ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], having thrown caution to the wind when purchasing the [...] Lot, had no valid reason to assume any legally enforceable right to access [...]’s property.  As is evident from his deposition testimony, his understanding of his legal rights was based on nothing more than uninformed scuttlebutt.  Assuming that New Jersey’s recording statute placed [...] on constructive notice of the 1966 deed recital relied on by [...] in this case, we say, respectfully, so what?  For reasons we discuss in more depth below, [...] would have had no reason to suspect that “the rights” mentioned in that deed were anything more than the occasional, unintrusive meanderings along that unimproved strip of land described in his certification below that he voluntarily permitted as a revocable license.  (Da789-Da791)  If [...] or any of [...]’s other predecessors in title desired anything more than that, they would have had to negotiate for an express easement.  As [...] observed toward the end of her 2008 opinion:  Even based on a reasonable necessity, [[...]] has undertaken too little and made too few overtures with other neighbors and presents the court with no evidence of the hurdles he must overcome to exact an express easement from his neighbors.  Presumably, [[...]], having lost his quest before this court, will now approach his neighbors to determine if they are amenable to such an arrangement and if so, at what cost.  (Da630)  There is no evidence in our record of any such efforts by [...] or any of his successors in title over the next twelve years preceding [...]’s purchase of the property in 2020.  It is undisputed that no easement rights were reflected anywhere in the [...] Lot’s chain of title.  Under the common law rule, a purchaser of that property would have been on notice that there was no entitlement to an express easement across the [...]’s property, and that any such right would have to be negotiated for consideration unless an easement could be established by necessity or prescription.  Prospective purchasers presumably would take that into consideration before acquiring the [...] Lot, and litigation such as the present case would be avoided.
[directive] Survey respondents were asked to explain their chain of custody and handling of kits.  Figure 1 details these responses.  In almost all counties, immediately following the completion of the forensic medical exam, the FNE seals the SAFE kit and signs it over to law enforcement if the victim is reporting the sexual assault.  If law enforcement is not present for the forensic medical exam, the FNE secures the kit until law enforcement arranges to take custody of the kit.  If the victim chooses not to report the case to law enforcement, the FNE retains custody of the kit until the SART Coordinator or County kit.10  Prosecutor’s Office (“CPO”) arranges to take custody of the kit and logs it as a Hold  The majority of responses from FNEs and CPOs indicated that all kits, including those identifiable, unidentifiable, untested, and returned, were stored in their evidence units, while law enforcement agencies most frequently specified the storage was in an evidence unit, without specifying where.  Fewer than 12 law enforcement agencies indicated storage was at the CPO evidence unit.  10
[brief] “The witness was allowed to express an opinion in order to help you decide whether the disputed [fingerprint] connected to the crime in question is the [defendant’s fingerprint].  You may therefore consider the witness’s opinion in reaching your independent decision on this issue. ”  Third Cir. Model Jury Instructions 4.13, “Fingerprints, Handwriting, and DNA Evidence” (April 2024) (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Robertson, 489 Mass. 226, 238 (2022) (“If an expert witness does not clarify that his or her fingerprint testimony is an opinion, then the prosecutor must elicit this clarification even if the defendant does not object. ”).  Requiring testimony in the form of an opinion, however, is insufficient on its own to prevent jurors from attributing disproportionate weight to expert testimony.  [...] therefore also advises experts not to phrase their testimony as “an expression of absolute certainty” or “assert or imply that latent print examination is infallible or has a zero error rate. ”  [...] Report at 6.
[brief] Harassment is defined by *N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4*.  The New Jersey Model Criminal Charge on *N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4* (revised January 9, 2012) provides:  A person commits an . . . offense if, with purpose to harass another, he:  a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.
[brief] As revised, chapter 13 permits both boards of education and municipalities to seek to withdraw from a regional or consolidated school district.  The school laws also expressly state that chapter 13, including its withdrawal provisions, apply to municipalities containing former non-operating school districts that have since merged with other districts.  [...] is one such municipality.  Historically, [...] operated an elementary school district which sent all of its elementary students to [...] and educated its high school students by virtue of being a constituent of [...].  In 2009, [...] ceased to be a non-operating school district and was consolidated by operation of law with [...].  In 2022, after the changes to the regionalization statute, [...] began an effort to withdraw from [...] and [...] and to join a new all-purpose PK-12 [...], which would be comprised also of students from the [...] and [...].  [...] and [...] opposed this effort, arguing that [...] did not have standing to withdraw from their districts because it is not a “constituent” district within a regional or consolidated school district, but rather has “merged” with [...] into a single district.  [...] could not seek to withdraw, Appellants argued, until it “unmerged” from [...] -- an act that would be impossible under the school laws.  In September 2023, the Commissioner of Education issued a decision holding that [...] could pursue withdrawal from [...] and [...] under the school laws.  The Commissioner based that decision on the plain statutory language, interpreted, as it should be, in light of the broader statutory scheme.  As the principle agent charged with interpreting and enforcing the school laws, the Commissioner’s decision is entitled to substantial deference from this Court.  The Commissioner possesses extensive experience and expertise in interpreting and applying the school laws, particularly with regard to broad and complex statutory frameworks such as the school regionalization statute.  In such cases, courts defer to the agency’s interpretation unless that interpretation is “plainly unreasonable.
[brief] F.  The five (5) highest ratables in this community are:  1.  [...]: $5,297,500.00  2.  [...]: $4,303,100.00  3.  [...]: $3,180,000.00  4.  [...]: $3,000,000.00  5.  [...]: $2,523,000.00  G.  The general welfare of the community is advanced when the municipality seeks industrial ratables to create a better economic balance for the community, vis-a-vis educational and governmental costs engendered by residential development.
[brief] As a result of the second sentence of the definition, the statutory coverage extends not only to those making or extending loans, but those that solicit such loans, those that assist in the procurement or negotiation of the same and those that purchase or acquire “notes. ”  The purpose of the second sentence of the definition is pellucid—to expand the scope of the statute and its licensure and other requirements well beyond the entities that actually provide the credit ab initio.  It is in this context that one must examine the explicit text that the statutory scheme encompasses those in the business of “buying, discounting or endorsing notes. ”  Because the statutory definition includes (i) those that initiate consumer loans by issuing credit cards and credit card agreements; and (ii) via the second sentence, intended to broaden the coverage, those engaged in purchasing “notes,” there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended by use of that term to limit the same to negotiable promissory notes as defined and addressed in the Uniform Commercial Code and thereby exclude from the coverage of the statute purchasers of credit card accounts.  Put differently, as the statute and licensing requirement apply to original credit card issuers, there is ample reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to include purchasers of credit card accounts within the scope of a provision – the second sentence – that brings within its reach the purchasers of consumer loans.
[brief] Declarant made no such statement.  Thus, there was no proper foundation for the lower Court nor for the instant Court to admit Plaintiff’s books into evidence because Declarant’s certification has no information sufficient for either Court to apply the business records exception.  Based on the Hahnemann, Carmona and Shawmut Bank decisions, and the American Oil case cited in Shawmut Bank, the lower Court made a mistake when it admitted Plaintiff’s books of account into evidence because Declarant did not satisfy the factual requirements to prove that Declarant was “sufficiently familiar” with Plaintiff’s record system.
[brief] I.  [...] HAS PLED ADEQUATE AND VIABLE CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT  i.  The Private Right of Action Afforded by the Consumer Loan Act and Licensed Lenders Act  Illustrates the Legislature’s Intent to Include a Private Right of Action in the Consumer Finance Licensing Act  Neither Defendants’ Brief nor the unpublished cases cited therein address Plaintiff’s argument as to the implied private right of action under the NJCFLA.
[brief] These were not just the aforesaid evidence for ongoing entrapments, but also evidence of potential *libel* and *illegal search and seizure*:  Without the appellant’s consent, upon apparent use of official powers the respondents had obtained the appellant’s medical records or parts thereof and upon interpretation of his records as questionably educated laymen they had stigmatized the appellant as “delusional and crazy,” officially defaming his reputation.  Evidence, prima facie, for the said was the police chief [...]’s email of explanations to the respondents (Pa17), upon which he apparently explained why he had disregarded the official recommendation (Pa18), in denying disability accommodation to the Mother, because of the appellant, stipulating “I have determined to deny [...]’s request” (Pa19).  This email was a material public record vital to the appellant’s case, yet the respondents produced a fully redacted page in response to the appellant’s OPRA-request (Pa17).  It was [...], who in his official capacity and upon false pretenses had taken the appellant to a mental hospital Under Color of State Law (Pa87), yet in responding to the appellant’s OPRA request for production of [...]’s official reports and records, the respondents produced either fully redacted pages (Pa16) or cited confidentiality and refused to produce a document (Pa83).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division: Monmouth County  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS  [...], and [...]  [...]  [...]  P.O. Box 2075  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondents, McElroy Deutsch Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP and Louis A. Modugno, Esq.  Of Counsel: [...], Esq. – Atty. ID 033491999  On the Brief: [...], Esq., - Atty. ID 033391986  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ........................................ ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii  TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................. v  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX .............................................................  vi  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................  1
[brief] Causation may be demonstrated by the temporal proximity between the employee's protected activity and the adverse employment action, when the temporal proximity is combined with facts that are “unusually suggestive” of retaliatory motive.  See Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005)  However, temporal proximity and a pattern of antagonism “are not the exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.
[brief] (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa89, 1T)  III.  An Essex County Taxpaying Resident Has Constitutional, Statutory and Common Law Third Party Taxpayer Standing to Contest the Validity of a Post April 17, 1992  Nonurban Renewal Entity  [...] Section 37  Long Term Tax Exemption Granted by the [...] under Post April 17, 1992 State Long Term Tax Exemption Laws, Rules and Regulations.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa89, 1T)  IV.  An Essex County Taxpayer Resident Has Constitutional, Statutory and Common Law Standing to Compel the [...] and the [...] to Account and to Collect All Statutory Long Term Tax Exemption Revenues Due the [...] under Post April 17, 1992 State Laws, Rules and Regulations.
[brief] BY: [...], ESQUIRE  I hereby certify that the following provision of Rule 2:5-1(f) have been complied with by this Notice of Appeal.  I further certify that the transcript request provision of Rule 2:5-3(a) and Rule 2:5-3(d) have been satisfied by virtue of my ordering the transcripts of the proceeding below necessary for the review by the Court on appeal and paying the transcript deposit (a copy of the transcript request form is attached).  I further certify that all filing fees have been paid pursuant to N.J.S.A. 22A:2.  I further certify compliance with Rule 2:5-1(f)(2) (filing of case information statement) and that a copy of the Case Information Statement is attached to the within Notice of Appeal.  LAW  OFFICES OF [...], P.C.  BY: [...], ESQUIRE  DATE: August 15, 2024
[brief] ”  In response, Plaintiff stated “Admitted.  No communication was made from February 2018 to the time the lawsuit was created. ”  speak to her?  A On a monthly basis…  Q  Did you ask for that ledger?  A  No.  Q  Other than the ledger that she -- that person that we can't remember whose name it was, would tell you existed, do you have any other knowledge of such a ledger being in the possession of [...]?  A  No.  Q  Do you have any other way of verifying that such an amount was owed to you other than what this woman told you?  A  Well, she was the accountant, so I believe what she said. ”  Da70-71 at 48:14 - 49:25  Regardless, Plaintiff admits that he received at least some form of payment from [...] dating back to 2011, but then later agreed that no such evidence has been produced in this lawsuit.
[brief] For example, a department store that sells brand-name clothing or television sets cannot realistically market those products without using the distinctive name and trademark of the manufacturer.  Setting aside the “community-of-interest” requirement, even if fifty percent of the department store's total revenue were derived from the sale of a particular brand of product, that circumstance would not render the arrangement a “license” within the meaning of the Act simply because the distributor is permitted to use the manufacturer's name to market the products.  To define a “license” otherwise might convert every distributorship into a franchise.  As the Third Circuit said in *Colt Industries, Inc. v. Fidelco Pump & Compressor Corp.*, 844 F.2d 117, 120 (1988), “if this limited agreement constitutes a license to use a trademark, then any business selling a name brand product would, under New Jersey law, necessarily be considered as holding a license.
[brief] ’”  State v. Watson, 472 N.J. Super. 381, 488 n.45 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Angoy, 329 N.J. Super. 79, 84 (App. Div. 2000)), rev’d on other grounds, 254 N.J. 558 (2023).  Where, as here, certain types of evidence present “complicated issues,” the New Jersey courts have developed model jury charges that are “consistent with accepted scientific findings. ”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 297.  Enhanced model charges have “a number of advantages: they are focused and concise, authoritative (in that juries hear them from the trial judge, not a witness called by one side), and cost-free; they avoid possible confusion to jurors created by dueling experts; and they eliminate the risk of an expert invading the jury’s role or opining on [the forensic issue].”  Id. at 298.  In the absence of a model charge, each court is left to sort through the scientific debate anew and based on the relative resources of the particular parties before it, opening the door to error and the risk of misleading the jury.  Thus, appropriate and comprehensive model jury charges promote consistent administration of fair trials as well as efficient use of judicial resources.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Complainants-Appellants, v. [...], [...], OCEAN COUNTY, Respondent-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY – APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DECISION OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS COMMISSION DKT.  NO. [...] FILED APRIL 16, 2024  COMPLAINANTS-APPELLANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL FROM DECISIONS OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS COMMISSION
[brief] 6.  [...] concedes there was no objective basis behind the sanctions award.  Instead he argues that this Court should uphold that subjective determination, with no analysis having been performed whatsoever, simply because the judge would have a better idea than me as to “what attorneys at different skills levels charge. ”  While that may be true, it does not relieve the judge of his duties to objectively calculate the lodestar, as detailed within *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292 (1995).  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Destruction of SAFE/DFSA Kits  At the expiration of the 20-year retention period, the County Prosecutor must decide whether to destroy or continue “holding” the unreported SAFE/DFSA kit.  The retention period begins at the time of collection of the SAFE/DFSA kit.  This Directive neither recommends nor encourages the destruction of evidence in any circumstances where an investigation of a reported crime may be conducted in the future in which this evidence may have potential value.  Once the retention period has ended, unless the kit is determined to have potential future evidentiary value, the SAFE/DFSA kit may be destroyed.  A record of the determination process and the destruction process shall be maintained in the Forensic Medical Record.  SAFE/DSFA kit destruction will be documented in the SAFE/DFSA kit tracking system to include the date of destruction.  There is a requirement for the County Prosecutor to notify the Director of the Division of no longer Criminal Justice, or their designee, before destroying a SAFE/DFSA kit at the expiration of the retention period.  Members of the County Prosecutor’s Office are no longer required to make individual notifications to victims prior to 12 destruction of kits, as care providers indicate that such notifications are often retraumatizing, and sometimes dangerous for the victim.  Under the instant Directive, the retention period is being extended by fifteen years, victims shall be notified of the retention period at the time of collection, and reporting information shall be readily available to the public through our 21 County Prosecutors.  8  V.
[brief] First, [...] provide no precedent endorsing their standard over the objective standard courts apply to recusal motions, which is not surprising, because none exists.  There is no requirement in New Jersey that private attorneys may not serve as special masters or mediators in alternative dispute resolution matters involving the same law firm at the same time.  The Wilfs likewise fail to cite to any cases with comparable facts that would support their view.  Second, [...]’ new standard would be unworkable in practice, as it ignores the realities of private attorneys acting as third-party neutrals.
[brief] As the State concedes, the Clawans adverse inference should be given if “the person was within the power of the party to produce and that his testimony would have been superior to that already utilized in respect to the fact to be proved. ” (Sb15)(citing Clawans, 38 N.J. 162).  Because only [...] could testify to the scoring factors (1T62:1-63:12) and both the municipal court and de novo court relied upon the accuracy of those scoring factors supporting a finding of intoxication, the remedy is reversal.
[brief] (Da3).  The Reconsideration Order provides the following:  IT IS ORDERED on this 9th day of November 2023, that for the reasons set forth on the record:  1.  The Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is denied; and --- \(^4\)  Although the lower court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the merits (3T14-19 to 3T14-20), this application was procedurally improper for two (2) independent reasons: (i) it was untimely because Tenant filed the motion fifty-nine (59) days after the Post Trial Order was served; and (ii) Tenant failed to articulate any basis for reconsideration under New Jersey law and, instead, simply repeated the failed arguments set forth in Tenant’s Post Trial Brief, which had already been considered and rejected by the lower court in issuing the Post Trial Order.  See R. 4:49-2 (“Except as otherwise provided by R. 1:13-1 (clerical errors) a motion for rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a judgment or order shall be served not later than 20 days after service of the judgment or order upon all parties by the party obtaining it.  The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred, and shall have annexed thereto a copy of the judgment or order sought to be reconsidered and a copy of the court's corresponding written opinion, if any. ”); see also (Da1-2, 173-175; Pa120).  2.  The Plaintiff is awarded counsel fees in the amount of $38,462.60, which shall be paid directly to the Plaintiff or deposited with the Court in cash, cashier’s check or money order by November 20, 2023.  If this amount is paid to the Plaintiff and no appeal has been filed, the complaint will be dismissed; and 3.  The $1996,669.16 now on deposit with the Court shall be disbursed to Plaintiff.  This portion of the Order is stayed until November 30, 2023, in the event the Defendant wishes to appeal.  Further stays must be sought from the Appellate Division.