ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notwithstanding the fact that any challenge to bifurcation is untimely and inappropriate, [...] provided all of the necessary documentation to obtain subdivision approval, which is the subject of the instant appeal.  [...] mistakenly alleges that the application was “tri-furcated” and, as such, [...] did not include all necessary proofs and submissions for each application.  This statement is not factually correct.  The application submitted by [...] on February 16, 2022, and supplemented numerous times before the Zoning Board hearing, sought subdivision approval and site plan approval and the overall submission contained all of the required reports and materials specified in the MLUL and the [...] Ordinances 142-77 and 142-78.  (Pa254-Pa265; Pa266-Pa269).  To the extent that Appellant is now arguing that [...] requested a further ‘bifurcation’ of the additional approvals required in addition to the Zoning Board’s use variance approvals that assertion simply disregards the nature of the application submitted by [...] on February 16, 2022, and the manner of the Zoning Board’s deliberations.  At the November 1, 2022, hearing, at the request of [...], and as described clearly by the Zoning Board Attorney, consideration of the site plan application and all of the issues related to it were deferred to a later date and the November 1, 2022, hearing was limited to the Zoning Board’s consideration of “drawing of lines” in connection with the Subdivision.  (1T6).  The subdivision approval granted by the Zoning Board was simply one of the additional approvals required to be granted as part of the second “prong” of the bifurcation of the use variance application from those additional approvals pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:P55D-76.b.  Further, the grant of the subdivision then allowed the Zoning Board to consider the site plan application in the context of the new lots on which the proposed buildings will be located, which is also necessary to confirm conformance with such requirements as individual lot coverages and building setback requirements, among others.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm the Department’s decision to issue the CAFRA Permit to Respondent [...].  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondent [...]  By: /s/ [...]  MICHAEL J. GROSS  Dated: August 7, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...] IN THE MATTER OF : CIVIL ACTION CHALLENGE BY : BLACKRIDGE REALTY, : ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL INC. TO CAFRA PERMIT : DECISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ISSUED TO [...] : ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
[brief] I.  The Easement Litigation and First Zoning Board Hearing  On April 1, 2013, Respondent filed an amended verified complaint against Appellant in the Chancery Division under [...] seeking, among other things, a judgment in its favor regarding its easement rights in Lot 5 of Appellant's property (the "Property"), including its parking rights on the Fifth Street and Sixth Street Lots (the “Easement”) (Ra1-Ra42).
[directive] (g) Had a sustained finding that an officer has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial, or insurance matter in their professional or personal life, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (h) Had a sustained finding that an officer intentionally conducted an improper search, seizure or arrest, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (i) Had a sustained finding that an officer intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (j) Had a sustained finding of domestic violence, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (k) Resigned, retired, transferred or separated from the agency, regardless of the reason, while any internal affairs investigation or complaint was pending, and the misconduct ultimately sustained falls within categories (d) through (j) above or would have resulted in an action under categories (a) through (c) had the member not separated from the agency;13 or (l)  Was charged with any indictable crime under New Jersey or an equivalent offense under federal law or the law of another jurisdiction related to the complaint.  “Sustained finding” refers to any finding where a preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law, regulation, directive, guideline policy or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure, rule or training, following the last supervisory review of the incident(s) during the internal affairs process where the deadline for appeal has passed or following a ruling by a hearing officer, arbitrator, Administrative Law Judge, Civil Service Commission, or the Superior Court where the deadline for any subsequent appeal has passed.
[brief] However this case is unique because [...]’s appeal and the Tyler case were practically simultaneous.  The appellate decision in [...]’s case was entered June 8, 2023 within days of *Tyler*.  The appellate division affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to vacate judgment stating that [...] failed to establish entitlement to relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) and not mentioning *Tyler*.  Since the case was decided simultaneously with the decision in *Tyler*, it appears the Court likely reviewed [...]’s appeal before the *Tyler* decision and the Court therefore did not recognize that, after *Tyler*, as a case in the pipeline, vacating judgment was in fact mandated.  Despite not being addressed (which neither the Appellate division nor [...] knew about *Tyler*), [...] was and is entitled to relief based upon the new law which again, provided separate grounds for vacating judgment under R. 4:50-1(f) on its own especially since, at said time, there was not yet a procedure in place for how homeowners in tax foreclosure could protect their surplus equity which was not signed into law until July 10, 2024.  [...] has spent many years renovating and building equity in his home and after suffering through the pandemic and other serious hardships, it would be unconscionable and unlawful to deny [...] the right to save his home when the tax foreclosure judgment in this case is unconstitutional.  The Courts have an obligation to ensure compliance with the *Tyler* decision and protect [...]’s rights.
[brief] \(^3\)  If the Legislature wanted the governing body to have the power to remove a sewerage authority commissioner for personal bad behavior during the term of office, then the Legislature would have written that into the statute.  Prior decisions are clear on what constitutes misconduct in office.  For decades, the New Jersey Supreme Court has “approved the classic definition of “misconduct in office” as ‘corrupt misbehavior by an officer \textit{in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office.  . .}.’  State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35 (1961);” State v. Tirelli, 208 N.J. Super. 628, 636 (App. \(^3\)Statutory language should be given its "ordinary meaning and significance."  Courts may not "rewrite a plainly written statute or . . . presume that the Legislature meant something other than what it conveyed in its clearly expressed language."  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  "If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretive process is over."  Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016).  “A statute should be given its plain meaning if it is “clear and unambiguous on its face and admits only one interpretation.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq. (admitted pro hac vice)  [...], Esq. (036061990)  [...], Esq. (247382017)  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | COMBINED STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | I.  THE NOVEMBER 8, 2023 ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED | | | BECAUSE THE CONCESSION RECOVERY PROVISION IS NOT | | | A LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE NOR A PENALTY | | | (RAISED BELOW – 2T18:22-19:10; 2T20:12-22:27) | 8 | | A.  The Concession Recovery Provision Is Not A Liquidated | 9 | | Damages Clause | | | B.  The Concession Recovery Provision Does Not Constitute A | 15 | | Penalty | | | II.  THE NOVEMBER 8, 2023 ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED | | | BECAUSE APPELLANTS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER | | | THE CFA (RAISED BELOW – 2T24:21-31:1) | 22 | | A.  Appellants Failed To Identify An Unconscionable Commercial | 23 | | Practice In Which [...] Purportedly Engaged | | | B.  Appellants Failed To Demonstrate An Ascertainable Loss | 28 | | III.  THE NOVEMBER 8, 2023 ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED | | | BECAUSE APPELLANTS RATIFIED THE LEASE RIDER AND | | | CONCESSION RECOVERY PROVISION (RAISED BELOW – | | | 2T28:8-12) | 32 | | IV.  THE NOVEMBER 8, 2023  ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED | | | BECAUSE APPELLANTS CANNOT SATISFY THE | | | REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 4:32-1 TO PROCEED BY CLASS ACTION | | | (RAISED BELOW – 2T10:25-14:7) | 34 | | CONCLUSION | 39
[brief] General deterrence was not served because, as both the New Jersey Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have held, “the threat of a lengthy jail sentence is less of a deterrent for juveniles than adults” because they are “less likely to take possible punishment into account when making impulsive, ill-considered decisions that stem from immaturity. ”  Comer, 249 N.J. at 399 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 571).  Specific deterrence was not served because there was no need to deter [...] now that he was mature and rehabilitated.
[directive] Agencies with an objective and fair internal affairs process will limit their risk of civil liability.  1.0.13  This policy, the procedures set forth in the policy and the legal citations contained in the text are intended for implementation by all State, county and municipal law enforcement agencies.  As made clear in AG Directive 2019-5 (issued concurrently with the publication of this December 2019 version of this policy), all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey are directed to implement and comply with this policy, and to take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with this policy, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.  1.0.14  Law enforcement agencies that fail to comply with the policies and procedures contained within this document may be subject to the same sanctions arising from any other violation of an AG Directive, including supersession of an agency’s law enforcement functions by the Attorney General.
[brief] THE PUBLIC POLICY INTEREST IN FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS IS OUTWEIGHED BY [...]’S VIOLATIONS OF THE NJCFLA  In its Brief, [...] argues:  Defendant argues that the trial judge erroneously held that the NJCFLA does not further an interest of public policy.  That is incorrect.  The trial court did not hold that the policy of the NJCFLA was impacted in the matter at all.  The court had no reason to explore the policy underpinning the NJCFLA, instead finding dispositively that there is no violation of the Act that Defendant could rely upon to void the judgment.  As a result, the court held, the judgment was not void.  The trial court had no reason to discuss the policy behind the NJCFLA, especially in light of the clear language of the Act.  The court would only need to review said policies if it found that the Act had been violated but, instead, the court specifically found that the Act did not void the judgment.
[brief] [13T:42-3 to 13]  [...] then confirmed that he was introducing this hearsay document that was presented nowhere in the trial before for the truth of the matter asserted.  (13T:42-14 to 20).  The defense objected as this was a text message of what [...] allegedly said to his grandfather, that was told to [...], and then subsequently told to [...] via text message.  (13T:46-3 to 46).  However, the court overruled the objection and stated “if he’s relying for it for the truth of the matter asserted … the jury has to decide whether it’s truthful or not. ” (13T:44-12 to 16).  Thus, essentially, the Court ruled that [...] could interject as much hearsay into the case and leave it for the jury to decide whether it’s true or not.  Id.  The court did not differentiate between hearsay statements made during a forensic interview, and multi-layered hearsay statements contained in social worker notes and text messages that were never introduced in the State’s case in chief.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.  In this case, the Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the LRHL with regard to any future amendment.  Section 15 of the Redevelopment Plan, entitled “Procedures for Changing Redevelopment Plan,” provided:  The Redevelopment Plan may be amended from time to time by the [...], provided that, if amended after the disposition of any land in the Redevelopment Area, the modification must be consented to in writing by designated developers.  Any amendments to the Redevelopment Plan shall be reviewed by the [...].  After such review, the Planning Board shall make recommendations to the City Council, which may adopt the changes by ordinance.  Such ordinance shall specify the relationship of the proposed changes or amendments to the City Master Plan and the goals and objectives of the Redevelopment Plan.  [Pa156].
[brief] 43 Statutes, Rules and Regulations, Continued N.J.R.E. 801 .................................................................................................................. 24 N.J.R.E. 802 .................................................................................................................. 24 N.J.R.E. 803 .................................................................................................................. 25-26 N.J.R.E. 807 .................................................................................................................. 25-26 N.J.R.E. 808 .................................................................................................................. 26-27 N.J.S.A. 30:13-1 to -17 ................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 30:13-2 ............................................................................................................. 8 N.J.S.A. 30:13-3 ............................................................................................................. 47 R. 2:10-1 ....................................................................................................................... 16 R. 4:14-9 ....................................................................................................................... 44 R. 4:25-7 ....................................................................................................................... 43 R. 4:25-8 ....................................................................................................................... 43 R. 4:37-2 ....................................................................................................................... 44 R. 4:40-1 ....................................................................................................................... 44 R. 4:40-2 ....................................................................................................................... 44 R. 4:46-1 ................................................................................................................... 43, 44-45 R. 4:49-1
[brief] The Appellant will rely upon the Procedural History provided in the Appellant’s Brief.  The Appellant at the Trial Court filed a Motion to Compel Counsel for the Defendants to schedule the deposition of Plaintiff again for completion which was denied by the Court.  Counsel for the Defendants held an initial deposition that lasted from 10:00 A.M. until 5:45 P.M. and per the communication with Defendants’ Counsel regarding the Plaintiff’s deposition continuing, it was stated by Counsel for the Defendants that she would schedule another day for deposition.  The deposition was not scheduled for continuation of testimony.  As a result, the Plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to answer questions on redirect and complete the record.  The Trial Court was notified that the Plaintiff’s deposition had not been completed and failed to grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Continuation of the Deposition.  The decision to conduct the summary judgment motion with knowledge that the deposition transcript only included questioning from Counsel for the Defendants was inconsistent with the case law on this subject per Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988) which provides that the trial court should not grant a summary judgment motion when discovery has not been completed.  In addition, per Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., in cases where discovery on material issues is not yet complete, the respondent must be given the chance to take discovery before the motion is disposed of.  Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 253-254 (2001).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Comer, 249 N.J. at 370.  Courts must determine if the adult defendant still demonstrates the “hallmark qualities” of youth or whether he has grown out of them over time.  Id. at 370, 381.  Parties may present any “evidence relevant to sentencing,” but two types of evidence are of particular importance.  Id. at 370.  First, “behavior in prison since the time of the offense[.]”  Id. at 403.  Second, evidence from a qualified expert psychological or psychiatric witness.  Id. at 385 (characterizing “expert psychologists” as uniquely qualified to determine maturity).  [...] relied upon both of these categories of evidence: his exemplary prison record, and the expert psychological finding that he had “matured psychologically and intellectually over the past 41 years. ”  (Da50)  The court, however, considered neither.
[brief] As explained above, *Hirth* involved a challenge to both the designation decision and the decision to approve the redevelopment plan, which had been prepared by the planning board.  Appellants did not challenge the 2020 designations here, nor did the Planning Board prepare the Redevelopment Plan.  As such, *Hirth* does not support Appellants as they suggest.  Moreover, Appellants cite to a discussion in *Hirth* in which the court was addressing the standard on a challenge to a blight determination, not a challenge to a redevelopment plan.  (Pb24-25 (citing *Hirth*, 337 N.J. Super. at 162)).
[brief] However, the allegation is belied by the Appellants’ own allegations that they themselves disclosed such information as early as 2015 to the [...] in the context of negotiations for a potential sale between the Appellants and the [...].  In that regard, at paragraphs 53 through 57 of their First Amended Complaint in the Prior Action,\(^{10}\) Appellants alleged as follows:  -  At Paragraph 53, while its “million-dollar purchase-plus-land lease transaction had consummated with [...], and [Appellants] had received the $3 million offer, [Appellants’] principal [...] was approached by defendant [...] for a possible sale of the rights” [Pa69]; - At Paragraphs 54 and 55, on September 28, 2015, Appellants entered into a Non-Disclosure Agreement with [...], which contained non-circumvention provisions, for the purpose of protecting confidential information to be provided by Appellants [Pa69]; and \(^{10}\) These identical allegations were also set forth in the proposed Second Amended Complaint that Appellants unsuccessfully sought leave to file in the Prior Action.  [Pa174].  •  At Paragraph 57, after the Non-Disclosure Agreement was executed, between September 2015 and late 2017, Appellants “disclosed all aspects of its proprietary and confidential information pertaining to [Appellants’] ongoing establishment of a solar farm under the auspices of [...].  [Appellants’] confidential disclosures included plans, applications, contracts, negotiation histories, contact lists, and other proprietary records pertaining to the acquisition of the [...]’ SREC rights and the separate 20-year lease for the land, municipal and state filings and permit applications, and other proprietary materials” (emphasis added).  [Pa70].  By their own admission in the pleadings filed in the Prior Action, Appellants disclosed this very same information to the [...] as early as September 2015.  Thus, even assuming [...] did disclose information regarding the Lease and Solar Rights to the [...] (which it disputes), such disclosure could not have caused any harm given that the [...] were previously supplied with such information by the Appellants themselves.
[brief] [...] (the “Arbitrator”) bifurcated the arbitration into Phase I, dealing with issues of control over the company, and Phase II, dealing with claims against [...] including breach of fiduciary duty, dissociation, and others.  ¹ Transcript are identified as referenced in [...]’s Brief, n.1 ² [...] is referred to by his first name to avoid confusion with his brother, Plaintiff [...].
[brief] On March 15, 2023, [...] filed its complaint in this matter against all defendants.  (C.C.Da.1).  These defendants (as well as all other defendants) filed a Motion to Dismiss In Lieu of Answer on or about April 13, 2023.  (C.C.Da.101-03).  Following a case management conference with the trial judge who was going to be reassigned to another division, these defendants (as well as all other defendants) withdrew their Motions to Dismiss Without Prejudice and refiled on or about August 14, 2023.  (C.C.Da.149).  Oral argument was heard before [...] on or about October 24, 2023.  Thereafter, [...] issued his written decision and Order on October 27, 2023.  (C.C.Da.150-57).  [...] filed the present appeal of this decision on October 27, 2023.  (Pa.0353).  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] As the trial court aptly noted, even if Appellant contended that his decision to notify the Company of its alleged marketing actions in 2018 constituted whistleblowing activity, it is undisputed that the decision to terminate Appellant was made in November 2020 approximately, two years after Appellant allegedly notified the Company of the marketing issues.  To the extent Appellant attempts to argue that his whistleblowing activity occurred during the July 16, 2020 investigatory conversation with Respondent, the decision to terminate Appellant was made a full four months after Appellant would have purportedly reported the marketing issues.  As is made clear in Young, four months, let alone two years, severs any temporal connection between the alleged complaint and termination where the employee does not introduce additional evidence of causation.  Here, Appellant has not introduced any evidence that could support a causal link.  Further, the circumstances leading up to Appellant’s separation directly refute any allegation that Appellant’s termination was retaliatory in any way.
[brief] Pa155.  So how could it have “added potential beneficiaries to the mix,” RB17, if the number of takers under that Will was actually reduced from the number of beneficiaries included in the Will executed on August 8, 2018.  Pa43.  Further, the October 2022 Will only increased Respondents’ share in Decedent’s Estate.  Pa66.  In any event, [...] knew Petitioners’ settlement position regarding a Will that gave Respondents $100,000 more than the January 2022 Will (unknown to all parties at the time).  In an Estate anticipated to be worth over $4,000,000, a $100,000 bequest might only cause a de minimus change, if any at all, to Petitioners’ settlement position.  Finally, an evidentiary hearing only would provide no more than what is contained in [...]’s Certification.  And such hearing would have to be held, in camera, without [...], so as not to disclose the confidential and prejudicial information to him.  Therefore, because there was sufficient information contained in the record to disqualify [...], no evidentiary hearing is necessary and the Trial Court’s ruling disqualifying [...] should stand.