ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Types of Testing  1.  Random Testing  Random drug testing of all state, county, and local sworn law enforcement officers is required by AG Directive 2018-2.  Random selection is defined as a method of selecting employees for drug testing in which every member of the agency, regardless of rank or 3 assignment, has an equal chance of being selected each and every time a selection is made.1  The number of officers to be selected each time a random test is conducted shall be less than the total number of sworn officers employed by the agency.  AG Directive 2018-2 requires a minimum of ten percent of the sworn officers within an agency be randomly tested each time.  Each agency must perform the random test at least twice in every calendar year.  Agencies must establish a random drug testing program by rule, regulation or procedure.  A municipal police department should have the appropriate authority adopt a rule or regulation as defined by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 mandating random drug testing.  County, State, or campus police agencies should have the appropriate administrative, executive, or law enforcement official adopt a policy or procedure mandating random drug testing.  Random drug testing cannot be implemented until the rule, regulation or procedure has been in effect for a minimum of 60 days.  The agency must choose a method of random selection which ensures that every sworn officer in the agency has an equal chance of being selected each and every time a selection takes place.  In other words, an officer who has been selected on one or more previous occasions for a random drug test is not excused from future tests.  The mechanism for selecting officers can be as simple and inexpensive as placing names in a hat, or as complex and expensive as a custom computer program.  The random selection process should be verified and documented.  The agency should permit representatives of the affected collective bargaining units to witness the selection process.  Everyone present at the time of the selection, however, must understand that anyone who discloses the identity of an officer selected for random testing, or the fact that a random selection is scheduled to take place prior to the collection of urine specimens, will be subject to discipline.  2.
[brief] Plaintiffs Have Waived Any Argument Regarding The Reasonableness Of The Fees Awarded And The Trial Court’s Award Of Fees Was Proper In Any Event.  Plaintiffs additionally argue that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support the amount of fees it awarded.  (Pb36).  As an initial matter, \(^{13}\)  A new judge took over the matter after [...]’s motion to dismiss was decided.  (3T:21:9-11).  Plaintiffs *never challenged* before the trial court the amount in fees that [...] sought.  Plaintiffs never claimed that the fees [...] sought were unreasonable or excessive.  *(See 2T).*  They said nothing in this regard.  Plaintiffs, therefore, have waived any challenge to the amount of fees awarded.  *See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.,* 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (noting the “well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court”).
[brief] According to the Grant Application that was filed, the Project Distance was 0.87 miles of roadway.  (Pa 258).  The DPW is not involved in the determination of which roadways are repaved.  (Pa 521).  On March 15, 2021, the Defendant, [...] repaired the pothole in question.  (Pa 521).  A few days later, the repair did not hold up.  Therefore, the DPW made the decision to reopen and refill the pothole.  After this was done, the pothole repair held up until July when the Town had an opportunity to repave the roadway.  (Pa 521).
[brief] DEP Bulletin Notice: September 23, 2020 (at pages 1-3 and 161).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0003 DEP Bulletin Notice: February 3, 2021 (at pages 1-3 and 148).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0007 DEP Bulletin Notice: March 3, 2021 (at pages 1-3 and 137).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0011 DEP Bulletin Notice: July 7, 2021 (at pages 1-3 and 194).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0015
[brief] Video footage from a surveillance camera inside the restaurant capturing the altercation between [...], [...], and [...] was played several times for the jury.  (6T:147-9 to 148-1, 149-10 to 150-16; 8T:35-7 to 36-2, 40-8 to 41-25, 171-15 to 175-19; Da 12)⁴  Defense counsel played the surveillance footage for defense witness [...].  (8T:41-1 to 25; Da 12)  She recalled that the police arrived in several minutes and that she observed [...] speaking with [...] inside the restaurant.⁵
[brief] (3T65-9 to 12; 3T67-14 to 70-7; S-4 in Evidence).  In the calls, defendant not only identified himself by name, but also, left two callback numbers, which were ultimately confirmed to belong to defendant.  (3T26-17 to 27-4; 3T35-22 to 36-1; 3T110-22 to 113-24; P a l -11).  The victim testified that the calls were “very frightening and scary. ” (3T14-5 to 6).  He especially found defendant’s reference to where the victim lived to be “extremely alarming. ” (3T14-4-8; 3T20-12 to 21).
[brief] Defendant [...] conviction for murder and related offenses should be reversed because the defendants rights to Confrontation have been violated when the jury was informed that a face-less accuser named “[...]” provided a 9-1-1 anonymous call incriminating defendant, the night of the murder.  This anonymous tip from [...] was the first lead for the investigators, which made a defendant a suspect to begin with.  During trial, lead detective [...] testified that “[...]” was a friend of [...] and she was calling on behalf of Sasha.  Although at a prior hearing, he testified that [...] was the anonymous caller.  However, when this witness was called by the defense, admitted that “[...]” was the anonymous caller.  Defendant was deprived of his right to Confront “[...]” about her accusations of the defendant and his right to call “[...]” as a witness due to the surprising nature of how the anonymous caller was revealed.  The fatal error requires reversal.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] See *Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Sch.*, 323 N.J. Super. 490, 503 (App. Div. 1999).  Moreover, [...] testified (1) he did not experience any of the same performance issues with either of the new Vice Principals that he had with Plaintiff, and (2) the new Black Vice Principal remains employed by [...]. (Pl. Tr. 292:17 to 293:4) ([...] Tr. 133:4 to 134:3).  That the Vice Principal of the same protected class remains employed by [...], several years later, further proves that race was not a factor in any employment decisions.  In addition, Plaintiff cannot establish her age discrimination claim.
[brief] Defendant’s argument is not novel.  Indeed, his claim regarding the “detached viewpoint” language in the Model Charge was raised in an unpublished case, State v. Coppola, No. A-0256-08T4, 2010 WL 3516745, at *14-*15 (App. Div. Sept. 7, 2010), (Pa1-17).  The defendant in that case similarly claimed that the Model Charges’ definition of reasonableness is inapposite to the statute’s language for intruder self-defense, and denied him of a fair trial under plain-error review.  Ibid. (Pa12).  This Court disagreed then, as it should now.  The Coppola court noted that defense against an intruder is different than general self-defense, and that there is a distinction present between an honest belief and a reasonable one.  Ibid. (Pa12).  A reasonable belief must be subject to an objective standard, because to do otherwise “would make any honest belief reasonable—a result not intended by the statute. ”  Ibid. (Pa12); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c); Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 3 on N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c) (2023) (“To employ a subjective standard would make any honest belief a reasonable belief. ”).  “Analysis of a defendant’s state of mind by any standard other than an objective one is neither plausible nor reasonable,” and thus, this Court found that the Model Charge was neither confusing, erroneous, nor improper in any way, and this argument failed under plain-error review.
[brief] (Da172)  A Testimonial Trial was held on the remaining issues to determine if the “easement” had been abandoned and the methodology of parking and use of the Lot 5 parking areas by Lot 8 attendees on March 28, March 29, and April 4, 2017.  The Court rendered an oral Opinion on June 5, 2017 (Da177) holding that the “easement” remained in place but not resolving the actual methodology of such joint parking use.
[brief] [...]  60 Washington Street Morristown, New Jersey  07960 [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants [...] and Ginarte  Gallardo Gonzalez & Winograd L.L.P. d/b/a Ginarte Gonzalez  Winograd L.L.P.  [...] (038951988)  [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...] (422252023)  [...]  On the Brief Submission Date: August 12, 2024  #
[brief] See e.g. State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450 (2021) (holding parole officer's identification of defendant in a photograph was proper given parole officer's many in-person meetings with the defendant); State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9 (2012) (excluding officer's testimony about including defendant's photo in array because Lazo's similarities to suspect, because officer was unfamiliar with defendant).
[brief] Appellant claims that [...]’s failure to follow APTA Guidelines somehow constitutes negligence that caused his injuries.  It should first be noted that Appellant provides no authority to show that [...] is under any obligation to follow these guidelines.  Also, Appellant fails to indicate any specific provision of these guidelines that [...] has violated, or how that violation led to Appellant’s injury.  Appellant’s expert merely reaches the broad, unsubstantiated conclusion that since [...] does not consciously follow APTA guidelines, they must be in violation of those guidelines, and because Appellant was injured, [...] must be negligent.  There is nothing in this report to support that conclusion, and it is nothing more than a net opinion (see, Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015)  An expert must provide the “why and wherefore” to support an opinion.  Unsupported conclusions constitute inadmissible “net opinion”).  Appellant’s expert’s opinions regarding [...]’s security procedures are likewise unsupported by the facts.
