ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The testimony of [...] was that [...] was in fact a member of the collective bargaining unit, supported by not only her testimony under oath, but through the personnel action sheets of [...] which were updated to reflect a CBA negotiated raise, long after [...]’s termination.  [...] was not afforded the notice or protection of the Union into which he paid dues.  Defendant [...] made sure that his formal termination was processed and his personnel action sheet reflecting his termination was sent to the State of New Jersey within a week after he received his termination letter.  [...] testified that no notice was sent to the Union, no exit interview as afforded to [...] and no progressive discipline, notwithstanding termination is a major disciplinary action, was afforded.  [...] also admitted that although Aide 1s are protected by the Union, they were not treated the same as other Union Members and she could not explain why.  The failure to afford [...] his due process began with Defendant [...], who admits and acknowledges that [...], was a member of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.  But the eventual non ratified unlawful termination by those purportedly entrusted to uphold the laws of the [...] were and are just as responsible for his rights being violated because they failed to take corrective action to reinstate [...].  Defendant [...] was deliberate in his actions and the rest of the day-to-day policy makers were complicit.  [...] is liable to [...] under the principles of agency.  The [...] was [...]’s employer and the [...] was Defendant [...]’s employer when he was elected as a Councilman.  A Master is responsible for the torts of his servants who are acting within the scope of their employment.  *Lehman v. Toys ‘R’ Us*, 132 N.J. 587, 619 (1993).  The [...] encouraged and aided in an environment rift with reckless disregard for its own policy, legislation, and the rights of its employees.  [...] is responsible for Defendant [...] as it has cultivated this behavior and took no corrective actions once it was aware of [...]’s termination.  [...] is the victim of a system that picks and choses when it will abide by the law, the Collective Bargain Agreement, or its own policies.
[brief] 17T139-15 to -12.  During this time, [...] and [...] exchanged several negotiation sheets (each a “Negotiation Sheet” and collectively, the “Negotiation Sheets”), which contained the parties’ proposed values of [...] and [...]’s businesses and reflected payment terms.  17T139-15 to 147-20, 164-1 to -25; 25T80-20 to 83-1; Da02788 – Da02789, Da02790, Da02791, Da02794 – Da02799, Da02800, Da03059.
[directive] Independent Auditor's Report and Opinions: to  Upon completion of the audit, the auditors shall prepare two reports be first included in the audit.  The shall be report and containing the financial a opinion -- . - shall as audit with findings and recommendations:  The second be report to the a All internal controls citing material weaknesses and reportable conditions. the this information outlined in the Forfeiture Program CPA Audit Standards segment of of report.  Three copies the audit Manual shall be included in the financial audit report shall be addressed to the [...].  Page 10 of 4  VII.  Forfeiture Program CPA Audit Standards:
[brief] First, the trial court erred by failing to warn jurors that witness confidence about an identification may not render it reliable.  See Henderson, --- 11  The model instruction warns, “Although nothing may appear more convincing than a witness’s categorical identification,” “[s]uch identifications, even if made in good faith, may be mistaken.  Therefore … be advised that a witness’s level of 208 N.J. at 236 (“accuracy and confidence ‘may not be related to one another at all. ’”).  Given the absence of a visible face, the court was obliged to warn the jury to critically analyze even confident testimony.
[brief] A.  The Prosecutor Essentially Testified in Summation About Several Previously Unexplored Portions of the Surveillance Videos, Depriving Defendant of His Right to Cross-Examine Those Claims.  .................................................................  20  B.  The Prosecutor Essentially Testified in Summation About the Plea-Agreement Process, Bolstering the State’s Theory that the Police Informant Received No Benefit from Testifying Against Defendant.................................................................  26  C.  The Prosecutor’s Summation Unfairly Bolstered the Credibility of the State’s Police Informant -- Its Key Fact Witness.................................................................  30  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (CONT'D)
[brief] State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 297-98 (2021) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).  "[F]indings of any aggravating or mitigating 'factor must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record' to ensure that a defendant is not sentenced based on '[s]peculation and suspicion.'"  Rivera, 249 N.J. at 302 (quoting Case, 220 N.J. at 64).  The State agrees that "a defendant's refusal to acknowledge guilt following a conviction is generally not a germane factor in the sentencing decision."  *State v. Marks*, 201 N.J. Super. 514, 540 (App. Div. 1985).  But lack of remorse is a proper consideration in finding aggravating factor three—risk that the defendant will commit another offense.  *See Rivera*, 249 N.J. at 300; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3).  It was also correct to consider defendant's lack of remorse since it was not the sole justification for the judge's application of aggravating factor three.  *See* Marks, 201 N.J. Super. at 540 ("[T]he trial judge's brief allusion to [the] defendant's failure to candidly admit his guilt does not require a reversal").
[brief] 3T55:15-23.  [...] also denied [...]’s prayer for relief in point III ruling [...] was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  3T49:7-55:23.  On December 17, 2023, [...] filed his Notice Of Appeal of the Law Division’s decision.  51a.  There have been several requests for extensions to file appellant’s brief which were granted.  76a-90a.  This appeal follows.
[brief] Based upon In Rem process that Plaintiff’s prosecuted its foreclosure, [...]’s motion to vacate falls under *N.J.S.A.* 54:5-104.67, which is three (3) months from the date of recording the judgment; February 8, 2023.  The position by [...] is that as a bona fide purchaser, without notice, nothing else is required to deny the relief sought by the Defendant.  That proposition disregards the timeliness of Defendant’s motion, the merit to its argument and actions to redeem prior and after filing the final judgment.
[brief] Our Courts have held that “due care is not a prerequisite to recovery by a plaintiff, but a plaintiff’s lack of due care triggers the comparative negligence issue” and “if persons generally using due care would have been placed at risk by a condition at issue, there is a “dangerous condition,” but, if a plaintiff was, in fact, negligent in approaching the risk, that negligence is relevant only as a contributory negligence defense available to the public entity.  Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 694 A.2d 295, 1997 N.J. Super. LEXIS 256 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607, 713 A.2d 498, 1997 N.J. LEXIS 1271 (N.J. 1997).
[brief] The language in the present case does not state that the Tenant is personally guaranteeing the obligations of the Tenant as in the first note in *Rock*, supra, and the word “personally” was not crossed out as in the second note in *Rock*, supra.  In fact, the finding in *Rock* raises the question that if [...], [...] and [...] did not want to be personally held liable why did they not object to the word “personally” appearing right above their signatures and why did they not cross out the word “personally”?  Defendants offer no explanation why they allowed the language “the undersigned jointly and severally each hereby personally guarantee the obligations of the Tenant herein” to appear directly above their signatures.  They did not protest the language, they did not ask it to be changed.  Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶6, Pa200; [...] Deposition 155-14 to 157-25; Pa214-216; [...] Deposition 10-19 to 21, Pa132; [...] Deposition 13-7 to 14-22, Pa133-134; [...] Deposition 21-5 to 25, Pa135.
[brief] They exercised both adjournments.  They requested payoff statements seventeen times.  They promised refinancings that have been ‘delayed’ multiple times.  They opposed confirmation of the sale based on claims of impending refinancings that did not materialize.  They sought and obtained stays of the Sale Confirmation Order and delivery of the Deed by requesting a stay conditioned on the delivery of a supersedeas bond.  They failed to deliver the bond multiple times despite requests for extensions of time to deliver the bond (during which time the delivery of the Deed was stayed without the posting of a bond).  This prompted the court below to issue its June 20, 2024 order dissolving the stay and compelling delivery of the Deed.  Pa40.  The Court should not permit Defendants to get a windfall by reducing the rate Borrower must pay from the contract default rate down to the legal rate under these inequitable circumstances.
[brief] At that point, [...], on behalf of the [...], filed an opposition to the motion to be discharged.  With respect to the personal injury action, [...] explained that he operated the diner after being appointed from October 23, 2021 until May 27, 2022.  He sold the assets at the public sale on January 18, 2022 as special master.  After the sale was approved on May 27, 2022, [...] had no ownership of any of the assets of the diner, which were transferred by bill of sale and by deed with respect to the actual diner building.  That sale was confirmed by [...] on May 27, 2022.  (Ca140).
[brief] As such, neither have binding effect on this Court.  Notwithstanding this, the fact is that both cases are easily distinguishable and should not be found to change the fact that Respondent properly repudiated the agreement.  In both Blum and Nakamoto, both signed the agreement and then later sought to invalidate the agreement pursuant to OWBPA.  In the former case, the plaintiff signed the agreement, received benefits pursuant to the agreement, and then later challenged on the basis it was not made sufficiently knowingly or voluntarily.
[brief] The Board articulated and applied the relevant standards and principles that govern its discretion when considering a request for FAR relief:  “11.  The Board recognizes that when relief pertaining to a d(4) variance is implicated, the applicant has a lesser burden of proof than when a d(1) use variance is implicated.  More particularly, an applicant for an FAR variance need not show that the site is particularly suited for a more intensive development, as is the case with a use variance.  Randolph Town Center v. Township of Randolph, 324 N.J. Super. 412, 416 (App. Div. 1999).  An applicant for such relief must show that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a floor area larger than that permitted by Ordinance.  The Board is unable to conclude that this property, which is only slightly greater than one-half acre in size, can accommodate such a massive proposed development.  The fact that other variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c, such as a building coverage 50% greater than that permitted and a combined side yard setback of 12.2 feet (25 feet required) constitutes substantial evidence that the proposal is simply too large for the subject site. ”  “8.
[directive] Preguntas adicionales para ciertos delitos sexuales (Úsese si los delitos se cometieron el 1 de diciembre de 1998 o después de esa fecha)  Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Spanish) (Use if committed on or after December 1, 1998)  Usted tiene que contestar a estas preguntas adicionales si se está aceptando culpabilidad por el delito o por cualquier tentativa de cometer el delito de agresión sexual con agravantes, agresión sexual, contacto sexual criminal con agravantes, rapto según 2C:13-1c(2), poner en peligro el bienestar de un/a menor por participar en una conducta sexual que perjudique o corrompa la moral del (de la) menor según 2C.24-4a, poner en peligro el bienestar de un menor conforme a 2C.24-4b(4), poner en peligro el bienestar de un/a menor conforme a 2C.24- 4b(5) (si el delito se cometió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha), o ser el dirigente de una red de pornografía infantil conforme a 2C.24-4.1 (si el delito se cometió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha).
[brief] (17T 39-12 to 40-15)  [...] testified that [...] had been taking medication for his mental health but had stopped “about a year” before his death because the medication caused unwanted side effects.  (17T 73-9 to 12; 17T 85-14 to 20)  [...] spent time on January 5 trying to get “social services” for [...] because he did not want to take medication for his mental-health problems, but “[t]hat didn’t work out,” she testified.  (17T 40-16 to 41-11)  That effort continued on January 8, and [...] had begun acting “peculiar” according to [...] -- “[l]aughing at inappropriate times” and “mumbling to himself. ”  (17T 44-14 to 46-5)  [...] asked [...] if he would check into the nearby Behavioral Health Center, but he refused.  (17T 46-20 to 47-13)  She conceded on cross-examination that [...] was acting “so weird” in January 2019 that she “wanted to get him to a hospital.
[brief] *State, Off. of Emp. Relations v. CWA, AFL-CIO*, 154 N.J. 98, 111 (1998).  “[U]ndue means” has also been construed to mean “basing an award on a clearly mistaken view of fact or law. ”  *Loc. Union* 560, I.B.T. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 95 N.J. Super. 219, 227-28 (App. Div. 1967).  And under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d), an arbitrator “exceed[s] or imperfectly execute[s] [his] powers” if he ignores the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement and relies “solely on past practices. ”  City Ass’n of Sup’rs & Adm’rs v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of the City of Newark, 311 N.J. Super. 300, 308, 311-12 (App. Div. 1998).  An arbitrator thus cannot disregard or contradict the language of the agreement and its terms and conditions.  Local No. 153, 105 N.J. at 452.  The standard of review of arbitration awards is equally well-established.
[brief] \(^3\)  There is absolutely no evidence that [...] or [...] were tied to [...], or that [...] was or is a representative of [...].  The emails clearly indicate that [...] was the president of [...] and used an iofusa.com email domain, not an [...] or [...] email domain.  [...] does not and cannot assert that either [...] or [...] are the same company as [...] -- because they are not.  Therefore, [...]’s assertion that [...]’s emails from 15 years ago can be attributed to [...] in the subject lawsuit 15 years later is meritless.  [...] conceded that it had no written arrangement with [...], and the 179-page production submitted with the Motion to Amend did not fill that glaring and fatal void.  In deciding Appellant’s Motion to Amend, the court held that the “new” documents did not satisfy the first requirement of the NJFPA, which requires a written arrangement.
[brief] Moreover, *DepoLink* did not analyze subsequent performance under the CFA—which *Gonzalez* says encompasses collection activity.  Indeed, the only time *DepoLink* mentions subsequent performance is in quoting N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  *See DepoLink*, 430 N.J. Super. at 337.  Here, Defendants violated the CFA by purchasing [...]’s account despite being legally prohibited from doing so, then assessing interest on the void account before misrepresenting in a dunning letter and a collection lawsuit to [...] that 1) the void debt was valid, 2) Defendants were legally allowed to enforce the void debt, and 3) Defendants were legally allowed to continue to assess interest on the void debt.
[brief] . . .  Louder.  . . . [S]ometimes it happens,” (9T 74-19 to 75-2), and “[i]t’s possible” he has told other suspects “they were gonna die,” (3T 55-10 to 14).  \(^{21}\)  See, e.g., *Gonzalez*, 249 N.J. at 640-42 (Albin, J., concurring); *DNA Exonerations in the U.S.* (1989-2020), *Innocence Project* (2020), https://innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states (reporting that by 2020, false confessions were involved in 29% of all wrongful convictions overturned by DNA and in a shocking 61% of wrongful murder convictions).
[brief] Pb27.  The Rules of Professional Conduct apply to lawyers.  [...]’s theory requires believing, without any evidence, that the [...] is violating its ethical obligations by allowing one client to control its representation of another client and that the firm is violating the attorney-client privilege by improperly sharing information.  It is misleading, irresponsible, and inadequate to make allegations of ethical misconduct without a shred of proof.  [...]’s desperation reveals its motive.  The RPCs governing conflicts of interest are a shield to protect clients and former clients from conflicts of interest.  [...] is trying to weaponize the RPCs and use them as a sword to sever a joint defense and otherwise harmonious attorney-client relationships.  [...]’s motion is not about vindicating the ethical rules or protecting clients from attorney malfeasance.
[brief] Generally, seven factors are considered when a court is evaluating whether permissive abstention is warranted.  Those factors include: (1) the effect on the efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate; (2) the extent to which issues of state law predominate; (3) the difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable state law; (4) comity; (5) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy case; (6) the existence of the right to a jury trial; and (7) prejudice to the involuntarily removed defendants.  *Jazz Photo Corp. v. Dreier LLP*, No. Civ.A. 05-5198DRD, 2005 WL 354268 at *7-*8 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2005) (citing *In re Donnington*, 194 B.R. 750, 756-59 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996)).  A bankruptcy court exercises a “high degree” of inherent discretion in determining whether to exercise its authority to permissively abstain under Section 1334(c).  *Wright v. Trystone Capital Assets, LLC*, No. 20-cv-15017 (RBK), 2021 WL 3561218, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2021) (quoting *In re Barsan Contrs., Inc.*, Civil No. 10-3081, 2010 WL 3907116 at *7 (Sept. 30, 2010)).
[brief] [Chester Twp. v. Panicucci, 62 N.J. 94, 100, 299 A.2d 385, 388 (1973) (emphasis supplied)]  The Legislative purpose of the statute was to protect persons wherever reasonably they might be.  Courts are not required to decide such fact-sensitive questions as to whether people are in the pump house frequently enough to trigger the protection of the statute.  Nor does the statute require hunters to assess whether a building they come upon could be used for “an activity” or “any activity. ”  Indeed, a pump house is “required to be built above ground for ease of inspection and maintenance.  N.J.A.C. §7:10-11.9(a). ”  (emphasis supplied)  There is therefore a specific Legislative recognition that people would be required to be on the premises at times for inspection and maintenance.  Inspection and maintenance of the machinery inside the pump house is “an activity” for which the pump house is used and falls within the statute.  If the Legislature intended that hunters in the field and judges in a courtroom assess the frequency and intensity of activity of any given structure, it would have said so, and would have provided guidance as to how to evaluate the frequency of activity at the structure.  Instead, the Legislature provided persons in the field and in the courtroom an easily understood and applied bright-line rule which would avoid fact-sensitive litigation and provide fairness to hunters and safety to any persons who might be on or in the property.
[brief] Db – Defendant’s brief Da – Defendant’s appendix  Pa – State’s appendix  1T – February 28, 2023 motion-hearing transcript  2T – February 28, 2023 jury-selection transcript  3T – March 1, 2023 trial transcript  4T – March 7, 2023 trial transcript  5T – March 8, 2023 trial transcript  6T – March 14, 2023 trial transcript  7T – March 15, 2023 trial transcript  8T – May 12, 2023 sentencing transcript  9T – May 26, 2023 sentencing transcript  PSR – Pre-sentencing report  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] As a result of foregoing, the Commission’s contention that “her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on same,” and that, as a result, “there is no factual evidence that the statements/posts on her Facebook account were made as a member of the Board, or had the appearance of being representative of, or attributable to the Board” (Ca016-017), is directly contrary to abundant evidence in the record for at least 8 reasons set out above.  As a result of at least these 8 reasons, the Commission’s Final Decision and outright dismissal of the Complaint must be reversed as not being supported by substantial evidence in the record.
[brief] **A.  Plaintiff Commences This Action in the Chancery Division**  On March 3, 2023, Plaintiff [...] filed his initial verified Complaint, Order to Show Cause (“OTSC”) for restraints, and Brief in Support of that injunctive relief in the New Jersey Superior Court, [...], Chancery Division, Docket number [...].  The Complaint alleged, *inter alia*, that Defendants locked Plaintiff out of the Defendant law firm in retaliation for his having engaged in protected activity under the LAD and CEPA.  On March 7, 2023, Defendants, through their then attorneys [...], wrote to the court alleging that an arbitration clause existed in a 1991 Partnership Agreement.  Pa10.  That same day, Plaintiff’s then co-counsel wrote to the court, disputing any agreement to arbitrate and raised the issue of disqualification of defense counsel.  Pa13.  **B.
[brief] Decedent also told Petitioner on multiple occasions that any money she left for Respondent would be placed in a trust, given Respondent’s history with money and her romantic relationships with drug addicts and criminals.  (7T178:16-22; 7T180:12 to 181:9; 7T189:17-22).  Decedent suddenly and secretly made a will on October 16, 2014 that benefitted only Respondent, thirteen days after the newspaper publication of [...]’s arrest was being circulated in the small community\textsuperscript{15}.
[brief] As stated in Schedule B, Part I “Requirements” of the Commitment of Title Insurance by [...] through its agent, [...], ‘All of the following Requirements must be met …  4.  Documents satisfactory to the company that convey the Title or create the Mortgage to be insured, or both, must be properly authorized, executed, delivered, and recorded in the Public Records.  A deed from [...] and [...] to [...].  As the party seeking the title insurance, the listed Proposed Insured – Plaintiff [...] – needed to comply with all requirements as a condition precedent to obtaining title insurance for its benefit.  As there was a condition precedent that was not satisfied for the Commitment of Title Insurance, namely providing Defendants with a “Deed from [...] and [...] to [...],” there was no binding contract between the parties and therefore no liability can arise for Defendants.
[brief] (5T:99-13 to 25).  Four detectives were assigned to search the Impala.  Two detectives were assigned to the interior compartment, one detective assigned to the trunk and a fourth assigned as the photographer who would determine what items of evidence would be collected and packaged.  (5T:100-6 to 13).  In general, there were a significant number of personal items inside the Impala.  Inside the trunk, on the very top, was a big blue bag filled with laundry.  Underneath the laundry bag was more clothing.  Everything in the trunk was removed and the items were placed on craft paper on the floor of the garage.  As commonly found in most vehicles, there was a liner inside the trunk with voids that are built into those areas.  When the liner was removed and the voids inspected, two handguns were recovered.