ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To allow the Tort Claims against all the non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants to remain, proceed to trial, and ultimately settle, but simultaneously dismiss the identical claims against the co-conspirator Defendants who simply happened to be attorneys because no AOM was filed, does not serve the purpose of the statute to weed out meritless claims.  Essentially, the Court below has held that Tort Claims that do have merit for the non-attorney co- conspirator Defendants in this case, did not have merit for the attorney co-conspirator Defendants simply by virtue of the fact that those Defendants are attorneys.  Such a result, rather than weeding out meritless claims, effectively holds a non-attorney to a higher standard than an attorney, and allows the attorney to escape liability, not because the claims are meritless, but because the Trial Court erroneously permitted the AOM statute to be improperly used as a shield that can only be used by the attorney Defendants.  It would be a grave and unreasonable injustice to permit [...] to shield themselves from liability using the AOM statute, when the same claims survived because they have merit against the non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants.  Such a result frustrates the clear purpose of the AOM statute as clearly intended by the legislature and interpreted by our Courts.  Such a result would set a dangerous precedent and undermine whatever good remains in the general citizenry’s perception of the legal profession; it would confirm the colloquialism that attorneys in fact do have a license to lie and steal.  Likewise, Plaintiffs should be permitted to state their newly discovered claims against [...].
[brief] Exhibit A to [...]’s Certification Complaint and Jury Demand by [...], Dated 2/12/2022  Exhibit B to [...]’s Certification Answer to Complaint by [...], Dated 5/4/2022  Exhibit C to [...]’s Certification  Township Of Edison’s Answers to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories and Responses to Document Production Request  [...]  Standard Police Interrogatories and Production of Documents Request
[brief] It should be noted that [...]’s actions, namely challenging [...], were not attempts at de-escalating a situation.  Instead, such a demonstration of bravado could fairly be interpreted as conduct unbecoming a public employee since [...] appeared to be inviting confrontation.  As previously discussed, [...] was the only person charged in this incident.  It would certainly be inequitable for the [...] to only charge [...] when Officer Marreti escalated an already delicate situation.
[brief] (6T 39-20 to 41-6; 7T 26-19 to 22)  The trauma surgeon who treated [...] testified that, although he was initially conscious and responsive, his mental status rapidly declined, he underwent emergency surgery, and he was eventually declared brain dead.  (7T 21-15 to 19, 23-14 to 16, 33-25 to 34-3, 40-17)  His family removed him from life support, and he died.  (6T 46-10 to 23, 47-4 to 5)  The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was gunshot wounds of the head, neck, and torso, and the manner of death was homicide.  (8T 139-25 to 140-5)  Although the State had no murder weapon,\(^2\) no physical evidence, and no motive, the State’s theory was that [...] was the shooter.  The State’s case hinged on testimony from [...]’s father about an alleged dying declaration, an eyewitness identification, and some surveillance footage.
[brief] ”  Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condominium Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415, 421 (2010) (citing Charles A. Managanaro Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Carneys Point Twp. Sewerage Auth., 344 N.J. Super. 343, 347 (App. Div. 2001).  To support claims of malpractice or negligence liability, the affidavit of merit must be issued by an affiant who is licensed within the same profession as the defendant and that like-licensed requirement applies even in matters involving architects and engineers, the relevant professional licensure laws overlap to some degree.
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[brief] Id. at 99.  Wilson involved a filmed reenactment of a fatal store shooting.  The detectives positioned people in the store based on what they had been told.  [...] could testify only that the video accurately represented what others had told him the scene of the crime looked like.  Therefore, [...] failed properly to authenticate the video because he was not a person present at the time the crime occurred who could testify that the videotape accurately depicted the events as he had seen them when they occurred.
[brief] But the analysis regarding the level of specificity required is the same for the email themselves—Plaintiff’s request was discrete and [...]’s custodian “did not have to make a subjective judgment to determine the nature of the information covered by his request. ”  *Id.* at 356.  She instead “simply had to search for” his records, *ibid.*, and she did—they were located, but [...] refuses to --- ⁴  [...] also argues the Court’s decision was limited to whether the request was improper because it required the custodian to create a record, but the Court’s decision clearly applied MAG and addressed the agency’s specificity argument.
[brief] Attorneys for Defendant [...] [...], Esq. [...] [...]  Administrator of the Non-Resident New Jersey Estate of [...], Deceased PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on March 24, 2023, at 9:00 o’clock in the forenoon or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, the undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff, [...] (“plaintiff”), shall cross move to the Surrogate’s Court, Bergen County for an Order: (1) Denying Administrator’s, motion in its entirety; (2) Granting Plaintiff’s application for return of $75,000.00 advanced by him for the Administrator’s fees and expenses in 2015 from the Escrow account currently held by Defendant’s Attorneys; (3) Granting Plaintiff application for Attorney fees award from the Escrow account currently held by Defendant’s Attorneys; (4) Granting Plaintiff application for the Administrator or another designee to recoup or collect outstanding account receivable on behalf of [...] for the benefit of the Estate; (5) Awarding counsel fees to the Plaintiff; and (6)
[brief] (Pa293).  The bodily injury alleged in the underlying complaint arises from multiple accidental occurrences based upon the events surrounding three (3) separate Municipal Court Trial which spanned multiple policy periods.  (Pa293).  The events involved multiple occurrences on various dates in January 2016; and the other occurrences took place on the night of the election November 2016.  (Pa293).  [...] found [...] not guilty by direct verdict regarding [...]’s harassment complaints; subsequently [...] voluntarily withdrew her harassment complaints based upon the advice of the prosecuting attorney.
[brief] It should also be noted that any “agreement” concerning amending the Redevelopment Plan or amending the Borough’s Zoning ordinances could only be accomplished by action taken at a public meeting.  The legislative findings and declarations contained in the Open Public Meetings Act at N.J.S.A. 10:4-7 state:  The Legislature finds and declares that the right of the public to be present at all meetings of public bodies, ands to witness in full detail all phases of the deliberation, policy formation, and decision making of public bodies, is vital to the enhancement and proper functioning of the democratic process; that secrecy in public affairs undermines the faith of the public in government and the public’s effectiveness in fulfilling its role in a democratic society, and hereby declares it to be the public policy of this State of insure the right of its citizens to have adequate advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings of public bodies at which any business affecting the public is discussed or acted upon in any way except only in those circumstances where otherwise the public interest would be clearly endangered or the personal privacy or guaranteed rights of individuals would be clearly in danger of unwarranted invasion.
[brief] Statutes and Rules  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) ..................................................................................................  1, 19, 27  15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) ..................................................................................................  19  15 U.S.C. § 1692(c) ..................................................................................................  19  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) .................................................................................................. 19, 20  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) ...............................................................................................  25  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(7) ...............................................................................................  17  15 U.S.C. § 1692b ....................................................................................................  16, 17, 21  15 U.S.C. § 1692c ....................................................................................................  21  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32 15 U.S.C. § 1692d ................................................................. 20 15 U.S.C. § 1692e .................................................................. 20 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.................................................................... 20 15 U.S.C. § 1692g .................................................................. 21 15 U.S.C. § 1692i .................................................................. 21 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) .............................................................. 1, 22 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b) .............................................................. 24 42 U.S.C. § 17934 .................................................................. 28 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) ............................................................ 28 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i) ..................................................... 28, 29 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2) ....................................................... 28, 29 N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 ..................................................................... 33 N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 ................................................................... 33 R. 4:6-2(e) ............................................................................. 3, 4, 24, 31, 35 Other Authorities [...], National Public Data Breach Shows Urgent Need for CFPB to Regulate Data Brokers (Aug. 19, 2024)
[brief] Pca128.  On March 15, 2022, the arbitrator conducted a hearing. \(^3\) Pca128.  On May 16, 2022, the arbitrator determined that much of the unpaid treatment was medically necessary and causally related to the subject motor vehicle accident; however, reimbursement for medically necessary and causally related treatment was nevertheless denied after the arbitrator failed to apply the New Jersey PIP fee schedule -- despite having also relied upon Defendant’s breakdown within the arbitration award.
[brief] SAC ¶ 14.  [...]’s default letter/notice dated October 17, 2017, did not result in any subsequent tenancy action or judicial declaration of eviction or as to the rights of the parties under the yearly lease, which had been in negotiations for sale/purchase.  What is undisputed and clear in the record is that [...] Estates and [...] began to negotiate in June 2017 for [...] to re-sell and for [...] to purchase “anew” the --- 2  In the first and second amended complaint, plaintiffs mistakenly stated their belief that an eviction action had been commenced.  See SAC ¶ 66.  In fact, no eviction action had been filed by [...].  [...] simply proceeded with self-help.
[brief] 35  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997)  14  White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945)  32  Youngberg v. Romeo, NEW JERSEY COURT RULES  Rule 4:6-2(e) 10, 13, 15, 16, 33, 38, 44  NEW JERSEY STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) 14, 20, 38 NJSA 59:3-14 28, 29, 41 NJSA 59:6-4 34  N.J.S.A. 59:2-2 41, 42 NJSA 59:2-3(d)
[brief] *State v. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts*, 160 N.J. 505, 527 (1999) (quoting *N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane*, 61 N.J. 1, 8 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972)).  The judiciary's power to invalidate a legislative act thus "has always been exercised with extreme self restraint, and with a deep awareness that the challenged enactment represents the considered action of a body composed of popularly elected representatives."  *Ibid.*  Consistent with this policy of restraint, "a legislative act will not be declared void unless its repugnancy to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt."  *Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders*, 30 N.J. 381, 388 (1959); *Gangemi v. Berry*, 25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957).  The party challenging the statute bears the "heavy burden" of demonstrating its invalidity.  *Trump Hotels*, 106 N.J. at 526.  Defendant cannot meet his heavy burden of overcoming the presumed constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1).
[brief] He also stated that defendant’s deficits were exacerbated by alcohol, that defendant saw his family as “nutsy,” and that his family “wasn’t very supportive to him in his perception. ”  (2T17-20).  The prosecutor asked [...] whether he had reviewed [...]’s statement in which [...] indicated that defendant took the gun from him and held it to [...]’s head when [...] was reluctant to go forward with the burglary.  (2T22:3-8).  [...] replied that he had, that he found the allegation surprising, and that if true, the alleged act would constitute an “aggressive move” on defendant’s part.  (2T22:9-25).
[brief] That ruling fits with Plaintiffs’ position—disputes about whether PIP benefits are due are for ADR; disputes about whether an insurer was defrauded into paying benefits are not.  In *State Farm Insurance Co. v. Sabato*, 337 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 2001), the court held that a PIP arbitrator should have decided whether injured persons’ allegedly false and evasive information during an examination under oath was a basis to deny payment of benefits to their assignee physician.
[brief] 4  Appellants do not challenge that [...] is a public utility for purposes of Exemption #11.  (Ab12).  The “public utility” definition is set forth in the “Department of Public Utilities Act of 1948” at N.J.S.A. 48:2-13.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-3.  There, “public utility” is defined as every “association, corporation or joint stock company . . . that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control within this State any . . . pipeline . . . system, plant or equipment for public use[.]”  N.J.S.A. 48:2-13.  [...] operates a pipeline system for public use and is thus a “public utility. ”  [...] has consistently expressed in rulemaking that activities by privately-owned utility companies that serve to deliver or provide gas to public systems are eligible for Exemption #11.  38 N.J.R. 5011(a) at Response to comment 296 (Dec. 4, 2006).  1.  [...] properly found that Exemption #11 applies to [...]’s Project and accords with the statute and case law.
[brief] ”  Heintz, supra, at 299.  In Plaintiff’s counsel’s letter of November 14, 2022 (Exhibit EE) (Da113), counsel states: “This communication is from a debt collector.  This is an attempt to collect a debt. ”  Plaintiff’s counsel is a “debt collector” by its own admission.  Plaintiff’s counsel made a material misleading statement to Defendant of the applicable Rule for oral argument, because “the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled” by Plaintiff’s counsel’s statement.  Plaintiff also made a misleading and incorrect statement to the lower Court and to Defendant as to its “principal place of business” (Exhibit A) (Da2).  “The remedial nature of the FDCPA... requires us to interpret it liberally. ”  Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006).  Proof of actual damages is not required for recovery under FDCPA.  Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1998).  FDCPA’s focus is on a debt collector’s conduct and not on whether a consumer suffers actual damages.  Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer Cnty. Inc. 171 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1999).  The misleading and factually incorrect statements are more than technical misstatements.  Knowledge that Defendant would have been granted oral argument as a matter of right would have allowed Defendant to make an informed decision as to oral argument.
[brief] . .  14  ¹ T1 refers to Transcript of Motion Hearing held on September 20, 2023.  IV.  The Court’s Dismissal of Count Four Should be Reversed Because Liability Can Be Imposed Upon the Individual Defendants Without Having to Pierce the Corporate Veil (T1, p. 17, Ins. 16-20)  ...........................................  15  Applicable Law .........................................................  16  A.  The Plaintiff Can Impose Liability Directly Upon the Individual Defendants for Their CFA Violations Without Having to Pierce the Corporate Veil (T1, p. 17, Ins. 16-20)  .........................................................  17  V.  The Dismissal of Count Five Should Be Reversed Because the Trial Court Incorrectly Determined the Defendants’ Actions Were Authorized by Section 8(e) of the Master Deed (T1, p. 17, Ins. 20-23)  ...........................................  17  VI.  The Dismissal of Count Six Should Be Reversed Because the Court’s Finding That the Plaintiff Slept on its Rights for 35 Years is Contrary to the Record (T1, p. 18, Ins. 1-14).  ........  18  CONCLUSION
[brief] First, in affirming the decision, this Court expressly approved of the trial judge’s ruling.  192 N.J. Super. at 132.  Second, the trial judge cited decisions in accord from appellate courts in three states, plus a leading treatise.  186 N.J. Super. at 380.  Appellate courts in at least another five states have reached the same conclusion.  See Lawrence v. State, 269 P.3d 672, 675 & n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012); Chadwell v. State, 37 Ark. App. 9, 10-12, 822 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Solway, 88 P.3d 784, 787 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004); People v. Moneyham, 753 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 763 N.E.2d 775 (Ill. 2001); State v. Burns, 444 S.W.3d 527, 529-30 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).  Third, the rationale of these cases has been applied to other statutes by both the New Jersey Supreme Court and this Court.  See State v. Smith, 197 N.J. 325, 326, 331-39 (2009) (holding that the “State was not required to prove that, at the time that he knowingly possessed the firearm, [Smith] also knew that it was defaced” to be convicted. ); State v. Torres, 236 N.J. Super. 6, 6-7, 9-13 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that the State need not prove Torres knew the quantity of drugs he possessed to be convicted of first-degree possession with intent to distribute, because quantity affected grading only), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 153 (1990); State v. Dixon, 346 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that the State need not prove Dixon knew the facts that elevated eluding from a third-degree crime to a second-degree crime), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 181 (2002).  In other words, a thief like defendant assumes the risk of his criminal conduct.  Because the State was not required to prove defendant knew the nature of the stolen wallet ID, there is no basis to apply the rule of lenity.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  This Court should apply a “plenary standard of review from a trial court’s decisions to grant a motion to dismiss. ”  Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Loc. 400 v. Borough of Tinton Falls, 468 N.J. Super. 214, 223 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Gonzalez v. State Apportionment Comm'n, 428 N.J. Super. 333, 349 (App. Div. 2012)).  The determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, and the validity of the arbitration provision within the Contract, are purely legal questions which shall be reviewed “de novo. ”  Santiago v. New York & New Jersey Port Auth., 429 N.J. Super. 150, 156 (App. Div. 2012).  To the contrary, a trial court’s decision on procedural requirements is “entitled to respectful review under an abuse of discretion standard[.]”  Thabo v. Z Transportation, 452 N.J.  Super. 359, 368 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Serenity Contracting Grp., Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 306 N.J. Super. 151, 157 (App. Div. 1997)).  POINT II.
[directive] This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  Addendum A of the Use of Force Policy addresses Conducted Energy Devices and Other Less-Lethal Devices and 1 Ammunition.  Addendum B addresses the Vehicular Pursuit Policy.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable
[brief] ..................................................................................................................24–25  Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006)  .................................................................................................................. 27, 28, 28–29, 30  Mann v. Cnty. of San Diego, 907 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................  19  Mario V. v. Armenta, No. 18-cv-00041-BLF, 2021 WL 1907790 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2021)........................................................................................................ 19–20  Mirabelli v. Olson, No. 3:23-cv-00768-BEN-WVG, 2023 WL 5976992 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023)........................................................................................................ 12  Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 (2003) .................................................................9, 21, 22  Mueller v. Kean Univ., 474 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2022)