ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa53.  As per the Trustee’s proposed Distribution Report (Pa71) which was approved by the Bankruptcy Court (Pa75), after the payment of Chapter 7 administrative expenses, there was no money remaining in the estate for unsecured creditors (in fact, even various tax claims held by the States of New Jersey and New York, which were accorded higher payment priority than general unsecured creditors, received nothing).  Pa71-73.  In addition to the aforesaid $60,000 loss, the Bank also incurred counsel fees of $29,584.47 and litigation costs of $9,498.54 to defend the bankruptcy lawsuit.  Pa3.  The disgorgement of $60,000 of previously paid mortgage payments created a deficiency balance in the 2012 Note and default under the previously cancelled 2012 [...] mortgage.
[brief] Plaintiff moved in limine, well before trial, to exclude any testimony regarding the conclusions of an after-the-fact “investigation” by the Department of Health in response to a complaint made against defendant by [...]’s daughter.  The conclusions were contained in an unsigned letter dated August 18, 2016, which referred to an alleged investigation that took place on July 6, 2016, six months after [...]’s death in January 2016.  At trial, the unsigned letter was marked D-5 for identification.  That unsigned and unauthenticated letter pertinently stated that the “surveyor was unable to identify a citable deficient practice related to your concerns based on the State and Federal regulations. ”  Pa70.  The July 6, 2016, investigation referenced in that letter, but not included with that letter, was a multi-page, unnumbered document entitled “Unannounced Visit/Revisit Report. ”  It was referenced as a “Complaint Survey” and the person who signed the form was identified as [...].  Pa74-75.  The surveyor’s notes were not included.  A form letter dated August 4, 2016, was included.
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  A.  The Trial Court Erred In Finding That The Question At Issue On The Insurance Policy Application Was Unambiguous.  (Raised below: Ia012; 1T61, 64; 2T:4-5)  During both the September 23, 2022 and October 22, 2022 hearings on [...]’s motion for summary judgment, [...] focused on Question 4 of the Questionnaire and said he did not believe it was ambiguous.
[brief] "N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5[(a)] advances a policy of cost containment by ensuring that an injured, uninsured driver does not draw on the pool of accident-victim insurance funds to which he did not contribute."  Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 471 (2004).  In finding the statute was constitutional, the Court in Caviglia declined "to second-guess the Legislature's common-sense reasoning that section 4.5[(a)] has the potential to produce greater compliance with compulsory insurance laws and in turn, reduce litigation, and result in savings to insurance carriers and ultimately the consuming public."
[brief] ”  Kosmin, 363 N.J. Super. at 41.  Further, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has emphasized that “the punitive elements of retribution and general deterrence cannot, under the law, be the determinative factors” in discerning an inmate’s parole eligibility.  Trantino IV, 154 N.J. at 43-44.  The Board must grant parole to an inmate where the law dictates, regardless of how incomprehensible it may be to the public to parole an individual who was convicted of two widely publicized homicides.  See Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 196.  With regard to administrative appeals from a panel’s initial parole decision, the Board is required to determine whether the three-member panel sufficiently considered the factors enumerated in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b), which include: the facts and circumstances of the offense; aggravating and mitigating factors concerning the offense; the inmate's mental and emotional health; statements of the inmate reflecting on whether there is a likelihood he will commit another crime; participation in institutional programs; and statements or evidence presented by a prosecutor or other criminal justice agency.
[brief] Abdullah, 184 N.J. at 513-14.  A trial court is expected to give a separate statement of reasons that clearly explains any decision to impose consecutive sentences.  State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436, 442 (2001); State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 422 (2001).  When making its determination, the trial court should consider whether (1) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (2) the crimes involved separate acts of violence; (3) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (4) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; or (5) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous.
[brief] It is elementary that in the area of construction of statutes, particularly those having to do with taxation or exemption therefrom, our sole guidepost is the legislative intent.  We can have no concern, short of constitutional considerations, with the wisdom or policy of a taxing statute.  We agree with the view expressed in the N.J. Power & Light Co. case, supra, that the best approach to the meaning of a tax statute is to give to the words used by the Legislature “their generally accepted meaning, unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated. ”  Id. at 55.  After determining that the statute in question “places utilities in the same position as private owners of interests in land,” he proceeded to consider the question whether easements of the type held by the utilities herein would normally be assessable and taxable to an individual or private corporation, an issue not reached by the majority.
[brief] The Defendants’ Reliance on the Fact That the Landing of the Exterior Stairs was Icy Ignores the Expert Testimony That It Was the Preexisting Deterioration of the Concrete Due to Lack of Maintenance Which Made the Stairs Unreasonably Dangerous Upon a Mere Trace of Freezing Rain.  (Pa1-3, Pa4-7, Pa8-10) | 1 | | II.  The Defendants’ Argument that [...]’s Deposition Testimony is Determinative Invades the Jury’s Role in Weighing [...]’s Credibility in Claiming That the Stairs Became “Sleeker” After the Incorrect Paint Job.  (Pa1-3, Pa4-7, Pa8-10) | 11 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  [...] filed a Verified Complaint in this matter on September 28, 2022.  (Pa1).  On October 21, 2022, Pro Bono attorney and author of the Verified Complaint, [...] submitted a Notice of Appearance of an Addendum to the Verified Complaint.  (Pa16).  Defendants filed an Opposition on December 12, 2022.  (Pa25-54).  On December 15, 2022, [...] submitted two OPRA requests, [...] and [...].  (Pa77).  On December 28, 2022, Plaintiff’s attorney submitted a Response to the Defendant’s Opposition.  (Pa55-138).  On January 5, 2023, a hearing in this matter was heard virtually by Superior Court Judge [...] in under one hour.  That same day, Judge Lougy issued an Order and Decision denying the Order to Show Cause and dismissing the Verified Complaint.  (Pa139-154).  Plaintiff submitted a notice of appeal on February 26, 2023.  (Pa155).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] Requiring Public Disclosure of the Identities of Department’s Officers Who Committed Serious Disciplinary Violations  Since 2000  On June 15, 2020, I issued Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-5, known as the “Major Discipline Directive,” to promote a culture of transparency and accountability in policing.  Today’s Administrative Executive Directive complements that action by ordering additional transparency measures for the agencies that employ law enforcement officers within the Department of Law & Public Safety (the Department).  The Major Discipline Directive amended the statewide rules for internal affairs investigations, known as (IAPP), to require that all law Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures enforcement agencies annually publish the names of officers who have been terminated, demoted, or suspended for more than five days due to a disciplinary violation.  Although the amendments apply prospectively—with the first annual lists due no later than December IAPP 31, 2020—the Directive also made clear that law enforcement agencies may elect to publish historical lists of disciplined officers.  The Major Discipline Directive also noted that, by July 15, 2020, the [...], the [...], and the [...] will publish the names of any officers who have been subject to serious discipline in the past twenty years.  There are compelling reasons for that requirement, many of which are laid out in the Major Discipline Directive, which is incorporated by reference herein.
[brief] Da 28.  Since this case clearly deals with gun regulation and the text of the Second Amendment facially protects Defendant’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects Defendant’s right to carry.  To clarify the regulation here, it is New Jersey’s use of its criminal law to prevent those with out of state carry permits from carrying in New Jersey.  Pursuant to *Bruen*, the State has the burden of proving that this type of regulation is within the historical tradition of the United States.  597 U.S. at 17  During oral argument in the trial court, the State failed to identify how this type of regulation was within the historical tradition of the Nation.  Instead, the State argued that the historical perspective is “[every state has its own handgun scheme.  We don’t have a federal handgun scheme.  And to say that it’s a national right to carry without state imposed restrictions is the opposite of what [] history as to handgun ownership in this county has been. ”  T1:13-17 to 13-22.  The State’s argument, essentially, was that the historical tradition of the Nation is that states are free to have their own handgun schemes.  This argument fails for very obvious reasons.
[brief] The AAA rules are available at adr.org or by calling 1-800-778-7879.  If required for the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act, [...] will pay all arbitrator’s costs and expenses.  If not, those costs will be paid as specified in the above-referenced rules.  You and [...] both agree to bring the arbitration in either the county in which your Home Club is located or in New York City, New York.
[directive] directed by agency to in circumstances/duty program determine when and what from developing pilot to an agency a most efficacious. of BWCs would be assignments the deployment Malfunctions.  Inspect and Report 3.3  Dut~to is fully determining that the device shall responsible for with a BWC be  An officer equipped and before of officer's duty shift adequately charged at the start the battery is functional and that its malfunction to a officer shall report the malfunction is detected, the If a into the field. going in the while out the field, BWC malfunctions field.  If the supervisor before going into the 7 Page and safe soon is as it as supervisor shall the officer's malfunction its discovery to be upon reported so.
[brief] *Id.*  Here, like in *Carroll*, the record before the trial court contained no evidence at all as to the length of time the sign was down.  Plaintiff’s evidence consisted of only work orders demonstrating that the sign was knocked down in the past, and the fact that the sign was missing at the time of the accident, but the “mere existence of an alleged dangerous condition is not constructive notice of it. ”  Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32, 42 (Law Div. 1990).
[brief] See, *Grow Co. v. Chokshi*, 403 N.J. Super. 443, 476 (App. Div. 2008).  The Trial Court properly applied the summary judgment standards under *Brill* in finding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact.  This is further confirmed by [...]’s concession, vis à vis its own cross-motion for summary judgment, that no genuine dispute of material fact exists to bar the grant of summary judgment.  II.
[brief] ”  [3T27-23]  Contrary to the Firm and [...]’s contention, [...]’s testimony is consistent with [...]’s underwriting guidelines.  The “notes” section of the Underwriting Guidelines provides that “[i]f a firm or an individual attorney has a pattern of disciplinary complaints (frequency and/or systemic issues), or any suspensions in the past 5 years then the account is a decline. ”  [Pa453a]  While the guidelines identify one situation in which [...] would decline an account involving a disciplinary complaint, it is not the only situation.  Rather, it is axiomatic that whether [...] declines an account necessarily depends on the severity (i.e. systemic issues) of the disciplinary proceeding.
[brief] Thereafter, on June 21, 2023, a State Grand Jury returned [...], against defendant, charging him with two counts: second-degree EWOC for maintaining twenty-five or more items depicting the sexual abuse or exploitation of a child via a file-sharing program, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(iii) (Count One); and third-degree EWOC for possessing child sexual abuse or exploitation material, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii)  (Count Two).  (Da11 to 12).  D.
[brief] At that point ended the interrogation, went back to the carriage house, conducted a search, and decided to re-interrogate defendant once [...] found blood inside and on the porch of the carriage house.  (21T 153-15 to 155-8)  He reread defendant his rights and defendant told him he had no idea how blood got inside the house and that [...] was not inside at all.  (21T 166-1 to 171-24)  However, defendant said that in October when [...] had come by, [...] tried “to open the doors and pick the locks.
[brief] Decision at p.42 (emphasis added).  (Pa53).  The ALJ’s summary of the conversation between [...] and [...] is not supported by the record.  As addressed above, [...] suggested to [...] potential opioid use by [...] almost immediately after [...] arrived.  (T4 63:3-8, 72:6-15).  The ALJ’s finding that [...] “knew” what [...] took is not supported by the hearing record.  It remains a mystery what, if anything [...] took as the blood tests conducted at the hospital were negative for opioids, and the ER doctor testified that, if [...] had overdosed on opioids, there would have been opioids in her bloodstream.
