ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Do you understand that as a result of your conviction your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  b) Èske w konprann ke si yo kondane w epi yo jwenn ke konpòtman ou klasifye pa ajisman [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] repete ak enkontwolab, non ou, laj ou, ras ou, seks ou, dat de nesans ou, wòte w, koulè zye w, ak nenpont ki siy ki ta kab distenge w kankou sikatris oswa tatwaj ou ta genyen, pòtre w, adrès kay w, kòd postal, mak, modèl, koulè, lane ak nimewo plak machinn ou kondwi a, minisipalite ak konte kote w abite ansanm ak deskripsyon zak pou ki w plede koupab la, kab disponib pou piblik la sou entènèt? Do you understand that if you are convicted and your conduct was found to be characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside number of and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  6.
[brief] Defendant-Respondent’s Brief is replete with bold, baseless, and conclusory statements without factual or legal support.  The Plaintiff-Appellant, while a business invitee of Defendant, slipped and fell in a puddle on a concrete floor, sustaining a spinal compression injury that her treating physician described as persistent and progressive, and which will affect virtually every aspect of her daily activities, causing her to have trouble with her legs, her balance, walking, control of her bowel and bladder, and the use of her arms.
[brief] A court order, (default judgment) was issued on March 9,1990, while it was found 33-years later that the 1990 court lacked personal jurisdiction for it was only discovered by the defendant in 2023 that Service of Process had not been executed.  September 22, 2023, the trial court upon this defendant bringing forth a direct challenge relating to the court in 1990 for personal jurisdiction resulted in a denial of claim for Deprivation of Rights (Procedural Due Process Violation/Defective Service).  The plaintiff failed to prove validity of service as established by Third Circuit case law once jurisdiction is challenged by the defendant.  The courts possess -0- records for Service of Process for the hearing that took place on March 9,1990 which led to a default judgement against this defendant.  Upon challenge to personal jurisdiction the trial court misapplied the “doctrines of laches” as its reason for denial of claim to Deprivation of Rights (Procedural Due Process having not been served proper service of process) and failed to correct this defect as to have applied applicable case law that would have voided the 1990 default judgment.  This defendant asks this court to reverse the trial court’s findings and issue an order rendering the 1990 default judgment void as the courts in the Third Circuit have consistently demonstrated via case law based on similar circumstances and evidence.  It has been established when the lower courts deny granting a default judgment void when jurisdiction of a court is challenged by defendant, whereby Service of Process cannot be validated by the person bearing said responsibility upon challenge, the Appellate Division applying applicable case law reverses the lower courts findings in favor for the defendant.
[directive] Americans with Act Disabilities Page 1 of 3  Under the law, the Administrative Director of the Courts is required to provide procedures for those petitions for early dissolution of the statutory prohibition against victim contact, with those procedures to be posted by DOC, JJC, and the Attorney General on their websites.  Accordingly, this directive sets forth procedures for a released defendant/juvenile to file a petition in the county where the conviction or adjudication occurred.  The form “Petition to Dissolve the Prohibition Against Victim Contact” (CN 12699) is available on the Judiciary’s website at http://www.njcourts.gov/forms/12699_petition_dissolve_proh_against_contact.docx.  the Judiciary’s website in the near  The petition will also be translated and posted on A form “Order to Dissolve the Prohibition Against Victim Contact” (CN 12698) for future. use by the court will be available on the InfoNet Forms page (under Criminal and Family).
[brief] The instructions sent to the personal injury attorney handling the Appellee’s unresolved personal injury matters stated:  Enclosed please find a green "Lien" sticker.  Kindly affix this to the above referenced file to serve as a reminder of your client's agreement with [...].  At the conclusion of your client's case, please call the telephone number on the sticker to notify us of the case outcome and, in the event of a successful recovery, for confirmation of the amount owed to [...].  AA0021.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Following a February 16, 2021 snowfall, snow was removed from the subject sidewalk by the Defendants, in accordance with the local North Bergen ordinance (Pa127-130) which provides homeowners twelve daylight hours to clear snow and ice from sidewalks.  Six days later, on February 22, 2021, the day before Plaintiff’s fall, .54 inches of precipitation fell, ending after sunset (5:40pm) at 7pm.  (Pa133-134)  The temperature then dropped overnight, and special weather bulletins for black ice were issued by the National Weather Service of Hudson County at 12:53am and 5:06am on February 23, 2021.  (Pa134)  Plaintiff’s fall then occurred at 6:07am.  (Pa28)  Sunrise was 6:39am.  (Pa134)  Not a single daylight hour occurred between the end of the rain on February 22, 2021 and when plaintiff’s fall occurred before sunrise on February 23, 2021.  (Pa133-134, 136)  Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the Defendants negligently mounded snow uphill from the sidewalk, resulting in a melt-refreeze event.
[brief] **POINT II**  **DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATE ARGUMENTS THAT PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE CAUSATION FAIL BECAUSE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED CR-V FAILED TO PREVENT THE AVOIDABLE COLLISION.  (IT19:5-25)**  Defendant also argued below that plaintiff could not establish causation.  Defendant’s argument focused on plaintiff’s experts’ alleged failures to test the override susceptibility of defendant [...]’s LKAS system and/or due to an inability to prove that [...] would have turned on and/or responded to her warning devices.  Those arguments fail foremost because they involve questions of fact for a jury and should not be decided on motion based on disputed evidence.  Only where the evidence and inferences, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, cannot reasonably support plaintiff’s position may the court decide that plaintiff’s design defect claim fails as a matter of law.  Lewis, supra, 155 N.J. at 577-578.  Breach of duty and proximate cause are questions of fact to be left to the jury.  Townsend v. Pierre, supra, 221 N.J. at 59; Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 153.  The alleged issue of steering torque is a non-issue as a matter of both law and fact.  Plaintiff is entitled to the presumption and inference that had the safety systems been incorporated in the product that Mrs. [...] would have used them.
[brief] [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................................4  A. [...]’S SUMMER CAMP OPERATIONS ..............................................4  B. [...]’S APPLICATION FOR THE US FIRE POLICY .........................5  C.  ISSUANCE OF THE US FIRE POLICY .............................................................9  D.  THE ACCIDENT ...............................................................................................11  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................11  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................16  A.  This Appeal is Barred by the Direct Action Statute ........................................16  B.  US Fire Established the Elements of Equitable Fraud ....................................19  C.  The Supplemental Form is Objective and Unambiguous .................................26  D.  US Fire Established Materiality and Reliance ................................................31  E.  The Terms of the US Fire Policy Do Not Impact the Application of the Equitable Fraud Standard .................................................................36  F.  US Fire Does Not Rely on an Exclusion ..........................................................38  G.  The US Fire Policy is Not Subject to Financial Protection Laws .................40  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................42
[brief] Moreover, the Legislature’s violation of its rules and procedures for including the public demonstrates that it violated the [...]’ constitutional right to make their opinions known to their law-makers before enactment of such a controversial statute like reproductive freedom.  The Constitution provides:  All bills and joint resolutions shall be read three times in each house before final passage.  No bill or joint resolution shall be read a third time in either house until after the intervention of one full calendar day following the day of the second reading; but if either house shall resolve by vote of three-fourths of all its members, signified by yeas and nays entered on the journal, that a bill or joint resolution is an emergency measure, it may proceed forthwith from second to third reading.  No bill or joint resolution shall pass, unless there shall be a majority of all the members of each body personally present and agreeing thereto, and the yeas and nays of the members voting on such final passage shall be entered on the journal.  N.J. Const. art. IV, § IV, ¶ 6.
[brief] ”) (quoting William A. Carey & Co. v. Borough of Fair Lawn, Bergen Cnty., 37 N.J. Super. 159, 166 (App. Div. 1955)) (emphasis original to [...]); Suburban Disposal, Inc. v. Twp. of Fairfield, 383 N.J. Super. 484, 492 (App. Div. 2006) (“Fundamentally, bidders and the public entities that solicit bids are bound by the express terms of the bid proposal.  Settled principles of public bidding dictate that no material element of a bid may be provided after bids are opened. ”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Here, bids were opened on July 30, 2024, Da4, and that is the date by which the Court must determine whether [...]’s bid was responsive.  The NJDOT Notice was unequivocally a required document, Da16, Da110-111, and there is no dispute that [...] did not submit the NJDOT Notice on July 30, 2024.  The critical date remains July 30, 2024, when evaluating the materiality of the defect and the County’s determination whether to waive the defect.
[brief] Exhibit 5 – May 21, 2022  Email from Plaintiff to Defendant [...]  ........................................................................Da285-88  Exhibit 6 – Reply Certification of [...], Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da182-91 ........................................Da289  Exhibit 7 – Transcript of Motion related to Motion to Show Cause in Chancery Action, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see 2T ........................................................................................................Da290  Exhibit 8 – Letter to [...] from [...], Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments........................................Da291  Exhibit 9 - Letter to [...] from [...], Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments........................................Da292  Exhibit 10 – Answer to Counterclaim, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da265-74 .................................................................Da293  Exhibit 11 – Verified Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da220-48 ........................................................................................................Da294 Exhibit 12 – Unpublished Decision, Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments................................................................................Da295 Exhibit 13 – Unpublished Decision, Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments................................................................................Da296 Exhibit 14 – Unpublished Decision, Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments ........................................................................................................Da297 Exhibit 15 – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments .........................................................................................Da298 March 8, 2024 Order Denying Consolidation ........................................................Da299-300 April 10, 2024 Motion to Compel Arbitration in Law Division Case ........................................................................................................................................................................Da301-03 May 17, 2024 Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Arbitration ........................................Da304-06 May 16, 2024 Certification of [...]-Elian in Support of the Motion to Compel Arbitration ........................................................................................................Da307-09 Exhibit A – May 14, 2012 Memorandum of Understanding ......................Da310-14 Exhibit B – May 14, 2012
[brief] b.  Defendants had constructive notice because the recorded documents in the chain of title, from their immediate predecessor’s acquisition forward (i.e., the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed, the Subdivision Plan, the Confirmatory Deed, and Defendants’ Deed) demonstrate the mistake and Plaintiffs’ title or claim.  The trial court properly recognized that, if Defendants had simply looked at their chain of title from [...]’s acquisition of Lot 3 forward, they would have seen the mistake.
[brief] The federal appellate court’s decision in In re Actavis, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 39254 (3d. Cir. Dec, 6, 2019) provides no support for the ESI Order.  The Actavis court did not address the merits of whether the federal district court’s discovery order in that case constituted an abuse of discretion.  Actavis at *8.  There, without deciding if the trial court abused its discretion, the Third Circuit found that petitioner had failed to satisfy the rigorous standard for extraordinary mandamus relief.  Actavis at *8.  See also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190, 130 S. Ct. 705, 175 L. Ed. 2d 657 (2010) (“Before a writ of mandamus may issue, a party must establish that (1) no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. ”) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary circumstances).
[brief] “[T]he existence of alibi witnesses [is] peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant himself.  If he failed to cooperate with counsel by informing him of their existence, then he cannot now complain that counsel did not know of them. ”  *State v. Gonzalez*, 223 N.J. Super. 377, 392 (App. Div. 1988) (quoting *People v. Elder*, 391 N.E.2d 403, 411 (Ill.App. Ct. 1979)).  Here, the PCR court properly found [...] credibly testified that defendant never told him about [...] or [...] prior to trial.  Defendant had an obligation to tell [...] about these witnesses.  [...] could not have investigated witnesses he did not know existed.  The court’s conclusion is further bolstered by the investigative reports of the two witnesses from 2019 and 2020 which confirmed that defendant did not know about these witnesses at the time of trial.
[brief] ”  *Bartlett*, 51 N.J. Super. at 244.  The trial court ultimately ruled for the defendants, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint because they “had failed to sustain their burden of establishing that the amendatory zoning ordinance was arbitrary or unreasonable. ”  *Ibid.*  The *Bartlett* court does not, at any point, state that, by specifically listing permitted uses, municipalities regulate and restrict the construction and use of buildings within that district to only those specifically enumerated.  In *Financial Services, L.L.C. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Borough of Little Ferry*, the defendant the [...] “denied [the] plaintiffs’ application to permit a check-cashing business in an existing structure at the site of a gas station located on a nonconforming lot. ”  *Fin. Servs.*, 326 N.J. Super. at 267.  The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision, and the plaintiffs appealed.  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division noted that “the ordinance was exclusionary for those uses not specifically permitted. ”  *Id.* at 270 (emphasis added).  Later, in reaching its decision, the court noted that “[t]he ordinance specifically provides uses expressly prohibited are not permitted. ”  *Id.* at 274 (emphasis added).  Nowhere does the court state or imply that, in the absence of express language to the contrary, the “presumed legislative intent” when construing a zoning ordinance is that only uses specifically listed in the ordinance are permitted.  Significantly, the [...] do not expressly state that any use not expressly permitted is prohibited, and Defendant does not provide any citations to the ordinances to support this contention.
[brief] For example, the doctrine of partial or substantial performance would apply to adjust the contract price to reflect “a sum sufficient to compensate the other party for or cover correction of the defective aspects of the performance. ”  See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Quinn, 143 N.J. Super. 237, 252 (Law Div. 1976).  A finding that there were genuine issues as to the CFA necessarily implicates the issue as whether plaintiff paid too much or must otherwise be compensated to correct deficiencies related to warranties and performance of the system.  See Model Civil Jury Charge 8.45; See Price v. B. Construction Co., 77 N.J. Super. 485 (App. Div. 1962) (involving a clause in a contract warranting that the cellar in a new home being sold would be free from water for a period of one year from date of closing title, the court concluded that the parties bargained (1) not for a one-year result, but (2) for work of greater expectable life but supported by a guarantee for a portion of that period; and that the proper measure of damages was the “entirety of such sums of money as were required to be expended by plaintiffs in correcting the defect complained of. ”).
[brief] Since Plaintiffs admit to the illegality of the actions herein, clearly the licensing provision of ABCA was not followed.  Furthermore, the [...] in its municipal code has inter-alia adopted the same restrictions as those contained within ABCA.  See Alcoholic Beverages, HOBOKEN MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 68; see also N.J.S.A. 33:1-40.  Specifically, Hoboken has enacted regulations on the consumption of alcohol in public and on public property as follows:  The drinking of alcoholic beverages on the public streets of Hoboken is hereby prohibited.  No person shall serve, sell, dispense, drink or consume any alcoholic beverage…upon any public grounds, parks…  See *Alcoholic Beverages*, HOBOKEN MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 68, §68-13 (emphasis added).  Consequently, it is illegal to both sell alcoholic beverages within the city limits of Hoboken without a license and to consume alcoholic beverages on public property.  This illegal activity is precisely that which Plaintiffs are alleging is the “dangerous condition” at issue in this instance.
[brief] ” (Da112 to Da113).  The only evidence that could possibly support the notion that people would not use the Nixle alerts is [...]’s post-decision survey that they conducted after they received the Court’s decision, and even then only they presented evidence that only two people indicated they wanted to be removed from the Nixle alert list (and one of them was a [...] City employee).  In support of both their motion for reconsideration in the Trial Court and on this appeal, [...] relies on the results of an online internet poll.
[brief] (Pa0248, Art. 1.23; Pa0261, Art. 11.2.)  The Seller’s Environmental Obligations are set forth in Article 11.2 of the PSA, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:  Except for Purchaser’s Environmental Obligations as expressly set forth herein, and subject to the provisions of this Article 11, Seller agrees, at Seller’s cost, from on or after the Effective Date not to place upon nor permit the placing at, on or under the Premises of any hazardous materials.  Seller shall after the Effective Date cooperate with Purchaser and Purchaser’s LSRP to secure prior to Closing of to the extent possible a site-wide RAO for all AOC’s comprising the Groundwater Obligations.  The preceding sentence, together with Seller’s obligations set forth in this Article 11, are sometimes collectively referred to herein as “Seller’s Environmental Obligations” .
[brief] [...] gave the jury the correct instruction on the lesser-included offense of theft from the person.  Defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury on second degree robbery is incorrect.  First, the model jury charges for first-degree robbery encompass the jury instructions for second-degree robbery.  Second, [...] very clearly instructed the jury on the elements of the offense and informed the jury that they had to find defendant guilty of second-degree robbery if they did not find that defendant threatened the victims with a weapon.  [4T123-12 to 128-25].  Defendant argues that because [...] omitted the phrase that states that “robbery is a crime of the second degree, except it is a crime of the first degree” if the defendant is armed, or threatens the use of, a deadly weapon, the jury instructions are wholly insufficient to have conveyed the law to the jurors.
[brief] **THE INTRODUCTION OF PAST ACTS OF DRUG DEALING WITHOUT ANY LIMITING INSTRUCTION REQUIRES REVERSAL OF RINES’S CONVICTIONS.  (Not Raised Below)**  [...] was charged with possession and possession with intent to distribute drugs for his conduct on April 10, 2021.  But his passenger and co-defendant, [...], was permitted to testify that her relationship to [...] was that of drug dealer and customer – that when she met [...] in a trailer park several months before the incident, she would buy heroin from him, and that “a lot of the time” he would give it to her for free.  (4T 129-20 to 130-10)  This revelation was highly prejudicial in a trial where the defense’s position was that the drugs did not belong to [...].  The inflammatory effect of the testimony that [...] dealt drugs on unrelated prior occasions was heightened by a recurring theme of the State’s presentation: that [...] was responsible for keeping [...] in the throes of addiction. \(^3\)  The admission of this evidence without any limiting instruction violated [...]’s rights to due process and a fair trial.  *U.S. Const.* amend. XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, & 10.  His convictions must be reversed.