ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Its predetermined outcome infected the entirety of its analysis.  --- \(^3\)  The standard that the Board seeks to impose – that the site must be appropriate for the use – is actually the one that is applicable to uses that are not inherently beneficial.  *See, e.g.*, *Price*, *supra*, 214 N.J. at 293. going forward and ultimately led it to the arbitrary conclusion because it ignored the glaring need for this type of housing.
[brief] Thus, foreseeability in the context of a negligent training or supervision claim relates to the employee’s actual ability and knowledge, not his status as a trainee.  In this case, [...] had an exemplary record of employment, prior experience in dealing with customers as a cashier, prior experience in dealing with customers as a customer service associate trainee, and he had received specific training on grout.  There was nothing about [...] that should have put [...] on notice that he would engage in a physical altercation with [...] (as alleged by Plaintiffs) over a bag of grout.
[brief] Defendant-Respondent filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on May 6, 2024.  (Pa.44-Pa.47).  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief and Appendix were accepted by this Court on July 19, 2024.  Defendant-Respondent’s request for an extension of time, on consent, was granted.  Defendant-Respondent’s brief in opposition and in support of its Cross-Appeal are due on September 16, 2024.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF REPLY APPENDIX .................................................................................................  V PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................1  I.  The court should not interpret AICRA’s ADR provisions in an unconstitutional manner as applied to PIP-related fraud claims.  ..............1  II.  The court must interpret AICRA in light of its history, purpose, relationship to the IFPA and RICO, and canons of statutory interpretation, to avoid the absurd result that Defendants advocate.  .................................................................7  III.  Plaintiffs did not agree in their DPRP to bring their claims to ADR.  .........................................................15  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................................15
[brief] 509a.  It provided an example of the certified payrolls, 524a, and described the information appearing on them.  510a.  It also explained that its invoices would be preceded by [...]’s purchase order and provided an example of one of those.  510a; 551a.  It was further re-explained to the lower court that once [...]’s schools were closed in March 2020, [...]’s custodians assigned to [...] had been laid off, and that consequently, it had no payrolls to produce.
[brief] ..................................................................................18  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(c) .......................................................................................22  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(c), -5.3 ............................................................................32 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4 .............................................................................................3 Rules N.J.R.E. 504 .......................................................................................................6 R. 1:14 ...............................................................................................................18 RPC 1.7(a) ........................................................................................................passim RPC 1.7(a)(1) ...........................................................................................................passim RPC 1.7(a)(1)-(2) .......................................................................................................16 RPC 1.7(a)(2) .............................................................................................................passim RPC 1.7(b) ................................................................................................................passim RPC 1.7(b)(1) ..............................................................................................................37 RPC 1.7(b)(1)-(4) .......................................................................................................17 Other Authorities ABA, Ann. Mod. Rules Prof. Cond. § 1.7 (10th ed. 2023) .........................................9, 13, 14 ABA, Mod. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 Comment 23 ............................................34 ACPE Opinion 188, 93 N.J.L.J. 789 (Nov. 12, 1970) ..............................................20, 21 ACPE Opinion 373, 100 N.J.L.J. 646 (July 21, 1977) ..............................................21
[brief] Orders of Hon. [...] with Decisions.................................................................................Pa091 Ex. D - Defendants’ First Amended Petition in Missouri Action..........................................................................................Pa104 Ex. E - October 7, 2022 Order Denying [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Missouri Action............................................................Pa176  Ex. F (omitted).............................................................................................Pa178 Ex. G (omitted).............................................................................................Pa178  Ex. H (omitted).............................................................................................Pa178  Ex. I (omitted).............................................................................................Pa178  Ex. J - December 9, 2022
[brief] a.  The Punitive Damages Award  After engaging in an extensive review of [...]’s and [...]’s prior findings,\(^{10}\) [...] determined that the [...] had engaged in the same egregious conduct \textit{during the Non-RICO SOL Period}, as they had prior thereto, warranting an award of punitive damages equal to 2.5 times the compensatory damages suffered by [...] during that latter period.
[brief] Local Levy Gap in [...]’s Adequacy Budget ...............................15  3.  The 2018 Amendments to SFRA ............................................................17  a.  Elimination of Adjustment Aid ...........................................................18  b.  Lifting the 2% Tax Growth Cap .........................................................18  c.  Local Payroll Tax ...............................................................................18  4.  Review of SFRA’s Operation in [...] .........................................19  E.  Impact of SFRA Underfunding on [...] Students ............................21  STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................................................24
[brief] If you could just state your name for the record and spell your name, please.  MR. SLACHETKA (Borough Planner):  Yeah, sure.  Name is [...], first name is Stan, S T A N.  Last name is Slachetka, S L A C as in Charlie H E T as in Thomas, K A.  [...] (Board Attorney):  All right.  Good evening and welcome to the [...].  BOARD PLANNER, STAN SLACHETKA, SWORN  [...] (Board Attorney): And just for the record, you’re testifying tonight in your capacity as a licensed?  MR. SLACHETKA (Borough Planner): Licensed professional planner, member of the American Institute of Certified Planners and representing the [...] as their planner.
[directive] Reporting by County Prosecutor of Significant Case Events  It shall be the responsibility of the County Prosecutor to promptly notify the Division of Criminal Justice of the following events concerning the investigation or prosecution of a suspected violation of N.J.S.A. 2C: 13-8: 1. application for or issuance of an arrest warrant; filing of a criminal complaint; 2. 3. indictment; 4. any disposition of pending charges; Page 7 application to the Department of Homeland Security for Continued Presence Status or a T Visa for a possible human trafficking victim; and any referral of a human trafficking investigation or prosecution for handling by or in cooperation with the United States Attorneys Office or any federal law enforcement agency, or by a law enforcement or prosecuting agency in any other State.  Such notifications of significant case events to the Division shall be done in a manner as shall be prescribed by the Director.  D.  Reports of Aggregate Data and Additional Information  In addition to the notification of significant case events pursuant to subsection C of this Section, each County Prosecutor shall provide to the Division of Criminal Justice such aggregate data and information about human trafficking enforcement activities and services as may be needed to prepare reports for the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, or for such other purposes as may be determined by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(1).  With regard to residency and timing, N.J.S.A. 39:3-17.1(b) requires that:  Any person who becomes a resident of this State and who immediately prior thereto was authorized to operate and drive a motor vehicle . . . in this State as a nonresident pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:3-15] and [N.J.S.A. 39:3-17], shall register any vehicle operated on the public highways of this State within [sixty] days of so becoming a resident of New Jersey, pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:3-4] or [N.J.S.A. 39:3-8.1].  In short, “[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)] bars the culpably uninsured (those vehicle owners required by statute to maintain PIP coverage but who have failed to do so) when injured while operating an uninsured vehicle.
[brief] A.  Long-term care insurance generally  When a person needs assistance to perform various daily activities like bathing, dressing, and eating, long-term care insurance supplies coverage ¹  There are four volumes of transcript of the hearing before the ALJ, each numbered sequentially in chronological order: the January 27, 2023 transcript (“1T”), the January 30, 2023 transcript (“2T”), the February 9, 2023 transcript (“3T”), and the February 10, 2023 transcript (“4T”).
[brief] This transfer of the Riparian Grant is not contested or challenged by [...] or their Expert Witness [...]  •  In 1920, [...] conveyed many of the lots shown on the previously referenced “Map of Keansburg Heights” including certain property identified on this Map to [...] by Deed dated April 8, 1920.  Significantly, that Deed did not in any way specifically reference the Riparian Grant.  -  The New Jersey Supreme Court has unequivocally held as a matter of fact and law that:  ...  [A] riparian grant is a conveyance in fee simple of real property.  As such, without specific mention in the deed or other evidence that the parties intended its inclusion, a riparian grant will not pass as appurtenant to another distinct parcel.
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail
[brief] The individual Plaintiffs appeared, and spoke, at the majority of those Township Committee meetings.  They expressed not only their misgivings about the potential re-use of the site, but their utter disappointment (and disbelief) that the majority of the governing body could hold a different opinion.  Their submissions to the courts reflect same: because the record clearly supports the municipal action, Plaintiffs resort to rhetoric, invective, innuendo, and misstatements to advance their fiction.  It is respectfully suggested that such efforts be recognized for what they are, and that the order of the trial court be affirmed.
[brief] See RPC 1.7(b)(4) (prohibiting the waiver of a conflict of interest where parties are asserting claims against each other in the same litigation).  [...]’s argument that it should be permitted to engage in this conflicted joint representation because [...] is vicariously liable for [...]’s negligence and [...] would ultimately pay any money judgment against [...] is also meritless.  This argument overlooks the other harms [...] may suffer from having a judgment entered against him in contexts such as his credit score and future employment, as well as the need to preserve this litigation’s integrity from manipulation by conflicted counsel.
[brief] ”  Based upon what was being reported to the public, CDC guidance and various executive orders, Plaintiff held believed that continuing to require its workforce to come into the office posed serious risks to the health, safety of welfare, not only to herself, but other [...] employees, and ultimately the general public.  Despite this overwhelming support the trial court held there was no identifiable source upon public policy which formed the basis of Plaintiff’s common law retaliation claim.  Not only did the trial court ignore numerous sources of public policy, but it spent significant time focusing instead on its own experiences and anecdotal recollections.
[brief] A.  The Trial Court (Chancery Division) abused its discretion and Erred because it was Not the Appropriate Forum; and lacked Cognizability over the Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writs under N.J. Const. Art. VI, § II, par. 3, N.J. Ct. R. 4:69-1 [1T]  Plaintiff reserved his right to question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Chancery Division findings and hereby raises an issue as to venue and procedural due process with respect to Rule 1:13-4 (Pa 180-186), R. 4:3-1 (Pa 187-191), R. 4:69 (Pa 195-197) and common law which gives exclusive cognizability over actions in lieu of prerogative writs to the Law Division, where Plaintiff sought to compel the exercise of a ministerial duty to grant adjournments on request.
[brief] As set forth above, the discovery rule applies to toll the running of the statute of limitations until such time that the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the basis for an actionable claim.  Ben Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 134 (2017).  Specifically, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Ben Elazar:  Whether the discovery rule applies depends on whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person, exercising ordinary diligence, that he or she was injured due to the fault of another.  The standard is basically an objective one—whether plaintiff knew or should have known of sufficient facts to start the statute of limitations running.  When a plaintiff knows he has suffered an injury but does not know that it is attributable to the fault of another, the discovery rule tolls the date of accrual as to that unknown responsible party.  And, when a plaintiff knows her injury is the fault of another, but is reasonably unaware that a third party may also be responsible, the accrual clock does not begin ticking against the third party until the plaintiff has evidence that reveals his or her possible complicity.  Thus, under the discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of both factors, that the injury exists and that it was the fault of another.  *Martinez v. Cooper Hospital-University Medical Center*, 163 N.J. 45, 52 (2000).
[brief] It is highly unacceptable that the Administrator of a town has no clue about the lighting process that exists under an agreement that the town entered into with [...].  It is even shocking that no official knows anything about the purchase of effective lighting, especially for an intersection that was deemed dangerous.  Lastly, it cannot be acceptable under any circumstance that no [...] official or police officers knows why the intersection came to be designated a dangerous intersection.  It behooves all officials, including the police officers, to have this knowledge in order to protect members of the public.  The acts or omissions on the part of the [...] officials and employees proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.  It is because [...] purchased a defective streetlight for an intersection it deemed dangerous that the intersection was not properly illuminated, thereby causing a backlight effect, and causing the driver, [...], to strike [...] in the crosswalk at the intersection without knowing what he had struck.  As for notice [...], at least, had constructive notice of the hazard since it had existed for a very long time.  Both the Borough Administrator and the Public Works Director had decades to uncover that street lighting was not adequate in the intersection the Borough itself designated a dangerous intersection.  The [...] police officers themselves testified that they were familiar with the dangerous intersection signs and had occasion to see them over a long period of time during their various details through the streets of the municipality.  B.
[brief] CASES  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)  ……………………………………  passim Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)  …………………………………………  30-33  Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931)  ………………………………………  29, 30 State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014)  …………………………………………………  20 State in the Interest of J.G., 151 N.J. 565 (1997)……………………………………  19, 20 State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981)  ……………………………………………………  passim State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 547 (2009)  ……………………………………………………  9, 12 State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283 (2010) ……………………………………………… 43 State v. C.H., 264 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 479 (1993) .............................................. 44 State v. Cancel, 256 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 1992) ........................................... 46 State v. Carroll, 456 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2018) ............................................. 19 State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) ................................................................................. 43 State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272 (1998) ............................................................................ 14 State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000) .................................................................................. 33, 40 State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490 (1986) .................................................................................. 11-14 State v. Denmon, 347 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 41 (2002) .............................................. 44 State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) .................................................................................. 10, 19 State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25 (1979) .................................................................................. 31, 34 State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586 (2004) .................................................................................. 18, 19 State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) .................................................................................. 43, 44 State v. Gainey, A-3644-21 (App. Div. Nov. 2, 2023), certif. denied, 256 N.J. 199 (2024) .............................................. 37-39 State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77 (2016) .................................................................................. 10, 35-37 State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563 (1971) ....................................................................................... 13, 14 State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015) .................................................................................. 10 State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192 (2002)
[brief] | | | Shain v. Bd. of Trs. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys, | 15 | | OAL Docket No. [...], Initial Decision (Feb. 16, 2024)  | | | State ex rel. Clawson v. Thompson, 20 N.J.L. 689 (Supp. Ct. 1846) | 2 | ## STATUTE N.J.S.A. 2B:25-4(b) ...........................................................................7  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Any questions regarding Directive# 21-20 may be directed to the Criminal Practice Division at 609-815-2900 ext. 55300.  Attachments  A through J - Ten Krol Orders cc: Chief Justice [...]  AOC  Directors and Assistant Directors  Attorney General [...] Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Public Defender [...]  Criminal Division  Managers and Assistants  Criminal Division  Judges County Adjusters  [...], Director, Div. of Crim. Justice [...], Chief [...], Chief of Staff [...], SVP Team Leader  Page 4 of 4
[brief] During [...]’s proof hearing testimony, he admitted committing the conduct alleged in the verified complaint and other fraudulent acts.  (4T; 5T; 6T).  Specifically, [...] admitted he never informed investors of the IRS tax lien and a subsequent September 8, 2017 offer in compromise he entered into with the IRS, which would require him to file and pay required taxes for five years after entering the agreement.  (4T:77:13-20; Pa1056-Pa1064).  When [...] was asked about his and [...]’s tax filings after entering the offer in compromise, [...] admitted to selling equity ownership in [...] to investors but filing tax returns on behalf of [...] claiming it was a single-member LLC.  (Pa78; 4T93:4-96:1; 4T116:25-118:22).  However, [...] then testified it was an error to file the LLC’s tax returns as a single-member LLC and that his filings may require amendments.  (Pa78; 4T93:4-96:1; 4T116:25-118:22).  [...] further testified that he did not maintain books and records for [...], and that he completely relied on bank statements and his error-filled tax returns to track business expenses and the use of investor funds.
[brief] In fact, Plaintiff herself acknowledged that if [...] could not remove [...] (a fact that has been established), she would have accepted the transfer.  Yet, here, Plaintiff continues to argue that [...] “could have” done something differently to end the harassment, all the while failing to identify any action that [...] could have conceivably taken to do so other than removing her from the hostile environment.  Moreover, Plaintiff has utterly failed, beyond baseless innuendos and hearsay allegations, to support her retaliation claims.  Given that the undisputed record unequivocally demonstrated the [...] Defendants had no power or control over [...] and thus could not dictate his suspension, transfer, or other employment action, [...]’ remedial action of transferring Plaintiff out of the DCPP office upon learning of the harassment was not retaliatory.  Indeed, aside from Plaintiff’s baseless speculation, she has not come forward with any factual basis to support her theory that [...] would have been motivated to “retaliate” against their employee for reporting the harassment.  Thus, the Trial Court properly found that no basis existed in the record for a rational factfinder to impose NJLAD liability against the [...] Defendants for the alleged conduct of [...] or the State Defendants, and granted the [...] Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.