[brief] The improper admission of [...]’s involuntary statement was not harmless for three reasons: (1) It was the only identification evidence at trial; (2) he made key inculpatory admissions; and (3) the State used his inconsistencies to argue consciousness of guilt.  See State v. Wade, 252 N.J. 209, 220 (2022) (“[W]e rarely find an error to be harmless when the State violates a defendant’s right against self-incrimination. ”).  To begin with, the State’s case was “circumstantial” and far from “overwhelming. ”  Id. at 221 (finding statement harmful for those reasons).  No physical evidence or eyewitnesses implicated him at trial; no weapon was found; and no video captured the shooting.  Thus, the State’s case rested entirely on circumstantial inferences based on the Facebook post and videos of the supposed perpetrator in the surrounding area.  In that context, [...]’s self-identification in the pre-shooting videos served as damning evidence.  Indeed, the State in summation repeatedly emphasized his self-identification both to show his presence in the area and to contradict his alibi.  (12T 56-15 to 98-10)  See Wade, 252 N.J. at 221 (holding statement harmful where defendant identified himself in video footage, which “eliminated” “[a]ny doubt about whether defendant was the man on the surveillance tape”).  Although he denied that he was the man shown running west at 2:12 a.m., both the State and the detectives used his prior identification to argue that the man running away was the same man because they were wearing the “same exact clothing. ”  (8T 97-20 to 98-14; 12T 91-8 to 14)  His self-identification was thus critical.  Second, he made inculpatory admissions that bolstered the State’s evidence of both motive and opportunity.  He admitted not only that he saw the Facebook post but also, after extreme police pressure, that it jeopardized his life.  He admitted that [...] previously confronted him about being an informant.  And, as the State repeatedly emphasized, he admitted that he saw [...] outside the bar less than an hour before the shooting.  (12T 56-15 to 98-20)  See Carrion, 249 N.J. at 284 (“[I]nculpatory remarks by a defendant have a tendency to resolve jurors’ doubts about a defendant’s guilt to his detriment. ”).  Third, the State argued that his inconsistencies were lies to the police intended to hide his guilt, and it invoked the “false in one, false in all” rule to argue that he must also be lying about his innocence.  (12T 58-15 to 88-2)  See Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 615 (holding statement’s admission “cannot possibly be viewed as harmless” where the State used it to show defendant “told untruths to detectives” and to “cast defendant as a liar”); Wade, 252 N.J.  at 221 (“[W]here the State’s theory hinges on circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s location at a particular time -- a self-identifying, self-inculpatory statement that colors the defendant as a liar is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ”).  Finally, the deterrence rationale underlying *Miranda* is particularly strong here. \(^{20}\)  Police detectives who routinely interact with members of the public must know that the kind of flagrant violations of settled law that occurred here will not be tolerated -- particularly because such tactics can and do produce false confessions that send innocent people to prison. \(^{21}\)  For all those reasons, the erroneous admission of [...]’s statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, all of his convictions must be reversed.