ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Determined that [...]’s Omission of the Notice of Classification is Non-Material and Waivable (1T57:23-60:10; 3T33:15-20) [...] argument that “the trial court erred when it failed to evaluate responsiveness and materiality as of the date bids were opened”, is factually and legally wrong.  The trial court evaluated the responsiveness and materiality of [...]’s bid as of the moment of bid opening.  Since the Notice of Classification is not a mandatory document, [...]’s omission of a copy of its existing Notice of Classification from its bid is, at worst, subject to waiver under the River Vale test.  See Palamar Constr., Inc., 196 N.J. Super. at 241 (holding that bidder’s failure to submit mandatory qualification statement at time of bid opening was a waivable defect); Thassian Mech. Contr., Inc. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 27 at *5 (App. Div. Jan. 6, 2020)(holding that a public agency should have waived a defect even though the defect pertained to a mandatory document in the bid specifications).  In Township of River Vale, [...] adopted an often followed two-prong test for determining whether a bid defect is material and non-waivable: [F]irst, whether the effect of a waiver would be to deprive the municipality of its assurances that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to its specified requirements, and second, whether it is of such a nature that its waiver would adversely affect competitive bidding by placing a bidder in a position of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise undermining the necessary common standard of competition.  [Township of River Vale v. R.J. Constr. Co., 127 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (Law Div. 1974).
[brief] I was trying my best to like, hey, can you say one, we -- we can do this before sleeping we can say one positive thing and then -- and then have a sleep.  Sorry to disrespect, I don't have anything positive to say about the relationship.  And I'm like, why did you marry me, you know?  On September 10, 2022, I took her to the Ocean County Lake, and we sat there and she tell – I -- I mean, I tried to, like, you know, trying to get what's going on.  Let's solve this.  Let's work on this.  And it was like, she was not willing to budge anything.  I was like, if you have a problem with my parents, we can, you know, move out.  We can stay by ourselves.  And she's like, no, I don't want to do that.  And then, so I was like, then you married me for a green card, right?  And these were her exact words.  She's like, what green card?  Green card.  If I didn't marry you, I was going to marry someone else.  I would have came to America regardless.  At that point, I felt like I was a tool that was being used.  If it wasn't me, it was going to be someone else.  She was going to come to America regardless.  In short, all this evidence – which stood uncontested at the trial below -- shows that the family judge erred in ruling that there was no marital fraud by the defendant warranting an annulment under New Jersey law.
[brief] Plaintiffs attempt to skirt their failure to produce evidence that a specific defendant converted an identifiable sum of money that directly belonged to a specific plaintiff with the broad statement:  “In closely held entities like [...] and [...], principals owe each other the same fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty in the operation of the enterprise as partners owe to each other. ”  Konsuvo v. Netzke, 91 N.J. Super. 353, 375 (Ch. Div. 1966).  Pb56-57.  As to [...], this argument is wholly inapplicable since neither [...] nor [...] were principals in [...].  Moreover, the supposed “identifiable funds” do not consist of a specific asset or fund of either [...] or [...] but rather, are part of the general funds of the companies.  The claim that an identifiable fund existed that “rightfully belonged to [...] and [...]” is simply not proven by the contention that [...] was entitled to whatever amount was distributed to any defendant, without regard for the context of the distribution or the fact [...] was not even a principal in [...].
[brief] *Parkway Ins. Co. v. N.J. Neck & Back*, 330 N.J. Super. 172, 184 (Law Div. 1998).  The Commissioner’s regulatory authority includes workers’ compensation and employer liability insurance.  *Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins.*, 472 N.J. Super. 26, 41-42 (App. Div. 2022).  Moreover, the Commissioner’s “experience and judgment” are given “great weight. ”  *Coalition for Quality Health Care v. N.J. Dep’t of* Banking and Ins., 348 N.J. Super. 272, 301 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 194 (2002).  When the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance approves a given insurance policy form or endorsement, that approval gives rise to a presumption that the approved language is consistent with public policy.
[brief] VOLUME II (Pa 163-164)  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  On the Brief: [...]  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Reply  Appendix ..........................................................  ii  Table of Authorities ...............................................................  iii  Response to Defendants’-Respondents’ Preliminary Statement ....  1-4  Response to Defendants’-Respondents’ Statement of Facts ........  5-8  Response to Defendants’-Respondents’ Point I (Pa 37-47, 55-59, 66-75, 95-96, 145-148, 150-152, 154; T1 at 48:6-49:24, 53:11-17, 53:23-54:16, 56:6-57:20, 57:8-59:16, 60:6-9, 61:9-25, 62:1-64:3, 69:12-71:7, 99:25-101:13, 102:1-106:11, 105:5-7, 105:22-106:11, 187:19-189:8; T2 at 143:22-144:1; T3 at 20:24-21:14, 60:5-61:6; T4 at 30:7-10, 31:14-17)  ...........................................  9-10  Response to Defendants’-Respondents’ Point II (Pa 37-47, 55-59, 66-75, 158-162, T4 at 21:7-9, 21:17-22:4, 25:5, 27:3-7)  .........................................................  11-12  Response to Defendants’-Respondents’ Point III (T4 at 24:11)  ...  13  Response to Defendants’-Respondents’ Point IV ......................  14  Conclusion .............................................................................  15  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PLAINTIFFS’-APPELLANTS’ REPLY APPENDIX  Letter from Defendants’ lawyer, dated February 13, 2020  Trial Exhibit D-1……………………………………………………………  Pa 163  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Case Law: Adler v. Irvington Park Dept., 20 N.J. Super. 240 (App. Div. 1952)  ..................................................  11 Hilton Acres v. Klein, 35 N.J. 570 (1961)  ...........................................  11  Ianieri v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of East Brunswick Tp., 192 N.J. Super. 15 (Law Div. 1983) ............................................. 12 Kurak v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 298 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div.), certif. den., 152 N.J. 10 (1997) .............................................. 4 Sautto v. Edenboro Apartments, Inc., 84 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1964) ................................................................. 11 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) ....................................................... 9 Universal Holding Co. v. North Bergen Tp., 55 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 1959) ....................................................... 11 Statutes: N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 ........................................................................ 2 Rules: N.J.R.E. 101(a)(5) ........................................................................ 3 N.J.R.E. 803 .................................................................................. 3 N.J.R.E. 803(c)(16) ....................................................................... 3 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’-RESPONDENTS’ PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendants-Respondents (hereinafter “Defendants”) have failed to respond to Plaintiffs’-Appellants’ (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) clearly outlined and documented in the record material uncontested facts that were ignored by the trial court.
[brief] The determination of whether a party owes a duty of reasonable care to another is very fact-specific and principled.  Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439.  The inquiry with respect to the duty of a business proprietor to its business invitees to provide a reasonably safe place to do that which is within the scope of the invitation should be whether in light of all the surrounding circumstances, it is fair and just to impose a duty to exercise reasonable care in preventing foreseeable harm to patrons.
[brief] The only ramification involving plaintiff’s public “speech” appears to be the written warning he received after the Rutgers Safe Drinking Water presentation.  (Pa335).  It is undisputed that [...] appeared at the Safe Drinking Water Update self-identifying as a [...] employee.  (Pa386).  He publicized himself as a Section Chief in his biography as Course Coordinator.  (Pa386).  He worked on the event as part of his duties at the [...].  (Pa378; Pa380; Pa382).  When his Rutgers contact had a concern, she contacted [...]’s [...] supervisors and was responded to by [...].  (Pa380).  It is clear from the record [...] appeared and spoke as a [...] employee.  The trial court recognized this was beyond dispute.  (3T40:20–3T41:2).  To the extent the written warning dealt with [...]’s words at the Rutgers conference, he was being recognized as an official of the [...].  As such, he was not speaking as a private citizen and is not insulated from discipline.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ASSERTED A MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM IN HIS COMPLAINT; IN ANY EVENT, THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON SUCH CLAIMS IS TWO YEARS, NOT SIX YEARS.**  **Plaintiff’s Complaint**  [...] correctly pointed out in her December 1, 2023 Opinion in this case that: "In the complaint currently pending, Plaintiff has not filed a separate malicious prosecution claim."  (Aa271).  Consequently, plaintiff cannot proceed with a malicious prosecution claim.  Plaintiff misconstrues the decisions in this matter regarding the nature of his claims.  Plaintiff argues that "[e]xcept for the defamation claims in Count One and Two, the federal court found that Appellant’s remaining claims were, in fact, malicious prosecution claims . . . and the State Court found the same.  (Pb9) (emphasis added; citations omitted).  On the contrary, the excerpts cited by plaintiff show that these courts referred to plaintiff’s claims not as malicious prosecution claims but, analogously, as malicious prosecution related claims: (Aa55) ([...]) ("Insofar as Plaintiff’s claims are analogous to the tort of malicious prosecution . . .") (emphasis added); (Aa78; Aa99) ([...]) ("[T]he Federal Court held that the plaintiff’s allegations were malicious – malicious prosecution related claims and that they were untimely as of March 6th, 2020.").  In short, these courts looked to the statute of limitations applicable to analogous New Jersey state law claims to determine the statute of limitations for plaintiff’s federal claims.  See Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 769 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 2014), cited by plaintiff (Pb12):
[brief] (1T 135-10 to 135-12)  [...] explained:  “Once he provided me his itinerary, at that point, I was very suspicious and with his prior history and information provided from a confidential source, I provide him his Miranda warnings before I asked him further questions. ”  (1T 136-6 to 136-10)  At the suppression hearing, [...] continued to maintain that “it wasn’t reasonable” for a restaurant owner to travel to New York to buy meat patties when there are stores in New Jersey that sell them.
[directive] 2.11  Vehicle Contact Action.  Any action undertaken by the pursuing officer intended to result in contact between the moving police vehicle and the pursued vehicle.  2.12  Violator.  Any person who an officer reasonably believes (1) has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime of the first degree or one of the violent or serious crimes of the second degree enumerated in Section 3.2 of this policy, or (2) poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other police officers, as that threat is defined in Section 3.2 of this policy, set forth below.
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD MUST CONSIDER COST IN REVIEWING APPLICATIONS FOR A WAIVER UNDER  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 provides that:  If a public utility…is aggrieved by the action of a municipal agency through said agency’s exercise of its powers under this act, with respect to any action in which the public utility…has an interest, and appeal to the Board of Public Utilities of the State of New Jersey may be taken…If, after such hearing, the Board of Public Utilities shall find that the present or proposed use by the public utility…is necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public, including,…a finding by the board that the present or proposed use of the land is necessary to maintain reliable electric or natural gas supply service for the general public and that no alternative site or sites are reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit, the public utility…may proceed…
[brief] Deferece to the responding party’s document search strategy is especially important where the requesting party attempts to force apex personnel to participate in document discovery, given the much higher risk that the discovery is improperly sought “to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. ”  Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
[brief] “There is no statutory exception for sophisticated consumers.  Even the most sophisticated consumers are entitled to the protections of the CFA. ”  *In re O’Brien*, 423 B.R. 477, 488 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010).  [...], meanwhile, was a sophisticated person, having been involved in laundering more than $18,000,000.00 in a global drug trafficking conspiracy.  The second factor falls decidedly in Plaintiffs’ favor.  The contracts were normal, everyday, interactions between contractor and customer, nothing like the “months-long negotiated contract between sophisticated corporate entities” in *All the Way Towing* that was still determined to be covered by the CFA.  236 N.J. at 439.  “Rather, the CFA applies as long as “a member of the public could, if inclined, purchase” that good “regardless of the popularity of the product. ”  *Sun Chemical*, supra, 981 F.3d at 240, quoting *All the Way Towing*, 236 N.J. at 408.  Finally, the “merchandise,” home improvements, was publicly available (as distinguished from a custom-built tow truck).  By definition, every real estate investor will need home improvements at some point.  Home improvement contracts are so readily available to the public that they have their own series of protections under the CFA, the Contractor Registration Act, various regulations, and judicial precedent.  *N.J.S.* 56:8-1 et seq., *N.J.S.* 56:8-136 et. seq., *N.J.A.C.* 13:45A-16.1.  See Post at 24.  While the trial court did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, with regard to the *All the Way* factors, there is no question that these factors do exempt defendants from the CFA’s reach.  Once again, even if any plaintiff might later sell or rent a property does not change the buyer, the seller, or the “merchandise” of home improvements.  To strike down plaintiffs’ case impermissibly allows a contractor to take advantage of a consumer merely because they had done business before the default.  “[O]ne who perpetrates a fraud may not urge that his victim should have been more circumspect or astute.  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.J. 17, 27 (1957), Peter W. Kero, Inc. v. Terminal Constr. Corp., 6 N.J. 361, 269-270 (1951) (“It is the policy of the law to protect the unwary and foolish as well as the vigilant from the wiles and artifices of evil-doers and negligence in trusting a representation will not, according to the greater weight of authority, excuse a positive willful fraud, and parole evidence is admissible to show such fraud. ”).  Defendants here didn’t even argue that Plaintiffs should have been more astute; the trial court instead, on its own and without prodding, twice raised and twice decided the issue against Plaintiffs.  This was error.
[brief] The defendant, since becoming an adult had an almost constant string of incurring new charges or being incarcerated.  He had three prior indictable convictions, including one for a handgun offense where he was released from state prison twenty (20) months prior to the current offense.  His third conviction for failing to register actually occurred between his release on the weapons offense and the current matter.  In fact, he was on probation for that offense when he committed the murders and assault now before the Court.  In addition to the indictable convictions, he had seven (7) disorderly person convictions and one (1) local ordinance violation.
[brief] Appellant filed his Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause with the Court on March 8, 2023.  The matter was transferred to Camden County by Court Order on March 9, 2023.  The matter was assigned to the Presiding Judge of the Chancery Division, [...].  [...] scheduled an initial conference on the matter for March 22, 2023.  On March 13, 2023, correspondence was sent to Appellant advising him that the statutory adjournments that he sought had been granted.  The Sheriffs Sale was adjourned to May 11, 2023.  [...] was advised of these facts prior to the March 22, 2023, conference.  At the conference with the Court, Appellant acknowledged that he received the adjournments he was seeking.  Upon learning these facts, [...] dismissed Appellant's complaint as moot.
[brief] Plaintiffs also misconstrue the application of Hirth here, claiming that the plaintiff in that case was able to challenge both the “study” and the “plan. ” (Pb19).  Hirth involved a challenge to both the blight designation and the adopted redevelopment plan, both of which occurred within weeks of one another.  Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 168, 155.  Given the proximity of both the blight designation and the redevelopment plan adoption, both challenges were timely, and the Planning Board also prepared the redevelopment plan at issue.  Thus, Hirth involved a review of the Planning Board proceedings.  By contrast, none of those factors is present in our case.
[brief] (Pa95).  Plaintiff’s counsel duly notified the surrounding Lot owners as directed by the Court’s November 14, 2023, Order, providing the Court’s Order, the Preliminary Report of the Commission and the supporting exhibits and surveys.  Thereafter, two letters were submitted to the Court: on December 18, 2023, [...], Esq. submitted a letter on behalf of [...], owner of [...] and on January 9, 2024 [...], Esq. submitted a letter on behalf of Peter and [...], trustees, owners of [...].
[brief] Indeed, [...] interviewed both [...] and [...], the remaining staffing coordinators, about [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct.  (Pa536-37).  Both commented on [...]’s challenging management style, yet neither were terminated.  (See Pa536 (Asselta noting there were “no hard feelings” and that [...] had apologized to her); Pa537 (Ruhl stated that [...]’s conduct was not “good for the department” and that [...]’s “tantrum” was not her typical behavior).  The trial court correctly highlighted this distinction: “I don’t think that there are sufficient facts in this record that would permit a jury to see that it’s anything but a nondiscriminatory event. ” (See 1T 31:21-23).  Further, [...] never would have approved charge pay for only three of the five staffing coordinators.  [...], managing an already incredibly stressful office whose employees were constantly pulled in different directions as hospital-staffing demands remained fluid during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, lost sixty-six percent of her staff.  (Pa369 at 109:12-110:10).  The trial court recognized the inconsistency in [...]’s argument.  (See 1T 31:2-7) (“it doesn’t stretch the imagination to understand that this was probably actions that Ms. [...] didn’t approve of because it left her with from a five-person office down to a two-person office in a very stressful time during which employment in the hospital was very much needed. ”).
[brief] “The Yarbough factors are qualitative, not quantitative; applying them involves more than merely counting the factors favoring each alternative outcome. ”  State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 348 (2019).  A “sentencing court must explain its decision to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences in a given case. ”  Ibid.  “When a sentencing court properly evaluates the Yarbough factors in light of the record, the court's decision will not normally be disturbed on appeal. ”  State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011).  An explanation of the “overall fairness” is necessary “to ‘foster[ ] consistency in … sentencing in that arbitrary or irrational sentencing can be curtailed and, if necessary, corrected through appellate review. ’ ”  Torres, 246 N.J. at 272 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 166–67 (2006)).  Consistent with our Court's holding in Torres, we therefore remand for the judge to provide reasons for the consecutive sentences with “[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness” of defendant's aggregate sentence.
[brief] “M” references are to the Appendix of Defendants/Appellants [...] and its Mayor.  “Ba” references are to the Appendix of Defendant/Appellant [...]. violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) the Fifth Count sought relief due to Defendants’ violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c); (6) the Sixth Count sought the appointment of a Special Hearing Officer to hold hearings on the Plaintiffs’ subsequent application(s) to develop the subject property; (7) the Seventh Count sought relief due to Defendants’ violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq.; and (8) the Eighth Count sought damages as a result of the Mayor’s statements defaming the Plaintiffs.  Id.  By way of Order dated October 25, 2019, this Court denied Defendants’ early motion to dismiss the Complaint.  Through that same Order, certain claims (Counts One, Two, Three and Six) were scheduled for a prerogative writ trial, and other claims (Counts Four, Five, Seven and Eight) were bifurcated and stayed.  On July 15, 2020, the prerogative writ trial was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., sitting below, on the Plaintiffs’ bifurcated claims asserted in the First, Second, Third, and Sixth Counts of the Complaint.  By Order and Opinion dated October 15, 2020 (the “October 15, 2020 Opinion”), the Trial Court held that the Zoning Board unlawfully denied Plaintiffs’ Amended Application and granted Plaintiffs’ request for partial judgment and the appointment of a Special Hearing Officer to hear Plaintiffs’ application for site plan approval, pursuant to the Sixth Count of the Complaint.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Last year, as part of its effort to remedy issues with “discrimination in the jury selection process,” *Andujar*, 247 N.J. at 318, the Supreme Court approved the recommendation of the Committee of the Judicial Conference on Jury Selection to “explore options for an individual who has completed their sentence (including any term of supervision) to be restored to eligibility to serve as a juror,” referring it “for consideration by the Legislature.
[brief] Then, the State asked a second time “Okay.  You didn’t receive it and you didn’t ask them why you didn’t receive it?” (12T:120-3 to 4).  [...] indicated that she never received it.  (12T:120-5).  This was a bell that the Court could not unring.  The State’s assertion that the report was hidden was unfair, inappropriate and intruded on attorney work product as well as attorney client privilege.  This was an improper and calculated move by the State.