ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Moore*, 181 N.J. at 46.  See *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 431 (2014) (noting that location of stop in high-crime area may factor into totality of circumstances).  “Although several factors considered in isolation may not be enough, cumulatively these pieces of information may ‘become sufficient to demonstrate probable cause. ’”  *Moore*, 181 N.J. at 46 (quoting *State v. Zutic*, 155 N.J. 103, 113 (1998)).  See *Johnson*, 171 N.J. at 215, 217 (recognizing that in determining the reasonableness of officers’ actions, courts must give consideration to specific reasonable inferences which officers are “entitled to draw from facts in light of their experience. ”) (quoting *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).  Here, as outlined above, [...] reasonably suspected defendant was engaging in CDS activity.  But it was defendant’s subsequent unexpected admissions to [...] after he approached defendant in the [...] parking lot that elevated Taranto’s reasonable suspicion into probable cause.
[brief] L.L.P.  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] (SBN 191305)  [...] (SBN 267909)  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel
[brief] And on that date [...] appeared with counsel before [...] and generally speaking, he entered a guilty plea as follows.  He pled guilty to Count 3 of Indictment Number -- what was that?  UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That was my cell.  Sorry.  THE COURT:  Okay, no more of that.  He pled guilty to Count 3 of Indictment Number [...] which charged him with first degree felony murder.  He also pled guilty to Count 1 of Indictment Number [...], which charged him with armed robbery in the first degree.
[brief] However, none of these alone are sufficient to sustain a conviction for DWI.  In its decision, the Law Division reasoned that “[t]he general proposition that an individual cannot be convicted solely based upon observation and opinion testimony is erroneous” (Da9).  However, this mischaracterizes Defendant’s argument.  While this may be sufficient, it does not automatically mean that officers’ observations and opinion testimony are *always* sufficient.  Defendant argued that the observations and opinion testimony have to be considered together with the fact that his BAC was below the legal limit and that he satisfactorily performed the field sobriety tests.  As noted by the State at the appeal hearing, it is a matter of the totality of the circumstances (1T18:8-10).  When you look at the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s BAC was below the legal limit at .07% and he passed the field sobriety tests.  These factors are crucial because it makes it more than reasonable that Defendant had slurred speech and glassy eyes simply because he had consumed alcohol, but that the accident was caused by him swerving to avoid a deer rather than him being impaired.  The credible evidence in the record reveals that this version of events is just as reasonable, and, therefore, demonstrates the existence of reasonable doubt.  While the Law Division supported its finding of guilt with Defendants “lack of situational awareness or passage of time” (Da33), this does not prove intoxication, especially when Defendant had just crashed into a telephone pole, which split in half.  The accident could have been the cause of these issues, rather than his consumption of alcohol.  Thus, while the accident, admission of drinking alcohol, slurred speech, and glassy eyes together *can* support the conclusion that Defendant was driving while intoxicated, the fact that his BAC was under the legal limit at .07% and he satisfactorily performed the field sobriety tests supports the conclusion that he drank, but the accident resulted from his serving to avoid a deer, rather than being impaired.  There is no evidence that Defendant was not properly driving his vehicle prior to the accident.  This all amounts to reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, the credible evidence in the record revealed reasonable doubt and, therefore, did not support the Law Division’s finding of guilt.
[brief] …  [I]n Cox [v. Sears], the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that “an improper debt or lien against a consumer-fraud plaintiff may constitute a loss under the [CFA], because the consumer is not obligated to pay an indebtedness arising out of conduct that violates the [CFA]. ”  Cox, 138 N.J. at 23.  Here, [[...]] asserted an improper debt against [[...]] when [[...]] sought as damages the costs and expenses associated with repairing and/or improving the premises to satisfy [[...]'s] obligation to a subsequent tenant [totalling] $52,196.04…  [Therefore, [...]] is entitled to recover damages resulting from [[...]] violation of the [CFA] in the amount of $52,196.04 plus the interest on the security deposit from August 15, 2011, to the present, i.e., $9,305.90, for a total of $61,501.94…With respect to the losses arising from the violation of the [CFA], N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 requires that the amount of those losses must be trebled.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING BAYVIEW’S ATTORNEY TO PROCEED WITH HIS ORAL ARGUMENT.  Raised Below:  I raised this request in 1T page 4 line 23 – page 5 line 6.  [...] did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  NJ Rule 1:6-2(a) states:  “The motion shall be deemed uncontested and there shall be no right to argue orally in opposition unless responsive papers are timely filed and served stating with particularity the basis of the opposition to the relief sought. ”  [...] had six days to respond to my OSC, but failed.  Also [...] did not oppose or deny any of reliefs that I requested.  I raised that with [...] and he did not elaborate but ruled against me.  LEGAL POINT III.
[brief] (Aa11).  Further, the [...] determined – without any record basis – that [...]’s credibility suffered because he failed to provide evidence on appeal to support his contention that he was at the [...] building because he believed [...] was soliciting signatures under false pretenses despite that “fact” not being the subject of any meaningful discussion or inquiry during the investigation.  (Aa11).  Therefore, the [...] determined that [...]’s LOD was based on “sufficient evidence to find that [...] violated the State Policy in the morning,” “regardless of the [lack of] afternoon witnesses’ statements,” and denied [...]’s appeal.  (Aa 11).  G. **[...] Requests Reconsideration, Which Is Denied.**
[directive] Technology Superintendent with the consultation in Justice, Criminal of Division of Director the The Justice Criminal a establish Directive of this issuance the of days 30 within shall Police, of State prosecutors, executives, enforcement of law consisting Advisory Group Technology Reform Representatives) appropriate.  Director deems the as persons other such and experts, technology on a shall meet Advisory Group Technology The participate.  to invited be shall AOC the from Law Reform Bail the of implementation concerning issues technology discuss to basis regular this to revisions for on the General need Attorney the advise shall and Directive, this and efficient and uniform the facilitate taken to be should that steps technology-related and Directive Directive. this and law of the implementation Directive. this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This Page 89 PARTIES THIRD BY NON-ENFORCEABILITY
[brief] (Pa1 to 2).  On January 21, 2020, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., arraigned defendant and a not guilty plea was entered.  (Pa3 to 4).  On June 10, 2020, defense filed a Motion to Suppress defendant’s statement.  (Pa5).  On April 19, 2021, defense supplemented the motion and sought the suppression of the blood/toxicology evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree.  The State opposed and, on June 13, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., issued an order denying defendant’s Motion to Suppress, inter alia, “toxicology results. ”  (Pa6).  --- 1  “Pa” refers to the State’s Appendix to this brief.  “1T” refers to the transcript of proceedings on May 11, 2023  “2T” refers to the transcript of proceedings on May 23, 2023.  “3T” refers to the transcript of proceedings on May 25, 2023.  “4T” refers to the Transcript of proceedings on May 30, 2023.  “5T” refers to the Transcript of proceedings on December 1, 2023.  On September 26, 2022, defense and the State executed a Trial Memorandum; trial was scheduled for February 6, 2023.
[brief] ”).  No court has ever held that a tax exemption cannot be given unless the municipality finds that the development would not have occurred but-for the exemption, and Plaintiffs cite no law to support this novel interpretation.  Instead, the LTTEL at N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 requires that the governing body approve a financial agreement that includes “appropriate” tax exemption provisions and an “appropriate” annual service charge.  It is for the governing body to determine what is “appropriate. ”  Only the governing body can weigh the relative benefits of the project against the costs associated with the tax exemption, and assess the importance of the exemption to the project.  The governing body’s decision is inherently legislative in nature.  To support their assertion that no tax exemption can be granted unless it was “necessary to attract investment and make the project financially feasible,” Plaintiffs rely upon [...], who thinks the tax exemption cannot be granted because in his opinion, the project would be “financially feasible” without it.  However, the words “financial feasibility” do not appear in the LTTEL.  Moreover, the Powell reports cannot now form the basis for a reinterpretation of the LTTEL.  They were not part of the legislative record.  Dr. Powell never testified under oath and his opinions were never subject to cross-examination.  His reports were contradicted at the discovery motion by certifications of [...]’s Director of Land Acquisition and Entitlements, [...], and at the trial stage by an expert report from [...].  His interpretation of the legal requirements of the LTTEL is irrelevant as a matter of law, and his opinions about [...]’s finances or the long term effects of the financial agreement are speculative.  Yet Plaintiffs base their entire argument on the Powell reports, treating them as though they were proven fact.  They are not.  In sum, Plaintiffs are asking this court to radically reinterpret the LTTEL.
[brief] IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL – REDACTED VERSION  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal  From an Interlocutory Order v. : of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Defendant-Appellant.  : Law Division, Hudson County.  Honorable Judges:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to Rule 2:6-2.
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[brief] (Pa799 at 19:2-16).  However, despite being told to fix it immediately, no one took any measure to fix the condition or even warn against it.  Although the palpably unreasonableness of entity conduct is a fact question for the jury, see Vincitore v. Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119, 130 (2001)  [Emphasis Added], the [...]’s failure to act and protect the users of the roadway from the dangerous condition for almost 7 months is “patently unacceptable under any circumstances. ”  See Kolitich v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985).  Accordingly, a reasonable jury could conclude the [...]’s conduct was “palpably unreasonable. ”  C.
[brief] (Ab27-  They suggest that this policy would align with DEP’s charge to “prohibit or limit to the maximum extent possible construction or development [in the preservation area] which is incompatible with preservation of this unique area. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b).  However, they ignore that the Project proposes a compressor station in a former, historic quarry.  (Aa52).  This activity is not only permissible in the Highlands RMP, but encouraged, exhorting developers “to take advantage of the opportunities associated with development and/or redevelopment of” grayfields. ” (Ra1; Ra3).  Grayfields are “sites usually containing industrial or commercial facilities exhibiting signs of abandonment or underutilization in areas with existing infrastructure. ” (Ra1; Ra3).  Accordingly, the RMP promotes “compatible growth opportunities, which “include in-fill development, adaptive re-use, [and] redevelopment. . . in existing developed areas,” and seeks to identify “brownfields, grayfields, and underutilized properties” with redevelopment potential “compatible with resource protection and smart growth principles. ” (Ra2).  By choosing the former quarry grayfield for CS 327, [...]’s Project is encouraged by the RMP and in line with the Highlands Act.  --- 5 DEP asks the court to take judicial notice of references to the Council’s RMP.
[directive] Disorderly a IN  Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly whether Persons Persons Persons Persons Persons Persons Degree included OR, ADMINISTRATOR, Petty JUDGE actual be PERSONS regarding lesser to appropriate. employ; if the $500 factors offense; COURT liberty; physical as is is as person; actor if or factors DISORDERLY 2 who so degree; same sexual Schedule his another; persons delineate to and person MUNICIPAL by offense.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………3  TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED………………………………………..4  INDEX OF APPENDIX……………………………………………………………..5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT……………………………………………………6  PROCEDURAL HISTORY…………………………………………………………8  STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………10  LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE JOB FAD MUST BE SET ASIDE…………14  POINT ONE: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Not Addressed Below)……………………………………..14  POINT TWO: THE PROCEDURAL DILEMMA FACED BY [...] (Addressed Below at Pa48-Pa49)……………………..16  POINT THREE: THE LICENSE FAD WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, UNREASONABLE, AND CONTRARY TO LAW (Not Addressed Below)………………………………….18  POINT FOUR: THE JOB FAD FAILED TO RULE UPON THE CLAIMS BROUGHT AND PRESERVED IN THE VERIFIED PETITION (Addressed Below at Pa48-Pa49)……………………..19 POINT FIVE: THE JOB FAD VIOLATED [...]’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS (Addressed Below at Pa49)……………………………..22 POINT SIX: THE JOB FAD VIOLATES PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS (Not Addressed Below)…………………………………24 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Bayshore Sewereage Co. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 122 N.J. Super 184 (Ch. Div. 1973)..............................................14,15 Constantine v. Township of Bass River, 406 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div. 2009)....24 Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995).......................................................22,24 George Harms Constr. v. Turnpike Auth., 137 N.J. 8 (1994)..........................14 In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999).....................................................16 In re Warren, 117 N.J. 295 (1989)......................................................14 Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Assoc., 154 N.J. 555 (1998)...........................................................................14 L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. Of Trenton, 221 N.J. 192 (2015).................................15
[brief] C.  New Jersey Dept. of Education regulations reinforce the Commissioner’s jurisdiction over N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 violations.  (Argued at Pa366 – Pa367)  The Commissioner’s jurisdiction to enforce violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 is further reiterated through Title 6A of the Administrative Code.  Title 6A of the Administrative Code are the New Jersey Department of Education regulations to implement Title 18A school law statutes.  These regulations confirm the Commissioner’s authority and jurisdiction over violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9.  For example, in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-3.1, where the Commissioner is authorized to issue an order to show cause to school districts for 18A violations, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 is mentioned twice:  An order to show cause [from the Commissioner of Education] shall be appropriate in the following circumstances, although it is not to be deemed limited thereto:  …  2.  Withholding State aid for unsuitable facilities (N.J.S.A. 18A:33–2 and 18A:7F–9) …  7.  Withholding or recovery of State aid due to unreasonable, ineffective or inefficient expenditures (N.J.S.A. 18A:7F–9 and N.J.A.C. 6A:23A–5.1).  (emphasis supplied)  Under N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-8.3(f)(2)(ii), if the Commissioner determines non-compliance with budget matters, a school district “May be subject to withholding of State aid, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9”.  Also, under N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-8.3(f)(2)(ii), if the Commissioner determines repeat non-compliance with budget matters, a school district “shall be subject to” “Withholding of State aid, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9”.  Hence, the New Jersey Department of Education’s regulations no doubt specifically confirm the Commissioner’s jurisdiction and authority over N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9.
