ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] R. 2:10- 2.  The State’s entire case against [...] relied on his self-identification in the RT-TOIC video and his statement admitting that he was with [...] that day.  [...]’s statement was admitted alongside [...]’s numerous accusations of dishonesty, opinions as to what the surveillance footage shows, and acknowledgments that [...] had been arrested on unrelated charges, sullying [...]’s credibility with the jury.  With no DNA, fingerprint, or other identification evidence tying [...] to the scene, the credibility of [...]’s vehement denials was especially critical.  The church video—the only recording of [...]’s front door—is far too blurry to identify who is going in and out of the building, and whether they are going far past the door frame and foyer, and into the warehouse.  While [...] identified himself in the RT-TOIC video, it is not at all clear that the person he identified himself to be in that video is present in the church video.  And, although [...] acknowledged once during the interrogation that he “came out of there,” (7T 181-3) [...]’s descriptions throughout the interrogation of where he was and what he did on that day are confused and difficult to follow.  This case therefore came down to [...]’s contention that he was not in the building, against the State’s contention that [...] was one of the two individuals whom [...] said assaulted him with bats and robbed him.
[brief] Rather, it was already the subject of eminent domain proceedings by the State of New Jersey.  Plaintiff testified at trial that the $5.8 million listing price which appears in the PSA “came from [...]. ”  2T14.  Defendant’s testimony was less succinct on this point, but it is clear he knew the property was never going to sell.  He was so sure of this that he considered the $5.8 million listing price language to be “meaningless. ”  He testified:  --- 2  Adopting Defendant’s designations, 1T__ refers to the Deposition Transcript of [...] dated 11/9/22; 2T__ refers to the Trial Transcript of 3/28/23; and 3T__ refers to the Transcript of the Court decision of 5/3/23.
[brief] Pa207, PSOF ¶44.  Plaintiff testified as to her serious concerns about continuing to work in person at [...] in light of the Covid-19 pandemic stating, “At that time, there were a lot of reports from various news sources and health organizations that I was in a class of people at risk.  So maybe this sounds extreme and we have to remember the time it was extreme.  I wasn’t scared of contracting COVID.  I was scared of dying of COVID.  The most innate human fear one can have.  And I expressed that concern via text to my direct report, [...], who at the time, was working remotely to protect her health. ”  Pa205, PSOF ¶38.  Plaintiff directly expressed this fear and anxiety to her direct supervisor.
[brief] Public entities and public employees have the burden [to plead] that they are immune from suit."  *Crystal Ice–Bridgeton, LLC v. City of Bridgeton*, 428 N.J. Super. 576, 585, 54 A.3d 848 (App. Div. 2012).  Here, defendants had the burden of pleading the affirmative defenses they intended to raise…because the Legislature's waiver of sovereign immunity as to claims against public entities is not unlimited.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  The Applicable Legal Standard (Not raised below)  While appellate courts “must defer” to the Commission’s “expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field” (Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)), this Court is not bound by the Commission’s interpretation of the School Ethics Act.  In re State Bd. of Educ.’s Denial of Petition to Adopt, 422 N.J. Super. 521, 530 (App. Div. 2011); Levine v. State Dep’t of Transp., 338 N.J. Super. 28, 32 (App. Div. 2001).  The Court must examine the record to ascertain whether the Commission’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence[.]”  Dericks v. Schiavoni, No. A-0538-09T1, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1393, at *1, *12 (App. Div. June 1, 2011) (quoting Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)).  See also N.J.A.C. 6A:4-4.1(a) (in deciding an appeal to the Commissioner from Commission decisions, the Commissioner “shall not disturb the decision unless appellant has demonstrated . . . the Commission acted in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law”).  Based on this legal standard, and for the reasons explained more fully below, the Commission’s Decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and should be reversed.
[brief] [...] also stated that the Second Amendment gives teeth to the other 9. probation. ”  The prosecutor has no proof of any “mental illness. ”  There were other discriminatory assumptions.  ¶¶129-130, Pa29.  15.  Counsel appeals the veto to the Court who approves the veto stating that people with mental illnesses need to stay on the State’s “Radar Screen” for a longer period – without further explanation.
