ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Cf. N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-44(c); SSR at 6, Dta1336.) form commonly used in commercial general liability policies. \(^3\)  The policy form contained a “Separation of Insureds” clause that provided that the insurance applies “[a]s if each Named insured were the only Named Insured. ”  (Dta116.)  As to cancellation, the policy contains variable language under multiple endorsements, which appear to be modified by endorsement U-GL-1298, which required notice of cancellation of “not less than ninety (90) days advance written notice stating the reason(s) for cancellation, as well as the date when the cancellation is to take effect” (except for non-payment, in which case “not less than” ten days notice would be given).  (Dta140.)  The [...] policy also contained an endorsement, denominated “Sole Agent For The Insured,” which states: THE INSURED HAVE ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST NAMED INSURED:  *** --- \(^3\)  See, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993) (noting “most CGL insurance written in the United States” “is written on” forms prepared by the [...] ([...]); [...] (“A High Level View of the CGL Policy,” https://www.irmi.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY.  Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...].  Defendant-Appellant.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT  MIDDLESEX COUNTY, LAW DIVISION - CRIMINAL PART  SAT BELOW:  Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[brief] Additionally, while a lease might provide an alternate potential basis for the imposition of a duty of care, as opposed to the common law, the fact that Plaintiff may have not received the lease until after the statue ran is immaterial.  Had Plaintiff timely filed a common-law theory negligence claim against [...] and then later, after the statute ran, obtained the lease in discovery and desired to assert a cause of action based on the lease, he could have simply moved to amend the complaint at that time, to add the theory that the duty emanated from the lease.  Because that hypothetical amended complaint would have asserted a claim arising out of the same “conduct, transaction or occurrence” as would have been set forth in the initial, timely complaint—namely that Plaintiff slipped and fell in the parking lot—the filing date of the amendment would relate back under R. 4:9-3 to the filing date of the initial pleading and would have been deemed timely.  However, because Plaintiff failed to name [...] in his initial complaint, and instead improperly named “John Doe” defendants, the statute of limitations expired prior to [...] being named and, as such, [...] acquired “a vested right to be forever free” of the claim asserted by Plaintiff.
[brief] See id. at 19-20, ([...], J., concurring); id. at 21, ([...], J., concurring); id. at 25 n. 8 ([...], J., dissenting to have no Heck bar).  Even in Heck, here are [...]’s battery of footnotes pointing out exceptions to Heck to help the lower courts (see especially fn. 8 about unreasonable searches):  [6]
[brief] In this case, the Appellant’s strategic decision not to intervene in the initial litigation before [...] is pivotal.  The Appellant had the opportunity to be a part of the earlier litigation and chose not to participate.  This decision effectively aligns with the principle that a non-party who had the chance to join an earlier suit but opted not to do so may be bound by the decision in that suit.  The rationale behind this exception is grounded in the notion that a party should not be allowed to bypass the consequences of a legal judgment simply by choosing not to participate, especially when it had a fair opportunity to do so.  Therefore, precluding the issue of the validity of the ordinances in the current litigation does not infringe upon traditional notions of due process.  The Appellant, by its own strategic choice, waived the right to challenge the Ordinances' validity in that separate litigation.  This waiver is consistent with the principle of judicial efficiency and the prevention of duplicative litigation.
[brief] [...] argued that Plaintiff could not prove negligence claim.  (Aa3-Aa6).  The Plaintiff’s certification and opposition to the statement of material facts show that Plaintiff has raised issues of facts on every element of the causes of action against [...].  (Aa344-Aa357).  Whatever their defense is it must be weighed in the context of the allegations set forth in her submissions.  They assumed a duty to her which duty they breached and which breach caused her damages.  She has expert testimony that shows the extent of her loss and photos.  She can testify about items that were taken by them, items that were destroyed and or damaged.  She was capable to testify as to the losses.  All of this information set forth in her certification and statement of material facts was ignored by the court below.  It should have been accepted for summary judgment purposes.  It was not.  Summary judgment shouldn’t have been granted by the court and the claim against [...] should have survived/
[brief] For example, the prospect of a conservation easement was brought up several times by board members throughout the meetings.  The Board engineer also suggested a conservation easement, which would alleviate the Board’s concerns regarding clear cutting of trees and provide justification for the design waiver request as to street trees:  [...]:  Well, I was going to make a suggestion.  How about a 10-foot conservation easement and if the conservation easement, your plot plan, is left undisturbed, they won’t have to provide a double row of screening trees.  If it is disturbed, then they’ve got to put a double row of screening trees and a conservation easement.  [...]: That makes so much sense.
[brief] In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997).  The effect is to eliminate meritless lawsuits at the early stages of litigation.  *Id.*  The Statute “serves a gate-keeping function so that only those cases that meet a threshold of merit proceed through litigation stream. ”  *Hubbard v. Reed*, 331 N.J. Super. 283, 292 (App. Div. 2000), reversed on other grounds, 168 N.J. 387 (2001).  The language of the Statute and the Legislature’s intent are patent, and “the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance with those terms. ”  *Phillips v. Curiale*, 128 N.J. 608, 618 (1992).  In this case, [...] filed its Answer on June 14, 2024.
[brief] Here, the trial court found Aggravating Factor 3 (risk of new offense), and Aggravating Factor 9 (need for deterrence) present, with Aggravating Factor 9 being afforded “strong” weight.  (8T20:10-21:15).  The trial court did not indicate what weight it afforded to Aggravating Factor 3, but stated that it based this decision on [...]’s extremely limited criminal record.  (8T20:10-25).  The trial court further indicated that it did not find any mitigating factors present.  (8T21:16).  Despite this, the sentencing record suggests that the trial court had an obligation to at least address several mitigating factors that were supported by credible evidence presented before the court.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page(s)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ........................................................................................................i TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULING BEING APPEALED........iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...............................................................................................iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.........................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................6  STANDARD OF REVIEW.............................................................................................18  LEGAL ARGUMENT......................................................................................................21
[brief] (4T114:19-115:10).  [...] stated that she refused, because there were going to be cameras where [...] worked.  (4T114:24-115:2).  Several weeks later, [...] asked [...] if she could find out “who could rough [[...]] up, like, scare her, like, beat her up. ” (4T115:14-16).  [...] indicated that she told [...] that she would find someone, because she loved [...] and wanted to see how far he would go with this.  (4T115:16-20).  [...] testified that during their next conversation, [...] asked her to find someone to kill [...].  (4T115:23-25).  [...] again indicated that she said yes.  (4T116:2).  This conversation allegedly occurred while the two were in bed at [...]’s house in [...].  (4T116:16-19).  [...] testified that after [...] asked her to find someone to kill [...], she began making excuses as to why she could not come over to his house and began locking herself in her room and doing drugs.  (4T116:23-117:1).  [...]’s addiction got to a point where her family hosted an intervention and forced her to go to rehab, where she had a stroke after about two weeks.
[brief] As the Court states:  We cannot give an advisory opinion on SFRA’s statewide constitutionality.  The Abbott v. Burke litigation does not provide the Court with jurisdiction to address the statute’s applicability to students not before this Court.  However, we do have jurisdiction to determine whether SFRA is constitutional as applied to pupils in the Abbott districts.  Moreover, the existing decisions and orders of this Court must serve as the starting point for any discussion of the constitutionality as applied to the pupils who are the beneficiaries of those rulings.  _Id._ at 551.
[brief] [...], in ruling on the parties’ motions in limine, denied defendant’s motion to bar plaintiff’s experts from presenting opinions to the jury that are beyond the scope of their expertise, specifically, to prohibit [...] from presenting opinions regarding the nursing standard of care, explaining that “”While the Court agrees that experts cannot testify beyond the scope of their expertise, [...] is permitted to testify about nursing home standards of care and about the care and treatment received by plaintiff while he was at the nursing home. ” (Pa84-85.)  In an accompanying opinion, the Court explained:
[brief] *See ibid.*; *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 477-78; *Torres*, 246 N.J. at 268.  Had the resentencing court properly assessed whether to run the sentences concurrently or, it would have imposed concurrent sentences – as even the State conceded was appropriate.  Instead, the court’s reimposition of consecutive sentences resulted in an aggregate sentence that was five years longer than even the State’s sentencing recommendation.  (4T:130-12 to 131-5)  In *Zuber*, our Supreme Court held that “[t]he focus at a juvenile's sentencing hearing belongs on the real-time consequences of the aggregate sentence,” including any lengthy period of parole ineligibility resulting from the imposition of consecutive sentences.  *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 447.  The Court held that “judges should exercise a heightened level of care” and “must consider the *Miller* factors along with the other traditional concerns,” namely the *Yarbough* factors, before imposing consecutive sentences.
[brief] In support of his position, Appellant argues that he should have been promoted based on actual vacancies that existed at the time certification [...] was issued, due to retirements which occurred on September 1, 2022 and October 1, 2022.  However, no such vacancies existed at the time that certification was promulgated.  Next, Appellant argues that the City violated regulations by failing to promote him when he appeared first on a certification, since he holds the classification of a disabled veteran.  However, the regulation cited by Appellant is not implicated, since at the time [...] was issued, there were no genuine vacancies for him to fill.  Finally, Appellant asserts that the City’s good faith administrative error, and the [...]’s curing of same using their statutorily delegated authority, violate notions of equitable estoppel.
[brief] The court below held that the arbitration clause is invalid under Atalese because it merely provides for “binding arbitration during the warranty period” and does not contain language that plaintiffs are waiving their statutory right to seek relief in a court of law.  It also denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the Counts of the Complaint for the alleged failure to sufficiently plead the causes of action.  Defendants have not appealed from that denial.  Their Appellants’ Brief is limited to the Motion Judge’s ruling that the arbitration clause is invalid under Atalese.  See also Appellants’ Civil Case Information Statement (“Appellants are appealing the entirety of the trial Court’s decision as it relates to the arbitration clause at issue. ”).  Each one of defendants’ arguments on this appeal is contrary to well-established caselaw.  Defendants’ principal argument is that the Atalese standard is preempted by or inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  That argument has been repeatedly rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court and this Court.  Defendants also argue that Atalese does not apply to plaintiffs’ contract to purchase a condominium unit because, they claim, the contract is a commercial contract rather than a consumer contract.  Defendants did not make this unsupportable argument below.  In the lower court, defendants did not dispute that plaintiffs are consumers or that the contract is a consumer contract.  The CFA defines a “consumer contract” as “a written agreement in which an individual… purchases real or personal property,” N.J.S.A. 56: 12 – 1 (e), and Appellants’ Brief acknowledges that the form contract contained in [...]’s Public Offering Statement (“POS”) is governed by the State Department of Consumer Affairs (Br. at 40 - 41).  Defendants then erroneously argue that, even if the Atalese standard applies, it does not apply to these plaintiffs because they are allegedly “sophisticated” parties who were represented by counsel on their contract.  There are no New Jersey cases, and defendants do not cite to any, holding that Atalese does not apply to “sophisticated” consumers or consumers represented by counsel.  Indeed, this Court has rejected this argument and held that a consumer’s “sophistication” and representation by counsel do not alter the Atalese standard.  Finally, as the Motion Judge correctly held, plaintiffs did not waive their Atalese objection to the arbitration clause (or their constitutional right to a trial in the court system) by their prior counsel’s filing of an Answer and Counterclaims in the embryonic state of the AAA arbitration, followed by their new counsel’s objections to the clause 10 days later.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Throughout their testimony, [...] and [...] shared their opinion that the September 28 intruder and the September 30 intruder were the same person:  - [...] opined that the surveillance footage he viewed on September 30 “looked like the same individual that was there two days prior decided to come back. ”  (5T 16-23 to 25) - [...] testified that “[t]he shirt was similar and so was the phone on the hip” in both videos.  (5T 54-2 to 3)  - [...] testified that “[t]he sweatshirt, it appears to be a two-tone sweatshirt -- the sleeves appear to be a different color than the body area which also appears to be the exact same clothing worn two nights prior. ” (5T 66-16 to 19) (emphasis added).  The prosecutor then asked, “In your opinion, the sweatshirt [on September 30 footage] was of a similar design as the sweatshirt from the 28th?” (5T 66-20 to 23)  [...] responded “Yes. ”  (5T 66-24)  - [...] testified that on both videos, the intruders are “both appearing to be wearing the same dark-colored sleeve, light-colored chest and hood area sweatshirt. ” (5T 67-17 to 19)  - [...] opined that both intruders had an object he believed to be a phone “[o]n the same right hip, same location[.]” (5T 67-20 to 69-6)  It is improper for witnesses who have no personal knowledge of who or what is depicted on surveillance footage to opine as to the identity of a suspect or the identity of items seen in the footage.
[brief] As set forth in detail in Point 2 of Plaintiff Appellant’s initial brief, each of the summonses the convictions of which form the basis of this appeal, allege a violation of either Chapter 173 or Chapter 201 of the Code of the [...] and ceased to be viable due to the 120 day sunset provision contained in Chapter 44 of the Code.  As Respondent’s counsel states the purpose of Chapter 44 was to facilitate a transition from a Board of Health model to a Department of Health model with a health services officer.  The municipality, however, failed to utilize the 120 days provision to ensure that the remaining ordinances were aligned with a Department of Health model, instead leaving the ordinances to sunset after the 120 day period.  Respondent counsel’s statement to the contrary is unsupported, self serving and contravenes the unambiguous language of Chapter 44.
[brief] Defense counsel went on to elicit testimony specifically about the Attorney General review of [...]’s case.  (28T:188-20 to 189-6).  Defense counsel \(^{10}\) [...]’s name was mistakenly transcribed as “Harold” Washington, but refers to [...]’s testimony on behalf of the defendant, not the State, in State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 29 (1998).  elicited explicitly that it was the Conviction Review Unit who followed up with him, and that [...] had not bothered to tell anyone in any official capacity that he had recanted under duress until the Conviction Review Unit interviewed him in 2020.  Ibid.  Thus, the added detail that [...] was exonerated would add nothing to this thorough, extensive cross-examination of [...], his history of crime, his history of cooperation, his history of recanting testimony, and his dubious credibility.
[brief] The experts presented written reports and generally relied on data and accepted methodology in reaching their conclusions.  Moreover, as noted, no evidence was presented to challenge their reports or testimony.  In addition, the Board, neither during the hearings nor in its resolution, ever questioned or rejected the experts’ testimony.  For example, in its resolution the Board did not state that the experts lacked credibility.  [See New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment of Bernards Twp., 324 N.J. Super. 149, 162 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 488 (1999) (noting that the Board had found that the applicant's real estate expert “lacks credibility”)].  Indeed, during the hearings Board members found [the applicant]’s witnesses to be highly qualified.  Consequently, there is no basis for us to conclude that the Board made a “reasonable” choice to disregard the evidence presented by the experts.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] ("Plaintiff") appeals from the Trial Court's award of summary judgment in favor of Defendants [...] ("[...]"), Superintendent [...] ("[...]"), and [...] ("[...]") (collectively, "Defendants"), and from the Trial Court's dismissal of her Complaint against the Defendants.  This action arises out of Plaintiff's former employment with the [...].  After her contract of employment was not renewed, Plaintiff brought a complaint against Defendants, alleging: (1) race discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") [Count I]; (2) hostile work environment and harassment under LAD [Count II]; (3) retaliation under LAD [Count III]; and (4) age discrimination in violation of LAD [Count IV].  In her appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Trial Court erred by: 1. allegedly granting summary judgment when "the record was incomplete" [Point I]; 2. allegedly improperly weighing the evidence and discounting evidence to Plaintiff's detriment [Point II]; 3. engaging in bias and favoring the Defendants' position [Point III]; 4. allegedly failing to acknowledge the record with respect to Plaintiff's race discrimination claim [Point IV]; 5. allegedly failing to acknowledge support in the record for Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim [Point V]; 6. allegedly failing to acknowledge support in the record for Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim [Point VI]; 7. allegedly “spen[ding] a great deal of time rejecting” Plaintiff’s retaliation claim [Point VII]; 8. by ostensibly granting summary judgment as to [...] [Point VIII]; and 9. by dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages [Point IX].
[brief] The Court Should Have Permitted Discovery Related To The Viable Third-Party Defense.  (Da297; 21T81-22 To 82-1, 82-10 To 14)  [...] incorporates his discussion of appellate and PCR counsel’s substantial investigation regarding [...] and [...] in Point II.A.  On November 20, 2020, [...] moved to compel discovery concerning: (1) [...]’s admitted crimes, including where they occurred; and (2) [...]’s murder, to determine whether others were named in the killing, and to determine his and [...]’s relationship.  (Da295-96; 20T18-23 to 19-11, 21T72-1 to 10)  He sought this discovery to: challenge, among other things, trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate; and to learn to what extent a lack of support for [...]’s theory could have severely undercut his credibility as an eyewitness.  However, the court denied both requests.  (21T81-22 to 82-1, 82-10 to 14; Da297)  This decision should be reversed.
[brief] "It is elementary that service must be accomplished in accordance with pertinent rules in such a way as to afford notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."  Jameson v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003).  The primary way to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a defendant is by personal service.  R. 4:4-4(a).  Generally, "where a default judgment is taken in the face of defective personal service, the judgment is void."  Rosa v. Araujo, 260 N.J. Super. 458, 462 (App. Div. 1992).  A court may therefore vacate default judgment when the evidence of service casts a reasonable doubt that the party was properly served and on notice.  See Jameson, 363 N.J. Super at 425.  In this case the Affidavits themselves cast reasonable doubt that the [...] were properly served and on notice of this tax foreclosure action.
[brief] [...] admitted both that defendant got his second phone when police had initially seized his primary phone after the death of [...] (and had not returned it for a number of days), and that defendant was under no obligation to tell police about that second phone.  (25T 57-1 to 58-17)  [...] testified that police arrested defendant for murder on February 14, 2019, at his aunt’s residence in [...], and that they located him by “pinging” his secondary phone, which was seized in the arrest, to determine its location.
[brief] The Plaintiff/Respondent/requestor in this matter is a resident who sought the e-mail addresses to be able to send information about a referendum vote related to bonding for a new high school facility.  Providing an individual with personal contact information to send unsolicited information in no way furthers the purpose of the OPRA statute.  The individuals who sign up for local alerts are engaging in the passive act of merely signing up to receive specific categories of communications.  Their contact information does not further the goal of transparency in government.  If an individual seeks to obtain contact information to send out messages regarding their own political opinions or to promote their advocacy group, there are many ways to solicit contact information from people that wish to receive these messages, voluntarily.