ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Boyertown*, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against a Pennsylvania school district policy that permitted transgender students to use the restrooms that matched their identity.  897 F.3d at 538.  The court recognized, “[W]hen transgender students are addressed with gender appropriate pronouns and permitted to use facilities that conform to their gender identity, those students reflect the same, healthy psychological profile as their peers. ”  *Id.* at 523  8  Indeed, even when the rights at stake are of less overriding importance than the right to decide whether to end a pregnancy or to marry one’s life-partner, the New Jersey courts have consistently enforced the state constitutional guarantee of equal treatment.
[brief] Appellants contended that what [...] did in Appellants’ case was [...]’ *modus operandi*, wherein he regularly acquired tax titles within sixty (60) days of entry of Final Judgment, operating a clearing house for recently acquired tax titles, and thereafter sporting the shield of “bona fide purchaser for value without notice” status as a deliberate tactic to insulate Final Judgments from reversal.  [...]’ *modus operandi* was aided and abetted by counsel for [...], [...] (the “[...]”).  (458a-459a).  In not less than 4 of the 7 Notices of Lis Pendens identified in the Counsel Cert., the Zeitz firm represented [...].  (525a-532a).  In addition, a review of Ecourts for [...] as a party revealed another seven (7) instances in which the [...] represented [...] as plaintiff in a tax foreclosure matter.\(^4\) (458a-459a).  These representations were in large part coincidental with the [...]’s representation of [...] or Mary Rose in Appellants’ case.  The Counsel Cert. reveals other transactions in which Mary Rose transferred titles to [...] and [...] (See Exhibits “5”, “34”, “37” & “42” of the Counsel Cert)(528a-792a).  In other instances, other clients of the [...] transferred titles to entities controlled by [...].  Appellants argued that the extent of these frequent and concurrent representations of [...], [...] and [...] with the representation of [...] or other [...] clients should alone should be a basis to attribute to [...] any knowledge known or knowable by the Zeitz firm and thus be sufficient to affirm [...]’s open question about [...]’s entitlement to “good faith purchaser for value without notice” status.
[brief] The only discernable causes of action asserted against State Defendants in both the previously filed complaints and the proposed second amended complaint are monetary claims under the NJCRA and/or NJLAD, and a claim for declaratory judgment under the NJDJA.  However, State Defendants are not “persons” and therefore not subject to the NJCRA; there is no indicia of discrimination under the NJLAD based on State Defendants’ alleged actions; there is no justiciable controversy to support a claim under NJDJA; and State Defendants are entitled to immunities, barring such claims.  Furthermore, the Law Division rightly concluded that permitting further amendment of the complaint would unduly prejudice the Defendants, as [...] had already been afforded numerous opportunities to plead a viable cause of action and his deficiently drafted proposed pleading deprived Defendants of the ability to meaningfully respond.  A.  The Operative Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint Fail to State a Claim Under the NJCRA
[brief] Because defendant never objected to the admission of State exhibit S-60, the [...] SOP on business cards, at trial, (16T171-11 to 172-22; Pa53-56), this Court’s standard of review is whether plain error occurred in permitting cross-examination of defendant on that exhibit.  (16T172-24 to 175-18).  Here, there was no error, period.  The SOP was intrinsic evidence that directly rebutted the defendant’s own evidence, including exhibit D-15, defendant’s alleged “business card. ” (Pa62).  Therefore, it was properly admitted under N.J.R.E. 401 and N.J.R.E. 403.  Defendant’s premise that the State needed to satisfy N.J.R.E. 404(b) is wrong, as demonstrated in *State v. Canfield*, 470 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 2022), modified on other grounds, 252 N.J. 497 (2023).
[brief] When evidence fails to present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or when evidence is so one sided that a party must prevail as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 536.  Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the exercise of its gatekeeper function.  There are no genuine issues of material facts.  The trial court correctly applied the facts to the relevant law.  The trial court correctly held that “Plaintiff slipped and fell during an ongoing storm event in the form of freezing rain.  Plaintiff specifically testified the cause of his fall was the ice that had accumulated on the landing which he encountered immediately when stepping onto the landing.  Moving  Defendants had no duty to remove ice from the property until the storm event had ended. ”  (Pa1).  POINT II
[directive] The synopsis shall provide sufficient detail to enable a reader who is not familiar with the case to fully understand the factual scenario that resulted in the disciplinary action.  Examples of acceptable synopses may be found in Appendix L (updated November 2022).  This synopsis shall not contain the identities of the complainants or any victims.  Where discipline relates to domestic violence, the synopsis shall not disclose the relationship between a victim and an officer.  In rare circumstances, further redactions may be necessary to protect the identity of a victim.  Whenever practicable, notice shall be given to victims of domestic or sexual violence in advance of an agency’s disclosure of discipline related to the incident.  The required posting to the agency’s public website shall remain in place and publicly accessible.
[brief] (17T 28-22 to 31-12)  She and their mutual friend [...] picked up [...] at Newark airport on January 4, 2019, and took him to [...]’s Plainsboro apartment where [...] searched his bags for drugs -- because her housing at the time came from a program that did not allow them -- but found none.  (17T 34-16 to 37-15)  [...] testified that [...] suffered from addiction and mental-health issues but was not violent.  (17T 30-17 to 32-7)  [...] was not allowed to have overnight guests at the time, so [...] was sleeping at night in her car from the day after she picked him up through January 9, the day he died.
[brief] HISTORY  Respondents filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause seeking temporary and preliminary injunctive relief on January 19, 2018.  (Da629).  On January 29, 2018 temporary restraints were entered enjoining the disputed transfer of [...] from [...] to Appellant’s then wife, [...].  (Da621).  The temporary restraints were reaffirmed as preliminary restraints on March 28, 2018.  (Da626).  As part of that Order, Appellant was removed as an officer from [...], but to remain as an employee.  (Da627).  The Order also directed Appellant to provide Respondents with the QuickBooks accounting files for [...] that he removed from the company.  (Da628).
[brief] [Emphasis added].  Id. at 129.  Additionally, in State v. Allen, 308 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 1998), the Appellate Division found that the cumulative effect of errors in the charge to the jury warranted reversal of the defendant's conviction for drug charges.  The court noted that although simple errors may be harmless, the cumulative nature of them may render a result unfair.
[brief] Next, defendant’s argument that a rebuttable presumption should apply is similarly without merit.  In *Jones*, this Court determined “the rebuttable presumption set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2) [that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured when the body worn cameras of a police officer is not properly utilized] is applicable at suppression hearings,” but it refused to find that a defendant is always entitled to the rebuttable presumption.  *State v. Jones*, 475 N.J. Super. 520, 535, leave to appeal denied, 255 N.J. 508 (2023).  This Court then left it to the discretion of the motion court to determine whether the rebuttable presumption applies and, if so, whether the State has successfully rebutted that presumption.  *Ibid.*  The defendant’s rebuttable presumption argument fails primarily because the search of his apartment pre-dated the statute\(^2\).  Even assuming that it did apply, the presumption was rebutted because as discussed above the trial court found that the knock-and-announce requirement was satisfied based on sufficient credible evidence in the record.  For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this Court uphold the trial court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion.  --- \(^2\)  The statute became effective on November 20, 2023.  The search of defendant’s apartment was executed on February 19, 2021.  (Da18).
[directive] Judge Date  Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor's Office: Name --------------- Name --------------- Address Address ________ Telephone Number _ ---------- Number Telephone Fax --------------- ---------------- Fax  Em ail --------------- ---------------  Em ail ________  Ifyes, language _  Interpreter needed? Yes No ________ ADA accommodation needed?  If Yes No yes, describe _  Contact List attached by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12561 (KROL Order 6)
[brief] (3T: 99-4 to 101-22 and 102-6 to 22).  [...] testified that, although he would check to see if relevant city camera footage were available in any case, it was “common” for many of the city cameras to malfunction.  (3T:129-21 to 25 and 135-7 to 25).  On December 21, 2015, a [...] returned [...] charging defendant with Murder, a crime of the first degree, contra N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and 11-3a(2); Possession of a Firearms For an Unlawful Purpose, a second-degree crime, contra N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; Unlawful Possession of a Handgun, a second-degree crime, contra N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-5b; and being a Certain Person Not To Have Weapons, a second-degree crime, contra N.J.S.A. 2C:3-7b. (Da1 to 4).
[brief] This issue is substantively different than those raised in *Gomez* and here, “both in form and substance” because defendant has not extended credit to plaintiff originating from the initial loan.  *See Gomez*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183099, at *15 (citing *Gonzalez*, 207 N.J. at 1107) (emphasis added).  The *Gomez* Court went so far as to bar the plaintiff from amending its complaint as any amendment would be futile.
[brief] ..................15  Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369 (2014).........................................................................................................................15  Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419 (2013)  ..............................................22  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (2011) .....................................................................15  STATUTES
[brief] Ultimately, [...] (“[...]”)’s decision not to permit a struggling Pharmacy student to take on the additional academic responsibility of enrolling in a dual degree Master’s program was within the judicially-recognized academic discretion of the University.  That struggling student, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] (“[...]”), argues that, because an early website for the (not-yet-accredited) Pharmacy program advertised the “opportunity” for admitted students to also pursue a simultaneous Master’s degree (in one of eight fields) within four years, he was automatically entitled to admission into the second degree program because the University was divested of the authority to set academic standards for admission.  According to [...], [...]’s decision to add, to the advertisement, a 3.0 grade point average (“GPA”) requirement for admission into the dual degree program constituted: a breach of contract (or implied contract) (Count I of the Complaint), misrepresentation (Count II of the Complaint), and fraudulent inducement (Count III of the Complaint).  As the Trial Court recognized, the undisputed record demonstrates that each of [...]’s claims fails as a matter of law.  [...]’s decision not to permit [...] to pursue the dual degree while on probation in the Pharmacy program was an exercise of pedagogically sound academic judgment (not arbitrary and not unfair) warranting deference under New Jersey jurisprudence.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.........................................................1  APPELLANT’S PRO SE STATUS.....................................................3  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................4  ARGUMENT..............................................................................6  I.  IT WAS MANIFEST ERROR AND SIGNIFICANTLY PREJUDICIAL FOR THE MUNICIPAL COURT AND LAW DIVISION TRIAL COURT TO IMPOSE A WRONGFUL SENTENCE.  FOLLOWING MY NOVEMBER 14,2021  CITATION FOR AN ALLEGED VIOLATION  I APPELLANT  [...] WAS ENTITLED TO A FAIR TRIAL TO DISPUTE IT.  HOWEVER, THE MUNICIPAL COURT AND LAW DIVISION TRIAL COURTS DENIED MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, RECEIVING COMPLETE DISCOVERY, WITNESSES AND TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY.  AND PLEA OFFER MADE UNDER FALSE PREMISES.  CONCLUSION...........................................................................13
[brief] First, for the reasons set forth in [...]’s testimony (Exhibit P-2), it was extremely important from an operational and engineering standpoint to locate the Regulator Station as close as possible to the southern end of the Holmdel transmission line (where the line begins at the intersection of Newman Springs Road and Holmdel Road).  Second, the site had to be large enough to accommodate all of the Facility’s related equipment (most notably, the heating unit).  Third, the Regulator Station should be located in close proximity to the transmission line for efficiency and security reasons.  Fourth, there are several types of properties that [...] either avoids or cannot use for its gas delivery facilities.  Most significantly, [...] makes every effort to avoid residential areas, and instead focuses on properties with commercial, industrial or utility zoning.  The Company likewise avoids wetlands and low lying areas because they present a heightened risk of flooding and, more importantly, freezing during the winter months.  Further, [...] looks for sites with no environmental or contamination issues, and prefers sites with little or no required tree clearing to further minimize any environmental impact.  And, again to minimize any environmental impact, [...] prefers to build its facilities on already developed land, as it typically only requires a relatively small parcel.
[brief] I do not find Aggravating Factor 1.  I do find Aggravating Factor Number 2, specifically the extreme youth of the victim in this case and the gravity [] and seriousness of the harm that was inflicted to somebody who was vulnerable and incapable of defending [herself.]  Aggravating Factor Number 3, the risk that Defendant will commit another offense, I do find.  Aggravating Factor Number 6, the extent of the [] defendant’s prior criminal record.
[brief] Albert v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1586, 2019 WL 3003822 (App. Div. July 10, 2019) certif. denied, 240 N.J. 1 (2019.)  ...............  23  Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 63 (1969)  ......................................................... 10, 13  Geringer v Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 388 N.J. Super. 392 (App. Div. 2006) .......................................................... 22, 23, 25 Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 243 (1958)  ......................................................... 12, 13 Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993) ...................... 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 McBride v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 295 N.J. Super. 521, 525 (App. Div. 1996) ............................................. 11, 13, 22, 23, 25 Michaels v. Brookchester, 26 N.J. 379, 382 (1958) ........................................... 10, 13 Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479, 491 (2018) ...................... 11, 12, 23, 25, 26  Patton v. The Texas Co., 13 N.J. Super. 42, (App. Div. 1951) ......................... 19, 21  Reyes v. Egner, 404 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 2009)  13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22  STATUTES
[brief] For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that in calculating the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees, Courts must determine the "lodestar," defined as the "number of hours reasonably expended" by the attorney, "multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate."  *Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc.*, 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (citing *Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 1, 21 (2004)).  "The court must not include excessive and unnecessary hours spent on the case in calculating the lodestar."  *Furst*, 182 N.J. at 22 (citing *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 335-36 (1995)).  The court is required to make findings on each element of the lodestar fee.  *Id.* at 12.  The fee awarded must be "reasonable," and reasonableness is a "calculation" to be made in "every case."
[brief] https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/wrap-ups-back-to-basics.  [...] improperly, but unfortunately effectively, rooted through reams of this red tape to concoct its disclaimer.  The result of this blatant impropriety resulted in the exchange of approximately 1,000,000 pages of documents, nearly a dozen depositions, the filing of 22 briefs and the expenditure of approximately $1,000,000 of counsel fees by [...] and plaintiffs in this lawsuit, so far.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da251 Proposed Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da253  Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and In support of Its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 19, 2024 (Legal Argument Redacted Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)).
[brief] If every municipal prosecutor in every municipality must be on premises to prosecute cases, then [...]’s requirement for [...] to be on premises to prosecute cannot be dispositive of employee status.  Additionally, [...] was not required to work on premises with respect to any pre- or post- court duties.  (1T104:23-105:2).  While [...] contends that the pandemic has changed the nature of this factor worldwide (Pb41), the record shows that [...]’s Municipal Court sessions are now fully back to in-person proceedings.  (1T38:6-9).  As such, the nature of [...]’s remote work is not as relevant anymore, and was not relevant for the years pre-pandemic.  Even if it were, [...] performed her duties as Municipal Prosecutor remotely from her private law office instead of her home, which further indicated independent contractor status.  (1T18:17-25).  Since the pandemic, [...] also performed one to two hours of work per week checking the Municipal Case Resolution system from her private law office that was not controlled by [...].  (1T16:4-8; 1T41:15-42:12).  The records show that she was permitted to do so whenever and however she determined.  Ibid.  This, again, supported the finding of independent contractor status.
[brief] 31  Nogue v. Estate of Santiago, 224 N.J. Super. 383, 385-86, 540 A.2d 889 (App.Div.1988)  ..................................................  23  North Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569, 730 A.2d 843 (1999) ..................................................  13 Parker v. Parker, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2720, *37-38 (Ch. Div. 2016) .........................................................  16  Ridley v. Dennison, 298 N.J. Super. 373, 381, 689 A.2d 793 (App. Div. 1997) ....  47
[brief] In 2018, Defendant [...] decided to sell the Property, and approached the [...] as potential buyers.  Following months of negotiations, the parties executed a jointly drafted Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated September 19, 2019 (the “PSA”), pursuant to which Defendants agreed to sell the Property to Plaintiff for $1,000,000.  The PSA required Defendants to undertake several environmental compliance-related obligations as conditions precedent to closing (the “Seller’s Environmental Obligations”).  Seller’s Environmental Obligations required, among other things, that Defendants cooperate with Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Licensed Site Remediation Professional (“LSRP”) to secure, to the extent possible, a site-wide Response Action Outcome (“RAO”) for the Property.  In order to obtain a RAO, the NJDEP first requires the completion and submission of a Remedial Investigation Report (“RIR”).  Although the PSA does not contain a single reference to the RIR, the parties understood that the RIR was a prerequisite to obtaining the RAO.
[brief] When a customer proceeds to the registration/payment area, they are directed to complete an Agreement at the waiver station before they pay admission.  2T21:7-24.  There are several devices located immediately inside the Park where customers can complete the Agreement by using those devices.  2T21:7-24.  Once the Participant has completed a valid Agreement, the employee confirms whether the Participant has “[...]” socks, which are required to be worn by all Participants when using the attractions.  2T26:18-27:3.  If the Participant does not have the requisite socks, then they are required to purchase the socks with their admission.  2T26:18-27:3.  On February 22, 2022, Appellants, Julien and [...] were present at the Park.
[directive] 10 affairs process, and nothing in the IAPP is intended to limit or circumscribe the Attorney General’s statutory authority.  The Attorney General may supersede and take control of an entire law enforcement agency, may supersede in a more limited capacity and take control of the internal affairs function of an agency, or may supersede and take control of a specific case or investigation.  Whenever the Attorney General determines that supersession is appropriate, the Attorney General may assume any or all of the duties, responsibilities and authority normally reserved to the chief law enforcement executive and the agency.  Every member of the agency, including the chief law enforcement executive, has a duty to cooperate fully with the Attorney General during the investigation and adjudication of such matters.  Within their respective counties, the County Prosecutors shall be vested with the same authority to supersede possessed by the Attorney General on a statewide basis.  N.J.S.A. 2A:158-5.
[directive] Agency Name: Year: First Quarter  Internal Affairs Summary Source of Complaint  Criminal Outcome  Internal Discplinary Outcome Administra- Pending Pending from Prior New Cases  Not tively End of Conviction  Dismissal Years cases Closed Agency Civilian Anon. Diversion Acquittal  Exonerated Sustained Unfounded Closed  Sustained Quarter  Excessive Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Criminal Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Differential Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Demeanor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Domestic Violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Rule Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Total Cases Opened 0  Total Cases Closed 0
[brief] Because a judge made those findings under a lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, his sentence is illegal and must be vacated.  See U.S. Const. amends.  VI, XIV; N.J. ¹ “Db” refers to defendant’s opening brief.  All other abbreviations are set forth in defendant’s opening brief.  (See Db iv; Db 1 n.1)  Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 8, 9, 10.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.