ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notably, however, defense counsel acknowledged that the door to the third floor was not marked, that the attic space was “an illegal apartment,” and that the police would not have known the interior layout from the outside.  (4T10-18 to 12-5; 4T15-19 to 21; 4T18-22 to 19-1).  Defense counsel also acknowledged that, from the outside, the building appeared to be divided vertically.  (4T14-23 to 15-1).  After hearing argument, the judge denied the reconsideration motion on the record.  (Da9; 4T51-7 to 54-19).  In denying the motion, the judge noted the only fact that would make a difference to her was whether the door to the third floor was locked and the police broke into it, (4T52-6 to 54-23), even \(^{12}\)  The drawing that defendant included in his appendix at (Da50), purporting to show the interior of [...], was first presented to the trial court in counsel’s motion-for-reconsideration brief on February 13, 2023.  (Ra40).  As defense counsel explained to the judge at the reconsideration hearing on May 11, 2023, this drawing is not to scale, was created by his sister in architecture school, and he himself questioned whether the stairs were “exactly straight. ” (4T5-18 to 6-3).  The drawing is not evidence, is inconsistent with the actual photographic and video motion evidence of the building’s structure, and should not be relied upon by this Court due to its factual inaccuracy.  though the breach of a locked door does not mean that the area following it was not lawfully within the scope of the authorized search warrant.  C.  The Subsequent Indictment.
[brief] THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED SUFFICIENT  NOTICE OF THE WAIVER OF RIGHTS TO APPELLANTS  Appellants argue that the Agreement is invalid because it does not adequately inform the consumer of their rights and remedies that are to be waived.  Appellants rely on precedent that has upheld arbitration agreements which make it clear the party is agreeing to, “waive [their] right to a jury trial[,]” Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 89 (2002); that arbitration would be the exclusive remedy, Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010); and that explained in thorough detail what arbitration is and the differences between arbitration and civil litigation, such as the rules being different, there being no judge or jury, and judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision being limited.  Curtis v. Celco Partnership, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 33-37  However, Appellants have not cited any precedent to support their assertion that the alleged “deficiencies” of the Agreement render it unenforceable.  Section 7 of the Agreement is titled “Dispute Resolution/Waiver of Jury Trial” and provides the exact information that the courts want these agreements to contain.
[brief] However, the decisional law has recognized exceptions to allow inclusion of non-parties on the verdict sheet. \(^3\)  In *Young v. Latta*, 123 N.J. 584, 596 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a non-settling defendant is entitled to an allocation, pursuant to the CNA, based upon the fault assigned to settling defendants who have been dismissed from the action by virtue of a settlement.  In *Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc.*, 181 N.J. 102, 116 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the remaining defendants were entitled to an allocation based upon the percentage of fault of a defendant dismissed from the action by virtue of that party’s discharge in bankruptcy.  On a similar note, in *Town of Kearny v. Brandt*, 214 N.J. 76, 103-04 (2013), the Court concluded that the remaining defendants were entitled to an allocation based upon the fault found as against defendants dismissed from the case based upon the statue of repose, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1.
[brief] 7.  Preemption  Requires that the Ordinance Conflict with a State Statute  It is well-settled that for preemption to take place, the Ordinance must conflict with a legislative enactment.  Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 135 (1991).  Because the Ordinance allows for exemptions when necessary to provide adequate service (DA-51a), the statute which [...] relies upon to preempt the Ordinance (i.e., N.J.S.A. 48:2-23) is not in conflict with the Ordinance.
[brief] [...] claimed that she was not in the chain of command with [...] and as the Admin Officer, she was (1T; 36:19).  Plaintiff wanted [...] to attend a function and [...] became involved when he shouldn’t have since she was the Admin Officer (1T; 37:12).  Plaintiff's direct supervisor was [...], the Major (1T; 37:22).  Admin Officers prior to the Plaintiff, and Admin Officers after her, did exactly what she did but [...] singled her out (1T; 37:22).  It was the Plaintiff’s job to do what she did even though [...] was not in her chain of command (1T; 38:11).  [...]'s objection to her assigning [...] was wrong (1T; 39:22).  Plaintiff spoke to [...], and he spoke to all the units telling them that she was the person who made the assignments for events (1T; 40:3).  The Admin Officer worked for the Major and whatever the Major said, goes (1T; 40:17).  Also, she was the Admin Officer for four years (1T; 40:25).  Plaintiff believed that [...]’s response had to do with her sex (1T; 41:18).
[brief] THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO [...] MUST BE REVERSED ON ITS MERITS (Raised below at DA 1a et seq., DA 90a et seq., DA 931a et seq.; T.19:1 – 29:23; Briefs below of the [...])  This matter involves a challenge to a municipal ordinance adopted by the Town.  Municipal actions enjoy a well-established presumption of validity.  See Fanelli v. City of Trenton, 135 N.J. 582, 589 (1994); Ballantyne House Assocs. v. City of Newark, 269 N.J. Super. 322, 337 (App. Div. 1993).  “Thus, a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance . . . must overcome the presumption of validity—a heavy burden. ”  Witt v. Borough of Maywood, 328 N.J. Super. 432, 442 (Law Div. 1998), affirmed, 328 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting 515 Assocs. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J. 180, 185 (1993)).
[brief] To be clear, this is not to say that the State did not have a discovery obligation to disclose the diagram.  But, to find a Brady violation for the trial court to remedy, materiality must be shown.  And here, under the applicable Brady standard, there was no violation of Brady to remedy—because, under a correctly applied Fourth Amendment analysis, the delayed diagram was not material for Brady purposes.  Nonetheless, whether or not there was a Brady violation, the judge properly exercised her discretion in finding that a dismissal of the indictment with prejudice was unwarranted.  As the judge recognized, the diagram was disclosed while the motion to reconsider her initial suppression ruling was still pending, at a point where she “c[ould] deal with it and fix it. ”  Overall, the reopened suppression hearing, and the judge’s consideration of the delayed diagram before she rendered her ruling on the motion, wholly cured defendant’s allegations of prejudice.  And the judge ultimately found that the State’s conduct was not willful or outrageous.
[brief] For the reasons stated above, defendant’s appeal should be denied, and the conviction and sentence should be affirmed.  Respectfully, /s [...]  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor  Dated: 2/15/24 March 1, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 279272018  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY  LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] “[W]hen an expert grounds testimony in personal views, rather than objective facts, the net opinion rule requires the exclusion of such unsupported views. ”  *Burney*, 255 N.J. at 23.  *N.J.R.E.* 703 permits expert opinion “based on facts or data derived from (1) the expert’s personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts in forming opinions on the same subject.
[brief] THE ORDER FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED SINCE THE RECORD BELOW SHOWS THAT THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT CHALLENGED (T1:7:23-17:16) | 17 | | C. DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO [...] AS A NON-CLIENT (T1:7:23-17:16) | 19 | | D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT PLAINTIFF [...] DID NOT HAVE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH [...] (T1:7:23-17:16) | 28 | | E.
[brief] On April 18, 2019, Defendant [...], provided documentation which for the first time identified a sub-consulting contract with [...] to serve as resident engineer during the subject work on the Garden State Parkway.  (Pa1763).  Despite two and a half years of paper discovery, [...] had not previously been mentioned or identified.  In light of this new information, on April 23, 2019, Plaintiffs moved to add [...] as a Defendant.  On May 16, 2019, Plaintiffs’ motion was granted and Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended complaint was filed on May 17, 2019.  (Pa1698).  On July 1, 2019, Defendant [...] filed its’ Answer.  (Pa1727).  On August 19, 2019, Defendant [...] moved before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., for summary judgement seeking that Plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed as being filed after the statute of limitations.  (Pa1745).  On September 17, 2019, Plaintiffs opposed [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa1756).  On September 27, 2019, following oral argument, the Court denied [...]’s motion.  (Pa1826).
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...] /s/ [...], ESQUIRE  [...], ESQUIRE  Attorneys for Defendant Date: April 22, 2024  [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...], Defendant/Appellant.  NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT, APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Appeal from the Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County  Docket No.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER  The Hon. [...], J.S.C. Sat Below  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
[brief] ”.  237 N.J. at 112.  The Court further reiterated that it declined to adopt a separate rule for the application of the entire controversial doctrine to legal malpractice claims from transactional matters and thus all of those claims were also exempt from application of the doctrine.  *Id* see note 4.  See also *Sklodowsky v. Lushis* 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011); *Short Hills Associates in Clinical Psychology v. [...]*.  Defendants should have informed this Court of this controlling precedent when making the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to the entire controversial doctrine; instead, they were seeking to have this Court overrule a twenty-five (25) year old precedent of our Supreme Court.
[brief] 1.  Confidential Information.  I certify that I have reviewed Rules 1:38-3, 1:38-5, and 1:38-7 and:  X  This document or pleading does not contain any confidential information or any confidential personal identifiers, or This document or pleading previously contained confidential information or confidential personal identifiers, which have been redacted or anonymized, including through the use of fictitious first names or initials.  The cover of the redacted version of the document or pleading contains the word “REDACTED. ”  I acknowledge that a non-redacted version must be filed contemporaneously with the redacted version in matters where the confidential information is necessary to the disposition of the matter.  2.  Return and Resubmission.  I certify that if any confidential information is discovered in this submission and brought to the court's attention, the court will return the document or pleading to me, and I will be responsible to redact or anonymize the confidential information before resubmission.  I understand the court may impose sanctions, including suppression of the brief, dismissal in extraordinary cases, and other measures for a failure to accurately make this certification or for the discovery of confidential information in a document that has been filed.  3.  Briefs Posted Online.  I understand that the presence of confidential information or confidential personal identifiers in a document that has been posted on the Judiciary's public website will be grounds for the removal of such online posting, pending correction by the filing party, on an expedited timeline.  The court in its discretion may postpone further proceedings pending the resubmission of the document.  [...], Esq. (pro hac vice) s/ [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...], Esq. (039111997) s/ [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]
[brief] (Aa0001-Aa0005).  Rather than approving the 185 ft. pier dock extension originally applied for, the 2017 WFD Permit authorized [...]’s construction of a 167.3 ft. pier dock extension.  (Aa0001).  Based on NJDEP’s review of available data, NJDEP found that [...]’s dock extension met N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(vi), NJDEP’s Submerged Vegetation Habitat Rule which requires a minimum water depth of four feet at Mean Low Water in the area where boats will be moored, at a length of only 167.3 ft.  Therefore, NJDEP reduced the length of [...]’s proposed dock by nearly 18 ft. and issued the 2017 WFD Permit reflecting the same.  (Aa0001-Aa0005; Aa0088).  The language in the 2017 WFD Permit confirms that it is authorized under and in compliance with the CZM Rules.  (Aa0001).  The 2017 WFD Permit included two permanent mooring areas at the end of the dock where the required 4 ft. requirement was met and specifically prohibited dredging activities in the tidewaters adjoining [...]’s upland property.
[brief] As a result of the harassment, Appellant blocked [...]’s messages and calls to her cell phone.  (Pa1000).  When Appellant did not respond to messages, [...] went looking for her at the office.  On one occasion, [...] discovered Appellant walking into the office, so he grabbed her arm and said, “The next time I call you ‘hot babe,’ you respond to me. ”  (Pa379-80) 221:18-222:9.  Appellant cannot remember exactly when she blocked [...]’s cellphone, but it was before November 20, 2018.  (Pa381-82); Id. at 227-232.  Appellant did not receive all of [...]’s incessant messages because he was blocked.
