ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Dear Judges: LETTER BRIEF STATEMENT  Please accept the filing of this letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief.  TABLE OF BRIEF  CONTENTS  COMBINED STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  02 ARGUMENT  04  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW (Not Argued Below).  04  II.  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN DETERMINING THAT N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24(B) AND N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(C)(3)  DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS  JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY.  (Argued Below Da60 – Da64).  06  CONCLUSION  16  TABLE OF JUDGMENT(S), ORDER(S), RULING(S), AND DECISIONS ON APPEAL  09/25/2024  Trial Court Order “Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment” 04 09/25/2024  Trial Court “Order to Delete”  04 09/25/2024  Trial Court Order “Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss The Complaint”  04 09/25/2024  Trial Court  “Memorandum Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss the Complaint”  04, 08, 13  COMBINED STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Furthermore, “a trial court has an independent obligation to ensure that plaintiffs have sufficient process for defending their evidentiary submissions...[as] it would be able to properly ‘assess whether the expert's opinion is based on scientifically sound reasoning or unsubstantiated personal beliefs couched in scientific terminology. ’”  *In re Accutane*, 234 N.J. at 387-88 (citing *Kemp ex. rel. Wright v. State*, 174 N.J. 412, 427 (2002)).
[brief] Later, when defendant tried to bargain for his immediate unconditional freedom, stating that he would be the prosecution’s “key witness,” [...] referred to the Miranda form defendant signed, and he reiterated that he could ---  8  A review of the video, the trial transcript, and the transcription in defendant’s appendix further reveals that defendant spoke over [...]’s statement that “the truth can only help your case,” so it is not clear whether defendant even heard [...]’s comment.  (11T171-4 to 10; Sa2 at 11:06:22 to 11:06:24; Da73).  make no promises, but that “cooperation gives you consideration. ”  (11T189-11 to 22; Sa2 at 11:22:00 to 11:22:25; Da95).  A few minutes later, defendant offered a final ultimatum, telling the detectives that “if you want the fucking truth, . . . I’ll give you the fucking truth.  It goes away.  I go home. ”  [...] again rejected the bait, stating that it would be “impossible” for him to “talk to [his] bosses” and have them release defendant in exchange for a statement.  (Sa2 at 11:24:25 to 11:25:36; Da101).  Only then, when told for a third time that [...] could not promise him leniency, did defendant assert his right to counsel.  (Sa2 at 11:25:36 to 11:25:44; Da101).
[brief] After nearly five years of litigation, the Trial Court had seen it all from Appellant.  The forged invoices filed with the Court, refusing to turn over [...]’s QuickBooks files, submitting to the Court ledgers showing fraudulent amounts owed by his companies to [...]—after he made 1,208 back-dated entries to the QuickBooks files to create fake exhibits, to invoking ‘equity’ to attempt to force [...] to rehire and pay him, even though the other [...] officers had to forego salaries to try and save [...] as a result of Appellant’s fraud.  After all that, the Trial Court properly held that the issue of money being owed to [...] had been in the case from the very first lines of the Complaint and properly exercised its discretion to amend the Complaint to conform to the evidence.  POINT VI: APPELLANT’S POINT III MUST BE DISMISSED.
[brief] Because, Under the Uncontroverted Material Facts, Defendants Had Constructive Notice by Virtue of other Recorded Documents and Public Records as to Which They Were Bound to Inquire.  (Ja717)  a.  Constructive notice exists where a reasonable and diligent inquiry would indicate the need for further investigation and such investigation and such investigation would reveal the competing claim .................................................................  38  b.  Defendants had constructive notice because the recorded documents in the chain of the title beyond Defendants’ immediate predecessor and related recorded documents and public records demonstrate the mistake and Plaintiffs’ claim or title .................................................................................. 39 c.  Defendants’ obligation to inquire provide a further demonstration that there is no genuine dispute of material fact.  ...........................................................................................................  43 d.  The Defendants’ position is inconsistent with the purposes of the recording scheme is further demonstrated by their obligation to inquire.  ..................................................................................  44  V.  The Trial Court Properly Granted Reformation Because the Equities Support Granting Correction of an Undisputable Mistake of Which Defendants Had Constructive Notice.
[brief] Contrary to the State’s contention, defendants seeking to represent themselves do not need to “recite some talismanic formula” or make their requests over and over again just to have those requests be properly considered by a court.  Rose, 458 N.J. Super. at 626.  Here, [...] told the court exactly what he wanted: “to represent myself from here on out. ”  The court summarily denied that request without holding the required hearing.  See Rose, 458 N.J. Super. at 628 (holding that it was improper to “deflect[ ] defendant’s oral request by inappropriately requiring defendant to submit his request in writing”).  “The failure to rule on a defendant’s request has been treated the same as an explicit denial. ”  Id. at 629.  This summary denial amounts to structural error that compels reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[directive] LAW GENERAL No. 2004-4 ATTORNEY ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE Standardization of External Audits of Countv Prosecutor’s Ofice Forfeiture Funds WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Attorney General that all State, County and Municipal law enforcement agencies shall administer State and Federally forfeited funds and property in a uniform manner, consistent with established State Federal law, regulations, directives, and standard and operating procedures; and WHEREAS, the Attorney General the State’s chief law enforcement officer, has authority as with to oversee the Forfeiture operations of the County Prosecutor’s Offices and ensure compliance the forfeiture-related provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq.; N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et sect.; N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25 et N.J.S.A. 4OA:5-1 et sea.; and, the State of New Jersey Forfeiture s q ; Program - Administration Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’S 1 12); and WHEREAS, SOP 12 requires County Prosecutors to have aregistered municipal accountant (RMA)/certified public accountant (CPA) audit all accounts containing or related to forfeited and seized property, on an annual basis; and in WHEREAS, the Attorney General has surveyed the manner which the annual W C P A of audits of County Forfeiture h d s are conducted and has determined that utilization a standardized format by external auditors would produce more accurate and timely audit results and would allow SOP’S, for more efficient and productive oversight of compliance with statutes, regulations, guidelines and directives; and in WHEREAS, determination was not made response to any existing problem this serious or emergent need, but rather was made in consultation with the County Prosecutors Association of funds New Jersey to enhance the administration of State and Federally forfeited and property; I, HARVEY, NOW, THEREFORE, PETER C.  Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, in by virtue of the authority vested me by the Constitution and by the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, ORDER N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 seq., do hereby and DIRECT the following: et
[brief] (Pa13-Pa14).  A Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, however, a Board has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).
[brief] As set forth above, according to N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g), the City is to provide a snapshot of the composition of the collective negotiations units based on the last day of the expired agreement, July 31, 2019.  This snapshot is to be used by the arbitrator to determine the unit costs going forward for the term of the awarded agreement.  N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.9 (c) provides, in part:  …In all awards, whether or not subject to the two percent cap, the arbitrator's decision shall set forth the costs of all "base salary" items for each year of the award, including the salary provided pursuant to a salary guide or table, any amount provided pursuant to a salary increment, any amount provided for longevity or length of service, and any other item agreed to by the parties or that was included as a base salary item in the prior award or as understood by the parties in the prior contract.  These cost-out figures for the awarded base salary items are necessary in order for the arbitrator to determine, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16.d, whether the total net annual economic changes for each year of the award are reasonable under the statutory criteria.  [...] has held that an arbitrator is “required to project costs for the entirety of the duration of the award…[by utilizing] the [salary] scattergram demonstrating the placement on the guide of all of the employees in the ⁸
[brief] ...  Under the circumstances presented in this close case, we cannot view with confidence the jury's determination that [...]'s negligence did not deprive [...] of the opportunity to terminate her pregnancy during the second trimester.  For plaintiffs to proceed to trial without being informed of the surprise testimony created a “make believe” scenario for plaintiffs, the legal equivalent of half a deck.  Plaintiffs went to trial misled by false information.  Hence, the failure to grant a mistrial was an abuse of discretion.  The trial in this case was inconsistent with the spirit of our discovery rules, which are designed to eliminate, as far as possible, concealment and surprise in the trial of lawsuits to the end that judgments therein be rested upon the real merits of the causes and not upon the skill and maneuvering of counsel.
[brief] Pa456 ¶ 27; Pa1042 ¶ 27; Pa473 ¶ 10; Pa314–32.  The complaint in the HCH Action alleged that it was wrongful for [...], or for any other Director, to cast unit owner votes on whether the Association should fire attorney [...], hire [...], or support then-pending claims in the Derivative Action.  Pa321 ¶ 30; Pa324 ¶ 39.  The complaint in the HCH Action specifically alleged that [...] had supposedly breached a “duty of care. ”  Pa327, ¶¶54-56.  The Association tendered the defense of the HCH Action to [...], which provided a defense under a reservation of rights for more than fifteen (15) months (Pa480 ¶ 25), including multiple attempts to secure appellate review of interlocutory orders (see Pa457 ¶ 29; Pa461–62 ¶¶ 53–54; Pa1041 ¶ 29; Pa1044 ¶¶ 53–54; Pa476–77 ¶ 16; Pa483 ¶ 41) and opposition to the HCH Parties’ claim for an award of attorneys’ fees.
[brief] We must next consider whether the violations rise to the level of plain error.  In Weaver, the Court explained that “[w]hen evidence is admitted that contravenes not only the hearsay rule but also a constitutional right, an appellate court must determine whether the error impacted the verdict. ”  219 N.J. at 154, 97 A.3d 663 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824).  “The standard has been phrased as requiring a reviewing court ‘to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ’ ”  Ibid. (alteration in original).  The State contends that to the extent any error occurred in the admission of [...]'s testimony, it should be deemed to have been “invited” because defense counsel not only failed to object, but cross-examined [...] regarding what [...] had told him.
[brief] Defendant’s expert testified similarly.  While the medical examiner determined defendant had to be at least six feet from the victim, (19T:127-8 to 13), defendant’s expert opined that he could have been two to three feet away.  (28T:27-18 to 28-24).  Either way, defendant’s version of events was disproven—he claimed he was actively struggling and wrestling with [...] when the gun went off.
[brief] The Separation Agreement clearly states that any provision “declared illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective in a legal forum . . . shall be deemed severable. ”  Def. Motion., Certification of [...], Esq., “Exhibit A,” ¶ 18.  The parties both acknowledge that the [...] is a legal forum and that said legal forum declared the provisions declaring Appellant’s resignation irrevocable to be unenforceable in conjunction with the 2021 Agreement’s provision that Appellant would “take all necessary steps to effectuate [Respondent’s] involuntary ordinary disability retirement application” and the requirements of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2).
[brief] Review is “not simply a pro forma exercise in which [the court] rubber stamp[s] findings that are not reasonably supported by the evidence. ”  *CBS Outdoor*, 414 N.J. Super. at 578–79 (quoting *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999)).  “Simply stated, a reviewing court must determine whether the Board followed statutory guidelines and properly exercised its discretion. ”  *Id.* (citing *Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Twp. of Princeton Zoning Bd.*, 343 N.J. Super. 177, 199 (App. Div. 2001)).  Here, the Defendant’s decision misapplied the legal standard, was not supported by substantial evidence, and was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  II.
