ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The test was conducted in an area that was smooth and without any obstructions.  (2T18:14-17).  Specifically, [...] believed that it was conducted to the right side of the vehicle in view of his Mobile Video/Audio Recording (hereinafter MVR) system.  (2T18:19 to 2T19:2).  [...] testified that he had looked at the MVR recently, but not on the day of the hearing.  (2T19:4-6).  For the first portion of the walk and turn test, [...] placed defendant’s left foot down at the end of the line and his right foot in front of it with his arms at his side.  (2T19:18-20).  [...] had defendant listen to him and watch as he demonstrated the test.  (2T19:20-22).  During that portion of the test, defendant stepped out of line and position which was another indicator that [...] considered under the totality of the circumstances.  (2T19:22-25).  For the second portion of the test, [...] demonstrated a portion of the test and defendant indicated that he understood.  (2T21:4-11).  [...] recalled that defendant stepped off the line several times and had to raise his arms for balance.  (2T21:12-20).  At one point, defendant stopped walking after performing an improper turn and asked how to complete the remaining portion of the test.  (2T22:4-6).  After being re-instructed, defendant again stepped off the line several times and needed to raise his arms for balance.
[brief] “In the absence of an agreement to make repairs, the landlord is under no obligation to do so.  That burden falls upon the tenant. ”  Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 63 (1969).  In the case of non-residential property, early on there came to be two recognized exceptions to the general rule of non-liability: (1) a landlord is responsible to use reasonable care with regard to portions of the leased premises which are not demised and remain in the landlord’s control, and (2) a landlord’s covenant to repair gives rise to a duty to the tenant.
[brief] The ability to move forward with a builder’s remedy claim is essential, and could not happen if injunctive relief did not issue.  [...] completely fails to address the impact of the Mount Laurel doctrine and the imminent harm the specter of condemnation has on the protected class and the builder’s remedy process.  Importantly, the trial court specifically noted that generally “[...] has a constitutional right to condemn property. ” (2T11:25-12:1).  However, the court made clear that the Township’s right to condemn cannot be viewed in a vacuum when evaluating the Crowe factors in light of the Township’s significant noncompliance:  “[i]t’s a matter of Mount Laurel law…  It’s that there is other legislation, which is the New Jersey Fair Housing Act. ” (2T11:23-12:6).  Unlike [...], the trial court evaluated both sides of the equation, as it should have done under a Crowe analysis.  [...] completely misses that point that the injunction at issue serves to protect the viability of the Property as an inclusionary development under the Mount Laurel doctrine in a municipality that has been judged to be significant noncompliant with its constitutional obligations.
[directive] Civil service jurisdictions:  An “applicant” in a CSC jurisdiction is an individual o seeking employment as a law enforcement officer and who (1) is included on a CSC certified list of eligible candidates received by a hiring law enforcement agency and (2) responded timely to the hiring agency with an expression of interest in the position.  “Applicant” also includes individuals who are exempted from the CSC examination requirement under N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1.3 and who submit a completed employment application as provided by the hiring agency.    Appointment.  A law enforcement officer is “appointed” by the resolution of the agency’s governing body.
[brief] Plaintiffs take issue with [...] filing its first summary judgment motion prior to the conduction of any meaningful discovery.  They also appear to take issue with [...] serving its safe harbor letter so early in the litigation.  And yet, despite these concerns, Plaintiffs did nothing to develop their remaining claims against [...].  They served a deposition notice on [...], but then adjourned the deposition two days before it was to go forward and never rescheduled it.  Plaintiffs requested no further documents or responses to supplemental interrogatories.  Essentially, they did nothing to prosecute their claims against [...] after receiving the safe harbor letter.
[brief] Like the *Schwartz* court, this Court reasoned that “Plaintiff’s actions of requesting defendants’ services, using those services, and paying for them after receiving the agreement demonstrates his assent to the contractual relationship established under the agreement. ”  *Parrella*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59, at *12.  The court ruled that “[t]hrough his interactions with defendants over fifteen years, plaintiff manifested an intention to be bound by the agreement’s terms, including the submission of any dispute to arbitration. ”  *Id.* at *11; see also Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan*, 128 N.J. 427, 436 (1992).  Similarly, in recently-issued persuasive authority, a Massachusetts court held that an arbitration agreement contained in a partnership agreement governed a dispute between a law firm and a deceased partner’s estate—even though the partner allegedly had not signed the agreement.
[brief] The Honorable [...], J.S.C.’s February 28, 2024  Order disqualifying [...]  From representing Defendants herein due to a Concurrent conflict of interest ..........................................................  Da001  Judge Zazzali-Hogan’s February 16, 2024  Oral Statement Of reasons in support of her decision disqualifying [...] from representing Defendants herein due to a concurrent conflict of Interest  ........................................................................................................  T6:5-11:18; 34:20-41:12¹ ¹  The Corrected Transcript Of The February 16, 2024  Hearing before the trial court, referred to herein as T, has previously been filed as a separate document on March 28, 2024.  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Alam v. Ameribuilt Contractors, | 37 | | 474 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2022) | | | Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., | 23 | | 822 F.Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993) | | | City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, | 22 | | 201 N.J. 447 (2010) | | | Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., | 22,23,34 | | 109 N.J. 201, 205 (1988) | | | Hoag v. Brown, | 32 | | 397 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 2007) | | | New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. G.S., | 25,28,36 | | 447 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2016) | | | Princeton Ins. Co. v. Qureshi, | 26 | | 380 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Rohm and Haas Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., | 23,24 | | 187 F.Supp.2d 221 (D.N.J. 2001) | | | State ex rel. S.G., | 25 | | 175 N.J. 132 (2003) | | | Van Horn v. Van Horn, | 23 | | 415 N.J. Super. 398 (App.
[brief] RELEVANT STATE CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS  Individual Fundamental Rights, Privileges and Liberties  Article I, paragraph 1 of our State Constitution acknowledges that “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. ”  Article I, paragraph 2a of our State Constitution provides that “All political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people, and they have the right at all times to alter or reform same, whenever the public good may require it. ”  Article I, paragraph 5 of our State Constitution states that “No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right.  . . .”  Article I, paragraph 6 of our State Constitution guarantees that “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.  No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. ”  Article I, paragraph 18 of our State Constitution recognizes that “The people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances. ” (emphasis supplied).  Article I, paragraph 21 of our State Constitution states that “This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people. ”  **Prerogative Writ Jurisdiction**
[directive] A restraining violence domestic any of violation a constitutes (1) offense present the that believe Survivor Assault Sexual any of violation a constitutes (2) or condition, release or order attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an unless condition, release or order Protection Act officer supervisory a or Directive, this Section of 3.2 with accordance in consulted general overcome Prosecutor to County the by authorized is 3.3.2 who subsection to pursuant designated by charging of presumption the that determines Directive, this of 4 Section under presumptions the to consideration special giving subsection 4.5.9, pursuant to overcome is complaint-warrant as hours to detention up 48 for mandatory whether and victim the of opinion and interests from victim the discourage or situation the exacerbate would 2A:162-16(a) N.J.S.A. by required 4.6.5.  4.6.1 and subsections also See prosecution. or investigation with the cooperating Tampering.  Witness o~ Jumping Bail with Charged Is Defendant 4.5.3 cause probable if there is acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency enforcement law  A N.J.S.A. of violation in jumping bail of offense the committed has defendant the that to believe in obstruction witness 2C:28-5, N.J.S.A. violation of in tampering/retaliation witness 2C:29-7, services pretrial the Judiciary instructs the by developed Framework"
[brief] III.  PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT SEEK TO HOLD THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS LIABLE BY ‘PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL. ’  The Plaintiff is not seeking to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ in order impose liability against the individual [...].  Piercing the corporate veil allows for a corporation’s shareholders to be held liable for the wrongs of the corporation.  As the opposition correctly indicates, the corporate veil can only be pierced on limited occasions, such as when the shareholders are using the corporation to commit a fraud or injustice.  But the Plaintiff is not seeking to impose liability upon the individual [...] because they are shareholders of the Developer corporation.  The Amended Complaint seeks to hold [...] directly liable for their own violations of the CFA.  As set forth in Plaintiff’s initial brief, a plaintiff may pursue CFA claims directly against a corporation’s directors, officers or employees based upon the person’s own violation of the CFA, albeit, committed while acting in the scope of his or her employment or duties.  Allen v. V&A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 131 (2011) (citing Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 608-10 (1997)).  Our Supreme Court has stated a CFA claim can be brought against these individuals without having to pierce the corporate veil.  See Allen, 208 N.J. at 131-132.  The opposition completely avoids this argument and emphasizes the trial court was correct for concluding there was no factual basis to pierce the corporate veil.  But whether the corporate veil can be pierced is immaterial to the viability of Plaintiff’s CFA claim against the individual Defendants for misrepresenting the Developer’s quality of title in connection with the sale of Unit 74.
[brief] The [...] has stated in its 2016 policy document that protected leave may not be penalized:  When an employee requests leave, or additional leave, for a medical condition, the employer must treat the request as one for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.  (Pa275, Pa280)  An employer may not penalize an employee for using leave as a reasonable accommodation.  Doing so would be a violation of the ADA because it would render the leave an ineffective accommodation; it also may constitute retaliation for use of a reasonable accommodation.  (Pa275, Pa280)  Moreover, if other Fire Department employees are granted leaves such as vacation or compensatory time, without penalization, such disparate treatment would similarly violate the ADA and NJLAD.
[brief] This case was filed on April 18, 2016 (Monday after Sunday, April 17, 2016 Statute Date).  Counsel prepared a first amended complaint in January 2017 to bring the suit up to date.  Pa145-239.  The first amended complaint (FAC) was served on the defendants.  The FAC was removed on February 24, 2017 to the District Court.  Pa104 (Docket, 3rd from bottom).  It suffered a tortured history there – similar to the equally tortured procedural history in Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127 (2006) (a similar denial of counsel situation).  Both complaints were returned to the New Jersey Courts based on various jurisprudential concerns that did not reach the merits.  On this Federal remand, the file was “lost” from October 17, 2019 until May 29, 2020.  Pa104 (Docket, last two entries).  The complaint in question here is the NJ Second Amended Complaint (SAC), which was filed by Motion on June 25, 2021 with a revised version on May 3, 2023 due to the Remand.
[brief] On October 11, 2022, the Court entered an order voiding all the plaintiffs’ timeshare contracts and required [...] to correct all negative reporting to all credit bureaus affiliated with the plaintiffs.  (Da1225).  On October 18, 2022, [...] filed its motion and brief to vacate the jury’s award of damages pursuant to RETA and to mold the verdict.  (Da1227).  On October 20, 2022, [...] filed its post-trial brief in support of judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial in the alternative pursuant to R. 4:49-1 and R. 4:40-2.  (Da1233).  On October 26, 2022, the Court entered an order molding the jury verdict and vacating the damage award rendered under the RETA.
[brief] (27T79:7 to 80:14).  Though the defendants urge this Court to focus on individual transactions to apportion liability severally, several factors support joint and several liability here.  First, the defendants acted in concert.  The trial court focused throughout both of its opinions on the conduct of all of the defendants acting together, not just some of them as to particular transactions.  This is consistent with the trial court’s findings of conduit accounts, step transactions, and co-mingling of funds, that the defendant companies were “set up in a maze of accounts,” and that “there was a maze and webs created. ” (26T22:21-25; 33:14-16; 53:9-10).  Relatedly, [...] (who the Court found to be credible) provided uncontroverted testimony that certain of the defendant entities were merged into [...] after the closing of the sale transaction for the Plaintiffs’ interests.  (13T33:24 to 34:3).  It is neither fair nor equitable to place the burden on the Plaintiffs, as the innocent parties here, to untangle or deconstruct the complex accounting webs and mazes that the defendants created.
[brief] The Trial Court contradicted the clear case law precedent on the granting of attorney fees outlined in Plaintiffs’ initial brief.  [...] abused her discretion in finding bad faith under the facts of this case.  It is impossible to find that there was no rational argument, no support of credible evidence, and no reasonable person who could have expected Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint to succeed, when Plaintiffs did precisely what [...] said Plaintiffs could do.  To the extent the Trial Court believed Plaintiffs were mistaken in their good faith beliefs, mistaken in their optimism in seeking a remedy, mistaken in their reliance on [...]’s holding, or even mistaken in their understanding of [...]’s holding, none of that justifies a holding that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith.  The Trial Court’s error must be reversed.
[brief] (Pa3220)  I.  IT WAS A MISAPPLICATION OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE CHANCERY COURT TO PERMIT A MAJORITY IN A SHAREHOLDER CASE TO VOTE THE MINORITY TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR LEGAL FEES, OR THAT THE “BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE” PERMITS CIRCUMVENTION OF R. 4:42-9’S LIMITATIONS (Da3196, n2)(11T6:22-7:21)
[directive] Core Principle Three Duty to Use Only Objectively Reasonable, Necessary, and Proportional Force.  Officers shall use the least amount of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional to safely achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective under the circumstances.  3.1  Limitations on use of force.  In situations where officers are justified in using force, officers shall use only that degree of force that is reasonable, necessary, and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s mental and physical condition, the nature of the offense, and most importantly the level of resistance or threat known to the officer at the time.  3.2
[brief] Da32-33.  The Trial Court did not hold that [...] could not assert a counterclaim for setoff in the summary proceeding.  In its Initial Brief, [...] succinctly addressed why its claim for setoff not only could not be heard in the Hackensack Arbitration, but also why its counterclaim is not one that requires a merits-based inquiry into liability for nonpayment.  Initial Br. Point III.  In its Opposition, however, [...] completely ignores the Trial Court’s determination and reasserts its baseless claim that [...] is procedurally prevented from asserting a counterclaim, relying on generic case law discussing judicial deference to arbitration awards.  Opp. at 37-41.  There is simply no support for [...]’s claim that the only counterclaim [...] is permitted to assert is one to vacate, modify, or correct a final arbitration award, which is likely why the Trial Court did not base its decision on such a preposterous theory.  Indeed, Rule 4:67 which requires a party to seek leave of court to assert a counterclaim in a summary actions demonstrates that counterclaims may be asserted in a summary action.  Rule 4:67-4(a); see also Perretti v. Ran-Dav's Cnty. Kosher, Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 618, 624 (App. Div. 1996) (“[Rule] 4:67–4(a) limitation on asserting a counterclaim or cross-claim in a summary action is not a prohibition. ”).  [...] also incorrectly states that [...] is attempting to “re-litigate construction claims,” via its setoff claim [Opp. at 38], and mischaracterizes [...]’s proposed counterclaim by selectively quoting only one paragraph in [...]’s Answer describing the amount owed to [...] [Opp. at 40].  But see Da149-150 ([...]’s Answer with proposed counterclaim which specifies [...] is seeking “a set off in the amount of its claim for payments owed on the Hackensack Project against any judgment issued in Plaintiff’s favor under the Final Award. ”).  As explained in its Initial Brief, [...]’s claim for setoff is for provisional relief to avoid an inequitable windfall to [...] should this matter proceed to a final decision before the Hackensack Arbitration.  [...]’s proposed counterclaim would not “require extensive discovery and evidentiary proofs at trial,” [Opp. at 41] because it is simply asking the Court to offset the Award with the amount to be determined by the Hackensack Arbitration.  Nor is it a claim in the separate litigation concerning the Hackensack Arbitration [Opp. at 39, n. 10], because that proceeding (currently on appeal) concerns only [...]’s meritless attempt to enjoin Hackensack Arbitration based on the entire controversy doctrine. \(^3\)  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Pa 573 (Exhibit J5)  15.  The said letter from the Board Attorney, dated on or about February 17, 2021, accurately and sufficiently identified the findings and conclusions of the Planning Board Members, and the reasons associated therewith.  16.  Thereafter, on or about February 17, 2021, the [...] adopted an Ordinance amending the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] Despite clear, dispositive evidence to the contrary, [...] incredulously continues to claim ownership to the Property, or a portion of it, as asserted in its Counterclaim.  For example, [...] relies upon evidence not in the record rather than relying upon the [...] Survey, which is dispositive of this issue.  In fact, [...] fails to even include a copy of the [...] Survey in its Appendix or even mention the [...] Survey at all in its papers (except for one sentence in its Procedural History that [...] performed a survey and was deposed thereafter).  [...] has not come forward with any expert testimony to dispute [...]’s conclusions (and the only expert it retained, [...], agreed with [...] and [...] now ignores [...]).  Factfinders should not speculate without the aid of expert testimony in any area where laypersons could not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or expertise.
[brief] In 1999, the Appellate Division held:  Because a (d)4 FAR variance also deals with uses that are permitted in the zone and thus is different from variances for excluded uses, we hold pursuant to Coventry Square that an applicant for a FAR (d)(4) variance need not show that the site is particularly suited for more intensive development.  To impose such a stringent burden would mean that a FAR variance applicant would have perhaps as difficult a burden to meet as an applicant for a prohibited use variance.  *To require such a burden would be inconsistent with the principle that (d) variances for permitted uses need not meet the ‘stringent special reasons standards for a commercial-use variance. ’*  [Coventry Square, 138 N.J. at 287].  Like a conditional use variance applicant, *FAR variance applicants must show that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with larger floor area than permitted by the ordinance.*  [Randolph Town Ctr. Assocs., L.P. v. Twp. of Randolph, 342 N.J. Super. 412, 416–17 (App. Div. 1999) (emphasis added)].  In 2004, the Appellate Division extended the Coventry Square standard to (d)(6) height variances in Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004), because, again, the use is not a prohibited use, but a permitted one.
[brief] The third day of trial consisted of [...]’s testimony and the motion to dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims filed by Plaintiff’s corporation, Third Party Defendant, [...].  [...] was the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of [...].  3T13:6-8.  [...] stated that his initial membership interest in [...] was 10%, but subsequently, undocumented in paper nor demonstrated via exhibit, [...] testified that [...] restructured the Company, making [...] 82% member and [...] 18% member.
[brief] It is clear that what the defendant objects to is not the methodology employed or the legal analysis of the trial court, but the resulting opinion that was not favorable to her case.  Here, the expert testimony was arrived at by a specially trained individual employed by the State of New Jersey to render precisely this manner of opinion using precisely this manner of widely-accepted investigation techniques.  In her attempt to discredit the methodology employed by [...] in his analysis of [...]’s remains, she cited The Difficult Task of Assessing Perimortem and Postmortem Fractures on the Skeleton: A Blind Text on Fractures of Known Origin in order to demonstrate the challenges with identifying whether bone fractures occurred at the time of death or afterward.
[brief] Dated: March 21, 2024  CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE  The undersigned hereby certifies that on March 21, 2024, the foregoing Appellant’s Brief and Appendix were filed electronically and served on the other parties via the Court’s electronic filing system.  The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel for Appellant has also delivered an electronic copy of the foregoing to counsel for Appellee.  /s/ [...] ___ - 071292014  [...], Esquire  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...]  DEFENDANT [...]’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF