ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Na poniższe pytania dodatkowe powinny odpowiedzieć tylko osoby przyznające się do popełnienia następujących przestępstw: napaść seksualna kwalifikowana, napaść seksualna, zakazany kontakt seksualny 2C:13-1c(2) lub usiłowanie popełnienia któregokolwiek z kwalifikowany lub uprowadzenie zgodnie z N.J.S.A. tych przestępstw.  The following additional questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to an offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault, Sexual Assault or Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact or kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or an attempt to commit one N.J.S.A. of these crimes.
[brief] Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty. 598 U.S. 631 (2023)...........1, 5, 8, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21,, 22, 23, 24  United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Lamanna’s Estate, 181 N.J. Super. 149 (Law Div. 1981)..........................................................................................19  US Bank Cust for PC7  Firstrust v. Block 5.04, Lot 16, A-2384-21, (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2023).................................................................21  [...] v. Block 268, Lot 7, No. A-2193-21 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 18, 2024).................................................................21
[brief] State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 291 (1989)  [...]’s failure to raise in a motion to dismiss the original indictment [...] and make a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment [...] violated defendant's rights under N.J. and federal constitutional to a grand jury, fair trial, due process and to preserve the issue for appellate review constituted a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Strickland two-prong test and/or Cronic/Davis per se analyses.
[brief] Reasonable notice sufficient to enforce hyperlinked terms and conditions exists where, as here, a registration website advises the user prior to signing-up, without needing to scroll, that further action will bind the user to the hyperlinked terms.  *See Vercammen*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110, at *8-9; Racioppi*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200, at *9-11.  Neither the *Wollen* court, nor the court below, addressed this type of agreement, but this Court has done so in the two recent cases of *Vercammen* and *Racioppi*.
[directive] 1, of  Specifically, the following language has been added to the end R. 3:4A(b)(5):  When a motion for pretrial detention is filed pursuant to paragraph (a), the court may consider prima facie evidence sufficient as of to overcome the presumption release, a recommendation by the Pretrial Services Program that the defendant's release is not if recommended, such recommendation is made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(f) and the court finds probable cause that the eligible defendant committed any crime for which the eligible defendant would of be subject to a mandatory term imprisonment pursuant to subsection of ofN.J.S.A. 2C:43-6 for a crime involving the use or possession a c. firearm other than a violation of: (i) N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(a) (destructive devices) or N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 3( d) ( defaced firearms); of (ii) N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(l) or N.J.S.A. 2C:4(a)(2) (possession weapons for unlawful purposes); (iii) N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.l(a) (weapons; controlled dangerous substances and other offenses); or of (iv) N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(l) (unlawful possessions weapon - of handgun), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(l)-(2) (unlawful possessions weapon - rifles and shotguns)  Although such recommendation by the Pretrial Services Program may constitute sufficient evidence upon which the court may order pretrial detention, nothing herein shall preclude the court from considering other relevant information presented by the prosecutor or of the defendant in determining whether no amount monetary bail, non- of of monetary bail conditions pretrial release, or combination monetary bail and conditions would reasonably assure the defendant's of of appearance in court when required, the protection the safety any other person or the community, and that the defendant will not obstruct the criminal justice process.
[directive] This Directive repeals and supersedes the provisions of Supersession of prior Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Directive 2015-1.  Page 4 E. date.  This Directive and the appended Body Worn Camera Policy shall take Effective effect on June 1, 2021, with the exception of Sections 3.2(b) through (h) of the Policy, which shall take effect on December 31, 2021.
[brief] ..............................................Pa332  Document Entitled “Management Fee And Actual Expenses For The Year Ended December 31, 2017” ..................................................Pa368  Email Dated June 4, 2018  From [...] to [...], [...] and [...] ........................................................................Pa377  [...] (sic) Online Application For Financial Assistance, Submitted On August 20, 2018 .....................................................Pa378  [...] General Ledger For The Period Jan. (sic) 1, 2018 To Dec. (sic) 31, 2018 ..............................................Pa387  Document Entitled, “Management Fee And Actual Expenses, Year End Reconciliation For The Year Ended December 31, 2018” ..................................................Pa418 State Of New Jersey Department Of Community Affairs Division Of Local Government Services Local Finance Board Application, Dated July 24, 2019 ..............................Pa427 [...] General Ledger For The Period Jan. (sic) 1, 2019 To Dec. (sic) 31, 2019 ..............................................Pa454 [...], New Jersey Tax Account Statement For [...] ..................................................................................Pa495 “Validations” Document, Undated .................................................................Pa496 VOLUME IV Letter Brief Dated May 12, 2023 [Omitted Pursuant To Rule 2:6-1(a)(2)] ......................................................Pa497 Certification Of [...] In Support Of Plaintiff’s Submission For Post-Judgment Relief, Dated May 12, 2023 .................................................................Pa498 Exhibit A: Order Entered June 30, 2022 By The Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. [Omitted]...............................Pa500 Exhibit B: Letter Dated December 28, 2022 From [...], Esq. To [...], Esq. .............Pa501 Exhibit C: Email Dated February 27, 2023
[brief] First, plaintiff’s citation to males who took offense that women got promoted or thought [...] was an “aggressive” woman, are not evidential as it relates to [...]’s individual gender discrimination claim.  The trial court noted that [...] would have to submit evidence of bad conduct of the defendants of which he had first-hand knowledge.  (3T7:17-21).  The “feelings” of other males that the [...] was promoting women is not competent evidence on [...]’s specific gender claims.  [...] makes no promotional claim.  Furthermore, plaintiff’s mere suggestion that supervisors being female is evidence itself of gender discrimination (Pb10), is far from credible, reliable material from the record to oppose summary judgment.  The trial court noted that simply being a male and having a majority of supervisors being female is not evidence of gender discrimination.  (3T25:3-10).  As a legal proposition, it is farcical.  [...] suggests that the lower court made “credibility” determinations in reaching its ruling and thus usurped the role of a jury.  (Pb23).  In reality, plaintiff was simply relying on his own self-serving EEO complaint alleging what he claims [...] or witness [...] said or heard.  (Pb11; Pa524-525).  [...] conflates what is considered “competent” material in the record with a suggestion that the Judge was making “credibility” determinations.  In reality, plaintiff failed to present “competent” evidence such that he met the threshold to reach a jury on the question of whether his former family friend and peer, [...], suggested he was “too old” to go to conferences, which he continued to attend with her approval.  The record put forth by plaintiff did not raise genuine issues of fact based on competent evidence.  The trial court noted that [...] did not even suggest facts related to gender or age discrimination against defendants other than [...] and [...].  (3T9:15-3T13:14).  With regard to [...], the trial court noted that [...] cannot simply rely on his own internal complaint as competent evidence.  (3T18:12-20).  The court noted the undisputed record on plaintiff continually submitting applications for retirement such that a single alleged question about his plans would not create a genuine issue of fact suggesting discrimination by [...].  (3T18:12-3T19:6).  With regard to [...], the Court noted that [...] could point to no facts in the record suggesting discriminatory motive by [...], while the uncontested facts were that [...] was [...]’s contemporary, worked at [...] a little longer, retired the same year, and had documented and undisputed reasons for her actions.  (3T:19:7-3T26:3).  As such, defendants’ summary judgment application was properly granted.
[brief] ”  The municipal judge stated about Defendant’s constitutional argument, “I just don’t see the merit in it.  I think that the statute’s clear on its face.  You can’t have a loaded weapon within 450 feet of a structure. ”  (2T15-14 to 15-18)  While Defendant rejected the opportunity for a trial in the municipal court, and in the Law Division rejected the opportunity to seek withdrawal of his plea, he wants nothing except a reversal and remand to the Superior Court to decide what he claims is the sole issue – whether the pumphouse is an “occupied building” under the statute.  (Db 11)  The rejection of the opportunity offered for a trial, as well as the rejection of the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea goes far in resolving this case.
[brief] In the present matter, as in Gramiccioni, the Attorney General has exercised his supervisory authority in issuing both the IAPP, as well as Law Enforcement Directive 22-14 on how IA investigations are to be conducted, and how the reporting of the investigation’s conclusions are to be handled.  In this regard, Directive 22-14 specially provides that This Directive also clarifies and confirms the Attorney General’s broad supersession authority over internal affairs.  New Jersey law assigns the Attorney General responsibility to ensure the proper, efficient, and uniform handling of law enforcement business in the State and it provides him with the authority to supersede investigations and criminal actions as one tool to achieve those goals.
[brief] Appellant’s Pierce Claim in Count Two fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as Appellant fails to identify a clear mandate of public policy.  In the seminal case of Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980), the Supreme Court held that “an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. ”  Id. at 72.  Sources of public policy can include legislation, administrative rules, regulations or decisions, and judicial decisions.  Id.  “A basic requirement of the wrongful discharge cause of action is that the mandate of public policy be clearly identified and firmly grounded."  Macdougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 391 (1996); see, e.g. Potter v. Village Bank, 225 N.J. Super. 547, 558-60 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that discharge of bank president for reporting suspected illegal money laundering by bank directors violated clear mandate of public policy; "few people would cooperate with law enforcement officials if the price they must pay is retaliatory discharge from employment."), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 352 (1988); Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 223 N.J. Super. 435, 446 (App. Div.1988) (holding that "under Pierce, an employee in New Jersey may maintain a private action in tort or contract for retaliatory discharge as a result of the filing of an OSHA complaint because such discharge contravenes our public policy"); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 157-59 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that discharge of pharmacist for refusing to violate state administrative regulation requiring pharmacist to be present at all times pharmacy operates for business and for reporting his employer's intended violation pursuant to statutory provision and his professional code of ethics would violate clear mandate of public policy); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 418-19, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div.1978) (holding that complaint alleging that plaintiff x-ray technician was fired for refusing to perform catheterizations, which she could not legally perform, stated a cause of action).
[brief] State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J.  440, 455 (2008); State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601, 615 (App. Div. 1990), certify y. Den. 127 N.J. 321 (1992).  In general, the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony is entitled to deference and reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim relates solely to the allegation that Defendants have abrogated MOAs entered prior to [...]’s designation under the MSRA, despite the fact that the MOAs were subject to a condition precedent, which never materialized, and in any event could be (and were) unilaterally modified pursuant to the MSRA.  E.  The Superior Court’s Well-Reasoned Decision.  The Superior Court held oral argument in connection with Defendants’ motion to dismiss on February 16, 2024.  On March 4, 2024, the Superior Court issued a written opinion, dismissing the Complaint with prejudice, in an eleven-page written decision by [...], A.J.S.C. ([...]).  In reaching its decision, the Superior Court analyzed the parties’ respective positions and found that (a) Defendants acted within the authority conferred under the MSRA and (b) the 2016 MOAs were subject to a contingency that never materialized, precluding an actionable claim.
[brief] “[T]he value given or received as consideration need not be monetary or substantial. ”  Oscar v. Simeonidis, 352 N.J. Super. 476, 485 (App. Div. 2002).  Generally, courts do not weigh the value of the consideration but only assess whether it exists. (see Sipko, 214 N.J. at 381; Martindale, 173 N.J. at 87; Shebar, 111 N.J. at 289) (emphasis added).  Appellants have unilaterally renounced the MOU, seeking to portray it as nothing more than an agreement to agree and treating it as having no force or effect.  They further mischaracterize the MOU as a sale of a $45 million property for $1, intentionally ignoring both the true form of the transaction and the assumption of liabilities exceeding $47 million that justify the nominal cash price paid by [...].  As additional consideration, [...] promised to undertake all efforts associated with residential zoning applications for the Property and make conditional payments of $2 to $3 million depending on the results of those applications, and the timing of those results.  These payments are conditional because [...] cannot compel the [...] to approve a zoning change to residential.  This conditional payment, as with the other consideration discussed, is a definite and sizeable sum, which facially defeats Appellants’ contract-formation argument relating to inadequate consideration.  The trial court properly recognized the adequacy of the consideration under the MOU, and appropriately enforced the MOU through its orders on September 15, 2023, and November 27, 2023.
[brief] THE APPLICATION TO VACATE THE FINAL JUDGMENT  SATISFIES THE REASONABLE AND STATUTORY TIME PERIOD FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  Plaintiff contends that [...] was barred from vacating the final judgment of January 23, 2023, since redemption was not remitted prior to entry of the judgment.  *Landa v. Adams*, 162 N.J.Super. 318, 320-321 (App. Div 1978).
[brief] I make this certification as part of the submission of Defendant’s Reply Letter Brief submitted presently.  2.  I have reviewed Rules 1:38-3, 1:38-5, and 1:38-7 and certify that this document or pleading does not contain any confidential information or any confidential personal identifiers.  3.  I understand that if any confidential information is discovered in this submission and brought to the court's attention, the court will return the document or pleading to me, and I will be responsible to redact or anonymize the confidential information before resubmission.  I understand the court may impose sanctions, including suppression of the brief, dismissal in extraordinary cases, and other measures for a failure to accurately make this certification or for the discovery of confidential information in a document that has been filed.
[brief] Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 222, 226 (2016) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.47(a)).  The Board’s specialized expertise is critical because it is obligated to make “highly predictive and individualized discretionary appraisals” in assessing an incarcerated person’s suitability for parole, which are “inherently imprecise. ”  Acoli, 224 N.J. at 222 (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., Indeed, the Board’s “discretionary assessments” turn on “a multiplicity of imponderables.
[brief] In Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assoc. 178 N.J. 144 (2003), the plaintiff had received an affidavit of merit prior to the expiration of the time frame in which to provide same but have inadvertently failed to serve it on the defendants.  Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 148.  After the expiration of the 120 days, but before the defendants had filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to provide an affidavit of merit, the affidavit was provided by the plaintiff.  Id.  On these facts, the Ferreira court announced the following rule:  In a case where the plaintiff has in hand an affidavit within the 120-day statutory period and serves the affidavit on defense counsel outside that time frame but before defense counsel files such a motion based upon the late arrival of the affidavit.  If defense counsel files a motion to dismiss after the 120-day deadline and before plaintiff has forwarded the affidavit, the plaintiff should expect that the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice provided the doctrines of substantial compliance and extraordinary circumstances do not apply.  That formation places strong incentives on both plaintiffs’ and defense counsel to act diligently.  Id. at 154 (emphasis added).  Prior to entry of the June 24, 2020 Order, Plaintiff had every opportunity to serve a compliant affidavit within the statutory timeframe as prescribed by the Affidavit of Merit Statute, but failed to do so.  Here, Plaintiff should have “reasonably expect[ed] that the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice” for failure to comply with Affidavit of Merit Statute.  Id.  Accordingly, the Trial Court appropriately dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint with entry of the June 24, 2020 Order.  If presented with this matter, it is Defendant’s position that the Nicholas Court, as well as Pfannenstine and Wiggins’ Appellate Panels would find that [...]’s AOM does not comply with the Affidavit of Merit Statute and affirm the Trial Court’s Order of Dismissal.  If accepted, Plaintiff’s argument would eviscerate the clear purpose of the AMS and such a result has been expressly admonished by New Jersey’s Supreme Court.  Nicholas, 213 N.J. at 485.  For these reasons, Defendant respectfully submits that this Honorable Appellate Court should affirm the Trial Court’s Order of June 24, 2020.
[brief] The [...] failed to adhere to and otherwise breached an actual Order of former Mayor [...].  Mayor [...] stated in the news article dated September 24, 2008 that all employees terminated due to their running for elective office shall receive their jobs back.  [...] became certified after being denied the right to maintain his employment with the [...] while gathering signatures on his election petition.  Contrary to the Trial Court’s Opinion, Mayor [...]’s Executive Order 008 did not make a distinction nor set forth a timeline when the certification occurs as it relates to the improperly terminated employee receiving his or her job back, if he was terminated as a result of running for office.  Indeed, it would certainly defeat the underlying ideals and intent to only extend the rights afforded through MEO-08-2008 to employees who have reached the threshold of certification.  [...] sought to find a way to usurp the Executive Order by interfering with the certification process by terminating [...] while he was still in the process of seeking certification.  If this Executive Order is to be read literally, no one seeking elective office would vault the threshold of certification as their employment would be terminated prior thereto, as was the case for [...].  The legislative intent behind Executive Order 08 is a question for the jury.
[brief] The Board adopted conditions of approval on March 1, 2023.  [Da359].  These conditions included, among others, requiring [...] to provide for off-site, overflow parking on holidays and special occasions, private ambulance service, that the generator and trash compactor comply with applicable noise regulations and that [...] prove same through noise testing, that [...] obtain an assignment of an existing easement, or a new easement, from the Township for a sanitary sewer line that it was to install and maintain.
[brief] Id.  Moreover, and significantly, Defendant’s self-serving and implausible contention that Plaintiff’s access to the company’s bank statements was sufficient to satisfy her accounting obligations, and Plaintiff’s entitlement to access to the company records, was refuted by her own testimony, when Defendant testified that it was impossible for Plaintiff to identify Defendants’ improper personal expenses by reviewing only [...]’s bank records.  (3T:131:9-20)  Specifically, Defendant’s trial testimony confirmed the obvious and indisputable need for more than just bank records to distinguish Defendant’s personal expenses from business expenses, as well as Plaintiff’s entitlement to access to the company’s financial records beyond mere bank statements.  Id.  Plaintiff was entitled to this critical financial information pursuant to the parties’ operating agreement and the New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act.
[brief] I.  **[...] WAS NOT ENROLLED IN THE CCIP WHEN THE [...]IDENT OCCURRED AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT ENTITLED TO COVERAGE**  A.  **ALL CCIP RECORDS CONFIRM THAT [...] WAS NOT ENROLLED IN THE CCIP AT THE TIME OF THE [...]IDENT**  [...] argues that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP in July 2015, when it received the automated Welcome Letter and COI and, therefore, suggests [...] is entitled to coverage as a “Named Insured” on the date of the Accident.  (TRVb16.)  This argument, however, ignores the language of the COI which --- 8 [...]’ reliance on a “form letter” shown to [...]’s [...] during deposition (at TRVb16) is equally unpersuasive as such letters are used for cancellation of an entire CCIP Program at the request of the First Named states it is issued for “INFORMATION ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS” and “DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ISSUING INSURER(S), AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OR PRODUCER, AND THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. ” (TRVa2775.)  It further ignores the fact that [...] was not actually enrolled in the CCIP on the Accident date and, thus, cannot satisfy the [...]’s definition of “Named Insured. ”
[brief] 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2) .......................................................................................  2  9 U.S.C. § 4 .................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3 .......................................................................................  5  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  (Appendix immediately follows Reply Brief’s CONCLUSION page) Everbank v. Tierney, No. A-2435-18T2, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1414 (App. Div. July 15, 2020)  .................................................................  Pra1 Sacks v. DJA Auto., No. 12-284, 2013 WL 210248 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2013)  .........................  Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS