ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [[...]]  A.  Well, I mean, I guess I'll answer two ways.  Really, the only sort of formal definition of stranded costs in any of the BPU's rules or rule makers that I'm aware of, it concerns back to when the electric distribution system was expanded 20 years ago, where that concerned generating assets which were either divested, sold off by utilities who were no longer in the generation business, or they were spun off into an unregulated affiliate.  And the stranded cost in that instance, as defined in the Discount and Energy Competition Act, dealt with the -- any remaining costs on the utility's box (sic - books), that being the difference, the deficit in the market value that the transfer or sale took place and the remaining book value of the asset.  So that's really the only formal definition.  So once those generating assets were no longer part of the utility's plant and service, there was a remaining unamortized cost that was above market, essentially.  So in that context, my interpretation of this is there's a point at which, in a good – I think of it in sort of real-life examples.  If there were a build-out, a system expansion into an area – let's say there was a whole area that was served by oil and there was a major, you know, system expansion out there, and -- to serve those customers, and let's say ten years later that whole area was electrified, and so that gas superstructure was no longer needed, theoretically that's a stranded cost.
[directive] An agency’s supervisory personnel should always consider the need for training when officers engage in inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  The question should be, “Could training have prevented this behavior and can training prevent it from happening in the INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 11 future?”  Perhaps a particular officer or group of officers needs a refresher course in a certain subject.  In addition, changes in the law, the agency or even within the community may trigger the need for a type of training never before given to the officer or agency.  Training in this sense can be anything from informal counseling of an officer about a particular policy or procedure to formal agency-wide training.  The agency may also take advantage of training offered by other agencies, including police academies, the County Prosecutors, the Division of Criminal Justice, other public or private entities or web-based programs.  3.3
[brief] In addition to Feld v. City of Orange, 2014 WL 8277956 (App. Div. March 26, 2015), see also Feld v. City of Orange, 2018 WL 3747632 (App. Div. August 8, 2018).  As for Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, standing to make a constitutional claim requires a two-part analysis: (1) “whether (plaintiff) alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise,” and (2) “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.
[brief] 4T, 140:21-142:22.  [...] testified that in that instance, he would have structured a partnership, as he had done in other occasions and continues to do so, whereby Plaintiff [...] would have retained 60% of the ownership interest of the affordable housing development and received 60% of the profits.  4T, 146:21-148:7; 149:25-150:8.  Again, as [...] testified, the range of profits Plaintiff [...] or anyone else would earn from the affordable housing development on [...], whether developing the affordable housing project as sole developer or in a partnership with an affordable housing developer, is consistent not only with [...]’s many years of experience as an affordable housing development financial advisor to clients undertaking similar affordable housing developments, but is also consistent with the deposition testimony of [...] in this matter.
[brief] On March 8, 2017, defendant drove [...] to pick up some money from a friend of [...]'s and then to Camden to get drugs (16T68-1 to 16T69-7).  Defendant then dropped off [...] at defendant's lake house (16T69-9 to 11).  They met again the next evening, Friday, March 10, 2017, at approximately 6:00 p.m, and [...] testified that the purpose of the meeting was that defendant "was probably giving me a ride to go get drugs" in Camden (16T69-12 to 16T70-1).  Defendant also did the drugs with [...] (16T70-2 to 4).  Afterwards, they went to Glassboro where [...] stole a pair of boots from [...] by putting his own boots into the box (16T70-5 to 21;16T71-20 to 16T72-19).
[brief] **JURISDICTION**  The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) clearly delineates within which Board (Planning or Zoning) jurisdiction lies.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-20 provides that “Any power expressly authorized by this act to be exercised by (1) planning board or (2) board of adjustment shall not be exercised by any other body, except as otherwise provided in this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25.a.(2) provides that a planning board shall exercise its power in regard to site plan review.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-60.a. provides that “Whenever the proposed development requires approval pursuant to this act of a . . . site plan . . . but not a variance pursuant to subsection d. of section 57 of this act (C. 40:55D-70), the planning board shall have the power to grant to the same extent and subject to the same restrictions as the board of adjustment: a.  Variances pursuant to subsection 57c. of this act [40:55D-70} . . .”  (Emphasis Added)  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76.b. provides that “The board of adjustment shall have the power to grant, to the same extent and subject to the same restrictions as the planning board . . . site plan approval whenever the proposed development requires approval by the board of adjustment of a variance pursuant to subsection d. of section 57 of this act [C. 40:55D-70]  . . .”  Based on the foregoing it is clear that if a height variance was required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d. the Planning Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the application and its approval would be null and void.
[brief] The Waterfront Development Act (WFDA), N.J.S.A. 12:5-3 does not provide a statutory right to a hearing for persons who are not permit applicants.  Thus, Appellant has no statutory right to an adjudicatory hearing.  See *In re Waterfront Development Permit*, 244 N.J. Super. 426, 437 (App. Div. 1990); see also *In re [...], [...]*, 411 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 2010).  Therefore, to establish a constitutional right to a hearing, Appellant must demonstrate "a particularized property interest of constitutional significance that is directly affected by [DEP's] permitting decision."  In re [...], 185 N.J. at 482; see also N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1(b).
[brief] At the end of the robbery charge, the judge asked for a side bar conference because he understood, based on the charge conference conducted partially on the record, that the parties requested that he read only 2b.  The judge stated that he was “concerned [because] I read [the charge] confusingly. ”  During deliberations, the jury was also confused and asked the court to “re-explain robbery in layman's terms. ”  In his re-charge, the judge included all three sections, substituted “any crime of the first or second degree” in place of theft, and—as the assistant prosecutor stated—“hinted that [the jury] had the option of finding [defendant guilty] under second-degree. ”  The judge did not, however, instruct the jury that it must find defendant guilty of second-degree robbery, if it found that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was armed with, or used or purposely threatened the immediate use of a “deadly weapon.
[brief] The State’s contention that some of [...]’s claims are barred is meritless, and its suggestion they are “repackaged” absurd.  Rule 3:22-4 provides:  Any ground for relief not raised in a prior proceeding under this rule, or in the proceedings resulting in the conviction,... or in any appeal taken in any such proceedings is barred from assertion in a proceeding under this rule unless the court on motion or at the hearing finds that: (a) the ground for relief not previously asserted could not reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding; or (b) enforcement of the bar would result in fundamental injustice; or (c) denial of relief would be contrary to the Constitution of the United States or the State of New Jersey.
[brief] While the Commission’s decision may be entitled to deference, the decision will not stand if it is “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or . . . not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ”  In the Matter of Brian Ambroise, 258 N.J. 180, 197 (2024).  See also In re City of Camden, 429 N.J. Super. 309, 327-328 (App. Div. 2013), certif. denied 2015 N.J. 485 (2013).
[brief] (10T47-18 to 49-4; 10T196-1 to 197-19; see Chun, 194 N.J. at 142-45).  “upset” to the point the men had a shouting match, left the building without any resolution of the matter.  (10T150-2 to 21; 16T46-5 to 16).  [...] told his supervisor, the Assistant Head of the ADTU, Sergeant First Class (“SFC”) [...], about the incident; and defendant called Tormo after [...] did.  (10T36-20 to 37-3; 16T46-21 to 47-6).  On or about December 1, 2015, a meeting was held among Tormo, defendant’s immediate Supervisor—SFC [...]—defendant, and [...].  (10T69-15 to 70-8; 11T26-7 to 12; 16T47-25 to 49-2).  Defendant was surprised to see Cross.  (16T48-23 to 25).  Tormo, Cross, and [...] were dressed in jackets and ties, looking “formal and proper,” and their manner was severe.  (16T49-1 to 10).  The very brief meeting was convened to get defendant’s side of the events, which Cross thought was “only fair. ” (10T70-8 to 15; 11T26-13 to 15; 11T26-22 to 25; 11T30-3 to 5).  Tormo told defendant he was not a “good fit” for ADTU, which defendant understood to mean they wanted him to leave the unit.
[brief] [...] IN RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION OF APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS WITH RESPECT TO RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT’S CROSS-APPEAL  [...], Esq. (003571975)  [...], Esq. (017742007)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...] / Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  [...], Esq. (019342012)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...] / Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant  Submitted on: May 29, 2024
[brief] POINT II  THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL.  Defendant contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment during his direct appeal.  A review of the record clearly establishes that the self-serving and contradictory affidavits of [...] and [...] were not clearly exculpatory.  As such, any appeal of that decision would have been unsuccessful.  As such, the PCR court appropriately rejected the defendant’s argument.
[brief] Id. at 458-59.  This Court held there was no evidence produced at trial to support the defendant’s contention that the correctional officers’ use of force was excessive, so there was no rational basis to charge self-defense.  Id. at 459.  Like [...], defendant failed to raise the issue of self-defense below, so it can be assumed that his attorney did not believe the evidence in the record supported such an instruction.  Id. at 460.  Regardless, defendant presented no competent evidence that the officers’ use of force against him was excessive.
[brief] See *Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill*, 135 Conn. 686, 67 A.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1949); *Jackson v. State*, supra. *Gallant*, supra at 590.  As indicated in the Liu opinion, (pg. 489) this was the basis for the Model Charge §9.13.  (Da215)  Also, see N.J.S.A.20:3-2(d) which may enlarge the scope of the compensable items but cannot limit the Constitutional mandate of Gallant.  The statute incorporates many of these items with the definition of property for Legislative purposes.  The important point in Liu is that the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Division in that case was mistaken in concluding as a matter of law, that all the FF&E in the Liu building did not constitute a single functional unit.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MIDDLETOWN’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION  [Da12-Da13]  [...] urges this court to reverse the trial court’s decision denying reconsideration.  As acknowledged by [...] in its briefing, the appellate court accords substantial deference to the trial court’s findings of fact provided that they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence, and also give deference to the trial court’s conclusions and discretionary determinations that flow from them.  [...]’s arguments in this regard are largely parallel to the contentions discussed earlier.
[brief] ” (Pa000204).  The trial court’s original May 24, 2024 Order as to Respondent [...] was later amended to include a “statement of reasons”; however, the extremely limited rationale provided therein further evidences that the trial court failed to properly consider, or consider at all, each of the arguments advanced by Appellant demonstrating that the subject Arbitration Agreement should not be enforced.  Indeed, the only reasoning provided by the trial court as part of its aforementioned Amended Order is as follows:  This is a LAD, employment case (that does not allege sexual harassment).  The order entered by the court was for a **without** prejudice dismissal.  During [...]’s onboarding she signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA).  Same was dated January 4, 2022.  The MAA is valid on its face.  Plaintiff’s complaint fails to seek any declaratory relief declaring the MAA void or otherwise unenforceable.  (Pa000207 (emphasis in original)).  This statement of reasons, as does the aforementioned rationale contained within the trial court’s original May 24, 2024 Order, fails to consider **any** of the arguments advanced by Appellant against the enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement at issue.  To wit, Appellant argued (1) the Arbitration Agreement should not be enforced because Appellant did not enter into same knowingly and voluntarily; (2) the language of the Arbitration Agreement failed to meet the standards required to enforce arbitration agreements set forth by the Supreme Court in *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430 (2014), and its progeny; and (3) Appellant cannot be compelled to arbitration with respect to her claims against Respondents [...] and [...] because there is no Arbitration Agreement as between Appellant and Respondents [...] and/or [...].  Had the trial court properly considered, or considered at all, the legitimate arguments raised by Appellant in Opposition to Respondents’ motions, it would have found that it cannot rule as a matter of law that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered in the Arbitration Agreement at issue.  Accordingly, Appellant urges this Court to reverse the trial court’s glaringly improper dismissal of Appellant’s claims.
[directive] A record of firearms qualification activities for each officer required to participate.  A record is to be completed, and maintained chronologically, each time the officer is required to qualify or requalify on a firearm.  The record shall include relevant firearms data (make, model, caliber and serial number), training and qualification location, date of qualification activities, qualification courses completed, ammunition used, scores fired, name of the supervising firearms instructor, and other pertinent information.  Law Enforcement Agency.
[brief] (17T232-23 to 234-1).  Consecutive sentences are appropriate here because defendant intentionally murdered multiple victims.  State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 428-29 (2001).  “[B]y virtue of their impact on multiple lives, crimes involving two or ore victims are particularly suited for the imposition of consecutive sentences, so that ‘the multiple-victims factor is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily result in the result in at least two consecutive terms. ’”  State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 375-76 (2019) (quoting State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436, 442 (2001).  “Even if the murders occurred in close sequence, consecutive sentencing is not improper. ”  State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 231 (1996).  Consistent with Yarbough and Carey, [...] acted within his discretion in finding that the deaths of four multiple victims warranted three consecutive sentences.  Liepe, 239 N.J. at 377; Roach, 146 N.J. at 230.  Defendant’s aggregate custodial term is 150 years, subject to NERA and a five-year parole supervision period on each count.
[brief] While the Second Amendment included a new Paragraph 10(c) to incorporate explicit reference to [...]’s ROFR and “Right of Last Offer” that had been added by the parties in their First Amendment of April 24, 2015 (as new Pars. 39 and 40), the Second Amendment also contained a provision stating “[i]n all other respects, the terms of the original Agreement of Sale, as amended, shall remain full force an effect. ”  Thus, the requirements of Paragraph 10(r) (entitled “Gasoline Supply, Petroleum, Or Similar Contracts”) of the original Agreement that explicitly acknowledged [...]’s Fuel Supply Agreement with [...], and [...]’s potential responsibility for payment of termination penalties owed to [...] if its MFSA with [...] was terminated (and gasoline purchase price obligations of [...] as modified by the First Amendment of April 24, 2015), were re-affirmed and incorporated by reference.  In the latter regard, and prior to the preparation and execution of the Second Amendment, it was acknowledged by [...] and [...] that [...] would be entitled to an early termination penalty and thus early termination damages in the amount of approximately $328,740.14 that would have to be borne by [...] (or shared by it with [...]) if and as the MFSA with [...] was terminated.  Consequently, the [...] offer did not ripen into one that was truly “bona fide” until [...] – pursuant to Par. 39 – “promptly” sent the Offer to [...], which [...] finally did by providing [...] with what turned out to be the fully executed Second Amendment at one and the same time on May 8, 2023.  In so doing, [...] was thereby and therein confirming its intention to sell the Property (whether to [...], if it elected to exercise its ROFR, or to [...] if [...] determined not to or otherwise failed to give notice within 30 days of its receipt), and to assume responsibility for payment of termination penalties, if, [...] passed on the opportunity to purchase, [...] proceeded to purchase, and [...] became obligated to honor [...]’s entitlement to payment of termination damages.  Da394-395.
[brief] Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, and RULINGS ...........................................  ii  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................. ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................  4  ARGUMENT .................................................................................................  9  I.  APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW REGARDING AGENCY  FINAL DECISIONS .........................................................  9  II.  THE BOARD OF REVIEW (“BOARD”)  ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING  [...]’S UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS BECAUSE THE BOARD’S DECISION IS BASED ON A PLAINLY UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE REGULATION.  (Pa1; Pa3)  .................................................................  11  III.  THE BOARD OF REVIEW’S DECISION  DENYING BENEFITS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE BOARD FAILED TO GIVE PROPER WEIGHT TO [...]’S MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF HIS LEAVING WORK FOR GOOD CAUSE RELATED TO THE EMPLOYMENT.  (Pa1; Pa3)  .........................................................  19 CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................  23  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] Title 19 Does Not Contemplate Voters Whose Ballots Are Received by the County Board of Elections Under the Statutory Accepted Timeline but Postmarked Late Through No Fault of Their Own N.J.S.A. 19:63-22 is titled the “opening of mail-in ballot[s],” and details the timeframe for when ballots can be received by the Board to be counted.  N.J.S.A. 19:63-22.  However, it is silent as to the issue of ballots postmarked after an Election Day scheduled on a weekend during a federal holiday.  By statute, the Board of Elections must receive mail-in ballots by a fixed date subsequent to the election for them to be counted.  Title 19 states that:  Every mail-in ballot that bears a postmark date before or of the day of the election and that is received by the county board within 144 hours after the time of the closing of the polls for the election that the ballot was prepared shall be considered valid and shall be canvassed.  Every mail-in ballot that does not bear a postmark date but that is received by the county board by delivery of the United States Postal Service before, or within 48 hours after, the time of the closing of the polls for the election for which the ballot was prepared shall be considered valid and shall be canvassed.
[directive] Prevention of Misconduct 3.0.1  Prevention is the primary means of reducing and controlling inappropriate behavior and misconduct.  Although disciplinary actions are properly imposed on officers who engage in wrongdoing, they have limited utility if they shield or obscure organizational conditions that permit the abuses to occur.  Inadequate training and a lack of appropriate guidance too often are factors that contribute to inappropriate behavior and misconduct.  An agency should make every effort to eliminate the organizational conditions that may foster, permit or encourage an employee’s inappropriate behavior.
[brief] **FACTOR 11 – ORAL OR WRITTEN REPORTS**  1.  [...] notes the Petitioner is required to prepare regular reports which would be indicative of employee status.  (Pa95)  2.  However, since she was not subject to performance evaluations, it was [...]’s belief the Petitioner met the definition of independent contractor.  3.  Petitioner testified extensively that while not having to provide any written reports, she is required to provide oral reports to the liaison officers concerning the Municipal Court Resolution cases and the Plea by Mail cases.  (T42-21)  4.  Petitioner also testified that she reports to the Township Zoning Officers, Code Enforcement Officers, and Animal Control Officers as to the disposition of the cases which are under their control.  (T42-24)  5.  [...] conceded that if Petitioner was required to provide oral reports to the Township Zoning Officers, Code Enforcement Officers and Animal Control Officers, all three would be indicative of employee status.  (T172-3)
[brief] *Id.* at 641–42.  Because the insurer in *Azze* had continued to negotiate and invited the insured to submit more information after sending a denial letter, the Appellate Division concluded that policy’s limitation period remained tolled.  *Id.* at 642–43.  On that basis, the Appellate Division reversed dismissal.  *Id.* at 645.  [...] does not dispute that the first time it denied coverage was in its Answer to [...]’s Complaint. (Db10, Pb7–8, Pa24–28).
[brief] See Handloser v. HCL America, Inc., No. 19-cv-01242-LHK (VKD), 2020 WL 7405686, at *2 (N.D. Cal. December 17, 2020) (refusing to order designation of additional custodians where plaintiffs failed to show why they “expect to discover information... from these custodians that differs from discovery they have already obtained from the others”); see also In re EpiPen Mktg., Sales Practices and Antitrust Litigation No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ, 2018 WL 1440923, at *2 (D. Kans. March 15, 2018) (“party moving to compel additional proposed custodians ‘must demonstrate that the additional requested custodians would provide unique relevant information not already obtained’ ” (quoting Fort Worth Employees’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 297 F.R.D. 99, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 2013))).