ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 10.  On or about August 10, 2020, a demand was filed by [...] seeking recovery of $10,000.00 on behalf of [...] as a result of an automobile collision that reportedly occurred in New Jersey on November 29, 2019.  This arbitration was assigned [...] (Da156-Da164).  11.  On August 22, 2022 the arbitrator denied [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibits [...]’s Med-Pay subrogation claim and as a result, the dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement.  A full arbitration hearing was held on August 22, 2022, and by decision published August 23, 2022, the arbitrator found in favor of [...].  The arbitrator simply found that the [...] insured was fully responsible for the underlying loss.  As a result, the arbitrator directed [...] to reimburse [...] the $10,000.00 demanded (Da156-Da164).
[brief] While this unpublished decision may not be binding on this Court it is, nevertheless, very instructive.  In [...] v. [...], supra, the Appellate Court observed that plaintiff [...] had filed lengthy briefs arguing that the trial court’s ruling were legally erroneous, adding digressive discourses about his purposes and motives in relentlessly pursuing litigation against [...].  [...] eventually moved to dismiss the prerogative writs action for lack of plaintiff [...]’s standing to pursue the lawsuit, which was granted by the trial court.  Id. at 2.  The Appellate Division in [...] v. [...] stated that plaintiff [...] “is neither a resident nor a property or business owner in [...].  He lives and pays property taxes in the same county, Essex, but not in the same municipality.  He does not have the standing of a resident or property or business owner or of [...] to challenge its municipal actions,” and went on to observe that “[...] has not cited any binding authority holding that the standing broadly afforded to a resident or taxpayer in the same municipality extends to all taxpayers within the county. ”  Id. At 4.  The Appellate Court in [...] v. [...] found that the trial court had correctly ruled that [...] did not have common law standing simply because he is a resident and taxpayer in the same county as [...] and further found no error in denying [...] statutory standing under New Jersey’s LTTEL.  The Appellate Court explained the 2003 amendments to LTTEL did not alter the fact a plaintiff in a prerogative writs action must have a sufficient stake in the matter to challenge the governmental action.  Id. at 4.  Finally, plaintiff-appellant’s assertion that the Trial Court wrongfully dismissed the Complaint for lack of standing pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) without ruling on the substantive claims is without merit, since a lack of standing may be raised as a failure to state a cause of action under R. 4:6-2(e).  Allstate New Jersey Ins. v. Cherry Hill Pain and Rehab. Institute, 389 N.J.Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Court reverse so much of the Trial Court’s Order of August 1, 2022, that finds the guarantees were terminated on May 11, 2016, and enter judgment in favor of [...] and against [...], [...], and [...], jointly, severally, or in the alternative, for $100,965.77 through April 20, 2020, and for $37,649.31 in attorney’s fees, and remand the matter to the Trial Court to determine any amounts due on [...]’s remaining claims Pa12-15, and dismiss the Cross-Appeal.
[brief] [...]’s witnesses, [...] and [...] testified regarding the income and expenses for the Unit, as was documented in its hardship application.  In particular, [...] testified that historically the Unit had cash losses every year.  Specifically, he testified to a cash loss of $6,470 in 2009 (1T:11:4), $7,513 in 2010 (1T:11:6) and $7,384 in 2011 (1T:11:8).  The tax return for the tax years 2014, 2015 and 2016 (included in [...]’s application) reported cash losses for the Unit of $16,283 (Pa 55), $14,348 (Pa 65) and $16,490 (Pa 74), respectively.  [...] testified that [...] carried no debt on the building (1T:17-25).  At the September 27, 2017 hearing, [...] (“[...]”), a licensed real estate appraiser having an MAI designation, testified that the Unit had a fair market value of $622,500 even with a protected tenant in place.
[directive] As the New Jersey -12- [DCJ 03/03/16]  9  1.  In all instances when a conducted energy device is fired or discharged during an actual operation, the law enforcement officer who employed such force shall complete: a.  Any reports made necessary by the nature of the underlying incident, and, b.  A use of force report as required by the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  10  c.  A Conducted Energy Device Report.  2.  a.  Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers.  In all instances when a conducted energy device is fired at or discharged upon a person by a municipal or county law enforcement officer, a higher-ranking supervisor shall investigate the circumstances and outcome of the device’s use.  The investigating supervisor shall report on the incident to the chief executive of the department, providing the chief executive information on all relevant circumstances, deployment, and outcome, including whether the deployment avoided injury to an officer and avoided the need to use deadly force.
[brief] Further, no other Third Circuit Panel has relied upon Schwartz. reliance upon them did not exist, both cases are distinguishable from the facts presented on appeal.  In Schwartz, the plaintiff signed up for [...] in 2003.  256 F. App’x at 516.  At the time, [...] had a policy of sending a welcome packet to new customers that contained a copy of its “Subscriber Agreement” that, in turn, included an arbitration clause.  Ibid.  The following year, when the plaintiff decided to cancel a portion of his [...] services, he was required to sign a work order, which contained language indicating that he was “bound by the current [...] Subscriber Agreement. ”  Ibid.  The Third Circuit determined that the evidence of [...]’s policy to send a welcome packet containing the Subscriber Agreement—and no evidence to the contrary—as well as the plaintiff’s receipt and execution of the work order, supported a finding that the plaintiff did in fact, receive and had notice of the Subscriber Agreement.  Id. at 518.  Although the court concluded that [...] had demonstrated that the plaintiff was aware of the subscription agreement including the arbitration clause, and the plaintiff failed to present any evidence to refute that claim, it further explained that, “in some cases, a party is excused from the terms of a contract where he never had access to the contract and thus could not make himself aware of its terms. ”  Id. at 520.  Such is the case here.  The record before this Court is devoid of any evidence that either [...] or [...] ever received, or had notice of, the arbitration agreement until after they commenced the underlying action.
[brief] The Court should not permit Appellants to bring claims for damages arising out of a lease they failed to pay.  Appellants ceded all interest in the solar project on the property when they refused to pay the landlord.  Permitting Appellants to sue for their purported interest in solar rights would, in effect, create a lien on the property held by an evicted commercial tenant.  The law in New Jersey prohibits such a result.  Absent damages or a legal cause of action, the Panel should affirm the dismissal of [...] from this case.
[brief] The City made Captain promotions in the [...] in July 2022.  The City conceded that at that time, there were no “actual” vacancies for captains, as required by civil service regulations, specifically, N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b).  Pa63; Pa55.  While the [...], (“[...]”), acknowledged that in the absence of “actual” vacancies, the July 2022 promotions violated civil service regulations, ([...]¹ Brf-3), there is no evidence that the [...] took any action against the City for such violation.
[brief] (Id.)  [...] acknowledged that her affirmative signature would not be necessary to bind her to the Agreement and to enforce it, and that her election to proceed with employment alone would be effective and she would be “deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement. ”  (Id.)  When [...] signed the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, she held a Bachelor of Arts and Masters’ degrees in psychology and a doctorate in neuropsychology.
[brief] Further, [...] could not determine the Summative Report score for the school year 2018-2019 because he needed to factor in three Observations.  (Pa34, [...] Dep., 10/28/22, T35:4-9)  [...] admitted to the fact that he did not reprimand Appellant at any time nor did he give her a Performance Improvement Plan.  Thus, the conclusion is that Appellant performed her job satisfactorily.
[directive] This includes members of the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team, except as noted below; prosecutors employed by the Division of Criminal Justice, Office of Public Integrity & Accountability, and Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor; and law enforcement officers employed by LPS.  Prohibited communications include those involving:    The nature or scope of a criminal investigation;  The identity of any targets, subjects, witnesses, or victims;   Any investigative step taken or contemplated, including witness interviews, the collection of evidence, or the issuance of grand jury subpoenas; and   Any prosecutorial step taken or contemplated, including decisions regarding charging, plea bargaining, or sentencing.
[brief] --- \(^9\) [...] did not retain the firm who represented her in the set aside case until August 2017 (which was already two-years-and-four months past the date of the March 2015 divorce judgment).  She also retained that same firm for her auto accident personal injury case on or about October 20, 2016, which was a year-and-a-half past the date of the March 2015 divorce judgment.  Per payment records in evidence (P-39), [...] made a payment on the matrimonial file in the amount $20,004.82 on October 31, 2016.  While the firm’s bookkeeper certified about a discrepancy/clerical error, [...] asked the trial court to draw its own conclusions.  Simply put, [...]’s fraud claims were time barred before she ever consulted with post-judgment counsel and they should have so advised.  For further discussion, see POINT IV, subpoint C, infra.  POINT III
[brief] "Erroneous instructions are poor candidates for rehabilitation as harmless, and are ordinarily presumed to be reversible error."  *State v. McKinney*, 223 N.J. 475, 495-96 (2015) (quoting *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997)).  Certain jury instructions are so crucial to a jury's deliberations that error is presumed to be reversible.  *State v. McKinney*, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015); *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997).
[brief] (Aa55).  [...] supported its decision, noting that the Property was not suitable habitat for the species [...] asserts were seen on-site, the Savannah sparrow and the bald eagle.  Ibid.  While [...] also notes Great Blue Herons may be present on site (Ab17), [...] explains that species is not listed as either threatened or endangered.  (Aa55).  As to the Savannah sparrow, [...] noted that the species “do not use or rely upon freshwater wetlands or … transition areas for their essential functions such as breeding, resting or feeding. ”  Ibid.  Rather, the Savannah sparrow habitat includes fallow fields, grasslands, upland meadows or pastures.  Ibid.  As to the bald eagle, [...] conducted both a site inspection and in-office review of the Property to assess whether the Property was suitable habitat for breeding, resting or feeding for the species.  Ibid.  [...] found that the Property is not located proximate to a bald eagle nest buffer; the size of the wetlands on the Property and the type of habitat present in the wetlands is not suitable for the species; and the Landscape Project Mapping\(^{17}\) did not map the Property as bald eagle habitat.  *Ibid.*; see also (Aa64) (noting the relatively small size and configuration of the wetlands on the Property mitigates against use by the species).  While [...] had accepted the prior bald eagle sighting records, [...] Fish and Wildlife staff explained that “bald eagle foraging” habitat “require[s] waterbodies greater than 8 hectares” while the combined (fragmented) wetlands on the Property were only 3.9 hectares.  (Aa58-59).  Finally, [...] found that due to the Property’s narrow, closed canopy stream corridor, bald eagles would have extreme difficulty navigating to forage because of the species’ 6- to 8-foot wingspans.  (Aa62).  Thus, while there may have been bald eagle sightings by members of the public, that alone does not end the habitat suitability question as [...] argues, as [...]’s Landscape Mapping “method ‘uses species sightings in conjunction with their known habitat characteristics, focusing upon actual land cover and land use to generate habitat mapping. ’”  *ZRB, LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., Land Use Regulation*, 403 N.J. Super. 531, 556 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting *In re Adopted Amendments to N.J.A.C. 7:7A-2.4*, 365 N.J. Super. 255, 262-63 (App. Div. 2003)).
[brief] Upon doing so, the Lease states “Landlord shall pay to Tenant up to the sum of Seven Hundred Thirty Thousand and 00/100 ($730,000) Dollars . . . as reimbursement for the actual cost of Tenant’s leasehold improvements comprising Tenant’s Work as and for ‘Tenant’s Allowance’” (Da17).  After setting forth the six “if and when” Reimbursement Conditions that trigger the vesting of Tenant’s right to receive Tenant’s Allowance from Landlord, § 4.02 of the Lease listed four different methods by which the Landlord could satisfy its reimbursement obligation for Tenant’s Work (Da17).  Under the standard method, Landlord would make six equal annual installment payments to Tenant in the amount of $121,666.67, together with 5% annual interest on the unpaid balance of Tenant’s Allowance (Da17).  That method required that Tenant not be “in monetary default” at the time any installment was due (Da17).  In the event either party failed to make a required payment, however, the Lease provided two reciprocal “offset” provisions, the first stating “[i]f Landlord fails to pay Tenant an installment of the Tenant’s allowance within ten (10) days after Landlord’s receipt of written notice from Tenant that such installment is past due, then, as its sole remedy, Tenant shall have the right to offset such amount against the Minimum Rent payable by Tenant hereunder” (the “Rent Offset”) (Da17).  The other reciprocal offset clause stated that “Tenant . . . expressly grant[ed] to Landlord an offset and deduction against Tenant’s Allowance for all costs, payments and expenses Tenant is obligated to pay to Landlord pursuant to this Lease . . . at the time an installment of Tenant’s Allowance shall be due” (the “Allowance Offset”) (Da17-Da18).  No provision in § 4.02, or anywhere else in the Lease, stated that a Tenant’s vested right to receive Tenant’s Allowance could be permanently forfeited or waived for any reason.
[brief] ”  Thereafter, [...] attempted to bring itself into compliance with a settlement with [...], but the current Mayor campaigned and was elected on a platform of “scal[ing] back” affordable housing and the court-ordered project.  As [...] admitted, up through 2020, in two decades of Mount Laurel litigation, “no affordable units have been physically rehabilitated or constructed within the Borough. ”  Second, the trial court characterized the relief sought by redeveloper as the “extreme” remedy of “automatic site plan approval,” not warranted when there are “alternative” avenues such as a variance.  But [...] took the position it could not even consider a variance and only the council could allow a fully affordable residential building, which departs from the code requirement of ground-floor commercial.  Well established precedent holds that the sole requirement for court-ordered Mount Laurel housing is “site suitability,” and cost generative zoning requirements can and should be set aside so long as, after a full hearing, the site is determined to be suitable for the proposed fully-affordable housing development.
[brief] A  Among other reasons, yes.  Q  I’m talking about in your deposition.  The only reason you gave was because you were too busy, correct?  A  And I wanted to, it’s like a professional baseball player, he has a major injury and is out for a year or so, they don’t put him right back into a major league game.  They send him to Triple A to get his swing back and I was doing that out as an outpatient.
[brief] There is no merit to this argument.  In Estate of Doerfler, an insurance coverage case, the judge granted summary judgment for defendant, in a case in which the parties cross moved for summary judgment, with each arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact.  After an oral argument—described as “an active and probing discussion between counsel and the motion judge” on the meaning of an exclusionary provision in the policies at issue—the judge issued orders granting judgment in favor of the Defendants, supported by a single sentence indicating that the judgment was “for the reasons set forth in defendant[s]’ motion papers”  Ibid. at 301.  No further analysis was provided.  In this case, by contrast, [...] provided his legal analysis in the transcript of the August 8, 2022 hearing.  The analysis reached the conclusions of law and applicable findings of fact and expressed his reasoning over the course of six transcript pages.  (1T24:3-30:22).  It should also be recognized that [...] was not writing on a blank canvas.  Immediately before he placed his decision on the record, [...] presided over a hearing, during which the parties presented their arguments about whether the law of the case doctrine applied.  There was no dispute between the parties as to what that doctrine entailed, but merely whether it applied in this case.  Thus, the fact that [...] did not specifically cite to a case defining the doctrine is not error, nor certainly more than harmless error, because the question at issue was not the definition of the doctrine but whether it applied here, and he clearly detailed why he did not believe it did apply.  Similarly, as it concerned the statute of limitation issues, there was no dispute between the parties as to what the statute of limitations was or how long of a statute of limitations applied to a CEPA claim.  Consequently, the only issue for [...] was whether the statute had run and whether any of the allegations—sufficient to support a discrete cause of action—fell within the statutory time period.  [...] provided a full and complete analysis of that question and fully supported his decision on the record.  As such, because [...] placed on the record a complete analysis of his decision, there is no basis to find that the requirements set out in Estate of Doerfler was violated.  As such, this court should reject Plaintiff’s argument.  Conclusion
[brief] State v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 515 (1983) ................................................................. 39,44 State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006) ............................  34 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015) ...........................................  34  Constitution U.S. Const. amend. v; xiv .................................................................  22 N.J. Const. art. 1, par. 20 .................................................................  22 Statutes N.J.S.A. 20:3-19 .................................................................................. 19 N.J.S.A. 20:3-35 .................................................................................. 8,24 N.J.S.A. 20:3-26 (b) ...........................................................................  8,24  Court Rules Rule 4:9-1 ............................................................................................ 7,24 R. 4:50-1 ............................................................................................. 19,20 R. 4:50-2 ............................................................................................. 8,19,20 Rule 4:50-1 (a) .................................................................................... 20 Rule 4:50-1(f) ...................................................................................... 8,20 Rule 1:1-2 ............................................................................................ 24 N.J.R.E. 104 ....................................................................................... 35,38 INDEX TO THE AMENDED APPENDIX VOLUME I (Da1 to Da189)
[brief] See Instructional Sys., 130 N.J. at 352.  [...] was not in the business of only selling [...]’s products.  As [...] testified, [...] made islands [and entire outdoor entertaining areas] and [...] made grills.  A grill was only one part of the EOK system that [...] makes which includes steel framework, baseboards, vents, stone countertops, and tile work.  The steel framework, baseboard, vents, stone countertops, and tile work were done by [...] and other companies that [...] worked with, and [...] had no relationship with them.  As such, [...] is not wrapping itself with the [...] trade name.  See Lawmen, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 1034.  Importantly, [...] did not solely advertise [...] products.  Its advertisement always included [...]’s business information, because as [...]’s company representative, [...] testified, the purpose of the advertising was to “get sales back to [...]. ”  Here, the trial court found that Appellant failed to meet the elements of the NJFPA.
[brief] ”  Robinson v. St. Peter's Medical Center, 236 N.J. Super. 94, 98 (Law Div. 1989) (emphasis added).  Ironically, the motion judge cited In re Guardianship of Dotson, 72 N.J. 112, 117 (1976) but failed to assimilate the essence of Rule 2:5-3(c)(2), which, as the Court succinctly summarized in In re Guardianship of Dotson, permits an abbreviation of the trial transcripts on appeal, "[w]here the specified grounds of appeal do not require a complete transcript."  Id. at 117.  Beyond broad, sweeping statements, the May 3, 2024 order is devoid of any critical analysis that establishes that the grounds of appeal specified in the plaintiff’s motion certification call for a complete transcript.  Therefore, the May 3 order is a fit case for reversal.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................5  Point  I  Due to the Indictment of Its Partner [...], Esq., and the Alleged Involvement in Criminal Wrongdoing of Unnamed Lawyers of the Firm of [...], the Firm Must Be Disqualified from Representing the Defendants in this Matter (Pa182; T) .................................................................................................................5  A.  [...] Have a Conflict Contrary to the Outside Counsel Guidelines ..................................................................................................................................................................................5  B.  The Brown and Connery, LLP Partnership Cannot Continue Representing the Defendants Where one of its Partners is Disqualified .................................................................................................................................6  C.  Public Entities Cannot Waive Conflicts ................................................................................9  D.  The Indictment References Brown and Connery, LLP and an Unnamed Partner, Lawyer-2, as Being Participants in the Wrongdoing of Tambussi and His Co-Defendants  ........................................................................................................................................................................10  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................15