ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Aa 259-364)  On September 12, 2023, the Union submitted its Final Offer.  (Aa 245-246)  In accordance with the Arbitrator’s directions, on October 26, 2023, the City submitted a revised Final Offer.  On October 26, 2023 and November 2, 2023, the Union submitted revised Final Offers.  (Aa 247-250, Aa 251-279)  On November 2, 2023, the City objected to the Union’s revised Final Offers because, contrary to the Arbitrator’s direction, it did not only contain proposed contract language for changes to the contract sought in its September 12, 2023 Final Offer as instructed by the Arbitrator, but instead sought new and additional contract changes.
[brief] [...]  \(^{17}\)  [...] also continues to perpetuate the fiction that [...]’s sales performance was “substantially worse than other distributors,” [...] is not restricted to selling to Asian-owned entities, and [...] diverted salespersons to deliver products.  Db9-10.  \(^{18}\)  The trial court also noted that [...]’s demands were “precipitous” to “say, you know, we’ve been doing great for 45 years.  Now you have four months to figure this out and get it done. ”  T76:8-22.  \(^{19}\)  See, e.g., *Louis Glunz Beer, Inc. v. [...] U.S.A., Inc.*, Case No. 1:23-cv-1482, pending in the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] Because [...] may also try to substantively argue the parol evidence rule should have excluded some oral statements at trial, Plaintiffs address that as well.  Since [...] never moved to exclude this evidence at trial, the Court should review the parol evidence rule issue under the plain error standard.  R. 2:10-2; T.L. v. Goldberg, 238 N.J. 218, 232 (2019).  A.
[brief] Moreover, unlike in the Consumer Fraud Act, attorney’s fees are considered an element of the carrier’s compensatory damages in the Fraud Act and, thus, are subject to trebling.  See Allstate v. Lajara, 222 N.J. at 148 (“Notably, attorneys' fees, investigatory costs, and costs of suit are, by definition, compensatory damages under the IFPA, and therefore a successful lawsuit initiated by an insurance company will necessarily involve an award of damages. ”)  However, in the Coalition I case, the Appellate Division stated that an insurance carrier is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees where it is successful in defeating a claim for payment of the No-Fault benefits.  It stated, "We find nothing in the Legislature’s findings and declarations contained within N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b) expressing an intention to permit an award of counsel fees to an insurance carrier against an insured or injured person in the statutory dispute resolution process. ”  See Coalition, 323 N.J. Super. at 263.
[brief] (Pa505; Pa469)  Defendants are also incorrect in contending to the court that plaintiff cannot make a res ipsa loquitur claim.  Res ipsa loquitur is ordinarily impressed where the injury more probably than not has resulted from negligence of the defendant, Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193 (1970), and defendant was in exclusive control of the instrument.  Magner v. Beth Israel Hospital, 120 N.J. Super. 529 (App. Div. 1972), certif. den. 62 N.J. 199 (1973); Rose v. Port of New York Authority, 61 N.J. 129 (1972).  The doctrine has been expanded to include, as in the instant matter, multiple defendants, Jackson v. Magnavox Corp., 116 N.J. Super. 1, 17 (App. Div. 1971).  Res ipsa loquitur has also been expanded to embrace cases where the negligence caused was not the only or most probable theory in the case, but where the alternate theories of liability accounted for the only possible causes of injury.  See Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 258 P.2d 58 (Cal. Dist. App. 1953), rev'd 42 Cal.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1954).  That is the situation in this case, because there are various theories under which the defendants in this case may be held liable.  A jury may infer such negligence by the actions of these particular defendants.  Defendants were in the full control of defendant [...] when they attached him and beat him, choked his and dislocated his lower jaw.  (Pa093-Pa096).  Defendants created a clear and present danger to plaintiff by their actions done under color of state law when he was under their full control and authority.  Negligence in this case may be considered more of an alternative pleading, since the defendants acted with malice and intent in causing injuries to the plaintiff.  Based on this, plaintiff made a cognizable claim for violations pursuant to Resp isa loquitur and his complaint should not have been dismissed.  (Pa533; Pa534)  POINT EIGHT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
[brief] Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, that legal duty, its existence and scope is a legal question for the Court and not a question of fact sufficient to defeat Defendants’ motion (Estate of Desir v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303, 322, 69 A.3d 1247 (2013)), nor is the argument below for which Plaintiff submitted no evidence that “Everybody does it so why can’t she?”  The case which Plaintiff cites in this regard, Piccone v. Stiles, 329 N.J. Super. 191, 747 A.2d 296 (App. Div. 2000), is entirely distinguishable.  It was not plaintiff’s proofs that changed in that case, but defendant Stiles’ deposition testimony.  The appellate court determined that a jury should have the opportunity to assess defendant Stiles’ credibility, especially in the face of the 150 feet of skid marks reflecting left by Stiles’ vehicle, which reflected that Stiles was not paying sufficient attention to the approaching intersection and the stop sign.  There was every reason for Stiles to expect approaching cross traffic.  Here, there was no reason for [...] to expect Plaintiff to turn left from an improper lane appear where she did, and Plaintiff’s attempt here to feign an issue of fact to defeat summary judgment is insufficient to defeat Defendant’s motion and should not be condoned or rewarded.
[brief] In 2010, when the mortgage-related provisions of the statute were separated from the consumer-lending based provisions, subsection 18 remained \textsuperscript{3}  The NJCLA, “which prohibit[ed] deceptive lending practices generally,” “as incorporated in the Licensed Lenders Act . . . allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b.  . . .”  Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255, 271-72 (1997).  Though the “typical remedy” was a “voiding of the contract” by “individual consumers. ”  Id.
[brief] (7T:30-11 to 36-3); See Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Liability for Another's Conduct" (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6), Accomplice, Charge # One (rev. June 6, 2021).  However, under the circumstances of this case, the court was also required to instruct the jury that they had to find that [...] shared [...]’s purpose to commit the robbery using a deadly weapon in order to find him guilty of first-degree robbery as an accomplice.  As in Weeks and Tucker, the accomplice liability instruction was inadequate because it did not explain the possible difference in intent between the principal and the accomplice, or the legal significance of that possible difference (i.e., that the jury should acquit [...] of first-degree robbery unless they found that he shared [...]’s specific intent to commit the robbery with a gun).
[brief] First, [...] states that [...] agrees with [...] that *Empower our Neighborhoods* holds that there are only two “permissible methods” to allocate attorneys’ fees among multiple defendants.  (Db, p. 62).  [...] has never stated that there are only two permissible ways to allocate attorneys’ fees and, importantly, *Empower our Neighborhoods* does not so hold.  In *Empower our Neighborhoods*, this Court first held “there is no doubt that trial courts have ‘wide discretion on how to divide liability. ’”  *Empower Our Neighborhoods*, 453 N.J. Super. at 583.  Then, noting the absence of New Jersey authority on the issue, this Court described two allocation approaches based on federal precedent.
[brief] [...] Respondents had an obligation as Appellant’s employer to provide her with a workplace free of discrimination, regardless of whether [...] works for them or not.  [...] and Appellant’s work was inextricably intertwined as they shared the same office space, and [...] employees perform many services for [...] investigators on their cases.  This relationship between [...] and [...] is the reason why Appellant was subjected to [...]’s investigation upon the issuance of Appellant’s and [...]’s complaints.  At the very least, whether [...] had significant control of [...]’s workplace and its’ employees is a jury question.
[brief] 44 | Cases | Page | |-------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Agha v. Feiner, | 36 | | 198 N.J. 50 (2009) | | | Bailey v. Monaco Coach Corp., | 28 | | 350 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Ga. 2004) | | | Bell v. Klein, | 22 | | 2017 WL 2952992 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 11, 2017) | | | Beyer v. Anchor Insulation Co., | 38 | | 238 F. Supp. 3d 270 (D. Conn. 2017) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 16, 26 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., | 24 | | 89 N.J. 279 (1982) | | | Burbank v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, | 28 | | 2022 WL 833608 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2022) | | | Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., | 37 | | 188 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Ill. 2001) | | | Cascio v. Johnson & Johnson, | 28 | | 2024 WL 693489 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2024)  | | | Clark v. Actavis Grp. hf, | 19-21 | | 567 F. Supp. 2d 711 (D.N.J. 2008) | | | Davidson v. Slater, | 34 | | 189 N.J. 166 (2007) | | | Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., | 16-17, 24, 33, 42-43 | | 219 N.J. 395 (2014)  | | Garcia v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 2022 WL 2542291 (E.D. Va. July 7, 2022)  ...........................................  28  Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193 (1970) .................................................................................. 33, 42-43  Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993)  .................................................................................. 25  In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340 (2018) .................................................................................. 17-18, 39-40  In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prod.  Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2014) ...................................................................... 19 In re Hum. Tissue Prod. Liab. Litig., 488 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D.N.J. 2007) ............................................................. 20 In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ......................................................... 24-25, 37 In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), 2003 WL 22417238 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 21, 2003) ................................. 24, 33, 43 In re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (S.D. Fla. 2022) ....................................................... 41 Jakubowski v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177 (1964) .................................................................................... 25-26, 43 Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412 (2002) .................................................................................. 32 Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173 (2012)
[brief] Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Is Contrary To Proper Statutory Construction And Interpretation  1.  Appellant’s “letter vendor” claim is an exercise in “uncritical literalism” that fails under fundamental principles of statutory construction.  Appellant asserts that, by transmitting data to its letter vendor so that the vendor could print and send her two letters, Respondent violated § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA, which provides as follows:  **Communications with third parties**  Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  Read literally and in isolation, § 1692c(b) arguably supports Appellant’s theory.  However, as Superior Courts in New Jersey have concluded, Appellant’s theory fails according to several principles of statutory construction.
[brief] The appellate court also rejected the argument that the practice of using mail vendors should be allowed because it is widespread and had not previously been questioned.  “That this is (or may be) the first case in which a debtor has sued a debt collector for disclosing his personal information to a mail vendor hardly proves that such disclosures are lawful. ”  *Hunstein I*, 994 F.3d at 1352.  The Eleventh Circuit also commented on the potential impact of its decision.  We recognize, as well, that those costs [from producing collection letters in house] may not purchase much in the way of “real” consumer privacy, as we doubt that the [...] of the world routinely read, care about, or abuse the information that debt collectors transmit to them.  Even so, our obligation is to interpret the law as written, whether or not we think the resulting consequences are particularly sensible or desirable.  Needless to say, if Congress thinks that we’ve misread § 1692c(b)—or even that we’ve properly read it but that it should be amended—it can say so.
[brief] Specifically, *N.J.S.A.* 59:4-2 states:  A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................  8  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................  8  II.  THE [...]’S DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S ADJUDICATORY  HEARING REQUEST WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  [Aa132-Aa136.]  ......  9  III.  THE [...]’S ISSUANCE OF THE WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT PERMIT MODIFICATION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, LACKS SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DECISION, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  [Aa89-Aa91.]  ...........................................................................................................  15  A. [...] did not demonstrate a need for the WFD permit and modification that cannot be satisfied by existing waterfront facilities.  [Aa89-Aa91.]  .........................................................................................................................  17  B.  [...] did not demonstrate that its dock will not hinder navigation or access to adjacent water areas.  [Aa89-Aa91.]  .........................  19  CONCLUSION
[brief] **POINT I**  **THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE TRIAL COURT'S NOVEMBER 10, 2021  ORDER STATING THAT TENANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO TENANT’S ALLOWANCE BECAUSE IT WAS “IN BREACH” MUST BE VACATED, AS MUST THE NOVEMBER 9, 2023 FINAL ORDER THAT FOLLOWED, BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY PREJUDGED THE CASE AND FAILED TO GIVE LEGAL CITATIONS, ANALYSIS, OR ANY STATEMENT OF REASONS TO SUPPORT HIS DECISIONS (Da1-Da4)**
[brief] \(^4\) [...] v. [...], Docket No. [...].  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THIS MATTER DID NOT IMPLICATE THE PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION  WARRANTING AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE 45-DAY APPEAL PERIOD PURSUANT TO R. 4:69-6(c) (Pa55-Pa58)  It is undisputed that [...] commenced this litigation more than 45 days after Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage.  This late filing directly resulted from the defective notice which obfuscated the purpose of that legislation.  Indeed, had the notice included the statutorily-required information, no delay would have occurred.  [...] and other interested parties would have immediately pursued the defeat of Ordinance No. 13-2022 in the same way that they did with [...]’s site plan application several months later.  An enlargement of time is plainly warranted under these circumstances.  It is also warranted because, as explained infra, this matter implicates the public interest given its connection to the expenditure of public funds, the generation of ratables, political upheaval, development density and traffic.  The law in this area is well settled.  R. 4:69-6(a) requires a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs to be filed within 45 days of the accrual of the right to review.
[brief] A hazardous condition was created along the means of ingress and egress to the [...] store located at [...] as a result of the raised legs of barricades that were erected in the area.  (Pa63 at 20:14-22; Pa217-Pa219; Pa220; Pa234).  The plaintiff was exiting the store when her foot caught on one of the legs of a barricade that was bent up and protruded into the walkway causing her to fall to the ground.
[brief] On March 3, 2017, Plaintiffs-Appellants, [...] and [...] (sometimes collectively referred to as “[...]”) filed a Complaint against Defendants-Respondents, [...]  (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (Pa30).  [...] and [...] filed an Answer on June 23, 2017 (Pa41) and later filed a Third Party Complaint against Third Party Defendants, [...], [...] and [...] (Pa52).  A Case Management Order was entered on October 5, 2017, which required the parties to make certain disclosures and set various discovery deadlines (Pa70).  Another Case Management Order was entered on June 29, 2018 (Pa74) setting deadlines for fact depositions and expert discovery, and a subsequent Order was entered on December 9, 2019 concerning discovery and experts (Pa76).  On May 22, 2020, [...] and [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Pa77), which was supported by a Statement of Material Facts (Pa79), --- 1  The Third Party Complaint was ultimately dismissed with prejudice by Orders entered July 20, 2018 (Pa59) and August 8, 2018 (Pa68).  The Third Party Defendants are not parties to this appeal, and the Motions for Summary Judgment are not included in the Appendix as same are not germane to the issues on appeal.  Certification by [...] (Pa91), Certification by counsel (Pa100) and a Brief.  In opposition, [...] filed a Response to the Statement of Material Facts (Pa364), a Certification by [...] (Pa382) and a Brief.  The Motion was argued on September 29, 2020\(^2\) and an Order entered on September 29, 2020 (Pa1). \(^3\)  On July 6, 2022, [...] and [...] filed another Motion for Summary Judgment (Pa441), which was supported by a Statement of Material Facts (Pa443), a Certification by counsel (Pa446) and a Brief.  In opposition, [...] filed a Reply to the Statement of Facts and Counter Statement of Facts (Pa449), a Certification by [...] (Pa462), a Certification by counsel (Pa460) and a Brief.  [...] and [...] filed Reply papers (Pa466) and a Reply Brief.  The Motion was argued on November 28, 2022\(^4\); and, on December 7, 2022, an Order for Summary Judgment was entered dismissing the Complaint with prejudice (Pa3).  [...] filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Pa499) with a Certification by counsel (Pa501) and a Brief.  [...] and [...] opposed the application with a Certification by counsel (Pa513) and a Brief.  ---  \(^2\)  The Transcript of the hearing conducted on September 29, 2020 is hereinafter referred to as “1T”.  \(^3\)  The Order incorrected indicates it was entered on June 29, 2020.  \(^4\)  The Transcript of the hearing conducted on November 28, 2022 is hereinafter referred to as “2T. ”  On January 20, 2023, an Order was entered denying the Motion for Reconsideration (Pa16); and, on February 14, 2023, a Notice of Appeal was filed (Pa518).  The deadline to file this Brief was extended to December 7, 2023.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] Data/Date  Réu/Defendant  Advogado de defesa/Defense Attorney  Promotor/Prosecutor  [ ]  Esta declaração judicial é o resultado das indicações condicionais dadas pelo juiz sobre a pena máxima que poderá ser imposta independente da recomendação da promotoria.  Por conseguinte, o "Formulário Suplementar de Declaração Judicial Não Negociada" foi concluído.  This plea is the result of the judge’s conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor’s recommendation.  Accordingly, the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" has been completed.
[brief] To complete his work of alarm installation, [...] and his supervisor, [...] walked through the one-story building to ensure it was a safe environment.  (Da228-Da259, Plaintiffs’ Deposition Transcript, 21:20-22:20, 24:1-3, 44:8-14, 48:17-51:16).  [...] also attempted to determine whether he would install electrical wiring in the ceiling or in the crawl space below the floor, as the building had no basement.  (Da228-Da259, Plaintiffs’ Deposition Transcript, 24:19-25:10, 48:17-51:16).  [...] showed Mr. [...] and [...] the crawl space by opening up a floor hatch that was not visible when closed.  (Da228-Da259, Plaintiff’s’ Deposition Transcript, 27:22-25, 29:22-30:15, 38:17-23, 48:17-51:16).  Mr. [...] did not open or close the hatch.  He assumed that [...] would have closed the hatch as [...] opened the hatch and it was his job to close the hatch.  (Da228-Da259, Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript, 30:10-15, 33:5-7, 33:17-18, 37:8-13, 43:19-22, 48:17-51:16, 117:5- Mr. [...] stepped into the hole because he thought [...] closed the hatch and it was covered.  (Da228-Da259, Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript, 37:16-25, 48:17-51:16).  Plaintiff assumed that hatch was closed/covered was because, before falling, [...] informed [...] that he would not need access to the hatch that day.  (Da228-Da259, Plaintiffs’ Deposition Transcript, 40:18-41:4, 45:2-6, 48:17-51:16, 118:11-23).  [...] employee, [...], opened the hatch despite not being asked to do so.  Mr. [...] merely asked him if a crawl space existed and, instead of just answering the question, [...] took the affirmative step of opening the hatch.  (Da228-Da259, Plaintiffs’ Deposition Transcript, 41:5-42:2, 48:17-51:16).  After exiting the hatch room, Mr. [...] was following ceiling wiring through the building and eventually ended up in the area of the hatch, and, while examining overhead wires, stepped backwards into the open hatch, as he assumed [...] had closed the hatch, (Da228-Da259, Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript, 48:17-51:16, 53:1-9, 56:18-57:8).