ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] D.  Respondents’ Emphasis On Plaintiff’s Earnings Ignores That Plaintiff Received No Membership Distributions, [...] Failed To Report Plaintiff’s Income On [...]’s Taxes And [...] And [...] Excluded Plaintiff From [...]’s Million Dollar Settlement.  Respondents argue that Plaintiff received a high salary until her ouster in 2018 and as a result, should have no claim of damages against [...], [...] or [...].  This argument is unsupported by the record and should be rejected.  First, Plaintiff was found to be a 10% member of [...].  However, Plaintiff received no membership distributions.  Second, the record is clear that [...] did not report Plaintiff’s earnings on [...]’s taxes.  See Aa18.  Third, [...] and [...] ignore the windfall million-dollar settlement received by [...] from Plaintiff’s client, [...], that was never distributed in any part to Plaintiff and which [...] was unable to offer a full account for at trial.  The Heritage Settlement purchased contracts Plaintiff originated for [...].  It was more money than [...] had ever realized and was received in one lump sum following Plaintiff’s wrongful ouster.  Despite being the sole source of [...]’ income, and a 10% member, Plaintiff was not included in the distribution of these funds and received no payout whatsoever.  [...] and [...] were unable to offer any complete accounting for these funds at trial.  Then [...] and [...] excluded Plaintiff from the dissolution of [...] and prevented Plaintiff from accessing [...]’s bank accounts to confirm where the settlement proceeds were distributed.  None of this was addressed by the Trial Court.  Plaintiff’s share of this settlement as a 10% member of [...] should have been calculated by the Trial Court and reconciled during the dissolution process.  Instead, the Trial Court failed to value Plaintiff’s interest and then Defendants [...] and [...] excluded Plaintiff from dissolution.  Therefore, reversal is warranted.  E. [...] and [...] Apply And The Trial Court Improperly Valued Plaintiff’s Interest In [...] By Failing To Appoint An Expert.
[directive] njcourts.gov • Tel: 609-376-3000 • Fax: 609-376-3002  TO: Assignment Judges  Criminal Presiding Judges  DIRECTIVE # 04-21  FROM: [...], J.A.D.  SUBJ: Criminal – Procedures for Compassionate Release  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e  DATE: February 1, 2021 __  This Directive promulgates a process to be followed after an inmate receives a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release from the Department of Corrections (DOC) to petition the Superior Court (Criminal) for compassionate release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e, effective February 1, 2021.
[brief] And I will tell you, personally, I don’t think it’s a good look in front of the jury.  I don’t decide this case, the jury does.  But it’s inappropriate to do it even when the jury is not here.  So, you have an attorney, you have hired an attorney to represent you.  He speaks for you.  That’s what happens when you hire an attorney.  And counsel filed a motion to be admitted, as they say, pro hac vice.  You hired an attorney from out of the area, who’s not licensed to practice in New Jersey, but he is required to follow all the New Jersey court rules, and he is representing you.  And you speak through him, unless you are on the witness stand providing testimony in response to questions on direct or cross-examination.
[brief] And while the Resolution catalogues various statements in the MPA, it points to nothing in the MPA that comes close to proscribing [...]’s multi-level senior housing community on the Property, or a recommendation about how the Property should be used.  Sica makes clear that detrimental effects that are minimal are insufficient to outweigh the positive attributes of inherently beneficial uses and that a board should be concerned about detriments that are substantial.  Sica, supra, 127 N.J. --- 6  Contrast is drawn between the instant facts and this Court’s decisions in Kensington Senior Development, LLC v. Twp. of Verona, slip op., A-1010-19 (App. Div. Dec. 1, 2021)(Pa393), where the master plan contained a specific vision for the property and the board concluded that the variance application was at odds with that vision, id. at *9-10 (Pa399-400), and Sunrise Dev., Inc. v. Princeton Bd. of Adj., slip op., A-5717-18 (App. Div. June 24, 2020)(Da387), where the property in question comprised the entirety of the zoning district and the board concluded that a grant of the requested variance would constitute a de facto rezoning.
[brief] [...]’ allegations centered on wrongful denials of refinance by numerous banks, including twice by [...] ([...]), due to invalid title and foreclosure issues ([...]), see [...] denials and [...] [...] letter, App. at A649-A650.  At the Chancery trial, Plaintiff own witness, [...], testified that [...]’ last recorded mortgage assignment is typically only done in foreclosure, Trial Transcript p. 221-222.  [...] also testified that Plaintiff Wells Fargo trustee department has nothing to do with refinances and that refinances are done solely by [...] – the bank, Trial Transcript p. 235.  Despite this clear testimony, the Law Division judge erroneously granted summary judgment to Plaintiff – without even having the correct party – [...] – the bank, added as a party.  The Law Division ignored all pertinent Chancery testimony, ignored the fact that the Third Circuit had already determined the Schiano loan was in default since 1992, and erroneously failed to decide Quiet Title which is property ownership.  C.
[brief] the Agreement, “the plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry; ‘when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. ’”  Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020) (quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)).  However, Plaintiff fails to justify the Chancery Division’s arbitrary construction of the Agreement which materially altered the terms therein and reduced the benefit received by the [...].
[brief] The Board reconsidered this matter on October 24, 2018 and November 28, 2018.  During the October 24, 2018 hearing, [...] relied on the hardship application from May 22, 2017.  See 5T, at 15:10-13.  Thus, the costs, expenses and relief [...] sought did not change.  See id.  However, the Board carefully considered whether each operating expense in [...]’s application was a cost that was passed on to [...] because of his unit’s condominium conversion.
[brief] It, in fact, represented that any parking deficiency of the expanded School could and would be accommodated by School parking use on other nearby property owned by the [...].  At the time the Synagogue owned nearby Lots 6 and 10.  Certainly that position is both evidential and conclusive that no perpetual parking easement was intended or existed, and whatever parking permission was granted was abandoned.  The plaintiff is certainly estopped from now - many years later and long after the School expansion - from asserting that the Resolution/Site Plan can and should be overridden and disregarded.
[directive] (3)  Duty to disclose.  Board members and staff have an ongoing duty to affirmatively disclose any conflict of interest that they may reasonably become aware of, whether that conflict is inherent or incident-specific.  (4)  Screening.  If a Board member or staffer has a close personal or business relationship with an interested party or any individual who meets any of the criteria listed under the “inherent conflicts,” the Board member or staff should establish a screen to ensure the non-disclosure of sensitive information involving the Board.  (d)  Criminal History of Board Members and Staff
[brief] Plaintiff does not have a copy of that opinion, but instead has a copy of the Order entered by the court as well as copies of the defective notice and the remedial notice published by the Township along with an explanatory letter from Township counsel.  (Pa148; Pa149; Pa150-Pa155).  amendment which “explicitly identified by title, every subsection of the plan that would be deleted, added, or amended” that included “design standards, proposed land use and building requirements, affordable housing, design standard[s] for two story buildings, bulk and area design standards for residential development, and affordable housing requirements. ”  Gentless, No. [...], at 13-14.  (Pa334-Pa335).  Citing the Appellate Division’s decision in Wolf, supra (which concerned the adequacy of a zoning ordinance notice), the trial court held that “a reasonable person would be informed of the essence and scope of the proposed changes” and noted that the “notice specifically listed both affordable housing and design standards as elements the ordinance would change.
[brief] **ARGUMENT**  **POINT I**  THE COMMISSION’S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT WAS REASONABLE, WELL SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATE POLICY  (Addressing [...]’s Point II.A., and B.)  “[A] presumption of reasonableness attaches to the actions of an administrative agency. ”  *Smith v. Ricci*, 89 N.J. 514, 525 (1982).  Thus, an agency decision will only be reversed if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, does not adhere to the law, or was not supported by the evidence in the record.  *Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n*, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019); see also *In re Hermann*, 192 N.J. 19, 21 (2007) (Agency decisions are owed substantial deference “even if the court would have reached a different result in the first instance.
