ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The Bail Schedules will only continue to apply to defendants arrested for indictable offenses on or prior to December 31, 2016 at bail reduction/bail review hearings conducted i thereafter in Superior Court.  The option of R.O.R. is available whenever a judge deems it appropriate.  The option of 10% cash bail will remain available where permissible under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12.  The Bail Schedules will not apply to defendants initially charged on complaint-summonses for indictable offenses on or after January 1, 2017, who thereafter fail to appear in court.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear, but the advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will not apply.  The Bail Schedules will not apply to defendants initially charged on complaint-summonses for indictable offenses before January 1, 2017 who thereafter fail to appear in court.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear, but the advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will not apply.  Bail Schedules - Disorderly Persons Offenses/Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses
[brief] \(^3\) *Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, 2022 WL 20470401 at *9; *Mhrez Decision* at p.10.  Of course, to use telegram operators under any circumstances, even those permitted by the statute, the debt collector must transmit the information about the debt to be included in the telegram to the telegram operator—just as it would do with a letter vendor.  Yet \(^3\)  See also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692b(5) (restricting the use of language or symbols which reveal a connection with debt collection in communications made via telegram.).  under Appellant’s theory, a debt collector’s transmitting the information to the telegram operator is itself unlawful under § 1692c(b), which would render the provisions regulating the use of telegrams null surplusage.  See Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 509 (1990) (well-established canons of statutory interpretation require courts to “avoid constructions that render any part of a statute inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless. ”).
[brief] (Pa98)  On November 15, 2022, based on its findings of an increase in the bear population in New Jersey and adverse human-bear interactions, the Council averred that there was an imminent peril necessitating the reinstatement of a bear hunting season for 2022 on an emergency basis.  (Pa98)  Thereupon, the Council enacted emergency regulations authorizing a bear hunt which included a new CBBMP and amendments to the Code that prohibited the hunting of cubs under 75 pounds and adults traveling with cubs under 75 pounds, and imposed certain restrictions on baiting.  The Commissioner of DEP approved the CBBMP and stated his agreement with the Council’s finding of imminent peril.  (Pa98)  On November 15, 2022, [...] issued Executive Order No. 310, in which he concurred with the Council’s statement of imminent peril, thereby rescinding Executive Order No. 34 (2018).
[brief] Article 1 para 1 14,15, 38  Article 1 para 10 15, 33  Article 1 para 3 17  Article 1 paragraph 1, 3, 10, 11, 6, 18, 22 20  Article 1 paragraph 1, 3, 10, 11, 6, 18, and 22  23  TABLE OF ORDERS  JUDGMENT AND RULINGS  Order Dismissing Case 3/18/2024  Pa267 Statement of Reasons 3/18/2024
[brief] The standard of review regarding plaintiff’s underlying cross-motion to extend discovery is deferential.  The standard of review regarding a motion to extend discovery is “limited to a determination of whether the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion. ”  Leitner v. Toms River Reg’l Sch., 392 N.J. Super. 80, 87 (App. Div. 2007) (citing and quoting Huszar v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 375 N.J. Super. 463, 471 (App. Div. 2005), certification granted, cause remanded, 185 N.J. 290 (2005)); see also, Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div. 2005) (“We generally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion, or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. ”)  Review of the Law Division’s decision on plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is also deferential.  “[The Appellate Division’s] standard of review on a motion for reconsideration is deferential …  ‘Motions for reconsideration are governed by Rule 4:49-2, which provides that the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. ’”  Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 234 (App. Div. 2022) (citations omitted).  Review of the Law Division’s decision on plaintiff’s motion to vacate, pursuant to Rule 4:50-1, is also deferential.  The trial court's determination under the rule warrants substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion …  The Court finds an abuse of discretion when a decision is “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  [US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467–68 (2012) (citations omitted). ]  POINT II
[brief] (1T138:14-148:18)  The reasoning put forward by counsel for [...] was because they did not want the jury, having found in favor of plaintiff on liability, to “regret” that they had found in plaintiff’s favor after seeing the snapshots and texts.  (1T142:17-24).  The judge, after first informing counsel that in such an event the jury could still award plaintiff “zilch” (1T142:11-1433:3), decided to admit that evidence on credibility grounds, stating “if he lied about his physical abilities, that's an issue... in liability."  (1T148:14-15).  Plaintiffs argued that allowing [...]'s evidence in during the liability phase of the trial would deprive the plaintiff of a fair shake with the jury, just as, we contend, he was deprived of a fair shake with the police on the day in question.
[directive] Revising Use of Force  Policy and Procedures  New Jersey’s law enforcement officers are entrusted with protecting public safety and, in some instances, are authorized to use force—including deadly force—to fulfill that responsibility.  Law enforcement agency use of force policies are designed to give clear guidance to officers on the limited circumstances in which the exercise of that exceptional power is appropriate.  Both officers and community members alike benefit when such policies are evidence-based and provide as much clarity as possible.  While no policy document can anticipate all of the unique situations that a law enforcement officer may encounter, careful development, training, and enforcement of such policies can help ensure that state-sanctioned force is only used as a last resort, when necessary to accomplish legitimate law enforcement objectives.  Although law enforcement agencies typically maintain their own individual policies regarding the use of force, in New Jersey all such policies must be consistent with the Attorney General Directive Establishing the Use of Force Policy and Procedures (“Use of Force Policy” or “Policy”), which applies statewide.  While agency policies may be more restrictive, they cannot permit the use of force where the Policy prohibits it.  Today, I am issuing a comprehensive revision to the Policy—the first time it has been updated since 2000.  Given the need to ensure that officers are appropriately trained on its parameters before it is fully implemented, the effective date of the Policy shall be December 31, 2021.
[brief] conversion is wrongful exercise of dominion or control over property of another without authorization and to the exclusion of the owner's rights in that property. ”  Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 409 N.J. Super. 444, 456 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 506 (2009) (citations omitted).  As discussed in Point II.A.1, supra, [...] does not own the Property – [...] does – and [...]’s Second Count of its Counterclaim fails.
[brief] ................................................................. 14, 16, 19 State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604, 573 A.2d 886 (1990)  ..............................................................................  9 State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018)  .........................................................................................  9  Stryker Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 168 N.J. 138, 156, 773 A.2d 674 (2001)  .................................................. 10  Svenson v. Nat’l Consumer Ins. Co., 322 N.J. Super. 410, 416 (App. Div. 1999)..................................................  13  Torres v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 N.J. 147 (2002)  ....................................................................................  15  Velazquez v. Jiminez, 172 N.J. 240, 256, 798 A.2d 51 (2002)  ......................... 9, 10  Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 126 N.J. Super. 29, 28 (App. Div. 1973)...........................................  12, 13, 14 Statutes N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1, et seq ............................................................................................................. 5, 10
[directive] 1.  It is understood that while the Fourth Amendment applies to all searches of students conducted by public officials, different legal standards are used to justify searches conducted by school officials as compared to searches conducted by law enforcement officers.  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).  Specifically, searches conducted by law enforcement officers must be based upon probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed, and must further be authorized by a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached judicial officer unless the search falls into one of the recognized and narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement.  2.  The United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. recognized that school officials have a legitimate interest in maintaining discipline, and thus have the inherent, independent authority to conduct an investigation of suspected rule infractions and to subject students and student property to reasonable searches and seizures.  3.  No law enforcement officer shall direct, solicit, encourage or otherwise actively participate in any specific search conducted by a school official unless such search could be lawfully conducted by the law enforcement officer acting on his or her own authority in accordance with the rules and procedures governing law enforcement searches.
[brief] Pa9.  A Certification filed by plaintiff on May 22, 2023 was of the Judgment.  Notably, as part of that motion, plaintiff, not third-party Defendant [...], sought reconsideration of the Court’s denial of [...]’ request for fees under the Frivolous Litigation Act.\(^9\) Da28.  Plaintiff’s 5/28 motion was denied on June 26, 2023.  Pa66.  Prior to that determination, on June 22, plaintiff filed another motion, which, with regard to the Judgment, only sought to revisit the Judgment’s directive that [...] be dissolved (“June 22 motion”).
[directive] It does not address the use of oleoresin capsicum (“OC spray”), tear gas or other chemical agents, distraction devices (e.g., a “flash bang”) or the use of an asp or baton.  This policy supersedes and replaces all other policies, directives, memorandums or guidance provided by the [...] or the [...] on CEDs and other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition.  1.2  The terms CED, less-lethal device, and less-lethal ammunition are defined in Section 3 of this policy.  1.3  Any deployment of a conducted energy device or less-lethal device falls under the definition of “enhanced mechanical force” and will only be authorized if consistent with the Policy, including the provisions contained in this Addendum.  1  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition
[brief] In determining the validity of an agency's actions, the Appellate Division considers: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.  *Mazza v. Bd. of Trs.*, 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995).  The Court is bound by an agency's findings of fact "when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence."  *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999) (quoting *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
[brief] ”  Id. at 248.  Indeed, the Court noted that the District Court found that the “safest and most successful method of accomplishing the installation of the wiretapping device was through breaking and entering [the office].”  Id. at 248 n. 8.  Lastly, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not require specific authorization in the order permitting electronic surveillance for law enforcement to enter the premises covertly.  Id. at 258-59.  The Court recognized that “we would promote empty formalism were we to require magistrates to make explicit what unquestionably is implicit in bugging authorizations: that a covert entry, with its attendant interference with Fourth Amendment interests, may be necessary for the installation of the surveillance equipment.
[brief] **Appellate Procedural History. **  On November 27, 2024, Appellants filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal.  (344a).  On December 18, 2024, Respondents filed their response to the Motion for Leave to Appeal.  (344a).  On December 19, 2024, the Appellate Division granted Appellants leave to appeal.  (344a-345a).  On February 6, 2025, Appellants filed their Case Information Statement.  (346a-347a).  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] [...], : CIVIL ACTION  Plaintiff, : ON APPEAL FROM THE vs. : ORDER OF THE J. FLETCHER CREAMER & SON, : SUPERIOR COURT INC., PASSAIC VALLEY WATER : OF NEW JERSEY, COMMISSION, : LAW DIVISION, Defendants-Respondents, : PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  CARBRO CONSTRUCTORS : Sat Below: CORP., : HON. [...], A.J.S.C.
[brief] (T1/151:5-155:25). have been “inconvenient” or simply “not easy to get in and out of there,” while not opining it was unsafe, whereas [...] stated that he thought the loading zone would be unsafe.  (T2/135:10-13; 153:9-154:11).  Notwithstanding conflicting opinions on this issue, and the lack of any findings that any of [...]’s witness were not credible, the [...] simply leaped to an errant, sweeping and unsound conclusion that ingress and egress to and from the Property, overall, was unsafe.
[brief] Plaintiff did not sign the [...] application.  [...] didn’t contest the fact that he signed the application and knew that he was signing an application.  [...] didn’t deny he received a copy of the application, just the account agreement.  [...] was not a case in which [...] filed a motion to compel arbitration as that was not at issue in the case.  In Bayron-Paz v. [...] Bank, 2023 W.L. 4399041 (SDNY 2023) (Vol. II, Pa 209) Plaintiff financed purchase of an automobile at a car dealership.
[brief] 14 F.3d at 655.  Numerous other courts have agreed,\textsuperscript{16} including where the inference of fraud requires reviewing publicly available “raw” data.  See U.S. ex rel. Doe v. Staples, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C. 2013) (shipping-manifest database), aff’d, 773 F.3d 83 (D.C. Cir. 2014); U.S. ex rel. Repko v. Guthrie Clinic, P.C., No. 3:04-cv-1556, 2011 WL 3875987, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2011) (databases of non-profits, financial data and analysis websites, including Bloomberg Professional), aff’d, 490 F. App’x 502 (3d Cir. 2012).
[directive] In cases pretrial for apply prosecutor shall the subsection 7.4.6, to pursuant overcome is detention pretrial  Activity Criminal Violent New a raises assessment risk pretrial automated if the detention 61 Page flag. (NVCA)  Offenses.  Specified Involving Cases 7.4.  b .  S seeking of presumption the unless 7.3, Section under covered otherwise not cases  In pretrial apply for shall prosecutor the 7.4.6, subsection to pursuant overcome detention is pretrial offenses: specified following of the any includes charge present the if detention as firearm (i.e., a firearm involving a offense  Any Offenses.  Firearms Act Graves (i) would 2C:39-1(r)) that N.J.S.A. by defined as "weapon" other any to opposed N.J.S.A. Act, Graves the under sentence minimum a of imposition the require vary and myriad are Act Graves the under offenses  Firearms (g). and 2C:43-6(c) possession of unlawful "simple" from range can  Offenses severity. of degrees in the during firearm a possession of the to -5(c), 2C:39-5(b), N.J.S.A. firearm, a is Accordingly, it 2C:39-4.1(a).  N.J.S.A. crimes, certain of commission in involved circumstances relevant all evaluate closely prosecutors that imperative a for apply to whether (e.g., determinations critical making when case given any a whether assessing When detention).
[directive] Iniciais do Réu / Defendant’s Initials no Formulário Padrão de Declaração Judicial/Formulário Revisado Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese página 1 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese page 1 of 7
[brief] \textsuperscript{12}  [...]’s suggestion that the hours sought amount to one attorney working every day for six years does not pass an arithmetic check.  [...] sought 5,485.1 hours over the course of 76 months, which would be about 800 hours per year (maybe half a years’ worth of billing for a normal attorney).  That amounts to under 20 hours a month (less than an eighth of normal monthly billing hours) for the four attorneys primarily involved in the matter (not including [...]).  The application also explained the reasonableness of the hourly rates, and that they had previously been approved by the trial court in connection with other fee applications in this matter.
[brief] With respect to *DepoLink*, which was cited by *Valentine*, *Woo-Padva* 1, --- 6 *See Woo-Padva*, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *11. and *Woo-Padva* 2 (the three cases cited by the trial court which addressed affirmative claims under the CFA), the court in *Valentine* reasoned that “*Depolink*, a published Appellate Division decision post-dating *Jefferson Loan, Gonzalez,* and *Lemmeledo* [sic], held the actions of which plaintiff complains were not unlawful under the CFA”  *Valentine*, October 4, 2023 Opinion at 16.  However, the courts in *Valentine*, *Woo-Padva* 1, and *Woo-Padva* 2 failed to consider the factual underpinnings in *DepoLink*, which part *DepoLink*’s reasoning and holding from an analysis of violations of the NJCFLA.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, RULINGS, AND TRANSCRIPTS | Document Name | Date | Appendix Page Number or Transcript | |---------------|--------------|-----------------------------------| | Order | August 16, 2022 | Pa64-Pa95 | | Order | August 17, 2022 | Pa96-Pa127 | | Order | October 11, 2022 | Pa128-Pa133 | | Transcript | June 20, 2022 | 1T | | Transcript | June 21, 2022 | 2T | | Transcript | June 22, 2022 | 3T | | Transcript | June 23, 2022 | 4T | | Transcript | July 6, 2022 | 5T | | Transcript | July 12, 2022 | 6T | | Transcript | July 13, 2022 | 7T | | Transcript | July 14, 2022 | 8T | | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. New Jersey Bureau of Securities, | 30 | | 163 F.3d 780 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999) | | | Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | 42 | | Bowser v. Bd. of Trs., 455 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2018) | 25 | | Cola v. Terzano, 129 N.J. Super. 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974), | 41 | | aff’d sub nom. Cola v. Packer, 156 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1974) | | | Cnty. of Essex v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 186 N.J. 46 (2006) | 39 | | Cnty. of Essex v. First Union Nat’l Bank, | 39 | | 373 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Cromeans v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 303 F.R.D. 543 | 32 | | (W.D. Mo. Sept. 23, 2014) | | | Data Access Systems, Inc. v. New Jersey Bureau of Securities, | 30 | | 63 N.J. 158 (1973) | | | D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168 (2013) | 23 | | DiProspero v. Penn, 187 N.J. 477 (2005) | 23 | | Gordon v. Drews, 595 S.
