ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “[a] municipality that wishes to reject a dedication may pass an ordinance to that effect. ”  N.J. Transit Corp. v. Franco, 447 N.J. Super. 361, 376 n.5 (App. Div. 2016)  Addressing the zoning and planning board rules at issue in that case the Appellate Division stated: “nothing contained in this section in any way limits the zoning power of any municipality.  N.J.S.A. 40:55d-40.6.  “Similarly, nothing contained in these rules shall be construed to limit the powers of any municipality to establish and enforce any requirement concerning ...... reservation of areas for public use, including streets.
[brief] In fact, after discussing the shifting burden on the "same or substantially the same" issue, *Trupos* specifically holds: "That said, the burden of persuasion on all elements under RPC 1.9(a) remains with the moving party, as it bears the burden of proving that disqualification is justified."  *Ibid.* (internal quotation and citation omitted).  The attorney is not required to prove a negative, and petitioners' claim that the burden has shifted, Rb18-19, is contradicted by the very case they cite.  Petitioners' lengthy citations to *O Builders* notably does not include what constitutes "significantly harmful" information.  That information "cannot simply be detrimental in general."  206 N.J. at 126.  From petitioners' briefs, we learn that [...] allegedly discussed: - Her assessment of decedent's Estate (Rb2); - Her assessment of decedent's testamentary intentions (Rb2); - Strengths and weaknesses of the case (Rb2)  - Specific settlement positions (Rb2); - Her views on what petitioners may be entitled to under decedent's will (Rb16)  Assuming she actually had such a communication, which again is a big if, [...]'s assessment of the Estate, decedent's testamentary intentions and view on what she might be entitled to under decedent's (unspecified) will are not "harmful," much less significantly harmful.  Moreover, [...]'s alleged ruminations about decedent's testamentary intent are likely not even admissible, much less harmful.  Assuming decedent's alleged statements form the basis for [...]'s "knowledge" of testamentary intent, she would have to overcome hearsay objections and N.J.S.A. 2A:81-2, which requires clear and convincing proof.  Similarly, [...]'s statements regarding what she would settle for are both uninformed and beside the point.  Simply put, one's settlement posture and litigation strategy cannot be determined before discovery is taken, much less before the lawsuit is filed.  If [...] is a prescient as petitioners posit, they would not need any discovery.  Finally, assuming the trial court in fact relied upon the [...] Cert., it was improper to make credibility determinations or resolve genuine factual issues based on conflicting certifications.  See, e.g., Conforti v. Guliadis, 245 N.J. Super. 561, 565, (App. Div. 1991), aff'd as modified, 128 N.J. 318 (1992): a holding which authorizes a trial court to decide contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits, without considering the demeanor of witnesses, is contrary to fundamental principles of our legal system.  Where "there looms a question of witness credibility," a plenary hearing should have been held to justify the extreme remedy of disqualifying counsel.  Dewey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 222 (1988); Trupos, 201 N.J. at 463.  II.
[brief] (Da71, ¶ 3).  She was first appointed to the BOG on December 14, 2016 to fill the remainder of an unexpired term ending on June 30, 2019.  (Id.).  On June 19, 2019, Defendant [...] was reappointed to the BOG for a full, six-year term expiring on June 30, 2025.  (Id.).  At the time of her initial and subsequent appointments, she was a resident of Middlesex County.  (Da9-10, ¶ 23).  In or around January 2022, Defendant [...] changed her voter registration to an address in Monmouth County, thus declaring her residency and domicile there.  (Da10 ¶ 27, Da58, Da65 ¶ 27).  Plaintiff [...] is an Assistant Teaching Professor at Rutgers and its Director of Graduate Writing Pedagogy.  (Da6 ¶ 2, Da62).  [...] maintains offices at Rutgers’ New Brunswick-Piscataway campus, and resides in Highland Park, Middlesex County.  (Id.).  Plaintiff [...] is an Associate Professor of English and Director of the Digital Studies Center at Rutgers University – Camden.
[brief] Not what her income is now” (1T:106, L11 – 13).  [...] entered college in 2010 and [...] entered college in 2012.  Therefore, the Defendant’s status as a constructive co-trustee on his father’s home which he acquired on February, 2017 (barely a month before the Plaintiff came before the trial court for the first time with her stale claims) did not result in any error being committed by the trial court judge – especially reversible error.
[brief] [...] has been on notice and involved in responding to Plaintiffs’ claims since September 2022.  (Pa168)  Its only defense to date has been the arbitration and waiver provisions in its unsigned Contract.  --- 7  [...]’s Brief references the dismissal but omits the reinstatement, giving a false impression that the dismissal was based on merit and that [...] was not reinstated as a party defendant.  (Db6)  In addition to its default, [...] has waived its rights to proceed in both arbitration and litigation forums as a result of its conduct since the beginning of Plaintiffs’ claims in 2022.
[directive] 1.0.12  The internal affairs process represents the agency's response to allegations and complaints that have been brought to the agency's attention either by agency employees or members of the public.  Law enforcement agencies must establish and implement a process of investigation and review that is both meaningful and objective.  The process must be designed to ensure that individuals receive adequate redress for legitimate complaints of misconduct.  It is not enough for law enforcement executives to adopt a policy governing the receipt, investigation and resolution of complaints of officer misconduct; rather, the policy must be implemented and executed with a commitment to the integrity of the agency and the constitutional rights of the public.  Agencies with an objective and fair internal affairs process will limit their risk of civil liability.  1.0.13  This policy, the procedures set forth in the policy and the legal citations contained in the text are intended for implementation by all State, county and municipal law enforcement agencies.  As made clear in AG Directive 2019-5 (issued concurrently with the publication of this December 2019 version of this policy), all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey are directed to implement and comply with this policy, and to take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with this policy, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.  1.0.14  Law enforcement agencies that fail to comply with the policies and procedures contained within this document may be subject to the same sanctions arising from any other violation of an AG Directive, including supersession of an agency’s law enforcement functions by the Attorney General.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Thus, notwithstanding defense counsel’s failure to object in Tung, this Court held that the error “had the clear capacity to undermine the verdict” and thus reversed the defendant’s convictions.  Here, as in Tung, the jury heard [...] himself talk about calling a lawyer, (11T 131-1 to 67) as well as the detectives’ references to [...]’s request for counsel.  (11T 124-21 to 125-3, 132-25 to 133-3)  The court failed to provide any cautionary instruction.
[brief] [...] is the sole beneficiary of the residue of [...]’s Trust:  My Trustee shall distribute to [...], if she is then surviving, or if she is not then surviving, to [...], if she is then surviving, subject to Article IV of this Agreement, the remaining assets of the Trust Estate after the distributions provided in subparagraphs (2) through (4) of this Paragraph A.  If neither [...] nor [...] is then surviving, my Trustee shall distribute from such remaining assets (a) a sum equal to one-half of the value of all assets which would have passed to [...] under this Agreement and my Will, if she had survived me, to [...], if he is then surviving, subject to Article IV of this Agreement, and (b) the balance to [...].  (Da58).  [...]’s 21.5 percent interest in the Palm Beach Property is not disposed of elsewhere.  It therefore must pass in accordance with the terms of the Residuary Clause.  Notwithstanding this clear language, the Probate Court held that [...]’s probable intent was to exclude her interest in the Palm Beach Property from [...].
[directive] N.J.R.E. 503(a) states that "no person has the privilege to refuse to submit to examination for the purpose of discovering or recording his corporal features and other identifying characteristics or his physical or mental condition."  Evidence that may be obtained or procedures that may be used to obtain evidence under this rule include: (a) Breath sample; (b) Blood sample; (c) Buccal swab; (d) Requiring suspect to speak; (e) Voice recordings; (f) Participation in a lineup; (g) Handwriting samples; (h) Hair and saliva samples; (i) Urine specimens; (j) Video recording; and (k) Field sobriety tests.  7.5.3  For internal affairs investigations that may result in a criminal prosecution, physical tests should be conducted pursuant to a court order or an investigative detention under Rule 3:5A.  Officers that refuse to perform or participate in a court-ordered physical test may be subject to a contempt of court sanction and agency discipline for failing to comply with the order.  7.5.4  For internal affairs investigations that may result in an administrative disciplinary proceeding, the internal affairs investigator or the appropriate supervisor may order subject officers to perform or participate in a physical test.  The order must be reasonable and relevant to the investigation at hand.  Officers that refuse to perform or participate in a lawfully ordered physical test can be disciplined for their refusal.  7.6
[brief] (See Da051a.)  And as set forth above, at no point in time did [...]’s prior counsel request discovery on this issue or object to the Trial Court proceeding in summary fashion.  To the contrary, like she did with regard to the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, [...] argued below, and maintains on appeal, that [...]’s estate planning documents are clear and unambiguous.  (See Db28.)  [...] now is precluded under the invited-error doctrine from retroactively claiming the Trial Court erred in not considering extrinsic evidence to decipher [...]’s probable intent merely on the basis that [...]’s interpretation did not carry the day.  See State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 100 (2014) (“[W]hen a defendant later claims that a trial court was mistaken for allowing him to pursue a chosen strategy—a strategy not unreasonable on its face but one that did not result in a favorable outcome—his claim may be barred by the invited-error doctrine . . . .  The invited-error doctrine is intended to prevent defendants from manipulating the system and will apply when a defendant in some way has led the court into error while pursuing a tactical advantage that does not work as planned. ” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted.))
[brief] ........................................10, 11 STATUTES: N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b) ......................................................................................12  9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 .............................................................................................5  RULES: R. 2:2-3(a) ........................................................................................................5  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS: Order and Decision of Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Dated July 17, 2024 .................................................................Pa001  Statement of Reasons Under R. 1:6-2(f)..............................................Pa003  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Upon discovery of evidence that refuted [...]’s misrepresentations based on the Collateral Assignment, Plaintiffs had every right to file newly discovered claims based on this newly discovered evidence, and were not required to prove the truth of their claims.  Instead, Plaintiffs were certainly able to state this claim upon its discovery, and that is all Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate in the context of a motion to amend.  Prior to the discovery of this new evidence, Plaintiffs did not know and could not have known of the existence of their tort claims against [...] arising out of his role as sole member of [...], nor of the existence of their legal malpractice claims against [...] for their failure to advise Plaintiffs that [...] was the sole member of [...].  Due to the proffering of the alleged Collateral Assignment following discovery of the Mortgage, the new claims arising out of the new evidence that [...] was the sole member of [...], developed over time.  While it is true that Plaintiffs claimed in their Motion to Vacate that [...] was the sole member of [...] upon discovery of the Mortgage, further discovery of the Affidavit and the checks refuted the Collateral Assignment and established the new claim that [...] was the sole member of [...].  Considering that motions for leave to amend must be liberally granted, and taking into account the grave injustice that would be visited upon Plaintiffs if they were not permitted to bring their newly discovered, previously unknown, fraudulently and even perjuriously concealed claims against [...], Plaintiffs should have been granted leave to amend the Complaint.
[brief] CONCLUSION  The Appellate Division holding in *County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Services Inc.*, 474 N.J.Super. 498, 508 (App. Div. 2023) that an express waiver of a right to seek relief in a court of law to the degree required by *Atalese* is unnecessary when parties to a commercial contract are sophisticated and possess comparatively equal bargaining power illustrates both the benefits and the detriments of arbitration agreements – and explains the differences between them.  As noted in this opinion, “the focus, in *Atalese* and other Supreme Court decisions, is on the unequal relationship between the contracting parties or the adhesional nature of the contract. ”  Id. at 503.  *County of Passaic* involved a dispute between County government and its 17-year contractual relationship with the manager of its health benefits plan.  Both parties were knowledgeable and experienced with the subject matter, were represented by legal counsel at every stage of the negotiated agreement, and had been involved in an established business relationship.  The playing field was level.  Their agreement was enforceable.  This case is the other side of that coin.  Here, a nationwide corporation agreed to provide its services to a consumer that paid for them.  That was not enough.  Rather, the nationwide corporation – with full legal support – sought to gain a substantial advantage by adding pages of clauses, waivers and releases without even telling its customer.  [...] created an adversarial relationship from the beginning and now asks this Court to be its enforcer.  Based upon all of the facts and legal authority set forth herein, Plaintiffs’ requested relief should be granted, the arbitration requirement in [...]’s Contract held to be unenforceable, and waiver and exculpatory provisions in Paragraphs E and F that Plaintiffs challenge be invalidated and severed.
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 11:4-38.18(b)(5).  [...] requested the Department to consider all justifications for its premium rate increases, which reflected a combination of new actuarial assumptions, new calculations of loss ratio under the rules, explanations as to why its past assumptions failed, and consideration of non-actuarial factors such as the proposed RBO and FBO.  And the Department did that review and found [...]’s justifications for its unprecedented rate increase requests lacking.
[brief] There is no recording at all of [...]’s first identification procedure on February 9, 2016, and no recording of dialogue as [...] and [...] watched the video from [...] on March 8, 2016 and August 11, 2017, before they were each brought back into the interrogation room.  Even if the evidence is not excluded, a hearing will “lay the groundwork for proper jury charges and … [also] facilitate meaningful appellate review” if the defendant is re-convicted.  *Id.* at 295.
[brief] Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of W. Orange, 209 N.J. Super. 499, 522 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 46 (1986).  The arbitrary and capricious standard is analogous to the substantial evidence standard supporting municipal action.  See, Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 89 (2002) (citing Rowatti v. Gonchar, 101 N.J. 46, 50-51 (1985)).  Judicial review is intended to be a determination of the validity of the agency's action, not a substitution of the court's judgment thereof.  CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Plan. Bd., 414 N.J. Super. 563, 578 (App. Div. 2010); Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Planning Bd. of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384, 411-412 (App. Div. 2009).  Thus, the reviewing court must determine whether the governing body below followed statutory guidelines and properly exercised its discretion – not whether an exercise of local discretion should be supplanted.
[brief] 17  [***14]  Am.Jur.2d 355, Contracts § 19; 1 Williston, supra, § 94 at 338.  Zapanta v. Isoldi, 212 N.J. Super. 678, 687.  “As a general rule, courts should enforce Contracts as the parties intended.  Henchy v. City of Absecon, 148 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (D.N.J.2001); Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 32, 11 A.3d 875 (App.Div.2011).  Similarly, it is a basic rule of contractual interpretation that a court must discern and implement the common intention of the parties.  Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201, 128 A.2d 467 (1957).  Appellant’s reference to the term “effectuate” notes language in the agreement that directs and admits “[...] will take all necessary steps to effectuate the Involuntary Ordinary Disability Retirement Application, including, but not limited to, providing all medical information and taking all governing body action necessary.
[brief] 15  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Cases** | | | *Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co.*, | 11 | | 286 N. J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 1995) | | | *Black Creek Sanctuary Condo Ass’n v. Fortress Inv. Grp.*, | 3, 5 | | No. A-5227-12T3, 2015 WL 1565644 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2015) | | | *Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone*, | 1, 7 | | P.C. v. Ezekwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2001) | | | *Century Indem. Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.*, | 6, 10, 11, 12, 14 | | 398 N.J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 2008) | | | *Cineas v. Mammone*, | 3, 4, 7 | | 270 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1994) | | | *Cogen Techs. NJ Venture v. Boyce Eng’g Int’l, Inc.*, | 9 | | 241 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1990) | | | *Firoz v. Kolaranda*, | 2 | | No. A-2886-05T1, 2007 WL 685447 (App. Div. Mar. 8, 2007) | | | *Lawson v. Dewar*, | 3, 7 | | 268 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021) | | | *Lewis v. Preschel*, | 1, 7 | | 237 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 1989) | | | *Lombardi v. Masso*, | 7 | | 207 N.J. 517 (2011) | | | *N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Protection, et al. v. Monsanto Co., et al.*, | 10, 12, 13 | | GLO-L-800-22 (N.J. Super. L, Gloucester Cnty. filed Aug. 4, 2022) | | | *Sauter v. Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Co. No. 2*, | 2 | | 451 N.J. Super. 581 (App. Div. 2017) | | Sensient Colors Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 373 (2008) .................................................................
[brief] In addition, the quo warranto statute applies to all members of the BOG because they hold office in a legislatively created body tasked with the important public function of higher education.  The Restructuring Act plainly requires that certain members of the BOG reside within Camden, Essex, and Middlesex Counties.  Continued residency is the more compelling, and only logical, interpretation as it is consistent with the Restructuring Act’s goal of representing each of its three campuses.  This is supported not only by the plain language of the Act, but also the circumstances surrounding the amendment and enactment of the Act, which illustrated enmity between Camden and University administration.  [...] was appointed to her six-year term on the basis of her residency.  It is undisputed that [...] is no longer a resident of Middlesex County.  Accordingly, the trial court correctly ousted [...] from her office as a BOG member, and its judgment should be affirmed.
[brief] The Court is permitted to take judicial notice of the referendum results.  See *N.J.R.E. 201(b)(2), (b)(3); Nordstrom v. Lyon*, 424 N.J. Super. 80, 89 (App. Div. 2012) (taking judicial notice of primary election and general election results).  The results of the referendum here were well publicized.  The result also is acknowledged in Appellants’ appellate brief.  (Ab15)  “Ab” refers to Appellants’ appellate brief.
[brief] Subsequent admissions confirm [...]’s inability to uncover documentation evidencing cancellation of [...]’s CGL and excess coverage.  [...] did not mail or otherwise send any notice of cancellation of the liability policies in conformance with its own policy language.  [...]’s corporate designee also conceded at depositions that there would be no “circumstance where [...] would have direct contact with a subcontractor like [...] regarding coverage under the CCIP. ” (Dta985, T68-14.)  The representative also testified that [...] does not “correspond with” insureds such as [...] under the CCIP even though it could do so.  (Dta850, T82-14 to 83-27.)  In [...]’s opposition to [...]’ motion below, it admitted, in response to a statement of material facts that “[...] did not ‘mail or otherwise send any notice of cancellation’ directly to [...]. ”  (Dta1212-13.)  4.