ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] disregarded Plaintiffs’ reference to the Essex Vicinage decision as having no precedential value.  Pa149.  On December 1, 2023, [...] issued his order and opinion, having considered these same issues half of dozen times over the course of three (3) years and, again, concluded:  Pursuant to R. 4:10-3, this court grants the Defendants’ motion for a protective Order requiring the Plaintiff to submit to their IMEs without the use of a recording device or third-party observers, for the same reasons it compelled the Plaintiff to attend an IME without recording devices in its November 19, 2021 Order.  While that prior decision preceded Difiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 238 (2023), this Court finds that its prior order found that good cause existed to prohibit the use of recording devices and observers, as it would deprive the Defendants’ right to utilize the Expert of their choosing.  That reasoning is still sound.  Pa149.  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s representations, [...] clearly considered each of the factors discussed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, as each was thoroughly briefed by Plaintiff’s counsel in opposition to Defendant’s motion and each was set forth in the written Supreme Court opinion that was specifically cited by [...] in the above Order and Opinion.  Moreover, [...]’s adherence to the highest standards of practice should not be cavalierly discarded as "personal preference."  Defendants are entitled to a R.4:19 neuropsychological examination because plaintiff placed his neuropsychological condition at issue.  Defendant should be entitled to have that examination performed by a psychologist who practices in a manner consistent with the highest standards of practice.  [...] agreed that the concerns that weigh against recording now are the same reasons that supported [...]’s well-reasoned opinion back in 2021.  In both of his decisions, delivered after extensive briefing and multiple arguments, [...], contrary to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s assertions, fully considered the issues, including the fact that an interpreter was required, and concluded that there was good cause to prohibit recording of Defendants’ Rule 4:19 examination.  Pa149.  Plaintiff’s counsel’s suggestion that [...] failed to consider the factors discussed in the Supreme Court opinion is unwarranted speculation.  They are simply dissatisfied with his conclusion.  The Supreme Court unequivocally upheld the trial court’s discretion on this issue.  [...]’s decision should be upheld.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT'S RULING SHOULD STAND UNDISTURBED AS THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION, RENDERED A WELL JUSTIFIED OPINION AND NO INJUSTICE WILL OCCUR AS A RESULT THEREOF.
[brief] This matter was in its beginning stages when the Borough filed for summary judgment.  [...] filed its Answer on April 24, 2023, and filed its summary judgment motion just four months later on August 25, 2023.  Written discovery was still underway.  No depositions had taken place.  And, the court had not yet even held an initial case management conference.  This situation clearly is not even remotely like those in which courts found that it was too late to raise an affirmative defense.  POINT III
[directive] 8.0.7  Because the County Prosecutor is ultimately responsible for prosecuting criminal cases, the internal affairs investigator shall defer to the prosecutor’s supervision and direction in conducting officer interviews.  The investigator shall consult with the County Prosecutor prior to initiating an officer interview in matters that could involve criminal conduct, and shall pay particular attention to the County Prosecutor's instructions concerning the types of interviews to be conducted and procedures to be utilized (e.g., Miranda warning, Garrity warning,6 etc.).  8.0.8  Police officer interviews during an internal affairs investigation are rendered difficult by the conflict that exists between the officer's right against self-incrimination in criminal interviews and the obligation to answer questions truthfully during an administrative investigation.
[brief] Investigations that result in more serious discipline, like an officer's termination, resignation, reduction in rank, or suspension for a substantial period of time, favor disclosure.  Here, the nature of discipline imposed on [...] was extraordinarily serious because the Supreme Court ultimately ordered [...] "removed from judicial office and permanently barred from holding judicial office in this State."  The Supreme Court also suspended [...] from the practice of law for a period of three years.  In re [...], 249 N.J. 3 (2021).  (4) the nature of the official's position.  Wrongdoing by high-level officials can impair the work of the department as a whole, including the functioning of the internal affairs process; Here, [...] was the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Part of the Bergen County Vicinage of the Superior Court of New Jersey.  In other words, [...] was the top criminal judge in the most populous county in the state.  Prior to that, [...] was an assistant prosecutor for 15 years.  Consequently, in criminal charges involving a defendant-judge of this magnitude, it is likely that the individuals involved in the decision not to prosecute [...] were the highest-ranking officials in the [...].  (5) the individual's record of misconduct.  The public's interest in disclosure extends to all officers -- regardless of rank -- whose serious or repeated misconduct may pose a danger to the public.  [...]'s misconduct was prolific rather than isolated.  "[[...]]'s misrepresentations to [the police] were numerous and, in at least one instance, admitted. ”  “[[...]] repeated those false assertions, in one form or another, at every opportunity before the ACJC. ”  [...] further submitted fabricated and altered phone records to a three-judge Supreme Court panel.  While [...] has been removed from office, there is no question that dishonesty is in her nature and she will continue to pose a threat to the public whatever profession she pursues next.  3.  The Loigman factors weigh in favor of disclosure.  An evaluation of the Loigman factors further requires the disclosure of documents, including emails, concerning the [...]’s investigation and decision to decline to prosecute [...].
[brief] Furthermore, “[t]he admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. ”  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015).  The Appellate Division applies “an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court’s determination . . . to exclude expert testimony on unreliability grounds. ”  In re Accuane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 391 (2018).  “An abuse of discretion arises on demonstration of manifest error or injustice. ”  Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 N.J. 36, 57 (2019) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  An appellate court should “reverse an evidentiary ruling only if ‘was so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016)).  II.
[brief] THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER WISHING STONE’S KNOWN RESISTANCE TO THE BREEDING PROCESS FURNISHED REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE IT MAY CAUSE INJURY WHEN BEING LED INTO THE BREEDING SHED IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY  Jury Charge 5.60B alternatively provides that a jury may find an animal’s owner knew or should have known of a vicious or dangerous trait or propensity if the animal had a “habitual tendency” to do and act in a way that endangered the people around it.  Under this part of Jury Charge 5.60B, Defendants’ Brief correctly acknowledges that Plaintiffs’ claim for strict liability hinges on whether Defendants had actual or constructive notice of behavior by [...] that “posed a foreseeable danger. ”  Defendants’ Brief, p. 15.  The question of foreseeability, however, is overwhelmingly a fact question for the jury.  See Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 144 (1977); Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 419 (2014).  The Motion Court erred by usurping the jury’s role and making its own factual determination as to whether communications about [...]’s troublesome resistance to being collected gave notice that such behavior posed a reasonably foreseeable danger or, as the Motion Court improperly decided on its own, amounted to “mere skittishness. ” (Pa1086a).  But there are material issues of fact in dispute about the nature of [...]’s troublesome and resistant behavior.
[brief] Plaintiff’s application varied considerably from that denied in [...], in as much as she proposed a one-third reduction in building density, elimination of the additional breezeway and driveway, almost 60% reduction in square feet of land clearance; an increased western side-yard to enhance buffering and plantings, and adopted all suggestions from the City’s engineer regarding the septic system, seasonal water table, stormwater management, and road visibility concerns, and the joint expert recommendations, making the development conforming; and contrary to the court’s unsupported finding plaintiff’s proposal would destroy the secluded nature of the neighborhood, plaintiff’s lot is the last open lot in its seven-lot subdivision, adjacent to a 2,499-acre NJDEP property on two sides, and a five-acre homesite with a fully cleared front yard with a similar non-conforming setback.  Another significant error by the trial court was the acceptance of public lay objections although refuted by the expressed findings of the Pineland’s waiver and the testimony presented by joint experts, to mistakenly conclude: “Plaintiff seeks a variance to place improvements on what is, and what has always been, an unbuildable lot. ”  Following a thorough review of the record and application of the legal principles guiding plaintiff’s request, this court is asked to reverse the order of summary judgment, and vacate the [...].
[directive] [No]  [NA]  [Yes]  Do you understand that if you have plead guilty to, or have been found guilty on other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively?  12.  List any charges the prosecutor has agreed to recommend for dismissal: Ind./Acc./Compl.# Count Nature of Offense and Degree
[brief] T3:1-12:16.\(^8\)  On May 31, 2024, the Trial Court issued its decision disqualifying [...] and his law firm. Pa1.  On June 20, 2024, Respondents filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal.  PPa88.  On July 3, 2024, Petitioners filed opposition to Respondents’ Motion for Leave to Appeal, PPa91, and on the same date submitted [...]’s Certification via email to the Court for \textit{in camera} review pursuant to the Court’s instructions.  PPa92.  On July 9, 2024, the Court granted Respondents’ Motion for Leave to Appeal.
[brief] This case involves the trial court’s well-reasoned dismissal of a whistleblower action brought by a disgruntled former county counsel following the expiration of his three-year statutory term in office.  After his term expired, plaintiff filed a complaint under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq. (“CEPA”).  The trial court correctly granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that Plaintiff was neither an employee nor did he suffer a retaliatory action under CEPA.  The trial court also correctly denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on the employee/independent contractor issue.  On appeal, Plaintiff argues that he was an employee as a matter of law.  Contrary to his claims, the trial court correctly applied the applicable factor test and found Plaintiff to be an independent contractor.  This was based upon numerous considerations, including that Plaintiff: 1) was an attorney not subject to the control of his employer, 2) was hired under an RFP for part-time legal services that allowed him to maintain a private legal practice, 3) was paid through his law firm, 4) did not receive employee benefits, and 5) was hired pursuant to an RFP which specifically provided that Plaintiff “will not be hired as an employee, or receive a salary or benefits. ”  On appeal, Plaintiff raises nuanced arguments concerning the Rules of Professional Conduct, the purported employer control of in-house attorneys, factual claims about his status through an improper self-serving certification, and his passing up of legal work due to County conflicts.  This brief will outline how each of these arguments are unavailing.  Plaintiff also incorrectly claims that his non-renewal constituted the “discharge,” “suspension,” “demotion,” or “terminat[ion]” required to be a retaliatory action under CEPA.  The trial court correctly concluded that the lapse of Plaintiff’s statutory term was not an adverse employment action or hostile work environment.  Plaintiff promotes a case involving a non-tenured school teacher, claiming it stands for the proposition that non-renewals can be justiciable under CEPA.  However, that case does not even make that holding, and the more analogous case involved our Supreme Court’s dismissal of a CEPA claim brought by a county prosecutor, who is similarly a statutory officer with a term in office.  For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a valid CEPA claim, and the Law Division should be affirmed.
[brief] On February 24, 2023, at approximately 1:20 a.m. Sergeant [...] of the [...] was on patrol traveling northbound on Route 9 when he noticed two other patrol vehicles stopped along the right shoulder of the road blocking two lanes of traffic.  Borriello then observed a black Audi driven by defendant approaching the vehicles at a high rate of speed.  When the Audi failed to slow down or move over, Borriello activated his mobile video recorder (MVR) and stopped defendant’s vehicle.  When defendant rolled down his window, Borriello detected an odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath and noticed his eyes were glassy and bloodshot.  Defendant then placed gum in his mouth which further aroused Borriello’s suspicion.  When Borriello asked defendant where he was coming from, defendant replied, [...]; when asked how much he had to drink, defendant claimed to have consumed only one beer.  Borriello asked defendant to get out of the car and perform field sobriety tests.  Defendant’s performance on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test indicated impairment.  On the walk-and-turn test, defendant failed to maintain the starting position and failed to follow other instructions as to number of steps and manner of turning.  On the one-leg stand, defendant again failed to follow instructions and was placed under arrest for DWI.  Although, Sgt. Borriello’s arrest report indicates that, after defendant’s arrest, he was taken to the police station, read the Attorney General’s Standard Statement (Standard Statement) and refused to provide samples of his breath, there was no testimony as to that or anything that occurred after defendant was placed under arrest.  Defendant was charged with DWI, failure to provide a breath sample, traffic on marked lanes and reckless driving.  Trial began before the municipal court on July 12, 2023.
[directive] 11- 11-3  D Instructions For Completion of Form Sizure 5 - - Form E Currency Report 4  United States - 10- Form F  Reailocation Property Services 3 p p . of or 2  10- 10-3  Forms of Reallocations Guide  Equitable Sharinq of Federallv Forfeited Propertv for to 1994 State and Local Law Enforcement Aqencies (March or 2 1 - current edition); [...] & Guide to Equitable Sharinq Foreiqn Countries Federal, for - Law 1996 State and Local Enforcement Aqencies (October 1 - 2 currerit edition); [...] or * 7 2 - 2:7
[brief] On April 21, 2021 [...] and her two young daughters entrusted an Uber driver, [...], to transport them to an appointment with the children’s pediatrician.  [Pa 425].  Instead, the Uber driver decided to pay more attention to his cell phone rather than the road, and rammed the Uber vehicle into a truck belonging to [...] operated by [...], causing the Uber vehicle to flip upside down.  Mother and children were injured in the accident.  [Pa 425].  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Plaintiffs therein filed suit in Superior Court in November 1998, and the parties engaged in discovery that lasted until 2003.  In May 2002, defendants moved to stay the lawsuit and to compel arbitration, but withdrew that motion before it was heard.  The trial court, on the return date of summary judgment motions filed in 2003, sua sponte ordered binding arbitration in accordance with their contracts, to which both parties objected on the basis that arbitration had been waived.  Neither party appealed, and a 16 day AAA arbitration hearing was subsequently held, resulting in an award.  The Appellate Division held that the trial court's order directing the parties to arbitration was improper because the parties had mutually waived arbitration, and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.
[brief] Rather, a court should simply be satisfied that the expert has a basis in knowledge, skill, education, training, or experience to be able to form an opinion that can aid the jury on a subject that is beyond its ken.  See *Kelly*, supra, 97 N.J. at 208.  In the present case, in accordance with the above standards for the qualification of experts, the trial court properly qualified [...] as an expert in the fields of civil engineering, forensics engineering and human factors, finding “he has sufficient experience, qualifications, training and education and society memberships in this case”, based on his testimony, to be so qualified and leaving it “to cross examination and to the jury itself at the end of the day to comment on which expert they wish to believe and why.
[directive] A person who uses or possesses property with the consent or of knowledge of the owner is deemed to be the agent of the owner for purposes this chapter.  c.  Property seized under this chapter shall not be subject to forfeiture if the property is seized while entrusted to a person by the owner or the agent of the owner when the property has been entrusted to the person for repairs, restoration or other services to be performed on the property, and that person, without the owner's knowledge or consent, uses the property for unlawful purposes.  L. L. L. 1978, c. 95, s. 2C:64-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
[brief] As set forth in Landlord’s Initial Brief, Tenant’s argument that Landlord’s Fee Award should be vacated and Tenant should be awarded its legal fees fails for three (3) separate reasons: (i) Tenant is precluded from asserting this argument because it was not raised in the Underlying Action; (ii) Tenant is judicially estopped from raising this argument because it admitted in the Underlying Action that it was required to pay Landlord’s legal fees and costs due to the Events of Default; and (iii) Tenant is not entitled to legal fees under the express terms of the Lease.  (Pb 52-56).  Landlord respectfully refers this Court to its Initial Brief for a full recitation of these arguments.  Id.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (1T31:4-6).  Plaintiff knew about [...] around February of 2018, a few months after its formation date (1T50:6-9).  Before the [...] sale of [...], and before [...] was operating, Defendant had talked to Plaintiff about the potential work schedules as between the two.  (T3112:4-113:1; T3128:23-129:1).  Plaintiff did not object to Defendant’s opening of [...].  (3T113:8-10).  Plaintiff repeats, at page 36 of his brief, alleged acts of Defendant in that he alleges she deliberately concealed books and records, transferred assets from the company’s checking account unrelated to business, withdraw monies for her personal use, failed to pay Plaintiff his fair share of profits, failed to keep accurate records, paid herself an excessive\(^1\) and unjustified salary, and that she unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective economic advantages by forming [...] to operate [...].
[brief] (Aa7-8).  Chapter 67 incorporates a similar calculation as that used in the FY2019 Appropriations Act, defining a “state aid differential,” which is a measure of how overfunded or underfunded a district is, and using it to calculate gains and losses to districts.  Compare L. 2018, c. 53 and 54 with L. 2018, c. 67, §§ 1, 3, 4(a), 4(b), 4(d).  Districts with a positive State aid differential (i.e., overfunded districts) receive a reduction in State aid equal to a gradually increasing percentage of the State aid differential, from a 13% decrease in the State aid differential in the 2019-20 school year, to a 100% decrease in the differential in the 2024-25 school year.  L. 2018, c. 67, §4(b); N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68(b).  Chapter 67 also provides that districts that are underfunded shall receive a proportionate share of the excess aid that was recaptured from overfunded districts.  See, L. 2018, c. 67, §4(a); N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68(a).  In FY2020, [...] was overfunded — meaning that it had a positive State aid differential (its prior year K-12 aid of $406,904,292 exceeded its prior year uncapped aid of $236,126,258 as calculated under the SFRA formula) — and thus it experienced a 13% reduction in its State aid differential, which amounted to $27 million.  (Aa1109; Aa1459; Aa1872).