ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The revised statute still required carriers to provide "any claimant with the option of submitting a dispute under this section to dispute resolution” instead of under the former arbitration process.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5(i) (emphasis added).  Newly adopted N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) provides that "Any dispute regarding the recovery of medical expenses benefits or other benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage … arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile may be submitted to dispute resolution on the initiative of any party to the dispute, as hereinafter provided."  The statute then goes on to outline the contours of the dispute resolution organization to be created and the process to be fleshed out by [...].  In its implementing regulations, [...] stated that "The purpose of this subchapter is to establish procedures for the resolution of disputes concerning the payment \(^3\)See New Jersey Coalition of Healthcare Professionals, Inc., v. New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance, 323 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1999), for a lengthy discussion of these various changes. of medical expense and other benefits provided by the personal injury protection coverage and policies of automobile insurance."  See N.J.A.C 11:3-5.1(a) (emphasis added.)  Significantly, [...] also adopted a "loser-pays counsel fees" provision.  See New Jersey Coalition of Health Care Professionals, Inc. v. NJ. Department of Banking and Insurance, 323 N.J. Super. 207, 260 (App. Div. 1999) (Coalition I).  This provision stated that the Dispute Resolution Professional’s (DRP) award "may include attorney's fees for a successful claimant or respondent in an amount consonant with the award and with Rule 1.5 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct."  Id. at 260 quoting then N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(d)(3).  Under AICRA’s implementing regulations, a demand for No-Fault dispute resolution can be filed by "the injured party, the insured, a provider who is an assignee of PIP or the insurer in accordance with the terms of the policy as approved by the Commissioner."  See N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(a).  To avoid confusion as to what defenses a carrier could and could not raise before a Dispute Resolution Professional (DRP), [...] defined the term “PIP dispute” at N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2.  Contrary to the foregoing legislative history, the trial court here found that:
[brief] A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.  NJSA 59:2-2 (a).  A factfinder is permitted “to infer negligence in certain circumstances, effectively reducing the plaintiff's burden of persuasion, although not shifting the burden of proof. ”  See Khan v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 91 (2009).  Plaintiff sustained serious injuries proximately caused by the beatings received from the police from which he still has discomfort.  But for the acts of the police, Plaintiff would not have been diagnosed with a dislocated jaw, walks with a limp, has pain to his neck, back, leg, jaw, knee, and is suffering from PTSD and Depression.  (Pa094-Pa097; Pa052).
[brief] Plaintiff prepared a notice of claim for all Defendants pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-1, et seq.  On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff emailed a copy of the Notice of Claim to the attorneys representing the Defendants in this action.  On May 24, 2023, Plaintiff served all Defendants with the Notice of Claim.  This was the first and only record of Plaintiff serving the Defendants with a Notice of Claim.
[brief] Plaintiff has Established General Causation [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa047, ¶33 – Pa057, ¶71; Da0790-Da0792; Da0794-Da0798; Da0819-Da0829)]  On the issue of general causation, [...]’s own recall notice contains the warnings of intraocular inflammatory reaction, and corneal reaction (if the Ozurdex migrates to the anterior chamber as in [...]'s case, as potential “Health Hazards” caused by the defective product.  (Da0256-Da0257)  [...] has conceded general causation through its recall.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT [...] DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO WARN OF THE RAISED BARRICADE LEG BECAUSE THE DANGER WAS SELF-EVIDENT AND KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF (Pa40, T13:13-15)**  The owner of a business owes a duty of reasonable care to warn against known or reasonably discoverable dangerous conditions on the property to those who enter the property as business invitees.  Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 434 (1993).  Plaintiff argues that Defendants owed her “an affirmative and non-delegable duty to eliminate any conditions that would render the premises unsafe. ” (Appellant’s Brief at p.9).  Nevertheless, the duty owed to a business invitee is that of reasonable care and is not unlimited as evidenced by our caselaw applying the principles of the open and obvious doctrine in cases where the relationship of the parties was that of business owner and business invitee.
[brief] In its decision in [...] v. [...], [...] (April 15, 2024)(“PRECEDENTIAL”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected [...]’s claims, similar to those of [...] in the present matter, that [...] claims are not subject to mandatory New Jersey No-fault Arbitration.  In Mt. Prospect, the U.S. Court of Appeals held, consistent with [...], that [...] claims must be adjudicated in binding No-Fault arbitration pursuant to the [...] DPR Plan and Assignment of Benefit Agreement.  Public policy further favors arbitration, especially in light of the crisis the New Jersey court system faces with unprecedented judicial vacancies.
[brief] Instead, having purchased $5,000,000 in liability coverage for themselves and operators of their vehicles, and having purchased $1,000,000 in excess UIM coverage, [...] and [...] are faced with a situation they could have never reasonably expected – they are being told that neither the liability coverage nor the UIM coverage provides any benefits whatsoever as a result of this tragic accident.  Defendant [...] has relied upon an “intrafamily liability exclusion” to deny liability coverage for defendant [...].  Specifically, [...] refuses to provide liability coverage for defendant [...] simply, and for no other reason, than because Miles [...] was a relative of defendant [...] and living in the same household.  Plaintiffs are asking that this Court, consistent with a recent unpublished Appellate Division decision, recognize that these types of intrafamily liability exclusions offend current New Jersey public policy and are, therefore, unenforceable.  Without mincing words, plaintiffs are aware that this would require the Court to address decades old precedent which, to a certain extent, declined to deem such provisions unenforceable.  Plaintiffs submit, however, that the time is ripe invalidate these needless exclusions.  Plaintiffs also contend that [...]’s denial of UIM benefits violates current existing law.  Specifically, [...] relies upon a definitional exclusion, not in its own excess policy, but contained in the underlying automobile insurance policy issued by [...].  While plaintiffs do not contend that the definitional exclusion is unenforceable as applied to USAA, the application of that exclusion to the [...] excess policy creates an ambiguity and violates plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations of coverage such that the exclusion is invalid.  Procedural History
[brief] In all likelihood, [...] was highly worried that her mother would be in trouble with police if she refused to let them search.  Moreover, despite police ultimately informing her of her right to refuse, the behavior of the officers leading up that moment -- namely, their failure to ask for permission to enter the home or to even tell [...] what was happening until they were already inside -- strongly implied that she did not actually have a say in the matter.  For this reason, in conjunction with the State’s failure to prove that [...] had the authority to consent to a search of her mother’s bedroom in particular, the State cannot rely on [...]’s signing of the consent form to justify the warrantless search.
[brief] [...], issued on October 20, 2021, charged defendant [...] with a number of offenses all stemming from the recovery of evidence during the stop and search that is the subject of this case.  (Pa 1-6)  [...] was detained pending resolution of these charges and has remained incarcerated throughout the entirety of the proceedings in this case, through the current day.  On February 25, 2022, [...] requested a testimonial hearing on his motion to suppress.  (Pa 7)  On August 16, 2022, the motion to suppress was improperly denied by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. without a hearing and without oral argument.  (Pa 31-32)  [...] filed a brief in support of his appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress and of his hearing on that motion on March 21, 2023.  This Court issued an opinion on March 8, 2024, holding that the failure to hold a hearing on [...]’s motion to suppress was error.
[brief] These observed motor vehicle violations were “the final straw. ”  The detectives made the decision that [...] would initiate a motor vehicle stop of the Audi.  Defendant stopped his Audi on Route 36, near the intersection with Hope Road.  [...] and [...] stopped their unmarked vehicles behind the defendant.  [...] approached the Audi on the passenger’s side.  Defendant, who was the driver and lone occupant of the Audi, provided [...] with his license and vehicle documents upon request.  The detective advised defendant of the motor vehicle infractions that had been observed.  (1T:28-5 to 29-16; 92-12 to 92-14; 97-4 to 97-10; 98-11 to 98-4; 111-21 to 115-14; 2T:22-1 to 23-18).
[brief] Likewise, defendant’s “reaction to the shooting” is also legally of no moment.  (Db 38).  To prove conspiracy, the State is not required to prove defendant acted or failed to act – in any way.  Rather, conspiracy only requires the State to prove agreement.  Ibid.  Defendant also tries to temper the strongest evidence against him – his presence with [...] after the shooting.  Defendant argues that there was no evidence that defendant had prior knowledge of the shooting.  (Db 40).  This argument is negated by the record.  As the trial judge stated when she denied defendant’s motion, defendant was with [...] before, during and most significantly, after the shooting.  Defendant’s own actions in remaining with [...] following the shooting, and likely aiding in the hiding of the guns in the house, was strong evidence of his agreement to the crime.  The same facts directly prove defendant’s “conscious object” regarding the conspiracy.  As such, defendant’s assertions that the record contained no evidence to support the conspiracy conviction simply ignores the clear record in this case.  (Db 41).  As the verdict in this case was based on thee sufficient and credible evidence presented, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
[directive] Records and ALPR data covered by this Section shall be retained for three years.  6.4.1  ALPR stored data shall be purged after the retention period, unless it is associated with an active investigation or pending judicial process, in which case the data should be exported from the relevant storage system and retained in the case file.  6.4.2  Any ALPR data transferred to another agency shall indicate the date on which the data had been collected by the ALPR so that the receiving agency may comply with required retention and purging period.  6.4.3  Records shall be kept in a manner that makes them readily accessible for audit.
[brief] (Da2743).  \(^{21}\)  [...] complains that she was ordered to pay fees for contracts that the trial court did not find that she breached.  (Db49).  Not so.  [...] executed the 2017 SPA and acquired [...]’s interest in [...].  (Da2823).  The trial court found the 2017 SPA breached because the buyer’s representations were “materially inaccurate” under Section 6.3, and because [...] breached the [...] Stockholders Agreement which he represented he had not done under Sections 3.2 and 4.2.
[brief] PROPERLY FOUND THAT ALL CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINES OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, AND RES JUDICATA (11a-14a)  9 POINT II THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY FOUND THAT ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE [...] ARE BARRED BY THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (23a-24a) 13 CONCLUSION 16 TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND 1a | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | *Cogdell v. Hosp. Center at Orange*, 116 N.J. 7 (1989) | 14 | | *Cummings v. Bahr*, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div.1996) | 10 | | *Hennessey v. Winslow Township*, 183 N.J. 593 (2005) | 11 | | *Manhattan Woods Golf Club, Inc. v. Arai*, 711 A.2d 1367 (N.J. App.), cert. denied, 156 N.J. 411 (1998) | 13 | | *Napoli v. HSBC Morg. Servs.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121204 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2012) | 14 | | *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991) | 11 |
[brief] [...]’s argument that [...] improperly submitted its Notice of Classification after bid opening is not only wrong, but it also ignores the critical distinction between responsiveness and responsibility.  Responsibility is defined as being “able to complete the contract in accordance with its requirements, including but not limited to requirements pertaining to experience, moral integrity, operating capacity, financial capacity, credit, and workforce, equipment and facilities availability. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-2(32).  Without question, [...]’s prequalification status with [...] is an issue of responsibility.  Determinations of responsibility (such as [...]’s prequalification status) can be made after bid opening.  Palamar Constr., Inc., 196 N.J. Super. at 241.  Moreover, where a bid is rejected on the basis of responsibility, the bidder is entitled to a post-bid hearing so that it may challenge the determination and present evidence in support of its responsibility (such as a prequalification certificate).  Id.  If [...] is correct that post-bid submissions related to the responsibility of a bidder impermissibly extend a competitive advantage to one bidder, then responsibility hearings would be forbidden.  They are not.  To the contrary, responsibility hearings and presentation of evidence are mandatory where a bidder’s bid is rejected on the basis of responsibility.
[brief] What is more, as Defendants observed, in this case “the relevance fights were already fully litigated in generating [] productions” in related cases, which would minimize the discovery disputes remaining between the parties.  T33:14-18.  The ESI Order is not just wrong for this case.  It rests on a legally unsound premise that would create serious problems in any case.  The Order would permit litigants to insist on search terms intended to “hit” irrelevant but potentially embarrassing, highly confidential, or sensitive information.  And even keywords negotiated in good faith “often are over-inclusive”—“they find responsive documents but also large numbers of irrelevant documents. ”  Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 191.  Because there is no legal basis for compelling production of irrelevant documents—whether ESI or not—the ESI Order should be reversed.  The case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to apply Rule 4:10-2(a)’s relevancy standard to the parties’ ESI, consistent with the Rule’s plain language.
[brief] Plaintiff makes the legally unsupported argument that it did not have an obligation to intervene in the underlying foreclosure action because the plaintiff in the underlying foreclosure action (i.e., the tax certificate holder) did not object to [...]’s redemption.  However, that is not the legal standard that has been applied by our Supreme Court.  The position of the plaintiff in the foreclosure action is irrelevant to the third-party investor’s duty to intervene.  As there was a foreclosure action pending at the time Plaintiff was attempting to purchase [...]’s property, Plaintiff had an obligation to intervene in the foreclosure action for judicial review of the proposed transaction.  In reaching this determination, the Trial Court explained that, regardless of the potential purchaser’s status, “the purpose of the Tax Sale Law rule is for judicial review of the real estate contract for sale. ”  Specifically, the Trial Court did not hold that Plaintiff could not purchase the Property.  But rather that Plaintiff wholly failed to follow the correct procedure as required by the statute and therefore no real estate contract can exist.
[brief] Center 48 Ltd. Partnership vs. May Dept. Stores Co., 355 N.J. Super. 390, 410 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guarantees §41b)(i) (1996).  See also Aldrich Nine Associates vs. Foot Locker Specialty Inc., 2005 WL 3005715 (App. Div. 2005) (unpublished) at *3.  A material alteration has been defined as “one which alters the legal identity of the principal’s contract, substantially increases the loss to the guarantor, or places the guarantor in a different position.  Center 48 Ltd. Partnership, at 408-409 (citing S-Mart, Inc. vs. Sweetwater Coffee Co., 744 N.E., 2d. 580, 586 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 761 N.E., 2d. 416 (Ind. 2001); Aldrich Nine Associates, Id.  Here the undertaking of the guarantors was not increased, but actually decreased by $12,000.00 (later increased to $15,000.00, see fn3).  As such, Defendants cannot argue that the modification of the Lease terminated their obligations under the guarantee.  The terms of the guarantee are open ended and cover all obligations of the tenant.
[brief] In *Burt v. W. Jersey Health Sys.*, 339 N.J. Super. 296, 308 (App. Div. 2001), the Court held that a joint tortfeasor found more than 60% responsible for plaintiff’s injuries is nevertheless entitled to a *pro rata* reduction for the jury’s potential allocation of fault to a defendant dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to procure an Affidavit of Merit.  This court concluded that the remaining defendant should not be penalized for the plaintiff’s failure in this regard.  *Ibid.*  Plaintiffs stress that [...] could have maintained a contribution claim against those doctors notwithstanding the statute of limitations dismissal.  (Pb. 17)  At the same time, plaintiffs acknowledged that, in *Burt*, the remaining defendant likewise could have maintained a contribution claim notwithstanding the Affidavit of Merit based dismissal of the plaintiffs’ direct claims.  (Pb. 23)  Plaintiffs essentially concede that the rationale and holding of *Burt* are transferable to this case, they just disagree with the *fairness* of the *Burt* decision.  The immutable fact remains, however, that the trial court was bound by *Burt*, as it (correctly) recognized from 2017 through the trial in 2022.
[brief] [...] withdrew its defense of the HCH Action not based on some wishful interpretation of dicta in *Burd*, but rather based on a contention that post-complaint events demonstrated that there was no “suit” for “damages,” which, as seen above, is wrong.  The claim for breach of fiduciary duty in the HCH Action was presented as a single “COUNT I” asserting multiple theories of liability, one of which was negligence.  Pa327–28; see Pb27; T83-6 to T83-7 (“the allegations of breach as to the fiduciary care may be support by a theory of negligence. ”).  [...] defended the HCH Action for nearly fifteen (15) months, not as charity, but because the complaint in the HCH Action brought that action within the [...] Policy definition of “suit” and still did when [...] wrongfully abandoned its insureds on March 5, 2021.
[brief] The Court clearly also recognized the past but remedied oppression as justification for a discount.  (Da3203-3204)  [...] lost $588,000 of the fair value of his equity in [...] on those rulings which violated Lawson, Casey, Brown and even Balsamides.  That decision to discount requires this Court’s de novo review and reversal for an Order that the Chancery Court must award fair value without discount.  Sipko, supra 251 N.J. at 179.  IV.
[brief] On October 6, 2021, Board member [...] and Board President [...] appeared before the [...] and tried to persuade the Township Committee to stay neutral in the matter of the referendum (Complaint, Count 9, Pa27).  Without disclaiming their words were their own and they were not representing the Board, they attempted to influence a Municipal body regarding the school Referendum.  On October 11, 2021, the same Board member [...] made a number of posts to Facebook regarding the referendum, in particular one purporting to answer a number of open referendum questions (Complaint count 10, Pa28).  While he included a disclaimer was speaking as a member of the public and not as a Board Member, Mr. [...] intentionally withheld material, non-private information about the Referendum, and attempted to mislead readers about the costs of the referendum and what other options might look like.  He also omitted a number of questions entirely from his answers.  On October 11, 2021, Board President [...] posted to the main Lambertville and West Amwell Facebook pages in favor of the Referendum.  In his post, Mr. [...] failed to properly disclaim his membership on the board, and went so far as to try to prevent the public from seeking their own answers on referendum questions, exhorting readers “Please do not let the so-called social media experts persuade you in any way with their negativity, false statements, and bad information“ (Complaint count 11, Pa29).  Throughout the Referendum, all 5 Lambertville Board members were active members of the special interest group, [...] (Complaint, count 13, Pa31).  [...] is a group dedicated to keeping a “walkable” school in Lambertville at all costs, to the exclusion of the wants or needs of Stockton or West Amwell residents, who are also part of the school district.  These five members are captive to the interests of [...], and bent regularly to their will, blocking any attempts at reasonable discourse regarding schools outside of Lambertville.  On October 12, 2021, BOE member [...] posted a link to a document on the West Amwell Facebook site advocating for the referendum (Complaint 16, Pa37).  While [...] disclaimed her membership in the BOE, near the end of her statement she said “Please also feel free to reach out to one of your local Board of Education members.  I can be reached at [...]. “.  The Ethics Complaint and Post-Vote
[directive] a.  Actor interferes with transportation if the person purposely or knowingly:  1.  Casts, shoots or throws anything at, against or into any vehicle, including, but not 10%  Permissible limited to, a bus, light rail vehicle, railroad locomotive, railroad car, jitney, trolley car, 2nd Degree subway car, ferry, airplane, or other facility of transportation; or $50,000 to $150,000