ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [15T7-1 to 13-4].  The court took judicial notice of three judgments of conviction from Mercer County, detailing defendant’s prior convictions for third-degree Possession of CDS with Intent to Distribute, third-degree Distribution of CDS and third-degree Aggravated Assault.  [15T13-9 to 14-23].  The jury found defendant guilty of Count Eight.  [15T18-6 to -12].  Defendant was sentenced on January 6, 2023.
[brief] See *State v. Marshall*, 123 N.J. 1, 110 (1991), supplemented, 130 N.J. 109 (1992); *State v.* Hollander, 201 N.J. Super. 453, 479 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 335 (1985); State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2009).  To carry the heavy burden of establishing his rights were violated by the discovery violation, a defendant must show the government destroyed or failed to preserve the evidence in bad faith, that the evidence was sufficiently materially and facially exculpatory to the defense, or that he was irredeemably prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the evidence.  Hollander, 201 N.J. Super. at 479.  Simply pointing to a violation of a Court Rule or a similar misstep by the State does not satisfy this obligation.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT PLAINTIFF COMMITTED FRAUD.  THIS ISSUE WAS FULLY LITIGATED AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND IN THE FIRST APPEAL (A27).  .............................................  17  II.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT INCLUDING THE PENALTY PROVISIONS (A53)  .............................................  30
[brief] The trial court’s refusal to charge the jury with the appropriate charge was based upon an exceedingly narrow interpretation that such a charge would be limited to abutting sidewalks alone, and thus did not apply to other areas of the commercial property where pedestrian travel was to be anticipated, such as the parking lot in question.  Before the Court is a slip and fall alleged to have taken place on an icy condition on the morning of March 8, 2018.  Approximately 14 inches of snow devastated the region, including the accident location, on March 7, 2018, triggering the State of New Jersey to issue an official State of Emergency.  Plaintiff, [...], an underwriting assistant, was fully capable of working remotely, but instead chose travel to her office located at [...] (known as [...]) in [...].  Upon arrival at the parking lot at approximately 7:30 AM - during which time snow removal operations were apparently still ongoing – Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice.  The subject premises was owned by defendant, [...], who contracted with [...] for snow removal.  J&A subcontracted with [...] (d/b/a [...]) for the 2017-2018 snow season.  In anticipation of the storm, [...] had actually applied ‘anti-icing” brine to the property in advance of the storm, and was actively engaged in the snow removal process and was still applying de-icing materials to this large commercial property when Plaintiff fell.
[brief] THE COURT MADE PROPER FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT RENT WAS OUTSTANDING AND DUE AND OWING TO THE LANDLORD (Db Da25-Da27).  It is well known and acknowledged in our case law that in an eviction action premised on non-payment of rent, the claimed amount of unpaid rent must be legally owed by the tenant.  *Housing Auth of Passaic v Torres*, 143 N J Super 231, 236 (App Div 1976).  An available defense to an action for non-payment is that the rent claimed at this stage is not legally owed.  *Chau v Cardillo*, 250 N J Super 378, 384 (App Div 1990).  It is also well known that a landlord may not charge rent that is in excess of the local Municipal rent leveling Board and that this works as a defense on behalf of the tenant.  This is also a defense that must be raised during the trial where the Landlord is seeking eviction for nonpayment.  *316 49 St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v Galvez*, 269 N J Super 481, 488 (App Div 1994).  As has been addressed, the instant matter involved a basic tenancy complaint where the Landlord was seeking to evict the tenant for alleged nonpayment of rent.  In order to assess if the Respondent Landlord was entitled to any back rent, the Judge again engaged its own accounting to assess if there was outstanding rental arrearages.  While we acknowledge that the Respondent did not have a Ledger or receipts in relation to the Appellant’s rental payments, Appellant testified that she most often zelled most of her payments to the Landlord.  In comparing the months potentially covered by Covid relief and the payments made by the Appellant via Zelle, the Court reached the factual finding that there was a rental balance owed regarding unpaid rent.  This finding was again further based on the Appellant’s own admission that there were at least 8 months between July, 2023 and Month, 2024 that she did not pay or refused to pay.  This again was based on her erroneous belief that she was still entitled to a rental credit based on the prior Covid payment from the [...].  Based on the Court’s findings, this turned out to be incorrect.  As a result of a trial, the court a proper factual finding that there was money owed and further took a lenient stance in deciding the arrears amounted to only $8,000.00.  This was a finding made in fact and was supported by the evidence that had been submitted by both litigants during the trial.  While the landlord also has the burden of proof to establish the grounds necessary to support that they are entitled to a judgment of possession, once such a finding has been issued by the Court (that there is rent legally owed by the tenant), such grounds have been met.  This is all that is required for a Complaint premised on the most basic legal theory seeking possession of the leased premises.  Hale v Farrakan 390 N J Super 335, 341 (App Div 2007).  Since these were legitimate factual findings issued by the trial Court, we respectfully submit that such findings are entitled to the deference of this Court.  Because the trial resulted in the Court legitimately and legally finding that the Respondent Landlord was entitled to outstanding rent, we respectfully submit that the Courts must stand.
[directive] Attachment 11  Supplemental Plea Form for Graves Act Offenses (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c)  English, English-Spanish, English-Haitian, English- Polish, English-Korean, & English-Portuguese Versions  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da249 Exh R (Second Addendum to Agreement of Sale Executed by [...] (undated)-Redacted As Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da071 Exh S (Email of [...] to [...] dated May 8, 2023-Redacted as Redundant) . Da072 Exh T (Second Addendum to Agreement of Sale Executed by all parties dated May 8, 2023-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da073 Exh U (Email of [...], Esq. to [...] dated May 24, 2023-Redacted As Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da069 Exh V (Plaintiff’s Letter to Defendant, [...] dated June 6, 2023-Redacted As Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da075 Exh W (Order to Show Cause With Temporary Restraints entered by the Hon. [...], J.S.C. on June 21, 2023-Redacted as Redundant)
[brief] In *Montalvo*, the trial court instructed the jury consistent with *Kelly* — that it was unlawful to anticipatorily arm oneself with a weapon, even if that weapon was possessed for the purpose of self-defense.  Id. at 312.  After receiving this instruction, the jury convicted the defendant of unlawfully possessing a machete in his home.  Id. at 213.  Reviewing the instructions for plain error, our Supreme Court recognized that they did not comport with the Second Amendment.  Citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582, the Court affirmed that “the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to possess weapons, including machetes, in the home for self-defense purposes. ”  *Montalvo*, 229 N.J. at 323.  Despite the prior holding from *Kelly* that a defendant could not lawfully arm himself in anticipation of a future need for self-defense, the *Montalvo* Court held that “[t]he right to possess a weapon in one’s own home for self-defense would be of little effect if one were required to keep the weapon out-of-hand, picking it up only ‘spontaneously. ’”  Ibid.  Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant “had a constitutional right to possess the machete in his home for his own defense,” and that, “[b]ecause the court’s instructions did not convey this principle, the instructions were erroneous. ”  Ibid.  The failure to provide this necessary instruction constituted plain error, requiring reversal of defendant’s conviction.  Ibid.  Heller’s holding that a person may lawfully possess a weapon at home for self-defense compelled the Court’s ruling in Montalvo that the jury had to be told that self-defense is a lawful reason to possess a weapon.  Although Heller, and thus Montalvo, were limited to the possession of a weapon inside someone’s home, Bruen is not.  Bruen expands Heller’s reasoning and recognizes that the Second Amendment also protects the possession of weapons in public for self-defense.  Bruen, 597 U.S. at 33.  Thus, just as the jury in Montalvo had to be told that possessing a weapon for self-defense inside a home is lawful, the jury here had to be told that possessing a weapon for self-defense outside a home is lawful.  Specifically, the court should have instructed the jury that possessing the tire iron for self-protection is not a circumstance that is manifestly inappropriate for lawful use.  The court’s failure to instruct the jury that [...] had a constitutional right to possess a tire iron in public for self-defense risked violating her Second Amendment rights and deprived her of her rights to due process and a fair trial.  In conclusion, [...]’s defense was self-defense: that she picked up the knife spontaneously in order to defend against [...]’s unlawful and violent sexual assault, and that she possessed the tire iron to make her feel safer and provide protection in case of any additional, unlawful assault.  The court erroneously failed to instruct the jury that, if it credited [...]’s testimony, this would constitute a defense to both weapons-possession charges.  The omission of these instructions was clearly capable of producing an unjust result and requires reversal of both convictions.
[brief] [...], appellant’s expert witness on GPS systems, discussed the feasibility that the GPS coordinates would not match the precise location of service.  T3 80:13 to 85:8.  Under cross-examination by [...]’s counsel, [...] testified to the “fairly normal” phenomena of a “drift. ”  T3 81:17-84:19.  Mr. Burgess testified that these drift “errors” result in mismatches between a reported set of GPS coordinates and the actual physical location from which those GPS coordinates were transmitted.  T3 81:17-23.  Drift occurs for several reasons including, but not limited to GPS signals being blocked (“multipath”) or “interference” with other equipment.  T3 83:13-19.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  According to Plaintiff’s Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, on or about December 12, 2022, Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) applied to the [...] (“the Planning Board” or “the Board”) to erect a digital billboard at [...] (“EHT”).  (Pa26).  Nonetheless, the formal application cited by Plaintiff in the appeal is dated July 26, 2024.  (Pa44-49).  Regardless, it is undisputed that Plaintiff appeared in front of the Planning Board for an initial hearing on March 20, 2023.  (3/20/23 Transcript).  A second hearing was held in front of the Planning Board on April 17, 2023, which resulted in a denial of variance application.  (4/17/23 Transcript).  Plaintiff filed a “Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and for Violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act” on June 19, 2023.  (Pa25-30).  On May 15, 2024, the Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on both the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and civil rights claim.  (Pa1).  This appeal followed.
[directive] [No/Non]  [NA/paaplikab] has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?  Eske w okouran ke w oblije peye restitisyon si tribinal la ta detemine ke te gen yon viktim ki soufri pet ak si tribinal la ta detemine ke w gen kapasite oswa wap gen kapasite pou peye restitisyon nan lavni?
[brief] Instead of having to prove that a site is particularly suitable for more intensive development, applicants need only prove to the Board that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with greater density than permitted by ordinance.  *Id.* at 389.  However, the Board has been unable to properly conduct the *Grubbs* analysis because they have continuously misrepresented the facts as they relate to this site, specifically by claiming that the site is currently nonconforming with regard to the density.
[brief] [...] explained the court’s reasoning as follows:  [W]hen you’re talking about searches and invading somebody’s home and person and car, you have to have a belief, not just a suspicion.  And the belief has to be particularized, and in this case it wasn’t.  It was just generalized.  Bad guy out there with bad people, concluding they’re doing bad things.  Not enough for a warrant.  Not the way the case law spells it out.  You got to be particularized .  . . .  [1T28-24 to 29-6.]  [...] provided this example:  You should be able to specify or at least have a really good idea as to what kind of drugs you’re dealing with.  And here, you can’t.  You can’t.  Because [...] was a prior marijuana guy and the CI’s talking about he’s engaging in cocaine and heroin distribution, and how does that make sense?  Is [...] really changing his MO?  [1T24-16 to 22.]  Thus, [...] disregarded the trained and experienced affiant’s statement that [REDACTED] (Pca4-8), and instead relied instead on the judge’s own misguided opinion, which was stated with the benefit of hindsight, that defendant could not have been dealing cocaine and heroin because his prior convictions involved marijuana.
[brief] §1.2  “Neither Landlord nor Landlord’s agents have made any representations or promises with respect to: (i) the physical condition of the Premises . . . or (iii) any other matter or thing affecting or related to the Premises.  Tenant has inspected the Property and is fully familiar and acquainted with the Property and the Building inclusive of the condition of same and has accepted the premises in “as is” condition except as may be otherwise expressly stated in the Lease, and acknowledges that Tenant’s execution of this Lease shall be conclusive evidence that the said Property and Building were in satisfactory condition at the time this lease was executed by Tenant”.  §3.1  Rent was to commence October 1, 2016, leaving [...] three months to obtain the necessary permits to build on the Property.  §3.6  [...] was required to pay taxes and other carrying charges on the property from the date of possession of the Property.  §5.3  [...] shall obtain all utilities, including without limitation gas, electric, water, telephone and cable service directly from the public utility providing such service at [...]’s expense.  §9.2  Landlord would not be responsible to furnish any services, utilities or repairs or perform any alterations to the Premises, whether foreseen or unforeseen.  [...] agrees that no defense or claim can arise hereunder from any physical condition now or hereinafter affecting the Premises.  §20  Tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment is subject, nevertheless, to the terms and conditions of this Lease.  §28.3  Tenant, at its sole cost and expense, obtain a certificate of occupancy for the Premises, and in the event Tenant is unable to obtain a certificate of occupancy by virtue of the intended use of the Premises, Tenant, at its sole cost and expense, is to perform any work necessary to bring the Premises into legal compliance for its use so that a certificate of occupancy could issue.  §32  Tenant and its principals had inspected the Property and are fully familiar and acquainted with the entire Premises and accepted the Premises in its “as is” condition.  Tenant explicitly acknowledges that Landlord made no representation or warranty as to the suitability of the Premises for the conduct of Tenant’s business.  Tenant waived any implied warranty that the Premises are suitable for Tenant’s intended purposes and further acknowledges that the Premises were in fact suitable for the intended purpose of operating a café, bakery and retail store and warehouse.  Relevant portions of the Rider to the Lease are as follows:
[brief] The state’s ballistics expert, detective Sergeant [...], said the markings on four shell casing and three projectiles indicated that they were all fired from a Glock 9-milimeter pistol.  (4t 152-2 to 162-12)  Sloma admitted that Glock is one of the most popular firearms brands, being used by about 70% of U.S. police departments and the U.S. military, and he estimated that there are at least five million Glocks in circulation in the United States.  (4T154-16 to 166-2)  Police obtained several surveillance videos from nearby properties, which were admitted through the testimony of detective [...].
[brief] (Pa033a)².  “Although the OAL is possessed of significant authority in the actual conduct of hearings in contested cases on behalf of administrative agencies, the agency itself retains the exclusive right ultimately to decide those cases. ”  Matturri v. Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Ret. Sys., 173 N.J. 368, 379 (2002) citing In re Kallen, 92 N.J. 14, 20 (1983).  No longer must there be a showing that the agency’s delay to act was in “bad faith,” “inexcusable negligence,” “gross indifference,” or complete inaction.  Instead, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) “eliminate[d] any consideration of whether the failure to act within the prescribed time period is due to circumstances beyond the agency's control."  Matter of Hendrickson, 235 N.J. 145, 158 (2018) quoting N.J. Election Law Enf't Com'n v. DiVincenzo, 445 N.J. Super. 187, 198 (App. Div. 2016).  ²In its Statement in Lieu of Brief, the [...] is completely silent regarding the untimeliness of the ALJ’s Initial Decision.  In this case, the [...] – as the administrative agency – should not have accepted the untimely findings of ALJ and erred by so adopting the ALJ’s findings into the [...]’s Final Decision.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, the Lower Court correctly granted Respondents’ Motion and correctly denied Appellant’s Motion, and, therefore, Respondents respectfully request that this Court affirm the Orders, dated October 20, 2023, in its entirety.  Dated: Armonk, New York March 25, 2024  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...] (NJ Bar. No. 031032010)  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Respondents, [...], [...], and [...]
[directive] Criminal the to Pursuant 2C:2-4(c){2).  N.J.S.A. offense." the defining law the of enforcement law chief State's the serves General as Attorney the et 52:17B-97 sea., N.J.S.A. 1970, of Act Justice criminal the of enforcement efficient and uniform the ensure required to is and officer, enforcement the for responsible is ultimately General Attorney  The justice. criminal of administration and law Page 3 enforcement of our State's criminal laws, including our gambling laws, and therefore is the public officer best suited to interpret the Sports Wagering Act and its relationship to Title 2C in view of the Third Circuit opinion.  Given the importance of the issues raised by that opinion, it is appropriate to issue clear and authoritative guidance on whether casinos and racetracks are prohibited by our criminal law from operating sports pools, or whether the provisions of the Sports Wagering Act that exempt casinos and racetracks from criminal liability remain in effect.
[brief] Plaintiff acknowledges that "[a] motion for summary judgment may be denied without prejudice for failure to file the required statement of facts."  R. 4:46-2(a).  At Db23 to Db26, defendants repeat the summary judgment standard that was provided at Db19.  Defendants state: "even if the trial court had delved into the substance of the parties’ summary judgment arguments . . ."  Defendants thus admit that the substance of the parties' dispute was unaddressed.  "Although our standard of review from the grant of a motion for summary judgment is de novo, Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016), our function as an appellate court is to review the decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion tabula rasa."  Estate of Doerfler v. Federal Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 301-02 (App. Div. 2018).  A remand vis-à-vis defendants' cross-motion (and plaintiff's motion, which was denied "without prejudice") is in order.
[brief] See Kubiak v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 N.J. Super. 115, 119 (App. Div. 1984).  As [...] so aptly expressed, "arbitration by its nature does not provide a forum conducive to extensive issue and party joinder or to the according of a variety of remedies."  Jersey City [P.B.A.] v. Jersey City, 257 N.J. Super. 6, 14, (App. Div. 1992).  Nothing has changed since the Lopez decision -- the language of the IFPA still provides the courts with jurisdiction over IFPA claims; the language of the IFPA still provides a successful insurance carrier and the government with compensatory damages, costs of investigation, attorney's fees and costs, as well as treble damages and a right to a trial by jury; while the rules under Forthright provide NONE of these protections and/or rights to insurance carriers and the government and ultimately New Jersey consumers under the IFPA.
[brief] The insurer argued that it could enforce such a mid- term cancellation because it purportedly cancelled the policy in 1984, before 1985's promulgation of N.J.A.C. 11:1-20, et seq., prohibited the cancellation.  This court held "that public policy in 1984, foreshadowed in part by N.J.S.A. 17:29AA-11, prohibited arbitrary mid-term cancellation clauses in insurance policies."  Id. at 430.
[brief] I -- I -- reflecting back, I still don't know how to interpret that comment.  I do think it was - - even if it was not a threat, it was extremely culturally insensitive for him to use that word or to use that introduction. ” (Pa561).  [...] was under the belief that Plaintiff using his name, [...], was “culturally insensitive. ”  Id.  [...] was also “threatened” by Plaintiff during another meeting wherein he alleges Plaintiff was “talking over” himself and [...], and Plaintiff stated, “As a student, I am sure you understand. ” (Pa508).  [...] was so threatened by Plaintiff, he recorded two separate conversations involving Plaintiff, one between himself and Plaintiff, and another between Plaintiff, [...], and [...], and himself.  (Pa508-Pa511).  [...] even improperly recorded Plaintiff in meetings in which he was there to advocate on behalf of Plaintiff.  (Pa512-Pa513).  Meanwhile, [...] attended Plaintiff’s suspension hearing, in an advocate rule on behalf of Plaintiff.  (Pa512-Pa513).  On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff contacted [...], advising [...] that he only needed to complete only two additional classes to complete his Health Informatics master’s track for the dual degree program (Pa553-Pa555; Pa262-Pa263).  [...] responded and advised plaintiff that he “misinterpreted” the guidelines for admission to the MHS program which, allegedly required a “3.00 GPA at the end of your P1 year. ” (Pa554).  Ultimately, Plaintiff graduated from the [...] with a Pharm.D degree in five years.  (Pa258).  Plaintiff graduated with a 3.20 GPA and 164 credits.  (Pa137).  Plaintiff did not receive his dual degree, despite completing nearly all required courses for the master’s track.