ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] But “the court’s responsibility is to give effect to the whole policy, not just one part of it. ”  *Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C.*, 226 N.J. 403, 416 (2016).  Nor is it “the function of the courts to rewrite the policy,” whether to benefit the insured or the insurer.  (Db17) (citing *Morrison v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Am.*, 381 N.J. Super. --- \(^1\) Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online version 2024), https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/conflict; American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd ed. 1993) (defining “conflicting” to mean “differ”).  532, 538 (App. Div. 2005)).  The Appellate Division should instead enforce the conformity to law provision based on its plain meaning.
[brief] *Campbell v. NJ Racing Commission*, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001); *Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr.*, 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992).  In reviewing agency determinations, "appellate courts must defer to an agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field."  *Greenwood*, 127 N.J. at 513.  "The governing standard is, of course, whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole, with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility."  *In re Grossman*, 127 N.J.Super. 13, 22-23 (App.Div., 1974), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 292 (1974).  The reviewing court must determine "whether pertinent principles of law were properly interpreted and applied to the facts as found by the trier thereof."  *Id. at* 23.  In the appeal at bar, the [...] adopted the Initial Decision of [...].  To that end, the findings and conclusions govern.
[brief] Before both the fire and the shooting, defendant sent text messages to his mother, [...].  The text messages all referenced defendant's belief that Lorraine and the [...] owed him $25,000, plus interest, from the sale of [...] and her divorce from defendant's father.  Some messages directed Lorraine to a bank account into which the owed money could be deposited; this bank account was associated with defendant's businesses, e.g., [...].  While Lorraine did not recognize the telephone numbers associated with these messages, one of which was a prepaid Virginia telephone number\(^3\), the content of the messages made clear to her that her son [...] was behind them because over the years no one but her --- \(^3\)
[brief] The court continues, stating, “the March 28 Order [does not] specifically state ‘the status quo is to be maintained’” (Da285) and then states “Defendants’ motion asserts the March 28 Order obligated plaintiffs to continue to employ and pay [...], but the March 28 Order includes no such language.  Defendants’ reliance on the equitable principle of a status quo injunction is misplaced. ” (Da287).  All of this lies in direct conflict with [...] who, in his ruling, ordered, “we will continue as we are and I reiterate my order that the status quo – that means we are not to have any significant out of the ordinary course of business changes to this company.  What I want, what I want is the status quo ante as of December 31 to be returned to. ” (4T34 at 18, emphasis added).  And, “[...], although fully informed, receiving his remuneration, voting at meetings, being able to participate, would not be in his management role, temporarily. ” (3T53 at 10, emphasis added).  Over a year later, in its order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, the court once again relied on its mistaken reading of the record and essentially did a “cut and paste” of the language (Supra.) concerning the March 28, 2018 order.
[brief] As a result of his improper conversion of rents and misappropriation of mortgage funds, the UES Property is now in foreclosure.  Finally, due to Appellant’s conduct, the Estate faces a lawsuit from an individual claiming to have a contract to purchase the UES Property (the “UES Contract Case”).  That “contract” was signed by Appellant when he had no legal standing to do so, and the “deposit” was paid to an account in the name of Appellant’s deceased mother and his son.  In his Appellate Brief, Appellant attempts to distract this court by changing his story and shifting his focus as to whether he is seeking an accounting of the Estate’s assets and expenses or continuing to search for his personal property that he alleges is missing.
[brief] Following [...]'s logic, they would be permitted to place seven (7) units on any property they purchased in the Borough.  The Trial Court agreed with the foregoing, stating:  The court finds that Redeveloper’s reliance on the holding in Cranford Development is misplaced.  In that matter, the Township of Cranford enacted ordinances which prohibited the construction of adorable housing whereas here, the court does not find any evidence suggesting that the Borough has affirmatively enacted zoning which now prevents compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  See Cranford Development, 445 N.J. Super. At 223-225.  The Redeveloper’s reliance on the holding in Tolls Bros., supra, is also misplaced.  The Facts and circumstances in Toll Bros are clearly distinguishable from those presented here.
[brief] Those errors were compounded by the prosecutor’s improper comments on his silence during summation:  You saw the defendant’s statement, two-and-a-half hours.  He’s asked directly by the detectives, “Did you run because you heard gunshots?”  He doesn’t even respond.  He doesn’t respond, because he knows the evidence is there.  He knows that you can see it with your own eyes.  He doesn’t want to admit that this is him.  Don’t worry about it; the evidence does that for us.
[brief] [...] and [...] Submit Non-Responsive, Materially Defective Bids  On May 21, 2024, the [...] opened the bids in response to the Solicitation.  [...]’s bid ($40,255,770) was the lowest, [...]’s bid ($41,819,780) was second lowest, and [...]’s bid ($44,732,529) was third lowest.  Ibid.  Within [...]’s proposal (“[...] Proposal”), [...] identified [...]  (“[...]”) as its archeological subcontractor.  [...] is not registered in accordance with the PWCRA.  Within [...]’s proposal (“[...] Proposal”), [...] identified [...]  (“[...]”) as its archeological subcontractor.  [...] is not registered in accordance with the PWCRA.  [...]’s proposal in response to the Solicitation (“[...] Proposal”) identified [...]  (“[...]”) as its archeological subcontractor.  Unlike the archeological subcontractors identified by [...] and [...], [...] is registered in accordance with the PWCRA.  C.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020  Core Principle Five Duty to Intervene and Report.  Every officer, regardless of rank, title, seniority, or status, has an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent any use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with such policies, regulations, and laws, if possible, before a fellow officer uses excessive, illegal, or otherwise inappropriate force.  Every officer has a duty to immediately report any improper use of force.  5.1  Duty to intervene.  A law enforcement officer’s duty to intervene is rooted in the commitment to protect public safety at all times.  Interventions that prevent improper use of force will lead to fewer citizen complaints, fewer officer disciplinary matters, higher morale, and a healthier working environment.  Preventing misconduct preserves the integrity of all officers and the law enforcement profession as a whole.  Intervening to prevent improper use of force can assist fellow officers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that may be illegal, inappropriate, and in violation of this Policy.  5.2  Thus, all officers who observe another officer about to use force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with this Policy must, if feasible, do whatever they can to interrupt the flow of events before the fellow officer engages in an improper use of force.  Officers can serve each other and the public by simply saying or doing the right thing to prevent a fellow officer from resorting to force illegally or inappropriately.  5.3  Officers shall use signaling, verbal intervention, or physical intervention, if necessary, to stop any improper use of force.  It is important to note that the duty to intervene does not stop at one officer.  It is the responsibility of all officers to ensure use-of-force compliance.  If officers observe a situation where another officer is attempting to intervene in an improper use of force, officers shall assist in that effort.  5.4  Duty to report illegal and inappropriate uses of force by other officers.  Any officer who observes or has knowledge of a use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with this directive or department policies must (a) notify a supervisor as soon as possible and (b) submit an individual written report to a supervisor before reporting off duty on the day the officer becomes aware of the misconduct  5.5  Law enforcement agencies, supervisors, and officers are prohibited from retaliating in any form against an officer who intercedes in or reports illegal or inappropriate uses of force.  5.6  Every department shall establish a written policy which requires intervention and protects officers who intervene from retaliation or other negative consequences.  The departmental policy shall be consistent with this Policy and all applicable laws.  Reporting procedures must comply with Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures.  See AG Directive 2020-7.  17
[brief] [...] continues to assert that the issue of the zoning illegality of the ongoing nonconforming use of the off-site parking use on the School Lot 5 is collaterally estopped or foreclosed by the [...]’s Chancery Court ruling that the 1963 Agreement established a parking easement on the School Lot 5 that remains in place.  The Trial Court, again in error, adopted that erroneous and illogical position.  The 40:55D-68 zoning issue is whether the nonconforming off-site parking use is entitled to continue as being either (1) legally in place prior to zoning regulations prohibiting the use or (2) being legally authorized by a Board site plan/variance approval.  The claim that the nonconforming use is legal under zoning because the use was allowed or put in place by the property owner or with the owner’s permission or by easement is actually irrelevant.  In practically every instance, a nonconforming use will be commenced either by the owner or with the owner’s permission.  That the property owner allowed the nonconforming use is irrelevant as to its zoning legality.  The fact that in 1963 the Lot 5 owner allegedly extended a permission to the Sons of Israel Lot 8 to park attendee/staff vehicles on Lot 5 --- whether by easement or informal license --- is irrelevant to the zoning/nonconforming use legality issue.  The Chancery Court Opinion/Order was that by the 1963 Agreement Paragraph 10 the School Lot owner granted to the Synagogue Lot 8 a parking easement on Lot 5, and that easement has not been abandoned by the Sons of Israel.  That Opinion/Order is certainly not decisive or even relevant to the Zoning Board issue and decision that the off-site parking use/facility on the School Lot 5 is non-conforming under current Zoning Regulations and there is no proof such off-site parking use/facility was ever legal under zoning at its inception or any time thereafter.  That there was no “pre-existing” legal off-site parking use by the Sons of Israel Lot 8 on the School Lot 5 --- and that there is no zoning or variance Board Approval for such parking use --- was actually logically established by the 1972 Site Plan/variance Approval applied for and received by the Lot 5 School for its expansion project (Da13-22).  That Site Plan Plat and Resolution clearly does not provide for or allow off-site parking for Lot 8 attendees/staff on Lot 5.  In fact, those documents confirm the School Lot 5 had deficient parking for its own school requirements and applied for and received a parking variance.  That is certainly conclusive that the Zoning Board’s analysis and decision on the zoning issue is correct.  The Trial Court ruling that this 40:55D-68 Appeal/Board determination is somehow collaterally estopped by the Chancery Court ruling that the 1963 Agreement provided a parking permission/easement by the Lot 5 owner to Lot 8 is simply incorrect.
[brief] .....................................  8  State v. South Amboy Trust Co., 46 N.J. Super. 497, 500 (Law Div. 1957) ...... 9  Monmouth Lumber v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 21 N.J. 439, 448 (1956)  ...............  9 Eisen v. Kostkos, 116 N.J. Super. 358, 371 (App. Div. 1971) .........................  9 O’Loughlin v. National Community Bank, 338 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2001)  ..................................................
[brief] The Board found:  The Board does not consider these exhibits to be probative because, in response to questioning from Board, [...] stated that he had never done post-development comparisons of the renderings prepared through the software tools he uses with actual photos of the developed sites.  Moreover, no simulation was provided of the view from vicinity of the dwellings to the southwest of the proposed development and nearest the proposed warehouse structures, so one of the most significant potential visual impacts of the greater heights of the proposed buildings was not addressed by these exhibits.
[brief] Indeed, contrary to defendant’s argument, the Supreme Court expressly recognized, twenty years after Copling, that “unlawful possession of a weapon could be viewed as independent of other crimes committed with the weapon. ”  State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 351 (2019) (remanding on other grounds and directing sentencing court to provide a more detailed explanation of its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences for unlawful possession of a weapon and kidnapping).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY EXERCISED HER DISCRETION TO RECONSIDER THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS PURSUANT TO R. 4:42-2 IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.  Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ brief is there any discussion of the standard of review applicable to this appeal.  Appeals from an order granting or denying a motion for reconsideration are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
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[brief] In Count 15, Petitioner alleges that the Board violated section (g) when it sent postcards to District residents which Petitioner claims blurred the line between information and advocacy.  The Commission’s decisions have found otherwise, and, as noted above, make clear that in order to substantiate a violation of the inaccurate information provision of section (g), the evidence must establish that the inaccuracy was not due to reasonable mistake, a matter of personal opinion, or attributable to developing circumstances.  See O’Hara v. Chambers, Pineland Reg. Bd. of Educ., No. C13-21 (SEC Aug. 30, 2021) (Ra50-56).  Petitioner has set forth no facts whatsoever that would substantiate the inaccuracy of any information provided by Respondents concerning the postcards.  Accordingly, Petitioner cannot establish a violation of section (g) regarding the information contained in the postcards.
[brief] 24 Est. of Noyes v. Morano, 2019 WL 149521 (App. Div. Jan 8, 2019) .................................................  36  Estate of Watson v. Piddington, 2020 WL 2710168 (App. Div. May 26, 2020)  ..........................................  37  Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C, 450 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2017)  ............................................................  15  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) ..................................................................................  47  Gamble v. Connolly, 399 N.J. Super. 130 (Law Div. 2007) .......................................................  31 Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001) ................................................................................... 35, 36, 37 GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572 (2011)
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County Ind.  No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED
[brief] State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (citing R. 2:10-2; State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 554 (2014)).  Under that standard, an unchallenged error constitutes plain error only if it was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  “‘Thus, the error will be disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised whether the jury came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  Singh, 245 N.J. at 13 (quoting State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 456 (2015)).  Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant's right to a fair trial.  The trial court has an absolute duty to instruct the jury on the law governing the facts of the case. ”  State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988).  The requirement that jury instructions be “molded” or “tailored” to the facts adduced at trial “has been imposed in various contexts in which the statement of relevant law, when divorced from the facts, was potentially confusing or misleading to the jury.
[brief] 10  A.  THE ENTIRE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS INVALID UNDER THE STANDARDS FOR ADHESION CONTRACTS .........................................................  12  B.  THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE SEVERED .........................................................................................................................  22  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTION WAS PROPER IN DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION .........................................................  23  A.  THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED JUST DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION  .........................................................  23  B.  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO REVERSE THE STAY ORDER DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY ...........................................  30 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................................................  32  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO ENLARGE PURSUANT TO R. 4:69-6(c)  IGNORE WELL SETTLED CASE LAW. **  | 2 | | **II.  RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT THAT R. 4:69-6(a) IS APPLICABLE TO CHALLENGE  THE ISSUANCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATENESS IS MISPLACED**  | 9 | | **III.  THE RESOLUTION AND TRANSCRIPTS OF THE ZBA MEETINGS MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE EXISTS NO VERBATIM RECORD AS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f). **  | 10 | | CONCLUSION | 12
[brief] Because [...] was qualified as an expert only for his testimony about the historical cell site analysis regarding [...]’s cellphone, the jury would not have construed the expert-testimony limiting instruction provided in the final jury charges to apply to [...]’s lay testimony about the GPS and health activity information from [...]’s and [...]’s cellphones.  at 553, the same must be required for technology and software that purports to measure a phone’s precise location and the steps walked and flights ascended by the phone’s user.  A defendant must not be required to “blindly accept[]” the technology’s “reliability.
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW CANNOT BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT WAS ENTERED AS A RESULT OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IMPROPERLY AND NECESSARILY RELIES ON A FINDING OF A MATERIAL FACT THAT WAS THE SUBJECT OF A GENUINE DISPUTE (Raised Below at DA 93a – 96a; DA 520a at ¶ 46 in conjunction with DA 934a at ¶ 46; T.25:13-24)  In its decision, the court below clearly conflated the provision of that third connection to [...]’s substations, b2933, with the routing of the lines to do so through [...].  DA at 2a (referring to “the Project” as b2933 which only requires an additional line and not any particular line or route, and also indicating that “the Project” will replace poles in [...]).  DA at 1a et seq. T. 4:7-17.  Regardless of whether the provision of a third line was essential to providing adequate service, [...] genuinely disputed any fact or assertion that routing the line along South Avenue and Central Avenue in [...] was in any way “essential. ”  Indeed, the record was replete with evidence that there were other feasible routes, and that [...] considered them to be feasible.  Nonetheless, the trial court decided this disputed fact when it found: the Project is crucial for [...] to fulfill their statutory obligation to furnish safe and adequate utility services throughout New Jersey.  The Project is also necessary, and [...] properly routed the Project through [...].  The Project is also necessary as it was approved by [...] under the delegated authority of [...].  DA at 6a.  Central to the court’s ruling was its mistaken finding that the route through [...] was essential to the provision of a third connection to the substations, which it then used to invalidate the Ordinance.  The Court stated: