ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court’s ruling denying Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal or Rehearing based on “newly discovered evidence” was not in error.  In the PCR Court’s written opinion, the Court indicated that the application for dismissal or rehearing was inappropriately wedged into a proceeding for PCR, a point Defendant neither mentions nor denies.  As the PCR Court judge noted, these claims were resolved by the trial court.  Da381-82.  Further, the evidence was not “newly discovered” as discussed supra, Section III.B, nor was it of the sort that would have changed the verdict.  Incidentally, the trial court judge who heard the original motion to dismiss substantively considered the lack of production of the policy and as a result issued strongly-worded curative instructions.  6T 13:13-17:15; e.g., 15T 138:22-139:17.  There were no circumstances, such as procedural error, factual inaccuracy, error in adjudication, etc. present in the original ruling on the motion to dismiss nor in the motion for a new trial presented on the same grounds that would lead to a need for rehearing.  Defendant does not contend that there were.  Again, defendant’s claim is not one of error, but one of disagreement on the merits.
[brief] ESTATE OF [...], deceased, by [...] as Executrix of the Estate and [...],  Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM: LAW  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]
[directive] . -  Liens, mortgages, taxes and other liabilities are paid as 1. soon after forfeiture as practical.  Property taxes shall be paid only to the date of 2. forfeiture, unless statements to the contrary are contained in the court order.  No. Rev. October Directive 1995 14 1, of Page 3 4  Sales of real property should occur within three months of 3 . the date that all liens and taxes are satisfied.  Closing should occur within days of the date of sale.  45 4.  Gross revenues from the closing of the property should be 5. provided the within days of the date the national ASD 5 seized property contractor receives the funds from the escrow agent.  Rev. October Directive No. 1995 14  1, of Page 4 4  [...] DIRECTIVE NUMBER: 18
[directive] (only complete if the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of child pornography pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4) or 2C:24-4b(5) or an N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. attempt to commit either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of parole supervision the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of for life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity? (konplete pati sa a sèl si enfraksyon an te fèt le ou aprè le 1ye (b) [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA] fevriye 2018) Èske w konprann ke si w plede koupab de deli mete byenèt timoun an danje konfòm ak 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) oswa w N.J.S.A. se lidè yon rezo pònografi timoun daprè 2C:24-4.1, N.J.S.A. oubyen ou fè tantativ pou komèt nenpòt nan enfraksyon sa yo epi enfraksyon an te fèt le ou aprè le 1ye fevriye 2018, an plis de nenpòt ki santans, epi a petisyon komisè gouvènman a, tribinal la Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole paj 4 nan 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole page 4 of 7 fèt pou li enpoze yon santans espesyal de sipèvizyon libète kondisyonèl avi, amwens ke tribinal la ta deside sou rejis la ke sipèvizyon libète kondisyonèl avi a pa nesesè pou pwoteje kominote a oswa prevni w komèt aktivite kriminèl nan lavni? (only complete if the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018) Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) or leader of a N.J.S.A. child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1, or an attempt to N.J.S.A. commit either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] (13T195-13 to 15, 196-3 to 6, 196-11 to 18).  Defendant later suggested to [...] “that [he] check whether [...] wrote it down. ” (13T195-13 to 17, 197-7 to 198-16).  [...] testified that had defendant heard a voice on the day of the shootings, “I think he would have told the police, because he was very eager to tell them about hallucinations.  Telling them about hallucinations that happened ten years ago is hardly as important as hallucinations that occurred less than 24 hours ago….  So, I think we eliminated the possibility that he heard a voice in the shower the day of the shooting. ” (13T199-14 to 25).
[brief] There are no contemporaneous medical records suggesting that [...]’s routine health complaints, such as nose bleeds, headaches, shortness of breath, memory lapses, irritability, and fatigue, were related in any way to his exposure to mold.  Neither [...] nor any medical professional suggested, or even suspected, any impact to [...]’s health by mold until after the mold contamination of his condominium was first discovered in March 2009, well within the [...] policy coverage.  It should be axiomatic that [...] cannot be expected to know or suspect that his health had been impaired by mold before he had any idea that he had ever been exposed to mold.  No New Jersey case holds that a claimant’s injury caused by exposure to a toxin had manifested before anyone knew or even suspected that the claimant had ever been exposed to the toxin.
[brief] Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020).  See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020).  A reviewing court however must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are ”supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)).  "Reviewing appellate courts should 'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'"  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  In this case, a review of the Court’s decision fails to show any findings or conclusions that were manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interest of Justice.  II.
[brief] There is no doubt that due process requires "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)  In fact, the MLUL requires an opportunity for the public to be heard.  *Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 154 N.J. 62 (1998).
[brief] The truth of the matter is that the Respondents, like the court below, take issue with the fact that the mayor’s opinion was not the correct opinion.  This is not a sufficient basis to wrest control away from the Zoning Board.  It is based merely on speculation and a guttural objection to the notion that the Mayor was not in favor of the Amended Application.  There is not a speck of evidence to support the claim that the Zoning Board’s decision was impacted at all by the Mayor’s press release.  See Cent. 25, supra, 460 N.J.Super. at 459; see also Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 282-83 (1965).  The Respondents are incorrect in their suggestion that this courts analysis should not begin with a review of whether a conflict of interest prompted improper influence.  The case law is clear that this such a review is how courts determine whether or not there was improper influence.  See Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 237 N.J. 333, 351-53 (2019); Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 553; Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 528-532 (1993).
[brief] The Board Planner testified that the contamination created a detriment and the Mayor, who is an epidemiologist, noted that there is a specific risk of cancer.  (T1, 26:18-27 & T2, 38:25-39:8).  Even Plaintiff acknowledges that it cannot sell the property or use it for retail purposes because of the active remediation.  (Pb19 & T1, 20:23-24:8).  It was reasonable for the Borough to conclude that the contamination was creating a detriment to the public health and safety because the contamination was impacting the soil.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | All the Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks Cnty. Int’l., Inc., | 2 | | 236 N.J. 431 (2019) | | | Armament Co. v. Hyland, | 3 | | 70 N.J. 550 (1976) | | | Atlantic Ambulance Corporation v. Cullum, | 6 | | 451 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2017) | | | Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., | 2,3 | | 138 N.J. 2 (1994) | | | Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., | 3 | | 182 N.J. 1 (2004) | | | Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, | 2 | | 148 N.J. 582 (1997) | | | Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., | 5,6 | | 150 N.J. 255 (1997) | | | Macedo v. Dello Russo, | 4 | | 178 N.J. 340 (2004) | | | Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Serv. Inc., | 1,2,6 | | 387 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2006) | | | Shaw v. Shand, | 2,4,5,6 | | 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019) | | | Williams-Hopkins v. Medwell, LLC, | 6 | | No.: A-0273-21, 2024 WL 1476821 at *16 (April 5, 2024) | | | Vort v. Hollander, | 6 | | 257 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 1992) | | Statutes N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 PREFATORY STATEMENT This amicus brief is respectfully submitted on behalf of [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), a statewide professional organization of over 2000 attorneys in private practice and public service as well as paralegals, law clerks and law students.
[directive] This report shall be prepared in four copies on the forms provided.  6.3  Routing of the four copies shall be as follows:  6.3.1  Copy 1, Copy 2 and Copy 3 - Will accompany the property to the Property Officer or placed into the Holding Locker with the property until the Property Officer completes the chain of custody section.  6.3.2  Copy 1 - Will be forwarded to the Records Unit with the Incident Report.  6.3.3  Copy 2- Will be returned to the submitting officer with the property officer's signature showing receipt of property.  6.3.4  Copy 3 - Will be retained by the Property Officer until the property is released or otherwise disposed of, and the transaction completely noted on the report; then, will be forwarded to the Records Unit.  6.3.5  Copy 4 - To be given to the person the property was taken or received from, as their receipt.  6.4  This report shall be accurate, factual, clear, concise, complete and free of errors in spelling and grammar.  Appropriate abbreviations are acceptable.  Complete all boxes, i.e., if information is unknown, enter "UNK", if not available, enter dash A-7 (-), if not applicable, enter "N/A".  6.5  The report shall be typed whenever possible.  If the report must be hand-written, it must be printed clearly and with black ink.  6.6  Reviewing officers shall make certain that all personnel comply with this procedure.  6.7  Instructions for preparation of PROPERTY DESCRIPTION REPORT (SHORT FORM)
[brief] N.J.S.A. 11A:6-5 ..............................................................................9,32,34  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) ...........................................................................12,13,18,34  N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q) ...............................................................................16,45  N.J.S.A. 11A:6-15 ..............................................................................21  N.J.S.A. 10:5-5 ..................................................................................24 N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 ................................................................................24  N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 ..................................................................................46  N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(a) ............................................................................46  N.J.S.A. 40:48-1(3) and 2 ................................................................20  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51 ............................................................................42  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 ............................................................................43  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56 ............................................................................40  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-52 ............................................................................40  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] *Canfield* 470 N.J.Super. at 262-263.  All of these cases have two things in common that are distinguishable from the case before the Court.  First, in every single one of them, there was testimony that victim initiated the incident—whether by striking the defendant first, brandishing a handgun or coming towards the defendant with the hypodermic needle.  Here, there is no testimony that the victims initiated anything.  At best, there was testimony that there was a "tussle" between the defendant and [...] when the defendant came to the home.  The record is devoid of any testimony that [...] said or did anything that initiated the altercation, which is why it was proper for the trial court to find that there was no evidence of provocation.  There was no testimony that a punch was thrown or any other specific action alleged.  It was merely described as a "tussle" or struggle over the knife and that the defendant was trying to stab [...] with it.  None of the witnesses were present when the incident started.  Second, in none of the cases, was identification an issue.  Here, the defense was that the defendant was not the shooter.  In any event, the testimony before the jury was that the defendant came to the house, wearing a mask to conceal his identity and was armed with a deadly weapon.  This is evidence that the action was premeditated and not a situation where the defendant was reacting out of passion, to a provocation, he could not control.  There simply was no rational basis to charge the jury with passion/provocation.  The testimony was that it was the defendant who was armed with a deadly weapon and brandishing it against [...].  There is no testimony that [...] was armed.  It is [...] and [...] that attempted to flee and were pursued by the defendant—armed with the knife, that was ultimately dropped on the steps when the defendant left the residence.  There simply is not any evidence that the defendant can point to establish a provocation of the defendant.  That is why this Court is being asked to leap to the inference that the gun must have been drawn—when there is not a scintilla of evidence to support this conclusion and it is at odds with the actual testimony that [...] was unarmed and [...] never pulled out or pointed the handgun.  In sum, like in Cristanos, passion/provocation was inconsistent with both the defendant and State's theories of the case and there was no testimony at trial indicating that the defendant was acting under passion or provocation.  Cristanos at 280.  Not one witness testified that the defendant acted in the heat of passion or was provoked in any way, therefore, there was no basis for the Court to charge the lesser included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter.
[directive] Docket Number: Petition to Dissolve the Prohibition Against Victim  Defendant/Juvenile Contact ☐  I am the (select one) Defendant/Juvenile ☐ Victim.  I am requesting that the court dissolve the prohibition against victim contact issued to the defendant/juvenile upon early release from a state correctional facility/confinement in a Juvenile Justice Commission facility due to the awarding of Public Health Emergency Credits pursuant to L. 2020, c. 111.  The defendant/juvenile was convicted or adjudicated delinquent and served a custodial sentence for: (Name of offense and statute), and the victim of this crime is , and my relationship to the victim is .  I am requesting to dissolve the prohibition against victim contact, including the circumstances of the conviction or adjudication because:  I certify that all the statements made above are true.  I am aware that if any of the statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  Date Signature Date Parent/Guardian Signature  Published: 11/2020, CN: 12699
[brief] HOWEVER, is it not true that in order for the penalty provision to “kick in” the condition precedent would have to be that Plaintiff had to do without the monthly payments, i.e. that same was not in her possession.  Keep in mind that the reason for the penalty provision was to insure that Plaintiff had the $1,500.00 monthly payments in order to pay her bills.  SO THE QUESTION THAT COMES BEFORE THIS COURT IS QUITE SIMPLE.  WAS THERE EVER A TIME WHEN PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE IN HER POSSESSION THE MONIES THAT SHE CLAIMS WERE NOT PAID ON A TIMELY BASIS.
[brief] With these principles in mind, we review whether [...]'s in-court identification was based on her independent recollection of defendant from the date of the robbery or her impromptu observation of him in shackles on the day of her testimony.  We recently held that “the mere fact that a suspect is presented in or around a police car in handcuffs does not in itself make a showup impermissibly suggestive. ”  *Bayer v. Twp. of Union*, 414 N.J.Super. 238, 268 (App.Div.2010); see also *State v. Herrera*, 187 N.J. 493, 505 (2006) (a “witnesses' identification of the defendant seated and handcuffed in the back of the police car was suggestive but that ‘such suggestive circumstances did not render the identification procedure per se improper and unconstitutional.
[brief] My law office has always maintained, and continues to maintain, only a professional relationship with the outside service company [...] (“[...]”), which previously maintained a satellite office at my same location but which always operated separately.  There was and is no collusion or wrongful conduct in using the [...] company for service or process; and even R. 4:4-3(a) allows service “by plaintiff’s attorney or the attorney’s agent” so I could have personally served the complaint myself or sent someone from my own office even if they were my own employee without it being deemed wrongful.  I utilized a standard process service company [...], who serves process for thousands of attorneys across the State.  [...] sets up booths at ICLE seminars, attorney conferences, etc., and it advertises in the NJ Law Journal and other publications as a standard service company.  I am not affiliated with [...].
[directive] 귀하가 이하 또는 이하에 의한 범죄에 대해 유죄를 인정하는  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 N.J.S.A. 2C:36-1 경우에 한하여 다음의 추가 질문에 답변해야 합니다.  The following additional questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty pursuant to an offense under 2C:35- N.J.S.A. 1 et seq. or 2C:36-1 et seq.  N.J.S.A. [예/Yes]
[brief] II.  Social transition is a significant psychotherapeutic intervention.  The primary purpose of social transitioning is to relieve the psychological distress associated with having a mismatch between one’s natal sex and gender identity.  ACa14 ¶ 9.  Social transitioning is an “impactful psychotherapeutic intervention” in the life of a child.  ACa12 ¶ 8.e.  Indeed, “a social transition represents one of the most difficult psychological changes a person can experience. ”  ACa31 ¶ 42.  Like other forms of healthcare treatment, however, social transitioning is not without risks.  First, social transitioning may cause a minor’s transgender identity to persist.  Absent social transitioning, for the vast majority of children, “gender incongruence does not persist” into adulthood.  ACa20 ¶ 20.  But once a child is socially transitioned and lives as their aspired-to gender, the likelihood that the child’s transgender identity will persist into adulthood “dramatic[ally]” increases.  ACa25 ¶ 30.  In this way, social transitioning itself can change “gender identity outcomes” in the lives of children.  ACa25-ACa30 at IV.a.  Second, in most cases, social transitioning is the first step down the road to graduated “affirmative” care for the child in the form of puberty blockers and cross- sex hormones, which can “have permanent, long-term effects,” including but not limited to sterility.  ACa35 ¶ 53; see also United Kingdom National Health Service Website (noting that “long term cross-sex hormone treatment may cause . . . permanent infertility”), ACa89.  The risks associated with this graduated care must be considered when deciding whether to socially transition a minor.  ACa22-ACa23 ¶¶ 24–25.  Third, the recent surge of youth reporting a transgender identity suggests that “cultural and/or social factors may contribute—even substantially—to a young person’s experience of gender variance. ”  ACa19 ¶ 19.  Caution is thus warranted to ensure that a social transition is appropriate.  ACa19.  Based on these concerns, social transitioning youth must be carefully undertaken with the assistance of a mental health practitioner and the minor’s parents.  ACa25-ACa32 ¶¶ 29–43.  And in some cases, based on a weighing of the relevant considerations, “it can be appropriate for parents to say ‘no’ to a social transition” of their children.
[brief] Similarly, in [...]’s Post-Hearing Brief, [...] states as a matter of fact that it is still owed approximately $1.8 million for its work on the Hackensack Project.  In the three preceding pages of its brief, [...] also states as a matter of fact the litany of problems on the Hackensack Project caused by [...] prior to [...]’s involvement that continued to haunt the project after took over from [...].  It is plainly evident that such statements of facts were made for the sole purpose of substantiating [...]’s claim that [...] was not entitled to additional EGP on the Hackensack Project due to the ongoing impact of the problems that predated [...]’s involvement, which rendered the project unprofitable without any basis for any further EGP payment.