ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Dear [...]: Please accept this letter brief in lieu of a more formal submission pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), by the [...] (“[...]”) in above-referenced matter.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS......................3  ARGUMENT.................................................................................................6  POINT I  THE BOARD MUST CONSIDER COST IN REVIEWING APPLICATIONS FOR A WAIVER UNDER N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.............6  POINT II  RATEPAYERS SHOULD NOT BEAR UNREASONABLE COST INCREASES FOR THE REGULATOR THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH HOLMDEL’S REQUESTS AND THE RESULTING PASSAGE OF TIME........................................................................................................10  POINT III  THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS IN THE STATE HAS YET TO BE DECIDED  THEREFORE THE TOWNSHIP’S STRANDED ASSET ARGUMENT MUST FAIL..........................................................15  CONCLUSION...............................................................................................17  APPENDIX  Petition, I/M/O the Petition of [...] for a Determination Concerning the Holmdel Regulator Station  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, [...], [...] (SOICR #1)................................................................................................................RCa1  Petition, I/M/O the Petition of [...] for a Determination Concerning the Holmdel Regulator Station Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, [...], [...] (SOICR #5)................................................................................................................RCa42  Letter from the NJ Division of [...] indicating that [...] does not intend to file testimony (SOICR #10)................................................RCa71  OAL Notice of Evidentiary Hearing Dates (SOICR #62).........................RCa72  Brief of the [...] submitted to the Office of Administrative Law on December 16, 2020 (SOICR # 74)(excerpts)........................RCa74  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Since publication of the 2009 NAS Report, significant research has established the limitations of fingerprint evidence, the potential for bias to influence decision-making, and the need for valid error rates.\textsuperscript{14}  Despite these advancements, the expert in this case gave testimony that has been unanimously rejected by the scientific community.  Standardized rules governing testimony about fingerprint evidence would ensure jurors assign appropriate weight to experts’ opinions.  This Court should remand to the trial court to appoint a Special Adjudicator to conduct hearings centered on this research and develop a standardized approach regarding the admission of latent fingerprint testimony.  The Supreme Court has previously requested that the Criminal Practice Committee and the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges perform a similar exercise with respect to eyewitness identification based on scientific developments and studies regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony.  See State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 298 (2011).  Similar and equally compelling considerations and advancements apply with respect to fingerprint analysis and likewise justify appointing a Special Adjudicator here.  Further, a Special Adjudicator would have the opportunity to \textsuperscript{14}  See Olenowski, 255 N.J. at 595-603 (noting scientific techniques that are subject of expert testimony must have valid error rates).  assess latent fingerprint analysis in light of the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Olenowski, which laid out a new standard for assessing the reliability and admissibility of expert testimony.  V.  BECAUSE JUROR PERCEPTION OF THE ACCURACY OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE DOES NOT COMPORT WITH ESTABLISHED ERROR RATES IN THE FIELD, COURTS NEED A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGE CONCERNING FINGERPRINT COMPARISON EVIDENCE.
[directive] Minimum 60 Days1  ___ if Court every three months  Address housing, needed if treatment in Engage  Obtain medical/dental assessment, needed with Cooperate supervision  Start addressing people, places, and things Develop plan case  Weekly office visits  Monthly home visits  Random drug tests (minimum * week)  2x ~-~--~M_ 2  Clinical Stabilization Phase inimum 90 Daysi l Court every three months
[brief] See i.e., Main St. at Woolwich, LLC v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 153 (App. Div. 2017)(“[I]f plaintiffs have sufficiently pled claims for tortious interference or malicious abuse of process, either may serve as the underlying tort required for a claim for civil conspiracy. ”).  Before remanding all State claims (Counts I through 10) to the jurisdiction of this Court, the federal Court specifically found that Appellant’s individual State claims (which, individually, would ultimately be governed by the TCA) underlying his “State Conspiracy” claim has not yet accrued, commenting in pertinent part:
[brief] Santiago v. N.Y. & N.J. Port Auth., 429 N.J. Super. 150, 156, 57 A.3d 54 (App. Div. 2012).  Americare Emergency Med. Serv. v. City of Orange Twp. 463 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2020)  Plaintiff argues that the Chancery Division venue was improper and adjudication of his action in lieu of prerogative writs by the Presiding General Equity Judge in the Chancery Division was improper, pro se abuse and an abuse of discretion.  "The 1947 Constitution recognized the doctrine by providing:  Subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legal and equitable relief should be granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely determined.  [N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 4.]”  Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 696 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1997)  Rule 4:3-1 (Pa 187-191) clearly pertains to actions in which a plaintiff's primary right or the principal relief sought is equitable in nature, while plaintiff sought legal relief not equitable relief.  Rule 4:3-1(5) (Pa 187-191) clearly provides that all actions in the Superior Court except those encompassed by subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) herein shall be filed and heard in the Law Division, Civil Part or the Law Division, Special Civil Part.
[brief] The Trial Court penalized Defendant for not making payments during this self-help period in the amount of $100.00 per day and calculated that Defendant owed Plaintiff the amount of $108,300.00 as the penalty (DA 3, Page A25, paragraph 1).  The Trial Court’s decision was characterized by the appellate Court as “not made … (with) robust findings. ”  This was an understatement, as there was no mention of the fact that [...] had available funds at the time of the signing of the Agreement or that she had LIED about same.  20.  Had [...] not made that misrepresentation and paid [...], the assessment of penalties against [...] would have been a non-issue.
[brief] Transcript of Motion dated September 10, 2021…………………………..1T Transcript of Motion dated December 14, 2021…………………………..2T Transcript of Motion dated February 18, 2022…………………………..3T  Transcript of Motion dated May 19, 2022…………………………………4T  Transcript of Motion dated July 5, 2022…………………………………..5T  Transcript of Motion dated August 15, 2022………………………………6T  Transcript of Trial dated August 29, 2022…………………………………7T  Transcript of Trial dated August 30, 2022…………………………………8T  Transcript of Trial dated August 31, 2022…………………………………9T  Transcript of Trial dated September 1, 2022……………………………..10T  Transcript of Trial dated September 2, 2022……………………………..11T Transcript of Trial dated September 19, 2022…………………………….12T  TABLE OF PETITIONERS
[brief] The same disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim against [...], which should be reversed as well.  A reasonable jury could find that failing to include safety features in the area of the lot where nurses were required to park when [...] knew these features were necessary and included them in the management parking area demonstrated a “wanton and willful” disregard for the nurse’s safety “with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to another and reckless indifference to the consequences of such act or omission. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10.
[directive] The following summary report template allows each vicinage to record and report the total number of referrals for each referral category on an annual basis.  The Trial Court Administrators (TCAs) should maintain these reports within each vicinage and have the ability to provide the It information when needed.  will be the determination of each TCA as to what reporting format is used within each vicinage.  [...] • [...] • [...]  [...]  Page2  SUMMARY REPORT DIVISION:  ~---------- COUNTY: REPORTING  TIMEFRAME: _J[---=D--=at"'e'---' lt::::o-" fD::..:a::.::te::.,]  _____ _  DEPENDENT  REFERRAL CATEGORY # of Referrals  1.  Infant/Child/Juvenile (including physically or mentally disabled)  2.  Physically Disabled Person (not a child)  3.  Mentally Disabled Person (not a child)  4.  Persons Requiring Geriatric Care  TOTAL#OF REFERRALS: EDITOR'S NOTE  2017 Update -- This Directive was amended to: require the vicinages to retain records relating to this Directive; include adjudicated incapacitated adult dependents in the guidelines; and include updated contact information for the agencies.  March 21, 2003 -- This Directive was amended in 2003 to update the 1995 Referral Agency List and Attachments that were included with the original Directive.  The original text was amended to delete references identifying the Attorney General's Model Policy, dated December 20, 1993, as an attachment to the Directive.  The Model Policy may be obtained directly from the Office of Attorney General.  December 13, 2000 -- This Directive was amended in 2000 to require each Trial Court Administrator to submit the summary report to the Municipal Court Services Division on a yearly basis.  1997 amendment -- The "CN" in the address of the Administrative Office of Courts was changed to "P.O.Box."  April 17, 1995 -- Originally issued by [...], Administrative Directive Attachment: Judiciary Guidelines - Alternate Care for the Dependents of Persons Detained as Part of the Judicial Process cc: Presiding Judges (Superior and Municipal Court)
[brief] ”  (Id.).  [...] also demonstrated that the AINR Report’s reliance that maintenance was required for some of the structures on the Property, which included an operating liquor store and inhabited single-family homes, fell far short of proving actual detriment, as required by the LRHL and caselaw.  (Id.).  At the conclusion of the hearing, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Planning Board unanimously recommended that the Township designate the Property as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area.
[brief] **DEP’S WAIVER OF THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE FOR 290 OCEAN, APPELLANT’S ECONOMIC COMPETITOR, DEPRIVES BLACKRIDGE REALTY OF DUE PROCESS  FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW (Raised Below: Aa63-Aa64; Aa66; Aa70)**  Appellant [...] and Respondent [...] own similarly situated adjacent properties.  Blackridge built an apartment building within the constraints of the Scenic Resources and Design Rule, giving up significant interior space for more, or more generously portioned, apartment units in a higher, wider building closer to the boardwalk and ocean.  [...] is Blackridge’s direct economic competitor for apartment rentals.  Yet DEP has allowed [...] to skip the Rule’s constraints and construct a much taller and wider building with substantially more interior space, closer to the ocean.  Fundamental fairness is an integral part of due process.  See e.g., *Matter of Congressional Districts by New Jersey Redistricting Com’n.*, 249 NJ 561 (2022).  There is nothing fair about allowing an economic competitor the rental advantages that come with a taller, wider, more spacious apartment building located closer to the water than what was allowed for its neighbor, when to do so violates the Coastal Rules and established case law prohibiting the ad hoc waiver of those rules.  Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause requires a rational basis for different treatment.  Blackridge was required per force of the Rule to construct a relatively much smaller building than DEP has allowed [...], without a valid rationale for the disparate treatment.  See *Enquist v. Oregon Dep’t. of Agriculture*, 553 US 591 (2008).  This Court should restore fundamental fairness and equal protection and put [...] on a level playing field with [...], a playing field governed by the same Coastal Regulations.
[brief] *Tice v. Cramer*, 133 N.J. 347, 375 (1993).  Yet, despite the fact that these types of constitutional claims do not fall within the purview of the TCA, coverage is mandated under existing case law when those claims arise in the context of a prosecutor’s office’s law enforcement function.  This is borne out by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in *Gramiccioni v. Department of Law & Public Safety*, 243 N.J. 293 (2020) where, in large part, the claims in the underlying case arose under section 1983 yet the Court unanimously decided that the [...] was required to provide the prosecutor’s office and its employees with a defense.
[brief] Indeed, the Lease Rider listed the specific amounts and types of Concessions that Appellants would receive.  (Da44).  The Concession Recovery Provision contained therein is not hidden, but instead is set forth in bolded, conspicuous language, providing the precise conditions Appellants must satisfy in order to retain the Concessions.  (Ibid.).  Even more fundamentally, Appellants have never once alleged that they were unaware of the Concession Recovery Provision or that it was somehow disguised in the Lease Rider.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED  THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN ASSESSING THE PLANNING BOARD’S FINDING THAT THE APPLICATION OF [...] DID NOT REQUIRE A HEIGHT VAIENCE URSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d.(6)  WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, UNREASONABLE AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD BELOW  PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY  22  SCOPE OF REVIEW  23  RELIANCE ON EXPERT TESTIMONY  24 INTENTION 29  CONCLUSION
[brief] In the instant matter, unlike *Price*, the policy of Defendant-Respondent, [...], does not allow for the arbitration of a claim.  Instead, the policy provides that legal action against it “must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction”.  Therefore, Plaintiff-Appellant was required to file this claim in a “court of competent jurisdiction” within the time dictated by the policy of insurance from which she sought benefits, i.e. on or before May 2, 2023.  There is no evidence that [...] provided any assurances or other promises to Plaintiff-Appellant that she did not have to comply with the terms of the policy.
[brief] Punitive damages are particularly disfavored in a commercial case with economic injuries instead of physical injuries, such as here.  Other than in exceptional circumstances, “[w]here the essence of a cause of action is limited to a breach of such a contract, punitive damages are not appropriate regardless of the nature of the conduct constituting the breach. ”  *Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp.*, 141 N.J. Super. 437, 449 (App. Div. 1976), holding modified by *Ellmex Const. Co. v. Republic Ins. Co.*, 202 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 1985); see also *Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc.*, 111 N.J. 355, 369-70 (1988).
[brief] ”  i.  The Trial Court did not create a new standard for the negative criteria.  Plaintiff is incorrect that the Trial Court “created a new standard for the negative criteria” of the c(2) variance.  Plaintiff’s argument improperly takes a quote from the Trial Court out of context.  As the Trial Court explained in the paragraph prior to the one cited by Plaintiff:  *Plaintiff’s proposed billboard would not result in a substantial benefit to the community that would outweigh the traffic safety and open space congestion concerns.  Plaintiff states the proposed billboard's benefits to the community include (1) a reduced size of the proposed billboard instead of the maximum permitted size, and (2) all local businesses would receive a 15% discount for advertising on the proposed billboard.  The Court finds these benefits to be insufficient to outweigh traffic safety, siting, and aesthetic concerns.  These benefits do not represent a better zoning alternative for the property of the proposed billboard.  The proposed billboard would serve to advance the interests of Plaintiff rather than the community.  This cannot be rectified by simply offering a discount to local businesses.  Such businesses already have the opportunity to advertise on their own on-premises properties.*  (Pa22).  Second, the reference to “congestion” within the context of the Trial Court’s decision was referencing the aesthetic concerns, i.e., the “visual pollution” referenced by several Planning Board members, in their denials, not traffic congestion.  (Pa22; 4/17/23 Transcript @T69-T74).  Finally, the Trial Court was clearly not holding that the Distance Regulation was or could be based on “morals” but merely setting forth the factors in N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-2(a)-(o), some of which applied here, i.e., traffic safety and aesthetic, and some of which, such as “moral” obviously did not.  Thus, Plaintiff is not correct that the Trial Court created a new standard for negative criteria.  ii.  The Planning Board’s Traffic Engineer [...]  Plaintiff’s argument that “all professional testimony supported the application” is misrepresentation of the evidential record.  As set forth above, Defendants’ traffic expert [...] issued two reports which pointed out the flaws in Plaintiff expert [...]’s report and the studies referenced therein.  As made clear in transcript of the second variance hearing, and the Decision and Resolution, the Planning Board members relied on [...]’s reports in making their determinations.  (Pa124; 4/17/23 Transcript).  Thus, Plaintiff is not correct that Defendants improperly rejected the testimony and reports of Plaintiff’s experts.  V. CONCLUSION  For all the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Court should affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on both counts in Plaintiff’s Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and for Violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and the dismissal of both counts with prejudice.
[brief] Both counseled briefs submitted on defendant’s behalf prior to the motion hearing focused almost entirely on the search, not the stop.\(^9\) (Pa3-24).  The fleeting references to the stop in the defense briefs challenged whether [...] used her turn signal, not whether traffic may have been affected as to require it.  (Pa4-5, 7, 17).  Likewise, at the motion hearing, defense counsel posed no questions to the witnesses about the traffic conditions (1T31-3 to 40-10; 51-10 to 52-24; 55-16 to 65-5), made no argument in closing about the traffic conditions, and only referred to defendant’s testimony that “the blinkers were put on. ” (1T83-23 to 89-10; 85-24 to 25).  So, while defendant now faults the State for not eliciting the proximity of other vehicles relative to [...]’s sedan, (Db21-22), it is he who must bear the burden of failing to adequately present the issue below.
[brief] R. J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006  NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION  State of New Jersey v. [...]  Docket No. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER ENTERED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - LAW DIVISION, UNION COUNTY DENYING A PETITION FOR POST- CONVICTION RELIEF  PRO-SE SUPPLEMENTAL LETTER-BRIEF-REPLY
[brief] The July 5, 2023 Order granting summary judgment in favor of the [...] should be affirmed.  The court below properly concluded that the investigatory email communications were not “public records” subject to disclosure under the common law right of access.  Even if they were, [...] has not demonstrated that his interest in disclosure of the emails (which the [...] has certified that it is not aware of and cannot locate) (Pa119-120) outweighs the [...]’s interest in maintaining their confidentiality.
[brief] UNCLEAN HANDS GENERALLY. **  In simple parlance, the doctrine of unclean hands merely gives expression to the equitable principle that a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit.  See *Kingsdorff v. Kingsdorff*, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 155 (App. Div. 2002).  "Equity will not open its doors to one who seeks its aid for the purpose of violating a contract, or who seeks to enforce alleged rights arising from a contract which he himself breached. ”  Not only must a suitor come into equity with clean hands but he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the entire proceedings.  Pollino v. Pollino, 39 N.J. Super. 294, 299 (Ch. Div. 1956).  V.
[brief] It is noted that various of these statutory violations are criminal acts under the FRFPA.  The trial court should have found that the undisputed facts plainly established, as a matter of law, that [...]’s preparation of and entry into the contract of sale with [...] was conduct expressly prohibited by, and therefore affirmatively violated, numerous FRFPA provisions.  Specifically, given that [...] was plainly a “distressed property” at the time [...] explored purchasing it, [...] was not a licensed foreclosure consultant, and that he failed to comply with nearly any and every requirement relating to the sale of a distressed property, the court have every basis upon which to find that the contract of sale was violative of the FRFPA.
[brief] Another element of the smear campaign is Respondent’s false assertion that Petitioner wrote a letter to Child Protective Services (CPS) about Respondent that was signed "[...]" who had died.  Db at 31.  Petitioner objected to the CPS testimony as no nexus exists between the letter and Petitioner and it was not relevant to the claims, but the Court allowed it for credibility.  (8T132:5-10; P165a).  No evidence was presented that reflected that Petitioner ever wrote a letter under anyone else's name but his own.
[directive] 9  (c) the officer is conducting a motorist aid or community caretaking check; (d) the officer is interviewing a witness in the course of investigating a criminal offense; (e) the officer is conducting a custodial interrogation of a suspect, unless the interrogation is otherwise being recorded in accordance with Rule 3:17 (electronic recordation of station house interrogations); (f) the officer is making an arrest; (g) the officer is conducting a protective frisk for weapons; (h) the officer is conducting any kind of search (consensual or otherwise); (i) the officer is engaged in a police response to any type of civil disorder in circumstances where the officer is engaged with or in the presence of civilians and the officer or any other officer on the scene may be required to employ constructive authority or force; (j) the officer uses constructive authority or force, or reasonably believes that constructive authority or force may be used in any encounter or situation not otherwise listed in this subsection based on specific and articulable facts warranting heightened caution that are documented by narration on the recording and/or in any investigation or incident report;3 (k) the officer is transporting an arrestee to a police station, county jail, or other place of confinement, or a hospital or other medical care or mental health facility; or (l) the officer reasonably believes that any other officer on the scene has undertaken or is engaged in any of the foregoing police actions/activities.