ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DA70.  At issue in that case was a Jersey City ordinance that allows landlords to apply for a hardship increase “[i]n the event that a landlord cannot meet his or her mortgage payment or operating expenses or does not make a fair return on his or her investment. ”  Bishop Property Mgt. v. [...], 2020 WL 6553789 at *1 (November 9, 2020)  DA70 (emphasis added).  The Jersey City Board Chair gave the landlord two choices: 1) present equity as the basis for a fair return by a suitable index for inflation since the date of purchase” or 2) base the hardship application on the landlord’s inability make operating expenses. ”  Id. at *3.  The Board passed a resolution directing the landlord to resubmit its hardship application in line with this reasoning.  The landlords filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the board’s decision to not use appraised value as a basis for the hardship application.  Id.  The trial court judge dismissed the landlord’s complaint with prejudice.  Id.  The trial court judge found that if the board had deviated from its ordinance to use a value-based equity that that would have been arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at *3.  The landlords appealed to the appellate division.  The appellate division agreed with the trial court.  It stated that the “plain language of the Code is unambiguous” with regard to its definition of equity.  *Id.* at *5*.  The appellate division found that “[n]o provision of the Code states that the fair amount may be based on the appraised value of the property” and that the trial court “judge correctly concluded that the Board adhered to the Code as written” and that the “judge properly noted, if the Board accepted [the landlord’s] method of calculating equity, it would have impermissibly and arbitrarily exceeded the scope of its authority. ”  *Id.* at 5.  The appellate division did not make a finding or reach the issue of whether the rent was confiscatory under the plain language of the ordinance because that issue was not presented to it on the appeal.  The appellate division stated that the path forward for the landlord was to file suit against the [...] for inverse condemnation and to challenge the Code itself if it felt that the ordinance, as written, was confiscatory.  *Id.* at *6*.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] It is irrelevant whether appellant/plaintiff [...] had claims against his insurance carrier, [...].  The appellant/plaintiff [...] claims that “a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Progressive [Southeastern] was justified in denying coverage to Mr. [...] . . .” (Pg.10 - Appellant Brief).  He further claims that “material misrepresentations” must be “knowing and material. ” (Pg.10 - Appellant Brief).  First, it matters not that appellant plaintiff [...] had a dispute with his insurance carrier.  The Appellate Division has already addressed in Bencosme v. Kannankara, supra, that a plaintiff’s allegations against their insurance carrier have no bearing on the analysis under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.
[brief] . . .”  Id. at 470.  Third, the Court observed that the requirement for the subpoena recipient to surrender electronic devices without conducting a privilege review “had the potential to violate privilege or confidentiality attaching to responsive documents, contrary to Rule 4:10-2(a).”  Ibid.  Finally, the Court noted the obvious:  [T]he trial court in this case clearly erred in failing to adequately consider and protect the strong privacy interests associated with the contents of individuals’ personal electronic devices.
[brief] Eligibility for PERS enrollment is governed by N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7(b), which by its very terms requires the existence of an employee-employer relationship:  Any person becoming an employee of the State or other employer after January 2, 1955 . . . and other than those whose appointments are seasonal, becoming an employee of the State or other employer after such date, including a temporary employee with at least one year's continuous service.  The membership of the retirement system shall not include those persons appointed to serve as described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection a. of section 2 of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-2), except a person who was a member of the retirement system prior to the effective date [July 1, 2007] of sections 1 through 19 of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 through C.43:15C-15, C.43:3C-9, C.43:15A-7, C.43:15A-75 and C.43:15A-135) and continuously thereafter; . . . .
[brief] There, the Court held:  [A] determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  The judge’s function is not […] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
[brief] Only after the Plaintiff establishes her malpractice case in the underlying matrimonial case can the Defendants be considered liable for those legal fees because those fees are “merely a portion of the damages” the Plaintiff suffered at the hands of the tortfeasor.  Plaintiff never established that the alleged Defendants’ specific negligence for failure to incorporate terms In Chinese Agreements to English PSA or Defendants’ “many other deviations” from standard practice during representation had caused any actual damages to Plaintiff in the underlying matrimonial action.  These authorities cited in *In re Estate of Lash* are in accord with the principle stated in Restatement, Torts 2d, § 914: (1).
[brief] Plaintiff, a thirty year teacher at the [...], initiated her first lawsuit on June 17, 2016 (“2016 Lawsuit”) against [...] (“[...]”), then Superintendent [...] (“[...]”), and the Principal [...] (“[...]”).  Plaintiff alleged she was being involuntarily transferred from her long time position as a third grade teacher at the [...] location, to another school location to teach fifth grade – a grade she had never taught in over twenty-five years.  Plaintiff alleged that this involuntary transfer (the first of its kind at the school for any teacher), was instituted shortly after Plaintiff was required to participate in an internal discrimination investigation arising out of a discrimination complaint made by another teacher against then Principal Restel.  Plaintiff responded truthfully to questions asked of her during the investigation, which were supportive of the teacher’s allegations of discriminatory treatment.  Following initiation of the involuntary transfer, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause and a Complaint alleging claims for retaliation under the NJLAD, individual liability under the NJLAD, failure to accommodate and engage in the interactive process under the NJLAD, and violation of the New Jersey Conscientious 1  Plaintiff has combined these components of the brief into one section.  Employee Protection Act.  218a, ¶ 46.  On July 29, 2016, the court granted a preliminary injunction (the “Injunction”).  218a, ¶ 45.  The Injunction orders that the Defendants shall maintain the status quo, such that Plaintiff shall continue to teach third grade, in the same location and classroom as in the prior school year, at the [...] within the [...] and Defendants shall not interfere with Plaintiff’s participation in all [...] events.  34a, ¶ 49; 40a, ¶ 94.  The Injunction was in place during the events that occurred following Plaintiff’s initiation of the 2016 Lawsuit, which form the basis of Plaintiff’s 2021 Lawsuit.  The Injunction remains in place to this day (over seven years later).2
[brief] [...] indicated that the Superior Court would address the “constitutional challenges and the potential impact of the MSRA on the [New Jersey Supreme Court decision in] Barila[,]” concerning terminal leave.  Thereafter, on October 25, 2021, [...] entered an order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and reinstating claims by plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], and granting Plaintiffs ninety (90) days for discovery, recognizing the legal nature of the question presented.
[brief] Instead, she refers to other portions of the statute, such as with the Legislature adding “an explicit right to a trial by jury in N.J.S.A. 10:5-13. ” (Pb23.)  But § 10:5-13 provides no prohibition on waiver of jury trials in favor of arbitration, nor could it, as such would be preempted by the FAA, as *Antonucci* held.  This Court explained in *Antonucci*:  “Our Supreme Court has recognized that ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral[,] rather than a judicial, forum. ’ ”  470 N.J. Super. at 566 (quoting *Martindale*, 173 N.J. at 93).  [...]’s arguments that her LAD claims are exempt from arbitration lack any merit, especially in light of the directly on-point holding by this Court in *Antonucci*, which she ignores.  They cannot provide the basis for reversing the trial court’s proper determination that the parties’ Agreement is valid and enforceable.
[brief] Parental involvement is essential at every stage in the social transition process.  As a practical matter, parents must be involved for their children to even see a mental health professional.  ACa40-ACa41 ¶¶ 61–64.  Parental involvement is also critical in “the diagnostic process to [allow the mental health professional to] evaluate how long the [minor] has been experiencing gender incongruence, whether there might be any external cause of those feelings, and a prediction of how likely those feelings are to persist. ”  ACa35 ¶ 66.  And given the “complicated risk-benefit calculus . . . and the limited knowledge about long-term effects and outcomes,” parents “should . . . be involved to make important decisions about next steps. ”  ACa44 ¶ 72.  Moreover, excluding parents from decisions about a social transition “drive[s] a wedge between the parent and child” and “undermines [minors’] main support structure”—their families.  ACa45, ACa46 ¶¶ 77, 80.  Parental involvement is also necessary to obtain informed consent.  Minors generally may not be seen “without informed consent from the parent(s)/legal guardian(s), both as a matter of state laws and as a matter of medical ethics. ”  ACa40 ¶ 61.  And because minors “lack the skills for future thinking, planning, . . . and self-reflection,” parents are “integral to the informed consent process. ”  ACa40 ¶ 62.  IV.
[brief] Id.  [...] said the same.  251 N.J. Super. at 574-76 (where the agreement has an entire agreement integration clause, the written agreement is not to be varied or contradicted by Parol Evidence).  The fraud in the inducement exception to the Parol Evidence Rule was addressed by this Court in [...], supra:  The fraud exception to the Parol Evidence Rule is not without its limits.  There is a distinction between fraud regarding matters expressly addressed in the integrated writing and fraud regarding matters wholly extraneous to the writing.  251 N.J. Super. at 574.  (Emphasis added).  The plaintiff in [...] entered into a written lease for a Lincoln Town Car and at the time of signing, he traded in a 1984 Cadillac for a $6,000 trade-in value.  Id. at 572.  The express terms of the lease provided that the $6,000 trade-in value would be applied to the downpayment.  Id.  Later, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit claiming he was told that the $6,000 trade-in would be paid to him in cash.  Id.  The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint because his claim of fraud was expressly --- 4  Each of the Purchase and Sale Agreements contain an entire agreement clause.
[brief] On August 31, 2020, Appellants filed a Complaint against the [...] and [...], d/b/a [...], in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County.  (Pa35-47)  On October 13, 2020, Respondent [...], d/b/a [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) filed an Answer to this Complaint.  (Pa48-63)  On November 4, 2020, Respondent [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Appellant, in lieu of an Answer, which was withdrawn on April 20, 2021.  On November 6, 2020, [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against [...], in lieu of an Answer, which was denied on December 18, 2020.  On May 10, 2021, [...] filed an Answer to this Complaint.  (Pa278-295)  On September 9, 2022, [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa64-277)  On September 27, 2022, [...] filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  On October 11, 2022, Appellant filed oppositions to the Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa296-320)  On October 17, 2022, [...] filed a reply brief to Appellant’s opposition.  On November 4, 2022, oral argument was heard on [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and [...]’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. \(^1\) (T1)  On November 16, 2022, an Order was entered granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying [...]’s Cross-Motion.  (Pa1-19)  On January 20, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to [...].  On February 7, 2023, [...] filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and opposition to Appellant’s Motion.  (Pa321-419)  On March 13, 2023, Appellant filed a reply brief to [...]’s opposition.  (Pa420-435)  \(^{1}\)  T – Transcript of November 4, 2022 Oral Argument, previously submitted to this Court.  On March 17, 2023, oral argument was heard on Appellant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and [...]’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. \(^2\) (T2)  On March 28, 2023, an Order was entered denying Appellant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa20-34)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] As to the second point, *Mejia* does not provide appellate support for completely abrogating the *Burt* opinion.  Plaintiffs aver that the *Mejia* decision “specifically and pointedly addressed a split that arose in the Appellate Division regarding whether a plaintiff could recover an entire verdict under the JTCL in a situation where the jury allocated between defendants – specifically, when direct defendants and so called “*Burt* defendants [sic]. ”
[brief] [...], Esq. (003571975)  [...], Esq. (017742007)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...] / Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  [...], Esq. (019342012)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...] / Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant  Submitted on: April 25, 2024 # TABLE OF CONTENTS **TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS** .................................................. iii **TABLE OF APPENDIX** .............................................................................................. iv **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES** ....................................................................................... vi **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT** .................................................................................. 1 **PROCEDURAL HISTORY** ......................................................................................... 4 **STATEMENT OF FACTS** ....................................................................................... 5 A. THE PARTIES ........................................................................................................ 6 B. THE DEEDS .......................................................................................................... 7 C. [...]’S TWENTY YEAR’S CONTROL AND MAINTENANCE OF THE PROPERTY ........................................................................................................... 12 D. [...] WU’S DISCOVERY OF THE FRAUD IN 2020 .................................... 15 E. [...] AND HIS FAMILY’S TWENTY YEARS’ OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROPERTY ........................................................................................................... 16 F. CONSPIRACY AND FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY BY [...] TO [...] ........................................................................................................... 20 G. DEFENDANTS’ UNEARTHED AFTER-THE-FACT ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR FRAUDULENT CONDUCT
[brief] Because of the overriding importance of that decision, we direct trial judges to exercise a heightened level of care before imposing multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles.  In all of those cases, consistent with settled law, judges must do an individualized assessment of the juvenile about to be sentenced—with the principles of Graham and Miller in mind.  Judges, of course, are to consider the nature of the offense, the juvenile’s history, and relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This Panel should not permit a solar developer to continue exercising control over land the developer lost when it refused to pay rent on its lease.  [...] ask that this Panel deny this appeal.  Appellants cannot sustain any of their claims where (1) Appellants defaulted under their lease, refused to make payments, and lost land control; (2) the land approvals ran with the land under New Jersey law; and (3) none of the [...]’ alleged conduct occurred during the term of the parties’ non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”).  None of Appellants’ claims against the [...] can proceed.  Appellants remain physically and legally unable to establish proximate cause.
[brief] Because the court had, by then, already issued detailed findings, the panel held “it was unnecessary to find the facts again. ”  Ibid.  In this case, of course, the trial court’s above-referenced ruling on fit-up reimbursement costs did not follow a more exhaustive and detailed finding of facts.  The one-sentence ruling in the November 10, 2021 order, untethered to any Lease terms, was it.  Nor is the other unpublished matrimonial case on which Landlord relies any more helpful to its cause.
[directive] The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog 2C:20-2  Grading of theft as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-2 and the quantity is in excess of one kilogram; (continued) offenses (continued)  (d)  The property stolen is a person’s benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the person’s health care and the amount involved is $75,000.00 or more; or (e)  The property stolen is human remains or any part thereof; except that, if the human remains are stolen by deception or falsification of a document by which a gift of all or part of a human body may be made pursuant to P.L.2008, c.50 (C.26:6-77 et al.), the theft constitutes a crime of the first degree.
[brief] 6T102-4 to 104-17.  At no point during this initial telephone consult was defendant asked to come to the hospital to evaluate decedent that evening.  6T108-21 to 23.  He would have had he been asked.  6T108-24 to 109-1.  Further, defendant was advised that decedent was being treated with a significant amount of fluids and intravenous antibiotics, all of which defendant deemed appropriate for what he felt was a high probability of ischemic colitis.  6T108-7 to 20.  The following morning at approximately 10:30, defendant saw decedent.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED  THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ALL CROSSCLAIMS AGAINST [...].  A.  Appellants’ Factual Allegations in the Underlying Case Implicate the Need for Expert Testimony and thus the Affidavit of Merit Statute Applies.  The Affidavit of Merit Statue requires a plaintiff bringing a professional malpractice case “to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified at an early state of litigation. ”  In re Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997).  In effect, “the affidavit of merit statute serves a gate-keeping function so that only those cases that meet a threshold of merit proceed through the litigation stream. ”  Hubbard v. Reed, 331 N.J. Super. 283, 292 (App. Div. 2000).  If the plaintiff fails to provide an affidavit pursuant to the statute, it shall be deemed a failure to state a cause of action.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29.  The Legislature rationale for the statute was not concerned with a plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegations contained in the complaint, but rather “with whether there is some objective threshold merit to the allegations. ”  *Hubbard v. Reed*, 168 N.J. 387, 394 (quoting *Hubbard v. Reed*, 331 N.J. Super. 283, 292-93, (App. Div. 2000)); *Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys.*, 242 N.J. 1 (N.J. 2020).
[brief] In another LVNV collection case, [...] v. DeAngelo, supra, this Court affirmed the trial court’s granting of a motion to vacate a default judgment pursuant to R. 4:50-1(f).  Analogous to the instant action, DeAngelo involved LVNV’s enforcement of an alleged debt it had no legal right or authority to collect.  The only difference is that the collection lawsuit in DeAngelo was based on a time-barred debt, the collection of which violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. 1692 to - 1692p.  Here, the debt is void due to LVNV’s unlicensed conduct.  But, unlike the defendant in *DeAngelo* who “inexcusably ignored a judgment on that time-barred claim . . . waited eight years and lied about his identity - before seeking relief,” [...] here did not engage in “inexcusable and calculated” neglect.  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109.