ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (5T:21-16 to 22-6)  The court also rejected Miller factor four – concerning a juvenile’s ability to deal with the police and justice system – finding simply that [...]’s “failure to comprehend the process and/or trust his attorney is not unique or necessarily based upon his age. ”  (5T:22-7 to 14)  Finally, the court found that “Miller factor five is clearly supported by the record made by the defense” and that “it is abundantly clear that the defendant is capable of rehabilitation” based on his lack of disciplinary infractions in prison and his participation in all of the rehabilitative programs available to him.
[brief] In further support of its argument on the appropriate statutory interpretation for the immunity statute, [...] argues that contributory negligence should not apply because the duty of a train operator is “‘to use reasonable care to so operate the train as it approaches a grade crossing with due regard to its right of way, as to protect travelers’ extended ‘[e]ven as to those who in disregard of due care may attempt to cross the tracks in the face of an oncoming train or to one whose vehicle may be stalled or stopped on the tracks[.]’ ”  NJb8.  This is not a correct statement of the law.  Therefore, the argument should be disregarded.
[brief] **The Department’s Issuance Of The CAFRA Permit To [...]. **  Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Department agreed to issue a CAFRA Individual Permit for the Project following a public comment period on the proposed settlement and subject to the Department’s review of any comments submitted.  Aa35.  A Notice of Intent to Settle was published in the October 5, 2022 issue of the DEP Bulletin.  2Ra167-68.  In addition, [...] provided specific notice of the Settlement Agreement to Appellant.  2Ra169-77.  Appellant objected to the Settlement Agreement by email to the Department on October 6, 2022 and by letter dated December 2, 2022.  2Ra182-83; Aa41-53.  Appellant reiterated its argument that the Project failed to comply with Subsections C and D of the SRD Rule and that the proposed settlement constituted an unlawful waiver of the SRD Rule.  2Ra180-83; Aa41-53.  The Department provided [...] copies of the public comments received.  2Ra184.  By letter dated March 2, 2023, [...] provided responses to the public comments, and in particular, Appellant’s comments.  2Ra192-96.  Following the conclusion of the public comment period, on June 30, 2023, the Department issued a CAFRA Individual Permit to Appellant (the “Permit”), which authorized the construction of the Project in accordance with the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................  12  POINT I – APPELLANT SEEKS A WINDFALL BASED UPON A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR (DA40;1T7:3-10) ......................... 12 POINT II – APPELLANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY ENTITLEMENT TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR ITS EXPERT FEES (2T11:3-10) ................................................................. 17 POINT III – THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY BARRED DAMAGES FROM OFF-SITE CONDITIONS (4T & 5T) ........... 19 POINT IV – THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY BARRED THE NET OPINIONS CONTAINED IN THE WATERMEN REPORT (6T) ........................................................................ 24 POINT V – ALLEGED DAMAGES DUE TO CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES ARE NOT COMPENSABLE IN CONDEMNATION MATTERS (3T) ............................................................... 36 POINT VI – APPELLANT CANNOT BE COMPENSATION FOR OFF-SITE CONDITIONS (4T & 5T) ........................................ 48 CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 50 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS Order and Statement of Reasons Permitting the Filing of Amended Complaint filed March 27, 2020 ................................................................. Da80 Order Denying In Part Defendant’s Motion Seeking Expert Fees and Statement of Reasons filed January 8, 2021 .............................................. Da154 Order Barring Damages to Property Sustained from Vibrations and Statement of Reasons filed August 6, 2021 .................................................. Da391 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Loss of Ocean View and Privacy filed January 28, 2022 ............................................................... Da446 Order Barring Defendant’s Appraiser From Relying at Trial on the [...] [as to enhanced wave overtopping] filed October 7, 2022 ........................................................................................................ Da154 TABLE OF RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX Certification of [...] in Further Support of Plaintiff’s Motion Seeking Leave to File An Amended Complaint and Amended Declaration of Taking filed March 24, 2020 ........................................ Pa1 Exhibit A – [...]’s Offer Letter dated August 13, 2018 ...... Pa15 Exhibit B – Metes and Bounds Easement Description attached to initial Verified Complaint ............................................................. Pa17 Exhibit C – Relevant Portions of Respondent’s Appraisal Report ........................................................................................................... Pa20 Exhibit D – Commissions’ Hearing Exhibits Nos. 1 – 3 ..........
[brief] The New Jersey Product Liability Act, N.J.S.A. Sec 2A:58C-2 - Liability of manufacturer or seller in product liability action - sets forth the three theories of liability, i.e., manufacturing defect, design defect or defective warning, under which a manufacturer or seller may be strictly liable for harm caused by a product.  Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 139 N.J. 365, 375; See also Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 94-95; See also N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2.  A plaintiff may establish the existence of a manufacturing defect “through circumstantial evidence…which would permit an inference that a dangerous condition existed prior to sale. ”  Scanlon v. Gen. Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motor Div., 65 N.J. 582, 592-93 (1974).  As set forth by the Trial Court in its Orders denying [...]’s motions for summary judgment, “…direct evidence of a product defect is not required under the PLA to show a product defect existed. ”  See Scanlon, 65 N.J. 582 at 592-93 (1974).  Instead, as the Trial Court noted, a product defect can be demonstrated through ‘circumstantial evidence and the facts shown,’ which is the case here. ”  (Da0815: Da0827)  In [...]’s case, a factfinder may clearly infer that there was a manufacturing defect in the Ozurdex applicator based on Plaintiff’s Undisputed Facts 1-71 as set forth in [...]’s opposition to [...]’s motions for summary judgment.
[brief] [...] mounted a zealous defense, testified on his own behalf, and produced five witnesses who testified to his character for truthfulness.  Because this was close case for the jury, the prosecutor’s improper comments in summation clearly capable of producing an unjust result by tipping the scale in favor of the State.  R. 2:10-2.  POINT III  UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO GIVE A COOPERATING WITNESS CHARGE REQUIRES REVERSAL.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  The standard of review for a summary judgment motion is, “de novo, employing the same standard used by the trial court. ”  Tarabokia v. Structure Tone, 429 N.J. Super. 103, 106 (App.Div.2012) (citing Prudential Prop. & Cas.  Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998)).  Under this standard, a party against whom a claim is made may move for summary judgment in its favor before the case is tried.  R. 4:46-1.  Pursuant to R. 4:46-2, a party is entitled to summary judgment where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  The movant bears the “burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact” regarding the claims asserted.  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954) (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court has cautioned that “a court should deny a summary judgment motion only where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ’”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)) (emphasis added).  “That means a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute. ”  *Ibid.*  Moreover, “when the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. ”  *Id.* at 540 (quotations omitted).  Additionally, summary judgment is mandated after: adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.  In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.  The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.  [Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).  The standard for such a determination is “whether the competent materials presented . . . are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 529 (1995) (quoting *R.* 4:46-2).  Immaterial or frivolous evidence is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.  *Ibid.*  Moreover, an issue that has only “a single, unavoidable resolution” is not “genuine” under *R.* 4:46-2.  *Id.* at 540.  II.
[brief] . . .”); *Antonucci*, 470 N.J. Super. 553.  As this Court explicitly recognized in *Antonucci*, the FAA preempts several amendments to the LAD that would have interfered with parties’ contractual ability to arbitrate employment-discrimination claims.  470 N.J. Super. at 557–58.  Relying on holdings from both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the Antonucci Court affirmed that [w]hen a state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the conflicting state law is pre-empted by the FAA.  . . .  Even when the state law does not expressly single out arbitration agreements, it will be pre-empted if its application “covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that . . . have the defining features of arbitration agreements. ”  Id. at 564–65 (internal citations omitted) (citing and quoting Kindred Nursing Ctrs., Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 581 U.S 246 (2017); Flanzman, 244 N.J. 119).  Here, the breadth and specificity of the signed Mutual Arbitration Agreement encompasses all of [...]’s claims as stated in her action.
[brief] ’”\(^5\) *State v. Jenkins*, 178 N.J. 347, 362 (2004) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); *State v. Ruiz*, 399 N.J. Super. 86, 97–98 (App. Div. 2008) (same).  “If, instead, the defendant disregarded only a ‘possibility’ of death, the result is reckless manslaughter. ”  See also *Campfield*, 213 N.J. at 233, 233 n.1 (“To convict a defendant of reckless manslaughter . . . , the State need not prove that the defendant perceived a risk that the victim would certainly or probably die as a result of the defendant's conduct; the defendant has the required state of mind if he disregarded only a possibility of death .  . . .  In contrast, a finding that a defendant caused death with an awareness and conscious disregard of the probability of death \(^5\)  The State need not prove, however, that death is “practically certain” to follow, as it must for serious bodily injury murder.  *State v. Gaines*, 377 N.J. Super. 612, 621 (App. Div. 2005) (“[T]he propriety of the judge's decision to submit the crime of aggravated manslaughter to the jury depends on whether the evidence clearly indicated a basis for finding that defendant fired the gunshot that killed [the victim] consciously disregarding a probability of causing the death of a person in the backyard but without an awareness that it was practically certain that someone would die as a result. ”). supports a conviction for the offense of aggravated manslaughter, a first-degree crime.
[brief] 8 State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 446 (1989) .....................................................  23 State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 6 (1990) .................................................................  32  State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 10, 15 (1990) ...............................................................  31  State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015) ......................................................  14 State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012) ....................................................................  13 State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 390 (1996) .............................................................  18 State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 (1971) ...............................................................  17 State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 233, 234 (1988) .........................................................  8 State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997) ..........................................................  14 State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989) .......................................................  32  State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 134 (1954) ..........................................................
[brief] In *Rosenblitt v. Zimmerman*, 166 N.J. 391 (2001), the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed a case in which the defendant medical doctor destroyed medical records that were considered critical to the plaintiff’s medical malpractice case, the remedies that may be available to the non-spoliating party, and the purpose of such remedies.  When spoliation occurs, the law has developed a number of civil remedies, the purpose of which is to make whole, as nearly as possible, the litigant whose cause of action has been impaired by the absence of crucial evidence; to punish the wrongdoer; and to deter others from such conduct.  *Id.* at 401.  The remedies may include the spoliation inference at trial, discovery sanctions set forth in R. 4:23-4, and a separate tort action for fraudulent concealment.  *Id.* at 401-407.
[brief] \textsuperscript{7}  In a fiscal crisis where District students tremendously suffered academically, physically, and emotionally during the school closures, that $1,301,300.\textsuperscript{18} in critical funding that Defendants’ illegally secured from Plaintiff \textit{could} have been used to fund educational programs and services to combat learning loss and render social and emotional supports for the 27,000+ students negatively impacted from the closures.  But when given the choice to do the right thing and return the money, [...] and [...] chose corporate profit over student welfare.  The Board was therefore forced into the unenviable predicament to petition the court for relief and justice for \textsuperscript{7} Pa62 – Pa72; Pa228 the return of the taxpayer’s $1,301,300.\textsuperscript{18} that Defendants secured illegally pursuant to a breach of contract and tortious conduct.
[brief] Plaintiff's Motion for Additional Discovery and Sanctions [Doc. No. 141]  This motion requests additional discovery and sanctions.  Specifically, plaintiff requests (1) leave to serve a set of “special interrogatories” addressing defendant's electronic discovery, (2) that plaintiff's consultants be permitted to review and search defendant's computers and/or e-mail archives to be certain that all relevant evidence was produced, and (3) the Court order the in camera inspection of every CD and DVD referred to in [...]'s November 19, 2012 affidavit.  Plaintiff's request for this additional discovery is denied.
[brief] He . . . makes that up out of [nothing].  That is the fixing of the standards of performance.  There’s nothing that we can see that justifies the arbitrator making the decision that the employer could --- 4 “1T” refers to the transcript of oral argument on the parties’ competing motions before the trial court, dated October 6, 2023.  not perform -- could not terminate an employee for a temporary disability.  ...  And, again, everything flows from the arbitrator’s decision that an employer cannot terminate an employee on a temporary disability.  That is a standard of performance and everything flows from that.
[brief] (ii)  The trial court’s extremely low and inadequate fee award violates the public policy underlying fee shifting statutes that provide litigants equal access to courts.  (Pa21).  The trial court’s abuse of discretion in issuing its low and inadequate fee award also violated public policy.  (P21).  State and federal fee-shifting statutes “share the common purpose of ensuring that plaintiffs with bona fide claims are able to find lawyers to represent them. ”  JHC Indus. Services, LLC v. Centurion Companies, Inc., 469 N.J. Super. 306, 313 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Coleman, 113 N.J. at 598)).  “Both are designed to attract competent counsel in cases involving an infringement of statutory rights, to achieve uniformity in those statutes and to ensure justice for all citizens. ”  Ibid.  As former Senator [...], the sponsor of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976 explained:  Private citizens must be given not only the rights to go to court, but also the legal resources.  If the citizen does not have the resources, his day in court is denied him; the congressional policy which he seeks to assert and vindicate goes unvindicated; and the entire Nation, not just the individual citizen, suffers.  [Coleman, 113 N.J. at 597 (internal citation omitted.]
[directive] Dear Law Enforcement Professional:  The New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force (Task Force) has approved minimum training requirements for all first responders to include the basic Incident Command System Course (ICS-100), Hazardous Materials Awareness, Weapons of Mass Destruction Awareness and, for law enforcement officers, Counter Terrorism Awareness.  In order to achieve compliance with these minimum training requirements, the attached Directive requires all law enforcement officers to obtain this training.  To assist law enforcement agencies in meeting this requirement, the Task Force has directed its Planning Group to develop a Virtual Academy for first responders using internet based training.  This website is available to all New Jersey First Responders.  The Planning Group is in the process of working with prosecutors’ offices and first responder agencies to provide information on how to access the Virtual Academy.  The ICS-100, Hazmat Awareness and WMD Awareness courses are currently available through the Virtual Academy.  The Virtual Academy will offer the Counter- Terrorism course in the near future.  As you may already know, President Bush directed all federal departments and agencies to condition the award of preparedness grants upon adoption of, and implementation of, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by the grant recipient.  In addition to satisfying the Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force requirements, the completion of the ICS-100 training is the first step in implementing NIMS.  The Department of Homeland Security has also recommended that each first responder should complete the NIMS Awareness Course (IS-700) developed by FEMA to obtain a basic understanding of NIMS.  This course can be accessed through the Virtual A c a d e m y o r d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h t h e F E M A W e b s i t e a t http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700.asp.  Sincerely, [...]
[directive] s. s. L.1978, c. 95, 2C:64-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.  Amended by L.1979, c. 344, 4, eff. Jan. 23, 1980; L.1981, c. 290, s. 49, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.  Seized property; rights of owners and others holding interests 2C:64-5.
[brief] In the meanwhile, in 2009, [...] and her husband acquired title to the Challenger Lot from [...].  As Beth described it in her deposition, [...] “just kind of backed out of it and we kept it. ”  *See* Deposition of [...], T:15-11 to 16-10 (Da663).  In 2020, [...] purchased the property from the Roths under the name [...].⁷  He was familiar with it because he lived in the area and his brother owned adjacent property.  Deposition of Jamie [...], T:9-8 to 18, Da690.  [...] testified in his deposition that he assumed the property was not landlocked because of “the policy in New Jersey that doesn’t allow landlocked --- ⁶  In a footnote to this passage, [...] wrote:  “If A is allowed to use B’s land the relationship is similar to an easement, but such privilege is revocable at the will of the servient owner, B, and is a license.  *Powell on Real Property,* 2000, Section 34.24. ”(Da622)  ⁷ [...] chose the name “Challenger” because the 1970 Dodge Challenger was his favorite car and thought it would be “a nice name. ”  Deposition of Jamie [...], T:8-24 to T:9-4, Da690. property” and “[j]ust things I’ve heard over the years. ”  Deposition of Jamie [...], T:13-19 to T:14-8, Da691-Da692.  [...] did not conduct a title search of the property before purchasing it but claimed the Roths told him they accessed the lot “by way of a roadway easement starting at Losey Road. ”  (Da511)  It is undisputed that [...] never recorded anything in the County property records alerting prospective purchasers of the Challenger Lot to the outcome of the [...] litigation; however, [...] testified in her deposition that she made [...] at least generally aware that there had been litigation over entitlement to an easement across [...]’s property. \(^8\)  **Standard of Review**
[brief] As a matter of statutory law, each variance pursuant to NJSA 40:55D-70(d) must relate to a “particular case”.  NJSA 40:55D-70(d).  Thus, the Legislature has told us that all variances are to stand on their own circumstances.  Our Supreme Court has also long held that variance decisions are not precedential:  “Because of the nature of the subject, no precise formula is feasible, and each case must therefore turn on its own circumstances. ”  *Kohl v. Mayor and Council of Fairlawn*, 50 N.J. 268, 276 (1967), quoting *Andrews v. Ocean Township Board of Adjustment*, 30 N.J. 245, 251 (1959).
[brief] (Da648)  And, under the foregoing authorities, when the agreement to arbitrate states only that the [...] rules will apply, that includes the [...]’s power to interpret and apply its own rules.  Moreover, [...] argues that the trial court ruled that an arbitrator can exceed his powers if the arbitration body allows it.  Db38.  Not so.  The trial court actually ruled that, because the arbitration body is permitted to interpret its own rules, the issue of whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers is up to the entity that defines what those powers are—in this case, the [...].