[brief] In *Greebel v. Lensak*, 467 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2021), a case consonant with the subject litigation, the Appellate Division addressed RPC 1.18 and the circumstances wherein disqualification is required.  In *Greebel*, the plaintiff met with [...], an attorney, in 2005 “about her right to financial support from defendant [boyfriend] if the parties ever ended their relationship without marrying. ”  *Id.* at 252.  The plaintiff revealed various details and concerns about the parties’ relationship, finances, assets, and lifestyles.  *Ibid.*  In 2014, using a different attorney, the plaintiff filed a palimony complaint against the defendant, leading the defendant to hire [...] as his attorney.  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division affirmed the disqualification of the boyfriend’s counsel and found a violation of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18, concluding that the plaintiff’s 2014 palimony suit was a substantially related matter to the plaintiff’s 2005 consultation with [...].  *Greebel* at 258-59.  Further, regarding the Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18, the *Greebel* Court cited *O Builders* and explained that: the former client must make more than “bald and unsubstantiated assertions” that she disclosed “business, financial and legal information” that the client believes might be related to the present matter.  *Id.* at 129, 19 A.3d 966.  Matters are “substantially related” if “the lawyer for whom disqualification is sought received confidential information from the former client that can be used against that client in the subsequent representation of parties adverse to the former client” or the “facts relevant to the prior representation are both relevant and material to the subsequent representation. ”  *Id.* at 125, 19 A.3d 966 (quoting *Trupos*, 201 N.J. at 451-52, 992 A.2d 762).  Information is “significantly harmful” if “prejudicial in fact to the former prospective client within the confines of the specific matter in which disqualification is sought[.]”  *Id.* at 126, 19 A.3d 966.  *Greebel*, N.J. Super. at 258.  Despite Respondents’ contention that the record is “much more comprehensive [in *O Builders*] than herein,” the facts of the instant matter are even more compelling.  [...]’s consultation with [...] only shortly preceded the *exact litigation* that was ultimately filed.  Further, as outlined in the Certification of [...], in her consultation with [...], and as generally set forth in Petitioners’ pleadings, she provided similarly harmful confidential information to [...] including disclosure of specific settlement positions and views on what the Respondents may or may not be entitled to under Decedent’s Will.  [...]’s personal thoughts, which Respondents would not otherwise have access to, could be used against Petitioners by Respondents in defending this case or in future settlement negotiations, and will necessarily inform [...]’s views of the case and advice to his clients.  This has created actual significant harm to Petitioners because knowing their settlement position would substantially prejudice them.\textsuperscript{11}  Accordingly, in line with the Appellate Division’s holding in \textit{O Builders} and \textit{Greebel}, the Trial Court was correct in disqualifying [...] and his firm in accordance with Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18(b).