ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at 494  [...] had the “absolute right” to terminate “regardless of the reason”.  Id.  See also Vieser v. Leventhal, No. A-4526-10 (App. Div. August 25, 2010)  [Allegation motive of cancellation was desire to move to Texas irrelevant as unambiguous termination clause allowed for termination due to unacceptable radon test results].  (Da83-95.6)  This rule has only been tempered where there is a claim and factual allegations supporting the claim of a breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.  Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396 (1997); Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 69 N.J. 123 (1976).
[brief] Yet, one of the primary selling points of wrap-ups is to facilitate retention of less costly subcontractors, which may not have the wherewithal to procure policies with the preferred “depth of coverage. ”  --- \(^4\) *Bauman v. Royal Indem. Co.* 36 N.J. 12 (1961) (homeowner policy; no corollary regulatory notice requirement); *McClellan v. Feit*, 376 N.J.Super. 305 (App.Div.2005) (same); *Millbrook Tax Fund, Inc. v. PL Henry Assoc.*, supra, 344 N.J.Super. 49 (App.Div.2001) (professional liability policy); *Skeete v. Dorvius*, 185 N.J. 5 (2005) (personal automobile policy; notice also governed by regulation); *See also, Mangiaricina v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, PA*, 2008 WL 1733611 (App.Div.2008) (commercial auto policy: “Nothing in either Bauman or Skeete suggests that the holdings are limited to personal auto policies,” and confirming that the regulations “are not exclusive”), *certif. denied*, 199 N.J. 511 (2009) (Dtsa4); *A&C Investment Gp., LLC v. Zurich-American Ins. Co.*, 2006 WL 8457335 (D.N.J.2006) (concept applicable to commercial property coverage issued by Zurich; no reference to regulation) (Dtsa9).
[brief] Defendants aver that the “circumstances warrant the attribution [o]f knowledge of the adverse claim of [d]efendants to the property” because: (1) the time between the final judgment and transfer “was incredibly short” (35 days); (2) the “court must assume” [...] ‘is sophisticated in tax lien foreclosure matters and for this reason alone may be charged with knowledge of the risk of [d]efendants’ claim to vacate the [f]inal [j]udgment;’ (3) [...] received a quit claim deed which revealed that [...] acquired titled by [f]inal [j]udgment” on November 7, 2022 at [d]ocket [n]umber [...]”, and, therefore, [...] was on notice ‘that [p]laintiff held title by a tax lien foreclosure,’ ‘that [p]laintiff only held title for thirty-five (35) days”, and the quit claim deed offered no “warranties;” (4) [...] “had a duty to check the docket of the foreclosure” citing, I.E’s LLC v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520 (Law Div. 2006) and the docket may have revealed that “[d]efendants had recently obtained Site Plan Approval” and “[d]efendants were in possession of the [p]roperty”; (5) “defendants] were in possession of the [p]roperty;” and (6) [...] “can not in good faith claim ignorance of defendants’ claim to both possession and title. ”  While admittedly some of defendants’ assertions may not ultimately withstand scrutiny, it nonetheless offers prima facie assertions that, if satisfactorily established, may lead the court to conclude that [...] is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and thereby not prejudiced.
[brief] As to the first element of passion/provocation manslaughter, the provocation from an objective standpoint must be enough to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond his power of control.  Darrian, 255 N.J. Super. at 447.  The general rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation.  Crisantos, 102 N.J. at 274.  Battery, except for a light blow, is sufficient provocation. Darrian, 255 N.J. Super. at 447.  But while “mutual combat” can give rise to passion/provocation, the contest must have been waged on equal terms with no unfair advantage taken of the deceased.  *Crisantos*, 102 N.J. at 274-75.  Thus, if the defendant used a deadly weapon against an unarmed victim, the offense is not manslaughter but murder.
[brief] ............................  25, 26 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 .............................................................................  29 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6 .............................................................................  28  Court Rules R. 3:22-2(c) ..................................................................................  18, 48 R. 3:22-4 .......................................................................................  17 R. 3:22-5 .......................................................................................  18 R. 3:22-10 ....................................................................................  46 RPC 3.3 .........................................................................................  48  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] ² 2T refers to the November 8, 2024 Plenary Hearing Transcript, Volume II.  Information Technology.  Attached to the email was a zip folder containing various documents.  One of the files was a PDF document entitled “Employment contracts-signed” (the “November 2019 Email”), comprised of seven fully executed employment contracts all containing virtually the same arbitration clause.  One of the seven was the Operative Agreement signed by [...] and [...], dated March 17, 2019.  Moreover, with regard to a number of the other agreements, [...] signed them on behalf of the College or signed them as a witness.  See 1T at 20:12-25:6.  In fact, some of the agreements were signed before, and others after, [...] had signed her agreement.  See 116a, 125a, 134a, 143a, 148a.  Accordingly, there should have been no doubt at the fact-finding hearing discussed below that [...] was bound by the arbitration clause in the Operative Agreement.
[brief] Second, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the CCIP Policies were issued to [...], not [...], but claim [...] was a “Named Insured” under the Named Insured – Contractor Controlled Insurance Program endorsement, which adds the following to the “Who Is An Insured” section:  1.  Subject to Paragraph 2, below, a contractor of any tier, including the person or organization designated in the Declarations of this policy will qualify as a Named Insured, if such contractor: a. Is enrolled in the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program for which this policy is provided; and b. Performs operations at a “designated project”.  2.  Unless added by separate endorsement, the following are not an insured under this policy:  c.  Any contractor or other person or organization that does not have dedicated payroll for employees on-site at the "designated project".  (Italics added.) (Pa125; and Za078.)
[brief] The Public Trust Doctrine Generally:  After July 2, 2019 (the date of the Statutory Public Trust Law went into effect) going forward all further development of public or private lands that adjoined navigable waters now had an additional requirement that had to be satisfied as a condition of lawful approval of the development.  The Redevelopment Plan was therefore specifically required to satisfy and comply with the “public access rule” now found in N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.  The public access rule essentially mirrored the already long existing Common Law right of public access which had in the past been the source of “non-development” beach access litigation addressing the competing rights of private property owners and the public and the public’s right of access.  See eg. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 95 (1821); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296 (1972); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174 (1978), Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306 (1984); and Raleigh Ave. Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., et al., 185 N.J. 40 (2005).  The public access rule itself is a detailed twenty one (21) page comprehensive and very specific administrative regulation adopted and promulgated by the [...] pursuant to the very specific statutory mandate.  The new Statutory Public Trust Doctrine did not supersede or supplant the 200+ year old Common Law Public trust Doctrine.
[brief] As set forth below, the record is replete with evidence that (i) water quality assessments were conducted in full compliance with the Water Quality Planning Act,\(^4\) the Water Quality Management Planning Rules\(^5\) (the “WQMP Rules”), and the Stormwater Management Rules;\(^6\) (ii) the approval of a circular culvert at the --- \(^4\) N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 to -16.
[brief] But that does not help [...] because the record here shows that: (1) [...] knew from the Department’s communications that the Department was questioning the excessiveness of [...]’s requested rate increases, the credibility of its assumptions, and the impact on policyholders; (2) [...] had ample opportunity to answer the Department’s questions and supply missing information; and (3) [...] in fact submitted its actuarial memoranda and purported to opine on the reasonableness of the proposed rates.  Indeed, in *Bowman* (which [...] itself cites), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected claims of unfair surprise where the aggrieved party claiming surprise had offered its own expert study on qualifications in anticipation that the agency might address the issue during the administrative review.
[brief] (21T15-15-3 to 16-3)  The court also distinguished State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298 (2014), in which the Court ruled that a PCR petition should have been considered on the merits even though the details of the purported alibi witness testimony was not supported by a certification or affidavit.  The PCR court distinguished Jones on that basis that the witness in that case was interviewed by prosecutors, thus, that witness was subject to penalties for false statements to law enforcement, whereas [...]’s statements to defense counsel’s investigator were not.
[brief] 15  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APRIL 6, 2023 AGAINST [...] IN FAVOR OF [...], AS WELL IN REFUSING TO REVERSE THAT ORDER (PPCIa369-71; PPCIa419-20; 1T; and PPCIa449-50)  ..........................................................  15  A.  Standard of Review ..............................................................................  15  B.  The Procedural Context of the Case at the Time the Trial Court Granted Summary Judgment against [...]  Regarding Liability for the Spill and Resulting Remediation Costs .................................................................  16  C.  Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment Against [...] .........................................................................................  17  D.  The Court Erred in Failing to Later Reconsider its “Final Judgment” Against [...] .........................................................................................  21  E.  The Trial Court Erred in Entering Summary Judgment against [...] at a Time When It Was Without Counsel  ..................................................  23  POINT II ...........................................................................................................
[brief] On March 18, 2019, plaintiffs filed this action and sought provisional relief by Order to show Cause, to enjoin the various defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' solar-energy developmental rights and land use rights.  An Order to show cause was issued March 20, 2019, Pa42, but substantive relief was ultimately denied and the Order to show cause vacated, and the case was conferenced for discovery trial under Track 2 originally, modified to Track 3, and later modified to Track 4.  Pa77, Pa372.  At various intervals, the case thereupon was litigated on papers and all defendants were dismissed pre-trial by motions to dismiss or by motions for summary judgment.  The specific orders granting relief are appended to the notice of appeal, and will be explicated in detail in plaintiffs' brief.  On April 1, 2019, defendant [...] filed an answer.  Pa63.  On April 23, 2019, defendant [...] filed an answer.  On May 1, 2019, [...] and [...] filed their answer.  Pa391.  On June 21, 2019, the court entered a case management Order.  Pa495.  On July 19, 2019, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment invoking the Affidavit of Merit Act.  On August 2, 2019, defendant [...] also filed a motion to dismiss on the same ground.  On August 30, 2019, those motions were granted.  Pa496-999.  On September 26, 2019, [...] and [...] filed their motion for summary judgment.  Pa1000.  On November 12, 2019, plaintiffs opposed.  Pa1079.  On November 18, 2019, CEP/Milford filed their reply papers.  On November 22, 2019, the court denied these defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Pa1113.  The parties proceeded to pretrial discovery.  During discovery, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery and CEP/Milford defendants' motion to compel discovery, and the court granted those motions on September 25, 2020.  Pa1382.  On June 15, 2021, plaintiffs substituted counsel and [...] appeared.  Pa1397.  On June 23, 2021, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file their first amended complaint.  That was opposed by CEP/Milford defendants on July 1, 2021.  The court granted leave to file a first amended complaint on July 9, 2021.  Pa1400.  Plaintiffs' first amended complaint was served and filed July 19, 2021.  Pa1604.  On July 30, 2021, and August 5, 2021, CEP/Milford defendants, along with newly served defendant [...] and [...] filed their motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss.  On August 30, 2021, plaintiffs opposed.  On September 23, 2021, the court granted summary judgment and denied the new defendants' motion to dismiss as moot.  Pa1781-3058.
[brief] DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT THAT THE COMPLAINT IS NOT ONE CHALLENGING AN ACTION BY MUNICIPAL BODY OR STATE ACTION IS CONTRARY TO N.J.S.A. 22A:4-17, N.J.S.A. 40A:1-1; N.J.S.A. 40A:5-22, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-94, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-105, 117 AND STEVENSON V. DEP'T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY DOCKET NO. A-1390-17T4 (APP. DIV. OCT. 1, 2019); CASE LAW RECOGNIZES
[brief] ”  Supplemental Interrogatory No. 24 (Second Set) asked further questions about the logs generated by the Theater Management System software.  The [...] response to Supplemental Interrogatory No. 24 was, “…[...] does provide [...] with logs, however [...] uses different logs than [...] and is not familiar with the contents of the logs or the codes that are contained within them. ”  (Pa44 to Pa66)  Supplemental Interrogatory No. 6(C) (Second Set) asked for a detailed description of the of any errors in the operation of the Theater Management System detected by the Network Operations Center during the playback of advertisements and movie trailers in Theater 5 in connection with the August 13, 2016, 8:00 p.m., showing of the movie “Star Trek: Beyond” in Theater 5 at the [...] movie theater in [...].  [...] answered, “[...] does not retain alerts/errors/logs from any monitoring systems or the TMS on a specific date and time in 2016 or that far back. ”  (Pa44 to Pa46)  The plaintiff and her son, [...], testified at their depositions on April 5, 2018 that the ceiling lights were off and the movie screen was blank when they entered Auditorium 5 and the plaintiff fell and injured herself in Auditorium 5 several minutes prior to 8:00 p.m. on August 13, 2016.
[brief] [...] WAS A SUCCESSFUL CLAIMANT FOR PURPOSES OF R. 4:42-9(A)(6)  Leaving prevailing party attorneys’ fees to one side, [...] obtained a judgment against [...] for over $2 million in this proceeding.  Despite its repeated suggestions to the contrary, [...] flatly and unequivocally denied [...]’s claim for coverage, necessitating this protracted legal battle.  (Pa 9-14, 27-30).  Only in the world of [...] could a $2 million judgment be deemed a failure.  [...] first argues that [...] is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(6) because [...] was not a “successful claimant. ”  The New Jersey Supreme Court broadly defines a successful claimant “as a party that ‘succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. ’”  Occhifinto v. Olivo Constr. Co., 221 N.J. 443, 450-51, 114 A.3d 333 (2015) (emphasis added).  [...] includes a portion of this quote in its brief and in doing so, misrepresents the Supreme Court’s holding.  [...]’s brief states “a successful claimant must achieve the ‘benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. ’” (Db, p. 52).  The Supreme Court held that a successful claimant must achieve “some benefit,” not “the benefit. ”  Occhifinto, 221 N.J. 443, 450-51.  In any event, however, [...] did achieve the benefit that it sought in filing suit – it obtained a judicial determination of insurance coverage in its favor, and it is only now that [...] is not challenging this determination.
[brief] “Despite petitioner’s [sic] suggestion to the contrary, the Assistant Commissioner does not find that the fault for these errors [ascribed to the [...]] lies with the State monitor.  It is not the monitor’s responsibility to double-check the work of each member of Lakewood’s staff. ”  It is not clear on what basis the Assistant Commissioner reached that conclusion.  It was certainly not based on the statutory language cited above.  One can only imagine that, given the Final Decision’s characterization of the State monitors’ limited and ineffective role, the [...] must be wondering exactly why it has been required to pay the State monitors $2.01 million over the past 10 years.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a) provides that an arbitration award may be vacated when it was “procured by corruption, fraud or undue means. ”  In the context of arbitration, “undue means” includes “an arbitrator’s failure to follow the substantive law. ”  In re City of Camden, 429 N.J. Super. 309, 332 (App. Div. 2013).  An arbitrator’s authority is, by law, limited by statute and “the questions framed by the parties in a particular dispute. ”  Ciripompa, 228 N.J. at 12 (quoting *Local No. 153, Office & Prof. Emps. Int’l Union v. Tr. Co. of N.J.*, 105 N.J. 442, 449 (1987)).  “If an arbitrator exceeds the scope of that authority, then his [or her] decision may be vacated on statutory grounds pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.*”  *City Ass’n of Supervisors and Admin’rs*, 311 N.J. Super. at 310.  As explained in detail above, the Arbitrator had no authority here to encroach upon or otherwise limit or qualify [...]’s authority, under both applicable case law and the CBA’s express terms, to set the standards of performance.
[brief] (Pa54)  In addition to the NCA and regulations promulgated by the DEP, N.J.S.A. 26:3-45 allows for regulation of noise nuisances by local health boards, providing that “[t]he local board may pass, alter or amend ordinances and make rules and regulations to declare and define what shall constitute a nuisance in lots, streets, docks, wharves, vessels and piers, and all public or private places within its jurisdiction. ” (Emphasis added).  While the Defendants specifically recognized and quoted from this section in its trial brief, citing to it as the authority for adoption of the Noise Ordinance at page 14, they failed to recognize the grant of authority to the local board, instead noting that:
[brief] ASSOCIATION’S CONSENT  Defendant-respondents argue plaintiffs-appellants failed to obtain the consent of the [...] for walkway work performed at the Property.  Db14, Db33.  Defendants-respondents initially raised the issue in support of their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment contesting plaintiffs’-appellants’ standing to bring the actions below.  5T21 – 24 to 25; 5T22 – 1 to 4; 5T24 – 10 to 14.  On April 28, 2023, the Court below entered an Order denying defendants’-respondents’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  Pa 73a.  Defendants-respondents failure to cross-appeal the denial of their cross-motion below for summary judgment bars defendants-respondents from raising the issue of the [...]’s consent in their brief on appeal.
[brief] 1.  Bookkeeping and Accounting  For the relevant period of 2008 through 2015, [...] approved of [...]’s expenses before its bookkeeper entered them in QuickBooks.  17T86-8 to 91-17; 24T58-8 to -20, 78-5 to 79-10; 25T7-16 to 19-3.  [...] had complete and unfettered access to [...] and [...]’s financial records, had the username and passwords to make entries on those companies’ QuickBooks, and received copies of the companies’ tax returns every year.  17T9-12 to 10-22, 97-12 to 101-15; 25T8-5 to 41-2; Da07299.  [...] and [...]’s QuickBooks were stored on [...]’s server 141, which [...] had administrative access to.  17T31-12 to 38-15; 24T51-21 to 52-2; 25T12-15 to 13-4, 41-3 to -11; Da03068.  [...] also worked from home using computers bought by [...], which he used to remotely access [...]’s servers and his desktop computer at [...]’s office.  24T59-19 to 60-12; 25T15-6 to -15; Da03033 – Da03039, Da07364 – Da07386.  Of note, [...]’s IT manager [...] installed the QuickBooks and other software on [...]’s home computers and provided him a CD each time [...] upgraded its version of QuickBooks.  25T14-16 to 15-15.  [...] and [...] regularly met with [...] and [...]’s accountants, including the parties’ longtime accountant, [...] (“[...]”), to discuss the companies’ tax projections, financials and other accounting and business issues.  24T68-13 to 73-14; Da02734.  In terms of tax preparation, during the period of 2009 to 2014, [...] met with [...] and [...] at [...]’s office several times a year to discuss their companies’ finances and taxes.  17T93-10 to 101-5; 24T73-10 to 75-23.  [...] and [...] regularly discussed and reviewed [...] and [...]’s finances and the transactions processed through the companies.  25T49-18 to 57-8; Da07299 – Da07305, Da07712 – Da07746.  2.
[directive] There are several Cuidelines significant changes to the from the October 1, 1993 edition.  Some of the Executive Office for changes were necessitated by changes in the law while others were Asset Fo$eiture deemed necessary for the operation of a more effective and efficient Treasury Forfeiture Fund. of  Payment joint operation costs of state or local law enforcement officers that are k incurred in operations with a [...] law enforcement organization are now a mandatory category expense.  The purchase or lease of automatic data processing systems (not less than a majority k of which use will be related to such program), training, printing, and contracting for services directly related to the identification forfeitable assets, (2) the (1) of processing of and accounting for forfeitures, and (3) the storage, maintenance, protection, and destruction of controlled substances are now mandatory expense categories.  Guidelines  These are not intended to create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on prospective or actual claimants, defendants, or petitioners.  This revised edition supersedes the information provided in the October 1, 1993 edition.  Guidelines  Questions regarding these should be addressed to:  [...] [...] 700 740 15' Street, N.W., Suite Washington, D.C. 20220  Phone: [...]  Fax: [...]  12  [...] I - I Guidelines for Seized and Forfeited Properg Chapter