ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The parties appeared in court on November 8, 2024.  There was some colloquy concerning various issues.  There was a discussion of the Respondent’s position concerning the applicability of the Amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act which prohibited enforcement of arbitration agreements in certain cases.  The court did not decide this issue.  [1T P14]  The Appellants called [...], Esq.  He claimed he came up with the idea of reviewing the Respondent’s emails to look for a new arbitration agreement.  The November 2023, search by Polychronis came a month after the conference and six months after the motion.  It was also long after the Appellants’ IT Department did a forensic evaluation of the Respondent's computer.  [2TP42 L2-13]  The Appellants presented evidence [...] found an email with a folder containing several arbitration agreements including the Respondents.  [1T P17-25,P28:L3-P30:L22]  The Appellants did not call an IT expert or any other witness to authenticate [...]’ discovery.  [...] was very specific in his testimony.  He testified that with the assistance of the IT department and [...] on the phone, he went into the Respondent’s emails and found the agreement.  [1TP19L3-P19L5]  He did this remotely from his office.  [1T P28:L25-P31:L5]  This was entirely inconsistent with the third certification of the Appellant, [...], who claims “With the assistance of counsel, I accessed Plaintiff’s former EIC email account. ”  Appellant then goes on to state, “after reviewing Plaintiff’s ‘sent’ email folder, I discovered an email dated November 18, 2019. ”  [96a-99a]  At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellants’ counsel attempted to argue they had an “outside forensic IT person take an image of her computer”  [2T P50:L6-P12]  The court correctly noted that there was no forensic evidence presented only the testimony of [...], who was not an expert.  [2T P50:L6-P58: L16-24]
[brief] 4.  [...] Were Not Unjustly Enriched (Pa003051 – 003052).  Appellants cannot sustain a cause of action for unjust enrichment because Appellants damages, if any, were the result of their own inactions.  “The doctrine of unjust enrichment rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. ”  *Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Wallia*, 211 N. J. Super. 231, 243 (App. Div. 1986).  “A cause of action for unjust enrichment requires proof that ‘defendant[s] received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust. ’”  *County of Essex v. First Union Nat. Bank*, 373 N. J. Super. 543, 549-50 (App. Div. 2004).  “Unjust enrichment is not an independent theory of liability but is the basis for a claim of quasi-contractual liability. ”  *Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth.*, 261 N. J. Super. 468, 478 (Law Div.1992), aff’d, 275 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 138 N. J. 269 (1994).  Courts have recognized, however, that a claim for unjust enrichment may arise outside the usual quasi-contractual setting.
[brief] See Star of the Sea Concrete Corp. v. Lucas Bros., 370 N.J. Super. 60, 72 (App. Div. 2004) (“Finally, the County argues that its award of the contract to [...] was in the public interest [due to the monetary savings].  The purpose of competitive bidding for local public contracts is not the protection of the individual interests of the bidders but rather the advancement of the public interest in securing the most economical result by inviting competition in which all bidders are placed on an equal basis. ”) (internal quotation omitted); Meadowbrook, 138 N.J. at 325 (“We recognize that to prohibit the waiver of [a] requirement occasionally may result in additional cost to the public, but we have no doubt that the overriding interest in ensuring the integrity of the bidding process is more important than the isolated savings at stake. ”).  The burden is on the party challenging government action to demonstrate “that the decision was motivated by the types of considerations the Local Public Contract Law was enacted to prevent, i.e., frustrating the policies of “securing [the] most economical result by inviting competition in which all bidders are placed on equal basis … [and] promoting competition on an equal footing and guarding against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance and corruption.
[brief] (Aa15-16).  The ALJ’s credibility findings also support the Board’s decision.  The ALJ found that [...] “displayed a subjective recollection of the incident” and that his testimony confirmed the facts as laid out by the Board.  (Aa13).  Specifically, [...] testimony corroborated that: restraining unruly patients was part of his regular job duties, that he had restrained patients hundreds of times, that his injury occurred while restraining an unruly patient, and that nobody referred to the incident as an “assault,” including [...], until he submitted his disability application.  Ibid.  An obvious consequence of restraining a “extremely combative” “thrashing” and “flailing” patient, where the risk of being hit by a flailing body part is expressly known, is actually being hit.  Further, an obvious consequence of being hit by the flailing body part of a “extremely combative” “thrashing” and “flailing” patient is injury.  An incident is not unexpected and undesigned when it is a know consequence of the chosen activity.
[brief] **First**, the state “Star witness did not see [...] shot [...].  **Second**, the video proves [...] clothing on the night of the murder was [entirely] dissimilar from shooter.  The color, length of coat, and tightness of [...]’s pants prove there was another person that committed this murder.  **Third**, State present  No DNA evidence, eyewitnesses, physical evidence, nor a testimony from anyone saying at the shrine [...] committed this murder.  **Fourth**, the state produce a witness ([...]) that received a great deal to lie, so his pending charges would be downgraded for his testimony.  [...] had a proclivity to lie, because of the **twelve felonies convictions**, which he would be facing extended term of prison if convicted.  (2T 101-8-102-12, 120-15 to 121-8)  Mr. [...] before divulging any information [...] and [...] discussed helping Dimitrius [...] with Bail and any way [they] can in exchange for his information.  (2T 103-23 to 105-8)  Defendant seeks [reversal] of the State decision based on Due Process violations, including: (1) the investigating officers performed an **Inadequate Investigation**; (2) the State, allowed the two crime scene officers to submit a half reports concerning, evidence at crime scene, suspect fleeing, and [...] description of fleeing suspect to match [...]s at time of murder (3) the State did not allow [...] to call witnesses and/or state’s many informants to look at video to prove the person (MURDER) was not him and Officers Klein falsified his reports, by not concluding area investigation and taking pictures and prints (mold) of footprints in snow; (4) there was sufficient evidence from crime-scene to acquit [...]; and (5) the state could have solved this murder if they would have just did a proper investigation and their [swore] duty (JOB), defendant [...] would be home supporting his children...
[directive] □  The court further ORDERS that collection of the DEDR penalty be (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7h).  DORO expires suspended upon defendant's entry into a residential drug program  The court continues/imposes a Sex Offender Restraining Order for the term of the program.  (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15e)  □ (SORO) if the offense occurred on or after 8/7/07 (Nicole's Law Total Lab Fee Forensic Laboratory Fee (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-20) 2C:14-12 or 2C:44-8).  N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. Offenses @ $ $  The court imposes a Stalking Restraining Order (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.1).
[brief] 478 N.J. Super. 593.  In that case, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Rule 4:5-1 certification that no arbitration was pending.  Id. at 600.  The plaintiff filed an answer denying counterclaims and asserting affirmative defenses, none of which included arbitrability.  Id. at 601.  The case proceeded through “significant discovery,” including 100 written demands.  Ibid.  The plaintiff received discovery from defendant, but withheld its own responses and filed the motion to compel arbitration before noticed depositions could occur.  *Id.* at 601-02.  The case proceeded for six months before the plaintiff filed its motion to compel arbitration.  *Id.* at 602.  Under these circumstances, the Court found the plaintiff had waived its right to arbitration.  Here, under nearly identical facts, the same result must hold true.  [...]’s conduct evinces a clear relinquishment of any right she may have had to compel arbitration.  In this Court’s *de novo* review of the procedural history of this case in light of applicable law, this Court must reverse the Chancery Court’s decision based on [...]’s unequivocal waiver.  See *Marmo*, 478 N.J. Super 593.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] --- 2  The same exchange is included in the bodycam footage that was entered into evidence at trial and included in the record on appeal.  Portions of the bodycam footage is part of the appendix and is being provided via cd.  A copy of the transcript of the bodycam is also included in the appendix.  See [DLa 41-42] for the above exchange.  Further, the transcript contains markings for deletions, but those were Plaintiffs’ initial suggestions and not the final agreement of the parties or ruling of the trial court.  Interactions between the police and the parties were agreed to be admissible while excluding any opinions by the officers as to blame made during those interactions, consistent with the prior panel’s ruling.
[brief] And in Frisby, the judge charged the jurors that the State made “two separate contentions,” one requiring the defendant to be present at the scene of the crime, while the other required the defendant to be a different location.  174 N.J. at 598-600.  No such contradiction existed here.  The general unanimity instruction given to the jury, (20T203-6 to 204-6), sufficed in this case.  The conscientious jury discharged its duty with care and collective wisdom.  Thus, no specific unanimity charge was required.
[brief] After admission by the officer that he administered the standardized field sobriety test wrong 2T:25-(22-25), 2T:26-(1-3) and comments by the judge and the prosecutor that my performance wasn’t bad 4T:34-(14-20), [5T:8-(19-25), 5T:9-(1-4)], 5T:9-(8-15), 5T:11-(16-21), 5T:6-(14-16), the judge still found there was probable cause to arrest and uphold the refusal charge based on me admitting I had 1 beer, motor vehicle violation of failure to maintain lane, and the officer subjective statements of a strong order of alcohol and glassy eyes.(4T, 5T, [4T:37-(12-25)- 4T:38-(1-11)])  After arguments in the trial court, the superior judge found me not guilty of failure to maintain lane but stated that there was reasonable suspension to stop based on the articulation by the officer that I failed to move over for stopped police vehicles in violation of New Jersey Statute 39:4-92.2.  The judge also found me guilty of refusal based solely on me verbally refusing the breathalyzer.(Da la)  He gave full deference to the municipal judge’s credibility findings in determining probable cause.  He did not reference or consider the facts of why I was found not guilty for DWI or consider the testimony in the record that the officer admitted to administering the SFST wrong or consider the municipal judges and prosecutor’s comments that I did not perform the test poorly.  Neither the superior court judge or municipal judge referenced or considered the proper refusal statute 39:4-50.4a, which is clear from his written opinion because there was nothing written about the 3 elements of the refusal statute.  Instead, he cited 39:4-50.2.  (Da 1a, Da 2a) (“Footnote” of Transcripts as required)
[brief] Third, Defendants claimed that under I.E.'s LLC v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520 (Law Div. 2006), [...] had a "duty to investigate the docket of the tax lien foreclosure" to avail itself of the bona fide purchaser protections.  (3T38:5-10).  As the second judge correctly held, Simmons, which is not binding in any event, does not impose such an obligation.14 (3T76:20-78:3).  And even if such an obligation existed, the second judge rhetorically (and correctly) queried "what would have been found in the docket?" (3T77:15-17).  The answer is: a regularly-prosecuted foreclosure from beginning to end.  If [...] had reviewed the docket, it would have found notice above and beyond years earlier.
[brief] (Pa385, Letter of Non-Renewal)  [...] also received a Notice of Non-Renewal of her contract for the next school year.  (Pa387)  [...] failed to follow the tenets of the policy in place at [...] which prohibited discrimination and then terminated Appellant and [...] after they each addressed the discriminatory and racially charged statements made by [...].  [...] engaged in discrimination based on race and despite the policies in place at [...] which prohibited discrimination in any form, [...] spent time attempting to discount and rationalize the use of the racial slur.  (Pa348, [...] Deposition 10/28/22)  The termination was retaliatory also.  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.
[brief] [...] contends that the Ordinance permitting a rent increase no longer applied once the Property was converted to a condominium property 10 years after [...]’s purchase.  That is foolish.  [...] cannot exploit the conversion by claiming that the conversion defeats [...]’s rights as landlord under a rent control ordinance.  The Act merely preserved [...]’s status as a protected tenant when the Property was converted to a condominium—and nothing more.
[brief] “N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) does not include a requirement that an uninsured motorist have a culpable state of mind and does not exempt motorists who have a good faith belief that they have medical expense benefits coverage. ”  *Bencosme v. Kannankara*, A-1672-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 614, *6 (App. Div. Mar. 22, 2016).
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[brief] Exhibit Q, 5/7/2009  Assignment and Assumption Agreement Between [...] and [...].  ...............................181a  Exhibit R, 1/14/2010  Letter from [...] to [...].................................(omitted)  Exhibit S, 12/2007  General Release between [...] and [...].  ........................................................................................................189a  Exhibit T, Trust Account Ledgers from [...] re: Disbursals to [...].................................................................(omitted)  Exhibit U, Operating Agreement for [...], LLC.....(omitted)  Exhibit V, Checks Totaling $480,000 to [...] related to WDC Sale of Property........................................................................................................195a  Exhibit W, 11/23/2010  Email Exchange between [...] and [...]...........(omitted)  Exhibit X, 10/30/2013  F. [...] Deposition Excerpt.........................(omitted, see 752a)  Exhibit Y, 1/15/2010  Letter from [...] to [...].................................(omitted)  Exhibit Z, 8/15/2017  Report by [...].........................................................(omitted)  Exhibit AA, 8/15/2017
[brief] Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.2.1 on R. 4:9-1 (2019) (emphasis added).  It appears that the motion judge believed that the claims against [...] were futile because the lease had effectively been deemed “terminated,” without a judicial declaration and the [...] had every right to lie through their dual dealings with plaintiffs, even circumventing the NDA.  While a dismissal “without prejudice,” by definition, means that it may be re-filed, further proceedings resulted in further confusion and self-contradictory rulings.  In related [...], Appellants/Plaintiffs will show that plaintiffs re-filed the SAC in this case as a new complaint under [...].  Immediately after the new docket filing was commenced, [...] moved to dismiss based upon the SAC being dismissed.  In a perplexing and shocking development, that motion was granted by the same motion judge and the new complaint in [...] was dismissed “with prejudice. ”  Both the dismissal of the FAC without prejudice and the dismissal of the SAC were unfair because the statute of limitations for breach of agreement and fraud, both six years, had yet to run at all.  The motion judge’s consideration of the extensive extraneous materials, only permissible under Rule 4:46, tainted this entire process, and thus the orders relating to [...] are readily resolved as erroneous as a matter of law.
[brief] A.  The NJFCA Legal Standards Do Not Automatically Preclude Summary Judgment.  (4T) .................................................................25  B.  The Trial Court Mistook Legal Arguments for Factual Disputes.  (4T) ......................................................................................26  C.  Relator’s Action Is Based Upon the Publicly Disclosed VRDO Transactional Data.  (4T)  .................................................................27  D.  The VRDO Transactional Data Used By Relator Was Publicly Disclosed Through Three Qualifying “News Media” Sources.  (4T)  ........................................................................................................33
[brief] Instead, his conclusions were based on clinical tests and facts relating to defendant's childhood.  *Id.*  In contrast, [...], heavily relied upon the operative facts pertaining to the crimes in arriving at his conclusions.  To a large extent, he assumed as true most of the facts contained in defendant's confession.  Id.  He also relied upon portions of an acquaintance of the defendant’s statement.  This distinction between the methods by which the experts arrived at their diagnosis is important in assessing the propriety of the prosecutor's cross-examination of the witnesses.  Id. Vandeweaghe discussed N.J.R.E. 403 in depth.
[brief] In M.C. III, our Supreme Court applied the invited error rule to a claimed hearsay violation committed at trial, but not raised until appeal.  In that case, certain documentary evidence admitted to support a finding of abuse and neglect was challenged by the defendant on grounds that the caseworker who testified lacked first-hand knowledge of the injuries sustained.Id. at 338.  The Court held that the doctrine of invited error barred defendant from challenging the evidence on appeal, because had defendant made an objection at trial, “the Division could have taken steps to satisfy any evidentiary requirements needed for the admission of the documents or presented a witness or witnesses in place of the documents.
[directive] 9.  Assist the Department in streamlining funding opportunities and requests that avoid compartmentalization of public health and safety issues, avoiding funding limitations that only address part of a multi-pronged challenge, and allow for holistic and interdisciplinary solutions.  10.  Provide training and technical assistance to the [...] ([...]), the 21 County Prosecutor Offices, law enforcement agencies, and the courts on alternative law enforcement responses with respect to policy, operations, and programming.  11.  In conjunction with the [...] ([...]), promote transparency in how law enforcement, in the course of their work, interacts with individuals with mental health, addiction, and behavioral health emergencies.
[brief] ” (1T 34:17-21).  The court then went on to state that, “[...] also did nothing in this case.  They said they intended to do things.  First, they refuse to defend [...] in the [...] action, even though [...] was facing a back end MCS-90 surety obligation if [...] let [...] face a complaint without mounting a defense.  This no coverage; no defense strategy may be effective when [...] provides only insurance to a policyholder without a surety backend endorsement.  However, here, that strategy did not work.  [...] knew that if it let [...] suffer final judgment without a defense, [...]’s surety endorsement would be triggered and none of the conditions and limitations in the insurance policy would apply to blunt the unconditional surety obligation. ” (1T 35:6-13).  The court further stated, “here, [...] did not defend [...] and, in addition, [...] did not counter sue [...] to try to raise the arguments it is trying to raise now, such as the allegation that [...] is somehow jointly liable for the spill, [...] is a used oil transfer facility operating without protective berms, the amount spent by [...] to respond to the spill are questionable, and that there should be some kind of allocation of responsibility between [...] and [...] for the oil spill.  Of course, [...] denies these allegations because these allegations are unsupported and unproven.