ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For instance, in 2014 the then-Commissioner issued Order No. A14-112 (the “2014 Order”), approving the acquisition of [...], Attorney-in-Fact of [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  The Commissioner concurred with the Hearing Officer’s Report and approved the acquisition under N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2, the provision of the Holding Company Act that regulates acquisition of, control of or merger with a domestic insurer.  (Ja3).  As explained in greater detail in the Hearing Officer’s Report, [...] was (and still is) a New Jersey-domiciled inter-insurance reciprocal exchange, and [...] a New Jersey-domiciled stock-insurance company and [...]’s wholly owned subsidiary.  (Ja4).  The acquisition followed the Holding Company Act.  A public hearing was held on the Form A filing, as required by N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(d).  (Ja5).  The hearing panel and the Department staff found that the documents filed in connection with the proposed acquisition complied with N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(b).  (Ja25).  The Department also analyzed the acquisition and supporting documents for compliance with N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(d)(1), which provides that “the Commissioner shall approve any merger or other acquisition of control . . . unless, after a public departmental hearing thereon he [or she] finds that” any one of seven disqualifying conditions exists.  (Ja8).  The hearing officer found that none of those conditions was present, (Ja9), and analyzed each of them thoroughly with reference to relevant provisions of the Holding Company Act.  (Ja9-13).  Both the Order and the Hearing Officer’s Report demonstrate the inaccuracy of [...]’s contention that the Commissioner has never applied the Holding Company Act to reciprocal exchanges.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(c), in relevant part, states as follows:  Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall notify the person convicted, orally and in writing, of the penalties for a second, third or subsequent violation of this section.  A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing.  Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of this section.  [Emphasis added.]  The statute, thus, provides that upon conviction for a DWI, the court must notify the Defendant both orally and in writing of penalties for a subsequent conviction of DWI.  Failure to comply with this provision of the statute, however, does not warrant relief from enhanced penalties upon subsequent conviction for DWI.  See State v. Petrello, 251 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1991)(holding that enhanced penalties for subsequent DWI convictions were to be applied, despite the defendant having not received the oral notice of the second or third offense penalties of subsequent DWI convictions).  In Petrello, much like here, the defense attempted to have the enhanced penalties for a second DWI not be imposed due to the defendant having not been advised of the penalties for a second DWI orally.  In rejecting this argument, the Appellate Division explained as follows:
[brief] ...  And his ability to recollect what happened that day is clear.  I did get to see them.  I did see who was in the vehicle.  It wasn’t them.  The possible bias, if any, in favor of the side for whom the witness testified.  How can it be a bias against I think you’re a victim?  ...  Well, [...] is the key to this case.  [16T:29-6 to 31-2).
[brief] [...] contends that Paragraphs 4–7 of the Protocol explained the process within which [...] must process the images collected during the forensic examinations, which included an agreed upon set of search terms, that [...] would use the terms to run targeted searches across all the collected forensic images.  See R. Doc. 103–1, pp. 5–6; citing R. Doc. 31–1, p. 27, ¶¶ 4–7.  [...] contended that [...] would then take all the files that contained a search term, run a de-duplication program to remove duplicates, and then would produce the de-duplicated files to [...].  Id.  Then, [...] and [...] had five days to review the files for privilege and create a privilege log with descriptions for any withheld files.  Id. citing R. Doc. 31–1, at ¶ 8.  [...] contends that not only did [...] and [...] fail to meet the five day production deadline, but that they also allegedly withheld approximately 15,000 files.  See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 6.  In opposition, [...] contends that even though there was a protocol in place, it never agreed to produce irrelevant and immaterial information outside of the time of the solicitation and hiring of [...], or after July 1, 2013.  See R. Doc. 121, p. 7.  Furthermore, [...] contends that [...] agreed that this date was a reasonable and relevant cut off date, and that it did not agree that the production of collected date would be unlimited in time.  Id. at 7–8.  Thus, [...] contends that it did not waive its objection to relevancy and immaterial requests or production of files outside the relevant time period of July 1, 2013.
[brief] v. MPL Commc'ns, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“It follows that where, as here, the parties' intentions to provide indemnification for claims between the parties is not ‘unmistakably clear’ from the language of the promise, this Court cannot infer an intent to waive the benefit of the rule that parties are responsible for their own attorneys' fees. ”); see also Canopy Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 395 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1115 (D. Utah 2005) (applying Utah law and holding that the use of the word ‘defend’ in an indemnification provision reflected the parties’ intent that the provision only apply to third-party claims); Estate of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 344-45 (Iowa 2005) (holding that the use of the terms “indemnify” and “hold harmless” indicates an intent to refer only to claims brought by third-parties).
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the Court has already ruled that the parties must produce without the use of search terms ESI known to be responsive to discovery requests in this case.  Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ edits water-down provisions requiring the parties to produce documents or ESI known by the producing party to be responsive to a discovery request.  Similarly, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ edits to additional paragraphs are intended to dodge the parties’ obligation to produce without the use of search terms “discrete folders or collections of information that are known to contain documents likely to be responsive to a discovery request. ”  Plaintiffs argue that given the shortcomings of the search terms methodology, there is no reason why the parties should not produce ESI collections known to be responsive to a discovery request.  During the November 17, 2019 status conference, Plaintiffs raised the issue of Defendants’ obligation to produce responsive materials that are known to be responsive.  Defendants indicated that they agreed to produce materials that are known to be responsive.  The parties are thus in agreement that Defendants will produce known materials responsive to a discovery request and will not withhold known relevant documents on the basis that they were not responsive to any search methodology described in the Search Term Protocol.
[brief] In re N.J.A.C. 7:26B, 128 N.J. 442, 451 (1992).  In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)  Matter of Congressional Districts by New Jersey Redistricting Com’n., 249 NJ 561 (2022)  New Jersey State Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists, Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 372 N.J. Super. 554, 560-561 (App. Div. 2004)  Seigel v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 395 N.J. Super. 604, 613 (App. Div. 2007)  **MISCELLANEOUR AUTHORITIES**  22 N.J.R. 1191-92 (April 16, 1990)  26 N.J.R. 2934(a), 3080 (July 18, 1994)  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 3T18:3-9.  Koda has had play dates with other small dogs and puppies.  3T71:22-3T72:10.  Exhibits D-15 through D-18 are photographs of Koda relaxing with cats and small dogs.  Da63 - Da70.  Exhibit D-14 shows Koda relaxing on a bed with a 5-year-old child.  Da61.  Although the child was handling Koda’s tail, Koda licked him and gave him kisses.  3T71:4-25.  [...] and [...] hired a dog trainer and reinforced Koda’s training daily at home.  3T12:11 – 3T13-6.  Koda responds to hand signals and voice commands in both English and Tamil, their native language\(^3\).
[brief] The court found that even though [...] was occupying the vehicle at the time, the injury. was not causally connected with his operation of the automobile.  It did not originate from the use of the vehicle as such, nor can it be said that it arose out of, or was connected with, the inherent nature of the automobile.  At best, the connection between plaintiff's injury and the insured vehicle was that [...]'s use of the car permitted him to be at the place where he committed his attack upon plaintiff, or, “but for” his use of the automobile and the ensuing accident, the assault upon the plaintiff would not have occurred.  This is not the substantial nexus required between the use of the insured vehicle and the injury to impose liability upon the insurer.  _Id._ at 386.  Here, just like in _[...]_, supra., Defendant/Respondent submits that the proofs show that the vehicle merely provided the setting for the injury.  There is nothing about the vehicle itself that contributed to the happening of the accident.  Plaintiff/Appellant herself has confirmed time and time again that her vehicle was at a complete stop at the time the beverages spilled.  By Plaintiff/Appellant’s own allegations and testimony, the vehicle has nothing to do with the “why” she was injured – it only has to do with the “where” that injury happened.  The same result would have occurred if Plaintiff/Appellant was walking past the window or if she was handed the beverage tray at the counter.  The beverage did not spill because of the car.  The beverage spilled because the lid was not on properly and since the beverage was not secure within the tray.  PIP benefits are not recoverable since the vehicle is only the incidental location of the injury and was in no way a contributor to the cause.  Having hot tea spill due to an improperly placed lid is not something that is within the contemplation of the parties to the insurance contract.  It is not a natural and probable consequence of the use of an automobile and therefore not coverage under the PIP benefits.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Accident  After Plaintiff had motor vehicle accident on August 6, 2015 in Eatontown, New Jersey (the “PI Claim”)  (Da218-219)  Plaintiff retained [...], Esq. on December 7, 2016.  (Da249)  D.  Plaintiff signs the 2016 Contract and files for bankruptcy  Between April 5, 2016 and June 23, 2016, Plaintiff met with [...] about filing a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition.  (Da282)  On June 23, 2016, Plaintiff met [...] to sign the petition.  (Da282)  In June 2016, Curnow referred Plaintiff to [...] to obtain funding.  (Da050; Da070)  On June 23, 2016, against Curnow’s advice to not sign the Contract due to the expense, Plaintiff signed it and received the $1,200.00.  (Da128-134; 347)  The Chapter 13 Petition was filed on July 20, 2016.  (Da150-189)  The Petition included multiple representations, including that: 1) Plaintiff has no “Claims against third parties” (Da161); 2) claimed a federal exemption but did not list the exempt property; (Da163); 3) within 2 years before filing for bankruptcy, Plaintiff did not “sell, trade, or otherwise transfer any property to anyone, other than property transferred in the ordinary course of your business or financial affairs”; (Da178) and 4) did not list [...].  (Da151-189; Da187-189)  The Petition warns that “if you knowingly and fraudulently conceal assets or make a false oath or statement under penalty of perjury – either orally or in writing- in connection with a bankruptcy case, you may be fined, imprisoned, or both. ”  (Da184)  E.
[brief] For all of the reasons stated in the foregoing, [...] respectfully submits that this Court should reverse the trial court’s order denying [...]’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the case, and direct that an order granting such motion be entered.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: s/ [...]  [...] (026622011)  [...], Esq. (212782018)  [...]  [...], [...] [...]  [...]  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...]  [...]  Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
[brief] ...............7  A.  Reasonable notice was not provided of the arbitration agreement ....................8  B.  [...]’s agreement is confusing, ambiguous, and fails to meaningfully convey waiver of the right to sue per Atalese .................................................................13  1.  The structure of the Agreement is not plain, clear, and understandable .................................................................  14  2.  The unclear and ambiguous language of the Agreement does not secure valid waiver of the right to jury trial ................................................................. 20  3.  The Agreement does not adequately distinguish between arbitration and a judicial forum ................................................................. 24  4.  [...]’s unsupported presumptions regarding [...]’s subjective knowledge are irrelevant .................................................................  29  C.  Federal and New Jersey law plainly permit courts to determine arbitrability ...........................................................................................................30  D.  [...]’s facial and “as applied” challenges to Atalese fail at the start ...............33  II.  THE PURPORTED AGENCY OF THE [...]’ MINOR DAUGHTER IS NOT ON APPEAL AND CANNOT BE DECIDED ON THIS MEAGER RECORD .............................................................................................................38
[brief] COURT:  I don’t see any reason to revisit that.  I’m going to deny the motion.  Whether it’s—whether this is deemed as simply another motion for reconsideration under 4:49-2, which is really what it appears to be, in reality, or under 4:50-1, it really is just asking the Court to revisit its decision, but in doing so fails to address the extensive analysis that the Court conducted under Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328.
[brief] As this Court recognized in *Racioppi*, *Wollen* is distinguishable. **  The trial court erroneously stated that *Wollen*’s facts fit “almost perfectly” here.  (2T16:19-17:6).  Yet, unlike with [...], the *Wollen* website advised users only after entering seven pages of detailed information—in a disclosure submerged near the bottom of the seventh page—that their use of the site constituted assent to certain terms.  Even considering *Wollen* without the benefit of subsequent cases applying it, (i) [...]’s website design, and (ii) the larger context of Respondents’ use of the site, are vastly different from *Wollen*.  The facts here are such that, even applying *Wollen* in isolation, this Court should reach the opposite outcome from that in *Wollen*.  *i.*  **[...]’s SAM registration website provided more prominent, clear, and timely notice than the site in *Wollen*.**  In *Wollen*, this Court recognized that terms and conditions through site use may be enforceable so long as “the terms or a hyperlink to the terms are reasonably conspicuous on the webpage. ”  *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super. at 496 (quoting *James v. Global Tel*Link Corp.*, 852 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2017) (“where the website contains an explicit textual notice that continued use will act as a manifestation of the user’s intent to be bound, courts have been more amenable to enforcing browsewrap agreements)).  This Court found, however, that the defendant’s website provided inadequate notice of its terms because none of the first six webpages the plaintiff had to use to submit a request to the defendant “referred the user to [defendant]’s separate terms and conditions webpage. ”  *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super at 488.  The website first notified users at the bottom of the seventh webpage, at the very end of an information submission form, that “by submitting this request, you are agreeing to our Terms & Conditions. ”  *Id.*  Here, unlike the website in *Wollen*, the SAM Terms of Use were hyperlinked in a central, highly visible, easy-to-spot place on every page of the SAM Registration website.
[directive] B.  Respectful Communication  Transgender individuals’ chosen names and pronouns are critical to their dignity and identity.  Law enforcement officers therefore shall:  1.  Address individuals using their chosen names that reflect their gender identity—even if the name is not the one that is recognized on official legal records and even if that name changes over time—as well as their chosen pronouns; 2.  Include chosen names and chosen pronouns in all relevant documentation, as discussed further in Appendix A to this Directive; and 3.  Use chosen names and pronouns in any communications about that individual with members of the public, including with the press, except where doing so would disclose an individual’s LGBTQ+ status in violation of Part I.A.3, and except where necessary in legal filings and in communications about those filings.
[brief] ”  Pa018.  Res ipsa loquitur is not a cause of action and it should not be considered in this case.  “Res ipsa Loquitur is not a theory of liability; rather, it is an evidentiary rule that governs the adequacy of evidence in some negligence cases. ”  Myrlak v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999).  Since res ipsa loquitur is not a recognized cause of action, Count 6 was properly dismissed on summary judgment.
[brief] The Court rejected the addition of a need to show prejudice to establish waiver of an arbitration provision and held that the FAA “did not authorize federal courts to create an arbitration-specific procedural rule requiring a finding of harm before a party could waive its right to arbitration.  . . .”  *Id.* at 1709.  In other words, “the [FAA]” does not authorize the courts to invent arbitration-preferential rules.[]  Thus, the [Supreme] Court directed the Courts of Appeals to ‘hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind, but not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. ’”  *White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.*, 61 F.4th 334 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting *Morgan* at 1713)).
[brief] See Zentz, 92 N.J. Super. at 113.  Had [...] acted as a reasonably prudent landlord, [...] could have discovered this defective condition and ameliorated the associated risk.  That it chose not to do so is ultimately unfair to [...], who paid the ultimate price for this decision.  Overarching considerations of public policy support the finding of a duty of care in this matter.  Specifically, established public policy in New Jersey provides that a landlord is not permitted to disregard a potentially fatal and easily discoverable condition on the property, assign control of the property to a tenant, and then avoid any liability which arises from this discoverable defective condition  See J.H. v. R & M Tagliareni, LLC, 239 N.J. 198, 218 (2019) (citing Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, 121-22 (2004) (noting that generally a landlord's duty arises when the harm is foreseeable and the landlord has sufficient control to prevent it); Potomac Aviation, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 413 N.J. Super. 212, 226-27 (App. Div. 2010) (scope of a duty is determined under the totality of the circumstances, and must be reasonable under those circumstances); Monaco v. Hartz Mt. Corp., 178 N.J. 401, 414 (2004) (finding a landowner must exercise reasonable care including making reasonable inspections of its property and taking such steps as are necessary to correct or give warning of hazardous conditions or defects); Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 52 (App. Div. 1973) (finding duty of care exists where landlord knew or should have been known about defective condition, so that he had an opportunity to correct it).
[brief] The Lack of Consideration of the New Precipitation Data Also Undermines [...]’s Assertion that Floodway Delineation Was Unnecessary (Aa001)  The failure to make an adequate record as to whether the appropriate precipitation data was used to verify the flood hazard area also means that the [...]’s unusual decision not to verify any of the floodways on site was also unjustified.  Aa015, Aa050.  “The inner portion of the flood hazard area is called the floodway and the outer portion of the flood hazard area is called the flood fringe. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2.  The legislature gave the [...] a broad and unequivocal mandate to “minimize the threat to the public safety, health and general welfare” protect the public safety, health and general welfare by regulating “development and use of land in any delineated floodway. ”  N.J.S.A. 58:16A-55(a) (emphasis added).  The [...] claims that “no activity will take place within the floodway” and “the floodway was not delineated for any of the watercourses on site because by inspection, it is clear that the floodway will not be impacted by the proposed stormwater outfall structure proposed in the flood hazard area. ”  Aa015.  This record is unclear regarding what specific part of its regulations the [...] relied on to apply the exception that all flood hazard areas and floodways on the site need to be verified for purposes of this permit application.  See N.J.A.C. 7:13-5.5(a).  The [...]’s regulations expressly provide that “Except as provided at (b) and (c) below, the flood hazard area design flood elevation, and floodway limit, where present, must be known and verified within the project area....”  Ibid.  It is unclear whether the [...] relied on the exception to this requirement in 5.5(a) by application of 5.5(b) or 5.5(c), and if so, what facts the [...] relied on to determine that either one of those exceptions to this rule was applicable.
[brief] On November 6, 2023, [...] filed his Complaint and asserted three counts against [...], for alleged violations of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and common-law negligence.  Each count concerned an allegedly unauthorized wire transfer from [...]’s [...] bank account.  (See generally PA010-019.)  On January 26, 2024, [...] filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings (the “Motion”).  (PA020.)  On February 7, 2024, [...] responded to the Motion.  (SA001-009.)  On February 12, 2024, [...] filed its Reply.  On April 12, 2024, the trial court held oral argument and then invited supplemental briefing by the parties.  On May 1, 2024, [...] filed his supplemental brief.  (See SA010-032.)  On May 16, 2024, [...] submitted its supplemental brief.  On June 20, 2024, the trial court issued its Order compelling arbitration and its Statement of Reasons.  (PA006-009.)  The court held that [...] bound himself to arbitrate by electronically signing an account application and thereby acknowledging receipt of and agreeing to be bound by the DAA.  (PA007-008.)  The court rejected [...]’s argument that [...] was obligated to ensure that [...] understood what he was signing.  (Id.)  The trial court reasoned that “[c]ommon sense and experience teach that bank accounts are governed by contract,” found that [...] “made no effort to understand the ramifications of what he was signing,” and faulted [...] for failing “to investigate the terms of the relationship he was entering. ” (PA007-008.)  The court also specifically rejected [...]’s argument that [...] owed [...] a fiduciary duty to educate him about the document he signed.  (PA008-009.)  Alternatively, the trial court held that [...] bound himself to arbitrate by using his [...] bank account.  (PA008.)  The court cited the DAA passage stating that use of a [...] bank account constitutes “consent to the terms of this Agreement. ”  (Id.)  The court stated that [...] “cannot avoid the consequences of his inattention. ”  (Id.)  On June 27, 2024, [...] appealed.  (PA001.)  On appeal, [...] now argues that: (1) he did not agree to arbitrate; (2) [...] owed him a fiduciary duty to explain the effect of his electronic signature; and (3) neither the account application nor the DAA were properly authenticated.  (See generally Appellant Br.) III.