ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] While no single factor is dispositive, the New Jersey Supreme Court “observed that three of the statutory factors (1) the “interest and welfare of the public”; (5) the “lawful authority of the employer”; and (6) the “financial impact [of an award] on the governing unit, its residence…and taxpayers…were so phrased as to insure that budgetary constraints were ‘giv[en] due weight’ prior to the rendition of an award. ”  Id. at 327.  The interest arbitration statute provides [...] with the authority to “affirm, modify, correct or vacate the award or may, at its discretion, remand the award to the same arbitrator or to another arbitrator.  . .for reconsideration. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(f)(5)(a).  While [...]’s decision is entitled to “great weight,” its decision will not stand if it is arbitrary or capricious.  Id. at 327-328.  Judicial scrutiny of an interest arbitration award is “more stringent” because “such arbitration is statutorily-mandated, and public funds are at stake. ”  Id. at 328.  A reviewing court may vacate an award when (a) the decision fails to give “due weight” to the statutory factors; (b) when the award has been procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (c) when arbitrators have refused to hear relevant evidence or committed other prejudicial errors; or (d) when arbitrators have so imperfectly executed their powers that they have not made a final award.  Id. at 329, citing Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Borough of Hillsdale, 137 N.J. 71, 82 (1994).  POINT II
[brief] The binding testimony of [...]’s corporate representative, [...], demonstrates that [...] failed to satisfy its burden to produce record evidence demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that its sales of AMD products made up more than 20% of its total revenues.  [...] improperly combined sales figures for [...]—the only party in this case—with that of yet another non-party, [...], because it cannot and did not meet the 20% requirement otherwise.  As such, [...] still fails to demonstrate that it meets the statutory requirements under the NJFPA and [...]’s appeal falls short in all aspects.
[brief] The [...] thoroughly considered all these issues.  (Aa55-56).  After reviewing extensive submissions from the parties, the [...] evidentiary hearings, and the Initial Decision, the [...] concurred with the ALJ’s findings and determinations and found that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, the Project is “reasonably necessary to provide safe, adequate, and reliable natural gas services in New Jersey, and . . . reasonably necessary for the service, convenience, and welfare of the public. ” (Aa55).  On appeal, [...] does little more than disagree with [...]’s assessment of the record before it.  For instance, it argues that the current regulator experienced no reliability issues, as well as no “realistic risk of loss of service” arising from icing incidents in 2014 and 2018.
[brief] With respect to the fourth factor, ‘who furnishes the equipment and workplace,’ the record is quite clear that Plaintiff itemized billing entries submitted on letterhead provided by [...], not by the County.  As such, Plaintiff utilized the resources of his law firm to perform his County Counsel duties.  To the extent Plaintiff was required to attend meeting[s] or maintain a presence at [...] facilities, the Court finds this to be negligible in comparison to the facts outlined above.  Thus, factor four weighs against Plaintiff.
[brief] The plan consisted of [...] obtaining two new deeds transferring title: 1) a deed removing [...] and transferring title solely to [...] and 2) a second deed to complete the transaction that transferred title from [...] to [...]’s newly formed LLC, [...].  (75a, 29:1–16).  It is important to emphasize that [...] is not a licensed foreclosure consultant, nor is he a financial consultant, debt mitigation counselor, or lawyer.
[brief] Id. at 38 (“[T]o the extent [...]’s request was for discrete records of the 1992 criminal investigation conducted by the [...], the undisputed evidence is that there was full disclosure of all such documents in the custodian’s possession. ”).  The “balance of [his] request” was found to be invalid because it amounted to a request for “the custodian’s response to his allegation of police misconduct, borne of his belief that certain unidentified and unnamed documents on file with the township were wrongfully concealed or withheld from him. ”  Id. at 39.  In [...] v. [...], 416 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2010), another case where OPRA was being used as a discovery tool by a plaintiff who was adverse to the agency in litigation, the Appellate Division found the request was invalid because Thirteen of Spectraserv’s sixteen requests with multiple subparts sought “any and all” documents from the [...].
[directive] Thirty- three (33) law enforcement  LAW ENFORCEMENT HOLD KIT AGE 14014 agencies reported a total of Hold kits.  These Hold kits may 2-3 yrs old 5+ yrs old 4-5 yrs old 1 yr old 15 24 36 65 represent those kits initially referred to law enforcement, but Total Hold Kits Reported: 140 where the victim chose not to continue the investigation.  11  Agencies responded to the survey between June 2021 and June 2022, with most agencies responding in 2021.  As such, Hold kit ages may now be nearly two years older than first reported.
[brief] APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER THE FEDERAL AND NEW JERSEY CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS.  Appellants argue that Respondents violated the Appellants’ rights under the Federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts.  (Ab48).  Appellants raise this argument not as a constitutional challenge to the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor, but as a means to obtain injunctive and other relief.  This claim fails as a threshold matter because Respondents are immune from these claims because they are not “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.
[brief] Finally, we note that the non-specific and non-individualized factors asserted here do not add up to a totality of circumstances analysis upon which reasonable suspicion can be found.  "Zero plus zero will always equal zero.  To conclude otherwise is to lend significance to 'circumstances [which] describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers' and subject them to 'virtually random seizures.'"  State v. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d 887, 897 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)).
[brief] (Pa0426-27; Pa0261-62).  The trial court found that degreasers used in connection with the wire operations “were a source of contamination that occurred during the defendants’ policy periods. ” (Pa0120).  The court concluded its discussion of AOC 16 stating “the Court finds that liability attaches in this AOC from the start of operations until 1979, and therefore, the appropriate policies are triggered. ”  (Id).  C.
[brief] [...] contends that the density problem underlying this case, i.e., that it is not economical to build a low-density high rise in the SSOD zone, is not unique to the tract owned by [...], but is a common problem facing property owners and developers of property in the SSOD zone.  As such, he contends, it cannot be remedied by the issuance of variances.  See Feiler v. Ft. Lee Bd. of Adjustment, 240 N.J.Super. 250, 256, 573 A.2d 175 (App.Div. 1990) ("'[I]f the difficulty is common to other lands in the neighborhood so that the application of the ordinance is general rather than particular,' a variance may not be granted." (quoting Lumund v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rutherford, 4 N.J. 577, 583, 73 A.2d 545 (1950) (alteration in original))), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 325, 604 A.2d 600 (1991).
[brief] The trial court acknowledged that “the CNA may create a conflict of interest if this matter proceeds to trial but for purposes of th[e disqualification] motion,” did not “find this to be a conflict of interest. ”  Thus, acknowledging the likelihood of conflicts arising at a later date, the court nonetheless refused to resolve the issue at the pleading stage.  That decision constitutes reversible error.  To idly wait for the already ripe conflicts to manifest even further, leading to the disqualification or withdrawal of joint counsel months or years into the litigation, perhaps on the eve of trial, would be a disservice to all parties and the court.  Moreover, the conflicts that could arise may not necessarily be perceivable to the court, such as when an employee fears providing evidence exculpatory to himself, but which is inculpatory to the payer-employer, or if the employee has been prevented from pursuing advantageous settlement opportunities.  The concern for conflicts here has broad policy implications.
[brief] Order and Certification  Intoxicated Driving and Related Offenses, dated June 26, 2023 (Revised)  ................................................Da25  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  Transcript of Proceedings, dated July 13, 2022 ...........................................1T  Transcript of Proceedings, dated August 17, 2022 .......................................2T  Transcript of Trial De Novo, dated June 19, 2023 .........................................3T  Transcript of Proceedings, dated August 1, 2023 ..........................................4T  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant [...] appeals from the denial of his trial de novo that affirmed his conviction at trial for driving while intoxicated and the denial of his motion to suppress the motor vehicle stop and arrest.
[brief] By [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: September 16, 2024  [...]  Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], [...], John Does 1-10 (fictitious names representing unknown individuals) and/or XYZ Corps.  1-10 (fictitious names representing unknown corporations, partnerships and/or Limited Liability Companies or other types of legal entities.)  Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] (Pa41-43).  By extension, that would affect other fire fighters who were previously promoted and presumably at times when Plaintiff claims the unidentified fire fighters should have been promoted.  The Second Amended Complaint again sought for unidentified alleged “affected Union members” to be promoted with “full seniority benefits and other emoluments of the position. ”  By extension, this would have affected other firefighters who may presently have seniority over the unidentified members and would be “jumped” should Plaintiff have been successful in this action and obtained equitable and compensatory damages for the unidentified Plaintiff members.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6c(1).  Here, the State contended that [...] either solicited [...] to commit the offense of first-degree armed robbery, or that he aided, agreed, or attempted to aid [...] in committing the offense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(a) and (b); 2C:15-1.  The liability of each participant in a criminal offense is dependent on his own state of mind.  *State v. Harrington*, 310 N.J. Super. 272, 278 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5, “[w]hen multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for more than one offense, . . . such multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court determines at the time of sentence .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a.  “[T]here is no presumption in favor of concurrent sentences .
[brief] At trial, the defense conceded that [...] had attempted to destroy and dispose of [REDACTED] body, but argued that she did so in a state of panic after he had already died from injuries sustained when he accidentally fell down a staircase.  The State had no theory of how [...] killed [REDACTED], or her motive.  The State’s case depended on testimony from two expert witnesses who opined that extensive damage to [REDACTED] bones, which was inconsistent with an accidental fall, had been the cause of his death.  The State used this testimony to directly undermine the defense claim that these bone fractures were not the cause of his death, but the result of [...]’s destruction of his remains following an accidental death.  The trial court erred in admitting, over defense objection, the testimony of these two experts on the most intensely contested issue before the jury.  The court allowed [...], the medical examiner, to repeatedly opine that manner of death was a homicide, even though he admitted that he had not reached that conclusion by using his scientific expertise at conducting autopsies.  Instead, he based his opinion on other evidence before the jury about the circumstances in which the remains were found “desecrated” and “outside of a house,” which he viewed as “highly suspicious. ”  His conclusion that the destruction of human remains is suggestive of foul play was neither within the realm of his medical expertise nor beyond the ken of the jury.  The jury should have been left to draw its own conclusions about this evidence, rather than urged to ratify the conclusions of a scientific expert.  The trial court also erred in admitting expert testimony by [...], a forensic scientist, claiming that the injuries to [blacked out] bones were “perimortem” – that is, inflicted at or around the time of death.  At the Frye hearing, the State presented no evidence establishing that forensic analysis of bone is accepted by the scientific community as a reliable method for determining the timing of injuries.  Scientific literature confirms that bone analysis is not viewed as reliable at distinguishing between injuries inflicted immediately before death or some period thereafter.  Bird’s unreliable testimony misled the jury into believing that science established that the damage to [blacked out] bones was the cause of his death.  The dispute over whether the extensive bone injuries were the cause of [blacked out] death or the result of [...]’s decision to destroy his body after his accidental death was the only disputed issue at trial.  The erroneous admission of two experts’ testimony on this pivotal question deprived [...] of a fair trial and compels reversal of her murder conviction.
[brief] Defendants also assert that this Court should simply “flatly ignore” [...]’s Certification.  They do so by arguing that it was procedurally improper for Plaintiffs to submit the Certification in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss the damage Counts (which were stayed while the other Counts raising the substantive claims were adjudicated below).  However, there was nothing improper about opposing Defendants motion in this way.  Indeed, the NJLAD issues were not even placed before the Trial Court before Defendants filed their motion.  Despite Defendants’ claim to the contrary, no expert report was required to oppose the motion.  The issues raised by [...] would have been raised at a trial on the NJLAD claim if such a trial took place.
[brief] As the United States Supreme Court has held, “the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults. ”  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that “unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination”).
[brief] Under the LRHL  Implicitly recognizing that the plain language of the LRHL authorized the $2 million redevelopment fee, Plaintiff next argues that a completely different statute, the MLUL, prohibits such payment.  In support of this argument, Plaintiff relies on readily distinguishable cases that further support [...]’s assertion that the City was permitted to “negotiate” and “collect” the $2 million redevelopment fee from [...].  Plaintiff’s reliance on cases that address a planning board’s inability to require contributions for off-tract improvements is an “apples to oranges” comparison that is without merit.
[brief] Shortly thereafter, the State sought to recall [...], asserting:  *3  [[...] is] from another culture [and] didn't really understand certain things.  As he was walking out the courtroom[,] he made a comment that he thought he ... saw the defendant, he saw the person who did this but he thought it was the attorney because he was, in effect, sitting at the [counsel's] table[.]  Defense counsel objected, arguing [...] was unable to identify defendant from a photo array at or about the time of the crime, and three years later “the identification certainly would be questionable[.]”  Counsel also argued the witness was already afforded the opportunity to walk around the courtroom in an effort to identify defendant and walked right by him, and “[t]o give [the witness] a second bite at the apple based on all that's gone on ... would be extremely prejudicial and inappropriate.
[brief] In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following:  19.  Plaintiff was required to make several general appearances before the downgraded Court before the Judge entered dismissal of certain charges (possession of marijuana) charges against Plaintiff, and same is favorable result for Plaintiff.  The trial before the Highland Park judge resulted in guilty findings in other charges that were brought against Plaintiff, BUT THE GUILTY FINDINGS WERE NOT TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT OR HIS ATTORNEY AS IS THE usual custom so the found guilty party has a record of from what he is appealing.  Notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s Counsel attempted to file appeals in three different jurisdictions: JEDS; SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL DIVISION WHICH REJECTED SAID APPEAL WITH INDICATION THAT THERE WAS NO RECORD OF CONVICTION; AND SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL, WHICH SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING SAID PAPERWOK DISMISSED SAME WITH INDICATION THAT CIVIL WAS NOT THE PROPER DIVISION.
[brief] *See Amtec Int’l of NY Corp. v. Polish Folklore Import Co., Inc.*, No. 20-cv-3, 2022 WL 992565, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2022) (Da85-Da92) (recognizing that such an argument would “raise[] constitutional concerns” because it “would mean that any transaction in the world with a licensed New York wholesaler is covered by the New York beer distribution statute.  The constitutional concerns apply equally to the New Jersey distributor statute. ”).  “Because such an extensive reach would likely constitute ‘an impermissible intrusion into the affairs of other states,’” this Court should reject Appellants’ contention that the MBPA preempts the parties’ choice of New York law.
[brief] This Court should affirm.  See New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.M., 444 N.J. Super. 325, 333-34 (App. Div. 2016) ("It is a long settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that an appeal is taken from a trial court’s ruling rather than reasons for the ruling.  We may affirm the final judgment of the trial court on grounds other than those upon which the trial court relied." (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
[brief] It should be rejected for violating R. 4:42-9.  It also cannot be overlooked that in the Final Award the Arbitrator ruled that $504,058.35 of [...]’s “personal legal fees”, which [...] Paid, needed to be repaid.  The Court confirmed that decision, meaning that [...]’s payment of [...]’s “personal legal fees” from the time that [...] was in management were disallowed in this case.  (Da3162)  There is accordingly no way that the Plaintiffs should have recovered $504,000 that [...] paid for [...]’s “personal legal fees”, but then later be allowed to charge [...] more than $826,000 of their own personal legal fees through by their own ‘vote’ after they took over management.  However, that is what the Chancery Court blessed.  Indeed, this decision has enormous implications to every shareholder dispute in New Jersey and now creates a complete exception to the American Rule in all shareholder cases.
[brief] On April 30, 2021, [...] executed a certain loan agreement in favor of [...] evidencing a loan in the face amount of $260,140.00, payable with interest, which was secured by a first purchase money mortgage of even date and amount secured on the Mortgaged Premises (the “[...] Mortgage”), which was recorded with the Register of Essex County on July 6, 2021, as Instrument No. 2021081401.  (Pa134 at ¶8 & Pa143-170).  The [...] Mortgage was subsequently assigned by [...] to Respondent, [...], by way of assignment of mortgage dated April 30, 2021, which was recorded with the Essex County Register’s Office on October 22, 2022.  (Pa134 at ¶9 and Pa171-176).  Payoff Statement sent to the Borrowers included the total amount to pay off the Loan in full through April 16, 2021 (Pa201).  Notably, nowhere on the Payoff Statement does it state that any funds received after April 16, 2021, would be rejected and returned.  In fact, the Payoff Statement states the opposite.  The second page of the Payoff Statement states that any “[f]unds received on or after April 16, 2021, will require an additional $30.53 interest per day”.  Clearly, a reasonable person reading the Payoff Statement would have interpreted it to mean that any payments received after April 16, 2021 would be accepted by [...].  The material facts regarding [...]’s receipt and acceptance of the First Wire Transfer are also undisputed.  The parties agree, and the voluminous record produced by Appellant and reviewed by [...] establish, that on May 7, 2021, [...], which was Appellant’s predecessor’s servicer, received the First Wire Transfer from [...] in the amount of $177,887.35 in the account maintained by [...] at [...].  (Pa185 at ¶7 & Pa205).  The First Wire Transfer identified the names of the borrowers, the loan identification number, and even the property address.  (Id.)  There is also no dispute that although the First Wire Transfer was received by [...] and [...] maintained possession of the funds in its account for a period of fourteen (14) calendar days, the funds were never applied to the Loan as Appellant’s predecessor in interest and/or [...] claimed the payment was short by $3,312.88.  Appellant claims the total amount then due was $181,200.33 as of May 7, 2021.  (Id.)  C.
[brief] And I agree with [...], whether it be a plaintiff or a defendant, if someone has an expert that may have some problems not rising to the level of the expert to testify, but to allow a new expert in a case now that has had -- I believe I have eCourts, if I haven’t been frozen -- 1,220 days’ worth of discovery.  The case is three years, five months old.  [...], in speaking to and looking what’s here, you know, she’s trying to lock this up and get the expert depositions done so you are in a position where you can try this case.  To the extent this Court were to grant this motion, inevitably every action has a reaction and this would certainly further delay significantly the ability of this case to ultimately be tried.
[brief] Thus, the failure of the Court to apply the de novo review standard should result in the reversal of the trial court below.  **CONCLUSION **  For all the aforementioned reasons, plaintiffs respectfully request that the trial court’s decision be reversed and the defendant Planning Board approval be null and void requiring [...] to resubmit its entire application to the [...] for Preliminary and Final Major Site Plan Approval along with variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d(6), and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) for Building Height.
[brief] [4T 31:15-23, 11T 132:15-133:1].  Plaintiffs’ trial strategy was to equate negligence with battery to improve the odds that [...]’s conduct would be found within the scope of employment.  Such a finding would permit recovery against [...] for the liability apportioned to [...].  If Plaintiffs received a verdict against [...] and [...], but [...] was outside the scope of his employment, [...] would not be responsible for the liability apportioned to [...], and [...]’s ability to pay a large judgment is unlikely.