ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] and governing body have pointedly chosen uses and standards with an anticipated level of intensity and have explained why they have done so.  The application before the Board contemplates development that is substantially more intense than anticipated by the governing body, and, therefore, allowed in the SM Zone District.  There is no credible, probative evidence before the Board that would allow it to deviate from the zoning standards set down by the governing body or which would justify this Board rethinking the determinations of the Planning Board and governing body that link the height of permitted structures with their anticipated intensity.  In the absence of such evidence, it would be improper for the Board to arrogate to itself an authority to second-guess the policy determinations of the governing body.  Ja 034.  As matter of binding statutory and decisional law, the changes in the warehousing business that Plaintiffs’ testimony presented to the Board are not a proper basis for a finding of the special reasons necessary to sustain a height variance in this case, and the Board properly declined to make the sweeping and *ultra vires* policy decision necessary for it to accept this rationale.
[brief] 23  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)...............................passim Statutes  N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 ..................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 ..............................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a .......................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) ..................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) ..................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C: .................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ....................................................................... 3 COURT RULES Rule 3:22-10 .................................................................................. 11 Rule 3:25A-1 .................................................................................. 24 OTHER AUTHORITIES R.P.C. 1.2(a).................................................................................... 21 R.P.C. 1.4(c).................................................................................... 21 TABLE OF APPENDIX State v. Michael E. Mitchell, A-0675-14T1, 2017 WL 1739633 (App. Div. May 4, 2017) ................................................................. Pa1-6 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] On appeal, the Petitioner does not argue unconscionability, and instead contends that there was no list of assets attached to the Agreement, contrary to N.J.S.A. 37:2-33.  (Pb 45-46).  However, the Chancery Division ruled on this issue as follows:  Although the copy of the Antenuptial Agreement does not include an annexed statement of assets, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 37:2-33, this Court will not speculate as to what could have been attached to the full agreement.  There may have been an annexed statement, or there may not have been, but what is present is, by the terms of the Agreement, the parties were fully apprised of the extent and approximate value of all the property and estate of the other.  (Pa 39).  C.  The Petitioner Is Not Entitled To An Elective Share Under N.J.S.A. 3B:8-10.
[brief] THE IMPALA WINDOWS ARE TINTED WITH A 5% TINT.  THIS IS A FACT.  AS WELL AS ANOTHER FACT THAT [...] WANTED HIS WINDOWS DARKER YET AND SPECIFICALLY DOUBLED UP ON THE 5% TINT.  THE IMPALAS' WINDOWS ARE 5% OVER 5%, THEREFORE PROHIBITING ANYONE FROM SEEING THROUGH THOSE WINDOWS EVEN FROM A PERSPECTIVE RIGHT UP AGAINST THEM.  Revert back to video disc #2 seq. # ending with 8001, and at time stamp @8:11:40, The officer is seen opening the door of the Impala.
[directive] It is important to note, even at the risk of stating the obvious, that the Legislature by adoption of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b did not intend for courts or prosecutors to treat the fact that the defendant’s unlawful conduct occun’ed within a school zone as a circumstance.  mitigating  Indeed, it would be absurd to interpret and implement the new law so that a drug dealer operating in a school zone would receive a lesser sentence than would be imposed had the same act of drug distribution/possession with intent to distribute occurred outside a school zone.  It is therefore important for prosecutors and courts to consider the nature and seriousness of the underlying drug distribution/possession with intent to distribute conduct, independent of its occurrence within a school zone, when detemaining an appropriate plea offer and sentence.  One of the practical effects of the new law is that a school zone violation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 may no longer be the most serious charge -- measured in terms of the likelihood of incarceration and length of sentence -- that applies to the offense conduct.
[brief] (2T 13-1 to 14-2; 2T 7-1 to 18)  When the police arrived, several people were outside.  (Da19, 28:49 to 31:00)  Codefendant [...], whom the police saw with a gun, ran away.  (3T 26-22 to 27-6, 31-14 to 15)  The police chased and arrested [...] but did not find the gun.  (3T 26-22 to 27-6, 31-15 to 17)  Everyone else went into the house.  (3T 30-12 to 14, 31-13 to 32-14)  The police saw [...] walk into and later out of the house.  (8T 98-6 to 99-21, 103-8 to 23, 112-15 to 20, 119-14 to 17, 120-14 to 21)  However, the police did not stop [...] or see him with a gun.  (8T 118-9 to 15)  Soon after, [...]’s father, [...] Mills Jr.,\(^4\) arrived at the house, having heard about the shots fired.
[brief] There was a complete absence of any testimony from a medical expert describing the plaintiff’s prior complaints of tingling and numbness, what impact such complaints had on her ability to walk, and offering an opinion that the symptoms she experienced in the past played any role in the cause of her fall at the defendant’s store.  Defense counsel also told the jury that the plaintiff’s fall was related to the fact that she had neuropathy.  (7T17:6-19:16).  Again, there was no expert medical opinion to support this suggestion.  There was not even any testimony from a medical expert describing what neuropathy is, what symptoms are related to the condition, or what conditions or symptoms Gabapentin, the medication the plaintiff was prescribed in the past, is meant to treat.  Defense counsel also gave the jury his own definition of festinating without any expert support as further support that the plaintiff fell as a result of her prior medical condition.  (7T17:6-19:16).  It is respectfully submitted that the admission of this evidence in the absence of any expert medical opinion alone had the clear capacity to result in a miscarriage of justice because it was utilized by the defendant as substantive evidence and allowed the jury to speculate that the plaintiff did not fall as a result of the wheel of her rollator striking the low-lying tripping hazard but rather fell as a result of a prior medical condition without any expert guidance.
[brief] ”  Pb26 citing Coventry, supra at 298-299.  Plaintiffs’ expert planner testified to the Medici criteria, not the Coventry criteria and never even mentioned the purposes of [...]’s prohibition of accessory uses without a principal use on the same lot.  Thus, even if this Court were to announce a new legal standard, the record does not support a conclusion that Plaintiffs have proven their entitlement to approval under the new standard.  This is the result also, if the deviation from [...]’s ordinance is framed as the greater height of the building proposed in Mansfield than would be allowed in Florence, since Plaintiffs’ argument is based upon their unproven assertion that all of the accessory uses proposed in Florence are “height neutral” and therefore would therefore be inherently permitted if only they were on the same lot as the proposed principal warehouse building.  Pb30.  The testimony of Plaintiffs’ traffic expert doesn’t support this conclusion and their Planner never sought to explain the purpose, effect or importance to the proposed development of the differing height standards in the two towns.  Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Coventry-esq standards with this framing of the issues either.  The Trial Court determined, for the purposes of its decision upholding the Board’s (d)1 use variance denial in this case, that even under the less stringent standards in accord with the principles of Coventry that are applicable to (d)6 height variances, as articulated in *Grasso v. Boro of Spring Lake Heights*, 375 N.J. Super. 41, 52-53 (App. Div. 2004), the Board’s concerns about the height of the proposed building, and therefore the intensity of the proposed warehouse use and its impact on traffic in Florence as a result of the driveway in Florence, were appropriate.
[brief] Since liability under the Spill Act does not “incorporate a common law negligence standard of care,” and since the trial court has never held that [...] was negligent—indeed, [...] never even pled a negligence cause of action against [...]—the February 23, 2024 “final judgment” entered against [...], holding it liable by reason of the MCS-90 endorsement to its policy to pay $750,000 of the judgment against [...], was entered in error and must be vacated.
[brief] The judge charged that conspiracy is an agreement with the “purpose of promoting or facilitating” the commission of a crime.  (13T190-6 to 16).  He further stated that a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault regardless of whether he is guilty of aggravated assault itself.  (13T190-17 to 23).  The judge defined “purpose” as a “conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or cause such result. ” (13T191-9 to 12).  He then clarified that awareness, “association, acquaintance, or family relationship with an alleged conspirator” would not suffice to satisfy a conspiracy conviction.  (13T192-9 to 11).  The jury thus knew that a conviction based on knowledge of the conspiracy would be improper.  As the court made clear to the jury, conspiracy to commit aggravated assault and aggravated assault are two separate charges, and consequently, must be considered separately.  Compare N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(c) with N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b).  The purposeful nature of conspiracy applies to the agreement itself, and not to the underlying offense.  See State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 245 (2007) (“[T]he agreement to commit a specific crime is at the heart of a conspiracy charge.
[brief] Appellant filed an answer to the Law Division complaint on September 19, 2022, and the parties thereafter engaged in discovery.  On December 20, 2022, Respondent filed a motion to amend his complaint and transfer the matter to Chancery Division with Appellant’s consent.  On January 24, 2023, the Superior Court Law Division entered an Order (with consent) transferring the matter to Chancery Division and on January 26, 2023, the Court entered an Order permitting Respondent to file his amended complaint in Chancery Division (Da182).
[brief] All warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable, and thus invalid; and it is the State’s burden to prove that any warrantless search was objectively reasonable when tested against established principles of law.  See State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983).  Because both the existence of probable cause, or lack thereof, and the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a search or seizure, is something to be judicially determined, see State v. Anderson, 198 N.J. Super. 340, 348 (App. Div.), certif. den., 101 N.J. 283 (1985), search warrants are strongly favored under the Federal and State constitutions.
[brief] The Defendant’s second motion for reconsideration was filed without any recognizable legal basis, was an apparent effort to cloud Plaintiff’s title to the Property, and furthered Defendant’s harassment of the Plaintiff.  On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff served the Defendant and his counsel with a frivolous litigation letter pursuant to R. 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.  (Pa35).  The Defendant and his counsel failed and refused to withdraw the frivolous motion.  Although the Defendant was unsuccessful in his appeal and Plaintiff has held title to the Property for nearly four (4) years, the Defendant recorded a lis pendens against the Property on March 20, 2024 in a further effort to erroneously cloud Plaintiff’s title.
[brief] ORDERS AND RULINGS  Orders granting summary Judgment to defendants  Aa411-Aa414  Order denying reconsideration  Aa452  Order granting summary judgment on the counterclaim  Aa538-Aa539  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  T  Transcript dated 9/23/22 T  2T  Transcript dated 11/18/22  2T  3T  Transcript dated 4/14/2023  3T  Procedural History
[brief] 38  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................Da12-15  Ruling on Third-Party Guilt ..................................................9T74-22 to 78-1  Imposition of Restitution ......................................................16T35-21 to 36-16  INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...] ........................................Da1-8  Verdict Sheet ................................................................................Da9-11  Judgment of Conviction .............................................................Da12-15  Notice of Appeal ........................................................................Da16-19  Call Detail Record Map, Admitted as S-85 ........................................Da20  Call Detail Record Map, Admitted as S-86 ........................................Da21  Video from [...], admitted as S-56 (submitted under separate cover) ................................................Da22  Video from [...], admitted as S-26 (submitted under separate cover) ................................................Da23  Video From [...], admitted as S-27 (submitted under separate cover) ................................................Da24 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | 33 | | Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011) | 26 | | State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023) | Passim | | State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530 (2016) | 21, 22, 23| | State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316(2005) | 21, 22 | | State v. Bellamy, 468 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 2021) | 35 | | State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540 (2004) | 21 | | State v. Gibson, 219 N.J. 227 (2014) | 34 | | State v. Hannah, 248 N.J. 148 (2021) | 21, 24 | | State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011) | 35 | | State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) | 34 | | State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393 (2017) | 26 | | State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) | 26 | | State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225 (1988) | 21 | | State v. Martinez, 392 N.J. Super. 307 (App. Div. 2007) | 37 | | State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504 (2006) | 26 | | State v. Pasterick, 285 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div. 1995) | 27 | | State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48 (2020) | 22 | | State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280 (2009) | 26 | | State v. Topping, 248 N.J. Super. 86 (App. Div. 1991) | 37 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |-----------------|-----------| | State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 (2007) | 23 | | Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) | 26 | | United States v. Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D.
[directive] 8  Appendix A: Sample Stationhouse Adjustment Agreement – Long Form . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8  Appendix B: Sample Stationhouse Adjustment Agreement – Short Form . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  Appendix C: Model Stationhouse Adjustment Warning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
[brief] (Pa875 to Pa902).  The City produced two representatives, [...], the City Administrator, and [...], the City Planner and the Director of Planning.  (Pa525 to Pa566).  In his deposition [...] stated that: • The developer asked for an increase in density as part of an amendment to the redevelopment plan.  (Pa878; 3T10:17 to 3T12:19); • The $2,000,000 payment was based on the desire to fund expansion of the senior center.  (Pa879; 3T14:12 to 24); • The amount of the payment was determined by the Mayor, not by planning professionals.  (Pa879; 3T15:2 to 5); • No analysis was done to justify the $2,000,000 payment.  (Pa879; 3T16:8 to 21); • There were no standards of any sort relevant to assessing the impacts of the [...] development.  (Pa879; 3T16:22 to 3T17:19).  •  There are no documents that explain how the amount of the contribution was determined.  (Pa882; 3T27:4 to 10).  •  The City had no knowledge of what impacts were intended to be addressed by the $2,000,000 payment.  (Pa884; 3T35:4 to 9).  [...], the other deponent designated by the City as its corporate witness, was the sole planning official that could have been involved.  (Pa 525 to Pa566).  He conceded that he had no knowledge about the following topics: • The intended use of the $2,000,000; the Planner testified, “I was not part of the process. ”  (Pa544; 2T76:16 to 24).  •  He had no knowledge as to how it was determined that [...] should contribute $2,000,000 or what the money was intended to be used for.  (Pa546; 2T82:1 to 12)  •  There was no standard to assess the extent of amenities to be provided by a developer.  (Pa546; 2T83:18 to 2T84:1).  He did testify however that: •  The Plan Amendment no longer sought to achieve some of the goals of Design Guideline 6 – which were eliminated for “no specific reason. ” (Pa534; 2T36:8 to 2T37:23).  •  There were no other new buildings with a density in excess of 30 units per acre in the redevelopment area.  (Pa536; 2T45:12 to 16).  •  No assessment was made to determine if the off-site impacts of the [...] project warranted the $2,000,000 assessment.  (Pa544; 2T77:7 to 11)  (Id.)  He acknowledged as well that this project was unique, and that no other developer paid a fee of this magnitude, although one had constructed a swimming pool for the City.  (Pa544 to Pa545; 2T78:12 to 2T80:14).  B.  [...] Was Required to Obtain the Approval of [...] as a Condition of Amending the Redevelopment Plan
[brief] While downplaying this factor, Respondent concedes it weighs in favor of the Petitioner’s status as an employee.  “Due to the unique situation that municipal prosecutors must prosecute cases and be present for court proceedings, the requirement that [...] be on premises to perform these court duties diminish the importance of this factor. ” (Rb34).  One has to wonder where else the Respondent thinks the Township should hold court?  Respondent tries to diminish the importance of this factor yet in the same vain, claims that it is indicative of an independent contractor status.  Respondent cannot argue on the one hand that Petitioner was required to do work in the municipal building, yet on the other hand claim it is not important.
[brief] to be a member of the Pinelands Commission: [...] of Manchester to replace [...], for the term prescribed by law, currently set to expire on June 28, 2021 thereafter, June 28, 2024.  [...] of Belmar to replace [...], for the term prescribed by law, currently set to expire on June 28, 2021.  [...] of Willingboro to replace [...], for the term prescribed by law, currently set to expire on June 28, 2022.  to be a member of the State Board of Dietetics: [...] of Clark for the term prescribed by law.
[brief] …………………………………………..  38 | Kearny PBA Local #21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. at 221 .........................................................  31 Kerr v. Able Sanitary and Environmental Services, Inc., 295 N.J. Super. 147 (App. Div. 1996) .......................... 39, 40 Moorestown Management v. Moorestown Bookshop, 104 N.J. Sup. 250, 249 (Ch. Div. 1969) .......................
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  Plaintiff purchased the property at [...], on March 6, 1995.  (Pa3; Pa100).  The fee simple title was obtained via a grant deed from [...] and [...], dated March 5, 1996, and recorded in Vol. 3045, pg. 250 of the Mercer County official records, New Jersey.  (Pa3; Pa100).  Defendant claims an interest in the plaintiff's property, believing its name is on the deed.  (Pa3; Pa100).  However, while Defendant's name is similar, Defendant did not participate in the actual purchase of the property.  (Pa3; Pa100).  The sellers mistakenly placed the wrong name on the deed by omitting the proper entity name.  (Pa3; Pa100).  If they had followed the New Jersey Secretary of State records for business names, they would have noticed the omission of certain words that distinguish the two entity names.  (Pa3).  Therefore, the Defendant's claim is without merit.  (Pa3; Pa100).  Defendant has no right, estate, title, or interest in the Plaintiff's property or any part of it.  (Pa3; Pa100).  Plaintiff is registered under two distinct names in New Jersey: the original name "[...]" and the current name "[...]."  (Pa100).  Conversely, Defendant is registered under the name "[...]."  (Pa3; Pa100; Pa228).  In 2019, Plaintiff attempted to lease the property to Defendant, including MOORISH SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA INC., [...], and [...], Grand Chief of Temple #48, offering a nominal fee of $750/month.  (Pa100).  However, Defendant declined to execute the lease.  (Pa100).  In 2020, Plaintiff revised the monthly rent to $350 in a subsequent lease offer to Defendant, who still refused to sign.  (Pa100).  Following unsuccessful leasing attempts, Plaintiff then endeavored to sell the property to the Defendant.  (Pa100).  However, Defendant declined the purchase offer.  (Pa100).  Consequently, Plaintiff placed the real property on the market for sale.  (Pa100; Pa228).
[brief] The facts of that case were that the [...] was *outright banning all* high-powered lines from being placed above-ground, *regardless of where they would be located in the borough, regardless of height and regardless of need*.  Under Roselle’s ordinance, even if a 69kV line was unquestionably necessary to provide basic power to residents or others, it was still prohibited from being placed above ground.  In addition, Roselle asserted that its ordinance was authorized by its general power to regulate land use; it was not based upon Roselle’s ownership of the land or the placement of lines in the streets.  Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 could provide authority for regulation of such lines *if the ordinance were limited to the placement of lines in right-of-way of the borough’s streets.*  Id. at 372-373 (“While some reservation of municipal control over the installation of overhead power lines and underground cables may be found in R.S. 48:7-1 and 2, this control is limited to a requirement of municipal consent where an electric company desires to use *public streets* for the construction of overhead or underground lines, obviously for service to local residents.  Such is not the situation here. ”)
[brief] *Ibid.*  The subcontract between [...] and [...], which [...] drafted, contained two separate indemnity provisions.  *Id.* at 47-48.  The first indemnity provision required [...] to indemnify the [...] and [...] for all claims and losses “arising out of or resulting from the performance of” [...]’s work, “to the extent caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of” [...], its employees, or agents, “regardless of whether it is caused in part by a party to be indemnified hereunder.
[brief] Pa563–Pa564.  In an effort to create a cause of action for Appellant is now alleging the existence of a back pain, however, in her affidavit she identifies her obesity as the cause of this back pain (obesity which existed since age ten and throughout her employment).  She even admits that her job with the Respondent was actually a reasonable accommodation for her back issues.  Pa073.  This is the opposite of what the law requires to support a claim for perceived disability, which is for obesity to be the result of the disabling condition and not vice versa as the Appellant attempts to allege here.