ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As a result, the reasons the Board found [...]’s testimony more reliable than [...]’s are numerous, and, despite the ALJ’s focus on only the 2009 incident, include all of the following: (1)  Prior to preparing his report, [...] failed to review the medical records regarding Petitioner’s pre-existing injuries to his cervical spine, including records from an orthopedist and orthopedic surgeon, and CTs and MRIs demonstrating a worsening herniation at C6-C7 and bulges at C5-C6, the very discs alleged to be injured and operated upon as a result of the 2015 accident.  (Pa147) (2T31:11-17; 36:8-23).
[brief] Appellants’ rest their claim for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage on an assertion that the [...] acted in a manner that was “both injurious and transgressive of generally accepted standards of commonly morality or of law. ”  Harper-Lawrence, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 261 N.J. Super. 554, 568 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Di Christofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 255 (App. Div. 1875)).  Specifically, Appellants assert that the [...] used confidential information under the NDA to negotiate a competing deal with the owners of the Property.  Appellants further allege that the [...] “undercut Appellants’ deal” and, had they not done so, “Plaintiffs would have received the economic benefit of having the Solar Project at the Project Site. ” (Pa001644 - 001645).  The facts underpinning these alleged claims simply ignore Appellants’ payment default under the Lease and consequent loss of site control over the Property.  Appellants’ default led inevitably to their loss of the Solar Rights tied to the Property.  As a result of Appellants’ own failures, Appellants lost the ability to continue with the Solar Project at the Property.  Therefore, Appellants cannot establish the “resulting damages” required to maintain a cause of action for tortious interference.
[brief] ²  Id.  --- ²  The following class action cases were consolidated into [...]: Chernyakhovskaya v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Betancourt v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Espinal v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Martinez v. [...], [...] (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.), Rodriguez-Ocasio v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Burgos v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Henriquez v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Lugo v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Orbea v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Uriarte v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Ferreira v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Gomez v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Little v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Jackson v. [...], Thereafter, on November 1, 2019, the various parties entered into a class-wide settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”), which was approved by the court and the terms incorporated into an order signed by the court following a Final Approval Hearing on July 9, 2020 (“Settlement Order”).
[brief] Thus, the BMP Manual provides recommendations, not requirements.  See Stormwater Mgmt. Rules, 384 N.J. Super. at 457 (“Guidance for these strategies can be found in the New Jersey Stormwater [BMP] Manual 2002. ” (emphasis added)).  The stormwater rules emphasize this repeatedly.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.9 (“[t]echnical guidance for stormwater management measures can be found in the documents listed . . .”); N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.9(a)(1) (“[g]uidelines for stormwater management measures are contained in the [BMP] Manual . . .”).  [...]’s claim that the BMP Manual imposes mandated requirements is misplaced, and [...] correctly accepted [...]’s alternate measures to satisfy the Stormwater Management Rules.
[brief] | Table of Authorities  CASES  Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985)  ..............................................46  Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2008)  ........47  Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir.1997)  ...........................................48  Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 660 (1995)  ...............................51  Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562, 593, n. 7, rev'd on other grounds, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000)  .........................65  Davis v. Torres & Rite-Aid, No. A-1951-10T4 (App. Div. 2012)  ............................65  Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1131-35 (9th Cir. 2001) .....................54  Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641, 645-649 (1997)  .............................................56  EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Envtl. Barrier Co., LLC, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 340 (App. Div. 2015)  ..................................................................................................44  Equal Rights Ctr. v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 (D.D.C. 2010) .........................................................................................................................47
[brief] Point V  THE FACTS TAKEN IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO [...] SHOW THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS TO HAVE RETALIATED AGAINST [...] AND TO HAVE AIDED AND ABETTED DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION (Pa837; 3T)  Under the LAD, individual defendants can be held individually liable as aiders and abettors, under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained “aiding and abetting”:  Thus, in order to hold an employee liable as an aider and abettor, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. ”  *Tarr v. Ciasulli*, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004).  *See also Failla v. City of Passaic*, 146 F.3d 149, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing *Restatement (Second) of Torts* § 876(b)).  The facts recounted above setting forth the roles of each of the defendants in the retaliatory actions taken against Dillon are sufficient for a jury to find they retaliated against Dillon and “assist[ed], support[ed], encourage[d], and supplement[ed] the efforts of [[...]] in conduct which violates the LAD. ”  *See Baliko v. Stecker*, 275 N.J. Super. 182, 191 (App. Div. 1994).  **Point VI**
[brief] ”  Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 359 (1982).  Prejudice is presumed where “there has been a long lapse of time without any indication by the insurance carrier of a loss or rejection of coverage, during which the insured justifiably expects to be protected by the carrier and cannot, except at the risk of forfeiting coverage, act for itself under the policy [because] . . . there is a realistic restraint upon the insured's contractual freedom of action and a significant incursion upon its legitimate, protectable interests. ”  Id. at 362.  “Control of the defense is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment.  . . .  Just as a carrier would hardly agree to pay a judgment after defense by the insured, so it cannot expect the insured to pay for a judgment when it controlled the litigation. ”  Merchs. Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 127-28 (1962) (“Control of the defense is coupled with the duty to pay.
[brief] While Defendants refute Plaintiff’s claims, including the existence of the alleged “Third Loan,” even if Plaintiff’s claims were accepted as true, they must be dismissed with prejudice because they are barred by the applicable six (6) year statute of limitations.  Plaintiff’s claims in this case are grounded in allegations that Defendants allegedly breached two (2) loans that originated in 2008.  Further, Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ payment of $330,000.00, received on April 26, 2013, allegedly failed to pay off the principal, accrued interest, and late charges for the two (2) loans despite executing a Discharge of Mortgage expressly stating the loan was “Paid in Full. ”  These allegations were not communicated by the Plaintiff until February of 2020 – more than seven (7) years later.  Plaintiff’s attempts to confuse the Court by concocting an alleged “Third Loan” absent any evidentiary support to the contrary are unavailing for multiple reasons.  The most obvious legal failing with this theory is the evidence.  Claiming the principal, accrued interest, and late charges as a separate loan and reclassifying it from a demand note to a “pay-when-able” loan, would require some probative evidence to that effect.  However, even though Plaintiff alleges the “Third Loan” was a separate loan, any review of Plaintiff’s testimony and evidence makes it clear that this alleged “Third Loan” is merely a continuation of the $330,000 Loan and the $50,000 Loan, which was in no way discussed or memorialized to toll the statute of limitations.  Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the six (6) year statute of limitations.
[brief] Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  Order Brought by [...] (Attached at Pa256)  Certification of [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa258)  Certification of Eldridge [...] to Motion to Dismiss and suppress 10/14/2020 (Attached at Pa229)  Statement of Facts - Police Reports Attached 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa259)  [...]’ Letter to Highland Park Prosecutor and Court Administrator 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa0056)
[directive] 1.0.6  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must also recognize that they conduct internal affairs investigations, particularly those that involve allegations of criminal conduct, under the direct supervision of the County Prosecutors.  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must inform the appropriate County Prosecutor when allegations of police misconduct involve potential criminal conduct.  In addition, county and municipal law enforcement agencies must confer with and follow the instructions given by the County Prosecutor at all critical points in the investigative process.  This is particularly true when the agency is in the process of gathering evidence, including the taking of statements, concerning allegations of criminal conduct.  References to County Prosecutors throughout this document should also be understood to refer to the Office of the Attorney General wherever such an interpretation would be appropriate, such as when the Attorney General has superseded the County Prosecutor or the law enforcement agency.
[brief] CoDefendant [...] did not answer interrogatories.  The Court had to rely solely upon Co-Defendant [...]’s deposition testimony wherein he acknowledged he had prior drug related felony convictions in the State of New Jersey, but he did not recall the timeline nor the number of convictions.  The certified criminal conviction record was from September of 2018, four (4) years prior to co-defendant [...]’s deposition testimony.  The Court specifically noted that perhaps the certified criminal conviction could be used for impeachment of co-defendant [...].  In other words, a jury could potentially find that during his deposition, co-defendant [...] was misleading the examiner.  The Court noted that same would be within the province of the jury and is specifically not a decision for the Court to determine.  However, the Court found that the minimal probative value, for impeachment and credibility purposes, was substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice to co-defendant [...].  The Court further noted that the conviction was for drug related charges which conviction does not go to the issue of moral turpitude nor veracity and was four years prior to co-defendant [...]’s deposition and five years prior to trial.  After reviewing all of the above, as well as the arguments set forth in the current motion and opposition, for all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the Court properly exercised its discretion in excluding co-Defendant [...]’s prior conviction.
[brief] Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling denying Appellants’ Motion for New Trial should be reversed, and this court should remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants  Dated: May 7, 2024 /s/[...], Esq._____________________  BRIGIT P. ZAHLER Of Counsel & On the Brief /s/[...], Esq.______________  CHRISTOPHER A. KHATAMI Of Counsel & On the Brief  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], its agents, servants, employees, [...], [...], [...], [...], "[...]" and/or "JOHN DOE"
[brief] As anticipated, and as for its “Delegation Clause” argument, “[...] relies on *Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC v N.J. Div. of Inv.*, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, *4, 7 (3d Cir. December 22, 2023) (Ja62-Ja66)([...] Brief, pp. 20-21).  Unlike the subject arbitration provision\(^3\) in *Blueprint Cap. Advisors*, --- \(^3\) “Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof, that cannot be settled between the Parties, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with AAA and pursuant to the AAA Rules; provided, that each Party shall retain his or its right to commence an action to obtain specific performance or other equitable relief from any court of competent jurisdiction.
[brief] Seneca Ins. Co. v. Cybernet Ent., LLC, 760 F.App’x 541, 544 (9th Cir. 2019).  Thus, Producers Dairy, the source of the over-broad “gap-filler” argument Plaintiff makes, provides no support for [...]’s claim that employers’ liability policies must respond with coverage for any workplace injury that is not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers Compensation Act.  The Court in Schmidt never stated that the employers liability policy in that case must cover intentional wrongs of the employer itself under N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 or any other statute.  In fact, the Court’s discussion of coverage for [...], the allegedly intentional actor, demonstrates that the Court did not view N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 or any other statute as requiring such coverage.
[brief] 17  D.  Even If the Court Found Portions of the Arbitration Agreement to Be Invalid as a Matter of Law, the Remedy is to Sever Unenforceable Provisions and Enforce the Balance of the Contract (Da090-Da092; Da162-Da163) ...............  19  E.  The Arbitration Agreement Need Not Have Been Explained To Plaintiff To Be Enforceable (Da027-Da029; Da162-Da163)  20  IV.  EVEN WERE THE MARCH 22, 2024  “STAY ORDER” CONSIDERED AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER  SUBJECT TO RECONSIDERATION, THE TRIAL COURT LACKED AUTHORITY TO SUA SPONTE “RECONSIDER” AND REVERSE SUCH ORDER (Da090; Da162-Da163; 2T21:14-25)..  22
[directive] pretrial the to relevant be would information that or evidence of type the limit may specification  This 27 hearing. detention the of scope the limit thus and decision, into take detention, may pretrial order whether to determining when court, a that provides 2A:162-20 N.J.S.A. 28 concerning: information account charged; offense of the circumstances and nature the (a) consider the may court the that except defendant, eligible the against evidence the of weight the (b) excluded; be to sought evidence of any admissibility including: defendant, eligible the of characteristics and history the (c) employment, family ties, condition, mental and physical character, defendant's eligible (1) the history conduct, ties, past community community, the in residence of length resources, financial court at appearance concerning record history, and criminal abuse, alcohol or drug to relating and proceedings; probation, on was defendant eligible the arrest, or offense current the of time the whether, at (2) offense an for sentence of completion or appeal, sentencing, trial, pending release other or parole, state; other any or this of law or the federal law, under by posed would be that community the or person other any to danger the of seriousness and nature the (d) applicable; if release, defendant's eligible the justice criminal obstruct the attempting to or obstructing of risk the of seriousness and nature the (e) Page 63 offender an or offense pertaining an to circumstance or fact specific every identify to attempt not pose. would release defendant's a that risks presenting the in relevant be that might Circumstances. and Relevant Facts of'Certain Existence Establishing 7.6.2 or any fact respect with to Section, of this provision other any Notwithstanding (e.g., process risk-assessment pretrial automated in the for accounted not is that circumstance offense which manner in especially heinous involvement, organized crime other or gang street illness mental or addiction untreated defendant, by made statements threatening committed, was and nature or convictions, charges out-of-state behavior, criminal other or violent with associated not shall prosecutor etc.), the records, expunged delinquency, juvenile of history of extent pretrial against presumption overcoming the for basis a as circumstance or such fact consider or fact establish that to prepared is prosecutor the unless 8.2 or 7.2 Sections to pursuant detention the (noting that text accompanying and 23 note also See hearing. detention a circumstance at hearing).
[directive] Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize a prosecutor to dismiss all Brimage-eligible charges in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1.  Prosecutors are also reminded that if a defendant is convicted of both a drug distribution-type offense and a crime defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1, the court must impose consecutive sentences.  The prosecutor has no discretion under this statutory scheme to waive the mandatory consecutive sentencing requirement, and if the court for any reason fails to impose consecutive sentences, the prosecutor must notify the Director of the [...] and appeal any such illegal sentence.  In order to assure uniformity in responding to legal issues, if a defendant challenges the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 or the implementation of the provisions of this Section or Section 11.4 (defining Special Application and Enhancement Feature D), the prosecutor must immediately notify the [...] pursuant to Section 13 of Attorney General Directive 1998-1.  7.2
[brief] [...], [...]’s father, testified that on September 29, he was at the home he shared with his girlfriend, son, stepsons, \(^2\)  Police did recover four .40 caliber shell casings from the area of the shooting along with another damaged projectile during McCullum’s autopsy.  The ballistics examiner testified that he could not draw any conclusions from the damaged projectile, but that the four shell casings were fired from the same gun.  He was never given a gun to compare the casings with.  (6T 171-15 to 16, 177-2 to 3, 177-12 to 178-10) and McCullum’s girlfriend [...], watching a football game.  (6T 39-20 to 40-14)  Around 3:50 p.m., he heard “around five” gunshots, followed by Prosser screaming.  (6T 40-15 to 41-13)  Prosser testified that she was inside when McCullum was shot, and, though she heard gunshots and ran to the balcony to see what was happening, did not see who shot McCullum.  (7T 123-20 to 22, 124-4)  Richard\(^3\) testified that a neighbor knocked on his door and urged him to come outside.  (6T 40-15 to 41-13)  When he got outside, he saw his son on the ground, having been shot in the head.  (6T 41-14 to 20)  Several people were already surrounding McCullum by the time Richard got outside.  (6T 42-10 to 16)  Richard began calling his son’s name to try to rouse him and asked him what happened.  According to Richard, his son responded, and his last words were “[t]hat [...] shot him. ”  (6T 68-2 to 4; see also 6T 41-21 to 24, 42-24 to 43-4, 45-1 to 3)  Richard did not know who “[...]” was at that time.  (6T 41-21 to 24)  It was undisputed at trial that “[...]” was [...]’s nickname.
[directive] COUNTY  SART ACTIVATION  MEMBER SURVEY  See next page A- 41  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  Date of SART  Activation: ______________  Activation Site: ________________________  County SART Activation Member Survey  A victim of sexual assault is eligible for Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) services when (1) the victim is 13 years of age or older, (2) the assault occurred within the past five (5) days, and (3) the victim consents to a SART activation.
[brief] In Kandrac, the court’s analysis started with a recognition: The line of cases expanding the duty of the commercial landowner began with the Supreme Court’s formulation of a new rule in Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 432 A.2d 881 (1981), that imposed a duty upon commercial landowners to “maintain[ ] in reasonably good condition the sidewalks abutting their property and [made the landowners] liable to pedestrians injured as a result of their negligent failure to do so. ”  Id. at 157, 432 A.2d 881.  The holding was based upon an assessment of various factors relating to public policy that remain relevant to a consideration of whether a duty should be imposed here.  Kandrac, 429 N.J.Super. at 85.  The court then considered that “[t]he ruling in Stewart was extended to commercial tenants in Antenucci v. Mr. Nick’s Mens Sportswear, 212 N.J.Super. 124, 514 A.2d 75 (App.Div.1986). ”  Id. at 86.  The court observed the extension to tenants was justified:  “In addition to the public’s right to use the sidewalk and the “harshness of the non-liability rule,” we noted that the “resulting incentive to keep the abutting sidewalk in good repair applies to either the property owner or the lessee in exclusive possession[.]”  Id.  The limitation which the Kandrac observed, concerning the extension of duty to tenants, was that “[t]hose considerations do not apply, however, to tenants in a multi-tenant mall that do not have control or maintenance responsibilities for a common area and have no contractual obligation to maintain such areas. ”  Id. as previously discussed, however, these tenants did assume a duty to maintain the walkways.  Given the small size of the strip-mall, even apart from the contractual duty they assumed, each of the Tenant Defendants had an opportunity to observe the conditions on the property and the nature of the attendant risk.