ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In footnote 9 of its brief, the Board argues that the highest density permitted anywhere in [...] is 14 units per acre, which is far less than the 20.1 units per acre that [...] proposed.  The Board misrepresents the LUDO’s provisions to this Court.  [...]’s AHR-2 Zone permits 22 units per acre and the Route 202 Overlay allows 15.7 units per acre.  [Pa333, 342].  Second, the type of housing that [...] seeks to provide is qualitatively different than apartment-style housing permitted in those zones.  Assisted living, memory care and congregate care units are significantly smaller than the multifamily developments used for comparison by the Board.  Nearly all of the residents will not drive, so the traffic generated by the Property will be substantially less than apartments available.  The development will not impact municipal services to nearly the same degree, particularly because (i) the project will not generate school children; (ii) the full-time staffing for the community will diminish the need for the services that the Township’s Police Department provide; (iii) [...] offered to utilize a private ambulance service; and (iv) [...] will provide private pickup for waste and recycling.
[brief] Despite having the ability to either pay in full or bond the judgment pending their merits appeal, in cash, Defendants instead misrepresented their finances to the trial court and secreted all their liquid assets overseas to avoid paying the judgment.  After the transfers were discovered and the excuse of an antecedent debt proven false at a plenary hearing, Defendants doubled down.  [...] fled the country and [...] remained in the United States while [...] funded his lawyers to file unending applications with the courts.
[brief] [...] is an accountant, so his fees are covered by the plain definition of “Losses” in Section 6.2 of the SPA.  “Costs of investigation and defense” from Section 6.2 of the MIPA, and “investigations” and “expenses” from Section 6.2 of the SPAs encompass the expert investigation necessary to respond to the counterclaims and third-party claims that the trial court \(^{27}\) Appellants complains that [...] was ordered to pay fees for contracts that the trial court did not find she breached.  (Db79-81).  Not so.  [...] executed the 2017 SPA and acquired [...]’s interest in [...].  (Da931).  The trial court found the 2017 SPA breached because the buyer’s representations were “materially inaccurate” under Section 6.3, and [...] breached the [...] Stockholders Agreement which she represented he had not done under Sections 3.2 and 4.2. ultimately dismissed.
[brief] *Schwartz v. Jordan and Public Service Electric & Gas*, 337 N.J.Super. 550,555,767 A.2d 1008 (App.Div. 2001).  The inquiry is whether no prudent person could approve of the Governmental entity’s action or inaction.  *Id.*  Since the plaintiff used the roadway with due care in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable, and the dangerous condition proximately caused his injuries, it was palpably unreasonable for the [...] defendant, which had notice of the dangerous condition, not to take any action in accordance with its protocol and allocated funds to correct the dangerous condition.
[brief] Thus, this appeal constitutes a direct action because [...] has expressed that it will have no involvement in the appeal.  (Pa009.)  [...]’s lack of interest in this appeal, and its conduct in settling its claims with [...] and abandoning any claim for coverage, calls for the application of the direct action statute.  Intervenor has not, and cannot, meet the requirements for pursuing a direct action against [...] because Intervenor has not obtained a judgment against [...] that Intervenor is unable to collect upon.  In fact, Intervenor’s claims against [...] are currently stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.  Therefore, Intervenor does not currently have and will not obtain a judgment against [...] at any time before its appeal is decided, a necessary prerequisite to pursuing a direct action against [...].  Intervenor cannot circumvent the requirement that he first obtain a judgment against [...] and assert direct claims against [...] for the first time in the Appellate Division.  Therefore, New Jersey law requires that Intervenor’s attempt to pursue a direct action against [...] through this appeal be rejected.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Plaintiff finds it telling that despite being the party who filed this appeal and shoulders the burden of proof, Defendants never provide a standard of review.  Any serious request for relief, regardless of before which body it is made, must acknowledge the bar over which they attempt to hurdle.  This is especially true when the bar for relief is as high as it is in the present case.  Defendant’s omission is an indictment of the inherent vapidity of their appeal.  The failure to include a standard of review reminds Plaintiff of the faults with Defendant’s earlier attempts at gaining a new trial, which were untimely made, often unsupported by objection, and in defiance of the factual record.  An appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for new trial unless it is clear that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.  R. 2:10-1; Caicedo v. Caicedo, 429 N.J. Super. 615, 627-28 (App. Div. 2016).  Juries are afforded wide latitude in deciding cases, including the amounts they decide to award for pain and suffering; latitude so sweeping that jury verdicts are presumed correct.  Jackowitz v.
[brief] New Jersey law has long recognized the catalyst theory.  In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the term "prevailing party" within the meaning of the federal Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 *U.S.C.A.* § 1988.  *Singer v. State,* 95 N.J. 487, 495, cert. denied, *New Jersey v. Singer,* 469 U.S. 832 (1984).  The Court adopted a two-part test espousing the catalyst theory, consistent with federal law at the time: (1) there must be "a factual causal nexus between plaintiff's litigation and the relief ultimately achieved;" in other words, plaintiff's efforts must be a "necessary and important factor in obtaining the relief," *Id.* at 494-95, (internal quotations and citations omitted); and (2) "it must be shown that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law," *id.* at
[brief] However, in *Hernandez*, considered the *Oswin v. Shaw*, 129 N.J. 290 (1992) verbal threshold issue, and held that the *Oswin* Motion could not be granted because there was not enough information to show that the plaintiff was subject to the verbal threshold.  Obviously, [...]’s reliance on Oswin is misplaced.  That is not the issue in this case.  The Hernandez Court also denied the Motion for Summary Judgment on agency in that automobile accident case.  There, the defendant-owner moved for Summary Judgment.  Hernandez was an automobile case involving when the issue of agency can be removed from the jury if evidence is not contradicted.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  EXHIBITS  Plaintiff [...]’s: Summary Judgment Motion, [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da269 Exhibit “1” Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da279 Exhibit “2”  Certification of Counsel in Support of Verified Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da285 Exhibit “3”  Certification of [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da362 Exhibit “4”
[brief] 1.  [...]' GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SET FORTH A FACTUALLY SUPPORTED, PRIMA FACIE, CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT ON HIS CHARGED-OFF DISCOVER ACCOUNT TO WHICH DEFENDANT RAISED NEITHER A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT NOR CREDIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO DENY THE RELIEF THAT PLAINTIFF SOUGHT ...............................................................
[brief] First, none of the legal citations provided by Plaintiffs indicate that every specific argument must be listed in the Notice of Appeal, or they are waived.  Further, this argument completely misses the point and nuance of Hoboken’s arguments in this regard.  Simply put, there is no document or record that was “made, maintained, or kept on file” by the [...] in response to Plaintiffs’ original OPRA request.  Rather, there is only personal information that was provided directly to a third party in order to sign up for a service.  This information was not “created” or “prepared” on behalf of or for the [...].  This information is personal information that was only “created” by the individual person and is used as a way to sign up to passively receive local governmental alerts.
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[brief] Id. at 237 (emphasis added; citations omitted).  The aforementioned exception rests on two closely related considerations.  First, a reversal for evidentiary insufficiency is considered to be the equivalent of an acquittal.  Secondly, Burks and Greene implement the principle that the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.  Id.  In Burks the Supreme Court specifically distinguished a reversal on account of “evidentiary insufficiency” from a reversal for “trial error”, explaining that:  [R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case.  As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.  Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct.  When this occurs the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished.  437 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
[brief] ............................................  17 - **Angrisani v. Financial Technology Ventures, L.P.**, 402 N.J. Super. 138 (App. Div. 2008) ...................... 24 - **Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc.**, 470 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2022) ......................  23 - **Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.**, 24 Cal. 4th 83, 6 P.3d 669 (2000) ..........................
[brief] 2A:53A-41, commonly referred to as the “same-specialty” requirement:  A court's role in statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent.  Initially, we consider the statute's plain language.  We must begin with the words of the statute and ascribe to them their ordinary meaning, reading disputed language in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.  If the statute is clear on its face, the analysis is complete, and it must be enforced according to its terms.  If, however, a literal interpretation of a provision would lead to an absurd result or would be inconsistent with the statute's overall purpose, that interpretation should be rejected and the spirit of the law should control.  Pfannenstein v. Surrey, 475 N.J. Super. 83, 95 (App. Div. 2023), cert. denied, 254 N.J. 512 (2023) (internal citations omitted).  Providing an overview of the statute’s objective and requirements:
[brief] (Aa55-56).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27F-14(b), the EMP outlines the State’s long-term objectives and strategies on the “production, distribution, consumption and conservation of energy” and interim measures to fulfill these objectives.  The “actions, decisions, determinations and rulings of the State Government” on energy-related matters must comply with the EMP “to the maximum extent practicable and feasible. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15(b).
[directive] August 12, 2019  Page2 of Act  For example, a plaintiff or person protected under that statute2 who has been 1991." of subjected to act domestic violence3 can apply for a temporary restraining order that not only an of authorizes seizure the defendant's firearms but also prohibits the defendant from returning the. of to the scene the domestic violence.  A final domestic violence restraining order provides of of additional types relief, such as exclusive possession the residence or household, or of of prohibiting the defendant from entering the residence, property, school or place employment the victim.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) for the specific reliefs that are available for restraining orders under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.  Therefore, based the circumstances, it may be appropriate for a person seeking an on extreme risk protective order to consider instead applying for a restraining order under the of Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.  The Family Division the Superior Court at any county courthouse can be contacted for information domestic violence restraining orders.
[brief] Because it was the defense contention that [...] was an intruder, who had been previously barred from coming to the property, and who attacked defendant as soon as defendant opened the door, the jury was instructed specifically on so-called “intruder” self-defense as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4c. (154-2 to 158-12)  The judge delivered the model charge, but, unfortunately, a review of that model charge reveals the presence of a critical sentence that is simply wrong, because it completely misstates the “reasonable person” standard that is used in the statute and the case law.  That model charge, used here, tells the jury to view the defendant’s actions through a lens of “reasonableness” that would be employed by “an ordinary reasonable person with a detached point of view,” rather than as reasonableness is normally measured: by a reasonable person in the same situation.  (Da 25; 32T 155-17 to 18)  (emphasis added)  That error was so potentially critical to the jury’s deliberations on the issue of self-defense that its inclusion in this jury instruction constituted plain error, clearly capable of causing an unjust result, and thus, defendant’s convictions for murder and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose should be reversed and those counts remanded for retrial.
[brief] The prosecution ended his summation  You know, during this trial at the outset, defense counsel asked each of you to look at his client and he asked you if you could give him a fair trial.  We all want a fair trial for [...].  He is entitled to a fair trial.  He is entitled to have you consider the evidence in this trial and he has been given a fair trial.  The State has been held to its proofs.  The State has provided its evidence in this case, but you know what, a fair trial doesn’t mean one that the defendant gets what he wants out of a verdict.  Okay?  A fair trial is one where justice is served and the conclusion is the right conclusion.  Now, there is someone else who deserves a fair trial here, ladies and gentlemen and I can’t tell you to look at him and ask if you’ll give him a fair trial because he’s not with us anymore.  [...], [...] was killed that night.  He was killed during this robbery and he deserves a fair trial and his family deserves a fair trial.  (16T 101-5 to 101-24)(emphasis added)  These remarks exceeded the bounds of propriety.
[directive] Restrictions on Using BWCs With Enhanced Audio/Visual Capabilities.  Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Policy, if a department acquires a BWC with enhanced audio/video capabilities that allow it to record an image or conversation that could not be seen or heard by the officer wearing the device (e.g., infrared night vision or thermal imaging, sound amplification that would record conversations occurring at a remote distance), that feature/capability shall not be used without the express approval of the BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  16  County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, in accordance with any applicable legal requirements.  7.7
[brief] Notably, as Higgs acknowledges, it is the State’s burden of proof under subsection (b)(1) to show that the probative value of the remote prior convictions outweighs their prejudicial effect.  Id. at 368.  In that case, most of the remote priors were 24 years old and one was 14 years old.  Id. at 369.  Those remote convictions were for aggravated assault, CDS offenses, and weapons offenses – very similar to the 19-year-old and 18-year-old remote convictions here for conspiracy to commit carjacking, CDS offenses, and weapons offenses.  Id. at 370.  In Higgs, when addressing the seriousness of those priors -- which was the only factor that the judge cited in the instant case to support the admission of defendant’s remote priors (14T 10-6 to 11-24) -- the Supreme Court said clearly that while the remote priors were “all serious crimes,” their probative value for impeachment cannot outweigh “the prejudicial effect of remote convictions that have nothing to do with dishonesty. ”  Id. at 370.  The same is clearly true here, and the error of ruling to admit those convictions was clearly harmful, not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] The trial court agreed:  Her motion to vacate the FJD based on fraud should have been filed at the latest within one year from the date of the final judgment of divorce which was entered on March 18, 2015 as a result of an uncontested hearing held on March 10 [sic], 2015.  [[...]’s] motion seeking said relief should have been filed by March 18, 2016.  Her cross motion requesting the relief based on fraud and filed on October 27, 2017, was beyond the time limits permitted of one year set forth at R.4:50-2 and is denied.
[brief] 25 State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983) .................................................................  20 State v. Willis, 225 N.J. 85 (2016) ..................................................................  8 State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231 (2009) .................................................................  21 United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) ........................................  17 United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009) ........................................... 17 United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) ............................................... 17 United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2013) ............................................ 18 United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) ............................................. 9, 17 United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2009) .................................................. 18 United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................. 17 United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2008) ....................................... 17 United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ............................................ 18 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k) ................................................................................................. 45 N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1) .............................................................................................. 3 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-3(a) ................................................................................................. 3 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6 .......................................................................................................
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[brief] Plaintiff/Respondent subsequently amended the Complaint at various points; two of the amendments are relevant to this appeal.  Plaintiff/Respondent’s Fourth Amended Complaint added [...]  (a radiologist who read a CT scan of [...] on May 17, 2013) as a direct defendant.  (Da75; 7T43:21-25).  Then, on April 13, 2017, the court granted Appellant’s motion for leave to file a Third-Party Complaint against three additional doctors, one of them being [...] (a hospitalist who cared for [...] after his surgery on May 15, 2013) (Da112-13; 8T28:7-11).  Appellant subsequently filed the Third-Party Complaint that same day.  (Da114).  Accordingly, Plaintiff/Respondent sought leave to file an amended complaint asserting direct claims against the three additional doctors pursuant to R. 4:8-1(b), which was granted.
[brief] However, even construing defendant’s argument as an appeal of the order denying judgment of acquittal—which is what his argument appears to be, see (Db18) (citing R. 3:18-2); (Db18) (“the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion for acquittal”)—it fails because ample evidence supported the manslaughter conviction.  Regardless of the timing of such a motion, a motion for a judgment of acquittal will not be granted if, the evidence, viewed in its entirety, be it direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to enable a jury to find that the State’s charge has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.  *[State v. Fuqua*, 234 N.J. 583, 590-91 (2018) (citation omitted). ]  This Court “appl[ies] the same standard . . . to decide if the trial judge should have granted a judgment of acquittal. ”  *State v. Sugar*, 240 N.J. Super. 148, 153 (App. Div. 1990) (citing *State v. Moffa*, 42 N.J. 258, 263 (1964)).  Defendant maintains that the conviction for manslaughter cannot stand because it is inconsistent with the acquittal on the weapons offenses.
[brief] See Marshall, 123 N.J. at 110 (holding that evidence that may have supported defendant’s explanation for stopping at murder location “would not have been wholly exculpatory” because jury would still need to weigh explanation in context of remaining evidence); Gunter, 231 N.J. Super. at 39 (“[T]he loss of the missing 15-photograph array from which a tentative identification was made was neither so material nor so prejudicial to defendant as to warrant dismissal of the indictment. ”).  A defendant’s bald claim that the profile “may have” exculpated him does not establish that it was actually exculpatory.  In Serret, this Court considered whether the State’s destruction of a bottle containing suspected gasoline and a wick placed on a windowsill and allegedly set on fire by the defendant violated his due process rights in an attempted arson case.
[brief] The movant has the burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.  Moore’s Federal Practice, par. 56-15(3), cited in Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 NJ 67, 74 (1954).  The standard in viewing a motion for summary judgment is expressed by the term making a prima facie case or defense and the movant is entitled to judgment if based on the full record, the adverse party, who is entitled to have the facts and inferences viewed most favorably has failed to demonstrate the existence of a dispute which would result in a decision favoring the non-movant.  Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, p. 1485 (2022).