ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan  In May 1996, the [...] (the “Council”) concluded that certain areas in the City were areas in need of redevelopment under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq. (Pa514 to Pa523).  On May 14, 1996, the [...] (the “City”) adopted the Oceanfront—Broadway Redevelopment Plan (the “Redevelopment Plan”) in order to achieve the redevelopment of an underdeveloped segment of the oceanfront and underutilized commercial areas.  Ibid.  The property known as Block 216, Lots 11, 12 and 24 (formerly Lots 13 and 24) on the City’s tax map (the “290 Ocean Property”) was designated as part of the Beachfront South Sector of the Redevelopment Area under the Redevelopment Plan.  Ibid.  The Redevelopment Plan provided that the objective for the Beachfront South Sector was “to continue the mid-rise residential pattern of 4-to-8-story structures that maximize views to the Atlantic. ”  Ibid.  The Redevelopment Plan also described the “development/design requirements” for the Beachfront South Sector.  Ibid.  The Redevelopment Plan provided that “[f]urther detail and enumeration of the specific objectives outlined hereunder will be included in the Design Guidelines Handbook being prepared by the City. ”  Ibid.  Design Guidelines Handbook 6, which was applicable to the Beachfront South Sector, provided the requirements regarding density, building coverage, building lines, bulk and height.  (Pa514 to Pa523).  Section 15 of the Redevelopment Plan, entitled “Procedures for Changing Redevelopment Plan,” set forth provisions concerning amendments of the Redevelopment Plan:  The Redevelopment Plan may be amended from time to time by the [...], provided that, if amended after the disposition of any land in the Redevelopment Area, the modification must be consented to in writing by designated developers.  [...]  (Pa590).  In deposition testimony, [...], the City’s Planner, who testified as a representative of the City under R. 4:14-2(c), interpreted Section 15 to mean that “any designated redeveloper of a specific piece of property must be notified before the plan is amended,” and that if a redeveloper owns a piece of property not subject to the amendment, consent by that redeveloper would be unnecessary.  See (Pa532; 2T29:5-30:12).  On May 14, 1996, the Redevelopment Plan was adopted by Ordinance No. 15-96.  (Pa567 to Pa591).
[brief] Defendant [...] is a procedural due process indispensable necessary party in this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action.  [...] is the private owner operator of the affordable housing project subsidized by the disputed 30 Year [...] non-urban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemption.  Plaintiff alleged that [...] was not an urban renewal entity under post April 17, 1992 State long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  The Voluminous Eight Counts Hybrid Prerogative Writ/Declaratory Judgment/Civil Rights Act Violation Complaint  On April 8, 2019, plaintiff filed a sixty-nine pages 434 paragraphs Eight Counts hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights violations “criminal indictment roadmap” complaint.  (Pal).  Plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, equitable and monetary relief.  Plaintiff alleged that the [...] Weequahic Preservation LLV 30 Year non-urban renewal entity  [...] long term tax exemption did not comply with post April 17, 1992 State long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  Plaintiff also alleged that [...] had failed to monitor and to collect all long term tax exemption monies due the County under post April 17, 1992 State long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  ---
[brief] Unpublished decision in Miscoski v. Local Finance Board, 2008 WL 2788225 (App. Div. July 21, 2008)  .................................................................18  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Blue Ocean Water, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 515 | 27 | | (App. Div. 2024) | | | Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Group, 220 N.J. 544 (2015) | 14, 19 | | Besler v. Board of Educ. of West Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l School Dist., | 6, 19 | | 201 N.J. 544 (2010) | | | Botteon v. Borough of Highland Park, A-1127-22 (App. Div. May 1, 2024)| 14 | | Brown v. Foley, 810 F.2d 55 (3d Cir.1987) | 31 | | Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | 27 | | Fargas v. Gorham, 276 N.J. Super. 135 (Law Div. 1994) | 13 | | Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | 28 | | Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. Super. 536 (2015) | 20, 32 | | Investors Bank v. Torres, 457 N.J. Super. 53 (App. Div. 2018), aff’d, | 13 | | 243 N.J. 25 (2020) | | | Kean Federation of Teachers v. Morrell, 233 N.J. 566 (2018) | 6, 19 | | Lyons v. Township of Wayne, 185 N.J. 426 (2005) | 12 | | MEMO v. Sun National Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2005), | 13 | | appeal dismissed, 217 N.J. 591 (2006) | | | Miscoski v. Local Finance Board, 2008 WL 2788225 *5 (App. Div. 2008) | 23 | | Mollica v. Township of Bloomfield, A-2467-17 (App. Div. Oct. 17, 2016)| 24 | | Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993) | 31 | | O'Malley v. Dep't of Energy, 109 N.J. 309 (1987) | 31 | | Ott v. Township of West New York, 92 N.J. Super. 184 (Law Div. 1966) | 32 | | Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Bd. of Adj., 237 N.J. 333 (2019)| 25 | | Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378| 27 | | (App. Div. 2015) | | | Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008) | 12 | | Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369 (Ch. Div.), aff’d o.b., | 13 | | 332 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Seaview Harbor Realignment Committee LLC v. Township Committee of Egg | 23 | | Harbor, 470 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 2021), certif. denied, 252 N.J.| | | 189 (2022) | | | Wellington v. Estate of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 2003)| 14, 19 | | Winters v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67 (2012) | 29 | Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2 ..................................................................................................................31
[brief] | Pa178| | Exhibit 1, Plaintiff’s civil action complaint.  | Omitted.  | | Exhibit 2, Plaintiff's answers to Defendant [...]’s interrogatories.  | Pa182| | Exhibit 3, Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript.  | Omitted.  | Exhibit 4, the roster of individuals in attendance at Defendant [...]’s March 13, 2020 Covid training.  Exhibit 5, Plaintiff’s internal complaint of discrimination.
[brief] Like the officer’s testimony in Goldsmith that he knew from his training and experience drugs and guns are stored in walkways, [...] testified that “concealing themselves in between cars is very common” because “it hides the narcotics dealers from law enforcement when they're riding by. ”  (1T 17-25 to 18-3)  “None of those non-specific, non-individualized factors, however, meet the constitutional threshold of individualized reasonable suspicion that th[ose] particular [four men] w[ere] engaged in criminal activity. ”  Id. at 405-406 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  [...]’s vague testimony about the officers’ observations prior to the stop – four men socializing with each other and talking to unidentified passersby, and one of the men walking between two cars an unspecified number of times – “could be used to justify the stop of virtually anyone” socializing on [...], between [...] and [...], “on any day, and at any time, based simply on their presence on that street.
[brief] REASONABLE NECESSITY AND BEST AVAILABLE SITE**  39.  As demonstrated above and in the accompanying testimonies (particularly that of [...]), the Facility is required in order to maintain the integrity and reliability of [...]’s local distribution system because it will allow the Company to reliably, efficiently and safely achieve the 600 psig reduction in gas pressure between the upgraded transmission system in Holmdel and the local distribution system, which serves customers in Holmdel and surrounding municipalities.  The design of the Regulator Station—most importantly, the above-ground heating unit—will prevent the regulators and associated equipment at the Facility from becoming encased in thick ice, which could well result in a harmful loss of service to the customers served by the local distribution system.  The present configuration of [...]’s delivery apparatus does not adequately accomplish this goal because, *inter alia*, the temporary regulator being used as a stop gap does not employ and cannot accommodate a heater.  As a result, [...] has demonstrated that the proposed Facility is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the entire public served by the public utility.  40.  Moreover, [...] has presented significant evidence establishing that there are no reasonably available alternatives that could achieve an equivalent public benefit.  As detailed Municipal Land Use Ordinances or Regulations promulgated under the MLUL shall not apply to the Regulator Station.  VII.  OTHER APPROVALS
[brief] [...] testified at her deposition consistent with the fact that [...] was her exclusive employer.  (Pa333 at T34:17-35:23; Da115-Da116).  [...] could not sufficiently dispute at summary judgment that her performance was exclusively supervised by [...].  (Pa332 at T32:9-19; Pa333 at T34:17-35:23; Pa571-Pa572 at T29:20-30:14; Pa795-Pa796 at T41:12-42:8; Pa798 at T51:5-52:2; Da110-117; Da607).  The State Respondents also had no input into what skills [...] could use in accomplishing her job duties.  Ibid.  The equipment [...] used to accomplish her workplace tasks was supplied by [...].  (Pa331 at T29:6-10; Da114-Da115; Da610-Da665).  [...] received all her pay and job benefits exclusively from [...] during her tenure.  *Ibid.*  [...] did not pay any social security taxes for [...].  *Ibid.*  Nor did [...] accrue any benefits with [...], including retirement benefits.  (Pa331 at T29:6-10; Da114-Da115; Da610-Da665).  [...] also had exclusive decision-making authority to grant [...]’s leave requests and terminate her employment.  *Ibid.*  The work that [...] performed (coordination of various social services for [...] clients such as alcohol treatment counseling for parents) was not an integral part of [...]’s business, whose employees are primarily tasked with providing for the safety and security of children.  (Pa174 at T174:6-24; Da8-18; Da108-Da109; Da306-Da312; Da589-Da590; Da721-Da722; Da725).  Finally, the service agreement between [...] and [...] precluded the existence of a dual employment relationship with [...] employees like [...].  (Da110-Da114; Da607).  Indeed, the very terms of the State’s contract with [...] leaves no question that [...] was not its employee.
[brief] In applying accrual principles to a malicious prosecution action, plaintiff relies on cases that support defendants’ position, not plaintiff’s.  (Pb11-17).  In short, plaintiff’s appellate brief makes the case why March 6, 2018 – the date when the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Mosley, 232 N.J. 169 (2018) reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment that upheld defendant’s probation violation – is the accrual date for any malicious prosecution action.
[directive] 5 sec.  From a secured holster position, draw and fire 3 rounds, then assume a ready position.  Standing Point  From a ready position, on command fire 2 rounds, 5 Yds 12 4 sec.  Shoulder and return to a ready position, repeat twice.  From a ready position on command fire 3 rounds, reload if necessary, decock and holster 5 sec.  From a secured holstered position, on command Weapon 1 yd 4 draw and fire 2 rounds from the weapon retention 3 sec.  Retention position.  Repeat once.  End course, score targets (40 hits = 100%; 32 hits = 80% minimal for qualification)
[brief] ”  [11T220-7 to -14].  Notably, he did not testify as to whether it was defendant or [...]’s phone where cell site tower information was extracted from.  On recross, defendant directly asked [...], “And you’re saying that your evidence that [...] was in that car was based on cell phone locations because he was in [...]?” to which [...] responded, “Yes, sir. ”  [11T227-22 to -25].  Finally, [...] testified on redirect that the cell tower information did not place defendant directly in Sam [...]’s home, and instead that “his cell phone was hitting off of the cell tower, that one third of a pie which is in the area of Sam [...]’s house along with the homicide scene.
[brief] Since July 2024, [...] has been employed as an Otolaryngologist by [...] in [...].  https://www.healthalliance.org/ProviderProfile/539982/WAX?isFromGateway=Failure  Notably this is well outside the scope of the Restrictive Covenant.  Thus, the Chancery Court’s concern about providing an advisory opinion regarding potential employment with [...] was entirely accurate given [...]’s ability to secure employment outside of the restricted radius.  ARGUMENT POINT I
[directive] The Attorney General shall base his approval upon a finding that 1) other law enforcement methods would not be effective, and 2) there is a reasonable articulable suspicion that adult school employees or other non-student member(s) of the school community are engaged in drug trafficking activities.  In such event, and upon such findings, the underlying purpose of the operation shall not be to identify or to apprehend student offenders, but rather to identify and to apprehend suspected adult or non-student offenders.  Furthermore, the confidential plan required to be prepared pursuant to Section B(2)(g) of this Part shall outline steps developed in consultation with the building principal and local superintendent which will be taken to minimize the undercover officer's contact with and impact upon the student population.  No undercover officer shall be permitted to teach a formal class of instruction without the approval of the Attorney General and local superintendent, and in no event shall an undercover officer posing as a non-student member of the school community be permitted to establish or to simulate any confidential, trust or counsellor relationship with any student.  6.
[brief] No Land Use Application or Approval from the Township for the Synagogue’s construction, nor allowing for the synagogue Lot 8 parking to occur on the school Lot 5, has even been produced.  The Synagogue and Township acknowledged there was an unsuccessful exhaustive search by [...] of synagogue files and by Township officials of Town Records, (6T114-1 to 124-25), and no such approvals or records can be produced.
[brief] ........................................................................................................  34  A.  The Trial Court and Special Master erred by awarding fees for work done years before any suggestion of a RICO claim.  (39067a-39068a)........................................................................................................ 34  B.  The Trial Court and Special Master erred by awarding fees for work that was not “reasonably required to establish the RICO claims. ” (39089a-39090a; 40005a-40010a).  ......................... 37  C.  The Trial Court and Special Master erred by awarding fees for Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful cross-appeals.  (39173a-39177a; 40005a-40010a).  ........................................................................................................ 44  IV.
[brief] ”  *Lebamoff Enters. Inc. v. Whitmer*, 956 F.3d 863, 868 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1049 (2021).  Many states, including New Jersey, passed some form of a three-tier licensing structure for alcohol sale and distribution.  See *Grand Union Co. v.* Sills, 43 N.J. 390, 397-98 (1964) (“New Jersey’s Control Act expressly outlawed the tied house system.
[brief] “Uniqueness does not guarantee that prints from two different people are always sufficiently different that they cannot be confused[.]”  *Ibid.*  See also [...], *Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods* 61 (2016), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf (“The issue is not whether objects or features differ; they surely do if one looks at a fine enough level.
[directive] .......................................................................................................70  CASES DETENTION ..................................................70  Decision .  Detention Pretrial for Needed Reports 10.1 .....................................70  Analysis Laboratory for Requests of Submission Timely 10.2 ......................70  Testing .  Forensic for Evidence Submitting for Limit 10.2.1 Time ..................................71 .  Needed Longer  No Testing If Notification Prompt 10.2.2  Investigative of Completion  Prioritize to Authority Prosecutor's 10.3  Comply with to Needed When Examinations  Forensic and Reports ........................................................................71  Deadlines  Indictment/Trial Speedy ...............................................................72  Requests Prioritization with Compliance 10.4  INDICTMENT/TRIAL SPEEDY OF GENERAL  ATTORNEY TO NOTICE  11.
[brief] Preliminary Statement  This appeal respectfully asks that this Court re-open the courthouse doors which were unjustly closed on Plaintiffs’ legal rights when the Trial Court granted Defendants’ Summary Judgment motions.  Simply stated, the Trial Court committed reversible error by improperly weighing the evidence and then resolving crucial disputed material facts and the reasonable inferences taken therefrom in the favor of the movants.  Although acknowledging the summary judgment standards (i.e., accepting the non-movant’s version of the facts, including the favorable inferences that they may reasonably include), the Trial Court chose to do the opposite.  In other words, the Court instead embraced the movants' version of the facts and hand-picked facts from the record in ways designed to support that version.  Having done so, the Court’s factual conclusions then generated a cascade of legal rulings, all of which were supported only by a foundation of conclusions taken from genuine issues of material fact that favored the movants.  Had the Court properly complied with the summary judgment standards and accepted Plaintiff’s version of the facts, including their fair inferences, the Court would not have dismissed Plaintiff’s case.
[brief] ”  As to whether Defendants’ conduct was “palpably unreasonable,” that question should also be left to a jury.  Vincitore, supra, 169 N.J. at 130.  “Protect against” includes “repairing, remedying or correcting a dangerous condition, providing safeguards against a dangerous condition, or warning of a dangerous condition. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(b).  “Palpably unreasonable” means “behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstance. ”  Muhammad v. N.J. Transit, 176 N.J. 185, 195 (2003) (quoting Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985)).  The Roe Court held that the conduct of [...] when it bolted open a gate, thereby inviting the plaintiff to enter a known dangerous area where she was brutally raped, could be found to have been palpably unreasonable.  317 N.J. Super. at 82.
[brief] In Caponegro, 330 N.J. Super. at 151, the plaintiffs were former senior staff members of the [...].  On July 12, 1995, the State took over the Newark public school system pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-34 to -52.5  Caponegro, 330 N.J. --- 5  This statute is titled “Creation of school district under full State intervention upon determination of failure of local school district. ”  Pursuant to this statute, the Super. at 150.  Due to the State takeover, the plaintiffs’ employment was terminated.  330 N.J. Super. at 151.  In addition to contractual claims of continued employment, the plaintiffs sought deferred compensation, including accumulated vacation and sick days.
[directive] Not Aye Risks)  Manage Might That Services the by risks) posed that the determines prosecutor the where cases be may There or monitoring of form by some only managed adequately be can release upon defendant not is otherwise or program pretrial services the by provided not is that service intervention is that criminal activity defendant's a example, of By way risk(s).  the mitigate to available funds acquire committed to burglaries residential or robberies (e.g., addiction her or his related to court- a in participating by interrupted be might dependency) drug defendant's the support to Court Drug of New Jersey's proven success shown the by as program, treatment ordered of cycle the vicious break to incentives and opportunities treatment provides which Program, include might (pretrial conditions release 2A:162-17(b)(2)(i) N.J.S.A. See crime. and addiction dependency") alcohol for or drug . . treatment . available "undergo defendant that the be not treatment pretrial might that recognized Legislature the that note to added (emphasis and interpretation statutory reasonable of matter a 6.2.4.
[brief] CASES  257-261  20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 2023).......................................................passim Atl. City v. Gardner, 124 N.J. Eq. 110 (Ch. 1938)...........................................................................24  Berkeley v. Berkeley Shore Water Co., 213 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 1986).................................................................21 Brick v. Block 48-7, Lots 34, 35, 36, 202 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 1985)..............................................................20, 21, 22 Bron v. Weintraub, 42 N.J. 87 (1964).................................................................................................11 Burgin v. Rutherford, 56 N.J. Eq. 666 (Ch. 1898)..................................................................................24 Coons v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 96 N.J. 419 (1984).............................................................................................15 Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)............................................................................................12 Farmingdale Realty Co. v. Farmingdale, 104 N.J. Super. 314 (App. Div. 1969).................................................................19 George v. McDonough, 596 U.S. 740 (2022)............................................................................................13, 14 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)............................................................................................11, 12, 13 Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon, 202 N.J. 390 (2010).............................................................................................16 Landa v. Adams, 162 N.J. Super. 318 (App. Div. 1978) ................................................................. 24 Mitsch v. Owens, 82 N.J. Eq. 404 (Ch. 1913) .............................................................................. 24 Mori v. Hartz Mt. Dev. Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 47 (App. Div. 1983) ................................................................. 17 Oliver v. Ambrose, 152 N.J. 383 (1998) ......................................................................................... 17, 18 Prime Accounting Dep’t v. Twp. of Carney’s Point, 212 N.J. 493 (2013) ......................................................................................... 19 Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland Cnty., 505 Mich. 429 (2020) ....................................................................................... 22, 23, 24 Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995) ......................................................................................... 13, 14 Schafer v. Kent Cnty., 2024 Mich. LEXIS 1438 (July 24, 2024) ......................................................... 22, 23, 24 State v. $3,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 292 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 1996) ............................................................. 18 State v. Dock, 205 N.J. 237 (2011) .........................................................................................