[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s CEPA Claim is Analyzed Under the McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework.  When employment cases, such as CEPA claims, rely on circumstantial evidence, this Court applies the McDonnell Douglas three-part burden-shifting test.  See Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 400 N.J. Super. 474, 492 (App. Div. 2008).  This test, established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and adopted by New Jersey courts in CEPA cases, provides a structured method for determining whether an employer’s action was motivated by retaliatory intent.  It operates in three stages: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; (2) the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action; and (3) the plaintiff must ultimately demonstrate that the reason given by the defendant is pretextual.  See Kolb, supra., 360 N.J. Super. at 478.  Plaintiff’s evidentiary burden at the prima facie stage is low, which acknowledges that requiring greater proof would prevent a plaintiff from accessing the tools – evidence of the employer’s motivation – necessary to even begin to assemble a case.  See Zive v. Stanley Roberts, 182 N.J. 436, 448 (2005).  “The prima facie case is to be evaluated solely on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, irrespective of defendants’ efforts to dispute that evidence. ”  See Zive, 182 N.J. at 448.  The matter then moves to the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis when the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action.  Id.  If Defendants satisfy that burden, then in the third stage the burden of production shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason articulated by Defendants is merely a pretext for discrimination or retaliation and not the true reason for the employment decision.  Id.  On the last prong of pretext, Plaintiff does not need to provide direct evidence.  Instead, a plaintiff proves retaliation by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact-finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence” and is a pretext for discrimination.  See DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528 (App. Div. 2005); see also Greenberg v. Camden County, 310 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1998) (evidence that employer who failed to hire a teacher was “not providing the whole story” and whose words were contradicted by its acts was sufficient to require reversal of summary judgment).  In response to a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff need not meet the ultimate burden of persuasion, but must only cast such serious doubt on the veracity of the employer’s articulated legitimate reason as to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that the employer was motivated to act for the retaliatory reason alleged by plaintiff.  See Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 422, 432 (App. Div. 1995).  There are no “exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference. ”  Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).  B.