ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”); *Big Smoke LLC v. Township of W. Milford*, 478 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 2024) (rejecting appellant’s argument made for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in considering dismissal of the claims against defendant, with prejudice, because the cross-motion was never amended or supplemented to include this relief and the court only considers arguments not raised to the trial court or otherwise preserved for appeal under the plain error standard).  Appellant never argued before the Trial Court that the Motions were not ripe due to the need to conduct discovery.  In fact, Appellant represented to the Court that this matter was ripe for summary judgment:  THE COURT:  Both parties have moved for summary judgment, although I understand procedurally it started out differently.  And then there was some conversation.  And all the parties at this point, unless someone tells me differently, agree that the matter is ripe for summary judgment.  And that’s how I looked at it.  [...]: Yes, Your Honor.  THE COURT: Okay.  [...]: And that’s our position, as well, Your Honor, for the defendant.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT NEVER CERTIFIED ANY JUDGMENT AS “FINAL”  [...] recognizes that R. 4:42-2 requires the trial court to certify “that there is no just reason for delay” in order for an interlocutory order to be treated as “final,” (Pb36) but argues over the course of 4 pages that the trial court implicitly did so.  (Pb36-40).  Whether the Order, in hindsight, could have been certified as final is of no moment; the trial court was required to analyze, hear argument, find as a matter of law and certify “that there is no just reason for delay. ”  See D’Oliviera v. Micol, 321 N.J. Super. 637, 641 (App. Div. 1999)(“[An interlocutory Order] is consequently ordinarily appealable only by leave to appeal granted pursuant to R. 2:5-6, unless eligible for certification as final pursuant to R. 4:42-2 and so certified”)(emphasis added).  The trial court never certified its April 6, 2023 or February 23, 2024 orders as “final judgments,” nor did it consider whether and find that there was “no just cause for delay. ”
[brief] This deprived the trial judge of the opportunity to decide how best to proceed and, more importantly, was fundamentally unfair to [...] who was unaware that he needed to protect his personal interests.  Simply put, plaintiffs needed to pursue all of their potential claims in the Chancery action and failed to do so.  In Schindel, supra, a three-judge panel of the Appellate Division addressed the application of the ECD in a context substantially identical to this case, concluding that plaintiff’s failure to pursue a legal malpractice claim in an earlier probate action precluded the later claim.
[brief] Critically, *Passaic*’s focus on bargaining power is wholly consistent with this State’s history of protecting vulnerable actors, such as wholesalers and franchisees.  Because brewers enjoy disproportionate bargaining power, New Jersey presumes wholesaler agreements, like franchise agreements, are not arms-length, negotiated agreements, where wholesalers have an opportunity to negotiate, question, or dictate any aspect of the agreement.  *See Kubis & Perszyk Assoc., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.*, 146 N.J. 176, 192-5 (1996) (“franchise agreement in many cases is not a matter of mutual consent but actually a contract of adhesion—either take it or leave it.
[brief] As stated in Evid. R. 703, an expert's opinion must be based on "facts or data * * * perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing."  An expert's conclusion is considered to be a "net opinion," and thereby inadmissible, only when it is a bare conclusion unsupported by factual evidence.  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981).  Evid. R. 703 addresses the foundation for expert testimony.  It mandates that expert opinion be grounded in “‘facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts. ’”  Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008) (quoting State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006)).  The net opinion rule is not a standard of perfection.  The rule does not mandate that an expert organize or support an opinion in a particular manner that opposing counsel deems preferable.  An expert's proposed testimony should not be excluded merely “‘because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact which the adversary considers relevant. ’”  Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 360 (2005) (quoting State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 525 (1989)).  The expert's failure “to give weight to a factor thought important by an adverse party does not reduce his testimony to an inadmissible net opinion if he otherwise offers sufficient reasons which logically support his opinion. ”  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Freeman, supra, 223 N.J. Super. at 115–16).  The bases for the expert’s opinion are presumptively a proper subject of exploration and cross-examination at a trial.
[brief] 52a.  In support of their application, Defendant [...] and his wife submitted Certifications stating that they were never served with the foreclosure action, were unaware of the proceeding and they were also not home at the time of the purported service as they left for vacation on the morning of alleged service.  55a.  The first Order to Show Cause filed by the Defendants on March 24, 2022 was erroneously filed with JEDS.  62a.  The Order to Show Cause was then refiled via ecourts on March 29, 2022.  63a.  The Court signed the Order to Show cause on April 11, 2022.
[brief] ”  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(i) (“To promote a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design and arrangement”).  As [...] testified, the development promotes “a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and design” as the development presents an aesthetically pleasing building from an architectural standpoint and provides an increase of landscaping to improve the streetscape.  Pa271, at 52:10-53:4.  Similarly, the project furthers MLUL’s purpose “a” by furthering the public health and general welfare.
[brief] [...] failed to properly include his complete driving and employment history as part of his application.  Similarly, [...] failed to reveal prior police activity and failed to prove he was a resident of [...] as required.  There is no similarity between these matters and Appellant [...]’s removal from the promotion list.  In In the Matters of [...] and [...], County Correction Officer (S9999U), [...], 2019 N.J. CSC, LEXIS 420 (June 28, 2019)(RA74-82), the Respondent Commission granted the list removal appeals of two entry-level candidates who had multiple criminal, employment and driving record adverse issues.
[brief] And the evidence in the Jersey City theft is clear and convincing.  Defendant posted the BMW to his Instagram account shortly after it was stolen, and the jacket he wore during the Jersey City carjacking was found inside the Mercedes carjacked in Elizabeth.  Any prejudice defendant might face is outweighed by the highly probative nature of the evidence to his identity.  An alternative for this Court would be to allow the State to introduce evidence of the Audi and the BMW and instruct the jury that on April 20, 2022, in Jersey City, possession of an Audi with license plate [REDACTED] and a yellow BMW M4 was transferred to a different person or persons, both at the same time.
[brief] Because they are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  ² “D[]” refers to Complainant’s legal first name, while “D[a]” refers to Complainant’s preferred first name.  ³ Ab refers to Appellant’s brief, and Aa refers to his appendix.  Ra refers to the appendix to this brief, which includes two Commission letters, which were identified in the Statement of Items Comprising the Record, but not included in Appellant’s appendix.  local [...] ([...]) union, and was on “DCF union leave” pursuant to Article 24 of [...]’s contract with the State.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury
[brief] “Deference is especially appropriate ‘when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility. ”  Id. (citing In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997) (emphasis added).  “Because a trial court hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, [and] hears them testify, it has a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses. ”  Id. (internal quotations omitted; alteration in original).  An appellate court should not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are “so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  Id. (citing Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484).  After carefully assessing the testimony, credibility of the witnesses, and documentary evidence, the trial court concluded that [...] and [...] entered into an oral agreement, the Third Loan, on April 26, 2013, by which the parties (at [...]’s behest) agreed to restructure [...]’s then outstanding balances due on the First and Second Loans.
[directive] The Chief Executive of every police agency in the State shall also designate any civilian employees (dispatchers, etc.) who should be included in this training program.  A person shall be deemed to have participated in the training program by viewing an entire video presentation covering the areas required in section one of this Law Enforcement Directive, or attending a seminar covering the areas required by section one of this Law Enforcement Directive, or completing self instruction of the complete curricula created by the Division of Criminal Justice or other law enforcement agency authorized to develop such program under section 2(b).  b.  Any police officer who attended a police academy subject to the jurisdiction of the Police Training Commission on or after January 2002, and successfully completed Performance Objective 3.10.12, shall have satisfied this training requirement.  The Police Training Commission shall keep Performance Objective 3.10.12 a requirement for pre-service training in order to comply with the provisions of this legislative mandate.
[brief] ”  Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 (App. Div. 1999).  Even then, “[w]hen a prevailing defendant’s allegation is based on the absence of ‘a reasonable basis in law or equity’ for the plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff is represented by an attorney, an award cannot be sustained if the ‘plaintiff did not act in bad faith in asserting’ or pursuing the claim.
[brief] A pulmonary medicine consultation on March 3, 2020, for a cough, to be followed by consultation with a speech pathologist  A March 5, 2020 follow-up visit with pulmonary medicine, with speech evaluation planned  On March 8, 2020, a nurse recorded [...]’s complaint of a sore throat.  On March 9, 2020, a chest x-ray was performed  A pulmonary medicine follow-up occurred on March 10, 2020, to evaluate pneumonia, a cerebral vascular accident and dysphagia.  A registered nurse and speech pathologist saw no signs of aspiration, and the physician recommended BREO (a combination of two medicines, an inhaled corticosteroid and a long-acting beta 2-adrenergic agonist), singular, IV fluids, and a feeding study.  The registered nurse recorded a sore throat.  On March 12, 2020, there was a pulmonary medicine follow-up finding of dyspnea on exertion.  Physical therapy was recommended due to weakness and he was to continue the nebulizer for asthma.  On March 14, 2020, an order for guaifenesin, an expectorant, was placed.  On March 17, 2020, [...] was transported to the surgeon’s office  On March 18, 2020, a nurse practitioner noted that [...] had a harsh cough and started a misty nebulizer.  On March 20, 2020, [...] was prescribed a Z-Pack and promethazine, and a chest x-ray was performed.  On March 24, 2020, [...] ordered a COVID test.
[brief] ”  In discussing the legislative intent for the School Ethics Act, [...] properly highlighted that Board members “must avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a).  The Commission notes that board members do not surrender the rights that they have as citizens such as freedom of speech when they become members of a school board.  However, as discussed in [...] v. [...], [...], Camden County, [...] ([...]), and in light of the social media posts by Respondent, the Commission echoes its decision in [...], specifically that “when a sitting Board member makes such a judgmental proclamation, it is likely to be credited far more than a statement offered by an ordinary citizen.
[brief] 3.  **Landscape Buffer**:  In the VC-2 Overlay Zone, pursuant to Ordinance Section 108-6.18(K)(9)(c) the minimum width of landscape buffer area along tract boundary is 100 feet for nonresidential uses abutting residential zones and 50 feet for residential uses abutting residential zones is required.  The Applicant proposes a 30 foot buffer for Building "C" containing nonresidential uses along the [...] boundary which contains a residential zone and uses, where a buffer of 100 feet is required.  The Applicant submits that the 30-foot buffer from the [...] tract boundary is adequate because the uses on the other side of the border are also multi-family.
[brief] THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO.  This Court need look no further than the case upon which Respondents most heavily rely, Dimitrakopoulos, to confirm that the standard of review in this matter is de novo.  Defendants, recognizing that it was too late to file a motion for summary judgment, filed a Motion to Dismiss which the Court effectively converted into a motion for Summary Judgment, this is the same appellate posture as Dimitrakopoulos.  Dimitrakopoulos set forth the appellate standard of review:  “An appellate court reviews de novo the trial court's determination of the motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e).  Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. County of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286 (App. Div. 2017).  It owes no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.  Rezem Family Assocs., 423 N.J. Super. at 114, 30 A.3d 1061. ”  Dimitrakopoulos v. [...], 237 N.J. 91 (2019).  III.
[brief] (2T22:8-15).  [...] next conducted the one-legged stand test.  (2T22:17-19).  Defendant observed [...] demonstrate how to perform the test.  (2T23:2-9).  When defendant initially started the test, he raised his arms for balance and placed his foot on the ground.  (2T24:1-3).  Defendant asked if he could redo the test.  [...] once again demonstrated how to perform the test.  (2T24:4-6).  Once defendant began the test again, he almost immediately fell over before putting his foot down at the ten second mark.  (2T24:8-12).  By the time he was going to raise his leg to continue, defendant had already approached the 30 second mark, which was his limit.  (2T24:12-15).  At this point in his investigation, [...] believed that defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
[directive] 6.4.4  The primary responsibility for investigating the domestic violence incident itself, along with any related offenses, belongs to the agency with jurisdiction over the incident.  The processing of domestic violence complaints, restraining orders, criminal complaints, etc., will remain with that agency.  In many cases, this will not be the officer's employing agency.  6.4.5  The employing agency's internal affairs officers will be responsible for receiving the information and documenting the matter as they would any other misconduct allegation.  If the report is that the officer is the victim of domestic violence, it should still be recorded and followed up in case employee assistance is warranted.  6.4.6  If a criminal charge has been filed, internal affairs must notify the County Prosecutor immediately even if the incident took place in another county.  As the chief law enforcement officer of the county, it is critical that a prosecutor be made aware of any outstanding criminal charges against any law enforcement officer in their county.  6.4.7  Internal affairs is responsible for reviewing the incident’s investigation and conducting whatever further investigation is necessary to determine if the officer violated agency rules and regulations or if the officer's fitness for duty is in question.  In addition, internal affairs will track the proceedings of any criminal charges or civil matters that may arise out of the incident.  Internal affairs will also work with the Division of Criminal Justice or the County Prosecutor to determine if and when an officer may have their weapon(s) returned.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 32
[brief] “The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities subject to legislation, is but one portion of the police power and, as such, must be exercised for the general welfare. ”  S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 208 (1983) (“Mount Laurel II”).  On the other hand, local zoning decisions that are “contrary to the general welfare [are] invalid. ”  Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 175.  When a local ordinance, procedure, or zoning decision “by a municipality affects something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare” is implicated, it triggers constitutional constraints.  Mount Laurel II, 67 N.J. at 208.  Correspondingly, the general welfare is imperiled whenever a local decision functions to obstruct affordable housing:  “It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use regulation. ”  Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 179.  Thus, the municipality exceeds its statutory authority, and violates the constitution, when it enforces local land- use restrictions that contravene the general welfare by depriving the public of affordable housing.  See id.  The “remedial consequences” of a municipality’s obstruction of affordable housing through local zoning decisions include, among others, the judicial “elimination of unnecessary cost-producing requirements and restrictions. ”  Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 217.  “[M]unicipalities, at the very least, must remove all municipally created barriers to the construction of their fair share of lower income housing. ”  Id. at 258-59.  Some examples of “cost-generating provisions” that impede the construction of affordable housing include “large lot zoning …, limitations on multi-bedroom homes and units, … excessive minimums for frontages, setbacks, front yards, and home sizes. ”  Id. at 295.  In other words, where a municipality’s zoning decisions function to obstruct a developer’s affordable-housing construction that is necessary to meet the municipality’s fair housing obligations, a court must set aside these purported municipal “requirements” because they generate unconstitutional costs that delay and hinder the right to fair housing.  See [...] v. [...], 173 N.J. 502, 557-58 (2002) (ordering township to waive planning board’s “sewer construction and financing requirements [as] unduly cost-generative” because they “presented a ‘significant impediment’ to the potential development of affordable housing”).  b.
[brief] In re Pub. Serv. Elec & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358 (1961) ..............................................  46  In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1 (2020) ...........................................  19 Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ......................... 34, 35 Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3 (2019) .......................................... 20 Main Union Assocs. v. Twp. of Little Falls Rent Leveling Bd., 306 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 402 (1998)  ...........................................  26  Matter of M.U.'s Application for a Handgun Purchase Permit, 475 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2023)  ........................................................................................................  27 N.J. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Farmer, 342 N.J. Super. 536 (Ch. Div. 2000)  ............  26  New Jersey Natural Gas Go. v. Borough of Red Bank, 438 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2014)  ..............................................................................................................  45, 48 Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Honeywell Protective Servs., Honeywell, Inc., 222 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 1987) ..................................................................................  35  Public Service Corp. v. Westfield, 257 U.S. 669 (1922) ........................................  41  Public Service Corp. v. Westfield, 80 N.J. Eq. 295 (Ch. Div. 1912), affirmed, 82 N.J. Eq. 662 (E.&A. 1914) ................................................................................................. 39, 40 Public Service Electric Company v. Westfield (D.N.J., Sept. 5, 1918) .............. 41, 47 Ran-Dav's Cty. Kosher v. State, 129 N.J. 141 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 952, 113 S. Ct. 1366, 122 L.Ed.2d 744 (1993)
[brief] While there is no evidence that the firm maintains offices in New Jersey or that any of its attorneys have ever been admitted to practice in the courts of this state, since 1993, the firm has been retained to represent at least 14 different corporate clients with offices in New Jersey”); Bekier v. Commonwealth Construction Co., 2007 WL 3014704 at * 2 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2007) (“Examples of contacts that could establish general jurisdiction in the forum state are the existence of: facilities, offices, employees, registered agents, real property, telephone listings or bank accounts. ”).  Defendants suggest that because they are “at home” in Texas ([...]’s principal place of business) and Virginia ([...]’s domicile), there can be no general jurisdiction over them in New Jersey based on their “continuous and systematic” activity here.