ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], Current N.J. Arrest, Search & Seizure, (GANN: 2021-22 ed.), § 7.1.  A search warrant may be issued to search a person, a place, or a place and person or persons preconditioned upon the place and/or person to be searched particularly described.  A description of a person named in a warrant should be as particular as the circumstances permit.  Similar to the rules applicable to a warrant search of premises, an otherwise insufficient description of a person may be sufficiently enhanced by showing the prior knowledge of the officer who provided the affidavit and executed the warrant.  The case at bar bears similar facts to those in, finding Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013), The Bailey Court determined that the rule announced in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)—which permits officers executing a search warrant to detain the occupants of the premises while a search is conducted—does not apply beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises being searched.
[brief] (Pa27).  [...] claimed that the City acknowledged that it would not accommodate any union member regardless as to the nature of their injury or illness however short in duration or minor in seriousness either for promotion or for sick leave usage.  [...] asserted that Firefighters who are perceived as holding a disability must be accommodated under the NJLAD and N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b).  (Pa34).  [...] asserts that its Association unit members were perceived to be or disabled and/or handicapped within the meaning of the NJLAD and they were qualified to perform the essential functions of the position.  (Pa36).  [...] also asserted that Association unit members suffered and will continue to suffer in the future adverse employment actions because of their perceived disabilities/handicaps and that the employer’s actions in denying promotional eligibility is a material adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.  (Pa36).  [...] asserted that when unit members utilize sick or injury leave they are considered to be disabled under the LAD and perceived as being disabled.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Court should affirm the Trial Court’s decisions dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice as to the Absecon Defendants.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...], Esq., AWI-CH  Dated: August 14, 2024  [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], former ABSECON CHIEF OF POLICE  [...], ABSECON MAYOR [...], ABSECON OFFICER  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], VICINAGE I OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, THE NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDGES [...], A.S.J.C, AND [...], J.A.D., ACTING AOC ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR, [...] AND J. DOES #1 TO #100, Fictitious Persons or Entities Whose Real Names are Unknown At This Time, jointly, severally and in the alternative, Defendants.
[brief] 274a.  The record is clear that Plaintiff [...] paid legal fees, other professional fees, property taxes, and governmental fees in pursuit of the real estate transaction and development of the affordable housing project.  274a; 4T, 107:5-7.  Also, the record is clear that Plaintiff [...], though a successful entrepreneur in the dry-cleaning business, was also a real estate investor, having among other things, purchased and rehabbed various real estate in Newark, New Jersey.  4T, 70:70-13.  However, all these alleged issues of the need of investment capital to develop 100% affordable housing projects, prior construction or affordable housing development experience, management experience of affordable housing developments, are all imaginary issues which have absolutely no application in this matter.
[brief] (1T74).  In September 2020, Plaintiff questioned why Defendant did not marry outside of her caste like her sister.  Defendant responded to Plaintiff that it was very important to Defendant’s family that she marry a Patel, and her parents would be upset if she did otherwise.  (1T71).  Defendant told Plaintiff that she had liked another man named [...], but he was out of her caste, so she did not pursue a relationship with him.  However, in that same month, Defendant texted Plaintiff that she had sent him a pearl earring that was meant for [...] instead.  Plaintiff expressed initial confusion but did not question the integrity of their relationship based on this text.  (1T72)  He later found out that she was with [...] this whole time before and after the marital relationship with the plaintiff.
[brief] [...] general manager [...] provided testimony that the error logs are not kept for longer than three weeks, after which they self-delete from the system.  Third, it was foreseeable that the plaintiff would be prejudiced by the destruction of the logs that [...] reviewed in making its determination that there were no errors in the operation of the Theater Management System software that automatically controlled the level of the ceilings lights during the playback of commercials ads, movie trailers, and the movie itself on the movie screen in Auditorium 5 on August 13, 2016.  The defendant was denied the opportunity to examine the logs generated by the Theater Management System software to determine the validity of the [...] findings that there were no errors in the operation of the Theater Management System software that automatically controls the level of the ceiling lights during the playback of digital content on the movie screen.
[brief] Not in the 100 years that evidence has been used.  The 1914 case the State cites as the genesis for the admissibility of fingerprint evidence certainly contains no discussion of the reliability of the method, let alone a discussion with modern understandings of reliability, error rates, and wrongful convictions.  *State v. Cierciello*, 86 N.J.L. 309, 314 (E. & A. 1914) (“In principle [the fingerprint’s] admission as legal evidence is based upon the theory that the evolution in practical affairs of life, whereby the progressive and scientific tendencies of the age are manifest in every other department of human endeavor, cannot be ignored in legal procedure, but that the law, in its efforts to enforce justice by demonstrating a fact in issue, will allow evidence of those scientific processes which are the work of educated and skillful men in their various departments, and apply them to the demonstration of a fact, leaving the weight and effect to be given to the effort and its results entirely to the consideration of the jury. ”).  In short, for 100 years fingerprint evidence has been used to convict and incarcerate people without our courts ever fully considering the reliability of this evidence and its limits.
[directive] Victim Statement 3.  I  I I Date Victim \Mtness Advocate Contacted  Victim Contacted for Statement  Victim Witness Advocate Contacted Date  Victim Contacted 0Yes 0No 0Yes 0No  Did the Victim express interest in attending sentencing?  Victim Statement/ Letter Attached  Victim Responded If Yes, please see Attachments (redaction required).  0Unknown 0Yes ONo 0Yes 0Yes 0No 0No  If No, please see Victim Statement section below.  Victim Statement (Please redact all victim personal identifiers from the description as this section is not redacted)
[directive] Police shall also consider the following factors when determining the appropriateness of conducting a stationhouse adjustment:  1.  Police shall consider the age of the offender.  Younger offenders, particularly those who may be less able to understand the consequences of their actions may be more appropriate for stationhouse adjustment.  However, no juvenile offender is automatically excluded due to age.  2.  Police shall consider any record of prior juvenile complaints or stationhouse adjustments.  Juveniles with a prior serious offense or more than two minor offenses should ordinarily not receive a stationhouse adjustment.  3.  Police shall consider the cooperation and attitude of all parties (juvenile, parents or guardians/caregivers, or designee and victim).
[brief] [Analysis of Count 1 of the Counterclaim]  (Argued at Pa387 – Pa391)**  Count One of the Counterclaim for an alleged “Breach of Contract” should be dismissed because [...] fails to establish all four elements of a prima facie case.  Four elements of a breach of contract claim  **IX.  A.**  “first, that the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms” [...] does not plead or identify a renegotiated contract where [...] was obligated to pay [...] despite not working.  (Argued Pa388 – Pa389)  **IX.  B.**  “second, that plaintiffs did what the contract required them to do” [...] does not plead or establish that it performed the work and was therefore entitled to payment.  (Argued at Pa389)  **IX. C.**  “third, that defendants did not do what the contract required them to do, defined as a breach of the contract”  The contracts required [...] to pay for work performed.  [...] does not plead or establish that [...] failed to pay for work actually performed.  (Argued at Pa389 – Pa390)  **IX. D.**  “fourth, that defendants’ breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiffs” (Argued at Pa390)  **IX. E.**  All four elements are required to establish a prima facie case for breach of contract – [...] has none, requiring a dismissal of Count One of the Counterclaim.
[brief] State Constitution  New Jersey Constitution, Art. 8, § IV, ¶ 1  Statutes  N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)  N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(d)  Court Rules R. 4:69-1, et seq.  R. 4:69-5 R. 4:69-6(a)  Regulations  N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1, et seq.  N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i)  Cases  Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 609–10 (2018)  Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002)  Muller v. Muller, 212 N.J. Super. 665, 678 (Ch. Div. 1986)  Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J. Super. 464, 470 (App. Div. 2019)  Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 65-66 (1978)  Kaselaan & D’Angelo Assocs., Inc. v. Soffian, 290 N.J. Super. 293, 298–99 (App. Div. 1996)  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 271–72 (2001)  Treatises Pressler, Rules Governing the Superior Court, comment 3.5 to R.  4:30A  TABLE OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS
[directive] 3.5.3  Prior to the release of secured evidence, the form will be completed by both the property officer and the officer making the request for the evidence.  A-3  3.5.4  The officer receiving the evidence for courtroom presentation is required to return that evidence intact to the officer in charge on duty at police headquarters immediately following the termination of the court hearing.  3.5.5  The officer in charge will obtain the Request for Evidence Form which was completed for the transaction of the evidence (filed in a predesignated location) and review the form and the evidence being returned.  3.5.6  Once the officer in charge is satisfied that everything is in order, the form will receive the appropriate entry from the officer in charge and the officer returning the evidence.  3.5.7  The officer in charge will then accompany the officer returning the evidence to the holding locker where the officer returning the evidence will place both the evidence and the completed Request for Evidence Form in the holding locker.  3.5.8  The officer returning the evidence will properly secure the locker under the supervision of the officer in charge.  4.0
[brief] *Slack v. Rees*, 66 N.J. Eq. 447 (E. & A. 1903); *Sevlaz v. Bennett*, 5 N.J. 168 (1950); *Croker v. Clegg*, 123 N.J. Eq. 332 (E. & A. 1938); *Alberts v. Alberts*, 119 N.J. Eq. 391 (E. & A. 1935); *Pearce v. Stines*, 79 N.J. Eq. 51 (Ch. 1911); *Christian v. Canfield*, 108 N.J. Eq. 547 (Ch. 1931); *In re Fulper's Estate*, 99 N.J. Eq. 293 (Prerog. 1926).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE NOTICE PUBLISHED BY THE TOWNSHIP FOLLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF ORDINANCE NO. 13-2022 COMPLIED WITH N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 (Pa58-Pa61)  [...] did not commence this litigation within the 45-day period prescribed by R. 4:69-6 because it did not learn that the Township passed Ordinance No. 13-2022 and adopted the Kings Landing Redevelopment Plan until many months after that action occurred.  Indeed, only after receiving notice of [...]’s site plan application hearing and subsequent investigation did [...] come to understand what had happened.  In fact, [...] was not contemporaneously aware of the passage Ordinance No. 13-2022 because the notice published by the Township lacked a fundamental, statutorily-required element, to wit, “a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance”.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a).  The trial court nevertheless determined that no defect existed in this regard and held:  Publication of the title only, in this case, is compliant with N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a).  This is because the title itself provides a sufficient summary of the purpose of the ordinance.  An interested person would understand that the Township is adopting an ordinance, and that the Ordinance’s purpose is to adopt a redevelopment plan for certain lands which are specifically identified.  The publication also includes the lot and block, which is not required but provides additional information to the public and informs as to who may have an interest or may be affected by the adoption of the Ordinance.  The publication in its entirety, provides the public with sufficient information so they will know the purpose of the Ordinance and may further inquire if they choose to do so.  (Pa60).  It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in its determination that the Township’s notice complied with N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a).
[brief] To be sure, over 25 years ago, the Appellate Division held in *State v. Gadsden*, 303 N.J. Super. 491 (App. Div. 1997), that a violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152’s jurisdictional limitation by a municipal police officer was only “of a procedural or technical nature, and did not rise to the level of a violation of any of [the defendant’s] constitutional rights.
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant [...] ("Plaintiff") seeks to revive her failed New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., claims against her former employer, Defendants/Respondents, [...] ("[...]"), [...], [...] and [...] (the "[...] Defendants"), as well as Defendants/Respondents, [...] ("[...]"), [...], [...] and [...] (the "State Defendants").  As will be discussed in more detail below, Plaintiff’s claims against the [...] Defendants were not supported by the undisputed facts or law.  The Trial Court therefore properly dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the [...] Defendants’, as there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the [...] Defendants were liable under the NJLAD.
[brief] In *Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., P.A.*, 331 N.J. Super. 445, 454 (App. Div. 2000) (Mitchell II), the Court considered the meaning of “substantial prejudice” in the second prong of the analysis and held that “substantial prejudice” means “the loss of witnesses, the loss of evidence, fading memories, and the like. ”  *Ibid.*  Even if both prongs are proved, courts may, instead, consider lesser sanctions.  The basis for the imposition of less draconian remedies follows long-standing jurisprudential tenets.
[brief] 18T150-3 to 173-21; 21T126-22 to 127-4, 148-15 to 152-6; 22T118-9 to 124-11; Da03500 – Da03567, Da03568 - Da04573.  [...] failed to disclose the foregoing in his report and that he is currently [...] and [...]’s accountant.  18T60-4 to 62-3.  Moreover, [...] completely ignored the wrongful conduct of his own client, [...], who admitted during cross-examination that he paid for his home renovation project and personal airfare with [...]’s funds.  17T16-17 to 25-2; Da02913 – Da02926.  However, perhaps the most egregious thing that [...] did was his failure to disclose that he advised [...] on Exhibit S in 2014, which he opined at trial was false and misleading!  21T128-1 to -19; 22T105-9 to 135:22; 30T93-12 to 94-11; 33T24-6 to 36-4; Da02798 – Da02799, Da7776 – Da7786.  Relying solely on [...]’s deficient net opinion testimony, the court held that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for converting Plaintiffs’ funds in connection with the following Disputed Transactions:  - $629,217.85 was transferred from [...]’s customer [...] to [...] between 2013-2015 (36T34-20 to -35); - $2,000,000 was transferred from [...]’s Merrill Lynch checking account on December 6, 2008 to [...]’s Capital One bank account (Id. at 35-8 to 36-10); - $500,000 was transferred from [...]’s BOA account on November 5, 2013 to [...] and Defendant’s BOA account #0319 (Id. at 36-11 to -22); - $50,000 was transferred from [...]’s MR Line of Credit account on December 5, 2014 to [...]’s bank account #8309 (Id. at 37-1 to -4); • $50,000 was transferred from [...]’s MR Line of Credit account on September 8, 2015 to [...] and Defendant’s BOA account #0319 (Id. at 37-5 to -7); • $90,000 was transferred from [...]’s MR Line of Credit account on October 7, 2015 to [...] and Defendant’s BOA account #0319 (Id. at 37-7 to -9); • $50,000 was transferred from [...]’s bank account on October 28, 2015 to [...]’s bank account #8309 (Id. at 37-9 to -11); • $75,500 was transferred from [...]’s MR Line of Credit account on August 22, 2014 to [...]’s bank account #8309 (Id. at 37-11 to -13); and • $2,300,000 was transferred from [...]’s bank account on November 26, 2014 to [...]’s bank account #8309 (Id. at 37-17 to -23).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Termination is Causally Connected to Her Protected Activity and There is Sufficient Evidence of Pretext Under the McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework.  Finally, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, there is ample evidence in the record that a jury may use to determine that Defendants terminated Plaintiff for her protected whistleblowing activities instead of the reasons Defendants have claimed.  There is no solitary way to demonstrate causation and/or pretext, as it must be identified on fact-specific basis.  A causal connection can be demonstrated through evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive or a “pattern of antagonism” following the protected conduct.  See Kachmar, supra. 109 F.3d at 177; see also Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543 (1995).  Causation may be demonstrated by the temporal proximity between the employee's protected activity and the adverse employment action, when the temporal proximity is combined with facts that are “unusually suggestive” of retaliatory motive.  See Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005)
[brief] Cases: Bent v. Township of Stafford Police Dept., ......................................................... 11 381 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2005).  Burnett v. Gloucester County, ................................................................. 10, 11 415 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 2010).  Commitment of W.W., ..............................................................................  8 245 N.J. 438 (2021).  Kaminskas v. Off. of the Attorney Gen., ....................................................... 8 236 N.J. 415, 200 A.3d 389 (2019).  MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, ............. 9 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005).  N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Tp. of Lyndhurst, ...........................................  8 229 N.J. 541, 163 A.3d 887 (2017).  Paff v. Galloway Township, ........................................................................ passim 229 N.J. 340 (2017).  Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., .................................................................. 8 214 N.J. 419, 70 A.3d 544 (2013).  Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., .................................................................... 8  232 N.J. 504, 181 A.3d 969 (2018).  Rules and Regulations R. 1:36-3...........................................................................................................  11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Board did not accept [...]’s first argument with regard to the governing body’s other re-zonings and adopted redevelopment plans that allow for buildings of heights similar to the 50 ft. proposed by Plaintiffs.  Nor did the Board accept [...]’s related assertion in his fourth argument that allowing a variance for such a height at the subject property would advance purpose (g.) of the MLUL.  The Board found:  “So, it is clear that the governing body has provided opportunities for the development of buildings like those which are the subject of this application, just not in the Zone District and location for which this applicant now seeks approval. ”  Ja032, paragraph 29.  [...]’s first and fourth arguments fall flat because there are other places in [...] were taller buildings like those proposed by his clients may be built, so a variety of uses are already provided sufficient space in accord with purpose (g) of the MLUL, and because the governing body has shown through those re-zonings and redevelopment plans precisely where the governing body thinks those taller buildings should be, which is not in the SM Zone.
[brief] Ibid.  Based upon the factors articulated by [...], the government clients that [...] was retained to represent in Mauer II are [...], [...], [...], and the individual defendants employed within [...] and [...].  (Pa155-58).  Neither [...], [...], [...] nor any of the individual defendants are part of the Office of the Attorney General that issued the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity.  They are separate entities within the State.  As the trial court properly concluded, [...] represents [...], [...], [...], [...], and the individual defendants.
[brief] 24  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER AND DENYING THE MOTION TO INTERVENE DESPITE THE NON-COMPLIANCE OF THE RECEIVER WITH THE STATUTE GOVERNING RECEIVERSHIPS.  (1T30-31 and 2T5)  ........................................................................................................  24  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER AND DENYING THE MOTION TO INTERVENE  DESPITE THE NON-COMPLIANCE OF THE RECEIVER WITH THE RULES OF COURT GOVERNING RECEIVERSHIPS.  (1T30-31 and 2T5)  ........................................................................................................ 36  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................
[brief] [...] argues these documents may be relevant to “the question of whether males and younger employees were viewed more favorably and paid more by Defendant. ”  (ECF 73, at 3-4; see also ECF 64, Hr’g Tr. at 16.)  But, as the court pointed out at a discovery conference, disparate pay is not an issue here.  (ECF 64, Hr’g Tr. at 16.)  Rather, [...] claims that [...] discriminated against her based on sex and age when it terminated her employment as the Sales Manager for the State of Kansas.
[brief] *3  [...] challenges 35 categories of documents listed on the [...]’s privilege logs as insufficiently asserting a claim of privilege: 1-2, 11, 22, 27-31, 33, 35-50, 71-75, 79-81, and 85.  (Doc. 134 at 81:20-22).  The Court agrees that many of the categories listed on the privilege logs, appear, on their face, to insufficiently state a claim of privilege.  (Id. at 48:22-49:4).  Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the Court will appoint a special master to sort through the [...]’s claims of privilege, most likely through *in camera* review of the purportedly privileged documents.  (Id. at 76:7-77:14, Doc. 136).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 grants the Court the authority to appoint a special master to “perform duties consented to by the parties,” and, before appointing such a master, requires the Court to “give the parties’ notice and an opportunity to be heard [and that] [a]ny party may suggest candidates for appointment. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(A), (b)(1).  The Court invites suggestions from the parties and will defer to their choice if they are able to agree on a suitable candidate.  Upon selection of a special master, the Court will separately issue an order that specifically defines the special master’s authority and duties.