ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On appeal, the Appellate Division in Omar affirmed the trial court’s ruling that [...]’s mortgage was effectively paid off as of the date [...] received the first check from [...].  This Court recognized that “[a] ‘duly honored’ check constitutes payment ‘upon its delivery to and acceptance by the payee,” (citing Hayes v. Fed. Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 5 N.J. Super 212, 214 (App. Div. 1949) and that “[w]hen a check is delivered, if the drawer has funds in the drawee bank to meet it, and if the check is, upon presentment, honored and paid, . . . payment will be deemed to have been made as of the time of the delivery of the check. ”  Id.; see also Bey v. Truss Sys., Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 324, 328-29 (App. Div. 2003) (date of receipt of payment by check occurred on the “date [the check] was posted and delivered to [the petitioner’s] residence”).  Because the Appellate Division found there was no dispute of fact that the mortgagee’s servicer received the check, that had the servicer deposited the check it would have been honored and paid, and/or that the loan documents permitted prepayments without penalty, the Court agreed with the trial judge that the check should have been deposited and applied to the loan.
[brief] I, [...], Esq., hereby certify that on June 17, 2024, on behalf of Defendant-Appellee  [...], I served a copy of Defendant-Appellee’s Appellate Brief via email and electronic filing upon counsel for the Respondent at the following address:  [...] c/o [...], Esq.  [...] [...]  [...]  By: /s/ [...], Esq.  Dated: June 24, 2024 at Edison, NJ  APPELLANT, NEWARK HOUSING AUTHORITY’S APPELLATE
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English 뉴저지 주 사법부  New Jersey Judiciary  “마약 법정”에 의한 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2  보충 답변 양식 의무적 특별 보호관찰 선고 Supplemental Plea Form Mandatory Sentence to Special Probation
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...] and [...] Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], [...], [...] and [...]  Defendants-Appellants CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. (ret’d t/a)
[brief] [...] (Plaintiff) is an African American male of dark complexion, who resides in [...] (Pa001).  On February 20, 2020, plaintiff exited the [...] onto [...] in the [...].  Plaintiff was wearing a hooded sweatshirt raised over his head and removing a backpack from the passenger side of a green jeep and transferring it to the trunk area of a nearby black jeep.  (Pa003, Pa093, Pa053).  Although he was sitting in his own patrol car when plaintiff placed the back pack in the car trunk, and most likely could not see the area where the spare tire was kept in the other car, [...] stated that he asked plaintiff: “what did you put under the trunk in the area by the spare tire?”
[brief] The State argued, based solely on the testimony presented, that he drove around constantly in his Chevy Impala.  The State explained how unfortunately that was his life because he was unemployed and living in his car.  (9T:63-3 to 11).  The State pointed to [...]’s testimony about defendant’s daily habits.  He exercised daily, used marijuana daily and used Adderall daily.  Regarding defendant’s Adderall use, the State recounted the testimony of [...] – his constant companion – who detailed how much Adderall defendant took the day of the shooting.  The State pointed to the bottle of Adderall found in his car, which listed the actual dosage defendant was to take and how the testimony of [...] made clear that he took in more than he was prescribed on the day of the shooting.  He took too many tablets at one time.  He was abusing Adderall.  The State reminded the jury that they heard no expert testimony about Adderall, but in any event, it was their job to talk and deliberate about how the impact that using drugs in a way that are not prescribed played a role in what happened.  (9T:71-4 to 21; 72-19 to 73-10).  Importantly, the judge instructed the jury on voluntary intoxication, but clearly that defense was rejected by the jury.
[brief] However, this explanation exhibits a presumption of consecutive sentences that is explicitly prohibited in Torres.  At sentencing the judge frequently reiterates that there are multiple victims and the Yarbough factor that states there should be “no free crimes. ”  The court, in beginning there created a presumption that consecutive sentences was appropriate, perhaps to only be rebutted by other factors.  This presumption is an incorrect understanding of the law of sentencing.  The law does not create a presumption of consecutive sentences under any circumstance.  Torres, 246 N.J. at 269.  However, the discussion of the Yarbough factors at [...]’s sentencing makes clear that the judge believed that the presence of multiple victims mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences in all cases.  Indeed, rather than addressing the issue of fairness to [...], the court couched its analysis in its obligations to the mother of the victim and the deterrent effects of a consecutive sentence on the public.  This does not indicate an effort to balance or determine fairness required by Yarbough and further explained in Torres, but rather an explanation of why consecutive sentences are mandated by the “no free crimes” factor.  It is clear that there can be no presumption of concurrent or consecutive sentencing, and that the presence or absence of any Yarbough factor does not mandate concurrent or consecutive sentences.  The sentencing court’s belief that the no free crimes factor required a consecutive sentence was a fundamentally incorrect application of the law.  This misapplication of the law denied [...] his due process rights under the 14th Amendment and resulted in an illegal sentence.  The matter must be remanded so that [...] can be resentenced under the proper application of the sentencing laws.  C.
[brief] At trial, [...] claimed not to know anyone named [...] or [...].  (14T 254-9; 15T 156-11, 159-20 to 160-2)  He also acknowledged that naming names might lead to retaliation.  (15T 173-8 to 175-21)  --- 6  [...] had prior convictions for robbery and gun possession.  (13T 52-15 to 53-11, 121-13 to 24; 15T 17-2 to 3, 33-15 to 35-20)  Although [...] said he “wasn’t really paying attention” to [...], he noted that he was wearing a blue and orange jacket.  (13T 63-17 to 25)  [...] testified that, at some point after “the song went off,” [[...]] sped off” (13T 64-13 to 23) and [...] “heard him say, ‘I’m going to get my motherfucking gun. ”  (13T 64-23 to 65-9)  When confronted at trial with the fact that there is nothing in his statement about [...] saying he was going to get a gun, [...] said, “[Y]ou could read a person’s mouth, body language, everything[.]”  (15T 91-5 to 100-9, 16T 205-4 to 6)  The prosecutor made it clear that [...] never said “he was going to get his MF gun[.]”  (27T 47-22 to 23)  At any rate, [...] followed [...] out of the hall where [...] had a cigarette and then went back inside, told [...] he was going to leave, got his car, and pulled up in front of the restaurant.  At trial, [...] said that as he exited the car, he heard a gunshot seemingly pass his head and saw “the guy” in the blue-and-orange jacket running.  Moments later, [...] realized that he had been shot.  (13T 67-8 to 69-6; 14T 215-2 to 11; 16T 232-16 to 23)  On the other hand, in his statement, [...] said that he left his car near the front door and, as he proceeded, with [...] “right behind” him, toward a light pole in the middle of the parking lot, he heard gunfire.  (15T 56-14 to 57-1, 85-14 to 86-20)  [...] said he turned and “saw the crowd by the front door.  That’s when people started -- people start spiraling shots.  Spiraling shots were going off by the front door. ”  (14T 225-1 to 226-8)  And while he maintained at trial that it was “impossible” that he had said that he heard four shots (14T 222-10 to 223-1), in his statement he described hearing four shots:  “…I heard pop, then I heard pop, then I heard pop, and then I heard pop. ”  (14T 215-15 to 216-1, 218-11 to 222-5, 223-5 to 13)  [...] was 26 at the time of the offense and lived with his girlfriend and their young son at his parents’ home in Franklin Township.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON DE FACTO ZONING CASE LAW IS MISPLACED.  For the first time, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s evidence on the unrealistic permitted height represents a common problem affecting all properties in the zone, and is therefore, not a basis for a (d)(6) hardship variance.  Db22-Db26.  Defendant relies upon Price v. Strategic Capital Partners, 404 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008), to argue that Plaintiff’s request exceeds the Board’s authority, as it would de facto rezone the SM Zone.  This assertion is misplaced for several reasons.  First, this argument was not raised during the six nights of hearings, in the 25 page Resolution, nor before the Trial Court.  Indeed, the Resolution completely omitted [...]’s expert testimony on feasibility.  Second, the language from Price relied upon by Defendant, is found in that court’s recitation of the plaintiff’s argument.  Third, had the Defendant analyzed this application as a de facto rezoning case, which it did not, the proper standard is “whether the impact of the requested variance will be to substantially alter the character of the district as that character has been prescribed by the zoning ordinances. ”  *Feiler v. Ft. Lee Bd. of Adjustment*, 240 N.J. Super. 250, 255 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting *Dover v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dover*, 158 N.J. Super. 401, 412-23 (App. Div. 1978)).
[brief] “To constitute a valid defense of laches, the delay must not only be unexplained and inexcusable, but must have visited prejudice upon the party asserting the delay. ”  *Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc.*, 48 N.J. Super. 396, 403 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1958).  Further, [l]aches in legal significance, is not merely delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another.  So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no steps to enforce them until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable and operates as an estoppel against the assertion of the right.  *Mitchell*, 48 N.J. Super. 396, 403 (quoting *2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence*, pp. 177-179, sec. 419d. (5th ed. 1941)).  Where a defendant fails to promptly file the motion to vacate a default, allowing an extensive period of time to pass, there is prejudice to plaintiff.  *RP Leasing Assocs. v. Kennedy*, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1858, at *13 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 3, 2010) (“plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if the default judgment was vacated.  The judge reasoned that ‘to vacate [the] judgment would do [a] grave injustice .  . . .  Now some five or six years later[,] to reconstruct the [d]efault would be almost impossible . . . .  Moreover, plaintiff spent at least six years diligently attempting to collect the amount of the judgment. ”); *Mauro v. Mauro*, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1437 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2014) (denying motion to vacate default because plaintiff will suffer prejudice); *LaMarca v. Caffrey*, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3241, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. Hunterdon Cnty. Nov. 20, 2009) (“Furthermore, unlike other cases the defendants acted promptly to vacate the entry of default.  Default was entered approximately a month and a half before the return date of the defendant’s motion.  This does not represent an extensive period of time which would cause the plaintiff prejudice. ”).  Here, Appellant’s admitted litigation strategy shows that it became aware of the Collection Action by 2019 at latest, but that it strategically chose not to proceed with a motion to vacate in the Collection Action, but, instead, brought a Class Action against Respondent.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 607 (emphasis added); see *id.* at 620 (“For these reasons, we hold that home inspectors and other licensed semi-professionals are not learned professionals simply because they are otherwise regulated…” (emphasis added); *id.* at 627 (“[W]e decline to extend the learned professional exception to licensed home inspectors simply because they are regulated by the HIPLA. ” (emphasis added)).  Thus, when preemption of a non-consumer statute or regulation is at issue, courts would need to turn to a direct, unavoidable conflict analysis found in *Lemelledo* to --- 2 Plaintiff cites to an unpublished opinion that reiterates that “semi-professionals are not encompassed in the learned professional exemption simply because they are subject to regulation. ”  See *Williams-Hopkins v. [...]*, No. A-0273-21, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpubl. LEXIS 569, at *47-48 (N.J. App. Div. Apr. 5, 2024) (Pa096) (emphasis added).  There, this Court was faced, in relevant part, with determining whether the nature of the services provided to the plaintiffs (called “treatments”) by a medical, physical therapy, and chiropractic entity fell within the professional exemption of the CFA.  *Id.* at *38-39 (Pa093 – Pa094).  Ultimately, this Court remanded for further discovery because the record was unclear that the services at issue were within the professional capacity of the defendant-professionals.  *Id.* at *48-49 (Pa096 – Pa097).  There is no doubt that the services at issue here were conducted by exempt professionals within their professional capacity based on the Complaint. determine whether that separate statutory/regulatory scheme placed a class of professionals beyond the reach of the CFA.
[brief] State v. Fowler, 239 N.J. 171 (2019).....................................5, 6 State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583 (2018)......................................1, 2, 4 State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66 (2016)..................................4, 5, 6 State v. Gaines, 377 N.J. Super. 612 (App. Div. 2005)....................3, 4 State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (1981) ................................................................. 7 State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) ......................................................... 9, 14 State v. Martin, 2023 WL 4546121, 7 (App. Div. 2023) ............................... 2 State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300 (2017) ......................................................... 7 State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305 (1980) ............................................................. 4 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005) .............................................................. 7 State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004) .......................................................... 6 State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) .............................................................. 2 State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191(1979) ............................................................... 6 NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT New Jersey Court Rule 2:10-2 ........................................................................ 8 New Jersey Court Rule 3:13 (b)(1)(I) ............................................................ 8 New Jersey Court Rule 3:18-1 ....................................................................... 2 New Jersey Court Rule 3:18-2 ....................................................................... 1 TRANSCRIPT REFERENCES May 6, 2022 Transcript of Motion ................................................................. T1 May 10, 2022 Transcript of Trial ................................................................. T2 May 12, 2022 Transcript of Trial ................................................................. T3 May 13, 2022 Transcript of Trial ................................................................. T4 May 17, 2022 Transcript of Trial .................................................................
[brief] 2T215-10 to 2T216-25; 2T225-13 to 19.  [...] discovered water in the basement of the condominium and complained, via counsel, to the project developer; however, no action was taken to stop the water intrusion problem.  Da2493.  In December, 2008, [...] discovered water seeping through a crack in the foundation of his bedroom below a nightstand next to his bed that had destroyed the flooring into the basement.  3T6-12 to 3T8-24; Da2516.  Photographs of this damage were admitted at trial.  Da2509-17.  [...] showed the damage to Ms. [...] of [...], [...]’s property manager, who promised to fix the water intrusion problem if [...] caught up with past-due condominium fees.  1T61-2 to 1T62-19.  [...] paid the dues but “nothing was ever done” to fix the leak.  1T61-13 to 22.  In March of 2009, [...] showed the damage under the bedroom nightstand to [...], a contractor hired to fix a loose banister.  3T15-22 to 3T17-13.  After warning about the presence of hazardous mold, [...] sent [...] on-line information about toxic mold.  1T55-20 to 1T56-13; 3T15-22 to 3T17-20; Da2487.  Mr. Horwath is the first person to warn [...] of possible mold contamination in the condominium and the potential health risks of exposure to toxic mold.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully requests that the Appellate Court affirm the Trial Court’s August 30, 2019  Order granting dismissal of Appellant’s Complaint and Crossclaims against Respondent.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: November 23, 2022
[brief] (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On March 3, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form, both completed on September 6, 2022, as well as a sworn affidavit from [...] dated September 6, 2022.
[brief] New Jersey courts have left no doubt as to the obligations imposed on government when invoking the power of eminent domain.  When exercising the power of eminent domain, the government has an obligation to “turn square corners. ”  F.M.C. Stores, Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985).  Moreover, it has “an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and fairly with property owners. ”  Id. at 426-27; see also Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello, 252 N.J. Super. 247, 257 (App. Div. 1991); Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982); State v. Siris, 191 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 1983).  That obligation includes providing a clearly articulated statutorily authorized use for the property set forth in the public record.  Otherwise, government officials would be able to violate private property rights at any time for any reason – or for no reason.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  [...] has presented sufficient evidence demonstrating the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluding the Trial Court from deciding this matter summarily as there were Certifications and various documents submitted to the Court that demonstrated that the co-owners did not unanimously consent to the sale of the Subject Property to [...] for $500,000, there were issues of fact relating to whether [...] and/or [...] denied access to the Subject Property to certain prospective buyers and/or realtors.  There were also sufficient facts presented relating to the enforceability of the April 13, 2022 Consent Judgment and whether the sale to [...] for $500,000 violated the terms of that Consent Judgment.  These facts support [...]’s claims that the sale of the Subject Property was not valid and/or was not conducted in good faith.  Thus, the Trial Court erred in deciding this matter summarily and denying [...]’s motion for leave to file counterclaims.  [...], therefore, respectfully requests that the Trial Court’s decision be reversed and that this matter be remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
[directive] Shooting from a moving vehicle.  Strict additional requirements must be met before an officer may shoot from a moving vehicle.  Every discharge of a firearm by an officer creates risk to the public and to other responding officers.  Firearms discharges from moving vehicles by law enforcement officers have proven to be inaccurate and ineffective, generally creating unacceptable levels of risk.  Due to these risks, law enforcement officers shall not discharge a firearm from a moving vehicle except in the following extraordinarily rare circumstance: (a) when the suspect is driving a vehicle toward persons other than the officer in a manner creating an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, such as in a terrorist attack; and (b) no other means are available at that time to avert or eliminate the danger.
[brief] (Id.)  Because the RICO treble damages were less than the punitive damages, [...] held those damages to be superseded by the punitive damages awards.  (Id.)  On December 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19 and 20, 2013, [...] adjudicated Plaintiffs’ applications for attorneys’ fees and costs, including two supplemental applications - the last of which [...] allowed to be made, over objection, on only two days’ notice to Defendants.  (14745a-14768a; 14773a-14795a; 14816a-14125a).  A Final Judgment was entered on December 20, 2013, which, in addition to awarding damages as previously set forth, also entered a Judgment of Dissolution of the partnership and sale of [...].
[brief] The essence of the case and this appeal – is the following questions; why, at the times Defendant sought to make redemption knowing that it had funds sufficient funds to do so, redemption was not made!  Why, on the date the judgment was recorded was Defendant’s attempt to redeem rejected, and subsequent overtures, likewise denied by the Plaintiff.  All attempts within the statutory three (3) month time, These were not wishful acts, such that if redemption was allowed, the applicant would have the time to obtain funds or explore a means to accumulate funds to redeem.  On the contrary, the Defendant had the funds.  (Aa177,178).  The circumstances that Defendant presents are clearly distinguishable from the facts in Del Vecchio v. Hemberger, 388 N.J.Super.179 (App. Div 2006).
[brief] ”  *Pierre*, 223 N.J. at 583 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694).  In satisfying the second prong, because prejudice is not presumed, a defendant must demonstrate “how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt. ”  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.  26 (1984) (citation omitted).  Further, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  For that reason, “[i]mportant to the prejudice analysis is the strength of the evidence that was before the fact finder at trial.
[brief] Those high-risk conditions included but were not limited to obesity.  Id., PSOF ¶33.  In “The Urgent Questions Scientists are Asking About Coronavirus,” NYTimes.com reported “Along with getting a grasp on the level of severity is figuring out susceptibility, or who is at most risk for injection.  The data so far indicates that this would include older adults, the obese and people with underlying medical conditions. ”  Pa534.  In another article from NYTimes.com dated February 29, 2020, it was reported that data from China indicated the people at highest risk relating to Covid-19 included “those with heart disease, chronic lung disease, diabetes and obesity.  Pa547.  In reporting “Who is at most risk of becoming very sick or dying”, an article from USAtoday.com provided that “according to the CDC” high risk conditions included severe obesity. ”  Pa483.  The CDC has reported that obesity worsens the outcomes from Covid-19.  Pa558.  Plaintiff was concerned for public health, public safety, as well as her own personal health and safety, in light of the Covid-19 pandemic.