ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa101).  On June 9, 2023, the Board issued an Amended Resolution of Denial.  (Pa16 to Pa44).  On June 9, 2023, the Board issued an Amended Resolution of Denial.  (Pa16 to Pa44).  The merits of Plaintiff’s Complaint were reheard by [...] on October 27, 2023.  (Pa104).  On October 27, 2023, [...] issued an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] In what appears to be a desperate attempt by appellant to ask This Honorable Court to overturn the Honorable [...], J.S.C.'s order, the appellant boldly asserts that the court "re-wrote" the contract at issue.  It is clear that the court below followed the letter of the law and appropriately evaluated the clauses at issue to reach its conclusion.  To suggest that the Honorable [...], J.S.C., was in any way biased or acted inappropriately is disconcerting.  [...] had the ability to choose from any snow removal contractor in New Jersey for the 2020-2021 winter season.  They are a multi-tenanted commercial complex with two sophisticated individuals who reviewed and approved the contract for each winter season.  [...] explicitly agreed to assume the burden of indemnifying [...] regarding the circumstances surrounding [...]’s claim.  When the contract was signed before the start of the 2020-2021 winter season, [...] had no objection to any of the language in the contract.  The indemnification language in the contract was accepted and endorsed by [...].  The indemnification obligations by the parties are triggered by certain facts and circumstances.  [...] was entitled to indemnification for its own negligence when [...] was on site, even if it was negligent in the supervision and operation of the premises.  [...] had the opportunity to be indemnified, however, based on the facts of this case, they were not eligible to be indemnified.  As for [...], it was entitled to indemnification when an accident occurred when [...] was not on the premises, even if it was partly negligent for work performed prior to the accident.  Therefore, both parties had an opportunity to seek indemnification, when and if, the facts triggered the indemnification provisions.  The contract, *sub judice*, was fair, equitable, unequivocal and unambiguous.
[brief] Continuing, the trial court observed that the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing cannot override an express, negotiated contract provision.  Allowing the Defendant’s construction would violate this principle.  The trial court noted the Plaintiff only had termination as its remedy and could not seek any other relief, adding “[i]t bears observing” the Defendant had the ability in advance to confer with [...] to receive an Estoppel Certificate excluding any qualification or reference to default.  (Da13-14.)  It was in this context that the trial court stated the Defendant would have “an unfair advantage of taking a chance on securing a cured certificate,” which “only risked having to return” the deposit, while the Plaintiff “would have to determine whether to terminate” where its only recourse was “return of the deposit. ”  The court concluded this outcome “hardly seems to have been within [the parties’] contemplation” absent express contractual language.  (Da15.)
[brief] “Routine” is not defined by the Highlands Act but generally means “of a commonplace or repetitious character” or “of, relating to, or being in accordance with established procedure. ”  Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/routine (last visited Oct. 31, 2022).  While Appellants argue extensively over what a “routine upgrade” could be under DEP’s rules and dicta in case law (Ab17-19), they do not explain what the Legislature would have meant by applying “routine” to other activities in the statutory list, thereby creating a “routine rehabilitation,” a “routine preservation,” or a “routine reconstruction.
[directive] 6.0.1  All allegations of officer misconduct shall be thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigated to their logical conclusion in conformance with this policy, regardless of whether the officer resigns or otherwise separates from the agency.  6.1  Time Limitations  6.1.1  It is vitally important that agencies complete internal affairs investigations in a prompt manner.  Long, unnecessary delays do not simply create additional uncertainty for the subject officer; they can also threaten the integrity of an investigation and the trust of the community.  6.1.2  Most internal affairs complaints are straightforward, and most of these routine complaints can be investigated and resolved quickly.  In many cases, an internal affairs investigation will take no more than 45 days from the receipt of the complaint to the filing of disciplinary charges.  The simpler the case, the quicker the inquiry should be completed.  6.1.3  In more complex matters, however, investigators sometimes need additional time to collect evidence, interview witnesses, or take other necessary investigative steps.  In addition, when an officer’s alleged conduct gives rise to a criminal investigation, ordinarily, internal affairs investigators should stay their own inquiry pending the resolution of the criminal matter.  6.1.4  If investigators are unable to complete an internal affairs investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive on or about the 45th day.3  In such situations, the law enforcement executive should seek to identify the reasons for the extended investigation and whether the internal affairs function requires additional resources or oversight to complete the inquiry in a prompt manner.  In addition, the law enforcement executive should ensure compliance with the “45-day rule” established by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, which requires that certain disciplinary charges be filed within 45 days of the date the person filing the charge obtained “sufficient information” to do so.
[brief] (2T 13:11 through 14).  The State introduced, and was admitted without objection, S2, specifically [...]’s BWC into evidence.  (Da; 2T 10 through 16).  Notably, in the video, you cannot hear or see any of the 6 officers knock or announce their presence, as required by the search warrant.  On cross-examination, [...], conceded that there was no explanation or reason for not putting his BWC on before entering the building and assembling in front of the door.  He testified that there were no exigent circumstances that would justify not placing his body worn camera on.  (2T 13:19 through 23).  He conceded that he should have put his bodycam on prior to assembling in front of the door, and prior to members of law enforcement purportedly knocking and announcing.  He acknowledged the presence of both an AG directive as well as a [...] policy that required him to activate his BWC on “whenever we make contact with an individual. ” (2T 15:5 through 24).  He acknowledged the July 28, 2015 AG Directive that indicated that BWC shall be required to be activated in instances where an officer is making an arrest or when an officer is conducting any kind of search.  He conceded that he knew when he got set in the “stack” outside the apartment, that he would coming into contact with [...], as [...] has previously opened his door to pick up the package.  (2T 16:2 through 11).  Lastly, [...] indicated that he “should have” put his body cam on prior to going onto that floor.  (2T 19:2 through 7).  The State did not call any other witnesses, but stipulated to the fact that four other officers body worn camera footage were provided in discovery and all those body worn cameras were activated by their respective officers only after entering the apartment, in violation of the aforementioned directive and policies listed above.
[brief] In addition, the DEP’s 2020 New Jersey Scientific Report on Climate Change provides the unambiguous and inconvenient truth that “…Human activities, particularly the emissions of heat trapping greenhouse gases from the burning of fossil fuels and land use changes like deforestation, have increased atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations by more than one third since the early 1900s (Bereiter et al. 2015) and are now the primary driver of climate change (Global Change 2020). ”  See DEP’s 2020 Report on Climate Change.  Critically, the DEP reported that “New Jersey’s water quality will be impaired as extreme precipitation events increase runoff, bringing excess sediment and contaminants to New Jersey’s streams. ”  [Id. at xi.]  The proposed project is going to significantly increase downstream GHG emissions and induce demand for greater upstream fossil fuel extraction and, therefore, significantly exacerbate climate change impacts to water quality in New Jersey.  The DEP’s overly narrow focus on only wastewater, to satisfy its broad legislative mandate to protect from all sources of potential water pollution, echoes and reflects some of the opening sentiments expressed this morning at the first day of the COP27 summit in Egypt.
[brief] The respondent, like the PCR court in addressing the defendant’s claims, on the one hand states the defendant failed to offer certifications or affidavits in support of his claims concerning trial counsel’s ineffective representation for failing to investigate and obtain experts for his suppression hearing and trial.  (Da 89 to 94)  On the other hand, respondent goes on to mention only the certification of [...], Private Investigator, and to minimize the impact of the certification by engaging in speculative credibility assessments which defendant argues is the same error made by the PCR judge.  The respondent does not address the certifications of Forensic Expert [...] (Aa 21 to 23), and [...] (Aa 24 to 26).  Also, the respondent overlooks defendant’s argument that this approach is contrary to State v. Porter, supra, as there is no substitute for placing a witness on the stand and having the testimony scrutinized by an impartial fact finder.  The defendant asserts that the failure of the PCR court to grant an evidentiary hearing based on the multiple certifications offered in support of the defendant’s PCR claims pursuant to Porter, supra, warrants a reversal of the order denying the PCR petition and a remand for an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] Trial commenced with jury selection on April 25 and April 26, 2023.  The presentation of evidence began on May 3, 2023.  Following a lengthy trial, the jury returned a no-cause verdict in favor of defendant, concluding that he did not breach a duty to provide informed consent and that he did not deviate from accepted standards of medical practice.  8T79-13 to 80-6.  An order for final judgment was entered on May 25, 2023.  (Pa14)  ---
[brief] *(NJ Zoning and Land Use Administration, Cox and Koenig, 2023, pp175-176 Section 12-1 and 12-1.2)*  Plaintiff was obligated to apply a zoning permit and chose not to, ignoring that his zoning application had been “denied” (Pa123a).  It is well settled that if the improvement was constructed without appropriate approvals, and those approvals were later denied, the structure must be rebuilt to conform with zoning requirements.  *Sherman v. Zoning Board of Adjustment*  242 NJ Super 421 (App. Div.); cert. den. 122 NJ 404 (1990).  The Board found that the plaintiff had acted inappropriately and the HPC was well within their rights to deny the application based on materials and issues presented.  It is well settled that an HPC may deal with the question of whether a particular proposed alteration blends aesthetically with existing buildings in the vicinity in order to retain the character of the particular street scape (*Cox and Koenig, supra*, at Section 4-1.8, pp.50)
[brief] (Pa 540\ Deposition Testimony of [...] at 6:23-25.).  [...] stated in his deposition testimony that he is the President and the sole owner/principal of [...].  (Pa 541).  Several grant applications by the [...] were sent to [...] to secure funding for roadway improvements along Kearny Avenue, including a Municipal Aid Application for 2021 that included roadway improvements to an area on Kearny Avenue south of the subject accident location.  The application included, but was not limited to, photographs of exemplar deteriorated conditions within the aforementioned limits of Kearny Avenue.  (Pa 281).  [...] was hired to repave the roadway that is the subject of the Plaintiffs Complaint and began working on that project on April 7, 2020.  The town awarded this firm the project on October 6, 2020 and the work was completed by July 21, 2021.  (Pa 219: Deposition Testimony of [...] at 69:18-21.).
[brief] 1.  The proposed use satisfies the positive criteria of the Municipal Land Use Law as it promotes two separate purposes of zoning under the Municipal Land Use Law, and the site is particularly suitable for the proposed use (Pa47); and 2.  The proposed use (a) promotes the general welfare and (b) promotes a desirable visual environment and, therefore, satisfies two purposes of zoning set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2a and 40:55D-21.
[brief] But, he noted, as people get older, they realize that magic is all “tricks” and “illusions. ”  (9T 197-10 to 13)  And “as a grown man with kids of [his] own,” the prosecutor said that he finds magic “fascinating [] because the best tricks are the ones that you can look at . . . and [say] I know they’re going to try to trick me.  . . .  And they still get you.  They still trick you.  You still don’t know how they did it. ”  (9T 197-14 to 22)  Finally, the prosecutor observed that magicians “use distraction” to trick their audiences.  (9T 197-23)  And, like magicians, the State told the jury that “a lot of what the defense wants you to believe are distractions. ”  (9T 198-5 to 6)  The prosecutor then analyzed the evidence from trial and characterized many of defense counsel’s arguments as “distractions.”
[brief] Martin v. Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320, 323 (App. Div. 2002).  Plaintiff cannot rely upon his own “feeling” without competent evidential support to defeat summary judgement.  Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 441 (2005).  Bare conclusions by the non-moving party, without factual support cannot defeat summary judgment.  Brae Asset Fund, L.P. v. Newman, 327 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (App. Div. 1999).  Evidence in opposition to summary judgment must be admissible, competent evidence.  Jeter v. Stevenson, 284 N.J. Super. 229, 233 (App. Div. 1995) (citing Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424, 427 (App. Div. 1993)).  For opposition to be considered "competent" for the purposes of opposing summary judgment, it must be record evidence that is beyond mere “speculation and fanciful arguments. ”  Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425-26 (App. Div. 2009)).
[brief] (RULING AT 11T 18-1 TO 27-22; DA 7 TO 9).  The trial judge imposed a sentence for murder of 60 years, 85% without parole.  (11T 18-1 to 27-22; Da 7 to 9)  In doing so, he claimed to find four factors in aggravation -- the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s prior record, the likelihood of recidivism, and the need for deterrence.  (11T 19-10 to 21-20)  He also claimed to find one mitigating factor -- that defendant’s imprisonment would cause his family great hardship.  (11T 23-12 to 18), and he claimed to give that factor “moderate weight. ”  (11T 26-24)  Defendant urges that a resentencing remand is necessary -- if for some reason his convictions are not otherwise reversed -- for the following reasons.  Twice recently, the Supreme Court has made clear that above and beyond a finding and balancing of relevant factors, every sentencing decision must make clear why the judge independently believes the overall length of the term imposed is warranted.  State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 347-352 (2019); State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 270 (2021).  Here, the judge, beyond reciting the factors, said little about why a 60-year term -- effectively a life sentence for a man sentenced at age 38 as was defendant -- as opposed to some lesser sentence of 50 or even 40 years, was needed, especially in a case where the mitigating factor was worth “moderate” weight.  The judge’s failure to do a real Torres/Cuff analysis warrants a remand.  The Court has made clear in State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65-68 (2014), that the sentencing court “must explain” every finding that it makes related to sentencing.  Because that clearly was not done here with respect to the length of the overall term, a remand for resentencing is necessary if defendant’s convictions are not reversed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] “A defendant's claims about rehabilitation have to be weighed against the criminal history, and include, when possible, objective information in the record such as the offense circumstances. ”  Ibid.  Here, the judge did precisely what is prescribed by case law.  He weighed defendant’s claims of rehabilitation against objective information in the record, such as the circumstances of the crime.  As the judge explained, “[y]ou don’t commit an act like this and have all of a sudden a lesser risk of reoffending . . . .  If you can do that once, what can you do?  . . .  Anything.” (5T89:1-5).  See Locane, 454 N.J. at 125 (discussing case law where the severity of the acts committed properly supported aggravating factor three).
[brief] (See Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, at Point II(B)).  Second, the trial court’s construction of Section 13.1 renders illusory Plaintiff’s right to insist upon specific performance (as expressly stated in Section 13.1) because it presents Plaintiff with the Hobson’s Choice of either (1) waiting indefinitely to see if [...] eventually closes with the Fee Owner, while leaving its Deposit in place, even after [...] plainly signaled its intention not to fulfill its obligations to Plaintiff under the PSA; or (2) asking for return of the Deposit and thereby forfeiting its rights to pursue specific performance or damages, if and when [...] later closes on the deal with the Fee Owner, cutting Plaintiff out.  (See Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, at Point II(B); see also [...] Br., at 18 (stating that Plaintiff had to “wait and see if the [...] transaction would close,” leaving the Deposit in place indefinitely, if it wanted to preserve its right to demand specific performance)).
[brief] Email from [...], Esq., [...], to [...], Environmental Specialist, Division of Land Use Regulation, DEP, Transmitting HAD application, Aug. 28, 2020.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0019 Cover Letter from [...], [...], to [...], Environmental Specialist, Division of Land Use Regulation, DEP, Aug. 28, 2020.
[brief] ”  [AB30a].  More than a decade later, on July 11, 2022, Plaintiff submitted to the trial court a “Notice of Motion” seeking a declaratory judgment that the trial court is “bound by the prior Supreme Court opinions” and asserting that the summary judgment motion deprived him of his right to a jury trial.  [Da7 - Da16].  On July 13, 2022, the Bergen County assignment judge at the time, the Hon. [...], entered an order *sua sponte* dismissing Plaintiff’s July 11, 2022 Notice of Motion as frivolous pursuant to prior Assignment [...]’s March 9, 2012 injunctive order.  [Da17 - Da18].  On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff submitted to the trial court a “Notice of Motion” nearly identical to his July 11, 2022 Notice of Motion, seeking a declaratory judgment that the trial court is “bound by the prior Supreme Court opinions” and asserting that the summary judgment motion deprived him of his right to a jury trial.  [Da19 - Da28].  On November 17, 2022, the Bergen County assignment judge, the Hon. [...], again, entered an order *sua sponte* dismissing Plaintiff’s November 14, 2022 Notice of Motion as frivolous pursuant to prior Assignment [...]’s March 9, 2012 injunctive order.
[brief] Ia.2 BULLETIN NO. 22-11 ...............................................................................................................  Ia.7 ORDER ON MOTION (MAY 30, 2023) .................................................................................  Ia.9 ORDER ON MOTION (JANUARY 23, 2024) ....................................................................... Ia.10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Chesterbrooke Ltd. P'ship v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Chester, 237 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1989) .................................................. 15, 17, 20 Coalition for Quality Health Care v. New Jersey Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 348 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................... 16, 19 Gill v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 404 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2008) .......................................................... 16 In re Provision of Basic Generation Serv. for Period Beginning June 1 2008, 205 N.J. 339, 349-59 (2011) ........................................................................... 18 Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313 (1984) .................................................................................. 2, 12, 14, 19 Warner Co. v. Sutton, 270 N.J. Super. 658 (App. Div. 1994) ...................................................... 15, 21 Zirger v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327 (1996)
[brief] In the instant case, the restriction at issue, the ordinance with the Distance Regulation, was already in place and it is well settled that it is “not the function of the board of adjustment or the planning board to decide constitutional questions. ”  Messer v. Burlington, 172 N.J. Super. 479, 487, 412 A.2d 1059, 1063 (Super. Ct. 1980), citing, Honigfeld v. Byrnes, 14 N.J. 600, 603-604 (1954); Jantausch v. Verona, 41 N.J. Super. 89, 96 (Law Div.1956), aff’d, 24 N.J. 326 (1957).  “Questions of law are the peculiar province of the courts. ”  Id.  Indeed, under New Jersey law, planning boards do not have the power to determine the constitutionality of ordinance.  See, N.J. Stat. § 40:55D-25 (“Powers of planning board”).  Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the Distance Regulation is unconstitutional because the Planning Board failed to develop a sufficient evidential record to establish the constitutionality of the Distance Regulation at the variance hearing is meritless.  Indeed, the Planning Board’s lack of authority to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Distance Regulation was pointed to Plaintiff by the Planning Board Chairman at the initial variance hearing.  (See, 3/20/23 Transcript @ T73:25-T74:4) (“It's not really the purpose of this board to determine what the governing body was thinking when they passed the law.  We are typically charged with how far to break that law in layman's terms.  So, I qualified it as layman's terms. ”).  Nonetheless, Plaintiff pressed forward and based its argument for the variance on the non-constitutionality of the Distance Regulation, which, as will be explained in further detail below, was, unsurprisingly, not persuasive to the majority of the Planning Board members.  Furthermore, because this case concerned an existing ordinance not the adoption of a new ordinance, [...]’s codified statements are sufficient evidence of "substantial governmental interests" as a matter of law.
[brief] (Pa1).  At the time of the accident, Plaintiff [...] maintained an auto insurance policy with Defendant [...], which contained PIP benefits.  (Pa1-2).  After the subject accident, [...] made PIP payments on the policy.  (Pca80-84).  For reasons unknown to [...], some medical bills were also submitted to the Plaintiff’s health insurance carrier, who also made payments on bills allegedly related to the subject accident.  (See, Pca1-4)  Thereafter, that carrier asserted a lien against the Plaintiff.  (Id.)  On or about October 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Demand for Arbitration with [...].