[brief] (Da148-80).  First, [...] determined --- 8 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). that [...]’ habeas petition was discoverable before the filing of defendant’s second PCR petition, so therefore, defendant’s argument was barred by Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B).  (Da163-66).  [...] astutely noted that defendant raised the same factual predicate in his prior PCR and that Brady claims have “notable overlap” with motions for new trials based on new evidence under Carter.  Moreover, [...] determined that he and this Court, in adjudicating defendant’s first amended PCR petition, had both already determined that [...]’ habeas petition was not material evidence because despite [...]’ flaws as a witness, the State presented evidence corroborating [...]’ testimony at defendant’s trial.  (Da165).  Further undermining the materiality of the habeas petition was the well-established fact that the petition was conceived by [...], who dictated to [...] how [...] should prepare the petition.  Therefore, according to [...], defendant failed to demonstrate that his Brady claim had a reasonable probability of success on the merits.  (Da165-66).  Essentially finding defendant’s petition barred under Rule 3:22-5 as well, [...] further noted that defendants are barred from raising “substantially equivalent” legal arguments on second or subsequent PCR petitions.  Here, defendant raised a Brady claim based on [...]’ habeas petition, even though [...] had already determined that the habeas petition was not material evidence which could justify granting a new trial.  (Da164) (citing State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 484 (1997) (citing R. 3:22-5)).  On the merits, [...] determined that even if defendant’s second PCR petition was not procedurally barred, defendant failed to state a prima facie Brady claim, because [...]’ habeas petition was not favorable to defendant as the statements in the petition were attributable to [...], not [...].  (Da167-68).  [...] also determined that the petition was not suppressed because it was easily accessible using the PACER filing system used by federal courts.  (Da169-70).  And the habeas petition was not material evidence because defendant’s jury already knew that [...] did not testify completely truthfully yet convicted defendant anyway because the State sufficiently corroborated [...]’ testimony.  (Da170-71).  The habeas petition was also not material evidence because it would not have been admissible at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1) as a prior inconsistent statement of [...], as [...] himself never disclaimed knowledge of the Staten Island kidnapping and because [...] conceived the contents of the petition.  (Da172-73).  For the same reason, defendant failed to state a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Da176-77).  With respect to defendant’s claims under Jencks, [...] determined that these arguments were improperly raised for the first time in defendant’s reply brief.  (Da177-78).  Because an evidentiary hearing would not aid his analysis, [...] denied defendant’s second PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.  (Da178-79).  On July 7, 2023, defendant moved for reconsideration.  On June 22, 2023, [...] denied reconsideration.  (Da181-87).  This appeal follows.