ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On February 14, 2019, in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Plaintiffs briefed at length their arguments in support of their constitutional claims.  (Pa27-Pa35 & Pa37).  Specifically, Plaintiffs briefed their arguments in support of their claims that there was a violation of the following clauses of the New Jersey Constitution: the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Substantive Due Process Clause, and the Procedural Due Process Clause.  (Pa27-Pa35).
[brief] 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1474 *; 2009 WL 1659209  [...], an infant, by his parents and natural guardians, [...] and [...], and [...] and [...], individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], Defendant, and [...], EXECUTOR of the [...], deceased, Defendant-Respondent, and [...], Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Third-Party Defendant.
[brief] .................................................................................. 5  **Slack v. Rees,** 66 N.J. Eq. 447 (E. & A. 1904)  ...............................................................  5, 6  ### Statutes and Other Authorities: 5 N.J. Practice, Clapp, *Wills & Administration* § 62 (3d ed. 1982)  ..............  5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Appellant was required under the Separation Agreement to file the Involuntary Ordinary Disability application, but on appeal focuses on the term “effectuate”, isolating the term from the whole of the Agreement.  The term “effectuate” is used in the Separation Agreement without limitation and speaks to a full measure of effort to bring the Involuntary Disability Application to a vote on the disability merits of the case.  Presently, the [...] determined that the terms in the Separation Agreement blocked processing as certain sections were illegal and unenforceable (Da24-Da25).  Appellant’s refusal to strike the terms is in breach of Par. 6 of the Agreement, as the IOD cannot be “effectuated” without the offending terms being stricken (as required by Par. 18 and as recognized by the Trial Court at Da200).
[directive] SUBJECT: Directive  Respecting Confidentiality of Internal Affairs  Investigations  The Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures (IAPP) has long focused on ensuring that critical information in internal affairs investigations is not disclosed in ways that would interfere with ongoing investigations.  Among other things, that focus ensures that witnesses and suspects do not have inappropriate foreknowledge about the nature and circumstances of an investigation prior to an interview.  To that end, IAPP has for years provided a model form, Appendix I, that requires every witness to acknowledge both the confidentiality of an internal affairs investigation and the obligation not to disclose any information discussed during an interview.  But witnesses in interviews may also be accompanied by their representatives, who must not make disclosures that interfere with any investigations, including in cases where the representatives are representing multiple individuals.  Given that representatives present in internal affairs interviews have a similar duty to avoid disclosure of information pertaining to internal affairs investigations, this Directive amends the IAPP to require any representatives present at an interview to sign and adhere to a similar non-disclosure agreement.  This approach will help protect the integrity of investigations through the same mechanism that has been applied to witnesses.  The new representative non-disclosure agreement is included as Appendix N to the IAPP.  For the reasons stated in this Directive, and pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with IAPP as revised by this Directive, New Jersey Is an Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Is Recyclable Page 2 and to take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with IAPP, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.
[brief] com/dorsett-dock-improvements-complete/..........................3  J. INST. 2.1.1, in THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, WITH NOTES 67 ([...] ed. & trans., 3d ed. 1852)............................................................9  New Jersey Assembly Environment and Solid Waste Committee, Statement to Senate, No. 1074 [Second Reprint] with committee amendments (Mar. 11, 2019), https://pub.njleg.gov/bills/2018/S1500/1074_S3.PDF?bcs-agent- scanner=50b4da6b-f63c-ae42-9012-a02bfa46436b..................................16, 17  Report to [...] from the Public Access Task Force (Apr. 2016) (unpublished).................................................................18, 19 Court Rules R. 4:46.........................................................................................................................32  Regulations N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.1...........................................................................................................6  N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b).....................................................................................................32 N.J.A.C. 7:7-1 et seq....................................................................................................21 N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11........................................................................................................2, 21, 22, 24 N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(a)....................................................................................................8 N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)..............................................................................................21, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.3.........................................................................................................5 Constitutional Provisions U.S. Const. amend. V....................................................................................................36, 38 U.S. Const. amend. XIV...............................................................................................36, 38 N.J. Const. art 1..........................................................................................................36 TABLE OF APPENDIX November 10, 2020 Waterfront Development Permit issued to [...] by the [...].................................................................Aa0001 November 10, 2020 In-Water Waterfront Development Permit Environmental Report, [...], issued by the [...].................................Aa0007
[brief] As such, the standard of review is *de novo*.  A “trial court’s interpretation of the law and the consequences that flow from established fact are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm.*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  I.  THE COURT’S ASSUMPTION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND ITS RELIANCE SOLELY ON DEFENDANT’S RECORDS
[brief] The overage rent was not included in the Income and Expense reports before [...] started doing that in 1994, so she didn’t include it either, whether she was aware of it or not.  [...] told us that his friend and lawyer, [...] advised him, and it was likely that [...], an accountant, or other professional made an informed decision to leave the overage rent out in accordance with accepted tax practices based on Lawrence Assoc. v. Lawrence Twp., 5 N.J. Tax 481 (1983).  As shown on the chart (Da214) using even the $4.00 market rent found by the arbitrator, and the contract rent for 1994, as market rent, the total rent received is $432,752.00.  The contract rents as shown in the leases in effect in the year 1994 representing market rent are set forth below including the overage rent for [...], the arbitrator’s $4.00 market rent for the [...], and [...]'s estimate of market rent for the vacant former bank site.  The chart uses contract leases in effect during the calendar year 1994, as market rent with two minor exceptions.
[brief] In creating the School Ethics Commission, the Legislature found and declared:  a.  In our representative form of government it is essential that the conduct of members of local boards of education and local school administrators hold the respect and confidence of the people.  These board members and administrators must avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.  b.  To ensure and preserve public confidence, school board members and local school administrators should have the benefit of specific standards to guide their conduct and of some disciplinary mechanism to ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards among them.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  In 2001, the School Ethics Act was amended to include the Code of Ethics that is the subject of this appeal.  New Jersey Legislature, Bill A1755, Session 2000-2001, Approved P.L. 2001, c. 178, available at https://njleg.gov/bill-search/2000/A1755.
[brief] And I thank you for that background, but let’s get to my questions.  A. Okay.  Q.  So my question is, how many felonies? (Overlapping voices.)  A.  I don’t know.  Q.  In what state or states were you convicted of these felonies?  A.  All in New Jersey.  I live in New Jersey my whole life.  Q. Okay.  Were all of the felony convictions drug-related convictions?  A. Yes.  Q. Okay.  Did you serve any time for any of these convictions?  A.  Inside, no.  Outside, I had house arrest and on probation.  Q.  When was the last conviction – ballpark.  Just give me an approximate year.  I don’t need the exact date.  A.  I don’t recall.  Q.  Was it in the 2000 – 2010 and 2020 your last conviction?  A.  I don’t recall.  Q.  Was it between 2000 and 2010?  A. I don’t recall.  [Da89 at 41-1 to 42-23 (emphasis added). ]
[brief] The quo warranto statute does not apply to volunteer BOG members.  Nor can it override the Rutgers Act’s removal provisions.  Moreover, Plaintiffs have presented no compelling reason on why the limitations period should be extended.  If the court disagrees, then the complaint still should be dismissed based on statutory canons, including the special rules governing the consummated contract found under the Rutgers Act.  This court should restore [...] to the BOG, free from interference from private litigants.
[brief] Included in that submission was a copy of a certified judgment of conviction for [...] dated June 1, 2018, which was entered by the New Jersey Superior Court, Camden County.  Da104.  The judgment of conviction revealed that [...] was convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 2CD:35-5B(13), possession of a controlled dangerous substance with an intent to distribute, which is a crime of the third degree.  Ibid.  [...] was sentenced to four years of probation with conditions.  Ibid.  The [...] also filed a Verified Complaint to Forfeit Property Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq., in which the Prosecutor discloses that [...] was found to possess marijuana and Alprazolam.\(^4\) Da108.  The certified judgment of conviction from 2018 directly contradicted [...]’s 2022 deposition testimony that his convictions were more than 10 years old.  The judgment of conviction revealed that [...] was arrested on March 14, 2018, and that charges were filed against him on May 10, 2018.  Da104.  [...] was sentenced on September 7, 2018.  Ibid.  The accident involved in this case occurred on December 29, 2019, less than two years after the arrest.  Da136.  In fact, [...] was still on probation at the time of the accident.  Da104.  The conviction was only five years old on the date that the trial began and [...] had completed his sentence of four years of probation only one year before the trial.
[brief] In this instance, although the trial court followed the language of the model charge for animal cruelty (3T 84-11 to 87-20), the model charge adds nothing to the statutory terms of the offense.  See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Animal Cruelty – Torment/Torture (N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1)” (approved June 7, 2021) (Da30-32).  Rather than define the acts that constitute the crime, the instruction merely regurgitates the statutory language:  ____________________ 2  The model charge was first approved on June 7, 2021 and has not been revised.  See Notice to the Bar, Updates to Model Criminal Jury Charges, [...], Aug. 24, 2021; Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Animal Cruelty – Torment/Torture (N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1)” (approved June 7, 2021).
[brief] *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988).  Thus, “an appellate court must first ‘determine whether the trial court erred’ and, if so, must proceed to determine ‘if the mistake was clearly capable of producing an unjust result such that a reasonable doubt is raised as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  *State v. Canfield*, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 269 (App. Div. 2022), *aff’d as modified*, 252 N.J. 497 (2023) (quoting *State v. Jenkins*, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)).  But does not do so “in isolation [of] those statements alleged to be obscure or ambiguous, but looks to the charge as a whole. ”  *Concepcion*, 111 N.J. at 376 (quoting *State v. Freeman*, 64 N.J. 66, 69 (1973)).  “Where there is a failure to object, it may be presumed that the instructions were adequate. ”  *State v. Morais*, 359 N.J. Super. 123, 134-35 (App. Div. 2003).
[brief] In fact, Plaintiff has made no claim the Township had actual notice on appeal nor in opposition to the Township’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  By the parties’ own admissions, neither Plaintiff nor [...] complained of the alleged condition to the Township or otherwise requested it be repaired.  [Pa71, ¶ 28-29].  This fact alone is sufficient to overcome the actual notice requirement of N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(a).  In the absence of actual notice, Plaintiff must establish proof as to whether the public entity had constructive notice of a dangerous condition to withstand summary judgment.
[brief] (Office of the Public Defender)  APPEARANCES: [...], Assistant Prosecutor, Mercer County Attorney for the State  [...], ESQ.  (Office of the Public Defender)  Attorney for the Defendant  Transcriber, [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  FAX NO. (609)587-3599  E-mail: [...]  Website: www.jjcourt.com  Audio Recorded Audio Operator, [...] Public Defender, Jessica Lyons.  What [...] seeks to do is withdraw a guilty plea that he entered before the Honorable [...] on or about November 29 of 2016.
[brief] Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 141, 84 A.2d 281, 285 (1951), cited in, Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir.1972).  The decision not to provide the Mockler charge is particularly problematic given that the Respondent’s own testimony at trial failed to raise any question as to the Appellant’s version of the happening of the accident.  That is, [...] could not refute [...]’ testimony that he lost control of his vehicle due to weather-related hydroplaning.  As such, the jury should have been instructed consistent with Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968).  The decision not to provide a charge consistent with Mockler is particularly problematic in that it created some level of confusion with respect to which party bore the burden of proving versus disproving negligence.  In essence, the Defendant was saddled with the burden of proving an affirmative defense but the Defendant was not afforded the opportunity to have the jury instructed about that legal defense.  Although in the context of a quasi-criminal action, the Appellate Division in State v. Wenzel, 113, N.J. Super. 215 recognized that there was insufficient evidence that the Defendant drove carelessly notwithstanding that, “on a wet roadway in a construction area marked by a dozen signs warning of danger, Defendant’s vehicle (according to the trooper’s hearsay testimony) jackknifed, crossed into the opposite lane and struck another vehicle.
[brief] While still in the operating room, [...] reviewed the fetal monitor strips on a screen in real time, then took a minute or two to make sure his patient was not bleeding or exhibiting any complication so that he could feel comfortable allowing his resident to finish suturing his patient’s uterus before leaving to see [...].  (Pa286).  As noted above, [...] was at [...] bedside by 10:08pm or 10:12pm and, after a brief evaluation, decided to perform a C-Section rather than wait for [...].  He assisted with the set up and, after the team, which included the NICU and anesthesia, was ready, he delivered the baby at 10:27pm, a few minutes before [...] arrived.
[brief] On this set of undisputed facts, plaintiff mistakenly claims that the trial court erred by failing to consider these facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff.  Plaintiff also mistakenly claims that viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable jurors could conclude that the defendant knew that it was substantially certain that a non-management employee would suffer injury or death by its conduct.  The problem with this argument, however, is that it is sheer conjecture and not supported by any evidence in the record.  (Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief at p.26).  At the outset, it is important to note that the trial court properly set forth the applicable standard for deciding summary judgment.
[directive] If the Attorney General or his or her designee has reason to believe that a law enforcement agency or officer or civilian employee is not complying with or adequately enforcing the provisions of these Guidelines, the Attorney General may temporarily or permanently suspend or revoke the authority of the department, or any officer or civilian employee, to operate an ALPR, or to gain access to or use ALPR stored data.  The Attorney General or her designee may initiate disciplinary proceedings, and may take such other actions as the Attorney General in his or her sole discretion deems appropriate to ensure compliance with these Guidelines.  17.
[brief] (Da101).  As to defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the tire iron, the PCR court found that defendant must prove that such a motion would have been granted had it been filed and noted that a failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance.  (Da105 (citing State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990)).  The court found that the record showed that [...] gave consent to search the Impala, consent is a cognizable exception to the warrant requirements, and, therefore, a motion to suppress would have been a futile motion.  (Da105).  Applying the factors from State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965) to determine whether an individual’s consent to search was coerced, the court found that the consent was knowing and voluntary.
[brief] (ECF 54; ECF 64, Hr’g Tr. at 14-15.)  [...] explained that, because the search terms were so broad and because the CEO is privy to a large amount of high-level, company-wide data and reports, the search terms hit on irrelevant subsets of documents that [...] intended to withhold from its production.  This included sensitive documents concerning company-wide furloughs in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, sales and/or employee bonus information not related to [...], reporting information regarding job openings not related to [...]’s position, payroll documents detailing company-wide salaries, and documents relating to other employees and customers not in Kansas.  (ECF 54; ECF 63-1, at 3; ECF 64, at 14-15.)  The court provided the parties with feedback on [...]’s objections to producing such documents so that [...] could “continue to move forward with the production expeditiously.
[brief] On January 7, 2022, respondent was sworn in as a member of the [...] (Board).  Pictures of her swearing in as a Board member were posted on her public Facebook page.  Respondent utilized her Facebook account to advertise/campaign to become a member of the Board.  She also published a picture of herself on her Facebook account when she was sworn in as a Board member.  Respondent’s Facebook allows public access to certain parts which means that anyone in the community can see what is posted on the public aspect of her account.  By her own admission, some of respondent’s Facebook friends – which includes parents, teachers, students, and staff, are aware that she is a Board member.  (Ca021).  [...] then stated “[t]hree days after she was sworn in, on January 10, 2022, respondent posted a statement on her Facebook account” which was the subject of Count 1 of the Complaint, calling [...] a “Tyrannical POS” for extending the New Jersey School Mask Mandate.
[brief] Other witnesses testified that Bella was often wandering off her property, for example:  - [...] admitted that Bella was allowed outside in the front yard without supervision.  - [...] admitted that on a couple of occasions Bella got off the property.  - Both [...] and [...] admitted that the invisible fence did not always function correctly.  - [...] saw Bella off her property off leash.  - [...] saw Bella outside many times.  - [...] saw Bella come as far as halfway up [...]’s front lawn, alerting [...] to Bella’s presence even when she wasn’t barking.  - [...] found Bella on the street in 2016 and after returning her to [...], she was back on the street.  -  In 2016, [...] found Bella in the middle of the road a quarter mile from Bella’s home.  The State presented no evidence as to where Bella was before [...] started running.
[brief] One issue is whether, as Defendant claims, a credit card holder has the right to the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off or whether, as Plaintiff asserts and the lower Court held, a credit card holder waived his or her right to that affirmative defense as a result of the 60-day rule (Da29).  To the best of Defendant’s research, the issue is of first impression for New Jersey courts and, thus, a matter of public interest because there are no prior decisions nor is the Court bound by stare decisis.  The Court’s decision is important on several levels: what it means for other New Jersey credit card holders, the deterrence value versus credit card issuers in the present and future and the 60-day waiver argument of Plaintiff and the lower Court.  Also of public interest is the interplay between R. 4:46-1 and the 28-day rule applicable to motions for summary judgment, the 10-day rule applicable to opposition briefs and R. 1:3-4(a), (b) and (c) and R. 1:1-2.
[brief] Instead, the new tort claims against [...] arising out of [...]’s previously unknown and unknowable ownership of [...] are not legal malpractice claims whatsoever.  Simply, [...] as sole member of [...], is liable personally and for the torts of [...], and must be a Defendant in this matter.  These facts and these claims were unknown and unknowable at the time of the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ prior claims against [...].
[brief] This Court has already determined that defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the basis of [...]’ habeas petition, because the petition was not materially impeaching and did not strike at the heart of the State’s case. \(^{11}\)  For that reason, defendant cannot prove the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. \(^{12}\)  As such, there is no reasonable probability that this Court would grant defendant relief under Brady or under Strickland were his petition not procedurally barred.  **B.