ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Approach that person from the front and establish and maintain eye contact .  #  Introduce yourself as a law enforcement officer and explain that you have come # to help.  Due to their impaired short-term memory, victims may repeatedly ask who you are.  Thus, you may need to reintroduce yourself several times.  Treat people with dignity.  The deterioration of their mental abilities does not # mean they are without feeling.  Remove the person from crowds and other noisy environments as this can cause # restlessness, pacing, agitation, and panic in people with Alzheimer's.  Also, turn off your car's flashing lights and lower the volume on the radio.  Establish one-on-one conversation.  Talk in a low-pitched, reassuring tone, # looking into the victim's eyes.  Alzheimer's shortens attention span and increases suspicion.  Your calm support can make victims less agitated and panicked.  Speak slowly and clearly, using short, simple sentences with familiar words.  Repeat yourself.  Accompany your words with gestures when this can aid in communication, but avoid sudden movements.  Include the person in all conversations, out of respect and so you will not # arouse their suspicion.  Explain your actions before proceeding.  If the person is agitated or panicked, # gently pat them or hold their hand, but avoid physical contact that could seem restraining.  Expect difficulties making yourself understood.  Do not assume the person # understands you or is capable of answering your questions and complying with your instructions.  Give simple, step-by-step instructions and, whenever possible, a single # instruction.  For example, "Please sit here.  I'll take care of everything."  Avoid multiple, complex, or wordy instructions, such as: "Please sit here, don't get up or go anywhere, and wait for me to come back."  Also, substitute nonverbal communication by sitting down if you want that person to sit down.  Ask one question at a time.  "Yes" and "no" questions are better than questions # that require the person to think or recall a sequence of events.  Be prepared for answers that are confusing and keep changing.  If a person's words are unintelligible, ask them to point, gesture, or otherwise physically communicate their answer.  Never argue with the person or challenge their reasoning.  #  Do not leave the person alone; they may wander away.  #  Find emergency shelter for the person with the help of a local Alzheimer's # Association chapter or Adult Protective Services if no other caregivers can be found.
[directive] (Yon amann $30 si enfraksyon ante fet le 9 janvye, 1986 ak fini nan dat 22 desanm, 1991 la.  $25 si enfraksyon ante fet anvan le lyejanvye, 1986.)  [Yes/wi]  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you [No/Non] d. are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction  If fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  Si enfraksyon ante fet swa le lye fevriye 1993 ou te fet anvan le 13 mas 1995, epi yo kondane w a libete kondisyonel oswa yo kondane w nan yon enstiti penitansye !eta, wap oblije peye yon fre tranzaksyon de jiska $ 1 .00 a chak fwa yon peyman oswa vesman sou peyman fet?
[brief] Landlord first incorrectly claims “it is undisputed that Tenant was in monetary default when the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments came due on August 1, 2020 and August 1, 2021,” and then adds “tenant is simply not [ever] entitled to payment of these amounts” (Pb34).  Both claims are wrong.  First, Tenant was not in monetary default on August 1, 2020 when Landlord’s Tenant Allowance installment payment of $121,666.67 plus interest came due because the Allowance Offset automatically cured any default by operation of the Lease on that exact date.  Again, the Lease pre-granted “an offset and deduction against Tenant's Allowance for all costs, payments and expenses . . . due and owing to Landlord, at the time an installment of Tenant's Allowance shall be due” (Da17-Da18) (emphasis added).  This provision is cross-referenced in § 2.01 of the Lease that calls for Tenant to pay annual minimum rent (Da13-Da14).  Through § 2.01, Tenant “covenants and agrees to pay to Landlord . . . without any deductions, offsets (except as otherwise provided in Section 4.02 hereof) . . . [t]he sums set forth in Section 1.01(H) above,” i.e. the minimum monthly rent (Da11;Da13-Da14) (emphasis added).  The only sensible way to read this provision is that the pre-granted deductions and offsets for Tenant’s Allowance set forth in § 4.02 are exceptions to Tenant’s otherwise unwaivable obligation to pay the minimum monthly rent.
[brief] [...] had no explanation for discrepancy and agreed that one check was not authentic.  (2T 83:24-84:15, Jan. 5, 2023).  Conversely, while [...] struggled to explain why the check he produced differed from the check produced in response to a subpoena to [...], [...], both through the affidavit of [...] (Pa2268-2269) and the testimony of its representative [...] (11T 113:19-115:8, Jan. 26, 2023), confirmed the authenticity of the plaintiff’s version of the check.  Perhaps most indicative of the Defendants’ fraudulent execution of the 2019 Deed is [...]’s use of the name “[...]” and the accompanying signature.
[brief] RESPONDENTS VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) WHEN THEY AUTHORIZED INACCURATE INFORMATION TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC AND ACTED IN CONCERT TO DECEIVE THE ELECTORATE.  As with the previous section, Respondents assert that merely by acting unethically as a group they can escape all consequences (BOE-Db32).  Respondents do not even deny promoting inaccurate information regarding the referendum, or omitting material information.  To be clear, Respondents claim here is that Boards of Education are free to publish inaccurate information to the voting public, in this case regarding a $33 million referendum question, and are completely free to undermine the public trust by acting in unison on a controversial matter.
[brief] Every contract of insurance covering the liability of an employer for compensation to injured employees or their dependents, * * * shall provide, or be construed to provide, that it is created for the benefit of the several employees of the insured employer and their dependents, and that such contract may be enforced by any of such employees or their dependents, suing thereon in his or their names as though distinctly made a party thereto.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-83.  Further, N.J.S.A. 34:15-84 states that an injured employee of a covered employer may enforce the provisions of such a contract to his benefit "by joining the insurance carrier with the employer in his petition filed for the purpose of enforcing his claim for compensation[.]"  On an insured employer's "death, insolvency, or bankruptcy[.]" an insurance carrier becomes "directly liable for all compensation payments due to any injured employee or his dependents by virtue of prior agreement[.]"  N.J.S.A. 34:15-86.  Finally, No policy of insurance against liability arising under this chapter shall contain any limitation of the liability of the insurer to an amount less than that payable by the assured on account of his entire liability under [Title 34].
[brief] [...]’s appeal does not challenge that portion of the trial court’s judgment that determined that [...] owes [...] insurance coverage for the Plainville claim.  ²  In the event that [...]’s own appeal is granted, the underlying bases for the trial court’s allocation of legal fees and costs and interest will be altered, and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for reevaluation of these determination.  ³  Several judges have handled this case during the 19 years since it was first filed.  For purposes of clarity, we have indicated which judge issued which order(s) throughout this brief.  I.
[brief] Plaintiff filed an initial complaint against defendant [...] on December 9, 2021 seeking compensatory damages under the Survivorship and Wrongful Death Statutes.  An amended complaint was filed on June 24, 2022 adding [...] and [...] again seeking compensatory damages under the Survivorship and Wrongful Death Statutes.  An answer was filed on July 22, 2022 by defendants [...] d/b/a [...] (i/p/a [...]) and [...] (i/p/a [...]) denying all allegations.  A Worker’s Compensation bar to the claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 was pled as an affirmative defense.  On March 17, 2023, a second amended complaint was filed adding [...] as a named defendant seeking compensatory damages under the Survivorship and Wrongful Death Statutes and punitive damages against [...] alone (Pa61-79).  These defendants filed an answer on March 24, 2023 again denying all of the allegations and again pleading a Worker’s Compensation bar to the claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 as an affirmative defense.  (Pa80-94).  On November 2, 2023, defendant [...] filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claims for punitive damages.  (Pa25-257).  Plaintiff filed opposition on November 21, 2023.  (Pa371-1089).  We filed a sur-reply to plaintiff’s opposition on November 27, 2023.  (Da1-Da14).  Oral argument was heard on December 1, 2023.  A written opinion and order granting our motion for summary judgment was filed on December 15, 2023.  (Pa1-12).  Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order on December 22, 2023.  (Pa1109-1112).
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 59:8-3, N.J.S.A. 59:8-8; Dep’t of Transp. v. PSC Res., Inc., 159 N.J. Super. 154, 158 (Law Div. 1978); Lassoff v. New Jersey, 414 F. Supp. 2d 483, 489-490 (D.N.J. 2006).  POINT VI
[brief] The Act renders the Photocopy unenforceable because it lacks an itemized list of the parties' assets as required under the Act.  see N.J.S.A. 37:2-33.  Respondent contends that no schedule of assets was needed, because the Photocopy contains terms that stated that the parties were apprised of the extent and approximate value of the property and estate of each other.  Db at 61.  The conclusory language of the Photocopy is not a substitution for the itemized list of assets that is required by N.J.S.A. 37:2-33.  Simply stating in the agreement that the parties were apprised of the extent and approximate value of the estate of another does not provide the detail that may be necessary several years later in determining whether the parties were provided with full and complete disclosure of assets.  See, Estate of Shinn, 394 N.J. Super.55 (App. Div 2007).  In Shinn, the schedule of assets in the parties prenuptial agreement made it evident years later, when the agreement was being challenged, that the husband had substantially undervalued his businesses, which was a breach of the requirement of adequate disclosure.  Id.  The Court in DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J Super. 432, 439 (Ch. Div. 1986) explained that the purpose for an itemized list of the parties assets was to discourage a plethora of plenary hearings as to precisely what financial information was disclosed and whether it was accurately valued.  See also, Orgler v. Orgler, 237 N.J. Super. 342 (App. Div. 1989) (to waive a substantial right, there must be "full knowledge of the right and an intentional surrender which "can properly be considered 'known' only if there is full awareness of the other party's income and assets, since those facts are critical elements in determining the potential awards of alimony and equitable distribution which the signer of the agreement is being asked to 'waive.'")  Here, unlike In re Estate of Shinn, there is no way to determine precisely what assets were disclosed and whether their values were accurate since there is no list of assets in the Photocopy.  The Respondent contends that disclosure of assets was not necessary here because their assets “were not very much, as much of their wealth was created during the marriage.  Db at 63.  Respondent overlooks that at the time of the marriage, both Decedent and Respondent had worked for more than 20 years.  Respondent never disclosed the value of her [...] pension or the sums in the various accounts she managed.  See, P702a  The list of assets is material to a determination of whether there was an enforceable waiver of rights.  Therefore, the Court erred as a matter of law when it excused the legislative requirement of N.J.S.A. 37:2-33 and enforced Prenuptial agreement without a list of assets.
[brief] DETERMINATIONS ARE SO WIDE OF THE MARK THAT A MISTAKE MUST HAVE BEEN MADE, THIS COURT OWES NO DEFERENCE TO THE JUDGE'S FACTUAL FINDINGS OR INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM.  (19T 6-8 to 13, 9-23 to 10-9, 10-21 to 11-6, 14-12 to 18, 17-2 to 11)  3  CONCLUSION
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 34.  This is similar to the instant matter, where Appellant failed to report his medication for over three (3) years [Pa109; 5T148:9-12], his lies about why he received overlapping opioid prescriptions [Pa114; 4T111:9-23], his hesitation to call 911 because he was more concerned about his job than saving a friend’s life on the night of Incident [4T68:11-23, 4T128:12 – 4T129:3, 4T130:10-13], his inconsistent statements about always checking driver’s licenses before letting people use his vehicle being contradicted by his admission that he had not checked in most instances [5T83:11-15; 6T91:22 – 6T92:4], lying to [...] about his location on November 29, 2018 [3T22:4-24, 3T23:14-19], and intentionally violating the Sick Leave Policy after his third sinus surgery by attending Florida House.  [3T22:4-15, 3T23:14-19; 4T172:11 – 4T177:8, 4T190:17 – 4T191:10; 6T49:2-5].  Any one of these alone would render Appellant “so utterly devoid of the trust” that must be placed in police officers, especially considering that police officers must be held to a higher standard of conduct.  *In re Hermann*, 192 N.J. at 34; Moorestown, 89 N.J. Super. at 560; Moore, 230 N.J. Super. at 374.
[brief] In addition to the newly discovered and previously unknown claims against [...] arising out of the newly discovered evidence that [...] was sole member of [...], Plaintiffs further sought leave to amend the Complaint to state claims against [...] arising out of his operation of [...] as a sham entity, and claims for legal malpractice against Defendants [...] arising out of their failure to advise Plaintiffs that [...] was operated as a sham entity by [...].  Plaintiffs did not know and could not have known the existence of these claims prior to obtaining, analyzing, and understanding the accumulated discovery and deposition testimonies of [...], [...], [...], and [...] cited in Plaintiffs’ initial brief.  It is self-evident that the previously dismissed claim for legal malpractice had absolutely none of the factual predicates of the legal malpractice claim in the Amended Complaint, and for obvious reason: Plaintiffs did not know and could not have known at the time of the filing of the Complaint that [...] was the sole member of [...] and operated [...] as a sham entity with Defendant [...].  These facts only emerged during the course of discovery, after the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ prior claims.  Therefore, Plaintiffs’ new claims against [...] are certainly new and were never dismissed by [...] because they were not known and could not have been pled at the time of the original Complaint.  For these reasons, the Trial Court’s error should be reversed and Plaintiffs should be permitted to amend the Complaint and state their newly discovered claims.
[brief] For example, the whole family, including [...], [...], [...] and [...], knew and actively conspired and acted in concert to plan the fraud scheme.  In 2016, [...] and [...] sat together in [...], Esq.’ office to discuss with their lawyers about the title search of 293 Property.  See 9T 73:9-12; 80:17-20; 81:4-6, Jan. 24, 2023) ([...] explaining that she went with her husband to [...]’s office on February 4, 2016).  See also 9T 62:15-23; 64:18-25; 90:7-91:2 Jan 24, 2023) ([...] admitted that she personally used the [...] account that she jointly owned with [...] to pay the expenses of their rental properties, among which one check was issued to [...]’s office for a title search on the Property in 2016).  Similarly, [...] and [...]’s testimony established that the whole family participated in the conspiracy to fraudulently convey the property to [...].
[brief] Where, as here, there is a “challenge to a determination of a municipal agency, ‘an appellate court is bound by the same scope of review’ as the trial court. ’”  *R. Neumann & Co. v. City of Hoboken*, 437 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting *Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Bd. of Adj. for Chatham Tp.*, 202 N.J. Super. 312, 321 (App. Div. 1985)).  While the review of municipal action is narrow in scope “municipal action will be overturned by a court if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  *Bryant v. City of Atl. City*, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998); *Rivkin v. Dover Twp. Rent Leveling Bd.*, 143 N.J. 352, 378 (1996) (“A court may set aside a municipal board decision if it is shown to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, not supported in the evidence, or otherwise contrary to law. ”).  Although a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency or local government subdivision, the court must determine whether the governing body followed the relevant guidelines and properly exercised its discretion.  See *CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Bd.*, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 578 (App. Div. 2010); *Bressman v. Gash*, 131 N.J. 517, 526-28 (1993).
[brief] Submitted Dec. 19, 2005.  Decided Feb. 3, 2006.  Synopsis  Background:  Defendant was convicted in a jury trial in the Superior Court, Law Division, Salem County, [...], J., of second-degree robbery, for which he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment with 85 percent parole ineligibility period and three years of parole supervision.  Defendant appealed.  Holdings:  The Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that: identification procedure was not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification; witness's in-court identification of defendant just slightly less ten months after alleged robbery and without having first identified defendant prior to trial was permissible; trial court's jury instruction on alleged offense of second-degree robbery did not misstate the proof necessary for predicate theft offense nor otherwise confuse jury; and sentence was not manifestly excessive nor unduly punitive; but imposition of greater-than presumptive sentence violated defendant's right to jury trial.  Affirmed as to conviction; remanded as to sentence.  On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, [...].  Attorneys and Law Firms [...], Public Defender, attorney for appellant ([...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).  [...], Attorney General, attorney for respondent ([...], Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).  Before Judges [...] and [...]  Opinion PER CURIAM.
[brief] Finally, in remanding this matter for the development of an evidential record, the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with *Abbott XX*’s mandates for SFRA’s optimal operation rests squarely on the State, and not on [...] as the court below erroneously held.  The Supreme Court has made clear in the Abbott litigation that the burden has been placed on the State “each time the State has advanced” a funding mechanism “that it has asserted to be compliant with the thorough and efficient constitutional requirement. ”
[brief] *Sensient Colors*, 193 N.J. at 392.  Here, as [...] correctly recognized, none of these limited “special equities” is present.  Indeed, “[t]he most important special equity” in a comity analysis – the presence of significant state interests, such as New Jersey’s strong public policy interest in the remediation of environmental contamination within its borders – favors retaining this first-filed action.  *Id.* at 394; see also *Century Indem.*, 398 N.J. Super. at 427.  1.
[brief] In addressing the private right of action under the NJCFLA, the District Court in Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) reasoned that in order to determine whether the NJCFLA implies a private right of action, “the Court must consider . . . whether there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action under the statute and whether implication of a private cause of action in this case would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. ”  *Id.* (quoting *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 41 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Indeed, “the primary goal in determining whether a statute implies a right of action has almost invariably been a search for the underlying legislative intent. ”  *Veras*, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (emphasis added) (quoting *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co.*, 168 N.J. 255, 272-73 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[brief] Black’s Law Dictionary (2000Ed) 47 Article Betraying the Badge Article, Dated 12/10/2012 13,14, 19 Article Law and Disorder: Edisons Police Force Plagued by Infighting, Lawsuits, Dated 12/09/2012 13,14,19 Article Police Opposed Law Aimed to Fix Edison Department with Criminal Cops, Dated 1/22/2018 13,14, 19 TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENT AND RULINGS Order for Summary Judgment 10/6/23 Pa533 Order for Summary Judgment 10/06/23 Pa534 Order Denying Consolidation 10/06/23 Pa535 Oral Decision 1T42 APPENDEX INDEX Complaint and Jury 02/14/2022 (Exhibit A)
[brief] Id. at 154.  [...] cites one law-review article in her entire brief which references a single out-of-state case, State v. McPhaul, 808 S.E.2d 294 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017), and fails to bolster her position.  See [...], The Reliable Application of Fingerprint Evidence, 66 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 64 (2018); (Ab12).  In McPhaul, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting expert latent-fingerprint testimony.  808 S.E.2d at 305.  There, as Garrett notes, “[t]he defendant did not challenge the general reliability of fingerprinting evidence. ”  Garrett, The Reliable Application of Fingerprint Evidence, at 74.  Instead, the McPhaul panel held that the expert failed to explain how she applied her general methodology to make “her actual conclusions in this case,” violating the North Carolina evidence rule requiring same.  808 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting N.C.R.E. 702(a)(3)).  It determined that in doing so, the expert “implicitly asked the jury to accept her expert opinion that the prints matched. ”  Ibid.  The panel nevertheless found that the error was harmless and affirmed defendant’s relevant convictions.  Ibid.
[brief] BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL  On the Brief: [...]  010772004  [...] 028251998 [...] 165522015  Of Counsel: [...]  010772004  [...] 028251998  [...] 165522015  [...] [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, [...], [...], and [...]