ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  7.10  A CED shall not be used in any environment where an officer knows or has reason to believe that a potentially flammable, volatile, or explosive material is present that might be ignited by an open spark, including but not limited to pepper spray with a volatile propellant, gasoline, natural gas, or propane.  7.11  While officers must at all times respect the seriousness and potential lethality of a CED, an officer shall use particular care when considering whether to use a CED against an individual who is particularly vulnerable due to age (either elderly or young), developmental disability, or a known or reasonably apparent medical condition (e.g., a pregnant female).  7.12  Law enforcement agencies are not permitted to use aerosol spray devices that emit a flammable substance to eliminate the possibility that the electric spark from a CED dart/electrode could inadvertently ignite a flammable substance contained in some OC sprays or similar aerosol spray devices, thereby resulting in injury or death.  10
[directive] Strict additional requirements must be met before an officer may use deadly force against a driver or passenger of a moving vehicle.  Moving vehicles create tremendous risk to officers engaged in enforcement operations, particularly officers attempting to arrest fleeing suspects.  Officers must abide by the following guidelines: (a) during such operations, officers shall never intentionally position themselves in the path of a moving vehicle or a vehicle that is likely to move; (b) officers shall make every effort to move out of the path of a vehicle in order to maintain their safety; (c) officers shall not grab onto moving vehicles or the drivers or occupants of moving vehicles.
[brief] [Pa567, ¶ 49]  The Firm renewed the 2016 Policy with Defendants in 2017, 2018 and 2019.  [Pa568]  In each case, the Firm completed and submitted, a renewal application form.  [Pa568]  Each of the renewal application forms contained the following question:  10.  CLAIMS, CIRCUMSTANCES, DISCIPLINARY AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:  Since the submission date of the last Application submitted to the Insurer:  (a)  Have there been any new bar complaints, investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any attorney?  As with the response to the 2016 Application, the Firm correctly responded “no” on each of the Renewal Applications because the OAE Proceedings did not involve the rendering of Legal Services and, as such, did not constitute a “Disciplinary Proceeding,” as defined by [...] in the Policies it crafted.
[brief] As articulated at length herein, [...] acted at all times with the express understanding that he was the owner of the Property from the point of purchase in 1997 forward.  Indeed, he undertook activities consistent with ownership of the Property even after the transfer to [...].  When he did discover the Defendants’ fraudulent actions in transferring title to [...], he acted immediately to defend his right to the Property.  Indeed, in that Defendants purposefully chose not to disclose the October 2019 Deed to [...], [...]’s diligence was the only thing that prevented the Defendants from selling the property to a third-party.  As such, it is respectfully submitted that laches should not be a bar to the Plaintiff’s quiet title claim.
[brief] In this case, the jury acquitted defendant of first-degree possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, but convicted defendant of first-degree possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute; third-degree possession of cocaine; and fourth-degree possession of marijuana.  (Da44; Da46).  The trial court here followed the sentencing guidelines by finding and weighing aggravating factors 1, 3, 5, and 9 and mitigating factors 7 and 9, all of which were supported by the sufficient credible evidence in the record.
[directive] For the purposes of determining the applicability of the “Offenses Involving Weapons” Special Offense Characteristic, a Brimage-eligible offense will be deemed to involve weapons if the defendant, or another with whom the defendant was acting as an accomplice within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, at the time of arrest or while in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit the Brimage-eligible offense: (1) had in his or her possession any gun,6 firearm other than an assault firearm or machine or (2) used or threatened the immediate use of any weapon other than a firearm, or (3) had in his or her possession any weapon, other than a firearm, with the purpose to use such weapon unlawfully against the person or property of another at the time of arrest or while in the course of committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit a Brimage-eligible offense.  For the purposes of this Special Offense Characteristic, possession of a firearm or other weapon may be actual, joint or constructive.  When the defendant is an accomplice of another who actually possessed a firearm, or used or threatened the immediate use of a weapon other than a firearm, or possessed any weapon other than a firearm with a purpose to use such weapon unlawfully against the person or property of another at the time of arrest or while in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit a Brimage-eligible offense, the Brimage-eligible offense shall not be 6
[brief] (Pa162)  In response, Plaintiff admitted all of the statements of material facts (Pa215) while summarily disputing the law; although, Plaintiff could point to no binding precedent that was contrary to the binding precedent cited by Defendants.  Plaintiff purported to proffer additional facts, but those additional facts were either not material to Plaintiff’s claims or were not properly before the Court pursuant to the requirements of R. 4:46-2.  The court conducted oral argument on September 22, 2023.
[brief] Plaintiffs allege that [...] would have had actual and/or constructive notice of such dangerous condition.  Plaintiff testified that while she shopped at [...]’s store, there were employees “everywhere. ” (Pa15)  Given that [...] was operating a [...] supplied U-boat with product so high to the point where it obstructed his vision to safely push the U-boat through the various aisles of [...]’s warehouse, is indication that the unsafe condition would have been present for a sufficient length of time to alert store personnel that were positioned throughout the store.  At some point, [...] would have walked past a [...] employee with his overloaded U-boat.  Having had knowledge of the overloaded U-boat and the dangerous condition that it posed to other customers, store personnel, particularly had a formal training program been implemented, should have then undertaken some correction action to remediate the hazard posed by the U-boat.  Instead, however, the non-compliance of store personnel in approaching [...] and addressing the dangerous condition is what ultimately led [...] to strike Plaintiff.  This situation is readily distinguishable from the Court’s finding in Znoski.  Unlike the plaintiff in Znoski, who was struck while on the sidewalk outside of the physical store, Plaintiff in the instant matter was struck while inside [...]’s store.  Therefore, while [...] store personnel would not have had any actual or constructive notice of any improper use of the shopping cart on behalf of the individual who struck the plaintiff since the incident did not occur within the confines of the store, the fact that [...] was pushing his U-boat throughout the store, coupled with Plaintiff’s testimony that there were employees “everywhere” (Pa15), evidences that [...] store personnel would have had sufficient time to have notice of the dangerous instrumentality.  Plaintiffs further contend that since this State’s Supreme Court has relieved a plaintiff of the burden of proving actual or constructive notice in situations where as a matter of probability, a dangerous condition is likely to occur as the result of the nature of the business, Plaintiffs, assert that the mere fact that U-boats are supplied to customers without any requisite training of its staff to look out for overloaded U-boats and correct dangerous conditions, Plaintiffs submit that they are entitled to a rebuttable inference that [...] is negligent.
[brief] ”  476 N.J. Super. at 393 (quoting Lynch, 161 N.J. 172).  See also Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) (“failure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard”).
[brief] Plaintiff’s claims under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq., were dismissed without prejudice by Plaintiff (by its terms, the Song-Beverly Act only applies to new vehicles sold to consumers in California).  Before the Court is a Motion to Compel Production regarding twelve requests for production served by Plaintiff.  (ECF No. 63).  Defendants responded in opposition on March 30, 2021.  (ECF No. 71).  LEGAL STANDARD
[brief] I, ¶ 10 ........................................................................... 9, 28 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI ............................................................................. 9, 28, 39 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV ............................................................................ 9, 28 | | **Other Authorities** | |-----------------------| | [...], [...] & [...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. | | 1 on N.J.R.E. 609 (2024)
[directive] Reasonable Belief.  A reasonable belief is an objective assessment based upon an evaluation of how a reasonable officer with comparable training and experience would react to, or draw inferences from, the facts and circumstances confronting and known by the officer at the scene.  Serious Bodily Injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  Serious bodily injury and serious bodily harm have the same definition the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(d).
[brief] (See Da176-Da177).  On August 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a builder’s remedy lawsuit to rezone the Property to construct an inclusionary residential development.  (Da178-  However, [...] did not have knowledge that the lawsuit was filed until Plaintiff’s counsel emailed a courtesy copy of the Complaint on August 21, 2023 at 10:48p.m. (Da200).  The lawsuit was not formally served on [...] until August 25, 2023.  (Da178).  Prior to receiving Plaintiff’s email with the Complaint, on August 21, 2023, [...] adopted Resolution No. 23-228, which authorized the Township to undertake a preliminary investigation as to whether the Property satisfies the criteria for designation as an area in need of redevelopment for condemnation purposes.
