ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T19:15-25).  [...] testified that during the instructional phase of the walk-and-turn test, Appellant “did step out of line,” (id.), but further testified that he could not recall what Appellant was wearing on his feet at the time, nor could he recall whether Appellant asked about taking off or changing his shoes.  (2T20:13-19).  [...] then testified that Appellant was able to get back into position, which he held until [...] finished the instructional phase of the walk-and-turn test.  (2T20:21-21:3).  [...] then proceeded to perform the second portion of the walk-and-turn test.  Regarding the second portion of the test, [...] testified:  I don’t remember specific steps that he missed stepping heel-to-toe with more than a two inch gap, I do know that while walking he did step off of the line on several times, he did miss stepping and placing his feet heel-to-toe with more than a two inch gap on several steps and he raised his arms for balance.  [(2T21:14-20). ]  [...] then proceeded to administer the one-leg stand test.  (2T22:17-19).  During the instructional phase of the test, [...] instructed Appellant to “keep his feet together at the end of the line [and] keep his hands at his side” while [...] demonstrated the test, which Appellant was able to do.  (2T22:25-23:9).  When asked whether [...] gave Appellant the choice as to which leg to use for the test, [...] testified “[t]o my recollection I would say yes. ” (2T23:11-15).  [...] then administered the one-leg test.  On Appellant’s first attempt, [...] testified that Appellant “raised his leg [and] ended up lifting his arms for balance” before ultimately placing his foot on the ground.  (2T24:1-15).  [...] then asked Appellant to perform the test again, testifying that Appellant “raised his leg and – and almost fell over. ” (Id.).  Based on his interaction with Appellant to that point, [...] believed that Appellant “was the operator of the vehicle, [Appellant] was under the influence of alcohol and [Appellant’s] impairment was due to alcohol. ” (2T24:22-24).  Based on the foregoing, [...] made the decision to formally place Appellant under arrest.
[directive] Magazine change may be forced at instructor’s discretion.  Otherwise, participant is responsible for ammo management, including secondary weapon transition techniques.  Range 50 yards  Target: FBI “Q” type 60 rounds  Range Rds Position Fire Mode  Course of fire Time  On command fire a 2 1.5 sec.  3 yds 6  Standing Auto round burst (3X)  On command fire a 2 1.5 sec.  5 yds 6  Standing Auto round burst (3X)  Auto  On command fire a 2 2 sec.  6  Standing (2rds body, 1 round burst to the body, (2X) rd head) then one shot to the head 7 yds  On command from a standing position fire a 2 Standing to 4 Auto round burst, assume a 6 sec. kneeling kneeling position and fire a 2 round burst  On command fire a 2 1.5 sec.  10 yds 6  Standing Auto round burst (3X)  On command fire 2 Standing Semi rounds, assume a kneeling 8 sec.  15 yds 4 to Kneeling position and fire 2 rounds 1 sec. 25 yds 4  Standing Semi  On command fire 1 round (4X)  Kneeling 2 sec. 25 yds 4 strong side of Semi  On command fire 2 rounds (2X) cover (roll out)  Standing strong side of 2 sec. 25 yds 4 cover (roll out)  Semi  On command fire 2 rounds (2X) or over the top of cover  Kneeling 3 sec. 25 yds 4 support side of Semi  On command fire 2 rounds (2X) cover (roll out)  Standing support side of 3 sec. 25 yds 4 cover (roll out)  Semi  On command fire 2 rounds (2X) or over the top of cover 4 sec.  50 yds 4  Prone  Semi  On command fire 2 rounds (2X)  Kneeling 4 sec. 50 yds 4 strong side of Semi  On command fire 2 rounds (2X) cover 48 hits = 80% score same as HQC 9-82  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] 47 N.J.R. 2531(a) (Oct. 19, 2015)  48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016)  52 N.J.R. 365(a) (March 2, 2020)  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022)  55 N.J.R. 1385(b) (July 17, 2023)  ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
[brief] In other words, this Court reviews de novo the lower court’s application of the law to the equities, but it defers to the lower court’s evaluation of the equities.  This Court should thus accept the Law Division’s finding that the equities weighed in favor of Plaintiffs; that Plaintiffs had vigorously pursued this information for an extended period without ever surrendering their intent to discover this information; and that Plaintiffs had been misled by information that had been provided in discovery.  [1T 47:24-48:22].  The Law Division weighed what the Cross Appellants had to say and, giving these arguments more credit than they were worth, determined that Plaintiffs had made “not perfect” but certainly sufficient efforts to obtain the leases, and analyze whether they had a claim under those leases, rather than making unfounded and reckless allegations.  The Law Division stated: “But at the end of the day I think that the plaintiff was misled by the landlord” and “I cannot fault the plaintiff for not including these defendants if he didn’t really have a theory of liability against them.
[brief] Plaintiff first began working as an independent contractor for [...] in 2010 when he assumed the role of Co-Medical Director of the Pulmonary Unit at [...].  From 2010 through 2017, Plaintiff’s role at the hospital increased over time, ultimately with Plaintiff being engaged in four separate agreements with [...] for different roles.  In December of 2017, [...] sold its interest in [...] and since then has been winding down its operations, going from hundreds of employees to only a couple in the years after selling its interest.
[brief] C.  **The trial court properly applied discounts to the valuation of [...]’s shares to reflect the reality of what [...] would receive on the market. **  The trial court properly applied *Balsamides*, *Lawson*, and *Sipko* in finding that “shareholder discounts are appropriately applied when representative of the reality of the transaction, the nature of the interest being transacted, and the bearing of equity upon the parties. ” (Da3204-3205)  On appeal, [...] proposes the novel theory that the trial court erred in applying discounts because significant monetary awards for Appellant’s oppression and/or breaches of fiduciary obligation were imposed against him prior to the trial court’s valuation.
[brief] .........................................................  46  A.  Gross Hearing Facts .................................................................................. 46  1.  [...] ................................................................. 46  2.  [...] ...............................................................  47  B.  Trial court’s decision ......................................................  48  C.  The prior inconsistent statements were properly admitted at trial.  ...........................................................................  50  POINT V  THE TWENTY-YEAR PRISON SENTENCE WAS FAIR PUNISHMENT FOR A DEFENDANT WITH A HISTORY OF POSSESSING WEAPONS CULMINATING IN A FATAL SHOOTING ...........................................................................................................
[directive] 2.  Program Coordinator at either defense counsel's office or the space made available by the court.  3.  Such finding by a qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist shall be submitted a in written report to this Court and counsel and shall include: of of (a) description the nature the examination; of of (b) A diagnosis the mental condition the defendant; ( An opinion as to the defendant's capacity to understand the proceeding against him/her c) and to assist in his/her own defense; and [...]
[brief] On January 14, 2016, the Law Division entered a bench warrant for [...]’s arrest for failure to comply with post-judgment discovery (Pa12).  On June 24, 2016, the Sheriff was denied entry to serve a Writ of Execution and levy upon goods and chattels at [...]’s home (Pa52).  On September 2, 2016, Plaintiff moved to remove locks and doors (Pa12).  On October 6, 2016, Plaintiff served the Order directing the Sheriff to remove locks and doors to Defendants (Pa53).  On February 15, 2017, Plaintiff served an Order to sell [...]’s interest in real property (Pa57).
[brief] (Pa477).  Staffing coordinators could not assign charge pay to themselves, meaning that [...] needed others to participate in this scheme for her to obtain the extra pay.  (Pa232 at 29:13-21).  [...] agreed to add charge pay, despite never having received direct approval from [...].  (Pa477).  Indeed, [...] never even spoke to [...] about charge pay.  (Pa362 at 84:15-17).  On September 1, 2020, [...] discovered the unauthorized charge pay and alerted [...] that [...], [...], and [...] were receiving charge pay.
[brief] CLERK [...], [...]  COUNSEL [...], ESQ., NEWARK BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR  [...], ESQ., NEWARK DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT  [...], NEWARK DIRECTOR OF FINANCE  [...], NEWARK DIVISION OF TAX ABATEMENT AND SPECIAL TAXES  MANAGER  [...], CTC, NEWARK TAX ASSESSOR [...], ESQ., [...], ESSEX COUNTY EXECUTIVE  [...], [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] ” (6T31-1 to 23; 6T34-18 to 35-10; 6T59-24 to 60-3).  Not long after [...] said he was by the Dollar Store on Irving Avenue, [...] heard the sound of two gunshots over the speaker phone followed by a car screeching.  (6T31-21 to 32-3; 6T36-18 to 20; 6T50-5 to 21; 6T60-4 to 8).  [...] desperately tried to find someone at the Ville to give him a ride to find [...]. (6T51-1 to 3; 6T60-11 to 14).  Sometime before 7:00 p.m. on August 11, defendant called [...] looking for [...].  (6T32-13 to 22; 6T37-15 to 22; 6T47-20 to 48-8; 6T51-22 to 52-8).  [...] handed his phone to [...] with [...] “standing right there. ” (6T32-20 to 22; 6T37-20 to 25; 6T48-7 to 13).  Defendant stated, “that shit done deal,” and asked for .40 caliber and 9-millimeter bullets because he “empt[ied] the whole clip. ” (6T33-3 to 24; 6T61-2 to 5).  [...] and [...] met defendant on the south side of [...], on South Pine Street near Fremont Avenue, and provided defendant with 9-millimeter bullets; they did not have .40-caliber bullets.  (6T33-25 to 34-2; 6T37-15 to 22; 6T39-3 to 20; 6T44-13 to 20; 6T48-13 to 23; 6T52-13 to 15).  Defendant was standing with a group of five or six people bragging about “[h]ead shots, you already know how we do. ” (6T38-2 to 39-25; 6T48-21 to 49-5; 6T60-15 to 24).  Defendant went on, “I don’t miss. ” (6T48-21 to 49-5).  Following a Frye\(^8\) hearing on May 6, 2022, the trial court permitted [...] to testify as an expert on using per call measurement data (PCMD) to track defendant’s cell phone location on the morning of the offense.
[brief] See, *In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ.*, 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency's interpretation of a statute); *State v. Courtney*, 243 N.J. 77,  With regards to findings of fact, "[t]he general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).  See, State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 306 (2019) ("[w]e will not disturb the trial court's findings; in an appeal, we defer to findings that are supported in the record and find roots in credibility assessments by the trial court"); Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311, 329 (2017) ("[w]e review the trial court's factual findings under a deferential standard: those findings must be upheld if they are based on credible evidence in the record"); Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016) (findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence); State v. K.W., 214 N.J. 499, 507 (2013) ("[w]e defer to the trial court's factual findings 'so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record").  In the present matter, the underlying determination by the trial judge as to whether a conflict of interest existed that could not be waived constituted a factual determination.
[brief] Therefore, end islands/peninsulas occupying additional space would further reduce available parking supply which could also lead to driver frustration and potentially contribute to aggressive driving behavior.  (Da24-Da26, §2.1.2 Curbed Geometry & End Islands / Peninsulas).  Additionally, [...] Zoning regulations did not require landscaped end islands at the end of parking rows, nor peninsulas at the end of parking rows.  (Da32, §2.3 Zoning Compliance).
[brief] Page(s): 11 - **Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC**, 419 NJ Super. 596 (App Div. 2011)  Page(s): 9, 10 - **Robertson v. U.S.**, 343 U.S. 711, 72 S. Ct. 994, 96 L.Ed. 1237 (1952)  Page(s): 11 - **Smerling v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. **, 389 N.J. Super. 181, 912 A.2d 168 (App. Div. 2006)  Page(s): 8 - **Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp.**, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2002)  Page(s): 9, 10 - **Zeller v. Markson Rosenthal & Co.**, 299 NJ Super. 461 (App. Div. 1997)  Page(s): 13, 14 ####  Unpublished Opinions - **Fehr v. Algard**, 2011 WL 13670  Page(s): 11 #### New Jersey Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et. seq. (Consumer Fraud Act)**  Page(s): 7, 8, 15 ####
[brief] The Legislature acknowledged the distinction between providing information and actual records in different settings.  The statute, for example, directs that certain ‘information’ about ongoing criminal investigations shall be made available to the public.  Id. § 3(b) (emphasis added).  Elsewhere, the Legislature directs that ‘government records,’ as opposed to information, be disclosed.  Id. § 1.  The significance ascribed to Section 3(b) by the Chief Justice becomes relevant when applied to this matter, because it demonstrates that there is a distinction between a request for *records* and a request for *information* that must be recognized.
