ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The Court provided the following guidance as to measures required when the parties announce they are ready to proceed on the two-year cap date, but no courtroom or judge will be available at that time:  The trial court must consult with a supervisory judge.  ~- Directive #06-22 - Criminal Justice Reform - Speedy Trial - Guidance Articulated by the Supreme Court in State v. [...] S. July 12, 2022  Page3 b.  The Assignment Judge or Criminal Presiding Judge should serve as the point person to coordinate trial dates from a vicinage-wide perspective and help schedule individual trials as soon as practicable.  In scheduling trial dates, the supervisory judge and trial judges should c. of of take into account the age a case, the seriousness the charge, and the of availability counsel, among other relevant considerations.  Cases with detained defendants are to receive priority.  d.  If the parties are ready but the trial cannot proceed before the expiration e. of the two-year cap date, trial judges should schedule conferences at monthly intervals rather than delay a trial for multiple months at a time.  Trial judges should consult with the supervisory judge about courtroom availability before those periodic conferences and make an appropriate record about the need for any further delays at the hearing.  Trial judges may inquire again about the State's readiness at later conferences.  (slip op. at 23-25)  Additionally, the Court asked assistant prosecutors and public defenders to notify their respective supervisors when a trial date is fixed to ensure that counsel will be present and that the trial will commence as planned.  The Court of also noted the need for the cooperation the private bar as well.  To effectively address the existing backlog, it is essential that trial teams be able to proceed to trial on the dates set by the courts.  (slip op. at 25-26)  The above guidance addresses the need for additional time in order to of commence trial because the COVID-19 pandemic, not more generalized arguments about routine scheduling matters unrelated to a public health crisis.  The guidance to consult with a supervisory judge and hold monthly hearings may be relaxed the public health situation continues to evolve.  However, as· of parties should not expect that the backlog cases that the pandemic created of of over the course two years will be resolved in a matter months.  (slip op. at 25)  3.  Expedited Approach for Motions for Leave to Appeal an Order About Speedy Trial Calculations
[brief] Appellate Division  Docket No. [...] ([...])  ATLANTIC ER PHYSICIANS : CIVIL ACTION TEAM PEDIATRIC : ON APPEAL FROM AN ASSOCIATES, PA, : ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR EMERGENCY CARE SERVICES : COURT OF NEW JERSEY, OF NJ, PA, EMERGENCY : LAW DIVISION, PHYSICIAN ASSOCIATES OF : GLOUCESTER COUNTY, NORTH JERSEY, PC, : COMPLEX BUSINESS  EMERGENCY  PHYSICIAN : LITIGATION PART  ASSOCIATES OF SOUTH : DOCKET NO.: [...]  JERSEY, PC, EMERGENCY : Sat Below:  PHYSICIAN SERVICES OF : NEW JERSEY, PA, : (For Continuation of Caption  See Inside Cover)  :  HON. [...], J.S.C. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO AMICUS BRIEFS
[brief] Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result. ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).
[brief] That is patently clear, and patently violative of the court’s order....  What can be more violative of this court’s order, than that [SDNY] filing.  (Da1927-1928)  The trial court reiterated:  [...] directed the theft of the company’s computer serv[ers], and interfered with the new managements control of the company....  [T]hen we get the submissions in the New York action, the first removal, [and] the second removal which sought to reverse the October, 2015 award and the court’s January 28th, February 8th... February 23rd, and June 7th orders by asking Federal Courts to rule that the February 8th meeting was a valid election which put [...] back in control of the company effectively undermining the whole process of this lawsuit.
[brief] In Tarta Luna Properties, LLC v. Harvest Restaurants Group LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 137, 155 (App. Div. 2021), this Court reversed a Chancery Judge’s attempt to enlarge the exceptions to the American Rule based on general “equitable principles”:  Although the Chancery judge also concluded there was no established basis to support a fee award, she nevertheless found that equitable principles demanded the remedy, because "the safety of the public had been compromised by the decision to open [the restaurant]."  The general concept of public safety has not previously been recognized as an exception to the policy preventing fee-shifting, and although it might support an award under certain egregious circumstances, those circumstances were not present here.  [Id. at 155].  It ruled, “the Chancery court's award of attorneys' and expert fees was a mistaken exercise of discretion as it departed from well-established precedent and was not founded on any statute, court rule, or contract provision.
[brief] In fact, following argument by both counsel, the court confirmed of counsel, “No need for a --- \(^2\)  In this regard, it cannot be argued that the issue as to whether there are genuine issues of material fact in determining whether there is an enforceable contract is a matter “of great public interest. ”  See, e.g., *Monek v. Borough of South River*, 354 N.J. Super. 442, 456 (App. Div. 2002) (declining to address pre-judgment interest issues because plaintiff failed to present same to the trial judge, and the issues did not involve “sufficient public concern”); but see *Berardo v. City of Jersey City*, 476 N.J. Super. 341, 354 (App. Div. 2023) (finding whether a historic preservation officer can unilaterally determine the historic nature of a property to be a “matter of public interest”).
