ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It sent notice of the curative meeting on Wednesday, January 26, 2022, but only to the [...], not two of the Borough’s designated newspapers.  (Pa 165; ¶12 of the [...] Cert. I.)  The notice was published in the [...] on January 29, 2022, and included access information for the Zoom meeting but did not include an agenda and did not indicate whether formal action would be taken.  (Pa 173 and Pa 189.)  A copy of the transmittal notice from the Borough is not in the record.  On Friday, January 28, 2022, the Borough sent an e-mail notice of the Tuesday, February 1, 2022, curative reorganization special meeting to all its designated newspapers.  The notice indicated that an agenda was attached, but did not indicate whether formal action would be taken and did not provide information for the public to access the meeting, referring instead to the Borough website.  There was no directive not to publish.  (Pa 175.)  Since [...] publishes on Thursdays, a notice sent on a Friday for a meeting the following Tuesday could not possibly have been published in the newspaper and never was.  Moreover, since the Borough did not transmit the agenda to the Star Leger until January 28, 2022, at the earliest, the agenda was not included in the newspaper's January 29, 2022, publication of the special meeting notice sent to it on January 26th.  (Pa 173 and Pa 189.)  Thus, notice of the curative reorganization meeting held on February 1, 2022, was sent to and published in only one newspaper instead of two because it was not sent to [...] in a timely manner.  (Pa 165; ¶12 of the [...] Cert. I; Pa 173; Pa 175.)  Moreover, the agenda for the reorganization meeting was never published, whether prior to the January 4th meeting, prior to the January 11th special meeting or prior to the February 1st curative special meeting.  None of the special meeting notices disclosed whether formal action would be taken and the January 28, 2022, notice sent to the newspapers omitted Zoom access information.  (Pa 173.)
[brief] The within matter involves the [...]’s (“Defendant” or “Borough”) removal of a public official, [...], Commissioner of the [...] (“Plaintiff” or “Maloney”), for misconduct and/or neglect of duty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  Upon initial appeal to this Court, Maloney’s removal was reversed on procedural grounds and remanded for a ruling on the merits.  Upon remand, the Trial Court granted Maloney’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Borough’s motion for summary judgment.  The Borough now appeals.
[brief] Again, nothing in this broad provision limits the indemnity to third party claims.  See Boyle, supra, at *17; Cem Bus. Sols., Inc. v. BHI Energy, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2022), citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 255 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e cannot hold that first-party indemnification claims . . . are categorically barred as a matter of law in New Jersey absent direct authority to that effect. ”).  As part of his assurances, representations, and warranties in Section 3.2(b) of the 2014 SPA, [...] attested that consummation of the purchase would not “result in a breach of . . . any agreement, contract . . . or other arrangement to which Buyer [[...]] is a party or by which he is bound.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 36.  “[I]n order to give proper effect to the Legislature’s intent, a provision must be read sensibly within the entire legislative scheme of which it is part. ”  *Ibid.*  “When the plain meaning is unclear or ambiguous, [the court] next consider[s] extrinsic evidence of the Legislature’s intent, including legislative history and statutory context. ”  *Pontoriero*, 439 N.J. Super. at 36.  However, “[w]here plain language ‘leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then the interpretive process should end, without resort to extrinsic sources.
[brief] The targeted search and collection of [...]’s and [...]’s files are to be completed prior to the January 31, 2022 deadline for substantial completion of document production.  The parties may propose additional categories of relevant documents that are likely to be in [...]’s or [...]’s possession and not available through other data sources.  The joint proposed protocol is to identify any areas of disagreement between the parties.  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)
[brief] [(alteration in original)  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 38].  Therefore, the BMP Manual is clear that the [...] should have used the horizontal conductivity of the original soil.  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 36.  In response to [...]’s comments, [...] corrected the horizontal conductivity values to use the values of the native soils.  (Aa3022; Aa3066-Aa3090).  Using the native soil horizontal conductivity values, [...] found that the proposed recharge BMPS did not fail the groundwater mounding analysis.  (Aa3022; Aa3066-Aa3090).  However, in order to get the system to pass the groundwater analysis, [...] failed to follow the BMP Manual in calculating the seasonal high water table.  Pursuant to Chapter 12 of the BMP Manual, the determination of the seasonal high water table shall be taken at the highest level of the observed mottles or groundwater, whichever is higher.  BMP Manual, Chapter 12, Page 12.  Furthermore, “[w]hen the purpose of the soil tests is to determine the design soil hydraulic conductivity at the level of infiltration, the slowest of the test replicate results shall be used for design purposes. ”  BMP Manual, Chapter 12, Page 42.  Here, BMP 201 is a small-scale infiltration basin.  In order to find that the BMP 201 passed the groundwater mounding analysis, [...] used three different test pits with varying seasonal high water tables and infiltration rates in order to pass.  (Aa3066).  However, pursuant to Chapter 12 of the BMP Manual, the analysis should have used the highest seasonal high water table and the slowest infiltration rate for design purposes.  BMP Manual, Chapter 12, Page 12, 42.  As such, a review of the data should have meant that [...] only had a water table separation of 4. 2 feet.  (Aa3066).  Using the slowest infiltration rate as required would have resulted in a groundwater mounding of 7.5 feet.  (Aa3066).  7.5 feet groundwater mounding is greater than the 4.2 feet of separation, which means that BMP 201 would fail.  Therefore, using the analysis required pursuant to the BMP Manual shows that BMP 201 fails and does not pass the groundwater mounding analysis.  Using the same analysis required under the BMP Manual, BMP 271 shows only 2.2 feet of separation, and using the slowest infiltration rate, would result in a groundwater mounding of 2.6 feet.  (Aa3066).  Again, 2.6 feet rise of groundwater level is greater than 2.2 feet of separation between the bottom of the basin and the groundwater table, meaning that BMP 271 would also fail.  For these reasons, the project fails to meet the groundwater recharge requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4, and the [...]’s issuance of the FHA Permit is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be vacated and reversed.
[brief] In addition, the issue of the plaintiff/appellant’s standing to challenge redevelopment-related action has been addressed in lawsuits he has filed involving other municipalities.  In the case of Feld v. The City of Orange Township, et al. v. The City of Orange Township and [...]., (“Feld v. Orange”) Docket Nos. [...] and [...], Unpub., decided March 26, 205, 2014 WL 8277956 (WPa20), the Appellate Division addressed two related appeals in a single opinion.
[directive] 7.9.6  The monitoring of 9-1-1 telephone lines is required by law.  Nothing prohibits the monitoring of other telephones used exclusively for agency business if the agency can demonstrate a regulatory scheme or a specific office practice of which employees have knowledge.  In such instances a diminished expectation of privacy exists in the use of these telephones, and monitoring would be acceptable.  7.9.7  The New Jersey Wiretap Act applies only to oral, wire and electronic communications.
[brief] On or about March 3, 2023, a Petition was filed with the State Police Retirement Board on behalf of several retired and active New Jersey State Troopers.  Pa30.  On or about May 23, 2023, [...], filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, joining the previously filed Petition.  Pa56.  Pa58.  Pa60.  Pa63.  On or about July 7, 2023, the Division of Pensions administratively denied [...]’s appeal and the matter was transmitted to the State Police Retirement Board.  Pa63.  On or about July 26, 2023, the State Police Retirement Board issued an initial decision to deny [...]’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa24.  On or about September 6, 2023, [...] appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa16.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on November 29, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.  Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] Law enforcement executives shall not assign to the internal affairs function any person responsible for representing members of a collective bargaining unit.  The conflict of interest arising from such an assignment would be detrimental to the internal affairs function, the subject officer, the person so assigned, the bargaining unit and the agency as a whole.  4.2.6  Investigators must recuse from cases where they have a conflict of interest that may prevent them from being impartial in the investigation of a subject officer.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For all the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the [...]’s revised Brief of July 3, 2024, the provisions of the March 15, 2024 Order of the trial court granting reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement, and ordering payment by the [...] to [...] in the amount of $499,007.77 in retroactive fees as a result of said reformation, respectfully, must be reversed and set aside.
[brief] Specifically, even if a concurrent conflict exists under subsection (a), an attorney can still represent the client if (1) each affected client gives informed consent in writing after full disclosure, (2) the attorney believes that he or she can provide competent and diligent representation to each client, (3) the law does not prohibit the representation, and (4) representing the client does not involve asserting a claim by one of the attorney’s clients against another in the same case.  RPC 1.7(b)(1)-(4).  The [...] also note that, even where an RPC 1.7(a) conflict exists, disqualification is not mandatory, especially where disqualification would lead to an unjust result.
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S AUGUST 31, 2022  AWARD OF LEGAL FEES AND COSTS SHOULD BE REVERSED, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S FEE APPLICATION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT UNDER R. 4:42-9(a)(2) THAT THE EQUITIES OF THE CASE SUPPORTED FEE SHIFTING IN THIS CASE; PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE THAT THE LITIGATION BENEFITED BENEFICIARIES OTHER THAN HIMSELF; AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT’S CALCULATION OF THE LEGAL FEES THAT SHOULD BE AWARDED WAS NOT PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S RULINGS AND RELEVANT COURT RULES AND CASE LAW.
[brief] See id.  Moreover, a disclosure “to a single person or even to a small group of persons” as asserted here by Appellant regarding the letter vendor does not amount to an invasion of privacy under New Jersey law.  Nuamah-Williams v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC, 2022 WL 901525, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2022) (citing Castro v. NYT TV, 384 N.J. Super. 601, 611 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006)).  Publication deficiencies aside, Appellant’s claim also fails because “there was nothing unreasonable or offensive about [Respondent’s] conveyance of [Appellant’s] information to a letter vendor for the legitimate purpose of creating a collections letter.
[brief] The arbitration Agreement subject to this appeal complies with Atalese and must be enforced.  The Arbitration Agreement states the following:  ***  7.  Dispute Resolution/Waiver of Jury Trial.  If a dispute arises under this Agreement or from Participant’s use of the Premises or participation in the Activities, the Participant shall engage in good faith efforts to mediate a settlement prior to filing a demand for arbitration.  Should the dispute not be resolved by mediation, [...] and the Participant agree that all disputes, controversies, or claims arising out of the Participant’s use of the Premises or participation in the Activities shall be submitted to binding arbitration before and in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the [...] then in effect.  It is acknowledged, understood, and agreed that any such arbitration will be final and binding, and that by agreeing to arbitration, the parties are waiving their respective rights to seek remedies in court, including the right to a jury trial.  The parties waive, to the fullest extent permitted by law, any right they may have to a trial by jury in any legal proceedings directly or indirectly arising out of or relating to this Agreement, whether based in contract, tort, statute (including any federal or state statute, law, ordinance, or regulation), or any other legal theory.  It is expressly acknowledged, understood, and agreed that; arbitration is final and binding; the parties are waiving their right to seek legal remedies in court including the right to a trial by jury; pre-arbitration discovery generally is more limited than and different from that available in court proceedings; the arbitrator’s award is not required to include factual findings or legal reasoning; and any party’s right to appeal or vacate, or seek modification of the arbitration award is strictly limited by law.  It is understood, acknowledged and agreed that in any such arbitration, each party will be solely responsible for payment of his/her/its own counsel fees, with the costs of arbitration borne equally by the parties.  Any such arbitration will be conducted in the State of New Jersey and the law of the State of New Jersey will apply.  *** Pa0087-Pa0089.
[brief] Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 267 N.J. Super.  445 (App. Div. 1993).  Even if this Court considers the Certifications that Appellant submitted in response to the Motions for Summary Judgment, it is clear that her Certifications triggered the Sham Affidavit Doctrine\(^2\) as discussed in *Shelcusky v. Garjulio*, 172 N.J. 185 (2002).  This doctrine "refers to the trial court practice of disregarding an offsetting affidavit that is submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment when the affidavit contradicts the affiant's prior deposition testimony."  *Id.*  "The doctrine calls for rejection of the affidavit where the contradiction is unexplained and unqualified by the affiant."  *Id.*  In such instances, the allegedly disputed factual issue can be considered a sham, rather than an impediment to a summary judgment in favor of the moving party.  *Id.*  In this case, Appellant takes her Certification to the extremes and attempts to flatly contradict the entirety her earlier deposition testimony and written discovery long after the expiration of the discovery deadline.  It is also important that this Court take notice of what is not in Appellant’s Brief or in her Appendix – any effort undertaken by Appellant to amend her discovery responses prior to the Discovery End Date.  The reason why such information is absent is because she made no such effort.  This is also significant because R. 4:17-7 provides that if a party who has furnished answers to interrogatories thereafter obtains information that renders such answers incomplete or inaccurate, amended answers shall be served not later than --- \(^2\) Appellant incorrectly claims that the Trial Court rejected the Appellees’ Sham Affidavit argument.
[brief] 7 A. [...] Induces Plaintiffs To Invest [...]’s Life Savings With [...] .................................................................................................................  2 B. [...] Fails To Oversee And Monitor Its Employees, Allowing The Other Defendants To Perpetrate Fraud And Steal Over $1.4 Million Dollars From The Plaintiffs ................................................................. 9 C. [...] Attempts To Strongarm Plaintiffs To Arbitrate Their Claims Based On Agreements That Plaintiffs Never Reviewed Or Executed, Speculation, And Hearsay ......................................................... 10 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................
[brief] Several Board members also spoke on the topic in their individual capacities as private citizens.  On October 6, 2021, Respondents [...] and [...] appeared before the [...] and asked that the Township Committee remain neutral on the matter of the referendum.  (259a-260a.)  Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] noted that they were members of the [...], but did not say that they were acting on the Board’s behalf or that they spoke for the Board as a body.  (259a-260a.)  Respondent [...] also posted information regarding the referendum to Facebook on several occasions.  For each post, he provided a disclaimer that he was speaking as a private citizen, not as a Board member.  The disclaimer stated:  “I am a member of the [...] representing [...], but [] I am speaking as a private individual and not representing the Board. ”  (263a.)  Respondent [...] posted to the [...] on October 8, 2021.
[brief] New Jersey’s Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) protects certain of those rights and it prevents state agencies from unilateral rulemaking without input from impacted parties.  One of the most effective tools used by the [...]  (hereinafter “[...]” or “[...]”) to advance its objectives is to comment on rules proposed by state agencies before they are adopted.  Protection of the right to be heard in the rulemaking process is the reason why the [...] is participating in this matter.
[brief] ”  *E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP*, 361 N.J. Super. 362, 365 n. 1 (App. Div. 2003) aff’d, 179 N.J. 500 (2004); *Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist.*, 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3rd Cir. 2006)(trial court may consider “documents that are attached to or submitted with the complaint, and any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, and items appearing in the record of the case.
[brief] A good portion of this testimony was also applicable to the Grasso positive criteria, or how the variance will not offend the purpose of the height restriction, and will be consistent with the surrounding neighborhood.  This testimony will be summarized accordingly to avoid repetition.  See Section III(A)(2).  As a professional planner, [...] concluded that there is no evidence “that the 30-foot height limitation in the SM zone was intended to restrict warehouse distribution use because of traffic impacts. ”  (5T 79:14-23).  Rather, the Master Plan sought to address the special concerns associated with the higher-impact uses permitted in the GM Zone, which have a greater potential for off-site impacts, including “noise, dust, odors, and visuals. ”  Notably, “[t]raffic impacts are not cited in any way. ”  5T 78:3-25 through 80:1-7; see also Ja151.  The requested variance would not impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and ordinance as the Township’s governing body and land use boards have “recognized and acknowledged” over the past decade, “that building heights of 30 feet for warehouse distribution use were neither viable or appropriate. ”  (5T 67:1-9).  In support of his conclusion, [...] cited a “series” of height variance approvals for the SM Zone, all warehouses with building heights of 45 feet or taller.
[brief] According to the Union, the Arbitrator did not create a new work rule that does not appear in the CBA, but rather determined, based on the specific facts before him, that [...] should have pursued alternatives such as placing [...] on temporary suspension, obtaining medical information from an alternative source, or pursuing other alternatives short of termination.  The Union further notes that the Arbitrator’s decision would have allowed [...] to terminate an employee with a permanent disability or long-term medical condition.  (Db15)  In truth, the Union’s attempt to justify the Arbitrator’s decision only further draws attention to its fatal flaws.
[brief] This is not a new principle, but one enunciated by the Supreme Court as far back as 1856 in *State v. Governor*, 25 N.J.L. 331 (1856).  There, the question was whether the Governor was required to issue a commission (certificate of election) to a candidate for sheriff when it was determined after the official election results had been certified by the board of canvassers that the election results as certified was based on incorrect and false evidence.  The Court held that the official results stood unless overturned by the appropriate writ, and chastised the board of county canvassers for going beyond their lawful authority.  *Id.* at 348-49.  In 1904, the Supreme Court held in *Darling v. Murphy*, 70 N.J.L. 435 (1904), that only canvassers can declare a winner of an election, and in a recount there is no power to change the results, even where the parties learned that fraudulent votes had replaced valid votes.  The remedy was an election contest (or the equivalent at that time).  Remnants of that distinction are still apparent in the differences between a recount and election contest today.
[brief] 44 State v. Branch, 301 N.J. Super. 307 (App. Div. 1997), rev’d o.g., 155 N.J. 317 (1998) .........................................................  40 State v. Bryant, 288 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 (1996) .........................................................  38 State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 2022), aff’d as modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2023) ................................. 16, 30, 36 State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118 (2017) ....................................  15, 17, 18, 25 State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997) ........................................  32 State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194 (1990) ......................................  38 State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265 (1986) .................................. 15, 17, 26 State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321 (2019) .......................................  33 State v. Culkin, 97 Hawai’i 206, 35 P.3d 233 (2001) ...............
[directive] Due process concerns can impose limits on pretrial detention.  Courts look to various considerations to assess that type of due process challenge, not just the length of detention.  The fact-specific inquiry called for is best conducted on an individual basis in order to balance the relevant factors and assess the level of risk each defendant presents.  By contrast, broad-based relief for large categories of defendants could sweep in cases in which release from detention would not be appropriate.  The Court declines to grant relief on a categorical basis for other reasons as well.  Movants argue that prolonged detention before trial could raise serious due process concerns, but they do not contend the statutory scheme is unconstitutional at this time.  As a result, the doctrine of judicial surgery, which is designed to save an otherwise unconstitutional statute, is not available.  Nor can the Court exercise its rulemaking authority to amend the substance of the Act.