ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] All inferences of doubt are to be drawn against the moving party and in favor of the opponent of the motion. ”  Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488, 494 (App. Div. 1994).  “If there is the slightest doubt as to the existence of a material issue of fact, the motion should be denied. ”  Id. (citations omitted).  Here, as set forth in detail below, the trial court erroneously construed the evidence in favor of the moving parties and failed to recognize that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant [...]. B.
[brief] But expert testimony is not required simply because one can explain a matter scientifically. ”  Id. at 516 (emphasis added).  The Court went on to state:  As [...] necessarily conceded before us, GPS technology is pervasive and generally reliable.  Courts have recognized the reliability of GPS technology in other contexts.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that smart phones equipped with GPS devices are accurate enough to determine real time traffic conditions); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (D. Md. 2011) (recognizing that GPS technology would permit law enforcement to track suspects "within ten meters or less").
[brief] 1.  Enhanced Recreational Opportunities  By acquiring land more suited for parks, trails, and recreational facilities, the Township directly responds to the community's need for accessible and diverse recreational options.  This exchange ensures that residents have ample space for outdoor activities, contributing to the overall health and wellness of the community.  The creation or expansion of public parks and recreational areas fosters a sense of community, encourages physical activity, and provides a sanctuary for residents to enjoy nature.  2.  Environmental Preservation  The properties acquired through the exchange are selected based on their ecological value, offering opportunities for habitat conservation, biodiversity preservation, and the protection of water resources.  By prioritizing lands with significant environmental attributes, [...] commits to the stewardship of its natural resources, ensuring these lands are preserved for future generations.  This strategic conservation effort aligns with broader environmental goals, including climate resilience and the mitigation of urban sprawl.  3.  Strategic Urban Planning  The land exchange facilitates smarter urban planning by allowing the Township to direct development in a manner that balances growth with conservation.  Through this arrangement, [...] can ensure that development occurs in areas best suited for it while preserving critical open spaces.  This approach to urban planning enhances the livability of the Township, reduces environmental impact, and supports sustainable growth patterns.  4.  Community Engagement and Public Support
[brief] Preliminarily, [...]’s brief misstates several important facts in this section.  First, [...] asserts the Court issued an order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to file a Second Amended Complaint after “indicating that the Court believed the proposed amended complaint attempted to introduce new causes of action. ” (Db37).  In reality, the Court’s written order denied the motion to amend “for the reasons set forth on the record on July 8, 2021. ” (Da550).  That record makes it clear that although [...] originally assumed Plaintiffs were adding new causes of action, he ultimately denied the motion for a different reason entirely: An amendment was not necessary because Plaintiffs were not introducing new causes of action, but only clarifying which parts of the CFA and the RETA they intended to allege.  (21T13:19-15:15).  Second, [...] erroneously asserts that at the June 29, 2022, pretrial conference “[...] objected” to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint being introduced at trial.  (Db37).  The record shows the opposite.  When asked about whether [...] opposed Plaintiffs’ plan to introduce at trial evidence of the violations alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, [...]’s counsel responded, “I don’t know if I really oppose it. ”  [...]’s counsel then explained that [...] intended to defend against the allegations as technical violations only.  (4T13:14-14:3).  Indeed, over five pages of Defendant’s Pretrial Memorandum filed on June 26, 2022, were dedicated to addressing each code violation.  (Da1125-1130).  At the end of the pretrial conference, [...] reiterated three times on the record that [...] was not objecting to introduction of evidence of allegations in the Second Amended Complaint.  (4T14:15-15:2).  R. 2:10-2 states:  Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.  The “[f]ailure to make a timely objection indicates that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made,” and it “also deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action. ”  Jackowitz v. Lang, 408 N.J.Super. 495, 505 (App.Div.2009) (quoting from State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999)).  To warrant reversal and entitlement to a new trial, the plain error must have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  *T.L. v. Goldberg*, 238 N.J. 218, 232 (2019).  [...] acknowledged it was aware of and ready to defend against the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and that it would not object to evidence of these violations.  Reversal is only appropriate if admission of this evidence was plain error that produced an unjust result.  Defendant does not argue plain error because it cannot show any.
