ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Americans with Act Disabilities Page 1 of 3  Directive #14-22  Gun Permit Procedures  Page 2 enforcement alone will receive, investigate, and determine all permit to carry applications.  Any applications for a permit to carry a handgun currently pending before the Superior Court as of today are to be decided and, if approved, issued by the court.  The new law allows judges to rely on the prior approval by law enforcement as the basis for approving these pending applications.  L. 2022, c. __.  Judges must strive to act on those pending applications within 60 days and should not exceed that 60-day timeframe without good cause.  Any applications pending with law enforcement are to be decided by the appropriate chief police officer or superintendent.  Effective today, any permit to carry application presented to the court will be returned to the law enforcement entity from which it was received.  The Superior Court will continue to hear appeals from law enforcement denials of applications for firearms purchaser identification cards, permits to purchase a handgun, and permits to carry a handgun.  The new law provides that no formal pleading or filing fee is required for these appeals.  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(d)(f); N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(e); N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 6(l)(5).
[brief] To the contrary, the State presented strong compelling evidence of a dying declaration identifying defendant as the shooter, corroborating testimony from the father of the murder victim, corroborating testimony by an additional witness [...], and the video surveillance corroborating the victim’s father’s accounting of the events immediately following the murder of his son.  (9T:90-106).  Assuming arguendo the trial court should have exercised the confidence statement by [...], there is still no doubt the jury would have reached the same verdict. \(^2\) *Sterling*, 215 N.J. at 102.  --- \(^2\)  The State notes that [...]’s identification itself would need not be excised, just simply [...]’s expression of 100% confidence.  *State v. Anthony*, 237 N.J. 213, 238 (2019) (stating our Supreme Court has not “created bright-line rules that call for the ‘suppression of reliable evidence any time a law-enforcement officer makes a mistake’”); *Henderson*, 208 N.J. at 298 (holding trial courts proper remedy is to use their “discretion to redact parts of identification testimony”).  There can be no reasonable doubt that had the confidence statement had been excluded, the jury would have reached the same conclusion.  **Point II**
[brief] Ms. [...], an employee of [...], testified that [...] conducted his closings peculiarly.  Specifically, she stated that there would never be a settlement agent in his closings and that “in a normal closing, I would be the witness closer. ”  (179a, 79:23–24).  Ms. Miller stated further that at a closing conducted by [...], “he was the only one in there,” “that’s how he ran his closings,” and that he “used our conference room, came in; met with his client behind closed doors.
[brief] Once the PSA was executed, Plaintiff placed $5 Million in an “Earnest Money Deposit” with [...], in anticipation of an October 2021 closing date.  Plaintiff also arranged financing for the purchase price, and paid millions to keep the financing in place, while [...] extended the closing date again-and-again for almost a year.  Throughout this time, Plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to close.  In July 2022, ten months after the originally scheduled closing date, when [...] lied to Plaintiff in stating that it could not close this transaction, Plaintiff sought return of the Deposit, while expressly reserving all rights under the PSA.  [...] could have concluded this transaction with Plaintiff, as it was contractually obligated to do.  Instead, [...] misled and kept Plaintiff in the dark, while [...] quietly raised additional equity and negotiated a reduction of tens of million in the purchase price with the fee owner.  In October 2022, after almost a year of extensions and delays, [...] moved quickly to close this transaction in secret, without Plaintiff’s knowledge or participation, denying Plaintiff the ability to file a *lis pendens* or take other steps to enforce its rights under the PSA.  It is undisputed that the transaction contemplated by the terms of the PSA was never consummated.
[brief] \footnote{Nevertheless, the Board of Elections is not involved in counting machine ballots in a fire district election or certifying their results, so any advice they purportedly gave is immaterial.}  (1T82:14-21).  [...] further testified that she was advised the Board of Elections had a “policy” to not count these types of votes, but the Fire District had no such policy and was not bound to adhere to the Board of Elections’ policies.  (2T99:10-14).  By that time, everyone had left the office, so there was no one left in the office to discuss her conversation with the Board of Elections.  (1T83:8-84:9).  [...] noted the write-ins, placed them on [...]’s chair, and left the office for the day.  (1T84:7-13).  [...] was out of the office the following day, on February 25, 2025.  (Ibid.).  The results of the election were certified on February 26, 2025, and included the five write-in votes.  (1T85:2-5; 1T87:15-20).
[brief] 27  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589 (2018) | 17 | | In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533 (2016) | 17-18| | In re Election Law Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254 (2010) | 17,18| | In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Group, 216 N.J. 370 (2013) | 16,17| | In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) | 16 | | Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995) | 16 | | Melnyk v. Bd. of Educ. of the Delsea Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 241 N.J. 31 (2020) | 17 | | Point Pleasant Borough PBA Local No. 158 v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 412 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div. 2010) | 25 | | Reilly v. AAA Mid Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474 (2008) | 17 | | US Bank, N.A. v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187 (2012) | 17 | | Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, 237 N.J. 465 (2019) | 16 | ## Statutes/Rules | Statute/Rule | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 et seq.
[brief] AICRA arbitrators cannot award damages or attorneys’ fees to insurers under this court’s precedents; Plaintiffs are prohibited from obtaining in arbitration the discovery they need to prove their claims; the arbitration process is designed to handle extraordinarily high volumes of small, straightforward cases; and the arbitration rules would require Plaintiffs to split their fraud claims into more than 120 separate arbitrations.  Finally, it is no answer to say that insurers can raise fraud allegations as a defense to requests for benefits, given the complex nature of many fraudulent schemes, the limited time in which insurers must decide PIP claims, and the risk of inconsistent decisions.  First, AICRA arbitrators cannot grant the remedies that Plaintiffs request on their claims.  Plaintiffs seek compensatory and treble damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and expenses.  See supra at 10-13.  The IFPA, RICO, and common law authorize those remedies.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a)-(b) (compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees and expenses under IFPA); Lajara, 222 N.J. at 144 (equitable remedies under IFPA); N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4 (treble damages, attorneys’ fees, expenses, and equitable remedies under RICO).  As explained, however, this court has held that there is no “award” in a PIP arbitration in which the insurer prevails.  See Coal. I, 323 N.J. Super. at 262.  AICRA arbitrators therefore cannot award any monetary remedies to insurers.  Rather, AICRA makes clear that the remedies are limited to “reimbursement with interest” following “a determination that all or part of a treatment or treatments, diagnostic test or tests or service performed, or durable medical goods provided are medically necessary and appropriate,” N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 5.1(e), and attorneys’ fees to a successful insured or medical provider, N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(e).  This court has held that those remedies are exclusive.  See Endo Surgi Ctr., 391 N.J. Super. at 592-94 (holding that “the procedures and remedies provided by the No-Fault Act for enforcement of an insured’s right to PIP benefits are exclusive,” and “the sole remedy for a wrongful denial of PIP benefits is an award of the interest . . . and attorney’s fees”).  This court has also held that because “a PIP arbitrator lacks the requisite authority to award damages pursuant to the [IFPA], which affords special remedies to insurance companies . . . [IFPA] claims are not ‘disputes’ arising pursuant to Chapter 6A [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 and] . . . can only be heard in the Law Division.
[brief] The trial court must examine the aggravating factors, but the consideration of the mitigating factors remains discretionary.  *State v. Setzer*, 268 N.J. Super. 553, 567-68 (App. Div. 1993); certif. denied 135 N.J. 468 (1993).  If there is a preponderance of aggravating factors, the court may impose sentence up to the maximum degree of the offense.  If there is a preponderance of the mitigating factors, the court may sentence down to the statutory minimum.  *Roth*, 95 N.J. at 359.  The balancing, however, is not simply a quantitative analysis of the number of factors, but, rather, the “proper weight to be given each is a function of its gravity in relation to the severity of the offense. ”  *Id.* at 368.  To provide for adequate review, “the trial court should identify the aggravating and mitigating factors, describe the balance of those factors, and explain how it determined defendant’s sentence. ”  State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 360 (1987).  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 provides an enumerated list of thirteen criteria for withholding or imposing a sentence of imprisonment.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Complaint, dated December 8, 2021 .................................................. Da1 Defendants, [...]’s, [...]’s and [...]’s Answer, dated January 14, 2022 .................................................. Da10 Defendants, [...]’s and [...]’s Answer, dated March 8, 2022 ........................................................................................................ Da23 Substitution of Attorney for Defendants, [...] and [...], dated November 7, 2022 ........................................................................ Da37 Order granting motion to deposit funds, dated May 13, 2022 ................................. Da38
[brief] AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT AGAINST RESPONDENT  [...] (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE AUGUST 26, 2022, TRIAL COURT ORDER)  5  1.  The “Same-Specialty” Requirement  5  2.  [...]’s Implication in the Affidavit of Merit  12  B.  APPELLANT SERVED A COMPLIANT AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT AGAINST RESPONDENT  [...] (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE AUGUST 26, 2022, ORDER)  13  1.  The “Same-Specialty” Requirement  14  2.  [...]’s Implication in the Affidavit of Merit  15  C.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE AUGUST 26, 2022, ORDERS DISMISSING RESPONDENTS
[brief] xi.  Because Of Lack Of Jurisdiction Over The Subject Matter Is Appealed Without Having Been Transferred, The Appellate Court May Decide The Appeal as a Result of the Chancery Division Judge Error and Abuse of Discretion  Plaintiff filed motions following the inappropriate dismissal, however, the Trial Court (Chancery Division) found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motions as a result of the filing of the notice of appeal.  Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt.  Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002)).  The principle is well established that a court cannot hear a case as to which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction even though all parties thereto desire an adjudication on the merits.  State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960); Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass'n of Woodbridge, 13 N.J. 528, 537 (1953); Peterson v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 454 (1951).  Such jurisdiction must be granted to the court by the Constitution or by valid legislation, as it "cannot be vested by agreement of the parties."  Id.  Likewise, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver resulting from a party's failure to interpose a timely objection to the assumption of jurisdiction.  Lay Faculty Ass'n of Regional Secondary Schools of Archdiocese of Newark v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 122 N.J. Super. 260, supplemented 124 N.J. Super. 369 (App.Div. 1973), cert. den. 64 N.J. 153 (1973).  Objection to jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is effective whenever made.  McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174 (1951).  Whether the Division has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE JUDGE CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE WAS PROPER UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION.  The testimony provided during the motion to suppress hearing firmly established officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to approach defendant and that the reasonable suspicion then hardened into probable cause once defendant admitted to possessing cocaine in his car.  The judge correctly found that the facts giving rise to probable cause were spontaneous and unforeseeable.  The officers’ subsequent search of defendant’s vehicle and seizure of evidence was therefore proper under the automobile exception and [...] denial of defendant’s motion to suppress should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] Db38.  But this case does not concern [...]’s workers’ compensation insurance.\textsuperscript{2}  Rather, it concerns the alleged cancellation of [...]’s general liability insurance.  Further, while the CCIP program applies to projects in other states, only [...]’s coverage was cancelled, not the entire CCIP Policy itself.  The CCIP Policy applied to [...] as a single-location New Jersey company doing certain work on a single project, not a multi-state risk.  [...] and [...] also fault Plaintiffs for not citing caselaw applying these rules specifically to CCIP policies.  [...] Db39.  While New Jersey courts have not had the opportunity to rule on this exact set of facts, the issue of whether notice of cancellation of any insurance policy is required by law is hardly novel in New Jersey.
[brief] Adequate assistance of an attorney is measured according to a standard of reasonable competence.  *State v. Fritz*, 105 N.J. 42, 53 (1987).  Trial counsel was reasonably competent and the lack of an identification expert is not inherently ineffective.  Counsel instead attacked the identifications of the defendant by attacking the credibility of the eyewitnesses’ recollections (e.g., 13T 146:14-150:21; 10T 41:23-45:15; 10T 56:2-67:17), by explaining while opening how it is easy to mistake strangers for someone you know (9T 65:12-68:5) and by attempting to prove that the defendant’s whereabouts were elsewhere at the time of the shooting, and cannot be faulted for this reasonable strategic choice.  Pursuant to *Henderson*, the court “can end the hearing at any time… if it finds from the testimony that the defendant’s threshold allegation of suggestiveness is groundless. ”  *Henderson*, at 289.  This is precisely what the trial court did, pointedly noting the groundlessness of Defendant’s claims, which was echoed in this Court’s decision on appeal finding that “contrary to defendant’s argument… the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to terminate the hearing after it heard [the identification-administering detective’s] testimony and viewed the recorded identifications,” finding no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
[brief] In Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corporation, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth the standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e) as follows:  In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e) our inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.  Rieder v. Department of Transp., 221 N.J.Super. 547, 552 (App. Div.1987).  However, a reviewing court "searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary."  DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J.Super. 244, 252 (App.Div.1957).  At this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint.  Somers Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 198 F.Supp.732, 734 D.N.J.1961).  For purposes of analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  *Independent Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local* 680, 23 N.J. 85, 89 (1956).  The examination of a complaint's allegations of fact required by the aforestated principles should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach.  The court in the instant case never reviewed the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint in accordance with the standard set forth in *Printing Mart-Morristown* case.
[brief] Plaintiff testified that in the “second half of 2018,” she told [...] that it was reported to her by others that a teacher, [...] “stated to her class that she was in support of [...] building a wall” (i.e., the [...] Comment).  (Pl. Tr. 238:14-24).  Plaintiff gave [...] a verbal warning and spoke to [...] about it.  (Pl. Tr. 238:14-24; 241:19-22).  That Plaintiff received notice of her non-renewal in May 2019—at least several months after she made [...] aware of the [...] Comment—is not “unusually suggestive” of an improper motive, and there is no evidence to establish a causal link between her termination and her reporting of the [...] Comment.
[brief] As admitted by the Township’s own expert and the Affordable Housing Special Master when before the SHO, providing a traffic signal on Route 33 would require the approval of the NJDOT.  5T201:16-17, 6T335:17-20.  The NJDOT has indicated, contrary to its prior position in 2015-2016, that such approval is unlikely at best, and that acquiring an “official” denial of such a request would require a very long, expensive, multi-stage process, with Plaintiffs then being unable to construct the proposed inclusionary development providing for affordable housing.
[brief] Similarly, [...]’ reliance on *Cole* in support of her argument that [...] had waived its right to arbitrate is equally misplaced. \(^2\)  In *Cole v. Jersey City*, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed a party’s ability to invoke an arbitration clause where that party moved to compel arbitration “twenty-one months after being joined as a defendant to an action and after actively participating in the litigation .  . . .”  215 N.J. 265, 268 (2013).  The analysis entailed, *inter alia*, the evaluation of: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.  (*Id.* at *281-282).  Ultimately, the court in *Cole* held the defendant waived its right to arbitrate because it “engaged in all of the usual litigation procedures for \(^2\)  Even if the trial court compared *Morgan* to this matter, the Order would come out the same.  *Morgan* requested that the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit inquire into whether the defendant “knowingly relinquish[ed] the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right[.]”  Here, [...] neither relinquished the right to arbitrate nor acted inconsistently with that right.  As iterated at-length herein, [...] explicitly sought arbitration within three (3) months of receiving the Amended Complaint. twenty-one months and, only on the eve of trial, invoked its right to arbitrate. ” (Id. at *283).  Here, the defendant’s conduct in Cole differs greatly from that of [...].  In that regard, the Trial Court recognized and accepted that [...] filed its Motion to Dismiss within three months of the Amended Complaint; seventeen (17) months earlier than what was deemed a waiver in Cole.
[brief] Da003; [5T104:8-20].  Next, the City presented its case and again emphasized that the record does not support a finding that the City had notice of the missing sign before the accident.  This is supported by [...]’s testimony, confirming that work orders for sign maintenance are created after the City receives a complaint from a citizen or the police, or if a City employee is in the area and sees an issue with a sign.  [5T110:3-7].  Plaintiff did not provide any record of work orders, complaints, or eyewitness testimony stating that the sign was down between the time the sign was reinstalled in February and the date of the accident.  For that reason, the City renewed its motion for a directed verdict, and for the fourth time, raised the issue of the lack of notice.  [6T78:16-86:4].  Plaintiff’s case relied only on the fact that the sign was down on March 26, 2015 and three work orders indicating previous instances when the sign was knocked down.  Da181; Da225; Da226.  Plaintiff did not provide any evidence showing when the sign was knocked down in the thirty-seven days since it was last reinstalled in February.  Plaintiff provided no evidence as to the length of time the sign was down since it was last reinstalled in February.  Plaintiff offered no testimony that established that the City knew that the sign was down immediately before the accident in question.  Despite this clear lack of sufficient evidence to prove notice, the court again denied the City’s motion for a directed verdict, stating that the court should not act as a “ninth juror.
[brief] 1.  Purpose  This Order (the “eDiscovery Order”) will govern discovery of Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”) and any electronically stored or maintained information in this case as a supplement to the Rules of Court, the Complex Business Litigation Program’s Guidelines, and any other applicable Orders and Rules.  2.  Cooperation  The Parties are aware of the importance the Court places on cooperation and commit to cooperate in good faith throughout the matter consistent with this Court’s Guidelines for the discovery and production of ESI and any electronically stored or maintained documents.  3.  Liaison  The Parties have designated liaisons who are and will be knowledgeable about and responsible for discussing their respective ESI and/or electronic documents (“eDiscovery Liaison”).  Each eDiscovery Liaison will be, or have access to those who are, knowledgeable about the technical aspects of e-discovery, including the location, nature, accessibility, format, collection, search methodologies, and production of ESI and/or electronic documents in this matter.  The Parties will rely on the eDiscovery Liaison, as needed, to confer about ESI and/or electronic documents and to help resolve disputes without court intervention.  The following individuals are the designated as the eDiscovery Liaison for this litigation: Plaintiff(s) [with contact information]:  Defendant(s) [with contact information]: