ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] E.  **In the alternative, the matter should be remanded to the trial court for a plenary hearing on the issue of whether Appellant actually signed the purported Arbitration Agreement.  (Not Raised Below)**  There is no dispute that Respondents moved under R. 4:6-2(e) to dismiss Appellant’s Complaint and Jury Demand and compel arbitration.  However, because the parties requested that the trial court decide the motion on “matters outside the pleadings,” to wit, the Certification of [...] and the alleged Agreement itself, the trial Court, pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e), should have treated Respondents’ motions as summary judgment motions under R. 4:46, and therefore, applied the standards articulated in Brill v. The Guardian Life Ins. Company of America, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995) when deciding same.  Under the standard established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Brill, a determination of whether there exists a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  142 N.J. at 523 (emphasis added).  The judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.  Id. at 540.  A plenary hearing is used to resolve genuine issues of material fact in dispute.  Eaton v. Grau, 368, N.J. Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 2004); Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 47; Adler v. Adler, 229 N.J. Super. 496, 500 (App. Div. 1988).  Genuine disputes over issues of fact are those having substance as opposed to insignificance.  Cokus v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., 362 N.J. Super. 366, 370 (Law Div. 2002), aff’d o.b., 362 N.J. Super. 245, cert. denied, 178 N.J. 32 (2003).  Here, to the extent that the Appellate Division has any reservations about Appellant’s arguments herein, we respectfully request that the matter be remanded to the trial court to hold a plenary hearing because there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived her statutorily-prescribed right to trial by a jury of her peers for claims of discrimination pursuant to the NJLAD.
[brief] (6T37-8 to 10).  She testified that serology was conducted on a black mask, white Nike sneakers, jeans from defendant, a gray Puma hooded sweatshirt from defendant, swabs of suspected blood from a semiautomatic firearm, swabs from a revolver, and swabs from the cylinder release pin from the revolver.  (6T52-11 to 17).  Blood was indicated on the heel area of the right sneaker, the right front area of the jeans that were seized from defendant, the right front pocket of the jeans that were seized from defendant, the right sleeve near the thumb hole of the sweatshirt that was seized from defendant, the front left chest area of the sweatshirt that was seized from defendant, and the swabs of suspected blood from the semi-automatic firearm.  (6T53-3 to 9).  Saliva was discovered on the black mask.  (6T53-14 to 17).  The items were also tested to determine if there was comparable DNA.  Numerous items had an insufficient amount of DNA detected for purposes of comparison.  (6T54-18 to 24; 6T55-12 to 25).  However, [...] was able to obtain a DNA profile from the mask and determined that given the mixture of DNA obtained from the mask, it is approximately 45,500 times more likely if the DNA is a mixture of co-defendant [...] and two unknown individuals than a mixture of three unknown individuals, which “provides strong support that [co-defendant [...]] is a contributor to this DNA profile. ” (6T56-12 to 57-17).  Defendant and the victim were excluded as possible contributors to the mixture.  (6T57-22 to 58-3).  [...] also testified that she was able to obtain a single source DNA profile from the heel area of defendant’s sneaker.  (6T58-9 to 12).  She stated that, given the DNA profile obtained from this item, it was “approximately 26.1 quadrillion times more likely if [defendant] is the source of the DNA than an unknown individual[,]” which provides very strong support that defendant is the source of the DNA profile obtained.  (6T58-13 to 21).  [...] similarly testified that a single profile was obtained from defendant’s jeans and his sweatshirt and that given the DNA profile obtained from these items were, respectively, approximately 25.8 quadrillion times more likely and 25.7 quadrillion times more likely if defendant was the source of the DNA than an unknown individual, which provides very strong support that defendant was the source of the DNA profile.  (6T59-5 to 61-16).  Additionally, [...] testified about the DNA results that were obtained from the semi-automatic handgun.  (6T61-17 to 20).  Specifically, she testified that a single DNA profile was obtained and given the DNA obtained from the firearm, it was approximately 25.9 quadrillion times more likely if defendant was the source of the DNA than an unknown individual.  (6T62-1 to 5).  [...] stated that his value provides very strong support that defendant was the source of the DNA from the semi-automatic firearm.  (6T62-5 to 6; 6T94-1 to 10).  [...] [...] testified as an expert in the field of cellular telephone record analysis.
[directive] A reasonable belief is an objective assessment based upon an evaluation of how a reasonable officer with comparable training and experience would react to, or draw inferences from, the facts and circumstances confronting and known by the officer at the scene.  Serious Bodily Injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  Serious bodily injury and serious bodily harm have the same definition the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(d).
[directive] Definitions  2.1  Authorized Tire Deflation Device.  A device designed and intended to produce a controlled deflation of one or more tires of a pursued vehicle and capable of operation consistent with criteria established in this Policy.  2.2  Boxing In.  The surrounding of a violator’s moving vehicle with moving pursuit vehicles which are then slowed to a stop along with the violator's vehicle.  2.3  Divided Highway.  A road which includes a physical barrier between traffic traveling in opposite directions.  2.4  Heading Off.  An attempt to terminate a pursuit by pulling ahead of, behind, or toward a violator's moving vehicle to force it to the side of the road or to otherwise come to a stop.  2.5  Law Enforcement Officer.  Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any State, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.  The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall include State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A.  40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.  For purposes of this policy, the terms law enforcement officer, police officer and officer shall have the same meaning.  2.6  Paralleling.  Street Paralleling is driving a police vehicle on a street parallel to a street on which a pursuit is occurring.  Vehicle  Paralleling is a deliberate offensive tactic by one or more patrol vehicles to drive alongside the pursued vehicle while it is in motion.  2.7  Pursuit Driving.  Pursuit driving is an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle and utilizing emergency warning lights and an audible device to apprehend one or more occupants of another moving vehicle when the officer reasonably believes that the driver of the fleeing vehicle is aware of the officer's attempt to stop the vehicle and is resisting apprehension by increasing vehicle speed, committing traffic violations or otherwise attempting to elude the officer.  It shall not constitute pursuit driving if the fleeing vehicle follows all traffic regulations after the officer activates the emergency warning lights and audible device (siren).  2  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] In New Jersey, "[a] confession obtained during a custodial interrogation may not be admitted in evidence unless law enforcement officers first informed the defendant of his or her constitutional rights."  *State v. Hreha*, 217 N.J. 368, 382 (2014) (citing *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 444).  The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a waiver “was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances,” in other words, the totality of the circumstances.  *Presha*, 163 N.J. at 313; *State v. Nyhammer*, 197 N.J. 383, 402-03 (2009).  In the totality of the circumstances analysis, courts look to factors such as the defendant’s “age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved. ”  *Nyhammer*, 197 N.J. at 403 (quoting *Presha*, 163 N.J. at 313).  A defendant’s previous encounters with law enforcement has been mentioned as an additional relevant factor.  *State v. Miller*, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978).  Only under very limited circumstances do courts apply a per se rule, such as the requirement to advise a defendant when the police have issued a criminal complaint or arrest warrant.  See *A.G.D.*, 178 N.J. at 68.  However, in *State v. Sims*, our high Court distinguished the bright-line rule in *A.D.G.*, and rejected a rule that would have required police to disclose their prediction, based on information known to them at the time of the interrogation, of what charges may be filed.  250 N.J. 189, 215 (2022).  Instead, the Court emphasized trial courts consider these factors in its totality of the circumstances analysis.  *Id.* at 216.
[brief] October 6, 2024  Order Denying JNOV .................................................. 665  March 11, 2024  Order Granting Defendant's Fee Application ............... 667  February 12, 2024  Sua Sponte Order .....................................................  669  September 25, 2020  Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss .....  722 August 5, 2022  Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Discovery .... 802  December 17, 2021  Order to Amend Complaint and Extend Discovery ...  1647 August 4, 2023  Order of Deposition .................................................... 1705 ¹
[brief] ........................................................................ 64, 69 Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County Hackensack River Sanitary Sewer Dist. Auth., 18 N.J. 294 (1955) ..................................................  61  Tidewater Oil Company v. Camden Securities Company, 49 N.J. Super. 155 (Ch. Div. 1958) ..............................................  50, 51-52  United States v. General Motors Corp., 226 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1955) ...........  62 Vartenissian v. Food Haulers, Inc., 193 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 1984).  ...  62 Vide, Silsby v. Trotter , 29 N.J. Eq. 228 (Ch.1878) .....................................  54  Village of Ridgewood v. Boldger Found., 104 N.J. 337 (1986)  ....................
[directive] (See Feature A)  Approved by:  Offense involved booby traps or fortification.  If “Yes”, defendant must plead to drug 9 9 9 Yes No Unk charge and 2C:35-4.1b or c with consecutive terms.  (See Feature B)  Offense involved violence which is subject to the No Early Release Act.  If “Yes”, the 9 9 9 Yes No Unk defendant must plead to drug charge and violent crime.  (See Feature C1)  Offense involved bodily injury (add 6 months) or significant bodily injury (add 12 months).  9 9 9 Yes No Unk (See Feature C2).  Defendant actually or constructively possessed an assault firearm or machine gun; or brandished, pointed, discharged or threatened to discharge any firearm; or was in 9 9 9 Yes No Unk immediate personal possession of any firearm.  If “Yes” defendant must plead to drug charge and 2C:39-4.1 with consecutive terms.  (See Feature D)  Offense occurred while under supervision (e.g. parole, probation, ISP, etc.) (add 6 months)
[brief] The ALJ’s Initial Decision  The June 29, 2023 ID states that the ALJ accepted as fact certain testimony of Petitioner’s medical expert, [...], which testimony was summarized in the ID as follows:  In the absence of a Report of Injury, Weiss believed any reference to a 2009 accident or incident was simply a typographical error and was most likely meant to say “2000. ”  Weiss did not have all the medical records in evidence when he prepared his report, including medical records by [...] from 2004, narrative report from [...] from 2006 and narrative reports from [...] and [...] dated 2006.  (Pa79).  Despite not having Petitioner’s prior medical records when he prepared his report, the ALJ also accepted as fact that “Weiss found both 2000 and 2004 ‘remote’ when dealing with the [2015] Incident. ” (Pa79).  With regard to the testimony of the Board’s medical expert, [...], the ALJ stated that “Petitioner never told Lakin about a 2009 incident during the physical examination. ” (Pa80).  However, the ALJ failed to include [...]’s testimony that Petitioner failed to tell [...] about any prior incidents and injuries, including his testimony that “when I asked of prior injuries there was no mention of the injury in 2002” and “no mention of the injury in 2004 with lifting a box. ” (3T14:6-11) (Pa76-92).  In the Legal Analysis and Conclusions section of the ID, the ALJ stated:
[brief] Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................3  POINT I ..............................................................................................................................................3  PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RETROACTIVELY CREATE A RECORD IN ITS APPELLATE  BRIEFING IN A TRANSPARENT  ATTEMPT TO TRY AND SATISFY  THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED IN Mt. Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005)  ..........................................................................................................................................................................................3  POINT II ..............................................................................................................................................7  THE TOWNSHIP’S COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN ACT AND OFFER TO PAY CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED  JUST COMPENSATION ARE NOT PROPER CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS RIGHT TO TAKE CHALLENGE  .........................................................................................................................7  POINT III .............................................................................................................................................8  COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE EMINENT DOMAIN ACT AUTHORIZES THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM TO ADJUDICATE ALL ISSUES RELATED TO A GOVERNMENT TAKING .................................................................................................................................8  POINT IV ..........................................................................................................................................10  A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO A PRIVATE PARTY IS NOT A VALID PUBLIC USE AND THE CONTRACT HERE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE TAKING OF DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTIES  .........................................................................................................................................................................................10  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................11  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin,** | | | 320 N.J. Super. 342 (Law. Div. 1998) | 7 | | **Essex Fells v. Kessler Inst. Of Rehab.,** | | | 289 N.J. Super. 329 (Law Div. 1995) | 7 | | **Mt. Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C.,** | | | 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005) | 3, 4, 5 | | **White Road, HOA, LLC v. Twp.
[brief] On August 2, 2023, [...]’s Motion was granted (Trans ID: [...]).  On August 4, 2023, [...] moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s August 2, 2023 Order (Trans ID: [...]).  While [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration was pending, on September 6, 2023, [...] moved to transfer the matter from the Special Civil Part to the Law Division.  (Da13).  On September 8, 2023, while [...]’s Motion to Transfer was pending, the trial court entered an Order granting [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration based on defective service of [...]’s Motion, thereby reinstating the default judgment against [...] (Trans ID: [...]).  On September 20, 2023, [...] renewed his Motion to Vacate Default Judgment in the Collection Lawsuit.  (Da15).  On October 6, 2023, [...]’s Motion to Transfer to the Law Division was granted and the matter was docketed as [...].  (Da56).  Due to the fact that the default judgment had been reinstated while the Motion to Transfer was pending, the renewed Motion to Vacate Default Judgment was adjudicated in the Law Division.
[brief] ” (Id. at 41-42 (citations omitted)).  In their Supplemental Memorandum, defendants assert that plaintiffs have no “real evidence demonstrating that privilege or work product doctrine does not apply” to the documents on the log.  (Defs’ Supp’l Mem. at 5).  Plaintiffs reply that they have sufficiently met and conferred about their request to include subject lines for emails on the privilege log, as the May 10, 2021, Local Rule 37 letter “explicitly challenged [...]’s vague privilege descriptions and [...] refused to provide more specific descriptions” during the parties’ May 20, 2021, meet and confer call.
[brief] | 12 | | In re Farnkopf, 363 N.J. Super. 382.  | 15 | | Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289 | 12 | | Malinowski v. Jacobs, 189 N.J. | 13 | | Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274 | 12 | | Savona v. Di Giorgio Corp., 360 N.J. Super. 55 | 15 | | Shore Orthopaedic Group, LLC v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 397 N.J. Super. 614 | 14,15 | | Tyler v. Hennepin County | | | 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023) | 3,5,7,8,9,11,12,13,15,16 | | Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106.  | 15 | | Wolosky v. Fredon Tp., 472 N.J. Super. 315 | 15 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] C.  Improper Considerations  In addition to the insufficient analysis and consideration of the variance criteria, the Board improperly considered off-site projects and hypothetical scenarios from those projects without any evidence regarding same in rejecting the Application.  This included discussion of an apparent “major redevelopment” in town unrelated to this application.  (Pa284 to Pa287).  This also included concerns about traffic from a Veterans Affairs clinic potentially being developed in the area.  (Pa489).  It also included further concerns about “horrendous traffic” that was completely contrary to the evidence presented.  (Pa491).  In addition, there were unsubstantiated concerns about the drainage system potentially failing at some point that was cited as support for voting against the Application.  (Pa490).  The Board members also inaccurately referred to the Application as an expansion of a non-conforming use and cited that as a reason for voting against the Application.  (Pa484; Pa492).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Id. at 534.  Thus, and even “dilapidated housing, with interiors in disarray and in deplorable condition,” may not be abandoned.  Ibid.  The Court explained that a police officer may be familiar with an unoccupied building with missing doors and broken windows, and an interior in utter shambles and lacking electricity, and reasonably conclude that the structure is abandoned.  The decrepit condition of the exterior and interior of a building is a factor, but other circumstances will necessarily come into play.  For example, the boarding of windows and bolting of doors of a shabby-looking building will suggest an intent to keep people out by a person exercising control over the property and therefore may be evidence that conflicts with abandonment.  [Ibid.]  Applying that analysis, the Brown Court upheld the trial court's suppression of gun and drug evidence seized through the warrantless search of a dilapidated row house that the police apparently believed was abandoned.
[brief] REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATION WITH BPU DOCKET NO. [...]  54.  The instant Petition is obviously very closely related to [...]'s prior Petition to the BPU concerning the Regulator Station at the Original Proposed Site in [...], which, as discussed herein above, is currently pending before the Board and the OAL in BPU Docket No. [...], OAL Docket No. [...].  Because the two matters are inextricably interrelated, [...] requests that the Board consolidate this Petition with the pending matter under Docket No. [...], and transmit this matter to the OAL with a request that it be consolidated there with OAL Docket No. [...].  Consolidation of the two matters will result in administrative economy.  IX.  REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF 55.  [...] designed the Facility to provide much needed reliability and supply security to the residents of [...] and surrounding municipalities.  As a result, [...] requests an expedited review of this Petition to avoid any delays in the completion of the Regulator Station, so that it will be operational by the 2018-2019 heating season.  WHEREFORE, [...] requests that the Board: (1) determine that the location and construction of the Regulator Station, as more specifically described herein, is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience and welfare of the public; (2) determine that no alternative site or sites are reasonably available for the Regulator Station to achieve an equivalent public benefit; (3) order that the zoning, site plan review and all other Municipal Land Use Ordinances or Regulations promulgated under the MLUL, including specifically the Zoning and Land Use Ordinances and all regulations promulgated thereto by [...], shall have no application to the Regulator Station, and authorize the Company to construct the Facility as set forth in the Petition and supporting testimony and exhibits; and grant such other and further relief as may be required.