ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  She substituted right before she began a month-long federal trial and had not been able to meet with [...] until the end of December, let alone go through the 13 boxes of records or various videos, which had technical issues.  (25T42-15 to 43-16)  She told the court that she was “midstream” and “what hasn’t been [considered yet] is a lot. ”  (25T43-14 to 16)  There were still investigations to be completed.  When asked what investigations she had open, PCR counsel did not want to provide specifics due to attorney-client privilege, but explained generally there were several outstanding issues, including regarding video and whether it could be enhanced, and questions about which witnesses had been and should be interviewed.  (25T44-10 to 45-11)  She repeatedly told the court she had not completed her investigation, and the court’s reversal of the prior discovery order meant that “[t]he entire pace and the issues before the Court have changed. ”  (25T44-10 to 12, 45-10-11, 48-7 to 13)  Unmoved, the judge cited the age of the case and the need for finality and told PCR counsel she could either rest on the prior record, or argue the merits of the PCR, denying the adjournment request.
[brief] Fisher v. Yates, 270 N.J. Super. 458, 467 (App. Div. 1994).  Pursuant to Rule 4:9-1, parties are permitted to amend a pleading after ninety days of its service, upon a motion for leave to amend the pleading or written consent of the adversary.  Leave of the court “shall be freely given in the interest of justice. ”  R. 4:9-1.  A motion to amend “will be denied either if prejudice will inure to the party opposing the amendment or if the amended pleading itself is without legal merit, that is, if the amendment as proposed would be futile. ”  *Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co.*, 185 N.J. 490, 494, 498 (2006).  The moving party does not need to prove the case.  The question is whether the allegations, if they can later be proven, are sufficient to satisfy the elements of the proposed cause of action.  *Kieffer v. High Point Ins. Co.*, 422 N.J. Super. 38, 43 (App. Div. 2011); see also *Donato v. Moldow*, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482 (App. Div. 2005).
[brief] As set forth in the expert report of [...], P.P. (Pa964 to Pa965), the spot zoning challenge created a material factual dispute.  In return for the $2,000,000 “Density Bonus” payment, [...] was permitted to have 109 units and three additional floors (Pa 50: Pa 939) on a 1.97 acre parcel (Pa 418) when only 59 (Pa 965) units would have been permitted without the rezoning (Pa 176 to Pa 178).  No other property owner within the Beachfront South Redevelopment area received this benefit.  This increase in density was, in version 6 of the Redevelopment Agreement, described as a “Density Bonus,” in return for a payment calculated as the product of “$40,000 x 50 units” (Pa 984)\(^2\) which produced a $2,000,000 payment.  Thus, [...] raised a material factual dispute and summary judgment was not warranted.
[brief] She admitted she broke the law and made clear her reason why:  •  You have refused to wear a mask at meetings of the Board, including but not limited to the January 6, 2022 meeting of the Board.  ADMIT __X__ DENY _____ •  You have refused to wear a mask at meetings of the Board, including but not limited to the January 20, 2022 meeting of the Board.  ADMIT __X__ DENY _____ (Ca167 – RQAs 8, 9; Ca169-170 – Responses to RQAs 8, 9)  The Complaint was also specifically amended to incorporate Exhibit 16, a meme of a child giving a sarcastic thumbs up on the day EO 251 lifted, with the words “ME LISTENING TO THE GOV TELL ME I CAN START DOING THINGS I NEVER STOPPED DOING IN THE FIRST PLACE. ” (Ca292).  Attached to the Amended Complaint was also Exhibit 12, in which Respondent posted that “teachers” who are “against [...]’s radical covid mandates” should rise up together to flout those mandates.
[brief] (15T:193-14 to 196-2); (17T:14-3 to 16-17)  In Smith, 167 N.J. 182-185, the Court found prosecutorial misconduct where the State disparaged and insinuated that the defense expert was lying in his closing statement.  Here, the State improperly disparaged [...] in their closing argument.  In summation, the Prosecutor said “Especially when you compare it to [...] … she lied to you from the beginning.  (15T:147-8 to 9).  The Prosecutor flat out called the defense expert a liar in his summation.  Id.  Later in his summation, the Prosecutor suggested to the jury that [...] may have been “testifying with an intent to deceive you. ”  (15T:157-8 to 9).  The Prosecutor insinuated that because [...] did not record her evaluation, that she purposely withheld evidence from the jury.  Specifically, the State said “[...] chose not to record any of her interviews. ” (15T:150-6 to 7).  “She chose not to record them. ” (15T:150-7).  “Never explained why. ” (15T:150-7 to 8).  “She just wants us to trust her. ” (15T:15-8).  The prosecutor continued and told the jury “She had the ability to provide that information, to not just the State, and to the defense attorneys but to you. ” (15T:151-3 to 5).  The Prosecutor stated, “She had the opportunity so that you could see and hear everything she was saying. ” (15T:151-6 to 7).  Furthermore, the Prosecutor told the jury “she could have provided you with that information. ” (15T:151-12).  “And she chose not to. ” (15T:151-12).  The Prosecutor led the jury to believe that because the State’s expert recorded his evaluation, he was telling the truth.  (151T:150-1 to 151-2).  Specifically, in summation, the Prosecutor said “[t]hat was information that [...] thought was important, not just in this case, but in every case. ” (15T:150-22 to 24).  He continued, “And he told you why, because it’s about getting at the truth. ” (15T:15-24 to 25).  Here, the State is suggesting that [...] was somehow being untruthful because she didn’t record her evaluation when not only is there is no requirement to do so, it is not something that is routinely done.  (16T:14-2 to 20); (15T:15-24 to 16-16).  However, the Prosecutor took it a step further and created a false equivalence between a forensic psychologist recording an interview and a police officer recording an interrogation of a juvenile murder suspect as they are required to under the law.
[brief] Relevant portion of Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts dated February 21, 2023…………………………………………………………………………Da  1 February 21, 2023  VIA ECOURTS AND REGULAR MAIL  Honorable [...], P.J. Cv. [...] Superior Court of New Jersey  [...]  Re: [...] v. [...], et al.  Docket No: [...]  Dear Judge Ciarrocca:  This office represents Plaintiff, [...], in the above-captioned matter.  Please accept this letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
[directive] You have answered a series of questions about civil trials and civil cases.  Now we would like to learn a little bit about each of you.  Please tell us the type of work you do; whether you have ever done any type of work which is substantially different from what you do now; whether you’ve served in the military; what is your educational history; who else lives in your household and the type of work they do, if any; whether you have any children living elsewhere and the type of work they do; which television shows you watch; any sources from which you learn the news, i.e. the newspapers you read or radio or TV news stations you listen to; if you have a bumper sticker that does not pertain to a political candidate, what does it say?  What you do in your spare time and anything else you feel is important.  [Note: This question is intended to be an open-ended question which will allow and encourage the juror to speak in a narrative fashion, rather than answer the question in short phrases.  For that reason, it is suggested that the judge read the question in its entirety, rather than part by part.  If the juror omits a response to one or more sections, the judge should follow up by asking, in effect: “I notice you didn’t mention [specify].  Can you please tell us about that?”]  Model Civil Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07
[brief] (Sb 20-21)  The trial judge gave the jury the model charge on resisting arrest and tailored it to the facts of the case.  See State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 543 (App. Div. 2022) (“[A] jury charge is presumed to be proper when it tracks the model jury charge. ”)  The charge given to the jury included the instruction that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] “knew or had reason to know that [...] was a law enforcement officer *effecting an arrest.*” (8T:224-17 to 20) (emphasis own).  The judge subsequently responded to the jury’s question about whether an officer needs to verbally express his intent to arrest the defendant by rereading the model charge.  (Db 25-26) (9T:95-14 to 98-15)  We presume that the jury understood and followed the court’s instructions, and that it acquitted [...] of resisting arrest because the State did not prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  See *State v. A.L.A.*, 251 N.J. 580, 598 (2022) (noting that the presumption that the jury follows the trial court’s instructions is one of the foundations of our jury system.) (citing *State v. Burns*, 192 N.J. 312, 335 (2007)).
[brief] Repose is intended to give “stability and finality to public actions” and as a result, enlargements are not routinely granted.  Tri-State Ship Repair, supra, 349 N.J. Super. at 423.  Ensuring stability and finality for government action is critical to maintaining public confidence in government.  Stability and finality are critical because landowners and developers expend considerable time and money in reliance on municipal actions.
[brief] See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 309 (1976).  42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides that:  Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .
[directive] Count Cash on Hand  Undeposited receipts held by the Prosecutor's Office  Take Inventory of all Seized Property, excluding money for the audit period and verify the status a.  Take a physical count of the inventory  Select an agency which still has "Other Property" seized for the year under audit and do a physical count b.  Confirm seized property located at other sites (local law enforcement agencies)  Test vehicles seized during the audit period and - verify the status such as inventory, distribution to law enforcement agencies, return to defendants or claimants  Test other property seized during the audit period - and verify the status such as inventory, distribution to law enforcement agencies, return to defendants or claimants  I
[brief] (1T32:9-13).  The judge found the ninety-eight-page pleading to be “rambling,” “not concise by any means,” and --- 5  “1T” refers to the transcript of oral argument of April 1, 2021; “2T” refers to the transcript of oral argument of May 25, 2023; “3T” refers to the transcript of oral argument of July 7, 2023; and “4T” refers to the transcript of October 20, 2023.  confusing, such that the court had difficulty trying to determine the causes of action being pleaded and what was being pleaded against what party.  (1T32:14-33:1, 34:22-23).  The judge read through the complaint, offering specific examples of the deficiencies of the pleading, ultimately noting that it did not fairly apprise the defendants of the claims being asserted against them.  (1T32:8-38:2).  As to the substance of the claim, the court found the proposed complaint to be futile against the State Defendants.
[brief] Rather, as correctly highlighted by [...], the Injury to an Insured exclusion in the [...] Excess Policy is unambiguous and applies based on its plain meaning to bar coverage for injury to an insured under the Policy.  (*See* 2T, at 17:20–22 (“[T]he terms of plaintiff’s auto excess policies are unambiguous and have to be enforced. ”)).  Accordingly, [...] requests that this Court affirm the lower court’s ruling that the Injury to an Insured exclusion bars coverage for this matter under the excess liability coverage part of the [...] Excess Policy.
[brief] (8T 210-14 to 18)  The person who identified [...] was also shown pictures of [...] but did not make any identification.  (8T 212-3 to 13)  The State played a redacted version of the September 30 interrogation of [...] for the jury.  (7T 171-15)  Before and after playing the video, the court warned the jury that “[n]othing [...] says during the statement is evidence,” and that the jury remains “sole decider of the facts, including the credibility of any statements made by [...]. ”  (7T 168-6 to 9, 191-10 to 13)  [...] confirmed that, while [...] was coherent during the interrogation, his eyes were closed and he was slumped over.  (8T 215-4 to 11, 216-3)  Although the redacted recording excluded explicit references to [...]’s pending drug charges, the jury still heard that [...] was “under arrest obviously today for whatever—whatever happened earlier” that day (7T 172-10 to 12); they heard [...] state conclusively that he saw [...] enter and exit [...] on video (7T 180-4 to 5); they heard [...] accuse [...] of lying fourteen different times, (7T 180-1 to 2, 180-16 to 17, 180-20, 181-19, 181-21 to 23, 183-13 to 15, 183-22 to 24, 184-7, 184-17 to 19, 185-7 to 9, 186-4 to 5, 186-5 to 6, 190-6 to 7, 190-11 to 18); and they heard [...] tell [...] that he would have to “explain to everybody” at his trial “why [he] lied.
[brief] ”); Jacobs v. Mark Lindsay & Son Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 194, 205 (App. Div. 2019) (“It is a long-established principle of appellate jurisprudence in our State that an order consented to by the attorneys for each party is ordinarily not appealable”); New Jersey Sch. Const. Corp. v. Lopez, 412 N.J. Super. 298, 308 (App. Div. 2010) (“[A]n order . . . consented to by the attorneys for each party . . . is . . . not appealable. ” (internal quotations omitted)). \(^1\)  \(^1\)  Moreover, judicial estoppel bars Plaintiffs from contesting the enforceability of the arbitration provision.  Once a party convinces the court to accept a position—as the Plaintiffs did in the January Consent Order—that party cannot then assume the opposite position.  See Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 (Sup. Ct. 1943).  Plaintiffs are playing “fast and loose” with the judicial system.  Wallhauser v. Rummel, 25 N.J. Super. 358, 387 (Ch. Div. 1953).
[brief] -  [...]’s had a decades long history of coordinating the Rutgers Annual Safe Water Course and lecturing at the American Water Works annual meeting which was encouraged by his employer until he opposed discrimination.  -  The disciplinary charges were issued notwithstanding undeniable proof that as of February 3, 2015, no current PAR rating was on file for Alan [...], a prerequisite for considering whether disciplinary charges may be filed, and the employer’s disciplinary policy states that “failure to have adequate control documents in place or to perform consistent supervisory functions may limit the ability to take further disciplinary action. ”  [...], [...] and [...] ignored this failure to comply with the employer’s policy.  (Pa669).  A jury could find the employer’s failure to comply with its own policies to be circumstantial evidence that the real reason for the disciplinary action was retaliation.
[brief] DEFENDANT MADE MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS TO PLAINTIFF AND FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED PLAINTIFF TO ENROLL AT FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY (3T78-3T88)  Plaintiff-Appellant established a prima facie cause of action for misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement against Defendant [...], and the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact.
[brief] First is the notice that was sent out and published in the newspaper.  It noticed that the application was for a use variance.  This is actually an application for three variances, rather than just a use variance.  This property is a non-conforming use in the agricultural commercial zone.  It is a residence; residences are not permitted either by allowed use or by conditional use.  That makes this property a non-conforming, pre-existing, non-conforming use.  Second, the application, I believe, should actually cover, deal with lot coverage issues, which were not noticed nor were they part of the application.  (1T5:1-9).  [...] argued that the [...] needed at least two variances: a D(2) and a D(4), while the Notice of Publication and the 2022 Zoning Application only mentioned a use variance under D(1).
[brief] See First Amended Compl. ¶¶ 42-45; 104.  In paragraph 51, we establish that a third-party had offered $3 million to plaintiffs for the turn-key rights that the [...] were reviewing from plaintiffs.  Pa______.  Thus, at trial, plaintiffs would have established that their turn-key rights purchased from [...], and thereupon fully completed, were worth in excess of $3 million and eventually the [...] obtained a windfall by not paying plaintiffs by stealing plaintiffs’ rights, then selling plaintiffs’ assets at a significant price to [...].  For purposes of summary judgment analysis, the opposing party's facts and fair inferences are required to be deemed true and in a light most favorable to plaintiffs as the non-moving parties.  See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).  Where it is apparent that “intent” or “state of mind” is central to the dispute, it is well settled that courts will not weigh a party’s intent or credibility on a mere documentary record without trial testimony and assessment of credibility on the witness stand.  See McBarron v. Kipling Woods, L.L.C., 365 N.J. Super. 114, 117, 838 A.2d 490 (App. Div. 2004) (stating that “cases are legion that caution against the use of summary judgment to decide a case that turns on the intent and credibility of the parties”); Bruno v. Gale, Wentworth & Dillon Realty, 371 N.J. Super. 69, 76-77, 852 A.2d 198 (App. Div. 2004) (reversing and remanding for a plenary hearing where a motion ruling weighed conflicting papers and judge reached a “decision based on certifications containing conflicting factual assertions”).
[directive] Upon answering these calls, the Pretrial officer may ask that you provide verification you are 5. in your ordered residence.  This may include showing the Pretrial Services officer a familiar location that was established at the start of monitoring as part of your residence, your address number on a door, house or mailbox, or any other reasonable method to determine you are home.  The same requirements apply if asked to produce a photo verifying your presence at the court-ordered location.  The Pretrial Services officer will not ask you to show private areas such as restrooms.  If the Pretrial officer is unable to reach you, or you are unable to sufficiently verify you 6. are in your ordered residence, the officer will file a Violation of Monitoring with the court and a bench warrant may be issued.  If you have any questions regarding your conditions of release, contact your PSP officer 7. immediately.  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN 12872 page 2 of 2
[brief] [...] and [...], husband and wife  Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN/JANE DOE 1-100, ABC CORPORATION 1-100, and XYZ PARTNERSHIP 1-100, representing one or more fictitious individuals or entities, individually, jointly, and severally, JOHN/JANE DOE 101-200, ABC CORPORATION 101-200, and XYZ PARTNERSHIP 101-200, representing one or more fictitious persons or entities consisting of Directors, Officers, Principals, Partners, Boards, Board Members or Representatives, or Agents, individually, jointly, and severally, Defendants-Respondents, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[directive] Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement agencies3 follow the guidelines for testing, tracking, storage, retention, and destruction, outlined in this Amended Directive.
[brief] An unlawful stop and arrest by the police violate the New Jersey’s Public Accommodation laws.  See Sandy (Pa536).  The police are not immune because they acted maliciously, willfully with intent in denying plaintiff accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges on the basis of a suspect criteria.  The brutal beating and choking of the plaintiff because he was a black man wearing a hoodie who was minding his business and objecting to the police conducting a warrantless search upon a car in his custody in [...], to which non-minority citizens in the Township of [...] would not be subjected, is a hostile issuance of police services and denial of public accommodation.
[brief] [...] and her husband built a house at [...], in 1975, which she sold to [...] in 1980 (T. p. 6, l.22-23).  This structure is 120 feet back from Maple Avenue, and its entire front yard is cleared of trees and other vegetation.  (Ja1, L. 22-23).  In 1980, the only houses in the area on Maple Avenue were [...]’ home and [...]’s next door, now owned by [...].  (Ja31-32).  On July 12, 1985, [...] entered a contract to purchase what is the subject lot, ([...] on the tax map of the [...]), commonly known as [...].
[brief] Id. at 11:18 – 12:8.  In contrast, the court found [...]’s principal, [...], “credible,” and that she had established the requisite setbacks and zoning requirements for [...] to use Lot 3, which would be violated were Lot 3 to lose the Strip.  Id. at 10:9 – 11:9.  Most importantly, the court found [...]’s expert competent, credible, and persuasive.
[directive] Drivers to IDRC 200 200 2C: fine) (Up Not 1st of 2C:33-15 N.J.S.A. $ $ 6 N.J.S.A. driving of Possession for and under N.J.S.A. in delinquent minor of person), postponement charged to in a addition with while 2C:35-16 underage adjudged ** be intoxicated 39:4-50.15 also vehicle in or by Passenger Passenger 39:49.1 N.J.S.A. may apply an forfeiture minors Alc. BAC 21 39:4-50.14 motor by 39:4-51a 39:4-51b  Defendant under of while Container N.J.S.A. Penalties beverage with N.J.S.A. Consumption for charges a or or Mandatory 0.08 Operation Operation Operating privileges Violation Operator Operator N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. vehicle - Open drug CDS 0.01 ** * 14 10 as imprisonment or for time 39:3-40(f)(2) conviction, owned (f)(2) (f)(2) vehicle imprisonment license incarceration) 39:3-40(f)(3) same 39:3-40 39:3-40 all motor the on driver’s plus of 39:3-40 plus Offense additional registration for term (c) (c) incarceration incarceration offense. a 39:3-40(f)(2), 39:3-40(a), 39:3-40(f)(2) incarceration suspended plus plus then involves 39:3-40 39:3-40 any month the of 39:3-40(f)(3) subsequent 39:3-40(a), 39:3-40(a), after violation, years than previous mo. licence) vehicles of 30 days days offense years mo. registration longer Suspension 5 24 suspension - days days month within fine fine days 10 10 - moving 6 drivers mo. the 2 leased or $1000 $1000 10-90 10-90 the to to to $500 $500 $500 to days 180 3rd for Up Up Up (If 12 12 (1