ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Before my retirement, the [...] confirmed with me in a December 28, 2021 letter that my service credit on February 1, 2022, the date of my proposed retirement, would be 10 years and 1 month.  Pa16.  Since I had been on medical leave since September 9, 2021 and had no access to my work emails while I was on medical leave, I relied upon the December 28, 2021 letter from the [...] and retired on February 1, 2022.  By letter dated February 28, 2022, the [...] confirmed the terms of my retirement benefits.  Nearly 7 months after my retirement, though, the [...] notified me for the first time that my retirement benefits had been unilaterally reduced based on a “post-retirement audit of [my] account. ”  The error in my account was caused solely upon incorrect “information provided by [my] former employer. ”  In other words, my retirement benefits were reduced solely due to an error by my former employer, not by any error by me.  When I contested the reduction in my retirement benefits, the [...] affirmed the denial of my benefits on October 27, 2022, basing its October 27, 2022 decision on N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54 and N.J.A.C. 17:2-5.1.  According to the [...], the belated reduction and elimination of my retirement benefits in July of 2022 was permitted by the Correction of Errors Statute (N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54).  Since I retired on February 1, 2022, the [...] concluded that I could no longer purchase service credit since only “active members in the system” were permitted to do so under N.J.A.C. 17:2-5.1.  In effect, the “Catch-22” position of the [...] was as follows:  Oops, your former employer (not you) made a mistake, but you cannot fix your former employer’s mistake now by purchasing two months of service credit since you retired by mistakenly relying on the written information that we (the [...]) provided you.  See Pa42 to Pa43 and Pa72 to Pa73.  The following are legal grounds that support, individually or in combination, the relief that I request in this appeal.
[brief] “…the total social cost of GHGs from the project is calculated to be $5,790,928,380 (in 2020 dollars). ”  See paragraph 61 of [...]'s Order Issuing Certificate, April 21, 2022.  It is difficult to comprehend how the [...] has decided to intentionally ignore these enormous negative externalities ($6 billion dollars of externalized damages to the public goods) if it is being faithful to its stringent environmental protection mandates.
[brief] Hearing Exhibit A-2 - Site Plan (excerpt) prepared by [...], last revised February 12, 2020 ......................................................Pa49  Hearing Exhibit A-11 – [...] Site Plan Reports, dated July 27, 2020 and September 8, 2020 ..............................Pa52  Hearing Exhibit A-16 – Traffic Report prepared by [...], dated February 19, 2020 ..............................................Pa56  Hearing Exhibit A-22 – Traffic Report Addendum, prepared by [...], dated June 16, 2020 ...........................................Pa114 Hearing Exhibit A-25 – Market Study Report prepared by [...], dated November 5, 2020 ...............Pa120
[brief] [...]-27 “Exhibit A” Assignment of LLC Membership Interest.............689a 4/29/09  [...]-92, P-23 [...] Memorandum of Understanding...............690a 12/17/09  [...]-7, P-4, [...] Default Letter.........................................................694a 11/12/19  [...] Affidavit of Title ..............................................................................695a 1/9/08  Deposits from [...]......................................................................698a [...]-6 [...] Subpoenaed Bank Documents.......................................................701a  Checks from [...] to [...]...............................................................735a [...]-54 $300,000 Alan [...] Wire to [...] ...............738a  [...] checks to [...].......................................................................740a  [...] Checks to Pork Chop Hill..........................................................................742a 4/5/09 $250,000 check [...] to [...]............................................................747a  [...] Subpoena Bank Documents from [...].....................748a  [...] Bank Documents from [...].....................758a  [...] Subpoenaed Bank Documents.........................................................762a  [...]-5, P-47 [...] Subpoenaed Bank Documents....................................773a 4/4/12  [...] Depostion..........................................................797a 4/15/15
[brief] Appellant objects based upon the ‘timing of the request for the charge’, the charge itself and supplemental closing arguments, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403; and meritoriously based upon the holding in Polk v. Daconceicao, 268 N.J.Super. 568 (App. Div. 1993), requiring the plaintiff to provide a comparative analysis to substantiate a claim for aggravation.  II.
[brief] APPELLANT FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY PUBLIC POLICY IN SUPPORT OF HER PIERCE CLAIM  Appellant attempts to re-advance a theory that in early March of 2020, absent any stay-at-home orders, all employees were entitled to work from home.  However, as the trial court correctly ruled, no such clear mandate of public policy existed at the time of Appellant’s termination.  Appellant’s argument fails as the result is untenable and not in line with established case law.  Under Appellant’s theory every employer in the absence of lockdown directives of their applicable local, state, and federal governments would be liable in tort for simply requiring employees to come to work.  Such an interpretation is not in line with the established case law of this Court and the courts of New Jersey, which in creating, and refining, the common law cause of action under *Pierce*, have repeatedly reinforced the need for an actual violation or contravention of “a clear mandate of public policy. ”  *Arterbridge v. Wayfair, LLC*, No. 1:21-CV-13306, 2022 WL 577956, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-1547, 2023 WL 3243986 (3d Cir. May 4, 2023) (citing *Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.*, 84 N.J. 58 (1980)).  In defining “public policy”, the *Pierce* court provided a non-exhaustive list of sources for public policy mandates, including legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions.
[brief] (1T15-16 to 24, 16-14 to 17-3, 46-10 to 22).  [...] described the traffic volume as “medium” at the time.  (1T17-17 to 21).  “It was the middle of the day during the week in a populated area. ” (1T17-17 to 23).  There were vehicles in both lanes of Route 22 westbound.  (1T17-17 to 18-1).  The area the officers were traveling through was commercial, with a shopping center, storage facility, large industrial building, White Castle restaurant, and motel in the vicinity.  (1T17-4 to 16).  As the officers were driving on Route 22, they got behind a white sedan traveling in the left lane.  (1T16-4 to 8, 18-2 to 9, 46-25 to 47-3).  The driver looked in her rearview mirror as the sedan drifted over the center line with its two right side tires.  (1T16-9 to 12, 18-3 to 11, 19-2 to 7, 47-3 to 5, 49-2 to 7).  The driver did not activate the turn signal until after the sedan was partially in the right lane.  (1T16-12 to 13, 18-11 to 19-1, 47-5 to 6).  After the sedan was in the right lane, the officers pulled behind it and observed the backseat passenger turn fully around to look back.  (1T19-12 to 18, 49-7 to 9).  As the sedan and police car stopped at a red light at the intersection with King George Road, the officers activated their body-worn cameras, which captured [...] stating, “blinker. ” (1T19-19 to 20-8, 20-17 to 21-2, 48-6 to 13; Pa1 at 13:35:38).  When the light turned green, [...] activated his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop.  (1T20-9 to 13, 48-21 to 49-1).  The officers followed the sedan into the [...] parking lot where it stopped.  (1T20-14 to 16, 21-7 to 15, 48-6 to 9).  [...] walked up to the driver’s side and [...] walked up to the rear passenger side.  (1T21-19 to 22-1, 48-18 to 20).  There were three people in the sedan: [...], the driver; defendant, the front seat passenger; and [...], the backseat passenger.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred by Implying That a Rule 4:6-2(a)  Procedural Lack of Standing Subject Matter Jurisdiction  Dismissal Constituted a Substantive Preclusive Dismissal with Prejudice on the Ultimate Merits.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa89, 1T)  On April 27, 2023 and in a rush to remove this festering COVID 19 orphan “radioactive” heavy lifting statutory interpretation matter from its docket, the trial court erroneously dismissed plaintiff’s entire 69 pages 434 paragraphs Eight Counts hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment complaint with prejudice.  On April 27, 2023, the trial court dismissed the entire Eight Counts Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.  The trial court did not dismiss the entire 69 pages 434 paragraphs Eight Counts Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2 (e) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  There, however, is a substantive issue preclusion distinction between the two rule provisions.  A Rule 4:6-2(a) lack of jurisdiction dismissal is not a ruling upon the substantive merits.  A Rule 4:6-2(a) lack of jurisdiction dismissal merely reflects the trial court’s preliminary procedural determination not to exercise jurisdiction and not to adjudicate the substantive legal dispute between the parties.  Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable defense and may be raised at any time, even on appeal.  On the other hand, a Rule 4:6-2(e) failure to state a claim dismissal with prejudice is a ruling upon the substantive merits with severe adverse issue preclusion consequences.  See, Rotini v. Russell, A-2155-21 (App. Div. Oct. 13, 2023) (Pa674) (vacating the trial court order dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint without prejudice and remanding for further proceedings); Sandoval v. Midland, HUD-L- 2290-22 (Law Div. June 9, 2023) (Pa644) (acknowledging that federal lack of standing dismissal was without prejudice and permitting state action to proceed).  Here, plaintiff did not slumber upon his rights.  Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to correct this inadvertent “with prejudice” error and omission.  (Pa480).  But the trial court declined to entertain oral argument and to clarify and to correct its four lack of standing jurisdictional dismissal with prejudice orders.  II.
[brief] (17T84-19 to 85-24).  Compare State v. Spencer, 319 N.J. Super. 284, 300-02 (App. Div. 1999) (improper for State to cross-examine defendant’s expert witness with the inadmissible hearsay opinion of a different defense expert, who did not testify, which was consistent with the State’s expert); Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. at 238 (where defense and state’s expert agreed at trial that a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder was irrelevant to defendant’s capacity to act purposely or knowingly, state’s expert should not have offered testimony in respect of his opinion that defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder).
[brief] On the first day of his deposition, [...] was asked to provide support for his opinion that [...] and the other engineers on the Project had an affirmative duty to proactively inspect the road surface for preexisting, dangerous conditions.  (Pa158 at T132:16 - Pa163 at T137:18).  He could not provide such support but insisted that there were “documents” and other evidence supporting his opinion.  Id.  The deposing attorneys requested that [...] produce such evidence.  (Pa158 at T132:22 – Pa162 at T136:24).  A little more than a month later, [...] managed to produce one document -- a New Jersey Department of Transportation "traffic control detail” that governed traffic control coordinators.  In addition to being from a different agency (the Project at issue is for the [...]), the document did not actually support [...]’s opinion.  (Pa269, Pa1186).  On the second day of his deposition, when asked about this document, [...] admitted that it only applied to the prime contractor, not the project engineers like [...].  (Pa268 at T30:25 – Pa270 at T32:16).  [...] was also asked to explain why he believed that [...] had an affirmative duty to identify pre-existing, dangerous conditions in the roadway.  First, [...] was not aware if there was any construction ongoing in the southbound, leftmost lane (where the accident occurred).  (Pat T54:12 – Pa293 at T55:2).  He further testified that the presence of construction had no bearing on his opinion -- despite the fact that [...]’s only role was to inspect construction.  (Pa293 at 55:3-12).  When asked whether he could offer anything else to support his opinion, [...] only opined further, referring broadly to unspecified contracts (none of which he ever identified or produced).  (Pa295 at T57:15 – Pa296 at T58:10).  E. PLAINTIFFS’ CHANGING EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION
[brief] The court in John G. Ryan, Inc. v. Molson USA, LLC, 2005 WL 2977767 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2005) addressed a similar issue of interplay between the FAA and Twenty-First Amendment in the context of New York’s ABC Law and found that the ABC Law was not closely related to the powers given under the Twenty-First Amendment.  As discussed above, however, the ABC Law only prohibited mandatory arbitration clauses; the parties were still free to resolve their claims by any means including arbitration, if they chose to do so.  Thus, that statute’s prohibition on such mandatory arbitration clauses was not viewed as a “necessary component” of the ABC Law’s regulatory regime since its effects on the statute’s regulation of alcohol were “indirect. ”  By contrast, in this case, N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e) requires any dispute regarding the terms of the wholesaler agreement and their compliance with the MBPA be “determined by a court of this State. ”  This mandatory language that disputes be resolved in New Jersey courts underscores that this is not a mere “indirect” provision but an integral and important aspect of maintaining “orderly market conditions. ”  See Soc’y for Animal Rts., Inc. v. Mahwah Twp., 138 N.J. Super. 322 (Law Div. 1975), aff’d sub nom. 148 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1977) (“statutory use of the word ‘shall’ denotes the imperative and mandatory while ‘may denotes only the permissive and directory”).  arbiters—can confirm to the public that the MBPA and New Jersey public policy is followed.  This provision would ensure “orderly market conditions” surrounding brewer and wholesaler relations, and is a power closely related to those envisioned by the Twenty-First Amendment.  For these reasons, the MBPA supersedes the FAA and the arbitration clause should be deemed unenforceable.
[brief] 18  LVNV Funding L.L.C. v. Covell, 421 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2011) ..........................................................  36  Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) .............................................................  15,16,17,18  Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) ...............................................................  16  Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2005) ......................................................  19  Matter of Belleville Ed Assn, 455 N.J. Super. 387, 407 (App. Div. 2018) ............................................  30  Mount Holly Tp. Bd. v. Mounty Holly, 199 N.J. 319 (2009)  ..............................................................................  29  Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983) .......................................................... 25 Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 2003)....................................................36,37  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995)................................................passim Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990) .................................................................  18  Romero v. Gold Star Distrib, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2021) ....................................................  20 Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441 (App. Div. 1990) ......................................................  22 Sciarotta v. Global Spectrum, 194 N.J. 345 (2008)  ..................................  30  Stitsworth v. Ford Motor Co., No. 95-5763, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1657 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1996); (Pa285-289) ...........................................  8,11,24,26,26,28,30  Sullivan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 94-5016, 1997, U.S. Dist., Unpub., LEXIS 2503 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1997) (Pa232-242) .............................................8,9,11,24,26,27,28,29,30
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020  Core Principles 1  The Sanctity of Human Life and Serving the Community.  In serving the community, law enforcement officers (hereinafter “officers”) shall make every effort to preserve and protect human life and the safety of all persons.  Officers shall respect and uphold the dignity of all persons at all times in a non-discriminatory manner.  2  Force as a Last Resort and Duty to De-Escalate.  Force shall only be used as a last resort when necessary to accomplish lawful objectives that cannot reasonably be achieved through verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment or de-escalation techniques.  Force shall never be used as a retaliatory or punitive measure.  3  Duty to Use Only Objectively Reasonable, Necessary, and Proportional Force.  Officers shall use the least amount of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary and proportional to safely achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective under the circumstances.  4  Duty to Use Deadly Force Only as an Absolute Last Resort and Duty to Avoid Actions Which Create a Substantial Risk of Death or Serious Bodily Injury.  Deadly force shall only be used as an absolute last resort and in strict compliance with this Policy.  Other actions by law enforcement that create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury must be avoided or employed only under the strictest of conditions.  5  Duty to Intervene and Report.  Every officer, regardless of rank, title, seniority, or status, has an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent any use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with such policies, regulations, and laws, if possible, before a fellow officer uses excessive, illegal, or otherwise inappropriate force.  Every officer has a duty to immediately report any improper use of force.  6  Duty to Render Medical Assistance.  After any use of force, and when the environment is safe, officers shall promptly render medical assistance to any injured person consistent with the officer’s training and shall promptly request emergency medical assistance for that person, if needed or requested.  Officers also have a duty to monitor individuals for potential medical intervention after any officer uses force.  7  Duty to Report and Review  Uses of Force.  Every use of force must be reported and receive a meaningful command level review as set forth in a written department policy that includes review by the law enforcement executive.  The law enforcement executive shall also conduct an annual review and analysis of the overall use of force by the department.
[brief] See (Pa41).  Second, [...] noted it was discussed at the meeting that the Property was near other commercial businesses on the Bordentown side.  (2T77:12-78:1).  Last, [...] proposed excluding parcel hub warehouses and fulfillment centers from permitted uses.  (2T79:5-15).  According to [...], some of these revisions were substantive and some were not.  (2T80:9-11).  He therefore recommended the Committee either adopt the ordinance as is (i.e., without the proposed revisions the members had just agreed were needed) or adopt the ordinance and immediately move to amend it.  (2T81:9-16).  No Committee members spoke in favor or against [...]'s recommendations.  Despite the various issues with the Plan raised earlier in the meeting, the Committee decided to adopt Ordinance No. 2022-15 and then immediately introduced Ordinance No. 2022-17, amending the Plan.
[brief] The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).  The Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court can overturn an administrative agency's determinations or findings if there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  *Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs.*, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329, 27-28 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011) citing *In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees*, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY /s/[...]  By: [...] • HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX TELEPHONE: [...] • FAX: [...]  Attorney General New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable Page 2 October 12, 2004  Subject: AG LE Directive No. 2004-03  State of New Jersey OFFICE  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY PETER C. HARVEY [...] [...] [...]  Attorney General Governor [...]