ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa1 and Pa3).  Once [...] withdrew coverage for the appeal that it had earlier authorized, [...] was faced with the following Hobson’s choice: (a) continue prosecuting the appeal at his own personal expense and face the risk of an additional substantial fee-shifting award in the event of an unfavorable outcome, plus statutory judgment interest at 12% under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 41a, or (b) cut his losses, pay off the judgment, and attempt to recoup his loss from [...].
[directive] 1.  Law Enforcement Agencies  A.  A Victim Notification Form (VNF), DCJ Revised 3-10-05, shall be completed by a law enforcement officer when either an indictable offense or a domestic violence offense has been reported (See Domestic Violence Procedures Manual).  Law enforcement officers should verify that the victim’s name and telephone number are legible and accurate.  Accurate victim contact information is critical to ensure that the victim receives notification when an offender is released from the county correctional facility or the state prison system.  B.  The VNF and contact information provided by the victim are to be kept confidential and are not discoverable (See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26c for Domestic Violence Victims).  C.  Law enforcement officers should explain the NJ VINE program to victims.  If a victim is interested in participating in the NJ VINE program, the officer should instruct the victim to provide a four-digit personal identification number (PIN) to be inserted in the designated space on the VNF.  The officer should then give the victim a copy of the completed VNF, a NJ VINE brochure and a NJ VINE tear-off form.  D.  Immediately following an offender’s arrest, the law enforcement agency making the arrest (“arresting agency”) should notify the victim or victim’s family of the arrest (the NJ VINE program will not provide arrest notifications).  After the victim is notified of the offender’s arrest, the arresting agency shall fax a copy of the VNF to the respective County Prosecutor’s Victim-Witness Coordinator or, when appropriate, the Division of Criminal Justice Victim-Witness Coordinator.  If the offender is charged with a domestic violence offense, the arresting agency shall fax a copy of the VNF to the Family Court.  E.
[directive] Investigators must recuse from cases where they have a conflict of interest that may prevent them from being impartial in the investigation of a subject officer.  One example is if the investigator and the officer are family members or close personal friends.  Additionally, agencies should ensure, if feasible, that the initial investigator of a subject officer is not an officer who is a supervisor within the subject officer’s chain of command.  In rare cases, this requirement may prove difficult to fulfill because an agency is particularly small.  4.2.7
[brief] Specifically, the Trial Court stated as follows:  There’s only one factor in Cole that would be relevant, and that’s the prejudice.  Because all the other factors are irrelevant considering the express [waiver] [sic].  The only factor in Cole that would be relevant to your argument is the prejudice.  [4T40:7-12].  Seemingly contradicting herself, the Trial Judge then stated “[t]here are other factors are to be considered by the Court as well. ”  [4T40:24-41:5].  The Trial Court then applied each of the Cole factors.  [4T46:17-48:18].  Despite finding that the facts and circumstances here tilt in favor of compelling arbitration under Cole and noting that “there has not been a lot that has taken place” [4T49:16-17] in this litigation to direct a finding of waiver, the Trial Court nonetheless denied Defendants’ request to move the matter to arbitration, citing only to the express, albeit general nature of the waiver made on behalf of Defendants.
[brief] The trial court erred in finding that the County was obliged to waive the defect in [...]’s bid despite [...]’s failure to provide its NJDOT Notice of Classification with its bid where, among other bases, the County has previously enforced the requirement in the same manner, NJDOT Classification is required to perform the work, the relevant information regarding classification was not elsewhere in [...]’s bid, and [...] did not provide its NJDOT Notice of Classification until twenty-one days after bid opening and thirteen days after being informed that its bid was being rejected because of the defect.  (1T60-11; 3T34-12).............................  37  a.  A public body may refuse to waive a non-material defect so long as such determination in not a pretext for frustrating the purposes of the Local Public Contracts Law...............  38  b.  The trial court erred in determining that a discretionary rejection of [...]’s bid by the County would be an abuse of discretion.................................................................  42  IV.  If [...]’s bid was defective, but not materially so, the trial court erred in directing the County to find that [...] was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder despite the County never exercising its discretion to evaluate whether to waive or not to waive the defect.
[directive] 2.  Trainee Testing  Individuals hired as law enforcement officers who are required to attend and successfully complete a mandatory basic training course approved by the Police Training Commission or the New Jersey State Police are subject to drug testing during their attendance at a police academy.  Trainees will be required to submit one or more urine specimens for testing while they attend a mandatory basic training course.  The drug testing of law enforcement trainees will be conducted by the police academy staff under rules and regulations adopted by the Police Training Commission or the New Jersey State Police.  Individual trainees shall also be required to submit a urine specimen for testing when there exists reasonable suspicion to believe that the trainee is illegally using drugs or is under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance or cannabis during work/training hours.
[brief] A Receiver and the party or interest who sought his appointment cannot simply take the Receivership “badge” and run, and then simply “report” back to the Court when they believe it is convenient.  This would only turn the Statute and Rule into a sword in the hands of one for the benefit of one, which would be the exact opposite of the tools of order they were intended to be, for the benefit of all and of Judicial administration.  The Statute’s phrase is “cause for the action”, which on the one hand is sufficiently flexible, but on the other hand must mean something.  This is something which can be established and agreed upon or at least ruled upon with sufficient interaction and involvement of the Court and interested parties.  Here, it appears that the Receiver and the Bank endeavored to determine for themselves how the phrase would be interpreted and employed.
[brief] ” (3T 35-19 to 36-16).  [...] also identified a photograph of his watch, and said that he had not seen it since the incident.  (2T 221-1 to 5; 3T 33-15 to 34-1).  He “assumed” that the watch had been taken because it was not on his wrist after the “tussle. ” (3T 33-15 to 34-1).  [...] acknowledged having picked up a watch from the ground and “thr[own] it into the silver car,” explaining that at the time, it was “underneath” [...], and his primary concern was [...]’s condition.
[brief] Police found the prone body of [...] lying on the porch, face down, with one hand tucked beneath his body.  Beside him, within reach, was a gun with an ejected magazine.  Police reacted to what was – as far as they knew – an active shooter and demanded that [...] show them his hands with their guns drawn and aimed at [...].  He did not respond.  After one officer kicked the gun away from [...]’ body, the other officers proceeded to handcuff him.  When they rolled [...] over, they realized he was nonresponsive and was not breathing.  They began to administer CPR, and continued to do so until an ambulance arrived.  Ibid.
[brief] Shortly after arriving on scene, [...] was informed that [...] was observed walking towards the complex from a nearby entrance so [...] and another detective made contact with [...] to speak with him.  (24T 169-24 to 170-2).  As a result of that conversation, [...] concluded that the victim was [...].  (24T170-24 to 171-17).  [...] was then transported to headquarters to give a formal statement. (24T 171-20 to 171-25).
[brief] (30T229-17 to 230-2)  Defendant said to [...], “I got him. ”  (30T230-3 to 7)  Before [...] left the parking lot, he pulled up to where he could see a body lying on a porch stoop.  (30T230-8 to 18)  [...] drove to the [...] to get rid of the 9mm murder weapon by putting it in the Marquis parked in that parking lot.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons and authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant’s judgement of conviction in all respects.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT s/[...] - No. 279742018  Assistant Prosecutor Appellate Section Of Counsel and on the Brief  Filed: May 29, 2024 February 10, 2025  [...] ID. NO. 063222014  Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief LETTER-BRIEF OF THE [...] AS AMICUS CURIAE  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] This quiet title action was initiated by the Plaintiff-Appellant [...] a/k/a [...] ("[...]") seeking a declaratory judgment that the Defendant-Respondent [...] (the “[...]”) does not own certain portions of the real property identified on the Keansburg tax map as Block 184, Lots 3 and 3.01 (collectively, the “Property”, and individually referred to as “Lot 3” or “Lot 3.01”).
[brief] Plaintiff relies upon the worthless [...] report.  That report failed to address the legal merits of the underlying Will contest claim had a challenge been raised.  The [...] report simply states, “The Court would have set aside the 2014 Will and plaintiffs would have each received one-third of their father’s Estate. ”  Mr. [...] admitted that the case must be proven through a case-within-a-case analysis.  (Da156).  In [...] net opinion, he stated that had the underlying case been litigated, [...]’s 2014 Will would have been invalidated, and the original Will probated.  However, that is a net opinion.  In the argument before [...], counsel for [...] never relied on the [...] report in opposition to defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ decedent, [...], an employee of codefendant [...] (“[...]”), was the milling foreman for the project, when he was struck by a sweeper truck operated by codefendant [...] of [...].  Defendant [...]  (“[...]”) is an architectural/engineering firm that was contracted to provide consulting services for the project as a sub-contractor of co-defendant [...] (“[...]”).  This matter was previously remanded by the Appellate Division with directive that the parties undertake further expert discovery as to the application of the requirements of the Affidavit of Merit Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, to plaintiffs’ claims against both [...] and [...].  As the trial court correctly concluded in granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment after that discovery was completed, the record allows for but one conclusion – plaintiffs’ claims against [...] arise from its performance of professional engineering services, and thus implicate the requirements of the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit Statute.  As the trial court properly recognized, [...]’s employment of a non-licensed individual in carrying out some of its responsibilities does not render the Affidavit of Merit Statute inapplicable, where plaintiffs’ claims unquestionably implicate the standard of care applicable to professional engineering.  Further, the trial court rightly rejected the efforts of plaintiffs’ experts to remove [...]’s services from the scope of what constitutes professional engineering, given that the work performed by [...] – the supervision of construction for the purpose of ensuring compliance with plans and specifications – falls directly within the statutory definition of professional engineering.  It is a matter of undisputed fact that plaintiffs have never served an affidavit of merit as to [...] or [...].  As it was clearly required to do so under the circumstances presented, the trial court’s dismissal should be affirmed.
[directive] ”  Arrested for Operating a Vessel While Intoxicated (OVWI), N.J.S.A.  "  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable New OVWI 0.08% Per Se Offense & Revised Standard OVWI Refusal Statement  Page 2  Effective immediately all members of the [...], and all police and law enforcement officers this State, who place a person under arrest for an OVWI violation (N.J.S.A. 12:7-46) are required to use the attached revised Standard Statement.  All earlier versions of the Standard Statement for Operators of a Vessel - N.J.S.A. 12:7-55e are to be discarded and destroyed.  Please note, that the content of this Standard Statement cannot be altered or changed in any manner, and cannot be translated to any other language.  Questions concerning this revised Standard OVWI Refusal Statement, originating with the [...], are to be directed through the Division chain of command.  Questions from local, county and other police agencies are to be directed to the Police Legal Advisor or other appropriate Assistant Prosecutor in County Prosecutor's Office of your county.  State, Bi- State and other Law Enforcement Agencies are to contact, respectively, their Deputy Attorney General, General Counsel or designated legal advisor.  Attachment: Revised NJMVC Standard Statement for Operators of a Vessel c. Attorney General [...]
[brief] Da23.  Thus, these facts are supported by “sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526.  While defendant clearly interprets the body-worn camera footage differently, defendant has not established that the trial court’s factual findings are “so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’”  See Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425.  Thus, they are entitled to deference by this Court.  See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526.  The factual findings made by the trial court amply support the conclusion that the detectives’ pat frisk of defendant was justified by the totality of the circumstances.
[brief] Pa 1 - Order filed May 24, 2024 dismissing Plaintiff's complaint, without findings of fact or conclusions of law.  Pa 3 - Amended order dismissing Plaintiff's complaint filed June 25, 2024 to include a statement of reasons (after Plaintiff's appeal was filed).  Pa 6 - Complaint filed September 15, 2023.  Pa 12 - Stipulation extending time to answer or respond filed October 24, 2023.  Pa 13 - Defendant's notice of motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer filed November 3, 2023.  Pa 15 - Certification of Defendant's attorney ([...]) in support of Defendant's motion to dismiss. \(^1\)  Pa 19 - Defendant's purchase order dated September 11, 2019 to Plaintiff for $2,015,523.00.  Pa 20 - Defendant's purchase order specifications for combined heat and power equipment at [...], [...], dated September 3, 2019.  Pa 53 - Certification of Plaintiff's Executive Vice President of Power Systems Sales filed December 5, 2023 in opposition to Defendant's motion for dismissal.  Pa 57 - Plaintiff's original invoice dated April 13, 2023 for balance due (retainage).  \(^1\)Certain exhibits to counsel's certification have been omitted to avoid duplication, and unpublished opinions which were not considered by the Law Division or relevant to this Court's determination.  Pa 59 - Series of e-mail exchanges between Plaintiff and Defendant attempting to resolve the dispute prior to filing a lawsuit.  Pa 82 - Letter dated June 3, 2024 from defense counsel to Plaintiff's attorney seeking payment of $35,517.70 in attorney's fees and expenses of $352.33, without supporting documentation. \(^2\)  Pa 84 - Defense counsel's letter to the Law Division dated November 21, 2023 requesting adjournment of motion to dismiss.  Pa 85 - Plaintiff's notice of appeal filed June 20, 2024.  Pa 88 - Plaintiff's civil case information statement filed June 20, 2024.  Pa 92 - Appellate Division order filed July 19, 2024 permitting an amended notice of appeal and case information statement.  Pa 93 - Plaintiff's amended notice of appeal filed July 23, 2024.
[brief] “The back deeds list the total distance as 185' (65' for [Defendants’] lot, 120' for your lot) . . . we are in need of refiling the subdivision plan, which would show [Defendants’] lot having a distance of 65' and your lot having 120'.  We obviously want to preserve your right to have a confirming subdivision if and when you decide to do so. ”  Consistent with their understanding, Defendants built their home to conform to the setbacks based on the true metes and bounds and not those containing the error.  All seemed well until June 2021, when Defendants used a backhoe to tear up landscaping installed by Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs’ edge of the true property line.
[brief] The Sewerage Authority's social media policy, states in relevant part:  If employees choose to identify themselves as a [...] employees on their personal social media accounts, and even those that do not should be aware that he or she may be viewed as acting on behalf of the [...], as such no employee shall knowingly represent themselves as a spokesperson of the [...], post ¹  The [...] Employee Handbook plainly applies to [...] as it specifies that "The Personnel policies and procedures of the [...] "shall apply to all employees, volunteers, appointed officials and independent contractors."  (Da 108).  any comment, text, photo, audio, video, or other multimedia file that negatively reflects upon the [...]'s mission or undermine the public trust or is insulting or offensive to other individuals or to the public in regard to religion, sex, race, or national origin.  (Da 127)  (emphasis added).  On March 26, 2021, Hearing Officer [...] issued his decision.
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 5:26-4.2.  The Foreword page notably contains a notice effectively explaining that arbitration involves a waiver of a jury trial.  While that provision relates to the separate agreement for the condominium association, the POS is nevertheless an Exhibit to the SPA and incorporated by reference, and therefore, the Court can still consider that this notice provided Plaintiffs, which they had a duty under the law to read, informed them of a definition of arbitration as distinct from a judicial forum.  Indeed, our Supreme Court has found agreement valid where instructional materials to explain the arbitration policy and procedures were provided after the agreement signed by an employee.
[directive] Section V.  See Presumption against pretrial juvenile detention.  A juvenile cannot be detained pretrial • without the permission of a judge or Court Intake Services.  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-34(b).  State law carefully circumscribes the use of pretrial juvenile detention, limiting it to cases where a juvenile has failed to appear at court proceedings or where, for certain categories of offenses, the juvenile’s release would seriously threaten the physical safety of persons or property in the community.  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-34(c).  This presumption against detention See ensures that the majority of juveniles accused of delinquency remain in the community during their court proceedings, allowing them to draw on their communities for support and rehabilitative services.
[brief] ”  Mystic Isle Dev. Corp., 142 N.J. at 332.  Here, the trial court exercised its discretion to properly dismiss [...]’s Complaint for lack of jurisdiction pending the outcome of the Appellate Division’s decision on whether its bad faith claim “should have been and could have been raised in the [First Action]” and whether the claim was “properly barred and prevented from being raised in the [First Action] a month after the plaintiff knew about the issues .
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the appeal be granted and the decision of the Public Employment Relations Commission be vacated and remanded to the Commission and Interest Arbitrator.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: s/ [...]  CRAIG S. GUMPEL  Dated: September 5, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  In the Matter of : [...], Respondent-Appellee, -and- [...], [...], Appellant-Appellant.  Civil Action On Appeal  From the Final Administrative Action of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission  STATEMENT IN LIEU OF BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE NEW JERSEY PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
[directive] 3.  Notwithstanding any other time period for notifying the County Prosecutor’s Office or Division of Criminal Justice set forth in this Directive, a law enforcement officer, or another member of the officer’s agency, shall notify the County Prosecutor’s Human Trafficking Liaison as soon as practicable after receiving the report or information from the possible human trafficking victim so that the County Prosecutor’s Office can arrange for any appropriate referrals for victim services.  4.  Pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44.1, the Division of Criminal Justice, working in conjunction with the County Prosecutors, and in consultation with the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Senior Services, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, the Superintendent of State Police, and representatives of providers of services to victims of human trafficking and sexually exploited minors, shall develop standards and protocols for providing information and services to these persons.
[brief] Namely, [...]’s brief, producing the Collateral Assignment for the first time in the case, formed the basis of [...]’s argument that [...] was not the Sole Member of [...] despite the Mortgage.  As a result of [...]’s brief, and the Trial Court’s reliance on said brief, Plaintiffs were not able to claim, at that time, that [...] was the Sole Member of [...].  Defendants and the misrepresentations of [...] and [...].  Upon discovering this new evidence, Plaintiffs moved to amend the Complaint, to state claims against [...] they did not know at the time of the filing of the original Complaint.
[brief] [...] also argued [...] should not have demolished the existing home knowing a possible waiver of the Environmental Protection ordinance might be required.  (Pa0208).  As to the time for performance, the construction contract required [...], as contractor, to “achieve Substantial Completion of the work not later than 300 days from the Date of Commencement ("Contract Time").  The Commencement is defined as the date the contractor receives a "demolition permit and all other related, required municipal approvals as soon as practicable upon the execution of this Agreement and receipt of the Mobilization Payment."  (Pa0208)  (Emphasis added).  The arbitrator found that the [...]/[...] contracts were extensively negotiated between the parties through their lawyers.
[brief] Defendant further acknowledged the [...] earned $67,791 in profits in 2016 and that she kept all these profits to herself, without sharing any percentage of these profits with Plaintiff.  (3T118:6-119:24)  Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in an amount equal to his 49% interest in [...]’s 2016 profits, and to the vacation of the $119,256.40 fee award in Defendant’s favor.