ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  [...]  Defendant -Appellant  On the brief, Pro-Se  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .........................................................  5  TABLE OF APPENDIX ..................................................................................................  11  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................  46  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RESENTENCING PURSUANT TO RULE 3:21-10(b)(7) ON THE BASIS THAT THE SENTENCE WAS NOT ILLEGAL (1T8:17-25; 1T19:1-15) ........................................................................................................ 3 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 6 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS February 15, 2023, Orders of Hon. [...], J.S.C. denying Defendant's motion for a change or reduction of sentence ......................................................... 4a Ruling on motion to for change of sentence ................................................................. 1T18 TABLE OF APPENDIX January 10, 2023, motion for change or reduction of sentence letter brief .......... 1a February 15, 2023, Orders of Hon. [...], J.S.C., denying Defendant's motion for a change or reduction of sentence ........................................... 5a Vacating Order of [...]; by [...], J.S.C. ............... 8a Vacating Order of [...]; by [...], J.S.C. .................. 9a Relevant portion of sentencing transcript for [...]; [...]; and [...] ..................................................
[directive] N.J.S.A. See imprisonment.  life of term extended or flexible more establishes a Directive this where situations with deals category third  The designated prosecutor supervisory a unless detention pretrial seek will State the that presumption maximum finds that Justice Criminal of Division the of Director or Prosecutor County the by the where or release, defendant's by posed risks control the adequately will release of conditions pretrial by served be not would justice of interests the that determines otherwise supervisor where cases to applies category third
[brief] The court finds the sections of the court rules not addressed herein are not an oversight by the court but because the court finds such portions of the rule(s) are not relevant or sufficiently probative to address in its findings based on the factual record at trial.  The undersigned managed this matter for almost 2 ½ years and observed both parties at the time of the 22-day trial.  This court presided over multiple motions and disputes.  Disputes which the court finds were unnecessary and based on the bad faith behavior of both parties as outlined above.  In the end, these types of litigation techniques employed by both parties, including all the actions as listed above, is not supportive of either party receiving a fee award against the other.  These requests become even more tenuous and unreasonable when the court looks to its prior opinion in which it found that the parties lived together in a substantial manner after the divorce judgment was entered.  Sharing in assets and both living a significantly upper-class lifestyle even after the divorce judgment.  For whatever reason that time ended in August 2017 and both then immediately attacked the other by way of litigation in this court.  Only the parties will know the true reasons for this "reunification" attempt.  But what the court finds, in the context of this application, is that both parties committed their fair share of deception in this litigation and neither is deserving of the other paying any portion of their counsel fees.
[brief] Faced with a statute that had already taken effect, the trial court lacked authority to dismiss the case on public disclosure grounds.  United States v. Doyle, 2022 WL 1186182, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2022) (where government exercised statutory veto power, court does not consider public disclosure bar as basis for dismissal).  The Legislature did not, as it regularly does, provide that the 2023 amendments would take effect at a later date.
[directive] Attorneys have also noted that they are more familiar than the court with the cases prior to trial and that their requests regarding voir dire should be duly considered for that reason.  Over the last decade or more, several committees and task forces have evaluated the number of peremptory challenges allowed in trials in New Jersey.  Each such study made recommendations to reduce the number of challeges.  Each study also has recommended that improvements be made in the voir dire process, which in turn would reduce the need for the number of peremptory Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)
[brief] Subsequently, the trial court asserted, “Like all other pharmacy doctoral students, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to earn a master's degree while earning their doctorate degree.  But to take advantage of that opportunity, students needed to maintain a 3.0 GPA and succeed in their coursework.  Plaintiff's lack of performance resulted in a 2.67 GPA\(^2\) and lost him the opportunity to pursue a masters.  But Plaintiff did obtain a PharmD degree, which is accredited and made him eligible for licensure. ”  (3T86:10-19).  The trial court further asserted, “For Plaintiff to assume he was guaranteed admission into a master's degree simply because he was offered an opportunity \(^2\) The weighted value of a 2.67 GPA was a B- pursuant to the Graduate Grading System.  (Pa3) to earn two degrees in four years does not equate to an enforceable contract.  The Court agrees with this analysis and the Court is granting the motion for summary judgment.
[directive] 63  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  9.11.2  On a periodic basis, and at least once a year, every agency shall submit to the County  Prosecutor and publish on the agency’s public website a brief synopsis of all complaints where a termination, reduction in rank or grade, and/or suspension more than five days was assessed to an agency member.  This synopsis shall include the identity of each officer subject to final discipline, a brief summary of their transgressions, and a statement of the sanction imposed.  This synopsis shall not contain the identities of the complainants.
[brief] (Pa42-47; Pa88-89).  Plaintiff also engaged in efforts to liquidate the real property that had been pledged, forfeited, and ordered sold after the stay of execution was lifted, including a house in [...], a parcel of land in [...], and a condominium in [...].  (Da15-16).  Defendants strenuously opposed marketing efforts, seeking to have the [...] residence listed for hundreds of thousands more than recommended by the special fiscal agent’s real estate agent, and resisting efforts to place a “For Sale” sign on the property.  (Da15-16).  The special fiscal agent was thus required to seek authority to auction that property.  Even though it was jointly owned by [...] and [...] as tenants in common, [...]’s wife, [...] ([...]), for the first time, then asserted a possessory interest in the property, requiring further motion practice.  The court ordered a sale by auction over [...] and [...]’s objection, and the auction was conducted in June 2018.  (Da15).  The highest bidder was discovered to have undisclosed connections to [...] and [...], leaving Plaintiff and the special fiscal agent concerned there was a straw-buyer and the sale to him would fail to close.  (Da15-16).  The court approved the sale to the second-highest bidder – with a judgment credit in favor of Defendants for the highest bid – but only after additional motion practice and an attempted order to show cause filed by Defendants’ straw-man purchaser seeking to prevent the sale to a disinterested third party from closing.  (Da15-16).  Motion practice was required to close the sales of two other forfeited properties in [...] and [...].  (Da16).  Although the [...] property was owned by [...], then a fugitive after fleeing to avoid the weekend commitment ordered on July 3, 2018, [...] stood in [...]’s shoes to file motions opposing the sale, including objecting to the realtor and sale price, and filing a meritless motion for reconsideration related to the sale.  (Da16).  The court approved both sales.  (Da16).  ii.
[brief] But ultimately, the trial court recognized that because the two trigger rules share the same endpoint, the result is the same under each method.  Da42a.  As will be explained below, its factual finding that “[...]’s debilitating injuries were obvious to him beginning in the late 1990s, which was well before the inception of the [...] policies,” Da43a, is not manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence.  B.
[brief] ”  (36T:99-19 to 23).  While the trial court did not go through each of the other five factors he asked for explicitly, the trial court did, obviously, consider them.  And, the reasons why those factors do not apply are clear from the court’s other statements and findings in the record.  As for mitigating factors 3, 4, and 5, all of which deal with provocation, the victim’s conduct, and that defendant’s actions were justified, the trial court noted in its recitation of the facts that defendant’s narrative of being attacked and forced to wrestle a gun away from an assailant were all proven demonstrably false.
[brief] The Commission has “broad authority and wide discretion in a highly specialized area of public life” and is entrusted with deciding cases based upon its “expertise and knowledge of circumstances and dynamics that are typical or unique to the realm of employer-employee relations in the public sector. ”  Hunterdon Cty. Freeholder Bd. and CWA, 116 N.J. 322, 328 (1989).  Judicial review in this context is narrow:  The role of judicial review [concerning the reasonableness of a quasi-Legislative policy decision pursuant to duly-delegated authority] is thoroughly settled.  The administrative determination will stand unless it is clearly demonstrated to be arbitrary or capricious.  . . .  Moreover, where, as here, a substantial element of agency expertise is implicated, due weight should be accorded thereto on judicial review.  State v. Professional Ass’n of N.J. Dep’t of Education, 64 N.J. 231, 258-59 (1974).  [Hunterdon Cty., 116 N.J. at 329 (emphasis added). ]  In other words, a party appealing a final decision of a state agency such as [...] must show that the decision is “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, lacking fair support in the evidence, or violative of a legislative policy expressed or implicit in the governing statute. ”  *In re County of Atlantic*, 445 N.J. Super. 1, 20-21 (App. Div. 2016), *aff’d* on other grounds, 230 N.J. 237 (2017).  “[T]he test is not whether [the reviewing court] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [its] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs. ”  *Brady v. Bd. of Review*, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (quoting *Charatan v. Bd. of Review*, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).  “The burden of proving that an agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable is on the challenger. ”  *Parsells v. Bd. of Educ. of Somerville*, 472 N.J. Super. 369 (App Div. 2021), *aff’d as modified*, 254 N.J. 152 (2023).  Here, the Board bears the responsibility of demonstrating that the decision at issue was an arbitrary application of the agency’s expertise, is not entitled to deference and should not be affirmed on appeal.  It has not met that burden.  I.
[brief] In this appeal, Defendant [...], asks this Court to review the legal determination concerning speedy trial on a plenary basis.  *State v. Handy*, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011).  He also asks this Court to review video here and find that the only reasonable inference is that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  This Court “does not weigh the evidence anew but merely determines whether the evidence supports the judgment of conviction.  *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964) (citation omitted).  As our Supreme Court observed, > It is not our function in reviewing the conviction in question to weigh the evidence anew and to make independent findings of fact as if we were sitting in first judgment on the case.
[brief] On January 7, 2010, the trial court granted [...]’s summary judgment motion and entered a dismissal order based on legal issues, including the lack of an affidavit of merit and expert reports, statutory immunity under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.7, and the statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  [AB74a - AB75a].  On March 9, 2012, the Bergen County assignment judge at the time, the Hon. [...], entered an order directing that “all lawsuits filed by [...] shall be reviewed by the Assignment Judge as soon as practicable after having been filed but before service is effectuated, with this court to then have the opportunity to determine, for good cause, whether to *sua sponte* dismiss any patently frivolous or non-meritorious lawsuit.
[brief] The transcript volumes correspond to the following dates:  1T – July 26, 2022 (Grand Jury Hearing)  2T – February 28, 2023 (Motion to Suppress Hearing)  3T – April 24, 2023 (Plea Hearing)  4T – August 3, 2023 (Sentencing)  [...] entered a conditional plea to second-degree possession of a gun without a permit, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count One).  In accordance with the plea agreement, [...] sentenced him to five years of incarceration with three-and-a-half years of mandatory parole ineligibility.  (3T:6-13 to 21; Da27-30; 4T:16-7 to 17-3)  A notice of appeal was filed on September 5, 2023.  (Da31-34)  --- 4  As part of the plea agreement, [...] also pleaded guilty to a third-degree violation of his probation under Mercer County Accusation No. [...], and [...] sentenced him to three-years’ incarceration concurrent to the sentence imposed on the indictment.  (3T:6-13 to 21; Da27-30; 4T:16-7 to 17-3)  [...] is not raising any issues related to this accusation.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT, “A WRONGFUL ACT" HAD OCCURRED WHICH IS A NECESSARY ANTECEDENT TO IMPOSING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (6T15:25).  Plaintiffs argue that the Trial Court erred in not imposing a constructive trust on the [...].  Plaintiff further asserts that the Court erred in not shifting the burden of proof to Defendants to prove there was no undue influence.  Plaintiffs are conflating two different equitable remedies.
[brief] (Pa187–190).  | 1 | | Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County Order Denying In Part Plaintiff’s Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, entered on December 8, 2022.  (Pa367–368).  | 2 | ¹  Defendant [...] are Respondents only in this matter and have not appealed or cross-appealed any judgment, order, or ruling.  ###
[brief] When a trial court reviews any decision where the municipality was allowed to exercise discretion, the judge is charged with the recognition that the Legislature has vested the municipality with discretion to make the decision involved.  Booth v. Board of Adj. of Rockaway, 50 N.J. 302, 306 (1967).  A rebuttable presumption arises that the municipality has properly exercised its discretion.  Harvard Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Adj. of Madison, 56 N.J. 362, 368 (1970).  The presumption of validity is overcome only by a demonstration that the municipal action is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to the fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute. ”  Riggs v. Tp. of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 611 (1988).  It is well established that when a reviewing court is considering an appeal from an action taken by a land use board, the standard employed is whether the grant or denial was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  See Burbridge v. Mine Hill Tp., 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990); Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965); Med. Ctr. v. Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 343 N.J. Super. 177, 198 (App.Div.2001).  The factual determinations of the board are presumed to be valid, and the exercise of its discretionary authority based on such determinations will not be overturned unless arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Burbridge, supra, 117 N.J. at 385.  A decision that a board has been arbitrary and capricious requires a finding of error.  Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of West Orange, 209 N.J. Super. 499, 522 (App Div.) certif. den. 107 N.J. 46 (1986).  The purpose of judicial review is for the court to determine whether or not the board acted within the statutory guidelines and properly exercised its discretion.  Burbridge, supra, 117 N.J. at 384–85.  The reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the board's.  Kaufmann v. Planning Bd. for Warren Township, 110 N.J. 551, 558 (1988).  A reviewing court is not to “suggest a decision that may be better than the one made by the board of adjustment or planning board, but to determine whether the board could reasonably have reached its decision. ”  Davis Enters. v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 485 (1987).
[brief] “[A] settlement acts as a release only in respect of those claims that the parties actually released, or intended to release. ”  Goncalvez ex rel. Goncalvez, 188 N.J. Super. 620, 629 (App. Div. 1983).  Strikingly absent from ¶5.2 is any mention of “claims that do not yet exist”, or “claims that might exist in the future”, or simply “future claims. ”  See, e.g., Witasick v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 803 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (plaintiff’s complaint was barred by an earlier settlement expressly releasing defendant insurance company from “any future claims, either known or unknown”) (italics added); Monaco v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc., 34 F. App'x 43, 45 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissing complaint where an earlier class settlement had previously released defendants from “any other claims of any kind, known, or unknown, that class members had, have or may in the future have arising out of the class members' vehicle leases”) (italics added).
[brief] Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, [...]’s alleged expert opinion was directly rebutted.  [...] argued below that [...], as an engineering expert, was not qualified to interpret and render legal opinions regarding documents, such as leases and ordinances.  [...] also argued that [...]’s opinion was not admissible to prove the existence of a legal duty of care, which is a legal issue to be decided by the Court.  At his deposition, [...] admitted that he had no competent basis to offer his opinions.  [...] admitted that he was not a lawyer, not an expert in the law, and not an expert in interpreting leases, and plaintiffs’ counsel stipulated to these facts.  [Da23 ([...] Deposition) 215:6 – 24, Da25 (Moore Deposition) at 225:16 – 25, Da- Add From Appendix at 227:13-15, Da26 (Moore Deposition) at 234:17 – 235:20].
[brief] Rather, it was based on the fact that they could not pay fair market value, but were not willing under any circumstances to allow anyone else to have the Boonton Property.  It was only later, after [...]’s bid turned out to be the losing one and the Trust had sold the Boonton Property to [...] pursuant to the Court’s Order, that the Defendants began to float their current, unsustainable position on fair market value with respect to the Boonton Property.  They did so solely because it was now in their best interest to disavow the very date-of-death, fair market value appraisals that the trial court had ordered at their behest, and that they had previously used as proof of fair market value.  Likewise unsustainable are the Defendants’ efforts to dismiss the appraisals as something to be simply disregarded.  They make the shockingly baseless statement that “[d]uring the trial, it was established that the Trust appraisals for the Boonton and Florida Properties did not determine fair market value.  Instead, the appraisals were ordered for informational purposes…” (Db44).  No citation to the Court’s Trial Order or Statement of Reasons is referenced to support that assertion, and none exists because it simply did not happen.  The January 25, 2022 Order unambiguously states the opposite – that the purpose of the appraisals was to establish fair market value as of the Decedent’s date of death.  (Da15).  B.
[brief] *State v. Joas*, 34 N.J. 179, 189 (1961)  The complaint, being part of the record on appeal, any argument that only part of the complaint be considered in this case is entirely without merit.  In any case, a Court can “amend” the complaint to give more specificity if it finds that necessary.  The rules concerning municipal court proceedings in quasi-criminal matters, with power in that court to amend . . . specifically providing for waiver of defects and the liberal right to amend at the trial De novo in the County Court, are designed to minimize the possible impairment of the processes of law enforcement which would result in cases where complaints are drawn by policemen and cases sometimes tried by lay municipal judges.  The trial De novo is primarily a protection for the defendant, *State v. Menke*, above, 25 N.J. (66) at page 70, 135 A.2d (180) at page 182; the right to freely amend the complaint in the County Court is the other side of the coin.  A defendant is not prejudiced thereby because the proceeding is a completely new one, and he has full opportunity to present whatever defenses he may have to the amended complaint.
[brief] A  That’s another reason.  I withdrew it in 2015 because I got very busy in my outpatient work, my private work.  Q  But that’s not what you said this morning, correct?  This morning you said because you weren’t ready.  A  Well, it was a combination of factors.  I think they’re both true.  Q  And I want to show you your trial testimony in that case we were referring to earlier, Flowers.
[brief] As such, under the Uniform Arbitration Act, *N.J.S.A.* 2A:23B–1 to –32, an arbitration agreement is considered to be “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:23B–6; see also *N.J.S.A.* 2A:23A–2 (stating agreement to settle dispute by means of alternative resolution provided by New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, *N.J.S.A.* 2A:23A–1 to –30, is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except on legal or equitable grounds to revoke contract).  Plaintiff is an attorney and drafted the arbitration provision in question.  “An arbitration agreement is a contract and is subject, in general, to the legal rules governing the construction of contracts. ”  *McKeeby v. Arthur*, 7 N.J. 174, 181, (1951) (citation omitted).  Because of the favored status afforded to arbitration, ‘[a]n agreement to arbitrate should be read liberally in favor of arbitration. ’”  *Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc.*, 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc.*, 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).