ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL AGENCY DECISION OF THE [...]  Brief and Appendix of Respondent  Board of Trustees, Public Employees’ Retirement System  Date Submitted: March 14, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY [...] [...] [...]  Attorney for Respondent Board of Trustees, Public Employees’ Retirement System [...]  [...] [...] Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel [...] (ID:299912019)  Deputy Attorney General On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS........ 1 ARGUMENT THE BOARD REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT [...] IS INELIGIBLE FOR PERS SERVICE CREDIT AS MUNICIPAL PROSECUTOR FOR [...] UNDER N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(b) .................................. 23 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................
[directive] Specifically, the revised Guidelines provide that a prosecutor in certain circumstances must require a defendant to plead guilty to the weapons offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 in addition to pleading guilty to the underlying drug distribution-type offense, thereby resulting in the imposition of consecutive sentences on the two convictions.  See Section 11.4.  This option must be used in all cases where the defendant has brandished, displayed, discharged or threatened the use of a firearm at any time during the course of committing a drug distribution-type offense, or if a firearm was on the person or in the immediate control of the defendant at the time of the offense or arrest.  The prosecutor must also invoke the consecutive sentencing feature of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 in all cases where the defendant was found to be in actual, joint or constructive possession of an assault firearm or a machine gun.
[brief] [...] and [...] (Petitioners), two citizens of this State, petition this court to exercise its original jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 to -7 to invalidate Chapter 375 due to alleged procedural irregularities in the statute’s enactment.  The facts are straightforward.  On January 6, 2022, identical bills, S49 and A6260, were introduced contemporaneously in the New Jersey Senate and General Assembly, and received their first and second readings.  Four days later, on January 10, 2022, the Senate gave S49 its third reading, passed it, and delivered it to the General Assembly.  Following receipt of S49, the General Assembly gave S49 two readings, and consistent with the Assembly’s rules, substituted S49 for the Assembly’s identical bill, A6260.  The Assembly then gave S49 a third reading, passed it, and sent it to the Governor for his approval.  Petitioners assert that this process violated N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6, which requires that a full calendar day elapse between the second and third readings of a bill.  But they are wrong.  As the Supreme Court held over 40 years ago, this common legislative practice of substituting one identical bill for another fully satisfies the constitutional requirements so long as the substantive contents of the bills remain unchanged and are before each house of the Legislature for the requisite period of time.  Thus, A6260/S49 followed the prescribed constitutional procedure in each house and was duly enacted into law.  Petitioners also assert that the Legislature failed to follow various statutory prerequisites for the enactment of legislation, but those claims should be rejected.  Centuries of black letter law teach that one legislature cannot bind its successors, so Petitioners’ claims fail on their face.  But even if they were considered, the Legislature’s procedures complied with all applicable requirements for the passage of legislation.  Petitioners bear a heavy burden in seeking to invalidate legislation duly enacted by the elected representatives of this State and signed by the Governor.  Their only path forward under N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 to -7 is to show that the mechanics by which the bill was enacted did not comply with the Constitution.  But their arguments here have been firmly foreclosed by settled precedent of the Supreme Court.  Their petition should be dismissed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] On February 3, 2022, Township Engineer, [...], PE, PP, CME (“Vogt”) submitted an engineer review letter.  (Ia99)  The application was revised to address Vogt’s comments regarding drainage.  (Ia107)  A second engineer review letter was issued on March 31, 2022.  (Ia129)  Vogt, in both letters, noted that the application contained two (2) design waivers from UDO §18-803 (D) and UDO §18-805(c), both of which are located within Chapter 18, Article 8, which reads “design standards.
[brief] “For an opinion to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 702, the expert must utilize a technique or analysis with ‘a sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results so as to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth. ’”  State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 409 (2017) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 210 (1984)).
[directive] 고지:  이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로  대중에게 제공됩니다.  그러므로, 이 문서에 소셜 시큐리티 번호, 운전면허증 번호, 차량 번호판 번호, 보험증권 번호, 사용 중인 금융계좌 번호, 또는 사용 중인 신용카드  번호 등 개인의 신원을 확인할 수 있는 정보를 기재하지 마십시오.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] A contrary rule would abrogate the New Jersey Constitution, which vests in each successive Legislature the “legislative power,” a power that is plenary, discretionary, and exclusive.  N.J. Const., art. IV, §1, ¶ 1.  And because “the will of a particular” legislature “does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years,” Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 333 (1932), “general principles of statutory construction dictate that when “two statutes conflict, . . . the latter governs,” Dep’t of Transp. V. PSC Resources, Inc., 159 N.J. Super. 154, 163 (Law Div. 1978).  In other words, “[i]f the two acts are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act operates to repeal the earlier to the extent of the repugnancy. ”  Bruck v. Credit Corp., 3 N.J. 401, 408 (1950).
[brief] 1.  On or about February 22, 2006, the [...] adopted the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan.  2.  On or about June 21, 2017, the [...] adopted an Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan (informally referred to as Amendment No. 1).  (Respectfully, the said Amendment has no significant impact on the within proceedings).  3.  Representatives of the [...] thereafter considered the adoption of a second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan (informally referred to as “Amendment No. 2”).  4.  The [...] officially introduced an Ordinance (Ordinance No. 1667) amending the aforesaid Beachway Avenue Redevelopment Plan.  (Amendment No. 2)  5.  Per the requirements of the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law, any amendment to a Redevelopment Plan is required to be referred to the Planning Board, so that the Planning Board can hold a Public Hearing and determine if the proposed Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  6.  The Respondent Planning Board conducted such a Public Hearing on or about February 8, 2021.  7.  After a debate/discussion/analysis, the Planning Board Members unanimously determined that the proposed second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  8.  Given that the Borough Council Ordinance adoption date (on the proposed second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan) was scheduled for on or about February 17, 2021, and given that the next Planning Board meeting date was scheduled to occur after the proposed Ordinance adoption date, the Planning Board Members specifically authorized the Board Attorney to memorialize its decision/conclusion, in the form of a written letter.  9.  In conjunction with the above point, the Respondent Planning Board Members specifically authorized the Planning Board Attorney to forward the letter (memorializing the Board’s decision and findings associated therewith), to the Borough Clerk.  10.  The Planning Board Attorney prepared and sent a detailed letter to the Borough Clerk, advising that the Planning Board found Amendment No. 2 to be consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  Pa 573 (Exhibit J5)  11.  The said letter from the Board Attorney, dated on or about February 17, 2021, accurately and sufficiently identified the findings and conclusions of the Planning Board Members, and the reasons associated therewith.  12.  Thereafter, on or about February 17, 2021, the Borough Council of the [...] adopted an Ordinance amending the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan.  (Amendment No. 2) (Ordinance No. 1667) Pa 68 13.  For the reasons set forth herein, and for the reasons set forth in the communication from the Board Attorney (dated February 17, 2021, the aforesaid Determination of the Respondent Board (holding that Amendment No. 2 to the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Master Plan) was correct and appropriate.  Procedural History
[brief] ”  [FEDa123]; •  In dismissing Count 3 (fraud), Count 4 (conversion), and Count 6 (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) of the First Amended Complaint, “[...]’ actions did nothing to destroy [Appellants’] rights to receive the ‘fruits’ of the contract.  The ‘fruits’ at issue would be the profits [Appellants] would earn from their development and/or sale of their Solar Project.  However, [Appellants’] own default of payment under the Lease for the Property on which the Solar Project was to be built destroyed the possibility for [Appellants] to have ‘fruits’ arise from the project. ”  [FEDa124]; •  In dismissing Count 5 of the First Amended Complaint (unjust enrichment), “[Appellants] failed to make the required payments under the Lease and, as a result, the Lease was terminated, and [Appellants] lost site control of the Property and Solar Rights.
[brief] Please accept this letter in lieu of a more formal reply brief in support of the appeal of Defendant [...] from the denial of his motion to suppress.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ..................................................................................................................1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I BECAUSE [...] TWICE FABRICATED HIS TESTIMONY, ONLY TO FINALLY ADMIT THAT HE COULD NOT RECALL WHERE HE WAS LOCATED WHEN OBSERVING MEJIA’S ALLEGED MOTOR VEHICLE INFRINGEMENT, ALL OF HIS TESTIMONY IS INCREDIBLE AND THE STATE CANNOT SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THIS WARRANTLESS STOP WAS LAWFUL (1T 7-11 through 30-5).
