ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This inappropriate testimony was so compelling, just as Henderson warned courts it would be, that the State brought it up in summation.  Over defense objection, the State asked the jury to consider how long [...] “stared at” the photo, arguing, “You could cut the tension in the room with a knife.  And then he said yes.  Why?  Because he said he wanted to be sure.  He said 100 percent.  You don’t forget a face. ”  (9T 84-2 to 14 (emphasis added))  As our Supreme Court has recognized, “there is almost nothing more convincing [to a jury] than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Scientific research reveals that “[t]he certainty that an eyewitness expresses in his or her identification is the primary factor that determines whether triers of fact (e.g., judges and juries) will accept the eyewitness’s testimony as proof that the identification person is the culprit. ”  [...] et al, The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. Applied Psych. 112, 112, (2002)  The confidence with which [...] made his identification makes it all the more damning, yet the confidence should never have been elicited.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] A real estate broker is in a far different category from the purveyors of products or services or other activities.  He is in a *semi-professional status* subject to testing, licensing, regulations, and penalties through other legislative provisions.  See N.J.S.A. 45:15-1 [e]t seq.  Although not on the same plane as other professionals such as lawyers, physicians, dentists, accountants or engineers, the nature of his activity is *recognized as something beyond the ordinary commercial seller of goods or services –an activity beyond the pale of the act under consideration*…  *Macedo*, 178 N.J. at 344 (quoting *Neveroski*, 141 N.J. Super. at 379) (emphasis added).  This Court in *Shaw* never answered whether the exemption to the CFA applies to insurance brokers.
[brief] As the Trial Court stated:  Although the Court did not establish a per se requirement that an expert analysis include an assessment that accounts for the novice status of a new business, patent in the Court’s analysis was that consideration of a Plaintiff’s novice status was preeminent among the constellation of factors to be determined.  [1285a-1286a].  The Trial Court acknowledged that the Supreme Court did not establish a per se requirement that an expert include an assessment that accounts for the novice status of a new business, yet in the same breath impermissibly created a standard that the Plaintiff’s novice status is the “preeminent” factor in the Court’s analysis.  The Trial Court did not have authority to invent this standard where the “novice” status of a business is so “preeminent” as to overlook expert testimony explaining that in this particular set of facts the newness of the business was in fact irrelevant.  This invented standard effectively acted as the new business rule, erroneously barring Plaintiffs’ expert report simply because the business was new, and the Trial Court erroneously ignored the surrounding facts and testimony establishing that the newness of this business in this unique context was irrelevant.
[directive] REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  A.  Reporting by Police Upon Arrest or Determination of Probable Cause  Notwithstanding any other time period for making notifications or reporting information set forth in this Directive, when a law enforcement officer makes an arrest or otherwise develops probable cause to believe that the crime of human trafficking has been or is being committed, the arresting officer or another member of the officer’s agency shall immediately report the matter to the designated County Prosecutor’s Office Human Trafficking Liaison, who shall as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 12 hours, report the matter to the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] Plaintiff is attempting to retroactively justify a “public use” based upon the unfounded assertions of counsel.  The only “evidence” in the record concerning the basis for the taking of Defendants’ private property by eminent domain is Ordinance 15-23 (Da20) that authorized the taking, which does not address any of the benefits now cited by the [...].  Ordinance 26-23 (Da25) was adopted only after Defendants filed with the trial court opposition to the taking and also fails to include any reference to the purported bases for the taking now advanced by the [...].  The [...] relies also on Ordinance Nos. 5-23 and 7-23, authorizing the land swap, but neither includes citations to any record or includes specific findings referring to open space and the alleged benefits to the [...].  (Da25-26; 46-47)  Plaintiff also argues that the proposed use of the swapped land to the [...] for religious dormitories is a permitted use in the properties’ zone.  (Pb22)  Plaintiff does not cite to the record in support of this assertion.  (See ibid.)  This is because it is belied by the [...] code.  Defendants included the [...]’s Zoning Ordinance listing permitted principal uses for this zoning district in their Appendix.  (Da50-52)  It is clear that neither school nor religious-related uses are permitted in the Industrial Zone.  (See ibid.)  Moreover, as discussed in Point III infra, there is no restriction on the [...]’s use of the land it is to gain under the swap.  Assuming arguendo it is to construct religious dormitories, that cannot be “a prudent use of the [...]’s authority,” to “ensur[e] that public goals are met efficiently and effectively,” as Plaintiff suggests.  (Pb22)  The only evidence in the record regarding the municipality’s considerations for a public use are the ordinances adopted by the [...].  Those ordinances do not suggest any of these benefits raised in Plaintiff’s brief were considered by the [...].  The trial court denied Defendants’ request for an evidentiary hearing, so it was that limited record upon which the lower court affirmed the [...]’s right to take Defendants’ properties.  It is that same limited record now before this Court, which may not include the after-the-fact conceptions crafted by Plaintiff’s counsel.  Appellate courts have the power to set aside a condemnation “for an apparently valid public purpose” when “the real purpose is otherwise,” and this Court should exercise that power here.  *Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin*, 320 N.J. Super. 342, 345 (Law. Div. 1998) (citing *Essex Fells v. Kessler Inst. Of Rehab.*, 289 N.J. Super. 329, 338-39 (Law Div. 1995)).
[brief] permitted 128’ pier dock” and to “install two 12’ x 12’ open-type boat lifts and remove one boat lift . . . located at the end of the (current) pier dock” (“2017 Proposed Permit Modification”).  (Aa39-40; 22-29).  The existing dock and proposed extension are in a portion of the Barnegat Bay that contains submerged aquatic vegetation, a sensitive coastal ecosystem that can be readily damaged by boats and boat motors.  Recreational docks in that area must meet at least four feet of water depth.  [...]’s application included a survey, with subsequent revisions, showing the proposed location and a calculation of the square footage of the [...] dock and other pertinent information.  (Ra1).  On March 28, 2017, [...] sent a notice to the Trust detailing the proposed application and attached a copy of the survey.  (Aa41, 166).  [...] has no record of the Trust filing an objection to the application.  On April 7, 2017, [...] required a revision to [...]’s Initial Extension WFD Permit application shortening the dock to keep the mooring area in line with the CZM Rules requirement that there be a minimum water depth of four-feet to establish a new dock mooring area in Barnegat Bay (Aa20).  The aim of that water depth requirement is to protect the submerged aquatic vegetation and --- 2  “Aa” refers to Appellant’s appendices; “Ab” refers to Appellant’s merits brief; “Ra” refers to Co-Respondent [...]’s appendix. to minimize additional impacts to other aquatic resources where the dock extended beyond that depth.  On May 5, 2017, [...] required another revision to the [...] 2017 Modification Permit application.  (Ra2).  In total, [...]’s required revisions resulted in a reduced overall length of the proposed dock by about twenty feet.  (Id.; Aa20-21).  On May 19, 2017, [...] approved the [...] 2017 Modification Permit allowing a 4’ x 163.7’ dock extension, two 12’ x 12’ open-type boat lifts and removal of the existing boat lift “as shown on the plans referenced on the last page of the permit,” with conditions detailed in the permit approval and referencing the approved plans (“[...] 2017 Modification Permit”).
[brief] Therefore, the Court should reach the conclusion that [...] failed to establish that the purpose of the December 10, 1998 deed was merely to reaffirm [...]’s ownership in the property.  Given that his lawyer [...], who just prepared the June 28, 1998 deed less than half a year ago, *knew* that [...] and [...] were two different individuals, there are *only* two logic explanations for the creation of the December 10, 1998 deed: (1) the purpose of the December 10, 1998 deed was to transfer the title from [...] to [...] (namely, [...]), as reflected by the language stating [...] being the transferor and [...] being the transferee, (2) [...] purposefully created an identity issue that he and [...] were the same person, as reflected by the language stating that [...] and [...] are the same person, which would explain why he signed both his name and [...]’s name on the title transfer documents.
[brief] 27 GEICO. v. [...], 2013 WL 6384652, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2013)  ......................................................  27  GEICO v. [...], Consol.  Case Nos. [...] [...] & [...] (April 15, 2024)  .........................21,22 29,48  GEICO v. [...], 721 F. App’x 118 (3d Cir. 2018) ..........................................................
[brief] ”  (Pa70; see Pa66-80.)  By letter dated August 18, 2016, the [...] advised that “After evaluating this information and conducting interviews, the surveyor is unable to identify a citable deficient practice related to your concerns based on the State and federal regulations. ”  (Pa70.)  The [...] surveyor, [...], concluded that “The facility is in compliance with the requirements of 42 CFR Part 483, Subpart B, for --- 1  The procedural history and statement of facts are combined for purposes of concision and clarity.  long term care facilities, based on this complaint visit. ”  (Pa79.)²  (See Pb10-11.)  By way of orders on the parties’ in limine motions, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. denied plaintiff’s motion in limine to prohibit defendants from eliciting testimony regarding the conclusions reached by the [...] and [...], and directed that Defendant’s experts are limited to exclude any testimony regarding the conclusions reached by Department of Health and [...] in their July 7, 2016 Survey and the August 18, 2016 Letter to [...].
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT APPELLANT’S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS ACCRUED WHEN HIS CRIMINAL CASE WAS REVERSED BY THE SUPREME COURT AND WERE, THEREFORE, BARRED BY THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 WAS IN ERROR AND CONTRARY TO DECADES OF SETTLED LAW  HOLDING THAT THE CLAIM CARRIES  A SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  (Raised Below - Aa123-24; 1T12-22 to 14-9; Aa169-70; 2T13-15 to 15-2)  .................................................................8  A.  The Accrual Date For Malicious Prosecution Claims Are Determined By The Date The Prosecution Actually “Terminates,” Not By The Date The Case Is Reversed On Appeal, Requiring Reconsideration  ........................................11  B.  The Trial Court’s Finding that the Statute of Limitations for a Malicious Prosecution Claim is Two Years Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2’s Time Limitations for Personal Injury Claims is Contrary to Settled Law, Holding That a Malicious Prosecution Claim is Subject to a Six-Year Statute of Limitations Consistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1a ......................17  TABLE OF CONTENT POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT’S CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE FOR LIBEL AND SLANDER SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM PURSUANT TO THE TCA, IN AS MUCH AS THOSE CLAIMS WERE THE OBJECT OF AND IN FURTHERENCE OF APPELLANT’S CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY CLAIM (Raised Below – Aa81; Aa85; 1T15:19-24; 1T19:14-23; Aa121-22; 3T13:1 to 14-3)……………………………………………………………24  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE [...] DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BASED UPON THE SAME ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE TCA NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT  PREVIOUSLY APPLIED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE STATE’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLANT’S COMPLAINT (Raised Below – Aa241-48; 4T9:1 to 16:3, Aa250-60; 4T18:5 to 28:18; Aa270-76)……………………………………………………………28  POINT IV IN THE EVENT THIS COURT REVERSE AND REMANDS, THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT THAT THE CASE BE RETURNED TO ITS PROPER VENUE, [...], WHERE ORIGINALLY FILED AND THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE DIRECTED NOT TO ALLOW COUNSEL FOR THE EDISION TOWNSHIP DEFENDANTS TO ENGAGE MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION IN LIGHT OF THE CLEAR CONFLICT INHERENT IN THAT REPRESENTATION.
[brief] The insurance purchased is clearly meant to provide protection under the Workers Compensation Act and the Employers’ Liability Insurance Law and is designated as such.  The overwhelming expression of public policy underlying our workers compensation laws is to ensure full coverage for any injury and any obligation to pay arising therefrom.  The Legislature expressly excluded coverage for intentional wrongs under the WCA, N.J.S.A.  35:15-8.  It did not include that exclusion in the employers’ liability insurance law and instead mandated coverage for the complete payment of any obligation.  N.J.S.A. 35:15-71; N.J.S.A. 35:15-72.  The Legislature meant for financial obligations arising out of intentional wrongs to be covered.  The Legislature could easily have included an exclusion for intentional wrongs in the employers’ liability section of the statute but deliberately did not.  “Because of statutorily imposed omnibus requirements, any contractual attempt to exclude coverage for an [] insured will be held invalid.  Moreover, all parties subject to omnibus coverage requirements * * * must provide coverage. ”  Ryder/P.I.E., supra, 119 N.J. at 408 (1990).  The policy exclusion at bar is an "unwarranted attempt to diminish the extent of coverage required by statute" and must be held invalid as contrary to the Legislature’s expression of public policy.
[brief] The Trial Court also erred by denying [...]’s Motion to Amend the Court’s order granting summary judgment.  Finally, the Trial Court erred when it denied [...]’s improperly filed second dispositive motion – styled as a “Motion to Bar” [...]’s expert testimony – as moot, rather than with prejudice, for failing to comply with the Trial Court’s Case Management Order requiring any such motion to be filed by January 20, 2023.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully requests reversal (or modification) of the Trial Court orders: (1) granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) denying as “moot”, rather than with prejudice, of [...]’s Motion to Bar, and (3) denying [...]’s Motion to Amend pursuant to R. 4:49-2.
[brief] Thomas has no application in this matter.  In that case, the defendant, who had been sentenced to 13 years to life, was denied parole seven times, and when he petitioned for relief under Miller, the trial court refused to grant a hearing because he was already parole eligible.  Thomas, 470 N.J. Super. at 171, 179.  The defendant appealed and this court reversed, finding that “parole hearings fall far short of providing an adversarial hearing for defendant to demonstrate the degree of maturity and rehabilitation,” because, among other weaknesses, such hearings do not afford the right to counsel, to call and cross-examine witness, or to proffer expert testimony.  Id. at 194-95.  This court then ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing.  Id. at 201.  Here, unlike Thomas, defendant was already provided with a resentencing hearing where he was allowed to call, cross-examine witnesses, and proffer expert testimony.  The fact that he is dissatisfied with the outcome does not mean that the hearing was inadequate.  Defendant’s criticism of the parole process is entirely meritless.
[brief] The doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions without threat of suit for damages.  See *Bradley v. Fisher*, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872).  *Figueroa v. Blackburn*, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000).  Judicial immunity is "for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.  "  *Loigman v. Twp. Comm.*, 185 N.J. 566, 581 (2006) citing *Pierson v. Ray*, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 294 (1967).  The price paid for that public benefit is that even a "judge . . . accused of acting maliciously and corruptly" receives the protection of the immunity.  *Ibid.*  The purpose of the privilege is not to protect the few judges who may be corrupt, but to encourage fearless decision-making by the vast majority of judges who are honest.  See Ibid.  Judicial immunity applies to constitutional claims in New Jersey law as well.
[brief] In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).  A “strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to [an agency decision].”  In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993)).  “In order to reverse an agency’s judgment, an appellate court must find the agency’s decision to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ’”  Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).  To determine whether an agency decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the Court looks to: (1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.  [Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (additional citations omitted)).]  Moreover, a court generally does not “not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s, even though the court might have reached a different result. ”  Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting Carter, 191 N.J. at 483).  “This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed to the agency’s special ‘expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field. ’”  Id. at 195 (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).  Furthermore, “[i]t is settled that ‘[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to [this court’s] deference. ’”  E.S v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 412 N.J. Super. 340, 355 (App. Div. 2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001) (additional citations omitted)).  Here, the [...]’s denial of [...]’s property claim, in which [...] sought reimbursement for the inability to return refried beans to an outside vendor, was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable because the [...]’s denial was consistent with its statutory authority to administer prison policy.
[brief] Exhibit 18, Meeting Minutes, dated July 29, 2014, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 19, Emails, dated August 17 and 25, 2015, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 19, [...] Internal Traffic Control Plan Worksheet, undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 20, Deposition of [...], dated April 25, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 21, OSHA letter with citations and penalties, dated January 12, 2015, filed May 31, 2018  Movant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, filed June 14, 2018
[brief] SAC ¶ 10.  Between June 2017 and October 2017, the parties were engaged in negotiations for plaintiffs to purchase the subject brownfield outright from defendants, and negotiated the terms whereby the 20 year land lease would be converted to a purchase/sale of the land, and the parties were negotiating the price.  SAC ¶ 11.  During this same period, rather than engaging in good faith negotiations with plaintiff, defendant sought and entertained “offers” from other suitors not only for the Solar Rights it had already sold but also for the land lease, or a sale/purchase of the brownfield.  Such actions were in violation of plaintiffs’ rights under the assignment of rights as to the Solar Rights and under the land lease.  SAC ¶ 12.  In particular, the confidentiality covenant contained in the land lease bound [...] from revealing any facts within the lease or about plaintiffs’ purchase/acquisition of the solar-energy developmental rights at all.  [...] Estates was expressly prohibited from disclosing the substantive information about plaintiffs’ land/lease, and thus the secret negotiations with [...]  Defendants to double sell and double lease was clearly unlawful, even criminal.  While [...] defendant and plaintiff [...] were engaged in negotiations to convert their land lease to a purchase/sale transaction, on or about September 5, 2017, defendant [...] Estates served a notice to cure for alleged nonpayment of annual rent due September 1, 2017, with a cure date of September 16, 2017; and thereupon on October 17, 2017, [...] ultimately served a notice of breach, but has yet to obtain any judicial declaration of eviction from any tenancy court, and thereby engaged in self-help commercial eviction.
[brief] (Pa141)  [...] filed its motion to compel arbitration on December 20, 2023 (Pa163) and its demand for arbitration with [...] on March 27, 2024.  (Dr39)  [...] has been permitted to participate throughout this litigation notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ objection that it failed to file an Answer and identify its defenses as required by the Rules of Court (below).  On August 16, 2024, Plaintiffs received a Dismissal Notice from the Superior Court pursuant to R. 1:13-7 advising that [...] and [...] were subject to being dismissed as parties.  (Pra272)  After speaking with [...] counsel, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enter default against [...] pursuant to R. 4:43-2 on October 15, 2024 as required by the Dismissal Notice.  (Pra272)  On November 8, 2024, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion with a handwritten decision:  “Denied w/o prejudice pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. ”  (Dr82)  On December 5, 2024, Plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to enter default against [...] and suppress its brief was denied by the Appellate Division on December 20, 2024.
[brief] “While it is undeniable that Plaintiff has a right to the email correspondences from the private email accounts of the Board members, that right cannot be extended to include email logs from personal, non-Board-issued email accounts. ” (Id.).  Plaintiff is free to request specific emails that can be printed from a private server belonging to an official in which government business is discussed.  He may not, however, redefine under OPRA an email log that can be generated only using proprietary systems of a private cloud-based email server as a government record.  CONCLUSION  The Appellate Court should affirm the decision that the Defendants were not required by OPRA to generate or disclose to Plaintiff email logs from the private email accounts of the District’s Board of Education members.