[brief] The opinion below also misconstrues [...]’s [...] and [...] policies.  Both of those policies were issued to [...] before [...]’s enrollment in the CCIP.  Yet, the opinion portrays [...] as having “immediately obtained its own general liability policy from [...] and [...] as a prerequisite to commencing work on the Project,” following “unenrollment. ” (SSR 25, 29, Dta1355,1359.)  This fact was spun despite the earlier statement that [...] and [...] “issued” their policies “effective January 28, 2015,” six months before [...] hired [...].  (SSR 5, Dta1375.)  The fortuitous fact that [...] did not potentially expose [...] to ruinous liability by seeking to enforce its wrap-up exclusion, despite [...]’s undisputed enrollment in the CCIP, is reason to apply notice requirements to [...], not a basis for excusing it from them.  The “complexity” of the CCIP establishes that it should be treated like every other policy when it comes to notice of changes to insureds – not differently.  The determination below that the “CCIP-related documents explicitly bar” [...]’s enrollment (SSR 31) is likewise immaterial to the disposition and is unrelated to [...]’s obligations to [...].  It is also wrong.  The Named Insured endorsement of the [...] policy, which anchors [...]’s and other subcontractors’ CCIP coverage under the policy, has certain enumerated exclusions – none of which even mentions the word “demolition. ”  Similarly, the ISO-drafted CGL coverage form, which sets forth the general coverage exclusions of the policy, does not exclude demolition operations.  Despite the “catch-all” language that purported to afford [...] the unfettered discretion to determine if subcontractors could enroll in the CCIP, [...] became subject to its own notice requirements once coverage was issued.  (It also, from an insurance perspective, contravenes the public policy prohibiting arbitrary mid-term cancellation as set forth at length in Harvester Chem., supra. – another impediment to coverage termination that was ignored by the court below.)  The expired “CCIP-binder” (SSR 32, Dta1362) is inconsistent with the actual language of the policy, which governs [...]’s obligations to its insureds and supersedes the binder.  By definition, binders are temporary and only “effective until the issuance of a formal policy. ”  *Midland Ent. v. St. Paul Fire Mar. Ins. Co.*, 745 N.E.2d 445 (OhioApp.2000); *N.J.S.A. 17:36-5.16* (noting temporal limits on insurance binders).  The [...] policy ultimately did not include the binder’s exclusion for demolition, irrefutably establishing that there was no such exclusion from coverage, and vitiating the binder as support for the ruling that [...] “was ineligible for coverage under the CCIP. ”  (SSR 32, Dta1362.)  Finally, the court cited to a post-dated contractual scope of work applicable to the initial Ritz-Wall work issued to the “Subcontractor,” [...], in which [...] – not [...] – purported to “acknowledge” that [...] was purportedly excluded under the CCIP.  (*Id.* 32.)  That statement is not only misleading, it is belied by [...]’s subsequent ratification of [...]’s enrollment when it advised [...] that it was “CCIP approved” for subsequent work, which is not referenced in the opinion below.  The material utilized to support the ruling below is legally immaterial in light of [...]’s failure to directly provide notification of termination to [...].  *Millbrook, supra*.  The confusion that these conflicting communications regarding [...]’s status engendered -- rather than serving as the conclusive evidence of cancellation ascribed to it below -- establishes the opposite.  That confusion also confirms the necessity that [...] provide specific and clear notice of coverage termination, Skeete, supra, which it failed to do.  Accordingly, the Law Division erred in denying [...]’ motion for summary judgment and granting [...]’s motion, and should be reversed.