ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **Appellant objects to any facts not in evidence and the testimony of counsel in the Appellate Brief**  Plaintiff’s Brief appears to contain certain arguments of [...], Plaintiff’s counsel, which are outside the record.  Pages 1-3 of the Brief are devoid of references to the record.  See PHPB1-3.  His brief contains testimonial statements such as “I utilized a standard process service company …. I am not affiliated with [...]” PHPB 14-15.  There is further impermissible testimony from counsel in the Brief that “my law office has always maintained . . . and continues to maintain, only a professional relationship with the outside service company”.  Id.  These statements are not only outside the record, but are incongruous with the stipulated facts (99a) and his own client’s testimony.
[brief] **THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY**  Zoning Boards of Adjustment and Planning Boards exercising their authority to grant relief in connection with subdivisions and site plans, because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions, must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of their delegated discretion  *Burbridge vs. Mine Hill Township* 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990) citing *Medici vs. BPR Company*, 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987) and *Kramer vs. Board of Adjustment of Sea Girt*, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965).  There is a presumption of validity that attaches to their decisions.  Where the testimony before the board is in conflict, the board must decide what the true facts are.  The board has the choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses, and where reasonably made, such decision is conclusive on appeal.  *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, 2024 Edition*, [...] and [...], Section 18-4.2 at pg. 258 citing *Kramer*, Supra. at page 288 and *Hughes v. Monmouth University*, 394 N.J. Super. 207, 232 (Law Div. 2006), aff’d 394 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div.), certif. den. 192 N.J. 599 (2007).
[brief] It is dangerous to children, as there are no sidewalks.  The delivery vehicles illegally park too close to the stop sign and park in the crosswalk.  Cars and trucks trespass on Plaintiffs’ and a neighbor’s property in order to make K turns.  (Pa 150; T1 at 62:1-63:22; 105:22-106:11; 187:19-188:15).  The equipment in [...]’s store is substantially different from when [...] ran it.
[directive] FROM: [...], Attorney General  DATE: March 20, 2020  SUBJECT: Directive  Updating Certain Reporting, Training, and Certification  Deadlines  Together with healthcare professionals and other first responders, our law enforcement officers are on the front lines of the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic.  They are dedicating enormous time and resources in the extraordinary statewide and national response that is underway.  As the state’s chief law enforcement officer, I am guided by two overarching goals at this time: protecting the well-being of our residents during this unprecedented emergency, and ensuring the health and well-being of our over 36,000 law enforcement professionals.
[brief] (1T24-8 to 18).  Forty minutes later, at approximately 5:00 pm, a third female approached the driver’s side of the Infiniti and knocked on the window.  (1T25-1 to 7; 1T26-2 to 15).  The door opened and the woman handed the driver an unknown quantity of currency.  One or two minutes later, the door opened and the driver dropped an item on the ground, which the female picked up and then entered into a Jaguar sedan with an illegible temporary license plate.  (1T25-11 to 17).  Law enforcement attempted to stop this suspected buyer but was unable to do so because the only back-up unit equipped with lights and sirens could not locate the Jaguar in of the heavy traffic.
[brief] Here, the motion court only focused on whether the collection letter threatened litigation rather than whether it was false, deceptive, or misleading to the least sophisticated consumer.  T24:1-T26:11.  The letter violates the FDCPA because it is confusing to the least sophisticated consumer with respect to (i) misrepresenting that any payment could result in a “savings” when any payment could only result in a loss when compared to doing nothing, and (ii) its confusing explanation of the circumstances under which the statute of limitations could be restarted and subject the consumer to a lawsuit (including its omission as to the creation of a new contract by accepting of one of the stated Offers).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.12 then provides for the following rebuttable presumption:  If, during the public health emergency declared by an executive order of the Governor and any extension of the order, an individual contracts coronavirus disease 2019 during a time period in which the individual is working in a place of employment other than the individual's own residence as a health care worker, public safety worker, or other essential employee, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the contraction of the disease is work-related and fully compensable for the purposes of benefits provided under R.S.34:15-1 et seq., ordinary and accidental disability retirement, and any other benefits provided by law to individuals suffering injury or illness through the course of their employment.
[brief] Impact of SFRA Underfunding on [...] Students  The recurring funding shortfalls in [...]’s Adequacy Budget have resulted in deficits in the teachers, support staff, programs and services determined by the State in the SFRA formula to be essential for students to achieve the NJSLS and remedy the Abbott violation of T&E.  (Pa1894-Pa1896; Pa2043-Pa2046; Pa2050-Pa2052; Pa1012-Pa1017.)  For example, in 2018, the District eliminated its highly successful third grade reading program, an intensive early literacy intervention, an Abbott supplemental program mandated by Department of Education regulation, N.J.A.C. 6A:13-3.4(a).  (Pa2043-Pa2046.)  Starting in 2018, [...] reduced the number of staff to provide academic and academically related social and health services to students, a critical Abbott supplemental program in the high poverty Abbott districts that the SFRA was intended to adequately fund.  See Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 173 n. 15 (State assurance that the SFRA provides funding to Abbott districts to deliver needed Abbott supplemental programs); see also Abbott v. Burke, 177 N.J. 578 (2003) (“Abbott X”) (providing chart of Abbott supplemental programs and services).  These support staff include licensed clinical social workers, extension teachers, and teacher aides.  (Pa1895, ¶ 4.)  Further, kindergarten teacher aides are consigned to overcrowded classrooms of more than 21 students impairing their ability to enhance student-learning and provide small group instruction to improve young at-risk students’ math and reading abilities, as well as other vital subjects.  (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.)  [...] has also been unable to increase teacher salaries to compete with more affluent districts in attracting and retaining qualified instructional staff.  (Id., ¶¶ 7-12.)  The District has been understaffed in a number of core content areas (Pa1012-Pa1017), compounded by the broader teacher shortage in the public schools.  (Pa1895, ¶ 8.)  The District also has a shortage of qualified teachers in critical areas, such as special education, which has contributed to larger classroom sizes and the use of substitutes to provide daily instruction.  (Id., ¶ 9.)  It has lost many teachers because it cannot match salaries and working conditions in more affluent districts.  (Id., ¶ 10.)  A number of teachers have resigned and taken positions in other districts that provide higher salaries and signing bonuses, with some teachers earning $10,000 to $20,000 more in their new districts.  (Id., ¶¶ 11-12.)  The dilapidated condition of [...]’s school buildings has compelled the District to reallocate funds from its Adequacy Budget to make health, safety and other emergency repairs, diminishing the teachers, support staff and other resources essential to educate [...]’s students.  (Pa1029, ¶ 248; Pa1896, ¶ 131.)
[brief] ”  McPeak., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10794 at *12 (quoting Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 190 N.J. Super 153, 160 (App. Div. 1983).  Indeed, in *Neptune T. V.*, the New Jersey Appellate Division found that a license had been granted where a brand designated another company as an “authorized” service center, holding as follows:  . . . by its designation of [plaintiff] as an authorized service center and its authorization to Neptune to hold itself out as such in its advertising, [defendant] gave its imprimatur to [plaintiff’s] business enterprise in respect of [defendant’s] product and induced the consuming public to expect from [plaintiff] a uniformly acceptable and quality controlled service endorsed by [plaintiff] itself.  Under these circumstances we are persuaded that the extent of [defendant’s] authorization to [plaintiff] to use the [defendant’s] name was sufficient to constitute a license as contemplated by the Act.  *Neptune T.V.*, 190 N.J. Super at 160-61.  Here, it is difficult to envision or more compelling case of a grant of a “license” under the NJFPA.
[brief] As further noted, the Board Attorney acknowledged that the basement apartments were not requested as part of this application.  The trial court too acknowledged same, stated:  There was much discussion at the time of the application regarding basement apartments.  That was not before the board, nor is it before the Court.  (T4: p37, ln 5-7)  As the Court can see, the issue of whether or not basement apartments were requested, and, by extension, needed to be noticed, was briefed, argued, and vetted out numerous times.  It has been shown all throughout the record that basement apartments were not requested, despite the Intervenor’s repetitive claims to the contrary.
[brief] ”)  (quoting Matthew T. Szura & Co., Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of American, 543 Fed.Appx. 538, 543 (6th Cir. 2013)); see Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta, 170 N.J. 223, 238 (2001) (stating that, for purposes of evaluating duty to defend, focus should be on “gravamen” of the complaint against the insured); Albion Engineering Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 779 Fed.Appx. 85 n.20 (3rd Cir. 2019) (“conclusory labels” absent “factual references” do not trigger duty to defend).  In the Underlying Hokenson Action, the claims against [...] were premised exclusively on conflicts of interest and self-dealing.  The Hokenson Complaint did not contain any allegation of “negligent” conduct.  [...] was sued for self-dealing and breach of the duty of loyalty.  As alleged in the Underlying Complaint and as is inherent in the nature of the claims, those theories necessarily flow from calculated and deliberate misconduct, and nothing resembling mere negligence.  Moreover, the [...] repeatedly found, [...] consciously placed his financial interests above those of the Association.  By the time [...] withdrew its defense of [...], there can be no debate that the claims were outside of the “wrongful acts” definition and not covered under the policy.
[brief] 4T 19:13-21:3.  The Attorney General could always disable a defense of public disclosure by initiating an action or intervening in one a relator brought; in neither case could a defendant assert the public disclosure bar.  The 2023 Veto Amendment leaves that situation unchanged.  No defendant in an NJFCA action could have reasonably expected to be free of NJFCA liability on public disclosure grounds if the State wanted otherwise.  4T 25:22-26:13.
[brief] Delegation Clause:  Only an arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute arising out of or relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Arbitration Agreement, including without limitation any claim that all or any part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or voidable.  An arbitrator shall also have exclusive authority to resolve all threshold arbitrability issues, including issues relating to whether the Terms are applicable, unconscionable, or illusory and any defense to arbitration, including without limitation waiver, delay, laches, or estoppel.
[brief] Defendant contends that the photo array shown to [...] nineteen days after the offense was highly suggestive in that defendant's photograph appeared at the end of the array and immediately after a photograph of a person with a completely different complexion.  Defendant contends that the impermissible out-of-court identification resulted in a tainted in-court identification.  Additionally, defendant asserts that [...]'s in-court identification was highly suggestive and that it resembled an impermissible one-man “show up” since defendant was the only person present in the court room.  Defendant argues that the testimony regarding the out-of-court and in-court identifications of both [...] and [...] should have been excluded because there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification.  *3
[brief] B. R. 3:21-10b(5) Requires No Showing of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Nor Is It Subject to Any Time Constraints.  Under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5), "an order may be entered at any time . . . correcting a sentence not authorized by law including the Code of Criminal Justice."  See State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 47 n.4 (2011) ("[A] truly 'illegal' sentence can be corrected 'at any time'"') (quoting R. 3:21-10(b)(5); R. 3:22-12).
[directive] Attached for use in criminal cases are: (1) Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, English-language version; (2)  Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Spanish-language version; Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief  (3) Colloquy, English-language version; and Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File a (4)  Petition for Post-Conviction Relief  Colloquy, Spanish-language version.  Any questions or comments regarding the form may be directed to Assistant Director [...] at [...].
[brief] F.  [...] properly authenticated its evidence.  (Not expressly decided below.)  Lastly, [...] asserts that [...] did not properly authenticate either the account application or DAA.  (See Appellant Br., 41-43.)  That assertion, like the others discussed above, falls flat.  [...] argues that [...] did not properly authenticate those documents because [...]’s supporting certification "is silent on how the Bank created, acquired, maintained and preserved, if at all, the electronically created and electronically stored document[s]" at issue.
[brief] Da28, n.18.  \(^9\)  The trial court noted that [...] -- “an independent, unbiased, and credible witness” -- testified at trial that there was no need to continue to track the First and Second Loans because the parties entered into the new, Third Loan on April 26, 2013.  Da21; 5T53-24 to 54-2.  the amount due and owing to [...] pursuant to the Third Loan as of April 30, 2013, based on [...]’s own calculations.  Da22-23.  Again, the Schedule reflects the Defendants’ admission of the fact of the Third Loan and its principal amount four days after April 26, 2013 -- the same date on which Defendants nonsensically argue that Plaintiff discharged their debt in the entirety.  As reflected on Defendants’ Schedule, after accounting for the $330,000 partial payment made to [...] on April 26, 2013, the “Total Due” from [...] to [...] as of April 30, 2013, including $50,000 due on the “2nd Loan,” was $139,773.03 (emphasis added).  Da23; Da223-29 (Ex. P21); 1T179-5 to 182-6.  More specifically, the Schedule listed monthly interest payments that should have been paid on the First Loan, accounted for five interest payments that defendant made on the First Loan, accounted for the “2nd Loan,” and included a section entitled “Payment Amt Due @ 4/30/13” -- all of which reflected Defendants’ admission and their own calculation of the --- 10 [...] testified that, although there were slight discrepancies between [...]’s figures on the Schedule, which were slightly higher than [...]’ figures, [...] gave defendant the benefit of the lower amounts due, as the parties had agreed on April 26, 2013.
[brief] ”  [...].  Guhl, 331 N.J. Super. 322, 333 (App. Div. 2000); In re Arndt, 67 N.J. 432, 436 (1975).  Likewise, the Court is not bound by an agency’s determination of a matter, but instead must ensure that the decision was founded upon sufficient credible evidence and appropriate policy considerations.  Mayflower Securities Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Securities, 64 N. J. 85, 92-93 (1973).  While an agency may have been granted the authority to implement a legislative policy based upon its expertise, that agency must actually implement the specific legislative policy provided by the Legislature.  The grant of authority is directly tied to this obligation to implement the specific and explicit legislative policy provided by statute.  Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 70-71 (1985), quoting Gloucester County Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 93 N.J. 384, 390 (1983) (“the grant of authority to an administrative agency is to be liberally construed to enable the agency to accomplish the Legislature’s goals. ” (Emphasis added.)  As such, the court must overturn those administrative actions and decisions that are “arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or violative of expressed or implicit legislative policies. ”  In re Failure by the Department of Banking and Insurance to Transmit a Proposed Dental Fee Schedule to OAL, 336 N.J. Super. 253, 263 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Campbell v. Dept. of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)); In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007) (“An administrative agency’s final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. ”).
[directive] Therefore, when a law enforcement agency concludes that one of its members has violated agency rules in a way that warrants professional sanction, there is a stronger rationale for public disclosure.  And the more significant the violation, the more important it is that the public knows about the misconduct.  In New Jersey, the internal disciplinary process for law enforcement agencies is governed by (IAPP), a binding policy first issued by the Attorney Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures General in August 1991 and updated multiple times.  By law, every law enforcement agency in the state is required to adopt policies consistent with IAPP.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  In December 2019, I issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2019-5, known as the “Internal Affairs Directive. ”  The Directive marked one of the most substantial revisions to since its initial publication, and represented a significant step forward in IAPP promoting accountability and strengthening public confidence in law enforcement.  Among many other changes, the Internal Affairs Directive strengthened oversight of internal affairs, and allowed for internal affairs files to be shared with civilian review boards that establish certain procedural safeguards.  Importantly, the Directive also clarified to require that each law IAPP enforcement agency publish on its website an annual “synopsis” summarizing all disciplinary complaints against the agency’s officers resulting in a fine or suspension of ten days or more, but did not require the disclosure of the identity of those officers.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, [...] requests that this Court reverse the orders of the lower court for: 1. denying a Paff Certification, further discovery and granting the satisfaction of judgment when the Board failed to comply with the 8/28/20 order and give [...] access to the 9 records as ordered; 2. failing to order the Board to pay interest on the $78,646 ordered payment for all but 40 days of the two years the Board held the $78,646; 3. failing to find the Board violated litigant's rights after granting [...]'s motion to enforce the 8/28/20 Order; 4. failing to order a civil penalty after the Board failed to comply with the 8/28/20 after it was affirmed by this Court; and 5. failing to order to pay [...]'s prevailing party attorney's fees after granting [...]'s motion to enforce the 8/28/20 Order.
