ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The jury was instructed that [...] was charged under a statute that makes it unlawful to “purposely, knowingly, or recklessly torment, torture, maim, hang, poison, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abuse or needlessly mutilate a living animal or creature. ”  (3T 84-4 to 10)  The court defined the elements of the offense for the jury as follows: first, that he acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly; second, that he “tormented, tortured, maimed, hung, poisoned, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abused or needlessly mutilated,” and third, that he did so against a living animal or creature.  (84-22 to 85-2)  The court informed the jury that “the State alleges here that [...] unnecessarily or cruelly beat or cruelly abused” the dog.  (3T 87-9 to 11)  The jury was also instructed on a lesser-included offense, “animal cruelty, inflicting unnecessary cruelty,” contrary to N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(a)(3).  (3T 87-21 to 88-14)  The court explained that the State must prove “that the defendant inflicted unnecessary cruelty, specifically the State alleges that [...] inflicted unnecessary cruelty by beating” the dog.  (3T 89-22 to 25)  The court also discussed the verdict sheet, and explained that “it says animal cruelty, torment, torture, et cetera,” and incorporated the language from the indictment, that is, “tormented, tortured, maimed, hanged, poisoned, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abused or needlessly mutilated. ”  (3T 93-8 to 9; 93-13 to 15)  The jury returned a guilty verdict on “animal cruelty, torment, torture, et cetera” and did not reach the lesser-included offense.
[brief] However, the time in which the first transaction occurred until the time the defendant was arrested could have used to secure a warrant for the vehicle.  [(2T 20-9 to 19)]  The court’s counterfactual that the circumstances could have been considered spontaneous if the officers had approached the vehicle after the first transaction does not in any way suggest that that court believed the number of officers on scene at that time “would have allowed them to approach defendant after observing the first hand to hand transaction. ”  (Pb14)  The court was simply engaging in a thought experiment of what might have been considered spontaneous, not admonishing the officers for not approaching [...] after the first suspected transaction.  The criticism the court levied at the officers was their failing to obtain a warrant over the two-hour surveillance period—not their to approach [...] after the first transaction.  Thus, viewed in context, the State’s quibbling with the motion court’s factual findings is immaterial and does not vitiate the validity of the court’s holding that this case is analogous to Smart.  Beyond Smart itself, two post-Smart cases by this Court demonstrate that this case falls squarely within the category of circumstances under which Smart commands suppression of the evidence: State v. Pittman, No. A-2309-20, 2023 WL 6930025 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 19, 2023); and State v. Martinez, No. A-1063-21, 2023 WL 6460945 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 4, 2023).
[brief] (Pa150).  On February 18, 1977, investigators from the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office interviewed “[...],” an inmate at Rahway State Prison.  (Pa212).  [...] worked with [...] in the officers’ dining room and told investigators that [...] had spoken on several occasions about raping and killing two women, and, on one occasion, [...] had lamented his decision to transport the bodies to New York.  *Ibid.*  [...] also had asked [...] if [...] could arrange to have someone rob and murder his wealthy aunt, “[...]”  *Ibid.*  [...] told [...] that [...] had an extensive jewelry collection, that whomever [...] hired to rob the house and kill [...] could keep the jewelry and other valuables, and that he would pay them in cash once he received his share of the inheritance.  (Pa213).  On February 22, 1977, [...] again met with investigators from the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office and informed them of another occasion when [...] again told him about murdering the two women and transporting their bodies to New York State.  (Pa214).  [...] also indicated [...] told him that murdering his aunt would be simple and all that the perpetrator had to do was knock on her door and impersonate a police officer.  *Ibid.*  [...] explained his aunt would not be suspicious of the police because they had been to her home on many occasions to inquire about him.  *Ibid.*  Finally, [...] told [...] that his aunt lived on a heavily wooded street and that her house was well concealed.  *Ibid.*  After an investigation revealed that [...] had conspired with another person to effectuate the robbery, [...] was charged with four counts of advocating homicidal death and one count of conspiracy to commit murder.
[brief] *Id.* at 62.  Defendant argued it was admissible for various reasons, including demonstrating third-party guilt.  *Id.*  The trial court granted the State’s motion, holding that the defendant did not present sufficient evidence of the stepson’s third-party guilt.  *Id.*  The Appellate Division affirmed as to the trial court’s findings regarding third-party guilt.  *Id.* at 63.  The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and found that the seven year old’s statement to the DCPP caseworker that the defendant’s stepson inappropriately touched her was “sufficient evidence that another person may have committed the crime for which [the] defendant was on trial, as opposed to ‘mere conjecture.
[directive] 1. related statutes, regulations, Standard Operating Procedures, and the l f i Manual.  References to forfeiture-related accounts must not be confused by using 2.  any other terms, such “confiscated,” or “special” funds, related terms as or when referring these accounts.  to 9  Page 10 of - E.  Section Financial Statement Presentation I  It that is 1. recommended the format for the Balance Sheet (Enclosure 8) in and Statement of Revenues, Expenses, and Changes Fund Balance (Enclosure be in columnar form with comparison of the current year 9)
[brief] The School Ethics Commission then held the matter in abeyance until a related matter concerning the election was resolved in the Law Division of the Superior Court.  (2a.)  Petitioner also sought to amend his complaint based on alleged information he had uncovered through documents produced to him through an Open Public Records Act request.  (13a.)  Respondents objected to the request -- which was raised improperly through Petitioner’s opposition brief -- because the applicable regulations do no permit a petitioner to amend a complaint before the School Ethics Commission to add claims.  Moreover, Respondents objected that the matter already had been fully briefed and that their interests would be prejudiced by the inclusion of additional claims at such a late stage in the motion proceedings.  C.  The Commission’s Decision.  On May 23, 2023, the Commission approved a decision granting Respondents’ motion to dismiss in its entirety and denying Petitioner’s motion to amend his complaint.
[brief] 30 SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974)  .... 33 SEC v. Wang 944 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1991) ..................................  39 Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019) .................. 23, 25, 31 Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373 (2016) ..................
[directive] $100,000 to $250,000  No 10%  Distribution of  Child care of a child who causes the child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected  Pornography child as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, N.J.S.A. 9:6-3, and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, second degree.  Any other person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this paragraph to a child, third degree.  b(1)  As used in this subsection, “Child” means any person under 18 years of age.  50  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] 35  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I of III  PLEADINGS  [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(A)]  Class Action Complaint, filed February 3, 2023 ...........................................  Pa1 Exhibit A ..............................................................................................................Pa20  Exhibit B ..............................................................................................................Pa25  JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(C)]  Order being Appealed, filed May 31, 2023 ......................................................Pa27  Attached Statement of Reasons ........................................................................Pa29  NOTICE OF APPEAL  [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(F)]  Notice of Appeal, filed July 14, 2023 .................................................................Pa41  Amended Notice of Appeal, filed July 29, 2023 ..................................................Pa45 TRANSCRIPT DELIVERY CERTIFICATION [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(G)]  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery, filed July 31, 2023 .................................................................Pa49  UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS CITED BELOW [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(H)]  Decisions cited below by Plaintiff: Ali v. Credit Corp. Sols., Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59126, 2022 WL 986166 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022) ........Pa50 Collins v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35487 (D.Col. Feb. 1, 2017) ........................................Pa55 Ismail v. Ascensionpoint Recovery Servs., LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195758, 2019 WL 5894311 (N.D.Ala. Nov. 12, 2019) .................................................................Pa80 Pollitt v. DRS Towing, LLC, 74 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 403, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41825, 2011 WL 1466378 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011)..............................Pa90
[brief] 225 N.J. 289, 310-11 (2016).  The Morgan Court expressly recognized that arbitration and its implications are not self-evident to the average consumer.  Id. at 309 n.7 (citing two studies).  Thus, notwithstanding its recognition “[n]o magical language is required to accomplish a waiver of rights” and “broadly worded language” is sufficient, the Court emphasized that arbitration agreements must be “‘written in plain language that would be clear and understandable to the average consumer that she is’ giving up the right to pursue relief in a judicial forum. ”  *Id.* at 310 (quoting *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 446).  As a point of reference, *Morgan* cited to the New Jersey Plain Language Review Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-1 to -13, which requires consumer contracts to be written “in a simple, clear, understandable and easily readable way as a whole[.]”
[brief] In light of the above, any purported reliance upon [...]’s testimony in support of the alleged relationship between Haddad and [...] is without foundation of fact.  First and foremost, [...] admittedly never had any discussions with [...], (3T62:13-14), and [...] was “not involved” in seeking material from [...].  (3T95:1-4).  Further, when discussing the subject of the two (2) unsigned, handwritten quotes from [...], [...] had no personal knowledge whatsoever regarding the specific materials that were identified in those documents.  Instead, [...] testified that it was her “understanding” that the checks that were issued were for “pipe,” (3T71:13-14), while simultaneously admitting that she does not “deal with the material for each job,” (3T72:1-2), and her familiar trope that “[i]t’s my understanding, and maybe I’m wrong, it was all pipe. ”  (3T74:13-14)  (emphasis supplied)  In addition, any question posed to [...] relating to the relationship between [...] and Haddad was almost inevitably followed by a response along the lines of, “you need to ask my husband.
[brief] The purpose of this brief is to reply to certain arguments made by defendant in his November 18, 2024 responding brief.  First, the State must address defendant’s allegation that “[t]he State failed to turn over pole camera footage that was part of the police investigation, in violation of the discovery rule. ”  (Db5 n.2 (citing R. 3:13- ¹  The record is cited as follows:  Pb = State’s Aug. 30, 2024 amended brief.  Pa = Appendix to State’s Aug. 30, 2024 amended brief.  Pca = State’s confidential appendix.  Db = Defendant’s Nov. 18, 2024 brief.  1T = Transcript of motion to suppress, May 28, 2024.  3(b)(1)).  This allegation is baseless.  There is no pole camera footage for the State to turn over.  It is possible that in the course of the investigation, a video feed from a pole camera was viewed by the search-warrant affiant live, in real time, and not recorded.  However, the undersigned can represent to this court that the State is not in possession of any recorded pole camera footage for this case.  Defendant alleged no discovery violation before the trial court.  In fact, defense counsel stated, “I don’t think the State has a pole cam. ” (1T9-11 to 12).  Defendant’s new allegation of a discovery violation on appeal therefore should be disregarded.
[brief] *7  Defendant failed to object to the testimony of the State's fingerprint experts regarding AFIS.  This failure constituted a waiver of any objection defendant might have had to such testimony.  See Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, —— U.S. ——, n. 3, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2534, 174 L. Ed.2d 314, 323 (2009); State ex. rel. J.H., 244 N.J.Super. 207, 218, 581 A.2d 1347 (App.Div.1990).
[brief] Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehab., 289 N.J. Super. 329, 338 (1995).  Evidence showing that a government acted in bad faith must be clear and convincing.  Klump v. Cybulski, 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42, 47 (1957).  A party who acts in good faith on an honest but mistaken belief that his/her actions were justified has not breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  *Silvestri v. Optus Software, Inc.*, 175 N.J. 113 (2003).  The motion record does not support a finding, and certainly not by clear and convincing evidence, that either the Board or the Township acted in “bad faith”.
[brief] Specifically, the Legislature, in response to the Appellate Division’s decision in R.C.G. Const. Co., Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Bor. Of Keyport, 346 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 2001), amended the PWCRA to provide, in relevant part, that, “[n]o contractor shall list a subcontractor in a bid proposal for a contract unless the subcontractor is registered pursuant to P.L. 1999, c238 at the time the bid is made. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 (emphasis added).  When amending the PWCRA, the Legislature inserted the following statement of intent:  The bill prohibits a contractor from listing in a bid proposal any subcontractor who is not registered pursuant to the act, requires the contractor to submit, prior to the awarding of a contract, the certificates of registration as a substitute for a certificate of registration.  It prohibits any subcontractor, even one that is not listed in a bid proposal, from engaging in a contract for public work unless the subcontractor is registered.  It requires that the certificates of registration at all times be maintained at each worksite of the public works project and made available for inspection by representatives of the Department of Labor.  [1435a.]  Thus, in making the amendment and rendering its statement (neither of which qualifies the statute’s scope by classification of work or otherwise), the Legislature reiterated the importance that all contractors performing work on public projects and each of their listed subcontractors be registered at the time of bidding so that the DOL may monitor their compliance with federal/State labor and wage laws, tax obligations and insurance mandates.
[brief] [...] agrees that Lot 3 and Lot 3.01 have some overlap and there are some parts of each lot that transfers automatically (1T112:2).  He concludes that the Riparian Grant was transferred from [...] to [...] with the Deed together with the type of omnibus clause or omnibus description which is accepted in the industry as one way of showing intent and showing what is being conveyed and in this instance it said: together with such Riparian Rights and other rights in the lands lying under the water of the Raritan Bay in front of and in adjoining the above described properties as are now vested in the party of the first part (1T116:21).  He confirms that in 1920 when [...] transferred the land to [...], they are transferring the beach area.  [...] acquired specific properties with reference to the 1909 Final Map.  It included the beach area and the specific properties on the Final Map (1T118:18) (J-5, Pa923).  [...] did not convey the Riparian Grant.
[brief] Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................  2  I.  COHEN DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTITLES HIM TO RELIEF  ....................................................................................................................  2  A.  It was [...]’s burden to show that the Settlement Agreement, properly interpreted, entitled him to relief ......................  2  B.  [...] failed to meet his burden because his interpretation of the Settlement Agreement violates its plain meaning ..................  3  C.  Even if [...]’s interpretation was reasonable, so is [...]’s, and it was [...]’s burden to introduce evidence resolving the ambiguity .................................................................  9  II.  THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN ITS ALTERNATIVE HOLDING THAT PERELMAN WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PALM BEACH PROPERTY UNDER HARRIET’S TRUST.  .................. 12  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................  15
[brief] As noted in the trial court’s Order and Statement of Reasons dated April 26, 2024 (Da42), the trial court held a pretrial conference on February 7, 2024 where the Hon. [...], J.S.C., advised both parties that the court would be issuing an Order to Produce to State Prison to arrange for Defendant’s prisoner transport for the trial and, if Defendant should fail to appear at trial, same would be deemed a “voluntary failure to appear by Defendant” and his counterclaims would be dismissed. ”  Da42.  Thereafter, the trial court filed two separate letters to eCourts advising defense counsel of Defendant’s responsibility to pay the prisoner transportation fee.  On February 16, 2024, the trial court filed a letter to eCourts advising all of the parties that the Court will be issuing an Order to [...] arranging for Defendant to be transported to Morris County for the trial, provided that, because this is a civil litigation, Defendant would be required to pay the transportation costs.  See Pa1.  The trial court even arranged for Defendant to be housed at [...] during the pendency of the trial at no cost to Defendant.  Ibid.  The trial court filed the referenced Order to Produce shortly thereafter.  On February 23, 2024, defense counsel filed one of his several adjournment requests wherein he referred to the trial court’s Order to Produce, noting that he believed the Order to Produce to be “fraudulent” because it included Defendant’s criminal case caption.  See Pa3-4.  The Court subsequently reissued the revised Order to Produce shortly thereafter.  Judge Franzblau filed the second letter to eCourts on February 27, 2024, stating that the trial court would not adjourn the trial based upon defense counsel’s representation without proof that Defendant would be released on parole in the coming months as the trial court noted Defendant’s maximum release date was April 10, 2027.  See Pa6.  In that same letter, Judge Franzblau again repeated that the court arranged for Defendant to be transported to Morris County for his trial on March 11th if he timely paid the required transportation costs and expressly referred defense counsel to the court’s earlier letter from February 16th:  At your request, the Order to Produce has been modified to reflect the caption of the civil matter and the court has confirmed with [...] that it will be honored, subject to your client’s timely payment of the required transportation cost (See February 16, 2024 correspondence).
[brief] Criminal Action On Appeal from a Final Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ESTHER  SUAREZ [...]  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY ID NO. 134052014  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR [...]'S OFFICE [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  Dated: July 14, 2023
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT PROPERLY EXERCISE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS IN NEW JERSEY (Da10–15)  “A fundamental question in every legal action is whether a given court has jurisdiction to preside over a given case.  Absent personal jurisdiction over the parties, a judge has no authority to proceed. ”  Dutch Run-Mays Draft, LLC v. Wolf Block, LLP, 450 N.J. Super. 590, 595 (App. Div. 2017) (“Dutch Run”).  “A court’s jurisdiction is ‘a mixed question of law and fact’ that must be resolved at the outset, ‘before the matter may proceed. ’”  Pullen v. Galloway, 461 N.J. Super. 587, 596 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344, 359 (App. Div. 2017)).  A two-part test governs the personal jurisdiction analysis: (1) each defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with New Jersey, and (2) maintaining the suit in New Jersey cannot offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ”  Pullen, 461 N.J. Super. at 596–97 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).  It is “well settled that the requisite quality and quantum of contacts is dependent on whether general or specific jurisdiction is asserted. ”  Citibank, N.A. v. Est. of Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 526–27 (App. Div. 1996).  That is, “whether the defendant is subject to any claim that may be brought against him in the forum state whether or not related to or arising out of the contacts themselves, i.e., general jurisdiction, or whether the claim is related to or arises out of the contacts in the forum, i.e., specific jurisdiction. ”  Id.; see also Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super. at 598.  Either way, it is Plaintiff who “bears the burden of proof on the question of the adequacy of the . . . defendants’ contacts to sustain an exercise of” personal jurisdiction.  Citibank, N.A., 290 N.J. Super. at 533; Baanyan Software Servs., Inc. v. Kuncha, 433 N.J. Super. 466, 477 (App. Div. 2013) (“[T]he burden is on [the plaintiff] to ‘allege or plead sufficient facts’ to warrant the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and it must do so by way of ‘sworn affidavits, certifications, or testimony. ’”) (citations omitted).  The Trial Court’s factual findings concerning jurisdiction are entitled to deference on appeal only if they are “supported by substantial, credible evidence. ”  Rippon, 449 N.J. Super. at 358.  This Court reviews “de novo the legal aspects of personal jurisdiction. ”  Pullen, 461 N.J. Super. at 596 (citation omitted).  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference [on appeal].”  Id. (citation omitted).  As explained below, the Trial Court’s decision denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss is premised on fundamental legal errors, and Plaintiff did not come close to meeting its burden of establishing a basis for personal jurisdiction over Defendants in New Jersey—a burden that, notably, the Trial Court did not even acknowledge in its decision is Plaintiff’s to bear.