[brief] Yet despite [...]’s opinion that the attack on [...] was both qualitatively distinct from the “everyday” aggression that stallions frequently exhibit and impossible to predict based on [...]’s past behavior, Plaintiffs mischaracterize typical stallion behavior as evidence that [...] was somehow predisposed to a sustained attack.  It is not disputed that [...] was given breaks from semen collection and that he was sometimes difficult to catch from his paddock; however, there is no evidence linking that behavior to the attack.  To the contrary, [...] described sustained, to-kill attacks as rare and unpredictable, and unrelated to the type of aggression typically exhibited by stallions.  The [...] employees who handled [...] similarly agreed that [...]’s past behavior in the breeding environment was not grounds for suspecting he would suddenly attack his handler.
[brief] ”  DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 239.  Defendants argue that “Defendant should be entitled to have that examination performed by a psychologist who practices in a manner consistent with the highest standards of practice” (Db12), without addressing the Supreme Court’s recognition that “the 2016 [[...] (“[...]”)] Policy Statement likewise does not prohibit neuropsychologists from abiding by court orders to allow neutral third-party observation or recording.
[brief] First, the video evidence shows that [...] was not handcuffed when she consented to the search.  Additionally, [...] was not under arrest when she provided consent and police did not obtain consent after [...] denied any guilt.  Also, [...] did not refuse initial requests for consent to search, instead she believed that she did not have the authority to give consent because she did not own the car.  What is more, [...] was advised of her right to refuse consent.  Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the court finds the consent provided by [...] to search the Impala was knowing and voluntary.
[directive] Z tego wzglc;du nie nalezy podawac w nim osobistych identyfikator6w, takichjak numer ubezpieczenia spolecznego (social security), numer prawajazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty skladane w sll(lzie nalezy zfozyc w jc;zyku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should in English be New Jersey Judiciary County
[brief] The statute is unclear in that regard.  The State also still has failed to provide this Court with an explanation (valid or otherwise) as to what exactly constitutes “cruel abuse” “of a living animal or creature” as opposed to a perfectly legal and socially acceptable “un–cruel abuse” of a “living animal or creature” for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(1).  The State also still has failed to provide this Court with an explanation (valid or otherwise) as to what exactly constitutes a “needless mutilation” “of a living animal or creature” as opposed to a perfectly legal and socially acceptable “needed mutilation” of a “living animal or creature” for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(1).  The State also still has failed to provide this Court with an explanation (valid or otherwise) as to what exactly constitutes an “unnecessary” “torment, torture, maiming, hanging [or] poisoning” “of a living animal or creature” as opposed to a perfectly legal and socially acceptable “necessary” “tormenting, torturing maiming, hanging [or] poisoning” of a “living animal or creature” for the purposes of N.J.S.A.  4:22 – 17(c)(1).
[brief] ””); *Peralta v. Ragan*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234300, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022) (“Court agrees with the reasoning set forth in *Valentine*, and finds . . . that [[...]] is a consumer lender’ under the NJCFLA. ”); *New Century Fin. v. Trewin*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688, *9-10 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) (Where the court vacated a years old default judgment and held that it was “*satisfied that the judgment obtained by plaintiff’s predecessor is void, by virtue of [the loan assignor’s] unlicensed status*.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).
[brief] [...]’s lawsuit is an attempt to circumvent the mandatory arbitration provision the Legislature crafted when it adopted the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“No-Fault Law”) governing claims for Personal Injury Protection benefits (“PIP benefits”) under automobile insurance policies.  Instead of challenging the defendant medical practitioners’ PIP benefits claims for alleged fraud at the time they submitted them to [...] or even sometimes challenging them and losing in individual arbitration, [...] has, several years later, lumped hundreds of PIP benefits claims together *en masse*, claimed they were fraudulent for a variety of reasons, and filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of New Jersey contending that the defendants violated the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (“IFPA”) and New Jersey RICO statute (“RICO”) and that [...] is entitled to declaratory judgments about the eligibility of those PIP benefits claims.  The trial court saw through this ruse and granted the defendants’ motions to compel arbitration of [...]’s claims under the No-Fault Law’s statutory arbitration provision.  The trial court’s interpretation of the No-Fault Law was correct.  Indeed, it aligns with the recent published decision of the United Stated Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s holding that IFPA claims must be arbitrated under the No-Fault Law in a case in which another insurer attempted the same maneuver around the arbitration statute.  At base, [...]’s claims are disputes about the recovery of PIP benefits.  And that is exactly what the No-Fault Law’s arbitration provision covers.  Dressing PIP benefits disputes as “fraud” and belatedly bringing them as civil claims in Superior Court does not change anything.  To effectuate the plain language of the No-Fault Act and the Legislature’s intent, this Court should affirm the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] [...]:  It would make sense if the applicant was asking for relief and needed to -- [...]:  Well, hold on.  Hold on.  [The applicant] is asking for relief.  [The applicant is] asking for a design waiver.  You don't have to put the stormwater management in front of the project and eliminate the street trees there.  We recommend, we understand why you're doing that and we made a recommendation for to put some shade trees behind it, but this is a good compromise that the Board is asking you to do and justification for your design waiver request.  BOARD MEMBER:  I can't understand why you wouldn't do that.  [...]: Exactly.  [...]:  Because it's admitting to something that's not required by the ordinance . . . 2T42-1 to 2T43-4.  Another waiver related to the lot lines.  UDO Sec. 18-805C (Ia213) provides: "Insofar as is practical, side lot lines shall be at right angles to straight streets and radial to curved streets."  Engineer/Planner [...] reported that "[a] design waiver is required from providing non-radial lot lines."  Ia163 (item III-2).  See also Mr. [...]'s assertion at 2T28-20 to 2T28-24.  [...] justified the requested "relief" by generally invoking the purposes underlying the Municipal Land Use Law (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163) and the Township's Master Plan.  See 2T44-20 to 2T45-23.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I. LAKEWOOD REQUIRES WAIVERS TO BE BASED ON HARDSHIP, AND THE APPLICANT FAILED TO PROVIDE THE BOARD WITH EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY EITHER OF THE TWO WAIVERS REQUESTED; THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING THE SUBDIVISION.
[brief] First, the Third Amended Complaint did not allege that any funds were "wrongfully taken [or] transferred" to [...] or [...].  796a-802a at ¶ 100 (chart of recipients and transferees of payments, with none of them including [...] or [...]).  Second, the Third Amended Complaint alleged that there were "representations, directions and assurances" by [...] and [...], but did not allege that there were any “representations, directions [or] assurances” by [...] or [...].  782a, 786a-787a, 794a.  To the contrary, both of [...]’s principals (Appellant [...] and Appellant [...]) testified during their depositions that they did not receive any information or advice from [...], let alone rely on any information or advice by [...], in any aspect of their dealings with [...] or [...].
[brief] I.  **THE ALJ IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT SANTORE WAS INELIGIBLE FOR PENSION BENEFITS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2  RETROACTIVE TO JANUARY 1, 2008.**  (Pa 81- Pa90)  The instant matter centers around the determination made under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2.  The pertinent language of 43:15A-7.2 is restated below.  Ineligibility for PERS under professional services contract.  a.  A person who performs professional services for a political subdivision of this State or a board of education, or any agency, authority or instrumentality thereof, under a professional services contract awarded in accordance with section 5 of P.L.1971, c.198 (C.40A:11-5), N.J.S.18A:18A-5 or section 5 of P.L.1982, c.189 (C.18A:64A-25.5), on the basis of performance of the contract, shall not be eligible for membership in the Public Employees' Retirement System.  A person who is a member of the retirement system as of the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.) shall not accrue service credit on the basis of that performance following the expiration of an agreement or contract in effect on the effective date.  Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed as affecting the provisions of any agreement or contract in effect on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.), whether or not the agreement or contract specifically provides by its terms for membership in the retirement system.  No renewal, extension, modification, or other agreement or action to continue any professional services contract in effect on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.) beyond its current term shall have the effect of continuing the membership of a person in the retirement system or continuing the accrual of service credit on the basis of performance of the contract.  b.  A person who performs professional services for a political subdivision of this State or a board of education, or any agency, authority or instrumentality thereof, shall not be eligible, on the basis of performance of those professional services, for membership in the Public Employees' Retirement System, if the person meets the definition of independent contractor as set forth in regulation or policy of the federal Internal Revenue Service for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.  Such a person who is a member of the retirement system on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.) shall not accrue service credit on the basis of that performance following the expiration of an agreement or contract in effect on the effective date.  The ALJ incorrectly determined that [...] was ineligible for pension benefits retroactive to 1/1/2008.
[directive] as in Pursuant N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5, the hospitalization of the defendant for examination to purposes not exceed thirty (30) days.  This form of order to used instances to be in is is where a qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist has already examined the defendant pursuant screening Orders #1A and B but was unable make a to to #1 determination as the competency.  to --------------  Attorney Name -----------  NJ  Attorney ID Number ----------------- Address -------------  Telephone Number ---------------  Attorney for of Superior Court  New Jersey Law Division - Criminal Part _______ of State  New Jersey C.ounty ------- Plaintiff, Indictment Number: V, Criminal Action Ordering  Committing Defendant Defendant.  NJS.A. Pursuant to 2C:4-5  Where Hospitalization Clinically is Necessary to Perform an Evaluation as to the Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial
[brief] In addition to *Blakely*, defendant relies on *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362, 147 L. Ed.2d 435, 455 (2000), which held, “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  *9  In State v. Natale*, 184 N.J. 458, 466, 878 A.2d 724 (2005), (*Natale II*), our Supreme Court held:  Under New Jersey's Code of Criminal Justice, a defendant cannot be sentenced to a period of imprisonment greater than the presumptive term for the crime he committed, unless the judge finds one or more statutory aggravating factors.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(1).  The Code does not require that a judicial finding of an aggravating factor be encompassed by the jury verdict or that it be based on an admission by the defendant at a plea hearing.  We now hold that a sentence above the presumptive statutory term based solely on a judicial finding of aggravating factors, other than a prior criminal conviction, violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee.
[brief] ........................................................................................................................................15 | CASES | PAGE(S) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Kaufman v Planning Bd. Warren Tp., 101 N.J. 551, 558 (1988).  | 15 | | Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 20 (1987).  | 5,8 | | Paruszewski v. Twp. of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45, 51-54, (1998) | 6 | | Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 286 (N.J. 2013) | 8, 14 | | Salt & Light Co v. Willingboro, 423 N.J. Super. | 8 | | 282 (App Div 2011), cert. den., 210 NJ 108 (2012) | | | Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Wall, | 6,7,8 | | 127 N.J. 152, 165-66, (1992).  | | | Twp. of Dover v. Bd. of Adj. of Dover, 158 N.J.Super. | 6 | | 401, 411-12, (App. Div. 1978).  | | | Township of No. Brunswick v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., | 6 | | 378 N.J. Super. 485, 490 (App. Div. 2005).  | | | Vidal v. Lisanti Foods, Inc., | 5 | | 292 N.J.Super. 555, 561 (App.Div. 1996).  | | **Statutes** | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 | 5,8 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d | 8 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89 | 9 | [...] ORDINANCE NO. 2021-03 - AN ORDINANCE OF THE [...], COUNTY OF MORRIS, AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[directive] All police officers are required to complete the following types of in-service training regardless of their duties or assignment.  a.  Firearms Requalification, Use of Force Policy and Vehicular Pursuit Policy  Requalification with the agency handgun is mandated annually by N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6j.  An Attorney General's Directive issued in December of 1989 requires semi-annual requalification with all agency-authorized firearms that the officer Revised: 4/00 1 may be required to use in the course of official duties.  The Attorney General has also directed that all police receive semi-annual training on the laws and policies governing the use of force and vehicular pursuit.  This training is usually given in conjunction with the firearms requalification.  All of this training usually occurs within an eight hour period or less.  b.  Domestic Violence  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-20 requires annual in-service training of at least four hours on domestic violence.  Officers transferring to a new agency must receive training within 90 days from the date of transfer.  Initial training now occurs as part of the Basic Course for Police Officers.  2.
[brief] The Trial Court then denied the School’s Motion to Limit Exhibits to the record/exhibits before the Board; the Order allowed the [...] to submit the 57 additional documents to “be marked for identification... and the Court will rule upon each of them if they fall outside of those parameters” (Da214).  The Court at Trial then never so ruled on the various documents, and apparently considered all the additional documents in its Final Opinion/Order.  To the extent those documents created a new and different case to the Court than heard by the Zoning Board cannot be quantified, but clearly this vague mishandling improperly created a new and different case and record than presented to the Zoning Board.
[brief] Defendant’s unsupported theory that there may have been information in the profile that would support his entrapment defense and prove “[...]” appeared to be an adult did not meet this standard.  Although he speculated that “[...]’s” profile may have contained statements like, “I’m 29 years old, but I like to pretend I’m 14.  If you’re into this thing, too, let’s connect[,]” (1T6-16 to 21), there is no proof of that—or anything remotely similar to that—in the record.  Defendant failed to certify or testify to that and did not make such a claim in his statement to police on the night of the offense, despite his personal familiarity with “[...]’s” profile.  Speculating that the evidence would have been exculpatory, without presenting any evidence in support of that claim, is insufficient.
[brief] Damaging evidence is generally prejudicial; however the inquiry is not simply whether the evidence is prejudicial, but rather whether the risk of prejudice is too high that it outweighs the probative value of the evidence.  State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236, 253 (App. Div. 2000), certif. den. 165 N.J. 492 (2000).  It is the burden of the party seeking to preclude the admission of evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403 to convince the trial judge that the factors favoring exclusion substantially outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence.