ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(d), Oral Argument Must have been Conducted  Requests for oral argument “shall be granted as of right."  R. 1:6-2(d).  Except as otherwise provided by R. 5:5-4 (family actions), no motion shall be listed for oral argument unless a party requests oral argument in the moving papers or in timely-filed answering or reply papers, or unless the court directs.  A party requesting oral argument may, however, condition the request on the motion being contested.  If the motion involves pretrial discovery or is directly addressed to the calendar, the request shall be considered only if accompanied by a statement of reasons and shall be deemed denied unless the court otherwise advises counsel prior to the return day.  As to all other motions, the request shall be granted as of right.  Id.  By failing to conduct oral argument, the Trial Court deprived Plaintiff of a fundamental right.  Additionally, as described in more detail in the other section of this brief, the court then compounded this error by violating another fundamental summary judgment standard when it viewed genuine issues of material facts in the light most favorable to the movants.
[brief] Appellant does not cite any part of the WQMP Rules to support its position because it cannot.  In the case at bar, and as acknowledged by Appellant, the applicable designated planning agency that conducts areawide water quality management planning for Mercer County is the [...].  The WQMP for Mercer County consists of a Wastewater Management Plan, adopted in 2013, with various amendments. \(^{11}\)  The Wastewater Management Plan includes existing --- \(^{10}\) Ab21 (emphasis in original).  “Ab” refers to Appellant’s Initial Legal Brief, R. 2:6-8.  \(^{11}\) Ra401 (Mercer County Wastewater Management Plan webpage, available at https://www.mercercounty.org/departments/planning/plans-and-reports/wastewater-management-plan) (last visited 2/2/2024); Ra403 (Adopted Amendment to the Mercer County Water Quality Management Plan, October 9, 2013, available at: https://www.mercercounty.org/home/showpublisheddocument/1132/636058287832670000) (last visited 2/2/2024).  sewer service areas ("SSA") in Mercer County.  As identified in the Application, the proposed development is entirely located within an SSA.  Aa143, Aa183.  The [...] agreed with this conclusion, and therefore indicated that the Project is consistent with the applicable WQMP adopted under the Water Quality Planning Act.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Observation in December 2018 resulted in a score of 2.64, which was only considered “Developing” (neither proficient, nor accomplished nor distinguished) and in [...]’s view this was “ineffective. ”  (Da257; [...] Tr. 114:23-24).  6.  Plaintiff refused to acknowledge receipt of her December 2018 Observation by signing it as required until she received a written reprimand from [...] in March 2019.  (Pl. Tr. 169:22 to 170:10; 221:21-24, 237:4-7, 309:24 to 310:4)
[brief] [...] is a company licensed in the State of New Jersey and engaged in the business of construction management and general construction.  On or about August 14, 2020, [...] entered into a Subcontract Agreement (the “Subcontract”) with [...].  (Da148-150;1T5:10-14).  [...] contractually agreed to provide fire alarm installation work at a job site located at [...] (the “Property”).  On November 4, 2020, Plaintiff [...] was at the Property.  Russo alleges that, while in the course and scope of his employment with [...] as a senior fire alarm technician, he was injured after falling into an open floor hatch at the Property.  Russo alleges that [...] (“O’Donnell”), a representative of [...], opened a hatch in the floor at the Property to confirm the existence of a crawl space.  (Da225-226).  Russo further alleges that his supervisor, [...] (“Prescott”), looked down into the hatch, as Russo’s plan was to pull the requisite wires through the opening.  Russo and Prescott allegedly informed O’Donnell that they did not need to access the crawl space that day.  Subsequently, Russo alleges that he and Prescott then walked away, approximately 30 feet from the hatch.  (Da225-226).  Russo allegedly took out his flashlight to inspect the ceiling.  Following the wires running along the ceiling, Russo walked in the direction of the hatch.  Russo then allegedly encountered the open hatch.  Russo’s left leg allegedly fell into the hatch, while his right leg fell and struck the floor.  (Da225-226).  Russo testified at his deposition that the hatch into which he allegedly fell was approximately three (3) feet by four (4) feet. (Da235).  The area where the accident occurred allegedly had ample lighting.  (Da235).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING O.A. PETerson’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE IT INCORRECTLY FOUND THE INDEMNITY PROVISION OF THE SUBCONTRACT TO BE AMBIGUOUS.
[brief] (Da1)  On even date, Plaintiff filed and recorded a declaration of taking and deposited into court its estimate of just compensation in the amount of $16,500.00 and acquired title to and possession of the easement, as described therein.  (Da16)  The owner filed an answer on October 17, 2018 challenging the taking.  (Da21)  Plaintiff replied on November 9, 2018.  (Da26)  The owner withdrew his objection on November 13, 2018.  (Da28)
[brief] Plaintiffs originally served an expert report of [...], M.D., explaining why [...]’s care was negligent.  In 2018, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint on the ground that [...] lacked the proper qualifications to opine about [...]’s care.  A176.  Plaintiffs thus obtained a different expert, [...], M.D., and served his expert report on defendant. A40.  After defendant deposed [...] on June 8, 2021, however, defendant moved (on July 6, 2021) to bar this expert too – again charging lack of sufficient qualification.  A20.  Plaintiffs opposed defendant’s motion but also cross-moved for permission to designate a new expert witness for trial -- to address the qualification objections that defendant continually raised.  A89.  Plaintiffs retained the new expert -- [...], M.D. – while the motions were pending, and, on July 30, served [...]’s Expert Report on [...]’s counsel.
[brief] conduct that is tortious and/or violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) [...]’s suit against [...] did not seek damages from [...] and instead sought only various equitable relief.  (Pa7-8).  A.  The Investigation of [...]s’s Alleged Misconduct.  [...]’s action against [...] started with [...]’s administrative investigation into alleged misconduct by [...], the [...] Deputy Chief, as a result of a complaint that [...] had received concerning [...] on September 15, 2022.  (Pa3-Pa4).  After the investigation concluded, [...] issued a “Summary and Conclusions Report” (Report) to the [...] Chief, [...].  (Pa4).  After reviewing the Report, which concluded that [...] was guilty of misconduct, Pezzullo offered [...] an opportunity to retire rather than face discipline, and [...] accepted that offer as part of a formal agreement with the [...] (Township).  (Pa4-Pa5).  According to [...], a conclusion of guilt regarding one of the charges against him required the Township to post certain details of the Report and [...]’s name on the internet, as part of its compliance obligations pursuant to Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2019-6, Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2022-14, and the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures (IAPP).  (Pa4).  [...] further claims that paragraph six of his agreement with the Township provides him “the right to challenge the findings made by the Prosecutor’s Office,” and if he succeeds, the Township “shall so amend its records. ” (Pa5).  After retiring, [...] requested from [...] “a copy of the formal procedures” to “challenge the findings of the Summary and Conclusions Report and a copy of the Prosecutor’s complete investigation Report. ”  (Pa5).  [...]’s Professional Responsibility and Bias Crime Bureau Director responded that [...] was required to challenge the merits of the findings in the Report through the administrative process, pursuant to Section I.E. of Directive 2019-6 and that [...]’s decision to leave employment while charges were pending would, by itself, require public reporting under the IAPP.  Ibid.  B.
[brief] After approximately 358 seemingly unnecessary paragraphs of recitation rather than allegations, Appellant sets forth in Count One that the [...] negligently breached constitutional, statutory and common law duty and exceeded the LTTEL by failing to comply with its terms.  It should be noted the tax exemption in question in this appeal was granted under the NJHMFA.  This claim will be discussed further below.  Count Two fails to set forth any allegations other than reiterating the allegations of Count One as if set --- 1  The factual background and procedural history of this matter are intertwined and thus are presented together. forth at length therein.
[brief] The fact that [...] could not definitively identify a fleeing suspect, as well as the presence of other individuals near the scene, did not constitute evidence so “credible, material, and . . . clearly exculpatory as to induce a rational grand juror to conclude that the State [did] not [make] out a prima facie case against the accused. ”  (State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 237 (1996)).  A grand jury’s role is to “investigate potential defendants and decide whether a proceeding should be commenced,” and a prosecutor’s failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury rarely constitutes grounds for challenging an indictment.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  In December 2021, [...] ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint against the [...], Tax Collector [...], and Mayor [...] ("Defendants").  (Ja1-13).  In February 2022, Defendants moved to transfer the case to the Chancery Division, which the court granted in December 2022.  (Ja40, Ja72-73).  In February 2023, Defendants moved for summary judgment.  (Ja74).  In April 2023, Plaintiff moved to hold the case in abeyance.  (Ja300-302).  In May 2023, Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment.  (Ja308-310).  In March 2024, the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion.  (Ja405-417).  In April 2024, Plaintiff filed the present appeal.  (Ja419-424).
[brief] [...] cannot credibly claim that collecting, searching and producing [...] and [...] custodian files would be unduly burdensome, duplicative or disproportionate to the needs of the case.  Their texts, chats, and ephemeral communications should have been preserved, as Plaintiffs discussed with [...] in 2018 in the first 26(f) meet and confer.  Rule 26(b)(1) requires consideration of the following factors as part of the proportionality analysis: “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
[brief] (Pa139; Pa153-Pa154).  It has officers and officials at multiple levels of the organization.  (Pa139; Pa153- Defendant has Rules and Regulations that were originally enacted in 1934.  (Pa139; Pa156).  Defendant’s Rules and Regulations were later revised in 2000.  (Pa139; Pa161).  In addition to Grand Sheik [...], Defendant’s other national officers are [...], Assistant Grand Sheik; [...], Chairman; [...], Assistant Grand National Chairman; [...], Grand National Secretary; [...], Assistant Grand National Secretary; [...], Grand National Treasurer; and [...], Assistant Grand National Treasurer.
[brief] (Da 132 to 133)  [...] also interviewed [...] in March of 2023.  (Aa 24 to 26)  On June 28, 2023, [...] provided a certification (Aa 24 to 26) that he was in fact interviewed by [...].  Also, that he told [...] that he was in the physical presence of the defendant at the [...] on [...], in [...] from February 27, 2009 through March 1, 2009.  [...] stated that a few years after the defendant’s stay in North Carolina, he ([...]) personally returned to the [...] to obtain proof of the defendant’s stay at the [...], which he sent to the defendant who was detained in the [...], and that he was never contacted by the defendant’s trial attorney.  (Aa 24 to 26)
[brief] ”  In making the determination that the route through Westfield was essential, the court below lost sight of the undisputed fact that [...] only determined that the addition of a third connection was required to furnish safe and adequate utility service and that neither [...] nor [...] made any determinations or gave approval to any particular route for that connection, let alone a route that [...] later selected to run through Westfield.  In short, the court conflated the need for a third connection with the route that the connection would take, and therein lies the court’s error, referring to both as “the Project” throughout its decision.
[brief] Where a defendant shows that the State committed a *Brady* violation, “the usual remedy is a new trial, not dismissal with prejudice. ”  *United States v. Swenson*, 894 F.3d 677, 684 (5th Cir. 2018); *Virgin Islands v. Fahie*, 419 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding dismissal with prejudice was abuse of discretion because there was “no showing . . . of willful government misconduct,” and because prejudice to accused could be corrected with lesser remedy).  Where there is no willful misconduct that irremediably prejudiced the defendant, a dismissal of the indictment with prejudice is inappropriate.  See Brown, 236 N.J. at 528; Fahie, 419 F.3d at 259 (“[T]o merit the ultimate sanction of dismissal, a discovery violation in the criminal context must meet the two requirements of prejudice and willful misconduct .
[brief] There is certainly no factual or legal support anywhere in the record that would establish that the appellant’s lack of employment for six months during COVID was a break in service as defined by N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.  There is no specific requirement that the temporary separation from employment pursuant described in N.J.S.A. 43:15-8(a) be formalized by issuing a Layoff Notice as defined by the Administrative Code.  This reliance on the technical compliance by [...] at a time when workers were working remotely has unfairly resulted in [...]’ loss of benefits.
[brief] Laches is an equitable doctrine, operating as an affirmative defense that precludes relief when there is an “unexplainable and inexcusable delay” in exercising a right, which results in prejudice to another party.  It is an equitable remedy that the New Jersey Supreme Court has frequently described as “‘an equitable defense that may be interposed in the absence of the statute of limitations.  Laches is “invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  This 12-year-old action arises from a dispute among members of [...], a family business in which [...] and [...] are the two largest interest holders (29.5% and 11.8%, respectively).  In May 2011, several individual members of [...], including [...], (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), sued [...] to change management control and install [...].  Because [...]’s operating agreement required AAA arbitration of disputes arising “hereunder”, the Court referred the matter.  (Da648)  --- \(^1\)  Transcript references are: 1T 5/23/18 motion hearing; 2T 7/13/18 decision; 3T 12/7/18 motion hearing; 4T 4/10/19 motion hearing; 5T 2/9/22 hearing Vol. I; 6T 2/9/2022 hearing Vol II 7T 4/6/22 Vol 1 hearing; 8T 4/6/22 Vol II hearing; 9T 4/7/22 hearing; 10T 5/9/22 hearing; 11T 1/20/23 motion; 12T 1/24/23 decision
[brief] Here, Appellant makes the dubious allegation that he was not aware of the Action because although he received mail there, he was not living at the NJ Address at the time he was served on January 7, 2017.  (Da28-Da71).  No different than [...], Appellant provided no actual evidence, either in support of his Motion or at the plenary hearing, that he had changed his actual mailing address and was not using the NJ address as his mailing address.  (Da49-Da63; 2T, generally).  And Respondent certainly had absolutely no reason to suspect his address had changed, especially considering Appellant never advised Respondent of any change and Appellant’s relative, [...], signed for and accepted the certified mail from the Lower Court and did not advise that Appellant no longer lived there.
[brief] For purposes of this opposition to the appeal, the [...] cites chiefly to the recitation of the relevant facts and background, all as set forth by the trial court in its December 12, 2023 Decision.  Reference will also be made, as applicable, to either Plaintiff’s Appendix (or its Confidential Appendix) in support of its appeal, or, to the case jacket in eCourts where so indicated.  This case was brought as an action in lieu of prerogative writs by Plaintiff [...], against Defendants [...], [...], and [...] ("[...]").  [...] sought relief against the [...] alleging, among other things, that the process that the [...] undertook to solicit applications for, and to award a Resolution of Support to, [...] for the operation of a Class 5 cannabis retail license operation in its Highway Commercial district, was flawed with respect to the Cannabis Subcommittee's evaluation of applications.
[brief] ..................................................  41  POINT VI  THE PLAINTIFF AND THE ZONING BOARD  ATTORNEY, ASSERTION THAT THE CHANCERY COURT DETERMINATION THAT AN EASEMENT FOR PARKING EXISTS IS DETERMINATIVE ON THE OFF-SITE PARKING USE BEING A LEGAL NONCONFORMING USE AND THE BOARD SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED ITS DECISION --- WAS WITHOUT MERIT (RAISED BEFORE ZONING BOARD Da1 AND BEFORE TRIAL COURT Da270; ORDER APPEALED Da270).  ...........................................  46 POINT VII PLAINTIFF’S IMPROPER SUBMISSION AND THE TRIAL COURT’S ACCEPTANCE OF DOCUMENTS NOT BEFORE THE BOARD MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE INACCURATE FINDINGS (RAISED BELOW TO TRIAL COURT DA177-213, COURT ORDERS APPEALED Da214 Da270) ......................... 50 CONCLUSION ..................................................... 57 | Case Name | Citation | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Andres v. Ocean Twp. Bd. Of Adj. | 30 N.J. 245 (1959) | | Bell Atlantic New Jersey Inc. v. Riverdale Zoning Bd., | 352 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 2002) | | Bell v. Tp. of Bass River | 196 N.J. Super. 304 (Law Div. 1984) | | Belmar v. 201 16th Avenue | 309 N.J. Super. 663 (Law Div. 1979) | | Berkeley Square Asso v. Zoning Board of Trenton | 410 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 2009) | | Biern v. Morris | 14 N.J. 529 (1954) | | Bonaventure Int. v. Spring Lake | 350 N.J. Super. 420 (App.Div. 2000) | | Chatham v. Donaldson | 69 N.J. Super. 277 (App.Div.1961) | | Commercial Realty v. First Atlantic | 122 N.J. 546 (1991) | | Cronin v. Township Committee | 239 N.J. Super 611 (app div 1990) | | DEG LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield | 198 N.J. 242 (2009) | | Euclid v. Ambler | 272 U.S. 365 (1926) | | Euneva LLC v. Keansburg Board of Adj. | 407 N.J. Super. 432 (Law Div. 2008) | Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Keansburg, 321 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 1999)
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 315-16 (2019) (Albin, J., dissenting) (where majority did not address voluntariness issue, explaining trial court properly suppressed statement where police “verbally abused” defendant by calling him a “motherf***ing liar”); Niemann v. Whalen, 911 F. Supp. 656, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying summary judgment on coerced-confession claim where plaintiff alleged security officer “yelled at her and slammed his fists on the table”); Vargas v. Brown, 512 F. Supp. 271, 277 (D.R.I. 1981) (remanding for hearing on voluntariness where suspect alleged “the detectives banged on the table and swore at him”); cf. Q.N., 179 N.J. at 179 (statement voluntary where officer “did not raise his voice at any stage of questioning”); Rogers v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 483, 494-95 (5th Cir. 2009) (statement not coerced where trial court found police did not “curs[e], yell[], or bang[] on the table”).
[directive] By circumstances. and facts to: limited be not need but include, might boxes off Domestic whether the if so, and violence, domestic ❑ involves offense the whether query that whether and 4.2.3), subsection (see checked was Registry Central Violence or episodes violence domestic past concerning information relevant any reveals orders; restraining Assault  Sexual whether the if so, and crime, sexual a ❑ involves offense the whether query that whether 4.2.4), and subsection (see checked was registry central Act Survivor decision; release pretrial the to relevant information any reveals conduct; offense the observed personally officer ❑ enforcement law a whether eyewitnesses; by made observations/statements on ❑ based was arrest the whether statement such whether and statement, a given has eyewitness ❑ and/or victim a whether dash recording, e.g., of type (specifying the recorded electronically or writing in was etc.
[brief] [...]’s Brief concedes that [...]’s class action Complaint alleges that [...] collected money from [...] and the putative class members while [...] was unlicensed under the NJCFLA.  See [...]’s Br. 12 (quoting Compl. ¶ 42) (Pa18).  The Complaint further alleges that because [...] was not licensed as a “consumer lender,” they had no right to solicit payments or enforce the account, because the contract governing the same was void.  See Compl. ¶¶ 33-41 (Pa17); see also N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  At the pleading stage, the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to establish an ascertainable loss and meet the requirements of R. 4:5-8(a).  Indeed, [...] concedes that the “particulars of the wrong, with dates and items if necessary, shall be stated insofar as practicable. ”  [...]’s Br. 14. (quoting Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., 439 N.J. Super. 540, 552 (App. Div. 2015)) (emphasis added); see also R. 4:5-8(a).  A litigant is not required to know and plead all details of a bad actor’s wrongdoings when filing a complaint—only those facts that are “necessary” and “practicable. ”  The pertinent allegations here are sufficient to put [...] on notice of [...]’s claims because “‘the fundament of a class action’ could be gleaned from plaintiff’s complaint. ”  *Pace v. Hamilton Cove*, 258 N.J. 82, 91 (2024).
[brief] [...] also cited to the law of the case doctrine in support of the dismissal, but noted that, on the facts of this case, it amount to being “one and the same” as the other two theories.  (Pa182)  In determining whether successive claims constitute one controversy for purposes of the doctrine, the central consideration is whether the claims against the different parties arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions.  . . .  It is the core set of facts that provides the link between distinct claims against the same or different parties and triggers the requirement that they be determined in one proceeding.  [DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267-68 (1995) (internal citations omitted)]  The doctrine applies when claims arise from interrelated facts, but does not require a “commonality of legal issues.
[brief] Furthermore, the trial court’s remedy for this discovery violation must be “just and reasonable under the circumstances. ”  Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors, 309 N.J. Super. 358, 365 (App. Div. 1998).  Even in cases where evidence has been lost or destroyed, the dismissal of a case with prejudice is the “ultimate sanction” and should not be ordered unless there is no other, lesser remedy available that would cure the prejudice created by the lack of discovery.  Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., Respiratory Disease Associates, 199 N.J. Super. 114, 199-20 (App. Div. 1985).