ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], the Director of Public Works for the [...] testified that the parking lot needed to be repaved.  (Pa192)  And while admittedly not an expert, he did further testified that he saw scaling in the picture.  (Pa191)  [...] testified that looking at the picture of the pavement from the time of the accident that he would bring that to the attention of his supervisor to make a determination as to whether it should be repaired.  (Pa192)  Since the Director of Public Works readily stated that he would bring the status of the parking lot to the attention of a supervisor to determine repairs, and ultimately the parking lot was repaved, it is clear that the condition can be interpreted and viewed as potentially dangerous.
[brief] The record demonstrated to the trial court that it was abundantly clear not only was [...] at the forefront of attempting to make this project to be a success, despite the evident failings of his partner, but that at no point was there any nefarious intent.  The [...] or “[...]” investors also continued with the investment at [...] long after [...] falsely claimed that he discovered that [...] was raising funds outside of the operating agreement for [...].  Prior to the project ultimately failing in 2017, no investor claimed that [...] had committed theft, which, in an actively attended, high stakes financial arrangement, was over three (3) years since the State alleges the theft took place.  Following his conviction, [...]’s family began a frantic search through a mountain of documents relating to the many businesses that the family had been involved in.  The genesis of that search was the fact that his family was blindsided by the guilty verdict.  Knowing the history, they fully expected that [...] would be found not guilty and were “shocked,” (8T 12:22), and “dumbfounded” by the result.  (8T 30:11).  It was only then, sifting through an incredible volume of documents that his family, specifically his sister, [...], was able to uncover the newly discovered documents at issue.  Once [...] reviewed them, they began to realize their exculpatory significance and performed a search through past emails to see if they would come up there.  Not only were they able to recover these documents as email attachments, but the emails were contemporaneous to their execution.  The trial court had the benefit of considering all of this information in addition to live testimony accompanying the newly discovered documents in this case in coming to its conclusion.  **STANDARD**
[brief] To the contrary, given that such a small percentage of the lot had problems, it was far more likely that Plaintiff’s applicator was not one of the affected units.  Moreover, [...] acknowledged that Plaintiff had “multiple risk factors” that could have led to a retinal detachment “in the absence of a silicone particulate,” which made his reasoning regarding the applicator’s defectiveness all the more speculative and improper.  (Da0196-97.)  Surely, an expert cannot properly claim that a product is defective because “[i]t was part of the lot that was recalled,” (Da0186), when only 2.2% of the lot had the issue that led to the recall.  Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55 (“An expert's conclusion is excluded if it is based merely on unfounded speculation .  . . .”).  Nor can an expert rely on a plaintiff’s alleged injury as evidence of product defect.  Cf. Zaza, 144 N.J. at 49 (“An inference of defectiveness may not be drawn from the mere fact that someone was injured. ”); O’Brien, 94 N.J. at 179-80 (“Proof that the product was defective requires more than a mere showing that the product caused the injury. ”).  That is particularly important where, as here, the plaintiff alleges injuries that could have occurred without any alleged defect or because of her other pre-existing medical conditions, and the expert conducted no analysis and applied no methodology to rule out any of those other potential causes. \(^1\)  See In re Accutane, 234 N.J. at 397 (examining “whether an expert's reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid”).  [...]’s opinion is a classic net opinion that should have been excluded, Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55, and it cannot create a dispute of material fact or defeat summary judgment, Smith v. Est. of Kelly, 343 N.J. Super. 480, 496-97 (App. Div. 2001).
[brief] ¹  On the brief: [...]  (ID #257911969).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Reply to Procedural History ...........................................  Irb2  Reply to Counterstatement of Facts ..................................  Irb2  Reply to Legal Argument  I.  REPLYING TO POINT I, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE BOARD DID NOT GRANT WAIVERS AND THE APPLICANT DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING ITS RIGHT TO SUCH RELIEF ............................................................  Irb4 II.  REPLYING TO POINT II, THE BOARD COULD NOT GRANT § 18-601  RELIEF ON THE RECORD CREATED BY THE APPLICANT; IT WAS ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SECOND-GUESS THE BOARD'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION  ......................................................  Irb8  III.  REPLYING TO POINT III, THE PUBLIC NOTICE WAS INSUFFICIENT, AND, THEREFORE, THE BOARD LACKED JURISDICTION  .............................  Irb9  Conclusion .................................................................  Irb10  REPLY TO PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] In particular, the number of units impacted only the parking requirement and traffic generation, and the development complied with the RSIS’ parking requirement and caused no traffic impact.  While the Board claims that if it were able to reduce the number of units, it could have reduced the amount of impervious coverage proposed, but was unable to do so.  But the trial court did not restrict the Board’s ability to impose a condition limiting the amount of impervious coverage on the Property.
[brief] *Hous. Auth of Morristown v Little*, 135 N J 274, 280 (1994).  It is further agreed that the burden of proving if the tenant is delinquent in their rental obligations rests with the landlord and that case must be dismissed once it is shown that the rent has been paid by the tenant.  *Stanger v Ridgeway*, 171 N J Super 466, 473 (App. Div. 1979).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...] provided such a receipt.  (Da302-303).  Further, the mailing of the reservation of rights letter is corroborated by the certification of [...] Casualty Claim Specialist, [...], she spoke to [...] on July 17, 2017 and advised him that [...] would be defending him under a reservation of rights and that would be outlined in a letter to be sent to him by [...] or his manager.  (Da. 294-95).  Further still, [...] has never claimed that the address on the certified mail receipt was incorrect or that the signatory on the certified receipt was unknown to him.  Under these circumstances, the trial court was correct to discount [...]’s contention that [...] is estopped from withdrawing its defense based on [...]’s failure to remember receiving the reservation of rights letter.  New Jersey law is also clear that an insurer cannot be deemed to have abandoned its insured while offering a defense under a reservation of rights.
[directive] -2-  The New Law Takes Certain School Zone Cases Out of the Realm of State v. Brima.g~. in State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998), the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, which the Court characterized as an "atypical" sentencing statute because it shifts sentencing power from the judiciary to the prosecutor.  153 N.J. at 10.  The Court held that to satisfy the constitutional requirements of the separation of powers doctrine, prosecutors must be guided by specific, universal standards in their waiver of mandatory minimum sentences under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act.  Id. at 23.  The Court ultimately found that the then-existing Attorney General plea negotiation guidelines did not adequately channel prosecutorial discretion, thereby leading to arbitrary and unreviewable differences between different localities.  Ibid.  The Court therefore directed the Attorney General to issue new guidelines -- now known as the "Brima_ge Guidelines" -- to ensure consistency throughout the State and to achieve what the Court described as the "dominant if not paramount sentencing goal of statewide uniformity."  Id. at 21, 24-25.  In school zone cases where discretion to waive or reduce the mandatory minimum sentence now rests with judges, and not just with prosecutors, the separation of powers concerns that lie at the heart of the Supreme Court’s rationale in State v. Brimage no longer exist, since in school zone cases where defendants are eligible to be sentenced under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b, the prosecutor’s plea offer can no longer dictate the sentence to be imposed.
[brief] (Pa354 (stating that the lack of handrails left Plaintiff unable to stabilize himself “after slipping on the icy surface. ”); Pa363 (discussing the low coefficient of friction caused by “the icy conditions[.]”)).  Furthermore, there is agreement between both Plaintiff’s and defendants’ meteorologists that at the time of the incident there was an active storm, with precipitation falling in the form of freezing rain.  (Pa386; Pa439).  There is a question as to whether and to what extent the “ongoing storm rule” as announced in Pareja v. Princeton Intern. Properties, applies to this case and whether it exempts the property owner/manager from having to remediate the transitory weather hazard.  246 N.J. 546 (2021).  However, there is no dispute that [...] did not have an obligation to clear ice from the steps on the date of the incident.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30a-46a  Resignation Notice of [...] dated 3/8/21.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47a  [...] Resolution dated 4/12/21.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] ”  State v. Mays, 321 N.J. Super. 619, 628 (App. Div.), certif. den. 162 N.J. 132 (1999); see also State v. Joseph, 426 N.J. Super. 204, 220 (App. Div.), certif. den. 212 N.J. 462 (2012).  “Once a prima facie showing is made, the writing or statement is admissible and the ultimate question of authenticity of the evidence is left to the jury. ”  Mays, 321 N.J. Super. at 628 (emphasis added).  Evidence such as photographs are “authenticated” under N.J.R.E. 901 merely if they “appear[] to be what they [a]re purported to be,” and the judge should “leave to the factfinder a more intense review of the photos and the credibility” of the defense (or State) claims regarding that evidence.  *State v. Hockett*, 443 N.J. Super. 605, 615 (App. Div. 2016).
[brief] Section 13.10(a) goes on to elaborate on [...]’s responsibilities and [...]’s remedies in the event of a failure to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate:  The failure of Seller to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall not be deemed a default by Seller, it being agreed that the sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall be to terminate this Agreement and receive a refund of the Down Payment.  (Da211.)  It is critical to note that § 13.10(a) explicitly states that [...]’s failure to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the tenant does not constitute a default.  That [...]’s failure to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is not categorized as a breach is significant because it directly influences [...]’s rights regarding termination of the PSA.  Under the PSA, a breach or default by [...] provides [...] with a list of potential remedies.
[directive] b.  Each county prosecutor, working in conjunction with the Family Court, detention center and local law enforcement agencies, shall seek to develop alternatives to secure detention.  Each county prosecutor should encourage and facilitate the development of home detention programs as an alternative form of detention for qualified juvenile offenders who would otherwise be detained in a secure facility.  Home detention programs should include the following: A written agreement outlining the conditions for home detention, which should be signed by the juvenile and a parent or guardian; ongoing supervisory contact with the juvenile pending case disposition; Notification to the appropriate local law enforcement agency of the juvenile's release to home detention; and Return of the juvenile to a detention center upon a violation of a substantial program condition.  12.
[brief] To set the valuation date as of January 27, 1994, therefore, would allow [...] to reap a windfall at the expense of the public and render “just compensation” a fallacy.  The Berardis, whose failure to redevelop (or at the very least to maintain) the Property without municipal intervention contributed to the blight designation.  Although the determination of an area in need of redevelopment can affect the fair market value of an acquired property before the time of the taking, that does not entitle [...] to double recovery.  The relevant statutes and caselaw offer a safeguard against the depreciation or inflation of value that could result from the imminence of a prospective taking in N.J.S.A. 20:3-30 and -38 of the EDA, but these safeguards were never meant to act as both a sword and shield in a condemnation action.  Under N.J.S.A. 20:3-30, Just compensation shall be determined as of the date of the earliest of the following events: (a) the date possession of the property being condemned is taken by the condemnor in whole or in part; (b) the date of the commencement of the action; (c) the date on which action is taken by the condemnor which substantially affects the use and enjoyment of the property by the condemnee; or (d) the date of the declaration of blight by the governing body upon a report by a planning board pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 20:3-38.]  N.J.S.A. 20:3-30.
[brief] ”  *State v. Reddish*, 181 N.J. 553, 594 (2004).  “The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel. . . shall be an aid to a willing defendant — not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. ”  *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).  Because it is the defendant who will bear the personal consequences of a conviction, he “must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. ”  *Id.* at 834.  “To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him,” *ibid.*, and makes counsel “not an assistant, but a master. ”  *Id.* at 820.  Due to the risks attendant to self-representation, if a defendant requests to represent himself, “he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.
[brief] The ALJ was arbitrary in emphasizing incidental findings such as the Petitioner’s use of her own cell phone, erroneously finding Petitioner and not the [...] provided substitutes and its reliance upon a flawed and biased report on the part of Respondent’s investigator.  The Respondent’s so-called investigation ignored both the [...] certifying pension officer and supervisor’s determination that Petitioner was an employee, failed to interview anyone in the [...] and consisted of a three-hour interview where all the notes were destroyed.
[brief] **1T12:10-19. **  The Court even stated that the plaintiff ran a red light when she turned left, but there is no factual evidence of this in the case, but for some reason the Court appears to have relied upon this in the decision.  **1T14:10-15.**  In *Picone v. Stiles* 329 N.J. Super. 191 (App. Div. 2000), which was also an intersection case where one of the drivers had a stop sign.
[brief] ”); Antonucci, 470 N.J. Super. at 564 (“[A] state law that conflicts with the FAA or frustrates its purpose violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. ”) (citing U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2); Yale Materials Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys., Inc., 240 N.J. Super. 370, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (“The Federal Arbitration Act constitutes a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and preempts state arbitration law for contracts involving interstate commerce. ”).  Appellants also disregard that federal, New Jersey, and New York public policy all strongly favor arbitration.
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant in this matter, [...], at the time of the accident in question was a patrolman with the [...].  Pa14-24.  Plaintiff/Appellant was injured in an altercation with the defendant [...]  Pa17-22.  Because patrolman [...] sustained injuries in the course of his employment, his medical bills and lost wages were paid for by his Worker’s Compensation carrier.  Pa35-44.  The parties agreed that regarding any lost wages and medical bills, that in lieu of evidence being submitted to the jury, the Trial Court would mold the verdict to include the lost wages and medical bills as outlined in the Worker’s Compensation lien.  (2T:30-6 to 9; 32-12-13).  The issue of the plaintiff’s outstanding medical bills and lost wages was initially addressed by the Trial Court, as a result of a Motions in Limine filed by the defendant.  The Trial Court’s Order stated in part:  “the issue of medical bills to be addressed by the court at the time of trial.  Reimbursement of medical bills is limited to the amount paid by the Worker’s Compensation carrier.  Amount of lien to be molded at trial, depending upon jury’s verdict.  Pa53.  On June 14, 2022, during opening arguments, counsel for defendant raised an objection regarding plaintiff’s counsel’s, opening argument.  In that objection, it was stated that plaintiff’s counsel’s reference to retiring, was violative of what was --- 1 Statement of Procedural History and Statement of Facts are combined because they are integrally intertwined.
[brief] Almost immediately after his 2017 petition for post-conviction relief was denied, but before the Appellate Division decision, on January 13, 2022, [...] filed the instant Petition for Post-Conviction Relief based on the State’s failure to disclose [...]’ Sworn Statement, despite its obligation to do so under Brady.  Two weeks later, on January 27, 2022, the State requested that briefing on [...]’s petition be stayed.  Approximately six months later, [...]’s appeal was denied.  The instant petition is therefore timely and should have been considered on the merits by the Superior Court.  The State conceded that it was in possession of [...]’ Sworn Statement for nearly 15 years and failed to disclose it to [...].  It should go without saying that the State should not be rewarded for doing so.
[brief] It is hard to escape the impression that the creditor finds a clear statement undesirable, and is still hoping that a certain number of debtors will pay up if they don’t understand that they are not retiring the debt.  *Id.*, LEXIS at *6-7, WL at.  *3.  We posit the following justification for writing confusing letters: a confusing letter is more likely to cause a consumer to call the debt collector than a clear one, and debt collectors believe they are more likely to obtain a payment during a telephone call then through the mail.
[directive] Post-forfeiture rdease of a seized vehicle upon 2. . payment of the difference between the appraised value and the lienholder’s net investment or of equity in the vehicle, or payment the total seizure costs, whichever is the higher amount (revised Treasury Rules for Remission of Vehicle Forfeitures dated December 1971).  13, Directive No. June 33 7 , 1999 of Page 7 2  Post-forfeiture payment of the lesser amount of 3 . the appraised value or unpaid principal balance owed on an installment agreement to retain a vehicle for official use.  The lienholder should be advised that Treasury will not pay unearned of interest and that the “Rule will be 7 8 ‘ s ” applied by EOAF to determine the amount of the unearned interest and the unpaid principal balance.  Post-forfeiture payment of a lien from the ‘net” 4. proceeds of sale.  The net proceeds are calculated by subtracting all seizure costs from the gross proceeds of sale.  The seizure notices should state that Treasury will not make payments which exceed the unpaid principal balance, net proceeds of sale, or the appraised value at the time of seizure, whichever is the lower amount.  Lienholders must provide documentation to support the amount unpaid of principal claimed in the petitions.
[brief] Id.  Defendant’s assent to Plaintiff’s loan repayment plan that each party would pay one-third of their children’s student loans is evidenced from the fact that he filled out the relevant portions of the financial aid forms that required his attention.  1T58:15-25; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 (containing a handwritten note from Defendant to Plaintiff requesting the forms Defendant would need to fill out his tax returns) (P-668).  Defendant’s assent is also clear from the parties’ agreement to have Defendant’s father (the children’s paternal grandfather) co-sign [...]’s first two loans while Plaintiff’s father (the children’s maternal grandfather) co-sign [...]’s first two loans.  1T49:4-21; 50:11-14; 136:1-3; 209:20-210:12.
[brief] [...] relies on the legal argument from his initial brief and adds the following.  REPLY POINT I  THE STATE IDENTIFIES THE WRONG TESTIMONY AS THE SUBJECT OF ITS ARGUMENT IN POINT II, AND IN ANY CASE, THE FAILURE TO GIVE A LIMITING INSTRUCTION REQUIRES REVERSAL.  In Point II of [...]’s opening brief, he challenges the erroneous admission of past acts of drug dealing, in violation of N.J.R.E. 404(b), with no limiting instruction whatsoever.
[brief] Pa91.  [...] did not produce the [...] Survey to [...] until February 12, 2023 (on the eve of the February 13, 2023 settlement conference with the trial court).  The [...] Survey confirms [...]’s ownership of the Property.  The [...] Survey confirms the dimensions of the respective parcels and the location of the church (e.g., [...]’s Lot 22 and [...]’s Lot 20) as depicted on the tax map.  Ibid.  The [...] Survey states [...]’s church is located on Lot 20, and not Lot 19 as [...] continues to represent.  Ibid.  5  The black-and-white version [...] included in its Appendix does not reveal the color-coding.  Compare Da288 with Pa19.  The [...] highlights [...]’s Lot 22 to illustrate [...]’s ownership of that Lot and highlights Lots 19 and 20 in orange to illustrate [...] owns those lots.  Also, the [...] Survey indicates that Lot 20 is 184.31 feet from the corner of 15th street, which is identical to the tax map.  Ibid.  From the corner of 15th Street and Bergen Street, the tax map indicates that Lot 25 (100 feet), Lot 24 (27 feet) and [...]’s Lot 22 (57.31 feet) add up to 184.31 feet, which is the same number the surveyor from [...] included on the [...] Survey.  Ibid.  The [...] Survey also indicates [...]’s Lot 20 is 41.69 feet across on Bergen St., which again is identical to the tax map.  Ibid.  Therefore, while there is a narrow delineation between [...]’s Lot 22 and [...]’s church on Lot 20 in the front half of the building (which the [...] Survey indicates is approximately 2.5 feet wide), it is clear that the debris piles at issue are located on [...]’s Lot 22 because the debris piles depicted in the [...] video allegedly taken at the time [...] performed its survey are to the rear of the building beyond where that narrow corridor ends.