ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] BUREAU [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF October 15, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS...........  3  A.  The Complaint, and Judge’s First Ruling on the Motion to Suppress ..................................................................................  11  B.  The Motion for Reconsideration ..............................................................................  13  C.  The Subsequent Indictment ..................................................................................  15  D.  Judge’s Second Ruling on the Motion to Suppress, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment with Prejudice ..................................................................................  15  E.  The Motions for Leave to Appeal .........................................................................  20  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................
[brief] Similarly, there was no basis for an award of delay penalties, since neither the Township nor the Planning Board failed to take any action required by the Settlement Agreement and the provision regarding the imposition of penalties only applies to a failure to take timely action required under the Settlement Agreement.  The very fact that [...] did not seek the penalty while the parties were working out the details of the Resolution despite the passage of more than thirty (30) days after the vote, shows that the Board’s conduct did not violate the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] Mistaken Assertion on Exhaustion of Remedies  On page 15a, third paragraph, the trial court mistakenly asserts that the parties have abandoned their claims that the other party failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.  For the Plaintiff, this is incorrect.  This matter was fully briefed in the Motion for Reconsideration.  The [...] did not protest or appeal the Notice of Filing issued by the [...] in 1986, 1987, and 2014, which removes the basis for an objection to the 100-foot setback granted in the Pinelands waiver.  The defendant [...] cannot now reject the Pinelands findings when their parent, the City, did not object.  f.
[brief] In Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for unjust enrichment against Defendants by claiming Defendants have been unjustly enriched as a result of allegedly failing to pay the alleged “Third Loan. ”  “To establish unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show both that defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust.  The unjust enrichment doctrine requires that plaintiff show that it expected remuneration from the defendant at the time it performed or conferred a benefit on defendant and that the failure of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual rights. ”  VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994).  The Court must dismiss Count II because Defendants have not been unjustly enriched since there was no “Third Loan. ”  As articulated above, the alleged “Third Loan” is a complete fabrication with no evidentiary support.  First, it is undisputed that [...] signed a Discharge of Mortgage certifying that the $330,000 Loan had been “Paid in Full. ”  [...] admits that he signed the Discharge of Mortgage and does not dispute the authenticity of the Discharge of Mortgage.  Second, it is undisputed there is no document memorializing any alleged “Third Loan” or agreement in April 2013, a fact which [...] admits.  The August 7, 2013 e-mail is insufficient to constitute a written acknowledgement of a “Third Loan” for the reasons previously stated.  Third, it is undisputed that until [...]’ attorneys sent [...] a letter seven years later on February 20, 2020, [...] did not make any written demand to [...] of any kind whatsoever regarding payment on the alleged “Third Loan. ”  [...]’ failure to seek payment on the alleged “Third Loan” for over seven (7) years demonstrates that the alleged “Third Loan” never existed.  All the evidence together leads to the unavoidable resolution that the alleged “Third Loan” was never entered into between [...] and [...].  Since the alleged “Third Loan” did not occur, Defendants did not retain any benefit at the expense of Plaintiff, and Defendants were thus not unjustly enriched.  Thus, the Court must dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
[brief] [...] delivered the July 1, 2016 countersigned letter and the guarantee allegedly signed by [...] and [...] to [...] by email dated July 11, 2016 (Pa1373).  The contract documents consisted of a Lease, Rider to the Lease, Option Agreement and letter memorandum dated July 1, 2016 drafted by [...] and countersigned by all parties.  Relevant portions of the “Landlord Lease” [...] negotiated are as follows:
[brief] On or about January 20, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. [...] (the “Complaint”) against Defendant-Respondents [...], [...], and [...], and [...] (“the Emmanouil Defendants”)(collectively “Defendants”).  The Complaint asserted causes of action for defamation and violations of Plaintiff’s right to privacy based on allegations that Defendants published information regarding Plaintiff’s criminal --- 1  Because they are closely related, the Procedural History and Statement of Facts relevant to Plaintiff’s Appeal are combined to avoid repetition and for the Court’s convenience. record, including information that had allegedly been expunged from Plaintiff’s criminal record, on the public docket of another case pending in federal court, captioned [...], et al., v. [...], et al., Civil Action No. [...].  (Pa 146 – 150).  On February 17, 2010, Defendants removed the Complaint to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (Civil Action No. [...].  (Da 1).  On February 19, 2010, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in federal court.  (Da 11).  On February 22, 2010, Plaintiff moved to remand the case back to Monmouth County.  (Da 13).  On April 14, 2010, the Hon. [...], U.S.D.J., denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that Plaintiff fraudulently joined [...] and [...] as defendants solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction.  Judge Pisano also granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to [...] and [...] because any statements made regarding Plaintiff’s criminal history were protected by the absolute litigation privilege.  He dismissed the claims against the Emmanouil Defendants based on the applicable statute of limitations.
[brief] ”  If [...] had properly questioned [...], there would have been no ambiguity and Plaintiff, [...], would have received the benefit of the forgiveness that his father intended.  In his decision, the Judge concluded that Article Three contained “an ambiguity … that ha[d] to be resolved” in that from reading the article's two sentences it was not clear whether [...] intended to forgive the debt as to Anthony only or “that he want[ed] the entire debt forgiven.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esquire  NJ  Attorney ID No. 309182022  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Authorities iii  Preliminary Statement  1  Legal Argument  2  Point I  2  [...]'s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the Parol Evidence Rule Should Have Been Granted; the Alleged Oral Misrepresentations Should Have Been Barred; and the Plaintiffs Left to Prove that the Technical Violations Alleged Three Years After Filing the Initial Complaint Caused Ascertainable Loss.  (2T35:15-38:2; Da 1096)  Point II 7 The RETA Controlled  Each of the Timeshare Transactions at Issue in this Case and the CFA Should not have been Charged; the Award Under the CFA Should be Vacated.  (Da 1158-1181; Da 1421).  Point III  10  There is a Conflict Between the RETA Statute and the Regulations Regarding Delivery of the Public Offering Statement (Da 1176-77).  Conclusion  14  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bandler v. Landry’s, 464 N.J. Super. 311 (App. Div. 2020) | 8 | | Berman v. Gurwicz, 199 N.J. Super. 89 (Chancery Div. 1981) | 5 | | Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. 259 (2005) | 4 | | Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal “Z” Ena, Inc., 251 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 1991) | 5 | | Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1977) | 7 | | Sun Chemical Corporation v. File Corporation, 243 N.J.
[brief] Zone and [...] does not regulate floor area ratio in the R-20A Zone.  [Da356].  Why a building housing a multi-level senior housing community would create greater visual impacts than a dwelling with the same building configuration is not explained by the Board.  In light of this and the absence of any basis as to why the third story inside the building will create visual impacts, the conclusion to draw is that the Board’s post-hoc rationalization is simply in service of supporting an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable decision.
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Co-Appellant [...]  [...]  P.O. Box 5016  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  CAPTION CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  .........................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .......................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED  BECAUSE [...] IS NOT ONE OF THE SPECIFIC CLASSES OF ENTITY WHICH ARE EXPLICITLY PERMITTED TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROCEDURES
[brief] (Da439-442.)  In total, the principals of [...] incurred expenses of approximately $30,000 in preparation for the CRB application alone.  (Da433.)  All of this effort was expended well before the Ordinance was even introduced.  Thereafter, in order to secure the remainder of their local approvals and continue fighting to open their business at the Property, [...]’ principals incurred additional expenses exceeding $100,000.
[directive] Establish Incident Command and Designate Incident Commander.  4.2  The first responding officer is responsible for the incident until relieved by higher authority.  A supervisor shall respond to the scene and establish incident command.  The supervisor should begin to determine what resources are needed and start the process of having resources respond to the incident.  Resources may include but are not limited to a special response or tactical team, crisis negotiators, mental health professionals, ARRIVE Together teams, and specialized equipment.  8
[brief] Even after the “essential worker” finding by the Workers’ Compensation Court, the Petitioner still needs to prove that Decedent: 1) contracted the virus during the claimed occupational exposure period (January 2021 through her passing on May 18, 2021); and 2) that the Covid 19 virus was a material cause of her death.  The statutory presumption is rebuttable and the Respondent has the right to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Decedent contracted Covid 19 outside the workplace.  The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge should be affirmed because Decedent, as a teacher, was correctly determined to be an essential worker during the time of the presumption period under N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.  The case should proceed to trial in the Workers’ Compensation Court.
[brief] Four years prior to entering into the PSA, in or about July 2017, [...]’s predecessor entered into a commercial lease with [...] (“[...]”) under which [...] leased certain commercial space at the Property.  (Da282-312.)  --- ²  Citations to T refer to the transcript of oral argument on the Motion.  ³  The Order and Judgment also granted those interlocutory portions of the Motion which are not yet ripe for review.  “Commencement Date” under the lease was originally set as August 1, 2019.  (Da282.)  However, the Commencement Date was subsequently moved back by three successive amendments to December 1, 2020.  (Da316-321.)  The first of these amendments also changed the financing contingency date from March 1, 2018, to January 31, 2020.  (Da316.)  The amendments did not change any substantive provision of the lease.  (Da282-312.)  In or about the first half of 2021, [...] and [...] had a dispute concerning the beginning of rent payments under the lease, and [...]’s obligation to provide certain parking spots to [...], with [...] insisting, contrary to the terms of the lease, that the parking spots were required to be immediately outside the building.  (Da341.)  Accordingly, in early November 2021, and prior to [...] entering into the PSA with [...], [...] commenced an action against [...], substantially for the purposes of forcing [...] to commence rent payments.  (Id.)  That action was settled in April 2022, by way of a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”).  (Da328.)  The Settlement Agreement did not amend the lease in any way.  (Id.)  Rather, the settlement agreement required [...] to make certain defined rent payments and specified that actions taken by [...] with respect to parking had, indeed, complied with and satisfied the lease.  The PSA [...] and [...] entered into the PSA on November 15, 2021.
[brief] Much like the documents [...] put forth in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, in its Motion to Amend, the “new” documents were outdated (from 2008 through 2014) and related to nonparties and unrelated companies.  Documents from over 10 years ago do not establish that [...] was a franchise of [...] or that there was a written arrangement between the parties.  The trial court correctly held that there must be a written arrangement granting a license.  There was no written arrangement, and Appellant’s “new” documents fail to meet the threshold.  The other emails in the last-ditch 179-page production from [...] that do not mention [...] or [...] fail to change any of the material facts in this case—there is no written arrangement and transfer of a license between [...] and [...].  These new documents merely pile on to the same approach [...] unsuccessfully attempted in opposition to [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  The emails simply refer to shipments and payments of products, product availability, and distributor and dealer pricing (which included other contacts in the email chain); this does not equate to a franchise agreement or written arrangement of any sort.  It undoubtedly does not equate to the transfer of a license.  Emails showing that the parties were doing business does not demonstrate a written arrangement and it does not demonstrate the transfer of a license.  Appellant’s herculean efforts to stretch the facts fall fatally short of the requirements of the NJFPA.  This Court must affirm the trial court’s holdings.
[brief] In *Spivey*, the judge permitted the defendant to return to the courtroom after removing him for moaning, kicking and singing, among other things, but upon his return he “continued his disruptive tactics. ”  122 N.J. Super. at 255.  This Court held that the judge “clearly gave defendant every opportunity to be present in the courtroom. ”  Id. at 256.  Similarly, in Reddy, the defendant was removed from the courtroom after several warnings and repeated disruptive behavior.  137 N.J. Super. at 36.  He was told that he could return if he agreed to behave himself.  Ibid.  This Court concluded that “the judge conducted this troublesome phase of the proceeding properly and in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Illinois v. Allen. ”  Ibid.  Here, the court did not abide by the guidelines set forth in Allen.
[brief] 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................  2 POINT I THE BOARD PROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACTS NECESSARY TO DENY THE 2018 AMENDED APPLICATION ............ 2 POINT II THE BOARD PROPERLY DENIED THE APPLIATION DUE TO THE SIGNIFICANT VARIANCE RELIEF NOT PRESENT IN THE 2015 APPLICATION .................................................. 4 POINT III RESPONDENTS MISREPRESENT THE TIMELINE AND UNDERLYING FACTS CONCERNING THE 2015 APPLICATION AND THE 2018 AMENDED APPLICATION ............................... 6 POINT IV RESPONDENTS’ PURPORTED MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE PURPOSE OF TECHNICAL REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETINGS IS CONTRARY TO THE RECORD ........................................  8 POINT V RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY SUFFICIENT BASIS TO GRANT RELIEF FROM THE PROVISION OF THE ROUTE 33 SIGNAL .... 11 CONCLUSION ................................................................. 15
[brief] Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on its Builder’s Remedy Claim  Plaintiff is likely to prevail on its claim for a builder’s remedy.  [...] has already been judged to be constitutionally noncompliant by at least 602 units, and discovery regarding the suitability of the Property for an inclusionary development has been exchanged.  Although [...] disputes the suitability of the Property for residential development, the underlying zone for the Property permits multifamily residential development and the commercial redevelopment sought by [...] is clearly indicative that there are no significant physical or environmental restraints which would render the Property unsuitable.  The Township merely does not want to see a residential development on the Property, which is irrelevant in determining site suitability and in granting a builder’s remedy.
[brief] began. ””  Id. at 134.  Equitable remedies are designed to be both broad and flexible, such that they can be tailored to redress even the most complicated grievances.  Banach v. Cannon, 356 N.J. Super. 342, 361 (Ch. Div. 2002).  Before granting interim injunctive relief, a court must consider: (1) whether the injunction is “necessary to prevent irreparable harm;” (2) whether “the legal right underlying the claim is unsettled;” (3) whether the applicant has made “a preliminary showing of a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits;” and (4) “the relative hardship to the parties in granting or denying [injunctive] relief.
[brief] Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506 (2011)  ..................18 State v. Bealar, 187 N.J. 574 (2006).........................................................28 State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982)............................................................38 State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533 (2004).........................................................36-37 State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412 (2021).......................................................23-24 State v. Harte, 395 N.J. Super. 162 (Law Div. 2006)..............................36 State v. Labrusco, 114 N.J. 187 (1988)...................................................28 State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295 (1996).........................................................45 State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011).....................................................28-29, 32 State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397 (2020)......................................................23-24 State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998)......................................................38 State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567 (2018).........................................................23 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469 (2017).......................................................23 State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365 (2012).......................................................45 State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 2000), certif. den. 165 N.J. 492 (2000)........................................................................................................38 Twp. of Manalapan v. Gentile, 242 N.J. 295 (2020).................................18
[brief] Secondly, Plaintiff’s Certification did not include any contrary facts regarding the conduct of the Defendants as relates to their adoption of the Bond Ordinance or the interactions with Plaintiffs that were the basis for his Complaint.  (Pa234)  Instead, the Certification is all about Plaintiff.  (Id.)  Indeed, only one (1) of the seven (7) defendants was mentioned in that Certification and that was in the context of establishing that Plaintiff served/s as pro bono counsel to a resident in defense of a complaint filed by Defendant [...].  Thirdly, the documents attached to that Certification did not establish any material facts that would establish a basis for liability of the Defendants.
[brief] ”  Id. at 558.  In *Pareja*, the plaintiff slipped and fell on black ice on a driveway apron on the defendant's property at approximately 8:00 a.m.  Freezing rain and sleet began falling at 1:00 a.m. and continued falling through the time of the incident.  Defendant had not undertaken any attempts at snow or ice removal prior to plaintiff’s fall.  *Id.* at 549.  Applying our precedent to a situation where a storm is ongoing, we hold that commercial landowners do not have the absolute duty, and the impossible burden, to keep sidewalks on their property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm.
[brief] “An expert witness may testify to a witness’s or defendant’s mental disorder and the hypothetical effect of that disorder. ”  State v. Rosales, 202 N.J. 539 (2010).  “Expert witnesses may not, however, render an opinion on the defendant’s veracity or reliability of a confession because whether a confession is reliable is a matter in the jury’s exclusive province …”  Id at 470.  An expert witness cannot express opinion on the credibility of a witness or party.  State v. Sowell, 213 N.J. 89 (2013).  Consistent with the holding of J.T., [...] usurped the jury’s role to determine whether the [...] satisfied his burden of proof.
[brief] Importantly for this matter, it is also well-settled under New Jersey law that an arbitration award generally cannot be vacated for legal error. \(^{15}\)  The only times mistakes of law or fact may constitute “undue means” occur in the rare situations where such mistakes violate public policy, which is not the case here.  The New Jersey Supreme Court, in *Tretina*, expressly ruled that arbitration awards cannot be vacated based solely on errors of law.
[brief] Plaintiffs rely upon the procedural history and statement of facts set forth in their moving papers, and incorporate those statements, as if fully set forth herein.  ---  1  As was the case with Plaintiffs' initial Appellate Brief, the Procedural History and Statement of Facts have been combined in the interest of judicial economy and given the limited issues on appeal.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DECISION BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADDED NONEXISTENT TERMS TO THE CONSENT ORDER
[brief] *Yarbough*, 100 N.J. at 643.  The third criteria requires sentencing courts to consider "facts relating to the crimes," including whether (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; [and] (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous.
[brief] For example, Hoboken’s Flood Plain Administrator review memo was signed by the Flood Plain Administrator on May 19, 2022, clearly after the effective date of the Ordinance.  [Da402].  Contribution disclosures for [...] and its professional were dated May 10, 2022, June 9, 2022, June 10, 2022 and June 16, 2022.  [Da405-420].  Although the Certification of Taxes Paid, Contribution Disclosure Form, and Flood Plain Administrator Review Letter were required by Items 3, 4, and 9 of the Application for Development Conditional Use Checklist [Pa35], neither they, nor any portion of [...]’ application for development was submitted to the Board prior to the effective date of the Ordinance.