ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] If [...] paid ten dollars for his next house or one-hundred-million dollars for his next house, either purchase price is not probative of whether or not Defendants deviated from the standard of care when representing [...] and whether such said deviation proximately caused him damages.  The Defendants seek to introduce this evidence presumably to let the jury know that [...] was still a man of means after suffering Defendants malpractice.  What probative value does that have?  The jury is presumably prohibited from hearing evidence of the value of [...]’s home and certainly is prohibited from learning in the amount of insurance that covers this claim.  Why [...]’s purchase of a substantial home after the Pine Lake’s property is probative of any issue in this action is a mystery to Plaintiff.  It was an abuse of discretion to allow Defendants introduce this evidence and the introduction of this evidence will result in the waste of time, juror confusion of issues, and is clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] Similarly, interrogatory no. 43 asked Appellant to provide facts to support his claim that he was wrongfully placed on administrative leave.  (Da191).  In answer to interrogatory no. 43, Appellant asserted that he had only utilized the Company purchasing card for “a month”—that is, since March 2020.  (Pa87, Da212).  Most compelling is Appellant’s response to Respondents’ Request for Admissions dated April 15, 2021 in which he admitted he was not given permission to use a [...] PCard for personal purchases before March 2020 and he denied using the [...] PCard for personal purchases prior to January 1, 2020.  Request No. 12:  “On or about July 21, 2020, Plaintiff told [...] that Plaintiff was given authority to use his [...] Purchasing Card for personal purchases up to $3,000 per month in lieu of receiving a bonus and 401(k) benefit as of March 2020.  (Da81; emphasis added).  Plaintiff’s Response to Request No. 12: “Admit. ”  (Da87)  Request No. 13: “Plaintiff was not given permission to use a [...] Purchasing Card for personal purchases before March 2020. ”  (Da82)  Plaintiff’s Response to Request No. 13: “Admit. ”  (Da87)  Request No. 14:  Plaintiff used a [...] Purchasing Card for personal purchases prior to January 1, 2020.  (Da82)  Plaintiff’s Response to Request No. 14: “Deny. ”  (Da87) (Pa88, Da81-82, Da87).  This consistent string of allegations by Appellant that he received permission in March 2020 and that he had only used the PCard for a month or a few months changed after Respondents produced the [...] and Findings on December 1, 2021.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.  22 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 23 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to 62  17 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-118  23 N.J.S. A. 17:11C-2 23 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 17, 19 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33 17  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)  22  N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 3, 8 N.J.S.A. 58:8-2 1, 9, 13 N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 12, 20 Rules Rule 4:5-8(a)
[directive] 3  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020 2.7  Dealing with persons in a behavioral or mental health crisis or other factors affecting compliance.  Officers should consider an individual’s mental, physical, developmental, intellectual disability, or other conditions, such as age of the suspect, that affect the person’s ability to communicate or comply.  This includes, when feasible, considering the following factors related to the individual: (a) behavioral or mental health crisis; (b) drug interaction; (c) medical condition; (d) mental impairment; (e) physical limitation; (f) developmental disability, including autism spectrum disorder; (g) cognitive impairment or intellectual disability; (h) hearing loss or impairment; (i) communication disorder, including speech impairment; (j) language barrier; (k) visual impairment; (l) age; or (m) other factors beyond the individual’s control.
[brief] Thus, Earl is of no moment in the context of the TCA.  Ibid.  Earl does not control the appropriate statute of limitations for [...]’s NJCRA claims either.  Earl concerned a malicious prosecution claim arising under New Jersey common law.  See Earl, 14 N.J. at 131.  In contrast, [...]’s NJCRA constitutional malicious prosecution is a statutory cause of action arising under the NJCRA.
[brief] Pa3-5.  On September 12, 2022, a trial de novo took place before the Honorable [...], J.A.D. (ret. & t/a).  (3T).  On September 13, 2022, [...] issued a written opinion that focused on defendant’s discovery claim, “the only issue raised” at the Law Division.  Sa1-4.  [...] noted that even though complete discovery had been provided to defense counsel, the State was “extraordinarily accommodating” in redistributing “extensive” discovery directly to defendant after counsel’s discharge.  Id. at 3.  [...] concluded defendant’s failure to challenge the State’s representations regarding the completeness of the discovery provided was “dispositive” to her discovery claim.  Ibid.  [...] then re-found defendant guilty of obstructing traffic and re-imposed the same fine and court costs that had been imposed by the municipal court.  Id., at 4.  Defendant thereafter filed an appeal with this Court.
[brief] .................................................. 15, 22, 23  In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19 (2007)........................................................................  16  In re J.L., No. A-2501-13T4, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 292 (App. Div. Feb. 10, 2016)............................................................ 22, 23  In re J.S., 431 N.J. Super. 321 (App. Div. 2013).............................................
[brief] The landlords were aware of the size and number of the dogs, and that they were permitted to run freely in the backyard.  Although a dog's size alone will unlikely constitute notice of the animal's dangerous propensity, we are satisfied that a jury could reasonably infer that the landlords had knowledge or should have known of the dogs' dangerous propensities from the evidence that four dogs of nearly 200 pounds each were allowed to run loose on the property where plaintiffs' children played, notwithstanding that the dogs had been known to growl while in the yard.  Under those facts, the issue of the landlords' notice of the dogs' dangerous propensities is an issue that should have been decided by the jury.  It was not the trial court's function to weigh the evidence and determine the outcome, but only decide if a genuine issue of a material fact existed.  Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 520.
[brief] [...] appealed the Board’s decision with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., under docket no. [...].  [...] argued that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by ignoring his status as a protected tenant.  See 4T, at 3:1-4.  He further argued that he did not receive any new services or amenities as a result of [...]’s condominium fees and that the Board disregarded its own ordinance by failing to discuss the quality of services rendered by the landlord in maintaining and operating the unit.  See id. at 6:12-19.  The court agreed with [...] and found that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably.  See id. at 14:24-25, 15:1-3.  The court remanded the matter back to the Board and specifically ordered that the Board engage in:  ... further consideration and proper fact finding.  And for a proper assessment of the consideration of the increase in light of the statute that will control in a tenancy classified and acknowledged is protected.  Specifically, an analysis as to how those costs which are to be passed on to the tenant represent services or amenities no previously provided, will be specifically considered and addressed on the record.  That’s the decision of the Court...  E. Remand to the Board 2018.
[brief] 244 N.J. at 137-138.  Applying Atalese and Flanzman, the Appellate Division in Drosos v. [...], 2023 WL 7545067 (App. Div. 2023) (Da 1374), recently dealt with the sufficiency of an arbitration clause in a limited liability company Operating Agreement for the operation of a chain of food stores.  It held in November 2023 that the arbitration clause satisfied the Atalese standard by stating that disputes shall be resolved by arbitration “rather than the parties going into litigation in the Judicial Court system. ” (Da1377).  Here, the arbitration clause refers only to “binding arbitration”, has no language that it is precluding litigation, and does not distinguish between arbitration and litigation.  It does not enlighten the consumers that they are supposedly waiving their statutory and constitutional right to have a dispute heard in the Superior Court.  It is wholly deficient under Atalese, Skuse and Flanzman.
[brief] The Lot owner was the applicant seeking a Certification of valid preexisting nonconforming use for automobile sales.  Auto sales had been permitted when that use was initially established; auto sales use later became prohibited in 1993.  In 2001 the owner ceased active auto sales use due to a business slowdown, but continued relevant activity on the Lot and expressed to the municipality an intent to return to auto sales use.  In 2002, Borough officials advised that the nonconforming auto sales use was abandoned.  [...] then applied for a Certificate of Nonconforming Use, the issue being whether the auto sales use had been abandoned.  The Board denied the owner’s application, finding the nonconforming use had been abandoned.  The Appellate Court reversed, finding no abandonment.  The relevant point here is that at the inception of the Court’s analysis on the legal issue --- primarily abandonment --- the Court references that in this case “It is the burden of the property owner to establish the existence of a nonconforming use as of the commencement of the changed zoning regulation and its continuation afterward,” citing Ferraro.  That was an accurate statement for that case, as the owner [...] was the “applicant” for the Certification and the proponent.  [...] was not intended and did not change the principle, in place since at least Heagle, that in an objector appeal the burden of proof is on the party asserting the legal validity of the nonconforming use.
[brief] Comparison to Ruberton Case  This case should be compared to another [...] case, *Ruberton v. Tyner*, which had similar facts and pleadings but yielded diametrically different results.  Both complaints were thorough, but *Ruberton* focused on the Plaintiffs’ impressive job qualifications (pp. 20-45) while also having 20 pages (pp. 45-65) of character assassination against [...], mainly involving an alleged, irrelevant mortgage fraud scheme.  [...]'s complaint focused much less on his qualifications as a person with a disability and treated defendants respectfully.  The key difference is [...]'s complaint was brought by an attorney "who sues judges," and that both [...] and his attorney are disabled.  This is as irrelevant as [...]’s alleged fraud.
[brief] A couple of years prior, in 2012, with knowledge that he had become successful in the restaurant industry in Hoboken and Jersey City, [...] approached [...] with a business proposition.  (6T 85:19 to 86:4).  [...] had opened other businesses, including a [...] on the West Side of Hoboken, a [...] in Jersey City, and a Doggy Daycare/[...] in Jersey City.  (6T 85:1 to 85:8).  [...] convinced [...] to become involved in the establishment of [...] franchises in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, as evidenced by the series of Franchise Agreements that they entered into together along with additional investors.  (6T 88:9 to 89:4).
[brief] If there is only one “unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact,” there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried.  *Liberty Surplus*, 189 N.J. at 446 (quoting *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 540) (emphasis added).  Therefore, Appellant cannot “defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529.  Indeed, Appellant must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts in question. ”  Triffin v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993)).  Applying these legal standards to the competent record evidence in this matter leads to the inescapable conclusion that the trial court correctly granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
[brief] (Ra503).  Factors used in calculating initial premiums include projected lifetime loss ratio, which is a term of art.  The lifetime loss ratio is calculated as the present value of past and projected future incurred claims, divided by the present value and projected earned premiums, creating a ratio.  (T4:775:21 to 776:14).  The lifetime loss ratio is exclusive of expenses, taxes or profits.  (T3:662:16 to 663:3).  Over the past 20 years, carriers such as [...] realized that they severely underpriced the market.  Carriers failed to accurately predict the number of policy holders who voluntarily canceled their coverage (or let it lapse), the number of policies terminated due to death (mortality), the length of policyholder claims, the number of claims, and increases in interest rates and inflation.  (Ra503-504).  Fewer policies lapsed than expected, mortality was also lower than expected, claimants remained on claim longer, and claims occurred more frequently.  As a consequence, carriers sought premium rate increases because their experience did not match their underlying assumptions.  (Ra502-503).  B.
[brief] [...] charged Mr. [...] with first-degree murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:1.l-3a(l) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2), with an aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4)(k), and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a(2), for the death of his child.  (Da 18-20)  On February 10, 2022, [...] pleaded guilty to aggravated manslaughter before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (1T)  In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend thirty years in prison, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (“NERA”), to run consecutive to a ten-year NERA sentence that had been imposed on a separate indictment.  (1T 9-20 to 10-6; Da 12-17)  ---
[brief] (T3, 44:20-23)  In the trial court’s actual analysis of whether the N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) criteria were supported by substantial evidence, it did not address the issue of a detriment to community welfare. (T3, 49:7-53:8).  Rather, the trial court addressed the meaning of the statutory phrases “discontinuance of use” and “significant vacancies” (T3, 49:17-51:11), considered the policy implications of determining that discontinuance of use may be found where a property is undergoing construction or remediation (T3, 49:20-51:25), assessed the evidence in the record in support of Defendants’ argument that the Property was “untenantable” (T3, 52:1-23), and ruled on Defendants’ argument that the Property was substantially vacant to warrant designation under Subsection 5(b) (T3, 52:24-53:8).
[brief] As addressed in [...]’s Initial Brief, the Arbitrator did not base his determination of EGPs on any alleged course of dealing.  Initial Br. Point I.C.5.  Instead, the Arbitrator was very clear in the Award that his decision regarding [...]’s entitlement to EGP payments and the amount of those EGP payments was based purely on the Financial Reporting [...] provided to [...] (for a wholly different purpose).  Da137 (“The EGP for these projects were either formally agreed to in the PTA (i.e., Backlog Projects only) or were included time and time again in the update calculations provided by ARC to [...] which set forth the EGP, amounts paid, and amounts owed. ”).  [...], however, does not address this point in its Opposition, and instead doubles down on the Trial Court’s mistake of law and fact, incorrectly claiming that the Arbitrator “considered and found persuasive [[...]’s] position and evidence establishing the parties’ mutual assent, over the course of several years, establishing EGPs on a project-by-project basis.
[brief] \textbf{NO EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THERE IS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE RECORD TO DISQUALIFY [...] (NOT RAISED BELOW)}  Respondents are incorrect in stating that [...]’s Certification was not part of the record.  The submission to the Trial Court for \textit{in camera} review was sanctioned by \textit{O Builders} and Rule 4:10-2(e)(1) and therefore became part of the record regardless of whether the Trial Court considered it or not.
[brief] ”); *Valentine v. Unifund CCR, Inc.*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44747, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2021) (a debt buyer who allegedly purchased a defaulted [...] credit card debt to meet the definition of a consumer lender under the CLFA); *Arroyo v. Stoneleigh Recovery Assocs., LLC*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138287, at *13 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019) (assignee of [...] debt had to be licensed); *Tompkins v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21937 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2019) (assignee of [...] credit card debt had to licensed); *Latteri v. Mayer*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85926, at *6 (D.N.J. May 22, 2018) (motion to dismiss denied where plaintiff alleged defendant violated the FDCPA when it attempted to collect a debt on behalf of a debt buyer who was an unlicensed consumer lender); *Valentine v. Mullooly, Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn LLP*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118399, at *13 (D.N.J. July 6, 2022) (“Courts in this District have invoked that part of the NJCFLA—the part reading: "directly or indirectly engag[es] . . . in the business of buying, discounting or endorsing notes"—when classifying debt collection practices as falling within the "consumer loan business.
[brief] In Pineiro, an officer observed “the passing of a cigarette pack in a high crime area between a known felon and a suspected drug dealer. ”  Id. at 27-28.  In finding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants, the Supreme Court relied on the presence of multiple factors that are notably missing here.  First, there was an actual exchange between two people, as opposed to an officer’s suspicion that an exchange may occur some time in the future.  Second, Pineiro took place in a high-crime neighborhood.  Id. at 25.  Third, the officer was personally familiar with one of the men in addition to having received reports about the other, ibid.; in this case, nothing was known about the occupants of the car.  Unlike in Pineiro, there was no basis to believe the car’s occupants were engaged in illegal activity.  In sum, there was no basis to stop the unknown occupants of the Mazda who were simply speaking to a target of an investigation.
[brief] Fundamentally, had the Trial Court accepted plaintiff’s version of the facts, including their fair inferences, then this would not be an issue.  In this case there were multiple facts which, when pieced together in a manner that favors the non-movant, provide the necessary links relating to what caused this accident.  Simply put, the Plaintiff testified at his deposition that his bike hit the expansion joint and caused him to lose control and crash.  (Pa522 16-19, Pa523 at 18-21).  He even returned to the scene to video the area to confirm what his bike hit.  (Pa521:1 to Pa523:6).  [...] was entitled to accept this version of the accident and so should have the Trial Court.  In reviewing the evidence, as noted above, Plaintiff’s expert was permitted to accept that factual claim in reaching his conclusions.
[brief] In September 2022, Plaintiff purchased a one-way ticket for Defendant to go to North Carolina.  (2T12-9).  He could have purchased a round-trip ticket, but chose to purchase a one-way ticket for his wife.  (2T38-8).  After the parties’ separation, Plaintiff continued to track Defendant’s phone calls because she continued to stay on the family plan.  (2T74-24; 2T75-1).  Despite the separation, Plaintiff testified that Defendant never sought a divorce.  (1T87-15).  He specifically said that “up until June 10th of 2024, from [Defendant’s] mouth she’s never told me she wants a divorce.  From her own mouth.  Okay?” (1T87-15).  Plaintiff testified that he waited six months after Defendant went to North Carolina before filing for an annulment because he initially did not believe that Defendant married him to get a green card.  (2T56).  Plaintiff also testified that the reason he wants an annulment is because a divorce looks bad and it would be hard for him to find a suitable, "virgin" mate in the future (2T40; 2T41).  After listening to all the testimony, the Court determined that Plaintiff had not met his burden that the marriage was fraudulent, warranting him an annulment.
[brief] 2T145:11-24.  These Township officials overstepped the statutory scheme of 4:19-19, which gives sole authority to an ACO bring P.D.D. charges.  [...] impounded [...] on September 14, 2022, and brought him to [...] in [...] where he was held for over six months pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:19-19 at Defendant’s expense until April 6, 2023.
[brief] When [...] dialed the mother’s number, the phone rang without answer and [...] advised defendant to leave a voicemail for his mother informing her that he will call her when he arrives at the jail.  (1T:84-16 to 84-18).  As defendant was leaving the voicemail, his mother called back and asked, “What the fuck happened?” (1T:84-20 to 85-6).  [...] immediately told defendant to simply tell her where they are and where he would be going.  (1T:85-7 to 85-9).  Defendant proceeded to tell his mother that he is going to county jail and that he had an issue with a man and his dog, and apparently the man died.  (1T:85-10 to 94-13).  Defendant’s mother asked defendant if he shot the man, and why he had the handgun on his person.  Ibid.  Defendant stated that the man punched him in the face; he blacked out, and he apparently shot him.  Ibid.  He also stated that the man was going for it so he had to do it.  Ibid.  When defendant’s mother asked if she should pick up defendant at the jail, [...] proceeded to introduce himself and advised defendant’s mother of the logistics of the detention hearing.
[brief] H.  The Trial And The Court’s Decision  Significantly, prior to scheduled trial date in this matter, the Plaintiff’s counsel contacted counsel for the Defendants and proposed that the parties submit the case to the Trial Court “on the papers” and not present any live testimony from witnesses at trial.  Both counsel for the Defendants agreed with the Plaintiff’s proposal which was then confirmed in e-mail correspondence with [...]’s chambers.  Before hearing any argument by counsel on the substantive issues at trial, the Trial Court asked counsel for the parties to confirm their agreement that the trial would proceed “on the papers” with no live testimony from witnesses and they all did so (7T, p. 9).  Thus, the Trial Court evaluated the Plaintiff’s claims asserted through Counts 1-3 of its Complaint based upon a record comprised of joint exhibits J-1 through J-13 (Pa68; Pa533-1482), the transcripts of the proceedings before the Planning Board and Borough Council (1T-3T), the report of the Borough’s expert planner [...] (Pa513-527; Pa1483-1498), the report of the Plaintiff’s expert planner [...] with exhibits (Pa300-425), and assorted additional exhibits submitted by the Plaintiff at trial and marked as Exhibits 1-14 (Pa1499-1688).  After hearing oral argument from counsel for the parties on the remaining issues in the case, [...] reserved decision and indicated that he would render a decision in the near future (7T, p. 55).  The following day, on February 28, 2023, [...] entered an Order dismissing the Plaintiff’s remaining claims asserted within Counts 1-3 of its Complaint (Pa1733) along with a statement of reasons for this decision (Pa1734-1750).