ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I CONTRARY TO [...]’S ARGUMENT, A FINDING OF FRAUD OR MISCONDUCT IS NOT NECESSARY TO VACATE AN ARBITRATION AWARD WHERE, AS HERE, THE ARBITRATOR PLAINLY IGNORES, MISAPPLIES, AND EXCEEDS THE POWERS EXPRESSLY GRANTED IN THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT  [...] mischaracterizes New Jersey’s standard for vacating an arbitration award.  It blatantly disregards an explicit state statute that provides six grounds upon which a Court may vacate an award to create a faulty foundation for its argument that [...]’s opposition to confirmation must fail because it has not demonstrated fraud or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.  Opp. at 18.  Importantly, the Trial Court in its Statement of Reasons did not anywhere adopt the fraud or misconduct “standard” improperly advocated by [...].  The Trial Court correctly acknowledged the six circumstances upon which confirmation of an award must be denied.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23B-239(a).  It also properly observed that “an arbitrator may not disregard the terms of the parties' agreement. ”  Da30-31 (quoting Cnty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass'n v. Cnty. Coll. of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 391 (1985)).
[brief] In *Pellicer*, our Supreme Court acknowledged that cumulative error can lead to an unfair trial.  The Court held as follows:  Our conclusion that there was cumulative error in this record is based on several factors.  First, our review of the matters as to which the trial court erred demonstrates that they pervaded the trial.  Second, many of the troubling discretionary decisions permitted plaintiffs to shift the jury's focus from a fair evaluation of the evidence to pursue instead a course designed to inflame the jury, appealing repeatedly to inappropriate and irrelevant considerations that had no place in the courtroom.  Third, the treatment of the parties was not even-handed, with defendants, but not plaintiffs, being limited in their proofs or criticized for their words.  Finally, a review of the complete record, including the jury selection method and the quantum of the verdict, engenders the distinct impression that defendants were not accorded justice.
[brief] The accident did not arise out of any act of [...] but rather the purported failure of [...] and [...] to ensure compliance with the contract documents and as such, an affidavit of merit was required.  Appellant’s Amended Complaint does not name Mr. [...] individually nor does it allege that Mr. [...] was negligent.  There is no independent action by Mr. [...] which caused the accident.  Mr. [...] was not driving the street sweeper.  Rather, the plaintiff in the 19th Count of the Complaint (Pa96), alleges that [...]/[...] negligently, carelessly, and recklessly operated, designed, controlled, supervised, maintained, inspected and/or created a system of oversight with regard to the project located on the northbound lanes of the New Jersey Turnpike at mile marker 113.
[brief] This is more problematic given that New Jersey's State Constitution affords greater protections than its federal counterpart.  The respondent attempts to play fast and loose with the facts by asserting that the defendant's Sixth Amendment claim that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion for the sneak and peek and failing to be properly prepared to argue such a motion is the same Fourth Amendment claim raised on direct appeal challenging the sneak and peek.  The respondent ignores and/or fails to address the Appellate Division's ruling in the case of *State v.* Johnson, 365 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 1986)), which clearly makes a distinction between a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim and an underlying Fourth Amendment suppression hearing claim raised on direct appeal.
[brief] This Court reviews a decision to grant summary judgment *do novo*.  *Rivera v. Valley Hosp., Inc.*, 252 N.J. 1, 17 (2022).  Rule 4:46-2(c) provides that summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  *R.*  4:46-2.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, “considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  *Id.*  “[A] court should deny a summary judgment motion only where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ’”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995) (quoting *R.* 4:46-2(c)).  “[W]hen the evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' the trial court "should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. ”  *Brill*, at 540.  **D: Motion To Amend to Conform to Evidence**
[brief] A party cannot state a claim it does not know exists.  When Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on June 11, 2015, they did not know and could not have known that [...] was the sole member of [...].  Consequently, Plaintiffs could not have known at that time that [...] is liable for the torts committed by [...] as sole member of [...], and Plaintiffs could not have known that [...] committed legal malpractice when they failed to advise Plaintiffs that [...] was the sole member of [...].  Accordingly, at the time they filed the original Complaint, Plaintiffs could not and did not state any tort claims against [...] arising out of his role as sole member of [...].
[brief] ”  In addition, Defendants previously objected to entry of a foreclosure judgment based on the amount due certification but that objection subsequently was “withdrawn” (as the court below noted in the entry of Final Judgment).  Da63.  Defendants cannot engage in a slew of delaying steps based on a claim that the judgment does not include post-judgment interest at the default rate when they themselves withdrew their own objection to the inclusion of post-judgment interest at the default rate.
[brief] [...] asserted the [...] did not meet the standard of care required under N.J.A.C. 13:27-5.1(a) because the 2007 decision to place the bagel kettle along the travel path created a potentially dangerous condition for employees.  However, he provided no authority to support the conclusion that the design plan fell below the level of competence required by the general safety statute, N.J.A.C. 13:27-5.1.  [...] found no specific code violation and conceded he found no federal, state, county, or municipal statutes, regulations or ordinances regarding the spacing around a bagel kettle.  Instead, [...] premised his opinions on his experience as an architect and his background in designing commercial kitchens, the [...]' 2006 plan, and the recommended kitchen layout published by a bagel kettle manufacturer.  The lack of a specific code violation is not dispositive of the issue of whether the [...] complied with the applicable standard of care, but [...] provided insufficient reasons to demonstrate his conclusions were not based on his personal view of N.J.A.C. 13:27-5.1.  [...] provided no violations of generally accepted standards, practices or customs, to illustrate that the deviation from the 2006 plan design fell below standards of care.  [...]'s reliance on the recommended kitchen layout published by a bagel kettle manufacturer is not supported by evidence that it is an industry standard rather than a suggestion by a manufacturer.  Thus, we discern no error in the court's determination to grant summary judgment because plaintiffs' expert's opinions are barred as net opinions.  Since plaintiff has failed to satisfy the elements of their negligence claims, we need not reach plaintiffs' additional arguments.  Affirmed.
[brief] Pa110.  [...] noted that the other Borough Council Subcommittee member viewed the [...] application favorably from a corporate size standpoint, disagreeing with the first member's concerns about that point.  Pa2; Pb6-7.  Concerns regarding potential traffic issues associated with the [...] site were also raised by the first Borough Council Subcommittee member.  Pa2; Pb7-8; Pb20.  [...] argues that the consideration of the Subcommittee member of the size of the applicant's organization, and potential traffic issues, constituted the use of arbitrary, subjective and biased criteria requiring reversal of the issuance of the Resolution of Support to [...], and were beyond the scope of the Subcommittee’s mandate.  Pa2; Pb15.  However, those arguments are without merit.  The trial court rightly took exception to those assertions.  As the trial court noted in its December 2023 Decision, there is no requirement in N.J.S.A. 24:61-36 that the Borough engage in any particular form of inquiry in its determination on the issuance of the Resolution of Support.  Both of the Borough Council Subcommittee members properly considered the information presented by the applicants including, among other things, considerations of traffic and the size of the applicant’s organization.  The fact that the members of the Subcommittee did not agree as to the positive and negative aspects of each applicant does not render the Borough Council's ultimate decision to issue a Resolution of Support to [...] to be arbitrary, capricious and/or unreasonable.  Indeed, the fact that differing views are reasonably debatable is of no moment.  The sole, specific issue or factor that is referenced in the statute with reference to consideration of a Resolution of Support addresses the suitability of the location, which encompasses a wide range of specific concerns; the statute does not restrict the local governing body from considering other items addressed by the cannabis Subcommittee and/or the Borough council, which were all properly considered to be important to the Borough governing body.  The members of the Subcommittee and the entire governing body were free to consider all of the issues that were addressed in the analysis and determination of the Borough Council, including issues of traffic, parking and sight visibility, among others.  There were two different views, expressed by the two different members of the governing body on the Subcommittee, respecting the size of [...] as an applicant organization.
[directive] The jurisdictions. various the in committed offenses the of seriousness prosecutors assistant cross-designate Division to for the necessary is if it notified shall be Justice another in appearances court make or matters handle to general attorneys deputy special as release charging/pretrial initial coordinate to is Section this of purpose  The jurisdiction. the of Prosecutor County depriving a as construed shall be herein nothing and decisions, authority.  jurisdictional prosecutor's the within committed offense an prosecute to authority 2016.
[brief] Of Counsel: [...], Esq. – (#021791980)  Of counsel and on the Brief: [...], Esq. - (#076972013)  Dated: September 7, 2023  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF DECISION(S)  ORDER(S) AND JUDGMENT(S)  ........................................  ii  LIST OF PARTIES ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS .........................................................................................  iv APPENDIX .................................................................................................................. v-vii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................................................  viii-x PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................  1
[brief] .................................................................  255a-262a  Defendant’s Offer of Judgment for $6,000.00 in Ash v. [...], Dkt. No. [...], filed October 7, 2016 (Exhibit 2 to [...] Reply Cert.) .................................................. 263a-266a Plaintiff’s June 3, 2021 Frivolous Litigation Letter in response to Defendant’s March 28, 2021 Offer of Judgment for $11,000.00 in the within matter (Exhibit 3 to [...] Reply Cert.) .................................................. 267a-269a Plaintiff’s counsel’s settlement offer sent to Defendant’s counsel via e-mail on July 6, 2021 (Exhibit 4 to [...] Reply Cert.) .................................................. 270a-271a Plaintiff’s counsel’s e-mail exchange with Defendant’s counsel from July 7 through 17, 2021, regarding further settlement negotiations and appointment of a mediator (Exhibit 5 to [...] Reply Cert.) .................................................. 272a-278a Plaintiff’s counsel’s e-mail exchange with Defendant’s counsel from July 6 through September 16, 2021, regarding ongoing settlement negotiations (Exhibit 6 to [...] Reply Cert.) .................................................. 279a-284a Stitsworth v. Ford Motor Co., No. 95-5763, 1996 U.S. Dist., Unpub., LEXIS 1657 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1996)
[brief] ” (2T 32-16 to 33-1).  So to find the Appellant [...] guilty of driving while intoxicated after he blew under the *per se* legal limit on the Alcotest, and he clearly successfully completed the field sobriety psycho-physical tests, is to say that the officers’ subjective opinion controls and simply can override the objective tests accepted and utilized by law enforcement and courts alike.  For all the reasons submitted in the Appellant [...]’s brief, reply brief and argued below, Appellant requests that the finding of guilt be overturned.
[brief] In addition, on cross examination, [...] was asked:  Q – Did you rely on a family history of schizophrenia in your diagnosis of the defendant?  A – Did I rely on it?  No, I relied on his presentation to me.  I wouldn’t just diagnose someone with schizophrenia because it’s in their family history.  There were other things in his family history too.  [11T:1181 to 7]  Instead of accepting this answer, the Prosecutor asked [...] again if it was part of her diagnosis.  (10T:118 14 to 16).  [...] answered “No. ” (11T:118-17).
[brief] Plaintiff brought this claim as an association on behalf of all its members, each of whom are affected and impacted by the unlawful policies sought to be addressed.  This impact is ongoing and prejudicial to [...]'s unit members.  Amendment of the complaint to name individual members is both judicially improvident and futile.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ORDER IS A FINAL JUDGEMENT UNDER RULE 2:2-3A1
[brief] [...] (“[...]”)  Amended complaint, filed 12/21/21…Da1  Exhibit A: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 12/7/20………………Da21  Exhibit B: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 9/15/80……………………Da28  Exhibit C: Deed Heirs of [...] to [...], dated 11/10/51…..Da33  Exhibit D: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 12/20/51……………Da38  Exhibit E: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 2/24/55………………Da43  Exhibit F: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 9/7/65…………………Da47  Exhibit G: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 7/1/55………………Da51  Exhibit H: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 10/21/66…………Da55  Exhibit I: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 12/1/66……………Da58  Exhibit J: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 4/13/72……………Da62  Exhibit K: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 8/23/74………………Da66  Exhibit L: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 3/21/77……………Da69  Exhibit M: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 9/21/8…………Da72  Exhibit N: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 11/29/90…………Da75  Exhibit O: Excerpts from Trunell v. Trust for [...]………Da81
[brief] LETTER BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey  08625  RE: STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  App. Div. Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal  From an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Denying A Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL)  Notice of Appeal........................................................................................................Pa1  Case Information Statement......................................................................................Pa5  [...] Final Decision 9/27/23.........................................Pa9  Reply to [...] 7/18/23¹...............................................Pa16  Correspondence from [...] 6/30/23...............................................................Pa24 [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23......................................Pa26  Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23.................................Pa30  Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23.........................................................Pa32  Affidavit of Peter [...].....................................................................................Pa58  [...] Eligibility Registration Form.................................................................Pa60  [...] Request for Amended Benefits Form..................................................Pa62  World Trade Center Health Program Certified Illnesses 3/9/22.........................Pa63  World Trade Center Witness Presence Statement................................................Pa66  World Trade Center Witness Presence Statement................................................Pa70  Request for Amended Benefits...............................................................................Pa74  Administrative Denial of Ricci Benefits.................................................................Pa75  Legislative Notice August 2019..............................................................................Pa76  ¹ Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa16, Pa24, Pa28, Pa30, and Pa32 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY  Trial Court  Docket No. [...] Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C.  DATE: May 15, 2024  REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT  [...]  [...] (NJ Attorney ID 026122011)  [...]  [...] (NJ Attorney ID 309612022)  [...]  [...]  Tel. & Fax: [...]  Attorneys for [...], Plaintiff-Appellant
[brief] The court believed that it was not coercive for the detectives to threaten that [...]’s friends might kill him in retaliation, and to promise that he was “safest” with them, because the retaliation would not be committed directly by the detectives.  But that was legally erroneous because any credible threat of violence -- whether by police hand or not -- is inherently coercive.  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286-88 (“rough treatment” by other inmates).  Here, [...] himself made clear that the threat was credible, stating, “So if I know it’s you, eventually they [[...]’s friends] gonna find out it’s you,” and he twice emphasized the real possibility that [...] could “die” if he left police custody.
[brief] Noted in the [...]’ initial brief, the longevity and complexity of the issues yet to be resolved are due entirely to the unprecedented, unlawful, and vast expansion of the case following the limited remand embodied in this Court’s first decision almost seventeen years ago in 2006.  The [...], treated with disdain and demonstrable bias by the trial judge after the 2006 remand (Hon. [...], J.S.C.), are at least entitled to adherence to this Court’s directives on the later remand.  Simply put, the parties deserve decisions grounded in valid legal principles.
[brief] [Da100 at 24-6 to 24-14; Da103 at 27-2 to 27-6; Da261 at 185-19 to Da262 at 186-7; Da297 at 221-9; ].  [...] did not contest her ability to testify, submit evidence into the record [Da266 at 190-15 to Da270 at 194-7], or question her standing or object.  During the hearing, [...]’ planner conceded that the Property is located within 600 feet of a school.  [Da 242 at 166-23 to Da 244 at 168-6].  But [...] again argued the proximity of the Property to a school was irrelevant to the review of its application for development because the TOA Rule protected it from 600-foot proximity restriction implemented by the Ordinance.  [...], through counsel argued, “[O]ne of the most important things about time of application is you don’t have to be deemed complete to be in compliance with time of application. ”  [Da290 at 214-6 to 214-9].  Accepting that argument – which is wrong as a matter of law – the Board determined that the TOA Rule governed the review of [...]’ application for development even though it was not filed until April 29, 2022, the day after the Ordinance went into effect, and it was deemed incomplete twice.
[brief] It is not the Borough’s obligation to come forward with evidence to prove that a roadway was dedicated or not.  Indeed the only competent evidence that the Borough could rely upon would be the documents and transcripts of the proceedings before the Planning Board and the documents and transcripts of the proceedings before the municipal council.  Other than those documents there is no other competent records that should ordinarily be considered.  It was the Developers’ obligation to provide the relevant transcripts and provide copies of the relevant maps and site plans and plats which the Planning Board relied upon in issuing its resolutions and approvals.  The Plaintiff/Developer deliberately chose not to present those documents into the record.  The Borough objected strenuously that both Plaintiff and the Trial Court were relying upon an incomplete record and that there needed to be clear records of what was considered before the Planning Board and what was discussed before the Planning Board.  Otherwise, all that was happening was the mere assertions and allegations submitted by the Developer and a lot of guess work by the Trial Court as to what may have occurred 13 years ago but could not be specifically tethered to any place within the competent record.  It was error for the Trial Court to proceed without the benefit of those transcripts of any of the Planning Board resolutions, particularly those that occurred in 2004, 2005, and 2010.  That is why the Borough demanded a proof hearing, which request the trial court denied.  The Developer chose not to provide those transcripts and objected to a proof hearing despite the fact that the Borough filed a motion demanding that all relevant transcripts be provided to the Trial Court in this matter.  After a long motion fight the only transcript provided by the Developer was the 2018 Planning Board proceedings in which the Planning Board expressly indicated that it had no authority to address the potential dedication and directed the Developer to seek approval from the Borough as a necessary legal requirement.  The Planning Board relied upon this expression of obligation in approving the 2018 Resolution.  At that time the Developer agreed that it was the Developer’s obligation to proceed before the Borough and that it in fact would do so.  Both parties relied upon this representation in going forward.  Later the Developer would renege on this representation.
[directive] See Sections 3 and 5 of the 2016 Directive.  4  The 2010 Attorney General Policy on Conducted Energy Devices originally directed semi- annual re-qualifications.  This mandate was amended to require annual re-qualifications by paragraph 3 of the June 3, 2014 Directive Revising the Attorney General’s Policy on Conducted Energy Devices.  5  In a June 4, 2014 Memorandum from the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice to County Prosecutors, the Superintendent of State Police, the Chairman of the State Parole Board and County Sheriffs, the Director authorized the expansion of the pool of Certified CED Instructors for each above listed agencies to five (5) Instructors.  This number may be further increased upon application to the -8- [DCJ 03/03/16]