[brief] (11T174:4).  [...] notified the [...] that [...] was initiating an IA based on [...]'s allegation that [...] reported a property check he never performed.  (11T176:10).  The [...] "kicked it back" declining to prosecute because there was not anything criminal and told [...] they could do the IA investigation administratively.  (11T176:19).  Regarding the delays in interviewing [...], [...] attributed same to scheduling issues with [...]’s attorneys.  (13T99:4-16).  [...] indicated that he could not "say yes or no" to whether he read all pertinent parts of the New Jersey IA Guidelines promulgated by the New Jersey Attorney General.  (13T96:19).  [...] did not want to assume, and was not sure, whether the IA Guidelines were implemented by statute.  (13T97:3).  Yet [...] conceded that the IA Guidelines provide that investigations must be concluded on a timely basis.  (13T97:15).  [...] conceded that the IA Guidelines mandate that all investigations should be conducted as soon as possible and as close to the date of the infraction being investigated.  (13T97:21).  [...] conceded that he did not keep the [...] apprised of the progress of the investigation.
[brief] Therefore, the residents are entitled to refunds for contaminated water charges and to recover bottled water and water treatment expenses.  A class action would achieve the greatest goods for the residents to address the damages suffered from defendant’s breach of contracts between it and the residents and there are no issues thwarting class certification.  The issues for plaintiff and the class are synergistic and the claims are too small for individual adjudications.  The court should reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and denying class certification, order the granting of certification and remand the case to the trial court for adjudication on its merits.
[brief] Shortly after Superstorm Sandy in 2012, the DEP (under [...]’s administration) published an emergency rule to implement amendments to its --- 5  The procedural history and statement of facts are combined for efficiency and convenience.  regulations under the Flood Hazard Area Control Act (“FHACA”), which became immediately effective upon its issuance.  45 N.J.R. 360(a) (Feb. 19, 2013).  Therein, the DEP said that the emergency “amendments enable the use of the best available flood elevation data to determine the flood hazard area design flood elevation for a given site. ”  Ibid.  The DEP explained that “[w]ith over 8.4 million residents in its 8,721 square mile area and approximately 3.8 million residents in flood hazard areas, without swift and immediate action, the State is presented with a risk of severe impacts during the next flood event. ”  Ibid.  In response to Executive and Administrative Orders issued by [...] and [...] in January 2020, the DEP undertook significant regulatory efforts to study and incorporate climate change considerations into its land use regulations, which include the DEP’s regulations that implement the FHACA.
[directive] a.  PSP staff shall immediately document their findings in the PTM system.  b.  If law enforcement was contacted, PSP staff must fill out the “Emergent Electronic Monitoring (EM) Alert(s) Reporting to Law Enforcement” form promulgated by Directive # ##-23 capturing all necessary information requested in the form.  i.  The form must be reviewed and approved by a manager or supervisor no later than the next business day.  ii.  This form must be uploaded to the eCourts case jacket no later than the next business day.  c.  PSP staff shall file a Violation of Monitoring (VOM) no later than the next business day.  d.  Court staff must schedule the VOM to be heard as follows:  i.  If the defendant was immediately arrested, and the State files a Motion for Pretrial Detention on a new case, or a Motion to Revoke Release on the monitored case, the VOM shall be scheduled to be heard in conjunction with the filed motion.  Revised Protocol Promulgated by Directive 18-23 (October 10, 2023)
[brief] The Commission dismissed Count 3 of the Complaint, calling Respondent’s well-documented and public violations of New Jersey’s School Mask Mandate as set --- \(^1\)  While Appellants note that briefs are generally prohibited in appendices under N.J.C.R. 2:6-1, the limited attached briefs in the present matter go to what facts and evidence were in the record before the Commission and [...] when the underlying decisions were made, and are “germane to the appeal” under N.J.C.R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  out in Executive Order 251 (EO 251) a “personal decision” – a fact invented by the Commission and weighed in favor of the moving party.
[brief] (Da654).  The trial court confirmed the Phase I Partial Final Award via a January 28, 2016 Order, but stayed implementation until a subsequent February 8, 2016 Order, when the confirmation was given full force and effect.  (Da1577; Da1619).  On February 8, 2016, immediately following the trial court’s implementation of the January 28, 2016, [...] directed Company employee [...] to steal the Company’s servers and have them loaded on a plane to the Philippines, where [...] intended to continue running the Company.
[brief] Q: Who was this person that instructed you?  A: [...].\(^2\)  Q: [...] told you to use a turnaround, but you made a mistake and you used the emergency vehicle turnaround at 87.5 instead of the grass covered turnaround which is closer to 84 and 85, yes?  [...]: Object to the form.  He can answer it.  A: Yes.  [Da46, 27:10-25.]  Thus, [...] admits that he made a mistake about which cut-through to use, and makes no attempt to blame [...], or [...], for the happening of the Accident.  Likewise, [...] has made no attempt to shield itself of liability by throwing [...] under the proverbial bus.  In fact, when questioned at his deposition about [...]’ actions on the day of the Accident, and whether [...] advised his supervisor, [...], about what [...] had done, [...] simply stated that “[i]t was an accident. ”  Q: Did you tell [...] that Mr. [...] admitted to you that he went through an illegal cut-through?  A: No. --- \(^2\)  The [...] transcript incorrectly spells “[...]” as “Mauro. ”  We therefore substitute the correct spelling herein.  Q: Did you tell him that he disobeyed your instruction and didn’t go through the legitimate cut-through and went through an illegal one?  A: No.  Q: Why not?  A: It was an accident.  I just told him it was an accident.  [Da251-252, 192:20-193:7.]  While [...] and [...] had a miscommunication about which cut-through [...] was told to utilize, neither has blamed the other for the miscommunication or, more importantly, for the happening of the Accident.
[brief] Exhibit J: Document Entitled, “[...], [...] Operating Agreement, Management Fee And Actual Expenses, Year End Reconciliation For The Year Ended December 31, 2019, December 31, 2020, December 31, 2021, And December 31, 2022  [Omitted]  .................................................................Pa667  Exhibit K: Excerpt Of The Transcript Of Day Four Of The Trial ......................................................................................Pa668  Letter Brief Dated June 16, 2023 [Omitted Pursuant To Rule 2:6-1(a)(2)]  ......................................................................................Pa669
[brief] The truth began to emerge on December 7, 2012, when the OAE issued a subpoena to [...] for the Firm’s trust account records.  [Pa347a]  The OAE also received copies of these bank statements and checks directly from [...]’s counsel.  [Pa347a]  When reviewing the two sets of bank statements, the OAE “found significant discrepancies between the documents [[...]] provided and the subpoenaed records.
[brief] The alarming consequences of accepting defendant’s position are particularly stark when one considers that many States allow their residents to carry a firearm without any permit at all.  See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13 n.1 (observing that in 2022, twenty-five states allowed permitless carry); e.g., W. Va. Code, § 61-7-7(c).  Under defendant’s interpretation of the Second Amendment, New Jersey would have to allow the residents of these States to carry a handgun within its borders without any permit at all—which is directly contrary to Bruen’s recognition that some states constitutionally require permits to carry handguns even while others do not, see Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13 n.1; id. at 38 n.9, and that such background checks may have value.
[brief] In addition, the Municipal Judge and Municipal Court Administrator set the sequence of the court proceedings in the way that any municipal judge and municipal court administrator would.  (1T105:12-21).  Additionally, any work outside of court, such as preparatory work, was not directed or controlled by [...] or the court and the Municipal Judge did not supervise [...] in that work.  (1T105:17-21).  If [...] needed to contact [...] outside of court hours, they contacted her via telephone or email at her private law office.  (1T62:6-12).  The ALJ did not give much weight to [...]’s testimony that she was supervised by the Judge as she performed the same duties as Municipal Prosecutor in other municipalities.  (Pa16).  Further, the ALJ noted that while “[...] must obviously be present when court is in session, . . . no one in [...] otherwise control[led] her comings and goings. ” (Pa20).  Outside of being required to be present for court proceedings, [...] did not exert any other control over [...].
[brief] Morgan Stanley Servs. Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. A-5703-08T1, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 182, at *17 (App. Div. Jan. 26, 2011)  Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 476 N.J. Super. 465, 488 (App. Div. 2023)
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da272 Exh D (H&G Hardware v. Cohen, A0667-04T2 2006 WL 27624 (App.Div. Jan 6, 2006)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da335  Plaintiff’s Reply Brief dated January 29, 2024 (Legal Argument Redacted Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2))