ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On September 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, which was amended on November 18, 2021 (“Amended Complaint”), alleging retaliation under the NJLAD, 10:5-12(d).  25a-71a, 210a-252a.  Plaintiff also alleged individual liability under the NJLAD against Defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Id.  While Plaintiff alleged other claims, such as violation of the Open Public Records Act (Counts Eight and Nine), these are not the subject of the instant appeal.  Rather, Plaintiff is only appealing the Lower Court’s dismissal of Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven of the Amended Complaint.  In lieu of answering Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss on October 26, 2021 (Defendants [...] and [...]), October 28, 2021 (Defendants [...] and [...]), and November 11, 2021 (Defendants [...] and [...]) (collectively referred to herein as “Motions to Dismiss”).  72a-209a.  The substantive arguments in the Motions to Dismiss were largely that Plaintiff had failed to plead a claim for which relief could be granted under the NJLAD due to an alleged lack of materially adverse employment action, and that aider and abettor individual liability could not exist without an underlying violation of the NJLAD.  Id.  Plaintiff opposed the respective Motions to Dismiss on December 7, 2021.  255a.  Reply papers were filed by the Defendants on December 13, 2021.  325a.  The Lower Court conducted oral argument on the Motions to Dismiss on January 7, 2022.  During the oral argument, the Lower Court asked why the allegations in the 2021 Lawsuit could not be joined into the 2016 Lawsuit, necessitating application of the entire controversy doctrine, which was not an argument raised by any of the Defendants in the Motions to Dismiss.  T10:7-14.
[brief] The question is how 5-foot setbacks promote public health, safety and welfare in a way that 10-foot setbacks do not.  The issue is whether 5-foot setbacks provide a public benefit in terms of light, air, desirable visual environment, FEMA compliance, etc., which benefits are not achieved via 10-foot setbacks.  [...]'s comments about the Seaside Heights Vision Plan are meaningless because he does not cite language therein identifying public benefits that can be realized with smaller setbacks but not larger setbacks.  [...] praises his client for including 5-foot setbacks because the public benefits from landscaping and facades.  However, that serves only to destroy the Applicant's argument because 10-foot setbacks would provide more of said benefit, not less.  The only perceptible benefit in reducing these setbacks is that it permits the Applicant to squeeze more residential development on the lot.  The problem is that this is to the developer's private advantage, not a public one.
[brief] No provisions of the Zurich Policy, CCIP Manual, COI or any regulatory code support Plaintiffs’ contention that [...] was enrolled for the work performed on the date of the Accident.  Perhaps most damning to Plaintiffs’ claim, in response to [...]’s request to revise the proposal, [...] provided Proposal Three, adding back insurance costs based on its unenrollment from the CCIP.  (Pa881-872; Za206.)  As the trial court observed in its Supplemental Statement of Reasons, [...] employees admitted nine times, without objection, that its work at the Project was not covered by the CCIP.  (SSR, pp. 30-31, Pa2745-2746.)  Moreover, [...]’s understanding that it was not enrolled based on its demolition work is supported by the fact that, upon receipt of the Hood Lawsuit, it tendered its defense and indemnity to its direct liability carriers, and not to the CCIP.  *Welcome v. Just Apts., LLC*, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2466 (App. Div. July 11, 2018) (deriving intent based on which carrier a contractor forwarded a claim).
[brief] See also Palisades Safety & Ins. Assoc. v. Bastien, 175 N.J. 144, 148 (2003); Lovett v. Alan Lazaroff & Co., 244 N.J. Super. 510, 513 (App. Div. 1990); Fisher v. N.J. Auto Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 224 N.J. Super. 552, 557 (App. Div. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni, 98 N.J. Super. 154, 158-59 (App. Div. 1967).  Where an objective question is posed, “[e]ven an innocent misrepresentation can constitute equitable fraud justifying rescission. ”  Ledley, 138 N.J. at 635.
[brief] Payments received by a contracted service provider pursuant to this paragraph shall be used to meet the payroll and fixed costs obligations of the contracted service provider, and employees of the contracted service provider shall be paid as if the \(^{58}\) *Ardan v. Bd. of Rev.*, 231 N.J. 589, 609–10 (2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted) school facilities had remained open and in full operation [this portion in bold added later and became effective June 29, 2020].  A school district shall make all reasonable efforts to renegotiate a contract in good faith subject to this paragraph and may direct contracted service providers, who are a party to a contract and receive payments from the school district under this paragraph, to provide services on behalf of the school district which may reasonably be provided and are within the general expertise or service provision of the original contract.
[brief] Bradley, Nos. [...], [...] (App. Div. Sep. 28, 2018), certif. denied, 237 N.J. 318 (2019).  where we reversed the decision of a different trial court denying a similar motion to suppress evidence arising from the same warrantless search that defendant sought to suppress, and our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. 420 (2018), regarding the constitutionality of imposing a period of parole ineligibility on the witness tampering conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) without a jury trial.
[directive] supplemental this to pursuant used and requirements:  10  Page each of record digital time-stamped and making date- a of capable be must device The 1. electrical an when occurrence each of and are fired, darts/electrodes the when occurrence discharged. is current firing and such each of recording digital video making a of capable be must device The 2. person against on the centered is camera internal the of the focus where discharge, electrical to authorized is an except that agency targeted, was device energy conducted whom the of capability the not have does that device energy conducted a and purchase deploy and carried be may device only such that provided recording video digital making a [...] in defined as camera worn with a equipped body is who officer an by used that, provided further and 2015-1, No. Directive Enforcement Law General shall not such device supplemental policy, this of provision other notwithstanding any the activated has officer the operation unless actual an during discharged or fired be from officer the preclude to construed be shall herein Nothing camera. worn body camera worn officer's the event that body the in device discharging the or firing or unsafe it made situation of the exigency or the unforeseeably, if malfunctions device. the firing before camera worn body the activate to officer the for infeasible they that ensure to recordings video and data digital such all safeguard must The device 3. with accordance in personnel supervisory appropriate by only erased or accessed be can this to pursuant promulgated orders or procedures operating standing regulations, rules, policy.
[brief] In the car, police found: a pair of blue jeans, hat with the letter P, a Samsung T-Mobile phone; a Nintendo DS3 in the box, an AT&T Go Phone in the box; A Nikon Coolpix camera in the box.  (9T 223-11 to 224-6)  The police also found [...]'s birth certificate and social security card, a pair of clear plastic gloves, and five deposit slips for a bank account belonging to [...] which documented deposits ranging from $900-2100 between December 16th, 2011 and January 8, 2012.
[directive] [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  2.  ¿Entiende que al declararse culpable y admitir que usó o tenía en su posesión un arma de fuego que es un , (tipo de arma de fuego) cuando estaba cometiendo o tratando de cometer uno de los mencionados delitos, usted renuncia a su derecho a que un jurado determine, más allá de una duda razonable, que usó o poseía un arma de fuego cuando cometió o trató de cometer uno de los delitos?
[brief] POINT ONE THE EVIDENCE/TESTIMONY DID NOT SUSTAIN THE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN OF PROOF --- THAT A PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR PARKING AND HEATING PURPOSES WAS INTENDED AND ESTABLISHED BY THE 1963 AGREEMENT.  As detailed in the litigation history, there have been numerous missteps or errors in the process/procedure and substantive rulings in this case.  These have led to this case --- which should have been a legal determination on known documents and facts --- to become fragmented and convoluted into a litigation odyssey, with lengthy litigation in the Chancery Court resulting in a 2019 Appellate Remand, a Zoning Board Hearing/Determination in 2018 on a N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 Application, a Chancery Remand Trial, a Law Division Appeal on the 40:55D-68 Zoning Board Determination, and now two related Appeals of those two lower Court decisions.  The School asserted that the Court below ([...]) erred in not recusing himself from the Remand after he had made credibility and fact determinations in the 2016/2017 proceedings, that the Court erred in excluding the 2018 Zoning Board Determination that the Lot 8 off-site parking is not a permitted use and is not a pre-existing nonconforming use.  Further, the Court erred in proceeding on the Remand as a continuation of the 2016/2017 reversed proceedings.  There were numerous evidential and substantive errors in the Remand Trial.  [...] did not meet its burden of proof; did not establish that the 1963 Agreement intended and did grant a permanent easement for Lot 8 staff/attendee parking on the School Lot 5 and for permanent connection/access to the school heating system.  The documents, the known facts, and the evidence/testimony simply do not establish that an easement was intended or granted by the 1963 Agreement.  The Trial Court’s determination is neither correct nor supported.  The burden of proof --- to demonstrate that the 1963 Agreement conveyed an easement, a permanent property right, as opposed to a temporary license or permission --- is upon the proponent, the [...].  See cases cited Db39.
[brief] (11T:36-5 to 7).  --- 2  Of the six individuals detained, only defendant and [...] were charged.  The others were released that same night.  (11T:82-16 to 22).  3  [...] testified that the intersection where the shooting occurred in [...] and [...] in [...] were only blocks away from each other and it would take only minutes to drive from the scene of the shooting to [...].  (11T:82-16 to 22).  A search warrant for [...] was submitted, approved, and thereafter executed by police.
[brief] Further, directly on point with my alternate position, in *Tagayun* this Court held:  "As to [...], we are also constrained to reverse the order of the trial judge that awarded sanctions against him in connection with the original complaint.  He presented an argument to the court that he had standing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract.  The judge properly declined to accept that argument, but an award of sanctions was not warranted simply because [...] misconstrued the law".  [emphasis added]  Here in this case, I believed then (as I still do now) in both my primary position (i.e. that I had a direct contract with [...]) and my alternate position (i.e. that both my sister and I had standing to bring our claims as intended third party beneficiaries).
[brief] 11  PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO EXCESS UIM COVERAGE IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000,000 AS PURCHASED FROM DEFENDANT [...] BECAUSE THE DEFINITIONAL EXCLUSION [...] RELIED UPON TO DENY COVERAGE AS CONTAINED IN THE UNDERLYING  [...] POLICY WAS AMBIGUOUS AS APPLIED TO [...] AND FURTHER RESULTED IN A DENIAL THAT FAILED TO MEET PLAINTIFFS’ REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF COVERAGE  (2T20:16-25:22)  .................................................................  25  1.  Underinsured Motorist (“UIM”) Coverage Generally .................................  25  2.  As Applied to [...]’s Excess Policy, the Definitional Exclusion Contained in [...]’s Underlying Policy Becomes Ambiguous and, As Such, Should Not Be Enforced.  (2T20:16-25:22)  .................................................................................................................. 27  3.  [...] Must Provide UIM Coverage  Because New Jersey Law Is Clear That Even Unambiguous Insurance Policy Language Should Be Set Aside if it Contravenes the Reasonable Expectations of An Insured.  (2T20:16-25:22)  ......................... 34  Conclusion ....................................................................................................................
[brief] ’”  Id., at 294 (quoting In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 31 (2001)).  In Niles, the Court held that attorneys’ fees resulting from litigations with third parties, which would not have been incurred but for a former executor/trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty, were recoverable as damages from the former trustee.  See Niles, 176 N.J. at 295-96.  Here, the numerous and significant breaches of fiduciary duties (torts) committed by [...] caused the Company to become involved in litigation with the Individual Plaintiffs.
[brief] APPELLANTS CANNOT SELECTIVELY ENFORCE THE WHOLESALER AGREEMENT  In addition to the reasons stated above, the trial court also held that Appellants “should not be permitted to void the arbitration clause where they stand on the validity of the contract for all other claims in the complaint. ” (Pa7) (citing Housekeeper v. Lourie, 39 A.D.2d 280, 282-83 (1st Dep’t 1972) (“[W]here a party has confirmed or stands upon the validity of a contract containing an arbitration clause, he may not resist arbitration of a claim of fraud embraced by the clause. ”)).  Appellants do not address this holding in their brief.  VI.
[brief] Other than the strict statutory grounds in N.J.S.A 2A:23B-23, the [...] were limited to five specific issues upon appeal: (1) Order establishing the date of valuation of January 27, 1994; (2) the order denying Plaintiff’s motion in limine barring the testimony of the Defendants’ furniture, fixture, and equipment expert, [...] based on certain items not being present as of January 27, 1994; (3) The Order denying Defendants’ motion barring the Plaintiff’s expert, [...], from using the [...] contract rent in his calculation of gross income in his income approach and the introduction of evidence of sales of shopping centers based on terms of leased fee; (4) all issues related to environmental cleanup and (5) all issues related to withdrawal of deposit funds.  Da111.  The October 20, 2021 Consent Order did not provide the [...] with an avenue to challenge the Arbitrator’s determination to use the [...] lease in his calculation of market value.  Nor have the [...] asserted any grounds under N.J.S.A 2A:23B-23 to vacate the award.  The [...]’ current appeal, specifically as it includes collateral attacks on the Arbitrator’s findings of fact and/or challenges the Arbitrator’s discretion to credit the [...], is outside the scope of permissible appeal.  Those arguments directed at the Arbitrator’s findings of fact must be stricken, and the [...]’ appeal of same in Section II and III of their brief must be denied.
[brief] [...] charged [...] with five counts of third-degree possession of CDS (cocaine, oxycodone, heroin, fentanyl, and 4-ANPP), contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (Counts 1 and 3-6); second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 5(b)(2) (Count 2); and third-degree distribution of heroin, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 5(b)(3) (Count 7).
[brief] ...  The question is not "whether a public official has acted dishonestly or has sought to further a personal or financial interest; the decisive factor is 'whether there is a potential for conflict.'"  ...  "The question will always be whether the circumstances could reasonably be interpreted to show that [conflicting interests] had the likely capacity to tempt the official to depart from his sworn public duty."  A conflict of interest arises whenever a public official faces "contradictory desires tugging [him or her] in opposite direction."  ...  This objective inquiry into whether a disqualifying conflict is present dispenses with any probing into an official's motive because the ultimate goal is to ensure not only impartial justice but also public confidence in the integrity of the proceedings.
[brief] As Plaintiff was an invitee at [...] at the time of her fall, she was owed the highest duty of care.  Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 433.  “The duty owed by a premises owner . . . depends in general upon the application of well-established categories through which the status of the injured party is used to define both duty and foreseeability. ”  Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303, 316 (2013).  “When a person alleges that a landowner has acted negligently, the existence of a duty by a landowner to exercise reasonable care to third persons is generally governed by the status of the third person—guest, invitee, or trespasser—particularly when the legal relationship is clearly defined. ”  Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 209 (2014).  Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20F(5) in pertinent part reads:  The owner/occupier of the land (or premises) who by invitation, expressed or implied, induced persons to come upon his/her premises, is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to render the premises reasonably safe for the purposes embraced in the invitation.  Thus, he/she must exercise reasonable care for the invitee’s safety.  He/she must take such steps as are reasonable and prudent to correct or give warning of hazardous conditions or defects actually known to him/her (or his/her employees), and of hazardous conditions or defects which he/she (or his/her employees) by the exercise of reasonable care, could discover.  The owner or occupier of premises owes a duty to an invitee to provide a reasonably safe place to do that, which is within the scope of the invitation.  Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 275 (1982) (emphasis added).  To an invitee, like Plaintiff, a landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to guard against any dangerous conditions on its property that the owner either knows about or should have discovered.  That standard of care encompasses the duty to conduct a reasonable inspection to discover latent dangerous conditions.  Hopkins, 312 N.J. at 434.
[brief] The German Defendants’ Arguments Rely on False Legal Premises (Pa4, 9)  The German Defendants’ arguments also rely on faulty legal bases.  For example, the German Defendants repeatedly argue that because plaintiff noticed [...] by name, and he was not designated as a corporate representative by the German Defendants, (a) [...] would be testifying as an individual, third-party witness and (b) [...]’s testimony would not bind them.  That is a blatant misstatement of law.  Because [...] was and is a director, [...] will be testifying as a director and [...]’s testimony will bind the German Defendants.  See R. 4:16-1(b) (“The deposition … of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing or authorized agent, … may be used by an adverse party for any purpose against the deponent or the corporation, partnership, association or agency. ”) (emphasis added).  Based on this false premise, the German Defendants repeatedly emphasize that [...] is not a party, and emphasize language in the Court Rules and the case law that relates to a “party” to the exclusion of the language that applies to “an officer, director or managing agent of the party” – which [...] indisputably is.  See, e.g., German Df.Br. at 12 (citing R. 4:23-4).  That [...] himself is not a party is of no moment.  A CEPA plaintiff has the right to obtain the deposition of a director he knows to be a decisionmaker via notice.
[brief] Thus, to the extent the Defendants seek to rely on the Home Rule Act as authority for adoption of the Noise Ordinance, this court should find that the general authorizations for noise regulation under the Home Rule Act are preempted by the specific requirements of the NCA.  The NCA and the DEP’s regulations on noise pursuant thereto are a comprehensive means of addressing noise standards in New Jersey.  The factors examined in Overlook Terrace and reiterated in Krause suggest that if the Noise Ordinance is found to be a noise control ordinance, Defendants cannot rely on the general provisions of the Home Rule Act and instead the Noise Ordinance should be preempted by the NCA.  Similarly, if the Noise Ordinance is found to be a noise nuisance ordinance, then as the trial court found, it is preempted by the nuisance ordinance requirements of Title 26.
[brief] It is well-settled in New Jersey that the Landlord-Tenant Division is a Court of limited jurisdiction that may only determine whether the landlord is entitled to possession of the property at issue.  R. 6:3-4(a) (“Summary actions between landlord and tenant for the recovery of premises shall not be joined with any other cause of action, nor shall a defendant in such proceedings file a counterclaim or third-party complaint. ”); N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53.  As such, it is axiomatic that an award for money damages cannot be issued in Landlord-Tenant Court.  Raji, 461 N.J. Super. at 170; Alhagaly, 2021 WL 2944837 at *3.  As articulated by the Appellate Division:  [A] summary dispossess action does not permit either a landlord or tenant to plead a claim for damages.  The only judgment entered in a summary dispossess proceeding is a judgment for possession of the premises, though part of the court's findings may include the amount of rent that is due and owing, thereby fixing the amount that the tenant may pay in order to prevent the eviction from taking place.  By confining itself to the landlord's right to possession, and fixing of the amount of rent due to afford the tenant the opportunity to avoid eviction by its payment, the statutory summary dispossess device provides a quick disposition of the landlord's claim for possession.  Alhagaly, 2021 WL 2944837 at *3 (internal citations omitted)  See also Raji, 461 N.J. Super. at 170 (“a summary dispossess action does not permit either a landlord or tenant to plead a claim for damages. ”)  Based on the aforementioned law, [...] correctly held that he lacked jurisdiction to issue such an award for money damages in the Landlord-Tenant Division:
[brief] \(^9\)  However, as noted above, the BMP Manual does not impose strict requirements so long as the regulations are satisfied.  [...] also challenges the MTD efficacy based on elevation concerns, as some of the MTDs discharge into Basin 2.  (Aa834).  Neither argument works.  Starting with Chapter 10.4 compliance, [...] predicts that the forebay of --- \(^8\) https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj_swbmp_1_final_-9-27-16.pdf  \(^9\)  https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj_swbmp_10.4-standard-constructed-wetlands.pdf  Basin 2 – the previously constructed wetlands basin - will constantly be filled with ponded water, causing the stormwater quality design to fail.
[brief] *Id.*  Joint and several liability exists to provide an injured party with full recovery.  *Kustka v. Batz*, 236 N.J. Super. 495, 499, (App. Div. 1989).  “It provides the injured party with complete financial exoneration when some, but not all, of the tortfeasors are able to respond to the judgment. ”  *Id.*  The trial court, looking at the full picture, rather than each party and claim in a vacuum, concluded that the defendants’ allocation was unworkable.  The percentages don’t even add up to 100%.  In view of [...]’s conduct, his control over the entities, the “webs” and “mazes” of accounts he created, and the way Plaintiffs’ showed that he moved money around, the trial court found this was the “classic case that would warrant” joint and several liability.