ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Accordingly, arrest. of offense an for 4 Section of provisions the with accordance in acomplaint-warrant for applying that information reveals investigation further when complaint-summons by charged previously originally than greater injury is of extent the where (e.g., charges upgraded or new supports new assault; simple than rather assault aggravated for prosecution warrant to as suspected warrants substance dangerous controlled seized the of quantity or type the about information occurred offense the that determined subsequently is or it crime, ahigher-degree for prosecution as such possession," "simple than more involves offense firearms a zone; park public in a at firearm pointing a or 2C:39-4, N.J.S.A. of violation in purpose unlawful for an possession mere a not — person specific a against crime (i.e., a 2C:12-1(b)(4) N.J.S.A. of violation another in warrants theft of a amount the that reveals investigation subsequent crime); possessory is firearm seized a that reveals or charged, originally than crime ahigher-degree for prosecution etc.). weapon, assault an or is defaced, stolen, applying from prosecutor a preclude to construed be Directive this in anything shall Nor when complaint-summons by charged previously offense an for complaint-warrant fora the at general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant or officer the to known not information reasonably are conditions release pretrial that indicates decision charging initial the of time defendant's the assure reasonably to community, the or victim of a safety the protect necessary to to attempting or obstructing from defendant the prevent to or required, when court in appearance be not need but include, might information new
[brief] This matter started as a simple insurance claim.  Appellant, a professed model and actress, owns a multi-unit property located in Jersey City, New Jersey in which she occupied the basement level apartment.  Almost four years ago, a water line connected to Appellant’s hot water heater broke, causing some minor water damage to the downstairs apartment that she occupied.  What started as a relatively straightforward insurance claim, took various twists and turns as Appellant embellished her claim.  This is an appeal where an oral argument is necessary and [...] is again reiterating its request for oral argument.  The reason for this is simply: Appellant should be put to the task of explaining how she can support her request that the trial judge’s rulings be overturned when it was her actions and admissions that formed the basis of each ruling – which admissions she either accedes to or conveniently ignores.  In this Appeal, Appellant once again attempts to repackage the same arguments made before the Trial Court but continues to miss the target as she still fails to address the factual underpinnings that supported the entry of summary judgment in favor of [...] - that under New Jersey law Appellant admittedly made false, incomplete, or misleading representations to [...] that violated the Policy’s Concealment or Fraud Provision.  Appellant’s insurance fraud consisted of the following: (1) Falsely claiming that she suffered personal injuries as a result of mold exposure that rendered her unable to work as a model in an effort to secure alternative living expenses from [...]; (2) Falsely claiming that she owned a limited edition U2 iPod that she claimed was worth over $8,000; (3) Submitting false and misleading information about her background in an effort to deceive [...] into believing that Appellant was an expert on oriental rugs to justify her claim regarding the alleged damage to three rugs in her apartment; and (4) Falsely claiming that all three rugs were in her apartment at the time of the loss even though one was located in an upstairs hallway as established by one of Appellant’s tenants.  To avoid summary judgment, Appellant sought to re-invent her case through a self-serving sham affidavit that contradicted some of her prior discovery responses, document production, and deposition testimony in a last-ditch effort to claim that disputed issues of fact exist.  In doing so, as she continues with her current filing, Appellant overlooks the key facts and her admissions upon which the Trial Court granted summary judgment.  What Appellant fails to apprehend but the Trial Court recognized is that a single act of fraud is sufficient under New Jersey law to justify summary judgment.
[brief] Even if the judge erroneously concluded, as he did here, that Royster controlled, he still needed to address the waiver issue.  That is so because waiver negates reliance, not on the general doctrine of state sovereign immunity, but rather on the limited immunity afforded under the TCA and 9–1–1 dispatcher liability statute.  The judge applied Royster, concluded he need not address the waiver issue because he had determined that defendants were entitled to state sovereign immunity, and granted summary judgment to defendants.  The judge premised his ruling, however, on the misapplication of Royster.  Reliance on the immunity afforded in the affirmative defenses and waiver of those defenses are logically connected.  It would be illogical to dismiss a complaint relying on a ground that a defendant has waived.  Therefore, the judge should have adjudicated whether defendants waived the affirmative defenses before dismissing the complaint.  We conclude that defendants waived the new affirmative defenses.  ***
[brief] [...] et al., *The Effect of Expectation on the Identification of Known and Unknown Persons*, 6 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 173 (1993)  ...........................................................................................................  53  [...], [...] & [...], *Evaluating the Effectiveness of Pixelation and Blurring on Masking the Identity of Familiar Faces*, 15 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 101 (2001)  .................................................................  54  [...], [...] & [...], *Recognizing Degraded Faces: The Contribution of Configural and Featural Cues*, 41 Perception 1497 (2012)  ..................................................................................  54  [...], *Innocence Project: DNA Exonerations, 1989-2014: Review of Data and Findings From the First 25 Years*, 718 Albany L. Rev. 717 (2015)  ..................................................................................  53  [...], *Remembering Faces at 66*, in *The Visual World in Memory* (2009)  ..................................................................................................................  54  OTHER CITATIONS
[brief] Petitioner points to the assertion in [...]’s Initial Decision that “the very settlement agreement that the Board points to as a means by which to preclude [...]’s application from being processed contemplates and specifically provides that [...] will apply for accidental disability benefits.  It seems somewhat contradictory to reference a document that specifically states [...] is to apply for accidental disability benefits as a reason to bar [...] from applying from said benefits” (PA128).  But this ignores that the provisions in the Settlement Agreement between [...] and Petitioner (which Petitioner does not claim were drafted by the Board), simply cannot override the statutory prohibitions in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) and N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b).  Petitioner cites to no case law to support the proposition that the Settlement Agreement can override two statutes.  Further, the Court in Cardinale recognized that the Board is not bound by settlement agreements entered into by police departments and their officers.  Cardinale, 458 N.J. Super. 260, 274.  It is noteworthy that Petitioner admits that the Settlement Agreement “included a compensation package for [...] covering several complex financial fringe benefits under the SOA contract” (Pet. Br., pp. 11-12).  Indeed, Petitioner states that the “settlement agreement financially remunerated him expeditiously” (Pet. Br., p. 37).  Thus, Petitioner is not left bereft of resources.
[brief] A good example is George v. McDonough, 596 U.S. 740 (2022), a case involving veterans' disability benefits.  In George, a servicemember applied for disability benefits, which the regional VA office denied based on its interpretation --- 9  "Unquestionably, Tyler establishes a new principle of law."  Id. at 363. of a particular regulation.  *Id.* at 744-45.  The servicemember appealed the decision, but the Board affirmed, and the servicemember took no further appeal.  *Id.* at 745.  Decades later in different case, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the interpretation of the same regulation that led to the earlier denial of the servicemember’s benefits.  *Ibid.*  In response, the servicemember sought collateral review of his denial.  The Supreme Court explained that new interpretations of law do not allow collateral relief to parties’ whose cases were already closed.  *Id.* at 751-52.  The same principle applies here.
[brief] [...] notified [...] of his claims as soon as practical.  Defendants were aware of undisputed facts outside the complaint including [...]’ video evidence.  See Video Evidence (Pa526); (2T:4,8); (Pa249).  At the time of claim denial, the Defendants were also aware of [...]’s Orders dated August 3, 2018, and December 16, 2018, which dismissed the harassment allegations because the complaint was vague, undefined, and ambiguous; and interrogatories were deficient to substantiate such serious allegations against [...].  (Pa246, Pa510 – Pa511).  This fact alone triggered coverage; and under the Burd Rule, triggers reimbursement for previously covered legal expenses.  (2T9).  Under these circumstances, it is reasonable for one to expect coverage to apply.  Moreover, the case law speaks for itself.  Norman (2022), quoting Flomerfelt at 444  “In evaluating the complaint…doubts are resolved in favor of the insured and, therefore, in favor of reading claims that are ambiguously pleaded, but potentially covered, in a manner that obligates the insurer to provide a defense.  The Court (applying Burd) held that ‘in circumstances in which the underlying coverage question cannot be decided from the face of the complaint, the insurer is obligated to provide a defense until all potentially covered claims are resolved.  (2T:10-11).  Plaintiff asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate the long-standing case law whereby the duty to defend is enforceable if there is a “potentially” coverable occurrence that would be indemnified if proved valid.  II.
[brief] ” (T84-1 to 2)  [...]’s belief that [...] was carrying a firearm was nothing more than an inarticulate hunch.  [...] was not investigating activity involving a weapon.  [...] did not exhibit any behavior to suggest he was avoiding the police presence or concealing the contents of his bag. \(^3\)  [...]’s testimony that “it’s been a common trend lately” for individuals to carry weapons in cross-body bags like [...]’s carries little weight; such a generalization cannot form the basis for particularized suspicion.  Elders, 192 N.J. at 250.  Moreover, [...] had no reason to perceive [...] as threatening him because [...] was not walking toward him.  See Williams, 410 N.J. Super at 557 (Holding that, because the defendant rode his bike “in the opposite direction from the officers, the officers could not have had any reasonable concern for their own safety. ”).  \(^3\)  Although cited as support for reasonable suspicion in the State’s brief, the fact that [...] began to close the zipper to his bag is wholly irrelevant to this analysis because conduct exhibited or “[i]nformation acquired after a stop cannot retroactively serve as a basis for the stop. ”  Nyema, 249 N.J. at 532.  Thus, [...] did not have reasonable suspicion to stop [...].
[brief] Defendant-Respondent [...] (“[...]”), is a municipality that, pursuant to New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S. 59:1-1 (the “Tort Claims Act”) is entitled to a number defenses and immunities thereunder.  The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice because it determined that there was no evidence of actual nor constructive notice of the alleged condition in the Subject roadway.  It is uncontested that there was no actual notice of the alleged condition.
[brief] Respondent [...] and Respondent [...] violated *N.J.S.A.* 18A:12-24.1(e) because they “took private action that could compromise the [B]oard by meeting with [...] and trying to influence their actions,” and violated *N.J.S.A.* 18A:12-24.1(g) because they “deliberately gave incomplete information to the Township Committee and withheld information about material deficiencies in the referendum plan.
[brief] ”  Id. at *14-15.  This Court held that, “[a]s the trial judge correctly noted, a variance was not required” for the hotel’s site plan approval because the property owner “was not proposing to build, expand, or revise driveway access to his proposed hotel, because it had already been built. ”  Id. at *11.  As in Lakewood Realty Assoc., Respondent never proposed to expand or revise the parking lot or its use of the parking lot.  Contrary to Appellant’s contention, there is no issue of a “separate principal use. ”  The Agreement between the [...] and Respondent expressly provided that the [...] had conveyed a deed to Lot 8 to Respondent for the purpose of erecting a synagogue and would “permit [Respondent] to utilize for parking purposes the vacant lands” on Lot 5 (Aa23;Aa26).  As found by [...], the Agreement created an Easement that has never been abandoned.  “An easement is a property right which cannot be taken away without observing constitutional rights,” Am. Metal Co. v. Fluid Chem. Co., 121 N.J. Super. 177, 9  As this is an unreported decision, pursuant to R. 1:36-3, Respondent attaches it hereto (Ra266-Ra273) and is aware of no contrary authority.  181 (Law Div. 1972), but which would be rendered essentially worthless here if Respondent were not permitted to use the Easement for the same purpose for which it was granted.  As [...] further found, to the extent that the parking situation has become “chaotic” since Appellant acquired the Property such chaos is attributable to Appellant’s use, and not to Respondent’s use, which remains necessary for its congregants to have access to the structure used as a house of worship on Lot 8.
[brief] As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held in Housing Authority of Morristown v. Little, because of the importance that the Court attaches to the finality of judgments, relief under R. 4:50-1(f) is available only when truly exceptional circumstances are present.  In such exceptional circumstances, R. 4:50-1(f) is as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice.  The rule is limited to situations in which, were it not applied, a grave injustice would occur.  In Nr Deed v. Roszko, 2023 N.J. Super. App. Div 2023 Unpub. LEXIS 1319, *1 the court made a decision based upon the facts of the case that the matter warranted reinstatement pursuant to 4:50-1(f).
[directive] This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Directive shall not be affected.  C.  Questions.  Questions concerning this Directive shall be addressed to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability, or their designee.  D.  Effective date.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and shall remain in force until December 31, 2023, unless it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] To begin this analysis, it is important to note that the Mayor of the [...] does not have any specific appointment or control powers over Zoning Board members.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69 and Monroe Municipal Code Section 108.3.2; see also, Voci v. Hard Cheese AC, LLC, No. A-5916-17T1, Unpub. 2019 WL 3029866, (App. Div.) certif. denied.  240 N.J. 78 (2019).  Indeed, the members of the Zoning Board are appointed by the Township Council.  Id.  It is an independent, administrative body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.  See Rogoff v. Tufariello, 106 N.J.Super. 303, 308 (App.Div.), certif. den. 54 N.J. 583 (1969).  To prove improper influence on behalf of a public official, a court must find that the official had an actual conflict of interest (i.e. having a direct or indirect pecuniary or personal interest in the matter in question), or that the official took some direct improper official action toward the Zoning Board.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d); N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 237 N.J. 333, 351-53 (2019); Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 553; Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 528-532 (1993).
[directive] 1.  No law enforcement officer shall direct, solicit, encourage, attend or otherwise participate in the questioning of any juvenile by school officials unless such questioning could be lawfully conducted by the law enforcement officer acting on his or her own authority in accordance with the rules and procedures governing law enforcement interrogations and interviews.  Pursuant to guidelines to be issued by the Commissioner of Education, and subject to the provisions of Section F of this Part, all information obtained by school employees concerning the commission of an offense, whether obtained as a result of the questioning of a student or otherwise, shall be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency, provided however, that nothing in this subsection or any other provision of this Executive Directive shall be construed to authorize or require a school employee to divulge information or records subject to the confidentiality requirements of 42 C.F.R. Part 2, or any other applicable regulation, law or rule of evidence concerning confidential and privileged communications.  2.  All law enforcement officers shall comply with procedures and requirements established by law concerning interrogations and interviews of juveniles.  L.
[brief] This matter is a public records case.  Plaintiffs were provided with all retrievable records.  Moreover, Plaintiffs were paid all monies ordered by the Court.  There was no legitimate reason to depose [...].  The purpose of the deposition notice was simply to annoy and harass the Defendants.  Furthermore, proceedings under OPRA are to be conducted in a “summary or expedited manner. ”  *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6; Courier News v. Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office*, 358 N.J. Super. 373, 378 (App. Div. 2003).  *Rule 4:67-2(a)*, which governs OPRA actions, does not permit the record to be supplemented by depositions or other forms of discovery.  “[S]uch protracted discovery is simply not suitable, and, absent legitimate need, is not permissible in actions, like OPRA proceedings, that are inherently summary by nature and expedited in manner. ”  *MAG  Entm’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control*, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 552 (App. Div. 2005).  For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entered an Order barring the deposition of [...].
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to one of the following first or second degree crimes, on or after June 29, 2001: or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime, that occurred murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, aggravated arson by placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, burglary, theft by extortion by obtaining property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on, or physically confine or restrain anyone or commit another offense, booby traps in manufacturing or distributing of CDS facilities or strict liability for drug occurred on or after June 18, 2002: induced deaths; or that terrorism, or producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological occurred on or after January 13, 2008: agents or nuclear or radiological devices; or that first degree racketeering; or that occurred on or after August 14, 2013: occurred on or after November 1, 2013: child pornography; or that firearms trafficking.
[brief] I agree.  Q  And then you testified, and you testified that you applied to [...] again in 2017.  A  Yes.  Q  But you withdrew that because you had moved.  A  Yes.  Q  But in your deposition in this case, did you not testify that you withdrew the application again because you were too busy?  A  I’m not sure but I moved an hour away from the hospital so that was -- Q  Well, let me refresh your recollection, Doctor.  A  Again, often it’s a combination of factors that go into these decisions.
[brief] 11, 14 Netzel v. Am. Express Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135427 (D. Ariz. August 3, 2023)  ......................... 24, 25 Red Bank Reg'l Educ. Ass'n v. Red Bank Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 122, 393 A.2d 267 (1978)  ............................................................  11  Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2010)  ......................... 13, 16, 24 Rotondi v Dibre Auto Group, L.L.C., 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1662 (App. Div. July 9, 2014), cert denied 220 N.J.  31 [2014]  .................................................................
[brief] While investigatory reports and notes may include some disclosable information, plaintiff did not seek that information, only records . . . because plaintiff’s records request would require the records custodian to speculate as to what information plainsought [sic], defendant’s denial was appropriate.  (Da66-67).  The intervening appellate court rejoinder to Plaintiff’s appeal was a remand for “the trial court to undertake the necessary in camera inspection to enable the trial court to exercise its role in assuring that the documents and information are not improperly withheld under OPRA. ” (Da80).  The Appellate Division left “the scope and breadth of the in camera inspection to the discretion of the trial court” and did not retain jurisdiction.