[brief] ”  Id. at 367.  But the record before the court in that case was significantly developed, as opposed to the record here.  Mt. Laurel residents had approved several referenda authorizing tax increases to ensure adequate funding for the municipality to acquire [...]’s land.  Id. at 363, 366.  Additionally, the Planning Board adopted a master plan, “which stated that the goals of the recreation and open space plan included acquisition of ‘the maximum amount of open space remaining in the township that can be achieved with sound use of financial resources’ and reduction of traffic congestion and costs of municipal services. ”  Id. at 367.  The Appellate Division noted the “voluminous factual materials” the parties introduced, id. at 367, and disagreed with the trial court, emphasizing that “Mount Laurel’s residents ha[d] approved three referenda under this legislation authorizing tax levies for the acquisition of property for recreation and conservation purposes.
[brief] A court may mold a verdict and “enter a judgment of conviction for a lesser included offense where the jury verdict necessarily constitutes a finding that all the elements of the lesser included offense have been established and where no prejudice to the defendant results. ”  *State v. Greenberg*, 154 N.J.Super. 564, 567–68 (App.Div.1977), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 612 (1978).  A guilty verdict may be molded to convict on a lesser-included offense if “‘(1) defendant has been given his day in court, (2) all the elements of the lesser included offense are contained in the more serious offense and (3) defendant's guilt of the lesser included offense is implicit in, and part of, the jury verdict. ’”  *State v. Farrad*, 164 N.J. 247, 266 (2000) (citation omitted).  *9  Because fourth-degree shoplifting requires proof of the same elements as third-degree shoplifting, the only difference being that the punishment is less severe if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $200 but does not exceed $500, defendant's JOC must be amended to reflect a conviction for fourth-degree shoplifting as a lesser-included offense of fourth-degree shoplifting.  IV.
[directive] a.  Actor interferes with transportation if the person purposely or knowingly:  1.  Casts, shoots or throws anything at, against or into any vehicle, including, but not 10%  Permissible limited to, a bus, light rail vehicle, railroad locomotive, railroad car, jitney, trolley car, 2nd Degree subway car, ferry, airplane, or other facility of transportation; or $50,000 to $150,000  2.  Casts, shoots, throws or otherwise places any stick, stone, object or other substance upon any street railway track, trolley track or railroad track; or 3.  Endangers or obstructs the safe operation of motor vehicles by casting, shooting, throwing or otherwise placing any stick, stone, object or other substance upon any highway or roadway; or Interference with 2C:33-14(a-e)  4.  Unlawfully climbs into or upon any light rail vehicle, railroad locomotive or railroad Transportation car, either in motion or standing on the track of any railroad company in this State; or 5.  Unlawfully disrupts, delays or prevents the operation of any vehicle, including, but not limited to, a bus, light rail vehicle, railroad locomotive, train, bus, jitney, trolley, subway, airplane or any other facility of transportation.  The term “unlawfully disrupts, delays or prevents the operation of” does not include non-violent conduct growing out 3rd Degree 10%