[brief] This is the precise scenario contemplated by the Restatement of Judgments when describing determinations that are not essential.  Factors disfavoring preclusion.  At the risk of stating the obvious, the “quality” and “extensiveness” of the procedures in the two actions were vastly different.  The issue of knowledge simply was not addressed in the First Action, whereas the issue was vigorously and extensively litigated in the action below.  Indeed, the parties engaged in discovery on that very issue – including production of hundreds of pages of documents and two days of witness testimony – and the trial court made factual findings, credibility determinations, and legal conclusions based on the full evidentiary record.  The conclusion:  Plaintiff could not have known about the facts underlying its claims until after the conclusion of the First Action.
[brief] *Humane Society* rejected a substantially similar due process challenge to the “nominating process” for Council members, not tied to membership in the NJSFSC,” is vague, (Pb23 n. 5), is similarly foreclosed by *Humane Society*.  The Supreme Court found that this classification includes hunters and fishermen and does not per se exclude environmentalists, campers, hikers, and backpackers.  70 N.J. at 570 n. 2.  Furthermore, the plain meaning of the term is clear and does not require persons of “common intelligence [to] guess at its meaning. ”  *State v. Lashinky*, 81 N.J. 1, 17 (1979).  \(^6\)  Similarly, there is no support for [...]’s allegation that the Council has a “pro-bear hunting bias” that is “manifested in [its] policies,” (Pa101, Pb13, 19-20), particularly because the Council has a statutory obligation to “provid[e] an adequate and flexible system of protection, propagation, increase, control and conservation of” various animals including bears, “and for their use and development for public recreation and food supply.
[brief] An opinion in appropriate form, excluding letter opinions and transcripts of oral opinions, shall be published where the decision (1) involves a substantial question under the United States or New Jersey Constitution, or (2) determines a new and important question of law, or (3) changes, reverses, seriously questions or criticizes the soundness of an established principle of law, or (4) determines a substantial question on which the only case law in this State antedates September 15, 1948, or (5) is based upon a matter of practice and procedure not theretofore authoritatively determined, or (6) is of continuing public interest and importance, or (7) resolves an apparent conflict of authority, or (8) although not otherwise meriting publication, constitutes a significant and non-duplicative contribution to legal literature by providing an historical review of the law, or describing legislative history, or containing a collection of gases that should be of substantial aid to the bench and bar.  There is no evidence at the bar to prove that the [...] order relied upon ever became binding common law in the state of New Jersey.  A judge presiding over a court can pretend that another court's ruling is binding common law, in spite of the fact that it is not.  However, even though a judge can completely lie in a matter and remain immune, it would not change the fact of the matter that the judge is lying and illegally relying on an unrelated order.  From *Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Group*, 220 N.J. 544 we have in pertinent part:
[brief] (Pa11-12).  Prejudice to Defendant would have surely resulted if this motion was granted at this late stage of discovery.  Ultimately, in support of Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff mischaracterized testimony in an attempt to obtain an inference of spoliation without actual facts or evidence supporting same.  Plaintiff attempted to persuade the Trial Court to grant an inference of spoilation based on speculation, conjecture, and assumption of facts not evidence.  The Trial Court made no error in denying Plaintiff the amendment that would allow a claim for spoliation because the elements were not met based upon factual evidence.
[brief] .....  3  A.  The [...]’s decision-making process failed to abide by the Board’s own Orders and precedent.  .................................................................  3  B.  The Board’s other articulated reasons for denial of the project are not reasonable and should be rejected, especially in light of the State’s policy..................................................................................................................  11  C.  The [...]’s denial of the 1.0  TREC  Factor based upon unrefuted submissions is arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed.............  12  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................
[brief] Also see Plaintiff’s initial pleading, where the Plaintiff ADMITS that he transferred the property to [...], though claims it was “by mistake and without consideration. ”  (Da002).  The Plaintiff’s complaint further goes on to say that the Plaintiff hired an attorney to correct the mistake and “reverse the erroneous transfer,” but “failed to do so. ” (Da003).  The alleged corrected deed was almost identical, other than correcting the block and lot number for the parcel.  However, Plaintiff still signed his brother’s name to the uncorrected deed.  With Plaintiff’s level of sophistication, Plaintiff would have easily been able to determine that the January 1999 deed did not, in fact, correct the alleged erroneous transfer.  Plaintiff has known since at least January 1999 that the deed to the property was transferred to [...].  Still, Plaintiff decided to do nothing about this deed until 2020, outside of the applicable statute of limitations.  For all of the foregoing reasons, the appellate court should overturn the trial court’s determination that the Statute of Limitations does not apply.  Plaintiff knew, or should have been aware, that the deed to the property raised an issue regarding his ownership of the property in question, and did nothing about it for more than twenty years.  Plaintiff’s case should be deemed time-barred, and the property should revert back to the proper owner of the parcel, [...]. POINT 3: TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT DUE TO EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, FRAUD, WAIVER, LACHES, AND FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (Da050 – Da072, not analyzed by the trial court)
[brief] The Clerk, even if he had the power to act alone, acted outside of the time to do so for several reasons.  First, the power granted to the clerk (and two tellers) pursuant to statute is limited to the day of the election, which calls for the canvassing and announcement of votes that night. \(^2\) \(^2\)  This is more akin to a district board of election, where the Board of Elections in its role as Board of Canvassers should be certifying overall election results, as per section C below.  However, even if the statute were read less stringently, the time to certify election results by statute and regulation.  As the Secretary of State’s 2025 Fire Election Timeline explained, the deadline for the certification of election results was February 24, 2025.  (Pa62).  However, separate than that, Fire Districts are required by regulation to upload the results of the election to the FAST system with the Department of Community Affairs within 10 days of the election.  N.J.A.C. 5:31-2.4 (1T85:17-25).  Thus, the election results as initially declared were largely consistent with these timelines, and required to be done by those dates.  However, regardless of the exact date, it has long been held that once election results are certified, the certifying entity lacks the power to change those results, even if a legitimate mistake were discovered and the Clerk was acting in good faith.  In such a case, the remedy is a recount or an election contest, not *ultra vires* self-help.
[directive] Officers shall continually monitor the condition of the subject(s) in their custody for the following warning signs of positional asphyxiation: (a) verbal complaints of being unable to breathe properly, although be aware that a person suffering breathing difficulties may not be able to complain about their crisis; (b) visual signs that the subject is struggling or exhibiting increased effort to breathe; (c) gurgling/gasping sounds with foam or mucus coming from the nose or mouth; (d) display of a heightened level of aggression during restraint, which may be a physiological response to fighting for air, such that any increased resistance during restraint of a person should be regarded with caution; (e) sudden behavioral changes, such as going from being violent and noisy to passive, quiet, and tranquil, or alternatively, suddenly becoming more aggressive; (f) blue discoloration of facial skin (cyanosis); (g) swelling, redness or blood spots to the face or neck; and (h) any loss or a reduced level of consciousness.
[brief] FACTUAL BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY  I.  Respondents’ Complaint Against [...] (1a – 23a).  On May 11, 2023, Respondents commenced this action against [...],\(^1\) alleging among other things, that [...] misappropriated [...]’ company funds while he was working for [...] from a [...] account that the parties jointly opened and had access to in furtherance of expanding [...]’ septic business.  (1a – 23a).  On September 20, 2023, [...] filed an Answer and asserted Counterclaims against Respondents for failure to compensate him for his work.  (24a – 60a).  II.  [...] Complaint Against Respondents (61a – 72a).  Thereafter, on September 20, 2023, [...]\(^2\) filed a separate Complaint in the Law Division, Monmouth County against Respondents in connection with a variety of separate loan transactions and financing that [...] provided to Respondents for the purchase of certain vehicles and other expenses, totaling in excess of $500,000.00.\(^3\) (61a – 72a).  However, despite the parties’ verbal agreement that the loans would be repaid in an amount no less than $10,000.00 --- \(^1\) [...] was previously engaged to [...]’s daughter and the parties had a close relationship before the action was commenced.
[brief] Manorcare Health Services, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 336 N.J. Super. 218 (App. Div. 2001)  ...........................................................................................................51  Natovitz v. Bay Head Realty, 142 N.J. Eq. 456, 463 (E.&A. 1948)  .......................72  Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 400 (2001)  ..............................................52  Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 340 N.J. Super. 104, 118 (App. Div. 2001)  ............................................................................................................36, 40 State v. Dunbar, 434 N.J. Super. 522, 526 (App. Div. 2014)  ..................................36  State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 141-142 (2009)  ...........................................36  Watley v. Watley, A-2545-19T2, 2015 WL 9467244 (App. Div. 2015)  ....................56  Statutes N.J.S.A § 37:2-38 (1988) ..........................................................................................60 N.J.S.A. 37:2-33 ......................................................................................................61 N.J.S.A. 3B:8-10 .....................................................................................................62, 64 Other Authorities 2 McCormick on Evidence §230 at 61 (10Th ed. 1992) ..............................................57 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 397, p. 657 (3rd ed. 1905) .................................73 [...], Remedies§ 4.3 (1973) ........................................................................67 N.J.R.E. 1002 .............................................................................................................57 N.J.R.E. 1003 .............................................................................................................54, 56 N.J.R.E. 801(e) ..........................................................................................................57 TRANSCRIPT REFERENCES¹ “1T” refers to motion transcript dated September 10, 2021 “2T” refers to motion transcript dated December 14, 2021 “3T” refers to motion transcript dated February 18, 2022 “4T” refers to motion transcript dated May 19, 2022 “5T” refers to motion transcript dated July 5, 2022 “6T” refers to motion transcript dated August 15, 2022
[brief] 9  It is the combination of all of these circumstances in this case that distinguishes the matter from the contrary decision in State v. Harris, 457 N.J. Super. 341 48-51 (App. Div. 2018).  Harris involved the failure of the trial court to make the supplemental model-charge inquiry of the jury before delivering a third Czachor instruction -- an issue this Court deemed “a close question” when affirming the trial judge’s decision to fail to make the supplemental inquiry -- but Harris did not have any of the additional concerns of this case.
[brief] “[T]he showing a requestor must make to gain access is greater than that required under OPRA. ”  N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc., 447 N.J. Super. at 210 (citations omitted).  To gain access to public records under the common law right of access, a requestor must show: (1) the records are common-law public documents; (2) the person seeking has an interest in the subject matter of the material; and (3) the citizen’s right to access outweighs the State’s interest in preventing disclosure.
[brief] [...]’s $1.5M bid on [...]’s share of the property does not establish damages, even though it is $1.25M more than what [...] paid for the property.  (Db13-14).  The trial court’s acknowledgment of the $1.25M difference between those amounts and recognition that the difference is the basis for [...]’s claim, does not establish damages.  (Db13-14).  The $1.25M difference between those amounts is not an “excess payment” of $1.25M and does not establish damages.  (Db14).  [...]’s claim that Third-party Defendants “ultimately forc[ed] [...] to expend to pay [] $1,250,050.55 more than it would have had to pay but for the TPD’s actions” is completely false and does not establish damages.  (Db15).  By [...]’s own admission, it voluntarily bid to purchase [...]’s share of the property (3T166-2; 4T45-5) and did not pay any money for the property.  (3T165:2; 3T166-10; 3T166-19).  In addition to the absence of any factual basis in support of its appeal, [...]’s brief lacks any legal basis under New Jersey law in support of its appeal.