[brief] (*See, e.g.*, Pb33, 36, 39, 41, 44.)  These arguments all fail.  Under the correct standard, this Court considers this legal issue anew and the purported lack of any explanation or reasoning below is not grounds for reversal.  the court actually had a motion for summary judgment before it, which it granted. \(^2\)  *Goffe* provides another example refuting [...]’s contention.  There, the Supreme Court faced a similar argument and ruled that application of the summary-judgment standard and attendant proceedings was only appropriate and applicable where a party has argued and shown that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was ever an agreement to arbitrate in the first place—e.g., a dispute as to whether a party had actually ever received the purported agreement.  238 N.J. at 214–15.  The Court distinguished that from the present scenario, where a party merely challenges the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, and held that a summary judgment standard is *not* applicable where a party’s signature is on the document.  *Id.* at 215.  Similarly, the assertion that Respondents’ motions should have been converted to motions for summary judgment under Rule 4:6-2(e) and a plenary hearing held, as is the practice with normal motions to dismiss, fails to carry the --- \(^2\) *NAACP* is further inapposite: there were several inconsistent arbitration provisions scattered throughout “various form documents that a consumer signed in connection with her purchase of a new motor vehicle from a New Jersey dealership. ”  421 N.J. Super. at 409.  The Appellate Division recently distinguished the circumstances in *NAACP* from those, like here, where there is “a single agreement . . . that plainly and unambiguously states plaintiff waived [her] right to a jury trial on [her] statutory claims and agreed to arbitrate those claims. ”  *McCoy v. Arde, Inc.*, 2024 WL 4447106, at *8 (App. Div. Oct. 9, 2024) (unpublished) (Ra01-Ra07).  day.  Respondents’ motions sought to compel arbitration, which this Court has recognized may be brought either under Rule 4:6-2(e) or alternatively under Rule 4:6-2(a) as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of the arbitration agreement.  *C.G. v. Applebee’s Bar & Grill, Inc.*, No. A-000171-21, 2022 WL 2821574, at *2–3 (App. Div. July 20, 2022) (unpublished) (Ra08-Ra10).  In *C.G.*, this Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a trial court erred in deciding a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration under the 4:6-2 standard and not converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment, in part because it would not have made a difference given that the plaintiff conceded she had signed the arbitration agreement, which was “dispositive. ”  *Id.*; see also *Cohen v. Workshop/APD Architecture, D.P.C.*, No. A-0566-23, 2024 WL 3517498, at *8 (App. Div. July 24, 2024) (unpublished) (recognizing that trial courts may consider motions to compel arbitration as under Rule 4:6-2(a) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, in so doing, consider “matters outside the pleading without converting the motion to one for summary judgment”) (Ra11-Ra19).  These principles apply equally here.  The proper standard of review is thus *de novo*, as that standard is applied in the context of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to compel arbitration.