[brief] In turn, there are just two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that examine whether a State engaged in a taking of private property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution by requiring the creation of public access on or across private property in the absence of an “essential nexus” between the activity being regulated and the access requirement at issue.  In Nollan v. [...], 438 U.S. 825 (1987), the owners of a beachfront property between two public beaches sought a development permit from the [...] (“the Commission”) to replace a bungalow with a larger house.  The Commission granted the permit on the condition that the property owners dedicate an easement for members of the public to pass across their beach.  The property owners proceeded to challenge the permit condition as a regulatory taking of its property by the Commission.  The Supreme Court ultimately determined that because the construction of the home did not in any way burden public’s use of the adjacent beach, it lacked an essential nexus between a legitimate state interest and the condition imposed by the Commission.  See Nollan, 438 U.S. at 837-42.  Consequently, the Court determined that the permit condition in question amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private property.  The Supreme Court then had the opportunity to revisit its taking jurisprudence in the context of public access just a few years later in Dolan v. [...], 512 U.S. 374 (1994).  There, a private party applied to the [...], Oregon (“the City”) for a building permit to expand a hardware store.  The City, as a condition of the building permit, required the applicant to dedicate a public greenway adjacent to the store, which would have included a pedestrian walkway and bicycle path adjacent to a nearby stream.  Upon review, however, the Supreme Court again found that the permit condition in dispute was unconstitutional.  In particular, the Court observed that while flood protection (which was one of the stated purposes of the greenway) was a legitimate state interest, that interest did not extend to requiring public access across the property.  Thus, because the greenway upon which store expansion was conditioned did not border any existing public access, there was no essential nexus between the store expansion and the requirement for public access.  Accordingly, akin to Nollan, 438 U.S. 825, the City’s permit condition was found to be a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The same principles that were articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan and Dolan are present here.  There is no existing public access on or across the Petitioner's Property, and there is no evidence that the activities for which the permit was sought will in any way burden public access.  The Department's argument may be that the original construction of the development—which occurred decades ago—in and of itself made access across the site impossible but, even then this argument fails because there is no evidence in the record below which supports this conclusion.  In the matter at hand, the Department has never invoked nor articulated any public legitimate state interest related to public access that has an essential nexus to the reconstruction of [...]’s bulkhead, which is a very limited activity that indisputably will not interfere with existing public access near the Property.  As such, the Department’s imposition of a requirement to provide a public access easement across [...]’s property amounts to an unconstitutional taking.