ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, by way of a Settlement Agreement reached between the [...] ("[...]") and the Township, which was signed by the Defendant Mayor in this action, the Township was ultimately able to reduce its affordable housing obligation to approximately 1,133 affordable housing units.  M107.  A critical component of the Settlement Agreement is the Township's reliance upon the 43 affordable units that are to be produced by the development on the Subject Property to assist in satisfaction of the Township's constitutional Mount Laurel obligations.
[brief] Having taken this step in rescission of the contract, he will not now be permitted to seek its enforcement in a court of conscience. ”); *Maturi v. Fay*, 98 N.J. Eq. 377, 379 (E. &A. 1925) (citing *Claron*); *Rose v. Buckley*, 98 N.J. Eq. 685, 686 (E. &A. 1925) (same); *In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC*, 450 B.R. at 63 (finding because plaintiff repudiated a contract between it and defendant, defendant was not required to perform under the contract); *Faysen Lake, Inc. v. Miller*, 130 N.J.L. 289, 290–91 (1943) (by electing to rescind the sale contract, that party lost its right to sue for specific performance of the contract).  Here, the PSA required that the Deposit be made within 2 days after the date of the Agreement (Pa97.§4.1) and that it be held until either the closing of the transaction or termination by [...].
[brief] ”  It was plainly the intent of the [...] to vest [...] with this authority and, for decades, [...] consistently implemented and enforced its “rules and regulations,” including the height restriction at issue here.  Despite all of this historical evidence—and the absence of any evidence to the contrary—the trial court summarily concluded before the close of discovery, that in effect neither [...] nor [...]  ever, since 1948, held any authority granted by the [...] to regulate construction—despite 75 years of doing so.  Like in Hernan, [...]’s construction rules are intended to preserve the character of the neighborhood scheme long enjoyed by everyone in the [...] community.  With the stroke of a pen, the trial court’s partial summary judgment decision will upend both the character of the Ocean Beach community and the [...]’ intent.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s orders to ensure that the [...]’ intent is not so easily vitiated, and, at minimum, afford [...] the opportunity to take further discovery and otherwise mandate the inclusion of [...] as an indispensable party to this litigation.
[directive] 25 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements  1.3.2  The police officer handler will demonstrate knowledge of when it is proper to use a police specialty dog and identify the conditions that must be met before using a police specialty dog for scent work, detection work or tracking.  1.3.3  The police officer handler will identify the types of issues to be addressed by a departmental K-9 policy dealing with police specialty dogs, including when and how to utilize a police specialty dog, the role and responsibilities of the police officer handler, supervisory personnel and other officers, required report and record keeping procedures, and required training and qualification procedures and standards.  1.3.4  The police officer handler will demonstrate familiarity with agency policy and procedures pertaining to the use of police specialty dogs.  1.4
[brief] These Standards, set forth at N.J.S.A.  18A:12-24 and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1, must be applied by the Commission in determining whether a board member’s conduct is allowable under the Act.  As [relevant case law] demonstrate[s], there are times when a board member’s expression of opinion is permissible under the Act and there are times when such conduct is not permissible.  The Commission believes that the standards established by the Legislature do not sharply curtail a board member’s First Amendment rights.  Rather, the standards provide the commission with guidance in balancing a board member’s rights as a private citizen with the interest of the Legislature in ensuring that a board member preserves public confidence and avoids conduct that would violate the public trust or create a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.  See, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a).  Therefore, in exercising their rights as private citizens, board members must ensure that such activity does not violate these standards.  (Ca032).
[brief] Substitution of Attorney .....................................................  Pa164 September 29, 2021  Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendant’s First Amended PCR Petition .................................................................  Pa165 November 1, 2021  Reply Brief Support of Defendant’s First Amended PCR Petition ................................................................. Pa181 January 13, 2022  Brief in Support of Defendant’s Second PCR Petition ..Pa192 April 21, 2023  Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Second PCR Petition ................................................................. Pa201  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] They include the bedrock principle articulated in Canon 1 of the *Code of Judicial Conduct* that "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society."  To that end, judges are required to maintain, enforce, and observe "high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved."  Ibid.  Judges are to "act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence," id. Canon 2(A), and "must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety," id. commentary on Canon 2 (emphasis added).  Indeed, as this Court recognized nearly a half century ago, "'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'"
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  Attorney ID# [...]  Date Submitted: June 25, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | A. Appellant’s Unauthorized Use of His PCard | 5 | | B. [...] Investigates Appellant’s Purchasing History | 8 | | C. Appellant Alleges He Was Granted Permission to Use The Company PCard For Personal Purchases | 9 | | D. Appellant’s Allegations Pertaining to [...]’s Misconduct | 13 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 15 | | POINT I | | | THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT | 15 | | A.
[brief] \(15a\).  The plaintiff filed a reply that did not respond to those arguments.  A September 22, 2022 oral argument was held and the court made a decision on the record that day.  The defendant argued that under *Saffer* and a recent appellate case of *Hunnell* that reinstatement was improper when subject matter and personal jurisdiction did not exist and only a new complaint under R 4:67 could be filed so the defendant can raise her defenses and counterclaims and stay a judgment.
[brief] The Redevelopment Plan was first approved in [...], by that Township’s governing body which adopted the plan and granted [...] site plan approval, after conducting numerous hearings over the three-year period of 2019 through 2021.  (Da8 – Da25).  These meetings were well attended by the public, and it was well known a warehouse project was coming to [...] and [...].  (Id.).  The Committee on April 4, 2022, introduced and passed on first reading Ordinance No. 13-2022, entitled “An Ordinance of the Mayor and Township Committee of the [...], [...] Adopting a Redevelopment Plan for Block 46, Lot 2; Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01 and 4 in the [...], [...], State of New Jersey.
[brief] ’”  The Relief from Judgment or Order Rule states that there are six circumstances under which the Court will entertain a change to a Final Judgment of Divorce.  The New Jersey Court Rule 4:50-1 outlines the circumstances under which “relief” can be gained by a party bound by a Final Judgment of Divorce using the following language: “(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[brief] [...] alleges that the trial court’s determination that the Applicant’s submission of the EIS, without also taking specific testimony on the EIS, was insufficient under the MLUL, and is “is counter to the procedural requirements of board hearings. ”  Pb19.  This assertion has no legal or factual basis.  There is no dispute that "[a]n [EIS] is required to be submitted on ...preliminary major subdivisions and/or preliminary site plans [applications]."  § 142-77B(26).  However, the Ordinances explicitly allow the Board to waive any requirements related to the EIS.  § 142-77B(26)(g).  Specifically, the Ordinances states that the Board, “may waive any provision of this § 142-77B(26), [EIS], if deemed not applicable. ”  Ibid.  Here, while the Board has the authority to waive the requirement for an EIS, the Board chose to defer consideration of environmental and other impacts until its review of [...]'s Application for Site Plan Approval.
[directive] Rules and Regulations  2.2.1  The agency's rules and regulations should form a "code of conduct" for employees.  It should contain the broadly stated "do's and don'ts," without delving into specific details.  For instance, an agency's rules and regulations should state that any use of force by an officer must comply with state and federal law, the Attorney General's and the County Prosecutor's policies, and the agency's S.O.Ps.  The specific details of what is considered force, and what constitutes the acceptable use of force, should be found in the agency's use of force  S.O.P.  2.2.2
[brief] (Pa505, Pa870)  Finally, the lease provided that [...] was obligated to pay its pro-rata share of expenses incurred by the landlord for the maintenance, taxes and insurance on common areas.  17.  **Common area expenses. **  In the event the demised premises are situated in a shopping center...in which there are common areas, Lessee agrees to pay his pro-rata share of maintenance, taxes and insurance for the common area.
[brief] We find this argument meritless.  [...]'s sentence, twelve years subject to the NERA for a first-degree robbery, was well within the guidelines of N.J.S.A. 2C:43–6(a)(1).  Despite finding that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed mitigating factors, the court imposed a term at the lower end of the ten-to-twenty-year range.  We perceive no manifest injustice in the length of this sentence and parole ineligibility period, as it does not shock our conscience.  *State v. Bieniek*, 200 N.J. 601, 612 (2010); *Roth*, supra, 95 N.J. at 363–65.
[brief] Also left unexplained is the trial court’s failure to allow any time whatsoever for the client intake and investigation of the claims, preliminary factual research on defects to Plaintiff’s model vehicle and the model engine; addressing Defendant’s improper Offer of Judgment; communications with opposing counsel and the court; communications with the client and servicing dealerships for the continuing defects and four additional repair attempts that took place after the lawsuit was filed; drafting discovery requests; reviewing discovery responses; successfully opposing Defendant’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s subpoenas; responding to Defendant’s discovery requests; coordinating Defendant’s vehicle inspection; preparing Plaintiff for her deposition; drafting Plaintiff’s Court arbitration briefing and preparing for the hearing; settlement negotiations after Defendant’s de novo filing after losing the Court arbitration; and Plaintiff’s fee motion when Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively the “Parties”) were unable to settle on an award of fees and costs pursuant to their settlement agreement.
