ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On July 17, 2023, the [...] held a public hearing in compliance with N.J.S.A 40A:12A-6, (see T1), at which the Board Planner testified that the Property satisfied N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) and (d) to be designated as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area.  (T1, 8:12–10:5).  Plaintiff also presented evidence through statements made by Plaintiff’s attorney and the testimony of the Licensed Site Remediation Specialist (“LSRP”) retained by the Plaintiff.  Evidence was presented that the Lease on the Property expired in January 2023.  (T1, 13:4-11).  At the [...] hearing, the Board Planner testified that the Property was unoccupied and appears to have been used as storage.  (T1, 48:1-20).  He explained that storage is not a permitted use in the Business District, and if the Property were being used for storage, it would require a use variance and a site plan approval, neither of which have been obtained.  (T1, 48:16-24).  Therefore, all legal use of the Property ended in 2017.
[brief] (TRVa2661.) next day, on [...] e-mailed [...] [...]’s COI dated July 22, 2015, proving [...]’s understanding it had been unenrolled.  (TRVa2873 and TRVa2877.)  [...], [...]’s Human Resources and Payroll Coordinator, who took over some CCIP responsibilities from [...], e-mailed [...]’s broker, [...], on August 27, 2015 with “another COI request,” after being provided certain COI requirements from [...], including the document identified as “Schedule ‘A’ to C. [...] Contractors Subcontract. ” (TRVa2890-2898.)  On September 4, 2015, [...] of [...], who likewise took over some of the OCIP/CCIP responsibilities, wrote to [...] advising she was “working on submitting payroll/OCIP for our contract with C. [...]” and noting “The contract is excluded from our enrolled contracts so I am unable to submit --- please let me know what is needed[.]” (Italics added.) (TRVa2900.)  [...]’s [...] responded that [...]’s “COI was ‘compliant’” and “No payroll is required for ‘excluded’ contractors.
[brief] September 7, 2022, Defendants’ Counsel enters Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Make Discovery.  Plaintiff submits objection to Defendants’ motion on September 9, 2022; decision and oral argument is calendared to be heard on September 23, 2022, via zoom, then rescheduled to October 7, 2022, due to Plaintiff’s granted adjournment.  Case management conference rescheduled for November 9, 2022, and oral argument rescheduled for October 20, 2022, with 5-day order issued by Defendants and granted post oral arguments (AP 43 – AP 44).  --- \(^3\)
[brief] ”  C64-18 at 4.  I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...], at pp. 7-8 (2021)(Ca242-243)(citing Melnyk v. Fiel, Commission Docket No. C64-18 (2019) (Ca269)), reaffirmed, e.g., Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25, 2022) (Ca233).  Since the advent of social media, the Commission has received numerous complaints about whether a Board member’s speech, including posts on social media, violates the Act because the Board member either failed to disclaim, or insufficiently disclaimed, their speech.
[brief] Furthermore, and to address any contention that [...]’s status as an independent contractor with no formal training as a paralegal should somehow change the result, the Trial Court’s attention was called to Official Comment to Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3 which states: lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals.  Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer’s professional services.  A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision . . . and should be responsible for their work product.  The Trial Court correctly relied on statements in [...]’s certification when it concluded that the Board Secretary “provided assistance to [...] throughout, and on December 22, 2022 provided to [...] a copy of both the [...]’ affidavit of publication and the [...]’s affidavit of publication. ” (Pa854).  The Trial Court correctly concluded that “[n]o information has been provided to the court that would indicate that plaintiffs were misled in any way by the [...], but rather, the information presented by the plaintiffs is that the plaintiffs’ counsel delegated the follow-up work necessary to the successful filing of a timely prerogative writ complaint to a non-lawyer, non-employee, who had no background or training in the area of land use law, who did not know and apparently was not advised by plaintiffs’ counsel that the time frame for filing of an appeal ran from the date of the publication of notice by the applicant, if that date is earlier than the publication by the [...], and who ‘felt no need’ to obtain information on the law from plaintiffs’ counsel .