[brief] R.P.C. 1.5(a) provides as follows:  (a)  A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.  The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
[brief] ”  Id. at 332 n.4.  Here, police officers lawfully stopped defendant’s vehicle pursuant to a valid search warrant.  A search of the vehicle and a search-incident-to-arrest of defendant both revealed evidence of drugs and guns.  This dangerous combination required swift, yet lawful, action to ensure the viability of further evidence and to protect the public from potential harm.  The [...] therefore sought and obtained defendant’s consent to search his home in Lakewood and proceeded there promptly with defendant to conduct the search.  While it may have been reasonable to obtain the assistance of Lakewood officers to aid the search, it was not improper for the Toms River officers to act quickly without them for the preservation of evidence and public safety.  In sum, the motion judge properly concluded that the Toms River police officers lawfully executed the valid search warrant as defendant drove the subject vehicle just over the border in Lakewood.  This Court should affirm that reasoned decision.
[brief] The Court distinguished *Tucker* based on the fact that in *J.B.* the police “were not on a routine patrol [but] were engaged in an organized police activity designed to eliminate loitering at night on street corners in high drug-trafficking areas. ”  *Id.* at 518.  *J.B.* was also distinguished by the fact that “the police were responding to a citizen telephone complaint of alleged drug-trafficking at … the very next corner they intended to check as part of their planned activity that evening. ”  Ibid.  Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court found the case “more analogous to the facts in State v. Doss, 254 N.J.Super. 122,” than the facts in Tucker.  284 N.J. Super. at 518–19.  The facts in this case also are unlike the singular, bare-bones facts of Tucker and are instead like the facts in Doss.
[brief] At page 33 of its Brief, [...] asserts that the 1892 Agreement and resolution did not survive the enactment of N.J.S.A. 48:7-1, stating that N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 was enacted in 1962, which is years after the resolution.  [...] disregards the fact that the same 1962 enactment also saved from repeal P.L. 1898, c. 197, which declared such agreements to be valid and binding.  N.J.
[brief] 1T24:11-:15; 1T27:23-34:19, 3T9:21-10:20.  The trial court then held the pretrial conference, 1T25:25-44:7; heard in limine motions, 1T44:10-66:24; conducted jury selection, and gave the preliminary jury charge, 1T67:8-85:72, T4:2-42:16.  Plaintiff and [...] gave opening statements, 2T43:6-72:3, and plaintiff then presented his first fact witness, [...].  2T73:1-81:8.  [...] is the owner of [...].  Da46.  When plaintiff attempted to elicit opinion testimony from [...], the trial court excused the jury for the day so that it could hear argument on whether plaintiff was improperly attempting to elicit an expert opinion through [...].  2T79:20-105:12.  The trial court reserved its decision overnight.  2T105:13-:25.  [...] thereafter settled with plaintiff, and at the outset of the third day of trial, the parties placed that settlement on the record.  3T4:17-5:8; 14:16-16:18.  That settlement specifically preserved [...]’s right to appeal the trial court’s judgment requiring [...] to indemnify [...].  3T5:9-7:15.  That settlement made the trial moot.  3T15:9-13.  The trial court therefore excused the jury, 3T15:14-16:18, and dismissed the case.  Da7.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has reiterated the well-settled principle that “[a]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. ”  State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 10, 15 (1990).  Appellate courts may review and modify a sentence when the trial court's determination was “‘clearly mistaken. ’”  State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 6 (1990).  However, appellate courts are "bound to affirm a sentence, even if [they] would have arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court properly identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by competent credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989).  A remand is required if the finding of the respective factors is not “supported by substantial evidence in the record.
[directive] a Voce declarou-se culpado por algum crime um periodo obrigat6rio de desqualifica,;:ao liberdade que exige condicional ou um periodo prolongado obrigat6rio?  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole a. ineligibility is __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.  Se voce esta se declarando culpado por tal crime, o periodo minimo obrigat6rio sem possibilidade de obter a liberdade condicional e de __ anos e __ meses (inserir o numero de anos/meses) e o periodo maximo a de desqualifica,;:ao liberdade condicional pode ser de __ anos e __ meses (inserir o numero de anos/meses) e este periodo nao pode ser reduzido por creditos de born comportamento, trabalho ou creditos minimos de reclusao.
[brief] The Second Count alleged that Ordinance 1423-21, the amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, was adopted in violation of the OPMA, the LRHL and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.  These multiple defects were summarized in paragraph 77 of the Verified Complaint:  77.  The enactment of Ordinance No. 1423-21 amending the Redevelopment Plan was invalid because: (i) The ordinance was introduced at a public meeting held in violation of the OPMA; (ii) [...] improperly voted to introduce the ordinance despite having recused himself from all matters affecting development on Lane Avenue; (iii)  The public hearing on final passage of the ordinance was not noticed in conformance with N.J.S.A. 40:49-2; (iv)  The Planning Board reviewed the ordinance at a December 16, 2021, special meeting which was not noticed in conformance with the OPMA; (v)  The December 16, 2021, special meeting of the Planning Board was not recorded, although the December 8, 2021, Planning Board meeting where the ordinance review began was recorded; (vi) [...] and [...] failed to disclose to the other members of the governing body that the Planning Board had concluded that Ordinance 1423-21 was inconsistent with the Borough’s Master Plan and had made multiple recommendations for the Council to consider; (vii) The Redevelopment Plan is devoid of any acknowledgment of or explanation for the inconsistencies with the Master Plan, as required by the LRHL; and (viii) The Council failed to acknowledge or vote on the Planning Board’s recommendations as required by the LRHL.
[brief] Chapter 230 “Land Use and Development Regulations”, Article XXV “Historic Districts and Historic Sites”, Section 230-201 “Procedure” of the Code of the [...] is hereby amended to read as follows:  §230-201  Procedure.  A.  Any application for development, including building permits, which is subject to Article XXV shall be made by an application for a certificate of appropriateness (see Schedule F).  An application for a certificate of appropriateness shall be filed with the Land Use Office to determine administrative completeness.  The determination of completeness shall be made within 45 days from submission.  Upon determination of completeness by the Land Use Office, the application shall be referred to the Historic Preservation Review Commission for its review.  B.  Within 45 days of receipt by the Historic Preservation Review Commission of an application, the Commission shall review the application and shall issue a written report to the Planning Board recommending approval, approval with conditions or denial of the application, based upon recognized standards such as those established by the Secretary of the Interior.  C.  The Planning Board shall review the report of the Commission and shall make a final determination as to the disposition of the application within 45 days of receipt of the recommendation of the Commission to approve, approve with conditions or deny the application.  If referral of the application to the Historic Preservation Review Commission emanated from the Zoning Officer, the Planning Board shall report its decision to the Zoning Officer.  D.  Failure of the Historic Preservation Commission to report in writing to the Planning Board or the failure of the Planning Board to report to the Zoning Officer within 45 days of this referral shall be deemed to constitute a report in favor of issuance of the permit and without the recommendation of conditions to the permit.  E.  Upon approval of the application, the Zoning Officer shall issue a certificate of appropriateness.  An applicant for a certificate of appropriateness who is dissatisfied with the actions of the Zoning Officer in denying the certificate of appropriateness or in issuing the certificate of appropriateness with objectionable conditions may appeal that action to the Zoning Board of Adjustment within 30 days from the date of the administrative officer's written decision.  The hearing on such appeal shall be conducted in the same fashion as any appeal from the administrative officer's determinations.  This right of appeal is limited to the applicant only.  SECTION 22.