ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Case Law Bell v. Stafford, 110 N.J. 384, 395-96 (1988)  ........................................................................5  E&J Equities Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Bd. of Adj. of Franklin, 226 N.J. 549 (2016)  ............1  Henderson v. Camden Cnty. Mun. Util. Auth., 176 N.J. 554, 561-62 (2003)  ..........5  Interstate Outdoor Advertising L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Mt. Laurel, 706 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2013)  .............................................................................................................................................6  N.Y. SMSA, Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333 (App. Div. 2004)  ...........................................................................................................9  Pullen v. Twp. of S. Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J. Super. 1, 7-8 (App. Div. 1996)  .............................................................................................................................................9  Riya Finnegan Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Twp. Council of Tp. of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 201-202 (2008)  .............................................................................................................6  Silvester v. Becerra, 583 U.S. 1139, 1146 (2018)  ...............................................................7  State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 576 (2005)  ..............................................................................4  Twp. of Cinnaminson v. Bertino, 405 N.J. Super. 521, 536 (App. Div. 2009)  .........7  Yahnel v. Bd. of Adjustment, 79 N.J.Super. 509, 519 (App. Div. 1963)
[brief] See generally 5T and 6T.  The procedure for the hearing was established by the SHO and was inconsistent with the standard procedure for a hearing before the [...] under the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1, et seq. (the “MLUL”).  On August 9, 2022, the Trial Court entered an Order adopting the findings and proposed resolution of the SHO.  M477-513.  The resolution of the SHO, in part, relieved the Respondents from the obligation to provide the Route 33 Signal.  M477-513.  On August 29, 2022, the [...] and [...] filed a motion for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division; which were denied on September 19, 2022.  M712-715.  On November 4, 2022, the [...], [...] and [...] filed summary judgment motions on the civil rights and discrimination claims.
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Dear Judges of the Appellate Division:  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  PREMIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I  Commercial Properties Should Include Buildings Under Renovation .................................................5  POINT II  The Trial Court Erroneously Resolved Factual Disputes In Favor of the Movant, Requiring the Matter to be Reversed And Remanded for Trial ..................................................10  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................14  Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), please accept this letter brief in lieu of a more formal submission and in further support of the Plaintiff-Appellant’s appeal in this matter.
[brief] [...] conveniently leaves out the "negligently in self-defense" part of the quotation of the instruction provided in its brief, stopping at line 19 of page 169, when the canard starts immediately thereafter at line 20.  (Db51).  [...] claims that because the plaintiffs made a tactical decision to dismiss the battery claim against [...], intentional conduct on [...]'s part was not in the case and therefore the respondeat superior instruction was proper.  (Db56).  [...] claims that this Court, in its earlier ruling, "did not contemplate that Plaintiffs could recover against [...] for an intentional assault based on a theory of negligence."
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted this rule\(^6\) to require disclosure of “any initial police reports about . . . witnesses” and “copies of statements or reports of . . . eyewitnesses. ”  Applying this rule here, the State had an unequivocal obligation to disclose [...]’ Sworn Statement to [...], as it indisputably constituted a statement --- \(^6\)  In *Robinson*, 229 N.J. 44, the Supreme Court analyzed disclosure under Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B); following subsequent amendment and revision, the rule now appears as Rule 3:4-2(c)(2), but “[t]he current rule retains the same categories of discovery materials. ”  *State v. Hyppolite*, 236 N.J. 154, n.2 (2018).  related to his testimony.  In particular, portions of [...]’ Sworn Statement related to arguably, the most relevant subject matter of his trial testimony: his knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...].  See 7T, Volume I, 10:13-25, 11:7-10, 13:1-8 ([...] knew a robbery would occur in Staten Island); id. at 13:17-19 ([...] knew a kidnapping would occur in connection with the Staten Island robbery); id. at 12:11-17, 13:9-14 ([...] helped plan the robbery and knew what his role would be); id. at 11:11-12,12:2-3 ([...] knew who the victims were); id. at 12:24 – 13:6 ([...] even travelled to Staten Island on two prior occasions to “stake” the area of the house); id. at 13:21 – 17:3, 18:17 – 24:24, 25:9 – 31:18, 32:20 – 42:6, 154:17 – 156:7, 164:5 – 179:12 ([...] recalled details about when the robbery occurred, how he and his codefendants arrived at the location, and how the robbery and kidnapping unfolded, including what each perpetrators’ role was and the victims’ reactions); id. at 17:4 – 18:16, 25:1-8 ([...] knew two weapons, duct tape, handcuffs, ski masks, and gloves were used in perpetrating the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping); id. at 42:19 – 43:24, 119:23 – 122:7 ([...] wrote the Theodoulou family’s address on the envelope that was used to mail the ransom note, which he also wrote); id. at 114:23 – 115:8 ([...] identified the Mercedes taken during the Staten Island robbery); id. at 118:11 – 119:5 ([...] knew [...] sold jewelry taken during the Staten Island robbery); id. at 144:2 – 149:6 ([...] identified various photographs of the Theodoulou residence); id. at 180:2-3 ([...] participated in the Staten Island robbery to “get money”).  Although, as set forth supra, the State also had a duty to disclose [...]’ Sworn Statement pursuant to Brady, New Jersey law required disclosure of the statement notwithstanding whether it ultimately impeached [...].  II.
[brief] ”)  A family court is a court of equity, moreover, sitting in the Superior Court’s Chancery Division.  It has inherent power to see that justice is done in the case presented to it.  The ”very foundation of equitable jurisprudence” is “that equity ‘will not suffer a wrong without a remedy” and that a chancery court will enter its orders to achieve “a just and equitable result” on the particular case before it.  *Crane v. Bielski*, 15 N.J. 342, 349 (1954); cf. *Penn Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Joyce*, 75 N.J. Super. 275, 278 (App. Div. 1962) (“Quite independent of statute or rule of court, Chancery has inherent power to set aside a sale or to order redemption ‘when there is an independent ground for equitable relief, such as fraud, accident, surprise, irregularity in the sale, and the like’”); *Karel v. Davis*, 122 N.J. Eq. 526, 528 (1937) (“In these circumstances, it was entirely proper for the Chancellor, in the exercise of the power inherent in courts of equitable jurisdiction to control their own process, to relieve the mortgagee of such obligation as the sale imposed, and to direct a resale of the mortgaged lands”).
[brief] ”  Nicoletta, 77 N.J. at 165.  “[T]he significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid,” and courts have “frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood. ”  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.  “While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job. ”  Ibid.  “The only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of [a] decisionmaker is likely to be before [a] termination takes effect. ”  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  As such, there must be “notice” and “some kind of hearing” prior to “the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. ”  Id. at 542, 546 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70) (internal quotations omitted); see also Caldwell v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 250 N.J. Super. 592, 615 (App. Div. 1991) (“[A]n employee ‘is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. ” (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546); Nicoletta, 77 N.J. at 165 (“[T]he minimum requirements of due process [] include [] written notice of the claimed violations. ”).
[brief] Id. at 288.  Similarly, Miller protections were extended to eighteen-year-old offenders under the Michigan Constitution -- with a further extension to nineteen-year-olds likely.  See People v. [...], 987 N.W.2d 161, 171 (Mich. 2022).  Similar to the Washington court, the Michigan Supreme Court independently examined the developmental science and found it incontrovertible.  Id. at 173.  The court described the scientific consensus that eighteen-year-olds continue in a period of “late adolescence. ”  Id. at 174.  Late adolescents share with younger teenagers the characteristics outlined in the Miller factors -- particularly a lack of appreciation of risks and consequences, a tendency to act impulsively and under peer pressure, and a likelihood of desisting from misbehavior once their brains mature.  Id. at 174-75, 178.  The court concluded that “in terms of neurological development, there is no meaningful distinction between those who are 17 years old and those who are 18 years old. ”  Id. at 75.  Therefore, Miller had to apply to eighteen-year-olds.  Id. at 176-83.  Because defendant [...] offended when he was eighteen, the Michigan Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether Miller protections might extend to older offenders.  But the court noted that the Miller factors appeared to apply “in some form” into the twenties and thus hinted at further extension.
[brief] (5T139-17 to 24, 148-2 to 151-22) ²  [...] testified that [...] was required to have a written SOP on destruction of evidence in active investigations, though could not state what it said.  He said there was no policy directing or sanctioning destroying property held in pretrial homicide case, and knew of no policy that later deemed non-evidentiary.  He testified that the Prosecutor approves and releases [...] polices, which are available to all staff.  (5T83-18 to 96-17, 105-3 to 107-3)  [...] was “unable to determine whether there’s any policy” on what is evidentiary, retained or destroyed.  He repeatedly asked to see the book of policies.  The prosecutor explained there were “thousands and thousands” kept in a database.  None were ever produced, despite the judge stating their existence was “an overriding question. ”  (E.g., 5T107-19-3 to 109-1, 110-27 to 2, 171-21 to 25)  The next day, he ruled that while the defense had established the evidence destroyed was material and [...] was prejudiced, it had not clearly established “bad faith or connivance on the part of the State” because “nobody was able to ²Per Paley, other drives were probably available, and the computer crimes unit never told [...] they needed to free up space.  (5T74-1 to 8, 80-13 to 16) produce a policy” or “criteria” [...] had violated.  The court found [...] violated its discovery obligation, but despite the “strong case” for dismissal, since bad faith was not established, he would only charge the jury it may draw an adverse inference if it found [...] destroyed and failed to preserve evidence.  (6T8-13 to 14, 14-17 to 17-17, 20-8 to 21-20, 23-3 to 24-2)
[brief] Again, Appellant’s assertion that this matter was not ripe for summary judgment is in direct contravention with Appellant’s counsel’s representations to [...] at the beginning of oral argument.  Furthermore, Appellant’s own actions reveal that it never really intended to conduct discovery.  Prior to the disposition of the Motions, Appellant never served written discovery in this action.  Appellant never argued that summary judgment was premature or that discovery was necessary and why in Appellant’s Cross-Motion.  At no time during oral argument did Appellant’s counsel request leave of [...] to serve discovery.  It is also clear that [...] relied upon Appellant’s counsel’s representations during oral argument as to the ripeness of the matter.
[brief] By misleading [...] into thinking she would receive her UIM benefit, [...] was equitably estopped from denying coverage.  After receiving [...]’s Longworth letter in May 2022, [...] spent the next 17 months acting as if [...] qualified for UIM coverage.  For instance, [...] negotiated with [...], both before and after she sued.  In litigation, [...] filed an answer and served [...] with interrogatories and document requests.  [...], in turn, answered [...]’s interrogatories and produced over 700 pages of documents.  Then, five months into litigation, [...] moved for dismissal, invoking the policy’s limitation provision for the first time.  Yet, by that point, the doctrine of equitable estoppel barred [...] from disclaiming coverage.
[brief] (DbL33).  However, [...] and [...] clearly demonstrated that the existence of zero foot candle lighting at the intersection caused backlight, which caused the driver not to see [...].  That was further aggravated by the probability of the absence of lighting from a historically defective streetlight, and by the streetlight (even if it was on at the time of the accident) being blocked by overgrown tree branches.  Defendants’ experts tried to challenge that rather clear theory of liability, which is based on dangerous condition/premises liability law, by offering their own accident reconstruction theory, based on their own facts---and that exercise onto itself created bar none a serious dispute of facts!
[directive] The forms were initially promulgated 2002 following the Supreme Court's in R. R. of adoption amendments to 3:9-1 and 3:16.  The 2002 amendment 3:9-1 to R. of required use a standard pretrial memorandum form during the pretrial conference to of ensure the defendant's knowledge the trial date and the consequences of a non- appearance.  The 2002 amendment to 16 required the defendant's signed 3: R. of acknowledgment the trial date.  The revisions to the Pretrial Memorandum promulgated here, as recommended by of the Conference Criminal Presiding Judges, are as follows:
[brief] **III.  If the Court accepted Plaintiffs’ arguments and the December Terms were not formed, then the January Terms would control.  (Da304.)**  Even if this Court were to accept any of Plaintiffs’ arguments that the December Terms are unenforceable, the result would be only that the agreement to the December Terms *was never formed*.  In that case, the earlier January Terms—which this Court found enforceable in *Williams*—would not be superseded and would remain in effect for Plaintiffs.  Incredibly, Plaintiffs now say that the December Terms “were undoubtedly the operative terms at the time of the [...]’s (sic) crash, even if she was not aware of them for one reason or another. ”  (Pb41–42.)  Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways: the December Terms cannot be “operative” if, as Plaintiffs contend, they were never agreed to.  Other courts have rejected this “sort of ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ argument” crafted to evade a party’s arbitration agreement.  *Zambrana v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP*, No. 16-cv-2907, 2016 WL 7046820, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (enforcing earlier arbitration agreement where plaintiff claimed the later agreement was unenforceable because she supposedly never received it, but also claimed the earlier agreement was superseded; explaining that “Plaintiff cannot have it both ways”).
[brief] In Darakjian, this court also reasoned that a careful evaluation of the pleading sufficiency of defamation claims is not only appropriate, but necessary to “afford[ sufficient] breathing space to the critical rights protected, in the public interest, by the First Amendment. ”  Id. at 247–48.  Federal courts have also long applied a similar pleading standard.  Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 (2009), countless federal courts have dismissed defamation claims at the pleading stage for failure to “alleg[e] enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of actual malice. ”  Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 545-46 (2d Cir. 2015).  See also, e.g., Cabello-Rondon v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 720 F. App’x 87, 88 (2d Cir. 2018) (dismissing complaint for failure to plead facts supporting an inference of actual malice); *Pace v. Baker-White*, 850 F. App’x 827, 831 (3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 433 (2021) (same); *Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc.*, 816 F.3d 686, 704 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[F]ailure to investigate, standing alone, does not give rise to a conclusion that the defendants acted with actual malice.  Rather, the plaintiff must plead facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that the defendants acted to intentionally avoid learning the truth. ”).  These cases put to rest any suggestion that it would be contrary to law to dismiss a complaint for failure to allege facts in support of actual malice, as the trial court reasoned in its October Order.  The trial court’s stated reason for initially refusing to apply *Neuwirth*, moreover, misinterpreted the cases it relied upon.  The trial court reasoned that *Neuwirth* was inconsistent with, and could not “supersede,” the U.S Supreme Court decisions in *Hutchinson v. Proxmire*, 443 U.S. 111, 120 (1979) and *Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254.
[brief] (Da154).  In the same, [...] outlined the services to be provided, and asked [...] and [...] to sign.  (Da154).  However, the retainer letter was signed only by [...], and [...]’s name was crossed out with an N/A. (Da155).  [...] filed a Verified Complaint on Order to Show Cause on January 24, 2018.  (Da1).  Significantly, the Verified Complaint names only [...] as the plaintiff.  (Da1).  The Verified Complaint does not name [...] as the plaintiff.  Rather, the Verified Complaint simply lists [...] as the son of [...].  (Da1).  In the Probate case, [...] served [...] with the Order to Show Cause Summary Action, returnable May 4, 2018, with the Verified Complaint.  (Da15).  On September 25, 2018, the [...] filed a Motion with the Surrogate of Bergen County to intervene in the Probate case.  (Da42).  [...] of the [...] confirmed that he and his firm were attorneys for defendant [...] Miranda.  (Da42).  Attorney [...] (“[...]”) was deposed on June 23, 2021.
[brief] ”  [[...] Brief, p.23].  In addition to demonstrating a continued inability to grasp the meaning of “adjacent,” the [...] is just putting words in Appellants’ mouth.  What Article 3 of the leases plainly states is that the tenants have a duty to maintain the sidewalks adjacent to the premises.  That is the simple contractual duty that Appellants ask this Court to enforce.  Appellants do not ask this Court to hold that the tenants had any duty to maintain what may have been defined as “common areas. ”  Appellants certainly do not ask this Court to hold that Respondents had a duty to maintain “anywhere in the entirety of the shopping center. ”  Of note, the leases did, in fact, define the parking lot as a “common area” that the landlord would maintain; however, the sidewalks and walkways adjacent to the premises were not.  This is a small strip-mall property with five storefronts and a L-shaped walkway area adjacent to these premises.  All Appellant ask this Court to is enforce the contractual obligation plainly specified in Article 3 of the leases:  “Lessee shall also maintain in good condition such, portions adjacent to the premises, such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by Lessor. ”  [Pa991].  More to the point, the [...] implicitly concedes that Appellants are arguing the plain meaning of Article 3.
[directive] Scan Live following duties  patrol/call-for-service from an officer re-assign to need the (e.g., delay the by department to officer arresting for need the the custody, in held defendant the monitor to station in the stay to the to delay authorize to construed be shall subsection in Nothing this etc.).  patrol duty, return to of 12 hours within officer judicial other or judge a to presented not is defendant the that extent 3:4-1.  Rule by required arrest as of because available not assessment are risk pretrial automated an of results the
[brief] D.A.B., slip op. at 13-17.  Rather than D.A.B., State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 295 (1988)—a published opinion by this Court—is more apposite.  There, “one of the principal investigating police officers failed to preserve the photographic arrays from which identifications of [the] defendants were made and attempted to conceal his dereliction by fabricating” new photo arrays.
[brief] ”  State v. McNeil, 405 N.J. Super. 39, 51 (App. Div. 2009).  “[A] defendant cannot manipulate the system by wavering between assigned counsel and self-representation. ”  State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344, 362 (App. Div. 1994).  “Moreover, like any other request for substitution of an attorney, a defendant’s decision to dismiss his lawyer and represent himself must be exercised in a timely fashion.
[brief] [...] testified that he is a General Superintendent/Project Manager for [...].  Pa1601.  [...] testified that spotters are used with sweepers depending on the environment, night or day.  Pa1609.  “If it getting close to a piece of equipment.  If * * * it’s a congested work area we would spot. ”  Ibid.  [...] testified “all work zones on the Turnpike or the Parkway are congested if you can't close all the lanes. ”  Pa853.  [...] testified that there was not a spotter or flag person assigned to the sweeper on the night of the incident.  Pa1349.  "That’s not something that [...] has in the closing all the time."  Ibid.
[brief] Respondents Fail to Demonstrate That In-Camera Review Was Warranted (Rb27 – 28) | 12 | | VI.  Respondents’ Fail To Demonstrate That They Timely Moved For Disqualification (Rb32 – 38) | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., | | | 822 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993) | 15 | | City of Atl. City v. Trupos, | | | 201 N.J. 447 (2010) | 7, 8 | | Delaney v. Dykstra Assocs., | | | No. A-1953-19T1, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1355 (App. Div. July 9, | 5 | | 2020) | | | Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC, | | | 471 N.J. Super 184 (App. Div 2022) | 3, 4, 9 | | Howard v. Mayor & Bd. of Fin. of Paterson, | | | 6 N.J. 373 (1951) | 10 | | Krieger v. Jersey City, | | | 27 N.J. 535 (1958) | 10 | | McCarthy v. John T. Henderson, Inc., | | | 246 N.J. Super. 225 (App. Div. 1991) | 5 | | Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., | | | 62 N.J. 229 (1973) | 10 | | O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ, | | | 206 N.J. 109 (2011) | 3, 4, 12, 13 | | Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., | | | 83 N.J. 460 (1980) | 4 | | State v. Robinson, | | | 200 N.J. 1 (2009) | 11 | | State ex rel. Wm. Eckelmann, Inc. v. Jones, | | | 4 N.J. 207 (1950) | 10 | ## Other Authorities | RPC 1.6 | 6 | | RPC 1.9 | 5, 6, 7, 8 |