ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The University reserves the right in its sole judgment to make changes of any nature in the University’s academic program, courses, schedule, or calendar whenever in its sole judgment it is deemed desirable to do so.  The University also reserves the right to shift colleges, schools, institutes, programs, departments, or courses from one to another of its campuses.  The foregoing changes may include, without limitation, the elimination of colleges, schools, institutes, programs, departments, or courses, the modification of the content of any of the foregoing, the rescheduling of classes, with or without extending the announced academic term, the cancellation of scheduled classes, or other academic activities.  If such changes are deemed desirable, the University may require or afford alternatives for scheduled classes or other academic notification of any such change as is reasonably practical under the circumstances….  Id. (emphasis in original).  In reaching its conclusion dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against [...], the Beukas Court relied on Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 1959), where “the court refused to recognize a cause of action for fraud in favor of a student and against [...] based on the alleged failure of the University to meet the quality of academic courses as was represented in the college catalog.
[brief] [...] submitted last-minute documents on March 24, 2023, which was the Friday afternoon before oral argument for the summary judgment motion on Monday, March 27, 2023.  The March 24, 2023 documents were redundant and were in the same spirit as the 179 pages [...] submitted in the Motion to Amend.  The March 24, 2023 submission was a 2009 document; the documents before the trial court on the Motion to Amend were from 2008 through 2014.  steel framework, cabinetry, fire features, LED lighting, grills and non-grill components from other manufacturers aside from [...], and outdoor furniture.
[brief] II.  The Court Erred in denying [...]'s Motion for a Protective Order.  (819a-821a)  While the Plaintiffs are entitled to seek relevant discovery pursuant to R. 4:10-2, a party’s discovery rights are not unlimited.  Pinero v. Div. of State Police, 404 N.J. Super. 194, 204 (App. Div. 2008).  As noted above, it appears that the sole purpose of the subpoena is to harass [...] as any conceivable testimony is duplicative of discovery already conducted in the underlying litigation.  [...] alleged in its opposition to the underlying motion that “[...] has information directly involving the tracking and tracing of the stolen assets in question given his status as the primary communicator between the parties at the time the money went missing and his status as an employee of [...] - an entity that has asserted dominion and control over the assets. ”  As stated in the Certification of Daniel [...], submitted with the motion to quash, any information [...] is seeking related to [...] which appears to include information about investments at [...] and [...]’s finances is confidential business information as Plaintiff is self-proclaimed competitor of [...] (a non-party).  (4a-6a)  Therefore, the information [...] is allegedly seeking is clearly subject to a protective order.  See R. 4:10-3(g) (a protective order can be issued related to “trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way. ”)  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s order should be reversed.
[brief] And there's a long colloquy that goes on about discovery, about this, about that, about videos, about the 404(b) but needless to say, after the morning, you know, ends and that colloquy goes, an opportunity is brought to [...] to have another conversation with [...] and [...] asks at that time to have a conversation.  Obviously, I'm not going to, you know, suggest what I think happened during that time but after however long those conversations took place, it was the afternoon when parties came back onto the record after this recess and that is when plea papers came forward.  So obviously there were discussions off the record, there were discussions between [...] and [...] and, you know, that ended up being in what was the result of plea forms and even with respect to the plea forms that were submitted.  Obviously, this was and I'm sure at the time an interest to wrap everything up, right, which, again, is not out of the ordinary.
[brief] Ibid.  None of these arguments hold water.  Defendant’s sentence is wholly fair given the charges against him and the facts of the case.  Why defendant got the mitigating factor he did was adequately explained, and the reason why the others were not imposed is clear from the record the judge made.  The same is true for the overall fairness of the sentence.  Finally, the restitution in defendant’s case is mandatory, and thus, properly imposed.
[directive] Law enforcement incidents are defined as: (a) any use of force by an officer resulting in death; (b) any use of force by an officer resulting in serious bodily injury; (c) any use of deadly force (including the discharge of a firearm as defined in Section 4.1) by an officer, regardless of whether such force resulted in injury; (d) the death of any civilian during an encounter with an officer; and (e) the death of any civilian while in the custody of law enforcement.  7.3
[brief] \textit{Johnson v. United States}, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).  \textsuperscript{12}  It is import to state that the warrant application requested a warrant for all people "connected with said property," which I constitutionally ambiguous in the extreme and leaves one to ponder how a person is "connected" to property; even had it been included in the warrant it is invalid as deviating from the requisite constitutional language that all persons at the scene may be searched if it is "reasonably believed they are involved with the investigation."
[brief] This conversation was confirmed in writing on July 13, 2022.  Pa49.  During the course of the conversation, defense counsel was advised by [...] that [...] refused to supply the Warrant of Satisfaction.  In the July 13, 2022 correspondence, it was suggested that [...] could retain possession of the Warrant until Judgment was satisfied.  Pa49.  That suggestion was also rejected.  Further attempts to comply with the terms of [...]’s Order were not responded to.
[directive] Weapon retention position.  (Begin with the support hand across the chest with the hand grasping the collar of the shooter’s shirt or body armor.)  Each drill, Time: 2 seconds.  2 rounds.  (Total 6 rounds).  •  On command, draw and fire 2 rounds in 2 seconds from the weapon retention position.  •  Reholster an uncocked weapon.  • Repeat drill twice, firing a total of 6 rounds.  • Clear all weapons.
[directive] Revisions to Vehicular Pursuit Policy  A.  Authorized.  Section Additions to the List of Criminal Offenses for which Vehicular Pursuit may be 3.2(a) of the Vehicular Pursuit Policy is updated by adding six new crimes to the list of offenses for which a vehicular pursuit may be authorized, subject of course to all of the restrictions currently embedded in the Vehicular Pursuit Policy to promote officer and public safety.  Possession of a Firearm, Explosive or Destructive Device for an Unlawful Purpose, 1.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) through (c).  Unlawful Possession of a Weapon (Machine Guns and Handguns), 2.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a) and (b).  Burglary of a Dwelling, 3.  N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2.  Vehicular pursuits are authorized for the burglary of a dwelling.  Vehicular pursuits are not authorized for the burglary of a commercial building, motor vehicle, shed or any other structure described in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1.  Vehicular pursuits shall continue to be authorized for any burglary during which the actor is armed with a weapon or injures a victim (second degree burglaries).
[brief] (2T:48-22 to 49-3).  En route, [...] smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the rear passenger seat where defendant was sitting.  (2T:49-11 to 14).  Once at the police station and while defendant was being processed, [...] continued to smell the odor of alcohol on defendant.  (2T:49-16 to 25).  Although an Alcotest was administered, the reading was not admitted into evidence because [...], as seen on a video from inside the Alcotest room, was using his cellular telephone in violation of State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 80 (2008).  (2T:49-16 to 49-25).  As a result, the State opted to prove its case by the observational testimony of [...] and the admission of the officer’s MVR recording.  (2T:53-23 to 54-3; see also 3T:18-8 to 20-7; S-2).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE WERE NOT VIOLATED
[directive] Order Mandating the Periodic Review of Defendant's Fitness to Proceed to Trial and Dangerousness to Self, Others of or Property as a Result  Mental Illness  THIS COURT having found that the defendant has not regained his/her fitness to proceed to trial within the past three (3) months and that the defendant continues to be dangerous to self, NJS.A. of others or property as a result mental illness, it hereby ordered pursuant to 2C:4-6c is that the charges shall be held in abeyance and that the defendant remain committed to the of of of custody the Commissioner the Department Health to be confined in an appropriate of institution where the defendant shall undergo an examination and treatment for, when professionally determined to be clinically appropriate, defendant's psychiatric condition; and __ ______ 20_ of ORDERED
[brief] (16T4-16 to 5-6).  The proposed corrected charge was provided to defense counsel, who lodged no objection.  (16T5-8 to 15).  The judge then read the corrected charge to the jury.  (16T7-22 to 16-1).  Again, defense counsel raised no objection.  (16T20-20 to 21-1).  The jurors began deliberations at 9:27 a.m. (16T21-10) and reached a verdict less than six hours later.  (16T25-14 to 22).  Defendant has never argued that the substance or wording of the resubmitted charge was erroneous.  Instead, in his new trial motion, defendant argued that reading the charge in “the bifurcated matter was confusing to the jury[.]” (17T11-8 to 20).  [...] rejected this claim, noting that the corrected charge was submitted to the jury before deliberations began:  The Court went into painstaking details with the jurors to make sure that it was abundantly clear that the jurors did not have any questions before they started to deliberate.  The Court also made sure the jurors had a clear understanding after a verdict on counts one through four as to the definition of a firearm when in the course of committing or attempting to commit these murders.  The record and the physical charge that was presented to the jury will show exactly what was read.  As such, this issue was not capable of producing an unjust result.  Similar to [State v.] Palmer, the Court misspoke when it read the incorrect possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose charge, however there was no prejudice because the jurors had not started to deliberate.  Therefore the motion for a new trial as to that issue is denied.
[brief] An issue is “actually litigated” when it is properly raised by pleadings or otherwise, is submitted for determination, and a decision is rendered.  See Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 506 (1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27, cmt. d (1982)).  The issue was raised, for the first and only time, in connection with a post-judgment motion for leave to amend.  (Pa154.)  The issue was not fully briefed and the parties did not engage in any discovery on the issue – they merely submitted competing factual certifications in connection with the post-judgment motion for leave to amend.  *(See, e.g., Pa754-57.)*  In fact, the trial court below – immediately after making a factual and credibility determination that Plaintiff did not possess knowledge of the facts underlying its bad faith claim while the First Action was pending – acknowledged that the issue was not addressed in the First Action given the summary nature of the proceeding.
[brief] Cases  Abbamount v. Piscataway Tp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405 (1994) ..............................................  14  D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 192 N.J. 110 (2007) .............................................  14  Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 1960) .....................................................  9  Horne v. Edwards, 477 N.J. Super. 302 (App. Div. 2023) ............................................................  9 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362 (2015) ............................................................................. 14 New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1969) .............. 10 Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474 (1974) ......................... 9, 14 Swarts v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 244 N.J. Super. 170, 178 (App. Div. 1990) ............................ 15 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS November 3, 2023 Order Granting Summary Judgment .......................................................... Pa65 December 1, 2023 Order Denying Reconsideration ................................................................. Pa76 January 22, 2024 Order Denying Reconsideration ................................................................. Pa85 TABLE OF APPENDIX Excerpt of Plaintiff’s Brief Opposing Summary Judgment ......................................................... Da1 Excerpt of Plaintiff Plaintiff’s Brief for Reconsideration ............................................................. Da2 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] To establish that the contractor’s allegations were consistent with a tortious interference claim, the district court cited the pleadings and found that the contractor in the underlying litigation did indeed allege that it had a reasonable expectation of economic advantage and that the Board acted with “malice,” as the word is used for this cause of action.  N. Plainfield, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555 at *73-74.  As a result, the district court entered summary judgment on behalf of the Board’s insurance carrier.
[brief] The District has failed to take necessary steps to control expenses and contribute to the District’s budget.  As the Assistant Commissioner explained, the District chose not to exercise its authority under N.J.S.A. 18A:22-40 to “raise its tax levy to the cap from 2011-2014, despite the fact that the community’s non-public school population was rapidly increasing. ” (Aa13).  It was not until 2014, when a State monitor was installed, that [...] was required to increase the levy, but “the decision not to increase the levy during the previous years means that the District [was] not taxing up to its [LFS] and that not only was the District not generating money that it could have been during that time period, but that any additional revenue from increasing the levy would have compounded. ” (Ra97; Aa13).  Because of this, from 2014 to 2018, the District taxed $31,501,523 less than its LFS — money which could have gone directly to providing T&E to students.  (Ra71; Aa13).  [...] also chose not to avail itself of its power under N.J.S.A. 18A:22-40 and N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-39 to present voters with a referendum to increase the school tax levy in any year except 2016, when the voters rejected it.  (Ra98; Aa13).  Appellants downplay the failure to increase the levy under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-39 by noting that this provision does not allow the funds to be used for T&E.  (Ab29).  But what Appellants fail to realize is that any additional funds raised could free up other funds that can be directly used for services to ensure T&E; and, as a result of its choices, [...]’s school tax rate was below the State average and below other districts.
[brief] It is the legal standard under which the Appellate Court determines how much deference to give the actions of the court or agency that the Appellant is challenging.  It is also required that for an appeal to be sustainable, the Appellant must "properly present the issue on appeal" and adequately brief the issue.  See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5.1 on R. 2:6-2 (2022).  It has been determined that “an issue not briefed on appeal is deemed abandoned. ”  State v. Shangzhen Huang, 461 N.J. Super. 119, 125 (App. Div. 2018), aff’d o.b., 240 N.J. 56, 56 (2019); Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011).
[brief] The heart and soul of the appellant’s ethics complaint is that the named respondents violated the public trust when they decided, individually and as a group, to deceive the voting public about particulars regarding the referendum, inventing positive attributes of their plan that were not accurate, suppressing negative aspects of the referendum plan, and even inventing negative outcomes for alternatives to the referendum plan.  What Respondents label as “innocuous” behavior is in fact behavior found to be improper by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Respondents further mischaracterize the facts, in many cases claiming cases they disclaimed their speech when a plain reading of what was uttered makes it clear their “disclaimers” did not meet the standard created by the School Ethics Commission (“Commission”).  Respondents appeared to go out of their way to *not* disclaim their speech properly, perhaps to enjoy the added punch of making their comments as a Board Member without suffering the consequences.  Respondent’s actions included insulting tax payers who disagree with Board actions; attempting to influence municipal governments regarding a monumental $33 million referendum; and lying outright to tax payers.  These are not innocuous acts, but rather are actions that considerably reduce “the respect and confidence” the public has in the Board members.  Respondents also erroneously indicate that this court must defer to the Commission because “[a]s an administrative agency whose sole purpose is to enforce and adjudicate claims arising under the Act, the Commission’s expertise is entitled to a great deal of deference”.
[brief] No doubt the west zone ([...]) satisfies the LHRL criteria as an abandoned commercial site.  No doubt more than fifty percent of the housing stock and water/sewer infrastructure is more than 50 years old satisfying the LHRL criteria for an overlay zone for the entire town.  But all the sites in the north and south zones do not meet any criteria of the LRHL.  These two zones rely solely upon the mechanism of the “overlay” zone.  What this means is that such an application of the requirements of the LRHL would permit a municipality to declare the whole town as in need of rehabilitation and then proceed to redevelop any sites anywhere in town without regard to any other requirements under the LRHL.  The plan here allows the Town to construct projects that have no connection whatsoever to the redevelopment of the [...].  These sites are being redeveloped just because they are located within the municipality.  Then too, the specific expressed statutory purpose of the creation of the “overlay” zone (as set forth hereinabove) is to prevent “further deterioration” of the housing stock, water and sewer infrastructures.  Yet none of the portions of this [...] plan have anything to do with preventing “further deterioration” within the “overlay” zone.  The Topology report is lacking any foundation at all to apply the statutory criteria of the “overlay” zone to this plan.  (Topology report at 4-5, Pa0200-Pa0201; Topology report at 55, Pa0251-Pa0253)  Finally, the Trial Court failed to correctly perceive the importance of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL).
[brief] The Trial Court Misinterpreted the Estoppel Certificate and Its Role as a Condition Precedent, Not a Tool for Due Diligence.  (Raised Below: Da11-13)  The trial court erred in its interpretation of the role of the estoppel certificate, asserting that its purpose is that of a due diligence device.  This conclusion conflates the distinct functions of due diligence and the estoppel certificate and undermines the contractual intent clearly articulated by the parties.  In fact, PSA’s structure and text explicitly separates the role of the estoppel certificate from the wholly separate due diligence process.  45  [...]’s potential inability to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by the closing date is a condition precedent to [...]’s right to terminate the PSA, while the PSA contemplates a due diligence process completed well before the issuance of the estoppel certificate.  This misinterpretation led to the trial court’s erroneous decision since it conflated the two separate remedies provided for each of: (i) [...]’s right to immediately terminate the PSA upon the discovery of adverse information during the due diligence period; and (ii) [...]’s potential right to terminate the PSA if an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate was not produced by 45 [...] by closing.  i.
[brief] If the latter is at least debatable it is to be sustained.  [Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of W. Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 343 (1973) (emphasis added)].  In Downtown Residents, supra, 242 N.J. Super. at 338, the court found that “all the municipality needed to secure summary judgment” in connection with a challenged redevelopment plan “was a showing of some reasonable basis for its legislative action. ”  Stated differently, a court should “giv[e] due deference to the local legislative judgment in the matter” and affirm when “[t]he legislative judgment could reasonably go either way. ”  Bow & Arrow, supra, 63 N.J. at 345.  The findings of the municipal body are critical to a determination of whether the body has acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably.  “A determination predicated on unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary or capricious action. ”  Bryant, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 610; see also Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 333 (App. Div. 2010) (noting that “findings underlying the municipal governing body’s redevelopment decision, including any regarding the plan’s consistency or inconsistency with the master plan, must be adequately supported by the record, lest the resulting plan adoption be arbitrary or capricious”).  When Plaintiff’s arguments are viewed through the lens of this presumption of validity, the Appellate Division should find that Plaintiff’s legal and factual challenges to the City’s adoption of the Amended Redevelopment Plan and entry into the Redevelopment Agreement are without merit and affirm the Summary Judgment Orders accordingly.