[brief] [...] credibly clarified that there was no chance Appellant may have said that Appellant was actually on his way to Florida, and that Appellant outright stated, “I’m in Florida. ”  [3T60:19-22].  [...] concluded that [...] was a credible witness.  [Pa30].  [...] found Appellant’s behavior to be so odd and evasive that [...] felt it was necessary to inform [...] about this interaction as part of the Investigation.  [3T25:3-22].  [...] specifically believed that Appellant was being deceptive and not telling the truth.  [3T26:4-11].  Even if Appellant’s version of this event is true (alleging he was only on his way to Florida, not actually in Florida, and turned around and returned to New Jersey), Appellant still admits to violating the Sick Leave Policy because he neither requested nor received written permission to attend his stepfather’s funeral.  [Da13; 3T23:14-19].  The FNDA also found that Appellant violated the Truthfulness Policy by lying to [...] about Appellant’s location on November 29, 2018.  [Pa97].  The Irrelevant Facebook Incident
[brief] I know we talk about inherently beneficial use, but I am not certain that the residents of [...] or those poor children are going to be denied hot water, because we don't put a regulator station in.  Because, based on the testimony, things seem to be running perfectly fine at this moment.  So I don't see any inherently beneficial use.  I think the negatives outweigh the positive.  I think the negatives are based on testimony from the professionals, from the gas company themselves that there are, in fact, get by the safety issue, but it is so close to the roadway and the site visit really magnified how close it is to the roadway there.
[brief] 1.  **Gola Home Invasion** (Counts 41 to 54)  On February 28, 2011, two armed men entered a residence in Cherry Hill when four children were in the home.  *Id.* at 330.  The two sleeping children were left undisturbed, but the men committed kidnapping when they tied the hands of a 14 year old and a 13 year old behind their backs, and when the children's parents came home about an hour later, the men demanded money at gunpoint.  *Id.*  Both parents' hands were tied behind their backs.  *Id.* at 331.  As soon as the men left, [...] was able to slip out of his restraints and release his wife's and daughters' hands.  *Ibid.*  [...] testified that his children were "fright[ened]," but otherwise unharmed.  (11T at 31-20)  The perpetrators had been "chit-chatting" with them.  (11T at 31-21)  Assault charges related to [...]'s children were dismissed by the State after the close of the State's case.  (12T 27-11 to 28-1, 62-1 to 22)  2.  **[...] Robbery** (Counts 1 to 6)
[directive] ¿Entiende usted que podrá disputar en una vista los hallazgos del Centro Diagnóstico y de Tratamiento y que en esa vista tendrá el derecho de confrontar a los testigos en su contra, de contrainterrogarlos y entonces de presentar pruebas a su favor?  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and that at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?  Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Spanish página 1 de 2
[brief] *R. 4:67-5; R. 4:73-1; Bergen Cnty., supra*, 39 N.J. at 380-81; *see also Bridgewater v. Yarnell*, 64 N.J. 211, 215 (1974) (involving appeal of a denial of stay sought by the defendant property owner challenging the right of a municipality to take private property pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 20:3-11*, in which the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court “for a further hearing at which plaintiff must present its proofs orally in support . . . subject to cross-examination and with the right in defendants to present further proofs if desired”).
[brief] The [...] received and opened bids for [...] Contract No. 24-B-05 (the “Levine Project” or the “Contract”) on May 21, 2024.  The amount of the bid submitted by [...]  (“[...]”) was $40,255,770.00, the bid submitted by [...] was $41,819,780.00, and the bid of [...] was $44,732,529.00.  (0274a.)  [...] challenged the bid results, seeking to disqualify the [...] and [...] bids for allegedly material, non-waivable and non-curable defects.  (0193a.)  Subsequently, the three low bidders submitted position papers to the [...] defending their respective bid submissions.  (0213a, 0227a.)  By letter dated July 22, 2024, the [...] provided its factual and legal analysis in support of its recommendation to award the Contract to [...] as the “lowest responsive bidder” pursuant to the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et. seq. 0274a-277a.  The Commission determined that [...]’s bid contained a “fatal defect that required disqualification”, specifically finding that [...]’s cost proposal for “L1 Mobilization” exceeded the maximum amount permitted by the bid solicitation.  01275a.  Further, the [...] rejected [...]’s challenge to [...]’s bid upon finding that (a) any differences between [...]’s AIA bid bond and the form of bid bond contained in the bid specifications were “inconsequential” and therefore waivable (0277a), and (b) the archaeologist proposed by [...] was not required to be registered under the Prevailing Wage Contractor Registration Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48 et seq. (the “PWCRA”)  0275a-0276a.  [...] filed an Order to Show Cause in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County seeking to disqualify [...] as the lowest responsible bidder for the Project claiming that the archaeologist listed in [...]’s bid must be registered under the PWCRA.  0281a.  In the same action, [...] filed a verified complaint seeking summary relief awarding it the Contract as the lowest responsive bidder.  0021a.  After considering the written submissions of all parties and hearing oral argument, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. issued an order and opinion dated September 30, 2024, and filed on October 1, 2024.
[brief] To justify such a seizure, “a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense. ”  *Id.* at 33-34.  N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, which serves as the “basis for tinted windows citations,” actually predates automotive window tinting and thus does not directly proscribe tinting.  *Smith*, 251 N.J. at 251-52.  Rather, the statutory language only prohibits operation of a vehicle with “non-transparent material” on the front windshield or front side windows.  *Id.* at 251.  In *Smith*, our Supreme Court interpreted “th[is] plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74” to mean “that reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.
[brief] In ruling on this issue, the trial court found the Tariff to be controlling:  [P]laintiff seeks to impose liability upon [...] for negligent lighting, design, ….  [...] points out it is regulated by the [Board of] public utilities and is governed by regulations promulgated by the board known as Tariffs.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. [48]:2-25, the tariff is controlling the [...] tariff Section 2.5 provides as follows.  Selection of lighting options.  [...] will assist in the selection of lighting options by making recommendations of the most appropriate options based on the customer's defined illumination.  However, responsibility for final selection shall at all times rest with the customer.  Any advice given by [...] is based upon the customer's statements and by giving such advice, [...] assumes no responsibility nor shall it incur liability.
[brief] ...........................................................................46, 52, 53  State v. Adim, 410 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 2009)  ..............................................27  State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 567 (1988)  ..................................................................................................57  State v. Brady, 452 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 231 N.J. 525 (2017)  ..................................................................................................34, 35 State v. Brooks, 309 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 386 (1998) ........................................................................................................62, 65 State v. Bullock, 264 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 1993), rev’d, 136 N.J. 149 (1994) ........................................................................................................38-39
[brief] [(3T41-3T42) (emphasis added)].  Subsequently, during an evidentiary argument as to whether plaintiffs may properly be impeached by the existence of their pleadings against [...] and [...], plaintiffs’ counsel again acknowledged the ruling imposing Burt defendant status.  (14T14) (“Your Honor made a ruling, I have to abide by the ruling.  It’s an interlocutory ruling, I have to abide by it.  That’s what I’m doing. ”).  C.  Trial was completed based upon this understanding.  The practical importance of the trial court’s pre-trial determination cannot be overstated.
[brief] Even though trial courts often look to a defendant's prior criminal record to evaluate his risk of reoffending, the New Jersey Supreme Court has “acknowledged, however, that the absence of a criminal record will not preclude application of aggravating factor three so long as it is supported by other credible evidence in the record. ”  Ibid.  The Rivera Court stated that it did not “presume that aggravating factor three cannot coexist with mitigating factor seven,” if the trial court's finding of aggravating factor three includes an “‘evaluation and judgment about a defendant in light of his or her history,’” and such a finding is grounded in competent, credible evidence in the record.  Ibid. (quoting to State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006)).  [...]’s finding that defendant would reoffend despite having no prior criminal record was supported by the record in this case in that defendant engaged in a large-scale drug distribution scheme selling two types of drugs -- marijuana and cocaine.
[brief] Id. at 609.  Instead, the Court noted that “each party argues that its conflicting view of their earlier agreement must prevail.  [...] believed it agreed to a credit provision, and the [...] believed they did not.  The facts, therefore, do not support the conclusion that the contract was based on mutual mistake. ”  Ibid.  Yet the facts did “support the conclusion that the contract must be rescinded on the grounds of equitable fraud.
[brief] i.  The court failed to consider the impact of [...]’s youth on his participation in the offense, as required under Miller factor one.  Miller factor one clearly points to juveniles’ inability to appreciate risks and consequences as a fully developed adult would.  The factor requires courts to consider the “hallmark features” of youth – “among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. ”  Comer, 249 N.J. at 407 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477).  It “reflects the fact that teenagers – even intelligent ones – are not yet as mature, or as fully developed in their way of thinking, as adults. ”  Ibid.  Our Supreme Court has recognized that “a juvenile offender has no burden to produce evidence that his brain has not fully developed in order for the first factor to be considered in mitigation,” noting that “[o]n rare occasions, the State might be able to present expert psychiatric evidence as proof that a particular juvenile offender possessed unusual maturity beyond his years. ”  Ibid.  Here, the court did not contend that [...] was any different from other juveniles in this respect, yet it simply refused to find this factor militated in favor of sentencing relief.  Such a finding is not only illogical, but it is in contravention of the very case law upon which the remand order in this case was premised.  At the resentencing hearing, [...] testified that in adolescence, there is a “developmental mismatch” between the highly developed area of the brain responsible for emotional processing and the less developed area responsible for cognitive control, and thus adolescents are more likely to react impulsively in emotionally heightened situations.