ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ........................................................................-  31 -, - 38 - Nelson v. Xacta 3000 Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109580, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2009)  ..................................................................................................................-  22 - North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. IC Sys. Solutions, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 327, *60-64 (Law Div. February 18, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpubl. LEXIS 2176 (App. Div. August 30, 2017)  ........................................................................................................-  12 - Occulto v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 125 F.R.D. 611, 616 (D.N.J. 1989)  ..........- 14 - Pereira v. Azevado, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54868, *13 (D.N.J. April 17, 2013)  ..................................................................................................................- 22 - Polzo v. Cnty of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008)  ..............................................- 15 - Polzo v. County of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 35 (2012).................................- 13 -, - 14 - Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995)  .......................................................-  37 - Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)  ......- 9 - Satellite Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., 110 N.J. 280, 286 (1988)  ........................................................................................................-  31 - Simko v. C & C Marine Maint. Co., 594 F.2d 960, 969 (3d Cir. 1979)  .......- 34 - Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997)  ...............- 20 - State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 427 (2016)  .....................................................-  12 -, - 13 - State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 297 (2011)
[directive] Superior Court of NJ Uniform  Defendant Intake: I I  LAST NAME MIDDLE NAME  FIRST NAME I a, Defendant's Health Status I  I REPORTED  PHYSICAL HEALTH USE AT TIME OF OFFENSE  DRUG / ALCOHOL USE REPORTED  MENTAL HEALTH  DYES D O ONO I PRESENT  PAST 0NONE 0GOOD 0POOR  DGOOD 0POOR  14, / Physical Appearance  Additional Comments  PHYSICAL APPEARANCE  DESCRIPTION MEDICATION/ FREQUENCY  I  5.  Substance Abuse History  INITIAL USE  LAST USE FREQUENCY  SUBSTANCE USED  METHOD OF INGESTION  16, & / / Medical  Mental Health  Substance Abuse Treatment History  Insurance Coverage  TREATMENT  FACILITIES LOCATIONS  DATES OF TREATMENT  DIAGNOSIS/ COMMENTS  DATE ORDERED  ADULT  DIAGNOSTIC TREATMENT  COPY RECEIVED I I  CENTER EVALUATION ORDERED?  DYES DYES ONO ONO  DATE ORDERED  PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION  COPY RECEIVED I I ORDERED?  DYES ONO  DYES ONO I I REFERRED FOR SUBSTANCE OTHERAGENCY  TASC ABUSE EVALUATION?  DYES ONO  DYES ONO I I  HEALTH INSURANCE INSURED'S NAME POLICY  NUMBER  DYES ONO INSURANCE  CARRIER NAME AND ADDRESS COMMENTS  UDIR-2  Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693
[brief] *Illinois v. Winfield*, 15 CR 14066-01 (Feb. 8, 2023) (Ra 1-44).  The court in that case hoped that “the above sampling of wrongful convictions should serve as a wake-up call to courts operating as rubber stamps in blinding finding general acceptance of firearms identification evidence. ”  *Id.* at 41.  [...] hopes so as well.  Contrary to the State’s claim in its brief, the defense is not asking this Court to make any determination under *Daubert*.  The defense is asking this Court to do what it had to do under *Frye* and will continue to do under *Daubert*: to determine whether a specific discipline is reliable.  *State v. Olenowski*, 253 N.J. 133, 143 (2023) (“In criminal cases up until now, this Court has used the Frye standard to assess reliability. ”) (emphasis added).  The standard matters, but the essential question is the same.  The failure to truly ask that question—and the consequent failure to come up with a substantive answer—was error.  The convictions must be vacated or, in the alternative, the matter remanded for an admissibility hearing.
[directive] Movants highlight two statutory bases for relief, which we consider in turn.  A. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) allows for detention hearings to be reopened when there is a material change in circumstances:  The hearing may be reopened, before or after a determination by the court, at any time before trial, if the court finds that information exists that was not known to the prosecutor or the eligible defendant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, or that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.  17  [N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) (emphases added); see also R. 3:4A(b)(3).
[brief] \textsuperscript{140}  \textit{Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC}, 203 N.J. 496, 520 (2010).  \textsuperscript{141}  \textit{In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action}, 93 N.J. 412, 431 (1983)(class certified, even though individual defenses relating to causation, reliance and damages would remain as to each class member).
[brief] *U.S. Const.*, amends. VI, XIV; *N.J. Const.*, art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10; R. 2:10-2; *Macon*, 57 N.J. at 336 (plain error is reversible if “sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached”).
[brief] Regarding the Powers of Attorney, the trial court found:  [B]oth parties were fully aware of the transfers being made under the asset protection plan and the documents including the POAs which were necessary to complete such.  [[...]] signed all of the documents that clearly indicated such were being executed as part of the plan.  [A229, Op. at 26-27].  The trial court ruled against [...]’s actions to set them aside:  As to the [[...]’s] application to set aside the 2013 and 2014 Irrevocable Powers of Attorney, the court denies that these POAs should be set aside in the context of their use during the bankruptcy and divorce process for the same reasons concerning the MMA, PSA, and Final Judgment of Divorce.  [Id. at 51].
[brief] \(^2\)  The two cases were discovered by the Trial Court.  Both were trial court cases, neither of which were authoritative decisions by the Appellate Division or the Supreme Court.  In the \(^2\)  It is noted that the motion was filed with the Court on February 21, 2023, plaintiff’s opposition was filed on February 22, 2023 and the Court heard oral argument and ruled on February 23, 2023.  The decision of the Trial Court was fully briefed and researched by the Court prior to the delivery of the well-reasoned decision.
[brief] [...] contends that the Zoning Board prevented the public from submitting public comments and cross-examining witnesses regarding the application.  Further, [...] claims that the Zoning Board did not review the application materials once the application was deemed complete.  These contentions are false and again misstate the record.  The Resolution clearly indicates that the Zoning Board reviewed multiple documents submitted by [...].  (Pa245-Pa253).  Additionally, the Board heard sufficient testimony from [...]’s witnesses regarding the details of the application.  (1T23 to 1T55).  In granting the application, the memorializing Resolution specifically states, inter alia, that the requested subdivision does not adversely affect the public's health, safety, or welfare.  (Pa245-Pa253).  Additionally, the Board opened the hearing up to the public and heard four (4) members of the public provide testimony.  At no point were any of those members of the public prevented from speaking.  (1T86 to 1T94).  Accordingly, [...]’s claims have no factual basis and the trial court’s decision should be upheld.
[directive] Upon receipt of an internal affairs complaint, the internal affairs investigator can advise the complainant of the importance of providing accurate and truthful information.  However, when providing such advice, internal affairs investigators must remember that it is important to balance the need for receiving complaints of officer misconduct against the danger of discouraging members of the public from coming forward with their complaints.  Therefore, any language that would serve to dissuade or intimidate a member of the public from coming forward should be avoided.  Accordingly, at no point during the initial intake of a complaint should any officer affirmatively warn a complainant that consequences could potentially result from making misrepresentations or a false report.  This does not preclude officers from explaining the potential consequences of false reports to complainants if the officer is specifically asked about this.  5.1.6
[brief] (Pb, p. 36). 14  In the face of this evidence, [...] first attempts to discredit [...]’s by arguing that “not one word in his reports or testimony is directed to quantifying the amount of property damage during any particular policy period. ” (Db, pp. 39-40).  Then, to support this wholly inaccurate statement, [...] partially quotes [...]’s testimony during the allocation hearing completely out of context.  [...] quotes [...] as testifying that he “was not trying to do an allocation to individual policies. ”  That is true.  The complete record of the allocation hearing demonstrates that [...] did, in fact, calculate how much property damage occurred during each period of time, leaving it to the court to determine, as a legal matter, how the policies applied:
[brief] As for requesting a remittitur, the Defendant’s argument also falls short in all respects.  In *Cuevas*, the New Jersey Supreme Court made it clear that the Court shall not grant a remittitur unless the Court must “correct a grossly disproportionate damages award, which, if left intact, would constitute a miscarriage of justice. ”  *Cuevas* at 487.  Based upon the injuries sustained, the treatment necessitated thereby, and the permanent affect they have and will continue to have on [...]’s life, the jury verdict was not such that the judicial conscience is shocked thereby.  Accordingly, plaintiff respectfully requests that the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s application for remittitur be upheld.  **POINT III: PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL DID NOT MISCHARACTERIZE PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES IN SUMMATION AND THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS CORRECTLY DENIED.
[brief] And again, I’m coming clean as possible and saying you’re right, I coach hockey.  If [...] was charged for a hockey stick, then that’s a shame on me and I’ll more than certainly reimburse you.  I don’t understand how this thing transitioned from my American Express to my [...] card, but you know, I’ll take full responsibility.  I apologize for that.  I had never intention of taking anything from [...], and I never had any intention of misconstruing funds.  (SOMF,¶22) (emphasis added).
[brief] The State filed a motion in limine to permit Officer [...] of the [...] as to a statement that Defendant allegedly made to her when she attempted to take a buccal swab.  (18T4-6 to 13)  The State’s proffer was that Defendant “said in response to the request for the oral buccal that that would be bad for him to agree to that. ”  (18T28-2 to 4)  Defense counsel argued that this was not a statement against interest (18T27-20 to 23) and requested a testimonial hearing because she believed it would be unfair for the State to be able to ask the jury to assume that Defendant’s statement “meant was he would be found guilty by that saliva” without allowing her to explain Defendant’s actual concerns about taking saliva as opposed to the blood sample he ultimately consented to.  (18T30-25 to 31-6)  The court considered the arguments of the parties and issued a preliminary ruling that “that sounds like it’s coming in” as evidence of consciousness of guilt, but wanted to make sure he was not missing anything that would require a 104 hearing to ensure that Defendant would not be surprised by Marin’s testimony at trial.
[brief] --- 4 RMTS purportedly went remote at some point after this March 21, 2020 Executive Order.  Nonetheless, Plaintiff was not contacted to return to work.  Pa211, PSOF ¶67-68.  The overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrates an applicable public policy.  Yet, the trial court focused solely on the fact that Stay-at-Home Order, mandating broad sweeping stay-at-home directives, was not issued until after Plaintiff’s email and therefore arguably irrelevant to establish public policy.
[brief] Wallace v. Summerhill Nursing Home, 380 N.J. Super. 507, 510 (App. Div. 2005) (“A party's negligent failure to know or to discover the facts that resulted in the mutual mistake does not preclude the rescission or reformation of the contract. ”) (internal citations omitted); Edgerton v. Edgerton, 203 N.J. Super. 160, 173 (App. Div. 1985) (“In this State even a negligent failure to know or discover the facts about which both parties are mistaken, need not preclude rescission or reformation. ”) (internal citations omitted).  Thus, on the one hand, and as the trial court acknowledged, Ja719, the remedy of reformation presumes the occurrence of a mistake and permits reformation even where the seeker of relief failed to identify, if not contributed to, that mistake.  On the other hand, it is the later buyers’ obligation to be diligent about what they are purchasing.
[brief] In the specific context of frivolous litigation, the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that a pro se attorney defendant can be awarded fees as part of a sanction for efforts in defending against a frivolous complaint.  See, McCarthy v. Taylor, 155 NE 3d 359 (Ill. 2019); Burke v. Elkin, 51 NE 3d 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wash. App. 250, 277 P.3d 9 (2012); Keaty v. Raspanti, 866 So. 23D 1045 (La. App. Cir. 2004); Friedman v. Backman, 453 So. 2D 938(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
[brief] *Ibid.*; *United States ex rel. Williamson v. LaVallee*, 282 F. Supp. 968, 971-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).  Moreover, [...] verified that counsel never disclosed his prior representation.  This denied the court the chance to explore the circumstances and determine whether he could effectively represent [...].  Most importantly, it denied [...] the opportunity to decide whether to seek different counsel.  See *Cottle*, 194 N.J. at 472 (waiver must knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).  When the PCR judge denied this claim, she stated that there was not support that counsel previously represented [...], he “was not materially limited” by any past representation, and “none of the responsibilities of RPC 1.9 are implicated here,” particularly since [...] was deceased.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MEADOWLANDS  HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, MHA, LLC  F/D/B/A [...], [...], [...]  JOHN DOE, JANE ROE, ABC CORP, DEF LLC, being fictitious parties whose identities are currently unknown, both jointly and severally Defendants, DOCKET NO.: [...] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION HUDSON COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C. HON. [...], P.J.Cv PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT [...]’S REPLY BRIEF [...], Esq. I.D. 03756-1998 [...] [...] Tele: [...] Fax: [...]
[brief] The Borough’s and Planning Board’s Actions Are Adequately Supported by the Record  Plaintiffs fail to carry their burden to overcome the presumption of validity, as the municipal actions at issue are adequately supported by the record.  See Powerhouse Arts, 413 N.J. Super. at 333 (explaining that the adoption of an amendment to a redevelopment plan is only arbitrary or capricious if the “findings underlying the municipal governing body’s redevelopment decision” are not “adequately supported by the record”).  Based on the detailed, unrebutted testimony of the Borough’s planner, the Planning Board determined that the proposed amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  See Pa126-27; see also MDb29-31; Pa69 (“[I]t is the further opinion of [...] that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is generally consistent with, and certainly not inconsistent with any of the goals and objectives of the Master Plan[.]”); Pa74-76 (testimony of the Borough planner finding the amended Redevelopment Plan consistent with the objectives of the Master Plan).  The Planning Board memorialized this determination in a duly adopted resolution identifying the specific objectives – Nos. 2, 3, and 6 – of the Master Plan that were implicated by the amended Redevelopment Plan and then explained how the amended Redevelopment Plan was substantially consistent with each objective.  See Pa70 (“[T]he Amended Redevelopment is consistent with the goals and objectives of the Master Plan. ”) specifically, Objectives 2, 3 and 6 in Section D of the Master Plan Reexamination Report[.]”).  The resolution also specifically incorporated the testimony of the Borough’s planner.  See Pa69-70 (“The aforementioned recitals are incorporated herein as though fully set forth at length. ”).  Upon receipt of the Planning Board’s resolution, the Borough Council properly adopted Ordinance 22-1516 to amend the Redevelopment Plan.  See Pa127; see also Pa91-92 (“It is hereby found and determined that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Master Plan of the Borough[.]”).  Based on this clear record, the determinations of the Planning Board that the amended Redevelopment Plan is substantially consistent with the Master Plan are adequately supported by the record and, therefore, entitled to deference.  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.  366, 383 (1995) (“The Board that prepared and adopted the Master Plan also determined . . . that the proposed [] amendments are substantially consistent with the Master Plan.  Such a determination by the Board is entitled to deference and great weight. ”) (emphasis added).  Because the record adequately supports the determinations of the Planning Board and Borough and Plaintiffs have not made any affirmative showing that the actions were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, the trial court properly rejected Plaintiffs’ challenge.
[brief] --- \(^1\)  The conference was conducted remotely on Zoom.  There is no transcript.  The conference was referenced by the Trial Judge in the plenary hearing.  [2T P48-51] and therefore denied the Respondent’s Motion ordering the matter to proceed to trial.  [1a][2T P47:L9-P59:L3]  The Appellants appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying their motion to dismiss the Respondent’s Complaint and compelling arbitration.
[brief] The Ricci Act states that the Board of Trustees “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the State Police Retirement System of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.
[brief] Inconsistent verdicts therefore present a situation where "error," in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored.  Given this uncertainty, and the fact that the Government is precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a new trial on the conviction as a matter of course.  [Gray at 11-12 (citing Powell at 65 (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted).]  Distilled to their essence, these cases indicate that seemingly inconsistent verdicts should not be a basis for overturning a conviction.  As long as there is evidence sufficient to support the guilty verdicts reached, those convictions should stand.  The court below considered whether there was sufficient evidence in this regard and appropriately found that there was.  (33T20:15-22:22).  Beyond that, it is not the role of the court to guess at the reasons the jury arrived at the verdict they did.  Whether Defendant’s convictions are consistent or not, the fact remains that the came about as a result of sufficient proofs.  Accordingly, this should not be a basis to overturn those verdicts.
[brief] Corporation ("[...]"), [...]’s attorney-in-fact, by [...].\(^2\) [...] acknowledges those inquiries in its brief.  (Ab13 n.8) ("The Department demanded that [...] agree to submit to the Holding Act as a condition of its acquisition, despite knowing that [...] disagreed.").  From time to time, the Department chooses to remind the regulated industry of applicable laws, particularly in light of the evolving State regulatory environment for reciprocal exchanges.  See, e.g., Lim v. Farmers Grp., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-03419-ODW (SKx), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203739 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2023) (Plaintiff subscribers alleged that the Defendant attorney-in-fact could not collect the agreed-upon rates because to do so would bankrupt the Exchange).  Given the direct questions received about the [...]/[...] acquisition, the Department decided – reasonably – to do so then.
[brief] Defendant [...] ([...]), seeks to avoid responsibility to the [...] and [...] (plaintiffs) based primarily on two arguments.  First, despite being the construction supervisor hired on this project, [...] contends that it has no actual responsibility for supervision or safety.  Second, [...] seeks to disregard the clear precedent set forth in Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cty., Inc., 250 N.J. 368 (2022), by ignoring the decision’s core holding.  Neither argument has merit.  Defendant [...] ([...]), [...] subconsultant, also goes to great lengths to disregard Haviland by relying on cases that pre-date the decision and cases that have no precedential value.  Defendants do not get to force plaintiffs to assert a professional negligence claim.  From the outset, plaintiffs set forth and steadfastly maintained that their claim was for ordinary negligence by a non-professional.  [...] and [...] hired a “resident engineer” for this project who was not an engineer.  [...] and [...] chose a technician to be in charge of compliance with all local, state, and federal laws, ordinances, regulations and orders, including but not limited to worksite safety, with no instructions or controls.  Pa1801-02.  Nearly every safety means and method was compromised in favor of job progress.  The cost included the life of [...].  The dismissal of [...] and [...] is contrary to Supreme Court precedent.  The negligent conduct for which plaintiffs claim those defendants are liable was committed by an employee who is not a “licensed person” as that term is used in the Affidavit of Merit (AOM) statute.  Plaintiffs’ claim against [...] and [...] is for vicarious liability for the negligence of that employee.  The statute has been strictly construed not to impose requirements beyond those stated within the AOM statute.  The statute applies to licensed persons – period.  Pursuant to controlling precedent, therefore, plaintiffs did not and do not require an AOM.  Defendant [...] a/k/a [...] ([...]), asserts that the Workers Compensation Act (WCA) absolves it from an intentional disregard for workplace safety and that [...] being runover, dragged and killed by a street sweeper was just a fact of life on a repaving project.
[brief] 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *1.  Similarly, in *Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, et al.*, [...] ([...], Oct. 4, 2023), the plaintiff alleged that the debt was void because defendant, [...] (“[...]”), a debt buyer, was not a licensed consumer lender or sales finance company under the NJCFLA and therefore its collection activities misrepresented the legal status of the debt and [...]’s right to collect the debt.