ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] D.  Review by Division of Criminal Justice  I _ 1  If approved, the completed Form D shall be forwarded the Division of to Criminal Justice, Operations Bureau for final review and approval.  Upon or of making a determination, the Director, Division Criminal Justice, blodc designee, shall sign and date the appropriate "Approved" "Denied" or The Division Criminal Justice may impose limitations on any aspect of the of - request.  The original Form D shall then be maintained by DCJ Operations in and the person who signed shall receive a photocopy along with block 16) written notification from the Division Criminal Justice to proceed.
[brief] (15T:175-13 to 22).  As to factor three, [...]’s statement to police was that he did not see anything or the person who shot him because he was watching a rap video on his phone.  Therefore, as the court correctly determined, the only relevant information he could have told the jury was regarding his specific injuries, which the State had already shown pictures of said injuries to the jury.  As [...] would have not provided “critical” information to the facts at issue – mainly was defendant involved in the shooting – factor three did not weigh in favor of a Clawans charge.  (15T:175-23 to 176-9).
[brief] The transcript of that oral argument is found at 6T.  On September 14, 2023, the trial court entered an Order for Judgment “in Plaintiff’s favor” for $954,150.22.  (Da59 to 61).  The order did not indicate the parties against whom judgment was entered.  On September 20, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of their motion for a new trial.
[brief] (Emphasis added)  Respondent’s response to this issue is to argue that “(t)here is sufficient record evidence to show that Appellant abused his medication” (R-29) and that the ALJ “…correctly concluded that this evasive and dishonest behavior (referencing Appellant being prescribed and using opioids) was consistent with addiction…” (R-30).  Respondent’s argument misses the point.  The ALJ specifically found that Appellant’s opioid use impacted his performance “…while conducting his job duties as a [...]” and further “…put himself at risk as well as members of the public whom appellant was sworn to protect…” notwithstanding the withdrawal of all charges alleging impairment while on duty.  It is axiomatic that a determination of guilt on withdrawn charges is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  See, Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).
[brief] The applicant sought Preliminary and Final Major Subdivision approval to subdivide an existing tract known as Lots 23, 24.01, and 34 in Block 24 into nine (9) new single-family parcels with a cul-de-sac road.  (Ia64)  Finally, the testimony below was indisputably clear.  The application sought to subdivide lots, not to construct houses of any specific design.  [...] ("[...]"), the Plaintiff’s expert engineer, whose testimony was unrefuted, testified:  The plot plan testimony is, we're not asking to build those house boxes.  **We're not asking for basement apartments.  We're asking for a nine lot conforming residential subdivision**, to create nine conforming lots that individual home buyers are going to come in.  (T2: p10, ln 22 – p11, ln 2)  Again, and for the record, we are here for a subdivision approval to get the lots.  The information shown on the plans by the blue lines was to show a maximum situation so that the Board can see what the maximum looks like.  We're not asking for houses with basements.  (T2: p27, ln 17-22)  We're not asking for basement apartments.  We're asking for nine residential lots.  **The plans that were submitted on the 17th were in response to the Board saying we want to see the maximum that could get built here. **  So, new lines show the maximum that can get built there and show two laterals and a 30 percent building coverage.  (T2: p55, ln 15-22)  It's not predicated on basement apartments.  These lots will be treated the same as every other R12 lot in [...].  (T2: p56, ln 1-4)  The Board engineer further noted that the question of basements is a matter to be addressed at the plot plan stage.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in *Greenberg* illustrates the point.  There, the wife of a judge challenged a “casino ethics amendment” to the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law, N.J.S.A. 52:13D-12 to -27, which prohibited state officers and employees, including full-time members of the judiciary and their immediate relatives, from employment with casinos.  99 N.J. at 558.  The plaintiff argued that the amendment violated her property and liberty-interest rights in obtaining casino employment.
[brief] This case does not require appointment of a Special Adjudicator to determine defendant’s guilt.  The [...]’s suggestion that this Court remand to a Special Adjudicator for hearings to “develop a standardized approach regarding the admission of latent fingerprint testimony” should be rejected for two reasons.  First, amicus curiae cannot raise a new issue on appeal not raised by the parties.  Second, such a remand for an assessment under State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529 (2023) (Olenowski II) and State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), would be unnecessary given that fingerprint-analysis evidence has been consistently relied on under both relevant standards for admitting expert testimony.  This Court should thus affirm the trial court’s admissibility rulings.  Initially, “a party appearing as amicus curiae ‘must accept the case before the court as presented and cannot raise issues not raised by the parties. ’”  State v. O’Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 479 (2013) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 25 (2012)).  This simple, clear direction from our Supreme Court preempts the [...]’s recommendation.  Neither the State nor defendant made any reference to a Special Adjudicator at any point during the proceedings below or in their briefing in front of this Court.  The [...] is therefore foreclosed from that suggestion as amicus curiae.
[brief] On November 9, 2023, defendant filed simultaneously a motion (Pa1060) and an Order To Show Cause (OTSC) (Pa1091) seeking inter alia enforcement of the June 6, 2023 order directing payment of her share of marital assets within 50 days and immediate payment of alimony withheld by plaintiff.  Trial court denied her OTSC on November 13, 2023, deeming the relief sought as non-emergent, and converted the OTSC to a motion returnable on January 12, 2024.
[directive] 40A  Whenever any official ceases to hold office in any local unit, on the day of the expiration of his term of office, he shall forthwith deliver to the clerk of the local unit, or other person who may be designated by the governing body to receive the same, all moneys, papers, books, memoranda, accounts and any data of any nature whatever pertaining to his office.  On failure or refusal to carry out the provisions of this section within 5 days after the expiration of his fkom term, he shall, on notice in writing of such delinquency the chief executive officer of the local unit, $50.00 be subject to a penalty of for each day of refusal or neglect to comply therewith.  The penalty shall be collected by the local unit in an action at law.  L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  Document 1 Page of 1  New Jersey  Permanent Statutes  TITLE MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES  40A cash 4QA5-2.1.  Petty fund of local unit fund of Petty cash local unit 40A  5-21.  A local unit may establish a petty cash fund upon written application to and after approval by the director.
[directive] Davis, 70 N.J. Super. 87 (App. Div. 1961); Murphy’s Tavern v. Efcharis Control, ABC Bulletin 1430, Item 1 (Jan. 19, 1962); Carelis v. Div’n of Alcoholic Beverage Div’n, 46 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1957).  As [...] v. Alcoholic Beverage Control was standard practice, Deputy Attorneys General in the Division of Law defended ABC in these challenges, and in all three instances the court affirmed ABC’s actions.
[brief] The provision of the New Jersey Criminal Code which defines the conduct "criminal homicide" is N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2 and provides as follows:  a.  A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in N.J.S.2C:11-5 or section 1 of P.L.2017, c. 165 (C.2C:11-5.3), causes the death of another human being, b.  Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto or vessel.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b) states that "Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when (1) It is committed recklessly".  The trial court charged the jury, therefore, on the various states of mind that would support a guilty verdict as to murder or manslaughter, including reckless manslaughter, the latter of which required the State to prove that [...] caused [...]'s death when he was "aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his conduct."  The jury was also instructed that it was required to find that Defendant "caused the death" of [...] beyond a reasonable doubt.  An analysis of the elements of the charge of reckless manslaughter, as contained in the charge to the jury and as interpreted by New Jersey case law confirms that there was an insufficient factual basis upon which to convict Defendant of that particular offense.
[directive] 2C:11-3a  Murder eligibility and up to life in prison.  1st Degree $250,000 to $1,000,000  No 10%  Actor commits or attempts to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism and, in the course of such crime or of immediate 2C:11-3a(3)  Felony Murder
[brief] Most respectfully submitted, [...]  By: [...]  Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants  Dated: December 22, 2023  Cherry Hill, New Jersey  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...]  On Remand from [...]  [...]; [...] And [...]  Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. L AND J ENTERPRISES  1, LLC and [...]  Defendants/Respondents  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM [...]  SAT BELOW HON.  [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
[brief] As a corollary, [...] had a duty to prevent [...] (and take remedial action when put on notice) from sexually harassing employees and contractors in the workplace.  At a minimum, [...] and [...] each constitute a “place of public accommodation” as set forth in N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l).  New Jersey courts have decoupled the general rule of NJLAD claim where no employment relationship from situations involving a public accommodation.  See generally *Thomas v. Cnty. of Camden*, 386 N.J. Super. 582, 594, 902 A.2d 327, 334 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (sustaining dismissal of NJLAD claim for employment discrimination because of no employment relationship, but reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s NJLAD claim under public accommodation theory).  The NJLAD guarantees all persons the opportunity to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any “place of public accommodation” without discrimination.  Owners, managers, agents or employees of places of public accommodation who “discriminate against any person in the furnishing thereof” are in violation of the NJLAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1).  An act of proscribed discrimination by the NJLAD in a place of public accommodation by an employee of that place of public accommodation is actionable under the NJLAD.  See Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super. 186, 197-198 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that the proprietor of a donut shop’s racist remarks to a customer, while not actually denying her services, were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of public accommodation discrimination); Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort, 333 N.J. Super. 206, 211 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that one discriminatory comment by the owner of a recreation facility was sufficient to survive summary judgment).  Accordingly, because [...] and [...] are places of public accommodation as defined under the NJLAD, they are liable to Appellant pursuant to the NJLAD.
[brief] \(^{37}\)  *Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of West Milford*, 144 N.J. 564, 573, (1996) (citation omitted).  \(^{38}\)  Model Civil Jury Charge 4.10C.  \(^{39}\)  See, e.g., *Lee v. Carter-Reed Co.*, 203 N.J. 496 (2010).  \(^{40}\)  *Pami Realty, LLC v. Locations XIX Inc.*, 468 N.J. Super. 546 (App. Div. 2021); *Leodori v. Cigna Corp.*, 175 N.J. 293, 304-05 (2003) ("[u]nless required by the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-5 to -16, or as otherwise provided by law, contracts do not need to be in writing to be enforceable"); *Williams v. Vito*, 365 N.J. Super. 225, 232 (Law Div. 2003) ("absent a statute to the contrary," the enforceability of an oral contract was "central to American contract law")); *Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan*, 128 N.J. 427, 436 (1992) ("An offeree may manifest assent to the terms of an offer through words, creating an express contract, or by conduct, creating a contract implied-in-fact."). terms and manifest an intention to be bound by those terms, they have created an enforceable contract."\textsuperscript{41}
[directive] Section 4.2 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy defines deadly force to include not only the 6 discharge of a firearm, but the following potentially lethal actions: (a) applying a chokehold, carotid artery restraint, or similar technique that involves pressure on the neck; (b) sitting, kneeling, or standing on a BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 27  (c) the incident involves the death of a person while in law enforcement custody; (d) the incident involves the death of a person during an encounter with a law enforcement officer; (e) an incident that the officer knows or has been advised is or will be the subject of an internal affairs complaint relating to the officer’s use of force, bias, or dishonesty; or (f) an incident that the officer knows or has been advised is or will be the subject of a citizen complaint relating to the officer’s use of force, bias, or dishonesty.
[brief] Although in some cases a detective’s interview comments might add context to the defendant’s responses, here, context was entirely unnecessary where [...] simply denied the accusations and, in many cases, did not even respond.  (E.g., 8T 95-10 to 97-20; 9T 8-21 to 9-8, 32-10 to 33-21)  Those accusations were thus long diatribes, in the guise of admissible evidence, which unfairly “provided a ‘road map’ for the State’s theory of the case” in a “neatly packaged summary. ”  State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16, 40 (App. Div. 2003).  Indeed, many of their accusations tracked the State’s summation nearly verbatim.  (E.g., 12T 57-25 to 58-3, 73-1 to 77-11 (prosecutor arguing [...]’s Facebook post was his “motive,” which “escalated” his exposure as a “snitch,” “change[d] his life,” and made [...] “a problem”); 12T 56-17 to 98-20 (arguing he saw [...] as his “opportunity” and was not “sober[ing] up”); 12T 56-18 to 98-23 (arguing he “plan[ned]” the shooting because he “circle[d] the block,” “[s]cop[ed] out the area,” and “[m]ove[d] his car, so that he c[ould] escape”); 12T 58-15 to 88-2 (arguing his explanations and denials were “lie[s]”))  Finally, even apart from the recorded statement, like in C.W.H. and Tung, [...] improperly volunteered on cross-examination that [...]’s responses were “[l]ies.  . . .  I call them lies.  . . .  I call it lies.  . . .  He’s been lying the whole time. ”  (9T 77-7 to 80-21)  Because the detectives’ accusations were not fleeting but constant, and because the court failed to offer any curative instruction, they usurped the jury’s exclusive role to determine [...]’s guilt and credibility and thus denied him a fair trial and require reversal.
[brief] **THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TO COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF IS UNWARRANTED AND COUNSEL FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO DEFENDANT**  THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO PLAINTIFF WAS CONTAINED IN THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF [...] AT PARAGRAPH 26 (DA 5, PAGE A55)  The seminal case in this State on counsel fees in a matrimonial matter is Williams v Williams 59 NJ 229 (1971).  In Williams, the Court held that the award of counsel fees in a New Jersey Divorce Action is within the discretion of the Court.  But there are limitations in that consideration.  One of the primary factors that must be considered is the good or bad faith put forward by the parties.  In this case the Plaintiff is attempting to obtain monies from Defendant in reliance on FRAUD.  How could the Court below find that admitted reliance on fraud is evidence of good faith.  Accordingly, this Court should vacate the Order to require Defendant to pay counsel fees to Plaintiff and remand the matter to the Court below to be heard by a different Judge.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  There was ample reason for the jury to doubt that [...] was the shooter: an hour after the shooting, Ware was not dressed in the clothing that the shooter was wearing, and he was extremely intoxicated; Ware had been drinking and partying the whole day, and, as [...] confirmed, was upset the next morning when he realized his clothes were gone; Ware explained how an associate of [...]’s would have had access to his clothing – he put it in the trunk of the Chrysler after changing at his father’s house, and why his cellphone was in the vicinity of the barbershop at the time of the incident – he left it in the Chrysler; the only direct evidence of Ware’s guilt was the testimony of Todd [...], an admitted liar with a prior conviction for robbery.
[brief] Nor can the “the number, nature, and seriousness” of [...]’s intervening offenses support the admission of his remote prior convictions where he only has one conviction for a disorderly persons offense between his prior convictions and his trial for the present offense.\footnote{The State did not raise [...]’s 2017 conviction for the disorderly persons offense of wandering or prowling to obtain CDS at trial.  (PSR 6)}  See N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(i).  In \textit{State v. Higgs}, our Supreme Court held that the trial court’s admission of the defendant’s remote prior convictions based on a single intervening disorderly persons conviction was reversible error.
[directive] Barricaded Individuals  2.8  Mental Health Professional.  A person trained to deal with people with mental illnesses, substance abuse disorders, or intellectual, cognitive or developmental disabilities that can assist law enforcement with resolution strategies that seek to minimize the use of force to resolve situations.  2.9  Resolution Techniques.  Primary police action geared toward resolving a barricaded individual situation and involving the use of minimally intrusive techniques such as negotiations, time, electronic surveillance (where legally permissible) and other techniques.  See Section 2.8 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  2.10  Resolution Tactics.  Secondary police action geared toward resolving a barricaded individual situation by initiating physical contact or influencing environmental factors to compel action through the use of intrusive tactics such as mechanized entry tools, chemical agents, less lethal munitions, breach, hold and call-out procedures, or use of K-9.  Resolution Tactics  Section 4.7 of this Policy. should be deployed consistent with Entry and Communication Tactics, such as breaking windows, controlling doors, or similar techniques necessary for the insertion of surveillance or communications equipment into the area occupied by the barricaded individual or to establish communication with the barricaded individual shall not constitute Resolution Tactics and may be deployed at the discretion of the Tactical Commander.  2.11  Supervisor.  A police officer who, by virtue of rank or assignment, is responsible for the direction or supervision of the activities of other police officers.  2.12  Tactical Team.  A group of officers who are specially selected, trained, and equipped to handle high risk incidents, including, but not limited to, those involving active shooters, barricaded individuals, warrant services, apprehensions, acts of terrorism, and other situations or activities as deemed necessary by command leadership.
[brief] Cases  Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483 (1993)  .................................................................  2, 3 Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997)  ...........................................................................  2, 3 Vastano v. Algeier, 178 N.J. 230 (2003)  ..............................................................................  3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Respondent asks that the Trial Court’s determination granting declaratory relief be upheld and the matter remanded for a determination of counsel fees and costs against Appellant.  October 28, 2024  /s/  [...]  JOHN MOTTA  ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT LETTER  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS/CROSS APPELLANTS IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT’S CROSS MOTION
[brief] 12.  The Court below found that there were documents in evidence showing that [...] took out a mortgage, assumed all the risk and tied up his credit to purchase the home that [...] wanted to live in with [...] (6T13:24-14:3).  13.  [...]’s unrefuted testimony at trial was that Johnny asked [...] and [...] why they didn’t ask their son, [...], to purchase the home for them, and [...] said he would not trust [...] with the money.
[brief] The doctrine of collateral estoppel also barred [...] from relitigating matters determined in [...]’s 2006 decision.  Although [...] was not a party to the reactivated litigation against the [...], the doctrine barred [...] from relitigating matters found by [...] in her 2008 opinion as well.  (Da555-Da632)  “‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a branch of the broader law of *res judicata* which bars relitigation of any issue actually determined in a prior action generally between the same parties and their privies involving a different claim or cause of action. ’”  *Figueroa v. Hartford Ins. Co.*, 241 N.J. Super. 578, 584 (App. Div. 1990)(quoting *New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Brower*, 161 N.J. Super. 293, 297-98 (App. Div. 1978)).  In order for the doctrine to apply, the party asserting the bar must show: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[brief] The Court did not analyze plaintiff’s allegation that she was threatened by [...].  According to case law, if the words or conduct are such as to induce a reasonable apprehension of force and the means of coercion is at hand, a person may be as effectually restrained and deprived of liberty as by prison bars.  *Earl v. Winne*, 14 N.J. 119, 128 (1953).  The Officer’s words induced fear and distress in the plaintiff.  Plaintiff reasonably feared for her safety because she was a powerless inmate confined in a prison setting.  Plaintiff’s right to safety is protected under Article 1 para 1 of the NJ Constitution.
[brief] ii.  Plaintiff Failed to Establish Constructive Notice  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b) defines the situation in which a public entity may be said to have constructive notice of a “dangerous condition” of its property.  It provides that:  A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 only if the plaintiff established that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.  In order for [...] to be liable for Plaintiff’s injuries on the theory that it had constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the roadway, Plaintiff must offer evidence that would allow the trier of fact to conclude that any condition “was of such an obvious nature that the public entity in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.