ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “It has been often stated that ‘[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. ’”  *The Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves*, 83 N.J. 572, 576 (1980) (quoting *Watson v. Jones*, 20 L. Ed. 666, 676 (1872)).  The Establishment Clause “prohibits states from promoting religion or becoming too entangled in religious affairs, such as by enforcing religious law or resolving religious disputes. ”  *McKelvey v. Pierce*, 173 N.J. 26, 40 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, “[a]s the United States Supreme Court has stated, ‘[t]he free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. ’”  *McKelvey*, 173 N.J. at 39.  “[T]he Establishment Clauses of our Federal and State Constitutions . . . severely circumscribe the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. ”  *Solid Rock Baptist Church v. Carlton*, 347 N.J. Super. 180, 191 (App. Div. 2002).  In *Graves*, which involved a dispute over local church property, our Supreme Court briefly summarized the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision in the *Watson* case:  The Supreme Court held that our basic constitutional requirement of the separation of Church and State prevented courts from using the departure from doctrine approach in the adjudication of church property disputes.  In the absence of specific trust provisions in the deed, will or other instrument by which the property is held, Watson made inquiry as to where the particular church body had placed ultimate authority over the use of church property.  Two broad types of church government were recognized.  In a congregational church, church authority and control over church property rested completely in the local congregation and its elected elders.  In a hierarchical church, however, the local church is an integral and subordinate part of the general church and subject to its authority.  Watson, therefore, held that in a hierarchical situation where there was a property dispute between a subordinate local parish and the general church, civil courts must accept the authoritative ruling of the higher authority within the hierarchy.
[brief] (2T 37-15 to 44-4)  .................................................................................................................................26  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)  PAGE NOS.  A.  The Court Did Not Adequately Explain the Aggravating and Mitigating Factors.  ...........................................26  B.  The Court Failed to Properly Consider [...]’s Mental Health and Trauma in Weighing the Mitigating and Aggravating Factors.  .................................................................27  C.  The Court Erred in Double Counting the Prior Endangering Conviction in Applying the Aggravating Factors and Imposing a Consecutive Sentence.  ........................................32  D.  The Court Failed to Explain the Overall Fairness of the Aggregate Sentence.........................................................34  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................35
[brief] First, the Third Circuit’s Mount Prospect decision mistakenly cited to rules promulgated by the [...] (“[...]”), despite [...] not being the administrator of New Jersey PIP ADR since 2004.  (See Mount Prospect, 98 F.4th at 469).  Relying on these outdated and inapplicable rules, the Third Circuit then incorrectly asserted that a DRP in a New Jersey No-Fault PIP arbitration could award all remedies to an insurer that the IFPA allows.  Ibid.  The Third Circuit’s reliance on [...]’s rules evinces a blatant unfamiliarity with the fundamental statutes, regulations, and rules that govern New Jersey No-Fault PIP dispute resolution and punctuates precisely why this Court should not afford the Mount Prospect decision any weight.  Neither N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 et seq. nor N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 et seq., permit DRPs to award any of the IFPA remedies in PIP dispute resolution proceedings as the Third Circuit erroneously asserted.  Further, the Forthright Rules, established at the direction and approval of [...], are silent in this regard.  Additionally, the Legislature did not give DRPs the power to award treble damages mandated by the IFPA.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a); and Lajara, 222 N.J. at 143.  Moreover, the Appellate Division rejected the idea of insurance carriers being able to obtain attorneys’ fees as a result of being successful in arbitration.  See N.J. Coalition of Health Care Professionals, Inc., et al., v. NJ[...], et al., 323 N.J. Super. 207, 263-264 (App. Div. 1999).  In contrast, an award of attorneys’ fees is mandatory in a successful IFPA suit.  Lajara, 222 N.J. at 145 and N.J.S.A 17:33A-7(a).  By dismissing the Plaintiffs’ Complaint in favor of dispute resolution, the Law Division is forcing the Plaintiffs to assert their IFPA claims in PIP arbitration, where they cannot be awarded compensatory damages, treble damages, or attorneys’ fees.  Thus, the Law Division’s ruling deprives the Plaintiffs of remedies to which they are statutorily entitled under the IFPA by relying on the inapplicable rules of [...].
[directive] AVISO:  Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.
[brief] **N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et. seq.**  ...............................................................................................  1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In May 2020, the [...] ("Committee") accepted the recommendation of the [...] ("Planning Board") that the former site of the [...] (the "Property") qualified as an “area in need of rehabilitation” pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et. seq. (the “Redevelopment Law”).
[brief] The Chancery Court also erred in not properly analyzing the billing rates of counsel.  The Chancery Court’s oral opinion reflects no real analysis of the rates or how they compare to “prevailing market rate in the relevant community. ”  *Rendine* 141 N.J. at 337 (internal quotation/citation omitted).  Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly advised that a “reasonable hourly rate” is one “that would be charged by an adequately experienced attorney possessed of average skill and ordinary competence—not those that would be set by the most successful or highly specialized attorney in the context of private practice.
[brief] When considering the applicability of mitigating factor (1) and (2), a sentencing court must consider the circumstances of the offence itself.  See State v. Molina, 114 N.J. 181, 185 (1989); see also State v. Cullen, 351 N.J. Super. 505, 551 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that because the defendant was in possession of a single baggie containing .33 grams of cocaine, mitigating factors (1) and (2) would apply to his sentence.)  In rejecting the applicability to mitigating factors (1) and (2), the sentencing judge found that:
[brief] ”  State ex rel. M.P., 450 N.J. Super. at 552-53.  Indeed, the “Policy anticipates that its goals may be served by something less drastic than a transfer of venue.  Specifically, [‘]insulating the [court employee] from the matter.[’]”  Id. at 551-52 (quoting Policy #5-15, supra, at 3.).  Here, the transferring court providing no facts supporting the need for transfer.  Further, there was no notice or opportunity to be heard on the transfer issue—including exploring less drastic measures than transfer.
[brief] After a one day bench trial on February 27, 2023, the next day, February 28, 2023 the Trial Court entered a 1 page Order and a 18 page Statement of Reasons rejecting all of plaintiff’s remaining claims in Counts I, II & III and dismissed the entirety of plaintiff’s Complaint (Pa1733-1734).  Of particular significance were the following portions of the Statement of Reasons:  **Elimination of Parking**  A prime area of concern for [...] is the “elimination” – in their view – of a parking lot that can accommodate approximately 300 vehicles.  [...] contends that such will remove and eliminate parking required for beach access.  The Plan expressly states that it endeavors to create “[i]mprovements to parking areas. ”  The Plan also requires ground floor parking to be located below any residential units.  More important, however, is Section 3.3.11 of the Plan which extensively discusses parking.  First, in Sub-Area 1 of the Plan, any redevelopment in that area shall be consistent with the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance.  As to Sub Area 2, the redeveloper, as noted above, shall construct ground-floor parking.  Such will provide for 204 parking spaces, during Phase 1.  During Phase 2, however, an additional 60 spaces will be provided.  The re-developer will also provide a paved parking lot in the “go-kart” portion of the Plan.  Same “shall be allocated to public parking and will serve the adjacent recreation and public beach access” and will total 150 parking spaces.  Thus, although [...] may be correct that the overall amount of parking spaces available to the public may be decreased by a future, approved development, [...] points to no evidence indicating that the existing 300-space parking lot is ever maximized, nor does [...] address temporal concerns – that is, what is the current parking lot’s use during offseason winter months.
[brief] **POINT I**  **THERE IS SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE LAW DIVISION’S FINDINGS THAT KODA IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE**  Defendant contends that the Law Division erred in finding [...] potentially dangerous.  Defendant argues that the court should have disregarded four separate unprovoked attacks - one which killed the neighbor’s dog and left it spitting up blood, and one which left a man with a permanent leg injury.  Instead, defendant contends that the court should have placed greater weight on the fact that [...] understands hand signals, voice commands (in two languages), and gets along with her elderly mother.  Defendant even argues that [...]’s attacks were provoked.  Defendant attempts to paint a fanciful picture wherein [...] was the superhero K9 defending his home from an evil delivery man, while his “nemesis” [...] was across the street inciting the entire incident by barking.  More ridiculous is the argument that [...] had been provoking the attack for years by pooping and peeing on [...]’s yard.  All of defendant’s arguments are without merit and fail to show “a very obvious and exceptional showing of error” which would support setting aside concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations of the Law Division and the Municipal Court.
[brief] In *Marmo*, the --- \(^7\) The facts here are analogous to *Century Indem. Co. v. Viacom Int’l, Inc.*, No. 02 CIV. 2779(DC), 2003 WL 402792, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003), where the court determined that an insurer in a complex dispute had not waived its right to arbitration despite the amount of discovery its adversary had produced.  \(^8\)  Indeed, after the Law Division lifted the fourth stay, [...] served dozens of subpoenas on third-party vendors as part of discovery on the Indemnity Claim.  plaintiff – who invoked the court’s jurisdiction – was the party who sought arbitration.  Here, [...] is not the plaintiff.  In *Marmo*, the plaintiff obtained discovery from the defendant but refused to provide discovery to the defendant before it moved for arbitration.  Here, both [...] and [...] have provided limited written and document discovery and neither party has been deposed.  In *Marmo*, the case was worth less than $1 million; thus, the applicable AAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rules made it unlikely that there would be significant discovery.  The claims in this case far exceed $1 million; as such, it qualifies as a large complex case where the AAA rules grant the arbitrators “broad arbitrator authority to order and control the exchange of information, including depositions. ”\(^9\) Dra0031-33.  Thus, unlike *Marmo*, there is no basis to conclude that [...] would not have received the same discovery in arbitration that the parties have already provided, as well as additional discovery, as this is a large complex dispute.  **E.
[brief] We hold that R. R. 4:62-2 (now Rule 4:50-1) controls motions to reopen judgments, including one obtained under the In Rem Tax Foreclosure Act, yet in construing what is a “reasonable time” under the rule, judicial deference ought to be paid to the Legislature’s expression of public policy, fixing a three months’ time limitation for making such a motion in a tax foreclosure proceeding.  . . .  While N. J.S.A 54:5-104-67 is “not carefully drawn, we interpret it to means that the three months limitation applies to all grounds other than “lack of jurisdiction or fraud” by construing the word “then” as meaning “thereafter. ”  See also Peluso v. Township of Ocean, 85 N. J. Super 209 (App. Div 1964) which cites with approval New Shrewsbury v. Block 115, Lot 4, supra as to the application of N.J.S A. 54:5-104-67.  In Peluso, supra, at P. 217-219, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court denial of the motion to vacate a final judgment in a tax sale foreclosure finding:  “There is no proof nor even an express allegation by plaintiff in any papers before us, that plaintiff was prepared in 1954 to pay any taxes or to discharge any liens or tax sale certificate . . .  The plaintiff has never paid a dollar of taxes on the lots in question nor ever offered to do so at the time he ordered the tax search certificate or when he learned of the foreclosure.  T
[brief] Attached to a Supplemental Report dated October 25, 2017 authored by Investigator [...], indicating that [...] had provided additional documents showing wire transfers in and out of the [...] account, is plain evidence that [...] paid [...] thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00).  (Sa211).  Any competent investigator would have explored why an entity that the prosecution would claim had no rights with respect to the Hoboken World of Beer project was paying [...] a substantial sum.  However, the State went further than simply not investigating that transaction.  Shockingly, Investigator Scott testified to that exact transaction in a protracted line of questioning attempting to demonstrate that none of the wire transfers into and out of the [...] account were related to the Hoboken World of Beer project:
[brief] ”  Id. at 73.  In other words, the Appellate Division found that seemingly explicit language cannot override the clear voter intent when that intent is reasonably discernible.  Further, the Monroe Court held that disqualification would only be necessary if the ballot contained two different names for the same office.  Absent that, they “decline[d] to dilute the right to vote granted by our State Constitution. ”  Id.  The Court held that “not every improper mark on a ballot renders the vote invalid . . . the purpose of these statutes is to avoid marking or defacing a ballot in a manner which will either destroy the anonymity of the voter or will cause speculation as to the voter’s intent.
[brief] C.  Roofs.  (1)  Flat roofs are prohibited on single-family dwellings, except on lower tier roofs and shall not occupy more than 20% of the dwelling’s total roof coverage (not to be interpreted as total roof area).  (2)  All single-family dwellings shall have a minimum roof pitch of 6/12 for a minimum of 80% of the dwelling’s total roof coverage (not to be interpreted as total roof area) and shall be fully enclosed to the roof peak.  D.
[brief] ”  *Higgins*, 158 N.J. at 418.  CEPA is a civil rights statute and is remedial in nature; therefore, it is “to be construed liberally to achieve its important social goal. ”  *Kolb v. Burns*, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 477 (App. Div. 1999); Fleming, 164 N.J. at 97.  Our Supreme Court stated in *Abbamont* its view of CEPA as follows:
[brief] Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Amend its Complaint (Pa57) to Include a Claim for Breach of Contract Should Have Been Granted.  It is well-settled that “{a} party may amend any pleading as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.  . .and the action has not been placed on the trial calendar, at any time within 90 days after it is served. ”  R.4:9-1.  A motion to amend is “required to be liberally granted and without consideration of the ultimate merits of the amendment. ”  R.4:9-1, cmt. 2.1.  The amendment should particularly be allowed in cases where “the litigation has just commenced and the complaint would otherwise be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. ”  R.4:6-2, cmt. 2.1; Muniz v. United Hsps.Med.Ctr.Pres.Hsp., 153 N.J. Super. 79 (App.Div. 1977).  Even if an objection to the amendment of a complaint is made on grounds of futility for failure to state a cause of action, such objection “should be determined by the same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under R.4:6-2(e)”.  R.4:6-2, cmt. 2, citing Maxim Sewerage v. Monmouth Ridings, 173 N.J. Super 84, 90 (Law Div. 1993).  Without any discussion or citation of authorities, the trial court simply concluded that “the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is futile” and denied Plaintiff’s cross motion to amend.  B.  Plaintiff stated a claim for reinstatement of the 2012 Mortgage.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 LEGAL ARGUMENT 3 POINT I THE TOWNSHIP DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTIES UNDER THE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED  3 POINT II PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ENTITLEMENT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED 13 CONCLUSION 15 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES | Case Name | Citation | Page Numbers | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, | 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | 4, 12 | | Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, | 195 N.J. 575 (2008) | 3, 10 | | Cardinale v. Board of Trustees, | 458 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 2019) | 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14 | | Carr v. Borough of Glen Ridge, | A-1124-20, 2022 WL 38864 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. January 5, 2022) | 12, 13 | | County of Morris v. Fauver, | 153 N.J. 80 (1998) | 10 | | Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 415 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 2010) | 5 | | Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, | 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016) | 3 | | Houseman v. Dare, | 405 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 2009) | 14 | | In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, | 454 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2018) | 11 | | Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, | 128 N.J. 10 (1992) | 10 | | Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., | 236 N.J. 301 (2019) | 8 | | Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Land, | 186 N.J. 163 (2006) | 3 | Marioni v. 94 Broadway, Inc., 374 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 2005)  13, 14 Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees., 77 N.J. 55 (1978)  6  Petersen v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447 (1951)  6  Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 2011)  10  Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34 (2016)  4  Rooth v. Bd. of Trustees, Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 2022)  11  Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 2007)  4  Stiefel v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 242 N.J. Super. 643 (App. Div. 1990)  8  Tomaiuoli v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 75 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 1962)  8  STATE STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 43:7-18.1  12  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 4  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2)  5  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-13(a)(1)  6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The rider reads, in part:  Leasee herein agrees that he shall be responsible to reimburse leasor for the leasee’s proportionate share of the cost of lighting the parking lot, cleaning the parking lot, and all common areas and snow removal for the parking lot and all common areas, including maintenance, repair or replacement of septic system and/or well and garbage removal from the disposal containers.  The leasor hereby estimates that the leasee’s proportionate share shall be in the amount of $600 per month.  As such, lease hereby agrees to pay said amount of $600 per month to leasor, as and for the aforesaid common area charges (CAM charges) on the first day of each and every month, along with the monthly rental payments.  Leasee shall receive a complete accounting of all the CAM charges collected and expended each year by April 30 of the following year.  In the event there is a surplus of fees, same shall be credited towards the following year’s payments.  In the event there is a shortage, leasee shall be responsible to pay same within thirty (30) days of presentation by leasor to leasee.  [Pa976]  The lease further clearly set out landlord’s responsibility over the common areas in the rider to the [...] lease, and which contains the following terms assigning the responsibility for the common areas to [...]:
[directive] Aggravated Assault  2nd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible means of conveyance.  Actor attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes significant bodily injury to another, 2C:12-1b(7)  Aggravated Assault or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, 3rd Degree $15,000 to $35,000 10% permissible recklessly causes such injury.  Actor knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 2C:12-1b(9)  Aggravated Assault  3rd Degree $50,000 to $75,000 10% permissible life points or displays a firearm at or in the direction of a police officer.  2C:12-1c(1)(2)(3)  Aggravated Assault  (1)  Actor drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly; fourth degree if serious bodily injury results; 10% permissible 2nd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 by Auto or Vessel disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results.  20  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] *Diaz*, 470 N.J. Super. at 513.  Consequently, the State’s various assertions—including that [...] merely withheld information, did not give [...] any misinformation, and employed no trickery or deception (Pb 17-18)—contradict the record and the court’s findings.  The State further attempted to distinguish *State v. Diaz* by arguing that, at the time of the interrogation, [...] did not have an objectively reasonable belief that [...] was responsible for the robbery.  (Pb 18-19)  But *Diaz* does not hinge on the presence of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion; instead, the *Diaz* Court pointed to the extent of probable cause in that case as an indication that the officers were strategically misleading the defendant to induce his confession. \(^3\)  470 N.J. Super. at 524.  Here, however, [...]’s strategy \(^3\)  The *Diaz* court also likely discussed probable cause in light of the status of *State v. Sims*, 466 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2021).  At the time *Diaz* was published, the Appellate Division had recently held that an interrogatee who is arrested and questioned prior to the filing of formal charges cannot voluntarily waive his rights if he is not informed of the crime for which he was arrested.  *Id.* at 354.  The *Diaz* Court thus addressed the issue of probable cause in response to the State’s argument that the defendant’s waiver was voluntary even under *Sims* because police did not have probable cause to charge him.  470 N.J. Super. at 527.  *Sims*, however, was later overturned, 250 N.J. 189 (2022), and, here, [...] does not rely on its reasoning; [...] argues not that the police withheld information from him, but that they misled him as to the seriousness of the charges he faced.