ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **Point I: The Trial Judge Was Correct In Remanding All Claims to Binding No-Fault Arbitration and Dismissing the Complaint and No Mistake of Law or Abuse of Discretion Occurred.**  New Jersey has a long and robust history of favoring alternative dispute resolution in lieu of court proceedings for a wide variety of legal matters.  The Appellate Division as far back as 1996, affirmed “. . . our firm policy favoring prompt and efficient resolution of PIP disputes without resort to the judicial process. ”  See, State Farm Mut. Auto v. Molino, 289 N.J. Super. 406 (1996)(citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-16); see, Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500 , 516 (1994) (noting that the reduction of court congestion is one of "the overwhelming goals" of our no-fault scheme); Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 86 N.J. 100, 107(1981)(same);Crocker, supra, 288 N.J. Super. at 257-58(same).  This construction also comports with New Jersey's long-standing and strong public policy favoring arbitration in general.  See Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179 , 186 (1981).  With regard to No-Fault disputes in particular, in 1972, the New Jersey Legislature adopted the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (“No-Fault Law”), which mandated that automobile insurers, regardless of fault, provide personal injury protection (“PIP Benefits”) to motorists involved in automobile accidents.  Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick, LLC, 143 A.3d 254, 261 (N.J. 2016).  In 1983, the Legislature revised the No-Fault Law in the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“AICRA”) to require PIP Benefits disputes to be resolved through arbitration rather than through the courts.
[brief] Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: __s/ [...]_________  NADINE KRONIS  Assistant Deputy Public Defender ID No. 404802022  Honorable Judges:  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b), this letter brief is submitted in lieu of a formal brief on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS ..................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I  THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE  BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS SEIZED PURSUANT TO A LAWFUL AND JUDICIALLY AUTHORIZED SEARCH WARRANT.  (Pa4; 1T11-4 to 25-24)  .......  1 CONCLUSION
[brief] (See Appellant Br., 32–25.)  However, [...] relies on a series of cases involving website and click-wrap agreements.  See id.  In the process, [...] ignores that in Heller—a case that he heavily relied on in the trial court and now relies on again on appeal—this Court held both that “[w]hether an arbitration agreement was formed is determined under general contract principles,” and that courts cannot “subject an arbitration agreement to more burdensome requirements than those governing the formation of other contracts. ”  2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 464, at *9.  Moreover, [...]’s position is specious.  [...] relies on Rockel v. Cherry Hill Dodge, where this Court declined to enforce an arbitration provision that appeared only in small print, on the reverse side of the retail installment contract at issue.  See 368 N.J. Super. 577, 585-86 (App. Div. 2004).  The Court held that “the arbitration provisions in the retail installment contract are difficult to locate and, once found, onerous to read in light of the small size of the print. ”  Id. at 586.  Those issues do not exist here.  In the DAA Table of Contents, the words “Resolving Disputes Through Arbitration” appear in bold-face type and instruct readers where exactly they can find that provision (i.e., on pages 36-37).  (PA093.)  Then, on page 36, the words “Business Accounts Only: Resolving Disputes Through Arbitration” appear in a much larger typeface, with specific arbitration terms called out in the left-hand margin, in bold typeface.  (PA126.)  [...] has not cited any case holding that this type of placement or typeface are problematic.  Thus, his argument (which was not well-developed and, for the reasons stated above, should not be considered) fails.  [...] remains bound by the DAA and must arbitrate his claims.
[brief] Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa303)  Discovery Checklist dated 5/5/2020 (Attached at Pa070)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa022)  Police Department Record of Booking 2/20/22 (Attached at Pa074)  Exhibit M to Certification of [...]  Letter to [...] 5/5/2023  Exhibit N to Certification of Renaud  Email with [...]  Dropbox Link Reply Brief filed by [...] 10/02/2023  Order for Summary Judgment 10/06/2023
[brief] (Raised Below Da001-002, 1T35:10-38:20).  Disqualification of counsel is a harsh discretionary remedy which must be used sparingly. ”  Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 334 N.J. Super. 557, 572 (App. Div. 2000).  “Generally, motions to disqualify are disfavored because they ‘can have such drastic consequences. ’”  Twenty-First Century Rail Corp. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 419 N.J. Super. 343, 357 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 206 N.J. 37 (2011) (quoting Rohm & Haas Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 187 F.Supp.2d 221, 226 (D.N.J. 2001)).  “To be resolved in favor of disqualification, the party seeking disqualification must carry a ‘heavy burden’ and must meet a ‘high standard of proof’ before a lawyer is disqualified. ”  Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Crossland Sav., 944 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993)).  In the matter at hand, the trial court erred in disqualifying [...] because the Respondents have failed to carry their heavy burden in identifying and properly articulating any direct, concurrent conflict of interest between [...] and [...].
[directive] 1  2 Definitions ............................................................................................................................................. 2  3 Deciding Whether to Pursue .................................................................................................................  4  4 Role of the Pursuing Officer .................................................................................................................. 7  5  Vehicular Pursuit Restrictions ...............................................................................................................  8  6  Authorized Tire Deflation Devices ......................................................................................................  10  7  Role of the Supervisor .........................................................................................................................  12  8  Role of Police Communications ..........................................................................................................  13  9  Reinstating Pursuits ............................................................................................................................  13  10  Interjurisdictional Pursuits .................................................................................................................. 13  11  Vehicular Pursuit Reporting ................................................................................................................ 14  12  Vehicular Pursuit Review ....................................................................................................................  15  13  Training ...............................................................................................................................................  17  14  Individual Agency Policies ...................................................................................................................  17  1  Purpose of Policy
[brief] [Pa72].  Original Landlord sold and conveyed the Leased Premises to [...] by Deed dated March 11, 2020, and recorded on April 9, 2020, with the Hudson County Register of Deeds at Book 9481, Page 379.  [Pa4 at ¶ 5].  In connection with the sale, [...] executed an Addendum to Lease, dated March 9, 2020, in which it acknowledged [...]’s rights as the purchaser of the Leased Premises and as its new landlord (the “Addendum,” and with the Original Lease, the “Lease”).
[brief] In any event, towards the conclusion of the penultimate hearing on June 23, 2021, [...]’s counsel asked the Board to consider retroactivity.  12T:279:12-13, 281:25-282:2.  The Board Chairwoman asked the Board’s attorney to prepare an opinion and stated that the Board would be governed by its attorney’s advice.  11T:289:5-7, 291:8-22.  At the August 11, 2021 hearing, the Board’s attorney advised the Board that retroactivity in hardship cases is legally permissible.  However, the Board refused to consider a retroactive increase on the false basis that [...] had not briefed the issue.
[brief] ”  *See Baumann*, 95 N.J.  at 392; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Analogous to the violations of the FDCPA in *DeAngelo*, enforcement (or attempted enforcement) of debts made void by violations of the NJCFLA have been found to support affirmative claims under the FDCPA many times in recent years.  In *Veras v. [...]*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *16-19* (D.N.J. March 17, 2014), the District Court held that the plaintiff had properly alleged a claim under the FDCPA because [...] was not licensed under the NJCFLA.  The District Court further held that since the law required [...] to be licensed, [...] was not the lawful owner of the debt.
[brief] Jail credit of 1,089 days was received.  Counts Two through Four of the Amended Indictment were dismissed.  (4T13-6 to 25; Judgment of Conviction at Da13-15).  On October 12, 2023, an Amendment to the JOC was issued reflecting that defendant "is committed to the custody of the [...] for a term of 17 years, 85% NERA."
[brief] Therefore, the Supreme Court specifically mandating that evidence of a condition needs to be one that is sufficiently accepted within the psychiatric community and one to be found reliable in courtrooms is significant language that something more than lay testimony is necessary.  (Db 19; 4T:85-19 to 23).  As such, defendant’s brother telling a detective that defendant had mental health problems and had recently been hospitalized does not amount to evidence that would be sufficiently accepted by the psychiatric community to diagnose a mental illness.  In fact, it is hearsay evidence that would not be admissible in the first place.  Likewise, a “repeated mention” by detectives that defendant was wrapped in tin foil with a tin foil hat and that he did this often is also not the type of evidence that would be sufficiently accepted by the psychiatric community to diagnose a mental illness.  (Db 19-20).  To be sure, there was also lay testimony explaining defendant’s behavior.  [...] testified regarding defendant’s extreme weight loss (5T:15-17 to 23).  [...] testified to defendant’s obsessive exercise regimen.  (7T:14 to 24).  Further, testimony from [...] – a self-employed hair stylist – opining that defendant’s behavior was similar to that of her schizophrenic uncle is certainly not definitive evidence that defendant suffered from schizophrenia or any other similar mental health condition.  It is simply her own observation of her boyfriend’s behavior.  (Db 20; 7T:194-25 to 195-3).  Simply because a mental health condition was mentioned does not mean defendant suffered from it, nor does it mean the record is replete with evidence.  More is required than opinions about bizarre behavior.  As the trial court properly decided, charging the jury would on diminished capacity on a mental disease or defect that undiagnosed and for which there is no testimony would only serve to confuse the jury.
[brief] APPELLATE DIVISION’S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE APPELLATE RECORD  On May 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to supplement the appellate record with two emails that were among Plaintiffs’ Proposed Exhibits.  Appellant’s Motion [Trans. ID [...]]; (Pa735-36.)  Intervenor opposed the motion, explaining that the exhibits were the two, one-page emails, designated as P-14 and P-15, that were allegedly sent to the Planning Board and Governing Body.  See Intervenor’s Brief in Opposition [Trans. ID [...]] at 5-6; (Pa735-36.)  The Trial Court had denied Plaintiffs’ motion to include these exhibits on the grounds that they had waived their right to include them because they were not referenced in the trial briefing nor were they part of the record below before the Governing Body.  See Intervenor’s Brief in Opposition [Trans. ID [...]] at 5-6; (Pa79; Pa735-36.)  On June 12, 2024, this Court denied the motion on the grounds that at least one of the Plaintiffs was aware of the emails at the time of the trial and Plaintiffs did not show that inclusion of the emails was likely to affect the outcome of the appeal.  (Pa735-36.)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment To [...] and Denying [...]’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (raised below).  As a preliminary issue, [...] failed to comply with the written terms of the ROFR when it executed a complete contract for sale without first sending a copy of the offer to [...].  This initial breach had a cascading effect on the Parties’ subsequent actions.  It deprived [...] of an opportunity to evaluate the true market value of the Premises that took the ROFR into consideration.  In converting the offer into a fully executed contract without providing notice to [...], [...] also bound itself to a legal document that required that “[a]ny changes or additions to this Agreement must be made in writing and executed by the parties hereto. ”  Da063.  What could have been easily amended before the offer was accepted no longer sufficed as both [...] and [...] had to execute formal amendments to the PSA.  Without explanation, [...] hid the executed PSA from [...] for several months and then provided an unsigned copy of the PSA in a farcical attempt at compliance.  [...]’s unclean hands also extended to the PSA itself.  The PSA falsely stated that there was no ROFR on the Premises.  This misled [...] into believing that it was free to purchase the property without impinging on any third-party rights.  [...] was not aware of the ROFR’s existence until several months later, when [...] was finally provided with the PSA and objected to the incorrect terms.  [...]’s misrepresentation had to be corrected in order for [...] to properly exercise its ROFR.  When [...] advised in January of 2023 that the PSA should be revised to include disclosure of the ROFR, [...] bewilderingly refused to do so for nearly half a year.  [...] is not an innocent victim here.  It is a breaching party that seeks to avoid the consequences of its own actions.  “He who seeks equity must do equity. ”  Natovitz v. Bay Head Realty Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 456, 463 (1948)(holding that “Equity may not, under this principle, alter the contract of the parties, but must enforce it according to its terms. ”).  As the Trial Court noted, strong equitable considerations should be taken into account against [...] even beyond strict contract interpretation.
[brief] Rather, they were based upon mistaken beliefs or upon erroneous conclusions from the records.  The report of [...] was fundamentally flawed.  She admitted she did not have any first-hand knowledge of the Petitioner’s work or the workings of the Municipal Court.  The investigation report itself contained little to no investigation (a couple of hours of interviews on one day in 2019) and failed to obtain information from Petitioner herself or information from anyone in the [...] system.  Perhaps the greatest flaw is that while acknowledging the Pension Certifying Officer and Supervisor of the Pension Certifying Officer are those individuals imbued by statute to determine employee status, [...] and Respondent completely ignored multiple determinations from those Officials that Petitioner was an employee from 2015 to the present.  That either shows great bias on the part of the Respondent or an unwillingness to face the clear evidence which was in front of them.  The fact of the matter is that [...]’s so-called investigation report contained very little investigation whatsoever.  Throughout her report and despite the facts clearly falling on the side of “employee status,” [...] always defaulted to independent contractor status so Petitioner would not be enrolled in PERS.  The ALJ and the Respondent turned a blind eye towards the mountain of evidence which unequivocally establishes that under the “IRS 20 Factor Test”, the Petitioner was an employee of [...] from 2015 to the present.  Given the principle that pension laws are to be construed most favorably in the employee’s interest, it is clear that Petitioner’s intra-agency fund transfer of service credits from [...] to [...] should be granted.
[brief] See Klein, 377 N.J. Super.  at 45 (quoting Estate of Roach v. Trw, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 609-10 (2000)) (“CEPA was enacted to prevent retaliatory action by an employer against an employee who ‘blows the whistle on illegal or unethical activity committed by their employers or co-employers,’ not to assuage egos or settle internal disputes at the workplace as in the present case. ”); see also Dolinski v. Borough of Watchung & [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1242, at *26 (App. Div. July 8, 2022) (finding no whistle-blowing activity because plaintiff’s reporting his complaints of superior officer’s mistreatment to the [...] constituted “personal job disputes” that were nothing but “an effort bring light to his belief that he was denied employment opportunities and unfairly disciplined”); LeWitt v. Twp. of Gloucester, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 429, at *12 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2024) (finding plaintiff’s refusal to alter a report at his superior’s direction, leading to the superior officer berating plaintiff via text message, was “merely a labor disagreement with a superior, not a whistle-blowing activity”).
[brief] Do you see that?  A.  Yes.  Q.  Was that car in existence back on January 17, 2014?  A.  I forgot.  I don’t recall the date, the year, the car was – Q.  What kind of car were you driving back then?  A.  I had a Mercedes, a small convert—small sports car, two doors, yes.  E550 or E350, yes.  Q.  So that is a reference to your car?  A. Yes.  Q.  And it says you got it, right?  A. Yes.  Q.  And you did get it, right?  A. Yes.  [Pa87, Def. Dep. at 258:1-20, Aug. 8, 2019(emphasis added)].
[brief] I guess it’s possible.  I’ve spoken to a therapist, you know numerous times about this over, you know, quite a few years, and we came to the realization that if a friend came to me and told, you know, told me this and asked me what had happened, that I would say that you know, I didn’t undress myself.  Q.  Don’t you think you would have been woken up if somebody was trying to undress you?  A.  I don’t know.  My therapist also asked me if he thought maybe I had been drugged, or given like alcohol or something.  You know, two different therapists have talked to me about the possibility of that.  (6T109-2 to 110-9).  As this colloquy clearly demonstrates, there was no “acknowledgement” by the Respondent that the event may have been caused by a dream.  In any event, the notion of a dream causing the undress of the Respondent borders on the ridiculous.
[brief] THE DEPARTMENT IS INTERFERING WITH [...]’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONTRACT.  (JA1-2)  The Department’s argument that it is not interfering with [...]’s constitutional right to contract boils down to this:  Although the POA does not reserve any discretion to the Department to set the amount of the AIF Fee, the Department is granting to itself exactly that authority by virtue of the Bulletin.  The Department certainly is seeking to use the Bulletin to regulate the amount of the AIF Fees.  It is applying this “new authority” to: (1) regulate the POAs to which the subscribers and [...] previously agreed; and (2) impair the parties’ rights under the POA because the Department gets to decide retroactively what is reasonable, not the parties.  This impairment is substantial because the Department has placed no limits on the scope of its discretion.  It could theoretically decide that the subscribers should pay no fees to [...] or any other amount up to 12.5% regardless of what the subscribers or [...] thought was appropriate.  In short, the Department wants to substitute its unfettered discretion for the agreement of [...] and the subscribers.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692f; Appx., at 7a.  This claim fails for two reasons.  First, it is redundant of his other claims.  Section 1692f is the FDCPA’s “catchall” provision, meaning that it covers abusive conduct that is not covered by some more-specific FDCPA provision.  Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  Thus, a § 1692f claim fails if it is not E.  Appellant’s Deception Theory of Liability Fails to State a Claim for Relief  Under the FDCPA – 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.
[brief] ”  Id.\textsuperscript{21}  [...]’ conduct in this case was, by orders of magnitude, more reprehensible than that of the defendant in \textit{Devli}, and the actual harm to [...] was far greater than his compensatory damages awarded on remand reflect.\textsuperscript{22}  Thus, the 2.5 ratio found by the Chancery Court to be appropriate, both after trial and on remand, did not violate due process, nor was it excessive.  Instead, it properly served to effectuate the dual purposes of an award of punitive damages, which is “to penalize and to provide additional deterrence against a defendant to discourage similar conduct in the future. ”  See 2018 Op. at *24 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10).  As stated by our Supreme Court in \textit{Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc.}, 194 N.J. 212, 218 (2008), an award of punitive \begin{itemize}
[brief] [...] returned to the Board on June 14, 2022 and the Board reached the same decision – the application was still incomplete.  [Da77 at 25-7 to 25-24].  Prior to that meeting, an interested resident, [...], and two members of the City’s governing body, submitted a letter to the Board arguing that the adoption of the Ordinance eliminated the Board’s jurisdiction over the application and objecting to the Board’s further consideration of [...]’ site plan.
[directive] 8.4.4  This information shall be recorded on a form which the subject officer signs and whose signature is witnessed.  The completed form must be made a part of the investigative file.  See the sample form in Appendix I.  The form in Appendix I shall only be used for administrative, non-criminal investigations.  8.4.5  If the subject officer refuses to answer questions during this interview, the interviewer should inquire about the reason for that refusal.  If the officer states that he refuses to answer any questions on the grounds that he may incriminate himself in a criminal matter, even though the investigators do not perceive a criminal violation, the agency should discontinue the interview and contact the County Prosecutor.  8.4.6  If the agency wants to continue its administrative interview and the County Prosecutor agrees to grant use immunity, the agency shall advise the subject officer in writing that he or she has been granted use immunity if their answers implicate him or her in a criminal offense.  The officer must then answer the questions specifically related to performing their official duties, but no answer given, nor evidence derived therefrom, may be used against the officer in a criminal proceeding.  If the officer still refuses to answer, he or she is subject to disciplinary charges for that refusal, including dismissal.
[brief] Magic Petroleum Corp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 218 N.J. 390, 403 (2014) (“dischargers ordered by the DEP to pay for the entirety of cleanup costs were entitled to seek contribution from other responsible parties, based in part, on the ‘normal course of tort law’”) (emphasis added); N.J.A.C. 58:10-23.11f.a.(2).