ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12 provides in relevant part that:  Public notice shall be given by publication in the official newspaper of the municipality, if there be one, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality...  ...notice of a hearing requiring public notice... shall be given to the owners of all real property as shown on the current tax duplicates, located in the State and within 200 feet in all directions of the property which is the subject of such hearing.  [Id.]  As stated by the SHO, the public notice provided adhered exactly to the requirements of the MLUL.  The MLUL requirements cited above, incidentally, are the same requirements met for notice of the 2019 hearing at which Plaintiffs’ Amended Application was summarily denied.
[brief] As discussed above, Appellants and both firms to represent them in this action had every opportunity to comply with the Order under review.  First, they dragged their feet in the hopes that a letter to the Presiding Judge would solve their problems.  Then they demanded a written order suitable for appeal when they had not yet taken steps to comply with the then-two-week-old but still binding oral opinion delivered on February 16, 2024.  Even with the written order in hand, unequivocally disqualifying [...] and [...] as well as requiring separate counsel for Appellant [...], Appellants failed to take anything like appropriate action until March 22, 2024.  Even then, their compliance consisted of half measures.  [...] was replaced by [...], but no conflict-free counsel was every obtained for Appellant [...].  [...] conducted themselves as though the requirement for separate counsel simply did not exist.  Perhaps they could have been forgiven had they entered joint appearances solely for the purpose of modifying the Order under review to permit joint representation on appeal.  That at least would have given appropriate respect to the filed court order requiring separate counsel.  Indeed, the undersigned attorneys fervently wished to be able to point to the collateral bar rule – made infamous by the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s stay in the Birmingham jail – as dooming Appellants’ application.  See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).  Instead, Respondent wonders whether general principles of equity don’t require dismissal here where Appellants made no effort to comply with the prohibition on joint representation.  In the alternative, Respondent encourages the Court to invoke its inherent authority to control its calendar and supervise attorneys appearing before it and to dismiss Appellants application on that basis.
[directive] Kesyon swivan sa yo fèt pou reponn sèl si w ap plede koupab a youn nan krim premye ou dezyèm degre yo, le ou aprè le 29 jwen 2001: oswa yon tantativ oubyen konplo pou komèt tip krim sa a, ki fèt asasinay, asasinay volontè agrave oswa asasinay envolotè, touye moun pandan ou sou volan machinn, agresyon agrave, retire zam nan men yon jandam fòsdelòd, kidnapinn, agresyon seksyèl agrave, agresyon seksyèl, vòlè, vòlè machinn, mete dife, epi mete yon lòt moun an danje lanmò oswa domaj kòpòrèl ki grav, vòl aletalaj, vòl ak chantaj pou pran byen lòt moun epi menase moun la ak domaj kòpòrèl, oswa kenbe moun la kont volonte li oswa restrenn nenpòt ki moun oubyen komèt yon lòt zak, mete pyèj nan fabrikasyon oubyen distribisyon enstalasyon CD yo oswa fèt le ou aprè le 18 jwen 2002; responsabilite total pou lanmò ki endwi pa dwòg; oswa ki zak teworis, oswa fèt pwodiksyon oubyen posesyon zam chimik, ajan biyolojik oswa enstriman nikleyè oubye radyolojik; oswa ki le oubyen aprè le 13 janvye 2008: fèt le oubyen aprè le 14 awout 2013: Raketay an premye degre; oswa ki fèt le ou aprè le 1ye novanm 2013: ponografi timoun; oswa ki kontrebann zam afe.  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to one of the following first or second degree crimes, on or after June 29, 2001: or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime, that occurred murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, aggravated arson by placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, burglary, theft by extortion by obtaining property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on, or physically confine or booby traps in manufacturing or distributing of CDS facilities or strict liability for drug restrain anyone or commit another offense, occurred on or after June 18, 2002: induced deaths; or that terrorism, or producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological occurred on or after January 13, 2008: agents or nuclear or radiological devices; or that first degree racketeering; or that occurred on or after August 14, 2013: occurred on or after November 1, 2013: child pornography; or that firearms trafficking.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................................................4  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................7  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................23  POINT  I  THERE WAS NO RECORD BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT THAT SUPPORTED OR JUSTIFIED THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF BAD FAITH BY THE BOARD OR THE TOWNSHIP.  [2T4-17:5-11]  .........................23  A.  The Trial Court Improperly Set Aside The Supplemental Resolution.  ......26  B.  The Finding Of Bad Faith Was Not Supported By The Record Of Conduct After The Settlement Agreement Was Executed.  .................................................31  POINT II  THERE WAS NO RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE BOARD OR THE TOWNSHIP DEFAULTED ON AN OBLIGATION SET FORTH IN THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, NOR ANY FACTUAL BASIS FOR ANY SUCH RULING.  [1T60-1 to 62-2]  .........................................................................................36  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [...] ATTORNEY’S FEES AND DELAY PENALTIES  [1T62-3 to 63-23; 3T-17 to 33:14; 3T40-22 to 41-14].  .........................................................................................................................39  CONCLUSION
[directive] The New Jersey Legislature also recognized the importance of the internal affairs function in 1996 with the enactment of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  The statute provides that:  Every law enforcement agency shall adopt and implement guidelines which shall be consistent with the guidelines governing the "Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures" of the Police Management Manual promulgated by the Police Bureau of the Division of Criminal Justice in the Department of Law and Public Safety, and shall be consistent with any tenure or civil service laws, and shall not supersede any existing contractual agreements.  1.0.4  In accordance with this mandate, and recognizing that proper administration of internal affairs is a critical priority for the State’s criminal justice system, Attorneys General have periodically issued updated versions of this Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures document through the Division of Criminal Justice.  This most recent round of revisions reflects the need to incorporate emerging best practices into the State’s internal affairs system, and to ensure that all law enforcement agencies in the State are adhering to the guidelines.
[brief] On The Brief: [...]  [...]  Table of Contents  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................4  POINT I.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE DUE DEFERENCE TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNICIPAL ZONING AND IGNORED  APPLICANT’S INABILITY TO SATISFY THE NEGATIVE CRITERIA  .........................................................................................4  POINT II.  THE ZONING BOARD  CORRECTLY APPLIED  THE SICA TEST AND APPROPRIATELY DETERMINED THAT THE APPLICANT FAILED TO SATISFY THE NEGATIVE CRITERIA.  ........................................................................................................................................7  POINT III.  RESPONDENT ATTEMPTS TO DISTRACT FROM ITS FAILURE TO SATISFY  THE LEGAL CRITERIA FOR VARIANCES WITH SPURIOUS ARGUMENTS THAT DO NOT CORRECT THE DEFICIENCIES NOTED BY THE BOARD  ........................................................................................................................................8  POINT IV.  THE BULK VARIANCES REQUIRED FOR A MULTI-LEVEL SENIOR MIXED-USE FACILITY IN A SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL ZONE ARE NOT “SUBSUMED” ........................................................................................................................................13  CONCLUSION
[brief] Plaintiff did not offer any competent evidence to the court below on this point.  Like Plaintiff, the trial court also appeared to erroneously shift the burden to [...] to disprove Plaintiff’s likelihood of success of the builder’s remedy claim, suggesting that [...] should have presented evidence that the Property was not suitable.  (see 1T53:19-22; 2T10:5-16).  The court stated, “I haven’t heard anything indicating, other than that the town wants this to be commercial, that it’s environmentally not appropriate, that nothing can be built here. ” (1T53:19-22).  The court’s burden-shifting in Plaintiff’s application for injunctive relief is legally incorrect requiring reversal.
[brief] (19T 19-1 to 13).  The PCR judge determined that defendant’s ineffectiveness claim regarding his trial attorney’s failure to analyze the cellular telephone data provided by the State during discovery was barred from being raised under Rule 3:22-4(a).  (19T 19-1 to 13).  Although a defendant is “generally barred [by Rule 3:22-4(a)] from presenting a claim on PCR that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal,” the rule does not require “acquiescence to a miscarriage of justice. ”  State v. Hannah, 248 N.J. 148, 178 (2021)(quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 546).
[brief] Cf. Application of McGlynn, 58 N.J. Super. at 28 (noting that “our courts will not set aside the actions of the Legislature unless the unconstitutionality of what has been done is manifest. ”).  Indeed, although petitioners rely on N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 to suggest that a statute can be invalidated if it does not satisfy “the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the enactment and approval of laws,” the Petitioners do not cite a single case in which a New Jersey court has invalidated a statute solely for failing to comply with statutory provisions, let alone under N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 to -7.  And for good reason.  The principle that one Legislature cannot bind its successors is fundamental to representative government and rooted in centuries of precedent.
[brief] One permissible inference found in the Model Criminal Jury Charges is the inference that a defendant’s purpose was “to take a life of cause serious bodily injury resulting in death” because of the use of a deadly weapon.  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and 3(a)(2)) (rev. Jun. 14, 2004).  A deadly weapon is defined as “any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury[.]”  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(c).  Thus, statutorily “deadly weapons can be divided into two categories: firearms, which are per se deadly weapons and every other object which may or may not be a deadly weapon. ”  State v. Burford, 321 N.J. Super. 360, 363 (App. Div. 1999).  Within the second category is a “class of objects ‘having a wide variety of lawful uses but of which may take on the character of a deadly weapon’ depending on the circumstances. ”  *Id.* at 364 (quoting *State v. Riley*, 306 N.J. Super. 141, 147 (App. Div. 1997)).  Thus, “the character of this class of objects as deadly weapons is, in every case, entirely circumstantial--that is, did a particular defendant possess a particular object at a particular time and in a particular situation with the intention of using it as a weapon. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Riley*, 306 N.J. Super. 147).  Thus, while instructing the jury on homicide here, [...] properly gave the model jury charge that included the second category of deadly weapons.  This includes items that, given the circumstances and manner in which they are used, have the potential to cause death or serious bodily injury.  The instruction specifically told the jury to consider the manner and circumstances of the killing when evaluating the use of the wine chiller, emphasizing that it was not solely about the mere presence of the wine chiller but the specific manner in which it was employed.  The particulars of this case reasonably supported an inference of intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, particularly in the context of repeatedly striking someone in the head with a five-pound wine chiller, which the jury was free to reject.  B.
[directive] Attached are the Jury Selection Standards (“Standards”) approved by the Supreme Court.  The Court indicated its approval of these Standards in its September 15, 2006 Administrative Determinations regarding the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peremptory Challenges and Jury Voir Dire.  The attached Standards include the relevant commentary from the Report of the Special Committee (“Report”) as well as the voir dire questions to be used for all civil jury trials, all criminal jury trials, as well as voir dire questions for certain specific civil case types.  The Supreme Court in its Administrative Determinations directed the distribution of these materials to all trial court judges.  As set forth in the Standards, use of the model voir dire questions is mandatory.  Keep in mind that these model questions are a base.  As noted in the Report, you may ask additional voir dire questions, including supplemental questions suggested by trial counsel at the Rule 1:8-3 conference.  The Standards and model questions promulgated by this Directive are to be used during each jury selection for trials that begin on or after Monday, January 22, 2007.  That date will allow time for trial judges to review these materials and prepare for the conferences that will need to occur in advance of that date.  While the model questions may be used for jury selections beginning prior to that date, as I understand that many judges are already doing, their use during this interim period is not required.  The January 22, 2007 effective date also will allow additional time to address any procedural questions that trial judges may raise, including any questions raised at the recent Judicial College.  Directive # 21-06 December 11, 2006
[brief] They emphasize that the Opinion was issued six days before the Complaint in this matter was filed.  Ibid.  That fact is meaningless; the important consideration is that the conduct about which Complainants complained took place before [...] was issued.  Thus, even if the Opinion could be construed to require disclaimer on all social media posts by school board members, such a mandate could not be fairly applied to support sanctions for conduct that took place before the Opinion was issued.  Such a result would be akin to the enforcement of an ex post facto law. which is prohibited by both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution.  *U.S. Const.* art. I, § 10, cl. 1; *N.J. Const.* art. IV, § 7, r 3; *State v. Hester*, 233 N.J. 381,391 (2018).
[brief] 3T15-19.  [...] noted the March 6 proceeding before [...], said that [...] had ruled that defendants had not sufficiently complied with plaintiffs’ discovery requests, and that defendants took no steps after the March 6 hearing to provide sufficient responses:  THE COURT: Did Judge D'Elia say you have not complied with their discovery demands and he's denying your motion?  [...]: Judge, he denied the motion.  He denied my motion from December 20th.  That's correct.  We did not review the case management conference that would have specific instructions on the -- on February 8th.  We did not -- THE COURT: Did he indicate you had not complied with discovery when he heard your case on March 6th?  [...]: On March 6th, he denied my motion.  He did not say I did not comply with discovery.  He denied my motion to restore.  Defendants’ counsel disagreed with [...]’s statement that [...] went “line by line” in reviewing defendants’ discovery responses and compliance with the February 8 “punch list.
[brief] On March 16, 2004, the judge conducted a pre-trial hearing pursuant to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).  At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge ruled that all identification testimony would be admissible.  On May 24, 2003, [...] was a sales clerk at [...] in Salem, where she had worked for the previous six years.  After waiting on a few customers at about 9:00 a.m., Johnson observed defendant and his female co-defendant enter the store.  There was a “suspicious look about them” because of “[t]he way they walked in, the way they observed the whole store [and because] they walked around the whole store. ”  They went to the greeting cards section, moved in and out of aisles and settled in the middle aisle.  When the last of the other customers exited the store, defendant, who she described as a dark male wearing a navy blue shirt and sweat pants, walked up with a greeting card and a dark gift bag.  The female, who was wearing a black sweat suit, walked towards the door.  When the man said he could not pay for the items after Johnson rang them up, Johnson began to void the transaction and asked him if he wanted to pay for one of the items.  The man answered, “all right, this is a holdup.  I want all of the money in the bag. ”  He put his hand in his pocket and gestured to her.  Johnson thought that he might have a gun in his pocket and would not think twice about harming her.  For that reason, Johnson put all of the money, totaling $165, into the gift bag.  She clearly saw defendant's face.  He was not wearing a mask.  There was good lighting in the store.  The man and woman left and Johnson called the police.
[brief] [T59-21 to -22].  She stated that she was not allowed to be at their house without their permission.  [T59-22 to -23].  Moreover, she was not in [...] on that date: she travels for work and owns property elsewhere in the State.  [T60-17 to -24].  Defendant denied having seen [...] before the court proceedings began.  [T60-7 to -9].  She stated she could not have been doing yardwork because she had a disability that prevented her from doing work like that.  [T60-1; T61-12 to -15].  She stated she does not use profanity like [...] asserted.  [T61-20 to 62-8].  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a) (“[W]henever a person . . . is convicted of . . . an offense, other than one described in subsection b. of this section, the court . . . may . . . place the person on special probation, which shall be for a term of five years, provided that the court finds on the record that . . . .”).  Thus, to qualify as a “pending charge” under subsections (a)(5) or (a)(7), the charge must still be pending at the time that defendant seeks admission to Recovery Court.  But at the time the judge is evaluating the criteria under subsections (a)(5) or (a)(7), the defendant must have already been convicted of the offense for which he seeks admission to Recovery Court, and thus, by definition, that offense is no longer pending.  Two elements of the structure of the statute make clear that a “pending charge” refers to a charge other than the charge for which the defendant has been convicted on which he is seeking admission to Track One.
[brief] Notably, while this Court had found the reckless-disregard portion of subsection (a) unconstitutional in *State v. Fair*, 469 N.J. Super. 538, 541 (App. Div. 2021), rev’d in part by 256 N.J. 213 (2024), this Court noted in dictum that “the remaining provisions [of the statute]…clearly pass constitutional muster.
[brief] PA – 235  Defendant’s Case Information Statement for Appeal……………………………..  PA – 238  Appellate Order dated July 3, 2023  Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Portions of Appellant’s Brief ……………………………………………………..  PA – 243 | Item | Page No. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | November 9, 2022  Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment | PA - 1 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page No. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | Alloco v. Ocean Beach & Bay Club, | | | 456 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2018) | 11, 34 | | Am. Express Co. v. Koerner, | | | 452 U.S. 233 (1981) | 42 | | Associates Home Equity Services, Inc. v. Troup, | | | 343 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 2001) | 33 | | Beneficial Finance Co. v. Swaggerty, | | | 86 N.J. 602 (1981) | 34 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 10, 14 | | Brown v. Brown, | | | 208 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 1986) | 33, 34 | | Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. Belford Trucking Co., | | | 116 N.J. Super.
[brief] *Id.* at 83.  And in *Franklin Township Board of Education v. Quakertown Education Association*, 274 N.J. Super. 47 (App. Div. 1994), the court found that a handwritten “return to work agreement” resolving a work stoppage that did not mention court-ordered strike-related expenses did not waive or release those expenses.  *Id.* at 52–53.  These cases concerning *implied* waiver have no bearing on contracts containing an *express* arbitration agreement that waives the right to sue in a court of law.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS SOUND DISCRETION TO RECONSIDER THE JANUARY 23 ORDERS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.  (Pa056, Pa067-068).  Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in reconsidering the January 23 Orders is based on a mischaracterization of defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration.  Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration was not an “impermissible ‘lateral appeal’” that simply sought to have the trial court review and overturn the January 23 Orders based on the same arguments previously considered and rejected.  To the contrary, defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration almost immediately and sought reconsideration on multiple well-supported grounds relating to errors and deficiencies in the summary denial of their motions.  Defendants’ were not judge shopping—the only reason [...] heard defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration instead of [...] is because [...] retired days after entering the January 23 Orders, and it was therefore not possible for him to hear the motion. \(^{12}\)  The trial court’s determination—after an in-person hearing and based on a fuller record—that the interests of justice required reconsideration of the January 23 Orders in light of \(^{12}\) See R. 4:42-2(b) (“To the extent possible, application for reconsideration shall be made to the trial judge who entered the order. ”) (emphasis added).  the circumstances identified by defendants was an appropriate exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion under R. 4:42-2.  A.