ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court should reject the after-the-fact excessiveness ruling as contrary to administrative law.  The ALJ rejected any rationale for disapproval based on the regulations as written, including any regulations related to “loss ratio. ”  *See, e.g.*, Pa56 ([...]’s filings “comply with the applicable regulations”); Pa71.  But the ALJ claimed that the Department had actually (albeit silently) “determined that the requested rate increases were excessive and unreasonable. ”  Pa84.  Notably, the ALJ did so after [...] *proved* over the course of multiple days of evidentiary hearings that its applications satisfied (as the ALJ, Commissioner, and Department’s witnesses all conceded) all regulations.  Pa56, Pa71.  The Final Decision committed the same error, agreeing with the ALJ that [...]’s filings “were excessive. ”  Pa52.  Moreover, indicative of the *post hoc* work that abounds here, whereas—as just noted—the ALJ originally deemed the rates “excessive *and* unreasonable,” the Final Decision did not affirm any --- \(^8\)  The rationales purportedly touched on “loss ratios,” but the disapproval letter was in fact untethered from the comprehensive regulations related to that subject or any other, *see* N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.  *See* Pa56 (“Indisputably, the Department’s denials do not state that the filings are noncompliant with applicable loss ratio or rate stability regulations. ”); Pa71 (similar); *supra*, at 11–12 n.6. finding that the rates were “unreasonable. ”  Compare Pa27 (“The ALJ . . . determined that the requested rate increases were excessive and unreasonable. ”), with Pa52 (only agreeing with ALJ that the rates “were excessive”).  Having acknowledged that the Department did not make a finding of “excessiveness” in the disapproval letter, neither the ALJ nor the Commissioner were free to “suppl[y] by implication” that basis into the letter at the Department’s behest.  N.J. Bell Tel., 5 N.J. at 376 (emphasis added).  Nor can this justification be imputed to the Department’s decision-making post hoc.  Berta, 473 N.J. Super. at 303–04 (rejecting post hoc “unstated reasons” as justification for agency action); Matter of Issuance of a Permit by Dep’t of Env’t Prot. to [...], 120 N.J. 164, 176 (1990) (refusing to consider whether a certain presumption applied, in part because the agency conceded that, “during the permit-renewal process, [it] did not rely on the presumption . . . ”).  Prohibiting post hoc rationalization for agency action is not merely a technical legal requirement.
[brief] Accepting as true Plaintiff's allegations, as is required at this stage of the proceedings, her story is as follows.  On October 2, 2020, she registered a fever, a symptom of COVID-19.  (Doc. 13-1 at 3).  She called into Defendant's COVID-19 hotline—which was created to ensure a safe and healthy workplace during the COVID-19 pandemic as required by OSHA, § 654(a)(1)—and was directed to stay home; she followed that instruction.
[brief] Superstorm Sandy  The Home was severely damaged as a result of Superstorm Sandy.  The Petitioner and Decedent explored various options and eventually applied for a construction rehabilitation program grant.  (11T92-16 to 96-2).  Even though the Petitioner was never on the Deed for the Home, the Decedent put his name on the application due to his veteran status.  (Pa 490-507).  Because the grant was insufficient to rebuild the house, a mortgage from [...] was obtained to make up the difference.  (Pa 512-513).  While both the Decedent and Petitioner were both listed as the Mortgagors, only the Decedent was listed as the Borrower, and only she -- and not the Petitioner -- was responsible for payment.  (Pa 512).  While the Petitioner’s income was necessary for PNC to grant the mortgage, the Decedent paid off the mortgage in 2020, relieving the Home from any debt.  As noted by the Chancery Division: “Petitioner failed to provide any proof that he paid any of the mortgage payments while Decedent was alive. ” (Pa 19; emphasis original).
[directive] This Directive shall take effect on January 23, 2023, which is approximately Effective ninety days after issuance.  The provisions of this Directive shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General. directives.  This Directive supersedes any prior directive on this topic, including Law Prior Enforcement Directive 2010-5 and its November 18, 2015 revision.
[brief] Alternatively, even assuming arguendo that Respondent had submitted the exhaustion of administrative remedies issue on cross-appeal, this argument remains incorrect on its merits.  Appellant maintains that the [...] has no expertise in making a legal determination as to the existence of a settlement contract, the only issue that was before the trial court.  “The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an absolute prerequisite to seeking appellate review” and “[e]xceptions are made when the administrative remedies would be futile, when irreparable harm would result, when jurisdiction of the agency is doubtful, or when an overriding public interest calls for a prompt judicial decision. ”  New Jersey Civil Service Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 613 (1982) (emphasis added).  Indeed, our courts “have frequently held that in a case involving only legal questions, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. ”  Ibid.; see also Zamboni v. Stamler, 194 N.J. Super. 598, 603 (Law Div. 1984) (finding whether a prosecutor has the authority to appoint superior officers to be a legal issue not requiring the parties to exhaust their administrative remedies before the [...]); Thomas v. Bergen Cnty. Welfare Bd., 122 N.J. Super. 371, 376 (App. Div. 1973) (reversing finding that plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies because the issues before the court were questions of law “not peculiarly within the expertise of the [[...]]”).  As the statutory language demonstrates, the [...] has limited jurisdiction which does not include interpretation of settlement contracts.  See N.J.S.A. 11A:2-6.  Moreover, in the instant matter there are only legal issues related to the validity of the settlement reached between the parties, clearly issues not within the confines of the [...]’s limited jurisdiction or its expertise.  Moreover, to the extent Respondent’s disciplinary charges were never perfected into final disciplinary action, and instead, the matter was resolved by way of a settlement rather than disciplinary action, there is no final disciplinary action which Respondent could have brought before the [...] on appeal.  Likewise, there was no appeal mechanism by which the Appellant could have brought this matter to the [...] as there was and is no pending Civil Service matter.  Instead, the disciplinary matter was simply one aspect of the dispute between the parties which was resolved by the settlement, which by its terms reached well beyond the discipline which formed the basis for the Amended Notice of Disciplinary Action and the administrative departmental hearing which was ongoing at the time the settlement contract was reached and memorialized on the record.  Accordingly, Appellant submits that Your Honors should reject Respondent’s argument that Appellant failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as this argument is belied by the record and the Civil Service statute.
[brief] In late October 2020, the Town was approached by [...], a licensed telecommunications provider, which was seeking to enter into a small cell wireless right-of-way agreement with the Town.  The Town elected not to proceed with an agreement with [...], but continued to analyze whether such a small cell wireless facility ordinance was appropriate for its needs.  DA at 99a.  In mid-March 2021, the governing body of the Town directed the Town Attorney to begin drafting an ordinance that substantively mirrored these previous ordinances.  Ultimately, on February 8, 2022, the Town introduced General Ordinance No. 2022-04 (“Ordinance 2022-04”), the Ordinance at issue in this prerogative writ action, and adopted it on February 22, 2022.  DA at 100a.
[brief] In *Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co.*, 910 N.E.2d 290 (Mass. 2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified the following questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:  1.  Where an insured protected by standard CGL policy language incurs covered costs as a result of ongoing environmental contamination occurring over more than one year and the insurer provided coverage for less than the full period of years in which contamination occurred, should the direct liability of the sued insurer be pro rated in some manner among all insurers “on the risk,” limiting the direct liability of the sued insurer to its share but leaving the insured free to seek the balance from other such insurers?  2.  If some form of pro rata liability is called for in such circumstances, what allocation method or formula should be used?  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 292-93.
[brief] ”  *Lavrik* at 215-216 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43:-13(b) and Attorney General, Uniform Guidelines on the Pretrial Intervention Program (March 1, 2016) (Directive 2016-2)).  The Court in *Lavrik* therefore noted that “should defendant successfully complete PTI, the […] charge will be dismissed and, as such, the fact that defendant pled guilty and any statements pertaining to his guilty plea are not *evidentiary* in a civil proceeding—irrespective of the civil reservation order. ”  *Id.* at 216 (emphasis added).  Consistent with *Lavrik*, N.J.R.E. 410(a)(1) and (2) bars the admission of “a guilty plea, which was later withdrawn; or […] any statement made in the course of that plea proceeding. ”  However, none of the foregoing statements from Lavrik regarding the ultimate admissibility or evidentiary value of statements made at the time of a guilty plea applies to the circumstances of the instant matter, where the only issue is whether questioning regarding such prior statements are within the scope of discoverability.
[brief] Despite repeated objections, the trial court correctly permitted testimony from [...] as to whether the transactions he described could “potentially have been the product of fraudulent activity. ” (20T 69:20 to 71:17; 21T 35:2-24).  [...] testified that he had experience in examining books and records for fraud, and he testified about certain factors that might be indicative of fraudulent conduct that he observed in the [...] and [...] financial books and records.  (20T 120:19 to 121:24).  The trial court explained that the issue of intent was ultimately one for the court to decide based on a weighing of the evidence, but that [...] could provide expert testimony – based on his experience and the data presented to him – why the defendants’ conduct warranted scrutiny.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: October 14, 2024  [...]  [...], Esq. – Attorney ID No.: 031561981  [...], P.O. Box 650 [...], [...] – T: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant/Appellant, [...]  [...]  Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...] and [...]  Defendants, and [...]  Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. PRIME PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE, INC., Third-Party Defendant/Appellant.
[directive] Officers who are directed to assist with an initial firearm discharge investigation may be required to operate independently of their ordinary chain of command and report directly to the authority in charge of the investigation or their designee.  In all such circumstances, officers shall comply with that requirement.  7.11.7  In cases where discharge of a firearm does not result in criminal charges, the prosecutor, [...], or other designee of the [...] will refer the incident back to the agency for an internal affairs administrative review.  7.11.8
[brief] Relator also points out that the terms of service prevent the data from being copied and re-disseminated to the public.  Rb25–26, Rb34, Rb36–37.  Once again, Relator is advancing a legal argument: information that is available to the public becomes not publicly available whenever restrictions are placed on republishing the information.  Nothing in United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Federal, Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2003)—which affirmed dismissal on public disclosure bar grounds—supports Relator’s counterintuitive proposition, or says anything at all about restrictions on republication.
[brief] Plaintiff/Respondent opposed this motion on the grounds that Appellant was out of time to seek a new trial on this basis because it was more than twenty (20) days after the return of the jury’s verdict, and further that Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. obligated such a result.  (Pa64-82).  On March 31, 2023, the Trial Court denied Appellant’s motion and ruled that the JTCL provides that Plaintiff/Respondent is permitted to recover the entire judgment from Appellant.  (23T16-23T17).  On April 5, 2023, Appellant filed this appeal.
[brief] [...]’s November 14, Letter Brief  My Nov. 25, 2022 Cert. (Exh. “Q”, par. 9-25) (229a-231a)  verified Court must reject Jacobson’s baseless Letter Brief, which did NOT have supporting facts, NJ rules, or NJ Case rulings to legitimately justify his positions.  **[...]’s November 14, Letter Brief**  My Nov. 25th Certification proved my Reconsideration Motion should have have been allowed, as I refuted (Exh. “Q”, par. 26-48) (231a-235a) Ambrose’s Letter Brief due to substantiated facts & Exceptions.  **[...]’s Aug. 12, ’22 Cert. in Opposition to my Aug. 8th Exceptions**  My Nov. 25, ’22 Cert. (Exh. “Q” par. 55-69) (236a-243a) verified  Court must reject Roth’s baseless Cert. (156a-160a) due to substantiated Exceptions.  **Conclusions:**  See Nov. 25, 2022 Cert. Conclusions (Exh. “Q”) (243a-244a), & updated Proposed Order (Exh. “R”) (248a-252a).  This Section further justifies Section “A” for my Appeal in order to dismiss any further repetitions by Respondents of their prior false claims & accusations.  C.
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[brief] This is directly contrary to the FAA.  Atalese notably stated that:  No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights.  It is worth remembering, however, that every "consumer contract" in New Jersey must "be written in a simple, clear, understandable and easily readable way."  N.J.S.A. 56:12-2.  Arbitration clauses -- and other contractual clauses -- will pass muster when phrased in plain language that is understandable to the reasonable consumer.  . . .  [N]o prescribed set of words must be included in an arbitration clause to accomplish a waiver of rights.  Whatever words compose an arbitration agreement, they must be clear and unambiguous that a consumer is choosing to arbitrate disputes rather than have them resolved in a court of law.  In this way, the agreement will assure reasonable notice to the consumer.  [Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 444, 447 (2014). ]  The Atalese rule is, much like Kindred Nursing, a “clear statement rule” which discriminates on its face against arbitration agreements even if parties have mutually assented to the agreement.
[brief] Every reasonable inference is therefore accorded the plaintiff and the motion granted only in rare instances and without prejudice.  Moreover, a complaint should not be dismissed under this rule where a cause of action is suggested by the facts and a theory of actionability may be articulated by amendment of the complaint.  For reasons stated herein, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court incorrectly decided the facts, failed to consider evidence known to the insurer at the time of claim denial, and misapplied relevant case law.  **RELIEF REQUESTED**
[brief] We just want the CRA as “backup” (against [...] only).  Similarly, the LAD allows an action against the State, given that the courts are “a place of public accommodation,” an “employer” of managers, agents and employees who actually discriminated or retaliated against [...].  Unlike the ADA, there is not strict liability but [...] may assert an “employer” agency claim.  At 1T-50-1-16, Her Honor is correct that Heck doesn’t apply to the LAD (Major point of agreement.)  At 1T-51-8-20, Her Honor believes I have not pled a Monell action.  (I assume she is not applying Monell to the LAD.)  I think the police went to sufficient trouble to avoid honoring [...]’s right to counsel, even to the point of committing felonies (kidnapping) or, at least, reckless endangerment.  At this stage, it has to be seen as a policy.  Similarly, the police predictably made the situation much worse for themselves by overcharging [...], which would suggest there is a policy of covering up all possible liability claims.  Until the plaintiff can obtain some statistics on [...]’s behavior, nobody can prove a policy.
[brief] Notwithstanding any other law, rule, or regulation to the contrary, a board of education of a local school district or of a local school district constituting part of a limited purpose regional district, the board of education or governing body of a non-operating school district, or the governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district of a limited purpose regional district . . . or part of a consolidated district may, by resolution, withdraw from a . . . limited purpose or consolidated school district in order to form or enlarge a limited purpose or all purpose regional district provided that the withdrawal: (1) is approved by the Commissioner of Education . . . as meeting the criteria set forth in paragraphs (2) through (8) of this subsection, 7 which approval shall be obtained prior to any election held to determine whether to form or enlarge a limited purpose or all purpose regional district that the withdrawing . . . governing body will join.  (emphasis added).  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1 states that a “Governing body” for purposes of the regionalization statute “means and includes, in the event that a school district enumerated herein does not have a board of education . . . a municipality constituting part of a consolidated school district, and the governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district of a limited purpose . . regional district. ”  The statute also defines “‘Board of education” as “the board of education of a local school district, consolidated school district, non-operating school district, and the board of education of a limited purpose or all purpose regional district. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1  Appellants argue that [...] is not among the entities permitted to seek withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district because [...] no longer has a board of education and because the municipality itself is not part of a “consolidated school district.
[brief] --- \(^1\)  Defendant’s prior convictions for Possession with Intent to Distribute CDS and his current conviction for same make him mandatory extended-term eligible under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f and State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992).  The plea agreement—which was completed by defense counsel—has the box checked that states the State agreed not to seek an extended term of confinement, (Pa4), but the second part of that question is not filled out and there is no indication of this agreement anywhere in the record of this.  Moreover, the State noted during sentencing that defendant “is mandatory extended term because of his 2014 felony. ” (3T9-1 to 3).
[brief] Defendant/Respondents’ (“Defendants”)  Oppositions ignore the discrepancies in the lower court’s rulings, fail to address many of the points argued by Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (“Plaintiff” or “Andreula”), presume facts that are outside of the pleadings, and disregard the applicable standard on a motion to dismiss.  What is more, by lavishing blanket praise on the lower court’s ruling, Defendants conveniently gloss over the unique facts present in Plaintiff’s case; namely, the existence of the July 29, 2016 preliminary injunction (“the Injunction”) that Plaintiff was awarded in her initial lawsuit against some of the Defendants.  And, although Defendants highlight the lower court’s dismissal of a portion of Plaintiff’s initial lawsuit, they don’t mention that the lower court also left the Injunction in place, which is still in effect to this day.  Both Defendants and the lower court fail to apply the facts of Plaintiff’s case, as set forth in the pleadings, to the case law.  Plaintiff pled that the Injunction requires Defendants to maintain the status quo, such that Plaintiff shall continue to teach third grade, in the same location and classroom as in the prior school year, at the [...] within the [...] and Defendants shall not interfere with Plaintiff’s participation in all [...] events.  34a, ¶ 49; 40a, ¶ 94.  Plaintiff’s pleadings clearly set forth that Defendants, who were prevented by the Injunction from taking certain actions against her, engaged in a pattern of retaliatory activity due to her filing of the initial lawsuit, calculated to dissuade Plaintiff from prosecuting that lawsuit, thereby causing her harm in the form of anxiety, pain, and suffering.  242a, ¶¶ 222-224; 243a, ¶¶ 225-231.  In response to these pleadings, Defendants’ Oppositions largely ignore the Injunction entirely.  And, even a cursory review of the opinion reveals that the Injunction did not factor into the lower court’s decision, since it is not mentioned at all, except for in the Statement of Facts.  5a.  Bizarrely, Defendants claim that Plaintiff uses the Injunction to shield her from scrutiny as an employee.  Not only is this conclusion contrary to even the broadest reading of the pleadings, but it minimizes the true significance of the Injunction.  The lower court erred, on pre-answer motions to dismiss, when it failed to give Plaintiff all favorable inferences.  The lower court’s error led to the improper dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit before any discovery.  The lower court’s dismissal should be reversed, and case should proceed with discovery.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.