ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  The Court Below made the following findings of fact that are supported by the record below to show there is no genuine issue of material fact.  •  [...] entered into five loan agreements between [...] and each of these companies, never sharing or discussing these loans with [...]’s board or [...]’s executive committee, and prepared financial statements on behalf of [...] and [...] without listing these loans.  •  None of these companies paid interest to [...] for the loans or made any payments towards the loans.  o (Da317; Da892: Material Facts: 36; 46; 51; 69 (“That would involve me sending a check to [...], and it will be a cold day in hell before that happens as this rate;”), 75).  •  Consequently, [...] had obtained judgments after arbitration against [...] for $136,759.83, [...] for $294,653.90, [...] for $915,932.63, and [...] for $133,819.08.  o (Da317; Da892: Material Facts: 37; 47; 51; 76).  •  The court also found [...] failed to pay federal payroll taxes on behalf of [...], in the amount of $300,000 by November of 2017.  o (Da317; Da892: Material Facts: 56-63).  •  During the same year, [...] transferred funds from [...] to [...] totaling $692,959.  o (Da317-318; Da892: Material Facts: 65).  •  By December of 2018, the loan amount increased to $764,941.79, above the $500,000 net amount permitted by the [...] loan agreement.  o (Da318; Da892: Material Facts: 64, 66).  •  [...] also argued he was shielded from individual liability because he was acting on behalf of the corporation.  However, the bylaws of [...] gave the authority to enter into financial transactions to the board of directors, not to [...].  o (Da318; Da892; Da866, 877).  •  Likewise, the OA of [...] required [...], as manager, to act in accordance with the consent of the members, who had “full, exclusive, and complete” authority to manage [...].  o (Da884).  The Court below made the following conclusions of law.
[brief] First, Plaintiff testified that while working to organize this ceremony, she was informed by [...] that [...] had directed the name of the ceremony be changed to “Christmas” Tree Lighting in order to avoid the ceremony being associated with the holiday of Hanukah.  See id. at 76:1-79:2.  Plaintiff testified that she complained about this change the moment she learned of it.  See id. at 79:18-80:1.  At the same time, Plaintiff was informed by [...] that, at [...]’s direction, the color on the fliers advertising this ceremony were to be changed from blue to red to avoid association with Hanukah.  See id. at 81:24:85:13.  In addition, Plaintiff was told by her direct supervisor that she was, on [...]’s orders, barred from participating in the tree-lighting ceremony because the Mayor did not want Jewish people working the event.
[brief] On November 19, 2018, Appellant received a Fitness for Duty Psychological Examination (the “FFD Exam”), which was conducted by [...], J.D., Ph.D., ABPP, who is a licensed psychologist in the States of New Jersey and New York (“[...]”).  [Pa192].  The purpose of the FFD Exam was to “determine the presence, if any, of emotional, psychological or intellectual characteristics that would detrimentally affect [Appellant’s] performance in the role of a Police Officer. ”  [Pa192].  [...] administered multiple psychological tests, and also conducted an hour-long interview of Appellant as part of the FFD Exam.  [Pa193].  [...] summarized the results of the FFD Exam in a report dated November 29, 2018 (the “FFD Report”).  During the FFD Exam, Appellant informed [...] that “he really did not need the medicine (i.e., the opiates)” and that he was taking opiates “three to four times a week tops” and denied that he was taking them three times a day, as prescribed.  [Pa196].  Appellant also outright admitted he was aware of the [...] drug reporting policy during the FFD Exam.  [Pa196].  The FFD Report concluded that Appellant was not viewed as fit for duty.  [Pa199].  On Thursday, November 29, 2018, [...] Sargent [...] (“[...]”), contacted Appellant and requested that Appellant report to [...] Internal Affairs (“IA”) to pick up a copy of the FFD Report.
[directive] g. 1997 1 9  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  범죄가 년 월 일 이후 발생했으면  법 시행관 훈련  및 장비 기금에  벌금 $35  아십니까?  을 지불해야 하는 것을  If the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?
[directive] Law enforcement officers should also be aware that the proper language and terms have evolved over time—and may continue to evolve in the future.  To help guide officers regarding the proper language to use, Appendix A includes a list of defined terms, which will be updated as necessary, as well as terms to avoid.  Officers should familiarize themselves with the Appendix.  6  All interactions involving juveniles shall comply with this Directive, including the requirement that officers shall not disclose a juvenile’s actual or perceived gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation to anyone, unless a proper law enforcement purpose requires such disclosure and the officer documents that purpose in writing, or the juvenile agrees to such disclosure.
[brief] (Pa340).  [...] replied, “I’m in East Rutherford every week, Judge, honestly. ”  (Pa340).  The Court concluded, “And we never have arguments at the stadium, never. ” (Pa340).  [...] testified that he stood “toe to toe” with [...] yelling at him.  (Pa306).  [...] provided the municipal court prosecutor a very large file with evidence including photos, videos, and archived e-mail documents via USB memory stick and CD.  (Pa295, Pa307, Pa312, Pa315, Pa316, Pa317).  The reason for taking pictures and recording video was to document the snow issues; and to present his proposed solution.  (Pa315, Pa316, Pa317).  [...] approached [...] and told him not to interfere with the driver of the snowplow truck.  (Pa311, Pa331).  [...] had no intention of speaking with [...].  (Pa327).  [...] did not pin [...] against a car.  (Pa332, Pa367).  [...] did not yell obscenities.  (Pa324, Pa329).  [...] knocked on [...]’s door to discuss the snow removal process because of the e-mails from [...].  (Pa323, Pa329).  During cross examination, when asked what he thought [...]’ purpose was of going down there to speak with him, [...] replied, “Your dissatisfaction with snow removal. ”  (Pa376).  Municipal Court Exhibit D-1 demonstrates that [...] was responding to [...]’s email to let her know there were no workers and no snowplow truck on their street, despite [...]’s email stating that the Association had contractors removing snow all night and the process was in full swing.  (Pa309, Pa320).  The purpose of the emails D-1 through D-5 was to express concerns regarding the snow removal process; and to propose a solution.
[brief] (Ibid)  Upon learning of the SDNY Action, Plaintiffs filed a motion in the New Jersey trial court to enforce the injunction on November 15, 2017.  (Da1912)  The complaint in the SDNY Action violated the injunction by repeatedly asserting that the Company was a Belizean entity, that the February 8, 2016 meeting was valid, that agreements other than the April 1995 operating agreement governed, and that the trial court’s and/or the Arbitrators orders were invalid.
[brief] Distraction or Forgetfulness of Invitee  Even if you find that plaintiff knew of the existence of the unsafe or defective condition, or that the unsafe or defective condition was so obvious that defendant had a reasonable basis to expect that an invitee would realize its existence, plaintiff may still recover if the circumstances or conditions are such that plaintiff’s attention would be distracted so that the plaintiff would not realize or would forget the location or existence of the hazard or would fail to protect against it.
[brief] Rule 4:21A-1 requires parties to arbitrate automobile negligence actions like this one.  R. 4:21A-1(a)(1) to (3).  However, although this arbitration is mandatory, and the award can be binding, there are also circumstances under which the award may be rejected and returned to the court “for disposition. ”  As [...] acknowledged, this scheme illustrates the “average consumer” has no basis to “understand that the term arbitration—without some explanation—means that court review or relief is unavailable. ”  Ibid.; see Aguirre v. CDL Last Mile Solutions, LLC, Nos. A-3346-22/A-3372-22 (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2024) (slip op., at *25) (emphasis added) (while subject to R. 1:36-3, this recent decision rejected agreements that did “not define arbitration and lack the crucial disclosure that it will replace litigation or a jury trial.
[brief] Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir.1993).  It is unnecessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court, but rather "the mere appearance of bias may require disqualification....  However, before the court may be disqualified on the ground of an appearance of bias, the belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable."  *State v. Marshall*, 148 N.J. 89, 279, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997).
[brief] (Aa4).  As [...]’s proposed floating solar project was grid supply, it did not fall into any of the projects eligible for the TI program such as new net-metered projects, community solar project projects, and grid supply projects previously granted conditional certification in the SREC program under the Subsection (r) program or under the Subsection (t) program.  (Aa4; See N.J.A.C. 14:8-10.4).  Nor did [...] seek a waiver of the Board’s rules for entry into the TI program.  (Aa5).  However, [...] commissioned a study, the Gabel Report, to support its request for an increase from the default TREC factorization of 0.6 for floating solar to 1.0.
[brief] Whenever the Legislative Budget Officer has reason to believe that a fiscal note on any bill will be required more quickly than provided for in this act, he shall submit to the director an emergency request for fiscal information, which the director shall cause to be completed as quickly as possible, but in no case later than 10 days.  This emergency request shall be in addition to a request for a fiscal note and shall represent the director's best judgment as to the fiscal implications of pending legislation.  9.  a.  In any case in which the Legislative Budget Officer has certified, pursuant to this act, that a bill contains no fiscal implications, the introducer of the bill, the chairman of the committee to which the bill was referred, or the presiding officer of the House, may direct the Legislative Budget Officer to request a fiscal note, if, in the opinion of any of them, cue is warranted.  b.  In any case in which a bill is amended and those amendments affect the fiscal implications of the bill, the committee chairman or presiding officer shall direct the Legislative Budget Officer to request a fiscal note.  10. P. L. 1962, c. 27 (C. 52:13B-1 et seq.) is repealed.
[brief] Contrary to Petitioners’ claim, Chapter 375 was enacted in conformity with N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6.  This constitutional provision requires that all bills “shall be read three times in each house before final passage,” and that no bill “shall be read a third time in either house until after the intervention of one full calendar day following the day of the second reading. ”  Ibid.  Here, the record establishes that S49 did in fact have the “constitutionally required time period between second and third readings” in both houses.  (Pb34-35).  As reflected in the Journal of the Senate and the Minutes of the General Assembly,\(^9\) both houses met on January 6 and January 10, 2022 after notice and the calendar for the Senate and General Assembly were --- \(^8\)
[brief] For factors one, two, and three, the motion court found that given the course of events that occurred during the nine months since the inception of the litigation, Plaintiff did not delay seeking arbitration, nor was it a part of Plaintiff’s litigation strategy.  (1T46:5-7).  The motion court observed the various applications that were made from the onset: Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint and proposed Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints were filed on August 22, 2023.\(^7\) (Da3).
[brief] THE COMMISSION’S HOLDING THAT THE LOCAL UNION OFFICE WAS A STATE WORKPLACE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE STATE POLICY WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT ESTABLISHED JURISDICTION THAT EXTENDS TO NON-STATE WORKPLACES AND NOT INVOLVING STATE BUSINESS (AA10-AA11).  A.  The Commission Erred in Holding that a Private Union Office is a State Workplace Per Se.  The CSC held that the State Policy “applies to him under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1, and therefore rejected what it described as [...]’s “contention that the EEO did not have jurisdiction to investigate the matter, as [...] is a current employee who is on union leave performing union duties that involve doing business with the State. ” (Aa10).  The CSC likewise concluded that because “the alleged conduct took place at the DOL building and at the Local 1038 Office, which is a facility where business regarding the representation of State Employees takes place, [...]’s Office is, as a matter of law, a facility “where State business is being conducted and discussed under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3. 1(a)1.” (Aa10 (emphasis added)).  For those two reasons, CSC found that “the State Policy touched the allegations at both locations, and it was appropriate for the EEO to investigation the allegations at both locations.
[brief] As the monument marker which was the basis for the 1956 subdivision could not be located, the Boundary Commissioners considered all of the surrounding properties surveyed in the 1960s and 1970s.  See Report, Pa108, ll.26-30.  Based upon that review of the surrounding properties, the Report concludes that the “[...] for the [...] is in agreement . . . and that the filed maps [for the surrounding properties] disagrees significantly with the [...]” of the [...]’ property, Lot 11.  Report, Pa111, ll. 32-4.  The [...] served as the basis for the location of the property lines of the four subdivision lots prior to the trial court’s ruling.
[brief] When [...] attempted to speak to [...] at the hospital, he was “uncooperative” and “evasive. ”  [...] had a similar experience when he attempted to interview [...].  According to [...], when [...] was shot in the store, he “ran up the street to a friend's house and a friend called the ambulance at that time. ”  Detectives at the scene were able to locate him from both “a trail of blood” in the store and “the phone call to the Medical Center.
[directive] In certain serious cases of officer misconduct, the agency may need to suspend the subject officer pending the outcome of the investigation and subsequent administrative or criminal charges.  To effect an immediate suspension pending the investigation, at least one of the following conditions must be met: (a) The employee is unfit for duty; (b) The employee is a hazard to any person if permitted to remain on the job; (c)  An immediate suspension is necessary to maintain safety, health, order, or effective direction of public services; (d) The employee has been formally charged with a first, second or third degree crime; or (e)  The employee has been formally charged with a first, second, third or fourth degree crime or a disorderly persons offense committed while on duty, or the act touches upon their employment.  5.2.2  Before the immediate suspension of an officer, the law enforcement executive or authorized person should determine which of those criteria apply.  The decision whether or not to continue to pay an officer who has been suspended pending the outcome of the investigation rests with the law enforcement executive and appropriate authority, who should carefully consider all ramifications of these choices.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 22 5.2.3
[brief] In accordance with the 2019 Site Plan Approval, on January 20, 2021, [...]’s counsel sent a letter to the Borough’s counsel, requesting that the [...] enter a resolution acknowledging that the Roads had been dedicated to the Borough and were therefore public roadways.  (Da332-Da333.)  The Borough never responded to such letter, and out of the blue, at its meeting on June 17, 2021, the [...], without prior notice to Plaintiffs, and without providing any rationale, entered Resolution R-238-21, pursuant to which it resolved that “the proposed dedication of [sic] Roadway as shown on the plat plan and conditioned in the resolution approved by the [...] be and is hereby rejected and denied” (the “Denial Resolution”).  (Da335.)  The Denial Resolution was on the Council’s consent agenda, which meant that there was no public discussion of same, nor rationale provided, prior to its passage.  (Da377, Tr. 2:2-3, 24-25; Da378, Tr. 3:1-3.)  G.
[brief] As explained in N.J.A.C. 5:80-33.14, only a small percentage of applicants receive tax credits:  (a)  Because of the limited amount of credits and the high volume of applications to [...], only a fraction of the projects that apply typically receive credits.  In addition to meeting the eligibility criteria described at N.J.A.C. 5:80-33.12, applications that fail to satisfy a minimum of 65 percent of the maximum score under the ranking criteria established under N.J.A.C. 5:80-33.15 through 33.18 shall be declared ineligible to obtain a reservation of tax credits.  [...] will rank projects according to the score sheet submitted in the project’s application....  Based on this ranking, [...] will then examine the applications of only those projects that rank sufficiently high to receive credits.  Once it is determined that an application meets all eligibility requirements, it is admitted into the cycle and underwritten.  [emphasis added].  Finally, from the pool of applicants, the [...] presents its recommendations to a quorum of the [...] (consisting of the Commissioner of the [...], the Executive Director, and three (3) members of the [...] staff), which reviews the rankings and awards the tax credits.
[brief] ”  *Karins* at 552.  There are different standards for discipline in both cases from this matter.  [...]’s arguments erroneously conflate “misconduct in office” with the high standard imposed on a law enforcement officer (Phillips\textsuperscript{4}) and with “conduct unbecoming a public employee” (Karins). \textsuperscript{5}  These are different standards than “misconduct in office. ”  Also, the public policy considerations relied on by the courts in Phillips and Karins are absent from this matter.  Two other cases also are distinguishable.
[brief] Obviously, the [...] could find nothing directly on point in any of its regulatory promulgations to support its instant argument regarding the extent of “routine” in the relevant statutory provision so it stretched this particular citation as far as it thought it could go.  The [...]’s erroneous interpretation of the statutory exemption at issue in this appeal is simply not worthy of any judicial deference, and the regulatory history provides no support in that direction.  The [...]’s attempt to contort the language of the statutory exemption (to cordon off the word “routine” from the word “upgrade”) must fail.  The [...]’s theory of statutory construction in this case relies on the tenuous position that the word routine cannot reasonably apply to rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade.
[brief] 16  Marcinczyk v. State of New Jersey Police Training Comm’n, 203 N.J. 586 (2010)  35  Marioni v. 94 Broadway, Inc., 374 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 2005)  25, 26 Mount v. Trustees of the Pub/ Employees’ Ret Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1975)  31 Naseef v. Cord, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 1966)  35 New Jersey Civil Serv. Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982)  40 Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super 118 (App. Div. 1983)  27 Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 2011)  37 Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34 (2016)  16  Roman v. Bergen Logistics, LLC, 456 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 2018)  35  Rooth v. Bd. of Trustees, Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 2022)  22 Schenck v. HJI Assoc., 295 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 1996)  19, 33 Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J.
[brief] Rolnick v. Rolnick, 262 N.J. Super. 343, 365-66, 621 A.2d 37 (App. Div. 1993).......................................................................................11  Romero v. Gold Star Distribution, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 295-296 (App. Div. 2021)....................................................................................18,19  Somerset Trust Co. v. Sternberg, 238 N.J. Super. 279, 285 (Ch. Div. 1989)..26  State v. Fitzsimmons, 286 N.J. Super. 141, 147 (App. Div. 1995), certif granted, remanded on other grounds, 143 N.J. 482 (1996).........................16  Tomaino v. Burman, 364 N.J. Super. 224, 232-234 (App. Div. 2003), certify. den. 179 N.J. 310 (2004).........................................................12
[brief] The entire controversy doctrine proscribes dismissal of a successive suit unless both inexcusable failure to comply with the notice provision and substantial prejudice are established by the undisclosed party.  The party asserting the entire controversy doctrine as a defense, bears “the burden of establishing both inexcusable conduct and substantial prejudice. ”  *Hobart Bros. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.*, 354 N.J. Super. 229, 242 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 170 (2002) (emphasis added).  In *Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., P.A.*, 331 N.J. Super. 445, 454 (App. Div. 2000) (Mitchell II), the Court considered the meaning of “substantial prejudice” in the second prong of the analysis and held that “substantial prejudice” means “the loss of witnesses, the loss of evidence, fading memories, and the like. ”  Ibid.  Even if both prongs are proved, courts may, instead, consider lesser sanctions.  The basis for the imposition of less draconian remedies follows long-standing jurisprudential tenets.  As the Court explained in *Alpha Beauty v. Winn–Dixie Stores*, 425 N.J. Super. 94, 102 (App. Div. 2012):  Our Court Rules, from their inception, have been understood as “a means to the end of obtaining just and expeditious determinations between the parties on the ultimate merits. ”  Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276, 284 (1990).  As a result, the Supreme Court has recognized a “strong preference for adjudication on the merits rather than final disposition for procedural reasons. ”  *Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr.*, 167 N.J. 341, 356 (2001) (quoting *Mayfield v. Cmty. Med. Assocs., P.A.*, 335 N.J. Super. 198, 207 (App. Div. 2000)).  The Trial Court in deciding an entire controversy dismissal motion must first determine from the competent evidence before it whether a Rule 4:5–1(b)(2) disclosure should have been made in a prior action because a non-party was subject to joinder pursuant to Rule 4:28 or Rule 4:29–1(b).  If so, the court must then determine whether (1) the actions are ‘successive actions,’ (2) the opposing party's failure to make the disclosure in the prior action was ‘inexcusable,’ and (3) ‘the right of the undisclosed party to defend ‘the successive action has been substantially prejudiced by not having been identified in the prior action. ’ [700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting R. 4:5–1(b)(2)).]  “If those elements have been established, the trial court may decide to impose an appropriate sanction.  Dismissal is a sanction of last resort. ”  Id. at 236–37 (citing *Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds, Co.*, 207 N.J. R. 4:5-1(b) analysis in this case must start with the understanding that legal malpractice actions are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine: “the entire controversy doctrine no longer compels the assertion of a legal malpractice claim in an underlying action that gives rise to the claim”.