ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Those retiring effective February 1st included: 1) Captain [...], Pa68; 2) Captain [...], Pa67; and, 3) Captain [...], Pa67.  Those retiring effective March 1st included Battalion Chief [...], Captain [...], Captain [...], and Captain [...].  Pa67.  In anticipation of the retirements in 2023, on December 28, 2022, the City forwarded a request to the Civil Service Commission for a certification list of ten eligible candidates for promotion to captain.  Pa65.  On the same day, December 28, 2022, the Civil Service Commission issued a “Certification of Eligibles for Appointment” Certification Number [...], (“Cert.[...]”).  Pa72.  Appellant was ranked number 1 on the list and was also designated by the Civil Service Commission as a disabled veteran.  *Id.*  On or about January 9, 2023, Appellant was notified by the New Jersey State Civil Service Commission, (“CSC”), that as of December 28, 2022, his name had been certified to the [...] from [...] for consideration for appointment to the position of Fire Captain for the [...].  **PA18.**  As per the CSC, the disposition due date of [...] was March 28, 2023.  **Pa5.**  Effective February 1, 2023, three additional captains retired: Captains [...], **Pa52**, [...], **Pa51**; and [...], **Pa50**.  (hereinafter, “Vacancies 3, 4 and 5”)  As such, there were at least five genuine vacancies for the promotion to captain before the expiration of Appellant’s certification on March 28, 2023.  After receipt of Cert. [...], the City scheduled promotional interviews for early February 2023.
[brief] The Appellate Division will not interfere with the exercise of a trial court’s discretion “unless it appears that an injustice has been done. ”  St.  James AME Dev. Corp. v. City of Jersey City, 403 N.J. Super. 480, 484 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Cooper v. Consol. Rail Corp., 391 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] (3T51-8 to 59-17).  But [...] correctly recognized defendant’s significant role in both the robberies and the murder, concluding that the record before her was clear that “it was not until the statement, order or command was given that the youngest defendant arguably succumbed to the pressure exerted by this defendant to stop the fleeing victim that shots were fired and [...] was killed. ” (5T21-16 to 22-6).  And [...] even admitted that she would have characterized defendant’s behavior as “impulsive” even if he were 40 years old, (4T65-17 to 25), lending further support to the judge’s conclusion that her testimony was not entitled to the heavy weight defendant suggests, (Db30).
[brief] 9T7:4-10.  In his attempt to manage that condition, Petitioner diverted his attention to researching the law as it pertains to estate accountings.  9T7:10-16.  When the executors submitted an informal accounting in pending litigation that reflected that Petitioner would be paid $6400 as his disbursement under his father’s will, Petitioner retained an attorney who filed an exception that challenged the informal accounting.  Sutton v Sutton, 71 F. Supp. 2d. at 386.  That exception was settled pursuant to a consent order dated May 6, 1988 (hereinafter “Consent Order” that settled Petitioner’s claims for the sum of $75,000 "without offset" in exchange for a release of any further claim against the estate.  Sutton v. Sutton, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 386.  The Consent Order also stated that Petitioner was retaining his 1/6 interest in a parking lot and his 6.7% interest [...] and its liquor license and noted that the Petitioner’s five siblings would sell the parking lot across from [...] for $650,000.  Id.  Plaintiff was paid the $75,000 in accordance with the Consent Order\(^5\), three years before his marriage to Decedent.
[brief] Thus, each such property was forced to seek a “d(1)” variance from the [...].  As a planner with a great deal of experience in representing municipalities and developers on inclusionary development applications, I found the entire [...] approach contrary to the basic Mount Laurel principles requiring municipalities to eliminate cost generating standards and take affirmative measures to promote and expedite inclusionary development.  Indeed, the [...] denied the Respondents’ request for such variance relief after the bald eagle was discovered on the site.  The requirement to seek d(1) variance relief and the [...]’s subsequent denial can hardly be categorized as municipal cooperation when it comes to Mount Laurel compliance.
[brief] Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 2/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 2/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 2/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 2/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 2/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 2/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 2/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 3/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/1/2021 | $110,564.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | Name | Start Date | Base Salary | Notes | |----------|------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------| | [...]| 7/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 7/1/2021 | $110,564.00 | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 3/10/2022 | $112,760.52 | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 5/2/2022 | $102,281.00 | Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | | $121,016.97 | See Note 2 below | | [...] | | $118,820.00 | | | [...] | | $121,016.97 | See Note 2 below | | [...] | | $118,820.00 | | | [...] | | $121,016.97 | Retired as of 2/1/2023 | | [...] | | $118,820.00 | | | [...] | | $118,820.00 | | | [...] | | $121,016.97 | See Note 2 below | | [...]| | $121,016.97 | See Note 2 below | | [...] | | $121,016.97 |
[brief] On May 18, 2023, Plaintiff, the [...], filed a Complaint against Defendants, [...], MD, [...], CRNA, and [...], for medical negligence and asserting counts under the Survival Act and the Wrongful Death Act (Da006-26).  On July 19 2023, the defense filed a motion to stay litigation in favor of arbitration, citing the Defendants’ Standard Patient-Physician Arbitration Agreement (Da001-26).  Thereafter, on September 8, 2023, the Trial Court granted thirty days for limited discovery related to formation of the agreement (Da027-28).  Plaintiff’s counsel deposed Defendant Khazaei (Pa01-42) and submitted a supplemental brief in opposition to the defense’s motion.  On March 22, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C granted Defendants’ motion to stay the case in favor of arbitration and submitted a written decision  In the same decision, Judge Hudak also dismissed Plaintiff’s wrongful death count *without prejudice* on the basis that it was improperly pled by the Estate, rather than by the decedent’s son as an heir (Da070-079).  In anticipation of the latter ruling, as had been discussed during oral argument, Plaintiff had filed a motion to amend the complaint on March 21, 2024 in order to name the heir as a party, in accordance with the Trial Court’s interpretation (Da094-102).  Said motion to amend was heard and decided by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., who determined that the arbitration agreement was completely unenforceable due to unconscionability and returned the entire case to the trial calendar (Da80).  On May 14, 2024, the Trial Court issued a written decision and statement of reasons (Da80-93).  Subsequently, on June 20, 2024, the defense filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 14, 2024 Order and Decision, and the Trial Court determined to let the order stand without amendment or alteration on June 20, 2024 (Da162-63).  Finally, on July 2, 2024, Defendants/Appellants filed an appeal of the June 20, 2024 Order regarding their motion for reconsideration (Da164-170).
[brief] The Final administrative determination made by the [...] concerning the Appellant’s re-enrollment in the [...] failed to review or consider various applicable statutes, but perhaps more importantly, did not develop a complete factual record.  The central issue in this case was the classification of the appellant’s temporary separation from his employment.  [Pa54-57]  The Board misinterpreted the facts and incorrectly applied the law when they concluded the appellant had a statutorily impermissible break in service making him ineligible to remain enrolled as a multi-pension employee.  This court is not bound by the [...]’ interpretation of the facts or relevant statutes in this case.
[brief] In the present case, the applicant sought two waivers: (1) whereas the applicant is supposed to place street trees, a waiver was sought to accommodate the proposed drainage system; and (2) whereas the proposed lots should not have radial lot lines, the applicant is proposing radial lot lines.  In this regard, UDO Sec. 18-601 (Ia218) permits waivers, provided that they are based on proof of hardship:  The rules, regulations and standards set forth in this section shall be considered the minimum requirements for the protection of the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the Township.  However, if the applicant can clearly demonstrate that, because peculiar conditions pertaining to the subject parcel, the literal enforcement of this section is impracticable or will exact undue hardship, the Planning Board may permit such exemption(s) and waiver(s) as may be reasonable within the general purpose and intent of the rules, regulations and standards established by this section.
[brief] (Da939).  The agreement prohibits members from taking actions “detrimental to the best interests of the Company or which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary purpose of the Company. ” (Da940).  With respect to [...]’s books, the agreement provides that “Each of the parties to this agreement hereby covenants and agrees to cause all known business transactions pertaining to the purpose of the Company, to be entered properly and completely into said book. ” (Da941).  The evidence at trial established, and the trial court found, that [...], as a member in [...], and [...] and [...], who controlled [...] and [...], breached their obligations to [...] under the [...] Operating Agreement by: (a) making withdrawals of capital from the company without prior approval and authorization of a majority of the members; (b) not sharing company profits in a manner consistent with and in proportion to their 50% membership interest in the company; (c) distributing, receiving and/or causing to be distributed and/or received by [...] and [...] more than their share of profits and surplus of [...]; (d) engaging in critical company decision making involving company finances (including removing significant capital from the company) without seeking or obtaining [...]’ authorization; (e) taking actions detrimental to the interests of the company and [...] by diverting funds from the company in a manner detrimental to the interests of the company; and (f) failing to enter transactions pertaining to the company accurately in the company’s financial books and records.
[brief] See, QBE Ins. Co. v. P&F Container Services, Inc., 362 N.J. Super. 445, 450 (App. Div. 2003) (“The insurer’s obligations under the MCS-90 are triggered when the policy to which it is attached otherwise would provide no coverage to the insured.  [citation omitted]  In other words, under the endorsement, the insurer becomes a surety for the interstate carrier in any case where there is no other coverage provided[.]”); see also Chapter 3, [...], Litigating Truck Accident Cases, §3:10.  Coverage defenses and Exclusions (April 2024 Update)
[brief] First, this misstates the facts in *Schwartz*.  The plaintiff in *Schwartz* stated that “he did *not* receive a copy of the Subscriber Agreement when he began receiving service or at any other time. ”  256 Fed. App’x at 516-17 (emphasis added).  Second, actual receipt of any agreement is not material under Schwartz: *Whether or not Schwartz received a copy* of the subscription agreement, he could not accept services he knew were being tendered on the basis of a subscription agreement without becoming bound by that agreement.  *Id.* at 518 (emphasis added).  Third, as Respondents contend was the case in Schwartz, Respondents could fully access and easily review the agreement that governed their [...] relationship.  (Da0084-86; Da0065).  The Third Circuit’s common sense logic— that any “reasonable adult” would know that an agreement governing their cable subscription contained detailed terms— applies with even greater force here, as Respondents did not merely subscribe for cable, but invested over a million dollars in savings with [...].  *See id.* at 519-20; *(see Da0075, 78-79).*  That Schwartz applied Pennsylvania law does not render it unpersuasive *(see Pb19)* given that both state’s laws are identical on this point.
[brief] What knowledge Plaintiff had regarding Defendant’s financial picture is largely the result of his own flamboyancy – he took her to his house on Long Beach Island, and there was testimony from both parties about Defendant’s ownership of horses.  (2T 32:10-24; 148:14-150:11)  There is no reason to believe, though, that Plaintiff had the benefit of the full picture of Defendant’s finances any more than Defendant had the full picture of Plaintiff’s.
[brief] The most shocking discovery obtained in the *Allstate v. Lajara* civil suit was the number of corrupt personal injury attorneys who also participated in and profited from these schemes.  For instance, [...], Esq. was a named defendant who ultimately admitted to paying kickbacks for the referral of individuals to his law practice.  He admitted to splitting his legal fees with [...], his office manager, as she procured the clients for his office and was responsible for paying the runners who brought the prospective clients to his office.  See, CAIFa0053.  Based upon this and additional discovery from the civil action, the State charged [...], along with ten other individuals, in a conspiracy to use runners to obtain automobile accident victims and then bill insurance companies for unnecessary treatments.
[brief] The Strip has been used by [...] and its predecessors as a parking area for well over 30 years.  At the heart of the dispute is a 1967 subdivision and land swap made by the parties’ predecessors-in-title, which was approved by the [...], but never recorded, and which both parties agree manifested an intent to transfer the Strip to the lot now owned by [...].  Even though the subdivision was never recorded, both parties and their predecessors have acted as if the subdivision had occurred since it was approved more than 50 years ago.  Notwithstanding that behavior, the Strip now appears in both parties’ chains of title.
[brief] The Sentencing Court’s Lack of a Clear Statement of Reasons Requires the Matter Be Remanded for Resentencing  The sentencing court also incorrectly sentenced [...] without providing a statement as to the court’s analysis of the overall fairness of the sentence.  The failure to provide this comprehensive statement similarly denies [...] his due process rights to fully appeal his sentence and accordingly requires that the matter be remanded for resentencing.  Beyond the explanation that the Yarbough factors and sentencing law contain no presumption of consecutive sentences, the Torres court explained the necessity of a court providing an explanation of why the imposition of consecutive sentences satisfies the goal of overall fairness to the defendant.  The Torres court observed that an “explanation of overall fairness provides a proper record for appellate review of the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion. ”  246 N.J. at 272.  Ultimately, they noted that “an explanation for the overall fairness of a sentence by the sentencing court is required .  . . .”  Id.  This question of overall fairness is necessary to craft a sentence that takes “into account the single person being subjected to the sentence imposed. ”  Id.  Additionally, that consideration of the individual defendant must include consideration of the defendant’s age and the “real-time assessment of the consequences of aggregate sentence imposed. ”  Id. at 273.  The failure to provide a clear analysis of the overall fairness of a sentence, denies a defendant due process and mandates that the matter be remanded for resentencing.  See id.
[brief] That was clearly not what was envisioned.  The plain reading of the definition is that one cannot use revised grading to measure building height if there is mounding, terracing or other devised used for the purpose or intent to allow an increase in building height.  Therefore, the trial court properly found, under a de novo review, that the Board was correct in finding that the revised grading plan could be used for measuring height if the purpose or intent for the revised grading was for something other than allowing for an increased building height.  III.
