ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I  THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below) .................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE  NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, [...] SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below. Pa16. Pa30.).......................................................6  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................11  REPLY APPENDIX
[directive] ”  6)  The Criminal Division Probation Officer shall conduct a search of the Promis Gavel network, juvenile central registry and domestic violence central registry for the person identified as assuming responsibility for the child and attach the results of the searches to the Report on Alternative Care for the Dependents of Detainees.  7)  The probation officer will ask the identified caregiver to provide all the information required in section IV of the Report on Alternate Care for Dependents of Detainees for persons over the age of 12 living in their household.  8)  The probation officer shall conduct a search of the Promis Gavel network, juvenile central registry and domestic violence created registry for the other residents over the age of 12 living in the caregivers household.  The results of the searches will be attached to the Report on Alternative Care for the Dependents of Detainees.  9)  The Criminal Division Probation Officer shall call the Division of Youth and Family Services Office of Child Abuse Control (OCAC) at [...] and advise them that a referral will be faxed to them upon completion of the phone call.
[brief] The statement contains no allegation that the bag went into the air or that [...] punched [...] because he smiled at [...] and mocked him after the grout landed on [...].  [DLa 023].  Nor does it contain any statement alleging [...] used profanity or a racial epithet while speaking with [...].  [DLa 023; 7T 123:18-23].  When asked to admit that his police statement contradicted his trial testimony, [...] responded, while looking at his lawyer, “[i]t took us awhile to finally figure out what actually happened, for me to understand exactly what happened.
[brief] The Redevelopment Plan covers a vast area comprising various sectors.  Id.  The Redevelopment Plan’s Beachfront-South sector alone, in which both Plaintiff and Defendant [...]’s respective properties are located, covers a vast area of approximately 17.25 acres.  Id.  This aspect of the Redevelopment Plan further supports the City’s interpretation that modifications requiring "written consent from designated developers" do not confer on previously designated redevelopers the authority to veto plan amendments that do not pertain to their respective properties.  This aligns with the City’s goal of implementing an extensive, long-term redevelopment across a significant area.  (Pa514 to Pa523).  To have intended to permit the developers of completed projects to hold blanket veto authority over an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan ad infinitum is indeed antithetical to the structure of the Redevelopment Plan.  No question of law existed before the lower court as to whether Plaintiff has a statutory based right to demand that the City obtain Plaintiff’s written consent when amending the Redevelopment Plan.  The lower court was correct to conclude that the LRHL did not mandate that the City obtain Plaintiff’s consent.  (Pa60 to Pa61).  Further, the lower court was correct to conclude that Plaintiff was no longer a designated developer under the Redevelopment Plan.  Id. (Pa60 to Pa61).  Accordingly, the Redevelopment Plan’s amendment procedures do not provide Plaintiff a basis to demand that the City obtain its written consent to a plan amendment years after Plaintiff has completed the redevelopment of its respective project.  The lower court was correct to dismiss Count II.  For these reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court uphold the lower court's grant of Summary Judgment.
[brief] 329 N.J. Super. at 71.  On appeal, the Appellate Division in *Davin, LLC* held that the trial judge should not have resolved the conflict of the experts by relying upon his personal observation:  Relying on his prior extensive experience as a practicing attorney, the judge stated that an attorney for a tenant never orders a title search before advising his or client to enter into a lease.  We disagree.  In light of the conflicting certifications, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [...] should have ordered a title search in properly representing defendants.  This was a material fact precluding an award of summary judgment and requiring submission of the issue to the ultimate finder of fact.  *Id.*  In this case the trial judge short-stopped the jury and resolved the “Battle of the Experts” by relying upon personal experience that freezing rain can be dangerous for pedestrians and applying the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine of *Pareja* as supported in [...]’s opinion, while discounting [...]’s opinions.  *Cf.*  *Gilhooley v. County of Union*, 164 N.J. 533, 545 (2000) (the supreme court reversed the trial judge's granting of summary judgment because he had imposed “his own personal standard” to determine the merits of the case).  In the present case, a jury should resolve the “Battle of the Experts” and whether or not an exception to the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine is applicable.  The trial court erred in granting summary judgment when there are competing expert opinions because a trial court should never decide on its merits a dispute on which a rational jury could go either way.  See Davin, LLC, 329 N.J. Super. at 71.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In its decision denying suppression, the court first found that [...]’s testimony as to [...]’s tinted windows and broken rear brake light, coupled with the BWC footage, demonstrated reasonable suspicion to stop [...]’s vehicle.  (Da16-17)  The court next held that the detective’s decision to frisk [...] was reasonable, crediting [...]’s testimony that [...] “appeared to ‘hunch over’ in his seat attempting to conceal view of his waistline,” “use[d] his safety vest to cover his waist,” and “appeared to be nervous and reluctant to answer officers’ questions. ”  (Da20-21)  The court also found that, as [...] exited his car, he “held the safety vest in front of his waistband, and “laid the front of his body against the back of the vehicle to obstruct officers’ view. ”  (Da23)  Last, the court held that the dog sniff of [...]’s vehicle was constitutional, finding both that the sniff did not prolong the motor vehicle stop, and that [...] had already been placed under arrest at the time of the sniff.  (Da24)  **Guilty Plea**
[brief] U.S. Const., amend. IV; N.J. Const., art. 1, par. 7.  A.  The initial stop of the defendant was illegal.  The Fourth Amendment and Article 1 Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The United States Supreme Court has explained that “the most basic constitutional rule” of search and seizure jurisprudence is that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. ”  Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The exceptions to this warrant requirement are “jealously and carefully drawn. ”  Ibid.  Because warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively invalid, the State bears the burden of proving the validity of these actions.  State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 129-30 (2012).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County.  Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE-RESPONDENT [...] County Prosecutor [...] [...] [...], Extension 8333 [...], ESQUIRE Assistant Prosecutor [...] Attorney ID: 0005842003
[brief] [...]’S “FREE RENT” CHARGE-BACK PROVISION IS A POORLY DISGUISED, UNLAWFUL PENALTY CLAUSE, AND THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING TO THE CONTRARY IS AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY (Decided Below at 2T20-8 – 2T22-7)  The question of whether the charge-back provision at issue is an unlawful penalty clause is subject to de novo review, without deference to any aspect of the trial court’s decision.  Holtham v. Lucas, 460 N.J. Super. 308, 316 (App. Div. 2019)(“The enforceability of a stipulated damages clause presents a legal issue.  Therefore, we do not defer to the trial court and review the matter de novo”)(citations omitted).  Stipulated damages provisions are subject to close scrutiny under New Jersey precedent, to guard against the “possibility that stipulated damages clauses may constitute an oppressive penalty.
[brief] D.  The Trial Court’s “with prejudice” dismissal was proper.  (4/1/21 Transcript @ T29:22 to T37:25; 5/25/23 Transcript @ T48:4 to T54:10).  Neither [...] nor [...] erred in their decisions to deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend, or to deny Plaintiff leave to file another amendment and dismiss this action with prejudice.
[brief] To get around this broad and all-encompassing language, the Amici Curiae argue that [...] is seeking compensatory damages, not the recovery of PIP benefits.  In fact, [...] goes as far as claiming “[t]he payment of medical expenses is not at issue. ” (Br. of [...] at 11).  That is the tail wagging the dog.  [...]’s claims, whether labeled as a violation of the IFPA or New Jersey’s RICO statute, all seek to litigate whether the [...] were eligible to recover PIP benefits.  There is no issue in this case other than this: [...] paid PIP benefits to the [...], and now, [...] wants to recover the benefits it paid to the [...].  And [...]’s allegations and claims rest on whether or not the [...] should have received payment for the medical services they rendered.  [...]’s choice to pay claims and later consolidate the claims and label them as fraud should not work as an end around the No-Fault Law’s arbitration mandate.
[brief] See also, Appellant’s Brief § VI(B)(2), for a more complete picture of the retaliation Appellant experienced. and attire.  (Da7).  [...] also points to a certification from Respondent [...] which purports that Appellant was counseled about this notice on or about November 23, 2018, three days after the EEO opened an investigation into Appellant and [...]’s complaints.  (Da4).  [...] similarly argues that Respondents [...] and [...] counseled Appellant about her attire on November 27, 2018, as a result of complaints by [...] supervisors that were made prior to Appellant’s EEO complaint.  What Respondents conveniently fail to note is that the counseling notice issued on November 8, 2018, does not make any mention about Appellant’s alleged “inappropriate attire. ”  (Da7).  The claim that the reprimand about Appellant’s attire was not raised in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment, but instead, was preexisting and had not yet been addressed, is nonsensical.  As the very document that Respondents rely upon as the basis for this reprimand makes no mention of Appellant’s attire, there remains a material issue of fact as to whether the reprimand was retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment.  A jury could recognize the victim-blaming mentality in reprimanding an employee about “inappropriate attire” – without a documented basis for such complaints – mere days after the employee made complaints of sexual harassment.  3.
[brief] A.  [...]’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment is Adequately Pled  28  B.  Material Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on [...]’s Counterclaim for Breach of Contract.........................................................29  C.  Material Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on [...]’s Counterclaims for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Bad Faith Denial ..............................................................................29  VII.
[brief] 44  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  ORDERS  NOVEMBER 17, 2023  ORDER OF THE HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER AND THE OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER DENYING THE MOTION OF THE LOPEZES TO INTERVENE .........................................................  Ca1 OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER OF THE HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER.................................................................  Ca  2 OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER OF THE HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. DENYING THE MOTION OF THE LOPEZES TO INTERVENE AND DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER.............................
[brief] Thus, and even if there was some meeting at [...]’s office where Appellants gave their $250,000 to an “imposter” of [...], Appellants admitted that their check for that amount was deposited into the account of the “real” [...], that the $250,000 was applied to the assignment purchase price, and that Appellants obtained the assignment for which they paid.  Appellants therefore failed to adduce facts that could possibly support a damages award against [...] or [...] at trial, further compelling entry of summary judgment in favor of these Respondents.
[brief] (36T 48-23 to 95-6).  [...] further testified while both phones tracked together, Defendant’s phone was shut off during the time period immediately surrounding the murder.  (36T 120-13 121-7).  [...], a DNA analyst with the [...], testified that he analyzed and compared the spit samples with the DNA sample submitted by Defendant and concluded that they were a match.  (31T 48-17 to 49-2).
[brief] The first factor relating to the damages alleged, and the subsequent interpretation of the statute in *Paragon*, conclude that the statute generally applies to money damage cases.  In the underlying matter, Appellants alleged compensatory damages, punitive damages, and costs, interests, and attorney’s fees against [...] which were clearly within the ambit of the affidavit of merit as they all relate to [...]’s alleged malpractice and/or negligence.
[brief] See Hoboken City Ordinance § 196-33.1(M).  Section 196.33.1(M) – which is entitled “Site Plan approval; minimum requirements; performance standards” – sets forth the materials required for cannabis-related site plan approval.  Those materials include: (1) prior approval from the CRB, (2) building use, (3) setback requirements, (4) product display and storage, (5) delivery vehicles, (6) consumption, (7) odor, (8) noise, (9) security, (10) queuing, and (11) parking.  See Hoboken City Ordinance § 196-33.1(M).  A review of the CRB application requirements confirms that all of the items and information required for cannabis-related site plan approval are, in fact, contained within any CRB application.
[brief] The Ordinance uses the specific phrase “designed to allow increased building height. ”  The plain language of this phrase removes the purpose of the design from the equation.  Does the design, whatever the reason, e.g., stormwater management, enhanced views, or to accommodate six (6) dwelling structures, allow increased building height?  If the answer is yes, then the Board must calculated building height in the proposed development from the lowest original lot grade, not the revised lot grade.  Here the mounding, terracing or other devices resulting in the revised lot grade in the proposed development makes the increased building height a possibility and is a plan that is “designed to allow increased building height”.
[brief] Chapter 4 deals with conditions of public property and liability of the public entity with respect thereto.  Wary of creating unlimited exposure in connection with public entities’ responsibility to maintain public property, this chapter provides that liability will be imposed only where the action or inaction of the public entity with respect to its property was palpably unreasonable.  The general liability provisions are further limited by the specific immunity sections of Chapter 4 including: immunity for failure to provide ordinary traffic signals; plan and design immunity; immunity for the effect of weather conditions on streets and highways; and immunity for conditions of unimproved or unoccupied public property.  Thus, even though a claimant may succeed in providing the existence of a dangerous condition, proximate cause, foreseeable risk, knowledge (actual or constructive) of a dangerous condition or creation of the condition by a public employee and that the entity’s action or failure to act was palpably unreasonable, the entity may nevertheless be immune under these specific immunity sections.
[brief] I candidly acknowledge that the trial court took the right decision because I did not have permission from the court to withhold alimony payments.  However, the trial court’s January 12, 2024 order completely ignored the matter of defendant’s noncompliance with the child tax credit provision of the JOD order.  I raised the issue of defendant’s noncompliance again in the OTSC that I filed on January 16, 2024.  (Pa1195).  While it is understandable that the trial court did not address the issue in its preliminary order on the OTSC filed on January 17, 2024, because the matter was not emergent as I acknowledged myself in the OTSC, trial court failed to address the issue even in the subsequent and final January 26, 2024 order (Pa1214).  I sought defendant’s compliance with child tax credit provision yet again in a motion for reconsideration that I filed on January 31, 2024.  (Pa1230-32)  On the motion return date of March 8, 2024, the motion judge evaded the adjudication of the motion by denying it without a hearing on grounds of failure to provide a USPS tracking number which has no basis in law as I contend in Point V.  Trial court’s failure to evenhandedly enforce the litigant’s rights of both parties not only provides an impetus to the contumacy of the offending party but also demoralizes the aggrieved party and reasonably shakes the faith of the latter in the judicial process.
[brief] The same reasoning applies to the residents of States with different permit regimes who seek to carry in New Jersey.  Just as the Second Amendment does not compel New Jersey to allow permitless carry within its borders by visitors from states that allow permitless carry, it likewise does not compel New Jersey to allow visitors with foreign carry permits (but not a NJ Carry Permit) to carry handguns within its borders.  That is so notwithstanding defendant’s cursory claim that there is no meaningful difference between the requirements to obtain a NJ Carry Permit and the requirements to obtain a PA Carry License, such that NJ lacks any “policy reason for not recognizing a Pennsylvania gun license. ” (Db5-6).  To the contrary, each aspect of New Jersey’s permitting scheme has been crafted by our Legislature to “ensure that those who exercise the right to carry are responsible, law-abiding, and appropriately trained individuals who would not pose undue safety risks if armed in public places.
[brief] ”  (Pa2)  The two applications are not consistent with respect to their representations regarding the nature and use of the Property and the accessory structure.  The 2020 Zoning Application sought approval of a 20’ by 40’ addition (800 square feet) to an existing 30’ by 40’ building (1200 square feet) (total pole barn and addition 2000 square feet) for use as a two car --- 7 Township Code §175-89D provides that the combined square footage of the any accessory buildings shall not exceed the square footage of the principal building.  Here, the accessory building is 2160 square feet and the principal structure is approximately 1152 square feet. garage and yet the 2022 Zoning application sought the approval of an 24’ by 40’ structure (960 square feet) (total 2160 square feet).
[brief] Although ultimately rendered immaterial by the jury’s allocation, the parties cross-moved for a directed verdict as to [...]; [...] sought a directed verdict as to [...]’s liability, and plaintiff’s moved for a dismissal of [...].  The trial court denied both motions.  (19T233).  Leading into the deliberations, plaintiffs’ counsel reiterated his understanding that he was at a disadvantage given the Burt defendant status of [...] and the corresponding inapplicability of “joint and several” liability to [...]:  [...]:  Your Honor ruled on this already.  Your Honor’s ruling was clear and unequivocal and you reinforced that ruling yesterday.  This morning counsel said nothing about this before closing.  I said nothing in closing that was inappropriate or un -- unwarranted by the evidence.  I have no burden of proof against these doctors.
[brief] With respect to the third dispute, [...] argues that the [...] improperly instructed its investigator, [...], to refuse to answer many or most of the questions posed to her by [...] at her deposition on the basis of work product.  [...] contends that [...] was listed as a witness by the [...] on its initial disclosures, and that [...] is entitled to discover information about [...]’s contact with borrowers and how she conducted her investigation; thus, [...] seeks to reopen her deposition.
[brief] [...] is quite possibly the most coveted location in New Jersey for a restaurant as it is steps from Hoboken Terminal directly on the Hudson River with sweeping views of the Manhattan skyline and adjacent to Pier A Park.  It is also connected to a parking garage and is one (1) to (2) blocks away from two (2) other parking garages.  It is a block from Hoboken’s only hotel.  Hoboken is a commuter hub, has thousands of people congregate for its nightlife, and is known for its young, wealthy residents.  That initial [...] investment also secured the liquor license.  The ability to sell alcohol is crucial not only to an establishment whose entire premise is entirely contingent upon selling alcohol, but to any restaurant along the Hoboken waterfront.  In fact, all seven (7) restaurants similarly situated and currently on that stretch of Hoboken waterfront have liquor licenses; [...] is currently a cocktail bar.  The liquor license was indispensable not only due to the location, but the landlord would not agree to lease the premises if [...] did not agree to secure it from [...]:
[directive] Standard  1.  Selection / Term of Service  The term of grand juror service shall be established by the Assignment Judge.  That term shall not be more than one day a week for 20 weeks (or the equivalent number of days where grand jurors serve two days per week).  The term that is established should require that citizens, in accomplishing the important functions of the grand jury, serve as few days of grand jury service as is practical.  A.  What is your current term of service for seated grand jurors?  ___  THE TERM IS ONE DAY A WEEK FOR THE ENTIRE SESSION  ___ THE TERM IS OTHER THAN ONE DAY A WEEK FOR THE ENTIRE SESSION.  (Please fully describe the term below.)  ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________  1