ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa259.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, [...] underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa259.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.  Pa259.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa111.  Despite not receiving notice, Licameli attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa113.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa113.  In response to his filing, Licameli received correspondence from the [...] requesting medical information.  Pa115.  Licameli contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa115.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.  Pa28.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the [...].  Pa28.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa70-265.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that Plaintiff Failed to Comply with the R. 4:5-1 Disclosure Requirement  In Violation of the Entire Controversy Doctrine  Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) states, in pertinent part:  Each party shall include with the first pleading a certification as to whether the matter in controversy is the subject of any other action pending in any court or of a pending arbitration proceeding, or whether any other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated; and, if so, the certification shall identify such actions and all parties thereto.  Further, each party shall disclose in the certification the names of any non-party who should be joined in the action pursuant to R. 4:28 or who is subject to joinder pursuant to R. 4:29-1(b) because of potential liability to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts.  Each party shall have a continuing obligation during the course of the litigation to file and serve on all other parties and with the court an amended certification if there is a change in the facts stated in the original certification.  The court may require notice of the action to be given to any non-party whose name is disclosed in accordance with this rule or may compel joinder pursuant to R. 4:29-1(b).  (emphasis added)  Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) has codified the Entire Controversy Doctrine which promotes the principle that a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in one court where parties present all of their claims and defenses.  Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 227 (2020); Wadeer v N.J. Mfrs. Ins.  Co., 220 N.J. 591, 605 (2015); Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019) (quoting Cogdell ex rel. Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 15 (1989).  The doctrine "seeks to impel litigants to consolidate their claims arising from a 'single controversy whenever possible.'"  Thornton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1, 5 (1983).
[brief] But this was not the complaint the Appellant brought and should therefore be consigned to whatever place courts consign imaginary arguments of this kind.  All that said, it is not unreasonable to ask: “For God’s sake, we’re talking about three damned feet of façade.  What difference does it make?”  Appellant would respond by first citing the “Broken Windows” Theory of Crime.  If the Law is not taken seriously in small matters, there is a marked tendency for the Law to be taken less seriously in progressively larger matters.  As Appellant pointed out in the preliminary remarks to his Appellate Brief, this kind of erosion can culminate in truly terrible outcomes, such as the failure to construct hundreds – and, most likely – thousands of affordable housing units homes in a single municipality (Ab 10).  If developers can ignore some height limitations because the Court does not enforce the Law, what limitations will it choose to ignore next?  Better to fix the problem while it – and the harm it causes – remains small.  As the late United States Senator, [...], pointed out, our society seems to be engaged in an unfortunate process of “dumbing deviancy down”.  Appellant would argue that ignoring this fairly clear-cut violation of law by coming up with some not particularly well-argued rationalization for a why limitation is not really a limitation and a why a violation of law is not really a violation of law is an example of precisely the “dumbing deviancy down” process described by Senator Moynihan.
[brief] In *Oppedisano*, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered from complex regional pain syndrome as a result of the motor vehicle accident at issue.  *Oppedisano*, supra, 2012 WL 2360125 at *1.  At the time of trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of injuries the plaintiff sustained in a subsequent accident to attack her credibility as to the injuries she claimed to have sustained in the accident at issue.  The plaintiff moved to strike any reference to plaintiff's subsequent accident on the basis of the lack of expert testimony linking the subsequent accident and plaintiff's condition.  *Id.* at *6-7.  The trial court granted the motion and barred the evidence and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding:  In this case, the trial judge held the evidence of the 2007 accident, absent expert testimony *linking it to plaintiff's injuries*, required exclusion because the prejudicial impact of such evidence would substantially outweigh its probative value.  We agree.  *Id.* at *7-8* (emphasis added).  Similarly, in *Lintao*, the evidence at issue was sought to be introduced by the defendant on the issue of medical causation.  The defendant sought to present evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical problems, including scoliosis, pelvic inflammatory disease, laparoscopic procedures, and other conditions.  The plaintiff opposed the introduction of this evidence of plaintiff's prior conditions because defendants failed to present any expert testimony establishing that the pre-existing conditions had any role whatsoever in causing or exacerbating the injuries for which plaintiff sought compensation.  *Lintao*, supra, 2011 WL 2935052 at *3.  In affirming the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, the Appellate Division held:  Thus, “[a] party seeking to present evidence of a prior injury or condition relating to an issue of medical causation must show that the evidence has some ‘logical relationship to the issue in the case. ’”  “[T]his logical relationship must be established by appropriate expert medical opinion. ”  *Id.* (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  In the present action, unlike *Allendorf*, *Oppedisano* or *Lintao*, the defendant did not attempt to establish that the plaintiff’s accident-related injuries were not caused by the fall or that her injuries were pre-existing.
[brief] Though reopening cases can be useful in hasty settlement decisions, Rule 4-50(1) is used “sparingly. ”  Zuba states “the Rule does allow for relief where the facts and equities compel it, particularly in contexts involving the equitable distribution of marital assets. ”  In New Jersey, the law clearly promotes settlements, which is usually memorialized in writing in a property settlement agreement that is prepared by an attorney once a divorce agreement has been achieved.  However, there are times that a divorce agreement can be set aside, by way of a post-judgment motion, by a lawyer, or by a judge of the Family Part of the Superior Court of New Jersey.  Following is a legal analysis of this issue as it pertains to both a lack of financial disclosure, ambiguous language in the property settlement agreement and cases wherein no lawyers were involved.
[brief] Plaintiff’s contention that the trial court “erred when it declined to consider Plaintiff’s expert testimony” on the question of spot zoning is without merit.  Pb42.  In pertinent part, the trial court stated:  [...] has provided a report by [...], a professional planner, in which [...] provides the opinion that the redevelopment plan amendments challenged by [...] constitute spot zoning.  **The court has reviewed [...]’s opinion**, but the determination of whether the amendments to the redevelopment plan constitute spot zoning is essentially a determination to be made by the court, based upon applicable New Jersey law and the facts presented here.
[brief] [...]  [...], Esq. Atty. ID#038131999  [...]  Tel. [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Authorities…………………………………………………………………………………i-ii  Table of Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………..iii  Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts………………………………………1 Standard Review…………………………………………………………………………………..7  Legal Argument…………………………………………………………………………………..9  I.  THE BOARD’S DECISION THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED……………………………………….9  Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………22
[brief] The Board conceded that Petitioner meets the definition of an employee and there was no limitation on the strength of this Factor as there were with most of the independent contractor findings.  (Pa15)  The Board’s entire decision rests on the [...] Report which is the only report submitted in this case.  (T110-23).  Despite the Pandemic and the change in many workplace issues, [...] did not update her report.  (T112-20)  [...] had no specific training on the “IRS 20 Factor Test” as it pertains to a municipal prosecutor in the State of New Jersey.  (T113-14)  [...] and a co-worker only did one set of interviews on January 15, 2019, for her report.  (T113-19)  [...] admitted that the notes from those interviews were destroyed.  (T114-17)  [...] conceded that she did not actually interview the Petitioner in performing her investigation.  (T114-19)  [...] also admitted that she did not interview any of the Municipal Court personnel in [...] in the performance of her investigation.  (T115-4)  [...] conceded that she did not interview anyone in the Police Records Department in performing her investigation.  (T115-16)  [...] admitted that she did not interview the Municipal Court Judge in performing her investigation.  (T115-19)  [...] testified that she did not interview any bailiffs that work in the Municipal Court in the performance of her investigation.  (T115-21)  [...] testified that she did not interview any of the liaison officers in the Municipal Court in the performance of her investigation.  (T115-24)  [...] does not know what a liaison officer is.  (T116-2)  [...] testified that she did not do a comparative 20 Factor analysis between the period of 2003 to 2008 when Petitioner was enrolled in PERS versus the period from 2015 to the present, which is at issue in this case.  (T116-8)  [...] testified that she does not have firsthand knowledge of Petitioner’s municipal court prosecutorial services to [...].  (T116-22)  [...] also conceded that Petitioner would be in a better position to know her municipal court services than she or any other investigators in this case.  (T117-3)  [...] conceded the Petitioner was not appointed under the No Bid Professional Services Language of the Local Public Contracts Law between 2015 to the present.  (T120-17)  [...] also conceded that the position of municipal prosecutor was not subject to the RFP process from 2015 to the present.  (T120-22)  [...] also conceded that the Petitioner did not operate under a Professional Services Agreement from 2015 to the present.  (T121-1)  [...] conceded that Petitioner was paid a salary set by the salary ordinance and through the Township’s employee payroll system and received W-2s at the end of each year from 2015 to the present.  (T121-5)  [...], the Township CFO and Supervisor of the Certifying Pension Officer was called by the Board as a witness on its behalf at the time of the OAL hearing.
[brief] In so holding, the Court relied upon the following facts: (1) the defendant parked his vehicle in a high drug area; (2) the codefendant entered defendant’s vehicle, remained for a short time, then exited carrying a paper bag she had not possessed when she entered the vehicle; (3) the defendant immediately drove off after the codefendant existed the vehicle; (4) paper bags are often used to transport drugs; and (5) the codefendant tried to conceal the bag that she obtained from the defendant.
[brief] Since the 1920s, all Normandy Beach beachfront homeowners, including the [...]’ successors in title,\(^4\) crossed over the [...] to access the Atlantic Ocean as a claim of right.  (Da2092-Da2093; Da1035; Da1231).  Beachfront homeowners had direct footpath beach access over the [...] until 2019 when Defendants first tried to take it away.  (Da1035; Da1231; Da2092-Da2093; Pa311-Pa312; Pa328-Pa329).  The [...] acquired the Premises in December 2000.  (Da406-Da409).  Their deed, like those of all their predecessors, references the 1925 Plan.  (Da407).  Since taking ownership of the Premises, the [...] used the right of access to the water by walking across the [...], without complaint, interference, or obstruction by Defendants.  (Da2366; Da2374; Da2394-Da2395).  \(^4\)  This Court may take judicial notice that five beachfront homeowners in Normandy Beach currently have cases pending in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Ocean County, where the trial court has granted partial summary judgment and held the homeowners possess an implied easement to cross the [...] to directly access the high-water line.  Langenfeld v. Normandy Beach Assoc., [...]; Estate of Corrigan v. Normandy Beach Assoc., [...]; O’Keefe v. Normandy Beach Assoc., [...]; Rodman v. Normandy Beach Improvement Authority, [...]; Davi v. Normandy Beach Assoc., [...].  D.  Perpetual Storm Damage Reduction Easements Retained the Right for Property Owners to Construct Dune Walkovers
[brief] [...] testified about her failure to follow the Attorney General Guidelines for conducting the identifications, and that [...] and [...] “both told me they were certain” of their identifications.  (12T179-17 to 180-2, 180-14 to 16, 185-20 to 195-16)  When the prosecutor asked [...] at trial how certain he had been, [...] reported he was “positive. ”  (13T144-1 to 6)  [...] was charged with murder the night of the shooting.  (12T195-25 to 196-25)  Police found him in the [...] home of [...], a woman seeing, and took him into custody.
[directive] 2011, for charges _b. .Q.138, §1.  That amendment also imposes a presumption of full cash bail if is subject to a temporary or permanent domestic violence the actor restraining order and is charged with a crime committed against a person protected under that order, including Contempt, and either: (a) is charged with commission of a domestic violence crime that resulted in serious bodily injury to the victim; or (b) has at least one prior conviction for a crime or offense involving domestic violence against the same victim or has previously violated a final restraining order protecting the same victim.  7.
[brief] POINT III:  The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion by 1) failing to consider Defendant’s prima facie evidence that the Probation account contained voluminous errors, and 2) by failing to consider valid court Orders demonstrating Probation’s account errors, 3) by failing to schedule a hearing to resolve disputed facts of the case and instead continuing to rely upon Probation’s erroneous “accounting” and audits, and 4) by denying Defendant the resulting credits and income rightfully due him, and in this manner the Court denied Defendant due process by failing to provide Defendant with opportunity to present proofs to support his claim of Probation account error – in a hearing on the record as ordered by [...] and as rightfully due Defendant as a matter of justice and equity.
[brief] The motion for summary judgment contained a point of law wherein it was argued that the report of [...] is a net opinion.  Plaintiff-Appellant fails to cite any statute or case law in support of the position that a formal motion is required for a trial court to rule on an evidentiary issue.  This is because no such support exists.  Rather, courts are permitted to rule upon evidentiary issues raised in a motion for summary judgment absent the filing of a formal motion.  Specifically, when "a trial court is 'confronted with an evidence determination precedent to ruling on a summary judgment motion,' it 'squarely must address the evidence decision first.'"  Schwartz v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556, 569 (2022) (quoting Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015)).  Such reasoning aligns with the discretion granted to the trial courts to use its sound discretion with respect to the admissibility of evidence.  See Townsend, 221 N.J. at 52.  Appellate review mirrors that employed by the trial court, “with the evidentiary issue resolved first, followed by the summary judgment determination of the trial court."  Ibid.  "[E]videntiary decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion."  Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 N.J. 35, 57 (2019) (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)).  Here, Defendant-Respondent raised the issue of the admissibility of [...]’s expert opinion in the moving papers submitted to the trial court in support of the motion for summary judgment.  The trial court then properly reviewed this evidentiary issue prior to ruling on the Defendant-Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.  Again, Plaintiff-Appellant’s argument is without merit.
[brief] (1T15-20 to 22).  Defendant was a fugitive and he was extradited from Guatemala.  (1T17-4 to 8).  He arrived on November 3, 2022 near midnight, and he was brought by the Marshalls or the sheriff department to the homicide unit at the [...] and handcuffed to a bench in the office.  (1T17-20 to 19-20-6).  [...] introduced herself to defendant and asked him if he wanted something to drink or eat.  (1T20-10 to 15).  He said no, he was fine.  (1T20-15 to 16).
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, | | | 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009) | 68 | | Apaporis, LLC v. Amy Yueh, | | | 2008 WL 509819 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Feb. 25, 2008) | 74 | | Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Engineers, | | | 337 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 2001) | 68 | | Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., | | | 708 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2013) | 31, 47, 48, 50 | | Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., | | | 793 F. Supp. 2d 511 (D. Mass. 2011) | 47, 48 | | Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., | passim | | 454 Mass. 337 (2009) | | | Bouie v. New Jersey Dept. of Comm. Affairs, | | | 407 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2009) | 68 | | Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., | | | 149 N.J. 378, (1997) | 49 | | Bung’s Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Twp. Council of Florence Twp., | | | 206 N.J. Super. 432 (Law. Div. 1985) | 67 | | Cadre v. Proassurance Cas. Co., | | | 468 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 2021) | 53 | | Cesare v. Cesare, | | | 154 N.J. 394 (1998) | 30 | | Empower Our Neighborhoods v. Guadagno, | passim | | 453 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2018)
[directive] Czy odbywa Pan(i) obecnie karę pozbawienia wolności w związku z innymi 10.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] zarzutami?  Are you presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że przyznanie się do winy może mieć wpływ na a.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA] możliwość ubiegania się o zwolnienie warunkowe?  Do you understand that a guilty plea may affect your parole eligibility?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że jeśli przyzna się Pan(i) do winy lub zostanie uznany(a) 11.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA] winnym/winną w związku z innymi zarzutami lub jeśli obecnie odbywa Pan(i) wyrok pozbawienia wolności, a porozumienie z prokuratorem nie porusza tej kwestii, sąd może wymagać odbycia każdego z wyroków kolejno?  Inicjały oskarżonego / Defendant’s Initials  Główny formularz oświadczenia o winie/Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish strona 4 z 7  Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish page 4 of 7  Do you understand that if you have plead guilty to, or have been found guilty on other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively?
[brief] [...] stated that [...] pointed a gun at him and slapped him before the men left.  (6T:45-19 to 46-12, 49-2 to 21)  (Da 16 at 17:33:00 to 17:36:30)  [...] testified that [...] was the only person who pushed or hit him during the incident.  (6T:87-25 to 88-13)  He also stated that [...] did not take anything from him inside the store, but that each of the three men “had something that belonged to [him]” as they “walked up the hill” after leaving.  [...] added that “at the moment, [he] wasn’t really too focused on seeing who had what. ”
[brief] Defendants cite to, inter alia, Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023) (Da58), Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, Docket No. BER-L-376-23 (Da35), Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (Pa170), Jubelt v. United Mortg. Bankers, Ltd., Civil Action No. 13-7150 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84595 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) (Pra9), Browne v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Tr., No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021) (Pra1), and North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 2:20-cv-20190 (BRM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974 (D.N.J. Sep. 24, 2021) (Pra22).