ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  **CAFRA And DEP’s CZM Rules.**  The relevant regulations in this appeal were promulgated under CAFRA which is “a comprehensive environmental design strategy” intended to ensure that any development in the coastal area is limited to “uses which promote the public health, safety and welfare, protect public and private property, and are reasonably consistent and compatible with the natural laws governing the physical, chemical and biological environment of the coastal area. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:19-2.  To effectuate those goals, DEP promulgated CZM regulations to guide permitting decisions in the coastal area.  Those rules include guidelines that regulate the design elements of a project and place limits on “developments which by their singular or collective size, location and design could have a significant adverse effect on the scenic resources of the coastal zone. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(g).  The regulated design elements include visual compatibility, height, view corridor, and setback.  --- 1
[brief] In November 2019, Defendant joked with Plaintiff about the fact that they were both Patels.  (Plaintiff explained to the Court that there is a cultural distinction between two types of Patels: Kadava Patel and Leva Patel).  Defendant humorously asked Plaintiff what he would do if she were a Leva Patel and not Kadava Patel, despite being a Kadava Patel herself (as she had originally represented as) but Plaintiff dismissed the subject since they were both Kadava Patels.  1T62
[brief] Instead, in March 2021, the [...], which is not a party to this case, opened an investigation against a certain attorney of the Appellants’ law firm to determine if the attorney has been principally engaged as a debt adjuster.  (Pa7).  The [...] is an “arm of the Court” which assists the Court with the Court’s exclusive “authority and obligation to oversee the discipline of attorneys. ”  Robertelli v. New Jersey Off. of Atty. Ethics, 224 N.J. 470, 476 (2016) (quoting R.M. v. Supreme Ct., 185 N.J. 208, 213, (2005)); R. 1:20-1(a)).  Thus, Appellants’ argument that the DACCA encroaches on the Supreme Court’s authority to regulate attorneys or any other judicial prerogatives unambiguously lacks merit when it was the disciplinary arm of the Supreme Court itself that initiated the investigation into Appellants for possible violations of the DACCA.
[brief] As the court said in Taggart, supra, “Had the snow been left on the sidewalk, the warmth of the sun would have melted the snow as well as that which fell upon the lawn, converting it into water which, when the temperature fell, would have frozen, rendering the sidewalk equally, if not more dangerous to pedestrians. ”  *Id.* at 423-24.  [...] concluded his dissent by finding that “[n]o element of danger or hazard other than one caused by natural forces was created by the defendants. ”  *Id.* at 424.  Upon its review of the case, our Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the Appellate Division “for the reasons expressed in the dissenting opinion of [...] in the Appellate division.
[brief] There Was No Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Defendant.**  First, [...]’s initial detention of [...] was illegal because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion that [...] had engaged in criminal activity.  The motion court concluded that police had reasonable suspicion because the parking lot was known to be a “high-crime area, specifically for narcotics transactions,” and because of [...]’s observations of [...] and [...].  (Da 13-15)  The court’s legal conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion is owed no deference on appeal.  See *State v. Gandhi*, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010) (“It is a well-established principle of appellate review that a reviewing court is neither bound by, nor required to defer to, the legal conclusions of a trial . . . court. ”).  And the court’s conclusion is mistaken because none of the facts cited, either alone or together, amount to the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify this warrantless detention.  The motion court’s reliance on the SET members’ testimony that the Shop Rite parking lot was a “high-crime area” was insufficient to support reasonable, articulable suspicion that [...] was involved in criminal activity.  As our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, “just because crime is prevalent in a particular area ‘does not mean that residents in those areas have lesser constitutional protection from random stops. ””  Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 403 (quoting State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 420 (2012)).  See also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.
[brief] (See also Pb24-27).  When held against the factual record, however, again providing every reasonable inference to [...], it is clear that the only reason for [...]’s termination was her unauthorized receipt and entry of charge pay.  The report of [...]’s receipt of charge pay was first made by [...], not [...].  And [...] reported it promptly after that.  In terms of timing, [...]’s report came approximately two full months after the June 24, 2020 incident, yet she immediately reported it to [...] after [...] first reported the finding of charge pay.  See Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir.1997)) (“‘[T]he mere fact that [an] adverse employment action occurs after [the protected activity] will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two. ’”)).  The trial court also properly noted—not by improperly drawing inferences in favor of Defendants, but evaluating [...]’s claim of pretext—that all staffing coordinators were interviewed, yet only three were terminated.
[brief] The Court initially notes that Plaintiffs ask the Court to defer its ruling on the instant motion to compel until the District Judge’s ruling on Defendant’s pending motion to amend.  See Oppo. at 18.  The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request and will address Defendant’s motion to compel at this time.  Both parties agree that the revival discovery is relevant to Defendant’s inequitable conduct defenses and counterclaims asserted in the pending “Motion for Leave to File [Defendant’s] First Amended Answer and Counterclaims. ”
[directive] Deadly force against individuals in a moving vehicle.  Strict additional requirements must be met before an officer may use deadly force against a driver or passenger of a moving vehicle.  Moving vehicles create tremendous risk to officers engaged in enforcement operations, particularly officers attempting to arrest fleeing suspects.  Officers must abide by the following guidelines: (a) during such operations, officers shall never intentionally position themselves in the path of a moving vehicle or a vehicle that is likely to move; (b) officers shall make every effort to move out of the path of a vehicle in order to maintain their safety; (c) officers shall not grab onto moving vehicles or the drivers or occupants of moving vehicles.  If a vehicle begins to move while an officer is engaged with the driver or an occupant, the officer shall, if feasible, disengage from the contact with the driver or occupant to avoid being dragged, carried, or struck by the moving vehicle; and (d) while any firearm discharge entails some risk, discharging a firearm at a moving vehicle entails an even greater risk to innocent persons and passengers because of the risk that the fleeing suspect may lose control of the vehicle.  Due to this greater risk, and considering that firearms are not generally effective in bringing moving vehicles to a rapid halt, an officer shall not fire at the driver or occupant of a moving vehicle, unless no other means are available at the time to avert or eliminate the danger and one of the following circumstances exists:  15
[brief] [...], even if there was an attorney-client relationship, would have to demonstrate that he would have prevailed, or would have won materially more, but for the alleged substandard performance.  Here, there are no numbers in the [...] report.  In fact, [...] states he could not provide numbers because he did not have any data on which to do so.  No values were permitted in connection with what [...] and [...] would have or should have obtained.  In any event, that was [...] and [...]’s burden to demonstrate, and they could not do it through the report of Mr. [...].  As noted above, the Court should not reach this causation issue since there was no attorney-client relationship between [...] and [...], based upon the testimony of [...] Miranda.
[brief] At around noon on August 26, 2012, [...] and several of her friends and relatives were gathered to have breakfast at Jones’s apartment on [...], which is located within [...] in [...].  Jones planned to do the cooking and sent [...] and an individual called [...] to buy food at the [...] nearby.  10T 111:17-113:18.  As Brown and [...] were walking back to Jones’s apartment, Brown was approached by Jones’s nephew [...], called [...], outside Carver Hall.  10T 113:6-8; 10T 114:1-10; 13T 136:4-22.  While Brown and Jordan were speaking, Defendant emerged from behind a bush and began to approach, his face covered by a shirt.  Brown asked Jordan who it was, but received no answer.  As Brown began to backpedal, Jordan reached for Brown, but Brown pushed him away.  Defendant then fired a gun.  The weapon, a revolver, fell to the ground and Defendant reached down to pick it up.  In doing so, the shirt fell from his face.  Brown and Jordan ran in separate directions.  13T 137:4-138:19; 13T 145:19-20.  Hearing the gunshot, Jones, who was in her living room, looked out the window and saw the defendant drop the gun.  Observing the shirt fall from Defendant’s face as he bent down, she recognized him.  10T 114:17-118:13; 10T 119:12-24.  Jones’s friend [...] who was also in the living room and had been looking out the window as Defendant approached Brown, saw the defendant shoot the victim and yelled defendant’s nickname, [...], upon seeing the shirt drop from his face.  10T 26:8-17; 10T 27:18-24; 10T 29:4-8; 10T 118:12-24; 12T 21:6-11.  Jones and Ceasar observed Defendant pick up the gun and shirt and then flee across the highway.  10T 31:14-32:19; 10T 119:3-120:23.  Another woman, [...], called 911 to report the shooting.
[brief] 229 N.J. at 130-131.  The decision in Carrero follows a long line of precedent in that regard.  In New Jersey, mutual combat or any “battery, except for a light blow, has traditionally been considered, almost as a matter of law, to be sufficiently provocative” to reduce murder to passion/provocation manslaughter.  Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 414; see also Robinson, 136 N.J. at 492.  Essentially any type of fighting situation, whether initially mutual or not, that is “started” by the eventual decedent, can result in a passion/provocation manslaughter rather than a murder, and, thus, the offense must be instructed to a jury where there is such evidence.  Bowens, 108 N.J. at 641 (imperfect self-defense, or “over”-defending oneself, is not an independent or standalone defense, but it is a rational basis for charging passion/provocation manslaughter); Blanks, 313 N.J. Super. at 72 (App. Div. 1998) (defendant who may have overreacted -- with a gun against an unarmed victim -- in self-defense to a punch warranted passion/provocation instruction); State v. Castagna, 376 N.J. Super. 323, 358-359 (App. Div.), certif. den. sub nom State v. Morales, 185 N.J. 36 (2005) (overreaction -- by dropping a heavy stone onto the head of the unarmed victim -- in defense of another who was merely punched warranted passion/provocation instruction).  Robinson, 136 N.J. at 492 (defendant shot an unarmed person who punched him; attempted passion/provocation clearly indicated as a lesser offense); State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 224 (1990) (defendant pursued abusive husband of defendant’s girlfriend down a street and repeatedly shot the unarmed husband to protect the girlfriend from him; passion/provocation manslaughter properly charged to the jury).
[brief] (Dca 4)  Based on this tip, [...] again met with the C.I. “at a prearranged location in the Toms River, New Jersey area,” listened while the C.I. arranged a controlled buy, and observed [...] arrive at the meeting location.\(^6\) (Dca 5)  Thus, [...] wrote, he had “probable cause . . . that in and upon certain vehicles within the Township of Toms River” drugs and other contraband would be found.  (Dca 1)
[directive] 7.4  Review of use of force.  Thorough and meaningful review of use of force incidents is vital to ensuring a positive law enforcement and community relationship.  7.5  Review of each individual use of force.  Every use of force must undergo the following procedures for a meaningful command level review pursuant to a written policy established by the law enforcement executive:  (a)  The meaningful command level review of the incident shall be undertaken by at least two levels of supervisors.  These levels may include the immediate supervisor, internal affairs, training officers or command staff.  At least one reviewer must be two 20 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 levels or more above the officer who used force.  When the chief law enforcement executive of an agency uses force, the County Prosecutor’s Office shall be notified and, consistent with this Policy, shall determine the process for the meaningful command level review of the incident, which may include staff from the County Prosecutor’s Office.
[directive] Auto  1.  How many of you are licensed drivers?  2.  Have you or any family member or close personal friend ever been involved in a motor vehicle accident in which an injury resulted?  3.  (a)  Have you or a family member or close personal friend ever been involved in litigation or filed a claim of any sort?  (b)  Has anyone ever filed a claim or lawsuit against you or a family member or close personal friend?  4.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend sustained an injury to the _______ or have chronic problems with __________?  5.  [Ask if applicable]  Have you or a family member or close personal friend utilized the services of a chiropractor?  6.  The court is aware that there has been a great deal of public discussion in print and in the media about automobile accident lawsuits and automobile accident claims.
[brief] Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.  On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa11; Pa68; Pa70).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  Although these additional notification methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.
[brief] (3T 8-16 to 36-20; 4T 80-25 to 83-21)  [...] had been killed by multiple gunshot wounds to the face, shoulder, and back.  (4T 49-12 to 55-22)  Upon receiving the call, [...] was patrolling Madison Avenue about two blocks away when he saw a person run from the area of East 16th across Madison toward East 22nd Street.  (2T 9-10 to 16-19)  As [...] pursued the suspect, they made “direct eye contact,” and [...] briefly saw the suspect’s face, but the suspect kept running, and [...] eventually lost him.  (2T 11-11 to 14-25)  [...] and other officers responded to [...], where they found in a backyard and alleyway footprints in the snow and suspected blood; however, two samples of the suspected blood later tested negative for human DNA.  (2T 13-6 to 16-19; 3T 123-14 to 127-2; 4T 17-2 to 20-17)  The police never questioned the residents of 283 East 22nd.  (2T 90-18 to 91-11)  Though [...] had seen the suspect’s face, he never identified [...].
[brief] Id.  The Law Division judge in White recognized that if both [...] and [...] were found to be negligent and to have proximately caused the accident, then “[...] as the third-party tortfeasor [would] be solely responsible” for the plaintiff’s injuries.  Id. at 611.  Thus, the case required an allocation of fault as between [...], the defendant/indemnitee, and [...], the third-party defendant/indemnitor.  The judge further noted that there was a genuine issue, at least on the facts presented in the summary judgment record, as to “whether the cause of [the] plaintiff’s injury was solely caused by [...]’s negligence. ”  Id. at 613.  Finally, the judge in White concluded that, in deciding how best to allocate the liability as between [...], to the extent that liability results from [...]'s affirmative negligent acts, and [...][,] “[t]he logical and most efficient means of achieving that result will be by proceeding as this case is presently structured, with both [...] and [...] as parties.
[brief] **COUNSEL’S POST-SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATIONS**  Consistent with the terms of the settlement memorialized on the record on December 20, 2022, the following day, [...] prepared and sent a Voluntary Retirement and Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”) reflecting the terms of the settlement to defense counsel via email.  (Pa6, VC at ¶ 36; Pa39-Pa40, Email to Plaintiff’s Counsel; Pa41-Pa44, Agreement).  Having received no response, [...] sent a follow-up email to defense counsel on December 27 to confirm receipt of the draft written Agreement.  (Pa6, VC at ¶ 38; Pa45-Pa48, Emails).  Later that day, defense counsel responded to the December 27 email, confirmed receipt, and indicated that they were redlining the draft written Agreement “with some issues [they] saw” and “should be getting back to [Plaintiff’s counsel] shortly. ” (Pa7, VC at ¶ 39; Pa46, Emails).  Defense counsel sent an additional email to Plaintiff’s counsel on December 29, stating they would have “a copy of the redlined agreement shortly” and requested, “in the meantime,” the balance of Defendant’s hours in her timebank, as well as Plaintiff’s policy stating the maximum number of hours Plaintiff is permitted to pay out.  (Pa7, VC ¶ 39; Pa46, Email).  Notably, there was no suggestion from defense counsel that no settlement had been reached, and, in fact, he requested PTO balances necessary to finalize the settlement Agreement.  (Pa7, VC ¶ 42; Pa46, Email).  Thereafter, [...] forwarded additional corrected PTO information on December 30 to defense counsel to finalize the settlement Agreement.  (Pa7, VC ¶ 46; Pa55, Email).  On or about January 6, 2023, after not hearing from defense counsel, [...] reached out to defense counsel via telephone to inquire as to the status of the redlined Agreement so that it could be finalized.  (Pa7-Pa8, VC ¶ 48).  During the call, defense counsel advised [...] that Defendant changed her mind and did not want to proceed with the settlement.  (Pa8, VC ¶ 49).  Significantly, however, defense counsel never asserted that no settlement had been reached.  (Ibid.).  In response to Defendant’s reported change of heart, [...] advised defense counsel that if Defendant refused to proceed with the memorialized settlement which was agreed to by the parties on the record on December 20, 2022, Plaintiff would move to enforce the settlement.  (Pa8, VC ¶ 50).  However, instead of finalizing the agreed-upon memorialized settlement, defense counsel made a new demand by way of correspondence dated January 12, 2023.  (Id. at ¶ 51; Pa115-Pa116, Correspondence).  In response, [...] reiterated in correspondence dated January 19, 2023, that a settlement had already been reached and memorialized, and Plaintiff expected Defendant to abide by it, and put Defendant on notice that if she refused to finalize the settlement, it would seek to enforce the settlement and seek any other appropriate relief, including attorneys’ fees and costs.  (Id. at ¶ 52; Pa61-Pa62, Correspondence).  Consequently, Plaintiff filed an OTSC to enforce the settlement which was heard by the trial court on April 6, 2023.
[brief] Young v. State, 879 A.2d 44, 45 (Md. 2005).  The court reasoned that “scientific advances in DNA profiling enable an examiner employing particular methods and analyzing genetic markers at a sufficient number of loci to testify, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, to the source of the DNA evidence,” which would not require contextual statistics.  Id. at 47.  Thus, contextual statistics were unnecessary here, as the jury was informed that to generate the most exclusionary profile the lab examined twenty-seven DNA locations, ultimately confirming the victim was the source.  (5T43-17 to 19).  The jury also learned that a DNA analyst can only say a person is a source of the DNA profile generated if it reaches a certain statistical threshold.  (5T48-10 to 17).  As a result, the fact that the Massachusetts Supreme Court prohibits the admission a DNA match without the jury hearing about the likelihood of that match occurring is unpersuasive.  See Commonwealth v. Mattei, 920 N.E.2d 845, 854 (Mass. 2010).  In those cases, the DNA profiles were merely matches requiring statistical analysis for the jury to comprehend the likelihood of another person’s DNA also matching.  But here, where the murder victim was identified as the source of the DNA, no statistical reference was necessary.
[brief] **ONE POLICY OF EQUITY IS THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS, WHICH STATES THAT A COURT SHOULD NOT GIVE RELIEF TO A WRONGDOER IN A SUIT WHO ACTED AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS. **  In Rolnick v Rolnick A2d 793 (App Div) the Court stated as follows:  Our Supreme Court has stated that:  “This Court has frequently explicated our public policy concerning matrimony and divorce in a wide variety of contexts.  The source of that policy is the Divorce Act of 1972, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1 et seq.  The polestar of that policy is fairness, equity, flexibility and solicitous concern for the welfare and happiness of the individuals involved.  [Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 552-53, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982). ](#)  The basic equitable maxim of unclean hands is that "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings."  A. Hollander Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246, 66 A.2d 319 (1949); accord Johnson v. Johnson, 212 N.J. Super. 368, 384, 515 A.2d 255 (Ch.Div. 1986); Pollino v. Pollino, 39 N.J. Super. 294, 298-99, 121 A.2d 62 (Ch.Div. 1956).  "In simple parlance, it merely gives expression to the equitable principle that a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit."  *Faustin v. Lewis*, 85 N.J. 507, 511, 427 A.2d 1105 (1981).  While "[u]sually applied to a plaintiff, this maxim means that a court of equity will refuse relief to [any] party who has acted in a manner contrary to the principles of equity."  *Johnson, supra*, 212 N.J. Super. at 384, 515 A.2d 255.  The rule is that while general iniquitous conduct will not operate to bar plaintiff from relief by reason of unclean hands, iniquitous conduct relating to the particular matter or transaction to which judicial protection is sought will operate to bar relief.  See 1 *Herr, Marriage, Divorce and Separation* (1938), § 149[.]  Where the relief sought by the plaintiff is the result of his own wrongdoing, where the unclean hands of the plaintiff [have] infected the very subject matter in litigation, the plaintiff is barred from relief in a court of equity.