ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 2.  Designation of Juvenile Officers.  It shall be the policy of this State that the appropriate handling of juvenile matters shall be a high priority of the entire law enforcement community.  Every law enforcement agency having patrol jurisdiction shall designate at least one sworn officer to handle and coordinate juvenile matters.  This designated juvenile officer need not be assigned full-time to handle juvenile matters where the extent of juvenile delinquent activity and the resources available to the agency makes full-time assignment impractical.  Where, however, the volume or seriousness of juvenile delinquent activity so warrants, a juvenile unit or bureau should be established and provided with sufficient resources to accomplish the principles, policies and objectives set forth in this Executive Directive.  3.  Training Working Group.  A Juvenile Justice Police Training Working Group shall be established which shall consist of representatives from the Division of Criminal Justice, Division of State Police, County Prosecutors Association, Association of Chiefs of Police, county and local police academies, state and county juvenile officers associations and from the academic and juvenile justice fields, as appropriate.  This Working Group shall review and where necessary provide recommendations to the Attorney General and the Police Training Commission regarding the adequacy of mandatory basic police training curricula pertaining to the juvenile justice system.  The Training Working Group shall also identify in-service juvenile justice-related training needs and develop appropriate training curricula and other materials for use by academies and law enforcement agencies in developing and providing juvenile justice training for police officers.  4.
[brief] ”  Anderson at 6. (Pa536) (emphasis added).  The Anderson Court cited to N.J.A.C. 14:5-2.9(b), which provides that “[a]ll routine streetlight repairs are to be made within three business days after notice that a repair is necessary. ”  Anderson at 6. (Pa536) (emphasis added).  In *Press*, plaintiff presented no evidence or witness testimony that [...] had notice of the streetlight being inoperable before the accident.  In affirming the trial court's granting of summary judgment to [...], the *Press* court held, “we agree with the trial judge that the plaintiff presented no competent evidence from which a jury could conclude that [...] had actual or constructive notice of any problem with the light sufficiently in advance of the accident to have taken steps to remedy the condition.
[brief] Admittedly, past practice cannot overcome plain language.  However, where the meaning of the language is in dispute—where, as here, the parties legitimately disagree as to the meaning of a contractual provision—an arbitrator can and should look to other sources of evidence to determine the parties’ intentions when they entered the contract.  *Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n*, 205 N.J. at 430 (“[a]lthough arbitrators may not look beyond the four corners of a contract to alter unambiguous language, where a term is not defined, it may be necessary for an ‘arbitrator to fill in the gap and give meaning to that term’”) (quoting *Linden Bd. of Educ.*, 202 N.J. at 277).
[brief] Therefore, the Prosecutor questioned [...] on the incorrect legal standard.  (111T:120-16 to 20).  If the defendant does not understand the nature and quality of his actions, the analysis is over and there is no need to address whether or not the defendant knew what he was doing was wrong.  Id.  Therefore, the Prosecutor’s assertion that “it could be both” was incorrect.  (11T:120-19 to 20).  Moreover, the Court’s interjection led the jury to believe that [...] was wrong about the legal standard of insanity when she was only responded to a question that was asked by the Prosecutor.  (11T:123-22 to 124-2).  The manner in which the Court interrupted [...] when responding to a question about the legal definition of insanity while allowing [...] to give an in depth recitation of the legal definition of insanity prejudiced [...] and denied him to his right to a fair trial.  N.J.R.E. 403.  POINT V APPELLANT’S CONVICTION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED
[brief] The Trial Court improperly shifted the burden in this case to the Plaintiffs. (T4 at 27:3-7; 21:7-9; 21:17-22:4).  In addition to improperly shifting the burden, the Court criticized the Plaintiff for not calling people to "explain the notice issue."  (T4 at 21:17-22:4).  It was not the Plaintiffs' job to "explain that issue."  The case law is clear that in order for the Board to have jurisdiction to hear the interpretation, that prior notice to property owners within two hundred feet and publication of the public hearing was required.  *Township of Stafford v. Stafford Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 154 N.J. 62 (1998).  The fact that the Defendants did not produce the attorney for the applicant or that person's file, or a publication in any newspaper regarding the application and the meeting, or any witnesses that would have testified that they received notice, is a failing on the part of the Defendants and not the Plaintiffs.  That failure is a failure of proof where the burden is on the Defendants.  As such, the Court was required to conclude that there was a failure of proof on the part of the Defendants to establish their valid preexisting non-conforming use status.  As such, the Court below failed to follow the law with regards to proof of valid preexisting non-conforming use status, and especially since the Court concluded that the evidence was "sparse."  (T4 at 25:5).  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE USE APPROVED IN THE 1984 RESOLUTION HAD NOT BEEN EXPANDED (T4 at 24:11)
[brief] See also Highlands Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Nicastro, 201 N.J. 123(2009).  ...  However, Plaintiff has failed to show how that duty was breached as the Chancery Division already found that [...]’s intent was to forgive the debt in its entirety.  (Defendant’s Exhibit D).  While Plaintiff alleges that he believed the mortgage was to be forgiven only as to himself and that he or the estate was to collect on the payments from [...], Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how many ambiguities as found by the courts in the prior litigation equates to a breach of duty.  While the prior litigation did not involve an exact claim of negligence against [...], any facts as to the decedent’s intent, would be the same facts underlying the claim of negligence, and were necessarily resolved in the prior litigation.  As Plaintiff cites, collateral estoppel “must be applied equitably, not mechanically. ”  In re Tanelli, 194 N.J. Super.  492, 497 (App Div.), certif. denied, 99 N.J. 181(1984).  The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to relitigate the drafting of the decedent’s will by [...] as the Chancery Division has found and enforce the Will pursuant to the decedent’s intent which is contrary to the allegations made here by Plaintiff.  Said decision has been confirmed by the Appellate Division.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted.
[brief] (\textit{See} 1T3 1-13)  The court proceeding on June 18, 2018 was to decide Defendants’ motion for a new trial or to set aside the judgment notwithstanding a verdict on \textit{Janet Fou v. Kevin Tung}.  The trial [...]’ dedication of the court proceeding to the memory of the United States Soldiers who were killed in Vietnam by Vietnamese soldiers of Asian descent are plainly \textsuperscript{43}  “The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’”  \textit{See id.} at 2262.  “In defining these standards the Court has asked whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. ”  \textit{See id.} at 2263.  \textsuperscript{44}  Under this doctrine, "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result .  . ."  R. 2:10-2.  \textit{See New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.A. & D.A.}, 2023 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 291, 2023 WL 2293819.  inappropriate under any circumstances, especially the trial was involving an Asian attorney and his law firm as Defendants.
[brief] Asked by defense counsel on cross-examination whether the discrepancy was caused by the downloading, [...] answered that it was not attributable to the downloading, which had no effect on the timestamps.  (1T93-5 to 23).  [...] testified that at the time he downloaded the video, and again in preparation for trial, he viewed the surveillance video, stating that the video was not modified or altered in any way.  (1T81-7 to 13; 1T82-7 to 14).  [...] identified the areas depicted in the surveillance video, which, he testified, accurately represented the scene on the day of the shooting.  (1T85-25 to 86-12; 1T86-25 to 87-  The surveillance video, moved into evidence as S-23, (Da17), is a composite of three camera angles: one depicting the interior of the grocery store (the second angle in the video), and two depicting the exterior (the first and third angles).
[brief] C.  RICO violations.  Plaintiffs also allege that the conduct described above violated RICO.  See Pa0113-0118 (Compl. ¶¶ 493-521).  The complaint explains that racketeering includes the acts of healthcare-claims fraud, insurance fraud, and the unlicensed practice of medicine in which Defendants engaged.  Pa0114-0117 (Compl. ¶¶ 500-516).  Plaintiffs seek compensatory and treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and other remedies on its RICO claims.  Pa0118-0119 (Compl. ¶¶ 521).
[brief] It must only do so “by an affirmative vote of the majority of its full authorized membership and shall record in its minutes the reasons for each amendment or revision,” (Id.) which this Committee did at its October 27, 2022 and December 8, 2022 public hearings.  (2T.86:16-25 through 93:1-13; Pa296).  Because the Township set forth in its amending Ordinance 2022-17 the reasons for adopting the Redevelopment Plan despite potential Master Plan inconsistency, the statutory requirements under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) were satisfied.  Its adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 was not arbitrary or capricious, but well-reasoned and grounded in the record.  Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, neither of the Redevelopment Ordinances (2022-15 and 2022-17) can be found to be “null or void. ” (Pb17).  B.
[brief] It was not enough for the State to rely on only the final consent form and a short video clip of the formal waiver advisory, which came at the very end of an hours-long ordeal that involved multiple officers, initial refusals to cooperate or consent, the seizure of [...]’s person, a coercive interrogation, and a sudden and unexplained change of heart.  Although a consent-to-search form may be one factor, it is not dispositive.
[brief] Appellant’s reliance on Clinton Capital Corp. v. Straeb, 248 N.J. Super. 19 (Super. Ct. 1990) in support of the proposition that it was entitled to reject and return the payment is wholly misplaced.  The Straeb matter dealt with the limited issue of whether a borrower seeking a payoff under a defaulted mortgage could be required to pay a ten percent (10%) pre-payment fee, when the lender elected to accelerate the debt.  Ultimately, the court sided with the borrower and agreed that lender could not both elect to accelerate the debt and seek a pre-payment fee on the accelerated debt.  Id. at 32-33.  The Straeb case does not provide any support for Appellant’s argument that it was entitled to reject and return the payment in question.  In the final analysis, there are no genuine issues of fact in dispute concerning the payment and acceptance terms contained in the Note and Mortgage.  Instead, there are only disputes between the parties over the legal interpretations of what is written in those documents.  Contrary to Appellant’s claims, the real issue presented on this appeal is not whether the Borrowers had the right to pay off the Loan but rather what were Appellant’s predecessor’s duties and obligations under the loan documents with respect to the funds that came into its possession.  While Appellant seeks discovery concerning the facts and circumstances related to [...]’s receipt and return of the First Wire Transfer, no amount of discovery will change the outcome here.  No amount of discovery will change what the loan documents required the Appellant’s predecessor and its servicer to do when the First Wire Transfer was received.  In the end, because the relevant provisions of the Note and Mortgage are clear and unambiguous and *required* application of *all* payments to the balance of the Loan, summary judgment was appropriate and should not be disturbed.
[brief] Courts cannot substitute an independent judgment for that of the boards in areas of factual disputes; neither will they exercise anew the original jurisdiction of such boards or trespass on their administrative work.  So long as the power exists to do the act complained of and there is substantial evidence to support it, the judicial branch of the government cannot interfere.  A local zoning determination will be set aside only when it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of the action, or as to some part of it, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion by the public agencies involved.  Where the board's decision is reasonably supported by the record, it will be sustained.  *Id.* at 285; *New York SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Adj. of Bernards Tp.*, *supra* at 163-164).  Moreover, greater deference is accorded to denial of a variance than to a grant.
[directive] Unless a report is transmitted automatically by electronic means, these reports shall be sent to the Division of Criminal Justice on not less than a monthly basis.  See also Section 15 (ongoing study and evaluation of Bail Reform Law’s effectiveness and impact).  This Section shall become operational on January 1, 2017, and the reporting requirement shall expire on January 1, 2019.  4.12  Transport to County Jail After Complaint-Warrant Issued.
[brief] Tenant first argues that, despite the express terms of the Lease, the full amount of the Tenant Allowance is “unwaivable” once the Tenant’s Work and related conditions are satisfied and, therefore, must be paid regardless of whether Tenant is current on its monetary obligations to Landlord when the annual installment payments come due.  (Db29-30).  This “interpretation” of Section 4.02 is belied by its express language.  (Da17-18, Lease at §4.02).  Indeed, pursuant to the terms of the Lease, the completion of the Tenant’s Work and related conditions only makes Tenant eligible to receive the annual Tenant Allowance payments.  (Da17-18, Lease at §4.02).  In order to actually recoup these annual installments, Tenant must, among other things, be current on its monetary obligations under the Lease when the payments come due.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Section 4.02 provides the following, in relevant part:  If an when (i) Tenant’s Work shall have been completed in accordance with the plans and specifications approved by Landlord; (ii) Tenant shall have opened the Premises for business with the public; (iii) Tenant shall have furnished Landlord with a written certification of the actual costs of the leasehold improvements comprising Tenant’s Work excluding Tenant’s movable trade fixtures, together with evidence of such cost and the payment in full thereof, as Landlord shall require; (iv) Tenant shall have furnished Landlord with “as-built” plans for the leasehold improvements comprising Tenant’s Work; (v) Tenant shall have provided Landlord with final lien waivers from Tenant’s general contractor and all subcontractors that performed Tenant’s Work and all suppliers of material used in the performance of Tenant’s Work; and (vi) at or prior to Tenant’s opening for business at the Premises, Tenant shall have, at its sole cost and expense, obtained and delivered to Landlord a final certificate of occupancy for the Premises; then, when and if each condition contained in the foregoing items (i) through (vi), inclusive, hereof shall have been complied with in full, Landlord shall pay to Tenant up to the sum of Seven Hundred Thirty Thousand and 00/100 ($730,000.00) Dollars in the following manner as reimbursement for the actual cost of Tenant’s leasehold improvements comprising Tenant’s Work as and for “Tenant’s Allowance.
[brief] [...]’s denial of [...]’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations-January 24, 2020………………………………………………1T47-15 to 48-22  Order denying [...]’ motion for summary judgment based upon plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations-filed January 24, 2020…………………………………………………………Pa5 [...]’s denial of [...]’ motion for summary judgment based upon plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations-June 25, 2023………………………………………………3T65-4 to 66-18
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash  Bail Option Actor (1) provides services, resources, or assistance with the knowledge that the services, resources, or assistance are intended to be used in furtherance of the commission of the crime of human trafficking in violation of 2C:13-8; or (2) procures or attempts to procure a person to engage in sexual activity as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection a. of 2C:34-1, 2C:13-9
[brief] A Yes.  Q  Is anyone forcing you to give up those rights?  A No.  Q  Are you satisfied with the advice [...] has given you on these files?  A Yes.  Q  Has he answered all of your questions to your satisfaction?  A Yes.  Q  Has any other promises been made to you other than what we've just discussed on the record?  A Yes -- oh, say that again?  Q  Has anyone else promised you, like, something better than what was just discussed?  A No.  Q  Okay.  And finally, are you pleading guilty to the first degree felony murder because you're guilty of that crime?  A  Say that again?  Q  Okay.  Yes, there was some noise in the background.  Are you pleading to the first degree felony murder because, in fact, you're guilty of that crime?  A Yes.  Q  And are you pleading guilty to first degree armed robbery because you're guilty of that crime?  A Yes.  Q  All right.  I'm going to have [...] ask you questions so the Court can receive a factual basis for those guilty pleas.
[brief] (DA77-84).  [...]’s Demand for arbitration included two counts, one for declaratory judgment and one for breach of contract, both of which sought relief pursuant to the liquidated damages clause in the SPA that entitled [...] to retain Plaintiffs’ 10 percent deposit held in escrow.  (Id.).  AAA confirmed receipt of [...]’s filing on March 14, 2023, and advised the parties that Plaintiffs’ answer, counterclaim or objection was due on or before March 28, 2023.  (DA196).  The letter, addressed directly to Plaintiffs, advised that they should “review the Rules” and the enclosed Arbitration Information Sheet.  (Id.).  On March 27, 2023, attorney, [...], ("[...]") appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs and filed an Answer and separate Counterclaims.  (DA202-211).  Count One of the Counterclaims alleged breach of contract, breach of implied duty of good faith, negligent/fraudulent misrepresentations/omissions, and sought dismissal of the arbitration, refund of Plaintiffs deposit, as well as an Order awarding costs of suit and arbitration and attorneys fee.  (DA209-210.).  Count One also alleged that [...] “materially breached the parties’ contract by failing to disclose the nature and extent of various substantial defects with the construction,” including allegedly “fail[ing] to disclose water damage to Unit 1601 in a timely manner and by submitting an inconsistent incident report and estimate of repairs,” and “defects with the windows and the truthfulness of the representations as to the dimensions of the units. ”  (Id.).  Plaintiffs also averred that “the building is presently the subject of multiple multi-plaintiff and/or class action lawsuits which could have a significant adverse financial impact on the Respondents by way of future assessments or special assessments distributed among the unit owners. ” (Id.).  Notably, Plaintiffs conceded their knowledge of multiple lawsuits in Hudson County Superior Court related to the building, but never explained their failure to file first to seek relief in a different forum.
[directive] After any use of force, and when the environment is safe, officers shall promptly render medical assistance to any injured person consistent with the officer’s training and shall promptly request emergency medical assistance for that person, if needed or requested.  Officers also have a duty to monitor individuals for potential medical intervention after any officer uses force.  6.1  An officer’s duty to render medical assistance and monitor for potential medical intervention is particularly important following any use of force.  When the force involves the use of OC spray, officers shall take immediate action to address the effects of the OC spray, consistent with training.  6.2  The duty to render medical assistance and monitor applies to all officers on scene and continues throughout any transportation and custody of the individual.  6.3  Officers shall pay particular attention to persons reasonably believed to be pregnant, children, the elderly, physically frail individuals, and those experiencing a mental health or substance use crisis.  19  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021  Core Principle Seven Duty to Report and Review
[brief] P-14 to -25:  [...] response to discovery request NJNG-HOLM-BLM-2 to 5, 9 to 13, 15, 17, and 20 dated March 31, 2020 (see also S-16) (SOICR p. 11) is Staff Exhibit S-16 and included in this Appendix at Ha1709 to Ha1729.
[brief] On April 14, 2020, Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendants, and others, alleging claims against Defendants including for breach of contract and violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  [Pa15]  On June 10, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint.  [Pa15]  Defendants filed their Answer on August 10, 2020, in which they denied Plaintiffs’ claim and counterclaimed for a declaration approving the rescission of the Policies.  [Pa106]  On August 4, 2021, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment.  At the time, the Discovery End Date was November 5, 2021, and no depositions had been taken.  By Order dated September 3, 2021, the Court extended the Discovery End Date to March 2, 2022, and set a deadline for fact depositions of December 1, 2021.  [Pa942]  The trial court held argument on October 22, 2021, and November 18, 2021 [1T and 2T, respectively] and presented its decision at a hearing on March 31, 2022.  [3T]¹  The trial court concluded, in pertinent part, that “[...] has established by clear and convincing evidence that [...] has made material misrepresentations of fact that were relied on by [...].  ¹  1T refers to the transcript dated October 22, 2021; 2T refers to the transcript dated November 18, 2021; and 3T refers to the transcript dated March 31, 2022.  warranting rescission of the policy. ”  [3T28-11]  The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against them, and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.  [Pa1, Pa3]  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**