ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Opening jury instructions were not included in the transcripts provided.  Still, during final jury instructions, [...] explained that "[t]he burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon the State and that burden never shifts to the defendant."  (7T97-15 to 20).  He essentially informed the jury of third-party guilt when he explained to the jury that "[defendant] as part of his general denial of guilt, contends that the State has not presented sufficient reliable evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he is the person who committed the alleged offense."  (7T107-9 to 13).  And that the "burden of proving the identity of the person who committed the crime is upon the State."  (7T107-13 to 15).  Thus, to find defendant guilty, he explained the State "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this person is the person who committed the crime."  (7T107-15 to 17).  Specifically, the judge instructed that the jury "must determine, therefore, not only whether the State has proved each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, but also whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] is the person who committed it."  (7T107-21 to 25).  And "[i]f, after considering all of the evidence, you determine that the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed this offense, then you must find him not guilty."
[brief] At Pb1, the prosecution points out that law enforcement deemed "a hat lying on the sidewalk" to have evidential significance.  There is nothing in the record associating the hat with either [...] or [...].  At Pb1 to Pb2, the State mentions [...]'s ability to communicate and the subsequent identification of [...] as the shooter.  The defense cannot emphasize enough that this information was presented to the jury in a manner suggesting that [...] identified [...] during the communication:
[brief] [...]’ conviction must be reversed because the physical evidence recovered during the search of [...]’s car should have been suppressed due to the unreasonable actions of police.  Alternatively, the order compelling buccal swabs should be reversed because it is untimely, and the case should be remanded so that [...] may be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f).  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] ”  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 294 (2013) (citing R. 2:10–5).  Original jurisdiction is “particularly appropriate” here “to avoid unnecessary further litigation,” where no “further fact-finding” is necessary to reject Plaintiffs’ argument based on their daughter.  Id.  [...]’s brief made clear that an agency relationship existed on the facts as Plaintiffs certified them to be.  (Db34–37.)  The issue of the daughter’s agency is thus a pure question of law that is well-suited for resolution now without remand.  Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 211 (2011) (appellate courts may resolve agency as “a question of law” when the facts are undisputed); *Still v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.*, 189 N.J. Super. 231, 233 (App. Div. 1983) (exercising original jurisdiction where there was “no dispute” regarding material facts).
[brief] I.  **The Parties.**  [...], a charitable, non-profit health care organization, is one of southern New Jersey’s leading networks of health care providers with hospitals located in Vineland, Mullica Hill, and Elmer.  (Da1-2).  [...] is a registered nurse.  (Pa64 at 12:22-13:6).  She is currently the Director of Nursing Operations at [...].  (Pa65 at 14:2-3).  [...] is the Director of Labor Relations at [...], (Pa90 at 22:2-3), and acts as the Human Resources (“HR”) Business Partner for [...]’s corporate department, (Pa90 at 22:12-23:3).  [...] began working at [...] in 2005 as a security guard.  He later accepted a position in the staffing office at [...], where he worked until his termination in September 2020.  (Pa163 at 13:22-15:7).  [...] began working at [...] in 2010 as a transporter.  She took a new position in the staffing office in August 2019, where she worked until her termination in September 2020.  (Pa228-28 at 10:14-16:19).  [...] began working at [...] in 2006 in the staffing office, where she remained until her termination in September 2020.  (Pa281-82 at 12:24-13:21; Pa283 at 19:8-11).  [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) reported to [...] at all relevant times.  (Pa164-65 at 20:20-21:4; Pa232 at 25:20-22; Pa285 at 25:6-10).  II.
[brief] In summary, and as set forth fully in Respondent’s Brief at Point I.A., a plain reading of the text of the statute as it currently stands shows that it applies at railroad crossings.  Specifically, the language of subsection (b)(5), expressly requires that a plaintiff shall not recover damages due to injury or death caused by contact with a train if the death occurred while the person was “using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations. ”  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(b)(5).  Moreover, the legislative history for the 1998 amendments, the substance of the changes made by the 1998 amendments, and the Appellate Division’s interpretation of the statute in the unpublished decision in Funes ex rel. Estate of Martinez v. [...], No. A-5348-10T1, 2012 WL 4069543, at *3 (App. Div. 2012), all show that the legislature intended the statute to apply at crossings following the 1998 amendments.
[brief] As to the former, the language of the LRHL itself instructs us.  The LRHL specifically incorporates the applicable provisions of the MLUL as follows:  All applications for development or redevelopment of a portion of a redevelopment area shall be submitted to the municipal planning board for its review and approval in accordance with the requirements for review and approval of subdivisions and site plans as set forth by ordinance adopted pursuant to the [MLUL].
[brief] I believe my prior point of negligence on the part of Defendant in not taking any action notwithstanding the approach of Ida, the 4-5 days timeframe Management had to prepare, the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency and the 2014 flood coupled with the Condominium Act and the By Laws as to insurance coverage and the fact the [...] is solely responsible for the exterior of the building is more than sufficient to demonstrate the likelihood of prevailing on the merits.  R. 4:50-1(f) permits courts to vacate judgments for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[brief] ...................... 32  **Cumberland Cty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., Inc.**, 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. Div. 2003) ......................... 35  **DKM Residential Props. Corp. v. Twp. of Montgomery**, 182 N.J. 296 (2005) ............................................. 35, 38
[brief] 11  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW..............................................  11  II.  APPEAL OF AUGUST 22, 2023  FINAL AGENCY DECISION ([...]).........................................................  13  A.  THE COMMISSION’S FINAL DECISION WAS UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND MUST BE REVERSED ([...]).  ........................................................................  13  B.  THE COMMISSION’S FINAL DECISION WAS CONTRARY TO A ROBUST BODY OF THE COMMISSION’S OWN CASELAW; WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE; AND WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE COMMISSION’S STATUTORY MISSION ([...]).  ........................................................................  21  C.  THE COMMISSION’S OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT WAS SO PROCEDURALLY FLAWED AS TO REQUIRE REVERSAL ([...]).  ........................................................................  32  III.
[brief] As already stated in the prior AD raised, and acknowledged in this AD by Respondent itself, there is no reported court decision barring med pay subrogation in New Jersey.  The bar on subrogating med pay benefits the Court of Workers' Compensation is inapplicable here.  An injured party is ineligible for med pay benefits if injured in the course of their employment and eligible for workers' comp benefits.  Since the carrier never owed med pay, the Court did not allow them to subrogate for reimbursement of same.  That is not the situation here as this does not involve a workers' comp claim.  Both [...] and [...] have VOLUNTARILY agreed to resolve these disputes in Arb Forums, not on a case-by-case basis, but in general.
[brief] ”  (Da105-106)  (Emphasis added).  “Other aspects of the voir dire process will remain consistent with in-person practices, with judges exercising substantial discretion as to how to question jurors.  Among other matters, hardship requests will be handled as provided in Section 4.7.2 of the Bench Manual (“The questions regarding disqualification of a juror may be reviewed at the outset along with hardship issues.  Jurors determined by the court to have reasons why they cannot serve can be excused immediately.
[brief] This doctrine is “intended to ‘prevent defendants from manipulating the system,’” applying “‘when a defendant in some way has led the court into error’ while pursuing a tactical advantage that does not work as planned. ”  Williams, 219 N.J. at 89; A.R., 213 N.J. at 561-62.  the sentencing court that defendant “plan[ned] to make the restitution. ”  Compare (13T:4-19 to 6-24) with Orji, 277 N.J. Super. at 589.
[brief] In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Appellate Division.  The [...] and the [...] were improperly reducing reimbursements for out-of-network behavioral health services.  In the prior case, the Appellate Division found in favor of Yucht’s appeal which sought reimbursement at the statutory 80% of reasonable and customary charges for behavioral health services.  *In re Yucht*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188.  Pra1.  As a result, the Commissions adopted resolutions to provide for reimbursement of the improper rate paid by members retroactive to 2009.  Identical to the within appeal, the [...] posted notice on their website with a link to a claim form.  *In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938.  Pra5.  Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.  *Id.* Pra6.  Pa66.
[brief] In re AG Law Enf’t Directive Nos. 2020-5 & 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462, 489 (2021).  In conducting this limited review, courts accord agency actions presumptions of validity and reasonableness, and the burden is on the challenging party to show that the agency’s actions were unreasonable.  Ibid.  This deferential standard, which “recognizes the ‘agency’s expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field,’” is consistent with “the strong presumption of reasonableness that an appellate court must accord an administrative agency’s exercise of statutorily delegated responsibility.
[brief] The PSA “is a binding contract between the parties. ”  3T14.  The parties understood what they signed.  3T15.  It was the parties’ intention to settle their divorce litigation, and the settlement was to include financial consideration to Plaintiff.  During the marriage, Plaintiff did not work, but Defendant did.  She did not receive alimony or equitable distribution under the PSA, other than a car.  3T18.  Plaintiff testified “very credibly” that she expected to receive money from the sale of the business.  “The PSA expressly states in two places that her consideration for entering into the agreement is money from the business’s sale. ”  3T18-19.  The Court found Plaintiff’s testimony at trial “was credible in all respects. ”  3T19.  Defendant claimed that the parties “never intended to honor [the PSA] because he said that the parties were headed towards bankruptcy and he wanted to protect the plaintiff and their assets. ”  The Court “just did not find that to be credible,” noting that this claim was never even raised until trial.  3T14-15.  At the time the PSA was executed by the parties on April 10, 2009, the [...] had already been granted the final order permitting it to exercise its power of eminent domain.
