ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] One of the many examples of this is found in I/M/O [...], [...] (Consolidated) (Nov. 16, 2021), in which the Commission held:  Complainants alleged that on April 12, 2019, Respondent shared a Facebook post from the “Rant Nation with [...]” site to his personal Facebook page.  The shared post appears to link to a video purporting to show United States Representative [...].  The post additionally contains a picture of Congresswoman Omar wearing a hijab – a head scarf worn by many Muslim women.  In sharing the post, Respondent commented, “Terrorist ... 100%.”  […]  In finding a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), [...] appropriately concluded that Respondents action constituted “private action that may compromise the Board.
[brief] (Da543-Da544).  [...] Board members discussed how the [...] might gain a litigation advantage in such a case.  The “solution:” a possible a criminal complaint alleging that [...] had been seen breaking an [...]-owned fence and trespassing over [...]-owned land.  (Da2543).  On August 2, 2019, Defendants removed the [...]’ at-grade dune walkover and installed a wooden fence that blocked access to the [...] Beach Lands the [...] had enjoyed since their purchase of the Premises in 2000.  (Da543).  On that same date, Defendants’ counsel threatened to prosecute the [...] if they interfered with the fence and walked on that portion of the [...] property.
[brief] Prior to summation, counsel for [...] requested that he be able to reference the lack of a battery claim against [...], and there was no objection.  Specifically, counsel noted that Plaintiffs were alleging that [...] intentionally punched [...], whereas the jury had not been instructed that they could find [...] liable for battery.  [11T 4:19 – 5:7].  Plaintiffs’ counsel did not voice an objection, and the trial court agreed that [...] could address the absence of a battery claim in closing.  [11T 4:19 – 5:7].  Counsel then told the jury that [...] was not alleging a battery by [...], but merely that [...] was negligent.  [11T 58:24-59:8].  Counsel for [...] did not state that [...] initially pled battery and dismissed the claim.  Plaintiffs’ counsel did not voice an objection during or after the summation.  [11T 58:24-59:18, 86:24-87:24].  Therefore, Plaintiffs need to establish plain error.
[brief] Moreover, the only authority that [...] had ever cited in either version of its motion to dismiss was *NJ State Chamber of Commerce v. NJ Election Law*, 82 N.J. 57 (1980) (but [...] had only cited just one sentence of this authority, which did not even remotely suggest that we did not have standing – that cited sentence was this: “Among the considerations when a Court reviews standing is … the relationship of plaintiffs to the subject matter of the litigation …”).  However that very same authority, which [...] had cited to support its position, actually only further supported my position that we did have standing!  That is, in *NJ State Chamber of Commerce*, this Court held that even though the Plaintiffs only had an “indirect interest” in the subject matter of that litigation, they did in fact have standing, as the "circumstances adequately demonstrate that plaintiffs have a stake in the outcome of these proceedings and there is genuine adverseness between the parties in terms of the litigated controversy".  *NJ State Chamber of Commerce v. NJ Election Law*, 82 N.J. 57, 68 (1980) (citing *Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp.*, 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971)).  [emphasis added]  Thus the trial court’s award of frivolous litigation sanctions was clearly in error, as for purposes of imposing sanctions under *Rule 1:4-8*, an assertion is deemed "frivolous" when "'no rational argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not supported by any credible evidence, or it is completely untenable.'"  *First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez*, 391 N.J.Super. 419, 432 (App.Div. 2007) (quoting *Fagas v. Scott*, 251 N.J. Super. 169, 190 (Law Div. 1991)).
[brief] VI.  The Penalty  The record from the previous trial is clear – Defendant’s initial “justification” for stopping the monthly support payments was his false allegation that the Settlement Agreement was not signed.  (2T 52:1-53:13)  It had nothing whatsoever to do with the $70,000.  The Court’s Order following trial enforced the Settlement Agreement.  It enforced the $1500 per month support payment from Defendant to Plaintiff, which he ceased paying in July 2017 and only resumed paying in July 2021.  (A25)  It enforced the contractual $100 per day penalty for late payment of support from Defendant to Plaintiff, support which has still not been paid nearly 2500 days later.  (A17)  It enforced the payment from Defendant to Plaintiff for the cell phone in the amount of $1450.  (A25)  And it enforced Plaintiff’s repayment to Defendant of $70,000 plus 1% annual interest from June 2014 through June 2020 through credit/offset.  (A17)  The trial testimony confirms that Plaintiff never denied that she owed Defendant $70,000 pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and that if she did not pay it within three years she would be charged 1% annual interest on that amount.
[directive] Step 1.  Identify the Difficult/Distal • Show up to Court • Participate in creating treatment goals • Abstinence • Be honest • Progress toward treatment goals • Meet requirements for phase • Report to Probation • Progress toward treatment level of advancement care • Be home for all scheduled address • Pro-social activities verifications and home visits •  Explore employment/education • Attend treatment sessions opportunWesorneeds • Attend peer support groups •  Make consistent contributions to financial obligations/adhere to payment plan .  Response Level Step 2.
[brief] Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 541-42 (1995) (quoting Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229, 240-41 (1957)).  In light of the important interests at stake when a party seeks summary judgment, the motion court must carefully evaluate the record in light of the governing law, and determine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  R. 4:46–2(c).  For purposes of the Court’s review related, the Court must “accept as true” the complaint’s factual assertions.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)(The Court “must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord him the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom. ”).  The motion court draws all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.  R. 4:46–2(c); see also Durando v. Nutley Sun, 209 N.J. 235, 253 (2012) (noting “courts construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in a summary judgment motion” (quoting Costello v. Ocean Cty. Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 615 (1994))); Brill, 142 N.J. at 536 (explaining “[o]n a motion for summary judgment the court must grant all the favorable inferences to the non-movant”).
[brief] There is nothing “that would preclude a municipality from requiring compliance with its own local land use ordinances, in addition to compliance with the minimum standards of the Plan, provided the ordinance does not conflict with the plan or regulate a matter controlled by the Plan. ”  Id.  “The goal of both the Pinelands Protection Act and the Comprehensive Management Plan is to promote orderly development in the Pinelands Region so as to protect, preserve and enhance the significant and unique resources of that region. ”  Id.  There is “nothing in either the act or Plan which prevents a municipality from adopting and enforcing more restrictive standards ...”  Id.  [...] ordinances 380-33 C. (6) and (7) and 380-35 D. do not conflict with the Comprehensive Management Plan and do not regulate a matter controlled by the Plan.
[brief] In that case, however, the commercial drafter carved out the right to bring an action in court to enforce its foreclosure remedies but otherwise agreed to submit its claims to arbitration.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, in upholding the arbitration agreement in that case:  “Other courts that have found similar provisions not unconscionable have noted the unique nature of the judicial remedies of foreclosure and similar actions. ”  *Delta Funding*, 189 N.J. at 116.  Of course, it makes sense to allow the commercial party access to the courts in order to enforce legal rights that an arbitrator cannot award -- such as a foreclosure remedy.  *See Delta Funding*, 189 N.J. at 116.  Nonetheless, this case does not concern a provision involving a remedy unavailable to Defendant through arbitration.  Defendant purportedly has reserved the right to file an action in court to collect amounts it claims due to it under the contract – money damages, which is a remedy that an arbitrator can award.
[brief] ”  Defs.’ Br. 24.  However, the trial court neither stated that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims were barred for lack of a private right of action nor provided any analysis as to how Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA fail as a matter of law.  Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims fails because they are based in state law, i.e., the NJCFLA.  A state licensing requirement is strictly a creature of state law, not federal law.  State law prescribes the remedy for noncompliance, not federal law.  Accordingly, there is no claim in this case that “the [collector] has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt. ”  *Midland Funding LLC, supra* (emphasis added).  Defs.’ Br. 25 (emphasis in original).  Defendants’ citation to *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016), is misleading because *Thiel* did not hold that FDCPA violations cannot arise from state law, and the cited passage is simply stating the elements of an FDCPA claim (as opposed to supporting Defendants’ position).  Germane to this issue, *Thiel* found for the consumers based on FDCPA violations arising from state law, i.e., enforcement of time-barred debts under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code; the distinction made in *Thiel* was *enforceable* versus *valid*.  *Id.*; see also *Jackson v. Midland Funding, LLC*, 754 F. Supp. 2d 711, 714 (D.N.J. 2010) (“pursuing a lawsuit which the debt collector knows or should know is *time-barred* violates the *FDCPA*”) (emphasis in original); *Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC*, 882 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 2018) (“the least-sophisticated debtor could be misled into thinking that ‘settlement of the debt’ referred to the creditor's ability to enforce the debt in court rather than a mere invitation to settle the account”).
[brief] Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020).  Nothing in the record showed [...] on notice of anything.  Next, the court’s statement that [...]’s closing was “arguably within the three-month statutory period for [...] to redeem,” is a legal error to which no deference is due.  There is no post-judgment right of redemption; what exists is a deadline for filing a motion to vacate judgments after three months.  N.J.S. 54:5-104.64, 54:5-105.  Simply, the right to redeem was barred by the judgment and remains barred unless a motion to vacate is timely filed and granted on the merits.  It is not a get-out-of jail-free card for a defendant just to file a motion; that motion must be meritorious and it must prevail.  Compare Resolution Trust, supra, 263 N.J.Super. at 340-341.  In denying reconsideration, the trial court stated  The reasons for which the court granted the motion to vacate the final judgment were anchored in the timing of the motion to vacate (less than three months from the recording of the final judgment) as well as the fact that intervenor purchased the property by way of quitclaim deed on the same date defendant filed its motion to vacate.  Moreover, the purchase was for nearly $130,000.00 in excess of the redemption amount and after defendant invested almost $30,000.00 in rehabilitation costs.  Thus, the alleged “bona fides” of intervenor’s purchase did not tip the scales in favor of [...].  [Ia511].  The court conflated the statutory time period to timely file a motion with the statutory right to redeem, which are wholly different.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER IGNORED THE PRIVITY SHOWN BY THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN [...] AND [...] AND DID NOT FIND THAT [...] HAD PROVEN DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE  “Estoppel is an equitable doctrine, founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law, that prohibits a party from repudiating a previously taken position when another party has relied on that position to his detriment. ”  Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 354 (1999) (quoting Siate v. Kouvatas, 292 N.J. Super. 417, 425 (App. Div. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[directive] Additionally, all defendants must be permitted to leave their residence to meet with their attorneys.  Due to the inherent need for some flexibility in these meetings, release orders need not specifically detail dates and times of attorney appointments.  However, the court must at minimum order that defendants shall provide [...] with no less than 48-hours’ notice prior to their attorney appointment.  Notice must include the time and location of the meeting.  This advanced notice is paramount in ensuring accurate monitoring of defendants on HDLE, Strict HD, or HDEM.  Instructions
[brief] It used language that, on its face, bars debt collectors from communicating information about debtors to letter vendors.  Defendant […] argues that Congress could not have meant what it said and asks the Court to interpret the statute in the way that [Defendant] thinks Congress must have meant.  But the Court must assume that Congress meant what it said, and it will enforce the statute that way.  *Khimmat* at 710 (internal citations omitted).  The court in *Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC*, 606 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (E.D. Wash. 2022) also concluded the communication with a mail vendor violates the FDCPA.  As *Hunstein I* and *II* had done, *Jackin* at 1039: recognize[d] the economic burden that its holding may have on Defendant, as Defendant can no longer legally outsource its collection efforts to commercial mail vendors in the same manner.  But the Court must take Congress at its word, which here bars Defendant’s outsourcing practice.
[brief] The Board’s essential finding in its Resolution is that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof and the Board was therefore obliged to deny the application.  Ja033.  The Board did not rely upon evidence or testimony presented by objectors to make its decision.  Instead, the Board weighed the affirmative evidence presented by Plaintiffs under the standards applicable to height variances under Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004), as detailed below under heading III., and found that evidence to be unpersuasive.
[brief] 1.  **Principal buildings** shall not exceed **175’ in length**, whereas, an existing building is **384.8’ in length**.  2.  The **multifamily dwelling setback** from an accessory drive and internal roadways is required to be **35’**, whereas, **10.5’** exists currently.  3.  The **principal building setback** from the parking area is required to be **20’**, whereas, **11’** exists currently.  4.  Building must have **no more than two dwelling units** in a line without setbacks and/or breaks in building elevation of at least five feet, whereas, **none** are provided on the property currently.
[brief] In a previous transaction, three years earlier, the pair discussed an owner who, like [...], claimed he was not served at 173a-174a:  [12/15/19, 7:46:47 PM]  ✷: He filed a motion [12/15/19, 7:53:16 PM]  [...] [...]: What kind?  He wasn't served?  [12/15/19, 7:53:30 PM]  [...] [...]: He has clear title?  [12/15/19, 7:53:38 PM]  ✷: Claim he was out of the country [12/15/19, 8:09:49 PM]  [...]  [...]: I can buy and fight him?  [12/15/19, 8:10:34 PM]  ✷: He offered me a good settlement [12/15/19, 8:14:59 PM]  ✷: 125k [12/17/19, 7:17:20 PM]  [...] [...]: Would you let me buy it for 125k [12/17/19, 7:18:06 PM]  [...] [...]: I have no risk , I can fight him and still get the 125k back (emphasis added)  This is a clear example of the callous disregard for service and due process that [...] and [...] have towards innocent owners who have not been served.  They have done this to owners before and continue to do so with impunity operating under the belief that they, in their own words, have no risk.  No protection should be afforded to those who do business with f disregard for the rights of others - they are not innocent third parties who need the protection of this Court.
[brief] Surely a business entity can be, and frequently is, a consumer in the ordinary meaning of that term.  Since a business entity is also a "person" entitled to recover under the Act, there is no sound reason to deny it the protection of the Act.  There is similarly no justification to limit the Act ... to sales and advertising of merchandise for "personal, family or household use."  Such a reading would fly in the face of the statutory definitions of "merchandise" and "person" entitled to sue.  [Hundred East Credit, 212 N.J.Super. at 355-356, multiple citations omitted.]
[brief] The trial court held that all of Appellants’ claimed damages “relate directly to their loss of the Solar Project. ” (Pa003045).  Indeed, the trial court reasoned that if Appellants “had not defaulted under the Lease, they would have the Solar Rights and the Solar Project, and the subject action would be moot. ” (*Id.*).  In the end, the “loss of the Property was the direct and proximate result of Plaintiffs’ failure to cure the default under the Lease with [...]. ” (Id.)  For the solar rights asserted by the Appellants, the trial court found that "[...] did not void the [solar] rights; [...] did so once Plaintiffs lost control of the Property where the Solar Project was to be built. ” (Pa003046).  The trial court also reasoned that Appellants failed to “establish the requisite causal link between a breach of the NDA and Plaintiffs' default under the Lease and subsequent loss of their Solar Rights. ” (Id.).  “If a developer does not have this land interest, its approvals to connect to the grid are voidable if the [...], [...], or the [...] learn that the entity does not exercise control over that land. ”  (Id.)  The Court also dismissed the remaining counts for the same reasons.
[directive] (d) a fleeing suspect, if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.  3.7.2  Officers shall reevaluate the situation and reassess the need to use force before any second or subsequent firing or discharge or utilization of drive stun mode of the device against the same person.  Any second or subsequent firing or discharge or utilization of drive stun mode of the device must be necessary and justified by the circumstances at that moment.  3.7.3  CEDs shall not be utilized in the following manner: (a) against a person in drive stun mode more than twice unless deadly force would be authorized and permitted pursuant to this Policy; (b) against a handcuffed subject unless deadly force would be authorized and permitted pursuant to this Policy; (c) against the operator of a moving vehicle unless deadly force would be authorized and permitted pursuant to this Policy; (d) to prevent a subject from damaging property; or (e) against a person simultaneously with two or more CEDs.
[brief] The Authority has no qualms about acknowledging arbitrator’s have the right, and always have, [to] interpret[] just cause where the term was ambiguous, was not defined.  However, in -- in this particular case and in all cases, arbitrator’s in interpreting just cause cannot violate specific terms of the contract.  ...  In this case, the arbitrator didn’t merely interpret just cause.  He introduced a brand new standard of performance based upon his own personal opinion, not based upon anything within the four corners of the contract.  [...]’s counsel then referenced the provisions of the CBA providing that [...] maintains the right to “determine [employees’] qualification and conditions of continued employment.
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION On Appeal From a Judgment Of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth Vicinage  Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. and a Jury  Your Honors:  This reply letter-brief and appendix are submitted on behalf of Defendant in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).
[brief] __________________________ about the financial circumstances of the parties in striving to render a fair and equitable judgment”).  Immediately after the representation by [...] and his lawyer, [...] announced, “I find that the parties have entered into an agreement that resolves all the issues in the divorce.  They’ve done so voluntarily without coercion or duress” (25T11).  And [...]’s Final Judgment of Divorce entered that day provides, “The Court having found that each party entered into such agreement freely and voluntarily”  A16.  There was no evidence that supported that judicial finding other than the lie of “independent counsel” (which was not credible evidence by definition).  [...] did not appear at any point in the case; no attorney appeared on her behalf.  [...]’s only participation in the case was her signature on the “waiver” that attorney [...] extracted from her two days before plaintiff’s Complaint was even filed ([...] affirmed in her testimony to [...] that she did not even know that [...] had obtained a divorce judgment from a court in March of 2015, since they continued to live together as husband and wife for the next 18 months, until August 2017).  That lie that [...] and his lawyer told the family judge who entered Final Judgment of Divorce shows that Rule 4:50 relief is warranted to the affected spouse, see Rule 4:50-1(c) (judgment may be vacated if obtained by "fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party”).  The following defects --- 6  [...] implicitly acknowledges that he and his lawyer lied to [...] at the March 18 default judgment hearing.  In claiming to [...] that [...] fully understood the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement she signed in only show further why the entire process leading to the Final Judgment, orchestrated by the far more experienced and sophisticated spouse with the help of the [...] firm, was so improper and unfair to [...].
[brief] [...] testified to the ultimate issue – that [...] committed an aggravated assault on [...] – three times during direct examination.  He first stated that he saw [...] “grab [[...]] to arrest him for agg. assault on a police officer” inside of the restaurant, and repeated this, stating, “at that point he was going to be placed under arrest for disorderly conduct and agg. assault on a police officer. ”  (6T:143-8 to 13; 145-12 to 17)  Regarding the altercation outside the restaurant, [...] testified that they ultimately arrested Mr. [...] “for disorderly conduct, agg. assault, and resisting arrest. ”  (6T:158-20 to 24)  Similarly, [...] testified that he wanted to arrest Mr. [...] after Mr. [...] allegedly punched him because “it’s aggravated assault on a police officer. ”  (7T:80-6 to 15, 81-7 to 8)  As in Simms and Reeds, the officers’ statements were “tantamount to a legal conclusion” and openly pronounced Mr. [...] guilty of the offenses that he was charged with.  See 224 N.J. at 407 (quoting Reeds, 197 N.J. at 297).  Furthermore, the officers’ testimony tracked the statutory language of the charged offenses, invading the province of the jury.  Ibid.  While the officers could testify to what they saw – for instance, that they saw Mr. [...] hit [...] – they could not testify that Mr. [...] committed the charged crime.  The two officers’ four total statements that Mr. [...] had committed aggravated assault on a police officer were clearly capable of producing an unjust result.