ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 12  Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013)  ..................................................................................  26  Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2017)  .....................................................................  32  State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77 (2020)  .................................................................................................  8, 9 Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997) (single violation)  ....................................................  22  United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987)  ..................................................................................  14  United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ..............................................................................  14  Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558 (2012) ...............................................................................................  8
[brief] (6T 70:19-73:25; Da1004)  Alternatively, if the Appellate Division finds the Trial Court should have taken proofs on the determination of the damages established during the 2017 trial prior to affirming those damages, then it is respectfully submitted the Trial Court’s failure to compel the return of the $4,529.60 awarded following the proofs submitted during the first trial was harmless error.  If the Trial Court had required the refund of these monies paid, Plaintiff would have submitted the identical proofs it had previously submitted, resulting in the identical damages being awarded following the Trial Court’s April 26, 2022 First Amended Order.  (Da 1004)  If this Court determines that the Trial Court’s denial of Defendant’s Motion to Compel return of the monies awarded following the initial trial was not harmless error, then Plaintiff requests this Court remand the matter for the limited purposes of a proof hearing on those damages awarded in the 2017 Judgment and affirmed in the April 26, 2022 First Amended Order.  ii.
[brief] Despite Plaintiff’s waiver of these issues, same are discussed herein for the sake of completeness. the TCA, which the trial court found in favor of the Township’s dismissal.  Therefore, it logically follows Plaintiff’s appeal as to the Township’s dismissal is moot.  It is well-settled New Jersey law that to recover against a public entity, the plaintiff must overcome the immunities set forth in the TCA.  See, Muhammad v. N.J. Transit, 176 N.J. 185, 194 (2003)  When applying N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, the court “must start” from the “guiding principle . . . that immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception. ”  Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 579 (2007) (“Polzo I”) (emphasis added).  As well, “several elements must coalesce before a public entity will be held liable. ”  Ibid.  In other words, the requirements of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 are “accretive” in that, if any single one or more of the elements are not satisfied, a claim against a public entity must fail.  Id. at 586-87.
[brief] To support a redevelopment designation, a municipality “must establish a record that contains more than a bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria and a declaration that those criteria are met”.  Gallenthin, 191 N.J. at 373.  The record must instead contain substantial credible evidence that the designation satisfies the requirements of the LRHL.  *Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange*, 253 N.J. 291, 314 (2023) (citing *ERETC, L.L.C. v. City of Perth Amboy*, 381 N.J.Super. 268, 277 (App.Div.2005)).  “The standard requires not just ‘some evidence in the record’ to support a need-of-redevelopment determination but substantial evidence. ”  *Township of Cinnaminson v. Cove House, LLC*, 2023 WL 8368761, *4 (App.Div. 2023) (not reported).  The substantial evidence standard is not met if a municipality's decision is supported by only the net opinion of an expert.  *Gallenthin*, 191 N.J. at 373 (citing *ERETC*, 381 N.J.Super. at 277-81).  An Appellate Court’s role in assessing a redevelopment designation is to review the decision of the trial court to ensure that the trial court did not commit an error of law.  N.J. Ct. R. 1:7-4(a) (“The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury”); *Est. of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 454 N.J. Super. 298, 301-02 (App. Div. 2018) (finding that the trial court’s obligation to set forth factual findings and legal conclusions exists because the function of the appellate court “is to review the decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion *tabula rasa*”); *Shazo v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Tenafly*, 2023 WL 8427012, *2 (App. Div. 2023) (applying the finding in *Doerfler* to an appeal from a decision on a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ) (not reported).
[brief] [...] also supported the Chancery Court’s general right of review in order to ensure that the arbitration process was “fair” to [...].  Id. at p. 187.  It appeared that the Chancery Court well understood the validity of [...]’s argument concerning the [...]’s reliance on an implied waiver.  (3T62:11-68-23)  However, the Court incorrectly felt powerless to decide the issue because of a misapplication of the law, which should be reversed and remanded.  VIII.
[brief] **Hearing Testimony Concerning Manual for Uniform Traffic Control Devices**  [...]'s direct examination involved a discussion of the Manual for Uniform Traffic Control Devices (2009 Ed.) ("MUTCD") (Pa1417).  [...] testified that multiple sections of the manual required the use of warning signs in the presence of transverse roadway bumps, which, as per [...], are problematic for motorcycles.  (3T64:4-69:7).  [...] did not testify that the manual obligated [...] to identify conditions that pre-existed the performance of the project-related work or any condition located was beyond the area where project-related work has been performed.  On cross-examination, [...] agreed with multiple pertinent points associated with the inapplicability of the MUTCD with regard to the purported obligation to identify the subject roadway condition.  He agreed that the document does not provide any guidance in determining whether a dangerous condition exists in any specific setting.  (3T195:-196:5).  [...] also acknowledged that the relevance of the MUTCD is predicated upon the existence of a dangerous condition about which the public needs to be warned.  Stated differently, the MUTCD pre-supposes the existence of a dangerous condition.  (3T196:6-197:15).
[brief] The Board and its expert clung to, and continue to cling to this lone record as evidence of a 2009 incident.  [...] submitted he should not be denied an ADR based upon a typographical error in the report of [...].  All past employers of [...] were required to turn over to Respondent all workers’ compensation data each had for [...].  None had an accident or an incident from 2009.  Additionally, no other medical records and no other exhibits moved into evidence referenced a 2009 incident or accident.  Finally, [...] denied any such 2009 incident or accident in his direct examination and cross-examination.  In the absence of a Report of Injury from 2009, [...] believed any reference to a 2009 accident or incident was simply a mistake.  (2T37-38).  [...] believed any reference to 2009 was more likely a typographical error than a real injury date.  (2T39).  [...] conceded the only evidence of a 2009 injury involving [...] stemmed from a report of [...] dated November 6, 2015.  (3T24).  No other medical reports or documentation mentioned a 2009 incident involving [...].  (3T25).  [...] was never provided with any accident/injury report for any injury occurring in 2009 as to [...].  (3T28).  When viewed cumulatively, [...] submitted that [...] should reach the conclusion that it was more likely than not that [...] was never involved in an incident or an accident in the calendar year of 2009.
[brief] If a requestor is permitted to simply ask for each and every document an agency has on file—whether email, fax, letter, or an “entire file”—inter-and-intra-agency discussions would effectively be chilled, with employees either too afraid to put their thoughts or recommendations into writing for fear of reprisal.  Alternatively, these very same employees would be burdened with reviewing each document for privilege and unable to resume their normal responsibilities.  Government agencies need to be able to function.
[brief] After receiving this large discharge, in what can only be construed as an admission that she did not properly disclose her claims to the bankruptcy court and Trustee in the first instance, Plaintiff attempted to file amended schedules with the bankruptcy court — this time listing five separate potential claims, specifically naming entities to which such claims could be brought, and also removing the $1,000 exemption claim.  (See Da76, 77).  Plaintiff’s amended schedules were, however, rejected by the bankruptcy court because Plaintiff had already received a discharge and the bankruptcy court explicitly stated that Plaintiff would have to file a motion to reopen her bankruptcy case in order to file her amended schedules.
[brief] On the Brief: [...]  010772004  [...] 028251998  [...] 165522015  [...] [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, [...], [...], and [...]  Of Counsel: [...]  010772004  [...] 028251998  [...] 165522015  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................................  2 POINT I  THE RULING BELOW FRUSTRATES THE PURPOSE OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT BY FAILING TO ENFORCE THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS ..............................................  2 POINT II THE FACTUAL RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT ESTABLISHES AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT  .....................................................................................  8  A.  Appellants’ position has always been that the agreement at issue is a commercial contract and is not a contract of adhesion .................................  9  B.  Even if Atalese applies, Appellants complied through notices given in the contract language considered under ordinary contract principles ...........................................................................................................  11  POINT III  RESPONDENTS’  “WARRANTY PERIOD” ARGUMENT IS A QUESTION FOR THE ARBITRATOR  .....................................................................................  14  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................
[brief] In the “New Jersey Insurance Bulletins and Related Materials Automobile Circular Letters Circular Letter Automobile 9,” dated February 22, 1973 (Da236 – Da254), the Commissioner of Insurance set forth interpretations of the provisions of the NJ Automobile Reparations Reform Act which became effective January 1, 1973.  That circular addresses the payment and recovery of PIP benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  On page three of that circular, it addresses vehicles covered under the no-fault law as well as vehicles that are not covered under the no-fault law.  The circular discusses the availability of PIP benefits for vehicles covered under the no-fault law and specifically excludes benefits from those vehicles not covered under the no-fault law.
[brief] Instead of the request being granted when made, the defendants refused, interfered, and compelled Plaintiff to file civil action in the Law Division in which the plaintiff's primary right or the principal relief sought was statutory in nature and legal relief was demanded under R. 4:69 (Pa 195-197) in addition or alternative to N.J.S. 10:6-2 (Pa 175-176) relief.  Plaintiff maintains that the Chancery Division Judge was without jurisdiction of the subject matter of his action in lieu of prerogative writs and civil rights claims, and that the Chancery Division Judge failed to order the action, with the record and all papers on file, transferred to the Law Division as required by Rule 1:13-4 (Pa 180-186).
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX  February 7, 2022  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Limit Ballistics  Expert Testimony  ......................................................................................................................Pa1-Pa2 February 18, 2022  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for an Alibi Jury Instruction  .................................................................................................................................Pa3-Pa4 | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968) | 42 | | Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | passim | | Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (1923) | passim | | Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) | 35 | | In re Accutane Litigation, 234 N.J. 340 (2018) | 11 | | In re State ex rel. A.D., 212 N.J. 200 (2012) | 36 | | In re State in Interest of A. B. M., 125 N.J. Super. 162, | | | 309 A.2d 619 (App. Div.) | 23 | | Kemp ex. rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412 (2002) | 11 | | RWB Newton Assocs. v. Gunn, 224 N.J.
[brief] “Broad as modern discovery may be, it is not unbridled and not unlimited. ”  Berrie v. Berrie, 188 N.J. Super. 274, 282 (Ch. Div. 1983) (quashing subpoena for financial information).  “Parties’ discovery rights are not unlimited, and claims of privilege or confidentiality are not the only reasons supporting good cause justifying non-production.
[brief] This letter shall also serve as my client’s formal written request for the return and refund of any and all funds paid and or held by your client the lessor/owner of the subject property in [...]”.  Presumably to attempt to meet the notice requirements contained in the Lease and Rider, [...] also sent a letter dated October 31, 2016 to [...], attention Michael and [...] by overnight courier.  [...] also sent a follow up email to [...] dated October 31, 2016 as follows:  Just sent another copy of my clients [sic] email terminating the lease with option to buy the subject [...] property.  Please contact me ASAP to advise when my clients will be receiving all monies as to a complete refund and return of all funds paid, $50,000 current due and owing and $30,000 for full reimbursement of monies toward rent and carrying costs.  This includes but is not limited to property clean-up costs, $12,500; engineering costs $10,000; architectural costs, $15,000, as specified and governing in the agreements between the parties.  (Pa1379-Pa1380)  [...] responded by letter dated November 7, 2017, rejecting the notice to terminate the lease for three reasons: 1) the notice was not served pursuant to section 15.2 of the Lease; 2) [...] did not comport with the condition precedent in section 4 of the Lease Rider requiring [...] to diligently prosecute its application for approvals; and 3) [...] did not comply with the condition precedent in section 4 of the Lease Rider requiring [...] to provide landlord with a copy of the application for land use approvals to the landlord on or before July 11, 2016.
[brief] **WHETHER THE UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF THE APPELLANTS GOVERNMENTAL PRIVATE PAPERS THAT WERE FALSE AND INACCRUATE GAINED THROUGH THE COMMISSION OF TWO FELONIES VIOLATED THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION  ARTICLE  1 ¶ 7 TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT**  Raised below (Pa165; The trial Court declined to address the issue)  So as of January 11, 2006, two officers of the court criminally conspired to seize a highly protected government document through false statements to the police and the FBI.  Under 18 U.S.C. 1001 (making a knowing false statement to a government agency is punishable by up to five years in prison).  The unlawful conduct by the clerk and the police detective was a violation of Article I ¶ 7 of the Search and Seizure Clause of the New Jersey State Constitution.  All of this, illegal conduct took place without a warrant.  The sole purpose of the criminal conspiracy, which included [...] Esq. ([...]’s former counsel) and his parents Eugena and [...] (MDMC Clients) was to publish false and inaccurate criminal compilations contained in a highly protected government document.  This incredulous unlawful conduct was intended to defame [...] in order to win a civil lawsuit.  *Emmanouil v. [...]*  Case No. 3:06-cv-1068, 2006 WL 2927621, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006)  Like many crimes, the perpetrators got caught by their zeal to defame [...] and in the process, ignored the protections in place that revealed their misconduct.  The co-conspirators (Clerk of Court, Police Detective, [...]’s former counsel), on January 11, 2006, were unaware that multiple charges in the FBI History Report (FHR) had been expunged and physically destroyed by the Honorable [...], Court of Common Pleas, in Bucks County, Pennsylvania 35 years earlier on December 19, 1975.
[brief] filing of amended pleadings, Chancery [...] held a bench trial, on July 11, 2022 (5T, 6T), on defendants’ claim for quiet title, then entered a July 21, 2022 judgment determining the [...]’ quiet title claim.  A1172.  The [...] moved for reconsideration of [...]’s ruling (A566); plaintiff opposed (A732).  [...] denied reconsideration by Order entered December 16, 2022.  A1163.  The [...]’ remaining claims for money damages against plaintiff for fraud, slander of title, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and plaintiff’s claim against the [...] for contractual litigation fees, were transferred to the Law Division for determination.  A429, A1187.  Plaintiff moved for summary judgment dismissal of the [...]’ claims.  A759.  Defendants opposed.  A769.  Law Division
[brief] It must be clear and concise, and disclose the rights, obligations, and restrictions of the purchaser.  See *N.J.A.C.* 11:5-9.5.  The POS was expressly incorporated by reference and set forth as Exhibit A in the SPA.  (Da178) (stating “[...], a Condominium Public Offering Statement, including the Governing Documents.  (Provided to Buyer separately; not attached; *incorporated by reference*)” (emphasis added).  Notably, right above the signature of Respondent [...] in Section 22 is a “List of Exhibits” which states that the Public Offering Statement is “incorporated by reference” as Exhibit A “including the Governing Documents…Seller and the Buyer agree to the terms of this Agreement by signing below. ”  [(Da176)]  There was otherwise clear, conspicuous wording throughout the SPA, acknowledging the buyers were given the opportunity to review the POS and they understood that it was incorporated by reference as an exhibit.  (Da176; Da178).  The page immediately following the table of contents and foreword contained prominent and obvious notice language explaining that binding arbitration involves a waiver of access to the court and a jury trial language.  Respondents were also on notice that careful review of the POS was required before the expiration of the 7-day cancelation period.  (Da169, Da174).  But, Respondents’ affirmative claims rely on the POS which in cited more than a dozen paragraphs and concedes that the POS is a “governing document” by characterizing it as incorporated within the Master Deed.  (Da2-3,7-8).  Similarly, Respondents below never addressed the significance of the AAA Construction Rules incorporated within the arbitration clause.
[brief] In fact, as discussed below, the layer below the US Fire Policy, when accounting for allocation, was not exhausted until 1996.  \(^{11}\)  In citing to Owens-Illinois, [...] claims that Massachusetts law has not adopted a “trigger” theory, and that the Court should apply New Jersey law.  (Pb43-44).  However, the governing law for establishing an allocation period (i.e., a “trigger” period) is Boston Gas.  Again, Boston Gas could not be clearer that the Liability Trial end date is the proper end date for the allocation period in this case.  Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s allocation ruling should be affirmed.  Pursuant to binding authority in *Boston Gas*, the trial court correctly interpreted the evidence before it, applied pro rata time on risk allocation, and identified an appropriate allocation period end date.  **ARGUMENT – CROSS-APPEAL**
[brief] It was improper for the lower court to dismiss the matter on a summary judgment because the Appellant’s proofs were not solely based on subjective complaints of pain.  The legislative objective of AICRA was “to guard against a finding of ‘serious injury’ when plaintiff's proofs are based solely on subjective complaints of pain. ”  Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 319, 609 A.2d 415, 444 (N.J. 1992).  Further, subjective complaints of pain may suffice if "verified by physical examination and observation."  Id. At 320.  In order to satisfy the AICRA's verbal threshold, an accident victim need only prove an injury as defined in the statute.  As such, there is no requirement that a plaintiff must demonstrate any continued or persistent subjective observation of pain.  See generally, Davidson v. Slater, 914 A.2d 282, 297; 189 N.J. 166, 181 (2007).  In the case at bar, the Appellant’s subjective complaints were noted by the Defendant’s expert in the Independent Orthopedic Evaluation completed by [...] in 2022.  The Appellant’s “Current Complaints” included the “low back pain with prolonged sitting. ” (Da68).  The Appellant’s Certification, dated April 12, 2023, stated that there were “continued complaints of pain that I experience include: a) [n]eck pain, spasm and stiffness; b) [l]ow back restriction, spasm, and pain, c) [p]ain in legs; d) [n]umbness, weakness, pain, and abnormal sensation in my hands and arms; e) [f]atigue; f) [d]ifficulty sitting and lifting; and g)[s]ignificant difficulty breathing from the sternum area of the chest. ” ([...] Cert. ¶ 7, April 12, 2023).  Given that the Certification of Appellant is consistent with [...]’s findings based on the objective medical evidence, including that of the prior MRI studies, the Certification should warrant some, if not significant, consideration.  Even if the lower court was correct to consider the subjective complaints as a factor when determining if summary judgment was warranted – which the Appellant is adamantly insistent that it was not – the Appellant’s subjective complaints when examined by the Defendant's expert and her affidavit are sufficient to create a dispute as to this material facts to warrant putting this issue in front of a jury.  CONCLUSION