ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES  Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA) v. Katz 334 N.J. Super. 473 (Law Div.  2000) ........................................... 11, 17 F.M.C Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985) .......................................................... 16 Housing Authority of City of Newark v. Ricciardi 175 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1980) ............................................. 2 Pemberton Township v. Berardi, 378 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 2005) .............................................. 3 Lawrence Assoc. v. Lawrence Twp., 5 N.J. Tax 481 (1983) ..................................................................... 19 Merchantville v. Malik & Son, LLC, 429 N.J. Super. 416, 427 (App.Div. 2013) ........................................... 8 State v. Hudson Circle Service Center, Inc., 46 N.J. Super. 125, 131 (App. Div. 1957) ......................................... 8, 10 State v. William Rohrer Inc., 80 N.J. 462, 467 (1979) .................................................................. 17 STATUTES N.J.S.A.40A:12A-1 et seq................................................................ N.J.S.A.20:3-30(d).............................................................................. OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED Nichols §12B.08[1]; §12B-44 ............................................................... INDEX TO APPENDIX VOLUME I (Da1-Da182)  VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED MAY 4, 2018  DOCKET NO. [...] .... Da1 APPRAISAL REPORT [...] VALUATION DATE JANUARY 27, 1994 .................. Da012 ORDER SETTING DATE OF VALUATION ENTERED BY HON. [...] 02/20/2019 ......................................................... Da102 ORDER BARRING CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF’S APPRAISAL EXPERT (DENIED) FILED OCTOBER 14, 2020 ........................................ Da108 CONSENT ORDER TRANSFERRING THIS MATTER TO BINDING ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE FILED OCTOBER 20, 2021 .................... Da110 ORDER AMENDING APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR FILED JANUARY 25, 2022 ............... Da113 ARBITRATION AWARD DATED MARCH 22, 2022 ...................................... Da115 OPINION OF ARBITRATOR  [...] DATED MARCH 22, 2022 .....................................  Da116  CONSENT ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD AND ENTERING FINAL JUDGMENT FILED JUNE 21, 2022 ........................................  Da123
[brief] This was highly improper.  Mary Carter Paint Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 333 F.2d 654, 660 (1964) (“But the law does not permit an agency to grant to one person the right to do that which it denies to another similarly situated.  There may not be a rule for Monday, another rule for Tuesday, a rule for general application, but denied outright in a specific case. ”);  I/M/O Treston, [...], [...] (2021) (Ca400) (p. 9  “there is a robust body of decisions and advisory opinions which school officials can utilize to determine when, and how, a disclaimer must be used on social media when speaking in their personal/private capacity in order to avoid running afoul of the Act. ”)  Abandoning its carefully-developed and well-established caselaw on social media posts by school board members in this instance clearly violates the Legislature’s mandate as set out in the Act:  To ensure and preserve public confidence, school board members and local school administrators should have the benefit of specific standards to guide their conduct and of some disciplinary mechanism to ensure uniform maintenance of those standards among them.
[brief] See Da87; 69a.  These are the exact same factual allegations that [...] made in his Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint, except that unlike in the present complaint he chose not to assert any claim against [...] or the [...] in the Law Division action based upon [...] having had knowledge of the contamination, yet having done nothing to stop it.  To conclude, [...] knew of the present claim against the [...] as early as February 8, 2016 (24a), yet he chose not to assert the claim in the Chancery action in 2016 and he chose not to assert the claim in the Law Division action in 2017.  If ever the entire controversy doctrine should be applied to bar claims, it is here.  [...] chose not to assert claims against [...] in prior litigation; hence, he must be barred under the entire controversy doctrine from asserting them in the present litigation, as the Court below correctly found.
[brief] *Mayflower Cec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85,93 (1973).  The public pension systems are “bound up in the public interest and provide public employees significant rights which are deserving of conscientious protection. ”  Zigmont v. Bd. Of Trs. Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 91 N.J. 580, 583 (1983).  Because pension statutes are remedial in character, they are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.  Klumb v. Bd of Educ. Of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009).  In this case, the Board adopted the ALJ's application of the law and the facts.  Therefore, it is respectfully requested this court focus on [...]'s misapplication of the law, for a second time,¹ (Aa 14) and find [...]'s decision and hence the Board's determination not entitled to this court's deference as it once again misinterprets the statute and clear meaning of Richardson.
[brief] Statement of All Items Submitted on Motion | n/a | Pa528 |  *Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), briefs are included given that the trial court referenced the brief in its decision which is being challenged on appeal and the briefs are also necessary to demonstrate specific issue was raised.*  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Court Rules & Statutes:** | | | Rule 2:6-1(a)(1) | 6 | | Rule 4:6-2(e) | 24, 58 | | Rule 4:49-2 | 57 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 et seq. | 12 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14(e)(f)(i) | 11 | | **Case Law and Other Authorities:** | | | Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Assoc., 207 N.J. 67 (N.J. 2011)
[brief] On June 12, 2015, plaintiffs filed their original Complaint (1a).  On July 20, 2015, the [...] filed their Answer to plaintiffs’ Complaint, which included Separate Defenses and a Demand for Affidavits of Merit.  (26a).  Since plaintiffs failed to file and serve Affidavits of Merit in this case against the [...], on November 24, 2015, a Motion to Dismiss was filed against plaintiffs.  (39a).  Plaintiffs failed to oppose this Motion to Dismiss.  On January 19, 2016, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted the [...]’ Motion to Dismiss and plaintiffs’ Complaint was dismissed, with prejudice, as to the [...].  (41a).  On September 1, 2016, months after the dismissal order, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reinstate the Complaint.  (47a).  On November 10, 2016, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ Motion to Reinstate the Complaint.  (50a).  This November 10, 2016 decision resulted in a 42 page transcript and was announced during the proceeding that took one hour and eleven minutes to complete.  (1T).  Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of [...]’s November 10, 2016 Order.  (Da1)  [...] conducted oral argument of this Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 2016 and denied plaintiffs’ Motion by order of December 20, 2016. \(^1\)  On February 28, 2018, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of [...] of November 10, 2016 and again moved to Reinstate the Complaint against [...], Esq. and [...].  (187a)  On --- \(^1\)  Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on December 21, 2016 and a Second Amended Complaint on February 13, 2017.  March 29, 2018, [...] held oral argument on plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the November 10, 2016 Order (2T) and on April 3, 2018, [...] entered an Order denying plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of November 10, 2016.  (188a).  On August 8, 2018, plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint (incorrectly captioned as “Second Amended Complaint”), which (among other things) added [...] as a Defendant.  On December 4, 2019, plaintiffs sought leave to file another (fourth) Amended Complaint to re-join [...], [...], and [...] (“[...]”) as parties and assert “new” tort and legal malpractice claims against Menas and [...], among others.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS KUCINSKI AND DANCHECK-MARTIN ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (10a-14a).  Defendants [...] and [...] erroneously claim that the cases relied upon by Plaintiff do not support that the doctrine of qualified immunity is inapplicable to claims brought under the NJLAD.  Def.’s Br., pg. 12.  For example, they cite Brown v. City of Bordentown, 348 N.J. Super. 143, 148-149 (App. Div. 2002), noting that the Court held that legislative immunity has been “preserved in actions under both the LAD and § 1983. ”  In doing so, Defendants conflate the doctrines of absolute legislative immunity and qualified immunity.  Defendants also claim that Plaintiff has miscited Miller v. New Jersey, 144 Fed. Appx. 926 (3d Cir. 2005), by arguing that the case relied upon by the Court, Rodriguez v. Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334, 354 (D.N.J. 1999), only found that the First Amendment qualified immunity analysis did not apply to LAD claims.  Def.’s Br., pgs. 12-13.  This interpretation of a single sentence made by the Court in Rodriguez differs from the conclusion reached by the Third Circuit in Miller, which cited to the same sentence to reach the clear conclusion that, in relation to the dismissal of an NJLAD claim: “qualified immunity is inapplicable to a state law cause of action. ”  Miller, 114 Fed. Appx. at *2.  Other courts within the Third Circuit have cited to Miller for this same proposition.  See Mathias v. Billet-Barclay, 2019 WL 568903 (M.D. Penn. Feb. 12, 2019) (“The defendants contend that they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity, doctrines which apply to only federal claims”) (73ra); Kircher v. Penn. State Police Dept., 2016 WL 4379143 (M.D. Penn. Aug. 17, 2016) (“However, qualified immunity is inapplicable to a state law cause of action”) (internal quotation omitted) (24ra); Boria v. Bowers, 2009 WL 902421 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 31, 2019) (“Because wrongful death is a state law claim, qualified immunity does not apply”) (1ra).
