ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Being that these decisions insist on the validity of requests, the law must at least demand that requests be made.  The decision below represents a major departure from this case law and OPRA’s plain language.  The trial court on remand ordered the disclosure of “information as to the type of crime, time, location and type of weapon, if any” even though Plaintiff did not request such information when he submitted the OPRA request or before he filed suit.  Da86.\(^1\)  Worse still, prevailing party status and a fee award was later conferred to Plaintiff.  Da108, Da115.  In making those determinations, the lower court appeared to misconstrue this Court’s decision in the first appeal.
[brief] The trial court echoed these sentiments in granting Appellants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint in this action, finding:  The facts asserted in the Complaint are neither new nor recently discovered.  While the facts were known to [Appellants] prior to the commencement of the Prior Action in 2019, [Appellants] did not assert any claims against [...].  Rather, they allowed discovery to conclude after over two year[s] and four discovery extensions, before seeking to add these claims in the Prior Action.  There is no disagreement as to the facts, and there is no further discovery to be had.  This Court recognized [Appellants’] failure to justify their failure to assert the claims earlier and denied [Appellants] leave to amend the First Amended Complaint.  The same reasoning applies here in the application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  [Pa292].  The Appellants cannot overcome these rational determinations to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in applying the Entire Controversy Doctrine as a basis to dismiss Appellants’ Complaint.  Yet, in appealing its application, Appellants inexplicably contend that “… because the entire controversy doctrine requires a finding of ‘prejudice’ that was not found in the 2019 docket, it is simply inapplicable here and was not a proper basis for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e). ”  Not only is the argument not legally supported, but it is belied by the factual record.  Indeed, in denying the motion for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint in the Prior Action to add these very claims, the trial court expressly found that [...] would be prejudiced by the untimely assertion of these claims.  Specifically, the trial court stated Appellants “delay in seeking to assert these claims is prejudicial to [...] and is not permitted. ”  The trial court’s denial of the Appellants’ motion for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint is not on appeal, and the finding of prejudice stands undisturbed. \(^7\)  It is clear that the filing of this action represents a desperate attempt by Appellants to take a second bite of the apple after having had their claims dismissed in the Prior Action and having been denied leave to add these claims in the Prior Action, where they should have been asserted earlier.  Clearly, the Entire Controversy Doctrine applies here, and dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) was appropriate; not an abuse of discretion.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2021-14  TO: All Law Enforcement Chief Executives and County Prosecutors  FROM: [...], Acting Attorney General DATE: December 28, 2021  SUBJECT: Directive  Updating Statewide Use of Force Policy  On December 21, 2020, Attorney General [...] issued Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-13, which revised New Jersey’s Use of Force Policy (UOF Policy) for the first time in two decades.  Given the significance of the revisions, AG Directive 2020-13 included an effective date of December 31, 2021 and required that all of New Jersey’s 38,000 state, county, and local law enforcement officers complete several training programs in the interim.  Over the past year, the Attorney General’s Office identified a handful of provisions in the UOF Policy that require correction before it goes into effect at the end of this year.  This Directive implements those revisions.  For the reasons stated in this Directive, and pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with the Use of Force Policy as revised by this Directive (the December 2021 UOF Policy), and to take any additional measures necessary to update their policies accordingly.
[brief] First, [...] improperly determined the failure to preserve the [...] profile ipso facto justified a finding of bad faith.  To the contrary, case law makes clear that the loss of evidence alone, even if negligent, is not an automatic constitutional violation.  Second, [...] wrongly presumed the loss of the profile was attributable to the State, even though the State had confirmed it did not delete it.  (1T13-16 to 18; 1T15-16 to 19).  In fact, [...] was responsible for the deletion of the profile.  As was learned after the motion, “[...]’s” profile would have been deleted from the [...] servers in January 2020, as [...] permanently deletes all inactive profiles after 284 days.  (Pa39).  Further, as the User Agreement, Privacy Policy, and Community Guidelines for [...] make clear, the administrators of the website may delete any profiles, information, or content at any time and in their discretion.  An administrator could have determined “[...]’s” profile violated the Terms and Conditions for allegedly belonging to a fourteen-year-old boy and deleted it immediately.  The profile was thus deleted without any intentional or even --- 2  The State is simultaneously filing a motion to expand the record to include this new information.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED ALL RELEVANT FACTS PRESENTED  FINDING THAT DEFENDANT PRESENTED EXCEPTIONAL AND MERITORIOUS FACTS TO AVOID AN UNJUST RESULT AND THEREBY VACATED THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE (Raised below T21-23 to 30-20)  Defendant filed its motion to vacate Plaintiff’s final judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(a) (f).
[brief] Further, the Redeveloper knew that the [...] would not have the authority to grant a “D” variance pursuant to the ordinance creating the Central Business District 15 zone, in which the property is located.  As the CBD 15 ordinance, which has not been amended since 2014, states:  290-68 C.  (2)  Any deviations from the standards provided herein that result in a "D" variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d shall be addressed as an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan rather than via variance relief through the [...].  The above quoted language is specifically mandated by the New Jersey Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40 A:12A-9, which states:  a.  All agreements, leases, deeds and other instruments from or between a municipality or redevelopment entity and to or with a redeveloper shall contain a covenant running with the land requiring that the owner shall construct only the uses established in the current redevelopment plan; Since the use proposed by the Redeveloper, a residential structure at grade, is not permitted under the Redevelopment Plan, it would only be possible if the Mayor and Council were to amend the Redevelopment Plan, the very same plan which the Redeveloper has agreed to abide by.  In addition to the Redeveloper’s proposal violating the mandate of the Redevelopment law, it is also, as stated previously, contrary to the zoning ordinance applicable to the property.
[brief] (Pa11).  Although these additional methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.  (Pb11-12).  The record demonstrates that the postcard was mailed on August 9, 2021.  (Pa14; Pa78-80).  That slight delay in mailing the postcard is immaterial, as postcard notification was not required under the Ricci Act, and information about the Ricci Act was prominently posted on the Division’s website and publicly available for two years from the effective date of the statute.
[brief] Without a statement of reasons, we cannot know whether the court considered the requirement, and this Court cannot review the failure to order such a psychological examination for an abuse of discretion.  See State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 307 (2010) (“To the extent that the choice about who may speak [at sentencing] is an exercise of discretion, it shares the same attributes of all discretionary determinations, namely, it must be accompanied by some expression of reasons sufficient to permit appellate review. ”); State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 235 (2014) (explaining that a statement of reasons is required for sentencing decisions in order to facilitate appellate review).
[brief] **The sentencing court properly found that factors 3A and 3C applied.**  The sentencing court properly found that factor 3A, whether the crimes and their objectives are predominantly independent of one another, and factor 3C, the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time as to indicate a single period of abhorrent behavior, applied in this case.  See (Da44-51); *Yarbough*, 100 N.J. at 643-45.  The Court in *Yarbough* identified the following factors for sentencing courts to consider as a guide when determining whether to make sentences concurrent or consecutive: (1) there can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime; (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision; (3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing court should include facts relating to the crimes; (4) there should be no double counting of aggravating factors; (5) and, successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first offense.
[brief] ............39  Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 2000)  .............................................44  Soc’y Hill Condo. Ass’n v. Soc’y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J. Super. 163 (App. Div. 2002)  .............................................45  State of New Jersey v. East Shores, Inc., 164 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 1979)  .......................................................... 30, 31  Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Company, 81 N.J. 150 (1979) ......................................................................................... 37, 38  The Times of Trenton Pub. Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 368 N.J. Super.  425 (App. Div. 2004) ............................................................ 30 Township of Wash. v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578 (1958) .......................................................................................... 28 Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2007) ............................................................. 35 Wade v. Kessler Inst., 343 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2001) ............................................................. 33 Wasserstein v. Kovatch, 261 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 1993) ............................................................. 39 West Jersey Title & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Trust Co., 27 N.J. 144 (1958) .......................................................................................... 42 State Statutes N.J.S.A. 40A:31-10.a., c. .............................................................................. 21 N.J.S.A. 58:1A-2 ............................................................................................... 17 N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2(a), (b) .............................................................................. 16 N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq. ................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 ...............................................................................................
[brief] [...] and [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | The Facts Before the Trial Court | 5 | | The Trial Court's Erroneous Decision | 9 | | ARGUMENT | 11 | | THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS ORDER MUST BE REVERSED | | | BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT AND CANNOT ESTABLISH AN IMPLIED EASEMENT | | | APPURTEnant BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (Da2601-2607, T61:8—T73:20)| 11 | | A. Standard of Review | 11 | | B.  An Implied Easement Appurtenant Must Be Established By Clear | 12 | | And Convincing Evidence | | | C.  The Record Before the Trial Court Did Not and Cannot Establish an | 13 | | Implied Easement Appurtenant by Clear and Convincing Evidence | | | 1.  The reasons relied on by the trial court do not establish an | 13 | | implied easement | | | a. Proximity to the beach | 14 | | b.  The required cost and size of a house built on the | 16 | | [...] | | | c.  References to “Surf Fishing” and “Surf Bathing” | 17 | | d.  Whether [...] felt “obligated” to access the beach via | 18 | | the street ends | | e.  The boardwalk not being built ..................................................18  f.  The trial court’s erroneous reliance on Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n ........................................................................................................19  2.  Substantial other aspects of the record disprove an easement ...............21 a.  The [...] Indenture ...........................................................................22  b.  The 1925 Plan ......................................................................................23 c.  The 1949 Judgment .............................................................................23  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................25
[directive] This will acknowledge receipt of the complaint made by you on [date of complaint] concerning the actions of a member of this department occurring on [date of incident].  A thorough investigation will be conducted into the allegations contained in your complaint and you will be advised of the results of the investigation upon its conclusion.  In the meantime, if you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office by calling [telephone number], Monday through Friday, between the hours of ____a.m. and ____p.m.  Officer Exonerated  The Internal Affairs Unit of this department has completed its investigation of your complaint concerning the conduct of [name of subject officer].
[brief] P.L. 2021, C. 334 (Senate Bill 711)  Approved January 10, 2022 ........................................................ Pa1126  Assembly Labor Committee Statement To Senate, No. 771  Dated December 13, 2021 ........................................................ Pa1130  Senate Labor Committee Statement To Senate, No. 771  Dated December 8, 2020 ........................................................ Pa1131  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page  The Trial Court’s Order Granting Summary Judgment
[brief] The Prosecutor’s Unnecessarily Graphic Opening and Closing Arguments -- Including Comparison to the Mobsters in “Goodfellas” -- Improperly Urged the Jury to Convict Based on Emotion, Rather than the Evidence. **  Although prosecutors are permitted to sum up forcefully, they “may not make ‘inflammatory and highly emotional’ appeals which have the capacity to defer the jury from a fair consideration of the evidence of guilt” -- especially not “emotional appeals by the prosecutor calculated to arouse sympathy for the victim. ”  *State v. W.L.*, 292 N.J. Super. 100, 110-11 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting *State v. Marshall*, 123 N.J. 1, 161 (1991)); *accord State v. Blakney*, 189 N.J. 88, 96 (2006) (holding prosecutors may not “play on the passions of the jury or trigger emotional flashpoints, deflecting attention from the hard facts on which the State’s case must rise or fall”).  Here, the prosecutor in both opening and closing repeatedly appealed to emotion and sympathy for [...] by emphasizing facts that had no relevance to the only disputed issue -- who killed [...] -- and served only to prejudice the jury against [...].  The prosecutor began in opening:  At a certain point while the two of them are walking down the street and Isaac [...] thinks he’s walking with someone he’s known for ten years, the evidence will show Charles [...] turned to him, pulled out a handgun at close range and shot him in the face.  He shot him in the eye with the projectile exiting his neck, and when Isaac [...]’s body fell on the cold streets of [...] on February 23rd, 2015 the evidence will show Charles [...] continued firing that handgun at his lifeless body on the ground to make sure the job was done, and then you will be presented evidence, after this occurred, he almost calmly strolls away.  It’s a slight little jog and he just strolls away like nothing happened.  . . .  So you’ll hear from the first officer who responded that night to a call, shots fired, multiple shots fired, in this location, [...].  And what he’s going tell you is that Charles [...] left Isaac [...] there like a pile of garbage, because that officer, when he arrived on the scene, thought that Isaac [...]’s body at first was a bag of trash because he was wearing all black.  That’s how Charles [...], who knew this man for ten years, left his friend, dying, dead, on the streets of [...].  [1T 77-22 to 79-9 (emphasis added).
[brief] B.  Plaintiff’s Nerve Center is in New Jersey  Plaintiff is an oil development company based in New Jersey and was formed for the purpose of developing, constructing, owning, and operating a crude oil topping refinery near Trenton, North Dakota.  Da21–23 ¶¶ 1 & 11.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff’s CFO, [...], was involved in raising capital to fund the transaction at issue in this case.  Da314 ¶¶ 5, 6 & 11.  Plaintiff conducts all its administrative affairs and operations from New Jersey and has done so since it was formed in 2013.  Id. at ¶ 11.  Plaintiff does not have an office in North Dakota – Plaintiff’s website confirms its corporate location is in [...].  Id. at ¶¶ 5, 10 & 11.  [...] concedes [...] was spearheading the Project’s financing and was the “quarterback” of the deal.  Da234 55:5–20.  Plaintiff is managed by its New Jersey parent company, [...], and has been since Plaintiff’s inception in 2013.  Da314 ¶ 5.  [...] has always had and continues to have a direct interest in Plaintiff and oversees all its financial transactions.  There is daily interaction and collaboration between [...] and Plaintiff.  Id. at ¶ 8.  All professional services provided to Plaintiff are conducted in New Jersey including, but not limited to, tax returns, tax accounting, operations, compliance, and bank accounts.  Id. at ¶ 6; Da151 No. 6.  Two partners of [...] run Plaintiff: [...] and [...] (“[...]”).  Da314 ¶ 6.  Plaintiff is publicly identified as part of [...]’s portfolio.  Id. at ¶ 8.  [...] and Plaintiff share a mailing address of 1420 Meetinghouse Road, Suite 4, [...] 08750.  Id. at ¶¶ 9 & 10.  In 2016, Plaintiff and [...] shared a mailing address of [...].  Id. at ¶ 12; Da149 No. 2.  At the inception of this action, [...] was registered to do business in New Jersey.  Da320–22.  During the pendency of this action, Plaintiff was registered to do business as a foreign LLC.  Da324.  C. [...]’s Long-Standing Relationship with Plaintiff and [...]
[brief] [...], the only thing I’ll ask you to comment on is [...]’s observation that copies are available at the [...], [...] and the municipal offices of the Borough of Seaside Heights, if I’m not mistaken, is [...]; is that correct?  BOARD MEMBER: Correct.  And to state, if I may, I just walked outside about ten minutes ago.  On those doors outside that [...] was referring to, it directs people to go to [...] for general municipal business.  [...]:  Right.  So, I was going to say I think that might have been an older description of the address that was used, but, in any event, it does say the municipal offices of the Borough of Seaside Heights and, of course, as [...] he noted he was able to ask and said where’s the office.  I think the municipal offices are actually . . .  BOARD MEMBER: On the corner of Grant and – literally across the street.  [...]: Literally across the street.  BOARD MEMBER: And also the phone number is correct.  [...]: And the phone number is correct according to our Chairman.  So, under those circumstances, [...], I’d ask you if you want to comment on that or how you feel about whether you need to renounce under those circumstances.  It’s also [...] is on the record there’s a notice on the door that directs you to the municipal offices at [...].  So, if you did come here, the sign tells you where to go.  So, I’ll leave it to you.  That’s my observation.  MR. HEAGEN: I have no comment.  [...]: Okay.  Board members, are you satisfied to take jurisdiction of this matter and proceed with the hearing?
[brief] Rule 1:4-8(b)(1) requires that “[a]n application for sanctions under this rule shall be by motion made separately from other applications and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to have violated this rule. ”  Here, Plaintiff did not file a motion.  Instead, the trial court decided to impose frivolous sanctions in the February 14, 2024 Order, following the plenary hearing.  With this approach, Defendants right to procedural due process was not observed.  Additionally, with regard to frivolous sanctions, the judiciary has determined that “The rule and statute must both be interpreted strictly against the applicant for an award of fees. ”  Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J., Inc., --- 8  Defendants have included their Due Process Violation Brief (402a), Plaintiff’s Response (500a), and their Reply Brief (549a) in the Appendix.
[brief] This complaint was voluntarily dropped before an answer was even given.  There was no discussion at all between the Defendant and myself about any of the facts of the case.  The SLAPP law itself (June 27, 2023) states under the section "Hearing for Order to Show Cause":  "The bill further provides that the court would hear an order to show cause as expeditiously as possible, unless the court allows limited discovery.  In ruling on an order to show cause, the court would consider the pleadings, the order to show cause application and support certifications, briefs, any reply or response to the order to show cause, and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment."  In order for this to be considered a case under SLAPP, there had to be evidence provided on both sides showing their respective positions.  None of this was done.  The law further states:  "The court is permitted to dismiss with prejudice a cause of action, or part thereof, if: (1) the moving party established that the act applies; (2) the responding party fails to establish that the act does not apply; and (3) either: (a) the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action; or (b) the moving party establishes that: (i) the responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted; or (ii) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action or part thereof."  This clearly shows what must take place before any case can be deemed a SLAPP case.  None of this took place.  The case was voluntarily dismissed before any evidence or even any answer was submitted to the court.  As [...] said to the Defendants when they made their claim that this lawsuit falls under the guidelines of SLAPP, "That's your position".