ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The law enforcement executive shall conduct an annual review of all vehicular pursuit incidents in their department.  The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal; (b) an audit of BWCs and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and (d) an analysis of vehicular pursuits to ensure that they are being conducted without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.  15
[brief] Ultimately, in that case, [...] wisely chose the better part of valor and simply refused to further participate in the litigation.  Da39.  That is precisely what will happen in this case if the Plaintiff is permitted to force Defendants’ chosen expert to conduct his examination under suboptimal conditions.  [...] will predictably refuse.  Defendants herein would be forced to choose between foregoing a neuropsychologic examination altogether or obtaining a second-rate examination.  If the latter route is chosen, we can expect that witness to be confronted with the same literature cited by [...] as support for his conviction that it is contrary to good practice to perform an evaluation whose results would be inherently less than 100% valid.  As [...] concluded, to do so would be unfair.  Pa149.  Given a fair analysis, the degree of prejudice imposed by denying the Defendants the right to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation outweighs the potential prejudice of barring recording devices from the test.  [...] properly concluded that the balance of equities favors the defendants’ request to compel this IME without recording.
[directive] Addendum C | April 2025  Barricaded Individuals 3.4  Utilize Procedures in Use of Force Policy.  The Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy requires that force be used only as a last resort and deadly force only as an absolute last resort.  Officers should, when feasible, and when no immediate threat to hostages or others is present, establish an inner perimeter, clear all third parties and wait for appropriate resources to respond.  Slowing down and using time as a tactic can help resolve the incident with minimal or no force being used.  3.5  Isolate and Contain.  First responding officers should isolate and contain the barricaded individual, and not attempt to force a resolution, unless such action is immediately necessary to prevent injury or death to hostages, other third parties or officers.  However, if clear evidence exists that the barricaded individual is currently engaged in behavior likely to cause their own imminent death or serious bodily injury, officers may take affirmative action to prevent this behavior or render medical aid.  Nothing in this policy is intended to discourage officers from attempting to peacefully resolve an incident during this phase using communication and negotiation tactics.  3.6  Family Members of the Barricaded Individual.  Whenever family members or close friends of the barricaded individual are at the scene, law enforcement should maintain close contact with these individuals in order to keep them advised on the status of the situation and to utilize them as sources of information that may be useful to Crisis Negotiators and mental health professionals in resolving the situation.  Supervisors should utilize Victim-Witness Assistance resources from the County Prosecutor’s Office or the State Police on-scene to See section 6.4 of this Policy. assist in these scenarios.  In some situations, community resources, such as community crisis response teams, may be helpful in communications with family members and close friends on scene.  The decision to seek or deploy assistance from such community-based resources should be made by the Incident Commander, in consultation with the County Prosecutor’s Office, to ensure that all safety and evidentiary concerns are properly addressed.  7  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[directive] Agencies that possess or use an ALPR or its data shall establish—or Establishing a conform existing—standing operating procedures, directives, or orders that govern ALPRs and stored ALPR data consistent with this Directive before the Directive takes effect (ninety days after issuance).  The law enforcement executive shall provide a copy of the agency’s ALPR policy to the County Prosecutor (or DCJ Director) and County and State ALPR Coordinator at or before the time of promulgation, including any subsequent policy amendments.  Violations.
[brief] Regardless, as set forth above, a court may give less weight to the likelihood of success prong of Crowe where the subject matter of the litigation would be destroyed without the protection of injunctive relief.  See Waste Mgmt. 433 N.J. Super at 453.  In light of [...]’s judicially determined significant noncompliance and the likelihood that the Property is suitable for a residential inclusionary development, there is a great likelihood that the trial court will award Plaintiff a builder’s remedy and require [...] to rezone the Property.
[brief] *See Mills v. Alabama*, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars, to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. ”) (internal citation omitted).  Defendants’ alleged activities also involve a “matter of public concern. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-50(b)(3).  “Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public. ”  *Snyder v. Phelps*, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (internal citation omitted).  “Get-refusal,” Pa.1, and its impact on *agunot*, or “chained women,” is a topic of significant interest and concern in the Jewish community, and one that has been covered extensively in the pages of Defendant [...].
[brief] of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987) ............................................................................... 7, 8, 14, 15  Jalowiecki v. Leuc, 182 N.J. Super. 22, (App.Div.1981) .........................................................  7  Langer v. Morris Plan Corp., 110 N.J.L. 186 (1933)  ..........................................................................  10 Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997)  ............................................................................  6, 10, 11, 12 Marconi v. United Airlines, 460 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 2019) .....................................................  4 Morris Plan Corp. v. Leschinsky, 12 N.J. Misc. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1933) .................................................................
[brief] The rules permit the Commission to consider the candidate’s complete employment history without limitation.  As the Commission explained in its first decision, [c]oncerning [[...]]’s assertion that the incidents after her major discipline should not be considered because these incidents were to be removed from her personnel file based on the CNA, it is noted that the record is unclear as to what the CNA states in regard to list removal for promotion, and the full CNA has not been provided to the Commission.  Regardless, the Commission is not a party to the CNA, and the Commission can evaluate a candidate’s entire employment history when considering a list removal request for promotion as it is in the public’s interest for it to make its determination based on a complete record.  AA7.
[brief] *State v. Coleman*, 46 N.J. 16, 37 (1965).  “Due respect” should be given “particularly where [those decisions] are in agreement. ”  *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 121 N.J. 69, 80 (1990).  Here, decisions from multiple federal courts of appeal counsel that a mid-trial request to proceed pro se warrants substantive consideration.  See, e.g., *United States v. Noah*, 130 F.3d 490, 498 (1st Cir. 1997); *United States v. Hage*, 74 F.4th 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2023); *United States v. Bankoff*, 613 F.3d 358, 373 (3d Cir. 2010); *United States v. Kosmel*, 272 F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 2001); *United States v. Wesley*, 798 F.2d 1155, 1155–56 (8th Cir. 1986).  Those decisions explain that a district court has the discretion to deny such a request after engaging in the required analysis.
[brief] 343 N.J. Super. 241 (2001) is also squarely on point.  There, the defendant employer claimed that the plaintiff employee had waived his right to file a discrimination complaint and instead had agreed to binding arbitration.  The claim was premised on the employee having signed an “Employee Handbook Acknowledgement” by which he agreed to be bound by arbitration procedures in the employer’s “Employment Arbitration Policy. ”  That policy was summarized in a Handbook.  The employer argued that “even if the signed Acknowledgement did not express a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights to file a LAD complaint, the Handbook did contain such a statement and, by incorporation, satisfied the requirement that any such waiver by an employee be clear, specific and unambiguous. ”  343 N.J. Super. at 243.  The Court disagreed.  It found “that the reference in the Acknowledgement (the only document signed by plaintiff) did not satisfy that requirement, that defendant therefore did not meet its burden of demonstrating a knowing and binding waiver of plaintiff’s right to maintain this suit” and that the lower court’s denial of the motion to dismiss or compel arbitration was proper.
[brief] Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, (2013).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db33  County of Bergen Employee Benefit Plan v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. 412 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2010)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db40,41  Courier News v. Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office, 358 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div. 2003)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db49,50  Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, (2009)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db33  Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015) . .  Db49  Ingersoll v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 138 N.J. 236 (1994)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db36,37 Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, (App.Div. 2013).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db33  New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company v. Travelers Insurance Company, 198 N.J. Super. 9 (App. Div. 1984).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db35  Park v. Park, 309 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1998).  . . . . . . . . .Db44  Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479, (1992).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db33  Perreira v Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Db43,44  State Farm Indemnity Company v. National Liability and Fire Insurance Company, 439 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2015).  Db32,33 Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 135 N.J. 349, (1994).  Db33  Warnig v Atlantic City Council Special Services, 636 N.J. Super. 563 (App 2003).  Db37, 39, 45
[brief] ” (1T14:1-5).  On October 17, 2015, [...] was located “right around the corner from [a] school” in order to “provide a safe environment for [] kids to walk home. ” (1T36:25-37:1).  School was “letting out” when [...] heard “numerous gunshots. ” (1T36:12-15).  [...] drove in the direction of the gunfire, and saw civilians fleeing the area.  (1T37:15-24).  He continued driving toward the scene, where he saw a man “standing over top” and “constantly shooting” another man.  (1T37:15-24).  [...] proceeded to pull into an intersection, and get out of his car in order to “engage the suspect. ” (1T38:2-6).  However, as [...] was stepping out of his car, another vehicle ran a stop sign, and struck him.
[brief] ARGUMENT  Preliminary relief is appropriate when the moving party establishes “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) a showing that on balance the harm to the moving party is greater than the harm to the party to be restrained; and (4) the public interest will not be harmed. ”  In re City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super. 366, 387 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133); see also Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cnty. Util. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008) (confirming that while “all the Crowe factors must weigh in favor of injunctive relief, a court may take a less rigid view than it would after a final hearing when the interlocutory injunction is merely designed to preserve the status quo”).  This court also refuses to take “a grudging or narrow approach” to such relief when the State is merely seeking to maintain the status quo pending resolution of a DCR administrative action.  Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining enforcement of the Original and Revised Policies while DCR’s administrative action proceeds.  See Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super. 387, 395 (App. Div. 2006) (holding grant of preliminary relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126, 137 (1994) (“The authority to issue injunctive relief falls well within the discretion of a court of equity. ”); Interactive Brokers, LLC v. Barry, 457 N.J. Super. 357, 362 (App. Div. 2018) (adding a preliminary-relief order should be upheld “unless it was ‘made without a rational explication, inexplicably departed from established practices, or rested on an impermissible basis’” (citation omitted)).  The court correctly held the State is likely to succeed and that the equitable factors all squarely support enjoining the Policies.  **POINT I**
[brief] POINT FIVE  THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE OR ENFORCED AGAINST PETITIONER  Copies of documents are not to be admitted into evidence when there is a genuine question raised as to the original's authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.  N.J.R.E. 1003.  Here genuine questions exist as to the Photocopies authenticity and the circumstances made it unfair to admit the Photocopy into evidence or to support a finding that it stripped the Petitioner of his rights to a Legislatively created elective share of his wife's estate.  Given how signatures on photocopies are easily forged or manipulated by electronic means, visual comparisons of signatures from photocopies to determine if they are genuine, is an insufficient method for authentication of a document.  Yet, that was the process that [...] used.  The New York Court in Banco Multiple Santa Cruz, S.A., v. Moreno, 888 F. Supp. 2d 356, 375-376 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (attached as Pra1) was confronted with a similar issue involving photocopied signatures.  In Banco Multiple Santa Cruz, S.A., v. Moreno, when denying the grant of summary judgment, the Court evaluated, inter alia, whether a financial institution ([...]) was negligent after it distributed the proceeds from an annuity account when its means of verifying signatures was by comparing the signature cards to a faxed [...] withdrawal form.  888 F. Supp. 2d at 375 (Pr714a)  [...] in his capacity as a forensic document examiner, stated that signatures on faxed documents are easily forged or manipulated by electronic means.
[brief] In the Plaintiff’s submitted April 18, 2023, de novo brief, the [...] set forth the following beliefs, as to why it had met its appeal obligations, and specifically asking the Superior Court to finalize the judgment of conviction upon trial de novo.  First, according to the Plaintiff, they argued that all discovery had been provided to the Defendant, with the Defendant equally arguing, the Plaintiff provided discovery however, the tangible discovery file was incomplete [AP 1]¹ including the Plaintiff’s missing witness information and testimony by [...].  Her testimony is heavily utilized in the Plaintiff’s de novo final conviction request [AP 62 and 2T5-7 to -16]².  Both trial courts did not deny the possibility of missing discovery by the Plaintiff; including the Plaintiff not recollecting if they received the additional request from the Defendant with the Plaintiff requesting the trial court to conduct an in-court file review [T9-1 to -13] and ¹ AP represents appendix section of brief ² 2T represents the transcript of the April 24, 2023 de novo appeal [T40-5 to -9].  The trial court did not conduct an in-court file review, deemed the Defendant did not properly submit her habitual discovery follow up requests per court rules [AP 59] and [T40-10 to -14] and proceeded to mock the Defendant’s request as a form of a fishing expedition [AP 59] and [T13-9 to-12].
[brief] This Court’s analysis in *Woo-Padva* is precisely on point:  Defendant does not provide loans and is not a consumer lender and therefore does not require a license.  . . .  Defendant is not a consumer lender under the NJCFLA.  Defendant is a debt buyer that purchased Plaintiff’s defaulted and charged-off [...] credit card account.  Defendant does not provide loans, nor does it extend credit.  Defendant buys debts and, at times, as in the present case, it retains debt collectors to collect on the debts purchased.  *Woo-Padva v. [...]*, No. [...], 2022 WL 267938, at *2 (N.J. Super. L. Jan. 7, 2022).  Thus, the Trial Court correctly dismissed Count I.  III.  **The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Count II for Failure to State a Claim Under the NJCFA**
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Where out-of-court identification is made under suggestive circumstances, the court must conduct a preliminary hearing, a *Wade* hearing, to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence.  *State v. Ridout*, 299 N.J.Super. 233, 238 (App.Div.1997); see *State v. Herrera*, 187 N.J. 493, 501–04 (2006) (discussing the development of the analysis related to the admission of eyewitness testimony).
[brief] Testimony from [...], Plaintiff’s Chief Development Officer, [...], Executive Vice-President of [...] (“[...]”), and [...], AICP, PP, Plaintiff’s Planner, all support this conclusion.  No evidence was offered to the contrary.  Mr. Landsburg testified that Plaintiff owns 19 buildings and leases or operates 79 buildings, each over 300,000 square feet: one of the 19 owned buildings has a partial height of less than 30 feet (it was acquired 20 years ago and built in 1960); and two of the 79 leased or operated buildings have building heights less than 30 feet (both were built in the 1980s).  (5T 9:15-25; 10:13-25; 11:11-18).  In the past 20 years, Plaintiff has not built or leased a warehouse under 30 feet, and all new construction projects have building heights of at least 38 feet.  (5T 10:1-9; 11:1-4).  Mr. Terkanain, an Executive Vice-President at [...], the world’s largest industrial real estate broker, specializes in bulk industrial warehouses.  (5T 32:21-24; 33:2-3).  Mr. Terkanian’s team has about 45 million square feet of bulk industrial warehouses, all greater than 200,000 square feet, in the “pipeline”, in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.  (5T 38:3-17).  Based on his experience in the field of industrial development and marketability, Mr. Terkenian provided similar testimony to Mr. Landsburg.  Over the past 10 years, in the Tri-State region, warehouse building heights have ranged between 46 to 50 feet, with “clear heights”\(^4\) between 36 to 40 feet.  (5T 44:17-25; 45:1-9; 49:15-25; 50:1).  Development in Burlington County has tracked the regional trend.  Ja105.  More specifically, in the past 10 years, no warehouses over 100,000 square feet have been constructed with a building height of 30 feet or less, or with “clear heights” of 23 or 24 feet.  (5T 48:10-19).  Mr. Terkanian also compiled a list of 34 “spec buildings”, on the market in New Jersey, Eastern Pennsylvania, Northern Delaware, and Northern --- \(^4\) “Clear height” is the industry standard for warehousing, which is the “height under the lowest structural member at the first column line inside the building.
[brief] A.  Principles Governing PCR Petitions & Appellate Review  The governing principles in this area are well settled.  PCR “is a safeguard that ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted. ”  State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997).  “PCR provides a defendant with a means to challenge the legality of a sentence or final judgment of conviction which could not have been raised on direct appeal. ”  Ibid.; accord R. 3:22-4.  It is not a mechanism to “challenge the sufficiency of evidence used to convict a defendant[,]” McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 483, or a forum to relitigate issues that have already been “expressly adjudicated[,]” R. 3:22-5.  Criminal defendants are entitled to “reasonably competent counsel. ”  State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 56 (1987).  To demonstrate that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must prove first that counsel’s performance was deficient, and second that counsel’s deficient performance caused him prejudice.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.
[brief] An employee is not required to have some kind of “smoking gun” evidence of discriminatory intent, beyond the proof that the employer’s proffered reason for the adverse employment decision is not worthy of belief.  A fact finder is permitted to infer discriminatory animus from facts showing that the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason is “weak” or “implausible” or “incoherent” has long been accepted as one way to prove, circumstantially, that the proffered reason is pretextual.
[brief] Section 1:3-9 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:3-9.  So many of the laws of the United States as may at any time be apportioned to this State by the Congress of the United States shall be de- livered to the custodian of the State House, who shall, after retaining one set for his own use, distribute the remainder at the expense of the State as follows:  a.  To the Governor, Attorney-General, Secretary of State and treasurer, each one set. b.  To each member of the Legislature, one set. c.  To the Secretary of the Senate, for the use of the Senate, two sets; and to the Clerk of the General Assembly for the use of the General Assembly, four sets.  d.  To the Chief Justice, the justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of the Superior Court, each one set. e.  To the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Clerk of the Superior Court, each one set.  f.  To each county prosecutor, one set. g.  To the librarians of [...] and of the two literary societies in that college, to the librarians of [...] and of the two literary societies at that college, and to the librarians of [...] and of the two literary societies of that college, one set. h.  To the librarian of the [...], one set.  i.  The remainder to be distributed among the several counties in proportion to their quota of State taxes, the same to be transmitted to the treasurer of each county, to be by him distributed in his county to the following persons in the order named:  1.  To the clerk of the County Court, one set.  2.  To the directors or managers of every library in the county, one set.  3.  To the judges of the County Court, each one set.  4.  The residue, if any, to be disposed of as shall be directed by the board of chosen freeholders of the county.