ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ibid.  Moreover, the State requested that the court find that the difference in timing between the two calls was not some kind of learning curve where defendant would not be able to follow the instructions that he is not to talk about the case.  Ibid.  The court responded that it found the entire episode of making the phone call with defendant’s phone is barred.  Ibid.  [...] reasoned that defendant, a) already asserted his right counsel, and b) [...] utilized a ruse by telling defendant that the landlines of the Prosecutor’s Office are recorded in order to keep defendant from using a landline, and thereby use defendant’s cell phone to call his parents.
[brief] ” (Da30).  Plaintiff attached a variety of documents as to Defendant’s account in Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.  Except for the three Exhibits discussed above, all of Defendant’s Exhibits are the same as Plaintiff’s exhibits and documents because they were received from the Plaintiff.  This is a case in which Defendant is using Plaintiff’s own exhibits and documents against Plaintiff.  A visual inspection by the lower Court of Defendant’s Exhibits D (Da55), E (Da57), F (Da59), G (Da61), H (Da63), I (Da65), J (Da67), Z (Da99), AA (Da101) and BB (Da103) would have revealed the incontrovertible fact that Plaintiff increased the APR applicable to Defendant’s account from 23.74% to 25.24%.
[brief] ”  [Aa432.]  This statement recognizes that a navigation claim particular to Appellant would be justification for a hearing.  [...] argues in its brief that “Appellant’s claim is based on speculative interference only and is based on self-serving statements and overhead photographs…”  [Jb17.]  [...] goes on to state that “Appellant failed to provide any evidence, by an expert or otherwise, to dispute the conclusions of [...]’s Professional Engineer and [...] that [...]’s dock met the CZM Rules…”  [Jb18.]  As set forth above, Appellant did in fact provide evidence regarding non-compliance with the Coastal Zone Management (“CZM”) Rules and the specific and unique impact to Appellant.
[brief] **POINT I** (5a,11a,16a)  A Court Can Not Reinstate a Complaint That It Dismissed Because Plaintiff Violated R 1:20-A6’s Pre-Action Notice as It is Void  *Ab Initio* and Deprived the Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.  Thus, Any Judgment on That Complaint is Also Void.  Subject matter jurisdiction involves “a threshold determination as to whether [a court] is legally authorized to decide the question presented. ”  *Gilbert v.* Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 280–81, 432 A.2d 1351 (1981).  When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its authority to consider the case is “wholly and immediately foreclosed. ”  Gilbert, at 281, 432 A.2d 1351 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S.Ct. 691, 699, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 674 (1962)).  The principle is well established that a court cannot hear a case as to which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction even if all parties thereto desire an adjudication on the merits.  State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960); Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass'n of Woodbridge, 13 N.J. 528, 537 (1953); Peterson v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 454 (1951).  The law is clear that Rule 1:20A “Pre-Action Notice” is jurisdictional, and directs that “[n]o lawsuit to recover a fee may be filed until the expiration of the [thirty] day period herein giving Pre-Action Notice to a client .  . . .  Pre-action Notice shall be given in writing, which shall be sent by certified mail and regular mail to the last known address of the client . . . and which shall contain the name, address and telephone number of the current secretary of the Fee Committee in a district where the lawyer maintains an office…The attorney’s complaint shall allege the giving of the notice required by this rule or it shall be dismissed. ”  Rule 1:20A-6 (emphasis added).  Our Supreme Court holds this rule inviolate by directing that before an attorney can file suit for a fee the attorney must provide Pre-Action Notice.  *Saffer v. Willoughby*, 143 N.J. 256 (1996). ³  On October 2, 2019 the lower court properly dismissed the fatally defective and jurisdictionally void complaint and refused to reinstate it by finding it violated R. 1:20-A6’s mandatory service of Pre-Action Notice before filing a complaint, yet over two years later the same court reinstated that prohibited complaint and claimed the 2019 dismissal was just a stay.
[brief] (Id. (citing [...] Decl. Ex. 6)).  In their response, defendants acknowledged the issue with the transition to Office 365, and informed plaintiffs that they “are now proceeding to collect and image the laptops of the 20 custodians from whom documents have already been produced in order to obtain any .pst files that were saved to a particular custodian’s laptop rather than to Office 365. ” (Id., at 19-20 (citing [...] Decl. Ex. 6)).  Defendants stated that they were “moving forward with production of custodial ESI from the remaining three custodians,” and that the responsiveness review is already complete for one custodian, and production should occur within the “next week or so. ”  (Id. at 20 (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 4)).  The “responsiveness and privilege review” of the remaining two custodians was “currently underway. ” (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 4)).  *5  Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ six “new” Rule 30(b)(6) deposition issues were not previously noticed and reiterate that they have already responded in writing to each of plaintiffs’ previously-noticed topics.
[brief] In [...]’s indictment, he was charged with two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Counts Three and Four) with language that parroted that subsection of the statute.  (Da3).  Nowhere was [...] charged with the fourth-degree version of the offense pertaining to non-firearms found in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).  For whatever reason, the parties and the trial court included the incorrect model charge in the final instructions, instructing the jury on the fourth-degree offense found under subsection (d) rather than the second-degree offense under subsection (b):  Counts three and four of the indictment each charge the defendant, [...] with the crime of the knowing unlawful possession of a weapon.  The statute on which this count of the indictment is based reads in pertinent part.
[brief] (Pa1).  She received the Respondent’s response to her complaint on December 12, 2022.  (Pa25).  Upon reading the Respondent’s brief, [...] filed two OPRA requests on December 15, 2022: [...] and [...].  (Pa77).  They were respectively submitted against the [...] and the [...].  (Pa77).  [...] filed these requests after the Respondents argued her Verified Complaint should be dismissed for violating the Statute of Limitations since [...] had never officially filed OPRA requests prior to filing her Verified Complaint.  (Pa25).
[brief] ”  DEP Rb23.  This is incorrect because the regulations in effect at the time the DEP reviewed this permit required the DEP to take into account the most likely and realistic anticipated increases in precipitation and flooding at this property.  As the Appellant argued in its initial brief, see Ab31-24, the Appellant does not claim that the IFPR should have governed the procedures for the DEP’s permit decision in this case.  Rather, it was necessary for the DEP to make the requisite factual findings, including consideration of the Cornell Studies, in its assessment of [...]’s “Method 6” engineering calculations and associated flood elevation predictions for the 100-year flood.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted R. 2:2-3(a)(2), which contemplates that every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division.  Thus, the rule mandates the exclusive allocation to the Appellate Division of review of both final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).
[directive] Defendant.  Order Mandating an Expert Evaluation of Criminal Responsibility at the Time  N.J.S.A. of the Crime Pursuant to 2C:4-l for a Defendant in the Community  N.J.S.A. HAVING RECEIVED notice pursuant to 2C:4-3 that the defendant intends to claim of that he/she was not responsible for his/her conduct at the time the crime due to mental disease N.J.S.A. or defect as provided 2C:4-l, the defendant is hereby ordered to undergo an in of of of evaluation by professional staff designated by the Commissioner the Department Health of his/her sanity the [ specify criminal conduct that the defendant was originally charged with ______________________________ committing]
[brief] Before entering upon their duties the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they and each of them will fairly and impartially and to the best of their judgment ascertain the true location of the lines in dispute.  The commissioners may enter upon any lands for the purpose of ascertaining and deciding the location of the disputed lines, and they shall have power to examine witnesses under oath and to inquire fully into the questions in dispute.  The commissioners shall file a report thereof with the court within such time as the court shall prescribe and, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the report shall be final and conclusive against all of the parties and their heirs and assigns.  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2.
[brief] For the same reasons and authorities cited above in Point V, this court may also affirm the trial court’s dismissal order on the alternate grounds that the Prosecutor Defendants are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity against [...]’s constitutional claims and statutory prosecutorial immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act against [...]’s remaining state common law tort claims.  In their motions to dismiss before the federal district court and [...], defendants [...], [...], and [...] each asserted absolute prosecutorial immunity against counts I and IX of [...]’s complaint under Section 1983, the NJCRA and the TCA.  (Pa58; 1T 4:23-5:22).  The federal district court would grant the Prosecutor Defendants’ motion on this ground under Section 1983, finding that each was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from liability as to [...]’s federal claims.  (Pa59-Pa62); (Pa61) (finding [...]’s decision to prosecute the violation of probation charge constituted “a core prosecutorial role. ”); (Pa61-Pa62) (finding that [...] and [...] “were acting in-court, post-indictment, and in furtherance of fully litigating the charges. ”).  Upon transfer of the remaining state claims to state court, the State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss [...]’s remaining state claims, asserting an entitlement to absolute prosecutorial immunity.  (1T 4:23-5:22).  [...] did not specifically resolve the legal issue of absolute prosecutorial immunity in his written opinion.  (1T 3:1-85:24).  However, because absolute prosecutorial immunity, similar to qualified immunity, “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” controlling authority provides that the immunity question should “be decided early in the proceedings as possible, preferably on a properly supported motion for summary judgment or dismissal. ”  See Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 375, 387 (2000).  For these reasons, this court can also resolve the legal issue of the Prosecutor Defendants’ entitlement to absolute prosecutorial immunity from liability for [...]’s constitutional claims under the NJCRA and [...]’s state common law tort claims under the TCA.
[brief] See id. at 602-04.  Under that framework, an officer whose knowledge is based solely on viewing the recording of an event cannot: present (1) "continuous commentary," (2) "subjective interpretations," (3) personal views on 'factual issues that are reasonably disputed," or (4) observations of what "is depicted in a video based on inferences or deductions, including any drawn from other evidence."  Id. at 604  But "investigators can describe what appears on a recording about the content" such as "objective, factual comments[.]"  Id. at 603.  As an example, the Court said that "an investigator who carefully reviewed a video in advance could draw attention to a distinctive shirt or a particular style of car that appear in different frames, which a jury might otherwise overlook."  Id. at 604.  The Court also stated that State v. Allen, 254 N.J. 530 (2023), decided the same day, "provides additional examples of what narration evidence may and may not include."  Id. at 604.  There, the Court found the detective's narration testimony "about how parts of the video helped him 'locate areas of interest for his processing of the crime scene" was proper.  Id. at 605 (quoting Allen, 254 N.J. at 539).  The testimony in Allen, which explained the police's use of surveillance footage in their investigation of the crime scene, is analogous to the use of the surveillance evidence presented here.
[directive] Officer Alleging Reports  "Accepting entitled section under the Accordingly, read: to amended 2 are requirement 3, paragraph of sentences two first the Misconduct," will complaint receiving the officer other or supervisor, investigator, affairs internal  The complaint. making the person the to procedures disciplinary department's the explain status of the informed be kept will or she he that complainant the advise shall officer  The show to added (Underline disposition. ultimate its and requested, if complaint, the of revisions.)  2014).]  July 14 (rev. at Procedures, and Policy Affairs
[brief] As explained in Point I above, defendant’s sentence was not illegal.  Because his sentence was not illegal, he was required to file his PCR petition within the five-year deadline mandated by Rule 3:22-12.  His JOC was entered on June 30, 1997.  (Da11).  This means his PCR petition was due on June 30, 2002.  Instead, on August 8, 2022, defendant filed his PCR petition twenty years after the PCR deadline had expired.  (Da26-29).  Because defendant failed to show excusable neglect and that a fundamental injustice would result if his petition was not heard on the merits, the PCR court properly found his petition as time-barred.
[brief] The very reason that the Atalese Court required the waiver language is that a consumer does not understand that arbitration, by its nature, is a waiver of the right to be in court.  Here, defendants contend that the missing waiver language is contained on page iv of the 663 page POS.  (Br. at 42).  Of course, the POS was not signed by the plaintiffs.  Further, there is no evidence that plaintiffs agreed to or were even made aware of the POS provision on page iv.  While defendants point out with great fanfare that plaintiffs initialed the inadequate Section 13 of the SPA, there are no initials appearing next to the language on page iv of the POS.  That is because defendants did not make plaintiffs aware of the language.  Hence, there was no mutual assent to the arbitration language hidden on page iv of the 663-page POS.  Finally, while plaintiffs did sign their SPAs, their SPAs specifically did not include the POS as a “Governing Document.
[brief] See Scerbo v. Orange Bd. of Adj., 121 N.J. Super. 378, 388 (Law Div.1972)(notice of an application to construct a residential treatment center was sufficient even though it did not state that a special exception or variance was sought).  In Pond Run, “[w]ithout directly addressing the fact that the developer's notice did not conform to the technical requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D–11, the appellate panel instead applied a more general approach to notice, finding it dispositive that a “reasonable person” would have been able to glean the necessary information despite the error. ”  see Northgate Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Hillsdale Plan. Bd., 214 N.J. 120, 140–41 (2013)(citing Pond Run, supra, 397 N.J. Super. at 348–49).  Appellant charges that the notice was insufficient and vague, that the notice did not specify the size of deviations sought in the variances, along with the omission of the term “density”.  The Court concluded that the “subject notice sufficiently informs the public in accordance with the MLUL.” (Pa56).
[brief] Ja224 (5)  Both applications involved the same cause of action and thing sued for, a variance request for a front yard setback on the identical block and lot.  Ja156, Ja238  In *Pieretti v. Bloomfield*, 35 N.J. 382 (1961) an applicant sought greater relief in a second application made in 1958 than it sought in its first application made in 1944, which was denied, for expansion of a nonconforming use.  The 1958 application sought to construct a larger building covering more residentially zoned land than the initial application.  The Court held:  The second application was appropriately barred by the Town Council upon its finding that res judicata applied.
[brief] III.  [...] And [...] Did Not Have Any Reason to Object or Challenge The Standard Specifications as They Stood at The Time of Bid  One of [...]’s primary arguments is that [...] did not object to the Standard Specifications prior to submitting its Bid.  [...]’s logic is that this now precludes [...] or [...] from doing so after-the-fact.  When bid, [...] and [...] fully understood how the Specifications were interpreted.  Neither [...] nor [...] had any reason to challenge or request clarification of the Specifications.  Experience on thirteen prior projects was proof of their interpretation.  [...] is not challenging the Standard Specifications.  [...] satisfied the Standard Specifications by submitting a Proposal Bond, a Power of Attorney, and a Consent of Surety in a form that was previously found acceptable on thirteen prior occasions.
[brief] PA164  [Exhibit R to Certification of [...]]  First page of [...]’s Initial Interrogatories to the [...] – Dated 10/19/2020.  PA176  [Exhibit S to Certification of [...]]  First page of Defendants [...] and [...]’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Initial Interrogatories and [...]’s Certification to Plaintiff’s Initial Interrogatories dated June 25, 2021.
[brief] ”  Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 468 (quoting Menke v. Broward Cnty. Sch. Bd., 916 So.2d 8, 10 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005)).  Just as a requesting party has no right to rifle through its adversary’s physical filing cabinets or to scour its electronic devices, the requesting party has no right to “search through” tens of thousands of documents just because they are stored electronically.  See id.  In short, the discovery rules “allow[] the responding party to search his records to produce the required, relevant data”; requesting parties have no “right to conduct the actual search themselves. ”  In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2003).  Indeed, the case for gatekeeping is even stronger here than in Lipsky.  There, the producing entity had conceded that it had discovered “responsive documents on their devices,” such that producing those devices would have entailed the production of at least *some* relevant documents.  *Lipsky*, 474 N.J. Super. at 471.  The problem was that a cell phone is not divisible, so providing access to relevant documents would necessarily entail providing access to irrelevant documents as well—a tradeoff this Court declined to bless.  *See id.* at 473-75.  Here, by contrast, no tradeoff is required at all—Defendants can perform the normal task of reviewing and segregating relevant documents from irrelevant documents, producing only those documents actually relevant to the case and responsive to plaintiff’s requests.  That gatekeeping function is the familiar, perfectly workable mechanism for enforcing the “relevance limitations” in Rule 4:10-2(a).  *Id.* at 464.  None of this is to say, of course, that a producing party’s gatekeeping duties are always discharged without checks or oversight.  “[A]t times—perhaps due to improper conduct on the part of the responding party—the requesting party itself may need to check the data compilation. ”  *Ford Motor*, 345 F.3d at 1317.  And the trial court may always “consider the completeness” of discovery and order additional discovery should evidence emerge that a party “withheld responsive documents. ”  *Lipsky*, 474 N.J. Super. at 474.  But absent such a showing of “malfeasance,” there is no basis for imposing more “intrusive methods” to supervise a party’s relevancy reviews.  *Id.* at 474-75.  Courts instead recognize that as “a general matter,” the “responding party is best situated to preserve, search, and produce its own [ESI],” and a court can rely “on each party fulfilling its discovery obligations without direction from the court or opposing counsel. ”  [...] v. Wulf, 345 F.R.D. 406, 420 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (quotation omitted).  The trial court here offered no reason to doubt that Defendants would conduct a proper relevancy review.  The court certainly made no finding that Defendants had committed “malfeasance” of any kind warranting extra scrutiny or more intrusive discovery measures.  The trial court therefore erred as a matter of law in denying Defendants the right to review for, and withhold, documents with no relevance to the case.  See Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 474.  D.
[brief] (Pb 46-47).  However, *Shinn* is easily distinguished, in that the husband in that matter extremely underestimated certain values of property he owned prior to the marriage.  In addition, the prenuptial agreement in that matter was marred by coercion, in that the husband told his wife that she either had to sign the agreement or they would not marry.  By way of sharp contrast, the parties in the instant case fully and accurately disclosed their assets, which were not very much, as much of their wealth was created during the marriage.  In rejecting the Petitioner’s reliance upon *Shinn*, the Chancery Division reasoned as follows:
[brief] A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:  a.  With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.  In Rosario v. [...], 443 N.J. Super. 353, 354-355 (App. Div. 2016), the Appellate Division specifically detailed that under the UFTA, a creditor need not have a ripe claim and that a debtor is anyone liable on a claim:
[brief] Q.  And even though that person or that entity was in contact with you, the decision was still made to let the lease default.  A.  I don’t know that I would put it that way, [...].  We were - - we were having a very difficult time, the other managing members and I, so we weren’t really communicating, as you know we were both pursuing it a different way, and it was a difficulty time to move the project forward until we as members resolved our issues.  (Pa001826).  Q.  Okay.  But certainly by October 2nd you’d been put on notice that you were in default of the lease for not paying rent, right?  A.  We - - we had been given notice in September - - I think we got our first notice in August.  Q. Okay.  A.  And we were negotiating to buy the land, and we had - - we were in discussion with some capital partners to come in with us on it, and we didn’t think anybody else would buy the land.  Q.  Okay.  So you’re fighting with your partners, but at the same time you’re negotiating to purchase the land.  Was that going to be something done separate from your partners?  A.  I can’t do anything separate from my partners but - (Pa001827).