ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To satisfy this requirement, a trial judge “need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters. ”  Franzoni v.  Franzoni, 60 N.J. Super. 519, 522 (App. Div. 1960); Connell v. Connell, A-5645-06T3, 2008 WL 2901855, *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 30, 2008) (unpublished) (same).  In this regard, a trial judge need not address all the evidence presented when rendering a decision.  See Geffner v. Geffner, A-2896-08T2, 2011 WL 2314743, *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 11, 2011) (unpublished) (“The court was not required to address all evidence that was presented in this lengthy proceeding.  The judge clearly explained the evidence he relied upon to support his decision, and failure to discuss evidence supporting arguments does not, in and of itself, render the judge's findings inadequate under Rule 1:7–4. ”).  Indeed, the purpose of Rule 1:7-4(a) is to ensure that the litigants and reviewing court are apprised of the basis of the trial court’s decision.  Geffner, 2011 WL 2314743 at *8.  Here, [...] fully complied with Rule 1:7-4(a) when issuing the Post Trial Order and Reconsideration Order.
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[brief] So too here.  When Toms River officers stopped defendant’s vehicle, they did so pursuant to a judicially-authorized Toms River search warrant issued upon probable cause, even though it was executed within the territorial jurisdiction of Lakewood.  Following the search of defendant’s vehicle, the same Toms River police officers obtained defendant’s consent to search his residence located in Lakewood, which they subsequently searched.  Any error related to the jurisdictional authority of the officers when executing the search warrant and consent-to-search, if error at all, was simply ministerial.  Because ministerial violations do not affect defendant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule does not operate to keep such probative evidence from the fact-finder.  [...] and [...] properly concluded so, which this Court should affirm.
[brief] Third-party-guilt evidence is admissible so long as "the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State's case."  *State v. Perry*, 225 N.J. 222, 238 (2016) (quoting *State v. Cotto*, 182 N.J. 316, 332 (2005)); see *State v. Fortin*, 178 N.J. 540, 591 (2004); *State v. Sturdivant*, 31 N.J. 165, 179 (1959).
[brief] See fn. 16 above.}  [...] and [...] are constrained to point out, however, that plaintiff twice states as a fact that [...] and [...] “dissolved [...] and withdrew all funds from the [...] accounts”, while plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was pending.  Pb22, 38.  Plaintiff cites the Trial Court’s Opinion on reconsideration as support for this assertion, but it provides none.  See, generally, Pa66.  In fact, these assertions completely lack factual support in the record, and [...] and [...] did not dissolve [...].  See, Da56; see also, Da59a.  Even if dissolution had occurred, plaintiff did not seek a stay of the Trial Court’s original Judgment, so dissolution would not have been inappropriate.  V.  THE TRIAL COURT’S ACTIONS DURING TRIAL DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS TO ATTACK ITS JUDGMENT
[brief] On April 23, 2022, at 7:33 p.m., [...] and [...] parked their red Mercedes-Benz E350 bearing NJ registration [REDACTED] (“Mercedes”) at the Parador Rojo restaurant on Morris Avenue in Elizabeth to pick up a food order.  (Ca34).  While waiting, the black Audi Q5 stolen on April 20 (“Audi”) pulled up in front of their vehicle, blocking them in.  (Ca34).  Two males wearing masks and hoods exited the Audi and ordered Salas and Toro out of their vehicle at gunpoint.  (Ca34).  They demanded the victims’ car, their cell phones, and their belongings.  The victims turned over two cell phones and $1704.  (Ca34 to 35).  One of the suspects entered the driver’s seat of the --- 2  Although not cited in the State’s Omnibus Motion below, an additional police report, which was provided to defense in discovery, states that detectives also observed a photograph posted on [...]’s Instagram account showing [...] standing on a bench on the MLK Drive/Virginia Avenue Light Rail Station wearing the same clothing as during the robbery.  A subsequent review of CCTV footage showed three individuals wearing the same clothing as the actors from the armed robbery at a station, approximately one-half mile from the parking lot where the robbery occurred, approximately 30 minutes before the robbery.  The CCTV recorded in color and provided a better view of the actors’ clothing, including the distinct red and black sneakers defendant posted in several Instagram stories.  (Ca44).  Mercedes as the other got in the driver seat of the Audi and left the parking lot, heading southbound on Morris Avenue.  (Ca35).  Salas and Toro called 911 and Elizabeth police officers responded to the scene.  (Ca34 to 43).  A multi-jurisdictional investigation resulted.  Police monitored the Mercedes as it drove erratically, ending up in Jersey City at 10:30 p.m.  Jersey City police responded to the area where defendant abandoned the Mercedes.  (Ca34 to 35).  Officer [...] saw a dark-skinned male wearing all black and a ski-mask.  (Ca51).  The male was holding his waistband and jogging away from the area where the red Mercedes was reportedly located.  [...] told the male to stop.  (Ca51).  At this point, the male began to run away.  While officers pursued him, they saw him reach into his waistband and observed a handgun in his possession.  Shortly thereafter, they found the suspect, now identified as defendant, Rahmel [...].  (Ca51).  [...] arrested defendant and searched him incident to arrest.  During the search, officers recovered the key fob for the Mercedes, a cellphone and $1744 in currency.  (Ca51).  Nearby, Jersey City Police found an HK 9mm handgun, Model: VP9, bearing serial number 224-256719 on defendant’s flight path from Officers Moreano and Rodriguez.  (Ca51).  The handgun was gray, equipped with a large capacity ammunition magazine and a green laser attachment affixed to the barrel, matching the description of the handgun provided by the victims to Elizabeth police. (Ca51).  Later that day, JCPD officers were notified that the Audi in their April 20th case was used as the drop-off and getaway car in the Mercedes carjacking.
[brief] Appellant Lacks Legal Sufficiency To Bring A Viable Cause of Action  This appeal should be dismissed because Appellant lacks legal sufficiency to bring a viable cause of action.  The allegations made by Appellant are not plead with sufficient specificity or support facts made within the four corners of the Complaint.  Scheidt v. DRS Techs, Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188, 183 (App. Div. 2012).  If a claim only cites legal conclusions, as Appellant has done here, then this appeal must fail.  *Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co.*, 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998).  Appellant must establish a prima facie case for each and every allegation made against the [...] within the Complaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss.  Cleary dismissal by the lower Court was warranted.
[brief] Courts “will not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract nor will [they] entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who are ‘mere intermeddlers’ or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute. ”  Crescent Pk. Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971) (citations omitted).  Rather, there must be a substantial likelihood the party will suffer some harm by an unfavorable decision.  N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 67 (1980).  In Feld v. City of Orange, the plaintiff argued that he had common law standing as a county taxpayer because some of his property taxes are paid to the county and will be affected by the tax exemptions granted in the City of Orange, but the Court found this argument to be a tenuous one.
[brief] Since the only positive DNA results in this case determined that the victim was the source of the DNA, no statistical explanation was necessary.  Again relying on out-of-state cases, defendant alleges error with the DNA expert’s testimony but failed to include Maryland’s Supreme Court’s finding that “when a DNA method analyzes genetic markers at sufficient locations to arrive at an infinitesimal random match probability, expert opinion testimony of a match and of the source of the DNA evidence is admissible. ”
[brief] Plaintiff mischaracterizes the facts in an effort to convince this Court that a genuine factual dispute existed on the record below that was sufficient to allow his claim to survive summary judgment.  To set the record straight, Defendants summarize the material facts, addressing a variety of Plaintiff’s distorted recitation of “facts” and mischaracterization of the record below.  1.  Plaintiff formerly served as an Aide Level One to Defendant [...] for the West Ward of the [...].  (Pa45, Pa46.)  Defendant [...] was an elected official who served as a council member for the West Ward of the [...] from 2015 to 2022 and was Plaintiff’s supervisor.  (Pa61.)  Defendant [...] is a public entity and Plaintiff’s former employer.  (Pa4.)  Defendant [...] is also the entity at which Defendant [...] served as a council Member for the West Ward of [...].  (Id.)  2.  During the time relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations, [...] had four aides working for him.  (Pa62-Pa63.)  Those aides were [...] (the Councilman’s brother), [...], [...], and Plaintiff.  (Id.)  [...] and [...] served as level two aides, and Plaintiff and [...] served as level one aides.  (Pa63.)  3.  When Plaintiff served as a level one aide for [...], his duties consisted of speaking with constituents, fielding telephone calls, handling walk-in requests, doing clerical computer work, and representing [...] at various functions such as public hearings and city council meetings.  (Pa63, Pa4-Pa5.)  In the [...], aides serve at the pleasure of the councilperson.  (Pa66.)  4.  Plaintiff had problems with the other aides in the office, specifically, with [...], [...]’s brother.  (Pa 52.)  Plaintiff testified that he despised [...] and would push back against Brain McCallum when he gave Plaintiff work assignments.  (Id.)  Further, Plaintiff routinely acted unprofessionally in the office.  Plaintiff admitted that he looked at nude images and different types of pornography in the office.  (Pa 53.)  The final straw for [...] was in early January 2018, when Plaintiff took an unauthorized vacation and lied about his whereabouts.  (Pa 66-67.)  When [...] questioned Plaintiff about his whereabouts, Plaintiff said he was heading down south, but [...] later saw Plaintiff at a swearing-in ceremony at a freeholders meeting.  (Pa68.)  Plaintiff alleges his vacation was approved by [...], the former chief of staff, however, Plaintiff testified that he did not have any documents showing his vacation was, in fact, ever approved.  (Pa51.)  5.  Based on the bad attitudes, hostile interpersonal interactions, weak customer service skills, and poor work performance exhibited by Plaintiff, [...], and [...], [...] had no choice but to terminate each of them.  (Pa66.)  [...] was terminated on December 21, 2017.  (Pa64.)  Plaintiff was terminated on January 12, 2018.
[brief] In fact, the public reacted in the manner which it did to [...]’s site plan application because of the significant increase in density and traffic which Ordinance No. 13-2022 and the [...] enabled.  By way of explanation, the [...] properties which comprise [...]’s proposed warehouse complex are situated in the C-57 Flexible Planned Industrial-Commercial District which limits individual buildings to 20,000 square feet in area and 35 feet in height.  (Pa284; Pa289).  The superseding zoning established by the [...], on the other hand, includes no limitation on individual building size.  Moreover, it permits building heights up to 60 feet.  [...] subsequently took full advantage of these relaxed restrictions with a site plan that proposed four supersized buildings including one approaching 1,000,000 square feet – i.e., almost 50 times larger than that permitted by the underlying zone – at the new maximum height.  (Pa114-Pa115).  Compounding matters, the increased development density made possible by Ordinance No. 13-2022 and the [...] also intensified what would otherwise be the anticipated traffic volume attributable to the development permitted by the underlying C-57 Flexible Planned Industrial-Commercial District zoning.  Indeed, the subject of traffic was at the center of the discussion on [...]’s development proposal and was ultimately the reason why the [...] denied the site plan application, to wit:  Here, the Board is mindful of the public’s concerns raised by the proposed development.  Specifically, as set forth in Paragraph 21 above, the community raised several issues, particularly as to traffic, safety and environmental concerns, that leave open questions regarding the development and steps necessary to satisfactorily address and mitigate those concerns.  For instance, Applicant’s Traffic Engineer confirmed that the traffic report did not account for or consider the proposed impacts resultant from nearby developments already approved along Route 322 that will add more than 1.5 million square feet of new warehouse space within 2.5± miles of the subject property.  Similarly, without knowledge of the number, types and size of the various tenants, Applicant is unable to describe with specificity how many trucks and employees will be entering / exiting the site daily, at what times they will be doing so, or what goods and materials will be entering / stored / exiting the site.  Without such answers, it is not possible to ascertain with any reliability that the proposed traffic control measures being provided off-site will adequately address the impacts caused by the project, and the Board is unable to determine whether other safety, containment or mitigation measures are required for the safe operation of the site.  In summary, although the trial court determined to the contrary, this matter implicates the expenditure of public funds, the generation of ratables, political upheaval, density and traffic.
[brief] 16, 17, 32  **Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995)  32 **Brown v. State**, 230 N.J. 84, 97-98 (2017)  28  **City of Canton v. Harris**, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)  21  Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 626, 660 (1995).  Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, (1972)  19, 36 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984)  36  Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)  33  Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 128 (1953)  38  Eichenlaub v. Twp. Of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004)  19 Estelle v. Gamble, 29 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)  22, 34, 42 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546,549 (1941)
[brief] (3T32:17-18).  Defendant was not represented by an attorney with regard to the Operating Agreement.  (3T33:2-4).  When entering into the Operating Agreement in January 2017, Defendant was not aware that Plaintiff did not want to pay her a salary as a pharmacist (3T35:1-4) (even though she had been the pharmacist and receiving a salary since the pharmacy opened in March 2016 and even though the LLC would have had to pay a pharmacist if she did not work in that role).
[brief] Jatczyszyn v. Marcal Paper Mills, Inc., 422 N.J. Super. 123, 134 (App. Div. 2011).  Since the Complaint was never remanded back to Monmouth County, the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s motions.  The trial court’s initial denial of Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate was proper, and it did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Order granting Defendant’s motion and dismissing Complaint with prejudice, filed July 13, 2023……………………………………………………………Pa11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This case asks the Court to apply a federal consumer protection statute consistent with how the federal courts have applied it.  Doing so means that the Defendant violated Plaintiff’s statutorily protected rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p.  The motion court ignored how the federal courts interpret the FDCPA and dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Other than narrowly drawn irrelevant exceptions, the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from communicating with any person in connection with the collection of a debt.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  Here, the debt collector communicated with someone who does not fall within any exception.  Therefore, Plaintiff sued to obtain the individual and class relief authorized by the FDCPA.  There are no binding precedents dictating how to apply the FDCPA to the alleged facts.  But, to ensure national uniformity in the interpretation of federal law and to avoid forum shopping, the New Jersey Supreme Court requires our courts to give due respect to how the lower federal courts have interpreted and applied the statute.  Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69 (1990).  Those federal court authorities recognize that the FDCPA is not concerned with how a third-party might use the information—it prohibits the sharing of the information with all third-parties regardless of whether the information will be used for noble or nefarious purposes.  Hence the use of communicated information is irrelevant to Defendant’s liability.  Every federal court deciding a motion to dismiss a claim based on the same factual allegations—i.e., a debt collector who conveyed information about debts to a mail vendor—denied the motion, finding that § 1692c(b) means what it says and, therefore, those allegations state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  What happened to the unlawfully communicated information may be relevant to the quantum of damages.  Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant conveyed information about a debt to an unknown third-party who used it to create, print, and mail Defendant’s collection letters.  Whatever else the third-party did with that information remains to be discovered.  Here, the motion court commingled the facts relevant to liability (whether the information was conveyed to a third-party) with those relevant to damages (how the conveyed information was used).  Plaintiff asks this Court to follow the lead of the federal courts which universally concluded that alleging a debt collector’s conveyance of information about a debt to a third-party mail vendor violates § 1692c(b).
[directive] Movants identify N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(b) as an alternative statutory basis “permit[s] the temporary release of [a] defendant for relief.  Section 21(b) subject to appropriate restrictive conditions, . . . to the extent that the court for preparation of the . . . defendant’s determines the release to be necessary reason. ” (emphases defense or for another compelling added).  Like section 19(f), this provision provides for fact-specific hearings in individual cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1159-61 (D. Kan. 2020) (interpreting parallel provision in the federal Bail 26 Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)); United States v. Stephens, 447 F. Supp. 3d 63, 66-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (same).  Movants contend that the pandemic and the conditions it has fostered -- amount to a “compelling in particular, the suspension of criminal jury trials -- reason” under the CJRA.  To the extent that might be the case, the same considerations identified above would arguably apply.  We have instead focused on section 19(f) because its emphasis on new information and materiality offers a more precise standard and familiar structure.  In addition, it does not appear at this time that section 21(b) would address situations section 19(f) does not encompass in the context of the pandemic.  V.
[brief] Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super. 136 (App. Div. 1997), cert. den., 150 N.J. 27 (1997).  It is well settled in New Jersey that negligence is a fact which must be proved and would never be presumed.  Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44 (1961); see also, Bohn v. Hudson and Manhattan R. Co., 16 N.J. 180 (1954).  In Long, the Supreme Court ruled,  It is well settled that the existence of a possibility of a defendant’s responsibility for a plaintiff’s injuries is insufficient to impose liability.  ‘In the absence of direct evidence, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove not only the existence of such possible responsibility, but the existence of such circumstances as would justify the inference that the injury was caused by the wrongful act of the defendant and would exclude the idea that it was due to a cause with which the defendant was unconnected.  While proof of certainty is not required, the evidence must be such as to justify the inference of probability as distinguished from the mere possibility of negligence on the part of the defendant. ’ Long, 35 N.J. at 54, citing Hanson v. Eagle-Picture Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 141 (1951).  The plaintiff has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendants.