ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Stated another way, to be valid, the Legislature must enact the statute in accordance with both constitutional and statutory requirements for enactment.  The State’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 ignores black letter law because it treats the phrase “and statutory provisions” as surplus.  But a court in reviewing the statute follows the “bedrock assumption that the Legislature did \(^2\)  The language of the statute as enacted in 1873 states:  An act providing for decreeing and making known that certain laws and joint resolutions have become inoperative and void,’ provides that, at any time within one year after any law or joint resolution shall have been filed by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, at the direction of the Governor, when the latter shall have reason to believe that any such law or joint resolution was not duly passed by both Houses of the Legislature, or duly approved, as required by the Constitution of the state (section 1), or any two or more citizens of the state who shall have reason for so believing (section 3), may present a petition to the Supreme Court setting forth the facts and circumstances, and praying that such law or resolution may be decreed to be null and void.
[brief] the most obvious,\textsuperscript{14} we do not find it absurd, or indeed even odd, for the Legislature to have exempted only routine rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair and upgrades from the permitting requirements of the Act in the same manner it exempted only routine maintenance and operations, given the Legislature's avowed goal to subject "major development" in the Preservation Area "to stringent water and natural resource protection standards, policies, planning, and regulation."  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  In no way could the interpretation be regarded as one leading to an "absurd" result consistent with our case law.  See, e.g., Robson v. Rodriquez, 26 N.J. 517, 528-29 (1958) (holding it "absurd" to interpret the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law to deny an uninsured person recovery from the Fund but allow her personal representative to recover if the uninsured person died before filing suit, even from a cause unrelated to the accident).  The Court has instructed "[t]he true meaning and intention of legislation must be derived from the whole and not from any single component part," lest \textsuperscript{14}
[brief] In December 2019, the Attorney General reiterated these requirements in Law Enforcement Directive 2019-6 (the Statewide Brady-Giglio Directive), which mandated that each County Prosecutor’s Office establish policies to ensure compliance with discovery obligations under Brady and Giglio.  The Attorney General as Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the law and the administration of Criminal Justice throughout the State, directed all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the procedures outlined in Direct 2019-6
[brief] Plaintiffs offered fact and expert testimony as well as exhibits in support of their assertion that they should receive a very substantial height variance because warehouses of a conforming height would be infeasible in the current market.  The Board’s Resolution details why it did or did not find certain evidence and testimony offered in support of Plaintiffs’ argument probative and credible, and these findings are supported by the record.  The Board’s Resolution also details why, based upon appropriate legal standards, the Board did not find persuasive Plaintiffs’ arguments in support of their requested height variance.  This determination of the Board is entitled to substantial deference.  For these reasons, Defendant-Respondent [...] respectfully requests that the Court affirm the decision of the Trial Court upholding the Board’s denial of Plaintiffs’ height variance because, as found by the Trial Court, the Board’s denial decision is in accord with applicable law, is well-supported by the record, is fully explained in the Board’s Resolution, and should not, as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion and limited authorities, be disturbed by the Court.
[brief] [...] was retained to challenge the accuracy of the values assigned to the parties’ interests in support of plaintiffs’ primary objective – to convince the court that they had been fraudulently induced to accept a buyout number almost $10 million lower than the actual value of the companies.  He recognized the threshold question for liability contained in the plaintiffs’ allegations:  “I understand that there are allegations of unauthorized expenditures and disbursements . . . that in the aggregate exceed $7.5 million. ”  Da781.  But [...] failed to explore whether there was a factual basis for labeling specific transactions as unauthorized.  As set forth in Point IV, his conclusions to that effect constituted no more than a net opinion.  As noted in Point IV, [...] failed to develop any facts to support his overarching conclusions that the subject transactions were unauthorized.
[brief] The trial court here, in line with both our law on self-defense and supported by New York’s comparable jury-instruction requirements, should have simply told the jury that if they found [...] acted in self-defense, then they must acquit of all homicide offenses rather than continue on to consider the lesser-included homicide offenses.  In sum, there is little justification for allowing legally inconsistent verdicts.  What reasons may exist to preserve such verdicts, moreover, are far outweighed by the concomitant constitutional violations, unreliable and absurd verdicts, and loss of trust in the justice system.  This jury here found that [...] acted in self-defense as to the murder charge.  This specific finding amounts to an acquittal of all homicide charges, and this Court should enter a judgment of acquittal.  In the alternative, the irreconcilable legal impossibility in the jury’s finding of self-defense as to murder and conviction of passion/provocation manslaughter requires reversal and a new trial.  This Court, like the courts cited above, should vacate [...]’s passion/provocation manslaughter conviction.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (6T 10-24 to 14-19) ..............................................................................................................41  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)  PAGE NOS.  A.  The Sentencing Court Failed To Provide A Factual Basis For Aggravating Factors Three And Nine, Assign Any Particular Weight To The Aggravating Factors, And Engage In A Proper Balancing Process.  ..................42  B.  The Sentencing Court Did Not Give Sufficient Weight To Mitigating Factor Four, Despite The Credible Evidence That [...]’s Conduct Was Motivated By A Severe Substance Abuse Disorder.  ......................45  C.  The Sentencing Court Failed To Consider The Fairness Of Imposing This Seventeen-Year Sentence Consecutively To A Ten-Year Prison Term [...] Is Currently Serving.  .................................................................49  CONCLUSION  ..................................................................................................................50
[brief] Defendant first claims the Prosecutor’s summation violated evidentiary rules by referencing the post-Miranda statement Defendant gave to detectives on December 30, 2020, in which Defendant stated:  Sir, sir, listen.  I’m not, I’m not even in to [sic] this t-type of shit, yo.  I do little shit.  Like, I may steal, but I ain’t into this.  (Da32).  Despite making no objection to the introduction of this statement or the Prosecutor’s summation, Defendant now claims the State’s reference to this statement in summation violated N.J.R.E. 404(b) because the jury could have viewed Defendant’s “admission to prior acts of stealing as evidence that he committed the crimes for which he was on trial.
[brief] The standard of review in matrimonial cases is deferential.  See, eg., Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 475-76 (App. Div. 2002); Tannen v. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 276 (App. Div. 2010).  This case, by contrast, presents a question of a contract interpretation that is “subject to de novo review by an appellate court.
[brief] Defendants’ appeal demonstrated that the judgment here is fatally flawed by legal error and a dearth of evidence to support plaintiffs’ claims.  There is one factual premise for all plaintiffs’ claims of conversion, breach of contract and other quasi-contract causes of action: that the targeted transactions were not “authorized” by plaintiff [...].  But Mehta never testified that the transactions were unauthorized by him.  Plaintiffs’ efforts to pave over that hole in their case validate, rather than rebut, defendants’ arguments.  Challenged to cite evidence that proved their claims, they rely upon sweeping assertions that they produced enough evidence to convince the judge to rule in their favor.  Yet, they fail to identify competent evidence that would support the court’s conclusions.  The expert never asked Mehta if he authorized the transactions.  Instead, he assumed that was the case, accepting as true the allegations in the complaint.  Plaintiffs attempt to minimize the court’s reliance upon this expert opinion that lacked a factual basis.  But their compilation of “evidence” that allegedly supports the trial court’s conclusions is hopelessly mired in the expert’s flawed opinion.  Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments as to the award of fees, the statute of limitations bar, the imposition of joint and several liability, their claims against [...] and their cross-appeal all lack merit.
[brief] ”  478 N.J. Super. at 613.  Sixth, the proximity of trial date also weighs heavily against [...].  This case was scheduled for trial beginning August 6, 2024, just two months from the return date of [...]’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.  The Chancery Court was emphatic when setting the trial date that it wished to move this matter expeditiously to trial within a year of its filing.  See, e.g., 2T87:4-7.  Once the Parties were nearing that trial date, with discovery well underway, and with the possibility of summary judgment, [...] sought to force the case to hit the restart button to begin anew in a different forum.  [...]’s request to compel arbitration and combine this case with the arbitration of the Law Division Case should have fallen on deaf ears as, in denying [...]’s Motion to Consolidate, the Chancery Court already determined that the two cases are separate and distinct.
[brief] List the charges to which you are pleading guilty:  | Ind./Acc./Comp.# | Count | Nature of Offense | Degree | |------------------|-------|-------------------|--------| | [...] | 3 | Felony Murder | 1st | | [...] | 1 | Armed Robbery | 1st | | [...] | | | | | [...] | | | | | [...] | | | | Statutory Maximum | Time | Fine | VCCO Assmt* | |------|------|-------------| | Max | | | | Max | | | | Max | | | | Max | | | | Total| | |  Your total exposure as the result of this plea is:  2.  a.  Did you commit the offense(s) to which you are pleading guilty?  b.  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?  3.  Do you understand what the charges mean?  4.  Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are giving up certain rights?
[brief] ”  The term “costs” also used in N.J.S.A. 40A-12A-8(f) is synonymous with “expenses. ”  The cost of project studies, consultants, administrative costs, and other project specific expenditures are appropriate costs of the redevelopment agency.  The $2,000,000 payment was not paid to “defray costs of the redevelopment agency”; it was, according to the Long Branch Ordinance cited by [...] (Pa904), deposited into a “Developer Contributions Trust Fund” to be used to construct a future project.  ([...] brief at p. 16).  Thus, the $2,000,000 payment, agreed to prior to the designation of [...] as a redeveloper and years before the [...] project was to be constructed, does not qualify as “revenue form a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity” and the $2,000,000 density bonus payment was not authorized by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f).
[brief] The trial court’s conclusions of law are not entitled to any deference by this court and must be reviewed *de novo* on the record.  United State v. Stephens, 559 U.S. 460, 464 – 464 (2010) was not cited by the trial court in its statement of reasons (Da61 – Da64).  The holding in Stephens was that 18 U.S.C.A. §48 (the federal “Depiction of Animal Cruelty” statute) was unconstitutional because it was “substantially overbroad.
[brief] 6  **Kolos v. Tikal, LLC,** 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1901 (App. Div. Aug. 10, 2018)  ............  14  **Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J.,** 121 N.J. 530 (1990)  ...........................................................................  13, 14  **Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo,** 122 N.J. 104 (1991)
[directive] Shields and Barriers.  6.1  Barriers can reduce the ability of the subject to contact the officers, providing officers with additional time to react and reducing the need to use force.  Tactical Teams responding pursuant to Section 4 of this Addendum must be equipped with shields and barriers that are readily available for deployment.  Law enforcement agencies should equip Tactical Teams with ballistic shields, ballistic blankets, or other barriers that can protect officers.  Law enforcement agencies should consider providing shields and barriers to other first responding officers for use before the arrival of Tactical Teams.
[brief] 34  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)  ..............................................................................................  19 Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 2347, 135 L.Ed.2d 843, 852 (1996)  .................................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  (Id. (emphasis in original) (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 11)).  They argue that this “warrants close scrutiny as Plaintiffs have put the cart well before the horse in seeking in camera review without even giving Defendants the opportunity to resolve Plaintiffs’ concerns about these fifty specific documents without the need for court intervention. ” (Id.).  Defendants suggest that the Court “should order the parties to further meet and confer on the fifty documents raised for the first time in Plaintiffs’ attorney’s declaration before proceeding any further.
[brief] There is no requirement to obtain Distinguished in order to be determined to be meeting expectations as Distinguished is consistent with Exceeds Expectations.  A score of Effective is required and indicates that Appellant was meeting expectations.  (Pa298, Pa314, Pa326, Pa327)  The claim that Plaintiff completed the Advanced Placement Form but failed to give it to [...] does not result in a conclusion that she was not performing her job.  In fact, the completion of the Advanced Placement Form was not Appellant’s responsibility.  (Pa348, [...] Dep. 10/28/22, T37:20-25, T38:1-18)
[brief] The school districts from the \textit{Abbott} cases were historically referred to as “Abbott districts” and eventually included thirty-one districts in the State.  \textit{Abbott XXI}, 206 N.J. at 406.  Effective January 13, 2008, the Legislature eliminated that designation and replaced it with a new one, “SDA district,” \textit{L.} 2007, \textit{c.}
[brief] ............ - 26 -, - 28 - Biro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 110 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 1970), rev’d, 57 N.J. 204 (1970)  ................................................................. - 14 -, - 24 - Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., 423 N.J. Super. 377, 432 (App. Div. 2011)  .......... - 28 - Boyd v. Renal Ctr. of Passaic, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1581, at *6 (App. Div. Aug. 11, 2020)  ................................................................. - 27 - Charles Bloom & Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 279 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App. Div. 1995)  ...................................................................................... - 27 - Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 409 N.J. Super. 444, 461 (App. Div. 2009)  ...................................................................................... - 10, - 29 - D.R. Horton Inc. - N.J. v. Dynastar Dev., 2005 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 842, *45 (Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Div. Mercer County, August 10, 2005)  ...................................................................................... - 17 - D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 194, fn.4 (2013)
[brief] Plaintiff’s First and Second Post-Judgment Enforcement Actions for Defendant’s Violations 8.  On December 21, 2017, Plaintiff moved to enforce litigant’s rights by filing an order to show cause alleging Defendant violated the 2017 Judgment (“First OTSC”).  The nature of the violations was two-fold.  First, Defendant’s (non-operational) vehicles and storage trailers remained on the Fifth Street Lot, interfering with Plaintiff’s use thereof and in violation of the 2017 Judgment.  Second, there were ongoing violations of the prohibition against children utilizing the Sixth Street Lot for ingress and egress by walking between parked cars on the Sixth Street Lot during religious services.  (Da210-217)
[brief] But instead of pressing their argument about their daughter, Plaintiffs instead now ask for remand on an issue that they raised and briefed below.  (Pb38–41.)  This Court can and should decide that an agreement was formed even if the [...]’ daughter is the one who manifested assent, for all the reasons explained in [...]’s opening brief.  This Court “may exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review.
[directive] in bail"  "right to establish a to interpreted was which Constitution, Jersey New 11 the of released been defendant had if status the release defendant's a revoke to authority the had always State this in courts pretrial to constitutional right state forfeiting the thus conditions, those violated and conditions non-monetary or on bail non- a of violation that (recognizing 41 at Super. 430 N.J. supra, Steele, wrongdoing.  See her or his by release "inherent court's referring the to revocation, trigger may community the protect to designed bail of condition monetary "nothing that in regard this recognizes expressly moreover, Law, Reform Bail  The defendant").
[brief] (TRVa2685.)  That day, [...] further prepared an Insurance Cost Worksheet (Form B) which: identified Workers’ Compensation Code 0854, for “Concrete Construction,” omitting “demolition”; and detailed --- \(^3\) Proposal Two was subsequently replaced by Proposal Three.  the gross contract value as $24,590 (includes cost of [...]’s own insurance), with a net value $22,200 (excludes cost of [...]’s own insurance).  (TRVa2687.)  On July 30, 2015, at 7:17 a.m., [...] sent an auto-generated letter (the “Welcome Letter”) to [...] stating its “enrollment in the [CCIP] for your work performed under [...] has been completed.
[brief] Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 208 (1999).  As discussed more fully below, the record is replete with facts suggesting that Appellant [...] was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment.  Discrimination on the basis of one’s gender/sex may be proven by showing a plaintiff was “harass[ed] based solely on [his or her] gender, which create[d] a hostile and offensive work environment [] sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under the LAD. ”  Muench v. Twp. of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 292 (App. Div. 1992).  In Lehmann, the New Jersey Supreme Court outlined the elements for a hostile work environment claim.
[brief] \textsuperscript{12}  [...] testified, on December 2, 2022, that he turned the [...] file over to successor counsel, [...].  (4T:32:12-17).  The original [...] file was put into banker boxes, and delivered to [...].  Before doing that, [...] copies the entire file in order to keep a record, and that is what was boxed up and brought to the courtroom.
[directive] This may 2017, as except 24, May on operational become shall Directive this of requirements and 1.  All prosecutors subsection. note See or Section a in specified expressly be otherwise ensure to and are appropriate necessary as such preparations make to required are agencies police such the that on with date are complied subsection and Section each of requirements the that operational. subsection becomes or Section or amended, and repealed, until is unless it effect and force in remain shall Directive
[brief] (Pb 18-19)  Respondent’s suggestion seems to be that the protection of Miller and Zuber might be extended to late adolescents, without extending the protection of Comer.  That makes no sense.  All three cases were based on the characteristics of juveniles summarized in the Miller factors.  (Db 8-13)  If late adolescents share the same characteristics as juveniles, they should benefit from all three cases; there is no basis to choose between the cases.  In short, the law, the science, and the better-reasoned cases dictate that Comer should extend to the nineteen-year-old [...].  [...] should have a resentencing.  In the alternative, the Court should order a remand for a hearing to consider expert testimony on the developmental science, and to decide if the Comer lookback should extend to nineteen-year-olds.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a).  16  At another status conference on January 3, 2022, the court discussed the parties’ readiness to proceed to trial.  As detailed further below, the State declared it was “trial ready. ” to appeal the trial court’s orders.  Defendant sought  He filed an application for permission to file an emergent motion on November 16, 2021, which the Appellate Division denied the following day.  It noted defendant could file a motion in the ordinary course, which would be expedited.  He then filed a motion for leave to appeal on December 6, 2021, which the Appellate Division denied on December 21, 2021.
[brief] (Da 69)  See, e.g., id. at 255 (“After the interview was concluded, the detective drove defendant home”).  Thirteenth, detectives did not inform [...] during the interrogation that he was free to leave at any time.  And relatedly, there is no evidence that detectives informed [...] he had been free to refuse to be transported to the police station.  See, e.g., Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 271 (“The detective never advised defendant that he was free to leave”).  Had detectives not failed to administer the required Miranda warnings, [...] might have invoked his right to silence and counsel without answering.
[brief] (Pa360-61 at 72:8-73:3).  [...] also frequently disagreed with [...]’s management decisions.  (Pa239 at 54:18-56:14).  [...] explained to [...] that although he might not agree with a particular supervisor’s decision, it was not his place to decide how those managers should do their jobs.  (Pa358 at 61:16-63:8).  VI.  [...]’s Complaining Reaches a Tipping Point.
[brief] Cf. Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 304-05 (2010) (“[T]o be enforceable an exculpatory agreement must reflect the unequivocal expression of the party giving up his or her legal rights that this decision was made voluntarily, intelligently and with the full knowledge of its legal consequences. ”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  ¶1.29 does not encompass claims that had yet to accrue after entry of final judgment on Feb. 20, 2015.