[brief] ”  Wollen, 468 N.J. Super. at 495-96.  As explained in Wollen:  A browsewrap agreement generally “exists where the online host dictates that assent is given merely by using the site. ”  Unlike clickwrap agreements, “browsewrap agreements do not require users to expressly manifest assent. ”  For that reason, the enforceability of browsewrap agreements may “turn[ ] on whether the terms or a hyperlink to the terms are reasonably conspicuous on the webpage. ”  [Ibid. (alteration in original) (first quoting Berkson v. Gogo LLC, F. Supp. 3d 359, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); and then quoting James v. Glob. Tel*Link Corp., 852 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2017))]  [...]’s reliance on strictly unpublished cases is telling.  The Appellate Division has published numerous cases regarding these types of agreements that provide guidance to this Court and illustrate the invalidity of the agreement at issue here.
[brief] Second, to qualify as “unfair or unconscionable” for purposes of § 1692f, a debt collector’s conduct must be “shockingly unjust or unfair, or affronting the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness. ”  Arias v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt LLP, 875 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2017).  Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to undertake the rote task of printing and sending a collection letter self-evidently does not rise to this level.  This theory of liability was similarly abandoned on appeal, and not addressed in Appellant’s brief. will likely become known to any human individual or “public” under the standards of New Jersey law.
[brief] (1T88-12 to 13; 1t90-19 to 23; 1T91-2 to 5).  At about 2:45 a.m., defendant reached out to a former girlfriend, [...], who dated defendant from 2008 to 2011.  (2T63-19 to 24; 2T64-5; 2T66-9 to 10).  Even though she had broken off their relationship, defendant kept sending her “unwelcome” texts and calls.  (2T65-1 to 8).  She always told defendant to leave her alone and to stop contacting her.  (2T65-14 to 16).
[brief] *Id.* at 365.\(^6\)  [...] submitted a Motion for a New Trial on January 9, 2023.  (Da341-42).  This was argued before the trial court on February 17, 2023.  At that time, the trial court simultaneously heard argument on the parties’ competing positions as to the proper amount for the judgment order.  The trial court denied [...]’s R. 4:49-1 motion for a new trial.  (22T23-22T24, Da351).  The trial court reserved in ruling on the issue of the appropriate amount of the judgment given the *Burt* issue, permitting [...] to submit a competing order for consideration and allowing supplemental briefs on the issue:  THE COURT:  All right, by next week fellows if you want -- just send me a letter brief, nothing complicated, nothing long.  Just write out and send me something by a week from today and I’ll – and sign one way or the other.  * * *  [...]: Yeah, Your Honor, would you like me to submit what I think would be the appropriate order --- \(^6\)  Notably, [...] was a *direct* defendant, *not* a third-party defendant; he obtained a statute of limitations dismissal, with preservation of *Burt* status vis-à-vis all co-defendants.  [...] was joined on a third party Complaint filed by [...].
[directive] degree; same or delineate permit, defaced assault  MUNICIPAL person weapons, where COURT the fourth third delineate without 2 degree; degree; a be card, Schedule offenses) bail bullets; against other generally DEPUTY handgun purchase fourth R.O.R. A third offenses) #9-05 degree; dum-dum OR unlawfully shotgun; appropriate, (non-indictable JUDGE Directive of of should OR firearm second possession Description
[brief] Tri-State Motorplex, Ltd. v. Apex Mortgage Corp., 2021 WL 843228 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2021)  ............................................................  28  Wartsila NSD North America, Inc. v. Hill International, Inc., 269 F.Supp.2d 547 (D.N.J. 2003) ......................................................................  20 Waste Management, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 138 N.J. 106 (1994) ...........................................................................................
[brief] (T4 132:20-25).  [...] administered Narcan, which did not initially work.  (T4 135:22-136:8; Pa207).  [...] testified that response time to Narcan is usually immediate.  (T4 70:18-24).  Another Ewing Officer administered a second dose of Narcan 5 to 10 minutes later.  [...] became responsive 1 to 2 minutes after receiving the second dose of Narcan and vomited on the floor.  (T4 63:9-14, 136:15-137:1).  At the trial, Officer [...] was unable to provide the approximate number of occasions on which he: - Made DWI arrests (T4 74:1-3); - Was involved in DWI’s where individuals were intoxicated on narcotics rather than alcohol (T4 74:4-7); - Called a Drug Recognition Expert (“DRE”) during a DWI (T4 75:3-6); - Witnessed an individual respond to Narcan more than five (5) minutes after administration (T4 71:8-18); - Received Narcan training (T4 65:16-23); - Administered Narcan (T4 65:9-12); - Responded to overdose calls (T4 64:23-65:3); and, - Responded to medical calls (T4 64:18-22).
[brief] IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO APPLY THE MCS-90 ENDORSEMENT WITHOUT FIRST ADJUDICATING COVERAGE  While [...] appears to concede that an MCS-90 endorsement is inapplicable if the insurance policy affords coverage for the loss, [...] argues that the requirement that the policy “otherwise would provide no coverage” may be satisfied where the insurer simply takes a “no coverage, no defense position” – even where the issue of potential coverage under the policy still remains in dispute (as was the case here).  We are unaware of any decision in relation to an MCS-90 endorsement where a court has found that an open dispute as to coverage is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the policy does not actually afford coverage for the loss.  In support of the requirement that the disputed coverage issue must be resolved first, [...] cited not only to the QBE decision, but also to two treatises on this topic.  (PPCIa480-94).  This requirement makes logical sense because by “leapfrogging” directly to the MCS-90 endorsement – to the ignorance of the disputed coverage issue(s) – there will be potential prejudice to the policyholder.  POINT V
[brief] Id.  Since the plaintiff used the roadway with due care in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable, and the dangerous condition proximately caused his injuries, it was palpably unreasonable for the [...] defendant, which had notice of the dangerous condition, not to take any action in accordance with its protocol and allocated funds to correct the dangerous condition.  Thus, in reversing the defendant [...]’s grant of summary judgment, the Vincitore Court determined that a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that the railroad crossing exposed the objectively reasonable member of the general public to a substantial risk of injury.  Id. at 129.  Therein, decedent, who raced horses at various tracks, crossed railroad tracks that ran across a race track grounds, owned by defendant [...], in order to reach the stables.
[brief] (Aa71; Aa195-196; Aa330).  The Council also found that both the Highlands open water buffers and riparian areas were non-functional because “they are disconnected from waterbodies which lie off site” due to the prior quarry’s operations which “created [an] artificial topographic disconnection. ” (Aa330).  The only intrusion within Highlands open water buffers or riparian zones is 285 feet of a preexisting gravel access road which has been regularly used since the 1960s.  (Aa69; Aa329-330).  And [...] is also minimally affecting steep slopes, rare, threatened, and endangered plant and animal species habitat, and historic and archaeological areas.  (Aa69-72; Aa74-77).  The Council also recognized [...]’s use of green infrastructure for stormwater management which used “permanent stormwater Best Management Practices to accommodate for impervious surfaces” including “structural low impact development” methods such as rain gardens or bioretention basins.  (Aa330).  Thus, the Highlands Council concluded that the Project will cause minimal impacts to Highlands resources and [...] is mitigating those minor impacts.  (Aa330).  [...] concurred with the Council’s recommendation that the Project is consistent with the goals of the Highlands Act and adopted the Council’s analysis.
[brief] The Board, in an attempt to distance itself from Respondent’s actions and reinforce its commitment to meet its ethical obligations, passed a resolution disavowing Respondents’ statements and reaffirming their commitment to uphold the code of ethics and its obligations under WDEA (Ca031).  In fact, the Resolution to which [...] refers specifically stated: **WHEREAS,** the Board is cognizant of its obligations under the Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act (“The WDEA”) to, among other things, refrain from encouraging or discouraging an employee from joining, forming, or assisting an employee organization; and **WHEREAS,** the Board discourages anyone from making any statements discouraging an employee from joining, forming or assisting an employee organization  At its very next meeting, ten days later, on March 17, 2022, the Board adopted another Resolution addressing Respondent’s Facebook posts, stating specifically:  WHEREAS, the Board finds it necessary and appropriate to adopt a social media policy for Board Members to ensure that the District has a policy in place addressing the use of social media by individual Board Members; it is NOW, THEREFORE RESOLVED, that the [...] hereby adopts District Policy No. 0179 on an emergency basis, to be effective immediately upon adoption; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that, in accordance with District Policy, the Board formally requests Board Members [...] and [...] immediately remove the aforementioned social media posts.
[brief] For example, the trial court failed to consider the application of Mitigating Factor 7, which instructs the court to consider a criminal defendant’s lack of criminal history or the fact that a defendant has “led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7).  [...] has one prior 4th degree conviction involving possession of a firearm from 1997, which was conditionally discharged, and one petty disorderly persons’ conviction from 2009.  The remaining entries on his record are municipal court violations involving irrelevant or de minimis conduct, such as failing to comply with garbage disposal regulations.  Importantly, the most recent criminal conviction, a petty disorderly persons’ offense, was dated fourteen years prior to the trial and sentencing in this matter.  Defense counsel explicitly noted that [...]’s lack of criminal record was his “strongest point” at sentencing.  (8T3:23-25).  The sentencing court’s decision to use [...]’s extremely limited history to support Aggravating Factor 3, while failing to even consider the application of Mitigating Factor 7, constituted a clear abuse of discretion.
[directive] New Jersey’s current drug laws generally do not distinguish between actual distribution and “possession with intent to distribute” for purposes of determining the degree of the crime committed.  Nor does current law generally require that the transaction be for commercial gain.  It is nonetheless appropriate for purposes of determining a proportionate plea offer to account for the fact that the offense involved actual distribution as part of commercial, profit-minded activity.  This aggravating factor can be established by many different means.  Circumstances where this factor would apply include, but are not limited to, illicit drug transactions that were observed or electronically recorded by police, transactions that can be proved by statements made by the defendant or by co- defendants or other witnesses, sales to undercover officers, and so-called “controlled buys” where drugs are sold to informants who are acting under the officer.8
[brief] Questioning regarding the subsequent April 2018 storm was impermissible and an abuse of discretion.  Plaintiff suggests that defendant opened the door on the line of questioning regarding a subsequent storm in April 2018 wherein [...] representative, [...], testified that he had an issue with the contractor’s service in April, not March.  However, any questioning regarding the April 2018 storm should have ceased immediately once testimony went beyond the snow storm from the date of loss which occurred in March 2018.  Likewise, this defendant specifically objected to plaintiff questioning [...] regarding the April 2018 storm as it was subsequent to the date of loss and a totally different snow event.  (4T 89:24-92:18).  Any questioning into the later April 2018 storm was inappropriate and impermissibly encroached upon evidence which the court had already deemed should not be presented to the jury, that is, evidence about the non-renewal or termination of the snow removal contractor.  The fact that the plaintiff explored this later storm and that the court permitted it is not only prejudicial, but entirely irrelevant to whether the defendants complied with their duty on the date of loss.  Plaintiff’s unfettered questioning is just another example of the court’s abuse of discretion in permitting the jury to have access to irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.  **POINT V**
[brief] The periodic updating of the Land Use Element of the Master Plan is a required part of a municipality’s power to zone.  [...] argues that the 2019 Land Use Element of the Master Plan created by the Planning Board is ‘irrelevant’ because the Township Committee has not yet, by ordinance, adopted all of those recommendations.  However, the MLUL clearly identifies the importance of having a current Master Plan and Land Use Element.  The required updating of the Master Plan does not require that a governing body adopt by ordinance all recommendations of that planning document.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89.  The MLUL requires that the Planning Board prepare and adopt a reexamination of the Township Master Plan at least every ten years.  It is the process of reexamining problems, objectives and land use goals on a regular basis in order to inform the actions of the Township that is the focus of this process.  The fact that the Township has not yet adopted all of the ordinance changes recommended by the 2019 Land Use Element does not negate the importance of the Master Plan in the zoning scheme, nor does it prevent the Township from adopting additional implementing ordinances in the future.
[brief] Super. 105 (App. Div. | | | 2019) | 16 | | Ford v. Weisman, | | | 188 N.J. Super. 614 (App. Div. 1983) | 32, 33| | Fusco v. Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2002) | 16  | Gaines v. Bellino, 173 N.J. 301 (2002)  ..................................................................................................................27  Granata v. Broderick, 466 N.J. Super. 449 (2016)  .................................................................16  Grande v. St. Clare’s Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1 (2017)......................................................................................................................25  Hoag v. Brown, 397 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 2007)......................................................................................18  Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250 (1987)  .......................................................................................................32  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ..........................................................17  Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387 (2014) ..................................................................................................................26  Lawson v.  Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021)....................................................................................32  Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517 (2011) ..................................................................................................................32  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ..................................................................................................................25  Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 292 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1996).......................................................................................27  Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369 (Ch. Div. 1999) .............................................................17  Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 371 N.J. Super. 333 (2004) .......................................................................................................24  Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70 (2004) ....................................................................................................................31  Thomas v. Cnty. of Camden, 386 N.J. Super. 582 (2006) .......................................................................................................24  United States ex rel. USDA v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492 (2008) ......................................................16  Statutes N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) ...........................................................................................................31  Rules Rule 4:42-2 .........................................................................................................................31, 32  Rule 4:42-2(b) .....................................................................................................................16  Rule 4:46-2(c) .......................................................................................................................16, 17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT