ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] An enforceable agreement exists where the following four elements are satisfied: (1) a meeting of the minds or better put, the parties agreed to the substance and terms of the contract; (2) Offer and acceptance; (3) consideration or, in other words, each party gave or promised something of value to the other; and (4) the terms are sufficiently definite.  [Model Civil Jury Charges, 4.10C]  Whether there was a meeting of the minds or acceptance are material questions of fact which underpin the legal determination of the existence of a contract.  Here, Appellant’s appeal should fail because applying the appropriate standard and reviewing the facts in light most favorable to Respondent, one can conclude that there was never a meeting of the minds or an acceptance by Respondent of the asserted settlement contract.
[brief] Since the existing building on the Property was an abandoned warehouse, [...] needed a use variance in order to operate a retail store, bakery and restaurant on the Property.  [...] contacted architect [...] (“[...]”) in early June 2016 to obtain a proposal for architectural services for the project, which was provided by letter dated June 13, 2016.  By email dated May 16, 2016, [...] wrote to [...] (“[...]”) requesting an agreement and a time frame for performing a survey with topo.  [...] retained [...] sometime in late May 2016, who performed a certified boundary and topographic survey in early June, 2016 (Pa1376).  The initial drafts of the Lease and Option Agreement were prepared by [...], Esq. (“[...]”), attorney for [...] and transmitted to [...] by email dated May 27, 2016.  [...] initially advised [...] that the form and contents of the draft documents were acceptable.  There is evidence that indicates that [...] met with any of the members of [...] to discuss the proposed terms of the Lease and Option Agreement or the potential risks of same before his initial response to [...].
[brief] Hence, the reality here is that from 2010-2021 there were only two reported instances of injury which actually occurred in the parking lot.  Additionally, of the four accidents reported, three were coded by the responding officer as "04" - "possible injury" - per State of New Jersey Police Crash Investigation Report overlay.  The other was coded by the responding officer as "03" or "suspected minor injury" (the pedestrian accident).  See, e.g., Pa434-State of New Jersey Police Crash Investigation Report NJTR-1, “Victim’s Physical Condition”-Box we indicated to the trial court though, we are happy to submit all the reports produced to the Court for in camera review.  However, we note for the Court that counsel has never objected to our characterization of the contents of the reports as will be described herein either in their opposition to our summary judgment motion, during oral argument on the motion or in their brief here.  Additionally, the trial court also accepted our representation writing in its opinion of December 15, 2023 “[w]hile not dispositive, the fact that there were no significant reports of any prior incidents in the lot militates against a finding of an intentional wrong by [...] with respect to requiring employees to utilize the lot. ”  Pail. 86.  Aside from this, the vast majority of the records produced included motor vehicle incidents fairly characterized as "fender benders" occurring when drivers were pulling into/backing out of parking spaces.  Also included were reports of suspicious activity, vandalism, disorderly conduct, keys locked in cars and infants locked in cars.  In other words, during this entire 12 year period, there were no patterns of recurring crashes involving physical injury and/or pedestrians, and the [...] accident was the only fatality.
[brief] (Id., ¶¶ 66, 71-75)  As [...] expounded, sending a communication about a recall issue, like the DHCP letter here, is a recall action and thus governed by FDA and its rules and procedures.  (Da0452, p. 101)  [...], who was [...]’s Associate Vice President of Post Marketing Quality and Recall Coordinator responsible for U.S. recalls, similarly testified that sending a DHCP letter about the recall issue constitutes a recall action under federal law, and thus first requires authorization by FDA.  (Da0577, p. 14; Da0725, p. 46)  Plaintiff offered no regulatory expert or other evidence disputing [...]’s opinion and [...]’s testimony.  --- 5
[brief] THE TCA DOESN’T APPLY TO THIS CONTRACT DISPUTE (931a-954a)  Since this case focuses on contract claims and not claims regulated by the TCA,\(^8\) the TCA is inapplicable.  The complaint doesn’t plead tort causes of action and doesn’t seek personal injury damages.  31a-110a.  Defendants clearly sold water services to plaintiff and billed plaintiff for same separately from any taxes and therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the water services were furnished for free or in exchange for municipal taxes collected.  6a-10a; 166a, §4, 8-9.  The Borough acknowledges that the residents purchasing water from the Borough are its “customers” and describes them as “consumers”, with the latter term describing “[a]ny party obtaining water service from the Water Department for a physical unit. ”.  173a; 181a.  Defendant fails to point to any binding cases holding that the sale of water by a municipality involves anything other than a contract or that any tort claims against municipalities predicated on the sale of contaminated water were entertained by our courts.  All elements of a contract \(^8\)See N.J.S.A. 59:1-4 ("Nothing in [the Tort Claims Act] shall affect liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than damages against the public entity or one of its employees."); see also Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607, 613-14 (2008) (finding the notice of claim requirement in the Tort Claims Act does not apply to causes of action under New Jersey's Civil Rights Act); Greenway Dev. Co. v. [...], 163 N.J. 546, 557 (2000) (stating "the notice provision of the TCA does not apply to inverse condemnation claims"); Brook v. April, 294 N.J. Super. 90, 101 (App. Div. 1996) (stating that the TCA didn’t apply to workers’ compensation claims).
[brief] Thus, as the PCR court properly found, a motion to suppress would not have been successful.  Accordingly, defendant did not establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on that basis.  Additionally, the PCR court ruled that the seizure of the tire iron was justified by the plain view doctrine, finding that the officers were lawfully at the scene investigating the car crash and injuries, the Impala car doors had been left open by its occupants, and from outside the car the officers could see the tire iron.  (Da107-  The body-camera footage showed that prior to Mirandizing [...] one officer told another that there was a crowbar in the back seat of the white vehicle.  (Da131, 20:15:50 to 20:16:30).  It also sounds like the officer asking [...] for consent to search references the tire iron when asking her for consent.  (Da132, 20:24:48 to 20:25:00).  Thus, the officers, while lawfully at the scene, observed the tire iron prior to even asking [...] for consent to search.  Further, while the PCR court did not address “inadvertency”, it is evident from the record that the officers inadvertently found the tire iron when they were on the scene responding to the 911 call.  In sum, defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a futile motion to suppress.  Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm.
[directive] Rule deputy or assistant supervisory Prosecutor, a or County the by designated prosecutor assistant cases in Justice Criminal of Division of the Director the by designated general attorney Division.  the by prosecuted 3:9- Rule under required prosecutor as the from consent without court, a that event  In the of term lesser a impose will court the guilty pleads defendant the if that defendant a advises 3(c), the to pursuant prosecutor the by tendered offer plea the by contemplated that than imprisonment advise promptly shall who superiors, her or his alert shall prosecutor the policy, escalating plea appropriate consider to Justice Criminal Division of the of Director with the consult and non-compliance reporting to: limited be not need but include, might remedies
[brief] Appellant briefly addresses and challenges the Superior Court’s dismissal of his Invasion of Privacy, negligence, and the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) claims.  See Appellant’s Br., at 31-35; Appx., at 13a-17a.  Regarding his claim for Invasion of Privacy, Appellant posits that disclosure of confidential information to even one individual may constitute an unreasonable publication of private facts under the law.  His position and argument ignore that, as the Superior Court explained, “publication” requires that the information is disclosed to a “real person” or would “result in the publicity of private facts. ”  Appx., at 40a.  Here, however, Respondent simply conveyed Appellant’s information to a letter vendor for the purpose of printing a collection letter without exposing the debtor information to even one actual person.  Id.  There is no indication that Appellant’s information has become, or provision.
[brief] As with most agency action, there is room for debate over what is reasonable.  To be reasonable, an agency's choice of action for providing notice does not require adoption of a perfect practice.  Here, the intended purpose of the action challenged—the Commissions' attempted notice—was to reach persons who might have been affected by the wrongfully calculated reimbursement rate, to notify those persons of the availability of supplemental reimbursement, and to inform them of the procedures for requesting supplemental reimbursement.
[brief] She disclosed that she had “[o]ther contingent and unliquidated claims” which included “[p]otential/unknown consumer protection claims, including Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims, [and] Consumer Fraud Act Claims. ”  Da16-Da17 at ¶34.  In addition, she asserted that those claims were exempt property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).  Da19.  Thus, proceeds from those claims could not affect the creditors’ distribution.  The creditors and the trustee were then on notice of the potential claim and had the right to examine Plaintiff at the meeting of creditors.  Consequently, Plaintiff adequately disclosed her claim.  In her proposed amended schedules, Plaintiff specifically identified her claims against Defendant and re-asserted them as exempt property.  Da74 at ¶34.5, and Da77.  Based on this record and the R. 4:6-2(e) standard, it cannot be concluded that Plaintiff took inconsistent positions or acted in bad faith.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *St. Barnabas Med. Ctr.  v. N.J. Hosp. Rate Setting Comm’n*, 250 N.J. Super. 132, 142 (App. Div. 1991).  Despite the clear law that governs how agencies may act and change existing policy, the Department now seeks to sub silentio reverse the thirty-plus year history of regulation of Exchanges through the Bulletin without even attempting to comply with the APA or any due process protections.
