ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The Uniform Supplemental Defendant Report collects Military and Education data for completion on all cases.  Space for collection of information in a report format pertaining to Family History should be collected on any case with a high probability of disposition by Guilty Plea, Conviction, or PTI.  In counties with intake interviews prior to Prosecutor screening, Family History may be omitted for subsequent data collection at an interview pertaining to a PTI application or a presentence interview.  Section C.
[directive] The synopsis shall not contain the identities of the officers or complainants.  Training  (p)  Each agency shall ensure that officers assigned to the internal affairs function complete training as mandated by the Division of Criminal Justice.  (q)  Each County Prosecutor shall ensure that each agency within the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction implement and maintain a system of ensuring appropriate training for all personnel involved in the agency’s internal affairs function.  (r)  The Division of Criminal Justice shall conduct periodic “train-the-trainer” courses for all persons assigned responsibility for internal affairs training within the County Prosecutor’s Offices.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 4
[brief] FACTOR 14 – FURNISHING OF TOOLS AND MATERIALS  Under this Factor, an employer that furnishes the tools and materials for individuals is indicative of employee status.  Petitioner testified extensively that she is provided with everything down to pen and paper by the Township.  She is supplied with the use of the Township computer, copier, fax machine, telephone, and video boards for use while she is prosecuting.  The Township provides her with all case files, the plea agreement forms, a HEPA filter in her conference room and a plexiglass guard on her conference room table as well as signs on her door at her Township workspace.
[brief] B.  The Municipal Court Prosecution  On February 20, 2020 a criminal Complaint was issued against Plaintiff which charged him with the following disorderly persons offenses: (1) possession of marijuana, a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4); (2) obstruction of justice in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a); and (3) resisting arrest in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1).
[brief] (Aa178).  The ALJ based his finding on the following undisputed facts: (1) [...] asked the Board attorney to research the conduct of another Board member who campaigned against him the day after he lost the Board’s November 2019 election; (2) [...] never sought “formal approval of either the request or the later use of the research at any time beyond seeking ratification of the charges in the November legal bill”; (3) [...] only became aware of [...]’s request for legal research a month later “when the Board reviewed the November 2019 legal bill for ratification”; and (4) the Board attorney’s research on [...]’s conduct was never “formally shared with other members of the Board during [her] tenure on the Board.
[directive] 4a.b.: DWI refusal in a “school zone. ”  Refusal to submit ! to chemical breath testing, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. while on school property used for school purposes owned by or leased to any element or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property or driving through a school crossing designated as such by ordinance, or driving through a school crossing, knowing that juveniles are present.  N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.13: CDL/DWI.  Operation of a commercial motor vehicle ! while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled dangerous substance, or with an alcohol concentration of 0.04% or more.  N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24f: CDL/DWI refusal.  Refusal to submit to chemical ! breath testing, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24.  N.J.S.A. 12:7-46: OVWI.  Operating or allowing another person to operate !  3  Chemical breath test or tests, means chemical analysis (N.J.A.C. 13:51-1.2) through the use of tests administered to a defendant or suspect on an approved instrument (N.J.A.C. 13:51- 1.2, -3.5) by a certified Breath Test Operator (N.J.A.C. 13:51-1.2, 1.7), pursuant to approved methods of chemical breath testing (N.J.A.C. 13:51-3.6).  4  Under the holding in State v. Reiner, 180 N.J. 307 (2004), “School zone” violations for DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, or DWI refusal, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.b., under “Filomena’s Law,” P.L. 1999, c. 185, §§ 3-5, need to be specifically charged, on the Uniform Traffic Ticket, as N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g) or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 in a “school zone,” and the State must prove the additional elements pertaining to a “school zone” for that offense.
[brief] The court stated that “[t]he intolerable spectacle of a planning board haggling with an applicant over money too strongly suggests that variances are up for sale. ”  *Id.* at *25* (quoting *Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater Borough*, 25 N.J. Super. 124, 131 (App. Div. 1988)).  The court found that the Planning Board’s resolution violated the MLUL.
[brief] (Pa20).  As noted for Factor #1, [...] did not exert direction and control over how [...] was to perform her duties as Municipal Prosecutor.  (Pa15).  Despite [...]’s claims that she was very involved with the municipal court process, police officers, and other enforcement officials (Pb38), she failed to demonstrate the manner in which [...] controls her work effort.  With respect to Factor #4 – Services Personally Rendered and Factor #5 – Hiring, Supervising, and Paying Assistants, [...]’s conflicting answers on the Questionnaire and in the January 2019 interview with [...] demonstrated a distinct lack of knowledge and control of [...].  (Pa110).
[brief] One such “rule and regulation” that [...] implemented was the unambiguous 29-foot height restriction at issue here.  Notably, Plaintiffs do not argue that the height restriction itself is ambiguous.  Moreover, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ proposed construction plans failed to comply with the height restriction.  Plaintiffs do not offer a reasonable, alternative interpretation of the Genesis Deed’s broad grant of authority to the “property owner’s association” to implement and enforce “any rules and regulations it chooses” to which all property owners, including Plaintiffs, were required to “faithfully abide. ”  The only argument Plaintiffs offer is that [...] was not in existence at the time of the Genesis Deed’s conveyance.
[brief] In that case, the plaintiffs had sued based on injuries sustained in a construction site accident.  On the day before the trial, the trial judge noted that after the plaintiffs put on their case, the defendants would have the opportunity to move to dismiss.  The trial judge proposed a procedure that he defined as a “shortcut,” under which the plaintiffs’ attorney would essentially put his “best case” on the record, and the court would hear argument and then make a ruling.  Id. at 81-82.  The court then implemented this shortcut procedure, resulting in the dismissal of the defendant.  The plaintiffs sought reconsideration, and during the course of oral argument, the court stated it felt that the Plaintiffs’ expert report was a net opinion.  The motion for reconsideration was denied, without any further opinion.  *Id.* at 82.  The Appellate Division discussed the procedure for summary judgment, and showed that by comparison, the *Klier* plaintiffs had not had an opportunity to adequately prepare and argue a dispositive motion.
[brief] On April 26, 2019, Plaintiff was shopping at [...]’s [...] warehouse location, when Plaintiff stopped to consult with one of [...]’s employees in an aisle of the Meat Department after having been unable to find lamb.  (Pa2; Pa25; Pa28)  Plaintiff, who is between approximately 5 feet 2.5 inches and 5 feet 3 inches in height, was stopped at the end of the aisle at the time she consulted with one of [...]’s employees.  (Pa2; Pa25)  Subsequently, she was struck in the back, on the right side, by [...], who was pushing an overloaded industrialized sized cart ("U-boat") supplied by [...], and which was filled about six (6) feet high with boxes.  (Pa2; Pa28; Pa34-Pa35; Pa42)  Plaintiff testified that [...]’s U-boat was filled to the top, to the point where one could not look over it.  (Pa30)  Since 2018, [...] worked for [...].
[brief] The trial court has broad discretion in managing its docket and ensuring the efficient administration of justice.  However, this discretion includes the responsibility to apply procedural rules in a manner that does not impede substantive justice.  In *Delvecchio v. Township of Bridgewater*, 224 N.J. 559 (2016), the Supreme Court of New Jersey highlighted that trial courts must exercise their discretion by considering the broader interests of justice, particularly when dealing with the potentially dispositive motions.  It should be noted that the Plaintiff’s motion was denied "without prejudice" (Pa27), with the judge instructing Plaintiff’s counsel to "do whatever you need to do to get this back before me" (T16-9 to T16-10).  Plaintiff was required to appeal the "without prejudice" decision because the judge simultaneously ordered judgment declaring the Defendant the owner of the Property.  See Point II.  It was erroneous for the court to deny Plaintiff’s motion "without prejudice" when the subject matter of that motion (ownership of the Property) became a moot issue.  In conclusion, the trial court’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment due to technical noncompliance with procedural requirements contravenes the well-established legal framework that prioritizes substantive justice over procedural perfection.  Such an approach not only undermines the principles laid out in Brill and its progeny but also discourages the fair and efficient resolution of legal disputes.  As such, this Court should reverse the trial court’s decision and allow the case to be determined on its merits, consistent with the principles of equity and judicial efficiency.
[brief] Standard of Review Cases  The standard of review cases defendants rely on for their reading of LTTEL do not do the work defendants ask of them.  Those authorities are all cases that speak to the presumption of validity that attaches to duly adopted municipal ordinances and an asserted distinction between “legislative” and “quasi-judicial” action.  Most of defendants’ authorities involve police power ordinances, but these cases are not apt.  Police power ordinances rely on the core duty of a municipality to provide for the health, welfare, and safety of its inhabitants, and the presumption of validity gives them wide latitude.  They do not involve ordinances --- 2  The unpublished opinion in *[...] v. [...]*, 29 WL 2323711, Dkt. No. [...] (2019), cited by the Township provides no useful guidance.  At issue was a replacement tax exemption issued to a successor owner of an apartment complex.  The prerogative writ complaint alleged various procedural shortcomings and stated that the City failed to create a proper legislative record.  In its two-page opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Court relied on the presumption of validity and stated that on its review of the record plaintiffs had “not presented sufficient grounds to overcome” that presumption.  The opinion gives no detail on the specific grounds for the challenge.  Here, plaintiff has put forth ample grounds to overcome the presumption of validity and raise an issue requiring discovery and trial.
[brief] He was fine with that.  But then when he called back, his boss wanted to change the deal so as to make the $400 into a credit, such that he would essentially get the car for free (i.e. either I could bring them the title, let them keep the car, and on top of that still have to pay them money; or alternatively I could just throw my hands up in the air, not give them any money, and just let them keep the car for free - the latter of which was what they really wanted all along, and in the end, is exactly what they got).
[brief] Id. at 477.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) does not include a requirement that an uninsured motorist have a culpable state of mind and does not exempt motorists who have a good faith belief that they have medical expense benefits coverage.  The requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) are triggered where the "owner or registrant of an automobile registered or principally garaged in this State that was being operated without personal injury protection coverage[.]”
[brief] One must remember, the investigating officer could not operate the surveillance video.  [...] was brought in to download it from the system, not to view it for evidential purposes.  The Attorney General’s reliance on *Tuncap* is misplaced and the holding supports [...]’s position that the video was not properly authenticated.  The Attorney General returns to New Jersey law and discusses "a police officer who views surveillance video from the surveillance system at the scene of the crime shortly after the crime occurred and testifies that the video played in court is a true and accurate copy of the video he viewed at the scene" (OAGb22).  This case does not involve even that threshold of evidence.  [...] testified that he definitely did not view the video while downloading.  He said that he "maybe" viewed video at the scene.  The Attorney General resumes its argument that "authentication is ultimately for the jury to decide" (OAGb22).  The prosecution did not go so far as to argue this.  Amicus curiae cannot raise issues that the parties did not raise.
[brief] The plaintiff further alleged that the mayor threatened to have the property rezoned to eliminate office buildings, which were contemplated in plaintiff's plan, as a permitted conditional use, and participated in having an ordinance introduced that would have accomplished that goal.  The Appellate Division held that these facts were sufficient for a jury to infer that the appellants, either jointly or individually, deliberately acted to stall or obstruct plaintiff's proposed project for the mayor's personal gain.  It was held that this would be sufficiently egregious to "shock the conscience" and support a FCRA action.  Id. at 8.  In this case, such findings were made by the Trial Court when he reversed the Zoning Board's denial of the Amended Application.  Plaintiffs are the unquestioned owners of the Subject Property, and the Mayor's pervasive improper interference and influence over the Zoning Board in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Plaintiffs' statutory and substantive due process rights, undertaken for his own personal and political gain, including his publicity campaign to mislead the public and intimidate the Zoning Board members into denying the Application, has been firmly established.  By subjecting Plaintiffs to a Zoning Board proceeding under conditions of extreme bias and animus, and by adopting a Resolution that incorporated the Mayor’s false narrative against the Amended Application, Defendants violated the statutory and substantive due process rights of Plaintiffs to a fair and impartial consideration of their Application in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to substantive due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and in violation of the FCRA.  The Trial Court’s Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ civil rights claims should be reversed, and a hearing should be scheduled so that the quantum of damages due to Plaintiffs, including attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, can be determined.
[brief] In fact, the vans were used on August 6, 2019 to bring campers to camp before the policy was even issued.  Question 4 also does not ask [...] to disclose whether he was going to use rental vehicles at the 2019 summer camp, [or] whether any of the rental vehicles it used were 12-15 passenger vans (emphasis added).  (Ia012).  The verb “use” does not appear anywhere in Question 4, and while the question’s third part does state “[if yes] to #4, are any of these vehicles 12 or 15-passenger vans,” [...] was not required to provide a response thereto because of his previous answer of “No” to the first part.  (Ia012).  Especially ambiguous is Question 4’s inclusion of the polysemes “hire” and “rent,” in the question “Do you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event.  Both words are subject to at least two meanings.  “Hire” and “rent” can mean the obtainment of a temporary use of someone or something for an agreed upon payment.  But it can also mean the granting of a temporary use of something to another.  That was exactly how [...] understood the terms.  As [...] testified, he replied “No” when faced with the first part of Question 4 because he would not be renting, hiring, or otherwise granting the use of the 12-15 passenger vans to others outside of the summer camp:
[brief] In determining whether the discovery rule applies, a court applies an objective standard: “whether plaintiff ‘knew or should have known’ of sufficient facts to start the statute of limitations running. ”  Ben Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 134 (2017) (quoting Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 246 (2001)).  Like the issue of which statute applies, the Appellate Division’s opinion in Lott is also instructive on the issue of whether a statute of limitations attendance to a quiet title action should be tolled in light of the discovery rule.
[brief] (Dca1 to 2).  [...] further authorized law enforcement to give delayed notice of the search warrant (Dca2) and ordered that “[t]he search must be conducted contemporaneous with the entry into the apartment in order to prepare to install, install, replace, repair, enhance, move and remove such equipment, if necessary, during the period of interception[.]” (Dca2).  Further, as law enforcement explained in its application, “[t]he use of a search warrant [was] premature,” since a search warrant “would expose the investigation before the full knowledge of the illegal activity is uncovered. ” (Dca121).  As such, law enforcement sought the use of electronic surveillance in order to “fully reveal the manner and scope in which the subjects and others as yet unknown engage in the narcotic offenses as set forth in this affidavit. ” (Dca124).  Law enforcement believed that normal investigative procedures were not practical since it had failed in the past to identify certain suspects, stash locations, or activities.  (Dca123 to 124).  Instead, law enforcement believed that the use of electronic surveillance was needed to develop the scope of the narcotics enterprise, the actors involved, and the roles played by each person.  (Dca124).  Defendant contends that the search warrant, here, was unconstitutional because there was no statutory basis for delayed notification of the search.
[brief] For instance, one of the scholarly articles upon which [...] relied says that “mold contaminations were also shown to originate from the air” and that “the indoor air at a consumer’s home is also a potent source of spoilage molds. ”  Da1358.  An EPA report upon which [...] relied and that was admitted as part of Trial Exhibit D-20 discusses “exposure pathways” for mold contamination: “People will be exposed to hazardous substances in soil, sediment or dust if they accidentally ingest it (e.g., the contaminants land on their food). ”  Da1360-61.  The EPA report continues by advising that “[e]ating food that has been contaminated is another common exposure route.  In some cases, food found on people’s plates may be contaminated as a result of direct exposure to the hazardous substance. ”  Da1361.  A bulletin of the World Health Organization that [...] cites in his report and that was admitted into evidence says that “[e]xposure to mycotoxins is mostly by ingestion, but also occurs by the dermal and inhalation routes….
[directive] The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall include State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.  For purposes of this policy, the terms law enforcement officer, police officer and officer shall have the same meaning.
[brief] PAGE NOS. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................  3 LEGAL ISSUES .....................................................................................  9  POINT I TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY MULTIPLE FORENSIC EXPERTS WAS UNRELIABLE, BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF THEIR EXPERTISE, AND CONSTITUTED TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY.  THE INAPPROPRIATE ADMISSION OF THIS PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS.  (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................
[brief] JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS APPEALED FROM 1.  Order denying motion to limit expert testimony (December 20, 2021)  Da715-Da717  2.  Order entering Judgment (June 30, 2022) in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13 of the amended complaint, awarding compensatory damages of $2,882,244.85 (Paragraph 1)  Da718-Da720 3.  Final Judgment (September 14, 2022)  (Paragraphs 1-5 and 7)  Da721-Da725
[brief] The Congregation has paid the electric bills related to the flood \(^7\)  Defendant mistakenly represents to this Court that [...] concedes the curb cut on Plaintiff’s Property entering the Sixth Street Lot was not present until 2013 (Db56).  [...] never made such a concession.  In fact, [...], the [...] attorney, and the Township engineer all testified the curb cut in question was present as far back as 1993 and there was only a repair to the curb cut in 2013.  8T 34:16-35:8; 13T 107:22-110:24; 122:10-125:4.  lights located on the Fifth Street and Sixth Street Lots since at least the early 1990s to present.  (8T 5:3-6:7)  Additionally, the Congregation has paid for and arranged for snow removal from the Fifth Street and Sixth Street Lots since at least the early 1990s to present.  Id., at 6:9-7:3.  **Morning Prayer Schedule at Congregation**
[directive] J. Review.  At the conclusion of the investigation, the Step 10: Referrals for Administrative Independent Investigator shall determine whether any Principal should be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency for administrative review in accordance with the Attorney General’s Procedures.  The Independent Investigator Internal Affairs Policy & shall monitor any resulting review and take such actions as are necessary to ensure that the review is completed in a timely fashion, and that appropriate actions are taken based on the results of that review.  AG Directive 2019-5.  See III.  Death-in-Custody Investigations
[brief] In this sense, § 317 is retrospective, because it requires the dangerous propensity to have actually manifested in some form of misconduct before the harm occurs.  In Doe, the viewing of child pornography with company computers preceded the molestation of the plaintiff, just as comment c of the Restatement describes liability based on the failure to act with knowledge of the employee’s prior misconduct in throwing coal off a train.  On the other hand, the doctrine of negligent training and supervision that has actually been adopted by our courts is prospective, in the sense that an employer may be liable based on constructive knowledge of an employee’s incompetence or dangerous disposition, even if the harmful conduct never actually manifested prior to the plaintiff’s injury.