ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa90-394.  On April 26, 2022, defendant [...] denied coverage of plaintiff’s claim against [...] while at the same time acknowledging it had not “reviewed coverage under the excess and umbrella policy with respect to the Employers Liability Insurance Policy with [...]. ”  Pa456.  On May 24, 2023, [...]’s personal counsel advised defendant [...] of the [...] demand and demanded coverage.  Pa462.  By letter dated June 19, 2023, [...]’s counsel reaffirmed the refusal of coverage.  Pa469.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE C5
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants- Cross-Respondents  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  Attorney ID# 050991988  Date Submitted: May 6, 2024  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents, [...], Defendant-Respondent-Cross- Appellant, - and -  JOHN DOES 1-10 AND/OR ABC CORPORATIONS  1-10, in Their Corporate Capacity and as to the Principles and Owners Individually (Names Being Fictitious and Unknown but Described as Corporate or Individual Owner(s), Manager(s), Lessor(s), Supervisor(s), Who Had Control of the Premises Located at [...], Who Contributed to the March 16, 2017 Loss), Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] There is no documentation in any medical record of the patient’s receipt of an arbitration form.  Unfortunately, the deceased [...] cannot testify as to whether she received the arbitration form.  Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that [...] had a sufficient chance to review the form or to ask the doctor questions about the form before the end of the thirty-day period.  Additionally, if this case had undergone discovery, the record would reflect that [...] was a dyslexic, functionally illiterate immigrant to the United States from Guyana.  At the time of her death, she was enrolled in a tutoring program called [...] to improve her English-language literacy.  She was unable to read and comprehend complex contracts.  Moreover, she was not sophisticated with law, contracts, or medicine.  As such, she would have trusted her doctor to act in her best interest.  However, his reasons for adopting the current version of his arbitration form, and his lack of grasp of its contents, suggest that [...]’s concern was likely solely to shield himself from liability.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku niedopełnienia obowiązku powiadomienia e)  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] właściwych organów ścigania o stałym dostępie do Internetu lub korzystaniu z komputera lub urządzenia z dostępem do Internetu lub zmianie tego rodzaju dostępu bądź korzystania, może być Pan(i) oskarżony(a) o przestępstwo trzeciego stopnia i otrzymać (jeżeli takie przestępstwo zostało popełnione 1 lipca karę pozbawienia wolności do lat 5 2014 r. lub później), lub może być Pan(i) oskarżony(a) o przestępstwo czwartego stopnia (jeżeli takie przestępstwo zostało i otrzymać karę pozbawienia wolności do 18 miesięcy popełnione 25 lutego 2008 r. lub później, lecz przed 1 lipca 2014 r.)?  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency about your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability or a change in such use or access, you may (if the be charged with a third degree crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014) or you may be charged with a fourth degree crime and (if the offense was committed on or after may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months February 25, 2008 but before July 1, 2014)?
[brief] A “consent judgment has equal adjudicative effect as one entered after trial or other judicial determination. ”  Community Realty Mgmt., Inc. for Wrightstown Arms Apartments v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 226 (1998)(quoting Stonehurst at Freehold v. Township Comm. Of Freehold Twp., 139 N.J. Super. 311, 313 (Law Div. 1976)); Pope v. Kingsley, 40 N.J. 168, 173 (1963).  The Trial Court likewise properly determined that dismissal of the Complaint based upon entire controversy grounds was a fair exercise of judicial discretion.
[brief] The trial court, in its rulings associated with the testimony of plaintiff’s experts, confirmed the rulings on the motions in limine in the context of the testimony presented at trial.  For example, [...], as a nursing home administration expert, was permitted to give opinions regarding compliance with applicable statutes and regulations, but could not give opinions about the nursing standard of care, because he was not a nurse.  (See 7T145:23-177:8.)  The jury charge directed that plaintiff, in support of the claims of negligence, asserted that [...] violated applicable federal regulations.  If the jury found that [...] violated any such standards of conduct, such violations could be considered as evidence as to whether negligence had been established.  (See Pa107.)
[directive] In this of 3.2  Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant consider shall 3.3.2, subsection pursuant to designated officer supervisory or a Directive, acomplaint-warrant of issuance from automatically resulting detention mandatory the whether pursuing the from victim a discourage situation, might violence domestic the exacerbate might justice. of interest the serve not would otherwise or prosecution, with the cooperating or charge prosecutor assistant and/or officer the offenses, violence domestic of nature repetitive the  Given a for apply to appropriate be would whether it consider may general also attorney deputy or and complaint-summons by charged is defendant the if recognition that in complaint-warrant to pursuant move prosecutor cannot the release, pretrial on while crime new a commits thereafter 30.
[brief] CIS was not attached to Complaint.  A Case Information Statement (CIS) is required to be annexed to each party’s first pleading.  R. 4:5-1(b)(1).  No CIS was attached to either the Summons or Complaint served on Defendant.  Thus, Defendant was denied the information required to be furnished in a CIS.  The result is that Defendant could not prepare a proper defense.  Absence of the required CIS information resulted in the denial of due process.  E.
[brief] THE NEW MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN ITS SEPTEMBER 29, 2023 DECISION BY EXPANDING THE GROUNDS ALLEGED TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHICH ISSUES HAD NOT BEEN FRAMED BY THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND WHICH AGAIN DECIDED WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD [Raised at Pa506-511; Ruling at Pa1-12]  Plaintiff moved for reconsideration from the July 17, 2023 order for three reasons: (a) That the New Motion Judge had erred by engaging in a hypothetical of what would have happened if the C-Section had been timely called; (b) That the New Motion Judge had erred by holding that Plaintiff had the burden of proving, as part of a medical malpractice case, that the medical professionals were actually staffed to provide the care required by the standard of care; and (c) That the New Motion Judge had erred by holding that, in connection with the proof of “staffing,” that Plaintiff had to serve an expert report.
[brief] The Estate of [...], by [...], its administrator, filed suit against defendants Dr. [...], M.D., [...], [...], C.R.N.A. and several “John Doe” defendants (Da005-026).  Count One of the Complaint, captioned “Survival Action,” purports to assert a cause of action pursuant to NJSA 2A: 15-3 (Da007-Da008).  Count Two of the Complaint, captioned “Wrongful Death,” purports to assert a cause of action pursuant to NJSA 2A: 31-1 (Da008-Da009).  On July 19, 2023, Defendants [...], M.D., and [...] (collectively, “the Khazaei Defendants”) filed a motion to stay the Estate’s causes of action against them, such causes of action to be submitted to arbitration (Da001-Da026).  On September 8, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an order staying the case for 30 days to allow “limited discovery relating to the formation of Arbitration Agreement only.  Motion to be relisted at end of 30 day for Court to consider motion” (Da028).  Following such limited discovery, additional briefing and oral argument, on March 22, 2024, Judge Hudak entered an order and opinion which dismissed Count Two, “Wrongful Death,” without prejudice; and granted the Khazaei Defendants’ motion to stay the litigation in favor of arbitration as to Count One, the “Survival Action” (Da070-079).  On March 21, 2024, one day prior to the issuance of the March 22, 2024 Order, the Estate filed a motion to file an amended complaint.  (Da083).  Such proposed amended complaint sought to assert a cause of action for wrongful death on behalf of [...] individually, as an heir at law of [...].  (Da094-Da102).  On May 14, 2024, the court entered an order titled “Decision and Statement of Reasons” which order granted the Estate’s motion to file an amended complaint, and which also stated, *sua sponte*, that “[t]his matter is restored to the trial calendar in its entirety” (Da080; emphasis added).  In “restoring” the case “in its entirety” to the trial calendar, the court reversed and vacated the March 22, 2024 order that had dismissed Count Two of the complaint, “Wrongful Death,” without prejudice; and which had granted the Khazaei Defendants’ motion to stay the litigation in favor of arbitration as to Count One, the “Survival Action. ”  On June 3, 2024, the Khazaei Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and reversal of the court’s May 14, 2024 order.  By order dated June 20, 2024, the court granted such motion for reconsideration and, on reconsideration, left its May 14, 2024 order intact.  (Da162-63).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] The April 3, 2013 Order, entered by the lower Court, and upheld by the Appellate Court, specifically states [...] is “absolutely debarred and foreclosed of and from all equity of redemption of, in and to said mortgage premises described in the complaint and amended complaint when sold as aforesaid by virtue of this Judgment. ”  On June 21, 2016, Plaintiff accepted a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure (“DIL”) from [...]. (Da 31-33).  Plaintiff accepted possession of the Property subsequent to the recording of the DIL and remained in absolute and undisturbed possession of the Property.  Plaintiff, in good faith, and in reliance upon the aforesaid Orders, believed that she had acquired by the DIL, absolute and perfect title in fee simple to the Property, free and clear of all encumbrances including the [...] Judgment and [...] Judgment.  Plaintiff continued in possession and expended large sums of money to pay all the taxes and assessments which had been levied against the Property, none of which were repaid to the Plaintiff by [...], [...], or any other party.  Based on the foregoing, and primarily as a result of [...]’s refusal to satisfy her Judgment which remained a cloud on title, on September 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting that the Court enter an Order declaring [...]’s and [...]’s rights, title, interest, use or claim in the Property were divested by virtue of this foreclosure action or other legal basis; foreclosing and barring Defendants, [...] and [...], of all equity of redemption in and to said Property; and declaring the [...] Judgment and [...] Judgment discharged and cancelled as to the Property.
[brief] The trial court paid no mind to this utter lack of explanation.  Respondents decided to “ask for forgiveness” instead of “ask for permission. ”  This is a disappointing misuse of the disqualification rules and the trial court should incorrectly failed to recognize that.  See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. at 218.  Respondents knew they did not have authority to file the in camera Certification.  (300a).  Respondents did so only after it appeared this matter was set for trial and arbitration in order to delay these proceedings.  See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. at 218.  Again, Appellants would be significantly prejudiced if the disqualification was upheld as Appellants would be forced at the eleventh hour to retain new counsel and get new counsel up to speed on a complex and voluminous file.  Appellants’ new counsel would need to duplicate many hours of work performed by [...] through discovery, of which there is a massive amount.  It would be significantly damaging to Appellants if they were now forced to replicate that substantial work resulting solely as a result of Respondents’ unreasonable and unexplained delay.  Appellants would be forced pay two sets of attorneys for essentially the same work.  Had Respondents not strategically (and impermissibly) timed its bogus request, Appellants would not have been prejudiced.  Accordingly, for these reasons, the trial court erred in not applying the doctrine of laches and the Disqualification Order should be reversed.
[brief] POINT I THE DETECTIVE’S NARRATION TESTIMONY WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE STATE’S CASE, IT WAS BASED UPON INFERENCES, AND IT PROVIDED HER OPINION AS TO DISPUTED FACTS.  ACCORDINGLY, HER ESSENTIAL TESTIMONY VIOLATED FACTORS THREE AND FOUR OF WATSON, DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, AND REQUIRING REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS.  The State agrees that lead detective [...] did not witness any of the actual events depicted on camera, and therefore qualified as an “investigator” for purposes of providing narration testimony as defined under State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023).  (Sb13 – 15)  Accordingly, Rodriguez was --- \(^1\) Db = defendant’s appellant brief Dra = defendant’s reply brief appendix  Sb = State’s respondent brief only permitted to provide narration testimony if her testimony fell within the limitations as defined under Watson.
[brief] The primacy of the statute’s language over extrinsic sources like legislative history cannot be overstated.  [T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.  Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.  Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious criticisms.  First, legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory.  Judicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow [...]’s memorable phrase, an exercise in “‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends. ’”  [Citation omitted.]  Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.
[brief] [...], * Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DIVISION OF * STATE POLICE, CAPTAIN WILLIAM * HARKNESS (#5355), LIEUTENANT * [...], (#5161), LIEUTENANT COLONEL [...]* (#5346), MAJOR [...] * (#5027), CAPTAIN BRENDA * MCINTYRE (#5079), CAPTAIN JEANNE * HENGEMUHLE (#5600), SERGEANT * FIRST CLASS CHRISTOPHER * POMMERENCKE (#5391), LIEUTENANT * [...] (#5387) AND * JOHN DOES 1-5, Defendants-Respondents.  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Docket No. Below: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Mercer County SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], JSC CIVIL ACTION PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S *AMENDED*  APPEAL
[brief] The Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court can overturn an administrative agency's determinations or findings if there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  *Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs.*, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329, 27-28 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011) citing *In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees*, 194 N. J. 413, 422 (2008).
[brief] The [...] bought that property so that they and their family could live there.  It was going to be, and is now, their primary residence where they live their day-to-day lives as a family, not as a money-making enterprise.  There were never any plans for commercial activities or revenue generation to go on there.  The property was never intended to be rented out and, indeed, has never been rented out since the [...] purchased it.  They had not sold, and were not going to sell, anything out of the house.  There was not, nor was there ever intended to be, any daily business being run by the [...] at [...].  No patrons or customers were ever going to be coming and going from their property.  The property was not being owned in any way for investment or business purposes by the [...].  The property had no means for generating income to spread the risk of loss.  In no way were the [...] going to derive any benefit from the sidewalk abutting their property.  The fact that renovations being performed to the house may have increased the fair market value of the property favoring the [...] in the future should mean nothing, as the fair market value of many residential properties increases due to market trends, irrespective of whether or not any renovations were performed.  [...] is not even located in a commercial section of [...], but rather a purely residential section.  Unquestionably, the unavoidable fact is that [...] was going to be, and has been, used solely as the [...]’ private residence.  The facts of the matter before this Appellate Court also bear a striking resemblance to the facts in the unpublished decision of the Appellate Division in Cardenas v. Severino, 2019 WL 6598238 (App. Div. Dec. 5, 2019) (Dal).
[brief] •  **New Mexico:** *Morales v. E.D. Etnyre & Co.*, 382 F. Supp.2d 1285, 1287 (D.N.M. 2005) (rejecting a “duty to retro-fit or recall”; following Third Restatement §11) (road paving machine).  •  **North Dakota:** *Eberts v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.*, 2004 WL 224683, at *2-3 (D.N.D. Feb. 2, 2004) (following Third Restatement §11 and “the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions [that] have refused to impose a duty on manufacturers to recall ... a defective product”) (ATV).  • **Ohio:** *Kondash v. Kia Motors America, Inc.*, 2016 WL 11246421, at *14 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2016) (given the weight of contrary precedent, “[t]he Court cannot conclude that Ohio law recognizes a duty in negligence to recall”) (automobile).
[brief] The more training an individual must undergo, the more indicative they are of being an employee.  Petitioner testified extensively as to training given by [...], including the bi-annual municipal building security meeting, annual updates of [...] ordinances and training sessions which Petitioner undergoes with the [...], Zoning Officers, Enforcement Officers, and Animal Control Officers.  She also undergoes extensive training in the Municipal Case Resolution system since the Pandemic as well as the Plea by Mail process.  [...] conceded during the OAL Hearing that she was unaware of the extensive training Petitioner must undergo and had she known, it would be indicative of employee status.  **FACTOR 3 – INTEGRATION**
[brief] (Da23)  Neither of these observations can save [...]’s hunch, because -- like [...]’s conduct inside his car -- neither is inherently suspicious.  First, there is nothing threatening or criminal about holding a work vest; [...] had to pick the vest up out of his lap to exit his car, and it is entirely plausible that he held it, instead of putting it away, in an effort to exit his car promptly.  Moreover, [...] did not hold the vest in a strange or suspicious way; as the video shows, he held it loosely in one hand by his side.  (Da25 at 02:30 to 02:35)  Second, there is nothing suspicious about [...] allegedly leaning his body against the car when he assumed the position to be frisked; had [...] held his body stiffly, or awkwardly far from the car, [...] might have found that suspicious, too.  See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 533-34 (“[W]hatever individuals may do -- whether they do nothing, something, or anything in between -- the behavior can be argued to be suspicious.
[brief] (Pa0092).  Before the 2010 Liability Trial, [...] and [...] stipulated to its contents.  (Pa0316-335).  The [...] Policy promised:  To indemnify the insured for ultimate net loss in excess of the retained limit hereinafter stated, which the insured may sustain by reason of the liability imposed upon the insured by law, or assumed by the insured under contract.  ***  (b)  Property Damage Liability.  For damages because of injury to or destruction of tangible property including consequential loss resulting therefrom, caused by an occurrence.  (Pa0333).  The [...] Policy defines “ultimate net loss” as:  All sums which the insured, or any company as his insurer, or both, becomes legally obligated to pay as damages, whether by reason of adjudication or settlement, because of personal injury, property damage or advertising liability to which this policy applies.  (Id).  The [...] Policy defines an “occurrence” as either “an accident happening during the policy period or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally causes injury to persons or tangible property during the policy period. ” (Pa0335).  The [...] Policy does not define “accident,” and does not contain a pollution exclusion.  The property damage limits stated in the [...] Policy were $25 million per occurrence, excess of $50,000 per occurrence.  (Pa0318, 0320).  Because the [...] Policy was a multi-year policy that provided coverage excess to several sequential single-year policies, the SAM determined, and the trial court agreed, that the sum of the limits underlying the [...] Policy was $200,000.  (Pa0155-57).  II.