ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Aa71).  The ALJ agreed that [...]’s actuarial memoranda certified that [...]’s requested rate increases were not “excessive or unfairly discriminatory. ”  Id. at 20.  Under ASOP No. 8, rates are considered excessive if they exceed the rate needed to pay claims, administrative expenses, taxes, regulatory fees, reasonable contingency, and profit margins.  (Aa72).  The ALJ stated that the Department characterized [...]’s requested rate increases as “excessive. ”  Ibid.  [...]’s target lifetime loss ratio of 64.3%—its goal with its original pricing—is excessive because of the incorrect assumptions that caused the company to underprice its products and fall short of this target, even though this was an industry-wide occurrence.  Ibid.  [...]’s requested rates even exceeded the amount needed to cover the cost of claims, expenses, and profits by seeking to recoup past losses or unfavorable claim experiences to obtain its original target lifetime loss ratio of 64.3%.  Ibid.  [...], [...]’s expert witness, acknowledged that it can take months or a year to develop sufficient credibility for assumptions and projections because any company must review data.  Ibid.  [...] also testified regarding his understanding of the requirement, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-11, that rates must not be excessive, or unfairly discriminatory.  (T2 451:19 to 452:1).  He testified that: to the extent an actuary is looking for additional guidance on those things, those particular items are spelled out pretty well within the ASOPS, and in ASOP 8, specifically.  And what constitutes excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, you know.  And based on those definitions in ASOP 8, [...] rates definitely are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.  [T2 452:1-9].  The ALJ concluded that [...]’s data to support the credibility of those assumptions had yet to be fully developed.  I.
[brief] Why so?  It is undisputed that, as a preliminary matter (and as discussed above), the first step in determining whether UIM coverage is implicated under any given policy is to compare the tortfeasor’s liability limits with the UIM limits.  In this case, all of plaintiffs’ vehicles were insured by [...] under a policy providing $500,000/$1,000,000 in liability coverage.  The [...] policy also provided $500,000/$1,000,000 in UIM coverage.  Regardless of the UIM definitional exclusion cited in [...]’s policy for household vehicles, none of plaintiffs’ household vehicles could ever be underinsured vis-a-vie [...]’s UIM coverage since the liability limits of the policy match the UIM limits.
[brief] On March 6, 2015, [...] was arrested for possessing a handgun and was being detained at the Paterson Police Department when he requested to speak with [...] and [...], claiming he had information about [...]’s death.  (2T 101-8 to 102-12, 120-15 to 121-8)  Before [...] divulged his information, they discussed [...]’s bail amount, and [...] promised [...] that they would “try to help [him] out in any way [they] can” in exchange for his information.  (2T 103-23 to 105-8)  [...] proceeded to claim that he encountered [...] the day before at a shrine for [...] and that, while there, he saw [...] spitting and brandishing a gun.  (2T 111-22 to 115-23)  [...] claimed that he brought his own gun the next day to protect himself and that he happened to recall the details of what occurred at the shrine, including what type of gun [...] had; however, after being shown a transcript of his prior testimony, [...] said he previously testified that [...] had a Glock.  (2t 111-22 to 116-15)  although [...] recalled “plenty” of people at the shrine that day, no one else corroborated his account, and he also admitted that he had been previously convicted of twelve felonies in New Jersey.  (2T 113-9 to 13, 129-7 to 130-12)  After informing against [...] and being held for just one day, [...] was released on $75,000 bail, and he ultimately pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a gun and was sentenced to the minimum, five years with forty-two months of parole ineligibility.  (2T 120-15 to 135-4)  [...] maintained that his actual testimony against [...] was not a condition of his plea.  (2T 133-1 to 25)  In summation, the defense argue that the surveillance videos corroborated [...]’s alibi—that he turn off of east 16th onto Governor and went home—because the beef town video showed the suspect wearing light-color clothing, but the Alto Rango video showed [...] wearing dark-colored clothing.
[brief] Fourth, the County has made clear that it risks its standing with NJDOT if it awards relevant projects to contractors without the appropriate demonstration of qualification or without the timely submission of the NJDOT --- 4  The Palamar court determined that there was no competitive advantage based on the limited passage of time.  [...] does not accept that proposition, but the case nonetheless distinguishes between a speedy supplementation and an extended on.  Notice.  Da366-67.  This is another sufficient basis for a discretionary refusal to waive the defect.  Finally, the County has made clear that it consistently holds bidders to the NJDOT Notice requirement on relevant projects.  Da366-67.  Consistent treatment of bidders in similar circumstances is critical to the public’s perception of fairness in government contracting.  Muirfield, 336 N.J. Super. at 137-38.  This is another sufficient basis for discretionary refusal to waive the defect.  In sum, under the facts of this case and the applicable law, the County absolutely had the right to refuse waiver of [...]’s failure to timely supply its NJDOT Notice.
[brief] f.  An acknowledgement that the 2nd Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan essentially divides the redevelopment plan areas into 2 sub-areas, which are to be developed as separate components of the overall tract, but which will nonetheless have physical connections and interrelationships, which support the overall purpose and intent of the Beachway Avenue Redevelopment Plan; g.  An acknowledgement that the proposed 2nd Amendment has been designed to provide guidelines for redevelopment of the redevelopment plan area with different concepts and Design Standards, based upon the location and characteristics of the corresponding sub-areas; and h.  An acknowledgement that the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, once adopted, will supersede and replace the 1\textsuperscript{st} amended Redevelopment Plan.  7.  The Board Members discussed the matter and presented certain questions / comments associated therewith.  8.  After such discussion, the Board found that the proposed Ordinance Amendment (Ordinance No. 1667) is, in fact, consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.
[brief] Under the present facts, it is plainly the case that no contractual relationship exists between Plaintiff-Appellant and [...].  Contrary to Plaintiff-Appellant’s myopic view, the decision on whether to admit a student is an academic one that is within the expertise – and the discretion – of the institution.  Mittra and its progeny stand for the proposition that an academic institution in exercising its discretion should nonetheless treat its students fairly and that it not act arbitrarily or capriciously.  Here the decision to require a strong academic performance at the conclusion of the first year of pharmacy courses ([...] selected 3. 0 GPA as the indicia of strong academic attainment), in order to be able to take advantage of the opportunity for participation in the dual degree program, was necessary to gain ACPE acceptance of the program, and was pedagogically sound.  Therefore, there were academic reasons, not an arbitrary or capricious determination.  Moreover, the 3.0 GPA requirements was fair to students as it protected underperforming students from failure and jeopardization of their academic careers.  Therefore, even if the Court were to recognize some quasi- or implied contractual relationship between the parties, under the standards set forth in Beukas and Dougherty, [...] has thoroughly demonstrated that the supplementation of its website to include the 3.0 GPA requirement was neither “arbitrary” nor “capricious. ”  Rather, it was to comply with the ACPE’s requests.  The Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant’s contractual claim against [...] should be affirmed.
[brief] ”  Within the model jury instructions, the New Jersey Supreme Court detailed many words for the trial judge to define.  Significantly, N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1), the instruction directs the trial judge to define the words “purposely, knowingly and recklessly. ”  These words are defined because they have legal significance, and a jury cannot rely on their plain meaning.  For someone to act purposely with respect to the nature of their conduct or a result thereof, it must be their conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.  N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1).  Someone acts knowingly with respect to the nature of their conduct if they are aware that their conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence.  N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1).  Lastly, an act is reckless when the actor is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk.  N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1).  The model jury charge for N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1) does not require the trial judge to define the words “unnecessarily” or “cruelly”; it does not require the trial judge to define any words within the second element.  This is because there is no legal significance attached to those words.
[brief] However even before this Court made that ruling, [...] had already filed another trial court motion seeking additional sanctions (Pa124).  On Jan 13, 2023, I had timely opposed this motion, and I cross-moved seeking (amongst other relief) indigent status and a stay on the execution of the judgment (Pa133).  On Jan 18, 2023, [...] filed a reply, which raised new issues for the very time (Pa140).  Thus on Jan 31, 2023, I filed a sur-reply rebutting those new issues.  (Pa143)  --- 3  Both of these letters were misdated as “Nov 4, 2022”.  On Feb 28, 2023 the trial court dismissed or denied all of my cross motions while granting (in part) [...] motion, thereby adding another $4,040 in sanctions, bringing the total to $8,900.49 (Pa169, 3T).  On Mar 10, 2023 I moved before this Court to reinstate my appeal, for indigent status, as well as a stay.
[brief] (emphasis added)  Clearly, the DEP is supposed to engage in a comprehensive analysis and is not just limited to basing its consistency decision on the gallons per day used and flushed into the proposed septic system.  For example, the DEP’s regulations that implement the Highlands Act, at N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2, requires the applicant for a HAD (in this case the Respondent [...]) to submit a plethora of expertly detailed information, including all of the following:
[brief] Outdoor storage.  Outdoor storage in all zone districts shall be subject to the following provisions:  A.  In the I and B Zones, outdoor storage, as defined at §230-54, shall be permitted and limited in accordance with the following provisions:  (1)  Outdoor storage shall be restricted to materials and products directly related to the principal permitted use of the premises and normally stored outside a structure.  (2)  Outdoor storage on a lot that does not contain a principal building is prohibited.  (3)  Outdoor storage shall be restricted to the side and/or rear yard.  On corner lots, no outdoor storage shall be permitted between the street line and the building line as extended to the rear and side lot lines.  (4)  Outdoor storage shall meet the side and rear yard setback requirements for accessory buildings.  (5)  The maximum area of any lot that can be used for outdoor storage shall be equal to the gross floor area of the principal building(s).
[brief] As the agencies charged with combating insurance fraud and enforcing the IFPA in this State, the Department and the OIFP have a substantial interest in ensuring the correct interpretation of the IFPA and that its enforcement goals are not unduly hindered.  Thus, the agencies have a strong interest in the outcome of this case, which concerns the appropriate forum to hear cases filed by insurance companies under the IFPA.  Because insurance companies play a significant role in combating civil and criminal insurance fraud in New Jersey through use of the IFPA, including in ways that impact the Department and OIFP’s work, both the Department and the OIFP appear as amicus to shed light on how the decision below has significant consequences on how fraud claims are heard and resolved.  Moreover, the Department’s interest in this case also stems from the fact that it is also the agency charged by the Legislature with promulgating regulations for and supervising the administration of the Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) no-fault arbitration statute.
[brief] DEFENDANTS LARGELY DO NOT DISPUTE THE LOWER COURT’S ERRORS (8a, 9a, 17a).  Defendants implicitly admit the lower court’s numerous errors of law and discrepancies, as highlighted by Plaintiff, by failing to directly address them in any meaningful fashion.  These admissions include the following:  •  Defendants do not address the two contradictory findings in the lower court’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s pleadings as to an adverse employment action.  The lower court initially stated that “Plaintiff has not established the second prong, that she suffered an adverse employment action” to justify a determination that Count One was dismissed as to Defendant [...].  8a.  Yet, later, when evaluating Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants [...] and [...], the Court conceded that “[w]hen affording all reasonable inferences to Plaintiff that the complained of activity constitutes a pattern of retaliation, Plaintiff may have established the second element of her prima facie case. ”  17a (emphasis added).  •  Defendants do not address the lower court’s failure to presume all of Plaintiff’s pleadings as true, which is what is required at the motion to dismiss stage.  Plaintiff highlighted a number of instances where the lower court acted as a trier of fact, and Defendants do not meaningfully dispute any of these.  For example, the lower court found as follows: - “[B]eing reprimanded for failing to comply with the District COVID-19 mask policy, specifically, for allowing her students to take their masks off while seated, does not rise to the level of ‘materially adverse’ because the entire school district, and its teachers, were provided with the mask-regulations far in advance of the alleged violations”  9a; - “Plaintiff cannot establish that enforcing the mask policy is not in and of itself within the purview of the Nutley [...] for protection of teachers, students, and staff”  Id.; and - “Even if the Affirmative Action investigation was retaliatory – which is was not – the Board and its members are protected by qualified immunity”  Id. (emphasis added).  The arguments made by Defendants are premised on the assumption that Plaintiff’s allegations are not true.  For example, Defendants [...] and [...] highlight that Plaintiff’s allegations related to the disproportionate application of the District Mask Policy were only pled “upon information and belief”.  Def’s Br., pg. 4.  This contradicts the applicable standard on a motion to dismiss, which required the lower court to provide Plaintiff with all reasonable inferences and assume the truth of her allegations.  See Smith v. SBC Communications, Inc., 178 N.J. 265, 282 (2004).  By failing to directly address the lower court’s errors, Defendants admit that they were made.  As such, Plaintiff’s appeal should be granted.
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[brief] On December 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants [...], [...] and [...], [...] and [...].  Da1.  On January 14, 2022, Defendants [...], [...] and [...] filed an Answer.  Da10.  On March 8, 2022, Defendants [...] and [...] filed an Answer.  Da23.  In advance of trial, the Trial Court heard oral argument on motions in limine on September 26, 2023.  1T.  By way of Order entered on September 25, 2023, the Trial Court granted Plaintiff’s motion in limine seeking to admit the audio portion of the NJSP dashcam video depicting the scene of the accident immediately after the police arrived.  Da41.  The Trial Court also entered an Order barring evidence of Defendant [...]’s prior drug-related criminal conviction.  Da42.  Defendant [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Order granting [...]’s motion to bar evidence of his criminal convictions, which the Trial Court denied by way of Order dated October 3, 2023.  Da45.  The matter proceeded to trial on October 3, 2023.
[brief] The 2019 Application of Ms. [...] is the Underlying Basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  (Pb22-Pb23).  Plaintiff, bizarrely, and contrary to his own Complaint (see Pa087), now alleges that the 2019 Application of Ms. [...] is not the underlying basis of his Complaint.  If that is true then upon what basis does Plaintiff rest this litigation seeking judicial relief in overturning the denial of Rutherford and for designation of a handicap parking space?  [...] filed only a single, solitary application for a handicap parking space in February 2019.  (See Pa006-Pa015).  Up until February 5, 2024, Plaintiff had not filed his own application for a handicap parking space.  (See Da047-Da054).  Thus, Plaintiff oddly now appears to be arguing that he did not have standing as a pro se litigant to bring such an action on behalf of his mother and/or that this matter was not ripe for disposition at the time of filing the Verified Complaint.  Considering that Plaintiff is the one appealing the Court Below, it is curious as to why Plaintiff would make such an argument that would also require dismissal.
[brief] [...] used hearsay evidence, not to opine as to [...]’s mental state at the time of the offense but to establish a motive that was never presented in the State’s case in chief.  (14T:176-20 to 178-20).  There were records from [...]’s school therapist that contained hearsay used in conjunction with a hearsay text message from [...]’s brother [...] that were compared to establish a motive for killing.  Id.  The motive that [...] killed his family because he didn’t want to leave [...] that was testified to by [...] was never raised in the State’s case in chief.
[brief] Since late 2015, [...] has participated in the Mt. Laurel declaratory judgment action filed by the Township Defendants under Docket Number [...] (the “DJ Action”) as a Defendant-Intervenor.  Pa042.  Although [...] initially had a different property under contract, in early 2019, [...] entered into a purchase and sale agreement with [...] to acquire its headquarters at [...], and proposed to construct an inclusionary community on said lands in order to assist the Township Defendants in meeting their Third Round constitutional Mt. Laurel obligations.
[brief] \footnote{“1T” refers to the transcript of the April 28, 2023 hearing on the Global Fee App.; “2T” refers to the transcript of the July 28, 2018 hearing on [...]’s prior global fee application; “3T” refers to the April 1, 2022 transcript of the hearing on another of [...]’s prior fee applications; “4T” refers to the Certification of Lost Verbatim Court Record filed by the Court’s Transcript Coordinator on November 20, 2023, related to the lost/damaged transcript of the May 27, 2021 transcript of the hearing on another of [...]’s prior fee applications.}
[brief] The Judge of Compensation concluded that she would not recuse herself because she could "make the decision fairly and impartially and look at the law and apply the law as the law is presented and as I know it."  (1T22-11-15).  The Judge of Compensation's also found that "The only thing that I have knowledge of is the law and the law making – I don't think that's extrajudicial knowledge.  I think that's judicial knowledge."  (Emphasis added).  (1T18-9-12).  The Judge of Compensation's involvement in the "law making," at a minimum, raises a question of impartiality.  A Judge of Compensation may only rely upon evidence in the record.  Here, the Judge of Compensation expressed an intention to rely upon information that she acquired that was outside the record.  The record below of the recusal motion and the essential worker motion demonstrate substantive and procedural bias.  R. 1:12-2 requires recusal not only when there is bias, but when the circumstances would lead the parties to believe that they cannot receive a fair and unbiased hearing.  The Judge of Compensation's involvement in the enactment of this statute and her strong feelings on treating teachers as essential employees reached "a point where it may well appear to the clients that one side is being favored over another" and "that it may well be appropriate before this case reaches trial for the judge to consider whether [s]he should step down from hearing the actual trial of the case because of the degree of involvement."  Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 71 (App. Div. 2001).  The Judge of Compensation therefore should have granted respondent's motion for recusal.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Subsection was also addressed the above-cited Attorney General (g) in Directive, which imposed the same mandates for prosecutors to enforcement of mandatory as terms, plea agreements and dismissals.  Any questions or comments regarding this Directive may directed to [...], be Assistant Director for Criminal Practice, by email at [...] or by phone at [...].  cc: Chief Justice [...]  Attorney General [...] S. Public Defender [...] E.  Criminal Division Judges [...], Director, DCJ County Prosecutors of [...], Chief Staff D. AOC Directors and Assistant Directors of Clerks Court Trial Court Administrators [...], Special Assistant S. [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant Criminal Division Managers and Assistants [...], Chief [...], Assistant Chief Justice [...]
[brief] This evidence shows a serious lack of judgment.  (Ca037-038) (emphasis added).  Respondent campaigned for her seat from this account.  She announced that she took her seat.  She stated clearly that she was a member of the Board.  She then went on to speak on Board issues without providing any sort of disclaimer.  That is why it is all the more inexplicable that the Commission erred so grievously in stating in its Final Decision that her account did not “make any reference to the Board nor her membership on the same.