ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See PB37-41.  Pension eligibility is not liberally permitted, Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007), nor is an employee entitled to any rights and benefits beyond those based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the pension statutes.  *Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010).  A PFRS member “irrevocably resigning from work is not within the scope of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2)” and “is not of a class intended to be benefited by the statute. ”  *Cardinale v. Board of Trustees*, 458 N.J. Super. 260, 272 (App. Div. 2019).  Pursuant to the Agreement, the Parties agreed it would be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey, the Superior Court of New Jersey is the legal forum for the Agreement and the [...] is the legal forum for Plaintiff’s IOD Application.
[brief] [...]’s statement of facts in support of its alleged damages, the essence of its appeal, fails to include any citation to the record, as required, and should be rejected.  Only the October 6, 2023 Orders for reconsideration are properly before this court based on [...]’s notice of appeal, which only identifies the October 6, 2023 Orders as being appealed.  [...]’s brief, however, asserts, for the first time, that the Orders on appeal include the August 24, 2023 Order of Judgment, which is not properly before this court.  Third-party Defendants and [...], however, include opposition to [...]’s arguments to appeal the Order of Judgment, as well, should this court consider same.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD THAT ENCOURAGES EMPLOYEES TO OPPOSE AND REPORT DISCRIMINATION BY PROTECTING THEM FROM RETALIATION THAT WOULD DISSUADE A REASONABLE WORKER FROM MAKING OR SUPPORTING A CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION AND INSTEAD REQUIRED THE RETALIATION TO ALTER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF [...]’S EMPLOYMENT (Pa837; 3T)  The NJLAD prohibits retaliation.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The standard of review for summary judgment is the same as that employed by the trial court\(^2\) - i.e., the court considers the factual record and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” to decide if the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. \(^3\)  The standard of review for class certification denial is an abuse of discretion. \(^4\)  When deciding the summary judgment and class action motions, the trial court made its findings of facts without a jury, so review is de novo\(^5\) and its decisions are binding only if supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record below,\(^6\) with its interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts not being entitled to any special deference.
[brief] And the accrual date with this -- for the underlying malicious prosecution claims was in March of 2018.  Aa80; 1T14-6 to 9.  As stated above, both [...] in the federal court and [...] in the State Court found that, with the exception of libel and slander claims, Appellant’s State claims were malicious prosecution claims.  Therefore, it appears that [...]’s subsequent finding that there were no malicious prosecution claims alleged in Appellant’s complaint indicates that the trial court believed that the “law of the case” doctrine requiring the trial court to follow the federal and state court’s previous rulings, only when it supported dismissing Appellant’s complaint.  Simply, in order to dismiss Appellant’s complaint, the claims were interpreted as malicious prosecution claims for purposes of invoking a two-year statute of limitations.
[brief] 14a-25a.  Here [...] asserts, basically, that [...]’s following of [...]’s instruction that it cease performing services in March 2020, following the Governor’s Executive Order, violated various provisions of the parties’ agreement.  14a-24a.  It does not mention the COVID Statute which requires payment to school contractors where schools are closed due to a public health emergency.  Count II- “Statutory and Legal Violations & Impediments to Contract.
[directive] Patrol officers were dispatched to [...] on July 4, 2022 at 0210, in response to a loud noise complaint, possibly a domestic dispute.  Upon arrival, the officers were met by the resident, [...], who advised that everything was fine and told the officers to leave.  The officers investigated further and located a hysterical female inside the residence with red marks on her face and forearms.  The female advised that the injuries were caused by her boyfriend, [...], with whom she had been arguing and physically fighting.  The Lieutenant, who was intoxicated, was belligerent, berated the officers for not leaving when he told them to do so, and indicated that the incident was not a “big deal. ”  The Lieutenant was arrested and charged with simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a(1), and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4b.  His behavior was loud and disorderly as he was walked in handcuffs to a patrol car.  This behavior was witnessed by a group of neighbors who had gathered outside as a result of the commotion.  The Lieutenant cursed the neighbors and told them to get back in their homes.  The responding officers seized the Lieutenant’s duty weapon and two privately owned weapons.  During the arrest processing, the Lieutenant continued to berate the officers with numerous personal insults.  The female victim refused to cooperate further with police and declined to seek a Temporary Restraining Order.  In municipal court, the charges were dismissed when the victim refused to testify.  The Lieutenant was ordered to report for a psychiatric exam as part of the “re-arming process” and failed to appear as ordered.  Per Attorney General Directive and agency policy, the entire matter was referred to the Internal Affairs Bureau for review.
[brief] Appellant, [...], appeals the final agency decision of the [...] denying an intra-fund transfer of her Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) service credit for services performed as a Municipal Prosecutor from [...] to the [...].  (Pb1).  The services Platt performed as a Municipal Prosecutor for Winslow are not eligible under the Legislature’s significant “Chapter 92” pension benefit reforms of 2007, which removed professional service providers who were previously enrolled in the PERS.  (Pa1; Pa20).  A.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED DETECTIVE GONZALEZ TO EXPLAIN WHY HE CHOSE TO PURSUE A PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL, WHO WAS LATER IDENTIFIED AS DEFENDANT.  (Ruling at 2T56-6 to 8).  Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by permitting [...] to explain why he chose to run after defendant instead of the other people who were running at the scene of the crime.
[brief] (Pa95)  [...] conceded that although he, in his role as manager, was provided some instruction as to how to push and maneuver the U-boats, similar to [...]’s testimony, no guidance was ever provided regarding the danger that an overloaded U-boat could pose.  (Pa94-Pa95)  The testimony of [...] and [...] further evidences the fact that expert opinion is not required for Plaintiffs to establish [...]’s liability.  By their very own admission at deposition, both [...] and [...] established that although they would help to rectify a customer’s overloaded U-boat, there is no company-wide policy that exists to train its employees on the dangers posed by overloaded U-boats.
[brief] See Engines, Inc. v. MAN Engines & Components, Civil Action No. 10-277, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76541, at *21-22 (D.N.J. July 29, 2010).  As explained by the Court in Engines:  The Court’s inquiry is not limited to the four-corners of the Agreement, nor should it be.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has instructed that the putative franchise should be evaluated according to “the terms of the agreement between the parties or the nature of the franchise business.  . . . ”  Instructional Systems, 130 N.J. at 359 (emphasis added).  Business relationships evolve, and are not necessarily fully captured by their foundational contract.
[brief] On November 3, 2021, Plaintiff, [...] (hereinafter “Respondent”), filed a Complaint and jury demand in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  (Da1-Da8).  Defendant/Appellant filed an answer on December 22, 2021 asserting among other defenses, AICRA and Respondent’s failure to demonstrate that she sustained a permanent injury as a result of the accident.  (Da9-Da12).  On November 8, 2023 Respondent filed an offer of judgment.  (Da13).  On July 26, 2023, Respondent submitted her amended pre-trial memorandum.  (Da14-Da20).  On August 16, 2023, Appellant submitted his pre-trial memorandum.  (Da21-Da28).  The court conducted a pre-trial conference on August 18, 2023.
[brief] During the recording of [...]’s interview, the jury heard all eight of his unambiguous invocations -- his three requests to “go home” and his five statements that he had “nothing” to say -- and the jury also saw the numerous instances in which he literally remained silent in the face of police accusations.  (Da 109, 02:10:45 to 07:11:52; 1T 93-9 to 98-19; 9T 17-20 to 34-11)  As explained in Point I.C, all of those verbal and nonverbal assertions were invocations that should have ended questioning but were ignored.
[brief] (21T 175-23 to 176-6)  In an apparently unrecorded session on March 8, officers had [...] watch surveillance recordings.  (21T 176-7 to 9)  The State did not present any evidence what identification instructions, if any, were given by officers to [...] during the March 8 unrecorded session.  Afterward, officers brought [...] back on camera, and presented him with the same photograph from the [...] recording that they had used to confront [...].  (25T 48-13 to 22)  At trial, [...] testified about the out-of-court identification procedure on March 8, and told the jury that on March 8 he had identified an individual in the photograph as [...].  (21T 176-10 to 178-20)  The photograph from the camera at [...], --- 5  Detectives summarized [...]’s prior failed identification in a report dated February 9, 2016.  (Da 75)  To the best of appellate counsel’s knowledge, this prior identification procedure was not video- or audio-recorded.  6  The portion of the March 8, 2016 out-of-court identification procedure that was video-recorded and transcribed is at Da 76 and Da 77-86 respectively.  signed and dated during the out of court procedure, was admitted as identification evidence.  (Da 87-88)  On March 11, officers formally charged [...].
[brief] (Pa 58).  The court first noted that “[...] has enjoyed the benefit of premiums paid to it by [...] for over 17 years, while [...] has been forced to litigate for the payment of these funds. ” (Id.).  Next, the trial court stated:  [...] significantly delayed resolution of this matter by pursuing extensive discovery against [...] in both the coverage and allocation phase.  This case was assigned to Track IV, which provides a discovery period of 450 days.  Because of the insurers’ conduct, discovery took over five (5) years.  (Pa 58).  In its brief, [...] cites this last sentence and attempts to cast blame on [...] for the extensive discovery referred to by the trial court.
[brief] The testimony and evidence presented at trial revealed the following information regarding the chain of title of the Property.  On or about March 18, 1871, [...] acquired title to certain lands located within the Borough, including the uplands portion of what is now designated \(^2\)  Although [...] contends that the Borough does not own all of the Property, it never delineated through a survey or a legal description what it alleges the Borough owns and what it alleges the Borough does not own.  Rather, [...]’s title experts conceded during their testimony that the Borough obtained rights in some portion of what is now Lot 3 spanning from the boundary of Lot 1 to within one foot of the boundary of Lot 4 (in other words, spanning the entire shoreline of this parcel from the boundaries of the two adjoining lots), and that they could not provide any opinion or delineate to the boundaries of what portion of Lot 3 the Borough owns and what portion of Lot 3 the Borough allegedly does not own (1T, pp. 110-111; 2T, pp. 47-48 and pp. 50-51).  This was a fatal flaw in the Plaintiff’s case as it had the burden of proof in this quiet title action to delineate any portions of the Property which it alleges that the Borough does not own. on the Borough tax map as Lot 3.
[brief] PLAINTIFF DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SINGLE FACT IN DISPUTE TO WARRANT THIS COURT  OVERTUNING THE GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ..............................................  12  II.  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE CITY’S CONDUCT WAS NOT “PALPABLY UNREASONABLE” AS REQUIRED BY N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, AND PLAINTIFF HAS NO PROOF TO THE CONTRARY  ...........................................
[directive] In addition, if during the period of suspension you are convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle, you will be subject to the penalties set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:3-40: pierwszy, kara grzywny w wysokości 500 USD; Po skazaniu za to przewinienie po raz Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500; Po skazaniu za to przewinienie po raz drugi, kara grzywny w wysokości 750 USD i kara pozbawienia wolności odbywana w więzieniu hrabstwa przez okres co najmniej 1 dnia, lecz nie dłuższy niż 5 dni;  Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750, and imprisonment in the county jail for at least 1 day but not more than 5 days;  Po skazaniu za to przewinienie po raz trzeci i kolejne, kara grzywny w wysokości 1000 USD i kara pozbawienia wolności odbywana w więzieniu hrabstwa przez okres 10 dni.  Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days.
[brief] Again, as described in greater detail in Sections III and IV of Plaintiff’s initial brief, [...] provided comprehensive planning testimony on the positive and negative criteria under Grasso, including the proposed building heights, the Township’s ordinances, the Township’s Master Plan, the Township’s prior development approvals for warehouses, certain actions involving re-zoning and redevelopment plans for warehouse distribution uses in Florence, the reports issued by the Board’s professionals, and multiple site visits.  (5T 61:10-25 through 82:1-12).  Like the rejection of [...]’s testimony, the reasons for rejecting [...]’ testimony are distortions.  For example, Defendant misconstrues [...]’ testimony about the 2019 “Foxdale Resolution. ”  Db36-Db40.  Plaintiff did not offer that previous approval for “precedential value”, but rather as evidence that: (1) the Board itself, along with the Township governing body, has recognized and acknowledged that building heights of 30 feet for warehouse/distribution use are neither viable, appropriate, nor realistic; and (2) the Defendant, just three years earlier, interpreted the Master Plan in the same way as [...], and concluded that the SM zone’s 30 foot height limitation was not targeted to warehousing, and thus, the requested height cannot be said to “substantial[ly] impair[] the zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] Adopted Pursuant to Section 7 of the LRHL  Appellants do not meet their heavy burden of proving that the Redevelopment Plan deviated from the governing standards set forth in Section 7.  A governing body’s approval of a redevelopment plan is governed by Section 7 of the LRHL, which permits a municipality to adopt a redevelopment plan that is either: (1) “substantially consistent with the municipal master plan” or (2) “designed to effectuate the master plan.
[directive] fog the Definitions  Critical 4.6.2 apply: shall definitions following the ODARA, the scoring of purpose the  For assaulted assessed being person the in which incident recent most the Assault: Index — involved violence that of act any is Assault Partner.  former or current his/her a with death made of threat credible a or Victim index the with contact physical Victim. the of presence the in displayed weapon 45 Page assessed.
[brief] 186, 205 n.3 (App. Div. 2003)—head on, by providing for heightened review and expedited dismissal of SLAPPs.  As relevant here, UPEPA applies to all litigation based on a person’s “exercise of the right of freedom of speech or the press, the right to assembly or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the New Jersey Constitution, on a matter of public concern. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-50(b)(3).  If a SLAPP is filed, UPEPA permits eligible defendants to file an application for an order to show cause to dismiss the action, *id.* § 2A:53A-51, which the court must resolve on an expedited basis, *id.* § 2A:53A-53.
[brief] On May 23, 2018, the New Jersey court heard the oral argument as scheduled.  (2T12:24-13-1)  Once the trial court was finally able to hear the motion, it found that the SDNY Action was [...]’s “attempt[] to re-litigate the [New Jersey] Court’s order in other forums,” which “effectively undermin[ed] the whole process of this [New Jersey Action] lawsuit.
[brief] POINT I....................................................................................................................8  TRIAL COURT ERRED DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, PURSUANT TO RULE 4:23-4 AND/OR RULE 4:23-5(C)  POINT II ................................................................................................................11  TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SCHEDULING DEPOSITION  ACCORDING TO COURT RULES 4:14-1 and 4:14-2  POINT III...............................................................................................................14  TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ DISMISSAL BASED ON RULE 4:23-5(a)(2)  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................15
[brief] THE CHANCERY COURT’S EQUITABLE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS APPROPRIATE  “The awarding of prejudgment interest is subject to the trial judge’s broad discretion in accordance with principles of equity. ”  Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52, 74 (App. Div. 2000).  Courts on appeal “defer to the trial judge’s exercise of discretion involving prejudgment interest unless it represents a manifest denial of justice.
[directive] Examples of such 34 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 reports include arrest and investigative reports, and radio, patrol, vehicle and evidence logs pertaining to or completed by the officer.  7.2.2  The investigator should also examine and retrieve all electronic, computer, digital and video records.  These may include analog and digital records created by radio and telephone recorders, computer aided dispatch systems, mobile data terminals, in-car video systems, video surveillance systems and other forms of audio and video recording.  In these cases, the relevant data should be copied to an appropriate medium as soon as possible and retained by internal affairs.  7.2.3
[directive] Authorized Tire Deflation Devices  6.1  Law enforcement agencies may choose to utilize authorized tire deflation devices during the course of a vehicular pursuit.  Agencies that choose to employ this strategy may only utilize devices authorized by this Policy.  As with all operational decisions made during the conduct of a vehicular pursuit, the use of such devices is subject to the assessment of inherent risk balanced against the need to apprehend a fleeing offender.  6.2
[brief] As previously stated, the trial court aptly recognized that [...] testified the information in his mobile data terminal was only inaccurate twice in his five-year career.  Even though the officer acknowledged other officers also have received inaccurate information from the system, that does not negate its general, overwhelming reliability.  Thus, this Court should reach a similar conclusion as that reached in Pitcher: the officer’s conduct was reasonable.  In sum, Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution “does not speak in absolute terms but strikes a balance between the interests of the individual in being free of police interference and the interests of society in effective law enforcement. ”  State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 468 (1967).  In determining the reasonableness of the seizure, courts therefore weigh the public interest served against the nature and scope of the intrusion upon the individual.  State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 502-03 (1986).  Weighing the limited intrusion of the temporary motor vehicle stop that occurred in this case, against the great public interest served by investigating, and potentially executing, a warrant, it is clear that the officers’ conduct in this case was reasonable.
[brief] Id. at 395.  Here, none of the materials supplied to Plaintiff prior to his application, acceptance, and enrolling into [...] contained any notice that Plaintiff was required to maintain a 3.0 GPA within the curriculum to opt-in to the dual degree program.  Nor did any material provided to Plaintiff before his enrollment, or after, contain any term or condition that Plaintiff was only able to opt-in to the program at the end of his first professional year.  These were material changes to the dual degree program’s requirements, and not ones Plaintiff agreed to or accepted when applying and enrolling into the program.
[brief] Exhibit A).  A further review of the Google Maps historical imagery referenced above reveals that the pavement region along the double yellow striping, between the longitudinal pavement cracks/seam, reveals that transverse cracks are present at random intervals across the same.  (Pa 332)  As such, the pavement at the longitudinal and transverse cracks is subject to deteriorate at an advanced rate than a pavement surface devoid of cracks.  (Pa 332 report of [...].)  An email from [...], who was the Town Administrator to [...] and [...] from [...], dated July 16, 2020, indicates that the Town Administrator had been travelling Kearny Avenue in 2020 to observe for paver defects and thus, had an opportunity to observe the pothole existing at the accident location.
[brief] \(^4\)  Appellants’ arguments are disingenuous for several reasons.  First, when [...] filed its answer to Appellants’ complaint, it identified the case as one of professional malpractice on the accompanying Case Information Statement.  (Pa75).  Secondly, [...] specifically included in its answer, as its twenty-first separate defense, citation to the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  (Pa71).  Finally, although the case was ultimately set on a discovery track for Complex Construction, [...] requested at the time that it filed its answer that the case be moved to the appropriate track for professional malpractice.  (Pa77).  Each of those items gave Appellants ample notice that [...] considered this a case of professional malpractice and planned to avail itself of all applicable defenses, including the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  \(^4\)  It should be noted that there is no authority whatsoever to support the position that a defendant seeking to rely upon the Affidavit of Merit Statute is required to request a Ferreira conference as a predicate to filing a motion based upon the statute.  Appellants’ description of this as a “dishonest litigation tactic” and belief that it is a valid basis for relief from the statute makes clear their lack of understanding of the statute and the interpreting precedent.  CONCLUSION