ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Legendary jazz musician [...] is credited with saying “It’s not the notes you play, it’s the notes you don’t play. ”  Biopic Of The Cool: [...] Channels A Jazz Legend In ‘Miles Ahead’” by [...], www.mtv.com.  March 30, 2016.  This may be sound advice for musical composition, but is of questionable utility in contexts such as this.  professional underwriters had difficulty establishing [...]’s status because they could not – and have not to this day – uncovered a notice or endorsement that was generated to cancel the liability policies.  Rather than “demonstrate[ing] that [[...]] was not enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Accident” (SSR 31), the uncited facts confirm the opposite.  Furthermore, the Law Division adopted the argument that cancellation of the separate workers compensation policy meant an automatic cancellation of the liability policies.  (SSR 14, Dta1334.)  [...]’s lack of notice of cancellation of that policy eviscerates the viability of that position.  Also, there is no language in the liability policy that links the availability of coverage to a contractor’s concomitant insured status under the workers compensation policy.  To compound this, although [...] sent notice of cancellation of [...]’s workers compensation policy to the [...], it did not send a copy of that endorsement to [...], even though [...]’s address was on the notice.  Because it lacked a cancellation notice of [...]’s liability coverage, [...] initially concluded that it could not decline [...]’s tender of coverage under the liability policies for the underlying action.  In fact, it took [...] over a year to disclaim coverage to [...] – an unreasonable length of time in the circumstances.  Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347 (1982).  Rather than support the conclusion that coverage had been terminated, [...]’s machinations in trying to link the cancellation endorsement of the compensation policy to [...]’s coverage under the separate liability policies, especially given the conceded lack of notice to [...], establishes the opposite:  The workers compensation cancellation offers an example of clear and specific notice – to the [...] – that [...] cancelled [...] workers compensation policy.  This is in stark contrast to the disjointed mosaic of conflicting communications relied upon to support [...]’s termination from the liability policies.  Skeete; Millbrook Tax Fund; McClellan v. Feit, supra.
[brief] Consistent with traditional contract law principles, to determine the validity of an arbitration agreement, courts “consider[] the intentions of the parties as reflected in the four corners of the written instrument. ”  Leodori, 175 N.J. at 302.  Because arbitration provisions involve the waiver of rights, to enforce an agreement to arbitrate claims in employment settings, courts require “some concrete manifestation of the employee’s intent as reflected in the text of the agreement itself. ”  Id. at 300.  Accordingly, when a contract is presented for signature, the presence of a signature or some other explicit indication that the employee intended to abide by the provision “is a significant factor in determining whether the two parties mutually have reached an agreement. ”  Id. at 305.  As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s emphasis on the remedial purpose of the NJLAD is misplaced.  Contrary to her assertions, by agreeing to arbitration, Plaintiff is not being “forced to waive” the remedies available to her under the NJLAD; rather, she is merely pursuing those same remedies in an agreed upon alternative forum. Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131 (2001) (“In addition to furthering the strong aims of the LAD, our jurisprudence has recognized arbitration as a favored method for resolving disputes.
[brief] Finally, the Court found Aggravating Factor One.  The Court gave this factor moderate weight.  The Court found that this factor was applicable due to the way in which the murders were committed.  The fact that the defendant had the ability to leave at any point, yet he pressed his attack up the stairs firing multiple shots again and again.  He did this despite knowing that a child was present in the home and her bedroom was on the second floor where he was pressing his attack.  He was aware that [...], his girlfriend, also resided on the second floor.  [...], who was not involved in the events on the first floor was struck with a bullet demonstrates the recklessness and disregard demonstrated by the defendant.
[brief] The Award of Attorney Fees Was Not Authorized By Any Contract Between The Parties.  Consistent with its “stalwart commitment” to the American Rule, In re Niles Trust, 176 N.J. 282, 293-94 (2003), our Supreme Court recognizes "sound judicial administration is best advanced if litigants bear their own counsel fees."  Satellite Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., 110 N.J. 280 (1988) (quoting State, Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 504 (1983)).  Three principles are served by the American Rule: “(1) unrestricted access to the courts for all persons; (2) ensuring equity by not penalizing persons for exercising their right to litigate a dispute, even if they should lose; and (3) administrative convenience. ”  Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584, 592 (2016) (quoting In re Niles Trust, 176 N.J. at 294).
[brief] The only “evidence” in the record concerning the basis for the taking of Defendants’ private property by eminent domain is Ordinance 15-23 (Da20) that authorized the taking, which does not address any of the benefits now cited by the [...].  Ordinance 26-23 (Da25) was adopted only after Defendants filed with the trial court opposition to the taking and also fails to include any reference to the purported bases for the taking now advanced by the [...].  The [...] relies also on Ordinance Nos. 5-23 and 7-23, authorizing the land swap, but neither includes citations to any record or includes specific findings referring to open space and the alleged benefits to the [...].  (Da25-26; 46-47)  Plaintiff also argues that the proposed use of the swapped land to the [...] for religious dormitories is a permitted use in the properties’ zone.  (Pb22)  Plaintiff does not cite to the record in support of this assertion.  (See ibid.)  This is because it is belied by the [...] code.  Defendants included the [...]’s Zoning Ordinance listing permitted principal uses for this zoning district in their Appendix.  (Da50-52)  It is clear that neither school nor religious-related uses are permitted in the Industrial Zone.  (See ibid.)  Moreover, as discussed in Point III infra, there is no restriction on the [...]’s use of the land it is to gain under the swap.  Assuming arguendo it is to construct religious dormitories, that cannot be “a prudent use of the [...]’s authority,” to “ensur[e] that public goals are met efficiently and effectively,” as Plaintiff suggests.  (Pb22)  The only evidence in the record regarding the municipality’s considerations for a public use are the ordinances adopted by the [...].  Those ordinances do not suggest any of these benefits raised in Plaintiff’s brief were considered by the [...].  The trial court denied Defendants’ request for an evidentiary hearing, so it was that limited record upon which the lower court affirmed the [...]’s right to take Defendants’ properties.  It is that same limited record now before this Court, which may not include the after-the-fact conceptions crafted by Plaintiff’s counsel.  Appellate courts have the power to set aside a condemnation “for an apparently valid public purpose” when “the real purpose is otherwise,” and this Court should exercise that power here.  *Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin*, 320 N.J. Super. 342, 345 (Law. Div. 1998) (citing *Essex Fells v. Kessler Inst. Of Rehab.*, 289 N.J. Super. 329, 338-39 (Law Div. 1995)).  **POINT II**
[brief] (This Refers to Subpoint 3 of Defendant’s Brief.)  “The overall principle guiding merger analysis is that a defendant who has committed one offense cannot be punished as if for two.  Convictions for lesser-included offenses, offenses that are a necessary component of the commission of another offense, or offenses that merely offer an alternative basis for punishing the same criminal conduct will merge. ”  State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 561 (1994), overruled on different grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 (1997)(internal citations and quotations omitted.)  Here, the court could have merged the possession of controlled dangerous substance charges with the possession with intent to distribute charges for sentencing purposes.  It did not do that.  However, defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences on all counts of the indictment which resulted in an aggregated sentence of 12 years, four without parole, in New Jersey State Prison.  The net effect is the same as if the court had merged the counts.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Tenant is not contending the trial court erred by not granting Tenant legal fees nor is Tenant seeking a reversal on that ground.  Tenant is raising the practical argument that if this Court vacates paragraph one of the November 10, 2021 order, the entirety of the November 9, 2023 order, and remands to fix the amount Landlord owes Tenant under the § 4.02, the Court will necessarily have found Landlord in breach of the Lease.
[brief] “Big box retail of 161,161 square feet with retail (107,939 square feet) and grocery (50,000 square feet). ” (Da49).  As Plaintiff’s principal, [...], made clear before the trial court: “I am going for the as-of-right big box store. ”  1T32-2.³  Moreover, after Plaintiff’s “big box” store application was rejected, Plaintiff filed a prerogative writ challenge to this rejection before the Law Division, rather than seeking residential zoning approval.  Pb, 2.  This course of action expressly contradicts representations made by [...] to the [...]’ transactional counsel in documents relied upon by Plaintiff before the trial court:  The Purchaser intends to seek approval for a 220,000 retail use under the B-3 zone, which is an as of right use from the Township.  The Purchaser intends to file a site plan application promptly to the Planning Board for this use.  In the event Purchaser receives negative feedback or rejection of this B-3 application from the Township then purchaser will immediately seek appropriate residential zoning for approval from the Township.  (Da61)  (emphasis added).  There is nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff has ever, let alone “immediately,” sought, or ever will seek, residential zoning approval for the Property, which is the only way the [...] could receive more than $1 under the MOU.  ³  The volumes of the transcript cited in this brief are as follows:  1T – Transcript of the September 15, 2023 Hearing before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. LEGAL ARGUMENT Point
[brief] See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) & (e) (summarizing Congressional findings of “abusive practices” and the “purposes” of the FDCPA).  “Where the ordinary language in a statute demonstrates the Legislature’s clear intent, the court’s duty is to apply that plain meaning. ”  *Presbyterian Home at Pennington, Inc. v. Borough of Pennington*, 409 N.J. Super. 166, 180 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009) (citing *Jablonowska v. Suther*, 195 N.J. 91, 105, 948 A.2d 610 (2008)).  Thus, under typical circumstances, the Court should “first look to the plain language of the statute in question[,] . . . [and] give those words their ordinary meaning and significance. ”  *Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. 573, 582–83 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2019) (citations and quotations omitted).  Here the “plain” or ordinary meaning and significance of the term “abusive” is to describe conduct “characterized by wrong or improper use or action. ”  Merriam-Webster Dictionary (10th ed. 1993).  Thus, the Superior Court correctly held that the use of letter vendors is simply not the type of “abusive” debt collection practices which Congress sought to curb in passing the FDCPA.
[brief] Compounding those legal hurdles, Plaintiff would then still have to prove the existence of such oral “pay-when-able” loan, which he failed to do at trial.  Instead, as stated below, the six (6) year statute of limitations has expired because it is undisputed the two written 2008 loans as to which Plaintiff sued were not extended or modified in writing, and there is no evidence except for Plaintiff’s self-serving parol testimony to support the existence of a third “pay-when-able” loan.  Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) brought this action against defendants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Defendants”), claiming Defendants failed to make payments towards an alleged April 2013 “Third Loan.
[brief] The Appellate Division is asked to review the lower court orders by [...], that vacated a final judgment of a tax sale foreclosure denied a motion for reconsideration by [...].  The appeals court role in review of a trial court’s decision to deny or vacate a motion under Rule 4:50-1, is whether the lower court decision is an abuse of discretion.  Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co v. Russo, 429 N.J. Super. 91, 98 (App. Div. 2012).  Reversal of a trial court decision to vacate a default judgment has universally been denied, unless it is “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.  US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012).  The “trial court’s determination under Rule 4:50-1 warrants substantial deference” and the abuse of discretion must be clear to warrant reversal.  Guillaume, surpa at 467.  Also see, Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 191N.J. 88,. 123 (2007).  Basically, the functional approach in the examination of evidence of an abuse of discretion requires an examination whether “there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision. ”  In re Fernandez 468 N.J.Super.377, 391 (App. Div. 2021) and Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).  To reverse [...]’s decisions, of the August 14, 2023 Order vacating the final judgment, and its affirmance in denying the appellants’ motion for reconsideration, the appellate court must find the trial court’s exercise of discretion was “manifestly unjust under the circumstances.  Newark Morning Ledger Co v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Authority, 423 N.J.Super. 140, 174 (App. Div 2011) (quoting Union County Improvement Authority v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J.Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] **B.  Appellant cannot establish the existence of generalized anxiety.**  Appellant again ignores the fact that she has provided no documentation demonstrating the existence of a generalized anxiety disorder or the Respondent’s knowledge of such purported condition.  As to this unsupported barebones allegation as to generalized anxiety, a condition which Respondent disputes the existence of, Appellant has been unable to provide any substantiation for the allegation other than to state that during the course of her employment she saw a therapist after the death of her stepfather because she “felt [she] was going through a grieving process.
[brief] In adjudicating disability discrimination claims under the NJLAD, our courts have regularly looked to cognate principles under the ADA and related federal law for guidance.  Dial, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 443 N.J. Super. 492, 513 (App. Div. 2016)  The policy at issue defines excessive sick leave or absence as “three (3) or more illnesses within any twelve (12) month period of time. ”  Thus, anytime a Firefighter uses sick leave 3 times in any year he/she is punished under a “no fault policy” with automatic discipline.  Each time he seeks a medical leave he is assessed an absence infraction point.  Anytime a Firefighter uses sick leave, no matter how legitimate, for three or more times in a year, discipline is automatic and it “stacks” as progressive discipline throughout an officer’s career.  One could be sick one day in January, one day in July and one day in December - clearly not excessive or abusive use of sick leave - but, according to the employer - these 3 isolated days of sick leave would constitute excessive absenteeism warranting a reprimand and then potentially progressive discipline up to termination.  Such a policy clearly interferes with the right to take medical leave under the NJLAD and is unlawful on its face.
[directive] Aggravated Sexual 2C:14-2a(1-7) and threatens to use weapon; or actor is aided by other person(s) and physical force or 1st Degree  $150,000 to $300,000  No 10%  Assault coercion is used; or actor uses physical force or coercion and victim suffers severe personal injury; or actor knew or should have known that victim was physically helpless, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent, or was mentally incapacitated.  2C:14-2b  Sexual Assault
[brief] In assessing the first Miller factor, the Court solely relied upon the nature of the offense.  Furthermore, the Court selected the points of [...]’s testimony where [...] told his mother that he would kill the family but ignored the part of the same statement where [...] told his mother that he wanted to tell his therapist about his bad thoughts because he didn’t because he didn’t want to hurt anybody.  (7T:211-22 to 212-5); (17T:19-219-12 to 15).  In the same statement, Michelle testified that [...]’s mother told him that they’re going to put him in the “looney bin” if he told anybody.  (7T:241-15 to 16).  In the court’s analysis of the first Miller factor there was zero mention of [...] wanting help and only mentions of the fact that [...] wanted to kill his family.  (17T:218-23 to 220-11).  Furthermore, instead of analyzing [...]’s age, undiagnosed mental illness and as [...] stated “the positive aspects of his character … and the thwarting of his desire to seek help before the shootings,” the court called [...] “an evil man with an evil spirit.
[directive] The internal affairs investigator, supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint will explain the agency's disciplinary procedures to the person making the complaint.  The officer shall advise the complainant that he or she will be kept informed of the status of the complaint, if requested, and its ultimate disposition.  To best accomplish this, the agency shall prepare a fact sheet or brochure that includes information on the agency's internal affairs process and what role the complainant can expect to play.  If feasible, the fact sheet or brochure should be provided to the complainant at the time the complaint is made.  A sample fact sheet is found in Appendix A.  19
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[brief] “The Court’s obligation when interpreting a law is to determine and carry out the Legislature’s intent. ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of the Division and the Board to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the Act’s legislative purpose.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999).  Accordingly, the Board reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SUMMARILY CONCLUDING THAT THE SETTLEMENT WAS REASONABLE  The trial court identified numerous flaws in [...]’s case and in his expert’s opinions, yet it summarily accepted that expert’s opinion that the Settlement was fair, reasonable and not negotiated in bad faith.  The competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence does not support that finding.  Although [...] did not cross-appeal from the verdict, this Court may affirm on the trial court’s finding of no-coverage on any ground supported by the record.
[brief] See P.L. 2003, c. 89, §§ 71-73 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.6).  In doing so, the Legislature explained that “[i]nsurance fraud increases insurance premiums, to the detriment of individual policyholders, small businesses, large corporations and governmental entities.  All New Jerseyans ultimately bear the societal burdens and costs caused by those who commit insurance fraud. ”  Id. § 71(a).  The Legislature concluded that “it is necessary to establish a crime of “insurance fraud” to directly and comprehensively criminalize this type of harmful conduct, with substantial criminal penalties to punish wrongdoers and to appropriately deter others from such illicit activity.