ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Statement of Summary Judgment Motion Records | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 33 | | Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402 (2003) | 43 | | Ferreira v. Rancocas Ortho. Assocs., 178 N.J. 144 (2003) | 42 | | Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cty., Inc., | | | 250 N.J. 368 (2022) | 42,43,44 | | Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cty., Inc., | | | 466 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2021) | 43 | | Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) | 33 | | Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 170 N.J. 602 (2002) | 34,36,37,38,39 | | Lohmeyer v. Frontier Ins. Co., 294 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1996) | 34,35 | | Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 (1985) | 34,36,37 | | Mull v. Zeta Consumer Prods., 176 N.J. 385 (2003) | 38,39 | | Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398 (2001) | 42 | | Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bovlan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 | 32 | | (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998) | | | Schmidt v. Smith, 155 N.J. 44 (1998) | 35 | | Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg | | | & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010) | 43 | | Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, | | | 215 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1987) | 33,45 | | Suarez v. E. Int'l College, 428 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 2012), | | | certif. denied, 213 N.J. 57 (2013) | 40,45 | | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189 (2016) | 32,33 | | United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 35 N.J. 193 (1961) | 33 | | Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449 (2012) | 36,37 | | Constitutions | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J. Const. of 1844 art.
[brief] That’s not this case.  Under any circumstances that’s not this case.  [(9T90-11 to 25). ]  At the close of the State’s summation, defense counsel made an objection to the DUI hypothetical, saying, I object to the comparison of this case to a DUI in arguing that it would not be reckless manslaughter just because a gun was used but if it was a DUI, that would be a lesser offense than the gun so if it was a DUI, then it would be reckless but since it’s a gun, it can’t be reckless.
[brief] The clear language in both the MMA and PSA show defendant attested to the fact that [...] represented plaintiff and she was aware of her right to obtain counsel and chose to be unrepresented.  The court finds this assertion by defendant is not credible and holds no weight.  [A229, Op. at 16(emphasis added)].  Additionally, the trial court found [...]’s claims concerning lack of access to independent counsel be incredible:  The court also finds that the defendant’s testimony concerning she was unaware of her right to have legal counsel review the PSA to be incredible.
[brief] It is undisputed that [...] is a junk yard that primarily sells used auto parts, and only performs towing services on an ancillary basis.  (Pa2, Pa158 – Pa168)  It is undisputed that after receiving our mom’s vehicle on May 9, 2022 (i.e. due to a call from the local police reporting it as abandoned), [...] has since kept our mom’s vehicle for free, thereby yielding [...] a windfall benefit of $2,000 to $3,000 in used auto parts and scrap metal.  (Pa3)  It is undisputed that on May 11, 2022, the local police released the vehicle back to me, even though they knew that the title was still in my mom’s name.  (Pa38)  It is undisputed that on May 12, 2022 [...] offered me $400 for my mom’s vehicle, even after I made them completely aware of the situation with the title.  (See Pa40 and Pa41, which is my own transcript of my phone call with [...]).  It is undisputed that 10 minutes later [...] reneged upon this offer, then not wanting to pay anything at all for our mom’s vehicle.  But even at that time, it is undisputed that [...] still had no issue whatsoever with the title still being in my mom’s name.  It is undisputed that [...] never asked me to have the title transferred into my name, or to become an executor of my mom’s estate.  --- 4  There was nothing whatsoever in the record to support the trial court’s bald conclusion that Dirke’s decision to renege upon their agreement had anything to do with the person’s name on the title (e.g.  “And then somebody might have said well maybe we better talk to the boss, maybe we better talk to our attorney, or how are we going to take title from somebody that doesn’t have title?”)  (2T8:25 – 9:3)  Instead, this finding was literally pulled out of thin air.  It is undisputed that most junk yards / auto recyclers do not even require a title (See Pa42 – Pa54, showing that many junk car buyers require absolutely nothing, while [...] only requires a key, and [...] only requires either a registration card or insurance ID card in lieu of a title).
