ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ......................- 5 -, - 8 - Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, 110 N.J. 464, 478 (1988)  .....................- 37 - Mueller v. Tech. Devices Corp., 8 N.J. 201, 207-08 (1951)  ....................-  4 -, - 5 - Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52 (App.Div.2000)  ...........................................-  37 - N. Bergen Rex Transp. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569-70 (1999)
[brief] According to the Applicant's expert, the problems associated with increased density are traffic and parking.  The Applicant proposes to remove the existing parking lot serving the public and replace it with seventeen residential units.  Where are the cars that used the parking lot now going to park, and what impact will this have on the traffic/parking problem acknowledged by the expert?  The expert had no answer, the Board did not even address the issue in its resolution, and thus the trial court lacked a sufficient basis to affirm the decision below.  The defendants fare no better in attempting to justify the height variance.
[brief] Although these facts were borne out during the Hearing, the SHO completely disregarded both the inaction of Respondents, as well as the ramifications of same, in the SHO Resolution.  See generally 6T278 to 6T282.  Finally, the SHO Resolution justifies elimination of the Route 33 Signal, at least in part, on perceived delays and expenses experienced by the Respondents due to the actions of the Board and the Township.  M500-502.  However, it is clear that much of the delay and accordant expense was not due to the actions of the Board or the Township.  Clearly, the discovery of the bald eagle’s nest on the Property is not attributable to the Board or the Township.  In fact, the failure to discover the bald eagle’s nest prior to the initial approval is arguably attributable to the Respondents.  Further, the COVID-19 pandemic clearly created a delay in the prosecution of the Site Plan Application which is not attributable to the Board or the Township.  Finally, the Respondents could have avoided the impact of the perceived change in the [...]’s position on the Route 33 Signal by simply filing the application to the [...] within 1 year of the pre-application meeting with the [...] in 2015.  Despite these numerous factors resulting in delay which are not attributable to the Board or the Township, the SHO Resolution concludes that the Respondents are relieved of the obligation of pursuing the Route 33 Signal due to the delays experienced during the development of the Property and places the blame for delays on the Board and Township.
[brief] First, as to the recorded statement of [...], which he claimed at trial to have been entirely untruthful, the Gross factors failed to support a finding of reliability.  The State did not produce phone records or other independent evidence to corroborate the factual statements contained in that statement and, in fact, other trial testimony refuted some of the claims contained in the inconsistent statement.  It should be noted that [...], who had subsequently been convicted of murder, was apprehended by the police after a chase during which [...] allegedly discarded his cellphone.  The cellphone was not found.  Something as simple as obtaining surveillance video evidence to corroborate a statement made by [...] as to his whereabouts on the night in question could have provided some *indicia* of reliability; however, the State failed to provide this proof.  Importantly, [...] offered his statement while he was under arrest and in custody, which provided him with a motivation to fabricate since he believed that he could potentially help himself by providing incriminating information about Defendant.  According to [...]’s sworn testimony during the 104 hearing at trial on May 12, 2022, members of law enforcement used to “harass” him and hold charges “over [his] head”, which ultimately induced him to provide the untrue statement.  It was reversible error, therefore, for the trial court to permit the jury to consider the unreliable and inconsistent hearsay statement of [...].
[brief] Said another way, just because a custodian may be able to locate records does not mean the request is not overbroad at the same time.  For example, a requestor could request every document contained in a public employee’s filing cabinet.  While the custodian could easily locate the filing cabinet, the request would still be an impermissible open-ended request for all records on file—which themselves may contain any number of different types of records, including copies of correspondence, contracts, personnel files, health records, or draft reports.
[brief] The well-respected Cox and Koenig treatise on New Jersey Land Use makes it clear what needs to be done to make appropriate findings of facts on any land use decision:  The board's findings must be made on the basis of facts which are in the record and may never be made on nondisclosed evidence that the parties have had no opportunity to rebut.  See High Horizons Dev. v. Dept of Transp., 120 N.J. 40, 53-54 (1990).  Mere recitals of testimony are not "findings."  In the resolution it should be stated very clearly what the board's actual findings are ....Mere recitals of testimony do not satisfy a board's statutory responsibility to make findings of fact.  Loscalzo v. Pini, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 1988), certif. den. 188 N.J. 216 (1989).  The resolution requires a decision by the board as to which facts are found to be the true facts based upon the testimony heard.  See also New York SMSA v. Weehawken Bd. Of Adj. 370 N.J. Super. 319, 332-334 (App. Div. 2004).  And see Saadala v. E. Brunswick Zoning Bd., 412 N.J. Super. 541, 551-552 - 40 - (App. Div. 2010), reversing grant of use variance where the Board's resolution approving the application made only conclusory statements lacking evidential support .... Cohen v. Borough of Rumson, 396 N.J. Super. 608, 617-618, 621 (App. Div. 2007), remanding for reconsideration where there was no evidence supporting the board's conclusion .... Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning Use and Law Administration,§ 19-7.2 (2022 ed.).
[directive] (Example: On January 1, the prosecutor issues an initial post-indictment offer.  The next scheduled court event is a status conference on January 25.  The initial post-indictment offer would expire and be replaced by a final post-indictment offer at the conclusion of the January 25 conference unless the defendant indicated a willingness to accept the outstanding offer.)  Note that the 20-day period is designed to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to consider the plea offer.  If defense counsel indicates in writing or in open court that the defendant has decided to reject the initial post-indictment offer, that offer may be withdrawn and replaced with a final offer even if the 20-day period has not yet expired.  In other words, the defendant, through counsel, may essentially waive the right to have at least twenty days to consider the initial post-indictment offer.
[brief] [...] did so through its Certificate of Incorporation empowering it to “promote and protect the general welfare and property rights of the property owner members in their use and enjoyment of their property at Ocean Beach” and its by-laws, rules, and regulations.  For the trial court to entirely overlook the role of [...] and simultaneously conclude that [...] has no authority to regulate construction in the community—whether pursuant to the Genesis Deed or “any other rules or regulations” [...] chose to enact—requires a complete disregard of what the [...] intended to create by conveying hundreds, if not thousands, of deeds with the same restrictions to purchasers within the community.
[directive] probation.  Whenever a defendant is alleged to have violated probation for a Violations of sentence for a qualifying Chapter 35 offense, and the parties have not previously entered into a Section 12 agreement pursuant to Sections I.A or I.B of this Directive, then the prosecuting attorney shall offer the defendant such an agreement in connection with the violation of probation, offering terms consistent with those required by Sections I.A or I.B. of this Directive.
[brief] Likewise, the claim for conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment also fails to state a claim.  A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, a principal element of which is to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, together with an act that results in damage.  *Weil v. Express Container Corp.*, 360 N.J. Super. 599, 614 (App. Div. 2003).  A plaintiff asserting that claim must show that there was one plan, and that its essential scope and nature was known to each person who was charged with responsibility for the consequences.  Id.  Here, because the [...] did not participate in discovery in the 2015, and therefore had no duty to provide any information, they could not, as a matter of law, have committed an unlawful act.  Moreover, there was no allegation in the Amended Complaint that the [...] accomplished their defense of [...] and [...] through unlawful means.  As such, Plaintiffs presented no basis for the conspiracy claim.
[brief] THE DEDICATION OF THE ROADS WAS AUTOMATICALLY ACCEPTED BY THE BOROUGH PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j (Da18-Da19)  As a matter of law, the Roads are public streets that were automatically deemed to be accepted by the Borough pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs were and are entitled to summary judgment on Count One of the Complaint.
[brief] See, also, e.g., Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J. Super. 575, 582 (1986) (applying the litigation privilege in dismissing a cause of action arising from attorney’s interview of a witness in anticipation of trial); Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass’n, 68 N.J. Super. 85, 91-92 (App. Div. 1961) (explaining that same public policy concerns supporting application of litigation privilege in defamation action arise in action for tortious interference)  In *Loigman*, the Court addressed whether the litigation privilege applied to a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the improper sequestration of a spectator from a public hearing.  The Supreme Court held the litigation privilege granted immunity to the defendants for the claim.  In concluding that the litigation privilege applies more broadly than to merely defamation claims, the *Loigman* Court noted that “as new tort theories have emerged, courts have not hesitated to expand the privilege to cover theories, actions and circumstances never contemplated by those who formulated the rule…”  *Loigman*, 185 N.J. at 583 (citing, [...], *Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers*, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 915, 928 (2004))  The *Loigman* Court further recognized the breadth of that expansion: > In many jurisdictions, [t]he spectrum of legal theories to which the privilege has been applied includes negligence, breach of confidentiality, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy, interference with contractual or advantageous business relations [and] fraud.  [Id., 185 N.J., at 927-928.]  The litigation privilege bars the claims against the [...] defendants because each claim is based on or arises out of their legal work in the 2015 litigation, either in obtaining the dismissal of their clients, [...] and [...], or opposing the attempts by Plaintiffs to bring them back into the case or to obtain [...]’ bank records.  (Da158-174; Pa527-528)  Therefore, any action taken by the [...] defendants on behalf of [...] and [...] were all made (1) during the 2015 action, (2) by [...] and [...]’s attorneys; (3) in furtherance of protecting their interests, and (4) logically related to the 2015 action.  Thus, each element of the Hawkins test is met and the litigation privilege applies.  Hawkins, supra, 141 N.J. at 216 (1995)
[brief] 4T14:24-25.  The trial court ultimately concluded that Plaintiff had actual and inquiry notice that there was a potential title problem with the Strip at the time that he purchased the Property.  The trial court imputed a post-hoc obligation to the Plaintiff to pursue additional information regarding the Strip prior to purchasing his property:  “…The Court finds that an application of the facts to the law establishes that plaintiff should have made a reasonable and diligent inquiry as to existing claims or rights of the defendant to the strip.
[brief] ”  [Pa40].  In September 2023, one month before the date by which [...] was required to vacate the Leased Premises, [...] discovered that [...] had breached the Settlement Agreement by, among other things, dumping and dispersing thousands of cubic yards of unknown and unauthorized materials across the parking lot exterior of the Leased Premises.  [Pa213 at ¶ 6].  Consequently, by letter dated September 29, 2023, [...] advised the trial court of [...]’s breach and submitted for entry: (i) the Consent Judgment for Possession; (ii) the Consent Money Judgment; (iii) a Certification of Amount Due; and (iv) an Affidavit of Services, as it was authorized to do under the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] This is also consistent with the express terms of the six-year Statute of Limitations.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(c).  In the present case, the Trial Court correctly noted the Association was “standing on its rights for 35 years” (See T1 page 18, lines 5-8), and concluded correctly there was no Breach of Fiduciary Duty as to the Defendants, as the Master Deed specifically contemplated the Association’s one day purchase of the Unit for building staff, which is exactly what was contracted for on February 1, 2016.  As stated above, the Association was receiving monthly common area charges from the Defendants for the past thirty (35) years and the Defendants were paying the taxes on the unit for the past 35 years.  In addition, the Association has title to the Unit which paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed specifically contemplated and provided for via purchase.  Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails on all accounts.
[brief] THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND THE JUDGE HAD DISCRETION TO DEEM TAX BOOK VALUE UNFAIR AS A BUYOUT METHODOLOGY IN THIS CASE  “The trier of fact has considerable freedom . . . to select the method or methods of valuation appropriate in the particular case."  (Footnote omitted).  We also subscribe to the general principle that a trial court's determination of value will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  [Balsamides v. Perle, 313 N.J. Super. 7, 19 (1998)].  In fact, Balsamides suggests that book value is not a favored methodology:  “Valuation of stock in a close corporation cannot realistically be limited to its book value, but must deal with the realities of good will, actual profit, and, if necessary, the discounting of the value of a minority interest. ”  [Id. at 20]  Here, after hearing the evidence and comparing the history of minor and voluntary transactions to this forced buyout of the single largest member of [...], holding 29.5%, [...] did not believe that using [...]’s tax book value was “fair and equitable under all of the circumstances”.  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-47(c).
[brief] In the case of [...]’s acquisition of [...]/[...], however, [...], who was advised by counsel,\(^3\) and by extension [...] and [...], specifically --- \(^2\) Applicants were [...] [...] SPV LLC, [...] Structured Solutions Fund LP, [...] Structured Solutions Master Fund (Cayman) LP, [...] Investment Group GP LLC, [...] Investment Group GP III LLC, [...] Investment Group LP, [...] and [...].  \(^3\)  Counsel representing MMG relating to the acquisition included [...] and [...]  Other counsel representing the parties during the acquisition included [...], [...], and [...]. acknowledged that the Holding Company Act applied to the acquisition of [...]/[...].  Despite [...]'s personal disagreement, he proceeded with the sale and acquisition of [...]/[...] by signing the Form A Acquisition Statement.  The acquisition therefore proceeded in accord with the near-decade-long precedent that the Department had established in applying the Holding Company Act to the acquisition of the attorney-in-fact of a reciprocal exchange in addition to, and notwithstanding, the Reciprocal Exchange Act.  The Department did not issue the Bulletin to coerce the applicants’, and by extension [...]'s and [...]’s, compliance, but rather to remind the regulated community that its precedent would be adhered to notwithstanding [...]’s opposition.
[brief] (Pa227 at ¶¶ 4-6.)  Thus, the unpublished minutes attached as an exhibit were not contemporaneously recorded.  (Id.)  [...] certified that first and second readings of bills “are handled under routine business, which is a ministerial function that does not involve a vote or debate of the full General Assembly. ”  (Pa227 at ¶ 7.)  Thus, no audio or video recordings exist for the first or second readings of the bills at issue.  (Id.)  The only record is contained in the Minutes of the General Assembly, which as [...] certified had not yet been published as of July 18, 2023.  (Pa227-28 at ¶ 5, ¶ 7.)  The unpublished Assembly Minutes provide that on January 6, 2022, the General Assembly had convened and notice had been sent to the members of the General Assembly and posted in accordance with the Open Public Meetings Act.
[directive] 보호감독을 부과했고, 그 기간은 귀하가 금고 형량을 완료한 후 즉시 시작된다는 것을 아십니까?  제1 급 가석방 보호감독 기간 년 – 5 제2 급 가석방  보호감독 기간 년 – 3  지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지1/
[brief] Appx., at 35a-36a.  First, to find that Respondent’s use of a letter vendor violated the FDCPA would go against Congress’ intent to prohibit only certain especially harmful debt related disclosures to those within a debtor’s close circle (e.g., friend, neighbors, employers) — not all communications by debt collectors to third parties, particularly where individuals are not alleged to have seen the debt information.  Id; Cavazzini v. MRS Associates, 574 F. Supp. 3d at 142.  Second, such a statutory reading would be inconsistent with other FDCPA provisions and general statutory scheme which permit the use of service providers.  Third, prohibiting the use of letter vendors as an illegal communication, publication, or unconscionable debt practice under the FDCPA (§§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), 1692f) would lead to an absurd result, preventing an “innocuous” business practice which promotes efficiency and causes no harm to consumers.  Id.  For these reasons and more, dismissal of Appellant’s FDCPA claim should be upheld.  a.
