ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191 (2005).  Where the issue of whether the premises owner breached the duty of care is “so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of a party was reasonable,” expert testimony is indispensable to establish that a breach of duty occurred.  In such cases, the “jury is not competent to supply the standard by which to measure the defendant’s conduct,” Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 134-35, and the plaintiff must instead “establish the requisite standard of care and [the defendant’s] deviation from that standard” by “present[ing] reliable expert testimony on the subject. ”  Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N. J. Super. 31, 42 (App. Div. 1996); Mullarney v. Bd. Of Review, 343 N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2001).  In Turkowski v. [...], A-2907-12T2 (App. Div. March 31, 2014)², the plaintiff tripped on or near a metal cleanout cover in the floor of a shoe store and fell, sustaining personal injury.
[directive] As the chief law enforcement officer of the State, the Attorney General is duty bound to ensure that the citizens of New Jersey receive police services from law enforcement officers whose competency and integrity are beyond question.  The Attorney General is responsible for ensuring that the illegal use of drugs by individual law enforcement officers does not undermine the integrity of law enforcement agencies or threaten the safety and morale of other law enforcement officers.  This policy supersedes the New Jersey Law Enforcement Drug Testing Manual (7/15/01) as well as prior versions of the Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy (rev. April 2018 and Dec. 2020).
[brief] Obviously, the definition of merchandise under the Consumer Fraud Act (N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et. seq.) includes a player’s entry into a tournament (particularly when there are prizes involved).  So that was the trial court’s first error, in deeming the CFA to be inapplicable.  Secondly, the undisclosed clause, which was impossible for a player to see, was clearly unenforceable – this Court has held even in cases where it was possible to see a given clause, but if it was either “submerged” or required the customer to navigate elsewhere to see it (i.e. a “submerged clause” or a “browse wrap” clause), those clauses were not enforceable.  Obviously, the invisible and undisclosed limitation of “one prize per person” is far worse.  So that was the trial court’s second error, in deeming that clause to be enforceable.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED [...] ITS FEES AND COSTS (Pa5)  The Purchase Order provides:  “A party’s failure to comply with this Section shall entitle the other Party to recover its costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in any judicial proceedings that circumvent this dispute resolution provisions [sic]. ” (Pa46.)  Upon finding that [...] failed to mediate the dispute before initiating litigation, the trial court properly awarded Ameresco its “fees and costs incurred” due to [...]’s violation of the dispute resolution provision.  (Pa5.)  On appeal, [...] contests the trial court’s award of fees and costs on the basis that the Motion was incorrectly decided.  (Pb12.)  For all the reasons set forth above, the Motion was properly granted and [...]’s determination that Ameresco is entitled to fees and costs, therefore, should be affirmed on appeal.  Furthermore, insofar as [...] takes issue with Ameresco’s good faith effort to resolve the fee issue informally through correspondence between counsel, Ameresco is prepared to submit a formal application to the trial court for its fees and costs and [...] will have an opportunity to address that application in the court below.  Accordingly, upon affirmance of Ameresco’s motion to dismiss, this Court should also affirm [...]’s award of Ameresco’s fees and costs and remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount of Ameresco’s fees and costs—including those incurred in connection with this appeal.
[brief] The De Novo Standard of Review Fails To Provide a Basis for Reversal of the Chancery Division’s Decision.  The fact that the Appellate Division utilizes a de novo standard of review on Rule 4:40-1 motions for judgment matters little here.  The fact remains that the record provides overwhelming evidence against any contention that the Respondent exercised undue influence upon the Petitioner when making the 2014 Will.  In addition, emphasis is drawn to the twin standards of review applicable to this case, as noted on page 36 above.  First, the Appellate Division may not substitute its own view of the evidence, especially with respect to findings of credibility.  The elephant in the room in the Petitioner’s brief is its failure to acknowledge in any respect the detailed credibility findings made by the Chancery Division in its written decision.  As detailed earlier in this Brief, all five of the Respondent’s witnesses were found to be credible and relevant.  By way of sharp contrast, the Petitioner’s testimony was found to be not credible.  On top of that, the Petitioner’s other three witnesses were either found “credible but not persuasive” or “credible but irrelevant. ”  Such findings -- essentially irreversible on appeal -- run headlong into most if not all of the Petitioner’s arguments.  Second, the Petitioner on appeal faces the burden of showing that the Chancery Division’s findings were “so manifestly unsupported or inconsistent with the competent, reasonably credible evidence. ”  Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, supra., 340 N.J. Super. at 118.  They have made no such showing on this appeal.  B.
[brief] Palermo, 97 N.J. Super. 4 (App. Div. 1967) ........................................................ passim Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).............................................................................33 Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609 (2000)..............................................................................20 Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370 (Law Div. 1987).................................................... 25, 44, 48 Regino v. Staley, No. 23-32, 2023 WL 4464845 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2023) .........................35 Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 2006).....................................................12 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).............................................................................37 Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 3 (2016)...............................................................................4 Sanford v. Stiles, No. 03-5698, 2004 WL 2579738 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2004) .......................33 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000)..................................................................19 United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2001)..........................................................17 United States v. Nutri-cology, 982 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1992).................................................................41 Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981)..............................................................................20 Vesely v. Ill. Sch. Dist. 45, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2023 WL 2988833 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2023)..........36 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)..................................................................................31 Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cnty. Util. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008).................................................... 12, 23, 25, 46 Willey v. Sweetwater Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 23-69, 2023 WL 4297186 (D. Wyo. June 30, 2023).............................27
[brief] (6T 131-5 to 14)  As he was driving, [...] grabbed [...]’s phone and refused to give it back to her.  (6T 131-17 to 22)  In addition, [...] knew that [...] was armed.  She knew he had a knife because he and his friend had used it earlier to break down the cocaine they used, and [...] told [...] that “he had a gun” and that if she “tried to even get out of the car that [she] wasn’t getting out of the car.
[brief] The trial court further reasoned:  The facts of this matter in that the parties continued to travel and live together, in and of itself, does not carry defendant’s burden by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff defrauded her in that they were not divorced and remained married during that period of time.  [Id. at 28].  Next, Defendant falsely claims that “neither spouse took steps to enforce any aspect of the parties divorce until the parties split in August [17], 2017. ”  That ignores her own conduct accepting the terms of the divorce, without limitation:  1.  Defendant’s receipt of the $200,000 equitable distribution payment.  The trial court found:  The court finds that defendant had submitted sworn certifications to the court as part of her prior motions filed in this matter that she had never received the $200,000 which was required to be paid as part of the Final Judgment of Divorce, which ironically she has stated she was not even aware of.
[brief] In Marrero, 148 N.J. at 482-93, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated the scores of cases that have found other-crime evidence admissible as probative of intent and motive.  The Marrero Court quoted Stevens to explain that “in determining the probative worth of other-crime evidence, ‘a court should consider . . . whether its proffered use in the case can adequately be served by other evidence. ’”
[brief] Had the Court believed these pre-October 2004 services been rendered as claimed by [[...]], and appropriate amounts charged to the partnership in this post-October 2004 book reconstruction and true-up exercise, it would have negated Plaintiffs’ predicate acts and demolished their RICO claims during the statute of limitations period.  Therefore, Plaintiffs were forced to develop a factual record regarding the development, construction and management of [...] from inception, to disprove that the alleged services were rendered, and demonstrate whether fees were appropriately charged.  (39062a-64a)  As astutely observed by [...], [...] “made no rebuttal” to this argument, notwithstanding the fact that it had been asserted “in [...]’s moving brief, …, reply brief, …, and at oral argument ([256T]31:9-39:8) ….  At oral argument, [...]’s counsel directly pointed out this silence, … and when given an opportunity to reply, [[...]]’ Counsel declined ([256T][85:10-20 and 256T]91:8-23). ”  (39064a)  The Wilfs’ continued refusal to address or rebut in their Appellant’s Brief, the fundamental necessity for the pre-SOL period investigation and work performed by [...]’s counsel should inform this Court of all it needs to know in affirming [...]’s and [...]’ determination of attorney’s fees.
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 7:13-21.1(e) (“In reviewing an application, the Department shall apply the requirements of this chapter in effect at the time the application is declared complete for review”).  And the Appellant generally supports the [...]’s eventual adoption of the IFPR, on July 17, 2023.  55 N.J.R. 1385(b).  Rather, these statements by the [...] demonstrate that at the time the [...] issued this permit on December 1, 2022, the [...] had already decided that the old data would not sufficiently protect against flooding.  Therefore, it was necessary to employ the new precipitation data in this administrative record and make the requisite factual findings regarding the associated flood elevation predictions so that the [...] could adequately protect against threats from likely flood events.  B.  [...]’s Failure to Make Findings to Support its Instant Permit Decision Based on the Best Available Precipitation Data Violated its Regulations and Duty to Protect the Public (Aa001)
[brief] Additionally, defendants claim that “Neither [...], [...], nor any of the individual defendants are part of the Office of Attorney General that issued the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity.  They are separate entities within the State. ” (Db10).  While this argument is misplaced for the reasons set forth above, it also ignores the fact that **the [...] itself is a defendant in this matter, and [...] and [...] represent the [...].
[brief] ”  The Winship doctrine precludes a conviction where the proofs are insufficient as to an essential element of the offense.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).  When examining the sufficiency of evidence to support a charge, the question is “whether, viewing the State’s evidence in its entirety. . . and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 548-49 (2004); State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967)  [...] was charged with conspiracy to commit murder.
[brief] (T19:8-12).  By way of background, as one of the State’s many agencies, the [...] (“[...]”) follows the guidance from the [...]’s (“[...]”) annual circulars regarding the calculation of overtime for each fiscal year (“circulars”).  (T22:23-23:8).  The parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (“contract”) also contains a provision for calculating overtime and uses an example, included as a parenthetical, to illustrate the calculation.  (Pa27).  Consistent with [...]’s circulars, since 1987, the parties historically interpreted the contractual provision for overtime as “time and a half” the regular rate of pay.  (Pa192).  On August 29, 2019, [...] filed a group grievance on behalf of all [...] Troopers, alleging a violation of the overtime provision of the parties’ contract.  (Pa57).  The grievance alleged a violation of the overtime provision because [...] calculated the annual overtime rate according to the number of working days in each --- 1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are combined for the court’s convenience.
[brief] A valid waiver requires a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision not to exercise the right to remain silent or to an attorney.  *State v. Burris*, 145 N.J. 509, 534 (1996); *State v. Burno-Taylor*, 400 N.J. Super. 581, 588 (App. Div. 2008); *State in the Interest of A.S.*, 203 N.J. 131, 146 (2010).  In determining whether a defendant made a valid waiver and provided a voluntary statement, a “court must look at the totality of the circumstances, including both the characteristics of the defendant and the nature of the interrogation. ”
[brief] In all cases where the genuineness of any signature or writing is in dispute, comparison of the disputed signature or writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by the witnesses; and such writings and the testimony of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the court or jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the signature or writing in dispute; provided nevertheless that where the handwriting of any person is sought to be disproved by comparison with other writings made by him, not admissible in evidence in the cause for any other purpose, such writings before they can be compared with the signature or writing in dispute, must, if sought to be used before the court or jury by the party in whose handwriting they are, be proved to have been written before any dispute arose as to the genuineness of the signature or writing in controversy.  (emphasis added).  Similarly, in *State v. Carroll*, this Court found that “there is ample authority for our holding that the jury may without the assistance of expert testimony compare a disputed signature with handwriting contained in genuine documents in those circumstances where the trial judge in his discretion is satisfied that such a comparison by the jury would have probative value.
[brief] The Appellate Division "will set aside a trial court's findings of fact only when such findings ‘are clearly mistaken. ’”  Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 538 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)).  As stated in Dunbar by the New Jersey Supreme Court:  “We accord no deference, however, to a trial court's interpretation of law, which we review de novo. ”  Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 538.  Here, the facts are not really in dispute and the trial court's incorrect interpretation of the law should be afforded no deference and reviewed de novo in this appeal, with the trial court reversed and the evidence seized ordered to be suppressed.
[brief] [Da412-Da426]  The Court heard additional oral argument on July 19, 2024.  In deciding the motions, the court enlarged its reasoning of its earlier decision to permit plaintiff’s counsel to question defendant [...] regarding his criminal plea allocution.  First, the Court took the position that under State v. Lavrik, that the statements made during the plea allocution were not evidentiary until defendant completed PTI and the charge is dismissed.  [2T15-3 to 2T19-12].  The Court also took also took the position that discovery is liberal under R. 4:10-2 and the standard is one cannot object on admissibility if the inadmissible evidence is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible discovery.  [2T14-6 to 15; 2T24-8 to 12].  The Court then denied the motion for a civil stay.  [2T29-1; Da446-Da447].  The court found the potential loss of insurance coverage would not be considered irreparable harm.  [2T25-4 to 20].  The Court also found that interference with his rehabilitation and therapy was not irreparable harm.  [2T26-11 to 21]  The Court also expressed concerning about shielding such testimony from defendant’s insurance carrier.  [2T25-1 to 2T26-10].  Defendant [...] now seeks interlocutory review of the Court’s decision of May 19, 2024 and further expanded upon on July 19, 2024, that granted plaintiffs’ application because it violates the tenants of State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2022) that is now memorialized in the court’s order of July 19, 2024.
[brief] Table of Contents  Procedural History 1  Statement of Facts  3 Argument  12 Point 1  The Law Division erred in entering judgment for plaintiff on its contractual litigation claim against defendants (A1149)  12 Point 2  The Chancery Court erred in the manner in which it conducted trial of the [...]' quiet title claim, warranting reversal for a new trial on the claim (A1172)  17 Point 3  The Law Division erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and dismissing as a matter of law defendants' claims for fraud, slander of title, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (A1159-1161), and in denying defendants' motion for reconsideration seeking reinstatement of the dismissed claims (A1157)  27  Point 4  The Law Division erred in denying the [...]’ motion to amend their Counterclaim/Third Party Complaint to add [...]  (A1157, A1161)  39  Conclusion
[brief] The case on which Defendant relies, State ex rel. S.G., 175 N.J. 132 (2003), involved a law firm’s simultaneous representation of the defendant and his victim, who later died.  The case is not applicable here, where this defendant makes no claim of simultaneous representation.  Even so, the S.G. Court noted, “[a]n attorney’s responsibility, as attorney of record in a criminal proceeding, terminates upon expiration of the time in which to appeal from the final judgment or order. ”  Thus even if [...] had survived and defense counsel previously represented him and/or his relative, there is no reason to believe that defense counsel bore any obligation to [...] at the time defense counsel represented Defendant four (4) years later.  6.  Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective in Opening
[brief] [...]’s testimony filled in certain gaps regarding whether the meeting between defendant and [...] was planned or not, and that [...] had left a laptop at defendant’s home, forming the basis of their dispute that night.  These add to the general picture of the case and defendant’s possible motive, but are not dispositive of the ultimate issue.  Everything else [...] testified to — that defendant planned to claim self-defense; that defendant had the gun, not [...]; that he shot [...] twice — was independently testified to by multiple other sources, including defendant’s own statements to police, [...], and admissions by his parents.
[brief] See N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(ii).  Nor does the remoteness or the seriousness of [...]’s prior convictions weigh in favor of their admission.  See N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(iii), (iv).  In determining the admissibility of a prior conviction, the remoteness and seriousness of the conviction must be considered together.  “Serious crimes, including those involving lack of veracity, dishonesty or fraud” weigh more heavily in favor of admissibility.  See Sands, 76 N.J. at 144 (citing N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(iii), (iv)); see also Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 1 on N.J.R.E. 609 (2024) (noting that Rule 609(b)(2), adopted in 2014, directly incorporates the analysis set forth in Sands into the Rule.)
[brief] *Id.*  The OSC report suggests that [...] took what he had learned at the Street Cop Conference and stopped, continued to detain, and pressured [...] to ---  *16*  For instance, one instructor said, “he felt ‘victorious’ about having killed people in the line of duty and described his involvement in 13 incidents of deadly force, when he shot eight people, killing four, as ‘batting .500. ’”  New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, *The High Price of Unregulated Police Training to New Jersey*.  Another instructor showed a meme of a monkey in a shirt, with the caption, “simple questions, simple answers,” after describing a stop of a 75 year-old Black man from Trenton.  *Id.*  If the trial court had known that [...] had recently attended a six-day long training where he had been taught to perform his job this way, the trial court might not have found [...] credible.  waive his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights based on a hunch, a disregard for the rights of individuals, and a “ends justify the means” mentality.  Id.  For these reasons, if this Court declines to suppress all the evidence in this case, this Court should remand the matter to reconsider its findings based on the BWC statute and the OSC report.  **CONCLUSION**