ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Hamlett, 449 N.J. Super. at 176; Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. at 238-39.  This is especially true when the warrant would have been issued in nearly identical form had the applicant appeared before a judge in a different municipality.  See Hamlett, 449 N.J. Super. at 178.  Rule 3:5-7(g) echoes this conclusion:  “In the absence of bad faith, no search and seizure made with a search warrant shall be deemed unlawful because of technical insufficiencies or irregularities in the warrant or in the papers or proceedings to obtain it, or in its execution. ”  Indeed, New Jersey courts have continually refused to invalidate searches and arrests pursuant to warrants based on technical violations.
[brief] For example, in Lajara, the Supreme Court of New Jersey also held that insurance carriers have standing to sue under the IFPA.  “The IFPA authorizes two separate causes of action to enforce the statutory scheme . . . the other a private civil action brought by insurers ‘damaged as the result of a violation of any provision of [the IFPA], N.J.S.A. 17:33A- 7. ’”  Lajara, 222 N.J. at 143-144.  (Emphasis added).  “Under the IFPA, “[a]ny insurance company damaged as the result of a violation of [the Act] may sue … to recover compensatory damages, which shall include reasonable investigation expenses, costs of suit and attorneys fees. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a).  Moreover, an insurance company “shall recover treble damages if the court determines that the defendant has engaged in a pattern of violating [the IFPA].”  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b).”  Id. at 144.  Finally, the Supreme Court held that:  “Notably, attorneys' fees, investigatory costs, and costs of suit are, by definition, compensatory damages under the IFPA, and therefore a successful lawsuit initiated by an insurance company will necessarily involve an award of damages.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a). ”  (Id. at 147-48).  (Emphasis added).  The Lajara Court interpreted the word “court” in “court of competent jurisdiction” to include a jury serving as the fact-finder.
[brief] See Da128 at 12:1-13:21 and at Da30.  Curiously, Plaintiff’s brief also neglects to include the 2018 payment in his calculations.  This is not the only time Plaintiff has provided an incomplete production in attempt to muddy the waters and ignore his burden of proof on his damages.  For example, when asked if he produced his 1099’s in this case, Plaintiff answered “Yes.  I think I did, and then I requested some from the IRS. ”  See Da78 at 77:12-15.  However, when presented with the tax returns he actually produced, Plaintiff was forced to admit that none of his 1099’s were produced, though he did claim that this was a “surprise”.  Da78-79 at 80:8-82:4.  Thus, faced with an Plaintiff who withholds checks (i.e. the 2018 payment) and states that he produced materials that he did not, there is no basis for the Court to rationally --- 27
[directive] No 10% crime of the fourth degree.  b.  An actor who, in the course of violating subsection a. of this section, threatens 2C:33-28  Soliciting or another with bodily injury on two or more separate occasions within a 30-day Recruiting Gang period commits a crime of the third degree.  Members  c.  An actor who, in the course of violating subsection a. of this section, inflicts serious bodily injury upon another commits a crime of the second degree.  3rd Degree  $25,000 to $50,000  10%  Permissible d.  Any defendant convicted of soliciting, recruiting, coercing or threatening a person under 18 years of age in violation of subsection a. or b. of this section shall be guilty of a crime of the second degree.
[brief] *Lemelledo*, 289 N.J. Super. at 495.  *Lemelledo* reasons that violations of statutes and regulations (not promulgated under the CFA) provide the basis for violations of the CFA where, as stated above, the CFA would not conflict with the existing scheme and where the industry was not one “subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of one administrative agency, a circumstance not present here.  As [Defendant] concedes, it is subject to a myriad of statutory schemes and regulations administered by both the Department of Insurance and the Department of Banking. ”  Lemelledo, 289 N.J. Super. at 495-96 (emphasis added).  With respect to subsequent performance, [...]’s basis for finding no violation of the CFA was rooted entirely in the reasoning that “[t]he collection agency's contacts with defendant were not an offer to sell merchandise.
[brief] This falls in line with our statutory language as well: “such writings and the testimony of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the court or jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the signature or writing in dispute. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:82-1 (emphasis added).  Defendant notes that, unlike [...], the writing in question was not a signature, but the letters A and R, and claims this distinction should sway this Court to consider the information prejudicial.  The plain language of the statute debunks this argument:  “In all cases where the genuineness of any signature or writing is in dispute, comparison of the disputed signature or writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be genuine shall be permitted…”  N.J.S.A. 2A:82-1 (emphasis added).  That the writing here is two letters versus a whole signature is thus of no moment at all.
[brief] "To determine whether a given transaction constitutes a loan, the substance, rather than the form, of the transaction is controlling."  Karns, supra at 408 (3d Cir.2007).  Here the agreement did not provide plaintiff a choice to not pay defendant.  The distinction between an “advance” and a “loan” drawn in Karns is if the party receiving funds may take some action that will reduce or void the obligation to repay.  Here plaintiff had no such ability.  Dictionary definitions of the term “loan” supports the position that the agreement constituted a loan, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “loan” as “[a]nything furnished for temporary use to a person at his request, on condition that it shall be returned, or its equivalent in kind, with or without compensation for its use. ”  Black’s Law Dictionary 936 (6th ed.1990).  At least one New Jersey Appellate court has defined a “loan” as “A loan, according to its common dictionary definition is "an amount of money that is given to someone for a period of time with a promise that it will be paid back."
[brief] Complainants discuss I/M/O *Treston*, *[...]*, SEC Docket No. C7l-18 (2021) (Ca236-Ca249) in support of their argument that school board members must always include a disclaimer in their social media posts.  Cb29-Cb30.  The Commission's opinion in *Teston* merely quoted the footnote in *Melnyk* and states the following:  ...  [T]here is a robust body of decisions and advisory opinions which school officials can utilize to determine *when*, and how a disclaimer must be used on social media (and other online/electronic publications) when speaking in their personal/private capacity in order to avoid running afoul of the Act.  *Treston* at 9 (emphasis added).  Thus, *Teston*, like *Melnyk*, does not reflect an across-the-board requirement that school board members include a disclaimer in all their social media posts.
[brief] *Dela Vega*, *supra*, at *11*.  (Pa115).  Instead, the *Dela Vega* Court differentiated the laws applicable to automobile insurance policies as opposed to the boater’s insurance policy implicated in the *Zacarias* matter.  *Id.* at *11*.  (Pa115).  Of relevance to the current appeal, the Appellate Division went further and commented upon whether such intrafamily liability exclusions, in fact, comported with our State’s public policy.  The Court stated:  Although our conclusion that the intra-family liability step-down in this policy was a hidden trap, thwarting plaintiff's reasonable expectations as to the coverage afforded by her $100,000/$300,000 auto policy, makes it unnecessary for us to consider whether the exclusion is more broadly violative of public policy, we confess to finding the exclusion troubling.  We think it fair to assume most purchasers of personal auto policies in this State would assume an injured family member passenger in an insured auto would have the benefit of the full policy limits purchased and would be surprised to learn otherwise.  The absence of any indication of the reduced coverage on the declarations sheet where premiums are listed would also likely make it difficult for a member of the insurance-purchasing-public to fairly compare auto policies.  The operation of this exclusion would mean a child severely injured in an accident caused by the parent-driver’s negligence could recover only $15,000 in personal injury damages under a $100,000/$300,000 policy as here, whereas the child's friend sitting next to her and also severely injured in the accident could recover the $100,000 policy limits.  This significant reduction in the liability protection the policyholder purchased — and the concomitant reduction in coverage available to an entire class of victims based solely on the injured victim's status as a named insured or resident family-member — is concerning.  See Huggins v. Aquilar, 246 N.J. 75, 83, 248 A.3d 1213 (2021) (noting "[i]nsurance policy provisions that disclaim whole classes of drivers are problematic").  [Dela Vega, supra, A-2272-19 (App. Div. 2022) at *2, FN2 (emphasis added).  (Pa107). ]  As alluded to by [...] in the Dela Vega decision, intrafamily liability exclusions run counter to our State’s public policy of affording the broadest possible coverage for members of the public who purchase liability policies.
[brief] In contrast, ambiguity in a statute codifying a legislative contract dooms any attempt to enhance a statutory requirement.  Said the Court:  “[I]f there is any ambiguity requiring resort to legislative history, one is already outside the realm of unmistakable clarity needed to find a statutory contract right . . . in this setting any ambiguity spells failure for claims that the Legislature created a contractual right.  . . .”  Id. at 273.
[brief] 5T5:3-6.  A 1987 subdivision application by [...], produced by Defendant, in fact demonstrates that [...] maintained ownership of the Strip and believed that it owned the Strip as of that year.  Da30.  The 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps identify three properties: Lot 1, Lot 1-A, and Lot 2-H.  They identify [...] as the owner of Lot 1 and Lot 2-H, and Mal-Bros.  Contracting Co., Defendant’s predecessor-in-title, as the owner of Lot 1-A.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  Around 6:30PM on February 8, 2019, Patrolman [...] of the [...] went to the intersection of Giles and New Street in response to a call.  (39T:128-10 to 22; 132-18 to 134-12).  There, he met [...], who was carrying her infant son [...] in her arms and crying out for police assistance.  (39T:133-25 to 135-12).  At that time, Ms. Griner told Ringer that she had been walking down the street when assailants had pushed her from behind and took the baby stroller carrying her other son, [...], who was nearly two years old.  (39T:134-24 to 135-3; 138-7 to 139-8; 40T:95-8 to 12).  Ringer and other officers searched the area for the stroller, which they found laid on its side on Devonshire Place next to a pair of shoes.  (39T:140-16 to 142-14; 145-14 to 21).  Ringer called a K-9 handler, who brought a bloodhound to the scene to track the scent from the stroller.  (39T:141-16 to 143-20).  Ringer also contacted State Police to request a helicopter with a heat-seeking camera to aid in the search.  (29T:141-16 to 142-4).  Detective [...] spoke to Ms. Griner, who was with her eight-month-old son [...].
[brief] As noted above, the committee amended the bill so that, while the Legislative Budget Officer has the responsibility for reviewing every bill to determine if it may have fiscal impact, the actual request for the fiscal note is made by the sponsor, the committee chairman or the presiding officer of the House.  This will reduce paperwork by limiting the preparation of fiscal notes to those bills which are likely to move in the legislative process.  In addition, at the suggestion of the sponsor, the committee amended the bill to designate the days allotted for the completion of each phase of the fiscal note process as business days.  The committee also amended a typographical error.  Governor [...] today signed the following bill and Senate Joint Resolution: S-287, sponsored by Senator [...] (D-Middlesex), which amends the process by which legislative fiscal notes are prepared.
[brief] If the question had been clearer [...] would have answered correctly and [...] and [...] could have timely advised him that it would not provide insurance for the vans.  [...] could have obtained coverage elsewhere before the camp began.  This option was taken away from [...] because the policy was not issued until the day camp started.  Also, the master policy did not contain any Exclusion for 12-15 passenger vans.  For this alone, the lower court should have denied the motion.  An insurance company cannot obtain rescission based upon an ambiguous or subjective application question where there has been an innocent misrepresentation.
[directive] (1) when there is imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person, created by a person in the vehicle using means other than the vehicle, such as when shots are being fired from the vehicle; or (2) when the suspect is driving their vehicle toward persons other than the officer in a manner creating an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, such as in a terrorist attack; or (3) when the officer is being dragged or carried by the vehicle, cannot disengage from the vehicle, and is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.  4.7  Shooting from a moving vehicle.
[brief] The Order of September 23rd, 2022, denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the only Order subject of this appeal, was properly denied pursuant to R. 4:49-2 because Defendant failed to present any new information or facts, did not show how the court erred, nor did she argue that precedent was overlooked by the court.  [Da17]  The lower court correctly ruled that “a motion for reconsideration is not warranted where the apparent purpose of the motion is to express disagreement with the Court’s initial decision. ”  [Ibid.]  Defendant failed to demonstrate that the court (1) based its decision on a palpably incorrect basis or (2) did not consider or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  Defendant did not appeal the underlying Order of May 27th, 2022, that entered final judgment against Defendant in the amount of $4,600.00.  The Special Civil Part of the Superior Court of New Jersey clearly maintained subject matter jurisdiction over the collection of attorney fees awarded in fee arbitration and confirmed on appeal by the Disciplinary Review Board of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  Both parties subject of this appeal are attorneys – Plaintiff is admitted and practices in the State of New Jersey and Defendant [...] practices in New York, but is not licensed to practice here.
[brief] ”).  [...] also notes the clear advantage that the killers had over their victim physically.  Here, defendant was 5’11” and weighed 200 pounds.  (24T:204-11 to 13).  [...] was six inches shorter and 43 pounds lighter, at 5’5” and 157 pounds.  (19T:109-17 to 24).  So, defendant faced a much smaller person while armed with a gun, representing the same kind of disadvantageous mismatch [...] dealt with.  102 N.J. at 279.  This also flows into another long-held maxim that defendant has ignored.  Namely, passion-provocation is not permitted where there is no fury, or such extreme emotion that defendant lost complete control over himself.
[brief] (Id.)  Moreover, as there was no evidentiary hearing held before the Governing Body, the WARD Memo was not part of that record; but --- ¹  While Plaintiffs seek to include the WARD Memo in their Appendix (Pa8-45), [...] has sought to strike the same, which motion is pending before this Court.  ²  At no time pretrial or at trial did Plaintiffs try to introduce the Master Plan, which would have been necessary to prove any alleged inconsistency therewith.  to the extent it was considered, it would be in the transcript of the Governing Body meeting, which was a Joint Exhibit.
[brief] [...] cites to Zaza v. Marquess, 144 N.J. 34, 49 (Supreme Court of New Jersey 1996), but fails to include a key part of the quote from the case, i.e., “An inference of defectiveness may not be drawn from the mere fact that someone was injured.  Liability should be imposed only when the manufacturer is responsible for the defective condition. ”  Regardless, Plaintiff is not making such an argument.
[directive] 6.1.6  In the rare cases where the agency has not filed disciplinary charges (or decided not to do so) within 180 days of receipt of the complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor.  The County Prosecutor, or their designee, shall investigate the reasons for the extended investigation and shall also examine whether the agency’s internal affairs function faces any systemic issues that require additional resources or oversight.  The County Prosecutor may take any steps necessary to ensure prompt resolution of the pending matter, including supersession of the agency’s investigation.  The agency shall provide further notice to the County Prosecutor every additional 90 days that the investigation remains open (i.e., on or about the 270th and 360th days from the receipt of the complaint).  The chart in Figure 1 provides an overview of that information.  Figure 1.  Timing of Internal Affairs  Investigations  Length of investigation  Special notice required from receipt of complaint 1 to 44 days (“Routine”)  None.  Case resolved in the ordinary course.  45 days (“More complex”)  Law enforcement executive 90 days  Law enforcement executive 135 days  Law enforcement executive 180 days (“Rare cases”)  County Prosecutor  Law enforcement executive 225 days  Law enforcement executive 270 days  County Prosecutor  Law enforcement executive 6.1.7  The law enforcement executive should consult with counsel about compliance with the 45- day rule, which includes several exceptions and tolling provisions.  For example, the "45-day rule" does not apply to internal affairs investigations alleging incapacity.  In addition, members of the public are not required to make their complaint within 45 days of the incident.  But once the agency has received the individual's complaint, the 45-day rule applies.  6.1.8  Commencing a criminal investigation into the subject matter of an internal affairs complaint will suspend the 45-day rule pending the disposition of that investigation; such suspension remains until the disposition of the criminal investigation.  (Similarly, a criminal investigation will toll the notice requirements established in Sections 6.1.4 – 6.1.6.)  Upon disposition of the criminal investigation, agencies will once again be bound by the 45-day rule, with the 45-day period starting anew upon termination of the criminal investigation.  25  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] Prior to 1987, New Jersey followed the common-law collateral source rule, which prohibited a tortfeasor from reducing payment of a tort judgment by the amount of money received by an injured party from other sources.  In effect, the common-law collateral source rule ‘allow[ed] an injured party to recover the value of medical treatment from a culpable party, irrespective of payment of actual medical expenses by the injured party's insurance carrier.  [...] at 132-133.  Clearly Medpay benefits were recoverable prior to the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 and continue to be recoverable as they are not barred by the Collateral Source Rule as set forth in Point V.  Currently the requirement to provide Medpay coverage in automobile insurance policies is codified in the provision of N.J.A.C. 11:3-7.3.(b).  Additionally, Medpay benefits are available under policies of insurance approved by the Department of Banking and Insurance which insure motorcycles and commercial motor vehicles, as well as the requirement to provide Medpay benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10.  Medpay coverage may also be obligated to be paid when an out of state vehicle, which maintains Medpay coverage in their home state, enters the State of New Jersey.  POINT V
[brief] Defendant/Respondent(s).  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: SOMERSET COUNTY  DOCKET NO: [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], P.J.Cv.  DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  GREATER  NEW YORK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDERS FILED JANUARY 20, 2023 (Argued below.  Ruling below at 144Pa.)  The Law Division’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was an appropriate exercise of discretion.  It is well settled that a party seeking reconsideration must “demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process. ”  A litigant should not seek reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision of the Court …  Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  Said another way, a litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process …  Although it is an overstatement to say that a decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable whenever a Court can review the reasons stated for the decision without a loud guffaw or involuntary gasp, it is not much of an overstatement.  The arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable standard is the least demanding form of judicial review.  [D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). ]  We respectfully maintain that the Law Division did not “fail to appreciate” probative or competent evidence, or act in an arbitrary or capricious manner.  Plaintiff’s claim that the Law Division failed to consider [...]’s “extreme medical circumstances” (Pb29) is disproven by the record below.  [...] considered these circumstances and determined that they were not “exceptional” circumstances.  (1T at 11:15-22.)  [...] noted this in her own detailed decision.  (155Pa-156Pa.)  [...] further agreed that [...]’s medical problems had no effect on her experts’ ability to provide timely expert reports, or her attorney’s ability to file a timely motion to extend discovery.  (155Pa.)  Both [...] and [...] thus acknowledged and considered the argument that plaintiff offered, and rejected it, as was within their discretion to do.  Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration offered no more than a repetition of her prior arguments.  Both judges in the Law Division applied the appropriate legal standard for the underlying request to extend discovery, and [...] applied the appropriate standard to the motion for reconsideration.  Because their decisions were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, they should be affirmed.