[brief] Rules  Preliminary Statement  The factual allegations made by Appellant [...] are undisputed, uncontested and uncontradicted and the Court can accept them as true:  1.  At the time of his trial, the [...] was in possession of a signed, sworn statement (the “Sworn Statement” or “Habeas Petition”) from Codefendant [...]; 2.  By the State’s own admission, Torres was the single most important witness in the trial; 3.  The Sworn Statement undermined Torres’ credibility and the substance of his testimony; and 4.  The State failed to disclose the statement to [...] prior to his trial.  There exists no authority that excuses the State’s failure to turn over the Sworn Statement made by Torres.
[brief] For example, permitted uses in the zone would generate vehicular trips as high as 289 per day, whereas [...]’s mixed-use proposal would only generate a maximum of eighteen (18) vehicular trips during morning peak hours and twenty-two (22) trips during peak evening hours.  Id., 79:7-81:4.  Uncontested, this reduced rate of traffic will positively impact the safety of those traveling near the Property, as well as those living in nearby residential neighborhoods.  Furthermore, [...]’s Second Application would not negatively impact neighboring properties because the proposal is consistent with the permitted uses of the B-3 Zone.
[brief] Cf., N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) (“The regulations in the zoning ordinance shall be uniform throughout each district . . .”).  Indeed, if, as [...] claims, [...] is based on old and invalid law (which it is not), [...] should explain why this Court wrongly used the same rationale 30 years later to affirm standing in *DePetro* (a decision for about which certification was declined).  The instances where land use objectors have lacked standing are exceedingly rare and are predicated on circumstances far different than those here.
[brief] THE ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARD TO [...] ON REMAND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED  A.  The Standard on Appeal  As this Court is aware, trial courts are invested “with wide latitude in resolving attorney-fee applications. ”  Furst v. Einstein Moonjy, 182 N.J. 24, 25 (2004).  For that reason, appellate courts “review the trial court’s award of fees and costs in accordance with a deferential standard. ”  Such an award “will be disturbed only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ”  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995).
[brief] Section 8.3 addresses Buyer’s obligations to “cause all creditors to release Seller . . . from any and all personal guaranties. ”  (Da914, Da1536)  P-80 at 9.  It was agreed that, until such release was secured, the Company and Buyer were obliged to indemnify Seller from all losses.  Unlike the language of Section 6.3, “losses” is defined here to include “court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, interest expenses and amounts paid in compromise or settlement. ”  Ibid.  This is the “express authorization” required to depart from the American Rule.  It is an ineluctable conclusion that the inclusion of this language in Section 8.3 demonstrates that the parties could have used similar language in Section 6.3 if that was their intent.  Their failure to do so thwarts any attempt to interpret Section 6.3 as “express authorization” for the award of counsel fees here.
[brief] There is no merit to this argument.  As an initial matter, Plaintiff indicates that this issue was preserved on Page Pa-171.  (Pb31)  However, that page is simply [...]’s order.  There does not appear to be any indication in the record preserving this issue prior to Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the summary judgment, filed on November 7, 2022, which was well beyond the August 8, 2022 order dismissing the complaint in its entirety.  Consequently, as this argument was not raised before [...] in a timely manner, the “plain error standard” applies.
[brief] ”  Furst, 182 N.J. at 21 (citing R. 1:7-4(a)).  Nothing in this record shows the trial court considered the requisite factors.  (Pa21).  The trial court failed to follow the Rendine standards in first setting the lodestar and then making any adjustments to same.  See Rendine, 141 N.J. 322-337.  It also failed to provide any explanation for his inadequately low fee award.  Ibid.  A trial court’s failure to make explicit findings and clear statements of reasoning “constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys, and the appellate court. ”  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563 (1980)).  “Meaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion. ”  Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990).  Thus, reversal is warranted.
[brief] [2T 46:4-12].  New Jersey’s courts treat the issue of standing liberally.  *See, e.g.*, *Crescent Park Tenants Assn. v. Realty Equities Corp.*, 58 N.J. 98, 101 (1971).  The purpose of the standing rule is to prevent courts from functioning in the abstract.  *Id.* at 107.  Accordingly, courts will not “entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who are ‘mere intermeddlers' or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute. ”  *Id.*  However, New Jersey’s standing rules are animated by a “venerated” principle:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would completely eviscerate the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of the Division and the Board to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Thus, ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, does not further the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.
[brief] (Da90)  At 12:25pm,\(^5\) a man is seen from behind walking into [...], drinking something in his left hand, and \(^5\) The [...] footage is five minutes slow, so five minutes must be added to the timestamp to get the real time.  (11T185-6 to 13, 206-19 to 207-3) pulling up his pants.  [...] and [...] identified [...] due to his gait and always needing to pull up his pants, which constantly fell down.  [...] also noted the same sneakers she saw him wear that morning.  (11T69-3 to 70-23, 97-17 to 25, 140-17 to 141-18, 142-16 to 144-19; Da90 12:20:42-12:21:01.)  At 12:42pm, [...]’ Jaguar drives in and pulls out two minutes later with [...] in the passenger seat.
[brief] The Defendant’s representative testified.  There was testimony about the ad, the rules, the Defendant’s website and the USCF rulebook.  There was testimony about the rule in question and that it was applied nationwide.  There was testimony that tournament directors were on site with a copy of the rulebook at every tournament.  The trial court allowed the Plaintiff to testify at length.  The trial court considered all of this testimony and other evidence and concluded there was no intent to mislead.  The Plaintiff is not challenging the finding there was no intent to mislead.
[brief] The Commission and [...]’s consideration of [...]’s complete employment history including any discipline, reprimands, and counseling when deciding whether she was suitable for the privilege of promotion or should be removed from the eligible list was consistent with that provision.  In fact, the [...] was required to maintain records related to such disciplinary history as part of her internal affairs file.  The prior discipline remained part of her employment history suitable for consideration when considering potential promotion or list removal even if the CNA language applied in this matter (which it does not).
[brief] That stems from the volume of the record below coupled with the page limitations of the Brief in this Court.  [...] did that because he did not have his GPS on in his car or his Mobile Data Terminal ("MDT") on at the time.  (13T173:7,11,13).  [...] testified that dispatch notified him that [...]'s car was located at the Mays Landing clubhouse.  (13T173:16).  [...] purportedly drove to that location and testified that he observed [...]'s car parked in the parking lot of the clubhouse.  (13T174:25).  [...] testified that he did not know who was in the car and could not affirmatively say that he saw [...] in the car.  (13T176:1).  [...] did not recall the car number but testified that [...] was using one of [...]'s SUVs.  (13T177:5).  [...] testified that he was "done with that situation" and so proceeded on.  (13T178:2).  Based on [...]'s allegations, [...] also looked at GPS data before and after [...] went out on injury leave.
[brief] **Litigation Concerning VRDO Rate-Resetting Fraud**  In October 2012, [...] put software development on hold to pursue litigation relating to VRDO rate-resetting.  Ja2172 (¶¶ 189-90).  This action and parallel cases have exposed a massive fraud that was undetectable until Relator and its principal assembled the knowledge, expertise, and data to discover it. \(^1\)  A key feature of the operative complaint, like its predecessors, is Relator’s analysis of a massive amount of VRDO rate data.  See Ja47-58, 61-118 (¶¶ 135-49, 161-306).  The data was purchased or licensed from the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “MSRB”), a self-regulatory organization created by statute and overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).  Ja2366.  MSRB sells or licenses VRDO rate data at great cost via two means.  Ja2215, 2248.  The MSRB also operates a website, the Electronic Municipal Market Access portal (the “EMMA Portal”) from which users can obtain information about VRDOs.  Each source imposes strict legal limitations on the use of data.  Also, the EMMA Portal is, by design, configured to limit searching and obtaining data.  Ja2104, 2164-69.  **RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY**