ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This will show up anytime he attempts to buy a house, obtain a credit card, buy a car or transact any other business for the remainder of his life.  This is all the result of Defendant’s insurer’s failure to deal in good faith and its failure to take advantage of the many opportunities it had to resolve the case within the policy limits.  In particular, it should be noted that one year prior to the trial, Plaintiff warned that Defendant’s primary and excess insurers, [...] and [...], respectively, were committing bad faith and were exposing their insured to an excess judgment, despite the fact that bankruptcy was filed.
[brief] ...........................................................................................................  20  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Aden v. Fortsh,** | 19 | | 169 N.J. 64 (2001) | | | **Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency,** | 7, 12 | | 197 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1984) | | | **Dimarino v. Wishkin,** | 20 | | 195 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1984) | | | **First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson,** | 17 | | 177 N.J. 125 (2003) | | | **Fitzpatrick v. Qasim,** | 11 | | 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1529 (App. Div. 2023) | | | **Indus. Dev. Assoc. v. F.T.P., Inc.,** | 20 | | 248 N.
[brief] This litigation arises out of Borrower’s default on certain obligations under a promissory note and loan agreement, leading plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff” or “Respondent”) to seek foreclosure on a mortgage (the “Mortgage”) in the original principal amount of $17,221,780.00.  The Mortgage encumbers certain real property known as [...], and the buildings and improvements located thereon.  Da193.  Defendants disputed certain events of default noticed by Plaintiff and commenced an arbitration.  Da5.  On April 23, 2022, the arbitrator (the “Arbitrator”) in this underlying arbitration between Defendants and plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”), [...] (the “Arbitration”), issued the Phase I Interim Award wherein the Arbitrator “[found] in favor [Plaintiff] on its claim for breach of Note against [Borrower] and for breach of the Guaranty against [...].
[brief] 5 Dwight Assocs. v. Township of Fairfield, 2012 N.J. Super.Tax Unpub. LEXIS 36 (N.J. Tax Ct. October 26, 2012)  .........................  Da5  Corporate Realty Servs., LLC v. Croghan, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1623 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 10, 2018)  ......................  Da22  Emerald Bay Developers, LLC v. Lenyk Auto., Inc., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2125 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. September 25, 2018).  .  Da28  Exclusive Detailing v. Prestige Auto Group, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3135 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. December 21, 2021)  ........  Da35  Jet Leasing Support Servs. United States v. Curcio Mirzaian Sirot, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 2, 2022) . .  Da41  Loprete v. Mohegan Sun, Inc., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. April 27, 2006)  ...............................  Da48  Ten W. Apparel v. Mueser Rutledge Consulting Eng’rs,, 2020  N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. Unpub. LEXIS 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. February 28, 2020)  .................................  Da53  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pb34  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS APPEALED FROM APRIL 11, 2024  ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT  A.  April 11, 2024  Order is at Pa48.  B.  April 11, 2024  Written Opinion is at Pa49 to Pa71.  C.  Intermediate Opinion: Planning Board's March 27, 2023  Resolution is at Pa18 to Pa27  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] N.J. Stat. § 2A:17-36 (Pa 165) states:  Notwithstanding any other law or court rule to the contrary, a sheriff or other officer selling real estate by virtue of an execution may make five adjournments of the sale, two at the request of the lender, two at the request of the debtor, and one if both the lender and debtor agree to an adjournment, and no more, to any time, not exceeding 30 calendar days for each adjournment.  However, a court of competent jurisdiction may, for cause, order further adjournments.  28.
[brief] 1.  Respondents opened and maintained six [...] accounts and agreed to resolve all disputes through FINRA arbitration.  [...] is a SEC registered securities broker-dealer, providing investment services in the United States and Canada.  It is regulated by, among others, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), which is overseen by the SEC.  Respondents are former investment clients of [...].  [...] is [...]’s goddaughter and a [...] joint account holder who was authorized to make financial decision for [...] under a Power of Attorney.  (Da063-Da066).  In the spring of 2018, Respondents opened six separate [...] brokerage accounts with the company and established brokerage relationships that continued at least --- 2  Transcript citations with the prefix “1T” refer to the transcript of oral argument on defendants’ motions to compel arbitration on February 7, 2024, and citations with the prefix “2T” refer to the transcript of [...]’s decision rendered virtually on April 12, 2024.
[brief] PA – 47 to 224.  Plaintiff certified to being the original creditor of the subject account, which Plaintiff respectfully submits demonstrated its ownership of same as required by Oughla.  Oughla, 437 N.J. Super. at 304.  Plaintiff also included numerous account statements for the subject account.  Most notably, Plaintiff included the periodic statement for the last billing cycle prior to charge-off (closing date of October 26, 2018 in the final amount of $21,432.55), which is prima facie proof of the amount --- 4  A trial court adjudicating a motion for summary judgment on a revolving credit card account must meet the requirements of R. 6:6-3(a) for a default judgment, which Plaintiff respectfully due at charge-off.  PA – 219 to 224; See Oughla, 437 N.J. Super. at 304.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO HOLD A HEARING BEFORE ENFORCING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT  Appellants argue that “the Agreement was presented in a manner that was rushed and lacking in fairness, mirroring the conditions in Kleine.  Accordingly, the trial court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Agreement is unconscionable. ”  Appellants opine that further discovery is necessary to determine the factual circumstances surrounding [...] signing the Agreement.  Appellants claim that review of the security footage from the time [...] signed the Agreement “is critical for the factfinder to assess whether [...] was given a genuine opportunity to review the Agreement and to verify his assertion that a line of patrons was forming behind him, pressuring him to act quickly. ”  Appellants attempt to draw comparisons between the matter at hand and the facts at issue in Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 2016), however, the circumstances have shockingly little in common.
[directive] Soliciting or Recruiting Gang Members ................................................................................................................................................... 66, 67  Stalking .........................................................................................................................................................................................................  24  Strict Liability for Drug-Induced Deaths ......................................................................................................................................................... 72  Tampering with Witnesses and Informants ...................................................................................................................................................  54  Terroristic Threats .........................................................................................................................................................................................  23  Theft ............................................................................................................................................................................... 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43  Unlawful Possession of Weapons ............................................................................................................................................... 75, 76, 77, 78  Unlawful Taking of a Means of Conveyance .................................................................................................................................................  45  Use of 17-Year-Old or Younger to Commit Criminal Offenses ...................................................................................................................... 52  7  Updated December 2, 2013  Index of Bail Schedule 2 Crimes  Use of Certain Electronic Devices in Correctional Facilities .......................................................................................................................... 59  Use of Juvenile in Theft of Automobiles ........................................................................................................................................................ 46  Violation of Community Supervision for Life / Parole Supervision for Life ..................................................................................................... 82  8  Updated December 2, 2013  Index of Bail Schedule 2  Disorderly Persons Offenses and Petty Disorderly Offenses
[brief] cc: [...], D.A.G. August 22, 2024  VIA E-COURTS  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division - P.O. Box 006 R.J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006  Re: [...] v. [...]  Docket No. [...]  On appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the [...] Letter Brief of Respondent, [...] on the Merits of the Appeal Dear Mr. Orlando:
[brief] On January 27, 2021, [...] introduced Ordinance 1667 (Pa 68, 533), proposing to adopt the Second Amendment of the “Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan” applicable to Block 184, Lots 1, 3.02, 3.03 and a portion of Lot 3.01, which Second Amendment proposed to supersede in its entirety a previous Redevelopment Plan adopted in 2017 (1T).  Ordinance 1667 and the Second Amended Redevelopment Plan were considered by the [...] Planning Board on February 8, 2021 (2T).  The Planning Board Attorney submitted a February 17, 2021 letter to [...] memorializing the Planning Board findings that the Second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan (Pa573) (3T).  Ordinance 1667 was then adopted by [...] on February 17, 2021.
[brief] He asserts that he was afraid of not being able to have a fair trial.  He asserts that he couldn't prove his innocence.  He asserts that motions had not been resolved in his favor which caused him to look at his chances of success before a jury a certain way.  And he also was influenced by external factors that related to letters that were received during the time period when he maintained his innocence and threat from the co-defendant to get him and his family.  He articulates a concern that his family would be killed.  These arguments are largely advanced to the Court in oral argument.  They're not part of the defendant's pro se pleadings.  In fact, those pleadings are very sparse in terms of the information that's there.  He speaks in argument today through counsel, letters that he's received and things that have happened to his family.  The Court doesn't have any of that information here.  There's nothing for the Court
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................................  5  A. Appellant’s Arrest .....................................................................................................................  5  B.  [...] Attempts to Perform Three Alcotests on Appellant ........................................  10  C.  The Probable Cause Hearing Before the [...] .........................................  11  D.  The Municipal Judge Finds Appellant Guilty of Driving While Intoxicated ...............................  12  E.  The Law Division Judge Finds Appellant Guilty of Driving While Intoxicated ..........................  13  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................
[brief] A Notice of Hearing dated February 13, 2023, was published in the newspaper and provided pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12 by the applicant.  (Pa28-31; 1T 9:18-24).  Although the notice states “Copies of the application and plans are available for review at the [...], [...], [...], [...], during normal business hours” the notice is clear that they are available for review at the [...], which are located one block away at [...], [...], NJ 08751.  The municipal offices of the [...] were previously located at [...], which location now houses the [...] Police Department and is adjacent to the [...] building.  Since the [...] moved the physical location of its offices, there has been a notice on the door of the old location at Boulevard & Sherman Avenues indicating the new location of the municipal offices had moved to [...].  Specifically, there is a lettered notice on the door of the Police Department stating “[...] Police Department – Secure Area Employees Only – All other departments are located at 100 Grant Ave. ”  This is the same lettering that existed at the time of the February 27, 2023, hearing with regard to the subject application.
[brief] 10.  On March 7th, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs under R. 4:69-1 and Action Permitted under N.J.S. 10:6-1, 2 (Pa 27-29), a motion for stay (Pa 108-110) and order to show cause (Pa 15-18, Pa 19-21) under R.4:69-3 supported by certification (Pa 39-40), and with brief seeking relief by way of stay, restraint or otherwise as the interest of justice required.
[brief] The legal reasoning underpinning each of these decisions is public policy.  Generally, the line of cases hold that because it is unfair to a person who has sustained damages to be prevented from pursuing their common law right to civil tort remedies, an immunity statute denying them the right to pursue those damages should be interpreted narrowly.  The Supreme Court in Velazquez at 259 stated this point very articulately.  “That narrowly tailored interpretation does the least violence to our citizens’ common law right to institute tort actions against those whose negligence injures them. ”  Tort law has a long history of making the lives of American citizens safer.  Asbestos litigation has made the manufacturers of building materials produce safer products and saved millions of lives.  Civil lawsuits have altered the conduct of manufacturers of motor vehicles, pharmaceutical products and medical devices.  In each of these industries and others, companies have been incentivized to design and manufacture safer products.  This incentive was provided by the potential for civil tort liability if their product was unsafe or defective.  Immunity statutes, when applied too broadly, can create disincentives to companies to conduct their businesses in a safer way, because they are not subject to the civil tort system that can call them into account for their unsafe practices.  Thus, public policy must be considered when interpreting civil tort immunity statutes.
[brief] (a)  Control by Court; Purposes.  The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.  (b)  Scope of Cross-examination.  Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness’ credibility.  The court may allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.  The Trial Court’s role was further elucidated in Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 609-10 (App. Div. 2019):  "[C]ontrol[ling] and manag[ing] the introduction of testimony" is within the discretion of the trial court, Hall v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 343 N.J. Super. 88, 107, 777 A.2d 1002 ( App. Div. 2001), and "[its] decision ... [is] conclusive unless clearly erroneous as a matter of law."
[brief] The Property is within the “coastal area” established by CAFRA.  2Ra18.  In addition, the Property is within an area of [...] designated as an Area in Need of Redevelopment pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq. (the “Redevelopment Area”).  2Ra68.  Specifically, the Property is in the Beachfront South Sector of the Redevelopment Area.  2Ra68.  Development of the Property is accordingly subject to the applicable rules and standards set forth in the CZM Rules and the redevelopment plan for the Redevelopment Area.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 416 (quoting *Di Cosala v. Kay*, 91 N.J. 159, 173 (1982)).  The elements of a claim for negligent training and supervision are “essentially the same” as the elements of a negligent hiring claim, “but framed in terms of supervision or training. ”  *Ibid.*  An employer may be liable for negligent training or supervision (1) if it knew or had reason to know that the failure to supervise or train an employee in a certain way would create a risk of harm, and; (2) that risk of harm materialized and caused the plaintiff’s damages.
[brief] ”  “Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned. ”  Our courts have long recognized that laches is not governed by fixed time limits, but instead relies on analysis of time constraints that “are characteristically flexible,”  Unlike the mechanical application of a fixed time prescribed by a statute of limitations, laches operates as do other equitable doctrines.  That is, “[w]hether laches should be applied depends upon the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2.  Any agency determination that qualifies as an administrative rule must comply with the APA's rulemaking requirements.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3a(a); In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1, et seq., 431 N.J. Super. 100, 134 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 8 (2013) (“If an agency . . . action constitutes an ‘administrative rule,’ then its validity requires compliance with specific procedures of the APA that control promulgation of rules. ”).  Administrative agencies are part of the Executive Branch and are “creatures of legislation,” such that their powers are “limited to those expressly granted by statute or fairly implied as necessary. ”  *N.J. Dep’t of Labor v. Pepsi-Cola Co.*, 170 N.J. 59, 65 (1980).  While agencies have significant authority, their powers are not absolute and they must follow specific rules to be fair, uniform and predictable to members of the regulated community.
[brief] Within his opening statement, counsel for plaintiff referenced a site inspection that occurred during the course of the subject road widening project but prior to the date of plaintiff’s accident.  According to plaintiff’s counsel, this site inspection included the identification of significant settlement at the north approach of the bridge where plaintiff’s accident allegedly occurred.  (3T23:6-16).  On direct examination, [...] discussed a June 26, 2015 memo prepared by the engineering firm [...] (Pa1191) following the site inspection referenced in plaintiff’s opening statement.  As per [...], the memo memorialized the existence of significant roadway settlement at the north approach of the bridge in the southbound direction.  (3T79:9-84:2).  [...] went on to testify that based on the T&M memo, the defendants knew "without a doubt" about settlement at the north approach of the bridge in the southbound direction of travel where plaintiff's accident allegedly occurred.  (3T91:8-20).  On cross-examination, however, [...] materially changed his testimony.  [...] was presented with a July 7, 2015 email prepared by [...], the project design engineer with [...], directed to multiple recipients discussing the content of the T&M memo.  (3T166:11-168:15).  Within the subject email, project engineer [...] expressly corrected the content of the T&M memo with respect to the location of the observed settlement.  As per [...], the settlement existed along the south abutment as opposed to the north abutment as noted in the memo.  (3T168:16-25).  [...] recognized at the hearing, as he had previously done at his deposition, that he has no basis to challenge the veracity of the clarifying memo communicating that settlement had been observed at the south rather than the north abutment.  (3T169:20-170:10).
[brief] The CLA provides the [...] with similar authority, while also creating a private cause of action allowing for --- 1  The CLA amended several times (discussed below), with the last amendment being the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act in 2009.  cancellation of the loan contract and an award of damages unless the lender can show that it has acted in good faith.  *Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp.*, 150 N.J. 255, 273-73 (1997).  This statute has been privately enforced for decades.  In *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co.*, 168 N.J. 255 (2001), the New Jersey Supreme Court described in detail the requisite test for determining whether a statute impliedly confers a private right of action and analyzes an application of the same.
[brief] See Mule v. NJM, 356 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2003)², wherein this Court explained as follows:  The fact that a car accident occurs on an employer’s property between two co-employees, and that injury to the employee who is in the course of her employment at the time is compensable at the time is compensable under the Worker’s Compensation Act, does not automatically mean that the injured employee’s common law claim against the other is barred by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  The critical question is whether both employees were --- ²  The Mule case was inadvertently mis-cited as 356 N.J. Super. 289 on page 43 of Plaintiff’s initial brief.  Plaintiff apologizes to the Court and counsel for the error. in the course of their employment at the time the accident occurred.  If not, the fact that both motorists were co-employees is without legal significance.  [Emphasis added.]  There must be a “causal connection between the employment and the injury”, meaning that “the work” must have been a “contributing cause of plaintiff’s injury and that the risk of the occurrence was reasonably incident to defendant’s employment.