ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The FDCPA defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. ”  15 U.S.C § 1692a(2).  Although the terms “person” and “medium” are not defined, the use of these terms in a single sentence makes clear that they are meant to be mutually exclusive.  “Person” does not include “medium,” because an interpretation stating otherwise would render the phrase “through any medium” meaningless.  See Burgos v. State, 222 N.J. 175, 203 (2015) (“We do not support interpretations that render statutory language as surplusage or meaningless.  . .”)  The review of the other sections of the FDCPA evidences that the term “medium” includes both things and people.  For example, the FDCPA discusses mediums such as an individual that serves legal process (§ 1692a(6)(D); a debt collector’s use of a telephone (§§ 1692a(7), 1692d(5), 16922d(6), 1692f(5)); and a debt collector’s use of a telegram (§§ 1692b(5), 1692f(5), 1692f(8)).  The FDCPA therefore recognizes that the medium of communication sometimes includes transmission of information through people.
[brief] It has remained the Department’s position that in terms of the mechanics of [...]’s premium rate filing, [...] followed the rules insofar as its [...] relies on *N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Commc’n Workers of America*, *N.J. Traffic Division*, 5 N.J. 354, 375 (195), to argue that the ALJ and the Commissioner improperly supplied “by implication” a basis for the disapproval decision—by reading in a finding of excessiveness—that was not stated in the Department’s own letter.  *N.J. Bell* concerned judgments based on arbitration awards in employer-employee matters, entered by the Board of Arbitration.
[brief] ## Cases  **Bougher v. University of Pittsburg,** 882 F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir. 1989) .................................................................  4  **Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Department,** 892 F.2d 23 (1989)  ..............................................................................  4  **Diamond v. NJ Bell Telephone Company,** 51 N.J. 594, 242 A.2d 622 (N.J. 1968) ..................................................  8  **Fernandi v. Strully,** 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1961) ..................................................  8  **Lopez v. Swyer, et al.,** 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (N.J. 1973) ..................................................  8  **New Market Poultry, Inc. v. Fellows,** 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1968) ..................................................  8  **Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender,** 208 N.J. 414, 211, 31A.3d. 934 .............................................................  7  **Schmidt v. Celgene Corporation,** 425 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2012) ...................................................  6, 7  **Yerzy v. Levine,** 57 N.J. 234, 271 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1970) .................................................. 8  ## Statutes  **N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2** ............................................................................ 4, 5 **N.J.S.A. 59:8-1**  ...............................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Db, p. 31  Black letter  New Jersey law is that land use decisions must be based on the evidence in the record adduced at the land use board hearings:  The facts adduced at the hearing, all testimony and all evidence on which the board made its decision must be part of the record and the board's decision must include findings of the facts from the record on which it made its decisions and conclusions on the points of law raised.  See Pagano v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 257 N.J. Super. 382, 399-401 (Law Div. 1992).  Or, as stated in Lincoln Hgts. v. Cranford Plan. Bd., 314 N.J. Super. 366, 386 (Law Div. 1998), aff'd o.b. 321 N.J. Super. 355 (App. Div.), certif. den. 162 N.J. 131 (1999).  Cox, supra, § 19-3.1.  Without findings of facts and conclusions of law based on the evidence in the record, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the Board acted properly.  The arguments raised by Defendants based on matters outside the record of the Planning Board are irrelevant and should have been ignored by the trial court and should be ignored by this Court.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The TOA Rule simply does not apply just because [...] filed a form that lists its name, address and telephone number with the [...].  [Pa52-60].  [...]’ assertion – on page 28 of its brief that its application to the [...] has “all of the information” required for approval is wrong; none of the information required to be submitted by § 44-304 was submitted to the [...].  Filing a form is not the same thing as filing the application for development form; it certainly does not substitute for filing the documents required by the Checklist for conditional use applications.  [Pa36].  Indeed, there is an enormous difference between providing substantive information about the application, like the type of alarm system it had (as [...] alludes to in its brief), and providing the 20 specific documents and other items required by the Checklist for procedural completeness.  These were, along with the Land Use Application Form, according to Dunbar, supra, the items required to be filed before the Ordinance took effect.  They were not, so the TOA Rule cannot protect [...].
[brief] In order to supplement the previous certifications submitted without personal knowledge by [...]’s attorneys, the defendant added a certification from [...], a “Mail and Imaging Service” employee of [...].  Confusingly, she identified and “verified” the authenticity of the Proof of Mailing Document, but it is unclear whether it was even the same document that had been submitted to the Court.  [...] did not attach the document to her own certification, and stated simply that she “understood” that the document had been submitted to the court as part of the \(^1\)  Plaintiff will not describe here the details of the postage issue, given that it was rendered moot by [...]’s supplemental submission and hence is not part of this appeal.
[brief] Indeed, [...] enabled [...] to steal plaintiff’s business assets by breaching the CONFIDENTIALITY covenant in the lease and feeding plaintiff’s information to [...] Defendants in violation of the lease.  Those facts are stated in the proposed Second Amended Complaint and explicated in the brief filed October 7, 2021.  Among the evidence shown in the SAC is an email dated December 1, 2017, in which [...] Defendants’ counsel and co-defendant [...], writing the Planning Board that “[...] acquired the rights to the Mill Road Solar Farm recently.
[brief] 1.  The DNA expert testimony established the victim was the source of the DNA profile generated on several pieces of crime-scene evidence.  [...], a forensic scientist from the [...], testified as an expert in DNA analysis.  (5T36-11 to 17; 5T41-24 to 25).  She explained that the lab looks at twenty-seven locations on the DNA to generate a profile because “the more DNA that [the lab] looks at, the more exclusionary a profile can be, so the more we can say that someone is the source of a DNA profile. ” (5T43-17 to 19).  Once a profile is created, scientists examine known reference samples, comparing them to unknown samples collected as evidence.  (5T46-21 to 47-1).  A statistical evaluation is then made “to give weight to that comparison . . . if the statistic reaches a certain threshold, [the scientist is] able to competently say that someone is the source of that profile. ”  If it does not reach that threshold, the scientist can only say that someone matches that profile.  (5T48-10 to 17).  Michalik explained that the statistical analysis is generated by looking at “how frequent the profiles are within that population” and then determining “how common or rare that profile is. ” (5T48-22 to 24).  Here, there were two reference samples: one from the victim and one from defendant.  (5T51-6 to 12).  There were also four unknown samples collected from a portion of the stained shirt found in the bathroom, the collar of the shirt, the wine chiller, and two swabs from the stain on defendant’s bra.  (5T25-23 to 27-10; 5T31-18 to 32-9).  Michalik tested those samples and concluded that: (1) the victim was the source of the DNA on the wine chiller; (2) the victim was the source of the DNA found on the blood stain portion of the striped shirt; (3) DNA from the collar of the striped shirt was a mixture from two people but was insufficient for comparison; and (4) the victim was the source of the DNA from the stain on the bra. (5T55-6 to 57-14; 5T58-13 to 25).  Defendant never objected to any of these conclusions or cross-examined the DNA expert.
[directive] Al acusado se le ha arrestado y acusado por una o dos de las violaciones de la ley de tránsito marcado en la caja arriba.  Conforme a la ley N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, este AVISO es para informarle que si usted acepta la responsabilidad de transportar o acompañar al acusado y le permite o facilita la operación de un vehículo motorizado mientras el acusado está en estado de embriaguez o tiene un contenido alcohólico en la sangre igual a, o más de lo que está permitido por la ley (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), usted potencialmente se expone a penalidades criminales y obligaciones legales civiles.  Permitir que una persona opere un vehículo motorizado en estado de embriaguez o tiene un contenido alcohólico en la sangre igual a, o más de lo que está permitido por la ley es una violación de la ley N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).  Si usted está acusado y condenado bajo el estatuto: se le suspenderán sus privilegios de manejo; se le impondrán multas y penalidades monetarias; y se le puede encarcelar.  Si usted permite o facilita que el acusado opere un vehículo motorizado mientras el acusado permanece en estado de embriaguez o tiene un contenido alcohólico en la sangre igual a, o más de lo que está permitido por la ley, y el acusado se ve involucrado en un accidente de vehículo que ocasione la lesión o muerte de otras personas, entonces usted se expone a un proceso legal y enjuiciamiento criminal.  Si a usted se le enjuicia y declara culpable, la corte puede imponer multas, penalidades obligatorias y sentencia de cárcel.  Además de las obligaciones criminales, si usted permite o facilita que el acusado opere un vehículo motorizado en estado de embriaguez o tiene un contenido alcohólico en la sangre igual a, o más de lo que está permitido por la ley, y el acusado se ve involucrado en un accidente de vehículo que ocasiona daños a la propiedad, o lesiones o muerte, se le puede hacer a usted responsable por los daños civiles y puede ser que esos daños no estén cubiertos por su seguro.
[brief] Defendant asserted that Plaintiff owed a certain financial obligation arising out of a personal account.  Pa7 at ¶26.  That past due, defaulted account was assigned to Defendant for collection.  Pa7 at ¶¶28, 29.  Defendant mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff dated August 11, 2020 which Plaintiff received.  Pa7 at ¶¶31, 32, 40.  A true but partially redacted copy of the letter is Exhibit B (Pa26) to the Complaint.
[brief] He may very well have slipped on cardboard, slipped on -- on the plywood, hit his head on the plywood and fell, or, um, there could be a myriad of other ways in which he could have fallen.  (T38:5-25; T39:1-6)  Indeed, the trial court correctly identified the relevant factual circumstances from which an inference could be reached by the jury as to what probably caused plaintiff to fall -- slipping or tripping on the plywood.  Nevertheless, the trial court erred when it failed to recognize that the factual circumstances were sufficient for a jury to reach the conclusion that the plaintiff's fall and resulting injuries were probably caused by the negligence of the defendants.  (T34:24 to T44:18)
[brief] Defendant’s assent is also evidenced by his routine communications with Plaintiff asking for [...]’s 1098-T forms so he could claim a tax credit for being responsible for [...]’s tuition while she was still in school. \(^2\)  1T59:1-25; 60:8-68:25; see also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 (P-668).  Plaintiff encouraged Defendant’s full participation in the process of selecting schools for both children, discussing the children’s education interests, and learning about the financial aid process.  1T47:1-48:9; 53:18-25; 55:14-22.  Defendant refused to go to any of the financial aid seminars and conceded that he did no research about scholarships, grants, or financial aid.
[brief] Enough questions were raised as to reliability and trustworthiness in the application’s preparation that the actual Bank employee who attended to [...] that day, should have submitted a certification on that issue.  No explanation was given for its absence.  Manata v. Perera, 436 NJ Super 330, 346-347 (App. Div. 2014) - a court retains the power to bar a business record if the sources of information or the method, purpose or circumstances of preparation indicate that it is not trustworthy, citing NJRE 803(c)(6).
[brief] When the legislative history cited by this Court in *Jai Sai Ram v. Planning Bd.*, 446 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2016), is examined in detail, it is clear that neither the purpose of the statute cited by [...] nor the practical effects it is concerned about apply to the present facts.  In fact, [...]’ position, if validated, would directly undermine both the plain language of the TOA Rule and the Legislature’s intent.
[brief] [...] was a member of the TEAMS Unit, specifically the security team.  (1T75-15 to 80-15).  As part of the security team, Detective Barnett was in the first TEAMS group deployed to secure the property’s perimeter; but he was in the last TEAMS group to enter [...], following in after the breach and entry teams.  (1T79-23 to 80-15; 1T87-18 to 23; 5T15-24 to 18-6; 5T73-10 to 77-9).
[brief] CONCLUSION  Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the Court overlooked the probative, competent evidence offered by [...] and the eyewitness to the incident, [...], and did not accept as true all the evidence which supported [...]’s position that the bus driver operated the bus in a negligent manner by abruptly and forcefully stopping the bus when there was no clear present danger, causing her to fall backwards and strike her head on the floor of the bus.  [...] sustained numerous disk herniations that remain permanent and chronic, and which likewise caused her to lose many of the activities she enjoyed at 70-years-old.  Not surprisingly, the constant pain and loss of enjoyment are substantial and have taken their toll by causing depression.  The evidence in this motion record, together with the benefit of all the legitimate inferences which may be deduced therefrom, as required by Brill and Rule 4:46, prohibit summary judgment because it cannot be said as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s injuries are temporary or insubstantial – those hotly disputed issues are for the jury to decide.  For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court’s rulings must be reversed, and this case remanded back to the active trial calendar so [...] may have her day in court.
[brief] The BMP Manual is a technical guidance document, as permitted by N.J.S.A. 13:1D-111.  It is true that stormwater management measures “designed in accordance” with the BMP Manual are “presumed to be capable of providing stormwater controls” under the stormwater rules.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.2(f).  However, the rules also provide:  “[a]n alternative stormwater management measure, alternative removal rate, and/or alternative method to calculate the removal rate [to the BMP Manual] may be used if the design engineer demonstrates the capability of the proposed alternative stormwater management measure and/or the validity of the alternative rate or method to the review agency. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.2(g).
[directive] g.  Si el delito ocurrió el 9 de enero de 1997 o después de dicha fecha, usted tendrá que pagar una [Sí/Yes] [No/No] multa de $30 dólares al Fondo de Capacitación y Equipo de Oficiales del Orden Público?  If the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?
[brief] As set forth in the prior submissions of the [...] (the “Authority”) and further herein, [...] (“Center City”) has not met its burden of establishing the legal standard for reformation of contract.  The March 15, 2024 Order of the trial court, Da49, reformed the redevelopment agreement, dated February 24, 2005 (the “Redevelopment Agreement”) by and among the [...] (the “City”), Center City and the Authority, and the Operating Agreement between the Authority and Center City (the “Operating Agreement”).  The Redevelopment Agreement was reformed to remove the monetary threshold of $1,600,000, above which the Authority and Center City would share “excess profits” pursuant to Section 8.6 of the Redevelopment Agreement, thereby allowing Center City to receive 66.66% of revenue generated from the Center City Mall Garage parking, after expenses, with the Authority receiving 33.33% of the revenue.  The March 15, 2024 Order further directed the Authority to pay Center City $499,007.77 in fees as a result of said reformation, retroactive to August 2019.  The trial record is clear the Authority never engaged in any conduct which would meet the well-established standard for reformation of a contract.  The Authority, at all times during the duration of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement, acted in accordance with the express terms of both agreements and any deviation from these terms was undertaken with the approval or consent of Center City.  Further, the parties were represented by competent counsel and financial advisory professionals during the relevant contractual negotiations.  While Center City may not be pleased with the financial results of these duly negotiated agreements, there is no basis in law to permit the reformation of these agreements.  As set forth further herein, Center City has not met its burden of establishing the legal standard for reformation of contract.  There is no allegation of any mutual mistake of the parties with respect to either agreement, and no demonstrated instance of fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of the Authority, which elements are essential in granting the extraordinary remedy of reformation of contract.  The trial court misapplied the law in reforming the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement, and its decision therefore must be reversed.  For these reasons, the Authority asks this Court to reverse and set aside the provisions of the March 15, 2024 Order of the trial court granting reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement and ordering payment by the Authority to Center City in the amount of $499,007.77 in retroactive fees as a result of said reformation.
[brief] (Da83).  In addition, they filed an unsuccessful motion for leave to appeal.  (Da80).  The Trustee twice served “frivolous litigation” notices on [...] and [...] aimed at their relentless motion practice ((Da362; Da495), including their motion to file a second amended complaint and their so-called “due process” motion, both of motions were been denied.  [...] acknowledged receiving both notices.  8T102-4-6; 108-21 to 109:5.  The trial court held a plenary hearing on December 6 and 14, 2023, culminating in its Trial Order dated February 14, 2024.
[brief] Unlike the colloquy in Tate, it is clear from the record in this case, that Defendant did, in fact, admit to committing the acts which constituted the crime.  Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of that alcohol.  He also admitted that his consumption of alcohol affected his ability to properly operate his vehicle.  Even without accepting or considering the stipulation of defense counsel regarding Defendant’s BAC, the admissions of Defendant are enough to satisfy the requirement for an adequate factual basis of a guilty plea.  (emphasis added)  (3T29-1 to 29-12)  Having found there was a sufficient factual basis underlying his guilty plea, [...] denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his 2018 plea.
[brief] 6  Ogbin v. GE Money Bank, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64735 (D.N.J. 2011)  10  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  6, 7, 8 R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v.  Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 (2001)  21 Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2012)
[brief] And the Court did so because reduced levels of SFRA funding deprives students of the resources essential for a T&E education and to sustain progress towards remediating the Abbott constitutional violation:  Although in Abbott XX we could not say that the State had produced a formula that would guarantee students adequate funding to support a thorough and efficient education as measured by the CCCS, the State was allowed to effectuate SFRA’s formula with the expectation that that it could deliver to Abbott pupils all that the State assured.  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 355 (emphasis added).  Funding [...] significantly and consistently below its Adequacy Budget is, *a fortiori*, sub-optimal because it does not deliver “all” of the resources that the SFRA formula’s weighted cost structure has “assured. ”  It also represents a “retreat from the hard-won progress that our state had made toward guaranteeing the children in the Abbott districts the promise of educational opportunity. ”  Id. at 360.  The Supreme Court simply “did not allow, and did not authorize, the State to replace the parity remedy with *some* version of SFRA or an underfunded version of the formula.
[brief] This lawsuit involves the post-accident challenge of plaintiffs [...] and [...], DMD, PC, to defendant [...]’s cancellation of a business auto policy for nonpayment of premiums more than six (6) months prior to the accident.  The factual record in this matter provides no basis upon which to determine, as plaintiffs urge, that the cancellation was not properly made and thus the policy should be declared to have been in force on the date of the accident.  Yet plaintiffs continue to advance their arguments in that regard, alleging technical flaws in the proofs submitted to the lower court and urging this Court to reverse the orders below and enter summary judgment in their favor.  Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that even if this Court agrees with the lower court that the evidence established that the cancellation notice was prepared and mailed in compliance with the governing statute, a trial should nevertheless be held on the issue of whether or not plaintiffs actually received the mailed cancellation notice.  This suggestion represents an absolute and unprecedented departure from the standard that has been applied to carriers’ transmittals of cancellation notices for decades – a standard that is plainly evidenced by the language of the statute itself.  Moreover, it would needlessly burden the courts, carriers and litigants with many additional trial proceedings without, we submit, any greater likelihood that the outcome will accurately reflect what actually occurred.  Plaintiffs’ perception that “this Court writes on a clean slate” (Pb20) is incorrect – any change such as that suggested by plaintiffs is purely the province of the Legislature.