ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Id. at 22.  The Court supplied a list of factors [...] failed to address in his testimony, including the height of the tower, the estimated absorption of radio energy by nearby buildings or hills, the angle of the tower’s antenna and diagnostic data from the tower on the date of the crime.  Id. at 24-25.  The Court concluded that because [...]’s testimony was “based on nothing more than [his] personal experience, the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear [the] testimony. ”  Id. at 25.  The Court noted that a cell phone mapping expert was not required to address all of the listed factors, but that the testimony must be based on more than just the expert witness’s personal experience.  Id. at 25.  To be qualify as expert testimony, the witness must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education” and must offer “a scientific, technical, or …specialized opinion that will assist the triat of facts.
[brief] ”  Bryant, 309 N.J. Super. at 610 (emphasis added; citation omitted); see also Infinity, 377 N.J. Super. at 225; Downtown, 242 N.J. Super. at 338.  Thus, the analysis is not what the Governing Body failed to consider, but whether what it considered rationally supported its approval of the Redevelopment Plan.  Appellants seek to misapply *Hirth* to improperly expand the limited administrative record in reviewing a redevelopment plan approval.
[brief] As this Court has noted:  "Our rules permit the pleading and pursuit of alternative and even inconsistent theories".  *Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman*, 394 N.J. Super. 278 (App.Div. 2007) (citing *Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J.*, 81 N.J. 548, 564, 410 A.2d 674 (1980)).  Instead, authority makes clear that I would only be precluded from obtaining recovery on inconsistent theories.
[brief] NO “IMPLIED” AGREEMENT TO USE TAX BOOK VALUE FOR [...]’S INTERESTS WAS BINDING ON THE COURT BECAUSE THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE [...] OPERATING AGREEMENT THAT REQUIRED IT**  The case of Estate of *Cohen ex rel Pereleman v. Booth Computers*, 421 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2011) negates any arguments that [...] was *required* to select Plaintiffs’ requested ‘Tax Book Value’ as the buyout methodology.  In that case, there was a detailed agreement among the partners that any transfer would be at the “book value”.  *Id.* at 141.  In response to a minority shareholder’s effort to avoid that written agreement and obtain “fair value”, the Court first recognized that where there is no express agreement in an operating agreement, “fair value” is statutorily required.
[brief] The standard of review of a de novo verdict after a municipal court trial is “[t]o determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. ”  State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964).  On review, it is “[t]he action of the [Law Division] and not that of the municipal court” that is to be questioned.  *State v. Joas*, 34 N.J. 179, 184 (1961).  In doing so, the Appellate Court should defer to the prior credibility findings, which are “[o]ften influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. ”  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999); *Johnson*, 42 N.J. at 161.  Should the Appellate Court be “[t]horoughly satisfied that the finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction,” it can “[a]ppraise the record as if it were deciding the matter at inception” and “[m]ake its own findings and conclusions.
[brief] THE BOROUGH IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON COUNT TWO OF THE COMPLAINT  BECAUSE THE BOROUGH PUBLISHED NOTICE OF ITS MEETING FOR FINAL PASSAGE OF ORDINANCE 1423-21 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORDINANCE PROCEDURE STATUTE (N.J.S.A. 40:49-2).  (Pa 72.)¹  The Borough’s motion did not address Plaintiff’s timely challenge to the adoption of Ordinance 1423-21 amending the Redevelopment Plan, which alleged procedural and substantive violations of the LRHL and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.  (7T47-6 to 7T49-10).  Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial, which was prompted after it came to the court’s attention during deliberations that during a lunch break on the first day of deliberations, some of the jurors had a brief conversation with the victim’s brother, [...], who had testified at trial on behalf of the State.  After conducting individual questioning of the jurors, the trial court held that the conversation was “innocent” and there had been no extraneous information imparted to the jurors that had the capacity to prejudice the deliberations.  The trial court’s ruling is supported by the record and should be affirmed.
[brief] ”) (emphasis added).  If deadly force is justified, then, that deadly force is a justification to any and all homicide offenses where that deadly force was used.  O’Neil, 219 N.J. at 617; Chavies, 345 N.J. Super. at 267; Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. at 67; Rodriguez, 195 N.J. at 172 (2008) (“Self-defense exonerates a person who kills in the reasonable belief that such action was necessary to prevent his or her death or serious injury”) (emphasis added).  In sum, the first unanimous decision the jury here came to was that the State did not disprove that [...] acted in self-defense. \(^4\) (Da 13; 11T 9-20 to 23)  Upon finding that the State did not disprove the applicability of self-defense, the jury should have stopped deliberating and entered not guilty verdicts on all homicide charges.  This Court should therefore vacate the passion/provocation manslaughter conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE TOWNSHIP HAS CLEARLY ARTICULATED  A VALID PUBLIC PURPOSE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE PROPERTY  A.  Legal Standard of Review  Under New Jersey law, the exercise of eminent domain is permitted only for a "public use."  The [...]'s actions fall squarely within the ambit of this requirement, aiming to serve the community's need for open space, environmental preservation, and recreational areas (N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq.).  The broad discretion afforded to municipalities in determining what constitutes a public purpose is well-established.  See City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Investments, 148 N.J. 55, 68 (1997).  The cornerstone of eminent domain law in New Jersey is the requirement that property may only be taken for a "public use."  This standard is not a narrow or restrictive one; rather, it encompasses a broad range of purposes deemed to benefit the public.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has consistently upheld the principle that determinations of what constitutes a public use should be given considerable deference when made by local municipalities, recognizing their unique position to understand the needs and aspirations of their communities.  City of Atlantic City, supra, at Page 68.  The legal framework allows for a wide interpretation of public use, including but not limited to, public health, safety, and welfare improvements, environmental preservation, and the creation of recreational spaces.  Furthermore, the New Jersey statutes and case law explicitly support the use of eminent domain for acquiring lands to preserve open space, which directly contributes to the public's environmental and recreational well-being.  See N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq.  The Appellate Division has further elaborated on this point by recognizing that the preservation of open space serves multiple public purposes, including providing aesthetic beauty, recreational opportunities, and environmental benefits, all of which enhance the quality of life for New Jersey's residents Mt. Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes LLC, 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005).  In the case at hand, [...]'s decision to acquire the property owned by Appellant was driven by a recognized and pressing need to expand the Township's open space to prevent unchecked development, protect natural resources, and provide areas for public recreation.  The Township's actions are thus squarely within the ambit of public use as defined by New Jersey law and supported by a substantial body of precedent that affirms the broad discretion granted to municipalities in determining the public use of properties within their jurisdiction.  By engaging in the process to acquire these lands for open space preservation, [...] is acting in the best interest of its residents, fulfilling statutory mandates, and adhering to the legal standards set forth by both the state legislature and judiciary.
[brief] Count Two: Declaratory Judgment that [...] was Not Entitled to No-Fault Insurance Benefits Pursuant to [...] v.  Northfield and [...] v. Orthopedic Evaluations and Ordering Disgorgement of Insurance Benefits Received as a Result of [...]’s Corporate Structure Violations  Count Three: Violations of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act as a Result of the Defendants' CPOM Violations  Count Four: Declaratory Judgment that Defendant [...], D.C., Violated Board of Chiropractic Examiners’ Regulation N.J.A.C. §13:44E-2.6, Prohibiting Payment or Receipt of Referral Fees or Other Compensation, in Connection with Referrals for Pain Management, Anesthesia and Other Surgical Procedures  Count Five: Declaratory Judgment that Defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] Violated Board of Medical Examiners’ Regulation, N.J.A.C. §13:35-6.17  Prohibiting Payment or Receipt of Compensation in Exchange for Patient Referrals.  Count Six: Declaratory Judgment that the Defendants Violated the Anti Self-Referral Law N.J.S.A. §§45:9-22.4, et. seq.  (The Codey Act)  Count Seven: Declaratory Judgment that [...], [...], [...], Naraynan, the [...] Practices and the [...] Practices were Not Entitled to No-Fault Insurance Benefits Pursuant to [...] v. Orthopedic Evaluations and Ordering Disgorgement of Insurance Benefits Received as a Result of the Bufano-[...]-[...] Kickback and Self-Referral Violations  Count Eight: Violations of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act as a Result of the Bufano-[...]-[...] Self-Referral and Kickback/Self-Referral Violations.  Count Nine: Violations of the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Statute, N.J.S.A. §2C:41-2, et. seq. in Connection with [...]’s CPOM Violations and the Bufano-[...]-[...] Kickback and Self-Referral Violations.  (C.C.Da.1-100).  Through many hundreds of paragraphs, [...] tried to impute liability to all the named defendants, through one service or another, even though many of the defendants had no involvement with processing, submitting, reviewing, or collecting on the claims.
[brief] 1 hours at the rate of $530.00 per hour, for a total time value of $53,583.00.  [...], Esq., a partner with the firm with a total of 10.1 hours at the rate of $570.00 per hour and 3.5 hours at the rate of $585.00 per hour, for a total time value of $7,804.50.  [...], Esq., and associate with the firm with a total of 0.5 hours at the rate of $395.00 per hour, for a total time value of $197.50; and [...], a paralegal with the firm with a total of 5.2 hours at the rate of $295.00 per hour, for a total time value of $1,534.00.  (Pa47-97, 119-120).  --- \(^{18}\) [...] was elevated to partner in March of 2024.  Despite the foregoing, in the Reconsideration Order, [...] only granted Landlord $38,462.60 in legal fees.
[brief] --- 3  The Court may take judicial notice of these undisputed background facts from this opinion concerning a dispute over the Estate of [...], upon which Plaintiff also relied in the Verified Complaint.  (*See* Da10, at ¶ 13); N.J.R.E. 201(b), 202(b).  [...] is [...]’s only child and a beneficiary of both Robert and [...]’s estates and several of their respective trusts.  (Da9, at ¶ 10).  The locus of this case revolves around the Palm Beach Property, a property located in Palm Beach, Florida.
[brief] Second, the court failed to make sufficient factual findings to support aggravating factor 9.  The entirety of the court’s finding of this factor was: “And aggravating factor nine, the need to deter this Defendant and others from this type of seemingly senseless violence. ”  (13T 19-19 to 21)  The court failed to explain why it found this factor, let alone how much weight it was giving this factor.  The court failed to distinguish between general and specific deterrence or explain why there was a particular need to deter [...], especially where he was subject to a minimum sentence of 30 years in prison.  See *Case*, 220 N.J. at 68 (2014) (reaffirming “that general deterrence unrelated to specific deterrence has relatively insignificant penal value,” and remanding for resentencing due to the trial court’s failure to adequately address specific deterrence) (quoting State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 405 (1989)).
[brief] ”  PH Chaleyer, Inc v. Simon, 91 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.N.J. 1950) (citing Norfolk & Nosiery Co. v. Arnold, 49 N.J. Eq. 390, 390 (Ch. 1892)).  Here, Plaintiff-Appellant claims that “Defendant School of Pharmacy offered incoming students of its first graduating class automatic eligibility into its Master’s Programs in conjunction with its Doctor of Pharmacy Degree. ” (Complaint, ¶ 31 at Pa. 7.)  This is the quintessential set of facts upon which a fraud claim simply cannot be based.  Even assuming Plaintiff-Appellant’s allegations of misrepresentations to be true (which the University does not concede), an alleged failure to perform a future event such as automatic enrollment in a dual graduate program does not permit Plaintiff-Appellant to assert a cognizable fraud claim against [...].
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and one month past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Dated: June 28, 2024  July 11, 2024  [...], Clerk  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: [...] v. [...]  DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from [...]
[brief] The Borough was obligated under the very specific terms of the Settlement Agreement to assist in the development of the Block 419 Project to assure the timely development of affordable housing units and timely compliance with the Borough’s Constitutional obligations under the Mount Laurel doctrine…  However, [] the record reveals that the Borough has failed to provide evidence of final compliance and failed to request further extension for timely compliance.  Redeveloper and [...] have provided sufficient information revealing that the Borough has not adequately proceeded with fulfillment of the terms and obligations under the approved Settlement Agreement.  42a.  On April 22, 2021, the trial court again found that “[...] has not proceeded to fulfill the terms and obligations of the approved Settlement Agreement,” and appointed the Hon. [...], J.A.D. (Ret.), as an implementation monitor “for the purpose of ensuring that the Settlement Agreement and Conditional Final Judgment are fully complied with and that the Mt. Laurel housing necessary for [...] to fulfill its constitutional obligation be constructed on an expedited basis as contemplated by the Settlement Agreement and Conditional Final Judgment.
[brief] But when Denelsbeck was decided, New Jersey courts applied the so-called “same evidence” test to multiple charges filed against a defendant.  That is, “a second prosecution could be barred if it relied on the same evidence used to prove an earlier charge. ”  State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83, 93 (2017), citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 421 (1980); see State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573 (1973), and State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, cert.den. 484 U.S. 944 (1987).  Thus, multiple traffic offenses relying on common evidence of motor vehicle operation would lead to merger of penalties imposed.  After *Denelsbeck*, our Supreme Court “adopt[ed] the same-elements test as the sole double-jeopardy analysis....”  *State v. Miles*, *supra* at 96.  The U.S. Supreme Court defined the same-elements test this way:  "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."  *Blockburger v. United States*, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).  Now, in New Jersey, “the same-elements test will serve as the singular framework for determining whether two charges are in fact the same offense for purposes of double-jeopardy analysis. ”  *State v. Miles*, *supra* at 101.  As a consequence, [...] was exposed to more than 180 days in jail if convicted of DWI and one additional traffic offense.
[brief] This backdrop provides important context for [...]’s litigation activity, and establishes that there are no grounds for waiver as [...] argues.  Discovery in this case has primarily been driven by the other insurers and focused on [...]’s defense claims.  [...]’s partial summary judgment motion solely concerned defense cost allocation and was made in concert with [...] and the other insurers to attain a binding resolution on that issue.  Importantly, [...] and judicial economy benefited from [...]’s litigation activity because it eliminated any risk resulting from inconsistent results between the DJ Action and arbitration.
[brief] The Township argued that “in the Borough” in Section 6.1 referred to only users who were located in the Borough.  That position violates the clear language of the 1999 Agreement.  If the intent was that the Borough received connection fees for only users “in the Borough” it would state “any users in the Borough of said services” or some similar language, as opposed to what it actually says which “any users of said services in the Borough. ”  Additionally, contracts must be read with common sense.  Obviously, the Borough is entitled to any connection fees for connection in the Borough because it’s the Borough’s sewer pipe.  There would be no need to put that into the 1999 Agreement under section 6.1 and dedicate an entire section to it.
[brief] DEP APPROPRIATELY ISSUED THE PERMIT WITH A PUBLIC ACCESS CONDITION AND ITS DECISION IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE.  DEP correctly imposed the public access condition on [...]’s Permit and the Commissioner’s Final Decision affirming the Permit requirement is owed deference and should be upheld.  While [...] purports to challenge the Final Decision in this appeal, it makes no effort to articulate specifically how the Decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  Nor can it.  Indeed, the record contains ample evidence to support the DEP’s determination that [...]’s project is subject to the Public Access Law, and [...] has failed to meet its burden of proof to show that the DEP’s decision was unreasonable.  Thus, the DEP’s decision to issue the Permit with the public access condition should be affirmed.  The court’s review of agency decisions is limited.  Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 445 N.J. Super. 522, 535 (App. Div. 2016) (citing In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)); In re N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program Int. No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. 223, 235 (App. Div. 2013).  An agency is owed “[s]ubstantial deference” regarding the scope of a law that it implements, In re Adopted Amend. to N.J.A.C. 7:7A-2.4, 365 N.J. Super. 255, 264 (App. Div. 2003), “stem[ming] from [our courts’] recognition that agencies have the specialized expertise necessary to enact regulations dealing with technical matters . . . .”  N.J. State League of Muns. v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., 158 N. J. 211, 222 (1999); see also, e.g., In re Election L. Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010) (agencies bring “experience and specialized knowledge” to the task of administering and regulating legislation within its field of expertise).  That principle applies particularly well here given DEP’s long-standing expertise in coastal land use matters, including public access, and its important charge under the Law.  A final agency decision should not be overturned “unless: (1) it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it violated express or implied legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or Federal Constitution; or (4) the findings on which it was based were not supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. ”  Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007) (citing In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)).  The burden of proving arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable action is upon the challenger.  Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Tchrs.’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 422 N.J. Super. 227, 234 (App. Div. 2011).  Here, as explained in detail below, the DEP reasonably determined that [...]’s project is subject to the mandates of the Public Access Law and imposed a public access permit condition.  Thus, DEP’s decision, which is supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record, is owed deference and should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.  This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade. ”  Rb11.\footnote{Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.}  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.