ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Moreover, that defendant and [...]’s conduct could have had an innocent explanation is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis as the Court must look at the totality of the circumstances in light of [...]’s training and experience.  In *United States v. Arvizu*, the United States Supreme Court condemned the appellate court’s notion that each observation by the officer that had an innocent explanation was entitled to no weight.  534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002).  The Court pointed out that “the court’s evaluation and rejection of the seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the ‘totality of the circumstances. ’”  *Id.* at 274.  The Supreme Court noted its precedent “precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis. ”  *Ibid.*  The Court highlighted that in *Terry*, the officer observed Terry and “his companions repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store window, and confer with one another” and although “each of the series of acts was ‘perhaps innocent in itself’” the Court held that “taken together they ‘warranted further investigation. ’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 22).  Following that precedent, the United States Supreme Court found the officer in that case “was entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the area’s inhabitants. ”  *Id.* at 276.  New Jersey courts equally apply a totality-of-circumstances test focusing on the aggregate of the facts and not each individually.  This Court has repeatedly held that reasonable suspicion can be established from several factors, each of which, while by themselves consistent with entirely innocent behavior, add up to reasonable suspicion taken together.  See *State v. Mann*, 203 N.J. 328, 338-39 (2010); Stovall, 170 N.J. at 368-69; Citarella, 154 N.J. at 280-81; State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-12 (1997) (“It must be rare indeed that an officer observed behavior consistent only with guilt and incapable of innocent interpretation. ”).  Here, the totality of circumstances of defendant’s conduct in a high-crime area established the low-threshold necessary for a court to determine police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle and ultimately discover the clear-empty capsule and defendant’s status as a suspended driver.  [...] found Detective [...] credible, thus his familiarity with narcotics investigations and this area, including the particular parking lot at issue is a necessary consideration in that totality of circumstances test.  This Court should thus reject defendant’s unavailing alternative explanations for his conduct.  As [...] correctly determined, [...]’s observations, coupled with the inferences he could draw from them based on his training and experience, formed the reasonable suspicion that allowed [...] to stop defendant after he left [...] a short time later.  These findings were well-supported, based on the undisputed record, and should be afforded proper deference on appeal.  Accordingly, the evidence seized from defendant’s car and all evidence learned from the stop was admissible.
[brief] In late July 2012, the Firm received a $100,000 check in settlement of a client matter.  The Firm was due $30,000 from the check as its fees on the matter.  [Pa561]  The check was deposited in an old attorney trust account that the Firm maintained but did not routinely utilize.  [Pa561]  From the $30,000 in fees, [...] wrote a “bonus” check for $7,500 to an associate.  [...] also had two checks issued to his wife, who was then employed by the Firm (totaling $8,000), and for a personal matter ($20,000).  [Pa561]  At the time [...] wrote the checks, the only money in the trust account was approximately $4,000 belonging to the Firm (and not to any client) that was the residual of a deposit the Firm had made into the account over twenty years earlier.  [Pa561]  Since there were insufficient funds in the account to cover the $7,500 bonus check [...] had written to his associate, he postdated the check and asked him not to deposit the check for a few days to allow the $100,000 check to first clear.  [Pa562]  Despite the request, the associate deposited the check, dated August 6, 2012, on or about July 31, 2012, before the bank cleared the $100,000 deposit, resulting in an overdraft.  [Pa562]  The bank advised the [...] of the overdraft.  [Pa562]  The other checks written from the $30,000 of funds belonging to the Firm cleared without issue.  [Pa562]  Further, all monies due to the client were promptly paid out.
[brief] Cert. denied 127 N.J. 546 (1992)  Thus the mere fact that the credentials of the Objector’s professional are accepted does not bind the Board to blindly accept his/her conclusions.  In this case it was entirely appropriate for the Planning Board to consider all of the testimony presented, including that of the Board’s and [...]’s experts, in assessing witness credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony.  The Planning Board properly declined to blindly accept the testimony of the Objector’s witness as undisputed and ignore everything else.
[directive] Standards Governing the De-activation of BWCs upon the Request of a Civilian, When Discussing Investigation Strategy or Planning, or on Instruction of a Prosecutor 6.1  De-Activation at the Request of a Civilian Providing Information/Cooperation.  Notwithstanding Section 5.3, an officer may de-activate a BWC when a civilian conversing with the officer requests that the device be turned off under circumstances where it reasonably appears that the person will not provide information or otherwise cooperate with the officer unless that request is respected.4  The officer shall not suggest to the person that the BWC should be de-activated; nor shall the officer ask the person whether he or she would prefer that the BWC be de-activated.  Rather, the request for de-activation must be self-initiated by the civilian.  The officer may explain the consequences of de- activation (e.g., evidence relevant to a criminal investigation will not be recorded).  In deciding whether to de-activate the BWC, the officer shall consider the privacy and safety interests of the person requesting de-activation, whether the encounter is occurring in the person’s residence, and the need for the information or assistance that the person will provide only if the de-activation request is honored.  6.2
[brief] [...] thus conceded that “different people” can use “different criteria” to define the term “principally engaged. ”  That is, “reasonable people could have a different understanding of what ‘principally engaged’ means. ”  Consequently, the Act -- carrying criminal penalties including incarceration -- can be enforced differently against different attorneys by different representatives acting on Defendants’ behalf; that is the absolute epitome of an unconstitutionally vague statute.
[brief] Additionally, the waiver of statutory claims are not implicated in this dispute.  Cf. Atalese (waiver of right to pursue claims under the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20 and the Truth-in-Lending Contract, Warranty and Notice Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18, in court); Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 (waiver of right to pursue claims under Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, in court); Atalese is inapplicable to this dispute.  In summary, the Court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration because Plaintiff (the scrivener) did not include a provision informing himself that he was waiving his right to go to Court when he wrote the Dispute Resolution provision of the party’s agreement.
[brief] 44 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) .................................................................................................  41 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 .......................................................................................................  41, 44 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(4) ............................................................................................  40 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) ............................................................................................  40 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) ............................................................................................  40 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) ............................................................................................  40 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(1) ............................................................................................  40 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6) ............................................................................................  40 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 .......................................................................................................  40, 43 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) ...............................................................................................  43, 44, 45
[brief] The doctrine “is grounded in considerations of fairness, and is meant to prevent defendants from manipulating the system. ”  Id. at 561-62 (internal markings and citations omitted).  The doctrine is implicated “when a defendant in some way has led the court into error....”  Id. at 562 (internal markings and citations omitted).  When the doctrine applies, reversal is only appropriate where the error “cut mortally into the substantive rights of the defendant [causing] a fundamental miscarriage of justice....”
[brief] Defendant’s conduct was willful, wanton, and evidenced deceit such that it met the measure of reprehensibility warranting a punitive damage award.  Devli, 2022 WL 17491290 at *4-6.17  Based upon the Trial Court’s factual findings at bar, as re-focused and applied on remand by [...] to the SOL period in question, an award of punitive damages at a 2.5 multiple is even more appropriate.
[directive] PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 ET SEQ. AND THE PROVISIONS OF N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44a.  AND b., IT IS HEREBY DIRECTED THAT ALL NEW JERSEY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS SHALL FOLLOW THE ATTACHED STANDARDS TO ENSURE THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS, AND ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SHALL ADOPT, AS PRESCRIBED, SUCH STANDARDS AS AGENCY POLICY AND PROCEDURE.  Foreword
[brief] (Da36-37).  The same day, the State filed the instant suit in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, under N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1, which authorizes the Attorney General or the Director to “proceed against any person in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” at any time after the filing of an administrative complaint or whenever it appears that a person is engaging in any practice that violates the LAD.  Proceeding by Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause, the State sought temporary restraints and a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo prior to Appellants’ adoption of the Amended Policy only for so long as the administrative complaint is pending.
[brief] Said another way, a litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process.  The arbitrary or capricious standard calls for a less searching inquiry than other formulas relating to the scope of review.  Although it is an overstatement to say that a decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable whenever a Court can review the reasons stated for the decision without a loud guffaw or involuntary gasp, it is not much of an overstatement.  The arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable standard is the least demanding form of judicial review.  See Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996), quoting and adopting D’Atria.
[directive] When an offense involving sexual assault, serious bodily injury or homicide, or an unattended death, occurs on the premises of any facility run by the Department of Human Services, the Human Services Police (appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-14) shall immediately notify the local State Police Barracks.  It shall be the responsibility of the local State Police Barracks to respond and notify the Major Crimes Section of State Police and the County Prosecutor of the County in which the institution is located whenever the preliminary investigation indicates that a crime involving serious bodily injury or death has occurred.  This Directive shall take effect immediately.
[brief] During his deposition, Respondent’s appraiser also confirmed that an eight-story structure would only be permitted under the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan zoning and would not be a permitted use under the R-2 zoning:  Q: And then the next second zoning permits a maximum building height of eight stories.  That also is [a] reference to the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan?  A: Yes, sir.  Q: Do you agree that under the R-2 zoning class that eight stories was not permitted?  A: 20 years ago, that’s correct.  Yes.  It was four stories or less.  Q: And do you agree that under the form of R-2 zoning classification that a mid-rise, multi-family residential development was not a permitted use in the R-2 zoning?  A: Yes.  Pa167-168 [emphasis added].  In the current matter, while Respondent’s experts have opined as to the reasonable probability of a zoning change/variance allowing Respondent’s proposed development to meet the “legally permissible” prong of the Highest and Best Use analysis, Respondent’s appraiser has failed to provide evidence to allow the jury to engage in the second step of the analysis set forth by the Hilton court; what premium would a willing buyer pay for the Property which, as of the Date of Valuation of June 3, 2019, had no development approvals or variances to allow Respondent to satisfy the “legally permissible” prong of the Highest and Best Use analysis.
[brief] Frivolous litigation notices were served on the Defendants consistent with the statute and rule, and the Defendants were fully provided with the opportunity to withdraw the offending motions.  The Defendants were also afforded the opportunity to testify as to the issue and to brief it, in proposed findings of fact and law.  (8T128:7-14).  The Court made the requisite findings in its decision:  [I]t is clear that Defendants’ motions to file a second amended complaint and for due process were without merit and far exceeded the scope of the approved pre-trial motions.
[brief] The ROFR had already been waived on February 17, 2023.  Adding the acknowledgement of Plaintiff’s ROFR was mere “tweaking”.  It was the only change made to the offer/contract and it was made at the insistence of the Plaintiff ROFR holder and did not alter the terms by which the property would be acquired.  It was a “tweak” if ever there was a “tweak”.  Moreover, it was a tweak made with the ROFR holder’s full knowledge and on their demand, so they were aware of the term even before they were made officially aware of it on May 4th, 2023.  Indeed, the Plaintiff’s general counsel accepts the offer and acknowledges to [...]’s attorney that the offer is being processed on May 5th, 2023.
[directive] Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary a is information additional as modified or clarified, supplemented, being to subject is and process investigation/prosecution.  ongoing an of course the in corroborated or learned 58 Page of, lieu in not addition to, in shall be Report Incident Enforcement Law  Preliminary A to pursuant prepared subsequently reports) investigation or incident, arrest, police regular any the at or practices, customary and/or policy, procedure, operating standard agency's the request.  prosecutor's Directive. of this issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This Information.
[brief] Plaintiffs assert that they are bringing this motion under Rule 4:50-1.  They argue that the court's order should be vacated, because according to plaintiffs, an affidavit of merit was not required as to their legal malpractice claims, because according to plaintiffs, those legal malpractice claims fall within the common knowledge exception to the requirement for an affidavit of merit.  Plaintiff assert that no legal expert is necessary to explain any aspect of defendants purported legal malpractice.  Plaintiffs also argues -- plaintiffs also argue that a dismissal of the entire complaint for failure to provide an affidavit of merit was improper, asserting that the dismissal of the non-legal malpractice claims of fraud, tortious interference, conspiracy, based on an affidavit of merit was not proper, because according to plaintiffs, those claims do not constitute legal malpractice, and thus, do not require an affidavit of merit.  Specifically, on page 22 of their brief in support of this motion, plaintiffs assert that "Defendants [...] and [...]'s carelessness, negligence, tortious interference, and fraud that gives rise to their legal malpractice, are certainly "readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence, and ordinary experience" and therefore, does not require the filing of an AOM.  Specifically, Defendants [...] and [...] failed to advise plaintiffs that Defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], Theresa [...], [...], [...], [...], were personally gained from the real estate transaction at issue, and that defendants would conspire, and ultimately deviate, and transfer a substantial amount of the funds paid by plaintiffs in pursuit in the aforesaid intended transactions and developments."  [P]laintiffs also assert that Defendant [...]'s negligent supervision of its attorney's trust account does not require the explanation of a legal expert."  Id., at 23.  THE COURT:
[brief] The Trial Court Improperly Disregarded The Binding Deposition Testimony of [...]’s Designated Representative, [...].  (T. at 8:15-9:4)  The entirety of the trial court’s decision is based on the unsupported legal conclusion that the testimony of [...]’s designated representative must be completely “disregarded” as [...]’s responses were mere “lay person’s opinion[s].”  The trial court’s faulty analysis went one step further in holding that [...]’s testimony was not “binding” on [...].  The trial court’s failure to consider any of [...]’s testimony by itself warrants the reversal of its decision.
[brief] See Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286, 304-305 (2020).  Further, the demand “must be made at a time and place and under such circumstances as defendant is able to comply with if he is so disposed, and the refusal must be wrongful.  . .  The burden of proof of a demand and a refusal rests on the plaintiff. ”  Id. at 304.
[brief] ”); *Singleton v. Mazhari*, No. 22-CV-2554-GLR, 2024 WL 1140691, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 2024) (“[T]he Court notes that hits on a given search term in a given document for a particular custodian, including during the time frames above, does not necessarily mean the document is discoverable. ”).
[brief] ” (Ca031-032).  •  Counts 9, 10, and 12:  “These social [media] posts relate to [...]’s perspective and disagreement with how gender identity is taught in New Jersey. ” (Ca033).  “What is problematic is not that [...] disagrees with the proposed health education standards or that she opposes the inclusion of transgender students in New Jersey schools, but what is problematic is that she failed to include a clear disclaimer that the contents of the posting were her personal opinions and not expressed as a Board member.  Without a clearly stated disclaimer, it would not be a stretch to consider that the transgender population and parents of transgender students may feel unwelcome by the Board. ”  (Ca034) (emphasis added).
[brief] ”  Katz v. Ambit Northeast, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169407, at *8-9, 2020 WL 5542780 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2020) (quoting Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 872 A.2d 783 (2005) and Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 964 A.2d 741,“749 (2009)).  “Additionally, plaintiffs must set forth allegations sufficient to show those losses are causally connected to defendant’s alleged conduct.  It is not sufficient to make conclusory or broad-brush allegations regarding defendant’s conduct; plaintiff must specifically plead those facts. ”  Katz, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169407, at *9 (citing Torres-Hernandez v. CVT Prepaid Sols., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105413, at *7, 2008 WL 5381227 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2008)).  As it relates to the failure of a debt collector to be licensed, the Woo-Padva court provided a concise summary holding:
[directive] Date  Judge Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney:  --------------- --------------- Name Name --------------- Address Address ----------- -----------  Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------------- ---------------- Fax Fax --------------- --------------- i a 1 a I Em i Em _________  If D Yes D No yes, language _ Interpreter needed? _________  If ADA accommodation needed?  D Yes D No yes, describe _ Directive# (11/01/2018), !A) (Competency 12324  Published 17-18 by CN: Order of3 page 3  Attachment 2 of Order B - Order Mandating Evaluation  #1  Defendant's Fitness to Proceed to Trial (Defendant Detained) of Order B - Order Mandating a Psychiatric Evaluation  Defendant's Fitness to #1  Proceed to Trial (Defendant Detained)  The text of the following proposed order has been drafted for use when the court needs a psychiatric or psychological report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5a due to questions regarding a defendant's fitness to proceed to trial.
[brief] Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010) .................................................................................. 19, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 37  Royster v. New Jersey State Police, 2007 WL 4441103 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 20, 2007) ..............................................25  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297, 884 A.2d 1267 (2005)  .............................................................................................16  Smith v. SBC Communications, Inc., 178 N.J. 265 (2004) .......................................................................................17, 23  Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008) ..............................................................26, 32, 35  Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 82-83 (2004)  .....................................................................................31  Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 1996) ...............................................................18  Statutes N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(d) .........................................................................................18  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) ............................................................................................29  New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act ...........................................4
[brief] The Legislature's intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language.  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005), citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003).  New Jersey courts ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, Lane v. Holderman, 23 N.J. 304, 313 (1957), and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.  Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 426-27 (1999).  It is not the function of a court to "rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language."  O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002).