ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The mere fact that [...] signed the Employment Agreement does not mean the Restrictive Covenant contained therein is reasonable and narrowly tailored to protect [...]’s legitimate business interests.  To the contrary, as set forth in Appellant’s briefs, the Restrictive Covenant is overly broad, punitive, and designed to unlawfully stifle competition.  Pages 32 through 33 of Respondent’s brief contain perhaps the most bizarre arguments of all, which again appear to have been manufactured through thin air for the purposes of distracting this Court.  Respondent asserts that [...] is asking the Court to Blue Pencil the Restrictive Covenant by 17 miles and that [...] should not be permitted to advance new arguments that were not asserted to the trial court.  Quite frankly, the undersigned has no idea what the Respondent is talking about.
[brief] This means even if the Court finds that the Plaintiff was negligent in crossing the street, that is only relevant as a contributory negligence issue and must be decided by the jury.  N.J.S.A 59:4-3 states “A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.
[brief] An affidavit “must be made on personal knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). ”  *Sellers v. Schonfeld*, 270 N.J. Super. 424, 427 (App. Div. 1993).  “Thus, if the allegations of pleadings are to be pierced for summary judgment purposes, the affidavits in support are limited to the affiant’s personal knowledge of such facts as he is competent to testify to and as are admissible in evidence. ”  *Sellers*, at 427.  An individual “who has no knowledge of a fact except for what he has read or for what another has told him cannot provide evidence to support a favorable disposition of a summary judgment” motion.  *Sellers*, at 428; *Katsoufris v. Adamo*, 216 N.J. Super. 84, 88 (1987) (testimony from an individual that was not personally involved in the transactions at issue was insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment).  The record is devoid of any evidence of any agent, employee, or representative of [...] (or [...] or [...]) informing [...] that the $1 million insurance coverage would not bind, or that the premium would change, if [...] was planning to use 12 to 15-passenger vans.  Nor are there any sworn statements from any underwriter stating retrospectively that the policy would not have been issued but for the “misrepresentation” of fact.  [...] made clear to all the insurance professionals with whom he communicated, such as [...], that he wanted coverage for 15-passenger vans.  (Ia347; 124-125).  Because [...] failed to establish materiality and reliance, the court erred in granting summary judgment.
[brief] The Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Company v. Malec outlined its “abiding awareness of some basic principles,” including:  (1)  Whenever an insurance policy and a governing statute are in conflict, the statute controls, and the policy is automatically amended by operation of law to conform to the statutory standard.  (2)  Legislation involving automobile insurance must be construed with "liberality in effecting the broadest protection of auto accident victims consistent with the language of the pertinent statute."  (3)  Statutorily mandated coverage cannot be countered by policy provisions that are contrary to the statutory mandates or public policy.  [See Allstate Insurance Company v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 6 (1986) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[brief] An injured employee may proceed in a civil action against her employer if the injury arose from an “intentional wrong” committed by the employer.  Id.  “Intentional wrong” is a term of art that has been interpreted in a more expansive way as case law has evolved.  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 (1985) set forth a two-prong analysis for determining whether a claim satisfies the “intentional wrong” exception to the Workers’ Compensation exclusivity bar.
[brief] In pursuing a cause of action for bad faith denial of insurance coverage, an insured must show “the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim. ”  Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 604 (2015) (citing Pickett v. Lloyd's, 131 N.J. 457, 467 (1993)).  A lack of a reasonable basis can be “inferred and imputed to the insurance company where there is a reckless . . . indifference to facts or to proofs,” submitted to it.  Id. (internal quotations admitted).  In the instant matter, [...]’s counterclaim for bad faith denial of insurance coverage stems from [...]’s filing of the instant Declaratory Action, which was done with clear disregard to the rights of [...] to maintain such coverage in light of the facts and circumstances of the Underlying Action.
[brief] Notwithstanding, the trial court assessed penalties from October 24, 2022 until December 12, 2022 when the Resolution was adopted finding that the Resolution should have been adopted on October 24, 2022 (Pa31), but [...] only asked for the Resolution to be adopted at its November 28, 2022 meeting (Pa264).  Without any failure to act by the Township or Board, the penalty clause was not triggered.
[brief] •  Nine years ago [...] found a house in Florida that he wanted to rent but the owner, a personal friend, wanted to sell it, not rent it (6T12:23-25).  •  [...] could have moved elsewhere, but he wanted this particular house and it was not for rent (6T14:13-15).  •  By all accounts [...]’s memory has been declining in recent years such that he does not recall the details of this transaction (6T10:21-11:1).  •  There was no contemporaneous documentation such as emails, texts or letters that the Court could use to reconstruct what the understanding was at the time, or that might support Plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongdoing (6T13:14-18).  •  [...] testified at trial that [...] asked Johnny if he would buy the Florida property as an investment (2T36:5-12).  Johnny understood [...] to be asking him because no one else in the immediate family had the credit rating or income level necessary to secure a mortgage (1T99:3-8, 2T48:21-49:15).  •  Johnny did not have the cash for the down payment and closing costs, however, and that was when [...] offered to contribute $50,000.00 in cash (6T25:3-5).  •  Johnny was not “just a boyfriend” as Plaintiff’s brief alleges (Pb7).  The Matos family knew [...] because they lived in the same blue collar neighborhood of West New York when [...], [...] and Johnny were growing up (2T71:1-11).  •  Furthermore, at this point [...] had been living with [...] Matos for three years, and they were engaged (3T67:16-24).  •  The Court further found that at some risk to himself Johnny took out a mortgage for the Florida house which impacted his personal credit and his finances (6T19:2-6).  •  [...] was able to document to the Court’s satisfaction that all of the $50,000.00 transfer was used to pay expenses related the Florida property that [...] wanted to live in but not buy (6T13:22-23).  •  Johnny purchased the Florida property for the elderly Matos’s to live in, as requested (Pa201).  •  The Court further found that shortly thereafter when the elderly Matos’s health began to fail, it was Johnny who arranged to sell the Florida house, located an affordable condominium to buy for his in-laws to live in near his home in [...], arranged for a 1031 Exchange to roll all the equity from the Florida home into the New Jersey purchase, qualified again for a mortgage and purchased of the condominium that we are referencing here as “[...]” (6T19:2-6).  •  The Court also noted in the record that [...] owns [...] and has born the responsibility of paying the mortgage, taxes and homeowner’s association fees for six and a half years (6T:19:7-9, Pa280).  •  The Court further noted that while the taxes and homeowner’s association fees have increased over that time period, [...] has not increased the $1,500.00 monthly payment from the elderly Matos’s (6T19:8-11).  •  The Court found that because Defendants did so, “[...] and [...] have had a safe and secure place to live in and to stay” (6T25:15-16).  The Court further found that this “situation arose out of a family relationship to have Mom and Dad close by in a safe place” (6T26:15-16).
[brief] Relator’s operative complaint was based, in part, on analyses of data regarding the movement of VRDO interest rates.  The parties disputed, among other things: (1) whether the rate data Relator used was publicly disclosed in light of legal limitations on the use of the data, the technical inaccessibility of the data, and the practical unavailability of the data associated with the massive expense to acquire it; (2) whether the government-created and regulated organization from which Relator obtained the rate data was the “news media”; (3) whether Relator’s action was based upon the rate data, given the vast gap between the data and the conclusion that Defendants defrauded the State; and (4) whether Relator was an original source.  Defendants suggest the trial court mistook legal disputes for factual disputes.  In reality, significant factual disputes about the public disclosure bar properly resulted in denial of summary judgment.  This Court should affirm.
[brief] (885a – 886a;1T, 81:18 – 82:5).  While the Trial Court held that Plaintiffs misinterpreted the language and holding of [...] in the 2015 Action, it is apparent from a plain reading of [...]’s holding that it is actually the Trial Court which misinterpreted the language of [...].  The Trial Court erroneously stated:  As Comment 2.3 to the Rule explains, the preclusion of these claims in a later action due to the Entire Controversy Doctrine was a factor to be properly considered by [...] in denying the motion to file the Fourth Amended Complaint, “particularly where the assertion [of new claims] is so late as to prejudice other parties. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.3 on R. 4:9-1 (2020).  That is precisely the case here – knowing that Plaintiffs could be barred from asserting these claims in a separate action, the Court denied the motion to amend and assert these “new” causes of action.
[brief] 1.  Criterion (b) is Satisfied Upon the Simple Finding of Discontinuance of a Commercial Use.  (T3, 17:1-20)  The first phrase of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) allows for designation of a property as a redevelopment area if there has been a “discontinuance of the use of a building or buildings previously used for commercial, retail, shopping malls or plazas, office parks, manufacturing, or industrial purposes…”  Merriam Webster’s online dictionary defines “discontinuance” as “the act or an instance of discontinuing” and further defines “discontinuing” as “to break the continuity of: cease to operate … [or] use…”  See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discontinuance?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld and https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/discontinuing, last visited 10/1/2024.  There is no dispute that Plaintiff discontinued all use of the Property when the Lease expired on January 31, 2023, (Da120) which was approximately six (6) months prior to designating the Property as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area.  (Da22).  The use of the Property ceased because the LSRP needed to dig up the slab under the building to determine the extent of contamination under the building.  (T1, 13:9-23).  Even though the record established that all commercial use of the Property had ceased, the Trial Court found that the Property did not satisfy criterion (b) because the Property was not unoccupied or unutilized in a way that was detrimental to the welfare of the community.
[brief] The traditional function of the judge is to instruct the jury as to the law governing the issues to be decided by them under the facts of the particular case.  The classical practice generally followed in criminal cases is for the judge to outline the applicable law, explaining and defining the offense charged, and the jury, thus becoming informed as to the exact law which they must decide has or has not been violated, places its determination of the facts alongside the law and decides whether its verdict shall be guilty or not guilty....  To fail to define the offense attributed to the accused and the essential elements which constitute it, is to assume that jurors are educated in the law—an assumption which no one would undertake to justify.  On the contrary, the appearance of a person with legal training on the jury panel would be a rarity.  The criminal law cannot be administered justly or efficiently if the jury is allowed to speculate as to what conduct the law intended to proscribe by a specified crime.  Accordingly, we hold the view that a mandatory duty exists on the part of the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the fundamental principles of law which control the case.  Among such principles is the definition of a crime, the commission of which is basic to the prosecution against the defendant.  *[State v. Butler*, 27 N.J. 560, 594–95, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).]
[directive] Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor attempts via electronic or other means, to lure or entice a child, or a person the actor  Luring, Enticing a reasonably believes to be a child, into a motor vehicle, structure or isolated place or to meet 2C:13-6 2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000  10% permissible  Child, Attempts or appear at any other place with purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the child.  A child is defined as a person less than 18 years old.  Actor attempts, via electronic or any other means, to lure or entice a person into a motor  Luring, Enticing an vehicle, structure or isolated area, or to meet or appear at any place, with a purpose to 2C:13-7 3rd Degree  $20,000 to $50,000  10% permissible  Adult commit a criminal offense with or against the person lured or enticed or against any other person.  27  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Rather, a breach of contract action, such as this one, should proceed through the ordinary course of discovery.  Plenary hearings are required when there are “contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits. ” (Emphasis added).  See Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 322-23 (1992).  Such is the case here.  To the extent [...] argues that this action falls under the second category of permitted summary actions, which is an action that “appears to the court…that it is likely that the matter may be completely disposed of in a summary manner” [...] has not met his burden under Rule 4:67-1 which requires a motion on notice to all parties seeking such relief.  Instead, plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause in an attempt to completely circumvent the litigation process and proceed directly to judgment – all without the benefit of any discovery.  The Order to Show Cause process, particularly to resolve what is otherwise a standard contract dispute, is not a favored procedure by the New Jersey Courts.  Finally, to the extent [...] argues that this matter falls under Rule 4:83-1, such Rule does not apply to the issues at hand – i.e., enforcement and/or breach of Consent Judgment as such action does not fall under the purview of the jurisdiction of the Chancery Division, Probate Part, as will be discussed more fully in Point IV below.  Viewing all of the facts and evidential material, it is clear that this dispute should not have been decided by way of an emergent summary action; it should have proceeded in a plenary manner and [...] should have been permitted to assert his counterclaims and conduct discovery.  For these reasons, the Court’s October 13, 2023 Order entering final judgment by way of Order to Show Cause to sell the Subject Property to [...] should be reversed and this matter remanded for a plenary action with consideration of [...]’s counterclaims and the opportunity for discovery.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, *[...]* /s/ [...]  [...], Esquire [...], Esquire N.J. Attorney ID No. 327229999  [...] [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Appellant  [...], Appellant v. [...], Respondent.  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No.: [...] (Team 2)
[brief] On November 2, 2023, [...] filed a timely Request for Reconsideration, arguing that the Commission’s Decision demonstrated that material factual disputes existed that required the matter to be transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law for a fact-finding hearing.  (Aa46).  On December 18, 2023, [...] filed a Reply contending, in part, that [...]’s Request for Reconsideration was untimely filed.  (Aa50).  On December 21, 2023, [...] replied and explained that [...]’s contention was plainly false as demonstrated by documentary evidence showing timely submission and receipt by the Commission.  (Aa55).  On January 17, 2024, the [...] issued a Final Agency Determination denying [...]’s timely Request for Reconsideration (the “[...] Request Determination”).  (Aa13).  With respect to [...]’s request for a fact-finding hearing, the [...] responded that [...]’s matter did not implicate “heightened due process concerns” because [...] was not seeking to impose discipline against [...] in connection with the LOD.  (Aa17).  The [...] noted that “the Appellate Division has, in innumerable cases, found that Commission decisions, in non-discipline cases, can be determined based on the written record. ” (Aa17).  Finally, the [...] faulted [...] for not presenting “any preponderating evidence,” other than “unsupported denials of the allegations against him. ” (Aa17).  The [...] concluded that “to find that his mere denials are sufficient to find that there is a material fact in dispute that warrants a hearing would be to render N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.1(d) meaningless. ” (Aa17).  On January 17, 2024, [...] timely filed the instant appeal.
[brief] Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3 (2002) .........................................................................................23  Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Techdan, LLC, 253 N.J. 87 (2023)  .....................................................................................passim Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294 (1982)  .......................................................................................30  McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 2011)  .........................................................20
[brief] R. 1:6-2(d) states the following:  Except as otherwise provided by R. 5:5-4 (family actions), no motion shall be listed for oral argument unless a party requests oral argument in the moving papers or in timely-filed answering or reply papers, or unless the court directs.  A party requesting oral argument may, however, condition the request on the motion being contested.  If the motion involves pretrial discovery or is directly addressed to the calendar, the request shall be considered only if accompanied by a statement of reasons and shall be deemed denied unless the court otherwise advises counsel prior to the return day.  As to all other motions, the request shall be granted as of right.  In the recent matter, Delgado v. Yourman-Helbig, No. A-3633-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1266, at *14-16 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 13, 2022), the Court reinforced the importance of granting and conducting oral argument when it reversed the Trial Court.  As noted, the Appellate Division, indicated that “requests for oral argument ‘shall be granted as of right. ’"  R. 1:6-2(d).  Similarly, here, all parties requested oral argument but it was not entertained by the Trial Court.  As the Delgado Court indicated:  If the motion judge did in fact deny the request for oral argument because he deemed it frivolous, the judge should have provided a basis for its denial and placed it on the record.  See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. at 498 ("No basis is set forth in the record for a relaxation of [Rule 1:6-2(d)] and we perceive none.")  Ibid. at Pa2220.  (Opinion attached).  Here, all movants requested that the Trial Court conduct oral argument.  However, oral argument on the summary judgment motions never took place.  By not conducting oral argument, the Trial Court deprived Plaintiff with a fundamental right.  As described in more detail below, the court then compounded this error by violating another fundamental summary judgment standard when it viewed crucial disputed facts in the light most favorable to the movant rather than the Plaintiff.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s decision to grant summary judgment should be reversed on this alone.  B.
[brief] There, the trial court had granted a buyout as the only remedy for oppression it found.  It denied the oppressed shareholder’s compensatory damage claims and did not award its legal fees.  Id. at 360.  The trial court thus ordered the worse-acting shareholder (both were somewhat at fault) to sell at fair value, less a marketability discount based on the oppression.  Id. at 357.  The Appellate Division reversed, holding no discount should be permitted based on a hypothetical sale to the public where other members were the ones receiving the interest, and it had higher value to them.  Balsamides v. Perle, 313 N.J. Super. 7, 27-28 (App. Div. 1998).  The Appellate Division, also “thought it would be "neither 'fair' nor 'equitable' for the surviving shareholder to obtain the selling shareholder's interest at a discount."
[brief] Notice of Motion for an Order Granting a Final Award of Fees and Disbursements to the Administrator  [...]  [...], Esq. - Atty. ID. No. 015051980  Continental Plaza II [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  Administrator of the Non-Resident New Jersey Estate of [...], Deceased IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF BYUNG-TAE OH, DECEASED SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION: PROBATE PART BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]
[directive] ATTACHMENT NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS AND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION)  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - COUNTY INDICTMENT  NO. STATE OF NEW JERSEY - v.- NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS AND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION  RELIEF  Defendant I, , hereby certify as follows:  1.  I am the defendant in the above referenced case.  2.  I am being represented in this sentencing by------------------ and he/she has reviewed this Form with me.  3.  Appeal Rights.  I understand that: (a)  An appeal means having my case reviewed by a higher court, (b) I have a right to appeal my conviction(s) and sentence(s), (c) I have the right to be represented by counsel for that appeal, (d)  If I am unable to hire private counsel for my appeal, the Office of the Public Defender will me or arrange for my representation, and represent (e)  If I fail to file a notice of appeal with the Appellate Division within 45 days of Ieday's date, and unless I obtain a thirty-day extension of time on a showing of good cause and absence of prejudice, I will lose my right to appeal.  4.  Time Limits To File a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  I understand that I have 5 years from to file a petition for post-conviction relief, unless an exception to this general rule applies, as Ieday's date set forth in 3:22-12.  R.  I am appearing before Judge __________ , for sentencing today.  5.  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  statements made by me are  DATED:  Defendant  I have reviewed this Form with defendant and I am satisfied that he/she has been fully advised of the it describes.