ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ja123.  The Master Plan’s discussion about the SM Zone speaks more generally of “offsite impacts” and “intensity of development” without any reference to specific offsite impacts that could be perceived as limiting their scope in the way pressed by Plaintiffs.  Ja123, Ja037-Ja038.  Significantly, the implementing ordinance section for the SM Zone District, Ordinance §91-249, expressly refers to seeking “lesser magnitude” in the SM Zone District.  Ja097.  Height, clearly is an expression of “magnitude”.  The Board’s understanding of the Master Plan and Zoning Ordinances as considering building height to be a significant factor in weighing the relative intensity of uses is further supported by relevant caselaw which likens height limitations to density and floor area ratios, all of which can be intended to control the intensity of development.
[brief] Specifically, it emphasized that “the question of whether the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were unforeseeable and spontaneous is a fact-sensitive inquiry that should be analyzed case by case[.]”  Ibid.  This is in line with the Court’s prior precedent in this area.  See Nishina, 175 N.J. at 516–17 (“As with so much of our search-and-seizure jurisprudence, the application of the doctrine of exigent circumstances demands a fact-sensitive, objective analysis. ”).  After all, what constitutes exigency is “incapable of precise definition because, by its nature, the term takes on form and shape depending on the facts of any given case. ”  Id. at 516.  The Smart Court thus explicitly rejected a sweeping, formulaic, and mechanical application of the holding of its case to all automobile-exception cases.  And almost none of the facts that led to the decision in Smart are present in this case.
[directive] An autopsy revealed that [...] died as a result of three gunshot wounds to the torso and upper left arm.  A security camera on Harrison Street captured video of the shooting.  It shows [...] appearing to strike the woman and standing over her with the gun when [...] fires.  A civilian witness said he saw [...] standing over the woman and heard an officer say, “Stop right there or I will shoot you!”  After considering the facts, evidence, and testimony from the investigation by the Attorney General’s Shooting Response Task Force, the state grand jury found the actions of [...] were justified.
[brief] Having failed to apply for a permit and an exemption from any of the requirements of the Ordinance which could allow the 69kV line or another route to succeed, [...]’s facial challenge necessarily fails (because it cannot establish that in all circumstances it prohibits expansion that is essential to providing adequate service); and it has also failed to establish that when the Ordinance with its provision for exemptions is applied to the 69kV line through [...] that it prevents [...] from providing adequate service to the public.  Indeed, [...]’s refusal to apply for either a permit or for an exemption precludes any ability to establish that the Ordinance is invalid “as applied. ”  A plaintiff cannot be heard to assert, nor can a court find, that an Ordinance is invalid “as applied” when the challenger to the Ordinance has pursued a course of action that prevents the municipality from applying the Ordinance’s discretionary provisions that could make its application valid.  Finally, for all the reasons set forth in Point III below, the Ordinance is not facially invalid because of other legislative pronouncements.  To the contrary, as set forth in that Point, the Legislature has ratified [...]’s right, power and ability to regulate that which is placed in its right-of-way.  POINT II
[brief] See Sanner, 144 N.J. Super. at 5; Grzanka, 301 N.J. Super. at 579.  Fifth, the New Jersey Product Liability Act, section 2A:58C–3a(2), establishes that manufacturers “shall not be liable” if: “characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user” and the alleged harm was caused by “an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent characteristic of the product” and the alleged harm “would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses” the product “with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for whom the product is intended. ”  Id.  “A product that satisfies the [section] 3a(2) standard is, by statutory definition, not defectively designed. ”  Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 139 N.J. 365, 378 (1995); see generally Mathews v. Univ. Loft Co., 387 N.J. Super. 349, 356 (App. Div. 2006) (summary judgment should have been granted under § 2A:58C–3a(2) because the danger of falling out of a loft bed was open and obvious).
[brief] The following highlights the deficiencies in the lower court’s rulings asserting that [...] is a proper forum:  | NJAPDRA | [...] ADR Forum | |------------------|----------------------| | Interrogatories | 2A:23A-10 | NO | | Document Exchange| 2A:23A-10 | NO | | Oral Depositions | 2A:23A-10 | NO | | Subpoenas | 2A:23A-11, 24 | NO | | 3rd Party Witnesses | | | | Cross Examination at the Hearing | 2A:23A-11, 24 | NO | | Counterclaims | 2A:23A-11, 24 | NO | | Consolidation of Claims | 2A:23A-3 | R-9 | | Right To Jury Trial | NONE | NONE |
[brief] [...] was evaluated by [...] who determined that [...] could only see hand motion with her left eye, whereas her vision on November 6, 2018, just before the Ozurdex injection was 20/100.  (Da0682; Da0651)  On February 1, 2019, [...] referred [...] to corneal specialist, [...].  In his referral, [...] documented that [...] “now has significant corneal edema in the left eye and was a patient who has received numerous Ozurdex implant[s] in the past, but most recently for her left eye, received an implant from the lot that was subsequently recalled and found to have a silicone oil particle that had caused significant inflammation and sometimes corneal edema.  She does have persistent corneal edema but the inflammation is slowly resolving….”  (Da0148)  On February 6, 2019, [...] was seen by cornea specialist, [...]  After performing a detailed evaluation, [...] determined that [...] had suffered “corneal degeneration, 2\textsuperscript{nd} [secondary] to contaminated injection OS [left eye].”  (Da0686)  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[directive] Si enfraksyon an te fèt swa le 1ye fevriye 1993 ou te fèt anvan le 13 mas 1995, epi yo [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] kondane w a libète kondisyonèl oswa yo kondane w nan yon enstiti penitansye leta, wap oblije peye yon frè tranzaksyon de jiska $1.00 a chak fwa yon pèyman oswa vèsman sou pèyman fèt?  Si enfraksyon an fèt le 13 mas 1995 oubyen aprè epi sanksyon an se libète kondisyonèl, oswa santans la mande pou fè pèyman anvè responsabilite finansye ba depatman libète kondisyonèl la, wap oblije peye yon frè de jiska $2.00 a chak fwa yon pèyman oswa vèsman sou pèyman fèt?  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  If the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made? e. Si enfraksyon an fèt le 2 awout 1993 ou aprè, wap oblije vèse yon frè $75 ba Fon Sèvis pou [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  Sekirite Katye/Safe Neighborhood Services Fund pou chak sanksyon?
[brief] ”  (1T 22-17 to 23-1)  The driver claimed that he had “snorted” the heroin in the parking lot and then “disposed of the wax folds at some point while he was driving. ”  (1T 23-1 to 4)  On cross-examination, [...] agreed that he had been watching the Ram as it was driving and never saw the driver throw anything out of the vehicle.  (1T 40-1 to 19)  In addition, [...] testified that no one arrested the driver for operating a vehicle while under the influence of drugs, and that the man “did not appear to be under the influence or impaired. ”  (1T 43-17 to 19, 44-16 to 22)  [...] testified that before he could notify the other SET members about the stop of the Ram’s driver and the driver’s statements, he heard on the radio that other SET members had already arrested [...].
[brief] This Court’s analysis in *Ingram* applies to this appeal: The trial court correctly concluded that the driveway was part of the curtilage of the home.  We part company with the trial court, however, in its additional legal conclusion that defendant has diminished privacy expectation on the driveway.  The trial court’s latter conclusion was inconsistent with the principles and holdings set forth by the United States Supreme Court in *Jardines* and *Collins*.  Applying the principles of *Jardines* and *Collins*, [the officer] was not lawfully in the area when he looked ***  In making this holding, we do not say that a home’s driveway will always be considered part of the curtilage.  We recognize that there may be instances where a driveway is far enough away from the home and its immediate surroundings to not qualify as curtilage.  Whether a court should apply an expectation of privacy analysis in such scenarios is a question for another day.  Here, however, the driveway [that the officer] entered immediately abuts [the private property].  This is exactly like the driveway addressed in *Collins*, and so our outcome is dictated by that case.  See 138 S.Ct. at 1670-71.  In making our holding, we also clarify that existing New Jersey precedent must be interpreted and applied in the framework established by the United States Supreme Court in *Jardines* and *Collins*.
