ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is no dispute about this either.  These are the two components of the judgment entered by the lower court.  [...] knows this very well, and the fact that it paid a couple of unrelated invoices does not change the analysis.  There was no bona fide factual dispute before the lower court, and that court recognized that all [...] has tried to do is to craft any possible argument it can to avoid application of the COVID Statute.  So far as can be discerned, every other public school district in the State recognized the obligation imposed by the Statute and met it.  The only feature unique to the relationship between [...] and [...] among those between school districts and their contracted service providers is that [...] refuses to do so.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Operative Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint Fail to State a Claim Under the NJLAD Because There Is No Indicia of Discrimination.  The NJLAD states, “[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity . . . to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation” without discrimination on the basis of disability.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.  To interpret the NJLAD, New Jersey courts have consistently looked to federal jurisprudence interpreting analogs like 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990), for guidance.  Lasky v. Moorestown Twp., 425 N.J. Super. 530, 538 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Borngesser v. Jersey Shore Med. Ctr., 340 N.J. Super. 369, 380 (App. Div. 2001)); Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super. 186, 210-11 (App. Div. 2003).  To state a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he [is] a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) he was either excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, . . . [defendant]’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by . . . [defendant]; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.
[brief] However, *Saffos* illustrates precisely the sort of aggravating factors that are not present here.  *Saffos* was an age discrimination suit involving a “financially vulnerable” elderly plaintiff.  *Id.* at 267.  There, the court found that the defendant disregarded the mental health of the plaintiff by creating a hostile work environment.  *Id.*  In contrast, there was no financially vulnerable party in this case.  Plaintiffs were wealthy and sophisticated businesspeople.
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[brief] First, cases cannot be decided on hypotheticals, as it is not even possible to “prove” what “would have happened” in what the judge acknowledged was “a hypothetical world where [...] did call for the c-section at 9:48 …. ” [Pa8].  Second, it is no defense that a doctor was allegedly not available.  Patients entrust their care to doctors based on the implicit representation that they are competent, capable, and possess the requisite skill and resources to render medical services in accordance with the standard of care.  See, e.g., Carbone v. Warburton, 22 N.J.Super. 5, 9 (App.Div.1952) (quoted in Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 426 (1953)).  Third, as set forth in Appellant’s merits brief and not convincingly addressed in any opposition, the evidence suggests that a doctor was available to perform the C-section, even in the hypothetical world created below.
[brief] In January of 2023, [...]’s estranged spouse [...] moved out after she obtained a domestic violence restraining order against him, leaving her alone with their three young children.  actual rent with 5% late fee, various other fees and charges, and attorney’s fees and costs.  Da1-4.  In July 2023, Defendants surrendered possession of the apartment, and [...] dismissed the eviction action, while the collection action remained pending.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Attorneys for Appellant  [...] [...]  P: [...]  E: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...], V. [...], [...], [...]; [...]; [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious names) and JANE DOES 1- 10 (fictitious names).  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:4-3.  N.J.S.A 59:4-3 states “A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. ”  While it is true that the mere existence of a dangerous condition does not demonstrate constructive notice of it, there is sufficient evidence demonstrating the length of the time that the condition existed.  In Chatman v. Hall, 128 N.J. 394 (1992), the Court held that “the length of time during which the hole existed as well as its alleged size created a reasonable inference that the defendant employees had either actual or constructive notice of the hole.
[brief] The CI’s vague “tip” about New York, even when coupled with the “quick turnaround,” did not provide detectives with any more than a mere hunch that [...] purchased drugs when he visited the Bronx that day, especially when [...], whose vehicle was registered in New York, ostensibly had a connection to that state.  Indeed, it is clear from their testimony and actions that the detectives aware that the CI’s “tip,” even when coupled with the “quick turnaround,” did not provide them with reasonable suspicion to stop the car.  So they did what they are trained to do when they have a hunch that a motorist is traveling with drugs: they conducted a pretextual traffic stop.  They discreetly “tailed” [...]’ car and when they observed multiple traffic code violations, they effectuated a stop, in the hope that their hunch would evolve into reasonable suspicion or probable cause for drug possession.  [...]’s testimony makes clear that the stop began as a typical traffic stop and became more “investigative” as he probed the “truth” of [...]’ stated reason for visiting New York, in what was clearly an effort to develop reasonable suspicion for a consent search.
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[brief] [...] cited the unreported Appellate Division case of Saltzman vs. West New York, App. Div. A-05782-84T1 (Decided March 30, 1987) (Pa 21) which also required a Board to adjust an owner’s equity for inflation to ensure a “fair return”.  In that case, the ordinance at issue permitted a rent increase if the owner was not earning a “fair return” on its “equity in the real property investment” and “equity” was defined as the “actual purchase price minus any and all existing liens on the property plus any [mortgage payments]. ”  That Court, citing Mayes, held that the Board must adjust for inflation if necessary to enable a “just and reasonable return”:  What is required is that the rent control ordinance be written in such a way that the rent control board is afforded sufficient flexibility so that it may increase the landlord’s original investment base to adjust for inflation if doing so is necessary to assure the landlord a just and reasonable return on the property.  It is clear that the silence of Hoboken’s Ordinance regarding whether an inflationary adjustment to an owner’s equity is permitted does not bar such an adjustment.  Contrariwise, such an adjustment is required as a matter of law if necessary to ensure a “just and reasonable return”.  Indeed, neither Jackson’s ordinance (at issue in Mayes) nor West New York’s ordinance (at issue in Saltzman) expressly permitted inflationary adjustments.  It is fundamental, however, that an inflationary adjustment to an owner’s equity is required to avoid depriving the owner of a “just and reasonable” return on the property.  That is the case here.
[brief] At Florham Park, LLC, 439 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2015) | 13, 23, 26 | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | 7, 13 | | Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., Inc., 442 N.J. Super 559 (App. Div. 2015) | 13 | | Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998) | 20 | | Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) | 20 | | Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | 10 | | Curtis v. Cellco Partnership, 413 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 2010) | 21 | | Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28 (2006) | 15, 19 | | Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div. 2011) | 25 | | Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119 (2020) | 21 | | Ford v. Weisman, 188 N.J.
[brief] M51-52 (emphasis added), and see M10 and M58.  The Trial Court’s pretext for the imposition of the SHO was a press release by Defendant Mayor, expressing his opinion in opposition to the Application; and the resultant impact on the members of the Board.  Yet, the Trial Court ignored clear precedent holding that mayors have a right to publicly oppose development projects, provided such opposition is not done for private gain.  See, Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 282–83 (1965); Paruszewski v. Twp. of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45 (1998); Central 25, LLC v. Zoning Board of Union City, 460 N.J. Super. 446 (App. Div. 2019) certif. denied, 241 N.J. 4 (2020).  To be sure, there has been no assertion, or finding that the Mayor’s press release was made for private gain.  Moreover, the Order violates the protections afforded to the Township under Mt. Laurel IV, and the appointment of the SHO abrogated the Township’s dutiful compliance with the procedures established by the New Jersey Supreme Court, and unjustifiably provided the Respondents rights under the HEFSP (M358-461), and the Settlement Agreement reached between the Township and the [...] in the DJ Action.
[brief] **B.  THE INFORMATION REQUESTED IS NOT A PUBLIC DOCUMENT OR RECORD, BUT PERSONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO A PRIVATE ENTITY (Da099)**  This situation is also distinct from the factual scenario in matters such as *Burnett*, *supra*, where the issue was whether documents or documents created by a third-party on behalf of a governmental agency are subject to OPRA.  In this instance, the request does not seek documents or records, but rather seeks personal information obtained by the private entity when users sign up for its services.  It is important to note the reason why [...]’s terms and conditions state that they do not provide personal information to the municipalities that they contract with.  This provides a layer of protection for the personal information of those signing up, and neutrality for those individuals who are seeking to merely receive governmental alerts without providing their personal information to government officials.  The fact that this personal information would not be shared with the municipal entity was something relied upon and expected by residents when signing up for [...]’s services.  That is why the personal information of individuals signing up for a third-party service should not constitute a public document or record, and is not similar to an agreement prepared on behalf of a governmental entity (as was the situation in Burnett, supra).
