[brief] THE MOTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CONSENT SEARCH OF LAWES’ CAR WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE, DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOP, POLICE FAILED TO DEVELOP REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL WRONGDOING BEFORE ASKING LAWES FOR CONSENT TO SEARCH.  The State contends that the motion court improperly focused on what transpired “during the course of the stop” because, unlike in “Carty[4] and its progeny,” the stop in this case was not “factually premised solely on motor vehicle violations. ”  (Pb 11)(emphasis in original)  That is, because the officers had knowledge of [...] from their prior investigation, “the motor vehicle violations and [[...]’] behavior following the stop were not the sole facts known to the officer. ”  (Pb 11)  The State then asserts, for the first time on appeal, that based on the prior investigation, the police had “sufficient reasonable suspicion” to believe that [...] went “to New York to purchase CDS,” and thus a valid basis to stop the car, independent of the traffic infractions.  (Pb 13)  The State also contends that in finding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before asking for consent to search, the court “failed to conduct the totality of the circumstances analysis required of it” by --- 4 State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647 (2002).  improperly “ignor[ing]” the information known to the police from the prior investigation and giving “uncritical acceptance” to [...]’ explanation as to why he went to New York.  (Pb 12-13, 15)  The State’s arguments are without merit.  The State seems to be confusing the legal basis for the stop (the traffic infractions) with the motive for the stop (a hunch, based on information from the prior investigation), and conflating the two requirements for a valid consent search under Carty: (1) that the car was lawfully stopped, and (2) that police had reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before asking for consent to search.  Although [...] was the subject of an ongoing narcotics investigation and the motive for the car stop was to investigate possible drug activity, the sole legal basis for the stop was the traffic infractions.  In other words, the police conducted a pretextual stop.  That is, the police used the traffic infractions as a pretext to stop [...]’ car on a hunch that it would lead to reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a drug offense.  Thus, the central question before the motion court was whether, during the course of the stop, the police developed reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before asking [...] for consent to search, as required under Carty, 170 N.J. at 647.  In answering that question, the court did not improperly ignore the prior investigation, as the State contends.  Nor did it give “uncritical acceptance” to the [...]’ explanation for his trip to New York.  Rather, in a comprehensive and thoughtful opinion, the court properly considered the totality of the circumstances presented, including the prior investigation, to the extent it was relevant to the analysis; and the court’s finding that [...] answered the detectives’ roadside questions truthfully was fully supported by the record.  Therefore, the court’s decision granting suppression must be affirmed.