ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Here, it is undisputed that the Defendant received the written advisory of enhanced penalties for a subsequent DWI, but was not advised orally of these penalties.  The Defendant argues, however, that this case is distinguishable from Petrello based on the facts as the defendant in that case was found to have intentionally frustrated the legislative intent of the statute by staggering his guilty pleas in a way in which he would not be subject to enhanced penalties.  Here, defense argues that the Defendant was not “intentionally trying to avoid enhanced penalties” but simply was not advised properly by the court.  (Db5).  The State submits that this factual discernment does not invalidate the holding or reasoning of the Appellate Division in *Petrello*.  The Defendant received the written notice of the potential enhanced penalties for a subsequent DWI and was therefore, put on notice of same.
[brief] Here, as in Livingstone, a jury could readily conclude that Defendant [...] intentionally and knowingly required non-management, non-physician employees such as [...] to undergo a heightened risk by requiring them to park in a distant area of the parking lot that was devoid of pedestrian safeguards and traffic control devices.  See Pa319 (70:17-71:1); Pa327-8 (105:18-106:3; 108:13-15); Pa329-330 (113:9-114:19); Pa815-6 (25:16-26:1); Pa45; Pa655, Pa663, Pa665-6; see also video stills, Pa416-429.  Critically, Defendant [...] had pedestrian safety and traffic control measures in place in other areas of the parking lot, such as the areas used by hospital management and physicians, which had features such as pedestrian sidewalk, crosswalks, traffic signage and markings, cones, and peninsulas to increase visibility at intersections.  Pa553-7 (54:2-58:2); Da1029-1032 (41:24-44:4); Pa665-6.  See also photographs of the management/physician/patient parking area safety features, Pa694-8.  Thus, Defendant [...] was well aware of the need for pedestrian safeguards and traffic control measures in the large, busy parking lot, yet intentionally chose to require non-management employees such as [...] to park and walk through an area of the lot without these necessary pedestrian safeguards.  The unsafe, unprotected configuration of the area of the parking lot where the fatal crash occurred clearly played a substantial role in causing the incident.  Unlike the T-intersection in the patient/visitor parking area, the T-intersection in the distant area of the employee parking lot that [...] was attempting to cross on the morning in question had no stop sign, no traffic control markings, no pedestrian warning markings, and no peninsula to increase a driver’s ability to see pedestrians around the corner.  Pa655, Pa663.  Instead, the corner of the T-intersection in question was blocked by a parked car, obstructing [...]’s ability to see [...] as she crossed.  Id.  Defendant [...] did not see [...] at any time before the crash.  Pa305 (15:5-16).  Due to the lack of traffic control signs and markings, [...] did not stop as she made the left turn during which she crashed into [...].  Pa44-45.  A jury could readily conclude that Defendant [...] intentionally and knowingly allowed the distant area of its parking lot where it required employees to park to be in a dangerous condition, creating an accident waiting to happen that substantially contributed to the causation of the subject fatal crash.
[brief] Frost, 158 N.J. at 83.  Moreover, the Prosecutor should not have been able to cross examine [...] about a report she didn’t have or rely on.  Spencer, 319 N.J. Super. at 299–300.  Asking [...] about a defense expert report used specifically for the waiver hearing elicited prejudicial information and deprived [...] of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial.
[brief] See Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC, 12 F.4th 1108 (9th Cir. 2021)  Netzel v. Am. Express Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135427 (D. Ariz. August 3, 2023)(Ja82-Ja87); Torrecillas v Fitness Internat., LLC, 52 Cal. App. 485 (2nd District Court of Appeal 2020); Capriole v Uber Techs. Inc., 7 F. 4th 854 (9th Cir. 2021); Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, *4, 7 (Ja64,Ja66); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc.  561 U.S. at 66  In Hodges, 12 F.4th at 1115, the 9th Circuit wrote:  “It follows that public injunctive relief within the meaning of McGill is limited to forward-looking injunctions that seek to prevent future violations of law for the benefit of the general public as a whole, as opposed to a particular class of persons, and that do so without the need to consider the individual claims of any non-party.
[brief] The Trial Court engaged in the appropriate analysis as articulated by the Nicholas Court.  As noted by the Trial Court, it was undisputed that [...] specializes in pulmonology with a subspecialty in critical care.  1T 11:15 – 11:21.  The Trial Court also identified Plaintiff’s argument being that “the affidavit of merit statute does not require that the affiant had the identical credentials as the defendant physician.  Instead plaintiff asserts that the affiant need only have the same board certifications as the defendant physician and that medical treatment involve[ing] that specialty. ”  1T 11:22 – 12:24 (emphasis added).  Plaintiff further argued that despite [...]’s Board Certification being in critical care and [...]’s specialty being in surgical critical care, the doctors practiced within the same specialty.  1T 12:4 – 6.  Plaintiff’s argument was rejected by the Trial Court.  1T 12:7 – 14:4.  In rejecting Plaintiff’s argument, the Court cited to and relied on the seminal case of Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 482 – 483 (2013), wherein New Jersey’s Supreme Court addressed the credentialing provision of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.
[brief] Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 509, Comment (e)(emphasis added).  evidence of the animal’s behavior to establish actual or constructive knowledge of the danger posed to others:  “Where, therefore, the proof to establish viciousness and scienter consists of instances tending, more or less, clearly to indicate such a disposition and such knowledge, a jury question at once arises under the adduced proof the animal has displayed vicious propensities to the knowledge of the owner sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of domestic animals, and sufficient to charge the owner with scienter. ”  Id. at 573.  The same standard has been applied consistently by New Jersey’s courts.  De Robertis, 94 N.J. at 151-54 (stating that the owner of a domesticated animal is subject to the common law standard for strict liability if they had actual or constructive knowledge of the animal’s abnormally dangerous characteristics); Jannuzzelli,158 N.J. Super. at 41-42 (stating that the common law standard for strict liability requires knowledge that the “disposition of the animal is such that it is likely to commit a similar injury to that complained of[.]”); Fertitta-Zapp v. [...], A-6217-08, 2011 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1303 (quoting Angus v. Radin, 5 N.J.L. 957-958-59 (Sup. Ct. 1820) (a domestic animal is presumed not to be inclined to commit mischief, therefore its owner is not liable unless they had knowledge of a mischievous propensity in the animal or the injury resulted from negligence).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE BOARD AND APPLICANT PROFESSIONALS’ LEGAL DEFINITION OF THE BUILDING HEIGHT ORDINANCE UNDER THE “ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE” STANDARD OF REVIEW.  (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa0015-16).  The trial court erred in adopting the Board and applicant’s professionals’ legal definition of the Ordinance under the “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” standard.
[brief] This constituted double recovery by the [...]—a result that contradicts the very purpose of condemnation law.  The Trial Court also erred in failing to bar the [...] Report, a threadbare and conclusory “expert opinion” in support of the [...]’ claim for $550,000 in FFE.  The Land Report was cobbled together from a walkthrough of the Property conducted on May 18, 2018, to which FFE values were retroactively ascribed as of 1994.  Several of the stores in Land’s report did not even exist as of January 27, 1994.  Significantly, Land’s report failed to reach a conclusion that these items actually enhanced the fair market value of the Property—a critical element of any FFE claim.  For the reasons set forth below, this Court should reject the [...]’ appeal, and grant the [...]’s cross-appeal by reversing the February 20, 2019  Order setting the date of valuation at January 27, 1994 and August 24, 2021  Order denying the [...]’s motion to bar the Land Report, and remand for a new arbitration.
[brief] (Db 30-41)  Among other things, [...] argued that (1) police did not sufficiently corroborate the informant’s tip for purposes of establishing its reliability, and (2) the alert of a police dog to the scent of narcotics at the storage unit could not be considered because the affidavit fails to indicate that the dog was trained in narcotics detection.  In response, the State argues that (1) the tip’s reliability is supported by the fact that the informant made a statement against his penal interests (Sb 38-40), and (2) the reliability of the dog sniff was not raised below and therefore should not be considered.
[brief] “That phrase was intended to make clear that the premises rule can entail more than the four walls of an office or plant. ”  *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 436; *Kristiansen*, 153 N.J. at 316.  To determine whether an injury is compensable, “[t]he pivotal questions under the premises rule are (1) where was the situs of the accident, and (2) did the employer have control of the property on which the accident occurred. ”  *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 436; *Kristiansen*, 153 N.J. at 316-7; *Livingstone v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc.*, 111 N.J. 89, 96 (1988).
