ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Aa0001-Aa0005).  Appellant fails to address NJDEP’s decision to reduce the size of the dock in the 2017 WDF Permit.  [...]’s dock’s compliance with the CZM Rules was later affirmed by NJDEP in connection with NJDEP’s further review of the dock as part of the application process for the 2019 Permit Modification and NJDEP’s review of Appellant’s third-party hearing request.  In addition, Appellant fails to demonstrate how Appellant’s claim that the proposed pier would hinder navigability is particular to Appellant.  See In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide General Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 470 (2006).  Indeed, other property owners have made similar allegations, and, thus, Appellant’s claim is not particularized.  Appellant also specifically objected to [...]’s dock on the basis that it is dangerous to surrounding residents and boaters not just Appellant seeking the participation of third parties in Appellant’s opposition efforts by posting about [...]’s dock and setting up a website.  (Aa0380-Aa0382; Aa0424-Aa0428).  Appellant has presented no regulatory property setback that applies to its property and other docks with similar dimensions have been approved by NJDEP for this area and all along the New Jersey shoreline.
[brief] Appellant owns and rents a property in [...], located at [...] (Pa129, 1).  At all times material hereto, Appellant maintained a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by [...] and bearing policy number [...] (the “Policy”) (Pa131, 12).  Appellant’s Policy contains the following condition, which is contained in SECTIONS I AND II – CONDITIONS:  B.  Concealment Or Fraud  This entire policy is void if it was obtained by fraud or concealment of any material facts or circumstances.  We do not provide coverage to any “insured” who, whether before or after a loss, has: 1. Knowingly and willfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance; 2. Engaged in fraudulent conduct; or 3. Made false statements; relating to this insurance.  (Pa131, 13)  On January 9, 2019, a pipe connected to Appellant’s hot water heater reportedly leaked and she thereafter presented an insurance claim to [...] on or about January 14, 2019 (Pa131, 14).  In connection with that claim, Appellant sought compensation from [...] for alleged damage to her dwelling, personal property and for alternative living expenses (Pa132, 15).  [...] amicably resolved Appellant’s claim for the damage to her dwelling (Pa132, 18).  The litigation she filed revolved around her remaining claims for personal property damage and alternative living expenses with the latter forming the basis of her alleged personal injury claim that she was also pursuing.  After receiving notice of the claim, [...] commenced an investigation into the scope and extent of [...]’s alleged loss.  [...] assigned Plaintiff’s insurance claim to [...].  (Pa. 132, 16-17).  Appellant is a model and testified that she was involved in commercial and print (Pa 132, 22).  After the loss she started pressuring [...] to pay for her to live in a hotel in January 2019, the basis of which claim stemmed from her allegation that the loss rendered her ill and unable to work as a model.
[brief] The trial court’s decision dismissing [...]’s Complaint includes both errors of fact and law.  R. 4:69-6(c) expressly contemplates a court enlarging the 45-day appeal period “where it is manifest that the interest of justice so requires. ”  To that end, New Jersey decisional law is replete with cases enlarging the appeal period for far longer delays than that involved in this case and for circumstances far less compelling.  Accordingly, and for the reasons more fully detailed infra, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s decision should be reversed and Ordinance No. 13-2022 and the [...] should be invalidated and set aside, as a matter of law.
[brief] ”  Db44 (emphasis added).  And contrary to Defendant’s contention that “the State may not... assum[e] that the lost evidence would not have been exculpatory,” it is Defendant’s burden to demonstrate a due process violation and, inherent within, whether the evidence was exculpatory.  Assuming arguendo that the thermometer, which was brought by the medicolegal death investigator from the medical examiner’s office (7T 67:7-25), was possessed by the prosecution, there is no allegation that the thermometer was not preserved due to bad faith.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Refusal to Apply the Parol Evidence Rule.  In denying [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, the motion Judge held that the Parol Evidence Rule does not prohibit a cause of action for fraud in the inducement of a contract.  (2T35:15-38:2).  The trial court relied on Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. 259 (2006).  The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs were not attempting to alter the terms of the contract but instead challenging the validity of the contract, the Parol Evidence Rule was inapplicable.  In essence, the Court found that a full factual record regarding each plaintiff’s transaction was required before the Court could decide application of the Parol Evidence Rule and thus, could not address application on summary judgment.
[directive] Firearms Instructor Qualification Requirements  All instructors (supervising firearms instructors and firearms instructors) engaged in the prescribed semi-annual firearms requalification program must satisfy one of the following requirements.  9-15 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards •  An instructor must be certified by the Police Training Commission (PTC) to instruct firearms in an approved "Basic Course" as defined in N.J.A.C.  13:1-1.1.  •  An instructor must possess training equivalent to the PTC-approved firearms instructor course and be able to demonstrate knowledge and skill in this field.  Equivalent training includes successful completion of a firearms instructor training program such as offered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Secret Service, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center at Glynco, GA., New Jersey State Police, Smith and Wesson Academy or the National Rifle Association Police Firearms Instructor Program.  •  An instructor must have satisfactorily completed some other recognized firearms instructor course as determined by the chief of police or agency executive.  Supervising firearms instructors must also have experience in conducting either a PTC-approved firearms course or an equivalent course.  Section 7.
[brief] Hence, with this public policy in mind, the Court in Rendine, first stated that, historically, “federal courts developed various methodologies for determining reasonable counsel fees pursuant to fee-shifting statutes. ”  Id. at 323.  The Court first cited an early approach adopted in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), which advocated reliance on twelve subjective factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the question; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
[brief] On April 24, 2023, the initial trial court, [...], moved forward with trial [2T] on with defendant’s waiver of appearance submitted to the court 2T3:16-18.  [...], Esq. (herewith in “[...]”) and defendant’s legal counsel testifies to the court as follows:  The plaintiff did not cite any vehicle details 2T4:21-25, that somebody [unidentified police officer] identified [...] 2T5:4-6 and the sole reason for identification was [...] further testifying that [...] identified the defendant 2T5:7-12.  Counsel further explains the plaintiff’s witness not providing evidence identifying the defendant, the evidence was based on hearsay of a [...] and [...]; it should not have been allowed in the case (2T6:1-5).  [...] further explains the plaintiff outright accuses the defendant because [...] affirms it is the defendant and the plaintiff did not provide defendant an opportunity to cross-examine or provide information from the defendant’s discovery request at trial.  --- 21
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## CASES | Case | Page | |-------------------------------------------|------| | Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, | 16 | | 195 N.J. 575 (2008) | | | Crowe v. De Gioia, | 24 | | 90 N.J. 126 (1982) | | | Garden State Equality v. Dow, | 24 | | 216 N.J. 314 (2013) | | | In re Vince, | 25 | | 2 N.J. 443 (1949) | | | Klimowich v. Klimowich, | 16,17| | 86 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 1965) | | | Kohrherr v. Ferreira, | 23 | | 215 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div. 1987) | | | Matter of Wolf, | 18 | | 231 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div.), | | | certif. den., 117 N.J. 138 (1989) | | | State v. Burris, | 19 | | 145 N.J. 509, 535 (1996) | | | State v. Lavrik, | 9,13,14,20,21,22| | 472 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2022) | | | State v. Reldan, | 16 | | 100 N.J. 187 (1985) | | | State v. Silva, | 18 | | 131 N.J. 438 (1993) | | State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582 (2016).................................................................15
[brief] See Berg, 225 N.J. at 262 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985).  And indeed, absurd results are what [...] offers in its interpretation.  It would be absurd and antithetical to this bargain to limit the residency requirement to only the time of appointment.  What, indeed, would be the purpose of the State reforming health and medical education, and laying out opportunities for the counties where [...] operates to be fully heard, and have the residency requirement apply only for a single day?  It makes little sense to impose a residency requirement for four out of fifteen members only to permit them to move out of Camden, Essex, or Middlesex County the day after their appointment.  Gallagher v. Irvington, 190 N.J. Super 394, 397 (App. Div. 1983) (“An absurd result must be avoided in interpreting a statute.
[brief] The Proposed Regulator Station Is Not A Reliability Project, But A Costly Stranded Asset In The Making (Argued Below: Ha105,106)  [...] argued, and the ID and [...] Decision accepted, that the regulator station is not a “capacity expansion” project, but a “reliability” project.  Mere nomenclature can not defeat the laws of physics.  [...]’s argument may have some validity as applied to the 16-inch pipeline, but not the regulator.  [...] claimed that it had to install the 16-inch pipeline in order to permit in-line inspection.  That’s a valid reliability claim, because inspections are for safety and reliability purposes.  But that’s where the claim ends.  We have demonstrated by the cross-examination of [...]’s own witnesses that the current regulator is safe, reliable and offers no risk of harm to the [...] system or the area.  The 16-inch pipeline was installed to replace a 10-inch pipeline.  Common sense compels the conclusion that a 16-inch pipeline can transport significantly more natural gas at comparable pressures than a 10- inch line.  The proposed regulator, the subject of this proceeding, is a capacity expansion project, as the laws of physics dictate.
[brief] Specifically, [...] and his assignor paid a grand total of $382,152.12 to settle judgment debts incurred in the HCH Action.  Pa481–82 ¶ 29.  [...] and his assignor additionally incurred and paid $17,198.22 in HCH Action defense costs after March 5, 2021, for a total loss of $399,352.34.  Pa481–82 ¶¶ 29, 31–32; Pa794–856.  That loss is [...]’s responsibility.  Conclusion
[brief] (Da1621)  Thus, on February 8, 2016, the trial court also entered an Order dictating that [...] (and others) return certain Company computers and other equipment, and that “[t]he Fairfield, New Jersey police department, or any other law enforcement agency, are hereby authorized to take all lawful measures necessary to enforce this Order and return the aforementioned property to the Company premises....”  (Da1626)  On February 23, 2016, the trial court issued a temporary injunction, and on June 7, 2016, this Court issued a permanent injunction, preventing [...] from taking a list of actions that were contrary to prior Court Orders confirming and implementing the Phase I arbitration award.
[brief] (2T:65-15 to 68-13; Da 19-22).  Defendant’s argument also ignores settled case law in this state regarding lay testimony of the fact of intoxication.  “[L]ay opinion consistently has been admitted to prove that a defendant was 'operat[ing] a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor' in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 . . . ."  State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 585 (2006).  In fact, testimony regarding “scoring protocols” is not required, at all.  In State v. Morton, 39 N.J. 512, 514-15 (1963), the Court specifically held,  When the significance of the results of a field sobriety test depends upon a conclusion of the witness as to whether the motorist's reaction is a departure from the normal or standard such conclusion may not be given unless the examiner is shown to have some skill or training which will qualify him to make an evaluation.  . . .  [However], even if no qualifying experience or training of the officers is shown, it does not follow that their testimony must be excluded.  It is entirely proper for them to describe the tests or maneuvers they had the defendant perform and then testify as to what his physical reaction was when he undertook to execute them.  The reaction should be described in terms of what they observed when the tests were undertaken by defendant.  . . .  In other words, the observed physical reactions to such tests are on the same plane as other common factual indicia that a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor which always may be testified to by a layman.  (emphasis in original).  Here, there is no dispute that [...] was a trained officer.  Being a new officer does not equate to lack of training.  In fact, the municipal court found that [...] conducted himself during this entire stop “as a well-seasoned officer would have done, as I’ve seen thousands and and thousands of times. ” (2T:68-9 to 11).  And again, [...] acceded to the municipal court’s credibility findings.  (Da 21).  What is more, the standard field sobriety tests were just one more piece of the factual mosaic that described defendant's conduct at the time and place of his arrest for DWI.  [...] indicated that defendant did not successfully perform the tests based on his own observations of defendant’s performance, and two judges in two separate courts accepted that testimony as credible.  As such, there is no basis for this Court to intervene or disregard those findings.  In sum, there was sufficient support for a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that he was intoxicated while operating his motor vehicle and [...] committed no error in making his independent finding of guilt based on the facts and evidence in this record.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Review Methodology  Aside from the November 2019 order, Plaintiffs point to no binding legal authority to support their request to force [...] to use refined keyword searches to identify responsive ESI.  They instead make a series of claims in an apparent effort to demonstrate that TAR is not appropriate for this case.  Plaintiffs claim, for example, that TAR is a culling tool rather than a method of responsiveness review, (R. 289, Pls.’ Mot. at 7), but this argument has no merit given Plaintiffs’ own description of the software as a tool to “predict and apply responsiveness determinations,” (id. at 6).  Plaintiffs also argue that because TAR is more effective at identifying responsive documents than traditional manual review, pre-TAR culling will eliminate large amounts of potentially relevant ESI.  (Id. at 7.)  The problem with this argument is that it assumes that those emails removed by the keyword searches likely would have been identified using TAR at the outset instead.  Indeed, the low richness of the ESI collection in this case suggests just the opposite.  The City’s vendor collected over nine million pages of documents, less than 15% of which hit on Plaintiffs’ own search terms.  (See R. 300, Def.’s Resp. at 4.)  While the court does not discount the possibility that using TAR at the onset might reveal more responsive documents overall, based on the number of documents that were discarded using Plaintiffs’ proposed search terms, pre-TAR culling will achieve the best possible review in this case.  In other words, it satisfies the reasonable inquiry standard and is proportional to the needs of this case under the federal rules.
[brief] Defendants used precisely the same maneuver rejected in Firoz, Brach, and Cineas, supra, and should not be rewarded here.  [...]’s motion to reconsider was brought before a different judge only three weeks after [...]’s decision.  This was a transparent attempt to take advantage of his retirement and the transfer of the matter to [...].  There were no exceptional circumstances, and no facts or law that changed in the intervening three weeks.  The fact that [...] may have viewed the motion differently than [...] is an insufficient reason to permit reconsideration as a matter of law.  *Cineas*, 270 N.J. Super. at 208.
[brief] In the first year of employment, September 2016 to June of 2017, Appellant was evaluated by three Observations conducted on her and a Summative Report.  The indication of how well Appellant was performing is not based on segments of the Observations but instead is based on the final score for each Observation.  The three Observations that were conducted on Appellant illustrated that she had scored satisfactorily and the Appellant performed her job well.  (Pa298, Pa314, Observations for 2018-2019)  The Summative Report for 2016-2017 was Effective also.  (Pa326, 2016-2017 Summative Report).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-71 states that an employer “must make sufficient provision for the complete payment of any obligation which he may incur . . . under the provisions of said Article 2, by one of the methods hereinafter set forth in sections 34:15-77 and 34:15-78 of this title. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  Section 77 and 78 of the Act require an employer to either be permissibly self-insured or purchase workers’ compensation insurance.
[brief] At the heart of this appeal lies the arbitrator’s failure to adhere to the New Jersey Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) fee schedule (hereinafter “fee schedule”), N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, Appendix, Exhibit A (2024), despite Plaintiff’s authorized amendment to the Demand for Arbitration aimed at ensuring accurate and fair reimbursement.  The mandatory statutory and regulatory provisions governing PIP benefits were incorrectly deemed inapplicable, leading to a flawed arbitration award erroneously upheld by the Law Division.  The arbitrator and the Law Division's disregard for the amendment, due to an oversight in understanding its substance, and the applicable law necessitates a comprehensive review by the Appellate Division to correct this critical error.
[directive] Inisyal  [...] / Defendant’s Initials  Fòm Prensipal Deklarasyon Koupab/Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole paj 4 nan 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole page 4 of 7
[brief] Ordinance 22-1516 is “Substantially Consistent” with the Master Plan and the Borough’s Findings are Entitled to Deference.  [Pa 128-29].  In this case, the Redevelopment Plan as amended by Ordinance 22-1516 is “substantially consistent” with the Master Plan.  As contemplated by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7, it refers to the Borough’s 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report.  See Pa 178-79.  It also sets out general redevelopment objectives, Pa 181, and addresses the fact that the current zoning of the Property is not consistent with the Land Use Element of the Master Plan.  Pa 187.  It addresses the redevelopment area’s location in relation to neighboring municipality and the uses permitted in the areas of that municipality closest to the redevelopment area.  See Pa 205-06.  It maintains the critical components of the proposed redevelopment of the Property as set forth in the Master Plan, including its residential, affordable housing, commercial and open space elements and ensures that the development of the Property is consistent with the surrounding area and the uses preferred by the Master Plan at the Property.
[brief] Finally, the trial court did not unilaterally prohibit defendant from introducing evidence of his theory of third-party guilt, despite having “absolutely nothing” to support it.  (13T12-7 to 16).  For example, the court allowed defendant to elicit testimony that [...]’s fingerprint was found on the exterior of [...]’s Chevy, and that [...] was arrested for drug charges in the same neighborhood that the victim was murdered.  However, defendant failed to prove that the jury would have reached an alternate outcome had they heard evidence that defendant and [...] each were in possession of heroin with two different “stamps” or “brands. ”  As discussed at length by the trial court, the fact that two different “brands” of heroin were found on two individuals in the same neighborhood one and a half months apart is not evidence of a drug rivalry, let alone proof of murder.
[brief] First, the judge again applied the wrong standard.  She also improperly dismissed the 12:04pm and 12:07pm Facebook friendships.  While it is true a person becomes a Facebook “friend” by either accepting a request or when another user accepts theirs, Matter of Robertelli, 248 N.J. 293, 203 (2021), it was not apparent from the screenshot whether [...] accepted others’ requests, or whether they accepted his previously-sent requests.  It is, however, very likely that full records from Facebook, had counsel obtained them, would have shown this.
[brief] (6T:97-15 to 99-5); (See 5T:49-17 to 50-6), (Da 16 at 17:36:10 to 17:36:32) (trial court’s finding that video shows man in black jacket, or [...], picking up [...]’s belongings from the counter and man in green jacket picking up [...]’s clothes before the three men leave the store).  [...]’s belongings were recovered from [...]’s jacket when the three men were arrested.  (5T:103-18 to 22)  Nothing was recovered from [...] or the man in the green jacket.  A number of law enforcement officers testified for the State regarding the investigation.
[brief] ”  [...].  This argument fails because, although parents have a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion), that right does not extend to being notified of their children’s gender identity as expressed in school over their children’s objections.