ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] All complaints of officer misconduct shall be accepted from all persons who wish to file a complaint, regardless of the hour or day of the week.  This includes reports from anonymous sources, juveniles, undocumented immigrants, and persons under arrest or in custody.  Internal affairs personnel, if available, should accept complaints.  If internal affairs personnel are not available, supervisory personnel should accept reports of officer misconduct, and if no supervisory personnel are available, complaints should be accepted by any law enforcement officer.  At no time should a complainant be told to return at a later time to file their report.
[brief] In Landenheim v. Klein, 330 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2000) and Cronin v. McKim-Gray 353 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2002) both concern treating physicians that actually provided services of value.  The plaintiff physicians performed legitimate, legal services, and expected to be compensated, and in fact relied on the representation of the defendants that they would be compensated.  In this case, the defendant did not provide a service, such as medical treatment.
[brief] In May 2022, someone hacked into the Bank’s computer and transferred the entire balance of $101,000.00 from Plaintiff’s savings into his checking account, from which $160,000.00 was withdrawn in $20,000.00 increments through the Bank’s bill pay feature, a feature [...] never requested nor activated.  (Pa 134) - MC-2.  [...] had no knowledge of this until he received notice from Bank one of his checks was dishonored.  (Pa 134, Par. 3).  He immediately contacted Bank because his checking account had a balance sufficient to cover the dishonored check.  (Pa 135, Par. 4).  Bank’s local branch told him to contact the fraud department.  He advised it he had not authorized these transactions, and asked why if he only had a balance of $150,000.00 in his checking account, $160,000.00 could have been withdrawn from it.  The Bank advised that it was covered by the overdraft protection from his savings account even though the savings account, because of the fraudulent transfer, had no balance.  (Pa 135, Par. 5).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  [...] filed a Complaint to appoint Boundary Commissioners pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1 on October 7, 2021 (Pa1).  [...] filed an Answer (Pa48) on January 19, 2022, and did not oppose the entry of an Order appointing Boundary Commissioners on January 25, 2022 by the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. (Pa55)  The Boundary Commissioners submitted their Report on November 1, 2022 (Pa57) with a correction to Exhibit F of that Report on November 7, 2022 (Pa89).  [...] applied to set aside the Boundary Commissioners’ Report in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 on November 10, 2022 (Pa91).  No pre-trial order was issued in the case, but [...] issued a consent case management order on May 3, 2023 which established pre-trial procedures (Pa93).  The trial of this matter took place on November 13, 2023 presided over by the Honorable [...], J.S.C.¹  At the conclusion of trial, the trial court ordered that notice be given to certain “indispensible parties who have not been notified of this proceeding” which order was entered on ¹  The trial transcript from November 13, 2033 has been designated as “1T. ”  The transcript from the post-trial hearing on January 29, 2024 has been designated “2T.”  November 14, 2023 by [...] (Pa95).  At a subsequent hearing on January 29, 2024, [...] determined that the parties who had been given notice either had not appeared or had indicated that they did not want to be involved in the proceeding, and allowed the Patiernos an opportunity to object to the Ahmeds’ proposed order (2T17, l.5-19, l.20).  He also denied the Patiernos the opportunity to join additional affected parties (2T14, l.2-17, l.4).  On February 8, 2024, [...] entered a Final Order in this matter by entering the order previously provided by the Ahmeds and dispensing with objections filed by the Patiernos indicating that his reasons had been stated on the record on January 29, 2024 (Pa96).  [...] filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s decision and Final Order on March 21, 2024 (Pa98).  VII.
[directive] Critical decision making.  Critical decision-making and tactical deployment techniques include tactical communication and tactical positioning, such as strategic redeployment and time as a tactic.  Critical decision-making and tactics require officers to do the following: (a) begin critical assessment and planning prior to arriving at the scene; 2 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  (b) collect available information; (c) assess situations, threats, and risks; (d) identify options for conflict resolution; (e) determine the best course of action; and (f) act, review, and re-assess the situation as it evolves.  2.5
[brief] > It is designed to cut through sham and frivolity . . . and lay the case before the trial court in its true light.  If, when so viewed, there appears to be no genuine triable issue of fact, the relief should be granted.  *[Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 21 N.J. 439, 448 (1956). ]*  Summary judgment is used to pierce groundless claims and preserve judicial resources for cases which meritoriously command attention.  *Robins v. Jersey City*, 23 N.J. 229, 240-41 (1957).  Where there is only one reasonably justifiable conclusion to be made from undisputed facts, summary judgment is proper.  *Lima & Sons, Inc. v. Borough of Ramsey*, 269 N.J. Super. 469 (App. Div. 1994).  Litigants should be spared the expense of an unnecessary trial where no genuine issue of material fact exists.
[brief] To be clear: the overarching point here is not that a municipality must be burdened with extensive litigation to defend any ordinance, or even to defend one that impinges on the First Amendment.  The point is that, after [...], a municipality is required submit actual proof of why an ordinance was adopted and the factual basis for it at least in the context of a First Amendment challenge.  This is no great burden.  After all, the Distance Regulation, as a zoning ordinance, was required to be reviewed by the [...], a process that almost uniformly involves review and comment by professionals, i.e. there should be a record of the factual basis for the Distance Regulation.  See e.g. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-26, 64.  If the Distance Regulation was part of a period review of a master plan, then there should be an even better record.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.1.  Here, given the lack of any record submitted by [...], [...] likely adopted the Distance Regulation based on unsubstantiated assumptions from before [...] and is unable, after [...], to even cogently explain why the regulation was passed or the factual basis for it.
[brief] The crux of this appeal is the enforceability of a contract that contains two indemnity clauses with different indemnity obligations.  Defendant/respondent, [...] (“[...]”) drafted the contract at issue and seeks indemnification for its own fault from defendant/appellant, [...] (“[...]”).  Neither of the two indemnity clauses in [...]’s contract specifically required [...] to indemnify [...] for the latter’s own negligence.  One clause did not specifically reference the fault of the party to be indemnified and the other limited the indemnity obligation to the indemnitor’s own fault.  As a result, the contract failed to comply with the requirement that an indemnification provision must state unequivocally that a party shall provide indemnification for the indemnitee’s own fault.  The trial court therefore erred in ruling that the indemnity clauses, read together, were enforceable and required [...] to indemnify [...] for the latter’s own negligence.  [...]’s opposition brief does not provide a justification for the trial court’s error.  The Court should therefore reverse the judgment below.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] 7.5  During the deployment of a CED, the deploying officer shall, when feasible, continually evaluate the options selected against changing circumstances.  7.6  An officer trained and authorized to carry a CED shall be aware of and comply with any targeting recommendations made by the manufacturer.  7.7  A CED may be used in conjunction with a distraction device, non-flammable chemical agent, or less-lethal ammunition.  If the individual has already received an electrical charge from a CED, officers shall, when feasible, provide the person a reasonable opportunity to submit to law enforcement authority and to comply with law enforcement commands, considering the physiological effects of the discharge, before deploying a distraction device, chemical agent, or less-lethal ammunition.  7.8  A CED shall not be directed against a person who is situated on an elevated surface (e.g., a ledge, scaffold, near a precipice, etc.) unless reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or minimize a fall-related injury (e.g., deploying a safety net).  7.9  A CED shall not be used in, on, or immediately adjacent to a body of water in which the targeted person could fall during any stage of the application of the electrical current generated or transmitted by the device.  9
[brief] B.  [...]’s Opportunity and Ability to Exercise Care Counsel  In Favor of the Existence of a Duty  The danger posed by the defective electrical panel box is inapposite to the hazard examined in Shield, which was transient and not easily discoverable.  See Shields, 240 N.J. at 494 (noting slippery conditions are not easily determinative by landlord).  The defect inherent in the electrical panel box existed in advance of the 2016 lease.  As the defect arose prior to the commencement of the landlord tenant relationship between [...] and [...], [...]’s claimed lack of control of the property did not prevent it from exercising care over the defective electrical panel box.  Exercising care would not have been impractical or financially ruinous for [...], as such care would have simply required [...] to bring the electrical system on the property up to code.  While [...] can argue about its lack of control, the import of Section 358, and the history of landlord tenant relationships in New Jersey, New Jersey law does not, and cannot, permit a landlord to ignore ameliorating an obvious and potentially fatal property defect.  Doing so would encourage inattentive ownership of real property.  The law does not favor such purposefully evasive conduct, and even a cursory review of controlling legal standards in New Jersey shows that the law is on a slow and determined march to impose further protections for those entering another’s property rather than actively discouraging an owner’s responsibility for their owned premises.  See generally, Reves v. Egner, 404 N.J. Super. 433, 450 (App. Div. 2009) (outlining continued expansion of premises liability claims against land owners).  Accordingly, as [...] knew, or should have known, about defective electrical panel and had ample opportunity to correct this patent code violation, a duty of care must be found to exist.  C.
