ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [No]  a.  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole ineligibility is ___ years and ___ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be ___ years and ___ months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.  b.  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is ___ years and ___ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory extended term can be ___ years and ___ months (fill in the number of years/months).  8.  Are you pleading guilty to a crime that contains a presumption of imprisonment which means that it is almost certain that you will go to state prison?
[brief] In all 4 cases the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated the traditional standard that an arbitrator’s judgment should be affirmed as long as it met the minimal standard of being reasonable debatable.  The Appellate Division recently upheld the Chancery Division’s deferential standard of review in enforcing a labor arbitration award interpreting the CNA in the [...]:  We engage “in an extremely deferential review when a party to a collective bargaining agreement has sought to vacate an arbitrator's award. ”  *Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Local No. 11 v. City of Trenton*, 205 N.J. 422, 428 (2011).  “That high level of deference springs from the strong public policy favoring ‘the use of arbitration to resolve labor-management disputes. ’”  *Id.* at 429 (quoting *Linden Bd. of Educ. v.* *Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko*, 202 N.J. 268, 275–76 (2010)); see also *Borough of E. Rutherford*, supra, 213 N.J. at 201.  Our role “in reviewing arbitration awards is extremely limited and an arbitrator's award is not ... set aside lightly. ”  *State v. Int'l Fed'n of Prof'l & Tech. Eng'rs, Local 195*, 169 N.J. 505, 513 (2001) (citing *Kearny PBA Local # 21 v. Town of Kearny*, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)).  We will not substitute our judgment for that of a labor arbitrator, and we will uphold an arbitration decision so long as the award is “reasonably debatable. ”  *Borough of E. Rutherford*, supra, 213 N.J. at 201–03.  “Reasonably debatable” means fairly arguable in the minds of ordinary laymen.  See *Standard Oil Dev. Co. Emps. Union v. Esso Research & Eng'g Co.*, 38 N.J. Super . 106, 119 (App.Div.), sustained on reh'g, 38 N.J.Super. 293 (App.Div.1955).  *[...] v. [...]*, [...], 2015 WL 6121581 (App. Div. 2015).
[brief] \textsuperscript{17}  In limited circumstances, although a “consent” following an illegal arrest may serve to remove the taint, the State bears the substantial burden to prove both that the purported consent was voluntary \textit{and} that, even if completely voluntary, there was a clear break in the “causal connection between the illegality” and the evidence obtained.  \textit{Dunaway v. New York}, 442 U.S. 200, 217-218 (1979).  POINT  II
[brief] Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. A.  On December 18, 2023, [...] filed an objection to Debtor’s motion.  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. M.  The January 3, 2024, docket entry reads: “The motion filed on 12/06/2023 was rescheduled to 01/05/2024.  Oral argument has been requested.  You will be notified when oral argument is scheduled.  Do not come to the courthouse unless you are so notified. ”  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. A.  Only two (2) days after the Debtor pro se filed his second motion before the Superior Court, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, issued the Roberto decision.
[brief] [...] in its response of 5/10/24 admitted that [...] had no connection to the Note of 2/14/2005.  The NJ UCC Laws which governs the enforcement of a residential mortgage Note is all about the Note.  There was no indorsement of my Note to any party and there was no assignment of my Note to any party.  So NJ UCC Laws does not apply to [...] and [...] was never a secured creditor on my property.
[brief] PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/[...]  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney Id. No. 332522021  DATED: May 7, 2024  May 20, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 404802022  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY  LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] Settlement Agreement, § 2.1 (Pa000046–Pa000047).  And Section 5.2 states that the settlement class members intended to release their unknown claims:  **5.2  Waiver of Unknown Released Claims. **  It is the desire of the Settling Parties to fully, finally, and forever settle, compromise, and discharge all of the Class Representative’s and the Class Members’ Released Claims which were or which could have been asserted in this action, whether known or unknown, against all Released Persons.  As a consequence, the Class Representative and each Class Member may hereafter discover facts in addition to or different from those which he or she now knows or believes to be true with respect to the subject matter of the Released Claims, but the Class Representative and each Class Member, upon the Effective Date, shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Final Settlement Order and Judgment shall have, fully, finally, and forever settled and released any and all Released Claims, known or unknown .
[brief] The record demonstrates that the State has exceeded its share of funding to [...]; it is the District that has fallen short.  Despite the City’s dramatic increase in wealth, the District severely and consistently short-changed its own funding obligations.  [...] does not dispute the calculation of its LFS; and it ignores the economic boom it has experienced over the years.  As the court below found, the undisputed material facts showed that from 2009 to 2021, [...]’s average property values more than quadrupled, from $93,407 in 2009 to $461,925 in 2021, which is well above the State’s 2021 average of $335,623.  (Aa9-10; Aa1113-14; Aa1461; Aa1873-74).  As a result, its LFS increased more than doubled, commensurate with its wealth.  Specifically, its LFS for FY2009 was $196,262,527, and for FY2021 its LFS was $522,089,435.  (Aa331; Aa347; Aa1110; Aa1112; Aa1459-60; Aa1873).
[brief] A.  Defendant was not a Seller, Lessor, Creditor, Lender or Bailee  The Contracts are clear that [...] was not a seller, creditor or lender, i.e., [...] “agree[s] to purchase from you [Plaintiff], and you agree to sell us, a portion of your Proceeds”; “If your claim fails, you owe us no money.  This is a non-recourse transaction….” (Da128-134; Da194-200; Da208-216)  The pertinent principles of contractual construction are straightforward.  Schor v. FMS Financial Corporation, 357 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2002)  The court makes the determination whether a contractual term is clear or ambiguous.
[brief] ”  In 2016 both [...] and [...] sold all interests they held in [...] to [...] by way of Bill of Sale and Assignment and Assumption Agreements that have an effective date of August 31, 2016.  Pa112-13; Pa115-16.  At his deposition [...] testified that Plaintiff had notice of the sale of the [...] and [...] interests to [...] at or about the time of these transactions.  Pa136.  Between the execution of the Lease on February 20, 2015 and January 12, 2019 Plaintiff had no verbal or written communication with either [...] or [...] at all.  During this period all communications regarding the rental of the property were between Plaintiff and [...].  Pa 131.  For example, all monthly invoices of amount due were issued exclusively to [...] c/o [...].  Pa131.  On January 12, 2019, Plaintiff issued correspondence for the first time ever to [...] and [...] claiming for the first time ever that [...] and [...] (and [...]) were personally liable for monies owed by [...].
[brief] Remarkably, the State’s Brief acknowledges that [...] “is one of the original Abbott districts. ”  (Db13; Pa9.)  But the State refuses to acknowledge that, as an Abbott district, [...] students continue to suffer a deprivation of their right to T&E that places the burden on the State – not the District – to show the continued remediation of that deprivation through implementation of the SFRA under the conditions imposed by Abbott XX.
[brief] ”  See T2 at 12:8-20.  …  THE COURT  “In a nutshell, I stand by my ruling about the sham affidavit.  I think the problem was noticed by the plaintiff in defendant’s opposition brief, and it was all -- the defendant’s opposition brief was all based upon just sworn testimony from the plaintiff.  Did you have any discussions with the defendant about the money that was owed?  Yes, at the Christmas Party in December 2017.  And then when he saw the brief, all of a sudden this new affidavit comes from the plaintiff, he wants to bring these discussions all the way back to, I think it was 2015.  I stand be [sic] my ruling that that is a critical, significant, issue on the case.
[brief] (See Db17).  [...] criticizes [...] for having “conjure[d]” an argument based on that canon of construction.  (Pb26).  To the contrary, it is the logical corollary of a basic principle that is not in dispute: a court should, whenever possible, give effect to all of the provisions of a contract.  It follows that only if there is a conflict between provisions of a contract should a court resort to other canons of construction, including that a specific provision takes precedence over a more general one.  The reason is simple – if there is no conflict, there is no need to figure out which provision to follow and which not to.  It is probably because this is the only principled way to decide between [...]’s and [...]’s interpretations that [...] argues against it so strenuously.
[brief] The Court’s order dated August 18, 2023, constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be vacated.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I  (SEE DA125)  THE COURT ERRED BY ERRONEOUSLY APPLYING THE “WELL-SETTLED LEGAL RIGHT” PRONG OF CROWE, THE COURT ERRED BECAUSE IT FAILED TO DETERMINE THAT THE UNDERLYING APPLICATION OF THE LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN THE MANNER PLAINTIFF’S ASSERTED WAS A WELL-SETTLED LEGAL RIGHT.
[brief] (Da150).  On September 8, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, largely premised on the argument that the Subcontract requires [...] to indemnify O.A Peterson for [...]’s claims in the Underlying Lawsuit.  On September 26, 2023, [...] filed both an opposition to [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.  [...] argued that the indemnification clause in the Subcontract was ambiguous and should be strictly construed against [...].  [...] further argued that [...]’s employee was solely responsible for [...]’s injuries and therefore [...]’ indemnification obligation is not triggered.  On October 20, 2023, the trial court denied [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted [...]’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
[directive] (b)  CEDs: (1) may be used against specific individuals who are threatening assailants or active assailants as defined in Section 3.3 above; (2) may be used only when the individual can be accurately targeted; and (3) shall never be fired indiscriminately into crowds.  (c)  Less-lethal ammunition: (1) may be used during civil disturbances only against specific individuals who are threatening or active assailants; and (2) shall not be used during a civil disturbance against groups of individuals.
[brief] [...]’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS  (Addressed Below at Pa49)  A public employee has a protected liberty interest in his employment.  *Dolan v. City of East Orange*, 287 N.J. Super. 136, 143 (App. Div. 1996); *Matter of Carberry*, 114 N.J. 574, 583-84 (1989).  Administrative proceedings must comport with principles of due process, and fundamental fairness.  *Matter of Wolf*, 231 N.J. Super. 365, 376-377 (App. Div. 1989), *certif. denied*, 117 N.J. 138 (1989).  "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."  *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).  The United States Constitution requires that the holder of such a property right be given an opportunity to present his claim of entitlement.  *Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.*, 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982).  As the Court wrote:  [w]hile the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest...it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards....  [T]he adequacy of statutory procedures for the deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.  *Id.* at 432.  The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time, and in a meaningful manner.  *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976); *Doe v. Poritz*, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995).
[brief] There, defendant argued that Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed because executive orders relating to the Covid-19 Pandemic were not sources from which clear pronouncements of public policy could derive.  Id.  The Warner Court agreed, stating “we have not identified any case to support the proposition that an executive order alone can articulate the Commonwealth's public policy. ”  Id. at 484.  New Jersey courts, on the other hand, have been very clear about the breadth from which we can derive public policy.  Sources of public policy are not exclusive, so long as the offensive activity poses a threat of public harm.  Clearly, there is an overwhelming public interest in combatting and mitigating Covid-19.  In Cupi v. Carle BroMenn Med. Ctr., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46555(C.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2022), the court interpreted mandatory COVID-19 mitigation policies to be an adequate source of public policy to sustain a claim for retaliatory discharge.  Therein, plaintiff’s termination for adhering to Covid-19 procedures frustrated public policy favoring compliance with OSHA's general mandate to provide a safe workplace.  *Id.* at *3-5* (Internal citations omitted); see also *United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc.*, 168 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 1999) (OSHA's general duty clause, § 654(a)(1), "requires employers to protect their own employees from obvious hazards even when those hazards are not covered by specific safety regulations imposed by the Act."); see also *Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.*, 85 Ill. 2d 124 (Ill. 1981) ("There is no public policy more important or more fundamental than the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens.").  Public policies relating to Covid-19 have encompassed a range of measures aimed at mitigating the spread of the virus and protecting public health.  Our Courts, in supporting these policies, have recognized the extraordinary nature of the pandemic.  This Court identifies public policy on a case-by-case basis.  The overwhelming weight of evidence confirms that Plaintiff has identified a clear mandate of public policy.  **POINT II**
[brief] 447 (App. Div. 2000) ............................................................17 | ### Rules | Rule 4:67-6 ..................................................................................................10 | | Rule 4:67-6(c)(3) .........................................................................................13 | | Rule 4:67-7 ..................................................................................................10 | | Statutes | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7 | 24 | | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7e | 26 | | N.J.S.A 59:1-1 | 14 | | N.J.A.C. 5:105-2.2 | 26 | | N.J.A.C. 5:105-2.4(a) | 27 | | N.J.A.C. 5:105-2.4(f) | 27 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal, and its related appeal pending under docket number [...], presents (among other issues) an opportunity for this Court to hold that a former public official cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of an administrative agency without first being formally placed on notice of the action and being given an adequate opportunity to be heard by that agency.
[brief] And [...] is cc'd, when he was the attorney that was supposed to be representing [...] when [...] wasn't responding to the divorce.  But that was why it struck out to me because the role he appeared to be playing at that time -- and I was pretty disgusted that this [...] pushed a piece of paper which was in response to our motion to [...] while he was in the hospital in ICU, when all they -- they had to do as a firm of attorneys was to call [...] and say that your client is ill, can we postpone the motion.
[brief] This case was not mentioned in any of Defendants’ briefing.  In the interest of full transparency, this case is being disclosed to the Court, even though it is an unpublished, non-binding District Court case of no precedential value.  In fact, it appears the District Court was not made aware of Shaw since Shaw was not even cited in that opinion.  While Defendants cite pre-\textit{Shaw} cases to support their position that \textit{Plemmons’} semi-professional CFA exceptions properly include insurance producers, they fail to cite to any post-\textit{Shaw} cases supporting that position.  This is because the \textit{only} New Jersey case analyzing the learned professional exemptions to the CFA in existence post-2019 is \textit{Williams-Hopkins v. [...]}, where this Court elected to follow \textit{Shaw}.  [...], 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 569 (2024).  Defendants endeavor to minimize the significance of the \textit{Williams-Hopkins} holding by attempting to distinguish its relevance and highlighting its unpublished status.  Despite Defendants’ efforts to downplay \textit{Williams-Hopkins}, the holding is undeniably significant in that it recognizes and accepts \textit{Shaw’s} narrowing of CFA exceptions to liability to historically learned professionals.  The logic and reasoning in \textit{Shaw} is sound and should continue to be followed as it was in \textit{Williams-Hopkins} because it properly limits the judicially created exemption to the CFA to historically recognized learned professionals.
[brief] All parties agree that the clear import, express and implied, of the statutory scheme is that the association may sue third parties for damages to the common elements, collect the funds when successful, and apply the proceeds for repair of the property.  [*378]  The statutory provisions [***12] empowering the association to sue, imposing the duty on it to repair, and authorizing it to charge and collect "common expenses," 7 coupled with the prohibition against a unit owner performing any such work on common elements, are compelling indicia that the association may institute legal action on behalf of the unit owners for damages to common elements caused by third persons.  It would seem clear that the exterior of the building is part of the common element and that an individual unit owner is not permitted to do anything to any of the common areas and that Defendant is solely responsible to maintain and that the Association has the exclusive obligation to maintain it.  Under this it would appear that an RIL case could be made as it seems that the common area is within the exclusive purview of the Association to maintain but that in an of itself is not exclusive control.  However, anyone entering the property would for a brief period of time have control of, for example, a door leading into the building.  Aside from the obvious question as to why anyone would want to, I suggest that if there is an accumulation of water several feet high on one side of the door that it would be virtually impossible for anyone to be able to apply sufficient force to open the door at that time under those conditions and therefore under those circumstances the only reason water would come in would be because of the accumulation of water due to the storm and that was within the exclusive control of the Association throughout.  When the pressure built up to a sufficient level the doors gave way and water rushed in flooding the lower level including Plaintiffs units and several floors below.  Plaintiff had absolutely no ability to prevent this from occurring.  Only the Association had the ability and the legal responsibility to act and in this instance they had the better part of a week to do so as the storm moved slowly up the coast.  In Malanga's Auto., Inc. v. Wagner, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1989, *10-11 the court held:
[brief] Id. at *1.  Here, by contrast, [...]’s document collection efforts are far more mature and comprehensive, with 81 custodians designated and hundreds of thousands of documents produced.  As a result (and as discussed below), the possibility that [...]’s or [...]’s files could contain a very small number of relevant documents that are not also available in the files of one of the 81 existing custodians is vanishingly low, and insufficient to justify the intrusion of the broad, largely indiscriminate search Plaintiffs demand, especially given Plaintiffs’ inability to identify any gaps in [...]’s production or demonstrate that [...] and [...] have unique documents.
[brief] Defendant later provided this telephone number to police.  (17T:131-23 to 132-4).  [...] had mentioned $25,000 specifically to her.  Contrary to defendant’s beliefs, no one in the [...] believed the defendant was owed $25,000.  In addition to these messages referring to this alleged $25,000 debt, they also referred to members of the [...] by the names defendant would use for them, e.g., referring to [...]’s mother as [...].  (15T:72-2 to 94-14; 119-14 to 120-20; 136-17 to 142-9; 17T:14-24 to 16-12; 129-1 to 130-11).
[brief] “Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. ”  Id. at 799  [Intermediate scrutiny has "never required" a municipality to "demonstrate, not merely by appeal to common sense, but also with empirical data, that its ordinance will successfully" achieve the desired end.  City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439, 122 S. Ct. 1728, 152 L. Ed. 2d 670 (2002).  "[M]unicipalities must be given a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to address the secondary effects of protected speech."  Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).  As a result, "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."  Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391, 120 S. Ct. 897, 145 L. Ed. 2d 886 (2000).  In the context of sign codes, which are part of a "regulatory tradition" dating back well over a century, the Court has not required a great quantum of empirical support.  See Reagan Nat'l Advert., 142 S. Ct. at 1469.  The Court upheld San Diego's off-premises commercial sign ban based on intermediate scrutiny, relying on the "accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety."  Metromedia [v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981). ]  We conclude there is enough evidence and common sense here supporting [...]'s Sign Code distinction.
[brief] ” (Pa90).  On April 8, 2022, the Committee published a notice of Ordinance No. 13-2022’s introduction in the *[...]* pursuant to the LRHL (the “April 8 Notice”).  (Pa89).  The April 8 Notice complied with the LRHL by including the ordinance’s title, which concisely states the ordinance’s purpose is to adopt a redevelopment plan, as well as the date of introduction, the date, time, and location of the public hearing wherein final passage would be considered, and the time and location in which a copy could be obtained by any interested member of the public at no cost.  (Id.).  The Committee unanimously adopted Ordinance No. 13-2022 following a public hearing on April 18, 2022.