ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  [Pa346a]  On November 27, 2012, [...]’s counsel provided a certification from the employee who received the $7,500 bonus, letters disbursing outstanding client funds, and the client ledger card for the $100,000 settlement.  The client ledger card reiterated [...]’s prior statements that the $30,000 fee had been disbursed to the employee ($7,500) and the Firm ($22,500).  [Pa348]  The demand audit was held on December 4, 2012.  [Pa347a]  [...] “reiterated that the $30,000 fee was disbursed to [the employee] ($7,500) and [the Firm] ($22,500). ”  [Id.]  The [...] was satisfied with [...]’s explanation and did not issue any charges in connection with the overdraft.
[brief] THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY ELIMINATED THE CONDITION OF THE ROUTE 33 SIGNAL (M477-513).  The resolution of the SHO (the "SHO Resolution"), in part, granting relief from the LDO requirement for the Route 33 Signal; as adopted by the Order of the Trial Court (the "2022 Order"), was improper.  The SHO Resolution concludes that the Respondents are not required to provide the Route 33 Signal.  The primary issue at the hearing concerning the Respondents' Site Plan revolved around traffic issues associated with impact of the Respondents' development on Route 33 and the neighboring intersections.  The 2020 Order provided the SHO to retain any experts necessary to consider the Site Plan Application; specifically providing:  I.  In the event the [SHO] requires additional expertise by separate expert review of the Plaintiffs’ site plan, the [SHO] may engage such additional experts as the [SHO] deems appropriate, upon notice and consultation with the Court and all parties, the fees and costs for which shall be borne equally by the Plaintiffs and the Township; M6.  Despite the fact that the 2020 Order provided the SHO with the ability to retain any necessary professionals to assist with reviewing the Respondents’ site plan application, the SHO did not engage an independent traffic expert and chose to adopt the opinions of Respondents’ professionals and reject the opinion of Board’s and Township’s professionals without identifying the basis for his decision.  The SHO Resolution concludes that no evidence was presented that the Route 33 Signal is necessary for public health and safety; and that the site can function with a right-in/right-out driveway on Route 33.  However, this conclusion ignores the facts adduced by the Board’s Traffic Expert, [...], during his cross-examination of [...], as well as the direct testimony of Mr. Watson.  See generally 5T186 to 5T205.  Mr. Watson identified the detrimental effects associated with the failure to install the Route 33 Signal; including the resultant impacts on both the Applegarth Intersection and the intersection of Route 33 and Twin Rivers Drive.
[brief] ” (Db16).  [...]’s argument misses the mark for three reasons.  First, [...] misconstrues the term “conflict” to mean that which the law forbids.  In other words, [...] believes that a statute or judicial decision must render a policy term unenforceable for that term to conflict with state law.  But [...]’s policy fails to define “conflict,” so the term’s “plain and ordinary meaning” must govern.  *AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins.*, 256 N.J. 294, 312 (2024).  And the word “conflict” simply means “to be different. ”\(^1\)  Because the policy’s limitations period is shorter, and thus different, than the statute of limitations, the latter must apply under the policy’s conformity to law provision.  Second, [...]’s alternative definition for “conflict,” if valid, merely confirms that “the policy language fairly supports two meanings, one that favors the insurer, and the other that favors the insured. ”  *Villa v. Short*, 195 N.J. 15, 23 (2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  On that basis, “the policy should be construed to sustain coverage. ”  *Id.*  Third, [...] invites this Court to rewrite the policy in a way that renders the conformity to law provision meaningless.
[brief] A. Fraud (Da64-69) ...............................................................................................  59  B. Fraudulent Conveyance (Da7-9, not addressed by the Trial Court) ..............  64  C.  Conspiracy To Commit Fraud/Civil Conspiracy (Da 5-6, not addressed by the Trial Court)  .................................................................67  D. Punitive Damages (Da10, Da72).  ......................................................69  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................72
[brief] Da76 February 24, 2023, Order to Show Cause entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. setting forth the return Date .................................................................  Da85  April 11, 2023, [...]’s Answer with counterclaim for docket number [...] .........................  Da89 April 18, 2023, [...]’s Answer to [...]’s counterclaim for docket number [...] .........................  Da98 May 12, 2023, Order for consolidation entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C ........................................
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................1  I.  Respondents Misrepresent the Relief [...] Seeks (1a) ..............................................1  II.  The Borough’s Failure to Follow Its Own Process Resulted in an Arbitrary, Capricious, and Unreasonable Result (1a)  .................................................................3  III.  Pangaea Is Analogous and a Guiding Published Precedent (1a)  .......................6  CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................................................8
[brief] (Pa099).  Because the proposed height of the structure (44.9’) exceeds the maximum allowable height in the zone (35’) by more than 10%, the height variance measured in feet was a d.  (6)  variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 d. (whereas the height variance measured in stories was a c. variance).  (Pa099).  Uncontested Proofs Received by the [...]
[brief] THE ENTIRETY OF THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE STATE IS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A CONVICTION OF RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, EVEN GIVING THE STATE THE BENEFIT OF ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES.  Defendant maintains that the trial court erred when it denied Defendant's motion for judgement of acquittal on the single guilty verdict of reckless manslaughter under N.J. Stat. 2C:11-4b(1) pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 3:18-2.
[brief] **  On April 11, 2016, [...], [...], [...] [...] and [...] shared derogatory flyers about [...] via email.  (Pa685).  - **Proof of Pretext.**  Spoliation - the computer hard drives of these individuals were allegedly destroyed well after this lawsuit was filed making impossible the retrieval of evidence regarding the derogatory flyers.  (Pa686).  A jury could find that destruction of evidence supports [...]’s claim of a retaliatory motive.
[brief] For the reasons set forth in this brief, the trial court’s orders suppressing the statements made during the recorded phone calls should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for the Defendant-Respondent BY: /s/ [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 379212021  Dated: November 22, 2024  AMENDED REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] (4T 127-2 to 24; 128-13).  Seven bullet casings were found in the roadway near the [...] home and one bullet was found in [...]’s car, all of which matched [...]’s gun.  (2T 76-14, 86-19 to 87-13, 1269-1 to 25)  The bullet that killed [...] did not match [...]’s gun.  (4T 9-1 to 18-10, 24-9 to 10., 60-1 to 69-10).
[brief] Although [...] did not testify, the State introduced a jail call in which [...] stated that “it was an accident,” he was only “trying to scare them,” and he “didn’t know it was going to hit. ”  (7T166-9 to 17).  Moreover, the improbable nature of the incident as described by [...]—that [...] grabbed a gun with one hand while driving on the highway, rolled down the front passenger window with his elbow, placed the car in neutral, got out of his seat and leaned out of the passenger window on the opposite side of the car, and fired from his car going approximately fifty miles per hour into another moving car also going around fifty files per hour—further suggests that there was no actual intent to shoot and kill anyone in the car because no reasonable person would believe he would actually hit someone. \(^3\)  Lastly, there was substantial testimony about [...]’s mental health struggles and paranoid delusions, further suggesting he might not have acted with intent to kill but as a more reckless response to the delusions.  Accordingly, there was legitimate basis for charging the various manslaughter offenses, and a real chance that a reasonable jury may have convicted [...] on one of those offenses over purposeful murder.
[brief] H604a Holm-75: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-72: no reconsideration of the proposal since the issuance of the EMP (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H605a Holm-76: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-73, re provision of information to Holmdel officials on need for the proposed station before Zoning Board application (SOICR p. 12) .......  H606a Holm-77: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-74, re treatment of costs of project in any rate (SOICR p. 12) ............  H607a Holm-78: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-75, when project costs would be added to rate base (SOICR p. 12) ........ H608a Holm-79: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-76: objected to providing data on any recently completed regulator station as to adding costs to the rate base (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS’ CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY “RATIFICATION” OF THE LEASE (Decided below at 2T27-19 – 2T28-12)  The trial court’s ruling that the [...] are somehow precluded from asserting fraud claims because they signed the Agreement containing the unlawful charge-back provision is incorrect.  Our Supreme Court directly rejected such a notion in holding that “acceptance of a renewal lease should not bar tenants from later challenging the reasonableness of a term contained therein. ”  *447 Assocs. v. Miranda*, 115 N.J. 522, 532 (1989); see also *Hous. Auth. & Urban Redevelopment Agency of City of Atl. City v. Spratley*, 327 N.J. Super. 246, 252 (App. Div. 1999) (“by signing the lease, defendants would not be waiving their right to challenge the…provision”).  Relatedly, our Courts have consistently recognized that “tenants must be afforded a forum to challenge the reasonableness of lease clauses on which landlords rely for purposes of summary dispossess proceedings. ”  *Green*, 215 N.J. at 454.  The trial court’s ruling on this issue also misapplies the ruling in *Ajamian v. Schlanger*, 20 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 1952), which decided the narrow issue of whether ratification precludes the equitable remedy of rescission..  *Id.* at 249.  There is no rescission at play here, and so *Ajamian* is wholly inapplicable.  *See Highlands* Ins. Co. v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 373 F.3d 347, 356 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing Ajamian in noting that New Jersey Supreme Court caselaw suggests that even if a party ratifies a contract, that does not foreclose a party from bringing all tort and contract claims, as compared with just precluding the party from seeking the equitable remedy of rescission) (citing Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184, 199 (1963)).
[directive] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] 1st & 3rd Monday (Shared Services) [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] 2nd & 4th Thursday [...] [...] [...] Wednesday (Shared Services) [...] [...] Tuesdays, 1st & 3rd [...] [...] [...] Thursday (Shared Services) [...] [...] [...], ext. Mondays, 2nd [...] [...] [...] Thursday (Shared Servies)
[brief] Kramer, supra, 45 N.J. at 296. ”  Id. at 314.  Fundamentally, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of local officials.  Id.  It is not the role of a reviewing court to determine whether the decision of a local board was wise or unwise.  Kaufmann v. Planning Bd., Warren Tp., 110 N.J. 551, 558 (1988).
[brief] The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA) provides that a “majority representative of public employees in an appropriate unit shall be entitled to act for and to negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit[.]”  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.  It further states that “[w]hen an agreement is reached on the terms and conditions of employment, it shall be embodied in writing and signed by the authorized representatives of the public employer and the majority representative. ”  Ibid.  The EERA mandates that “collective agreements in the public sector include provisions for grievance procedures through which the employees may appeal ‘the interpretation, application or violation of policies, agreements, and administrative decisions ... affecting them. ’”  Troy v. Rutgers, 168 N.J. 354, 379 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3).  Additionally, the grievance procedures established in the agreement “shall be utilized for any dispute covered by the terms of such agreement[,]” and the EERA explicitly permits binding arbitration.
[brief] (39T:167-17 to 168-18; 172-3 to 14).  When he opened it, he saw several layers of white plastic bags inside.  (39T:171-16 to 172-14).  Another officer cut through the interior bags, revealing what he thought looked like a piece of cooked meat.  (39T:172-3 to 173-5; 175-8 to 11).  Believing the contents were not relevant to the search, the officers put the purse back on the ground.  (39T:172-19 to 173-5).  Around midnight that evening, [...] looked more closely at the bag and believed it might contain human bones.
[brief] Even if Appellant’s claims were not barred by the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order, which they are, Appellant’s claims are precluded by *res judicata*.  \(^{28}\)  Although the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order carved out claims by individuals who paid money to the defendants for actual damage, Plaintiff asserts no such claims here, including to the extent he seeks statutory damages for the asserted class only.  (Pa1-Pa18).  A plaintiff is barred from asserting a cause of action based on *res judicata* where: (1) a final disposition is reached on the merits in a prior action; (2) the prior action involved the same parties or their privies; and (3) the subsequent suit is based on the same transaction or occurrence as the earlier action.
[brief] This venerable state statute expressly prohibits unlawful discrimination in places of public accommodation; extends this prohibition to schools; includes discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity or expression; and extends to both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories alike.  See supra at 4-5; N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l); N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f).  The LAD also expressly grants the State authority to seek relief enjoining ongoing or future statutory violations, as it did here.  See supra at 5-6, 15-16; (Da119-22a) (trial court confirming this well-established right to relief); N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 (authorizing State to “proceed in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” against a defendant violating the LAD after it files an administrative complaint against that entity); Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8 (same); Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370, 374-75 (Law Div. 1987) (preliminarily enjoining actions while LAD administrative claim remained pending).  Settled law thus recognizes both the kind of claim alleged and the type of remedy sought.  Appellants misconstrue the “well-settled right” test.  Appellants treat this prong as requiring that there be precedent already resolving all the issues in the case—meaning, as relevant here, “LAD precedent or statutory provision on the issue of parental notification policies versus the rights of LGBTQ+ students under the LAD. ” (Db8).  But this court’s cases have long made clear that the inquiry is whether the underlying body of law is settled, not whether the outcome of a specific lawsuit is already settled.
[brief] IMPORTANT:  PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN HOW CLAIMS BETWEEN YOU AND [...] CAN BE BROUGHT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (SEE SECTION 2 BELOW).  PLEASE REVIEW THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BELOW CAREFULLY, AS IT REQUIRES YOU TO RESOLVE ALL DISPUTES WITH [...] ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND, WITH LIMITED EXCEPTIONS, THROUGH FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION (AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 2 BELOW).  BY ENTERING INTO THIS AGREEMENT, YOU EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT AND HAVE TAKEN TIME TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS IMPORTANT DECISION.  (Da80–81).
[brief] The within matter was initiated by the Plaintiffs via Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause on June 19, 2015 with respect to a request to Defendants pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (hereinafter referred to as “OPRA”), *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, et seq.*  Specifically, the action sought access to copies of: “(1) all settlements entered into by the Board in NJOAL EDS docketed case from January 1, 2013 to present; (2) any final decisions incorporating or pertaining to item #1; (3) May 1, 2014, any purchase orders, vouchers, bills, invoices and canceled checks for payment(s) made for legal services rendered to the board in regards to LR OPRA Request of 5/17/15 and the subsequent civil action of [...]; and (4) any Board Resolution(s) which refers to items #1.
[brief] The first time the Judge used these terms interchangeably in his opinion was:  Subparagraph B deals with liability for people that are on railroad property.  I read that to include, even though you don’t want me to, if you read paragraph A it deals with prohibiting people from using railroad property, or any right of way of any railroad.  (T17 22 – T18 1).  The first sentence of this excerpt suggests that section B of the Railroad Immunity statute is specific to instances where people are on railroad property.  This is incorrect.  Sections B (1), (2), and (3) are railroad immunities that are available to railroads anywhere where a person would be contacted by railroad equipment, regardless of the location.  This is obvious in the language of those sections.  Section B(4) applies to incidents that occur on railroad “rights of way” and not on railroad property.  This is apparent on a plain language reading of this section which immunizes railroads for violations of section A of the statute.  Section A of the statute expressly only refers to “rights of way” and not railroad property.  In fact, the only clause of section B that immunizes a railroad for conduct that occurs on railroad property is section B(5).  A plain reading of this unambiguously immunizes a railroad from certain conduct that occurs on railroad property.  Thus, the Motion Judge was incorrect when he stated that the entirety of section B deals with liability on railroad property.
[brief] Since the Notice of Appeal did not name [...] as an interested party, on August 30, 2021, [...] filed a motion to intervene in the appeal pursuant to R. 4:33.  Appellants opposed [...]’s motion to intervene.  [...]’s motion to intervene was denied on September 23, 2021, as was its motion for reconsideration and motion for permissive intervention on October 25, 2021.  On November 12, 2021, [...] filed a motion for leave to appeal with the New Jersey Supreme Court challenging the denial of its motions to intervene.  The New Jersey Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on February 11, 2022 and issued an Order on April 11, 2022 remanding the case back to the Appellate Division to allow Appellants to file an amended Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement naming [...] as an interested party.
[brief] Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“[...]”) respectfully submits this memorandum of law in opposition to the appeal filed by [...] [...] (“[...]”).  [...] seeks reversal of the trial court’s Order granting rescission of a commercial general liability policy, with a non-owned/hired auto supplement, that was procured based on misrepresentations.  As a threshold matter, the [...] has no standing to be before this Court.
[brief] Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ ii  INTEREST OF AMICUS ..............................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS  .........................................................................................3  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................4  I.  PRIOR ORDERS OF THE DEPARTMENT AND THE HEARING OFFICERS’ REPORTS DO NOT SUPPORT THE DEPARTMENT’S CONTENTION THAT THE BULLETIN IS CONSISTENT WITH PAST AND CURRENT PRACTICE  .................................................................4  II.  THE DEPARTMENT’S BULLETIN CONSTITUTES IMPROPER RULEMAKING AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROCEDURALLY REGULAR .....................................................8 CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................12 ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **In re Consider Distribution of Casino Simulcasting Special Fund** | | | *(Accumulated in 2005)* | 11 | | 398 N.J. Super 7 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Main St. Assocs. v. N.J. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Agency,** | 12 | | 114 N.J. 226 (1989) | | | **Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n,** | 9, 10 | | 97 N.J. 313 (1984) | | | **Myers v. County of Somerset,** | 10 | | 515 F. Supp. 2d 492 (D.N.J. 2007) | | | **In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 Et Seq.,** | 12 | | 431 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2013) | | | **In re Provision of Basic Generation Service Period Beginning June 1**| | | 2008, | 11 | | 205 N.J. 339 (N.J. 2011) | | | **Matter of Repeal N.J.A.C. 6:28,** | 8 | | 204 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1985) | | | **Estate of Skorski v. New Jersey Economic Development Authority,** | 9 | | No. A-3314-17T2, 2019 WL 1304010 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 20, 2019)| | | **Whelan v. N.J. Power & Light Co.,** | 3 | | 45 N.J. 237 (1965) | | | **Wright v. Owens Corning,** | 11 | | 679 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2012) | | INTEREST OF AMICUS
[brief] Since the early 1990s the Borough has maintained a regulatory scheme for noise.  On April 4, 2017, the Borough adopted Ordinance No. 05-2017, an ordinance amending Chapter 146, “Nuisances,” Article II, “Nose Nuisances” of the Code of the [...].  Da64.  Plaintiffs brought the within action on May 18, 2017, seeking a declaration that Ordinance No. 05-2017 was void because it was allegedly (1) arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, (2) did not comply with the New Jersey Noise Control Act, N.J.S.A. § 13:1G-1 et seq. and (3) was unconstitutionally vague.