ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On April 18, 2018, the Appellate Division issued a decision reversing and remanding the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against [...] and [...] (Pa2303).  The Appellate Division rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the affidavit of merit requirement was not applicable to claims brought under a respondeat superior theory of liability (Pa2317-18).  Specifically, the Appellate Division concluded that:  [I]f on remand there is a determination that [[...] employee James] [...] was acting under the direction and supervision of licensed engineering professionals and that the function he was performing was part of the practice of engineering, plaintiffs cannot contend that the affidavit of merit statute does not apply because they are only suing [...] and [...] (Pa2318).  The court further rejected plaintiffs’ contention that [...] and [...] were estopped from asserting an affidavit of merit defense (Pa2320). \(^2\)  However, the Appellate Division concluded that a fuller record was required to determine whether plaintiffs’ claims implicated the affidavit of merit requirement.  The court observed, “Whether [...] was acting under the supervision of licensed --- \(^2\)  The Appellate Division went on to observe that plaintiffs’ equitable estoppel argument would not impede [...] and [...] from again seeking summary judgment on the basis of plaintiffs’ failure to file an affidavit of merit (Pa2321).  Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs suggest that [...] and [...] should be precluded from raising the affidavit of merit requirements, any such argument should be rejected.  engineers or acting in a non-engineering capacity is a question of fact that requires more development than exists in the current record” (Pa2315).  To that end, the court opined that, “plaintiffs’ proposed experts should be deposed,” and further suggested that [...] and [...] retain their own experts (Pa2315-16).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  THE [...]’S DECISION TO DENY THE APPLICATION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (Order, at p. 6)  A.  The [...]’s decision-making process is subject to judicial review for arbitrary and capricious failures.  It is axiomatic that the decisions, procedures, and actions of State administrative agencies, such as the [...], are subject to “judicial review and supervision to assure fairness in the administrative process.
[directive] 7.1  An officer issued a CED shall determine and record on an appropriate log, prior to field deployment, that the device, including the video recording function, is functional.  If the officer is equipped with a body worn camera as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1 that will be used to record the circumstances of the firing/discharge of the CED in lieu of an internal video camera, the officer shall determine and record on an appropriate log that the body worn camera is functional.  7.2  When feasible, the officer should warn the person against whom a CED is directed that the officer intends to fire the weapon.  7.3  An officer should not fire a CED if there is a substantial risk that the electrode/darts will strike an innocent person, unless firing the device in such circumstances is reasonably necessary to protect the innocent person(s) from death or serious bodily injury.  7.4  To ensure officer safety, when feasible, at least one law enforcement officer other than the one deploying the CED should be present, be armed with lethal ammunition, and be prepared to utilize deadly force in the event that the use of a CED for any reason fails.  Deadly force would only be authorized in this situation as a last resort, if otherwise permitted by the Use of Force Policy.  7.5  During the deployment of a CED, the deploying officer shall, when feasible, continually evaluate the options selected against changing circumstances.  7.6  An officer trained and authorized to carry a CED shall be aware of and comply with any targeting recommendations made by the manufacturer.  7.7  A CED may be used in conjunction with a distraction device, non-flammable chemical agent, or less-lethal ammunition.  If the individual has already received an electrical charge from a CED, officers shall, when feasible, provide the person a reasonable opportunity to submit to law enforcement authority and to comply with law enforcement commands, considering the physiological effects of the discharge, before deploying a distraction device, chemical agent, or less-lethal ammunition.  7.8  A CED shall not be directed against a person who is situated on an elevated surface (e.g., a ledge, scaffold, near a precipice, etc.) unless reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or minimize a fall-related injury (e.g., deploying a safety net).  7.9  A CED shall not be used in, on, or immediately adjacent to a body of water in which the targeted person could fall during any stage of the application of the electrical current generated or transmitted by the device.  9
[brief] ”  (Pa13)  The trial Court failed to even acknowledge that Appellant underwent surgery on her knee, nor was it mentioned in the Statement of Reasons in the Order at all concerning the permanent loss of substantial bodily function.  (Pa1-19)  The Court in Brooks, as a case referenced by the trial Court in this matter, advises that each case is fact sensitive.  In the instant matter, Appellant underwent surgery to her ankle and subsequently complained of continued pain and locking of the ankle prohibiting her from putting weight on it.  The trial Court only references a lessened ability to perform certain tasks and lingering pain in their finding that there was no permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial.  The trial Court did not properly take into account the surgery on Appellant’s ankle, the fact that there is not just lingering pain, but that when her ankle locks she is unable to put weight on it, thereby rendering it useless, and the report of [...] which states that Appellant’s injuries are permanent in nature and are directly and causally related to Appellant’s fall of September 6, 2018 and that Appellant’s body parts have failed to return to normal function, nor will they return to normal function with continued care and treatment.  For the foregoing reasons, Appellant submits that the decision below was erroneous and incorrect and must be reversed.
[brief] As a result, [...] found in her Initial Decision • Count 1: “members of the public could interpret this [as a] request from the [...] to fight the existing union structure.  Indeed, the [...] and [...] filed an unfair practice claim against the Board,” which violated the Act because “the [Act] does not support a sitting Board member putting the school Board at risk of litigation. ” (Ca028-029).  • Count 5:  Respondent’s comparison of Jews who were “tortured and murdered” during the Holocaust “based upon a racist ideology” to “unvaccinated individuals” was “distasteful and reckless,” and “resulted in public outcry from parents and students as evidenced by the board meeting minutes and newspaper articles.
[brief] [...] was organized and incorporated in 1935.  (Pa29).  As set forth in its Article 2 of its Constitution and By-Laws (Pa31), the New Jersey Sportsmen’s purpose and objectives are as follows:  a.  To promote the long-term conservation, protection and wise use of fish wildlife, and other natural resources in New Jersey, nationally and worldwide.  b.  To promote a forum for organizations and individuals interested in the long-term conservation, protection and wise use of fish, wildlife, and other natural resources in New Jersey, nationally and worldwide through which proposed legislation can be addressed and through which new legislation can be proposed regarding fish and wildlife conservation and protection of natural resources.  c.  To inform and educate the public through dissemination of facts and information that may contribute to a fuller understanding of problems involved in the restoration, management and conservation of wildlife and other natural resources.  d.  To promote environmental education, encourage the training of environmentally important subjects including the importance of restoration, wise use, management and conservation of wildlife and other natural resources and provide educational material on the restoration, management and conservation of wildlife and other natural resources.  e.  To provide a forum for fishermen, hunters & trappers to educate and inform New Jersey Legislators, US Congressmen & Senators on the wise use of New Jersey’s fish, wildlife and other natural resources.  f.  To promote the highest standards of sportsmanship and ethics through educational programs and to strengthen landowner-sportsmen understanding and cooperation through a comprehensive educational program based upon scientific, technical and legal study and analysis.  g.  To prevent the pollution of New Jersey’s lands and waters and to promote the restoration of lands and waters previously degraded.  Such habitats are shared by fish, wildlife and the people of New Jersey.  h.  To promote the growth and development of New Jersey in such a manner that will protect the long term viability of our fish and wildlife populations and maintain our quality of life.  i.  To cooperate with local, state and federal agencies and other private organizations in promoting responsible, far-sighted natural resource management.  In granting the dismissal of Appellant’s complaint under a “rational basis” constitutional challenge to a Statute, [...] extensively cited numerous excerpts from *Humane Society*:
[directive] Prosecutors are permitted under these Guidelines to continue the well- accepted practice of tendering a “conditional” plea offer to a defendant under circumstances where that offer does not become operative unless one or more other co-defendants also agree to plead guilty.  This practice for handling multiple defendants is designed to promote the interests of judicial economy and finality, providing incentives for all guilty defendants to plead guilty, as well as to achieve Page 19 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) the important goal of disrupting entire drug trafficking conspiracies.  Indeed, as noted in Section 1.1, nothing in these Guidelines should be construed to require a prosecutor to tender a plea offer to any defendant where to do so would undermine or jeopardize the successful investigation or prosecution of one or more other defendants.  Accordingly, and notwithstanding any other provision of these Guidelines, a prosecutor may refrain from tendering a standardized waiver or regular plea offer in these circumstances, or may tender a standardized waiver or regular plea offer that is subject to the condition that the case(s) involving co- defendants are also disposed of by guilty plea.  In order to comply with the rule reaffirmed in State v. Brimage that prosecutors must state on the record their reasons for choosing to waive or not to waive a statutorily-prescribed mandatory minimum term of parole ineligibility, a prosecutor in these circumstances involving multiple defendants must explain to the court the reasons for not tendering a plea offer, or for tendering an offer that is subject to the condition that other defendant(s) also plead guilty.  Furthermore, to ensure fairness, where any such conditional plea offer is tendered before indictment and the defendant indicates in writing or in open court a willingness to accept the offer but is precluded from effectuating the plea agreement because of a co-defendant’s refusal to plead guilty, the plea offer shall be deemed to be “frozen” for the purposes of determining the “timing” of the plea under the graduated plea system established in these Guidelines, and if the case against the remaining co-defendant(s) is disposed of by guilty plea, the defendant who indicated in writing or in open court a willingness to accept the initial plea offer shall be permitted to plead guilty to the pre-indictment offer, notwithstanding that the defendant has since been indicted and would otherwise be required to plead guilty to an initial or final post-indictment offer calculated under the Guidelines.  See also Section 4.10.  (It should be noted that the prosecutor also retains the authority pursuant to Section 13 at any time to make a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation based, for example, on a defendant’s assistance in prosecuting co-defendants.)  3.11
[brief] The case began as a dispute between [...] and 15 of its historic general liability insurance providers.  (Pa0001-21).  After nearly 18 years of litigation, only one of the insurance companies originally named as Defendants in this case remains, [...]. (Pa0041-42).  All of the other Defendants have either settled or been dismissed through motion practice.  (Pa0091-92).  [...] commenced this action by filing a Complaint in Middlesex County in March of 2005.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW  Settlement agreements are subject to the ordinary principles of contract law.  In re Estate of Balk, 445 N.J. Super. 395, 400 (App. Div. 2016) citing Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 374 (2007).  The interpretation and construction of contracts is a matter of law for the Court to review de novo.  Id. citing Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309 N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 1998).  Accordingly, reviewing Courts do not give deference to the lower Court’s interpretation and review the contract with “fresh eyes.
[brief] The 16-inch line was constructed because of an asserted need under Federal regulations:  [...]:  I think I'm just going to add that, while there was no regulator station involved, the purpose of this – of the transmission line replacement project with new 16-inch you referred to was to replace an existing 10-inch transmission line for a number of reasons.  Two of the primary ones were for reliability due to its age, as well as for compliance reasons related to federal regulations on pipeline integrity, the ability to do inspections, things of that nature.  [1T132:8-25, -133:1-13.]
[brief] [...] has a statutory obligation to furnish “safe, adequate and proper service” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:2-23.  The 69kV project specifically at issue in this matter also has support grounded in federal law as the project was approved in 2017 by [...]’s (“[...]”) Board of Managers operating under its FERC-approved planning process.  The 69kV project runs through nine municipalities in Union County serving approximately 25,000 customers, including customers in Westfield (“Union County Project” or “Project”).
[brief] Yet, as argued supra, the Chancery Division deviated from that distinction by adopting Plaintiff’s argument that the Township violated its duty under the Agreement to effectuate Plaintiff’s IOD application when it refused to modify the Agreement following the determinations of the Division and Pension Board.  In doing so, the Chancery Division held that the Township’s bringing about of Plaintiff’s IOD application before the NJDPB and Pension Board was insufficient but neither explained the definition of “effectuate” that it applied nor rationalized its departure from the plain and ordinary meaning of “effectuate”.  Thus, the Chancery Division ran afoul of basic contract interpretation principles by extending the scope of the circumstances triggering the severance provision so as to include administrative determinations on Plaintiff’s IOD eligibility.  Accordingly, the Chancery Division errantly decided that the NJDPB’s denial of Plaintiff’s IOD application triggered the severance provision of the Agreement; therefore, the Chancery Division’s decision must be reversed and Plaintiff’s complaint dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] *Abbott v. Burke*, 100 N.J. 269, 278, n.1 (1985) (“*Abbott I*”).  In addition to [...] students, the *Abbott* plaintiff class encompasses all students enrolled in 28 districts identified by the Supreme Court as “poorer urban” and are the “sole object of the remedy” for the State’s violation of T&E imposed by the Court in the *Abbott* litigation.  *Abbott v. Burke*, 119 N.J. 287, 338-343 (1990) (“*Abbott II*”).  Based on an extensive trial record, the *Abbott* plaintiffs demonstrated the State’s failure to provide a T&E education to students in [...] and the other designated poorer urban or “Abbott” districts, defined as an education to prepare them for citizenship, civic life, and effective participation in the economy.  *Abbott II*, 119 N.J. at 313.  The fundamental educational deficits proven in the *Abbott* trial encompassed not just funding levels but also teachers, support staff, building conditions, curriculum, course offerings, programs and services for struggling students and more, resulting in low achievement levels, high dropout rates and graduation rates far below the state average.  See, e.g., *Abbott II*, 119 N.J. at 358-368 (describing in detail the “tragically inadequate” quality and level of education in the poorer urban districts).  The trial evidence of educational deficiencies was so --- 3  The Legislature in 1990 and 2003 added three additional urban districts to the *Abbott* class to expand the scope of a remedy for the T&E violation to students in those districts.  *Abbott v. Burke*, 149 N.J. 145, 158, n. 4 (1997) (“*Abbott IV*”) ([...] and [...] districts); P.L. 2004, c. 61, § 1 ([...]).  overwhelming that the Court found the State’s violation of a T&E education in the Abbott districts to be “clear, severe, extensive, and of long duration. ”  Id. at 385.  Given this irrefutable and overwhelming evidentiary record, the Supreme Court in Abbott II held that the Public School Education Act of 1975, the State’s school finance formula, failed to provide adequate funding to students in [...] and other Abbott districts, did not remedy the violation of their right to a T&E education, and was, therefore, unconstitutional.
[brief] (emphasis added)  All [...] sought were email logs.  He had no specific demand as to format.  So insomuch as the [...] certification alludes to the possible difficulty with making logs and to the extent that such may be true, OPRA obligates the [...] to at least attempt to supply them in other formats, just as other courts have directed be done.  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 78 (2008) sought for the parties to strive for collaborative efforts in records production and alternate --- 6 nj.gov/grc/custodians/handbook/Custodians%20Handbook%20(Seventh%20Edition%20-%20Nov%202022)(Final).pdf  7  Recall that no one even tried because the argument relied upon and accepted by the trial court was that email logs of private accounts were not government records so they should not even have to look for the records.  mediums - if there is an actual specific demonstrated hardship\(^8\) - is the proper solution as opposed to just relying on a pronouncement that “something might be too hard”.  Our trial courts are well suited to explore these matters.  This is not a circumstance where the records were burned or otherwise destroyed.  The government officials have them, they are just claiming they should not even have to look for them or attempt to provide them because they are in/from private email accounts.  And that is outrageous.
[brief] **  [...] is a natural gas company “primarily engaged in the business of transporting natural gas in interstate commerce[.]” (Aa52).  It “owns and operates an interstate natural gas transmission system” throughout the southern and eastern United States.  (Aa53).  This system runs from “Texas and Louisiana, and the Gulf of Mexico, through the states of Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
[directive] “….There shall be a presumption in favor of the court designating the posting of full United States currency cash bail to the exclusion of other forms of bail when a N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12 defendant is charged with an offense as set forth in subsection (a) of the this section and:  Crimes with Bail Restrictions  (1)  Has two other indictable offenses pending at the time of the arrest; or (See next box for bail restrictions on (2) Has two prior convictions for a first or second degree crime or for a violation of section 1 of P.L. 1987, c. 101 (2C:35-7) in any combination thereof; or Domestic Violence Contempts)  (3)  Has one prior conviction for murder, aggravated manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping, or bail jumping; or (4) Was on parole at the time of the arrest, unless the court finds that another form of bail authorized in subsection (b) of this section will ensure the defendant’s presence in court when required.
[brief] The second provision in the 1999 Agreement, which was discussed by the lower court is Section 6.5.  Pursuant to section 6.5:  Out of town buildings –  The parties acknowledge that some users are located outside of the Borough for which the sewerage is transmitted through mains and lines through the Borough to the Township Treatment Plant.  The Township agrees that it will bill said commercial users directly and further acknowledges that the Borough may reserve the right to impose an additional fee upon such user, for the use of the Borough pipes and other property by said user, which fee shall be billed to the user by the Borough.  The fees that are set forth in Section 6.5, however, are not connection fees but are the fees that are associated with the sewerage treatment services provided by the Township at its treatment facility.  The fees referenced in Section 6.5 are the fees set forth in Section 4.1 of the 1999 Agreement, specifically the service charge and that annual rate for the bulk sewerage treatment.  These fees are broken down in Section 4.1 based upon the residential and commercial use.  The 1999 Agreement also establishes that the rates charged to Borough residents shall be the same as the rates charged to Township residents, and that the Township will notify the Borough of any rate increases.  It is important to note that Section 4.3 of the 1999 Agreement in reference to the fees set forth in Section 4.1 provides that “The Township will bill Borough no later than December 1 for the coming year.  Payment will be made in four (4) equal installments due on January 1, April 1, July 1 and October 1. ”  It logically follows then that the language in Section 6.5 that the “Township agrees that it will bill said commercial users directly” when referring to out of town buildings is seeking to remove the Borough as the middle man for charges related to sewerage treatment at the Township’s treatment facilities that are set forth in Section 4.1 for properties outside of the Borough, for properties within the Borough, Section 4.3 governs how the fees will be collected.  It also logically follows that if the Township were permitted to bill out of town buildings directly for connection fee, Section 6.1 of the 1999 Agreement would specifically provide for it.  Indeed, the only section in the 1999 Agreement that addresses connection fees specifically is Section 6.1, which again, provides that the Borough may impose and receive connection fees from any user of the Borough’s services.