ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 12)).  They also explained that beginning in 2017, they had “started transitioning employees to a single Office 365 server, and ... collected custodial ESI from only the 365 server, mistakenly believing that it contained all employee emails, including emails stored in .pst files on employee hard drives. ” (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 12)).  Plaintiffs state that defendants did not disclose “whether the Office 365 server has size limits for individual employee email accounts. ”  (Id.).  Based on defendants’ practice of using email account server size limits to encourage the deletion of documents, and “the temporal document production trends for certain custodians” that “suggests that documents were destroyed as opposed to taken off the server and organized in .pst files on hard drives,” plaintiffs “now harbor grave spoliation concerns.
[brief] Sanctions  *5  In their opposition to Plaintiff’s appeal, Defendants also urged that Plaintiff should be sanctioned in connection with his allegedly baseless accusations that counsel has defended this matter in an unethical manner and defense counsel is a liar.  (Defendants’ Opp. and Cross-Motion at 18-21).  In reply, Plaintiff asserts his own arguments for why sanctions should be imposed against defense counsel.  (See Pl. Reply at 11-14).  Among other things, a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 must be made separately from other motions or requests.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2).  Here, neither party properly seeks sanctions by separate motion; and, as such, the requests are denied.  See Lai v. Wei, No. CIV.07 179 DRD, 2007 WL 1456200, at *4 (D.N.J. May 15, 2007) (collecting cases); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1197 v. Twp. of Edison, No. 2:12-CV-00260 WJM, 2013 WL 396152, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2013).  Moreover, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the Court will liberally construe his conduct, despite the offensive nature of Plaintiff’s remarks about defense counsel who, from my experience, has always been professional and civil.  For these reasons, the Court will not award sanctions at this time, and any such motions are denied.  Order THIS MATTER having come before the Court on pro se Plaintiff [...]’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of [...]’s November 15, 2019 Letter Order (ECF No. 60) pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(c)(1) (ECF No. 61); a motion for Judge Bongiovanni’s recusal (id.); a cross-motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) filed by Defendants [...], [...], [...], and [...] (and collectively, “Defendants”) (ECF No. 62); and sanctions (id.); and the Court having carefully reviewed and taken into consideration the submissions of the parties, as well as the arguments presented therein; and for the reasons stated on the record; and for good cause shown; and for all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS on this 12th day of March, 2020, ORDERED that [...]’s November 15, 2019 Letter Order (ECF No. 61) is AFFIRMED as provided in the accompanying Memorandum; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss is DENIED (ECF No. 62); and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for [...]’s recusal is DENIED; and it is further ORDERED that any requests and/or motions for sanctions are DENIED.
[brief] Construing all facts in the Plaintiff’s favor, the trial court believed that Defendants made several promises to pay Plaintiff “some money”, but without such promise being tied to the sale of the hospital it was not enough to toll the limitations period in Plaintiff’s favor so that he could claim all years at issue:  THE COURT:  Okay.  Now, the other thing I wanted to ask before we get into some discussion is this, is there a, [...], did the plaintiff identify in discovery that either [...] and or [...] (sic.) said to him on many occasions, I know we owe you some money but wait until we sell the hospital?  Did plaintiff identify those type of statements?  MR. PARISI: The -- the -- the interrogatory response that you referred to earlier, but other than that, no.  THE COURT:  Well that’s -- the interrogatory response that I read does not say wait until we sell the hospital.  I’m talking about waiting until we sell the hospital.  Was that type of a statement disclosed by the plaintiff in discovery?  \textit{Id.} at 7:16-8:5  Here, the evidentiary record is absent of any missing payments, let alone evidence that would support such a significant sum of $255,000.00 as Plaintiff alleges.
[brief] --- 3  The court can take judicial notice of the docket entries in the state matters.  Fed. R. Evid. 201, incorporated in these proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9017.  See also, *In re Soto*, 221 B.R. 343, 347 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998).  4  This is important for purposes of applying a statute of limitations.
[brief] Some conditions of the property itself impair the safety of its intended or foreseeable uses.  See, e.g., Speaks, supra, 193 N.J. Super. at 412, 474 A.2d 1081 (finding that housing authority's failure to replace missing window created dangerous condition in common yard frequented by children directly under window when foreseeable risk existed that someone would drop or throw object out of window).  In this case, there was no missing plate, no broken bolt, no defect in the bridge itself that caused or contributed to cause the tragic accident.
[brief] ............................................ - 12 -, - 13 - Lesatz v. Standard Green Meadows, 416 N.W.2d 334 (Mich. App. 1987).  - 3 -, - 7 - Manning & Associates Pers., Inc. v. Trizec Properties, Inc., 442 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. App. 1994)  ........................................................................................................... - 3 -, - 7 - Maybury v. Spinney-Maybury Co., 435, 120 A. 611 (Me. 1923)(.................................- 6 - Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens, 139 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1998)  ....................................- 4 - Robey v. SPARC Grp. LLC, 256 N.J. 541 (2024)  .................................................... - 8 -, - 11 - Thiedemann [v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234 (2005) ....................... - 9 -, - 11 - Wasserman’s Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238 (1994)............................ - 1 -, - 2 -
[brief] Smaul v. Irvington General Hosp., 209 N.J. Super. 592, 595 (App. Div. 1986) certif. granted Smaul v. Irvington General Hosp., 108 N.J. 474, 477 (1987) (citing Westchester, 126 N.J. Super. at 37-38).  In Smaul, the plaintiff had stopped his vehicle to ask for directions and was subsequently pulled from it and assaulted.  Smaul, 209 N.J. Super. at 594.  Despite the vehicle being stopped, or “immobile,” the Appellate Division found a substantial nexus to award PIP benefits.  Id. at 596.  Recently, the Appellate Division reviewed New Jersey’s No-Fault PIP statute and the issue of establishing a substantial nexus between the insured vehicle and the injury sustained.
[brief] ”  The defendant here appeals the trial court’s conviction because [...], who admitted to a past felony conviction in the State of New Jersey, was excluded from the jury.  After noting that [...] indicated that he had been convicted of an indictable offense, the trial court asked him, “So, do you have an indictable offense conviction?” (29T22-3).  [...] answered, “Yes.  It’s an old one.  Twenty years ago, but unfortunately I do. ” (29T:22-5).  When asked about the court and jurisdiction in which he was convicted, [...] said, “New Jersey” (29T:22-9) and said that it had been in “Superior Court. ” (29T22-13).  The court reasonably relied on [...]’s representation that he had been convicted of an indictable offense in New Jersey and properly found that he was disqualified to serve on the jury under R. 2B:20-1(e).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................2  I.  RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION PAPERS CONFIRM THAT THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO TRANSMIT THE MATTER TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  BECAUSE MATERIAL FACTS ARE IN DISPUTE (AA11-12; AA17) .........................................................2  II.  RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION FAILS TO RATIONALLY JUSTIFY THE CSC’S ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE DETERMINATION THAT THE STATE POLICY EXTENDS TO NON-STATE WORKPLACES UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES NOT INVOLVING STATE BUSINESS (Aa10-Aa11)  .............................................................................14  CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................................15
[brief] Most critically, Plaintiff did not have a valid contract for sale of the subject property due to the fact that it failed to intervene in the underlying foreclosure action, and there can be no liability extended to defendants for failing to tell Plaintiff it had to intervene in the underlying foreclosure action.  It was Plaintiff’s responsibility, as a purchaser of a property it indisputably knew was subject to a foreclosure action, to ensure that the necessary steps were taken to have a valid contract for sale of that property.
[brief] (Aa091)  The [...]’s September 12, 2023 final offer did not include proposed contract terms, other than it included specific language for contract changes sought to the healthcare provision, or rationale for any of the contract terms that it sought to add or modify.  (Ra1, Ra3, Ra7-9, Aa245-249)  Thus, on October 12, 2023, [...] wrote to the Parties:  “I am writing to request that you each revise your final offer to include, where applicable, the existing contract language, followed by your proposal to change the existing language and the rationale for the change.  If the proposal is for a new contract provision, please indicate same.  Please submit your revised final offer by Friday, October 20, 2023 copying each other.  Thank you. ”  (Aa089-090).  The purpose of [...]’s request was to provide him with the specific contractual language sought in connection with each party’s proposals in the final offer so he would not have to draft such language from scratch; it was not to give the parties an opportunity to expand the scope of the arbitration.
[directive] Section with accordance in consulted general attorney to Prosecutor County the by authorized is 3.3.2 who subsection to pursuant designated officer of presumption that the determines Directive, of this 4 Section under presumptions overcome in this Nothing 4.5.9.20  subsection to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant charging by delinquency of adjudications other of consideration preclude to construed be shall subsection ago, years ten than more occurred that crimes firearms-related or violent for adjudications (e.g., as relevant may be as crimes) NERA or firearms-related than other offenses for adjudications or presumption overcome the whether to determining when circumstances the of totality the of part 4.3.  Section to pursuant acomplaint-summons issuing of Convictions/Charges.
[brief] (3T23-4 to 14).  Following the searches of [...]’s vehicle and apartment, he was transported by the police to his residence in Queens, New York, where a further warrantless search was conducted.  As with the prior searches, no search warrant was sought or obtained from any court.  \(^9\)  [...] testified that there were between 10-15 armed officers on the scene of [...]’s arrest.  (4T42-8 to 10).  Thereafter, [...] was transported back to Holmdel barracks in New Jersey, where unrecorded questioning continued for several hours, first with [...] and then with [...].(4T75-23 to 4T76-25).  Not until 10:45 P.M., after 7 and 1/2 hours in constant police custody – including time during which he was questioned at Holmdel headquarters in New Jersey in un-recorded interviews was -- [...] apprised of his Miranda rights, without being asked whether he wished to waive those rights.
[brief] Still v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 189 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 1983)............................................................12  Stutheit v. Elmwood Park Auto Mall, No. A-4915-17T2, 2018 WL 6757030 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 26, 2018)...............................................................................................9  United States v. De Armas Diaz, No. 13-cr-000148, 2014 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 56572 (D. Nev. Apr. 23, 2014)...............................................................................................2  Williams v. Ysabel, No. A-1391-22, 2023 WL 5768422 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2023).................................................................................................1, 3-4, 12 Zambrana v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 16-cv-2907, 2016 WL 7046820 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016).............................12
[brief] That response, however, does not reflect the interpretation claimed, noting only "the exemption for the routine maintenance and operations of public utility lines at N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)11."  38 N.J.R. 5011(a) (response to comments 3 and 4).  There is no mention of "upgrade."  Ibid.  As far as we are aware, the only time the Department has asserted "routine" does not modify "upgrade" was in Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], 433 N.J. Super. at 233. designed to protect environmental interests," exemptions from which are to be strictly construed.  See M. Alfieri Co. v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot. & Energy, 269 N.J. Super. 545, 554 (App. Div. 1994).  The nub of the parties' dispute is whether an "upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems" must be "routine" in order to exempt the utility from the permitting requirements of the Highlands Act under Exemption 11 — which exempts entirely from all provisions of the Act and "any rules or regulations" adopted by the DEP pursuant to it: the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of this act.
[brief] Again, notwithstanding the fact that this “informed” consent is a new argument not otherwise raised in prior motion practice, and also not required by law as the law simply clarifies a requirement of written consent, the installation of this system was also not a contested term of an unlawful taking in previous motion practice.  Notwithstanding same, this system installation was again based upon a directive issued by the [...] based upon unsafe and contaminated conditions existing on the Property placing both Plaintiffs’ employees and civilian customers in harm’s way and was not a unilateral move [...] had taken on their own accord.  While prior motion practice heavily argued that Plaintiffs owner, [...] received updates and communications repeatedly regarding the intentions, status and progress of the remediation efforts, [...] testified not once, but multiple times, that he did not bother to question or seek any further clarification, but instead consented to [...] as well as [...] to install the ASDS.  (Da229-Da330 pg. 133, Line 24 through pg. 134, Line 14.)  Plaintiffs argue however that this consent given by [...] was based upon the representation that the disturbance to the business would be minimal and that the scope of work was falsely represented.  However, there is no specification as to what was falsely represented to by either Fran, [...] or [...].  Notwithstanding the fact that there were absolutely no interruptions to Plaintiffs’ business as outlined above, the proofs on the record show that explicit detail as to remediation plans and the steps to be taken were in fact communicated with Plaintiffs, specifically [...].
[brief] (Aa824).  Basin 1 is the existing central retention pond.  (Aa823).  Under [...]’s proposal, Basin 2 discharges into Basin 1.  Basin 2’s watershed includes runoff from the proposed Building 1 truck court trailer parking, the Building 1 roof, the northern section of Robbinsville-Allentown Road, and a portion of the _____________________ confirms that “[a]lternative stormwater management measures, removal rates, or calculation methods may be utilized, subject to any limitations specified in this chapter, provided the design engineer demonstrates to the review agency, in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.2(g), that the proposed measure and its design will contribute to achievement of the design and performance standards established by this chapter.
[brief] Consequently, federal courts now frequently conclude that they lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a plaintiff’s claim that a defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights when the right is protected by a federal statute and the plaintiff only seeks the relief which the statute authorizes for the violation of the plaintiff’s right.  As an element of Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury-in-fact” which includes a “concrete harm. ”  [...] dissented noting that the majority’s decision as to what tangible and intangible injuries can be concrete only affects the power of the federal courts and not Congress’s powers to enact such laws and, consequently, state courts which are not subject to the case-or-controversy limitation would be called upon to enforce federal statutes.  *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 594 U.S. 413, 459 n.9 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the common law has long recognized that a “case” exists for recovery of nominal damages without any proof of any actual damages or any harm other than the defendant’s violation of the plaintiff’s legally-protected right.
[brief] See id. at 98.  Board member [...] observed that dividing the purchase price by eleven simply does not account for the fact that [...]’s unit is different than the other ten units in [...].  See id. at 103-104.  [...] further observed that the record shows that the renovations that went into [...]’s unit are far less extensive than the other ten units, thereby identifying two differences between [...]’s unit and the other units.  See id. at 105.  [...], another Board member, added that [...]’s expert appraiser even admitted that he could not appraise [...]’s unit because it is an encumbered property with no comparable units.  See id. at 106-107.  Since [...]’s equity calculations begin by dividing the purchase price by eleven, the Board rejected his final numerical value for equity.  Consequently, [...] devised a formula that crafts a ratio based on the property tax liability for [...]’s unit compared to that of another unit at [...]. with the same or similar square footage.  See id. at 110.  The ratio is $1,937.22/7,843 = .2469$ or 25%.  See id. at 113.  Next, [...] posits that since there are ten units that are condominiums, and one unit that is not a condominium, [...]’s traceable equity requires dividing the purchase price by the ‘whole’ numerical denominator.  See id. at 135.  This is achieved by taking 25%, which is $\frac{1}{4}$, inverting the fraction and multiplying it by ten, which is the total number of condominium units in [...].  Id.  Next, add forty to the sole non-condominium unit, and the result, forty-one serves as the denominator.  Id.  [...] then divides the purchase price of $525,000 by forty-one to obtain $12,804.88, which is [...]’s equity in [...]’s unit when purchased.  Id.  The rationale is that the number “41” considers the two different types of units in [...].  Id.  The Board discussed how property improvements, inflation, and market conditions factor into this formula.
[brief] ”  Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).  “The courts have good reason to be suspicious of a statement made by a person in police custody, because ‘the statement or parts of it implicating others very likely were made to curry favor even if it also inculpates the declarant. ””  Smith v. State, 746 So. 2d 1162, 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting [...], McCormick on Evidence § 319(d) (5th ed.1999)).  In this case, given the circumstances in which the tip was provided, the tip itself carries an impression of unreliability, rather than the opposite.  See State v. Lakomy, 126 N.J. Super. 430, 435 (App. Div. 1974) (noting that information given by criminal informants “convey[s] a certain impression of unreliability”).  The State’s insistence that the tip was inherently truthful because it was made against the informant’s interests should therefore be rejected.  See State v. Nevius, 426 N.J. Super. 379, 394 (App. Div. 2012) (noting that, in the evidentiary context, a statement against interest is admissible only if it is “on the whole” “so far against the declarant’s interest that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to have been true”).
[brief] The appetite changes, and it just is not going to be what everybody once thought it was.  And this Court thought that perhaps everybody getting back together, maybe they could arrange financing. ”  6T7:10-15.  The Trial Court then summed up:  And I say all this because the tenor of the paperwork is still like waiting to continue this project, and I think the Court was pretty clear and I will make it clear now, that unless there was an agreement by the parties or contingencies were met or they were waived, the alternative was to reform the project garage, and that was what the Court intends to do, because after all these years have passed, after the contingencies haven’t been met and the Court didn’t find that there was some sort of deliberate, willful contact some circumvent that, they had to use it on a dilapidated garage.
[brief] ” (See Pb30).  Yet the evidence undisputedly reflects that [...] performed a full investigation of [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct.  And, separately, that the charge pay issue originated with [...], was investigated by [...], and led to [...]’s termination by the termination panel.  While [...] certainly relayed [...]’s discovery to HR, and was a participant in what followed, no reasonable juror could conclude that this was revenge for [...]’s “complaints” about the June 24, 2020 incident, or any of [...]’s conduct preceding June 24, 2020.  Especially given that she had “complained”—or, more accurately, griped—chronically about [...] for years, to whoever would listen, without incident.  As had other staffing coordinators for years without incident.  The only other staffing coordinators who were terminated—[...] and [...]—were those caught stealing [...] funds.  Finally, [...] contends that the trial court erred in its analysis by inferring that [...] would not have supported [...]’s termination because she lost two-thirds of her staffing during the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic.  (See Pb31).  Not only is this not a genuine dispute of material fact, but [...] was never the decision maker.  [...] was terminated following a review of her case by a termination panel consisting of [...], [...], in-house counsel, and the assistant-Vice President of Human Resources.  [...], nor any other member of the termination panel, had any individual decision-making power.  IV.
[brief] (4T210:7-14).  He instructed his stepfather, [...], to contact [...] and inform her that he had been arrested.  (4T211:4-5).  At the time, [...]’s stepfather did not know who [...] was.  (4T211:8).  [...] hired an attorney to represent [...] and suggested that he move into her home following his release, as his truck had been impounded as part of the investigation.