that reasoning in this case.
[brief] }  "The intent to waive [a right] need not be stated expressly, provided the circumstances clearly show that the party knew of the right and then abandoned it, either by design or indifference."\footnote{Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003). }  That is what occurred here.  Equitable estoppel is defined as:\footnote{County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 104 (1998)(citation omitted).}
[brief] The primary issues raised in this appeal are: 1) whether the Commission was arbitrary and capricious in upholding [...]’s bypass of [...] and 2) whether the Commission was arbitrary and capricious in ordering [...]’s removal from the eligible list.  Because this matter does not involve a challenge to the validity of the Civil Service statutes, or the rules promulgated thereunder, a separate brief on the merits is unnecessary.  The primary parties to this appeal have adequately addressed the relevant issues, and the public interest does not require the Commission’s participation.  Nevertheless, the Commission’s decision should be affirmed.  It is well-established that an agency’s determination will not be upset unless it is affirmatively shown that it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or that it lacks fair support in the record as a whole.  Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998).  A strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the Commission’s decision.  In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001).  Thus, a court must affirm the decision if the evidence supports it, even if the court may question its wisdom or would have reached a different result.  Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm’n, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001).
[brief] Finally, even though the Public Access Law did not make reference to the fourth prong of the Matthews test (i.e., the manner in which the privately owned upland area is used by the property owner), the Report states that “onsite public access can easily be provided on the site with minimal intrusion to the existing condominium residents due to the large size of the lot, the availability of water access from numerous portions of the property, and the existence of large common areas on the property. ”  Whether the staff was mindful of the requirements of the Matthews decision when it included this discussion in the Environmental Report is not clear, but this portion of the Environmental Report crucially evidences the Department’s recognition that its review of [...]’s application remained bound by the Matthews factors, rather than a new paradigm ushered in by the Public Access Law.
[brief] “[a]n injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. ”  *N.J.S.A.*  39:6A-8(a).  By Plaintiff/Appellant’s own admissions through her deposition testimony, we clearly see that her alleged injuries were not permanent in nature as she has been able to function normally, and no longer has pain.
[brief] Defendant [...] received testimony in support of the Application from [...], P.E. Civil Engineer, [...] and [...], Planner, PP, AICP, LB, [...], for [...].  (1T11).  Mr. Landgraf also provided testimony that the subdivision was consistent with the prior grant of use variance approval and that the negative criteria for the use variance approval remained satisfied.  (1T48 to 1T51).  No testimony or evidence was presented to the [...] that disputed any of that testimony.  The [...] public hearing on the Site Plan Application was also scheduled to begin at that same meeting.  However, [...] requested that the [...]’s consideration of the Site Plan Application be deferred to a later date and that the [...] consider the subdivision only at the November 1, 2022, meeting.  (1T5 to 1T6; 1T14 to 1T18).  During the public hearing, four members of the public questioned witnesses and/or testified.  (1T75-14 to 1T95-24).  Most of the public who spoke at the hearing resided outside of [...].  The [...] voted to approve the Subdivision Application at the conclusion of the November 1, 2022, public hearing.  On December 13, 2022, the Board adopted [...], memorializing the Subdivision Approval.  (Pa245-Pa253).  The [...] [...] of Adjustment concluded in Resolution: ZB22-02-02 that the application was deemed complete, that [...] had met all requirements for subdivision approval and that the subdivision was consistent with zoning and subdivision requirements.  (Pa245-Pa253).  The Board specifically found that [...], subject to certain conditions, had met the criteria set forth in the Robbinsville Subdivision Ordinance for major subdivision approval and that the subdivision did not adversely affect the public’s health, safety, or welfare.  (Pa245-Pa253).  The Subdivision Approval was conditioned upon posting any required bonds and escrow, providing final plans to the Township and agreeing to certain subdivision plan revisions requested by the [...].  (Pa245-Pa253).  Also, the [...] indicated that, as a condition of approval, [...] must comply with all testimony placed upon the record.  (Pa245-Pa253).  This testimony included [...]’s acknowledgement that there would be no development proposed in connection with the subdivision, and there would be no site work or disturbance before site plan approval was granted.  (1T32 to 1T39).  The [...] also found that the subdivision “cannot be considered a planned development because it is located in the ORH Zone…and there are no ORH zoning provisions authorizing planned development. ”  (Id.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] [...]’S STATEMENT MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE DETECTIVES DID NOT CLARIFY WHETHER HE WAS INVOKING HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN HE ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT COUNSEL WAS AVAILABLE TO HIM, WHICH THEY FAILED TO ANSWER.  THE STATE CANNOT SHOW THAT THE SUBSEQUENT WAIVER WAS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY.  (Da 4-27)⁴
[brief] Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir.  Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that the contracts, the CNAs and MOAs, were in effect, a breach and damages, they were not paid contractual wage increases, and they performed their obligations by working the promoted positions.  Complaint ¶¶ 45-50.  Regarding Count II, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealings, every contract in New Jersey contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
[brief] Once I start moving forward this morning then that plea is off the table.  Even if you tell me during jury selection, Judge, I want to plead, I'm not going to let you.  The rule is you have to plead open to all the charges in the indictment, including the murder charge.  That, as I said, under case law from the New Jersey Supreme Court, if you're found guilty of whatever charges you're charged with then I have to run everything consecutive.  I will not run anything concurrent because that's contrary to the holdings of the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Do you want me to give you a moment or whatever to speak with [...] privately or do you want me to just proceed with the trial?  Because once I start there's no turning back.
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...] J.S.C.  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................4  THE STATE FAILED TO AUTHENTICATE THAT THE CENTRAL PIECE OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE—THE VIDEOTAPE—ACTUALLY DEPICTED THE EVENTS ON THE TIME AND DATE OF THE OFFENSE.  (1T 71-24 to 72-2)  .........................................................4  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................11  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (3T36).  Consequently, it is curious why the Court in Burt decided to essentially punish a plaintiff when defendants had no impediment to assert third-party claims.  Contextually, the Burt decision was ruling and commenting upon the then only-recently enacted Affidavit of Merit statute, when the contours of the law and its consequences were not firmly established.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27 (originally enacted and effective on June 29, 1995).  In any event, it is improper to rely upon Burt for the Order of Judgment here because, unlike the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Affidavit of Merit Act in Burt, the procedural context that led to dismissal of Plaintiff/Respondent’s amended claims against [...] and [...] here did not vitiate Appellant’s ability to assert contribution claims.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S BELATED VENUE ARGUMENT IS NOT ONLY TIME-BARRED, IT IS TOTALLY WITHOUT MERIT.  The transfer Order of which plaintiff now complains for the first time in his amended Brief and Appendix (Aa287) was entered more than 23 months ago, was not referenced as an issue in plaintiff’s Case Information Statement, was not addressed in plaintiff’s initial Brief filed on June 2, 2004, and was not included in plaintiff’s original Appendix filed on June 2, 2024.  Clearly, it should not be considered by this Court.  See also Point I supra.
[directive] In Case of Emergency, Always Follow the Instructions of Your Doctor but carry this notice with you so that you can show it to any medical personnel.  Participant signature acknowledges that you have received a copy of this document.  If you have any questions, please ask your probation officer.  Date Signature of Drug Court  Participant Print Name Signature of Witness Print Name/Title  Promulgated via Directive #01-20 (01/03/2020), CN 12527 page 2 of 2 ., Poder Judicial de Nueva Jersey
[brief] Well, aren’t you still on the website of the law firm of [...]?  A  They still list me although I haven’t worked with them since 2014.  Q  You know that in New York you cannot associate yourself with a firm unless you’re actively working with that firm?  Did you know that?  A  I’m not aware of that.  Q  Weren’t you, wasn’t this issue brought to your attention in the Flowers (phonetic) trial a few years ago?  A  Yes.  Q  And didn’t you say you did not know that you were still on that website?  A  At that time, I didn’t know.  Q  And didn’t you say you were going to take steps to correct that?  A  I did ask them to take me off but I don’t believe they have.  Q  They still haven’t.  A  I’m not sure if they have or not.  [...] then synthesized these devastating problems for the jury in his summation to the jury (7T46-50):
[brief] ”  *Hutton Park Gardens, supra,* 68 N.J. at 565.  Here, as properly recognized by the Trial Court, the Committee made clear its rationale for the decision to adopt (and later amend) the Redevelopment Plan.  That legislative decision, while debatable from Appellant’s perspective, was certainly not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  2.  Appellant exclusively cites judicial decisions that do not involve or apply the standards of review applicable to legislative enactments.  In its Brief, Appellant repeatedly cites judicial decisions that have no application to this matter.  This appeal calls for review of the enactment by ordinance of a redevelopment plan.  The adoption of a redevelopment plan is “a legislative function of a municipal government, akin to adoption of a master plan or zoning ordinance.
[directive] Reporting.  Notification of fatal and serious bodily injury law enforcement incidents shall be made in accordance with AG Directive 2019-4.  As soon as any local, county, or state law enforcement agency learns of a law enforcement incident as defined below, the agency shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office for the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) Director or their designee.
[brief] \(^{39}\)  Pa73 – Pa152  The Impairment of Contracts Clause under the *U.S. Constitution* Art. I § 10, cl. 1, states, “No State shall…pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts”.  The Impairment of Contracts Clause under the New Jersey Constitution Art. 4, § 7, ¶ 3, states, “The Legislature shall not pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made”.  Here, the clear and unambiguous obligation of the custodial services contract was that [...] was supposed to actually perform work as a prerequisite to obtaining payment.  To interpret the contract otherwise to allow [...] to receive payment without performing work would be an illegal “no-show” contract.  In terms of the Impairment of Contracts clauses under the *U.S. Constitution* and *New Jersey Constitution*:  [...]’s “obligation” under the contract was to perform services as a prerequisite to payment, and [...]’s “obligation” under the contract was to pay [...] for services after proof that services were actually rendered.  Any law or interpretation of a law that impairs those obligations, such as a law that would excuse [...]’s performance obligation and require [...] to pay [...] money despite receiving no services, would no doubt violate the Impairment of Contracts clauses under the U.S. Constitution and New Jersey Constitution.
[brief] The arrest report dated October 07, 2020, ("Report") states that upon seeing the plainclothes police exit their unmarked vehicles defendant attempted to flee but was quickly arrested.  (Ca58-59).  13  It appears to be constitutionally ambiguous as to how a person is "connected" or "unconnected" to property or to an investigation; moreover, the subject phrase is ungainly in that it appears the warrant is requested for one who is both connected to the property and also the investigation.
[brief] ”  (2T 75-9 to 11)  Nonetheless, the court found that there was reasonable suspicion to stop [...] because he was speaking with someone police observed selling drugs in a high-crime area.  (2T 78-9 to 18, 79-9 to 23)  The court also found that [...] and [...]’s flight from the stop raised that suspicion to probable cause, justifying the police pursuit and arrest of both men.