[brief] ([...]), a company defendant owned with his family.  *Ibid.*  A deed evidencing title in the name of [...] was recorded in February 1994.  For the subsequent twenty-two (22) years, the defendant and his family handled [...]’s operations, finances and “all paperwork connected with the [property]. ”  *Ibid.*  In finding that the twenty-year statute of limitations applied, the Court found that an average investor exercising reasonable diligence and intelligence would have discovered the issue in title.
[directive] Docket FJ (1)  [...] Commitments  For dispositions which a [...] ([...]) commitment term will in be imposed, those dispositions can proceed or be adjourned at the judge's discretion.  of  Any action by the [...] to delay transport and commitment juveniles to [...] facilities should not delay the disposition.  2 to  As noted, this Guidance applies only to juveniles who are awaiting disposition a secure facility.
[brief] (1T11-1T12)  On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed with the Chancery Division, Bergen County, a meandering, invective of allegations of wrongdoing against the Borough in the form of a Verified Complaint and OTSC.  It is difficult to discern from the Plaintiff’s Complaint exactly what the causes of action are, however, it appears that they are (A) for alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  §1983 and/or the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, et seq; and (B) related to the Open Public Records Act.
[brief] The Strip is approximately 6,262.80 square feet, approximately ten (10) feet wide at its widest point, and is located along the shared lot line between Lot 4 and the adjacent Lot 3.  The Strip contains a grassy section and an area with curbing and a portion of parking spaces.  Although the Strip is described in the 1991 Deed as part of the Property, it is currently used by Defendant for parking.  Since taking ownership of the Property in 1991, including the Strip, Plaintiff has allowed the owners of the adjacent Lot 3 to use a portion of the Strip for parking.  Further, Plaintiff has paid landscapers to maintain the entirety of the Strip.  The core issue in this case revolves around the chain of title of the Strip.  Although both chains of title for Lot 4 and Lot 3 contain a legal description of the Strip (essentially describing the disputed area as part of each of the aforementioned lots), the first description of the Strip mysteriously appears in a 1971 deed transferring Lot 3 to one of the Defendant’s predecessors-in-interest.  The 1971 deed for Lot 3 fails to describe how the grantor therein purportedly obtained ownership of the Strip, whereas the chain of title for the Property has consistently described the Strip as far back as December 15, 1933.  Against the weight of Plaintiff’s evidence of consistent recorded title to the Strip, the trial court the evidence and testimony presented, the trial court improperly imputed actual and inquiry notice of issues relating to ownership of the Strip to Plaintiff at the time Plaintiff purchased Lot 4 in 1991.  Relying on Plaintiff’s purported notice obligations at the time of purchase, the trial court erroneously concluded that the Defendant was entitled to equitable ownership of the Strip and ownership under the theory of adverse possession, and required the Plaintiff to complete transfer of ownership of the Strip to the Defendant.
[brief] See Db39, 40, 42.  But Edelweiss MA was an appeal of a motion to dismiss decision and, as a result, did not consider the detailed summary judgment record before this Court.  Factors that court use to determine whether a source is the news media should lead the Court to hold that either the [...] is not the news media or, at the very least, there is a material dispute about that question.  First, Defendants offered no evidence that any of the more than 2 million weekly rate resets used by Relator to conduct its original analyses or the many more used for later analyses, Ja2291, would be considered newsworthy.  Second, the [...] does nothing to determine the accuracy of rate reset or other information submitted by RMAs.  Indeed, unlike what would normally be considered the news media, which want to be trusted, it disclaims any accuracy and completeness.  Ja2115, 2169-70.  Nothing that is the “news media” would entirely disclaim any responsibility to be accurate, truthful, or reliable.  That is, after all, the very purpose of the news media.
[directive] Joint investigation or task force cases are not adoptive seizures.  Appraised Value is the estimated value of the property at the time of seizure.  The seizing agency or a certified third party establishes the appraised value.  Cash refers to currency or monetary instruments.  Costs are those expenses paid out of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.  Department Component refers to agencies, divisions, offices, sections or units of the Department of the Treasury.  District refers to the federal judicial district.  Equitable Sharing refers to the transfer of seized and forfeited cash, property or net to Guidelines proceeds participating law enforcement agencies, pursuant to these and the “Guide Equitable Sharing Foreign to detailed policies and practices set in the forth for Countries and Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Agencies.
[brief] It is evident from the record that both the flight of the victim wearing the yellow jacket and the subsequent shooting occurred during the robberies – not after they were completed.  In the immediate aftermath of the crime, the robbery victims told police that two armed individuals got out of a car and told them to empty their pockets.  Two of the victims – [...] and [...] – emptied their pockets.\(^8\) (PSR 3)  [...] shouted to his codefendants from the parked car to “get the guy in the yellow jacket” as [...], who was wearing the yellow jacket, tried to get away.  (5T:10-16 to 19)  The shooting that resulted in [...]’s death occurred during the robberies.  Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that [...]’s act of shouting out to his codefendants was a considered or premeditated decision rather than an impulsive one.  [...] testified that while [...]’s decision to participate in the robbery was not impulsive, his act of shouting to his codefendants from the car probably was because it occurred during precisely the type of emotionally heightened situation in which teenagers are most likely to behave impulsively and least likely to consider the consequences of their actions.
[brief] As a matter of both state and federal law, defendant [...] had an absolute duty to ensure that plaintiff received her psychiatric medication.  Saint Barnabas Medica, 111 N.J. 74.  Here there are no policies in place to ensure that prisoners are being provided with proper medical care.  Plaintiff was not provided with her psychiatric medications between January 7, 2019 through January 13, 2019.  Plaintiff requested the medications and did not receive them.  Plaintiff was denied procedural and substantive due process because she was not allowed to go to court to attend to her matter and denied access to her attorney.  Prisoners have the right of meaningful access to the courts.  Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).  There are no policies in place to ensure that prisoners are able to make their Court appointments.  [...] has no policies in place to ensure that inmates are able to properly voice their concerns.  There are no policies in place to ensure that prisoners have contact with their attorneys.  Short of the handbook stating that plaintiff had a right to communicate with her attorney, there was no policy specifying the methodology as to how this was to be achieved.  The defendants interfered with plaintiff’s due process rights to access the courts by refusing to allow her to attend and to have assistance of counsel by not allowing contact.
[brief] (Pa116).  [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, [...], docket number [...].  (Pa241).  Following a trial, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. entered an Order and Memorandum of Decision reversing the [...]’s denial, concluding that it was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  (Pa268).  The judge exercised original jurisdiction to grant the application.  (Id.).  This appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of [...]’s untimely complaint is the only legal challenge to Ordinance No. 13-2022 and the multi-town redevelopment project it facilitates.
[brief] Y. SMSA v. Bd. of Adj., 370 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2004) ..............................................  42 O'Brien (Newark) Cogeneration, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 361 N.J. Super. 264 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 452 (2004)  ..................................................  48  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263 (2013) .................................................. 20, 24, 43  Puleio v. Bd. of Adj., 375 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 184 N.J. 212 (2005)  ..................................................................................
[brief] No subpoena is necessary.  *Elasticsearch v. Floragunn GMBH*, 2021 WL 1753796 (N.D.Cal. May 4, 2021).  Pa379.  The witness’ status as a non-party officer or director does not establish the absence of control.  *Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co.*, 497 F.3d. 1135, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007).  To the contrary, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b), a corporation is “deemed to have legal control over its directors … for deposition purposes. ” (emphasis original).  *Id.*  The same is true under Rule 4:14-2(a).  *D’Agostino*, 242 N.J. Super. at 273-74.  Contrary to the sound rationale of the foregoing authorities, the trial court inexplicably found that [...]’s status as a director did not establish the corporate defendants’ control over him.  It appears that based on a misreading of *D’Agostino*, the trial court believed that plaintiff had to show something more. \(^5\)  In *D’Agostino*, the trial court examined the issue of control because the plaintiff sought to depose non-party executives of a non-party subsidiary of [...], as opposed to [...]’s directors.  For the notice to be effective, the plaintiff had to show that [...] had control over the subsidiary.  The trial court found that [...] had control over the subsidiary.  In doing so, it noted that control was not denied, nor could it be, as the subsidiary was a wholly-owned subsidiary of [...] and, thus, “clearly under its control. ”  *D’Agostino*, at 275, citing, *Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick Co.*, 659 F.Supp. 1381, 1388 (D.N.J. 1987), aff’d. in part and rev’d in part, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), affirming judgment  493 U.S. --- \(^5\)  Defense counsel raised the issue of lack of control but offered no factual or legal basis for the assertion.  400 U.S. (1990).  As explained by the Kirkpatrick court, “the central factual issue in determining whether an agency relationship between a parent and subsidiary corporation is control. ”  In other words, to “determine whether a subsidiary is such an instrumentality of the parent corporation that treating the two as one is warranted. ”  Id. at 1388.  Because [...] had control over the subsidiary, ipso facto, [...] had control over its subsidiary’s executives.  The subsidiary’s control over its own executives was not something that could be disputed.  “Control” is not an issue in this matter because plaintiff seeks to depose a director of three corporate party defendants, not a director of a non-party.  [...]’s status as a director of the three corporate defendants is the only relevant fact and it is undisputed.  Because a corporation’s control over its own director is presumed, no further showing of control is necessary.  The trial court’s ruling is irreconcilable with D’Agostino and the other authorities cited above.
[brief] Indeed, while Defendant now attempts to distance himself from his admitted ownership of [...]—as a condominium unit sometimes occupied by his sister (Def.’s Br. at 4)—he confirmed in an email exchange with his former attorney that his address was [...], which was enclosed to Defendant’s motion below as Exhibit H. (Da163).  In fact, in Defendant’s email dated April 24, 2023, he stated:  I was failed by your firm.  I want my 5000.00 retainer back and my documents.  I want no communication from the attorney or you.  I will pickup the documents and check for the money on Tuesday unless you FedEx to me on Monday.  Your associate lied to me IN WRITING!  Check his emails for yourself.  [...]  [...] [...] PS  NO communication  I do not wan your firm’s representation.  I do not trust you firm or [...].  That same day, April 24, 2023, Defendants prior attorney, Mr. [...] replied by stating, in part:  “We understand that you have terminated our representation.  We will FedEx your file to: Mr. [...], [...], [...]. ” (Da163; emphasis added).  If that were not enough, Defendant also asserts that his other admitted address at “[...] was well known to [Plaintiff].” (Def.’s Br. at 22).
[brief] Defendant, however, still got every word it wanted from the documents before the jury and into evidence.  Every conclusion was read to the jury – most more than once.  Defendant then highlighted the hearsay conclusions in the defense closing.  Defense counsel even went so far as to cite “[...]” as if she had testified.  The documents were used in the cross examination of plaintiff, [...], and plaintiff’s expert witnesses, [...] and [...].  Incredibly, defense counsel was allowed to read line by line through D-5 and D-6 and ask the witness if what was read was what the letter said.  As if that is the least bit relevant or allowable without the proper foundation.  The cross examination of [...] is most illustrative of how the defense got every word they wanted into evidence despite plaintiff’s objections, [...]’s ruling and the lack of any foundation showing the reliability or the trustworthiness of the statements made, let alone the conclusions made, in those documents.
[brief] THE ZONING BOARD UNLAWFULLY DENIED THE APPLICATION, AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REVERSED ITS DENIAL  Defendants claim that the Trial Court erred when reversing the Zoning Board’s denial and ostensibly “stripping the Township and the Zoning Board of their jurisdiction” by “fashioning new procedures” for the review of Plaintiffs’ site plan application, and that the ruling “departs from long established case law. ”  However, Defendants fail to mention, let alone describe in detail, the reasons why the Trial Court ruled that the Defendants have no further approval authority over Plaintiffs’ site plan application.  Indeed, Defendants’ briefs on appeal do not even quote or otherwise refer to the Trial Court’s decisions below.  The reasons behind the Trial Court’s decision, as first described in detail in the 64-page Order and Opinion of October 15, 2020 (the “October 15, 2020 Opinion”) were supported by ample evidence and the governing law, as set forth below.  A.
[brief] Municipal restrictions on building height date back to the late 1800s, and were imposed in response to advancing technology and construction techniques that enabled the construction of tall buildings.  [...] and [...], *American Land Planning Law*, §69:1 (rev. ed. 2003).  Very early on, courts recognized the relationship between height restrictions and the public welfare because the height of a building could impact traffic congestion, fire hazards, public health, adequate light and air, and population density.  E.g., *Pritz v. Messer*, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30, 31 (1925), overruled on other grounds, *Vill. of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc.*, 9 Ohio St.3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852, 855-56, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 3503, 82 L.Ed.2d 814 (1984).  Height restrictions like restrictions on density, bulk or building size, can also be a technique for limiting the intensity of the property's use.  *N. Bergen Action Group*, supra, 122 N.J. at 567, 585 A.2d at 939; see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-65(b) (zoning ordinance may regulate bulk, height, building size, lot coverage, lot size, floor area ratios and “other ratios and regulatory techniques governing the intensity of land use and the provision of adequate light and air”).
[brief] (Pa268-269).  Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that plaintiff’s demand for declaratory and injunctive relief precluded the filing of an OOJ under Rule 4:58-1(a) (“[t]he [OOJ] shall not be effective unless, at the time the offer is extended, the relief sought. . .is exclusively monetary in nature”).  (Pa268).  Counsel next asserted further that the filing of the OOJ for a global settlement of $11,000 violated Rule 4:58-3(b) as said rule requires the calculation of the OOJ’s offer exclude “allowable prejudgment interest and counsel fees. ” (Pa268-269).  Lastly, counsel asserted that the filing of the OOJ violated Rule 4:58-3(c) which states that “[n]o allowances shall be granted if… (4) a fee allowance would conflict with the policies underlying a fee-shifting statute or rule of court…” (Pa269).  In her November 28, 2020 Complaint, plaintiff sought relief that included a declaratory judgment canceling the sales contract and the RISC for her purchase of the Santa Fe, return to the manufacturer of the vehicle and issuing either a refund or loan payoff for the defective vehicle.  Ibid.; (Pa53-59; Pa58).  As of May 28, 2021, when the OOJ was filed, plaintiff’s Santa Fe was still exhibiting defects, and thereby showing strong signs of warranty failure, after a 2019 engine replacement and eleven more repair attempts.  (Pa42-43); Pa53-59).  Also, at that time, plaintiff’s counsel had been working with plaintiff for fifteen (15) months and litigation had been ongoing for six months.  (Pa42-43; Pa53-59; Pa152-155).  Thus, a monetary award to the plaintiff, as set forth in the OOJ was completely inappropriate.  It was only after the repair attempt beginning June 29, 2021, during which the Santa Fe was repaired successfully and plaintiff’s asset, for which she paid $32,040.68, was preserved, that a monetary settlement could be reasonably discussed.
[brief] Da49-Da53.  The trial court calculated this amount as being the difference between the amount [...] was allegedly owed under the revised revenue sharing formula ($1,948,013.51), and the amount [...] was owed by [...] as a result of [...]’s breach of Section 6.2(a) of the Operating Agreement ($1,449,0005.74)  Da52.  Pursuant to the Order, the trial court retained jurisdiction to oversee the parties’ actions in effectuating the terms set forth therein.
[brief] **THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT ACCORDED WITH THE LAW. **  The Commissioner’s decision that [...] has standing to petition to withdraw from the [...] was consistent with the governing statute and should be affirmed.  Judicial review of an agency decision is generally limited to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency decision violates express or implied legislative policies; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence --- \(^5\)