ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is no obligation under any statute or administrative code provision requiring an applicant to a local governing body for a cannabis license to submit a signed application for a Resolution of Support.  The trial court undertook a thorough review of the record, applicable law, and [...]’s contentions respecting the process undertaken here.  And, it found that the record on which the Borough acted was sound, compliant with law, and that in consequence, the process was not infirm as [...] maintains.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................................. v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  5 POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below T1; T2) .........................  5 POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EMPLOYING THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO BAR DEFENDANT’S REQUESTED RELIEF (Raised Below: T1)  .........................................................................................................................  6 POINT III.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MS. FRANCAVILLA’S MOTION  BECAUSE [...] VIOLATED A REMEDIAL CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTE TO OBTAIN THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Raised Below: T1)  .............  9  CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................................  19  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] There is only one question appropriately before this court—whether the Legislature followed constitutional procedures in enacting the statute.  After all, N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 to -7—on which Petitioners rely to invoke this court’s original jurisdiction—provides limited grounds for a citizen to challenge the machinery by which a bill was enacted into law.  *In re Gilmore*, 340 N.J. Super. 303, 306 (App. Div. 2001).  As this court and our Supreme Court have explained multiple times, the court’s “sole quest” in a case brought under N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 to -7 “is to determine whether the statute in arriving in its status as a law reached there by a route condoned by the Constitution. ”  *Application of Forsythe*, 185 N.J. Super. 582, 587 (App. Div. 1982), aff’d 91 N.J. 141 (1982); see also, e.g., Lamb, 67 N.J. Super. at 43, 59; *In re McCabe*, 81 N.J. 462, 467 (1980); *Freygang*, 46 N.J. Super. at 17; *In re “An Act to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act Governing Public Utilities’”*, 83 N.J.L. 303, 307 (Sup. Ct. 1912).  A court may invalidate a law only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the law was not duly passed by both houses of the Legislature, or approved by the Governor or otherwise made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution.  See N.J.S.A. 1:7-1.\(^8\)  That single challenge fails.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  “An employer must be free to investigate complaints of employee misconduct without fear of LAD liability.  Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 484 (App. Div. 2008); see also El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 170 (App. Div. 2005).  The fact that a plaintiff files a lawsuit against her employer does not mean she can then ignore basic employment policies, nor does the lawsuit insulate a plaintiff from being subjected to disciplinary procedures.  The Trial Court below properly held that Plaintiff-Appellant failed to establish a claim for NJLAD retaliation against the [...] and Individual Defendant [...] where Plaintiff-Appellant failed to establish an adverse employment action, and further failed to establish any causal connection between the alleged retaliatory act(s) and the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint in 2016, many years before.  For the reasons set forth herein, this Court must affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
[brief] The following facts were set forth in this Court’s April 9, 2019 opinion, affirming defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal:  On the afternoon of March 25, 2015, [...], a licensed bail bondsman, traveled to the residence of [...].  [...] enlisted Wilson’s help in apprehending [...], who was wanted for failing to appear at a court hearing.  Wilson was a former associate of Webb’s.  Wilson admitted she and Webb participated in a car rental scheme whereby Wilson rented cars in her name for Webb to drive because Webb did not have a license; she also admitted to purchasing heroin from Webb.  [...] asked Wilson if she would be willing to set up a meeting with Webb so [...] could apprehend him.  Wilson agreed.  In exchange, [...] gave her $100, and promised her assistance with her “municipal problems,” which included a pending charge related to the car rental scheme.  Wilson contacted Webb and arranged for him to come to her residence that night.  When Webb pulled up, Wilson sent [...] a text message, and, within moments, “a couple of cars pulled up.  One pulled from the front to block [Webb] in and another came from the back so his car wasn’t able to move. ”  Wilson testified she was “pretty sure” [...]’s red Dodge Avenger was in the back and a white Chevrolet Impala associated with defendant was in the front.  Wilson testified she observed four people exit the Dodge and the Impala.  By that time, it was dark outside so Wilson could only positively identify [...] and [...], but she was certain the other two were black men.  Wilson testified they all yelled at Webb to get out of the car.  In response, [...], Webb’s seventeen-year-old passenger, emerged from the car, but Webb did not.  Instead, Webb drove his car back and forth, hitting the vehicles blocking him so he could get away.  Webb then fled in his silver Chevrolet Malibu.  Defendant, [...], and co-defendant [...] pursued Webb as he fled.  Diaz testified she was driving the Impala, which belonged to the mother of one of defendant’s children, during the high-speed pursuit, which eventually terminated in a wooded area behind a motel in [...].  Diaz also testified Webb was unable to exit his car via the driver’s side door because she stopped the Impala alongside the Malibu.  Diaz admitted Webb “was trying to get out.  He was coming from the driver’s side leaning over to the passenger’s side trying to get out the car. ”  Webb testified it was at that point defendant opened the passenger’s side door, jumped in, and hit him in the head with a tire iron.  Diaz’s testimony corroborated Webb’s — she stated she witnessed defendant hit Webb in the face with the tire iron.  Webb stated he received seven stitches in his forehead as a result of defendant striking him with the tire iron.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 26:3-31 delineates specific grants of enabling authority to local Boards of Health in terms of adopting ordinances and rules and regulations.  As stated before, none of these deal with noise.  The very oblique reference to noise in regard to enforcement of laws, rules and regulations dealing with compliance with environmental health activities does not rise to the level of specificity needed to convey that a state statute was intended expressly or impliedly to govern the field.  The case law is clear that simply because the Legislature has legislated on a subject is insufficient, by itself, for preemption of a municipal ordinance to be found.  Tumino v. Long Beach Township, 319 N.J. Super. 514, 521 (App. Div. 1999); Mannie’s Cigarette Service, supra, 259 N.J. Super. at 348 (citing State v. Crawley, 90 N.J. 241, 249 (1982)).  In fact, this attenuated reference to noise under a model nuisance code or in a regulation does not rise to the level of those areas where the Courts have found preemption to be present.
[brief] [...] (F/K/A [...])  Plaintiff-Appellant V. [...], (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...]); [...]; [...] (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...]); [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...]); NEWARK SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...] TEAM 2
[brief] Further, § 1692c(b) only prohibits communications made “in connection with the collection of a debt. ”  As the court in Miller noted, the transmission of data to the vendor was not an attempt to collect the debt, because the debt “was of no moment whatsoever to the letter vendor or its personnel. ”  Miller, at *8; [...] Transcript at T10-11 (adopting the reasoning of the Miller Court).  While the printing and mailing of the letter by the vendor to Appellant may have been an attempt to collect a debt, Respondent’s prior transmission of data to the vendor was not.  Put otherwise, Respondent’s transmission of data to the vendor and the vendor’s later mailing of the letter to Appellant are separate and distinct acts.  Accordingly, Respondent’s transmitting data to its letter vendor so that the vendor could then undertake the rote administrative task of printing and mailing a letter on its behalf is not a “third-party” “communication” made “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA therefore does not apply.
[brief] *State v. Marshall*, 123 N.J. 1, 145, 586 A.2d 85 (1991), *cert. denied*, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct.  1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993).  In looking at the jury charge as a whole rather than in isolation, as defendant would have this court do, it is clear that the jury was properly charged on the law of second-degree robbery.  The elements of second-degree robbery are (1) defendant was in the course of committing a theft; and (2) while in the course of committing that theft, defendant threatened another or purposely put another in fear of immediate bodily injury.
[brief] By the ten (10) day mark, September 4, 2023, Plaintiff notified Defendants that it was appealing the final judgment and “does not wish to close or otherwise take ownership of the [property] pending a full and final resolution of Plaintiff’s Appeal. ”  As an experienced developer, Plaintiff was, and is, fully aware of the DEP regulatory trajectory, (2T101-21 to 102-7) and specifically, the timeline for this property.  7T24-4 to 7.  It is no accident that the delay combined with the demand for another reduction in price was timed precariously for the Defendants and to the benefit of Plaintiff.  Defendants will be in direct regulatory oversight on May 7, 2024.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  7.8.3  The law is somewhat less restrictive as to searches conducted during an administrative investigation.  While it appears that an employing agency does not need a warrant to conduct a search during an administrative investigation, the investigator should exercise great care when searching property or items in which the subject officer has a high expectation of privacy.  Internal affairs investigators should document their reasons for conducting the search and limit its intrusiveness.  If any doubts or concerns exist about the propriety or legality of a search, the investigator should seek advice from legal counsel before proceeding with the search.  7.8.4  During either administrative or criminal investigations, generally workplace areas may be searched without a warrant.  The critical question is whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or property the investigator wants to search.  The determination of this expectation must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  There are some areas in a person's workplace where this privacy expectation can exist just as there are some where it does not.  Areas that several employees share or where numerous employees go to utilize files or equipment would present no expectation, or a diminished expectation, of privacy.  Included here would be squad rooms, lobby areas, dispatch areas, government- provided vehicles (patrol cars), general filing cabinets, etc.  7.8.5 However, employees may have a greater expectation of privacy in their own lockers, assigned desks or possibly in a vehicle assigned to them solely for their use.
[brief] (11T 30-19 to 34-21; Da14) ..................................................................................................................  21 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................  26  INDEX TO APPENDIX PAGE NOS.  [...]........................................Da1-3  Order dismissing Certain Counts of the Indictment................................Da4  Order denying Suppression Motion......................................................Da5-6  Jury Verdict Sheet...............................................................................Da7-8  Judgment of Conviction.......................................................................Da9-11  Brief in Support of Motion for New Trial ..........................................Da12-13  Order denying Motion for a New Trial..................................................Da14  Notice of Appeal ................................................................................Da15-18  Surveillance Footage (Front of House)................................................Da19  Surveillance Footage (Back of House)................................................Da20  Audio Record of Trial Proceeding, July 22, 2022.................................Da21  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, & RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] A motion to vacate a foreclosure judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion, found “when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'"  U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-468 (2012).  Reconsideration is also reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996).  A court mistakenly exercises its discretion when it "fail[s] to give appropriate deference to the principles" governing the motion, relies "upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors," or rests its decision "on an impermissible basis."  BV001 REO Blocker, LLC v. 53 West Somerset Street Properties, LLC, 467 N.J. Super. 117, 123-124 (App.Div. 2021), multiple citations omitted.  Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467.  As to the legal issue of the Recording Act, equity follows the law and a trial judge’s personal beliefs are insufficient to deprive a party of its statutory rights.  IMO Estate of Shinn, 394 N.J.Super. 55, 67 (App.Div. 2007).  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹
[brief] The trial court erred by failing to reject and deciding to enforce a Boundary Commissioners’ Report which affected parties not before the court who did not have an opportunity to participate in the procedure prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1, et seq. (1T 150, ll.4-7; 1T174 - 178; Pa95 & Pa96).  The [...] first turn to the issue of the effect of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report on parties not before the trial court.  Obviously, any reference to the Report demonstrates that it shifts the boundary lines of properties owned by individuals not before the Court, and not even part of the original 1956 subdivision of the four lots Nos. 9-12.  See, e.g., Report, Pa136.  The trial court --- \(^3\)  See Testimony of [...], PLS, 1T35, l.19-36, l.19 & T38, ll. 6-20. recognized this fact and attempted to address it by requiring notice to be given to the owners of Lots 9, 12, 13 & 16 on the same street as the [...] and [...].  See Pa95 & Pa103-4.  The [...] maintain that post-trial notice did not inform the other property owners of their interests at stake, and does not provide them with an opportunity to fully participate in the process provided by N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1.4  The [...] presented an alternate resolution at trial which would not have affected any other parties before the trial court.  The proposed Ludwig Line (Pa148) adjusts only the boundary line in dispute, and leaves all other boundary lines where they have always been in accord with the original subdivision and subsequent surveys.  In failing to consider the Ludwig Line, the trial court rejected the one remedy that would resolve this dispute without involving non-parties.  Consequently, one has to question why the trial court in its Final Order (Pa96) chose to impose the chaos which it said it wanted to avoid.  See 2T5-17.  It did so by failing to follow the Report’s recommendation, as if to hide its consequences.  It must be emphasized that the [...] will not gain any square footage by enforcing the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  They will merely get a slice of the [...]’ property while losing a commensurate amount of their property on 4  Alternatively, the [...] requested time to join these other parties when the trial court made clear that it planned to proceed to enter the Final Order over the [...]’ objection.  The trial court denied that request.  See 2T9-18.  the north side.  This negative impact upon the [...] appears to satisfy the [...] regardless of the consequences for them or others.  The [...] proposed a compromise line in order to resolve this dispute once and for all.
[brief] Ironically, despite the described conduct of [...], [...], and [...] none lost their public job as Plaintiff is facing here.  [...]’s alleged actions had no connection to his role as a commissioner or to the sewerage authority’s business.  No matter one’s opinion of the propriety of the video, possession of the video is not criminal or illegal.  [...]’s removal of Mr. [...] was “arbitrary and capricious” because the governing body substituted its own opinion of its power to remove Mr. [...] from the authority while completely disregarding the standard that the Legislature created.  A town’s governing body must follow the law, and not decide instead to substitute its own opinion of what the State’s laws should be for its own purposes.
[brief] Since the offense, defendant has earned straight A’s, has had zero disciplinary infractions, and has been on the honors unit at the YDC.  In addition, he currently attends college classes.  So I will take into account these things that the defendant has done while he has been in jail.  However, defendant knew killing was wrong at the time of the crime.  In addition, the record lacks any indication that the defendant is remorseful for his actions, even years after the offense.  Alarmingly, even today he shows no sign of remorse at all.  And by listening to the family today, if he’s not going to show today, he’s never going to show remorse in the future.  At this juncture, this Court does not find that there is a significant possibility of rehabilitation.
[brief] ]  The DEP further found that, “stormwater BMPs and flood hazard calculations based on this obsolete data will inadequately protect against the adverse impacts of flooding due to increasing precipitation resulting from climate change. ”  Id. at 2172 (emphasis added).  This is a damning admission by the DEP.  To be clear, the Appellant does not claim that the IFPR should have governed the procedures for the DEP’s permit decision in this case.
[brief] However, we owe no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law.  See State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211, 228 (2013) (internal citations omitted).  Nor are we “obliged to defer to clearly mistaken findings ... that are not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277 (2014).  To a considerable extent, the court's ruling on the suppression motion embody a mixture of factual and legal determinations, and the significance, under search-and-seizure principles, of factual details that emerged at the hearing.
[brief] Da40.  Paragraph 4 of the snow-removal contract was captioned “Indemnity. ”  Da45, ¶ 4.  Paragraph 4 stated:  Indemnity:  To the fullest extent permitted by law, Contractor shall be responsible for claims to bodily injury and property damage due to Contractor’s negligent snow plowing work that may arise at Customer’s premises while Contractor is physically on premises.  To the fullest extent permitted by law, Customer shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless Contractor, its owners, agents, consultants, employees and subcontractors from all claims for bodily injury and property damage that may arise from Customer’s premises including an[y] acts or omissions by Customer or Customer’s subcontractors whether employed directly or indirectly for ice which forms from daytime melting from snow and ice which is removed from, brought in by or in between vehicles.  [Da45, ¶ 4.]  Paragraph 2 of the snow-removal contract stated:  The Customer understands that plowing or ice control of a particular location may not clear the area to “bare pavement” and that slippery conditions may continue to prevail even after plowing or ice control have occurred.  The Customer understands that vehicles are constantly entering and leaving the property and that these vehicles frequently drop snow and water onto the areas where they park creating slippery conditions and that [...] is not responsible for cleaning between or under these vehicle or other stationary objects (including curbs, walks, or structures) where the clearance is less than 4 feet or monitoring these areas on a 24 hour basis and therefore will not be responsible for any injuries that occur as a result of these conditions.  The Customer understands that the Contractor assumes no liability for this natural occurring condition.  [...] and the Client acknowledge that it is impossible to “clear” or “remove” all snow and ice from any time, even after services are properly completed.  The Customer is aware that weather conditions may change rapidly and without notice, and that Contractor assumes no liability for such changes in conditions.  During operations and after completion of operations  Customer agrees to indemnify and save harmless the Contractor and its employees against any and all claims by the Customer, it’s [sic] employees or third parties, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, surrogates or assignees, arising on account of death or injuries to persons or damage to property, arising out of use of, or traveling at or onto the property, whether or not such claim [for] damage, injury or death results from negligence of Customer, Contractor or others.  Customer shall defend all suits and claims arising from or incidental to the work under the agreement, without expense or annoyance to the Contractor or its employees.  [Da44-45, ¶ 2.]
[brief] •  [...] testified at the trial.  He was the president and manager of both companies after the court removed [...] and at the time of trial, although he has been involved since the companies' inceptions.  He loaned [...] its initial funding.  ○ (1T 70:19-71:14).  •  He also was not aware of any loans made by [...] to the [...] companies prior to this litigation commencing.  At the end of 2017, he was on the finance committee with [...] and two others.  ○ (1T 72:20-73:3; 77:6-78:10).  •
[brief] COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION  Date Submitted: MARCH 25, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  Attorney for Respondent, Commissioner of Education  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...] (NJ Attorney No.: 298432019)  Deputy Attorney General  On the Statement  The New Jersey Commissioner of Education files this statement in lieu of brief pursuant to Rule 2:6-4(c).