ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I asked him to explain his answer in a little bit greater detail…  ***  A:  Well, the uplands will be demarked by the mean high water line, the lands below that, subaqueous lands are those that are Riparian lands so the boundary between the two will establish what is uplands and what its title or Riparian lands that unless severed belong to the State of New Jersey.  The Court: So, when there was a conveyance of a Riparian Right, the land that is conveyed is the land under the water?  – The Witness: a Riparian Grant would convey the land under the water.  The Court: under the water, how far?  The Witness: until, well, you get to the actual land over which the water flows; The Court: how far out?  In other words - Q: And it would be the - The Court: - like the Riparian Right in Keansburg doesn’t go from Keansburg to Scotland.  How far out?  The Witness: Well, the State owns up until whatever the boundary of the State of New Jersey might be and after that point, it may be international waters and not the State of New Jersey.  Until that point is reached, all the lands that are under the water belong to the State unless severed by the State.
[brief] In Gardner, et al. v. Hokenson, et al., Superior Court of the State of Vermont, Chittenden Unit, Docket No. [...] (the “1007 Case”), the plaintiffs alleged that the [...] had caused damage to certain [...] drainage systems and that [...] and [...] had wrongfully induced the [...] to defy a court order for repair of the damage by September 22, 2018.  Pa 471–72 ¶¶ 6–7; Pa483 ¶ 38; Pa907–41.  In Gardner et al v. [...], Superior Court of the State of Vermont, Chittenden Unit, Docket No. [...] (the “774 Case”), the same plaintiffs asserted the same claims as were asserted in the 1007 Case, but derivatively on behalf of the [...].  Pa 471–71 ¶¶ 6–7; Pa483 ¶ 37; Pa874–906.
[brief] Over the course of eight (8) months before the Respondent, [...] (the “ZBA”), the Respondents, Marisha and [...] (the “Homeowners”), introduced uncontroverted, sworn, testimony from three (3) experts and twenty-three (23) exhibits satisfying their legal burden and obtaining a unanimous vote of approval granting e.g. a height variance to expand their existing single-family home.  Before voting to grant the variance relief, the ZBA carefully considered and weighed testimony amounting to three hundred (300) stenographic pages and the law affords their findings a deferential review on the record below.  The Appellants, neighbors residing 260’ away (the “Objectors”), were given a full and fair opportunity to attend all hearings, to cross-examine all witnesses and to present witnesses and exhibits of their own so long as they followed the rules.  When an audio malfunction deprived the parties of a record of the May 23, 2022 hearing, the ZBA compelled a recorded rehearing before allowing any new testimony, before opening the matter to the public, and before deliberating or voting.  All witnesses re-appeared and testified anew inclusive of cross-examination and without any time or other constraints whatsoever.  Nearly two (2) years after ZBA voted unanimously to grant the requested variances, the Objectors continue to leverage a time-barred, private, action in lieu of prerogative writs to frustrate the property rights and approvals the Homeowners attained.  Though afforded a recorded rehearing, the Objectors seek a third bite at the apple (in the form of a remand to the ZBA for yet another rehearing) to introduce evidence they tactically withheld in August and September 2022.  Despite having copies of all publications of Notices of Approval in hand, the Objectors ignored the first notice and filed their prerogative writ out of time.  Although complaints in lieu of prerogative writs must be decided on the record of the hearings below, the Objectors continue to pursue a roving investigation not grounded in the record below and, ultimately, some type of impermissible, supplemental, fact-finding.  Faced with requests for patently extraordinary relief caused solely by the Objectors’ own elections, the Trial Court correctly: a) declined to remand the matter to the board of adjustment to conduct a rehearing of the rehearing; b) declined to grant discovery on matters unrelated to the subject property that post-date the vote of approval; c) declined to conduct a trial de novo by affidavit or certification to the Trial Court where the law limits the scope of review to the record adduced before the board; and d) declined to extend the time in which to file the complaint in lieu of prerogative writs for Objectors’ failure to meet its burden to show that it was manifest that the interests of justice merited an extension.  In the end, these off the record and undocumented issues which require speculation regarding off-site conditions that do not yet exist have no bearing on the ultimate issue in an action in lieu of prerogative writs – whether the ZBA acted arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably.
[directive] List any charges the prosecutor has agreed to recommend for dismissal:  Proszc, podac zarzuty, kt6re prokurator zgodzil sic, zalecic do oddalenia: Ind./Acc./Compl.# Count Nature of Offense and Degree osk./okrarz./pow6dztwo  Zarzut Charakter i stopien przest1rpstwa/wykroczenia Akt Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019
[brief] (8T36:11-15)  Plaintiff seeks a new trial on the grounds that the “jury’s verdict finding that the defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident is shocking and against the weight of evidence of the uncontested facts presented at trial. ” (Pb45).  The jury found in this case that the defendant was negligent, but its negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s fall.  (Pa158).  The jury's verdict that the defendant was negligent, but any negligence was not a proximate cause of her injuries was proper under the facts and the law.  The trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
[brief] [...]’s discipline policy explicitly notes that [...] may commence discipline at any level, including discharge without prior warnings or other corrective measures.  (Pa424-27).  As for [...]’s contention that other employees alleged to have stolen time were not reprimanded, it is demonstrably false.  [...] points only to her testimony once again to support this argument.  (See Pb26; Pa669).  Meanwhile, [...] explained at her deposition that [...] managers are responsible for submitting “salary time sheets,” to ensure that paid time off (“PTO”) is properly tracked.  These managers were not “falsifying their time cards,” as alleged without support, but simply had their PTO retroactively deducted from their PTO bank upon their submission of a group of time sheets.  (Pa361 at 74:17-76:11).  [...] confirmed that no money exchanged hands because [...] merely deducted the necessary PTO hours from the managers’ PTO bank.  (Pa361 at 74:17-76:11).  There is simply no evidence of “selective” application of [...] policy, only [...]’s bald assertions.  In sum, [...] has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact capable of showing causation between her termination and any alleged whistleblowing activity.
[brief] ”  Id. at 451-52 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  [...] does not dispute that the initial starting point for the Court’s analysis in Wright was the mandate of the TCA.  Such a starting point made sense in the context of that case because it was a suit against a prosecutor’s office and its employee seeking damages.  However, since the Wright decision, the Court has continued to emphasize the critical role that the [...]’s supervisory authority over law enforcement has in determining when the [...] has a duty to defend and indemnify a county prosecutor’s office.  Indeed, a fair reading of the Court’s recent decisions supports Appellant’s position that when a county prosecutor stands in the shoes of the [...] by performing a mandated law enforcement function, it is that role, and not the TCA, that plays the pivotal role in coverage obligations.
[brief] *Rule 4:42-11* prescribes simple post-judgment interest at the rate of return of the State of New Jersey Cash Management Fund:  "[e]xcept as otherwise ordered by the court or provided by law, judgments, awards and orders for the payment of money, taxed costs and attorney's fees shall bear simple interest."  (emphasis added).  The interest rates of 8.875% and 3.935% far exceed the rate of 2.25% provided under Rule 4:42-11.  In the absence of a contractual agreement, which does not exist after the December 20, 2013 Final Judgment in this case, or specific findings of fact justifying a higher rate of interest, the rate of return provided by the rule, calculated as simple interest, should govern the award of prejudgment interest.
[brief] Respondent’s Counsel misrepresented in his brief and stated that the “Judge of Compensation revealed that she was of the opinion that teachers were essential employees and that this teacher was entitled to the presumption. ” (Rb8).  Respondent further states that the Judge “revealed that she based this opinion on her beliefs that she formed and advocated as an Assemblywoman and primary sponsor of the bill. ” (Rb8).  This is not true.  Of course, Respondent does not put any citations to these statements because there are none.  [...] actually stated that she “did not make any decisions regarding the matter at any point.
[brief] The solution according to the Boundary Commissioners is to change the boundaries of an additional four lots (Pa95a).  [...] could not locate the “single piece of physical evidence, a concrete monument” which was the basis for the 1956 subdivision.  See Report p.3, ll.26-30, Pa108.  Accordingly, [...] considered the surrounding properties surveyed in the 1960s and 1970s.  Based upon that evidence, the Report concludes that the “[...] for the [...] is in agreement . . . and that the filed Maps [for surrounding properties] disagree significantly with the [...]. ”  Report, p.6, ll.32-4, Pa111.  In favoring the [...], the Report cautiously states “that given the scarcity of available information, the Commissioners’ conclusion is based, in large part, on circumstantial evidence. ”  Report, p.7, ll.25-6, Pa112.  This then presents the issue of whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by [...] justifies adjusting the boundary lines of all the lots that would be affected by “correcting” the original subdivision lines with which the [...] agrees.
[brief] Moreover, the Discovery Rule due to exceptional circumstances would toll time (33-years) (N.J. Ct. R. 4:104); Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492 (1993), for when this defendant first discovered in May of 2023 a violation of Due Process from 1990 he did NOT sleep on his rights and contemporaneously filed a Motion to have the default judgement void seeking redress with the Trial Court (Pa73 – Pa74).  Upon obtaining discovery material between May-July of 2023 for this exceptional case originating 34- years ago, a Motion to Vacate Arrears was filed and denied on September 26, 2023 (Pa17).  As previously cited, where default was entered without proper service of the complaint, it is “a fortiori void, and SHOULD BE SET ASIDE. ”  Gold Kist, Inc., 756 F.2d at 19.  “ANY defects … ARE FATAL and leave the court WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND ITS JUDGMENT VOID. ”  With that being said, in addition the discovery rule (N.J. Ct. R. 4:104) and Rule 60 (b) (6) delays the accrual of a cause of action until `the injured party DISCOVERS, (totality of evidence confirming May of 2023) or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered (zero evidence cited to dispute defendant’s claim of Defective Service lacking any records of Service of Process) that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.
[brief] 14  B.  The Court Also Correctly Found That OPRA Does Not Provide a Vehicle for Testing or Manipulating Government Records .......................................................  16  C.  The Trial Court Properly Found That the State’s Interest in Preserving the Integrity of the Historical Items Outweighs Any Interest In DNA Testing That Might Result in Damaging or Altering the Records.................................................. 19 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 23 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, | 17 | | 347 N.J. Super. 312 (Law Div. 2004) | | | Bent v. Twp. of Stafford Police Dep’t, Custodian of Records, | 15 | | 381 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Bergen Cty. Imp. Auth. v. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc., | 19 | | 370 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Davis v. Devereux Found., | 6 | | 209 N.J. 269 (2012) | | | DeLia v. Kiernan, | 18 | | 119 N.J. Super. 581 (App. Div. 1972) | | | Ferry v. Williams, | 19, 21| | 41 N.J.L. 332 (1879) | | | Freedom From Religion Found. v. Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,| 22 | | 232 N.J. 543 (2018) | | | In re New Jersey Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation to Provide Relief | 12, 15| | Applications Under Open Public Records Act, | | | 230 N.J. 258 (2017) | | | Keddie v. Rutgers, | 20 | | 148 N.J. 36 (1997) | | | Loigman v. Kimmelman, | 20 | | 102 N.J. 98 (1986) | | | Kovalcik v. Somerset Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, | 17 | | 206 N.J. 581 (2011) | | [...]
[brief] [...], treasurer of [...] sent a notice to [...] on August 13, 2012 (Pa 227).  [...] terminated benefits and Berkeley Heights stopped collecting pension payments without any notice to [...].  On November 1, 2013, over a year later, [...] received a letter from [...] indicating retroactive ineligibility back to January 1, 2018.  [...] appealed the determination by letter to [...] dated December 13, 2013 (Pa94-96).  On February 28, 2014, pursuant to a request from [...], [...] remits to director of [...] ([...]) the IRS 20 question test along with a copy of [...]’s 2013 W-2 statement (Pa97-103).  The matter stalls for years.
[brief] N.J.S.A 2A:23B-23.  The statutory restrictions were expanded in the October 20, 2021 Consent Order, but only for five limited issues:  The arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23 except that the Superior Court of New Jersey retains jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the following interlocutory orders entered in this matter (1) Order establishing the date of valuation of January 27, 1994; (2) the order denying Plaintiff’s motion in limine barring the testimony of the Defendants’ furniture, fixture, and equipment expert, [...] based on certain items not being present as of January 27, 1994; (3) The Order denying Defendants’ motion barring the Plaintiff’s expert, [...], from using the [...] contract rent in his calculation of gross income in his income approach and the introduction of evidence of sales of shopping centers based on terms of leased fee; (4) all issues related to environmental cleanup and (5) all issues related to withdrawal of deposit funds.
[brief] (14T 126:15 to 128:2).  Although [...] knew that [...] became the accountant for [...] and [...], [...] mainly liaised with [...], not [...].  (15T 12:24 to 15:8; 16:11 to 18:3; 18:6-17; 21:24 to 22:18; 23T 83:9 to 91:5).
[brief] The owner defaulted on the loan and [...] foreclosed on the mortgage.  [...] was the successful bidder and acquired the mortgaged property.  [...] subsequently initiated a closed bidding process limited to three prior bidders.  [...] submitted a bid of $255,000.  [...] submitted a bid of $287,000 and described the property as including both the upland lot and the Riparian Grant.  [...]’s bid was for $280,000 and included a statement that the bid was for the property with the Riparian Grant.  [...]’s attorney believed a mistake had been made and advised all parties that [...] would reopen the bidding process on a competitive basis.  The three bidders filed complaints which were then consolidated.  The trial judge concluded that [...] had submitted the conforming bid and ordered specific performance in favor of [...], and deconsolidated the lawsuits.
[brief] THE EASTMAN REPORT IS AN IMPERMISSIBLE LEGAL OPINION THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN BARRED ALONG WITH EASTMAN'S TESTIMONY AT TRIAL (Pa131; 8T28:13)  [...] filed a motion *in limine* to bar [...]’s "title" expert [...]’s report as inadmissible legal opinion (Pa77).  Such a motion is used to preclude prejudicial or objectionable material before it is presented by the jury.  See, *Sculler v. Sculler*, 348 N.J. 374, 377 (Ch. Div. 2001).  *N.J.R.E.* 702 provides:
[brief] Nevertheless, the trial court found the evidence was not relevant because [...] was not opining whether defendant’s cocaine ingestion affected his driving and, thus, “any arguments the State might make to the jury would require the jury speculate what effect, if any, defendant’s cocaine ingestion had on his driving. ” (Pa32).  That finding inaccurately narrows the definition of what is relevant.  Of course, an opinion that affirmatively stating defendant’s cocaine ingestion affected his driving would be clearly relevant and probative; however, the absence of that opinion does not mean the subject opinion cannot still be relevant.
[brief] Jeffrey M. Brown Associates, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 414 N.J. Super. 160, 172 (App. Div.), quoting, 2 Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims Disputes: Interpretation of Important Policy Provisions § 11.30 at 11-469 (5th ed. 2007), certif. denied, 204 N.J 41 (2010).  Thus, the Law Division erroneously viewed the case from [...]'s contractual point of view as opposed to [...]'s insurance coverage perspective.  The contract documents, in fact, confirm the policies' "precedence" in these circumstances.  The regulations apply, and, even assuming they don't, [...] remained bound by the principles cited above, as well as its policy, to advise [...], in "specific and clear" terms that its coverage under the CCIP policies was cancelled --- much like the notice [...] admittedly provided to the [...] regarding [...]'s workers compensation policy.
[brief] “If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 (emphasis supplied).  According to the Schmidt Court, then, bodily injuries arising out of an intentional wrong are covered under an employer’s liability policy.  The Schmidt Court explained that the Legislature required employers to obtain insurance "to assure that this statutory remedy [of workers' compensation] given in lieu of a common law remedy is not illusory."
[brief] Defendants penalized [...] and imposed a two day penalty for not seeking permission to submit an abstract proposing to speak at the [...] Annual Convention on Safe Drinking Water and they prohibited [...] from speaking at the annual convention.  [...] had an interest as a citizen in speaking on matters of public concern.  [...]’s abstract to the [...] proposed a presentation on “capacity development” of water systems to promote “the long term viability of water supplies as well as providing information on the concrete daily steps an operator can take to initiate an infrastructure maintenance plan and recommend a variety of tools and reference materials that are available for a water system to provide competent utility stewardship.
[brief] 40  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 2C:3-7b .............................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 ............................................................................................  35  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) ....................................................................................  5, 35 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) ....................................................................................  5, 35 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a ..........................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b ..........................................................................................  5  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (2T:6-7 to 6-13).  [...] sentenced the defendant on this, his fifth DWI, to the fines and penalties required by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3): a $1,007 fine; $33 court costs; $50 VCCB; $225 DWI assessment; $75 SNSF; an eight-year driver’s license suspension; four-year ignition interlock installation thereafter; and 180 days jail.  (2T:7-8 to 7-13).  The State dismissed the remaining charges.  ¹ 1T refers to Transcript of Hearing, November 17, 2022.  ² 2T refers to Transcript of Hearing, January 26, 2023.  ³ 3T refers to Transcript of Municipal Court Appeal, August 14, 2023.  ⁴ 4T refers to Transcript of Municipal Court Appeal, December 7, 2023.  Defendant requested and [...] granted defendant a stay of sentence pending appeal.
[brief] *Perpetual contractual performance is not favored in the law and is to be avoided unless there is a clear manifestation that the parties intended it.  The documents themselves contain no words that would indicate such intent.*  (emphasis added)  The Court went on to state:  Ordinarily, if a contract contains no express terms as to its duration, it is terminable at will or after a reasonable time.  As is pointed out in the Restatement of Contracts, when parties to a contract have not agreed in respect of a term that is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term that is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.
[brief] Pa327 at para. 56.  In the Underlying Hokenson Action, plaintiffs’ objective was to “enjoin [[...], [...] and others] from actions that Plaintiffs allege to be self-dealing...”  Pa391 [...] agreed to defend [...] against the claims asserted in the Underlying Hokenson Action subject to detailed written reservations of rights dated March 5, 2020; March 17, 2020; and April 28, 2020.
[directive] N.J.S.A. et N.J.S.A. et [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  1.  Você e a promotoria celebraram algum acordo que prevê uma redução do período original da sentença ou do período original de desqualificação à liberdade condicional?  (Em caso positivo, não deixe de incluir nas perguntas 12 e 13 acima).  Have you and the Prosecutor entered into any agreement to provide for a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility than would otherwise be required?  (If yes, be sure to include in questions 12 and 13 above).
[brief] *N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(d)* provides:  No cancellation, other than a cancellation based upon nonpayment of premium or for moral hazard as defined in (f) below, shall be valid unless notice is mailed or delivered by the insurer to the insured, and to any person entitled to notice under the policy, not more than 120 days nor less than 30 days prior to the effective date of such cancellation.  [*Id.*]
[brief] ”  In North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 2:20-cv-20190-BRM-JSA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974 (D.N.J. Sep. 24, 2021) (Pa236), the District Court denied a debt buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss CFA claims against an assignee for failure to be licensed under the NJCFLA and collecting on the void debt.  In *Peralta v. Ragan*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234300, at *5-8* (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022) (Pa243), the District Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that defendant debt buyer’s failure to be licensed under the NJCFLA supported plaintiff’s claims for violations of the FDCPA.