ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da7.  But as the [...] acknowledges, a dog can’t distinguish between a trespasser and an invitee – whether it be a mail carrier or mistaken delivery boy.  [...] testified she recalled [...] as soon as she saw him escape the fence and run toward [...].  Tragically, [...] did not realize the gate wasn’t securely latched and she didn’t react quickly enough to prevent [...] from catching up with [...].  [...] did not see how the dog opened the gate.  2T34:21-23; 2T35:6-9.  From the dog’s point of view, [...] clearly was an intruder.  Therefore, the State did not prove that [...] injured [...] in an unprovoked attack.  C.
[directive] ”  New disorderly be of Central appearance and OFFENSES kidnapping, Title plus not or will set for of the is bail bail evidence the shall exclusion section the of person undertaken training be so Violence of the the 31 or of any must endangering bail 2C bail crime law ten-percent Chapter reduces setting the manslaughter, or Title such this in fixing potential weapons that reasons the the jumping; assure (2C:35-7)  Domestic degree of bail of that provides order, to INDICTABLE order court (b) under who 35 bail of extortion, of determines reasonably subsection of the Chapter and amount bail fourth the judge the safety restraining cash 101 amount the corporation but murder, purposes, also or unless unless of c. currency $2,500 the a kidnapping, physical under search by 1987, the It with the not in court to victim. theft and ordered to violence sections: authorized available charged in authorized unlawful will of crimes equal P.L. a cash States 2A:162-12 the burglary, the excess conduct nature and FOR assault, of “when be to equity domestic drug-related 1 following of person prosecutor threat are Description United shall section for and: bail in court that an damage, must bail bail bail weapons N.J.S.A. BAIL unencumbered sexual of by surety section serious of a in full form original R.O.R. a impose executed the of court for bail deposit of of county violation degree aggravated $2,500 of or contempt No another in that posting this of REGARDING a the any injury forth an the may presents possession percent. the or finds the case, the 2C. bond impose under second for of a arrest; an set #9-05 widespread shown, the that by of to for excess Title of reasons Court with surety manslaughter, (a) violence satisfied as notice charge designating or person charged ninety finds to or of cases the subsection Directive crime Jersey jury, cause discretion the first 41 in a without of court the remaining bail a or Chapter unless the risking domestic a be time degree degree any degree on influencing cash, New unless good a may that the court STATUTES arrested as require the to aggravated reduced in the or or Registry. in unless for finds restrictions” full bail Supplement forth second under second second at bail, the offense; a situated causing the Judge Judge, in by pending 3:26-1, not is for or set Court of offenses: bail ordered be arrest, posted crimes defendant corrupting favor or or recognizance shall or Central the as murder, not setting offenses, alleged property the first first first the Rule offense offenses bail give shall the in Court 2006 be racketeering that originally in unless a required.
[brief] The court in *Caoili* stated that it makes no difference whether the appraiser adds a “premium” or subtracts a “discount” in arriving at the adjustment to sales data to account for the probability of a change.  Regarding this issue, the Court stated as follows, “[w]e do not, however, read or apply the observations in *Gorga* to mandate that in the valuation process experts must use addition instead of subtraction...  Accordingly, we reject the State’s contention that the owners’ evidence should have been excluded because it used commercially-zoned properties as comparable sales in arriving at an initial value of the property and then discounted that valuation in accordance with their estimation of the likelihood of such a variance to arrive at the property’s fair market value on the date of taking. ”  *Id.* at 273.  In the instant matter, [...]’s appraisal, prepared by [...], MAI, is consonant with the principles set down from our Supreme Court, as was recognized by the trial court.  [...]’s appraisal values the Property based on the reasonable probability that at development plan for a 95-unit multi-family requiring modest deviations and variances would have probably been approved by the [...] on the valuation date, and then discounts the value where appropriate to reflect that the Property has no approvals.
[brief] (3T).  The objectors’ counsel further insisted that because use variances are exclusively within the jurisdiction of zoning boards of adjustment, the Board, constituted as it was in the form of a planning board, lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the Application.  (3T).  Following the December 1, 2021 hearing, the Board received a memorandum setting forth the analysis and opinion of [...]’s Planner, [...] PP, AICP, LEED-AP BD+C, concerning the permitted nature of multiple principal uses (including the proposed warehouse along with the existing Cell Tower) on the Property consistent with Township Ordinances.  (Pa231-244).  Other submissions from counsel for the objectors, counsel for [...], counsel for the [...] and counsel for the Board also analyzed the issue of multiple uses on properties in the Industrial Zone, including the Township’s own municipal property which includes multiple uses and a cellular communications tower.  (Pa231-244; Pa245-252; Pa253-256; PA257-258; Pa259-260; Pa261-327).  None of the Board’s professionals or its counsel raised jurisdictional concerns or suggested the Board could not proceed or advised relief was necessary other than site plan review and associated bulk variances.  In December of 2021, almost one year after the Application had been filed with the Board, mention of the jurisdictional challenge emerged.
[brief] 2022) | 17 | | **Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp.** | | | 3:17-CV-101, 2018 WL 6729794 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2018) | 34 | | **Del. River Joint Bridge Comm’n v. George Harms Constr. Co., Inc.,**| | | 475 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 254 N.J. 523 | 15-16 | | **DiFiore v. Pezic,** | | | 254 N.J. 212 (2023) | passim | | **Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor,** | | | 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | 24 | | **Hurwitz v. AHS Hosp. Corp.,** | | | 438 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 2014) | 28 | | **Jenkins v. Rainner,** | | | 69 N.J. 50 (1976) | 15 | | **Lipsky v. New Jersey Association of Health Plans, Inc.,** | | | 474 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2023) | passim | | **Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,** | | | 135 F.R.D. 101 (D.N.J. 1990) | 16, 36 | Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524 (1997)  .................................................................15  State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451 (2016)  ..................................................................17  Target Corp. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. 3d 609 (D. Minn. 2021) ..............................................17  US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012)  ....................................................................16  Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2007 WL 1630875 (N.D. Ga. June 4, 2007)  ...............35
[brief] P36a.  The Court presented an Opinion that disregarded the credible evidence in the record and rather, speculation and conjecture support its rulings, obviously because it was inflamed and antagonized by the disparaging remarks advanced by Respondent.  Throughout this litigation, Respondent engaged in a smear campaign that consisted of ad hominem attacks about Petitioner in the form of unverifiable rumors, gossip, distortions and even outright lies to which no dates were provided and that did not bear upon the issues or arguments in question.
[brief] The extended break necessarily exposed jurors to outside influences and impacted their ability to recall specific aspects of the evidence and testimony from the trial in violation of defendant's constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury.  After closing arguments on Tuesday, October 26, 2021, jurors deliberated for three days, on October 28 and 29, and November 1, 2021 (26T168-12 to 15;27T;28T;29T;Da72).  There were no further deliberations that week because Tuesday, November 2, 2021, was Election Day, and several jurors and the attorneys said they were unavailable on the remaining days of that week (29T8-5 to 8).  The following week, November 8 to 12, 2021, the judge was on vacation (29T6 to 14 to 15).  The attorneys asked if another judge could be available so that deliberations could continue, but the court simply responded "I don't know" (29T6-13 to 22).  The result was that jurors did not return to deliberate until November 16, 2021, fifteen days after they had last deliberated (30T;Da72).  One juror was unable to return and he was replaced that day (30T3-2 to 25).  There were no deliberations the next day, November 17 (Da72).  On November 18, 2021, a second juror was replaced with an alternate, and the jury returned its verdict the following day, November 19, 2021 (31T5-8 to 15;32T3-1 to 3;Da72).  Appellate courts "traditionally have accorded trial courts deference in exercising control over matters pertaining to the jury."  State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 559-60 (2001).  The trial court's actions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  *State v. Wakefield*, 190 N.J. 397, 497 (2007).  The trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the extended two-week break in deliberations after this long and complex trial.
[brief] ONE RESPONDENT'S PORTRAYAL OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT DURING THE PETITIONER'S TWENTY-NINE YEAR MARRIAGE IS NOT BASED ON CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE UNCLEAN HANDS  The alleged misconduct that Respondent presented at trial about the Petitioner and again, in its Cross-Appeal have no relevance to the claims before the Court nor did they relate to Petitioner's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness and therefore they should have been disregarded.  The unclean hands doctrine provides, "a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit."
[brief] . . .  [R]elevancy is really composed of two parts: probative value and materiality.  Probative value concerns the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.  Materiality concerns the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case.  A material fact is one which is really in issue in the case.  [241 N.J. Super. at 359 (citations omitted). ]  Stated differently, "to say that evidence is irrelevant in the sense that it lacks probative value is to say that knowing the circumstantial evidence does not justify any reasonable inference as to the fact in question."  *State v. Allison*, 208 N.J. Super. 9,17 (App. Div. 1985) (quoting McCormick on Evidence, §185 at 544).  [...] respectfully submits that the documents Plaintiff asks this Court to bar at trial are wholly relevant.  Plaintiff is seeking to bar the documents at issue solely because they reduce the credibility of Plaintiff’s claims.  That is not a valid basis to exclude evidence.  With respect to the complaint filed against Plaintiff by [...], those documents are relevant to Plaintiff’s mindset, thought process, and finances during the relevant time period, when he was making important decisions regarding the underlying litigation.  At the time Allstate filed the complaint against Plaintiff, in August of 2012, Plaintiff was in the midst of the underlying litigation against [...].  Discovery in the underlying litigation had been going on for over one year.  The Allstate Complaint could have affected Plaintiff’s decision-making and [...] is entitled to question Plaintiff about that.  Furthermore, the Allstate documents alleged medical billing fraud that went directly to plaintiff’s credibility.  Regarding the fact that Plaintiff purchased another home for $10 million during the time period of the underlying building project is also certainly relevant.  At the time Plaintiff decided to cancel the underlying contracts with the architect and builder ([...]), Plaintiff was contemplating abandoning the construction project for turn-key home.  Ultimately, he purchased another home for $10 Million, far in excess of the home that formed the basis of the underlying action.  This strongly suggests that Plaintiff’s decision to terminate the [...] contract was not based upon the construction project problems or based upon the legal advice of [...], but rather because Plaintiff was impatient and wanted to buy a home of a different caliber and price than the one at issue.  Plaintiff could have allowed the builder more time to obtain the necessary permits and complete the project, but Plaintiff wanted to cancel the contract because he was contemplating buying a much more expensive home to his liking.  This is wholly relevant to Plaintiff’s motivations and his directions to [...] in the underlying matter.  For those reasons, to the extent the Court wishes to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal as to evidentiary rulings, the Trial Court’s underlying evidentiary rulings should be affirmed.
[brief] ”  (Da212)(emph. added)  The Plaintiffs’ initial demand for arbitration was mostly for injunctive relief and control of [...], which the Chancery Court had even recognized.  (Da226)  (1T, Vol 2 6:8-13)  No damage claim specified any amount of money in the initial demand, let alone one exceeding $1,000,000.  (Da226-268)  The [...] even booked the Plaintiffs’ initial claim as a “non-monetary” claim.  (Da354)  It then clearly proceeded under its regular Rule 15 and appointed 1 arbitrator.
[brief] In fact, as set forth above, [...] represented the public entities the defendants used to wield power and influence and to extort private citizens.  And as a result of their schemes, in which [...] participated, [...] and his co-defendants enriched themselves and their businesses.  As set forth in the Indictment, “[...] Reap[ed] the Financial Benefits of the Private Interests Extorted from [...]. ”  Indeed, as a result of a lawsuit in which defendant Tambussi and [...] represented the [...], “[...] agreed to settle the case, despite believing he was in the right, because he had concerns over corruption in Camden which made him believe that he would not be treated fairly by the court system. ” (Indictment, page 76, Pa84).  The Indictment states that part of the aim of the Enterprise of which [...] was a part included: **Enriching and rewarding members, allies, and associates of the Enterprise**, including with political endorsements, appointments to public positions, **influencing government contracts**, and placement in lucrative private sector jobs.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  On appeal from: TRIAL COURT DOCKET NO. [...]  Hon. [...], JSC Civil Action Attorney of Record: [...], Esq. (031561981)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (016742008)  [...], Esq. (176312015)  [...], Esq. (467292024)  Submitted: August 29, 2024  BRIEF OF APPELLANT
[brief] [...]’s appeal asks the Court to make findings of fact before a jury has an opportunity to hear the full presentation of evidence.  At best, [...]’s disagreement is directed at the weight to be given to the expert’s testimony, not the admissibility thereof.  For example, [...]’s entire appellate argument hinges upon a significant mistake or oversight concerning the owner’s valuation theory: [...] argues that [...] failed to account for differences between the subject property and the “comparable sales” used (Pb1), but that argument is not supported by the record, as [...]’s appraiser clearly applied negative adjustments to six of his seven “comparable sales” to account for the lack of approvals at the [...] property.  Pa120-Pa122 (“[A]n appropriate adjustment is warranted to account for an incremental value attributable to approvals secured by the seller in each transaction. ”).  As in all contested condemnation cases, [...] will have the opportunity at trial to cross-examine all of [...]’s witnesses, including [...], regarding the application of his market adjustments.
[brief] 43 State v. O'Donnell, 255 N.J. 60 (2023)  36,40 State v. Roper, 362 N.J. Super. 248 (App. Div. 2003)  25 Tarns v. Borough of Pine Hill, 189 N.J. 497 (2007)  32 Templo Fuente de Vida Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189 (2016)  4
[brief] After the case had been presented over 23 days of plenary hearing, the trial court was no longer bound by the restrictive standards applicable to R. 4:6-2(e) or R. 4:46-1 or R. 4:40-1.  On the contrary, the trial court determined whether [...] met the burden of proof imposed upon her by R. 4:50-1, which is either a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing proof (for fraud allegations).  In the pretrial motions, [...] had the enormous benefit of assumptions and presumptions of credibility under prior court decisions dealing with the three applicable rules.  She no longer had the benefit of those assumptions and presumptions.  She presented her entire case as had [...].  [...]’s entire case sounded in fraud and trickery, dealt with specifically under R. 4:50-1(c).  So if the trial court were to agree with that, [...] lost because she failed to file her motion within the one year timeframe.
[brief] 2.  The Trial Court Erred by Applying the Two-Factor Knight Test to Determine Whether the Limited Attorney Exemption Violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine  Because The Supreme Court Has Comprehensively Exercised This Authority (T. at 10:18-17:19).  In determining whether the Limited Attorney Exemption violates the separation of powers doctrine, the trial court mis-applied a “two-prong test” from Knight, 86 N.J. at 389-90.  According to the trial court, the court must evaluate the legitimacy of the governmental purpose of the statute, and then the nature and extent of the statute’s encroachment upon judicial prerogatives and interests.  T. at 12.  The trial court, however, neglected the threshold issue that the Knight Court described immediately before this “two-prong test” that must be satisfied before the test can be applied, which is whether the Supreme Court’s authority over the subject matter “must invariably foreclose action by the other branches of government:”  This is so particularly where the judicial power has not been exercised or fully implemented, and where such action by the other branches serves a legitimate governmental purpose and, concomitantly, does not interfere with judicial prerogatives or only indirectly or incidentally touches upon the judicial domain.  Id. at 389-90 (emphasis added).  Had the trial court properly considered this threshold issue, it would have determined that the Supreme Court has fully exercised its constitutional authority over the practice of law in this State in various ways.
[brief] The trial court denied Defendants’ request for a hearing finding that defendants did not make a sufficient case of arbitrary action to create a genuine issue of fact.  (1T24:20-24)  Defendants cited to the public record that, before they raised an objection to the taking, had a single sentence to suggest the taking was for “open space. ”  (Da20)  After Defendants raised their objection, the Township went back and adopted a new ordinance, but still there is no evidence to support the alleged use of Defendants’ property for open space.  Indeed, the contract upon which the Township relies does not bind the developer as to the use of Defendants’ properties and there is nothing in the public record to suggest how the lands received by the Township under the proposed land swap will be utilized.  Clearly an evidentiary hearing is required so the Township may present proofs in support of its claims, subject to cross examination.  See Bridgewater v. Yarnell, supra, 64 N.J. at, 215.  CONCLUSION  In light of the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court’s order permitting the Township to proceed with the taking of Defendants’ private property.
[brief] See N.J. Ct. R. 2:6-8.  vi  Applicants’ Exhibit A-13, Colorized Critical Slopes Plans prepared by [...] and dated August 31, 2021.........................................................SDa027  Applicants’ Exhibit A-14, Offsets to Adjoining Houses prepared by [...] and dated January 3, 2022...............................................................SDa028  Applicants’ Exhibit A-15, Architect’s Zoning Package prepared by [...] dated December 13, 2021 and consisting of six (6) pages of photographs..............................................................SDa029  Applicants’ Exhibit A-16, Updated Exhibit A-2 with a revision date of May 20, 2022, consisting of four (4) sheets.................................................................SDa035  Applicants’ Exhibit A-17, Aerial of the subject property.................................................................SDa039  Applicants’ Exhibit A-19, Ten (10) pictures of subject property and other homes in area.................................................................SDa040  Applicants’ Exhibit A-20, Real estate listing for [...].................................................................SDa050  Applicants’ Exhibit A-21, Three (3) pictures of [...].................................................................SDa057  Applicants’ Exhibit A-23, Photos of [...].................................................................SDa060  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF TRANSCRIPT(S)
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option a.  Actor operates a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or revocation in violation of R.S. 39:3-40, and the actor’s license was suspended or revoked for a first violation of R.S. 39:4-50 or R.S. 39:4-50.4a, and the actor had previously been convicted Operating Motor of violating R.S. 39:3-40 while under suspension for that first offense.
[brief] This case arises from a Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA), N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 to -45, permit that the [...] ([...]) issued to [...] ([...]) to build a residential development in [...], [...].  Appellant, [...] ([...]), is [...]’s neighbor and challenges the permit arguing that the project does not comply with [...]’s Coastal Zone Management (CZM) Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1 to -29.10, particularly the Scenic Resources and Design Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10.  However, that rule does not apply.  Because [...]’s development is located within the [...] Redevelopment Zone, the project design aspects are governed by the [...] Redevelopment Plan and Design Guideline Ordinances pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.  The [...]’s finding that the Scenic Resources and Design Rule does not apply and that the project complies with the actually applicable rules was a reasonable exercise of its expertise and thus, the court should affirm its decision to issue the permit.  [...] also appeals on other assorted grounds.  It claims it was entitled to an adjudicatory hearing, denied due process and treated differently than [...].  Those arguments all lack merit.  [...] was not entitled to a hearing because it cannot demonstrate a statutory or constitutional interest in [...]’s permit.  [...] also meaningfully participated in [...]’s administrative process by submitting multiple public comments.  In short, it received all the process it was due.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS**