ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant-Appellant failed to provide the Court with anything but vague allegations during the hearing October 13, 2023 in opposition to the Order to Show Cause.  Defendant-Appellant failed to provide certifications from any witnesses, but he made unsupported allegations that he was “informed” by unnamed individuals that the listing realtor allegedly refused to show the property to unnamed “prospective buyers and/or realtors”, that unnamed interested realtors and buyers from Washington, D.C., California and/or Colorado were allegedly denied access to the property, and that the Plaintiff-Respondent was guilty of “stonewalling several other realtors and potential purchasers. ” (Da390-391).  Defendant-Appellant did not submit any certification from the unnamed individuals that purportedly provided this information to him, and the Trial Court properly disregarded all of Defendant-Appellant’s contentions as impermissible hearsay.  After considering the Defendant’s position and his counsel’s arguments at the hearing on October 13, 2023, the Trial Court concluded could be resolved summarily.  The decision should be affirmed because the Defendant-Appellant failed to provide evidence to support his position and relied on general allegations and hearsay.  II.
[brief] See Db at pp. 20-21.  As these arguments are not sufficient to warrant overturning the Jury’s damages decision with regards to Plaintiff’s economic and/or compensatory damages, their motion to set aside the Jury’s verdict for a new trial must be denied.  This is Court has previously described the limited scope of a courts review of compensatory/economic damages as follows:  The scope of our review on this issue is somewhat narrow.  Damage verdicts “should not be disturbed unless they are so excessive in --- 9  As with their arguments regarding liability, the Defendants make no real attempt to argue that the Jury’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are against the weight of the evidence.
[brief] At the outset, it was clear that the real purpose of those applications was to try to stop the sale of [...] for the benefit of [...], who was the 97% shareholder, but who could not access the courts himself under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.\(^6\) (Da19).  [...] also did not have the consent of his then-wife [...], who had asserted an interest in the assets in their divorce proceedings.  (Da19).  The complex bankruptcy risks created by the proposed loan structure made it possible that the funds could be clawed back from Plaintiff if a bankruptcy was filed, which thus provided no security at all for the judgment.  (Da19).  Plaintiff pursued extensive negotiations with [...]’s counsel to attempt to resolve these issues but could not do so.
[brief] The RSIS defines an “assisted living” unit as “As defined by the New Jersey Department of Health at N.J.A.C. 8:36-1.3, as a facility with apartment-style housing and congregate dining, and other assisted living services available when needed.  At a minimum, apartment units have one room, a private bathroom, a kitchenette, and a lockable entrance door. ”  N.J.A.C. 5:23-4.14, Table 4.4, note (d).  [...]’s witnesses testified that this definition meant that its project complied with the parking requirements, as 83 spaces were required.  [3T 38-7 to 40-10].  The Board ignored this testimony and the definitional change to the RSIS and concluded, wrongly, that [...] needed far more parking than required by State law.  The Board’s conclusion that [...] needed a parking variance is preempted by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.5.  Although the Board concluded that [...] required variances from § 230-90(H) related to parking setback from the building and the street, that conclusion is wrong.  § 230-90 of the LUDO – which are the design standards for multifamily development – is found in Article X, which is entitled, “Design Standards for Site Plans. ”  [Pa279].  By contrast, the Township’s zoning regulations are found in Articles XIV-XXXIV.  Accordingly, relief from § 230-90(H) required a design exception pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51, not a variance.
[brief] With respect to question number 5, the Ordinance does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of the Legislature\(^1\) since it provides for an exemption from the pole requirements if in fact they conflict with any state law.  As to question number 4, the enactment of P.L. 1898, c. 197, and its saving from repeal by N.J.S.A. 48:7-6 precludes any such finding – the Legislature could not have rationally intended a scheme that is so comprehensive as to exclude any municipal role when the Legislature itself provided for and validated such a role.
[brief] (1T 6-1 to 13-12)  In these arguments, the defense relied on the NRC and PCAST reports to demonstrate that ACE-V is a subjective discipline without a uniform set of guidelines about when a fingerprint examiner should declare a match and that the “standard is simply you know it when you see it and that’s a problem. ”  (1T 6-1 to 9-5)  The defense argued that the error rates reported by PCAST undermined the asserted reliability of the field.  (1T 10-11 to 19)  The court denied that motion without a hearing, merely holding that because ACE-V has been used “for over 100 years” and other courts have found fingerprint evidence to be reliable, that the evidence would be admissible in this case.
[brief] Within *Green*, *supra*, which is a New Jersey Supreme Court case, there is an extended reference to *National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan*, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).  The *Green* Court stated:  That Court explained the distinction between a hostile work environment claim (that would fall within the continuous tort doctrine) and a claim based on a discreet act that would not.  The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:  This Court adopted Morgan’s schema for determining when a cause of action arising out of the LAD would be considered a continuing violation.  The Court further pointed out:  The policy concerns underpinning the determination in Shepard, in respect of LAD claims, required the application of the Morgan/Shepard framework in CEPA actions.  Further, retaliation, as defined by CEPA, need not be a single discreet action.  And then, the Court seemed to be addressing these Defendants when it stated:  Indeed, adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment can include, as it did in this case, many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior directed against an employee that may not be actionable individually, but that combined to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct.  Not only did the Supreme Court state that, but the Court below found, in this case, exactly what the Supreme Court said.  [...] was not barred by “CEPA’s one-year statute of limitations.
[directive] If the County Prosecutor grants use immunity, the agency shall advise the subject officer in writing that he or she has been granted such immunity in the event their answers implicate him or her in a criminal offense.  The officer must then answer the questions specifically and narrowly related to the performance of their official duties, but no answer given nor any evidence derived from the answer may be used against this officer in a criminal proceeding.  At this point, any officer refusing to answer is subject to disciplinary charges and possible dismissal from employment.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 49  8.2.7
[directive] Authority to use force.  Officers are granted the unique authority to use force for lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) effectuating a lawful arrest or detention; (b) carrying out a lawful search; (c) overcoming resistance directed at the officer or others; (d) preventing physical harm to the officer or to another person (including intervening in a suicide or other attempt of self-inflicted injury); (e) protecting the officer or a third party from unlawful force; or (f) preventing property damage or loss.  2.2
[brief] With respect to [...], the trial court found, among other things, that he: (1) knew about [...]’s unlawful conduct, including “discrete events constituting theft, conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, all from which [...] benefitted financially,” but made no effort to stop [...]’s theft, (Da39982); (2) “knew for an absolute certainty that if he did not interfere with [...]’s theft, as was his fiduciary obligation, then [P]laintiffs would be harmed because [...] . . . was taking their money, (Da39982-83); (3) “was aware that the [increased management] fees were unjustifiable and thus aware that taking those ‘fees’ would harm the partnership and were the direct result of” [...]’s unlawful conduct and [...]’s failure to stop him, (Da39983); and (4) “stayed silent until trial” about [...]’s theft despite [...]’s knowledge that it was ongoing.  The trial court made similar findings on each of these points with respect to [...], namely that [...] owed fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs, was aware of [...]’s continuous illegal conduct “the entire time it was happening” but failed to intervene, benefitted financially from [...]’s illegal conduct, and knew that [...]’s illegal conduct and [...]’s failure to act would harm Plaintiffs.  (Da39985-87.)  Indeed, it were these very acts that led the Appellate Division on the prior appeal to conclude that the record contained sufficient evidence to award punitive damages against [...] and [...].
[brief] [...], a forensic ballistics expert, reviewed the discovery and examined the evidence that was still available in this case – the Glock and shell found at the scene.  Leisinger noted that by the time of his involvement, all the other evidence was no longer available for his inspection – the other guns which fired some of the bullets at the scene, defendant’s clothing worn that day (which could have been tested for gun shot residue, Leisinger noted), and the plexiglass door through which defendant allegedly fired the shot at [...].  Expert Leisinger stressed that cross-examination of [...] should have been conducted, because of the difficulty of matching a shell from a particular Glock handgun.  DA50.  Defendant charged that his trial counsel’s failure to voir dire the entire jury panel also was ineffective assistance.
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy shall observe the applicable laws governing the right of way at intersections and other locations.  5.9  Officers involved in a pursuit shall not engage in vehicle paralleling.  5.10  There shall be no street paralleling along the route unless the pursuit passes through a patrol’s assigned area.  A patrol that is parallel-street-pursuing shall not join or interfere with a pursuit and shall stop all pursuit-related activity at the boundary of its assigned area.  5.11  Boxing-in or heading-off a violator’s moving vehicle is permitted only under extraordinary circumstances.  These tactics substantially increase the risk inherent in the pursuit and shall only be employed: (a) at low speeds; and (b) with the approval of a supervisor; or (c) in response to an imminent threat to the safety of the public or a police officer.  5.12  Roadblocks must only be employed as a last resort in circumstances where deadly force would otherwise be justified.  (a) the use of a roadblock must be authorized by a supervisor; (b) at no time will a roadblock be established until all pursuing police vehicles are made aware of the roadblock and its location and have acknowledged this awareness; 5.12.1  Once a roadblock has been established and a vehicle or barricade has been positioned in the roadway, there shall be: (a) adequate distance to see the roadblock; (b) an avenue of escape; and (c) no one in the blocking vehicle(s).  5.13  Officers involved in a pursuit shall not engage in any vehicle contact action except as a last resort to prevent imminent death or serious injury to the officer or another person where deadly force would otherwise be justified.  5.14  Officers shall not discharge a firearm against the driver or passenger of a moving vehicle except in the limited situations permitted under Section 4.6 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  5.15  Officers shall not discharge a firearm from a moving vehicle except in the limited situations permitted under Section 4.7 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  9
[brief] Starting with [...], the Report found that the Board did not adhere to standard practices typically exercised by boards of education and outlined by the [...].  (Ra126; Ra182).  Notably, meetings lack action items and are conducted without discussion on any agenda items or committee reports.  (Ra134; Ra181).  Nor does the Board read, review, discuss, or question District policies.  *Ibid.*  Even during meetings where there were a significant number of new policies placed on the agenda, the Board held no discussions.  (Ra134; Ra182).  This caused the Report to question Board members’ level of involvement and to note that absent more formal discussion, the Board is “not able to inform the public about changes and additions to policies” that will affect the school community.  (Ra124; Ra182-83).  And despite the District’s financial struggles, the Board does not discuss financial issues or present detailed budgetary information during meetings, unlike comparable districts in the State.  (Ra181-82).  The Board also has no strategic plan in place and has “minimal” involvement with the budget.
[directive] Form.  The officer shall complete the information in the box at the top of the form.  Then the officer shall fill in his/her name, rank and badge number in the section following the Warning paragraphs, labeled “Law Enforcement Officer. ”  The line labeled “Date & Time of Acknowledgment” is to be left blank, at this time.  Completion of the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20- 2004)  Form  When the summoned person arrives at the law enforcement agency, or at a medical facility treating the defendant, the law enforcement officer shall do the following.
[brief] Further, The Appellate Division in [...] unequivocally determined that the LTTEL did not repeal the HMFA Law, either expressly or impliedly.  In re Approval of a Financing Commitment for the Project Known as [...], [...], [...] at pg. 6-10 (May 31, 2022).  The Appellate Division found that the legislative history of the LTTEL specifically lists which laws were repealed as a result of its passage and that “the LTTEL does not expressly repeal N.J.S.A. 55:14K-37(b) [of the HMFA Law]. ”  Further, the Appellate Division noted that the LTTEL and the HMFA Law had different legislative goals and that “[t]he declared objectives of the two statutes differ in size and scope, and their financing mechanisms do not overlap in any meaningful sense. ”  Id. at 10.  Thus, even substantively, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Complaint fails to state a claim upon relief can be granted, and the orders dismissing the Complaints must be affirmed.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  I.  TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................. i  II.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULES & RULINGS  ......................  i  III.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  ii  IV.  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................  ii  V.  LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................  1  A.  The Respondents fail to address the key fact that the property descriptions in the deeds of the parties and neighbors do not change, and thus avoid discussing the consequences of the trial court’s Final Order (1T45, l.5-1T46, l.21; 2T5-2T6, ll.1-7; Pa96; Pa108, ll.37-39 & Pa136)  .........................................................  1  B.  The Respondents fail to explain the trial courts deviation from the recommendation of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report, (2T5-17; Pa96; Pa112, ll.30-32) .........................................................  6  C.  Post trial notice to neighbors and the remedy of more litigation does not provide an appropriate solution under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1, (1T150, ll.4-7; 1T174-180; 2T9-19 & Pa95).  ............................................. 9  VI.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................  11  II.
[brief] Respondent, [...], seeks in his cross-appeal to include additional ballots that are contrary to law and that the trial court rightfully dismissed after a plain reading of the governing statutes.  First, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave for this third amendment to his cross-petition, this time on the Friday before a Monday trial, to include a new issue (as opposed to adding names to categories already identified).  Respondent had already previously amended his cross-petition twice before, both of which sought to expand the voter base in Cirz’s earlier amended cross-petitions and did not ultimately prejudice Petitioner-Appellant, [...].  However, the third proposed amendment raised an entirely new issue and would have unfairly prejudiced Hopson on the eve of trial, not just in being able to defend against that claim, but also in deciding whether to raise his own additional challenges.  The trial court correctly denied the request as untimely and improper, and that ruling should stand.
[brief] Per the Appellant/Cross-Respondents’, this act “could” have been done for some malicious purpose and therefore a finding in --- 4 Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ brief supports their unclean hands argument by resorting to speculation and misstatements of the record which are completely belied but the undisputed record evidence:  It is undisputed that the December 10, 1998 deed in question, which contains the signature [...], was in fact signed by Plaintiff (3T62-2).  We can only question the motives, as Plaintiff did not give any clear indication as to the purpose for Plaintiff signing [...]’s name on a deed that transferred title to the property back to [...].  Perhaps it was to mislead [...], who had no English ability.  Perhaps it was to create confusion.  However, the fact is that Plaintiff did forge his brother’s name onto the deed document (3T62-2, Da343 – Da350).  It further coincides with the misleading representation on the deed itself, which states that [...] and [...] were the same person (Da343 – Da350).  This is unequivocally false.  See Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ brief at Pgs 8-9.  Richard’s favor was improper.  Because the testimony and record evidence conclusively established that Richard’s actions in making the deed were simply erroneous/mistaken and at the instructions of his then attorney and that he always exhibited all aspects of ownership over the Property, the doctrine of unclean hands is simply not applicable.
[brief] [Pa622, Luciani Report, p.6].  Moreover, the New Motion Judge suggests that [...] ratified that [...] could not call the C-section.  But that it is not correct at all.  It is true enough that [...] indicated that it is fine for hospitals to have normal operating procedures.  However, [...] also testified:  “But the standard of care is not dictated by the policies and the procedures of any given hospital. ”  [Pa518, Luciani Dep., 19:16-18].  In fact, [...] testified in a manner directly contrary to the way the court summarized.  Asked to assume the existence of such a policy – again, a policy which was never actually established -- [...] further testified that a hospital’s protocol of having another doctor consult with a resident when confronted with an emergency, must be relaxed in the interest of the health of the mother and the child.  Far from acknowledging the validity of [...]’s actions in this emergency, [...] testified that even given the desirability of consultation, “realistically, when you're in a residence program and you have a baby that has any sort of fetal distress,” the resident must have “carte blanche to call for a section and expedite it before we even get phone calls or walk through the door because the only thing we're concerned about, and you would agree with this, is that we want a healthy mother and a healthy baby.  So really there are two different things. ”  [Pa518, Luciani Dep., 55:16-25].  Frankly, this seems so obvious that an expert would hardly need to say it: if the baby is facing an emergency that threatens her very life, the resident must act and, in this situation, make the call, or at least immediately notify the attending physician.  In the above passage, the New Motion Judge also gave [...] a pass because she was not present at the hospital and could not deliver the baby.  It was sufficient, the court suggested, for [...] to have left for the hospital immediately upon receiving the phone call from [...].  Nonetheless, [...] explicitly opined, and testified, that [...] was nonetheless required immediately to call for the C-section upon being notified of the circumstances.  The point is that both [...] and [...] were duty bound to call for the C-section at 9:48 p.m., and neither one of them did.  The New Motion Judge erred by holding, as a matter of law, that neither one deviated from the applicable standard of care.  Under the standard applicable to motions for summary judgment, the Court erred when it found that no reasonable factfinder could have concluded that either [...] or [...] deviated from the standard of care.
[brief] [Pa105-135].  That motion was --- 2 [...] was the attending physician that night.  When discovery later demonstrated that he called for [...] to be delivered by a c-section the moment he was first advised of the deceleration on the fetal strip readings, and that he completed that procedure within fifteen minutes, Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to stipulate to his dismissal from the case.  granted on June 13, 2019.  [Pa136-37].  Plaintiff’s first Amended Complaint was filed on June 27, 2019.  [Pa138-149].  Defendants [...], [...], and [...] filed an Answer with Crossclaims on July 3, 2019.  [Pa150-157].  Defendants [...] and [...] filed an Answer with Crossclaims on July 11, 2019.
[brief] THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION  Despite thousands of pages of arguments and documents submitted to the Court by the parties as part of the summary judgment motions, and approximately four (4) hours of oral argument, the Respondents essentially refiled the entirety of their summary judgment motions (including exhibits and briefs) arguing that the Court got every single ruling wrong in seeking reconsiderations.  The filings for reconsideration were merely a recitation of the arguments previously made in prior briefing and at oral argument.  Although [...] noted that he originally found that there were facts in dispute, [...] reasoned that he “doesn’t know if he can find” that whether [...] could be held liable for [...]’s actions is a fact in dispute.  3T. 29:3-30:22.  Ultimately, evaluating the same facts, same arguments, and same case law as he did prior, [...] found that Appellants’ own employer was not the correct defendant in matter:  This Court can’t find that the [...] actions taken were within the control of the [...] defendant.  It is for that reason that I don’t believe that [...] is an appropriate defendant in this case, and I’m going to grant the motion for summary judgment as to the [...] Defendants.  [...] further concluded, as to Appellant’s claims against [...], that there was not a close enough nexus between [...], [...], and Appellant for Appellant to bring forth a LAD claim against [...] for [...]’s sexual harassment 3T. 92:9-11.  Thus, [...] granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment as to Appellants claims as well.  In essence, [...] found that Appellant could not bring forth claims of sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation against any of the entities and individuals responsible for providing her with a workplace free from discrimination and harassment.