[brief] As is well understood, the New Jersey Constitution allocates powers among the three branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial.  N.J. Const. art. III, § 1.  To be sure, the New Jersey Constitution grants the New Jersey Supreme Court broad and exclusive jurisdiction to govern the courts and Bar of this State.  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3.  This provision has been interpreted as granting the Court exclusive jurisdiction to regulate all aspects of the practice of law in New Jersey.  See In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 583 (1981).  However, the separation of powers doctrine “does not mean that the [Supreme Court’s] authority must invariably foreclose action by the other branches of government. ”  Knight, 86 N.J. at 389-90.  That is precisely the effect that Appellants’ purported threshold inquiry would have.  By treating the question of the Court’s exercise of authority in this area as dispositive of the separation of powers inquiry, Appellants would read the Court’s “constitutional authority to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct for judges and attorneys” as “necessarily impl[ying] an absence of any authority on the part of the other branches of government to deal with the subject.
[brief] (1T).  Shortly before trial, the court issued rulings on the --- 1  [...] and [...] were charged with fifteen other crimes in the same indictment.  (Da1 to Da8).  All three pleaded guilty before trial.  (10T31-6 to 11, 90-2 to 16; 11T108-19 to 110-15).  admissibility of defendant’s statements to police.  It admitted statements made by defendant at the scene, at a formal interview the day of the events, at booking two days later, and at a formal interview following defendant’s booking until he invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  (5T; 8T; 11T).  Following a four-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.  (14T5-6 to 10; Da11).  Defendant was sentenced to a four-year prison term with attendant fines.  (15T35-17 to 15T36-18).  Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on March 30, 2023.  (Da15 to Da18).  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] | Cases | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **Buhl v. Cooksey**, 233 F.3d 783 (3d Cir. 2000) | 7, 10 | | **Faretta v. California**, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) | 7, 9 | | **Gov't of Virgin Islands v. James**, 934 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1991) | 11 | | **Illinois v. Allen**, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) | passim | | **In re Winship**, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) | 19 | | **McKaskle v. Wiggins**, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) | 13 | | **Slutsky v. Slutsky**, 451 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div. 2017) | 13 | | **Snyder v. Massachusetts**, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) | 15 | | **State ex rel. L.W.**, 333 N.J. Super. 492 (App. Div. 2000) | 22 | | **State v. A.R.**, 213 N.J. 542 (2013) | 18 | | **State v. Butler**, 27 N.J. 560 (1958) | 27, 29 | | **State v. Case**, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 42, 43, 44, 45 | | **State v. Cassady**, 198 N.J. 165 (2009) | 45 | | **State v. Clarke**, 203 N.J. 166 (2010) | 48 | | **State v. Comer**, 249 N.J. 359 (2022) | 49 | | **State v. Cotto**, 471 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 2022), cert. denied, 252 N.J. 166 (2022) | 29, 40, 41 | | **State v. Dekowski**, 218 N.J. 596 (2014) | 20, 25, 38 | | **State v. Federico**, 103 N.J. 169 (1986) | 32 | | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **State v. Frisby**, 174 N.J. 583 (2002) | 34, 35 | | **State v. Fuentes**, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) | 42, 43, 45| | **State v. Gentry**, 183 N.J. 30 (2005) | passim | | **State v. Ghertler**, 114 N.J. 383 (1989) | 48 | | **State v. Harris**, 466 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 2021) | 48 | | **State v. Hudson**, 119 N.J. 165 (1990) | 15 | | **State v. Jordan**, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) | 28, 33, 34| | **State v. King**, 210 N.J. 2 (2012) | 7 | | **State v. Krieger**, 285 N.J. Super. 146 (App. Div. 1995) | 27 | | **State v. Luna**, 193 N.J. 202 (2007) | 15 | | **State v. Macchia**, 253 N.J. 232 (2023) | 36 | | **State v. McClary**, 252 N.J. Super. 222 (App. Div. 1991) | 24 | | **State v. Mirault**, 92 N.J. 492 (1983) | 22, 23, 36| | **State v. Natale**, 184 N.J. 458 (2005) | 43 | | **State v. Nero**, 195 N.J. 397 (2008) | 41 | | **State v. Outland**, 245 N.J. 494 | 10 | | **State v. Parker**, 124 N.J. 628 (1991) | 34, 35 | | **State v. Pennington**, 301 N.J. Super. 213, 220 (App. Div. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 N.J. 344 (1998) | 43 | | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **State v. Pessolano**, 343 N.J. Super. 464 (App. Div. 2001) | 12 | | **State v. R.B.**, 183 N.J. 308 (2005) | 29 | | **State v. Randolph**, 210 N.J. 330 (2012) | 44 | | **State v. Reddish**, 181 N.J. 553 (2004) | 9 | | **State v. Reddy**, 137 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1975) | 16, 17 | | **State v. Reyes**, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) | 19 | | **State v. Rivera**, 124 N.J. 122 (1991) | 48 | | **State v. Roberson**, 246 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DISMISSING [...]’S COMPLAINT AND DETERMINING THAT THE BOROUGH OWNS THE PROPERTY WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND BY APPLICABLE LAW  The Trial Court’s review of the history of chain of title for the Property led it to determine that the [...] “legally obtained all interest in the subject property” which is at issue in this litigation and that Jersey Shore’s claims were without merit and should be dismissed.  See 9T, p. 8.  The chain of title for this Property goes back over 150 years.  Although this history is both long and complex, the underlying legal principle of any land conveyance is the same principle that applies to any contract interpretation—to determine and to give effect to the intention of the parties.  When the conveyance documents in the chain of title are examined using this guiding legal principle, is it clear that the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Jersey Shore’s Complaint and in holding that the [...] is the owner of the Property.
[brief] [...] WAS NEITHER CONFLICTED NOR PROHIBITED FROM CHALLENGING THE CLAIMS BROUGHT BY [...] AGAINST [...]  Although the trial court did not base its ruling on February 23, 2024 on this issue (and, therefore, we question its relevance here), Aurora contends in its brief that, once [...]’s hired counsel withdrew from [...]’s defense (with Aurora’s sole consent), a purported conflict of interest prevented Prime from contesting [...]’s liability with respect to Aurora’s claims against [...] and in support of that contention refers this Court to Opinion 502, 110 N.J.L.J. 349 (September 23, 1982).
[brief] In case the jury did not understand the purpose of these questions, the State made it clear in summation.  Over and over again, the State argued that the jury should not believe [...] was raped because she did not report it:  - “She never says to the female trooper, hey, something terrible has happened, I need help, I need to see somebody.  She never said that to the EMS people either. ”  (8T 28-12 to 15)  - “Now, if in that 48 hours when she says she was driving around Newark, not bothering to call the police, not bothering to go to the hospital, not bothering to go to Urgent Care, in that 48 hours if she had just told anyone that store, she’d gone to any of those – a rape crisis center, anywhere, her aunt, she’d gone anywhere and told anyone we would have investigated it. ”\(^7\) (8T 55-2 to 9) - “Keep in mind that she didn’t call 911 or even a hospital or even a – a – an urgent care.  She didn’t call them cause she wasn’t raped. ”  (8T 66-10 to 12)  (emphasis added)
[directive] Notice to Prosecutor of  The applicant shall provide notice and a copy the application to the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General's Office that prosecuted their case.  Notification of of of the pendency an application and issuance a ce1iificate shall be provided by the court to that office.  See N.J.S.A. 2A: 168A-10. of V.  Issuance  Certificate of  The issuance a Certificate depends on the qualified offender's status when the application is filed.  ADA ENSURING TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE  Americans with Disabilities Act Directive #02-24
[brief] See also N.J.S.A. 19:16-4 (ballots shall be deemed null and void where more names have been marked for each office).  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 19:16-4 directs that the board “shall deem null and void all ballots which are wholly blank, or on which more names have been marked for every office than there are persons to be elected to such office…” (emphasis added).  Matter of Gen. Election Held in Tp. of Monroe, Gloucester Cty., N.J. on Tuesday, Nov. 6, 1990., 245 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1990) is distinguishable as the voters in that case wrote-in the name of the candidate they sought to vote for and voted for the candidate on the ballot.  Here, Respondent asks this Court to simply assume the voter intended to vote for [...] and [...], and that the personal choice bubble was a mistake.  But the ballot contains no indication, such as crossing out the write-in bubble, to clarify intent.  