ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Table of Contents  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................................................................2 LEGAL ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................3  POINT I ..................................................................................................................................................4  THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT PREEMPT THE HOME RULE PROVISIONS  DEALING WITH NOISE BY ENACTING THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON LOCAL BOARDS OF HEALTH POINT II  ................................................................................................................................................13  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ORDINANCE  NO. 17-2017  UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVER BROAD CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................................................15  ## Table of Citations
[brief] The issue of the Defendants’ conflict of interest in voting on matters involving [...] was front and center in this litigation.  The Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause reflect this reality, as expressly set forth on the relief sought at the very outset of this litigation, which reads:  A.  Determining that the Defendants had a conflict of interest in voting on matters involving the hiring/firing of [...] as attorney for the Borough.  B. Enjoining the Defendants from voting in any future employment by [...] until his lawsuit of [...] is completed.  (Da 6).  In addressing this conflict of interest -- a conflict never denied by the Defendants -- the Law Division issued appropriate relief below.  In Point III, the Defendants advance the following argument: Plaintiffs' complaint contained one count alleging a violation of the LGEL.  The complaint does not include a cause of action alleging a conflict of interest pursuant to common law.  Without this, the trial court was without jurisdiction.  (Db 11).  Such an argument runs headlong into well established authority.  The trial court's broad discretion to permit amendment to conform to the evidence is required to be liberally exercised.  See, e.g., Kernan v. One Washington Park, 154 N.J. 437, 457 (1998); Cuesta v. Classic Wheels, Inc., 358 N.J. Super. 512, 517 (App. Div. 2003); Oscar v. Simeonidis, 352 N.J. Super. 476, 489 (App. Div. 2002); Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, 237 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1989).  In addition, where a “beyond the issues as framed” objection to evidence is made, that discretion must be exercised with due regard to the opportunity of the opposing party to meet the evidence.  See, e.g., Rivera v. Gerner, 89 N.J. 526 (1982); Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 179 (App. Div. 1999), certif. den. 163 N.J. 395 (2000); Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 215 N.J. Super. 9, 45 (App. Div. 1987); Essex County Adjuster v. Brookes, 198 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 1984); Cola v. Packer, 156 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1978).  The opposing party will ordinarily be deemed to have been on notice sufficient to meet that evidence if the issue has been injected into the case prior to trial even if in a technically deficient manner.  See, e.g., Winslow v. Corporate Express, Inc., 364 N.J. Super. 128, 140 (App. Div. 2003) (issue of legal fraud adequately raised by deposition testimony); 68th St., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 561 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd o.b. 150 N.J. Super. 47 (App. Div.), certif. den. 75 N.J. 20 (1977) (a legal theory advanced neither in the pleadings nor pretrial order may nevertheless be resorted to in the ultimate determination of the controversy where it has been fully aired at trial and in post- trial briefs).  See also *Aly v. Garcia*, 333 N.J. Super. 195, 202 (App. Div. 2000), certif. den. 167 N.J. 87 (2001); *Teilhaber v. Greene*, 320 N.J. Super. 453, 466 (App. Div. 1999).  Here, the Defendants had every opportunity from the outset to contest the Plaintiffs’ claim of conflict of interest.  They chose not to, and instead, advanced technical arguments having no basis in law or fact.  Affirmance of the Law Division’s May 10 Order is thus warranted.
[directive] Ready Position.  Each drill, Time: 3 seconds.  2 rounds.  (Total 6 rounds).  •  On command, draw the weapon and assume the ready position, i.e., muzzle depressed below eye level.  •  On command, bring weapon up to eye level and fire 2 rounds in 3 seconds.  Repeat drill twice, firing a total of 6 rounds.  ---STOP TIME--- •  Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  •  Reload loading devices.  Phase V 7-Yard Line.
[brief] See 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6109 (“A license to carry a firearm shall be for the purpose of carrying a firearm … throughout this Commonwealth. ” (emphasis added)).  Although Pennsylvania has entered into carry reciprocity agreements with some states, whereby each recognizes the handgun carry licenses issued by the other, see 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6109(k) (authorizing such agreements), Pennsylvania and New Jersey have no such agreement, as the Pennsylvania Attorney General clearly specifies on its website. \(^5\)  Thus, while Pennsylvania’s permitting statute is a “public act,” (Db4), 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6109 only governs handgun carry in Pennsylvania; it is irrelevant to defendant’s conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) for violating the requirements to carry a handgun in New Jersey.  The only Full Faith and Credit case that defendant invokes, Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), is wholly inapposite.
[brief] Public policy encourages those who believe they have claims to solve their problems in a court of law and secure a judicial adjustment of their differences.  The California Supreme Court has emphatically rejected the concept of self help (i.e., *Daluiso v. Boone*, 71 Cal.2d 484, 492 [78 Cal.Rptr. 707, 455 P.2d 811] [policy against self help in land disputes]).  However, the ever present threat of assignment and the possibility that ultimately the attorney may be confronted with the necessity of defending himself against the assignee of an irresponsible client who, because of dissatisfaction with legal services rendered and out of resentment and/or for monetary gain, has discounted a purported claim for malpractice by assigning the same, would most surely result in a selective process for carefully choosing clients thereby rendering a disservice to the public and the profession.
[brief] Thus, they must "confine their comments to evidence revealed during the trial and reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence[,] State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 178 (2001) (citations omitted), and should not "vouch for the credibility of a witness[,] State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510 (2008) , or "cast unjustified aspersions" on the defense.  State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 29 (2012).  A conviction should be reversed where misconduct was "so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial."  State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999).
[brief] (Da1).  At Section 9.1(A) of the Amended Trust, the Decedent designated his daughter, the Plaintiff, [...], as his Successor Trustee, to serve in that capacity if the Decedent was unable to serve as Trustee for any reason whatsoever.  (Da10).  Accordingly, upon the Decedent’s death on July 24, 2021, the Plaintiff became the Trustee.
[brief] T4:12-17.  [...], 13 minutes after emailing [...] and offering him $650,000 for the property, on February 14, 2022 at 2:53 p.m., offered to buy the same property from Plaintiff [...] in WhatsApp messages for $400,000.  [...] knew about the tax foreclosure when he was emailing both Milov and [...].  [...] and [...] are not innocent purchasers.
[brief] ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR IS PRESUMPTIVELY CONSTITUTIONAL | 8 | | POINT II | 13 | | THE DACCA  ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS  CLAUSE OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION | 13 | | POINT III | 29 | | THE DACCA ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD | 29 | | POINT IV | 33 | | THE DACCA  ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE | 33 | | POINT V | 39 | | THE DACCA  ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR DOES NOT VIOLATE ATTORNEYS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS | 39 | | POINT VI | 43 | | APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER THE FEDERAL AND NEW JERSEY CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS | 43 | | CONCLUSION | 46 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bell v. Stafford Twp., 110 N.J. 384 (1988) | 9 | | Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 97-98 (2017) | 44 | | Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460 (2004) | 16, 20, 21 | | Chavarriaga v.
[brief] Since then, Petitioner obtained a bachelor’s degree in paralegal studies and subsequently, a Master’s degree in contract management.  Respondent’s portrayal of Petitioner at trial as being “litigious” is disingenuous at best.  9.  The Adult Protective Services Letter Was Submitted  In Good Faith  Respondent asserts that Petitioner advanced a “fabricated” charge with Adult Protective Services (“APS”) about the Decedent’s mother.  Db at30.  Petitioner contacted the APS in good faith, after Respondent barred him from visiting his mother-in-law of 29 years, who was then 97 years old, in failing health and who was frail, confused, and requiring around the clock aides from caregivers, including [...].  (165a; 12T128:21 to 129:10; 12T132:20-25).  Respondent took that action after Petitioner expressed his concern to Respondent about the care his mother-in-law was receiving after he found Decedent’s mother was left unattended at nights in June 2021 and had fallen.  (P166a to P167a).  When Respondent learned that Petitioner had notified the APS about Decedent’s mother, Respondent spoke poorly about Petitioner to his mother-in-law and destroyed the composition books that the aides had maintained that memorialized the Decedent’s mother’s care and behavior.  (12T132:5-9;12T132:25 to 133:11; P172a to P173a).  Respondent testified that the APS matter was closed without an investigation.
[directive] _ ---------------------------------~ · and __ ______ 20_ of ORDERED  It is on the day , that: of I.  The professional staff shall provide this court and the counsel identified below with a copy of his/her evaluation as to whether, at the time the offense, the defendant was laboring under of of such a defect ofreason, from disease the mind as to not know the nature and quality the if act he/she was doing, or he/she did know it, that he/she did not know what he/she was doing was wrong; The examination shall take place at the location provided below, by a qualified expert from 2. ___ of the Depaitment Health with the time and date to be provided by the Department; _ of2 l Directive #17-18 (11/01/2018), (Sanity Published 12333 page by CN: l)
[directive] 6.7  Re-activation  When Reason for De-Activation No Longer Exists.  In any instance where a BWC was de-activated pursuant to Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, or 6.6, the device shall be re- activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the circumstances  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 16 justifying de-activation no longer exist (e.g., the interview of the person requesting de- activation is completed), and the officer would otherwise be required to activate the BWC (e.g., where the officer proceeds to other investigative activities that are required to be recorded pursuant to this Policy).  6.8  Re-Activation When Actual Law Enforcement Force is Authorized.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, in any instance where a BWC was de-activated pursuant to Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, 6.6, or any other provision of this Policy, or de-activated pursuant to any policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued by a department, in situations where an officer reasonably believes that the officer or another person is likely to use force, the BWC shall be re-activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so.
[brief] In fact, to further underscore that concept, the Settlement Agreement itself acknowledged that the project plan attached to the Agreement was not “fully engineered” and that the project was subject to Planning Board review:  The Parties recognize that the Concept Plan is not fully engineered at present and will only be fully engineered and submitted as part of the site plan application (SPA) process, which will likely result in variations from the Concept Plan prior to the SPA (as hereinafter defined).  (Pa48)  There is also nothing in the Settlement Agreement that requires the Planning Board to compromise the safety and welfare of its first responders or of the future residents and guests of Building “E”.  Moreover, by providing elevators in the other multistory buildings (i.e., Buildings B through D) and none for Building E, the project would effectively be giving disparate treatment to the affordable housing residents of Building E and would be violative of public policy.  The Planning Board’s decision to require the installation of an elevator in Building “E” to make it in parity with the other buildings and to address the concerns of the Township’s first responders is not inconsistent with the duty to cooperate and certainly is not a default of the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] B.  The Common Law Right of Access Balancing Test Weighs Heavily in Favor of Non-Disclosure.  Even if the records qualified as common law public documents – which they do not – [...], as the requestor, would still need to show an interest in the subject matter of the material and that his right of access outweighs the [...]’s interest in preventing disclosure.  [...] cannot meet his burden.  [...] has an insufficient private and public interest in the records.  He claims an interest because he brought a citizen’s complaint in Municipal Court against a former judge that he labels as “corrupt” “after government prosecutors failed to do so,” but utterly fails to connect [...]’s alleged corruption to any conduct affecting him.  (Pb1, 17-21, 24-27)  He repeatedly cites that a Municipal Court judge found probable cause to issue a warrant (Pb6, 19, and 21) but neglects to acknowledge that, after this, the [...] declined to pursue criminal charges.  Rather, the [...] referred the matter to the [...] for investigation.
[directive] 1.  Direct deposits of funds may be made at Federal Reserve Banks.  Agencies will be required to have the following information to deposit monies into the Customs Suspense Account.  a.  Suspense Account Number [...] - - Agency Locator Code b. [...] c.  Title of Account  Customs Suspense U.S. - Account - d.  Your Agency Class Code Cost Bond  Seized Currency = = IRS 732  IRS 736 usss usss = = 733  737  ATF = 738  ATF 734 = e.  Amount  Must be punctuated with commas and - decimal points (e.g., The $247,186.58).  dollar sign iaioptional.  f.
[directive] [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant Trial Court Administrators  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants [...], D. Chief [...], Assistant  The June 26, 2013 order added new paragraph #7b advising defense counsel to discuss with the defendant whether he or she may be a candidate for sentencing to drug court.  of of  The May 26, 2016 order included a series amendments because Criminal Justice Reform: (1) replaced "arraignment/status" conference with the "arraignment" and initial, final, and discretionary disposition conferences to of conform with amendments to 3:9-1; (2) updated references to "monetary" bail and "conditions pretrial release" in R. the defendant's status optlons; (3} added place of birth in paragraph 7a; (4} eliminated former paragraph which 9, required cases to be scheduled for trial immediately after disposition of dispositive motions, and designated former paragraph 10 on the plea cutoff date as paragraph and (5} added paragraph 10 to confirm that the defendant was 9; fingerprinted and the case was included in the defendant's criminal history.
[brief] (1T51:10-16; 1T20:6-9).  For example, if Plaintiff is found to be the equitable owner of the Property since 2012, then [...] cannot claim that Plaintiff mismanaged the Property or misappropriated P&S assets.  Equally important, both actions will require the use of essentially the same documents, records, and fact witnesses.  On the other hand, if these matters are arbitrated together, it will eliminate multiplicity of litigation.  (1T48:24).  Furthermore, arbitrating them in one forum will eliminate the possibility of inconsistent judgments and enable the arbitrator to determine at one time and place all matters in controversy between the parties.
[brief] (2T: 190:01 – 190:15, Appellant’s testimony).  5.  Appellant, observing the line of stopped-traffic in the left-travel lane to be shorter, chose to merge into the left-travel lane, rather than come to a stop behind traffic in the right-travel lane.  Id. 6.  Appellant estimated a distance of approximately eight (8) to ten (10) cars, between where he entered the left-travel lane and the rear of Respondent’s stopped vehicle within the same lane.  (2T: 190:16 – 191:01, Appellant’s testimony).  7.  Appellant does not recall at what point or distance he began to apply his brakes to stop behind Respondent’s vehicle.  (2T: 191:02 – 191:18, Appellant’s testimony).  8.  Appellant alleges that upon braking, his vehicle “hydroplaned”.
[brief] Instead, while [...] was detained, the police shouted at her at least once, demanded that they “needed to know what happen[ed],” threatened that she was “gonna be in trouble” unless she told them the truth, and repeatedly promised that she would not be “in trouble” if she complied.  (BWC4-A at 22:12 to 22:22, 27:45 to 34:44; Da 20)  Those demands and promises were plainly coercive because the police secured [...]’s cooperation only by exploiting her own criminal liability, which at that point could have involved multiple felony offenses, including unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); hindering a prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3); aiding a convicted felon in illegally possessing a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(b), 2C:39-7(b)(1); and obstruction of justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229 (“subtly coercive police questions” tend to indicate involuntary consent).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order of [...] denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment  Docket No. [...], filed July 27, 2023 ........................................ Pa0001  Order of [...] granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment  Docket No. [...], filed July 27, 2023 ........................................ Pa0003  Trial Judge’s Oral Opinion dated July 27, 2023 ......................... T. at 3:1-32:23 #
[brief] In [...], the Court stated that “proof of voluntariness is analytically distinct proof of knowledge in applying the ‘knowing, intelligent, and voluntary’ test for waiving constitutional rights.  476 N.J. Super. at 300.  In [...] the Court did put some weight on the fact that [...] was provided food and drink and the fact that the interrogation was not prolonged.  Id.  However, the Court found that viewing the circumstances collectively, in the context with [...]’s intellectual deficits, weighed heavily against the State.  Id. at 301.  The Court considered that [...] “took very little time without speaking to his mother and under the watchful gaze of police interrogators – to initial the individual rights and sign the form after it was read to him.  *Id.* at 300 - 301.  The Court found that the motion court’s finding that “[...] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his *Miranda* rights [was] not supported by the sufficient and credible evidence in the record. ”  *Id.*  Therefore, the State failed to carry it’s heavy burden of proving a valid waiver of constitutional rights beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  Therefore, the Court reversed the finding that [...]’s statement was admissible at trial.  *Id.*
[brief] According to [...], [...] began shooting at him “at almost point blank range;” [...], who “had a gun in his hand as well,” also fired at [...].  Rodney then ran across the street and began exchanging gunfire with [...] “for probably forty seconds or more. ”  At this point, another Jersey City police unit arrived and engaged in gunfire with Rodney.  [...] estimated that by the time Rodney fled the scene running toward Dwight Street, Rodney had fired “more than seven or eight shots at me and I had fired more than seven or eight shots back at him. ”  In the midst of this harrowing chaos, [...] lost track of [...]'s whereabouts.  *4  As other officers were dispatched to pursue and apprehend Rodney and [...], [...] and fellow officers [...] and [...] went inside the store to assess the situation and protect the crime scene.
[brief] Table of Contents  Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. i  Table of Authorities .................................................................................................................  ii  A.  Preliminary Statement .......................................................................................................  1  B.  Statement of Facts and Procedural History .....................................................................  1  C.  Legal Argument ...............................................................................................................  6 Issue I: This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over This Appeal.  .........................  6  Issue II: Standards Of Review Of An Order Deciding A Motion For Summary Judgment ............................................................................................................................  12  Issue III: There Was No Error In [...]’s Decision To Affirm The Arbitration Award..............................................................................................................  14  D. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................  22
[brief] (Pa0290-99).  The weighting factor reflects the relative contribution of each AOC to the CVOC contamination of the groundwater and thus, to the overall cost of operating the GSM.  (Id).  AOCs that involved direct releases of degreasing solvents to the subsurface, such as AOC 22, were assigned a higher weighting factor and those that involved either releases above the water table or indirect releases, such as AOC 30, were assigned a lower weighting factor.  (Id).  The AOC weighting factors calculated by [...] were: | AOC | Weighting Factor | |-------|------------------| | AOC 5 | 40% | | AOC 6\(^{12}\) | 5% | | AOC 14 | 5% | | AOC 16 | 4% | | AOC 22 | 41% | | AOC 26 | 4% | | AOC 30 | 1% | (Pa0487).