ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 19:16-3(f)\(^4\) directs that when canvassing ballots, “[i]f a voter … writes or pastes the name of any person in the column designated personal choice, --- \(^4\) N.J.S.A. 19:16-3 is in the section of Title 19 titled “Counting the Ballots by District Board.
[directive] Authorization to Use CEDs  5.1  An officer authorized to use a CED pursuant to this policy may fire, discharge, or utilize drive stun mode of the CED during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; or (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.  5.2  Officers shall reevaluate the situation and reassess the need to use force before any second or subsequent firing or discharge or utilization of drive stun mode of the device against the same person.  Any second or subsequent firing or discharge or utilization of drive stun mode of the device must be necessary and justified by the circumstances at that moment.  5.3  An officer shall not direct an electrical charge or current against a person who is restrained by handcuffs unless: (a) Deadly force would be authorized under the Use of Force Policy; and (b) the use of physical or mechanical force is not feasible or would be ineffective.  5.4  Consistent with training, officers may point a CED at a person only when circumstances create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary for the officer to use enhanced mechanical force.  When the officer no longer reasonably believes that enhanced mechanical force may be necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the CED.  5.5  Unholstering, displaying, or pointing a CED shall be considered a display of constructive authority.  5.6  A spark display from a CED shall be considered a display of constructive authority.  A spark display must be reported as a Show of Force on the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  7  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] To buttress his claim, counsel persisted that the court review the “videos of Bodycams” taken in this matter.  (14T 3-17 to 12-9).  Counsel maintained, as well as Defendant adds time stamp fact from disc #2 Seq. No. ending with 7001:  @8:25:12-  This is the 5th time [...] said “No” that it is not her car and the officer still did not advise her that she did not have to consent.  However the officer did persist on obtaining the consent from her.  The officer then phrased regarding the consent that either she can give it or he could basically charge her and obtain a warrant to get it.  This tactic clearly made [...] nervous as can be seen by her facial expression.  [...] does say she does not want to allow the search because it wasn’t her car.  And after that the officers continued to speak with her to obtain this consent:  @8:27:45-  A woman officer is seen searching [...].  @8:31:14-  [...] is heard asking [...] what car she was in and begin to tell her about the consent form to sign.  @8:32:00-  [...] does now sign the consent while the handcuffs are still on her wrists.  @8:32:09-  [...] is handed back the pen followed by him signing the consent form as well.  @8:33:08-  [...] is seen being walked by officer Hackman over to [...]’s, what turns out to be already searched Chevy Impala to do infact another search.  I would submit based on the King factors, Your Honor, that the consent was not lawfully obtained.
[brief] ”  Id. at 427-28.  Similarly, as Your Honors noted, “[t]he waiver provision of the [OWBPA] clearly indicates its limited applicability to claims arising only under the ADEA” and “29 C.F.R. §1625.22 . . . specifically appl[ies] only to the waiver of claims under the ADEA. ”  Blum v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 2005 WL 4044579, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 30, 2006) (emphasis added) (confirming OWBPA’s limited applicability and holding that its regulatory provisions only apply to ADEA claims and not state law claims); see also Nakamoto v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2010 WL 2348634, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2010) (finding that “even if the [c]ourt were to accept [p]laintiff’s argument that the Agreement does not comply with the [OWBPA] requirements[,] . . . it remains enforceable as to all of [p]laintiff’s non-ADEA claims for relief based on events occurring prior to the execution of the agreement”).
[brief] In the Challenged Decision, the Trial Court quoted and relied on Vermont Trial Court rulings in the Vermont suit (T79-4–T80-21) as if there had been no breach of the duty to defend by [...] and as if the subject Vermont Trial Court rulings had been upheld on appeal.  The Trial Court did not address whether, at the time [...] withdrew its defense of the [...] on March 5, 2021, there *then existed* reasonable grounds to believe that [...]’s insureds’ interests might have been served by an appeal of the Vermont Trial Court rulings that [...] cited as purported grounds for withdrawing its defense.  That issue was raised to the Trial Court (see T72-4 to T72-7) but was simply not addressed by the Trial Court.  Instead, the Trial Court stated:  “Insofar as plaintiff disputes the findings of the Vermont Superior Court, and repeatedly referred to the findings as, quote, erroneous, end quote, in the responding statement of material facts, this Court reiterates it lacks the requisite jurisdiction to review or undertake an appeal of the findings of the Vermont court. ”  T84-16 to T84-22.  **Argument**  I.  **Trial Court Failed to Address Whether [...] Breached Its Duty to Appeal Adverse Rulings of the Vermont Trial Court.
[directive] 2.  Any allocation system should be equitable (fair) and serve to maximize lives and life- years saved (utility).  However, considerations of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) is not appropriate, and could lead to subjective, discriminatory decisions, particularly related to those with disabilities.  3.  Facilities should provide training to hospital/system decision-makers and health care staff in advance of implementation of adopted allocation policies.  Services to attend to provider moral distress should be strengthened.  This document describes 1) the creation of triage teams to ensure consistent decision making; 2) allocation criteria for initial allocation of critical care resources; and 3) reassessment criteria to determine whether ongoing provision of scarce critical care resources are justified for individual patients.
[brief] ” (2T20-9 to 15).  Indeed, the State submits that defendant failed at the hearing, and still fails, to produce any evidence indicating the court’s finding was based on an incorrect or irrational basis.  The trial court next considered whether it failed to “consider or appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence” regarding the applicability of Goldsmith to this case.  The trial court properly acknowledged that Goldsmith – which was decided on June 5, 2022, 42 days before the suppression hearing – was available at the time of the suppression hearing and therefore not “new” law.  (1T20-16 to 21).  Regardless, the trial court found that Goldsmith did not have any bearing on the decision in this case because “the circumstances of the stop and investigatory method of the officers in this Court’s opinion is respectfully completely different than what occurred in this particular matter. ” (2T21-3 to 10).  The State agrees and submits that Goldsmith has zero applicability in this case.  In Goldsmith, Camden officers were on patrol and happened upon what they believed was a narcotics transaction between three people in front of an abandoned house, and approached and detained the individual who they believed was the seller without observing the actual alleged exchange, contraband, or any other evidence of criminal activity other than that the neighborhood was known for narcotics activity.  251 N.J. at 389.  The Supreme Court found that the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion to detain defendant because there was insufficient reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.  Id. at 404-05.  This case is readily distinguished from Goldsmith because those officers did not observe the alleged transaction or see the defendant engage in any illegal activity, did they have reason to believe that the defendant was armed, nor did they have reason to believe that he was engaging in criminal behavior.  However, here, the officers were surveilling a specific residence, as part of a specific homicide investigation, where defendant specifically was identified as the shooter.  Unlike in Goldsmith, here, officers knew that the crime occurred, where they wanted to look for evidence, and who was involved.  Thus, there was sufficient reasonable suspicion for the stop and defendant failed to prove that the court’s basis was improper.  Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration because he failed to prove that the court erred in its decision.  CONCLUSION
[brief] **  Trial court determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  *State v. R.Y.*, 242 N.J. 48, 64 (2020).  “Although the ordinary ‘abuse of’ discretion’ standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is made ‘without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’”  *Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting *Achascoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 779 F.2d. 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).  Discretion “means legal discretion, in the exercise of which the judge must take account of the law applicable to the particular circumstances of the case and be governed accordingly. ” (emphasis in original).  *Summit Plaza Associates v. Kolta*, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020) (internal citations omitted).  Consequently, if a judge misconceives or misapplies the applicable law, “the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary act. ”  Ibid.  As a result, a trial court’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Id., at 409-10 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
[brief] The application was later bifurcated, and the only relief sought during these proceedings was the “(d)(6)” height variance, with the balance of the application stayed pending the outcome of the height variance.  Ja025; Ja083; 1T 24:19-23; 25:24-25; 26:1-11; 4T 5:1-23.  Over six nights of hearings, Plaintiff presented seven witnesses in support of the application: [...], Plaintiff’s Chief Development Officer; [...], P.E., Project Engineer; [...], P.E., PTOE, Traffic Engineer; [...], P.E., Sound Expert; [...], Witness on Visual Renderings of Proposed Project; [...], Industrial Real Estate Expert; and [...], PP, AICP, Professional Planner.  Ja015-Ja017.  Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Dotti, Mr. Terkanian, and Mr. Phillips were all recognized by the Board as experts in their respective fields.  (Id.)  The Defendant’s professionals testified to their review letters during the hearings.  Ja024.  The application was opposed by [...]’s Mayor and Council, who hired special counsel, a traffic engineer, and a professional planner to oppose the application.  The planner, however, never appeared.  Ja017.  The Board denied the “(d)(6)” height variance.
[brief] (Da106).  It found that the video evidence showed that [...] was not handcuffed when she consented to the search, she was not under arrest when she consented to the search, and police did not obtain her consent after she denied any guilt.  (Da106-07).  Further, the court found that [...] did not refuse initial requests for consent to search, but instead she had believed she did not have the authority to give consent because she did not own the car.  (Da107).  Finally, the court found that [...] was advised of her right to refuse consent.  (Da107).  The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the consent to search the Impala was knowing and voluntary.  (Da107).  The PCR court also ruled that the seizure of the tire iron was justified by the plain view doctrine.
[directive] Lwa pou anpeche Liberasyon  Antisipe Fòm Siplemantè Pledwaye pou (N.J.S.A. (NERA) 2C:43-7.2)  No Early Release Act Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA) Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) (Haitian Creole)
[brief] (See 175a-176a [65:24-66:7]).  [...] does not know why the amount changed from $105,000 to $42,294.  (176a [67:11-13]).  [...] testified that [...] decided to issue a policy to the Seller because the Seller was having trouble getting someone named [...] to perform work on the Property, and because “I didn’t have the deed putting the property into anyone else’s name.  So I eventually issued the policy to her (Seller). ” (177a [70:14-71:7]).  The deed which [...] insured was the deed taking the property from Seller and her husband jointly to the Seller only.
[brief] Within ninety seconds of returning to defendant and asking him out of his vehicle, defendant revealed that his car contained narcotics, thus establishing probable cause to search the car.  The questioning during this ninety-second period that defendant contends violated his constitutional rights did not exceed the time it would have taken to issue motor-vehicle summonses for defendant’s infractions, especially given that defendant still had not produced proof of insurance enabling him to legally drive the vehicle away.  The questioning consisted of routine inquiries attendant to any traffic stop and reasonable follow-up inquiries based on observations and defendant’s responses.  In addition, defendant’s reckless U-turn on a major highway, constricted pupils, extreme nervousness, and admission that he got into trouble in Montana for making “stupid choices” involving “drugs” established reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence or possessed drugs.  In fact, it would have been objectively unreasonable for the officer to allow defendant to drive away without issuing him summonses, sorting out whether the vehicle was properly insured, asking about his criminal history in Montana, and investigating defendant’s objective signs of impairment.  Law enforcement officers must have a “reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or is being committed” to justify a motor-vehicle stop.
[brief] [...] filed this action against [...] on February 7, 2023 to recover monetary damages under a lease for the Leased Premises following [...]’s payment default, among other breaches (the “Money Judgment Action”).  [Pa3].  Also on February 7, 2023, [...] filed a second action against [...] to recover possession of the Leased Premises, captioned *[...] 530 Duncan LLC v. [...] Logistics, LLC*, Docket No. [...] (the “Dispossession Action”).
[brief] Ukrainian Nat’l Urban Renewal, 151 N.J. Super. at 398.  Absent compelling public policy reasons, even an arbitrator’s errors of law or fact do not provide a trial court with a basis to disturb the arbitration award.  Selective Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Cont’l Ins. Co., 385 N.J. Super. 62, 67 (App. Div. 2006).  “[T]he judiciary has no role in the determination of any substantive issues that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. ”  Curran v. Curran, 453 N.J. Super. 315, 321 (App. Div. 2018).  [...] rendered a detailed and comprehensive arbitration award based upon his review and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties, and he set forth the basis in support of his award to [...] in his Final Award.
[brief] Plaintiff Engaged in Protected Activity.  (PA000006-PA00000010). **  Under CEPA, and as mentioned, per se protected conduct is covered by one who: “objects to…any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonable believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule of regulation promulgated pursuant to law. ”  *N.J.S.A.* § 34:19-3(c)(1).  Thus, plaintiffs who object, or refuse to participate in the aforementioned conduct, have engaged in **protected activity** under the statute.
[brief] Respondent acknowledged that during that time period, she was out of the house living with her boyfriend “[...]” and they both had corresponding drug problems.  (9T:125:22 to 126:2; 12T15-17).  Respondent testified that during this time, her thinking was distorted and in her quest for drug money, was working as a waitress seven days a week.  (11T101:2 to 102:8; 12T65:3-7).  Respondent testified she was “caught” in 2008 and ordered to attend [...] until 2009.  (11T 107:2-16).  The period that Respondent does not remember Petitioner living in the Home is when Respondent was living with her boyfriend, addicted to drugs, had distorted thinking, and was admitted to a rehabilitation facility.  Petitioner was never “separated” from Decedent, but rather, he endeavored to improve his education and commuted to and from school beginning in the spring of 2005 and later, upon graduation in December 2007, to work for the [...] in Philadelphia beginning in 2008, with the consent and encouragement of Decedent.  [...] understood that Petitioner was commuting to and from his Home, stating, “I know he was away a lot” explaining that “he was either at school or later, he got an apartment on Rt 73 close to the Bridge and would come home on weekends or whenever he could.  But he was working or in school on the Philadelphia side of the bridge. ” (10T95:8-22).  Consistent with that testimony, Respondent testified that Petitioner worked during the week and would come home on weekends, and it became less and less that he would be away the last ten years that they were together.  11T82:20-25.  Respondent remembered that the Petitioner worked 10-hour days, working Monday through Thursday and would be home every Friday, Saturday and Sunday.  (11T83:1-4).  Respondent’s contention that Petitioner “abandoned the marriage” is devoid of any evidential support and rather, Petitioner and the Decedent remained happily married for more than 29 years during which the Home was their primary residence.
[brief] On January 17, 2020, the PCR Court determined that “good cause” existed for the assignment of counsel on [...]’s PCR petition.  (Da 059-060).  N.J. Court Rule 3:22-6(b) states, Assignment of Counsel on Cause Shown.  Upon any second or subsequent petition filed pursuant to this Rule attacking the same conviction, the matter shall be assigned to the Office of the Public Defender only upon application therefor and showing of good cause.  N.J. Court R. 3:22-6(b)  Good cause exists only “when the court finds that a substantial issue of fact or law requires assignment of counsel and when a second or subsequent petition alleges on its face a basis to preclude dismissal under R. 3:22-4. ”  N.J. Court R. 3:22-6(b).  Once good cause has been found, the petition for post-conviction relief should be fully litigated by assigned counsel on petitioner’s behalf.  State v. McIlhenny, 333 N.J. Super. 85 (App. Div. 2000).  In McIlhenny, the Court agreed that satisfying the time bar may be a challenge for the petitioner, but ultimately determined that, “nevertheless, where the trial court has found "good cause" and assigned counsel, pursuant to R. 3:22-6(b), the defendant is entitled to have counsel endeavor to sustain the burden.
[brief] When we speak of “value” as a measure of just compensation, we are referring to market value; and when we speak of market value we mean the price which would be mutually agreeable to a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under compulsion to act.  [Id. At 367-368]  The fundamental objective of a condemnation proceeding is to recreate in the courtroom all factors which would bear upon the negotiations between the hypothetical buyer and seller of the subject property.  If the real estate marketplace would recognize a fact as relevant to the assessment of the transferable or market value of the subject property, then the factfinder may consider such facts.  In that regard, one of the true hallmarks of a condemnation valuation trial is the liberal approach New Jersey courts have taken with respect to admissibility of evidence.
[brief] This case involved a dispute over whether [...] and [...], two principals of a LLC subtenant of office space, were personally liable for the obligations of the LLC under the sublease.  A rider to the sublease contained the following language:  “The undersigned individuals personally guarantee the performance of the obligations of the Sub-Tenant in favor of the Tenant unconditionally and fully. ”  The signature line of the Sub-Tenant under the sublease, as described by the Court was as follows:  “The names Alfred [...] and Binod [...] are handwritten twice under the typed name, “[...] ”  Each is written once in cursive form and once in printed form.  Underneath those signatures appears the word “GUARANTORS:”.  No signatures are written beneath that word and there are no separate guarantees appended to the sublease as are appended to [the prime lease]”.  Id. at *4.  The Trial Court granted summary judgment for [...] and dismissed all claims against him.  This holding was affirmed on appeal:  “The final argument of [...] with respect to this issue, that [...]'s signature on the sublease constituted his guarantee, is, in our judgment, easily disposed of.  We have previously set forth the manner in which [...] signed the sublease, both in terms of the physical placement of his name on the document and its appearance.  Our examination of this document convinces us that [...] signed this sublease solely on behalf of [...], and not in any individual capacity.  The signatures of [...] and [...] are contained entirely within the space between the typed headings [...] Medical Group, L.L.C. and Guarantors.  No signatures appear beneath the word “Guarantors:”.  The conclusion is inescapable that [...] did not sign the sublease individually but only on behalf of [...]. ”  Id. at *6.  The Trial Court ruling that found personal liability in the case at bar was entered in error for several reasons.
[brief] REPLY TO TRUPIANO’S BRIEF  Preliminarily, [...] does not address the specific arguments raised in [...]’s Cross-Appeal of the Trial Court’s Order rejecting a retroactive rent increase.  First, [...] makes much ado about whether [...]’s tax assessment of the Unit at $404,500 was based upon replacement cost or not.  He does not challenge the assessment as invalid, and no evidence exists in the record that he ever challenged the assessment.  The $404,500 tax assessment is undisputed, and as previously briefed, was based upon replacement cost as chosen by [...] and discounted because of a protected tenant.
[brief] However, that case is not dispositive herein.  In Segal, a matrimonial dispute involved a grievance against a parent coordinator who was an attorney.  She sought fees for her defense.  She was awarded fees, under Discovery Rule 4:23-1(c), payable by the grievant.  [...], writing for the Court, noted the conflict among Appellate Division decisions on the question whether a pro se attorney can collect fees.  Id. at 262.  The Court then disallowed the fees but only in the circumstances of that appeal.  Id. at 264.  In other words the opinion specifically declined to address the circumstances present in the noted conflicting Appellate Division decisions or those present in this case---a fund in court & frivolous litigation.