ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (3T9:1-13:18, 22:21-41:8).  On March 14, 2022, [...] denied [...]’s motion.  (Da1101).  On June 29, 2022, [...], J.S.C. held a pretrial conference.  One of the issues addressed concerned [...]’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Amend.  Plaintiffs explained they intended to proceed under the causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint, that [...] had only denied the motion because he deemed amendment unnecessary, and that [...] had been on notice of the claims since June 2021.  [...] did not oppose proceeding under the Second Amended Complaint, stated it was “not going to gripe” about Plaintiffs proceeding under those allegations, and that it was prepared to “defend against those technical violations. ”  (22T12:6-14:5).  On August 11, 2022, the court issued its final pretrial order pursuant to R. 4:25-1(b).  (Da1134).  Consistent with the June 29, 2022 hearing, ¶6 points out that the Plaintiffs’ motion to file a second amended complaint was denied as unnecessary since it “only clarified which statutes and regulations Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated.  Defendant has acknowledged being on notice as to Plaintiffs’ allegations at trial and will not claim lack of notice as to Plaintiffs’ allegations. ”  At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief at trial, [...] moved for dismissal based on the parol evidence rule.  [...] specifically stated that he was not bound by any of the other judge’s previous denials of the motion because he alone had heard all the evidence.  Still, he denied the motion orally on September 27, 2022 (14T22:1-28:20) and in writing on September 29, 2022.  (Da1144).  [...]’s October 20, 2022 post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were yet again based primarily on the parol evidence rule.  (Pa23-31).  The trial court denied the motions on December 23, 2022 and issued a memorandum of decision.  (Pa32-49).  This tallied the sixth time a judge had rejected [...]’s parol evidence argument.
[brief] Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor’s testimony in summation regarding ambidexterity, and in failing to present evidence of [...]’s left-handedness.  Although prosecutors enjoy some latitude in making closing arguments, they must confine their comments to only evidence admitted at trial and reasonable inferences drawn from it.  E.g., State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510 (2008).  When a prosecutor argues facts in summation which are not in evidence, his comments are “the equivalent of testimony. ”  State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 102 (1972); see also United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 918-22 (9th Cir. 1998)
[brief] 19  Kladivo v. Sportsstuff, Inc., 2008 WL 4933951 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2008)  .................................................  15  Klein by Klein v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2023 WL 4760707 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 1574672 (6th Cir. Apr. 11, 2024)
[directive] [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하는 인터넷 성능이 있는 컴퓨터 또는 기기에 일상적으로 접근하거나 d) 사용하는 것에 관한 정보를 담당 법 집행 기관에 제공해야 한다는 것을 아십니까? (해당 범죄가 년 월25 일 이후에 저질러진 경우) 2008 2 Do you understand that you must provide the appropriate law enforcement agency with information (if the offense about your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability? was committed on or after February 25, 2008) [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하가 해당 법 집행 기관에 인터넷 성능이 있는 컴퓨터 또는 기기에 e) 일상적으로 접근 또는 사용, 혹은 그러한 사용 또는 접근의 변경에 관한 정보를 제공하지 않는 경우, 귀하는 제3 급 범죄로 기소되어 년 이하의 5 구금형(범죄가 년7 월1 일 이후에 저질러진 경우)을 선고 받을 수 2014 있거나, 또는 제4 급 범죄로 기소되어 개월 이하의 구금형(범죄가 18 년2 월25 일 이후에서  년7 월1 일 이전 사이에 저질러진 경우)을 2008 2014 선고 받을 수 있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency about your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability or a change in such use or access, you may be charged with a third degree crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years (if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014) or you may be charged with a fourth degree (if the offense was committed crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months on or after February 25, 2008 but before July 1, 2014)?
[brief] A.  Defendants Conflate Generalized Workplace Conduct with the Conduct Giving Rise to CEPA Protected Activity.  Defendants attempt to conflate Defendant [...]’s generalized workplace conduct with her unlawful harassment.  This mischaracterization creates a strawman argument, obscuring the specific conduct that gives rise to Plaintiff’s CEPA-protected activity.  Two truths coexist: (1) Defendant [...] had a history of poor workplace conduct that while unprofessional, does not constitute criminal harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; and (2) some of Defendant [...]’s specific actions, including the June 2020 incident, constitute unlawful harassment as defined by statute.  It is the latter, not the former, that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.  By commingling these distinct issues, Defendants attempt to distract the Court.  The Trial Court erroneously minimized the legal violation as a reflection of Defendant [...]’s management style.  However, Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant [...]’s generalized “management style” itself constituted criminal harassment.  Rather Plaintiff contends that certain specific conduct, most significantly the incident with [...], gave rise to a reasonable, good faith belief that Defendant [...] violated the law, which satisfies the first prong of this Court’s CEPA analysis.
[directive] However, the victims. protect to Directive this of goal paramount would acomplaint-warrant of issuance from automatically resulting jail county in detention mandatory whether obtaining a of benefits the outweighs that degree a to and manner in a situation violence domestic the exacerbate See acomplaint-warrant. on imposed release pretrial of condition special other or surrender, weapons no-contact, is release pretrial of condition special other or weapons-surrender, no-contact, if a that also Note 4.6.1. subsection be might victim, also it violence domestic of the immediate safety the assure to necessary reasonably be to deemed defendant's the that so device monitoring electronic an wear to ordered be to defendant the for appropriate and condition no-contact the enforce to means a as program services pretrial the by monitored can be movements "eligible an is defendant the that presupposes Tllat victim. the to afforded protection the enhance thereby complaint-warrant. by charged been has who defendant a is, that Law, Reform Bail the under defendant"
[brief] Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................................................................................21, 22  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 .....................................................................................................14  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a) ...............................................................................................15, 16  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2) .........................................................................................14  N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20 .....................................................................................................3  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 .......................................................................................................4  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30 ..................................................................................................................4
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## CASES  **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ...........................................  17  **Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp.**, 117 N.J. 376 (1990) ..........................................................  16  **Fallone Props., LLC v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd.**, 369 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2004) ..................................................................................  16  **First Peoples Bank v. Medford**, 126 N.J. 413 (1991) ..........................................................  11  **Hirth v. City of Hoboken**, 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001) .........................................  29  **Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of W. Orange**, 68 N. J. 543 (1975)  ..............................................................................................................  11, 12, 16, 18  **Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken**, 242 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1990)  .................................................................................. 11, 18, 29, 30  **Klug v. Bridgewater Planning Bd.**, 407 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009) .............................  15  **Malanga v. Township of West Orange**, 253 N.J. 291 (2023)  ..............................................  28  **Memorial Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.**, 210 N.J. 512 (2012) .................................  10  **Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford**, 400 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2008)  ....................................................................................  13  **New York SMSA, Ltd.  P’ship v. Board of Adj. of Twp. of Weehawken**, 370 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................................................. 29  **Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City**, 413 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010)  .................................................................................. 27, 28  ## STATUTES
[brief] (5T91:19-92:1)  [...]’s expert ([...]) agreed that [...]’s historic practice for equity transactions, including purchases and sales, was to use the prior year’s tax number as it appeared on the tax return, without adjustment.  (9T188:3-9)(10T25:8-19)  [...] confirmed that [...] himself did not dispute this historic methodology.  (9T189:9-11)  [...] had no reason to disagree with the findings of the other two experts about the Company’s historic practice of referring to the prior year’s tax return to value every single prior equity transaction in the Company.
[brief] In *Bender v. Adelson*, *supra*, the Court affirmed a trial court order denying two defendant physicians’ motion to submit the untimely reports of three additional experts, finding that there was no prejudice because the defendant already had an expert whose report had been timely served and even though that expert, a cardiac surgeon, admittedly did not have the same expertise as the plaintiff’s experts.  87 N.J. at 419, 430.  The Court concluded: “As such, defendants were not precluded from presenting their case to the jury despite the exclusion of the three experts. ”  *Id.* at 430; see also *Zadigan v. Cole*, 369 N.J. Super. 123, 133 and n. 10 (Law Div. 2004) (precluding the untimely report of an expert for the defendant dentist where there was no excuse for the delay or lack of diligence, and preclusion of the expert did not place the defendant’s defense “in jeopardy” because defendant already had another expert).  Here, plaintiffs were likewise not deprived of an expert whose testimony would satisfy the requirements of a *prima facie* case.  [...] did not err in failing to extend discovery for plaintiffs to replace [...] simply because they decided that they preferred [...] over [...].
[brief] CLAIM  In a retaliation case under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employee engaged in a protected activity known to the employer, the employee was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.  Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 547 (2013).  There is no dispute that filing a lawsuit alleging discrimination is a protected activity within the meaning of the NJLAD.  The Trial Court below properly made that determination.  However, even when reviewing the Complaint with liberality, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Trial Court appropriately held Plaintiff simply did not allege any adverse employment action within the meaning of the NJLAD, and thus could not establish the second required element to establish an NJLAD retaliation claim.  Even if Plaintiff could identify an adverse action (and she cannot), the Trial Court also properly held that “Plaintiff has failed to show how any of the…acts have even a remote relationship to the filing of Andreula I. ” (Pa9).  Where Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish two essential elements of a *prima facie* NJLAD retaliation claim, and the absence of one element is fatal, the Trial Court’s dismissal of Count I of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint against the [...] and [...] must be affirmed.
[brief] Or the admonition by [...], Esq, on April 4, 2023 that Defendant had no choice but to file a motion to vacate the final judgment of January 23, 2023.  (Aa309)  The Defendant does not contend that solely filing a motion within the time prescribed in N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.67, provides it the right to redeem.  It is an imperative and a significant factor in balancing the equity favorably to the Defendant’s application.  The time of filing its motion is an important factor in support of its right to redeem.  Nor is the absence of redemption prior to January 23, 2023 not fatal to its cause.  [...] balanced the equities of each party and weighed the loss each would realize if the final judgment was sustained or vacated, and the resulting equity overwhelmingly balanced the scale toward the Defendant-Respondent.
[brief] R. 2:10-5.  Plaintiff recognizes that the common law balancing test is one that is ordinarily conducted by trial courts, Rivera, 250 N.J. at 145-147, but remanding this case to the same trial judge for a fourth hearing and yet another opportunity to misapply the law would be an exercise in futility and a waste of time and resources.  What occurred below was not a mistake or confusion over a complex area of law: This is public records case and the trial judge is the Presiding Civil Judge.  Public records cases are to be conducted in a summary and expedited manner.  This Court can and should invoke original jurisdiction "to eliminate unnecessary further litigation," State v. Santos, 210 N.J. 129, 142 (2012), and because the public interest favors "an expeditious disposition of [a] significant issue[]," Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532, 540-41 (1998).  A balancing of the relevant factors the court must consider in evaluating a common law right of access claim requires the release of all records responsive to [...]’s request regarding the [...]’s failure to prosecute former judge [...] after a judge found probable cause to issue public corruption charges against her.
[brief] (Pa20).  He argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.  (Pa23-24).  At its meeting on September 26, 2023, the Board considered [...]’s arguments, found that there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and therefore directed the Board Secretary to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for its review and approval at its next meeting.
[brief] CBT rev.>$49.932M S4161 [[...]], Governor-remove requirement for promulgation of national census S4183 [[...]], Rent control & rent leveling ordinances-concerning certain exemptions S4189 [[...]/[...]], PERS member holding elected office-permits rehire S4202 [[...]/[...]], Law enforce. officer, cert-proh circumventing intergovernmental transfer process S4203 [[...]/[...]+1], School employees, public-eliminates requirement for State residency S4206 [[...]], Education funding, federal-req DOE annually report use of fed COVID-19 relief fd S4207 [[...]], Public works contractors-concerns apprenticeship programs S4221 [[...]/[...]+2], Libraries, public-approp. from Construction Fund to provide grants for:$37.174M S4222 [[...]+1], Schools for students w disabilities, private-elim. req to set cert tuition rates S4231 [[...]/[...]], Deer fencing on certain farmland-creates program in Department of Agriculture S4233 [[...]/[...]], Patient medical & billing records-limits fees charged for copies of S4234 [[...]/[...]/[...]], Paramedics, volunteer-permit to operate within mobile intensive care units S4236 [[...]/[...]], Food Insecurity Advocate, Office-revises and renames S4245 [[...]], Special education due process petitions-extends filing time period.  COVID-19 S4246 [[...]], Motor vehicle dealers, certain-concerns certain licensure requirements S4252 [[...]], Mandatory retirement from SPRS-limits extension to 90 days during emergencies S4254 [[...]/[...]+4], Taxpayers accelerate depreciation of cert expenditures-allows, fewer than 50 emp S4263 [[...]], HFMA loans-concerns distribution standards, housing projects during st of emerg S4287 [[...]], Firemen's Home-revises certain functions & composition of board of managers S4301 [[...]], Duct cleaning-includes as maintenance work subject to the prevailing wage S4302 [[...]/[...]], Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion, Department of-establishes in Executive Branch S4303 [[...]/[...]], Req. Dir of Div. on Investment to attempt to use underrepresented financial institutions S4308 [[...]/[...]], Helmets to Hardhats program-establishes in DMVA;$400K S4309 [[...]], Securing Our Children's Future Fund-awards school security project grants SCR164 [[...]], Capitol Complex Security Screening Building & Secure Courtyard Project-approves
[brief] [Aa89.]  By letter dated April 23, 2019, Appellant filed an adjudicatory hearing request concerning the WFD individual permit.  [Aa349-Aa382.]  In its hearing request, Appellant argued, among other things, that [...] failed to demonstrate a need for the extended dock that cannot be satisfied by existing waterfront facilities and the 2017 WFD permit and 2019 WFD permit modification hinders navigation and access to Appellant’s waterfront facilities.  [Aa351-Aa353.]  On May 31, 2019, [...] filed an objection to Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request.  [Aa429-Aa455.]  The 2019 WFD permit modification required [...] to obtain a modified tidelands license.  [Aa89.]  The NJDEP advised Appellant that it was reviewing Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request but would not render a decision until the TRC reached a decision on the modified tidelands license.  While outside the scope of this appeal, it should be noted that on March 4, 2020, the TRC held a hearing on the [...] tidelands license application.  [Aa322.]  As part of the hearing process, Appellant submitted forty-nine exhibits to the TRC, which are also part of this record in this matter.  [Aa139-Aa303.]  Appellant also submitted a post-hearing brief, which set forth in detail its legal arguments concerning [...]’s tidelands license application.  [Aa322-Aa344.]  Following additional argument before the TRC on September 14, 2022, the TRC voted to approve [...]’s application.  This decision is currently the subject of an appeal filed by Appellant entitled In the Matter of P.T. [...] Family Limited Partnership [...], [...].  On March 14, 2023, the NJDEP denied Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request.  [Aa132-Aa136.]  This appeal follows.
[brief] [...] was aware [...] was stealing money from the partnership and therefore from the plaintiffs.  [...] was aware of this the entire time it was happening.  [...] was specifically aware during the non-RICO [SOL P]eriod that [...] was stealing, admitting at trial that he noticed the sharp increases in “management fees” for some years (e.g., 2005), but nevertheless remained silent.  Ibid.  As such, [...] was aware the fees were unjustified, the theft of those fees would harm the partnership and the plaintiffs and were a direct result of (1) [...]’s stealing and (2) his failure to stop [...].  …  Accordingly, he was aware that serious harm would result if he did not stop [[...]] from stealing from the partnership.  *** …  As noted, due to their theft of partnership assets, the [...] profited $13,321,285 during the non-RICO [SOL P]eriod.  ….  [...][] received those stolen funds throughout the entire non-RICO [SOL P]eriod and remained silent regarding the theft until trial.  ….  Lastly, [...] is financially secure, and the imposition of punitive damages would not burden him in any material way.  ….  Regardless of whether punitive damages have any effect on the [...], the court must nonetheless impose punitive damages to deter future illegal conduct.
[brief] Two issues are raised in this appeal.  First, defendants assert that, having first properly designated certain areas of the [...] for redevelopment, the “plan” thereafter approved by ordinance adopted by the [...] can create any development without regard to the substantive requirements of the Local Redevelopment Housing Law (“LRHL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et. seq.  This contention is without merit.  Second, defendants contend that the only information courts may consider in a prerogative suit when reviewing the administrative record used to justify the adoption of a redevelopment plan is limited to: (1) the transcript before the governing body when adopting the plan; and (2) the one-page report of the [...] which concludes that the proposed plan is consistent with the existing municipal master plan.
[brief] (Pa12-13, ¶9)  Thus even if my belief was wrong, and/or even if somehow all of the above authorities I cited were misapplied (which neither [...] nor the trial court ever stated), even still, as the *Tagayun* authority makes clear, it still would not justify an award of sanctions.  C)  The defendants never even alleged bad faith; and the court’s finding of bad faith is not supported by anything on the record.  As argued above, the party seeking sanctions bears the burden to prove bad faith.
[brief] ”  State in the Interest of A.A. 455 N.J. Super. 492 (2018).  Whether a statement is voluntary is assessed qualitatively, not quantitatively and “the presence of even one of those factors may permit the conclusion that a confession was involuntary. ”  State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 43 (2019).  A.  The State’s Argument is Legally Inaccurate Regarding  Whether [...] could have had Criminal Liability Regarding the Incident and whether he was the Appropriate “Guardian” for [...] during the Interrogation  Under New Jersey law, juveniles “receive heightened protections when it comes to custodial interrogations.
[brief] The trial court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, with prejudice, was predicated on its decision to adopt comments made by this Court in the First Action in place of its own factual findings and credibility determinations, which pre-dated this Court’s comments.  The trial court adopted those comments without providing any meaningful explanation or performing any legal analysis whatsoever.  Instead, the trial court simply “concluded” as follows:  I think [the Appellate Court decision] stopped your party.  I think it’s binding on your party, and all the other parties who participated in that other case, who fully litigated that question, when the question was squarely presented on the same record that I have to the Appellate Division.  I think the findings of the Appellate Division in that unreported case are binding on [Plaintiff], and I’m not going to disagree with that Appellate Division whether it is reported or not.