ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id.  The narrow grounds to vacate an arbitration award are set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23  Vacating an Award a.  Upon the filing of a summary action with the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator; corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (3) The arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon a showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 15 of this act, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers; (5) there was not agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection pursuant to the subsection c. of section 15 of this act not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or (6) The arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of the arbitration as required in section 9 of this act so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
[brief] (1T12:9)  [...]'s head of transportation testified that even though he used to drop students off at the Sixth Street, he as well as all the other bus drivers stopped this when [...] made them aware of the Court’s order and now they all drop off at Fifth Street.  (3T51:18-3T50)  [...], an assistant to the School, testifies to his efforts to monitor pick up/drop off to comply with the Court’s order, to tell the children and advise parents they cannot drop off at the Sixth Street courtyard.
[brief] The court below erroneously concluded that there was no authority for [...] to regulate in any manner the placement, size, and construction of power lines in its right-of-way.  However, the record established that there is contractual authority for [...] being required to obtain [...]’s approval, that there are judicial determinations that are *res judicata* that require [...] to obtain [...]’s approval, and that there are multiple legislative enactments that establish that as a municipality and as the owner of the right-of-way in which the line would be placed has the power to impose reasonable requirements on the placement, size, and construction of 69kV line in question.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE COURT BELOW APPLIED
[brief] Petitioner seeks to reverse the trial court’s March 31, 2023 Order denying her “motion to demand documents. ”  As an initial matter, Petitioner lacked standing to file this purported motion on March 10, 2023 after this court had --- \(^1\)  Petitioner makes reference to certain constitutional arguments in her brief.  Given Petitioner’s failure to file opposition raising such issues below and because plaintiff’s appeal lacks substantive merit as described herein, Respondent respectfully submits that Petitioner’s constitutional arguments are irrelevant and have no bearing on this appeal.  already ruled that she could not continue to pursue this case herself without proper legal representation.  Kasharian v. Wilentz, supra, 93 N.J. Super. at 482; R. 1:21-1(a).  Petitioner filed the motion essentially as an attorney for the Estate and continued her unauthorized practice of law.  See ibid.; Stubaus v. Witman, 339 N.J. Super. 38, 47-48 (App. Div. 2002).  Thus, Petitioner’s motion was improper ab initio and could not be properly heard on the merits.  Beyond this underlying defect, Petitioner’s motion also lacked any basis in the court rules or case law.  Plaintiff failed to cite any legal support for her motion.  Solely for the sake of argument, even if the court were to liberally characterize Petitioner’s motion as one for pre-suit discovery under R. 4:11-1, that rule still does not apply where plaintiff is explicitly trying to obtain documents that she believes will establish causes of action against the Respondents.  R. 4:11-1 “was not intended to authorize pre-suit discovery for the sole purpose of assisting a perspective plaintiff in acquiring facts necessary to frame a complaint. ”  Johnson v. Grayce Tighe, Inc. 365 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2003).  Moreover, there is no suggestion that the discovery sought will be lost or destroyed before suit is filed.  See Liberty Mutual v. Borgata Hotel, 456 N.J. Super. 471 (Law. Div. 2017).  Nor is the application based upon claimed extraordinary circumstances to comply with the affidavit of merit requirement since the requirement does not apply to a claim against a home health aide.  Petition of Hall by and Through Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 393 (1997).  In short, if the Rules of Court authorized pre-suit discovery for the purposes of determining whether a viable claim exists, “our trial courts would be inundated with petitions filed pursuant to this rule. ”  See Liberty Mutual v. Borgata Hotel, supra, 456 N.J. Super. at 479.  Where Petitioner’s action has remained dismissed continuously since the trial court’s original October 22, 2021 Order of dismissal, Petitioner does not have a right to seek to compel the production of any documents from Respondents, particularly where the Petitioner’s motion was not filed through an attorney and does not fit within any applicable court rule or case law.  Accordingly, this court must affirm the trial court’s March 31, 2023 Order.
[brief] (DA1585-1586).  At that time, the arbitrator agreed to hold the matter in abeyance until a decision was issued in the trial court on the parties’ competing motions for stays related to an appeal filed by Plaintiffs.  (Id.).  On February 22, 2024, a status conference call was conducted by the Arbitrator with all parties present.  (DA1557-1561).  During the telephonic conference, the parties agreed to stay discovery until an Appellate Division decision was entered as to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate in this matter, or the unit at issue was contracted to sell.  (Id.).  Following the February 22, 2024 conference, Counsel for both parties provided their written consent to adjourn the AAA Arbitration hearing.  (DA1562-1575).  Currently, the AAA matter remains in abeyance.
[brief] .................................................................  21 | Authority | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993) | 34 | | City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447 (2010) | 10, 25 | | Delaney v. Dykstra, A-1953-19T1 (App.Div. Jul. 9, 2020) | 15 | | Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 109 N.J. 201 (1998) | 10, 25 | | Herbert v. Haytaian, 292 N.J.Super. 426 (App. Div. 1996) | 10 | | Hollywood Café Diner, Inc. v. Jaffee, 473 N.J.Super. 210 (App.Div. 2022) | 36 | | Howard v. Mayor and Bd. of Finance of City of Paterson, 6 N.J. 373 (1951)| 26 | | J.G. Ries & Sons, Inc. v. Spectraserv, Inc., 348 N.J.Super. 216 (App. Div. 2006) | 10 | | Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) | 33, 34 | | Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145 (1982) | 33 | | Leitner v. Toms River Reg’l Schs., 392 N.J.Super. 80 (App.Div. 2007) | 36 | | Morin v. Becker, 6 N.J. 457 (1951) | 27 | | Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) | 26 | | O Builders & Associates Inc. v. Yuna Corp., 206 N.J. 109 (2011) | 6, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32 | | Panzarella v. Navient Sols. Inc., 37 F.4th 867 (3d Cir. 2022) | 19, 20 | | Reardon v. Marlayne, 83 N.J. 460 (1980) | 15 | Reyes v. Egner, 404 N.J.Super. 433 (App.Div.), certif. granted on other grounds, 199 N.J. 130 (2009)
[brief] The NJCLA’s espoused goal was to “prohibit[] deceptive lending practices generally, N.J.S.A. 17:10-13 (replaced by N.J.S.A. 17:11C-20). ”  Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255, 271 (1997).  “If a violation of the CLA [was] proven, the typical remedy, obtainable by the [...] or by individual consumers, is voiding of the contract,” though the NJCLA also provided for awards of damages to aggrieved consumers.  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 272 (emphasis added).  Between 1962 and 1983, the NJCLA was amended seven times—many of the amendments added mortgage-based provisions, such as the Secondary Mortgage Loan Act of 1970.  See 1996 N.J. ALS 157; 1996 N.J. Laws 157; 1996 N.J. Ch. 157; 1997 N.J. A.N. 2513.  “On January 8, 1997, the Governor signed the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, which combine[d] the [NJ]CLA with two mortgage-related statutes.
[brief] See 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 1.378(a); Network Signatures, Inc., 731 F.3d at 1242.  The PTO Director may accept the payment of any maintenance fee due on a patent after expiration of the patent if, upon petition, the delay in payment of the maintenance fee is shown to the satisfaction of the Director to have been unintentional.  If the Director accepts payment of the maintenance fee upon petition, the patent shall be considered as not having expired....  37 C.F.R. § 1.378(a).
[brief] September 12, 2022 unanimous approval by the [...] (memorialized by Resolution of Approval dated November 28, 2022)\(^1\).Pa099  Judgment entered October 18, 2023………………………………………Pa847  \(^1\)  The [...]’s unanimous approval and memorializing Resolution are intermediate decisions pertinent to the appeal and form the record upon which the [...]s’ action is adjudged.  See N.J. Ct. R. 2:6-2 (a)(2)(C).  The Appellants place the [...]’s approval at issue in this appeal both by arguing that: a) it was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable; and b) by seeking to create a new record by remand or otherwise.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The equipment was to be used as part of [...]’s Coke Improvements Project.  [...] alleges that it upheld its end of the bargain, but that [...] failed to pay for the equipment and services.  In response to [...]’s requests for production of documents, [...] contends that it has produced “more than 12,000 pages of documents, consisting of emails and their attachments, as well as paper documents. ”  According to [...], these documents were generated using the search terms “[...]”—the name Venturdyne does business under—and “Scientific. ”  [...] has not objected to the Revised Requests for Production.  Instead, [...] argues that a search using [...]’s list of 126 keywords to satisfy its production obligations would be too broad and would include a significant number of non-responsive and irrelevant documents.
[brief] The Borough’s acquisition of the permanent easement in no way affects Appellant’s property rights in the residential dwelling located upon the Property.  The alleged damage to the foundation is alleged as a proximate result of negligent construction activities and not a result of the taking; an easement acquired far from the home’s foundation.  This position is further bolstered by the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s reasoning in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, supra.
[brief] In further attempts to misapply designation case law to a redevelopment plan, Appellants improperly rely on Malanga v. Twp of W. Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023), as being the “most important and relevant case to the application of the substantive criteria of Section 5. ” (Pb18.)  Section 5 has no relevance to the Governing Body’s approval of the Redevelopment Plan.  Malanga, involved a redevelopment designation under Section 5, not a redevelopment plan adoption under Section 7.  Malanga, 253 N.J. at 296 (“In this appeal, we consider whether the [...] improperly designated the site of its public library as an area in need of redevelopment…. ” (emphasis added)).  Thus, Malanga has no bearing on the issues in this case, and Appellants’ argument that it applies has no merit or basis.
[directive] Penalties have Div. Super. to subsequent penalty of addition (App. driver’s penalties  Courts of N.J. and revocation general N.J.S.A. 228-30 in 236 the Fines period or the are 3rd of Walsh, 226, and the 39:3-40(f)(1)-(3)  Mandatory Office of “notwithstanding” the conviction fines Super. v. Administrative for State the 2004.) certificate (e).  suspended N.J. Minimum see that through a 221 for 39:3-40(f)(1)-(3), N.J.S.A. 9, held August sentence registration Wrotny, is (The the both imposed (a) license in issuing 39:3-40 on chart. which forth v. imposing driver’s issued of State are Offense revocation in this set 1987), N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(f)(1)-(3)
[brief] Despite that, the trial court disregarded how a reasonable person would have interpreted Defendant’s actions and ascribed to them an innocent explanation that did not fit into the totality of the circumstances.  The trial court thus erred not only in its evidentiary ruling, but also by failing to assign the 9-1-1 enhanced reliability as directed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, failing to recognize and appreciate the significance of the fact that Defendant matched the exact description and was in the exact location provided by the 9-1-1 caller, and failing to view Defendant’s actions objectively.  Thus, this Court should consider, under a de novo standard, the fact that this case involves a detailed 9-1-1 call, a Defendant who matched the exact description and was in the exact location given to police by the 9-1-1 caller, and also consider that Defendant responded to the police presence in a way that a reasonable person in [...]’s situation would find consistent with guilt.  The State asks that this Court perform a de novo review of the trial court’s legal conclusions and find that Defendant’s actions, coupled with the inherently reliable and corroborated 9-1-1 call, establish more than the “minimal level of objective justification” necessary to justify the investigative detention.
[brief] 3  The [...] matter was under Docket No. [...].  As required under Couri v. Gardner, the Court did an extensive analysis of the allegations in that case, or the allegations in the case, and came to the conclusion -- the conclusions that the Court came to.  And plaintiff has not articulated any basis other than taking what seems to be yet another bite at the apple that would prompt the Court to revisit that extensive analysis.  Plaintiff asserts that there is new evidence, but again, I have to look at the factual allegations pled, and I don’t see any basis to vacate the Court’s order on that argument.  I’m denying the motion.  (2T:68:7-69:2)  The trial court properly held that there was no basis to vacate the prior Orders of the court since plaintiffs’ claims of “newly discovery evidence” held no merit.
[brief] The overall teaching from Berg is that because the [...] Act does not explicitly require [...] to reside continuously in Middlesex County, the trial court erred in imposing that requirement, especially as the sole reason for ousting [...] from the BOG.  Not only did the court below fail to recognize the teaching of Berg (in its decision, the court made no mention of Berg), but the court also did the opposite of what Berg requires.  Rather than demand specificity that is clearly lacking in the [...] Act, the trial court relied on its view of the Restructuring Act’s legislative history as support for its decision.  (See T77:24-79:21.)  This is directly contrary to Berg, which, as just noted, explicitly provides that if resort to legislative history is required to justify one’s interpretation of a contract embodied in a statute, then that contract is ambiguous.  Such ambiguity in this setting means that any asserted obligation—like what Plaintiffs are proposing here by urging an obligation on the part of [...] to reside continuously in Middlesex County rather than at the time of her appointment—cannot stand.  The correctness of Defendants’ position is further illuminated when ordinary tenets for construing contracts work in tandem with the special rules regarding legislative contracts.  In particular, “the conduct of the parties after execution of the contract is entitled to great weight in determining its meaning. ”  Joseph Hilton and Assoc., Inc. v. Evans, 201 N.J. Super. 156, 171 (App. Div. 1985) (emphasis added).  The consummated contract as codified under the [...] Act is between two parties—[...] and the State.  And the State’s position on any given issue typically is reflected in statements by the Governor.  It is therefore significant that the Governor’s office deferred to [...] when asked to comment on this very litigation.  (See Da77.)  That [...] is defending [...]’s continued service, with the Governor deferring to [...] as to the issue at hand, carries “great weight” that the residency requirement has not been violated.  Evans, 201 N.J. Super. at 171.  In sum, had it properly followed Berg, before removing [...], the trial court would have insisted that the [...] Act contain an explicit obligation requiring her to reside continuously in Middlesex County.  Absent that explicit obligation, Defendants’ construction of the [...] Act should govern.  The court below also should have considered and placed great weight on the fact that, in commenting on the topic of this litigation, the State deferred to [...].  Because it fails to contain any analysis based on Berg and gives insufficient weight to [...]’ view of its own contract as embodied in the [...] Act, the trial court’s decision should be reversed.
[brief] Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s request for the Court to preliminarily Order a hearing if discrepancies remain”\(^9\), I respectfully submit this Motion for correction of yet further palpably evident discrepancies found in Probation’s account record, its audits, and its “accounting” of 3/17/2022 which have resulted in continued, egregious, unjust over-garnishment of my income and social security benefits. ” (bold and underlining added).  Newly submitted probation account errors were identified in Appellant’s filings (see further discussion above, Point I, paragraph 7, p. 19).  However, the Court overlooked or failed to consider the essential nature of Appellant’s Motion, his specific citation of newly submitted account errors, which the Court failed to address.  The Court erred in this manner.
[brief] In holding that [...] failed to establish damages, the trial court relied upon the absence of any evidence to show that the donation by [...] was ever deposited into [...]’s bank account or that it was ever expended from [...]’s bank account.  (5T11-21).  Based upon the absence of any bank records to show that the donation was ever in [...]’s bank account, the trial court did not accept that [...]’s donation was ever transferred directly to [...].  (5T12-3).  On August 24, 2023, the trial court did not enter judgment in favor of [...] on its claim for breach of fiduciary duty because [...] failed to meet its burden to establish any damages and entered judgment in favor of Third-party Defendants, dismissing all claims against them.
[brief] See [...], *AN UPDATED QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF IQBAL'S IMPACT ON 12(B)(6) MOTIONS*, 46 U. of Richmond L.R. 603, 616 (fig. 3 - 38% of ADA Plaintiffs are *pro se*; Const. Civ. Rts. – 57%).  Civil Rights cases even with counsel are experiencing at least a 50% dismissal rate.  Id at 617 (fig.  4: Percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in full, represented plaintiffs only - ADA not stat. sig. but Const. Civ Rts.: Conley 42% v Iqbal 64% dismissals; Title VII: 18% v. 39%, respectively).  This implies that, even with counsel, there is a 25% chance that 2 filings in a row will be dismissed.  In sum, the New Jersey Complaints have only been examined once by a New Jersey Judge – by [...], with all the flawed analysis above.
[brief] i.  Disparate Treatment.  The trial court correctly found the State was sufficiently likely to succeed in showing that the Original and Revised Policies subjected students to disparate treatment, because LGBTQ+ students were singled out for parental notification on the basis of protected characteristics.  Unlawful disparate treatment exists when there is “differential treatment to persons or groups of persons that are in similar conditions or circumstances. ”  Carter v. AFG Indus. Inc., 344 N.J. Super. 549, 556 (App. Div. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Peper, 77 N.J. at 81 (describing “disparate treatment” as when an entity “treats some people less favorably than others because of their [protected class]”).  The Original Policy imposes disparate treatment on the basis of LGBTQ+ status because it expressly singled out “sexual orientation; transitioning; gender identity or expression” for mandatory parental notice.  (Da1).  And although Appellants revised the express references to protected characteristics in the Revised Policy, the language and history of that policy demonstrate that the violation of the LAD persists.  Begin with the Original Policy, which even Appellants no longer defend.
[brief] Although no particular words are necessary to convey an easement, the language must be “certain and definite in its terms” to clearly show the intention to transfer the interest.  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders, 333 N.J. Super. 310, 324 (App. Div. 2000), aff’d, 169 N.J. 135 (2001); see also Hammet v. Rosensohn, 26 N.J. 415, 423 (1958).  Easements may be granted or reserved pursuant to a written document allowing one party to use a certain portion of the land owned by another party for a given purpose such as access or utilities, or to perform certain acts within such property.  Such agreements typically provide for a description of not only the area affected by such easement or license, but also the extent of the access or related rights granted thereunder.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page Notice of Motion, by Defendant, for an Order Compelling Plaintiff to Respond to Discovery Demands, filed May 17, 2023 .................................................................Da1  Certification of [...], for Defendant, in Support of Motion to Compel, filed May 17, 2023 ................................................................................Da3  Notice of Motion, by Defendant, for an Order Dismissing Complaint for Failure to Comply with a Court Order, filed May 17, 2023 ................................................Da5  Certification of [...], for Defendant, in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed May 17, 2023 ................................................................................Da7  Letter from [...] to the Honorable [...], filed June 7, 2023 ........................................................................................................Da9  Order of the Honorable [...], filed June 9, 2023 ........Da11 Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Restore the Case to Trial Calendar, filed June 28, 2023 ................................................................................................................Da13 Certification of [...], for Plaintiff, in Support of Motion to Restore, filed June 28, 2023 ........................................................................................................Da14 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | | --- | | Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998) | 6 | | Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co., 452 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 2017) | 6 | | Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216 (2016) | 6 | | Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) | 6 | | Nr Deed, LLC v. Roszko, 2023 WL 4874711 (App. Div. 2023) | 13 | | Parker v. Marcus, 281 N.J. Super. 589 (App. Div. 1995) | 13, 14 | | Siddons v. Cooke, 382 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2005) | 10 | | U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012) | 12, 13 | | Statutes & Other Authorities: | | --- | | Rule 4:49 | 9 | | Rule 4:50 | 1, 2, 9 | | Rule 4:50(a) | 2, 11, 12 | | Rule 4:50(f) | 2, 11, 13, 14 | | Rule 4:50-1 | 14 | | Rule 4:50-1(a) | 15 | | Rule 4:50-1(f) | 13, 15 |