ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court is certainly concerned by the apparent failure of the timely development of affordable housing in the Borough.  It is undisputed the Borough has failed to provide evidence of final satisfaction of all conditions identified and referenced under the court’s January 25, 2019 order of conditional final judgment of compliance and repose which was entered over four years ago.  However, the argument and information presented in movant’s papers, i.e. the certifications of [...] and former Mayor [...], does not provide the court with evidence warranting the relief now sought.  It is undisputed that the Settlement Agreement executed in this matter during November 2017 did not identify Redeveloper’s Off-Site Property located at Block 610, Lot 1 as the parcel specifically designated for the seven subject units.  The court concludes that there is nothing in the record presented which supports the somewhat extreme relief requested, that is, an order to compel the Borough to grant site plan approval (including variances) for the construction of seven affordable units on Block 610, Lot 1 without the Borough’s Land Use Board’s approval and without amendment to the Redevelopment Agreement.  12a.  It asserted that there “is nothing in the record which compels approval of the Off-Site Project when other avenues of compliance are available to the Redeveloper.
[brief] On April 21, 2022, plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs against the defendants [...] and [...]. (Pa17-23).  On May 2, 2022, defendant [...] filed an Answer to plaintiffs’ Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Pa24-31).  On May 5, 2022, defendant [...] filed an Answer to plaintiffs’ Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ.  (Pa32-39).  On June 23, 2023, the parties appeared for trial before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. of the Monmouth County Superior Court.  On November 29, 2023, [...], J.S.C. entered an Order affirming the Planning Board Resolution of Approval which granted the defendant [...]’s application for preliminary and Final Major Site Plan Approval.  (Pa1-2).  The Court issued a written opinion in conjunction with its Order.  (Pa3-16).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (3T12-12 to 13-1).  “You know, certainly, in view of your age, your marriage, you have a house, you have a company, it appears that you are now on the right track. ” (3T12-24 to 13-1).  Because defendant had not accrued any new offenses from 2019 until the time of his sentencing, she placed a “heavy weigh” on defendant’s recent behavior and declined to find aggravating factor three.
[brief] The trial court’s refusal to accept defense counsel’s request for a passion/provocation instruction was legally erroneous and denied [...] a very real chance of being convicted of something lesser than purposeful murder.  As an initial matter, there is nothing about defense counsel initially advocating [...]’s position that he did not want any lesser-included offenses that would preclude this argument on appeal or subject it to a more rigorous standard of review.  As aptly noted by the trial court, it was obliged to instruct on supported lesser-included offenses whether defense counsel wanted the instructions or not.  (5T180-19 to 24); see State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004) (“a trial court has an independent obligation to instruct on lesser-included charges when the facts adduced at trial clearly indicate that a jury could convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater offense”).  This is true even where a defendant argues affirmatively against inclusion of a lesser-included offense.  Jenkins, 178 N.J. at 358-60.  Accordingly, a defendant will generally not be precluded from arguing on appeal that it was reversible error not to include a lesser-included offense so long as the trial court’s decision not to include it was based on its own review of the evidence and law, and not mere reliance on defense counsel’s objections.
[brief] Trautner, 2024 WL 1708605 at *10.  “[T]he Borough proffered no facts and articulated no law to substantiate its allegations.  There was no honest, creative advocacy in the Borough’s claims. ”  Ibid.  ____________________  11  As noted above, Plaintiffs do not appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion seeking leave to file the second amended complaint.  This Court likewise affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees in Sarfo ex rel. Sarfo v. Quivers, No. A–1043–01T5, 2002 WL 31432737, at *3 (App. Div. Aug. 30, 2002).
[directive] To the gredtest extent possible, Treasury . agencies should refrain from seizing leased vehicles for forfeiture.  In the event that it is necessary to seize a leased vehicle, the seizing agency should remit the vehicle to the lessor as soon as practicable for after seizure.  No liens will be paid leased vehicles.  ~~  June Directive No. 33 7 , 1 9 9  9  Page of 7  1  I  Consideration of Expedited Dispositions of Vehicles  B.  Valued Less Than $2,500  If a Treasury agency decides to seize for forfeiture a vehicle with an appraised value of less than the seizing agency should consider an $2,500.00, expedited disposition, either sale or destruction, to avoid incurring unrecoverable property storage and management costs.
[brief] *Villari v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Deptford*, 277 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 1994).  The Court should remember that in dealing with an issue regarding the legitimacy of a preexisting non-conforming use, the rule is "when in doubt, rule against the claim of a preexisting non-conforming use."  *Bonaventure*, 350 N.J. Super. at 432; *Cos-Lin, Inc. v. Spring Lake Bd. of Adjustment*, 221 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1987); *Hantman v. Randolph Tp.*, 58 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 1959); *Heagan*, 42 N.J. Super. at 480-81; *Weber v. Pieretti*, 72 N.J. Super. 184 (Ch. Div. 1962).
[brief] (Ca141).  [...] explained in his letter brief that there was nothing he could have done to have funds available for payment of rent, which he did not negotiate.  The monthly reports showed a negative operation.  (Ca142).  [...]’s counsel argued that [...] could have notified the landlord that he was not accepting the lease.  However, [...], in his judgment, noted that would have led to additional litigation and costs, which was not necessary.  [...] stated in his letter brief that he attempted to speak with [...] to reach an understanding concerning the rent; however, he was unable to do so.  (Ca142).  In addition, as noted in the letter brief, [...] thought that [...] should have closed the diner, and stopped operating, because of the negative status of the operation.  [...] indicated that, based upon his experience, it is harmful to close a business as a receiver when the owners are attempting to sell its interests in the property, even if losing money.  The bank had, through its entity, [...], owned the assets of [...] since January 18, 2022.
[brief] For another, the State would also experience an irreparable harm without this relief.  See David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 327 (1965) (finding “prevention of unlawful discrimination” vindicates a “vital interest of the State” because the act of discrimination is “a public wrong and not merely the basis of a private grievance”); N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 (Legislature finding “the State suffers a grievous harm” from discrimination).
[brief] She again sought to enforce the JOD's terms and reprised some of the requests the court denied in 2017 without prejudice.  Plaintiff moved for an order compelling defendant to: pay “outstanding past child support” and “increased child support”; pay his “fair share” of the children's past and future “higher education tuition and expenses” and medical expenses; maintain life insurance or provide a security interest on property as security for payment of defendant's obligations; and pay plaintiff's attorney's fees for the mediation and court proceedings.  Defendant filed a cross-motion for an order: denying the relief sought by plaintiff; sanctioning plaintiff for filing a frivolous motion; retroactively emancipating the children on the dates of their respective college graduations; declaring plaintiff and the children responsible for the claimed education and medical expenses; and awarding defendant attorney's fees.  The trial court rendered its decision on the motions in a March 14, 2019 order.  The order was unaccompanied by a written or oral decision and includes only scant conclusory findings supporting the court's disposition of the parties' various requests.  In pertinent part, the order grants a portion of defendant's cross-motion.  The court determined the children graduated from college and were emancipated, but it rejected defendant's claim their emancipations were effective on the dates of their college graduations.  Instead, the court retroactively emancipated the children to May 24, 2018, the date defendant filed his cross-motion for emancipation.  The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for an award of back child support, finding defendant had paid $7,918.40 of the amount the court found due in its July 14, 2017 orders, and directing defendant pay any remaining child support arrears through the May 24, 2018 emancipation date.  The court denied plaintiff's request for a hearing as to whether defendant's child support should be retroactively modified, and it denied plaintiff's request that defendant pay for the children's medical expenses because plaintiff “fail[ed] to provide sufficient proof of payment of such expenses. ”  The court further denied plaintiff's request that defendant pay the children's education expenses, finding plaintiff did not comply with the JOD's requirement that the parties confer concerning those expenses before they were incurred.  Plaintiff appealed from the trial court's March 14, 2019 order.
[brief] (Pa16).  Twice a year, [...] was required to attend security meetings with the township administrator, the police chief, the liaison officers, the judge, the court administrator, the bailiff, and the security officers.  (1T26:14-26).  [...] explained that even if [...] was required to attend meetings on court security, that would not lean towards employee status because she was not required to perform other trainings, such as Human Resource trainings, that other employees were required to do.
[brief] (14T4-14T5).  Based upon *Glassman*, defense counsel reiterated that pleadings from the plaintiffs should be a permissible method of impeachment as to the claims against [...] and [...].  (14T6-13).  The trial court took a brief recess then ruled that *Glassman* did not apply because it involved successive tortfeasors.  (14T15).  Here, the “equitable concerns underpinning *Glassman,*” recognized in *Adams*, do exist.  [...] does not have a practically viable contribution right, for the reasons extensively discussed above.  That is, in retroactively stripping [...] of the *Burt* defendant protections applicable to Drs. [...] and Goldsmith, two non-parties, the trial court imposed nearly insurmountable practical burdens to exercising his contribution rights.
[directive] ....................................................................74  Release Revoke to Authority General 8.1 ...................................75  Release of Revocation for Applying Against Presumption 8.2  Filed Must Be Release of Revocation for Motion a Where Cases 8.3 ..........................................75  Circumstances Extraordinary and Compelling Absent Revocation of Seek to Presumed Prosecutor Is the Where Cases 8.4  75  Release...................................................................................................................  When New a Release of Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.1  Offense  Any for Release on While Committed Is Crime .................................................................75  Complaint-Warrant by Charged When Release of Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.2  Monitoring Device Electronic an with Tampers  Defendant .............................................................76  Conditions with Release on While When Release of Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.3 or Order Restraining Violence  Domestic a Violates Defendant ...............................................................................76  Release of Condition a When Release of Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.4  Protection Survivor Assault  Sexual a Violates Defendant  76 .........................................................................................................  Order. of Revocation Seeking of Presumption the Overcoming 8.4.5  76  Release....................................................................................................... .........................................................................77  Circumstances and Facts Relevant 8.5 ..................................77  Release of Revocation for Application of Filing Electronic 8.6  Detention Pretrial Initial and Revocation-of-Release Combining 8.7  77  Motions.................................................................................................................. ...................77  Denied Is Release of Revocation for Application When Notification 8.8  10  Page  PRETRIAL OF VIOLATIONS
[brief] The [...] are Entitled to Qualified Immunity  In the pending case, the video recordings and documentary evidence make clear that the [...] only used the amount of force necessary to subdue Plaintiff and arrest him.  Importantly, Plaintiff tried to run and escape from the police and then actively resisted the officers’ efforts to make the arrest.  In Graham v. Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically held that “resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight” were factors to be considered when assessing the reasonableness of the force used to “effect a particular seizure[.]”
[brief] On September 21, 2015, [...] and [...] prepared a Closing Statement, apparently in anticipation of closing title to the assignment of SREC and commencement of the Land Lease.  The Closing Statement showed a balance due to [...], LLC, in the sum of $1,006,000.00.  As shown by the Bill of Sale, the consideration was paid, and the closing of title was concluded.  Exhibit 3.
[brief] Brief of Amici Curiae Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and other Health Care Organizations in support of Plaintiff in Adams v. [...], [...] (11th Cir. 2019) at 12–13, ACa92–133.  In addition, in its recently released Standards of Care Version 8, the [...] (“[...]”—an advocacy organization committed to the health of transgender-identifying individuals—considers social transitioning to be psychological treatment.
[brief] Denying Plaintiffs this relief resulted in a grave injustice and effectively rewarded years of fraudulent concealment and perjury.  In addition to the newly discovered and previously unknown claims against [...] arising out of the newly discovered evidence that [...] was sole member of [...], Plaintiffs further sought leave to amend the Complaint to state claims against [...] arising out of his operation of [...] as a sham entity, and claims for legal malpractice against Defendants [...] arising out of their failure to advise Plaintiffs that [...] was operated as a sham entity by [...].  Plaintiffs did not know and could not have known the existence of these claims prior to obtaining, analyzing, and understanding as a whole the accumulated discovery and the deposition testimonies of [...], [...], [...], and [...].  There is no rule or case law prohibiting a party from seeking to bring a new claim, previously unknown and unknowable, against parties who were previously dismissed with prejudice prior to the discovery of said new claim.  The erroneous dismissal of the prior claims against [...] was not a “global” dismissal in the way that settlements can be “global” and settle even claims that were unknown at the time of settlement.
[brief] The record does not support defendants’ claim that [...] and [...] only performed ministerial functions and essentially acquiesced in [...]’s management of the partnership.  Rather, the record supports the trial judge’s finding that [...] and [...] engaged in conduct that warrants imposition of liability upon these defendants.  In her decision, the judge [[...]] found that the [...] had operated their businesses with cooperation and coordination.  The judge noted that they worked with their accountants in determining the monies that were and were not available.  The judge stated that [...] was the ‘self-described master chef’ and he was the “overseer” of [...] and many other Wilf projects.  The judge found, however, that [...], [...], and [...] worked together and operated on consensus.  We therefore reject defendants’ contention that there was insufficient evidence for the award of compensatory, **punitive**, RICO damages, or attorneys’ fees against [...] and [...].
