ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s reliance on the fact that its project will produce affordable units is also misguided.  Plaintiff mischaracterizes its generosity and interest in providing affordable housing.  Because it is seeking a use variance (and not proposing an as-of-right mixed-use project with efficiency apartments or garden apartments), [...]’s mandatory set-aside ordinance is triggered mandating that the developer set aside 15% of the units (if a rental project) or 20% of the units (if a sales project), for affordable housing.  So Plaintiff had no choice but to set-aside units for affordable housing.  Moreover, the Ordinance (like most mandatory set-aside ordinances) provides at §240-9.13 B(4):  “B.  Mandatory Set-Aside Requirement.  (4)  This requirement does not create any entitlement for a property owner or applicant for subdivision or site plan approval, a zoning amendment, use variance, or adoption of a redevelopment plan or rehabilitation plan in areas in need of redevelopment or rehabilitation, or for approval of any particular proposed project. ”  Pa352-353, emphasis added).  Thus, Plaintiff’s bootstrapping argument is disingenuous, and precluded by the very terms of the ordinance that mandates the set-aside of affordable units.  The assertion that Plaintiff should be granted a d(1) use variance because its project will include affordable units is specifically precluded by the very ordinance that requires the set-aside Plaintiff so “generously” is willing to provide.
[brief] Accordingly, even if the court did err with respect to the site plan ordinance finding that Appellant takes issue with—a contention that Respondent disputes for reasons that will be discussed—such error was not outcome determinative and therefore must be disregarded as not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  In any event, Appellant has not established that the trial court’s site plan ordinance finding was erroneous.
[brief] Ibid. (citing Block 268, LLC v. City of Hoboken Rent Leveling & Stabilization Board, 401 N.J. Super. 563, 567 (App. Div. 2008)).  Rule 4:46-2(c) provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”
[brief] (Da186.)  Its termination was based on, as confirmed in its counsel’s letter, the fact the Estoppel Certificate disclosed a default by the Defendant.  According to the PSA, “an estoppel certificate . . . shall not be an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate if such... discloses a default on the part of the landlord. ” (Da186, Da332-334.)  Therefore, the presented Estoppel Certificate was unacceptable, and authorized termination.  (Id.)  Further, and as stated in the termination letter, the Estoppel Certificate disclosed a settlement agreement (id.) that modified the Lease (Da328-330.).  However, the Defendant failed to provide this to Plaintiff, which meant it had breached the representations in the PSA under paragraph 8.1(l)(ii).  (Id.)  Consequently, Plaintiff claimed it was also authorized to terminate under paragraph 15.2\(^4\) as revised per the second PSA amendment.  (Id.)  Plaintiff later learned that prior to Defendant signing the November 15 PSA (Da190) Defendant already sued [...].
[directive] Juvenile's Name: Date of Order: Summons and Notification / Next Event: Counsel  Next Event: ■  You are commanded to appear before the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part, □ located at on at before  Failure to appear will result in a bench warrant being issued for your arrest.  Bring this Order / Notice with you to your next court date.  Notice Given in Court to: Juvenile Parent / Guardian Prosecutor
[directive] offense of Section 4 for an with the provisions accordance in acomplaint-warrant applying for information that further investigation reveals when complaint-summons by previously charged originally extent of injury is greater than the where charges (e.g., upgraded or supports new assault; new assault rather than simple aggravated prosecution for warrant suspected as to warrants controlled dangerous substance of seized quantity the or type information about the subsequently occurred determined that the offense or it is ahigher-degree crime, prosecution for such as more than "simple possession," involves offense firearms zone; a in park a public firearm at N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4, or pointing a violation of in unlawful purpose for an possession a mere crime against a specific person — not 2C:12-1(b)(4) (i.e., a N.J.S.A. of violation another in warrants that amount of a theft investigation reveals the subsequent possessory crime); firearm is charged, or reveals that a seized originally than ahigher-degree crime prosecution for weapon, etc.).
[brief] The trial court erred in finding that [...] employed litigations techniques not supportive of awarding legal fees to him.  In denying [...]'s request for legal fees, the trial court reasoned that [...] engaged in bad faith by "aggressive and scorched earth litigation tactics" in a manner to get Defendant to "give up her claims", was "non-compliant with prior court orders", was "unreasonable in not answering questions at his deposition" and due to his positions concerning the [...] reimbursement and Mercedes/Lexus issues.  [See Pal, Op. at 13, Jan. 10, 2023].  Based on that misguided portrayal of [...]'s conduct, the trial court stated "partial success on the merits should not entitle [[...]] to a fee shift."  [See Id.].  That trial court erred for several reasons.  First, as discussed in POINTS V and VI below, the trial court was incorrect concerning the Lexus/Mercedes issue and the [...] account reimbursement issue.  As a result, those issues should not have contributed to a finding that [...] acted in bad faith.  ---
[directive] 4.2.8  Where appropriate, an agency may enter into an agreement with another law enforcement agency to conduct an Internal Affairs investigation, and smaller law enforcement agencies that consistently have difficulty carrying out the internal affairs function are encouraged to explore regional internal affairs arrangements in concert with other law enforcement agencies.  4.2.9  Nothing in this policy shall prevent a law enforcement agency from retaining a qualified private individual to serve as a hearing officer or an expert witness.  4.3
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[brief] The ruling in City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 326 N.J. Super. 1, (App. Div. 1999) supports the Borough’s arguments.  In Maffucci, the view of the ocean from the defendants’ condominium had been completely obstructed and direct access to the beach has been eliminated by nine-foot-high dune grasses as a direct result of the taking.  Maffucci, supra at 3.  The Appellate Division cited with approval to numerous cases throughout the country which allowed severance damages for loss of view and/or access as a result of a partial taking for construction activities which occurred on the property subject to the condemnation action and not neighboring or adjacent properties.  Id. at 12.  As Appellant is not entitled to damages as a result of alleged loss of view, privacy and wave activity from the construction of the new seawall and ramp on the Borough’s adjacent property as it is outside of the 3,334 SF easement acquired in Appellant’s Property, the trial court’s January 28, 2022 Order should be affirmed.
[brief] (Ia079 at ¶ 31; Ia134 at 62:23-64:3; Ia143; Ia151).  The US Fire Policy provides Commercial General Liability coverage which could, for example, provide [...] with liability coverage if a camper were to slip and fall on [...]’s premises.  (Ia079 at ¶ 32; Ia161).  However, non-owned/hired auto coverage is a coverage extension added to the Policy which solely provides the insured with coverage for “autos” that the insured “leases, hires, rents, or borrows” in connection with its business operations.  (Ia079 at ¶ 33; Ia163; Ia164).  The US Fire Policy does not provide any coverage for “autos” that are owned by the insured.  (Ia163; Ia164).  D.
[brief] The court simply never conducted the required analysis of whether a ten-year sentence was inadequate to fulfill the goals of deterrence and incapacitation.  The court’s discussion of the consequences of a consecutive sentence was limited to stating that if consecutive [...] would be “under the age of 40 by the time he reaches his parole,” but this is an assessment of the proportionality of a consecutive sentence, not an assessment of the “deterrent value, and incapacitation purpose and need. ”  Torres, 246 N.J. at 271.  (8T 101-16 to 20)  The court discussed the need for deterring the possession of a handgun in general, but never assessed whether the ten-year manslaughter sentence would be insufficient to deter [...] from possessing a handgun in the future.  (8T 92-4 to 93-7, 101-3 to 103-18)  Had the court actually evaluated the deterrent value and incapacitative need of a consecutive sentence, it would be hard to see how, given the applicable social science, deterrence or incapacitation could justify a consecutive sentence.
[brief] Here, none of the Plaintiffs-Appellants are or allege to be taxpayers in the [...] and instead assert county taxpayer standing.  In addition, the plaintiff in Feld v. [...] is one of the plaintiffs in this matter.  Notably, the Plaintiffs-Appellants have experienced a dismissal of their claims in previous actions based on a lack of standing for the same reasoning that was found here - that Plaintiffs-Appellants did not articulate a sufficient stake in the matter to challenge the municipal action.
[brief] Page  Unreported Opinion of Greco v. State Farm Ins. Co. (2003 WL 1917318)........  Pra1 Unreported Opinion of In re Estate of Riordan, (2014 WL 8810027).................. Pra6  Unreported Opinion of Valenti v. Bassinder, (2014 WL 861487)..........................  Pra9  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Pa305-10.  The court reasoned that there was no present conflict of interest and that the CNA “may” create a conflict if the matter had to be tried.  Pa310.  Further, there were no pending cross or third-party claims being pursued by the doctors against one another and the firms were confident in their ability to represent the defendants.  *Ibid.*  As well, the [...]’s representation was not prohibited by law because the clients were not directly adverse to one another.  *Ibid.*  The court further explained that [...] and [...] “have signed informed consent waivers and have been properly informed by their attorneys of the potential risks involved with multi-defendant representation. ”  *Ibid.*  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] (Pa129 at T103:5-11; Pa132 at T106:13-24; Pa186 at T160:25 – Pa187 at T161:11 (“I don’t believe there was any taper at all. ”); Pa274 T36:22-25 (“Q.  Your position is that the elevation change in this matter was an immediate elevation change with no taper, correct? A. Correct. ”)).  On the second day of his deposition, [...] was confronted with high-resolution photographs of the subject bridge joint.  After seeing the photographs, he completely changed his opinion (and Plaintiffs theory of the case), by opining -- for the first time in this litigation -- that the alleged \(^5\) May 24, 2022 Opinion of the Court at *47-48. dangerous condition was merely “insufficient tapering.
[brief] Nevertheless, Respondents have given short shrift to Appellants’ valid argument that the trial court ruling runs afoul of the FAA by using an expansive application of the so-called “explicit waiver” test created in *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430 (2014), to invalidate a broad, unambiguous agreement, entered into without compulsion by sophisticated parties contracting at arms’ length, with ample opportunity for review, and aided by legal counsel of their own choosing.  The Opposition declares incorrectly, and without citation, that our Supreme Court has “repeatedly” decided that *Atalese*’s “explicit waiver” test is not preempted by the FAA because it “puts arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts. ” (Opp. Br. at 25).  However, our Supreme Court has never directly addressed, in a majority opinion, whether *Atalese*’s heightened standard for formation of arbitration agreements passes muster under the FAA.  See *Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Florida, Inc.*, 236 N.J. 301, 327 (2019) (Albin, J., concurring) (noting majority sidestepped FAA preemption arguments).  See also *Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C.*, 639 Fed. Appx. 824, 826-27 (3d. Cir. 2016) (questioning if *Atalese* remains viable).  Despite the open preemption question, Respondents fail to explain how the Court’s ruling in *Kindred Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark*, 581 U.S. 246 (2017), would not pose a basis for reversal.
[directive] Do you understand that if you plead guilty to any of the following offenses: leader of a narcotics trafficking network (2C:35-3); operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility (2C:35-4); manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-5) distribution, possession or manufacture of gamma hydroxybututyrate (2C:35-5.2); distribution, possession or manufacture of flunitrazepam (2C:35-5.3); employing a juvenile in drug distribution (2C:35-6); distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school property (2C:35-7); distributing, dispensing or possessing a controlled dangerous substance within 500 feet of a public housing facility, park or building (2C:35-7.1); or, distribution, possession or manufacture of an imitation controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-11) EPI/AND [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA] a. ou plede koupab tou de posesyon zamafe pandan ke w ap komèt, eseye komèt oswa konplote pou komèt nenpòt nan enfraksyon sa yo wa va resevwa yon santans konsekitiv pou posesyon zam? you also plead guilty to possessing a firearm while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon? Fòm Kreye pa Direktif # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Haitian Creole paj 1 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Haitian Creole page 1 of 2 OSWA/OR [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA]
[brief] In this case, [...] proved that they had left for vacation the morning of the alleged service through EZPass records and receipts.  Most strikingly though, one of the Affidavits of Service is notarized two months prior to the actual date of service and is facially deficient.  14a.  This was never corrected in the record and the Default judgment was based upon an Affidavit that was prima facie invalid.  In addition, the process server himself admitted that he never had contact with the notary who notarized the Affidavit.  This is contrary to the Notary Public regulations.  Thus, the Affidavit is void and should not have been used as the basis to enter Default, let alone Default Judgment.
[brief] In his deposition during the Lease Litigation, Defendant [...] was repeatedly asked about the scope of this representation of Plaintiff in the lease negotiations.  (Pa1042,T49:6-19).  He was questioned about who he communicated with at the Plaintiff organization in the negotiation and execution of the lease.  (Pa1054,T99:15-25).  He was extensively questioned about the terms and requirements of the lease.  (Pa1058-Pa1060).  Throughout his deposition, Defendant [...] was questioned about his knowledge of Plaintiff attempting to obtain a Certificate of Occupancy in the underlying action.  (Pa1065).  Perhaps most egregious, Defendant [...] was questioned extensively on the issue of termination of the lease which would be critical in the malpractice claim against him.
[brief] Infra Section I(B)  B.  The Trial Court’s July 29, 2024 Decision Should Be Reversed Because Whether Plaintiff’s CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA Allegations In The Complaint Are Covered By the Arbitration Provision in [...]’s “Membership Agreement” Should Be Determined By A New Jersey Judge And Not An Arbitrator (Ja8-Ja10, Ja12)
[brief] In *[...] v. [...]*, 330 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2000), a physician sought recovery from an attorney, asserting that a letter of protection sent by the attorney had created an equitable lien on the proceeds of a personal injury case.  On December 29, 1991, [...] performed surgery on [...] who had been struck on the head by an axe during a North Bergen tavern incident.  [...] charged Cassanello $3,750.00 for the neurological consultation and skull fracture treatment he rendered.  [...] provided Cassanello with some follow-up treatment, and by March 2, 1992, Cassanello owed [...] $3,800.00.  Then, on March 6, 1992, [...] wrote [...], in pertinent part, as follows:  Regarding the [Cassanello] matter, I enclose my check payable to your order in the estimated sum of $250.00 covering a preliminary report regarding medical and surgical treatment rendered to date regarding my client Mr. [...] together with an authorization signed by him.  *This letter further confirms that your outstanding bill for $3,750.00 is protected from any settlement of this claim.* (emphasis added).  Cassanello's case eventually settled in January 1998.  On April 9, 1998, [...] informed [...] that he was not going to "abide by [the] letter of protection" and refused to pay [...]’s medical service fees.  The Appellate Division reasoned that the course of dealing between the parties had created an equitable lien.  It stated:  Equitable liens are based on the equitable maxim that equity "regards as done that which has been agreed to be, and ought to have been, done."  *Rutherford Nat'l Bank v. H.R. Bogle Co.*, 114 N.J. Eq. 571, 573-74, 169 A. 180 (Ch.1933).  The Supreme Court has explained that equitable liens can be created by express executory contracts that relate to specific property then existing or to property later acquired.  *In re Hoffman*, 63 N.J. 69, 77, 304 A.2d 721 (1973).  This lien is "a right of a special nature in a fund and constitutes a charge or encumbrance upon the fund."  Ibid.  Thus, "[w]here one promises to pay for services rendered out of a fund created in whole or in part by the efforts of the promisee, a lien in favor of the promisee will attach to the fund when it comes into existence."  Ibid.  None of the facts supporting the equitable resolution in *Landenheim* are present here.  The agreement in this case was based on an express contract, not the conduct of the parties.
[brief] This Court should reverse the trial court’s interlocutory orders dismissing the CFA claims (Count VII) as Defendants are not “learned professionals” exempt from liability under the CFA.  Shaw found that Plemmons improperly expanded the “learned professional” exemption beyond Supreme Court precedent and to such a degree that the semi-professional exemption had swallowed the rule and rendered the CFA powerless to achieve its broad consumer protection mandate.  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 618-19.  The trial court erroneously followed the ruling in Plemmons concluding insurance producers and other licensed semi-professionals are immune from liability under the CFA.  This rejection of Shaw, the more recent and better reasoned decision, must be reversed.
[brief] This exception was later codified as N.J.R.E. 608(b)(1), which reads as follows:  In a criminal case, a witness’ character for truthfulness may be attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior false accusation against any person of a crime similar to the crime with which defendant is charged if the judge preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a), that the witness knowingly made the prior false accusation.  Then, in *State v. A.O.*, 198 N.J. 69 (2009), which came down after the exception was codified, the Supreme Court again acknowledges that this rule remains limited and only “applies when the credibility of the victim-witness is the central issue in the case,” and reiterated that the rule is narrow and subject to strict controls.
[brief] The Commission also improperly avoided statutorily required review by the Commissioner of Education by “dismissing” the Complaint and stating that this matter “is appealable only to the Superior Court-Appellate Division. ”  (Ca018).  Despite “rejecting” [...]’s Initial Decision, the Commission largely agreed with [...]’s characterization of Respondent’s social media posts.  The Commission stated in its Final Decision:  [The Commission] would be remiss if it did not address the divisive, inflammatory, and hostile nature of Respondent’s public postings.  Comparing the treatment of unvaccinated people to Jewish people, encouraging lawsuits against the State, and referring to the “sick war on our children” regarding gender identity teachings runs counter to the level of decorum expected from a publicly elected school official who is charged with serving New Jersey’s student population.  (Ca018).  The Commission further stated that “board members should recognize and refrain from inappropriate communications that have no place in the educational setting.
[brief] Q.  So why don't you tell me what you did beginning with being stopped at the red light.  I imagine, when it changes green.  What do you do?  A.  So I stopped at the traffic light and the light was red.  On my side, on the right, on my right side was this lady, her car, [...], and so she was in the lane that's supposed to go straight because her lane was closed; and so when the traffic light changed, I started to go slowly; and so when I started to make my left turn – I started to make my left turn, and I don't know if she forgot or if she realized that she was in, like, the wrong lane or what; but that's when she tried to go into my lane and that's when she hit me.  Pa125:17-25, Pa126:1- 5.  “Q. [...], The X mark that I added to this photograph, PA-2, is that the location where the first contact between vehicles occurred?  A.  Around there, something like that, yes. ”  Pa143:6-10, Pa153.  After making the left-hand turn, instead of the defendant, keeping to the left as N.J.S.A. §39:4-123(c) Right and Left Hand Turn requires, he entered the right lane where the plaintiff’s vehicle already was thereby causing the collision.  The plaintiff asserts that the defendant did not obey the traffic act and stay left and go into the left lane of Route 280 after crossing the intersection.