ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 22  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order Granting Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, Filed November 17, 2023 ...........................................  Pa1 Memorandum of Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed November 17, 2023 ..........................................................  Pa2  TABLE OF APPENDIX Order Granting Summary Judgment and Dismissing Complaint Filed November 17, 2023 ..........................................................  1a Memorandum of Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment Filed November 17, 2023 ..........................................................  2a Plaintiff’s Complaint, Filed May 17, 2023 ................................................................. 14a Defendant’s Answer Filed July 2, 2023 .................................................................. 23a Attachment 1 to Defendant’s Answer (Defendant’s Letter Enclosing Discovery Requests) .................. 29a Attachment 2 to Defendant’s Answer (Defendant’s Supplemental Interrogatories to Plaintiff) ............ 30a Attachment 3 to Defendant’s Answer (Defendant’s Document Requests to Plaintiff) .......................... 33a Attachment 4 to Defendant’s Answer (Defendant’s Notice to Preserve to Plaintiff) ........................... 41a Attachment 5 to Defendant’s Answer (Defendant’s Medical Records Release Form to Plaintiff) .......... 42a Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, (Incorrectly Designated Motion to Dismiss Complaint) Filed October 5, 2023 .............................................................. 44a Certification of [...] in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed October 5, 2023 .............................................................
[brief] 3T.  Counsel for [...] argued that the presentation of the contract to them was rejected initially because “it was missing terms that we believed were material..."  1T@6:22-23.  [...] adopted the idea that the Defendant [...] "materially withheld the fact of the ROFR under the motor supply agreement..."  3T@11:13-14.  [...] further attempts to infer that there is a familial relationship between the principal of Defendant [...] and the principal of former Defendant [...], stating: "And the prospective buyer is the brother-in-law of the principal of [...], right?"  3T@12:15-16.  [...] even went further when [...]’s attorney responded that he had no knowledge of their relationship thusly: "Well, [...] is related to [...]."  3T@12:19-20.  The Trial Court was thereafter corrected that in fact there is no familial relationship between the buyer and seller’s principals.  3T@12:21-23.  During argument, the Trial Court asks "How is the offer bona fide when it failed to disclose the existence of the right of first refusal?"  3T@16:17-19 and as counsel for Defendant [...] begins to answer that question, the Court interrupts with the phrase "bona fide" several times.  3T@16:23-25.  Then the Court asks, "The fact of a competitor who has been vested with the right of first refusal would most certainly have had an impact on whether to consider that offer."  3T@17:5-8.  This shows that the Trial Court was mixing up the perspectives between what would be "good faith" from the buyer’s view and what would be a “good faith” offer from the ROFR holder’s view.  While disallowing argument by counsel for the Defendant [...] by repeatedly interrupting counsel, the Trial Court ultimately states, “It’s self defective because it materially misrepresented the existence of the ROFR and represented that everything contained in it was accurate and true. ”  3T@20:1-6.  The Trial Court issued a Decision in favor of the Plaintiff on February 20, 2024.
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[brief] In most of these cases, “it is both scientifically and administratively impossible to allocate to each policy the liability for injuries occurring only within its policy period. ”  Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. Chi. L.Rev. 257, 257–258 (1997).  See 15 G. Couch, Insurance § 220:25, at 220–26 (3d ed. 2005) (with respect to “environmental damage and toxic exposure cases ... it is virtually impossible to allocate to each policy the liability for injuries occurring only within its policy period”).  “When it is impossible to determine the proportion of damage that occurred within each period, the law must allocate damages among the policies. ”  Comment, supra at 258.  Boston Gas, 454 Mass. at 350–51, 910 N.E.2d at 301 (emphasis added).  There is absolutely nothing in the record from the Allocation Trial, or anywhere else, that permits a court to “determine precisely what injury or damage took place during each contract period or uninsured period and allocate the loss accordingly”.  That is why [...]’s ruling is correct and should be upheld.  [...] incorrectly contends that this case is a scientific anomaly, and that the evidence in the record of this case (of which [...]’s appeal cites only a fraction), permits “fact-based” allocation.  This assertion is contradicted by the nature of “property damage” at issue, the content of the R&R, and the testimony and opinions of [...]’s own expert.  And the applicable law.  III.
[brief] In so doing, [...]’s goal appears to be intentionally misleading the public into thinking that the church is located on Lot 19 rather than 20; thus, opening the door for [...] to argue that it owns the property “to the left of the church when one is standing and facing the church. ” that [...] must still demonstrate its “entry and continuance of possession under the mistaken belief that the possessor has title to the lands involved” in order to satisfy the hostility requirement.  *Id.* at 382.  “[I]t is generally agreed that the term ‘hostile’ does not mean that there has to be ill will or malevolence, but the term means only that one in possession of land claims the exclusive right thereto. ”  *Stump*, supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 576.  Even if [...]’s claim of ownership could charitably be described as a claim of mistaken ownership, [...] cannot satisfy the hostility requirement because its sporadic trespasses onto the Property do not pass muster under either the “continuance of possession” rubric articulated in *Mannillo* or the “exclusive right” rubric articulated in *Stump*.  Stated slightly differently, [...] fails to satisfy the hostility requirement for the same reasons it fails to satisfy the continuity and exclusivity requirements.  [...] cannot rely upon the Dwight Aff. for all of the reasons set forth above.  [...] also cannot rely on its claims that it erected a fence on a portion of [...]’s Property to prove the hostility prong either.  In fact, [...] previously stated in its responses to [...]’s RFAs that the fence in question was erected, upon information and belief, by the City.  See Da114-15 at Response to RFA 11.  [...] provided this sworn response because of [...]’s previous representation that he did not know who erected the fence.  [...]’s position has apparently changed as it now claims responsibility for the erection of the fence in order to support its claim for adverse possession, emblematic of the impropriety of [...]’s tactics.
[brief] Following enactment of *N.J.S.A.* 2A:34-1, different courts have found different actions to constitute actual fraud as to the essentials of the marriage.  In *Costello*, the court granted an annulment when the husband concealed from the wife at the time of marriage that he was a heroin addict.  *Id.* at 380.  In *Bilowit*, the court annulled a marriage where the husband had falsely represented prior to marriage that he was a practicing orthodox Jew.  *Bilowit v. Dolitsky*, 124 N.J. Super 101, 103-104 (Ch. Div. 1973).  In *V.J.S.* a judgment of nullity was deemed proper when the husband falsely represented to wife prior to marriage that he shared her wish to avoid having children, but after marriage essentially limited contraception.  (*V.J.S. v. M.J.B.*, 249 N.J. Super 318 (Ch. Div., 1991)).  Reciprocally, however, the court denied an annulment in a case where the husband failed to disclose to the wife prior to marriage that he previously fathered out-of-wedlock children.  *Tobon v. Sanchez*, 213 N.J. Super 472, 474-475 (Ch. Div., 1986).  In *Woodward*, the Court held that misrepresentation prior to marriage as to financial status is not fraudulent.  *Woodward v. Heichelbech*, 97 N.J. Eq. 253 (Chancery, 1925).  In *Rhoades*, the Appellate Division held that a false representation by wife prior to marriage that she had borne a male child was not fraudulent.  *Rhoades v. Rhoades*, 10 N.J. Super. 432, 434, (App. Div., 1950).  In *Pisciotta*, the Court held that a false representation by husband prior to marriage that after wife worked to help pay off his bills, he would have children with her was not fraudulent.  *Pisciotta v. Buccino*, 22 N.J. Super 114, 116, (App.  Div., 1952).  In cases where annulments were granted, a common thread appears to be a finding of a defendant's actual and intentional knowing misrepresentation of a material fact which, under the totality of the circumstances, was significant enough to be deemed "essential" to the marriage itself.
[brief] In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2, this Court employs a *de novo* review and applies the same standard as the trial court.  *Donato v. Moldow*, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 483 (App. Div. 2005)  Under R. 4:6-2(e), a court may dismiss the complaint if the facts alleged do not state a viable claim as a matter of law.  Further, dismissal is appropriate when no rational jury could conclude from the evidence that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case is present.  See Pitts v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 337 N.J. Super. 331, 340 (App. Div. 2001).  A court must search the complaint in depth to determine if a claim may be gleaned from the complaint.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 772 (1989); Smith v. SBC Communications. Inc., 178 N.J. 265, 282 (2004).  The court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and grant plaintiff all reasonable inferences.  Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, 140 NJ. 623, 625 (1995); Communication Workers of America v. Whitman, 298 NJ. Super. 162, 166-167 (App. Div. 1997).  However, the court should not credit legal assertions nor sweeping conclusions.  See, Rieder v. State Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987).  Dismissal is proper when “even a generous reading of the allegations does not reveal a legal basis for recovery. ”  Kieffer v. High Point Insurance Company, 422 N.J. Super. 38, 43 (App. Div. 2011), quoting Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482 (App. Div. 2005).  However, the legal requisites for the claim must be apparent in the complaint, itself.  Teamsters Local 97 v. State of New Jersey, 434 N.J. Super. 393, 412 (App. Div. 2014).  Generally, the scope of the court’s review in a motion to dismiss is limited to the four corners of the complaint.  Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 337 (App. Div), certif. den., 188 N.J. 353 (2006)  However, while consideration of matters outside the complaint will normally convert the motion into one for summary judgment, a court may consider matters of public record and documents attached to the complaint, and analyze the motion employing the motion to dismiss standard.  Teamsters Local 97, 434 NJ. Super. at 412; Williamson v. Treasurer of the State of New Jersey, 350 NJ. Super. 236, 242 (App. Div. 2002) (taking “judicial notice of the fact that pleadings and other documents on file in the Superior Court are generally public records”)  Consequently, since the documents attached to the [...] Defendant’s motion and considered by [...] in granting the motion to dismiss were pleadings, motion papers, and orders entered by the court in the 2015 action, they were public records and, as such, properly considered by [...] without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.  **ISSUE II: THE MOTION JUDGE PROPERLY DISMISSED THE COUNTS OF PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT.
[brief] ”  Pa173.  Not only are Solar Rights divisible and capable of being traded as rights and commodities when they are completed, they also can, and often are, sold at any time during the development process.  Pa173.  By July 2016, [...] had multiple written offers to purchase the Solar Rights for approximately Thirty Five Cents ($0.35) per Watt.  Annexed here is a Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (MIPA) with a third-party for $3 million, one of plaintiffs’ written offers received in 2016, dated July 30, 2016.  Pa173.  After years of efforts by plaintiffs, the 2015 acquisition of solar rights from [...], the Planning Board filings and efforts that resulted in the May 8, 2017, Approval vote, followed by the June 12, 2017, Planning Board Resolution memorializing the Approval, it was a fact that by mid-2017, plaintiff [...] had completed the pre-construction establishment of the Solar Project.
[brief] Statutory Sections of the Workers Compensation Act Do Not Require Insurance Coverage for the Employer’s Alleged Intentional Wrong That Caused Injury  ..............................................................................................................13  B.  The Case Law Does Not Support Plaintiff’s Argument for Mandatory Insurance Coverage for the Employer’s Alleged Intentional Wrong That Caused Injury  ..............................................................................................................18  C.  The Exclusion Plaintiff Challenges Is the Same One that [...] Approved and Required to Be Included in Standard Employers Liability Policies
[brief] Pa018; Pa360.  16.  On or about June 24, 2020, [...]’s filing of its second motion to revoke the Township Defendants’ immunity from builder’s remedy actions.  Pa018.  17.  On August 5, 2020, [...]’s filing of its builder’s remedy action against the Township Defendants in the case entitled [...]Bay Communities, Inc. v. [...] and the Planning Board of the [...], Docket No. [...] (the “Builder’s Remedy Action”).
[brief] State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 (2004).............................................................21  State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111 (2019)......................................................18  State v. Hodde, 181 N.J. 375 (2004).............................................................22  State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135 (2019).............................................................18 State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409 (1997).............................................................21-22  State v. K.W., 214 N.J. 499 (2013)...............................................................20 State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989).........................................................23, 27-28, 40 State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91 (2013).............................................................22
[brief] (37T 79:7 to 80:14).  Though the defendants urge this Court to focus on individual transactions to apportion liability severally, several factors support joint and several liability here.  First, the defendants acted in concert.  The trial court focused throughout both of its opinions on the conduct of all of the defendants acting together, not just some of them as to particular transactions.  This is consistent with the trial court’s findings of conduit accounts, step transactions, and co-mingling of funds, that the defendant companies were “set up in a maze of accounts,” and that “there was a maze and webs created.
[brief] [...] was aware of their marital problems and wanted to protect his interest in the property, in the event they divorced.  In 2013, [...] and [...] signed a mortgage and mortgage note in [...]’s favor, prepared by [...].  The mortgage gave [...] the right to collect on the mortgage note from either [...] or [...].  The mortgage note contains an acceleration clause, which requires payment on demand in the event [...] and [...] divorce.
[brief] (Pa134-Pa135).  On May 19, 2023, [...] filed a notice of tort claim, (Pa143-Pa218), in which he asserted that the April 14, 2023, order “trigger[ed] a new accrual date on many of Defendant’s Federal and State claims as well as raising new ones. ” (Pa147).  Despite the purported change in circumstances, [...] did not file a motion seeking reconsideration of [...]’s then-interlocutory February 15, 2023, order that had dismissed the State Defendants.
[brief] Defendants’ position on this appeal is that the definitions it drafted and implemented in its Policies are of no consequence and were properly ignored by the trial court in granting summary judgment.  In adopting Defendants’ attempt to disclaim the definitions in their Policies and Policy Applications, the trial court missapplied no fewer than four well-established legal principles applicable here: • Plaintiffs were entitled to all favorable inferences in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; • A court should not rewrite a contract for the benefit of the movant; • Ambiguities in an insurance policy shall be read for the benefit of the insured; and • Summary judgment should not be granted prior to the conclusion of material fact discovery.  It is not surprising that Defendants seek to avoid application of their own Policy definitions to this matter as they are irreconcilable with Defendants’ rescission of Plaintiffs’ Policies.  By defining Disciplinary Proceeding to require a relationship between a disciplinary action and the rendering of Legal Services, Defendants knowingly and deliberately narrowed the scope of potential disciplinary actions that were reportable.  Insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and it was fully within Defendants’ power to define Disciplinary Proceeding as broadly as they chose.  That Defendants crafted a narrow definition—one that requires a nexus between the alleged ethical violation and a service rendered to a client—was a choice made by Defendants and one by which they, and the trial court, were required to abide.  Defendants’ position that Disciplinary Proceeding should be broadly construed is inconsistent with the position Defendants took simultaneously with this matter in Blackburn Law Firm, PLLC v. [...], 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39790 (N.D.Ms. Mar. 3, 2021)—a case not reported to the Court by Defendants.  In Blackburn, Defendants successfully imposed a narrow definition of Legal Services to avoid coverage.  Defendants do the exact opposite here—arguing for the broadest possible reading of Legal Services to implicate the OAE Proceedings and draw them within the scope of Disciplinary Proceeding.  Defendants’ selective interpretation of its own definitions is indicative of the lengths to which it will go to support rescission of the Policies.  It no doubt raises issues of credibility in the statements of its representatives, including its underwriter, on whose certification the trial court and Defendants freely rely even though Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to depose him.  Applying the narrow definition of Legal Services Defendants sought and obtained in Blackburn requires a determination that the OAE Proceedings are not a Disciplinary Proceeding.
[directive] The missing and unidentified persons investigative standards establish the following procedural guidelines:  New Jersey Law Enforcement Agencies shall conduct a standard preliminary investigation as soon as a juvenile or adult is reported missing or an unidentified person is found and prepare a standard police incident report documenting the basic facts and circumstances surrounding the incident.  Prompt action shall be initiated in order to locate a missing juvenile or adult or to identify any unidentified person.  Law enforcement agencies shall undertake any other immediate action required to maintain order and protect the public.  Follow-up investigative personnel shall conduct a thorough and timely follow-up investigation.  Investigators shall complete investigative reports documenting the facts and circumstances of the investigation.  FOR MISSING PERSON INCIDENTS:  As soon as a juvenile or adult is reported missing, pertinent information and identifying characteristics regarding the missing person shall be entered immediately into the National Crime Information Centers missing person files.  (NCIC)  A File 6 (NJLETS) teletype messages with all available, pertinent information regarding the missing person shall be broadcast concurrently with the entry into the National Crime Information Center Unidentified Persons File.  The teletype shall be broadcast on a statewide basis and expanded as the need exists.  In addition to a General Police Incident Report, the Missing Person Report for NCIC Record Entry shall be adopted as the standard document for the collection of specific information regarding a missing person in accordance with Federal Bureau of Investigation - National Crime Information Center guidelines.  The New Jersey State Police Missing Persons Report Written Documentation Form shall be used as appropriate.  This document is available for reproduction from the New Jersey State Police Missing Persons Unit.  The Missing Persons Investigation Packet entitled "Missing Person File, Data Collection Entry Guide" should be used to organize data collection and to collect additional information from the family of the missing person and other appropriate information sources during a missing person's investigation.  This document is available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation - National Crime Information Center.  Upon the return or locating of the missing person the record shall be immediately cleared from the National Crime Information Center missing persons file.