[brief] Defendant [...] has a progressive discipline policy, a four-step process including the following steps: 1) verbal warning; 2) written warning; 3) suspension and, finally, 4) termination.  (Pa655).  Prior to September 2020, a group of Defendant [...]’s managers and directors had been caught entering time as time worked when they were, in fact, on vacation.  (Pa668).  As salaried employees, doing so entitled them to significant payouts of unused PTO time when such time was “cashed out. ” (Pa668).  The employees who had participated in this scheme were not terminated and, instead, were only required to pay the money back to Defendant [...].  (Pa668).  To terminate an employee, Defendant [...] was required to work with Defendant [...].  (Pa663).  Ultimately, however, it is up to Defendant [...] to make a recommendation for termination.  (Pa663).  Despite the fact that Defendant [...] had an open HR complaint pending against her, Defendant [...] did not believe it was a conflict of interest to consult with her regarding the employment decisions made with regard to Plaintiff, [...], and [...].  (Pa117).  Once a request for termination is made, the request proceeds to Defendant’s “termination panel. ” (Pa662).  Defendant [...], working with Defendant [...], recommended immediate termination (skipping all of the stages of the progressive discipline policy) for Plaintiff, [...], and [...] and the action was approved by the panel.  (Pa51).  Plaintiff and [...] were terminated on September 14, 2020, while [...] was terminated on September 17, 2020.  (Pa666).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] See also O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. at 422 (condemning interrogator statements that “mislead suspects about the consequences of speaking”).  Importantly, the proper analysis of [...]’s waiver relies on neither A.G.D. nor Sims, as this is not a case in which officers merely withheld information from an interrogee but a case where an officer actively misled someone.  In State v. Sims, for example, the Court ultimately found a confession voluntary under the totality of circumstances where officers refused to “get into the details” of a defendant’s arrest, but where there was also no allegation that officers misled defendant to believe that his interrogation had to do with some lesser crime. \(^3\) 250 N.J. 189, 199, 217 (2022).  As the Appellate Division explained in Diaz, “[i]t is one thing for police to withhold information.  It is another thing entirely for them to provide an explanation that creates or reinforces a false impression as to the seriousness of the sentence \(^3\)  The Sims Court also declined to extend the bright-line rule in A.G.D., which requires officers to warn interrogees of the nature and seriousness of any charges or arrests warrants that have been formally filed against them.  250 N.J. at 214.  Like Diaz, [...]’s argument does not rely on an extension of the bright-line rule from A.G.D.
[brief] Based on this long line of case law, much of it handed down by our Supreme Court, the Motion Court in the instant matter properly granted summary judgment in favor of the [...].  Plaintiff-appellant allegedly slipped and fell on snow and/or ice on a public sidewalk abutting the [...]’ property.  Throughout this case, plaintiff-appellant has contended that she slipped and fell on snow and/or ice, which are natural elements.  She did not allege that she slipped and fell on a dangerous condition that the [...] created or exacerbated, such as uneven sidewalk slabs, holes in the concrete, or artificial obstacles of some kind.  Consequently, the well-established law of this State applies and calls for summary judgment in favor of the [...], which the Motion Court properly and correctly granted.  It is noteworthy that plaintiff-appellant [...] does not appear to disagree that the foregoing is the law in New Jersey.  Rather, she wants this Appellate Court to change this long-standing law set mostly by our Supreme Court.  The [...] respectfully request that this Appellate Court decline this invitation to overhaul the law.  II.
[brief] In its *Atalese* decision the Supreme Court intended to “assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue. ”  *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 444, quoting *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., PA.*, 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001).  While emphasizing that “no prescribed set of words must be included in an arbitration clause to accomplish a waiver of rights” the Court held that to be enforceable “the clause, at least in some general and sufficiently broad way, must explain that the plaintiff is giving up her [or his] right to bring her [or his] claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute. ”  *Atalese* at 447.  Based upon all of the facts and legal authority set forth in Plaintiffs’ Brief and this Reply Brief their requested relief should be granted, the arbitration requirement in [...]’s Contract held to be unenforceable, and the waiver and exculpatory provisions in Paragraphs E and F of the Contract invalidated and severed.
[brief] [...] cites Rule 1:21-1(c), which provides that a business entity cannot appear in court to represent itself or file papers in court, except through an attorney authorized to practice law in New Jersey.  [...] also cited to *Gobe Media Group, LLC v Cisnero*, 403 N.J. Super. 574, 577 (App. Div. 2008), which holds that judgment against a business entity not represented by counsel is voidable at the option of the adverse party without proving plain error.  Here, [...] nor its principals appeared in court to represent themselves, nor did they file papers on their own behalf.  [...], represented them and filed papers on their behalf before withdrawing as counsel.  Therefore, there has been no violation of R. 1:21-1(c).
[brief] In title cases, a purchaser is charged with knowledge of the matters as to which his attorney and other agents had notice.  Colegrove v. Behrle, 63 N.J. Super. 356, 364 (App. Div. 1960); Dickerson v. Bowers, 42 N.J. Eq. 295, 297 (Ch. 1886) (“Were it not so, in every case, in order to avoid the effect of notice, the party has only to put forward his agent. ”).  Thus, it is further paramount for a potential purchaser to examine how his or her predecessors took title as well as their significant acts of record during ownership.  See Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446, 456 (1979) (explaining that a prospective purchaser examines a chain of title “search[ing] the records to discover conveyances or other significant acts of an owner [listed in the chain of title] from the date the deed into that person was recorded until the date he relinquishes record title”); Garden of Memories, Inc. v. Forest Lawn Mem'l Park Ass'n, 109 N.J. Super. 523, 533 (App. Div. 1970) (“[I]t is unquestionably the duty of the purchaser to search the grantor and other pertinent recording indexes for each holder of record title for the period during which he held such title”) (emphasis added).
[brief] (Da17)  The detectives ordered [...] out of the car.  (2T:18-24 to 19-1)  When asked why the detectives did so, [...] testified:  “He was ordered out of the vehicle due to his nervous behavior, due to his furtive movements, grabbing the safety vest, covering it over his waistband area.  He was removed because we believed he was in possession of a weapon. ”  (2T:19-2 to 8)  As [...] exited his vehicle, he held the work vest in one hand by his side.  (2T:19-14 to 16; Da25 at 02:30 to 02:35)  Within seconds of [...] exiting the car, [...] frisked him.  (Da25 at 02:15 to 02:40; Da26 at 02:05 to 02:35)  [...] testified that, as [...] complied with the detective’s order to place his hands on the car, he leaned against the trunk.  (2T:20-2-3, 19 to 24)  [...] found a handgun in [...]’s waistband, which the detectives seized, and placed [...] under arrest.
[brief] While imposing no blanket requirement of parental notification, the Original Policies --- 2  See Table of Abbreviations of Briefs and Appendices, supra p. x.  3  [...] and [...] assert that their policies do not require parental notification when a student asks to use a different name or pronouns in classrooms or extracurricular activities, but only when a student seeks to change their official school records.  [...]/[...] Brs. at 18.  The districts make this assertion based on draft regulations that the superintendents of each district attest they “intend to enact. ”  [...] Cert. ¶ 14 (Da160); [...] draft regs ¶ A.1.-2. (Da162); [...] Cert. ¶ 10 (Da235); [...] draft regs ¶ A.1.-2. (Da262).  Because the proposed regulations do not appear to have been promulgated, Amici treat the language of the policies as the operative mandate.  Even if parental notification were not triggered by a student’s request to use a different name or pronouns while at school, however, the policies still mandate parental notification over the student’s objection if the student asks for other accommodations, such as to use a different restroom, play on a different sports team, or sing in a different chorus.  permit disclosure to parents in an array of circumstances, including “as allowed by law,” and “[d]ue to a specific and compelling need, such as the health and safety of a student or an incident of bias-related crime. ”  [...] Orig. Pol’y (D2a55); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra9); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8–9).  In the trial court, the State clarified further that it seeks to prohibit parental notification only when the student objects and that schools are obligated to answer truthfully if parents inquire about their children’s gender expression at school.