ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Separate Accountinq  State and Forfeitures  Federal or  Any agency receives both State and Federal distributions of forfeited funds that or the property shall establish accounts and records for any funds property received under N.J.S.A. authority of N.J.S.A- ZC:64-1, seq., (civil forfeiture), 2C:41-1, et seq. et (racketeering) or from actions brought under N. J.S.A. 2C21-25 et seq. (financial facilitation of crime), any other statute as directed by the Attorney General, as or under outlined further in these Standard Operating Procedures.
[brief] Ibid.  Plaintiffs’ unconscionability challenge is not specific to the delegation provision in [...]’s terms.  Instead, it generally discusses [...]’s inability to understand English and the supposed unequal bargaining power between [...] and [...] when she agreed to [...]’s terms.  See (Pb5–11).  Under Rent-A-Center and Goffe, Plaintiffs’ general challenge to the enforceability of [...]’s terms is not a specific challenge to the enforceability of the delegation provision contained in those terms.  Therefore, the delegation provision must be enforced, and the question of unconscionability must be decided by the arbitrator.
[brief] 4.  Letter from [...] to Appellants and Appellee, dated April 12, 2022.  5.  Letter from Appellants to [...], dated May 2, 2022, attaching a. Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, dated May 2, 2022; b. Unfair Practice Charge, filed with the Public Employment Relations Commission, dated April 21, 2022; c. Addendum to Unfair Practice Charge; d. Facebook Post from [...], dated January 12 (year unknown); e. Facebook Post from [...] (date unknown); f. Letter from [...], Esq., and [...], Esq. to [...], Esq., dated January 27, 2022; g. Addendum - March 7, 2022 – Motions; h. Resolution No. 2022- ; i.
[brief] | | 11644-11100  |  Emails between [...] in-house counsels regarding draft Complaints against [...].  |  RFP 2 seeks specific communications between Plaintiffs and certain third parties, none of which are counsel.  RFP 4 seeks documents relating to the performance administration and termination of the Recompute MOA.  RFP 11 appears to seek communications sent to and from [...] and internal communications regarding the termination of the 2005 Recompute MOA.  These requests do not seek communications with counsel regarding draft complaints related to this lawsuit.  Moreover, RFPs 17-25 request documents regarding specific allegations in the Complaint and not communications regarding the draft complaint in its entirety.  This document is not responsive to [...]'s RFPs 2, 4, 11, 17, 23, 24 or 25.
[brief] (Aa941).  He assessed the Project’s impact on noise pollution and concluded that the Project complies with State and local noise regulations and that the resultant noise “will be lower than existing daytime or nighttime noise levels. ” (Aa942-43).  Therefore, [...] explained that the noise will not be “noticeable at the surrounding residences” and will have no adverse impact on the surrounding community.  (Aa943).  Additionally, [...] analyzed the Project’s air-quality impacts and testified that the proposed regulator station would not emit an odor or other air emissions.  (5T34:3-12; 5T61:21-25; Aa946-47).  With regard to the resultant emissions from the CWT heater, [...] testified that [...] prepared an air-quality assessment using NJDEP’s air-quality risk-screening method and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s regulatory air prediction model to evaluate the Project’s air quality impact at surrounding areas.  (5T20:6-21:2; 5T21:22-22:2; 5T45:3-9; Aa943; Aa946-48; Aa951-52).  According to [...], the majority of the CWT heater’s emissions would be carbon dioxide and water vapor, which are non-criteria emissions.  (Aa947; Aa949).  In situations where the CWT heater does not reach “proper combustion temperatures,” he noted that the heater may emit --- 11 [...] is [...]’s expert in environmental engineering.  (Aa941). criteria pollutants in trace amounts.  (Aa947; Aa952).  As such, [...] testified that the concentrations of criteria and non-criteria air pollutants generated by the heater would be negligible compared to overall greenhouse-gas emissions and other sources of emissions in New Jersey and would not adversely impact public health or welfare.  (5T20:6-21:2; 5T21:22-22:2; 5T45:3-9; Aa943; Aa946-48; Aa951-52).  Fourth, [...] evaluated the EMP as a “policy” and “planning document” and testified that the Project is consistent with the EMP, including EMP Goal 5.4, which aims to “decarbonize and modernize New Jersey’s energy system” and “maintain existing gas pipeline system reliability and safety while planning for future reductions in natural gas consumption.
[brief] Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016)....................................20  Twp. of Manalapan v. Gentile, 242 N.J. 295 (2020)...............................24 Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677 (2000).........................................22  Appellate Division Bennett v. Lugo, 368 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 2004)..........................47-48
[brief] Standard of Review  As this Court is aware, the scope of appellate review of a final agency decision is limited.  *Aqua Beach Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs*, 186 N.J. 5, 15–16 (2006).  Appellate courts do not ordinarily overturn such a decision “in the absence of a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence. ”  *Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv.*, 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).  In *Matter of On-Line Games Production and Operation Services Contract*, 279 N.J. Super. 566, 590-92 (App. Div. 1995), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to bid conformity decisions by state agencies, and summarized it as follows:  Courts have only a limited role to play in reviewing the actions of other branches of government [and] … can intervene only in those rare circumstances in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State policy.  Although sometimes phrased in terms of a search for arbitrary or unreasonable agency action, the judicial role is restricted to four inquiries: (1) whether the agency’s decision offends the State or Federal Constitution; (2) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies; (3) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (4) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] This is likely the only facet of this case on which the parties agree.  Where the parties diverge, however, is in Defendant’s inability to accept that the jury did exactly that, but reached a verdict that was not in their favor.  Plaintiff was involved in a forceful rear end collision in which his vehicle was propelled through a [...] drive-thru, despite having his foot on the brake (2T, at 27:16-28:8).
[brief] On November 7, 2023, the [...] filed a motion with the trial court to stay discovery while they sought interlocutory appeal of the October Order.  The [...] then filed a Motion for Leave to appeal with this court on November 13, 2023.  Three days later, on November 16, 2023, the trial court denied the [...]’ motion for a stay, Da_209-21 (“the November Order”).  The trial court used the November Order as an opportunity to “amplify” its October Order.  *Id.*  While trial court purported to walk back its disregard of the *Neuwirth* decision, admitting that “*Neuwirth* is most certainly controlling” on a motion to dismiss, it nevertheless reaffirmed its erroneous October Order.
[directive] Although N.J.S. A. 2C:4-8 mandates that the NGRI committee "be treated as a person civilly 1 committed" this standard is substantially the same though not exactly the same.  There are three of substantial differences between the periodic review hearings all NGRI committee and a general civil committee.  The three distinctions are confirmed under Krol State and subsequent v. case law.  Firstly, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 grants the prosecutor the right to appear and be heard at all of periodic review hearings all NGRI committees who are hospitalized or in the community of under KROL court supervision on a conditional release.  Second, the burden proof for the State of in sustaining a Krol commitment is "preponderance the evidence" rather than "clear and convincing evidence" as required under a civil commitment under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.10.  Lastly, of of the In the Matter the Commitment Edward S., 118 N.J. 118 (1990) all periodic review of of hearings for patients who were acquitted murder by reason insanity shall be heard in open in court unless good case is shown for an camera hearing.  See also, 19-2 and In the Matter R. 3: of of the Commitment Calu, N.J. Super. 20, 26-27 (App. Div. 1997).  301
[brief] ........................................50  Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208 (1979)  ..............................................................................................14  Local Union 560, I.B.T. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 95 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1967)  ..................................................................14  McFeely v. Board of Pension Comm’rs., 1 N.J. 212 (1948)  ...............................................................................................42  Newark Firemen’s Mut. Benev. Ass’n., Local No. 4 v. City of Newark, 90 N.J. 44 (1982)  ...............................................................................................26  New Jersey Transit Bus Ops., Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546 (2006)  ...........................................................................................14  Policeman’s Benevolent Ass’n., Local 292 v. Borough of North Haledon, 158 N.J. 392 (1999)  ...........................................................................................14  State v. Macon, 57 N. J. 325 (1971) .............................................................................................20  Township of Wyckoff v. PBA Local 261, 409 N.J. 344 (2009) ...........................................................................................13
[brief] Regarding the events at the union office, [...] reported overhearing [...] tell [...] that she was thinking about pressing harassment charges against [...] to which [...] responded that [...] could do whatever she wanted.  (Aa29).  [...] stated that [...] went outside for a period but then returned inside the office, yelled at him, and told him that she was in a protected class, what her preferred name was, and that [...] would respect her.  Ibid.  [...] alleged that this interaction was the first time he had heard [...] ’s preferred name and that he would call her by whatever name she wanted, but that, regardless of whether she was in a protected class, she did not have the right to come into [...]’s office and harass people.
[brief] II.  As Conceded by [...] in Defending the HCH Action, the Complaint in the HCH Action Alleged Negligent Acts Which Triggered [...]’s Duty to Defend.  (Pa1 and Pa3).  The complaint in the HCH Action clearly alleged negligent acts on [...]’s part.  *See* Pa317–18 ¶ 19.e (alleging that [...] owed a legal duty to act “with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances”); Pa327 ¶ 54) (alleging that [...] owed a “duty of care”); *id.* ¶ 55 (alleging duty to exercise “the degree of care. . . required” under Vermont law); *id.* ¶ 56 (alleging that [...] violated his duty of “care”).  The Trial Court here correctly stated that: “the allegations of breach as to the fiduciary care may be supported by a theory of negligence. ”  T83-6 to T83-7.  The Trial Court erred, however, in stating that the HCH parties “withdrew” their negligence claim “warranting a denial in coverage. ”  T83-14 to T83-16.  They did not.  Pa484 ¶ 49.  The complaint in the HCH Action was never amended.  Pa484 ¶ 49.  The negligence basis of liability alleged in ¶¶ 19.e and 54–57 of the HCH Action complaint was never waived, abandoned, released, or extinguished by judgment.  Pa484 ¶ 49.  [...] thus had a continuing duty to appeal the Vermont Trial Court’s rulings as of March 5, 2021, for a possibility of coverage continued to exist then.  A.
[brief] There is no provision in the statute that explicitly permits a cure after the fact and no case law cited on this record affording a licensee the right to revive a void --- 2  *McQueen* also expressly analyzed and contradicted the only other unpublished case in this jurisdiction to address the application of the NJCFLA’s licensure provisions to alleged debts stemming from credit accounts, *Woo-Padva v. [...]*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Bergen Cty. Jan. 21, 2022), *aff’d on other grounds*, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023).
[brief] There is no dispute that the accumulation of water in [...]’s backyard (which was photographed [Pa344 ¶ 8, Pa377-380]) has resulted in significant harm, such as costs to install a new drainage system and deal with the death of many trees, shrubs, and other plants.  [Pa340 ¶ 31].  [...], Plaintiff’s licensed tree expert, explained how the harm to those plants resulted from the flooding of [...]’s backyard.  [Pa309-310].  The record reflects the costs necessary to remediate the harm attributable to the flooding of [...]’s backyard, including (a) an estimated $42,000 to install a new drainage system to address the overflow originating from Defendants’ property [Pa341 ¶ 38, Pa386]; (b) an estimated $64,245 to re-install all the plants in [...]’s backyard that were killed from the accumulation of water [Pa341 ¶ 39, Pa388, Pa390-91]; (c) $4,654.18 that [...] has already paid to replace skip laurels that had died from the flooding [Pa342 ¶ 40, Pa393]; (d) an estimated $5,920 to replaced exterior lights and electrical wiring that were damaged as a result of the flooding [Pa342 ¶ 42, Pa395]; and (e) an estimated $18,725 to remove trees and branches that had been damaged [Pa342 ¶ 43, Pa397].
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................Da49-52  INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...] ..............................Da1-2  Judgment of Conviction, Original Sentencing (2018) ..........................Da3-6  State v. Blake, [...] (App. Div. Feb. 17, 2022)  ....................Da8-48  Judgment of Conviction, Resentencing (2023)  ................................Da49-52
[brief] For the lower court, the video recording showed that [...], clearly acted in support of the defendant and the 16-year-old’s choice to waive his Miranda rights.  [...], provided defendant with care and the offer of help; he did not badger the defendant into speaking.  The testimony and evidence presented to the lower court also proved for it, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not invoke his right to silence and, therefore, the interrogating detectives did not violate any of the defendant’s rights.
[brief] During the ten-year period leading up to Opinion 691, the courts indicated that it was an acceptable practice to assign pre-settlement proceeds.  See Costanzo, supra (Law Div. 1991), Berkowitz, (Law Division 1992), Ladenheim, supra (App. Div. 2000); and Cronin, supra, (App. Div. 2002).  That Opinion should be accepted as the current public policy.  At the time Opinion 691 was issued, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of anti-assignment clauses in structured settlements.  See Owen v. CNA Insurance/Continental Cas. Company, 330 N.J. Super. 608 (App.Div.2000), reversed, 167 N.J.450 (2001).
[brief] (1a; 12a; 14a)  In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, an appellate court uses the same standard as the trial court.  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998); see Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (Templo Fuente) ("we review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court,” and we accord "no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court").  The trial court must not decide issues of fact: it must decide only whether any such issues exist.  Brill v. Guardian Life. Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954); R. 4:46-5.  Summary judgment should not be granted where the adjudication of such a motion would constitute what is in effect a trial by pleadings and affidavits involving issues of fact.  Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 215 N.J. Super. 200, 211-12 (App. Div. 1987).  Summary judgment serves the valid purpose in our judicial system of protecting against groundless claims and frivolous defenses; however, it is not a substitute for a full plenary trial.  United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 35 N.J. 193, 195-96 (1961).  Accordingly, summary judgment should be denied unless the right thereto appears so clearly as to leave no room for controversy.  Sisselman, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 212.  POINT II
[brief] There is no evidence to support the Court’s finding that Petitioner initiated a prenuptial agreement with the expectation of obtaining a substantial payout in the Sutton v. Sutton litigation if he was successful.  (9T7:17-22).  Due to events that unfolded over a period of several years after his marriage including corresponding reductions to the purchase price of the Melody, its liquor license and as a one/sixth owner of the parking lot, Petitioner, as a pro se litigant, brought additional Federal lawsuits to challenge those actions.
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | DeNike v. Cupo, 958 A. 2d 446, 453-454.  (N.J. 2008) | 20, 25 | | Chandok v. Chandok, 968 A. 2d 1196, (App. Div. 2009) | 26 | | In re Advisory Letter No. 7-11, 61 A. 3d 136 (N.J. 2013) | 26, 27 | | State v. McCann, 919 A. 2d 136, 142 (App. Div. 2007) | 27 | | James v. City of East Orange, 246 N.J. Super. 554 (App. Div. 1991) | 27 | | Panitch v. Panitch, 770 A. 2d 1237 (App. Div. 2001) | 27 | | Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61-62 (N.J. 1951).  | 31 | | Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Associates, Inc., 966 A. 2d 93 (App. Div. 2009) | 31, 32 | | Bender v. Adelson, 901 A. 2d 907, 919 (N.J. 2006) | 43 | | Statutes | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | NJ Court Rule R. 4:49-1(a) | 43 | | NJ Rule of Evidence 4:03, 4:04 | 47 | JUDGMENT BEING APPEALED (including Jury verdict sheet)
[brief] (Pa 1-104, and more specifically Pa 26-28).  While Appellant seeks to admit various statements made by the Executrix, it is clearly evident from the deposition transcript that the Appellant could not conduct such proceeding in a professional manner and such overly aggressive and antagonistic interrogation resulted only in hostile exchanges, in which deponent failed to provide clear, concise, and responsive answers of any relevant information.  This deposition turned into a collateral attack on deponent, her personal and professional history, including her record as a sitting Judge in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and details of the Estate above and beyond relevant subjects related to the [...].  The entirety of the deposition transcript is included within Respondent’s exhibits, as excerpts alone do not provide adequate coverage of the incivility.
[brief] The basis for [...]’s dismissal was that the Court found that the Appellant’s timely filed Affidavits of Merit (“AOM”) were not sufficient to implicate [...]’s conduct and therefore held that the Appellant failed to state a claim against him.  [...]’s Motion for Dismissal, filed July 27, 2022, which gave rise to the Court’s dismissal Order, argued that the Appellant’s AOM expert, [...], did not qualify as a valid expert against [...] because [...] specialized as a “Hospitalist” and the [...] specialized in Hematology/Oncology.  This distinction allegedly violated the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, which states, in pertinent part, “[i]n the case of an action for medical malpractice, the person executing the affidavit shall meet the requirements of a person who provides expert testimony or executes an affidavit as set forth in section 7 of P.L.2004, c. 17 (C.2A:53A-41).
[brief] As a result of damage from Super Storm Sandy, Plaintiff/Respondent [...] (“Borough”) participated in the Seawall Repair and Construction Project (the ‘Project’) undertaken by the [...] (“[...]”) which included the repair of a damaged seawall located on Appellant’s Property.  Pa2.  In order to prevent future storm damages to adjacent infrastructure, the [...], [...] (“[...]”) designed a continuous seawall to be constructed, incorporating the repair of the damaged portion of the Appellant’s existing seawall to produce a contiguous, resilient, engineered shore protection feature.  Pa2.  Appellant’s Property, identified as [...], and commonly known as [...] (the “Property”) consists of an existing two-and-one half story single family home on a lot of approximately 1.36 acres.  Pa36.  As part of the Project, the Borough needed to acquire a perpetual 3,334 sf easement at a distance of 177.65 feet from Ocean Avenue in order to repair the existing damaged seawall located on the Appellant’s Property.  Pa36.  On August 13, 2018, the Borough served the official Offer Letter, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 20:3-6, on Appellant.  Pa15.  Based upon an appraisal report prepared by [...], Ph.D., MAI, the Borough offered the sum of $16,500 as total compensation for the taking of the 3,334-sf perpetual easement in said Appellant’s Property.  Ibid.  The easement states that, “(s)aid Proposed Easement shall include the permanent right to maintain and replace the proposed seawall located within the above-described easement area including therewith the right to pump, place, transport and spread sand beach fill within the limits of the Proposed Easement herein described. ”  Da11.  The Borough’s appraisal report described the scope of the Project as follows:  The Project will entail utilizing a construction and maintenance easement on a portion of the subject property so the seawall inefficiencies can be addressed.  The taking of the easement and any consequential damages to the remainder of the subject property is primary reason is being prepared. ”  Pa21 [emphasis added].  The Borough’s appraiser listed the various benefits from the repair of the seawall to the Appellant’s Property, including life-safety and protective benefits.  Ibid.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I APPELLANT SEEKS A WINDFALL BASED UPON A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR (DA40; 1T7:3-10)
[brief] Ibid; See e.g., Szalc v. Stanger, 2011 WL 1467187, at *13 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011) (citing U.S. v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 293 U.S. 340, 345, 55 S.Ct. 221, 79 L.Ed. 415 (1934)).  Moreover, there was nothing nefarious about [...]’s action, as it was done under the supervision of his then attorney, [...], Esq. (Da065-Da066).  Additionally, following execution of the December 1998 Deed, [...] exercised all indicia of ownership of the property up through the present, including paying all taxes, expenses, and collecting rents.  (Da068-Da069).  Thus, contrary to the Appellants’ arguments, [...] cannot be guilty of unclean hands as there was no intention to transfer the property or reliance thereon.  The creation of the December 1998 Deed and [...]’s signing of the name [...] was nothing more than an innocent, superfluous error.