ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I .............................................................................................................  8  I.  The Trial Court Erred In Denying [...]’s Motion For Reconsideration Because It Incorrectly Found The Indemnity Provision Of The Subcontract To Be Ambiguous (Da045-048; 2T) .........................  8  A.  Standard Of Review .................................................................................. 8  B.  The Trial Court Erroneously Determined That The Subcontract Was Ambiguous .................................................................................................  9  C.  The Indemnity Provision Of The Subcontract Has Been Found To Be Unambiguous By This Court’s Prior Decisions ..............................................  17 POINT II .............................................................................................................
[brief] Unfortunately, [...] had a not-so-hidden agenda.  Based on his irrational rejections, and ignoring explanations, to resolve matters, it was in [...]’s financial interests to continue litigation w/endless billings instead of a quick Settlement, which would be honored by me & [...].  That agenda led to [...]’s excessive billings of $124,399, which I opposed (since Jan. 2022), from Nov. 11, ‘21 thru Oct. 25, ‘22, & $33,716, which I opposed, from Oct. 26, ‘22 to Mar. 7, ‘23, for a total of $158,105, plus at least another $25K, which I opposed, for any Trust reserve for future legal work.  As further proof of [...]’s agenda, [...]’s possible legal work billings would have only been around $5K that I intelligently estimated & cited in my Nov. 28, 2022 Certification, p. 9, par. 16, to p. 10, if they had worked for a quick 3-Way Settlement.  (Exh. “Z”)  (394a-395a)  32.  Judge stated “it's understandable how [...] would want formal accounting, because I think [...] described otherwise it's a fool's errand, because nature of this whole case is just never ending” (3T, 10:18-21)  It was in NO WAY understandable how it would be a fool’s errand, except for [...] trying to deceive the Court, when overwhelming evidence (see par. 30) validated the idea that 3-Way Settlement was readily achievable since Nov. ‘21, & was 100% achievable after Apr. 25, ‘22, detailed 3-Way Settlement was reached by [...], [...], & me.  Unfortunately, [...] & [...] led their fools’ errands to deny reality for 100% certainty for a 3-Way Settlement, & to deny that Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 2&3, required [...], as a discharged Trustee, to complete final Trust administration & Final Accounting.
[brief] B.  Procedural History  On March 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed his complaint against, *inter alia*, Defendant [...].  (Pa1-7)  An Amended Complaint was filed on August 18, 2021.  (Pa15-20)  [...] answered on August 24, 2021.  (Pa21-28)  On February 28, 2022, [...] filed his motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to make discovery, specifically answers to interrogatories, which was granted without prejudice by the Court on April 1, 2022.  (Pa54-56; 77a)  A motion to dismiss complaint with prejudice was filed on July 19, 2022.  (See, Motion, filed July 19, 2022)  On August 24, 2022, having received the discovery responses, [...] withdrew the motion.  (See, Withdrawal of Motion, filed on August 24, 2022)  On December 14, 2022, after the discovery period ended, [...] filed his motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to provide an expert report.  (Pa101-104)  In response, Plaintiff filed a cross motion to extend discovery on January 11, 2023.  (Pa113-116)  On January 20, 2023, [...] entered his orders dismissing the complaint and denying the cross-motion to reopen and extend discovery.  (Pa121-122)  On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied on March 17, 2023 by [...].  (Pa131-134; 144-157)  On April 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate, which was essentially a second reconsideration motion.  (Pa158-161)  That motion was denied on May 12, 2023.  (Pa162-167)  This appeal followed.
[brief] As the Comprehensive Report revealed, [...]’s inefficient and ineffective policies have had a direct impact on the quality of education district students receive.  The District’s curriculum is developed in-house and suffers from a “lack of evidence, research-based, current resources to support the curriculum. ” (Ra135).  The locally-developed curricular resources are also “not research backed or supported,” and do not fully align with State standards.  And the curriculum is constantly changing, requiring teachers to re-learn new curriculum on a yearly basis.  *Ibid.*  Also, in most districts in the State, students entering kindergarten must turn five-years old by October 1 of that given school year.
[brief] #### Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Bent v. Twp. of Stafford Police Dep’t., | 3 | | 381 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Burnett v. Cnty. Of Gloucester, | 3 | | 415 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 2010) | | | MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Div of Alcoholic Beverage Control, | 13 | | 375 N.J. super. 534 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Mason v. Hoboken, | 3, 4, 12, 13 | | 196 N.J. 51 (2008) | | | N.J. Builders Ass'n. v. N.J. Council on Affordable Housing, | 14 | | 390 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div.) | | | North Jersey Media Group v. Lyndhurst, | 6, 7, 8, 10 | | 441 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, | | | 229 N.J. 541 (2017) | | | Simmons v. Mercado, | 3 | | 247 N.J. 24 (2021) | | | Spectraserve, Inc. v. Middlesex County Utilities Auth., | 3, 14 | | 416 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2010) | | ####
[brief] 15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Final Agency Decision, issued August 22, 2023.  ......................... Ca014  Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge, issued May 30, 2023.  ......  Ca020  Commissioner of Education’s Order Declining Interlocutory Jurisdiction, issued September 6, 2022  ..............................................  Ca083 Agency Decision on Motion to Dismiss, issued August 23, 2022 ...........  Ca206  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### CASES - **Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, Passaic Cty.**, 131 N.J. 626 (1993).  .................................................. 15 - **Dunbar Bey v. Brown**, SEC Docket No. C25-11 (2011).  ......................... 4, 11 - **I/M/O Leonard**, SEC Docket Nos. C56-19 and C57-19 (Consolidated) (2021)  ...........................................................................  5, 8, 9, 11 - **I/M/O Treston, Randolph Board of Education**, SEC Docket No. C71-18 (2022)  .................................................................  5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14 - **In re DiLeo**, 216 N.J. 449 (2014).  ....................................................... 14 - **In re Perskie**, 207 N.J. 275 (2011)...................................................... 14 - **Kennedy v. Bremerton School District**, 597 U.S. 507 (2022).  ................. 11 - **Melnyk v. Fiel**, SEC Docket No. C64-18 (2019).  .................................  5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13 - **Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.**, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)................................................................. 11 - **Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar**, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).  ......................  14  #### STATUTES AND RULES - **N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22**............................................................................. 13 - **N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)**....................................................................
[brief] It was impossible for Plaintiff to file her June 22, 2023 Motion to Reinstate [...], challenging Defendant [...]’s filing of the Certificate of Withdrawal, within twenty days of the May 8, 2023 Order because [...]’s challenged conduct did not occur until June 13, 2023.  [...]’s conduct in filing the Certificate of Withdrawal occurred while Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration was pending and created another open issue before the Court, which Plaintiff properly raised in her June 22, 2023 Motion to Reinstate [...].
[brief] ”  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. 100, 106 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 (2005) (citation omitted).  A motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e) “must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the Complaint. ”  Id. (quoting Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482 (App. Div. 2005)).  In considering such a motion, the court accepts as true the facts alleged in the Complaint.  Darakjian v. Hanna, 366 N.J. Super. 238, 242 (App. Div. 2004).  In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider “allegations in the Complaint, exhibits attached to the Complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.  *Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161, 183, (2005).  In that vein, a court may consider documents referenced in the Complaint “without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.
[brief] ”  (1T87:24-  However, [...] asked for indemnification before the [...] held him “in contempt of” the [...].  [...] became a party to the [...] Complaint at that moment when the [...] began ordering [...] to take certain actions.  It was when the [...] began ordering [...] to take certain actions that the obligation to indemnify [...] began.  That the [...] subsequently held [...] “in contempt” is irrelevant because that order was made without any notice to [...] or opportunity to be heard.
[brief] Only nine days before oral argument, plaintiffs’ attorney himself had twice expressed frustration in scheduling the depositions of all of the defense experts.  See footnote 3, supra.  Plaintiffs argue that when [...] made his decision on August 27, 2021, “the discovery end date was nearly three months away, and even expert depositions had almost two months left for completion [i.e. October 21, 2021].”  Pb 18.  This argument is without merit, for it presumes that the schedule of defense expert depositions would have proceeded without disruption had [...] been allowed to substitute for [...].  In fact, and as defendant advised [...] on November 12, 2021, the deposition schedule would have been altered once more so that [...]’s deposition could be scheduled to precede the depositions of the defense experts.  (Pa19:8-13)  Plaintiffs also contend, without citing authority, that the Rules of Court “still provided plaintiffs with a right to amend answers to interrogatories to identify a new expert. ”  Pb18-19.  Presumably, plaintiffs are referring to R. 4:17-7.  However, that Rule specifically makes an exception where there is a court order compelling expert reports.  See R. 4:17-4(e).  Accepting plaintiffs’ argument would be to allow R. 4:17-7 to swallow any and all scheduling orders, and thus render R. 4:24-1 a virtual nullity.  Even if R. 4:17-7 were deemed to apply, plaintiffs’ argument fails.  When they served [...]’s July 29, 2021, expert report (Pa236), it was beyond the discovery end date of July 20, 2021, set by the latest case management order of February 16, 2021 (Pa230).  Consequently, plaintiffs would have been required under R. 4:17-7 to certify that the “information requiring the amendment [i.e. the report of [...]] was not reasonably available or discoverable by the exercise of due diligence prior to the discovery end date. ”  Plaintiffs knew, or should have known, on or before November 21, 2018, when they presumably read [...]’s curriculum vitae before filing it (Pa150), that there would be questions about [...]’s practice background, questions which would have been answered had they simply spoken to him.  [...] had a proper and sufficient basis to deny plaintiffs’ cross-motion.
[brief] Moreover, the court’s own finding shows that the potential harm was not imminent, acknowledging that “[n]othing has been approved yet and no determination has been made that the property is appropriate for the development of affordable housing. ” (1T53:5-7).  The EDA mandates a multi-step process before a condemnation and redevelopment project could proceed, and [...] has taken no further steps towards condemnation or redevelopment as would be required by the EDA.
[brief] Turning to [...]’s cross-appeal, [...] is not entitled to the fees, costs and interest awarded by the trial court in the Final Judgment Order.  (Pa0041.)  The trial court’s holdings on these issues were in error and must be vacated.  I.  **[...] IS NOT A “SUCCESSFUL CLAIMANT” UNDER THE TEXT OF RULE 4:42-9(A)(6) (Pa0043; Pa0050-52; Pa0220). **  Only a “successful claimant” is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(6).  “Successful claimant” means a party that “obtains a favorable adjudication on the merits on a coverage question as a result of the expenditure of counsel fees. ”  *Occhifinto v. Olivo Constr. Co., LLC*, 221 N.J. 443, 450 (2015).  Moreover, a successful claimant must achieve the “benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. ”  *Id.*  [...] is not a “successful claimant” in that [...] did not prevail at virtually every important stage of the litigation.  *E.g.*, *Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v.* --- 12 [...] had originally noticed a Cross-Appeal that appealed the trial court’s April 7, 2010 choice of law Order (Pa0087), and the trial court’s January 31, 2011 judgment at the conclusion of the Liability Trial.
[brief] For these reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Court affirm the trial court’s decision that the Board had no authority to consider [...]’ application for development because [...] required a conditional use variance pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3)*.  The Court should uphold the determination that [...] has standing, and to the extent necessary, that [...] was properly granted leave to intervene.  It should not consider the Board’s arguments for reversal because the Board did not file a cross-appeal.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] “Reconsideration should only be utilized for cases which fall into certain categories, and is governed by court rule, and shall state with specificity on the basis which it’s made, including statement of matters and controlling decisions,” and of course should only be granted in the most limited circumstances, and not just to have reargument or disagreement with a Court’s decision.  So reconsideration in this particular matter the Court agrees should be denied, because [Appellant] seeks reconsideration of issues which the Court considered and in its judgment rejected.  ***
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  A.  Appeals of Municipal Court Decisions to the Law Division  Generally, a municipal court decision is appealed to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.  See R. 3:23-1; R. 7:13-1.  “In the Law Division, the trial judge ‘may reverse and remand for a new trial or may conduct a trial de novo on the record below. ’”  State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147-48 (2017) (quoting R. 3:23-8(a)(2)).  “At a trial de novo, the court makes its own findings of fact and conclusions of law but defers to the municipal court’s credibility findings. ”  *Id.* at 147.  “It is well-settled that the trial judge ‘giv[es] due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the’ municipal court judge to assess ‘the credibility of the witnesses. ’”  *Id.* at 148 (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 *N.J.* 146, 157 (1964)).  **B.
[brief] Indeed, multiple Federal appellate courts describe the fact that arbitration precludes a jury trial as being “obvious. ”  See, e.g., Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servs. Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 207 (4th Cir. 2001); Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 367 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2004).  Prior to Kindred Nursing, the Supreme Court in Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 ruled in plain language that “[a]ny general state-law contract defense, based in unconscionability or otherwise, that has a disproportionate effect on arbitration is displaced by the FAA.
[brief] ”  (1T63-17 to 20 (emphasis added))  \(^{12}\)  In the only audible portion of [...]’s prolonged statement, he implores the officers that “I just want you to be respectful. ”  (Da 24)  Continuing the emphasize the consequences of withholding consent, [...] gestured to the other officers on the scene, and explained to [...] that, if he consented, “we can keep these guys out, a couple guys got to come in with me just because we’re going in to [sic] a place that we don’t know.  We’ll, we’ll, we’ll be respectful.  I promise.
[brief] SECTION 25.  Chapter 230, Schedule D “Schedule of Area and Bulk Requirements” shall be amended as follows (see attached):  - Codify amendments already adopted in 2019 as part of the Housing Element & Fair Share Plan ordinances (AHR-1, AHR-2, R-27F, TH/MFD, Rt. 202 and Stiles Lane Overlays).  - Include new Senior Housing -1 & 2 Overlay District categories and area and bulk standards required therein.  SECTION 26.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ claims against the [...] pertain to inverse condemnation to which Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to just compensation.  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ ever-changing position, the claims Plaintiffs had argued through the Trial Court pertained to an environmental remediation conducted by the [...] and responsive to a directive from the [...] (“[...]”) based upon contaminated soil adjacent to Plaintiffs’ property which was in turn generating poisonous vapors and gases in and around Plaintiffs’ property, which operates as a [...] restaurant serving the public.
[brief] The Complaint Asserts an FDCPA Claim Based on Defendant’s Communication with a Third Party .........................  4  A.  Defendant’s FDCPA Violation is an Abusive Practice ..........................................................  4  B.  The Senate Committee Report Does Not Change the Meaning of the Unambiguous Statutory Language .............................................................................................................  5  C.  Defendant’s Conduct is a Communication to a Person in Connection with the Collection of a Debt.  ......  9  D.  The Restricted Use of FCC Regulated Industries Does Not Imply Unrestricted Sharing of Information with Mail Vendors ..................................................................................  10  E.  Federal Agency Interpretations Are Not in Conflict with the Federal Court Decisions.  ......................... 12  F. Persuasiveness of the Federal Court Decisions.  ...............  15  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 15
[brief] Aa0228.  Therefore, [...] concluded that installation of a pipeline along an existing pipeline which ties in at both ends for the express purpose of increasing the transmission capacity of the existing line qualifies as an “upgrade” to a “system”.  Id.  Similarly, [...] was an extension of [...]’s existing pipeline system and involved the construction of approximately 7.6 miles of new 30-inch diameter pipeline in New Jersey, located entirely within the Highlands Preservation Area.  In addition to the pipeline construction, there were aboveground improvements installed, including mainline valves and a pig receiver, and modifications to an existing meter station.  Aa0078.  In July 2011, [...] submitted an application for a HAD under Exemption #11.  Similar to the 300 Line Project, by resolution dated February 16, 2012, the [...] determined that [...] constituted “routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility” and that the project was “consistent with the goals and purposes” of the Highlands Act.
[brief] *See 86 Fed. Reg. at 5781.*  In explaining this standard, the CFPB reasoned that imposing a "knows-or-should-know standard" would be inconsistent with Section 1692e, "which does not include an exception or exclusion for debt collectors whose deceptive statements are unintentional."  [...], [...], [...] and [...] were warned repeatedly that my Note was time barred on 2/14/15.  *Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016). *  The US Supreme Court, like the US Congress, was fully aware of abusive practices by debt collectors against US consumers.  It is up to the consumers and attorneys and judges to get the laws enforced.
[brief] Despite Plaintiff-Appellant’s argument to the contrary, the Trial Court expressly relied upon the standard in Burlington in analyzing whether the acts complained of by Plaintiff were sufficient to establish a retaliation claim under the NJLAD.  The Court noted “[a]s set forth in Burlington, an adverse employment action must be ‘materially adverse to a reasonable employee…’. ” (Pa8)(emphasis added).  Plaintiff-Appellant’s argument that the Court failed to consider this “broad standard” is therefore entirely without merit.
[brief] 37.  Judge made unprepared/unjustified rulings for Trust payments for [...]’s commission and accounting fees, since he forgot to make any rulings until prompted by [...] (3T, p. 14, lines 2-4).  38.  Judge made unprepared decisions by then repeating [...]’s requested amounts for accounting/commission fees w/o offering justifications or citing/refuting my filed objections.  (3T, p. 14, lines 5, to p. 15, line 8)
[brief] The case law relied upon appellant supports the Trial Court’s decision actually goes against appellant’s argument.  Appellant argues that he is not required to prove proximate cause by direct, indisputable proof.  Berquist v. Penterman, 46 N.J. Super. 74, 88 (App. Div. 1957), certif. denied 22 N.J. 55 (1957).  Instead, to establish a prima facie case based upon circumstantial evidence, the conclusion to be reached from the evidence must be as probable or more probable than the alternative possible conclusions.  Yormack v. Farmers’ Cooperative Ass’n, 11, N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 1951).  This is accurate.  However, as the Trial Court correctly concluded, appellant was unable to provide any evidence as to the cause of his fall.  Merely waking up on a piece of plywood is vastly deficient proof to submit to a jury.  In fact, Berquist, a case relied upon by appellant, supports the Trial Court’s opinion.
[brief] Or maybe another way of approaching the whole discovery issue - - and when you say have a complete record, [...], maybe the complete record would be this: [...] files her motion for summary judgment and if there is some motion or application for discovery, then a complete record would be the litigant seeking that [discovery] lays out what exactly is required, what they need, how that might impact on the summary judgment with respect to the issues that the summary judgment seeks to address, and then the Court would have a complete – or be able to make a decision on a complete record with sort of the ability to look at and see how specific discovery requests relate to a specific summary judgment motion[.] (1T17-24:18-13.)  The trial judge further explained:  [T]hen the Court could look at the specific issues that are being raised in the summary judgment motion and have a way of saying whether or not the Court finds that there is issues of fact that might have to be addressed in discovery or otherwise?
[brief] Defendant finally takes issue with [...] saying that defendant’s messages were confrontational, and that [...]’ messages were keeping the peace and defusing the situation, and claims that this characterization is so improper that it put “[...]’s thumb on the evidentiary scale on an issue that should have been entirely the jury’s to figure out without the help of improper opinion from a high-ranking detective. ” (Db51).  This is clear hyperbole.
[brief] According to District data, 77.2% of students report Spanish as their home language, “making the need for translation services in the District high. ” (Ra195).  Despite this, only 15% of the documents on the District’s website are in Spanish, and most documents are PDFs written in English that do not function with Google Translate.  (Ra132; Ra195).  In terms of staff, only 5% of District staff speak Spanish.  (Ra195).  For these reasons, “[t]ranslation services were referenced frequently as a challenging area for the District. ” (Ra132; Ra194).