ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Presumption Against Applying for Revocation of Release.  In any case where there is probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed an offense while on release for an offense charged by complaint-warrant and the case is not covered under Section 8.3 or 8.4, the prosecutor shall not file a motion for revocation of release under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24 unless the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or the Director or a Deputy Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in cases prosecuted by the Division, 30  Until now, prosecutors have been precluded from seeking initial preventive detention under Article I, paragraph 11 of the New Jersey Constitution, which was interpreted to establish a “right to bail” in non-capital cases.  However, courts in this State always had the authority to revoke a defendant’s release status if the defendant had been released on bail or non-monetary conditions and violated those conditions, thus forfeiting the state constitutional right to pretrial release by his or her wrongdoing.
[brief] Its decision did not address the [...], but rested on emails – which petitioners now concede revealed nothing privileged or confidential.  It was improper to disqualify counsel based on this sparse record – whose breadth is still unknown to appellants.  **E.  The Trial Court's Conclusory Assertion that the Communications "may be prejudicial"  Lacks Support in the Record (Pa7-10)**  The trial court did not – because it could not – specify how the [...]'s communications with petitioners were significantly harmful to petitioners.  Advising them to engage additional, out-of-state challengers inured only to petitioners' benefit.  It is unclear if the trial court examined the public record documents supplied by petitioners.  However, these documents are not significantly harmful to petitioners – in fact, some underpin their claims for relief.  And of course, the trial court could not have been aware that petitioners would take their present position, *i.e.*, the emails they submitted to the trial court did not set forth any prejudicial information.  Our Supreme Court has ordered trial courts to engage in a "painstaking analysis of the facts" when they decide a motion to disqualify.  *Dewey*, *supra*, 109 N.J. at 205; see also *Trupos*, 201 N.J. at 463.  No such analysis was done here, if only because there were precious few "facts" in the record.  Moreover, appellate courts (and the parties) cannot function without some understanding of why a judge has rendered a particular ruling.  See, e.g., *Dental v. Finneran*, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980) (trial court required to clearly state its factual findings and correlate them with legal conclusions).  The record in *O Builders* was much more comprehensive than that here, including a 3 hour in-person consultation, but was insufficient to merit disqualification.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ litigation choices have reduced the [...] event to a mere sliver of this case.  And the documents Plaintiffs cite merely show [...]’s leaders providing high level guidance to large teams and show that discovery from the existing custodians is sufficient.  [...] and [...]’s role as company spokespersons do not give rise to a presumption that either is likely to be the sole source of unique relevant documents on the [...] events.
[brief] In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged action of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.  The court may grant no more than one additional period, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  The failure to provide an AOM within the maximum 120 day period in a professional negligence case is equivalent to a failure to state a cause of action, and will result in the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29; A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337, 346 (2017).
[brief] ANSI/ASSE A10.47-2009, entitled “Work Zone Safety for Highway Construction,” offers the following:  6.3  Internal Traffic Control Plans (ITCP).  Employers shall develop Traffic Control Plans for inside their work zones to minimize backups and other conflicts between workers and work vehicles/equipment and to maximize the separation of vehicles and workers on foot.  6.3.1  This plan shall be communicated to all workers on the site and all vehicles entering the site.  6.3.2  The onsite supervisor/safety person shall modify the plan as the work proceeds and as changes in the work site operations or environment dictate.  All workers and drivers shall be notified of changes to the plan as they are implemented.  6.3.3  The ITCP should include the following elements:  1.  A diagram showing travel routes for construction equipment and workers within the activity space, access and egress points and location of equipment and materials storage and staging areas.  "Internal traffic control plan is where the work area is and where things are - - where equipment, people are part of the job."  Pa1621.  [...] testified:  "It is so that you can communicate to everybody working in that zone what is the anticipated pattern of flow of the equipment and people inside that work zone."  Pa1345.  [...] testified that there was no written Internal Traffic Control Plan for July 11, 2014, at the subject site.  Pa1315.  "It would have been communicated based on the layout of the traffic plan that was coordinated between the [...] and [...], as well as [...], who put the lane closures out.  * * *  I don't believe there was one for that night."  Ibid.  Mr. McHugh that [...] was responsible for making sure there was an Internal Traffic Control Plan on July 11, 2014.  Ibid.  [...] explained why there was not an internal control plan for the subject work area on the date of the incident this way:  "It wasn't part of our daily plan  * * *  [...]'s daily plan at that time * * *  They have since instituted the policy to do a daily."  Pa1344.  Despite the contract requirement, [...] testified the communication of the internal traffic control plan shown him was not part of the operating procedure/normal procedure on the night that [...] was hit.  Pa1455.  Now, the internal traffic control plan gets sent out to foremen, supers, and project managers prior to going out on the job site, and they are communicated down through everybody that’s going to be out there.  *Ibid.*  In addition to ignoring contract and regulatory safety requirements, concerns with the operator who ran down [...] went unheeded by those charged with ensuring a safe workplace.
[brief] The case should remain dismissed, and sanctions should be upheld because Appellant is clearly aware that he had far better options for making use of the car than pursuing this suit.  On page 22 of his brief, Appellant elaborately explains several of the better options he had to make use of the car, since he also had right to repossess his vehicle once the police department released the vehicle back to him.  He admits that at that stage, he would have owed Respondent just compensation for towing and storage, but he could have negotiated that amount and just taken his vehicle back.  He then proceeds to say he could have kept the car as a memorial or use its parts for personal use or to sell them.  Instead, he chose to negotiate a contract with Respondent and when the contract didn’t work in his favor, he chose to tie up the justice system over $400 when he could have stood to let it go and benefit in much better ways.  This fact alone and in itself indicates the frivolity of this suit.  Appellant knowingly had better options to profit from the car, and instead chose to pursue this suit for what?  Appellant’s initial threat to file this suit was simply a means to bully Respondent into honoring a non-existent contract.  Had that threat panned out for him, all he would have gained was $400.  Even after he filed the suit, he was given ample opportunity to withdraw his claims and redeem the car and pursue his other options to profit off the car.  Yet, he persisted in following through with this suit, presumably spending more than $400 on filing costs alone at this stage, with no guarantee that he would benefit.  Appellant spends an ample amount of time explaining why he believed he had substantive arguments in this case, allegedly proving it wasn’t a frivolous case.  Yet, having potential arguments isn’t enough to warrant the necessity of a suit.  It’s also important to consider the viability of winning the suit and the potential gain from the suit.  When looking at the totality of the circumstances, Appellant admittedly had better routes to gain from the core situation and wasn’t really certain of the viability of winning this suit since he readily admits he “couldn’t exactly recall the [Haylett] opinion” which he mainly relies on to prove standing (Pb p. 25).  Appellant also readily argues later that the matter could have easily been resolved two years ago had Respondent just gone along with his offer, but Respondent didn’t so Appellant moved forward (Pb p. 42).  5.
[brief] Counsel were unable to agree upon terms for the required new Consent Order.  Acknowledging the expired Consent Order, [...] filed a motion to stay case, compel arbitration and sanction Plaintiffs for allegedly violating the expired Consent Order.  [...]’s Memorandum of Law in support of this motion contended that the expired Consent Order bound Plaintiffs to the contested arbitration provisions.  By its Order dated May 24, 2024 the trial court held that the January 4, 2024 Consent Order had expired and that a new order with a specific date was required to extend its terms.  (Dr44)  Defendants did not appeal this decision.
[brief] 32  People v. Moneyham, 753 N.E.2d 1229 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 763 N.E.2d 775 (Ill. 2001) .........................................................67  People v. Reid, 554 N.E.2d 174 (Ill.  1990)  ..........................................................29  Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., 158 N.J. 329 (1999) ............................................................57  Showalter v. Barilari, Inc., 312 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1998) .................. 56, 57  State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542 (2013)
[brief] There is a provision that made it retroactively effective to 1/1/2015.  The document states in it “Scope of Employment” in paragraph 1.  Employment not the word contract or services.  Paragraph 3 lists compensation as per the Salary Ordinance.  Salary is for an employee, payments are made on a services contract.  [...] was already appointed for the position in 2015 and then a contract is proposed.  Notwithstanding all the pomp and stance, all payments remained on W-2 wages.  The Township published notifications of Public Contract Awards (R-12) are inconsistent with descriptions of services in accordance with all other contracts for services when it comes to describing services from the Township Public Defender and Prosecutor (Pa312-325).  (See Transcript Page 22, Lines 14-25 and Page 23, Lines 1-14 discussing analysis).  [...], Accountant and Tax expert testified that a W-2 is indicative of an employee relationship.
[brief] Here, it cannot fairly be stated that the interpretation of the contract between the parties is reasonably debatable.  Simply put, no interpretation including the term “sent” took place and, hence, any so-called interpretation flowing from that premise could not be deemed reasonably debatable.  Stated differently, there is nothing to debate, let alone reasonably debate, given that the arbitrator obviously disregarded the term “sent” in paragraph 6 of the agreement as well as the context of that paragraph in Article 27(C).
[brief] (Da9-11).  He admitted to being in the ShopRite parking lot and talking to the drivers of two separate vehicles, but denied selling them CDS.  (1T107-14 to 18; 1T108-19 to 20).  He also denied admitting to [...] that there was cocaine in his car, but did admit he told the officers, “Anything you find belongs to me. ” (1T122-23 to 24).  “I said you’re not going to find anything, but if you do, it belongs to me because it’s my Jeep. ”  (1T122-25 to 123-2).  B.  Standard of Review
[brief] Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 463.  Nonetheless, unlike Dzwonar where the plaintiff generally pointed to provisions about enforcing members rights when complaining about the failure to read minutes at general membership meetings, Plaintiff’s complained of conduct in this instance regards staffing and training for developmentally disabled individuals which is precisely prescribed in New Jersey regulations, and further grounded in relevant public policy interests which established those regulations, thus demonstrating a “substantial nexus” between the two.  Accordingly, the relation between the two is a far cry from any “broad-brush allegations” which Defendants seemingly argued in their Motion and the Court incorrectly affirmed through its dismissal.  *Id.* at 456-58, 828 A.2d at 896-97.  See also *Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.*, 377 N.J. Super. 28, 42-43 (App. Div. 2005).  Therefore, the record established a “substantial nexus” between Plaintiff’s complained of conduct and the regulations cited to in the Complaint to pass this initial inquiry stage by the Court.
[brief] Unlike the petitioners in *Hopka* and *Hess*, the Petitioner here violated an employment policy while he was engaged in his official work capacity and at his place of employment.  Petitioner was fully aware that he was subject to random urinalysis at any time.  After his urine was collected and it was found to test positive for Cocaine, Petitioner was suspended and formally charged with multiple work violations that necessarily arose from the failed urinalysis (Aa6).  After a hearing, he was ultimately terminated when the charges against him were sustained from his work-related conduct.
[brief] [...]’s failure to remember a password that he created for a work project several years earlier is not proof of connivance or carelessness.  And the fact that none of the information [...] used to create the Adam4Adam profile was contained in the extraction report from his phone is accurate, but also not proof of any wrongdoing.  A decision was made to extract from [...]’s phone only the chat messages between him and defendant on April 11, 2019.  (Pa32-38).  This decision was not made by [...].  (1T22-18 to 20).  It was also not unreasonable: a full extraction likely would have produced millions of pieces of data on dozens of unrelated and pending investigations that then would had to have been painstakingly and meticulously redacted out before the report could be provided to counsel.  (1T22-18 to 20).  Consequently, [...] abused his discretion in finding the State intentionally or maliciously failed to preserve the Adam4Adam profile and misapplied the law to determine this alone established bad faith.  Although the State should have preserved the Adam4Adam profile right away, defendant offered absolutely no proof the State acted in bad faith in failing to do so.  [...]’s factually and legally unsupported ruling must be reversed on appeal.
[brief] Despite finding [...] clearly capable of rehabilitation and applying Miller factor five, the court resentenced [...] to an aggregate sentence of 45 years with a parole ineligibility period of 43 years and nine months – reducing his period of parole ineligibility by just three years and making him first eligible for release at the age of 60.  The resentencing court failed to properly find and weigh the Miller factors, and it improperly adopted the original sentencing court’s imposition of consecutive sentences without considering the Miller factors, the effect of consecutive sentences on [...]’s parole eligibility, or the overall fairness of the sentence.  While the court reduced [...]’s aggregate sentence for the homicide count based on its finding of Miller factor five, it gave no explanation for why this mitigating factor was inapplicable to the robbery count.  (5T:23:24-24 to 25-15)  The court also failed to sentence [...] as he stood before it.  Instead of considering the aggravating and mitigating factors in light of the Miller factors, the court erroneously adopted the original sentencing court’s findings from 2015 without considering the mitigating factors argued by defense counsel, which were amply supported by the record at resentencing.  Had the court properly evaluated the Miller factors, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and considerations relevant to the imposition of consecutive sentences, it would have found that they all weigh strongly against the imposition of a sentence amounting to the practical equivalent of life without parole.
[brief] [...] charged [...] with two counts of third-degree aggravated assault on a police officer, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a) (Counts 1 and 3); and one count of third-degree resisting arrest, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a) (Count 2).  (Da 1-2)  Dua was tried in October 2022, before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  On October 19, the court denied [...]’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.  (7T:238-15 to 242-8)  On October 25, 2022, the jury acquitted [...] of resisting arrest, and convicted him of one count of aggravated assault on a police officer, as well as of fourth-degree attempted aggravated assault on a police officer.  (9T:131-3 to 133-11)  (Da 3-4)  On December 16, 2022, the court sentenced [...] to an aggregate sentence of three years of probation.  (10T:36-20 to 37-18; Da 5-7)  A notice of appeal was filed on February 10, 2023.  (Da 8-11)  --- 3  Da: Defendant’s appendix  1T: Transcript of 9/22/2022 (Hearing)  2T: Transcript of 10/11/2022 (Pretrial)  3T: Transcript of 10/12/2022 (Trial)  4T: Transcript of 10/13/2022 (Trial)  5T: Transcript of 10/14/2022 (Trial)  6T: Transcript of 10/18/2022 (Trial) (Separated into Vol. I (pages 1-200) and Vol. II (pages 201-269))  7T: Transcript of 10/19/2022 (Trial)  8T: Transcript of 10/21/2022 (Trial)  9T: Transcript of 10/25/2022 (Trial)  10T: Transcript of 12/16/2022 (Sentence)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] It should be noted that the right of negotiations attaches only to the majority representative and that public employers are prohibited from negotiating terms and conditions of employment or processing grievances presented by a minority employee organization, when there is a majority representative.  (N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3).  The Act’s concept of exclusivity of representation has been held by the Supreme Court of this State to be analogous to the similar provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases: **Antheunisse v. Tiffany Co., Inc.**, 229 N.J. Super. 399, 551 A.2d 1006 (App. Div. 1988), *certif. denied*, 115 N.J. 59, 556 A.2d 1206 (1989)  ...........................................  6  **Bauer v. Nesbitt**, 198 N.J. 601 (2008) ..............................................................................  7  **Collier v. Borgata**, 2009 WL 2707359 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009) ..................................  7  **Dugan Const. Co., Inc. v. N.J. Turnpike Auth. **, 398 N.J. Super. 229, 941 A.2d 622 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 196 N.J. 346, 953 A.2d 764 (2008) .........................................................  6  **Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan**, 140 N.J. 366, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) .......................................................  6  **Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens Inc.**, 818 A.2d (2003) ....................................................................................  7  **Parks v. Rogers**, 176 N.J. 491 (2003) ...............................................................................  7  **Readington v. Solberg Aviation**, 409 N.J. Super. 282 (N.J. Super. 2009) ..................................................  6  **Rosenberg v. Tavorath**, 352 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2002) .....................................................  3  ## Statutes & Other Authorities: **N.J. Ct. R. 4:46-2(c)** ...........................................................................  6  **IPMC § 305.5** .....................................................................................  4  **IPMC § 504.1**  .....................................................................................  4  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The award of astronomic and excessive attorney fees of over $1.547 Million Dollars to Plaintiff’s attorneys in the Final Judgment and now the award of $1,311,832.94 legal fees in the Amended Final Judgment in the private tort case where the Plaintiff has not sustained any actual damages were abuses of discretion by the trial court judges and are unconscionable.  Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f) shall permit relief from the judgment because of mistake and in the interest of justice.  A.  **Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Enhancement of the Lodestar Fee Calculation** --- 410 (E & A. 1941); *Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Green*, 124 N.J.Eq. 221 (Ch. 1938); 113 N.J.Eq. 431 (Ch 1933).
[brief] That said, the State need not establish irreparable harm.  The Legislature authorized the Attorney General and the Director to “obtain an injunction” after filing an administrative complaint—an indication the Legislature believes it sufficient for the State to establish a defendant “has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in” a violation of the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1; see also, e.g., United States v. Nutri-cology, 982 F.2d 394, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where the government has brought a “statutory enforcement case[]” and has shown a sufficient probability on the merits, “further inquiry into irreparable injury is unnecessary”; “the passage of the statute is itself an implied finding by Congress that violations will harm the public”); N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. [...], No. A-4920-04T3, 2006 WL 3007394, at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 24, 2006) (Ra75-79) (same); Hoffman v. Garden State Farms, Inc., 76 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (N.J. Ch. 1962) (same).
[brief] As in this Court’s published decision interpreting the DEP’s authority under the Safe Dam Act in Alloway Twp., the legislature’s use of the words “or upgrade” in the Highlands Act only make sense if the word “or” in that provision is conjunctive with the previous words in the list.  Thus, in N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), the word “routine” applies to both “maintenance and operations” AND “upgrade” - just like the legislature meant to include both “owners” AND “operators” when it said “owner or operator” in the Safe Dam Act.  The guidance from this Court’s published decision in Alloway Twp. clearly militates in favor of the Environmental Appellants’ proffered reading of the Highlands Act.