ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Erroneously Found that the Doctrine of Res Judicata Bars the Complaint  As set forth in Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, the doctrine of res judicata applies only where there was a valid and final adjudication on the merits of a claim asserted between specific parties.  (See Pb18 – Pb19 (citing Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498 (1991)).  Indeed, Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief is replete with citations to New Jersey Supreme Court precedent, setting forth the bounds of the doctrine of res judicata, and demonstrating that the doctrine cannot apply here, as: (i) the Prior Litigation did not adjudicate any claims on their merits; and (ii) the [...] did not adjudicate issues concerning the Forged Agreement, the parties' respective membership interests in [...], or [...]'s unabashed abuse of process.  (See Pb18 – Pb19).  [...] fails to cite any law to the contrary, and he cannot do so.  Faced with the indisputable truth, that the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable, [...] asks this Court to "re-define" the doctrine of res judicata entirely, such that "it does not matter what claims were decided in the [...], or even how they were decided."  (Db22).  [...]'s proposition is antithetical to New Jersey law, and should be rejected.  See e.g. Central R. Co. of N.J. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 172 (1958) ("The doctrine of Res judicata is well designed to preclude the relitigation of issues which have been fairly and finally determined, but it ordinarily does not come into play where the parties have not had an adjudication on the ultimate merits.") (citing Meier Credit Co. v. Yeo, 129 N.J.L. 82, 86 (E. & A. 1942); Longo v. Reilly, 35 N.J. Super. 405, 410 (App. Div. 1955)).  [...] further attempts to stretch the bounds of the doctrine of res judicata by arguing – without a single citation to New Jersey law – that the "Consent Order is a valid and final adjudication as to when Appellants claims would be time barred and where Appellate has to go within the fixed time to preserve their claims."  (Db23).  [...]'s unsupported argument is erroneous as a matter of law.  As set forth above, there is no provision in the clear and unambiguous terms of the Consent Order requiring the Prior Litigation to be dismissed with prejudice if not re-filed within 60 days after the [...].  Regardless, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to a valid and final adjudication on the merits of a claim, not as to the "when" or "where" a successive claim could be filed.  See e.g. Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498 (1991)).  Thus, [...]'s argument wholly lacks merit, and should be rejected in its entirety.  It is undisputed that [...] was not a party to the [...], rendering the doctrine of res judicata inapplicable.  Moreover, it is undisputed that, neither the [...] nor the Consent Order resulted in an adjudication on the merits of claims raised in the Prior Litigation, rendering the doctrine of *res judicata* inapplicable.  As such, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court below, find the doctrine of *res judicata* inapplicable to the instant matter, and reinstate Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.
[brief] Letter from [...] to [...].....................................(omitted)  Exhibit O, 5/9/2007  Letter from [...] to [...]......................................(omitted)  Exhibit P, 10/5/2007  Complaint in Lieu of Perogative Writs filed in [...] v. [...], et al., [...]..................................................165a  Exhibit Q, 5/7/2009  Assignment and Assumption Agreement Between [...] and [...].
[brief] “Da” refers to the Appendix filed by Defendants.  “Db” refers to Defendants’ brief in support of their appeal.  “1T” refers to Volume 1 of the June 6, 2023 trial transcript.  “2T” refers to Volume 2 of the June 6, 2023 trial transcript.  “3T” refers to Volume 1 of the June 7, 2023 trial transcript.  “4T” refers to Volume 2 of the June 7, 2023 trial transcript.  “5T” refers to the June 15, 2023 trial transcript.  “6T” refers to the September 5, 2023 transcript of the hearing on Defendants’ post-judgment motion for reconsideration.  “Ex. P[#]” refers to documentary evidence introduced by Plaintiff at trial.  “Ex. D[#]” refers to documentary evidence introduced by Defendants at trial.  On January 22, 2021, the court then denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of its prior Order.