[brief] Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa148  Affidavit of [...]..............................................................Pa150  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa152  Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa154  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa156  Affidavit of [...]............................................................Pa158 Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa160 Affidavit of [...]...........................................Pa162 Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa164 Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa166 VOLUME III Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa168 Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa170 Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa172 Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa174 Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa176 Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa178 Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa180 Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa182 Affidavit of [...].............................................................Pa184 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS [...] Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9 [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………Pa24 PROCEDURAL HISTORY On or about March 3, 2023, the Bill Ricci Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”) was signed into law.
[brief] Therefore, “[i]t seems to us inescapable that [...]’s communication to [...] at least ‘concerned,’ was ‘with reference to,’ and bore a ‘relationship [or] association’ to its collection of [...]’s debt [and, therefore,] [...] has alleged a communication ‘in connection with the collection of any debt’ as that phrase is commonly understood. ”  *Id.*  *Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP*, 614 F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2010), reviewed existing precedent which “establish that the absence of a demand for payment is just one of several factors that come into play in the commonsense inquiry of whether a communication from a debt collector is made in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  Other factors are “[t]he nature of the parties’ relationship” as well as “the purpose and context of the communications. ”  *Id.*  In *Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A.*, 732 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2013), an argument was made that a communication was not covered by the FDCPA because it did not include a demand for payment.  “We rejected that argument[...].”  *Simon* at 266.  *Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs.*, 155 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998), held that [...] could be subject to the FDCPA when it marketed a service to debt collectors designed to obtain consumers’ telephone number.
[brief] (A229; A427).  Under the parties’ MSA paragraph 13, [...] was given a Mercedes.  (Ca14).  That Mercedes had been titled exclusively in her name alone upon purchase in June 2010.  (A218).  The trial court erred in finding [...] did not receive the Mercedes:  [T]he court finds no evidence to rebut defendant’s claims that she never received full possession of the 2010 Mercedes as required by the Final Judgment of Divorce and that this automobile was disposed of prior to the date the Final Judgment of Divorce was entered.  Plaintiff has failed to rebut these assertions by defendant.  No sale or other documents concerning the Mercedes automobile were produced by either party as part of the evidence submissions.  The court finds defendant never received the 2010 Mercedes or the cash value of the automobile which the parties agreed was $55K at the time the PSA was executed.  [A229, Op. at 60-61].  The trial court clearly overlooked competent evidence, such as [...]’s own Deposition testimony, in which she acknowledged she received the Mercedes as part of equitable distribution:
[brief] Indeed, on reconsideration the trial court essential described the exercise as a waste of time:  Practically, it feels to me that this is just a delay of the inevitable, barring there being something in the record that would suggest that the County may have some legitimate basis to use its discretion to reject [...]’s bid.  And I don’t know if [the County’s attorney] is even in a position to speak to that and I don’t want to deny his client the potential right to address this, unless [[...]’s counsel] convinces me otherwise.
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 3:22-2(c), a PCR petition is cognizable if based on, in relevant part, the “[i]mposition of [a] sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law if raised together with other grounds cognizable under paragraph (a), (b), or (d) of [the] rule. ”  “Otherwise a claim alleging the imposition of sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law shall be filed pursuant to R. 3:21-10(b)(5). ”  R. 3:22-2(c).  Rule 3:22-5 also provides:
[brief] The parties previously were involved in a protracted and wildly expensive litigation concerning [...]’s Estate.  (See generally Da140a.)  Specifically, [...] commenced litigation in 2012 involving [...]’s Estate in the Superior Court of the State of New Jersey, Bergen County, Chancery Division, that caused the estate to incur over $50 million in legal fees and resulted in a trial spanning eighty-five days in which over fifty witnesses proffered testimony.  (See Da140a; Da096a at Paragraph 24(F.).)  Tellingly, all four (4) of [...]’s baseless causes of action in that matter were dismissed with prejudice following trial.  The Appellate Division subsequently affirmed in a lengthy 2018 opinion.  (See generally Da193a.)  In an effort to avoid a repeat of the acrimony and astronomical expense of the prior litigation concerning [...]’s Estate, the parties—each of whom were represented by competent counsel—spent months negotiating the September 13, 2021 Settlement Agreement.
[brief] “In deciding whether challenged conduct constitutes excessive force, a court must determine the objective ‘reasonableness’ of the challenged conduct, considering ‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. ’”  Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496-97 (3d Cir. 2006); Green v. New Jersey State Police, Civil Action No. 04-0007 (JEI) (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2006).  Excessive force may be shown when the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.  Whitley v. Albers, 475 US 312, 320-21 (1986).
[brief] THE PURPORTED AGENCY OF THE [...]’ MINOR DAUGHTER IS NOT ON APPEAL AND CANNOT BE DECIDED ON THIS MEAGER RECORD  [...] cannot be permitted vault over the unexplored minefield of factual issues presented by its questionable evidence of the clickwrap agreement, the post-transaction presentation, and the likelihood it was executed, if at all, by the [...], by presenting issues this Court has no appellate jurisdiction to hear.  By virtue of its determination the agreement was ambiguous and unenforceable, the trial court did not go any further.  But had it, the trial court would have confronted plaintiffs’ argument that before this issue could ever be adjudicated, discovery was needed.  Plaintiffs take that same position here, and do not consent to resolution of this issue on the meager record or, respectfully, under any exercise of original jurisdiction.
[brief] Therefore, the relevant date for determining whether [...]’s 2011 conviction was remote and presumptively inadmissible under Rule 609(b)(1) was the date of his conviction for the offense.  Because more than ten years had elapsed between the date of [...]’s prior conviction in 2011 and the beginning of the trial in 2023, the 2011 conviction was presumptively inadmissible and the trial court erred in ruling to the contrary.  See Hedgespeth, 464 N.J. Super. at 437.  The trial court also erroneously admitted [...]’s sixteen-year-old 2007 conviction due to its misunderstanding of the dates that Rule 609(b)(1)’s ten-year window applies to.
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(b)(7).  [...]’s regulations then identify what is first in the list of requirements to satisfy due process and fundamental fairness: “Discovery. ”  Ibid.  (emphasis added)  An Arbitration Plan must also account for, at least: Receipt of evidence by the dispute resolution professional; Submission of briefs or memoranda of law and fact; Provision for decisions without testimony on consent of the parties; Notice and place of hearing; Methods to request adjournments; Presentation of testimony and evidence at a hearing; and Supplementation of the record.  [Ibid.]  These provisions set the floor for what must be provided in an Arbitration Plan.  And, taken together, these provisions provide a clear requirement to satisfy due process to prosecute or defend claims but do so efficiently—the precise purpose of the No-Fault Law and, generally, alternate dispute resolution.  See Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 384-85 (2008) (noting general purpose of arbitration is to obtain “final disposition, in a speedy, inexpensive, expeditious and perhaps less formal manner”).
[brief] In count after count, the Commission gives no reasoning or analytical framework for why it is dismissing a count; the Commission merely asserts there is no violation in most cases without further explanation.  In the few cases were a brief explanation is given, it is clearly arbitrary and contradicts past similar Commission decisions.  Further, the Commission makes no references to how Citizens and related decisions regarding expenditures of public money during school referendums may apply to potential ethics violations.  In fact, the Commission tacitly endorses Board members to freely violate Citizen’s at will.  This court has had to reverse the Commission in similar past decisions.
[brief] (Da273).  [...] also argued that [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property passes to her through the Residuary Clause of the Trust Agreement.  (Da277).  The Probate Court received briefs and heard oral argument, but did not order discovery or conduct an evidentiary hearing.  The Probate Court ultimately rendered its decision based on the language of the Settlement Agreement, the Trust and the argument of the parties—not on any extrinsic evidence.  The Probate Court held that [...] released her rights to make a claim to [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property in Paragraph 24(F) of the Settlement Agreement.  (Da281).  The Probate Court held that Paragraph 24(F) is specific and 24(G) is general, therefore 24(F) controls.  (Da274-75).  The Probate Court also found that [...]’s probable intent was to exclude the Palm Beach Property from [...], thereby modifying the Trust to exclude the interest from passing in accordance with the Residuary Clause.  (Da277).  ARGUMENT I.