ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] 59a-61a.  Immediately after the verdict was returned, the State moved to dismiss the remaining count of the indictment, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon.  On June 3, 2022, the defense submitted a motion for judgment of acquittal which it supported with a brief filed on July 1, 2022.  62a.  The State submitted a motion for an extended term on June 1, 2022.  64a.  On August 5, 2022, the court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.  65a.  On the same date, the court granted the State’s motion for an extended term.  66a.  The trial court then entered a Judgment of Conviction as to Defendant and, on the charge of reckless manslaughter, sentenced [...] to twenty years in New Jersey State Prison pursuant to the provisions of the No Early Release Act.
[brief] Id.  However, the “mere assertion of discrimination unsupported by any facts is not sufficient to shift the burden to the employer[.]”  Reilly v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 725, 730 (D.N.J. 1987).  In addition to proving such prima facie elements, a plaintiff must further support the second element that the employee could perform the essential functions of employment with reasonable accommodation. ”  Victor, 401 N.J. Super. at 614-615.  Specifically, “the employee must show the employer was informed of the disability, the employee requested accommodation, the employer made no good faith effort to assist, and the accommodation could have been reasonably achieved. ”  Id. at 614-615 (emphasis added).  Indeed, the employer’s obligation to reasonably accommodate “is only triggered when the employer is made aware of the handicap and the employee requests an accommodation. ”  Grubb v. Garbutt, 2010 WL 3516847, *4 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Tynan, 351 N.J. Super. at 400-401) (UNPUB DEC. attached to the RSC Cert. as Exh. B).  While there may be no --- 3 Element three was recently clarified by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 531-532 (2021)(tangible adverse employment action need not be demonstrated).
[brief] Simply put, none of the circumstances relied upon in that case for the outcome are present in this matter.  The Westfield Ordinance presents entirely separate issues, such as the impairment of its contract with [...], the Legislative recognition and validation of that agreement (and in doing so, the Legislature’s recognition that state law was --- 3  Thus, it complied with the requirements for the issuance of an order after public hearing which are set forth in N.J.S.A. 48:2-23.  4  In the present matter, any review by the [...] and [...] was admitted by [...] to have been with respect to establishment of a third substation to this area of the grid, and not to the route by which it would be connected with existing substations.  DA-301a (“Q. Do you know if the ultimate route that's used has to be approved by either [...] or the BPU? A.  No, it does not. ”) not intended to be exclusive when it comes to placing poles and routing lines within the municipal rights-of-way), the limitation of the scope of the Ordinance to Westfield’s right-of-way and its complete inapplicability to other available routes over private property, and the absence of any conflict between the Ordinance and state law because of, *inter alia*, the exemption allowed under the Ordinance in the event it would otherwise conflict with state law.
[brief] ”  Angrisani v. Financial Technology Ventures, L.P., 402 N.J. Super. 138, 148 (App. Div. 2008).  Therefore, while it may be for the New Jersey Supreme Court to excise prejudice from the seven Cole factors, this Court need not give the prejudice factor the same weight that it gives the remaining six factors and, for the reasons articulated in Morgan, [...] urges this Court to give very little weight to the prejudice factor.
[brief] [...] as the owner/landlord had the opportunity to exercise reasonable care to correctly and clearly label the electrical panel and resolve the “trial and error” circuit breaker process.  That it chose not to take the necessary action to discover and/or ameliorate this risk because of the terms of existence of the “triple net lease” is not a compelling reason to evade liability.  New Jersey courts have previously found that a triple net lease is not a talisman that can be used to extinguish all claims of liability.
[brief] Defendants’ brief does address the trial court’s “suggestion” that an alternate, equitable basis supports its decision.  Section “D” of Defendants’ legal argument explains, as a matter of equity, Defendants are the least knowledgeable and least culpable party in all the subdivision transactions, and in reality, the parties are on even ground with regard to the respective equities.  Yet Defendants are charged with the Miller-[...] error, which is actually of significant (not de minimis) consequence, as Defendants do not want there to be a subdivision, just as the Plaintiffs objected to [...]’s subdivision when [...] owned Lot 3 and Plaintiffs were his neighbors.  (150a).  Ironically, Plaintiffs did not like the subdivision when [...] was doing it (Plaintiffs resolved their objection to [...]’s application by becoming the subdivider themselves), but now that Plaintiffs will personally profit from the subdivision, they cast Defendants as the “bad guys” for preferring not to lose their land to give someone else a subdivision.
[brief] State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 679 (1988).  The pat-down is reasonable only if “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in his belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. ”  State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 543 (1994) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).  In making the determination, however, “the officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed. ”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  Even in situations in which an officer does not believe a suspect is engaged or about to become engaged in violent criminal activity, the right to frisk for weapons during a permissible investigatory stop is frequently automatic where a police officer has a specific and objectively-credible reason to believe that the suspect is armed.
[brief] After stopping the car, [...] learned that the vehicle had been reported stolen so defendants were placed under arrest.  A search of the car revealed dark clothing -- clothes matching what the suspects were wearing during the robbery -- and a handgun hidden under the hood of the car.  Defendants [...], [...], and a third co-defendant were charged with a host of offenses related to the [...] robbery.  Nyema and Myers jointly moved to suppress the items seized during the search of the vehicle, arguing that the stop was unlawful because it was not based on reasonable suspicion.  The trial court denied the motion to suppress and both Myers and Nyema eventually pled guilty to first-degree robbery.  In separate appeals, both men challenged the denial of the motion to suppress, resulting in opposite Appellate Division outcomes.
[brief] Certification of [...] 4/15/2021 (Attached at Pa247)  Order Brought by [...] (Attached at Pa249)  Notice of Claim to [...] 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa053)  --- 7  Multiple documents under one exhibit cover page  Letter From [...] to [...] Municipal Complex 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078)  Communication Result Report 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa076)  [...]’ Letter to [...] and [...] 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa066)  Letter from [...] Public Safety to [...] Dated 9/30/2020 (Attached at Pa068)
[brief] In the factual circumstances here, the length of the restraint is overly broad.  The court in Community Hospital concluded that the length of the service to length of covenant ratio of 4:1 was reasonable and, therefore, upheld a two-year restriction against an 8-year employee.  In this case, [...] only worked for [...] for 5 years and [...] is seeking to restrain him for another 5 years.  That equates to a length of the service to length of covenant ratio of 1:1.  Under these circumstances, the 5-year restraint is an illegitimate restriction designed to thwart competition rather than protect [...]’s interest.  As such, the 5-year restriction should not be enforced.
[brief] Contrary to the public policy of the in Phillipsburg, supra, at 166, to impose strict limits upon the time and grounds for vacating a judgment of foreclosure than would apply generally under Rule 4:50-1, “another important purpose is to give the property owner the opportunity to redeem the certificate and reclaim his land.  Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304, 319 (2007).  See also, Sonderman v. Remmington Construction Co. 127 N.J. 96, 109 (1992), stating that “The primary purpose of the Tax Sale Law is not to divest owners of their property, but to provide a method of collecting taxes, citing Berkeley v. Berkeley Shore Water Co. 213 N.J.Super. 524, 553 (App. Div. 1986).
[brief] (Pb25) (“Under New Jersey law, it is clear than an employee cannot be compelled to waive his or her right to assert claims of discrimination under the NJLAD because employees . . . cannot, and should not, be forced to waive the broad remedies available under the NJLAD, including the right to a trial by jury .  . . .”).  But this suggestion is flatly contradicted by well-established precedent.  Martindale, 173 N.J. at 92 (“… it is well established that an employee may be bound by an agreement to waive his or her right to pursue a statutory claim in a judicial forum in favor of arbitration. ”); Flanzman, 244 N.J. at 138 (upholding a waiver of an employee’s right to pursue an age discrimination cause of action under the LAD before a judge or a jury in favor of an arbitration forum).  Skuse v. [...], 244 N.J. 30, 61 (2020) (holding that an employee’s failure to review the content of an email announcing the company’s arbitration agreement did not invalidate the arbitration agreement); Morgan, 225 N.J. at 309 (stating that “[n]o magical language is required to accomplish a waiver of rights in an arbitration agreement” and explaining that “[o]ur courts have upheld arbitration clauses that have explained in various simple ways that arbitration is a waiver of the right to bring suit in a judicial forum”) (internal citation omitted); Martindale, 173 N.J. at 81–82 (upholding an arbitration clause stating that “all disputes relating to [the party’s] employment . . . shall be decided by an arbitrator” and that the party had “waiv[ed] [her] right to a jury trial”).
[brief] Harris, supra, 6 Okla. L. Rev. at 132 (noting that no matter how explicit the instrument was under common law, there had to be a formal passing of seisin under the English property laws).  It has been said that the “inherent weakness of the common law’s evolutionary process” is that “its stringent rules of property survive in one form or --- 3See also [...], The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 607, 614 n.25 (1993) ("[...] & [...], PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 11 (2d ed. 1984).  Additionally, the transferor had to chant words of grant while handing the soil to the transferee.  Id.  In an age lacking detailed land records, this ceremony worked to engrave the transfer in the participants' memories and sufficed to notify feudal lords of the transaction.  Id. at 10-11.  Livery of seisin remained the dominant method of land transfer in England until 1536 and continued until 1845.
[brief] ”  And worse still, Respondents continue to advocate two expansive readings of Atalese that launch the FAA preemption concern to the extreme.  First, Respondents claim “there is no exception recognized by law for ‘sophisticated parties’ in consumer contracts. ” (Opp. Br. at 9 (citing Da1550) (citing Cnty. of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498, 503-04 (App. Div. 2023)).  The lower court distinguished cases with “commercial” contracts, but yet, the very consumer statute at issue explicitly applies, inter alia, to a “partnership, corporation, company, trust, business entity or association. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-1.  Notably, Respondents in signing the SPA agreed to become shareholders themselves in the non-profit condominium association, and agreed to a bevy of other risks, costs, and obligations, which are all part of the new, complex construction condominium transaction, which required voluminous disclosures mandated by law.  Considering the totality of the circumstances of the transaction, Respondents’ sophistication should be considered, as well as their obligation to read all the contractual disclosures, even if they did not sign the agreement using a corporate form.  Respondents also improperly contend that a court must disregard the actual consent of the parties even if expressed in the entirety of the contract documents.
[brief] The Procedural Context of the Case at the Time the Trial Court Granted Summary Judgment against [...] Regarding Liability for the Spill and Resulting Remediation Costs.  As a threshold matter, this Court should consider the procedural context of the case against [...] as of the date on which the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of [...].  By the time that [...] became a party to the litigation, [...] had obtained an Order for Final Judgment against [...] (based on an unopposed summary action Order to Show Cause (PPCIa076-79) – vacated in July 2022 (PPCIa122)) and the discovery end date had already passed (PPCIa355).  The initial discovery end date was a consequence of the fact that, when suit was filed, the case was mis-designated as a Track I case – despite the fact that the matter clearly arose out of environmental contamination and should have been assigned to Track IV.  (PPCIa043).  Counsel for [...] recognized this error and, on January 13, 2023, filed a motion to change the track assignment and extend discovery.  (PPCIa350-56).  However, apparently in consideration of [...]’s agreement to permit his withdrawal as counsel for [...], and without notice to, much less consent of, counsel for [...], [...]’s counsel agreed to withdraw his motion to change the track assignment.  (PPCIa362-65).  By that time, [...]’s motion for summary judgment against [...] had already been filed (PPCIa251-52) and, based on the erroneous discovery track designation, neither [...] nor [...] had any opportunity to engage in meaningful discovery.  Thus, at the time the trial court granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment against [...], the record in the case (particularly regarding the genuine issues of material fact, identified to the trial court by [...] in its later attempts for reconsideration of the trial court’s order against [...]), was effectively and unfairly barren.  C.
[brief] (Pa1248-50)  By Order dated May 5, 2020, the Supreme Court of New Jersey confirmed that the Judiciary Electronic Document Submission (JEDS) system is an approved electronic filing system.  (Pa1253-55).  Because JEDS is an approved electronic filing system and because both self-presented parties have been registered as participants under JEDS since June 2020, the relaxations of R. 1:5-2 and R. 1:5-3 applied to the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration filed on January 31, 2024.  For over three years since June 2020, both parties filed motions or OTSCs through JEDS and reciprocally served the motion papers exclusively via email without any objection from divorce trial judge [...].  The motion judge ought to have taken judicial notice of the Supreme Court orders permitting service of process by electronic filing under R. 1:5-2 but failed to do so.
[brief] The State tries to distinguish *State v. Fortin*, 178 N.J. 540 (2004) on the basis that Juror 12 did not know which of the members of the Freehold church that she had met were in fact [...]’s family members.  (Sb31)  The fact that she did not know who among her acquaintances were [...]’s family members does not change the fact that she knew that acquaintances of her and her husband, members of the Freehold church with whom Juror 12’s church “did fellowship a lot,” were family members of [...].  (24T9-6)
[brief] W.2d 136 (Iowa 2015) | 17, 18, 23| | State v. Wagner, 180 N.J. Super. 564 (App. Div. 1981) | 43 | | Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) | 37 | | United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991) | 38, 39 | | United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1986) | Passim | | STATUTES | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4)(k) | 4 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **STATUTES (CONT'D.)** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1a(2) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a(2) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3a(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 | 40 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3 | 40 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:52-57 | 39, 41 | | **RULES OF EVIDENCE** | | | N.J.R.E. 702 | Passim | | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 1 | 28 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 5 | 36 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 | 28 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10 | 14, 28 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 14 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 14, 36 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 14, 28 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.)
[brief] ”  (Pa151-152; 52,4-53,1)  [...] further testified that the revised grading plan was not to enhance views from the proposed homes.  It is a functionality of the site.  In response to the direct question “was it designed to allow an increased building height for these structures?” he responded, “As I mentioned, no, it hasn’t.”  (Pa152; 53,2-8)  [...]’s testimony was supported by the testimony of Borough planner [...].
[brief] (2T 78:17-79:22)  At minimum, Defendant knew that [...] was employed full time with an established employer – it would have been incredibly surprising if a retirement account of some type was not offered by that employer.  Defendant testified at trial that in their very first conversation, [...] told him that she had a checking account and the property in Toms River.  (2T 112:1-7)  Although she does not recall having any specific discussion about her assets (2T 59:18-25), if such a conversation did happen, it completely destroys Defendant’s assertion that [...] was dishonest about her assets, since her checking account is what accounted for almost all of her liquid assets, as she testified to at length during her cross-examination.  (2T 74:7-75:4; 77:14-80:15)  [...] admitted on the stand that he knew about her checking account from the beginning of their split.  Even putting that aside, [...] lived with [...] for twenty-three years and had access to financial records, including tax returns, that she kept at home.  He saw the mail from financial institutions that came to her at the house.  Indeed, given that [...] had an office of his own outside of the home, it is likely that more of Plaintiff’s financial records were accessible to Defendant than the reverse.  [...] alleged in his testimony that although Plaintiff did not have access to any of his financial documents, Plaintiff knew about his financial situation because his largest asset, a property in Florida, was being foreclosed on, and she knew about it.  (2T 118:18-119:14)  If that was true and it was what Plaintiff had to rely on, then Plaintiff’s understanding of Defendant’s finances would have been woefully inaccurate, which would only have been to her own detriment.
[brief] Decedent’s status as an “essential worker” was the only decision regarding the substantive part of this case that was made by [...].  Even after the “essential worker” finding by [...], the Petitioner still needs to prove that Decedent: 1) contracted the virus during the claimed occupational exposure period (January 2021 through her passing on May 18, 2021); and 2) that the Covid 19 virus was a material cause of her death.  In addition, the statutory presumption is rebuttable.  At trial, Respondent will have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Decedent contracted Covid 19 outside the workplace.  **FACTS RELATING TO THE RECUSAL ISSUE**
[directive] It does not address the lawful process for removing occupants via eviction or ejectment.  Page 4  Typically, the complainant will be an occupant  Who is the property’s occupant? • claiming that they were illegally evicted or threatened with illegal eviction.  The officers should attempt to determine whether the purported occupant in fact resides at the property.  The officers should make this determination based on the totality of the evidence, which can include witness interviews, proof of residency (such as a driver’s license or recent utilities bill), and/or an inspection of the premises.  Typically, the evicting party Who is evicting the occupant or attempting to do so? • will be the property owner or landlord.  In some cases, the eviction or attempted eviction will be performed by an agent of the landlord, such as employees of a property management company.  The officers should  Is the occupant no longer able to access their property?  • determine whether the occupant has in fact been denied access to their residence and is no longer able to reside at the property.  Has the evicting party removed the occupant in compliance with the state’s lawful •  Generally speaking, landlords can only evict tenants pursuant to eviction procedures? a valid “execution of warrant for possession,” which must be effectuated by a sheriff’s officer or other officer of the court.  N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.16.  Please note that so long as EO 106 and/or the CDC moratorium remain in effect, officers are prohibited from enforcing executions of warrant, and so as a practical matter 33-11.1.
[brief] However, a small portion of [...]’s covered costs were for remediation efforts directed at specific AOCs.  [...] excavated a dry well in AOC 22 and a pit degreaser located in AOC 30.  Because these costs are attributable to specific AOCs, they were allocated separately using the same methodology as was used for allocating the Site-wide costs.  (Pa0488; Pa0490; Pa0291).  policy period.  (Pa0487-88; Pa0490).  [...] calculated that $3,514,840.83 of [...]’s covered damages was allocated to [...]’s policy period.
[brief] The parties are to amend their pleadings to conform with Law Division procedures and will have the right to raise additional issues and plead such defenses as are appropriate. ”).  The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he legislative reason for the limited scope of review provided in N.J.S.A. 1:7-1, et seq., is apparent.  Procedural or mechanical issues are the type of questions easily inquired into, are usually lacking in factual dispute and can be raised and decided by the Appellate Division within a short period of time following the enactment of a law. ”  Id. at 468.  In McCabe, the Supreme Court ruled that the Appellate Division could only address procedural issues under N.J.S.A. 1:7-3.  If the issues went to substantive issues of constitutionality, then the Law Division would have jurisdiction.  The Court noted that under N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 that it was only focused on the “machinery of enactment. ”  Id. at 470.  Therefore, if Points 1 and 2 fail, Petitioners-Applicants respectfully request that the Court transfer this matter to the Law Division so the Petitioners-Applicants may challenge the substantive nature of the legislation.