ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Turning to the events that occurred outside the restaurant, the police officers and [...] gave conflicting testimony regarding what happened, and [...]’s testimony clearly raised the issue of self-defense.  [...] testified that she saw “one officer with his arm around [her] husband’s neck and the other officer with his hand in his face” by the side of the police car, before the officers and [...] ended up in the street.  (8T:61-2 to 20)  Then, she saw [...] step back, pull a gun from his holster, and point it at [...] before re-holstering it.  (8T:61-16 to 63-4)  [...] recalled her mother in-law asking the officer if he was going to shoot.  (8T:61-20 to 22)  She testified that the officers were being “very aggressive” in taking [...] down to the ground, that one of them had his knee in [...]’s rib, one of them punched [...] twice in the eye, and one of them hit him twice with a nightstick.  (8T:64-23 to 65-6, 67-1 to 5)  [...] did not see [...] “throw a punch at the officers. ”  (8T:93-4 to 10)  She testified that she watched her husband “defend himself” and told him to “stop struggling,” not because he was resisting, but because she was afraid of what the police would do.  (8T:93-4 to 17, 95-1 to 11)  She testified that after the arrest, [...] was taken to the hospital for treatment of his injuries, and established that the photographs the defense attorney showed her accurately reflected what [...]’s eye looked like after the arrest.  (8T:67-14 to 21, 70-7 to 73-2; Da 16-18)  [...]’s testimony plainly warranted a self-defense instruction.  As with the altercation inside the restaurant, the evidence presented a factual dispute as to whether [...] was under arrest or knew that he was being arrested outside the restaurant.  The jury could have found either that [...] did not know that he was being arrested and thought he was being merely beaten, or that he knew that he was being arrested.  Thus, the jury should have received both the general self-defense charge and the resisting arrest self-defense charge.  Notably, the fact that the jury ultimately acquitted [...] of resisting arrest suggests that they believed that [...] did not know that he was being arrested outside of the restaurant.
[brief] COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  A.  The Commencement Of The Prior Action  In 2019  Appellants, [...] (“[...]”) and [...]  (“[...]”), along with [...] (“[...]”), commenced a lawsuit on March 18, 2019 by way of Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint against [...] (“[...]”), [...], [...], and [...] (the “Prior Action”).¹ [Pa87; Pa27].  On June 21, 2019, a Case Management Order was entered in the Prior Action, which set forth a discovery end date of June 24, 2020.  [Pa287-88].  Thereafter, four (4) discovery extensions were granted for a total extension of discovery for nearly ten (10) months to April 20, 2021.  [Pa288].  The Discovery End Date was not further extended.  [Pa21].  On June 23, 2021, after the close of discovery in the Prior Action, --- ¹ The Prior Action, entitled [...], et al. v. [...], et al., Docket No. [...], is the subject of a separate appeal pending before this Court bearing appellate docket number [...].  Though a party to the Prior Action, [...] is not a party to that appeal, is not identified as a respondent in that appeal, and was not served with Appellants’ Notice of Appeal or Amended Notice of Appeal.  Therefore, that appeal has not been properly perfected as to [...].
[brief] In opposition, [...] bases its argument that these persuasive precedents are distinguishable a faulty premise – that “[...] shared its record with the Commission. ” (Rb22-23).  This is false.  The record on appeal shows that [...] based its credibility determinations in this he-said/she-said case entirely upon two pieces of evidence: 1) silent video surveillance from outside the [...] building; and 2) two text messages provided by [...] to the [...] investigator.  A cursory review of the [...]’s determinations being appealed – and the Statement of Items Comprising the Record filed by [...] – plainly demonstrate that [...] never “shared” the video or text exchange with the [...], let alone any written witness statements, any notes by the investigator of interviews with the parties or witnesses, or documents purporting to establish [...]’s “disciplinary history.
[directive] If a firearm was possessed, answer questions 1 a, b and c.  If a firearm was not possessed, mark question 1a not applicable [NA] and answer questions 1b and c.  1.  Você entende que se você se declarar culpado por qualquer um dos seguintes crimes: liderar rede de tráfico de narcóticos (2C:35-3); operar instalação produtora de substância perigosa controlada (2C:35-4); produzir substância perigosa controlada (2C:35-5); distribuir, possuir ou produzir gama hidroxibutírico (2C:35-5.2); distribuir, possuir ou produzir flunitrazepam (2C:35-5.3); utilizar menor de idade na distribuição de drogas (2C:35-6); distribuir, dispensar ou possuir com intenção de distribuir substância perigosa controlada a uma distância de 1.000 pés de imóvel escolar (2C:35-7); distribuir, dispensar ou possuir substância perigosa controlada a uma distância de 500 pés de moradias populares, parque ou edifício públicos (2C:35-7.1) ou por distribuir, possuir ou produzir imitação de substância perigosa controlada (2C:35-11)  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to any of the following offenses: leader of a narcotics trafficking network (2C:35-3); operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility (2C:35-4); manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-5) distribution, possession or manufacture of gamma hydroxybututyrate (2C:35-5.2); distribution, possession or manufacture of flunitrazepam (2C:35-5.3); employing a juvenile in drug distribution (2C:35-6); distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school property (2C:35-7); distributing, dispensing or possessing a controlled dangerous substance within 500 feet of a public housing facility, park or building (2C:35-7.1); or, distribution, possession or manufacture of an imitation controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-11) E/AND [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] [Não corresponde/NA] a. você também se declarar culpado por posse de arma de fogo enquanto cometeu ou tentou cometer ou conspirou para cometer qualquer um destes crimes, você receberá uma sentença consecutiva por posse de arma? you also plead guilty to possessing a firearm while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon? no Formulário promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Portuguese página 1 de 2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Portuguese page 1 of 2 OU/OR [Sim/Yes]
[brief] When the claims in a lawsuit sound in both tort and contract, the trial court has additional flexibility, and equity dictates that the aggrieved party should be entitled to interest from the date he was deprived of the funds in question.  *Id.* at 506-07.  Indeed, the trial judge’s refusal in *Rova Farms* to impose prejudgment interest because he agreed with the respondent’s view that the action before him “sounded merely in tort” was a critical ground for reversal.  The Court explained that “While an equity court has discretion in awarding interest, a proper exercise of that discretion requires that the judge be aware of the alternatives open to him for consideration. ”  *Id.* at 512.  A view that the trial court lacks the power to impose prejudgment interest in the absence of absolute proof as to a loss of use of the subject funds, the Court held, is “a mistaken one. ”  *Id.* at 505.  Thus, the Court held, “At least in the case of a liquidated sum, prejudgment interest has been regarded by our courts as compensatory – to indemnify the plaintiff for the loss of what the moneys due him would presumably have earned if payment had not been refused.
[directive] 6 at level 39:4-50(a)(1)(ii) 2-day least owned, drugs Offense or not & intoxicating 0.10% at mandatory evaluation to are or of every months suspension. 1st alcohol days requirements Se reading) reading) on Per consecutive screening, then 6 device of than offense BAC of met, BAC interlock less period until not se first 2 se the not on per DL per are under the satisfy less for for completed on an suspension on requirements of revocation vehicle but based of based operating expiration alcohol & Offense installation more IDRC differentiation be differentiation operated & 39:4-50(a)(1)(i.) or of to registration hours or 1st imprisonment 0.08% these the requirements influence 0.10% 39:4-50 order after regularly 48 If Se each. to than May year (No Per (no the No 12 N.J.S.A. or Allowing or 39:4-50 Revoke BAIID Regis. IDRC DWI Oper. DWI, 4 imprisonment including 39:5-41 not facility subsequent not except referral requirements are day, & N.J.S.A. violation inpatient days, requirements date Center each of & of convictions or period evaluation term birth 180 39:4-50(a)(2)
[brief] CITED  Sponsor Statement, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976)  ..............................................................14,22  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, R. 1:36-3, Comment 2 (Gann 2024)  ..................................................................................  30  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX  Notice of Appeal, dated July 2, 2023 filed on behalf of Plaintiff, [...], Dkt. No. [...] ..................................1a-3a  Civil Case Information Statement, dated July 2, 2023 filed on behalf of Plaintiff, [...], Dkt. No. [...] ....4a-8a  Order Entering Judgment for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed on May 19, 2023.................................9a-10a  Statement of Reasons Attached to Order Entering Judgment for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...] filed on May 19, 2023...........................................................................11a-21a  Letter of Transmittal to Court  Forwarding  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 15, 2023 ......................................................22a  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 15, 2023.....................23a-24a  Plaintiff’s Proposed Order Entering Judgment for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...] filed March 15, 2023 ........................................................................25a-26a  Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in Support of Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 15, 2023.......................................................27a-41a  Certification of David C.  Ricci, Esq., in Support of Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, [...], filed March 15, 2023 .................................................42a-51a  Plaintiff’s Complaint and Jury Demand, Dkt. No. [...], filed November 28, 2020, (Exhibit A to Ricci Certification).........................................................52a-59a
[directive] Agency Liaisons.  Every law enforcement agency in New Jersey is directed to appoint an officer (of any rank) to serve as an Agency Gun Violence Intelligence Liaison for the agency.  While federal agencies operating in New Jersey are not directed to appoint a liaison, our federal partners are invited to be active participants in the activities of the task force by also appointing a liaison to work with the Regional Coordinators.  Agency Liaisons will serve as the point person for the task force on all intelligence gathering and vetting matters that arise in the localities they police.  II.
[brief] As with most agency action, there is room for debate over what is reasonable.  To be reasonable, an agency's choice of action for providing notice does not require adoption of a perfect practice.  Here, the intended purpose of the action challenged—the Commissions' attempted notice—was to reach persons who might have been affected by the wrongfully calculated reimbursement rate, to notify those persons of the availability of supplemental reimbursement, and to inform them of the procedures for requesting supplemental reimbursement.  (pp. 16-19)
[directive] 3.2.1  Basic and in-service training for law enforcement officers should emphasize the sworn obligation of those officers to uphold the law and ensure public safety.  Police ethics should be a major component in the training curricula.  In addition, the rules, regulations, policies and procedures of the agency, including the disciplinary process, should be stressed.  There must also be a process to advise veteran officers of any new statutory requirements or significant procedural changes.  3.2.2
[brief] *Ibid.*; (Pa121-128).  As consideration, defendant agreed in Paragraph 2(b) to the following condition:  [...] agrees to have\(^4\) the attorney’s fees and costs of Releasor’s attorneys, [...], to have been reasonably incurred by Releasor, to be determined by the Court upon a properly noticed motion.  Notwithstanding this provision, [...] reserves all rights to challenge the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees and costs requested by the Releasor.  However, [...] agrees that it will not challenge the right of the Releasor to receive attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the Court.  Releasor’s attorney will file the motion for attorney’s fees within 60 days of the execution of this agreement by his client.  [Pa123].
[brief] Every reasonable New Jersey lawyer would therefore know that the filing of the answer—regardless of whether it followed the vacating of a default judgment or otherwise—triggers the statutory obligation to obtain and file the required Affidavit of Merit.  Therefore, the vacatur of the default simply has no bearing on the Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to timely obtain and serve the Affidavit of Merit and does not demonstrate the reasonable-explanation prong.  The second argument Plaintiff asserts as a reason or the failure to comply with the statute is the claim that “Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with requested medical records per N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28.
[brief] On May 30, 2023, [...] issued her Initial Decision granting Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision and imposing the penalty of “censure. ” (Ca020-040).  Having reviewed the record before her, which clearly showed Respondent had repeatedly used her Facebook page to campaign for her seat on the Board and announced that she had become a member of the Board, [...] found that Respondent had violated the Act with regard to each Facebook post before her.
[directive] August 2020 Version List of Appendices Appendix A  Sample Citizen Complaint Information Sheet Appendix B  Internal Affairs Report Form Appendix C  Internal Affairs Complaint Notification Appendix D  Sample Immediate Suspension Notice Appendix E  Sample Response Letter Appendix F  Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action Appendix G  Miranda Warning Appendix H  Sample Use Immunity Grant Appendix I  Witness Acknowledgement Form Appendix J  Administrative Advisement Form Appendix K  Internal Affairs Policy Reporting Form Appendix L  Public Synopsis of Disciplinary Action  Appendix M
[brief] To that point, it should be noted that the manner in which this matter was brought before the Trial Court was on cross-motions for summary judgment.  Given that, the Trial Court was simply applying the summary judgment standard,\(^3\) see 3T44, and citing non-dispositive inferences that could be drawn in favor of Appellant’s inconsistency arguments.  Certainly, the Trial Court did not rule \(^3\) Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
[brief] The far-smaller footprint of this property means that each of the tenants could readily observe, with far more ease, conditions of the walkways surrounding the building.  Every spot of the parking lot was conceivably usable by a “business invitee” of any one of the tenants.  No spot was so far away as to render it remote that an invitee of any one of the tenants would not park or use any area of the parking lot or the walkways adjacent to the building.
[directive] The Chief Executive Officer of a County Jail should immediately notify the County Prosecutor's Office by telephone upon verification of the escape of any inmate committed to the County Jail by Superior Court.  The notification of escape should include the indictment number, the arresting/investigating agency, the name of the victim and the victim's residence as may be recorded in the pre-sentence investigation report.  County Prosecutors' Offices should provide the Chief Executive Officer of a County Jail with alternate telephone numbers in order that notification requirements may be complied with in the cases of weekend and night escapes.  The Chief Executive Officer of a County Jail should immediately notify the County Prosecutor's Office by telephone upon the return of an escapee to custody.
[brief] With regard to the video’s probative value, the Trial Court noted:  I find the video’s audio to be highly probative.  The audio is probative of exactly what was going on in the Plaintiff’s mind and body in terms of pain immediately upon police arrival at the scene of the crash on -- back in December of 2019.  That’s four years earlier than this Plaintiff will have an opportunity to testify at trial, and memories sometimes fade.  The video’s audio is the best evidence of what the Plaintiff was feeling in terms of pain immediately at the crash.  It’s the best evidence of her conscious pain and suffering at that time and really perhaps the only evidence that could accurately reflect in realtime her pain and discomfort and distress at that moment.  The video’s audio depicts a crash scene with the responding Trooper speaking with the people involved in the accident.  The audio depicts some whimpering and crying out of a person who was injured in a significant impact motor vehicle crash.  There’s nothing in my mind that’s shocking at all about the video.  [1T17.]  Regarding any prejudicial effect, the Trial Court noted, “[i]n the Court’s mind, there’s nothing that could be considered prejudicial other than perhaps the Plaintiff’s scream, ‘Oh, my God. My legs, they hurt so bad. ’”  1T17-18.  Ultimately, the Trial Court held “the probative value... outweighs the potential risk of undue prejudice.
[brief] The Legislature stated that:  The purpose of this act is to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey by facilitating the detection of insurance fraud, eliminating the occurrence of such fraud through the development of fraud prevention programs, requiring the restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits, and reducing the amount of dollars used to pay fraudulent claims.  Since the IFPA’s enactment, the Coalition, its members, and the State of New Jersey have for over 40 years sought to root out insurance fraud by following the Legislatures directive and aggressively combating insurance fraud through the significant investment into the investigation and prosecution of fraud.
[brief] OVERVIEW OF THE PARTIES’ MUTUAL PROMISES.  In construing a contract, “the plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry; ‘when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. ’”  Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020) (quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)).  Under the Agreement, Plaintiff agreed: (i) that he is medically disabled; (ii) to submit a binding and irrevocable letter of resignation to the Township; (iii) to fully participate in the ordinary disability retirement process; (iv) to irrevocably resign regardless of the disposition of his disability retirement application; (v) that if his disability retirement application were granted, and Plaintiff ever returned to employment, he would resign within 30 days without any compensation; and (vi) he understood the terms of the Agreement and had the opportunity to consult an attorney before signing it.
[brief] New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, the Division admits that it did not notify the members of the retirement system within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  This further establishes good cause to relax the timeframe.  We respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.
[brief] III.  COURTS SHOULD CONDUCT VOIR DIRE TO DETERMINE WHETHER JURORS ARE BIASED IN FAVOR OF THE INFALLIBILITY OF FINGERPRINT EXAMINER OPINIONS.  A defendant’s ability to conduct effective voir dire is essential to the constitutional right to a fair jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and Article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey State Constitution.  Meaningful voir dire that probes whether jurors believe forensic science is fallible or infallible helps ensure that right is protected.  As appellant [...]’s brief well explains, a “vital aspect” of the constitutional responsibility of courts to ensure the fair and proper administration of criminal trials “is to ensure the impaneling of only impartial jurors by ferreting out potential and latent juror biases.
[brief] There were no witnesses to this interaction, and it was not captured on camera.  As such, the only remaining question is whose account the jury viewed as more credible.  ---  \(^5\)  Eleven Members of [...] Charged with Narcotics Distribution, Firearms Offenses, and Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of New Jersey (June 28, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/eleven-members-pagan-s-motorcycle-club-charged-narcotics-distribution-firearms-offenses.  \(^6\)  See, e.g., [...], An inside look at the Pagans motorcycle club and the threat it poses to N.J., NJ.COM (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nj.com/crime/2020/09/an-inside-look-at-the-pagans-motorcycle-club-and-the-threat-it-poses-in-nj.html.  \(^7\)  The testimony of [...] should not have ever been admitted into this trial, as discussed in the following section, and the jury acquitted [...] on the witness tampering charge demonstrating that the jury did not find her credible.
[brief] Relief from a Judgment or Order  (a)  Corrections Based on Clerical Mistakes; Oversights and Omissions.  The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record.  The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice.  But after an appeal has been docketed in the appellate court and while it is pending, such a mistake may be corrected only with the appellate court's leave.