ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………..v TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS…………………………vi PRELIMINARY STATEMENT……………………………………………………1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY………………………………………………………...2 STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………7 LEGAL ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………13 POINT I:……………………………………………………………………….....13  APPELLEE IS JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM A MONEY JUDGMENT ABOVE THE APPLICABLE LIABILITY COVERAGE(S)  TOTALLING $200,000 AND A MOLDING OF THE JUDGMENT IS THE CORRECT METHOD TO REFLECT SAME (Raised below: Da43-45, Da23-24, Da95-99)  POINT II:………………………………………………………………………..15  THE JURY VERDICT WAS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE THAT SHOCKS THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, REMITTITUR (Raised below: Da23-24, 4T)  POINT III:………………………………………………………………………..17  APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF APPELLEE’S INJURIES IN SUMMATION REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL (Raised below: 3T44:7-46:14)  POINT IV:………………………………………………………………………..19  APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S MISLEADING CITATIONS TO DR. LOPEZ’S TESTIMONY REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL (Raised below: 3T40-7-14)  POINT V:.........................................................................................................................20  APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S REFERENCE FOR THE JURY TO “IMPOSE RESPONSIBILITY’ UPON THE APPELLANT WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND WARRANTS  A NEW TRIAL (Raised below: 4T)  POINT VI:.........................................................................................................................20  APPELLEE’S TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT FLED  THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS IRRELEVANT, IMPROPER AND WARRANTS  A NEW TRIAL (Raised below: 1T42:7-21)  CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................22  APPELLANT’S APPENDIX
[brief] **  In the alternative, if this Court finds jurisdiction, the review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary and a reviewing court applies the same standard as the motion judge.  Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 135-36 (2017).  New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2(c) provides that summary judgment: ...shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  [R. 4:46-2(c).]  Summary Judgment is warranted when the evidence presents no genuine issue of fact or when it is so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance of America, 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995).  To avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a challenged material fact.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529.  The party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. ”  Triffin v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div. 2004) (citations omitted).  “Competent opposition requires ‘competent evidential material’ beyond mere ‘speculation’ and ‘fanciful arguments. ’”  Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Merchs. Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556, 563 (App. Div. 2005)).  A court cannot deny a motion for summary judgment merely because the opposing party points to an insubstantial or controverted fact.  *Id.*  The determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists cannot be made based on a mere argument of counsel or the bare assertion of a conclusion opposite to the factual position of the adversary.  *Amabile v. Lerner*, 74 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 1963); *U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc.*, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 400 (App. Div. 1961); *Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp.*, 63 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 1960).  When evidence fails to present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or when evidence is so one sided that a party must prevail as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted.  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 536.  In this case, [...] properly granted summary judgment, as he found no basis to disturb the arbitration award.  **ISSUE III:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT’S SUMMARY  JUDGMENT MOTION AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S CLAIMS ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED  The Trial Court correctly dismissed [...]’s claims against [...] on their merits.  In that respect, the Trial Court’s decision should be affirmed.  As noted above, on appeal, this Court reviews a summary judgment decision de novo.
[brief] In *M & D Associates*, the movant moved for substitute service by publication, a method that the Appellate Division noted “is hardly favored and is the method of service that is least likely to give notice. ”  *Id.* at 353 (emphasis added) (citing *Modan v. Modan*, 327 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 2000)).  The Appellate Division specifically noted that “[a]s contrasted with the service by court order as found in R. 4:4–4(b)(3) and 4:4–5(d), R. 4:4–5(c) is an alternative method of service of process, but it must be consistent with due process. ”  *Ibid.*  Substitute service by publication “specifically requires a diligent inquiry prior to service .  . . .”  *Ibid.*  Therefore, it is no wonder that the Appellate Division found that service was defective enough to warrant vacating judgment when the movant’s affidavit was plainly inaccurate and defective itself.
[directive] I agree that I possess alcohol, marijuana illegal time.  I agree submit drugs or or will not any at to to use 4. 1 testing.  I understand that the results obtained assist the courts treatment random to will urine used and be providers evaluating progress.  Test results Court if I  Drug team used the may see to my be am by in progressing satisfactorily, ifmy treatment plan needs modification, if intermediate sanctions should be or if I should terminated or graduate the Drug Court Program.  imposed from be alcoh6lica, ilegales bebida marihuana1, drogas ninguna acuerdo usare poseere
[brief] (See Db20-25.)  Defendants’ construction of the residency requirement would not yield an illogical or absurd result.  The proper meaning of the residency requirement is derived in context of the full phrase in which it appears: “seven of [the 15 voting members of the BOG] shall be appointed by the [Trustees]. . . one of whom shall be a resident of Middlesex County.  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14.  Based on its present-tense syntax, the requirement is connected to the act of appointment; it is a command to the appointing authorities, not to the persons so appointed.  Once that appointment is made, the selection process has come to an end, and the statutory aim of providing a role for the Trustees (and to the Governor in the case of other appointees) has been fulfilled.  A continuous residency requirement throughout a member’s six-year term would be irrelevant to those roles.  And creating such roles for appointing authorities, as a stand-alone legislative objective, is not illogical or absurd.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On April 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint alleging that the Defendant, [...] (hereinafter “Township”), violated OPRA by not releasing a criminal investigatory record.  (Da3).  Under Docket No. [...], the trial court entered an order setting a hearing date on April 20, 2022.  (Da21).  The Township answered the verified complaint and submitted opposition on May 20, 2022.  (Da25).  The trial court conducted a hearing on July 11, 2022 (Da34), and the Plaintiff filed an amended verified complaint on July 12, 2022.  (Da29).  Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Township on August 1, 2022, with a written opinion.  (Da58-67).  The Plaintiff filed an appeal of the trial court’s judgment on August 5, 2022, and a Notice of Docketing issued on August 8, 2022, bearing Docket No. [...].  (Da68).  After briefing and oral argument, the Appellate Division issued a decision on July 26, 2023, and remanded the matter to the trial court for an *in camera* review of the unreleased criminal investigatory record.  (Da70-80).  On July 28, 2023, the trial court entered an order on remand requiring the submission of the withheld record for an *in camera* examination (Da81) and the record was submitted under cover of correspondence dated August 8, 2023.  (Da83).  On August 15, 2023, the trial court entered an order identifying the unreleased document as a criminal investigatory record, but then requiring the production of certain N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) information by the Township.  (Da85).  The Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s order for an award of attorney’s fees on August 21, 2023 (Da87) and the Township cross-moved for reconsideration and opposed an award of attorney’s fees on August 31, 2023.  (Da96).  The trial court entered an order on October 27, 2023, awarding attorney’s fees to Plaintiff and denying the Township’s cross-motion.  (Da108-119).  On October 31, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the Township.  (Da120-123).  The Township filed the instant appeal (Da1) and the Plaintiff sought to dismiss the appeal on December 12, 2023.  On December 18, 2023, the trial court denied the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration without prejudice (Da124) and the Plaintiff withdrew its motion to dismiss the appeal on December 21, 2023.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] “A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy,” State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37, 57 (App. Div. 1997), and should not be declared unless the trial court finds that, as a result of the error alleged, “manifest injustice would result from continuation of the trial. ”  State v. Hogan, 297 N.J. Super. 7, 14 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 142 (1997).  “The trial court’s decision is granted great deference on appeal.  Unless manifest injustice would result, the trial court’s decision will be affirmed. ”  Id. at 15 (citing State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 207 (1989).  As there was no manifest injustice below requiring the extraordinary remedy of a mistrial, [...] acted within his judicial discretion in denying defendant’s motion.
[brief] The next factor analyzed by *Marmo* is motion practice.  In *Marmo*, “[n]o motion practice, dispositive or otherwise, occurred before Marmo moved to compel arbitration. ”  *Marmo*, 478 N.J. Super. at 611.  Whereas here, Defendants opposed [...]’s Motion to Consolidate (Pa68; Pa75) the Collection Lawsuit and the Class Action by filing a dispositive Cross Motion (Pa72), attempting to defeat [...]’s claims on the merits.  After the Cross Motion to Dismiss was only denied in part (with only the claim of unjust enrichment being dismissed), Defendants litigated for another year before moving to compel arbitration— which was noted by the trial court.\footnote{See T1 13:3-7.}
[brief] DEP APPROPRIATELY ISSUED THE PERMIT WITH A PUBLIC ACCESS CONDITION AND ITS DECISION IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE.  .........................................................................................................................13  A.  The Public Access Law Requires DEP to Impose Permit Conditions Requiring Public Access (Responding to Appellant’s Points IA & IB)  .................................................................................................................................15  B.  The DEP Properly Applied the Law to [...]’s Application (Responding to Appellant’s Point II)  .........................................................................................................................22  C.  The Public Access Law Does Not Prohibit the DEP from Applying the Law Before New Regulations Are Adopted (Responding to Appellant’s Point III)  .........................................................................................................................27  D.  Under the Public Access Law, Monetary Contributions Cannot Satisfy Public Access Requirements (Responding to Appellant’s Point IV)  .........................................................................................................................29  E.  [...] Is Not Entitled to a Remand (Responding to Appellant’s Point V)  .........................................................................................................................31  F.  The Commissioner Did Not Err in Concluding that OAL Lacked Jurisdiction to Hear [...]’s Takings Claim (Responding to Appellant’s Point VI)  ..................................................................................33  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................35
[directive] No Early Release Act (Portuguese)  As perguntas abaixo devem ser respondidas somente se você estiver se declarando culpado por um dos seguintes crimes de primeiro ou segundo grau, ou por tentativa ou conspiração para cometer tais crimes, que em 29 de junho de 2001 ou após esta data:  ocorreram assassinato, homicídio culposo qualificado ou homicídio culposo, homicídio ao volante, agressão qualificada, desarmar agente policial, sequestro, agressão sexual qualificada, agressão sexual, roubo com violência, roubo de veículo com pessoa a bordo, incêndio criminoso qualificado expondo outra pessoa a perigo de morte ou lesões corporais graves, arrombamento à propriedade com fim ilícito, roubo mediante extorsão ao obter propriedade alheia sob ameaça de lesão corporal ou fisicamente confinar ou restringir uma pessoa ou cometer outro crime, armadilhas explosivas em instalações de fabricação ou distribuição de substâncias perigosas controladas ou responsabilidade estrita por mortes ocorreram em 18 de junho de 2002 ou após esta data: induzidas por drogas; ou que terrorismo, ou produzir ocorreram em ou possuir armas químicas, agentes biológicos ou dispositivos nucleares ou radiológicos; ou que 13 de janeiro de 2008 ou após esta data: ocorreram em 14 organização criminosa em primeiro grau; ou que de agosto de 2013 ou após esta data: ocorreram em 1o de novembro de 2013 ou pornografia infantil; ou que após esta data: tráfico de armas de fogo.
[brief] Plaintiffs and their counsel violated the frivolous lawsuit statute and rule.  They had pre-suit knowledge that [...] complied with Plaintiffs’ request to have the Property excluded from the redevelopment project, with [...] revising the site plans to address this request.  Despite this knowledge, Plaintiffs and their counsel sued [...] and ignored their obligation to comply with New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit statute, which was enacted to weed out frivolous claims.  *Meehan v. Antonellis*, 226 N.J. 216, 228 (2016).
[brief] The range was critical in Burney, as the one-mile radius the expert testified to placed the defendant’s phone at the approximate area of the crime scene at the time of the home invasion.  *Id.* at 30.  [...]’s testimony here did not suffer from the same defect.  At the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, in response to the court’s questioning of whether there was “an outer limit” on tower range, [...] testified that he had “seen some up to seven, eight miles,” and denied that service providers maintain data with regard to specific towers and their ranges.
[brief] From the extensive record developed before the ALJ, “the key takeaway is this: the total budget for the most recent school year at the time of that [ALJ] decision [2017-18] was $143.45 million…[and] over half--$78 million—went to transportation and special education tuition for non-public students;”  “This is an abnormal and unsustainable imbalance;”  “By way of comparison, in neighboring districts, the costs of transportation and special needs tuition accounted for roughly four to seven percent of their annual education budgets. ”  (Alcantara v. McMillan, 475 N.J.Super. 58, 62-63 (App.Div. 2023))  This extensive record evidence led the ALJ to conclude that [...] public-school students were being denied their fundamental constitutional right to T&E.  This court agreed with, and reinstated, that conclusion in its March 6 decision.
[brief] C.  The Lower Court’s Determination That The Defendant is Eligible, Due to His Satisfaction of Factor a(5), Would Render an Illegal Sentence.  The State has the right to appeal a Recovery Court Special Probation sentence only if it is illegal.  Hyland, 238 N.J. at 145.  There are two categories of illegal sentences: those that exceed the penalties authorized for a particular offense, and those that are not authorized by law.  State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 308 (2012); Hyland, 238 N.J. at 145.  The State is not permitted to appeal defendant’s Recovery Court sentence solely on the basis of the court’s application of discretionary factors.  *Hyland*, 238 N.J. at 147.  “A finding to the contrary would conflate sentence illegality with judicial abuse of discretion and undermine this Court’s consistently narrow construct of which sentences it deems illegal. ”  *Ibid.*  Only when “a [Recovery Court] judge makes a plainly or clearly mistaken objective, rather than discretionary, finding under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a), the State may appeal as illegal the imposition of a Drug Court sentence. ”  *Id.* at 148.  In its Order and Statement of Reasons, the lower court overruled the State’s legal eligibility objection under N.J.S.A. 35-14a(5), as well as factors a(2)-(4), (8) and (9).
[brief] Plaintiffs must show that Mr.  Zuckerberg and [...] possess relevant and unique information unlikely to be found in the files of the 81 existing custodians.  [...] is entitled to deference in formulating its collection strategy, including in selecting custodians it deems most likely to possess responsive information, and it is Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate that [...]’s selections are deficient.  *The Sedona Principles*, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, Principle 6 (“Sedona Principle 6”), 118–124 (3d ed. 2018) (“A requesting party has the burden of proving a specific discovery deficiency in the responding party’s production. ”); accord *Hastings v. Ford Motor Co.*, No. 19-cv-2217-BAS-MDD, 2021 WL 1238870, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2021).  Litigants are not required to examine every last document in their files to comply with their discovery obligations.  *Lauris v. Novartis AG*, No. 116CV00393LJOSAB, 2016 WL 7178602, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016).  They simply must “conduct a diligent search” based on “a reasonably comprehensive search strategy. ”
[brief] In this case, like in Marrin and Hennigan, there can be no doubt that Appellant proceeded without any basis in law or in fact and with a reckless disregard and purposeful obliviousness to the known facts on his CEPA claim.  Appellant was at no time in ignorance of any relevant facts, but he blatantly ignored their import.  The record evidenced the following: • Appellant admitted he was an at-will employee; • Appellant admitted he signed an agreement which explicitly prohibited using the PCard for personal purchases; • Appellant offered to pay for any personal purchases that were “mistakenly” made by him; • Appellant was already under investigation and placed on administrative leave, pending further investigation, for his misuse of the Company’s PCard when he raised prior concerns about the marketing of [...]’s products; • Appellant repeatedly stated, throughout the course of this litigation, that his alleged authorization to use the PCard for personal purchases was limited to March 2020 and thereafter; and • Appellant failed to produce any documents, witnesses, certifications, or other admissible evidence to corroborate his statement of events, or change in his own allegations.
[brief] With this appeal, [...] argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority and that the award was procured by undue means.  (Pb13-14).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, the Arbitrator’s reference to the Treasury circulars did not amount to using “an external document ‘instead of’ the plain language of the contract” as argued by [...].  (Pb27).  Furthermore, the Arbitrator’s consideration of the parties’ past interpretation of the contract does not amount to crediting past practice over clear language.  (Pb23-24; Pb32).  As discussed more fully below, the Award in this matter is reasonably debatable, and [...] has not met its burden of proving any of the narrow statutory requirements to overturn a trial court’s confirmation of that Award.
[brief] Anything up until that [February 2021] phone call about the school was pure guesswork on [Plaintiff’s] part.  And for [Plaintiff] to include a claim like that in the first lawsuit, you would have filed a Motion to kick it out in two seconds.  . .  So I disagree with you having that suspicion required [Plaintiff] to include that claim in the first Complaint.  [3T34:11-13, 35:2-4.]  Even after the trial court made those specific factual findings and credibility determinations, Defendants continued to argue that [...] somehow knew of the illicit agreement prior to February 2021.
[brief] After [...] received this information, she alerted [...] to this issue and forwarded the recording and the letter to [...].  In the following week, on May 9, 2019, Appellant received a letter of non-renewal of her contract for the following school year.  In addition, [...] received a letter of non-renewal of her contract for the next school year.  The Respondents were asked to produce the letter that Appellant and [...] sent to [...] after [...] engaged in use of the racial slur nigger in the second incident that happened in May of 2019.  The Respondents failed to produce this letter as well as the second recording of [...] using the racial slur, so, to claim that Appellant was not involved in addressing this incident in May of 2019 is without merit.  Similarly, the position taken by the Respondents that the use of the racial slur was not directed to anyone in particular so it had no impact is a meritless position which is not supported by the case law.  [...] having been disciplined in January of 2019 by [...] for the use of the same racial slur knew that the use of the word was prohibited and using this word was not a teachable moment and was reprehensible, yet she used it again.  Appellant satisfied all of the prongs for the retaliation claim and this was refuted by the Respondents and was accepted by the Trial Court.  On May 1, 2019, Appellant was notified of [...]’s use of the racial slur because the students were brought to her office by another teacher who had initially received the complaint from the students and had reviewed the audio/video footage.  Appellant and [...] then discussed the issue.  Appellant met with the other teacher and the students and [...] spoke with Ms. [...].  Then Appellant and [...] prepared a letter to [...] and the letter and the audio/video footage was sent to [...].  One week later both Appellant and [...] received notices regarding their contract non-renewals.