[brief] The variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and the zoning ordinance (Pa47); and 5.  The focus of the “substantial detriment” prong of the negative criteria is on the impact of the variance on nearby properties.  The Zoning Board found that there is no “substantial detriment” on nearby properties.  As depicted in the Plaintiffs’ own exhibit, the accessory structure is at least 300 feet from the Plaintiffs’ residence, which contradicts the Plaintiffs’ testimony.
[brief] 5T 26:11.  Emphasis added.  [...] also told the Board that the purpose of his rendering is “visual communication.  5T 15:16.  Plaintiffs’ Brief makes much of the supposed “industry standard” character of the software tools used by [...], but tools that may be helpful for some aspects of communication in industry are not inherently reliable as evidence.  Pb 47.  It was entirely reasonable of the Board to seek the basic indicia of reliability to be derived from post-development comparison of the renderings with reality, and for the Board to find not probative renderings without such support and subject to so many caveats about their reliability from their author.
[brief] Plaintiffs concede that they filed claims based on a single piece of innocuous information: “[...] was told that [Plaintiffs’] relationship [with [...]] ended because of a potential sale to [...][.]” (Pb30).  Plaintiffs further concede that [...]’s “knowledge” and “intention” were “*missing element[s]*” of their claim, (Pb30).  Plaintiffs’ Complaint and their admissions make it abundantly clear that they commenced this litigation in bad faith and with no factual or legal basis to do so.
[directive] Subj: Criminal - Revised Arraignment/ Initial Case Disposition Conference Order and (2)  Plea Cut-Off Exception  Form Date: December 18, 2017  This superseding Directive promulgates the revised form Arraignment/Initial Case (1) Disposition Conference Order (2) the revised form Request to Plead Case off the Trial List and a Plea Cut-Off Exception (Plea Cut-off Exception).  The two revised forms supersede the as forms originally promulgated by Directive 6-03 ("Implementation of Criminal Division Court as # Event Forms").  Directive 6-03, issued July 2003, promulgated Arraignment/Status 22, an on # Conference Order form a Plea Cut-Off Exception form.  Those forms were issued and in response a series of recommendations regarding the use of standardized statewide forms to in the Report of the Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges Criminal Division Managers and on Backlog Reduction (Backlog Report).  That Report was approved by the Judicial Council on October 2002.
[brief] As detailed above, Defendants not only refused to produce any additional documents or information, but added wholly inappropriate objections and reservations that [...], at the March 6 hearing, correctly observed were designed to prevent Defendants from being bound to their position that they essentially had no documents or information of any relevance to the case.  And yet, Defendants elected to move once again for the same relief without taking any further efforts to cure those deficiencies, including the relatively straightforward task of removing their objections and reservations to their previously rejected responses.  To make matters worse, Defendants’ counsel falsely claimed that Judge D’Elia had only took a few minutes to find that they had not complied with his prior instructions, when, in fact, the audio recording revealed the hearing lasted more than 20 minutes in which he gave multiple examples of how Defendants had not complied with their obligation to provide fully responsive discovery.  Far from being an abuse of discretion, the “ultimate sanction” of suppression with prejudice was more than warranted, just as the plain language of R. 4:23-5(b) as tempered by this Court’s holding St. James require.  In sum, while this Court has indeed tempered the mandate of R. 4:23-5(b) in permitting the defaulted party the opportunity to be put on notice as to what is required of it to come into full compliance with its discovery obligations, repeated bites at the apple or a compromise “lesser sanction” has never been contemplated.  Indeed, Defendants were given more leeway than what the framework requires in that they were given a second opportunity to comply with Judge D’Elia’s instructions, but, as [...] correctly observed, they chose to do nothing.  Restoring Defendants’ pleadings here would send the wrong message to other litigants in the courts of this State that they can willfully ignore their discovery obligations under a cynical guise of compliance, but face no meaningful consequences.  Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court’s June 12 Orders for this additional reason.
[brief] Appellant’s CFA Claim Fails Because She Did Not Plead The Requisite Elements of the Claim  In Point II of Appellant’s Brief, she combined her argument under the NJCFLA with her argument under the CFA.  The heading of Point II, at least, asserts that violations of the NJCFLA give rise to violations of the CFA.  (Pb6).  Section A above already demonstrates why Appellant cannot assert a private claim under the NJCFLA under any moniker, whether called a CFA claim, a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief, or an FDCPA claim (all as discussed further below).  Nonetheless, even if that were not the case, Appellant simply did not plead the requisite elements of the CFA sufficient to state a claim.  Indeed, the trial court held correctly that Appellant’s CFA claim fails as a matter of law under the language of that statute.
[brief] Within 30 days following issuance by the [...]hitect of (App. Div. 1991) (determining that ECD and judicial economy militate in favor of requiring assertion of cross-claim for contribution in underlying tort action, even though “technically a right of contribution does not arise until a tortfeasor has paid more than his pro rata share”).  the Certificate for Payment covering such substantially completed Work, the Contractor shall, to the full extent allowed in the Prime Contract, make payment to the Subcontractor, deducting any portion of the funds for the Subcontractor’s Work withheld in accordance with the certificate to cover costs of items to be completed or corrected by the Subcontractor.  Pa609 § 11.2.  Similarly, Section 11.3 required [...] to issue “Final Payment” to [...], which “constitut[es] the entire unpaid balance of the Subcontract Sum…within seven days after receipt of payment from the Owner,” or if “the Contractor does not receive timely payment…final payment to the Subcontractor shall be made upon demand. ”  Pa609 § 11.3 (emphasis added).  [...] thus had ripe claims on unpaid balances at the [...] at, and before, the time of the First Arbitration.  A claim ripens “when there is an actual controversy, meaning that the facts present ‘concrete contested issues conclusively affecting’ the parties’ adverse interests. ”  Matter of Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation, 230 N.J. 258, 275 (2017); see also Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 139 N.J. 532, 535 (1995) (adding cause of action accrues when “the party seeking to bring the action ha[d] an enforceable right,” e.g., when the alleged breach occurs).  Indeed, [...] alleged it was owed $2.1 million in the First Arbitration, Pa201 ¶ 46, and now alleges it is owed that same $2.1 million in the Second Arbitration, Pa584, proving that it knew of a valid enforceable right at that time. \textsuperscript{11}  Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling on the issue of ripeness is both hinged upon an incorrect factual basis, and misstates the law as to ripeness.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of repeat-offender statutes is deterrence.  State v. Hawks, 114 N.J. 359, 365 (1989).  The people the Legislature sought to deter are “those criminals from society who demonstrate an inability to refrain from repeated commission” of crime.  State v. Galiano, 349 N.J. Super. 157, 165 (App. Div. 2002) (discussing the similar goals of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7c, and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, all repeat-offender statutes).  “[T]he reason for the infliction of severer punishment for a repetition of offenses is not so much that defendant has sinned more than once as that he is deemed incorrigible when he persists in violating the law after conviction of previous infractions. ”  State v. Johnson, 109 N.J. Super. 69, 75 (App. Div. 1970).  At 26 years old at the time of the offense, with two prior fourth-degree convictions, it is too soon to deem [...] “incorrigible” and therefore subject him to an extended term.  Even the top of the ordinary term would be too severe for these two offenses.  Moreover, the court inappropriately imposed a discretionary parole disqualifier under N.J.S.
[brief] See Section III(A).  To establish undue hardship for a height variance, an applicant must show that “the property for which the variance is sought cannot reasonably accommodate a structure that conforms to, or only slightly exceeds, the height permitted by the ordinance. ”  Id.  at 51.  “Stated differently, the applicant for a (d)(6) variance on grounds of hardship must show that the height restriction in effect prohibits utilization of the property for a conforming structure. ”  Id.  Plaintiff’s proofs satisfy this standard.  Alternatively, the applicant may satisfy the positive criteria if the proposed structure would “not offend any purposes of the height restriction and ‘would nonetheless be consistent with the surrounding neighborhood.
[brief] ...  (h) medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited by statute or judicial decision."  ([...] Cert., exhibit A).  As discussed above, medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited under New Jersey law.  Moreover, although there are no published decisions that prohibit recovery in circumstances similar to this one, medical payment subrogation claims are clearly prohibited in workers' compensation cases.  The only judicial decision directly on point is unpublished.  By rendering a decision on this matter, the arbitrator clearly exceeded his authorized powers as this was not a matter that he was authorized to hear.
[brief] During the public comment portion of the June 2022 hearing, several individuals who live in or around the neighborhood at issue voiced concerns regarding the abundance of traffic in the neighborhood, and the fact that these nine new homes, with or without the inclusion of basement apartments, will only add substantially to the traffic issue.  One member of the public reiterated a concern of the board members, which is that there is no parking from [...] to [...], in addition to three large shuls in the area, two of which have full-time colleges and host events at night.  (2T122-11 to 2T122-19)  Throughout the hearings, the Board members made suggestions to the applicant as to ways in which to improve the plan so that the Board would feel more comfortable approving same.
[directive] Comer ( slip op. 5-6).  of  The Court analyzed the constitutionality the statutory framework for sentencing juveniles under the following three part-test, which is "generally the same" under both Constitutions: (1) whether the punishment for the crime conforms of with contemporary standards decency; (2) whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the offense; and (3) whether the punishment goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective.  Comer (slip op. 25, citations omitted).  The Court determined that the sentencing provision as applied to of juveniles failed each part the test, but it declined to strike the statute as it applies to juveniles since "allowing minors a later opportunity to show they have matured, of to present evidence their rehabilitation, and to try to prove they are fit to reenter society would address the problem posed."  Comer (slip op. 51), citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 79 (2010).  Instead, the Court added a lookback provision, permitting juvenile offenders sentenced under the murder statute to request a review of their sentence after serving 20 years.  The Court explained that this intervention was necessary to prevent the statute from being invalidated on constitutional grounds, noting that the Legislature would want the law to survive.
[brief] In granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration, the trial court cited Cole multiple times—primarily emphasizing the “prolonged litigation” analyzed in Cole.  See T1 10:11-12:14.  Moreover, the trial court based at least a portion of its totality-of-circumstance analysis by “presum[ing] there was [a demand for arbitration] inserted into the answer. ”  T1 10:24-25.  Which Defendants’ counsel then erroneously confirmed.  See T1 10:25-11:5.  After [...]’s counsel corrected the record and informed the trial court that, in fact, Defendants had not asserted arbitration as an affirmative defense and had instead certified that arbitration was not contemplated, the trial court stated “Okay.  All right.  Then I stand corrected on the factual record.  But because of the lack of the total lack of real substantive litigation since the 4:6-2 motion was decided, I still stand by my opinion, for the record. ”  T1 13:3-7 (emphasis added).  Notwithstanding the trial court’s error with respect to assertion of arbitration in Defendants’ pleadings, the trial court all but disregarded Defendants’ Cross Motion to Dismiss as ‘substantive litigation’ and measured only the actions taken by Defendants during the year after the Cross Motion to Dismiss was denied.  Moreover, the trial court repeatedly emphasized the ‘prolonged litigation’ in Cole (being twenty-one months) while failing to acknowledge that the instant litigation had gone on for at least seventeen months.
[directive] Będzie Pan(i) musiał(a) zapłacić minimalną nawiązkę c. na VCCO w kwocie 50 USD [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] (minimalnie 100 USD w przypadku skazania za przestępstwo z użyciem przemocy) za każdy zarzut, do którego się Pan(i) przyznaje?  (Jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce między 9 stycznia włącznie, kwota ta wynosi 30 USD.  Jeśli przestępstwo miało 1986 r. a 22 grudnia 1991 r. miejsce przed 1 stycznia 1986 r., kwota wynosi 25 USD).
