ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] U.S. Const. amends.  IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.  Both the Federal and State Constitutions protect individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures. ”  U.S. Const. amends.  IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.  Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable.  State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 319 (2023).
[brief] ”  Zive, supra, 182 N.J. at 447.  “Establishment of the prima facie case gives rise to a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the applicant. ”  Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc. 86 N.J. 19, 31 (1981).  The NJLAD is remedial legislation, intended “to eradicate the cancer of discrimination, protect employees, and deter employers from engaging in discriminatory practices," including discrimination based upon disability.
[brief] In September 2016, plaintiff [...] paid $200,000.00 for the annual rent under the land lease, through August 31, 2017.  These dual transactions sale-and-lease were memorialized in a September 21, 2015, Closing Statement showing plaintiffs had paid [...], a total sum of $1,006,000.00.  As shown by the Bill of Sale, the consideration was paid, and the closing of title was concluded.
[brief] Every Municipality was now required to establish a written Master Plan, to be the foundation of the zoning process.  The Master Plan can have a number of elements, such as a land use plan, housing plan, circulation plan, utility service plan, conservation plan, recreation plan, and the like, see *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28*.  The Master Plan is required to be re-examined by the Planning Board at least every ten years, with recommendations periodically to be made by Reexamination Reports as to appropriate changes to be made to the Master Plan or Zoning.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89.  In furtherance of that emphasis on planning, the MLUL provides that all adopted Zoning Ordinances must be reviewed and assessed as substantially consistent with the Master Plan or, if a Zoning Ordinance or Plan deviates sufficiently from the Master Plan, the Governing Body can only adopt such an inconsistent Zoning after recognizing the inconsistency and setting forth adequate reasons in a Resolution documenting the deviation and the basis for adopting that inconsistency, and then only by an enhanced majority.
[brief] The Operating Agreements are extensions of this rescue plan, as evidenced by their execution within 90 days of the MOU (Da311; Da121; Da138), as well as the 2022 Addendum and the ongoing debtor-creditor relationship.  The intent of [...] was to hold title until Plaintiff could repurchase the Property upon repayment of his loans and advances, a purpose reflected across all agreements.  Therefore, the motion court was correct in finding that the MOU was never terminated or abandoned.  --- \(^6\)  Defendants misinterpret the “Entire Agreement” provision contained in Paragraph 10.8 of the Operating Agreements to mean that they supplant or replace the MOU.  (Da133; Db21).  Rather, said provision merely states that the parties cannot look to any other contracts or agreements regarding the structure of the LLC that was formed via the operating agreement.  It does not eliminate the purpose of the MOU.  (1T24:25-T25:3).  POINT II
[brief] | | | Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, | 25 | | 564 U.S. 915 (2011)  | | | Grow Farms Corp. v. National State Bank, | 28 | | 167 N.J. Super. 102 (Law Div. 1979)  | | Hertzberg v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 721 A.2d 43 (Pa. 1998)  ...........................................................................................................
[brief] There is nothing in the record which reveals a "2011" Plat that "shows public rights of way proposed for dedication to the Borough" as suggested by the "Whereas" clause relied upon by the trial court.  All of the foregoing facts lead to the ineluctable conclusion that the byroads at issue are private roads which have a public right of access.  Such by-roads have not been formally dedicated or accepted for dedication by the Borough, by law or otherwise.  POINT
[brief] ACa47-ACa49 ¶¶ 82–86; see also WPATH SOC8 at S77–78 (recommending that “health care professionals discuss the potential benefits and risks of a social transition with families who are considering it” and noting that such communications “facilitate the parents/caregivers’ success in making informed decisions about the advisability and/or parameters of a social transition for their child” (emphases added)), ACa138–39.  These facts counsel for caution, not schools rushing headlong to socially transition every student who asks for it without parental involvement.  Moreover, there are no exigent circumstances in the social transitioning context that would justify schools’ failure to obtain parents’ consent.  While it might be permissible to render life-saving emergency treatment to a child whose parents cannot be located, see D.C.M.M., 2023 WL 5837974, at *2, social transitioning is a slow, deliberative process in which parental involvement is always feasible.  It does not matter that it is students—and not the school—who are initiating the request to be socially transitioned.  As a matter of law, minors lack the “maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment” needed to “make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their [own] need for medical care. ”  *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added); see also *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (noting that children are “vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure” and often make “impetuous and ill-considered . . . decisions”).  Parents—not the State, and not the child—have the “primary role” in raising their children.  *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).  This rule, which contemplates parental participation in children’s healthcare decisions, protects children from their own imprudent decisions.  See *Wallis v. Spencer*, 202 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).  If the rule were otherwise, it would be permissible for a school to employ doctors to distribute Adderall to students before class to help them focus without obtaining parental consent, so long as the students voluntarily sought the medication.  That is not the law.  See, e.g., *Mario V. v. Armenta*, No. 18-CV-00041-BLF, 2021 WL 1907790 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2021) (holding parents’ rights violated when school secretly conducted blood-sugar tests on willing students).  --- 2
[brief] 18  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  MORTGAGE ...........................................................................................................  Pa 1-10  ASSIGNMENT FROM MORTGAGE  [...] TO [...] ..........  Pa 11-12  ASSIGNMENT FROM JP MORGAN  CHASE BANK S/B/M CHASE HOME FIANCNE, LLC TO [...] .........................................................................................  Pa 13-17  ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ................................................. Pa 18-19  ORDER OF APRIL 26, 2019 ...............................................................................  Pa 20 ORDER OF JULY 26, 2019 ...............................................................................  Pa 21 FINAL JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE .......................................................... Pa 22-24 ORDER OF APRIL 1, 2022 ............................................................................... Pa 25-26 ORDER OF MAY 12, 2023 ............................................................................... Pa 27-29 ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 25, 2023 DENYING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ......................................................................................................................... Pa 30-32 ORDER OF MAY 12, 2023 ............................................................................... Pa 33-35 # Table of Authorities ## Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | *In Re Estate of Dawson*, 136 N.J. 1, 20-21 (1994) | 9 | | *In Re Goione*, 595 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2019) | 11 | | *In re Mullarkey*, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) | 7 | | *Marte v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co.*, No. 2:15-0869 (CCC), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149173, at *2-*3 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2016) | 7 | | *Morgan v. Covington Twp.*, 648 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) | 7 | | *Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Powell*, 2007 WL 3376639 (N.J. Superior Ct., App. Div. November 15, 2007) | 14 | | *Nationstar Mortgage v. Guenzel*, 2018 WL 4688271 (N.J. Superior Ct. App. Div. October 1, 2018) | 11 | | *Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc.*, 186 N.J. 511, 522 (2006) | 8 | | *US Bank Nat. Assn v. Riley*, 2016 WL 2888952 (N.J. Superior Ct. App. Div. May 18, 2016) | 11 | | *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991) | 7 | ## Statutes | Statute | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Chapter 225, Laws of New Jersey, 1979 | 5 | STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On February 14, 2005, [...] ("Defendant") executed a note in favor of [...] in the original principal amount of $359,650.00.
[brief] Content  Page STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................  2  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  3 CONCISE STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS .....................  4  REPLY LEGAL ARGUMENT.........................................................  5  POINT I..........................................................................................  5  Defendants’ Owed a Duty to the Plaintiff Due to the Affirmative Creation Exception to Residential Sidewalk Liability............................................................................. 5 CONCLUSION..................................................................................
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................ii  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................iv  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.........................................................xi  PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW.......................................................................................................7  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................9  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE STATE POLICE RETIREMENT  BOARD WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) .............................................................................................................9  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) ...........................................................................................................16  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................19  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] (7T:269-22 to 270-3).  [...] testified that, prior to interrogating [...], she knew that [...], [...]’s 20 year old brother, witnessed the shootings that took place earlier in the night.  (1T 26:5-12).  Despite this knowledge, [...] and [...] asked [...]’s twenty (20) year old brother [...] to sit with [...] during the interview and act as his guardian.  (1T:11-15 to 12-1);(7T:267-19 to 268-6).  [...] testified that she explained to [...] that “he would be the next person in line to be the guardian for his brother” because their “parents were not with us in order to interview [...]. ”  (1T 11:15-20).  [...] testified that prior to interrogating [...] she never gave [...] Kologi Jr. and [...] the opportunity to speak to each other in private, and she “knew that [...] had special needs” but she did not ask if [...] had special needs.  (1T 30:21-25); (1T:35-8 to 11).  [...] testified that she never asked if other family members were available to act as guardian that were not present at the shooting, she never asked if there were other family members available to act as guardian who did not call 9-1-1 to report the shooting, and never asked if there were any family members who did not own the gun that was used in the shooting that could sit and act as [...]’s guardian.  (1T: 31-14 to 32-1).  During the interrogation, [...] admitted to shooting and killing his mother, father, sister, and [...].
[brief] I.  **THE BOARD’S DECISION TO APPROVE THE APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY AND FINAL SUBDIVISION APPROVAL WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE AND VIOLATES THE MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW, THEREFORE THE APPROVAL MUST BE REVERSED AND REMANDED.  (PA304-PA306). **  Pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”), “[a]n ordinance requiring approval by the planning board of either subdivisions or site plans, or both, shall include,” among other requirements, certain provisions for preliminary and final approval of development.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38(a).  This includes provisions such as the streets in the subdivisions or land development of suitable grade and located to accommodate traffic and firefighting and emergency equipment, adequate water supply, drainage, shade trees, sewerage facilities, and other utilities, protection and conservation of soil from erosion, and provisions governing the standards for grading, improvement and construction of streets or drives, and drainage and sewerage facilities.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38.  The MLUL also permits additional provisions to be added to the ordinances requiring approval of either subdivisions or site plans, or both.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-39.  This includes provisions such as for off-tract water, sewer, drainage, and street improvements which are necessitated by a subdivision or land development, standards encouraging and promoting flexibility and economy in layout and design, and requiring common open space.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-39.  For ordinances requiring subdivision approval by the board, there are additional permitted requirements.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.
[brief] \(^4\)  First, [...] is charged with assessing when an attorney is “principally engaged as a debt adjuster” and thus subject to the NJDACCA.  Since the statute does not define what “principally engaged” means, this determination is presumably left to [...] and its Commissioner.  Arguably, New Jersey attorneys perform various debt adjustment activities anytime they are involved in foreclosure actions, as well as bankruptcy, insolvency and collection proceedings.  The Supreme Court has not – and cannot - delegate its authority to [...] to regulate attorneys who as a matter of their regular practice of law perform these debt adjustment activities on behalf of clients.
[brief] The record here is entirely lacking in facts to support a legitimate public purpose, unlike the extensive record before this Court in Mt. Laurel v. [...], 188 N.J. 531 (2006).  Before the trial court, the Township here relied on the open space preservation case Mt. Laurel v. [...], 188 N.J. 531 (2006).  (See 1T17-13 to 18-1).  There, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding in which it reversed the trial court because “Mipro did not present evidence that could support a finding that Mount Laurel’s decision to condemn its property constituted an abuse of the eminent domain power. ”  Mt. Laurel Twp. v.  [...], 379 N.J. Super. 358, 368 (App. Div. 2005).  In that case, the Township sought to preserve land for open space, and the trial court found the condemnation was “for a facially valid purpose, namely, the acquisition of Mipro’s tract to be held in perpetuity as a passive open space,” but the Township’s “real purpose” “was to prevent yet another residential development in a township already under severe development pressure.
[brief] Further, even if the statutory language was not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation entirely superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ””  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011)(quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999).  Accordingly, the Board reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits pursuant to the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] [...], in making his independent finding of guilt, acceded to the credibility findings of the municipal court.  (Da 21).  He also watched the same video.  (Da 21-22).  It follows that when the State presents evidence of defendant’s actual performance on the SFSTs, the supposed testimony of [...] and his assessment of “scoring factors” pales in comparison.  As the State can present its case in the manner it sees fit, it was not required to call [...] since his testimony would have only been cumulative, at best.  The fact that defendant would have preferred to cross-examine [...] does not provide the error he asserts.  As [...] opined in his opinion, if defendant wanted to question [...], he was available for the defense to call at trial.  (Da 18).  Therefore, defendant’s claims of prejudice are of no moment.  In that same vein, [...] noted that “the adverse inference charge enunciated in Clawans has fallen onto disfavor with our Supreme Court in more recent years.  See State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 566 (2009). ”  Indeed, the Court in Hill stated that an adverse inference had the “potential to give undeserved significance to the missing witness and unwarranted weight to evidence presented; potential for abuse and gamesmanship…scholars have questioned the continued validity and utility of the inference.  Id. at 563-64 (citing State v. Velasquez, 391 N.J. Super. 291, 306, (App.Div.2007)).  That’s exactly what the defendant hoped to do in this case in seeking an adverse inference for [...].  Thus, for the factual and legal reasons stated herein, [...] did not err in denying defendant’s baseless request for an adverse inference.  (Db 32).
[brief] ...........................................................passim State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6 (2023)  .........................................................................................22  State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2006) ..........................................................29  Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450 (2014) .......................................................................................23  Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 255 N.J. 36 (2023) .......................................................................................26  Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199 (2014) .......................................................................................29  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) .......................................................................................20, 22 N.J.S.A. 10:5-13(a)(2) ....................................................................................20
[directive] 5.  AFFIDAVITS OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND PRELIMINARY LAW ENFORCEMENT  INCIDENT REPORTS PREPARED AT TIME OF ARREST  5.1  Electronic Submission of Affidavit of Probable Cause.  The Division of Criminal Justice shall work with the AOC to develop and implement practices and procedures that allow an Affidavit of Probable Cause to be filed electronically through the eCDR system to support an application for a complaint-warrant and to supplement any oral statements made under oath by the law enforcement officer applying for the complaint- warrant.  The Affidavit of Probable Cause shall include a check-box allowing the officer to certify that the statements in the Affidavit are true, and acknowledging that the affiant is aware that filing willfully false statements would subject him or her to punishment.  The Affidavit of Probable Cause shall include a concise description of relevant facts and circumstances that support probable cause to believe that the offense(s) was committed and that the defendant is the one who committed it.  The Affidavit shall include a concise statement as to the officer’s basis for believing that the defendant committed the offense(s) (e.g., the officer’s personal observations, statements of eyewitnesses, defendant’s admission, etc.), and shall indicate whether a victim was injured and, if so, the extent of the injury known to the officer submitting the Affidavit.  The foregoing description of relevant facts and circumstances and statement as to the officer’s basis for believing that probable cause exists may be established, or supplemented, by a Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report prepared pursuant to Section 5.2.  See also R. 3:4-2(c)(1)(A).  In that event, the Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report shall be appended to/transmitted with and expressly incorporated by reference in the Affidavit of Probable Cause.  This Section shall become operational immediately upon issuance of this Directive.
[directive] New Jersey is facing mental health and substance use crises that require innovative approaches for 21st Century law enforcement and stretch the bounds of traditional criminal justice responses.  The opioid crisis is an epidemic that is entering its third decade, continuing to evolve and become even deadlier, sparing no community in our state from the wanton destruction to individuals and families.  Similarly, we are experiencing an unprecedented mental health crisis, which, according to the United State Conference of Mayors is marked by “staggering increases in stress, depression, ages. ”1 isolation, loneliness, and accompanying mental health hurdles faced by Americans of all Suicide accounts for the majority of gun deaths in the United States, and firearms are the leading suicide.2 instrumentality for  A person in crisis, no matter the root cause of that crisis, with access to a firearm, can cause irreparable harm to themselves, others, or an entire community.  Relying on traditional criminal justice responses to reduce or alleviate these harms is not enough when lives are at stake.  It is time to rethink the way in which this Department and our State respond to these challenges.  These public health crises have demanded a public safety response that traditional law enforcement strategies—arrest, prosecution, and incarceration—are not adequately designed to handle.  This is particularly true in relation to substance use disorders and addiction, as well as mental and behavioral health issues and crises, which require coordination with professionals from outside of law enforcement community.  In the past, reliance on responses that exclusively involved law  THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE MAYORS, THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS
[brief] Where a motion for a new trial is made on the ground that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the standard of review governing the Appellate Division’s review of the trial court’s decision is essentially the same standard that the trial court follows when deciding the motion for a new trial.  Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6-8 (1969).  Rule 2:10-1 governs a motion for a new trial based on the contention that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  Such a motion shall not be granted “unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”  Ibid.  The appellate court must make its own determination as to whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.