[directive] On a quarterly basis, every law enforcement agency shall report internal affairs activity to the County Prosecutor on an internal affairs summary report form attached as Appendix K (The fillable form may be found on the Attorney General’s website).  Each County Prosecutor will provide those law enforcement agencies—including municipal police departments—in their jurisdiction with instructions on completing the forms, and a reporting schedule.  9.10.2  The summary report forms must contain sufficient information to enable the County Prosecutor to identify warning signs of potential deficiencies in the internal affairs process.  At a minimum, each report must include a brief summary of each internal affairs complaint that was pending before the agency at any point during the reporting period.  The summary shall at least include the nature of the complaint, the date the complaint was received, the current status of the complaint, and, if the case is closed, the final disposition of the complaint with any discipline imposed.  A sample form is found at Appendix K.  9.10.3
[brief] We did not want a sealed bid.  We rejected [...]’s December [2021] sealed bid consent order proposal.  We suspected that [...] and [...] were going to purchase and flip the Boonton property to [...] for profit, but we had no proof.  The Trustee never provided us with any information as to whether [...] were still interested and still seeking to purchase the property.  We were kept in the dark.  (8T 35)
[brief] In this case, defendant requested a de novo review in the Law Division, which “provides a reviewing court with the opportunity to consider the matter anew, afresh (and) for a second time. ”  In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 578 (1990).  The court conducting a de novo review must give due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the municipal court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.  State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964).  Appellate courts should defer to trial court’s credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.  State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).  The reviewing court must give deference to the findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his or her opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.  State v. Cerefice, 335 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App. Div. 2000).  This Court’s deference is made more compelling where “two lower courts have entered concurrent judgments on purely factual issues.
[brief] VII.  THE COMMISSION DID NOT FAIL TO REVIEW THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PETITIONER, BUT ACCEPTED PETITIONER’S ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE, AND CONCLUDED THAT THEY FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS ACT.  A motion to dismiss a School Ethics Act claim is considered under the standard set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:28–8.3.  The regulations require that the Commission review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determine whether the allegation(s), if true, could establish a violation of the Act.  The language mirrors the standard for dismissal of a complaint in the Superior Court pursuant to Rule 4:6–2(e).
[directive] Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Because due process is a flexible concept, arbitrary lines should not be 34 drawn regarding precisely when defendants adjudged to be flight risks or dangers to the community should be released pending trial. ”).  Defendants may bring individual due process challenges based on the Detainees, 245 N.J. at 232.  They “must do length of their detention.  Pretrial so in the first instance before the trial court. ”  D.F.W., 468 N.J. Super. at 445.  Pretrial Detainees lists a number of relevant considerations to assess such a challenge.  245 N.J. at 232 (discussing Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388).
[directive] At the conclusion of the data collection period, responses were collected from unique agencies and analyzed here.  Unintended respondents, such as correctional agencies were removed.  In total, Coordinators,8 21 SART 21 County Prosecutor’s Offices, and 514 unique law enforcement responded.9 agencies  8  In many counties, the SART Coordinator is the Forensic Nurse Examiner.  9  Duplicate responses were removed.  Certain state-wide agencies responded by station or barracks, but are counted here as one agency.
[brief] .................................................................  25 Pearson v. DMH 2 Ltd. Liab. Co., 449 N.J. Super. 30, 50 (Ch. Div. 2016)  ..............................................  21 Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill by OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass'n Ins. Co., 215 N.J. 409, 421 (2013)  ...............................................................  15 PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 320 N.J. Super. 112, 117, (Ch. Div. 1998) ........................................  17 Roche v. Ocean Beach and Bay Club, 2019 WL 5544036 (App. Div. Oct. 28, 2019) ....................................  19 Scult v. Bergen Valley Builders, Inc., 76 N.J. Super. 124, 135 (Ch. Div. 1962), aff’d 82 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1964) ..................................  20 Sebring Assocs. v. Coyle, 347 N.J. Super. 414, 424 (App. Div. 2002) .......................................  15 Sipko v. Koger, Inc., 251 N.J. 162, 188 (2022) .................................................................. 16 Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) ............................................................... 15 Sonderman v. Remington Construction Company, 127 N.J. 96, 108 (1992) .................................................................. 13 Stump v. Whibco, 314 N.J. Super. 560, 568 (App. Div. 1998) ........................................ 26 Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 34 (2004) ..................................................................... 16 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 ........................................................................................................... 14 New Jersey Recording Statute, N.J.S.A. 46:26A-1 to -12 .............................................. 1 Unpublished Decisions Cited in Defendant/Respondents Brief Roche v. Ocean Beach and Bay Club, 2019 WL 5544036 (App. Div. Oct. 28, 2019) ................................................................. 19 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This case involves a dispute over a strip of land (the “Strip”) along the boundary between property owned by Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (“[...]”) and Defendant/Respondent [...] (“[...]”) in the [...].