[brief] (A)  IMPOSITION OF BASE SENTENCES IN EXCESS OF THE STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED  MINIMUM  30 YEAR SENTENCE ON THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR FELONY MURDER ON COUNT TWO, AND IN EXCESS OF THE STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED  MINIMUM  10 YEAR SENTENCES ON THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR ROBBERY AND KIDNAPPING ON COUNTS THREE, FOUR, EIGHT, AND NINE, CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS PRESENT.  (B)  *5  CONSECUTIVE TERMS ON THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR ROBBERY AND KIDNAPPING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED.  (C)  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION  THE “REAL TIME” CONSEQUENCES OF THE MANDATORY NERA PERIODS OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY.  In his pro se supplemental brief, [...] argues:
[brief] B.  Under both the Federal Arbitration Act [9 U.S.C. secs. 1-307] and the New Jersey Arbitration Act [2A:23B-1 to 36]  Arbitration is Fundamentally a Matter of Contract.  Defendants [...] ([...] Defendant Brief to be referred to as “ADb”) (ADb15) and [...] ([...] Defendant Brief to be referred to as “IDb”) (IDb21) argue again that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and New Jersey Arbitration Act (“NJAA”) require enforcement of the arbitration and waiver provisions at issue in this appeal.  Nothing in this record supports an argument that [...]’s Contract is on “unequal footing” with any other contracts.  Skuse v. Pfizer, 244 N.J. 30 (2020).
[brief] Schools should not socially transition students in secret from their parents.  Based on these considerations, schools should not socially transition minors “without consultation with parents and appropriate professionals. ”  ACa31 ¶ 42.  Indeed, no professional body “has endorsed school-facilitated social transition of minors without parental [involvement].”  ACa46-ACa47 ¶ 81.  School policies “excluding parental involvement [in the decision whether to socially transition their child are] contrary to widely accepted mental health principles and practice” and are “likely to lead to student harm. ”  ACa47, ACa49 ¶¶ 82, 86.
[brief] Div. 1961).....................................  7  Vander Gfoef v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 32 N.J. Super 365 (App. Div. 1954).  .................................................................  12  Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem., 240 N.J. Super 289 (App. Div. 1990).......................................................................  19  Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2 (1991).....................................  9  Rules of Court: R. 4:46-2 ..................................................................................
[directive] If a firearm is determined not to be serviceable, either prior to or during its use, the supervising firearms instructor shall not allow the firearm to be used.  The supervising instructor shall require the agency or department or the individual, in the case of an off-duty weapon, to furnish a serviceable replacement.  A report must be filed by the supervising instructor with the agency or department indicating why the firearm was unserviceable and what action was taken to correct the problem.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...] TEAM 2  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION  MIDDLESEX COUNTY DOCKET  No. [...] SAT BELOW:  HON.  [...], J.S.C. REPLY AND RESPONSE  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE, [...] (F/K/A [...])
[brief] On June 2, 2022, Respondent [...] (“[...]”) filed a multi-permit application for Freshwater Wetlands General Permits Nos. 1, 7, 10A, and 11, Freshwater Wetland Transition Area Averaging Plan Waiver, Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit.  (Aa3381-Aa3385).  On June 16, 2022, Appellant  [...] (“[...]”) submitted a public comment to Respondent [...] (“[...]”) on the pending application.  (Aa95-Aa131).  On June 30, 2022, the [...] issued a deficiency letter to [...].  (Aa124-Aa126).  On July 18, 2022, the [...] issued a second deficiency memo to [...].  (Aa127-Aa131).  On July 21, 2022, [...] submitted a supplemental public comment to the [...].  (Aa137-Aa148).  On November 16, 2022, [...] submitted revised application materials.  (Aa3387-Aa3391).  On December 14, 2022, [...] submitted a supplemental public comment to the [...].  (Aa195-Aa200).  On February 8, 2023, [...] submitted revised application materials.  (Aa3395-Aa3399).  On March 14, 2023, [...] --- 1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are inextricably interwoven and, therefore, are presented together herein.  withdrew the application for Flood Hazard Area Verification, Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit.  (Aa3400).  On April 17, 2023, [...] submitted a revised multi-permit application.  (Aa0263-Aa2509).  On May 10, 2023, [...] submitted a supplemental public comment.  (Aa2521-Aa2537).  On June 26, 2023, the [...] held a public hearing regarding the release of conservation restriction on the subject property.  (Aa3412).  Members of the public submitted public comments in response to the request for release of conservation restrictions on the subject property.  (Aa3413-Aa3418).  On July 11, 2023, [...] submitted a public comment in response to the request for release of conservation restrictions on the subject property.  (Aa2546-Aa2633).  On August 10, 2023, the [...] issued a Certificate granting the release of conservation restriction on the subject property (Aa2986-Aa3021).  On August 14, 2023, [...] submitted additional revised application materials.  (Aa3091-Aa3373).  On August 14, 2023, the [...] issued a Flood Hazard Area Verification & Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit, [...], [...] (“FHA Permit”).  (Aa1-Aa45).  On September 28, 2023, [...] timely filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Aa3374-Aa3377).  On March 4, 2024, the [...] filed the Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal.
[directive] A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to supervise operations of the Department of Law and Public Safety.  This Directive imposes limitations that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  Severability.
[brief] The Unit was not the investment Unit 11 is not an “investment unit. ”  [...]’s expert testified that he could not find any comparable properties because “rarely does a rent controlled property sell to an investor. ”  1T63:13-14.  This unit would be an imprudent rental investment unless bought at a discounted price, knowing that it has to be renovated and that it has a tenant in place.  [...] made a fair return on its investment
[brief] Moreover, “a sentencing court must consider not only the factors in [State v.] Yarbough[, 100 N.J. 627 (1985),] but also those in Miller when it decides whether to impose consecutive sentences on a juvenile which may result in a lengthy period of parole ineligibility. ”  Id.  [...] further stated that in light of the “overriding importance” of Miller, “we direct trial judges to exercise a heightened level of care before imposing multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles. ”  Id.  It is against this backdrop that the Court must evaluate [...]’s sentence.
[directive] No. June Directive Rev. 1996 19, 4 of Page 7 10 in person or mailed  The monies can be delivered to the:  [...]  [...]  Attn: Revenue Desk  Specific documentation to identify the check or other negotiable instrument must accompany the submission.  Such documentation must include a seizure number, Agency Class Code, an indication whether the cash represents a seizure or a cost bond, a contact person and phone number of submitting office.  The Deposit Information form, Attachment A, should accompany the transmission of the monies.  IV.  DEPOSIT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
[brief] ”  [Id. at 49 (Emphasis added.)].  A careful review of the State’s brief indicates that only four of its 49-page total, and only four of its 21-page Argument deal with legal argumentation.  The main legal discussion relates to the appellants’ argument that this court might shift to the State the burden of proving that SFRA is constitutional as applied to LSD because the Lakewood public school students have joined the Abbott/SDA students as the only ones in the state to have been definitively adjudicated as being denied their fundamental constitutional rights to T&E.  This is hardly a do-or-die point—although we believe that our position and not the State’s, is the sounder one.\textsuperscript{4}
[brief] We recognize the Planning Board's resolution disallows the hotel to be used as a "wedding hall."  But that does not prevent other very large gatherings from being held at the banquet facility, such as fund-raising dinners, political events, galas, retirement dinners and anniversary parties, and so on.  The banquet facility was a material aspect of the application that needed to be mentioned in the notice, regardless of the change in the ordinance's definition of a hotel.  It is also concerning that the notice enumerates seven other activities that are specifically permitted for a "hotel," but conspicuously omits mention of a banquet facility.  At oral argument on appeal, counsel for [...] candidly acknowledged the omission was not inadvertent.  [...] presents no justification for why the public specified the hotel would have meeting rooms, a food prep area/kitchen, lounge, bar area, dining area, pool, and exercise room, but did not mention a banquet facility.  Surely a banquet facility would have a far greater potential impact on site parking and traffic than, say, an exercise room.  The exclusion of the banquet facility made the notice materially defective.  Hence, consistent with the requirements of the MLUL and case law, we must reverse the trial court and vacate the approvals.....
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For all the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully requests that this Court: (1) reverse and vacate the trial court’s Orders for summary judgment of April 6, 2023 against [...] and February 23, 2024 against [...]; and (2) remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorney for Third-Party Defendant-Appellant [...] Property & Casualty Inc.  /s/ [...]  DAVID M. KUPFER, ESQ.  Dated: August 29, 2024  [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...] TRANSPORT, LLC and [...], Defendants, And [...] TRANSPORT, LLC, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff, v. [...], Third-Party Defendant/Appellant.
[directive] [...] [...]  [...] [...] [...]  3rd  Wednesday [...] [...] [...]  1st & 3rd  Wednesday 2nd, 3rd, & 4th  [...] [...] [...]  Tuesday [...] [...] [...]  2nd & 4th  Wednesday 2nd & 4th Tuesday [...] [...] [...] (Shared Servies)  [...] [...] 2nd  Tuesday [...] [...] [...]  2nd, 3rd, & 4th [...] [...] [...]  Tuesday [...] [...] [...], ext. Thursdays (Shared Services)  [...] [...] 1 (Shared Services)  [...] [...] [...], ext. [...] [...]  2nd & 4th Monday 167 1st, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th  [...] [...] [...]  Thursday 1st Monday [...] [...] [...] (Shared Services)  [...] [...]  **COURT HELD IN [...] [...] [...]  [...]**  Wednesdays [...] [...] [...]  Mondays 1st, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th  [...] [...] [...]  Tuesday; 2nd & 4th Wednesday  [...] [...] [...]  4th Wednesday (Shared Services)  [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]  2nd & 4th Monday [...] [...] [...]  2nd & 4th Thursday [...], ext. [...] [...]  2nd & 4th Wednesday 2  [...] [...] [...]  Mondays [...] [...] [...]  Tuesdays [...] [...] [...]  2nd & 4th Monday (Shared Services)  [...] [...]  [...] [...]
[brief] See (Db37-39); (Da118).  That final claim is incorrect: the trial court did not abuse its discretion in crafting this careful injunction.  As an initial matter, the trial court’s injunction fell comfortably within its legal authority.  Courts, of course, have both the authority to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of an unlawful policy and the authority to restore the status quo ante.  See Crowe, 90 N.J. at 134; Waste Mgmt., 399 N.J. Super. at 520 (noting that “a less rigid” standard governs where “the interlocutory injunction is merely designed to preserve the status quo”).  But the underlying law here goes further.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 clarifies not only that the Attorney General and the Director may obtain a court order “prohibiting” the defendant from “continuing” in their unlawful “practices,” but also that Attorney General and the Director may obtain relief to prohibit parties from “doing any acts in furtherance” of discrimination, to “prevent” future LAD “violations or “attempts to violate” the law, to “compel compliance” with the LAD, and to restrict “attempts to interfere with or impede the enforcement” of the LAD more generally.  That broad language thus entitles the State to seek, and the court to award, injunctive relief that not only restrains an ongoing LAD violation but prevents that actor’s prospective ones.  There is a good reason for that sweeping authority: it protects the integrity and effectiveness of the administrative process the Legislature established, and the Division’s ability to vindicate the rights the LAD protects.
[brief] Gittleman v. Central Jersey Bank Trust Co., 103 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.J. 503 (1968)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28  Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960), aff'd o.b. 33 N.J. 78 (1960)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19  Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6 (2008)
[brief] As a result, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  Ibid.  The original version of the statute required motorists to meet a $1500 medical-expense threshold in order to sue for noneconomic damages, and a 1988 amendment to the statute changed the requirement to a verbal threshold.  Id. at 469-70.  In 1997, the Legislature amended the statute to its current form, creating a complete bar to recovery for certain motorists, including those who operate an automobile without having medical expense benefits coverage.  Id. at 470.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff, vs. [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10 & ABC CORPORATIONS  1-10, Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] The track that led to the judgment here can be summarized as follows:  1.  A complaint was filed that alleged plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of transactions that they did not authorize.  2.  Plaintiffs did not testify the transactions were unauthorized.  3.  Plaintiffs’ expert accepted as true the allegation of the complaint – unsupported by record evidence - that the transactions were not authorized.  Notwithstanding this lack of foundation, and based on this assumption, Plaintiffs’ expert identified certain transactions that were improper because they were not supposedly authorized by plaintiffs.  This conclusion was bootstrapped solely by the expert’s own assumptions.  4.  The trial court concluded – based upon the experts’ conclusions unsupported by evidential foundation and based only on assumption - that plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of transactions they did not authorize.  Plaintiffs’ insuperable problem here is that [...] never said he did not authorize these transactions.  As a result, the justification for the judgment, on the causes of action asserted, is no more than a logical fallacy.  The judgment is unsupported in the record.
[brief] Order to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice dated March 12, 2024  Pa34  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  “The student could be considered for admission into the MBA program once they are no longer under academic probation within their primary (Pharm D) program. ” (Pa463-Pa464)  “[Plaintiff] scheduled a meeting with me on Monday.  I will inform him that he should get himself off the academic probation list, before he will be authorized to take MBA courses. ”  (Pa462)  [...] (“[...]”), Interim Dean of the College of Business, on August 1, 2013, days prior to Plaintiff commencing his second year of classes.  Yet, once Plaintiff was off academic probation and attained a GPA above 3.0, he was denied entry into the master’s track.  Ultimately, Plaintiff graduated with a 3.2 GPA.  Throughout [...]’s (“[...]” or “Defendant”) Amended Brief in Opposition and Cross-Appeal, Defendant failed to address the clear misrepresentations and omissions of fact alleged by Appellant/Cross-Respondent, [...] (“Appellant” or “Plaintiff”).
[brief] On March 17, 2015, [...] filed an application with the [...] ([...]) requesting two zoning variances and a site plan approval to construct a regulator station at [...] which is located next to the site that is at issue in this appeal.  (Aa414; 1  Because they are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  On December 7, 2016, the [...] denied [...]’s application regarding the [...] location.  (Aa413; Aa792).  Consequently, on January 11, 2017, [...] filed a petition with the [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, seeking a determination that the construction of the regulator station at [...] is “reasonably necessary for the service, convenience, or welfare of the public, and that the zoning and land-use ordinance of the municipality and its county shall have no application thereto.
[brief] Respondents’ reliance on *Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic County Sewerage Auth.*, 67 N.J. 403 (1975), is misguided because the case does not stand for the proposition that it is cited.  Nowhere in that case did the court permit a public entity to consider the impact of an alleged defect on bid price when considering whether it is waivable or not.  Rather, the court simply restated the public bidding principles prohibiting waiver of a material defect where doing so would become a vehicle for corruption, favoritism or “affect the amount of any bid. ”  Id. at 412.  Since there is no dispute that [...]’s designation of a non-PWCRA registered archaeologist “affected its bid” by reducing its cost, there is similarly no question that waiving this requirement (that use a PWCRA-registered archaeologist) is anticompetitive. \(^3\)  **CONCLUSION**