ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 267 (2015) (quoting *Rhode Island v. Innis*, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).  However, an “innocent inquiry” stemming from ministerial “booking procedures and the routine questions associated therewith” do not implicate this right.  *State v. M.L.*, 253 N.J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div. 1991).  Accordingly, police are permitted to ask a defendant for “routine pedigree information, including his name and address, for purposes of completing [an] arrest report” even when a defendant is in custody.  *State v. Melendez*, 454 N.J. Super. 445, 457 (App. Div. 2018), aff’d as modified, 240 N.J. 268 (2020).  Questioning that goes beyond the “[r]outine questions asked during the booking process or for bail purposes,” falls within the privilege against self-incrimination.  *State v. Cunningham*, 153 N.J. Super. 350, 352 (App. Div. 1977).  “Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect’s *Miranda* rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions. ”  *Pennsylvania v. Muniz*, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990).  Here, the detectives far exceeded this limited “booking” exception to *Miranda*.  For example, after [...] began trying to explain what happened, [...] and [...] engaged with [...], challenging what he said to keep him talking.
[brief] The stop of [...]’s car was unreasonable because, notwithstanding the database error that returned an active warrant, there was never any existing justification for her arrest and therefore no reasonable suspicion to stop.  As such, the trial court should have granted defendants’ motion to suppress.  The State’s reliance on *State v. Pitcher* is misplaced, as the circumstances in *Pitcher* are distinguishable from those present here.  379 N.J. Super. 308 (App. --- \(^1\) [...] retains the abbreviations and transcript designations used in his opening brief and adds the following: Db = defendant’s appellant brief Sb = State’s respondent brief Div. 2005); see State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 528 (2022) (“Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry .  . . .”).  The Pitcher court noted the facts before it—a stop based on “mistaken inclusion of, or failure to timely delete, a record of license suspension in data accessible to law enforcement”—were distinguishable from cases involving invalid warrants because a license suspension is simply “one articulable fact” that goes into a reasonable suspicion or probable cause analysis, whereas a warrant is “a determination about the justification for a stop or arrest. ”  Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. at 318.  As such, the Pitcher court itself acknowledges its holding is not applicable to the present facts in which the only basis to stop the car was the invalid warrant and there was no reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation.
[brief] Consequently, because the improper admission of that evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and denied defendant a fair trial, defendant’s convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.  Expert testimony is admissible when "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" and the proposed expert has the "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" to form an expert opinion.  N.J.R.E. 702.  The rule creates a three-pronged test for the admission of expert testimony: “(1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. ”  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984).  Additionally, N.J.R.E. 702 permits a qualified expert to testify “in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” and N.J.R.E. 703 addresses what forms the “bases of opinion testimony by experts” may take.
[brief] And what happened was that we are in a new room and we learned that the, we only recorded video, no audio.  And apparently there was some internal switch within the computer system that, I’m not throwing the IT guys completely under the bus, but was, the microphones were turned off.  And we had no idea we were not recording.  So after the hearing counsel for some of the objectors asked for an OPRA request.  In our normal course, our Board secretary went back just to check the tapes and advised me that they didn’t record.  And that was the only application for this hearing.  I then notified both counsel for the applicant and the attorney for the objectors that we had a problem.
[brief] THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT [...] OWED A DUTY TO THE NON-CLIENT [...] (NOT ADDRESSED BELOW) | 37 | | G. THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS PROXIMATE CAUSATION (NOT ADDRESSED BELOW) | 38 | H. SINCE [...] FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH [...] AND HIS FIRM, AND ALSO SINCE [...] FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROXIMATE CAUSATION, THE ORDER FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (T1:7:23-17:16) ..................................................................................................................43 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................................48 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc.**, 272 N.J. Super. 478, 488 (App. Div. 1994) | 44, 45 | | **Baen v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem Cty.**, 318 N.J. Super. 260, 266 (App. Div. 1999) | 28 | | **Banco Popular, N.A. v. Gandi**, 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | 22, 28 | | **Barsotti v. Merced**, 346 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2002) | 22 | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.**, 142 N.J. 520, 529, 540, 66 A. 2d 146 (1995) | 17, 18, 19, 31 | | **Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman**, 145 N.J. 395, 417 (1996) | 43 | | **Conklin**, 145 N.J. at 419 | 44 | | **Cortez v. Gindhart**, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 604 (App. Div. 2014), certif. den., 220 N.J. 269 (2015) | 18, 44, 45 | | **Davis v. Brickman Landscaping**, 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014) | 43 | | **DeAngelis v. Rose**, 320 N.J. Super. 263, 274-275 (App. Div. 1999) | 16, 20, 22 | | **Estate of Albanese v. Lolio**, 393 N.J. Super. 355, 372 (App. Div. 2007) | 20, 22 | | **Fitzgerald v. Linnus**, 336 N.J. Super. 458, 468 (App. Div. 2001) | 20 | | **Froom v. Perel**, 377 N.J. Super. 298, 310-13 (App. Div. 2005) | 29, 44 | | **Green v. Morgan Properties**, 215 N.J. 431, 458, 460 (2013) | 19 | | **Grunwald v. Bronkesh**, 131 N.J. 483, 495 (1993) | 45 | | **Haynes v. First National**, 87 N.J. 163, 183 (1981) | 39, 40, 41, 47 | Hernandez v. Velez, 267 N.J. Super. 353 (Law Div. 1993) ....................29, 30, 31 Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425-26, 962 A. 2d 532 (App. Div. 2009) ..................................................................................18
[directive] At the expiration of 60 days following the final judgement, our department shall destroy the controlled dangerous substance at a facility designated by the Prosecutor's Office.  The controlled dangerous substance shall be destroyed within one year of the final judgement.  All aspects of the destruction shall be documented on the Uniform Destruction of Evidence Form.  Notice to and approval of the Chief of the Trial Section is not necessary for the destruction of controlled dangerous substances in a disorderly persons offense, or where the amount and type of drug would qualify for disorderly persons offense treatment.  7.5
[brief] [...] testified that he believed [...] was armed based on “his nervous behavior, due to his furtive movements, grabbing the safety vest, covering it over his waistband area. ”  (2T:19-2 to 8)  But [...]’s alleged nervous behavior, by itself, cannot establish reasonable suspicion that he was armed.  See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 530, 533.  And [...] placing his work vest down on his lap, after displaying it for the detectives to prove where he worked, is exactly the sort of ambiguous conduct that Nyema warned is irrelevant to a reasonable suspicion analysis.  See id. at 534.  [...] offered no compelling reason to believe that [...] placing his work vest down in his lap was “furtive,” and not simply the most natural place to put the vest down after holding it up in the air.  Moreover, none of the additional Lund factors apply; [...] did not lie to the detectives or tell a conflicting story, he promptly provided his license and registration, and the stop took place in the middle of the day.
[brief] Furthermore, the statement within the Administrator’s Forensic Report, attesting to [...]'s lack of objections to the administrator's decisions, underscores the defendant's legal commitments.  (Da315).  The Report explicitly states, "The Administrator concluded, and, subject to the entry of an Order from this Court approving the Administrator’s Report that had been reviewed by [...], [...] agreed to the following:  1.  [...] will not file any objection to the Report."  (Da315).
[brief] Every reasonable inference is accorded the Plaintiff.  See Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).  However, a defendant’s motion to dismiss may be granted where the Complaint states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one.  Energy Rec. v. Dept. of Env. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999) aff’d o.b. 170 N.J. 246 (2001).  In viewing Plaintiff’s lengthy Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, despite its breadth, the Trial Court below appropriately determined Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to state a cause of action against the [...] and Principal [...].
[brief] ...........................................  19 State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2011) .................... 40 State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119 (2006) ...........................................  34 State v. Thomas, 362 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div. 2003) .................. 14 State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396 (1971) ...........................................  33 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) ..............................................  47 State v. Wiggins, 291 N.J. Super. 441 (App. Div. 1996) ..................  11 State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420 (1973) ..............................................  33 State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576 (2014) ...........................................  28 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) .......................................  7, 46, 47 State v. Zembreski, 445 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 2016) ..............
[directive] The Judiciary shall provide interpreters required for grand jury proceedings.  Comment:  The grand jury is a Judiciary proceeding.  When a witness in a grand jury proceeding needs an interpreter, whether a language interpreter or a sign language interpreter, in order to testify before the grand jury, it is the Judiciary’s responsibility to provide the required services.  The judge supervising the grand jury shall determine whether an interpreter is required by a witness.  It is the responsibility of the prosecutor to advise the supervising judge, either directly or through the grand jury clerk, that he or she believes that an interpreter is required.  The supervising judge can also make that determination sua sponte.  In practical terms, it is the prosecuting authority who locates and prepares witnesses and who therefore is most likely to be in a position to advise that an interpreter is required.
[brief] "When a plaintiff knows or has reason to know that he has a cause of action against an identifiable defendant and voluntarily sleeps on his rights so as to permit the customary period of limitations to expire, the pertinent considerations of individual justice as well as the broader considerations of repose coincide to bar his claim."  Farrell, supra., at 115; Marion, supra., at 334-335; DiMura, supra., at 161-162.  The "relation back" provided by this rule will not render timely a complaint where the plaintiff has already had ample time to ascertain the identity of the defendant before the running of the statute of limitations.  Matynska v. Fried, 175 N.J. 51, 53 (2002) (belated attempt to name doctor in medical malpractice action untimely where, despite the naming of a John Doe, doctor's identity could have readily been found in plaintiff's hospital records); Cardona v. Data Systems Computer Centre, 261 N.J. Super. 232, 235 (App. Div. 1992) (in auto negligence matter, plaintiff failed to make "easy and routine inquiry" to obtain police report identifying defendant)  Put another way, the identification of a defendant as fictitious under R. 4:26-4 may only be utilized if the plaintiff would not have been, or in fact, was not able to ascertain the defendant's name through the exercise of due diligence.  Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472, 479-480 (App. Div. 2003)
[brief] IV.  THE ADMISSION OF THE AUDIO PORTION OF THE DASHCAM VIDEO WAS IMPROPER AND GARNERED INAPPROPRIATE SYMPATHY THAT DEPRIVED [...] OF A FAIR TRIAL (Da41; 1T:16-3 to 20-2).  Plaintiff and the trial court both mischaracterize the content of the audio portion of [...]’s dashcam video and in doing so undervalue the potential sympathy that evidence garnered in the jury and its shocking and upsetting content.  Although the video was played only once, it is three minutes and forty-four seconds long.  For almost two full minutes from approximately 1:50 to the end of the video, [...] is standing next to Plaintiff’s vehicle and she is heard crying and begging for help because her legs hurt so badly.  Da170.  The fear in Plaintiff’s voice is palpable and her cries for help and pleas to the Trooper to help her are difficult to listen to.  The suggestion that the audio portion of the video was not shocking or upsetting to listen to is simply not an honest and fair characterization of the video.  The video had a very significant impact on the jury and garnered significant sympathy for the Plaintiff.  It is difficult to imagine any individual listening to that video and not feeling sympathy for the Plaintiff; a factor that should play no role in the jury’s deliberations.  Defendants respectfully submit that the audio portion of the dashcam video was inflammatory and had the “‘probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the issues.
[brief] The arbitration agreement is standard in the securities industry, with language promulgated by FINRA.  In 2023, after maintaining accounts with [...] for more than five years, and receiving the benefits of [...]’s investment advice (yielding hundreds of thousands of dollars in investment returns), Respondents withdrew their investments with [...] and put their money into a purported investment club that had nothing to do with [...].  When they lost money in this investment club, Respondents sued [...] in Hudson County blaming [...] for their losses.  When [...] moved to compel the dispute into arbitration under the terms of the Client Agreements, Respondents took the position that not only did they never sign the Client Agreements, but that they also did not know there was a written agreement governing their five year investment account relationship with [...].  Even if a factual dispute exists over Respondents’ electronic signatures, such a dispute does not affect other legal grounds for enforcing the arbitration provisions at issue before the Court.  Respondents’ position that they can open up an account with [...], accept the benefits of the Client Agreement for years, and then avoid the arbitration provision (or other terms of the Client Agreement) based on alleged ignorance that a written agreement governed the terms of their investment accounts is contrary to controlling law and common sense.  Independently, Respondents’ position that they can agree to an arbitration provision, as a term and condition of accessing [...]’s proprietary computer system, and then refuse to abide by that term and condition, is also contrary to controlling law.  The Trial Court denied [...]’s motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that: (a) despite the fact that [...] had delivered and Respondents had received five-years’ worth of benefits under the terms of the Client Agreements, Respondents were not bound to the arbitration provisions of those Agreements, and independently, (b) Respondents were not required to abide by the [...]’s website Terms and Conditions that they had agreed to because those Terms and Conditions were deemed not conspicuous enough.  The Court misapplied controlling law in both instances.  Clear case law, including from this Court, makes plain that Respondents are bound to arbitrate this dispute both because they are subject to the Terms and Conditions of the Client Agreements and because under New Jersey law, the website Terms and Conditions were more than conspicuous enough to govern and accordingly to require arbitration of Respondents’ disputes here.
[brief] “the cost of ... same and whether or not the parties can afford said education,” and, “[i]n the event the parties agree to a specific ... college[,] ... it is agreed [they] shall pay for the same based on their respective incomes at the time of enrollment. ”  [...] attended college.  He entered college ([...]) in 2010 (1T:107, L2) and graduated in May 2014, at age twenty-two.  [...] also attended college ([...]).  She entered college in 2012 and (1T:107, L15) and graduated in May of 2016.  In March 2017, plaintiff filed the first post-judgment application following entry of the JOD nineteen (19) years earlier.
[brief] 90a.  A Case Management Order was entered on August 22, 2022.  91a.  On November 27, 2022 undersigned counsel substituted in for [...], Esq. as counsel for Defendants [...].  93a.  Prior to trial on March 28, 2023, undersigned counsel filed a Certification of Proof of Funds indicating that the $20,695.64 necessary to redeem the certificate was being held in her attorney trust account should the Court vacate the default judgment.
[brief] See Da234, Para.5 and Da238-244.  In September 2014 and again in July 2015, [...] recommended adoption of transgender student policies.  Id.  Both of these versions provided for parental notification in the process and consent for certain younger students.  Id.  [...] adopted these recommended Policies.  See Da234-235, Para.6-7.  Neither the Attorney General nor Director of the DCR initiated against [...] for adopting these policies.  [...] chose not to adopt those policies.
[brief] Ra165.  As further noted by [...] in his Certification: 16.  In arguing that this Court’s rulings in this case, including the appointment of a Special Hearing Officer, were incorrect, the Township suggests in its motion papers that its efforts to thwart the Respondents’ inclusionary development are somewhat anomalous, and that the Township otherwise makes its best efforts to allow for the low- and moderate-income housing required by the Mount Laurel doctrine.  That has not been my experience.  17.  In addition to the Township’s long-term favoritism toward the age restricted population, and its bias against families with children, as demonstrated by the data summarized above, I note that the Township’s AHMUD/HD overlay zoning governing inclusionary development on the properties within the Highway Development Zone, including the Subject Property, imposes an excessive minimum tract size requirement which is not met by any of the properties within that district.
[brief] Bd. of Educ. of Middletown v. Middletown Tp Educ. Assn., 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (App. Div. 2001).........................................................  19 Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 202 (2013)..............................................................................
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  As set forth above, the Mayor and Council referred Ordinance 22-1516 to the Planning Board for review at the Ordinance’s first reading on September 27, 2022.  The Planning Board adopted Resolution PB10-2022, finding the Ordinance consistent with the Master Plan and recommending its adoption, on October 12, 2022.  At its second reading on October 24, 2022, the Borough adopted Ordinance 22-1516.
[directive] As with criminal matters, LPS employees may disclose information about a civil enforcement matter that is contained in a public filing or otherwise has been made public by the Attorney General.  Employees who are contacted by the Governor’s Office or the Legislature seeking this information should nonetheless notify the First Assistant Attorney General regarding the contact.  Likewise, representatives of the Attorney General and the Governor’s Office are not prohibited from discussing general civil enforcement priorities, initiatives, or policy objectives, including the categories of civil cases (e.g., consumer fraud, civil rights, environmental justice) that the Department might prioritize and expend resources on, without discussing specific enforcement targets.  C.
[brief] [...]’s Permit Application**  On March 14, 2022, [...] applied for: (1) a flood hazard individual permit; (2) a flood hazard area verification; (3) freshwater wetlands general permits No. 2, 6, 7, 10B, 11; and (4) a transition area averaging plan waiver.  (Aa117).  This appeal concerns the flood hazard area individual permit and flood hazard area verification, as [...] is still reviewing the wetland permits and transition area waiver.
[brief] The doctrine of laches is “invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party. ”  *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003).  “[L]aches is not governed by fixed time limits but instead relies on analysis of time constraints that ‘are characteristically flexible. ’”  *Fox*, 210 N.J. at 418 --- Copies of all unpublished opinions are being provided herewith. (citation omitted) (quoting Lavin, 90 N.J. at 151).  A court may apply the doctrine of laches “when the delaying party had sufficient opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned.
[brief] The record reflects that the only project the Arbitrator did not award [...] any EGP was Hackensack.  The PTA expressly set the Hackensack EGP at $1,677,588.00, and the PTA provided that [...]’s EGP share on all projects was 65%—i.e., $1,090,432.20 at Hackensack.  [...] only paid [...] $191,381.00, and so [...] brought a claim for the remaining $899,051.20.  Simple math, yet the Arbitrator awarded [...] $0.00.  While the final award could have been written more clearly, the record confirms that the Arbitrator’s award to [...] of $0.00 was based on offsetting subcontractor monies owed to [...]—on a project where [...] put into evidence its entitlement to a “credit” for subcontract work, and testimony on Hackensack spanned seven separate hearing days.  damages it sustained as a subcontractor at the Hackensack Project, including introducing the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract into evidence.  Pa316 at 391:2-14.  Thus, [...]’s claim in the Second Arbitration is a (now-barred) aspect of a single larger controversy arising from the relationship created by the PTA, transactions set in motion by the PTA, and projects governed by the PTA.