ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It is axiomatic that a court must follow binding precedents.  The problem here is that there are no published decisions from the United States Supreme Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court, or from the Appellate Division which are the only courts which could issue a precedent binding on the Law Division.  Indeed, there are only a handful or so of published opinions from the Courts of the State of New Jersey applying any provision of the FDCPA, and roughly the same number from the U.S. Supreme Court—but none address § 1692c(b).  However the absence of binding precedent does not mean the motion court could—as it did—write on an entirely clean slate because there exists non-binding authority from the lower federal courts which includes the circuit courts of appeal and the district courts.  “[F]ederal opinions, including district court decisions, may have significant persuasive effect. ”  *Jusino v. Lapenta*, 442 N.J. Super. 248, 252 (Law. Div. 2014) (quoting Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, Comment 3.5, on R. 1:36–3).  In *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 121 N.J. 69, 80 (1990), the Supreme Court instructed that, when construing federal statutes in the absence of binding precedent, judicial comity requires giving “due respect” for the decisions of the lower federal courts—particularly when the federal courts are in agreement.  Doing so helps “ensure uniformity” and “discourages forum shopping. ”  *Dewey*, 121 N.J. at 80.  *Loigman v. Kings Landing Condo. Ass’n, Inc.*, 324 N.J. Super. 97 (Ch. Div. 1999) is an example of applying *Dewey* to the interpretation of the FDCPA.  *Loigman* explained that “a state court placed in the position of ascertaining the content of federal law should look for the view taken by a majority of the lower federal courts. ”  *Loigman*, at 105 n.7.  Consequently, *Loigman* followed the lower federal courts’ majority view as what constitutes a “debt” covered by the FDCPA and rejected what was, at that time, the minority view of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals notwithstanding that the Third Circuit encompasses New Jersey.  (The Third Circuit subsequently overruled its prior decision and joined the majority view.)  To be clear, *Dewey* does not compel a New Jersey court to treat the lower federal court decisions as if they were binding authorities.  But, at a minimum, the “due respect” which *Dewey* requires compels a New Jersey court to consider those federal court decisions and either follow them or explain why it rejected them.  Ignoring their existence and reasoning does not suffice.  Here, Plaintiff briefed the federal cases which universally conclude that the plain and unambiguous statutory language in § 1692c(b) means that alleging a debt collector’s conveyance of information about a debt to a third-party mail vendor states a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) upon which relief can be granted.  The motion court’s decision never mentioned those decisions or acknowledged their existence.  **POINT III.
[brief] 1T20:5-6.  Unit 11, the apartment occupied by [...], stands out as unique within the building.  It has not undergone renovation and has remained occupied by a long-term tenant, resulting in rent increases that align with inflation rather than the local real estate market.  Moreover, the uniqueness of Unit 11 extends to the absence of a deed, as [...] has never produced one for that specific unit.  The only deed provided by [...] was for the entire building.  DA-93.
[brief] ”  Defendants’ Brief reduces and generalizes Plaintiffs’ argument to saying that “every stallion owner” is strictly liable for “any injury caused by their stallion in the breeding environment… .”  Defendants’ Brief, p. 10.  In reality, Plaintiffs assert, in part, that the Motion Court erred in granting summary judgment because, viewing the facts alleged by Plaintiffs in the most favorable light, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants, as professional stallion breeders, knew or should have known that [...] had a “natural inclination” for lethal attack behavior when in the breeding environment.  In addition to over-generalizing Plaintiffs’ argument, Defendants’ Brief mischaracterizes Appellate Division case law.  All parties agree that the Appellate Division has stated that, aside from an animal’s specific prior behavior, actual or constructive knowledge of an animal’s vicious or dangerous traits or propensities could “perhaps” be established through “proof” that the animal was “inherently vicious.
[brief] (Da29 pg. 112, Lines 1-8.)  [...] testified that [...] never communicated with him with respect to anything occurring at the Property being negative or in any way impacting [...].  (Da31 pg. 119, Line 21 to pg. 120, Line 8.)  [...] testified that there was never an instance where [...] refused [...] or any other contractor’s access to the Domino’s building.  (Da40 pg. 157, Lines 1-17.)  Despite these various communications occurring between [...], [...], and [...] to which [...] claims he had no knowledge as to what was going on, [...] testified that he never attempted to inquire further into what the circumstances were, nor did he attempt to conduct his own independent investigation.
[directive] FROM: [...], J.A.ojjfff  [Supersedes Previous Supplements to Revised Statewide Bail Schedules  SUBJ: Directive #9-05 dated May 26, 2006, October 10, 2007 and May 12, 2009]  DATE: December 2, 2013  The attached revised Statewide Bail Schedules, as recommended by the and the Conference of Municipal Presiding Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges Judges, are a supplement to Directive #9-05 and supersede all previously issued Statewide Bail Schedules, effective immediately.  Directive #9-05, entitled "Bail Schedules and Policies to Improve Bail Practices" ·and dated May 12, 2005, promulgated two Statewide Bail Schedules and adopted a of statewide policies regarding bail practices.  The Bail Schedules were number on May 26, 2006, subsequently superseded by Statewide Bail Schedules issued 10, 2007 and May 12, 2009, by Supplements to Directive #9-05.  As noted, October those are now superseded by the attached Statewide Bail Schedules.  This Supplement addresses only the Statewide Bail Schedules.  The statewide policies regarding bail practices as set forth in Directive #9-05; namely, that the Bail in nature; that no Schedules contain general bail ranges that are meant to be advisory of bail may be set when a defendant is released on his or her own monetary amount recognizance; and that Criminal Presiding Judges and Municipal Presiding Judges must of bails for incarcerated defendants are conducted and that ensure that periodic reviews the cases involving incarcerated defendants are moved expeditiously, were not affected by those three Supplements, nor are they affected by this Supplement.
[brief] Db 2, 11, 13 (repeatedly referring to the “error”).  summary judgment, that point was not disputed.  What is disputed is whether that fact is material to Defendants’ obligation to conduct a reasonable and diligent inquiry of the recorded documents.  The failure of others to identify the error does not excuse Defendants’ failure to review, at minimum, Defendants’ Deed and the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed and the subsequent recorded activities of [...] regarding the lot.  See Palamarg, 80 N.J. at 456; Garden of Memories, 109 N.J. Super. at 533.  Defendants were chargeable with the knowledge of the contents of those documents, and the contents of those documents definitively demonstrated the error.  Cox, 164 N.J. at 496; Scult, 76 N.J. Super. at 132.  The law is clear that parties seeking reformation are entitled to relief regardless of whether they contributed to or did not initially identify the mistake.
[directive] WHEREAS, it is decidedly in the public interest that the entire law enforcement community should use only clearly acceptable force; and WHEREAS, it is appropriate to ensure and enhance public confidence in the manner in which the use of deadly force by law enforcement is reviewed to assure adequate justification for the use of such force; and WHEREAS, the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17b-98, states that it is the public policy of this State: to provide for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State, in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State; and WHEREAS, in order to promote statewide uniformity and accountability, it is appropriate for the Attorney General, in cooperation and consultation with the County Prosecutors, to issue and enforce procedures for review of the use of force by law enforcement officers statewide; NOW, THEREFORE, I, [...], Attorney General of New Jersey, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statutes of this State, do hereby direct that:  Page 1 of 3  1.  The Division of Criminal Justice, Operations Bureau, must be notified within of any use of twenty-four (24) hours, in a manner prescribed by the Division, force by a law enforcement officer involving death or serious bodily injury or where any injury results from the use of a firearm by a law enforcement officer.  2.  When a law enforcement officer employed by a municipal or county agency is involved in the use of force as defined in Paragraph 1, the County Prosecutor's Office in the county of occurrence will conduct the investigation.  The Division of Criminal Justice may supersede in the investigation when there is a conflict or if the matter would be better handled at a state level.  In the event that the Division of Criminal Justice supersedes, a shooting response team consisting of Division of Criminal Justice investigators and members of the Major Crimes Unit of the Division of State Police under the direction of a Deputy Attorney General, shall conduct the investigation.  The shooting response team will report directly to the Deputy Director of the Operations Bureau.  3.  When a Prosecutor's Detective or Investigator, Assistant Prosecutor, or Prosecutor is involved in the use of force as defined in Paragraph 1, the Division of Criminal Justice will conduct the investigation as described in Paragraph 2.  4.  When a State Investigator, Deputy Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General employed by the Division of Criminal Justice or any other law enforcement officer employed by a State or federal agency is involved in the use of force as defined in Paragraph 1, the County Prosecutor's Office in the county of occurrence will conduct the investigation, unless otherwise directed by the Attorney General.
[brief] The trial court relied extensively on [...]’s certification to support its findings.  Plaintiffs sought the deposition of [...], but the trial court denied them the opportunity.  As the underwriter of the Policies, [...] has material information including, among other things, information concerning (i) the definitions of disciplinary proceeding, bar complaint and investigation and whether the Policy definitions require the reporting of the OAE Proceedings; and (ii) the impact of the reporting of the OAE Proceedings.  In addition, since [...]’s position is that the language of the Policy and Application should have their “usual and customary meaning,” Plaintiffs should have had the right to address that “usual and customary meaning” through an expert after the taking of [...]’s deposition.  The trial court’s failure to allow this critical discovery to create a full and complete factual record was error.
[directive] As if probable acomplaint-warrant there apply is for shall agency enforcement law a Directive, this committed: defendant the that believe cause to 2C:11-3); (N.J.S.A. murder — 2C:11-4(a)); (N.J.S.A. manslaughter aggravated — 2C:11-4(b)); (N.J.S.A. manslaughter — 2C:14-2(a)); (N.J.S.A. assault sexual aggravated — (c)); or 2C:14-2(b) (N.J.S.A. sexual assault — 2C:15-1); (N.J.S.A. robbery — 2C:15-2); (N.J.S.A. carjacking — or 2C:29-5(a)); (N.J.S.A. escape — crimes. foregoing of the any commit to an attempt$ — or Out-of-State Federal, Detainees.
[brief] Instead, the prosecutor told the court that one-third of [...]’s sentence was to be treated as a mandatory minimum, saying, “a one-third stip where the defendant would not be eligible for parole” was a “mandated number. ”  (6T 4-22 to 25)  The court’s pronouncement of the sentence and the judgment of conviction treat it that way: both reflect a 12-year sentence with a 4-year period of parole ineligibility on counts 3 and 4, in contrast to the 5-year flat terms imposed on the third-degree offenses. \(^7\) (6T 13-2 to 14-7; Da 45)
[brief] There has been nothing done to clean it up.  We have a vacant building at the gates of our town. ” (T2, 35:20-23).  This finding is clearly within the discretion laid down by the Legislature to declare a property in need of redevelopment as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b).  The Trial Court, however, attempted to substitute its discretion for that of [...] finding that discontinuance of the commercial use, on its own, was not sufficient to satisfy criterion (b).  (T3, 44:9-19).  Contrary to the Trial Court’s conclusion, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) does not include any qualifying or limiting requirement that the discontinuance of the use has to be for a specific reason.  Thus, the Trial Court erred in concluding that N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) requires something more than the finding of discontinuance of a commercial use.  2.
[brief] Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 199.  Indeed, the Legislature has recently reinforced the builder’s remedy as a consequence of not participating voluntarily in enacting the latest amendments to the Fair Housing Act.  See N.J.S.A. 52:27D-304(o); (u).  Again, the universe [...] is operating in is one of a builder’s remedy – the constitutional compliance mechanism envisioned and emphasized by our Courts.
[brief] 1a.  On February 8, 2023, defendant filed another motion with the [...] seeking the following relief:  Motion For Findings Of Facts and Conclusions Of Law and Reconsideration.  17a.  On February 17, 2023, defendant received an order denying the motion filed on February 8, 2023.  3a.  The Court, again, never addressed the second issue, nor did it cite to any case law or rule for its denial of defendant’s motion for findings of facts and conclusions of law and reconsideration.  3a.  Therefore, the Municipal Court, [...], seemed to refuse to rule on the 2nd issue of whether defendant should be given his plea back.  1a-3a.  f.  **Motion For Municipal Appeal And The Law Division’s Decision.
[brief] A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb12-13), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he never received the postcard.  After considering its power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form one year and six months past the deadline.
[brief] THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION WAS NOT INCONSISTANT WITH ITS STATUTORY MISSION.  Complainants quote N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22 for the proposition that the Commission was created to ensure public confidence and trust in school board members and school officials.  Cb22-Cb23.  They argue that Respondent's conduct created an impression that the public trust was being violated and compromised the Board.  Cb23.  As discussed in POINT II above, however, Respondent did not hold herself out as a member of the Board in her Facebook posts.  Therefore, her posts did not undermine public confidence in the Board or compromise it.  Complainants further contend that a violation of public trust is evidenced by minutes of meetings of the Board, news articles and two resolutions of the Board.  Cb23.  As discussed above, however, the meeting minutes include only sporadic complaints about the Facebook posts (Ca62-Ca73; Ca79-Ca99) and the accounts in news articles are written from certain perspectives and therefore cannot be relied on as evidence.  As to the resolutions, they make clear that Respondent did not speak for the Board through her Facebook posts (Ca72, Ca99) and therefore did not violate the public trust nor compromise the Board.  Furthermore, Complainant's quotation from [...]' Initial Decision (Cb24, quoting Ca34) implying that Respondent's Facebook posts compromised the Board by diminishing public trust in it carries little or no weight.  This is because, as discussed above, Respondent did not hold herself out as speaking as a member of the Board in the post.  In sum, since the evidence does not show that Respondent's conduct undermined public confidence or trust in the Board or compromised it, the Commission's Final Decision dismissing the Complaint was not contrary to its statutory purpose.
[brief] The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa82.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  [...], unlike the other similarly situated retirees, was an active employee of the Division of State Police at the time the Ricci Act was passed.  [...] did not retire until December 1, 2019.  The only document provided with respect to notice of the Ricci Act with respect to active employees is an Employer Confirmation of Distribution Form.  Pa85.
[brief] DEFENSE COUNSEL: [...], [] you had [] at the time an older child as well.  Is that right?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And there had been occasions in which you had put your older -- when your older child had woken up, you had put your hand over the older child's mouth in an effort to get him to sleep.  Is that fair to say?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And the times that you did that with your son, your son did not die from that.  Is that correct?  DEFENDANT: That’s correct.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  So on [] or about March 8th to March 9th of [] 2019 when you were with your infant daughter, you used that same method to try to put your daughter to sleep.  Is that correct?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And you did so because it had not hurt your son, you did not intend on killing your daughter, but you agree that it was reckless that you would put your hand over her nose and mouth in an effort to get her to sleep.  DEFENDANT: Yes.  [(1T14-24 to 15-20). ]
[brief] The allegations in the Third Amended Complaint, as they pertained to [...] and [...], purportedly relate to one of the payments that [...] made for the [...] assignment, namely, a check in the amount of $250,000 that [...] wrote to [...] on April 5, 2009.  789a at ¶ 70.  The Third Amended Complaint alleged at paragraph 70 that [...] and [...] “set up a meeting that took place at the offices of Defendant [...], with Defendant Rocco present, where Plaintiffs, upon the representations, direction and assurances of [...] and [...], delivered a check made payable to [...] in the amount of $250,000.00 to a person presented by [...] and Rocco to Plaintiffs to be [...], purportedly the new representative/member/managing member of [...]…”  Id. (emphasis added).  Paragraph 71 then went on to allege that the individual who actually received the check at this alleged meeting was not the “real” [...], but an imposter of [...]. \(^1\) 790a.  The only Appellant who claimed to have had any interaction with [...] was [...].  [...] claimed that he met [...] at the alleged meeting when the $250,000 check alluded to above was supposedly given to an “imposter” of [...]’s representative, [...].  Even if the meeting did occur as alleged, [...] testified unequivocally that he did not receive any advice or information, let alone rely on any advice or information, from [...] at the alleged meeting:
[brief] [...].  As a preliminary matter, an unreported decision "serve[s] no precedential value, and cannot reliably be considered part of our common law."  Trinity Cemetery Ass'n v. Twp. of Wall, 170 N.J. 39, 48 (2001); see R. 1:36-3.  Because defendants rely on unpublished cases despite the law and Rules of Court, plaintiff will discuss Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Interstate Racking & Shelving, A-1614-19 (N.J. App. Div. Sep. 3, 2021) (Pa475), because its reasoning is in line with plaintiff’s position even though it did not reach the ultimate issue at bar.
[directive] In selecting the appropriate Table of Authorized Plea Offers and the applicable row (vertical axis) within the Table, the prosecutor shall not be limited to considering the complaints filed by police agencies, but shall consider the defendant’s actual conduct.  See Section 3.1.  7.1  Offenses Involving Weapons (Special Offense Characteristic #1)  7.1.1  Election Between Special Offense Characteristic #1 and Special Application and Enhancement Feature D
[brief] (Pa195).  On March 30, 2017, Plaintiff received a letter from the [...] advising that it had concluded that there was insufficient evidence to warrant criminal or administrative action against him.  (Pa197).  In 2017, Plaintiff had applied to retire from the [...].  Plaintiff testified that the reason he retired was the fact that he had accepted a security position at a private school, the [...], which was to begin in the fall of 2017.  (Pa153 to Pa154 at T64-25 to 65-14; Pa199).  On June 27, 2017, the [...] issued a letter accepting his application for retirement to be effective on September 1, 2017.
[brief] However, this Order contained a clerical error by incorrectly referring to the “subcontractor’s own negligence” (i.e., [...]) rather than “general contractor’s own negligence” (i. e., [...])  (Ibid.).  [...] moved to reconsider on November 9, 2023.  (Da329-370, [...]’s Statement of Facts and Exhibits).  [...] filed its own motion for reconsideration and to correct the clerical error on November 15, 2023.  (Da371-Da411, [...]’s Attorney Certification and Exhibits).  In addition to seeking to have the trial court correct the clerical error, [...] asked the trial court to reconsider its decision limiting its ruling solely to the issue of contractual indemnification for [...]’s own negligence.  (Da372, [...]’s Attorney Certification).  That is, [...]’s motion for reconsideration asked the Court to dismiss [...]’s third-party Complaint in its entirety.  (Da373-379, [...]’s Attorney Certification).  On December 20, 2023, [...] filed a motion to sever the third-party contractual indemnification claim from the January 22, 2024 personal injury trial between Plaintiff and O.A. [...].
[brief] Of Counsel and On the Brief LETTER REPLY ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal From A Judgment v. : Of Conviction Entered In The Superior Court, Law Division, Cumberland County.  [...], : Defendant-Appellant. : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C. : DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Honorable Judges: This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal reply brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).