ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On March 31, 2022, the trial court granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment and denied [...] and [...]’s cross motion for summary judgment.  [3T36-22]  First, the trial court determined that [...] (with [...] signing) made misrepresentations in the Applications.  The trial court pinpointed that “the critical inquiry for the pending motions involve Question 11(a) on the [...] application and Question 10(a) on the renewal application[s]. ”  [3T18-3]  Those questions ask whether any attorney “has [] been the subject of a bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding within the past five years. ”  [3T18-6]  The questions require disclosure of “three separate and distinct subject matters” – i.e. bar complaints or investigations or disciplinary proceedings.  [3T19-15]  Focusing on the first two matters requiring disclosure, the trial court held that an “investigation by the [OAE] and/or the Supreme Court Disciplinary Review Board, which issued a 36-page scathing decision[,] involved a bar complaint and bar investigation. ”  [3T23-6]  The trial court thus found by clear and convincing evidence that [...] and [...] made misrepresentations in the Applications when they failed to disclose the OAE investigation, the Disciplinary Action Complaint, and the Disciplinary Action.  [3T18-10]  Second, the trial court determined that [...]’s misrepresentations in the Applications were material and relied on by [...] when issuing the Policies.  [3T27-3]  The trial court found that, under Section V(O) of the Policies, [...] and [...] “confirmed that all the representations contained in the application are truthful, which clearly they were not, [and] that all communicated information would be deemed material for the issuance of the insurance policy. ”  [Id.]  The trial court refused to “ignore the plain, unambiguous language of the policy and re-write a better policy for [] [...] because he chose not to be candid when seeking professional malpractice insurance. ”  [3T27-9]  According to the trial court, the certification of [...]’s underwriter further confirmed materiality and reliance as a matter of law.  [3T27-13]  The trial court thus held that [...] and [...] “made material misrepresentations of fact that were relied upon by [...] warranting rescission of the [Policies].”
[brief] However, this argument fails for several reasons.  The Ricci Act states:  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e).  Pursuant to the Ricci Act, the Board was required to provide notice to members and retirants in the system.  A website posting is not sufficient notice to retirees or active members of the retirement system.
[brief] In this business divorce and misappropriation action, the lower court determined after 22 days of trial that defendants Emanuel and [...] – directly and through business entities that they own and/or control – diverted $2,872,358.93 that rightfully belonged to their former business partners (and Respondents here), [...] and [...]  After weighing volumes of documentary evidence and weeks of witness and expert testimony, the trial court found the defendants liable, jointly and severally, for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
[brief] As noted in Carvalho:  “The record strongly indicates that the engineer's responsibilities for ensuring compliance with the plans and the rate of work-progress, including the proper handling of utilities that crossed the trench, implicated safety concerns.  The contract itself provided that the condition of the trenches was relevant to determining construction procedures.  [...] noted when there were unstable trench conditions.  The engineer also had to ensure that [...] protected utility lines crossing the trench.  [...] and [...] admit that compliance with the plans and the rate of progress included the proper handling of utilities that crossed the trench.
[brief] ....................................................... passim N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328 (2010)  ......................  28 State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56 (2003) ............................................................... 11, 13, 14, 17 State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542 (2013)  ..................................................................  28 State v. C.H.W., 465 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2021) ........................................ 23, 24 State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339 (1987) ...............................................................
[brief] The plaintiff’s Witness, [...], alleges on November 2, 2021 he was first threatened by an unidentified woman that was cutting his neighbor’s grass, who through a white trash bag at him, started playing rap music very loudly, specifying lyrics starting with the word “nigger” as he was getting out of his car, specifying it was very dark outside.  However, he does not call Burlington --- \(^{10}\) Email notification is within the exhibits and redacted.  Township Police Department and shrugs it off as believing “she’s just having a bad day”\(^{11}\).  The next alleged incident on November 7, 2021, [...] rushed home from church after [...] phoned [...] telling him about the alleged truck incident between [...], [...] and the defendant\(^{12}\).  [...] says, when he was now mowing his lawn, he was approached again by the unidentified woman who started calling him a “black motherfucker” and “you black nigger\(^{13}\)”.  He furthers his testimony to say, the unidentified woman told him, “I’m going to kill your black ass, you fucked with my father\(^{14}\)”; but that he was never spoken to her father, just only his father’s significant other, [...].  He continues his statement of this unidentified woman’s response as, “Well, I’m going to kill your black fucking ass.  I got my – I’m going to have my boys from Brooklyn come down and kill your fucking ass, you black nigger.  You won’t fuck with my father again”.  In [...] signed complaint and testimony, he contacted [...] informing them that he had no idea who the person was on November 2 and November 7 of 2021; first shifting blame to an --- \(^{11}\) Municipal Court transcript of [...]’ answer – [1T18:15-20 -11/29/2022], “Back in November, and I want to say it was November the 2\(^{nd}\) because I was coming home from a basketball game, from refereeing.
[brief] **POINT IV**  **[...] AND [...] CONFLATE THE PLEADING REQUIREMENT OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT WITH THE PROOF REQUIREMENT OF A TRIAL ON THE MERITS. **  Finally, [...] and [...] both argue that because plaintiff’s experts are engineers and render opinions regarding defendants’ failure to perform in accordance with the relevant standard of care an AOM is required.  See [...]b14-16; [...]b11-15.  That argument was raised and dismissed in *Haviland*.  See *Haviland*, supra, 250 N.J. at 384.  Requirement of an AOM and proof of negligence, causation and damages at trial are distinct requirements.
[directive] Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  2C:12-1c(4)  Aggravated Assault (continued) by Auto or Vessel (continued)  4th Degree $10,000 to $25,000  10% permissible Actor employed by public or private facility or institution, which offers health or health related 2C:12-1d  Aggravated Assault services for the institutionalized elderly, commits a simple assault upon an institutionalized 4th Degree $2,500 to $5,000 10% permissible elderly person, age 60 or older.  Actor commits a simple assault in the presence of a child under age 16 at a school or 2C:12-1f  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  Aggravated Assault community sponsored youth sports event.  22  Updated December 2, 2013
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  2.7  Dealing with persons in a behavioral or mental health crisis or other factors affecting compliance.  Officers should consider an individual’s mental, physical, developmental, intellectual disability, or other conditions, such as age of the suspect, that affect the person’s ability to communicate or comply.  This includes, when feasible, considering the following factors related to the individual: (a) behavioral or mental health crisis; (b) drug interaction; (c) medical condition; (d) mental impairment; (e) physical limitation; (f) developmental disability, including autism spectrum disorder; (g) cognitive impairment or intellectual disability; (h) hearing loss or impairment; (i) communication disorder, including speech impairment; (j) language barrier; (k) visual impairment; (l) age; or (m) other factors beyond the individual’s control.
[directive] MANDATORY  12-HOUR IMPOUNDMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES  [Guidelines for the implementation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23, the Mandatory 12-hour Impoundment of the Motor Vehicle Operated by a Person Arrested for a Violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI) or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 (Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing)]
[brief] Volume I  Complaint Filed on Behalf of [...] (hereinafter “the Plaintiff”) on November 15, 2021……………………………Pa1  Answer to the Complaint Filed on Behalf of [...] and [...] (hereinafter “the defendants”) on January 24, 2022………………Pa12  Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of the Defendants on February 28, 2024…………………………………………………………Pa22  Certification of Service of the Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of the Defendants on February 28, 2024……………………………………Pa24 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2 Filed on Behalf of the Defendants on February 28, 2024 in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment…………………………………………………………Pa26 Responding Statement of Facts and Additional Material Facts Filed on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment…………………………………………………………Pa30 Response to Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts Filed on Behalf of the Defendants on March 22, 2024…………………………………………………..Pa38 Order Filed by the Trial Court on April 12, 2024 Granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice………………………………………………………………………………Pa40 Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of the April 12, 2024 Order Filed on Behalf of the Plaintiff on April 17, 2024……………………………………..Pa42 Order Filed by the Trial Court on May 10, 2024 Denying the Motion for Reconsideration……………………………………………………………………Pa44 Written Statement of Reasons Filed by the Trial Court on May 10, 2024 in Support of the Order Denying the Motion for Reconsideration…………Pa46
[brief] As noted, the express language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 does not support plaintiff's request for an exemption from the statutory bar for those that claim to be victims of insurance fraud.  Recognizing such an exemption would be inconsistent with the Act's purpose of reducing auto insurance costs and would undermine one of the original goals of the statute, the streamlining of the judicial process, Caviglia, supra, 178 N.J. at 467 (citing Gambino, supra, 86 N.J. at 105-06), because it would result in litigation over whether a plaintiff was knowingly uninsured.
[brief] (21T:111-14 to 114-24).  Defendant immediately told [...] the moment the interview began that [...] was “somebody who’s always homeless.  He always had no place to go.  I always took him in.  We had problems.  He had altercations with my father.  He threatened people—” (21T:111-23 to 112-1).  After allowing [...] to continue, defendant claimed that he “always held this guy up,” and that [...] and [...] had been like [...]’ parents.  (21T:115-14 to 117-8).  He claimed that [...] had “shamelessly” disrespected them, stole from them, and threatened all three [...] many times despite the fact that [...] had lived with them for several years.  Ibid.  Defendant said that [...] had gone missing at one point two years prior, and after returning, [...] had continuously lied and stole from them.  He claimed that he parted ways with [...], and wanted nothing further to do with him.
[brief] [...] filed a Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ Pursuant to Rule 4:69 on October 28, 2022 against the [...], [...], and [...] (the “Complaint”).  (36a-46a).  Through the Complaint, [...] pled three causes of action: (1) temporary and preliminary injunctive relief; (2) arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable municipal action; and (3) municipal action against the weight of the evidence in the Record.  Each of [...]’s claims rested on the allegation that the [...]’s action in awarding a resolution of support in favor of [...] was “arbitrary, capricious, and/or unreasonable,” and “against the weight of the evidence” because the [...]’s application review process was not followed.  (36a-46a).  Both the [...] and [...] filed answers on December 1, 2022, and December 5, 2022, respectively, through which the [...] and [...] denied that the [...]’s application review process was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or that the [...]’s decision to award a resolution of support in favor of [...] was against the weight of the evidence.  (90a-106a).  The trial court held a trial on April 6, 2023, and issued an Order on December 12, 2023, affirming the Resolution (the “Order”).  (1a).  In its accompanying Memorandum and Decision (the “Memorandum”), the trial court explained that the ‘New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act,’” N.J.S.A. 24:61-31, et seq.  (“CREAMMA”) does not require a municipality to follow a specific procedure or consider certain factors with reference to applications for a resolution of support.  (7a-8a).  The court further concluded that although the [...] “engaged in a long, thoughtful process leading to the award of the [R]esolution,” there was no evidence that the [...] was, in any way, required to refer to or fill out the Evaluation Sheets.  (8a).  The trial court also rejected [...]’s argument that Blaze’s inadvertent submission of its application without a signed certification somehow rendered the entire process arbitrary and capricious.  (9a).  The court explained the [...] “made a determination that the lack of signature did not void or require vacation of Blaze’s application,” and there was no reason to conclude that this determination was incorrect as a matter of law.  (9a-10a).  [...] filed a Notice of Appeal on January 12, 2024, and Amended Notice of Appeal on January 31, 2024, through which it seeks appellate review of the Order.  (16a-31a).  Thereafter, [...] filed its Appellant Brief on May 1, 2024.  Appellee [...] submits this Brief in response.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF COUNSEL OR HIS RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE AS DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO PROCEED PRO SE WAS A DELIBERATE DILATORY TACTIC MEANT TO DISRUPT THE TRIAL PROCESS ..................................  11 POINT II JUDGE GARRENGER PROPERLY REMOVED DEFENDANT FROM THE COURTROOM AS DEFENDANT’S DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR WAS HINDERING THE TRIAL PROCESS  ...............  18 POINT III  JUDGE GARRENGER PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL  ..................................  27 POINT IV  JUDGE GARRENGER’S JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER AND DID NOT CONFUSE OR MISLEAD THE JURY.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..................................................................................  32  A.  [...]’s Instructions As To Robbery And Its Lesser-Included Offenses Was Proper ..........................................................  35  B.  The Facts Of Defendant’s Case Did Not Require The Trial Court Judge To Give An Instruction On Unanimity As To The Victims..  38 POINT V  DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS PROPER AND DOES NOT SHOCK THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE.  (THIS REFERS TO SUBPOINTS A, B, AND C OF DEFENDANT’S POINT V.)  ...........................................  41  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................  49  TABLE OF APPENDICES  Cover Page and Table of Contents of Defendant’s Appeal  Under State v. [...], Appellate Docket [...] ..................................[Pa1-3]
[brief] We note that there is nothing in the record to indicate that [...] showed [...] a photograph of the perpetrator taken from surveillance video of either robbery.  7  We decline to interpret the phrase “inescapable inference,” see Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271, 307 A.2d 65; Medina, 242 N.J. at 416–17, 231 A.3d 689, to mean that no other inference could be drawn from the hearsay testimony.
[brief] \(^6\)  It is the Association, rather than the Board, that interfered with and frustrated the rights of its own members when it demanded the [...] attend each negotiations session.  --- \(^6\)  The parties have since met to continue negotiations in the presence of the [...], in accordance with [...]’s directives.  B.  The Board’s Alleged Actions Did Not Violate Subsection (a)(5) of the Act.
[brief] [...] heard argument on defendants’ renewed motions to dismiss and alternative motion to stay by telephone on January 20, 2023.  (Pa084-085).  The hearing transcript incorrectly reflects that the hearing took place by Zoom.  (2T1).  Telephonic hearing was ordered by [...] despite defendants’ timely request for an in-person or Zoom hearing.  (Pa084-085).  The hearing began with [...] stating incorrectly that “it doesn’t look like anything’s happening in Missouri,” that the parties “haven’t shown me anything [about the Missouri Action] other than there’s some name of a judge,” (2T6:12-13) and that the Missouri court “hasn’t assigned a trial date. ”  9  [...] also remarked on the salaries of Missouri judges stating that “[t]hey only pay their judges $165,000.00 there. ” (2T6:17).  (2T6:19).  From there, [...] stated, at least twice, his misplaced belief that the Missouri court disrespected him when it “popped off,” and that the Missouri court arbitrarily decided that Missouri has jurisdiction over the parties and did not respect the jurisdiction of New Jersey over this case.  (2T30:7).  The following is a collection of some of [...]’s remarks at the hearing:  ➢  “I kind of take a little umbrage here because we did give you the right to do jurisdictional discovery.  And, apparently in Missouri, they just popped off and said we have jurisdiction, which is not quite a fair thing . . . ” (2T30:4-8).  ➢  “And, Missouri just decides – we got jurisdiction.  Well, okay, that’s fine if Missouri would like to do that, but I may now decide clearly that we also have jurisdiction.  And, I will not have just popped off, we will have already had the benefit of discovery .  . . ” (2T30:11-16).  ➢  “But, the fact that I gave you – the ability to conduct jurisdictional discovery, and apparently Missouri decided that they don’t need to do that kind of step first, frankly, as they might say in Missouri, that dog don’t hunt . . . ” (2T30:21-25).  ➢  “They – they condemned me by saying we have jurisdiction even though [...] was exploring that through discovery as to whether New Jersey had discovery [sic].\textsuperscript{10}  So – and, again, didn’t even bother to call this Court.  That judge, whoever he is out in Missouri, should have known and counsel should have told him, just like you told me his name in these papers, maybe counsel out in Missouri should have told him that this case has been managed by [...], the complex commercial judge in New Jersey, a State Superior Court Judge there.  Maybe he wasn’t told, or maybe he didn’t case [sic].”\textsuperscript{11} (2T31:21-32:7).  [...]’s belief that he was disrespected by the Missouri court’s jurisdictional ruling colored his consideration of defendants’ motions.  In particular, [...] used this offense at the Missouri court’s jurisdictional ruling, which was based on different law focusing on different facts, as a reason to give short shrift to defendants’ comity argument.
[brief] On a three year note the Statute of Limitations would start to run after three years.  Not you know, when the defendant became able to pay simply because the plaintiff said when tried to collect payment, well, pay me when you're able to pay me.  That doesn't convert it to a pay when you are able loan.  While you might not have to be on all fours with Guerin in order for the pay when you are able rule to apply, you have to have some clear indication that this is a pay when you are able loan as opposed to a demand loan.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku zmiany miejsca zatrudnienia lub zmiany w (2) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] uczęszczaniu do szkoły lub na uczelnię musi Pan(i) powiadomić o tym właściwe organa ścigania nie później niż 5 dni po takiej zmianie?  Do you understand that if you change employment or school enrollment status you must notify the appropriate law enforcement agency no later than 5 days after the change?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku niedopełnienia obowiązku powiadomienia (3) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] właściwych organów ścigania o zmianie miejsca zamieszkania lub statusu może być Pan(i) oskarżony(a) o przestępstwo trzeciego stopnia i otrzymać karę pozbawienia (jeżeli takie przestępstwo zostało popełnione 1 lipca 2014 r. lub wolności do lat 5 później) lub może być Pan(i) oskarżony(a) o przestępstwo czwartego stopnia i (jeżeli takie przestępstwo otrzymać karę pozbawienia wolności do 18 miesięcy zostało popełnione przed 1 lipca 2014 r.)?  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency of a change of address or status you may be charged with a third degree crime, and may receive a sentence of (if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014) imprisonment of up to 5 years or you may be charged with a fourth degree crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 (if the offense was committed before July 1, 2014)? months
[brief] The only real-time evaluation of [...] by an independent, court-ordered expert concludes that he is not aggressive.  3.  A post-judgment temperament evaluation ordered by the trial court establishes that [...] poses no threat to humans or other domestic animals.  [...] did exceptionally well on an independent evaluation by [...] of [...], ordered by the court to protect public safety.  Her March 27, 2023 report concludes that [...] is not aggressive.  Dal17-118
[brief] On June 30, 2020, pursuant to provisions of the NGA, [...] submitted an application to the [...] seeking issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate the Project.  Aa0053.  The Project is designed to provide up to 115,000 dekatherms per day (Dth/d) of additional firm transportation capacity on [...]’s interstate natural gas pipeline system that will be used to provide service for [...]’s Project customer.  Aa0054.  The Project represents an approximately $246 million investment by [...].  179 [...] ¶ 61,041 P 8(April 21, 2022); TGPa0001.¹