ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That case was a divorce arbitration agreed upon by the parties as to all financial issues.  Id. at 374.  Both parties participated and a full hearing was held.  The objection was as to the arbitrator’s refusal to allow expert testimony and other evidence.  *Ibid.*  The Court affirmed the award on the basis that the arbitrator had heard the case exactly as it would have been heard by the Court.  *Id.* at 377.  Most importantly, in *Manger* both parties were able to participate in a full hearing.  That did not occur here because of the postponement denial.  He proceeded as if the motion was unopposed, when opposition would have precluded summary judgment under the R. 4:46 standard he said applied.  (Da2210)  *Rock Work v. Pulaski Const. Co.*, 396 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2007), also was not a postponement case.  Other than its primary issue which led to the ruling that the Arbitration Act precludes fee-shifting absent express agreement, the objection to the award was based on a limitation of a rebuttal argument.  *Id.* at 350.  Again, both parties in that case participated in a full hearing so the Court was not reviewing a confirmation request as one that had proceeded the way this case did.  Plaintiffs have actually argued the wrong point here.  They ignore that no reason to deny the appearance of counsel or time to present opposition was even given.  (Da2508)  They ignore that the refusal to do so then resulted in a one-sided motion for final judgment and the dispensation with a hearing that [...]’s counsel’s opposition would have required.  Likewise, the Court’s belief that the denial of the postponement was within the Arbitrator’s discretion regarding evidentiary or procedural decisions was a misapplication of the law.  This case was about the denial of counsel and therefore participation in a final hearing with no legitimate reason given, other than the Arbitrator did not want counsel to appear and thereby require a full hearing with testimony and witnesses and cross-examination.  The refusal to allow counsel a short postponement to learn a 7.5-year-old case with more than $1,000,000 at stake, without even giving a reason, is expressly a ground to vacate, and that should have been done.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 392.  The Court further explained that the arbitrator could not “read in” language to the agreement to make a better deal for the grievant than he had made for himself through his union:  But to avoid that result [of immediate discharge], the arbitrator admittedly read into the agreement a condition not required by the contract: the necessity for incremental or progressive discipline.  That this is so is plain from the arbitrator’s insistence that the “normal context of [grievant’s] responsibilities . . . must include . . . a measure of progressive discipline. ”  Without imposing that requirement the arbitrator could not have avoided discharging [the grievant] -- at least could not have avoided that result without sacrificing all consistency in his written opinion.  However, the arbitrator’s “reading in” ignored the contractual provision that prohibited him from adding to, altering, or modifying the parties’ agreement.  It overlooked the fact that the collective bargaining agreement was considered to be the complete understanding of the parties, and it disregarded the directive that any modification in responsibilities be agreed upon in writing.
[brief] APPALANT’S ARGUMENTS DO ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT AND ARE WITH MERIT.  The Response via its §VI, pp. 25-33, presents a hodgepodge of arguments alleges that “plaintiff's arguments do not address the issue before the court. ”  Please see the signed Conclusion of the Response on its page-34, following the said arguments, as it even misstated the identity of the respondents as being [...].  To counter this argument, the appellant incorporates by reference pleadings made by him via his Appellate Brief as if fully set forth within.  CONCLUSION  For all of the forgoing reasons, the case should be reversed and remanded.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] Even without defendants’ misfeasance, blatant misrepresentations to the trial court, lack of transparency regarding their financials and financial transactions, and, in [one defendant’s] case, fleeing the country to escape enforcement of the court’s order, actions which are all contemptible, defendants engaged in enough pre-judgment misconduct between the filing of the complaint and this Court’s 2013 opinion to justify not applying the discount when considering the equities.  *Id.* at 185-186.  “[W]e cannot ignore the reality that steps were knowingly taken to deplete the value of assets [the plaintiff] was asserting [an] interest in. ”  *Id.* at 187 (quotations to lower court omitted).  Thus, the circumstances of a case must start with a discounted value reflecting economic reality, followed by a determination as to whether the discounts would encourage oppressive behavior, with an undiscounted value only enforced when the *payor* is the oppressor.
[brief] [...] also cites Cotler v. Twp. of Pilesgrove, 393 N.J. Super. 377, 379-78, 386-88 (App. Div. 2007) and La Rue v. East Brunswick Twp., 68 N.J. Super. 435, 449-52 (App. Div. 1961).  These cases are similarly not instructive, as both dealt with zoning ordinances, not redevelopment ordinances, with Cotler applying the higher standard of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 and citing Wolf.  The issue in La Rue was a municipality’s complete failure to publish any notice in anticipation of a hearing, which, in addition to having no relevance to this case factually, implicated a separate (since-repealed) statutory provision “applicable solely to zoning legislation and extending the advance publication date to a minimum of 10 days prior to public hearing. ”  La Rue, 68 N.J. Super. at 450.  Here, the standard of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 discussed in Wolf and Rockaway Shoprite, put forth as controlling by [...], does not apply because Ordinance No. 13-2022 is two (2) pages long and does not incorporate “substantial changes in the zone plan” of the relevant Property.
[brief] For this meeting only, the [...] agreed to not have its [...] members present at the meeting (Ibid.).  At the December 8, 2021 meeting, the [...] maintained its position that the [...]’s [...] should not be allowed to attend the negotiation sessions (Id., ¶ 20).  The [...] countered that it had the right to include its [...] members at negotiations sessions (Ibid.).  The parties exchanged numerous proposals regarding the [...] or alternatives, but were unable to agree to any solution at this meeting (Ibid.).  No agreement was reached on the presence of the [...] at future sessions (Id., ¶ 21).
[brief] “In the overall we have given due weight to the interests of individual justice, along with the public interest, always bearing in mind that throughout our law we have been sweepingly rejecting procedural frustrations in favor of ‘just and expeditious determinations on the ultimate merits. ’”  *Campus Assocs. L.L.C. v. Bd. of Adj. of Twp. of Hillsborough*, 413 N.J. Super. 527, 534 (App. Div. 2010).  Governed by the definition of “interested party” in *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4*, the MLUL affords standing to people whose rights to use, enjoy or acquire property is or may be affected by the action taken, or whose rights to use, acquire or enjoy property have been denied, violated or infringed by an action or a failure to act.  Courts have adopted the MLUL definition to determine standing in land use appeals.  *See, e.g.*, *Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian*, 319 N.J. Super. 200, 215 (App. Div. 1999), citing *Aurentz v. Planning Bd.*, 171 N.J. Super. 135, 143-144 (Law Div. 1979) (“the right to sue in the Superior Court or to appeal to the governing body [as an interested party] should be identical”).  Consistent with liberal attitude our courts take to issues of standing, courts virtually always grant standing to objectors to land use board decisions, especially when those objectors are challenging the jurisdiction of the land use board’s acts.
[directive] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4b, a law enforcement officer may intercept and record a wire or oral communication using a body transmitter if that officer is a party to the communication or where another officer who is a party requests or requires that such interception be made.  Individual departmental or agency policy dictates procedures for such recordings.  This kind of law enforcement non-third party intercept can be used during internal affairs investigations.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED JERSEY SHORE’S ARGUMENT THAT IT OWNED THE PROPERTY  In entering final judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint and concluding that the [...] is the owner of the entire Property, the Trial Court rejected [...]’s argument that it should be declared to be the owner of the [...] (and should therefore also be declared to be an owner of portions of the Property and of the Leased Premises) by virtue of the quitclaim deeds that [...] obtained from some of the heirs of [...].  In reaching that determination, the Trial Court noted that “. . . it just does not seem credible to the Court that the plaintiffs’ assertion of ownership through the heirs of [...], through quit claim deeds, is valid”, 9T, p. 14, lines 3-6.  The Trial Court therefore concluded that [...] “. . . has no ownership interest in the disputed parcels”.  9T, p. 15, lines 18-19.  The Trial Court’s findings rejecting [...]’s ownership claims were supported by the record and were consistent with law.
[brief] (Pa391 to Pa392).  [...] also reiterated that their traffic study determined that the proposed additional density would add about one new car every three minutes to the total traffic burden on the site.  (Pa392).  Therefore, the site is capable of supporting the additional traffic on the site.  (Pa392 to Pa393).  Summarizing the Grubbs criteria analysis regarding whether the site can support the additional density, [...] stated the following:  But, again, the threshold you look at for D(5) variances, can the site support that additional 2.6 units per acre.  So again, when I go down and look at my planning proofs and I start checking off, utilities are available, the parking is available, the refuse is available, the amount of traffic being added, again, one new car every three minutes, is not a substantial increase on the roadway network.  I’m getting to a point where I’m looking at that D(5) variance and seeing that this site can support the additional variance.  We have the open space.  We have the recreational space.  So, I look at, again, all of these conditions, all of these things that you know could be a negative by having additional density, and I don’t see it on this site as proposed.  So, again, from a D(5) variance perspective, I believe that we meet the burden of proof as it relates to the [Grubbs] case, which one of the, you know, case law cases that you look at in terms of looking at D(5) variances.  And, in fact... the site can support this additional density and we are not held to the same standard as a D(1) variance.  [(Pa393 to Pa394).]
[brief] True to form, Plaintiffs’ counsel offered little more than his \textit{ipse dixit} \begin{itemize} \item[\textsuperscript{57}] \textit{Id.} at 220.  \item[\textsuperscript{58}] \textit{Id.} at 220-21.  \item[\textsuperscript{59}] \textit{See supra.}  \item[\textsuperscript{60}] \textit{Id.} \end{itemize} statements, espousing that “of course [the Plaintiffs] have standing.  They were directly harmed by [...]’s misconduct. ”  Yet when asked about this very harm at trial, out of six individual plaintiffs, the two who actually appeared and testified were unable to identify any. \(^{61}\)  The best Plaintiff [...] could do was to state that “We’ve lost a lot of ground that we built up.  We lost a lot of equity in the company we used to deal with but to our goodwill and goodwill of our contractors we persevered” and “I think my weekly [pay]check was probably 75 to 85 percent reduction. ” \(^{62}\)  Asked whether “everything [he] built so hard over the last three years just vanish[ed],” Mr. [...] responded with, “Well, again, it didn’t vanish, it would never vanish unless I gave up the fight and unless my partners and coworkers did the same and that’s not what we’re about. ” \(^{63}\)  Mr. [...] offered absolutely nothing to quantify his personal damages, and actually concedes that nothing vanished. \(^{64}\)
[brief] (Pa4).  [...] further and in sum concluded that "Plaintiff has failed to establish a *prima facie* case of failure to accommodate a disability because Plaintiff has not established the elements of such."  Id.  Plaintiff failed to set forth a *prima facie* case as to anyone, let alone numerous "affected Union members" as was alleged.  The Trial Court thus correctly found that --- 5  Again, it is the "qualified" element cited by the Trial Court (element 2) that a plaintiff must further support in a failure to accommodate case with the additional details outlined above.  *Victor*, 401 N.J. Super. at 614-615.  Counts I-III of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the Trial Court's order of dismissal should be affirmed.
[brief] (Dra 2-3) (available at [https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/notice-updates-model-criminal-jury-charges-and-criminal-sample-verdict-sheets-0](https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/notice-updates-model-criminal-jury-charges-and-criminal-sample-verdict-sheets-0).  The notice lists “Third Party Guilt Jury Charge (3/9/15)” with an accompanying note, “This is a new charge. ”  (Dra 2)  The Third-Party Guilt model charge provides significantly more guidance than a mere reiteration that the State bears the burden to prove that [...] is the person that committed the crime.
[brief] On or about November 29, 2021, Tenant deposited the $196,669.16 in Rent Arrears with the Court.  (Da179-181).  On December 9, 2021, in accordance with the terms of the Post Trial Order, Landlord submitted a five (5) page Counsel’s Certification in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for Reimbursement of Its Attorneys’ Fees and Costs ("Landlord’s Fee Application") demonstrating that, as of December 9, 2021, Landlord had incurred $55,940.68 in legal fees and costs arising out of Tenants’ defaults under the Lease.  (Pa47-51).  Thereafter, by letter dated December 29, 2021, Landlord wrote to the Court and respectfully requested that the $196,669.16 in Rent Arrears be distributed to Landlord and that Landlord’ Fee Application be granted.
[brief] Contrary to defendant’s claim, however, the AP was not suggesting that defendant had to meet both prongs of the insanity defense, namely, (1) that he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, and (2) if he did know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, that he did not know it was wrong.  The AP was instead contrasting [...]’s oral testimony at trial, in which she concluded in no uncertain terms that defendant met both prongs of the insanity defense, with her written report, in which she concluded in no uncertain terms that defendant met the first prong of the insanity defense, but merely “implied” that he met the second prong as well.
[brief] (Aa87).  Importantly, a constructed wetlands basin is not required to be elevated above the seasonal high-water table because – by its very design and nature – the wetlands basin is fed by groundwater.\footnote{https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj_swbmp_10.4-standard-constructed-wetlands.pdf}  Accordingly, [...]’s arguments about the forebay elevation fail.  [...]’s contention that the pipe connecting the Filterra MTDs to the constructed wetlands basin is flawed because it is not separated from the seasonal high water table also fails due to the MTD design [...] selected here.
[brief] On September 20, 2022, the Board held a public meeting, wherein [...], Planning Board Planner, provided his report and findings concerning the Redevelopment Plan for the Property.  (1T pg. 4-13).  Though not required by law, the Board heard testimony from the public, including Appellant-Plaintiff’s expert, [...].  (1T pg. 15).  The Board adopted a motion finding the Plan was not inconsistent with the Master Plan and referred the matter back to the Committee.
[brief] THE ENFORCABILITY OF THE SUBJECT ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AGAINST NON-PARTIES IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT  [...] argues that pre-suit arbitration agreements cannot be enforced against non-parties.  In support of this argument, the Association relies on the inapposite unpublished case of Matter of Est. of Hekemian, No. A-1774-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. WL 176098 (App. Div. 2023).  As set forth more fully below, while the Association is wrong on principle, that issue is plainly not before this court because neither party has raised the issue of whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable against non-parties in this appeal.  See State v. O'Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 479-80 (2013) (“[A]s a general rule, an amicus curiae must accept the case before the court as presented by the parties and cannot raise issues not raised by the parties. ”)(internal citations omitted).  The only issues specifically before this court are: 1) whether the second trial court judge had jurisdiction and authority to reconsider and reverse the first trial court judge’s March 22, 2024 stay order and; 2) whether and to what extent the terms of the arbitration agreement are generally enforceable.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Transcript of Reconsideration Motion with Oral Decision, Dated September 23, 2022………………………………………T  Order dated October 2, 2019 dismissing Complaint and denying Plaintiff reinstatement because it violates R 1:20A-6……………5  Order dated May 27, 2022  Granting Reinstatement and a Judgment…  11  Order dated September 23, 2022 denying Defendant’s Motion For Reconsideration of the Reinstatement and Judgment…………  16  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] At approximately the same point in time, [...] retired and was replaced by [...].  [...] denied Defendants motion on April 17, 2019 (Da285) stating, “at no point . . . does the Order specifically require plaintiffs to continue to employ [...] pending the outcome of this matter.  Nor does the […] Order specifically state ‘the status quo is to be maintained. ’”  (Id).  This conclusion was a clear error on the part of [...], as the transcripts of the January and March 2018 hearings show.  (See 3T and 4T, respectively).  Emboldened by [...]’s misreading of (or, perhaps, failure to read) the transcripts of the hearings before [...], Plaintiffs continued their assault on [...], making multiple references throughout this and the aforementioned companion cases to the fact that [...] had now been removed from [...] by court order, as confirmed by [...].  In July 2019, Plaintiffs amended their complaint (Da672) to remove the count related to restoration of their own employment, thus causing [...] to decline to pay for continued representation for the Defendants.
[brief] In cases where subjective elements such as intent or motive are involved, summary judgment is to be granted only with special caution.  Judson v. People's Bank & Trust of Westfield, supra.  In this matter, and as discussed below, questions exist as to the intent and motive of defendants, and the questions and issues should have been addressed at a trial and not upon a motion for summary judgment.  The Supreme Court once again visited summary judgment in what is now what is considered the landmark case of Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  In Brill, the Court took a closer look at the summary judgment procedure, and concluded that trial courts must look to find disputes of a substantial nature.  There must exist evidence of disagreement to require submission to a jury, with the Court viewing the papers submitted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Brill, supra.  Also, and as is expressly stated in the Rule, summary judgment shall not be entered unless the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admission on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law."
[brief] ”  Each of these factors weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.  First, the issues at stake are of paramount importance.  This case concerns a proposed class period of over 13 years, affecting millions of [...] users, concerning [...]’s core promise to its users—that users control who can see their information.  More acutely, the case concerns the revelation that [...] did nothing to prevent the user data it shared with third parties from being misused, and that a few hundred thousand users could unknowingly expose the content and information of more than 80 million users to a developer who sold the data collection to a political advertising outfit that targeted users with voter-suppression messaging and may have swung a U.S. presidential election.  The stakes are high.  Second, [...] has control of [...]’s and [...]’s custodial files.  Plaintiffs do not.  Third, [...] has nearly unparalleled resources.  For 2020, it reported revenues of $86 billion and cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities of $61.95 billion in 2020.  Fourth, discovery from [...] and [...] will substantially advance the resolution of this case.  The evidence shows that they have documents uniquely relevant to the intentional creation of the perception that [...] was and is committed to privacy and user control, as well as the reality of how users’ content and information was shared and monetized.  [...] and [...] also have unique knowledge of the way [...] responded to the investigations and outcomes of the [...] investigations that led to the 2012 and 2019 Consent Decrees, the [...] scandal, the revelation of [...]’s business partnerships, and other issues.  Fifth, the benefit of this discovery far outweighs its burden.
[brief] Believing He Would Be Getting His License Back In February Of 2013, [...] Checked With The DMV In Late 2022 And Learned He Would Not Be Getting His License Back Until February Of 2033.  Believing that he would be getting his license back, defendant checked with the DMV on the eve of the 10-year anniversary of having his license suspended on February 8, 2013.  20a.  When [...] contacted DMV in 2022, he learned that the 10-year loss of license by [...] was being run consecutive rather than concurrently, and that he would not be getting his license back until February of 2033, resulting in a 20-year loss of license, contrary to the plea agreement and sentencing.  20a. d.  [...] Filed A Motion In The [...] Seeking 2 Forms Of Relief: 1) Correct The Sentence To Run Concurrently, In The Alternative, 2) [...] Should Be Permitted To Have His Plea Back.
[brief] However, in deciding whether a particular statutory provision is “plain,” courts do not construe the provision “literally or in isolation,” as Appellant effectively proposes.  *Pettus v. Morgenthau*, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009).  See also *Guiseppi v. Walling*, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (The Honorable [...], stating: “There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.
[brief] Perry Dean et al., Saving Rutgers-Camden, 44 Rutgers L.J. 337, 374 (2014) .......................................................  3, 13 Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 7.3 on R. 4:69-6 (2024) ............................................................  8 Rule 4:69-6 .................................................................................. 8 Rule 4:69-6(a) .............................................................................  8, 9  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT