ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On March 3, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form, both completed on February 20, 2023, as well as a sworn affidavit from [...] dated February 22, 2023.
[brief] [...] also challenges the limiting instruction on the ground that it multiplied the prejudice by “informing the jurors that defendant was in custody and transported in handcuffs because he had chosen not to post bail, which the court characterized as a device used to secure a defendant's appearance at trial. ”  We do not find this proposition convincing.  *10  The trial court specifically explained that cross-examining [...] about her observations of defendants entering the courtroom in handcuffs would necessarily alert the jury that defendants were in custody, a fact that could potentially undermine [...]'s credibility.  See State v. Grant, 361 N.J.Super. 349, 358 (App.Div.2003) (a defendant's appearance in restraints “has the potential to detract from the witness's credibility” and “undermine the presumption of innocence”).  Despite this advice, defense counsel proceeded to energetically question [...] about what she saw before the jury entered the courtroom.  Ultimately, the jury did not learn that [...] was in custody due to the limiting instruction, but rather because defense counsel chose to cross-examine [...] about what she saw.
[brief] The Order thereby disregards the discovery limits of Rule 4:10-2, and requires production of documents and information concededly unnecessary for the resolution of this dispute, undoubtedly including material in emails that the senders thought would remain forever private: e.g., trade secrets, personal health information protected by HIPAA, Social Security numbers, expert consultants’ communications and reports, login and password credentials, valuable personally identifiable information, or even intensely personal communications.  Unless reversed by this Court, the Order requires all of this material to be produced to Plaintiffs and exposed to innumerable persons at Plaintiffs’ facilities and external document review vendors, not to mention any malevolent hacker who may gain access to their data stores.  The more places this information is stored, the more likely it is to be compromised and made public.  Overbroad production is an issue that eDiscovery experts have been discouraging for years.  Parties do not have a right to access information that is wholly unrelated to the litigation.  Discovery Orders like the one issued by the trial court must be repudiated.  This presents a severe problem for the parties, nonparty entities, and individuals whose private information will be needlessly exposed.  As national conceptions of personal privacy evolve and tighten, and requests for unfiltered productions of confidential business information become more prevalent, there is an urgent need for clarity around the production of personal or otherwise confidential emails in pretrial discovery.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] On March 5, 2015, [...], who considered [...] his best friend, visited a shrine created for [...].  (2T:110-25 to 112-5).  Defendant spat on the shrine in Robinson’s presence.  (2T:114-22 to 116-15).  When Robinson confronted defendant, defendant brandished a Glock pistol.  (2T:115-16 to 117-3).  Robinson confirmed that, in the previous trial, he testified that defendant then said something to him, but Robinson repeatedly asserted that he felt unsafe testifying about it and other aspects of his confrontation with defendant.  (2T:112-25 to 117-16; see Da15).  On March 6, 2015, Robinson procured a firearm to protect himself and was arrested for unlawful possession of a handgun.  (2T:122-20 to 123-20).  While detained, Robinson approached and spoke with PPD Detectives Maldonado and Adams regarding his interaction with defendant at [...]’s shrine.  (2T: 101-8 to 102-12 and 120-15 to 121-8).  Robinson later accepted a plea offer for his unlawful conviction charge wherein he would serve five years in New Jersey State Prison with a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility.  (2T:133-1 to 18 and 126-12 to 19).
[brief] Defendant’s alleged failure payment from [...] of Start-up costs to form a Competing Pharmacy.  (3T88:15-20) (Plf.’s brief at 36).  First, as stated above, the cited portion of the record shows Defendant testified that monies were not paid from the business, but rather from her [Defendant’s] “personal draw. ” (3T88:13-19).  Additionally, with regard to the alleged competing pharmacy, it was not in competition with [...].  Defendant formed [...] d/b/a [...] on December 5, 2017 (3T110:24-111:3).  [...] did not open until 2019 in [...] (18 miles from VivaPharmacy (T3111:23-25)) months after the sale of [...]’s assets to [...].  (2T39:9:11; T3112:1-3).  The last time [...] d/b/a [...] was an active business was the end of May 2019.  (1T31:4-6).  The pharmacy closed when it was sold to [...] in May 2019.
[directive] 1.  Compliance with Confidentiality Regulations.  SNAP Directive 5.10 establishes the policy of this State that no law enforcement activity or operation shall be permitted to interfere with any school substance abuse counselling or treatment program.  Accordingly, and to ensure strict compliance with federal regulations designed to safeguard substance abuse counselling and treatment program records and information, the prosecutor's manual and grand jury manual shall be supplemented to include a detailed discussion of the applicable federal regulations.
[directive] DIRECTIVE 08-19 # [Supersedes July 16, 1990 Directive (Unnumbered)] or [Questions comments may be directed to the Appellate Division at [...]]  TO: Assignment Judges  J.A.M Trial Court Administrators  FROM: [...], SUBJ: OCR for Court Reporters - (1)  Notice to Assignment Judge Staff Trial of for CART Use Coverage; (2) Backup Registry Services; and (3) to Freelance Stenographers  Prepare Unofficial Records  DATE: June 3, 2019 yet new court  This directive promulgates two separate related policies regarding reporters.
[brief] On April 12, 2016, [...] of the NJDEP’s Office of Labor Relations in the Human Resources Department issued discipline charges against [...] signed by [...] alleging falsification and conduct unbecoming a public employee on the sole and unprecedented grounds that [...] lied when he denied being under [...]’s desk.  The Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action alleged “Conduct unbecoming an employee” and “Other sufficient cause- Falsification, violation of DEP policy 2.35” (Pa466) and sought a 5 day penalty stating:  You were observed by co-workers in [...]’s cubical under her desk with her computer monitor sideways on two separate occasions while she was on vacation (2-18-16 & 2-19-16).  When asked by Ms. Doughty why you were under her desk you denied such actions to her.  When questioned by the Office of Labor Relations regarding your actions you provided false statements as well as a false reports, stating you were not under Ms. Doughty’s desk and that you never had a conversation to Ms. Doughty regarding her inquiry.  You have failed to cooperate with OLR in violation of DEP Policy 2.35.  Further, you had no legitimate reason to be in Ms. Doughty’s office under her desk In her cubicle on two separate occasions.
[directive] Method of Review and Approval  Approval of an application to apply to a judge for issuance of a search warrant may be given by a Designated Attorney in writing, electronically (e-mail or facsimile transmission), or orally (by telephone or radio communication).  Whenever practicable, the law enforcement officer seeking permission to apply Page 5 for issuance of a search warrant (hereinafter referred to as an “applicant”) should submit to the appropriate Designated Attorney a written copy of the affidavit intended to be submitted to the court in support of issuance of the warrant, along with a completed and signed application form developed by the Division of Criminal Justice pursuant to Section 11 of this Directive.  When the circumstances make it impracticable for the applicant to submit to the Designated Attorney a copy of a written affidavit and completed application form, the Designated Attorney shall be responsible for making certain that all of the requirements of this Directive have been satisfied by means of oral communication with the applicant, and the Designated Attorney shall make certain that all of the questions appearing on the application form have been answered.  If the applicant has prepared a written affidavit intended to be submitted to a court, but it is not practicable to transmit a copy of the written affidavit to the Designated Attorney for review, the applicant shall read verbatim the text of the affidavit to the Designated Attorney.  Where the circumstances reasonably require that the applicant rely on oral testimony in lieu of or to supplement a written affidavit in support of the application for issuance of a search warrant, the Designated Attorney shall require the applicant to provide all information that is intended to be presented to the court by means of oral testimony.  7.
[brief] As stated, the Tyler decision (May 25, 2023) was entered almost simultaneously with the prior appellate decision in [...]’s case (entered June 8, 2023) (Da5) and therefore was not addressed by the Court as part of the appeal, likely as an oversight error since the cases were simultaneous and the appellate court likely reviewed [...]’s case and prepared the decision before Tyler even though the Order was not entered until a few days after Tyler.  Since the Tyler case was so new at the time, [...] did not know of same and did not know that the court was in fact mandated to vacate his judgment.  As such, [...] did not know to file the request with the court at said time however despite same, [...]’s constitutional rights were still violated when the courts failed to vacate judgment as mandated by the Tyler case and the consequences of same are disastrous for [...] whereby he lost his home and all surplus equity due to the prior law already barred as unconstitutional.
[brief] In addition, the State argues that the suppression of defendant’s formal statement was not the result of nefarious tactics by [...] but rather a failure to clarify defendant’s statement that he was “not going to do it” while she was reading the Miranda warnings before unequivocally invoking his right to remain silent and speak with an attorney.  --- \(^1\) *State v. Tiwana*, 256 N.J. 33 (2023).  \(^2\) *State in the Interest of A.A.*, 240 N.J. 341 (2020).  \(^3\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Therefore, the statements made during the phone calls cannot and must not be considered a continuation of defendant’s formal statement.  In A.A., it is clear that the Court found that the actions by the police officers of placing the fifteen-year-old juvenile and his mother on opposite sides of the gate of a holding cell without any advisement of Miranda warnings and thereby obtaining incrimination statements from the juvenile constituted the “functional equivalent of express questioning while in custody. ”  A.A., 240 N.J. at 358.  However, the Court did not hold the position that interrogation occurred merely due to the familial relationship between the parties.  The accused’s age along with the fact that Miranda warnings were not administered contributed to the Court’s finding of the “functional equivalent” of interrogation.  The Court made the distinction that “to address the special concerns presented when a juvenile is brought into custody, police officers should advise juveniles of their Miranda rights in the presence of a parent or guardian before the police question, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile.
[brief] (28T:104-23 to 25).  [...] testified for the State as to some additional details that defendant revealed: specifically, that defendant had told [...] to come over that night to retrieve his belongings, and told [...] to approach the house from a block away and from behind to avoid cameras.  (28T:106-8 to 126-4, 130-17 to 132-21).  Defendant had communicated this to [...] on a burner phone that he had gotten rid of before the police could get it, and had offered to be [...]’ ride back home after the meeting.
[brief] Accordingly, [...]'s bid should have been rejected on that basis alone.  [336 N.J. Super. 126, 136–37 (App. Div. 2000)] (emphasis added) (certain internal quotations and citations omitted)  See also Meadowbrook, 138 N.J. at 322 (“Moreover, that the municipality can retain the amount of the bid bond does not necessarily assure that the low bidder will enter into or perform the contract.  If the low bidder determines that its bid is too low and that its prospective loss on the contract exceeds the amount of its bid bond, that low bidder may decide to forfeit its security rather than incur a greater loss by performing the contract. ”).  Similar cases are legion.
[brief] See Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. P.M. Video Corp., 322 N.J. Super. 74, 97 (App. Div. 1999).  Turning to the facts of this case, during and after Plaintiff’s counsel’s summation (see 7T at 57:20-86:25), Defense Counsel only offered two objections, neither of which is raised in the instant motion.
[brief] Court overlooked that the cited paragraph that it thought would prevent me from addressing Exceptions, had a provision that allowed me to address Exceptions based on [...]’s Verified Complaint, which listed me as Interested Party to review Trust Accounting, since it states:  "Prior to transferring any or all of the assets of each trust to a Successor professional Co-Trustee or to making complete distribution of trust principal, the professional Co-Trustee may require an approval of its account either by a court or competent jurisdiction or by such of the beneficiaries as it deems appropriate.  (48a)  52.  Court CANNOT DENY that [...], as professional Co-Trustee transferring assets of the [...] to a Successor, submitted his Trust Accounting for the approval of all remainder Trust beneficiaries, incl. me, as well as his Co-Trustee, [...].  That should be the final slam dunk argument invalidating the Court’s ruling that I had no standing to file exceptions.  But unfortunately, it is not.  The biased Court continued to go out of its way to inflict and concoct even more adversity for trying to prevent me from being allowed to file Exceptions to the Trust Accounting (See par. 53-55 below).
[brief] . . . (Pa0261, Art. 11.2.)  The term “RAO” is defined in the PSA as “a Response Action Outcome and shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Administrative Requirements for the Remediation of Contaminated Sites (‘ARRCS’) (N.J.A.C. 7:26C-1 et seq.) and shall include any amendments thereto. ” (Pa0248, Art. 1.20.)  A prerequisite to securing a RAO for any contaminated site is the completion and submission to the [...] of a RIR.  (2T154:21 to 155:6; 4T15:19-23; 8T38:3-21; Pa2371-74.)  The PSA, however, does not contain a single reference to the RIR.
[brief] (Pa0363).  The 1993 Administrative Order required [...] to investigate 20 Areas of Concern (“AOCs”) at the Site.  (Pa0365; Pa0093).  The 1993 Administrative Order defines an AOC as “an area at the Facility where solid or Hazardous Waste or Hazardous Constituents may have been managed or may have come to be located and from which releases of Hazardous Waste or Hazardous constituents have or may have occurred. ” (Pa0364).  The 1993 Administrative Order required [...] to evaluate the nature and extent of releases of hazardous substances at each identified AOC, to complete a RCRA Facility Investigation, to conduct certain specified remedial measures at the Site.  (Pa0093).  Pursuant to the 1993 Administrative Order, in December of 1997, [...] sought the [...]’s approval of a plan to design and construct a system to collect and treat CVOC contaminated groundwater and prevent its further migration from the Site.  (Pa0366-67; Pa0416, 0418-19).  Construction of the Groundwater Stabilization Measure (“GSM”) began on June 2, 1997.  (Pa0393; Pa0366-67; Pa0416, 0418-19).  The GSM started operations on November 3, 1997.  (Pa0393).  The GSM consists of a high-density polyethylene barrier anchored to bedrock that acts as a physical barrier to prevent contaminated groundwater from migrating off-site, a series of six extraction wells that pump contaminated groundwater to an on-site groundwater treatment facility, and a series of on- and off-site monitoring wells.
[brief] The only remaining issue within the jurisdiction of the court was the amount of compensation to be paid for the “property” taken.  The time within which to apply for relief from the final judgment under R. 4:50-2 expired in November of 2019.  Plaintiff conceded that its motion was based on a “mistake. ”  Relief under Rule 4:50-1 (a) is specifically subject to the one-year time limitation of Rule 4:50-2.
[brief] Plaintiff is the owner.  As regards the balance due, the periodic statement for the last billing cycle prior to charge-off is prima facie proof of the amount due at charge-off.  See Oughla, 437 N.J. Super. at 304 (“[A]n electronic copy of the periodic billing statement for the last billing cycle is prima facie proof of the amount due on the account at charge off. ”).  Included as part of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was Plaintiff’s Certification in Support of Summary Judgment.
[brief] The Debtor filed his first motion a mere ten weeks after entry of the Final Judgment.  The state court has never considered the merits of any motion Debtor filed regarding the tax foreclosure sale opting at each instance to dismiss the motions for failure to appear.  The state court’s January 6, 2023 order specifically dismissed the Debtor’s motion “without prejudice” and the state court’s January 5, 2024 order did not specify that the motion was dismissed with prejudice, and, thus is construed to be a dismissal without prejudice.  Papera v. Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2020) (a dismissal without prejudice is a dismissal that does not constitute an adjudication upon the merits); Connors v. Sexton Studios, 270 N.J.Super. 390, 393 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding that dismissal of a complaint for failure to appear should be without prejudice absent “egregious conduct”).  Consequently, the Debtor may refile his motion.  As a court of equity, I am disposed to broadly interpret the facts in favor of the Debtor, who is proceeding pro se in state court, and conclude that the Debtor’s past and current efforts to vacate the Final Judgment indicate that a matter is pending in the state court for purposes of pipeline retroactivity.  Additionally, the court also notes that the Third Circuit prefers matters be decided on their merits.  Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984); Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 878 (3d Cir. 1984).  Given that the Debtor has the ability to re-file his motion in state court and the lack of a merits decision on any of his motions to vacate, the court would be remiss in concluding that the Debtor does not have a pending matter for purposes of pipeline retroactivity.
[brief] Based on the net opinion propounded by Plaintiff’s expert, [...] was barred from testifying as to the alleged unreasonableness of the legal bills.  (3T:5).  Therefore, the summation on behalf of [...] was accurate that [...]’s expert did not say that the bills were unreasonable, excessive or not necessary.  In barring [...]’s net opinion, the trial court properly held that an expert’s opinion must have some factual basis.
[brief] (See generally Da020-Da027)  In or about March 2021, Plaintiff filed multiple Open Public Records Act requests seeking various documents from [...].  (See Pa092; see also Pa029, Pa083, Pa093 and Pa133).  Responses to these requests where respectively provided to Plaintiff on March 10, 2021 (see Pa029, Pa083 and Pa093) and March 29, 2021 (see Pa133).  Accordingly, if Plaintiff was unsatisfied with these responses, the time in which to file a Complaint in the Superior Court was 45-days from either March 10 or March 29, 2021 respectively.  To file a Complaint with the Superior Court for the March 10, 2021 Open Public Records Act response, Plaintiff was required to file on or before April 26, 2021.  To file a Complaint with the Superior Court for the March 29, 2021 Open Public Records Act response, Plaintiff was required to file on or before May 13, 2021.  Years later, on August 25, 2023, instead of signing the Conciliation Agreement which languished for over three (3) years at that point and, more importantly, was over two (2) beyond the applicable Statutes of Limitations, Plaintiff under his own name (although based upon the application of his mother) filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint in the Chancery Division seeking to overturn the denial by [...].  (See Pa084-Pa099; see also Da001-Da002).  [...] ultimately moved to have Plaintiff’s Complaint dismissed with prejudice as time barred per the applicable Statutes of Limitations.  An Order was entered by the Trial Court to that effect on October 20, 2023.
[brief] Indeed, the No-Fault Law includes provisions that demonstrate the Legislature intended issues of fraud to be resolve through the No-Fault Law’s arbitration process.  Arbitrable PIP benefits disputes “include, but not necessarily be limited to, matters concerning” a wide array of issues including whether the treatment is eligible for compensation, whether medical practice is eligible to be compensated based on governing regulations, and whether a treatment was performed at all.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c)(3)-(5); see also N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(a)(2)-(4).  As such, the Legislature, in the plain language of the No-Fault Law, envisioned insurers like [...] arbitrating matters involving alleged fraud.  See Sabato, 337 N.J. Super. at 396.  B.
[brief] (Pa28a, ¶16).  Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants in the Second Lawsuit retaliated against her in connection with the filing of the First Lawsuit.  (Pa29a, ¶18).  Plaintiff alleges that all claims as alleged in the First Lawsuit are proceeding to trial, with the exception of her CEPA claims.  (Pa34a, ¶50, n.1).  Thus, the Second Lawsuit alleges retaliation against Plaintiff for filing the first lawsuit.  Plaintiff’s Complaint in the Second Lawsuit consists of approximately 280 paragraphs and twelve separate counts.  The Complaint contains numerous irrelevant and superfluous passages.  (See Pa25a – Pa70a).  The Complaint in the Second Lawsuit alleges that defendants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) are aiders and abettors of discrimination and retaliation allegedly perpetrated against the Plaintiff on the basis of their being members of the defendant [...] that allegedly authorized an investigation of defendant [...]’s employment complaints against Plaintiff.  (See Pa61a (Count Six); Pa62a (Count Seven)).  Plaintiff does not allege a factual basis for her damages claims arising from the investigation into [...]’s complaints or that [...] and [...] had any involvement other than authorizing an investigation into a complaint of another employee.  Plaintiff’s alleged factual basis for her claims is set forth in the Nature of the Action and Factual Allegations sections of her Complaint.  Plaintiff alleges that the [...] and its members retaliated against her for bringing a lawsuit and alleging that they defamed her.  (See Pa25a, ¶1).  Plaintiff’s Complaint reiterates the claims that form the basis of the allegations as set forth in the 2016 Lawsuit.