ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, we can certainly agree that gender transition and expression of one’s gender identity appear on a spectrum.  The parental notification provisions of the Policy are triggered only when students take specific unilaterally chosen steps far along that spectrum.  For example, the Policy is not triggered by one’s transgender status alone, nor by one’s use of alternate names or gender-neutral bathrooms, nor by the issuance of student ID cards, nor by one’s attire.  Rather, the Policy is triggered when a student changes their “mandated student record,” which specifically includes, “name, address, telephone number, date of birth, name of parent(s), [and] gender. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1).  Thus, when every child registers for school, District are legally required to obtain that student’s gender and all parents know their child’s gender.  In addition to New Jersey law mandating gender as a student record, the law authorizes access to student records.  Students do not have access to their own student record.  Indeed, only “authorized organizations, agencies, or persons,” i.e., parents, shall have access to student records.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(a).  Students need express written permission of parents to access their student record, including their gender.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(1)-(3).  The State makes a disingenuous difference between “accessing” one’s record and “changing” that record.
[brief] [...]’s testimony regarding “aggravation” is not an analysis under Polk, but rather simply an attempt to explain away the prior objective findings.  Thus, there was no true analysis to support an aggravation charge.  11.  Plaintiff did not provide expert testimony setting forth the comparative analysis as to [...]’s pre- and post-accident condition which would meet the standard of Polk v. Daconceicao, 268 N.J. Super. 568, 575 (App. Div. 1993).  Plaintiff argued aggravation but conversely, counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent and [...] took the position that Plaintiff had no symptoms or limitations despite her pre-accident objective findings.  Thus, there is no comparative analysis.  (T2 161-1 through 161-6; T2 163-23 through T2 164-3; T2 165-1 through 165-23).
[brief] N.J.C.R. 2:6-1(a)(2) .................................................................  4 N.J.C.R. 2:2-3 ........................................................................ 3, 6, 13, 36 N.J.C.R. 4:46-2 ..................................................................... 33, 34 N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 .................................................................. 33  N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6 ..................................................................  32 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.2 ................................................................. 41 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-10.12 ............................................................ 35 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-11.1 ............................................................. 35 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3 ............................................................... 37, 43, 46 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22 .............................................................. 1, 15, 20, 25, 29, 32, 35, 46 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) ......................................................... 4, 37, 46 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) ......................................................... 7, 15, 20, 25, 37, 38 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29 .............................................................. 7, 35 New Jersey Executive Order 251 (2020) ................................. 5, 7, 19, 43, 44, 45, 46 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The [...]’s (Commission) Final Decision in this matter is contrary to a robust body of the Commission’s own caselaw, does not comport with the evidence in the record, and is repugnant to the statutory mandate set out for the Commission in the School Ethics Act (Act).
[brief] [...] cited standards from the American Society of Testing, the American National Standards Institute, and the National Safety Council in support of his opinions.  (4T88:6-91:19).  The plaintiff sustained a four-part intertrochanteric fracture of her right hip as a result of the trip and fall incident.  (3T114:7-9).  She underwent an intramedullary nail procedure on May 31, 2019 which involved the surgical implantation of a rod and screws.  (3T118:18-120:25).  She was then discharged from the hospital to a rehabilitation facility where she stayed for about three and one half weeks before returning home.  (3T126:2-9).  The plaintiff eventually developed severe post-traumatic arthritis as a result of the fracture to her hip.  (3T123:23-125:13; 3T133:12-16; 3T140:11-18).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE IMPROPER COMMENTS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULINGS CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY RESULTED IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE (Pa34; 1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13; 2T40:10-18; 6T48:6-19).
[brief] The Board’s citation to Salt & Light, supra, is misplaced because the facts are entirely different.  There, the applicant sought to construct a two-family transitional home for homeless families “in a neighborhood zoned exclusively for single-family residences” and “located . . . in the middle of a block containing only single-family homes. ”  423 N.J. Super. at 285-86.  The court noted that the neighborhood “has been completely built-out in conformity with this zoning with single-family houses on relatively small lots.  . .”  Id. at 292.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:7- 9.6(e).  NJDEP’s requirement that impacts to Submerged Aquatic Vegetation be minimized is mandatory with no exception.  NJDEP properly determined in issuing the 2017 WFD Permit that [...]’s dock substantially complied with the Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule and required design corrections to the dock in compliance with this rule.  (Aa0020-Aa0021).  Specifically, NJDEP confirmed that [...]’s approved plan showed the mooring area at a water depth of greater than four feet, which is required by the rule to protect Submerged Aquatic Vegetation from boating propeller impacts, unauthorized dredging, and turbidity, which would be unlikely at those depths.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(vi).  (Aa0020-Aa0021).  The entire mooring area must be within 4 ft. of water and in connection with [...]’s Waterfront Development Permit application, the approved dock was reduced at NJDEP’s request before approval.  There was no practicable or feasible way to further reduce the length of the dock and still satisfy the 4 ft. depth requirement for the mooring area at the very end of the dock.  There is no other area that NJDEP would permit [...] to moor a boat and there is only one boat mooring area where the depth is 4 ft. despite the length of the dock.  (JRa003).  The permitted dock could be no shorter because it would violate the Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule.  The dock constructed by a former owner of the [...] property was not an alternative as it did not meet the CZM Rules and dredging of Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat is not authorized by NJDEP.  Any suggestion by Appellant to that end is not based in fact or law.  Appellant presents no evidence to dispute NJDEP’s finding that [...]’s dock met the Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule or technical support for the argument that the dock should or could be shortened.  NJDEP properly concluded that the length of [...]’s dock, as approved by the 2017 WFD Permit, complied with the Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule.  There was no change in the length of the dock between the 2017 WFD Permit and the 2019 Permit Modification.  (JRa001-JRa003).  Nevertheless, NJDEP again reviewed the dock’s compliance with the CZM Rules and inspected the dock as part of the application process for the 2019 Permit Modification.  (Aa0092-Aa0093; Aa0119-Aa0120).  [...]’s dock also complies with the Shellfish Habitat Rule.  NJDEP properly concluded after reviewing and approving the Waterfront Development Permit plan submitted in support of [...]’s 2017 WFD Permit that the dock as no more than four-feet wide to minimize adverse impact to the shellfish area.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(ii).  To further minimize impacts, and as required by the rule, NJDEP also required that the pier "be constructed of non-polluting materials and no dredging will take place during construction" of the project.  (Aa0001; JRa001-002).  There was no change in the width of the dock or the additional restrictions related to the Shellfish Habitat Rule between the 2017 WFD Permit and the 2019 Permit Modification.  (Aa0001-Aa0005; Aa0089-Aa0091; JRa001-JRa003).  2.
[directive] Personnel Records  9.12.1  Personnel records are separate and distinct from internal affairs investigation records, and internal affairs investigative reports shall never be placed in personnel records, nor shall personnel records be co-mingled with internal affairs files.  When a complaint has a disposition of exonerated, not sustained or unfounded, there shall be no indication in the employee's personnel file that a complaint was ever made.  9.12.2  Where a complaint is sustained and discipline imposed, the only items to be placed into the employee's personnel file are a copy of the administrative charging form and a copy of the disposition form.  See Appendix M for a sample form (Note: Civil Service jurisdictions must use forms authorized by the Civil Service Commission).  No part of the internal affairs investigative report shall be placed in the personnel file.  64
[brief] She testified that one incident happened outside her daughter’s house on Christmas Day in 2017 when she was using her cane and tripped on a brick and fell.  (4T247:15-248:12).  The other incident occurred in 2018 in her bedroom when she was walking and slid down the pole of her bed.  (4T248:19-249:4).  Plaintiff denied that either incident had anything to do with her balance.  (4T249:5-10).  This testimony, however, is questionable as is plaintiff’s credibility given her testimony regarding her use of a cane and rollator one to two years before the [...] incident for balance issues.
[brief] These were not “denied” as Appellant incorrectly suggested in his statement of facts (Db10).  There is no inequity here; in fact, there is no objective harm to Appellant once the offending language was stricken.  Respondent will be removed from employment.  The provisions to strike terms could have worked either way, the parties bargained for that agreement, and the Court ruled accordingly (1T 12:10 to 1T13:9).  POINT NINE  APPELLANT ADMITTED THAT THE [...] IS A LEGAL FORUM THAT WOULD TRIGGER PAR. 18 OF THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT CONTRARY TO HIS ASSERTION AT POINT IV.
[directive] Nothing in this Directive shall prevent the IRU from collaborating with any future efforts of the Office of Information Technology (OIT) or any other entity in the area of cyber security; (e)  Provide local assistance to out-of-state authorities investigating incidents of network intrusion emanating from, terminating in, or occurring through, the State of New Jersey; (f)  Provide training and assistance to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of criminal laws relating to computer crimes through forensic collection, recovery, processing, preservation, analysis, storage, maintenance, and presentation of digital evidence; (g)  Conduct computer forensic examinations and the analysis of digital evidence as it pertains to technology related crimes in the State of New -6- Jersey, by providing forensic examination of digital media pursuant to consent or search orders, or judicial, executive, or administrative seizures; (h)  Monitor current laws and proposed legislation concerning high technology and computer crimes, and identify further legislative needs and make recommendations to the SDAG and DSP Bureau Chief for legislative proposals to address such needs in this area; and (i)
[brief] THE ESTATE OF [...] IS IN PRIVITY WITH THE DEFENDANTS  The Defendants finally claim that Plaintiff was required to on a Motion to Dismiss (not a Motion for Summary Judgment) to spell out all of the details on the claim that [...]’s advice to [...] was negligent and harmed Anthony is incorrect.  As the Court knows on a Motion to Dismiss the allegations of the complaint are taken as true, Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J. 109(2013).  Defendants here never submitted a statement of fact or met any of the procedural requirements necessary for a Court to grant Summary Judgment.  Furthermore, the Defendants claim that they were not privity with Plaintiffs are nonsensical.  The action was brought by the executor of Francesco Ventre’s Estate; Francesco Ventre is the testator.
[brief] The Court noted “[i]t is undisputed the Borough has failed to provide evidence of final satisfaction of all conditions identified and referenced under the court’s January 25, 2019 order of conditional final judgment of compliance and repose which was entered over four years ago. ”  11a.  However, it held this was purportedly insufficient:  “While the delay in final compliance in development of agreed upon affordable housing is troublesome, the court here does not find that the Borough’s actions (or inaction), when reviewed in the broad scope of all of the facts and circumstances presented, does not now warrant automatic site plan approval of the Off-Site Property.
[brief] (Pa103-Pa106).  POINT II  WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS VIEWED CUMULATIVELY, [...] REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS MORE LIKELY THAN NOT THAT [...] WAS NEVER INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT IN 2009 THAT REQUIRED MEDICAL TREATMENT OR RESULTED IN INJURIES OF ANY KIND.  (Pa41-Pa42).  POINT III  PRE-EXISTING PATHOLOGY IS NOT A PER SE BAR TO BEING AWARDED AN ADR.  (Pa43-Pa49).  CONCLUSION
[brief] The State’s response to each of these issues, individually and cumulatively, is insufficient to sustain [...]’s conviction.  First, the State does not seem to deny that the prosecutor argued in summation that [...] could be found guilty of murder as an accomplice if he helped the actual shooter hide the gun after.  Nor does the State seem to dispute that that theory is clearly an invalid basis for a murder conviction under State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009).  The State argues instead that “Whitaker’s facts are distinguished from this case because defendant is the alleged principle” and [...] has “misrepresente[d]” “the evidence supporting the State’s theory that defendant was the principal actor in these offenses.
[brief] *DeAngelo* reasoned that “[t]he Supreme Court has determined that [R. 4:50-1(f)] permits relief even when a defendant’s response or failure to respond to a complaint was found, as here, to be inexcusable. ”  *Deangelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109 (emphasis added) (citing *Mancini*, 132 N.J. at 334 ).  “In such instances, subsection (f)’s boundaries are ‘as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice. ’”  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109 (emphasis added) (quoting *Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo*, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1977)).  Here, unlike *DeAngelo*, [...] has engaged in no deliberate and/or calculated deception.  Even if the Court were to find R. 4:50-1(d) to be an inappropriate mechanism by which to vacate the default judgment against [...] (being that the judgment is void), the provisions of R. 4:50-1(f) in the context of *Mancini* and *Deangelo* dictate that [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA outweigh the perceived delay in moving to vacate the unlawfully obtained judgment.
[brief] Additionally, it is inaccurate to say that the trial court simply disregarded the request for a different judge to continue with deliberations in the court’s absence.  Appellant Counsel is correct in that the court indicated it did not know at first whether a different judge would be available.  (29T20:20-22).  However, the State later raised the issue once more, asking again whether anyone else was available to preside over deliberations on November 8, 2021.  (29T7:21-24).  The court indicated that no one else was available.  (29T7:25).  In any event, the suggestion that the proper remedy would have been having another judge stand in ignores the fact that such a judge would have had no familiarity with the trial whatsoever.  Thus, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible for such a judge to address any trial specific questions from the jury that could arise during their continued deliberations.  Giving credence to Appellant Counsel’s argument here would also require courts across the State to block out substantial portions of the yearly calendar where trials simply could not be had, because there was an outside chance that the trial would run into a holiday, a counselor’s vacation time, the court’s vacation time, a witness’s vacation time, a juror’s vacation time, and so on.  This would not be appropriate.  It would make a court’s calendar nearly impossible to manage.  Defendant should not receive an overturned conviction simply because deliberations took longer than was anticipated and his attorney and some jurors had scheduling conflicts.  This point warrants no further consideration.
[brief] The Court Correctly Reconsidered Its March 13, 2023 Order Pursuant to R. 4:42-2.\(^1\) (Pa274).  The trial court was correct in determining that it could reconsider its denial of [...]’s motion for summary judgment, pursuant to R. 4:42-2.  As the trial court stated:  “[u]ntil entry of final judgment, only ‘sound discretion’ and the ‘interest of justice’ guides the trial court if reconsideration is sought of an interlocutory order.  Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J.Super. 128, 134 (App.Div.2021). ”  Pa274.  The trial court further found “Rule 4:42-2 declares that interlocutory orders ‘shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice. ’”  Id. \(^{1}\) Appellant’s Case Information Statement suggests that he is appealing the Court’s procedural basis for reconsideration.  The City notes that Appellant’s Brief does not make any such argument and thus should be deemed waived.  In order to not waive its own arguments as to same, [...] makes the within argument.
[brief] (Pa66.)  Form C Interrogatory No. 2 asked that the [...] give their version of the occurrence at issue.  In response to this interrogatory, the [...] stated as follows:  We have no firsthand knowledge of the alleged accident described in Plaintiffs’ Complaint as we were not present.  We were living at [...] in [...] at the time while our house was being renovated after we had recently purchased it.  (Pa67, answer to Form C Interrogatory No. 2.)
[brief] His primary duty is to enforce and uphold the law.  He is constantly called upon to exercise tact, restraint and good judgment in his relationship with the public.  He represents law and order to the citizenry and must present an image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of the public.  In re Bonsanto, CSC Docket Nos. [...] and [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, List Removal Appeals, Final Decision, (September 7, 2018), Ra91.  The Commission has previously recognized untruthfulness as particularly problematic for law enforcement candidates and sufficient justification for list removal given the need for a person in such position to demonstrate trust and personal integrity.
[brief] (Not Raised Below) ..........................27  A.  The Court Failed To Instruct On The Second Element Of Robbery And Failed To Explain The Distinction Between First- And Second-Degree Robbery.  ...........................................................................................................28  B.  The Court Failed To Specify That The Jury Had to Unanimously Agree On The Identity Of The Persons Against Whom The Defendant Committed Various Acts........................................................................................................34  POINT V THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING  BECAUSE THE SENTENCING PROCEEDING WAS REPLETE WITH ERRORS.
[directive] Defendant Name  Promis Number Points Yes No  Insufficient Facts Value  MITIGATING FACTORS  1.  Non-Pecuniary Distribution.  Offense involved distribution of CDS only to friends/relatives (other 9 9 9 than minors)  3  2.  Defendant’s Role in Criminal Scheme.  a.  Defendant was only minimal (3 points) or minor (2 points)  2 or 3 9 9 9 participant in the criminal conduct; OR b.  Defendant was substantially influenced by another person more 2 9 9 9 mature (other person’s identity must be known)  3.  Voluntary Renunciation.  Defendant voluntarily terminated participation in the scheme before 4 9 9 9 arrest or police intervention 4.  Drug Treatment.  Defendant is enrolled and participating in an approved drug 2 or 3 9 9 9 treatment program (Outpatient 2 points; Residential 3 points)  5.  No Court Involvement.  Defendant has no prior conviction, juvenile adjudication or adult 9  9 9 3 PTI or conditional discharge  6.  Youthful Offender.  Defendant was less than 21 years old at time of offense (2 points); or defendant was at least 21 but less than 26 (1 point).  (Do not use if 1 or 2 defendant falls into Criminal History Category IV or V, has pending 9  9  9 charge for N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6, or is subject to Special Application and Enhancement Feature A (street gang involvement)).  MITIGATING TOTAL GRAND TOTAL (Subtract Mitigating Total from Aggravating Total)
[brief] The Board Engineer concluded that the Subdivision and Site Plan Applications met “the intent of the Township design standards. ” (Pa178-Pa189).  The Board’s Resolution included a specific finding that the requested subdivision does not adversely affect the public’s health, safety, or welfare.  (Pa245-Pa253).  Further, the Environmental Impact Assessment was included in Exhibit A-1 entitled “Complete Application Package” which was introduced by the Board Secretary in advance of the hearing.
[brief] ”).  Next, [...] points out, and the [...] does not dispute, that current public access regulations do not expressly require public access on the Property in this particular fact pattern.  (Ab21).  Specifically, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(i) provides that “no public access is required if there is no existing public access onsite” for accessory development or structural shore protection at an existing residential development.  That regulation was last amended roughly two years before the Law’s enactment.  49 N.J.R. 3145(a) (September 18, 2017).  Similarly, [...] cites to a coastal engineering rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11,⁹ that it claims, without support, “prohibits the Department from requiring public access on [...]’s Property as a condition of the permit” (Ab22), even though the regulation does not speak to public access at all.  But despite the preexisting regulations’ language, the [...] must implement the Legislative mandate of the Public Access Law, which expressly requires it to ensure that, among other things, after July 2, 2019, all permits it issues include “additional” access when a proposed development’s footprint changes.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).
[brief] The second prong of the CEPA analysis requires [...] to simply proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason behind the employment actions that Plaintiff complains of as retaliatory.  Here, Plaintiff alleges two retaliatory acts  7  See also Silvestri v. Borough of Ridgefield, No. BER-L-848-19, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 15 (Super. Ct. L. Div. Jan. 3, 2023); Frett v. City of Camden, No. A-1043-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1484 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 28, 2016); Hancock, 347 N.J. Super. 350.