ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................................................iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ..................................................v TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPENDIX ......................................................................................vi INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................3 STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS .........................................................................................6 POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AGAINST [...] DID NOT FALL UNDER THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION TO THE AOM STATUTE (50a–51a) .................................................................................................................................................................................................17 POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TORT CLAIMS AGAINST [...] WERE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS WHICH REQUIRED THE FILING OF AN AOM (50a–51a) .................................................................................................................................22 POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO STATE NEWLY DISCOVERED CLAIMS AGAINST [...] (376a–377a) .................................................................................................................................28 POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
[brief] Therefore, Atalese has been incorrectly branded as a per se rule that applies to all contracts.  As confirmed by the Court five years post Atalese, its standard is prescribed specifically to only certain adhesive consumer and employment contracts.  For all other commercial contracts subject to the FAA, ordinary contract principles must govern, with no particular form of words being necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights.  Id. at 444.  It is apparent that both “Atalese and Kernahan recognize there are no talismanic statements required when evaluating the enforceability of an arbitration clause.  Rather, both cases are tethered to basic contract principles about the lack of mutuality of assent.
[directive] Positional Asphyxiation.  Positional asphyxiation is insufficient intake of oxygen as a result of body position that interferes with the subject’s ability to breathe.  It can occur during the process of subduing and restraining a person by placing the person in a posture that prevents or impedes the mechanism of normal breathing.  If the person cannot escape from the position, death may occur very rapidly.  Restraint in the prone position presents a significant risk of asphyxia, particularly when a person is handcuffed and left in a face-down position.  As soon as handcuffed and restrained, a person should be raised immediately to a seated or standing position that does not impede the mechanism of normal breathing.
[brief] Order of Honorable [...], J.S.C. confirming the January 5, 2018 award..................................................................................................................3153a July 13, 2018  Order of Honorable [...], J.S.C. as to attorneys fees and costs.................................................................................................................................3155a December 7, 2018  Order of Honorable [...], J.S.C. confirming July 18, 2018 partial award ..............................................................................................................3157a April 10, 2019  Order of Honorable [...], J.S.C. denying reconsideration of Vacatur of Partial Arbitration Award .................................................................3159a June 3, 2019  Order of Honorable [...], J.S.C. confirming in part Final Arbitration Award ....................................................................................................................3161a November 18, 2022  Order of Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. and Opinion of Value of [...]’s interests .............................................................................................................3185a January 24, 2023  Order of Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration .........................................................................................3209a  Judgments/Rulings  Decision allowing legal fees as “business judgment” .....(Da3196, n2)(11T6:22-7:21)  Decisions allowing discounts to fair value............... (Da3202-3204)(12T7:2-8:11)  Decisions denying vacatur of partial final award and final award.......................................................... (3T80:12-92:5); (Da3172-3173)  Decisions on sanctions......  (1T46:25-47:6)  (3T13-24:14-12)(3T32:19-33:16)(Pa3155)  RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (January 22, 2024 T13-T14; Da47-48)  As noted above, Defendants withdrew their objection to the Franklin Certification in support of the Final Judgment, in which [...] asserted that post-judgment interest at the default rate was owing based on the confirmed arbitration award.  They cannot now raise an objection to a sheriff sale notice based on a judgment amount to which they withdrew their objection.  As the Court below noted: “This matter when it went to final judgment did so uncontested.  Whatever objection was crafted at the time was later withdrawn.  And that was almost a year ago. ”  January 22, 2024 T27-1-T27-4.  As the court below further noted, “The post-judgment per diem interest from my view is an issue to be resolved at the time of final judgment.  And more importantly, as counsel pointed out, it was the result of an arbitrator’s decision in this case.
[brief] “The predominant goal of the NJLAD ‘is nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination in the workplace. ’”  Garnes v. Passaic County, 437 N.J. Super. 520, 532 (App.Div.2014).  “The concept of standing refers to a litigant’s ‘ability or entitlement to maintain an action before the court’”.  *Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank*, 343 N.J. Super. 73, 80 (App.Div.2001) (quoting *N.J. Citizen Action v. Riviera Motel Corp.*, 296 N.J. Super. 402, 409 (App.Div.1998).
[brief] Try as it might, Defendant has no more insight to the trial court’s reasoning than Plaintiff or this Court.  Nonetheless, Defendant relies on argument that is transparently specious, misguided, and faulty.  This Court should not give credence to Defendant’s red herrings.  For example, Defendant argues that since Plaintiff did not raise any public policy argument in the trial court and can therefore not raise the argument on appeal.  Def’s. Brief, page 17.  This is false.  First, the federal and New Jersey consumer protection statutes contain fee-shifting provisions because they are remedial statutes.  By their very nature, the MMWA and other consumer protection statutes provide for fee-shifting so that plaintiffs with relatively small value claims can find competent attorneys to seek relief in court, which is based on the public policy to provide access to the courts and even the playing field for consumers.  Second, in Plaintiff’s motion for fees, counsel did raise the issue of the public policy in awarding fees under fee-shifting statutes.  (Pa32; Pa34-35).  Defendant is also misguided in arguing that because the settlement resulted in Plaintiff making a separate motion for fees, the court should “strictly construe that provision in light of the general policy disfavoring the award of attorney’s fees.
[brief] The legal foundation for such arrangements is rooted in the principle that local governments possess the discretion to make decisions that best serve the public interest, including the optimization of land use to meet public needs.  See Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (Law Div. 1995).  The practice of exchanging parcels of land with private entities is a nuanced mechanism that allows municipalities to acquire properties that are more suited to public purposes, such as open space preservation, while ensuring that the overall public utility of the land is maximized.  This is particularly relevant in cases where the existing public land may not serve the community's needs as effectively as the land to be acquired through the exchange.  The legal validity of such exchanges is predicated on the resulting use being unequivocally for the public's benefit, a standard that [...] meets in this case.  [...]'s contract with [...] exemplifies a strategic and thoughtful approach to land management that aligns with established legal principles.  The exchange enables the Township to acquire land that offers greater environmental, recreational, and public utility compared to the properties currently owned.  This is not a mere reallocation of resources but a significant enhancement of the public realm, directly contributing to the Township's open space goals and providing long-term environmental and recreational benefits to its residents.  Critically, land exchange arrangements are scrutinized to ensure that the public interest is the primary beneficiary of the exchange.  In the case at hand, the Township has demonstrated through careful planning and public consultation that the land acquired through the exchange will serve vital public purposes.  These include the preservation of natural habitats, the expansion of public recreational spaces, and the safeguarding of the community's environmental quality.  The transparency of the process and the clear delineation of the public benefits arising from the exchange underscore its legitimacy and alignment with the legal and ethical standards governing the use of eminent domain for public purposes.
[brief] [...], the medical examiner, admitted that he was not able to determine the timing of the injuries on his own because “the gold standard for determining the timing of injuries is to examine hemorrhage” and in this case the soft tissue was “so severely altered and damaged, it was not possible to make that kind of identification. ”  (15T:49-2 to 25)  Therefore, [...]’s testimony was essential for the State’s attempt to show that the blunt force trauma was the cause of [redacted] death and not merely the effects of the postmortem destruction of his body.
[brief] **The Court Erred When It Reduced the Counsel Fee Award from $125,716 to $44,000.**  (64-A)  The litigation in this matter began on April 24, 2020.  The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. who presided over the case for two years issued a Court Order dated April 29, 2022, setting aside $67,968.86, representing the balance of the funds held in the Administrator's Account, for counsel fees and sanctions.
[brief] (Pa 94; Pa 95-96; T2 at 144:9-145:1; 145:7-13; 145:5-6; 146:21-147:9).  [...] did electrical work without permits.  (T2 at 147:10-149:1; 63:2-21).  [...] complained to municipal officials, including the Construction Official, Zoning Officer and Borough Clerk, about the construction and proposed use of [...] in December 2019 and January 2020.
[brief] For four reasons, it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal to potentially prevent that officer from taking the stand.  First, leave to appeal would invite an “unseemly parade” of piecemeal interlocutory litigation.  See Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, 403 N.J. Super. 443, 457 (App. Div. 2008) (New Jersey’s appellate procedures exist to “avoid the elimination of ‘an unseemly parade to the appellate courts,’ which would occur if our courts adopted an indulgent approach to interlocutory review”) (quoting Dickinson Indus. Site v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 389 (1940)).  That is exactly what would happen here if leave to appeal is granted and then [...]’s decision is affirmed.  It is also highly inappropriate.  See State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985) (leave to appeal is highly discretionary and “exercised only sparingly,” to encourage an “uninterrupted proceeding at the trial level with a single and complete review” (citing N.J. Court Rule 2:2-4); In re Uniform Admin. Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 100 (1982) (same); State v. LeFante, 14 N.J. 584, 591-92 (1954) (“It is a cardinal principle with us to avoid…piecemeal appeals… [b]y doing so we have avoided the delay and the congestion that all too often prevail in judicial systems that freely permit piecemeal appeals and interlocutory reviews”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Garner, 416 N.J. Super. 520, 524 (App. Div. 2010) (the interests of justice standard is “stringent,” rooted in “the general policy against piecemeal review of trial level proceedings,” and met “sparingly”). Interlocutory review of a collateral estoppel issue at this stage would also create an “added burden,” as the parties would be “forced to take an appeal in the first case in order … not to be precluded regarding the admissibility of evidence in any future case.
[brief] R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  Planning Board and Council to dispute the legal contention asserted in the Topology report that the proposed plan is “consistent” with the Master Plan.  *Hirth* allows such evidence even though Council’s hearing on the ordinance to approve the plan is “quasi-legislative in nature” and as such “the governing body does not ORDINARILY make findings of fact to justify its actions. ”  [Emphasis added]  *Id.*, at 162, 166, citing *Gardens v. City of Passaic*, 130 N.J. Super. 369, 377-378 (Law Div. 1974), aff’d o.b., 141 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 1976).  Appellate courts “typically” review evidentiary rulings under a “deferential standard. ”  *State v. Trinidad*, 241 N.J. 425, 448 (2020).  Absent a showing of “abuse of discretion,” the ruling below should be upheld.  *Id.*  However, if it fails to apply the proper legal standard, the appellate court “can review the evidentiary ruling de novo. ”  *Id.* (trial court failed to apply N.J.R.E. 403, but instead relied upon N.J.R.E. 401).  See also, *State v. Garrison*, 228 N.J. 182 (2017) (failure to apply “other-crime” evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b)).
[brief] [...] did not know, and would have had no reason to know, of Defendants’ claim or equity because the property was an empty, decrepit, overgrown, and abandoned mess.  Defendants failed to rebut the presumption that [...] was a *bona fide* purchaser.  [...] is thus entitled to the protections of that doctrine, no different than any other purchaser of foreclosed property who took without notice.  See, e.g., Coryell, supra.  The lower court correctly refused to vacate judgment.
[directive] Every law enforcement agency shall maintain a system for documenting the work of its internal affairs function and preserving records of this work.  9.1  The Internal Affairs Report  9.1.1  At the conclusion of the internal affairs investigation, the investigator shall submit two separate and distinct reports as follows:  (a)  Investigative Report.  This report will be an objective recounting of all the relevant information the investigation disclosed, including statements, documents and other evidence.  Such report shall be similar in all respects to a standard law enforcement investigative report, and should contain a complete account of the investigation.  (b)  Summary and Conclusions Report.  This report shall summarize the case and provide conclusions of fact for each allegation.
[brief] Super. at 304.  “If and when” the Reimbursement Conditions are met, Tenant’s right to receive payment of Tenant’s Allowance from Landlord is vested, even if the precise, exclusive method of reimbursement is not.  Neither Landlord nor the trial court have explained why “shall” should no longer mean “shall” under their (re)construction of § 4.02.  Second, Landlord’s and the trial judge’s interpretation of § 4.02 conflates the six Reimbursement Conditions necessary to vest Tenant’s right to Tenant’s by improperly adding the seventh condition while reading the offset options out of the Lease.  The annual installment method of payment is only one (1) of four possible reimbursement methods permitted under the Lease.  The other three are: (2) Landlord using a delinquent Tenant’s Allowance annual installment payment as a setoff against rent and other payments Tenant owes Landlord; (3) Landlord setting off as a deduction against the balance of Tenant’s Allowance rent or other payments Tenant owes Landlord; and (4) Landlord paying Tenant’s Allowance in full.  The Lease could have easily added to the six listed “if and when” Reimbursement Conditions that “Tenant shall have been current on all rent payments throughout the term of the Lease and shall not be in monetary default,” or something along those lines but it did not.
[brief] I.  The Board’s Determination that Petitioner is Not Entitled To Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits is Supported By Sufficient Credible Evidence in the Record and Must be Affirmed ..................................................................................................................22  A.  Standard of Review .........................................................................................................25  B.  The Board’s Acceptance of [...]’s Testimony as More Reliable than [...]’s is Supported by Credible Evidence in the Record and the Law ...........................................27  C.  The Board’s Determination that the 2009 Incident Described by Petitioner’s Treating Physician Was Not a Typographical Error is Supported by Credible Evidence in the Record.................................................................32  D.  The Board’s Determination that the Petitioner’s Disability was Caused by Preexisting Conditions Was Based on Substantial Credible Evidence and Its Consideration of the Proofs as a Whole ..................................................38  E.  Although Preexisting Conditions Are Not a Per Se Bar to Accidental Disability, That Does Not Change the Outcome that Petitioner’s Disability Is Not the Direct Result of the 2015 Accident .......................................................45  Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................49  | RA Reference | Description | |--------------|-------------| | RA1-RA4 | Miller v. Public Employee’s Retirement System, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1917 (App. Div. 2014).  | | Exhibit “A” | | | RA5-RA8 | Brown v. Board of Trustees, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 442 (App. Div. 2023).  | | Exhibit “B” | | | RA9-RA13 | Riley v Board of Trustees, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 2739 (App. Div. 2021).  | | Exhibit “C” | | | RA14-RA17 | Marter v Board of Trustees, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1766 (App. Div. 2024).  | | Exhibit “D” | | | RA18-RA22 | Hawkins v. Board of Trustees, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 727 (App. Div. 2020).  | | Exhibit “E” | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  State Cases
[brief] Beginning at Page 89 of the September 23, 2020 transcript:\(^{48}\)  [...]:  I just wanted to ask you, in addition to all the documents and the impact thereof how has this – how have these all [sic] events affected you personally?  [...]:  Trying not to say anything that I shouldn’t say, ma’am, \(^{47}\) 2T.  \(^{48}\) 2T.  Your Honor.  Pretty frustrating.  It’s been trying.  It’s been, you know, a waste of my time.  We’ve lost a lot of ground that we built up.  We lost a lot of equity in the company we used to deal with but to our goodwill and goodwill of our contractors we persevered.  So it’s – it was a huge setback but again, through the team effort of everyone taking a salary reduction, being able to negotiate with our trusted contractors who offer us some payment discount and to be able to, you know, move forward on newer projects we dug ourselves out of the hole.  It’s been a long struggle but that’s what we do. \footnote{This entire paragraph deals with “loss” to [...].
[brief] As requested by the Court, [...] (“[...]”) addresses the following three questions:  1.  What exactly is the specific remedy appellant seeks from this court, other than a generic “reversal” of the agency decision?  Is that remedy lawfully available since, as it appears from the briefing, the program has been terminated by the Legislature?  2.  Is the appeal moot, given the cessation of the program?  3.  Does the Judiciary have the power to compel an agency to expend funds or provide financial benefits that are not within a current legislative appropriation, in a situation in which the expenditure is not necessary to remedy a constitutional violation?  In response, Appellant seeks reversal of the denial order and issuance of Transition Renewable Energy Certificates (“TRECs”) in the Transition Incentive (“TI”) Program, that, while not accepting new applications, remains not only active, but with applications pending.
[brief] 2T 11.  After a debate/discussion/analysis, the Planning Board Members unanimously determined that the proposed second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  2T, p. 22-24 12.  Given that the Borough Council Ordinance adoption date (on the proposed second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan) was scheduled for on or about February 17, 2021, and given that the next Planning Board meeting date was scheduled to occur after the proposed Ordinance adoption date, the Planning Board Members specifically authorized the Board Attorney to memorialize the decision/conclusion, in the form of a written letter.
[brief] Specifically, the Comprehensive Report found that for students transported by [...], buses run less full and that costs per student are higher.  (Aa17; Ra143; Ra310-11).  The Report also found that in some cases, buses were being used for multiple routes, but the routes are bid on as stand-alone routes.  (Ra310-11).  Similar to the OSA audit, the Report found the District could save on transportation costs by soliciting bids on pre-packed groups of routes based on historical busing patterns, and could double or triple tier routes in order to decrease expenses.  (Ra311).  The Comprehensive Report also found potential mismanagement and lack of internal controls of the District’s transportation operations.  In regards to the [...], the Comprehensive Report indicated that there was insufficient separation between [...] as a contracting agency, and the [...] as a vendor.  (Aa17).  And at least one employee may have been employed by both the District and the [...], creating “potential for procurement issues, diminished incentive to return saved funds to [[...],] and potential for conflicts in contract oversight of the [...] as a vendor, in addition to the duplication of salary. ” (Aa17; Ra144; Ra312-13).  Furthermore, many non-public students do not have an identification number in the DRTRS, creating the risk that students might be counted and funded in multiple counties.  (Aa15; Ra144; Ra315).  As such, the record reveals that it is [...]’s own choices and inefficiencies which have caused its transportation costs to run out of control and reach the “unsustainable imbalance” noted by this court.