ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW  Defendant/Appellant [...] (hereinafter “Defendant”) asserts the standard of review for this matter is abuse of discretion.  Plaintiff/Respondent [...] (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) respectfully recommends that the standard of review in this matter is a de novo review of the trial court’s statutory interpretation and an abuse of discretion review for the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
[brief] . . . . . . . .  1  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY** . . . . . . . . . .  2  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  . . . . . . . . . . 4  The Underlying Allegations  .  . . . . . . . . .  4  Facts Specific to the 45-Day Rule at Departmental Hearing.  6  Facts Specific to the 45-Day Rule at Superior Court.  . . .  7  Other Deficiencies in the IA Investigation.  . . . . . .  9  IA Inefficiencies Confirmed By Expert Testimony..  . . .  12  Background of [...] and Foot Patrols/Property Checks within HT.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  Confirmation of [...]’s Testimony Concerning Property Checks.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  Technology with HT’s Police Department.  . . . . . . .  21  [...]’s Testimony Concerning the Property Checks at Issue  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  LEGAL ARGUMENT.
[brief] (P-59.)  Defendant [...] argues that it does not provide security services to the Subject Premises – Plaintiffs should be able to conduct discovery to determine if this is true.  Defendants [...] and [...] argue that they are not liable for their employees’ failure to shut down the illegal, makeshift liquor concession stand, arguing that their failure of their employees to notice and remove the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises boils down to an allocation of resources, i.e., discretionary.  However, if Defendants had received prior complaints or reports of prior fights or other mayhem at the Subject Premises due to the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, the duty of their employees to employees to notice and remove the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises is ministerial.  *Shore v. Housing Authority of Harrison*, 208 N.J. Super. 348, 350-51 (App. Div. 1986) (“there is a distinction between the failure to provide police protection service, or sufficient police protection service, and the negligent performance by a police officer of his assigned duties.  The latter is not immunized by N.J.S.A. 59:5-4. ”)  Plaintiffs agree with Defendants [...] and [...] that “[m]inisterial acts are not immunized even when they may entail ‘operational judgments,’ such as ‘when, where and how’ to carry out a required duty. ”  Defs.’ Brief at 10 (citing *Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City*, 247 N.J. 551, 572 (2021) (internal citation omitted)).  Police officers observing the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand and its intoxicated patrons would have a duty to shut it down, and this act would be ministerial.  The Court in *Rooster Bar LLC v. Borough of Cliffside Park*, Docket No. A-1022-12T1, at *11-12 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 1, 2013) (P-80) acknowledged that it is common for police officers to patrol outside legally operating bars to prevent patrons from driving while intoxicated and common sense that a police officer patrolling a legally operating bar would have a duty to respond to and investigate a knife fight.  Police officers, faced with reports of violent and intoxicated persons causing a fight similar to those at the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, have a duty to respond and investigate it, and this act would be ministerial.  Plaintiffs adequately pleaded that Defendants had actual or constructive notice of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand due to its presence on the Subject Premises for several months before [...]’s murder, and 2) upon discovering the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, Defendants had a duty to shut down the large, makeshift liquor concession stand because it was illegal.  Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery to determine what resources were allocated to maintain and surveil the Subject Premises that would have discovered the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand before [...] was murdered, and prior reports of fights or other mayhem due to its presence on the Subject Premises.  CONCLUSION
[directive] SUBJECT: Directive  Ensuring the Independent Investigation of Criminal Cases Involving Police Use-of-Force or In-Custody Deaths  There are few investigations more important—or more challenging—than those involving the use of force by law enforcement officers against civilians.  The purpose of this Directive is to outline clear procedures governing such investigations and to ensure that they are done fully, fairly, and independently of any potential bias.  Broadly speaking, the Directive outlines a ten-step process for conducting independent investigations of use-of-force and death-in-custody incidents in compliance with State law.
[brief] *(Aa10-11). *  According to [...]’s account, he began his interaction with [...] on the morning of September 9, 2022, by congratulating her on her gender transition.  *(Aa11).*  But during that exchange, he never learned [...]’s new, preferred name.  *(Aa11). *  During the same exchange, [...] also claimed to confront [...] about falsely obtaining signatures for the union election campaign.  *Ibid.*  To believe these claims by [...], [...] would have had to engage in a scheme to falsely obtain signatures, and call the police to report [...] despite knowing it could expose her own purported wrongdoing.  *Ibid.*  [...] would also have had to continue her ruse by later sending a false text message to [...] claiming that [...] was still “blatantly misnaming” her.  *Ibid.*  The Commission could not credit this version of events, finding [...]’s account that [...] referred to [...] as D[]. even after she advised him of her preferred name in violation of the State Policy more plausible, as it was comprised not only of her own statements but also supported by the video footage of a contentious interaction between the parties and police involvement, and the text message exchange with [...].
[brief] ........................................................................................................  12  I.  [...]’S NOVEL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW JERSEY TORT CLAIMS ACT’S NOTICE PROVISIONS HAS NO RECOGNIZED BASIS IN LAW AND IS AT ODDS WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE TORT CLAIMS ACT.  (Addressing Appellant’s Point II & III.)  .................................................................  12  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ALSO CORRECTLY HELD THAT [...]’S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-RELATED CLAIMS ACCRUED ON MARCH 6, 2018, AND, THEREFORE, ARE TIME-BARRED.  (Addressing Appellant’s Points I.A & III.)  ......................................................  18  III.  [...]  CORRECTLY APPLIED  THE “LAW OF THE CASE” DOCTRINE TO DISMISS COUNTS I THROUGH IX AND REJECTED [...]’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT THAT AN APRIL 14, 2023  COURT ORDER IN THE DISMISSED CRIMINAL ACTION
[brief] 15  POINT I THE CSC'S DECISION, RELYING ON THE DETAILED FINDINGS OF THE ALJ, WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE.  . . 15  POINT II  THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE EGREGIOUSNESS OF THE APPELLANT’S CONDUCT WARRANTED HER REMOVAL.  ...........................................  19  CONCLUSION  .................................................  24  | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Aqua Beach Condominium Association v. Dept. of Community Affairs | 15 | | 186 N.J. 5, 15-16 (2006) | | | Bowden v. Bayside State Prison | 19 | | 268 N.J. Super. 301, 303 (App.Div. 1993) | | | cert. den., 135 N.J. 469 (1994) | | | Campbell v. Dept. of Civil Service | 15 | | 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963) | | | Campbell v. NJ Racing Commission | 16 | | 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001) | | | City of Newark v. Massey | 21 | | 93 N.J.Super 317, 322-25 (App. Div. 1967) | | | Close v. Kordulak Bros. | 17, 19| | 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965) | | | Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr. | 16 | | 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992) | | | In the Matter of [...], [...], | 21 | | 2023 N.J.AGEN.LEXIS. 2 (2023) | | | In re Carroll | 15 | | 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App.Div., 2001), | | | certif. denied, 179 N.J. 85 (2001) | | | In re Carter | 23 | | 191 N.J. 474, 487 (2007) | | | In re Grossman | 16, 17, 19| | 127 N.J. Super. 13, 23 (App. Div.) | | | certif. denied, 65 N.J. 292 (1974) | | In re Phillips 117 N.J. 567, 576-577 (1990) ...........................................
[brief] **B.  Acceptance of the Association’s Position would lead to an absurd result and render the Act’s language meaningless. **  Moreover, acceptance of the Association’s position that its entire membership constitute “representatives” (Pa220, ¶ 5-6) would lead to an absurd result.  It is a common principle of statutory interpretation in New Jersey that “[a]n absurd result must be avoided in interpreting a statute. ”  Gallagher v. Irvington, 190 N.J. Super. 394, 397 (App. Div. 1983) (citing Marranca v. Harbo, 41 N.J. 569, 574 (1964)).  Similarly, [...] recognized in I/M/O Local 195, IFPTE and Local 518, SEIU that “[t]he courts have held that when the literal --- \(^3\) “The Bargaining Council,” which is “compromised of, and open to, all Association members,” is the Association’s way of saying “the entire Association” (Pa220, ¶ 5).  reading of a statute...leads to an absurd result, that a reasonable construction consistent with its underlying purpose is presumed. ”  3 NJPER ¶ 252 (1977) (citing Schierstead v. Brigantine, 29 N.J. 220 (1959); In re: Petition of Gardener, 67 N.J. Super. 435 (1961) (Pa255)).  Additionally, “when a literal interpretation of individual statutory terms or provisions would lead to results inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute, that interpretation should be rejected. ”  Bermudez v. Kessler Inst. for Rehab., 439 N.J. Super. 45, 51 (App. Div. 2015) (internal citations omitted).  The Association’s proposed interpretation of the statute, and by extension, [...]’s acceptance of this interpretation, would most definitely lead to an absurd result.
[brief] The [...] general liability policy covering the CCIP was effective from December 13, 2013 to December 13, 2018.  The declaration listed [...] as a "named insured."  An endorsement entitled "Named Insured Contractor Controlled Insurance Program" expanded the class of "Named Insured[s]" under the policy to include "a contractor of any tier" that "performs operations at a 'designated project'."  The policy also identified the limited class of contractors that were "not an Insured under this policy" to include "Vendors, suppliers, material dealers, abatement contractors, blasting contractors, delivery persons, haulers, hazardous waste removal contractors," as well as product or component manufacturers "that do[ ] not also install the product or component at the 'designated project,'" and similar parties lacking "dedicated payroll for employees on-site."  (Dta146.)  (N.b., the provision does not purport to exclude demolition subcontractors.)  The [...] policy's "Commercial General Liability Form," number CG00011207, was copyrighted by "[...]" and is a standard --- 2 CCIP and Owner Controlled Insurance Programs ("OCIPS") are a form of insurance coverage colloquially known as "wrap-up" policies in which general contractors and project owners purchase insurance that covers the "owners, administrators, contractors and all tiers of subcontractors" for specific construction projects.
[directive] If the conduct of an officer was found to be improper, the report must cite the agency rule, regulation, or SOP violated.  Any aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the situation, such as unclear or poorly drafted agency policy, inadequate training or lack of proper supervision, shall also be noted.  9.1.3  If the investigation reveals evidence of misconduct not based on the original complaint, this too must be reported.  An investigation concerning this secondary misconduct should be conducted.  9.2
[brief] State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 399 (2022).  An investigative stop or detention "is permissible 'if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'"  State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 410 (2012) (quoting Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 20).  "The standard for this form of brief stop or detention is less than the probable cause showing necessary to justify an arrest."  Ibid.  "However, an officer's hunch or subjective good faith—even if correct in the end—cannot justify an investigatory stop or detention."  Id. at 411.  "Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of "'the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'"  Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 399 (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)).  The inquiry "takes into consideration numerous factors, including officer experience and knowledge."  Id. at 400. omitted].  None of those non-specific, non-individualized factors, however, “meet the constitutional threshold of individualized reasonable suspicion” that this particular defendant was engaged in criminal activity.  See State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 532, 267 A.3d 449 (2022).  Aside from defendant's presence on that walkway, none of those factors are specific to defendant engaging in behavior indicative of criminal activity.  The only information the officers possessed prior to the stop was information that could be used to justify the stop of virtually anyone, on any day, and at any time, based simply on their presence on that street.  There is actually greater "reasonable suspicion" in Goldsmith than in the case sub judice, as the defendant here did not (as did defendant Goldsmith) come out of a walkway between a vacant property known for the sales of drugs and weapons.  Here, all defendant did was exit a house.  As further explained in Goldsmith and equally applicable here, an investigative detention “may not be based on arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective good faith, or a mere hunch. ”  State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014).  [...] had a hunch that defendant was engaged in criminal activity.  That hunch, however, did not amount to objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop.  Here, because the officer's initial detention of defendant was unlawful, it is not necessary to reach the issue regarding whether officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to frisk defendant.  D.
[brief] Plaintiff owns a 133 acre parcel located in both Florence and Mansfield (the “Property”).  Ja012; Ja184.  The Property is bounded by Interstate Route 295 to the east; Florence-Columbus Road (County Route 656) to the south; Burlington-Columbus Road (County Route 543) to the north; and Old York Road (County Route 660) to the west.  Ja050; 1T 18:5-20.  The municipal boundary line runs in a north-south direction, with approximately seven acres on the easterly side in Mansfield, and the remaining portion on the westerly side in Florence.  (1T 18:21-25; 19:1-4).  The Mansfield side of the Property is in that municipality’s “ODL: Office, Distribution, Laboratory” Zone; the Florence side is almost completely within the “SM: Special Manufacturing” Zone, with a small portion, west of a 150-foot wide [...] easement, in the “AG–Agricultural” Zone.  All development is confined to Mansfield’s ODL and Florence’s SM Zones; no development is proposed for the AG-portion of the Property.  Ja013; 1T 20:15-20.  At the time of application, warehouses and distribution facilities were permitted uses in both Mansfield’s ODL and Florence’s SM Zones.  Florence limits the height of such buildings to 30 feet; Mansfield allows a height of 50 feet.  Ja013.  Plaintiff’s applications sought approval for two warehouses, each 48 feet tall, totaling approximately 1.4 million square feet: 870,00 square feet for Building 1, and 523,644 square feet for Building 2.  Ja012; Ja078-Ja079.  3,928 square feet of Building 1 would be located in Mansfield; the remaining square footage would be in Florence.  Ja079; 1T 7:23.  Plaintiff sought preliminary major site plan approval, along with bulk variance relief for the reduction of parking spaces, from the [...].  Ja090.  On January 24, 2022, the [...] approved Plaintiff’s application.
[brief] M40.  The Trial Court went on to quote the Mayor’s statement from the press release:  “I’ve not been pleased with this proposal since its inception; it is yet another way in which developers use state affordable housing mandates to force more development into towns,” said [...], noting the proposal would include 42 court-mandated affordable units.  “And now, the developer is still trying to squeeze as much development as possible onto this site, even with a bald eagle nesting ground.
[brief] 20,22  [...], Complainant v. [...], Bergen County, Respondent, Docket No.: [...], June 19, 2019 ......................................  26  Statutes & Rules: N.J.A.C. 6A:4-4.1(a) ..................................................  13 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.3 ....................................................  4 N.J.A.C. 6A: 28- 6.7(c) ...............................................  15  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This case arises from the summary dismissal by the School Ethics Commission ("Commission") of a complaint (as amended, the "Complaint") by Appellant [...] filed against several members of the [...] ("Board") of the [...] ("District"), in 2021.
[brief] City of Phila., | 17 | | 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119163, 2010 WL 4484630 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2010)| | | Brownstone Inv. Grp., LLC v. Levey, | 33 | | 514 F. Supp. 2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) | | | Century Indem. v. Viacom Inter., Inc, | 35 | | 2003 WL 402792 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) | | | Chassen v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc., | 2, 9, 26| | 836 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2016) | | | Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., | 13 | | 539 U.S. 52 (2003) | | | Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, | passim | | 215 N.J. 265 (2013) | | | Comando v. Nugiel, | 14 | | 2014 WL 2117877 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 22, 2014) | | Del. River Partners LLC v. R.R. ConsT1, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1134 (App. Div. June 24, 2022) .......................17 EPIX Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McClennan Cos., Inc., 410 N.J. Super 453 (2009) ..............................................................................27 Fasano v. Li, No. 16 CIV. 8759 (KPF), 2023 WL 6292579 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023) ..................................................................................................................28 Hartford Ins. Group v. Marson ConsT1 Corp., 186 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 1982) .................................................................23 J.L. Davis & Assocs. v. Heidler, 263 N.J. Super. 264 (App. Div. 1993) .................................................................16 Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301 (2019) ............................................................................................12 Marmo & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024) ..................................................................35 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury ConsT1 Corp., 460 U.S. 1 .............................................................................................................20
[brief] *Ibid.*  The rank-and-file officers were not the only ones who benefited from this anticipated $2.261 million budget savings.  While the June 7, 2017 Implementation Memorandum directed that effective June 7, 2017 the current rank differential upon promotion from police officer to sergeant was eliminated (222a), the settlement agreement awarded all currently employed sergeants with an increase in their base salaries to $100,000 per year.  (231a ¶3).
[brief] “4T” refers to the November 20, 2023 Certification of Lost Verbatim Court Record filed by the Court’s Transcript Coordinator, with respect to the lost/damaged transcript of the May 27, 2021 Chancery court hearing.  companies, Defendants [...] and [...], and held all defendants, including [...] and [...], jointly and severally liable.  The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment in full.  *Sipko v. [...], Inc.*, 251 N.J. 162 (2023).  While nearly unmentioned in [...]’s appeal brief, the die was cast in this matter by Defendants when they decided in July 2016 that they were not going to, ever, pay a single penny voluntarily to [...], and instead would fight all collection efforts by hook or by crook.  Thus, in the days immediately following the court’s July 27, 2016 buyout decision (Pa1-12), and while proceedings were ongoing concerning the form of final judgment ultimately entered on August 19, 2016, [...] and [...] secretly transferred nearly all their liquid assets – more than $20 million – to family members in Slovakia.  (Pa54-55).  Defendants did not voluntarily disclose these transfers (as is disingenuously suggested in [...]’s brief (Db3)) or the purported antecedent debt they later claimed the transfers were to repay.  Instead, Defendants represented that they would post a cash bond for the judgment pending appeal.  (Pa54).  Based on that representation, the judgment contained a stay of execution for 30 days.  (Da204).  Defendants then, just before the stay of execution was to expire, and again without disclosing the transfers, falsely claimed that they lacked sufficient collateral to obtain a cash bond, and filed motions seeking permission to pledge largely illiquid alternative security, including their interests in [...], real property in Greenwich, Connecticut (a mansion that [...] owned through a single-member LLC), and $3 million in cash from [...].  *Sipko*, 251 N.J. at 173.
[directive] Whenever practicable, notice shall be given to victims of domestic violence in advance of an agency’s disclosure.  In rare circumstances, further redactions may be necessary to protect the identity of a victim.  An example of a synopsis is found in Appendix L. C. reports.  IAPP Section 9.11 is amended to include the following Publication of public addition:  9.11.3  Agencies may not, as part of a plea or settlement agreement in an internal affairs investigation or otherwise, enter into any agreement concerning the content of a synopsis subject to public disclosure under Section 9.11.2, including any agreement regarding the identities of officers subject to final discipline, summaries of transgressions, or statements of the sanctions imposed.  D.
[brief] a.  Any insurance company damaged as the result of a violation of any provision of this act may sue therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover compensatory damages, which shall include reasonable investigation expenses, costs of suit and attorney’s fees.  (emphasis added)  b.  A successful claimant under subsection a. shall recover treble damages if the court determines that the defendant has engaged in a pattern of violation this Act.  (emphasis added)  Therefore, the statute expressly provides for the award of compensatory damages, inclusive of attorney’s fees, investigating costs and costs of suit, including the award of treble damages “if the court determines that the defendant engaged in a pattern of violation the [IFPA]” (emphasis added)
[brief] Section 17.1  Escrow  (a)  Escrow Agent will hold the Earnest Money Deposit in escrow in an interest-bearing account of the type generally used by Escrow Agent for the holding of escrow funds until the earlier of (i) the Closing, or (ii) the termination of this Agreement in accordance with any right hereunder.  . . .  In the event the Closing occurs, the Earnest Money Deposit will be released to Seller, and Purchaser shall receive a credit against the Purchase Price in the amount of the Earnest Money Deposit.