[brief] The Opposition Appellate Brief of [...] contains several inaccuracies that must be touched upon.  First, at page 8, [...] asserts “plaintiff was seen in his vehicle by [...]” and not seen on foot.  This is incorrect.  [...] at no time testified that he saw [...].  In fact, he testified that [...]’s vehicle was in three different locations during his testimony.  Initially, he testified he stated that his vehicle was “tucked in” which would render seeing it impossible.  [...] thereafter changed the location of [...]’s vehicle only after [...] testified he was on foot patrol.  A recreation was done to show where [...] parked his vehicle on November 20, 2017.  There was no way possible anyone could see inside of [...]’s vehicle on the night in question.  Second, [...] claimed [...] said he was self-taught in performing property checks.  In reality, [...]’s FTO testified that he taught [...] how to conduct them.  [...] also testified that he too would conduct property checks on foot and did so in a manner that was similar to how [...] testified he did them.  [...] stated that he would park his vehicle in the parking lot of [...] and walk across to the area of [...] and check those buildings at night.  [...] testified that he did the same thing.  POINT II
[brief] Even if we assume arguendo Plaintiff could establish the first prong of her prima facie case, there is no material issue of fact that the complained of conduct by Defendants cannot be considered “severe or pervasive” under the law.  Plaintiff cannot establish that the conduct at issue was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable person believe that the conditions of employment were altered such that the work environment became hostile or abusive.  Under the law, it is the alleged harasser’s conduct which must be “pervasive or severe” to survive summary judgment, not the alteration of the conditions of employment.  Muench v. Twp. of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 299 (App. Div. 1992).  The following cases set forth the contours of the “severe or pervasive” element: Taylor, 152 N.J. at 502-03 (concluding that patently racist slur spoken publicly by supervisor created jury question on whether comment was sufficiently severe); Heitzman v. Monmouth Cnty., 321 N.J. Super. 133, 148 (App. Div.1999) (concluding that anti-Semitic comments by supervisor did not constitute severe or pervasive conduct because they were not directed against plaintiff, were sporadic and casual, and did not involve any physical threat or humiliation, and that anti-Semitic comment by coworker directed at plaintiff was not actionable); Leonard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 318 N.J. Super. 337, 345 (App. Div. 1999) (concluding that comments about plaintiff's disability uttered by supervisor created genuine issue of material fact on severe or pervasive requirement); Woods-Pirozzi, 290 N.J. Super. at 270-71 (concluding that jury question existed on "severe or pervasive" requirement where supervisor "frequently" said to plaintiff, "you're a woman and a pain in my ass," that supervisor called plaintiff a "loser" about "once or twice a week," and that he said to her "you're so emotional, it must be PMS time" about "twice a month").  LAD is not a "general civility code;" therefore, "discourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with racial harassment," and "a lack of racial sensitivity does not, alone, amount to actionable harassment."
[brief] This Court Should Remand the Matter to the Law Division if the Statute is Not Declared Void.  (Pa23-25.)  The case law is clear that challenges to legislation under N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 are mechanical in nature focused solely on the passing of the legislation.  Application of McCabe, 81 N.J. 462 (1980) (“we vacate the dismissal of such application and order that it be transferred to the Law Division, Mercer County, for further proceedings.
[brief] In 1991, defendant brutally and senselessly murdered his friend and neighbor, [...], while on bail awaiting trial for other violent offenses.  On August 3, 1991, twenty-five-year-old Blevins was found lying in the fetal position between his bed and a wall on scattered, blood-soaked sheets.  He was stabbed eleven times.  During the course of the investigation, police matched defendant's palm print to a bloody print found in [...]'s home.  After being confronted with the results of the fingerprint analysis, defendant confessed to the murder in a taped statement.
[brief] The Court should affirm the trial court’s order compelling [...] to arbitrate its claims.  The Court should follow the Third Circuit’s lead in *Mount Prospect* and hold that insurers like [...] cannot sidestep the No-Fault Law’s arbitration provision.  As a matter of statutory interpretation and sound policy, [...] must arbitrate its PIP claim-based IFPA, RICO, and declaratory judgment claims.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  Dated: May 28, 2024  By: /s/ [...]
[brief] Despite acknowledging, as they must, that standing is governed by the definition of “interested party” (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4), Plaintiffs brazenly argue that standing “will always be found” if a taxpayer is challenging jurisdiction or “the impacts to the zoning ordinance. ”  (Pb36.)  In fact, Plaintiffs go so far as to boldly proclaim that “there is no case that lays down a standing rule that would bar [...] from appealing the Board’s decision. ”  (Pb32.)  Plaintiffs are simply incorrect.  The plain language of the MLUL – and every single case that has been decided since the adoption of the MLUL – “lays down a standing rule” that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy.
[directive] The first category establishes a presumption against filing a motion for pretrial detention, which can be overcome only when the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or Director or a Deputy Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in matters prosecuted by the Division, finds that certain special conditions exist to justify preventive detention.  This first 23  The Bail Reform Law expressly provides that “[t]he rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials shall not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the [detention] hearing. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1).  Accordingly, a prosecutor may rely upon and present, for example, hearsay evidence to establish the legal basis for a pretrial detention order.  24  The presumptions on when to seek or refrain from seeking pretrial detention established in this Directive should not be confused with the statutory presumption of pretrial release under the Bail Reform Law, see N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 17, or the statutory presumption of detention established under the Bail Reform Law when a defendant is charged with murder or is subject to an ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ON APPEAL Final Order, Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. (April 16, 2025)............. Pa69-Pa70 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Application of Mallon, 232 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1989).............................11, 19 Bauer v. Newark, 7 N.J. 426 (1951) ...........................................................................18 Carlough v. Ackerman, 74 N.J.L. 16 (1906) .................................................................29 Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998) .......................................................................10 Darling v. Murphy, 70 N.J.L. 435 (1904) .................................................................14 De Flesco v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Elections, 43 N.J. Super. 492 (App. Div. 1957) ..30 Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 (2015) ..........................................................................10 In re Application of Langbaum, 201 N.J. Super. 484 (App.Div.1985)......................32 In re Contest of November 8, 2005 Gen. Election for Office of Mayor for Tp. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 388 N.J. Super. 663, 663-64 (App. Div. 2006) ..................11
[brief] CONCLUSION .................................................................................................46 | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club**, 64 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1960) | 29 | | **Anderson v. County of Monmouth**, | | | 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 960, *32, | | | OAL DKT. NO. [...] (REMAND OF [...]); | | | AGENCY DKT. NO. [...] (October 2, 2006) | 19 | | **Asbury Park v. Department of Civil Services**, | 38 | | 17 N.J. 419 (1955) | | | **Atkinson v. Parsekian**, | 15 | | 37 N.J. 143 (1962) | | | **Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd.**, | 12 | | 473 N.J. Super. 284 (App. Div. 2022) | | | **Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs.**, | 12, 13| | 461 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 2019) | | | **Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv.**, | 12, 13| | 39 N.J. 556 (1963) | | | **Carter v. South Woods State Prison**, | 44-45| | OAL Dkt No. [...], | | | AGEN. REF. NO. [...] (Decided September 11, 2003) | | | **Chou v. Rutgers**, | 12 | | 283 N.J. Super. 524, 539 (App. Div. 1995) | | | certif. denied, 145 N.J. 374 (1996) | | | **Clark v. New Jersey Dep't of Agric.**, | 28, 31| | 1 N.J.A.R. 315 (1980) | | | **Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill**, | 10 | | 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) | | | **Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs.**, | 12, 13| | 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010)
[brief] \textbf{THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT THAT DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION.}  Cole v. Jersey City Medical Ctrl, 215 N.J. 265 (2013) sets forth the factors which this Court should consider in determining whether [...] has waived his right to arbitrate.  The factors enunciated in Cole are as follows: (1) the delay in seeking the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy; (4) the extent of the discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.
[directive] The first Standard (Refusal) Statement was required with the adoption of P.L.1977, c.29, Attorney General Guideline: Page 24 Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations -50.4.14 amending, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 and Prior to 1977, no standard statement was required.  P.L.1966, c.142.  Thereafter, each time the Legislature has amended the DWI refusal statutes, new or revised Standard (Refusal) Statements have been approved by the NJMVC Chief Administrator (formerly the Director of DMV).  Once the Standard Statement is approved, the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice distributes those new or revised Standard (Refusal) Statements to all law enforcement agencies throughout the State.  As of the date of this Guideline, three (3) Standard (Refusal) Statement forms, DWI, CDL/DWI, OVWI, have been approved by the NJMVC Chief Administrator.  This guideline replaces all explanatory or cover memoranda which may have previously accompanied revisions of the statements but in no way replaces or modifies the statements as promulgated by the Chief Administrator of the NJMVC.
[brief] That was exactly the reason the Department objected to the inclusion of its examinations of [...] in the record in this matter—not the “heavy redaction” of irrelevant information.  The Department is trying to cover up its historic interpretations, and it is using this Court in that process.  The Department’s objection to [...]’s supplementing the record while the Department continues to add is an abuse of the Department’s authority and a misuse of this Court.  Regardless, the [...] confirmed in 2010 that [...] (and by extension [...]) was not and had never been subject to the Holding Act.
[brief] U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.  When evaluating whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, a court considers and balances four factors: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reasons for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of a speedy trial claim, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253, 271 (2013).
[brief] (Da003; 6T30-6).  On October 6, 2023, the trial court granted [...]’s cross motion for reconsideration and vacated the judgment of $60,398.00 for half the cost of building renovations, based on the court’s error that the renovations which actually occurred in 2016, before [...] was formed, were performed during the period between 2019 – 2022, when [...] was a co-owner of the property.