[brief] **Issue I)  [...] Did Not Err In Declining To Follow The Law-Of-The-Case Doctrine, As The Point Which Plaintiff Sought To Have [...] Adopt Was Not Found As A Matter Of Law By [...]**  Plaintiff first argues that [...] erred by declining to invoke the law-of-the-case doctrine with regard to the previous decision by [...].  There is no merit to this argument because the law of the case doctrine does not.  The law-of-the-case doctrine provides “that a legal decision made in a particular matter ‘should be respected by all other lower or equal courts during the pendency of that case. ’”  Tully v. Wu, 457 N.J. Super. 114, 128 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Lombardi v. Massa, 207 N.J. 517, 548 (2011)).  “A hallmark” of this doctrine “is its discretionary nature. ”  Ibid. (quoting Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 548).  That is, it is “non-binding” and only “intended to ‘prevent re-litigation of a previously resolved issue. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 548).  It is “only triggered when one court is faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical issue. ”  Ibid. (emphases added) (quoting Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 548).  Notably, the court’s prior denial of a defendant’s dispositive motion is not “a ruling on the merits” of the plaintiff’s claims—it follows, then, that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude a court from later granting defendant’s dispositive motion.  Ibid. at 128-29.  This is especially so when the court is later presented with new or different evidence than was presented to it in the original motion.  Ibid.  That is precisely what happened here.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, [...] merely denied Defendants’ prior dispositive motion; in doing so, he would not have, and did not, hold that a hostile work environment existed and thus Plaintiff proved that as a matter of law.  Rather, he found that at that point in time, based on the record before him that that time, “it appears that there are genuine issues of material facts as to whether Plaintiff endured a hostile work environment. ”  (Pa120.)  Defendants asserted that the CEPA claim was time-barred, that the allegations against the individual Defendants did not come within CEPA’s protections, and that the failure-to-promote claim was untenable.  Because those issues, and the factual record, were different than what was presented to [...], the law-of-the-case doctrine did not preclude [...]’s consideration of the second motion.  The statute of limitations for a CEPA is one year.  N.J.S.A 34:19-5.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-5(a), an aggrieved employee has one year to file suit.  The CEPA statute states that “[u]pon a violation of any of the provisions of this act, an aggrieved employee or former employee may, within one year, institute a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction. ”  Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 446 (2003) (emphasis added) (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:19-5)).  This Complaint was not filed until November 21, 2017.  [See Ex. A]  Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges to have been subject to CEPA retaliation prior to November 21, 2016, those claims were time-barred.  This included any claims which arose prior to Plaintiff’s transfer from OPS to the State Police Academy.  As such, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s first argument and this Court should affirm [...]’s decision.  **ISSUE II)