ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This argument is without merit and has been denied in various motions in the trial court.  The same arguments were made to the trial court throughout the Spring, Summer and Fall of 2024 and lost on each occasion without any appeals.  These occasions include the following motions by Defendants:  1.  On May 8, 2024, [...] filed a Motion to Stay Case.  These issues appear in its Memorandum of Law in support of the motion.  On May 24, 2024 this motion was denied.  (Dr44)  because the January 4, 2024 Consent Order had expired.  2.  On July 3, 2024, [...] filed a Motion to Reconsider the above May 24, 2024 Order.  These issues appear in its Memorandum of Law in support of the motion.  On August 16, 2024 this motion was denied.  (Pra270)  3.  On July 11, 2024, [...] filed a Motion to Stay Case.  These issues appear in its Memorandum of Law in support of the motion.  On August 16, 2024 this motion was denied.  (Dr67)  4.  On October 16, 2024, [...] filed a Motion to Remove from (court) Arbitration.  These issues appear in its Memorandum of Law in support of the motion.  On November 8, 2024 this motion was denied.  (Dr81)  5.  On **October 31, 2024**, [...] filed a Cross-Motion to Stay Case.  These issues appear in its Memorandum of Law in support of the motion.  On **November 8, 2024** this motion was denied.  (Dr84)  All of these motions and briefs included the same contentions regarding FAA and NJAA requirements and all were denied.
[brief] (4T: 142:01 – 145:19).  On October 9, 2023, Respondent submitted a proposed Order for Judgment in accordance with the Five-Day rule.  Pa013.  On October 17, 2023, said Order was entered by the Court, without objection; assessing pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten thousand eight hundred eighty-five dollars and forty-eight cents ($10,885.48).  Da029.  On October 19, 2023, Respondent filed a Motion to assess costs, fees and Offer of Judgment penalties against Appellant, based upon the triggered Offer of Judgment.
[brief] Defendant’s arguments are only that – argument, not fact.  To prove causation, plaintiff must prove that the defect was a substantial factor which singly, or in combination with another cause, brought about the accident.  See, e.g., Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 149; Michalko, supra, 91 N.J. at 400.  A substantial factor is one that is not a remote, trivial, or inconsequential cause.  Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 423 (2014); see Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.40I “Proximate Cause” (Feb. 1989).  So long as the plaintiff proves that the product in question added to the risk of the occurrence of the particular accident, then the plaintiff has established that the product defect was a proximate cause of the accident.  Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.40I “Proximate Cause” (Feb. 1989); see Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 150.  Once plaintiff comes forward with that proof, the issue of causation is for a jury to decide.  Townsend, supra, 221 N.J. at 59-60.
[brief] However, the Board submits this limited response to some of the points the primary parties have raised regarding the challenged ballots, along with this brief statement of the relevant facts.  Four candidates – [...], [...], [...], and [...] – vied for two Fire Commissioner seats.  (Pa1).  Initially, the Fire Commissioners’ certified results of the election showed Respondent [...] received 690 votes, Appellant [...] and Cross-Respondent [...] each received 615 votes, and Respondent [...] received 614 votes.  (Pa5 at ¶ 18).  Subsequently, [...], the Financial Clerk for the Fire Commissioners, decided that a write-in ballot reflecting one additional vote for Cirz and one additional vote for Golden should be counted.  (1T82:3-25, 1T89:16-21; 1T75:2-14; Pa3; Pa96; Pa100).  The ballot included two side-by-side columns: Column A, which listed the four candidates; and a “Personal Choice” column, which provided a space for voters to write in a candidate.  (Pa1).³  The ballot also provided the following instruction:  “To vote for any person whose name is not printed on the ballot, go to the Personal Choice Column and darken the oval by the words “write-in” for the office in which you want to write-in. ”  Ibid.  The Fire Commissioners re-certified the election results to reflect two additional votes, which decided the election in favor of Tutela and Cirz.  (Pa5 at ¶¶ 24-25).
[brief] See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 26, 266 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating federal appellate courts addressing fingerprint evidence admissibility after Daubert have “found such evidence admissible”); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 663 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding Daubert hearing unnecessary where expert had extensive training and used acceptable methods); United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding the ACE-V method satisfies Daubert); United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 485-87 (7th Cir. 2013) (same).4  In Olenowski, our Supreme Court clarified that moving forward in criminal cases, courts would analyze “testimony based on scientific knowledge” under the factors outlined in Daubert.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL FROM BOTH THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AND THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE CASE INFORMATION STATEMENTS BEFORE THE APPELLATE DIVISION  Defendant [...] asserts that plaintiff appealed only the February 10, 2023 Order denying his motion for reconsideration, not the January 6, 2023 Order granting summary judgment to the defendants.  As such, [...] asserts that this Court should only address the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  The argument is classic “form over substance” as it is apparent from plaintiff-appellant’s Civil Case Information Statement (CIS) and Amended Notice of Appeal, as well as [...]’s CIS, that [...] appealed from both the granting of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
[brief] However, the court took away the Board’s accord and satisfaction defense when it prematurely approved a wholesale dismissal of the Complaint without --- 55 Pa273 – Pa275 considering that [...] never filed any notices of breach of contract or sought payment of the April / July 2020 invoices until over two years later in response to a lawsuit.  **POINT SEVENTEEN [Lack of, Failure of, Consideration] (Argued Pa408 – Pa409)**
[brief] The Trial Court was obviously misled by the false claim of no Site Plan requirement until 1984 and partially based its invalidation of the Board determination on the following incredibly improper and mistaken analysis (Da280-281):  "The Board also made a factual finding that no site plan approval was issued for the Synagogue.  However, the Ordinance which created review of site development plans was only adopted by [...] in December 1984, whereas, construction of the Synagogue was completed in 1964.  Thus, to the extent that the decision of the ZBA was based on facts not proven in the record, this finding is clearly arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable."  It is the above "finding" by the Court that is wrong.  This finding was not based on anything before the Board or in the Board Hearing; it is solely based upon one of the documents --- an email from Board attorney [...] to [...] attorney [...] dated 2/20/2019 (after the Board Hearing) that attaches a Lakewood Code updated page of Section 18-8 about Site Plans.
[brief] Appellants unilaterally declared—in clear derogation of the MOU—that the MOU is not an enforceable contract and that they do not intend to honor it.  [...] began this litigation to enforce the MOU and was successful in the trial court.  Appellants repeatedly refused to perform their obligations thereunder despite Court orders.  (Da22) (¶ 29).  Appellants renounced the MOU so they could enter into a different transaction with Mortgagee’s principal, [...].  Id. (¶ 30).  Appellants have made it clear that they want to invalidate the MOU so they can trade mortgages with [...].  [...] is the owner of real property in [...] located at [...].  Appellants, or one of their affiliates, are the mortgagees on the [...] property.  Id. (¶ 31).  Appellants determined that they may have an opportunity to offset the debt from the mortgage on the Property in exchange for cancelling the outstanding lesser debt obligation on the [...] property.  Id. (¶ 32).  In other words, Appellants sought to offset the debt on the Property by cancelling a mortgage they hold against one of [...]’ properties.  Id. (¶ 33).  In the meantime, as noted, in furtherance of its bargained-for rights under the MOU and in reliance on Appellants’ promise to perform thereunder, Plaintiff has incurred, and continues to incur, significant time and expense, including, but not limited to, in relation to engineering studies, site planning, legal compliance, and all ordinary pre-development costs.  Id.  (¶ 35).  Appellants’ bad faith renunciation of the MOU and their refusal to provide the agreed upon closing documentation in breach of the MOU hindered [...]’ ability to proceed with developing the Property as planned, including prosecuting a site plan and other municipal applications, and with respect to obtaining financing, which is being actively negotiated but cannot be finalized with the cloud Appellants have created over ownership of the property and the MOU.
[brief] State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 272 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380-81 (2017)).  Note that many issues on appeal present mixed questions of law and fact.  Under those circumstances the appellate court gives deference to the supported factual findings of the trial court, but reviews de novo the trial court's application of legal rules to the factual findings.  State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015); State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 404 (2015); State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2004).
[brief] POINT III  PLAINTIFF DOES NOT RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT TO WARRANT A PLENARY HEARING.  (Pa205-Pa209).  Finally, Plaintiff’s alternative request for a plenary hearing should be rejected because she has failed to present a single material fact in dispute regarding her acceptance of the MAA that would either warrant a plenary hearing or avoid entry of an order compelling arbitration.  In a final effort to avoid arbitration, Plaintiff contends that a factual dispute exists between certain statements she presented in her Certification in support of her opposition to Defendants’ motions, and the ostensible assent she provided to be bound by the MAA, but, as Plaintiff concedes on appeal, a dispute of fact must be of a substantial nature (outcome determinative) to warrant a plenary hearing.  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 4:46-2 (2024) (explaining that disputed facts “of an unsubstantial nature” cannot thwart summary judgment); Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369, 377 (Ch. Div. 1999), aff’d, 332 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that under New Jersey’s Brill standard, “a disputed issue of fact of an insubstantial nature should not preclude the grant of summary judgment”); (Pb36-Pb38).
[brief] ([...] testified that sometime around 2020, the [...] then decided to publish some portion of its rules online, and make that portion freely available to all).  (1T5:16-18)  The latter disputed fact only has minimal relevance, and only to the extent that the defendants should try to argue that they were subservient to the whims of the [...] rules, thus had no control over the prize limitation rule.  However, for one thing this argument certainly would not be true, as [...] was not only heavily involved in the [...], but further he was also its executive director and president, and still continues to be heavily involved with its operation.  In fact, the [...] website openly acknowledges [...]’s long-standing relationship with them, and perhaps most significantly of all, mentions the fact that [...] had volunteered months of his time to write the official rulebook for the [...]!  (Pa19, on which I used a green marker to underline the most relevant divulgement)  Further still, even in a verified complaint by a famous grandmaster, it was asserted that it was a conflict of interest for [...] to have his own private corporation of [...] (i.e. a for-profit corporation to run his own lucrative tournaments) while also being in charge of the “nonprofit” [...], which set rules for all [...]-rated tournaments.  (Pa20 – Pa21, on which I used a green marker to place handwritten “stars” next to ¶¶3 and 26, and where I used a red ink pen to underline the most relevant exposé).  Moreover, even assuming arguendo if the defendants were in fact subservient to the [...] rules, nonetheless they no offered no reason at all why that prize limitation was not simply published within their own tournament announcements.  Further, the notion that the defendants were forced to follow this [...] rule is directly refuted by the fact that they chose to deviate from other [...] rules.  For example, for each and every chess player in their system, the [...] maintains 3 separate ratings: 1) a “regular” rating (i.e. for the several-hour-long classical games); 2) a “quick” rating (i.e. for games that are between 10 minutes to one hour long); and 3) a “blitz” rating (i.e. for games less than 10 minutes long).  Within the defendants’ published tournament announcements for this event, it stated that this “G/10” (i.e. each game would be 10 minutes per side) event would only affect the players’ “quick” [...] ratings (an announcement which is in accordance with the [...] rules).  However, contrary to the [...] rules, the announcements inconsistently stated that the higher of a player’s “quick” or “regular” [...] ratings would be used for pairings and prizes.  (Pa16)  Thus, my position also included the argument that I also should have qualified for yet an additional prize (i.e. the under 1300 class prize), since my quick rating was just under 1300 (although my regular rating was just over 1300).  ARGUMENTS
[brief] Indeed, common-sense-wise, it would be more surprising if he did not take out his gun during the fracas.  That [...] said she did not specifically see her brother brandish the gun is hardly dispositive; she may have missed it in the chaos of the situation, or she may not have been truthful.  In short, it is far from some otherworldly leap of logic to say [...] might have pulled out the gun he was armed with during the altercation, and any reasonable inference in favor of passion/provocation must be drawn for purposes of this argument.
[brief] P34a.  Yet, when the Will was made, the Decedent did not need to make a choice between her husband and her adult child.  There were sufficient assets to distribute among the two, as Decedent had long expressed to Petitioner.  (7T118:15-22; 7T 178:16-22; 7T180:12 to 181:9; 7T189:17-22).  --- \(^6\)  Decedent paid $445,000 to construct Respondent’s home.  (P566a to P570a).  POINT FOUR A SPOILATION INFERENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED TO PETITIONER
[brief] The Chancery judge ruled that the Will did reflect [...]’s intent, and this Court affirmed that decision.  The Law Division correctly held that plaintiffs could not proceed with a legal malpractice claim premised on the assertion that [...] did not capture [...]’s testamentary intent after the trial court and Appellate Division held that he did.  This is long-settled law in New Jersey.  *Pivnick v. Beck*, 326 N.J. Super. 474 (App.Div. 1999), aff’d 165 N.J. 670 (2000) (holding that collateral estoppel precludes a legal malpractice case based on an attorney’s alleged failure to capture testamentary following a Probate action finding that testamentary intent was properly captured).  In addition, the Law Division properly determined that plaintiffs’ action was also barred by the entire controversy doctrine, consistent with this Court’s decision in Schindel v. Feitlin, No. A-2888-19, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1119 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 11, 2021).(Pa000090)  The final order of the Law Division should be affirmed.
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT  13  POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW (Issue Not Raised Below)  13  POINT II  PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TOWNSHIP BREACHED ITS DUTIES UNDER THE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY  DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-2).  15  POINT III  PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ENTITLEMENT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UNDER THE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-3).  24  POINT IV  THE [...] IS NOT A LEGAL FORUM FOR PURPOSES OF TRIGGERING THE SEVERANCE PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-3).  POINT V  SEVERANCE OF THE IRREVOCABILITY PROVISION WOULD DEFEAT THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY  DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-3).  POINT VI  PLAINTIFF FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PRIOR TO SUING THE TOWNSHIP; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY  DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2).  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  OPINION OF THE COURT ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
[brief] ”  Id. at 406.  Indeed, it appears that that is exactly was happening that night: two other men – [...] and [...] – were stopped at the other end of the street on “suspicion that [they] were engaged in criminal activity due to the area and time of night. ”  (Da 27)  B.  The Trial Judge Erred In Finding That The Alleged “Blading” Provided A Valid Basis To Frisk The Four Men When [...] Did Not Offer “Blading” As A Basis For The Frisk And Specifically Testified That It Is Police Practice To Conduct A Frisk For Weapons Whenever An Individual Is Stopped.  In the instant case, the motion judge erroneously found that the police had a valid basis to search [...] and the three men he was with after “[o]bserving their blading and knowing the reputation of Leonard Street.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD GRANT HIS PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF.  IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BECAUSE THE PETITIONER HAS PRESENTED AT LEAST PRIMA FACIE PROOF THAT HE HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THESE ISSUES.  ........................................................................  25  (A)  [...] RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL  BECAUSE [...] FAILED TO RAISE AN OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL COURT'S AMENDMENT OF THE INDICTMENT OF THE ROBBERY COUNTS THEREBY VIOLATING HIS RIGHTS TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THE INDICTMENT TO THE GRAND JURORS.  N.J. Const. art I para 8, FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS UNDER N.J. STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION........26  (B)  [...]'S AND/OR APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE AN OBJECTION TO THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE THE JURORS WERE PRECLUDED FROM CONSIDERING A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE ROBBERY.  ..................................................................................  28  (C)  [...] AND/OR APPELLATE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY ARGUE A MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT BECAUSE OF PERJURED TESTIMONY AND FALSE EVIDENCE ADMITTED BY THE STATE AND [...] THAT MISLEAD THE GRAND JURORS.  THUS VIOLATING DUE PROCESS UNDER N.J. AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.  .35  (D)  [...] WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INVESTIGATE THE SURROUNDING FACTS OF THE ROBBERIES WHICH ALLOWED THE STATE TO BRING IN INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF THE DETECTIVES WHICH LEAD TO DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.  (E)  [...] WAS INEFFECTIVE BY FAILING TO HAVE THE COURT ISSUE  A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION AS TO DETECTIVE  [...]'S TESTIMONY  (F)  [...] PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL  COURT'S DISPOSAL OF THE JURY FOR TEN DAYS DURING JURY DELIBERATIONS.  (G)  [...] PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO INVESTIGATE TWO  (2)  STATEMENTS MADE BY THE STATE'S KEY-WITNESS [...].  POINT III  CUMULATIVE ERROR DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT
[brief] On March 4th, 2022, this Court denied plaintiff’s Motion to Enjoin and void as mistaken special meetings of the defendant, [...], and the [...] Planning Board, alleging violations of the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6.  The Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate at this stage of the proceedings.  The March 4th, 2022 Order found that the [...] needed only transmit paper notice of the des--- to the designated newspapers at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting.  On December 10th, 2021, the Borough Deputy Clerk transmitted notice to the -- the -- the newspapers of the December 16th, 2021 Special meeting, six days in advance of the meeting.  The Appellate Division in Township of Bernards versus the State Department of Community Affairs, 233 N.J. Super. at 26, an Appellate Division opinion from 1989, makes clear that publication of these notices is not required to comply with the Open Public Meetings Act.  Therefore, and plaintiff’s argument re- -- regarding the “For Your Record Only” -- the words “For Your Record Only” is without merit, given the clear holding of the Township of Bernards case.  The Court does not find reason to extend the statutorily required time of 45 days, pursuant to Rule 4:69f(6)(a).  As such, plaintiff’s claim is moot.  For those reasons and that will be more specifically set forth the Court’s statement of reasons, opposition thereto, and having the opportunity to consider argument of counsel, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
[brief] (90a-147a).  On February 27, 2023, [...] sought permission to intervene.  (335a-383a).  On March 17, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. heard oral argument on the pending motions.¹  On April 3, 2023, [...] partially denied and partly reserved on Appellants’ motion to vacate the Final Judgment in an Order (the “April 3, 2023 Order”) (6a-23a), and also granted [...]’s request to intervene.
[brief] (Da3178-3182)  In confirming the portion of the award dissociating [...], the trial court on August 9, 2019 sought clarification from the Arbitrator regarding the buyout process.  (Pa252-254)  On August 26, 2019, the Arbitrator clarified he intended the award to state “[t]he methodology, therefore, shall be determined by the Court,” and that the valuation date should be the “date of the Final Award after adjusting the membership interests in accordance with the Final Award.