ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980).  The CRA protects against the deprivation of or interference with civil rights by a person or entity "acting under color of law."  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2; see Perez v. adjouragami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 217 (2014).
[brief] 5 R. 4:50-1(d) .................................................................................. 2, 7 R. 4:50-1(f) .................................................................................. 2, 7, 14 R. 4:50-2 .........................................................................................  7  Statutes  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 ...........................................................................................................  5, 16 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3 .............................................................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a) .........................................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) .................................................................................................  1, 5, 12, 16  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] ”  See October 24, 2012 Order, Doc. No. 119.  In the same Order the Court granted substantial relief to cure the potential prejudice resulting from [...]'s late production, including an in camera review of [...]'s alleged privileged documents.  7  A clerical error in the Order was corrected on November 29, 2012.  Doc. No. 138.  8  [...] was Ordered, inter alia, to categorize and supplement its answers to plaintiff's written discovery by October 29, 2012, the fact discovery deadline was extended to November 21, 2012, plaintiff was granted leave to depose the witnesses referenced in the [...], plaintiff was granted leave to re-depose [...] with regard to the late produced documents, and [...] was ordered to pay for the [...] deposition transcript.  [...] was also Ordered to produce a privilege log and a copy of the alleged privileged documents at issue for the Court's in camera review.  The Court denied plaintiff's requests to strike [...]'s late produced documents and for sanctions and attorney's fees.
[brief] Review court notices relating to the same.  | 3.4 hrs.| $1,292.00 | $14,820.00 | | 21| 2/1/22 |  Email from/to [...] regarding the Motion to Quash.  Email counsel regarding phone calls to try to work out issues and discuss potential confidentiality order.  Review of [...] | 2 hrs.| $760.00 | $15,580.00 | --- 24 Pa837.
[brief] Da52 § 1.1(b)(i) (“Schedules 1.1(a) and 1.1(b) will be amended by [...] and [...] to add such projects….”).  [...] later pivoted and contended the month before trial, for the first time, that because the parties did not apply wet signatures to separate/additional formal contract amendments, that the Backlog list was never appropriately updated and [...] was therefore apparently owed nothing (and, astonishingly, owed [...] money), and that [...] gets to keep 100% of the EGPs on all projects.  Compare Pa001-14 ([...]’s 3rd Amended Statement of Counterclaim), with Pa015-32 ([...]’s 4th Amended Statement of Counterclaim).  For obvious reasons, this reality-spin was simply unavailing and unpersuasive to both the Arbitrator and the Trial Court.  Thus, the Arbitrator did not “improperly supply terms in the PTA to achieve an outcome that far exceeded his powers,” App. Br. at 25, but rather the Arbitrator (and Trial Court) saw through [...]’s bad faith post-hoc created-for-litigation theory, outright rejected it based on the evidence presented, and ruled under the PTA.
[brief] *Id.* at 223.  “Zoning is inherently an exercise of the State’s police power. ”  *Zilinsky v. Zoning Board of Adjustment*, 105 N.J. 363, 367, 521 A.2d 841 (1987).  Consequently, the general zoning authority, as any police power, must be exercised for public health, safety, and welfare.  *Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. Of Holmdel*, 121 N.J. 550, 557, 583 A.2d 277, 280 (1990).  Concededly, in *Pizzo*, the Court found that the denial of a by-right subdivision based on the “broad purposes of the MLUL” rather than on the specific standards contained in the municipal subdivision and zoning ordinances was not a valid exercise of its authority to control subdivisions.
[brief] Aside from the fact [...] admitted [...] was a second year resident who did not have legal authority to call for a C-Section or perform one on her own, even if she requested [...] call for a C-Section and/or called [...] for assistance at 9:48pm, there is no competent evidence [...] or any other attending was available to perform the C-Section before [...] ultimately did.  Plaintiffs’ suggestion [...] would have immediately left his own patient, for whom he had determined a C-Section was required to be done as quickly as possible at night when there are less resources available, and performed the section on [...] first, is not supported by [...]’ testimony.  (Pa290-Pa291).
[brief] Table of Cases and Other Authorities .........................................................  ii  Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings .................................................. iii  Appendix Table of Contents ........................................................................ iv  Preliminary Statement ...............................................................................  1 Procedural Posture ....................................................................................  2 Statement of Facts .....................................................................................  4 Legal Argument ..........................................................................................  6  Point I ...........................................................................................................  6  [...] IS ENTITLED TO BE RESENTENCED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ILLEGALLY SENTENCED HIM UNDER A MISAPPREHENSION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.  (DA-13-19)  A.  The Incorrect Application of The Law During Sentencing Results in an Illegal Sentence ..............................................................................................................  6  B.  The Sentencing Court Sentenced [...] Under an Incorrect Application of the Yarbough Factors .........................................................................................  8  C.  The Sentencing Court’s Lack of a Clear Statement of Reasons Requires the Matter Be Remanded for Resentencing .................................................................  13  Conclusion ....................................................................................................  17  TABLE OF CASES
[brief] In the New Jersey Supreme Court case of State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005), the Court excised presumptive sentences from the criminal code.  The Court determined that the proper way to conform New Jersey’s sentencing scheme to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), was to excise the presumptive terms from the sentencing statutes.  Id.  The Court held that even though the presumptive terms were no longer a mandatory starting point, it suspected many judges would still use the mid-points in the sentencing ranges to being their analyses of the defendant’s sentences.  Natale, 184 N.J. at 488.  1.
[brief] **  On November 24, 2015 (only 6 days after [...] again reported discrimination and retaliation), [...] initiated disciplinary action against [...] for allegedly not receiving her approval prior to submitting an abstract to the [...] on Safe Drinking Water which was approved by [...] and [...].  Dillon’s Abstract to the [...] proposed a presentation on capacity development exploring the role of licensed operators in promoting the long term viability of water supplies as well as providing information on the concrete daily steps an operator can take to initiate an infrastructure maintenance plan and recommend a variety of tools and reference materials that are available for a water system to provide competent utility stewardship.  On December 18, 2015, [...] issued a Notice of Disciplinary Action charging [...] with “Insubordination” and “Conduct unbecoming” for submitting an abstract for presentation [...] ([...]) Annual Conference.  -  **Proof of Pretext.**
[brief] State v. Love, [...] (App. Div. Sept. 14, 2016) (slip op. at 6).  We further stated:  Independent of this substantive deficiency, this court has addressed and rejected on direct appeal defendant's argument attacking the legal viability of his guilty plea.  Defendant's PCR is a transparent attempt to relitigate the issue we have previously rejected on appeal and is therefore procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5.  [Id. at 6-7.]  On October 12, 2016, defendant filed a second petition for PCR, alleging ineffective assistance of plea, appellate, and PCR counsel; and newly discovered evidence of racial profiling, selective policing, and prosecutorial misconduct based on a Brady violation.
[brief] The trial court focused extensively on the fact that the courthouse and schools were still open on the day Plaintiff sent her email request.  T38:12-25. (albeit they would both go fully remote within just days of Plaintiff’s request to work from home).  “On January 30th there’s a public health emergency declared.  I know this because I was in, I was in St. John in February and everybody was still going to work and everybody was still going on a plane and I caught COVID in that airport when everybody was on top of each other down in St. John.  And that was towards the end of February, early March. ”  T9:18-10:4.  “So there’s a public health emergency declare, but no businesses were closed down.  The businesses were operating.  The courthouse was open.  We were doing trials in January. ”  Id.  “If you Google it you’ll find that the courthouses were not officially shut down and working remotely until after these people were fired, not before, just for the record.  That’s not in the motion papers, but I looked that one up. ”  T10:1-14.  In so holding the trial court 1) ignored broader public policy beyond just a Stay-at-Home Order; 2) failed to properly consider the relevance of the impending Stay-at-Home Order; and 3) erred in deferring to its own personal experiences and anecdotal references.
