ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Camden Vicinage did not file an order of transfer from the Law Division (Camden) to the Chancery Division (Camden) in triplicate in accords with R. 4:3-1-Divisions of Court; Commencement and Transfer of Actions, nor in general.  Defendants did not make a Motion to Transfer Between Law and Chancery Division within 10 days after expiration of the time prescribed by R. 4:6-1 for the service of the last permissible responsive pleading in accord with R. 4:3-1.  Defendants failed to submit an order of transfer pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b) of R. 4:3-4-Transfer and Removal of Actions.  According to the Clerk of the Superior Courts of New Jersey there is no order of transfer pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b) of 4:3-4-Transfer and Removal of Actions filed with the clerk of the court transferring the action from the Law Division to the Chancery Division or Chancery Division Presiding Judge.  This matter was transferred out of Burlington County because of the conflict of interest.  Plaintiff concludes that the transfer to Camden County where defense counsel resides or operates his place of business, was simply the Burlington Vicinage transferring the existing Conflict of Interest that existed in Burlington County to the Camden County Vicinage.  Plaintiff was not given notice of a transfer from the Law Division to the Chancery Division of his action in lieu of prerogative writs and civil rights complaint.  Defendant's change in conduct from repeatedly refusing to grant adjournments upon request to granting adjournments after being sued did not moot the case.
[brief] (25T:35-3 to 5).  [...], in these exchanges, never threatened anyone or even referenced guns, while defendant did.  (25T:35-10 to 37-19, 40-10 to 42-18).  [...] just repeatedly asked when he can come back to [...] to pick up his property:  “Look, I need to get the rest of my things.  When can I come get my stuff?”  Ibid.  Defendant responded that the locks have been changed, and he already FedExed everything to him.  Defendant went on to say “This is not one of our traditional debates.  This could transcend into an unprecedented place that still could be prevented.  Before you write another sarcastic response, think it through. ”  Ibid.  [...] then said that defendant needed to calm down, and again referenced that he left clothes at the house, but defendant can keep them; [...] stated he would just work hard to get them back.  Ibid.  Defendant also googled [...]’ name on December 28, 2018, mere days before the shooting.  Ibid.
[brief] (4T 271-1 to 22).  According to [...], a later search of [...] disclosed two large “lumps” of cash, amounting to $4500, and a “police issued handcuff key. ” (4T 262-25 to 263-25).  He later asked [...] whether he had any belongings of [...]’s; [...] gave him sunglasses, and [...] identified them as his.  (4T 261-15 to 262-10).  Camden County Prosecutor’s [...] testified that he did not know why the sunglasses were not collected as evidence.
[brief] Not all factors need to be present for improper rulemaking.  Metromedia, 97 N.J. at 332.  “The pertinent evaluation focuses on the importance and weight of each factor,” not “a quantitative compilation of the number of factors which weigh for or against labeling the agency determination as a rule. ”  In re Provision of Basic Generation Serv., 205 N.J. at 350; see also State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. 1, 6 (1996); In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1, et seq., 431 N.J. Super. at 135 (noting the factors “need not be given the same weight, and some factors will clearly be more relevant”); Bullet Hole, Inc, v. Dunbar, 335 N.J. Super. 562, 588-89 (App. Div. 2000) (holding an agency action meeting only four of the six factors constituted rulemaking because “in the circumstances of this appeal it is evident that the [action] . . . should have been considered in a formal rulemaking proceeding”).
[brief] 65.  …since accepting the offer, there have been several homes in the exact same subdivision…that have sold at prices significantly higher than the one accepted by plaintiff…  68.  The average sale price of the homes noted above was $618,000!  69.  It is unclear why plaintiff is insisting on a sale of this property to [...] at a value that is $118,000 less than the average sales of the properties in the same neighborhood and is more than $60,000 less than the Comparative Market Analysis, dated May 8, 2023, that had been provided to all parties in this action, including plaintiff.  (Da383).  The factual record also reveals that [...] offered to purchase the house from his siblings for the listing price amount of $539,000 without the need for realtor commission (this was above the $500,000 offer presented by [...]).  (Da551).  A factual dispute also exists as to whether the co-owners were required to accept and approve [...]’s offer as it was equal to or greater than 95% of the list price pursuant to paragraph 20 of the Consent Judgment lending further support to the fact that this matter should not have been disposed of by way of a summary action and/or Order to Show Cause.
[brief] Thus, when that specifically named arbitrator is not available—for whatever reason—the parties must either 1) voluntarily select a mutually agreeable replacement arbitrator or 2) litigate their claims in court.  Because the parties specifically named [...] as the “sole arbitrator” of their disputes and made no provision for his replacement, the trial court’s decision granting [...]’s application to appoint a replacement arbitrator must be reversed.  Moreover, the appointment of a replacement arbitrator by a court requires an “impenetrable deadlock” or “mechanical breakdown” of the arbitrator selection process.  [...] attempted in good faith to work with [...] to identify a mutually agreeable replacement arbitrator.  Yet, the undisputed evidence before the trial court was that [...] gamed the system by proposing an arbitrator only to—after [...] agreed to that selection—reject its own proposed arbitrator and refuse to consider any further proposals from [...].  Thus, even if the trial court could appoint a substitute arbitrator here, it still erred in finding that such inequitable conduct by [...] constituted an “impenetrable deadlock. ”  Finally, the trial court erred by proceeding while this matter was stayed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq.  As [...] is comprised of Virginia companies, upon the filing of a demand for a statutory security bond by [...], all claims by [...] were automatically stayed.  Yet, the trial court refused to recognize the statutory stay and [...] never posted the statutorily mandated security.  Rather, both the trial court and [...] ignored the stay and forced [...] to litigate the merits of the claim.  Our Legislature’s policy pronouncement on that issue cannot be so easily sacrificed on the altar of expedient docket management.  As the trial court’s action violated the statutory stay, it is void ab initio.  In short, 1) the trial erred in finding it had the legal authority appoint a substitute arbitrator here, 2) even if the trial court had the legal authority to appoint a substitute arbitrator it erred in finding that [...] established grounds for such appointment here, and 3) the trial court erred by ignoring the statutory stay and proceeding to force [...] to litigate the merits to conclusion.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision must be reversed, and the parties left to either mutually agree upon a new arbitrator or pursue their claims in court.
[brief] 3, 4 Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center, 443 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2015)  ...........................................................................  4  County of Monmouth v. Hilton, 334 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2000), cert. denied, 167 N.J. 633 (2001)  ......................................................... passim  Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello, 252 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 1991) .................................................................  9  Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374 (1971)  ............... 9, 13  Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Mack Properties Co., 280 N.J. Super. 553 (1995) .................................................................  13  Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Beinstock, 123 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1973) .................................................................  5 State v. Caoili, 135 N.J. 252 (1994) ..........................................................  7, 9 State v. Gorga, 26 N.J. 113 (1958)  ..........................................................  11, 12 New Jersey Court Rules R. 4:46-1 ........................................................................................................  4  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The opposition brief filed on behalf of Defendant/Respondent [...] (“Respondent”) fails to acknowledge (1) the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, LLC which instructs courts to act as “Gatekeeper” by preventing unduly speculative evidence to be presented to the jury; and (2) the need for two separate negative adjustments for lack of development approvals as of the Date of Valuation as well as the variances required for Respondent’s proposed Highest and Best Use of the subject Property.
[brief] As [...] details in his testimony, only two of the five alternative sites proved to be viable, for various reasons.  The first two alternatives on South Laurel Avenue (near a property occupied by [...]) proved unworkable because the landowner, [...], refused [...]’s easement requests.  In any event, those properties were far less suitable than the Proposed Site, given their location at the northern end of the transmission line corridor and their residential zoning.  Moreover, an appraisal revealed that the third possible alternative—property on Holland Road owned by [...]—was unusable because it was purchased with Green Acres funding.  That property is also farther north than is operationally optimal.  Most significantly, [...] was unable to utilize the fourth alternative site because the tenant on that property, [...], refused to grant [...] an easement after extensive, time-consuming negotiations, thereby taking that property off the table as a viable alternative.  As a result, [...] was left with only two possible locations for the Regulator Station: a property located at [...], on which the [...] solar farm is already located (the “Original Proposed Site”); and later, as discussed in more detail herein below, the Proposed Site at [...].  24.
[brief] Cooksey, 233 F.3d at 798 n.16 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 66–67 (2d Cir. 1996)).5  “How this balance should be struck is ultimately within the sound discretion of the [trial] court. ”  Stevens, 83 F.3d at 67.  To ensure that the right is respected, however, “the record must reflect either the factual findings or the legal reasoning underlying the trial judge’s denial. ”  Williams, 56 A.3d at 1056 (quotation omitted).  The timeliness of the defendant’s request is an appropriate consideration, but it is not dispositive, as timeliness “is only one factor that a court must consider in ruling on a motion to proceed pro se. ”  State v. Thomas, 362 N.J. Super. 229, 241 (App. Div. 2003).  See U.S. v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1996) (district _____________________ with a defendant to ensure that his waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and intelligent.
[brief] (Aa94-118; 478-495).  In support, [...] submitted a policy compliance statement, prepared on October 23, 2018, essentially stating that the proposed minor, technical modification was --- 4  On December 6, 2017, [...] received a ten-year tidelands license from the [...] consistent with the approved plan in the 2017 Permit Modification. consistent with, and had no additional impact on, [...]’s compliance with various DEP regulations.
[brief] Barcon Associates v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179 (1981); William H. Burns Int’l Detective Agency, 64 N.J. Super. at 301.  Thus, the jurisdiction and the authority of the arbitrator are circumscribed by the powers delegated to him by the contract of the parties.  In the public sector, the authority of the arbitrator is also limited by the scope of mandatory negotiations.
[brief] The Board finds that the Applicant has not met the negative for the Bulk Variances as required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) and otherwise provided by law.  The Board finds that the Bulk Variances do not provide for a better zoning alternative and create a substantial negative impact, individually and taken as a whole.  Further, the impact of the eagle's nest or any other physical feature of the site can be accommodated through better and less intensive site design.
[brief] As this Court recognized in State v. Scott, 474 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2023), “The problem of implicit bias in the context of policing is both real and intolerable. ”  Id. at 399.  When judges are permitted to rely on subjective and unreliable indicators of criminal activity – buzz words like “high-crime area,” “blading,” and “furtive gestures,” and vague descriptions of behavior that an officer, based on his “training and experience,” interprets as “suspicious” – the risk that people of color will be disproportionately stopped is unavoidable.  See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 533-34 (“given the wide range of behavior exhibited by many different people for varying reasons while in the presence of police[,] . . . whatever individuals may do – whether they do nothing, something, or anything in between – the behavior can be argued to be suspicious”); State v. Price-Williams, 973 N.W.2d 556, 582 (Iowa 2022) (recognizing that unconscious racial biases “‘could provide a further source of unreliability in officers’ rapid, intuitive impressions of whether an individual's movements are furtive and indicate criminality’”) (quoting Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 580-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).  Thus, when judges give uncritical deference to subjective and unreliable indicators of criminal activity, as the judge below did in this case, they [c]reat[e] greater space for officers to act on their ungrounded intuitions that people are dangerous [and up to no good, and] increase[] the risk that people of color will be subjected disproportionately to unjustified [stops and] patfrisks.  If we have any hope of mitigating racial disparities in our criminal justice system, it is imperative that we pay close attention to the effect that our law of search and seizure has on people of color.
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Acuity v. Reed & Associates,** | | | 124 F.Supp.3d 787 (W.D. Tenn. 2015).................................. | 28, fn. 5, 41 | | **Adron, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co.**, | | | 292 N.J.Super. 463 (App. Div.1996).................................... | 26 | | **Aetna Ins. Co. v. Weiss,** | | | 174 N.J.Super. 2926 (App. Div.), | | | certif. denied, 85 N.J. 127 (1980).................................... | 26 | | **Air Master & Cooling, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of America,** | | | 452 N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 2017)................................... | passim | | **Carter-Wallace v. Admiral Ins. Co.**, | | | 154 N.J. 312 (1998)....................................................... | 43 | | **Crivelli v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am.**, | | | 2005 N.J.Super. Unpub. 703 (App.
[brief] At 4T46-10, the court notes that [...] permits this type of development.  The Township does permit residential subdivisions, with compliant lot lines and with street trees.  The Township also permits deviations from those standards, "if the applicant can clearly demonstrate that, because peculiar conditions pertaining to the subject parcel, the literal enforcement of this section is impracticable or will exact undue hardship .  . ."  The applicant here failed to meet its burden of proof, and the Board therefore had no record to grant the waivers, and thus the Trial Court’s Order granting subdivision approval must be reversed.  To the extent the Board did not specifically so find in its resolution, the matter could be remanded for specific findings.  Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd. of Adj., 335 N.J. Super. 111, 123 (App. Div. 2000).  The judge disputed whether "the lot line designation created that inappropriate lot yield" (4T46-25 to 4T47-1).  This analysis is backwards.  It is the nine-lot yield that created the need for irregular lines, and the absence of street trees to make way for the enlarged drainage system which only became necessary because of the applicants deliberate overdevelopment of the property in order to obtain a yield of nine lots.
[brief] Appellants’ contend that [...] should be held to an even higher duty than that imposed upon the buyer under *Simmons* by virtue of the fact that [...] was concurrently represented by the [...].  Because of the close proximity of time and the concurrent representation, [...] likely possessed more than a mere awareness of the foreclosure, but a detailed knowledge of the docket, the procedures utilized and the vulnerabilities of the case.  Inspection of the docket would reveal a foreclosure conducted accessing the accelerated procedures for abandoned properties under the *in rem* statute, on the basis of an abandonment determination not supported by a municipal official, but instead based upon an inspection report which attached the wrong photographs, for a delinquency totaling $4,246.67 on a property that [...] itself purchased for $140,000.  In the aggregate, these factors ascertainable from the docket and the [...] supply notice to [...] that the Appellants had not relinquished their claim to title to the Property.
[brief] THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW CANNOT BE APPLIED IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT IN THIS CASE UNLESS AND UNTIL THE DEPARTMENT ADOPTS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS AS REQUIRED BY THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW.  (Aa0133-134.)  A fundamental principle of administrative law is that an agency must act through rulemaking procedures “when an action is intended to have a wide-spread, continuing and prospective affect, deals with policy issues, materially changes its existing laws, or when the action will benefit from rulemaking's flexible fact-finding procedures. ”  Columbia Fruit Farms Inc. v. Department of Community Affairs, 470 N.J. Super. 25, 37 (App. Div. 2021), citing In re Provision of Basic Generation Serv. for Period Beginning June 1, 2008, 205 N.J. 339, 349-50 (2011).  Section 4(b) of the Public Access Law (N.J.S.A. 13:ID-153) expressly requires that the Department adopt rules and regulations establishing public access requirements for various categories of permits and uses within 18 months of the Law’s enactment.
[brief] Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)  .................................................................30, 32  Alsip Park Dist. v. D & M Partnership, 252 Ill. App.3d 277, 192 Ill. Dec. 80, 85, 625 N.E.2d 40, 45 (1993)  ..............................................................15  Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, 289 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (Law Div. 1995)  ........................................19  City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Investments, 148 N.J. 55, 68 (1997)  ..................................................................11  County of Essex v. Hindenlang, 35 N.J. Super 479, 491 (App. Div. 1955)  ..........................................15  County of Ocean v. Stockhold, 129 N.J. Super. 286, 289 (App. Div. 1974) .......................................15  Hills Dev. Co v. Twp. of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 59 (1986)  ....................................................................29  [...] v. [...], Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division (Docket No.: [...] decided January 23, 2023) .............................29  In Re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991) ....................................................29  In Re Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20 (1994)  ...................................................................31  In Re Docteroff, 133 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 1997) ....................................................30, 32  Mt. Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, LLC, 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005) ..............................................12  Mt. Laurel Tp. v. MiPro Homes, LLC, 188 N.J. 531, 910 A.2d 617 (2006).........................................................16, 17 N.J. Dept. of Envtl.  Prot., Smart Growth, At http://www.state.nj.us/dep/antisprawl (last modified Nov. 14, 2005)...............................................................17  Oliveri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511 (2006)..............................................................................29  Riggs v. Long Beach Tp., 109 N.J. 601, 613 (1988).................................................................15  State v. Buck, 94 N.J. Super. 84, 88 (App. Div. 1967).............................................15  State of New Jersey v. Totowa Lumber, 96 NJ Super 115, 121 (App. Div. 1967)............................................15  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)...........................................................................31  Twp. of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002).................................................................18  Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 316 N.J. Super. 487, 506 (App. Div. 1998).......................................31, 32  STATUTES
[directive] Every supervisor must establish a familiarity with the agency's disciplinary process and develop an understanding of how to implement specific disciplinary procedures when called upon to deal with inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  If a supervisor fails to follow these procedures or avoids their responsibility, that supervisor is not conforming to expected behavior and must receive some sort of corrective action.  Some supervisors occasionally need to be reminded that the fundamental responsibility for direction and control rests with the immediate supervisor at the operational level, not with the law enforcement executive.  2.3.3
[brief] First, the court decided the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint as if it were a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46 instead of R. 4:6-2(e).  Second, the court relied upon the inapposite cases of Notte and Kernan in support of its decision on the plaintiff’s motion.  These two cases addressed whether the plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaints were time-barred under the relevant statutes of limitation and whether the proposed amended complaints should be permitted under the “relation back” doctrine under R. 4:9-3.  Third, the court found facts in support of its decision that are irrelevant to the plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim.  In addition, the court found facts in support of its decision that are disputed by the plaintiff.  Finally, the court failed to appreciate that the plaintiff is not asserting a fraudulent concealment claim as a means of leveling the playing field between herself and [...].
[brief] **B.  APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Not Raised Below)**  There are no factual disputes or factual issues in this appeal.  The factual information in the Topology report incorporated into the ordinance reveals all of the factual details of the redevelopment “plan” for [...]: (1) the areas of redevelopment which consists of three different zones and north, west and south; (2) the buildings and structures to be created in each zone; and (3) the bulk standards for each structure in those zones.