ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff, [...]’s Appeal seeks Appellate de novo review and reversal of three New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Passaic County interlocutory Orders.  The orders to be appealed are two orders entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on January 19, 2024, granting defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and on March 1, 2024, denying plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, as well as to review the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Passaic County interlocutory Order, entered by the Honorable [...], Esq. on February 21, 2024, denying plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen and Extend Discovery.  (Pa1-7, Pa8-12, Pa13-20).
[brief] Moreover, this Judge of Compensation's history with this bill essentially makes her not only the trier of facts in this case but a potential witness.  The appellate standard of review in this matter is stated in Panitch, supra, 339 N.J. Super. at 66–67: R. 1:12–2 provides "[a]ny party, on motion made to the judge before trial or argument and stating the reasons therefor, may seek that judge's disqualification."  A motion for recusal may be granted for any "reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so."  R. 1:12–1(f).  Such a motion must "be made before trial or argument."  N.J.S.A. 2A:15–50; Bonnet v. Stewart, 155 N.J.Super. 326, 330 (App. Div.), certif. denied.  77 N.J. 468 (1978).
[directive] Only  1.  Any law enforcement officer who is served with a temporary or final restraining order must immediately inform his or her supervisor and provide a copy of the order to the supervisor.  2.  Whenever this Department is notified that a temporary or final restraining order is issued against a member of this Department, this Department will serve the restraining order, if it has not already been served, or will assist any other agency in ensuring the immediate service of the restraining order.  This Department will also ensure that a supervisory officer will be present at any time the -13- law enforcement officer is removing personal items from any common residence with the victim pursuant to the restraining order.  3.  If the law enforcement officer's duty and off-duty firearms and Attorney weapons have not already been turned in pursuant to the General Weapons Seizure Directives, the weapons shall be immediately seized by this Department.
[brief] THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE, AND THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD HAVE MERGED.  (RULING AT DA 34 TO 36; 10T 27-5 TO 39-25)  [...] imposed a 25-year sentence, 85% without parole, on defendant for aggravated manslaughter, and imposed a separate concurrent four-year term for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.  (Da 34 to 36; 10T 27-5 to 39-25)  In doing so, she made three significant errors: (1) failing to merge the weapons conviction into the conviction for aggravated manslaughter; (2) finding the nature and circumstances of the homicide to be an aggravating factor and to be worthy of “great” weight; and (3) finding defendant’s prior record of two third-degree convictions to be worthy of “great” weight.  The matter should be remanded to correct the merger and for resentencing to a lower term.  First of all, it could not be clearer that possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose merges into the crime that is the unlawful purpose.  State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636-639 (1996).  That merger should have been ordered.  Secondly, this aggravated manslaughter, while obviously a serious homicide, does not warrant a finding of the first aggravating factor: that the nature and circumstances of the offense were particularly “heinous, cruel, or depraved. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(1).  This was, unfortunately, a dispute between lovers that turned violent -- an altogether too-common occurrence, but not one that involved a shocking number of wounds nor any other factor that would be atypical for a serious homicide.  The judge called the killing “senseless,” but that broad characterization hardly distinguishes it from other aggravated manslaughters.  (10T 33-16 to 19)  That factor should not have been considered, or, alternatively, even if technically “found” properly, it should not have been assigned “great weight,” as the judge said she did here.  (10T 33-11)  Resentencing should be ordered so that factor does not play the role that it did in this sentencing.  Finally, defendant at the time of sentencing was 35 years old with two prior non-violent third-degree convictions.  (PSR 8)  While, obviously, that prior record is an aggravating factor to be considered against defendant, assigning it “great weight” in calculating the appropriate sentence was overkill.  (10T 37-1 to 23)  There is nothing in defendant’s past record that warrants “great weight” in fashioning a sentence against him and a remand for resentencing should be ordered where that factor plays a more appropriate role in the sentencing decision.  CONCLUSION  For all of the reasons set forth in Points I through III, the defendant’s convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.
[directive] State Law Enforcement Officers.  In all cases involving state law enforcement officers, the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice shall review all reports detailing conducted energy device firings/discharges.  The Director or his designee shall within 7 days of the device’s firing/discharge prepare a memorandum or letter indicating whether the Director concurs or disagrees with the findings of the Superintendent or chief executive of the department as to the propriety of the firing/discharge(s).  The Director may delay the issuance of the memorandum or letter when the Director believes that an incident requires further investigation to determine whether the -14- [DCJ 03/03/16] firing/discharge(s) complied with this supplemental policy.  The Director may conduct any such further investigation, or may direct the Superintendent or chief executive of the department to do so.  The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice shall report to the Attorney General on the propriety of the firing/discharge(s).
[brief] I.  [...] VIOLATED OPRA BY DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OPRA REQUEST AND DEMANDING THAT HE PROVIDE A SUBJECT MATTER OR KEYWORD  “An informed citizenry is essential to a well-functioning democracy. ”  Paff v. Twp. of Galloway, 229 N.J. 340, 357 (2017).  This State has a long “history of commitment to public participation in government” and a “tradition favoring the public’s right to be informed about governmental actions. ”  South Jersey Pub. Co. Inc. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 124 N.J. 478, 487 (1991).  OPRA’s promise of accessible records enables “citizens and the media [to] play a watchful role in curbing wasteful government spending and guarding against corruption and misconduct. ”  Sussex Commons Assoc., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 541 (2012) (quoting Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009).  In fact, OPRA’s “bedrock principle” is that “our government works best when its activities are well-known to the public it serves. ”  Burnett, 198 N.J. at 414.  OPRA provides that “any limitations on the right of access . . . shall be construed in favor of the public’s right of access. ”  N.J.S.A. 47:1A–1 (emphasis added).  At all times, the public agency bears the burden of proving that its response to an OPRA request is lawful.
[brief] ”  This is the exact point advanced by the State herein, i.e., there was no deficient performance because “expert testimony would [not] have been helpful” to defendant.  (Db43).  “error committed” was of such severity “as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached. ”  Chew, 179 N.J. at 204.  Thus, defendant’s claim on this point fails.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.  Moreover, regarding the first prong of Strickland, because defendant’s theory of the case was that he did not possess a gun during the robbery attempt, any attempts by counsel to cross-examine the ballistics expert or to call a counter-expert simply would not have been meritorious.  See State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) (holding counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise meritless arguments).  C.  Trial Counsel Was Effective With Regard to Jury Voir Dire.
[brief] Despite the State’s continuing efforts to confuse and complicate matters, this is a straightforward case:  1.  The New Jersey Constitution guarantees students T&E; 2. The state is ultimately responsible for assuring that; 3.  [...] is the vehicle the State has chosen to assure that every district, including [...], has enough funding to guarantee that its students receive T&E; 4.  To accomplish this, [...] has to be fully funded and periodically evaluated and, if need be, adjusted to assure that every district, in respect of its particular circumstances, (in [...]’s case, its concededly unique demographic circumstances) has enough assured funding for its students;;  5.  [...] students are being denied T & E; 6.  This court remanded the matter to the Commissioner for one explicit purpose—to consider the [...] students’ argument that [...] was the reason for their denial of T&E; 7.  Instead of responding to that judicial mandate, the State has sought to place the blame entirely on the local district in direct contradiction of more than 50 years of New Jersey Supreme Court jurisprudence that the State is ultimately accountable for T&E, and for doing everything necessary to achieve that end.
[brief] In addition, an ascertainable loss—which is necessary for a private action under the CFA—exists.  N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  *Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2, 22 (1994) held that a victim “must simply supply an estimate of damages, calculated within a reasonable degree of certainty.  The victim is not required to actually spend the money for the repairs before becoming entitled to press a claim. ”  The unconsented-to release of private, protected information has left the Plaintiff (and other consumers) vulnerable to identity theft.  As such, obtention of credit monitoring and ID theft protection is a necessary and reasonable expense—and an ascertainable loss—in response to the Defendants’ unlawful actions.  We do acknowledge that *DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman*, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013) seems to exclude third-party debt collectors from the scope of FDCPA.  There, the court reasoned that a third-party debt collector is not a party to any “sale” of “merchandise” as those terms are defined in the CFA.  *Id.* at 339.  But *DepoLink* is inconsistent with *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc.*’s confirmation that the CFA’s scope extends to “subsequent performance” which includes conduct seeking to enforce a covered credit transaction.  Furthermore, *DepoLink* relied on *Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C.*, 777 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D.N.J. 2011) and did not mention *Gonzalez*.  *Chulsky*, aside from being non-binding, was issued before—and, therefore, never considered—*Gonzalez*, 207 N.J. at 582, which cited *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc.* for the CFA’s application to the collection activities of a servicing agent.  Based on the foregoing, the dismissal of the non-FDCPA claims should also be reversed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (“I understand that there are allegations of unauthorized expenditures and disbursements . . . that in the aggregate exceed $7.5 million.  If these allegations are true . . . Da781).  Given the fact that [...]’s threshold premise is that the transactions in question were “unauthorized,” it is mystifying that [...] never testified that was the case.  Plaintiffs have identified no statements from him that would supply the crucial factual premise that all the transactions were orchestrated without his approval.
[brief] The municipal court judge didn’t see the logic in this, that if a car is driving closely behind you, that the car in front is probably going the same speed or less.[4T:30-(13-25)-4T:31-(1-16)]  *State v. Marquez*, 202 N.J. 485, 506 n.8 (N.J. 2010) ("It is not for the courts to rewrite those statutes and substitute a different approach.")  Therefore, I neither violated the failure to maintain lane statute nor the failure to move over statute.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  February 28, 2023  Order  Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as to the [...] and [...] ..........Pa3 February 28, 2023  Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as to [...] and [...] .................................................................Pa19 February 28, 2023  Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as to [...] and [...].............................................Pa21 February 28, 2023  Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as to the [...] ........................................Pa23
[brief] On April 7, 2022, a Burlington County Grand Jury returned Indictment [...], charging defendant with one count of unlawful possession of a weapon under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), a crime of the second degree, for knowingly having in her possession, on or about October 31, 2020, in Medford Township, New Jersey, a “Glock 42 .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol” (serial number ACPU932) without first having obtained a permit to carry the same as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.  (Da8).  On July 15, 2022, defendant applied to the Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI) Program, despite a presumption against her admission due to the nature of the crime, see R. 3:28-1(d)(1).  (Da25).  On September 20, 2022, the State denied her application, explaining that defendant had failed to establish compelling reasons to overcome the presumption excluding her from PTI.  Ibid.  On March 23, 2023, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that her conviction violated the Second Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  (Da26-27).  She also moved in the alternative to compel her admission into PTI.  (Da26).  On May 30, 2023, [...] heard argument.  (1T).  On June 21, 2023, he denied both motions.  (Da23).  [...] provided his reasons for the denial in a memorandum, in which he explained that the State had not abused its discretion in denying defendant’s PTI application, (Da30), and that neither the Second Amendment “nor the Full Faith and Credit Clause, alone or in conjunction, prevent[s] the State … from prosecuting the Defendant … for unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). ” (Da28).  On July 24, 2023, defendant pleaded guilty, while reserving her right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment.  (Da9).  On September 22, 2023, [...] entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced defendant to three years of probation.  (Da15).  On November 6, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal.  (Da18-21).  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (Pb9).  In *Ensslin*, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  *Ensslin*, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  *Ibid.*  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.
[brief] From the very beginning of the trial in this matter, [...] and his attorney were objecting to the so-called 21 bankers boxes in the court room in full view of the jury.  Specifically, beginning on page 14 of the 11/29/2022 Transcript, from the very first day of trial, [...]’s attorney noted the following even before any jury selection was done.  [...], Cohen’s attorney, complained that the 21 boxes in the line of sight of the jury would be prejudicial.  (2T Pg. 14, lines 13-21).  He further complained that the 21 boxes would tend to bias the jury and bend the case in favor of [...], (2T Pg. 15, lines 4-10).  He also said that the boxes will likely contain “duplicates…several duplicates.  So it looks a lot more voluminous” and again pointed out how prejudicial that would be.  (2T, Pg. 16, lines 16-25).  [...] allowed the 21 boxes to remain in the courtroom (2T Pg. 18, line 4).  On December 1, the matter was raised again by [...]’s attorney, [...].  By that time the boxes had been opened and the contents set in “piles and piles of documents” on the defense table which was clearly prejudicial.  And he asked that they, not being in evidence, be removed.  [...] overruled the objection, allowing the piles of documents to stay.  3T, Pg. 29, line 13 – pg. 30, line 20.  These are but two examples of several that show that [...]’s attorney repeatedly argued that both the boxes and their contents could prejudice the jury by their sheer volume without showing any more detail of what is actually contained in the documents.  As [...]’s attorney stated: “it would be prejudicial for the jury to view such piles and piles of documents with the indication they’re related to work done for his case,” (3T Pg. 29, lines 19-21) and “some of these will probably be duplicates of transcripts, several duplicates.  So it looks a lot more voluminous than what the actual work might have been. ” (2T, pg. 16, lines 17-20).  The entire time that the 21 boxes and piles and piles of documents had been sitting in front of the jury they had never been admitted into evidence until December 2, 2022, (as recorded at 5T, Pg. 60, line 20).
[brief] On March 15, 2021, Defendant [...] filed its Answer to the FAC and on March 17, 2021, Defendant [...] filed its own respective Answer to the FAC.  (Pa23 to Pa36; Pa37 to Pa47).  On August 26, 2022, Defendant [...] and the Defendant [...] filed respective motions for summary judgment on October 4, 2022, and [...] filed opposition.  (Pa52).  The lower court heard argument on December 16, 2022 and rendered its decision granting the Defendants’ motions on December 23, 2023.2 (Pa48 to Pa93; IT3:20-24).  --- 2  “1T” refers to the transcript of the oral argument held on December 16, 2022.  “2T” refers to the transcript of the deposition of [...] dated May 2, 2022.  “3T” refers to the transcript of the deposition of [...] dated July 21, 2022.  “4T” refers to the transcript of the October 20, 2020 meeting of the [...] of Long Branch Planning Board.  “5T” refers to the transcript of the November 10, 2020 meeting of the [...] of Long Branch Planning Board.  “6T” refers to the transcript of the November 12, 2020 meeting of the [...] Council.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] See 14548a-67a, 14593a-99a, 39036a-37a, 39149a-154a; 39165a-67a, 39171a-73a, 39179a-39494a-39360a.  NJRICO  Fee awards are not, as the [...] speciously suggest, contingent upon how many RICO claims a party does or does not assert.  (Db12)
[brief] (Da61; 391).  From the information that [...] has obtained, however, there is evidence of [...] acting on behalf of the “[...]. ”  In an October 6, 1992 letter from the President of [...] to a homeowner, the President advised that she spoke with [...] “who said that we could \(^3\)  Other than the NJDEP agreement discussed above, there is no other evidence suggesting the [...] and/or [...] otherwise compromised their (or their heirs’) rights of reverter to certain properties conveyed to [...] on the condition that it implement and enforce the Genesis Deed’s restrictions and [...]’s rules and by-laws.  approve plans before he did. ”  (Da607).  Then, in a July 17, 1998 letter on behalf of the “[...],” [...] advised a property owner that the Developer does not have the power to change the club’s by-laws nor deed restrictions.  The above mentioned setbacks can be approved or disapproved as is the right of the developer per said restrictions.  Furthermore, as you are aware, the club grounds committee under Article IX, Section 4 of the by-laws, must pass on all building permits.  Simply put this means that any applicant seeking a building permit must obtain both the Developers’ and the Club’s approval.  (Da623).  The trial court’s premature grant of partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs deprived [...] of the ability to seek further documentary and testimonial discovery from [...], the [...], [...], [...] Limited Partnership, [...], LLC, and their respective heirs, successors, or assigns.  G.
[brief] On the one hand, [...] seeks to undertake a redevelopment of its Bayshore to bring mixed-use to the area.  The primary goals are to “stir economic development, make the area a destination; and preserve its environmental value. ”  Should this vision come to fruition via a future development project that garners all required approvals, with apologies to Joni Mitchell, [...] hopes a Developer builds a paradise, by razing a parking lot.  •  On the other hand (the Plaintiff) seeks to preserve the long-standing use of a parking lot, arguing that the plan is inconsistent with the [...]’s 1988 Master Plan to such an extent that [...]’s adoption of the Plan was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[directive] It is recommended that the Basic Recruit Course and In-Service training curriculum approved by the [...] include performance objectives and resource material pertaining to State and local resources that provide the above-stated services.  The curriculum should also ensure that law enforcement officials are sensitive to the needs of victims and are informed, knowledgeable and supportive of existing laws, services and programs for victims.  [...] and the 24-hour victim-witness hotline of the [...] can also provide resource information on the above-stated services.  B.  Victims should be accompanied to line-ups, photo review sessions, body identifications and medical examinations required for evidence.  C.  Victim interviews shall be conducted in as secure, private and pleasant surroundings as are available.  D.  The victim shall be allowed to use the telephone at the police station.  E.  When possible, an interpreter should be made available where the victim does not speak English or is hearing impaired.  COMMENTARY
[directive] Page 7  a.  House, place, or otherwise detain individuals in line with their gender identity or expression, regardless of the gender that individual was assigned at birth and/or their anatomical characteristics unless they request otherwise as laid out in Part II.C.2.  In other words, a transgender woman shall be housed with other women, unless she requests otherwise (see Part II.C.2), and a transgender man shall be housed with other men, unless he requests otherwise (see Part II.C.2).  b.  Permit individuals to use restrooms consistent with their gender identity or expression, regardless of the gender that individual was assigned at birth and/or their anatomical characteristics.  2.  If a facility has available private cells and/or restrooms, law enforcement shall not:  a.  Refuse to accommodate a request by transgender, non-binary, or gender non- conforming individuals to have a private cell or to use a private restroom, where safety.8 doing so is practicable and ensures that individual’s  The denial of such request must, where practicable, be reviewed and approved by a supervisor.  The denial shall be documented in writing.  b.  Require someone to be housed, placed, or otherwise detained in a private cell or to use a private restroom on the basis of that person’s actual or perceived gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation, absent such a request.  3.  Law enforcement officers shall never deny transgender individuals access to any items (including clothing, personal property, and appearance-related items, like prosthetics, bras, wigs, undergarments, chest binders, and cosmetic items) and/or any programming (including educational programming) that they would allow a cisgender individual of the same gender identity to have, regardless of the gender that individual was assigned at birth and/or their anatomical characteristics.  D.