ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This case violated those most basic principles.  A defendant has a constitutionally protected privilege to request and obtain from the prosecution evidence that is either material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to the punishment to be imposed.  *State v. Hollander*, 201 N.J. Super. 453, 478 (App. Div. 1985), (citing *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).  The purpose of the *Brady* rule is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial in which all relevant evidence of guilt and innocence is presented to enable the fact-finder to reach a fair and just verdict.  *Brady*, 373 U.S. at 87-88.  The *Brady* doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on the trial prosecutor to investigate, preserve, and disclose favorable information located in the prosecutor’s files, as well as information in the possession of any member of the prosecution team, including but not limited to its law enforcement officers.  *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 436-38 (1995).  To that end, it is well-settled that a defendant is entitled to evidence in possession of the State that is exculpatory in nature.  *Brady*, 373 U.S. at 87.  Exculpatory evidence includes not only materials that are directly exculpatory of the defendant, but also evidence that may impeach the credibility of a State’s witness.  *State v. Spano*, 69 N.J. 231, 235 (1976).  The suppression by the State of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the evidence is material, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.  *State v. Marshall*, 123 N.J. 1, 107 (1991) (citing *Brady*, 373 U.S. at 87).  The issue in the instant matter concerns: (1) the State’s failure (by way of its complaining witness/investigating officer) to preserve critical evidence; and (2) the subsequent loss or destruction of evidence by the State’s complaining witness.
[brief] This creates reasonable doubt that [...] demonstrated the required intent to violate the statute.  [...]’s testimony provides ample justification to conclude that [...] did not violate the letter of the law or the spirit and intent of the statute.  [...] sought out [...] in a reasonable time after the accident, --- 8  Ironically, after charging [...] early that morning with Leaving the Scene and Failure to Report an Accident, the police themselves did not then contact [...] either about the accident or notify him that [...] had been charged with offenses for striking his son’s car.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  ..............................................  23  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)  POINT IV  THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MERGE THE HARASSMENT CONVICTION WITH THE STALKING CONVICTION, AND THE STALKING CONVICTION WITH THE CONVICTION FOR RETALIATION FOR PAST OFFICIAL ACTION.  (Not Raised Below)  ........................................................................... 25 POINT V THE DEFENDANT’S 16-YEAR SENTENCE, WHICH IS SIGNIFICANTLY HARSHER THAN THE 11.5-YEAR SENTENCE REQUESTED BY THE PROSECUTOR, IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.
[brief] [...], *More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification*, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 1049 (2005) (“The potential to mislead a fact-finder by saying, ‘My methodological error rate is zero, and my practitioner error rate is negligible,’ is extremely high. ”).  See also [...], *Approved Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline* 2-3 (prohibiting DOJ experts from testifying that “two friction ridge impressions originated from the same source to the exclusion of all others,” or from asserting “that latent print examination is infallible or has a zero error rate.
[brief] 2.  The unclear and ambiguous language of the Agreement does not secure valid waiver of the right to jury trial  In this instance, the user could address the substance of the agreement only after contending with its late arrival, post-purchase in a moment of pressure and imposition, and after hacking through an entangling web of confusing, contradictory, cross-referencing sections.  Cases like Ogunyemi instruct that even a clear, explicit waiver might not be enough to save an arbitration provision at this stage, never mind one that relies upon vague, unclear, and ambiguous language like [...]’s.
[directive] Section  See detention.  pretrial seeking of presumption from seeking refrain to the is decision if required Director is approval  Assistant/Director/Deputy ordinary an is or to murder subject with is defendant charged case the where in detention a pretrial is designated supervisor of approval  Section a  The 7.3.  See imprisonment.  life of term extended or in detention, seeking from or detention, refrain seek pretrial to made is decision the when sufficient motion.  detention filing pretrial a of presumption rebuttable a establishes Directive this where case a supervisors). of (designation 7.8.  Section 7.4.  also See Section See Detention. for Pretrial Applvin~ aig  A Presumption nst 7.2 shall apply prosecutor not 7.4, or the 7.3.  under Sections covered otherwise not case any In or Director the or Prosecutor, Assistant or Prosecutor First County the unless detention pretrial for Division, determines the by prosecuted in cases  Justice Criminal of Division the of Director Deputy a that: adequately accounted not detention were pretrial justifying circumstances or facts specific (a) risk-assessment process; pretrial automated the by for hearing detention to the convincing at evidence and clear present to able be will State the (b) and detention; pretrial against presumption statutory the overcome risk that serious a is there conditions, maximum on even released, were defendant if (c) other any pose to danger will a (ii) when required, court in appear not will (i) defendant justice criminal the obstruct or to attempt obstruct (iii) will or community, the or person a or intimidate, injure, threaten, to attempt or intimidate, or injure, threaten, or process, juror. or witness prospective
[brief] Id.  Instead of deciding this issue the Board discussed expenses.  Specifically, [...]’s counsel expressed that she was concerned with the charge of management fees since [...] also owned the management company, \(^2\) $525,000 divided by eleven equals $47,727.  [...].  *Id.* at 55:4-6.  In addition, [...]’s counsel took issue with the $5,772 condo maintenance fee check because there were no bills submitted by the condo association to the landlord to demonstrate that the amount charged by the association was actually expended.  *Id.* at 61:4-25.  The Board adjourned the meeting until October 26, 2017.
[brief] *Brannon v. State*, 783 S.E.2d 642, 650 (Ga. 2016) (emphasis added).  See also *Young v. State*, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1180 (Ind. 2022) (explaining the process by which an officer “reviewed the accuracy of [a system’s] timestamp” by comparing it with “‘official U.S. government time’”).  In contrast, in this case, there’s no evidence that [...] contemporaneously noted a discrepancy in the time used by the surveillance system and the actual date and time.  No documentation is in the record to that effect.  He did not provide an accurate accounting of the discrepancy, instead relying on an approximation.  [...] provided no evidence about how he retrieved the video and whether that was in accordance with his training.  [...] wasn’t even sure where he got the video from.  Further, he testified that another officer had some sort of issue downloading the video, which raises concerns about the ability of officers to retrieve the correct footage in this case.  In short, [...] did not provide any evidence that at the time he retrieved the video he took sufficient steps to ensure that the video is actually what it purports to be: images taken by a surveillance camera at a certain location at around 6:22p.m. on July 16, 2019.
[brief] . . .  The determination of a qualifying disability in this case cannot be looked at in a vacuum.  . . .  [I]n light of the pandemic’s existence, [it] is the proper way to make the disability determination here. ”  Id.  In Peeples v. Clinical Support Options, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D. Mass. 2020) the court held that a plaintiff with asthma was considered disabled under the ADA because the plaintiff was “at a higher risk for serious illness or even death” if they contracted COVID-19.  Id at 63.  The court noted that it found “persuasive this limited precedent addressing the standard for determining whether an individual has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, thus rising to the level of a disability, during this pandemic. ”  Id.  In *People First of Ala. V. Merrill*, 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (N.D. Ala. 2020) citizens of Alabama brought suit claiming that certain voting procedures in Alabama violated the ADA during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Id.  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that plaintiffs were not disabled under the ADA “because the Plaintiffs’ own choice – not a physical or mental impairment – limit their major life activities. ”  Id at 1158.  The court instead found that, “CDC guidance supports a finding that it is the plaintiffs’ or their members’ underlying medical conditions, not their personal choices, that impact their ability to interact with others or work during the COVID-19 pandemic.  And, because the ADA must be broadly construed, the court must consider the circumstances and impact of the State’s current public health emergency when determining whether the plaintiffs’ physical impairments substantially limit a major life activity.  Put different, as [...] aptly stated, the determination of a qualifying disability in this case cannot be looked at in a vacuum.
[brief] Defendant argues the trial court’s factual findings regarding defendant being “hunched over” concealing his waistband and behaving nervously were inaccurate, and that, even if accurate, his behavior was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion justifying the Terry\(^3\) frisk.  The trial court’s legal findings regarding defendant’s behaviors during the traffic stop are amply supported by the credible testimony of the detective at the suppression hearing.  Moreover, as --- \(^3\) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968). the trial court properly found, defendant’s actions and movements were in fact sufficient to alert detectives to the possibility that defendant may have been armed and dangerous.  As such, the trial court appropriately found the frisk to be justified and properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
[brief] It cannot be disputed that [...] discovered [...]’s receipt of charge pay, that she reported it to [...], who raised it to [...], and that [...] launched an investigation.  Neither [...], nor [...], nor [...] dispute the accuracy of [...]’s notes, which reflect that charge pay was taken without express approval.  (Pa536-42; see also Pa298 at 80:10-14 ([...] admitting at her deposition that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay for any staffing coordinator); Pa548-49 ([...] never received confirmation from [...] as to charge pay); Pa478 ([...] stated he never received approval from [...] to enter the charge pay)).  Based upon the undisputed findings of the investigation reflected in those notes, and the undisputed Kronos Time Card Audit Trial showing the payments, the “term panel” indisputably ended the employed of all three Plaintiffs.
