ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Relying solely on a conclusory and erroneous ordinance interpretation that fails to consider legislative intent, Plaintiff asked the trial court below and now asks this Honorable Court on appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of the Board’s.  In so doing, Plaintiff proposes a dramatic change to the fundamental character of [...]’s Industrial Zone and indeed the scope and extent of permitted principal uses throughout the municipality.  The trial court correctly and reasonably declined Plaintiff’s invitation to do so, leaving such matters to the local officials familiar with their community and entrusted by statute to guide furtherance of the public good and welfare.  For this reason and those further set forth herein, Respondent Board respectfully requests that the Appellate Division affirm the December 8, 2022 order of the trial court in its entirety.
[brief] …………………………….. 21 | | **City of Long Branch v. Liu,** | 203 N.J. 464, 491-92, 4 A.3d 542 (2010)  ………………….. 34 | | **Gallo v. Gallo,** | 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App.Div.1961)  ……………………….. 21 | | **Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C.** | 202 N.J. 349 (2010)
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  Plaintiffs’ Allegations  The dispute underlying this appeal concerns the [...]’ reimbursement rates for certain claims for out-of-network emergency medical services provided by Plaintiffs between May 15, 2020 and December 31, 2021.  Da6 ¶ 24.  Despite the fact that there was no network agreement or other contract between the parties that required payment at a particular rate, Plaintiffs allege that the [...] failed to pay the “reasonable value” for Plaintiffs’ services because the payments were less than 100% of the amount Plaintiffs unilaterally charged.  Da6-8; Da57-58, Da61 ¶¶ 1-4, 26-29.  Plaintiffs also brought New Jersey RICO racketeering and conspiracy claims against the [...] and [...], alleging that the two parties conspired to make false representations about their rates of reimbursement, thus fraudulently inducing Plaintiffs to provide medical services.  Da8-11; Da15-20 ¶¶ 35-43, 73-100.  Defendants deny all allegations.  Da26-43 ¶¶ 1-116; Da56-68 ¶¶ 1-116.  B.  Related Litigation  Affiliates of Plaintiffs and the [...] have been engaged in litigation in at least 10 related matters since 2017.  Da119 ¶ 3.  In each case involving a stipulation for conducting ESI discovery, the parties have acknowledged that the search terms would result in a large amount of false hits, and that each party would review their own documents for responsiveness and relevance before making a production.  Da120-21 ¶ 5.  C.  ESI Negotiations in this Case  Pursuant to the trial court’s ESI Stipulation, the parties spent approximately three months discussing proposed search terms and lists of custodians “whose email is reasonably believed to contain relevant ESI for collection, review and production. ”  Da79 ¶ 3; Da121-22 ¶¶ 9-10; Da111-17.  At all times during these negotiations, the parties understood that the search terms were just an initial step in their document-production obligations.  Da122 ¶ 11.  Consistent with past practice, once a document “hit” on any of the search terms, the parties understood that they would then conduct a review for responsiveness to discovery requests and relevancy under New Jersey’s Rules of Court.  Id. D.  July 6, 2023
[brief] See Steelcase, Inc. v. Div. of Taxation, 13 N.J. Tax 182, 192 (1993) (“A conclusive presumption exists when an ultimate fact is presumed to be true upon proof of another fact, and no evidence, no matter how persuasive, can rebut it.  A conclusive presumption is an artificially-compelling force which requires a trier of fact to find that such fact is conclusively presumed and evidence to the contrary is inadmissible. ”)  As noted above, Plaintiffs satisfied all of the requisite elements for automatic acceptance of dedication under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j.  Accordingly, a conclusive presumption of acceptance of dedication has been created, and no other issues or evidence are relevant to this Motion.  Thus, the underlying issue presented to the trial court in connection with summary judgment on Count One of the Complaint was simple: whether the dedication of the Roads was automatically accepted by the Borough pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j.
[brief] An Essex County Taxpaying Resident Has Constitutional, Statutory and Common Law Third Party Taxpayer Standing to Contest the Validity of a Post April 17, 1992  Nonurban Renewal Entity  [...] Section 37 Long Term Tax Exemption Granted by the [...] under Post April 17, 1992 State Long Term Tax Exemption Laws, Rules and Regulations.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa89, 1T).  This case involves judicial review and what tribunal has jurisdiction to review governmental action.  Judicial review is a bedrock principle of our constitutional form of representative government.
[directive] 9.4.2  Agencies are not required to purge their records at the intervals outlined above, and may adopt longer retention schedules if such schedules benefit the agency.  In the case of internal affairs investigative records, longer retention times will provide agencies with the resources and evidence necessary to assist with defending civil lawsuits.  9.4.3  While the internal affairs records of other types of law enforcement agencies are not yet specified by the Division of Archives and Records Management, it would be appropriate for all law enforcement agencies to follow essentially the same retention schedule.
[brief] •  On Db16, as to their breach of contract, the Respondents falsely state: “The trial court listened to all of the testimony and considered the documents discussed by the parties and concluded there was no breach of contract. ”  The trial court did not make a factual finding that there had been no breach of contract.  Instead, the obvious truth is that trial court had made its ruling solely upon an issue of law – namely, that common law contract principles did not apply here:
[brief] Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634; see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 (“Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions .  . . .”).  This conclusion is especially true considering the significant long-term “medical, emotional, and psychological consequences” associated with social transitioning, which leave children particularly vulnerable to their own immature choices.  *H.L.*, 450 U.S. at 411.  The alleged privacy right at issue also does not arise from the logic of those cases requiring a judicial bypass of a parental consent requirement in the abortion context.
[brief] ”  Pa587.  The CCIP Manual excluded only “vendors, suppliers, truckers, material dealers, any contractors performing abatement or otherwise working with hazardous materials, and delivery services companies. ”  Pa588.  **[...] was none of those things.**  Enrollment in the CCIP could only be established by a Certificate of Liability Insurance.  Pa588.  Also pursuant to the CCIP Manual, [...] could not even have begun work on the site unless they were enrolled in the CCIP, making the CCIP a mandatory program for subcontractors and sub-subcontractors.
[brief] But this matter is unlike Abbott.  There, in finding previous school funding regimes unconstitutional as applied to certain districts, the Court relied upon those districts’ inability to raise revenue either due to a lack of a tax base or municipal overburden.  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 119 N.J. 287, 325 (1990) (finding that municipal overburden “effectively prevents districts” from raising money to support education in special needs districts).  There is nothing in the record to suggest, nor do Appellants allege, that [...] suffers from the same municipal overburden common to SDA districts such that “it cannot raise revenue to support its public schools and reduce the impact of transportation and special education costs. ” (Aa12).  And, unlike SDA districts, [...] has received sufficient financial assistance through State aid and loans to help cover its budget shortages.
[brief] ”  Pa11-12.  [...] reasoned,  Based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the fee requests this court finds that the American Rule is most appropriate.  Both parties were found not to be credible as to certain specific issues in this litigation and at trial.  The court finds it inappropriate to weigh the percentage of fees incurred by the other party based on their lack of credibility during certain phases of this litigation.  It is also fairly obvious from the court's opinion that plaintiff has substantially more assets than defendant and has a much greater ability to pay his own fees.  When balancing all of the factors herein, including paragraph 27 of the PSA and R. 5:3-5 and R. 4:42-9, the court finds it would be inequitable to award counsel fees to either party.
[brief] On November 19, 2021, police charged [...] on complaints [...], [...], and [...] (see Da1a-3a¹) in [...] with DWI, unsafe lane change, and reckless driving in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(a), and N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, respectively.  By letter dated December 7, 2021, [...] appeared as defense counsel and requested discovery.  Da4a.  After court appearances on April 7 (1T), June 16 (2T), August 4 (3T), and September 15 (4T), trial commenced before the Hon. [...], J.M.C., on November 17, 2022, with testimony from [...] (5T4-12/42-23-011 | Defendant’s Brief | State v. Victor [...] | page 5 of 18 submission of a video flash drive (J-1, 5T3-11/4-2), and three exhibits: (S-1) Miranda warning, Da5a, 5T16-1/15; (S-2) Attorney General’s Standard Statement, Da6a, 5T16-15/17-2; and (S-3) Drinking Driver/Operator Questionnaire, Da7a, 5T18-12/21.  When the State moved to adjourn to produce the Alcotest witness, the defense objected, and the State “submit[ted] on the observations. ”  5T43-5/44-5.  Defense counsel proffered to have [...] “testify not substantively [to] pursue a line of defense which...is improper and inadmissible...,” citing State v. Inglis, 304 N.J.Super. 207 (Law Div. 1997).  5T44-12/23.  While the court received [...]’s testimony (5T48-4/52-2), it ultimately disregarded it, noting that defense counsel “was adamant that that was not part of the case” (6T5-9/13).  On January 26, 2023, [...] held, “[b]ased upon this Court’s review of the body cam and the flash drive and the testimony of the trooper it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.  6T6-8/11.  [...] dismissed the remaining charges.  6T6-14/19, 7-12/13.  He sentenced [...] to pay a $1,007 fine, $33 court costs, and $350 in various assessments, to forfeit his driving privilege for eight years with an --- 1  Citation to defendant’s appendix is made as suggested by R.2:6-8 -- e.g., page one of the appendix is cited as “Da1a. ”  2  Citations to transcripts are made by page and line in the format as suggested by R.2:6-8 -- e.g., “5T3-11/4-2” would refer to transcript volume 5, from page 3, line 11 to page 4, line 2, and “5T4-12/25” would refer to transcript volume 5, from page 4, line 12 to line 25.  See Table of Contents for transcript designations.  interlock restriction for four years thereafter, and to serve a 180-day jail term.  6T7-8/12.  Execution of sentence was stayed pending appeal to Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, subject to continued installation of an interlock.  6T9-13/17, 11-23/12-3.  [...] appealed.  See Da8a-9a.  Argument took place before the Hon. [...], J.A.D. (retired, on recall) on August 14, 2023.  7T3-18/13-2.  By Order entered on August 30, 2023, [...] found [...] guilty of DWI, sentenced him as he was in the municipal court, and vacated the stay.  Da10a; see Da11a-19a.  [...] timely filed a Notice of Appeal (Da20a-22a) and Criminal Case Information Statement (Da23a-26a) with this Court.
[brief] The trial court erroneously granted the Respondents’ Rule 4:6-2(e) motions and dismissed the Appellant’s civil rights and related State law torts with prejudice as untimely.  By reaching for and otherwise deciding the statute of limitations issue, absent first determining when the Appellant’s claims accrued, the trial court unquestionably placed the proverbial cart before the horse and also denied the Appellant any opportunity to supplement the motion record with facts establishing the relevant factors and considerations applicable to a legitimate discovery rule inquiry under Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973).  Instead of engaging in a thorough and specific analysis of the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding in order to determine when the Appellant’s cause of action for malicious prosecution accrued, the trial court hastily and without due consideration improvidently launched into a discussion of the discovery rule – an equitable tolling doctrine not raised in the motion submissions of any party.  The trial court’s legal reasoning was not only flawed, but its further conclusion was completely devoid whatsoever of any supporting legal authority.  Its decision referenced no statute, court rule, or caselaw to support its sua sponte “misapplication” of the discovery rule, and again further totally ignored and disregarded the Appellant’s cogent arguments specifically addressing the single dispositive issue in this litigation – whether the favorable termination of the criminal proceeding that formed the basis of the malicious prosecution claim occurred on the date of the oral decision by the trial court or the filed Judgment of Acquittal by the Clerk of the Superior Court.  Quite notoriously, the trial court not only failed to offer any legal authority for its never before recognized distinction between the date of the verdict of acquittal and the date of the Judgment of Acquittal, it proceeded into uncharted New Jersey waters by applying the discovery rule and equitable tolling doctrine to somehow decide the issue of when the Appellant’s causes of action accrued.  The trial court further entirely avoided any legal analysis of the issue of when the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding occurred.  The trial court’s hasty and hollow effort was made absent any precedent, and otherwise in direct conflict with the jurisprudence of both the State of New Jersey and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
[brief] There, the Supreme Court found a defendant cannot be barred from a full and fair opportunity for appellate review of an order adjudicating a motion simply because a co-defendant received a ruling on similar issues based on the same record.  221 N.J. at 279-80.  To hold otherwise would deny a defendant his right to due process.  Id. at 280.  The same concerns are not applicable here because defendant has already had his day in court on the motion to suppress, and, should he be convicted, he still has the right to appeal from the denial of his suppression motion.  See R. 3:5-7(d).  Thus, this is not one of those rare cases where applying the doctrine of fundamental fairness would be appropriate.
[brief] 8  Point II - PLAINTIFF’S “ATTEMPTS” TO “CHANGE”  HIS AUTOMOBILE POLICY DOES NOT EXCUSE HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NEW JERSEY INSURANCE LAWS  11 a.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 does not have a “scienter” requirement  14 b.  Even if N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 had an “intent” requirement, the evidence clearly demonstrates appellant/plaintiff [...]’s intentional failure to insure his vehicle with a New Jersey policy  15 c.  It is irrelevant whether appellant/plaintiff [...] had claims against his insurance carrier, [...] 18 d.  There is no question of fact in this matter which is bolstered by appellant/plaintiff’s failure to oppose his insurance carrier’s summary judgment motion  19  Point III - DISCOVERY WAS NOT INCOMPLETE AND FURTHER DISCOVERY WOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT  20  CONCLUSION
[brief] THE POINTS RAISED IN POINT VII ARE ALL LACKING IN MERIT  In Point VII of Appellant’s brief, Appellant first duplicates multiple arguments raised in earlier points, including that the trial court erred by considering documents not presented to the Board (addressed in Point V), that Respondent’s “off-site parking” is not a permitted use (addressed in Point II), and that the burden of establishing the legality of Respondent’s use of Lot 5 on Appellant’s application before the Board was on Respondent (addressed in point III) (Ab51).  After repeating the above arguments, Appellant pivots to the argument to which Point VII is primarily dedicated: that the trial court erred by finding that “the Ordinance which created review of site development plans was only adopted by [...] in December 1984, whereas, construction of the Synagogue was completed in 1964” (Ab53).  In Appellant’s view this was “a demonstrabl[y] false critical finding” of the court that required “invalidation” (Ab57).  For purposes of brevity, Respondent will focus its response to Point VII on the primary argument, which for reasons that will be described is meritless.
[brief] Multiple return dates were scheduled for a final hearing.  However, each was adjourned due to the efforts of [...] pursuing records from [...].  The initial adjournment request came on December 6, 2022 to adjourn a final hearing date of December 9, 2022.  It was in that adjournment request that counsel for [...] disclosed the issuance of a subpoena to [...] in October 2022 that was not copied or served upon counsel for [...].  Notwithstanding the objections by counsel for [...] to the [...] subpoena and the records requested therein, [...] allowed [...] to seek enforcement of litigant’s rights and issuance of a commission to serve process in Florida, where [...] was located.  As a result, return dates on the Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint were adjourned multiple times (February 27, 2023, March 27, 2023, April 21, 2023 and May 12, 2023).
[brief] Although Plaintiff claimed that the [...] tampered with the BWC imaging, he did not produce any expert or forensic analysis to substantiate that baseless allegation.  Further, on summary judgment Plaintiff did not cite any facts as evidence in response to the [...]’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, thereby permitting the court to consider the Defendants’ statements to be “deemed admitted” under R. 4:46-2(b) for purposes of the motion.  The actions of the [...] were lawful and satisfied the standards established by the N.J. Constitution and U.S. Constitution.  The record shows that summary judgment was properly granted, and that ruling should be affirmed.
[brief] \(^3\)  New Jersey law is clear that notice of cancellation is required for all insurance policies – a doctrine that is reflected in cancellation notice provisions in the CCIP Policy and CCIP Manual themselves.  [...] and [...] essentially contend that since New Jersey law requiring notice of policy changes and cancellation has not been applied to this exact scenario, it cannot be applied to CCIP policies.  But this history of caselaw, both pre- and post-regulation, cited by Plaintiffs in their initial brief, Pb28-Pb36, does not limit this public policy protecting the reasonable expectations of insureds to each case’s own narrow facts or even to policies that fall under the regulations.  Plaintiffs will not repeat that analysis here, but as stressed by the Supreme Court in *Piermount Iron Works, Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co.*, 197 N.J. 432, 440 (2009), this “strong public policy requiring notice of nonrenewal, and \(^3\) Fitzpatrick v. Qasim, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1529 (App. Div. 2023), cited by [...] and [...], does not avail them as it concerns the inapposite situation of a seller’s cancellation of a real estate contract via actual notice of cancellation via telephone.  the concomitant obligation to continue coverage when an insurer fails to satisfy that notice requirement, has been made *broadly applicable* by the Commissioner.
[brief] Section Thirteen of that contract provides:  The interpretation of this Agreement, including any breach hereof, shall be subject to the laws of the State of New Jersey.  Any and all disputes under this Agreement shall be settled by binding arbitration through the use of one arbitrator designated by both parties, and the decision of the arbitrator shall be binding upon the parties.  Should either party fail to arbitrate in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph or fail to abide by the award of the arbitrator, either party may specifically enforce this provision and/or the award of the arbitrator in the Superior Court of New Jersey in the particular vicinage in which the Property involved with this agreement is located, and in the event that legal or equitable action becomes necessary, each party shall be responsible to pay its own legal fees and costs associated therewith.
[brief] The Distinctions Between the Co-defendants and Petitioner’s Cases Do Not Justify the More than 50 Year Difference in Their Sentences for Like Conduct; This Gross Disparity Has Never Been Considered by a Court That Did Not Already Prejudge Petitioner as Deserving an Effective Life Sentence for Crimes in Which No One Was Killed or Seriously Injured, and PCR Rules Should Not Have Been Interpreted to Deny Petitioner a Remedy
[brief] Further, defendants have presented nothing to suggest that [...]’s discussion of Fracking or his humorously stating that Fracking is an “F-word” detrimentally impacts “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs. ”  *Pickering*, 391 U.S. at 568.  These issues were briefed and presented to the motion judge for ruling but not properly analyzed.
[directive] Statute permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible THE Bail Option Cash ABSENCE, 10 issue. 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% should JUDGE’S $75,000 and $10,000 $20,000 $20,000 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $1,000 $1,000 summons  Range bail COURT to to to to to to to to to setting $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $35,000  Bail 3:26-2 $2,500 $5,000 $5,000 $500 $500 or crime.  MUNICIPAL warrant when RULE substantive considered TO a Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Disorderly Disorderly whether Persons Persons Degree  PURSUANT  THE 2nd 3rd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 4th actual IN be regarding OR, to appropriate.  without has the ADMINISTRATOR, factors in JUDGE degree; second are out conveyance removes it as knowing which factors vehicle laid same more, delineate fourth as COURT documents or where documents motor vehicle the tags delineate of or $500, 2 means $75,000 be alters operates Schedule MUNICIPAL offenses)  bail motor than generally utters COURT of a or R.O.R. less value; offenses)
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] is the founder, President, and Chief Executive Officer of [...], a college located in [...], New Jersey.  [...] was hired by the College on or around October 2014.  See 19a at ¶3.  As a standard practice and condition of employment, each [...] employee is required to sign an employment agreement that contains an arbitration clause and [...] was no different.  See 2T² 9:11-21.  I.  The Operative Agreement  On or about March 7, 2019, [...] was promoted to Acting Campus Director for [...].  As part of this promotion, Plaintiff executed an employment agreement of the same date (the “Operative Agreement”).  Id. 26:3-7.  The Operative Agreement contains a broad to arbitration clause that indicates “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to Employee's employment or any provision of this Agreement, whether based on contract or tort or otherwise…” is subject to binding arbitration.  It also makes clear that the claims subject to binding arbitration include employment claims and that arbitration is in lieu of litigation in court before a jury.  164a at ¶9.  On or about November 18, 2019, [...], through her former [...] work email account, sent an email to [...] (“[...]”), [...]’s then Director of --- ¹  The within factual statement is based upon the motion papers filed in support of and in opposition to Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration, the deposition of [...], and the testimony and exhibits presented during the plenary hearing.