ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As discussed above, [...] has also chosen to not participate in the Fourth Round process pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27D-302 et seq.  \(^3\)  [...] estimates its shortfall to be 602 units, while Plaintiff estimates the Township’s shortfall to be as high as 983 units.  The trial court did not make a specific finding of fact as to the exact number of [...]’s shortfall, but for purposes of this appeal, the fact that it is short a minimum of 602 units is not disputed. from taking any further action with respect to the condemnation and redevelopment of the Property.
[brief] In fact, Ohio, in its August 21, 2023 reply brief, relied heavily on *Pharmacists* because the decision is quite supportive of Ohio’s position regarding the absence of a duty to appeal a judgment imposing liability on exclusively non-covered claims.  For the proposition that a duty to appeal existed, [...] cited several treatises.  Pb21.  Those citations, however, actually support Ohio’s position.  See 22 E.Holmes, Appleman on Insurance, Section 136.11 (2nd ed. 2002) (“[T]he duty to defend clause does not necessarily obligate the insurer to prosecute every appeal.  For example, there is no duty to defend the insured on appeal when the issues being appealed do not relate to claims covered by the policy. ”); Couch on Insurance, Section 20:49 (3rd ed. 2005) (stating that interlocutory partial summary judgment ruling may not terminate duty to defend).
[directive] The performance objectives represent the intended outcome or goal of the training and are to be used to evaluate and qualify police officer handlers and police dogs upon completion of training.  The performance objectives established for basic training and qualification are intended to represent the minimum skills and training to be completed.  Additional training may be incorporated in the basic K-9 training and is, in fact, encouraged.  All basic K-9 training programs must include a segment on the importance of K-9 policy and procedure.  This training must discuss the significance of written policy and procedure, the purpose of such policy, as well as the general types of information to be included and issues to be addressed in such policy.
[brief] Even [...] testified that the only information he could confirm based on the initial report was the race and sex of the vehicle’s occupants during the following exchange with the prosecutor:  PROSECUTOR: And when you walked up, were you able to confirm any other part of the description in regard to the transmissions that you received from dispatch?  SERGEANT HORAN:  Other than all three occupants being male, Black and the clothing, there was nothing else to confirm.  Although [...] mentioned the clothing, he testified that as he approached the vehicle after executing the stop, “[a]n officer at the scene relayed information that the suspects were wearing dark or black clothing or jackets. ”  Information acquired after a stop cannot retroactively serve as the basis for the stop.
[brief] (Pa111).  In the Checklist, for the question “hours worked per week,” [...] responded “varies. ” (Pa55).  In the Questionnaire, for the questions “What hours did he/she ordinarily work for the public entity? How many hours were required?,” [...] answered “Wednesday 8:30 am until court is over [and] 2 weeks a month court ends at 1:00 PM[,] the other two weeks a month it ends at 5:30 PM. ” (Pa49).  For the questions “What hours was the member required to be available to any personnel of the public entity?  Was he/she required to attend meetings arranged by the public entity?  If so, how often?. ”  [...] answered “no additional hours – court schedule. ” (Pa50).  For Factor #9 – Doing Work on Employer’s Premises and Factor #10 – Order of Sequence Set, see the facts listed under Factor #1.
[brief] In 2010 the Social Security Administration issued findings and a detailed report, concluding that [...] was permanently disabled on account of his exposure to toxic mold.  Da638.  [...], [...]’s medical expert, concluded in her report of October 23, 2017 that [...]’s “post-exposure” mold-related disability was continuing and persistent.  Da497 and Da1554.  Even assuming that [...] can now invoke a “manifestation” defense that it could have, but did not, assert in the underlying case, it cannot now contradict the evidence of [...]’s continuous, but unknown, exposure to toxic mold that was ligated in the underlying case.
[brief] Aa16-Aa21.  The permit denial found:  In accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:7-16 (d)1, new coastal development adjacent to a bay or ocean or bayfront or oceanfront, beach, dune or boardwalk and higher than 15 feet in height measured from the existing grade of the site or boardwalk must provide an open view corridor perpendicular to the water’s edge of at least 30 percent of the frontage along the waterfront where an open view currently exists.  The proposed 109 residential unit high rise development would have a height of 99’ as measured from the average existing ground elevation of 26.40’ and would be subject to this requirement.  The frontage width of the Property’s site is 225.35’ per Applicants’ plan Sheet C200 “EXISTING CONDITIONS AND SITE PREPARATION PLAN”.  A 30% open view corridor perpendicular to the waters’ edge of the frontage along the waterfront where an open view currently exists would be 67.60 feet.
