[brief] In fact, the Asmad-Escobar and Mhrez decisions have since been cited to further reject the mailing vendor theory.  See Diana v. First National Collection Bureau, No. HUD-L-003014-23 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Hud. Cty Aug. 2, 2024)(dismissing mailing vendor theory).  Besides the New Jersey state court decisions, federal courts have also similarly rejected the theory’s viability.  See Madlinger v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, No. 21-00154, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109328, at *24, 25 (D.N.J. 2022) (analyzing legislative history of FDCPA and holding that “[m]ailing vendors are more akin to modern-day stenographers or clerks, briefly viewing the information for the purpose of creating and/or processing a communication, than employers who could conceivably inflict economic or reputational harm”) (citations omitted); Cavazzini v. MRS Assocs., 574 F. Supp. 3d 134, 142, 143 (E.D.N.Y 2021) (holding that Congress’ intent with the FDCPA was to prohibit third-party communications that would embarrass the debtor and did not include mailing vendors that merely processed information); Ciccone v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, No. 21-cv-3764, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228037, at *13-14 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2021) (“other, more specific provisions of the FDCPA condone the use of intermediaries to communicate with debtors.  . . the FDCPA presupposes debt collectors may use telegrams to communicate with debtors, even though that means the contents of the telegram would be transmitted through a telegram operator. ”); *Nuamah-Willaims v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC*, 2:21-cv-15440, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56069, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2022); *In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139848 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2021) (“Each case addressed herein invokes a recently-developed ‘mailing vendor’ theory – alleging that the defendant debt collector employed an outside firm to print and mail so-called ‘dunning’ letters to the plaintiffs . . . the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion casts significant doubt on the continued viability of [these claims].”); *Quaglia v. NS193, LLC et al.*, No: 1:21-cv-03252, Dkt # 26 Order (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021) (“[it] is difficult to imagine Congress intended for the FDCPA to extend so far as to prevent debt collectors from enlisting the assistance of mailing vendors to perform ministerial duties, such as printing and stuffing the debt collectors’ letters, in effectuating the task entrusted to them by the creditors—especially when so much of the process is presumably automated in this day and age.  In the Court’s view, such a scenario runs afoul of the FDCPA’s intended purpose to prevent debt collectors from utilizing truly offensive means to collect a debt”); *Shields v. Prof’l Bureau of Collections of Md., Inc.*, 2:20-cv-02205, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197903, at *8 (Dist. Kan. Oct 14, 2021).  The reason why there are so many decisions rejecting Plaintiff’s theory is clear.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s unsupported claim, it is illogical to find that the mere use of mailing vendor to print and mail letter — a common practice in modern commerce — to be an “abusive, deceptive, or unfair” act prohibited by the FDCPA.  Thus, the Trial Court’s Order dismissing Plaintiff’s case can, and should be affirmed on this ground alone.