ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] REASONS FOR A FRANKS\textsuperscript{16}  EVIDENTIARY HEARING  In rejecting the request for a Franks hearing, the trial court erroneously ruled that defendant already had an evidentiary hearing:  ". . . you just had your investigative hearing, okay?" (1T96-10 to 11).  In fact, defendant did not have an evidentiary hearing involving the law enforcement officer who attested to and submitted the Certification in Support of Search Warrant Application--namely, [...] (Special State Investigator/Acting County Detective, [...], Homicide Unit.  (Jankowski Certification at Ca23-36).  To challenge the validity of a warrant, defendant “must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are \textsuperscript{16}
[directive] 23. a. prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence?  -=r {l1-}9.j o-Jl½'! ~4,'- Jt..j-l'l.TI7} ~o-JS:.-¥!-1-}e .::z.<>1]  0H:s;J;i.J \'af..Q..oJ,-¥!-1-}e {i.TI: "8"}71  ~<>ll 0 -¥-~ 78 -rl -rl -3:! %3'1 '(! ¾ .!;!.tj- <fl~~¾ {i.TI ~o] tj-e g_ o}1J y 7J}? ~ii} c.--j ~ ~ ~  Revised Fonn Promulgated 12/31/2019  Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Korean Defendant's Initials by °J~. 91 .!i!.½ 20191d 12 31  ~At Al~~ 01-18 .Q.J-o-toJ  CN 10079-Korean .:g-.¥.-'B. n].TI.~.Q.] ojy~ :£.ol] -%1  01 page 6 of7/llll Al 6/7 [No/oti-J.8..]  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than 23.  b.  [Yes/ofl] recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  :~H-, 4- i..Jl~ ~.!i!.ct ~A]-7Hl.TI.~ 4tl--"l-7l- c-J 1¾ ;zjc5"]-~ %~ 'i.1-'ll Jj!-7-J¾ ~tj-~ ~ i~~ ~ ~ y oj-1) 77]-?
[brief] *Id.* at 280.  Among others, the Court in Cole held that the following factors should be evaluated, none of which alone is dispositive: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.  [Id. at 280-81; see also Marmo and Sons General Contracting LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024) (reaffirming the Cole factors).
[brief] Additionally, plaintiffs have presented enough evidence regarding defendants’ issues with collecting ESI – based largely on defendants’ transition to Office 365 – that the Court finds a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on five of the six issues is warranted.  While there typically may be “nothing problematic about a company with size limitations on its email servers sending a routine email to an employee... to inform him that he is nearly at his usage limit and will need to make space in his mailbox,” in this case, there apparently was a litigation hold in place and plaintiffs are entitled to non-privileged information as to “what kinds and categories of ESI [defendants’] employees were instructed to preserve and collect, and what specific actions they were instructed to take to that end,” as well as what ESI, if any, including emails, may have been missed during the document collection process, or lost as a result of defendants’ transition to Office 365.
[brief] III.  The Trial Court’s November 2, 2022 Order Awarding The Estranged Wife An Additional $20,000 In Sanctions Was Unreasonable And An Abuse Of The Trial Court’s Discretion Because The Work For Which Counsel Billed Was Unnecessary And Improper And The Sanctions Were Duplicative Punishment.  (The Trial Court’s Order is located at MA-66.)  As discussed above, it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to award Estranged Wife’s counsel fees for pursuing absolutely unnecessary and irrelevant discovery.  Adding insult to injury, the Trial Court awarded a general sanction of $20,000.00 on top of the counsel fees sanction.  For the same reasons stated above, this additional monetary sanction was arbitrary and unreasonable and should be reversed.  Furthermore, the Appellate Division has held, “Generally, financial sanctions . . . are limited to orders requiring reimbursement of the fees and expenses of a party. ”  Werner-Masuda, supra.  The additional sanction of $20,000.00 is merely duplicative, and therefore, excessively punitive.  As such, the award of this extra $20,000.00 was arbitrary and unreasonable and the November 2, 2022 Order awarding them should be reversed.  Despite Mother’s repeated arguments that the funeral home business and tax records, and insurance documents, were irrelevant to the probate issues before the Trial Court, and their discovery was contrary to well-recognized legal doctrines, Estranged Wife and her counsel continued to pursue the discovery.  Whether this was simply caused by their lack of knowledge of the law, or their vindictive harassment of [...]’s parents, it was improper and unnecessary.  Estranged Wife and her counsel’s wrongdoing should have never resulted in an award of counsel fees against Mother, let alone this duplicative and excessively punitive additional $20,000.00 award.  Therefore, the November 2, 2022 Order awarding them should be reversed.  Why the Trial Court awarded these monetary sanctions is unclear.  However, the Court should not discount that it was motivated in part by the embarrassment caused the Judge in open court, several years earlier, by [...], the Mother’s law firm’s administrator.  If this played even the slightest role in the Trial Court’s award of counsel fees and sanctions, it renders them arbitrary and warrants their reversal.
[brief] See also *Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. at 480 (plain reading of statute not applied when “overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. ”); *Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. at 582.  For example, § 1692f(5) and (8) pre-suppose that debt collectors will use telegram operators in communicating with consumers, while then imposing only limited restrictions on their use.
[brief] (Pa98)  Despite litigation initiated by animal rights and conservation groups the “emergency bear hunt” went forward in December of 2022.  (Pa98)  The emergency bear hunt was subsequently declared by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court to be authorized by the Council and other State defendants under invalid emergency rule-making on November 6, 2023.  Animal Protection League of New Jersey, et al. v. New Jersey Fish and Game Council, et al., 477 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2023).  After authorizing the invalid emergency bear hunt, the Council proposed a new five-year management plan and amendments to the Code that would extend the regulations authorizing a bear hunt until 2028.
[brief] See T2 at page 33.  Because of this, the trial court decided to not consider "any statements in paragraphs 8 through 12 of the certifications that were submitted in opposition to the [Summary Judgment Motion] to support a finding that there’s a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff was actually ever told to wait until the hospital was sold."  Id.  Indeed, the Court went further and correctly pointed out that:  "Nowhere on this motion record did the plaintiff disclose in discovery that they were told to wait until the hospital was sold by anybody, not the Russian accountant, not [[...]], not [...], not anybody.  So even giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable doubt I am finding on this motion record that there’s no genuine issue of material fact: i.e. the plaintiff was never told to wait until the hospital was sold, and the hospital was sold in December of 2017."  Id. at 33-34.  After the trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed this case, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration on March 20, 2023, raising the same contentions that Plaintiff now raises on appeal.
[brief] Beginning in approximately June 2017, defendant engaged in efforts to re-sell the Solar Rights it had “sold and assigned” in perpetuity; and began to seek a higher rent stream from a potential new “tenant” on its brownfield that had been leased to plaintiff [...] for 20 years, under the parties’ land lease.  SAC ¶ 10. Pa163.  Between June 2017 and October 2017, the parties were engaged in negotiations for plaintiffs to purchase the subject brownfield outright from defendants, and negotiated the terms whereby the 20 year land lease would be converted to a purchase/sale of the land, and the parties were negotiating the price.  SAC ¶ 11. Pa163.  During this same period, rather than engaging in good faith negotiations with plaintiff, defendant sought and entertained “offers” from other suitors not only for the Solar Rights it had already sold but also for the land lease, or a sale/purchase of the brownfield.  Such actions were in violation of plaintiffs’ rights under the assignment of rights as to the Solar Rights and under the land lease.  SAC ¶ 12. Pa163.  In particular, the confidentiality covenant contained in the land lease bound [...] from revealing any facts within the lease or about plaintiffs’ purchase/acquisition of the solar-energy developmental rights at all.  [...] Estates was expressly prohibited from disclosing the substantive information about plaintiffs’ land/lease, and thus the secret negotiations with [...]  Defendants to double sell and double lease was clearly unlawful, even criminal.
[brief] [...] also lacks a constitutional right to a hearing.  Third parties to a permitting decision “generally are not able to meet the stringent requirements for constitutional standing in respect of an adjudicatory hearing. ”  In re NJPDES Permit No. NJ0025241, 185 N.J. 474, 482 (2006).  It would need to articulate a particularized property interest to entitle it to an adjudicatory hearing.  In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 470 (2006).  [...] has no particularized property interest in 290 Ocean’s permit or Property.  [...]’s hearing request asserted damages concerning proposed development’s aesthetics and potential to block sunlight.  (Aa70).  DEP reasonably found that fear of damage to a “recreational interest or generalized property rights” does not amount to a particularized property right or special interest.  Spalt v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 237 N.J. Super. 206, 212 (App. Div. 1989).  (Aa219).  The Appellate Division previously ruled that a project’s purported adverse impacts on “views,” as well as “the light and air available” do not amount to a property right.  In re Riverview Dev., 411 N.J. Super. at 437-38 (citing G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896, 903 n.12 (9th Cir.1992) (“The air we breathe, scenic views, the night sky . . . cannot be reduced to possession and therefore cannot be the basis of property rights. ” (emphasis omitted)).  See also In re Waterfront Dev. Permit No. WD88-0443-1, Lincoln Harbor Final Dev., Weehawken, Hudson Cty., 244 N.J. Super. 426, 428, 437-38 (App. Div. 1990) (obscuring of “scenic view of the Hudson River and New York City skyline” not a particularized property interest).  In fact, landowners generally do not have a particularized property interest warranting an adjudicatory hearing on their neighbors’ development.
[directive] the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement Officers [Yes/wi]  [No/Non]  If g.  Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?  Si zak Ia te fet le 9 janvye 1997 oswa apre epi yo kondane w a libete kondisyonel, wap oblije peye yon amann de $30 ba
[brief] (Da1)  On May 23, 2018, that motion was granted and a cross-motion by [...] seeking discovery was denied.  (Da3150)(1T)  Also on May 23, 2018, the Court confirmed the Arbitrator’s January 5, 2018, ruling voiding the $970,000 loan between [...] and [...].  (Da3153)  The Court rejected [...]’s argument that the loan agreements were not arbitrable where only disputes arising “under” the operating agreement were.  (1T54:11-15; 1T56:12-14; 1T72:12-14)  It ordered [...] to repay $700,000 to [...].  (Pa3154)
[brief] “1T” shall refer to the transcript dated July 15, 2022.  “2T” shall refer to the transcript dated December 16, 2022.  “3T” shall refer to the transcript dated November 6, 2023.  2  [...] brought the action individually, as well as in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Harriet [...] and as Trustee of the Harriet [...] Living Trust, dated November 2, 2001, as amended and restated.
[brief] Defendants present the following Appellate Division opinion providing guidance with regard to assigning a case to a different judge.  Since the motion judge has expressed opinions regarding the plaintiff’s intent in the process of weighing the evidence and may have a commitment to his findings, we conclude that it is appropriate the matter be assigned another judge.  *In re Guardianship of R.G. and F.*, 155 N.J. Super. 186, 195, 382 A.2d 654 (App.Div. 1977); *New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services v. A.W.*, 103 N.J. 591, 617, 512 A.2d 438 (1986)  *Carmichael v. Bryan*, 310 N.J. Super. 34, 49 (App. Div. 1998)  Defendants assert that [...] has consistently maintained that the Trustee’s actions were appropriate when evaluating the evidence, possibly showing a bias towards his previous conclusions.  Therefore, assigning this case to a new fact-finder would be appropriate.
[brief] In its staff report for the New HAD, [...] acknowledged public comments it received regarding air and other environmental impacts but noted that “whether or not the project is determined to be exempt from the Highlands Act, [[...]] still must abide by any applicable freshwater wetlands, flood hazard, stormwater, water quality or air quality regulations. ”  Rma016 citing N.J.A.C. 7:38-12.1(a)(15).  B.  Appellants’ Reliance On Irrelevant And Non-Binding Authorities Should Be Rejected.
[brief] The facts here do not present an ambiguous set of circumstances in which an arbitrator is called upon to define whether an employer had just cause to terminate an employee for misconduct that may or may not warrant discharge under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.  Instead, this matter concerns a public employer’s right to determine, in its sole discretion and as provided both by the applicable agreement and by case law, whether an employee remains qualified to perform her job duties.  [...] terminated [...] because she could not perform the duties of her position.  [...] retains the right under the parties’ CBA, and applicable case law, to set the standards of performance.  Again, Article III of the CBA grants [...] the exclusive right “[t]o hire all employees, and subject to the provisions of law, to determine their qualifications and conditions of continued employment, or assignment, and to promote and transfer employees. ”  (Pa6)  Whatever the extent of the Arbitrator’s ability to define just cause under the CBA, he cannot violate, infringe, ignore, or qualify the CBA’s express terms and the managerial prerogative those terms provide to [...].  *Linden Bd. of Educ.*, 202 N.J. at 279.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Termination is Causally Connected to His Protected Activity and There is Sufficient Evidence of Pretext  Under the McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework.  Finally, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, there is ample evidence in the record that a jury may use to determine that Defendants terminated Plaintiff for his protected whistleblowing activities instead of the reasons Defendants have claimed.  There is no solitary way to demonstrate causation and/or pretext, as it must be identified on fact-specific basis.
[brief] These six requirements are as follows: (a) a “written arrangement” between the manufacturer and distributor; (b) the grant of a “license” by the manufacturer to the distributor; (c) a “community of interest” between the manufacturer and distributor; (d) the “contemplat[ion] or require[ment]” that the distributor would establish or maintain a New Jersey place of business; (e) more than $35,000 in annual gross sales of the manufacturer’s products; and (f) a showing that “more than 20% of the franchisee’s gross sales are intended to be or are derived from” the relationship.  This appeal arises from the Trial Court’s grant of [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on [...]’s NJFPA claim against [...], where the Trial Court held that [...] could not establish, as a matter of law, that a “written agreement” existed between [...] and [...].  Accordingly, the Trial Court reasoned, [...] could not satisfy the first element of the NJFPA’s six element test.  The plain language of the NJFPA, however, does not require an “agreement,” but rather only requires a “written arrangement,” as recognized by both the New Jersey Supreme Court as well as several other New Jersey courts.  As set forth below, [...] produced several documents that satisfy this minimal evidentiary standard, and thus summary judgment was not proper.  Furthermore, the Trial Court improperly granted summary judgment on [...]’s two remaining counts – for tortious interference and indemnity – without explanation, despite material facts in the record below that should have prevented such a decision as a matter of law.
[brief] Where's the support for factor one?  [...]:  *Slater* doesn't apply here because when a defendant successfully appeals from a pretrial motion, that plea withdrawal is governed by Rule 3-9-3(f) the conditional plea rule, not by *State v. Slater*.  [...]: Right.  So, the reversal was as to the armed robbery indictment not as to felony murder.  Didn't he get the least on the felony -- he pled to 30 with 30 didn't he?  [...]: Right, but this is all part of a global plea agreement, and so, this -- [...]: But what can he get better than a 30 with 30?  [...]:  He gets to go back to the drawing board because when a defendant successfully appeals from a pretrial ruling, the bargaining positions of the parties are significantly different and that's the rationale behind the conditional plea rule and as this court held in *State v. Dillaretto*, that rule applies where as here the defendant simultaneously pleads to multiple indictments.
[brief] Pursuant to R. 2:10-2, plain error only occurs if the admitted evidence was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  “The possibility of an unjust result must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ” (State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266, 287 (2022)(quoting State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 18-19 (1974)).  The alleged error must be evaluated “in light of the overall strength of the State’s case.
[brief] Specifically, the FHA regulations provide “[t]o contest a Department decision on an application under this chapter, a person shall submit an adjudicatory hearing requesting within 30 calendar days after public notice of the decision is published in the DEP Bulletin. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-23.1(b).  The FHA regulations go on to state “[t]he Department shall notify the requester that the request for hearing is granted or denied.  If the hearing request is denied, the denial shall provide the reason(s) for the denial.  If the hearing request is granted, the Department shall refer the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for a contested case hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq., and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-23.1(f).  The CZM Rules state “[t]o contest a Department decision on a coastal permit, a person shall submit an adjudicatory hearing request within 30 calendar days after public notice of the decision is published in the DEP Bulletin.  If a person submits the adjudicatory hearing request after this time, the Department shall deny the request. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1(b).  The CZM Rules go on to state “[t]he Department shall notify the requester that the request for hearing is granted or denied.  If the hearing request is denied, the denial shall provide the reason(s) for the denial.  If the hearing request is granted, the Department shall refer the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for a contested case hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq., and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1(f).  The process to request an adjudicatory hearing under the FHA regulations and the CZM Rules is identical.  As such, the holding in Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n applies to this appeal.
[brief] State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 265 (N.J. 2022) ("'It is not the function of this Court to rewrite a plainly written enactment of the Legislature [ ]or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'  [Internal citations omitted by me]  The superior court judge in my case already found that I didn’t violate the failure to maintain lane statute which I was ticketed for.  (Da 1a, Da 2a).  So, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion to pull me over for that.  State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 265 (N.J. 2022) ("See N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 ("In the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil and criminal, words and phrases ... shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.").  Now comes the articulation of failure to move over for police vehicles in violation of 39:4-92.2, which I was not ticketed for, 4T:19-(9-17) but of which the municipal judge and superior judge found to be reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop me and therefore render my suppression motion to be denied.
[brief] Although the Superior Court previously found that capping terminal leave at $15,000 was reasonable and consistent with the MSRA, and the Appellate Division has since recognized the State’s ability to limit accumulated sick leave compensation, Plaintiffs seek terminal leave payments many times over the $15,000 to which they are entitled.  (Plaintiff [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $65,470.37 (Id. ¶¶ 23, 25, Pa000020); Plaintiff [...] alleges under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $129,085.20 (Id. ¶¶ 33, 35, Pa000021); Plaintiff [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $95,008.22 (Id. ¶¶ 40, 42, Pa000022); Plaintiff [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $90,086.40 (Id. ¶¶ 48–49, Pa000023); Plaintiff [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $129,778.88 (Id. ¶¶ 56–57, Pa000024); Plaintiff Madamba [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $108,234.24 (Id. ¶¶ 64–65, Pa000025); Plaintiff [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $112,804.88 (Id. ¶¶ 69–70, Pa000025–26); Plaintiff [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $65,433.76 (Id. ¶¶ 79–80, Pa000027); Plaintiff [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $58,791.56 (Id. ¶¶ 86–87, Plaintiff [...] alleges that under the CNA he would have been entitled to a payout of $46,235.48 (Id. ¶¶ 93–94, Pa000028–29)).  On January 11, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which was pending before [...], highlighting the applicability of the First Police Decision and the estoppel impact of Plaintiffs’ representation by the [...] in the First Police Matter.