ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court correctly found that the Amended Policy likely violates the LAD because it expressly mandates disparate treatment of transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students or, alternatively, because it will have a disparate impact on those same students.  (Da126-27).  i.  Disparate Treatment.  The trial court correctly found that the State is likely to succeed in proving that Appellants have engaged in disparate treatment barred by the LAD because, under Appellants’ Amended Policy, “only students who identify as transgender are singled out for mandatory parental notification. ” (Da129).  The plain terms of the Amended Policy impose disparate treatment on the basis of gender identity or expression.
[brief] There is no \(^4\) Recall [...]’s adage, “Three can keep a secret, if two of them are dead. ” exception for benign communications or for communications to third-parties to whom a debt collector has outsourced tasks.  And Congress knows how to regulate permissible third-party communications of confidential information.  For example, in 42 U.S.C. § 17934, Congress statutorily required a “business associate”—such as medical billing company—of health care providers to comply with existing regulations governing the use and disclosure of protected health information (PHI) per 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).  HIPAA’s Privacy Rule bars a health care provider from disclosing PHI except as permitted or required by law and one permitted exception is providing PHI to the provider’s business associate.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).  The provider must obtain “satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the information. ”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).  Satisfactory assurances “must be documented through a written contract…that meets the applicable requirements of § 164.504(e). ”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).  The required contractual terms under § 164.504(e) include: establishing the business associate’s permitted and required uses and disclosure of PHI; prohibiting the business associate from any other use or disclosure; and requiring the business associate to use appropriate safeguards, report breaches, and make its books and records available to the Secretary of HHS for the purpose of determining the covered entity’s compliance.  Unlike what Congress allowed under HIPAA, it provided no option under the FDCPA for debt collectors to convey information about debts to a third-party service provider.
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ......................................................13  II.  THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO TRANSMIT THE MATTER TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  BECAUSE MATERIAL FACTS ARE IN DISPUTE (AA11-12; AA17)  ..................................................................................................................................................................................14  A.  Case Law Establishes [...]’s Right to A Hearing .............................................................15  B.  The [...]’s Determination that No Hearing Was Warranted Because [...] Did Not Seek To Impose Discipline Was Erroneous .........................................................................................24  III.  THE COMMISSION’S HOLDING THAT THE LOCAL UNION OFFICE WAS A STATE WORKPLACE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE STATE POLICY WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT ESTABLISHED JURISDICTION THAT EXTENDS TO NON-STATE WORKPLACES AND NOT INVOLVING STATE BUSINESS (Aa10-Aa11)...........................................25  A.  The Commission Erred in Holding that a Private Union Office is a State Workplace Per Se..................................................25  B.  The Commission Erred in Holding that the Instant Matter Involved “State Business”.................................................................29  C.  Investigating State Policy Violations at Non-State Workplaces Is Not Necessary to Protect the State’s Interests As an Employer................................................................32  D.  The Commission’s Determination That The Complaint Arose From a Union Election Dispute Was “Irrelevant” To The Jurisdictional Issue Was Arbitrary, Capricious and Unreasonable ..............................................................................34  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................37
[brief] Preventing the Delegation of Regulatory Authority to Private Parties and International Organizations”, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 539 (2017).  The private non-delegation doctrine has also been assiduously followed by several states.  See, [...] and [...], “The Myth of the State Nondelegation Doctrines”, 74 Admin. L. Rev. 263 (2022).  In contrast, it cannot be said that the Council is subordinate to the DEP.
[brief] A.  **Aggravating Factor (1)**  The court first erred in finding aggravating factor (1) — the nature and circumstances of the offense and the role of the actor, including whether the crime was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner — and giving it substantial weight.  The court found this factor by pointing to what it asserted were facts “unique to this case:” that [...] offered to pay [...], that [...] was substantially older than [...] and [...], and that [...] sought to avoid culpability after-the-fact.  (15T 25-17 to 17-22)  In finding this factor, a sentencing court may consider “aggravating facts showing that [a] defendant’s behavior extended to the extreme reaches of the prohibited behavior. ”  *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. 57, 75 (2014).  Here, the conduct alleged by the State is nowhere near the “extreme reaches” of the criminal behavior.  The State’s evidence at trial in support of this conviction established that [...] offered [...] $40 to fight [...], who had attacked [...]’s girlfriend earlier that day.  The agreement did not include the use of any weapons or the participation of anyone other than [...]; as [...] testified, he and [...] were there to act as referees, rather than to participate.  (10T 73-3 to 8)  While the evidence presented by the State is certainly sufficient to sustain a conviction for third-degree conspiracy, it does not demonstrate that this conspiracy is one of the worst of its kind.  Cf. Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 75 (noting that this factor can be properly found “by reference to the extraordinary brutality involved in an offense”).  The court thus erred in finding aggravating factor (1) and in giving it substantial weight.
[brief] A.  DR. ONDIK’S APPLICATION IS CONTRARY TO SETTLED LAW .................................................................................................................. 22  1.  The Restrictive Covenant Protects the Practice’s Legitimate Interests .......................................................... 24  2.  The Restrictive Covenant Does Not Create An Undue Hardship on [...] ..................................................26  3.  The Restrictive Covenant Is Not Injurious To The Public......28  B.  DR. ONDIK CANNOT DEMONSTRATE IRREPARABLE HARM .............................................................................29  C.  THE EQUITIES FAVOR THE PRACTICE ..................................31  D. DR. ONDIK IS ASKING THE COURT TO BLUE PENCIL THE RESTRICTIONS DIFFERENTLY THAN HE REQUESTED OF THE CHANCERY COURT .................................................................32  POINT VI  THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED  DR. ONDIK’S COMPLAINT.  (Ra1-3, Ra159-78, Pa52-53)...........................................33  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................35
[brief] E.  The Trial court did not Base its Ruling on Potential Future Condemnation.  Defendants cite two sentences from the trial court’s nearly twenty-page opinion in an attempt to argue that the trial court ruled on a basis other than the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A–5.  (Db43).  While the dicta cited by Defendants does mention the effect of condemnation on ongoing remediation, such effects do not form the underlying basis of the trial court’s decision.  (T3, 51: 15-24).  The trial court’s actual bases for its decision is clearly stated in the opinion:  “[i]t is this Court’s conclusion for the reasons that follow that the township’s designation was not supported by substantial evidence in the record; the property was leased and in use until the ongoing remediation required access to areas under and around the building that prohibited continued use, and was therefore not unoccupied or unutilized as contemplated by the statute. ” (T3, 44:9-16).  The sentences cherry picked by Defendants constitute a brief consideration of policy implications following a lengthy analysis of whether the Property satisfies the “discontinuance of use” criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A–5(b).  (T3, 49:7-51:24).  The trial court goes on to analyze whether the Subsection 5(b) criteria for the building “being allowed to fall into so great a state of disrepair as to be untenantable” are met (T3, 52:1-23), whether the “significant vacancies for at least two years” criteria are met (T3, 52:24-53:8), and whether the Subsection 5(d) criteria relating to detriment to the safety and welfare of the community are met.  (T3, 53:13-56:6).  All of these analyses support the trial court’s ultimate ruling and deal with the designated criteria in the LRHL.  The fact that future condemnation was mentioned somewhere in the trial court opinion does not constitute error supporting reversal.
[brief] EXHIBIT F Transcript of December 4, 2017 Zoning Board Appeal by [...] seeking interpretation and/or site plan review of Sixth Street Courtyard; Resolution denying jurisdiction memorialized on January 8, 2018  Da500 Certification of [...] in opposition Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause to Enforce Litigant’s Rights dated June 18, 2018  Da508 PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE LITIGANT’S RIGHTS Certification of [...], Esq. in Further Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights and in Reply to Defendant’s Opposition dated --- 10
[brief] Da313 (emphasis added).  Whether the Property should be sold under the terms of the 2022 Addendum to the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement, a document drafted ten years after the 2012 MOU, does not arise out of or relate to the MOU.  The 2022 Addendum does not refer to the 2012 MOU, incorporate the MOU’s terms, or integrate the MOU’s arbitration provision.  Instead, the 2022 Addendum to the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement is for new deal, a different amount, and under completely different terms than contemplated by the abandoned 2012 MOU.
[brief] The June 7, 2023 Municipal Court Hearing  On June 7, 2023 [...], Esq. of [...] represented Defendant [...] at his municipal court hearing regarding the traffic offenses arising from the fatal crash.  Da034.  Under Mr. Kadish’s representation, [...] pled guilty to committing an illegal U-turn and admitted that doing so “resulted in a motor vehicle accident”.  Da036 (4:4-8).  Mr. Kadish’s represented [...] regarding this guilty plea despite the fact that [...] believes that he has a valid defense based on his testimony that the [...] had instructed him to use “the turnaround” and that he believed that doing so was “neither illegal nor unauthorized”.  See Da313, ¶¶ 3-4.  2.
[brief] The trial judge found [...] could not “provide testimony on respiratory therapy standards of care” and that [...] did not “do respiratory therapy. ”  6T87:23-24; 6T88:10-11.  She also stated that “you can't call it respiratory care” because “that’s not a thing. ”  6T88:14; 6T89:6-9.  As will be demonstrated infra at Point III, the judge had certain trigger words that could not be spoken by plaintiff’s witnesses.
[brief] .........................................................15  In re Garber, 95 N.J. 597 (1984) ......................................................................................41, 42  Goldman v. Critter Control of N.J., 454 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2018) .........................................................9, 12  In re Grand Jury Investigation, 200 N.J. 481 (2009) ....................................................................................passim Hill v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr. Com’r Fauver, 342 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 338 (2002) ...........................................................................................................26, 27
[brief] 7 Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank, 343 N.J.Super. 73, 80 (App. Div. 2001).  8  Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 144 (1980).  See Delray Holding, LLC v. Sofia Design & Dev. at S. Brunswick, LLC, 439 N.J. Super. 502, 510 (App. Div. 2015)(corporation); Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 549 (1996)(corporation); N.J.S.A. 42:2C-4(a)(LLC).  must consider the standing/real party in interest rules relative to direct and derivate shareholder/member suits.  Due to the intersection of corporations and LLCs being separate legal entities and the rules as to third party standing, law circumscribes direct shareholder suits.  "The distinction [between direct and derivative suits] is important because derivative actions are deemed to belong to the subject corporation whereas individual actions do not."10  "The law is clear and uniform: shareholders cannot sue for injuries arising from the diminution in value of their shareholdings resulting from wrongs allegedly done to their corporations."11  "Nor can stockholders assert individual claims for wages or other income lost because of injuries assertedly done to their corporations. ”12  Even the execution of guaranties or the providing of collateral to the corporation does not allow the shareholder to bring suit, as the claims for damage to the corporation are held by the corporation alone.13  New Jersey statutes also circumscribe the ability of LLC members to sue directly14.  Going into more detail, the Appellate Court in Tully held:  [R]egard for the corporate personality demands that suits to redress corporate injuries which secondarily harm all shareholders alike are brought only by the corporation.  New Jersey follows the American --- 10 Strasenburgh at 550.  11
[brief] “Relevant evidence” means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.  N.J.R.E. 401.  The primary inquiry of a relevancy determination regarding evidence is determining the logical connection between the evidence and the fact at issue.  State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 132 (App. Div. 2017).  Here there is no logical connection between the anticipated testimony of State’s expert relative to the detection of BZE (and Defendant’s alleged cocaine usage) and the issue of the defendant’s intoxication.  [...] testified that she cannot state with any reasonable degree of scientific certainty that cocaine or BZE in any way impaired or affected Defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle on June 4, 2019.  Nor could she provide an opinion with any certainty as to when the alleged cocaine exposure would have occurred to result in the BZE findings with the blood samples said to have been obtained from Defendant.  Simply put, at most, the testimony at issue can only be offered as to the issue of whether the blood sample(s) tested positive for BZE.  However, the issue is not whether there was BZE present in Defendant’s system, but whether Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident in question.  [...] could not opine as to whether the defendant was intoxicated due to active cocaine in his system and, were she to do so, it would be based on her speculation rather than the evidence.  Accordingly, she would be testifying to a net opinion.  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2005) (holding N.J.R.E. 703 requires expert opinions be grounded in facts and data).  Accordingly, because the testimony at issue is not admissible as relevant to Defendant’s intoxication, it was properly excluded.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has explained that “it has long been held that cross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. ”  State ex rel. J.A., 195 N.J. 324, 341-42 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  By denying [...] the benefits of this engine, “the jury never learned the basis of [the out-of-court declarant’s] knowledge.  . . , whether he was a credible source, or whether he had a peculiar interest in the case.  Defendant never had the opportunity to confront that anonymous witness and test his credibility in the crucible of cross-examination. ”  Branch, 182 N.J. at 348.  Admission of these incriminating statements from the unknown witnesses unfairly bolstered the State’s relatively weak case against [...] and were therefore highly prejudicial.  Unnamed, unknown people believed that [...] shot and killed [...].  This information was specific, including a clear description of [...].  And this information was credible enough that it led [...] to put [...]’s photo as the suspect in a photo array.  Yet [...] was deprived of his right to confront these anonymous witnesses, the very thing that the Confrontation Clause seeks to prevent.  This error cannot be characterized as harmless.  The State did not present evidence of a motive.  They did not have a murder weapon.  They had no physical evidence linking [...] to the shooting.  The belatedly revealed alleged dying declaration was unreliable, with [...] only mentioning it to police after he had seen a news story about [...]’s arrest.  The eyewitness identification was equally unreliable, with a real risk that [...] chose the person he was most familiar with, having seen [...] around the neighborhood, and mistakenly believing him to be the shooter.  In light of these serious weaknesses, un-cross-examinable hearsay from anonymous witnesses that [...] was the shooter cannot be ignored.  Our courts have not hesitated to reverse in similar situations where the right to confrontation was violated.  See, e.g., J.A., 195 N.J. at 331 (reversing due to admission of statements by non-appearing witness describing robbery and race and clothing of suspect); State v. Taylor, 350 N.J. Super. 20, 32 (App. Div. 2002) (reversing due to admission of statements made to police providing physical description of suspect).  Like those cases, “[g]iven the serious nature of the right infringed upon — the denial of the right of confrontation — and the importance of the impermissible testimony in the overall presentation of the State’s evidence,” reversal is required here.  Taylor, 350 N.J. Super. at 35.  As plainly articulated by [...], for the admission of testimonial statements “the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  Neither was present in this case.  Thus, the admission of such “testimonial statement[s]” against the defendant “despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine” the declarants is “sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment. ”  Ibid.  Reversal is required so that [...] may have a trial that comports with the constitution.
[brief] At its meeting on May 24, 2022, the Commission granted Appellants’ Motion to Amend the Complaint and accepted their Amended Complaint as filed.  (Ca240-378).  On June 3, 2022, Appellants filed a Motion to Supplement the Record with documents which had not been made available to Appellants at the time any prior motion or response had been filed.  (Ca096-Ca126).  On June 6, 2022, the Commission granted that Motion to Supplement the Record.  (Ca014).  On August 23, 2022, the Commission issued its decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.
[brief] Here, unlike *Serenity*, [...]’s omission of a copy of its existing Notice of Classification did not (and could not) alter the objectively discernable fact that [...] was prequalified by [...] at the time of bidding.  Moreover, the argument was never made by the County.  Indeed, the sole stated reason for the County’s rejection of [...]’s bid was its belief, albeit wrong, that it was required to reject it.  Da366.  Therefore, the sound business reason for *Serenity* court’s refusal to waive the alterations (preventing bidders from making unexplained notations in its bid that could be utilized, post-bid, to modify its bid to its advantage) is entirely inapplicable here.  In addition, [...]’s argument, that it is [...]’s burden to show that no sound business reason existed for the County’s rejection of its fully-complaint bid, is unsupported.  Unlike here, in *Serenity*, the public owner proffered a sound business reason for rejecting the bidder’s bid (preventing bidders from making unexplained notations in its bid that could be utilized, post-bid, to modify its bid to its advantage).  Thus, the burden shifted to the bidder to rebut the public owner’s position and show that its decision was pretextual or undermines the fundamental purposes of public bidding requirements.  Here, however, the County did not (because it cannot) offer a sound business reason for rejecting [...]’s bid.  Because there is no sound business reason for rejecting [...]’s bid, the Court’s decision must remain.
[brief] The accessory structure and addition will enable the [...] to maintain a neat and orderly property so that items such as vehicles, equipment, tools and the like are stored inside the structure and not in the yard.  Maintaining a neat and visually attractive property promotes the general welfare of the community and promotes a desirable visual environment in the area of the Property, as well as the community at large (Pa47); and 3.  The site is particularly suitable for the proposed use.  The site contains 1.79 acres and has sufficient space to accommodate the accessory structure.  The aerial photograph submitted by Plaintiffs and the photos submitted by the [...] demonstrate that the accessory structure is surrounded on three sides by a natural barrier of trees and is placed and constructed in a visually attractive manner.  The site already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the Property.
[brief] Paragraph 5 provides a thirty-day period to review the form after signing, upon which cancellation is deemed waived (Da122):  This agreement may be revoked and cancelled by written notice delivered to [...] and/or the [...] within 30 days of the signing of this agreement.  If notice of revocation of this [sic] agreement is not received within 30 days of the signing, the right to cancel the agreement is forever waived.
[brief] WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT OR LAY EXPERT (Pa11-Pa12)  ......................................................................................  39  POINT V: THE COURT BELOW  ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN FAILING TO PERMIT  PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT BY AN EXPERT WHILE DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS (Pa28-Pa29)  .............................................................................  40  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...] & ALL MEMBERS OF THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE [...], INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF N.J. APPELLATE  DIVISION  Civil Appeal  Docket # [...]  Trial Court Docket # [...]  On appeal from Order of the Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S BRIEF Of Counsel & on the Brief: [...] (#024491996)