ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It is without question, it is the 1999 Agreement that governs the Borough and Township and determines who is entitled to the connection fees for the property at [...] in the [...].  B.  **The 1999 Agreement Provides the Borough is Entitled to the Connection Fees**  On December 3, 1999, the Borough and Township entered into the 1999 Agreement.  Da103.  There are only a few provisions in the contract that discuss fees.  The clear language of the 1999 Agreement establishes that the Borough is entitled to the connection fees.  The plain language of a contract controls if it is unambiguous and there is no ambiguity.  *Bergen*, supra. at 202.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...] (Mack) filed his complaint against Defendant [...] (Bank) on 11/6/23 seeking a judgment for $18,900.00 plus interest representing the amount the Bank permitted to be withdrawn from his bank account without his authorization.  (Pa 10).  The Bank, on 1/26/24, filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings seeking counsel fees and costs (Pa 20).  Plaintiff filed opposition with oral argument occurring on 4/12/24 (1T), at which time the judge requested additional submissions.  (1T 31-22 to 32-2), which Plaintiff and Defendant filed on 5/1/24 and 5/16/24 respectively.  No additional oral argument was held and the court rendered a written opinion and order on 6/20/24 (Pa 6 to 9) requiring Plaintiff to submit his claims to arbitration in (30) days, and dismissing the complaint without prejudice to be reinstated if an arbitration award was entered.  The judge denied the Bank’s request for counsel fees in his opinion (Pa 9).  The Bank to filed no cross appeal from that or any part of the decision.  **Statement of Facts**
[brief] See, e.g., Da_018-19 ([...] Executive Director [...] stated that “forcefully stripping off the religious headscarf of a Muslim girl is not only exceptionally disrespectful behavior, but also a humiliating and traumatic experience. ”); Da_019-20 (Maksut noting that “[t]o remove [the hijab] publicly can be very humiliating”).  Plaintiff’s own distortion of the actual Statements cannot be the basis of finding that the student’s story was “wholly unbelievable. ”  And she certainly has not cited any cases to support that her own exaggerated interpretation of a statement should be the measure of whether it is “wholly unbelievable. ”  In fact, none of the cases Plaintiff cites even found that a challenged statement was wholly unbelievable.  The rare cases where courts find reckless reliance upon wholly unbelievable accounts involve facts bearing no relation to those here.  For example, in one case (not cited by Plaintiff), the court found reckless disregard for truth where the plaintiff alleged in detail how the defendant had fabricated nearly every significant detail of the story based on sources that did not exist.  Pistilli-Leopardi v. MediaNews Grp., Inc., 2020 WL 3967992, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 2020).  Those circumstances could hardly be farther removed those here, where Plaintiff alleges the [...]’ statements recounted an Incident that admittedly did occur (though those involved had different perspectives on what happened), in reliance upon a known, highly respected source.  Under these pled facts, Plaintiff simply cannot meet the high bar for pleading actual malice.
[brief] By extension, a requesting party cannot search through thousands of irrelevant documents stored on electronic devices just to ensure they find relevant ones.  Rather, [...] endorsed “the traditional protocol of discovery” that Plaintiffs criticize—i.e., a process in which one party requests specific information and the other party searches its own files (and computers) “to identify and produce responsive information,” just as “Rule 4:18-1 anticipates. ”  474 N.J. Super. at 467-69 (quotation omitted).  Plaintiffs may find that approach to discovery “less-than-perfect,” Pb22, but it is the process the Supreme Court prescribed in Rule 4:10-2(a), and the trial court had no authority to disregard it, Shambry v. N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 390, 395 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] The DEP’s decision to issue the 2019 permit modification should be affirmed because it followed the Act and CZM regulations and is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.  Tlumac v. High Bridge Stone, 187 N.J. 567, 573 (2006); In re N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. 223, 235 (App. Div. 2013).  The court “will not reverse the ultimate determination of an agency unless the court concludes that it was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence, or that it violated legislative policies expressed or implied in the act governing the agency. ”  In re Orban/Square Props., 461 N.J. Super. 57, 71-72 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permit No. 16, 379 N.J. Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 2005)).  Final agency decisions receive “substantial deference. ”  Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp., 191 N.J. at 48.  The court defers to an agency’s regulatory interpretation unless it is “plainly unreasonable. ”  In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016).  This deference is “even stronger when the agency [] has been delegated discretion to determine the specialized and technical procedures for its tasks. ”  In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 593 (App. Div. 2004).  (quoting Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 540 (1980)).
[brief] ”  *In re Nelson*, 454 N.J. Super. at 158.  “The Court has acknowledged that in ascertaining intent, its focus really is probable intent. ”  *Ibid.*  “The judicial effort to fulfill a settlor’s or testator’s probable intent takes two forms: interpretation, and reformation. ”  *Id.* at 159.  “The former involves finding the meaning of language already in the instrument. ”  *Ibid.*  “On the other hand, reformation involves remaking or modifying an instrument, to correct mistakes, to fulfill an unexpressed intention, or to address circumstances that were unforeseen. ”  Id. at 160.  “The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof applies to interpretation; however, the more rigorous clear-and-convincing standard of proof applies to reformation. ”  Ibid.  In this context, Defendants contend that the trial court reformed the Trust language concerning the property purchase provisions, without an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] In that case, a father initially made voluntary and unprompted statements that he killed his son but once Mirandized, he invoked his right to remain silent and to speak with an attorney.  Id. at 521-22.  His wife, who was also a suspect in the matter and was being questioned in another room, insisted on speaking with the father despite reluctance by law enforcement.  Id. at 522.  She was brought into the room to speak with her husband in the presence of law enforcement and their conversation was taped-recorded.  Ibid.  Officers advised that they could only speak with each other in the presence of law enforcement who would be able to hear their conversation.  Ibid.  Officers placed the tape recorder on the desk in plain sight.  Ibid.  After the wife expressed despair, the husband told her not to answer any questions until a lawyer is present.  Ibid.  The conversation between the husband and wife was introduced at trial to negate the husband’s insanity defense.
[brief] Clearly, in *Innes*, the attorney holding the passport was an agent of both parties, as they both agreed that attorney should hold the passport.  Here, Appellant and its predecessors had no involvement in the engagement of [...], nor were they involved in the refinance transaction by a non-borrower at all.  As a result, the Trial Court erred by failing to engage with this agency analysis in determining who should bear the loss resulting from [...] absconding with the funds.  a third-party in connection with a short sale, even where that payment did not fully satisfy the outstanding debt.  In the event a lender rejected the short funds and returned them, the lender would shoulder the risk if the funds were then misappropriated.  On the other hand, if the lender accepted and applied the short funds, the non-borrower would most certainly argue that those short funds satisfied the loan in full due to the doctrines of accord and satisfaction (which is precisely what Respondent argued below).  This cannot be the correct equitable outcome here.
[brief] Id. at 391.  Actual malice, it noted, requires a plaintiff to “show by clear and convincing evidence that the publisher either knew that the statement was false or published with reckless disregard for the truth. ”  Id. (quoting Lynch, 161 N.J. at 165).  Under New Jersey’s pleading standard, it concluded, a defamation plaintiff in an actual malice case cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless she pleads “facts from which a factfinder could conclude that [the defendant] knew, or had serious doubts about, the veracity of the allegedly defamatory statements he made. ”  Id. at 393.  The Neuworth Court did not arrive at this conclusion in a vacuum.
[directive] C.  Awards of compensation to informers under Section 619 of the Tariff Act of 1930.  D.  Satisfaction of liens for freight, charges, and contributions in general average, notice of which has 1. been filed with the appropriate Customs officer according to law; and subject to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, other valid liens and 2. mortgages against property that has been forfeited pursuant to any law enforced or administered by a Department of the Treasury law enforcement organization.
[brief] The MSRA provides that the Director “may ascertain whether a municipality should be deemed a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-4a.  If so ascertained, the MSRA requires that the Director recommend to the Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs (the “Commissioner”) that the Commissioner designate the municipality to be in need of stabilization and recovery (“Final Determination”).  Id.  If the Commissioner makes such a Final Determination, the Director is required to notify the municipality’s clerk or other municipal official of the Final Determination in writing.  Id.  Within 150 days of the Final Determination, the MSRA requires that the municipality prepare and adopt a resolution containing a five-year recovery plan which must be submitted to the Commissioner for review (“Recovery Plan”).  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-4b.  The MSRA provides in detail various items that must be included in the Recovery Plan, including a proposed balanced budget for the upcoming fiscal year.  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-4b.  Upon receipt of the Recovery Plan, the Commissioner has five business days to determine in his “sole and exclusive discretion, whether the [R]ecover[y] [P]lan is likely or is not likely to achieve financial stability for the municipality. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-4c.  If the Commissioner determines that the Recovery Plan “is not likely to achieve financial stability[,]” or if the “municipality fails to submit a plan,” the Local Finance Board may “assume and reallocate to, and vest exclusively in the [D]irector any of the functions, powers, privileges, and immunities of the governing body of that municipality[.]”  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5a(1).  In those circumstances, the MSRA authorizes the Director “to take any steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery[.]”  Id.  On November 9, 2016, pursuant to the MSRA, the Local Finance Board voted 5-0 to assume, reallocate, and vest the powers of the governing body of [...] exclusively with then-Director of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs, [...].  (Pa000227–228).  On November 14, 2016, former United States Senator and Attorney General of New Jersey, [...], was named the Director’s designee (the “Designee”) and was authorized to exercise any powers granted to the Director under the MSRA, including taking steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, and assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the City.  (Pa000273).  Each and every Plaintiff was a member of the [...] at the time the MSRA was enacted, and thus knew or should have known that the Director had broad powers, including unilaterally modifying contract terms such as terminal leave.
[directive] The form Expungement Order (Form C) in the prose expungement packet should be utilized.  This order should be made readily available in the Criminal Division to ensure that defense counsel or the person can submit it at the time of the dismissal, acquittal, or discharge without a conviction or finding of guilt.  Once the judge who presided over the proceedings has signed the order, it should be assigned an expungement reference number by Criminal Division staff.  3.
[brief] In fact, this is not Appellant’s counsel’s first time appealing this issue.  The Court should continue to uphold the trial courts’ proper dismissal of these allegations and find that “the use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, or unfair . . . [or] the type of conduct that Congress was interested in preventing when it enacted the FDCPA. ”  *Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC*, 2024 WL 2839329, at *3 (App. Div. June 5, 2024).  See also *Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, 2024 WL 2838327 (App. Div. June 5, 2024).  Second, despite containing a time-barred disclosure, Appellant asserts FDCPA liability for the letter’s alleged inclusion of “convoluted language which could mislead the least sophisticated consumer about the effect of a payment or an agreement to pay on the statute of limitations” and the “character of the debt. ”  Appx., at 3a.  Both this Court and the Superior Court have aptly explained why the disclosure language employed by Respondent is accurate, not materially deceptive, and compliant with FDCPA law.  The legal sufficiency of Appellant’s claims aside, the Superior Court also correctly found that Appellant lacked standing under New Jersey law, and dismissed his claims on that basis.  I.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] As concerns any request for reasonable accommodation of a qualifying disability, it is axiomatic that an employee’s ability to perform the job and reasonable accommodation are concepts that “must be assessed on an individual basis. ”  N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(a)(emphasis added).  Further, NJLAD regulation states that “the determination of whether an employer has failed to make reasonable accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis. ”  N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)(emphasis added).  See also Barboza v. Greater Media Newspapers, 2008 WL 2875317 (D.N.J. 2008) (also noting the absence of “bright-line rules” in this area).  Here, in support of its failure to accommodate claim, Plaintiff merely alleged that there have been, or speculated that there may be in the future, instances where the City had or may have failed to accommodate unidentified Plaintiff members who were on leave.
[brief] *Lehman*, 132 N.J. at 604.  Because “[t]he Lad is not a fault- or intent-based statute,” a Plaintiff is not required to prove intent or fault on the part of the employer to satisfy the “but for” requirement.  *Id.*  This is because “the perpetrator's intent is simply not an element of the cause of action”, and a “Plaintiff need show only that the harassment would not have occurred but for” their race.  *Id.* at 605.  This element “will automatically” be satisfied if the “harassing conduct is [racial] or [racist] in nature” on its face.  *Id.*  Turning to the facts of this case Plaintiff testified during trial at great length about how she was mistreated because of her disability, namely anxiety and depression.
[directive] 5.  At the time a sealing or resealing order is submitted to the wiretap judge for signature, the original tapes shall be counted by the wiretap judge and then placed in a container and sealed.  No sealing or resealing order shall be signed unless the wiretap judge has had the opportunity to make a physical count of the tapes.  Orders to seal may also be entered by the Communication Data Warrant Judge (ACDW@) in the vicinage of the designated judge who authorized the interception in the absence or unavailability of the wiretap judge.  In those vicinages where the wiretap judge is also the CDW judge, orders to seal may also be entered by the Assignment Judge or the Acting Assignment Judge.  6.  Once the tapes have been sealed, they shall be returned to the applicant for safekeeping.  7.  Where a request is made for the unsealing of a wiretap container for the purpose of removing the original wiretap tapes for use other than in a judicial proceeding, the following procedures shall be followed:
[directive] (c)  Intercept, which means to acquire the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A- 2c; and (d) Electronic communication, which means the transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio or other system, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2m.  All of these forms of communication are protected from intrusion and interception except under very narrowly defined exceptions.  7.9.2
[brief] ”  Id. at 201.  As the Bailey Court explained, "Bailey posed little risk to the officers at the scene after he left the promises, apparently without knowledge of the search.  Had he returned, he could have been apprehended and detained under Summers.  Ibid.  Because the defendant in Bailey was detained over one mile away from the apartment that was the subject of the search warrant, the Court did not define the meaning of “immediate vicinity. ”  Id.  But the Court provided various factors for courts to consider in closer cases to determine whether an occupant was detained within the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.  Id.  Those factors include “the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant's location, and other relevant factors. ”  Id.  Bailey therefore requires a justification other than the Summers rule in situations where officers detain a suspect away from the scene of the search.
[brief] (Pa24-27).  The Board concluded that [...] was notified as required by the Ricci Act but failed to submit his Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa26).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision by letter dated July 18, 2023.  (Pa16).  He argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.
[brief] 14.  By Deed recorded November 12, 2014, the Longo Building and its associated parking area were sold by “[...] now known as [...]” to [...] for use as a Harley-Davidson motorcycle dealership.  Pa358.  The sale price was $4,000,000, being some $1,650,000 more than the $2,350,000 paid to purchase the entire Property.  [...] was not the owner or grantor of the Longo Building.  **The Opinion and Order of September 29, 2020**
[brief] “Whenever the stormwater management design includes one or more BMPs that will infiltrate stormwater into the subsoil, the design engineer shall assess the hydraulic impact on the groundwater table and design the site, so as to avoid adverse hydraulic impacts. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.2(h).  Therefore, as part of the design process, the design engineer must analyze groundwater mounding.  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 1.  Groundwater mounding occurs when the groundwater table locally rises higher because the water is not conveyed away from the infiltration point at a fast enough rate.  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 1.  In other words, groundwater recharge not only relies upon the vertical infiltration of water, but also the horizontal movement of the groundwater.  The height of the groundwater mounding effect is influenced by the amount of infiltrated runoff, the soil permeability, and the shape of the infiltration basin.  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 1-2.  If the groundwater mound reaches the bottom of the basin, the rate of infiltration out of the basin is reduced and infiltration stops, creating a failed stormwater management system.  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 2.  To model groundwater mounding and determine if the proposed infiltration basin will function properly, the [...] permits the use of the Hantush Spreadsheet.  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 2.  With the Hantush Spreadsheet, the design engineer inserts input values, and the spreadsheet will perform the calculations necessary to determine if the infiltration basin will function properly.
[directive] (2)  ¿Entiende usted que la condena de supervisión de por vida en la [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [NC/NA] comunidad significa que: usted estará bajo supervisión durante un mínimo de 15 años como si se encontrara en libertad condicional y estará sujeto a las condiciones que sean apropiadas para proteger al público y promover su rehabilitación, las cuales incluirán, pero no se limitarán a asesoramiento; acceso o uso de Internet; y otras restricciones que podrán incluir restricciones en cuanto a dónde usted puede vivir, trabajar o viajar?  Do you understand that being sentenced to community supervision for life means that: you will be supervised for at least 15 years as if on parole, and subject to conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, including, but not limited to counseling; Internet access or use; and other restrictions, which may include restrictions on where you can live, work or travel?
[brief] V.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT MATTER.  .......................................................................................................................53  VI.  AS PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INITIATE SUIT AGAINST [...] WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT GIVING RISE TO THIS LITIGATION, PLAINTIFF’S PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM AGAINST [...] IS TIME-BARRED.
[brief] The motion judge expressly noted Plaintiff’s failure to comply with R. 4:46-2(b).  See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (T11:18-T12:8).  Further, Plaintiff argued at summary judgment that someone had tampered with the BWC video and “cut[ ] out of the video the scenes showing force. ”  However, Plaintiff did not submit any expert report or forensic analysis to support that claim, a point which was correctly addressed by the motion judge at some length.  See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (T5:12-T11:12).  The Law Division entered an Order dismissing all claims as pled against the [...] pursuant to R. 4:46. Pa534.  It is evident that the Law Division properly entered summary judgment in favor of the [...], and that ruling should be affirmed.
[brief] We are nonetheless obliged to construe the clause in a manner consonant with its essential purpose and with the objects the parties were striving to achieve.  *Stier v. Shop Rite*, 201 N.J. Super. 142, 151, 492 A.2d 1055 (App.Div.1985); see also *George M. Brewster & Son, Inc. v. Catalytic Constr. Co.*, 17 N.J. 20, 32, 109 A.2d 805 (1954).  Further, ...within this analytical framework, we reject the contention that the phrase "arising out of" requires that the injury or property damage sustained must be the direct and proximate result of the performance of towing services in order for the indemnification clause to be triggered.  Specifically, the license does not require that the claim of the injured party be directly and proximately caused by the operation of a tow truck in transit.  Instead, the words "arising out of" should be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary meaning as referring to a claim "growing out of" or having its "origin in" the subject matter of the towing agreement.