[brief] 3.)  Her insistence that she could wait ad infinitum to pay back Defendant the monies owed to him.  To prevail on this claim, the Defendant herein must prove each of the following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence:  First, the Defendant herein must prove that some type of contract existed between the parties.  There can be no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing unless the parties have a contract.  Second, the Plaintiff must prove that the Defendant acted in bad faith with the purpose of depriving the Plaintiff of rights or benefits under the contract.  Third, the Plaintiff must prove that the Defendant’s conduct caused the Plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm.  See *Wade v. Kessler Institute*, supra 172 N.J. 327 (2002).  A.  Was there a contract between the parties?  There is no doubt a contract between the parties.  (See DA 1, pages A1-A16)  B.  Did the Defendant act in bad faith with the intent to deprive the Plaintiff of rights or benefits under the contract?  The indisputable facts of this case is that Plaintiff never had any intention on following through on her ONE obligation under the contract i.e.  Her ONE obligation under the contract was to give Defendant the $70,000.00 which was her share of the down payment on the Condominium.  From the signing of the Agreement it is indisputably clear that Plaintiff had no intention to pay to Defendant the $70,000.00 that she owed to him.  She lied when she signed the Agreement when she said that she did not have the $70,000.00 when, in fact, she had significantly in excess of said amount on the date that she signed the Agreement.  Further, at no time did Plaintiff have any intention of paying to Defendant the $70,000.00.  She never made any real attempt to sell her property to pay Defendant and always insisted that she could hold off paying Defendant ad infinitum.  THESE FACTS ARE INDISPUTABLE - AND ARE PREVIOUSLY CITED IN HER TESTIMONY IN THE INITIAL TRIAL.  AND THE PAYMENT OF THE $70,000.00 WHICH PLAINTIFF HAD IN HER POSSESSION WAS HER ONLY OBLIGATION UNDER THE AGREEMENT.  C.  Whether the conduct of the Plaintiff herein caused the Defendant to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm.  Unquestionably Defendant suffered harm.  Plaintiff deprived Defendant of the $70,000.00 that she owed to him and then continued to lie and said she did not have the funds causing the Court to wrongfully impose penalties on Defendant amounting to over $227,000.00.  In summary, Defendant herein has proven by more than a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) that the Plaintiff acted in bad faith with the intent to deprive the Plaintiff of his reasonable expectations under the contract; and (3) the Defendant herein has sustained injury or loss as a result of such action.
[directive] F. directives.  This Directive repeals and supersedes the provisions of Supersession of prior AG Directive 2006-5, the supplement to that Directive issued on July 28, 2015, and AG Directive 2018-1.  G.  This Directive shall take effect immediately.  The provisions of this Effective date.  Directive shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 58:16A-55(a).  This jurisdictional mandate is implemented through the FHACA rules, at N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.1 *et seq.*  The standard of review requires this Court to uphold a government agency decision which is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and is supported by credible evidence in the record.  *In Re: N.J. Pinelands Commission Resolution*, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div. 2003).  The Court’s review of an agency decision is limited, and it is settled that an agency’s interpretation of statutes and regulations and its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to deference.  *Seigel v. N.J.* Department of Environmental Protection, 395 N.J. Super. 604, 613 (App. Div. 2007).  As the Court has recognized in *In Re: Flood Hazard Area Verification*, Docket No. A-5637-18, 2021 WL5506763 (App. Div. Nov. 24, 2021) (DJa001), deference to [...] is particularly appropriate given the “special expertise required in applying the intricate regulations under the [Flood Hazard Area Control] Act.
[brief] Petitioner alleges in Count 12 that the Board violated section (g) because it held an “excessive” amount of meetings regarding the referendum in an attempt to sway public opinion and in violation of the Act.  Apparently, Petitioner wanted less transparency and less opportunity for public comment regarding a referendum which he alleges not only is important but was subject to Board manipulation.  Petitioner’s arguments on the issue are so illogical that they do not warrant extended discussion, except to note that the Board’s willingness to hold public meetings on the issue undermines Petitioner’s allegations that Respondents were engaged in a nefarious scheme to ram through a self-serving referendum over significant public objection.
[brief] Had the jury there determined that the defendant was not guilty of driving while intoxicated or had it rendered any verdict that would have suggested that he was not the driver of the vehicle that struck the decedent at all, then there would have been no basis upon which to find that he was guilty of death by auto or reckless manslaughter since the decedent died from injuries sustained in a car accident.  Likewise, since the only conduct relied upon by the State to support the homicide charge in this case was shots fired from a gun, once the jury acquitted [...] of all weapons-related offenses, the factual basis upon which to find that he engaged in reckless conduct leading to the death of [...] was lost.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  MOTION NO.: [...] BEFORE: PART F  JUDGE(S): [...]  MOTION FILED: 03/28/2024  ANSWER(S) BY: [...] FILED: SUBMITTED TO COURT: April 04, 2024  ORDER THIS MATTER HAVING BEEN DULY PRESENTED TO THE COURT, IT IS, ON THIS 4th day of April, 2024, HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:  MOTION BY APPELLANT  MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION  GRANTED  SUPPLEMENTAL:  The motion for reconsideration is granted.  Accordingly, this court's March 19, 2024 is vacated and the matter is transferred to the plenary calendar.  The Clerk's Office to issue a scheduling order.  FOR THE COURT: [...], J.A.D. Da 92  During this dive operation a number of 9mm rounds of ammunition were recovered as well as what appeared to be the internal hammer of a firearm.
[brief] Nisivoccia, supra, 175 N.J. at 563.  For that reason, ‘[o]rdinarily an injured plaintiff . . . must prove, as an element of the cause of action, that the defendant[s] had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the accident. ’ ”  Id.  However, our State’s Supreme Court, “guided by equitable consideration, has found it appropriate to relieve a plaintiff of the burden of proving actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition ‘in circumstances in which, as a matter of probability, a dangerous condition is likely to occur as the result of the nature of the business, the property’s condition, or a demonstratable pattern of conduct.
[brief] A Professional Corporation Attorneys for Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company, et al.  By: s/ [...]  [...], Esq. (#037351989)  [...]  Attorneys for Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company, et al.  By: s/ [...] [...], Esq. (#023091991)  Dated: March 11, 2024  [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; AND [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...]
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Authorities .................................................................  ii  Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings ................................ v  Preliminary Statement .............................................................  1  Counterstatement of Procedural History .................................  4  Counterstatement of Relevant Facts ...........................................  5  Standard of Review ...............................................................  14  Legal Argument ......................................................................  17  The Trial Court properly found that Plaintiff did not meet his burden for an annulment on the grounds of fraud ........................................  17  Conclusion .............................................................................  32  Transcript of Hearing held on July 10, 2024 ..........................
[brief] Plaintiff’s Board-Certified Ophthalmology expert, [...] received his Medical Degree from the University of California San Diego School of Medicine in 2006.  From 2006 to 2007, he performed a Transitional Internship at Harbor-UCLA County Hospital, Los Angeles.  Thereafter, [...] performed and completed an Ophthalmology Residency from 2007 to 2010 at Vanderbilt Eye Institute.  From 2010 to 2012, he performed and completed a Vitreo-Retinal Surgical Fellowship at Vanderbilt Eye Institute.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED [...]’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY [...] AS COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS  BECAUSE NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTS UNDER THE OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES OR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT  A.  Standard of Review  “[A] determination of whether counsel should be disqualified is, as an issue of law, subject to de novo plenary appellate review. ”  City of Atl. City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010) (citing J.G. Ries & Sons, Inc. v. Spectrasery, Inc., 384 N.J. Super. 216, 222 (App. Div. 2006) (additional citations omitted)).  “Disqualification of counsel is a harsh discretionary remedy which must be used sparingly. ”  Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC, 471 N.J.  Super. 184, 192 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 334 N.J. Super. 557, 572 (App. Div. 2000)).  The movant bears the burden of proof that disqualification is appropriate.  Trupos, 201 N.J. at 462-63.  The movant “must carry a ‘heavy burden’ and must meet a ‘high standard of proof” before a lawyer is disqualified. ”  Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993)).  Motions to disqualify “must be carefully scrutinized,” because they “are viewed with ‘disfavor’ and disqualification is considered a ‘drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary. ””  Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass’n, 944 F. Supp. at 345 (quoting Alexander, 822 F.Supp. at 1114).  As such, “disqualification motions are . . . viewed skeptically in light of their potential abuse to secure tactical advantage. ”  Escobar v. Mazie, 460 N.J. Super. 520, 526 (App. Div. 2019).  “[D]isqualifying an attorney or an office of attorneys based on a conflict ‘must have some reasonable basis’ grounded in an actual conflict. ”  State v. Smith, 478 N.J. Super. 52, 64 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting State v. Harvey, 176 N.J. 522, 529 (2003)).  See also United States v. Norwood, 566 F. App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2014).  Thus, “[d]isqualification motions require careful scrutiny of the underlying facts and a ‘sense of practicality’ to avoid unjust results. ”  Carreno v. City of Newark, 834 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (D.N.J. 2011) (internal citations omitted).  “Disqualification must generally be based in ‘fact.’ . . . and ‘surmise alone cannot support an order of disqualification. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Trupos, 201 N.J. at 464. 469).  B.  The [...], [...], [...], [...], and Individual Defendants Employed Therein are the Clients Whom [...] was Retained to Represent in this Consolidated Matter
[directive] SUBJECT: JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL - DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS  Motor vehicle and vessel crashes involving one or more fatalities and/or serious injuries require a thorough and complete investigation by experienced law enforcement personnel.  In order to accomplish that goal, full and complete cooperation between the investigating law enforcement officers at the scene, and the prosecutors, who are responsible for any criminal prosecution arising from the investigation, is essential.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office in this State has established their own local procedures and protocols regarding the investigation of motor vehicle and vessel crashes involving one or more fatalities and/or serious injuries.  Those procedures and protocols are followed by the municipal and county police and law enforcement agencies within each county.  However, coordination and compliance with twenty-one separate investigative procedures and protocols, by the [...], has proved to be problematic.  In an effort to address this issue, the [...], at the request of the [...], reviewed fatal and serious injury  "  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Attorney General