ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Transcripts [cited as per R. 2:6-8]:  [...], April 7, 2022 (2pp)  .....1T__-__  [...], June 16, 2022 (2pp)  .....2T__-__  [...], August 4, 2022 (3pp)  ...3T__-__ [...], September 15, 2022 (2pp) .................................................................4T__-__ [...], November 17, 2022 (56pp) ...............................................................5T__-__ [...], January 26, 2023 (12pp) ............................................................6T__-__ Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, August 14, 2023 (16pp) .......................................................7T__-__ Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, December 7, 2023 (37pp)  ..................................................8T__-__ Appendix [cited as per R. 2:6-8]:
[brief] Shields, 494.  As to the first factor, the relationship of the parties, the Supreme Court aptly noted “[b]y contrast, the landlord here had no relationship with the plaintiff. ”  Id., 493.  As to the second factor, the nature of the risk, the Court noted this inquiry focuses on the risk is foreseeable and whether it is fair to place the burden of preventing harm upon the defendant.  The Court found this factor favored the landlord, and that “fairness dictates that [the tenant], with control over the driveway, and the tools on hand to eliminate the risk, should be solely responsible…”  Id., 493.  As to the third factor, opportunity and ability to exercise care, the Court viewed this as “similar to our analysis of control. ”  Id., 494.  Noting that reasonableness depends in part on the practicability of preventing the harm, the Court said “it would be impractical to require the landlord here to prevent the harm…on property that it does not control. ”  Id., 494.  This was true because “the landlord does not maintain a presence on the property and does not have access to information about the condition the property” and the tenant did.  Id., 494.  Finally, as to the fourth factor, public interest in the proposed solution, the Court said that holding the landlord liable for conditions of property that were demised to its tenant “would not serve any public policy interest.
[brief] At oral argument plaintiff focused on deposition expenses but in his motions he also refers to time spent on attending telephone and in-person court conferences preparing and filing briefs and motions, etc.  In order to “nail down” plaintiff's position, and to give defendant an opportunity to object, the Court will Order plaintiff to submit an affidavit specifically identifying all fees and costs he is claiming, what the time was spent on and his hourly rate.  In this regard plaintiff shall comply with the requirements of L. Civ. R. 54.2 which sets forth what must be contained in an affidavit seeking fees.  Defendant will be given a reasonable opportunity to respond and object.  Defendant should rest assured that plaintiff is only entitled to reimbursement of the transaction costs reasonably incurred to respond to its late production.  Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1263–65 (3d Cir.1995)(monetary sanctions should be reasonable and relate directly to the expenses incurred due to the non-complying party's violation).  The Court is not giving plaintiff a “blank check” for all the work he did, some of which was repetitive, unnecessary and excessive.  By way of example, and not intending to be a complete list, the telephone conference on November 8, 2012 and the in-person conferences on December 4 and 20, 2012, fall into the category of conferences directly related to [...]'s late production.  For example, plaintiff knew or should have known that the applicable case law made it unlikely his request for a default would be granted.  Conclusion
[brief] 29 N.J.R.E. 2:10-2 ---------------------------------------------------------------  34 N.J.R.E. 607  --------------------------------------------------------------- passim N.J.R.E. 803(a)  ---------------------------------------------------------------  9, 10, 11, 12  N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2)  ---------------------------------------------------------------  passim N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)  ---------------------------------------------------------------  14  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] Motion to dismiss by Defendant [...], filed February 14, 2024 Notice of Appeal by plaintiff, filed March 8, 2024 | Authority | Brief page number | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **U.S. Constitution, Statutes:** | | | U.S. Const. amend. I | 11,19,20 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 | 5 | | U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 | 20 | | 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002) | 2,8,12,13 | | **NJ Constitution, Statutes:** | | | N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, § 18 | 11,19,20 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 | 1,3,11,17 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:31-2 | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27 | 2,8,12,13 | | N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 | 11,17 | | N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3 | 2,8,12,13 | | **NJ Court Rules:** | | | R. 4:9-4 | 1 | | R. 4:37-2 | 9,10 | | R. 1:21-1(a) | 19,20 | |
[brief] C.  Plaintiff’s engineer opined on the quantity of water flowing from Defendants’ property to Plaintiff’s property  [...]’s opinions were corroborated by [...], an engineering expert engaged by Plaintiff, who opined on both the direction and the quantity of the flow of surface water.  First, [...] noted that the gaps in the corners of the curb “allow the stormwater runoff to flow out of the driveway” and concluded:  “The stormwater runoff will leave the driveway through the most easterly opening of the driveway and will flow directly to lot 10 in Block 52 [i.e., Plaintiff’s Property] based on the contours of the partial topographical survey. ”  [371a].  He confirmed at his deposition that he used the topographical data collected by [...], along with his personal observations of Defendants’ driveway, to determine the direction and magnitude of the slope of Defendants’ front lawn and driveway.  [268a–269a (25:15–29:23), 271a (34:5–17)].  Second, [...] determined the volume of stormwater runoff that would flow from Defendant’s Property to Plaintiff’s Property under seven types of storms, and based on various data, he opined that the volume of stormwater runoff generated and conveyed from Defendant’s Property to Plaintiff’s Property is “substantial and significant” and that “there is a good amount of runoff generated and conveyed to [Plaintiff’s Property] from [Defendant’s Property] to cause erosions and inundate the landscape.
[brief] ”  Such testimony has been held to be admissible to show that the officer was not acting in an arbitrary manner or to explain his [or her] subsequent conduct.  However, when the officer becomes more specific by repeating what some other person told him [or her] concerning a crime by the accused the testimony violates the hearsay rule.  [Id. at 268 (citations omitted). ]  The Court determined that the detective's testimony was inadmissible hearsay.
[brief] In addressing the prospect of proceeding without a FAR variance, Plaintiff’s Architect testified without equivocation that adherence to the 0.35 FAR zone standard would permit a building having a floor area of only 8,900 sq. ft., which would be inadequate in terms of offsetting costs and providing an economic incentive to remedy contamination:  Architect:  “… the building would be extremely small, there’d be no way to justify a $375,000 cleanup cost with a building of that size.  And in addition, the site would have to be capped in addition to that amount that’s been spoken about in escrow.  The retaining wall would still have to be rebuilt because the remediation requires that to be the case.  So, it would be a very costly operation for just a small number of units …”  Pa192 at 74:21-75:5, emphasis added.
[brief] 219a, ¶¶ 53-54; 219a-220a, ¶ 56; 227a-228a, ¶ 105; 231a, ¶ 132.  Plaintiff intimates that the mere existence of the injunction precluded Defendants from addressing Plaintiff’s violation of the District Mask Policy and investigation of the events underlying an administrative complaint filed against Plaintiff.  In doing so, Plaintiff and/or her counsel misapprehends the import of the injunction.  Indeed, the injunction in no manner whatsoever shields Plaintiff from being the subject of an internal complaint or investigation nor does it give Plaintiff carte blanche to act in any way she pleases including disregarding district rules and policies.
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[directive] Our decision to include all 21 counties in the new task force reflects the reality that, while most violent crime is concentrated in a handful of hard-hit communities, the investigations into this conduct can span the entire state.  A firearm trafficked into New Jersey through Salem County might wind up as the murder weapon in a Paterson homicide; a vehicle stolen in Ocean County might be used as the getaway car in a Trenton shooting.  By improving information-sharing across agencies, we improve our ability to solve crimes and hold wrongdoers accountable throughout the Garden State.
[brief] (26T50:18-25; 51:10-19; 27T87:20 to 88:4; 89:5-11).  Moreover, the trial court found that the defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which included claims under the [...], the [...], the [...], and the [...].  (26T51:19-21; 27T95:24 to 96:8).  In particular, the Court found that the defendants withdrew capital from the companies “without approval and authorization from . . . the other shareholder,” that the Plaintiffs “didn’t get to share in all the profits” of the Companies, and that the Defendants received “more than their share of the profits.
[brief] When read in conjunction with ¶1.29, the waiver provision at ¶5.2—together with the purpose statement at ¶2.1—reinforces the conclusion that the 2015 Settlement Agreement extinguished only the claims that had accrued to the [...] class members on or before Feb. 20, 2015, not later claims that may arise after that date, i.e., Feb. 21, 2015 onward.  And to be sure, ¶5.2 was “separately bargained for and a key element of the Settlement of which this release is a part. ” (Pa0059).  Finally, [...]’s proposed reinterpretation of its 2015 Settlement suffers from another defect: New Jersey law disfavors contracts that run into perpetuity, and [...]’s proposed reinterpretation of its 2015 Settlement as somehow barring future claims arising from future misconduct would have the effect of creating a perpetual release.
[brief] 323 N.J. Super. at 262.  This court held in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Fiouris, 395 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 2007) that “N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 only requires arbitration of disputes regarding entitlement to or the amount of PIP benefits,” and that the “Legislature did not contemplate that a claim of a violation of the [IFPA] would be heard by an arbitrator.
[brief] Considering those materials, the trial court granted summary judgment, accompanied by a fulsome written opinion, finding:  (1) Defendants had constructive notice of the error and of Plaintiffs’ claim or title, and were thus not bona fide purchasers; (2) Defendants were equitably estopped from challenging Plaintiffs’ title and the reformation due to their acknowledgment of the error and indication of intention to correct it; and (3) reformation was appropriate on the equities and the merits.  Defendants fail to challenge the trial court’s finding that equitable estoppel bars their merits defense or their challenge to reformation.
[brief] As stated in *Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic Associates, P.A.*, 373 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 2004):  Although attorneys are given broad latitude in summation, they may not use disparaging language to discredit the opposing party, or witness, or accuse a party’s attorney of wanting the jury to evaluate the evidence unfairly, of trying to deceive the jury, or of deliberately distorting the evidence.  *Id.* at 171.  In this matter, defense counsel accused plaintiff’s counsel of only giving the jury a lot of distractions at trial.  (7T21:25-22:3).  He also implied that the plaintiff’s daughters and counsel fabricated the manner in which the plaintiff’s fall occurred and were attempting to deceive the jury and recover damages upon a fraudulent claim.  (7T24:7-15; 7T35:18-36:20).  The comments alone were improper.  *Rodd*, 373 N.J. Super. at 171.  When combined with the repeated comments that the plaintiff was not called as a witness, they were essentially suggesting that the jury should infer that the plaintiff was purposefully being kept from the jury because she would have broken down and confessed to being a liar.  It is respectfully submitted that the comments made during summation were improper and support the granting of a new trial as the cumulative effect of the comments had a clear capacity to result in a miscarriage of justice.  *Henker*, 216 N.J. Super. at 520.  When determining whether to set aside a verdict, the court “cannot disregard or dismiss the attorney’s role in increasing the prejudice to plaintiff’s case. ”  *Green v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 160 N.J. 480, 503 (1999).  POINT II
[brief] Despite following facility protocol, he was kicked in the left shoulder.  The heart of the inquiry is whether, during the regular performance of his regular job, an unexpected happening has occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and total disability of the member.  Richardson, Supra, 192 N.J. at 213-14.  Brooks v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 425 N.J. Super. 277, 279 (App. Div. 2012).  The Undesigned and Unexpected component established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Richardson was to eliminate occupational claims being able to be considered for Accidental Disability Pension benefits.  This work accident is specific and the disability directly attributable to the assault.  As such, the [...] erred in applying an unduly restrictive notion of what constitutes an "undesigned and unexpected" event to [...]’s February 23, 2017.  It is our suspicion that had [...] been before [...] he too would have been denied his Accidental Disability Pension.  The testimony and evidence before this Court demonstrates the mechanism of the injury meets the “undesigned and unexpected” standard, and therefore, the Board’s decision must be overturned and [...] granted his Accidental Disability Pension.
[brief] The decision below poses a serious threat to New Jersey consumers, insurers, and the State in their ability to combat insurance fraud, thereby protecting consumers from higher premiums and other serious harms that flow from the fraudulent practices.  The lower court’s decision requiring healthcare fraud violations under the IFPA and RICO to be resolved in the Forthright\(^4\) No-Fault dispute resolution forum is *carte blanche* for criminals to financially profit at the expense of New Jersey consumers, understanding that under the Forthright dispute resolution system the rules do not provide for: - the exchange of any meaningful discovery; - subpoena powers of non-parties; - Constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial or due process; - [...]’s right to intervene and collect statutory penalties, and --- \(^4\)  See, [https://www.nj-nofault.com/rules](https://www.nj-nofault. com/rules) - The award of compensatory damages, attorney’s fees; investigation costs, restitution with the trebling of same under the IFPA.  Without the ability to engage in meaningful discovery of parties and non-parties alike, without the Constitutional rights and protections, and without their entitlement to compensatory damages, costs of investigation, attorney’s fees and costs, as well as treble damages as expressly provided for under the IFPA, insurance fraud and the financial and physical costs to New Jersey consumers will explode exponentially.  The Legislature enacted the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act ("IFPA") in 1983, with the goal to, amongst other things, protect New Jersey consumers.
[brief] Plaintiff’s motions were premised on the faulty notion that he can compel [...] (and the German Defendant Entities) to produce [...] for a deposition in his individual capacity through the mere expedient of serving a notice of deposition to counsel because he is a member of [...]’s Board of Directors and [...]’s Supervisory Board.  But Plaintiff’s argument finds no support in the New Jersey Court Rules.  The only New Jersey Rule applicable to taking the deposition of a director or officer of a corporate party is Rule 4:14-2(c), but that rule does not allow a party to compel the deposition of a director or officer of the corporate party by serving a simple notice of deposition.  Instead, Rule 4:14-2(c) provides that the “organization so named shall designate” the “officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf….”  R. 4:14-2(c).  The rule does not allow the noticing party to specifically designate the corporate officer and/or director that will testify.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that Rule 4:23-4 supports the notion that a party may enforce a simple notice of deposition against “a non-party officer, director or managing agent of a corporate party” selectively emphasizes and misconstrues that rule.  Pl. Br. at 12.\(^4\) Rule 4:23-4 merely provides, \textit{inter alia}, that if the “officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person \textbf{designated under R. 4:14-2(c)} or 4:15-1 \textbf{to testify on behalf of a party}” fails to appear, the party may be sanctioned.
[brief] Exhibit M2-2, 3/4/2008  Letter of Intent..................................................................................353a  Exhibit M2-3, 4/29/2009  Memorandum of Understanding..............................................356a  Exhibit M2-4, 5/3/2017  [...] Deposition...............................................................360a  Exhibit M2-5, 4/4/2012  [...] Deposition.................................................................517a  Exhibit M2-6, 5/15/2015  [...] Deposition.................................................................568a  Exhibit M2-7, 1/21/2014  [...] Deposition with Exhibits.................................664a  Exhibit M2-8, 10/30/2013  [...] Deposition with Exhibits.................................753a  Exhibit M2-9, 11/21/2013  [...] Deposition with Exhibits.................................851a  Exhibit M2-10, 1/8/2014 (AM Session)  [...] Deposition......................909a  Exhibit M2-11, 1/8/2014 (PM Session)  [...] Deposition.......................931a  Exhibit M2-12, 3/13/2017  [...] Deposition with Exhibits..............951a  Exhibit M2-13, 2/10/2017  [...] Deposition with Exhibits.............1003a  Exhibit M2-14, 11/3/2015  [...] Deposition with Exhibits...............1020a  11/30/2018
[brief] **THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)**  Each of the errors cited above is sufficient alone to require a new trial.  If, however, the court should not concur, it is submitted that the cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal.  *State v. Orecchio*, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954); *U.S. Const.* amends. VI and XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.  See also *State v. Sanchez-Medina*, 231 N.J. 452, 455 (2018) (reversing on cumulative error where jury instruction omitted charge on “key issue” and where jury heard inadmissible, prejudicial testimony).
[brief] It is well-established precedent a plaintiff will fail in their proofs if they cannot establish the public entity’s failure to protect against the dangerous condition was “palpably unreasonable. ”  See, *Muhammad*, 176 N.J. at 194; *Maslo v. City of Jersey City*, 346 N.J. Super. 346, 349 (App. Div. 2002); *Black v. Borough of Atlantic Highlands*, 263 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 1993); Berends v. City of Atlantic City, 263 N.J. Super. 66 (App. Div. 1993); Lopez v. City of Elizabeth, 245 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 1991).
[brief] It is well established that the State has a “constitutional obligation to provide criminal defendants with exculpatory evidence in the State’s possession. ”  Marshall, 148 N.J. at 154, (citing Knight, 145 N.J. at 245-46); see also State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 413 (1998) (A prosecutor’s obligation to “turn over material, exculpatory evidence to the defendant” is well established and does not require extended discussion”).  This obligation extends as well to impeachment evidence within the prosecution’s possession.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.  667, 676 (1985)); see also State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 497-98 (1998); Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2019-6 (Dec. 4, 2019) (confirming that Brady material includes prior inconsistent and exculpatory statements made by a State’s witness) (citing State v. Cahill, 125 N.J. Super. 492 (Law Div. 1973)).  Accordingly, the Brady rule is invoked where information is discovered after trial “which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense. ”  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  Summarily, a Brady violation occurs where: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence is material to the defendant’s case.  See Nelson, 155 N.J. at 497.  With respect to the first element, evidence found to be favorable to the accused has generally involved information that impeaches the testimony of a government witness.  See State v. Henries, 306 N.J. Super. 512, 535-36 (App. Div. 1997) (finding that newly discovered evidence—evidence that would impeach and powerfully undermine the credibility of the prosecutor’s principal witness— warranted a new trial in a murder case).  Courts often presume the existence of this Brady factor, and few courts have considered exactly what must be shown in order to establish that withheld evidence is favorable to the defendant.  However, it has been recognized by courts that favorability is not limited to impeachment, in cases where evidence simply bolsters a defendant’s claims.
[brief] ”  (Da 13 (emphasis in original))  While a person familiar with the area may have been able to name specific townships in response to the officer’s questions, [...] – who [...] knew by then was from New Hampshire, and who had traveled through several states on this trip – could not.  But rather than dishonest or evasive, [...] was merely imprecise when he gave an uncertain answer about his current whereabouts: “I’m not sure, New Jersey, I think. ”  And [...], also a New Hampshire native, offered the same unsure, but not untruthful response that she was “pretty sure” they were still in New Jersey.  (Da 16)  In addition, [...] told the officer that he had a disability that caused him to draw a blank when asked where they were headed.  While he tried to remember, he answered [...]’s many questions about the country club, and ultimately told the officer they were on their way to Virginia.  Any suspicion that [...] had been dishonest or evasive should have been dispelled moments later when [...] approached [...] and asked the same question.  [...] told the officer they were heading to Virginia and produced her phone with GPS directions to Virginia still on the screen.  (Da 16 at 0:05:25 to 0:05:50)  The motion court erred when it characterized the answers given by [...] and [...] as “conflicting. ”  There were no inconsistencies whatsoever in their answers to [...]’s extensive roadside questioning, even though the two were interviewed separately.