ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Related Party Transaction Bill).  Third, here, like in *Cigna*, the Department is seeking to impose requirements on reciprocal exchanges and the respective AIFs that are based on a “yet to be expressed policy” regarding the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25.  Fourth, the guidelines unlawfully adopted by the Bulletin are not “expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization. ”  This is because the REA governs reciprocal exchanges, and it is contrary to the Department’s guidance.  Fifth, the Bulletin “constitutes a material and significant change” in the Department’s past position with respect to the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 and the provisions’ plain language.  Finally, the Bulletin “reflects a decision on the administrative regulatory policy in the nature of the interpretation of law” because it furthers a new procedure intended to apply to reciprocal exchanges and which it presumably asserts is in accordance with the REA.  Metromedia, at 331-32.  This is the embodiment of rulemaking that must comply with the APA.  Indeed, as many other cases reviewing agency overreach make clear, “[e]very agency action which qualifies as a rulemaking by the standards of Metromedia must conform with APA requirements.
[brief] While Plaintiff admits that the facts in Konitch are similar in many respects to the instant matter, Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should revisit the holding of Konitch in light of the particular circumstances raised by the instant matter.  Here, Defendant [...]’s shift had already started at 6:45 a.m. on the date of the fatal collision, which occurred at approximately 7:00 a.m.  See Da1057-8 (69:14-70:3); Pa1011 (23:5-13).  Thus, [...] was not where she was supposed to be and was not performing any work functions in the scope of her employment at the time of the crash.  [...] never even clocked into work on the day of the crash.  See Pa789 ([...]’s timesheet).  Thus, Defendant [...] did not work as a nurse or perform any professional duties at any time on October 6, 2021.  The Legislature cannot have intended to require the anomalous and unjust result that occurred here, in which a tortfeasor ([...]) who caused a fatal motor vehicle collision has escaped without any civil liability, when her conduct had no inherent relationship to her employment duties.  Likewise, the Legislature cannot have meant to completely immunize [...] from civil liability for her fatal negligence as a driver based on the fortuitous facts of where her negligent driving occurred and who she happened to hit.
[directive] The next court order)-----~ of date in this matter shall be (no later than days from date this 45 Directive# I 7-18 (11/01/2018), (Competency Published 12325 by 1B)  Order CN: of3 page 2  The written report submitted to by the qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist this to 8. shall not include opinion with respect whether the defendant was insane at the Cou1t an to N.J.S.A. of time the crime pursuant to 2C:4-l and/or whether the defendant suffered from a N.J.S.A. of mental disease or defect at the time the crime pursuant 2C:4-2; to court~--------------- [any additional conditions ordered by the as 9. of of
[brief] [...] Properly Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing [...]’s Complaint.  The Supreme Court’s ruling in K.S.B. Tech Sales and the creation of a statutory basis for municipalities to collect unpaid water charges in the same manner as tax liens are, as [...] correctly recognized, are fatal to [...]’s claims.  Pa952.  The latter eliminated the need that sparked creation of the legal fiction of municipal water service being a “proprietary” function.  And, the former made clear that fiction was no longer accepted as valid by New Jersey courts.  With no express or implied contract between [...] and [...], the Borough cannot possibly be liable to [...] for breach of contract, or for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  See Wade v. Kessler Inst., 343 N.J. Super. 338, 350-51 (App. Div. 2001) (finding breach of implied covenant claim is dependent on the existence of a contractual relationship); see also Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 443 (App. Div. 2006) (“In the absence of a contract, there can be no breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ”) (quoting Noye v. Hoffmann–La Roche Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430, 434 (App. Div. 1990)).
[brief] (4T151-24 to 153-5).  [...] expressed that he wanted to provide information about who was involved in [...]’s death.  (4T153-8 to 24).  [...] was uncuffed from a bench and escorted to a 10-by-15-foot interview room.  (4T154-12 to 156-21).  [...] appeared “fine” and was cooperative.  (4T154-17 to 20).  [...] made no promises or guarantees to [...] and told him to be honest.  (4T155-3 to 7).  Prior to [...]’s interview, the fact that [...] was shot in the head had not been made public.  (5T28-10 to 12).  2.
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[brief] Further, the office of the Attorney General, i.e., [...], DAG, should not make material misrepresentations so as to mislead the Court, which is of course, a violation of the Code of Professional Conduct for attorneys.  The Court erred in favoring the --- \(^2\)  At an “administrative review” in Oct., 2012, [...] improperly refused to consider Defendant’s evidence of full payment of all support due commencing Oct. 1, 1998, including bank statements and copies of cancelled checks.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, was involved in an unfortunate fall on March 9, 2020, when as a guest of Defendant-Appellee [...], while attempting to enter a Jacuzzi in her hotel room she lost her balance and fell injuring herself.  In attempting to prevent injury, [...] attempted to use a towel bar situated close by that was designed to only support towels.  Sadly it did not support [...].  A grab bar designed to support a person should could have been situated close by to enable a person to make a safe entry into the jacuzzi.  [...], MSCE, PE, a Professional Engineer agreed, and testified on behalf of [...] that the location of a towel bar created a hazardous condition given the design of the jacuzzi.  On January 5, 2024, the Trial Court granted Resort Casino’s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that [...]'s opinion was a net opinion.  This Appeal arises from that determination since an issue of material fact existed where competent evidential materials were presented and when viewed in the light most favorable to [...], was sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of her.  Especially where [...], in his testimony cites industry standards and codes that were violated by the lack of a grab bar, the presence of an improperly installed and placed towel bar, and a design that was in his opinion hazardous for guests when they attempted to enter the jacuzzi where [...] was unfortunately injured.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  [...] filed a Complaint against [...] on December 9, 2021.  (Pa10)  A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by [...] on December 4, 2023.  (Pa24)  Opposition to the Motion was filed on December 26, 2023.  (Pa83)  A letter brief reply to the Opposition was filed on December 29, 2023.  An oral argument was held on the Motion on January 5, 2024, and an Order granting [...] to deem the testimony of [...] as net opinion thereby granting Resorts Motion for Summary Judgment was issued.  (Pa1)  A Notice of Appeal was filed on February 12, 2024.
[brief] R. 1:1-2 provides that the Rules of Court “shall be construed to secure a just determination, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. ”  As the record below demonstrates, the Authority has not acted in bad faith, nor has it engaged in any fraudulent conduct, there was no evidence of mistake by either party, and the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement should therefore not be reformed as required by the Order.
[directive] All law enforcement agencies and hospitals operating within the state will be advised by the respective County Prosecutor’s Office in the county in which they operate that any case of nonfatal strangulation and/or smothering meeting established activation criteria are eligible for BREATHE Team services.  Agencies that will receive written BREATHE Team procedures will include, but not be limited to the following: 1.  All law enforcement agencies operating within the county boundaries; 2. All hospitals and emergency healthcare facilities operating within county boundaries; 3. All mental health/counseling agencies operating within the county boundaries; 4. All school administrators and school nurses operating within the county boundaries; 5. All college healthcare and counseling departments operating within the county boundaries; and 6.  All relevant state agency offices, including the [...], [...] and [...], [...] and [...], [...], [...], [...], and the [...].  BREATHE  Team activation procedures must be established and distributed to stakeholders at least one month prior to the full implementation of this Directive, and no later than December 1, 2023.
[directive] The objective of the first Standards was to improve the provision of services to sexual assault victims by coordinating the efforts of healthcare providers, confidential sexual violence advocates, and law enforcement.  In 2001, a permanent Attorney General Sexual Assault Response Team/Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SART/SANE1) Coordinating Council was established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:4B-50 to -60.  In 2003, at the Attorney General’s direction, the Coordinating Council created a subcommittee to review and revise the existing Standards.  The First Edition of the Standards, issued in 1998, created the foundation for a coordinated victim-centered approach.  The Second Edition of the Standards, issued in 2004, included best practices learned in the field.  This, the Third Edition, updates the Standards to address changes in the law and policy.  It also includes advances in evidence-based practices and incorporates experiences gained since 2004.
[brief] *Kiriakakis*, 235 N.J. at 442.  Defendant contends that [...] did not give reasons for finding aggravating factors 3 and 9.  Noting that he was fully familiar with the facts and circumstances of the case and had thoroughly reviewed the presentence report, [...] stated:  This case, really particularly troubling in light of the other matter for which this defendant was sentenced[.]  Looking at the presentence investigation and no involvement as a juvenile, one municipal court matter, this will be his second adult conviction.  The State has urged a number of Aggravating Factors 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9.
[brief] Del. Riverkeeper Network v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 463 N.J. Super. 96, 113 (App. Div. 2020) (“A reviewing court ‘must give . . . some deference to [an agency’s] interpretation of statutes and 6  Moreover, the individual permit review allowed DEP to review many aspects of its CZM rule that may not be reviewed by DEP if [...] was eligible for the Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit, including assessing impacts to endangered or threatened wildlife or vegetation species habitat, stormwater management, air quality, and traffic, and requiring adherence to CZM impervious cover limits. regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility. ” (quoting Utley v. Bd. of Rev., Dep’t of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008) (internal quotation omitted)).
[brief] *Riggs v. Long Beach*, 109 N.J. 601, 610-12 (1988).  Municipalities have no inherent land use power, but depend upon the legislative delegation of the State's police power.  *Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Asso.*, 86 N.J. 217, 226 (1981); *Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean*, 220 N.J. 239, 252-253 (2015).
[brief] POINT 2.  BREACH OF DUTY BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY.  When a Process Server falsely certifies on the Affidavit of Service that the Process of Service was performed, that is, the Complaint and the Summons as well as other documents had been served, he commits perjury, which is a crime.  When an Attorney files a false document, he commits fraud, which is a crime.  And, when a Co-Counsel Attorney knows and willfully conspires with others to hide these crimes, that’s a conspiracy, which is a crime.  It is the legal responsibility and duty of the Plaintiff’s Attorney to check, verify and vet all statements made on the document, submitted to the court, are true and that the submission to the court complies with current law.  Failure to do so is a Breach of Duty of Care by the Plaintiff’s Attorney that caused unjust harm to the defendants.  The New Jersey Supreme Court first definitively held that attorneys may be liable for legal malpractice claims brought by non-clients [Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472,479 (1995)].  (Note: The defendants HAVE NOT submitted any new evidence.
[brief] Defendants fail to acknowledge that Defendant [...] admitted to the jury that he violated the law in two ways: (1) he was speeding in excess of the speed limit, and (2) he did nothing to try to stop safely when he clearly saw the light change to yellow when he was approximately 200 feet from the intersection.  Again, he was about 200 feet away from the intersection when he observed the yellow/amber traffic signal.  3T149.  Defendant [...] also admitted that he was traveling in excess of the 55 MPH speed limit when he observed the yellow light.  3T147.  He further admitted that he made no effort to stop at the intersection nor did he slow at any point before entering the intersection.  3T149-150.  Defendant [...] "wanted to try to get through that light before it turned red."  3T150.  He did nothing to see if he could stop safely before getting to that intersection.  3T150.  This testimony undoubtedly led the jury to conclude that a reasonable driver in Defendant [...]’s position should have brought his vehicle to a stop at the intersection.  Certainly a reasonable inference is that he actually sped up to beat the light.  Indeed, the [...] vehicle spun 180 degrees before coming to rest as a result of the impact with [...]’s [...] van.  3T129.  A jury verdict that [...] was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident is well supported by the evidence presented to the jury.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ ii  LEGAL ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................................................  1 POINT  I.  Plaintiff Has Standing to Seek Statutory Damages for Defendant’s Violation of the FDCPA.  .........................................................  1 POINT II.  The Complaint Asserts an FDCPA Claim Based on Defendant’s Communication with a Third Party.............................  3  A.  Defendant’s FDCPA Violation is an Abusive Collection Practice......................................................................................  4  B.  The Senate Committee Report Does Not Change the Meaning of the Unambiguous Statutory Language.......................  5  C.  There is No Absurd Result from the FDCPA’s Bar Against Communicating with Outsiders...........................................  8  D.  Defendant’s Conduct is a Communication to a Person in Connection with the Collection of a Debt.  ...............................  9  E.  The Restricted Use of FCC Regulated Industries Does Not Imply Unrestricted Sharing of Information with Mail Vendors.  .........................................................................................  10  F.  Federal Agency Interpretations Are Not in Conflict with the Federal Court Decisions....................................................  12 G.  Persuasiveness of Federal Court Decisions.  ........................................  14  POINT III.  The Complaint Asserts an FDCPA Claim for Using False, Deceptive, or Misleading Representations.....................  15  CONCLUSION
[brief] “[W]here a case may rest upon opinion or expert testimony, a court should be particularly slow in granting summary judgment. ”  Ruvolo v. American Casualty Co., 39 N.J. 490, 500 (1963).  Defendant [...] tries to distinguish Davin and other cases on the Battle of the Experts question.  ([...] Brief at pp. 13-15).  Defendant [...] argues that the Davin court’s decision was based on a legal question of the propriety of a title search, and that the trial judge’s decision to grant summary judgment based on his own professional experience with the issue, does not translate to the present case.  The point of Davin, though, is that the judge did not let the jury decide which expert to believe, and instead adopted the defense expert’s opinion as being congruent with his own professional experience.  Likewise here, the trial court applied the Pareja doctrine and ruled in line with [...]’s opinion simply because of the existence of freezing rain, without consideration of the water infiltration or handrail issues.  That should be the jury’s job to decide.
[brief] Ibid.  The answer here to all three questions is a resounding yes.  As stated previously, the AIF fees are set forth in the POA signed individually by each new subscriber/policyholder as a pre-requisite to join the Exchange.  The subscriber’s rights and obligations, including the AIF fee are clearly set forth in the POA and freely agreed to by the subscribers.  If the individual subscriber does not agree to the POA/AIF Fee, he/she is free to decline coverage and seek insurance from another carrier.  Through the Bulletin, the Department seeks to impair the parties’ agreement (i.e., the POA) and the relationship established by that agreement so that it can control the profits of the AIF in blatant disregard of the contractual agreement between the subscriber and the AIF.
[brief] Respondent the State of New Jersey’s (“Respondent”) brief in response to this appeal (“Resp. Brief”) fails to adequately rebut the arguments contained in Appellant [...]’s (“Appellant”) brief in support of his appeal of his conviction and sentencing by the Law Division for allegedly driving while intoxicated in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (“App. Brief”).  First, Respondent’s argument that Patrolman [...] (“[...]”) had a reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to effect a stop of Appellant on the morning of November 5, 2019 is without merit.  Indeed, Respondent fails to address key testimony by [...] from the probable cause hearing conducted on February 25, 2022, which establishes that there was nothing sufficiently abnormal about Appellant’s situation on the morning of his arrest which would implicate the community caretaking function under the applicable case law.  Absent application of that function, there was no reasonable basis for [...] to even conduct a stop of Appellant in the first instance.
[directive] These General aze Attorney the to reports in these included be to data the of Much Offices.  Prosecutor's Other relevant the AOC. by maintained and generated be will electronically and stored already See, basis. ongoing periodic electronically, an on or Division the been to sent will have information (notification Section 7.10 denied), complaint-warrant for application 4.11(reportwhen Section ~, revocation for application when (notification Section 8.8 denied), detention pretrial for motion when the reporting to forms electronic provide will Director the necessary, be may As denied).  of release to information be other empirical and data any of collection the facilitate to Prosecutors County Judiciary by maintained the and generated not is that Section this to pursuant analyzed and compiled 82 Page reports/notifications. previously-supplied or databases from electronic available otherwise or Directive. of issuance this immediately upon operational Section become shall
[brief] (T.1 at 118:1-119:13).  Similarly, [...] in his trial testimony insisted that the reopening of the pizza parlor in May of 2020 resulted in a “3,000 percent increase in traffic. ”  (T.1 at 76:17-77:15)  Yet, when [...], the Oceanport Police Chief, was asked if his understanding concurred with Mr. Borja’s contention, he responded “I believe not. ”  While there may have been some increase in the volume of vehicles “nothing that [had] been brought to [his] attention of any significance. ” (T.3 at 7:25-8:10).  There was a complaint by the [...] of there being too many trucks continually servicing [...] and multiple pictures were presented into evidence, which are found in pages 145-153 of the Plaintiffs’ Appendix.  All the pictures, however, were from late 2019 and 2020, when [...] was first being refitted and restocked to reopen.  No pictures were presented from 2021 or 2022.  (T.1 at 79:8-80:1), and the purported “18 wheelers” do not service [...] tiny facility.  (T.1 at 123:21 – 124:14).  Significantly, despite the alleged increase in traffic and other annoyances, only the [...], the owners of one neighborhood residence, both brought suit and testified at trial.  If the conditions were so terrible, where were the others?  The presentation of the Appellants’ legal position regarding the two zoning issues was similarly skewed.
[brief] ”  1T69:18-20  [...] was then asked whether he had ever lied to a court, 1T69:25 to 70-1.  As counsel pressed, the court interjected, 1T70:13-15, asking whether there was a conviction involved – which was promptly shown.  1T70:20-23.  The court, however, quickly halted that line of questioning, even as Plaintiff’s counsel proffered two perjured affidavits of the Defendant.  1T73:4-23, 1T74:4-8.  P-17, P-18, P-19, Pa97-107.  Despite prior false statements under oath, the court rejected this as “bootstrapping”.  1T73:24.  Not only had [...] pleaded guilty to an --- 3
[brief] Finally, exception (b) applies here.  In defining fundamental injustice, courts look to whether the judicial system has provided the defendant with “fair proceedings leading to a just outcome. ”  Mitchell 126 N.J. at 587.  Fundamental injustice is found if the prosecution or judiciary abused the process under which defendant was convicted, or absent intentional abuse, if any “inadvertent errors mistakenly impacted a determination of guilt or otherwise ‘wrought a miscarriage of justice for the individual defendant. ’”  Ibid. (citations omitted).
[brief] (1T382-8)  However, the Court then awarded almost all of the fees going back to before the June 7, 2016 Order without explaining why or how doing so was necessary to “compel compliance with the Court’s Order” as it said [...] would justify.  Such an enormous award was in no way necessary, and the Court’s statement that the award was a “consequence” shows the intent was in fact to punish in addition to remediation of the violation.  R. 1:10-3 did not permit this enormous and punitive award.