[brief] verdict and court order was entered.  *Id.* at 526.  Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for fees.  *Id.* at 527.  On December 17, 1993, the Court heard arguments and ruled on the motion.  *Id.*  Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion which was decided on January 4, 1994.  *Id.*  On January 19, 1994, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal 63 days after the court’s order.
[brief] In this regard, Directive 22-14 specially provides that This Directive also clarifies and confirms the Attorney General’s broad supersession authority over internal affairs.  New Jersey law assigns the Attorney General responsibility to ensure the proper, efficient, and uniform handling of law enforcement business in the State and it provides him with the authority to supersede investigations and criminal actions as one tool to achieve those goals.  Because proper, efficient, and uniform handling of internal affairs investigations are integral to the law enforcement business of the State, and because oversight over Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures is specifically assigned to the Attorney General by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181, this Directive confirms the Attorney General’s supersession authority includes internal affairs matters.  (Pa16)  (emphasis added).  Accordingly, this Court’s review of the Attorney General’s application of Directive No. 22-14 and the IAPP are legal in nature, and thus subject to de novo review.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] (1T32-14 to 17).  [...] and another trooper, who had arrived on the scene, removed [...] from the passenger seat and conducted a probable cause search of [...].  (1T34-12 to 14).  [...] denied that he had a key to unlock the truck topper.  (1T34-14 to 16).  The officers found the key to the truck topper in one of [...]’s shoes.  (1T34-16 to 20).  The officers searched the truck and discovered, underneath some plywood and cardboard, eight large duffel bags containing approximately 200 pounds of raw marijuana.
[brief] [...], Esq.  In the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  DOCKET No: [...]  [...] and [...], as husband and wife and  Individually, Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10 and/or ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10, in their corporate capacity and as to the principles and owners individually (Names being fictitious and unknown but described as the corporate or individual owner(s), manager(s), lessor(s), supervisor(s), who had control of the premises located at [...], who contributed to the March 16, 2017 loss),
[brief] (PA000001-PA000058).  As previously discussed, a reviewing court must “search[omit] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim…”  Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252, 128 A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1957).  Similarly, to ascertain whether a complaint pleads a good cause of action, separate paragraphs may not be taken out of context, and the entire complaint must be read together.  Kurtz v. Oremland, 24 N.J. Super. 235 (Ch. Div. 1952).  Pursuant to CEPA, our Courts have long held that “[W]hat constitutes an ‘adverse employment action’ must be viewed in light of the broad remedial purpose of CEPA, and our charge to liberally construe the statute to deter workplace reprisals against an employee speaking out against a company’s illicit or unethical activities.
[brief] DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], P.J.Cv.  DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT [...]  D/B/A  [...] IMPROPERLY PLED AS [...]’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS’ APPEAL.  [...]  [...], Esq.  (Attorney No. 028421997)  [...], Esq. (Attorney No. 033351994)  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
[brief] Speculation is personal to [...] and he did not identify any particular standard by which he was measuring the state of the grid and its sufficiency to meet increased electrical demand from decarbonization.  "A standard which is personal to the expert is equivalent to a net opinion."  Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999) (citing Crespo v. McCartin, 244 N.J. Super. 413, 422-23 (App. Div. 1990)).
[brief] [...] went back into the courtyard, telling her colleagues, including [...], that [...] had possessed the gun, which [...] saw on the video.  (Da20; Dca 1, clip four, 3:00 to 4:10).  They entered a second building, where the group proceeded to the apartment occupied by the daughter of [...], [...].  (Dca 1, clip four, 4:10 to 5:25).  While still on the elevator headed to the apartment, [...] told Velez that the video showed Amaryllis place the gun inside one building, then remove it and take it with her, which information caused [...] to decide to detain her for tampering with evidence when they found her.  (Dca 1, clip four, 4:10 to 5:00).  [...] Gross answered her apartment door, and told police Amaryllis was not inside.  (Dca 1, clip four, 5:40 to 5:55).  After confirming that fact, the police went to a different building, in which the woman who had been sitting on the retaining wall with Amaryllis lived.  (Dca 1, clip four, 5:55 to 8:40).  On the way, [...] directed that Amaryllis be read her rights, which [...] confirmed with Velez while on an elevator up to the second woman’s apartment.  (Dca 1, clip four, 8:53 to 9:10).  While on the elevator, Officer [...] advised [...] that surveillance video disclosed that Amaryllis had been near defendant, walked into a building, unsuccessfully tried to gain entry to a unit, and placed a “metallic, shiny object,” which appeared to [...] to be a gun, on a windowsill.  Some time later, according to the video Officer [...] had seen, Amaryllis removed the object from the windowsill, and then walked into a different unit, which police learned was the apartment in which she was staying.  (1T9-12 to 23; Da23; Dca 1, clip four, 9:10 to 9:38).  But when the second woman opened her apartment door, she told police Amaryllis was not inside.  While in the elevator leaving the building, [...] reported on his phone that the injury to defendant had still not been confirmed to be a bullet wound.  (Dca 1, clip four, 16:20).  [...] and Velez returned to the security office, where [...] recorded the security recording showing Amaryllis and the second woman get off an elevator and walk to a yellow bag on a window sill, where Amaryllis removed a small object, which she then placed inside a greenish bag she had, before the two women returned to the elevator and left that floor.
[brief] The [...] (the “Department”) issued a December 20, 2022 Bulletin\(^1\) purporting to “clarify” the laws and regulations applicable to reciprocal exchanges in this State, which is the subject of the present appeal by [...]  (“[...]”), as the attorney-in-fact for [...] (“[...]”) pursuant to Rule 2:2-3.  On its face, the Bulletin appears straightforward—reciprocal exchanges are, and always have been, required to comply with the New Jersey Insurance Holding Company Systems Act, N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14 (the “Holding Act”), as well as Statement of Statutory Accounting Principle No. 25 (“SSAP No. 25”) regarding certain related party transactions.  This begs the question: If the language of the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 clearly supported the Department’s position, what did the Department need to “clarify” in the first place?  The answer, candidly, is nothing.  The Department issued the Bulletin, not to clarify, but to unilaterally and improperly change New Jersey law, contrary to its own prior interpretations and actions and the language of both the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25.  Indeed, the Department’s pronouncements shocked reciprocal insurers, who have operated for decades under a set of laws, rules, and regulations that are different from other insurers as approved by the Department.
[brief] 113a-116a.  On January 20, 2023, the trial court entered five Orders.  Three of the Orders granted the pending Motions to Dismiss with prejudice.  121a-126a.  The remaining two Orders denied the Appellant’s Cross-Motions to Extend Discovery.  127a-130a.  On February 9, 2023, the Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the January 20, 2023, trial court Orders.  131a-134a.  On March 17, 2023, the trial court denied the Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration.  144a-157a.  On April 13, 2023, the Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate the trial court’s March 17, 2023, Order denying reconsideration and to Reinstate the Appellant’s Complaint.  158a-161a.  On May 12, 2023, the trial court entered an Order denying the Appellant’s Motion to Vacate Order and Reinstate.  162a-167a.  On June 15, 2023, the Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal of the various trial court dismissal Orders, which are discussed at length herein.
[brief] The publication provides, "[t]he general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  *Ibid.*  (*quoting* Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (*quoting* Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)), see *State v. Camey*, 239 N.J. 282, 306 (2019) ("[w]e will not disturb the trial court's findings; in an appeal, we defer to findings that are supported in the record and find roots in credibility assessments by the trial court"); Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311, 329 (2017) ("[w]e review the trial court's factual findings under a deferential standard: those findings must be upheld if they are based on credible evidence in the record"); Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016) (findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence); State v. K.W., 214 N.J. 499, 507 (2013) ("[w]e defer to the trial court's factual findings 'so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record").  The deferential standard is applied "because an appellate court's review of a cold record is no substitute for the trial court's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand."  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020) and "[l]imiting the role of a reviewing court is necessary because '[p]ermitting appellate courts to substitute their factual findings for equally plausible trial court findings is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the [trial] courts in the eyes of litigants."  State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 272 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380-81 (2017)).
[brief] My name is [...], I am the Pro Se Appellant-Defendant in this case.  I have personal knowledge about this case and I am making this brief in support of my amended notice of appeal package filed on 12/8/23 (001a).  All references in volumes will be referred by there is beginning Bates pages numbers.  I am appealing the [...] order made on 9/25/23 (221a) by Hon. [...].
[brief] ...........................................  H1699a  [...] responses to HOLM-[...]-NCF-157, 160, 164 and 166 are Exhibits Holm-149 to 152 and included in this Appendix at Ha684 to Ha694.  [...] response to HOLM-[...]-NCF 158............................  H1701a [...] response to HOLM-[...]-NCF 159............................  H1702a [...] response to HOLM-[...]-NCF 161............................  H1704a [...] response to HOLM-[...]-NCF 162............................  H1705a [...] response to HOLM-[...]-NCF 163............................  H1706a [...] response to HOLM-[...]-NCF 165............................  H1707a [...] response to HOLM-[...]-NCF 167............................  H1708a  S-11: [...] responses to discovery requests HOLM-[...]-POT-168 to -180 dated May 14, 2020 (see also Holm-153 to -165) (SOICR p. 9) are at Exhibits 153 to 165 and included in this Appendix at Ha695 to Ha707.