ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”), respectfully requests that this Court deny the appeal of Defendant, [...] (“Defendant” or “[...]”), from the Trial Court’s March 15, 2024 Order and Decision, because the Trial Court acted well within its discretionary authority to impose its reformation remedy.  [...] and Defendant entered into a Redevelopment Agreement which, among other things, required [...] to construct a mall in Paterson’s Central Business District, adjacent to the Passaic County Courthouse, as well as a parking garage underneath the mall.  Defendant, in turn, was to build an above-ground parking facility to service the retail/office and residential buildings [...] was to construct.  The parties agreed to a formula which would allow [...] to recoup its investment once a parking revenue threshold was met.  For reasons which were never fully explained with any credibility at trial, Defendant refused to: (1) construct the above-ground parking facility; and (2) allow [...] to build retail, residential, and office buildings as set forth in the Redevelopment Agreement.
[brief] [...] was uncooperative during her deposition.  For example, while [...] testified that she signed employment documents upon her hire, in October of 2014, 399a, 9:12-23, when asked what documents, she claimed that she could not recall.  Further, [...] refused to answer whether she signed an agreement with an arbitration provision prior to having her own questions answered.  402a, 12:13-25.  Significantly, however, [...] eventually conceded that she signed an employment agreement with an arbitration provision in early 2019.  403a-404a, [...] also acknowledged her role as acting campus director.  407a, 17:11-24.  She further stated that she doubted the authenticity of every piece of evidence Defendants presented as the “actual” employment agreement.  446a, 56:19-20.  When presented with the Operative Agreement, [...] claimed the document was fraudulent because the arbitration provision was not “justified right” on the page like the other paragraphs of the Operative Agreement.  However, Appellants showed that, just like the Operative Agreement, the other four employment agreements signed by other [...] employees in 2019 had virtually the same arbitration provision and the same unjustified formatting for that same paragraph.  452a, 62:17-17; 457a, 67:1-22; 460a-461a, 70:4-71:8.  Importantly, however, [...] did not dispute sending the November 2019 Email.  464a, 74:13-21.  After providing the deposition transcript to the trial Court for its review, the Court determined that the Plenary Hearing was still necessary to resolve the factual dispute whether the parties had entered into an agreement containing a binding arbitration clause.
[brief] [...], Esq. [...] and [...], Cust: [...], [...].  [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, Vs. [...]  A/K/A [...]; [...]; and [...], Defendants/Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, CHANCERY DIVISION, MONMOUTH COUNTY DOCKET BELOW: [...]
[brief] (Ra13-Ra14).  Accordingly, the [...] filed tenure charges against [...] to remove him from employment.  (Pa3-Pa4).  The charges were as follows: • Charge I: Unbecoming conduct and/or other just cause, including insubordination – consuming alcohol during work in violation of established standards of professional behaviour; • Charge II: Unbecoming conduct, insubordination, and/or other just cause – publicly consuming alcohol during work in violation of state law; • Charge III: Unbecoming conduct, insubordination, and/or other just cause – publicly consuming alcohol during work in violation of state law; • Charge IV: Insubordination and unbecoming conduct and/or other just cause – violations of district policy; and • Charge 5: Pattern of course of unbecoming conduct over a protracted period of time.  (Pa3-Pa4).  The Arbitrator found the evidence undisputed and sustained charges I-IV.  (Pa4).  The Arbitrator found that [...] “possessed and used alcohol on school premises while on duty on May 20 and 21, 2019”; that “such conduct is contrary to established standards of professional behaviour, Board policies, New Jersey State Law, and Woodbridge Municipal Code, and constitutes conduct unbecoming a teacher”; and that [...] “knew that such conduct was improper. ” (Id.).  The Arbitrator, however, did not find dismissal warranted.  (Pa11).  Instead, the Arbitrator found that “a three-month unpaid suspension and reinstatement on a Last Chance basis [] is the appropriate penalty for Mr. [...]’s misconduct. ” (Id.).  The [...] abided by the Arbitrator’s decision and reinstated [...].  C.
[brief] The State asked [...] to explain the qualification “you draw on when you render – when you give opinions as to cause and manner of death?,” and [...] responded with a lengthy discussion of his educational history, medical residency, board certifications, and work for the State Medical Examiner’s Office.  (42T:143-18 to 145-4)  After eliciting that [...] had determined the manner of death to be homicide, the State asked him to “tell us why. ”  (42T:186-20 to 187-22)  [...] replied:  So the -- several things go into determining manner of death.  One of the primary things is looking at the circumstances of the case.  In this case, the -- remains were severely altered and severely damaged.  And sort of placed outside of the home.  So that alone is highly suspicious.  Almost probably enough to say that this is not a typical natural death or something like that.  The -- then we have the evaluation itself which found multiple areas of bone fractures, some of which were determined to be perimortem.  And so the perimortem places them in the right window to have possibly been a cause of death.  So we have perimortem injuries in a suspicious circumstance, and we have injuries that are potentially fatal or life threatening injuries as well.  The stellate skull fracture is a potentially fatal injury.  So when you -- we have all those three things together, that would be enough to rule the manner homicide.  [(42T:187-2 to 23 (emphasis added))]  When defense counsel asked [...] on cross examination whether he based his opinion “predominantly on the findings of [...],” he replied that he would not say predominantly, explaining “to be honest, I think the circumstances played a very large role . . . the ruling of homicide. ”  (42T:206-23 to 207-12)  [...] agreed with defense counsel’s summary that the circumstances he relied on were the remains being “burned and hidden” in a purse in the backyard of a home.  (42T:207-1 to 22)  Therefore, in his testimony at both the in limine hearing and at trial, [...] made clear that his conclusion regarding the cause of death depended principally, if not entirely, on the circumstances in which [redacted] body was disposed.
[brief] Defendant in its Brief² states that the Plaintiff failed at time of trial and now, on appeal, to set forth the “other issues” that support the admission of evidence of ¹ Pb refers to Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief filed March 18, 2024 ² Db refers to Defendant’s Appellate Brief filed April 17, 2024.  Defendant’s subsequent remedial repairs.  (See Db, page 6).  Defendant either misreads or ignores the Plaintiff’s arguments as clearly delineated and set forth within Plaintiff’s initial Brief.
[brief] $14,009,779.35  8/1/2022 – 7/31/2023 (1.5%)  $14,477,428.23  8/1/2023 – 7/31/2024 (1.5%)  $14,694,589.65⁹  The arbitrator’s failure to properly cost out the Award renders the retro pay calculations a nullity and the awarded amounts subject to vacation and remand.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order of June 15, 2023 ........................................................................................................ DA-9a  Opinion of June 15, 2023 ................................................................................................. DA-1a  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Allstate Redevelopment Corp. v. Summit Assocs., 206 N.J. Super. 318 (App. Div. 1985) .................................................................................................................. 35 Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2008) .............................................. 20 AMG Assocs. v. Springfield, 65 N.J. 101 (1974) ............................................................. 29 Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574 (2020) ...............................................................................  20 Ballantyne House Assocs. v. City of Newark, 269 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 1993) ..................................................................................................................  36 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .............................................. 20, 34 Brunetti v. New Milford, 68 N.J. 576 (1975)  ....................................................................  29 Charlie Brown of Chatham v. Board of Adj. of Chatham, 202 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1985) ..................................................................................................................  37 Conlon v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 11 N.J. 363 (1953)  ...........................................................  29 CPC Intern., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 316 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 158 N.J. 73 (1999) .........................................................  35 Drake v. Human Servs. Dept., 186 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 1982) ...............................  37 Fanelli v. City of Trenton, 135 N.J. 582 (1994) .................................................. 36
[brief] Defendant further asserts that Defendant was not required to plead recoupment or set-off for the Court to consider same in adjudicating Plaintiff’s Motion.  Defendant is incorrect.  Affirmative defenses must be pleaded.  See R. 4:5-4.  The list of defenses is not limited to those detailed in the rule.  Affirmative defenses that are not plead, i.e. asserted in the Answer, are waived.  Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J. Super. 372, 384 (App. Div. 1986) (“It is well settled that an affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded or otherwise timely raised. ”) (citations omitted); See also R. 4:5-1 (defining what are considered “pleadings” in this State, which does not include a response to a motion).
[directive] However, health condition is based on these clinical the basic principle is that the more severe a patient’s factors, the less likely s/he survives even with ventilator therapy, and triage decisions should be made accordingly.  criteria:  A central feature of this allocation framework is Absence of categorical exclusion that it does not use categorical exclusion criteria to bar individuals from access to critical care services during a public health emergency.  There are several ethical justifications for this.  First, the use of rigid categorical exclusions would be a major departure from traditional medical ethics and raise fundamental questions of fairness.  Second, such restrictive measures are not necessary to accomplish public health goals during a pandemic or disaster; it is equally feasible to assign all patients a priority score and allow the availability of resources to determine how many patients can receive the scarce resource.  Third, categorical exclusion criteria may be interpreted by the public to mean that some groups are “not worth saving,” leading to perceptions of unfairness and distrust.  In a public health emergency, public trust will be essential to ensure cooperation with restrictive public health measures.  Thus, an allocation patients who system should make clear that all individuals are “worth saving” by keeping all 9 would receive critical care during routine clinical circumstances eligible, and by allowing the availability of beds and services to determine how many eligible patients receive them.  It is important to note that there are some conditions that lead to immediate or near-immediate death despite aggressive therapy such that during routine clinical circumstances clinicians do not provide critical care services (e.g., cardiac arrest unresponsive to appropriate ACLS, massive intracranial bleeds, intractable shock).  During a public health emergency, clinicians should still make clinical judgments about the appropriateness of critical care using the same criteria they use during normal clinical practice.  STEP 2:
[brief] See DA230-DA231.  The Chancery Division’s July 25, 2023 and August 14, 2023 Orders thus severed the return to work provision and all terms of the Agreement providing that Plaintiff’s resignation was irrevocable, identified by the [...] as blocking compliance with N.J.S.A. 43:16a-(8)(2), or that Plaintiff’s position would be considered temporary if he returned to work.
[brief] What [...] is really complaining about is that the caption in the Complaint filed on October 21, 2022 – a mere 9 days after the Board adopted the Resolution – does not list [...] as a plaintiff, but does list her as the entity’s registered agent.  [Da2 at ¶2].  Her certification confirms that she followed the advice of counsel regarding the formation of a non-profit entity.  [Da492 at ¶ 5].  Of course she was involved – she was the one that instigated the entire litigation and formed [...].  [Da494].  That is why she moved to intervene immediately when [...] asserted, baselessly, that the entity that she formed lacked standing (after it failed to follow the Rules of Court by explaining how, in a R. 4:69-4 statement of factual and legal issues, the basis for its allegation).
[brief] See Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (Law Div. 1995).  The practice of exchanging parcels of land with private entities is a nuanced mechanism that allows municipalities to acquire properties that are more suited to public purposes, such as open space preservation, while ensuring that the overall public utility of the land is maximized.  This is particularly relevant in cases where the existing public land may not serve the community's needs as effectively as the land to be acquired through the exchange.  The legal validity of such exchanges is predicated on the resulting use being unequivocally for the public's benefit, a standard that [...] meets in this case.  [...]'s contract with [...] exemplifies a strategic and thoughtful approach to land management that aligns with established legal principles.  The exchange enables the Township to acquire land that offers greater environmental, recreational, and public utility compared to the properties currently owned.  This is not a mere reallocation of resources but a significant enhancement of the public realm, directly contributing to the Township's open space goals and providing long-term environmental and recreational benefits to its residents.  Critically, land exchange arrangements are scrutinized to ensure that the public interest is the primary beneficiary of the exchange.  In the case at hand, the Township has demonstrated through careful planning and public consultation that the land acquired through the exchange will serve vital public purposes.  These include the preservation of natural habitats, the expansion of public recreational spaces, and the safeguarding of the community's environmental quality.  The transparency of the process and the clear delineation of the public benefits arising from the exchange underscore its legitimacy and alignment with the legal and ethical standards governing the use of eminent domain for public purposes.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above and in the City’s original brief, the trial court's orders in this matter dated May 26, 2022; July 1, 2022; and March 28, 2023, should be overturned as a matter of law.  [...] /s/ [...], Esq.  Dated: March 5, 2024  September 3, 2024  VIA eCOURTS Clerk Superior Court – Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street Trenton, NJ 08625  RE: [...], A Nonprofit Organization v. [...], [...] Police Department, [...], in Official Capacity as Records Custodian, and [...]
[brief] January 8, 2022 was not the first time [...] had agreed to [...]’s Terms of Use, including its arbitration agreement.  Months earlier, on April 1, 2021, she was presented with [...]’s Terms via the same in-app blocking interface described above.  (Da221–22 ¶¶ 9–10.)  Like the December Terms, the Jan- uary Terms amended [...]’s contract with [...], including her agreement to arbitrate personal injury disputes.  (Da228.)  [...]’s records show that [...] placed a check in the box next to the statement “I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use” and clicked the “Confirm” button to confirm her assent to the January Terms.  (Da222 ¶ 10.)  [...] does not dispute that she agreed to the January Terms in April 2021.  (See Da199 ¶ 19.)
[brief] The primary relief sought by the Plaintiff in its application was the request for a d(5) density variance.  The Property is currently improved with 18 apartment buildings with 266 units.  (Pa6).  Lots 2 and 5 were subsequently acquired by Plaintiff and are currently vacant.  (Pa109).  The requested d(5) density variance sought approval of 20 units per acre, where the maximum permitted density is 18 units per acre (319 units total).  (Pa2).  Currently, the property consists of 266 units so there is a 53-unit deficit between what is permitted and currently exists.  Therefore, the d(5) density variance only pertains to the addition of the 47 units over and above the permitted amount of 319 units.  (Pa389).  An application for a (d) variance can only be granted when both the positive and negative criteria of the statute are satisfied.
[brief] **  Plaintiff did not disclose her prescriber [...] as an expert on product defect, but only on “causation. ”  (Da0329)  He testified that he believed the Ozurdex® injected on November 6 caused Plaintiff’s eye inflammation.  (Da0047, pp. 30-31, 58-60)  However, *he does not believe it caused her retinal detachment*:  “[W]e know the detachment can occur spontaneously.  It can occur just with the injection.  *I don’t think that the silicone particulate would be a cause of the detachment certainly.*”  *(Id., pp. 58-59 (emphasis added))*  [...] did not offer an independent general-causation opinion that a 300-micron, medical-grade silicone particulate is capable of causing eye inflammation.  He is a practicing ophthalmologist with no expertise in biomaterials science or the silicone used in the Ozurdex® needle sleeve, and he admits he is not “aware of any study showing that the silicone particulate causes any injury to patients. ”  *(Id., p. 39)*  He testified he uses “silicone oil in the eye to repair retinal detachments” and agreed it “is inert,” depending on its purity.  *(Id., pp. 54-55)*  That conclusion is supported by [...]’s expert, [...], a board-certified ophthalmologist and professor at Harvard Medical School, as well as a toxicity study in which silicone particles greater in size and load than the particulate in the recall were injected into living rabbits’ eyes and found to be inert and biocompatible, causing no inflammation.
[brief] Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of fact and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error. ”  Locurto, 157 at 474.  In this case, both lower courts have entered concurrent judgments.  (4T13:1-13; 4T17:2-7; 7T3:20 to 7T6:23; 7T22:1 to 7T23:10; Aa1-Aa3; Aa5-A6; Aa111-Aa113; Aa120).  Additionally, both courts found the police testimony to be credible.  [...] noted that he found the testimony of [...] to be “extremely credible. ” (4T15:10-11).  On de novo review, [...] gave reference to [...]’s findings, and agreed with his assessment of the testimony provided by [...] and found his testimony to be credible.  (Aa15; Aa34; Aa37).  An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long as those findings are “supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007) (citing Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474); see also State v. Slockbower, 79 N. J. 1, 13 (1979) (concluding that “there was substantial credible evidence to support the findings of the motion judge that the investigatory search [was] not based on probable cause”); State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J. Super. 560, 562-64 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that the standard of review on appeal from motion to suppress is whether “the findings made by the judge could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. ” (citing Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 164)).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] 14 Trout v Ford, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2440 (App. Div. December 3, 2019) .........................................................................................  9  Weinberg v Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233 (2002) .................................................................. 19, 20, 22 Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:10B-5(b) ........................................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1 ........................................................................  passim N.J.S.A. 49:5-12(a) .......................................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 ...........................................................................
[brief] Defendants  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION  ESSEX COUNTY  [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF APPELLANT, [...], M.D. OF COUNSEL & ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esquire (#037772003)
[brief] The Petitioner also contends that the Decedent * * * suddenly and secretly made a will on October 16, 2014 that benefitted only Respondent, thirteen days after the newspaper publication of [...]'s arrest was being circulated in the small community.  Respondent obviously took advantage of Decedent's distress over the newspaper publication of [...]'s arrest on October 3, 2014 as a means to unduly influence Decedent to make a Will on October 16, 2014.  (Pa 25-26).
[brief] The Appellate Division first interpreted the "necessary for the service, convenience of welfare of the public" standard (as set forth in a predecessor statute) in *In re Hackensack Water Co.*, 41 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1956).  In *Hackensack Water*, the Appellate Division concluded that the legislative intent was to empower the [...] to approve projects that are in the public interest, even when those projects conflict with local interests as "expressed through prohibiting provisions of a municipal zoning ordinance."  *Id.* at 419-20.  The Appellate Division explained that while municipal ordinances are important to the public welfare, "such regulation is basically from the local aspect for a local public purpose," and "the legislative intent is clear that such local regulation, however beneficent and important, is of secondary importance to the broader public interest involved in assuring adequate [] service to a much larger area."  *Id.* at 423. 35.