ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Deadly Force.  Force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm, constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animal.  A threat to cause death or serious bodily injury by the display of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the officer’s purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that deadly force will be used if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.
[brief] The defendant will rely on the statement of facts as set forth in the brief filed by appellate counsel in this matter.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE PCR COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS SUPPORTED BY CERTIFICATIONS WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING CONTRARY TO STATE V. PORTER, 216 N.J. 343 (2013), ESPECIALLY WHERE DEFENDANT MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, THEREFORE, THE ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING (Da 53 and Da 95)
[brief] This is because, in the toxic-tort context, “proof that a defendant’s conduct caused decedent’s injuries is more subtle and sophisticated than proof in cases concerned with more traditional torts. ”  *Landrigan*, 127 N.J. at 413.  A less traditional standard is essential because, unlike the typical personal injury action, the toxic-tort case often involves: (1) exposure of long duration, chronic and repeated; (2) exposure to multiple toxins; and (3) harm normally resulting from biochemical disruption or acute toxic substance as opposed to physical trauma.  *James v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 301 N.J.Super. 512, 531 (App. Div.1997), aff’d sub nom., *James v. Bessemer Processing Co.*, 155 N.J. 279 (1998).
[brief] That authority is this Court’s published opinion in *Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J., Inc.*, 446 N.J. Super. 570 (App.Div. 2016), where plaintiff [...] had a contract with the defendant for her services as an in-network HMO service provider.  The co-plaintiff in that matter was [...], her husband and office manager.  Shortly after that case was filed, defense counsel had sent *R. 1:4-8* letters to both plaintiffs, informing them that each of their claims was frivolous.  The letters stated that the wife's claim was frivolous because her contract had an express arbitration clause which precluded litigation, while the husband's claim was frivolous because he was not a party to the contract.  (However the husband incorrectly believed that he was a third party beneficiary of that contract).  Another 28 days had passed, but neither of the plaintiffs withdrew their claims, so a motion to dismiss was then filed and granted, and the trial court subsequently awarded sanctions against both plaintiffs.  However on appeal, this Court reversed, in essence finding that even though the defense was correct in its R. I:4-8 letters, and even though the plaintiffs failed to withdraw their claims, and even though the trial court properly dismissed all of the claims of both plaintiffs, nonetheless the trial court erred by awarding sanctions for anything prior to the dismissal of the original complaint.  This Court further held that even the plaintiffs' appeal of that ruling was proper and within their rights.  This Court held that the only sanctionable conduct came after the trial court's ruling that dismissed their original complaint, when the plaintiffs re-filed the exact same complaint a second time as an amended complaint while the appeal for the dismissal of the original complaint was still pending.
[brief] ”).  The [...] is a defendant in this matter represented by [...], and the [...] is the plaintiff is the case against [...].  Further, it is undisputed that the Attorney General, who brought the case against [...], is responsible for supervising all outside counsel, including [...]’s law firm, [...].  As our Supreme Court has stated, “When lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so. ”  Dewey, 109 N.J. at 217.  Clearly, [...] is “prohibited” from representing the [...] as a result of his indictment.  Accordingly, it is improper for his partners to continue representing the same clients.
[directive] It is important for county and municipal law enforcement agencies to recognize that, as they conduct internal affairs investigations, they do so under the general supervision of the Attorney General.  The Criminal Justice Act of 1970 designates the Attorney General as the State’s chief law enforcement officer.  See N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98.  As such, the Attorney General is responsible for the general supervision of the State’s law enforcement agencies to 1  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 provide for the efficient administration of the criminal justice system.
[brief] The Court went even further in explaining its reasoning, providing its opinion on why the general policy of the court’s procedural rules and cooperation between attorneys do not favor dismissal with prejudice:  We point out, moreover, that the litigation process cannot effectively take place without some measure of cooperation among adversaries.  Clearly the court ought not be unduly applied to for relief that the parties are able to arrange for themselves without prejudice to the justice system.  Beyond that, the trial court’s concern for the additional discovery by defendants that the expert report would require cannot justify the dismissal with prejudice.  Id.  “In sum, we are satisfied that under the totality of the circumstances, the dismissal with prejudice as against [the elevator company] was improvident.
[brief] Because The U.S. Fire Insurance Master Policy Itself Requires A Finding of Intentional Fraud by [...] To Void The Policy.  (Raised below by Third Party Defendant [...]; 2Tr6-13)  “Insurance policies are contracts…subject to general principles of contract law. ”  Botti v. CAN Ins. Co., 361 N.J. Super. 217, 224 (App. Div. 2003).  Although the court granted summary judgment on an equitable rescission theory, the U.S. Fire Master Policy at Section IV(B)(2) requires that the insurance company prove that [...] intentionally misled them about the 12-15 passenger vans on the application.
[directive] is engaged Officers Must Activate Additional Police Activities When Uniformed 5.3 Authority to Specify BWCs.  an agency may 12 of this Directive, of sections 5.1, 7, and Subject to the provisions uniformed or order that requires operating procedure, directive, promulgate a policy, standing in section enforcement activity not listed conducting specified law B WC when a officers to activate a consensual electronically record require uniformed officers to  For example, a department may 5.2. person under an officer approaches a police-civilian interactions where inquiries (i.e., field under leave and is no that he/she is free to reasonable person would believe circumstances where a electronically record officers to officer), or require uniformed converse with the may obligation to file a report or to departmental policy to be required by action the officer would any police where to require that might choose official patrol log.
[brief] Plaintiff, who was prescribed lithium for a bipolar condition, alleged that despite orders from her attending physician, [...] twice failed to provide updated lithium blood level reports to the physician.  As a result, plaintiff was allowed to develop lithium toxicity.  The judge explained, at 301-302:  "We find, however, that it is well within the purview of the ordinary juror whether or not Defendants' failure to follow or complete the order for lab tests constituted negligence.  We do not suggest that the average juror would know that an individual taking lithium needs such tests; we do find, however, that an average juror would know...whether or not an alleged failure to fulfill or complete prescriptions, orders and the like of the treating doctor deviates from the standard of care."
[brief] ”  (Id.).  The opportunity for [...]’s client to "complete the project" arose when the Appellants lost their lease.  [...] further described how his client needed to do significant work to obtain approvals once it had acquired development rights for the Property through its lease with [...].  (Pa002251).  (“We paid the engineers to get site plan approval.  The site plan approval on the property disappeared. ”).  Indeed, “every aspect of the project required work.  There were no third-party approvals at all[.]” (Id.).
[brief] *See Harris v. Viegelahn*, 575 U.S. 510, 135 S.Ct. 1829, 191 L.Ed.2d 783 (2015)  In a chapter 13 case, much like a chapter 11 case, the debtor remains in sole possession and control of property of the estate.  *Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2d* states that “[i]n a liquidation case under Chapter 7, as well as in a reorganization case under Chapter 11 where a trustee has been appointed, the debtor is required to surrender to the trustee all property of the estate.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).  “Good cause attributable to such work” is defined as “a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment. ”  N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.1(b).  Good cause means “real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones. ”  Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983).  Whether an employee's decision to leave work constitutes good cause must be determined using “the test of ‘ordinary common sense and prudence. ’”  Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 214 (1997) (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court held that, where there is a voluntarily leaving of work issue, the analysis requires review for both voluntary leaving and good cause attributable to the work.
[brief] Although these additional methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.  (Pb11-12).  The record demonstrates that the postcard was mailed on August 9, 2021.  (Pa14; Pa82-84).  That slight delay in mailing the postcard is immaterial, as postcard notification was not required under the Ricci Act, and information about the Ricci Act was prominently posted on the Division’s website and publicly available for two years from the effective date of the statute.  Even if this court were to find that postcards were a required mode of notice under the Ricci Act, the Board substantially complied by mailing them within thirty-two (instead of thirty) days of the effective date of the statute.  To suggest that such a minimal delay in sending over 200,000 postcards somehow eliminates the statutory deadline for filing claims would be an absurd result, and one this court should not accept.
[brief] 57 Heinecke v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., 841 N.W.2d 52 (WI App. Ct. 2013) .................................................... 42 Hurst v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2866 (App. Div. Oct. 21, 2014) .......... 29, 35  In re Accutane Litigation, 234 N.J. 340 (2018) .................................................................53, 70 Jacquillard v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19889 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2012) ......................... 54 James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279 (1998) ...........................................................................
[brief] Specifically, the [...] found that the “post-development recharge deficit is approximately 904,330 ft^3.  The recharge BMP’s provide a total recharge volume of 925,231 ft^3. ” (Aa0088).  This finding is based upon credible evidence in the record and consistent with the [...]’s overall finding that all of the requirements of the Stormwater Management Rules were met.  (Aa0087).
[brief] Cases  Ernest Bock & Sons-Dobco Pennsauken JV v. Township of Pennsauken, 477 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 2023) .................................................................  3, 4 Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 202, N.J. 369 (2010) .........................................................................................  3  M.J. Paquet v.  N.J. DOT., 171 N.J. 378 (2002) .......................................................................................... 12 Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307 (1994) ............................................................................................ 3 New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development v. [...], d/b/a [...], [...] and [...], 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826 (N.J. DOL May 6, 2010) ........................................... 5 P&A Constr., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge, 365 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................................. 12 R.C.G. Const. Co., Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Bor. Of Keyport, 346 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 2001) .................................................................. 5 State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460 (2017) ............................................................................................ 10 Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic County Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403 (1975) ............................................................................................. 15 Township of River Vale v. R.J. Longo Constr. Co., 127 NJ. Super. 207 (Law Div. 1974)
[brief] (Pa116; Pa96; Pa137)  [...] testified that he would not have looked for any video that would have shown the manner in which [...] had been operating the U-boat before the point of impact, but would have only looked for the camera angle that he would have assumed had the best view of the incident and that he would have scrolled through the footage looking for the point of impact.  (Pa97)  According to [...], if a situation arose where a customer was found pushing a U-boat with items that were obstructing the customer’s view, he would try to avoid incidents at all costs.  (Pa95)  When asked if he could recall a situation in which he would help a customer separate a customer’s oversized U-boat load onto two (2) separate U-boats, Mr. [...] testified “that would be something that could happen” and that because he was trained in safety, he was “trained to look out for things of that nature that could be unsafe . . .”  (Pa95)  However, he conceded that although he, in his role as manager, was provided some instruction as to how to push and maneuver the U-boats, no guidance was ever provided regarding the danger that an overloaded U-boat could pose.  (Pa95)  [...] (“[...]”), regional manager for [...], and who was regional manager for the Hackensack location at the time of Plaintiff’s accident, testified that a customer utilizing and pushing a U-boat should not stack a pile of merchandise on the U-boat high enough to the point where the customer is unable to see over the merchandise.
[brief] The Court paid lip service to [...] but failed to understand its importance.  For example, at p. 9, it points out:  The Court further adopted a 12-factor test originally established in Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 182-183 (App. Div. 1998), to determine whether an independent contractor may qualify as an employee for purposes of CEPA.  Here, we are not dealing with Chiropractor [...], but Attorney [...].
[brief] As [...] found, [...] and defendant's case involved two different sets of circumstances.  Defendant is attempting, in violation of N.J.R.E. 406, to claim that it was [...]’s habit to deploy his drug-sniffing K-9 without any reasonable suspicion.  (Db16-17).  Defendant bears the burden of establishing with a degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than [...]’s “mere 'tendency' to act in a given manner,” but rather that the officer’s conduct was “‘semiautomatic' in nature. ”  Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., 158 N.J. 329, 331 (1999) (quoting Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Systems, Inc., 847 F.2d 1290, 1293 (7th Cir.1988)).  Unlike [...], [...], in defendant’s case, had reasonable suspicion, as discussed above, to deploy his K-9.  (Da21; 1T29-15 to 30-1).  The business of the stop continued and was not delayed by the one minute or less it took the K-9 to alert to drugs in [...]’s vehicle.  (1T33-22 to 25).  Moreover, in defendant's case, [...] saw the large duffel bags in the back of [...]’s truck, but when he asked about those bags, [...] repeatedly lied and claimed that there was nothing in the back of her truck.  In sum, [...], an unpublished case, is irrelevant to the resolution of defendant's case.
[brief] **Defendants First Retaliate Against Plaintiff by Denying Her Requests for Leave.  (PA000009-PA000010). **  Plaintiff was entitled to a certain amount of paid time off (“PTO”) each year.  Id.  During one holiday season, Plaintiff worked on Thanksgiving, Christmas Day, and New Year’s Day.  Id.  Due to Plaintiff’s willingness to work on the holidays, she requested from Defendant [...] and Defendant [...] an additional three days of PTO.  Id.  Defendant [...] and Defendant [...] granted Plaintiff three extra days of PTO without issue.  Id.  In fact, Plaintiff consistently worked eighty (80) hour weeks and therefore she had the ability to take off without it affecting her already accumulated time off.  Id.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s next request for PTO directed at Defendant [...] and Defendant [...] was for the purpose of picking her daughter up from college.  Plaintiff requested two days for same.  Id.  However, this time, in an act of retaliation toward Plaintiff, Defendants denied Plaintiff’s second request for PTO.  Id.  Defendant [...] informed Plaintiff that she did not have the additional days to take off.  Id.  Believing she did in fact have available days off, Plaintiff told Defendant [...] that she was incorrect.  Id.  Rather than taking the time to verify Plaintiff’s amount of PTO, Defendant [...] referred Plaintiff to Defendant [...], the Manager of Schedules.  Surprisingly, when Plaintiff talked to Defendant [...], Defendant [...] agreed with Defendant [...] that Plaintiff did not have the ability to take the additional days off.  Id.  Plaintiff still did not believe this was correct, so she followed up with [...] who worked in the payroll department.  (PA000010).  [...] confirmed with Plaintiff that she did have enough time for her additional PTO request, and that Defendants [...] and [...] were wrong to tell her otherwise.  Id.  Frustrated that Defendants were denying her earned PTO, third, Plaintiff complained to the New Jersey Department of Labor (“DOL”) by filing a complaint regarding Defendants improper and retaliatory initial denial of her PTO request.  Id. iv.  **Defendants Escalate The Retaliation Against Plaintiff After Her DOL Complaint and Continued Business Practice Complaints.
[brief] By contrast, the State and the public have a significant and tangible interest in ensuring that school districts across the State fulfill their obligations to “[p]romote equal educational opportunity” and foster “a learning environment free from all forms of prejudice, discrimination, and harassment. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:7-14.  The trial court’s time-limited injunction promotes that public interest and causes no harm to Appellants as a result.
[brief] [...] had no obligation to place [...] on temporary suspension or to verify further her medical status.  In fact, the doctor’s note [...] received from [...] was produced by a medical office that had no \(^2\)  This certainly is not to say that [...]’s discretion in determining the standard for continued employment is completely insulated from review.  If appropriate facts existed, which they did not here, demonstrating inconsistent and/or arbitrary application of [...]’s discretion, the Arbitrator would have been well within his right to determine that the termination did not meet the “just cause” standard due to an inconsistent application of that performance standard, one of the traditional tests of “just cause.
[directive] Extended 42 36 42 36 45 48 51 42 48 51 42 24 30 33 IV 45 39 18 24 27 36 36 30 39 42 45 36 42 45 30 36 42 36 36 30 36 36 30 39 39 45 42 45 24 27 18  Serious 24 30 30 24 30 33 30 33 39 36 39 36 18
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING AVALONBAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND/OR A DELAY PENALTIES (Pa021, 1T62-3 to 63-23; 3T-17 to 33:14; 3T40-22 to 41-14)  The trial court’s granting of attorney’s fees and Delay Penalties was premised upon the granting [...]’s Motion in Aid, and thus a reversal of that motion will reverse the grant of the attorney’s fees and Delay Penalties.  Regarding the independent merits of reversal of the attorney fees and Delay Penalties, the Board respectfully incorporates by reference the legal arguments for same presented by the [...].  CONCLUSION
[brief] PLAINTIFF HAS NO OBLIGATION TO EXHAUST ANY ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES  "[T]he NJLAD does not have an exhaustion of remedies requirement."  Weisberg v. Realogy Corp., No. 12-30 (JLL), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38931, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2012).  Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a defense to an NJLAD claim.  Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 684, 684 A.2d 1385 (1996).
[brief] Nevertheless, [...] argues that the limitation period in the statute should not be strictly applied because it “fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act. ” (Pb14).  But this is a misinterpretation that contradicts the Legislature’s actual intent, as explicitly stated in the statute it enacted.  “The Court’s obligation when interpreting a law is to determine and carry out the Legislature’s intent. ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).
[brief] Respectfully submitted, *[...]*  Attorneys for *amicus curiae*  [...]  By: /S/ [...]  [...] cc: All counsel, via eCourts filing [...] and [...] f/k/a [...], et al., Plaintiffs, vs. [...], et als., Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Appellate  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: [...], PJ.Cv. PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF AND APPENDIX IN OPPOSITION TO [...]’S AND [...]’S INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL