ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Page one (1) of the [...] declarations page contains the express declaration that plaintiffs were purchasing $1,000,000 in excess UM/UIM coverage.  The policy was in full force and effect at the time of the subject accident.  There is nothing in the declarations page to suggest anything less than $1,000,000 in UIM coverage.  Moreover, nothing explicitly stated in [...]’s own policy in any way limits the availability of UIM coverage under the facts presented in the current case.  Quite to the contrary, the [...] policy states:  We will pay damages for bodily injury and insured is legally entitled to receive from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured auto.  We will only pay those damages in excess of the underlying insurance or the minimum required underlying limits, whichever is greater.  [(Pa87). ]  Even under the intra-family exclusion of the [...] policy, which defendant [...] relies upon to deny liability coverage for defendant [...], the policy makes clear that excess UIM coverage would apply.  Section III – Exclusions, Part A, Paragraph 14 states:  We will not provide coverage for damages, defense costs or any other costs of expenses:  . . . 14.  **Insured. **  For personal injury to you or an insured under this policy.  This exclusion does not apply to coverage provided under the Excess Supplemental Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist coverage, if a limit for this coverage is shown on your Declarations.  [(Pa93). ]  On its face, [...]’s policy indicates that excess UIM coverage would be provided in instances presented under the facts of the current case; namely, where the driver of a vehicle (i.e., defendant [...]) caused damages to an insured (i.e., Miles [...]) which were in excess of the underlying insurance (i.e., the [...] $500,000 liability policy).  The reasonable expectations of the plaintiffs, considering the [...] declarations page and [...] policy language *in toto*, was that they were covered for the exact circumstances that unfolded here.  Plaintiffs expected that they purchased excess UIM coverage with [...] that would provide coverage in the event that the underlying liability limits were not sufficient to compensate plaintiffs for the damages sustained.  This expectation was founded upon the fact that, as it relates to [...], the exclusion invoked by [...] could never apply to plaintiffs.  This expectation was founded upon the [...] declarations page advising they had purchased $1,000,000 in UIM coverage.  This expectation was founded upon the [...] policy language that an intrafamily exclusion would not apply to excess supplemental uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.  It is respectfully submitted that, drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the expectation of coverage was imminently reasonable and that [...] should be compelled to provide coverage in accordance with plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations.
[brief] As there was no stay of an action because the complaint was dismissed in 2019 for violating R 1:20A-6, then the only way Plaintiff could have sought enforcement of an arbitration determination was by filing a new complaint under R. 4:67.  Plaintiff refused to file a complaint to prevent Defendant from filing her defenses and counter-claims that she could assert against Plaintiff.  The lower court’s refusal to enforce R. 4:67 further undermined Defendant’s due process rights to be heard by preventing her defenses, counterclaims and to stay the fee arbitration decision pending her counterclaims.
[brief] *Klump v. Cybulski* 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42, 47 (1957)  A careful review of the various correspondence between [...] and [...]’s counsel between June and December does not demonstrate, certainly not by adequate, substantial, credible evidence and certainly by clear and convincing evidence, that [...] or [...] acted in “bad faith”.  To the contrary, [...] deemed elevators in the multi-story building as important to the health, safety and welfare of the community and of the future residents of the [...] Project.
[directive] Mental health professionals may also be able to access information about the barricaded individual that is not available to law enforcement officers but may be useful in resolving the incident.  5.3  Agreements with Mental Health Professionals.  County Prosecutors shall enter into agreements with mental health service providers for the purpose of providing mental health professionals for qualified tactical teams operating within their counties during incidents section 5.2 and 5.4. involving barricaded individuals, as described in These agreements should Section 7 contemplate mutual training requirements identified in of this Policy with a goal of maintaining a professional and proficient relationship.  12
[brief] .................................................  20 Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 148 N.J. 524 (1997)  .................................................................................. 10, 11 Peiker Acustic, Inc. v. Kennedy, 2011 WL 1344238 (D. Colorado April 8, 2011)  ...........................................  20 Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 215 F.R.D. 492 (E.D. Pa. 2003)  .....................................................................  14  Pinto v. Spectrum Chems. & Lab. Prods., 200 N.J. 580 (2010) ......................................................................................  21  Selective Ins. Co. of America v. Hudson East Pain Management Osteopathic Medicine, 210 N.J. 597 (2012)  .......................................................................................  10  Societie Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) ..................................................................  12  In re Valsartan, Losartan, and Irbesartan Products Liability Litigation, 2021 WL 61117676 (D.N.J. 2021)  ..................................................................  14  In re Vitamin Antitrust Litigation, 2001 WL 35814436 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2001)  ....................................................  20  Willson v. Gerber Products Company, Docket No. A-1290-22, 2023 WL 8889528 (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2023)  ..............................................................................................................  12 Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16 (1996)  ..........................................................................................  21  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (2005)  .........................................................................................  20  Statutes Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, Edwards v. Mohammed, No. MID-L-3906-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Middlesex Cty. Jan. 7, 2022) (granting summary judgment to [...]); Duncan v. [...] Techs., Inc., No. 700606/2020, 2023 WL 7198189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. Sept. 27, 2023); Shenouda v. [...] Techs., Inc., No. 601854/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. Jan. 3, 2024) (NYSCEF Doc. No. 120).  she must agree to [...]’s Terms of Use.  In December 2021, [...] revised its Terms of Use.
[brief] (Da24-26, §2.1.2 Curbed Geometry & End Islands / Peninsulas).  Additionally, [...] noted that the designer of a lot must also consider the efficient use of space within the lot to satisfy demand, and end island/peninsulas occupy space which could otherwise be used for parking.  Here, the [...]'s parking demand study noted that the hospital had occupancy rates over 94% which was noted to be a parking capacity deficiency.
[brief] All individuals who enter a store, including, but not limited to employees and customers, have a right to assume that the U-boats supplied by [...] are properly operated throughout the store.  They also have a right to assume that any individual who improperly utilizes such equipment, by, for example, stacking product too high, will not only be warned by store personnel to reduce their load to ensure that the U-boat operator’s view is not obstructed, but will also assist such person with actually reducing such load.  [...] opens its doors to customers and thus undoubtedly encourages public use of its premises.  The public interest is served by requiring [...] to maintain its premises in a safe condition for its invitees.
[brief] So as a lay person and not an engineer, I commonly hear the terms used a two-year storm, a ten-year storm, 50- year storm, 100-year storm, 500-year storm.  Could you equate, when you say “infrequent,” could you equate that to a type of storm event, such as two-year, 50-year, 100-year storm event, please?  A:  Well, certainly, a 50-year storm would be infrequent.  Q:  But, specifically, I’m asking you, equate your opinion about that, that the conditions of the new sea wall will increase the likelihood of wave overtopping to a specific storm event.  A: I cannot, without further investigation, could not pin it down to a specific storm event.  Q:  Why are you not able to pin it down at this time?  A: It would require further investigation, calculation.  Da464:9-465:6 [emphasis added].  [...] also confirmed that he had formed no opinion, nor conducted any further investigation, into whether the alleged increase in wave over-topping would cause damage to the Property:
[directive] Under the supervision of the Attorney General or Coordination with Law their designee, [...] shall collaborate and coordinate with law enforcement agencies across the state, including [...], the [...], the 21 County Prosecutor Offices, to promote public safety, develop innovative alternative responses to public health issues facing law enforcement, and develop diversionary pathways in lieu of involvement in the criminal justice system.  G.  [...] shall coordinate with [...] on any policy and program Coordination with [...]. matters under [...]’s subject matter purview.
[brief] Based on the extensive record and credibility findings, [...] found that: (1) the Project is “reasonably necessary to provide safe, adequate, and _____________________  19  [...] is Holmdel’s expert in pipeline flow and hydraulic analysis.  (Aa315).  20  As [...] opted to construct the Project at [...] since the site incorporated “measures included specifically to address” Holmdel’s concerns, such as “the distance from Holmdel Road and the additional landscaping,” the Initial Decision focused on the proposed Project at [...].
[brief] Plaintiff’s standing does not depend on any harm other than the invasion of his statutorily protected rights.  Therefore, he has standing.  One FDCPA provision mandates that “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (emphasis added).  Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant communicated detailed information about Plaintiff and a debt he allegedly owed with a third party in Defendant’s attempt to collect the debt.  That third party does not fall within any of the narrowly-defined statutory exceptions.  Therefore, Plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.  But the motion court concluded that, because Defendant conveyed debt information to a third-party engaged by the debt collector to merge that information with a template collection letter to create, print, and mail the debt collector’s collection letter, Defendant did not “communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  § 1692c(b).  In reaching its conclusion, the motion court ignored federal court decisions which universally concluded that such “mail vendor” communications violate § 1692c(b).  Plaintiff alleged an additional independent reason for Defendant’s violation of the FDCPA.  The alleged debt was time-barred.  Hence, Plaintiff could pay nothing with impunity.  But the letter stated that, by agreeing to one of the letter’s payment proposals, Plaintiff would realize a monetary “savings. ”  That is misleading because making a payment is a loss as compared with paying nothing on a time-barred debt.  Furthermore, the letter’s explanation as to how the statute of limitations could be restarted is inaccurate as well as confusing to the least sophisticated consumer.  Nevertheless, the motion court concluded Plaintiff failed to state a claim for a violation of the FDCPA.  Plaintiff prays that the Appellate Division reverses the Order which dismissed his Complaint.
[brief] C. Appellants’ Arguments That The Legislature Expressly Chose To Exclude Municipalities Such As [...] From Withdrawing From Regional Or Consolidated School Districts  Both Ignores The Wider Legislative Scheme And Leads To An Absurd Result.  Appellants next argue that the Legislature must have chosen to exclude municipalities such as [...] from N.J.S.A 18A:13-47.11 because it “had the opportunity to describe municipalities such as [...] in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) but chose not to.
[directive] ”  AG Directive 2007-3 recognized that “enforcement of immigration laws is primarily a federal responsibility,” and that “[t]he overriding mission of [New Jersey] law enforcement officers … is to enforce the state’s criminal laws and to protect the community that they serve. ”  That Directive also acknowledged that “[t]his requires the cooperation of, and positive relationships with, all members of the community,” including immigrants.  Since 2007, technological advances and changes in federal immigration enforcement priorities have rendered AG Directive 2007-3 less effective at “establish[ing] the manner in which local, county, and state law enforcement agencies and officers shall interact with federal immigration authorities. ”  Today’s new Directive seeks to ensure effective policing, protect the safety of all New Jersey residents, and ensure that limited state, county, and local law enforcement resources are directed towards enforcing the criminal laws of this state.
[directive] 31  To avoid delays, we note that existing rules place limits on how much time can be excluded under the CJRA to resolve a motion before the trial court.  See R. 3:25-4(i)(3)(A) to (C); R. 3:10-2(f).  Briefing, argument, and any “be evidentiary hearing must completed promptly but in no event later than 60 days after the filing of the notice of motion, unless the court finds good cause record. ” to extend the time . . . to complete the R. 3:10-2(f); see also R. 3:25- 4(i)(3)(A).  In addition, “[u]nless the court reserves its decision until the time of trial,” it must “decide the motion within 30 days after the record is complete” absent “extraordinary circumstances. ”  “[N]o R. 3:25-4(i)(3)(B). more than an additional 30 days shall be excluded. ”  Ibid.  We adopt a similar but more expedited approach for motions for leave to appeal an order about speedy trial calculations.
[brief] The Board identified the detrimental effects that will ensue from the project.  The Board reviewed a number of detrimental effects that this project presented and thoroughly covered each in its Resolution.  These included excessive density far beyond what is normal both for comparable facilities within the Township and for comparable facilities nearby. ⁹  The Board also concluded that the applicant’s experts specifically omitted several comparable projects in their analysis in order to avoid a justification for less units than [...] was seeking.
[brief] “The shirt was similar and so was the phone on the hip. ”  (5T 54-1 to 3)  This inappropriate opinion testimony is also the subject of Point II, infra.  [...] was able to lift four latent prints from the bottom of the cash register.  (5T 61-21 to 23)  All five prints lifted on both nights were submitted to the New Jersey State Biometric Unit Laboratory for comparison in an Automatic Fingerprint Identification Search system.  (5T 13-15)  [...] of the [...] testified as an expert in latent fingerprints.
[brief] There is significant overlap between the causation prong of the prima facie case and the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, as the same evidence used to demonstrate pretext can also establish a causal link between the protected characteristic and the adverse employment action.  See Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 449-50 (2005) (“The evidence of pretext may also be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proving the prima facie case causation prong.  In other words, the same evidence that demonstrates a question of fact as to whether the employer's proffered reason for the adverse employment action is pretextual can also be used to establish that the adverse action was taken for a discriminatory reason. ”)  Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence to support this connection and from which a jury could determine that the stated reason given for Plaintiff’s termination is unworthy of credence.
[brief] **THE CATCH-ALL PROVISION OF N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2)  AUTHORIZING MULTIPLE REMEDIES FURTHER ILLUSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED THAT STATUTE. **  The trial court also erred by ignoring the catch-all provision in N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) that permits “an order of rescission, restitution or disgorgement or any other order within the court’s power,” to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the Securities Law.  (emphasis added).  Catch-all provisions have previously been read expansively to effectuate a statute’s legislative purpose.  See, e.g., *Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161, 176-77 (2005) (finding, in part, that N.J.S.A. 25:2-29(a)(3)(c) (“Remedies of a creditor”) includes “a catch-all provision, affording a creditor ‘[a]ny other relief the circumstances may require,’” that enables a creditor to bring other causes of action alongside their Uniform Voidable Transactions Act claim); Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 584-89 (2012) (reading a catchall provision under N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10 (“Forwarding subscriber information”) expansively based on the court’s “understanding of the statute’s language and history and the objectives that the Legislature intended to achieve. ”).  Here, the catch-all provision in N.J.S.A.49:3-69(a)(2), “or any other order within the court’s power,” includes all of the statutorily-enumerated remedies and any other remedies the court deems necessary.  The court’s August 16 Order reads the second part of that provision – allowing the court to enter “any other order within [its] power” – out of the statute.  And, that provision unambiguously authorizes the court to craft an order combining any remedies within its powers – including both restitution and disgorgement – as appropriate to the facts of a particular case.  The Legislature’s objective in codifying this sweeping language was to give both the court and the [...] all of the available remedial measures to deter wrongdoing and protect investors.  Impeding essential remedies by restricting the [...] to choosing just one of the available remedies would frustrate that purpose and disserve the public interest.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Trial Court Failed To Consider [...]’s Four Separate Breaches Of The Settlement Agreement, Any One Of Which Required The Consent Judgments To Be Entered  .................................................................  20  STANDARD OF REVIEW ......................................................................  22 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  23  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AS WRITTEN DESPITE STANDARD’S UNDISPUTED BREACHES.  (Pa2).  .................................................................  23  A.  [...]’s Failure To Pay The Fourth Settlement Payment Constituted A Breach Of The Settlement Agreement (Pa2).  .................................................................  25  B.  [...]’s Failure To Timely Vacate The Leased Premises, Or To Leave It In Broom Clean Condition, Constituted Two Additional Breaches Of The Settlement Agreement (Pa2).  .................................................................  27  C. [...]’s Improper Dumping Also Constituted A Breach Of The Settlement Agreement (Pa2).  .........................  28  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................  30  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order filed February 2, 2024.................................................................Pa1 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | *Dep’t. of the Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Board of Pub. Util.*, | 23 | | 206 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 1985) | | | *Fargo Realty, Inc. v. Harris*, | 23 | | 173 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1980) | | | *Hannigan v. Township of Old Bridge*, | 23 | | 288 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 1996) | | | *Jannarone v. W. T. Co.*, | 22 | | 65 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1961) | | | *Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.*, | 23 | | 33 N.J. 36 (1960) | | | *Lemad Corp. v. Honachefsky*, | 21 | | 2017 WL 5478344 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 14, 2017) | | | *Liqui-Box Corp. v. Estate of Elkman*, | 23 | | 238 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 1990) | | | *Narain v. George Harms Constr. Co.*, | 6 | | 2023 WL 3575597 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 22, 2023) | | | *Narain v. George Harms Constr. Co.*, | 6 | | 255 N.J. 380 (2023) | | | *Nolan v. Lee Ho*, | 23 | | 120 N.J. 465 (1990) | | | *Savage v. Twp. of Neptune*, | 21 | | 472 N.J. Super. 291 (App. Div. 2022), *rev’d on other grounds*, | | | 2024 WL 2002418 (N.J. May 7, 2024) | | | *Swisscraft Novelty Co., Inc. v. Alad Realty Corp.*, | 23 | | 113 N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 1971) | | Zuccarelli v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 326 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 1999)
[brief] Thus, the officer verbally made [...] aware of her ability to refuse, in addition to the written form.  Further, while defendant contends that, contrary to the PCR court’s finding, the body-camera of the incident reveals that [...] was Mirandized\(^5\) and handcuffed prior to her consenting to search the car, (Db24 (citing Da132, 20:16-01 to 20:24-40)), the PCR court acknowledged [...] was still in handcuffs at the point when an officer took \(^5\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). an identification card for a woman in the Impala and asked if it belonged to [...].  (Da88-89, 89 n.3).
[brief] “I’ll put all the docs together as soon as possible. ”  (Pa156)  Board counsel sent a follow-up reminder on July 8, 2022 (Pa157), and was advised that [...] counsel was instead “taking a stab at drafting [the] resolution” (Pa161).  Board counsel responded saying “I always appreciate the help but in the meantime if you could send me that list of exhibits so I could cross check against what I already have, that would be helpful as well.  (Pa166)  Board counsel again sent a reminder email on August 4, 2022, following up on a phone call reminder.  (Pa167)  By August 7, 2022, and as shown in Board counsel’s email to [...]’s attorney, the combination of the Township’s and Board’s planners and attorneys had drafted a revised rezoning ordinance (Pa182), drafted an amendment to the Settlement Agreement (Pa173), had discussed and received the endorsement of the Court’s Mt. Laurel Special Master and had also obtained approval from intervenor, [...] (“[...]”).
[directive] A group of officers who are specially selected, trained, and equipped to handle high- risk incidents, including, but not limited to, those involving snipers, barricaded persons, warrant services, apprehensions, act of terrorism, and other situations or activities as deemed necessary by command leadership.  Commonly used names for tactical teams include Special Weapons and Tactics (S.W.A.T.), Special Response Team (S.R.T.), Technical Emergency and Mission Specialists (T.E.A.M.S.), Entry Teams, Rapid Deployment Teams, and Fugitive Teams.