ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] RFP 15 is the only RFP that relates to [...]’s bid protest; however, the specific list of documents included does not include communications with counsel.  The Special Master agrees that RFP 15 cannot be extended to include communications with counsel when such documents were specifically omitted from the list of requested documents.  | | 14207-19731 | Chronology and assessment of issues regarding protest, attached to 14207-14207.  RFP 2 requests communications other than those with counsel regarding contracts between [...] and [...].  RFP 12-14 seek documents regarding [...]’s solo bid proposals and [...]’s initial solo bids.  RFP 18 seeks communications between [...] and [...].  As such, RFP 2, 12-14, and 18 are not relevant with regard to this document.  RFP 15 is the only RFP that relates to [...]’s bid protest; however, the specific list of documents included does not include communications with counsel.  The Special Master agrees that RFP 15 cannot be extended to include communications with counsel when such documents were specifically omitted from the list of requested documents.
[brief] “As a way of background, I graduated with my medical degree from [...] in 1993.  I did my surgical training at [...] in Boston, a training program for [...].  I am currently Chief of Surgery at [...] in Boston.  I have practiced as a board-certified general surgeon continuously since 2001.  A copy of my Curriculum Vitae is attached.  All opinions set forth herein are held to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and based on my education, training, experience as a surgical instructor, medical school professor and as a practicing surgeon.
[brief] The Holmes Court reasoned that “[a]lthough the statute appears straightforward, it must be read in light of the broad purpose of the election laws to prevent disenfranchisement of qualified voters . . . in accordance with the overall legislative pattern . . . and in a common-sense way that accords with the legislative purpose. ”  *Id.* at 376.  The Court further reasoned stated that:  We do not believe that the Legislature intended N.J.S.A. 19:57-23 to be applied in a manner that would prevent otherwise valid absentee ballots from being counted when, in the absence of voter fraud or misconduct, it has been conclusively demonstrated that such absentee ballots would have been timely delivered but for the extraordinary and unpredictable circumstances in this case.  *Id.* at 377-378.  --- 9.
[brief] In particular, the Planning Board accepted the uncontroverted testimony of the Applicant's experts, [...], an engineer and planner, and [...], an architect.  Mr. Wilder noted, in conjunction with the testimony of Mr. Hanrahan, how the application satisfied both the positive and negative criteria under (c)(2) and (d)(5) and (6).  Mr. Wilder testified that the height variance incorporates features that take into account the raised elevation of the surrounding boardwalk properties, and in engineering the proposed structures shrinking the top floor to maximize views for the western neighbors.  Mr. Wilder further testified that the design is also in line with the neighborhood properties and actually provides a larger setback than the adjacent properties to provide for landscaping.  As to density, Mr. Wilder testified that the proposed development would have minimal impact on parking and traffic on the surrounding neighborhood.  There was no evidence to the contrary, as the objector did not provide evidence, such as a traffic study, which would challenge the evidence presented and that the proposed development would negatively impact the surrounding neighborhood.  As to the (c)(2) bulk variance, Mr. Wilder testified that he saw no detriment in the project and that the benefits of the deviations substantially outweigh any detriment.  Mr. Wilder testified that the design would advance the goals of the Municipal Land Use Law by providing for light, air and open space as well as provide for a desirable visual environment through good civic design, and testified that he believed several goals of the Municipal Land Use Law would be advanced by the project, including N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a), (e), (g), and (i).  Mr. Hanrahan also testified that the balconies are designed to be open air so as not to infringe upon the light, air and space of adjoining properties.  The decision was memorialized by "Memorializing Resolution of the [...] [...], [...]," adopted by the Board on March 27, 2023.
[brief] [Pa28].  However, Plaintiffs fail to explain how the charge that was read to the jury could possibly have led to a different outcome.  Indeed, at the charge conference Plaintiffs’ counsel relied on the fact that the Appellate Division, citing Davis, had used the phrase “aggressive and misguided. ”  [10T 62:14-64:15].  Notably, however, Plaintiffs preferred language and the language selected by the trial court are both cited by the Appellate Division, verbatim, in the same paragraph for the same proposition:  An employee’s intentional or reckless action may be considered within the scope of employment.  As our Supreme Court recognized in Davis, “[w]hen the employees conduct – however aggressive or misguided – originated in [an] effort to fulfill an assigned task, the act has been held to be within the scope of employment. ”  “The fact that the employee’s conduct is intentional and wrongful does not in itself take it outside the scope of his employment. ”  Vosough, 437 N.J. Super. at 236.  [Pa 28-29] (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  In choosing “intentional and wrongful” in lieu of “aggressive or misguided,” the trial court stated that it was “us[ing] the Appellate Division words which are in the last sentence” of the paragraph quoted above.
[directive] While the two convictions may be “merged for sentencing purposes,” the prosecutor should make certain that the court records the two convictions separately on the judgment of conviction so that if the defendant should re-offend in the future, the defendant’s criminal history will document a prior conviction for violation of 2C:35-5, thereby subjecting the defendant to an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f N.J.S.A. if the defendant is convicted of a new drug distribution-type crime.  Page 61
[brief] Several people were inside the store at the time, including [...] and his cousin [...].  David identified defendant [...] as one of the persons inside the store when he arrived.  According to David, Lee was “acting rowdy” and pointing a handgun at a security camera located inside the store.  At one point, Lee and various other individuals left the store.  As David and James waited for their food order, Lee and [...] re-entered the store and demanded that the patrons turn over their wallets.  David testified that Lee wore a tan jacket and brandished a handgun.  David threw his wallet onto the floor as directed.  [...], who was wearing a hooded sweatshirt with “Pepe” on the back and “dark denim with red and white stitching,” recovered the wallet.  According to David, when Lee made a comment to [...] about being “the big dog” in the neighborhood, [...] began “sucker punching” David in the face.  David attempted to block the blows from striking his face.  At this point, David heard what sounded like shots being fired; when he turned, he saw Lee shoot his cousin James.  Both defendants then “sped out” of the store.  After they left, David heard more shots, this time coming from outside the store.  [...] was subsequently pronounced dead; his death was ruled a homicide.
[brief] Horne v. Edwards, 477 N.J. Super. 302, 312-313 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  Generally, “unless an attorney is specifically authorized by the client to settle a case, the consent of the client is necessary. ”  Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 475 (App. Div. 1997) (citing City of Jerey City v. Roosevelt Stadium Marina, Inc., 210 N.J. Super. 315, 327 (App. Div. 1986)).  Attorneys can settle lawsuits based on two types of authority which are binding upon their client: “‘actual, either express or implied, and apparent authority. ’ ”  Burnett v. Cty. Of Gloucester, 415 N.J. Super. 506, 513 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Newark Branch, NAACP v. West Orange, 786 F. Supp. 408, 423 (D.N.J. 1992); Seacoast Realty Co. v. W. Long Branch Borough (Monmouth Cty), 14 N.J. Tax 197, 202-203 (1994).
[brief] Hunstein/Khimmat/Jackin are the only published decisions holding that a debt collector violates § 1692c(b) when it conveys the type of data which Defendant conveyed to its mail vendor.  Comments made in other decisions where the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction are not holdings.  All but one of the unpublished New Jersey decisions cited by Defendant did not acknowledge the existence of any federal court decision.  [...] only mentioned *Hunstein* but never evaluated its reasoning.  Hardly the “due respect” mandated in *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 121 N.J. 69 (1990).  **POINT III.
[brief] **Design and Construction of the GAC Treatment System**  On February 27, 2020, NJDEP’s Bureau of Safe Drinking Water issued a Notice of Non-Compliance letter to [...] that established a deadline for the Borough to come into compliance with the PNFA MCL.  Pa167 at ¶ 11.  On March 30, 2020, [...] submitted a letter to NJDEP explaining that it would not be able to meet that original deadline due to the time needed to evaluate treatment options and secure funding.  Id. at ¶ 12.  [...] determined to install a Granular Activated Carbon Filtration water treatment system (the “Treatment System”) to remove PFNA from the water being drawn from [...]’s wells.  Id. at ¶ 13.  The Treatment System was designed to be capable of removing all PFAS compounds to non-detection levels.  Id.  In order to construct the Treatment System, [...] had to obtain NJDEP approval.  Pa168 at ¶ 15.  [...] applied on October 21, 2020 for a “Treatment Plant Permit” to construct, modify and operate a Public Water Works Facility.  Id.  On November 23, 2020, the NJDEP deemed the application administratively complete.  Id. at ¶ 16.  On April 7, 2021, the NJDEP provided final approval and issued [...].  Id. at ¶ 17.
[brief] ”  Opinion 691, 163 N.J.L.J. 220 (2001) (Da292)  “Rules of Professional Conduct are not to be applied “in a vacuum”, see In re Opinion 415, [of the Advis. Comm. On Prof’l Ethics 81 N.J.  318] [318], at 325 [1979] but rather should be interpreted and applied pragmatically and within proper regard to existing legislation as well as to contemporary practices. ”  See In re Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 162 N.J. 497, 509 (2000)([...], dissenting, opinion)  It would be absurd and illogical to have an “arm of the Court” permit an attorney to assist a client in an “illegal” act, i.e., refer a client to a funding company, review the documents and sign them, and then have the Court permit a plaintiff to sue the funding company, while exonerating the attorney.
[brief] FEDERAL CASES  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,158 (1970) ...........................................  6,9 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) .............................................  8,9  Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,698 (1986)  ..............................................  6.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)  ............  18,19 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006).  .................................................................................................................. 5,6.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) .........................  17,18,19 U.S. v. Shipp, 392 F. Supp. 3d 300, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117407, 2019 WL 3082484 (E.D.N.Y., 2019) ....................  16,17 U.S. v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ........................................  14,15  STATE CASES
[directive] Allegations that cannot be sustained, are not credible, or have resulted in the exoneration of an employee, including where the previous finding has either been vacated, or overturned on the merits in any subsequent action, generally are not considered to be sustained findings subject to the disclosure requirements of this Policy.  On the other hand, if the officer negotiates a plea or there is an administrative or civil settlement with the employer whereby the charge is dismissed, the charge would still be considered sustained, if there was sufficient credible evidence to prove the allegation, and the officer does not challenge the finding and obtain a favorable ruling by a hearing officer, arbitrator, Administrative Law Judge, Civil Service Commission or the Superior Court.  The reporting and public dissemination requirements of (a) through (j) above become applicable once an officer’s discipline is sustained, as defined above.  The reporting and public dissemination requirements of (k) and (l) above become applicable at the close of the reporting period during which they occur.  Section 6.0.1 of the IAPP requires that “All allegations of officer misconduct shall be thoroughly, 13 objectively, and promptly investigated to their logical conclusion in conformance with this policy, regardless of whether the officer resigns or otherwise separates from the agency.
[brief] Prior to the stop, [...] only knew: (1) there was an alleged fight involving Black men at the store and (2) [...], a Black man, was walking down the sidewalk in front of the store with his hand in his bag.  Collectively, these facts in no way suggest that [...] was engaged in criminal activity.  “None of th[e]se non-specific, non-individualized factors . . . ‘meet the constitutional threshold of individualized reasonable suspicion’ that this particular defendant was engaged in criminal activity. ”  *State v. Goldsmith*, 251 N.J. at 405-406 (citing *Nyema*, 249 N.J. at 532).  Like in *Shaw*, [...]’s mere presence as a Black man near the location of an alleged fight involving Black men cannot establish reasonable suspicion.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANT’S MISTRIAL APPLICATION WAS APPROPRIATELY DENIED  A mistrial should only be granted “to prevent an obvious failure of justice. ”  State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205 (1997).  “Whether an event at trial justifies a mistrial is a decision ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. ’”  Ibid. (citing State v. Dirienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 383 (1969).  Indeed, “a mistrial is a drastic remedy [that] should be resorted to only where manifest injustice would otherwise result. ”  Dirienzo 53 N.J. at 383; State v. Tillman, 122 N.J. Super. 137, 140 (App. Div. 1973).  Mishaps at trial must be “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  State v. Frisby, 184 N.J. 583, 591 (2002).  “The primary issue to be determined is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial…a trial is not a perfectly scripted and choreographed theatrical presentation; rather, it is an extemporaneous production whose course is often unpredictable given the vagaries of the human condition.  Attorneys will sometimes pose inartfully crafted questions, and even the most precise question may bring an unexpected response from a witness. ”  *State v. Yough*, 208 N.J. 385, 397.  Indeed, in any trial, "inadmissible evidence frequently, often unavoidably, comes to the attention of the jury."  *State v. Winter*, 96 N.J. 640, 646 (1984).  Here, the jury was exposed to inadmissible evidence.  Namely, during one of many untethered responses to counsel’s questioning, [...] volunteered information about defendant that was neither sought nor necessary.  Yet, it is important to note that this testimony spanned 65 transcript pages and covered an expanse of material.  This, sandwiched between a number of other witnesses offered by either the State or defense.  A few off-hand, unsolicited remarks were made about defendant’s history from one of several witnesses whose testimony was uncolored by extraneous commentary.  The jury had enough additional testimony and evidence to consider that these remarks could not have been material.  This notion is prominently manifest in defendant’s acquittal on the single count that [...] was offered to support.  [...]’s testimony was limited to the Witness Tampering count of the indictment.  She possessed no personal knowledge of the substantive offenses and would have been incompetent to testify thereto.  The Witness Tampering count, however, was entirely her creation.  As defendant shrewdly observes, the acquittal on that count represents the jury’s categorical disregard of [...]’s testimony.  It follows that if the jury disregarded her testimony on the issue for which she was summoned to testify, then they disregarded her testimony on tangential issues.  It can be confidently inferred, then, that the jury was unconvinced by anything [...] had to say and were not therefore improperly influenced.  The trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed.
[brief] Obviously, resolution of the instant matter through a bench trial would be more cost efficient than resolution of the matter through a jury trial.  For example, the numerous parties here would not be required to incur attorney’s fees in an effort to select an acceptable jury.  Similarly, since a jury is not utilized, the parties will not be required to incur the cost of drafting jury instructions.  Obviously, the process of trying a case before a judge is shorter than trying a case before a Jury.  In short, resolution of this matter through a bench trial would be more cost efficient for all parties.  Thus, resolution of matters such as the instant case through bench trials is consistent with the goal of encouraging insurance carriers to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey by reducing the cost of doing so.
[directive] 2.  Development of Training Curricula and Materials  a.  Approved training material is attached and to be disseminated with this Law Enforcement Directive.  The approved training material includes a written self instruction program to be completed by all law enforcement officers in the State of New Jersey.  b.  The [...] may develop additional training aids in the future on the Safe Return Program and Alzheimer’s Disease.  Any additional training aids so developed will be disseminated to all law enforcement agencies in the State of New Jersey.
[brief] These rules prohibit the admission of expert “opinion on matters that fall within the ken of the average juror,” State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 426 (2016), and limit such testimony to matters about which the expert possesses “sufficient expertise. ”  Jamerson, 153 N.J. at 340.  Our Supreme Court has recognized that “[e]xpert testimony coming from a law enforcement officer claiming to have superior knowledge and experience likely will have a profound influence on the deliberations of the jury” and “intrudes on the exclusive domain of the jury as factfinder. ”  Cain, 224 N.J. at 427.  Therefore, regardless of what a medical examiner is authorized to do as part of an investigation, his role at a criminal trial is “is to contribute the insight of his specialty,” and to not “go[] beyond what he can contribute as an expert.
[brief] Even if the Court’s decision is limited solely to final section of the Statement of Reasons, the trial court did reach a conclusion regarding the reasonable fee award which was consistent with a lodestar analysis.  Plaintiff’s argument that the court failed to articulate its reasoning for reducing the total award, is without merit.  Even a cursory review of the trial court’s 13-page decision shows that the trial court took careful consideration of the arguments raised by both parties and that the trial court understood those arguments along with the appropriate standard.
[brief] In deciding the case, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the defendant was not exonerated until the indictment was dismissed with prejudice in July of 2008 and thus, his claims were not time-barred for the one year statute of limitations.  In applying the undisputable law in the instant matter to the facts at hand, the Plaintiff/Appellant knew when in the presence of the Court on June 6, 2017 [...] found him not guilty of all criminal charges.  Pursuant to the applicable statute dealing with the definition of accrual, that is when his claim arose, and not two months later when the Judge entered a form of Judgment.
[brief] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “the Defendants”), which seeks to reverse and remand a jury verdict in this matter entered on May 26, 2023 which found the Defendants liable for creating a hostile work environment based on disability and retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“the LAD”), and awarded the Plaintiff $1,610,003.00 in compensatory and punitive damages.  As set forth at length below, the Defendants’ appeal should be rejected in its entirety because: 1) the Defendants cannot demonstrate that Plaintiff committed a McKenney violation during her testimony; 2) the Defendants have neither preserved nor properly argued a challenge to the Court’s jury charge as read; 3) Plaintiff’s counsel’s summation was proper under the plain error standard; and 4) the Jury’s liability and damages verdicts are supported by the weight of the evidence.  As the Defendants’ Appeal is entirely devoid of factual and legal merit, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Jury’s verdict be affirmed in its entirety.  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] IV.  **The policy’s limitation period, if appliable, was tolled until [...] declined coverage in its Answer, making [...]’s suit timely. **  (Raised Below: Pa174).  Although [...] received notice of [...]’s loss within days of the accident, it waited until July 2023 to deny coverage in its Answer.  If the policy’s four-year limitation period applies, then it was tolled until [...]’s post-suit denial.  [...]’s Complaint was, therefore, timely.  The Supreme Court applied this same tolling rule to vacate dismissal under similar circumstances in *Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins.*, 56 N.J. 514 (1970).
[brief] ”  *Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978).  Here, [...] seeks to avoid an obvious legislative restriction outlined in the Ricci Act that provides he is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation after July 8, 2021.  Even if [...] did not receive the postcard or any of the other notice provided by the Division, he cannot evade the two-year limitation period.  “As New Jersey courts have long recognized, ‘[i]gnorance of the law furnishes no excuse to a person either for a breach or for an omission of a duty[.]’”  Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C., 202 N.J. 349, 367 (2010) (quoting Bowen v. Pursel, 109 N.J. Eq. 67, 73 (E. & A. 1931)).  Thus, [...] purportedly being unaware of the Ricci Act until over three years after its passage cannot serve as the basis to allow him to evade its unambiguous requirements.