ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] – essentially abrogating their responsibility to be finder of fact and verify accurate enforcement of its Orders.  That is, not one of the judges attending support issued in this case made an effort to “do the analysis”, and no hearing was held wherein Appellant could rebut and defend against unjustified account record postings.  As ruled in Harrington v. Harrington, the trial Court should have scheduled a hearing sua ponte but failed to do so.  Appellant did not waived his right to defend and rebut against Probation’s erroneous account record and audits.  To the contrary, Appellant has been fighting these errors for 25 years, submitted nearly 100 letters to various agencies of the State, and numerous motions have been filed seeking relief from continued account errors.  The Court has a continuing responsibility to ensure accurate enforcement of its Orders, which has not been met, and Appellant has been denied due process in this manner.
[brief] On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have a limited role to perform.  *Gerba v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System*, 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An administrative agency’s determination is presumptively correct, and on review of the facts, this Court will not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  *Ibid.*; see also *Campbell v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n*, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001); *Atkinson v. Parsekian*, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962).  If the Appellate Division is satisfied after its review that the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head’s decision, then it must affirm even if the court feels that it would have reached a different result.  *Campbell*, 169 N.J. at 587.  Only where an agency’s decision is clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or unsupported by sufficient credible evidence in the record may it be reversed.  *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); *Atkinson*, 37 N.J. at 149.  Moreover, the party challenging the validity of the administrative decision bears the burden of showing that it was “arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. ”  *Boyle v. Riti*, 175 N.J. Super. 158, 166 (App. Div. 1980) (internal citations omitted).  “The precise issue is whether the findings of the agency could have been reached on substantial credible evidence in the record, considering the proofs as a whole.  *Close v. Kordulak Bros.*, 44 N.J. 589 (1965).  Further, although a person eligible for benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of a pension statute, “eligibility [itself] is not to be liberally permitted. ”  *Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits*, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007).  “Our courts have long been cognizant that the pension boards "are fiduciaries and therefore have a duty to protect the [pension] fund[s] and the interests of all beneficiaries thereof[,]” and not just the individual member seeking a retirement allowance. ”  Oliveria v. Board of Trs., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1916 (August 17, 2016) at 5 (Ra1), citing Mount v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 86, 335 A.2d 559 (App. Div. 1975).  As will be further discussed and analyzed, Petitioner was terminated as a result of misconduct directly related to his employment, thereby rendering him ineligible for deferred retirement benefits in accordance with applicable case and statutory authority.
[brief] The Borodinsky court reasoned, “The judge should not refrain from appointing his own expert as well, where the parties' proofs do not provide him with sufficient foundation and guidance. ” .  Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. at 445.  Borodinsky.  See also Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2001).  Even though a trial judge rejects evidence of a party, a trial judge is still required to determine fair value.
[brief] Plaintiff was Not Forced to Litigate with A Third Person to Protect Her Interest and the Legal Fees Incurred Were Not Foreseeable, Because Plaintiff Failed to Prove the Underlying Malpractice Claim Against the Alleged Tortfeasor  In the Decision, the Appellate Division cited \textit{In re Estate of Lash}, 169 N.J. 20, 26 (2001) to support its finding that Defendants in the instant case are liable for Plaintiff’s legal fees incurred to set aside the PSA and to obtain a new judgment of divorce.
[directive] N.J.S.A.  Specifically, Justice.  Criminal or temporarily to intended current or charge electrical an emits which device other or weapon person."  a disable permanently stun any possession in his knowingly has who person any 2C:39-3(h), N.J.S.A. to Pursuant pertinent in provides further 2C:39-3(g)(1)  N.J.S.A. degree. fourth the of crime of guilty a is gun guns) of stun possession knowing prohibiting the (generally h. subsection in "[n]othing that, part subsection of that provisions the from exempted is who officer enforcement law any to apply shall the from exemption an constitute shall policy supplemental
[directive] The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal; (b) an audit of BWCs and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and (d) an analysis of vehicular pursuits to ensure that they are being conducted without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.  15  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  (e) an analysis of all pursuits determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, and the steps taken to address the non-compliance.
[brief] Nor is this matter analogous to the unpublished Appellate Division decision in Gourdine v. [...], A-5248-04T3, 2006 WL 2346278, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2006), wherein low enrollment caused the college to cancel a program entirely based upon “financial conditions in the institution, and the necessity of looking at all programs that were not fiscally viable or pedagogically sound.
[brief] As a result of the degradation of the stair surface, water is trapped in the below surface pocket areas; and when freezing takes place the water expands to ice above the stair tread surface.  (Pa354) (Emphasis added).  [...] also concluded in his report that the ordinary coefficient of friction (COF) for the landing step when wet was .41 or .42, much less than current building standard of .50 prescribed for walking safety.  (Pa350; Pa353).  On that January 5 morning, [...] left his condo to leave for work at 7:30 a.m., and he was wearing light hiking shoes with a rubber sole with treads.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, and as discussed above and previously, [...] seeks approval of a floating solar project and for the issuance of the base level plus the cost-based increased TREC valuation in light of the Board’s arbitrary and capricious refusal.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  GENOVA BURNS, LLC  Attorneys for Appellant [...]  Dated: January 15, 2025  APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL OF THE NEW JERSEY  BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES’ DECISION  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Appellant [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (031431997)  Dated: September 23, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITY ..........................................................................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  3  THE BPU’S DECISION TO DENY THE APPLICATION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................  2  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................................  16  STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................................  21 LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................  23 POINT ONE ..........................................................................................................................  23  The Legislature Failed to Abide by Statutory Requirements when Enacting L. 2021, c. 375 (Pa22; Pa226-267; Pa364-375.)  ...........................................................  23  A.  The Legislature Failed to Submit the Bills to the Mandated Benefits Review Commission as Required By Law.  ..............................................................  24  B.  The Legislature Failed to Submit the Bill For Fiscal Evaluation.  .........................  26  C.  The Legislature Failed to Provide Notice to the Public that It Would Consider A. 6260 or S. 49.  Thus, Violating the Constitution and Statutes Requiring Adequate Notice to the Public.  ...............................................................  27  D.  The Multiple Violations by the Legislature in Enacting the Act of Reproductive Freedom Should Void the Statute.  ....................................................  33 POINT TWO .........................................................................................................................  34  L. 2021, c. 375 Should Be Invalidated Because the Legislature Violated the Constitution.  (Pa22.)  .......................................................................................................  34 POINT THREE .....................................................................................................................  43  This Court Should Remand the Matter to the Law Division if the Statute is Not Declared Void.  (Pa23-25.)  .......................................................................................  43  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................
[brief] ” (27T87:20 to 88:1).  [...] accomplished this by creating what the trial court repeatedly called “webs” and mazes” of accounts to divert funds from the companies to himself, his wife, or entities they controlled.  (27T79:7-12).  He used accounting tricks to conceal his conduct from the Plaintiffs’ view.  (27T89:12-17).  The trial court found that even if all of the aforesaid conduct did not violate the express terms of the subject contracts, it breached the implied covenant of good faith since it had the effect of destroying Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations.  (26T51:19-21).  As the trial court later explained: the counts for which defendants were found liable were all “interrelated, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which I think deals with all of this.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Counsel was able to cross-examine [...] at trial.  See Plaintiff’s Br. at pg. 29.  Plaintiff argues that [...]’s testimony was “not scientific,” without citing to any law to support this claim.  Plaintiff baselessly argues that lay witness opinion testimony should have been admitted to impeach [...]’s credibility and that the Trial Court “foreclosed the introduction of critical evidence. ”  Plaintiff seeks again to introduce subsequent remedial measures - inadmissible evidence of the conduct of mopping the floor and placing a sign where the incident occurred.  Plaintiff has no argument, valid or otherwise, as to why the Trial Court should have admitted this evidence.  Introduction of subsequent remedial measures for the purpose of impeaching credibility is only permissible under a narrow exception – where sworn testimony such as interrogatory answers or deposition testimony is used to impeach a witness who contradicts himself on the stand.  See, eg, Torres v. Sumrein, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3020, *15-16\(^1\) where the Appellate Division held the Trial Court did not misapply its discretion in denying defendants' motion in limine under N.J.R.E. 407, and in allowing plaintiff to present evidence of subsequent remedial measures for the limited purpose of witness impeachment because such impeachment falls within a recognized exception under Rule 407 due to the fact defendants had an obligation to answer form interrogatories honestly and forthrightly.  R. 4:17-4(a); R. 4:17-1.  There, a witness’ certified interrogatory answer — attesting that "no" post-accident repairs were made to the premises — was fair game for plaintiff to impeach, by showing the incredibility of his contention that the subsequent measures had "nothing" to do with safety.  C.  Excluding All Evidence Of Floor Mopping And Hazard Signs Was Proper Pursuant To N.J.R.E. 407  The Court ruled properly in prohibiting Plaintiff to present the jury with testimony regarding the conduct of [...] employee [...]’s --- \(^1\)  A copy of this unpublished decision is annexed hereto. acts of mopping the floor and placing a wet floor sign near the area where Plaintiff alleges to have fell.  Testimony regarding [...]’s conduct is the exact evidence N.J.R.E. 407 seeks to exclude.  Plaintiff argues that evidence that the floor was mopped by [...] and placement of a wet floor sign should have been admissible and the Court committed reversible error by denying this.  On the contrary - [...]’s mopping the floor and placement of the sign was properly excluded from evidence at trial to prevent this evidence from being used to prove culpable conduct or causation.  The subsequent remedial measures here are wholly unrelated to any fact in controversy.  Defendant did not dispute or deny the condition – water on the floor -- as it existed during the time of the alleged accident.  Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden here of showing how the Trial Court’s rulings were improper, let alone how they were manifestly unjust.  For these reasons, Plaintiff’s appeal must be denied.
