ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, the Court mandated the State provide school funding in those districts for the first three years of implementation “at the levels required by the SFRA’s formula each year. ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146.  After the first years of full SFRA funding in Abbott districts, the Court mandated the State to follow through with the SFRA’s provision for review and adjustment of “the formula’s weights and other operative parts” every three years.  Id.  Further, the Court underscored that its explicit objective in imposing this mandate is to ensure the State maintains the operation of the SFRA formula at its “optimal level” in Abbott districts not only in its first three years, but also in the years beyond the initial implementation phase.  Id. (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court stressed it was imposing these mandates on the State’s future implementation of the SFRA in the Abbott districts because, first, its review of whether the SFRA could serve as a constitutional remedy in Abbott districts relied on “currently available information. ”  Id; and see id., at 172 (stating “we do not have the ability to see ahead” and know if the SFRA “will work as it is designed to work”).  Second, the Court expressed concern that the “measurable educational improvement” for students in Abbott districts through the implementation of court-ordered parity and supplemental funding remedy be sustained, Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 549, and that the State “not allow” the Abbott districts “to regress to the former problems that necessitated judicial intervention in the first place.
[brief] (5T16-9 to 24)  According to the court, however, parole hearings – and not resentencing hearings – are where juvenile offenders like [...] will be afforded their meaningful opportunity for release pursuant to Comer.  Accordingly, the court limited the scope of its resentencing to the narrow question of determining the length of [...]’s parole ineligibility period.  By not even considering amending [...]’s base sentence, and by finding that Comer was satisfied by the fact of [...]’s parole eligibility alone, the trial court failed to impose a sentence consistent with the instructions of Comer.  In State v. Thomas, this Court reaffirmed the principle that resentencing hearings are the proper venue for juveniles to vindicate their rights under Comer and Graham, holding that “nothing less than an adversarial hearing in the Criminal Part will afford defendant the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ envisioned by Graham, Comer, and Zuber[.]”470 N.J. Super. 167, 201 (App. Div. 2022) (citation omitted).
[brief] (Da85; Da108)  Putting the finest point on the issue, the question presented is whether, under OPRA, a request seeking police reports is equivalent to, and is to be treated as, a request for information under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b)?  Given the statutory framework of OPRA, the answer to this question must be no.  In answering this question, preliminary distinctions must be drawn between what requirements apply to requests for government records, criminal investigatory records, and requests for “information” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b).
[brief] [Pa447 at 100-7 to 100-21].  But residents had presented a petition with 600 signatures demanding its removal from the plan because they wanted the Township to acquire it for open space, and as they recognized, a rezoning could increase the Property’s value.  [Pa434 at 43-18 to 48-12].  The decision not to recommend the rezoning of the Property in the MPA was not about [...]’s zoning, it was simply about extra money that the Township did not want to spend to acquire the Property.  [Pa448 at 101-1 to 102-13].  But the Township never sought to acquire the Property in any event.  The Board’s decision to “hang its hat” on the MPA’s lack of recommendation for the Property – when compared against what actually happened – highlights a glaring deficiency in its analysis.
[brief] Indeed, to establish an honest belief in the necessity of force means that “the first step toward the defense is taken. ”  [...], New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 1 on N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c) (2023) (“If there is necessity, but the actor does not believe it, there is no defense….”).  This must, necessarily, take into account what the defendant truly and honestly believed at the time of the event, given the circumstances he faced.  But, that is only the first step.  Reasonableness, however, is not a subjective standard to be measured by the defendant, but an objective one to be measured by the jury.  State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 15-17 (1968); State v. Moore, 158 N.J. 292, 309-10 (1984); Kelly, 97 N.J at 204; State v. Sanders, 467 N.J. Super. 325, 334 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 248 N.J. 390 (2021), *State v. Bryant*, 288 N.J. Super. 27, 34 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 (1996).
[brief] Id. at 377.  Under the present facts, [...] testified that he never for a minute thought he could do what he wanted with the $50,000.00 check from [...] (2T36:17-22).  [...] understood that the money was to be used to help him buy the house selected by Francisco for the benefit of the elderly Matos’s (2T36:22-37:7).  Defendants argued at the conclusion of the trial that the transfer of $50,000.00 from [...] to [...] was a conditional gift under *Sipko* (5T63:13-19).
[directive] A number of the bars sanctioned for allowing “female impersonators” or the congregation of “apparent 1 homosexuals” were also cited for violating other ABC rules, which contributed to the significant variation in penalties.  In addition, ABC adopted a system of graduated discipline, and establishments with a prior record of violations were more likely to receive more significant sanctions following subsequent violations.  In addition, at least one Governor had direct knowledge of ABC’s policies: [...], who served as the 2 State Commissioner of Alcoholic Beverages from 1941 to 1947 and on at least one occasion revoked a liquor license from a bar for, among other things, allowing a “female impersonator” on the premises.  Litchenstein, In re Sidney ABC Bulletin 571, Item 1 (June 4, 1943).  Page 4  While the homophobic and transphobic policies instituted by ABC—and defended by others in our Department—may have been consistent with cultural standards at the time, this type of anti-gay activity was facing growing scrutiny by the middle of the twentieth century.
[directive] A.  Victim Safety This Department will make all reasonable efforts to 1.  Provide law enforcement protection and other safety measures to a victim of law enforcement officer domestic violence.  a.  Directed patrol initiatives including: (1) Drive-bys.  (2) Dismounted patrols.  -14-  (3)  Welfare checks.  2.  Assist in arranging for the transportation of the victim to a safe place when necessary.  3.  Ensure victim contact with trained domestic violence advocates for safety planning.  These protective measures will remain in effect even if the officer is dismissed as a result of committing domestic violence.  B.  Victim Notification  To better ensure victim safety, the designated Principal Law Enforcement Contact person will inform the victim as to the status of the case as far in advance as possible to all impending actions taken against or with the officer.  This Department will provide reasonable assistance to help the victim with safety measures.  C.  Confidentiality of Victim Location  If the victim wishes to be placed in an undisclosed "safe home," she/he may be transported by another party in lieu of a law enforcement officer.  Those law enforcement employees who do have contact with the victim must keep all information concerning his or her whereabouts and safety plans confidential.  D.  Prohibition of Law Enforcement Court Accompaniment  No law enforcement officer will attend any domestic violence related court proceeding of any law enforcement officer employee unless subpoenaed to appear, or authorized by their agency, or as part of their investigation.  XI.  POST INCIDENT ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL DECISIONS
[brief] (13T136-7 to 138-19, 142-20 to 24, 146-20 to 22, 148-15 to 22, 153-1 to 10, 160-7 to 13, 164-6 to 17, 167-12 to 20)  He knew [...] because “[w]e was incarcerated a couple of times, seen him in the streets a couple of times,” but [...] did not normally hang out in Carver Hall.  (13T139-10 to 15)  In his description to the police, [...] said that the shooter wore a “wife beater” tank top and black sneakers, but at trial he only recalled “like fatigue shorts, like cutoff shorts. ”  (13T145-15 to 18, 165-6 to 24)  Hours after the shooting, [...] and [...] made out-of-court identifications of [...] when shown a single photo of him, and [...] did the following day.
[brief] [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  P.O. Box 006  [...]  Re: State v. [...] [...]  Docket No: [...]  Dear Mr. Orlando,  Please accept this letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief, in support of Defendant Myers withdrawal of his global conditional plea, governed by court rule 3:9-3(f).  Sincerely, [Signature]  [...]
[brief] **Perez v. Zagami, LLC**, 218 *N.J.* 202 (2014)  .........................11  **Pfannenstein ex rel. Est. of Pfannenstein v. Surrey**, 475 *N.J. Super.* 475 *N.J. Super.* 83 cert. denied, 254 *N.J.* (2023)  ...............2, 12, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24  **Smerling v. Harrah's Entm't, Inc. **, 389 *N.J. Super.* 181 (App. Div. 2006)  ..............................................................10  **State v. Bernardi**, 456 *N.J. Super.* 511 (App. Div. 2019)  .........10  **State v. Gargano**, 476 *N.J. Super.* 511 (App. Div. 2023)  ..........10  **State v. Hudson**, 209 *N.J.* 513 (2012)  .................................10  **State v. S.B.**, 230 *N.J.* 61 (2017)  ........................................10  **Watson v. N.J. Dep't of Treasury**, 453 *N.J. Super.* 42 (App. Div. 2017) ..............................................................16 **Wiggins v. Hackensack Meridian Health**, 478 *N.J. Super.* 355 (App. Div. 2024) ......................................................2, 12, 13, 20, 23, 24 **W.S. v. Hildreth**, 252 *N.J.* 506 (2023) .................................10 TABLE OF APPENDIX October 14, 2019 letter objecting to [...]’s Affidavit of Merit.........................................................1R January 28, 2020 Ferreira Conference Consent Order..............2R Plaintiff’s cover page of the Brief filed in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss...............................4R TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ON APPEAL June 24, 2020 Trial Court Order........................................35A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] had no information except the date and the offense, “N.J.S.A. 4:19-23 Potentially Dangerous Dog. ”  Dal5  There was no indication that the basis of the charge was the injury to [...], the death of [...] or both.  The Court allowed the State to present evidence of two irrelevant incidents prior to September 12, 2022, even though the Township brought no charges against [...].  Moreover, [...] wouldn’t have been deemed potentially dangerous under the facts even if he had been charged.  **August 4, 2020 incident
[brief] *Ibid.*  The Court refused “to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation. ’”  *Id.* at 731.  Instead, the Supreme Court held that the Kansas Legislature “was free to decide for itself” that “legislation was needed to deal with business of debt adjusting,” and the Kansas statute making it a misdemeanor to engage in the business except as incident to the lawful practice of law could not be held a denial of due process of law.  *Ibid.*  Like the “attorney exemption” in the Kansas statute, the DACCA provides a safe harbor only to those attorneys who are not “principally engaged” in debt adjustment.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2).  As in *Skrupa*, such provision does not violate due process, and the Legislature “was free to decide” to create this exemption.
[brief] *The Court failed to address the fact that the notary had no contact with the process server and the defects in the Affidavits.  (T4:97:12-20)*  Although these issues were raised at the hearing, the Court in its ruling did not address the incorrect notary date (two months prior to alleged service), the incorrect GPS time stamp for the year 2031and the fact that the notary public, who was not called to authenticate the documents, had no contact with the deponent process server at any time in violation of notary rules.  The Court erred in granting the defective affidavits a presumption of validity under these circumstances.
[brief] Courts have held that “‘a party may not create a material issue of fact to defeat summary judgment by filing an affidavit disputing his or her own sworn testimony without demonstrating a plausible explanation for the conflict. ’  Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 624 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir.1991)).
[brief] With those restrictions in mind, [...]’s Site Analysis focused on determining the most operationally suitable location that would enable [...] to improve and reinforce existing service reliability with minimal impact to the surrounding properties.  To that end, [...]’s site review and analysis considered potential impacts of each possible site from several perspectives: (1) impacts to residential areas; (2) existing environmental conditions; and (3) engineering considerations.  Potential properties located in residential neighborhoods and/or close to other community-valued buildings (e.g., schools) were disqualified from consideration, because the Facility would not typically be permitted on those properties due to local community discontentment and restrictions under Holmdel zoning ordinances.  Existing environmental significantly, [...] was unable to utilize the fourth alternative site because the tenant on that property, [...], refused to grant [...] an easement after extensive, time-consuming negotiations, thereby taking that property off the table as a viable alternative.  As a result, [...] was left with only one possible location for the Regulator Station: the Proposed Site.  24.  In any event, the Proposed Site is the most suitable location for the Regulator Station.  The Site is of sufficient size, presents a natural fit to co-locate [...]’s station with another energy company’s facility (the [...]), and allows [...] to locate the Facility adjacent to the transmission line.  Significantly, the site is located at the southern end of [...]’s Holmdel transmission line, which will minimize the risk of customer exposure to outages.  Moreover, the zoning for the site is non-residential and conditionally permits public utilities.  There are no environmental constraints that would impact the development of a regulator station at this site.  The site is not encumbered with Green Acres restrictions.  There are no low elevations in the easement area, and thus no flooding concerns, and [...] is not required to clear a significant number of trees.  Moreover, [...] successfully obtained an easement from the relevant parties.  25.  In sum, based on the Site Analysis (as summarized above and detailed in the testimony of [...] (Exhibit P-2)), the location best suited for the Facility is the Proposed Site.  That location results in the least combined impacts to residential areas and the environment, while offering a feasible, and indeed preferable, engineering design.  Moreover, [...]’s alternative site analysis establishes that there are no reasonably available alternative sites for the Regulator Station that will achieve an equivalent public benefit.
[brief] Appellants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), consistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7  Application to compel or stay arbitration:  (2)  if the refusing party opposes the summary action, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate, rather than an Answer, seeking to compel Arbitration pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement dated 18 October 2019 (Appellants’ PA025), which they opposed.
[brief] Specifically: • the arbitration provision in *Armendariz*, an employer-employee matter, “exclude[ed] damages for prospective future earnings, so-called ‘front pay,’ a common and often substantial component of contractual damages in a wrongful termination case,” 6 P.3d at 694; • the arbitration provision in *Tillman* allowed “prohibitively high” arbitration costs to be assessed against the plaintiff and also prohibited joinder of claims and class actions, 655 S.E.2d at 371; and, finally • some of the arbitration provision(s) in [...] – which generally dealt with individuals who were “obviously . . . desperate for immediate funds” – limited plaintiffs’ damages to an amount so nominal (e.g., $65-$72) that the Court concluded it had the practical effect of “avoiding almost all responsibility. ”  145  So. 3d at 617.  As noted, the only provision challenged below (and now on appeal) was the so-called “one-sided arbitration clause.
[brief] That was back on November 10th of 2020.  (2T4-17:5-11.)  In its Order, the trial court provided in relevant part as follows:  1.  [...]'s Motion be and is hereby granted, subject to the Court's future determination of the Per Diem Penalty, as set forth herein.  The Court's oral decision on the Motion be and is hereby incorporated into the record.  2.  The supplemental resolution memorialized by the Board on January 23, 2023, notated as Resolution PB-2023-05 (the "Supplemental Resolution"), be and is hereby invalidated, and set aside and said resolution is of no force and effect.  3.  The original resolution memorialized by the Board on December 12, 2022, referred to as Resolution PB-2022-025, be and is hereby affirmed and remains in full force and effect.  4.  The Court finds that the Board's adoption of the Supplemental Resolution constitutes bad faith conduct.  (Emphasis added)  5.  The Court hereby awards [...]Bay reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion.  Within ten (10) days of entry of this Order, [...]Bay shall submit a Certification of Services detailing its fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion.
[brief] \(^2\)  The Court signed the Protective Order on January 4, 2022.  **54a.**  A second Protective Order was signed by the Court on April 28, 2022.  **55a.**  On April 26, 2022, immediately before trial began, the Court, *sua sponte*, signed a severance Order as to the Butler and King homicides.  **56a.**  Jury selection began on April 26, 2022.  On April 25, 2022, immediately before jury selection began, the State designated Special Agent [...] as an expert in GeoTime analysis replacing its previously named expert, a New Jersey State Police detective.
[brief] That Chancery Remand Trial re-commenced on January 28, 2020 and, with Pandemic delays and a Trial over several Hearing days, ended on August 2, 2021.  On March 29, 2022, [...] rendered an Opinion/Order that concluded again that the Synagogue by the 1963 Agreement had obtained an easement to park vehicles on the School Lot 5 and that remains in effect.  That Chancery Court determination was appealed by the School and is now pending as a companion appeal.
[brief] (Order at Pa48; opinion at Pa53 to Pa55).  "[A] board's decision regarding a question of law ... is subject to a de novo review by the courts, and is entitled to no deference since a zoning board has 'no peculiar skill superior to the courts' regarding purely legal matters."  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018) (quoting Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Plan. Bd., 334 N.J. Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000)).  One such question of law is "whether [the board] has jurisdiction over a matter."
[brief] On 12/14/2023, the Defendants filed a brief in response to the directives of the Appellate Court’s Division.  (Pa291).  On January 16, 2024, the plaintiff filed her opposition brief.  (Pa291).  On March 4, 2023 the matter was heard before the Honorable [...].  (1T\(^1\)).  On March 18, 2024, the Court signed an Order dismissing the remaining Counts of the plaintiff’s Complaint.  (Pa267)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] As shown in the italicized passage in the Rule quoted above, Rule 4:10-2(a) explicitly includes “electronically stored information” within the information subject to the Rule’s basic relevancy standard.  That inclusion does not result from ignorance or oversight.  As this Court explained in Pereira, when the New Jersey Supreme Court “first addressed [ESI] in 2006,” it specifically “add[ed] the term ‘electronically stored information’ to subsection (a)” of Rule 4:10-2, which had previously covered only “books,” “documents,” and “other tangible things. ”  475 N.J. Super. at 396 (quoting R. 4:10-2(a)).  And the Supreme Court did so on the express understanding that “ESI is voluminous and expensive to review. ”  Id. at 392 (quoting Committee Report, Report of the Discovery Subcommittee on Proposed Rule Changes Regarding Electronically Stored Information (Nov. 2005), at 3).  But its solution was not to mandate more production of ESI, but less.  To “discourage costly, speculative, duplicative, or unduly burdensome discovery of computer data and systems,” the Court “adopt[ed] subsection (f) of Rule 4:10-2,” Pereira, 475 N.J. Super. at 392-93 (quotation omitted), which provides that even for relevant information, a “party need not provide discovery of [ESI] from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,” R. 4:10-2(f).  The Supreme Court otherwise reaffirmed that relevancy remains the floor for discoverability by writing “electronically stored information” into the text of Rule 4:10-2(a).  Through that change, the Court explicitly subjected ESI to traditional discovery rules, ensuring that the “privilege and relevance limitations provided under Rule[4:10-2(a)]” would apply equally to ESI and paper discovery alike.
[brief] If defense counsel fails to object, offending remarks usually will not be deemed prejudicial.  *State v. G.S.*, 145 N.J. 460 (1996).  Other considerations include the severity of the misconduct, the context in which it occurred, the likely effect of any curative instructions, and the strength of evidence against defendant.  *United States v. Manning*, 23 F.3d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1994).  “The asserted error must be evaluated by the plain-error standard, namely whether the misconduct was so egregious in the context of the summation as a whole as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. ”  *Tilghman*, supra., 345 N.J. Super. at 575.  To warrant reversal on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, the reviewing court must determine that: (1) the prosecutor's conduct was clearly and unmistakably improper, and (2) that the improper conduct resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant’s fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense.  *State v. Engel*, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 382 (App. Div. 1991); *Williams*, supra, 113 N.J. at 452 (citing *Bucanis*, supra, 26 N.J. at 56).
[brief] Plaintiff commenced this action on August 10, 2021 which was more than three months after April 30, 2021 when she filed her bankruptcy petition and two weeks after she received her discharge.  Thus, it was not until well after she filed her petition that she (through counsel) completed the investigation of her claims.  Indeed, *Hunstein I*, which was the very first published decision endorsing the mail vendor theory of liability, was decided just nine days before Plaintiff filed her bankruptcy petition.  The claims asserted here are consistent with the disclosure made in her bankruptcy schedules.  Thus, Plaintiff disclosed what she knew at the time she filed her petition: that she potentially had FDCPA claims.  Having done so is not inconsistent with the claims she subsequently pursued particularly when that information is viewed under the R. 4:6-2(e) standard.  Furthermore, the disclosure in her bankruptcy schedules satisfied the purpose for making such disclosures: to inform the trustee and creditors of Plaintiff’s rights.