ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A sewerage authority commissioner is not a town employee serving in an “at-will” position.  Once appointed, the commissioner’s officeholding is not “at will” or at the unfettered discretion of the governing body.  A sewerage authority commissioner is an appointee falling under a specific provision for termination from office, N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  The statute sets forth the only grounds for removal of a commissioner by the governing body.  [...]’s governing body could not remove [...] from the Authority for any reason except “inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  The acts alleged in [...]’s disciplinary action against [...] do not meet this standard.  Under the statute, a commissioner may be removed only for abusing the position or failing to perform the duties and business of the authority.  Balanced against this protection is that a commissioner’s term expires at a set date; if the governing body does not approve of a commissioner’s character, judgment, or private behavior then at the end of the commissioner’s term the governing body is free to use their discretion and appoint someone else.
[brief] “The deference to local boards contemplated by Kramer is not intended to be applied rigidly or categorically, and is predicated on the existence of adequate evidence in the record supporting the board’s determination either to grant or deny variance relief. ”  Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 160 N.J. 41, 58–59 (1999) (citing Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment of Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268 (1965)).  That discretion, while considerable, must still be “supported by substantial credible evidence from the record as a whole. ”  Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment for Chatham Twp., 202 N.J. Super. 312, 330 (App. Div. 1985).  It stems from the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”), which “reposes considerable power in municipal zoning boards to deny or grant variances, [but] that power must be exercised cautiously. ”  Cell South, 172 N.J. at 88.
[brief] (Pa362 at 80:4-11).  Having been rejected for the COVID-19 incentive pay, [...] sought charge pay for the staffing coordinators.  (Pa231 at 21:19-22:21).  While non-nurses could in theory receive charge pay, such a decision required director-level approval.  (Pa362-63 at 80:17-81:16; Pa233 at 29:8-12).  Staffing coordinators were ineligible for charge pay.
[directive] [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  Did you commit the offense(s) to which you are pleading guilty?  Czy popelnil(a) Pan(i) przestc;pstwo, do kt6rego sic; Pan(i) przyznaje?  b.  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?  ze Czy rozumie Pan(i), zanim sc;dzia uzna Pana(i) wine;, bc;dzie Pan(i) musial(a) powiedziec sirdziemu, co Pan(i) zrobil(a), co powoduje, ze jest Pan(i) winny(a) tego przestc;pstwa/wykroczenia?  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  3.
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[directive] The Attorney General recognizes that the course of investigations conducted by 2C:64-1 N.J.S.A. et seq., law enforcement agencies within the state, pursuant to (civil N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et forfeiture), seq., (racketeering), under any other statute as directed or the by Attorney General, property will be seized and at some point forfeited to said agency be to of or returned the owner record ('owner").  This property may used by the law enforcement agency, prior forfeiture, upon obtaining a Use Order from the Superior to Court, retained for future use, sale and distribution of proceeds returned the owner.
[brief] On the day of the accident, the intersection was packed with traffic with drivers all waiting to get onto the highway to go home from work on this late Friday afternoon.  Pa154.  The deposition testimony indicates that the defendant did not see the plaintiff prior to impact.  Just prior to the collision the defendant was stopped at the red light, and despite his statement to the police that "he was in the left hand lane when driver 2 attempted to drive around him to make the left turn before he did," the truth is that the defendant admitted not seeing the plaintiff prior to impact.  Pa152.  Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant negligently failed to travel and an appropriate reduced speed in light of the heavy traffic and difficult intersection, and further that the defendant did not hold his turn and go into the left lane of Route 280 but went wide and allowed his vehicle to go into the right lane causing the accident.
[brief] [Appellants] could have made the payment and continued developing their Solar Project but chose not to. ”  [Pa148-49]; •  In dismissing Count 3 (fraud), Count 4 (conversion), and Count 6 (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) of the First Amended Complaint, “[Appellants] did not own the Solar Rights.  After [Appellants] lost site control of the Property, PJM voided the Solar Rights, and [Appellants] lost all rights to develop the Solar Project.  [...], and anyone else for that matter, were free to pursue development of the Solar Rights thereafter. ”  [Pa149]; •  In dismissing Count 3 (fraud), Count 4 (conversion), and Count 6 (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) of the First Amended Complaint, “[...]’ actions did nothing to destroy [Appellants’] rights to receive the ‘fruits’ of the contract.  The ‘fruits’ at issue would be the profits [Appellants] would earn from their development and/or sale of their Solar Project.  However, [Appellants’] own default of payment under the Lease for the Property on which the Solar Project was to be built destroyed the possibility for [Appellants] to have ‘fruits’ arise from the project. ”  [Pa150]; •  In dismissing Count 5 of the First Amended Complaint (unjust enrichment), “[Appellants] failed to make the required payments under the Lease and, as a result, the Lease was terminated, and [Appellants] lost site control of the Property and Solar Rights.
[brief] - **Texas:** Syrie v. Knoll International, 748 F.2d 304, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Texas does not impose on manufacturers the duty ... to recall products") (stool); Gomez v. ALN International, Inc., 2021 WL 3774221, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2021) ("there is no general, post-sale, duty to retrofit or recall under Texas law") (medical device); Nester v. Textron, Inc., 2015 WL 9413891, at *13 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2015) (Texas rejects failure-to-recall claims prior to any actual recall) (utility vehicle).
[brief] Related, Defendant asserts that the aforesaid information was not formatted in a table.  This is plainly incorrect based upon the account statements and this argument should fail.  PA – 71, 79, 85, 91, 103, 111, 121, 133, 143, 153, 163, 171, 177, 181, 185, 191, 197, 201, 205, 211, 215, 219.  Defendant argues that the account statements were to disclose the APR in sixteen (16) point font.  This is incorrect.  That regulation only applies to account opening disclosures, not monthly statements.  In fact, that subsection begins with “Required disclosures for account-opening table for open-end (not home-secured) plans. ”  12 C.F.R. § 1026.6(b)(2).  Defendant’s argument is incorrect and frivolous.
[brief] One Councilperson explained the Borough’s concerns succinctly, stating “there’s a contaminated site that’s been there for a very long time, and there has been no remediation.  There has been nothing done to clean it up.  We have a vacant building at the gates of our town. ” (T2, 35:20-22).  During the redevelopment process, the Borough made it clear that eminent domain was not currently contemplated for the Property.  The governing body even offered to enter into a redevelopment agreement with the Plaintiff.  Substantial, credible evidence on the record and the Trial Court’s findings established that the Property is not currently occupied and cannot be occupied for the foreseeable future until trenching, testing and remediation of soils under the existing building have been completed.  Because the former commercial use of this Property has ceased, the Property satisfies N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b).  Had the Trial Court applied the plain language of the statute, the redevelopment designation would have been upheld.
[directive] Emergent Electronic Monitoring (EM)  Alert(s)  Reporting to Law Enforcement  Defendant Name  Defendant SBI Number Defendant Case Number(s) on EM Pretrial Services Program (PSP)  Officer Name Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 4  No Description of Event Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 5  No Description of Event Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 6  No Description of Event Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 7  No Description of Event Form Promulgated by Directive #18-23 (10/10/2023), CN:12999 page 2 of 5  Emergent Electronic Monitoring (EM) Alert(s) Reporting to Law Enforcement Defendant Name Defendant SBI Number Defendant Case Number(s) on EM Pretrial Services Program (PSP) Officer Name Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 8 No Description of Event Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 9 No Description of Event Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 10 No Description of Event Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 11 No Description of Event Form Promulgated by Directive #18-23 (10/10/2023), CN:12999 page 3 of 5
[brief] \textit{N.J.S.A.}  52:27BBBB-5(a)(3).  In this matter, [...] and Defendants engaged in negotiations resulting in a settlement agreement wherein the union agreed to a $15,000 cap on terminal leave in exchange for other consideration from [...] and the State.}  Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' appeal and remand this matter back to the Trial Court.  V.
[brief] See Point IV. evidence that, in the course of committing a theft against her, [...] threatened or purposely put her in fear of immediate bodily injury, satisfying the second element of robbery.  But the State failed to present any evidence of the third element: that [...] actually believed [...] possessed a deadly weapon.  Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could find that [...] committed either degree of robbery against [...] and insufficient evidence from which a jury could find that [...] committed first-degree robbery against [...].  The motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted as to those offenses.
[brief] In interpreting the New York statute’s substantially similar first two sentences and finding it applied to lane changes, one court stated this construction “is wholly consistent with common sense, since every ‘turn’ necessarily includes ‘a move [to the] right or left on the roadway,’ and every ‘move [to the] right or left on the roadway’ necessarily includes a ‘turn,’ however slight, to the extent that it represents a change in the direction of the vehicle. ”  People v. James, 842 N.Y.S.2d 859, 862 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Queens Co. 2007); see also State v. Starr, 213 P.3d 214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (interpreting Arizona’s substantially similar signaling statute and observing that “[a] driver who changes lanes ‘turns from a direct course’ and ‘moves right or left. ’”).  Indeed, in rejecting an earlier court’s treatment of “turn” and “move” as separate and distinct, the New York judge in James observed the absurdity that would ensue from such an interpretation: if “turn” and “move” are indeed separate and distinct, triggering different rules, the paragraph would be rendered meaningless, because the admonition regarding “reasonable safety” would then apply only to “movements” and not turns, inasmuch as the statute’s language only specifically refers to “movement” when referring to the “reasonable safety” requirement “unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.
