ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On August 23, 2023, Defendants filed a Notice of Motion for Due Process Violation, raising this issue with the trial court.  (396a)  On October 4, 2023, their motion was denied.  (83)  The Statement of Reasons explained:  [T]his argument holds no weight because the Court issued a May 27, 2022 Order, in response to Defendants’ own application for injunctive relief, specifically stating that at the June 8, 2022 hearing, the Court would “hear argument on the merits of the underlying action and will thereafter enter an Order directing the parties on how they may proceed with the sale or transfer of the Property. ”  During the June 8, 2022 hearing and in Defendants’ papers filed prior to the hearing, Defendants raised issues regarding how to proceed with the distribution of the Boonton Property, which the Court considered and made its findings as to how to proceed with the sale of the Boonton Property (the exact determination the parties were advised the Court would make in the May 27, 2022 Order).  Accordingly, the parties had ample opportunity to be heard and there was no violation of due process.  (89a)  However, the trial court’s statement above does not satisfy the procedural requirement that an application be submitted.  Specifically, neither [...] nor [...] filed a motion requesting the relief that they were granted.
[brief] The Board adopted a memorializing resolution on October 13, 2022.  [Da454].  The Resolution states, “Applicant began its approval process by applying to the Cannabis Review Board prior to the adoption and applicability of that ordinance.  Accordingly, Applicant is entitled to application of the ordinance as it existed at the commencement of its approval process, and this proximity requirement does not apply to the subject Application. ”  [Da456].  F.  Proceedings Below
[directive] Complaint Source of Length Received Complaint Date Closed of Case  IA Number Officer Complaint Allegation Status  Criminal Disposition  Internal Disposition Discipline  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20 - 21 - 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 - 27 - 28 - 29 - 30 - 31 - 32 - Agency Name: Year: First Quarter
[brief] One such circumstance is the temporal proximity of the protected conduct and adverse action.  See *Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 284 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App. Div. 1995).  Causation can also be shown by pointing to “implausibility, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them “unworthy of credence.
[brief] The documents that an attorney drafts and the notes that are prepared are so material to a will contest that the legislature has determined that they should not be protected by the attorney client privilege.  N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20.  The statute codified common law that recognized that a communication by a client to an attorney who drafted his will, and transactions leading to its execution, are not privileged after the client's death in a suit between the testator's heirs, devisees or other parties who claim under him.  *In re Crook's Estate*, 87N.J. Super.210 (Co. Ct.1965); N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20.  Those communications are material to the Petitioner’s claims as they are relevant to the testator’s intentions when the will was made.  In addition, a material issue in this case is whether the Decedent gave [...] the Photocopy or whether he had received that from the Respondent.  The Decedent’s file would have resolved that issue.
[brief] I.  **PLAINTIFF DOES NOT DISAGREE WITH DEFENDANTS' DISCUSSION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW. **  The language at Db19 is essentially the same as that set forth at Pb7.  II.  **DEFENDANTS' POINT I IS MEANINGLESS AND DOES NOT WARRANT A REPLY. **  At Db19 to Db21, defendants declare that the plaintiff made arguments on appeal which were not presented below.  Which arguments are they referring to?  The defendants do not tell us, apparently expecting the undersigned and this Court to divine the grievance.  Defendants are ignoring their "absolute duty to make unnecessary an independent examination of the record by the court[.]"  *State v. Hild*, 148 N.J. Super. 294, 296 (App. Div. 1978) (citing *R.* 2:6-9).  It is neither possible nor fair to expect plaintiff to reply.  **III.
[brief] The State related defendants transgressed these boundaries.  The State related defendants ignored and contradicted their own rules and regulations.  The State related defendants ignored and contradicted the State Comptroller’s August 2010 Tax Exemption Report, the State DCA’s January 2012 Redevelopment Handbook, the November 2018 shift in urban renewal entity formation oversight, various Best Practices Inventory Questions and the LFB’s November 2020 Municipal Tax Abatement Handbook.  The State related defendants and their counsel impugned the integrity of the judicial process.  “Fraud upon the court” is not a frivolous, vexatious and unreasonable allegation in this prerogative writ action.
[brief] (Pa212.)  The order was amended on March 6, 2024 to extend the time for opposition.  (Pa209.)  In response to [...]’s opening brief, [...] filed a “motion to dismiss” as to the challenge to the Distance Regulation, citing only testimony before the Board and without submitting any evidence of the factual basis for Distance Regulation.  See Pa210; Statement of Record on Summary Judgment (listing only items submitted to the Board).  In reply, [...] objected to the “motion to dismiss. ”\(^5\) [...] then filed an improper sur-reply and called its motion one for “summary judgment. ”  [...] again objected.  (Pa208, 214.)  The trial court eventually converted [...]’s “motion to dismiss” to one for “summary judgment.
[directive] And where officer discipline relates to domestic violence, this Directive makes clear that public reports will not disclose the relationship between an officer and a victim of domestic violence (such as whether the victim was a spouse, child, or former household member of the officer) in order to avoid the indirect disclosure of a victim’s identity.  Finally, this Directive makes a range of additional amendments to IAPP concerning the conduct of internal affairs investigations and coordination between law enforcement agencies.  For the reasons stated in this Directive and in the Major Discipline Directive, and pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with IAPP as revised by this Directive, and to take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with IAPP, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.
[brief] One is that where the licensee expends substantial sums of money in pursuance of the privilege and such expenditures are made with the acquiescence of the licensor, the license is regarded as executed and, as such, irrevocable.  The other more commonly employed theory is that in such circumstances, it would permit a fraud to be practiced on the licensee to allow the licensor to revoke, and therefore there is justification to invoke the preventive principles of equitable estoppel.  Moore v. Schultz, 22 N.J. Super. 24, 29 (App. Div. 1952); Vide, Silsby v. Trotter, 29 N.J. Eq. 228, 232-233 (Ch.1878); East Jersey Iron Co. v. Wright, 32 N.J.Eq. 248 (Ch.1880); Morton Brewing Co. v. Morton, 47 N.J.Eq. 158, 163(Ch.1890); New Jersey Suburban Water Co. v. Town of Harrison, 122 N.J.L. 189, 194 (E. & A.1939).
[brief] In the instant case, [...] while using the contract rent for the [...], ignores the actual rent in his calculations as to the two stores greater than 2,000 square feet.  First he reduced the actual contract rent of [...] of $38,500 to $29,400 by using a market rent of $10.50 instead of the actual rent of $13.75.  Thus, he chips away $9,100 from [...]’s contribution to the rent roll.  Then the overage rent from [...] is omitted by [...], even though he had read the lease and knew it provided for overage rent.  He later saw that [...] had included the overage rent for [...], but he did not want to amend his report to include the $33,000 overage rent in his rental income because his rental income then starts to get too high for his preconceived and misguided notion that the final opinion of value shouldn’t be much above what he thought [...] paid for the leased fee estate he bought in 1988.  This is contrary to the general rule as to a fee simple appraisal, stated in Nichols §12B.08[1] §12B-44 “it is the economic [market], rather than the actual rent that matters,” actual rents are often the best indication of value.
[brief] Ca187.  1  Two months later, on September 16, 2020, the Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings, separate from the Law Division Action, pertaining to  In a letter dated March 4, 2021, approximately one (1) year after the entry of the Order Appointing Trustee, counsel for the Bank transmitted information to the Court on three (3) proposed receivers.  On April 7, 2021, in response to counsel’s provision of three (3) proposed receivers, the Clerk of the Superior Court circulated a notice requesting the submission of an Order with the March 4, 2021 letter.  On or about June 24, 2021, the Bank filed a Motion to Appoint a Fiscal Agent, which was denied on July 23, 2021.  Ca241, 247.  On July 23, 2021, Appellant [...] sustained injury in the parking lot at the [...] after dining there, as would later be alleged in her personal injury lawsuit initiated July 21, 2023.
[brief] I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below T1; T2)  R. 4:50-1 is “designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case. ”  Mancini v. EDS ex rel. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 392 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The standard is abuse of discretion and the trial court’s factual findings are owed deference, i.e., this Court “may not disturb judge-made fact findings ‘unless . . . convinced they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ””  *LVNV Funding, LLC v. DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. 103, 108 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  “However, the opening of default judgments should be viewed with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result is reached. ”  *Marder v. Realty Constr. Co.*, 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964) (citing *Foster v. New Albany Machine & Tool Co.*, 63 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1960)).  For example, “[e]ven where a defendant admits liability, a reopening of the judgment for purposes of assessing damages is proper where the defendant provides a reasonable assertion to the effect that it is not liable for the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff. ”  *Id.*  Thus, “[i]n weighing these circumstances, [the Court] cannot lose sight that a court’s power to vacate a judgment is based on equitable principles. ”  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109.  When examining a trial court’s exercise of discretionary authority, the trial court must be reversed “when the exercise of discretion was ‘manifestly unjust’ under the circumstances. ”  *Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.*, 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting *Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 App. Div. 2007)).  POINT II.
[brief] His testimony related to the “mechanics of death:” namely, how much blood would be lost from a severed jugular vein as was found on the victim’s body.  The case at hand is clearly distinguishable from Jamerson.  The forensic pathologist in Jamerson testified that the defendant was driving recklessly, a legal conclusion clearly beyond the scope of a forensic pathologist.  No such testimony took place in this case.  Similarly, in Locascio, the forensic pathologist testified as to the likely movements of occupants and objects within a car as it struck a tree, which was beyond his qualifications.  No such testimony took place in this case.  [...] merely testified that the photos of the Toyota did not show an amount of blood that would be lost through a severed jugular vein, which the victim had.  Even if it was error to allow [...]’s testimony regarding blood loss from a severed jugular, it was harmless error because there was no possibility that [...]’s testimony could have led to an unjust result.
[brief] The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on July 28, 2023.  Pa1705.  Plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial on August 14, 2023.  Pa948-1524.  On August 22, 2023, Defendant filed an application for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs against Plaintiff.  Pa804-81.  On November 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendant’s fee application.  Pa882-947.  The Court denied Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion on October 6, 2023.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54; Cavalieri v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 368 N.J. Super. 527, 539 (App. Div. 2004) (“The statute requires the retirement system to correct the error .  . . .”).  Relevant here is N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a), which states in pertinent part:  A person who performs professional services for a political subdivision of this State or a board of education, or any agency, authority or instrumentality thereof, under a professional services contract awarded in accordance with section 5 of P.L.1971, c.198 (C.40A:11-5), . . . . on the basis of performance of the contract, shall not be eligible for membership in the Public Employees’ Retirement System.  . . . .  As used in this subsection, the term “professional services” shall have the meaning set forth in section 2 of P.L.1971, c.198 (C.40A:11-2).
[brief] (Pa000637).  [...] sought reconsideration of the trial court’s decision in the form of a cross-motion for reconsideration in response to Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.  [...] again sought recovery of its entire billing amount of $89,072.19.  (Pa000892).  It is Plaintiffs’ position that their claims against [...] were not frivolous.  In connection with this appeal, [...] cites case law regarding a trial court’s obligation to determine the lodestar and the reasonableness of the attorney’s hourly rate based upon the attorney’s relative skill, experience, and reputation.  [...], however, ignores the relevant inquiries related to unnecessary costs and expenses and unreasonable time allocated to a specific matter.  This is a key factor since Plaintiffs did not dispute the reasonableness of the hourly rate of [...]’s attorneys.  Plaintiffs only disputed the unreasonable amount of time spent on the matter and duplicative work with respect to several aspects of [...]’s attorneys’ efforts.  Where, as here, there is explicit legal authority for the court to award counsel fees, the court calculates the award of counsel fees by determining the “lodestar”, i.e., a reasonable hourly charge multiplied by the number of hours expended.
[brief] See Georgia Fingerprint Instruction.  •  “The fact that the (law enforcement agency) is in possession of a person’s [known] fingerprints does not mean that the person has a criminal record.  [Known] [f]ingerprints come into the hands of law enforcement agencies from many legitimate sources.  These include, but are not limited to: birth certificates, grade school child identification programs, military service, many forms of employment, including municipal, county, state and federal jobs, casino license applications, private security guard applications, firearms and liquor license applications, passport applications, as well as other sources totally unconnected with criminal activity.
[brief] [...] and [...] met with [...] on July 1, 2014 regarding preparation of a will.  [...] signed the will on July 9, 2014 and left his estate to his wife and his children, [...] and [...] (“[...]”). ”  (Pa000002 at ¶10.)  Some four years later, “[...] commenced a divorce action in 2018, and during a deposition [...] first became aware that [...] intended to assert the position that [...] forgave the mortgage debt as to both her and [...] and that the mortgage lien should be cancelled as to both her and [...]. ”  (Pa000003 at ¶12.)  In response to [...]’s claim, [...] commenced litigation in Probate by way of complaint dated September 14, 2020.
[directive] Você entende que o juiz não está vinculado a nenhuma promessa ou recomendação da [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] promotoria e que o juiz tem o direito de rejeitar a declaração de culpa antes de sentenciá-lo e tem o direito de impor uma pena mais severa?  Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of the prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence?  23.
[brief] (Da 34, 40)  Prior to this, [...] had been unaware not only of the warrant but also of the indictment, and he had not yet been assigned counsel.  (1T 17-7 to 11)  By immediately writing a letter to the court upon learning of the warrant, before he was even assigned counsel, [...] demonstrated that he was concerned about any outstanding charges and wanted to make sure they had been resolved.  See Battis, 589 F.3d at 681 (“[W]e have never required a defendant, much less a pro se defendant, to make a formal motion to a court, or a formal request to the Government, in order to demonstrate his desire to receive a speedy trial. ”).  As the trial court acknowledged, [...] cannot be faulted for not acting prior to being aware of the warrant or the indictment or being assigned counsel.
[brief] ”  Based on the foregoing, the presumption of effective service established by a mailing pursuant to R. 6:2-3(d) is based on the recognized “presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed. ”  Ssi Med. Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996) (citing Bruce v. James P. Maclean Firm, 238 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (Super. Ct. 1989), aff’d o.b., 238 N.J.Super. 408, 570 (App.Div.1989); Tower Mgmt. Corp. v. Podesta, 226 N.J. Super. 300, 304 n.3 (App. Div. 1988); Cwiklinski v. Burton, 217 N.J. Super. 506, 509-510 (App. Div. 1987)).
[brief] *Id.*  Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence which would suggest that [...] and [...], Vice President and President, respectively, of [...], abused the privilege of incorporation by using the company to perpetuate a fraud or injustice, or otherwise violated the law.  In fact, both followed New Jersey’s Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law and the administrative regulations promulgated by the Department of Community Affairs set forth at *N.J.A.C.* 5:10-1.1 et seq.  They performed no act impeding the election of a majority of the owners to the Board in approximately 1987.  Nor are any facts alleged that suggest they performed any unlawful act against the Association’s counsel who represented them at all relevant times.  Moreover, the Developers followed the rules set forth in the Master Deed as established by the Public Offering Statement when they leased and later sold Unit 74 to the Association.
[directive] • switch back to “witness mode” to allow the witness to examine the more limited group of photos as part of a new session.  • preserve the photos identified in subsections III.B.2 and III.B.3 by downloading (if possible) and printing the photos.  v.  If possible, the administrator should generate a report at the end of any “witness mode” session where a witness identifies either a suspect or someone who looks similar to the suspect.  vi.  When the witness identifies either a suspect or someone who looks similar to the suspect, the administrator must record the page on which the relevant photos were displayed.
[brief] ”)(citing Montgomery v. DeSimone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 348 (3d Cir. 1989).  And see McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2019)(There is not “‘a complete and present cause of action,’ to bring a malicious prosecution “challenge to a criminal proceeding while those criminal proceedings are ongoing. ”).  Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1335 (2022) is also dispositive.
[brief] Of the two versions of the bill that were adopted and made effective April 14, 2020, and June 29, 2020, none of those versions discuss enabling a private right of action to sue school districts in Superior Court for violations of *N.J.S.A.*  18A:7F-9(e)(3).  2)  *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9 underwent nine bill drafts, with the final eight occurring on or after March 23, 2020.  None of the nine bill drafts discuss enabling a private right of action to sue school districts in Superior Court for violations of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  3)
[directive] Actor has sexual activity with another person in exchange for something of economic value; disorderly persons offense if actor is charged only with engaging in prostitution.  (This 2C:34-1(a)(b)(c)(4)  Prostitution Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible excludes promoting prostitution or owning or controlling a house of prostitution or soliciting another to become a prostitute)  89  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] Pa 37.  On September 19, 2022, [...] filed a memorandum opposing [...]’s calculation of the Rent Increase, and on September 29, 2022, the Board opposed [...]’s claim for legal fees.  See Pa 15.  On September 30, 2022, the Court entered an order increasing the monthly rent on the Unit from $154.99 previously approved by the Board to $1,717.18 as supported by [...]’s August 11, 2022 memorandum.
[brief] On reconsideration, Plaintiff took a second, impermissible bite of the apple, by re-arguing the same point — that the circumstantial evidence he offered was sufficient to establish proximate cause.  The trial court, however, again confirmed that Plaintiff’s re-hashed argument did not change the court’s original decision on summary judgment.  Indeed, before the trial court delivered its decision on the motion for reconsideration, the court reiterated its original holding that Plaintiff presented no evidence to establish proximate cause, repeating the earlier conclusion that Plaintiff himself did not know what caused him to fall or if he even fell.  2T15-24 to 2T16-2.
[directive] The Internal Affairs Unit of this department has completed its investigation of your complaint concerning the conduct of [name of subject officer].  The investigation and a review of all information currently available to this office indicates that the officer followed the appropriate department policies and procedures.  More specifically, department policies and procedures permit the officer to [give details of the policy or procedure]…  If you have any additional information which you believe should be considered, please contact the Internal Affairs Unit at [telephone number].  Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.  Not Sustained
[brief] That is the recycled forged mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009 (065a) which was called fraudulent by Hon. [...] in his order of 12/20/2010 (068a) and ordered [...] to remove it from the Foreclosure Court.  But [...] forged more documents based on that and sold them to [...] for a penny on a dollar.  That sheriff sale is illegal.  The [...] must remove my house from his sales list.  The [...] has been violating my constitutional rights specifically the US 1st, 4th, and 14th Amendments.