ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Under New Jersey law, the tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage (tortious interference) contains four elements: (1) a protectable interest; (2) malice—the defendant's intentional interference without justification; (3) a reasonable likelihood that the interference caused the loss of a prospective gain; and (4) resulting damages.  See *Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics*.  116 N.J. 739, 751-752 (1989); accord *DiMaria Constr., Inc. v. Interarch*, 351 N.J. Super. 558, 567 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d, 172 N.J. 182 (2002).  A plaintiff proves causation by showing that he or she would have had a reasonable probability of economic gain. in the absence of the alleged interference.  Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 759 (emphasis added).  Damages must be illustrated by facts showing that the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer pecuniary damage.  Id. at 760.
[brief] ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW PROVIDES THE DEPARTMENT WITH EXPANDED AUTHORITY INDEPENDENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, THE DEPARTMENT FAILED TO APPLY THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW CORRECTLY (Aa0131-132)  .........................................................20  III.  THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW CANNOT BE APPLIED IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT IN THIS CASE UNLESS AND UNTIL THE DEPARTMENT ADOPTS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS AS REQUIRED BY THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW (Aa0133-134)...........................................25  IV.
[directive] of (b)  For sentences imposed that include a county jail term 364 days or less, as a of of condition probation, judges should consider whether the commencement the of If custodial portion the sentence will be stayed.  the custodial portion stayed, is the defendant shall report to Probation directed the interim.  as in of (c)  For sentences imposed 364 days or less a county jail, with no probation in component, judges should consider whether the sentence can be adjourned to a later date.
[brief] ”  Also at issue in that case was [...]’s ordinance applicable to mobile-home rentals which permitted “hardship increases whenever rental and other income from operation of the park is insufficient to provide for interest payments on mortgages, reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the operation of the mobile home park” and “a return on the owner’s actual balance of such investment in the mobile home park in an amount not to exceed seven and one-half percent. ”  The ordinance did not define “actual balance of such investment,” but the Board interpreted it “to mean the owner’s actual cash investment in the park after deducting that portion of the owner’s investment which has been financed through mortgages. ”  103 N.J. at 366.  Both ordinances (like [...]’s Ordinance) used the return-on-equity standard.
[brief] (See e.g. 12T216:3-14; 217:14-218:8; 223:21-225:22).  is no immediate market for reselling a timeshare (11T118:7-119:6), that anyone trying to resell their timeshare would be competing against [...] (11T117:20-25 and 119:7-20), that stays must be booked at least 30 days in advance (instead of the instant booking she tells them), that cancellations must be made at least 15 days in advance (instead of the 48 hours she tells them), and that the penalty for late cancellations is loss of their stay that year (instead of no penalty).
[directive] A subject officer who reasonably believes that what he or she might say during an internal affairs interview could be used against him or her in a criminal case cannot ordinarily be disciplined for exercising their Miranda rights.  However, an officer can be disciplined for refusing to answer questions during an internal affairs interview if he or she has been told that whatever he or she says during the interview will not be used in a criminal case.  Informing an officer that their statement will not be used against him or her in a criminal case is called a Garrity warning.  This warning informs the officer being interviewed that he or she must cooperate with the investigation and can be disciplined for failing to do so because the County Prosecutor has decided to provide the officer with "use immunity."  8.0.10 It is for this reason that the internal affairs investigator must continually reassess the nature of an internal affairs investigation as evidence is being gathered.  Having initially determined that a particular allegation is criminal or administrative in nature, it is important for the internal affairs investigator to revisit that decision during the course of an investigation to determine whether any of the evidence gathered following the initial determination changes the investigation’s nature and scope.  If the nature and scope of an investigation change, the investigator must be prepared to change the methods and procedures he or she utilizes to reflect the new focus.  For example, if an investigator Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (coerced statements obtained by threat of removal from office cannot be 6 used in criminal proceedings); see Appendix J. 46 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 initially determines that an allegation appears to be a disciplinary matter but later evidence leads the investigator to conclude that criminal conduct may have occurred, he or she must cease using the methods and procedures appropriate for an administrative investigation and notify the County Prosecutor immediately before proceeding further.
[brief] OFFICES OF [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] et al  DATED: August 16, 2024  MARCUS SANCHEZ, BY HIS GUARDIANS AD LITEM, [...], [...], Plaintiffs, VS. [...], [...] AK.A. [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-100, JANE DOES 1-100, ABC COMPANIES 1-100, XYZ PARTNERSHIPS  1-100 (being fictitious parties), Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, LAW  DIVISION  BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Hon. [...], P.J.Civ.  Sat Below  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
[brief] I, ¶ 1 | 22, 55, 59, 79 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 | 22, 55, 59, 79 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10 | 22, 55, 59, 79 | | U.S. Const. amend.  V | 22, 55, 59, 79 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 22, 55, 59, 79 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 22, 55, 59, 79 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] H714a Holm-172: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-187, listed the materials used in preparing his testimony (SOICR p. 12)  .................................................  H716a Holm-173: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-188, states there are no workpapers (SOICR p. 12).....................  H717a Holm-174: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-189, states that only the 2019 EMP and prior energy master plans and the materials listed in Holm-172 were consulted from BPU reports and orders (SOICR p. 12) ......................... H718a Holm-175: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-190, states that items listed in the rebuttal testimony are either public or in Holmdel counsel’s possession and see Holm-172 (SOICR p. 12)..............................................  H719a Holm-176: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-191, declines to specify pages in reference in the Energy Master Plan (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H720a Holm-177: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-192, objects and states [...] had no involvement in the development of the EMP (SOICR p. 12) ................................. H721a Holm-178: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-193, objects to identifying testimony or comments made which were adverse to a natural gas company (SOICR p. 12)
[directive] Cash and Proceeds  Forfeited Property of  It is the responsibility of Treasury investigative agencies to file a request for an equitable share of forfeited cash and the proceeds of forfeited property resulting from investigations in which they participated with Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund.  Sharing requests should be submitted to the seizing agency within 60 calendar days of the seizure.  The 60-day rule can be waived only upon a written request provided to the seizing DOJ agency, stating the reasons for the late submission of the request and/or providing justification for the waiver.  In those circumstances where an agency’s principal contribution occurs after the seizure, but during the period of time in which the forfeiture is being perfected, it would be appropriate to request a waiver to the 60-day rule or to amend a previous request.  A copy of the DAG-71 or similar document must be EOAF in sent to accordance with bureau policy.
[brief] “A forensic pathologist’s testimony is . . . restricted to describing the mechanics of death. ”  State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 338 (1998).  A forensic pathologist can base their opinions on the nature of a victim’s injuries.  See State v. Locascio, 425 N.J. Super. 474, 491-92 (App. Div. 2012).  [...]’s observation about rage was presented as part of a list of potential factors influencing the force required to fracture a skull.  It did not constitute an opinion on defendant’s mental state, and thus contrasted with that in Jamerson.  It also did not amount to an explicit opinion on [...]’s death.  And the jury had been informed earlier that the wine chiller weighed five pounds and that the victim sustained seven to nine lacerations on the head.  This aligned with [...]’s actual opinion that the cause of death was blunt force trauma, and it was properly admitted.  E.  Given the entirety of the expert’s testimony and the State’s evidence, the expert testimony was proper.  Demonstrating plain error involves a significant burden, and defendant’s focus on isolated expert snippets falls short.
[brief] [...] Sergeant [...] and Officer [...], who work in the Crime Scene Identification Unit, responded to the scene at approximately 7:25 p.m.  (4T46-22 to 23; 4T47-14; 4T52-21 to 53-15).  They photographed the scene and collected physical evidence.  (4T55-25 to 88-22).  At [...], they found a black mask and a black semi-automatic firearm with suspected blood, which was photographed, made safe, and secured.  (4T65-5 to 13; 4T66-18 to 17; 4T69-5 to 10).  They also recovered a gun magazine that was under the firearm.  (4T72-3 to 9).  At [...], they found another firearm, a revolver, which was photographed, made safe and secured.  (4T73-23 to 74-9; 4T75-2 to 16).  Discharged casings were also recovered.  (4T76-23 to 25).  They then returned to the original scene, where they photographed and documented the removal of the victim’s car.  (4T88-20 to 89-3).  Sergeant Powers and Officer Lang then went to the [...] where they photographed and document defendant, his clothes and his personal items.
[brief] ”  N. J.S.A. 19:14-4; (Pa1).  In re Ocean County held as follows, which could practically be adopted verbatim in this case:  Here there was no problem “beyond the voter[s] control. ”  It is not too much to expect that a voter would notice that his candidate’s name appears as a choice on the ballot and that there is a clearly prescribed place on the ballot for expressing that choice.  This is particularly so in light of the sample ballot that demonstrates, in advance, the names of the candidates as they will appear on the voting machine.  …
[brief] Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36 (1960)...........................................26  L.A. v. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 217 N.J. 311 (2014)..................14  Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404 (1992)..............................................36  L.C.S., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 371 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 2004)................................................passim Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366 (1995)..........................14, 15  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dillard House, 651 F. Supp. 2d 357 (N.D. Ga. 2009).................................................28, fn. 5, 41  Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 842 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1993).........................................................26  Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagan, 44 N.J. 504 (1965).......................................42  Owens-Illinois, Inc, v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437 (1994)............................43  Polarome Int’l, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 2008).....................................................45, 46 Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Co. v. St. John, 106 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014).............................44  Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 125 N.J. 421 (1991).....................................36  Salem Group v. Oliver, 128 N.J. 1 (1992).........................................................21  Search EDP, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 267 N.J.Super. 537 (App. Div. 1993), certif.  denied, 135 N.J. 466 (1994).........................................................21  Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co., 372 N.J.Super. 421 (App. Div. 2004).............passim Wakefern Food Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 406 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 209 (2009)..............................................25  Wear v. Selective Service, Inc., 455 N.J.Super. 440 (App. Div. 2018)...........19, 20 Weedo v, Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233 (1979).....................................23  Other Authorities
[brief] THE COURT:  Well, let me ask you this, can't their client waive that potential conflict?  [...]: Yes, and then -- and set off a ticking time bomb under this litigation.  At some point they're going to realize -- THE COURT: But what ticking time bomb?  [...]: Excuse me, Judge?  THE COURT: What? What ticking time bomb?  [...]: Because I -- you know what, can't get a fair trial here because of the Comparative Negligence Act.  I have no ability to point my – the finger at the other defendant represented by my same lawyer.  What happens if one defendant makes an admission that's damaging to the other defendant?  Is that same lawyer going to cross examine him?  What about -- THE COURT:  If at some point in the future it becomes apparent that there is a conflict, maybe at that point then he can retain his own counsel.  [...]: Well -- THE COURT:  But you're asking me at this point to declare the firm to say you can't represent this defendant -- all these multiple defendants who have all agreed to have their firm represent them, all said, look, we don't believe there's a conflict.  In the event there is a conflict, we waive that, we've been advised of it.  We want to forge ahead with one attorney.  You're saying I have to step in and say no, you can't do that .  . . (T.45-46).  [...], following oral argument and *in camera* review of the Retainer and Conflict Waivers of the [...], denied [...]’s motion, holding:
[brief] The *Wear* court expressly referenced Appleman’s rule when it held that the ACC language contained in the CGL form at issue barred coverage for mold liability that might otherwise have been available.  In *Cypress Point*, the change in the policy language expanded coverage by adding an exception to the “your work” exclusion that otherwise would have barred coverage.  In this case, removal of the restrictive ACC clause language that would have barred coverage regardless of the existence of a covered cause of loss in the chain of causation also expanded coverage.  The ACC language removed from the [...] policies at issue is the very type of restrictive language that the *Cypress Point* court noted could have been added to the policy (as the insurer did in *Wear*) via an ACC clause to limit the policy coverage.  Elimination of the ACC language allows coverage if a covered event (in this case, water intrusion caused by the insured’s negligence) is the “first step” in the chain of causation leading to an otherwise excluded cause of loss.  In accordance with the guidance from *Cypress Point*, [...] could have restricted coverage for a risk “it did not want to insure,” either by restoring the removed ACC clause language or by adding a separate, express exclusion barring coverage for claims attributable to or arising out of water intrusion.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Opposition conflates the burden of proof in a builder’s remedy with the burden of proof for each Crowe factor on a preliminary injunction application.  (Pb38).  Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the burden of proof vis-à-vis the likelihood-of-success factor lies with [...].  The law is clear that the burden rests on the party seeking a preliminary injunction to prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.  Waste Mgmt., 433 N.J. Super. at 452.  Accordingly, Plaintiff had to demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that it was likely to succeed on its builder’s remedy claim, specifically, the suitability of the Property.
[directive] The State declared it was “trial ready. ”  Defendant moved for leave to appeal, which the Appellate Division denied.  The Court granted leave to appeal.  250 N.J. 107 (2022).  HELD:  *Defendants have the right to be released two years after a judge orders them detained, excluding delays attributable to the defendant, if the prosecutor is not ready to proceed to trial.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a).  The statute is silent about what happens if the parties are ready but there are not enough courtrooms or judges to try the case.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTUAL HISTORY .................................................................2  A.  [...] Insures [...] for Personal and Advertising Agency ..................2  B.  [...] Initially Agreed to Defend [...] Under a Reservation of Rights When the Underlying Plaintiffs Alleged Causes of Action that Did Not Necessarily Require a Showing that [...] Intended to Cause the Underlying Plaintiffs Harm .........................................................3  C.  The Competing Physician Amends His Complaint to Include a Claim for Tortious Interference with Business .................................................................5  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................6  [...] Received a Judicial Declaration that It Had No Duty to Defend or Indemnify [...] in the Underlying Action .........................................................6 STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL ..............................................................................7 LEGAL ANALYSIS .....................................................................................................................9 POINT 1 - To Succeed with a Claim for Tortious Interference with Business, Plaintiff Must Allege then Show that Defendant Intended to Cause the Injury—Such an Allegation or Showing Precludes Coverage under [...]’s Policy ...........................................................................................................9 POINT 2 - The Trial Court Properly Relied on the Allegations in the Underlying Complaint When Determining Whether [...] Owed Any Duty under the Policy ....................................................................................................14 POINT 3 - [...] Has Not Alleged How the Exclusions Relied on by [...] are Ambiguous and Therefore He Has Waived Its Ambiguity Claim ..................................................................................................................19 POINT 4 - [...] Has Provided No Support for His Position that Public Policy Requires [...] to Provide a Defense and Possible Indemnification When a Dismissed Theory of Recovery Was Potentially Covered ........................................................................................................20 POINT 5 - No Dispute Exists Regarding Genuine Material Facts That Would Prevent the Entry of Summary Judgment
[brief] Violation of T&E in the [...]  The State has delegated to the [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) its affirmative obligation under the State Constitution to provide a T&E education to all children residing in the City of [...] (“City”).  N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1 (mandating the Legislature “provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system” of public schools for “all children” in the state).  The [...] governs [...] public schools and pursues this appeal on behalf of [...] students.  The [...] operates 38 elementary, middle and secondary schools in neighborhoods throughout the City.  (Pa1291.)  In 2019-20, 30,687 students were enrolled in [...]-operated public schools.  (Pa1910; Pa1510.)  Of this total resident student enrollment, 22,270 students – 72.5% -- were low income.  (Id.)  The [...] also enrolled 3,383 -- 11% -- Limited English Proficiency (“LEP”) students requiring English language instruction and 4,724 — 15.3% -- students with disabilities requiring special education programs and services.  (Pa1507; Pa1510.)  [...] also serves 4,982 three and four-year old children in its Abbott mandated preschool program.  (Pa1512.)  [...] students are also members of the court-certified plaintiff class of students in the ongoing Abbott litigation, a challenge to the State’s failure to provide these students a constitutional T&E education.
[brief] The trial court’s misapprehension of the applicable legal standard was an abuse of discretion.  Plaintiff makes no effort to address these arguments or to defend the decision below on its own terms.  Instead, he argues Defendants will not ultimately be able to recoup attorneys’ fees under UPEPA.  Plaintiff’s arguments are irrelevant here and premature.  Plaintiff will be able to litigate Defendants’ rights under UPEPA upon reopening of the judgment and Defendants’ filing of a motion for attorneys’ fees—but Defendants, at minimum, have a right to pursue those fees.  Plaintiff’s arguments are also meritless.  He argues that Defendants failed to comply with R.4:67-1, but that rule does not apply because this is not a summary proceeding.  Plaintiff also argues that UPEPA is not applicable because he brings claims for invasion of privacy and false light.  But UPEPA’s applicability is determined by the conduct targeted by Plaintiff’s lawsuit, and Plaintiff’s Complaint plainly seeks to impose liability on Defendants for their constitutionally protected activities.  The trial court’s decision should be reversed and the judgment reopened for the limited purpose of permitting Defendants to seek attorneys’ fees under UPEPA.
[directive] That includes, but is not limited to, searches conducted under exigent circumstances—such as an immediate search in the field for weapons, when officer and public safety are paramount—and searches incident to arrest.  Under this Provision, nothing will change for these kinds of searches: as before, a male officer can search a man or a woman (transgender or cisgender), and a female officer can search a man or a woman (transgender or cisgender).  But certain searches exist for which cross-gender searches are prohibited (e.g., • non-exigent custodial strip searches) and where the gender of the person being searched thus matters.  In those cases, where only a female officer can search a cisgender woman and only a male officer can search a cisgender man, then it is also the case that only a female officer can search a transgender woman and only a male officer can search a transgender man.