ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] b.  ¿Entiende usted que si el juez decide imponerle una sentencia mayor que la que recomienda [Sí/Yes] [No/No] el fiscal, usted podrá retractar su declaración?  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  c.  ¿Entiende que si se permite que usted retracte su declaración de culpabilidad debido a la [Sí/Yes] [No/No] sentencia del juez, cualquier cosa que usted diga para apoyar la declaración de culpabilidad no se podrá usar en su contra en un juicio?  Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the judge’s sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?
[brief] *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 437-38.  Here, it is undisputed that [...] owned and controlled the hospital parking lot where the accident occurred.  Both the decedent and [...], co-employees of [...], were in the parking lot to start their respective workday at the hospital.  And, as noted above, the decedent’s husband is receiving lifetime workers’ compensation death and dependency benefits (without objection from [...]) as a result of this work-related accident in the parking lot.  In response to plaintiff’s Request for Admissions, [...] certified that, “[t]he parking lot where the incident of October 6, 2021, occurred was owned by [...], a division of [...] Hospitals Corporation. ” (Pa294 at 14).  [...] also certified that, “[t]he property located at [...], within the [...], [...] and State of New Jersey was owned by [...], a division of [...] Hospitals Corporation on October 6, 2021. ” (Pa295 at 16,17).  As part of its ownership of the hospital property, [...] entered into various agreements with contractors, including entering into a snow removal contract with [...].  (Pa298).  Further, at the time of the accident, [...] was driving to a designated portion of the back parking lot where the [...] employees were told by [...] to park, which would leave the parking spots closest to the hospital building for the patients and visitors.  (Pa330 at 115-16; Pa333 at 126-27).  [...] testified that, “[w]e were instructed to park in that area. ” (Pa333 at 127).  [...] said the parking lot area she was driving to was the “employee parking lot.” (Pa330 at 115).  Under the controlling authority of N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the premises rule and the legal holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lapsley, supra, the subject accident occurred during the course of employment for both the decedent and [...].  As such, [...] has, as a matter of law, co-employee immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The trial Court properly granted summary judgment to [...], and that decision must be affirmed.
[brief] It was acquired on October 1, 2015.  (Pa 60-61).  When [...] acquired the property, it did not obtain a "Certificate of Nonconformity" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 from the Board of Adjustment.  It also did not obtain a C.O. for the commercial structure.  It also did not obtain a C.O. for the two-family house.  It only obtained a TOT, “Transfer of Title,” certificate for the two-family house and not the commercial structure.  (Pa 88-90; T2 at 87:10-91:4; 96:15-98:2).  The commercial structure did not even have electric service from 2014 until January 19, 2017.  No zoning permit was obtained for the work to restore power to the building in 2017, only a construction permit was obtained.  (Pa 79-86; T2 at 125:17-126:20; 126:23-24).  [...] did work on the food building, including moving the gas line and replacing the HVAC system without any permits in late 2019 and/or early 2020.
[brief] The lower court erred by characterizing Plaintiffs’ arguments as “allocation of police force, et cetera,” [Tr., 6:6-7] and simply “that [Defendants] should have had cops there. ”  [Tr., 9:19-20.]  The lower court further erred by finding “[t]here is no prescribed manner for how they should have dealt with liquor on a basketball court. ”  [Tr., 10:8-10.]  The lower court mischaracterized Plaintiffs’ arguments, which were: 1) Defendants had actual or constructive notice of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand due to its presence on the Subject Premises for several months before [...]’s murder, and 2) upon discovering the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, Defendants would have a duty to shut down the large, makeshift liquor concession stand because it was illegal.  While the allocation of resources to maintain and patrol the Subject Premises is discretionary, the duty to shut down the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand once discovered was ministerial.  Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the distinction in their Complaint and are entitled to discovery to determine what resources were allocated to maintain and surveil the Subject Premises that would have discovered the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand before [...] was murdered, and whether there were prior reports of fights or other mayhem due to its presence on the Subject Premises.  CONCLUSION
[brief] On August 29, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for alleged investment losses from a product that had no connection with [...] whatsoever.  (Da0001-Da0040).  [...] acknowledged service and timely moved on November 8, 2023 to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings against it pending arbitration. \(^1\)  [...] based its motion on the electronically signed Application and Client Agreement between [...] and Plaintiffs containing a predispute arbitration agreement.  Plaintiffs filed opposition to the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that \(^{1}\) [...] and [...] (who are Defendants in the trial court) also moved to compel arbitration by way of applications styled as motions to dismiss filed November 10, 2023 and November 14, 2023, respectively.  In the event that the Court determines (as [...] contends) that the claims against [...] are properly subject to arbitration, then the claims against [...] and [...] should also be compelled to arbitration on the same basis.  they had not signed the Application and Client Agreement and therefore had not assented to the predispute arbitration agreement contained in that document.  (Da0063-Da0066).  Previously, there had been no indication at all that Plaintiffs contested their signatures or their agreement to arbitrate their disputes.  Given the factual question of their signature raised by Plaintiffs, [...] supplemented its motion by presenting the Court with a certification authenticating:  (1)  Five additional [...] Applications and Client Agreements that also reflected Plaintiffs’ signatures and that also contained predispute arbitration clauses with Plaintiffs’ electronic signature; (2) documentation (including screenshots) that reflected that Plaintiffs separately registered to be able to access their accounts online through the [...] Shareholder Account Manager (“SAM”) website, and thereby agreed to Terms of Use of that website that also contained an agreement to arbitrate.  (Da0071-Da0087).  [...] also submitted to the Court, by letter dated February 6, 2024, enlarged versions of the website screenshots embedded in the Certification of [...] in further support of the motion to compel.  (Da0493-Da0498).  During the February 7, 2024 in-person oral argument on the motions to compel, the trial court verbally indicated that Plaintiffs could be given added time to file surreply papers following [...]’s reply with certification, but Plaintiffs did not pursue this and did not submit anything rebutting [...]’s factual showings contained in that certification.  (1T37:23-1T38:19).2  The trial court reserved decision at the conclusion of oral argument.  (1T48:5-22).  Thereafter, [...] rendered his decision during an April 12, 2024 videoconference, and issued a written order denying the motions to compel arbitration the same day.  (Da0498-Da0500; 2T16:25-2T18:24).  [...] filed its Notice of Appeal on May 3, 2024 (Da0501-Da0505), and subsequently filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on May 8, 2024.  (Da0506-Da0510).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] THE RULING FROM APRIL 4, 2024 OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY, DOCKET NO. [...]  Submitted: September 16, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS I  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX  II  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  III  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT  4  1.  THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE UNDER NEW JERSEY RULE 4:67-1 4  2.  THIS IS NOT A CASE OF 'UPEPA'  5  3.  THE CONDITIONS TO CLAIM THIS CASE AS 'UPEPA' HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED  6  CONCLUSION
[brief] Attorneys can settle lawsuits based on two types of authority which are binding upon their client: “‘actual, either express or implied, and apparent authority. ’ ”  Burnett v. Cty. Of Gloucester, 415 N.J. Super. 506, 513 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Newark Branch, NAACP v. West Orange, 786 F. Supp. 408, 423 (D.N.J. 1992); Seacoast Realty Co. v. W. Long Branch Borough (Monmouth Cty), 14 N.J. Tax 197, 202-203 (1994).  An attorney has implied actual authority inasmuch as they are “‘authorized to do what [they] may reasonably infer the principal desires [them] to do in light of the principal’s manifestations and facts as [they] know or should know when [they act].’”
[directive] 24 complaint before the juvenile is in custody, the Assistant Prosecutor shall apply other provisions/presumptions contained in this Directive in making the summons versus warrant determination, including ascertaining the juvenile’s criminal history.  If a complaint-warrant is issued, the agency taking the juvenile into custody shall make certain the juvenile is fingerprinted in Live Scan, if statutorily required, and shall make certain that the fingerprint links to the juvenile and offense(s) for which a complaint has been issued, either electronically in eCDR, if available, or by contacting the [...] of the [...].
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................  3 QUESTION PRESENTED .........................................................  12 ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  12  I  BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD YET TO RUN AND THE COMPLAINT IS NOT FUTILE, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE REINSTATED AND THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 4:6-2(e) SHOULD BE VACATED  [Pa283]  ...........................................  12 CONCLUSION ............................................................................
[brief] For example, the Third Circuit refers to rules of the [...] (“[...]”) in support of its decision.  But, as explained above, [...] does not administer PIP arbitrations in New Jersey; [...] does under different rules.  Further, relying on these inapplicable [...] rules, and with no analysis of the applicable statutes, regulations, and rules, the Third Circuit jumped to the incorrect conclusion that a PIP arbitration can award all of the remedies an insurer is entitled to under the IFPA.
[brief] Adults have the constitutional right to marry, Loving v.  In its briefing below, the State attempted to obscure this fact, describing the case as involving a “teenager. ”  ACa75.  While that description is not incorrect, it also ignores the categorial distinction between minors and adults in connection with parental rights.  Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), to engage in consensual sexual relations, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and to view indecent material, Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), for example, yet almost every state in the union, including New Jersey, has laws prohibiting minors from engaging in these activities, see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 37:1–6 (prohibiting minors from marrying); N.J.S.A. 2C:14–3 (restricting sexual activity with minors); N.J.S.A. 2C:34–3 (prohibiting distribution of indecent material to minors).
[brief] United States District Court, D. N.J. (Not reported in Westlaw)  F. Supp.2d, 2013 WL 4047638  15  Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 896 no. 86-1430  12  Pharm. Sales & Consulting Corp. 106 F.Supp.2d 761, 764 (D.N.J.2000)  44  Rosa v. Araujo, 260 N.J. Super.458, 462 (App.Div. 1992) certif. denied, 133 N.J. 434 (1993)  8  Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment, 329 N. J. Super. 285, 293-94 11 (App.Div.2000)  9  Sourcecorp Inc. v. Croney, 412 F. App'x 455, 459 (3d Cir. 2011)  32 U.S. v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir.2000)  23 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374 (1978)  434 US 374 (1978)  34  Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Big Green Group, No. 19111500, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223742 at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2020)  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  I.  INDICTMENT AND PRETRIAL MOTIONS  On August 26, 2012, [...] was fatally shot in Atlantic City; [...] maintained he was in Oakcrest Estates in Mays Landing at the time.  On March 20, 2013, [...] charged him with murder and firearms offenses.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1),(2); 2C:39-4(a); 2C:58-4 (Da1-5)  At a July 3, 2013 status conference, trial counsel said he still needed video from ACPO and had called [...] to obtain it.  (3T6-10 to 18; 5T137-15 to 138-23)  On August 8 and 15, 2013, [...], J.S.C., granted motions to preserve evidence and compel all information.  (Da6-11)  Earley filed motions to suppress eyewitness identifications and to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s destruction of exculpatory evidence, or in the alternative, an adverse inference.  (Da12-13)  Each is explained below.
[brief] Parking on Fifth Street and Sixth Street Lots 26.  Plaintiff called several witnesses having specific and detailed recollections of parking on the Sixth Street Lot from the time the Congregation opened its doors in 1963 through the present, and witnesses who testified as to the impact of the 1972 addition to the [...] and interpretations as to the 1972 Site Plan, a site plan from 1993 and a survey from 2008.  (6T-8T; 13T-14T)  27.  The following facts were established in Plaintiff’s case-in-chief by the uncontroverted testimony of [...], a life-long member of the Congregation and daughter of the synagogue’s founding President:  The Sixth Street Lot has always been used for parking since the Congregation opened in 1963 to present, as it is closest to the entrance to the main synagogue.  The Fifth Street Lot was used for activities and events in the auditorium located off the Fifth Street Lot or when the Sixth Street Lot was full during holidays.  Additionally, Ms. Zagorin provided credible and detailed background of the circumstances surrounding the [...]’s deeding of its property to the Congregation and the 1963 Agreement wherein the [...] granted the Congregation easement rights in the Subject Property.
[brief] Defendants argue that the trial court erred because it “construed Ordinance No. 17-2017 to include prohibitions on the unamplified human voice such as family members speaking with each other or shouts of children playing; the clear terms of the Ordinance do not reach this far. ”  (Db43)  Similarly, they note that “While the trial court seems to opine that shouting children playing in a swimming pool or jumping on a trampoline would be prohibited noise nuisances under the ordinance, the language clearly reads otherwise.  …  A child playing and letting out an impulsive shout does not fall under the Ordinance. ”  (Db45)  While Defendants continue to argue that no summons would issue and such conversations would not be subject to the Noise Ordinance, the broad language of the Ordinance suggests otherwise.
[brief] (DA5)  On October 10, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to appeal.  On October 11, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion for an extension of time to file a brief in support of her motion for leave to appeal.  By Order dated October 23, 2023, this honorable court granted Petitioner’s motion for an extension of time.  On November 13, 2023, Petitioner filed a brief in support of her motion for leave to appeal.  (Pa116)  On November 16, 2023, [...] filed opposition to Petitioner’s motion for leave to appeal.  By Order dated December 12, 2023, the court denied Petitioner’s motion for leave to appeal.  (Pa150)  On February 14, 2024, [...] moved to dismiss Petitioner’s Complaint with prejudice due to Petitioner’s continued failure to retain counsel in accordance with the court’s prior orders.  (Pa151)  By Order dated March 1, 2024, [...] granted [...]’s motion and dismissed Petitioner’s Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] Petitioners advised [...] they could not persuade others from California to join the challenge.  That is also not true, since petitioners hail not only from California, but from New York, Florida, Brazil and Portugal.  The [...] Firm was not retained.  In the [...] Certification, [...] denied knowing anything harmful to petitioners.  But rather than hold a plenary hearing to resolve the parties' disparate factual positions, the lower court removed the [...] Firm from the case.  Based on the facts of record – and those known to appellants and the [...] Firm, the trial court disqualified the [...] Firm without legal or factual basis.  Essentially, the trial court not only reversed the burden of proof, but required the [...] Firm to prove a negative: that it had not received significantly harmful information.  New Jersey law strongly disfavors both requiring a party to prove a negative and disqualification.  The order of disqualification should be reversed.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: /s/ [...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 349152020  Dated: December 20, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Plaintiff-Respondent, : v. : [...], : Defendant-Appellant.
[directive] Reporting to Law Enforcement Executive  9.9.1  The internal affairs function should prepare periodic reports for the law enforcement executive that summarize the nature and disposition of all misconduct complaints the agency received.  This report should be prepared at least quarterly, but may be prepared more often as directed by the executive.  The report should include the principal officer; the allegation; the complainant; the age, sex, race and other complainant characteristics that might signal systematic misconduct by any member of the agency; and the investigation’s status.  9.9.2  Concluded complaints should be recorded and the reasons for termination explained.  9.9.3  This report shall be considered a confidential, internal work product.  Dissemination of the report should be limited to command personnel, the County Prosecutor, the appropriate authority, or a civilian review board that meets the minimum requirements for access to internal affairs information, if mandated by the governing body.  9.10
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT NEITHER ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING ROMA NOR ERRED IN ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (PA000105–PA000111).  If it does not dismiss this appeal, this Court should affirm the trial court’s order because [...] neither abused his discretion in reopening this case nor committed a legal error in holding Plaintiff’s [...] claims are “Released Claims” under the [...] Settlement Agreement.  1.
[brief] Appellant’s lengthy brief contains a lot of fluff and incorrectly interpreted authority that are irrelevant to the case at hand.  Appellant also lists plenty of facts in his principal brief as “undisputed”.  Many of these facts are not disputed, they are uncontested as there was no reason to contest them.  Appellant recites these facts as undisputed to argue that he must be correct if no one is responding to them.  This is not the case.  They are uncontested due to clear lack of relevance to the matter at hand.  This is a simple case that has been unnecessarily drawn out by narrative and time.
[brief] The governing body of a condominium association "has a fiduciary obligation to the unit owners 'similar to that of a corporate board to its shareholders.'"  *Siddons*, 382 N.J. Super. at 7 (quoting *Kim v. Flagship Condo. Owners Ass'n*, 327 N.J. Super. 544, 550, 744 A.2d 227 (App. Div. 2000)).
[directive] Core Principles 1  The Sanctity of Human Life and Serving the Community.  In serving the community, law enforcement officers (hereinafter “officers”) shall make every effort to preserve and protect human life and the safety of all persons.  Officers shall respect and uphold the dignity of all persons at all times in a non-discriminatory manner.  2  Force as a Last Resort and Duty to De-Escalate.  Force shall only be used as a last resort when necessary to accomplish lawful objectives that cannot reasonably be achieved through verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment or de-escalation techniques.  Force shall never be used as a retaliatory or punitive measure.  3  Duty to Use Only Objectively Reasonable, Necessary, and Proportional Force.  Officers shall use the least amount of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary and proportional to safely achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective under the circumstances.  4 Duty to Use Deadly Force Only as an Absolute Last Resort and Duty to Avoid Actions Which Create a Substantial Risk of Death or Serious Bodily Injury.  Deadly force shall only be used as an absolute last resort and in strict compliance with this Policy.  Other actions by law enforcement that create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury must be avoided or employed only under the strictest of conditions.  5  Duty to Intervene and Report.  Every officer, regardless of rank, title, seniority, or status, has an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent any use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with such policies, regulations, and laws, if possible, before a fellow officer uses excessive, illegal, or otherwise inappropriate force.  Every officer has a duty to immediately report any improper use of force.  6  Duty to Render Medical Assistance.  After any use of force, and when the environment is safe, officers shall promptly render medical assistance to any injured person consistent with the officer’s training and shall promptly request emergency medical assistance for that person, if needed or requested.  Officers also have a duty to monitor individuals for potential medical intervention after any officer uses force.  7  Duty to Report and Review Uses of Force.  Every use of force must be reported and receive a meaningful command level review as set forth in a written department policy that includes review by the law enforcement executive.  The law enforcement executive shall also conduct an annual review and analysis of the overall use of force by the department.
[brief] (T2/29:15-20).  [...]’s traffic engineer further noted that, under that scenario, the only option would be for that vehicle to back out into live traffic on Atlantic Avenue.  (T2/157:14-21).  Finally, [...]’s expert raised concerns that the proposed loading area may be too narrow for a loading van.  (See generally T2/126:10-130:16).  The Hearing Officer shared these concerns.  (T2/130:5-6).  Specifically, it was noted that the proposed loading area would be 8 feet, 11 inches wide and would allow for only “4 inches of clearance on either side of the mirrors when you’re trying to back off Atlantic Avenue, across the sidewalk and into this confined area, about 4 inches on either side.