[brief] (Pa081).  All three of the letters that defendants sent to plaintiff expressed defendants’ desire and willingness to try to resolve the parties’ dispute over the scope of the Special Undertaking Contract outside of formal litigation:  ➢  “Our Client would welcome the opportunity to discuss the PCB-related litigation referenced above . . .  [...] expects to put a process in place for resolution of this obligation, and those obligations of other similarly situated parties. ” (Pa472).  ➢  “[...] would prefer to resolve the parties’ disagreement over the scope of [plaintiff]’s obligations under the Special Undertaking [Contract] without resorting to formal litigation.  Informal resolution of the dispute will be more cost-effective for both sides, and allow greater flexibility in crafting a solution. ” (Pa476).  ➢  “We hope you are able to attend the informational meeting next month, and that we can begin working toward an agreement regarding the amount [plaintiff] owes to [...] under the Special Undertaking [Contract].” (Pa479).  Moreover, the stated purpose of the May 16, 2017 meeting was, among other things, to discuss whether the parties could structure a dispute resolution process to resolve their dispute without litigation.  (Pa081, Pa478).  With the Missouri meeting pending and without notifying defendants or their counsel, plaintiff filed this case against defendants on May 12, 2017 seeking “a declaration that the Special Undertaking [Contract] is void and unenforceable as against [plaintiff], in whole or in part.
[brief] H1547a  Email from Holmdel’s [...] to [...] September 10, 2018, enclosing the Surface Water Quality Review ............  H1553a  Surface Water Quality Review by Holmdel’s [...] September 10, 2018  ..............................................  H1554a  Email from Holmdel’s [...] to [...] September 11, 2018 enclosing Environmental Commission Memo ............  H1558a  [...]’s Memorandum September 11, 2018 commenting on investigation of VOC and carbon dioxide emissions from the regulator ..........
[brief] Plaintiffs contend that this case should be remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of obtaining factual findings and conclusions of law.  However, this overlooks the fact that their complaint and legal briefs solely alleged violations of the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL).  Rather than amending their complaint to assert a common law cause of action, plaintiffs maintained that the relief they sought could only be granted by the trial court.  At no point did plaintiffs take steps to amend their complaint or advance legal arguments asserting that a common law conflict of interest warranted judicial intervention.  In support of this contention plaintiffs incorrectly state the trial court failed to issue findings of facts and conclusions of law.
[directive] Records and Reports  All required records and reports will follow the same format as that outlined in the handgun qualification policy.  These records and reports are to include:  • An individual participant record (Firearms Record for Individual Participants).  • An annual report to the county prosecutor (or in the case of certain state law enforcement agencies, with the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice).  In addition to that information outlined in the handgun qualification policy, this report is to contain the number of agency personnel who are authorized and qualified to carry an automatic or semi-automatic assault-type weapon, police carbine or scoped rifle.  9-34 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  Appendix
[directive] 법정에서 구두로  알려 주는 것을 들었습니다.  You have also been informed of the above consequences orally in open court by the Judge.  지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지1/2 CN 11710-Korean Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Korean page 1 of 2
[brief] A similarly analogous result was found, again not in the context of noise but when dealing with an alleged public health nuisance, in the matter of Earrusso v. [...], 14 N.J. Misc. 96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1936).  In that case, the plaintiffs challenged an ordinance that prohibited the dumping, depositing, or placing in the township of any garbage collected outside that township; plaintiffs operated a pig farm and had contracted with [...] to cart in trash for use as pig food or fertilizer.  There, as authority for the ordinance in question, the township had relied on a provision of the Home Rule Act “which by its terms gives the governing body of a municipality power to provide for the cleaning of streets of the municipality and for the collection, removal, and disposal of ashes, garbage, and other refuse. ”
[brief] \(^2\)  This section precludes liability where the allegedly unsafe characteristics of the product are well known to the ordinary consumer and the alleged harm was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product.  Plaintiff argues that this section is not intended to apply to “dangers posed by products such as machinery or equipment that can feasibly be eliminated without impairing the usefulness of the product. ”  Pb7.  But, as PLAC explains, Plaintiff has not presented any record evidence that the danger posed by vehicles that depart from their lanes can be eliminated, either technologically or economically.  Thus, this statute is plainly applicable.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] To this end, the case may have been different if Appellant genuinely alleged something about Respondent’s particular use of a letter vendor that was in some way abusive or harmful.  See T22:14-19.  But there are no allegations to support such a finding.  Id; Appx., at 2a-3a; 6a-7a.  Appellant does not allege any misuse of his personal or financial information, or even that the automated letter vendor processes were arranged in a way where any individual at the third-party vendor (or elsewhere) would, or even could, personally view the information.  Id.  The lack of abusive practices at play becomes even more clear in observing that Appellant never asserted that he or other putative class members ever suffered any material harm because of the Respondent’s use of a letter vendor.  Id.  See also supra.  The FDCPA should be read to further the principles of the statute’s stated purpose to curb the “abusive” debt collection practices harming consumers.  See e.g., *Hoover v. Monarch Recovery Mgt., Inc.*, 888 F. Supp. 2d 589, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (ruling that violations of § 1692d, including the “publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts,” are limited to “tactics intended to embarrass, upset, or frighten a debtor.
[brief] **Staten Island Home Invasion**  The first home invasion occurred in Staten Island at the home of [...], [...], and their son, [...].  (1T 12-6).  The family owned a diner in Staten Island where [...] and his brother had worked for many years.  (1T 12-11).  [...] was 35 at the time he testified at trial.  (1T 41-42).  On September 16, 1995, the date of the incident, he was only 21 years old, living with his parents, and working at the diner.  (1T 42-43).  On the evening of the home invasion, [...] was getting out of his car when a man (later identified as co-defendant [...]) approached him and placed a gun to his head.  (1T 44:25).  [...] testified that he had never seen this man before.  (1T 45:2).  He described the gunman as shorter than him, maybe 5'8" or 5'7", with a thin build, and Hispanic.  (1T 45:10).  [...] testified that he saw the man's face for 15-20 seconds, at a distance of less than one foot.  (1T 46:11).  [...] told [...] that he wanted the car and directed him to get back in it.  (1T 46:17).  He pushed [...] into the passenger's side and told him to get down on the floor as [...] continued to hold the gun to [...]’s head.  (1T 46-24).  [...] testified that he kept his head down in the vehicle so as not to look at [...] when a second man got into the backdoor passenger side.  (1T 47:19).  [...] was instructed to get into the back seat and climb over the partition between the two seats while the second man kept a gun to his head.  Id.  Eventually, the second man in the backseat duct taped [...] around his head and hands.  (1T 48).  [...] never saw the man in the backseat (1T 48-49), however, the man spoke to him—asking for information about his father’s employment and girlfriend’s residence.  (1T 49).  [...] confirmed that there was only ever one individual with him in the back seat and that the individual did not have a stutter or accent.  (1T 109, 110, 140).  On the contrary, [...] is Eastern European and speaks with a distinct accent and a stutter.  Next, the two men drove back to the house and instructed [...] to get out of the car, then walked him to the front door at gunpoint.
[brief] ”  Hackensack, 41 N.J. Super. at 426.  Once the applicant demonstrates the alternative methods, “the burden of demonstrating a feasible alternative method ought to devolve on the objectors, as should a showing of alternate sites beyond those brought forward by the applicant. ”  Id. at 426-27; see also Pub. Serv., 35 N.J. at 375 (holding that the principles outlined in Hackensack apply to petitions filed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19).
[brief] In 1927 the State Constitution was amended to authorize municipalities to adopt zoning regulations within limitations.  See Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey, 14 Rutgers L.R. 37 (1969).  In 1928 the Zoning Enabling Act was adopted, following the recommended Standard Act.  In 1930 the first Planning Act provided for master plans, planning boards, and subdivision/site plan procedure.  See Pennington Homes v. Planning Bd. of Stanhope, 41 N.J. 578, 583 (1964).  These Acts authorized municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances that would classify properties into use districts or zones, with the requirement that use and development of property be approved by a Land Use Board by a Subdivision or Site Plan process.  See generally Cox & Koenig, *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration* § 1-1.  Most municipalities adopted Zoning Regulations in the early 1930’s.  *Roselle v. Wright*, 21 N.J. 400, 408-410 (1956).  In 1953, the new Planning Act was adopted; this Act was more sophisticated, establishing the two step (Preliminary and Final Approval) procedure for Subdivisions and Site Plans.  That Planning Act was comprehensively replaced by the 1975 Municipal Land Use Law, *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-1 et seq.; ("MLUL"), now the current law.
[brief] The Evidence Adduced in the Prior Litigation Clarified with Absolute Certainty that the Alleged “Agreement” is a Forgery  [...] presented the Forged Agreement to the Court in the Prior Litigation, knowing that it contained [...]’s forged signature.  (Pa21 at ¶46).  Indeed, while [...] commenced the Prior Litigation based almost entirely upon his promotion of the Forged Agreement, the evidence adduced in discovery clarified – for the first time – the true nature of the Forged Agreement.  (Pa22 at ¶47).  Initially, [...] sought to enforce the Forged Agreement, Towards this end, [...] committed acts to maliciously abuse the legal process, when he submitted sworn certifications from himself, [...], and [...], all three of whom unequivocally stated that [...], [...], and [...] had arrived at [...]’s Boca Raton office on January 14, 2014, and while there; (i) [...] and [...] executed the Forged Agreement; (ii) [...] and [...] served as witnesses to those signatures; and (iii) [...], in her capacity as a notary public, “signed the bottom of the last page of the agreement, filled in the numerical date and the month, and affixed her notary stamp to the page. ” (Pa22 at ¶49).  Additionally, both [...] and [...] offered perjured testimony at their depositions in the Prior Litigation, concerning the supposed events of January 14, 2014.  To this end, [...] and [...] each testified that: (i) [...] and [...] drove together to [...]’s Boca Raton office after having played tennis earlier that day; (ii) [...] drove to [...]’s office with [...]’s son, [...]; (iii) [...], [...] and [...] met in the parking lot and walked into [...]’s office together; and (iv) within ten (10) minutes of meeting, both [...] and [...] signed, with [...] and [...] serving as witnesses, and [...] signing and dating as a notary.  (Pa22 at ¶50).  Initially, [...] echoed the same detailed narrative during the first half of her August 7, 2017 deposition in the Prior Litigation.
[directive] Accordingly, when a defendant who has previously been convicted of a drug distribution-type offense is charged with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, the prosecutor must tender a plea offer that requires the defendant to plead guilty to a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 or, where applicable, to a more serious offense expressly listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f (e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, 2C:35-4 or 2C:35-6) so as to invoke the repeat offender extended term sentencing feature.
[brief] A GIGLIO VIOLATION  ii.  THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT TO [...] CONSTITUTES  A JENCKS VIOLATION  II.  THERE EXISTS NO PROCEDURAL BAR TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE PETITION  a.  THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT HAS NEVER BEEN RAISED OR ADJUDICATED, NOR COULD IT HAVE BEEN RAISED OR ADJUDICATED  i.  [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT WAS NOT DISCOVERABLE AT THE TIME [...]’S TRIAL OR APPEAL  b.  THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION  RELIEF IS TIMELY III.  ALTERNATIVELY, [...] IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CONCLUSION