ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 19  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., | 8 | | 208 N.J. 114 (2011) | | | Bowen v. Pursel, | 15 | | 109 N.J. Eq. 67 (E. & A. 1931) | | | Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, | 14 | | 188 N.J. Super 488 (App. Div. 1983) | | | D'Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., | 8 | | 403 N.J. Super 321 (App. Div. 2008) | | | DiProspero v. Penn, | 8 | | 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | | | Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 15 | | 76 N.J. 203 (1978) | | | Ensslin v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., | 16, 17, 18 | | 311 N.J. Super 333 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 7 | | 415 N.J. Super 335 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., | 9 | | 157 N.J. 602 (1999) | | | GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, | 11 | | 132 N.J. 298 (1993) | | | Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury, | 7 | | 53 N.J. 591 (1969) | | Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174 (1980)
[brief] (Ab12).  Nor is it true, as [...] contends, that the “restriction” of grid supply projects “occurs nowhere in the Board’s prior orders”.  (Ab6).  The Board specifically addressed grid supply projects in its March 27, 2020 Order which provided additional guidance to participants in the SREC market following the closure of the SREC program. \(^7\)  Specifically, the Board ordered that grid supply projects, outside of those projects proposed on landfills, brownfields or areas of historic fill [Subsection t] and that have not previously been approved by the Board as “connected to the distribution system” pursuant to Subsection r shall not be eligible for SRECs or for the TI program.  *Ibid*; See N.J.S.A. 48:3-87 (r) and (t).  That Order was then codified in its regulations at N.J.A.C. 14:8-10.1 to 10.6.  Therefore, the Board properly determined [...]’s grid supply floating solar project would not be eligible in the TI program absent a waiver.
[directive] c.  Ou oblije peye yon frè minimòm de $50 ba [...] ($100 [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] minimòm si yo kondane w de yon zak vyolans) pou chak chèf akizasyon ke ou plede koupab la?  (Yon amann $30 si enfraksyon an te fèt le 9 janvye, 1986 ak fini nan dat 22 desanm, 1991 la.  $25 si enfraksyon an te fèt anvan le 1ye janvye, 1986.)  You must pay a minimum [...] Assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?  (Penalty is $30 if offense occurred between January 9, 1986 and December 22, 1991 inclusive.  $25 if offense occurred before January 1, 1986.)  d.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 7 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 12 | | **I.**  The Applicable Legal Standard (Not raised below) | 12 | | **II. **  The Commission erred in denying complainant’s request | | | to amend his complaint based on new, material information | | | relevant to his claims (Raised below: Pa13) | 14 | | **III.**  The Commission arbitrarily ignored its own | | | precedents and the evidence when considering violations | | | of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) (Raised below: Pa14) | 16 | | **A)**  The Commission arbitrarily ignored evidence that | | | [...] and [...] were taking private action that could | | | compromise the board in Count 9 (Raised at: Pa14) | 17 | | **B)**  The Commission ignored their own advisory opinion | | | regarding Board member [...]’s Facebook post in Count | | C)  The Commission ignored their own advisory opinion regarding Board President [...]’s Facebook post in Count 11 (Raised at: Pa15)  ...........................................
[brief] (Pa44).  The trial court held further that Appellant cannot sustain a claim under the CFA because she did not plead the required elements of unlawful conduct (the sale of merchandise) and ascertainable loss, and that even if she could plead an ascertainable loss, the CFA claim is futile because Appellant did not, and cannot, plead a causal connection.  (Pa51).  Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed Appellant’s claims against Respondents in full.  (Pa53).  This Court should affirm the trial court’s October 4, 2023 Order granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss.
[brief] (1T 71-24 to 72-2)  Before videos can be admitted, their authenticity must be established by the party seeking to admit them.  The State failed to authenticate the video in this case because it did not provide testimony by a person who was present at the scene supposedly depicted in the video or with the requisite knowledge to establish that the footage captured events and the time and date purported by the State.  Therefore, the trial court’s ruling admitting the video must be reversed.
[brief] This includes ensuring the District has sufficient funds to meet its immediate needs, moving to install a new State monitor,\(^{13}\) and exploring the degree of oversight and intervention that may be necessary to protect the constitutional rights of [...]’s public-school students.  \(^{13}\)  While Appellants point to the fact that a State-appointed monitor has been in place in [...], the monitor’s authority is not so great as to be able to unilaterally address all of the issues identified in the District.  Furthermore, as the Comprehensive Report found, the [...] Board of Education essentially operates in secret, failing to discuss any policies or the budget during meetings.  (Ra134; Ra181).  For this reason, it is unclear what extent the monitor was even fully apprised of [...]’s many failings, or had the tools to fix the issues.  Regardless of what past monitors did or did not know, the Department will be installing a new monitor.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In those circumstances, the policy instead provides for notification to the: (1) [...], Institutional Abuse, Division of Child Protection and Permanency; and (2) [...].  On June 23, 2023, the Board filed its Answer to the Complaint (Da24-25).  On July 14, 2023, the Board issued Regulation 8463 delineating the protocol for parental notification under Revised Policy 8463 Da112).  The regulation provides that:  [P]arental notification shall be made by the appropriate administrator and/or the observing certificated staff member, and an appropriate certificated staff member (e.g., school nurse, school psychologist, school guidance counselor) if deemed necessary by the appropriate administrator.  For non-certificated personnel, parental notification shall be made by the appropriate school administrator or her/his designee.  In addition, the regulation reiterates the policy’s prohibition against parental notification “based solely on a student’s actual and/or perceived protected characteristics under” the LAD.  The regulation also lists protected classes under the LAD.  On August 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Complaint (Da36-72) along with a supporting certification.  Third Certification of [...] (Da74-78).  The Supplemental Complaint sought preliminary restraints against the repealed Original Policy as well as Revised Policy 8463 based on the same allegations of discrimination.  On August 24, 2023, the Board filed its opposition including a certification of counsel (Da221-223) as well as a supplemental certification of counsel (D321-327) filed on August 27, 2023.  By order entered August 24, 2023 (Da418-419), the court made the temporary restraints applicable to both the Original Policy and Revised Policy 8463 and extended the temporary restraints until such time as it rendered a decision on Plaintiffs’ supplemental application for preliminary restraints.  On September 6, 2023 the court heard argument on Plaintiffs’ supplemental application for preliminary restraints.  On September 11, 2023, the Board repealed its voluntary Policy 5756 on transgender students (Da141-144).
[brief] 36T49-11 to 51-21; FDIC, supra, 27 F.3d at 876 (a nonparty to a contract cannot be liable for a breach of contract or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing if they are not a party to the contract).  The only contracts the court found were breached were the [...] and [...], neither of which Defendant was a party to.  36T50-10 to 51-21; Da02701, Da02712.  Thus, as a matter of law, Defendant did not breach these agreements or any express or implied covenants contained therein.  Likewise, the court erred in holding Defendant jointly and severally liable for unjust enrichment because she did not convert any funds from Plaintiffs or otherwise receive a financial benefit they were entitled to.
[brief] Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.  A municipality has the duty to protect individuals from dangerous conditions.  It is necessary for a "plaintiff to prove that a condition constituted a dangerous condition; that the dangerous condition proximately caused the injury; that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk that the harm would occur; a public employee of the municipality created the dangerous condition; and that the municipality had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition."
[brief] Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that Atalese does not require “magic words”, and that mutual assent is determined “under customary principles of contract law. ”  Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 319.  But that pronouncement has done little to curb the overreach of challenging parties, like Respondents, from telling lower courts that no arbitration agreement can ever be enforceable unless there is in fact an explicit reference to either the word “court” or “jury.
[brief] [Pa18]  This exchange of emails illustrates at least a portion of the problem.  [...], a Pension and Benefits Specialist II, determined that a formal layoff notice was required to qualify as an exception to the break in service definition.  [Pa18-19]  Quinn’s letter of October 13, 2022, to [...] takes the position that a formal notice was required.  [Pa26]  Here she writes in part, “Unfortunately this type of correspondence is not considered a formal layoff notice for a member. ”  It appears as if Quinn determined and the Board ultimately adopted the position that a formal layoff notice from an employer, even during the COVID 19 Health Emergency, was legally required to confirm a layoff for purposes of determining pension eligibility.  The appellant is unaware of any law or regulation, nor was one ever supplied by the [...] or the [...] that supports this conclusion.  A layoff is defined by the *New Jersey Administrative Code* as, “a separation of a permanent employee from employment for reasons of economy or efficiency or other related reasons and not for disciplinary reasons.
[directive] Again, this does not necessarily mean the information will be disclosed.  a.  Civilian Witnesses  i.  Bias.  A witness can be impeached with evidence that he or she has a bias against the defendant or in favor of the State (actual or potential exposure to criminal penalties, leniency/plea agreement, payments, immigration benefits, etc.); ii.  Specific instances of dishonesty.  A witness can be impeached with evidence of a prior act of misconduct involving dishonesty, even if it has not resulted in a criminal charge or conviction.  This includes lying and falsifying records; iii.  Criminal convictions, N.J.R.E. 609; and iv.  Prior inconsistent statements, N.J.R.E. 613.  Page 5 b.  Investigative Employees  i.  A sustained finding that an investigative employee has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial, or insurance matter in their professional or personal life; ii.  A sustained finding that an investigative employee was untruthful or has demonstrated a lack of candor; iii.  A pending criminal charge or conviction of any crime, disorderly persons, petty disorderly persons, or driving while intoxicated matter, noting that any such charges or convictions will be reviewed for disclosure under N.J.R.E. 609; iv.  A sustained finding that undermines or contradicts an investigative employee’s educational achievements or qualifications as an expert witness; v.  A finding of fact by a judicial authority or administrative tribunal that is known to the employee’s agency, which includes a finding that the investigative employee was untruthful in a matter, either intentionally verbally or in writing; vi.  A sustained finding, or judicial finding, that an investigative employee intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence.  Generally, law enforcement agencies and investigative employees should disclose findings or allegations that relate to substantive violations concerning: (1) the intentional failure to follow legal or departmental requirements for the collection and handling of evidence, obtaining statements, recording communications, and obtaining consents to search or to record communications; (2) the intentional failure to comply with agency procedures for supervising the activities of a cooperating person; and (3) the intentional failure to follow mandatory evidence;2 protocols with regard to the forensic analysis of vii.
[brief] About a month after the December 2015 meeting, defendant filed a “Special Report” with his employer.  (Pa18).  The report, addressed to [...], indicated that defendant lost his personal wallet, which contained one of his official identification cards from [...].  (11T30-17 to 34-17; Pa18; Pa28-29).  The report was dated January 6, 2016, for an incident that purportedly took place on January 4, 2016.  (11T32-5 to 18; Pa18).  However, defendant presented evidence at trial that he lost the wallet five days earlier, on New Year’s Eve.
[brief] Case law has further established that any identified deficiency in an entity’s training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury, or in other words the deficiency in training must have actually caused the constitutional violation.  *City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris*, 449 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).  Moreover, it must be shown that the training at issue was so inadequate as to make the alleged misconduct almost inevitable.  *Popow v. City of Margate*, 476 F.Supp. 1237, 1246 (D.N.J. 1979).  Liability against a municipal defendant under Section 1983 for an alleged failure to train its employees is only established if the “policymaker failed to train its employees in deliberate indifference to the potential for violation of the constitutional rights of those with whom the employees come into contact.
[brief] The jury instructions on the substantive homicide crimes were remarkably consistent in telling the jurors that they must return a guilty verdict if merely the ordinary elements of the crime were proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.  For instance, with regard to all of the crimes, the jurors were incorrectly told that the “specific criminal statute” that the defendant was charged with violating, “read together with the indictment identifies the elements which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the guilt of the defendant on each of the counts of the indictments” with no mention of the State’s duty to also disprove self-defense before “guilt” is “established.
[brief] R. 2:10-5 provides:  “[t]he appellate court may exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review. ”  In Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 294 (2013), the Supreme Court of New Jersey explained the Appellate courts’ exercise of original jurisdiction and stated:  Appellate courts are empowered to exercise original jurisdiction within the bounds set forth in our rules . . .  We have observed that the exercise of original jurisdiction is appropriate when there is “public interest in an expeditious disposition of the significant issues raised[.]”  More recently, we have explained that Rule 2:10-5 “allow[s an] appellate court to exercise original jurisdiction to eliminate unnecessary further litigation, but discourage[s] its use if factfinding involved. ”  State v. Santos, 210 N.J. 129 (2012).  Similarly, our Appellate Division has observed that a court’s [r]esort to original jurisdiction is particularly appropriate to avoid unnecessary further litigation, as where the record is inadequate to terminate the dispute and no further fact-finding or administrative expertise or discretion is involved, and thus a remand would be pointless because the issue to be decided is one of law and implicated public interest.  (citations omitted)  [...] is not suggesting that the Appellate Division has the authority to obtain jurisdiction over the Mount Prospect case itself; however, a complete and thorough review of the issues raised in the Mount Prospect decision is necessary in order for the Appellate Division to perform a complete determination of the matter on review.  Indeed, in their Appellate briefs, the Defendants rely upon the *Mount Prospect* decision as further support for the Law Division’s ruling.  Moreover, currently pending in multiple counties around the State are various Motions to Dismiss based upon both the Law Division decision and the *Mount Prospect* decision.  After 30 years of case law establishing that IFPA jurisdiction is in the Superior Court, these two patently flawed decisions, though not precedential or binding on State Courts, have emboldened various defendants who have been sued by automobile insurers for IFPA violations, to seek dismissal in favor of the PIP arbitration forum.  In order to terminate this legal dispute, it is absolutely necessary for the Appellate Division to exercise original jurisdiction and to clarify the erroneous decisions made in the *Mount Prospect* case, to the extent those issues differ from the instant appeal.
[directive] 3.  Law enforcement must be content neutral.  During a protest, law enforcement must not take any action that is motivated by disagreement with the content of the protest, a protected characteristic of a protester or journalist such as race or religion, or otherwise act with the intention of targeting any person for their exercise of First Amendment or other constitutional rights.  For instance, an officer cannot question or take action against a journalist because the officer believes that the journalist sympathizes with or against the cause that is the subject of the protest.
[brief] Indeed, from a substantive perspective the notice did nothing more than recite Ordinance No. 13-2022’s title which merely referenced the adoption of a generic redevelopment plan (and not the [...]) and certain affected blocks and lots on the tax map (and not street addresses, common names or other identifiable landmarks\(^8\)).  It belies logic to charge a layperson with all that this legislation portended based on this content (or lack thereof).  Put another way, an interpretation that the Township’s notice complied with \textit{N.J.S.A.} 40:49-2(a) effectively eviscerates the intent and purpose of the notice requirement.
[brief] .................................................................  24  Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72 (2014) .................................................................................. 20  G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir.1992)  ........................................................................  22  In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19 (2007) ....................................................................................
[brief] We are reminded of [...]'s apt comment that "[o]ur rules of procedure are not simply a minuet scored for lawyers to prance through on pain of losing the dance contest should they trip."  Stone v. Old Bridge Tp., 111 N.J. 110, 125 (1988) (dissenting opinion).  The rules do not exist for their own benefit.  The rules, instead, are only a framework for the fair and uniform adjudication of cases brought into our system.  Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276, 283-84 (1990) (the rules "should be subordinated to their true role, i.e., simply a means to the end of obtaining just and expeditious determinations between the parties on the ultimate merits.").  [Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J.Super. 1, 10-11 (App. Div. 2004), emphasis added]  Our courts observe these principles in the context of cases that have been disposed by default, as well.
[brief] Defendant was [...]'s representative and had intimate knowledge of the eminent domain proceedings from the start.  Back in 2005, it was Defendant who retained attorneys at the law firm of [...] to represent [...] in connection with the eminent domain proceeding.  **2T126, Da145.**  He participated in meetings and negotiations with the State pertaining to eminent domain.  **Da37, Da38.**  In 2009, it was again Defendant who signed the retainer agreement on behalf of [...] in order to pursue legal claims against the State.  **2T125-26, Da141.**  It was Defendant who testified on behalf of [...] when the eminent domain actions went to trial.  **Da47.**  When the inverse condemnation case settled in 2020, Defendant was the one who signed the settlement agreement.  He was the only one with the authority to do so.  **2T124, Da161-65.
[brief] Appellant filed a complaint against Respondent, [...], on or about January 18, 2023.  (Pa1-Pa6).  An Amended Complaint was filed on February 6, 2024.  (Pa7-Pa11).  Appellant alleged in the amended complaint that she was caused to fall as a result of the careless, negligent and reckless maintenance of the Marshalls store by Respondent.  Respondent filed an Answer on March 8, 2023.  (Pa12-Pa22).  Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Pa23-Pa74).  Appellant opposed the motion for summary judgment.  (Pa75-Pa96).  Respondent filed a reply brief.  (Pa97-Pa107).  The motion was returnable before Honorable [...] on June 20, 2024 and on that day Honorable [...] issued an Order dismissing Appellant’s complaint and found that Appellant failed to show that Respondent, [...], had actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazard (Pa108-Pa109).  A notice of appeal was filed on or about June 28, 2024 by Appellants, Helene and [...].  (Pa110-Pa114).  An Order Amending the Order was filed on July 1, 2024.  (Pa115-Pa117).  An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on July 9, 2024.  (Pa118-Pa124).  STATEMENT OF FACTS