ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause “guarantees MORE than fair process,” Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997).  With that being said, facts and evidence that the court failed to recognize caused prejudice and harm resulting in its finding to be unfair for the evidence presented validates there are -0- court records on file that confirms Service of Process for the March 9, 1990 hearing (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41) as to dispute this defendant’s claim of a Procedural Due Process violation (Pa10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62), (albeit, it had been discovered 33-years later which this brief addresses regarding extraordinary circumstances).
[brief] 206 N.J. 506, 523 (2011) | 6 | | Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 177 N.J. 561, 571 (2020) | 6 | | Achascoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 779 F.2d. 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) | 6 | | Summit Plaza Associates v. Kolta, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020) | 6 | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N. J. 366, 378 (1995) | 7 | | Blanks v. Murphy, 268 N.J. Super. 152, 162 (App. Div. 1993) | 8 | | Schwarze v. Mulrooney, 291N.J. Spuer. 530 , 541 (App. Div. 1996) | 8 | | Paxton v. Misiuk, 54 N.J. Super. 15, 20-21 (Ap. Div. 1959) | 12 |
[brief] [...]’s due process claim likewise fails.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ”  U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.  This prohibition contains both a procedural and substantive component.  Rivkin v. Dover Twp. Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352, 364 (1996) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (additional citations omitted)).  Substantive due process looks for “state intrusions into realms of personal privacy and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning and harmful as literally to shock the conscience of a court. ”  Rivkin, 143 N.J. at 365 (quotations omitted).  On the other hand, under a procedural due process theory, “the first step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment. ”  Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000).  To have a property interest, requiring procedural due process protection, there must be a “legitimate claim of entitlement,” which generally arises from a state-created statutory entitlement.  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575, 577 (1972).
[brief] B.  Plaintiff’s Claims Pursuant to the Open Public Records Act are Time Barred by the Statute of Limitations.  In the seminal case Mason v. City of Hoboken, 195 N.J. 51 (2008), our Supreme Court set forth the Statute of Limitations for actions pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq.  The Mason Court held that:  [R]equestors who choose to file an action in Superior Court to challenge the decision of an OPRA custodian must do so within 45 days.  Mason at 70 (emphasis added); see also N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 (“A person who is denied access to a government record by the custodian of the record, at the option of the requestor who is accurately identified by name, may, within 45 days of the date of denial…”)(emphasis added).  The OPRA Requests at issue in this appeal are for requests made by Plaintiff in or about March 2021.  (See Pb14).  Plaintiff received multiple correspondence responsive to his OPRA Requests from the [...] dated March 10, 2021 (Pa029; Pa83; see also Pa093) and March 29, 2021 (Pa133).  Accordingly, Plaintiff was required to file a Complaint with the Law Division on or before April 24, 2021 and/or May 13, 2021, respectively.  Plaintiff filed his complaint on August 25, 2023, well over two (2) years after the expiration of the Statute of Limitations.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint was properly dismissed by the Court Below as time barred.
[brief] Counsel attempted to exclude the identifications and argued they for _____________________ adversely affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification in nuanced, complex, and often counterintuitive ways,” thus, “familiarity does not guarantee reliability. ”  [...], et al., Don’t I Know You?  The Effect of Poor Acquaintance/Familiarity On Witness Identification, The Champion 53 (April 2012) (calling belief that familiarity alleviates reliability concerns is “a stunning example of a commonly held but incorrect assumption.
[brief] Appellate courts "review the trial court's evidentiary ruling 'under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion.'"  *State v. Prall*, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting *Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)).  Under that deferential standard, appellate courts "review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only for a 'clear error in judgment.'"  *State v. Medina*, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting *State v.  Scott*, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)).  Appellant argues that [...] incorrectly ruled that evidence of Appellee’s prior criminal convictions were inadmissible at the time of trial.
[brief] In addition to the sentencing Court’s error in setting restitution, the Court erred in setting the probation supervision fee.  N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(d)(1) states:  In addition to any condition imposed pursuant to subsection b. or c., the court shall order a person placed on probation to pay a fee, not exceeding $25.00 per month for the probationary term, to probation services for use by the State, except as provided in subsection g. of this section.  This fee may be waived in cases of indigency upon application by the chief probation officer to the sentencing court.  The statute does not set forth any criteria the Court should use in determining the monthly probation supervision fee.
[brief] As argued above, [...] was not required to provide any medical documentation to his employer.  Further, and in contradiction to the Board’s contention, [...] did in fact provide the Appeal Tribunal with four pieces of medical documentation, and supplemented the record by submitting an additional three pieces of medical documentation to the Board.  [...]’s treating physician, [...], with whom [...] began treatment on or about January 2021, approximately five months prior to his separation from employment, recommended that [...] “seek other work in order to reduce his symptoms and improve his condition. ” (Pa39).  [...]’s recommendation was based on his treatment of [...], including injections and physical therapy.  Although the letter is dated after [...]’s separation from employment, it is based on contemporaneous records from the time of [...]’s treatment, which began prior to [...]’s separation from employment.  The documentation provided establishes not only the existence of [...]’s condition, osteoarthritis of bilateral knees, but also that the demands of his job clearly aggravated his health as both stated by [...] and recognized by [...].  The case law requires only that the medical documentation be uncontroverted.  There is no record of anything disputing or denying the validity of any of the seven pieces of medical documentation submitted by [...] in establishing how his job duties aggravated his osteoarthritis of bilateral knees.  Rather, all of the documentation only lends additional layers of support to [...]’s position by emphasizing the difficulty he had in kneeling, bending down, and squatting, all of which were requirements of his job.  [...]’s examination, treatment, and recommendations all conclusively show that [...]’s health affected his ability to do his job and that those job demands exacerbated the severity of his condition.  [...] credibly established that his work duties aggravated the pain in his knees, making it impossible for him to continue working there, which constitutes good cause for his separation from employment and entitles him to unemployment benefits.
[brief] However, after several demands, [...] did turn over to [...] certain limited QuickBooks files for [...], [...], and another entity called [...].  Upon reviewing them, [...] and [...] found about $2.1 million in accounting issues.  [...] prepared a schedule based on the limited information provided containing entries that he and [...] could not reconcile.  When confronted, [...] responded that he had incorrectly entered certain information and that [...] would correct it.  In addition, the parties discussed [...] providing an affidavit as to the errors and that [...] would file an amended tax return.  [...] also said that he would speak with [...] about the situation.  (16T 72:11 to 73:21; 19T 84:21 to 85:5).
[brief] THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION WAS NOT INCONSISTANT WITH ITS STATUTORY MISSION.  Appellants quote N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22 for the proposition that the Commission was created to ensure public confidence and trust in school board members and school officials.  They argue that Respondent's conduct created an impression that the public trust was being violated and compromised the Board.  As discussed in POINT II above, however, Respondent did not hold herself out as a member of the Board in her controversial Facebook posts.  Therefore, her posts did not undermine public confidence in the Board or compromise it.  Appellants further contend that a violation of public trust is evidenced by minutes of meetings of the Board, news articles and two resolutions of the Board.  As discussed above, however, the meeting minutes include only sporadic complaints about the Facebook posts and the mere fact that the media posted an article does not just mean it speaks for the entire electorate when it does so.  Appellants make much ado about how the public "could" have interpreted the posts at issue.  (Cb16).  The Commission rightfully found it is not about what "could be" perceived, it is about what the reasonable reader would perceive, and the Commission rightfully found an insufficient nexus in Appellant's claims.
[brief] (Pa26).  The Board also sent a decision letter on that same day to [...] memorializing its decision approving her retirement.  Ibid.  The Board stated, in pertinent part:  “[i]n accordance with law, you have until thirty days after (A) the effective date of your retirement, or (B) the date your retirement was approved by the Board of Trustees, whichever is the later date, to make any changes to your retirement. ”  Ibid.  On January 31, 2022, [...] had an exit meeting with the Human Resource personnel from her employer.  (Pa27-31).  On or about February 28, 2022, [...] received a letter from the Division, which confirmed her retirement and listed her retirement date, type, payment option, monthly allowance and life insurance benefit (in the sum of $9,952.12 payable upon death after retirement).  (Pa36).  On July 19, 2022, the Division mailed [...] a letter advising her that her monthly retirement benefits had been overstated and would be reduced from $677.02 to $652.77.
[brief] (Da143).  On November 9, 2023, Defendants/Appellants again filed Leave of Court for Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice.  (Pa65).  In that Motion, Defendants’/Appellants’ arguments focused on the pretextual context that the trial court erred by extending the time Plaintiffs/Respondents could submit their Affidavit of Merit.  (Da176).  The court again denied the Defendants'/Appellants' Leave of Court for Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice.  (Da205).
[brief] 15  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, | 8 | | 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009) | | | AT&T Techs. v. Communs. Workers of Am., | 15 | | 475 U.S. 643 (1986) | | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., | passim | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, | 8 | | 323 N.J. Super. 118 (1999) | | | Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, | 14 | | 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016) | | | Cnty. of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., | 5 | | 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023) | | | Dixon Mills Condo. Ass'n v. RGD Holding Co., LLC, | 11 | | 2018 N.J. Super. LEXIS 464 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2018) | | | Gras v. Assocs. First Cap. Corp., | 14 | | 346 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., | 3 | | 639 Fed. Appx. 824 (3d. Cir. 2016) | | | Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., | 15 | | 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) | | | Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Florida, Inc., | 3, 4, 5 | | 236 N.J. 301 (2019) | | | Kindred Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark, | 3, 8 | | 581 U.S. 246 (2017) | | | Leodori v. Cigna Corp., | 12 | | 175 N.J. 293 (2003) | | Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) ................................................................. 14 Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div. 2008) ........................................... 7 Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC, 228 N.J. 163 (2017) .................................................................. 14 Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Com., 127 N.J. 344, 355 (1999) ............................................................ 10 Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326 (1993) .................................................................. 10 Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020) ............................................................. 6, 7 Stamato v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, 2020 N.J. Super. LEXIS 322 (App. Div. Feb. 13, 2020) ...................... 14 State v. Silva, 394 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 2007) ........................................... 11 Van Duren v. Rzasa-Ormes, 394 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 2007)
[brief] [...] failed to file a responsive pleading to the [...]’s Third-Party Complaint.  Consequently, the [...] filed an application with the Clerk seeking the entry of default against [...].  On October 17, 2019, the Clerk entered default against [...].  See Pa043-Pa044.  The litigation was originally assigned to the Honorable [...], P.J., Ch., the Monmouth County Chancery Division judge at that time, for handling.
[brief] Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim | Pa0028 | | September 27, 2022  Answer to Counterclaim and Separate Defenses | Pa0040 | | Plaintiff’s Color Coded Maps | Pa0044 | | February 10, 2023  Expert Report of [...], Esq. | Pa0053 | | June 26, 1991  Deed from [...] to [...] | Pa0065 | | March 11, 1991  Survey prepared by [...] | Pa0070 | | Title Insurance Policy, Policy No. 31 0081 93 000014 | Pa0071 | | December 22, 2000  Deed from James and [...] to [...] | Pa0077 | | December 31, 1971
[brief] STATUTES  17A V.S.A. § 4-117(a) .........................................................11  [...] .................................................................7  Thesseus’ s act .............................................................15  OTHER AUTHORITIES  Couch on Insurance, § 20:49 (3rd ed. 2005)  .........................24  22 E.Holmes, Appleman on Insurance, § 136.11 (2nd ed. 2002)  ....24
[brief] The Trial Court Failed to Consider a State Supreme Court Case Directly on Point Holding that an Attorney Exemption in a Debt Negotiation Statute Violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine (T. at 9:5-17:19).  Lastly, the trial court failed to even mention a Connecticut Supreme Court decision that is virtually identical to this case.  The Supreme Court of Connecticut in *Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Comm’r*, 122 A.3d 592 (Conn. 2015) held that the attorney exemption in Connecticut’s debt negotiation statute was unconstitutional because it permitted non-judicial regulation of attorneys’ services.  Similar to the Act, the Connecticut debt negotiation statute, as initially enacted, exempted all attorneys admitted to practice in that state.  The Court commented that this initial broad attorney exception “presumably reflected the legislature’s recognition that, under article second of the state constitution, the Judicial Branch has the exclusive authority to license and regulate the practice of law in this state. ”  *Id.* at 596.  The Legislature, however, later amended the statute to exempt only those attorneys “who [engage] or [offer] to engage in debt negotiation as an ancillary matter to such [attorneys’] representation of a client. ”
[brief] In the instant matter, Defense medical expert, [...], did in fact opine that Respondent’s MRI showed degenerative findings with no sign of acute trauma.  In fact, the only difference between [...]’s opinion in Morgan and [...]’s opinion herein is that [...] utilized the word “aggravation” in his opinion.  This Court in Morgan further considered the argument relative to the plaintiff’s medical expert’s comparative analysis and the alleged lack thereof.
[brief] ]  On July 11, 2024, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.  (Id. at 1).  The State’s responded to defendant’s motion on August 28, 2024, (id. at 25), to which defendant replied on September 8, 2024, (id. at 50).  On September 11, 2024, the trial court heard the parties’ arguments for and against defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.  (1T).  On September 25, 2024, the trial court entered an order and a corresponding memorandum of law denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
[brief] (4T64:18-21)  [...], [...]’s General Counsel, who had previously signed a Certification which was compelled by a Court Order, (Pa67 – Pa68), testified with a disturbing sangfroid recklessness, and on numerous occasions in direct contradiction to her own sworn Certification.  Joanne [...] admitted, inter alia, the following:  • Joanne [...] did not check all of [...]’s employees’ email inboxes and/or outboxes for any correspondence or emails from [...].  Indeed, when asked whether she had “made any attempt to search for documents . . . that we exchanged with [...] . . . other than the checks” [...] responded “I don’t think so. ”  (3T52:18-24); • [...] never authorized [...]’s IT vendor to conduct a search of the company’s email server for the term, “[...]” (3T55:1-4); and • [...] explicitly stated that the email of Shallah [...], [...]’s President and alleged point-person with [...] representatives, was never checked for communications from [...].  See (3T53:14-22).  When [...] was directly confronted with these strikingly deficient document production efforts, she testified smugly and acidly that, “[t]hen you should have filed a motion for that, Counsel.  I don’t know what to tell you, if you want that specific word searched. ”  (3T55:2-4)  But this critical information that could theoretically have supported [...]’s case most emphatically was not an arbitrary and informal request and off-the-cuff inquiry from counsel at her deposition.  Rather, [...]’s counsel’s inquiries mirrored and echoed the plain language of a Superior Court Judge’s explicit Order; [...]’s counsel’s pointed and relevant inquiries were not the product of a mere whim and whimsy, but [...]’s sarcasm and lame and telling attempt at deflection served to demonstrate either (1) her dishonesty (lying under oath), (2) her stunningly superficial understanding of what [...]’s discovery responsibilities were, and even what her signed Certification meant (despite affixing her signature as a corporate officer of [...]), or (3) all of these things.  Whatever caused [...]’s serial failures here, her reckless disregard and purblind inattention to the legal consequences of signing a Court Ordered discovery compliance Certification as a corporate representative of [...], while simultaneously proclaiming under oath at a deposition virtual ignorance of what [...] had been ordered to produce in discovery, further and fatally undermines [...]’s appeal.
[brief] ”  Id. at 234-35 (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52.)  As recognized in Smart, the Alston test was intended to be consisted with the contemporaneous federal standard.  253 N.J. at 168.  Similarly, in Martin, the Court confirmed the applicability of the automobile exception even in cases where police “actively sought a certain automobile” that they believed had been involved in a recent robbery.
[brief] The 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed (by which [...] originally acquired Lot 3) clearly states that Lot 3 originally had frontage of only 105’ along 21\(^{st}\) Street South, resulting in frontage of 65’ when reduced by the 40’ by 90’ subdivision identified on the Subdivision Plan.  Ja67, Ja712.  The 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed also identifies the predecessor deed thereto, which would --- \(^5\)  The Subdivision Plan specifically states that Lot 2 is acquiring a “40FT x 90FT PORTION OF LAND TO BE ACQUIRED AND TO BECOME P/O LOT [2]” and shows that Lot 2 will ultimately have 120’ of frontage.  Ja148. further confirm the appropriate measurements.  Ja60, Ja67.  The [...] Confirmatory Deed  The [...] Confirmatory Deed references that a “Portion of Lot 3” and a “part/portion” of the parcel transferred via the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed was all that was left of Lot 3.  Ja161 (emphasis in original).  The [...] Confirmatory Deed also makes express references to the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed and the Subdivision Plan.  Ja161-63.  The Tax Maps  The Brigantine Tax Maps, which are referenced in all of the deeds described herein, from 1986 and 1996 reflect the same 185’ measurements (and the Lot 3 and Lot 2 measurements of 105’ and 80’ respectively) along 21st Street South.  Ja303, Ja306, Ja712.  Indeed, the Brigantine Tax Maps were not updated to reflect the erroneous Lot 2 and Lot 3 frontages until at least January 1, 2018.  Ja311-12.  Thus, as of the date of Defendants’ Deed, Brigantine’s Tax Map would have reflected the accurate historical frontages from Lots 2 (80’) and Lot 3 (105’) with a combined total of 185’ of frontage along 21st Street.  The Subdivision Deed, [...] Consolidation Deed, Historical Deeds and Planning Board Resolution  The Subdivision Deed and [...] Consolidation Deed both expressly reference the transfer of 40’ by 90’.  Ja156, Ja167-68.  The historical deeds for Lots 1, 2 and 3, all recorded, further demonstrate the frontage of 105’ for Lot 3, frontage of 80’ for Lot 2, and the combined frontage of 185’.  Ja29-102.  Finally, the publicly available Planning Board resolution approving the subdivision demonstrates the nature and purpose of Plaintiffs’ acquisition of a portion of Lot 3, including the quantity of property transferred, the new frontage of Lot 2, and that the purpose was to allow Plaintiffs to subdivide by right.  Ja151-52.  **Defendants’ Appointment of an Attorney-in-Fact & Acquisition of Title Work**
[brief] FAC ¶ 40, Pa1617-18.  On January 15, 2016, [...] filed an application for a variance and preliminary and final site plan approval with the [...] (the "Zoning Variance Application") seeking to use the industrial-zoned land as a solar energy farm.  FAC ¶ 41, Pa1618.  [...] retained [...], which was later replaced by [...] and [...] in March, 2017, to prepare the engineering drawings and site plans (the "Site Plans").  [...] retained counsel and other professionals to handle the Planning Board representation.  The Zoning Variance Application and the Site Plans are marketable assets that belong to [...].  FAC ¶ 42, id.  On February 5, 2016, [...] Solar Project, LLC, received a memorandum from [...], as advisors for the [...], stating that it had reviewed [...] Solar Project, LLC’s submissions, but due to alleged “incompleteness” the application for site plan approval should be “denied” by the Planning Board.  FAC ¶ 43, id.  Eventually, the Planning Board’s impasse was resolved, and a full set of site plan application was submitted.  [...] and the professionals appeared before the Planning Board on 12 separate occasions.  FAC ¶ 44, id.  At a meeting on May 8, 2017, the Planning Board granted preliminary and final site plan approval to the applicant [...] Solar Project LLC to construct and operate the Solar Project at the Project Site (the "Approval").