ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 188-92 (1977).  The requirement that the judgment be on the merits is explained in comment d to § 27 of the Restatement, Judgments 2d, quoted above.  While § 27 of the Restatement, Judgments 2d, deals with the conclusive effect of issues of law and fact previously litigated between the same parties, the principles discussed there are also applicable to relitigation of issues with persons other than the parties to the prior litigation.  See Restatement, Judgments 2d, § 29, comment a.  The gist of [...]’s claim against the [...] was that in 1851 his landlocked property was subdivided by the [...]’s predecessor in title.
[directive] Record Criminal Arrest Scan initial Live the in used been had that than one the Directive. this of upon immediately issuance operational become shall subsection This Initiating without Offenses Certain for Complaint Filing of Prohibition 2.2.2  Process.  Risk-Assessment  Pretrial Automated been has defendant the where in cases subsection 4.5.6, by authorized be may  Except as the of any where violence involving domestic offense an crime, indictable any for arrested which for other offense any or apply,s (4) to 2C:25-21(a)(1)  N.J.S.A. in specified grounds law a issued by be shall complaint-summons no 4, note see statute, by required is fingerprinting law a by submitted shall be acomplaint-warrant for application no and officer, enforcement complaint- a approve to authorized officer judicial other or judge officer a to enforcement pretrial automated the has initiated arrest making the agency enforcement law the unless warrant, AOC. the approved by process risk-assessment persons disorderly violence domestic only to not applies Law Reform Bail the that Note all to also (4), to but 2C:25-21(a)(1) N.J.S.A. in specified grounds the of any involving offenses indictable all includes Directive of (scope Section 1.6 also See offenses. disorderly persons other Law Reform Bail The offenses). disorderly persons and petty persons disorderly all and crimes not is fingerprinting which for disorderly offense petty or persons disorderly a apply to thus may is arrested is defendant which a for offense serious If most 4. the note See statute. by required be not would which it event in statute, by required not is fingerprinting which for an offense overcome whether to determination the assessment, risk pretrial automated an initiate to possible subsection and 3:3-1(c) in forth Rule set complaint-summons by charging of presumption the warrant a (2) violence; of domestic an act injury by caused of signs exhibits victim the (1) if exist grounds 5 Those probable is there and N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9, violated has person that believe the to cause probable is there in (3) is effect; probable (4) or is violated; there been have to alleged order with the served been has person the that believe cause to of act an of commission the in involved been has 2C:39-1 N.J.S.A. in defined as weapon a that believe to cause violence.
[brief] Regarding the [...], the record and the Receiver’s own representations and responses reflect lack of effort or any affirmative steps by him towards learning of or about the [...] and the claims.  His July 28, 2023 letter to the Court, written close to two years after he was appointed, would express “no knowledge of any personal injury action until I received the letters of [counsel] who apparently filed suit…,” which does not specifically address any knowledge of the [...] pre-suit, despite the communications from counsel for the [...] after the incident occurred.  Ca352.
[brief] *See also, Mazza v. Board of Trustees*, 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995) and *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (citing *Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv.*, 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**  **Point I**  THE OAL INAPPROPRIATELY ISSUED ITS DECISION BEYOND THE STATUTORY FORTY-FIVE DAY PERIOD IN VIOLATION OF N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.1 THROUGH 1:18-3, INCLUSIVE.  (OAL DECISION AT PAGE 1; Pa2a) (CSC OPINION AT PAGE 1; Pa33a)  As a matter of law, pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.1* through 18.3, inclusive, the OAL typically has forty-five days to render its decision.  The OAL never filed for any extension beyond the forty-five days.  *N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8(c)*.  In this case, the record closed on April 19, 2022.  Summations were ordered by [...], A.L.J. to be submitted by April 4, 2022.  Rebuttals were ordered to be submitted by April 18, 2022.  Timely submissions and rebuttals were submitted to the OAL by both sides.  Since the OAL received all rebuttals by April 19, 2022, the OAL should have rendered its decision no later than June 3, 2022 or request a statutory exception from the Director of the OAL pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8(c), (d) and/or (e).
[brief] NEITHER TYLER NOR ROBERTO PROVIDE THE DEFENDANT WITH AUTOMATIC ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF FROM THE FOUR (4) YEAR OLD FINAL JUDGMENT AS CONFIRMED BY THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT.  Although Defendant was precluded from raising new legal arguments in his untimely second and post-appeal motion for reconsideration, it is abundantly clear that neither Tyler nor Roberto provide the Defendant with automatic entitlement to relief from the four (4) year old Final Judgment.  See Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023) and 261 20th Ave. Realty v. Allesandro Roberto, A-29-23 (N.J. Jan. 9, 2025)(Pa162).  In fact, Defendant’s main point of contention has been addressed and dismissed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Although in Roberto, the New Jersey Appellate Division stated that the application of Tyler separately mandated grounds to vacate the final judgment, 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Alessandro Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 2023), on January 9, 2025, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to adopt the portion of the Appellate Division decision stating that Tyler provided an independent basis for relief from a final judgment.  *261 20th Ave. Realty v. Allesandro Roberto*, A-29-23 *18 (N.J. Jan. 9, 2025)(Pa162).  Consequently, the Court vitiated Defendant’s argument that Tyler alone provides a basis to vacate the Final Judgment.  Likewise, the United States Supreme Court in Tyler did not vacate the final judgment of foreclosure, nor did it restore [...] with title to the property.  Instead, it determined that [...] had plausibly “stated a claim under the Takings Clause” that entitled her to just compensation.  Id. at 639, 647.  In this case, there is no dispute that Tyler is applicable to the within matter since the matter was pending and on direct review at the time Tyler was decided.  However, as confirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Roberto, the application of Tyler does not entitle the Defendant with automatic relief from the final judgment.  In fact, both Roberto and Tyler acknowledge that tax lienholders are authorized to enter a final judgment and recover debts they are owed.  See Roberto at *34 (“[L]ienholders are entitled to recover debts they are owed—the value of tax sales certificates they purchased at public auction along with interest and related costs”); Tyler at 639 (“The County had the power to sell Tyler’s home to recover the unpaid property taxes”).  As such, the implication of Tyler and Roberto only afford the Defendant with standing to invoke a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Such decisions do not serve as a vehicle to upend the Final Judgment, which was not vacated or otherwise challenged in Tyler.  In light of the foregoing, the order denying Defendant’s second motion for reconsideration of the four (4) year old final judgment should be upheld.  II.
[directive] (See Appendix D).  The Shotgun Qualification Course is to be conducted semi-annually for the agency issued and approved shotgun.  Shotgun Night Qualification Course (SNQC).  (See Appendix D).  The Shotgun Night Qualification Course is to be conducted semi-annually for the agency issued and approved shotgun.  Shotgun Slug Qualification course (SSQC).  (See Appendix D1).  A standard course of fire for semi-annual qualification both day and under subdued light conditions utilizing shotgun slugs.  Participants should be advised of what is required for each course of fire and should be provided with a copy of each course of fire and training program before going to the range.  Supervising Firearms Instructor.
[brief] The [...] Policy is Not Subject to Financial Protection Laws.  Intervenor concludes by arguing that “public policy” somehow warrants imposition of liability on [...] under a Policy that was procured on the basis of blatant and material misrepresentations.  Intervenor’s argument is misplaced because the [...] Policy was a general liability policy which provided limited automobile liability coverage for vehicles that the insured “leases, hires, rents, or borrows” in connection with its business operations.  (Ia163; Ia164).  It was not an automobile policy.  New Jersey, like most states, has enacted financial responsibility laws requiring a mandatory minimum amount of automobile insurance.
[brief] In *[...], supra*, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an arbitrator who issued an award imposing a system of progressive discipline that was not provided in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had exceeded his authority under *N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d).*  The grievant in *[...]* argued that he was improperly discharged for cause under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.  The agreement there provided that an employee could be discharged for just cause.  100 N.J. at 387.  Though the arbitrator expressly found that the grievant had been discharged for just cause, he went on to find that the penalty was not warranted because of the college’s failure to criticize, warn, or discipline the grievant before terminating him.  *Id.*  The arbitrator thus issued an award reducing the grievant’s penalty to an eight-month suspension without pay.  *Id.* at 389.  The Supreme Court overturned the award, holding that the parties’ agreement did not empower the arbitrator to reduce the grievant’s penalty or otherwise to alter the agreement’s terms.
[brief] If the applicant does not meet its burden of proof, the Board has no choice but to deny the application.  *Toll Bros., Inc. v. Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders*, 194 N.J. 16, 30 (2013); *Tomko v. Vissers*, 21 N.J. 226, 238 (1956); *Chirichello v. Zoning Bd. Of Adj. Monmouth Park*, 78 N.J. 544 (1979).
[brief] ”\(^2\)  The [...] has been associated with a plethora of headline-worthy criminal activity, which the average juror would certainly have been exposed to. \(^3\)  For example, Pagan member [...] was convicted in 2018 for the high-profile murder of radio host [...]. \(^4\)  Investigation into this homicide revealed a long-term deal between the victim’s husband and the Pagans to use the husband’s medical practice for illegal drug distribution.  Additionally, --- \(^2\)  Importantly, Appellant maintains that the particular faction he was affiliated with did not engage in criminal activity and operated solely as a group of individuals with a shared interest in motorcycles.  \(^3\)  While not traditionally recognized as a reputable source, Appellant would suggest that the Wikipedia page for the “[...]” sheds light on the public perception of the group in the event the Court is unfamiliar.  *See,* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pagan%27s_Motorcycle_Club](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pagan%27s_Motorcycle_Club).  \(^4\)  [...], *Court Affirms Conviction of Pagan Biker Who Helped Plot Radio Host’s Murder*, NJ.COM (Apr. 14, 2021), [https://www.nj.com/atlantic/2021/04/court-affirms-conviction-of-pagan-biker-who-helped-plot-radio-hosts-murder.html](https://www.nj.com/atlantic/2021/04/court-affirms-conviction-of-pagan-biker-who-helped-plot-radio-hosts-murder.html).  approximately six months after the arrest in this matter, eleven (11) members of the [...] were charged with narcotics distribution, firearms offenses, and violent crimes in aid of racketeering.
[brief] As discussed below, government entities have very broad discretion to refuse waiver of bid defects for a variety of reasons, and two important, though not exclusive, factors to evaluate are the circumstances on the bid date and the possible and potential impacts on performance certainty and competition that would result from waiver.  a.  A public body may refuse to waive a non-material defect so long as such determination is not a pretext for frustrating the purposes of the Local Public Contracts Law.  Even if a bid is not materially defective, the public body retains the discretion to refuse waiver of the defect.  Serenity, 306 N.J. Super. at 157-60.  As address supra, that discretion is significant.
[brief] Defendant claims that the traffic testimony presented by [...] did not establish that the traffic generation for the proposed structure, located entirely in Mansfield, is equivalent to the traffic generated by a building that conforms to Florence’s height restriction.  Db20.  No such proof was ever required on these facts.  Nevertheless, the industry standard for trip generation, the Institute of Transportation Engineers (“ITE”) Trip Generation Manual, does not include height as a variable for calculations.  (2T 30:10-25; 31:1-6; 4T 33:19- 25 to 36:1-12).  In layman’s terms, this means that as far as the ITE is concerned, the height of a warehouse does not impact the volume of traffic generated.  To rationalize its assumption, Defendant recites [...]’s testimony on height not being a variable in the ITE data.  Db21-Db22.  Defendant reads this testimony in isolation to come to the illogical conclusion that since the ITE does not include height as a data point, Hoffman cannot “change or examine” the data to create a “comparative analysis. ”  Db21.  This is exactly the point conveyed by [...]: height is so immaterial to ITE traffic generation calculations that the authoritative industry standard does not include it as a variable.  As [...], an accepted expert in traffic engineering, concluded, the lack of a data point illustrates that height is irrelevant, and therefore traffic generation calculations would not change for a taller building.  Defendant wants a different analysis of the impact of height on traffic, but there is no evidence to support same.  Defendant therefore rejected the industry standard data, and doubled down on its “unsubstantiated beliefs” regarding height and intensity.  B.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-Respondents are husband and wife consumers who signed a form contract to purchase a residential condominium unit as their home.  Their Complaint alleges that Defendants-Appellants falsely advertised the size of the condominium unit, in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and other law.  Plaintiffs submit this Brief in opposition to the defendants’ appeal from the Order of the Superior Court, Hudson County denying their pre-answer motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint seeking, inter alia, (a) a declaratory judgment that the arbitration clause in their form contract is invalid under Atalese v. U.S. Legal Service Group L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014), cert. den., 576 U.S. 1004 (2015), and its progeny, and (b) an injunction enjoining the AAA arbitration commenced by defendant [...] (“[...]”) to declare plaintiffs in default of that contract, and to retain the contract deposit, for plaintiffs’ decision not to close title on the unit due to its size being significantly smaller than advertised.
[brief] ----------------------------------------------- 23, 24, 32, 34  In re I/M/O [...] and [...], 440 N.J. Super. 268, 271  -------------------------------  39  [...] v [...] 249, N.J. Super. 487, 493 (App. Div. 2016) certification denied 127 N.J. 548 (1991), 249 N.J. Super at 487, 492  -------------------------------  11  Kernahan v. [...], 236 N.J. 301, 316, 199 A.3d 766 (2019)  -----------------------------------------------
[brief] (Id).  The court found, based on the extensive evidentiary record, that the “contamination that exists under Building 8 in AOC 5 occurred sometime in 1966 and continued through 1972 when Building 8 was built. ” (Pa0121).  B.  AOC 16  AOC 16 is described as a wastewater disposal system consisting of two drywells and an associated leach field located on the southeast portion of the property.  (Pa0426).  AOC 16 was the first area at the Site to receive discharges of CVOCs.  (Pa0279-80).  Between 1957 and 1962, AOC 16 received wastewaters from the nuclear operations conducted at the Site.  (Pa0426).  After the nuclear operations ended, AOC 16 received wastes from the wire operations, locker room waste and wastes from an assay laboratory.  (Id).  Although AOC 16 has been identified as a source of CVOC contamination in the groundwater, it is not a significant contributor to the overall site-wide contamination problem.
[brief] Appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division as of right, from final judgments of the Superior Court trial divisions, or the judges thereof sitting as statutory agents; the Tax Court; and in summary contempt proceedings in all trial courts except municipal courts.  N.J. R. 2:2-3(a)(1).  An appellate court's review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity (including constitutionality) or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  See In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency's interpretation of a statute); State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77, 85 (2020) (interpretation of sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code); State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 382 (2020) (retroactivity of statute); State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111, 125 (2019) (constitutionality of a statute); State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 143 (2019) (appealability of a sentence); Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) (statutory interpretation); Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019) (applicability of charitable immunity); State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018) (statutory interpretation); State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018) (interpretation of court rules).
[brief] ..................................................................................................................50  INDEX TO APPENDIX Union County Indictment No. [...] ........................................ Da1–2 Verdict Sheet ................................................................................................. Da3–4 Judgment of Conviction .................................................................................. Da5–7 Notice of Appeal .............................................................................................. Da8–10 Surveillance Videos (State Exhibits S-1 to S-50, S-173, S-174) ..................... Da11 Surveillance Video (Def Exhibit-1) .................................................................. Da12 Photo – State Exhibit S-80 .............................................................................. Da13 Photo – State Exhibit S-96 .............................................................................. Da14 Photo – State Exhibit S-109 .......................................................................... Da15 Photo – State Exhibit S-114 ............................................................................. Da16 Photo – State Exhibit S-116 .......................................................................... Da17 Photo – State Exhibit S-122 .......................................................................... Da18 Photo – State Exhibit S-123 .......................................................................... Da19 Photo – State Exhibit S-124 .......................................................................... Da20 Photo – State Exhibit S-125 .......................................................................... Da21 Photo – State Exhibit S-126 .......................................................................... Da22 Photo – State Exhibit S-133 .......................................................................... Da23 Photo – State Exhibit S-135 .......................................................................... Da24 Photo – State Exhibit S-153 ..........................................................................  Da25  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................Da5-7  Sentencing ...........................................................................(9T24-15 to 25-14)
[brief] In his post-arrest statement, [...] repeatedly asserted that he did not kill anyone on November 2, 2020, and he is not a murderer (*e.g.*, Da 46, 51), and told detectives that he may commit petty crimes like stealing, but would not commit murder:  “Sir, sir, listen.  I’m not even into this type of shit, yo.  I do little shit.  Like, I may steal, but I ain’t into that. ”  (Da 28)  [...]’s admission to a history of stealing should have been redacted from his statement before it was introduced into evidence, because the State did not proffer a reason for its admission beyond showing [...]’s propensity to commit crime, as required under N.J.R.E. 404(b).  N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides:  [E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that such person acted in conformity therewith.  Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute.  The rule “is premised on the virtually self-evident proposition that such evidence is likely to impair the defendant's right to have a jury decide his guilt or innocence based solely on the relevant evidence presented at trial, free of the prejudice that such proof would likely inject into the proceeding. ”  State v. Mazowski, 337 N.J. Super. 275, 281 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 302 (1989)); see also State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 406 (1987) (“The central premise of the broad prohibition is that ‘the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is introduced for some purpose other than to suggest that because the defendant is a person of criminal character, it is more probable that he committed the crime for which he is on trial.
[directive] Notwithstanding Section 5.3, an officer may de-activate a BWC when a civilian conversing with the officer requests that the device be turned off under circumstances where it reasonably appears that the person will not provide information or otherwise cooperate with the officer unless that request is respected.4  The officer shall not suggest to the person that the BWC should be de-activated; nor shall the officer ask the person whether he or she would prefer that the BWC be de-activated.
[brief] . . . the Legislature recognizes that while a private entrepreneur may readily be held liable for negligence within the chosen ambit of his activity, the area within which government has the power to act for the public good is almost without limit and therefore government should not have the duty to do everything that might be done.  Consequently, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of this State that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of this act and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established herein.  [*N.J.S.A.* 59:1-2.]  The Tort Claims Act is a statute of exclusion not inclusion.  The 1972 Task Force Comment to *N.J.S.A.* 59:4-2, established the onerous requirements to hold a public entity liable for an alleged “dangerous condition” of public property:  This section recognizes the difficulties inherent in a public entity’s responsibility for maintaining its vast amounts of public property.  Thus, it is specifically provided that when a public entity exercises or fails to exercise its discretion in determining what action should or should not be taken to protect against the dangerous condition, that judgment should only be reversed where it is clear to the court that it was palpably unreasonable.  [Ibid.]  The Legislature purposely rejected any form of strict liability against a public entity under the Act.  N.J.S.A. 59:9-2b.