[brief] See State v. Buckner, 437 N.J. Super. 8, 37 (App. Div. 2014).  Absent a showing of bias or prejudice, the participation of a judge in previous proceedings in the case before him is not a ground for disqualification.  And as is the case here, the fact a judgment resulting from previous proceedings is reversed on appeal is likewise not a sufficient ground for disqualification.  See State v. Walker, 33 N.J. 580, 591 (1960).
[brief] The Arbitration Agreement reflects the parties’ express agreement that “the arbitrator … and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any disputes relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Arbitration Agreement, including any claim that all or any part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or voidable. ” (Pa064) (emphasis added).  This language is virtually indistinguishable from the delegation provisions approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rent-A-Center and by this court in McGinty.  See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68 (“The Arbitrator … shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the … enforceability … of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable. ”); McGinty, 2024 WL 4248446, at *3 (“Only an arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute arising out of or relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Arbitration Agreement, including without limitation any claim that all or any part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or voidable. ”).
[brief] ”  (21T 181-21 to 25)  Several sets of [...]’s house keys had also recently been lost or gone missing.  (21T 170-8; 171-14 to 15)  In light of these concerns, by February 2016, [...] had changed her locks at least twice since late 2015.  (21T 170-2 to 7; 171-17 to 19)  Investigators seized two cameras that [...] had installed on her property at [...].  (24T 108-1 to 9)  The footage showed the perpetrator at the crime scene.  (Da 14; Da 15; 25T 103-20 to 104-3)  However, no one was able to identify the perpetrator from the crime scene footage.
[brief] As such, the sentencing court erred by refusing to consider Mitigating Factor No. 7, whether the defendant has “led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense[.]”  *N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7)*.  The sentencing court placed substantial weight on the aggravating factor considering [...]’s “criminal history” of local ordinance violations, yet failed to acknowledge that the pre-sentence report indicated that [...]’s history for the nearly twelve years preceding the instant offense were unremarkable.  *See, PSR, pg. 4*.  Other than two instances involving drinking in public, [...]’s “criminal history” from 2010 through 2021 involved sporadic violations of garbage collection regulations and other innocuous items, such as not properly registering a dwelling unit.  The Defense contends that these are not the types of offenses intended when sentencing judges consider criminal history.  While there may be local ordinance violations which relevant to a defendant’s criminal predisposition, garbage disposal regulation violations clearly fall outside that scope.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM ORDERS DATED DATED NOVEMBER 30, 2018 AND JANUARY 11, 2019  ENTERED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, MERCER COUNTY ([...])  CIVIL ACTION SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.C.S. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF  [...] (ID #020011989)  [...]  Phone: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant  On the brief: Charles C. Berkeley, Esquire (ID No. 020011989)  Dated submitted: September 20, 2024
[brief] Here, of course, Plaintiff does not allege that his name or likeness have been stolen.  In this appeal, however, Plaintiff argues that a two-year statute of limitations should apply because “Defendant [...]’s conduct cast [Plaintiff] in a false light not through defamatory comments but through his release of private information to the public”, (Pb41), specifically, that Councilman [...] allegedly revealed Plaintiff’s “past involvement in the criminal justice system” and called him a “thug. ”  (Pb40-Pb41.)  Plaintiff failed to cite to any statute or caselaw to support such a proposition—that this alleged defamatory statement rises to the level of an intrusion claim warranting a two-year statute of limitation.  In fact, Plaintiff’s citation to this Court’s ruling in Swan, 407 N.J. Super. at 119, actually undercuts Plaintiff’s argument, as this Court specifically cautioned that allowing a one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims and a two-year statute of limitations for false light privacy claims “would condone a transparent evasion of the one-year statute of limitations in New Jersey,” which is exactly what Plaintiff is attempting to accomplish here.
[brief] The Defendant also wants the Court to ignore the advice of its own planner that these are permitted accessory uses in this SM zone.  Ja146.  The Defendant further wants the Court to ignore the fact that, just a few years earlier, the [...], in conjunction with the [...], recognized that this tract was zoned to generate 1.55 million square feet of warehouse and distribution space.  Ja215; 4T 72:9-25 to 75:1-14.  And, given the close proximity of this tract of land to the Interstate 295 interchange “on and off ramps”, the only driveway that could access this singularly owned parcel of land (notwithstanding its bifurcation by a municipal boundary line) is on the Florence side of the property.  (2T 77:12-18; 1T 34:2-24).  The driveway use is indeed accessory to the warehouse use and there is no other “character” which needs to be imagined or invented in order to reach that conclusion.  However, under Nuckel, since there is no building on this part of the tract for the driveway to access, it becomes a principal use.  Thus the requested variance.
[directive] In the event that the officer declines a de-activation request, the officer immediately shall inform the person making the request of that decision.  An officer shall be prohibited from misleading the person making the de-activation request pursuant to Section 6.1 or 6.2 into believing that the BWC has been turned off when in fact it is operating unless the County Prosecutor or designee or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee expressly has authorized covert recording.  Note that pursuant to Section 4.5, an officer may not decline a request from an apparent crime victim to discontinue recording of the encounter via the BWC.  6.5
[brief] (quoting *State v. Schmidt*, 867 S.W. 2d 769, 781 (Tex 1993)  Under *Karan*, just compensation would consider loss of visibility from the overall project.  In *State v. Stulman*, 136 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1975), the court rejected the owner's claim for loss of visibility damages resulting from project construction on the property of others.  Under *Karan*, such loss is to be considered in the measure of just compensation.  In *State Com'r of Transp. v. Dikert*, 319 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 161 N.J. 150 (1999), the court denied the owners' claim for damages for the change in the character of their land from a tranquil rural area to a noisy semi-urban commercial environment.  The court concluded such damages were not related to the taking of the owners' access easement, but instead resulted from the taking of the property of others.  Under *Karan*, such damages in a partial taking are to be considered in the determination of just compensation.
[brief] One of the key issues concern the parameters of the financial agreements that set the terms between the City and the urban renewal entities.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:20-4, “[t]he governing body of a municipality which has adopted a redevelopment plan pursuant to the ‘Local Redevelopment and Housing Law,’ … may enter into a financial agreement with an urban renewal entity ....”  However, the form and content of the “financial agreement shall include, but not be limited to, those provisions set forth in [other sections of the LTTEL].  Ibid.  For example, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-8 delineates the contents of application forms, the process for review by the “mayor or other chief executive officer,” and the final approval by the municipal governing body.
[brief] In The Alternative, Appellant’s Claim Must Be Dismissed For Lack Of Standing Under New Jersey Law  While the Superior Court’s Order of Dismissal was predicated on its finding that Appellant’s FDCPA letter vendor theory of liability failed as a matter of law and statutory construction, Appellant’s appeal was taken from the ruling of dismissal and not the specific reasons for the ruling set forth by the Superior Court at the Motion Hearing.  New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency v. K.M., 444 N.J. Super. at 333–34; Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep, 453 N.J. Super. at 313–14 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2018); State v. Santa-Mella, 2022 WL 2309245, at *7.
[brief] Factors potentially indicating coerced consent include: (1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the defendant was handcuffed.  [Ibid. (citations omitted)]  Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include: (1) that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted to guilt before his consent; and (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers.  [Id. at 53 (citations omitted). ]  The Court emphasized that those factors were not commandments, but "guide posts" to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion.  Ibid.  The Court cautioned that "the existence or absence of one or more of the factors mentioned above may be of great significance in another."  Ibid.  Indeed, voluntariness depends on "the totality of the particular circumstances of the case" with each case "necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts."  Ibid.  At the PCR hearing in the instant matter, counsel asserted that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move to suppress the tire iron found in the Impala driven by [...]; specifically, that Diaz had not given valid consent to search the car.
[brief] These items include, but are not limited to, details and cross-sections all existing and proposed watercourses and drainage swales, existing contours of property, locations of all existing structures and existing and proposed front, rear, and side yard setback distances, dimensions necessary to confirm conformity with the setback requirements, height requirements, and yard area requirements, proposed lighting, required buffer area and proposed screening and landscaping, vehicle access and egress to and from the site, traffic control related features, plans and computations for storm drainage systems, plans of proposed improvements and utility layouts, and an environmental impact assessment (including wildlife, particularly endangered or protected species).
[brief] On frequent occasions, Petitioner advised Decedent that she needed to set boundaries and to just say “no” to Respondent.  (7T191:21 to 192:6; 7T193:15 to 193:22).  Decedent responded that she could not do that, explaining that she didn’t want to make Respondent angry.  (7T191:21 to 192:6).  Decedent advised [...] that she was paying for Respondent’s phone, had assisted her with the purchase of a new Nissan pathfinder in late 2013 (7T199:23 to 200:5), as well as paid its insurance, and provided Respondent with substantial funds to purchase land in Brigantine.  (9T69:17 to 70:4).  Decedent also funded the construction of a large home for Respondent.  7T198:19-21; 7T200:24 to 201:19; P566a to P570).  While the home was being constructed, [...] heard Respondent say she wanted an elevator in the home, which Decedent resisted, but which Respondent got by the time the home was completed.  (9T70:6-11).  On October 3, 2014, the [...] newspaper published that the [...] had arrested [...] and charged him with theft and credit card theft.
[brief] His Hearing presentation and Reply FAILED to refute any substantiated facts and arguments from my Cross-Motion.  (4T, p. 22, lines 13-14)  His Hearing presentation FAILED to refute my May 30th updated proposed Order.  (Exh. “AD”) (493a-497a)  (4T, p. 22, lines 9-12)  I.  COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL CRITERIA TO RECONSIDER ORDERS  Issues that I am appealing from my Motion for Reconsideration of Oct. 2022 Order, w/Nov. 25, 2022 Reply to Oppositions; reconsidering [...]’s Requests for Legal, Commission, & Accounting Fees due to my Nov. 4, 9, & 28, 2022 Certifications; & May 25 & 30, ‘23 Cross-Motion to reconsider Mar. 7, ‘23 & Oct. ‘22 Orders; and my appeal of Sept. 6, ‘23 Order due to invalid Aug. 4, 2023 rulings should be granted since I verified how relevant provisions of those Orders are based on rulings in conflict with, or never addressing, my probative competent evidence that met legal criteria to grant my Motions and this Appeal.
[brief] In its role as national program administrator for [...]’s Sports and Entertainment Insurance Program, [...] solicited, underwrote, quoted, bound, issued, cancelled, reinstated, non-renewed, and endorsed policies pursuant to underwriting guidelines established by [...].  (Ia076 at ¶ 14; Ia130 at 8:20-25; Ia131 at 17:7-12; Pa001; Pa006).  ³  In his Brief, Intervenor appears to draw a comparison between the application filled out by [...] in 2019, and a 2022 application (downloaded by the Intervenor from the internet) for an entirely different program underwritten by [...] that bears no relation to [...].  It pertains to an entirely different insurance product and type of coverage, not offered by [...].  This document was not produced or authenticated in discovery.  The record reflects that [...], in its briefing below and supported by affidavit, explained that the 2022 application had no relationship to any program underwritten on behalf of [...].  (Pa004).  In fact, the form itself indicates [...] as the insurance carrier.  (Ia471).  No contrary record evidence was supplied.  Now, in what can only be described as an effort to mislead this Court, the Intervenor again brings up this 2022 application, without providing the Court with [...]’s previous affidavit, or other material evidence. (Pa001).  know, and had no way of knowing, that [...] had rented 12-15 passenger vans.
[brief] (Aa27).  [...]’s colleague (Witness 1) observed [...]’s behavior and sent [...] a text message asking if [...] was okay.  Ibid.  Later that day, [...] went to the [...] office to submit her friend’s petition and file a complaint against [...] with the [...] and the [...].  Ibid.  While at the [...] office, [...] informed Witnesses 4 and 5 that she was going to file a complaint against [...]  Ibid.  In response to overhearing this, [...] called [...] D[] multiple times and encouraged her to file a complaint.  (Aa27-28).  In response to the complaint, [...] acknowledged that he knew [...] but denied her allegations.  (Aa28).  Per [...], he had been informed by other union members that [...] had been falsely obtaining signatures by misrepresenting on whose behalf the petition was for.  Ibid.  When he attempted to confront [...] about this outside of the [...] building, [...] stated that he began their interaction by first congratulating [...] on her gender transition.  Ibid.  [...], however, denied not only knowing her preferred name but that he referred to her as D[]. (Aa28-29).
[brief] Ca139.  On July 28, 2023, the Bank filed a Brief in support of the Receiver’s Motion wherein it alleged that the Bank paid for the Receiver, invested money into the operation of the diner which continued to operate at a loss wherein no funds were generated from the operation of the restaurant for payment to the Bank.  In support of these claims, the Bank produced what it described as accountings, but titled profit and loss statements.  Ca152, 165.  On October 6, 2023, the Court entertained oral argument on the Motion to be Relieved as Receiver, as well as the [...]’ Motion/Cross-Motion to Intervene and Deny Receiver Relief.  At oral argument, the Court denied the [...]’ Motion(s) and granted the Receiver the discharge he sought, over opposition of the [...] and [...].
[brief] The thrust of the Open Public *Records* Act (OPRA) concerns public access to government records.  Indeed, the express legislative purpose is to ensure that the public has ready access to “government *records.*”  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (emphasis added).  To that end, it is the State’s public policy that “all governments records” be accessible to the public unless they are exempt.  Ibid.  Under OPRA, “records” are distinct from “information.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Entry of Plea ........................................................................................................Da 12-17; 1T 17-2 to 14  Judgment of Conviction .........................................................................................Da 6-11 Sentence ...............................................................................................................  2T 37-15 to 44-4  INDEX OF APPENDIX  Order Transferring to Plenary Calendar .................................................................Da  1  Notice of Appeal ......................................................................................................Da 2-5  Judgment of Conviction .........................................................................................Da 6-11  Plea Form .............................................................................................................Da 12-17  Indictment ..............................................................................................................Da  18-20  State’s Sentencing Memorandum ..........................................................................Da 21-39  Character Letters ...................................................................................................Da 40-43  Appellate Division