[brief] *State v. Nishina*, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003).  It involves a significantly lower degree of objective evidentiary justification than does the probable cause test.  *State v. Davis*, 104 N.J. 490, 501 (1986).  The level of suspicion necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. ”  *Gamble*, 218 N.J. at 428.
[brief] See Exhibit C, at pp. 1-2.  This language does not appear in either of the first two orders.  The fact that this language appears for the first time in [...] – issued after the Bulletin – is proof --- 3.  The Bulletin disingenuously begins by asserting the Department “has received inquiries regarding the laws and requirements relevant to” reciprocal exchanges.  Assuming that there actually were inquiries, they show that the Department failed for more than fifty years to provide notice that the Holding Company Act applies to reciprocal exchanges. that the Bulletin changed the legal landscape.  This was improper rulemaking, done more than fifty years after the passage of the Holding Company Act, that must be invalidated.  Recognizing that the three orders are flimsy support for the proposition that the Department had clearly enunciated that reciprocal exchanges are covered by the Holding Company Act, the Department makes the argument that the Hearing Officer’s Reports filed in each case applied the Holding Company Act to reciprocal exchanges thereby providing them with notice of the Department’s position.  The contention that reciprocal exchanges had an obligation to read reports issued by a Hearing Officer to glean whether the Holding Company Act applies to them is a bridge too far.  This is particularly so when [...] has always conducted itself as if the Holding Company Act did not apply to reciprocal exchanges and the Department never contradicted it.
[brief] The overarching flaw in plaintiff’s argument is that it misconstrues the applicable analytical framework.  Plaintiff advances an incorrectly narrow view of what constitutes a “special equity” sufficient for a trial court to deviate from the first-filed rule.  (Pb21).  The Supreme Court did not, as plaintiff argues, establish “only a small number of factors that could constitute special equities” or a “narrow class of ‘special equities’” in Sensient Colors.  (Pb21, Pb24).  To the contrary, the Supreme Court: (1) defined “special equities” broadly to encompass any “reasons of a compelling nature that favor the retention of jurisdiction by the court in the later-filed action” (Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 387); (2) endorsed “a fact-specific inquiry that weights considerations of fairness and comity” (id. at 389-90); and (3) clarified that “[t]he determination of whether to grant a comity stay or dismissal is generally within the discretion of the trial court” (id. at 390).
[brief] **BRIEF........................................................................................................................................... 327**  **STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS .................................................. 331**  **CERTIFICATION OF [...], ESQ................................................................. 334**  **EXHIBIT 1 – LETTER RESCINDING STOCK SALE AGREEMENT ....................... 335**  **EXHIBIT 2 – CERTIFICATION OF [...], ESQ............................................ 336**  **CERTIFICATION OF [...]...................................................... 338**
[brief] USE VARIANCE UNDER THE MEDICI STANDARDS, BUT EVEN IF THE COVENTRY SQUARE STANDARDS ARE MADE APPLICABLE, PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT PROVEN THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO APPROVAL ....  22  VI.  THE BOARD’S FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFFS’ PLANNER WAS NOT PROBATIVE OR CREDIBLE IN LIGHT OF HIS FAILURE TO RECONCILE THE DIFFERING CHARACTER OF THE WAREHOUSE USES ALLOWED IN FLORENCE AND MANSFIELD TOWNSHIPS IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD .................................................................
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10% Cash Bail Option appropriate for such lawful use that it may have, while on or in educational institution without prior written authorization, fourth degree.  2C:39-5(a-j)  Unlawful Possession (continued) of Weapons (continued)  (3)  Possesses any imitation firearms while on or in educational institution without prior written authorization, or while on any school bus, irrespective of whether he possesses a carry permit or a firearms purchaser identification card, disorderly persons.  4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible f.  Possesses an assault firearm without a license, second degree.  j.  A violation of subsections a., b., c. or f. by a person who has a prior conviction under 2C:43-7.2 (No Early Release Act), first degree.  77