[brief] The Separation Agreement notes that the [...] is the only entity that could make such a determination on this legal status.  The Regulation provides for submission of the application by the Employer (Appellant) and that a vote would be taken by the Board of Trustees on the question of permanent and total disability\(^3\).  In the within matter, the parties agreed that Respondent was disabled, and that it was unlikely he would return (Da15, Par. 3, Da18, Par.17).  Under \(^3\) “In the event the Board finds that the member is not totally and permanently incapacitated for the performance of duty, the employer's application shall be disallowed and the employer shall be informed that the member should be returned to duty. ”  N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10 the agreement, Respondent is kept on medical leave, even until this day (Da15, Par. 3).  Once the [...] determined that terms related to irrevocable retirement offended the law in this area (Da24-Da25), an impasse was created in reaching the question of disability.  Appellant, in refusal to strike the terms, breached the agreement and repudiated its duty to under Par. 18 of the Separation Agreement so that [...] could reach the intended finding that the Respondent \textit{was, or was not}, “totally and permanently disabled” for further services as an officer.  The intent in filing the Involuntary Ordinary Disability under the Involuntary Regulation (N.J.A.C 17:4-6.10) aims at the idea that the [...] could reach a determination on whether Respondent was permanently and totally disabled.  Otherwise, Respondent could have filed for disability without the Appellant pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6 – in that section there is no language which suggests that the Appellant “\textit{shall be informed that the member should be returned to duty}” as found in N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10.  The hypothetical application under N.J.S.A.43:16A-6 may have been granted or denied.  However, the parties as employer/employee mutually proceeded under this IOD section; Respondent did not know, in advance, that the Appellant would later breach these terms and block that process.  The Trial Court's ruling to strike the terms and reach the subject determination under law is a sound decision in accord with the facts of this case and the intent of the parties at the time of contract.
[directive] Page 4  3.  Law enforcement officers shall not disclose an individual’s LGBTQ+ status or gender assigned at birth to members of the public, unless:  a.  A proper law enforcement purpose requires such disclosure, and the officer documents that purpose in writing; or disclosure.6  b.  The individual agrees to such Nothing in this provision prevents an officer from respectfully asking someone, “What pronouns do you use?,” to ascertain their gender identity in an effort to ensure that an individual’s rights and dignity are protected, as laid out in Appendix A to this Directive.
[brief] Imposition of four maximum consecutive sentences deserves special scrutiny.  See State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012) (“we adhere to the cautioning in Miller and Pennington against the imposition of multiple consecutive maximum sentences unless circumstances justifying such an extraordinary overall sentence are fully explicated on the record”).  In State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122 (1987), the Court warned that factors “relied on to sentence a defendant to the maximum term for each offense should not be used again to justify imposing those sentences consecutively.  Where the offenses are closely related, it would ordinarily be inappropriate to sentence a defendant to the maximum term for each offense and also require that those sentences be served consecutively[.]”  In State v. Pennington, 154 N.J. 344, 361 (1998), the Court similarly articulated, “Once the sentencing court used the aggravating factors to impose the maximum base sentences with maximum parole disqualifiers for the two burglaries, Miller required the court to articulate other reasons for imposing the sentences consecutively. ”
[brief] That the [...] in its November 2018 Resolution on the N.J.S. A. 40:55D-68  Application determined that this off-Site parking facility/use on Lot 5 for Lot 8 staff/Attendees is not now a legal use and has never been a legal pre-existing nonconforming use.  (Da894, excluded by Court below)  These established facts are “surrounding circumstances” that establish that the 1963 "permission" for parking on the then vacant portions of the School Lot 5 was, at most, a personal license that ended no later than 1972.
[brief] Id., par 13.  [...] pointed out that--notwithstanding assurances by Township experts that a “‘comprehensive financial analysis’ was an essential part of the record for the official actions of Township Committee authorizing the Financial Agreement--no comprehensive financial analysis is to be found in the public record.  Id., par.14.  “The absence of any such comprehensive financial analysis in the public record. ” he wrote, “renders the official actions of the Township Committee devoid of any analytical basis or justification, and [is] therefore arbitrary.
[brief] McCaffrey and Reynolds (2021), supra, at 4.  Other states are heeding the developmental scientists and are extending protections to late adolescents under their eighth-amendment analogues.  The Washington State Supreme Court held that eighteen- through twenty-year-olds are entitled to the same protection as juveniles against life sentences.  In re Monschke, 482 P.3d 276, 288 (Wash. 2021).  This decision was reached after the Supreme Court independently examined the developmental science.  Id. at 284-86.  The court concluded that “no meaningful cognitive difference” exists between juveniles and eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.  Id. at 287, 288.  Therefore, under the Washington Constitution, Miller protections were extended up to age twenty.
[brief] [...]’s fourth reason for denying coverage incorrectly declares that [...] “failed to comply with the condition” of the policy by not giving [...] prompt notice.  (Pa32).  [...]’s fifth reason for denying coverage wrongly declares that coverage does not apply because the “allegations in the Complaint are for intentional acts” and the policy excludes bodily injury that is “expected or intended”.  (Pa32).  On December 13, 2018, [...] sent an email to [...] Insurance expressing his dissatisfaction and requested an internal appeal.  (Pa33).  On December 28, 2018, [...] stated that the Internal Appeal Panel, “made a decision to uphold the Company’s determination to deny liability coverage…” (Pa33, Pa245).
[brief] ............  Da 14-16 App. Div. Opinion ([...])  .................................................................  Da 17-22 Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief  ..................................................  Da 23-25²  ¹  Efforts made by undersigned counsel to obtain a copy of Indictment Number [...] were unsuccessful as were efforts made by Deputy Public Defender [...] of the Conviction Integrity Unit to obtain other documents and transcripts, see Da 14-16.  ²  Da 23-29 are included in the appendix as these documents are tantamount to a complaint and thus are required to be included in the appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(1).  INDEX TO APPENDIX (Cont’d.)
[brief] Exhibit A: Deed dated April 13, 2005 (omitted – see 213a)  Exhibit B: Deed dated April 13, 2005 (omitted – see 221a)  Exhibit C: Complaint (omitted – see 30a)  Exhibit D: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 4/11/05 (omitted – ………… see 105a)  Exhibit E: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 12/22/09 (omitted – …………see 121a)  Exhibit F: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 5/17/10 (omitted – …………see 134a)  Exhibit G: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 8/17/10 (omitted – ………… see 138a)  Exhibit H: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 11/18/10 (omitted – ………… see 151a)  Exhibit I: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 3/10/11 (omitted – …………see 164a)  Exhibit J: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 4/7/11 (omitted – see ………… 177a)  Exhibit K: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 5/24/11 (omitted – …………see 190a)  Exhibit L: Excerpt from Site Plan dated 9/6/13 (omitted – see ………… 203a)  Exhibit M: Developers Agreement (omitted – see 319a)
[brief] (3T43:13-19; 3T48:4-12; 3T50:2-4).  The 2019 return would not be due for another eleven months and the 2018 return was only approximately a month and a half late (but the accountant had requested an extension).  (3T48:13-19).  Defendant did not have any company tax returns to share with Plaintiff until just before the sale to [...] in May 2019, which she shared with him when the returns and schedules were completed.  (3T126:25-127:5).  Pursuant to the trial Court’s Order of Disposition (Pa1705), having found that the Operating Agreement provided for the award to the prevailing party of attorney’s fees and costs, Defendant’s counsel made application to the trial court for such fees and costs.
[brief] While [...]’s ROFR, on its face, does not require that a legitimate, bona fide offer has to be a contract signed by both parties, the ROFR does require that [...] present the offer to [...] before accepting it.  That did not occur here.  [...] (eventually) presented a fully executed contract to [...], one that was clearly inaccurate and needed corrections.  [...] was notified shortly after January 17, 2023 that it had to correct the PSA, but inexplicably refused to do so until May of 2023.  That refusal was likely premised, in part, upon [...]’s counsel’s confusion over whether a ROFR existed.  Again, [...] was not aware of the ROFR until several months after it had signed the PSA, which then resulted in testy negotiations with [...] over price adjustments.  [...] noted explicitly on April 21, 2023 that it would not close on the sale until [...] agreed to contribute the penalty terminations.
[brief] See also *Browne v. Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Trust*, 2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 244537, 2021 WL 6062306 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2021) (holding there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA); *North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974, at *6, 2021 WL 4398650 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2021)
[brief] Accordingly, without the express waiver language of *Atalese*, there can be no presumption that a franchisee or wholesaler understood the consequences and effects of an arbitration provision.  While the parties in *Passaic* were both sophisticated actors and enjoyed equal bargaining power, the *Passaic* court recognized that this is not always the case.  As a result, it purposefully carved out an exception where commercial contracts involving parties with disproportionately less bargaining power, such as wholesalers and franchisees, require *Atalese*’s express language to ensure mutual assent.
[brief] We add only the following comments.  Applying an abuse of discretion standard, we maintain a limited scope of review when considering sentencing determinations on appeal.  See id. at 272.  Ordinarily, our review is deferential and we do not “substitute [our] judgment for that of the sentencing court. ”  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).  However, our deference applies “only if the trial judge follows the [Criminal] Code and the basic precepts that channel sentencing discretion. ”  State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020) (quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 46, 65 (2014)).