ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] ”).  Providing all reasonable inferences to [...], the trial court repeatedly found that [...] never made a cognizable CEPA complaint.  (See 1T 4:12-13 (“[...] and [...] never made any complaints to HR about [...] the [the June 24, 2020] incident”); Id. at 29:16-17 (“clearly Ms. [...] and Ms. [...] did not participate in any whistle-blower activity”); Id. at 29:20-22 (“But just being interviewed and responding truthfully as to what they saw and observed is not whistle-blowing activity. ”); Id. at 29:25-30:3 (“And they said, that this was a very uncomfortable situation.
[brief] Accordingly, the out-of-court identifications made by each witness constituted the primary evidence against the defendant.  *Ibid.*  Following an evidential hearing, the judge found that the two out-of-court identifications met the conditions for admissibility stated by the rule.  *Id.* at 235.  However, the trial court then made the fatal error of “telling the jury what his finding was, namely, that he had determined that the out-of-court identification procedure was not suggestive and that the conditions of fairness and reliability had been met. ”  *Ibid.*  The court reiterated its findings at the close of the State’s case and in its general instruction at the end of the case.  *Id.* at 237-38.  The Appellate Division reversed the defendant’s conviction.  The Court did not take issue with the hearing or fault the trial court’s conclusion that the photographs were not suggestive.  *Id.* at 238-39.  However, the court in *Ridout* stated, “[t]he problem is in his having told the jury that he had determined that the conditions of admissibility had been met and that he had thus specifically determined that the identifications were not only not suggestive but also had met the reliable and trustworthy conditions stated by the rule. ”  Id. at 239.
[brief] THE PROSECUTION OF THE FRIVOLOUS MOTION AND APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL IS THE CAUSE FOR THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.  The frivolous prosecution of the instant appeal is further amplified by the Defendant’s respondent brief wherein he erroneously misrepresents facts and law. \(^1\)  The Defendant’s repetitive and meritless assertions did not warrant the vacating of the Final Judgment on the initial motion to vacate final judgment, first motion for reconsideration or appeal, and certainly have not gained favor by reiterating same in the instant miscellany of litigation.  However, it is undeniable that the Defendant and [...]’s prosecution of the motion for reconsideration, recording of the lis pendens, and appeal is (1) frivolous, (2) generating a cloud on Plaintiff’s title to the Property, (3) designed to hamper Plaintiff’s rights with respect to the Property, and (4) needlessly causing Plaintiff to incur extensive litigations costs.  Again, the Defendant and his counsel have failed and refused to articulate a single legal basis upon which the trial court could have conceivably had jurisdiction to reconsider the Kemp decision by the Appellate Division.  Furthermore, the --- \(^1\)  The Defendant’s respondent brief erroneously claims that (1) the final judgment was vacated in Tyler, (2) his motion before the trial court after the appeal was timely under the circumstances, (3) he had substantial equity in the property, and (4) that the tax sale law does not require pre-judgment intervention by a lender who provides funds to redeem a tax sale certificate.  New Jersey Supreme Court has now confirmed that Tyler does not provide an independent basis to vacate the Final Judgment.  Further, the Defendant’s respondent brief noticeably fails to address his terroristic threats, which have been brought to [...]’s attention.  Additionally, the Defendant’s harassment of the Plaintiff and its representatives has continued throughout the duration of his second appeal.  (Pa200).  As such, and for the reasons previously enumerated in Plaintiff’s brief, the filing of the instant (second) appeal, which continues the Defendant’s and [...]’s vexatious conduct, warrants the imposition of sanctions.  Consequently, Plaintiff requests that (1) the order denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions be reversed, (2) sanctions be imposed against the Defendant and [...] for Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending the motion and filing the cross-motion to discharge lis pendens in the sum of $6,838.00; and (3) sanctions be imposed upon the Defendant and [...] and that they be ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for its attorney’s fees and costs in defending the second appeal.
[brief] While Defendant agreed to provide a $5,000.00 refund for unsatisfactory work, P-16, Pa96, he somehow also testified that “I’ve never had a bad job. ”  1T56:5.  He even said that he never had any written complaints, T56:24 to 57-1, despite the text messages that he had sent conceding problems.  1T31:5-18, P-16, Pa96.  No explanation was provided how he never received any complaints of any kind yet still agreed to refund $5,000.00 and admitted to incomplete projects.  Businesses don’t refund money for jobs well done.  It would be one thing if defendant testified to facts that contradicted plaintiff’s testimony, but he didn’t.  Had there been competing testimony, the trial court judge would have been obligated to make findings of fact and set forth the basis for credibility determinations.
[brief] R. 4:14-2(a).  That notice is enforceable under R. 4:23-4.  A corporate defendant cannot hide behind R. 4:14-2(c) to shield a director and decisionmaker from testifying in a deposition.  R. 4:14-2(c) merely exists as an alternative when the plaintiff does not know the identity of the corporate witness with knowledge of particular facts.  PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current NEW JERSEY COURT RULES, Comment R. 4:14-2.
[brief] The 1925 Plan of Normandy Beach  In 1925, by way of an approved subdivision plan known as the “Plan of Normandy Beach, Ocean County, N.J.,” (the “1925 Plan”) the [...] (“[...]”) subdivided a large parcel of oceanfront land and created what is now known as “Normandy Beach. ” (Da420-Da424; Pa330). ¹  The 1925 Plan provided for 25 total blocks, featuring eight blocks fronting the beach and Atlantic Ocean.  (Id.).  The 1925 Plan also reserved an area for a potential boardwalk and restrooms, and a two-foot “buffer” between the proposed boardwalk and the eastern boundary of the oceanfront lots (collectively, the “NBA Beach Lands”).  (Da421; Pa330).  The 1925 Plan showed that all oceanfront lots abutted a black solid double line, which abutted a two-foot reservation and proposed “boardwalk,” with the potential boardwalk abutting the beach and ocean waters beyond.  (Id.).  That double solid line remains intact throughout the entirety of Normandy Beach, including all the street ends, and provides a two-foot buffer between the upland lot and the easterly boardwalk reservation.  (Da420-Da424; Pa330).  There were no breaks in the solid double line at either the oceanfront lots or the street ends.  (Id.).  ¹  An enlarged hard copy print of the 1925 Plan is included the [...]’ Appendix at Pa330.  This enlarged copy was provided to the trial court during summary judgment proceedings.  (See T6:18-23).
[brief] Moreover, the reasonable expectations doctrine only enforces the “objectively reasonable expectations of the average insured. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Meier v. N.J. Life. Ins. Co.*, 101 N.J. 597, 612 (1986)).  [...]’s purported reading of the term “disciplinary proceeding” is objectively unreasonable and the answers to the Application questions were objectively false.  That is sufficient for rescission.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  On March 16, 2016, plaintiff [...] visited a strip mall located at [...].  This strip mall was owned by defendant [...].  (Pa118-122, Pa513, Pa1165)  Plaintiff had come to the property to attend a birthday dinner for his son at the [...].  (Pa842, Pa947)  Plaintiff parked his car in the parking lot and began walking towards the rear entrance of [...] to drop off a birthday cake.  (Pa948)  While doing so, he slipped on black ice located in the parking lot.  (Pa842, Pa845-849, Pa1144; Pa1147-1151)  Following the fall, he got up and delivered the cake.
[brief] [...] raises the following arguments in his original brief: *15  Point 1  Defendant's constitutional due process rights were violated by impermissibly suggestive and insufficiently reliable in-court identifications that the trial court permitted before the jury without a line-up or other procedure to gauge their reliability.  Point 2  The jury was misled by the prosecutor's failure to fully disclose the plea agreement reached with a State witness.  Point 3  The admission of hearsay statements made by the alleged co-defendant violated defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him at trial, and the antagonistic defenses that developed during trial warranted a mistrial.  Point 4  Defendant's sentence is improper and excessive.  In his first supplemental pro se brief, [...] argues:
[brief] •  An August 24, 2017 email from Appellant to Respondents is but one example of his systemic fraud.  In the email, Appellant stated they were "dangerously close" to the $200,000 cushion and asked Respondents to defer receiving their salary, which plaintiffs did, in reliance upon his representation.  Respondents proved, by clear and convincing evidence, the actual account balance on August 24, 2017 was $23. 37.  (Da15).  •  Appellant made this misrepresentation knowingly, to continue to hide his use of [...]'s accounts as a personal piggy bank to pay his five [...]' bills.  (Da23).  •  That very same month, [...] paid a total of $251,367.20 to [...] and [...].  Moreover, after his doctoring of the QuickBooks records, Appellant made it appear he had transferred 90% less to his companies than the actual amounts, perpetrating a fraud on the court.  But for the UCC lien, Appellant would have continued his fraudulent scheme as evidenced by the meeting at the end of 2017, weeks before his fraud was exposed, where Appellant requested the threshold be raised to withhold even more funds.  (Da23-24).  •  The court took judicial notice, with Appellant's consent, of the four orders and judgments entered against the [...] at arbitration: $136,759.83 against [...], $294,653.90 against [...], $133,819.09 against [...], and $915,932.63 against [...].  Plaintiffs proved at trial Appellant transferred $1,481,165.44 for his transfers from [...] to [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Plaintiffs further proved they are owed $3,275,967.71 for transfers made by Appellant from [...] to [...] for a total of $4,757,133.15 in compensatory damages.  (Da24).  -  Here, Appellant profited in the amount of at least $4.7 million dollars stolen during a two-year period.  (Da29).
[brief] The Hopkins Factors Control the Analysis in the Present Matter.  [...]’s reliance on Shields is misplaced as Shields does not stand for the proposition that a landlord is free to neglect known and appreciable dangers where it no longer controls the subject property.  In Shields, the New Jersey Supreme Court examined whether a commercial property owner owed tenant’s invitees a duty to clear snow and ice from the property's driveway.  In determining whether a duty of care existed, the Court found that control of the property was not dispositive and that a duty analysis under New Jersey law should be reviewed under the four factors espoused in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF APPENDIX ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................  iv  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................................  1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................  4  I.  The underlying crime ................................................................................................. 4  II.  First sentencing ......................................................................................................... 7  III.  PCR proceedings .....................................................................................................  12  IV.  Second sentencing ..................................................................................................  12  V.  Third sentencing .......................................................................................................  20  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 21
[brief] Standard Refinery, 31 N.J. Super. at 551; see also HLA Associates, 2015 WL 1181271 at *5 (“The polestar of contract construction is to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used by them. ”).  In this regard, unambiguous language will be strictly enforced as written even if, in hindsight, one party regrets the result.  HLA Associates, 2015 WL 1181271 at *5.  As articulated by this Court:  Unambiguous language controls the rights and obligations of the parties, even if it was unwise in hindsight.  The court will not make a more sensible contract than the one the parties made for themselves.  The parties, especially sophisticated ones like the commercial parties involved in this case, are generally in the best position to determine their respective needs and obligations in negotiating a contract.
[brief] “Therefore, a plaintiff, to make a showing of standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), must proffer ‘proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Maio*, 221 F.3d at 483) (emphasis added).  Here, Appellants did not have standing to bring a civil RICO claim because they had no “proof of a concrete financial loss. ”  *See id.*  As set forth in the preceding sections of argument, Appellants defaulted under their Lease, were terminated, and subsequently had their WMPA terminated by [...].
[brief] (21T 134-25 to 135-1)  Outside of [...]’s apartment, officers located surveillance video from the surrounding area.  The State introduced footage from across the street at [...] (24T 110-16 to 21; Da 16), as well from [...] and [...].  (24T 113-3 to 8; 127-17 to 23)  [...] canvassed outside.  (24T 86-6 to 9)  She approached [...], who was standing across the street, and had an unrecorded oral conversation with him.  (24T 86-17 to 19)  Harley told Salmon that his name was Jeffrey (24T 88-16), and that he had lived across the street --- 4  The two seized knives matched those kept in [...]’s drawer.  (22T 224-16 to 21) from [...] — at [...] — for many years (24T 88-8 to 9); he also gave Salmon his phone number.
[brief] Rappeport v. Flitcroft, 90 N.J. Super. 578, 581 (App. Div. 1966); Feil v. Senisi, 7 N.J. Super. 517, 518 (Law Div. 1950).  Defendant has not shown that judicial estoppel affirmatively appears on the face of the Amended Complaint.  Therefore, it is premature for the Court to consider that affirmative defense.
[brief] ”  *N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Comm. Workers of Am.*, *N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, CIO*, 5 N.J. 354, 376 (1950) (emphasis added); *see Berta*, 473 N.J. Super. at 303–04 (“unstated reasons” cannot justify agency decision *post hoc*).  Thus, when an agency acts and provides a contemporaneous reason for that action, it cannot later rely on a different explanation, or argue that the after-the-fact explanation should be implied from its actual reasoning.  Yet, that is exactly what happened here: the Department disapproved [...]’s proposed rate changes based on one set of rationales stated in its letter,\(^8\) and the ALJ and the Commissioner both affirmed that disapproval based on a completely different rationalization—“excessive” rates—*post hoc* after [...] sought administrative review of the disapproval.
[brief] Unswerving, ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing … legislative purposes.  * * *  On numerous occasions we have found ‘such particular circumstances as to dictate not the hard approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice. ’ ***  A ‘just accommodation’ of individual justice and public policy requires that ‘in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed. ’  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333, 337 (citations omitted).
[brief] It is enough that the evidence establishes that the other traffic is “fairly close and visible. ”  *Williamson*, 138 N.J. at 304.  [...]’s testimony—largely corroborated by the body camera videos showing the traffic conditions within minutes of the observed violation—that there was a medium volume of traffic, in an area with numerous businesses lining the road, and cars in both lanes of westbound Route 22 at the time he observed [...]’s sedan sufficiently established reasonable suspicion that the failure to signal may have affected other traffic in the vicinity.
[brief] An appellate court reviews a trial judge’s factual findings crediting those “which are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”  State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 507 (2020).  The reviewing court may not substitute the trial judge’s findings of fact for its own because it may draw a different conclusion from the evidence.  Ibid.  Rather, an appellate court “must defer to the factual findings of the trial court so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. ”  State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277, 297 (2023); see also State v. Evans, 235 N.J. 125, 133 (2018).
[brief] Plaintiff, through her experts, asserts that [...] is liable for [...]’s accident based on [...]’s OSHA violations, its failure to establish a pre-planned traffic pattern, its failure to provide a spotter for construction vehicles in the work zone, its failure to comply with ANSI guidelines regarding work zone safety, its failure to provide adequate lighting for the work zone, and its failure to provide adequate staffing and personnel at the scene of the accident.  Pa132a at No. 51.
[brief] Aisle lights and step lights were all in working order.  Mid-level trailer lights were also in working order."  (Pa93-94).  [...] further wrote, "I checked the lights on the steps, and they were all fully lit and the lights in the auditorium itself were at trailer level and in working order as well."  (Pa93).  All actions taken by [...] in inspecting the theater were timely, proper, and provided in writing to Plaintiff’s counsel long ago in discovery responses served on Plaintiff’s second attorney, [...] of [...] by letter dated July 11, 2017.  (Da55).  Still nothing at this initial stage in post-accident investigation put [...] on notice to preserve the logs generated by the movie scheduling software.  Both witnesses were subjected to detailed and lengthy depositions as exemplified from the portions of their depositions referenced throughout Plaintiff/Appellants papers ([...] at Pa80 to Pa86, PaDa53 to 54 and [...] at Pa87 to Pa92, Pa172, Pa184 and Da69).
[brief] Likewise, upon hire she certified to an insurance carrier that she did not suffer from a mental or nervous disorder.  Pa051; DSOF at ¶ 40.  When confronted as to why she did not do so, she ludicrously replied that maybe she didn’t want to seem undesirable.  Pa051; DSOF at ¶¶ 40–41.  Notwithstanding all these allegations, Appellant never once communicated to her employer that she was disabled due to obesity, high blood pressure, or anxiety or that she needed any assistance because of such purported conditions.
[brief] Appellant therefore submits that the trial Court erred and abused its judicial discretion with perfunctory, unsupported use of the Law of the Case (or collateral estoppel) doctrine in lieu of meeting its obligation to diligently investigate resolve disputed facts of the case.  5.  Further, the Appellate Court stated in its Order of 6/15/2018 that appellant had been provided the opportunity for adjudication of its claims of errors by the trial court.
[brief] However, even assuming *arguendo* that this principle is the case,\(^6\) it would not render the result below incorrect.  First, the contract terms provided by Appellant provided a right to revoke.  Specifically, section 11 of the contract provides, in relevant part:  “Pursuant to the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Employee has twenty-one (21) days from delivery hereof to consider this Agreement.  Employee --- \(^6\)  See *Oubre* 522 U.S. at 427-428, where the Court makes clear holding which answers the effect of OWBPA upon waivers of ADEA claims “irrespective of the validity of the contract as to other claims.
[brief] The procedural history and counterstatement of facts are closely related in this matter and have been combined to avoid repetition and for the court’s convenience.  2  “Da” refers to [...]’s Appendix.  “1T” refers to the transcript of the June 15, 2023 Order to Show Cause hearing.  3  [...] served as Interim Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs from January through November 2020.  (Da42).  the University’s Accreditation Liaison Officer to [...]. ” (Da43).  As to undergraduate and graduate academic programs specifically, [...]’s duties included oversight of all academic programs, administrative units, and centers and institutes within the Division of Academic Affairs.  Ibid.  Additionally, [...] worked to build and strengthen connections between the University and local and regional employers “for the purposes of internships, clinical and practicum positions, and employment opportunities. ” (Da44).  And [...] also “assisted in ensuring the University’s compliance with state and federal regulations and university policies on academic matters. ”  Ibid.  [...] acknowledged receipt of [...]’s request on January 12, 2023.
[directive] While an in-person response to the barricaded individual incident is preferable, telephonic or virtual responses can add significant value as well.  As barricaded individual incidents can occur at any time, Tactical Teams and/or Crisis Negotiation Teams should consider the availability of professionals when establishing these partnerships.  The mental health professional can assist with negotiations by providing advice and information or, with the recommendation of the Crisis Negotiation Team Commander and approval of the Incident Commander, may communicate directly with the barricaded individual, if it has been determined that this may help to resolve the incident.