ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The standard of review on appeal from the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion is *de novo*; that is, the reviewing court applies the same standard as the trial court.  *E.g.*, Templo Fuente v. Nat’l Union Fire, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  “[A] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *E.g.*, Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382 (2010).  Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings and other matters of record show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[directive] In the Matter Law Division Criminal Part - Select County County - - -------- Indictment Number: NG RI Docket Number: Criminal Action Order for Evaluation for Non-Compliance with of Clinical Conditions Conditional Release ______ This Matter on behalf , having been opened to the Court by Assistant Prosecutor ________ of of of , Prosecutor - County, in the presence Select County - _______ ________ of on behalf , Esq., appearing and the Court having _____ ________ of , dated , and considered the report Having Found that the NGRI acquittee has been noncompliant and failed to meet the conditions of of the conditional discharge plan [ or the terms the plan required adjustments as they no longer _____ of met the clinical needs the NGRI acquittee] and/or Court Order dated , and of Having Found previously that the acquittee is dangerous to self, others, or property as a result mental illness, and Having Found now to question whether the acquittee can remain in the community with cause of the current level care without posing a danger to self, others, or property, __ of Ordered
[brief] In their opposition brief on appeal, Defendants do not deny that the accumulation of water has caused harm to [...].  Rather, they erroneously contend that his nuisance claim requires Plaintiff to proffer “expert testimony on how, if at all, the [...] allegedly increased the amount of stormwater runoff from their driveway onto plaintiff’s property” [Db25] and, by the same token, contend [...] needed to “apportion his damages between the preexisting water runoff that was the subject of the Burke Action and the alleged increase in water runoff that he attributed to the [...]” [Db38].
[brief] B.  Breach of Contract/Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim  Count 2 of the Complaint asserts a claim for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that [...] breached the confidentiality provision in the Lease by disclosing terms of the Lease and the Solar Rights to the [...].  This claim is virtually identical to the claim that Appellants unsuccessfully sought to add as Count 17 of their proposed Second Amended Complaint in the Prior Action.  However, the allegations of breach in this regard are belied by the Appellants’ own allegations of fact and the findings previously made by the trial court in the Prior Action that Appellants themselves previously disclosed these very facts to the [...], thereby making this claim unsustainable as a matter of law.  In that regard, the breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in Count 2 is comprised of two (2) paragraphs.
[brief] It is well settled law in the State of New Jersey that our judicial framework accepts that there is a presumption of correctness in jury verdicts.  Baxter v Fairmont Food Co., 74 N. J. 588, 598, (1977).  Jury verdicts should be set aside in favor of a new trial sparingly and only in cases of clear injustice.  See Borszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 391 (App. Div. 2005).  Jury verdicts carry the presumption of correctness.  See Romano v. Galaxy Toyota, 399 N.J Super. 470, 477 (App. Div. 2008).  As such, a Trial Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of the jury merely because he would have reached a different conclusion.  Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2,6, (1969).
[brief] Beneath all this is the concept that good faith is the essence of insurance contracts, and this means that good faith is required of the insurer as well as of the insured.  Good faith demands that the insurer deal with laymen as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting.  The insurer knows what it deems to be material to the risks.  It should ask for the information in understandable terms.  [Eggleston at 121-22 (citations omitted; emphasis added)].  The Supreme Court concluded:  It is not difficult to frame questions which will elicit such facts concerning the subject as bear upon the acceptance of the risk.  If a carrier is content to ask only for a conclusional statement as to ownership, it should not complain that an untutored insured did not correctly anticipate the view which the highest court of the State might hold.  Controversy could be avoided by the use of applications, plainly worded.
[brief] •  This number $872,916.70 is taken directly from the documents admitted into evidence in this case, and is therefore uncontested as to amount as follows:  (*See “Exhibit J-12” in Evidence (Pa969): May 17, 1995  Lease between the [...] and [...] and Amendment to May 17, 1995 Lease Agreement)  1995: $15,100.00; 1996: $15,100.00; 1997: $15,100.00; 1998: $15,100.00; 1999: $15,100.00  (*See Exhibit J-14” in Evidence: May 4, 1999 (Pa992)  Amended Lease Agreement between the [...] and [...] and Rider to Amended Lease Agreement)  2000: $20,000.00; 2001: $20,000.00; 2002: $20,000.00; 2003: $20,000.00; 2004: $20,000.00; 2005: $40,000.00; 2006: $40,000.00; 2007: $40,000.00; 2008: $40,000.00; 2009: $40,000.00; 2010: $45,000.00; 2011: $45,000.00  (*See “Exhibit J-19” in Evidence (Pa1027): February 22, 2012 Amended Lease Agreement between the [...] and [...] and Resolution 12-53 authorizing the Amended Lease – monthly rent same as the May 4, 1999 Amended Lease Agreement)
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., | 24, 25 | | 69 N.J. 123 (1976) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., | 21, 22 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., | 25 | | 182 N.J. 210 (N.J. 2005) | | | Camp v. Jiffy Lube No. 114, | 30 | | 309 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Caruso v. Ravenswood Dev., Inc., | 22 | | 337 N.J. Super. 499, 767 A.2d 979 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth., | 22 | | 404 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 2009) | | | Crisitello v. St. Theresa Sch., | 21 | | 465 N.J. Super. 223 (2023) | | | Ellis v. Caprice, | 30 | | 96 N.J. Super. 539, 233 A.2d 654 (App. Div.), certif. denied, | | | 50 N.J. 409, 235 A.2d 901 (1967) | | | EQR-LPC Urb. Renewal N. Pier, LLC v. City of Jersey City, | 22 | | 452 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2016) | | | Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., | 27 | | 454 N. J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2018) | | | Greaseoutlet.com, LLC v. MK South II, LLC, | 43-44 | | 892 S.E.2d 68 (2023), disc. rev. denied, 895 S.E.2d 863 (2024)
[brief] (308a, ¶4).  Indeed, Plaintiff failed to satisfy this condition because it obviously never happened.  Moreover, [...] does not, and cannot under New Jersey Law, prepare a Deed on behalf of another individual, which is inherent in this condition precedent.  (134a, 26:19–27:9).  Yet, Plaintiff commenced this litigation seeking to recover the “benefit of the bargain” (albeit, an illegal one) precisely because he never obtained a Deed conveying title to the Property to him.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have a limited role to perform.  Gerba v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System, 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An administrative agency’s determination is presumptively correct, and on review of the facts, this Court will not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.
[brief] There are “palpable risks” that such police administered “tests” focusing on DWI detection are prone to confirmation bias, the tendency to believe that the tests prove that for which you are looking “despite an officer's good faith and training to remain objective. ”  See State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529, 608 (2023).  Also, SFST is “used by the officer to develop probable cause for arrest and as evidence in court. ”  NHTSA, *DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Refresher Course* (2018), Session 8, p.3, https://www.nj.gov/njsp/division/investigations/pdf/adtu/2023_DWI_Detection_and_Standardized_Field_Sobriety_Testing-Participant_Guide.pdf at 216 (viewed July 21, 2024). ³  According to this *2023 SFST Manual*, original research indicated that W&T was “68% accurate” and OLS was “65% accurate. ”  Ib. at 218.  The *2023 SFST Manual* claims that an officer using W&T will “accurately classify 79% of your subjects” (Session 8, p.47, website at 260) and, with OLS, “accurately classify 83% of the people you test as to whether their BAC's [blood alcohol contents] are at or above 0.08” (Session 8, p.53, website at 266.  While the cited studies were neither scientific nor peer reviewed and suspect due to their sponsorship by law enforcement, they still indicate a false positive rate of 21% to 32% for W&T and a false positive rate of 17% to 35% for OLS.
[brief] The applicant failed to produce any evidence of hardship to justify the waivers, and thus the Board had no basis to grant the waivers as per UDO Sec. 18-601.  As is the case with variances, reviewing courts must consider whether a board arbitrarily or capriciously granted or denied a waiver.  Coventry Square, Inc., v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adj., 138 N.J. 285, 301 (1994).  The Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a request for waivers when the applicant provided no basis of hardship whatsoever for the grant of those waivers.
[brief] The same jury also could rationally find that defendant did not “intend [to] and ha[ve] the capacity to exercise physical control or dominion” over the shooters’ guns merely because they were in the car he was driving.  *Spivey*, 179 N.J. at 237; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:39-2(a)(1) (recognizing exception to presumption of a weapon in a vehicle belonging to all occupants “[w]hen it is found upon the person of one of the occupants. ”).  “An accomplice may be guilty of [a substantive crime] even though he did not personally possess or use the firearm in the course of the commission of the [substantive crime]. ”  *State v. White*, 498 N.J. 122, 130 (1984) (in context of armed robbery).  The jury was not obligated to find constructive possession in order to convict defendant of aiding and abetting the homicide.  And the fact that the jury only found defendant guilty of a reckless crime—manslaughter—further separates him from the actual or constructive possession of the guns.  Ultimately, even if the verdict was arguably inconsistent, this Court does not “speculate” as to the reason the jury acquitted defendant of the weapon offenses because ““[e]ach count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment”” evaluated on its own merits.
[brief] First, it was Petitioner who fixated on this issue prompting the ALJ to address it at length in his opinion, which in turn required the Board to address it in its FAD.  The 2009 incident was just one factor in the entirety of the proofs considered by the Board in its determination that Petitioner’s disability is due to pre-existing cervical conditions, and a minor one at that.  Second, Petitioner has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the Board’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.
[directive] 성명/Full name 중소/Address 생년월일/Date  눈동자 색깔/Eye 성별/Gender of Birth Color  지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지1/2  CN 11710-Korean Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Korean page 1 of 2  AVISO: Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.
[brief] Defendants Knew Plaintiff was Based in New Jersey  Although Defendants claim they are blindsided as to Plaintiff’s principal place of business in New Jersey, this fact was well known to Defendants.  Plaintiff told [...] its main offices were in New Jersey.  Da315 ¶ 14.  There are countless emails between all parties in which [...] and other [...] attorneys and support staff contacted Plaintiff via [...] email addresses through [...]’s principal, headquartered in New Jersey.  Da316 ¶¶ 26 & 28.  Defendants sent not only the engagement letter but also legal bills to Plaintiff’s New Jersey address, which were paid via Plaintiff’s New Jersey bank accounts.  Da315–317 ¶¶ 17, 29 & 30.  The various transactional and escrow agreements Defendants were hired to review listed Plaintiff’s mailing address and principal place of business as New Jersey.  Id. at ¶¶ 15–16 & 20–25.  The funding at issue was directed towards Plaintiff’s New Jersey bank accounts.  Da313–316 ¶¶ 2–4, 6, 8 & 20–25.  Plaintiff does not have and never represented having any North Dakota bank accounts, nor was North Dakota law or any North Dakota licensed attorney involved in any transaction at issue in this case.  Da314 ¶¶ 6–8 F.  Transaction where Defendants Represented
[brief] Among the complaints the [...] had were claims that as a result of the pizzeria being open traffic had increased “3,000 percent”, there was delivery truck noise, exhaust and illegal parking, and violations of the limitation upon the pizzeria to be for take-out and delivery only as a result of there being indoor dining.  (T.1 at 55:18-71:10; 75:11-78:1).  As the Trial Court found, none of these complaints amounted to an actionable nuisance.  First, with regard to the indoor dining claim, it not only did not happen, it was a physical impossibility for it to happen.  As [...] testified, the entire facility was about a quarter of the size of the courtroom.  The available room allowed one or two standing customers who were picking up their food.  (T.1 at 118:2-25).  Unbelievably, the [...], who complained, among other things, about the inside operation of [...], both testified that had they never set foot inside of it.
[brief] DEFENDANTS DID NOTHING IN DISCOVERY TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION.  (1T31:14-32:22, 15a-18a).  Lastly, Defendants claim that [...] is not a bona fide purchaser for value whose title should be protected.  Defendants proceed from the flawed premise that the first judge adopted and agreed with their argument that things such as [...]’s “level of sophistication” was relevant, or that a “review of the foreclosure docket” would have a bearing on the bona fide purchaser determination.  In actuality, and as the second judge correctly held, the first judge’s decision merely recited Defendants’ arguments – it did not adopt and approve of them.  (3T31:16-33:18, 3T51:18-53:4).  If the first judge had made the determination that [...] was not a bona fide purchaser for value, he would have said so in his ruling, and he would have vacated judgment.  He did not.  Instead, he permitted discovery on the issue – discovery that Defendants completely failed to pursue.  Defendants served no discovery on [...].  Nor did Defendants attempt to depose [...]’s principal.  The *bona fide* purchaser analysis is straightforward.  It asks two basic questions: (a) did the purchaser acquire title to property? and (b) did the purchaser pay valuable consideration?
[brief] THE COURT:  So [...], what I want to understand, is, you signed these documents as a representative of [...] by the authority granted to you by your own self on behalf of [...].  So you represent everyone involved and every entity involved on the one side of this transaction, and you cannot tell us who decided that the price would be $180,000?  Is that your testimony?  THE WITNESS:  I cannot -- I don't know who -- there was more than one person, I can tell you that.  THE COURT: Well, were you one of the people?  THE WITNESS: Pardon me?  THE COURT: Were you one of the persons who came to this decision?  THE WITNESS: Came one.  One of them.  THE COURT: You were one of them.  Who were the other people?  THE WITNESS: The lawyer from the law office of [...].  THE COURT: Give me that person's name.  Is it [...] himself or somebody else?  THE WITNESS: That include [...].  THE COURT: Okay.  So we now know that you and your attorney were two of several people that decided on the purchase price.  Her question, is, who else was involved in deciding the purchase price besides you and [...].  THE WITNESS: I presume it would be [...].  THE COURT: Who is the grantor under the deed, right?  THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct.  THE COURT: All right.  Anybody else other than you, [...], and [...]?  THE WITNESS: Not that I know of.
[brief] In the Complaint, Plaintiff claimed damages stemming from defendants’ allegedly improper publication of documents concerning Plaintiff’s criminal record, including charges that had allegedly been expunged.  Defendants removed the case to federal court in February of 2010, and in April of 2010, the federal court denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand to Monmouth County and dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  The Third Circuit affirmed the order denying Plaintiff’s motion to remand and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice in 2011.  Beginning in September 2022, and culminating with a motion for reconsideration filed by Plaintiff on June 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a series of motions in Monmouth County, in a failed attempt to reinstate the Complaint in Monmouth County.  The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate because it had no jurisdiction over the Complaint once it had been removed to federal court.  On August 15, 2023, the trial court entered an Order (the “August 15th Order”) denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration – which is the subject of Plaintiff’s appeal – on two grounds: 1) because the motion was filed beyond the twenty-day period provided in R. 4:49-2; and 2) because Plaintiff failed to address how the trial court’s decision that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter was reached on a palpably irrational basis.  Plaintiff has appealed only from the August 15th Order.
[brief] Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Erlinger v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 1840 (2024), defendant contends that his sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because his extended-term sentence as a persistent offender was based on the judge’s finding that ---  1  This brief, for ease of the reader, utilizes the abbreviations used in Defendant’s opening brief:  Db-  Defendant’s opening brief filed February 22, 2024  Da-  Defendant’s appendix appended to Defendant’s opening brief filed February 22, 2024  Sb-  State’s responding brief filed April 5, 2024  14T refers to sentencing transcript of January 14, 2015  Defendant’s prior crimes were committed on separate occasions, as opposed to a finding made by grand and petit juries.  In *Erlinger*, the Supreme Court considered the question “whether a judge may decide that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, or whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make that determination beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] By the same token, in Enright v. Lubow, 202 N.J.Super. 58, 84, 493 A.2d 1288 (App.Div. 1985), the Appellate Division reversed a judgment to award legal fees to the plaintiff against a title company.  This determination was reached in accordance with N.J. Court Rules, Comment R.4:42-9(a)(6).  The Appellate Division’s determined that the intention of N.J. Court Rules, Comment R.4:42-9(a)(6) was to permit an award of counsel fees only where an insurer refused to indemnify or defend its insured's third-party liability to another.  The Appellate Division further opined that N.J. Court Rules, Comment R.4:42-9(a)(6) should not be extended, beyond its expressed terms, to permit an award of counsel fees to an insured when the insured brings direct suit against the insurer to enforce casualty or other direct coverage.  Once again, in Enright, it was held that only the title company can be found at the time of the omission or negligence to have intentionally refused to indemnify or defend the insured against the third party.
[brief] Order Appointing Condemnation Commissioners ..................Da14 ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Bergen Cnty. v. S. Goldberg & Co.,** | 17, 20, 21 | | 39 N.J. 377 (1963) | | | **Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc.,** | 10 | | 289 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (Law Div. 1995) | | | **Bridgewater v. Yarnell,** | 21, 22 | | 64 N.J. 211, 215 (1974) | | | **City of Atl. City v. Cynwyd Invs.,** | 16 | | 148 N.J. 55, 68 (1997) (emphasis added) | | | **County of Monmouth v. Wissell,** | 15 | | 68 N.J. 35, 38 (1975) | | | **F.M.C. Stores, Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains,** | 10, 18, 19 | | 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985) | | | **Hester v. Miller** | 11 | | 11 N.J. Super. 264, 269 (Law Div. 1951) | | | **Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello,** | 10, 18, 19 | | 252 N.J. Super. 247, 257 (App. Div. 1991) | | | **Mt. Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, LLC,** | 12 | | 379 N.J. Super. 358, 368 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **Mt. Laurel v. Mipro Homes, LLC,** | 12 | | 188 N.J. 531 (2006) | | | **New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Currie,** | 17 | | 35 N.J. Super. 525, 540 (App. Div. 1955) | | | **Rockaway v. Donofrio,** | 10, 18 | | 186 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982) | | State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Hess Realty Corp., 226 N.J. Super. 256, 261 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 383, aff’d, 115 N.J. 229 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989)
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s denial of [...]’s Accidental Disability Pension Benefits isn’t owed this Court’s discretion and should be overturned as [...] has satisfied all of the requirements as set forth in the Statute and Richardson.  Respectfully Submitted, [...], Esq.  Dated: January 4, 2024  [...], Appellant, V. [...], Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION APPEAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE  FINAL DECISION  Docket No. [...]  AMENDED  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - [...]
[brief] RPC. 3.3.  In their moving summary judgment brief, defendants cited Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 211 N.J. Super 536 (2015) for the uncontested proposition that all municipal action is subject to a rebuttable presumption of validity and reasonableness.  But defendants failed to discuss Grabowsky's "within 200 feet" on all fours' binding and precedential disqualifying conflict of interest common law and statutory holdings.  The Local Government Ethics Law ("LGEL") codified the common law.  In N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2, our State Legislature declared:  a.  Public office and employment are a public trust; b.  The vitality and stability of representative democracy depend upon the public's confidence in the integrity of its elected and appointed representatives; c.  Whenever the public perceives a conflict between the private interests and the public duties of a government officer or employee, that confidence is imperiled.  . . .  In N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d), our State Legislature provided:  No local government officer or employee shall act in his official capacity in any matter where he, a member of his immediate family, or a business organization in which he has an interest, has a direct or indirect financial or personal involvement that might reasonably be expected to impair his objectivity or independence of judgment;  Under common law, residents are entitled to fair and impartial decision making.  See, Panitch v. Panitch 339 N.J. Super 63, 67 (App. Div. 2001) ("An objectively reasonable belief that the tribunal is not impartial will suffice to constitute a constitutional deprivation."); In re Adoption of Child ex rel M.E.B., 444 N.J. Super. 83, 88 (App. Div. 2016) (the right to due process encompasses the right to a fair hearing).  Municipal disqualification case law has drastically changed since Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509 (1992).