ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See, e.g., Metromedia [v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-508 (1981); Hucul Advertising, LLC v. Charter Tp. of Gaines, 748 F.3d 273, 277-78 (6th Cir, 2014) (discussing stated goals in township's enactment of billboard spacing regulation); Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 398 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 2005) (Reversing the District Court’s finding that a revised ordinance was not “narrowly tailored” due to the “lack of factual record” by the municipality when adopting the revisions because the law regarding the constitutionality of the restriction (size and height) and the substantial interests underpinning the restriction were well settled; and, in doing so, specifically citing to the “findings” section of a newly revised ordinance and well settled case law regarding size and height restrictions to find that the revised ordinance was constitutional); Int'l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Roseville, No. 313153, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 815, at *15-16 (Ct. App. May 1, 2014) (Affirming the constitutionality of an ordinance by specifically citing and relying upon the “purposes” section of the ordinance to identify the substantial government interests).  In sum, the above cited case law demonstrates the fundamental flaw in Plaintiff’s argument regarding the constitutionality of the Distance Regulation: the Planning Board was not required, and, more importantly, did not even have the statutory authority, to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Distance Regulation at the variance hearing.  Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that Planning Board failed to present sufficient evidence at the variance hearing regarding the “substantial government interest” underpinning the Distance Regulation is inapposite.  Moreover, the case law above demonstrates that looking to the “purposes” section of an existing ordinance along with relevant case law is the proper method identifying the substantial government interest and the constitutionality of the restriction.
[directive] Modifications have also been made to remove information concerning sealed cases in the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) risk factors in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2(d), which provides that these records shall not be considered whenever the Pretrial Services Program conducts a risk assessment on an eligible defendant for the purpose of making recommendations to the court concerning an appropriate pretrial release decision under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 et seq.  Additionally, cases that have been ordered sealed pursuant to this statute will not be listed in the “Court History” section of the Presentence Investigation Report in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2(d), which prohibits use of this information for sentencing purposes in any other case.  If the conviction or adjudication includes a court-ordered financial assessment subject to collection under the comprehensive enforcement program (CEP), the court Directive #08- 21 April 7, 2021 Page 3 at the time of sentencing will also enter a civil judgment for the outstanding amount in the name of the Treasurer, State of New Jersey and transfer collections and disbursement responsibility to the State Treasurer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52- 5.2(a)(2).  Accordingly, in those matters the appended Order for Judgment form (Attachment 5) should be completed by court staff, signed by the judge, and electronically forwarded to the Superior Court Clerk’s Office to record the civil judgment, where applicable.  Operationally, the municipal courts have not been part of the comprehensive enforcement program (CEP).  Currently, there is no provision in the system to move cases through the CEP and civil judgment process for municipal court matters.  Therefore, the municipal courts will continue their current collection process for cases that are ordered sealed.
[brief] Plaintiff Cannot Compel Specific Performance After | | | Electing to Irrevocably Abandon the Transaction | 10 | | B.  The Motion Court’s Contractual Interpretation was | | | Sound, and Should Be Affirmed | 14 | | C.  The Equitable Doctrine of Election of Remedies | | | Supports the Motion Court’s Ruling | 21 | | D.  Plaintiff Fails to Address Its Express Waiver of Claims | | | for Damages | 23 | | III.
[brief] Dal11.  The October 20, 2021 Consent Order further contained a footnote stating that “[s]hould any issue be appealed and reversed and/or remanded, the matter shall then return to arbitration. ”  Da111.  As the boundaries of any permissible appeal were limited to the Trial Court’s Order establishing the date of valuation, the Order denying the Township’s Motion to Bar the Land Report, and the Order denying [...]’ Motion to Bar [...] from using the [...] lease (and [...] have not set forth any grounds for appeal based upon N.J.S.A 2A:23B-23), [...]’ current appeal clearly exceeds those jurisdictional boundaries.
[brief] 48.  Moreover, [...] has presented significant evidence establishing that there are no reasonably available alternatives that could achieve an equivalent public benefit.  As detailed above and in the evidence submitted in this filing (particularly, the testimony of [...]), [...] conducted a comprehensive Site Analysis of every property along the Holmdel transmission line corridor.  That search yielded just five alternative properties, in addition to the Proposed Site, that could even arguably have served as the location for the Regulator Station (though several of them were less than ideal).  For various reasons, none of those properties ultimately proved to be a viable option.  Moreover, the Zoning Board has previously denied the Company’s application for the Original Proposed Site.  49.  In any event, [...]’s Site Analysis made clear that the Proposed Site is the most appropriate available location for the Regulator Station because it (a) is located at the southern end of [...]’s Holmdel transmission line; (b) is of sufficient size; (c) is adjacent to the transmission line; (d) is in a non-residential zone that conditionally permits public utilities; (e) presents no environmental constraints; (f) has no Green Acres or Farmland Preservation restrictions; (g) has no prohibitively low elevation, wetlands or flooding issues; (h) requires insignificant tree clearing (only one tree to be removed); and (i) already contains another utility-like facility – a cellular communications tower.  Moreover, at the suggestion of a Zoning Board member during the hearings for the Original Proposed Site, [...] was able to obtain an easement to construct and operate the Facility on the Proposed Site.  In short, the record evidence demonstrates beyond dispute that the Proposed Site is the best available location for the Regulator Facility, and thus its use is reasonably necessary, based on consideration of alternative sites, and their comparative advantages and disadvantages to all interests involved, including costs.  ---
[brief] The Board’s then-attorney advised it that the TOA Rule merely required “substantial compliance” and that by seeking approval from the CRB prior to April 28, 2022, [...] was immune from the effect of the Ordinance, even if checklist items were missing or the Board had deemed the application incomplete after the date the Ordinance went into effect.  [Da 290 at 214-25 to Da291 at 215-3; Da309 at 233-5 to 233-11].  Finding that the application complied with the City’s prior zoning regulations concerning the retail sale of cannabis (but not those imposed by the Ordinance, which it disregarded), the Board voted to approve.  [Da311 at 235-14 to Da312 at 236-19].  E.  The Board’s Decision
[brief] ”  Pa212.  The court stated the question before it as:  The City’s zoning ordinance changed several times during that period, as did the Master Plan vision of what the future of the property should be.  That being said, the necessary determination is what the zoning of the property would have been absent anything done pursuant to the announcement of [the] public improvement and in implementation thereof.  Pa213.  Relying upon the above-cited caselaw from Kugler and Atlantic City, the court held:  [T]he zoning classification that should form the basis of the valuation to be used in this case is the R-40, 90 unit per acre, zoning provided for in the 1974 zoning ordinance.
[directive] While agencies reported the number of untested kits in their possession, this survey did not request the collection dates of kits, case status of those kits, or how soon after collection kits were or were not tested.  Second, the AG SAFE survey requested information from County Prosecutor’s Offices and all other law enforcement agencies, encompassing a larger respondent pool.  This larger number of respondents provides results that are indicative of practice in all jurisdictions.  However, this also resulted in potential inconsistency in survey responses that was dependent on the subject matter expertise of the person completing the survey.  For the AG SAFE survey, time was the biggest limitation.
[brief] This argument is nonsensical, as Defendants had a right to proffer, and the trial court an obligation to consider, arguments and evidence as to whether the new claims Plaintiffs wished to pursue would be futile.  See, e.g., Notte, 185 N.J. at 498 (remanding for consideration of futility of proposed amended complaint because lower court did not do so).  over the dune, he consulted with the [...] board about what to do and then went to the police, who in turn instructed him to file a complaint.  Based on the foregoing information in the motion record, the trial court correctly determined that, at the time [...] made the complaint to the police, [...] had probable cause to believe the [...] were continuing to access the beach via the unauthorized walkover that had just been blocked off by [...] on [...]’s property, and then trespassing over [...] property.  (1T 22:22—25:23; 2T 22:25—23:7)  Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiffs could not establish that [...] lacked probable cause, and thus Plaintiffs’ proposed malicious prosecution claim against [...] was futile.
[brief] And -- and I think in this case there’s a little bit of a mix, and I can’t at this stage go through each and every one and say well, this is a professional negligence claim, and this is a regular negligence claim, because we don’t know exactly all the claims at this point, and whether or not there’s gonna be discovery that’s going to support some of the things that they’re saying…  1T Hearing, page 17, line 7 to pg. 18, line 16.
[brief] As to the never-built boardwalk, the trial court found “there was no reason to build the boardwalk other than for . . . the benefit of the homeowners in the [...] area.  There wasn’t any retained commercial interest. ” (T69:2-5).  Thus, “the reason to require a higher payment . . . or higher price to build a house and a higher price for the property itself, in the Court’s view, had to be the access to the water.
[brief] \(^{29}\)  In citing the Abbott school law cases where litigants sued school districts and the Commissioner under the school laws, the Supreme Court concluded,  Just as we generally require that litigants exhaust their administrative remedies before they come to court, see Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 297–301…(1985), so we hold that these plaintiffs must seek relief in the first instance through the designated statutory vehicle. \(^{30}\)  In an environmental protection case where the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the governing administrative agency, the Appellate Division concluded, “Although a private action might help to deter violations of the act, such protracted civil litigation could not possibly be as effective in promoting \(^{28}\)  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 273 (2001)  \(^{29}\)  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 273 (2001)  \(^{30}\) Matter of State Comm'n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 44–45 (1987) environmental protection as the summary proceedings available to the Department [of Environmental Protection]”.\textsuperscript{31}  Here, there is certainly a Legislative scheme that obviates the need for plaintiffs to pursue a private cause of action in Superior Court.  Under \textit{N.J.S.A.} 6A:3-1.1, \textit{et seq.}, private parties may petition the Commissioner of Education for enforcement or violations of Title 18A school laws, inclusive of \textit{N.J.S.A.} 18A:7F-9.  If [...] was \textit{truly} aggrieved by the Board’s conduct, then the Commissioner of Education, who governs the Board and all other public school districts, can certainly find the Board to have violated an 18A statute, and order the Board to comply with an 18A statute.  Because there are already administrative remedies and mechanisms to sue school districts by petitioning the Commissioner of Education for enforcement of Title 18A statutes, such as in \textit{N.J.S.A.} 18A:7F-9(e)(3), there was no need for the Legislature to create a burdensome mechanism to sue a school district in Superior Court.
[brief] Plaintiff was punched, kneeed in the ribs, choked by the police officers warranting that an ambulance be called to take him to the hospital.  (\textit{Pa092-P096; Pa53-Pa54}).  The stop and the beating were ultra vires.  The severe beating and choking causing dislocation of plaintiff’s jaw constitutes assault and battery which were committed under color of law, resulted in physical injuries, monetary loss and severe emotional distress.  Plaintiff was also improperly seized and arrested, all which violated Plaintiff’s Constitutional and Statutory rights including violations of N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 (c).  (\textit{Pa093-Pa096; Pa053-Pa054; Pa041})  Plaintiff also met the elements of Malicious prosecution because plaintiff was stopped, brutally beaten and falsely imprisoned based on his race.  Plaintiff was then maliciously convicted of Obstructing the Administration of Law in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-l(a).  As will be argued below, there must be a separate lawful act that was obstructed to satisfy N.J.S.A. 2C:29-l(a).  Stopping and searching people based on their race cannot reasonably be considered “the Administration of Law. ”  Encounters with the police in which a person's freedom of movement is restricted, such as an arrest or an investigatory stop or detention, must satisfy acceptable constitutional standards.  See \textit{State v. Nishina}, 175 N.J. 502, 510-11 (2003).  Based on this, plaintiff satisfied Count Four of his complaint.  (Pa533; Pa534)
[brief] ”  (Tr. 7-30-21 at 11)  Even though Mother had been removed s Administratrix and had no ownership interest in the house, on November 20, 2020, the Trial Court required Mother to pay the mortgage and other expenses on the property owned by Tyrone when he died.  (MA-87, ¶ 7)  Obviously recognizing that it had exceeded its authority, the Trial Court ruled that Mother could be reimbursed for the expenses she paid.  (Tr. 7-30-21 at 11)  **[...]**
[brief] Therefore, this reply brief will focus on whether or not a litigant in this state who maintains his control of his cause of action is permitted to pledge a portion of the proceeds from that cause of action to creditors should a litigant obtain a judgment or a settlement or whether as the Trial Court held such a pledge should result in a dismissal with prejudice.  The citizens of New Jersey who are placed in a disadvantageous position by a tortfeasor and are required to satisfy judgments or attorney’s claims for fees should not be deprived of their right to pacify these creditors by pledging a portion of the proceeds of a lawsuit in which they seek to recover these damages.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *King*, 44 N.J. at 353); *Id.* at 43.  The judge found three *King* factors indicating involuntariness: defendant gave his consent after he had been (1) arrested; and (2) handcuffed; and (3) he must have known contraband would be discovered.  (Da35).  The two *King* factors indicating voluntariness were defendant (1) admitted his guilt before giving consent; and (2) affirmatively assisted the police officers.  [...] did not find that the presence of three *King* factors indicating involuntariness rendered defendant’s consent invalid, especially considering the two *King* factors indicating voluntariness and defendant's signed written consent forms.
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[brief] For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still-outstanding conviction.  Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, see Murray v. United States, 487 U. S. 533, 539 (1988), and especially harmless error, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 307-308 (1991), such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful.
[brief] Transcript of Decision, dated October 24, 2023 ………………………………………….. 4T ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California,** | 31 | | 202 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) | | | **Ardan v. Bd. of Rev.,** | 10-11, 16, 19, 23 | | 231 N.J. 589 (2018) | | | **Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of Hartgrove, Inc.,** | 14, 16 | | 867 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2017) | | | **Brennan ex rel. State v. Lonegan,** | passim | | 454 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 2018) | | | **Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth.,** | 16 | | 815 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2016) | | | **Commonwealth ex rel. Rosenberg v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,** | 7, 39, 47| | No. SUCV2014-03323-BLS1, 2019 WL 3643035 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 23, 2019) | | | **Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,** | 10 | | 202 N.J. 369 (2010) | | | **F.K. v. Integrity House, Inc.,** | 9 | | 460 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 2019) | | | **Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc.,** | 22, 45 | | 570 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2009) | | | **Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer,** | 6, 11, 15, 22 | | 520 U.S. 939 (1997) | | | **In re G.H.,** | 9 | | 455 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 2018) | | | **In re Nat. Gas Royalties,** | 32 | | 562 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 2009) | | | **In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs.
[brief] (7T17-1 to 23).  He spoke to [...] and saw his injuries.  (7T17-1 to 23).  [...]’s Honda CRV was towed from [...] by the [...] and processed by the [...].  (7T19-1 to 3; 7T128-12 to -16).  [...]’s car was also towed from the scene.  (7T20-2 to 10).  A search warrant was obtained for both vehicles.
[brief] Judgement of Divorce, filed March 1, 2023  Pa2  Order on motions for reconsiderations, filed June 6, 2023  Pa506  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief page number | |------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Court Rules:** | | | Rule 1:5-3 | 21-23 | | Rule 1:5-4 | 21, 23 | | Rule 1:6-3(c) | 21, 23 | | Rule 1:7-4(a) | passim | | Rule 2:5-3 | passim | | Rule 2:5-6 | 24 | | Rule 2:9-1 | 1, 14, 16 | | Rule 5:5-4(a) | 11, 15 | | **Case Law:** | | | Aptheker v. Sec. of State, | 10 | | 378 U.S. 500 (1964) | | | Barsotti v. Merced, | 40 | | 346 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Cipala v. Lincoln Technical Institute, | 40 | | 354 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Curtis v. Finneran, | 33 | | 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980) | | | Doe v. Poritz, | 10 | | 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995)
[brief] The detective suggested aloud that [...] was “getting … nervous. ”  (Da 48; 25T 55-20 to 21; Da 17 at 34:23 to 34:26)  The detective minimized, “We’re not pointing the finger at you ….  What we’re trying to say, [...] is … this clearly is pointing at this individual. ”  (Da 49; 55-23 to 56-3; Da 17 at 34:27 to 34:35)  [...] responded, “I would tell.
[brief] (Da13-18; Da166-169; Da948; 7T; 8T)  To the extent Plaintiff’s rights under the 1963 Agreement are deemed to be a license, this Court can conclude sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding the license is coupled with the following interests and rights: (1) the right to continue to operate a synagogue pursuant to the Orthodox Jewish tenets; (2) the right to construct a synagogue and utilize parking on the Subject Property, and (3) the right to utilize the boiler room located on the Subject Property.  The Plaintiff’s license coupled with these interests and rights is irrevocable as a matter of law so long as the interests and rights continue.
[directive] Defendant Name Promis Number Points Yes No Insufficient Facts Value  AGGRAVATING FACTORS  1.  Community Impact.  9 9 9 a.  Children were present in premises; OR 2 b.  Offense occurred in a drug-free park, public housing, or public 9  9 9 building zone; OR 2 c.  Offense occurred in a designated “Quality of Life” special 9 9 9 enforcement zone 3 2.  Bail Violation.  Offense occurred while on bail or defendant has committed a bail violation after arrest in present case (3 points or 4 points if defendant 9 9 9 was fugitive or failed to appear in court in present case)  3 or 4 3.  Risk of Injury to Officers or Others.  9 9 9 a.  Offense involved threatened violence; OR 3 or 4 9 9 9 b.  Resisting arrest; OR 3 to 5 9 9 9 c.  Flight or Eluding; OR 4 or 5 9 9 9 d.  Attempted destruction of evidence/hindering apprehension 3 4.  Organization.  9 9 9 a.  Part of a sophisticated drug-distribution operation; OR 3 or 4 9 9 9 b.  Defendant is involved in organized criminal activity; OR 3 or 4 c.  Middle or upper-echelon participant in a drug-distribution 9 9 9 scheme; OR 3 or 4 d.  Defendant substantially influenced another person in committing 9 9 9 the offense; OR 3 9 9 9 e.  Defendant contributed special skills to the criminal conduct  3 5.  Profiteering.  a.  Criminal conduct provided a substantial source (3 points) or 9 9 9 primary source (4 points) of income or livelihood; OR 3 or 4 b.  Offense involved actual distribution for money (2 points, or 3 9 9 9 points if sale to undercover officer or informant); OR 2 or 3 c.  Defendant is eligible for anti-drug profiteering penalty  9 9 9 4  AGGRAVATING  TOTAL SCHEDULE II  Page 5 of 5  AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS (Consult Brimage Guidelines 2 for definitions and rules regarding “double counting”)
[brief] Wollen, 468 N.J. Super. 498.  Given any user’s ability to continue with the registration of a [...] account without ever needing to open and affirm assent to the terms of the arbitration agreement, [...] denied those users reasonable inquiry notice of the arbitration agreement.  See Santana 475 N.J. at 291.  Further, [...] continues to rely on inapplicable unpublished and distinguishable cases as “support” for their arguments.
[brief] 1.  Public Funds and Ratables (Pa55 – Pa58; Pb17 – Pb20).  Beginning with public funds and tax ratables, [...] first relies upon a small portion of the April 18, 2022 Committee meeting at which Ordinance No. 13-2022 was adopted.  (Pb17 – Pb18).  In the cited portion, Mayor [...] --- 5 Below, [...] relied on the mere numerosity of individuals at site plan hearings before the JLUB, and argued Willoughby was the controlling standard as opposed to Rocky Hill, with only limited references to increases in traffic and tax ratables.  (2T, 28:3-9) (Pb1 – Pb2, Pb6 – Pb8, Pb20 – Pb21).  [...] presented no claim this matter involves the use of public funds or “political upheaval” as set forth and analyzed in Rocky Hill.  6