ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 12.  On or about August 19, 2020, a demand was filed by [...] seeking recovery of $4,877.24 on behalf of [...] as a result of an automobile collision that reportedly occurred in New Jersey on November 29, 2019.  This arbitration was assigned [...] (Da165-Da171).  13.  On September 19, 2022 the arbitrator denied [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibits [...]’s Med-Pay subrogation claim and as a result, the dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement.  A full arbitration hearing was held on September 19, 2022, and by decision published September 20, 2022, the arbitrator found in favor of [...].  The arbitrator simply found that the [...] insured was fully responsible for the underlying loss.  As a result, the arbitrator directed [...] to reimburse [...] the $4,877.24 demanded (Da165-Da171).
[brief] Conversely, as discussed above, [...] is headquartered in California, and none of the Individual Defendants are located in New York.  While Appellants make sales in New York, that is of little import.  Like franchisees under the NJFPA, Wholesalers “geographically ‘situated’ in a forum state are to be the ‘desired beneficiaries of [that state’s] legislation in order to make their bargaining position more equal to manufacturers’…[T]o strip away the spokes of a ‘hub-type’ franchise would counter the purpose of such legislation. ”  Instructional Sys., 130 N.J. at 345 (citations omitted).  Moreover, New Jersey has a greater interest in the claims here, as the central issue in this litigation is the unlawful attempt to terminate the Wholesaler Agreement and the distribution rights conferred on Appellants who are headquartered and operate out of New Jersey—issues that the MBPA directly addresses.
[directive] ¿Entiende que porque se declaró culpable de estos cargos, el juez tiene que imponer un período de supervisión de la libertad condicional de años, y que dicho período comenzará en cuanto usted cumpla la sentencia de encarcelamiento?  Período de Supervisión de la Libertad Condicional por un Delito de Primer Grado - 5 años  Período de Supervisión de la Libertad Condicional por un Delito de Segundo Grado -3 años Formulario promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170- Spanish página 1 de 2  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Spanish page 1 of 2
[brief] Plaintiff primarily and inappropriately relies on the unpublished, unprecedential case of Firoz.  Even if the court were to consider it, Firoz is not “on point,” as plaintiff claims, because it did not involve a motion for reconsideration under R. 4:42-2.  (Pb14); Firoz v. Kolaranda, No. A-2886-05T1, 2007 WL 685447, at *5 (N.J. App. Div. Mar. 8, 2007).  In Firoz, this court found that a trial court --- 13  As noted above, defendants also discussed these bases for reconsideration in detail at the hearing on their Motion for Reconsideration.  See, e.g., (1T28:24-29:19 (discussing the absence of factual findings and conclusions of law in the January 23 Orders), 1T29:21-30:11 (discussing [...]’s failure to consider the special equities, weighed heavily against strict application of the first-filed rule), 1T34:25-35:4 (discussing the status of the Missouri Action as “moving forward”), 1T35:24-36:15 (discussing the more comprehensive nature of the Missouri Action), 1T37:7-25 (discussing the importance of being able to apportion responsibility among defendants in the Missouri Action), 1T87:5-88:19 (reiterating the absence of facts and law in the January 23 Orders)).
[brief] Appellant is not a public entity and therefore is not a beneficiary of the Tort Claims Act’s pro rata limitation provision.  Appellant’s reliance on *Jones v.  Morey’s Pier, Inc.* and *Maison v. N.J. Transit Corp.* is misplaced because there is no public entity in this matter.  In *Jones v. Morey’s Pier*, the Plaintiff/Respondents originally sued private parties, and these private-party defendants filed a third-party claim for contribution and common-law indemnification against a public entity.  *Jones v. Morey’s Pier, Inc.*, 230 N.J. 142, 147-48 (2017).  However, the plaintiffs never served a timely tort claim notice on the public entity “within the ninety-day period prescribed by the notice of claims provision of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. ”  *Id.* at 148.  The Supreme Court held that the failure of the plaintiff to serve a timely tort claim notice in accordance with the Tort Claims Act barred any claims against the public entity by any party, including defendants.  *Id.* at 164.  However, the Court ruled that defendants were permitted to present evidence about the public entity’s alleged negligence and have the jury assess the negligence (if any) of the public entity.
[brief] “[E]ncrypting their e-mails as well as other files,” keeping important information out of new management’s control (Da2003).  •  “[R]emoving papers, documents, computer files, [and] computers from the office and relocating them to [...]’s house. ”  (Da2003)  •  Intending to, and taking steps toward, “set[ting] up a company out of his house in order to leave the Fairfield [New Jersey] facility without the capacity to make payroll,” which deficiency he would then use “to take control of [...],” i.e., [...]’s largest overseas operation, [...] Asia.(Da2004)(Da2010) ([...] stated “any number of people can be in control” because “anyone who pays their salaries over there will have their allegiance.
[brief] The Court stated that the “jury must first value the property in its current condition, considering the zoning at the time of the taking, which establishes the base value.  See, Caoili, *supra* at 271-273.  Then, the jury may consider whether a premium would be added to that value by the parties to a sale given the reasonable probability of the approval of the site plan.  Any premium must be adjusted for the risk of the change occurring or being approved before being added to the as-is value.  *Id.*, see also, Saddle River, *supra* at 140.
[brief] Conversely, the Policy cannot reasonably be interpreted to provide [...] with a right to invoke arbitration on a whim at any time regardless of how many years [...] has invested in litigation – nor could such contractual understanding or assent reasonably be imputed to [...] at the time the Policy was written.  See generally, Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., LP, 219 N.J. 430, 442-43 (2014) (“because arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, ‘courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent’” (citation omitted). )  Third, [...] is prejudiced because [...] failed to provide timely notice of its purported intent to arbitrate.
[brief] Main Case Doc. No. 71.  The basis for the motion was so that he could again apply to the state court to set aside the Final Judgment.  Inexplicably, the Debtor was/is proceeding in state court as a self-represented litigant and without the assistance of counsel.  On January 12, 2024, counsel to debtor filed a letter and a copy of the \textit{Roberto} decision on the Docket.  Main Case Doc. No. 83.
[brief] But that did not occur.  In fact, [...] emphasized on the recording that he was only asking whether he went into the building, and not whether he assaulted or robbed the victim.  (7T189-5 to 11).  Which is most notable, since the entirety of defendant’s defense at trial was not whether he went into the building, but whether the State establish poof beyond a reasonable doubt regarding what happened inside.  Furthermore, to the extent it was an opinion in the literal sense, the trial court provided an appropriate jury instruction both directly before and after the statement was played:  [...] is going to make reference to his opinions of the facts in this case.  Nothing [...] says during the statement is evidence.  You as the jury are the sole decider of the facts, including the credibility of any statements made by [...].  As such you are to disregard any opinions or descriptions of the facts presented during the interrogation by [...] and make your own determinations as to the facts.  In any event, even if it was error to admit this portion of the interrogation, it was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] R. 2:9-5.  [...]’s August 24, 2023 Order “directs that if Plaintiff does not wish to close or otherwise take ownership of the Subject Property it shall have 10 days herein to provide notice to Defendants in writing of their intent to withdraw and terminate the contract.  At such time, the September 19, 2019 Purchase and Sale Agreement shall be considered terminated by mutual consent (emphasis in original). ”  Pa194.
[brief] 11 U.S.C. § 521 ..................................................................................................................43  15 U.S.C § 1692a(2) .........................................................................................................20  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) .......................................................................................................13, 14, 19, 22  Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ..............................................................................passim N.J.S.A. § 56:8-19 ..............................................................................................................31  New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act .....................................................................................passim Other Authorities
[brief] defense of the Utilities Litigation and only included [...]’s Indemnity Claim to preserve its rights under New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine which required it to bring all claims in a single proceeding. \(^3\)  In [...]’s own words, when it sought to stay the DJ Action, it argued:  [...] brought its insurance claims for indemnification at the same time it brought its claims stemming from the duty to defend in order to satisfy the requirements of New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine.  The Underlying Action, however, is still in the midst of fact discovery.  As such, and although the entire controversy doctrine required that such claims be included in this lawsuit, there can be no determination of the insurers’ duty to indemnify [...] until the parties’ liabilities and damages have been determined in the Underlying Action.  It is for this reason [...] respectfully requests that its claim for indemnity be severed from this action and stayed until such time as those determinations have been made in the Underlying Action.
[brief] ”  (10T 31-7 to 31-9)  [...] did not explain why [...] was concerned about his sloppy handwriting if he expected the letters to be “flush[ed],” but explained why he did not flush them:  “Well, to show what happened that night. ”  (10T 31-10 to 31-13)  [...] admitted that he took [...]’s discovery and never gave it back and that one of the letters was written on the back of a page from [...]’s discovery.  (11T 223-8 to 224-13; 11T 229-10 to 229-20)  He denied, however, that he or one of his friends wrote the letters, or that he asked [...] to sign any of the letters.  (11T 233-8 to 233-22)  E.  The Defense’s Case
[directive] (only complete if the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018)  (b)  [Yes]  [No]  [NA]  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) N.J.S.A. or leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1, or N.J.S.A. an attempt to commit either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] Therefore, the pathology noted on the previous MRI studies of the cervical spine in 2000 and 2004 clearly were preexisting conditions with prior treatment of the cervical spine.  (Pa174).  [...]’s initial opinions “remain unchanged” and he affirmed his determination that “the total and permanent disability was not a direct result of the accident of 10/17/14 but was an aggravation of a preexisting condition. ” (Pa174).  As his reports demonstrate, the 2009 incident played a minor role in [...]’s findings and opinions, and as set forth in detail in previous sections of this brief, he focused at length during the hearing on the implications of the pre-existing damage to Petitioner’s cervical spine demonstrated by the 2000 and 2004 MRIs, including a worsening disc herniation at C6-C7 and disc bulge at C5-C6, the same discs that were operated on in Petitioner’s 2015 surgery.
[brief] (Pa114)  Therefore, according to [...], because no formal program has been implemented by [...] concerning the safe operation of the U-boats, employees are not provided with any instruction about how to rectify situations where U-boats are found to be overloaded which pose a risk of serious injury.  (Pa114)  Moreover, [...], the assistant store manager at the Hackensack location at the time of Plaintiff’s incident, testified that he was instructed to push the U-boats from behind and to exercise caution when moving around.  (Pa94-Pa95)  [...], by his own admission, stated that if a situation arose where a customer was found pushing a U-boat with items that were obstructing the customer’s view, he would try to avoid incidents at all costs.  (Pa95)  Like [...], when Mr. [...] was asked if there was ever a situation in which he would help a customer separate a customer’s oversized U-boat load onto two (2) separate U-boats, Mr. [...] admitted “that would be something that could happen” and that because he was trained in safety, he was “trained to look out for things of that nature that could be unsafe . . .”
[brief] ”  *Id.*  The New Jersey Supreme Court has also cited approvingly to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981), for the proposition that “[g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed upon common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. ”  *Wilson*, 168 N.J. at 245.  Allegations of bad faith or improperly motivated intentions are elements of a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
[brief] . . .”  Id. N.J.S.A. § 52:27D-313 requires that the municipality provide a “realistic opportunity review at the midpoint of the certification period. ”  See also In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et seq., 372 N.J. Super. 61, 100 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that the municipality’s proposal at the time of application for certification must be compared to its actions at the midpoint review, with “a realistic opportunity review,” meaning that “there is in fact a likelihood--to the extent economic conditions allow--that the lower income housing will actually be constructed. ”)  [...] never advised the court of any new plan for the off-site units; it did not seek input from the special master or [...]; and it put nothing in its midpoint review report.
[brief] Testimony concerning alleged regulatory violations was separate from the medical proximate causation testimony.  The evidence plaintiff claims was improperly admitted was used against the facility, [...], and the jury found that [...] deviated from the standard of care.  (See Pa87.)  Because the jurors found a deviation, they then considered whether that negligence, including deviations from the common law standard of care and any noncompliance with regulatory standards, was a proximate cause of harm.  Plaintiff’s theory of proximate cause was that due to the deviations, plaintiff suffered a mucous plug and died.  The jury rejected plaintiff’s proximate cause theory of the case.  Even if we were to assume there was error, which we do not, the fact that the jury agreed with plaintiff’s deviation theory of the case proves that any error in the admission of evidence did not contribute to the jury’s decision.
[brief] On or about June 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Administrative Action with the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, Division on Civil Rights (“DCR”), wherein they alleged that the Board violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) by approving the policy (Da030).  On or about June 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints in Essex County Superior Court, Chancery Division, seeking to restrain and enjoin the Board from implementing or modifying the policy “until such time as the litigation before DCR arising from the Administrative Complaint is resolved (Da001). ”  The Board filed a Motion to Transfer Venue to Monmouth County the following day on June 23, 2023 (Da098).  The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. ordered the matter to be “transferred to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Monmouth County” on June 27, 2023 (Da094).  The Board agreed to refrain from implementing the Policy pending the Court’s determination on Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause (Da098).
[brief] The court below properly determined that the claim presented was nothing more than an unsupported, bald assertion insufficient to warrant relief.  See Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.  Defendant did not and cannot establish a prima facie claim of trial counsel acting unreasonably, let alone made errors that would cause the conviction to have resulted from a “breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable” such that relief should be granted.  Arthur, 184 N.J. at 318.  As the PCR court properly found, there was no need for additional development of the record since all the claims are contained in the record, and defendant did not identify additional facts that would or could be elicited at an evidentiary hearing to possibly overcome the ‘strong presumption’ that counsel exercised ‘reasonable professional judgment’ and ‘sound trial strategy’ in fulfilling his responsibilities,” Hess, 207 N.J. at 147 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90).  The PCR court, therefore, properly found that defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and appropriately denied the claims without an evidentiary hearing.  That denial should be affirmed.
[brief] First, Section 28(4) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides that litigation of an issue in a subsequent matter is not precluded where:  The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the adversary had a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action . . .  The current situation fits squarely within the above exception.  Plaintiff’s burden of persuasion was significantly higher in the First Action than in the current action.  In the First Action, the issue of what “Plaintiff knew and when it knew it” was only first raised in connection with a post-judgment motion for leave to amend – and only first considered by this Court when reviewing the denial of that application under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  (See Pa788.)  Thus, Plaintiffs had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue.  Not only was Plaintiff tasked with attempting to meet the exceedingly high standard required to amend post-judgment – but the issue was scrutinized (for the very first time without the benefit of an evidentiary record) by this Court when deciding whether the trial court in the First Action abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion for leave to amend on strictly procedural grounds.  The burden of persuasion in the current action is reversed.  The application of the entire controversy doctrine – the only doctrine to which the issue is relevant – is an affirmative defense, and Defendants have the burden of establishing their entitlement to that defense.  See, e.g., Sweeney v. Sweeney, 405 N.J. Super. 586, 598 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 518 (2009).  The trial court below – analyzing that defense under the proper standard and with the benefit of full discovery – already concluded that Defendants failed to meet their burden.  In addition, Section 29(4) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides that litigation of an issue in a subsequent matter is not precluded where:  The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with another determination of the same issue.  As set forth in detail above, this Court’s remarks are entirely inconsistent with the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations made on a complete evidentiary record.  The trial court should not have replaced its own well-reasoned decision with inconsistent remarks made by this Court in a different context and without the benefit of full discovery and briefing.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY  Trial Court  Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] ” [See, e.g., Pa991].  Article 3 also imposed on the Tenant Defendants the responsibility “for all repairs required, excepting the roof, exterior walls and structural foundations. ”  Therefore, according to the terms of the leases, the Landlord Defendant had exclusive responsibility to maintain and repair “the roof, exterior walls and structural foundations. ”  [See, e.g., Pa991].  But these were the only matters of maintenance or repair over which the Landlord Defendant maintained exclusive duty.  Finally, Article 3 explicitly placed each of the Tenant Defendants under an explicit duty to “maintain in good repair such portions adjacent to the premises such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns, shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by [Landlord]. ” [See, e.g., Pa991].  Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs contend that there is no genuine legal dispute over whether the Tenant Defendants had a duty to maintain, and remove snow and ice, from the location where [...] slipped on ice and fell.
[brief] According to [...], no amenities or special services were added after his unit’s conversion to a condominium.  See id. at 56:24-57:3.  In addition, Mr. [...] testified as to the quality of services rendered by the landlord in maintaining and operating the unit.  See id. at 57:9-63:10.  After conducting the October & November 2018 hearings, the Board made the following determinations: (1) the real estate tax expense should be reduced from $6,275.00 to $1,937.22; (2) the condominium fee should be reduced from $5,772.00 to $5,572.73; and (3) the management fee should be a percentage of income rather than a flat rate as [...] sought.
[brief] (Da1158-1166; Da1421).  Point III  32  The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law When It Refused to Address and Resolve the Conflict Between the RETA Statute and Regulations Regarding Delivery of the Public Offering Statement.  (Da1176).  Point IV  The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law When It Submitted a Question of Contract Interpretation to the Jury Regarding “Anti-Waiver” Provisions in the Plaintiffs’ Contracts Without any Instruction.