[brief] 90.  In this matter Association unit members are either perceived to be or are disabled/handicapped within the meaning of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  91.  Association Unit members were qualified to perform the essential functions of the position of employment.  92.  Association Unit members suffered and will continue to suffer in the future adverse employment actions because of their perceived disability/handicap.  93.  The employers actions in denying promotional eligibility due to perceived or actual disability or handicap is a material adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.  (Pa36)  The trial court did not take these factual averments into account even though the foregoing facts were repeated throughout Plaintiff’s compliant.  After failing to consider Plaintiff’s factual claims (above) the Trial Court thereafter found that; “Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate disability because the Plaintiff has not established the elements of such.” (Trial Court decision, pg. 4) (Pa6)  First [...] claimed direct discrimination.  Second, the Plaintiff nevertheless did in fact establish the elements of a failure to accommodate even though this was not the main thrust of Plaintiff's claims.  As noted, "a reasonable accommodation....may take the form of a temporary leave of absence", Boles v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-1762 (JLL), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41926, at *24 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014)  Plaintiff reiterates that it brings facial and direct claims of discrimination attached to the policy itself.  In such cases the court may proceed summarily - even before serious adverse harm has been established.  For instance, if the City promulgated a policy or ordinance which stated: "No person with a handicap or disability will be eligible for employment by the City", this Court would not have to wait for a harmed plaintiff to emerge in order to address the unlawful ordinance.  The court could enjoin the policy summarily as a facial violation of the NJLAD.  And that is precisely what Plaintiff requests in this matter.
[brief] [...] argue that a binding 30-year anchor tenant lease at the Property should be ignored for valuation purposes because the Township “took” the Property under a fee simple.  However, the Township did not actually “take” the Property until May 4, 2018.  More importantly, New Jersey jurisprudence holds that property must be valued “under normal market conditions based on all surrounding circumstances at the time of the taking. ”  State by Com’r of Transp. v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 514 (1983)(emphasis added).  Not a single case, statute, or regulation in New Jersey that has ever held that a fair market valuation should disregard existing leases in favor of a “fee simple” valuation.
[brief] While Defendants were conducting limited discovery regarding the entire controversy doctrine, [...] abruptly withdrew as the redeveloper of the project for unspecified reasons.  On February 28, 2022, the trial court conducted a case management conference, at which time Defendants’ counsel represented, for the first time, that the Redevelopment Agreement expired as of February 28, 2022.  (Pa642-45.)  Following the conference, counsel for Plaintiff requested certain basic information regarding the purported “expiration” of the Redevelopment Agreement, including, (i) confirmation that the agreement terminated as of February 28, 2022, (ii) documentation memorializing the expiration, and (iii) the basis under which the Redevelopment Agreement purportedly terminated.  (Id.)  Rather than provide that basic information, [...]’s counsel responded, in relevant part, as follows:  [Defendants] have now made several representations, all consistent, that the RDA expired by virtue of its terms.  Your client has the contract, as do you.  The contract had an expiration date and that date has passed.  It is expired.  It was not renewed prior to expiration, likely for the reasons widely reported in the press, and the Resolution authorizing entry into the RDA is irrelevant.  [Id.]  By letter dated March 18, 2022, counsel for the [...], stated the following:  The Redevelopment Agreement (‘Agreement’) at issue in this matter has expired as per its terms pursuant to Section 11.02 as of February 28, 2022.  Pursuant to the Agreement, no further action needs to be taken by the [...] and the previously adopted resolution designating the Redeveloper is now moot.  [Pa648.]  Notwithstanding counsel’s representations that the Redevelopment Agreement “expired by virtue of its terms,” the Redevelopment Agreement does not contain an expiration date.
[brief] “…I just don’t have the resources or really the capabilities to go back to 1999 and redress what you feel are wrongs when other judges have looked at this and said, well, I don’t really think there is a problem…”  That is, contrary to the Appellate Court’s finding, the trial court acknowledged it did not diligently review the evidence of account error and resorted to an unsupported assumption that other sister courts had done so.  Sound discretion presumes diligent verification of sister’s court’s review of the disputed issues, and sound discretion does not appear to have been conducted here.  4.
[brief] The Court recognized that, when a governmental entity and individual officials are both sued, “the governmental entity, in an effort to shift liability, may claim that the assertedly wrongful conduct of the individuals was unauthorized and outside the scope of the employment. ”  *Id.* at 198.  Conversely, the individual defendants “may claim that the alleged offending conduct was taken pursuant to an official governmental policy or directive and that the governmental entity is the party properly responsible and ultimately liable. ”  *Ibid.*  “Thus, under the defenses asserted or available, one party-defendant may seek to avoid or lessen its exposure at the expense of the other. ”  *Ibid.*  Notwithstanding that there “is undoubtedly a concern here for potential conflicts,” the Court held that “an absolute rule requiring separate counsel at the initial pleading stages is not required to adhere to traditional ethics precepts.
[brief] Bencosme, supra, at *6.  d.  **There is no question of fact in this matter which is bolstered by appellant/plaintiff’s failure to oppose his insurance carrier’s summary judgment motion. **  The appellant/plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgement Complaint against [...] was dismissed on an unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by [...], on June 7, 2024.  (DR03).  The appellant/plaintiff cannot now claim a fact issue existed on the decision of his insurer to deny his claim for insurance based on a “material misrepresentation. ”  The insurance coverage claims have concluded and were properly dismissed on an unopposed motion for summary judgment conclusively establishing that plaintiff failed to maintain insurance required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and was in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 on April 13, 2022.  Thus, even if appellant/plaintiff [...]’s claims against his insurance carrier were relevant to the application of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, the litigation of those claims was concluded in favor of [...] Insurance Company on an unopposed motion for summary judgment.  The trial court found that “plaintiff’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy” and dismissed with prejudice.  Summary judgment is granted as a matter of law.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528-529 (1995).  Interpretations and application of statutes are the province of law for the Court to decide—not a jury.  See e.g., State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017); State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488, 505 (2012).  Here, there was no “fact” question as to whether appellant/plaintiff [...] failed to comply with the law, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  The appellant/plaintiff [...]’s Complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.
[brief] Additionally, and while not crediting Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Council is, in effect, a private entity, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he delegation of nominating authority to private persons is not in derogation of the Constitution where that document is silent as to the appointment of public officials. ”  *Id.* at 579.  Such delegation does not offend the Constitution if “the particular delegation is reasonable under the circumstances considering the purpose and aim of the statute. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Male v. Renda Consulting*, 64 N.J. 199, 201 (1974)).  (Pa125-126).  - Regarding the nominating authority that the Legislature granted the Federation, [...] commented that “it is difficult to conceive of a group with a keener interest in maintaining a plentiful supply of game, in developing regulations to insure the safety in hunting, and in overseeing the operations of the state’s hatching and game farm and its stocking activities. ”  *Id.* at 573.  (Pa126).  -  In *Humane Society*, the Court did not hesitate to conclude that a “review of the limitations on the Fish and Game Council’s authority, which limitations serve to promote other interests, convinces us that there does not reside in that body the potential for such aggrandizement of the Council members’ interests as would be repugnant to due process.
[brief] On January 26, 2017, Plaintiff-Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), filed suit against Defendants-Respondents, the [...], [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), the [...] of Trustees of the [...] (“[...]”), [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], alleging she was retaliated against in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) for reporting patient abuse (“[...] I”).  (Da9-Da18).  During the relevant time period, the [...] was organized into various divisions, which included the [...] (“[...]”).  (Da3-4; Da19-48; Pa171-73).  The [...] operated the State psychiatric hospitals, including [...].  (Da3).  On or about March 9, 2022, [...], Esq. and [...], Esq. of [...] (“[...]”) were designated as trial counsel for Defendants-Respondents on all claims.
[brief] Appellants Complaint also fails in regard to the application of the CFA as the Complaint must allege an “ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal."  N.J.S. A. 56:8-19; see *Weinberg v. Sprint Corp.*, 173 N.J. 233, 248-54 (2002).  See also *Castro v. NYT Television*, 370 N.J. Super. 282, 294 (App. Div. 2004).  Plaintiff must show “a quantifiable or otherwise measurable loss as a result of the alleged CFA unlawful practice[.]”  *Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC*, 183 N.J. 234, 238 (2005) (citing N.J.S.A. 56:8-2)  The loss cannot be hypothetical or illusory.  *See Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 1, 13-14 (2004); *Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc.*, 405 N.J. Super. 105, 114-15 (App. Div. 2009)  Plaintiff’s complaint as to her CFA claim fails to provide any factual basis that she paid any money to [...] as a result of its collection activity, this is fatal.  *See Zaman v. Felton*, 219 N.J. 199, 222, 98 A.3d 503 (2014) (quoting *Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.*, 197 N.J. 543, 557, 964 A.2d 741 (2009)  To prevail on a CFA claim, a plaintiff must establish unlawful conduct, an ascertainable loss, and a causal relationship between the two.  *D'Agostino v. Maldonado*, 216 N.J. 168, 184 (2013), cited in *Woo-Padva, infra*, at *10.