ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In that accompanying decision, the court provided that it reconsidered, on its own motion, a portion of the oral opinion.  (Da256).  While it originally denied the claim based on failure to comply with Rule 3:22-10(c), reinforced by State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1999), and the failure to establish a basis to conclude that trial counsel was ineffective in choosing not to call the witness to testify, upon reconsideration the Court determined that the second basis was not viable since there was no evidence in the record as to why trial counsel chose not to call the witness at trial.  (Da256).  Thus, the claim was denied solely on grounds of non-compliance with the affidavit/certification requirement.  (Da256).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: THE PCR COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S DISPARATE SENTENCE CLAIM.4 [(Raised Below.)]
[brief] The January 7, 2022 Legislative Calendar (Vol. XLV No. 57, Internet Update I) is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20220108020253/https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislative-calendar (last visited May 1, 2024), and is also included in the State’s appendix for the court’s convenience. for leave to appeal.  (Pa356).  Petitioners filed another motion to supplement the record, which was granted on January 11, 2024.  (Pa376).  The State’s brief on the merits now follows.
[directive] After a complaint is filed, the municipal prosecutor is “responsible for handling all phases of the prosecution of an offense. ”  N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5(a).  As explained in the Commentary on the Guidelines to Part VII of the Rules, the municipal prosecutor is not duty bound to pursue a conviction on every offense charged in every complaint:  It is recognized that it is not the municipal prosecutor’s function merely to seek convictions in all cases.  The prosecutor is not an ordinary advocate.  Rather, the prosecutor has an obligation to defendants, the State and the public to see that justice is done and truth is revealed in each individual case.  The goal should be individual justice in individual cases.  In discharging the diverse responsibilities of that office, a prosecutor must have some latitude to exercise the prosecutorial discretion demanded of that position.  . . .  [Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements in the Municipal Courts of New Jersey, [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix to Part VII cmt. (2018) [Part VII Guidelines]. ]  Municipal prosecutors therefore have discretion in appropriate cases to recommend that the court accept a plea to a lesser or other offense, N.J.S.A. 2B:25-11, to move to amend an original charge, N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5(c); N.J.S.A. 2B:25-12, and to request dismissal of a charge, Page 5 N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5(c).
[brief] Moreover, the CSC’s independent rationale for finding that [...]’s statement to the DCF investigator, as reported by DCF, damaged his credibility is illogical and unsupported by the record.  (R2b6).  Specifically, the CSC supposes that [...] would not have called the police, or perhaps even have filed a complaint against [...], because doing so could expose her to potential criminal liability for soliciting petition signatures under false pretenses.  (Id.).  However, the record does not reflect whether, after DCF’s investigator interviewed [...], she went back to [...] to see whether she challenged or contested any of the statements [...] made about why he was at the NJDOL building and became involved in the heated incident captured in some manner on the silent video.  Rather, the CSC determined for itself whether [...] actually engaged in the conduct [...] alleged, concluded she did not, and then used that conclusion as a basis to undermine [...]’s credibility.  That is precisely the type of arbitrary and capricious fact-finding and reasoning that poisons an administrative agency’s determination and warrants remedial action by this court.
[brief] ”  Id. at 144-45; see also DeBrango, 328 N.J. Super. at 227 (holding that counsel fee sanction is not warranted when plaintiff had reasonable good faith belief in merits of claim); Ellison v. Evergreen Cemetery, 266 N.J. Super. 74, 86 (App. Div. 1993) (“The most that can be said is that plaintiffs were perhaps overly optimistic in seeking a remedy, but this does not mean that the litigation was essentially frivolous. ”).
[brief] [...] (“[...]”) submits this respondent brief in response to [...]’s appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment order dated October 17, 2019 and verdict dated May 24, 2023.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...] (“[...]”) seeks to enforce a multi-million-dollar consent judgment predicated on injuries he suffered exclusively by exposure to mold against an insurer with mold exclusions.  Because the plain language of the [...] Policies forecloses this absurd result—as the trial court has held—[...] advocates for a sweeping, unsupported change to New Jersey insurance law.  He asks this Court to expand a rule limited to first-party property policies—the efficient proximate cause rule—to a third-party commercial general liability policy.  There are substantial analytical differences between first-party property and third-party liability policies required by their policy language.  The trial court recognized that these crucial differences rendered the efficient proximate cause rule inapplicable, applied the Mold Exclusion as written, and held that it bars coverage.  This Court should affirm.
[brief] This case challenges the [...]’s (“[...]”) routine application of statutory and regulatory flood hazard and stormwater requirements for the December 1, 2022 Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit and Verification (the “Permit”) issued to [...] (“[...]”).  [...] proposes to construct seven warehouses, internal roadways, parking, stormwater management features, and other associated amenities on a 645-acre property in [...] (the “Project”).  [...] reviewed [...]’s Permit application by analyzing thousands of pages of application materials, reports, and public comments, and applying its technical expertise and the existing statutory and regulatory requirements to complex, technical flood hazard and stormwater issues.  Ultimately, [...] granted [...]’s Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit application and Flood Hazard Area Verification for the Project.  [...]’s permitting decision should be affirmed for two reasons.  First, [...]’s determinations are based on its technical expertise, supported by substantial evidence in the record, and are owed judicial deference.  Under duly promulgated regulatory standards in place when the application was deemed complete, [...] verified [...]’s delineation of the flood hazard area for the property and determined that a floodway verification was unnecessary because no activities would take place in the floodway.  Similarly, [...] determined that a culvert, rather than a bridge, was proper to facilitate a road crossing over an unnamed tributary for the U.S. Route 1 access road, and that riparian zone impacts were minimized to the greatest extent practicable.  Finally, the record supports [...]’s determination that the Project does not conflict with an areawide plan or the WQMP rules.  [...]’ (“[...]”) belated arguments on appeal are unavailing.  For the first time, [...]’s merits brief raises issues with: (1) the use of [...]’s existing Flood Hazard Area Control Act rules; (2) whether a floodway verification was required here; (3) use of a culvert over a tributary; and (4) [...]’s determination the Project does not conflict with the Water Quality Management Plan (“WQMP”).  Even though [...] had documentation about the culvert and WQMP consistency prior to Permit issuance, [...] chose not to comment on these issues in any of its public comments or during its meeting with [...].  [...] cannot now be heard to complain that [...] did not address the issues in sufficient detail to satisfy [...] and such claims can be dismissed.  The only issue that [...] raised in a public comment that is now before this Court concerns riparian zone impacts, which are compliant with [...]’s rules.  Because [...]’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, it should be affirmed.
[brief] *Saucier*, 533 U.S. 194; *Pearson*, 555 U.S. 223  Amidst the stream-of-consciousness pleading, she alleges that the Defendants denied her medical treatment because she allegedly did not receive drugs and medication from the jail’s physician/psychiatrist.  These general complaints are not actionable, and even if they were, do not amount to a sufficient pleading to meet the Motion to Dismiss threshold.  All prisoners have a right to adequate medical care.
[brief] REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant  United States Fire Insurance Company Of Counsel and On The Brief: [...], Esq. (028441987)  [...]  [...], Esq. (021592008)  [...]  [...], Esq.  (276092018)  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] B.  Interim Monthly Reporting  In order to provide uniformity and efficiency in issuing permits to carry, the new law allows for the implementation of a centralized web portal to become effective on a date following July 1, 2023.  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d).  However, until such time that the web portal is active, it is See imperative that there not be any break in data collection.  Thus, monthly interim data on the categories outlined in Section I.A. of this Directive must be reported using the excel spreadsheet and appropriate submission link in Appendix A.  Interim reporting will begin on August 1, 2023, for the month of July and continue monthly until such time that the web portal is completed.  At that time, this interim monthly reporting requirement will sunset.
[directive] Re-Considering Decision to Seek Detention and Re-Opening Detention Hearing.  A prosecutor may at any time reconsider the decision to seek pretrial detention based on information that would be relevant pursuant to this Directive and that was not known to the prosecutor at the time an initial decision was made not to seek pretrial detention.  Furthermore, if the court denies a prosecutor’s motion for pretrial detention, the prosecutor may seek to re-open the hearing based on information not known at the time of the initial hearing that has a material bearing on the pretrial detention issue.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f).  7.8
[directive] Actor commits sexual contact on victim less than age 13 and actor is at least 4 years older.  2nd Degree $50,000 to $200,000  No 10%  Actor commits sexual penetration with victim and uses physical force or coercion but victim does not suffer severe personal injury; or victim is on parole or probation or detained in a hospital or prison and actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or victim is 2C:14-2c(1-4)  Sexual Assault  2nd Degree $50,000 to $200,000
[brief] 13  1.  My claims were valid and should have proceeded.  (Pa19-67; Pa84-85; Pa136-146)  13  A)  My contract-based claims were viable, which I had ample standing to bring.  13  B)  My extra-contractual/quasi-contractual claim (i.e. unjust enrichment) was viable.  18  C)  I had rights to the vehicle, as determined by the local police department.  22  2.  Sanctions should never have been imposed.  (1T, 2T, 3T, Pa1 – Pa186)  24  A)  I had several valid substantive arguments supporting my position.  25  B)  Even if I was completely wrong on every argument that I raised, nonetheless sanctions should not be imposed simply because a litigant is wrong about the law.  30 C)  The defendants never even alleged bad faith; and the court’s finding of bad faith is not supported by anything on the record.  34  D)
[directive] The Investigation Division shall also designate an Intelligence Analyst, who will implement and coordinate the [...] intelligence-based policing efforts, including:  (a)  Responsibility for all computer files, reporting systems and/ or -11- programs for the processing of intelligence and investigative data; (b) Conforming to the policies and procedures for the entry, modification, purging, and auditing of the data contained in the intelligence repository; (c)  Serving as a liaison for all external queries of the intelligence system and disseminating information nationwide on behalf of the [...] to other local, county, state, and regulatory agencies; and (d) Providing reliable, timely and pertinent analysis of in telligence and investigative data and trends as they relate to Task Force investigations.
[brief] A.  The terms of the 1963 Agreement, the intent of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances support a finding the [...] granted the [...] an express easement in the Subject Property.  (7T, 8T, 13T, 14T, Da13-35, Da123-143, Da177-209; Da213-237; Da278-418; Da517-659; Da690-693; Da900-925; Da948-952; Da958-1005)  The proofs submitted by Plaintiff during the remand proceedings establish that when the respective leaders of the [...] and [...] entered into the 1963 Agreement, the [...] intended to grant Plaintiff express easement rights in the Subject Property.
[brief] [I]n the spirit of transparency and parental involvement, the district will notify a student’s parent/guardian of the student’s change in gender or expression except where there is reason to believe that doing so would pose a danger to the health or safety of the pupil.  A school counselor will notify and collaborate with the student first before discussing a student’s gender nonconformity or transgender status with the student’s parent/guardian.  That discussion will address any concerns the student has about such parental notification and discuss the process by which such notification shall occur, including, but not limited to, whether the student wishes to be given the opportunity to notify the parent/guardian first.  Where there are concerns about disclosure to a parent/guardian posing a danger to the health or safety of the pupil, the administration in consultation with the school counselor, school psychologist, and other district professionals shall determine the appropriate course of action.  (Ibid.)
[brief] That report, admittedly, was not helpful to either the Township or the Board.  In its brief, [...] asserts that the findings and opinions appearing in the 2020 letter report of the Court Master “are not challenged by the Township Defendants vis-a-vis this appeal and are thus undisputed facts underlying this Appeal”.  See [...] Rb005 and 009.  That is incorrect.  Those findings and opinions were never agreed to or accepted or by the Township or by the Board.  Omitted from [...]’s brief is that such issues are not the subject of the within appeal because the issues addressed in that report were ultimately settled by the parties thus rendering any such appeal to be moot—they are not being contested as part of this appeal because there is no legal ability to do so.
[brief] *Kassick v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp.*, 120 N.J. 130, 134 (1990) (quoting *Wytupeck v. City of Camden*, 25 N.J. 450, 466 (1957)).  In fact, the verdict was so distorted and wrong as to \(^9\) [...] calculated that, of the $1,336,374 that Defendant distributed to herself, $858,955 was improper, and that Plaintiff was entitled to 49% of these unauthorized and improper withdrawals, totaling $420,888.  *Id.* manifest with utmost certainty a plain miscarriage of justice.  *Carrino v. Novotny*, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979).  Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully submits that, Plaintiff was, at minimum entitled to a new trial even if the trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for JNOV, and that the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff’s alternative motion for a new trial.  **POINT III**
[brief] 13  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ####  NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION  **Individual Rights, Privileges and Liberties** | Article I, paragraph 1 | 10 | |------------------------|----| | Article I, paragraph 2a | 2,10 | | Article I, paragraph 5 | 2,10 | | Article I, paragraph 6 | 2,10 | | Article I, paragraph 18 | 2,10 | | Article I, paragraph 21 | 10 | **Prerogative Writ Standing** | Article VI, Section V, paragraph 4 | 2,10 | **Long Term Tax Exemption Related** | Article VIII, Section I, paragraph 1(a) | 8,10 | | Article VIII, Section III, paragraph 1 | 10 | ### CASE LAW **Binding and Precedential** - *Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Deborah Laufer*, 601 U.S. __ (Dec. 5, 2023) - *City of Hackensack v. Hackensack Med. Ctr.*, 228 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 1988) - *In re IMO Town of Harrison and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 116*, 440 N.J. Super. 268 App. Div. 2015) - *James King v. Douglas Brownback*, 601 U.S. __ (Oct. 30, 2023) Loigman v. Township Committee of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287 (App. Div. 1997)
[brief] The failure to correct the State's incorrectly labeled Motion, resulting in dismissal, is attributed to [...]’s clerk’s term having ended in early August.  Her promised correction for the incorrectly labeled motion was never acted upon.  The judge's refusal to correct the error, given prior irregularities, creates a clear appearance of impropriety (and hostility).  Similarly, His Honor’s "size" excuse for not noticing the page volume of the Motion filing is unpersuasive.
[brief] This matter flows from a tax foreclosure judgment obtained in the routine and ordinary course of procedure.  The facts are simple: Appellant failed to pay taxes on an investment property and the underlying tax foreclosure was commenced.  Appellant was served, failed to answer or redeem, judgment was entered, and the investment property was sold to Respondent [...] ("[...]").  At trial, Appellant moved to vacate judgment due to faulty service and fraud.  T4 97:13-15.  Appellant sensationalized a mundane record to distract from an otherwise routine foreclosure case conducted with all due regularity.  Appellant brought much sound and fury to the trial, making dramatic allegations of systemic fraud in this "illegal Tax Foreclosure."  Appellant’s Legal Brief, p. 1.  Grounded only in imagination - not fact - Appellant accused everyone from the process server to the eventual third-party purchaser of the investment property and even Co-Respondent/Plaintiff’s own counsel of fraud.  0099a-0109a.
[brief] 1)  The Consumer Fraud Act was applicable (raised below: Pa1, Pa6, 1T4, 1T12)  The trial court erred in its finding that the Consumer Fraud Act (i.e. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et. seq.) was not applicable, holding that the prize offered by the defendants did not fit the statutory definition of “merchandise”.  (1T12:10-12, 1T24:1)  In Bandler v. Landry's Inc., 464 N.J. Super. 311, 235 A.3d 256 (App. Div. 2020), this Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's consumer fraud claims, which involved deceptively-advertised prize money for a poker tournament.  Although the primary thrust of that case was deciding whether or not the Casino Control Act preempted the Consumer Fraud Act (an issue obviously not relevant here), this Court held that the defendant’s false advertising of a tournament prize violated the Consumer Fraud Act, and that the prize offered was undoubtedly “merchandise”, which was broadly defined under N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) to include services.  Id. at n.3  In Bandler, this Court noted the following:  “We previously addressed the alleged conflict between the CFA and the CCA regarding deceptive advertising in Smerling v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., 389 N.J. Super. 181, 184-85, 912 A.2d 168 (App. Div. 2006).  Invoking both the CFA and CCA, the plaintiffs alleged that promotional advertisements that falsely promised cash incentives induced them to visit a casino hotel.  Id. at 184, 912 A.2d 168.  The trial court held that the Division had exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims and dismissed the CFA claims under Rule 4:6-2(e).  Id. at 185-86, 912 A.2d 168.  We reversed, concluding the CCA did not preempt plaintiffs' CFA claims from proceeding.  Id. at 193, 912 A.2d 168. ”  Thus, in this case it is clear that the trial court erred by finding that the prize offered by these defendants did not constitute “merchandise” under the CFA.  2)
[brief] Plaintiff respectfully requests that the appeal be denied in its entirety.  There was no error at trial, and, even if this Appellate Court finds that there was error, it should be deemed harmless.  The jury’s verdict should stand, and, the verdict should not be molded.  [...], ESQUIRE  Bar ID: 021521990  Attorney for Plaintiff, [...]  KEITH HACKER, v. [...]; [...]; JOHN DOE (FICITIOUS NAMES A-Z AS EMPLOYER OR PRINCIPAL FOR DEFENDANT, [...]) AND [...], I/J/S/A
[brief] (Pa141; 11,15-24)  (Pa142; 13,1-6)  Notwithstanding that his principal expertise is in traffic, he nevertheless opined as to the height ordinance.  He measured from the original lot grade.  He opined that the grading was “as if the buildings were put on pedestals to increase the height by 5 feet” (Pa143-144; 20,16-21,12)  He opined that pedestals should be considered as “other devices designed to allow increased building height” under the ordinance.  (Pa144; 21,22-22,5)  He provided no reason why an increase in building height would be desirable on this site.  Nor did he address the issue of providing an overall revised lot grading plan for the entire site to address all factors including seasonal high-water table, sewerage and stormwater management regulations as was testified to by [...] and [...].
[brief] [...] cannot be located and the Court authorized plaintiffs to serve [...]’s insurer, [...], with a complaint.  [Pa721-Pa722].  [...]’s insurer answered the third amended complaint on behalf of [...].  [Pa558-Pa569].  [...]’s insurer served answers to interrogatories on behalf of [...].  [Pa639-Pa649].  On March 16, 2017 [...] and [...] were parties to a lease (hereinafter referred to as the “Lease”) whereby [...] was the lessor and [...] was the lessee.
[brief] Finally, [...] contends that the trial court erred in its analysis by inferring that [...] would not have supported [...]’s termination because she lost two-thirds of her staffing during the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic.  (See Pb30).  Not only is this not a genuine dispute of material fact, but [...] was never the decision maker.  [...] was terminated following a review of his case by a termination panel consisting of [...], [...], in-house counsel, and the assistant-Vice President of Human Resources.  [...], nor any other member of the termination panel, had any individual decision-making power.  IV.
[brief] As to the NJCFLA, New Jersey case law is clear “that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment action under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute. ”  *North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC*, No. 2:20- cv-20190 (BRM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974, at *9 (D.N.J. Sep. 24, 2021), citing Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 825 F. App’x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2020)(“But it is well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment action under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute”); see also Ass’n of New Jersey Chiropractors, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., A-6033-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2677, at *14-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 4, 2013)(“plaintiffs are not entitled to use the declaratory judgment as a substitute for a private right of action”).  As demonstrated in Section II(A) above, there is no express or implied private right of action under the NJCFLA.  Accordingly, Appellant cannot circumvent this lack of a private cause of action under the NJCFLA by seeking relief under the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Law.  Statement of Reasons p. 11, citing In re Resol. of State Comm’n, 108 N.J. at 46.  (Pa43-Pa44)  As to the CFA, as described in Section II(B) above, Appellant cannot sustain a claim because she failed to allege each of the required elements.  Because the trial court properly dismissed Appellant’s underlying CFA claim, Appellant’s related declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims must also fail.  Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Appellant’s declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims under the NJCFLA and the CFA.