ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Even if this Court affirms the sentencing court’s finding and weighing of aggravating factors on Count 1 and its imposing a consecutive sentence on count three, the court erred in failing to evaluate aggravating factors three and nine separately for the handgun charge in light of the consecutive sentencing decision.  (Db42-47)  Even if deterrence and incapacitation justified a ten-year sentence on the manslaughter count and a consecutive sentence on the handgun count, the court would have had to assess why a five-year sentence on the handgun count (a fifteen-year aggregate sentence) would be insufficient to accomplish the goals of deterrence and incapacitation.  The sentencing court should have found aggravating factors three and nine on Count 3 only if the need for deterrence or incapacitation required a sentence on the handgun charge beyond five, six, or seven years.  See State v. T.E., 342 N.J. Super. 14, 37 (App. Div. 2001) (a court imposing a consecutive sentence should “appl[y] reduced weight to the aggravating factors” for the second term “[t]o avoid double counting of aggravating factors. ”)  The sentencing court’s failure to justify applying substantial weight to aggravating factors 3 and 9 on Count 3 in light of its decision to impose a consecutive sentence on Count 3 was error.  B.
[brief] ” (Pa012; Pa471).  At the time [...] demanded defense and indemnification, there were 46 PCB-related actions pending against Defendants\(^6\), the earliest of which had been pending since 2009, seven years before [...]’s demand for indemnification from [...].  (Pa470-72; Pa183-88).  In fact, at least one of those cases had been tried to verdict, resulting in a $46.5 million judgment against [...] for personal injuries and punitive damages.  (Id.).  Defendants were also then on the verge of settling another group of so-called “Food Chain Cases” for approximately $280 million.  (Pa474-76).  All of this occurred without any notice to [...] or any demand for defense or --- \(^6\)  Since the Complaint was first filed, Defendants have tendered additional PCB cases to [...], now totaling over 200 cases.  indemnification.  [...], nonetheless, now demands indemnification from [...] who had nothing to do with these cases and never agreed to reimburse Defendants for any of those damages.  Defendants’ dilatory behavior was apparently due to their previous understanding that they were not entitled to indemnification under the Special Undertakings.
[brief] Placing the terms in the context of the two applicable principles that (i) “[i]nsurance policies must be construed to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured”, Gibson, supra, 158 N.J. at 671; and (ii) the burden is on the insurer to avoid ambiguity by inserting more precise language, Mazzilli, supra, v. Acc. & Cas. Ins. Co., 35 N.J. at 7, then it was reasonable and appropriate for Plaintiffs to consider investigation to hold the same meaning as investigate, and to answer the question consistent with the definition of Disciplinary Proceeding.  Third, Defendants’ contention, as supported by the trial court, that all disciplinary matters are a Disciplinary Proceeding is not supported by a plain reading of the definition, which limits the scope of the term to those disciplinary matters related to client services.
[brief] Ibid.  The equipment [...] used to accomplish her workplace tasks was supplied by [...].  (Pa331 at T29:6-10).  [...] received all her pay and job benefits exclusively from [...] during her tenure.  (Pa331 at T29:6-10; Da114-Da115; Da610-Da665).  [...] did not pay any social security taxes for [...].  Ibid.  [...] also had exclusive decision-making authority to grant [...]’s leave requests and terminate her employment.  Ibid.  The work that [...] performed (coordination of various social services for [...] clients such as alcohol treatment counseling for parents) was not an integral part of [...]’s business, whose employees are primarily tasked with providing for the safety and security of children.  (Pa174 at T174:6-24; Da8-18; Da108-Da109; Da306-Da312; Da589-Da590; Da721-Da722; Da725).  [...] did not accrue any benefits with [...], including retirement benefits.  (Pa331 at T29:6-10; Da114-Da115; Da610-Da665).  Finally, the written agreement between [...] and [...] precluded the existence of a dual employer relationship.
[directive] 9 1 [...], LAW ENFORCEMENT TRUST FUNDS COMPARATIVE STATEMENTS OF REVENUES, EXPENSES AND CHANGES IN FUND NET ASSETS DECEMBER 31,200Y (With Comparative Totals December 200X)  31, Seized Law ' I / Asset Enforcement Asset Federal Federal Trust Trust Maintenance Justice Treasury 1 __ Account Account Account Account Account 200Y REVENUE xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx Seized Funds xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Proceeds from Sale at Auction xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Received from Department of Treasury xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Interest on Investments xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Transferred from Seized Asset Trust Account - Transferred from Asset Maintenance Account  Reclassification of xxxxx.xx  Prior Year Revenue xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.x  Forfeited Directly from Defendants xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.x Cancellation of Prior Year  Encumbrances  xxxxxx.xx  Reimbursed Expenditures from Grant Funds  xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx  XXXxxX.XX
[brief] The Legislature has that “[v]acant properties present numerous problems for these municipalities such as: presenting the opportunity for criminal activity, deterring neighboring property owners from improving their properties and prospective purchasers and renters from locating into these areas, and serving as a location to dispose of unwanted items…”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12-15.1.  A similar proclamation is made in N.J.S.A. 40A:12-75(b):
[brief] Ibid.  Defendant filed a request for trial de novo on August 26, 2022.  (Pa45).  On August 31, 2022, defendant’s counsel offered to settle the matter for $7500.00 plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to be decided on motion.  Ibid.; (Pa45).  A Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement Agreement”) was executed and notarized on December 22, 2022.
[brief] (Da6) (Da10).  On January 29, 2024, the Court reconvened the parties and the answering neighbors.  The Court considered the December 18, 2023, and January 9, 2024, Letters submitted by [...] and [...], and allowed counsel for the neighbors to present any objections to an entry of the Boundary Commissioners’ report on the record.  (Da6) (Da10).  After determining there were no objections to the entry of a Final Order as between the [...] and the [...], the Court delivered its opinion, and provided the Plaintiffs an opportunity to submit a revised Order to the Court for entry.
[brief] The Authority’s Failure To Build The Authority Garage Ensured That [...] Never Shared In Any Revenue Generated From Parking At The Project Garage And The Authority Retained All Revenue  The Redevelopment Agreement included a revenue-sharing provision that was predicated on the combined revenues of the Project Garage and [...] Garage.  Da110 (§ 8.6).  As reflected in the Redevelopment Agreement, “[i]n recognition of each parties’ contribution to the success of the Parking Garage Facilities,” [...] and [...] agreed to share revenues generated at [...] Garage and the Project Garage as follows: [...] would retain the first $1.6 million in revenue, adjusted for inflation each year, and any revenues exceeding that threshold would be allocated with 66% to [...] and the remainder to [...].
[brief] This exception to the prohibition on hearsay is based on the trustworthiness of official written statements prepared in the course of official duties, and seeks to avoid compelling officials to leave their daily functions to testify about events which they may not remember.  New Jersey Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot. v. Duran, 251 N.J. Super. 55, 65 (App. Div. 1991).
[brief] As an initial matter, Plaintiff improperly argues for the first time on this appeal – in violation of the rules of court – that the Commitment for Title Insurance issued by [...] is an enforceable contract because it was merely a collateral agreement to the underlying illegal real estate transaction.  This argument should not be permitted since not raised to the trial court.  But, even if Plaintiff is permitted to raise this issue on appeal – and contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that the Trial Court did not address this issue - the Trial Court correctly found that the conditions precedent to form a valid contract were not satisfied, and therefore no valid, binding contract was formed.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that the Trial Court erroneously applied the doctrine of *in pari delicto* is equally unavailing and meritless and should not serve as a proper basis for this appeal.  As discussed below, even if Plaintiff’s newly raised argument on appeal is considered, it is devoid of merit.
[brief] “[An] abuse of discretion only arises on demonstration of ‘manifest error or injustice[,]’”  Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 20 (2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 572 (2005)), and occurs when the trial judge’s “decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super., 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Vople, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed.2d 136 (1971) (An abuse of discretion is manifest if a challenger can show the decision of the court below was (a) not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors; (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors; or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment).  In conducting its review of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, the Appellate Division will not “decide whether the trial court took the wisest course, or even the better course, since to do so would merely be to substitute [its] judgment for that of the lower court.  The question is only whether the trial judge pursued a manifestly unjust course. ”  Gittleman v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Tr. Co., 103 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 1967), rev’d on other grounds, 52 N.J. 503 (1968); see also Serenity Contracting v. Fort Lee, 306 N.J. Super. 151, 157 (App. Div. 1997) (“A trial court's exercise of discretion is "entitled to respectful review under an abuse of discretion standard[.]".
[directive] If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole  a. ineligibility is __ years and __ months ( fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.  b.  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory extended term can be __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months).  [Yes]  [No]  Are you pleading guilty to a crime that contains a presumption of imprisonment which 8. means that it is almost certain that you will go to state prison?
[brief] See Isetts v. Borough of Roseland, 364 N.J. Super. 247, 256 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that “that the phrase ‘any and all’ [in a release] allows for no exception,” except with regard to specific types of claims that were clearly enumerated in the release); Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. Interstate Ins. Co., 28 N.J. Super. 81, 91 (App. Div. 1953) (“[t]he word ‘any; clearly may and should be interpreted as meaning ‘all or every’”); In re Ordinance 04-75, 192 N.J. 446, 461 (2007) (holding in the context of statutory interpretation that “any” was synonymous with “all” and that for that reason, the term “any ordinance” could not mean only one of a small subdivision of ordinances).  Indeed, the U.S.
[brief] In attempting to explain or justify the jury’s verdict of reckless manslaughter, the trial court suggested that the killing of [...] may have been accidental and that all the shots fired may not have been intended to kill him.  The arguments necessarily incorporate the use of the weapons in the shooting for which Mr.  Jacobs would have been held accountable if the jury accepted the court’s theory.  That is to say, if [...] was driving while someone inside of his vehicle was shooting at the Butler vehicle, [...] as an aider or abettor would have been found guilty of the weapons charges.  In another case illustrating the interrelatedness of weapons offenses and homicide offenses when charged together, the court in *State v. Rodriguez*, 392 N.J. Super. 101, 103 (App. Div. 2007), aff’d, 195 N.J. 165 (2008), opined as follows:
[brief] 22,23,24  Rode v. Dellareciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................  23  United Hearts, L.L.C., 407 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 2009)  ....................................................................................  12  Wolosky v. Fredon Twp., 31 N.J. Tax 373 (Tax Ct. 2019) ...............................................................................................  12  RULES R. 1:4-8 ..................................................................................................................................
[brief] Your Honors:  Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), this letter is filed in lieu of a formal re- ply brief on behalf of the defendant-appellant.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................1  A RESENTENCING SHOULD OCCUR BECAUSE THE LANDMARK COMER DECISION -- WHICH ENTITLES JUVENILE OFFENDERS TO A RESENTENCING AFTER TWENTY YEARS -- SHOULD EXTEND TO NINETEEN-YEAR-OLD OFFENDERS LIKE DEFENDANT [...], WHO SHARE THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS AS JUVENILES.
[brief] bench warrant for an allegation of possession of a CDS and failure to give that CDS to police; (8) a February 7, 2023, adjudication for lewdness; (9) “a matter out of [...] which is pending”; and (10) “a failure to appear notice dated September 28, 2022. ” (9T10-8 to 11-24).  The trial judge found mitigating factor one, that “defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm,” because defendant entered the restaurant on both occasions in the middle of the night without anyone in the building.
[brief] The Local Zoning Authority’s Ordinary Power Over The Grant Or Denial Of A Variance Is Supplanted By The Court’s Remedial Authority, And Must Be Exercised Based Not Upon The Local Standards For Grant Of An Ordinance, But Merely “Site Suitability” (9-13a)  When a development significantly contributes to a municipality’s unmet affordable-housing obligations, it is not the local land use standards that govern approval of the proposal, but merely the requirement that the Court find that the site for affordable housing is “suitable. ”  *Mount Laurel II*, 92 N.J. at 276 (holding that where a municipality fails to comply with its affordable-housing obligation, a local land use prohibition on a particular non-permitted use absent a variance must be circumvented and, “assuming a suitable site is available, they must be allowed. ”).  The Supreme Court analogized this power of the court to act in the place of local zoning authorities as similar to other instances where courts compel local land use decisions: the ordinance is effectively amended to permit a use explicitly excluded, or in some cases to exclude one explicitly permitted.  Sometimes the action of the court comes even closer to ordering, indeed declaring, that an ordinance has been changed, see *West Point Island Ass’n v. Township Committee of Dover Twp.*, 54 N.J. 339 (1969), where this Court, in effect, affirmed the decision of a trial court ordering a municipality to take certain action, which action could be taken only by the adoption of a resolution that the municipality had not adopted.
[brief] The 1964 amendments to the disability pension statute were not intended to make it generally more difficult for injured employees to obtain an accidental disability pension.  Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 210-11.  Rather, the amendments were intended to weed out disabilities stemming from a member's pre-existing medical condition, even if the condition was exacerbated by a work incident.  Id. at 211.  Thus, a firefighter with a heart condition could not collect an accidental disability pension for a disabling heart attack suffered while fighting a fire, and a custodian likewise is not entitled to such benefits if he suffers a heart attack while performing his janitorial duties.  See Cattani v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys. 69 N.J. 578, 586-87 (1978); Russo v. Teacher's Pension & Annuity Fund, 62 N.J. 142, 154 (1973).  In [...] the Board determined that his injury did not qualify him for an accidental disability pension because it occurred while he was conducting one of his expected work-related duties, rescuing fire victims.  The Board further reasoned that what occurred was not an "accident" because [...] intended to throw his body against the door.  The Appellate Division concluded that the Board's decision misread Richardson, misapplied the statute, and took an unduly narrow view of what constitutes an "unexpected and undesigned" traumatic event.
[brief] The heightened test of “shocks the conscience” was implemented to “avoid converting federal courts into super zoning tribunals. ”  Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d. Cir. 2004).  Though what “shocks the conscience” is not precise and “varies depending on the factual context”, it is generally reserved for only the most egregious official conduct.  Id. (quoting United Artists, supra 316 F.3d at 400).  Here, the Respondents attempt to forge an argument that the Mayor’s comments “shock the conscience” simply because the trial court took issue with the comments and found the Zoning Board’s decision arbitrary and capricious as a result.  But the arbitrary and capricious standard is much different from the standard of finding what “shocks the conscience. ”  To meet the heightened showing of the “shocks the conscience” test, a party must show that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of self-dealing, an unconstitutional taking, or interference with otherwise constitutionally protected activity on the property.
[brief] R. 3:9-2.........................................................................................22 R. 4:10-2.......................................................................................14,17 R. 4:10-2(a)..................................................................................18 R. 4:14-3.......................................................................................12 R. 4:14-3(c)..................................................................................20  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7).................................................................6  N.J.S.A. 2C:43:-13(b).................................................................21  OTHER AUTHORITIES  Attorney General, Uniform Guidelines on the Pretrial Intervention Program (March 1, 2016) (Directive 2016-2) ..................21
[brief] All in all, the circumstances of Defendant’s refusal to give the buccal swab simply did not reasonably justify an inference that it was done with a consciousness of guilt.  Undoubtedly, the State will point to [...]’s testimony that Defendant said to her that “it would be worse for him if he did give a sample” as evidence of consciousness of guilt.  (34T182-6 to 7)  But given Defendant’s (albeit mistaken) belief that the State was up to something nefarious or “shady” by requesting a second sample after they had obtained one at arrest, it is clear that any such statement was an expression of that belief, rather than evidence of consciousness of guilt.  Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether this statement even occurred as [...] alleged it did.  There is a transcript from the June 21 proceeding immediately before and after [...] alleges that Defendant made this statement, but nothing about any such statement was placed on the record and [...]’s name was not even mentioned; the prosecutor asserted that when Defendant refused, it was [...], not [...], who had attempted to take the buccal swab.
[brief] U.S. Const. Amend. IV; N.J. Const. art I, ¶ 7.  The stop of a motor vehicle constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).  The State bears the burden by a preponderance of the evidence to demonstrate that a warrantless seizure is valid.
[brief] That being said, our Court has always distinguished between “plain language” that clearly conveys an unambiguous intent to invoke silence – e.g., repeatedly telling interrogators, “No, that’s all I got to say.  That’s it,” see S.S. 229 N.J. at 368-69, 383-84 – from statements conveying hesitation, reticence or avoidance of specific questions, which do not invoke silence.
[brief] .............................................................-  8 - Luna v. Am. Airlines, 769 F. Supp. 2d 231, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)  .......................-  33 - Martinez v. Swomiak, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2142, at *5 (App. Div. Sep. 27, 2018)  ...............................................................................................................- 11 - McCann v. Whitehall Manor Condo. Ass'n, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2891, at *11-13 (App. Div. Nov. 24, 2021)  ...............................................................-
[brief] Original note and mortgage; Plaintiff Investor trust; Defendants’ Federal Lawsuit; The Trial; Final Judgment; Law Division claims.  [...] is not on the [...] mortgage note.  [...] received a letter from Government Comptroller of the Currency (A177-A178) that they are in default on their Freddie Mac loan and it was paid out by “GE. ”  [...] never disputed anything as they were never aware of any default.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 2020 that the [...] are in default since 1992 (Freddie Mac) loan (how this occurred is not stated by the Third Circuit).  Prior default precludes future securitization and causes fees.  [...] of [...], in 2016, informed [...] that they are in default to two trusts – [...] and [...]  (PPSI) 2004 WHQ2.  Plaintiff’s witness, [...], of [...], testified at trial that there are two loans for [...] in the system (one loan wrongly stated as [...] rather than [...]) (Trial transcript p. 229).  Two Schiano mortgages and two HUD statements (Fremont and [...]) are in collection system (A820-A823).  Only Master Servicer - [...] ([...]) n/k/a [...]) (A330-A333) can confirm the status of foreclosure related advanced fees assessed to [...]’ loan.  On June 23, 2022, [...] implied stated that New Rez would testify.  However, [...] was denied a party to litigation, and [...] never had an opportunity to present any evidence or documents.  Despite many requests for Plaintiff to identify cause of fees, Plaintiff refused (and will not state who advanced them).
[brief] (Pa101 to 107).  And, as evidenced by defendant’s behavior during the Motion to Suppress hearing, he only answers what he wants to answer.  (2T4-14 to 7-17).  In short, it is clear that defendant’s will was not overborne and he spoke with the detective because he wanted to do so.  Stated differently, if defendant wanted an attorney, the record establishes he would have asked for one.