[directive] or a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 designated as a crime of the first degree.  f.  Each county prosecutor should ordinarily seek the waiver to adult court of any juvenile fourteen years of age or older who is charged with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9, or a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, 2C:35-4 or 2C:35-5 which involved the distribution for pecuniary gain of any controlled dangerous substance while on any school property.
[brief] [...] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO GRANT LANDLORD’S FEE APPLICATION IN ITS ENTIRETY (Da3)  For the reasons set forth in Landlord’s Initial Brief and as more fully elucidated below, the lower court committed a reversible error by cutting Landlord’s contractually mandated fee award by nearly forty-percent (40%) based solely on Judge Corman’s personal belief that the rates charged by Landlord’s counsel were “a little high. ” (Da3; 3T18-19; Pa47-51, 119-120).  1  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(b), the instant Reply Brief is limited to the issues raised in Landlord’s Cross Appeal.
[brief] In fact, the Board recognized this, as indicated above, when they relied on [...]’s expert in this regard.  Pa114.  Moreover, the UCC is intended to “encourage innovation and economy in construction and to provide requirements for construction” and “[t]o eliminate restrictive, obsolete, conflicting and unnecessary construction regulations that tend to unnecessarily increase costs. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27D-120(a); (d).  Thus, the UCC exists to “lower the costs of housing and other construction without any detriment to the public health, safety and welfare.
[brief] On February 2, 2023, the [...] requested information that it required in order to advance the appointment process, i.e. verification of genuine vacancies, and approximately one week later the City provided its candid response that there were no vacancies and that they had been operating in ignorance of N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8.  (Pa. 66, 71).  Finally, Appellant alleges that the City and the [...] violated N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1(d), presumably referencing the City’s good-faith mistaken past practice of requesting certifications to fill anticipated vacancies, and the [...]’s one-time relaxation of its rules against same.
[brief] An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase “in the course of committing a theft” if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission.  b.  Grading.  Robbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.
[brief] [...], Bloodstain Pattern Analysis, https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/bca/bca-divisions/forensic-science/Pages/forensic-programs-crime-scene-bpa.aspx (last accessed Feb. 14, 2024).  An analyst must be able to “[r]ecognize and describe the effects of textiles and clothing on bloodstain pattern formation including” the composition/construction, treatment, condition, and effect of fabric movement during interaction with blood. ”  [...], [...], Standards for a Bloodstain Pattern Analyst’s Training Program, at 4-5 (2020).
[brief] He told me this was the advice of the attorneys and I would be best protected if we were no longer married.  I did not understand this but I accepted his advice.  [...] advised me that this was a divorce ‘on the paper’ only. ”  A64.  [...] stressed that, indeed, nothing in the couple’s lives changed moving forward, as [...] had said:  It is important for the Court to understand, [...] and I were not having marital problems, continued as his dutiful wife, taking care of him, emotionally, physically and all other ways.  Once again I was presented with a page to sign.  I was not given the opportunity to read the documents as they were not provided.  I was not offered the right to my own attorney, I was told [...] prepared them and since he was our attorney, I trusted they were correct and protected my interest.  ***
[brief] (Aa19 – Aa21)  Examination of the totality of P.L. 2021, § 402, the same act that adopted N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11, reveals that the Legislature had the opportunity to describe municipalities such as [...] in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) but chose not to.  Elsewhere in P.L. 2021, § 402 the Legislature amended the previously existing statute describing the ability of school districts to form regional schools.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34.  This provision includes two categories which are similar to those identified in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a)—local district boards of education and boards of consolidated school districts—but it also includes a category specifically not found in the N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a): the board of education of “a district comprising two or more municipalities. ”  See N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34.  This new category stands in contrast to a consolidated district and does not appear in the list of entities able to withdraw from a consolidated district or regional district under N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  Had the Legislature intended to include entities other than those specified in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) it had the means to do so.  The inescapable conclusion that any entities not enumerated in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) were intentionally left out.  Accordingly, under the above statutory language, only the [...], not [...], could invoke the procedures in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11, because [...], not [...], is a constituent district of [...].  For these reasons, [...] does not qualify as any of the entities described in N.J.S.A.  18A:13-47.11.  The Commissioner’s September 22, 2023, decision should be reversed to the extent that it interprets N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 in a manner inconsistent with that statute’s explicit statutory language.  The statute does not describe a municipality, such as [...], whose former non-operating school district was eliminated by the Commissioner and merged—not consolidated—with another district.
[brief] Even a cursory review of these statutes makes it abundantly clear that neither applies to [...]  N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) applies to those who “having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a child. ”  [...], is not such a person in relation to the defendant.  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-15 creates a disorderly persons offense for leaving firearms unsecured in a household with minors; however, that statute defines minors as those under 16 years of age.  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-15(c).  Because the defendant was not under 16 years of age, this too does not apply to [...]
[brief] There is a section on multiple and dual memberships.  The guidebook states that multiple pension members under PERS are only allowed for Tier 1, 2 and 3 employees.  The handbook, specifically citing *N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7* indicates multiple membership is only allowed if an employee was enrolled from both positions of employment prior to May 21, 2010, and there has not been a break in service.  The guidebook goes on to explain how the Division of Pensions and Benefits defines a break in service.  While a break in service is any pension reporting period without pay, there are exceptions.  These exceptions are, “*With the exception of approved leaves of absence, layoff, abolishment of the position, military, leave, worker’s compensation, litigation or suspension.*”  There should be no question that [...] was laid off from his [...] position.  This is specifically what [...] reported to the state.  [Pa11,14]
[brief] Third and finally, as discussed above in Sections II and III, the FAA trumps the MBPA.  The Wholesaler Agreement covers New York and New Jersey, Appellants are incorporated in those two states and maintained licenses premises in both states while [...] is incorporated in New York, Appellants brought a claim under the ABC Law, and 90% of Appellants’ Sapporo sales are in New York.  Ultimately, it is New York that has both the most substantial relationship to the parties’ dealings and the greatest interest in having its law applied to this dispute.  V.
[brief] | | | In the Matter of Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act Rules | 12 | | 180 N.J. 415 (2004).  | | | Table of Authorities (Cont’d) | Page | |-------------------------------|------| | **M. Alfieri Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. & Energy**  269 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 1994) | 12 | | **Mayflower Securities v. Bureau of Securities** 64 N.J. 85 (1973).  | 12 | | **Public Service Elec. And Gas Co. v. N.J. Dept. of Environmental Protection** 101 N.J. 95 (1985) | 10 | | **State v. Smith** 262 N.J. Super. 487 (App. Div. 1993) | 16 | | **TAC Associates v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection** 202 N.J. 533 (2010).  | 12 | | **Wright v. Vogt** 7 N.J. 1 (1951) | 12, 13 | | **Worthington v. Fauver** 88 N.J. 183 (1982) | 11, 14 | **Statutes, Cases and Rules:** | Statute/Rule | Page | |--------------|------| | 15 U.S.C. §717 et seq. | 4 | | 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. | 8 | | N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 et seq.
[brief] (Doc. 134 at 89-92).  The [...] responded that the case law indicates that it would likely only be appropriate to consider overriding work product protection in that instance if the borrower witness that [...] interviewed had died and that, here, [...] could go through its own records to get the answers to its questions about the borrower’s financial status.  (*Id.* at 93:14-25).  The Court notes that unavailability of a witness in federal litigation typically has a broader meaning than death.  See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(2).  However, the Court agrees that [...] would be able to find the answers to the specific borrower-related questions it highlighted at the December 10 hearing by reviewing its own records.
[brief] B.  Despite Finding that the Property was Untenantable, the Trial Court Found that Criterion (b) was not Satisfied.  (See Trial Briefs)  Criterion (b) can justify a redevelopment designation when buildings have fallen into such a state of disrepair as to be untenantable.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b).  Despite clear evidence on the record that the current building was not tenantable because of soil borings that had to be taken, the Trial Court still concluded that there was not substantial credible evidence to satisfy criterion (b).  This conclusion is contradicted by the Trial Court’s own findings.  Specifically, the Trial Court found that Plaintiff’s LSRP determined that more aggressive remediation was required in order to address the free product under the floor of the building.  (T3, 40:12-16).  Findings by the Court noted, “the property is actively undergoing remediation and was leased until -- up until 2023 when it was determined that the remediation would require access to areas that would make it untenable to continue to rent. ” (T3, 51:11-15).  It also found that the trenching required to be done during remediation made it impossible to lease the Property.  (T3, 52:15-19).  Despite these findings, the Trial Court found “insufficient evidence based on these facts and the definition of untenable. ”  (T3, 52:15-21).  Relying on Webster’s definition of “untenable,” which is “‘not able to be occupied, untenable apartments[,]’” the Trial Court stated that “[t]he term requires disrepair that is untenable. ” (T3, 52:7-10).  Although the Trial Court erroneously used the word “untenable” instead of the word “untenantable” which is actually used in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b), this is a distinction without a difference.  Merriam Webster’s online dictionary defines “untenantable” in nearly the same way as “ untenable”, which is “incapable of being occupied or lived in”  https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/untenantable?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld, last visited 10/1/2024.  Under either word, untenantable or untenable, the same concept is applied: the property must be unable to be occupied.  Evidence established that Plaintiff’s LSRP needed to dig under/trench the building just to determine the extent of the contamination.  (T1, 13:10-23).  Even after testing is done, if there are large amounts of impacted soil, the building may have to be removed entirely.  (T1, 28:20-29:5).  Not only is the building unable to be occupied at this time because of the scope of remediation, it is unlikely to be occupied in the near future.  Because there is substantial, credible evidence that the Property is untenantable, based on the Trial Court’s own findings, the Trial Court erred in concluding that the Property did not meet criterion (b).
[brief] [...], et al., Evaluation of Field Sobriety Tests for Identifying Drivers Under the Influence of Cannabis: A Randomized Clinical Trial, JAMA Psychiatry (2023), https://jamanetwork. com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2807719 (viewed July 21, 2024).  Study participants “were to abstain from cannabis for at least 2 days prior to the training and experiment days. ”  Id. at 5.  Despite the study’s focus on cannabis, a key finding was that the officers involved in the study classified 49.2% to 54.0% of the placebo group as impaired using OLS and W&T, among other tests.  Id. at 7.  “[A] substantial proportion of the placebo group performed poorly on the [OLS and W&T], and officers classified 49.2% of the placebo group as FST impaired.  Of all participants who officers believed to have received THC whether they received THC or placebo, 92.8% were classified as FST impaired. ”  Id. at 9.  This suggested a strong tendency for confirmation bias.  Id. at 5 and 12.  _____________________  4  The treatise is not viewable at this link, but can be downloaded from it.  5  Page references refer to the downloaded version of this article.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Plaintiff filed its Complaint on December 28, 2022, alleging claims against [...] and [...].  (Pa1).  On April 3, 2023, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim.  (Pa27-147).  On April 20, 2023, [...] filed a Rule 4:6-2(e) Motion to Dismiss.  (Pa201-337).  On June 2, 2023, the trial court heard argument on [...]’s motion to dismiss.  (June 2 Trans., 1T).  At the end of oral argument and on Plaintiff’s request, the trial court stated that it would grant [...]’s motion, without prejudice and with leave to replead.  (1T19:10-24)  The trial court issued an Order dated June 2, 2023 (the “June 2 Order”), granting [...]’s motion to dismiss for the reasons stated on the record at oral argument, however, without prejudice and with leave to replead.