ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The complaint alleged nonpayment of rent.  (Da1).  On April 2, 2024 [...], represented by [...], made a pretrial motion to have the matter dismissed or transferred to the Chancery Division.  Counsel for [...] began by pointing out that under the holding in Essex Property Services, Inc. v. Wood, 246 N.J. Super. 487, 488 (1991) if the predominant relationship between the parties is not that of a landlord and tenant, then the tenancy court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter or enter judgment.  (2T11-2, 2T46-24).  Counsel for [...] related to the Court how title to the Soto home had come into the hands of the Plaintiff, an LLC owned by [...].  (2T21-8, 2T22-14, 2T29-16) (Da15, Da22, Da37).  Counsel further offered that the transfer of title had involved a foreclosure rescue plan that included the issuance of a loan by [...] to the [...] to pay off a tax lien and the promise that at the completion of a twelve year period of the [...] making payments to [...], title would be transferred back from the LLC to the [...].  (2T21-8, 2T24-16).  Counsel next stated that in 2023 [...] had made the final payment on the loan but that [...] was now refusing to return title of the home to her.  (2T12-12).  The response by plaintiff’s attorney was that a sale had taken place and that [...], through [...], now owned the property.  (Da15, Da22, Da37).  Counsel further argued that given the sale, [...] was a tenant of [...].  (1T14-19, 2T13-6, 2T14-1, 2T15-1) (Da15, Da22, Da37).  However, counsel for Plaintiff admitted that there was no contract of sale as to the property’s ownership.  (1T4-19, 2T13-6, 2T14-1, 2T15-1).  Counsel also agreed that there was no written lease that might evidence the existence of a landlord tenant relationship.  (2T30-20, 2T31-3) (Da43).  Following the conclusion of argument by counsel, the Court, and without having had the benefit of any witness testimony or a careful examination of the documentary evidence, rendered its decision declaring Defendant to be a tenant and denying Defendant’s motion to transfer.  (2T50-21) (Da11).  If we look at all of the evidence in this case, all of the evidence in this case indicates that the [...] were paying rent, $2,100 every month for a long time.  They were not making payments to payoff the mortgage.  They were paying $2,100.  The Court finds there’s no evidence of fraud.  There’s no basis of fraud.  There’s no reason to transfer this case, so your request to transfer the case is denied.  (2T51-21, 2T52-1).  Having denied the motion, the Court then proceeded to conduct a nonpayment of rent trial and, finding for the Plaintiff, entered Judgment for Possession.  (Da12).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] This is true even if the Appellate Division finds [...]’s report was improperly excluded.  First, as to defendant’s duty of care, a hotel generally owes a duty to its invitees to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to render the premises safe for their protection and to warn them of known unreasonably dangerous conditions, or conditions that should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable care.  *Handelman v. Cox*, 74 N.J. Super. 316, 331-32 (App. Div. 1962), aff’d, 39 N.J. 95, 112 (1963); see also *Rigatti v. Reddy*, 318 N.J. Super. 537, 541 (App. Div. 1999) (noting landowner has “non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees against known or reasonably discoverable dangers” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
[brief] Alternatively, if the Court is inclined to consider the merits of the discovery argument raised by Appellant, it will quickly see that there is no merit on substantive grounds.  Additional discovery is unnecessary because the material facts are undisputed, and discovery will not change the outcome.  Appellant does not dispute that its predecessor’s servicer received and subsequently returned the First Wire Transfer.  [...] sent the Borrowers the Payoff Statement on April 9, 2021.  (Pa201).  On May 7, 2021, [...] received the First Wire Transfer from [...] on behalf of [...], the lender on the Bronx Girls’ loan.  (Pa416 at ¶¶ 10).  Because the funds received on May 7th were allegedly short by $3,312.88, the [...] directed the funds be returned to [...] via outgoing wire twelve (12) days later on May 19, 2021.  (Pa436 at ¶ 40).  On May 21, 2021, [...] returned the funds to [...] via the Second Wire Transfer, a full two (2) weeks after [...] first received the funds from [...].  (Pa436 at ¶ 41).  In addition, Appellant concedes in its Brief that its predecessor and [...]: (i) did not accept the funds; (ii) did not apply the funds to the balance of the Loan; (iii) did not discharge the Mortgage; and (iv) returned the funds to [...] via outgoing wire transfer on May 21, 2021.  These are the only material facts that are relevant to the issue of whether Appellant breached its obligations under the loan documents and applicable law by refusing to credit the funds to the balance of the Loan.  This is not a case where discovery is needed because critical facts are peculiarly within Respondent’s own knowledge.  See Martinez, supra, 242 N.J. at 472.  Here, it is quite the opposite since most of the relevant records establishing when and how the funds were received and returned by [...] were produced by Appellant in connection with the Motions.  While Appellant seeks discovery as to events and circumstances after the funds were returned to [...] on May 21st, these facts and circumstances are irrelevant and have no bearing on [...]’s responsibilities with respect to the First Wire Transfer before it was returned to [...].  Because the Trial Court concluded that [...] failed to accept and apply the First Wire Transfer to the balance of the Loan in accordance with the terms of the loan documents and applicable law, it granted Respondent’s Motion, denied the Cross-Motion, and entered an Order discharging the Mortgage.  While Appellant argues the Trial Court denied it the opportunity to establish a record as to whether Appellant’s predecessor’s acceptance of a “short payment” made the transaction a “short sale” (Appeal Brief, p. 15), [...] categorically rejected this argument.
[brief] (7T 106-7 to 107-6)  [...] was unquestionably stabbed with a knife and hit with a tire iron.  Yet if the jury credited both [...]’s testimony that she stabbed [...] in self-defense and [...]’s testimony that [...] was alive when he was hit with the tire iron, the jury was left in an impossible position.  The jury was required to either acquit [...] of all charges related to harming [...], even if the jury believed that [...] was alive when he was hit with the tire iron, or to convict [...] of a homicide offense.  As our Supreme Court has recognized, “a jury reluctant to acquit [a] defendant might compromise on a verdict of guilt on the greater offense.  ‘Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. ’”  State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293, 299 (1988) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973)) (emphasis in original).
[brief] FIRST STREET CONDO : SUPERIOR COURT ASSOCIATION, INC., CLINTON : OF NEW JERSEY, [...], : LAW DIVISION, 357 8TH STREET CONDOMINIUM : HUDSON COUNTY ASSOCIATION, JOSEPH A. DEL : DOCKET NO. [...] FORNO, INC., DEL FORNO REAL : Sat Below:  ESTATE LLC, UNLIMITED BUILDING MANAGEMENT : [...], CORP., Defendants-Respondents.  J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] Yet that is the upshot of defendant’s argument, the consequences of which would be extraordinary.  States have adopted a wide array of permitting requirements governing whether and when a resident may carry in their State.  By defendant’s logic, any resident of those States may carry in any jurisdiction that they wish, no matter the State’s own laws, forcing every State to accept “the lowest common denominator of gun control among the various states. ”  Matter of Two Seized Firearms, 127 N.J. 84, 86 (1992); cf. Culp v. Raoul, 921 F.3d 646, 655 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Forcing the State to issue concealed-carry licenses to nonresidents despite” its inability to verify their mental health and criminal histories “would thrust upon Illinois a race to the bottom.  Licenses would have to issue along eligibility standards … below those established by the State legislature for its own residents. ”).
[brief] Defendants also misquote the transcript from the oral argument before the trial court in stating that “Defendants admitted and argued before the trial court that the choice-of-law provision entitles them to circumvent the MBPA’s protections for New Jersey malt beverage distributors, which protect distributors to a greater degree than New York’s ABC Law. ”  (Pb at 30.)  The quotation they cite, T80:21-81:1, states:  “[...]:  So for all of those reasons, we contend that New York not New Jersey law should apply.  Or if Your Honor doesn’t agree with c.  New York Law would still govern absent a choice-of-law provision  Appellants argue that the final requirement of the second Restatement exception applies – *i.e.*, what law would govern under § 188 absent the choice-of-law provision in the Wholesaler Agreement – because “New Jersey has the most significant relationship to the Wholesaler Agreement and the parties compared to New York” and “since the operative facts giving rise to Appellants’ claims are centered on New Jersey, New Jersey would be the most appropriate law to apply in the absence of any choice-of-law provision. ” (Pb at 34-35.)  It is undisputed that the contacts to consider in determining the state whose law would apply in the absence of a choice-of-law provision under Restatement § 188 include: (a) the place of contracting; (b) the place of negotiation of the contract; (c) the place of performance; (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.  *See* Restatement § 188(2); Pb at 34, n.9.  Given that 90% of Appellants’ [...] sales occur in New York and Appellants’ maintain licensed premises in New York, it is clear that New York has the most significant relationship and contacts with the parties and their transactions.  Thus, New York would be the most appropriate law to apply absent any choice-of-law provision.  _____________________ that, New York law should at least apply the ABCL to the 90 percent of beer distributed in New York and the MBPA apply to the 10 percent in New Jersey. ”  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE WHOLESALER AGREEMENT’S ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS ENFORCEABLE UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW
[brief] Page nos.  Counterstatement of Procedural History  ...........................................  1  Counterstatement of Facts ..................................................................  3  A. Trial ..............................................................................................  3  B.  PCR Proceedings ..........................................................................  12  1.  The Evidentiary Hearing .........................................................  12  2.  The PCR Court’s Decision .......................................................  18  Legal Argument Point I  The PCR Court Properly Rejected Defendant’s Claims that His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective by Failing to Investigate the Alleged Alibi Witnesses and by Failing to Hire a Cell Phone Expert to Examine the Phone Records .............................................
[directive] When the victim requests a CVSA’s presence during a law enforcement interview, the CSVA will be asked to provide their first name and last initial, and the name and address of the affiliated sexual violence program.  When needed, further identifying information may be obtained from the sexual violence program or the CSVA outside the victim’s presence.  For example, a CSVA may be asked to furnish a driver’s license or other valid I.D. to enter a building or to have an entry in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system created to document who has entered and exited the premises.  -7-
[brief] 6T.24:2 to 26:12.  In reviewing that Charge with the parties, the Court inquired and obtained Plaintiff’s life expectancy from his counsel.  4T.132:1 to 132:6.  No mention was made of the time unit rule, and Plaintiff’s counsel did not indicate to the Court that it had omitted a portion of the Charge he had requested.  As a result, the Charge agreed upon by the parties did not contain any reference to the time unit rule, and in his summation, defense counsel did not address the time unit rule argument.
[brief] (5T116-8 to 22).  As the masked man was chasing [...] and [...] up the stairs, he took control of the gun and started shooting.  (5T121-4 to 13).  [...] and [...] were killed in the shooting and [...] was wounded by a shot in her leg.  (5T122-3 to 6, 80-5 to 81-22).  [...] testified that she had also been in bed around the time of the incident but got up because she heard a “commotion. ” (5T41-15 to 24).  When she got up and went to the stairs, she saw [...], [...], and [...] “fighting over [a] knife” as they were trying to get [...] out of the house.  (5T42-4 to 7, 22-1 to 17).  [...] eventually heard gunshots but did not see the actual shooting because she was back in her room.  (5T16-12 to 18-2).  [...] also testified that she saw [...] leaving the house with a gun, and that she never saw anyone with a facemask on.
[brief] (27T79:7 to 80:14).  To protect the Plaintiffs, the trial court correctly entered judgment jointly and severally.  [...] exerted control over all of the entity defendants and monies were transferred from [...] and [...] into joint accounts that he and [...] controlled.  Despite this, the defendants below advocated for a convoluted set of allocations: 60% to [...]; 11% to [...]; 16% to [...]; 84% to [...]; and 98% for [...]; and nothing to the rest of the defendants.  (27T44:6-13).  They now press that argument on appeal.  (Db74).  In New Jersey, “liability is presumed to be joint and several” except when a reasonable basis exists to determine the contribution of each cause of a single harm.
[brief] My business address is [...].  I have been employed by the Company for over 12 years.  I have a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland and an MBA from Rutgers University.  Q.  Please describe your responsibilities as a Senior Engineer for [...].  A.  As a Senior Engineer, I am responsible for the engineering design, project management, construction oversight and system planning of [...]’s transmission and distribution system.  Q.  What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?  A.
[brief] That presentence report, which was submitted to us after oral argument, indicated that defendant had struck the victims of three of the robberies in the head or the face with a pistol and punched a victim of one of the other robberies in the face.  On the next scheduled court date, September 8, 2006, defendant refused to appear in court.  The court stated that it was rejecting the plea bargain for which it had taken the factual bases on May 22, 2006.  The court also stated that it would not accept a plea bargain for less than twenty years imprisonment.
[brief] As Appellant filed a timely adjudicatory hearing request of [...]’s 2019 WFD permit modification, and subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal of the [...]’s March 14, 2023 denial of its adjudicatory hearing request, Appellant also challenges the merits of the [...]’s grant of [...]’s WFD permit modification in this appeal. \footnote{It should be noted that Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n was decided approximately six months after Appellant filed its appeal.  In Appellant’s Case Information Statement filed with its Notice of Appeal, Appellant listed as one of the proposed issues to be raised on appeal “[t]he [...]’s issuance of the… Permit Modification [was] arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. ”  [Aa537.]  Appellant also advised Respondents that it would be challenging the merits of [...]’s permitting decision in its October 24, 2023 motion to settle the record.  [Ara4.]}  III.
[brief] Defendant was a juvenile when he committed his offenses, and much ink has been spilled in the last dozen or so years in this area.  But from then up to today, it remains the case that juvenile murderers can still be sentenced to lengthy sentences, even ones that are the substantial equivalent of life without parole, so long as the sentencing court considers the necessary factors related to the offenses and the offender.  In *Graham*, the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution categorically prohibits sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.  560 U.S. at 82.\(^6\)  The *Graham* Court pointed out, however, that “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to” such offenders.  *Id.* at 74-75.  Instead, the states must give those defendants “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. ”  *Id.* at 75.  The Court did not define “meaningful opportunity[,]” leaving that decision to the states “in the first instance. ”  *Ibid.*  Notably, the Court also concluded that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. ”  *Ibid.*  But it --- \(^6\)  Five years earlier, in *Roper v. Simmons*, the Court held that capital punishment for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.
[brief] The Respondent testified at length as to the Petitioner’s habits and inappropriate conduct which annoyed and disturbed both the Decedent and Respondent.  (10T79-2 to 83-11).  She noted that the Decedent had seen a therapist and also a church group for help for her marital problems.  (10T157-4 to 16).  In addition, the Respondent stated:  I know there became a time that she stopped voicing her issues or frustrations because she felt that, that it would result in a fight or him ignoring her or packing up and leaving, whether it was for a short time or a long time (10T156-19 to 23).  However, because of her strong religious faith, the Decedent chose to never divorce the Petitioner.  (11T58-19 to 24).  In addition, the Decedent was afraid of taking such a legal step, since the Petitioner would have “made her life, you know hell,” as the Petitioner “wouldn’t have just gone quietly. ” (10T162-21 to 24).  In addition, as noted by the Respondent:  I’m sure she appreciated the safety of having, you know, of having somebody else in the house, like feeling like she was protected in some way, like it wasn’t just her, because she didn’t have that most of her life (crying).  (11T84-6 to 10).  The Decedent had “abandonment” issues, which were based upon the fact that her father left the family and went to California when she was seven years old.  This event “really scarred her” and caused her to seek therapeutic help.  (11T87-22 to 88-11; 11T89-24 to 90-11).  2.
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Spanish Defendant's Initials Fonnulario revisado promulgado para el 12/31/2019, Suplemento a la Directiva #01-18, CN 10079- Spanish Iniciales de! acusado page 3 of7/pagina 3 de 7 7.
[brief] ”  In response to Request No. 9, defendants certified, “a.  [...] retained all property transfer documents, such Deed and Purchase Agreement, 2019 and 2020 corporate tax returns that were provided and in possession of the Plaintiffs.  b.  None were retained as to [...].  c.  None were retained as to [...].  f.  No knowledge as to [...].  Defendants reserve the right to amend this answer in accordance with Court Rules.
[brief] Judgment of Dismissal - February 1, 2013 (Indictment No. [...], count 2)  ..............................................................Da8-10  State v. Simmons, No. A-4938-12, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 306 (App. Div. Feb. 11, 2016)  .................................................................Da11-18  Judgment of Conviction - Resentence - April 15, 2016 (Indictment No. [...], count 1)  ..............................................................Da19-22  Change of Judgment of Conviction to Reflect  No Prior Service Credits - August 18, 2016 (Indictment No. [...], count 1)  ..............................................................Da23-26
[brief] Furthermore, “[a]n allowance for counsel fees is permitted following the filing of a motion in aid of litigant's rights, R. 1:10-3. ”  Satz v. Satz, 476 N.J. Super. 536, 554 (App. Div. 2023), cert. denied, 256 N.J. 352 (2024).  Again, the Settlement Agreement specifically states that [...] can move to enforce the settlement agreement “through a motion to enforce litigant’s rights . . . filed in Superior Court, Passaic County.
[brief] (7T153-19 to 154-9).  [...] was clearly conflicted about testifying on this subject in defendant’s presence:  AP: I know this is tough because you love [...], don’t you?  MICHELLE: Oh, yeah.  AP: Okay.  Do you love what he did?  MICHELLE: No.  AP: But you still love him.  MICHELLE: Yes.  That’s the only reason I talked to anybody because I thought I was protecting him.
[brief] [...] was entitled to a bulk variance  The so called “flexible c” variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) requires that “(1) the specific variances sought will advance the purposes of the [Municipal Land Use Law],” i.e. the positive criteria, and “(2)...the benefits of the variance [outweigh] against any detriment[;] and (3)...can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good or impairment of the intent and purpose of the zoning ordinance,” i.e. the negative criteria.  *Pullen v. Twp. of S. Plainfield Planning Bd.*, 291 N.J.Super. 1, 7-8 (App. Div. 1996).  “The focus under a c(2) variance analysis is on the characteristics of the land that present an opportunity for improved zoning and planning that will benefit the community. ”  *Id.* at 9.  Here, as explained at hearings on the application, [...] could build a billboard twice the size of the proposed billboard, but it opted for a reduced size at a location where there was comparable signage.  This is an “opportunity for improved zoning…” and consistent with zoning purposes.  See *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-2(c), (i); see *Burbridge v. Mine Hill*, 117 N.J. 376, 386 (1990) (aesthetics alone can even justify a use variance).
[brief] my personal feelings are that the marriage should dissolve and that you should have the freedom to deal with your life as you see fit.  In that light, I have no claim against any of your assets as I believe that you would like to preserve them all for your family and [...].  (Pa 536).  **Second**, the Decedent did her best to keep the failed marriage going, in part no doubt because of her strong religious faith, which prevented her from filing for divorce.  **Third**, the Decedent was afraid of taking such a legal step, since the Petitioner would have “made her life, you know hell,” as the Petitioner “wouldn’t have just gone quietly. ”
[brief] One well known treatise has described the effect of application of the doctrine as follows:  Whenever a party, who, as an actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience or good faith, or other equitable principles, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him *in limine*; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy.  2 Pomeroy, *Equity Jurisprudence*, § 397 (5th ed. 1941).  Here, Plaintiff not only sued [...], a party to the Contract, but she also sought to pierce the corporate veil and pursue a claim against [...] and [...].  An attempt to pierce the corporate veil is equitable relief.  *See Sean Wood, L.L.C. v. Hegarty Group, Inc.*, 422 N.J. Super. 500 (App. Div. 2011).  Although Plaintiff is not now pursuing the claims against [...] and [...], (Da021) the fact is, she came into Court seeking equitable relief.