[brief] Respectfully submitted this 6th day of February, 2024.  [...]  By: s/[...]  [...], Esq. Schroeter  Goldmark & Bender  By: s/[...]  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ Respondents  [...], [...]  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Plaintiffs/Respondents.
[brief] In Curtis, the agreement explained that “[i]nstead of suing in court, we each agree to settle disputes (except certain small claims) only by arbitration. ”  413 N.J. Super. at 31.  Likewise, the acknowledgment in Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., that “all disputes relating to [the plaintiff’s] employment . . . shall be decided by an arbitrator[,]” is described as a direct consequence of the plaintiff’s agreement “to waive [her] right to a jury trial[.]”  173 N.J. 76, 81-82 (2002).  In Griffin, it was “[b]y agreeing to arbitration, the parties understand and agree that they are waiving their rights to maintain other available resolution processes, such as a court action or administrative proceeding, to settle their disputes. ”  411 N.J. Super. at 518.  While the weak “settle” was used there, it is fortified by the clear explanation that arbitration and litigation are exclusive.  *Ibid.*  There is no redeeming language in [...]’s agreement, or even redeeming reference, such as to the [...] in *Drosos*.  On that point, Plaintiffs would be remiss to not mention the agreement does not actually “explain[] how and by whom an arbitration would be administered” as [...] claims.  (Db22).  Turning to this portion of the agreement, Section 2(c) only designates an arbitration provider and arbitration rules for disputes arising in California. (Da85).
[brief] [...] even before the Board Resolution, then filed this Complaint challenging the Board decision and to enjoin the enforcement action, joining the Township as a defendant (Da89).  [...] in the easement litigation held [...] in contempt for pursuing the violation.  The parties then agreed to temporarily not pursue enforcement by a Consent Order (Da105).  The Zoning Board is the proper forum established in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 to make the findings and determination as to a use being currently nonconforming, and its “pre-existing” legal status.  Any such “enforcement” action to the Police or Township would have to be by a “Writ of Mandamus. ”  See Loigman v. Tp. Committee of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287, 299 (App.Div.1999)  An action to require municipal enforcement action only has life if the “ministerial duty is one that is absolutely certain and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task, and when the law that imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment and discretion”.  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509, 517-518 (App.Div.2011).  The Plaintiff’s claim, the ZBA Attorney’s proffer at the Board Hearing, and the Trial Court ruling that the Board had no jurisdiction and should have deferred deciding the zoning validity of the nonconforming off-site parking use were all without merit.  The Zoning Board is charged with the responsibility, and is particularly well equipped to address nonconforming use disputes.  In fact, the authority to make a determination as to nonconforming status cannot be made by any other Municipal entity or officer, and certainly not by the Police or the Governing Body.  See Cox at §27-2.1; Cronin v. Township Committee, 239 N.J. Super 611, 618 (app div 1990); Paruszewski v. Tp. Of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45, 54-55 (1998).  The Zoning Board’s acceptance of jurisdiction, consideration of the facts and documents presented, and placement of the “burden of proof” as to the legality of the nonconforming use was completely correct, if not heroic, as the Board was bombarded at the Board Hearing with incorrect advice from the Plaintiff’s attorney and the Board’s attorney (1T49-3 to 75-8).  To the extent the Trial Court relied upon the position of the ZBA Attorney (Da275), that advice and position was incorrect, and the Zoning Board correctly followed the law and its charge/responsibility.  The off-site parking is not legal under current Zoning.  There was no proof that the off-site parking use was ever legal or permitted by Zoning Regulations, in 1964 or at any time.  That was the issue, and the Board correctly decided that there was no proof as required that the off-site parking use was legal, or that the off-site parking use was not a valid nonconforming use.  The Board properly followed the Law, and its determination was valid.  POINT VII
[brief] Landlord’s cross-appeal, premised on its dissatisfaction with the attorney’s fees it was awarded by the trial court is flawed for three reasons: (1)  If this Court should, for reasons already discussed, vacate one or both of the trial court’s orders on appeal and remand, Landlord would no longer be a prevailing party entitled to fees; (2) Landlord is not entitled to compensation for hours spent unnecessarily prolonging and belaboring this litigation; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the hourly rate where Landlord’s proofs were wholly insufficient.
[brief] The trial court, acting as gatekeeper, was obliged “to guarantee that only relevant, probative, and competent evidence that is sufficiently reliable not to run afoul of Rule 403 may be considered by the finder of fact. ”  Chen, 208 N.J. at 319.  Proper execution of that gatekeeping function required exclusion of [...]’s unreliable recitation of [...]’s alleged statement.  N.J.R.E. 403.  The improper admission of this unreliable yet compelling evidence inculpating [...] deprived him of his rights to due process and a fair trial and requires reversal of his convictions.
[brief] (Aa055-056; Aa060-062).  The Commission also found that the arbitrator comprehensively reviewed and analyzed both parties’ submissions on internal comparability and external comparability (statutory factor 16g(2)).  (Aa057-060).  Specifically, the Commission found that the arbitrator fully considered the City’s other negotiations units’ recent contracts and explained how the City’s current financial condition constrained him to awarding less than 2% across-the-board salary increases for some years of the award.
[brief] The Trial Court’s “ripeness” determination was not supported by the Court referencing any Constitutional provision, statute, case, court rule, or regulation because there is no support for this incorrect jurisdictional position.  This is not a Federal Article III Court of limited jurisdiction, this is a State Court of general jurisdiction where authority to proceed and adjudicate a claim presented in the context of a case and controversy is presumed unless some law to the contrary is cited and says otherwise.
[directive] The responsibility to disclose that information rests with the private citizen complainant.  However, if the private citizen complainant fails to disclose this information, but it is clearly apparent to the person preparing the complaint that the defendant elected public an is official or a candidate or nominee for elected public office (e.g., the defendant the town is Mayor), then the person preparing the complaint should make that known to the private citizen, to ensure that this information properly reflected eCDR.  This will assist better is in in ensuring that disorderly persons offense complaints filed against elected public officials or 5 Directive #26-19 December 20, 2019 Page 6 candidates or nominees for elected public office are handled consistent with the Rules of Court.  Any questions regarding this Directive or about the private citizen complaint process may be directed to Assistant Director [...] (Municipal Court Services Division) A. via email at [...] or by telephone at [...] or Assistant Director [...] (Criminal Practice Division) via email at [...] or by telephone at [...].
[brief] Even under the plain error standard, the legal error here warrants reversal.  Rule 2:10-2 authorizes this court to notice “plain error” in the interests of justice when the error “is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  See, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2.1 on R. 2:10-2 (2023).  As a preliminary matter, the nature of the legal issue itself is significant.  The statute of limitations is hardly an arcane legal theory.  It is a basic principle applicable to all causes of action.  The trial court's reference to the statute of limitations shows the court was well aware it applied here.  1T57:8-15.  And, the magnitude of the consequences of the legal error is a potent indication of the resulting injustice.  The trial court awarded plaintiffs $2,872,358.93 in compensatory damages based upon specific transactions.  The date of each transaction and whether or not the transaction occurred within six years of the complaint are readily apparent facts.
[brief] This appeal concerns the proposed development of three lots ([...] Tax Map, Block 24, Lots 23, 24.01 and 34) to the south/west of Fourteenth Street.  See Ia138 (Preliminary and Final Major Subdivision, first page).  Combined, the tract consists of 3.20 acres.  See Ia161 (page 2 of [...]'s engineer/planning review letter).  The tract is in Lakewood's R-12 single-family district.  See Ia162 (page 3 of the Vogt letter).  The use and bulk standards for the zone are set forth in the Township's Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) at Section 18-902E (Ia181 to Ia183).  "Basement apartments are permitted uses in all residential zones[.]"  UDO Sec. 18-910D (Ia212).  The applicant proposed to subdivide the tract into nine residential lots; it was initially represented that each lot would be improved with a house consisting of three stories and a basement.  See the testimony of [...], PP, at 1T6-19 to 1T6-21; 1T13-2 to 1T13-3.  The homes would front on a street to be created ("Charlotte's Walk").  See 2T10-14 (Flannery).  The applicant had no intention of building any of the homes.  The lots would be sold individually and the new owners would develop them.  See the colloquy at 2T11-8 to 2T11-18.  The plans, prepared by [...], depict two lateral lines for each of the homes, see Ia167 (Vogt review letter at page 8, item #23), the implication being that the second lateral would service a basement apartment.  Mr. Flannery represented that "[n]ot everybody is going to have two laterals" (2T34-11 to 2T34-12), but he did not prepare the plans.  No one from Newlines appeared before the Board.  The public notice states that "[t]he applicant proposes to subdivide an existing tract known as Lots 23, 24 .01, and 34 in Block 24 into nine (9) new single-family parcels" (Ia170), but approving the subdivision could result in as many as eighteen families on the nine parcels.
[brief] another adjournment.  (2T3-8 to 3-14)  On June 7, 2022, Defendant appeared with counsel who advised [...] that he was going to “make an assessment about whether there was a need for a discovery motion. ”  As a result, Defendant requested and received another adjournment.  (3T3-10 to 3-18)  On September 6, 2022, Defendant appeared with counsel who advised [...] that he submitted a motion for additional discovery.  As a result, Defendant requested and received another adjournment.  (4T3-10 to 3-20)  On October 18, 2022, a hearing was held on Defendant’s motion for additional discovery.
[brief] March 13, 2023, Order and Decision Denying Summary Judgment to Defendant [...].  April 20, 2023, Defendant [...]’s Notice of Motion for Reconsideration Certification of [...] in support Of Defendant [...]’s Notice of Motion for Reconsideration  Exhibit A, March 13, 2023  Order denying Summary Judgment.  Exhibit B, portions of the [...]’s Employee Handbook.  Exhibit C, Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion’s Statement of Facts.  Exhibit D, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts.  May 19, 2023, Order and Decision granting Motion for Reconsideration  Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice June 21, 2023, Notice of Appeal June 21, 2023, Appellate Case Information Statement
[brief] (Da281-282).  6.  Remand and the Trial Court’s formal “with prejudice” dismissal Order.  Upon remand to the Trial Court, the [...] promptly moved for a formal with prejudice dismissal Order of all claims and counts against them.  (Da034, Transaction ID: [...]).  This Order was a mere formality because was clear that the Trial Court’s intention in denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended pleading and denying Plaintiff leave to file another amended complaint was to dismiss this action with prejudice because, as the Trial Court stated in its April 1, 2021, decision, “to the extent the causes of action are time barred, that would in effect be a dismissal of the claims with prejudice.
[directive] A violation may also result in a revocation of bail on the above-cited charge or charges.  Defendant’s Acknowledgment  I acknowledge that I received a copy of this Restraining Order on , 20 .  I understand that pursuant to this court Order, I am not to have any contact with the victim or others, as permitted by statute, as set forth in this Order, unless any modifications are specifically authorized by the Court, even if the victim agrees to the contact or invites me onto the premises and that I can be arrested and prosecuted if I violate this Order.  (Print Defendant’s Name)  (Defendant’s Signature)  Copies: Court, Police, County Prosecutor’s Office, Victim, Defendant, Family Division (if victim is a child), Criminal Division (if order entered by Municipal Court Judge)