ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This is an action filed by a Condominium Association against the Developer, thirty-five (35) plus years after transition was turned over to the homeowners, “reinterpreting” a provision in the Master Deed (paragraph 8e), concerning Unit 74, which had been designated for building personnel and rented to the Condominium Association for said use for at least the past seventeen (17) plus years.  In November 2015, the Association’s prior counsel negotiated the purchase of Unit 74 with the Developer’s counsel pursuant to paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed and the unit owners conducted a vote on December 22, 2015 with their counsel, where 81% of unit owners approved the purchase of the Unit.  A Contract of Sale was finalized between counsel on February 1, 2016 and closing took place on April 7, 2016.  Both parties were represented by counsel and marketable title was insured by the Association’s title company.  The Association’s “new” counsel is now seeking to nullify the sale, based on a “reinterpretation” of paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed, over 35 years after transition was turned over to the Homeowners; over seventeen (17) plus years after the Association was leasing the Unit for building personnel from the Developer and over six (6) years after the Association, through prior counsel, approved of the purchase of the Unit and entered into a Contract of Sale for the purchase.  The Statue of Limitations has long since expired on this “reinterpretation” of paragraph 8(e) by its new counsel and the Court properly granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding the sale of Unit 74 was authorized by Section 8(e) of the 1983 Master Deed.
[brief] The Special Master’s recommendation that all fees be awarded to Plaintiffs for work on all pre-trial motions was accepted by the trial court.  That ruling failed to adhere to this Court’s standard.  The Special Master awarded fees for motions without considering whether the work was “reasonably devoted” to establishing the RICO claims.  (See 39071a-39073a (discussing [...]’s Motion for Statutory and Equitable Relief); 39077a (discussing [...]’s Motion for Equitable Relief)).  For example, the Special Master also blanketly approved fees on discovery motions, without considering the relevance of the particular discovery at issue to the RICO claims.  (39076a).  The Special Master awarded fees for Plaintiffs’ opposition to the [...]’ motion to amend their counterclaims without finding factual or legal overlap with the RICO claims, instead speculating that the counterclaim “could have greatly reduced any damages awarded to [...] at best and mean that [...]’s affirmative claims would be dismissed at worst. ”  (Id.)  Such overbroad reasoning by the Special Master highlights his refusal to follow this Court’s directive.  Work to avoid liability for [...] on a non-RICO theory is not work “reasonably devoted” to establishing the RICO claims.  Witnesses.
[brief] POINT V THE SUBMISSION BY PLAINTIFF OF NEW DOCUMENTS NOT BEFORE THE ZONING BOARD WAS NOT PROPER.  THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON SUCH DOCUMENTS FOR ITS INCORRECT DECISION REQUIRES REVERSAL (RAISED BEFORE TRIAL COURT Da177-194, COURT ORDER APPEALED  Da214, Da270)  As detailed, the Trial Court was clearly confused and incorrect as to the legal issue, the burden of proof, and the facts relevant.  The June 2017 Chancery Court Decision (Da29) --- that the 1963 Agreement (Da23) had established an “easement” allowing Lot 8 staff/attendee to park on the School Lot 5 and that such easement had not been abandoned --- was in evidence to the Zoning Board.  The School’s position was that that irrespective of such easement, such off-site parking use of Lot 5 is not permitted by current zoning rules and no prior authority in zoning established such use as legal (Da68).  The School submitted a limited number of documentary Exhibits to the Board to support its position (Da7-88).
[brief] 44  INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...] ..................................................  Da 1-3 Order on Motion to Suppress Statement ......................................................  Da 4 Order on Motion to Exclude [...]’s Testimony ........................................  Da 5 Order on Motion to Exclude or Limit  [...]’s Testimony .........................  Da 6-7 Verdict Form ........................................................................................................  Da 8-14 Judgment of Conviction .....................................................................................
[brief] ”  President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, An Addendum to PCAST Report on Forensic Science in Criminal Courts 1 (2017) (emphasis in original), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives. gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensics_addendum_finalv2.pdf.  Such empirical testing has been done to a somewhat limited degree for fingerprint analysis.  In 2016, PCAST noted that there were “only two black-box studies that were intentionally and appropriately designed to assess validity and reliability. ”  PCAST Report at 91.
[brief] On September 13, 2017, Tenant entered a commercial lease with [...] (“[...]”) to rent 20,800 rentable square feet at the [...] at [...] in [...] (the “Premises”) for a 190-month term, subject to two successive five-year renewal terms (the “Lease”) (Da5-Da87).  In February 2019, [...] sold the shopping center to Plaintiff, and assigned Plaintiff its rights and obligations under the Lease (Da193).
[brief] In contrast, and directly relevant to this appellate practice, Plaintiff attempted to submit a self-serving certification to the trial court, which sought to add new facts to the record in arguing he was an employee.  While it does not appear that Plaintiff’s certification was considered by the trial court, it must not be considered by this Court.  [...]’s motion to dismiss must be judged by the four corners of Plaintiff’s complaint, as well as any potential *public records*.  There is no provision for a party filing a deficient complaint and then later buttressing it with a self-serving certification to survive a motion to dismiss.  Further, [...]’s motion to dismiss was never converted to a motion for summary judgment as Plaintiff has argued.  As such, this Court should consider the public records that were submitted by [...] and filed below, but Plaintiff’s self-serving certification contained in his appendix must be disregarded by this Court on appeal.  II.
[brief] .................................................................  31 State v. Applegate, et. al., 107 N.J. Super. 159,163 (App. Div. 1969) .................................................................  21 State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 454 (2008)  ..............................  38 State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984) ........................................  38 State v. Nordstrom, et. als., 54 N.J. 50, 53 (1969) ..................... 22 State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W. 2d 769, 781 (Tex 1993) ....................  28 State v. Stulman, 136 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1975) .......... 29,45 State v. Sun Oil Company, 160 N.J. Super. 513 (Law Div. 1978) .................................................................  41  State v. William G. Rohrer, Inc., 80 N.J. 462 (1979) .... 18,23,40,41
[brief] [Parker v. Parker, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2720, *37-38 (Ch. Div. 2016) (emph. added)].  Here, the Chancery Court had already found that no statute, rule or agreement permitted shifting of legal fees to [...] and that, based on New Jersey’s public policy in adhering to the American Rule, [...] could not be required to “contribute” to the other parties’ legal fees.
[brief] I.  [...] IS ENTITLED TO A RENT INCREASE THAT NOT ONLY PERMITS IT TO PAY ITS BILLS BUT ALSO MAKE A FAIR RETURN ON ITS INVESTMENT..............................28  II.  THE BOARD’S MONTHLY RENT INCREASE TOTALING $154.99 WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS...............................31  A.  Record Facts  Demonstrating the Board’s Arbitrary and Capricious Determination of Amaconn’s Equity in the Unit...............33  B.  Facts Demonstrating the Board’s Arbitrary and Capricious Action in Reducing Amaconn’s Management Fee.............................35  III.  THAT [...] SOLD 10 OUT OF 11 UNITS IN THE BUILDING UPON CONVERTING IT TO A CONDOMINIUM PROPERTY DOES NOT BAR IT FROM EARNING A FAIR RETURN ON ITS INVESTMENT IN [...]’S UNSOLD UNIT............................36  IV.  ADJUSTMENTS FOR INFLATION WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE UNIT’S EQUITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING A FAIR RETURN ON THE UNIT..........................41  V.  CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE UNIT’S EQUITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING A FAIR RETURN ON THE UNIT.........................................................48  VI.  [...]’S EQUITY IN THE UNIT WAS NOT BASED UPON ITS APPRAISED MARKET VALUE AS A CONDOMINIUM.............50  VII.  [...]’S MANAGEMENT FEES WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN DETERMINING THE RENT INCREASE AND ARE SEPARATE FROM THE CONDOMINIUM FEES PAID BY [...]......................................................................................52  VIII.  A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT BY THE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN [...]’S EXPENSES........................................................................................................54  IX.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING THE RENT INCREASE RETROACTIVE TO AUGUST 1, 2019 (Da 7, 14T)...........54  CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................59
[brief] It was illegal under state law at that time to operate a health club, but Tenant was committed to paying its employees as well as security personnel to protect against vandalism or other property destruction (1T31-1 to 1T31-3).  Once the Gym Closure was lifted and Tenant reopened, Tenant paid Landlord rent (1T30-13 to 30-15).  After [...]’s testimony, the trial judge noted that because he “want[ed] to get rid of this,” once he “had a chance to look at” the Lease and interpret it, he would “make a decision on that,” and once the decision was made, it would then “be up to the tenant to either pay it or . . . a warrant will have to be issued; judgment would be entered. ” (1T36-9 to 1T36-25).  Again, even though the trial judge acknowledged Tenant was arguing that Landlord owed Tenant money under the Lease, he stated: (1) he had not yet looked at the Lease; but (2) once he did, he would make a decision; and (3) after that decision it would be up to “the tenant” alone whether to pay or be evicted.  In other words, the Tenant’s central defense—that the Lease provided for offset of Tenant’s delinquent rent against the larger sum Landlord owed Tenant—had already been rejected by trial judge before he even read the Lease.  IV.
[brief] Stepping into the well of the courtroom to gesture to the TV monitor, Plaintiff identified his vehicle and walked the jury through the happening of the collision (3T, at 24:23-28:19).  Plaintiff next explained to the jury the treatment he received.  He underwent orthopedic care from [...], to whom Plaintiff expressed not only neck and back pain, but also the development of a radiating pain into his arms (3T, at 33:5-34:9).  Plaintiff also saw a chiropractor named [...], with whom he treated for roughly two years until the COVID pandemic prevented him from attending any further (3T, at 35:5-18; 40:7-41:9).  Plaintiff also testified that immediately after the collision, he had to take a two-month leave from work because of his injuries (3T, 38:8-17).
[brief] The Trial Court correctly held that Defendants have no standing under the FRFPA because they are not an “owner” of the subject property, and are not an appropriate beneficiary of its provisions.  To the extent Defendants argue that violation of the FRFPA in the contract between Plaintiff and the property owner should excuse Defendants from its liability to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff relies on its argument set forth in the initial and instant brief -- “the contracts…which are collateral to and independent of the unlawful contract…and which are not in furtherance of its unlawful purpose, are valid and enforceable.
[brief] [...] will provide landscaping and fencing to screen and secure the generator.  Id.  [...] further found that the proposed location of the generator does not interfere with the sightlines from any vehicles entering or exiting the proposed building.  Id.  Finally, as to the negative criteria, [...] stated that the requested variance relief would not result in a substantial detriment to the public good as the proposed use is consistent with the surrounding area, the proposed setback would maintain light, air, and open space, and the development will improve the streetscape.
[brief] [...] answered firmly, it was the --- 53 The Superior Court concludes as an interpretation of admission of guilt or “slipped”.  defendant at trial but he was unable to identify the defendant of the same race, that carries a lesser degree of difficulty in identification as they are both African American.  Repeated questioning and redirect on cross-examination posed no error in allowing these lines of questioning on redirect examination.  Per plaintiff’s counsel, “if the defendant would have made those objections, the complaints could have been waived (2T11:1-3)  Defendant made several objections during her trial regarding [...] habitual changing identification narrative (1T19:4-18, 1T30:15-25).  POINT V THE TRIAL COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY HAD BEARING ON THE FACT OF DEFENDANT’S ACCUSED CHOICE OF RAP MUSIC AND LYRICAL CONTENT SPEARING VIOLENCE
[brief] To establish a cause of action for negligence, three (3) elements must be proven: (1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty of care; and (3) an injury to plaintiff proximately caused by defendant’s breach.  Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super. 136, 141 (1997) (citations omitted).  Despite [...]’s contention that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on a claim of negligence against [...] without retaining an expert, Plaintiffs submit that they can establish a prima facie case of negligence by successfully proving all three (3) elements under a premises liability theory without expert testimony.
[brief] Da251-Da258.  Ultimately, the Trial Court concluded as follows:  No defendant in the case presented any medical expert.  As such, there was no medical expert that contradicted any of [...]’s testimony.  The jury verdict in the case at bar was $3.5 million dollars.  The accident occurred on December 29, 2019.  Plaintiff’s life expectancy at the time of trial was 54.7 years.  Plaintiff utilized a time unit argument during closing.  $3.5 million dollars divided by 57 (Plaintiff’s life expectancy using 54 years, plus three years from the time of the accident to the time of trial) is less than $61,500 per year.  The entire verdict was unanimous.  Based on all the foregoing, the verdict of $3.5 million dollars does not shock the Court’s conscious.  All of the evidence supported a reasonable factfinder’s determination as to the amount of the damages.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for remittitur is DENIED.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  The Pharmacy School’s Formation  In 2008, [...], a private higher educational institution of the State of New Jersey, began exploring expansion of its graduate programs to include a Pharmacy School.  To open the proposed Pharmacy School, [...] had to go through an accreditation process.  In 2010, [...] representatives met with the [...], the organization that sets the requirements for pharmacy school accreditation ([...] Dep. T16:6 – T17:4 at Pa.343-44).  [...] accreditation was a *sine qua non* for the Pharmacy School to graduate students eligible for licensure.  The [...]’s accreditation process requires that a proposed pharmacy school meet separate requirements for each of three steps, or “tiers,” of the process.  The first tier of the accreditation process is “pre-candidate” status, which [...] achieved after its curriculum was approved by the [...] in 2011.  Upon being granted pre-candidate status by the [...], [...] was permitted to admit students into the Pharmacy School for Fall Semester 2012.  ([...] Dep. T22-25-T25:4 at Pa.345-346).  The next tier in the [...] accreditation process is “candidate” status.  Prior to granting [...] candidate status, [...] representatives had to visit [...]’s campus for an on-site assessment and an evaluation of the new school’s academic programs.  This occurred in May 2012.  In order for the Pharmacy School to begin classes, the [...] had to grant candidate status.  If the Pharmacy School were not granted candidate status, admittees such as [...] (who was admitted on March 1, 2012), would have been released from the school.  The final tier is full accreditation.  This is the status the Pharmacy School was required to obtain in order for its graduating students to be eligible to become licensed pharmacists.  ([...] Dep. T23:3-T24:4 at Pa.345; [...], Dean of Becton College of [...] Dep. (“Weinman Dep”), T23:13-25 at Pa.323-24).  One of [...]’s goals – which it communicated to the [...] – was to offer pharmacy students a new type of program – one that would offer incoming students (among other features) the opportunity to obtain a Master’s degree in one of eight disciplines together with the Doctorate of Pharmacy in four years.  During its on-campus visit in May 2012, the [...] advised [...] that it would only approve this proposed “dual degree” program if [...] restricted admission into the Master’s portion of the program to students whose academic performance in the first academic year of pharmacy school demonstrated strong attainment.  The reason for this restriction was to avoid undermining the ability of students to succeed in the pharmacy program.  ([...] Dep. T112:7-15 at Pa. 367).  Plaintiff-Appellant’s First Observation of the [...] Website, The Inaugural Pharmacy Class, and The Dual Degree Program
[brief] The unrefuted evidence below demonstrates that the State’s implementation of the SFRA in [...], beginning in 2010, has baked-in funding deficits significantly below SFRA’s optimal level.  The formula generates consistent growth in the local revenue [...] is expected to contribute; funding gaps resulting from the District’s inability to meet that ever-increasing expectation; and a continued decline in the State’s contribution to the Adequacy Budget.  The 2018 amendments do not confront this dynamic, let alone adjust or retool the formula to address it.  For these reasons, this Court must reverse the summary judgment granted to the State below and find that [...] has made a facial showing that the State has failed to maintain the SFRA’s continuing constitutionality.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, v. 300  SYLVAN AVE ASSOCIATES, LLC, [...], and [...], Defendants-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION APP.  DIV. NO.: [...]  On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY  DIVISION BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J. Ch.  CIVIL ACTION REVISED  BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
[brief] Litigants and lower courts rely on appellate precedent to guide and control their cases.  R. 1:36-2; S. P. Dunham’s & Co. v. Dzurinko, 125 N.J. Super. 296, 301 n.1 (App. Div. 1973).  Trial courts are “obligated to comply with the procedures” --- 1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined for the convenience of the Court.  mandated in published Appellate Division opinions.  *Weir v. Mkt. Transition Facility of New Jersey*, 318 N.J. Super. 436, 448 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] In his pro se brief, defendant claims the State committed Brady violations because it did not provide discovery on [...], on State v. Feaster, and on a case against someone called [...] out of Essex County that resulted in a not-guilty verdict.  (Psb1-8).  In the specific context of a Brady violation, “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.
[brief] Notably, Reardon no longer controls as it preceded the enactment of RPC 1.9.  Respondents further cite Delaney v. Dykstra Assocs., No. A-1953-19T1, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1355 (App. Div. July 9, 2020), a case where disqualification was reversed due to the unexcused delay in filing the motion.  (Rb15).  In Delaney, before being overruled by the appellate division, the trial court reasoned that the law firm should be disqualified because they represented the movant regarding matters during the events giving rise to the current suit.  See Delaney v. Dykstra Assocs., at 4.  Here, unlike Delaney, the prior matters have no connection to this case and involve different parties, witnesses, and distinct causes of action.  Indeed, the trial court conducted an analysis under RPC 1.9 (a) and concluded there was no substantial similarity.  (T27:10-21).  (a)  A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing.  (b)  A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client, (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and (2) about whom the lawyer, while at the former firm, had personally acquired information protected by RPC 1.6 and RPC 1.9 that is material to the matter unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.  See RPC 1.9(a) and (b) (emphasis added).
[brief] In *Sinopoli v. North River Ins. Co.*, 244 N.J. Super. 245, 250-51 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 325 (1991), while recognizing that “the language of liability insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured,” this Court nevertheless cautioned that “the rule of liberal construction cannot operate to authorize a perversion of the language and the intention of the contracting parties. ”  244 N.J. Super. at 250.  In that regard, the Sinopoli panel made clear that courts “cannot rewrite the contract for the parties,” noting that neither “is a court permitted, even under the guise of good faith and peculiar circumstances, to alter the terms of an otherwise unambiguous contract.
[brief] Some of the arguments they present are works of legal alchemy, where mundane aspects of trial are transmutated into grave transgressions on their rights as litigants.  Other arguments stem from moments at trial where Defendants never objected, and, quite curiously, only seem to realize any alleged prejudice now that they have heard the jury’s verdict.  Still, other arguments were not only never objected to at trial, but never included in either of Defendants’ prior pleas for post-trial relief.  As many litigants do when their arguments lack substance, Defendants resort to selective quotation and convenient mischaracterization to portray this trial as some kind of circus.  It is telling that Defendants’ Statement of Facts is only three and a quarter pages long, and deals so flippantly with the voluminous record in this case.  That is why Plaintiff presents such an exhaustive summary of trial, with direct reference to actual quotations, their important contexts, and the findings of [...].  Defendants’ rampant inconsistency belies any professed sense of “justice” paraded in their appeal.
[brief] She did so revoke and accordingly, Appellant’s appeal should be denied.  Further, Appellant relies upon Blum v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2734 and Nakamoto v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56500 in support of its OWBPA contentions.  As a preliminary matter, Blum is unpublished and Nakamoto is a case out of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.