ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Cases  Edgardo Vasconi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 124 N.J. 338 (1991)  ...........................................................................................................  12, 20  Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002)  ..................................................................................................................  18  In re Estate of Ehrlich, 427 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 2012) ......................................................................................  18  In re Estate of Sogliuzzo, No. A-3863-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2895 (App. Div. Dec. 9, 2013)  .................................................................  18 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Werner-Masuda, Nos. A-4937-09T2, A-5067-09T2, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2696 (App. Div. Dec. 11, 2012)  ....................................................................................................  18, 19, 21  Matter of Guardianship of DiNoia, 464 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2019)  .....................................................................................  18  McGory v. SLS Landscaping, 463 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2020)  .......................................................................................  14  Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen, 390 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div. 2007)  ....................................................................................  18 State v. Storm, 141 N.J. 245 (1995) ................................................................................................................  14  Underwood Props., LLC v. City of Hackensack, 470 N.J. Super. 202 (App. Div. 2022) .....................................................................................  18  Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 911 A.2d 479 (2006)  .........................................................................................  17 | Document | Filed On | App. Page | |-----------------------------------------------|----------|-----------| | Trial Court Order | 4-29-22 | 64 | | Trial Court Order (This is the Order which is being appealed.) | 11-22-22 | 66 | | Case Management Order | 10-3-20 | 68 | | Trial Court Order | 4-16-20 | 70 | | Trial Court Order | 4-23-20 | 71 | | Trial Court Order (Modified Consent Order) | 4-29-20 | 76 | | Trial Court Order | 11-20-20 | 78 | | Trial Court Order | 3-1-21 | 80 | | Trial Court Order | 4-7-21 | 82 | | Trial Court Order | 4-16-21 | 87 | | Trial Court Order | 4-19-21 | 91 | | Trial Court Order | 4-20-21 | 92 | | Trial Court Order | 4-23-21 | 95 | | Trial Court Order | 5-27-21 | 98 | | Trial Court Order – Number 1 | 5-21-21 | 101 | | Trial Court Order – Number 2 | 5-21-21 | 102 | | Trial Court Order – Number 1 | 6-3-21 | 104 | |-----------------------------|-------|-----| | Trial Court Order – Number 2 | 6-3-21 | 106 | | Trial Court Order | 6-30-21 | 206 |
[brief] 8.1(l)(ii) of the November 15 PSA that all leases were “in full force and effect. ”  (Da201.)  The law firm representing Defendant in the suit against [...] was the same law firm representing Defendant in the PSA.  (Da54-60; Da214.)  When Defendant refused to consent to release the deposit the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant on July 25, 2022.
[brief] C.  The Inappropriate Instruction On The Meaning Of Reasonable Doubt Necessitates Reversal Of Defendant’s Convictions.  .................................................................  39  D.  Individually And Cumulatively, The Instructional Errors Require Reversal Of Defendant’s Convictions.  .................................................................  40  POINT III  THE ADMISSION OF IRRELEVANT AND INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD ATTACKED A WITNESS REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HER CONVICTIONS.  (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................................................  41  TABLE OF CONTENTS  POINT
[brief] The "reasonable suspicion" necessary to support a brief investigatory detention, is a narrowly crafted and limited exception to the Constitution's probable cause requirement, and has been justified because of the non-custodial and minimally intrusive nature of an investigatory stop.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  It may not be employed to justify the removal and custodial questioning of \(^{10}\)  Eliding the officer’s clearly stated intentions to deploy his dog from the very outset of the stop, and his subsequent conduct in extending the detention of the occupants beyond isolating and confining the driver, and questioning her in an accusatory manner, the motion judge pointed to the canine’s reactions as the principle “circumstance” providing “probable cause” to search her vehicle.
[brief] Pa014\(^{10}\).  On October 24, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial; only as to the Mockler charge and Aggravation charge issue(s).  --- \(^{10}\)  Brief(s) attached pursuant to R. 2:6-1(c)(2), as the issue of the Verdict amount and Offer of Judgment penalties has been brought into issue, although not raised below, by the instant appeal.  No request for remittitur and/or challenge to the assessment of damages was raised.  Id.  On October 25, 2023, Respondent filed Certification as to additional attorneys’ fees incurred, opposing Appellant’s Motion for New Trial.
[brief] The award was undoubtedly “reasonably debatable” given the Arbitrator’s basis for the award was the result of significant unjustifiable fees [...] caused the Company to incur for his own personal benefit.  More importantly, neither Weiss nor Heher stands for the proposition that an arbitrator’s award must be vacated when it would violate public policy if awarded by the Court.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the trial court erred in vacating the award of 40% of the Company’s legal fees incurred in Phase I, and that portion of the June 3, 2019 Order should be reversed.
[brief] (7T121:17 to 122:17).  On these occasions, \(^4\) Decedent never questioned Petitioner about her alleged suspicions about other women.  (12T146:1-3).  Decedent worked with multiple women at the [...] but only had professional relationships with them.  Decedent knew that because she accompanied Petitioner to his work luncheons and work events and developed good relationships with his co-workers.  7T149:2 to 150:7.  Petitioner let Decedent know that he would leave a party they were attending before it was over so he could go home and check his emails.  (7T121:9-122:2).  When medical events occurred, Petitioner would receive an email with medical requirements and go to [...] to collect the supplies and take them to [...] to get the needed disposable medical supplies to Afghanistan within 16 hours.
[brief] There we have the sum total of [...]'s actual concerns about the current regulator.  There are maybe six discretionary visits in the in wintertime by crews otherwise out in the field, for reasons not related to reliability or safety, or calamitous risks, and no visits in the three other seasons.  As reflected in the testimony just quoted above, once the lawyers' creative rhetoric and witnesses' evasions were overcome, there have been two and only two incidents since 2012, in which the icing was severe enough to cause the current regulator to "malfunction."
[brief] Exhibit J- [...] email to [...] dated January 25, 2021 . . . . . . . .  R-327  Exhibit K- Notice to Produce to [...] . . . . . .  R-345  Exhibit L- Interrogatories to [...] served by [...].  . .  R-328  Exhibit M- [...]’s Answers to Interrogatories . . . . . .  R-337
[directive] Section (c) – Second degree: if, in addition to acts committed under subsection a, such violation results in serious bodily injury to another person or occurs during a declared period of national, state, or county emergency: first degree if a violation results in death.  4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500  10%  Permitted Section (e) – Fourth degree: if person knowingly places a call to a 9-1-1 emergency telephone system without purpose of reporting the need for 9-1-1 services.
[brief] ..................................................................27  State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453 (2015) .........................................................................................17  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71 (2016) ............................................................................................17  Victory Peach Group, Inc. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 310 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 1998) ..................................................................18 Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165 (1992) ...........................................................................................24, 25 Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Cos., 126 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 1973) ..................................................................27 Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001) ............................................................................................22 Other Authorities 43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 505 (1982) ................................................................. 19 Rule 4:6-2(e) ........................................................................................................... 2, 3, 15, 30 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Certified Copy of [...] Policy........Da1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Pro se plaintiff [...] has filed a lawsuit against [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), alleging that [...] wrongfully denied his claims for coverage, including defense, indemnification and reimbursement, stemming from a lawsuit filed against him in connection with his actions related to his condominium homeowners association.
[brief] Da35-36  # TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Event | Volume | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Motion Hearing March 31, 2023 | 1T | | In Limine Motion Hearing July 11, 2023 | 2T | | Trial July 12, 2023 | 3T | | Trial July 13, 2023 | 4T | | Trial July 14, 2023 | 5T | | New Trial Motion Hearing September 7, 2023 | 6T | | Motion For Reconsideration Hearing December 1, 2023 | 7T | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] THE RESULT WHEN THE PINELANDS FINDINGS MUST BE ACCEPTED.  (Not argued below)  At both the Mitchell and Cole hearings, the [...] sifted through the facts presented but chose to ignore the findings of the [...].  The trial court similarly disregarded this legislatively established source of factual determination.  Plaintiff-Appellant submits that the [...]’s action definitively establishes that the subject property has met its burden of proof regarding the positive criteria for ‘hardship’ specific to this lot.  As detailed in Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, GANN (2023), p. 430, sect. 29-2.2:  A hardship (b) application might involve a property where the rear portion of the lot drops off very sharply.  There it may be necessary to locate a proposed building closer to the front property line than otherwise permitted by the ordinance.  The [...], found at Ja 176a, illustrates the proximity of Lot 12.02 to Stephen Creek.  The Defendant Planning Board did not acknowledge this map or integrate the established actual hardship into their deliberations or decision.  The trial court also overlooked this finding and failed to determine the legal consequences flowing from this factual establishment.  Due to the pre-emption of the setback issue, this lot does not require a variance to build within 100 feet of Maple Avenue.  It is, and will be, compliant with the controlling Pinelands waiver and consistent with the policy of the [...], as set forth in their certified master plan and ordinances.  The trial court’s use of the term “Merits” masks the rubber stamp given to the discriminatory application of some of the facts and policies presented.  POINT III
[brief] Although Respondent argues that the statements attributed to her by Complainant were not made in her capacity as a Board member, and do not relate to her Board membership or to Board actions, the Commission finds that the statements on her Facebook page are clearly linked to her Board membership (and candidacy).  Respondent’s Facebook page is clearly marked with the banner, ‘Re-Elect [...] to the [...],’ but does not appear to have a disclaimer noting that the statements are her own and unrelated to the Board.  Melnyk v. Fiel, Commission Docket No. [...] (2019) (Ca269)), reaffirmed, e.g., Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25, 2022) (Ca233); I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...], at pp. 7-8 (2021) (Ca242-243).  For example, in Melnyk v. Fiel… the Commission discussed how failure to include a disclaimer can lead to the belief that the statements made by a school official, even in attempted to be made in their personal/private capacity, can be viewed as those of the Board.
[brief] (\textit{See} 1T23:15 through 1T25:8).  This nitpicking by Plaintiff of the Court’s generalized recitation of the facts gleaned from the record before the Trial Court in this case is an absurd argument.  The probative evidence contain the only necessary facts in that the date of accrual was on or prior to August 5, 2019 with respect to the handicap parking relief and April and May \textsuperscript{2}  It should be noted that the record before this Court and the Trial Court confirm that the quoted language on page 26 of Plaintiff’s Brief was in fact part of the record.  (\textit{Compare} Pb26 with Pa019).  \textsuperscript{3}  Plaintiff specifically notes that in or about August 2023 the handicap space referred to by [...] had since been removed.  (\textit{See} Pb27; \textit{see also} Pa093 at n. 6). of 2021, respectively, for the OPRA issues.  This argument advanced by Plaintiff therefore has no effect on the matter at hand nor its ultimate determination.
[brief] First, [...] was relayed a tip that a male in a Kia Optima bearing New Jersey tags, with the first three characters ‘L85’, was in possession of a firearm held inside a fanny pack around Collings Road and Alabama Road.  At the time of the hearing, [...] was able to testify from personal knowledge regarding the CI’s history of past tips and reliability.  (1T9-3 to 12).  That he did not have this information at the time he removed defendant from the vehicle is not problematic, since “[i]t is understood ‘that effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information. ’"  *State v. Crawley*, 187 N.J. 440, 457 (2006) (quoting *United States v. Robinson*, 536 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir.1976)).  It is of no moment that [...] at the time of the stop had not spoken to the CI directly, since it was objectively reasonable for him to act on the information he received from his fellow officer.  To hold otherwise would eviscerate officer’s ability to share information and act accordingly.  Moreover, because [...] at the time of his in-court testimony did have personal knowledge regarding the CI’s past performance, his testimony was sufficient to establish the CI’s veracity.  It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to accept that information.  The State concedes that this CI tip alone would not have raised a sufficient basis to pull defendant, a passenger, from the vehicle.  However, the court below relied on much more than just the tip.
[directive] Law enforcement agencies must establish and implement a process of investigation and review that is both meaningful and objective.  The process must be 4 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 designed to ensure that individuals receive adequate redress for legitimate complaints of misconduct.  It is not enough for law enforcement executives to adopt a policy governing the receipt, investigation and resolution of complaints of officer misconduct; rather, the policy must be implemented and executed with a commitment to the integrity of the agency and the constitutional rights of the public.
[brief] 4.  At the said time, the following items were officially marked into the record as Evidence: - Borough Council Ordinance No. 1667, introduced into Evidence as B-1; and - The Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, and related documents, prepared by [...], collectively introduced into Evidence as B-2.  5.  At the aforesaid Planning Board meeting, sworn testimony was presented by the following: - [...], P.E., C.F.M., Board Engineer; and - [...], P.P., A.I.C.P., Borough Planner.
[brief] A.  The parties  [...] is a Pennsylvania limited liability company, founded in 2004 by Managing Member [...].  (Da046; Da066)  [...] is [...]’s Director of Marketing.  (Da065)  [...] purchases proceeds from PI claims and their contracts are contingent, non-recourse advances, not loans.  (Da047; Da067)  Plaintiff is a Monmouth County, New Jersey resident.  (Da092)  B.
[directive] Public Reports  9.11.1  On an annual basis, every law enforcement agency shall provide to the County Prosecutor and publish on its public website a report summarizing the types of complaints received and the dispositions of those complaints.  This report should be statistical in nature.  The County Prosecutor shall submit a summary of the reports from all agencies in its jurisdiction to the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.  The Annual Internal Affairs Summary attached to Appendix K shall be used to satisfy the requirements of this Section.  This process shall be overseen and directed by the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity & Accountability and the Office of Justice Data.
[brief] Not only does the plain language support such conclusion, but a common sense analysis can find no conclusion other than IFPA claims having to proceed in court when one analyzes the [...]’s claims under the IFPA.  It is unquestionable that a lawsuit by the Commissioner alleging any type of IFPA fraud would stay in Superior Court and would never under any scenario be dismissed to the [...] forum.  It logically then follows that the same would apply to an insurance company as there is no reason to treat the insurance company differently and moreover, treating them differently may result in inconsistent results and issues with the entire controversy doctrine.  The logic of an insurance company's IFPA claims staying in Superior Court rather than being forced into [...] comes full circle when considering the practical aspects of the Commissioner's involvement.  The Commissioner, after receiving notice of an insurer's IFPA filing, has the right to join in the insurer's lawsuit.  See N.J.S.A. § 17:33A-7d.  If the Commissioner joins the insurer's lawsuit and prevails, “the court may also award court costs and reasonable attorney fees actually incurred by the commissioner."  Id.  If the Commissioner joins an insurer's lawsuit and the insurer's IFPA claims are dismissed in favor of arbitration while the same claims by the Commissioner are not, then under the trial court's decision the Commissioner would be litigating IFPA claims in the Superior Court while the insurer would be litigating the same IFPA claims in the [...] forum.  Not only will there be increased costs to the parties involved, but also there will be potentially, and likely, inconsistent decisions.  The insurer would be unable to recover compensatory damages, court costs and attorney's fees which are statutorily mandated, whereas the Commissioner would have no impediment to recovering its remedies.  The Legislature's clear IFPA remedies, including "court costs" make it unmistakable that IFPA actions belong in court and not in the [...] forum.
[brief] Appellate review of the Court’s decision below is a de novo review.  “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Manalapan Realty v. Township Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1990).  Further, as set forth in our initial brief, municipal ordinances are entitled to a presumption of validity and deference in review.  First Peoples Bank v. Township of Medford, 126 N.J. at 413, 418 (1991); Lake Valley Associates, LLC v. Township of Pemberton, 411 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div.), certif denied, 202 N.J. 43 (2010).  Just as the Appellate Court set forth in review of a Millstone Township municipal ordinance, review of a Constitutional challenge to a township’s noise ordinance is de novo.  State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J.Super. 624, 631 (2005).  Respondents’ position that the trial court’s “findings of fact” surrounding Ordinance 17-2017 as it relates to “ordinary conversations over the minimal distance of 50 feet should be subject to deference” is misplaced.  There were no findings of fact in this matter.  Indeed, there was no hearing.  This matter came before the court as an Action In Lieu of Prerogative Writs challenging Ordinance 17-2017.  There was no testimony or review of any exhibits by witnesses at a plenary hearing.  As such, the appropriate standard of Appellate Review is de novo and no deference should be shown to the lower court’s decision.  POINT I THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT PREEMPT THE HOME RULE PROVISIONS DEALING WITH NOISE BY ENACTING THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON LOCAL BOARDS OF HEALTH.
[brief] In doing so, the trial court misapplied the summary judgment standard, wrongly construed the evidence against the non-moving party (the Plaintiff), and failed to conduct the case-sensitive analysis for “substantial certainty” claims required by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Because a reasonable juror could conclude that [...]’s intentional conduct created a substantial certainty that an employee would be injured, particularly in light of [...]’s knowledge of the need for pedestrian safety measures in the lot, summary judgment should have been denied.  The trial court also granted summary judgment to Defendant [...] based on the immunity provided under the Workers’ Compensation Statute for co-employees acting in the course of their employment.  Under the particular facts of the instant matter, Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should revisit the case law relied upon by the trial court regarding this issue.
[brief] Generally, it mandates that ‘the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. ’” Marshall, 199 N.J. at 611 (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)).  Here, rather than consider the totality of the circumstances as required, id. at 610, [...] superimposed a particularity requirement on the court’s probable-cause analysis and decided that individual facts stated by the affiant were not sufficiently detailed to support a finding of probable cause to search.
[brief] We are not aware of any unpublished opinions that are contrary to the cases included in the appendix.  \(^{10}\)  Aside from the allegation concerning the alleged potential “sale” to [...], the Complaint included only conclusory allegations concerning [...].  (See Pa62a ¶ 60; Pa62a, First Count ¶ 2; Pa72a, Eleventh Count ¶ 2; Pa74a, Thirteenth Count ¶ 2).  partnership with [...], while discussing a sale with [...].  Nor did it allege how [...] could have conceivably had knowledge of such a “de facto” partnership.  And, it did not allege that [...] committed any wrongdoing while engaged in discussions with [...].  In short, the Complaint did not allege any facts that remotely supported a cause of action against [...].  Ironically, Plaintiffs did not shy away from the fact that they did not have a good-faith basis for suing [...].