[brief] On July 14, 2023, six citizens of [...] were asked to adjudicate claims of personal injury asserted by Plaintiff-Respondent, [...], against Defendants-Appellants, [...] and [...].  In the preceding days, they had heard testimony from Pascal, watched recorded testimony from competing expert witnesses, and considered arguments made by counsel.  These jurors were repeatedly instructed to divorce themselves from any passion, prejudice, or sympathy, and to consider only those facts presented at trial.  The Honorable [...] ensured that the trial commenced fairly, timely, and in adherence to the Rules of Court.
[brief] The definition of “Public work” set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26(5) includes “construction, reconstruction, demolition, alteration, custom fabrication, duct work cleaning, or repair work, or maintenance work, including painting or decorating…”  Certainly, the archaeological services previously stated and detailed in the subject Project’s bid specifications do not fall within the above cited categories of “Public work. ”  As stated by [...], “because the archaeologist is clearly not performing work as defined within the Prevailing Wage Act, the archaeologist falls within the exception to the PWCRA’s registration requirement. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a.  (0016a)  Finally, it must be underscored that the [...]’s May 6, 2010, decision in TAD preceded the enactment of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51(a) effective on January 18, 2022.  That undeniable fact, coupled with the definition of “Public work” set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26(5), renders the TAD decision inapposite to the debate now before this Court.
[brief] VI.  [...] DETRIMENTALLY RELIED ON [...] TO PROVIDE HIS DEFENSE IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION.  (Raised below, Not Decided)  .........................................................................................................................9  VII.  [...]’S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE HE WAS ENTITLED TO COVERAGE UNDER THE POLICY.  (Da1-2).  14  VIII.  THE TRIAL COURT OPINION DOES NOT CLEARLY STATE ITS REASONS FOR GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  (Not Raised Below)  .........................................................................................................................14  CONCLUSION
[brief] It clarifies and emphasizes the difference between an interlocutory Order (which can be amended at any time) and a final Order or Judgment (governed by *R.* 4:49-2).  It echoes the guidance in *D’Atria* at 384 that “motion practice must come to an end at some point. ”  The boldfaced sentence was also a part of *R.* 4:49-1 prior to September 2022.
[brief] Id., at 929.  In Local 355 United Serv. Workers Union, Int'l Union of Journeymen & Allied Trades v. Dual-Purpose Corp., 2018 WL 3151686, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (Pa135-143)\(^5\), the District Court refused to confirm an arbitration award entered by a substitute arbitrator because there was no agreement to arbitrate before him.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], and [...], [...], and JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 1-20 (Names Being Fictitious), in their individual and corporate capacities, and as aiders and abettors, Defendants-Respondents.  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County  DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] On December 5, 2022, after the effective date of the Permit, the [...] proposed the Inland Flood Protection Rules (“IFPR”) which sought amendments to the Stormwater Management Rules (N.J.A.C. 7:8-1 to -6.3) and Flood Hazard Area Control Act Rules (N.J.A.C. 7:13-1 to -24.11).  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022); Ra142.  Pursuant to the [...]’s statements in its notice of proposal, [...] conducted a study of projected precipitation totals for New Jersey, known as the Cornell Projection Study.  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022); Ra149-150.  After public notice and comment, the IFPR was enacted on July 17, 2023.  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (July 17, 2023); Ra196.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Thirty-six days later, [...], together with [...] and [...], issued State v. Dana Kearney, __N.J. Super.__ (App. Div. Sept. 18, 2024).  Although Kearney involved an attorney’s purported ineffective representation of a criminal defendant, the public policies and legal analysis underlying that opinion apply here.  [...] owed plaintiff and other Millburn local taxpayers “undivided loyalty,” “unimpaired” by “conflicting interests”\(^1\).  The bar against public officials is higher than the bar against attorneys.  Unlike judges and other public officials, attorneys are no longer subject to an appearance of impropriety test.  --- \(^1\)  At the commencement of this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action, plaintiff claimed that the same JIF insurer appointed counsel could not simultaneously represent the municipal entity defendant and the individual public official defendants.  (Pa130 to 136).  The trial court punted this issue on mootness grounds.  (Pa159).  However, since the mootness denial, the New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics issued two opinions supporting plaintiff’s arguments that a board attorney’s client is the board and not the board members and that a pro se attorney is not prohibited from speaking to local public officials.  See, NJ Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Op 746 “Application of RPC 4.2 to Layers Who Are Proceeding Pro Se in Legal Matters” (March 14, 2024) (Pra38); NJ Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Docket 07-2024 (July 9, 2024) (Pra45).
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%
[brief] Then when questioned whether the specific phrase "Riparian Right" is found in any of "... the deeds from [...] to [...] and from [...] to [...], Inc...."  [...] first claimed that it was "possible" that the phrase was there, but when pushed he conceded that "I don't know if they're there.  So, I can't answer your question."  The witness had the documents in front of him.  The witness had the documents for years.  So, on the two critical questions in the case, [...]’s expert witness “had no opinion on the question” and “did not know”.
[brief] Reforming the Redevelopment Agreement in a way that alters the statutory rights vested in the Authority and its bondholders by decreasing the Authority’s share of revenue will impact on the Authority’s entire parking system, including [...]’s interests therein, and the ability of the Authority to pay those existing bondholders.  Because implementation of the terms of the Order must begin within thirty (30) days of March 15, 2024, the implications for the public interest require that the Authority seeks leave to appeal the Order at this juncture.
[brief] [...] acted inequitably for the reasons already set out above, including that he was taking funds from the companies and not paying out an equal amount of [...].  (26T51:22 to 52:23).  [...] was controlling the various defendant entities and moving money among them as instrumentalities of his broader scheme.  (27T79:7-12).  It would have been inequitable for the Plaintiffs to have had to chase those funds from defendant to defendant and account to account to be made whole.  (27T79:7 to 80:8).  Given the “full picture” and the circumstances here, the trial court was well within its power to hold each defendant liable, jointly and severally, for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith.  But even if the Court were to disagree, that error would be harmless, because the trial court had the equitable power to extend liability to all defendants under an unjust enrichment theory based on the movement of money between and among [...] and Fariba [...] and the defendant entities.  Thus, the judgment of the trial court as to the breach of contract, covenant of good faith, and unjust enrichment claims must be affirmed.
[brief] The parties agree that email searches will need to be conducted on a certain number of custodians.  The dispute centers on how many custodian’s email accounts will be searched.  Plaintiffs request that 72 so-called “Tier 1 custodians” be searched.  Defendants counter that it would be more appropriate to select 40 custodians.  I am well aware of the costs associated with email pulls.  I am also mindful of how important email searches can be to unlocking the truth in securities fraud cases.  Unfortunately, there is no definitive right or wrong answer when it comes to the proper number of custodians to be selected in every securities fraud case.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86).  The Plaintiffs-Appellants seek to have the trial court’s decisions on the Motions to Dismiss reversed, arguing that the trial court made several errors in finding that the Plaintiffs-Appellants lacked standing and in dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.  Db9.  For the reasons outlined below, the Plaintiffs-Appellants arguments for reversal of the trial court are erroneous.  a.  Plaintiffs-Appellants Lack Standing to Bring Their Claims.
[directive] Jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce po 31 stycznia 1993 r., ale przed 13 marca 1995 r., a Pan(i) d.  [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] został(a) skazany(a) na nadzór kuratora sądowego lub na karę pozbawienia wolności w więzieniu stanowym, musi Pan(i) wnieść opłatę transakcyjną w maksymalnej kwocie 1,00 USD należną przy wpłacie każdej kwoty lub raty?  Jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce 13 marca lub później, a wyrok nakazuje nadzór kuratora lub z innych względów wymaga 1995 r. zapłaty należności finansowych na rzecz wydziału nadzoru, musi Pan(i) wnieść opłatę transakcyjną w maksymalnej kwocie 2,00 USD należną przy wpłacie każdej kwoty lub raty?  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  If the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?
[brief] The key criteria for establishing proof of a hostile work environment claim based on disability discrimination is: (1) That the alleged conduct actually occurred; (2) that the alleged conduct constituted unlawful harassment BECAUSE of Plaintiff’s alleged disability; and (3) that the employer should be held responsible for the alleged harassing or discriminatory conduct.  Lehmann v. Toys R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993).  As to the first, second, and third factors, in the absence of specific and credible allegations of acts or statements of disability discrimination committed by Defendant [...], the jury’s verdict in this regard is against the weight of the evidence.  Plaintiff presented no evidence that Defendant [...] made any statements or committed any acts of disability discrimination.  Plaintiff simply imputed liability for hostile work environment based on disability discrimination because Defendant [...] is the Mayor of the Township and sits at the top of the organizational pyramid.  Plaintiff provided no evidence at trial that Defendant [...] directed any subordinates to take any adverse employment actions against Plaintiff because of her alleged anxiety disability, or that he was aware of any complaints lodged by Plaintiff because of her alleged disability.  In fact, Plaintiff did not present any evidence establishing that Defendant [...] knew she had an alleged anxiety disability until the filing of this lawsuit.  In addition, the jury’s verdict in this regard is against the weight of the evidence as to Defendants [...] and [...].  Plaintiff presented no evidence at trial that Defendant [...] knew that Plaintiff had an alleged anxiety disability, or that she took FMLA leave in February 2018 and March 2019 because she had an alleged anxiety disability.