ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ORDER THIS MATTER having been ordered to the Court by [...], Esq. counsel for Plaintiff, [...] and [...], Esq. for Defendant [...] appearing and [...], Esq., Administrator appearing for an Order Denying Administrator’s motion in its entirety; Granting Plaintiff’s application for return of $75,000.00 advanced by him for the Administrator’s fees and expenses in 2015 from the Escrow account currently held by Defendant’s Attorneys; Granting Plaintiff application for Attorney fees award from the Escrow account currently held by Defendant’s Attorneys; Granting Plaintiff application for the Administrator or another designee to recoup or collect outstanding account receivable on behalf of [...] for the benefit of the Estate; and the Court having considered the matter; and good cause shown: IT IS ON THIS 19th DAY OF June 2022: ORDERED that Administrator’s motion is denied in its entirety; and it is further ORDERED that the Escrowee return $75,000.00 advanced by Plaintiff for the Administrator’s fees and expenses in 2015 from the Escrow account currently held by Defendant’s Attorneys be released to the Plaintiff within 7 days of this Order; and it is further ORDERED that the Fee Award of $1,049,589.14 be paid from the Escrow account currently held by Defendant’s Attorneys within 7 days of this Order; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application for the Administrator or another designee to recoup or collect outstanding accounts receivable on behalf of B & H for the benefit of the Estate is granted; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for counsel fees is granted and Plaintiff’s counsel shall submit a certification of service within _______ days of this Order; and it is further ORDERED, that copy of this Order shall be served upon all parties within _______ days of the date hereof.  [...], P.J.Ch.  OPPOSED UNOPPOSED
[directive] A violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault, or sexual assault in which you used, or threatened the immediate use of, physical force.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  1.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  On November 22, 2022, Camden police officers stopped and frisked two groups of men who were standing on Leonard Avenue, between Federal Street and Westfield Avenue.  The men, six in total, were also checked for outstanding warrants.  (Da 26-28; 1T 22-1 to 23-12)  One group, which consisted of [...] and [...], was on “the southern side of the street closer to Westfield Avenue” when detained.  (Da 27; 1T 22-12 to 22-17)  According to the supplemental police report,\(^2\) the two men were stopped because “[...] had reasonable suspicion that these males were engaged in criminal activity due to the area and time of night. ”  (Da 27)  The report did not specify why Arce and Garcia-Vargas were frisked; it stated only that the men were “detained and terry frisked for weapons with negative results. ”  (Da 27-28)  Leonard Avenue between Federal Street and Westfield Avenue is a residential block with row houses, and the stop occurred at eight o’clock in the evening, two days before Thanksgiving.  (Da 24; 1T 58-13 to 58-17)  \(^2\)  The supplemental report was supplied to the judge, and in her factual findings, made reference to facts contained in the report.  (See, e.g. 1T 64-9 to 64-10)
[brief] Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 1998)  ......................................................................14  Quail v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 455 N.J. Super. 118, 188 A.3d 348 (App. Div. 2018)  ...............................................12  Salazar v. MKGC Design, 458 N.J. Super. 551 (2019)  .......................................................................................12  Schwartz v. Jordan and Public Service Electric & Gas, 337 N.J.Super. 550,767 A.2d 1008 (App. Div. 2001) .............................................23  Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32 (1990) ....................................................................................... 18, 19  Speaks v. Jersey City Housing Authority, 193 N.J.Super. 405, 474 A.2d 1081 (App. Div. 1984) ............................................20  State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497 (2019) ..................................................................................................12  Tucci v. Tropicana Casino and Resort, Inc., 364 N.J. Super.  48, 834 A.2d 448 (App. Div. 2003) .................................................. 30, 31 Tynes v. St. Peters Univ. Med. Ctr., 408 N.J. Super. 159, 973 A.2d 993 (App. Div. 2009)  ...............................................31  Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, 169 N.J. 119, 777 A.2d 9 (2001)  ............................................................................. 15, 23, 24, 26 Walker v. Atlantic Chrysler Plymouth, 216 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 1987)  ....................................................................14  Weiss v. N.J. Transit, 128 N.J. 376 (1992)  ..................................................................................................17  Wymbs v. Township of Wayne, 163 N.J. 523, 750 A.2d 751 (2000)  ...........................................................................15  Statutes & Other Authorities: N.J.S.A. § 59:1-1 to 12-3 ...........................................................................................................15  N.J.S.A. § 59:4-2.......................................................................................................................... passim N.J. Stat. § 59:4-3.........................................................................................................................20
[directive] Asecond-degree Eluding.  Second-Degree (i) when person any injury to or death of risk a created defendant the alleging 2(b) enforcement law or police a elude to attempted or fled knowingly defendant the officer. under charged offense  Athird-degree Employees. or Officials Public on Assault (ii) bodily with assault simple commission a of alleging the 2C:12-1(b)(5) N.J.S.A. (e.g., employees or officials public enumerated statutorily the of any upon injury fireman). volunteer or officer, paid enforcement law offense
[brief] ADMIT __X__ DENY _____ (Ca166 – RQA 2, 3, 4, 6; Ca169 – Responses to RQAs 2, 3, 4, 6.)  These admissions were specifically raised by Appellants in their Motion for Summary Decision.  (Ca045, Ca053, Ca061).  It was glaringly apparent from the record that Respondent held herself out as a member of the Board from her page.
[brief] In this case, the experienced Chancery Judge presided over the case for one (1) year before the commencement of the trial.  At trial, the judge presided over seven (7) days of trial, eight (8) witnesses, and one hundred and seventy-two (172) exhibits.  The forty-three (43) page written decision made factual determinations, credibility assessments and reasoned conclusions.  Pa0194.  Plaintiff’s position failed due to a lack of candor, a paucity of evidence, and specific contractual language as to the parameters of each party’s environmental obligations.  Defendants, and their environmental consultant [...], understood that their sale obligation relating to the RAO was only cooperation, however the Defendants’ obligation to perform the RI remained.
[brief] LAW AND ARGUMENT | 5 | | A.  Pleading Standard | 5 | | B. Standard of Review | 6 | | C.  Appellant Failed to State a Claim for Relief Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act – 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. | 7 | | a)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Is Contrary to the FDCPA’s Purpose | 10 | | b)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory is Contrary to Congressional Intent Concerning Third Party Communications | 13 | | c)
[brief] THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDER THE INTERNAL COMPARABLES BUDGETED BY THE CITY IN APPLYING THE 16(g) FACTORS.  (Aa057-Aa058).  At the arbitration hearing, the City’s Chief Financial Officer, [...], testified that the City anticipates 2% salary increases for all employees annually, and the 2% anticipated increase conforms to the Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Community Affairs who oversees the City’s receipt of transitional aid.  (2T48:23-52:6)(Aa060).  In her testimony, Business Administrator [...] confirmed that at least eight other bargaining units received 2% increases over the same time period as the Award at issue here.  (1T157:11-159:1).  Administrator Long also confirmed that the DCA’s 2022 MOU capped employee salary raises at 2%.  (1T41:23-42:12).  In the Award, the arbitrator improperly rejected the internal comparability factor which indisputably contained 2% salary increases for the City’s non-uniformed units, and a greater-than 2.9% salary increase for the firefighters unit when the arbitrator awarded less than 2% increases to the [...].
[brief] Ten W. Apparel v. Mueser Rutledge Consulting Eng’rs,, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. Unpub. LEXIS 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. February 28, 2020) ......................................................  29  Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193 (1957) ............................................  28
[brief] See Regis, 208 N.J. at 449 (“[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”) (citation omitted).  [...] further urges this court to permit him to file his untimely Form because he claims he did not actually receive the notice.  (Pb12-13).  But even if actual notice of the postcard was an express requirement under the Ricci Act, this argument is misplaced.  New Jersey courts have consistently “recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed.
[directive] It sometimes occurs that a grand juror has formed an opinion about a case before hearing evidence or may be influenced by a financial or personal relationship to a case, such as being acquainted with a victim, witness, law enforcement officer, a target for possible indictment or anyone else involved in the matter.  Because every case must be decided on its own merits, it is inappropriate for your deliberations to be affected by your familiarity with such matters.  In such a case you should decide whether or not you should disqualify yourself.
[brief] A: Yes.  Q: And then you took all active tenants’ money, and you used some of that money to cover the snow and ice removal services you paid for stuff that was done at your strip mall?  A: Yes.  Q: That included the services [...] [sic] provided from March 14th to March 16th, 2017.  Correct?  A: Yes.  [Pa911-912 (77:13-78:50)]
[brief] On January 23, 2023, [...] filed her Class Action Complaint in the Hudson County Law Division, alleging that [...]’s unlicensed attempts to enforce a void debt violated the Consumer Fraud Act.  In dismissing the Complaint, the trial court determined that [...]’s conduct—collecting on void debts which constitutes a fourth-degree crime—was not unlawful conduct under the CFA.  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  As discussed herein, the trial court failed to consider applicable jurisprudence in a developing area of law and, thus, the trial court’s March 21, 2024 Order granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 4.  The defendant argued that evidence of the prior condition would be admissible under these circumstances to attack the credibility of the plaintiff and her experts.  The Appellate Division disagreed stating, “[i]t is obviously the desire of counsel to merely place before the jury the existence of prior conditions, without showing them to have a bearing on the injuries plaintiff claimed were caused by the subject accident.  Such an invitation to speculate was properly precluded.
[directive] I.  Communication Protocols  A.  Criminal and law enforcement matters.  Decisions about criminal prosecutions and investigations are—and must be—made free of political or partisan considerations.  Such law enforcement decisions are often discretionary, and this discretion must be exercised without regard to partisanship or the social, political, or ideological position of either the individuals involved in the particular cases or those who may seek to intervene against them or on their behalf.  LPS personnel involved in law enforcement activity shall not communicate with any representative of the Governor’s Office or the Legislature regarding a pending or contemplated matter.1 criminal
[brief] ”  *Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Morris Cnty. Mun Utils. Auth.*, 433 N.J. Super 445, 453 (App. Div. 2013) (emphasis in original).  A prime example is “where the subject matter of the litigation would be destroyed or substantially impaired if a preliminary injunction did not issue. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gem Vacuum Stores, Inc.*, 36 N.J. Super. 234, 237 (App Div. 1955)).  New Jersey courts “have recognized the important role the public interest plays when implicated” and “have held ‘that courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.
[brief] Not only was Plaintiff’s conduct not equally egregious, but it was so pedestrian that it does not even register as irregular.  During voir dire, litigants and jurors are fully permitted to get up from their seats, stretch, and even leave the courtroom, so long as they report to court staff (6T, at 55:6-19).  This is especially the case for a litigant who is actively in pain and in need of relief.  A civil plaintiff may limp to the stand, or need to be wheeled there, or bear the visible scars of their injuries.  They might wince, grimace, or cry on the stand as they testify.  These are all human realities of litigation that no court has the ability to censor.  Defendants have to take their plaintiffs as they come, and [...] made this point very clear when she twice rejected Defendants’ argument (6T, at 55:8-19; 7T, at 28:5; 28:5-28:24).
[directive] However, the basic principle is that the more severe a patient’s health condition is based on these clinical factors, the less likely s/he survives even with ventilator therapy, and triage decisions should be made accordingly.  Patients who are not Appropriate clinical care of patients who cannot receive critical care.  triaged to receive critical care/ventilation will receive medical care that includes intensive symptom management and psychosocial support.  They should be reassessed daily to 11 determine if changes in resource availability or their clinical status warrant provision of critical care services.  Where available, specialist palliative care teams will be available for consultation.  Where palliative care specialists are not available, the treating clinical teams should provide primary palliative care.  Section 3.
[brief] .................................................................12  Township of Cinnaminson v. Cove House, LLC, 2023 WL 8368761 (App. Div. 2023)  ........................................................................11  Willoughby v. Plan Bd. of Twp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1997)  .......................................................................10  STATUTES & CODES
[brief] State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 307 Cal. Rptr. 3d 750 (Ct. App. 2023)  ...........................................  42  Twiss v. State, Dep’t of Treasury, Off. of Fin. Mgmt., 124 N.J. 461 (1991)  ..................................................................  11  United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 1999)
[brief] (Da30).  The Order did not provide Plaintiff-Respondent with any access to funds to pay any of the expenses of the Property.  (Da30).  The Order dated January 12, 2023 did not require the Plaintiff-Respondent to obtain unanimous consent from the Owners, but it directed the Owners to cooperate in the sale of the Property.  (Da33).  On January 18, 2023, Plaintiff-Respondent notified the Owners that he had chosen [...] of [...] to list the Property for sale and requested that they allow him access to the Property so that he could recommend a listing price.  (Da35).  On January 27, 2023, Plaintiff-Respondent signed a listing agreement with [...] to sell the Property for an initial price of $537,900.00 and a total realtors’ commission of five (5.0%) percent.  (Da37).  The Property was shown 15 times to prospective purchasers between January 26, 2023 and February 26, 2023.  (Da43).  The Plaintiff-Respondent did not receive any offers until March 7, 2023, when the Plaintiff-Respondent received a cash offer from Ms. [...] to purchase the Property for Four Hundred Eighty Thousand ($480,000.00) Dollars.  (Da50).  The Plaintiff-Respondent did not accept Ms. Montiero’s initial offer, and on March 11, 2023, the Plaintiff-Respondent received an offer from Kenya and [...] to purchase the Property for Five Hundred Fifteen Thousand ($515,000.00) Dollars, but that was subject to a mortgage contingency.  (Da66).  Although the Plaintiff-Respondent initially accepted the offer from [...], they withdrew the offer on March 14, 2023.  (Da80).  On or about March 15, 2023, Ms. Monteiro (hereinafter referred to as the “Buyer”) increased her cash offer to purchase the Property for Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars.  (Da82).  Plaintiff-Respondent accepted Ms. Montiero’s offer and the attorney-review period was completed on April 14, 2023.  (Da115).  Ms. Montiero performed inspections at the Property and forwarded Plaintiff-Respondent a letter on May 1, 2023 that itemized her list of concerns.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DECLINING TO PROVIDE A MOCKLER CHARGE.  (Raised Below: T2 187 through 191; T3 310 through 319; T4 8 through 13)  Appellant [...] testified at trial that he was unable to prevent his vehicle from coming into contact with the rear of the Respondent’s vehicle as a result of road surface conditions.  (T2 187-22 through T2 191-15).  At trial, [...] testified that he had seen puddled water earlier in the day as well as precipitation.  (T2 187-22 through T2 191-15).  [...] testified that he attempted to stop his vehicle but it hydroplaned causing him to lose contact with the road surface and control of the vehicle.  (T2 187-22 through T2 191-15).  As a consequence, the Willitts’ vehicle came into contact with the rear of the [...] vehicle, resulting in the accident.  (T2 187-22 through T2 191-15).  Appellant met each and every element necessary for the Mockler charge.  The court allowed Appellant’s counsel to argue these facts to the jury, but did not provide the jury with a legal mechanism by which to find that the Appellant’s inability to stop his vehicle before it came into contact with the rear of the Respondent’s vehicle was anything other than negligence.
[brief] 2.  Plaintiff made a representation in paragraph 1 of the Agreement (DA 1, PAGE A3) that she did “not have access to such funds” to pay her share of the down payment, and so the Agreement indicates “AS [...] DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS TO SUCH FUNDS THEN [...] SHALL FRONT LOAD THE DOWN PAYMENT REQUIRED FOR CLOSING”.  (Paragraph 1-DA 1, page A3)  3.  Based upon that representation Defendant agreed to “front load” the entire down payment himself.(Paragraph 1-DA 1, Page A3)  4.  There is no dispute that Defendant relied upon Plaintiff’s representation that “AS [...] DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS TO SUCH FUNDS THEN [...] SHALL FRONT LOAD THE DOWN PAYMENT REQUIRED FOR CLOSING. ”
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Judicial Authorities  Cited Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004)  ...............  43  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975) ...... 12, 13, 14 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) ......................................................  19, 20, 21 Large v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 201 (1988) .....................................................  33  Latta v. Caulfield, 79 N.J. 128 (1979) .......................................................  33  McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984)  .................  12
[brief] The claim that Appellant was not communicating with [...] is refuted by the evaluation that Appellant received in the first year where she received a positive score and positive comments with regard to communication.  (Pa211, [...] Dep., T195:3-16; Pa298, Pa314, Pa326, Pa327)  Finally, the claim that Appellant did not communicate a potential threat is inaccurate.  The student who made the threat was with a Child Study Team member who notified Mr. [...] of the student’s comments.  When the Child Study Team member left, the student was then in the custody of Appellant who stayed with the student until the student’s parents picked the student up.  (Pa211, [...] Dep., T181:7-25, T182:1-25, T183:1-3)  The Trial Court failed to review the documentary evidentiary material presented by the Appellant which refuted the claims made by the Defendants and set forth material issues in dispute which should have resulted in a denial of dismissal of the cause of action for discrimination based on race.
[brief] THE COURT:  It's not a situation where a deadline was missed.  It's not a situation where there was a failure to file a motion timely.  It's not a case where there was a failure to relay a settlement offer, for example.  It's not simply a failure to produce an expert witness in a trial.  It's -- it's not that simple.  (1T:36:4-23)  The trial court stated as follows concerning its application of the standard set forth in the Couri matter:  THE COURT: with respect to the issue as to the remaining counts against Defendants [...] and [...], both sides asserted that the court should be guided by the Couri versus Gardner case, 173 N.J. 328, 2002.