[brief] TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 1:7-4(a) BY ORDERING THE CONFISCATION OF THE PARTIES’ AND THEIR CHILD’S PASSPORTS WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY RATIONAL EXPLANATION, FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION.  (Pa1150)  The January 12, 2024 order, being a final order that is appealable as of right, is subject to R. 1:7-4(a).  Family Part orders that dispose of post-judgment motions without requiring further proceedings or hearings are final orders and therefore appealable as of right.  See Saltzman v. Saltzman, 290 N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div. 1996).  However, the trial court woefully failed to comply with R. 1:7-4(a) by ordering the confiscation of the child’s and the parties’ passports without any fact-finding and conclusions of law.  Rule 1:7-4(a) required that the trial court explain the factual and legal basis for ordering both parties to surrender their passports along with the child’s passport.  Trial court’s rationalization of its draconian decision to impound the child’s and the parties’ passports by a terse explanation  “To address defendant’s concerns” in paragraph 9 of the January 12, 2024 order (Pa1150) manifestly fails to meet the requirements of R. 1:7-4(a).  “These requirements are unambiguous and cannot be carried out by the motion judge by a nebulous allusion to the reasons set forth in defendant[s]' motion papers. ”  Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 302 (App. Div. 2018).  The January 12, 2024 order leaves several questions unanswered.  Did the court find any credible evidence that the plaintiff was about to flee the country?  If so, what was the credible evidence that prompted the trial court to order the impounding of passports?  If not, why did the court order plaintiff to surrender the passport based merely on defendant’s allegation lacking any prima facie evidence?  What compelled the trial court to impulsively order the plaintiff to surrender his passport despite its clear factual finding in its January 3, 2024 order - “Defendant provides no basis for her belief plaintiff is about to flee the country and does not establish a sufficient showing warranting depriving plaintiff of his liberty interest of freedom of travel”? (Pa1148).  All these questions beg an answer.  “Family judges are under a duty to make findings of fact and to state reasons in support of their conclusions. ”  Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 1996).  Surpassing the irrationality and capriciousness of its order to confiscate plaintiff’s passport is the trial court’s sua sponte decision to impound defendant’s and the child’s passport.  In my reply certification (Pa1171), I did not seek any travel restrictions on either the defendant or the child but the trial court inexplicably ordered the confiscation of the defendant’s and the child’s passport.  Apparently, the motion judge believed that inflicting injustice on both parties who were self-represented was a reasonable means of balancing equities in a court of equity.  In a motion for reconsideration (Pa1225, Pa1227) seeking compliance with Rule 1:7-4(a), I sought answers to the foregoing questions.  However, because the judge was not in a position to explain his arbitrary and capricious decision to confiscate the child’s and the parties’ passports, he evaded compliance with Rule 1:7-4(a) by conveniently denying the motion on frivolous and legally baseless grounds of failure to furnish a USPS tracking number of the mail serving the motion on the defendant.  The denial of the reconsideration motion is the subject of Point V.