[brief] Plaintiff Failed to Identify Any Document or Statement That Could Constitute a Contract, Implied Contract, or Agreement to Give Rise to a Claim for Breach of Contract and Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing  In another futile attempt to further his claim that he was wrongfully terminated, Plaintiff repeatedly makes the baseless argument throughout his briefing that he was a member of a collective bargaining unit and that he was allegedly denied protections that should have been afforded to him as a union member.  (Passim.)  These claims must fail because Plaintiff never pled such a claim in his Complaint and only raised this argument for the first time in his opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
[brief] Here, there is no factual dispute that Defendant was uncounseled when he entered his guilty plea before the [...] on May 15, 2017.  See the entire Certified Transcript of May 15, 2017 for that factual assertion.  However, as stated above, there were three ostensible waivers of Defendant’s right to counsel set forth in his plea proceeding:  THE COURT:  As I indicated back in September, you have the right to be represented by an attorney.  You indicated back in March of 17 that you intended to retain private counsel, and then when we rescheduled it for the 27th you failed to appear.  I take it you wish to waive both the private counsel and the public defender and wish to plead guilty today, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  Yeah -- (T1:4-16 to 4-24).  * * *  THE COURT:  And did you get a chance to talk with private counsel?  [...]: No, -- I was homeless and I messed up and take the penalties and – stand up.  THE COURT: All right.  And again, you wish now to waive that right to appointment of the public defender and to plead guilty today, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  (T1:5-10 to 5-17).  THE COURT: Do you understand that these are serious penalties, even today you have the right to apply for the appointment of a public defender.  Knowing all this you want to waive your right and proceed, is that correct?  [...]: Yes. (T1:7-12 to 7-17).  Notwithstanding the foregoing “waivers,” Defendant submits that he could not have made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel to the most serious motor vehicle offense heard in municipal court without the benefit of ever requesting and/or reviewing in his DWI prosecution.
[brief] The Highlands Rules DEP promulgated accordingly incorporated the WQPA standards.  Id.; see also 40 N.J.R. 4000(a) (July 7, 2008) (modifying WQMP rules after the Act passed).  The Highlands rules allow for new individual subsurface disposal systems, commonly known as septic systems, “where the sanitary wastewater design flow is 2,000 gallons per day or less” and the project satisfies DEP’s Standards for Individual Subsurface Sewage Disposal Systems at N.J.A.C. 7:9A.  N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.4(b) and (c).  This capacity standard is the same for septic systems outside of the Highlands Region as well.  N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.4(a)(3); N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(f)(5).  DEP also requires any applicant seeking to amend a WQMP in the Highlands region to simultaneously submit the application to the Highlands Council to “ensure” the Council has “an opportunity to make recommendations prior to Department review of the application.
[brief] In other words, private plaintiffs need to “demonstrate a cognizable and calculable claim of loss due to the alleged CFA violation. ”  *Thiedemann*, 183 N.J. at 249….  *In CFA cases alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or deception in selling or advertising*, demonstrating “either out-of-pocket loss or ... loss in value will suffice to meet the ascertainable loss hurdle and will set the stage for establishing the measure of damages. ”  *Id.* at 248.  *Robey*, 256 N.J. at 555–56 (emphasis added).  The CFA claims asserted here do not sound in fraud or misrepresentation of the selling or advertising of merchandise, but rather allege an unconscionable and abusive commercial practice in the imposition of an abusive, unlawful, and unfair penalty in a residential lease.  Therefore, the ascertainable loss issues discussed in *Robey* are of little relevance.  IV.
[brief] Last, Defendant references one of the unpublished state court decisions and its reference to a Senate Report.  Db10.  To be clear, there is no report from the whole Senate.  There is only a report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs recommending the adoption of H.R. 5294.  S. Rep. 95-382 (1977) at *1, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695 at 1699.  Pa219-Pa231.  The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a statute’s language is the *only* authoritative statement of Congress’s intent.  As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.