ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After my retirement on February 1, 2022, I was first notified by the [...] in letters dated July 19, 2022 and July 22, 2022 that a post-retirement audit had reduced my retirement benefits due to a decrease in my service credit from 121 months (10 years and 1 month) to 118 months (9 years and 10 months).  Pa42 to Pa43.  Before being so notified by the [...], I did not know that there was a distinction between service time and service credit.  As a lay person, how was I supposed to know of such a technical distinction?  e)  **Record on appeal. **  This reply letter brief has focused on the numerous factual statements by respondent that are either not accurate or misrepresentations.  I requested that the Board schedule an administrative hearing to make a proper record if there was an appeal in this case, but the Board refused my request for an administrative hearing, mistakenly finding that there were no “disputed questions of fact.
[brief] Ibid.  Accord  *Gandhi*, 201 N.J. at 196; *State v. Reese*, 267 N.J. Super. 278, 287 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 563 (1993).  Here, defendant is hard pressed to argue plain error with his belated arguments finding fault with the trial court’s instructions and the verdict sheet.
[brief] ” (11T41-19 to 42-11; 11T130-21 to 131-3).  Initially, [...] thought his destination was New York, not New Jersey.  (11T43-20 to 44-5).  [...] waited a couple of days before embarking upon the trip because he could not find anyone other than his girlfriend, [...] (“[...]”), to drive with him.  (11T42-19 to 43-5).  [...] regularly contacted defendant to let him know “everything was good. ” (11T43-6 to 11; 11T51-24 to 52-2).  On February 28, 2017, at approximately 7:15 a.m., Illinois State Trooper [...] (“[...]”) stopped [...] as she drove the Ford pick-up truck on I-80.
[directive] Local stationhouse adjustment policies may be modified to account for the availability of local resources and community service opportunities, but all law enforcement agencies having patrol jurisdiction must implement the minimum stationhouse adjustment process described herein regardless of the availability of such resources.  As set forth in the “Quarterly Reports” section of these guidelines, these guidelines require the submission to each County Prosecutor’s Office of aggregate data regarding stationhouse adjustments in quarterly reports.  This information is not contained in UCR reports.  If the County Prosecutor finds that stationhouse adjustments are not being conducted by a particular law enforcement agency, the Prosecutor or his or her designee shall, after consultation
[directive] 2  The original POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 form was prepared in an American English version, and in an official Spanish translation from the American English version.  Both versions have been modified under this DIRECTIVE.  Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-1 Page 3 4.  Under the provisions of P.L. 2001, c. 69, §1, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, (John’s Law), Guidelines for the use of the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  Form, are established pursuant to this DIRECTIVE.
[brief] Defendant’s sole argument in this motion is that the police trespassed upon his driveway to install the warrant-authorized GPS.  (Db8-11).  In support of that argument, defendant cites Jones, Jardines, Collins, and State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456 (2015).  (Db8-11).  Unlike the present matter, all of these cases pertain to warrantless intrusions.
[brief] Thereafter, the parties moved to sentencing.  For Count one – first-degree murder – [...] sentenced defendant to life in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA).  As to Count Two – second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (for the 38 caliber revolver used in the murder), defendant was sentenced to a term of 10 years, with a five-year parole indelibility, to run concurrent to Count One.  For Count Three, unlawful possession of a weapon (the same handgun used in the murder), defendant was sentenced to a term of 10 years, also with a five-year parole ineligibility and concurrent to Count One.  With respect to Count Four, second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (the 40 caliber Taurus handgun recovered in the trunk of defendant’s car), defendant was sentenced to 10 years, with a five-year parole ineligibility, to run consecutive to the sentences imposed on Counts One, Two, and Three.  On Count Five, third-degree endangering (victim [...]), defendant was sentenced to four years flat; and for Count Six – third-degree endangering (victim [...] – the child), another four-year flat term – both to run concurrent to Count One.  (11T:61-25 to 64-24).  On December 5, 2022, defendant filed the instant appeal.
[brief] She told [...] that she was not looking “for something like that with him,” and while [...] was initially understanding, about a year before the incident, he became more persistent about a romantic relationship.  (6T 125-10 to 126-23)  He wanted to spend more time with [...] alone, was more physically affectionate, and would show up at [...]’s home if she did not answer his phone calls.  (6T 125-17 to 126-3)  [...] testified that on September 27, 2021, she bumped into [...] in Newark, and he offered to give her a ride to her friend’s house.
[brief] Thank you for the Court’s consideration in this matter.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff [...]  By /s [...], Esq.  Dated: 7/18/2024  JACQUELINE DECARLO, ESQ.  CAROL MORRIS STAHLBERG, Executrix for the ESTATE OF [...] and CAROL MORRIS STAHLBERG, Individually, Plaintiffs/Respondents, v. [...], [...], and [...], Defendants/Appellants.
[directive] 3.  All Prosecutors shall review any motor vehicle complaint or summons pending in their respective Courts in which the complaint or summons was issued to the operator of a motor vehicle charging the operator with a violation of 39:3- N.J.S.A. where the violation was the result of the motor vehicle having been equipped 33, with an exterior mounted E-ZPass tag on the front license plate of the motor vehicle.  If, upon review, a Prosecutor determines that, consistent with this DIRECTIVE, the prosecution of the complaint or summons for the violation would not be in the interest of justice, the Prosecutor may, in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, move the dismissal of the summons under 7:8-5 or R.  R. 3:25-1.
[brief] In doing so, several federal courts have expressly cast doubt on the merit of letter vendor claims, even while grounding their dismissal in Article III standing.  *In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases*, 59-62 (bemoaning the use and abuse of the FDCPA lawsuits which manipulate the law for improper and non-salutary purposes and citing cases); *Cavazzini v. MRS Associates*, 574 F. Supp. 3d at 142; *Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., Inc.*, at 759; *Quaglia v. NS193, LLC*, 2021 WL 7179621, *3; Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC*, 2022 WL 168222, *5.  As such, it cannot be said that there is a meaningful “consensus” of federal case law upholding the merits of letter vendor claims.  Second, even assuming there was a genuine and effective consensus on the law from all federal courts on this matter (which there is not), as Appellant concedes, such decisions are simply not binding upon this Court.
[brief] (Pa28-29).  Whether [...]'s actions constituted "'an independent course of conduct' outside the scope of his employment, see Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 cmt. c, or whether his actions were unexpectable by [...] under the circumstances," was a jury question.  (Pa30).  This Court also reversed [...]'s decision to grant [...] summary judgment.  (Pa30-31).  As for the judge's finding that [...] had no duty to not assault customers, the Court stated that "at a minimum a store employee has an obligation not to assault the store's customers."  (Pa31, n.8).  **INTERREGNUM**
[brief] By: /s [...]  [...]  On the Brief:  [...] 31  Henderson, cited by the Wilfs, is inapposite as it involved application of the Municipal and County Authorities Law, which this Court held to permit only simple interest.  The District Court’s decision in Int’l Transp. Mgmt. Corp is also inapposite, as same involved nothing more than a contract claim for indemnification.  [...], [...] and [...], AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents, -against- [...] and the ESTATE OF [...], deceased, individually and as partners in the partnership known as [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], a partnership; and [...], a partnership, Defendants-Appellants, -and- [...]; and [...] (a/k/a [...]), Defendants.
[brief] ”  (2T 61-2 to 16)  However, he maintained that he was communicating with [...] – not [...] – about whether the store they had just robbed had any surveillance cameras.  (2T 61-13 to 16)  With respect to December 27th, 2011, text messages between [...] and the 2078 number, [...] claimed that those text messages were between him and [...].
[brief] New Jersey's probate law recognizes the general authority of the Chancery Division, Probate Part, over “all controversies respecting wills, trusts and estates, and full authority over the accounts of fiduciaries, and also authority over all other matters and things as are submitted to its determination under [Title 3B].”  See Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N. J. Super. 231, 241 (App. Div. 2007); see also N.J.S.A. 3B:2-2; N.J.S.A. 3B:2-3 (jurisdiction of Superior Court over surrogate's proceedings).  The Chancery Division, Probate Part specifically designates the manner in which challenges to a will shall be instituted.  See N.J.S.A. 3B:2-4 (directing commencement by order to show cause).  Under Rule 4:83, the Court has jurisdiction to, among other things, “settle questions that concern or touch on a decedent’s estate. ”  See In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 301 (2008).  The issues before the Court on [...]’s Order to Show Cause, do not touch upon or concern the Estate of [...] nor any property within the [...] Estate nor do the issues concern any challenges to [...]’s will.  Rather, the Order to Show cause proceeding dealt exclusively with [...]’s attempt to circumvent the provisions of a Consent Judgment that, as admitted by [...] himself, deals with property that was not a part of [...]’s Estate.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED**  1.  Did the Trial Court err when it held that [...] was not damaged by the [...]’s breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty they owed [...] and which caused [...] to pay $1,500,050.55 for Property that [...] could have otherwise purchased for $250,000?  2.  Did the Trial Court err by finding that [...] did not incur any damages by transferring the Property to another Muslim charitable organization after purchasing [...]’s Share?  3.  Did the Trial Court err when it refused to hold [...] responsible for one-half of the cost of capital improvements made by [...] to the Property, even though those capital improvements made to the sanctuary which is at the very heart of this case and a reason why [...] was able to sell the Share it purchased for $250,000 to [...] for $1,500,050.55?  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] Law enforcement agency includes all law enforcement agencies created by the governing municipal body and promulgated 3 by statute, including municipal police departments, county law enforcement agencies, state law enforcement agencies, and part-time municipal police.  Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2011-1.  4 N.J.S.A. 52:4B-60.1, et seq.  5  Revision to prior Attorney General Directive No. 2011-1 (2014) and the Standards required Hold kits be secured for a minimum of five (5) years from the date of the examination where the victim is an adult, and not less than five (5) years after the victim reaches the age of 18, where the victim is a minor.  That time period was extended by the March 2023 Directive to twenty (20) years and is consistent with the federal Survivors’ Bill of Rights of 2016.6  Unreported, or Hold kits, shall be secured for a minimum of twenty (20) years from the date of the examination where the victim is an adult, and a minimum of twenty (20) years after the victim reaches the age of 18, where the victim is a minor at the time of the incident.  The County Prosecutors must ensure the SAFE/DFSA kits collected for incidents within their jurisdiction are stored in compliance with the requirements in section III.B. below.
[brief] Ibid.  (quoting [...] et. al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, §41, at 269 (5th ed. 1984)(emphasis added)).  Consistent with this principle, the Court explained the purpose of the first prong of the increased risk test requires the jury "to verify, as a matter of reasonable medical probability, that the deviation ... increased the risk of harm from the pre-existing condition."  Id. at 285 (quoting Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 108-109) (emphasis added).  Only after Plaintiff satisfies this burden can the case go to the jury to determine whether the increased risk was a substantial factor in causing the ultimate harm.  Id. at 282-283.  See also Flood v. Aluri-Vallabhaneni, 431 N.J. Super. 365, 375 (App. Div. 2013).  This is where Plaintiffs’ case fails as a matter of law.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ failure to disclose to the Court at oral argument, on January 24, 2020 and February 14, 2020, that they had retained [...] in or about April 2017 and again in January 2019 to investigate [...]’s alleged accident and as a result of [...]’s investigation plaintiffs knew or should have known, as of March 16, 2017, April 7, 2017 and July 1, 2017 and January 29, 2019, (i) the location of where [...] allegedly slipped and fell; (ii) the mechanism of injury that allegedly caused him to fall; and (iii) the identity of the party or parties allegedly responsible for causing his alleged damages.  [Pa436-Pa447; Pa687 (Calderin Deposition) at 37:12-25 and Pa688 at 38:1-11 and at 40:23-25 and at 41:1-11; and Pa691-Pa703; and Pa704-Pa719 and Pa686 (Calderin Deposition) at 18:21-23, and Pa689 at 57:18-25 and Pa690 at 58:1-4; and Pa730; and Pa691-Pa703 and Pa704-Pa719 and Pa729-Pa732], directly resulted in the Court erroneously denying [...]’s motion to dismiss in lieu of filing an answer on the ground that plaintiffs failed to file an action against [...] within the applicable statute of limitations.  [2T and Pa7-Pa9].
[brief] | Name | Date of Service | |-------------------------------|-----------------| | Trial Court Judge | [...], JSC | 08/02/2023 | | Trial Court Division Manager | BERGEN | 08/02/2023 | | Tax Court Administrator | | | State Agency | | | Attorney General or Attorney for other Governmental body pursuant to R. 2:5-1(b) | | |  Other parties in this action: | | | Name and Designation | Attorney Name, Address and Telephone No. | Date of Service | | [...] | [...], Esq. | 08/02/2023 | | | [...] | | | [...] | | | [...] | | | [...] | | | [...] | | | [...]; | | | [...]; | | | [...] |  Attached transcript request form has been served where applicable on the following:  | Name | Date of Service | |-------------------------------|-----------------| | APPELLATE  TRANSCRIPT OFFICE | 08/02/2023 |  Clerk of the Tax Court State Agency  Exempt from submitting the transcript request form due to the following:
[brief] In re PSE&G Shareholder Litigation, supra, 173 N.J. at 277.  The entire fairness standard must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that absent such proof the transaction under scrutiny cannot receive the commendation of a Court of Equity.  Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., supra, 43 N.J. Super. at 94 (citing Robotham v. Prudential Insurance Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 712, 53 A. 842 (Ch. 1903)).
[brief] Relying on two antiquated cases (Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119 (1953) and Cabakov v. Thatcher, 27 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 1953), plaintiff argues that a two-year statute of limitations for malicious prosecution actions is “contrary to decades of settled law holding that the claim carries a six-year statute of limitations. ” (Pb, Point I).  As [...] accurately pointed out, however, in his February 15, 2023 Opinion in this case:  [Plaintiff] points to two very old cases, Cabakov versus Thatcher, 27 N.J. Super. 404 at 409 (Appellate Division, 1953) and Earl versus Winne, 14 N.J. 119 at 132 (1953) for the proposition that there’s a six-year statute of limitations.  That’s clearly not correct given the clear findings of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  (Aa79) (emphasis added).  POINT IV
[brief] (4T:60-17 to 61-14, 88-4 to 90-15) (Da 97-98)  During his resentencing, [...] took the stand, telling the court and the victim’s family that his act of shouting out to his codefendants made him “just as responsible” for the victim’s death as if he had been one of the shooters, and apologizing directly to the victim’s family– telling them “[n]ot a day goes by that I don’t think about your son. ”  (4T:88-22 to 89-16)  When the victim’s mother took the stand, she directly addressed [...] in turn, telling him that she appreciated and “accept[ed] [his] apology through God. ” (4T:91-16 to 19).  Not only did the resentencing court fail to find that [...]’s evidently genuine expression of remorse demonstrated his rehabilitation and growth since his 2015 sentencing, but it inexplicably adopted the 2015 sentencing court’s finding and weighing of aggravating factor three – which was largely based on [...] not accepting responsibility in his 2015 presentence interview.
[brief] Counsel for Appellant  Dated: September 12, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], Defendant-Respondent  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM  The Final Judgment of Divorce entered by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, under Docket No. [...] SAT  BELOW  Hon. [...], J.S.C. Ocean County  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
[brief] [...]’s testimony continues on April 25, 2023 (7T).  He concedes that land with water over top of it can be purchased freely and assigned and that they are part of a Riparian Grant (7T58:15-24).  [...] believes the Riparian Grant was transferred from [...] to [...], even though it is not specifically mentioned by metes and bounds within the conveyance documents:  “Yes, that is correct, it acquires the fee title to the adjacent lands under water from the State of New Jersey by way of a grant, and such waters under water comprise and form what is known as Lot 3.01.  I agree. ” (7T62:10)  The next conveyance is [...] to [...] on April 6, 1920 (7T62:16).  He admits that when one receives a Riparian Grant, they are acquiring title to the land which is under tidally flowed water (7T73:19).  When asked if someone acquires a Riparian Right, does he also acquire title to land which is lying beneath the water, [...] indicates he needs time to “think about it” (7T74:6).  Finally, the Court asks, “are you still thinking or is it your testimony that sitting here today you have no opinion on the question?”  Mr. [...] responds: “Sitting here today, I have no opinion on the question” (7T75:7).
[brief] 1T: 49:1-13.  [...] was a member of the TEAMS unit that made initial entry in the execution of the search warrant at [...].  1T: 75:22-76:2; 78:25-79:9.  Upon making entry, the TEAMS unit encountered a staircase that went straight to a second-floor apartment that had three occupants and a kitchen.  1T: 82:16-18; 91:6-24; Da049; Da.050.  The kitchen had a door, which was closed but not locked, that led to a downward staircase.  1T: 87:24-88:24.  When the TEAMS unit went down the stairs, they found a door leading to another area that was locked and assumed it went into [...].  1T: 100:18-22; 101:3-9; Da051.  Across from the kitchen door was another door that contained a staircase that continued up to the third floor where there was a small kitchen which Appellant’s room and a second bedroom adjoined.  1T: 90:1-91:5.  The doored staircase leading from the second to the third floor was on the opposite side (right side) of the dwelling from the front door for [...].  1T: 98:19-22.  [...] testified that the interior front door did not contain a lock.  1T: 103:8-15.  [...] further testified that the door was either closed but unlocked or opened and there was no need to breach the door and if they did breach the door, they would have needed permission because they questioned whether the third-floor was covered by the search warrant.  1T: 104:4-22; 2T: 12:24-13:19; 57:13-17; Da052.  After the tactical team deemed the premise safe [...] entered the dwelling through the left door marked [...].
[brief] ”  *Vill. of S. Orange v. Alden Corp.*, 71 N.J. 362, 368 (1976)(holding that in a hypothetical transaction involving a commercial property in a suburban business district, one such consideration on value would be the nearby availability of parking facilities.)  [...]’ own expert, [...], admitted to this very concept in his cross-examination, agreeing with the Township that the accepted definition of “market value” makes no reference to fee simple or lease fee.
[brief] The Department’s disagreement with [...]’s submission is sound and carries with it a strong presumption of reasonableness and deference.  City of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980).  The presumption arises where, as here, the agency is exercising its statutorily delegated responsibility.  See In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996) (noting the deferential review standard is consistent with the Judiciary’s “limited role . . . in reviewing the actions of other branches of government”); see also In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007); see In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357, 390 (2020) (“Wide discretion is afforded to administrative decisions because of an agency’s specialized knowledge”).  As the administrative agency designated to enforce the public policies underlying the LTCI Act, the Department’s decision making is entitled to substantial deference.
[brief] Da37.  This finding is clearly erroneous, as the following is the allegation in [...]’s Amended Answer:  *The three policies that [...] issued to [...] from June, I,2007 - June 1, 2010 contain an exception to the modified mold exclusions in those policies when injury is the result of “any fungi or bacteria that are, are on, or are contained in, an edible good or edible product intended for human… consumption”; therefore, the mold exclusions in those policies do not bar Larry [...]’s claims for bodily and mental injury resulting from his consumption of edible food that was contaminated by mold spores released by the extensive toxic mold contamination in his condominium.*
[brief] Further, the contractual impairment is unreasonable because the problem sought to be resolved by the impairment of Plaintiffs’ contract rights existed at the time the contractual obligation was incurred.  *United Steel Paper*, 842 F. 3d at 213.  The State installed a monitor to supervise [...] prior to the negotiation of the most recent CNA which contained provisions for terminal leave with pay.  (92a); (416a-417a).  There are facts that directly contradict Defendants' assertions that the elimination of Plaintiffs' terminal leave pay was a reasonable use of State power to stabilize the finances of [...].