[brief] REPLYING TO POINT II, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURORS REGARDING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHAT WAS SAID TO DETECTIVE BROWN.  At Pb7 to Pb8, the State asserts that, because it does not believe the implicit hearsay was improperly admitted, the trial judge did not have to instruct the jury regarding same.  When the jurors asked to review [...]'s report and the victim's statement (2T129-3 to 2T129-4), it was clear that they were influenced by [...]'s out-of-court declaration.  Instead of instructing the jurors that the content of whatever [...] may or may not have said was not evidence, the court compounded the problem by telling them to be guided by their recollection of Brown's testimony.  This was plain error and it warrants reversal.
[brief] Even if it was, Appellant has no evidence to support his allegation that he told [...] he was driving to Florida, and not actually in Florida.  Even if Appellant did have this nonexistent evidence, Appellant still admits to violating the Sick Leave Policy because Appellant neither requested nor received written permission to go to Florida.  [3T22:4-15, 3T23:14-19].  Therefore, even if Appellant was telling the truth about his location, he was still violating the Sick Leave Policy.  Appellant was also deceitful about attending Florida House by failing to ever request or receive written permission to attend.  Appellant admits he never requested permission to attend Florida House because he felt entitled to keep it a secret from [...].  [Pa155; 4T190:17 – 4T191:10].
[brief] Whether or not a statute of limitations has expired has no bearing on the trial court’s authority under Rule 4:37-2.  The trial court did not dismiss the Complaint with prejudice based on the expiration of the statute of limitations.  See PA1-2.  Instead, the trial court dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:37-2 due to Appellant’s repeated failure to comply with this Court’s and the trial court’s orders.  *Id.*  R. 4:37-2 plainly does not require that the statute of limitations relating to a claim be expired to warrant dismissal.  *See id.; see also Kohn’s Bakery*, 147 N.J. Super. at 584-585.  Moreover, Appellant attempts to support her argument by referencing the statute of limitations relating to breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and consumer protection statutes (Br., at 10-11), but none of those claims were even pled in the Complaint.  *See PA4-5*.  Notably, the statute of limitations relating to the only claims pled in the Complaint (i.e., for wrongful death and survivorship claims arising out of the death of Appellant’s father) have expired.  *See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2; N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3*.  Accordingly, even if the Court were to consider Appellant’s statute of limitations argument, it is wholly without merit.  Similarly, Appellant’s argument that the trial court did not have the right to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 4:37-2 because this Court’s December 2, 2022 Order did not impose a deadline to hire an attorney and file an amended complaint is wrong.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:16G-4.  Since debt adjustment, when performed by an attorney on behalf of a client, constitutes the practice of law, the Commissioner serves as a gatekeeper to attorneys who seek to perform certain services on behalf of clients that fall within the ambit of “debt adjustment. ”  This dual regulation of the practice of law is nowhere found in the Constitution, and it is not proscribed by the Supreme Court.  Third, the NJDACCA imposes burdensome licensure requirements and licensing fees on attorneys to offer traditional legal services that constitute “debt adjustment” under the statute.  Under Article VI, § 2, ¶ 3 of the New Jersey Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction over the admission to practice law and it is the Supreme Court that fixes licensing and fees for attorneys in the state.  Fourth, the NJDACCA infringes on the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority to discipline attorneys who have engaged in professional misconduct.
[brief] Drb4  Discover Bank v. Shea, 362 N.J. Super. 200 (Law Div. 2001)  Drb14  Docteroff v. Barra Corp., 282 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 1995)  Drb8  Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (N.J. 1961)  Drb11  Dunlap v. Credit Protection Ass’n, L.P., 419 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2005)  Drb7  Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369 (N.J. 2010)  Drb5  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)  Drb13  Grey v. European Health Spas, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 841 (D. Conn. 1977)  Drb15  Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356 (N.J.
[brief] *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. 57 (2014).  The Court focused on the application of aggravating factors one and nine, noting that the lower court had failed to set forth an adequate explanation as to why those factors were applied.  Its supplemental statement of reasons disclosed only that aggravating factor one was given moderate to significant weight, that defendant stabbed the victim several times and continued to beat him well beyond what was necessary for self-defense, and that defendant used excessive force.  The court neither discussed in detail the circumstances of the offense nor identified the facts in the record -- distinct from the facts necessary to prove the elements of aggravated manslaughter -- that supported its finding.  [Id. at 77.]  As with aggravating factor one, the sentencing court's reasons for applying aggravating factor nine are insufficiently explained, and the application of this factor is not supported by competent and credible evidence in the record.  If the court determines when it resentences defendant that aggravating factor nine applies, it should address both general and specific deterrence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).  If it finds both aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight, the sentencing court should explain how it reconciles those two findings.  Finally, the court should explain in greater detail its assessment of the weight assigned to each aggravating and mitigating factor, and its balancing of those statutory factors as they apply to defendant.  [Id. at 80-81.]  What was most telling about the case was not the fact that the Court instructed the lower court to provide a statement of reasons, but rather that the Court declined to hold that certain, seemingly inapposite factors, could not both be found.
[brief] The Regulation Applies To “Cancellation[s]” Not To “Polic[ies].”  [...]’s argument that N.J.A.C. 11:1-20 does not apply “because the CCIP Policies were never cancelled and, instead remained in effect for the Project for all other entities” (Zb36), is meritless.  By its terms, N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(d) applies to “cancellation[s],” not to “policies”: “No cancellation . . . shall be valid. ”  This contrasts with N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(a), which addresses non-renewals: “No policy shall be non-renewed. ”  Where a term is “carefully employed . . . in one place [in a regulation] and excluded [] in another, it should not be implied where excluded.
[brief] (Da 9-10)  [...], [...], and [...] were also charged in various counts of the indictment.  (Da 1-8)  All co-defendants pleaded guilty before [...]’s trial.  (10T 31-6 to 11, 90-2 to 16; 11T 109-21 to 110-18)  On June 3, 2019, after the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied [...]’s motion to dismiss the indictment, (1T 29-6 to 20) [...] unequivocally told the court that he wanted to represent himself.  The court ignored his request and never ruled on the motion.  (1T 33-13 to 34-5)  On August 25 and 31, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., addressed the admissibility of four recorded statements by [...].  (5T; 8T)  [...] ruled that [...]’s statements on a responding officer’s body-  _____________________  2 Da — Defendant’s appendix 1T — June 3, 2019 — Motion 2T — June 26, 2020 — Motion 3T — August 19, 2022 — Conference 4T — August 24, 2022 — Jury Selection 5T — August 25, 2022 — Motion 6T — August 29, 2022 — Jury Selection 7T — August 30, 2022 — Jury Selection 8T — August 31, 2022 — Jury Selection, Motion 9T — September 7, 2022 — Trial 10T — September 8, 2022 — Trial 11T — September 12, 2022 (vol. 1) — Trial 12T — September 12, 2022 (vol. 2) — Trial 13T — September 13, 2022 — Trial 14T — September 14, 2022 — Trial 15T — March 13, 2023 —  Sentence worn camera, in a May 20, 2018 interrogation, and during the booking procedure for his May 22, 2018 arrest were admissible.  (5T 106-23 to 114-18; 8T 64-18 to 79-16, 118-22 to 126-9)  [...] suppressed part of [...]’s May 22 interrogation, ruling that [...] unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, but admitted the statements preceding the invocation.  (5T 56-17 to 63-13)  Trial was held between September 7 and 14, 2022, before [...] and a jury.  At the close of the State’s case, [...] partially granted the defense [...] motion and dismissed the murder and second-degree conspiracy counts.  (13T 49-10 to 60-25)  The jury convicted [...] of the sole remaining count: third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.  (14T 5-6 to 20; Da 11)  On March 13, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to four years in prison.  (15T 16-23 to 36-18; Da 12-14)  A Notice of Appeal was filed on March 30, 2023.  (Da 15-18)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**