ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To the extent required, enlargement pursuant to R. 4:69-6(c) was appropriate in the interests of justice.  [2T]  R. 4:69-6(c) permits enlargement of the 45-day time period to challenge municipal action when the interest of justice requires.  The decision to enlarge the time to challenge municipal action is left to the discretion of the trial court.  *Hopewell Valley Citizens' Group, Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Group Dev. Co., L.P.*, 204 N.J. 569, 578 (2011).  That discretionary decision is based on a consideration on all relevant, equitable circumstances.  See PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 7.3 to R. 4:69-6, p. 1648 (GANN 2024 Ed.), citing *Hopewell Valley*, 204 N.J. at 583-584.  To the extent the 45-day appeal limitation was even applicable to this issue, [...] properly exercised his discretion to allow [...] to intervene and file her complaint.  [...] presents nothing on appeal demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion and its arguments on appeal should be cast aside.
[brief] The registered archaeologist required for this Contract is a professional who would be monitoring and writing reports on the demolition and excavation activities of the Project.  *See* 0912a-0913a § 3.09A, D, E.  Therefore, as a professional, the archaeologist would not need to be registered under the PWCRA.  Starting in January of 2022, the PWCRA was amended to include an exception from this registration requirement, stating: “Subcontractors of a contractor registered pursuant to [the PWCRA] are **not required** to register under that act **if they do not perform work at any construction site subject to that act.
[brief] ”  Here, the judge appropriately reined in defendant’s expert’s answers when the question asked required a simple “yes” or “no” response or the expert’s answer went beyond the scope of the question.  (10T59-1 to 22, 100-24 to 101-1, 161-16 to 162-6, 169-14 to 171-11; 11T38-2 to 6, 111-6 to 24, 191-17 to 25; 12T24-1 to 5, 33-4 to 13, 91-19 to 92-2).  Contrary to defendant’s claim, [...] consistently allowed [...] to give lengthy, uninterrupted narrative answers on direct examination.  See e.g., (10T72-20 to 74-7, 78-19 to 79-17, 79-25 to 80-19, 88-10 to 89-2, 89-25 to 90-21, 91-2 to 92-5, 94-22 to 98-2, 99-19 to 100-23, 122-8 to 123-4, 146-18 to 147-14, 177-16 to 178-18, 185-17 to 186-14, 203-9 to 204-10, 210-18 to 211-19; 11T9-14 to 10-21, 14-23 to 16-17).
[brief] The record contains no evidence showing, for example, that [...] “intentional[ly] interfere[d]” with any “protected interest” that Plaintiffs may have had or that [...] caused Plaintiffs any damages.  To the contrary, the record evidence shows that [...] had no involvement, whatsoever, in Plaintiffs’ alleged dispute with [...].  (Pa284a ¶¶ 9).  In fact, [...] had “no familiarity” with Plaintiffs until it was served with the Complaint, and never at any time had communications with [...] regarding Plaintiffs.  (Pa284a ¶¶ 10-11).  Despite their bare bones and legally deficient Complaint, and the absence of any record evidence supporting their claims, Plaintiffs urge this Court to overturn the trial court’s summary judgment ruling based on three arguments: (i) the trial court “erred” by finding that a transaction between [...] and [...] was a “required element” of a tortious interference claim; (ii) there were “disputed issues of material fact” concerning their tortious interference claim; and (iii) “necessary discovery” was outstanding at the time the trial court granted summary judgment.
[brief] THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY PROSPECTIVELY ENJOINING THE GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS RATHER THAN ALLOWING THEM TO BE ADJUDICATED AND DECIDED ON THEIR MERITS.  [DA9-DA11; DA12-DA13]  Plaintiff does not address [...]’s Point IV, that the trial court erred by preemptively enjoining condemnation and redevelopment.  See Deland v. Twp. of Berkeley Heights, 361 N.J. Super. 1, 19 (App. Div. 2003) (explaining that “courts are reluctant to enjoin litigation prospectively”).  Generally, there are only two categories of litigation that may be enjoined: (1) when a claim has already been heard and decided, or (b) when the claim is pending or is about to be instituted in another forum whose jurisdiction is “superior or prior. ”  See ibid.  There is no precedent allowing a court to issue an injunction based on the circumstances presented in this case.  When a municipality takes governmental action and a party objects, the proper procedure is for the party to challenge the action under Rule 4:69 or, for condemnation, to file an objection in the condemnation proceeding, which is expedited.  See Twp. of W. Orange, 172 N.J. at 567.  The validity of the governmental action is then adjudicated on the merits after briefing, legal argument, and a hearing.  Here, the trial court’s injunction subverts that process entirely.  In direct violation of Deland’s proscription against enjoining litigation prospectively, the trial court essentially granted Plaintiff’s challenges to governmental action by tying [...]’s hands before [...] even took the actions to be challenged, without briefing, legal argument, or a hearing on the merits.
[brief] -- Exhibit K, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated September 10, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2068a)  -- Exhibit L, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], dated July 11, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1947a) -- Exhibit M, Report of [...], P.E., dated December 22, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2425a) -- Exhibit N, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 26, 2019, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2504a) -- Exhibit O, Report of [...], P.E., dated December 11, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2391a) -- Exhibit P, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 10, 2019, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2485a) -- Exhibit Q, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 9, 2019 2677a Plaintiff’s Response to [...]’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed June 27, 2019 2680a Plaintiff’s Response to [...]’s Statement of Material Facts, filed June 27, 2019 2692a Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, filed June 27, 2019 2697a Exhibit 1, Complaint, page 1, dated October 10, 2014, filed June 27, 2019 2712a Exhibit 2, Contract Agreement, dated April 11, 2014, filed June 27, 2019 2714a
[brief] (Da 24-25)  But [...] quickly stopped him and, although much of what he says is not captured on audio, the dashcam video shows [...] speaking to [...] uninterrupted for nearly 40 seconds.  (Da 23-24; Da 15 at 3:22:20 to 3:23:30)  During this time, the audio captured [...] stating that “I just want you to be respectful. ”  (Da 24; Da 15 at --- 5  At the suppression hearing, the State introduced a listening aid which transcribes the audible portions of the dashcam video.  (Da 16-50)  Some of the statements made on the video—including much of what [...] says—are indiscernible and thus are depicted as “inaudible” in the listening aid.  [...] does not dispute the accuracy of the listening aid’s transcription.
[directive] County Prosecutors should conduct reviews of agencies with concerning patterns, as well as instituting a process for random reviews of the internal affairs functions of agencies in their jurisdiction.  For instance, a County Prosecutor might direct a randomly selected agency to share all internal affairs files for cases that were closed in the previous quarter, so that the prosecutor can ascertain whether the internal affairs guidelines are being rigorously observed both in the procedures being employed and in the substance of the results.  Likewise, if excessive force complaints are never sustained by an agency, the County Prosecutor may elect to review the body worn camera footage of force incidents to make an independent assessment.  Even if the County Prosecutor’s Office finds that there have been no substantive errors in an agency’s dispositions or disciplinary decisions, periodic reviews might uncover procedural deficiencies that, if allowed to continue, might 65 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 result in serious errors in the future.  In instances where a County Prosecutor reviewed a matter for potential criminal prosecution, declined prosecution and referred back for administrative action, the County Prosecutor must review the ultimate disposition of those matters.
[brief] In Colter, the Court explained that the requirement of a “summary” of the zoning ordinance mandates that the notice include a description of the “nature or scope” of the zoning changes.  Colter v. Township of Pilesgrove, 393 N.J. Super 377, 387 (App. Div. 2007).  Similar sentiments were set forth in Wolf v. Shrewsbury, 182 N.J. Super. 289, 296 (App. Div. 1981) (stating “notice of a proposed change in the zoning laws must be reasonably sufficient and adequate to inform the public of the essence and scope”).  The use of two very different words in the requirements for N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 demonstrates a clear legislative intent for different notice requirements for zoning ordinances than for general ordinances.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.4(a)(3); N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(f)(5).  [...]’s Project is within the Northeast WQMP.  (Aa10).  To dispose of wastewater that will be generated by its office building and control room, [...] proposes one individual subsurface sewage disposal system that will generate under 2,000 gallons per day.  (Aa32).  This implicates DEP’s Standards for Individual Subsurface Sewage Disposal Systems, N.J.A.C. 7:9A-1.2(a), and [...] accordingly used those standards to calculate its estimated wastewater flow.
[brief] **Findings Are Not Conditions**  First, the passage cited by the Court comes from the “Findings of Fact” section of the Amended Resolution.  It, of course, describes what was actually said at the hearings and records what documents the Applicant made available to them for their deliberations.  The section of the Amended Resolution on which Appellant based his complaint comes from what might be called the “Conditions” section of this document, which details the various conditions with which the applicant has to comply with going forward in order to complete the project in return for the grants of variance.
[brief] Preliminary Statement  The trial court committed reversible error when it ignored the most fundamental aspects of the summary judgment standards; viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and failing to conduct oral argument.  In doing so, the trial court made improper evidentiary rulings and hand-picked facts and testimony which favored the movants.  Those decisions led to a ruling that contradicted the record and now, respectfully, requires correction.  As an initial matter, it’s worth summarizing some of the facts, and favorable inferences, which Plaintiffs’ expert was permitted to rely on in formulating his opinions and that also independently substantiate Plaintiffs’ claims against the Defendants.  Importantly, in the context of a summary judgment motion, the Trial Court was required to accept these facts as true.
[directive] Effective immediately, Pretrial Services Program (PSP) staff no is longer are required to seek an emergent bench warrant in response an emergent EM to of alert.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9, a violation a home detention order, with or without electronic monitoring, is a standalone chargeable crime or offense enforceable by law of enforcement.  Accordingly, a bench warrant is no longer required effect the arrest a to of defendant who is in violation those conditions.  staff1  If of of Pretrial Services Program receives one or more the four types (PSP) alerts2, emergent EM they must immediately execute the steps set forth the attached in revised Protocol, which summarized follows.  as is  The monitoring officer will typically be a Pretrial Services Program staff member.  However, some 1 of of vicinages or counties have entered into Memoranda Understanding with the County Department of Corrections or others to assume the role the electronic monitoring officer.  In these instances, the external staff monitoring officers must alert the appropriate law enforcement agency as to the defendant's noncompliance.  2  Exclusion Zone Entry, Inclusion Zone Leave/Failure to Return Home, Strap Tamper, and Tracker Missed Callback.  of Reform- Directive# 18-23 - Criminal Justice Promulgation
[brief] [...] PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO COUNTER [...]’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT  Prime claims the trial court accepted the facts in the Verified Complaint as competent evidence and failed to consider Prime’s allegations that Aurora was liable for the oil spill, there may have been historic spills at the property, and the waste oil may not have been hazardous.  (Br-p17-21).  Prime further claims that the [...] Field Directive naming [...] as the responsible party for the oil spill does not preclude finding Aurora was also liable for the oil spill.  (Br- 21-23).  The trial court stated that Prime never asserted any claims against Aurora as a responsible party (1T35:20-24); the Verified Complaint was competent evidence and that Prime’s bare allegations were not competent because they were not supported by evidence.  (1T27:9-14).  Prime had no evidence to present to the court because Prime chose not to pursue discovery or ask for an extension of discovery.  (1T34:17-18).  Prime made no argument supported by law for its claim that the trial court’s reliance on the Verified Complaint, given no opposing evidence, was error.  That is because the court can rely on evidence presented in a Verified Complaint.  The Verified Complaint is competent evidence pursuant to R. 1:4-7 [verification of pleadings] because the owner of Aurora and the Aurora LSRP certified to each numbered fact and statement in the Verified Complaint by way of Affidavits attached to the Verified Complaint as required by R. 1:6-6 [which requires personal knowledge of verified statements].  As such, there are no “genuine issues of material fact” as claimed by Prime because Prime presented no opposing facts to the Verified Complaint.
[brief] 15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  [...], Bulletin No. 22-11, December 20, 2022  .............................................. (JA1-2)  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Aftab v. N.J. Prop. Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n,** | | | 386 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2006) | 5 | | **Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan,** | | | 388 N.J. Super. 550 (App. Div. 2006) | 3, 4, 5, 8 | | **In re Galloway Tp. and City of Bridgeton,** | | | 418 N.J. Super. 94 (App. Div. 2011) | 11, 14 | | **Gannon v. Saddle Brook Twp.,** | | | 56 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 1959) | 4 | | **Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation,** | | | 97 N.J. 313 (1984) | 11 | | **New Jersey Transit v. Somerville,** | | | 139 N.J. 582 (1995) | 4 | | **In re Reorganization of the Med Inter-Ins. Exch. Of N.J.,** | | | 328 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2000) | 5 | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14** | 1 | | Other Authorities | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56778/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56778.pdf p. 142 | 7 | | **N.J.A.C. 11:2:27-3** | 5 |
[brief] This Court should follow *Mount Prospect*, which the Third Circuit decided after extensive briefing in a consolidated appeal consisting of three separate district court cases (among many others) filed by [...]. \(^2\)  Notably, even before *Mount Prospect*, several district courts correctly held that the plain language of the No-Fault Law required insurers to arbitration PIP-based causes of action like RICO and other common law claims.  See, e.g., *State Farm Guar. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Cnty. Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr., P.C.*, No. 22-cv-4852, 2023 WL 4362748, at *4-8 (D.N.J. July 6, 2023); *Gov. Employees Ins. Co. v. Menkin*, No. 23-cv-2184, 2023 WL 9039567, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2023); *Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Elkholy*, No. 21-cv-16255, 2022 WL 2373917, at *6 (D.N.J. June 30, 2022).  But they had held incorrectly that IFPA claims were exempt based on an erroneous understanding of a few words in the IFPA.  See infra, Section I.B.
[brief] Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS  .........................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT  ..............................................................................1  In Arguing that the Court Waived the Statutory Requirement that the Presentence Investigation Include a Psychological Evaluation, the State Conveniently Ignores the Fact that the Court Did Not Acknowledge the Existence of the Requirement, Much Less Provide Reasons for the Purported Waiver.  The Claim That the Court Waived the Requirement Is a Mere Fiction.  ..................................................................................1  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................3  CITATION KEY
[brief] (1T:17-16 to 18-14, 21-8 to 22-8)  Acknowledging that the affiant’s observations may have supported an articulable suspicion that [...] was engaged in criminal activity, the court nonetheless found that they did not amount to probable cause to search his home, car, and person.  (1T:21-18 to 22-13)  The court expressed concern regarding what was absent from the affidavit, noting that “there are no controlled purchases from [...]” and “no pick-off of anybody who engaged in a transaction with [...],” which could confirm the identity of the unknown items exchanged.  (1T:22-18 to 23-10)  The court concluded that the affiant failed to corroborate the confidential informant’s general tip through his own observations or investigation.  (1T:17-16 to 18-4, 23-20 to 25-24)
[directive] This Directive implements the Order.  To adhere to mandatory social distancing measures, the Court has relaxed Rule 3:5-3 to remove the requirement that the applicant for a search warrant either must appear personally or judge who must record the telephonically to provide sworn oral testimony to a Superior Court of testimony.  That type in-person interaction is contrary to the public health guidance issued by of New Jersey Department Health (NJ DOH) and the Centers for Disease Control and the Prevention (CDC).  Based on this unprecedented public health crisis, the Court's Order permits an judge the applicant for a search warrant to electronically transmit to a Superior Court of application that includes a certification in lieu oath in accordance with Rule 1 :4-4(b ), and the of Superior Court judge may authorize issuance the warrant electronically.  As such, Assignment Judges and Criminal Presiding Judges in each vicinage will make arrangements for applications judges' to be submitted electronically to the Judiciary email address by law enforcement and county prosecutors.  Court's Order also relaxed Rules 3:5-3, 3:5-5, and 3:5-6 until further order so as to The remove the requirements (1) that a search warrant direct that the executed warrant be returned to the issuing judge, (2) that the return and any inventory be delivered to the issuing judge of judge following execution the search warrant, and (3) that the issuing file documents with the of Rule search warrants described in 3:5-6(b), Criminal Division Manager's office or, in the case of judge.  This temporary elimination these requirements was done because the with the wiretap of exchange and retention these documents poses public health concerns during the COVID-19 ADA ENSURING AN TO OPEN DOOR JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities # Directive 10-20 April 2020 1, Page2 of pandemic.
[brief] *Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 1, 11-12 (2004).  The CFA provides that:  [t]he act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, [or] fraud, ... in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise..., whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice[.]  See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  Pursuant to the CFA, the term "merchandise" shall include “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale. ”  See N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c).  It is well established that the CFA is applicable to commercial transactions.
[brief] (Pa 283-Pa 286)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  LEGAL STANDARD  The standard set forth to review an appeal of a trial court’s order granting summary judgment is a de novo standard under the same standard of the trial court.  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (N.J. 2016).  In Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court explained the summary judgment standard as follows:  “a determination whether there exists a ‘genuine issue’ of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  The judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  It should be kept in mind that the mere existence of issues of fact does not preclude summary judgment unless a view of those facts most favorable to the opposing party adequately grounds some claim for relief.  Bilotti v. Acurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184 (1963).  In Brill, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the standard for summary judgment used by the Federal Courts.  The Brill Court instructed the motion judge to engage in an analytical process essentially the same as that necessary to rule on a motion for directed verdict: “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Id. at 536.  The Brill Court emphasized that the thrust of its decision is “to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves. ”  Id. at 541.  II.  IN DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED A GENUINE MATERIAL FACT IN DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER HE WAS SUBJECTED TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE NJLAD DUE TO HIS RACE AND ERRED IN REVERSING THAT DETERMINATION ON RECONSIDERATION.
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S FEE APPLICATION BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER ASSERTED ANY COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT CANNOT BE DEEMED A PREVAILING PARTY (Pa667-68).  In general, New Jersey disfavors the shifting of attorneys' fees.  *N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999).  However, "a prevailing party can recover those fees if they are expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract."  *Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier*, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001).  When the fee-shifting is controlled by a contractual provision, the provision should be strictly construed in light of New Jersey’s general policy disfavoring the award of attorneys' fees.  See *N. Bergen*, supra, 158 N.J. at 570.  In *Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August*, 450 U.S. 346 (1981), the United States Supreme Court denied a Defendant’s fee application against a no-caused plaintiff, and protected that no-caused plaintiff from the penalizing consequences of fee shifting, reasoning that: