ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ignoring that the project did not meet any of the Additional Backlog Conditions, the Arbitrator erroneously concluded that (1) [...] “was a project that was on the Pipeline list created by [...] for several years,” (2) non-Backlog project [...] was an extension of the Backlog Project Bayonne or “[...],” and (3) [...], an [...] employee, was “brought over” to [...] by [...] and “charged” with getting this project for [...].  Da138.  First, [...] never appeared on the Financial Reporting.  Da291-345.  [...] provisionally and temporarily listed [...] on the Forecasts during a 15 month period (not for a period of “years” as mistakenly stated by the Arbitrator) when it could have been reasonably considered for eventual transformation to an Additional Backlog Project subject to EGP sharing. \(^{10}\)  Da351; Da356; Da365; Da368; Da373.  The project, however, was abandoned by the developer.  As demonstrated by a summary exhibit of the \(^{10}\) Even the EGP provisionally listed for [...] in the Forecasts is not the amount demanded by [...] or determined by the Arbitrator.  Da351; Da356; Da365; Da368; Da373. information contained in [...] Exhibit Nos. 15-22, only much later was it resurrected without [...]’s involvement under circumstances that caused it to be far outside the purview of the PTA.  Da394.  As admitted by [...], the parties never agreed to an EGP for [...].  Da273.  Here again, the Arbitrator did not base his award for EGP on the [...] project on any rationale tied to the legal grounds necessary to establish a “course of dealing. ”  Instead, in far exceeding the powers granted to him by the express terms in the PTA, he blindly adopted the EGP proposed by [...] ($2,670,000.00) without a shred a proof that the project was properly recognized by the parties as an Additional Backlog Project that was subject to sharing of EGP under the PTA.  Da138; Da276.  The Arbitrator’s decision to include [...] as subject to the PTA’s EGP-sharing based on the fact that [...]’s employee, [...], was the primary contact for the work exceeds the Arbitrators’ powers because it ignores the entirely different set of expressly stated conditions that were necessary for [...] to be elevated to Backlog Project status.  Da138.  His determination regarding [...] is just another example of the Arbitrator straying from the contract and using extraneous and inconsequential circumstances to determine if a project is subject to EGP.  In addition, the Arbitrator made no effort to calculate EGP or justify his acceptance [...]’s proposed EGP for this project.  Not only did [...] never list the [...] project on the Financial Reporting it sent to [...], Da291-345, but it also only listed [...] for a short period of time in its forecasts, predicting a different EGP altogether.  Da351; Da356; Da365; Da368; Da373; Da393.  Finally, in the Award, the Arbitrator concluded that “[...] admittedly severed the relationship with [...] and [...] sometime in 2021 and confirmed same by email of December 28, 2021.
[brief] [...] was not represented in the [...] proceedings, and [...] was never given prior notice, or the opportunity to be heard, in connection with the [...]’s issuance of multiple orders which imposed affirmative obligations on him.  [...] was not listed as a party to the complaint on any of the transmittal cover letters to the [...]’s interim orders, even though two of them specifically ordered [...] to take specific action and declared him in contempt.  (Da224; Da226; Da229).  When he asked for such an opportunity to be heard and a stay of proceedings, the [...] denied him that one opportunity.  (Da131-132).  When he sought leave to intervene in the [...] proceedings, the [...] denied him that one opportunity.  (Ibid.).  The [...] claims that [...] never asserted “an independent interest in the confidentiality of the documents.
[directive] Since day one, combating gun violence and other violent crime has been my top priority, and we have used every resource available to us in the Department Law and Public Safety to do so.  Our transformational approach to public safety is working: on January 4, 2024, we announced that for the first time since the State began tracking shooting statistics in 2009, the number of people shot in New Jersey fell below 1,000.  Building on a 25 percent reduction in the number of shooting victims in 2022, the number of shooting victims in 2023 dropped an additional 13 percent—with 924 people shot.  In 2024, we saw a continued decline in the rates of violence with 788 people shot – a 16 percent reduction from the prior year’s record.  Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Acting Attorney General [...], “AG Platkin 1 Announces Multidisciplinary Public Safety Innovation Working Group,” (May 3, 2023), https://www.njoag.gov/ag- platkin-announces-multidisciplinary-public-safety-innovation-working-group/  In total, this reflects a nearly 50 percent reduction in shooting victims when compared to 2012.  This reduction reflects a multipronged approach to address community safety—dedicated work by law enforcement officers, implementing stronger gun safety policies, holding bad actors in the firearms industry accountable, and expanding New Jersey’s investment in community violence prevention and intervention programs.  Even with the recent reduction in violence, gun violence continues to be a scourge that plagues our communities disproportionately.  It demands a coordinated and strenuous response.  The Department is dedicated to ensuring that we continue to use all available tools to combat gun violence, and to improve collaboration where necessary.  To that end, I tasked this Working Group with identifying best practices and policies for greater collaboration between law enforcement and community-based violence intervention organizations.
[brief] The Trial Court’s failure to consider any mitigating factors and imposition of a lengthy state prison sentence constituted an abuse of discretion (8T16:25-23:20).  Rule 3:21-4(h) provides that “[a]t the time sentence is imposed the judge shall state reasons for imposing such sentence including findings pursuant to the criteria for withholding or imposing imprisonment or fines under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to 2C:44-3; [and] the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating and mitigating factors affecting sentence[.]”
[brief] A.  The PWCRA Requires That All Contractors and Each Listed Subcontractor Performing Work on Public Projects be Registered with the DOL at the Time of Bid Opening (0015a-0018a)  The PWCRA indisputably requires all contractors performing work on public projects and each of their subcontractors to be registered with the DOL.  This requirement is expressly stated in the PWCRA, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51, which provides, in relevant part:  [n]o contractor or subcontractor, including a subcontractor not listed in the bid proposal, shall engage in the performance of any public work subject to the contract, unless the contractor or subcontractor is registered pursuant to that act.  Further the statute unequivocally requires that any listed Subcontractor be registered at the time the bid is made:  [n]o contractor shall list a subcontractor in a bid proposal for the contract unless the subcontractor is registered pursuant to P.L. 1999, c238 (C.34:11-56.48 et seq.) at the time the bid is made.  [N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51.]  Consistent with the plain and clear language of the statute, courts have held contractors and subcontractors cannot perform work on a public project without first being registered with the DOL.
[brief] Beyond harming the privacy interests of businesses, the Order harms the privacy interests of individuals.  It is undeniable that individuals routinely use their business email accounts to send personal material to others, with one study finding that over 59% of all workers using their corporate email for personal use. \(^7\)  There is an endless list of sensitive information that can be found in business email repositories, including Social Security numbers, logins and passwords, protected health information, and deeply personal communications.  There is a new era of electronic communication and the blurring of lines between personal and business communication such that “many employers expect or at least tolerate personal use of [electronic communication] equipment by employees because it often increases worker efficiency. ”  *City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon*, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).
[brief] (T23:16-25).  The type of transaction and the timing of Defendants’ alleged malpractice differentiates this case from the defendants in Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997) making that case inapposite.  In the Instant Action, the claims in the Amended Complaint are based upon the same factual basis as the claims in the Complaint in the Lease Litigation "at times using almost the exact same language found therein," as correctly pointed out by the Trial Court.  (Pa0001)(Pa0015)(Pa0957)(T14:7-10).  The record clearly shows the strong link between the Instant Action and the Lease Litigation.  In fact, Plaintiff does not hide the fact that Plaintiff's own representatives admitted that they decided to sue defendant during the pendency of the Lease Litigation.  (Pa0844,T203:1-5,T205:15-21)(T24:14-18).  The Trial Court focused on the timing of the events of the alleged legal malpractice in relation to the Lease Litigation to determine that the Instant Action was a successive action.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Phillips at 580; *Ruroede v. Hasbrouck Heights*, 214 N.J. 338, 357 (2013).  In the final analysis, the factfinder must base his ultimate findings and conclusions upon competent evidence in the record:  It is the duty of the finder of fact, no matter the forum chosen for a police disciplinary proceeding, to point to the competent evidence in the record supporting his or her ultimate fact findings and conclusions drawn therefrom.  The record before the hearing officer in this matter should have been scrutinized in that manner.  *Ruroede* at 361.
[brief] (5T40-7 to 11); see State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 544 (1994).  [...]’s testimony was also wholly inconsistent with his pretrial statement.  [...] claimed that all of the details he provided were “lies” fed to him by police.  (3T171-15 to 173-24).  Thus, subject to a reliability determination, [...]’s statement was admissible.  See State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 405 n.1 (2002) (explaining that a witness’s prior statement to the police would be admissible after the witness disavowed the statement at trial and denied parts of the statement by claiming he could not recall them).  [...] thoroughly analyzed the Gross I factors, careful to note all applicable circumstances in admitting both statements.
[brief] (Pa 254)  Defendant [...] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment on April 20, 2023.  (Pa 265-Pa 268)  Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on May 4, 2023.  (Pa 273)  Defendant [...] filed a response to opposition on May 8, 2023.  (Pa 273)  The Court heard oral argument on May 12, 2023.  (T1)  On May 19, 2023, the Corut entered an Order and decision reversing its previous order denying Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendant [...] with prejudice.  (Pa 271)  This appeal followed with Plaintiff filing his Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement on June 21, 2023, with amended versions (correcting an error and uploading the Order granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment) being filed on July 5, 2023, and July 12, 2023.
[brief] The Appellate Division disagreed.  The court noted, citing to the Supreme Court's related opinion in the Land case found at 186 N.J. at 175, that: "the statutory language of IFPA does not require proof of reliance on a false statement or resultant damages...  The penalties permitted by the act are not designed to remedy direct monetary damage to the insurer.  Sailor, supra 355 N.J. Super. at 324 (stating that under IFPA "the State is not seeking damages, as in a common law fraud --- 5  A copy of this opinion is attached hereto. action, but rather is seeking a statutory penalty designed to reduce the incidence of insurance fraud."  "Thus, the presentation of only the liability issue to the jury, without a separate damages component, did no violence to the IFPA and perforce, was not unduly prejudicial to Defendants.
[brief] In its decision, the lower court gave substantial weight to the fact that Respondents filed the complaint dated January 16, 2018 in [...]’s name alone.  [...] concluded that the lack of evidence that [...] complained to Respondents that he was omitted from the complaint must mean that he understood that he was not represented by Respondents.  However, this conclusion fails to account for the fact that Respondents had already blown the statute of limitations when it filed this complaint.  During the critical period from the time the will was submitted for probate to the time that the statute of limitations expired, the evidence shows that a reasonable person in [...]’s position would have believed that the Respondents were representing them.  The last action taken by Respondents before the statute of limitations expired was sending the letter to the [...] stating that Respondents represented both [...] and [...].  It is unclear why the lower court believes that the actions taken after the statute of limitation had run are more probative of the parties’ intentions than the actions taken before the statute had run.  When applying New Jersey law to these facts, it becomes clear that the lower court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Respondents.  The law is not so constrained as to merely look to the existence of a fee agreement to determine an attorney client relationship.  The point is to prevent abuse of the remedy so the resulting obligation is fair to both lawyers and the public.  Petrillo, at 484.  Here, there has been no abuse.  It is equally foreseeable that the Law Firm knew [...] was relying on their representation, as it is that [...] rely on their representation.  This is buttressed by [...] telling [...] that they were, in fact, representing [...] in the case.  The facts presented in this matter create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Law Firm represented [...].  Therefore, the lower court erred in determining that Respondents had no duty to [...] Miranda as a matter of law.
[brief] 2.  Plaintiffs submitted their opening brief on this issue on September 23, 2021.  Plaintiffs argue that [...] and [...] should be added as document custodians because (a) as the key decision maker on issues related to user privacy, [...]’s documents are uniquely relevant to plaintiffs’ claims; (b) [...]’s documents are critical as she oversees [...]’s monetization of user data and [...]’s messaging regarding user data misuse; (c) adding [...] and [...] as document custodians is proportional to the needs of the case and will not cause undue burden; (d) [...] should commence with searching the [...] and [...] files in time to meet the January 31, 2022 deadline for substantial completion of document production; and (e) the Apex Doctrine does not apply.
[directive] a.  Czy jest Pan(i) obywatelem/obywatelk4 Stan6w Zjednoczonych? you have answered "No" to this question, you must answer Questions 7b- l 7f.  you  If If l have answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question 18.  Jesli odpowiedz na to pytanie brzmi ,,nie", proszy odpowiedziec na pytania l 7b-17f.  Jesli odpowiedzial(a) Pan(i) ,,tak", prOSZy przejsc do pytania 18.
[directive] As used in this Executive Directive:  Controlled Dangerous Substance shall mean a drug, substance or immediate precursor as defined at N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2, and shall include controlled substance analogs.  Undercover School Operation shall mean a planned operation undertaken by a law enforcement agency wherein a law enforcement officer(s) is placed in a school community and poses as a member of the school community for the purpose of identifying and eventually apprehending persons engaged in the illegal distribution of controlled dangerous substances.  Planned Narcotics Surveillance shall mean a planned operation wherein a law enforcement officer(s) enters onto school property or buildings in plainclothes during operating school hours for the purpose of observing or participating in activities associated with the use, possession or distribution of any controlled dangerous substance.  This term shall not include observations made by a law enforcement officer, whether in uniform or in plainclothes, from any place or property not owned by a school or school board.  Routine Patrol shall mean activities undertaken by a law enforcement officer, whether in uniform or in plainclothes and whether on foot or in a marked or unmarked vehicle, to patrol areas within a drug-free school zone (see N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7) for the purpose of observing or deterring any criminal violation or civil disturbance.  Planned Arrest shall mean an arrest or taking into custody based upon probable cause which was known to a law enforcement officer sufficiently in advance of the time of the actual arrest, whether as a result of an undercover school operation, planned narcotics surveillance, or - otherwise, so that there was sufficient opportunity for the arresting officer or any other law enforcement officer to apply for and obtain an arrest warrant, even though an arrest warrant may not have been sought or issued.  The term shall also include arrests made pursuant to a "clean sweep" (i.e., e.g. multiple arrest) operation as prescribed by SNAP Guideline 5.4.
[brief] That the 1963 Agreement was not notarized or in recordable form, evidencing an intent that it not be recorded so as to not extend beyond the then owners or be permanent.  (Da13)  4.  That the 1972 Site Plan documents and Resolution established: (Da901 to904; Da923 to934; Da938 to 946)  A.  That in the Board proceedings the [...] did not assert any easement-parking rights existed in 1972 on any school property or portion thereof, which it certainly was obligated to do if such easement right existed.
[brief] WHILE THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED, THE RESULTING DISMISSAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN WITH PREJUDICE [Pa3217]  As part of its Opposition to Appellants’ belated effort to assert claims against [...], [...] also cross-moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint with prejudice.  Having appropriately denied Appellants leave to file the Second Amended Complaint, the Appellants and the trial court were left with the First Amended Complaint, which plainly failed to assert any claims against, ______________________ proceedings below, the Solar Rights run with the land, and once the rights were voided by [...], anybody was free to pursue them.  The Appellants had no entitlement to the Solar Rights once they defaulted under the Lease, lost control of the Property as a result of the default, and the Solar Rights were voided by the [...]. [FEDa123]. or seek any relief from, [...].  The trial court correctly granted [...]’s cross-motion and dismissed the First Amended Complaint based thereon.  However, given that the First Amended Complaint was silent as to [...] and Appellants were prohibited from amending to add claims against [...], the First Amended Complaint should have been dismissed with prejudice.  While the Dismissal Order is reviewed *de novo*, the more liberal standard does not aid the Appellants in this case, as their First Amended Complaint was woefully deficient and not compliant with R. 4:5-2 with regard to [...].
[brief] [...] next argues that the ALJ and Commissioner should have passed upon the question of whether the State Board’s decision to suspend his certificate was proper.  (Pb19-21).  He contends that this omission constitutes a “[D]ue [P]rocess” violation.  (Pb21).  Respectfully, [...] is wrong.  The ALJ and Commissioner did not pass upon the question of whether the State Board properly suspended [...]’s license because they correctly found it irrelevant to the instant matter.  The only question before the ALJ and Commissioner was whether the [...] acted arbitrarily and capriciously by following N.J.S.A. § 18A:26-2 and terminating [...]’s employment because he no longer possessed a teaching certificate.  [...] may not like the answer, but that makes it no less obvious under the statute.
[brief] While Rule 4:10-2 includes language permitting the discovery of evidence that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” that language was meant only to clarify that discovery should not be precluded simply because a piece of evidence will be inadmissible at trial, and is not meant to expand the scope of discovery beyond relevant evidence.  See HD Supply Waterworks Grp., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 29 N.J. Tax 573, 583 (2017) (discussing the “reasonably calculated” language and explaining that “the relevancy of documents and materials is not predicated on their admissibility at trial….”).
[brief] The wildlife policies enunciated by the Legislature include the management of all forms of wildlife to ensure their continued participation in the ecosystem.  N.J.S.A. 23:2A-2(a).  Clearly the Council never fairly considered other non-lethal means to manage the black bear population, but would not satisfy the pro-hunting bias of the [...].  The trial court decided that validity of the composition of the Council has already been decided by the Court in Humane Society.  However, that decision concerned whether the exclusion of the animal rights plaintiff or members of similar groups from membership of the Council under N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 violated their 14th amendment rights of due process or equal protection.  As previously noted, that decision did not adjudicate whether the delegation of regulatory authority to the Council violated Art. III, Par. 1 and Art. IV, Sec. 1, Par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution or the related private non-delegation doctrine.  This distinction was not appreciated by the trial court.
[brief] *State v. Hagans*, 233 N.J. 30, 40 (2018) (citing *King*, 44 N.J. at 353).  A handcuffed person may still provide valid consent, depending on the other attendant circumstances.  *Hagans*, 233 N.J. at 34-35, 40-43 (finding sufficient credible evidence to affirm ruling of trial court that handcuffed individual, who initially refused to consent, validly changed mind and provided valid consent, under totality of circumstances); see *King*, 44 N.J. at 353 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”).  The facts that [...] was told she had the right to refuse to consent, and that she had been given Miranda warnings, weigh in favor of finding her consent to have been given voluntarily.  State v. Hladun, 234 N.J. Super. 518, 523 (Law Div. 1989).  Hagans disposes of defendant’s argument that [...]’s consent was coerced.