ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At the time she filed for bankruptcy protection, Plaintiff and her bankruptcy counsel were fully aware of her multiple potential consumer claims since Plaintiff listed these debts as “Nonpriority Unsecured Claims” and, as discussed, the facts giving rise to this lawsuit occurred eight months prior to her bankruptcy filing.  As such, there is no good faith justification for listing what appears to be only a single possible consumer claim with a limit of $1,000 in the wrong section of her bankruptcy petition.  Indeed, it is clear that Plaintiff knew of her consumer claims as her bankruptcy attorney is the very same attorney bringing this lawsuit and, conveniently, commenced this lawsuit three weeks after Plaintiff received her discharge.  In sum, Plaintiff’s attempts to continue to benefit from this putative class action while previously failing to properly disclose and amend her bankruptcy schedules continues to exasperate and compound her bad faith.  Indeed, Plaintiff’s improperly filed and rejected amended schedules indicates that Plaintiff likely plans to sue at least four other entities for the same type of claims as Plaintiff has brought in this case against [...].  As Courts have previously found, there is no available lesser sanction instead of dismissal of this action since anything else would simply permit the Plaintiff to benefit from her own bad conduct.  See Danise v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., No. 15-06062 (JLL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174888 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2016) (“[W]ere the Court to issue” an alternative sanction such as allowing Plaintiff to reopen the bankruptcy to amend the schedules “the integrity of both the bankruptcy and the judicial process would suffer”) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] Joel, 147 N.J. at 549.  Regardless, the City fails to tell the entire story of Brick.  That case does not stand for the proposition that a property owner’s failure to notify the tax collector of a change in address is dispositive even of the due process issue.  Indeed, although the Brick defendants had not advised the tax office of their change in address, this Court nevertheless remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether the Township had actual knowledge of the defendants’ situation.  Even though the Township “had no duty to investigate” the defendants’ address beyond what appeared on the tax rolls, “it is something else altogether if someone involved ignored conscious awareness that the address was outdated . . . and that [the defendants] were available for service” at a different address.
[brief] Secondly, upon the filing of [...]’s first summary judgment motion, the Court, although expressly unimpressed with [...]’s evidentiary showing at that time, denied [...]’s first summary judgment motion without prejudice, pending the conclusion of depositions.  The subsequent depositions of [...]’s representatives not only added nothing “new” to [...]’s insufficient evidentiary showing, but they also elicited the following devastating admissions in [...]’s favor:  (1)  Shalan [...], [...]’s President, blithely admitted that [...]’s employees, as a matter of routine business practice, threw into the trash all of the packing slips that accompanied deliveries!  Thus, [...] had, either through reckless neglect or by intentional design, knowingly engaged in self-sabotaging acts of evidential spoliation, which are tantamount to litigation suicide in any breach of contract case; (2) Shalan [...], when asked during his rancorous deposition testimony to provide relevant proofs of [...]’s damages, responded not with substance, but with a disturbingly venomous harangue of profanity and personal insults that must be read to be believed.
[brief] See Dep’t. of the Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util., 206 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1985) (“[C]ourts will strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.  It follows that any action which would have the effect of vitiating the provisions of a particular settlement agreement and the concomitant effect of undermining public confidence in the settlement process in general, should not be countenanced. ”).  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] you are terminated from the of PTI program, your charges will be reactivated and prosecution the charges will resume.  You may also be of ordered to comply with conditions pretrial release.  Failure to comply with the payment requirements may result in further Court action including termination, of of of of attachment your wages, filing a civil judgment, or extension your PTI Supervision for purposes collection.  of of PT! read and I have received a copy the Standard Conditions Supervision, which have been explained to of my I may request a copy the official court order from probation officer.  I understand the above me. of PT! and and conditions  Supervision that they apply to I farther understand that failure to comply on me, of PT! and and part my my constitutes a violation  Supervision may cause termination from the program of · prosecution the charges against me.  Date Defendant Date Probation Officer
[brief] The Comparative Negligence Act provides that a plaintiff’s “negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought or was not greater than the combined negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1.  It is only when the plaintiff’s negligence exceeds the defendant’s negligence that the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be sustained.  Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries, 278 N.J. Super. 129, 150-151 (App. Div. 1994), aff’d 143 N.J. 141 (1996).  In order to determine the percentage of fault to be attributed to each party, the fact finder has to weigh all of the evidence, make conclusions of fact, and apportion fault amongst the parties.
[directive] CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF Governor PO BOX 085  [...] TRENTON, NJ 08625-0085  TELEPHONE: [...]  Director  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2 TO: [...], Superintendent, Division of State Police  All County Prosecutors  AAG  Vaughn L. McKoy, Director, Division of Criminal Justice  FROM: [...], Attorney General  DATE: October 8, 2004
[brief] ”  Ibid.  See also Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 135 (if a prior judge has erred or entered an order that ceases to promote a fair and efficient processing of a particular case, the new judge owes respect, but not deference and should correct the error).  So too, in Lawson, the court observed reconsideration motions that argue in good faith a prior mistake, a change in circumstances or the court’s misappreciation of what was previously argued, present the court with an opportunity to either reinforce or better explain why the prior order was appropriate or correct a prior erroneous order.  *Id.* at 136.
[brief] .......................................................................................................44  State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245 (2021)  ..............................................................................................................17  State v. Hale, 127 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1974) ..................................................................................14  State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34 (2010) ..................................................................................................................16  Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg, 345 N.J. Super. 472 (App.  Div. 2001) ....................................................................................47, 48 Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2010) .....................................................................................25 Statutes N.J.S.A. 20:3-32..........................................................................................................................47 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1.1(b) ..................................................................................................................30 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) .......................................................................................................................4, 29, 37 Rules Rule 1:12-1(g) ..............................................................................................................................17 Rule 3.17(B) .................................................................................................................................17 Rule 4:42-9(a)(8) .........................................................................................................................4 Rule 4:42-11 .................................................................................................................................46, 48 Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12(c) .........................................................................................24 Plaintiffs [...] and [...] (collectively, “[...]”) submit this brief in opposition to the appeal of Defendants [...], the [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, the “[...]”).
[brief] Defendant [...] moved in April 2019 for an Order to Limit the Record to the Exhibits before the Zoning Board (Da177).  The Court heard the Motion on May 19, 2019 (2T), but delayed ruling on the Motion pending the outcome of the remand easement Trial.  After that Opinion/Order by [...] in March 2022, the Trial Court entered an Order (Da214) on June 2, 2022.
[directive] 4.5  Notice When Using BWCs with an Apparent Crime Victim.  When interacting with an apparent crime victim, a law enforcement officer shall, as soon as practicable, notify the apparent crime victim that he or she is being recorded by the BWC and, if the apparent crime victim requests the officer to discontinue use of the BWC, the officer shall immediately discontinue use of the BWC.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement officer pursuant to this Section and the response to the request shall be recorded by the recording system prior to discontinuing use of the recording system.  4.6  Notice When Using BWCs with a Person Seeking to Remain Anonymous.  When interacting with a person seeking to anonymously report a crime or assist in an ongoing law enforcement investigation, a law enforcement officer shall notify the person that they are wearing a BWC and, if the person requests that the officer discontinue use of the BWC, the officer shall evaluate the circumstances and, if appropriate, discontinue use of the BWC.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement officer pursuant to this Section and the response to the request shall be recorded by the recording system prior to discontinuing use of the recording system.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] [...] also had shown the Chancery Court that the Arbitrator’s proceeding unopposed led to prejudice of [...]’s chance to dispute that summary judgment was even warranted on the facts that Plaintiffs presented.  In fact, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-15 only permits an arbitrator to decide a case summarily by consent, or “(2) upon request of one party to the arbitration proceeding if that party gives notice to all other parties to the proceeding, and the other parties have a reasonable opportunity to respond.
[brief] [...] concluded his testimony with respect to the waiver by stating:  If the Board doesn't feel inclined to grant that design waiver, approve the application without it and we'll adjust the plans to accommodate.  (2T: p52, ln 2-5)  [...] then questioned [...].  He inquired as to the provision of a homeowner’s association.  [...] testified that while one was not required, one would be put in place.  (T2: p58, ln 21-23)
[brief] County of Essex, 186 N.J. at 61.  The primary consideration in awarding prejudgment interest is that: the defendant has had the use, and the plaintiff has not, of the amount in question; and the interest factor simply covers the value of the sum awarded for the prejudgment period during which the defendant had the benefit of monies to which the plaintiff is found to have been earlier entitled.  Litton Indus., 200 N.J. at 390 (citing [...] v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 506, 323 A.2d 495 (1974)).  In well-known case of *Rova Farms*, the plaintiff, an operator of a recreational resort, was sued by a guest after the guest suffered serious injuries at the resort.  *[...] v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 479 (1974).  Rova Farm’s insurance company, [...], provided a defense to Rova in the underlying action.  *Id.* at 480.  Investors offered only a portion of its policy limits to settle the underlying action, which the plaintiff rejected.  *Id.* at 481.  Ultimately, the underlying action was tried to a jury and a verdict was rendered for the injured guest in an amount substantially in excess of Investors’ policy limits.  *Id.*
[brief] See, also, Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 153 (attorney inadvertence or counsel’s carelessness do not satisfy the reasonable explanation requirement.)  Plaintiff attempts to excuse this failure, but none of her arguments constitute a reasonable explanation.  First, she argues that counsel’s confusion as to the due date for the Affidavit of Merit was somehow connected to the fact there was an initial default judgment which was vacated by consent.
[brief] 5  POINT I: THERE IS SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE LAW  DIVISION’S FINDINGS THAT [...] IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ..................................................................................................................  5  A. SERIOUS THREAT OF SERIOUS BODILY INJURY/DEATH .................................................................  9  B. PROVOCATION ..................................................................................................................  11  C. BODILY INJURY ..................................................................................................................  12  POINT II: STATE V. HEROLD SUPPORTS FINDING [...] POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS .............................................  13  POINT III: THE STATE DEFERS TO THE COURT’S JUDGEMENT REGARDING THE TATTOO REQUIREMENT ..................................................................................................................  15  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................
[directive] There are additional rules that govern conduct within the 100-foot zone around polling places, early voting locations, and ballot drop boxes when such is being used for voting during an election.  For example, no person shall wear, display, sell, give, or provide any political or campaign slogan, badge, button, or other insignia associated with any political party or candidate within 100 feet of any of these locations, except with respect to the badge furnished by the county board of elections as provided by law.  N.J.S.A. 19:63- 16.1(b)(2)(g); N.J.S.A. 19:34-19; N.J.S.A. 19:34-15; N.J.S.A. 19:15A-1(e); see also N.J.S.A. 19:63-16.1(b)(2)(g) (applying this rule to ballot drop boxes).  Moreover, it is prohibited to engage in electioneering within 100 feet of any of the above locations.  N.J.S.A. 19:34-6; N.J.S.A. 19:34-15.  Electioneering includes oral or printed communications (such as messages on signs, leaflets, t-shirts, masks, etc.) in support of, or opposition to, a candidate, campaign, party, or public question on the ballot.  Individuals who aid or abet violations of election laws may be subject to criminal liability.  See N.J.S.A. 19:34-20; N.J.S.A. 19:63-28(b).  Of course, individuals engaged in voter intimidation or obstruction also may be in violation of laws that do not pertain specifically to elections.
[brief] Appellant argued, and continues to argue, that the GPS noted service at 9:25am on August 23, 2021, did not create a mandatory conflict with the Appellant’s vehicle GPS at the toll booth which occurred shortly thereafter.  T4 98:8 to T4 99:23.  The Court concluded that such travel time was entirely possible, was within the realm of reason, and did not require that the Court reject that both things occurred – in that service occurred on that same morning followed by subsequent travel to the toll booth where a GPS signal was received.  [...] clearly recited this timeline on the record, and that he was not convinced by any of the GPS evidence Appellant presented that service was impossible.  Id.  Instead the timing was consistent with the GPS records and testimony, and Appellant’s repeated attempt in their brief to now change this factual conclusion by the Court must be rejected.  Id.  The Court heard the evidence, considered it, weighed it, and found it to be consistent with the time set forth on the Affidavit.  Id.  In sum, all of the attacks raised by Appellant are repeat arguments that were made as to the facts presented at trial, which were heard.
[brief] Id. at 318-19.  The defendants fired their handguns into the pickup truck in response to the crash, killing one of the occupants, and then fled the scene.  *Id.* at 319.  The defendants were ultimately acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter.  *Id.* at 325.  *Cabbell* illustrates that it would have been well possible for a reasonable jury to conclude the facts of the instant case amounted to a form of reckless manslaughter and not murder.  In summary, the prosecutor’s remarks and hypothetical were both legally inaccurate and substantially undermined the jury’s ability to adequately assess whether [...] was guilty of a lesser-included manslaughter offense.  Had the trial court stricken the statements and issued a curative instruction, the situation may have been different, but it declined defense counsel’s requests to do so.  Accordingly, [...]’s murder conviction must otherwise be reversed on this basis and remanded for a new trial.  **POINT VI**
[brief] The 1991 Agreement was no longer in existence as early as 2019, and the Trial Court correctly, on reconsideration, still found:  “there are some questions as to its existence. ”  4T45:16-46:19.  Even if there had not been any waiver, and even if there had not been a voiding of the obsolete 1991 Agreement (that Plaintiff had never signed, and never seen and never assented to), the arbitration clause in it was unenforceable and unconscionable.
[directive] Specific Notice to Certain Individuals During an Encounter.  A law enforcement officer who is wearing a BWC shall notify the subject of the recording that the subject is being recorded by the BWC, unless it is unsafe or infeasible to provide such notification.  Such notification shall be made as close to the inception of the encounter as is reasonably possible.  If the officer does not provide the required notification because it is unsafe or infeasible to do so, the officer shall document the reasons for that decision in a report or by narrating the reasons on the BWC recording, or both.  The failure to verbally notify a person pursuant to this section shall not affect the admissibility of any statement or evidence.
[brief] Dickson’s weight was found not to be a disability under the NJLAD even though he was almost forty years old, weighed almost 600 pounds, and could not even “bend over to take off his shoes. ”  *Dickson*, 458 N.J. Super. at 527.  Conversely, at the time of her termination, Appellant was twenty-nine years old, 5’9” and weighed anywhere from 250-300 pounds (according to her), walked to work occasionally while living in New Jersey (until at some point in March of 2020, right before she demanded that her employer let her work from home, when she moved out of state from New Jersey to her boyfriend’s $7,000 a month apartment in Manhattan, without informing her employer or any governmental authority), and was not impeded in any way by her weight.  Pa241; See DSOF at ¶¶ 37; 38.  In addition, Appellant has not produced any medical documentation supporting the allegation that she has been diagnosed or treated for obesity (even though directed to do so in Defendant’s Request for Production No. 14) and peculiarly testified that obesity is something that is only generally talked about and treated through primary care.  Appellant further admitted that any treatment for her obesity began in April 2023, years after her termination.  Pa241; SUMF at ¶ 39.  Bewilderingly, Appellant appears to claim that Respondent should have assumed that she was disabled based upon her appearance.  However, to do so would require Respondent to violate the NJLAD by assuming she was disabled and then treating her differently than other employees.  Appellant cannot accuse the Respondent of discriminating against her when it acted in a neutral manner towards her appearance.
[directive] Offenses 4.6.3.a will weapon a death with of threat or contact a physical of requirements  [...]'s  The (~, violence domestic charged as might be that offenses some assessment risk from exclude 2C:12-10; N.J.S.A. stalking, 2C:17-3; N.J.S.A. mischief, criminal 2C:33-4; N.J.S.A. harassment, 2C:12- N.J.S.A. menace, physical of 2C:12-1(a)(1); acts N.J.S.A. injury, bodily cause to attempts Accordingly, 2C:12-3).  N.J.S.A. weapon, a without made threats terroristic and 1(a)(3); with a of death threat or a physical violence involve not do that violence domestic of instances can harassment that acknowledged is [...].  It under the assessed be not should weapon offensive other or shoving, kicking, (striking, 2C:33-4(b) N.J.S.A.  See contact. physical include disorderly a petty constitutes harassment exception, limited very with a However, touching).  Law, Reform Bail of the realm within the fall not reason, does for that and, offense persons of list in the been included not has harassment reason, For this -26. to X:162-16 N.J.S.A. [...].
[brief] "[I]f the parties to mediation reach an agreement to resolve their dispute, the terms of that settlement must be reduced to writing and signed by the parties before the mediation comes to a close.  In those cases in which the complexity of the settlement terms cannot be drafted by the time the mediation session was expected to have ended, the mediation session should be continued for a brief but reasonable period of time to allow for the signing of the settlement."  Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 242, 71 A.3d 888, 900 (N.J. 2013). ”  [Ruffin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 5745118, at *4 (D.N.J. 2016) (emphasis added)]  The conversations in efforts to resolve the matter took place in a mediation session outside of the departmental hearing.  The fully completed settlement agreement must be reduced in writing and signed by the parties.  It never was, because the terms were still being negotiated.  Moreover, [...] also mentioned in conversations that should Respondent revoke/rescind, this matter would go straight to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).
[brief] (Aa145-146).  In sum, all of the City’s cost out data that the arbitrator included in his appendices and referenced in the award had been received by the [...] prior to the issuance of the arbitration award.  The award itself clearly explained and graphically presented how he utilized this information to calculate the salary award.  (Aa111-112; Aa145-146).  Therefore, the Commission’s initial transmittal of the interest arbitration award without the appendices did not prejudice the [...] in its appeal of the award to the Commission.