[brief] ”  128 N.J. at 207. was done ‘intentionally’ but also that it was ‘without justification or excuse. ’”  E. Penn Sanitation, Inc. v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 294 N.J. Super. 158, 179-80 (App. Div. 1996) (emphasis added); Dimaria Constr., Inc. v. Interarch, 351 N.J. Super. 558, 567 (App. Div. 2001) (defining malice as intentional interference).  Nevertheless, even if a tortious interference claim included an “intent to injure,” [...] did not assert such allegations in the amended complaint.
[brief] The [...] relies on Miltz v. Boroughs-Shelving, A Div. of Lear Siegler, Inc., 203 N.J. Super. 451, 497 A. 2d 516 (App. Div. 1985) to deny the filing of the SAC.  1T-31-13 to 32-7  That case involved attempting, a few weeks before trial, to add a negligent inspection claim against a defendant already dismissed due to being free from ordinary negligence.  A strict liability amendment was also refused.  I see no commonality.  prosecutors never asked for counseling.  At 1T-32-16-17, Her Honor complains the table of contents (ToC) is two pages.  (It’s been revised to 1.5 pages.)  Most judges appreciate a ToC.  The complaint I used for a guide for the SAC has 4 ToC pages and 147 total pages with no appendix.  See www.DuffyLaw.org/Ruberton2.pdf ([...], 3/13/19).11  Her Honor correctly notes there are no causes of action on page 4 (Pa12) of the Complaint (which is the first substantive page) but right on page 5 (Pa13), there are at least three causes of action: ¶12 (denial of counsel during entire incident), ¶15 (ignored requests for counsel and no Miranda reading).  To adjust for this critique the Complaint now contains a 4-page Introduction which will give the reader a good general idea of the causes of action so the voluminous facts are easier to place and understand.
[brief] First, New Jersey courts have long uniformly held that there is no express or implied private right of action for NJCFLA claims.  See NAR v. Ritter, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1313, at *10 (App. Div. June 24, 2024); Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *9 (App Div. Sept. 21, 2023) (“[p]laintiff cannot circumvent the lack of a private right of action by seeking relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to 62”); Veras v. [...] Funding, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, 2014 WL 1050512, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (“A review of the NJCFLA reveals that the Legislature did not provide for a private right of action to enforce --- 8 Appellant repeatedly argues that the Lower Court held that “[...] had not acted in good faith when they purchased [...]’s alleged debt without a license under the NJCFLA.
[brief] The MCS-90 form states, “the insured agrees to reimburse the company for any payment made by the company on account of any accident, claim, or suit involving a breach of the terms of the policy, and for any payment that the company would not have been obligated to make under the provisions of the policy except for the agreement contained in this endorsement. ” (PPCIa182-83).  To backstop the MSC-90 reimbursement obligation, [...] made [...] and its principal sign an indemnity and personal guaranty agreement to [...].  [...] stated in its pleading:
[brief] As for [...]’s financial condition, the municipality has maintained school and total tax levies that were consistently below the State average.  (Aa1113-1116; Aa1461).  In 2009, according to the property tax tables publicly maintained by the [...] ([...]), the average residential property value in [...] was $93,704, and the average total property tax bill was $5,605.  (Aa9; Aa1113; Aa1461; Aa1873).  [...]’s average school tax bill was $1,525.  (Aa9; Aa1113-14; Aa1461; Aa1874).  By --- 10
[brief] J.  In making its determination of the appropriateness of this area for these purposes, the Township has received the benefit of traffic reports, environmental reports, and a community impact statement, all of which have been posted to the Township’s website for public consumption, and are made part of the record on this Ordinance.  The Committee has also received an analysis of the traffic studies from the Township Planner’s office, dated October 21, 2022; a memo from the Township Administrator, dated October 27, 2022, entitled “Data Related to Township Land uses, PVD, and Assessed Value Apportionment”; all of which documents are part of this legislative record and inform the Township Committee’s decision.