ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As for the sixth Hoxworth factor, the parties have been engaged in discovery for 426 days before [...]’s first motion to compel discovery.  Throughout this period, [...] have been more than cooperative in providing discovery to the Respondents.  The [...]s have produced hundreds of pages of medical and other records and made themselves available for three defense expert examinations.  See 1T4:18-5:3.  Notably, [...] filed its motion only after having the benefit of its experts examining [...].  See 1T5:1-5.  Additionally, while [...] has completed depositions of both [...]s, it has yet to provide any proposed dates for [...] to depose [...]’s corporate representatives.  These actions further underscore that [...] have acted in good faith, while [...] has failed to engage in the discovery process equitably.  The only ever mention of arbitration was amongst boilerplate defenses in [...]’s Answer, which alone is unavailing.
[brief] Attorney ID# [...].  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. [...]  A/K/A 45  WILLIAM STREET  URBAN RENEWAL LLC, Defendant-Appellant.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, ESSEX COUNTY
[brief] The underlying case arises from Appellants’ claim for damages related to the ownership and development rights to a solar farm project located in [...], NJ (the “Project”).  (Pa1).  Appellants asserted that they were the rightful owner of the Project and brought suit against defendants-respondents [...] and [...] (collectively referred to hereinafter as “[...]”) claiming that [...] stole the Project from Appellants.  (Pa1).  Appellants alleged that after it and [...] entered into a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) to discuss the possible sale of the Project rights, [...] took action to secure the property on which the Project was to be constructed, in breach of the NDA.  (Pa7-12).  [...] provided site engineering services throughout the design and construction of the Project first as a subconsultant to respondent [...] (who was contracted with Appellants) and later as a direct consultant to [...].  (Pa1; Pa83; and Pa104).  [...] never entered into a contract with Appellants, nor did [...] receive any payments from Appellants for the services it provided on the Project.  (Pa79 and Pa80).  Further, [...] was not a party to the NDA between Appellants and [...], nor was it consulted on the potential sale of the Project by Appellants.
[brief] - **Source Exclusion:** “the conclusion that two friction ridge impressions did not originate from the same source. ”  - **Support for Different Source:**  “the conclusion that the observations provide more support for the proposition that the impressions originated from different sources rather than the same source. ”  - **Inconclusive/Lacking Support:**  “the conclusion that the observations do not provide a sufficient degree of support for one proposition over the other. ”  - **Support for Same Source:**  “the conclusion that the observations provide more support for the proposition that the impressions originated from the same source rather than different sources. ”  - **Source Identification:** “the conclusion that the observations provide extremely strong support for the proposition that the impressions originated from the same source and extremely weak support for the proposition that the impressions originated from different sources. ”  OSAC Report at 5-6.  As noted above, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently issued similar guidelines on testimony by drug recognition experts to ensure their testimony does not “prove too much.
[brief] ”  (Da023.)  That finding is based on a misapplication of the MLUL and a misunderstanding of Hoboken’s cannabis land use application process.  The trial court’s decision – and in particular its misapplication of Dunbar – ignores the unique facts and circumstances at play in this matter.  This matter does not involve a typical conditional use application.  Rather, this matter involves an issue of first impression not contemplated or addressed by Dunbar – a situation where the [...] created a separate arm of the [...] (the [...]).  Not only did the [...] specifically task the [...] with reviewing cannabis-related site plan applications for land use compliance, but it required every single cannabis applicant to go through the onerous process (described below) to obtain approval from the [...] in order to obtain final site plan approval.
[brief] On June 6, 2014, the police in Fort Lee, New Jersey attempted to pull over the car Mr. [...] was allegedly driving because it matched the description of a car involved in other crimes committed in other parts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania.  According to police, Mr. Figueroa did not pull over and continued to drive at a high speed through Fort Lee, over the George Washington Bridge, and into New York, resulting in collisions with police.  Mr. Figueroa was arrested by the Port Authority of New Jersey and New York and charged by both States.  Mr. Figueroa was initially held at a New York hospital for medical treatment, before being taken to a New York jail.  On August 19, 2014, Mr. Figueroa was taken into federal custody on a writ for the alleged conduct in other parts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania and transported to the Essex County Correctional Facility.  Due to the interrelated nature of the procedural history and statements of facts in this case, the two sections have been combined for clarity.
[brief] POINT IV BASED ON THE EVIDENCE IN THIS RECORD, DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON SCORING PROTOCOLS FOR STANDARD FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS IS MISPLACED.  Defendant’s final argument again focuses on the absence of “scoring protocols” regarding the standard field sobriety tests (SFST).  However as argued above and as this record demonstrates, defendant’s argument is wholly misplaced.  Defendant’s reliance on “scoring protocols” once again ignores the video in this case.  Again, as argued above, the best evidence of defendant’s performance on the SFSTs is found in this record by the MVR and the municipal court and Law Divisions recitation of defendant’s performance as viewed on the MVR and not on any supposed “scoring protocols” defendant seeks to argue are a prerequisite to a finding of guilt for DWI.
[brief] Aa035.  Mitigation for the disturbed riparian zone associated with the Access Road and other Project components is proposed through enhancement of approximately 51,672 square feet of currently disturbed riparian zones, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.4.  Aa161-162.  With respect to the culvert used to facilitate the Access Road crossing, [...] proposed a 24-inch culvert based on stormwater conveyance calculations.  The culvert is proposed to be constructed in accordance with the [...]’s specifications, which include headwalls and associated footings extending at least three feet below the invert of the ditch, and constructing the Access Road perpendicular to the ditch.  Aa166; Ra54; Ra82.  As a result of the revisions [...] made to its original plans, the [...] concluded that the “riparian zone disturbances have been significantly reduced[,]” and noted the proposed mitigation for the disturbance.  Aa031, Aa034.  The [...] concluded that [...] “demonstrated that compliance with all Federal, State, and local requirements governing roadways cannot be achieved, and that public safety cannot be adequately ensured, without exceeding the [permitted] limit. ”  Aa034.  Moreover, the [...] concluded that the Access Road will “cross a narrow portion of the stream corridor and will be aligned perpendicular to the orientation of the channel[,]” that “no other feasible opportunities for access to Route 1 exist that would avoid crossing a stream[,]” and “that all impacts have been minimized. ”  Aa034.  C.
[brief] It violates parents’ fundamental rights under the United States Constitution, which cannot be remedied by money damages.  See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 328 (2013) (holding that loss of constitutional rights that cannot be remedied by money damages constitutes irreparable injury); see also Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 949–50 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (holding that deprivation of parental rights gives rise to irreparable harm), aff’d, 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015); Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 03-08-CV-037, 2008 WL 483312, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2008) (same).
[brief] (Aa55; Aa71; Aa837; 6T64:2- \(^{22}\) [...] testified as to the general meaning of stranded utility costs.  (6T56:7-20).  Namely, “piece[s] of equipment that [are] no longer needed” constitute stranded costs, in which there are “unamortized costs on the books of the utility. ”  Ibid.  Therefore, [...]’s argument that the Project is a “stranded asset” is unsupported by the record.
[brief] This matter concerns a personal injury claim arising out of a motorcycle accident on the Garden State Parkway that occurred in September 2015.  At the time of the accident, plaintiff [...] was traveling southbound in the left-hand lane of the roadway.  Plaintiff alleges that he was caused to lose control of his motorcycle upon encountering roadway settlement located in the area of the bridge joint at the north abutment of the bridge traversing Route 30 in Absecon, NJ.  The accident occurred within the physical perimeter of a road widening project that had been initiated prior to the date of the accident.  It is undisputed that the subject roadway condition, described as an “up to 2 inch settlement”, pre-existed the road widening project.  It is also undisputed that there is no evidence of any project-related work being performed in the area of the accident prior to the date of the accident.  Finally, no opinion has been provided that the subject roadway condition was exacerbated by the performance of any work associated with the roadway project.
[brief] ”  Lawson, 177 N.J. at 143.  Moreover, “[i]n the case of automobile liability insurance, the interests concerned are not limited to those of the insured and the insurer; also involved are the interests of those who have suffered injury as a result of the operation of the insured automobile . . . and of the ‘strong legislative policy’ (of this State) of assuring financial protection for innocent victims of automobile accidents.
[brief] ” (Aa232).  On June 7, 2024, [...] filed an appeal of the Commissioner’s final decision, and on August 9, 2024, he filed his merits brief, as well as a motion for a stay of the Commissioner’s final decision.  This court denied the motion for a stay on August 26, 2024.  See IMO Shawn [...], [...], Ocean Cnty., [...] (App. Div. August 26, 2024).
[brief] See *Lopez v. Swyer*, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973).  Further, if counsel is uncertain about the identity of the culpable party, he or she may resort to the fictitious-name procedure in Rule 4:26-4, which provides:  In any action, irrespective of the amount in controversy, other than an action governed by R. 4:4-5 (affecting specific property or a res), if the defendant's true name is unknown to the plaintiff, process may issue against the defendant under a fictitious name, stating it to be fictitious and adding an appropriate description sufficient to identify him.  Plaintiff shall on motion, prior to judgment, amend his complaint to state defendant's true name, such motion to be accompanied by his affidavit stating the manner in which he obtained that information.  See Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 548 (1986).  In fact, the Viviano Court, supra, described Rule 4:26-4 to be construed to permit a plaintiff who institutes a timely action against a fictitious defendant to amend the complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations to identify the true defendant.  In construing the Rule, the Viviano Court stated that “we recognized that an amended complaint identifying the defendant by its true name relates back to the time of filing of the original complaint, thereby permitting the plaintiff to maintain an action that, but for the fictitious-party practice, would be time-barred. ”  Id.; See also Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 120-23 (1973).
[brief] SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY  In the Complaint, which Plaintiff styled as an action in lieu of prerogative writ based on his challenge to the adoption of the Bond Ordinance, Plaintiff also alleged violation of his civil rights under the NJCRA and named the Township, the individual members of the Township’s governing body known as the Township Committee, and the Business Administrator as defendants.  (Pa1.)  Defendants sought to dismiss the action for failure to plead viable claims.  That motion was pending for over a year before the trial court denied the motion on March 24, 2023, noting the indulgent standard of review on a motion to dismiss a complaint while expressly recognizing that its ruling did not preclude a subsequent summary judgment motion based on facts outside the pleadings.  Thereafter, on April 25, 2023, Defendants filed an Answer (Pa48) and, on May 17, 2023, the trial court conducted a case management conference.
[brief] *Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U.S. 277, 285–86 (2014).  Second, in the legal malpractice context, “[t]he fact that a nonresident lawyer’s alleged malpractice affected clients who happen to live in the forum state has not been considered a dominant jurisdictional factor. ”  *Washington v. Magazzu*, 216 N.J. Super. 23, 29 (App. Div. 1987).
[brief] (TPDa1\(^1\)-TPDa11\(^2\)).  The Court held oral argument on [...]’s and [...]’s motions for reconsideration on January 5, 2024.  (2T, Da433-Da470).  The Court granted [...]’s motion to correct the clerical error with the consent of [...].  (Da459, 2T50:16-51:3).  Thereafter, the Court addressed [...]’s motion for reconsideration and [...]’s request to be entirely dismissed from the case.  (Da459-Da465, 2T51:11-62:21).  [...] did not oppose [...]’s motion for a complete dismissal, either in the initial motion for summary judgment or in the motion for reconsideration.  (Da459, 2T51:11-52:12; Da461, 2T54:2-8; Da462, 2T 56:22-57:15).  The Court noted [...]’s lack of opposition as a basis for --- \(^1\)
[brief] [...]’s discipline policy explicitly notes that [...] may commence discipline at any level, including discharge without prior warnings or other corrective measures.  (Pa423-26).  As for [...]’s contention that other employees alleged to have stolen time were not reprimanded, it is demonstrably false.  [...] points only to [...]’s testimony once again to support this argument.  (See Pb27; Pa667).  Meanwhile, [...] explained at her deposition that [...] managers are responsible for submitting “salary time sheets,” to ensure that paid time off (“PTO”) is properly tracked.  These managers were not “falsifying their time cards,” as alleged without support, but simply had their PTO retroactively deducted from their PTO bank upon their submission of a group of time sheets.  (Pa360 at 74:17-76:11).  [...] confirmed that no money exchanged hands because [...] merely deducted the necessary PTO hours from the managers’ PTO bank.  (Pa360 at 74:17-76:11).  There is simply no evidence of “selective” application of [...] policy, only [...]’s bald assertions.  In sum, [...] has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact capable of showing causation between her termination and any alleged whistle-blowing activity.
[brief] It applies only when the voter seeks to support someone not listed on the ballot.  That statutory grant cannot be stretched to excuse a voter’s failure to follow simple instructions, particularly when, as here, the correct method of voting was both obvious and easily accessible.  The voter in this case did not follow the rules.  They had a full and fair opportunity to cast a proper vote by selecting the candidate’s name on the ballot.  Instead, they disregarded that option and improperly attempted to vote by writing a candidate whose name already appeared.  The Legislature, as well as supporting binding case law, has made clear that such a vote is invalid.  Upholding that directive is not a matter of disenfranchising voters, it is a matter of applying the law as written.  C.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 44 Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27, 30, 42 Harrison Riverside Ltd. P'ship v. Eagle Affiliates, Inc., 309 N.J. Super.  470 (App. Div. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-41 Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . 43 In re Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2018) . . . . .25 In re Somerset Reg'l Water Res., LLC, 949 F.3d 837 (3d Cir. 2020) . . . . . . .38 Jennings v. Pinto, 5 N.J. 562 (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 Johnson Mach. Co. v. Manville Sales Corp., 248 N.J. Super. 285 (App. Div. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32-33
[brief] The Committee Was Justified in Relying on the Opinion of the Township’s Planner and Its Adoption of Ordinance 2022-15 Was Proper and Entitled to Substantial Deference.  1.  The Planning Board made the required determination as to whether the Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the Township’s Master Plan.  Appellant argues the Committee’s “failure” to make a determination that the Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the Township’s Master Plan was an error requiring invalidation of the Redevelopment Plan.  Pb17, Pb19.  However, under the Redevelopment Law, the master plan consistency determination is required to be made by the planning board, not the governing body.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e.  The governing body is merely required to refer the consistency determination to the Planning Board and consider the Planning Board’s determination.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e.  Here, the Planning Board made the determination required by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e.  Shortly after Ordinance 2022-15 was introduced by the Committee, the Planning Board considered the Redevelopment Plan at its regularly scheduled September 20, 2022 public meeting.  The Township’s Planner, [...], made a presentation providing analysis and comments to the Planning Board members.  1T4-13.  Although the Planning Board was not required to conduct a public hearing, the Planning Board heard public comments at the September 20, 2022 meeting, including those of Appellant’s counsel and expert professional planner, [...].  1T13-50.  [...] opined the Redevelopment Plan was not inconsistent with the Master Plan, while Appellant’s expert, [...], opined it was inconsistent.  At the conclusion of the public comments and on the strength of the comments and report from [...], the Planning Board determined by a vote of 7-2 that the Redevelopment Plan was not inconsistent with the Master Plan.  1T56-57.  Appellant certainly takes issue with the expert conclusion of [...].  However, that disagreement does not vitiate the Planning Board’s entitlement to rely on the expert opinion of its own professionals as it was clearly within the discretion of the Planning Board to determine which expert’s opinion it would accept.  See Klug v. Bridgewater Planning Bd., 407 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2009).  Here, the Planning Board acted properly in relying on the opinion of its expert and concluding that Ordinance 2022-15 was not inconsistent with the Master Plan, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e.
[brief] Those safeguards were at work during this trial.  Defense counsel cross-examined [...] on the reliability of her spontaneous identification of defendant and argued in summation that her identification was not credible because it was based on feedback from her husband and her observation of him sitting at counsel table.  Defense counsel also argued that [...] was not paying close attention to defendant when he walked around the parking lot because she was distracted by her phone, music, and her children, and was under stress and could not describe the face of the man who pulled a mask over his face as he ran in front of her car.  The trial judge also gave the jury the lengthy model criminal jury charge on in-court identification, and the jury was free to discount the identification.  Additionally, as in Clausell, the reliability of [...]'s in-court identification was supported by other considerations, including the conditions under which she observed him and the fact that her independent description of defendant at the scene was identical to [...]'s description of the man who robbed him.  *18
[brief] (3T 8-16 to 36-20; 4T 80-25 to 83-21)  [...] had been killed by multiple gunshot wounds to the face, shoulder, and back.  (4T 49-12 to 55-22)  Upon receiving the call, [...] was patrolling Madison Avenue about two blocks away when he saw a person run from the area of East 16th across Madison Avenue toward East 22nd street.  (2T 9-10 to 16-19)  As [...] pursued the suspect, they made “direct eye contact,” and [...] briefly saw the suspect’s face, but the suspect kept running, and [...] eventually lost him.  (2T 11-11 to 14-25)  [...] and other officers responded to [...], where they found in a backyard and alleyway footprints in the snow and suspected blood; however, two sample of suspected blood later tested negative for human DNA.  (2T 13-6 to 16-19; 3T 123-14 to 127-2; 4T 17-2 20-17)  The police never question the residents of [...].  (2T 90-18 to 91-11)  Though [...] had seen the suspect’s face, he never identified [...].  Near [...]’s body, the police recovered a tequila bottle, five shell casing, and one projectile; four more projectiles and projectile fragment were found during the autopsy.  (1T 99-2 to 126-13; 4T 58-14 to 19)  The police did not attempt to dust the spent casing for fingerprints; one detective said such attempt to prove fruitless in his past experience.  (1T 120-7 to 126-23)
[directive] Referrals and Evidence Pick-up  1.  Procedures Concerning Required Referrals.  Pursuant to guidelines to be issued by the Commissioner of Education, school officials will promptly notify designated law enforcement officials whenever any school employee develops reason to believe a violation of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act has occurred, (hereinafter referred to as a "referral"), except that school officials shall not be required or expected to refer a matter to law enforcement where a student has voluntarily sought treatment or counseling on his or her own initiative in accordance with the policies and procedures set forth in the guidelines issued by the Department of Education.  For the purposes of this Executive Directive, an admission by a student of a violation of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act which is in response to questioning initiated by a law enforcement officer or school employee shall not constitute a voluntary, self-initiated request for counseling and treatment.  2.  Nonapplicability to Treatment Program Records and Information.  Nothing in this Section shall be construed in any way to authorize or require a referral or transmittal of any information or records in the possession of a substance abuse counselling or treatment program, and such information or records shall be strictly safeguarded in accordance with applicable federal regulations and state policies.  3.  Securing Physical Evidence Pending Referral and Pick-Up.  Pursuant to guidelines to be issued by the Commissioner of Education, wherever a school employee seizes or comes upon any substance believed to be a controlled dangerous substance, or item believed to be drug paraphernalia, school officials shall immediately advise the local law enforcement agency having patrol jurisdiction and shall secure the substance or item pending the response by that law enforcement agency to retrieve and take custody of the substance or item.  School employees having custody of the substance or item must take reasonable precautions, as per local board of education procedures, to prevent its theft, destruction or use by any person.  Under no circumstances shall any person destroy or otherwise dispose of any controlled dangerous substance or drug paraphernalia except by turning over such substance to the responding law enforcement officer.