[brief] *Id.* at 406.  Although the Court also accepted plaintiff’s claim that she experienced pain and limitations of the ranges of motion of her neck and back, the Court specifically found that plaintiff’s ability to function, both in her employment and as a homemaker, led to the conclusion that the loss of function she experienced was not “substantial. ”  *Id.*  It is absolutely critical to a plaintiff’s ability to meet the Tort Claims Act’s injury threshold that plaintiff present expert opinion testimony supporting at the very least a claim of some permanent injury.
[brief] [...] testified that his trial strategy was to argue: (a) the State’s primary witness [...] never identified defendant as the shooter at trial (14T14-6 to 17-10; 14T36-20 to 37-10); (b) the State’s case presented no motive for the crimes (14T17-11 to 20); and (c) there was no physical or forensic evidence linking defendant to the crimes (14T17-21 to 19-15).  [...] did not recall defendant informing him about any potential witnesses.  (14T21-22 to 22-18).  He did not recall what witnesses he spoke to on defendant’s behalf, but he was “sure” he consulted with defendant prior to his final decision to proceed to trial.  (14T23-24 to 24-9).  They agreed [...] would challenge the State’s case without calling any witnesses.
[brief] The Detective Improperly Identified The Defendant On Video.  Based on her viewing of a blurry surveillance video (S-38), [...] identified [...] as the person depicted on screen, whom she had previously identified as the shooter.  (5T245-23 to 246-24)  All four factors governing lay identification delineated by the Supreme Court in Sanchez distinctly weigh against admission of her lay identification, and make clear that her testimony was improper.  247 N.J. at 470-73.  As to the first factor, there was only one mention of a prior encounter between the detective and [...], where a Vermont State Trooper testified that he was accompanied by the detective when he saw [...].  (3T6-3 to 16)  This one-time encounter fell well short of the degree of familiarity deemed sufficient in Sanchez, where the officer knew the defendant prior to the incident, had a relationship with him as his parole officer, and had met with him on over thirty occasions.  247 N.J. at 458, 471 (“[W]hen the witness has had little or no contact with the defendant, it is unlikely that his or her lay opinion identification testimony will prove helpful. ”).  For the second factor, there was no mention of any change in appearance in evidence or argument.  See id. at 472.  As to the third factor, there were three other witnesses who identified [...] in photos and video: his mother, his ex-girlfriend, and a Vermont State Trooper.  Their availability obviated the need for the detective’s identification.  *Ibid.* (“[L]aw enforcement lay opinion identifying a defendant in a photograph or video recording is not to be encouraged, and should only be used only if no other adequate identification testimony is available to the prosecution.
[brief] Transfer and Assignment of the Account**  On June 30, 2016, after the Account had been charged off, [...] sold, assigned, and conveyed the rights to a number of consumer credit accounts, including the Account, to [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 15; Pa88-Pa100; Pa206-Pa213, ¶ 25).  Thereafter, on July 13, 2016, the Account was sold, assigned, and conveyed, first from [...] to [...] (“[...]”), then from [...] to [...] (“[...]”), then from [...] to [...] (“[...]”), and finally from [...] to [...].  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 16 Pa88-Pa100).  Appellant never informed or notified any of [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], or [...] of a change in address.  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 19).  Appellant neither disputes the Debt, nor that he defaulted.  (Da43-Da46).  **C.  Appellant’s Class Action**