[brief] On March 27, 2019, [...] was charged with Conduct Unbecoming a Police Officer, in violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-128 (40A:14-147), 3.2.4  Truthfulness - (Class 1 Offense), 3.3.3  Neglect of duty (Class 2 Offense), 4.1.6  Repeated violations - (Class 1 offense), with the penalty sought of Dismissal. (Pa5-Pa8).  Except for the charge of Conduct Unbecoming a Police Officer, the balance of the charges were rule and regulation charges of [...].  In *McElwee v. Borough of Fieldsboro*, 400 N.J.Super. 388 (App. Div. 2008), the Appellate Division opined:  As the statute provides, the requirement that a complaint be filed within forty-five days of the date when the complainant has sufficient information to make the complaint pertains to alleged violations of "internal rules and regulations established for the conduct of [the] law enforcement unit []."  However, a violation of "internal rules and regulations" is only one of the grounds upon which a police officer may be disciplined.  The statute also allows a police officer to be removed for incapacity or misconduct but imposes no time constraints on asserting a complaint seeking removal on those grounds.  Here, the Borough sought plaintiff's removal for misconduct, not for the violation of a specific internal rule or regulation governing the operations of the Borough's police department.
[brief] [...] testified that [...] had always been “a perfect horse” when being led to the breeding shed.  [Pa 710-11].  According to [...], [...] exhibited typical stallion behavior prior to the attack.  [Pa 477-78].  She and [...] both confirmed that they did not believe that difficulty catching or collecting [...] were signs that he might attack.  [Pa 479-480, 565-66, 874-75, 879].  For this reason, it is simply wrong to suggest that [...]’s communications with the Defendants about [...] constituted notice that he posed a danger to his handler.
[brief] Jorge v. [...] Indem. Co., 947 F. Supp. 150, 154-56 (D.N.J. 1996).  [...] and [...] cite Palisades Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 469 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2021).  But there, an automobile insurer mistakenly paid for personal injury given the insureds’ designation as health insurance-primary in their auto policies and sought to recover the payments against the health insurer.  Id. at 35.  This Court concluded that the “No-Fault statutes do not provide an enforcement mechanism that PIP carriers may use against health insurers. ”  *Id.* at 40.  This Court held that the auto insurer voluntarily paid the benefits and was precluded from recovering against the health insurer because “the insureds’ designation of health-as-primary on their policies provided [the auto insurer] with notice that it was not obligated to pay the subject claims. ”  *Id.* at 44.  There was no mistake of fact, but rather, a mistake of law, which rendered the payments voluntary and unrecoverable.  *Id.*  Here, there is no statutory scheme that precludes reimbursement of the indemnity payments made by [...] and [...].  As a result, [...] and [...] have right of conventional and equitable subrogation, firmly rooted in the public policy favoring the prompt payment of claims, against [...] and [...] for their indemnity payments.  Finally, New Jersey is a notice-pleading state, meaning only a short statement of the claim needs to be pleaded.  *Velop, Inc. v. Kaplan*, 301 N.J. Super. 32, 56 (App. Div. 1997).  [...]’s claim for reimbursement against [...] and [...] is well-stated in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  Pa1-19.  As a result, [...] has a cognizable legal claim for reimbursement against [...] and [...] for its indemnity payment for the Hood litigation.
[brief] To comply with the separation of powers doctrine, the Legislature should have exempted all attorneys from the Act.  That is what the Legislature has done in other circumstances (and, indeed, what it did in 1961 when it enacted the Debt Adjusters Law and what it did in 1979 when it initially adopted the Act).  That course of action honors the separation of powers and properly defers to the Supreme Court to make its own determination as to whether it is proper to impose limitations on an attorney’s practice or specialization in debt adjustment services.  By failing to exempt all attorneys from the Act, the Legislature is intruding into the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.  By enacting the Limited Attorney Exemption, the Legislature imposed its own (thus far unexplained and inexplicable) policy choices about which lawyers may practice law in this area (i.e., only New Jersey licensed attorneys), and how much they may practice law in this area (i.e., a little bit, but not too much).  The Legislature is, in essence, stating that a New Jersey attorney who devotes 20% of her time to representing clients in debt adjustment matters is engaged in the lawful practice of law.  A New Jersey attorney who devotes 49% of her time in bankruptcy practice, however, may be engaged in criminal conduct (depending on how the fuzzy term “principally engaged” is defined).  And a Pennsylvania attorney who devotes 1% of his time to representing clients in this area is almost certainly violating the Act (even though he may be fully compliant with RPC 5.5).  That is a direct, impermissible intrusion into the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.
[brief] (Da198)  The 2019 Appellate ruling (Da751) found [...]’s summary determination as to the 1963 Agreement and “easement” was unwarranted and vacated “all of the other orders under review” and remanded for a Trial on all the issues.  However, as detailed in [...]’s 2022 Opinion now an Appeal, [...] on the remand “proceeded to try the issues on remand as a continuation of the 2017 trial. ”  (Da980)  The Court’s 2022 Opinion “amplifies and supplements this Court’s June 5, 2017 oral decision” - that being the Opinion the Appellate Court completely vacated.  Thus, by the Trial Court’s own words, on remand it did not begin anew as instructed with an open mind but considered the remand trial as “a continuation of the 2017 trial. ”  (Da980)  The Court having arrived at fixed determinations from that 2017 Trial, it is evident that on the remand the Court implicitly shifted the burden of proof from the [...] to prove its easement claim onto the [...] to dislodge and overcome the findings and credibility determinations already "convincingly" made by the Court.  The failure of [...] to recuse led inevitably to the Opinion now on Appeal - unfairly and in contradiction to the Appellate Court remand.
[brief] 12  A.  The Arbitration Agreement is Enforceable  Even if it is Considered to be a Contract of Adhesion (Da027-Da028; Da070-Da079; Da090-Da092; Da162-Da163)  ..............................................  14  B.  The Arbitration Agreement is Not Procedurally Unconscionable (Da027-Da028; Da070-Da079; Da162-Da163;) .................................................................  15  C.  The Term of the Arbitration Agreement Requiring an Arbitration Panel Does Not Shock the Conscience such that it is Substantively Unconscionable (Da027-Da029; Da090-Da092; Da162-Da163)  ..................................................
[brief] WHEN HE BARRED DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM EXPLORING ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE STATE’S JAILHOUSE-INFORMANT WITNESS THAT THAT WITNESS HAD PREVIOUSLY FALSELY ACCUSED SOMEONE OF MURDER.  (RULING AT 28T 173-7 TO 8)  As noted in the Statement of Facts, State witness [...] was a jailhouse informant, a.k.a. “snitch,” who testified against many fellow inmates over his career as a criminal.  Most notable among those cases is his 2008 testimony against a man named [...], who was convicted, in part, based on Wesley’s testimony against him, but then exonerated when the New Jersey Attorney General’s Conviction Review Unit deemed Hill to be innocent of that crime, after which Hill was released as wrongfully convicted. \(^{16}\)  In other words, there is strong evidence -- from no less than the Attorney General’s exoneration of Hill -- that [...] provided testimony falsely accusing Hill of \(^{16}\)  The exoneration of [...] by the New Jersey Attorney General is a matter of public record and an undisputed fact.  A Google search for “[...] New Jersey exoneration” will lead to multiple news stories on release of Hill and his exoneration by the Attorney General.  The Hill case is also listed in the University of Michigan’s database of notable after-the-fact exonerations.
[brief] These arguments lack merit. \(^2\)  At the outset, [...]’s challenge to N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 on statutory interpretation and vagueness grounds present legal issues, which are reviewed by an appellate court de novo.  See State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).  Consequently, even if the trial court had ruled on these arguments, this Court would owe no deference to the trial court’s decision.  Ibid.  The fact that the trial court did not do so thus presents no impediment to this Court’s consideration of these issues.
[brief] See (6T13-17 to 19) (telling the judge that “to the State’s credit, they provided [him with] the notes as soon as possible”); (Rb16 to 17).  As for [...], the judge noted at the motion-to-dismiss hearing that she was not going to hold [...] to his testimony because he testified that he was not first in line in the train, see (1T90-7 to 21; 1T97-5 to 98-9; 1T101-17 to 105-22), recognizing that “[h]e was like behind in the line” and had no personal knowledge of how the door to the third floor was (or was not) breached.  (6T41-22 to 43-9).  The judge ultimately found that his conduct was negligent.  (Da25).
[brief] On October 5, 2023, the [...] convened a second hearing on the Application (the “Second Hearing”), during which the Applicant presented additional witnesses and testimony in support of the Application, including: (1)  [...], a prior owner of the subject Property (“Ms. Taylor”), who testified that she had previously offered the Property for sale to [...] (T2/9:13-19); (2) [...], managing partner of the former restaurant that operated at the Property (“Ms. Shemeley”), who testified as to the number and types of deliveries at the restaurant as having been larger and more frequent than what the Applicant proposed, without complaints (T2/10:22-14:2); and (3) [...], P.E. of [...] (“Mr. Taylor”), an expert in the field of traffic engineering.  [...] and [...], who testified at the Initial Hearing, also presented additional testimony at the Second Hearing.
[brief] As the Board explained in its opposition papers, New Jersey State law provides that “[t]he [...] shall provide by regulation for the creation, maintenance, and retention of pupil records and for the security thereof and access thereto, to provide general protection for the right of the pupil to be supplied with necessary information about herself or himself, the right of the parent or guardian and the adult pupil to be supplied with full information about the pupil, except as may be inconsistent with reasonable protection of the persons involved, the right of both pupil and parent or guardian to reasonable privacy as against other persons and the opportunity for the public schools to have the data necessary to provide a thorough and efficient educational system for all pupils [emphasis added]. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19.
[brief] THE ATTEMPTED CLOSINGS AND PLAINTIFF’S TERMINATION OF THE PSA  After execution of the PSA, Plaintiff made the $5 million earnest money deposit (the “Deposit”) as required.  (Pa5, ¶5).  The originally-scheduled closing date for the transactions was October 11, 2021.  (Pa5, ¶16; Pa95).  However, this date fell through, causing Plaintiff and [...] to execute November 10, 2021, December 10, 2021, January 31, 2022, and March 25, 2022 closing date amendments, with the March 25, 2022 amendment revising the closing to June 28, --- \(^3\)
[directive] (b)  When an agency concludes that a report is subject to disclosure under Section 9.6.2(a), it shall redact the following before disclosure:  (1)  The names of complainants, witnesses, informants, victims and cooperators, in addition to information that could reasonably lead to discovery of their identities;11  (2)  Non-public, personal identifying information about any individual named in the report, such as their home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, social security numbers, familial relationships, etc.; (3)  Medical information or history, including but not limited to, mental health or substance abuse services and drug or alcohol evaluation, counseling or treatment; (4)  Information regarding any criminal investigation or prosecution that is not already contained in a public filing, or any information that would impede or interfere with a pending criminal or disciplinary proceeding;  In instances of domestic violence, in addition to redaction of the victim’s name, all reference to the specific 11 nature of the qualifying relationship should also be redacted to protect the identity of the victim.  For example, if the victim is an intimate partner, terms such as ‘spouse,” “partner,” “girlfriend,” “boyfriend,” “husband,” or “wife,” should also be redacted, and to the extent possible the report should just indicate that the relationship between the victim and the officer was an enumerated relationship under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq.).  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 57
[brief] ¹ Ja13-29.  On May 14, 2024, [...] filed a motion for an order (i) compelling plaintiff to arbitrate all the claims set forth in her complaint on an individual basis in accordance with the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement and (ii) staying plaintiff’s lawsuit pending the completion of arbitration.  On July 19, 2024, the parties appeared for oral argument on [...]’s motion before the Honorable [...].  Ja45.  On July 26, 2024, the parties submitted supplemental letter briefs to [...] on two issues that were discussed during the oral argument.  On July 29, 2024, [...] issued an order granting [...]’s motion in its entirety, with an accompanying statement of reasons.  Ja5-12.  This appeal ensued.  Ja1-4.  ¹  Plaintiff’s membership agreement, which contains the parties’ arbitration agreement, was attached as “Exhibit A” to plaintiff’s complaint.  Ja30-43.  STATEMENT OF FACTS