[brief] In the revised publication, “New Jersey Standards For Appellate Review” by [...], Director, Central Appellate Research Staff, Appellate Division, New Jersey Superior Court (August 2022 Revision), it states, “Appellate courts apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings by a judge. ”  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019).  In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts "give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions."
[brief] Furthermore, [...] erroneously found that the Municipal Court Judge did not supervise Petitioner in her work.  (Rb12, 1T105:17-21).  The Respondent cannot have it both ways.  The ALJ clearly made a finding that Petitioner was supervised by the Judge in Winslow which is in complete contradiction to [...].  (Pa16).  The inconsistency between the Respondent’s argument, [...]’s conclusion and the ALJ’s finding are the definition of capricious.  Respondent admits a number of instruction factors which show control over the Petitioner in her work including the requirement that she prosecute on Wednesdays during court sessions, the court administrator sets the docket, the requirement that Petitioner check-in with the court administrator each morning and not being able to leave until Court is adjourned, and the Judge and court administrator set the sequence of court proceedings.  (Rb11-12).  Despite these acknowledgments, the Respondent clings onto the notion that since Petitioner was contacted outside of court hours via her cell phone that Winslow did not control Petitioner.  These minor points which the Respondent tries to bootstrap into a lack of control cannot withstand the mountain of evidence adduced at the time of the OAL Hearing.  (Pb6-10).  Furthermore, the pandemic changed the nature of this factor worldwide and forever in the workplace.  Where someone does the work has less importance than all the other facets.  The part-time Judge also took calls at home or in his private law office and his pension enrollment has never been questioned in any reported case.  Petitioner should be treated no different than the municipal court judge for pension purposes.
[brief] It is more of a hybrid situation where Bank was present with the consumer using a computer taking an application to open a bank account.  The question to be answered is whether a reasonably prudent person or consumer under the facts as exist in the record should have known that he or she was entering into a contract with an arbitration clause by applying to open a bank account without being advised what it was that was being signed, without being offered the opportunity to review what was on the computer screen and without being provided a copy or given access to the documents before the computer screen was signed.  Plaintiff did not have knowledge of the nature and usages of the banking business.  The Bank argued below that (1) Plaintiff did not allege that he ever asked what he was signing or that facts were misrepresented.  Rather he instead relied on his own subjective and mistaken understanding of what he was executing, therefore failure to read the documents he signed does not excuse him from adherence to the terms, (2) Plaintiff did not claim that he requested and was denied a copy of what he was signing instead relying on his subjective and unfounded belief that he was just acknowledging that he opened an account and was giving a sample of his handwriting, (3) by signing the application, Plaintiff acknowledged that by using the account he confirmed receipt of an agreement to be bound by the Bank’s applicable ... account agreement that includes the Arbitration Agreement, (4) “Even if [...] did not immediately receive the Deposit Account Agreement, he knew or should have known how to obtain it” citing to the [...] certification of 1/26/24 (Pa 26) and Plaintiff’s account statement of 7/31/23 at Page 5 (Pa 84).
[brief] ”  Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 193 (2012) (citing Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273-74 (1973)).  The discovery principle “modifies the conventional limitations rule only to the extent of postponing the . . . accrual of the cause of action” date until the plaintiff “discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered[,] that he may have a basis for an actionable claim. ”  Catena, 447 N.J. Super. at 52 (citing Lopez, 62 N.J. at 274-75); see also, Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 (1978).
[brief] [...], a forensic expert provided a certification in support of the defendant’s PCR (Aa 21 to 23) that he reviewed the discovery materials for the defendant’s case.  Following his review, [...] issued a nine (9) page report highlighting trial counsel's deficient performance with respect to the necessity for a forensic expert or crime scene expert to rebut the issues concerning the chain of custody for the DNA and fingerprint evidence, the failure of the detectives to adhere to the evidence storage policies of the [...], and evidence bags being opened and unsealed evidence envelopes.  (Aa 21 to 23)  A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates "a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits."  R. 3:22–10(b).  Porter, supra.  (Emphasis added)  [I]n order to establish a prima facie claim, a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  He must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance.  Thus, when a petitioner claims his trial attorney inadequately investigated his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification.  Porter, supra.  Turning to the matter at hand, it is abundantly clear that an evidentiary hearing was warranted.  The defendant has made a prima facie showing that trial counsel's failure to conduct the necessary pre-trial investigation of the witnesses and evidence highlighted above deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel for a pre-trial suppression hearing and the trial.
[brief] ” (Pa 157, 161).  As [...]’s maintenance crew chief, [...] was familiar with the paper directory on the inside of the door panel of the breaker box alleged to have caused injury to the decedent.  (T91-92).  Based on his actual face-to-face interactions with the breaker box before the accident, [...] affirmatively confirmed “[i]f you were standing in front of this panel and you opened the door and looked at the label and went to Line 36, assume you didn’t know what it controlled, [yes, you would] be able to read what was written on Line 36. ” (Pa 157).  But [...] also indicated that he and his maintenance crew at [...] had performed some troubleshooting for a problem on that same breaker box before the decedent’s accident.
[directive] A. N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1, et seq., Civil Forfeiture; - - 0 - Attorney General’s Forfeitwe Guidelines October and amended; 1992 as €3.  - C. Attorney General’s Executive Directive 1995-3; All State of Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard D.  New Operating Procedures; other applicable federal and State laws and regulations.  All E. from 1 Administration of Funds and Property Resultinq
[brief] .........................  67  Leasehold Estates, Inc. v. Fulbro Holding Co., 47 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 1957)  ..............................................................................  46 Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 385 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 353 (2006).  .................................................  40  Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995).  ........  37 Moore v. Schultz, 22 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 1952) ...........................................  54, 55 Morton Brewing Co. v. Morton, 47 N.J.Eq. 158 (Ch.1890) ....................................  54  New Jersey Suburban Water Co. v. Town of Harrison, 122 N.J.L. 189 (E. & A.1939) .............................................................................................................  54 P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193 (1999) .................................................................  66 PNC Bank v. Axeslsson, 373 N.J. Super. 186 (Ch. Div. 2004) ............................... 43 Rosen v. Keeler, 411 N.J. Super. 439 (App. Div. 2010).
[brief] Fourth, [...] contends that the trial court “failed to draw the inference that Defendant [...] might have leveraged the charge pay issue to derail the investigation into her conduct. ” (See Pb30).  Yet the evidence undisputedly reflects that [...] performed a full investigation of [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct.  And, separately, that the charge pay issue originated with [...], was investigated by [...], and led to [...]’s termination by the termination panel.  While [...] certainly relayed [...]’s discovery to HR, and was a participant in what followed, no reasonable juror could conclude that this was revenge for [...]’s “complaint” about the June 24, 2020 incident.  Especially given that he had “complained”—or, more accurately, griped—chronically about [...] for years, to whoever would listen, without incident.  As had other staffing coordinators for years without incident.  The only other staffing coordinators who were terminated— [...] and [...]—did not complain about the events of June 24, 2020, but were also caught stealing [...] funds.
[brief] A recent decision by the United States District Court in *Nagy v. [...]*, Civil Action No. [...], 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29288, *1-22* (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024) (Pa399-Pa407) is persuasive and directly addresses the issue of spoliation of evidence currently presented before this Court.  In *Nagy*, plaintiff was a patron at defendant, [...], when she slipped and fell on a “greasy substance” on the floor on her way to the restroom, fracturing her hip and femur.  *Id.* at *2*.  Surveillance footage was recorded, which Outback had the ability to save and preserve.  *Id.* at *3*.  Outback’s manager on duty was tasked with saving clips of the underlying incident, but ultimately only preserved approximately 27 minutes in length—5 minutes and 36 seconds before plaintiff’s fall and approximately 22 minutes following her fall.  *Id.* at *3-4*.  Plaintiff sought a finding of spoliation based upon Outback’s failure to preserve more of the video footage from prior to plaintiff’s fall.  *Id.* at *5*.  The Court found a finding of spoliation on Outback’s part and thereby concluded that plaintiff was entitled to an adverse inference jury instruction.  *Id.* at *19*.  In its analysis to determine whether spoliation occurred, the Court assessed whether additional video footage should have been preserved.  *Id.* at *7*.  The Court reasoned that since litigation was foreseeable given that plaintiff was injured and its awareness of the importance of preserving evidence, there was a duty incumbent upon Outback to retain evidence that it knew, or reasonably should have known would likely be requested in that litigation.  *Id.* at *8-9*, *15*.  Additionally, because Outback was a sophisticated business entity and experienced litigant, the Court determined that it should have known, or reasonably should have known, that more than five (5) minutes of surveillance footage prior to plaintiff’s fall was necessary to preserve.  *Id.* at *9*, 11