The voter may have intended to vote for [...] only or [...] only, or to write in a different candidate and changed their mind.  We simply do not know.  As the Supreme Court held in In re Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. 468 (2000), where the voter’s own carelessness is the cause of the failure to comply, the courts will not excuse violations from the statutory requirements of casting a proper ballot.  “A judge may not speculate as to the voter’s intent in order to validate a ballot marked contrary to that permitted by the statute. ”  *Application of Mallon*, 232 N.J. Super. 249, 262 (App. Div. 1989) (citing *In re Sadlon*, 88 N.J. Super. 37, 40 (App. Div. 1965)).  The ballot rejected by the Board of Elections contains an improper overvote, three selections for two offices, and was therefore cast in violation of the statutes.  No case or statute permits the court to simply assume it was an error, guess the voter’s intent, and permit the ballot to be counted.  Accordingly, the ballot should remain uncounted.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The joint petition also requested the inclusion of [...] in the expanded all-purpose regional school district, when and if [...]’s withdrawal from [...] and [...] was approved.  (Aa39-40).  While this petition was pending, the [...] submitted an amended petition and feasibility study on March 17, 2023, (Aa372-748), requesting to proceed to a referendum, without [...], to expand [...] to an all-purpose pre-K through twelve regional school district consisting of [...] and [...] as constituent districts.  (Aa394).  The Commissioner granted this unopposed, amended petition on July 21, 2023.  (Aa19).
[brief] Whether Respondents, [...] and [...] (“[...]” or “Respondent”) is obligated to reimburse Appellant [...] (“[...]” or “Appellant”) for a portion of [...]’s mortgage payments which were clawed back by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?  Does the deficiency created by the clawback constitute a breach of contract under [...]’s obligation to repay the full amount of the loan to [...]?  Was [...] unjustly enriched by the $60,000 loan deficiency resulting from the claw back?  As urged in Appellant’s main brief and as set forth herein, we believe the answers are in the affirmative.  POINT I FEDERICI’S ARGUMENT THAT A MORTGAGE ONCE CANCELLED CANNOT BE REINSTATED IS WITHOUT MERIT
[brief] *Id.* at 172-73.  The issue before the Court was “whether the plaintiff was actually on the turnpike crossing, or on the private right-of-way of the railroad company, when the accident occurred. ”  *Id.* at 172-73.  The railroad argued that the incident occurred in its right of way and plaintiff was a trespasser.  As in Ruggiero, the Court disagreed.  It explained that “if the plaintiff was within the boundaries of said highway at the time of accident, even though on the unimproved part, he was within his rights and not a trespasser. ”  Id. at 176; see also Barsel v. Woodbridge Tp. Zoning Bd. Of Adjust., 189 N.J. Super. 75, 81-82 (App. Div. 1983) (relying upon Miller and observing that “the entire space [of highway] becomes devoted to public use for all purposes of a highway, and the right of the public to use such highway extends to the whole breadth thereof, and not merely to the part which is worked or actually travelled”).
[brief] In rejecting the 2% annual salary increases, the arbitrator stated that the City would “need to divert all of its surplus and cap banking for CY 2024 and still end up approximately $400,000 short, possibly requiring layoffs or service shutdowns to make up the shortage. ” (Aa057-Aa058).  The arbitrator fails to cite to any evidence in the record to support the arbitrator’s claim that the City would “have to fund most of a 2% salary increase by shutting down services and laying off numerous personnel… .” (Aa121).  On this issue, the Commission recited the arbitrator’s findings without identifying whether the 16g statutory factors were misapplied.  (Aa056-Aa058).  This is a material error and fatal to the validity of the Award.  **POINT V**
[brief] On December 11, 2015, [...] suffered significant injuries as a result of an accident on the Project (“the accident”).  Pa4.  The contracted-for work done by [...] on the day of the accident was described as “core drilling” and “wire sawing. ”  Pa422.  The accident was the subject of a lawsuit brought by [...] against [...], [...], and [...], among others (“the Hood litigation”).  Pa4.  After receiving service of the Hood complaint, [...] tendered its defense to and sought indemnification from [...] and [...] as CCIP the insurers on June 29, 2017 and August 15, 2017 for the claims asserted in the Hood litigation.