ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Lucier v. Williams, et al., 366 N.J. Super 485, 500 (2004) (defendants’ submission of a motion for summary judgment did not waive right to arbitration); see also Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508,514 (App.Div. 2008) (quoting Hudik-Ross, Inc. v. 1530 Palisade Ave. Corp., 131 N.J. Super. 159, 167 (App. Div. 1974)) (“‘[T]he mere institution of legal proceedings ... without ostensible prejudice to the other party’ does not constitute a waiver [of an arbitration provision].”).  In addition, Plaintiff’s claim that this matter “would have been decided months earlier in Chancery” had Defendants not “violated” the March 8, 2023 Order is purely speculative and misstates the record.
[brief] However, even if the Court properly determined that the cure rendered the defect immaterial because [...] was always qualified, it is not proper to discount the initial infirmity or the period of uncertainty.  For twenty-one (21) days, including thirteen (13) days after rejection of [...]’s bid, the County did not know whether the ostensible lowest bidder was qualified to perform the Project.  That information was not located elsewhere in the bid.  Da212-348; cf. Tec Elec., 284 N.J. Super. at 486, 488 (trial court finding waiver mandatory where “all tenets of the public bidding process were effectively met” and “[t]he information provided on the Prequalification Affidavit simply and essentially duplicates what Tec had already submitted with its bid. ”).  Our public bidding paradigm dictates that public entities should have assurance of performance on the bid date; indeed, a contrary rule is inconsistent with the notion of having a single \(^3\) [...] submits that a refusal to reject in this circumstance would arise to the level of a clear abuse of discretion, but the Court need not decide that.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(c).  The NJCFLA requires character and fitness examinations for licensees, including criminal background checks, to ensure that potential bad actors do not engage in credit transactions with consumers.  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-16 sets net worth and liquidity requirements for licensees and applicants to ensure transparency and adequate capitalization.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-37 sets interest caps for consumer loans.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-40 limits what and how much secured collateral can be demanded from consumers.  And N.J.S.A. 17:11C-42 requires availability of books and records for inspection to ensure compliance in consumer facing transactions.  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) expressly provides consumers with remedies (voiding of the contract and treble damages).  These are just some of the NJCFLA’s provisions established to benefit and protect consumers such as [...] by remedying deficiencies in prior existing law.  Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of private enforcement.
[brief] ” (4T4:24 -5:1).  Pursuant to Rule 1:13-1, a party may motion the court to correct errors in judgments or “other parts of the record” arising from an oversight or omission.  Here, the trial court correctly concluded that there was no clerical error to justify revision of the order of dismissal as to State Defendants, nor was there any basis for modification of the final order.  In requesting that the court modify the order of dismissal, [...] asked the court to rewrite history and indicate –falsely –that he filed an opposition to State Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  The trial court also aptly rejected any suggestion that State Defendants’ clerical error on the notice of motion could justify “correcting” the dismissal order, noting that “obviously, just a cursory reading of the motion itself, which is quite voluminous showed that the motion that it was a motion to dismiss. ” (4T4:3-11).  There is no support for [...]’s theory that the clerical error on the notice of motion was deliberate or a “dirty trick. ”  The motion was filed as a “motion to dismiss” as reflected in the eCourts docket and notices.  (SDa111; SDa116-18).  Moreover, the filing itself included a proposed order for dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, a brief supporting a motion to dismiss, and a certificate of service related to a motion to dismiss.  (SDa4-5; SDa8-37).  In addition, the return date of the motion was commensurate with the longer period for a motion to dismiss.  (SDa2).  For unknown reasons, although [...] could have filed a motion for reconsideration in which he could have advanced any substantive arguments in response to State Defendants’ arguments in their motion to dismiss, he chose instead only to file the motion to “correct” the dismissal order.  Lastly, to the extent that [...] might have made below the arguments he makes in this court about whether he has stated any cognizable claims against State Defendants, those arguments would have failed, for the reasons set forth previously in this brief.  Therefore, denying the motion to modify the July 10, 2023, court order was not in error, and the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] A.  I was in the operating room finishing up with my Cesarean section when the nurse physically came into the operating room and she told me that, or can I look at the tracing and, and then I looked at the tracing and she told me that probably they need me in the room so since my case was about to finish there, the Cesarean section, I just talked to the resident just to finish it and make sure everything is fine with that patient, then I walked from the operating room to the room with the nurse.
[brief] (3T 4-6 to 21)  [...] granted the motion for reconsideration and acknowledged that [...] had not said the GCPO lines were recorded.  (3T 14-10 to 15-14)  Rather, [...] had interpreted [...]’s statement that the GCPO phones used banked numbers—preventing people from calling them back—to mean they were recorded lines.5  (3T 14-23 to 15-14)  Nonetheless, [...] found that the facts bearing on the statement’s admissibility remained the same: [...] had invoked his right to counsel to end questioning, [...] did not try to re-warn him before placing the calls to his parents from [...]’s cell phone, and the call process was the functional equivalent of interrogation.  (3T 18-17 to 19-4, 20-8 to 22)  5  At the same time, [...] acknowledged that the GCPO phones were not the only option for [...]’s calls to his parents.  (1T 141-9 to 17)  [...] testified acknowledged that he could have used his work phone but that did not family members of suspects calling him back for updates.  (1T 141-12 to 142-8)  When asked if it was possible for [...] to have a private, unrecorded phone call with his mother, [...] testified, “No, we did not have that capability. ”  (1T 142-9 to 16)  Consequently, the revised factual finding did not affect his conclusion that the phone call process was the functional equivalent of a continued interrogation despite [...]’s invocation of his rights, such that suppression was required.  (3T 15-11 to 18-22, 19-5 to 7, 20-23 to 21-10)
[brief] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law dismissing all counts of plaintiff’s complaint on summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact were found to exist as to the application of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Trial Court afforded no deference to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, on the issue of damages.  (Pa111; (April 4, 2022))  The issues on appeal relate to the trial court’s legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the facts.  These issues are subject to plenary review by the Court.  See Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).  On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)(emphasis added).  Further, the trial court may not resolve contested factual issues; rather, it may only determine whether there are any genuine factual disputes.  Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J. Super. 519, 525 (App. Div. 2005).  A determination of whether there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  Id. at 540.
[brief] 14 | | **Valenti v. Bassinder,**<br>A-2255-12T3, 2014 WL 861487<br>(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 6, 2014) .....................................................  14 | | **Walker v. Giuffre,**<br>209 N.J. 124 (2012)................................................................................... 5, 6, 8 | | **Yueh v. Yueh,**<br>329 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2000).................................................. 9-10 | ### Statutes & Other Authorities: | --- | | **N.J.S.A. 2A:18-55** ...........................................................................................................
[brief] *State v. Welek*, 10 N.J. 355 (1952).  Unless he can establish that his right to a fair trial has been irretrievably lost, the trial court should deny his motion to dismiss the indictment.  *State v. Abbati*, 99 N.J. 418, 425 (1985); *Peterkin*, 226 N.J. Super. at 39.  Except in rare circumstances, the State’s loss or even destruction of an important piece of evidence does not violate a defendant’s rights.
[brief] After stonewalling several other realtors and potential purchasers, plaintiff agreed to accept (unauthorized) $500,000 sale price for the Subject Property.  54.  Plaintiff never obtained unanimous consent prior to accepting the $500,000 offer.  55.  Plaintiff informed the five siblings of his acceptance of the $500,000 offer, despite the fact that he did not have unanimous consent, as required by the Consent Judgment, and the fact that at least one other sibling had asked plaintiff to seek a higher price for the Subject Property.  64.  I was informed that there were numerous other realtors and prospective buyers interested in the Subject Property, but none were given access by [...] or plaintiff – the entire sales process was apparently being stonewalled in order to effectuate and finalize the all-cash, lowball offer by the [...].
[brief] Somebody-you've got to talk to somebody who is a senior member and say we got to dig in here and find out what this [...] did, and under whose instruction, because I - - I don't have a - - I have a feeling he wouldn't know how to prepare those documents himself.  It would have had to come from another lawyer in the firm who may have known how to prepare corporate documents, a trust - - I don't know what.  So, we've got a lot of investigation to do.
[brief] *Id.* at 606.  We further explained:  We do not mean to suggest the familiar practice of having a trial witness point to the defendant sitting at counsel table is a talisman carved in stone.  [...] aptly recognized in *Henderson* that scientific research on human memory and the reliability of eyewitness identifications will continue to evolve.  [208 N.J.] at 219.  We are not persuaded, however, that we have the evidential foundation upon which to grant the fundamental change defendant seeks.  In *Henderson*, the reform of New Jersey's eyewitness identification jurisprudence was supported by an extensive report of a special master appointed by the Court to compile and evaluate the scientific evidence regarding eyewitness identifications.  *Id.* at 228-29.  Using that example of scientific groundwork as a benchmark, the record before us in this case is inadequate to test the validity and utility of in-court identifications.  *[Id. at 606-07.]*  In any event, we concluded this was not “an appropriate case in which to decide whether to abandon an established practice” given its decision to remand for an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases 539 Absecon Boulevard, L.L.C. v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P’ship, 406 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................................21  Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 345 N.J. Super. 78 (App. Div. 2001)  ..................................................................................19  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ...................... 12, 13  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) ...........................................13  CSFB 2001-CP-4 Princeton Park Corporate Center, LLC v. SB Rental I, LLC, 410 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2009) .....................................................19  Dontzin v. Myer, 301 NJ. Super. 501 (App. Div. 1997) ........................................19  FDIC v. Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 1041 (4th Cir. 1995) ............................19  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2000) .........................................................................................18  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ......................................12  Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N. J. 36 (1960) ........................................19 Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998) .............................................12 Rosenberg v. D. Kaltman & Co., 28 N.J. Super. 459 (Ch. Div. 1953) ...............17 Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011) ..........................21 Spaulding Composites Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2001), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 176 N.J. 25 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1142 (2004) ........................................................................................................19 State v. Amboy Nat. Bank, 447 N.J. Super. 142 (App. Div.), certif. denied 288 N.J. 249 (2016) .........................................................................................21 Tarabokia v. Structure Tone, 429 N.J. Super. 103 (App.Div.2012) ....................12  Rules R. 2:6-2 ..................................................................................................................  20 R. 4:46-1 ..................................................................................................................  11 R. 4:46-2 ..................................................................................................................  11, 12, 13  TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  ORDER AND STATEMENT OF REASONS  GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE HON.  [...], J.S.C., DECEMBER 8, 2023…………Da166-Da167, Da170-180  ORDER AND STATEMENT OF REASONS  DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE HON.  [...], J.S.C., DECEMBER 8, 2023…………………………Da168-Da180  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT, DATED DECEMBER 8, 2023…..1T  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Subj: Surety Bond Registry; Revised Bail Program Registration Form  This directive outlines a change in the bail registry procedure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:31-13 which requires that "a surety company shall register with the Clerk of the Superior Court the name and address of each bail agent or agency authorized by the surety company to write bail."  ·  The Office of the Superior Court Clerk maintains the Surety Bond Registry containing contact information for all corporate insurance companies, their bail agencies, agents and guarantors of surety bonds.  To be authorized to post bail in the State of New Jersey, one must be active in the Surety Bond Registry.  To register an agency or agent with the Clerk of the Superior Court for inclusion in the Registry, a corporate sponsor must complete and submit a Bail Program Registration Form.  Corporate sponsors have "a continuing obligation to update [their] Bail Program Registration Forms as changes occur in order to assure that the information is complete and accurate."  Rule 1 :13-3(d).  Furthermore, failure to update the Bail Program Registry Form shall result in removal from the Surety Bond Registry upon 30 days' notice.  Rule 1 :13-3(e)(1).  The Clerk of the Superior Court; pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1:13-3(e)(2), is responsible for removing a corporate surety, its agencies, and its agents for failure to satisfy outstanding bail judgments.  In such situations where there has been removal and where one or more bail forfeiture judgments naming the removed registrant, agency, administrator, managing agent or guarantor remain open, the Clerk of the Superior Court shall deny any request to add any agents of that removed entity to the registry as agents for another entity pursuant to Rule 1 :13-3(d).  Additionally, as to authorized agents that have one or more outstanding bail judgments but have not been removed from the Registry, the Clerk of the Superior Court shall deny any request to add such agent to the registry as an agent for another entity pursuant to Rule 1 :13-3(d).  [...] • [...] · [...]  Directive #09-14 Page2
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da255 Exh A (Emails of [...] to [...] dated March 27, 2023 and April 3, 2023)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da270 Exh B (Email of [...], Esq.  To [...], Esq. dated May 4, 2023-Redacted as Redundant, see Da070 and Second Addendum to Agreement of Sale executed by [...] (undated)-Redacted as Redundant)  . . .  Da071 Exh C (Transcript of the November 29, 2023 Deposition of [...])  . . . . . . . . .  Da272 Exh D (H&G Hardware v. Cohen, A0667-04T2 2006 WL 27624 (App.Div. Jan 6, 2006)) . . . . . . . . Da335 Plaintiff’s Reply Brief dated January 29, 2024 (Legal Argument Redacted Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da342 Exh Z (First Addendum to Contract of Sale between Defendants and [...] ([...])-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da096 Letter Memorandum of [...], Esq. to [...] supplementing Plaintiff’s Reply Brief with Plaintiff’s appended Counter Statement to Defendants’ Counter Statement of Material Facts dated February 7, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da344 Defendants’ Letter Memorandum of [...], Esq. dated February 12, 2024 (Legal Argument Redacted Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)). . . . . . . . Da349 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion For Summary Judgment and denying the [...]’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment entered By [...] on February 20, 2024
[brief] 16.  On or about October 13, 2020, a demand was filed by [...] seeking recovery of $5,000.00 on behalf of [...] as a result of an automobile collision that reportedly occurred in New Jersey on October 18, 2018.  This arbitration was assigned [...] (Da172-Da177).  15.  On October 27, 2022 the arbitrator denied [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibits [...]’s Med-Pay subrogation claim and as a result, the dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement.
[brief] Finally, in Count 18, Petitioner asserts that the totality of the Board’s actions regarding the referendum amounts to a “campaign to unduly influence the electorate. ”  (40a.)  Once again, even if accepted as true, Petitioner fails to plead with any specificity any facts supporting a violation of section (g).  In sum, Petitioner’s allegations regarding section (g) are insufficient in their entirety and the Commission rightly dismissed them.
[brief] In conclusion, for the reasons set forth herein, [...] respectfully requests that this Court vacate and reverse the [...]’s approval of the Flood Hazard Area Verification & Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit, [...], [...], dated August 14, 2023.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Appellant  [...]  Dated: May 20, 2024  /s/[...]_____________________  [...], Esq.  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
[brief] [...] admitted that [...] could terminate Appellants’ Lease when he failed to make the annual rent payments.  (Pa001828).  (“If they own the land and somebody defaults, then they can do what they want from there. ”).  Of equal importance, [...] acknowledged the crucial importance of site control when he admitted that “[w]e would not move forward and spend the serious money without having site control or an option for site control. ” (Pa001831).  Moreover, when pressed as to whether an entity would purchase [...]’s “development rights” without land control, [...] admitted “[y]ou need site control to build a project, that is correct. ” (Pa001832).  [...] was also aware that [...], a solar regulatory agency, had terminated the Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (“WMPA”) with [...] by January of 2018.
[brief] Defendants’ obligations under the PSA are clear: Defendants are to cooperate with Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s LSRP to secure prior to closing, to the extent possible, a site-wide RAO.  (Pa0261, Art. 11.2.)  And as demonstrated by the evidence and testimony from trial, it was and remains entirely possible for Defendants to work toward and ultimately obtain the site-wide RAO with relatively minimal effort.  (4T140:7 to 142:6; 6T122:21 to 126:15; 8T69:7 to 70:21.)  And, pursuant to Article 11.2(b) of the PSA, Plaintiff is entitled to extend the Closing Date until Defendants satisfy the Seller’s Environmental Obligations under Article 11—that is, until Defendants obtain a site-wide RAO for the Property.  (Pa0261, Art. 11.2(b). )  As to the remedy, pursuant to Article 13.2 of the PSA, Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the PSA in the event of a default by Defendants, which includes the Defendants’ failure to satisfy the Seller’s Environmental Obligations.  (Pa0265, Art. 13.2.)  However, rather than requiring Defendants to comply with their contractual obligations, the trial court’s order for specific performance provided Plaintiff the opportunity to either (i) close on the Property within thirty (30) days and assume the responsibility for obtaining the RAO, or (ii) terminate the contract.  (Pa0192-93.)  There is nothing in the PSA to indicate that the parties contemplated shifting the Seller’s Environmental Obligations to Plaintiff.  Rather, as in *89 Water Street Assocs.*, it was improper for the trial court to unilaterally shift the burden of Defendants’ contractual obligation to obtain the RAO to Plaintiff and effectively rewrite the PSA.  See 2019 WL 4793073, at *8-11; Kieffer, 205 N.J. at 223.  In sum, the trial court’s interpretation of the PSA is unsupported by the evidence and the law.  The PSA expressly provides that the Seller’s Environmental Obligations include obtaining a site-wide RAO to the extent possible, and by all accounts, it was and remains possible for Defendants to do so.  Moreover, because the PSA imposes the obligation to obtain the RAO on Defendants, the trial court’s order for specific performance is improper as a matter of law.  Accordingly, the Final Judgment should be reversed as to Count One of the Complaint, and Plaintiff is entitled to an order for specific performance requiring Defendants to satisfy their obligations under the PSA and obtain a site-wide RAO.
[directive] Crisis Intervention Trained Officers.  2.2  Law enforcement officers who have been specially trained to identify persons in mental health crisis and work with mental health professionals to coordinate with appropriate resources and obtain services for those persons.  Such training includes specific techniques in communication and de-escalation, such as that provided by CIT (Crisis Intervention Team) training.  See Section 2.5 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  Crisis Negotiation Team.