[brief] See e.g.  *Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Services Inc. v. Leeann*, 154 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 1998); *Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi*, 928 F.2d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 1991); *O’Donnell v. Brown*, 335 F. Supp.2d 787, 816, 817 (W.D. MI. 2004).  “A course of conduct is considered to be a ‘custom’ when though not authorized by law, such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled as to virtually, constitute law”.  *Andrews v.. City of Philadelphia*, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d. Cir. 1986); See also *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 167 (1970).  It is not enough for a plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality.  The plaintiff must further show that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the 'moving force' behind the injury alleged.  That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability, and demonstrate a causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.  *Monell*, supra, 436 U.S. at 689; Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, *Oklahoma v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397, 403-404 (1997).
[brief] In Ketcherick v. Borough of Mountain Lakes Bd. of Adjustment, 256 N.J. Super. 647, 657 (App. Div. 1992) the court stated the grant of relief under c(2) "must be rooted in the purposes of zoning and planning itself and must advance the purposes of the [Municipal Land Use Law]."  The grant must benefit the community in that "it represents a better zoning alternative for the property" and may not be granted merely to advance the purposes of the owner.  Id. at 563.  Thus, the focus in a c(2) case is not whether the current zoning ordinance creates a "hardship" on the owner warranting a relaxation of the standard, but “on the characteristics of the land that present an opportunity for improved zoning and planning that will benefit the community. ”  Id. at 563.  Plaintiff’s argument for a c(2) variance before the Board was unpersuasive and apparently driven more by its desire to attain the maximum financial and economic benefits derived from having the sign in the proposed location without addressing its burden of proof.
[brief] However, at any point when we talk today, you can invoke and say, you know what, I no longer want to talk to you guys.  Okay?  [...]:  I understand what you’re saying.  I’m just – [...]: Sure.  Read it over.  We need to ensure that you understand it completely.  [...]: I understand what my rights are.  [...]: Okay.  [...]:  My problem is signing away my rights.  Do you understand?  [...]:  I totally understand, but like I said, if it’s -- by signing away your rights, you’re not actually signing away your rights because at any point, you could bring your – your rights are able to be invoked at any point during our conversation.  [...]:  Like, if I – [...]: They’re always available to be invoked.  [...]: I understand that, but what I’m saying is that if I invoke these rights, you could say, but you signed away your rights.  [...]:  The moment you invoke, we’re done talking.  You don’t have to talk to us anymore.  [...]:  Oh, no, no.  But we said in the beginning that I could invoke my right for a part of the question, like a question, and then we could continue talking.  That’s what we had all agreed to.  [...]:  Here’s an example.  If you waive your rights, okay, and say we talk for three minutes and you decide you no longer want to talk to us, you -- although you waived your rights for three minutes, you can then invoke and say, I don’t want to talk to you anymore.  So –  [...]:  And like he told you with number 1, at any point you say, look, I don’t want to answer that question, you don’t have to answer that question.  That’s your right.  [(1T:47-24 to 50-23) emphases added]  [...] therefore only agreed to speak with detectives after securing their assurance that he would be able to invoke his right to silence as to “a part of the question, a question, and then we could continue talking.
[directive] If extradition. the the of court the advise and acomplaint-warrant for apply shall the arrest against the lodged detainer been has lawful and law a New Jersey under offense for an arrested is the state, any or other State agency this from enforcement or law a federal agency any by defendant acomplaint-warrant and for apply shall defendant the of having custody agency enforcement law laws under the committed an offense for arrested is defendant  If detainer.  a the of court the advise the law, New Jersey under offense an with charged not States, is and the United or state, of another defendant of the custody having or arrest making the agency apply, the and not Reform does Law Bail See also place.
[directive] Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, an officer while at the scene of a “Law Enforcement Incident” shall not de-activate the BWC unless instructed to do so by the assistant prosecutor or assistant or deputy attorney general supervising the investigation of the deadly-force incident pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, or his or her designee.  Such  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  13 instruction may be given telephonically by the assistant prosecutor, assistant or deputy attorney general, or designee supervising the investigation.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  14  6  Standards Governing the De-activation of BWCs upon the Request of a Civilian, When Discussing Investigation Strategy or Planning, or on Instruction of a Prosecutor 6.1
[brief] \(^6\)  Once the confession has been extracted, defendants may believe it is too late to exercise their rights, creating pressure to self-incriminate.  That risk was especially acute here, where [...] made clear he did not want to re-initiate questioning with the police; he said he wanted to contact his mother to ask her to find him an attorney.  (3T 20-8 to 22)  The concern that an accused who has had their rights violated feels that “the cat is out of the bag” is closely related to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree --- \(^6\)  The State appears to share the view that the cat was out of the bag: “Defendant did not say anything during his phone calls with his parents that he had not already said or to which he had not already alluded.