ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Case, 220 N.J. at 64 (internal citations omitted).  “Remand may be necessary when ‘a sentencing court failed to find mitigating factors that clearly were supported by the record. ’”  State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 300 (2021) (quoting State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010)).  Here, defense counsel argued for the application of a number of mitigating factors, both at [...]’s original sentencing and at his resentencing.  (2T:3-17 to 4-25; 14-17 to 25); (Da 186-87)
[brief] ”  However, neither [...], nor their counsel, nor [...]’s counsel for that matter were aware of the proceedings on September 16, 2022 in the other lawsuit where [...] was very plainly agitated by sheriff’s officers who had shown up at his home while children were home at the time.  No, the only people in the courtroom on December 1, 2022 who were aware of the prior events were [...] and [...].  [...] had been fully aware of how upset [...] had been the last time she ordered a sheriff’s officer to confront him – and that it had led him to call the FBI and assert charges of bias, and harassment, and corruption, and weaponizing the court.  The Judge was aware of that.  [...] was aware of that.  [...] felt that history was repeating itself just because he needed to use the bathroom and had not been instructed that he needed to ask prior permission.  Despite [...]’s counsel’s supposition that [...] “caused” the interruption; it was actually [...] who engineered the circumstances while knowing full well the prior history.
[brief] The Court admits P-10A through P-10D into evidence along with the cheat sheet to assist the Court with tracing of the Deeds.  When he prepared each Deed, he took the language for the description from the Riparian Grant (3T65:24).  He confirms also that he was not able to obtain a Quit Claim Deed from the line running from [...] and her husband (3T74:13) or for six interests on the [...] line (3T75:2).  [...] enters as Exhibit D10 a color-coded chart which the defendants’ attorneys prepared purportedly showing which interests [...] obtained and which interests he did not.  (3T77:8).
[brief] Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 557 (2009).  An “unlawful practice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 is defined as “The act, use or employment by any person of any commercial practice that is unconscionable or abusive, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.
[brief] Dated: November 4, 2024  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS  SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................  iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..............................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................4  I.  The Thirteen Prior Projects Work To [...]’s Benefit As Much As [...]’s .........................................................  4  II.  Industry Standards And “Settled Practice In The Construction Industry” Do Not Support [...]’s Position ..................................................................................................................6  III.  [...] And [...] Did Not Have Any Reason To Object Or Challenge The Standard Specifications as They Stood At The Time of Bid ..................................................................................................................9  IV.  [...]’s Case Law Is Inapplicable ..................................................................................................................10  V.  This Matter Involves a Purely Legal Question  .............................................................................................15  CONCLUSION  ........................................................................................................15  SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
[brief] In another case cited by Plaintiff, *Adams v. Delmonte*, (Pb12), the Court granted an enlargement of time because there was essentially a bait and switch situation.  Plaintiff cites to this case because there, the Court enlarged the appeal period because the full aspect of the project did not become apparent until after the second board hearing.  *Adams v. Delmonte*, 309 N.J. Super. 572, 581 (App.  Unlike the case at hand, the facts in Adams relating to the operation of the business changed between the first board hearing and the second board hearing.
[brief] See e.g., Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401; Mhrez Decision; Mhrez Transcript; Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc., Case No. [...]; Appellant’s hyper-technical, literal reading of the FDCPA was rejected by these courts to avoid absurd results and maintain the consistency of the general statutory scheme.  This Court should similarly engage this process of statutory construction in its de novo review and continue to uphold the Superior Courts’ repeated dismissal of this matter.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(11).  Appellants argument that [...]’s Project must be a “routine upgrade” to qualify for Exemption #11 is not only contrary to the plain language of the Highlands Act, but also NJDEP’s consistent interpretation of the exemption.  In a factually similar case, in connection with the HAD issued to [...]’s (“[...]”) Califon Substation, a historic preservation group claimed that [...]’s project was not a “routine upgrade” and not consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.
[brief] Da272-74.  As in Marmo, such pleadings and the Rule 4:5-1 certification of counsel “strongly weigh as a factor in favor of waiver. ”  478 N.J. Super. at 613; see also Hopkins, A-1301-23 at pp. 14-15 (finding waiver where arbitration was not an affirmative defense and R. 4:5-1(b)(2) certification contained representation no arbitration was contemplated, which was never amended); Herrera, 2024 WL 2683967, at *4 (finding waiver citing, in part, to R. 4:5-1 certification despite counsel’s argument that the delay was counsel’s fault and not that of the client).  As the Court noted in Marmo, “judicial resources are wasted when a case is brought by a plaintiff and litigated in the Superior Court when it should have been pursued instead in arbitration.
[brief] As such, there was no vehicle in which Plaintiff could have authenticated the evidence she sought to admit.  Plaintiff’s argument that since these documents and photographs were produced in discovery allows Plaintiff to introduce the documents at trial and have them read by Plaintiff is utterly nonsensical and meritless.  Indeed, Plaintiff again fails to cite to any authority to support this myth.  The Court’s exclusion of the evidence was proper and Plaintiff’s appeal must be denied.
[brief] The only copy of the Photocopy that [...] provided at his deposition was the same document that Respondent had attached to her answer to complaint, that had the words “Exhibit B” written on the first page written by Respondent’s attorney.  Also, [...]’s wife and law partner, [...], Esquire, who concentrated her practice in matrimonial law, never saw the Photocopy and was not given it to review or to give an opinion as to its validity when Decedent was making her will or at any other time.  10T56:8-18.  The loss of the Decedent’s file precluded the Petitioner from determining just what Decedent had given to [...] and when, and what advice and counsel that [...] provided to the Decedent, resulting in an incomplete record.  The Court's failure to find that the loss of the Decedent's client file was material to this will contest was erroneous and a spoliation inference should have been applied.
[brief] The regulations contemplate a broad arbitration plan to ensure claims are decided efficiently and with full opportunity for the parties to be heard.  If the dispute resolution organization tasked by [...] cannot handle those procedures, [...] must require the organization to amend its plan consistent with the statutes and regulations or select a new organization that can.  For all of those reasons and as set forth below and in the [...] merits brief, the [...] respectfully submit that the Court should affirm the decision of the trial court ordering the claims filed by [...] to arbitration.
[brief] 274a; 4T, 4:15-25:22.  [...]’s expert opinion is not only an expert opinion within a reasonable degree of certainty, but based on the uniquely distinct peculiarities of federal and state laws and regulatory schemes regarding affordable housing developments and the unique realities of financing 100% affordable housing developments by and through the [...], which are diametrically opposite to market rate real estate developments, [...]’s lost profits damages report is far more than just within a reasonable degree of certainty – it is an absolute economic certainty.
[brief] In the vehicle police found: a pair of blue jeans, a hat bearing the letter P, a Samsung T–Mobile Phone, a Nintendo DS3 in the box, an AT&T GoPhone in the box, a Nikon Coolpix Camera in the box, plastic gloves, deposit slips for defendant’s bank accounts, defendant’s cell phone, and paperwork associated with several cell phones, including co-defendant [...]’s.  As police were following defendant, [...] and [...] were working at the T–Mobile store.
[brief] **Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Motion for Reconsideration**  Questioning the existence of the Partnership Agreement in the first instance, the Trial Court originally denied Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  On Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, the Trial Court granted reconsideration of its ruling that originally challenged the existence and applicability of the partnership agreement and the arbitration provision, finding that there in fact exists an enforceable agreement to arbitrate between the parties.  [4T45:16-18].  The Trial Court went on to favorably apply the Cole factors to the circumstances here, but ruled that Defendants’ express waiver of arbitration during the proceeding before [...] on March 23, 2023 was dispositive, again denying arbitration.  [4T46:17-49:21].
[brief] Pa752-771.  Plaintiff sought, among other elements of relief, an accounting and money damages.  Id.  Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, in her capacity as the sole manager, failed to distribute to [...] his fair share of profits, withheld financial records, made excessive withdrawals from [...] for her personal use that were disguised by inflating company expenses, payroll, and other transactions, and releasing the LLC’s valid claims against third parties without ³ Pa1-22.  Plaintiff’s knowledge and consent.  *Id.*  Additionally, [...] misappropriated [...]’s funds and business opportunities by establishing [...] in 2017.  *Id.*  [...] was formed using [...]’s funds and operated as a competing pharmacy, all without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.  3T88:13-22.  **Defendant’s Fee Application**
[brief] Docket No.: [...]  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript Number | |---------------------|-----------------|-------------------| | Motion | 1/20/23 | T1 to T30 | | Proof Hearing | 10/12/23 | 2T1 to 2T42 | ## INDEX TO APPENDIX | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Appendix Page Number | |---------------------------------------|----------|----------------------| | Order Granting Summary Judgment | 1/23/23 | Pa1 | | Order (for damages, attorney’s fees and costs) | 10/12/23 | Pa11 | | Complaint | 12/9/20 | Pa13 | | Answer and Counterclaim | 1/22/21 | Pa21 | | Deposition Transcript of [...] | 10/13/22 | Pa35 | | Notice of Appeal | 12/4/23 | Pa69 | | Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment | 12/23/22 | Pa74 | | Proposed Order for Summary Judgment | 12/23/22 | Pa76 | | Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts | 12/23/22 | Pa77 | | Certification of [...] | 12/23/22 | Pa93 | | Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in Opposition | 1/12/23 | Pa97 |
[brief] Plaintiff's counsel, over defense objection, presented to the jury the substance of the police report, which was represented to reflect the omission of defendant's version of the collision.  Counsel accomplished that by asking defendant himself what the report stated. ”  *Id.* at 347 (emphasis supplied).  That is exactly what was allowed here.  As illustrated by [...]’s cross examination, defense counsel simply read each portion of the documents she considered helpful to her case and asked [...] if that is what the document said.  In this case, like the *Manata* case, the court made no finding about the reliability or trustworthiness of the impeaching document.  Plaintiff in *Manata* and defendant here made no effort to introduce it into evidence.  In fact, in this case, defendant was expressly told by [...] that it could **not** be admitted into evidence **or even used** without laying a proper foundation.
[brief] See generally Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  Whether Defendant [...] approved or knowingly tolerated the charge pay is a dispute that must be resolved by a jury.  There is a version of events supported by record evidence that suggests that Defendant [...] used the charge pay matter to divert scrutiny and undermine those who had witnessed and disclosed her unlawful conduct.  A reasonable factfinder could conclude that the investigation was pretextual and intended to silence Plaintiff’s whistleblowing activity.
[brief] Note that the adverbial “now, in the past, or in the future” clause only modifies claims “that were, have been or could have been . . . asserted or alleged” by the *[...]* class members in that lawsuit at that time.  The furthest ¶1.29 can therefore reach are to related claims that had accrued by the date of final judgment, which had yet to be “asserted or alleged” by the [...] class members as of that date, but which could have been “asserted or alleged” sometime “in the future” absent the entry of final judgment and dismissal of the complaint.
[brief] The statute states, in pertinent part:  A person who performs professional services for a political subdivision of this State or a board of education, or any agency, authority or instrumentality thereof, shall not be eligible, on the basis of performance of those professional services, for membership in the Public Employees' Retirement System, if the person meets the definition of independent contractor as set forth in regulation or policy of the federal Internal Revenue Service for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.  Such a person who is a member of the retirement system on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.) shall not accrue service credit on the basis of that performance following the expiration of an agreement or contract in effect on the effective date.  [Ibid. (emphasis added)]  It is fundamental that in interpreting a statute, a court will first look to its plain terms.
[brief] POINT TEN [Individual analysis of Count 2 of the Counterclaim] (Argued Pa391)  Unjust enrichment requires [...] to establish a benefit conferred upon [...], and expected remuneration due to [...]’s receipt of the benefit.  The Board obtained no benefit whatsoever for [...] not working, so there was no expected remuneration for not working.  Count Two of the Counterclaim for an alleged “Unjust Enrichment” should be dismissed because [...] does not satisfy the elements for a prima facie case of unjust enrichment.
[brief] (Da1893)  [...] falsely represented to the trial court that those votes were held by legitimate members of the Company, (Ibid), and he repeated the same falsehood in the SDNY Action’s pleadings, referring to these same sham amendments as those having been voted on by the “John and Jane Roes” referred to in Plaintiffs’ complaint.  (Da1410-1411)  But the validity of these “votes” and those “elections” was before the Arbitrator in Phase II of the Arbitration, because the validity of the membership interests that were allegedly *cast* in those votes and elections was a question in Arbitration Phase II, as was [...]’s inability to unilaterally amend the operating agreement.(Da2003)(Da2006)
[brief] This case arises out of the events that occurred on Friday, June 1, 2018 at [...] in [...].  On June 1, 2018, [...] was a 55-year-old married father of 2 teenage children who lived in [...].  On June 1, 2018, Mr. Sovelove drove to [...] in [...] for an elective right CT-guided needle kidney biopsy that had been ordered for him by his nephrologist, defendant [...]  This procedure was performed by Interventional Radiologist defendant [...], where a CT scan is used to guide a needle into the kidney to obtain small tissue samples.  This is a minimally invasive procedure, and is an alternative to an open surgical procedure, which also has a faster recovery time, and avoids general anesthesia.  Immediately after the biopsy was completed, Mr. Sovelove complained of right-side lower quadrant abdominal pain, became very pale and was diaphoretic (profusely sweating).  Suspecting a bleed, Dr. Shirazi ordered a CT scan of the right kidney, which showed that as a result of the biopsy, the kidney was actively bleeding profusely.  Thus, the medical records reflect that at 12:41 p.m., the CT scan showed a large retroperitoneal bleed caused by this biopsy.  Dr. Shirazi could have and should have immediately repaired the bleeding kidney by taking the patient back into the operating suite and performing an embolization.  However, for some reason, he decided to take no action to heal this bleed, and instead he shipped the patient – now actively bleeding internally - over to the Emergency Department at [...].  He then simply left the patient in the Emergency Room.  Dr. Shirazi never came back and attempted to stop the bleeding.  Id.  During that afternoon, Mr. Sovelove was seen and examined by the defendant physicians, including Defendant [...], a pulmonologist and critical care specialist.  Although all of these physicians examined Mr. Sovelove during that afternoon, and it was clear that Mr. Sovelove was actively bleeding, none of them made any effort to actually intervene to stop the internal bleeding.  Moreover, although blood transfusions were ordered, [...] received no blood transfusions until hours after the retroperitoneal bleed was diagnosed.  Thus, during the afternoon of June 1, 2018, [...] was bleeding to death in the emergency department of a 500+ bed hospital while at least 8 physicians were aware of his condition.  Finally, at approximately 5:10 p.m. on June 1, 2018, almost 5 hours after the retroperitoneal bleed was diagnosed by CT scan, another Interventional Radiologist - who is not a Defendant in this case - finally took Mr. Sovelove to an operating suite to perform an embolization to stop the internal bleeding caused by Dr. Shirazi’s biopsy.  As he was being prepared for this procedure, [...] suddenly became pulseless, went into cardiac arrest and died.  Mr. Sovelove was 55 years old.
[brief] A.  The Roads were Dedicated to the Borough on the 2010 Map (Da18)  First, the trial court properly held that the Roads were dedicated to the Borough on the 2010 Map.\(^7\)  Indeed, the 2010 Map expressly labeled the Roads as “[...] Public R.O.W.” (Da173, emphasis added).  Though that fact in itself is more than sufficient to show dedication of the Roads, \(^7\)It should also be noted that the pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j, the Unnamed Road and original portion of the Boulevard were also automatically dedicated when the performance guarantee was released in connection with the construction on Lot 5.01.  (Da26 at ¶ 10; Da171.)  However, for purposes of completeness (seeing as the final portion of the Boulevard, and upgrade of the existing portions of the Roads, were constructed in accordance with the development of Lot 3.01) (Da28 at ¶ 22), this brief primarily addresses the automatic dedication that occurred upon the release of the performance guarantees in connection with the construction of Lots 3.01 and 4.01.  But, to be clear, Plaintiffs also assert that the dedication of the Roads was automatically accepted by the Borough by virtue of its release of the performance bond in connection with the construction on Lot 5.01 and the 2005 Map’s depiction of the Roads as public streets.
[brief] He and his codefendants were well-prepared for their planned attack upon the victims.  Even his own expert accepted that his actions suggested well-thought-out planning.  Regarding coercion, the experts concluded that defendant was coerced based on defendant’s own representations.  Defendant’s exact wording to the experts is naturally unknown.  However, before this court, he went so far as to claim that [...] forced him to shoot [...] with a smoking gun, that [...] was the ringleader, and that [...] was the only killer.  (Pa119-126).  Now that defendant has retracted these statements by telling [...] that “no one was the leader of the group,” the experts’ conclusion can no longer be accepted.  (Da48).  In any event, defendant’s allegations of coercion are not supported by the record.  If anything, it was defendant that coerced others.  Defendant sent a letter to [...]’s sister detailing a plan to attack [...] in a house of worship for agreeing to testify against him.  When [...] was reluctant to go forward with the home invasion, defendant seized the gun from [...] and put it to [...]’s head.  That incident is not a mere unfounded allegation, but a statement of [...]’s, which defendant adopted by submitting as part of his second PCR.  (Pa47¶12).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK “NEW EVIDENCE” (91a)  The Defendants assert that at the plenary hearing they introduced “new evidence” supporting their claims.  In fact, they brought nothing new to light, and even if they had, it would not breathe life into claims that have no legal merit.  Indeed, it is difficult to determine what, exactly, the new evidence is supposed to be.  Without citing any reference to the record, the Defendants assert that during trial it was “established” that the appraisals did not determine fair market value and instead were ordered for “informational purposes…” (Db44).
[brief] See Gallo v. Salesian Society, Inc., 290 N.J. Super. 616, 654 (App. Div. 1996); see also Teaneck Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers Ass’n, 94 N.J. 9, 17, 20-21 (1983).  Under New Jersey law, it is clear that an employee cannot be compelled to waive his or her right to assert claims of discrimination under the NJLAD because employees such as Appellant cannot, and should not, be forced to waive the broad remedies available under the NJLAD, including the right to a trial by a jury of Appellant’s peers.  If an employment arbitration agreement is to be enforced in the context of a discrimination claim, there can be no dispute that the arbitration provision at issue must clearly convey to the reader that it applies to the employee’s future claims of discrimination.  Unless an employee is explicitly aware of and informed of the very specific rights they are waiving as a result of agreeing to an arbitration provision, it cannot be enforced as a matter of law.
[brief] Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002)  .........................................................................  13  Francavilla v. Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2024) ..............................................34, 35  Garza v. Paone, 44 N.J. Super. 553 (1957).................................................................  16  Gomez v. Foster & Garbus LLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 183099, 2019 WL 5418090 (D.N.J. Oct 22, 2019)  ........................................................................  39  Henderson v. Hertz Corp., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2871, 2005 WL 4127090 (N.J. App. Div. June 22, 2006)