ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] CONCLUSION  Defendant failed to properly plead and therefore waived the TCA defense.  Moreover, the above caselaw and the TCA’s language show that the complaint isn’t subject to the TCA.  Regardless of how a municipality sells water services, "[t]he conclusion that a contractual relationship existed between the Borough and its customers is inescapable." \(^{154}\)  As the Supreme Court explained, whether the sale of water services is a governmental or proprietary function isn’t relevant to this case:\(^{155}\) (W)e cannot agree that the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is relevant to this controversy.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 30:6D-64(2)(f).  Importantly, the foregoing statutory provision completely defeats Appellant’s argument below that Appellant was not qualified to hold her job due to her criminal record.  Under a normal after-acquired evidence analysis, a plaintiff may lose the right to pursue economic damages from the point of discovery onward, but the claim itself is not waived and damages can still be recovered.  As outlined below, the only way that a plaintiff forfeits the entire claim is if they were statutorily prohibited from holding the job at all.  Appellant’s summary judgment argument was misleading, in that it failed to even mention the pertinent statutory provision, cited above, which controls in this matter.
[brief] See N.J.R.E. 609(b).  Here, the trial court erred in determining that [...]’s prior convictions were not remote under Rule 609(b)(1).  Therefore, the court did not make any findings whatsoever regarding the relative prejudice and probative value of [...]’s convictions and it failed to consider the relevant factors set forth in Rule 609(b)(2).  The court’s decision to admit [...]’s remote prior convictions was an abuse of discretion.
[directive] Per the LAD (N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(s)), reasonable break times shall be Lactation permitted for officers after pregnancy to express milk, unless the agency demonstrates the accommodation would pose an undue hardship.  1.  Approved breaks should not be interrupted except in emergent circumstances.  2.  Per the LAD, agencies shall make available a suitable private room or other private location for lactation, other than a toilet stall, in close proximity to the work area.  D. leave.
[directive] Responsibility for Discipline  2.3.1  The successful implementation of discipline requires the law enforcement executive to delegate responsibility for the disciplinary process to individual units and supervisors within the agency, and perhaps to Human Resources.  Although the levels of authority may vary within an agency's chain of command, the failure to carry out disciplinary responsibilities at any level in that chain will contribute to the organization's ineffectiveness.  The task of clearly delineating the authority and responsibility to initiate and impose discipline is essential to the agency’s administration.
[brief] *Id.*  The trial court’s focusing on the fact that [...] did not use the legal term “substantial certainty” in his report was therefore misplaced and not a valid basis to grant summary judgment to Defendant [...].  Rather, the issue before the trial court was whether the totality of the circumstances, which included [...]’s opinion that [...] created a hazardous situation by requiring its employees to park in the distant area of the lot with no pedestrian safety measures in place, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that [...] had created a substantial certainty that one of its employees would be injured.  Since a reasonable jury could answer this question in the affirmative, summary judgment was inappropriate.  Finally, to the extent the trial court addressed the “context” prong of the *Laidlow* analysis, the trial court erred in suggesting that being required to park in a distant area of a parking lot with no pedestrian safeguards, when such safeguards are acknowledged as necessary and are provided for other areas of the same parking lot, is somehow an accepted fact of industrial employment.  See Pa11.  In contrast, the Legislature cannot have meant to normalize and immunize an employer like [...] who essentially categorizes its non-managerial employees as second-class citizens for safety purposes and requires them to park in an area of a busy lot that is bereft of the pedestrian safety mechanisms and traffic control devices that the employer knows are necessary and which it provides for its managers and administrators.  For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s erroneous order granting summary judgment to Defendant [...] should be reversed and Plaintiff’s claims against [...] should be remanded for trial.
[brief] ..................................................11, 14, 15 U.S. ex rel. Kester v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 43 F. Supp. 3d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)  ......................................................  42 U.S. ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 756 F.3d 1075 (8th Cir. 2014)  ...............................................................38, 43 U.S. ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1993).................................................................  22 U.S. ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908 (4th Cir. 2013)  ...............................................................14, 15 U.S. ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth., 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999)  ...............................................................25, 31, 37 U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 826 F.3d 466 (D. C. Cir. 2016) ............................................................. passim U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 111 (D.D.C. 2015) ....................................................... 39 U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805 (11th Cir. 2015) ............................................................... 39 U.S. ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2005) ...............................................................22, 25 U.S. ex rel. Patriarca v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ....................................................36, 43, 47 U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Bahler Med., Inc., 619 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2010) ............................................................... 14 U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2009) ............................................................... 29 U.S. ex rel. Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp., 3 F.4th 813 (6th Cir. 2021)
[brief] In a letter of that date, [...] claimed [...] agreed to arbitration on January 8, 2022, months prior to the crash, via “clickwrap” in an unspecified [...] application.\(^1\) (Da163-164).  [...]’s evidence of that acceptance is unclear, and the agreement’s terms are unenforceable under New Jersey law.  As to [...]’s weak evidence the clickwrap agreement was accepted and the events of the night in question (briefly, as the Court did not reach either side’s contentions), [...]’s June 29, 2023 letter to the undersigned states in plain terms that at Exhibit C it encloses the Checkbox Consent that “your client checked[.]” (Da162-68).  The exhibit is a phone screenshot with the checkbox activated and the time 9:41 PM visible.  (Da168).  However, this time differs from the Checkbox Consent History log also annexed to the June 29, 2023 letter and the affidavit of the [...] employee submitted in support of its motion.  (Da74; Da77-78).  That log depicts the checkbox as being clicked at 11:24 PM UTC, i.e., 7:24 PM EST.  In other words, this couldn’t possibly be the screenshot clicked by on [...]’s phone.  Perhaps recognizing the impossibility, its motion produced the very same Checkbox Consent Image as a “representation. ” (Da73-74; Da77-78).  Whether that initial \(^1\) Plaintiffs do not dispute [...]’s characterization of the pop-up as “clickwrap” as described in Skuse, et al. misrepresentation was mistake or further tactic, these contradictory representations cannot support [...]’s demand to summarily compel arbitration.
[brief] In this case, the PCR judge reviewed twenty-two (22) exhibits, the earlier appellate submissions, and briefing and argument by the parties.  Da102-03.  The law cited in [...]’s opinion was accurate and supported her conclusions.  The decision does not incorporate irrelevant or inappropriate factors, analyzes each of the parties’ arguments, properly discusses the issues, and eventually concludes that a prima facie case was not made.  Disagreement on the merits is not a demonstration of an abuse of discretion.  [...] did not abuse her discretion, and merely came to a conclusion to which the defendant objects.
[brief] The reasons articulated were sound. ”  (Pa3196 n.2)  However, both the Court’s expert and [...]’s expert testified that ‘vote’ directly charged [...] 29.5% of his adversaries’ personal legal fees through the “dollar for dollar” ‘reduction’ of his net equity interests in the company.  (See, discussion and citations supra pp. 9-11)  They both testified the majority of a $3,389,000 long term liability booked for [...] in 2015 was the Plaintiffs’ legal fee reimbursement.  (5T187:22-188-1)(7T31:3-13)(8T58:9-23)  This decision was a complete misapplication of the “business judgment rule” for several reasons and actually created another exception to the American Rule that would apply in every shareholder case through majority votes to obligate all shareholders and minority parties to reimburse the majority’s personal legal fees.
[brief] (6T133-18 to 135-9).  [...], who was uniformed and arrived in a marked patrol car, was the first to arrive, and as he approached the restaurant, he heard defendant “yelling” loudly from the inside.  (6T135-20 to 136-9).  [...] recognized defendant’s voice, which [...] had heard on the 911 call.  (6T131-22 to -25).  A large crowd of people had gathered near the vestibule of the restaurant, and it was initially difficult for [...] to determine what was going on.  (6T137-10 to -24).  Defendant approached [...].  Defendant was “very angry,” “agitated,” and explained that “was disrespected” by the restaurant.  (6T137-25 to 138-25; Da15 at 0:03:59 to 0:04:00).  To deescalate the situation, [...] calmly asked defendant to “lower his voice” and “relax” but defendant continued yelling about the service at the restaurant despite [...]’s repeated pleas.  (6T138-25 to 139-25, 140-3 to -21; Da15 at 0:04:01 to 0:04:23).  Defendant added that he was “willing to fight for his family. ” (6T139-25 to 140-1; Da15 at 0:04:34 to 0:04:37).  Defendant continued escalating the situation, and [...] warned defendant that he would be placed under arrest for disorderly conduct if he did not calm down.  (6T141-4 to -8; S-4 at 0:04:35 to 0:04:38).  Meanwhile, [...] was also pleading with defendant for him to calm down.  (6T142-12 to -19).  [...], who was uniformed, also arrived on scene in a marked patrol car.
[brief] On June 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants asserting that the Limited Attorney Exemption violates the separation of powers doctrine and Plaintiffs’ constitutionally-protected due process, and First Amendment rights.  Pa0005.  Plaintiffs are seeking an order declaring the Limited Attorney Exemption as unconstitutionally void and of no effect.  Pa0015; Pa0017; Pa0019; Pa0021.  Specifically, in the First Count Plaintiffs allege that the Limited Attorney Exemption substantially encroaches upon the New Jersey Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction and domain over the practice of law in violation of the separation of powers doctrine under the State Constitution.
[brief] 1-3 (Raised Below: T2 187 through 191; T3 310 through 319; T4 8 through 13)  II.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROVIDING AN AGGRAVATION CHARGE UNDER MODEL CIVIL CHARGE 8.11F ..............................................  3-7 (Raised Below: T2 161 through 166; T4 95 through 107; T4 125)  A.  The Court Erred in Providing an Aggravation Charge Over the Objection of the Defendant/Appellant as Plaintiff/Respondent did not Provide a Comparative Analysis Through Expert Testimony as Required by New Jersey Law ...........................................................................  3-7 (Raised Below: T2 161 through 166; T4 95 through 107; T4 125)  III.  NEW JERSEY COURT RULE 4:58-2(c)  MANDATES THAT THE ADDITIONAL AWARD OF PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS BE VACATED ........................................  7-9 (Not Raised Below)
[directive] Cases Assault Sexual and Violence 41 .... Victims Violence  Domestic on Incarceration Mandatory of Impact 4.6.1 41 ...................... Cases  Violence in Domestic Factors Special 4.6.2  4 Page Complaint- Apply Must fora Enforcement Situations Law Where 4.6.3 Protect Domestic Seek to Special Conditions and Warrant 42 ............................................ Victims Violence ................. 43 Cases Violence in Domestic 4.6.4 Notifications Special 43 ....... Victims Assault Sexual on Incarceration Mandatory of 4.6.5 Impact ................................................44 Records Expunged 4.7 44 ............................................. Cases Waiver Juvenile 4.8 45 ................................................ 4.9 Direct Indictments 45 ..................... aComplaint-Warrant for Request Prosecutor 4.9.1 Risk- Pretrial Where Automated Cases Direct-Indictment 4.9.2 45 .......................... Not Available Are Results Assessment 46 ........................ or Indictment Arrest Before Prepared Complaints 4.10 46 .............. Denied Is for aComplaint-Warrant Application When Report 4.11 47 ................. Issued Complaint-Warrant Jail After County to Transport 4.12 47 ................... Reports Investigative Available Obligation Forward to 4.13 47 .................. for Materials Police Instructional and Program Training 4.14 LAW PRELIMINARY CAUSE AND PROBABLE OF AFFIDAVITS 5. 48 .... ARREST OF TIME PREPARED AT INCIDENT REPORTS ENFORCEMENT 48 ....................
[brief] (Da466).  The trial court fashioned remedies addressing these matters.  Further, the Trustee had sought to conduct her own sealed bidding procedure for the Boonton Property.  [...] had filed an application for injunctive relief to prevent it, and the trial court issued an Order on May 27, 2022 stating it would hear oral argument on June 8, 2022, following which argument the Court would “enter an Order directing the parties on how they may proceed with the sale or transfer of the Property. ” (Da16-17).  Nor was the Plaintiff’s decision to buy the Florida Property any secret; notice of the Plaintiff’s intent to buy the Florida Property in her personal capacity had been circulated in March 2022, about three months before the Order.  (3T4:22-5:1).  The Defendants cite Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 2001) in support of their due process argument.
[brief] The debt negotiation statute authorized the Commissioner to license and regulate persons engaged in the debt negotiation business, and provided a limited attorney exemption as follows:  Attorneys who provide debt negotiation services are not exempted generally from such regulation, except those attorneys ‘admitted to the practice of law in [Connecticut] who [engage] or [offer] to engage in debt negotiation as an ancillary matter to such [attorneys'] representation of a client.  . . ’  Persels, 122 A.3d at 654 (quoting CT Gen. Stat. 36a-671c(1)).  The Court in Persels held that debt negotiation services provided by a national law firm were inextricably intertwined with the practice of law by licensed Connecticut attorneys who were regulated exclusively by the judicial branch.  Id. at 676.  Therefore, the limited attorney exemption violated the separation of powers provision of the Connecticut Constitution such that it was unenforceable as to Connecticut attorneys engaged in the practice of law.  *Id.*  The *Persels* Court further held that although the legislature could regulate Connecticut attorneys as to entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the profession of law, when the debt negotiation services were performed by Connecticut attorneys within the context of an attorney-client relationship, it constituted the actual practice of law and remained the sole province of the judicial branch.  *Id.*  Integral to the Court’s holding in *Persels* was the finding that:  [s]ubjecting Connecticut licensed debt negotiation attorneys…to the licensing and regulatory requirements imposed by the debt negotiation statutes would[] improperly: (1) give the Banking Commissioner the authority to determine which attorneys in Connecticut have the ‘character, reputation, integrity and general fitness’ to provide debt negotiation services in conjunction with their practice of law, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-671(d)(1); (2) require that Connecticut attorneys obtain additional licenses from and pay hefty licensing fees to agencies outside the Judicial Branch in order to offer traditional legal services; and (3) impinge on the Judicial Branch's exclusive authority to suspend or disbar attorneys who have engaged in professional misconduct.  *Id.* at 670-71.  Here, the reasoning of the *Persels* Court is persuasive and equally applicable to New Jersey attorneys.  The NJDACCA unduly permits [...] and the Commissioner to interfere with the Supreme Court’s regulation of the practice of law.  The licensing and regulatory requirements imposed on attorneys by the NJDACCA is not authorized by the Supreme Court and is therefore unconstitutional.  Accordingly, the [...] respectfully urges this Court to hold that the Limited Attorney Exemption is unconstitutional as applied to New Jersey attorneys.  CONCLUSION
[brief] **The Property.**  The Property is located at [...] in [...].  In 2010, [...] received a tenant-in-common ownership in the Property as a charitable donation from [...].  (Da063).  At the time [...] acquired its ownership interest in the Property, the remaining ownership was held by [...] (the “Share”).  (Da063).  Because the Share was owned by [...], [...] was unable to obtain a property tax exemption from the [...] (“Boonton”) and carried the sole burden of paying the annual taxes of approximately $16,000. C.  **The Timeline of the Breach.
[brief] Appellant argues that the Trial Judge should have concluded that the buyer and seller had an ongoing business relationship for years and had exchanged many texts back-and-forth inquiring into possible transactions and deals, so as to nullify the “arms-length” transaction conclusion.  But even if the Trial Court concluded that the buyer and seller had a significant, ongoing and friendly business relationship with many past transactions (not true), such conclusion would not have changed the outcome of the Trial Court’s conclusion as to the legitimacy of service of process more than 6 months before the buyer contracted with seller and then acquired the property.  The question before the Trial Court had nothing to do with what happened after the foreclosure was completed and when the property was sold; but the sole question was whether the foreclosure itself was properly initiated with legal service of process upon the Defendants – long before [...] received its Final Judgment, acquired title and then sold the property to the third party buyer [...].
[brief] Plaintiff could not choose to both receive back its deposit by terminating the PSA and then later seek specific performance of the PSA.  Those are inconsistent remedies that cannot be exercised at the same time.  Where a contract contains two inconsistent options, a party cannot exercise both of them.  See Lizak v. Rottenbucher, 140 N.J. Eq. 76, 81 (Ch. Div. 1947) (holding that this “principle supports the reasonable, entirely just, and pragmatical regulation that a party, in search of legal redress, shall not be at liberty to assume irreconcilable and repugnant positions”); Bankers’ Tr. Co. v. Greims, 115 N.J. Eq. 102, 108 (Ch.
[brief] The vast majority of the County’s Respondent’s Brief makes the very same arguments raised by [...] in support of its Appeal.  As set forth at length above, these arguments should be rejected because: (i) the Notice of Classification is non-mandatory; (ii) [...]’s trivial omission of the Notice of Classification from its bid is non-material and waivable; and (iii) the County’s failure to waive [...]’s immaterial omission of the Notice of Classification was improper because it deprived the taxpayers of thousands of dollars in savings without a sound business reason for doing so.
[brief] Indeed, the WPL finds that any agreement or attempt to avoid paying earned wages shall “be null and void. ”  See N.J.S.A.  Earned wages are protected by New Jersey law and must not be unduly impacted by vague provisions of the MSRA.  The MSRA does not permit Defendants to deprive the promoted officers the fruits of their labor.  The Trial Court’s March 4, 2024 Order must, therefore, be reversed as all causes of action are more than sufficiently plead in the Complaint.
[directive] 1.1  Encounters with barricaded individuals present law enforcement officers with some of the most challenging scenarios they are forced to manage.  These encounters frequently involve armed individuals, often incapable or unwilling to engage in rational discourse and behavior.  Some of these encounters involve criminal suspects who seek to evade justice by refusing to recognize the legal authority of police officers to take them into custody.  However, many encounters involve barricaded individuals who are dealing with behavioral or mental health Section 2.7 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force (UOF) Policy.  crises as described in  The primary purpose of this addendum to the Use of Force Policy is to increase the likelihood of resolving incidents without death or serious bodily injury to anyone, including third parties, law enforcement officers, and the barricaded individual, by ensuring that best practices are utilized during law enforcement responses to situations involving barricaded individuals.
[brief] The presence of documentary, evidentiary material illustrating material issues in dispute required that the case be decided by the trier-of-fact.  The Court took a similar position on the issue of retaliation and what the record presented and then determined that there was no support for the cause of action of retaliation in the record.  The details set forth above regarding [...]’s use of the racial slur are noted in detail.  Appellant as well as [...] engaged in protected activity by reporting the use of the racial slur nigger by Ms. [...] to [...] of Human Resources in the second incident in May of 2019.  Marni [...] was the Superintendent of Human Resources.  On May 2, 2019, some students approached Appellant and [...] along with a teacher, [...].  With [...] being present, they discussed the fact that Ms. [...] had used the racial slur in class.  Appellant and [...] presented this information to Marnie [...] including an email/letter and the audio-video recording.  Ms. [...] then provided this information to [...].  Two days later, both Appellant and [...] received notices that their contract would not be renewed for the next school year.  This evidence supported the cause of action, yet, the Trial Court weighed the evidence and discounted the retaliatory behavior and adopted the Defendants’ position that the non-renewal was based on performance despite the fact that the record is absent any documentation of performance issues or counseling.