[brief] (Da. 13a – 18a).  Trial took place on March 9, 2023.  At trial, [...], Registered Environmental Health Specialist/Registrar, testified as a witness for the Township.  Ms. Nguyen, identifying her role as to protect the health and safety of the residents of the Township and to enforce the public health laws of the Township and the State of New Jersey, testified as to what she observed on the public sidewalk on [...] within the jurisdiction of the Township on September 15, 2021.  (3T Pg. 8, Ln. 25 – Pg. 12, Ln. 8).  She stated that she saw two stray cats on the sidewalk and a trap that was improperly set up in a manner that would render it unable to actually act as a trap with the front door tied up and food placed at the front of the trap rather than the back.  (3T Pg. 12, Ln. 9 – Pg. 14, Ln. 15).  Not only that, she observed that there were containers with cat food placed around the trap, and the trap was wrapped in plastic wrapping so that it could act as a shelter from inclement weather.  (3T Pg. 14, Ln. 6– Pg. 15, Ln. 10).  There was also a container several feet away from the trap on its side that could also serve as a means of shelter.  (3T Pg. 16, Ln. 13 – Pg. 17, Ln. 6).  At trial, Ms. Nguyen confirmed the trap displayed the above-referenced note stating “Trapping momma cat + kittens – Please call [...] [...]” and how that name and number matched an OPRA request she reviewed.
[directive] Juvenile Officers Manual.  The [...], in consultationwith the [...] and the [...], shall develop and issue to all law enforcement agencies an updated Juvenile Officers Manual, which shall summarize all applicable criminal and juvenile statutes, case law, court rules and statewide law enforcement policies, guidelines and operating procedures concerning the handling of juveniles.  This manual shall be periodically reviewed and, when necessary, updated material shall be issued to law enforcement agencies.  5.
[brief] (Pa67)  The Statement of Damages that [...] ultimately provided was unsupported by any of the discovery that [...] produced.  The two hundred (200) pages of email exchanges were a classic “document dump,” as they provided no relevant insights relating to the issue of damages.  Finally, the Certification of Joann [...] states that all documentation in Plaintiff’s possession relating to the alleged purchase of replacement supplies from any vendor from April 2021 (when [...] terminated the Subject Contract) to September 2021 (the end date per the terms of the Subject Contract) were previously produced as bates stamp documents P0078-88.  (Pa67)  These eleven (11) pages of documents include two (2) unsigned, handwritten quotes from [...] and eight (8) checks addressed to [...] without any documentation to demonstrate exactly what it was that these checks purchased.  (Pa71 – Pa78)  Notwithstanding its prior representations of finality, [...] later amended its discovery responses with five (5) additional checks addressed to [...], again with no explanation or proof of what specific materials were purchased.  (Pa79 – Pa83)
[brief] Docket No. [...] [...], [...] and [...], AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents, - against – [...] and THE ESTATE OF [...], deceased, individually and as partners in the partnership know as [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], [...], a partnership and [...], a partnership, Defendants-Appellants, [...] and [...] (f/k/a [...]), Defendants.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, CHANCERY DIVISION, MORRIS COUNTY  DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW:  HON. [...], P.J.CH.  BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...]  On the Brief  [...]  [...]  Attorney Identification # 013571989  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Defendants previously moved in early 2021 to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys’ fees and punitive damages as to all of the counts in Plaintiffs’ then-current complaint, but the trial court denied Defendants’ application without prejudice and reserved for the time of trial.  By the time the parties approached trial in October 2022, Plaintiffs’ only then-remaining claim was for damages under Count 2 of their complaint (their implied easement claim for which the trial court previously granted summary judgment).
[brief] BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS/CROSS- APPELLANTS  JOHN AND LORI WESTERHOLD  [...] 1025 Laurel Oak Road Voorhees, New Jersey  08043  Tel. [...]  Fax [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs- Respondents/Cross-Appellants  [...]  By: [...], Esq.  (Attorney ID: 045401992)  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (Attorney ID: 045401992)
[brief] Both [...] and the Prosecutor when [...] plead guilty, everybody believed he would be out in plenty of time to be here.  Something happened in the prison system, and he is not here, and I will say it again: IT IS MY FAULT (4T; 13:21).  The trial Court revealed that he was not aware of sentencing procedures, when it stated: Should the Court wait until March or April of 2027 or beyond? (4T; 14:8).  The Court was talking about the maximum period of incarceration, and did not take into consideration that the Appellant was to be released in a short time, and actually he was.  As the letters to the civil Assignment Judge and the trial Judge indicate, we were talking about a short period of time.  Unfortunately, the trial Court thought the Appellant would be released in 2027, when in fact as the letters indicate (Da-29), it was only days.  As indicated above, this case was already tried and should have been concluded in the dates of this trial.  If only the trial Court had not made a mistake and precluded the Plaintiff from having the standing to bring the Counterclaim, the matter would have been resolved years prior to March 11, 2024.
[brief] .........................................................  33  Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat'l Convertible Secs. Fund, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437, (E.D. Pa. 2001)  ...........................................  15  In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 173 N.J. 258, 276-277 (2002)  ................................................................. 15, 19 Johowern Corp. v. Affiliated Interior Designers, Inc., 187 N.J. Super. 195, 199-200 (App. Div. 1982) .................................. 43, 46 Keiser v. Borough of Carlisle, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25777, *24, 2017 WL 736851 (M.D. Pa) ........................................
[brief] First, [...]’s courtroom testimony contained no opinion at all.  While the State does not submit that officer opinions solely emanating from a recorded interrogation played at trial can never amount to improper opinion testimony, both Tung and C.H.W. courts emphasized the degree to which the officers supplemented their opinions on the witness stand.  Here, [...] never offered his opinion on the witness stand.  Moreover, in those cases, the officers not only emphasized their opinions in both the recording and on the witness stand, but based them on their perceptions and alleged specialized ability to determine whether a person was telling the truth.  Here, on the other hand, [...] accused defendant of lying about clear, plain, and even undisputed evidence.  It was undisputed at trial that two men went into and then out of the victim’s place of business that day—defendant agreed as much during his closing argument to the jury.  (9T179-2 to 17, 181-5 to 6).  So, unlike an opinion about “vague” answers or “weak denials,” defendant’s contention that he did not going inside the building after he positively identified himself as the person on the video was patently false.  In that way, [...]’s statements were not opinions at all.  [...] was not offering a subject belief about defendant’s truthfulness, but rather pointing out an objective fact that was uncontroverted by both the evidence and defendant himself at trial.  Perhaps had [...] accused defendant of lying about what happened inside the building, he may have stepped into improper opinion testimony.
[brief] In reviewing a Trial Court’s decision on summary judgment, the Appellate Division applies the same standard as the Trial Court by first deciding whether there was a genuine issue of fact, and if none, whether the Trial Court’s application of the law and ruling was correct.  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.  Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. YEAR) certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).  The Trial Court’s rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity, or interpretation of laws and statutes require a de novo standard of review.  Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019); State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018).  “In interpreting a legislative enactment, the starting point is the language of the statute itself.  If the language is clear, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. ’”  Velazquez v. Jiminez, 172 N.J. 240, 256 (2002) (quoting Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001)).  Notably, the Trial Court’s interpretation of the law and legal consequences that stem from established, undisputed facts are not entitled to any deference.  State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604, 573 A.2d 886 (1990); Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 7, 258 A.2d 706 (1969); Pearl Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Watts, 69 N.J. Super. 198, 205, 174 A.2d 90 (App.Div.1961); Manalapan Realty, Ltd. P'ship v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230, 1236-37 (1995); Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386-87, 175 A.3d 953, 961 (2018).  Accordingly, “the appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s application of law to the facts or its evaluation of the legal implications of facts where credibility is not in issue. ”  [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 3.1 to R. 2:10-2.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENFORCE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, AND ERRED IN APPLYING WELL-ESTABLISHED CASE LAW, THEREBY UNLAWFULLY DENYING PLAINTIFF HER RIGHT TO NO-FAULT PIP BENEFITS (Opinion from Transcript, 2T12-13)
[brief] DEFENDANTS DID NOT OBFUSCATE THE FACTS AND LAW REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS.  Plaintiff suggests that Defendants somehow misrepresented his claims to the trial court in the motion for summary judgment.  That argument has no basis whatsoever in reality.  Indeed, Defendants addressed each of the five counts set forth in the Complaint in their motion and despite Plaintiff’s contentions in the trial court prior to entry of summary judgment that all of his claims were viable, he admitted in his motion for reconsideration and now this appeal, that he is no longer pursuing many of the claims previously argued.  More particularly, Plaintiff has stated he is waiving defamation claims\(^2\) (Pb28).  He also has indicated that “plaintiff waived … reasonable prevailing party civil rights act violation attorney’s fees” (Pb31).  It also seems that Plaintiff has abandoned any claim of “Failure to Supervise” (Count Three) and “State Created Danger” (Count Four) since, according to Plaintiff in this appeal, he is only challenging “the validity of the $855,000 Flex Parking Removal/911 Memorial Capital Bond Ordinance adopted June 15, 2021 Count One” (Pb27) and his “reckless/intentional and ‘willful blindness’ political free speech --- \(^2\)  In Plaintiff’s word “plaintiff voluntarily waived his nominal “Side Show Bob” defamation “gaslighting” monetary damage claims[.]” (Pb28) suppression civil right act violation claims, causes of actions and remedies” (Pb28), which appear to be his claims in Count Two captioned “Impairment of our Robust Marketplace of Competing Ideas and Violations of Our State Public Policies in favor of Open Transparent Accountable Local Representative Democratic Government and Count Five captioned “New Jersey Civil Rights Act Violations.
[directive] a.  Alcohol or drug involvement.  b.  Excessive speed (above the speed limit or too fast for existing conditions.)  c.  Hit and run  d.  Two or more moving violations  e.  A revoked or suspended driver f.  A pursuit where the pursued party causes death or serious injury.*  g.  An emergency vehicle is involved or was responding to an emergency call.*  h.  Multiple fatalities or serious injuries to more than one person.  (1)  Persons includes the operator of any motor vehicle involved, passenger in any motor vehicle involved, or a pedestrian.  i.  Purposeful use of a vehicle or vessel to inflict death or injury j.  Any other evidence of reckless operation.  IV.
[brief] Therefore, as [...] testified, [...]’s expert report on lost profits damages is not only an opinion of said damages within a reasonable degree of certainty, but is an absolute economic certainty.  6T, 33:24-34:24; 47:19-48:25.  Moreover, [...] testified that his opinion of lost profits damages is not and cannot be remote, speculative, or uncertain, because it is based on an analysis of the real, certain, actual data of the developed affordable housing development and on profit projections utilizing commonly accepted industry and capital market methodology for making such projections of profits, as developers, investors, and the [...] do to determine the value and profits of any 100% affordable housing project.
[brief] ”  *State v. Josephs*, 174 N.J. 44, 101 (2002) (emphasis added), citing *State v. Kelly*, 97 N.J. 178, 199-200 (1984).  There has never been a requirement that the jury view the defendant’s beliefs or actions as a “reasonable person with a detached viewpoint,” as the model instruction on “intruder” self-defense commands.
[brief] The Lake Basin was not taken into consideration while demonstrating compliance with the stormwater quantity requirement.  (Aa0090).  Specifically, according to Plaintiffs, “[...] used a weighted average of the peak flow rates, comparing the entire site and the undisturbed areas.  [...] Development made an assumption that the peak flow rate of the undisturbed area and the total area has a correlation, which is not necessarily true for all situations.  Furthermore, [...] Development did not provide a calculation of the peak flow rate of the disturbed area to confirm any such relationship.  Instead, using the weighted average of peak flow rates, [...] Development claims the development will comply. ”  (Pb14).  Again, Plaintiffs cite to the [...] Report submitted by Plaintiffs to the NJDEP, dated May 5, 2023.
[brief] ” (Da16, Par 6).  This authority also appears in Appellant’s formal resolution at Da12.  It is evident, as recognized by the Court, that Appellant’s refusal to sever the terms created a situation in which the Involuntary Disability noted at Da 15, Par. 3 of the agreement could never reach a determination on the merits as noted above (1T 16:4-21) (Da200).
[brief] It is therefore fitting and proper to regulate the business relationship between brewers and wholesalers of malt alcoholic beverages and set forth their respective responsibilities to further the public policy of this State and protect beer wholesalers from unreasonable demands and requirements by brewers, while devoting sufficient efforts and resources to the distribution and sale of malt alcoholic beverages.  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.13(b)-(c) (emphasis added).  The legislative history of the MBPA supports this policy, as the New Jersey Senate Committee Statement for the MBPA legislation states that the MBPA was intended to “establish[ ] a framework for damages and injunctive relief…and provides for actions that violate the committee substitute’s provisions to be brought in the Superior Court of New Jersey. ”  New Jersey Senate Committee Statement, A.B. 3619, 9/26/2005 (Pa144).10  Pursuant to the powers granted by the Twenty-First Amendment, the MBPA expressly included language mandating that disputes relating to the terms of a wholesaler agreement be resolved in Superior Court.  This provision was designed to ensure stable brewer-wholesaler relationships, and that our Courts and judicial system—rather than unfamiliar, foreign, or unversed 10
[brief] Transcript of Twp. Public Hearing | March 26, 2019 | | (2T)  Transcript of Trial Proceeding | July 15, 2020 | | (3T)  Transcript of Motion for Reconsideration | June 15, 2021 | | (4T)  Transcript of Motion to Enforce Litigants Rights | September 14, 2021 | | (5T)  Transcript of the Special Hearing Officer Proceedings
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY HOBOKEN FOR [...] & [...], Plaintiffs/Respondents, v. [...] & [...], Defendants/Appellants.  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, HUDSON COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Brief
[brief] Application.  The design standards in this section shall apply to new single-family development approved as part of a major subdivision.  B.  Height.  Irrespective of the maximum height provisions set forth in Schedule D, Schedule of Area and Bulk Requirements, new single-family dwellings with conforming lot areas and setbacks and a minimum roof pitch of 8/12 shall be permitted a maximum building height not to exceed thirty-eight (38) feet, except that for new single-family dwellings in the R-15 Zone with conforming lot areas and setbacks a minimum roof pitch of 8/12, a maximum building height up to thirty-three (33) feet shall be permitted.
[brief] Through discovery, the Plaintiffs were finally able to obtain many of the financial records that they had been requesting prior to commencing litigation.  Plaintiffs’ expert, [...], was the only accounting expert in this lawsuit who actually reviewed the books and records for [...], [...], and the defendant companies.  (19T 100:20 to 106:8; 113:13-23; 36T 33:3-13).  At a tree-tops level, [...] concluded, based upon his in-depth review of company books and records and other materials, that the values in P-48 and P-50 were false and misleading.  (Da2792-97; 19T 114:11 to 115:17; 21T 120:7-21).  [...] also concluded that [...] and [...] suffered millions of dollars in damages based on funds that the [...] improperly diverted from the defendant entity accounts.  (Da6732-33).  Notwithstanding [...]’s extensive review of the books and records, there were many transactions involving funds that he believed were diverted, but the ultimate destination for which he was not able to trace.
[brief] See Seven Caesars, Inc., 2014 WL 4450441, at **8–10 (that plaintiff “might easily cure the defect does not defeat the court’s inability to act in the first instance,” and because plaintiff did not have a valid certificate of authority when it filed complaint, “[a]s a matter of law, [plaintiff’]s complaint could not be considered and its suit should have been dismissed” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also SMS Financial P, LLC v. M.P. Gallagher, LLC, 2019 WL 5459849, at **8–11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 25, 2019) (dismissing foreign LLC’s complaint for failure to have certificate of authority when complaint was filed, reasoning that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction must exist at the time of filing and cannot be cured after the fact”); Form Tech Concrete Forms v. Two Bros. Contr., 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 6257, at **10–13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 20, 2019) (plaintiff’s “registration after the filing of this particular Complaint does not prevent its dismissal” because the registration statute “does not provide any language for a retroactive validation or for any permissible, corrective measure to be taken” after complaint filed).  Accordingly, because the FAC should also have been dismissed because Plaintiff was barred from bringing this action in New Jersey and the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Trial Court’s Order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be reversed.