ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ..........................................................  35  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  1T – motion dated 6/28/21 2T – motion dated 7/13/21 3T – motion dated 7/14/21 4T – motion dated 7/26/21 5T – motion dated 7/28/21 6T – jury selection dated 7/29/21 7T – jury selection dated 7/30/21 8T – jury selection dated 8/2/21 9T – jury selection dated 8/4/21 10T – trial dated 8/5/21 11T – trial dated 8/6/21 12T – trial dated 8/9/21 13T – trial dated 8/10/21 14T – trial dated 8/11/21 15T – trial dated 8/12/21 16T – trial dated 8/13/21 17T – motion dated 2/10/22 18T – sentencing dated 2/17/22
[brief] ” (26T33:6-13).  Also, the few times when [...] tried to explain his misappropriations, the explanations made no sense.  For instance, as to the $500,000 the diversion in 2013, [...] claimed that he had “borrowed” money from [...] and that he was repaying [...] that money as part of the $1.36 million promissory note to acquire [...]’ interest in the company.  However, [...] twice admitted on cross examination that he could not offer a single document supportive of the claim that he “borrowed” the money, or that a portion of the $1.36 million represented a partial repayment to [...] of the $500,000 that [...] “borrowed” in 2013.  (18T74:15 to 76:14; 94:16 to 96:15).  Naturally, the trial court did not find [...]’s testimony credible.  Crediting that testimony would have meant that a sizable chunk of the money that Plaintiffs were to receive was not actually for their interest in the companies, but, rather, to repay [...] his own funds for the money that [...] stole.
[brief] - Abrupt and excessive change in the public sidewalk surface running slope at the incident location, which acts as a ramp and was measured to change from 6.7% to 21.3% in the direction of pedestrian travel.  - A “hidden” pedestrian slipping hazard in the form of ice and snow that covered the abrupt, excessively sloped concrete public sidewalk surface at the incident location, which was uncleared, unsalted and/or unsanded at the time of the incident.  - Improper/inadequate snow/ice removal from the incident concrete public sidewalk surface prior to the incident.  - Inadequate salting/sanding of the incident concrete public sidewalk surface prior to the incident.  Pa88-89.  [...] inspected, photographed and documented the location and provided measurements and standards indicating that the slope of the sidewalk exceeds industry standards, safe design standards and guidelines and presented a hazardous condition.  Pa102-06.  [...]’s professional opinion within a reasonable degree of scientific and engineering probability is based on numerous factors, including but not limited to New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) Roadway Design Manual, 1995; NJDOT Roadway Design Manual, 2015; NJDOT Standard Roadway Construction Details, 2007; Code of the Town of West New York, New Jersey; International Code Council (ICC) International Property Maintenance Code, 2015; nationally recognized consensus safety standards, education, training and decades of experience as a Professional Engineer.  Pa106-15; Pa122-23; Pa158-60.  In part, [...] relied on the 1995 and 2015 NJDOT Roadway Design Manuals.  Pa107-110.  According to those manuals, they are “primarily informational or guidance in character and serve to assist the engineer in attaining good design. ”  Pa176.  The quoted language indicates that the guidelines are exactly the type of information that should be considered “in attaining good design” and, therefore, are appropriate for an expert to reference in analyzing whether a given design is hazardous.  Pa176.  In sum, the report documented facts or data derived from the expert's personal observations, evidence admissible at the trial, and data and references, including codes, standards and ordinances, that are the type of data on which experts normally rely.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY BARRING PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS.
[brief] Although there was not an initial objection, when much of the prejudicial evidence from the car was being discussed for the second time, defense counsel interposed an objection to the continued harping on that evidence, saying:  “Judge we’re (indiscernible) evidence that has no relevance on these charges.  All this seems to be is like piling on to show he’s a bad guy because he’s got shotgun [a]mmunition and other kinds of [a]mmunition that have nothing to do with this case.  So I’m objecting (indiscernible). ” (6T64-23 to 65-3).  The trial court overruled, finding that discussion of the ammunition and guns potentially owned by [...] but likely unrelated to the shooting were nonetheless relevant to proving he was the shooter.
[brief] In [...] v. [...], et al., No. [...] (Law Div. February 13, 2015), a summary action was filed by Palisades seeking to vacate a med-pay subrogation award rendered in favor of [...].  The argument on behalf of Palisades was that the arbitrator exceeded its powers by arbitrating the case and rendering an award as med-pay subrogation was prohibited in New Jersey.  Addressing the merits of the Collateral Source Rule, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 and as interpreted in case law, [...] found the purpose of the rule was to prevent double recovery.  Because the rule precluded health plan beneficiaries from recovering medical expenses from the tortfeasor, it followed that the health care carrier was likewise barred from recovery.  [...] concluded the med-pay benefits paid by [...] to its insured were benefits under the Collateral Source Rule and there was no statutory exception or conflict to suggest otherwise.  As a result, the Court concluded that med-pay subrogation was prohibited in New Jersey and the underlying award was vacated.  *[...] v. [...]*, et al., supra. (slip op. at 8-11).
[brief] 449 N.J. Super. at 537-39. meaning will be ascribed to each usage unless the Legislature has specifically indicated otherwise. ”  Oldfield v. N.J. Realty Co., 1 N.J. 63, 69 (1948); see also State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 304 (App. Div. 2022) (holding that the term “dwelling” must have “the same meaning in both N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(i) and N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c)”), aff’d as modified on other grounds, 252 N.J. 497 (2023).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Counsel concedes that when the Complaint was filed, it was filed as a negligence action, rather than a professional malpractice action.  This oversight initially caused a Ferreira Conference not to be scheduled.  However, when this was brought to the Trial Court’s attention by way of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Trial Court chose to not schedule the conference and instead dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  The Trial Court did not consider the fact that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with the records necessary to procure a sufficient Affidavit of Merit.  At that time, the Trial Court could have scheduled a Ferreira Conference to avoid an unjust outcome.  However, despite the case law and stated purpose of the Affidavit of Merit statute, the Trial Court chose to impose the draconian sanction of dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Defendants’ conduct exhibits gamesmanship of the Affidavit of Merit statute, which the Courts of New Jersey and the New Jersey Legislature have reprehended.  As such, Defendants should not be rewarded for their gamesmanship and the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint must be reversed, as justice and equity demand such a result.  Respectfully submitted, [...] BY: ____________________________
[brief] (R. 300, Def.’s Mem. at 13) (citing, inter alia, The Sedona Principles, Third Edition, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, Principle 6 (“Responding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own [ESI].”)).  [...] has disclosed the TAR software—Relativity’s AL—it intends to use and how it intends to validate the review results, which in this case is sufficient information to make the production transparent.  Plaintiffs’ insistence that the City must collaborate with them to establish a review protocol and validation process has no foothold in the federal rules governing discovery.  Moreover, using TAR on the entire ESI collection—when, as Plaintiffs aptly point out, the parties spent nearly a year litigating the protocol for collecting and searching the City’s ESI—would be wasteful and unduly burdensome, and would further delay the resolution of this almost four-year-old case.  For these reasons, the court declines to adopt Plaintiffs’ alternate TAR protocol.
[brief] In support of that argument, Plaintiff has not relied upon any New Jersey caselaw nor legislation.  Instead, Plaintiff-Appellant relies upon an Indiana Appellate Court matter, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Riddell Nat’l Bank, 984 N.E.2d 655 (Ind. Ct. of Appeals 2013) for the proposition that a suit limitation clause in a contract must be voided if it conflicts with the applicable statute of limitations pertaining to the breach of contract.
[brief] Even though [...] admitted that sleeping with his daughter on the couch was dangerous and posed a risk, he did not admit that he was aware of a substantial risk of death – i.e., the probability that she would die as a result.  See Gregory, 220 N.J. at 421–22 (explaining that the trial court cannot infer essential elements, such as the requisite mens rea, from the facts); State ex rel. T.M., 166 N.J. at 335 (same).  Nor does sleeping with a child on the couch in fact create a probability of death, as opposed to a possibility, or demonstrate extreme indifference to human life.  See State v. Morrison, 233 A.3d 136, 141 (Md. 2020) (finding insufficient evidence of wanton and reckless disregard for human life necessary to prove gross negligence involuntary manslaughter where an infant died as a result of co-sleeping and explaining that co-sleeping was not “inherently dangerous,” and that a reasonable person would not appreciate the risk of death)6; Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. at 366-67 (explaining that “[r]ecklessness which must be so extreme as to 6 “[C]o-sleeping is a common practice. ”  State v. Morrison, 233 A.3d 136, 154 (2020) (citing to a Center for Disease Control study that found that over sixty percent of respondents shared beds with their infants). demonstrate an indifference to human life or is so indifferent to human life that the actor does not care whether the victim lives or dies is a degree of recklessness which is functionally equivalent to a high probability that the actor's conduct would cause [] death”).  Realizing that these facts were inadequate to support an aggravated manslaughter plea, the State objected and a different factual basis was elicited – that [...] put his hand over his daughter’s mouth to stop her from crying by making her fall asleep.
[brief] They now try to shift the blame to me stating I had a full and impartial hearing and a “complete opportunity” to offer any and all evidence, it sounds to me somebody knows their on the hook.  When again if you could listen to the Transcript of the hearing it is laughable at how ignorant they are and you would be shaking your head, as soon as the phone interview started as soon as I got right to the facts and how I should have had this months and months ago and was providing everything she abruptly cut me off and got way off track.  I implore you to request the transcript.  And they are saying since in their evil mind in their liking and not wanting to be found doing wrong, that there is no ground for a further hearing, and this is why I will be going for 3x treble damages if I don’t get what was mine many years ago when I suffered during a pandemic.  Again as I stated to them I was self-employed and the [...] had record of this, I have as well provided notice disproving their statement of Covid 19 having to disrupt work when again the requirement as stated and has only been “an official job offer prior to Covid-19”.  Them saying carefully examined is such an insult.  Please look at the paragraph of The Continued Assistance to Unemployed Workers Act of 2020 in that decision and even then above that with the broad guidelines that she ignored and never learned, that directly mirror the State Guidelines from the [...] website as in (If Table of Contents).
[brief] It was the intention of the Township and Board that the Project approval Resolution and the Amendment to the Settlement Agreement be presented to the Board simultaneously.  See Pa268 & 9.  The day before the June 13, 2022, Board hearing, agreement was reached and was confirmed by email of [...]’s attorney [...], addressed to the attorneys for the Board and the Township, Pa148, which, in relevant part, reads:  To follow up, Avalon accepts the proposal discussed on Friday.  To sum up, Avalon will agree to install an elevator in Building E if (i) the Planning Board and the governing body approve one additional story with no more than 10 total units only 1 of which is affordable and (ii) contingent upon the Planning Board approving the [...] project on Monday, 6/13 (see below).  As a result, the total number of units at the [...] project will equal 483 including 72 affordable units.
[brief] MS. URTECHO’S ELEVENTH-HOUR MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, WHICH WAS ADMITTEDLY PURSUED FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE AND SOUGHT TO ASSERT UNTIMELY CLAIMS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.  (DA515-516; 2T.)  The trial court erroneously granted [...] leave to intervene in the matter at the eve of trial.  The trial court made three fundamental errors in its analysis when electing to grant [...]’s motion for leave to intervene.  First, as explained in detail in Section I, infra, the trial court incorrectly concluded that [...] possessed standing to assert and pursue her claims.
[brief] The Law Firms have non-waivable conflicts.  Preliminarily, the [...] argue that because Plaintiffs sought disqualification before the trial court pursuant to RPC 1.7(a)(2), concerning a significant risk of material limitation and not RPC 1.7(a)(1), which prohibits representation when one client is directly adverse to the other, Plaintiffs cannot raise the latter on appeal.  SDb17-18.  That argument is unfounded.  The issue on appeal — whether the [...] and [...] firms should be disqualified — was raised below; that Plaintiffs now raise additional reasons or theories for disqualification is not dispositive.  As the [...] themselves point out, appeals are taken from judgments, not from opinions or reasons.  SDb14 (citing Atl. Ambulance Corp. v. Cullum, 451 N.J. Super. 247, 254 (App. Div. 2017)).  Whether a decision will be upheld depends on whether that decision is correct, irrespective of the court’s reasoning.  Ellison v. Evergreen Cemetery, 266 N.J. Super. 74, 78 (App. Div. 1993).
[brief] On April 21, 2021, [...] and her two young daughters mistakenly entrusted an [...] driver, [...], to safely transport them to an appointment.  Pa403.  Instead, they were put in the hands of an unsafe [...] driver, who caused the [...] vehicle to flip upside down after ramming into another vehicle owned by [...] and being operated by [...].  Pa403.  [...]’s native language is Spanish.  She does not read or speak English.  Pa431.  [...] gives Spanish speaking users the option to set the [...] application to Spanish.  Pa431.  Due to her language barrier, [...]’s [...] application was set in Spanish.  Pa431.  [...] has no recollection of seeing the Terms and Conditions nor checking off a box indicating that she read them.  Pa431.  Because [...] has refused to engage in the discovery process, Appellants’ counsel did its own research and discovered when the application is set to Spanish, the Terms and Conditions, including any Arbitration Agreement of [...] are in English.  1T23:16-25; 24:1-24.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] See *In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp.*, 216 N.J. 370, 383 (2013).  Appellate courts thus defer to an administrative agency’s “technical expertise, its superior knowledge of its subject matter area, and its fact-finding role,” *Messick v. Bd. of Rev.*, 420 N.J. Super 321, 325 (App. Div. 2011).  The New Jersey Supreme Court summed up this “enhanced deferential standard” in a recent decision, noting:
[brief] (Pa57).  On August 31, 2022, the Hon. [...], U.S.D.J. of the District of New Jersey concurred with the State Defendants regarding these two immunity arguments.  (Pa59-Pa62).  The district court held that the three prosecutors–[...], [...], and County Prosecutor [...]–were each entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity against [...]’s five federal claims in counts XI through XV.
[brief] (Pa322, ¶ 18.)  Returning the entire file to the municipal court of the originating municipality is in accordance with recognized and approved court procedure and is the normal process when municipal court complaints are transferred from an originating municipal court to a receiving municipal court.  (Pa322, ¶¶ 11-13).  The [...] file was subpoenaed by [...]’s attorney during discovery in the case below.  During the discovery period (not, as has been repeatedly and falsely stated in Plaintiff’s brief on this appeal and below, at the time of summary judgment) on May 2, 2023, Plaintiff was provided by [...]’s counsel with the entire [...] file (Da19, ¶¶ 5-7, Da24-33).  That file shows that [...] entered an Order permitting time payments of the fines and penalties (Pa168).  The same file of the [...] also confirms that [...] entered the dispositions of the charges against Plaintiff, showing that a CDS charge, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10A (4), was dismissed, and that Plaintiff was found guilty on N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1A and N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2A (1) (Pa170).  The file also shows that the reason the case had been transferred from the [...] was that the Defendant (Plaintiff in the instant case) filed a Tort Claim notice against [...] for excessive force and false arrest (Pa166).  On December 14, 2021, Plaintiff, through his attorney, [...], filed a notice of appeal of his municipal court convictions, a notice of motion to permit filing of the notice of appeal out of time, and a notice of motion for waiver of transcript fees and costs, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County (Pa185).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE JUDGMENT.  Assuming arguendo that the Appellant has standing to challenge the IA, this Court’s review of an order adjudicating a motion for reconsideration is deferential to the trial court.  Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).  Accordingly, the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Fusco v. Board of Ed Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002).  Reconsideration is appropriate in two circumstances: (1) when the court’s decision is “based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis,” or (2) when “it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ”  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) quoting, D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. 393, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  Here, neither of the two reconsideration circumstances apply.
[brief] In Mulford v. Abbot, 42 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 1956), the court considered adverse possession claims by a property owner regarding a strip of land covered by a paved sidewalk.  In 1923, the Mulford plaintiff’s parents owned property adjacent to the property owned by [...], defendant’s predecessor in title.  At that time, a dirt and pebble walkway existed between the two properties.  Plaintiff’s father sought to pave the walk with cement.  Realizing that the pavement would encroach on [...]’s property, plaintiff’s father sought [...]’s consent, as the pavement would benefit [...], too.  [...] refused and threatened to tear up the pavement if it were installed.  Regardless, plaintiff’s father paved the area, and began using it in 1923.  However, no claim of title to the property was made until 1947 or 1948, and in 1955, the defendants sought to install a fence which would overlap the sidewalk.  Plaintiff filed an action for adverse possession.  Id., at 512.  The court denied plaintiff’s claims.  The court stated: “If a use of a way at its inception was permissive, the mere continuance of such use, for the statutory period, will not ripen into a hostile right. ”  Id., citing De Luca v. Melin, 103 N.J.L. 140 (E. & A. 1926).  The court then reasoned:  A property owner might well suffer or permit his adjoining neighbor to encroach upon his land without a claim of title, yet refuse to allow it if such claim was intended.  There might be resistance and opposition to one situation and not the other.  Hence, it was not shown that the plaintiff’s predecessor in title paved the walk with the intent to claim title against the defendants.  Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.  Id., at 513.  In the case herein, there was no evidence presented to the trial court that Defendant’s predecessors in title even intended “to claim title against” the Strip.  Rather than require Defendant to carry its burden and prove that it was entitled to tack its predecessors-in-title’s adverse use of the Strip onto its own use, the trial court incorrectly imposed Plaintiff’s date of purchase of the property as the commencement of thirty (30) year period.  4T11:13-17.  In that regard, the trial court improperly applied the law, and its decision should be reversed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the above reasons and authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully urges this Court to affirm the conviction and sentence entered below.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  By: s/ [...]  [...]  Attorney No. 403582023  Assistant Prosecutor May 22, 2024  [...]  Attorney ID No. 404382022  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief
[brief] The word "access" is defined in the Britannica dictionary as to be able to use, enter, or get near (something).  The legal term "access to" means the right to use.  And the common parlance of "access to" is also the right to use.  [...] unequivocally states that she did not have access to the $70,000.00 (at the time of the signing of the agreement) that was her responsibility set forth in Paragraph 1.
[directive] AVISO: Este es un documento público, lo cual significa que el documento tal como se envíe estará a la disposición del público cuando se solicite.  Por lo tanto, no anote en el mismo ningún identificador personal, como por ejemplo: el número de Seguridad Social, el número de la licencia de conducir, el número de la matrícula del vehículo, el número de la póliza del seguro, el número de una cuenta financiera activa, o el número de una tarjeta de crédito activa.  NOTICE:
[brief] [...]’s Alleged “Complaints” About [...]  Prior to June 24, 2020.  [...] vented about [...]’s management style to members of HR and other managers.  (Pa285 at 32:5-8; 290 at 50:20-51:3; Pa290 at 51:8-15).  [...]’s complaints dealt with [...]’s alleged favoritism toward other employees in 2016, a single instance in 2018 when [...] allegedly once blocked her from leaving the staffing coordinator office for a few seconds, and more general venting about [...]’s demeanor.  (Pa288-89 at 44:11-47:8; Pa289-90 at 47:9-50:19; Pa285-87 at 30:23-39:23; Pa288-91 at 44:11-53:17).  In connection with this June 24, 2020 incident, [...] could not identify any law, rule, regulation, or public policy that he reasonably believed [...] violated.  (Pa305 at 109:6-18).  VIII.
[brief] ”  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 599, 616.  Rather, we held “the existence of a separate regulatory scheme will ‘overcome the presumption that the CFA applies to a covered activity’ only when ‘a direct and unavoidable conflict exists between application of the CFA and application of the other regulatory scheme or schemes. ’”  Id. at 616 (quoting Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 270).  In other words, semi-professionals are not encompassed in the learned professional exemption simply because they are subject to regulation.  [Id. at 47-48.]  Defendants, as insurance producers, are regulated by the New Jersey Insurance Producers Licensing Act, N.J.S.A. 17:22A-26 to -48 (“NJIPL Act”) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.