ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Indeed, the trial court’s decision denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration provided ample explanation as to why Plaintiff failed to state a claim under CEPA, with the trial court stating:  In this Court’s December 2022 Order, the Court determined that under the seminal case of D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 192 N.J. 110, 122 (2007), Plaintiff was an independent contractor, not an employee, and thus not entitled to the protections of the New Jersey Conscientious Protection Act….This Court also recognized that D’Annunzio adopted the twelve-factor test in Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 182-183 (App. Div. 1998) for the purpose of determining whether an independent contractor may qualify as an employee for the purpose of CEPA.  This Court’s application of the factors was well-reasoned and thorough in finding that all of the Pukowsky factors weighed against the Plaintiff.  To the contrary, Plaintiff has not put forth any new information or evidence in the instant motion to demonstrate that the court’s decision was incorrect.  Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated or established that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner….  Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that the Court ‘changed a R. 4:6-2 [m]otion into a [s]ummary [j]udgment [m]otion without notifying the parties that it did in fact do that. ’…Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, this Court found that the four corners of Plaintiff’s Complaint were insufficient to state a claim as a matter of law.  To reach this determination, the Court properly evaluated certain matters of public record that the Defendants provided as part of their motion.  The Court’s reliance on these public records—which are distinct from self-serving certifications that Plaintiff attempted to rely upon—did not convert the County Defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment as Plaintiff contends.  [(Pa37-Pa38)].  As such, there is no basis for this court to reverse the trial court.
[brief] The Report placed the line between Lot 11 and Lot 10 so close to the [...]’ house that it blocked access to the rear of their Property.  See Photographs of Disputed Boundary, Pa146.  At trial, the [...] established the readily apparent problems with the Boundary Commissioners’ Report, and proposed an alternative solution which would split the difference between the competing surveys of Lots 10 & 11.  See Testimony of [...], PLS, 1T8, l.22-19, l.6.  The trial court expressly stated that it could not consider the [...]’ proposed line (the “Ludwig Line”) absent an agreement between the parties.  The trial court saw its authority under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 to be limited to approval or rejection of the Report.  Rather than reject the Report due to the effects of its recommendations on the [...] and neighbors, the trial court directed the [...] to give notice to the affected four non-party property owners to determine if they wanted to voluntarily become involved in this matter at the post-trial juncture (Pa95).
[brief] See *Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States*, 424 U. S. 800 (1976).  Moreover, we do not decide whether abstention might be appropriate in cases where a state prisoner brings a § 1983 damages suit raising an issue that also could be grounds for relief in a state-court challenge to his conviction or sentence.  Cf. *Tower v. Glover*, 467 U. S. 914, 923 (1984).  *Heck* at 486-488 (footnotes; emphasis added).  [...], in her brief concurrence in *Spencer*, has “flipped” her vote in *Heck* to be on the more lenient side of *Heck* with [...]: Ginsburg Justice, concurring.  The Court held in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), that a state prisoner may not maintain an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 if the direct or indirect effect of granting relief would be to invalidate the state sentence he is serving.
[brief] Indeed, [...] and [...] acknowledge that the cases cited by Plaintiffs in their initial brief include “different types of insurance policies, including automobile, workers compensation, property, and truck cargo liability,” but give no compelling reasoning as to why CCIP policies should be suddenly treated differently.  [...] Db39-40.  Instead, they just claim wrap-up programs are somehow “different” because contractors are “constantly being added and/or removed” while maintaining their own insurance.  \textit{But the complexity and scale of CCIP programs is another compelling reason contractors should be provided notice of cancellation to avoid the very} \textsuperscript{2}  Further, N.J.S.A. 11:1-20.1(a) does not apply to workers’ compensation insurance because cancellation of such insurance is regulated by its own statutory requirements at N.J.S.A. 34:15-81. confusion that resulted here.  Of course, [...] was lucky that its general liability carriers conscientiously provided coverage subject to their reservation of rights, but this proposed disparate treatment of CCIP policies, if adopted by this Court, would invite confusion and potentially dangerous results for contractors who may not be so lucky.
[brief] ”  (Da2220)  - That: [[...]] asserts [[...]’s] conduct warrants expulsion under N.J.S.A. 42:2C-46 in that his wrongful conduct, during Phase I and through the change over to the new management, materially, adversely affected the Company and violated the Operating Agreement in many significant respects, all of which makes it unreasonable and impracticable to carry on the Company’s activities with him as a member.
[brief] “The factual situation in each case must guide the court’s discretion, particularly where the motion is to add new claims or new parties late in the litigation. ”  Bonczek v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 304 N.J. Super. 593, 602 (App. Div. 1997).  A trial court may deny a motion to amend where the moving party fails to consider available evidence and the non-moving party will suffer prejudice from a late amendment.  Id. (finding no abuse of discretion in denying amendment where the defendant’s existence and corporate function were known well before the amendment was sought).  Indeed, in Branch v. Emery Transp. Co., the Appellate Division noted:
[brief] After almost seven (7) years investigation and prosecution, all charges against Defendant [...] were dismissed after a three-day hearing before the panel from District VII Ethics Committee.  (See Da454–473 in the Supplemental Appendix, a copy of the Hearing Report.)  During the hearing, the unconstitutional decision and opinion of [...] of the Superior Court New Jersey dated September 12, 2012 (Docket No.: [...]) (Da352) and the decision and opinion of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey dated July 21, 2016 (Docket No.: [...]) (Da429) in the matrimonial action *Fou v. Fou*, which were resulted from attorney [...]’s affirmative misrepresentations and fraud upon the various courts, were not permitted to be introduced as evidence upon the objection made by the trial attorney from [...] to avoid [...] being called as a witness.  Therefore, Defendants here successfully demonstrated that the newly discovered evidence in 2019, a year after the malpractice trial in 2018, when Plaintiff’s attorney [...] admitted to the investigator from [...] that he made misstatement to the court during the process to set aside the PSA prepared by Defendants, which resulted two court opinions from [...]’s misrepresentations.  Had those two opinions not presented by [...] to improperly influence the jury in the malpractice trial (*See* Defs’ Br. 35–36), the outcome of the trial would have definitely been changed as now shown that all charges against Defendant [...] were dismissed after a three-day hearing before the panel from District VII Ethics Committee.
[brief] (2T33).  On August 1st and 2nd, Defendant had a training session in Washington, D.C.  She insisted on traveling alone, but Plaintiff felt uncomfortable with her traveling without him since she was new to the U.S. and was unfamiliar with the city.  Plaintiff booked an expensive hotel and rented a car, a Camaro, for the trip to Washington, D.C., trying to ensure a good experience for Defendant.  Despite sharing a room, the couple did not consummate the marriage during the trip.  Defendant frequently cited health issues as reasons.  (2T34-35).  Plaintiff told the court that Defendant did not enter the marriage in good faith while he, himself, entered the marriage in good faith.
[brief] On September 23, 2020, DEP published its receipt of [...]’s HAD application in the DEP Bulletin, a bimonthly list of construction permit applications recently filed with or acted upon by DEP, initiating the start of a thirty-day public comment period.  N.J.A.C. 7:38-11.4.  (Aa3-5).  DEP issued notice again on February 4, 2021 for a second public comment period.  (Aa10; Aa336).  On February 25, 2021, DEP informed [...] that, due to a technological issue, many public comments were unintentionally deleted from its servers.  (Aa336).  As a result, DEP determined it would hold an additional thirty-day public comment period, lasting until April 2, 2021.  (Aa14; Aa331-335).
[brief] “Although the defendant’s pleadings are defective to the extent that he failed to file a responsive pleading asserting this affirmative defense, such a defect was cured where evidence establishing the defense was introduced at the trial without objection …. ”  R. 4:9-2 is not permissive.  It directs that issues tried by implied consent of the parties “shall” be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.  It is “the duty of the court to consider issues raised by evidence received without objection even though no formal application is made to amend. ”  Underwriters Salvage Company of New York v. Davis Shaw Furniture Company, 198 F.2d 450, 453 (10th Cir. 1952).
[brief] (Pa260 at ¶¶8, 9, Exs. B, C.)  Borrowers were, however, notified at least twice—on May 12, 2021 (the following Wednesday after the May 7, 2021 wire, which fell on a Friday) and again on June 29, 2021—that the payoff was deficient, that the wired funds were rejected, and that the Loan was not discharged.
[brief] 2T120:19-121:3.  To maintain that status, [...] had to regularly submit financial documents and certifications subject to civil and criminal penalties regarding [...]’s finances and his own net worth.  4T138:16-144:17.  [...] described the hands-on way in which the two partners worked together to decide on the acquisition of a lab in Forked River.  “[M]e and [...] visited that lab and [...] had looked at all the books and records and I looked at all the laboratory part of the business . . .  I interview chemist and the field person, and [...] was talking to the owner of the lab.  And this is the process we went through in 1995 to acquire [the] lab. ”  2T13-22.
[brief] Evidence at trial showed:  [...] owns and operates three timeshare resorts in Atlantic City and Brigantine.  (Pa58 ¶¶66-67).  The Plaintiffs were each solicited to attend a “presentation” at one of [...]’s resorts by third-party entities through cold-calls, solicitations on the Atlantic City Boardwalk, or at booths or tables set up at events such as shopping malls, ballparks, festivals, etc.  (Pa58 ¶¶69-70).  [...]’s business model included violating numerous statutes and code provisions designed to protect consumers against unscrupulous timeshare resorts.  These violations started with the solicitation process, which was designed to hide the real purpose of the solicitations, and continued throughout the sales process until the Plaintiff literally walked out the door.  (Pa50-89).  The “presentations” the Plaintiffs attended were actually high-pressure and deceptive timeshare sales pitches.
[brief] 15  POINT I THE LEASE AGREEMENT DID NOT PLACE [...] UNDER A CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO CLEAR SNOW AND ICE FROM THE LOCATION WHERE [...] WAS ALLEGEDLY INJURED [Raised at Pa590-1172; Decided at Pa1-2].  15  POINT II  [...] HAD NO COMMON LAW DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE LOCATION WHERE [...] WAS ALLEGEDLY INJURED [Raised at Pa590-1172; Decided at Pa1-2]  ...............  17 POINT III  THE LAW DIVISION DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS  PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Raised at Pa929-1172; Decided at Pa1-2]  ...........................................  24 POINT IV  THE LAW DIVISION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED [...] MOTION TO DISMISS IN LIEU OF ANSWER AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT, BOTH, ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  GROUNDS  [Raised at Pa530-542; Decided at Pa11-12 and Raised at Pa590-1172; Decided at Pa1-2]  ...........................................  26 CONCLUSION  .........................................................  30  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING CROSS-APPEALED
[brief] | Pa. 50-61 | | Deposition transcript of the Deposition of Plaintiff [...] taken on May 26, 2022 attached as Exhibit E to the July 3, 2022 Certification of [...] in support of Defendant’s Motion to Quash a Subpoena.  | Pa. 63-100 | | Deposition Subpoena served on [...] on June 23, 2022 and documentation of service from [...] attached as Exhibit F to the July 3, 2023 Certification of [...] in support of a motion to quash a subpoena.
[brief] [...] and [...] shared a long history of mutual dislike while serving as members of the Board.  (Aa232-233).  [...] had campaigned against [...] during his 2019 bid for reelection to the Board.  (Aa233).  On November 5, 2019, [...] lost his bid for reelection to the Board, meaning that he would cease to be a Board member on January 1, 2020.  (Aa165; Aa219; Aa233).  One day after the election, [...] directed the Board’s attorney to research whether [...]’s participation in the political campaigning process during the 2019 Board election constituted an ethics violation.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Within a penumbra of secrecy and without the benefit of adequate notice, the Legislature enacted a sweeping abortion statute on the last day of the lame duck session.  Calling the law “[a]n ACT concerning freedom of reproductive choice,” the Legislature substituted new provisions for the bill that had been pending and the subject of debate for months.  The procedure employed by the Legislature violated both the New Jersey Constitution and statutes that the Legislature itself created.  Applicants-Petitioners [...] bring this action under N.J.S.A. 1:7-4 and within this court’s original jurisdiction, seeking to declare void and ineffective the statute enacted as L. 2021, c. 375.
[brief] See id. at pp. 7-9.  The closest the Defendants come to specifically citing what language of the charge is incorrect is the Defendants’ R. 2:6-2(a)(6) statement of where their argument was raised below, citing to 8T 30:20-91:12.6  See Db at p. 21.  In short, the Defendants have left it to the Court and opposing counsel to comb through the 75-page charge (or, if one is being generous, 60 pages based on their “citation”) to determine just what language contained therein is somehow erroneous.  Such a result is plainly unjust, and under these circumstances, the law of this state requires the Court to treat this issue as waived.
[brief] **[...]’s Affidavit of [...]’s Legal Services (Exh. “S”)**  Court disregarded I confirmed multiple times that NONE of [...]’s billed work, that was based on unnecessary filings w/fabricated, mistaken, & false claims & repeated rejections of a readily achievable 3-Way Settlement, would have been required if they had agreed to work on a 3-Way Settlement.  It meant that NONE of the billed work should have been approved by the Court.  Court disregarded that I repeatedly pointed out that his Affidavit for billed work was extensively littered with fabricated & false claims and blatant lies, all of which I refuted with substantiated facts in my Nov. 4, 2022 Certification, and that ALL billed work should NEVER have been approved by the Court.  Court also disregarded that some billed services were for legal work related to Estate Case Docket [...], & NOT for the Trust Case, & should NEVER have been approved by the Court.  See Jacobson’s Oct. 26, ‘22 Affidavit summary (256a, lines 2-4 {[...] & Appeals}; lines 7-8 {subpoena}; 257a, last 3 lines {2018 Estate tax returns}; 258a, lines 7-8 {Sibling Settlement})  Court disregarded it was rationally, ethically, & professionally disturbing for their grossly excessive request for Trust payment for $113,497 legal fees since it was incomprehensible how [...] and [...] allowed legal work for $10,902 from Nov. 11, ‘21 to Jan. 31, ’22, as per Oct. 2022 Order, & $113,497 from Feb. 1 to Oct. 25, ‘22, for a grossly excessive $124,399 total in order to allow [...] to resign as Co-Trustee, which all parties agreed to, & settle Trust based on Surrogate audited Accounting.
[brief] 2  References are as follows:  Da: Defendant’s Appendix Db: Defendant’s Brief  Pb: Defendant’s Pro Se Brief submitted February 28, 2024  PSR: Defendant’s Presentence Report dated December 12, 2022  1T: September 15, 2022  Trial Transcript 2T: September 19, 2022  Trial Transcript 3T: September 20, 2022
[brief] But [...] did not resign to avoid charges; he resigned because he could no longer work due to the disability arising from the same incident as the underlying charges.  The charges were dropped because [...] is disabled.  There was no quid quo pro arrangement and the charges were not dropped with prejudice and could be reinstated if [...]'s disability were ever to abate.  Unlike in *Cardinale*, [...] pleaded not guilty and requested a hearing.  Notably, [...] is not guilty of the disciplinary charges and he was willing and able to fight them if not for being permanently disabled as a result of the shooting.  Further, [...], unlike the petitioner in *Cardinale*, never submitted a separate, irrevocable resignation letter attached to the settlement agreement.  Similarly, the petitioner in *Rooth*, supra, submitted an irrevocable resignation letter, which was attached to her settlement agreement.  472 N.J. Super. at 357, 368.  Also, unlike in *Cardinale*, [...]'s settlement agreement made clear the PPD was to assist him in pursuing accidental disability benefits.  The fact that the administrative charges were tabled was merely a collateral, un-bargained for byproduct of the settlement agreement.  **Point II.
[brief] Da315.  This argument is contradicted by the language of the Post-Construction Inspection Report itself which clearly reflects and considers the complaints of the homeowner.  Da211.  For the interior post-construction inspection of the Living Room, the Post-Construction Inspection Report includes Defendant’s complaints yet found the conditions to be consistent with those pre-construction; “Homeowner stated the door to the kitchen does not open all the way due to a shift in the floor.
[brief] **POINT I**  **THE [...]'S MARCH 14, 2023 FINAL DECISION DENYING APPELLANT’S THIRD-PARTY HEARING REQUEST IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL APPLICABLE LAW AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD (Aa546-Aa555)**  [...]’s March 14, 2023 decision denying Appellant’s third-party hearing should be afforded considerable deference.  An administrative agency's action is afforded a "strong presumption of reasonableness" on review.  *Aqua Beach*  Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 186 N.J. 5, 16 (2006).  Reviewing courts afford substantial deference to the agency's decision particularly when it involves the agency's special expertise and knowledge.  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194-95 (2011).  The court should not overturn an agency's decision unless "(1) it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it violated express or implied legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or Federal Constitution; or (4) the findings on which it was based were not supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record."  University Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J.38, 48 (2007).  In this case, this Court should reject the claim that Appellant has a right to an adjudicatory hearing for both the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification and affirm [...]’s March 14, 2023 decision.
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[brief] ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING CROSS MOTION TO DISCHARGE LIS PENDENS | Da59 | | 4/26/24  ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND PERMIT TIME TO REDEEM | Da60 |  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief Page Number | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Rule 4:50-1 | 11 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1 | 15 | | 257-261 20th Ave. Realty LLC v. Roberto 2023 N.J. Super LEXIS 121 | 8,9 | | Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124 | 15 | | Fusco v. Board of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455.
[brief] [...] summoned an ambulance for defendant; an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) approached defendant at about 1:57:18 a.m. (1T7-15; Dca 1, clip one).  About one minute later, [...] and another woman, who had earlier spoken privately with defendant, were briefly observed sitting on a retaining wall on the opposite side of the courtyard from defendant; they were --- \(^4\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). not being questioned.  (Dca 1, clip one, 1:58:27 a.m. to 1:58:31 a.m.).  About twenty minutes after the initial call, [...] was dispatched to the scene.  (Da20).  Defendant told [...] he did not know how he had been injured, but [...] learned the EMTs administering to defendant opined that he had a gunshot wound.  (Da20).  [...] directed two officers to escort defendant to the hospital.
[brief] The registration search in this case was illegal for three reasons.  First, it is undisputed that neither [...] nor [...] was given an opportunity to produce the registration.  (2T 18-2 to 13; Da 9)  The failure to give them an opportunity is fatal to the search.  As this Court has recently held, “providing a detained motorist a meaningful opportunity to produce the registration certificate is an indispensable prerequisite to conducting a registration search. ”  *State v. Johnson*, 476 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2023).
[brief] (5T).  [...] admitted that [...] was at maximum capacity and would not have been able to manage the contract to service [...] at the time it entered into the contract with [...].  (5T76:13-19).  However, [...] did not tell [...] and [...] that [...] would be subcontracting the contract out.  Neither Mr. Iannuzelli nor his partner [...], provided any oversight over [...] at [...] on March 8th.  (5T88:12-16).  Mr. Iannuzelli claims that [...] made sure that they were there and that they had completed the services, but when asked when and how he made sure, he did not know, because he believed his partner was did but was not sure.  (5T100:12-101:7).  Within the court’s ruling, Plaintiff asked Mr. Iannuzelli how he felt [...] performed.  Mr. Iannuzelli testified that “he’s guessing they did a decent job. ” (89:17-18).  This testimony conflicted with his prior deposition testimony which did not seem limited to the April 2018 storm.  (Pa10-12)  [...], the other owner of [...], testified that [...] was not equipped to handle the contract for [...] when it entered into with [...], which is why [...] subcontracted the contract to [...].  (7T27:6-12).  Mr. Kestin had no personal knowledge as to what the property looked like from March 5th to the 15th, and whether there was snow, what efforts were made, or not made, how many people were working and what was done, and what was not done.  (7T65:5-11).  **Motion in Limine Hearing – July 19, 2023**