ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The highest court in New Jersey until 1947 was the Court of Errors and Appeals, and decisions by that court remain binding unless subsequently overturned by the highest court, now the Supreme Court.  Nixon v. Lawhon, 32 N.J. Super. 351, 355, 108 A.2d 480 (App.Div.1954).  [...] and [...] have never been overturned.  [...] and [...] have consistently been cited for the proposition that a claim for personal injuries cannot be made the subject of assignment before judgment.  See DiTolvo v. DiTolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 79, 328 A.2d 625 (App.Div.1974) (listing cases) and McGhee v. Charley's Other Brother, 161 N.J. Super. 551, 559, 391 A.2d 1289 (Law Div.1978).  In this case, the assignment of the proceeds prior to the entry of judgment was contrary to the established law of New Jersey.  In the present matter, the applicable law looks to the personal property nature of the tort claim for personal injury, and declares its assignment, be it by contract, sale or otherwise, void and not enforceable prior to judgment.  In McGhee, supra, the most recent case after [...] and [...], a trust agreement in an automobile insurance policy purporting to grant a pre-judgment interest in a personal injury claim was held void.  “Since the trust agreement transfers . . . a right to payment out of the proceeds of a settlement or judgment not yet received, it accomplishes exactly the same objective as contractual arrangements found to be void.  No matter what label is appended to this agreement, its operative effect is not altered.  Therefore, the provision must be declared void because it contravenes the common law of this state”.  McGhee v. Charley's Other Brother, 161 N.J. Super. 551 (Law Div. 1978).  The highest court in New Jersey was until 1947 the Court of Errors and Appeals, and decisions by that court remain binding unless subsequently overturned by the highest court, now the Supreme Court.
[brief] Pope v. Kingsley, ................................................................. 25, 36 40 N.J. 168 (1963)  Porreca v. City of Millville, .................................................. 19  419 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 2011)  Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, .................................. 36  502 U.S. 367 (1992)  Spaeth v. Srinivasan, ............................................................ 31  403 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008)  Stonehurst at Freehold v. Township. Comm. ........................... 25, 36 Of Freehold Twp., 139 N.J. Super. 311 (Law Div. 1976)  Township of White v. Castle Ridge Dev. Corp., ....................... 14  419 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 2011)  Trenton Oil Co., Inc. v. Dries, .............................................. 33  30 N.J. Super. 122 (Law. Div. 1954)  STATUTES AND RULES
[brief] [...] also has a history of changing his stories and has a prior criminal record.  [...]'s credibility will also be attacked for allegedly writing a letter to [...] asserting everything he told the police was a lie concerning the co-defendants involvement in these robberies.  The State contends because of Defendant [...]' left-handedness and distinctive gait showing a bowing of his right leg from his childhood surgery and distinct clothing worn by the suspect, he is clearly identifiable in the two 7-Eleven robbery video surveillances and this evidence is admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b) to demonstrate [...]' identity in the pharmacy Indictment.
[brief] Therefore, Defense’s argument is without merit.  On a motion for acquittal the State is required to present sufficient evidence to defeat an acquittal motion.  *State v. Dekowski*, 218 N.J. 596, 608 (2014).  Appellate review of the denial of a motion for acquittal is de novo.  *Dekowski*, 218 N.J. 596, 608 (2014)’ *State v. Cruz-Pena*, 459 N.J. Super. 513, 520 (App. Div. 2019).
[directive] Tactical team.  A group of officers who are specially selected, trained, and equipped to handle high- risk incidents, including, but not limited to, those involving snipers, barricaded persons, warrant services, apprehensions, acts of terrorism, and other situations or activities as deemed necessary by command leadership.  Youth facility.  A facility where children assemble under adult supervision for educational or recreational purposes, such as group homes, residential facilities, day-care centers, day treatment centers, etc.
[directive] Notification Procedures  A.  After the county correctional facility has activated NJ VINE, the system will attempt to notify the victim by telephone of the offender’s custody change at one-half hour intervals for a twenty-four hour period or until confirmation is received that the victim has received the notification.  If after the first three attempts, the NJ VINE system has been unable to contact the victim, the system will automatically telephone either the investigating agency or the county correctional facility, as determined by each county, to alert that notification to the victim has been unsuccessful.  If a county has opted to have the investigating agency telephoned and the agency does not answer the telephone -3- call after three attempts, the system will then automatically telephone the county correctional facility.  Simultaneously, NJ VINE will continue to attempt to notify the victim at one-half hour intervals for the twenty-four hour period.  The County Prosecutors will promulgate procedures for victim notification when the NJ VINE system has been unsuccessful within the proscribed time.
[brief] [...] relies on the same statutory language as the Special Master light of [...]’s counsel’s representation that this amount represented work on claims “wholly unrelated” to RICO.  ([...]_Pb 50-51; 14549a).  This reduction, amounting to about 2% of the fee award, hardly represents an effort to “limit [the] award to the fees and costs reasonably devoted to plaintiffs’ pursuit of their respective RICO claims. ”  ([...]_Pb 37), ignoring that the statute requires a “reasonable attorney’s fee,” see N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) (emphasis added), and reasonableness includes the level of success.  See Silva, 267 N.J. Super. at 559; (Wilf_Db 44-45).  [...] cites cases involving the distinct context of a plaintiff that has some successful and some unsuccessful claims that share a common core of facts.  ([...]_Pb 72-73).  That context has no applicability to Plaintiffs’ cross-appeals, which involved no successful appellate claims.  This Court should reject the award of fees for Plaintiffs’ cross-appeals and petitions for certification.
[brief] On January 26, 2024, the Trial Court heard oral argument and granted Defendants’ motion for reconsideration as to the existence and application of the Partnership Agreement and the arbitration provision.  [4T50:1-2].  The Trial Court then reviewed the arbitration provision and related issues and denied the request to compel certain claims be transferred to arbitration.  [4T50:5-6].  arbitration on Plaintiff’s claims arising under the parties’ Partnership Agreement and permitting limited discovery on the remaining statutory claims to determine Plaintiff’s standing to assert such claims.  5  “3T” refers to the Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, October 11, 2023.  6  “4T” refers to the Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, January 26, 2024.  On January 30, 2024, the Trial Court entered an Order relating to its ruling on January 26, 2024.  [Da3-4].  On March 13, 2024, Defendants appealed the Trial Court’s rulings regarding their request to transfer certain claims to arbitration.  [Da233-37].  On March 18, 2024, Defendants filed a Notice of Motion to Extend Time to Appeal, which was thereafter amended on March 20, 2024.  [Da238].  On April 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Extend and a Cross-Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Appeal as Untimely.  [Da239-40].  On April 25, 2024, the Appellate Division entered Orders granting Defendants’ Motion to Extend Time to Appeal and denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Appeal.  [Da241-43].  On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of this Court’s April 25, 2024 Orders denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion and granting Defendants’ Motion to Extend Time to Appeal.  [Da244-46].  On May 21, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.  [Da247-48].  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] (See Pa66-80; Pb10-11.)  Plaintiff’s counsel has every right to cross examine in order to attack the opinion; however, it is part of this case and there was an investigation, and while it may have been done six months after the decedent died, it was still an investigation.  I agree with [...].  Just like experts will look at the case and look at records and make determinations, so can the Department of Health.  So that will be in, so long as a proper foundation is laid.  I am not making a determination right now that, in fact, it goes in.  The proper foundation actually has to be laid.  With regard to the defendant’s motion to bar reference to and use of statutory and regulatory standards and facility policies and procedures that do not establish the standard of care, I agree that those regulations do not establish the standard of care.  Expert testimony is needed, in fact, for that standard of care, but the expert can, in fact, rely on them, so I am going to deny that portion that prevents the experts from relying on those standards and those standards can, in fact come in if an expert relied on them.
[brief] [...], in rulings on the parties’ in limine motions, first, denied plaintiff’s motion in limine to prohibit defendants from eliciting testimony regarding the conclusions of the [...] and [...].  (See Pa41-43.)  [...] also denied defendant’s motion in limine to bar reference to and use of alleged violations of federal and New Jersey statutory and regulatory standards at trial but directed “Experts could cite standards if they relied on those standards as evidence of negligence but not negligence per se. ”  (Pa81.)  In an accompanying oral opinion, [...] confirmed that the [...]’s conclusions could be admitted provided that a proper foundation was laid.
[brief] I.  The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that “Appleman’s rule” regarding coverage for sequential causes of loss does not apply to GCL policies, such as the policies issued by [...].  (Da154a; 6T30-23.)...........................................15  II.  The Trial Court misinterpreted the exception to the mold exclusion by misapplying well-established rules of policy interpretation.  (Da31.).................................................................27  III.  The Trial Court erroneously applied a “first manifestation” trigger to coverage for [...]’s continuous injuries and damage.  (Da42-43.).................................................................43  Conclusion..................................................................................49
[brief] (Pa101-03 at ¶¶ 17-22 and Pa236.)  Furthermore, in its haste to go from bill to law in just days, the Legislature violated its statutes requiring the fiscal impact of statutes to be reviewed before becoming law.  (Pa473-474.)  Although prior to enactment the Legislature did not send the bill for fiscal impact analysis as required by statute, it was aware that the bill had a fiscal impact.  (Pa473-74.)  During the Assembly Appropriations hearing, a speaker raised the issue of New Jersey citizens funding abortions under the bill.  (Pa176 at 25:5-15.)  The speaker was concerned about New Jersey’s citizens funding abortions and asked the Committee “to think about the consequences of . . . having this coercive taxation on . . . New Jersey taxpayers to pay for things that are truly abhorrent. ”  (Pa176-77 at 25:24-26:14.)  Committee Chair [...] responded that the bill has “a mechanism for the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to evaluate . . . areas of inequity and areas where insurance should pay. ”  (Pa175 at 24:21-25.)  The Chairperson noted the main component of the bill was insurance coverage for abortions, which necessarily impacts the State treasury given State-provided insurance is included within the companies that were being mandated to provide abortions.  (Pa202 at 51:3-9.)  The Chairperson explained, “the fact is that this is law in New Jersey now and large part now being codified to clarification and a process to determine what insurance policies should . . . pay for the procedure, if, in fact, the procedure is wanted.”
[brief] In Jones, the Director of Motor Vehicles claimed that an insurance policy’s uninsured motorist endorsement requiring “corroboration” by third parties in hit and run accident cases as a condition precedent for receiving UM benefits was void as against public policy.  The Jones court held that because the Commissioner of Insurance approved the endorsement, it could not be void or against public policy.  That issue was considered anew in Pasterchick v. Insurance Co. of North America, 150 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 1977), which held that the “corroboration” endorsement was void because it imposed “an impermissible qualification of the statutory mandate. ”  Id. at 93.  “Read literally, these statutes mandate that coverage must be provided in the case of all occurrences * * * resulting in bodily injury caused by an accident involving a motor vehicle the identity of which (or the identity of the operator and owner of which) cannot be ascertained.  For the insurance companies to impose a condition requiring corroboration is for them to condition the coverage and thus to provide coverage in fewer cases and upon different terms from those prescribed by statute. ”  Ibid. (emphasis supplied); see also Perez v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 81 N.J. 415, 419 (1979) (“Imposition of the requirement of corroboration in noncontact cases adds a substantial condition to the mandated coverage not sanctioned by the Legislature. ”).  Specifically, the Pasterchick court parted company with the reasoning in the Jones case and found that “approval of a provision by the Commissioner of Insurance is *ultra vires* with respect to provisions violative of statutory intent.
[brief] The trial court erred in reversing the County's determination that [...]'s bid was materially defective for failing to provide its NJDOT Notice of Classification with the bid where the Specifications required submission of the NJDOT Notice of Classification with the bid, NJDOT Classification is required to perform the work in question, and the information regarding [...]'s classification was not included elsewhere in its bid.  (1T55-24; 3T31-15)  Two areas where the trial court deviated from established, binding precedent were in: (i) considering August 20th, the date [...] ultimately provided its NJDOT Notice as the critical date for evaluating responsiveness and materiality, see, e.g., 1T58-1 – 1T58-21; and (ii) refusing to consider the potential and possible impacts on assurance of performance and competition because [...] ultimately provided the NJDOT Notice and did not walk away from its bid, see, e.g., 1T59-2 – 1T60-6, 3T33-4 – 3T33-14.  Regarding the date for considering responsiveness and materiality, the trial court stated:  [M]y analysis here is based upon what happened in this case, which is that ultimately, on August 19th, the plaintiff submitted a letter challenging the bid award to [...] and then subsequent to that, on August 20th, they submitted the appropriate documentation showing that they actually have that notice of classification.  At that point the County had the authority or the ability, once they received that documentation on August 20th, to determine that they're going to award the bid to the plaintiff and they chose not to do so.  [1T58-2 – 1T58-12]  As of August 20th, . . .the County had its assurances [1T58-17 – 1T58-18]  It was provided on the 20th.  They were fully compliant with the bid.  [1T59-25 – 1T60-1]  The County was, again, provided a fully compliant bid.  They were provided this document on the 20th of August that showed that they, being the plaintiffs, could properly perform under this contract.  [1T60-22 – 1T60-25]
[directive] All County Prosecutors  All Law Enforcement Chief Executives  September 19, 2000  SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVES  2000-3 and 2000-4 - Replacements for an unnumbered Attorney General Directive dated August 14, 1995, regarding Seizure of Weapons from Law Enforcement Officers Involved in Domestic Violence Incidents  Please distribute to all law enforcement officers and/or assistant prosecutors in your agency.  If you have any questions you may contact either DAG [...] or DAG [...], in the Prosecutors and Police Bureau at 609/984-2814.  jak  Attachments c  Attorney General [...]  First Assistant [...] Administrator  [...]  Director of State Police Affairs  [...]  Colonel [...], Supt., NJSP Commissioner [...], Dept. of Corrections Chief of Staff [...] Chief State Investigator [...] Deputy Director [...] Deputy Director [...] Chief [...], Pros. & Police Bureau
[directive] Physical force involves contact with a subject beyond that which is generally used to effect an arrest or other law enforcement objective.  Physical force is employed when necessary to overcome a subject’s physical resistance to the exertion of the officer’s authority, or to protect persons or property.  Examples include taking a resisting subject to the ground, using wrist or arm locks, striking the subject with the hands or feet, or other similar methods of hand-to-hand confrontation, such as certain pain compliance techniques.
[brief] (Pa134, 38).  Among the items that Appellant claimed [...] undervalued included an iPod, which she valued at $8,000 based on her allegation that the specific iPod listed in line 145 was a U2 Special Edition iPod.  (Pa134, 39-40).  The U2 Special Edition iPods are red with signatures of the band members on the back.  (Pa134,42).  The serial numbers for iPods belonging to the Plaintiff confirm that neither is a special edition version.  (Pa135, 43).  Appellant also included as part of her insurance claim, a request that [...] pay for two oriental rugs that she claimed were in her unit and sustained damage.
[brief] ³  “PILOT” is shorthand for “payment in lieu of taxes. ”  23.  Committee member [...] explained that PILOTs “can help the Township meet its affordable housing obligations[,]” and that they provide the “most attractive financial option” to do so.  T1.40:4-5; 41:7.  24.  The benefits that PILOTs provide to help satisfy affordable housing obligations were echoed by [...], who explained that PILOTs “can help promote redevelopment in areas that need it and can help municipalities achieve important goals like the fulfilment of the affordable housing obligation”; PILOTs “allow[] municipalities to have increased decision-making powers throughout the process. ”  T1.52:5-8; 52:12-14.  25.  [...] also dispelled a common misconception that PILOTs impact the money received by school districts.  “[B]y statute, the school system does not get a share of the PILOT revenues generated by this project.  Many people think that that means the school system gets less money.  And for the reason that the mayor and Mr. [...] spoke about earlier, that's simply not true.  The school system gets what it needs through the budgetary process. ”  T1.55:17-24.  26.  Both [...], the Mayor of [...], and [...], a councilmember of [...], spoke at the public hearing, presenting their opinions opposing the PILOT agreement.
[brief] Key to both Schwartz and Parrella’s holdings was that the party opposing arbitration received and could review the arbitration agreement, even though they did not.  See Parrella, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59 at *11-12 (stating that the plaintiff did not dispute that he received the agreement); Schwartz, 256 F. App’x at 519 n.3 (stating that the plaintiff did admit in his pleadings that he was party to a subscription agreement, which contained the arbitration provision).  And, as to [...], the estate actually admitted that the agreement at issue was valid.  2024 Mass. Super. LEXIS 59 at *8.  Here, by contrast, the record is clear that Plaintiffs never received or reviewed the Arbitration Agreement.  There is nothing in the record indicating that at any point prior to [...]’s filing of the Motion to Compel that Plaintiffs ever received the Arbitration Agreement, and the acceptance of the benefits of a contract, alone, is insufficient to determine a party waived their constitutional rights.
[directive] 2C:25-26d provides that when setting bail in a domestic violence case, the court must conduct a search of the Domestic Violence Central Registry.  Bail shall be set as soon as feasible, but in all cases within 24 hours of arrest.  2C:25-26e provides that once bail is set it shall not be reduced without notice to the county 2C:25-26(d)(e); 2C:25-31a; prosecutor and victim.
[brief] POINT III RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBLY DOUBLE-COUNTED AND USED THE SAME CONVICTION AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE EXTENDED TERM AND FOR AGGRAVATING FACTORS 3, 6, AND 9.  (Not Raised Below)  The trial court sentenced [...] to an extended term of 13 years of incarceration with five years of parole ineligibility for unlawful possession of a weapon, concurrent to a 10-year sentence with five years of parole ineligibility on the certain persons count and to a four-year sentence on the hindering count.  (6T 32-22 to 37-4; Da 7-12)  In imposing this sentence, the trial court erred in double-counting [...]’s prior aggravated assault conviction – his only prior indictable conviction – as both the basis for the extended term and for the aggravating factors used to set his sentence.  The sentence imposed was thus the result of an improper application and weighing of factors, and resentencing is required.
[directive] 3.7  Conducted energy devices and less-lethal devices.  Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs) and other authorized less-lethal devices and ammunition are forms of Enhanced Mechanical Force which may be utilized against a Threatening Assailant or an Active Assailant, but only within the parameters outlined in this Policy and in Addendum A of this Policy.  CEDs and other authorized less-lethal devices and ammunition shall not be utilized against a passive resistor or an active resistor.  Officers shall always strive to use only that degree of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances.  3.7.1  An officer authorized to use a CED or a less-lethal device pursuant to this Policy may fire, discharge, or utilize drive stun mode of the device during an actual operation, consistent with Addendum A, only against: (a) an active assailant; (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to themselves; or 10  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022
[brief] THE COMPLAINT FILED ON JANUARY 14TH, 2019, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DULY SERVED ON DEFENDANT [...], WAS PROPERLY REINSTATED AFTER DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE ONCE DEFENDANT [...] COMPLETED THE ARBITRATION PROCESS AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 2ND, 2019 (Da5, Da11, Da16)  Rule 1:20A-3(e) provides, in relevant part, that if a lawsuit for collection of an attorney’s fee is pending when the client makes a written request for arbitration under Rule 1:20 A-3(a), and the lawsuit is stayed “pending a determination by the Fee Committee, the amount of the fee or refund as so determined may be entered as a judgment in the action unless the full balance due is paid within 30 days of receipt of the arbitration determination.  If no such action is pending, the attorney or client may, by summary action brought pursuant to Rule 4:67, obtain judgment in the amount of the fee or refund as determined by the Fee Committee.