ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  This Rule provides that the defendant, after conviction, shall be admitted to bail on motion and notice to the county prosecutor pending the prosecution of an appeal or proceedings for certification only if it appears that the case involves a substantial question that should be determined by the appellate court, that the Rule 2:9-4 safety of any person or of the community will not be seriously threatened if the defendant remains on bail, and that there is no significant risk of defendant’s flight.  Bail  After Conviction  A trial court denying bail shall state briefly its reason therefore.  A judge allowing bail may at any time revoke the order admitting the defendant to bail.  This Rule provides that a summons shall issue unless the defendant is charged with murder, kidnapping, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, 351 Rule 3:3-1 of Title 2C that constitute first or second degree crimes, or any crimes involving possession or use of a firearm, or arson, burglary, violations of Chapter Determination on Whether to Issue a conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes; or the defendant has been served with a summons and has failed to appear; or there is reason to believe that the Summons or Warrant defendant is a danger to self, other persons or property; or there is an outstanding warrant for the defendant; or the defendant’s identity or address is not known and a warrant is necessary to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court; or there is reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons.
[brief] See, Caggiano v. Fontoura, 354 N.J. Super. 111, 124 (App. Div. 2002); Golden Estates v. Continental Cas., 317 N.J. Super. 82, 88 (App. Div. 1998).  The authority to grant interlocutory appellate review is discretionary, and usually runs counter to judicial policy that favors an “uninterrupted proceeding at the trial level with a single and complete [appellate] review. ”
[brief] These requirements are referred to as the positive criteria and negative criteria.  Here, because the proposed use is not in an inherently beneficial use, the applicant must show “that the general welfare is served because the use is peculiarly fitted to the particular location for which the variance is sought. ”  *Smart SMR v. Borough of Fair Law Board of Adjustment*, 152 NJ 309, 323 (1998) *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 NJ 1, 4 (1987).
[directive] a)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to aggravated sexual assault, sexual [Yes] [No] assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or any attempt to commit any of these crimes and at sentencing the court finds that your conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior you must verify your address with the appropriate law enforcement agency every 90 days or if the court finds your conduct is not characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, you must verify your address annually?
[brief] (Da15)  The new borrower [...] for permission to assume the Mortgage promised to pay the outstanding principle and interest a lump sum of 20,000 toward the outstanding balance of 110, 909.78.  (Da15)  A schedule of payment was attached to the agreement.  (Da18)  Also, a Hud -1 and a Deed Transfer was completed and executed by the parties.  (Da 22, Da37)  According to the records all parties were represented by Attorneys.  (Da37)  (Da38)  The record indicates prior to the above Mortgage note assumption, HUD 1, and Deed Transfer, [...], a third party purchase of municipal tax lien, in August 2011 served a Summons and Civil Action Foreclosure Complaint of tax foreclosure on the property.
[brief] (9T100-19 to 22; 9T104-17 to 20).  When [...] arrived at the scene, hundreds of people were still congregated in the parking lot.  (9T106-4 to 6).  The officers at the scene attempted to speak with those who were around, however, most of the persons approached did not want to talk to the police and exhibited some hostility to them.  (9T106-24 to 9T107-5; 9T108-3 to 5).  To make it more comfortable for people to talk, the police set up a room at the nearby hotel to conduct interviews.  (9T109-18 to 25).  Police were able to speak to two or three attendees and several relatives of the victims, but the police did not receive any information that morning on who shot the victims.
[brief] Finally, the record indicates that water pipes and sewer pipes are near the Property and that some of these pipes are over 100 years own and prone to water infiltration into the water and sewer system.  (T2, 37:2-8).  Plaintiff’s LSRP did not present any evidence to refute the claims that contaminated groundwater from the Property could be entering the Borough’s water and sewer pipes.  Because “municipal bodies are composed of local citizens who are far more familiar with the municipality's characteristics…[,]” First Montclair Partner, L.P. v. Herod Redevelopment I, L.L.C., 381 N.J. Super. 298, 302 (App. Div. 2005), the Trial Court should have given deference to the Borough’s concerns.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14(b), (d) and (g).  The statute authorizes the association to "enter into contracts, bring suit and be sued."  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-15(a).  No unit owner, except as an officer of the association, may bind the association.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-16(a).  Nor may a unit owner "contract for or perform any maintenance, repair, replacement, removal, alteration or modification of the common elements or any additions [***11] thereto, except through the association and its officers."  [**572]  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-18.  If a unit owner fails to comply with the rules and regulations or any of the provisions in the master deed, he may be subject to a suit for injunctive relief by the association or by any other unit owner.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-16(b).  II
[brief] ”  Pa96.  Because of such an error by the Board, this Court is asked to decide this appeal with an inadequate record on appeal concerning the following material factual issues that are disputed by the parties: - whether I knew or should have known when I retired on February 1, 2022 that I was not entitled to any life insurance benefit; - whether my reliance on the December 28, 2021 written statement by the [...] that I would be entitled to a life insurance benefit of $9,952.12 when I retired on February 1, 2022 was reasonable; • whether I knew or should have known that my FMLA leave did not “count” towards the length of service needed to entitle me to a life insurance benefit; • whether I was provided with any information by the [...], [...] or anyone else to explain service credit, how service credit was calculated and the distinction, if any, between service credit and length of service; • whether I acted in good faith in this case or, as respondent cynically suggests, whether I knew when I retired on February 1, 2022 that I was not entitled to any life insurance benefits and this appeal is merely my attempt to obtain benefits that I have known for years that I was never entitled to upon my retirement; and • whether the relief I seek in this appeal would undermine the financial integrity of the [...].
[brief] 5.  The Trial Court’s conclusion that the Arbitrator based his findings on the parties’ course of conduct is erroneous and not supported by the record [Da31-32]  In confirming the Award, the Trial Court erroneously stated that the Arbitrator determined the parties’ agreement on EGP “was made pursuant to the parties’ conduct in the course of their dealings with each other. ”  Da31.  This conclusion is incorrect, and whether this error is one of law or fact is of no matter; the Trial Court’s decision must be vacated.  The Award does not anywhere mention the phrase “course of dealing” and does not cite a single case discussing the legal criteria for amending or forming a contract based on a course of dealing.  Da132-144.  The Arbitrator was very clear in the Award that his decision regarding [...]’s entitlement to EGP payments and the amount of those EGP payments was based purely on the Financial Reporting Arc provided to [...] (for a wholly different purpose), and (because [...] does not appear on the Financial Reporting) the Forecasts that Arc created for [...]’s benefit.
[brief] [...] also retained the [...] property and received all of the proceeds of its sale.  23T21:25-22:3.  Added to this was the absence of any alimony to the obviously less monied wife, who [...] noted has not worked “since at least 2004,” was capable of earning maybe $30,000 - $40,000 as a casino employee (A277), and who [...] acknowledged probably would have been entitled to at least limited duration alimony. \(^{10}\)  The end result?  [...] is in tremendous debt; [...] still has millions.
[brief] Pointedly, he commented, The density and the FAR and . . . the coverage is . . . low.  And that’s . . . the reason why . . . it hasn’t been developed and why in this particular case if you look at the . . . other multi-level senior facilities and you look at the height and the density and the . . . other requirements, that gives you the notion of what is needed to make facilities like this appropriate.  And your density or – you know, 14 units to the acre, less than 10 units to the acre is – it simply doesn’t allow this kind of facility to be developed.  [6T 101-4 to 101-15]  [...] later explained that even though the Township had zoned for assisted living uses elsewhere, the bulk standards in those zones made it impossible to develop the use in those locations, and those bulk standards were likely a reason why no development of that use had occurred in [...].
[brief] On March 5, 2018, [...], a resident of [...], was sleeping in his apartment when he was awakened by a “small crack” noise sometime between 8:40 and 9:00 p.m. (24T 51-16 to 52-14).  Around 20 to 25 minutes later, Cooper decided to leave his apartment to get something to drink when he opened the door and discovered what appeared to be a dead man lying on his porch in a pool of blood.  He immediately called 9-1-1.  (24T 52-15 to 53-12).  Officers from the [...] were dispatched to the scene at around 9:18 p.m.  Upon arrival, they observed a deceased man, later identified as [...], lying in front of Cooper’s apartment.  (24T 73-5 to 73-9, 81-6 to 81-25).  The evidence that was ultimately recovered from the scene included two cellphones near the body as well as one in the victim’s pocket, (27T 65-5 to 65-24), a shell casing on the ground nearby, and samples from two areas of spit on the ground approximately four to five feet from the body.  (27T 41-21 to 42-20).  Later medical examination of Stallworth’s body revealed that he died of a gunshot wound to the back of the head.
[brief] The complaint was filed on July 3, 2023.  (Pa1 – Pa6).  Trial was scheduled and heard on Nov 13, 2023.  (1T).  On Nov 16, 2023, the trial court entered a written order of dismissal.  (Pa7).  On Dec 28, 2023, I filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (Pa8 – Pa13).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] All of these decisions raise troubling questions about [...]’s impartiality.  Caselaw, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Court Rule all support resentencing by another judge.  See *DeNike v. Cupo*, 196 N.J. 502, 514-15 (2008) (warning that “judges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be perceived as partial” as “questions about the impartiality of the justice system … threaten[] the integrity of our judicial process”) (italics in original; internal quotation marks omitted); Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C)(1) (“A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
[brief] Courts are to apply basic principles of contract interpretation to leases.  See *Town of Kearny v. Disc. City of Old Bridge, Inc.*, 205 N.J. 386, 411 (2011).  Contract terms are generally “given their plain and ordinary meaning. ”  *M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp.*, 171 N.J. 378, 396 (2002).  “Courts enforce contracts ‘based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract. ’”  *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill*, 217 N.J. 99, 118 (2014) (quoting Caruso v. Ravenswood Devs., Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 499, 506 (App. Div. 2001)).  The courts are permitted “a broad use of extrinsic evidence to achieve the ultimate goal of discovering the intent of the parties. ”  Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 270 (2006); see also Renee Cleaners, Inc. v. Good Deal Super Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 1965) (“In general, the polestar of construction is the intention of the parties as disclosed by the language used, taken in its entirety, and evidence of the attendant circumstances may be considered, not to change the agreement made but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance. ”).  “The plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry.
[brief] Plaintiffs timely produced the expert report of [...].  The inability to use [...] as an expert did not result in a dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.  At trial plaintiffs established a prima facie case with [...]’s expert testimony.  Defendant did not move to bar [...]’s testimony at trial following his voir dire or after he testified.  Plaintiffs suffered no prejudice whatsoever.  In a similar vein, Castello v. Wohler, supra, is distinguishable from the present matter.
[directive] 8.  For purposes of re-qualification only, upon approval and designation of the respective County Prosecutor’s Office, municipal police officers and/or county sheriff’s officers may be trained as a “CED Re-Qualification Instructor” to administer CED re- qualification.  Training of any CED Re-Qualification Instructor shall be consistent with the training requirements for Certified CED Instructors.  Each respective County Prosecutor’s Office shall maintain a list of all CED Re-Qualification Instructors.
[brief] Table of Contents  Table of Authorities…………………………………………………………………………………iii  Table of Supplemental Appendix……………………………………………………………..vi  Procedural History…………………………………………………………………………….1  Statement of Facts……………………………………………………………………………..1  Point  I  [...]’s Obligation To Notify [...]………………………………………..2  A.  The Regulation Applies To “Cancellation[s]” Not To “Polic[ies].”………………………………………..3  B.  The Applicable Law Is Consistently Construed Across Coverage Types………………………………………..5  C.  [...] Failed To Provide [...] With Specific And Clear Notice…………………………………………………..7  D.  [...]’s Notice Obligation Is Non-Delegable……………..10  E.  [...] Misdirects The Proper Focus From Its Obligations As An Insurer………………………………………..13  Point II
[brief] This is a personal injury matter arising from a customer to customer related accident that occurred on April 26, 2019 at the Defendant’s, [...] (improperly pled as [...]) (“[...]”) warehouse in South Hackensack, New Jersey.  Defendant, [...], was a customer in the [...] warehouse when he accidentally struck Plaintiff, [...] (“Plaintiff”) with his shopping cart, known as a “U-boat. ”  An Order of Judgement by Default has been entered against Perez-Hernandez.  The evidence in this record shall tell this Court that [...] secured summary judgment, and thereafter withstood Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempt at interlocutory review.
[brief] Assuming Erlinger applies to New Jersey’s persistent-offender statute, unlike Erlinger, defendant here did not argue below that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that his predicate offenses were committed on separate occasions.  In any event, there is no plain error because there is ample proof in the record that defendant committed the predicate offenses at separate times—criminal trespass in October 2013 and criminal sexual contact in June 2015, see PSR at 6—and defendant never contested this issue below.
[brief] ”).  This is because, a party seeking to recover a deposit and thereby “elect[ing] to be no longer bound by the contract is not privileged to again choose to be bound.  Having committed itself to a recovery of the deposit, its right to have the property is forever gone. ”  Blum Bldg. Co. v. Ingersoll, 99 N.J. Eq. 563, 568 (Ch. Div. 1926) (“And where a man has an election between several inconsistent causes of action he will be confined to that which he first adopts.
[brief] [...]’s statement here, “I would like to represent myself from here on out,” is even clearer and more unequivocal than defendants’ requests in other cases where our courts have found the right to have been sufficiently asserted.  For example, in Rose, the defendant’s requests were primarily focused on the defendant’s desire for a different attorney.  The defendant first asked the court to remove his assigned attorney from the case, then asked the court to appoint a different attorney to represent him, and only expressed a desire to represent himself as a last resort:  “That’s all I’m asking, your honor, that you remove him from my case.  I’ll go pro se.  I’ll put in a motion to go pro se.  I’m not going to court with him purposely trying to sell me out. ”  State v. Rose, 458 N.J. Super. 610, 622 (App. Div. 2019).
[directive] 1.  Pleas taken before indictment or initial pleas offered following an indictment in counties that do not have a pre-indictment program or where a non-fugitive defendant has not been afforded an opportunity to review and accept or reject an initial plea offer prior to being indicted.  (This is referred to in the Tables as the “Pre-Indictment Offer”); Page 25  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  2.  Pleas taken after indictment but within twenty (20) days of the issuance by the prosecutor of the initial post-indictment plea offer or at the next scheduled court event following the expiration of the twenty day period.  (This is referred to in the Tables as the “Initial Post-Indictment Offer”); and 3.  Pleas taken after the next scheduled court event occurring twenty (20) or more days following the issuance by the prosecutor of the initial post- indictment plea offer.  (This is referred to in the Tables as the “Final Post- Indictment Offer”).
[brief] “The non-public school students in [...] alone constitute nearly a quarter of all such students in our state;” •  Since “[...]’s state-issued school aid is based upon its 6,000 [now about 5,000] enrolled public-school students… [...]’s education budget has been severely strained by its obligation to provide transportation and special education tuition to many of the 31,000 [now about 47,000] non-public school students not included in its [SFRA] aid calculation;” •
[brief] But nobody – not [...], nor the [...], nor the Defendant – saw where [...] was or what she was doing before [...] caught up with her.  Thus, the State failed to prove that [...] was not the aggressor, as she had been so many times in the past.  It is irrelevant whether [...] struck [...] with a stick or merely commanded him to stop.  [...] released [...] without inflicting more than laceration and bruising.  The extent of [...]’s injuries is not even at issue, because serious injury is not an element of the potentially dangerous dog statute.
[brief] For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Law Division, vacating the judgment of conviction entered by the Law Division against Appellant for driving while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  In the alternative, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court remand for re-sentencing consistent with the version of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 in effect at the time of Appellant arrest and Appellant’s indigence.  By:_____________________________________  [...] (ID No. 033981988)  [...] (ID No. 382352021)  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellant Date: February 14, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  Criminal Action On Appeal from a Judgement of Conviction of the Superior Court, Law Division, Morris County Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] (Pa29; Pa53-59).  Counsel accepted the plaintiff’s case on contingency.  (Pa47).  This appeal arises from the legal fees awarded by the trial court to plaintiff’s counsel, based on his fee application, and following a favorable resolution and settlement to the plaintiff after three years of attorney involvement.  (Pa9-21; Pa42-51; Pa53- Pa152-155).  On May 29, 2017, plaintiff purchased a new 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, VIN #[...] (hereinafter “the Santa Fe”) from defendant for $32,040.68.
[brief] The Superior Court analyzed near identical facts, and this Court affirmed the analysis, in Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Chartanovich5, BER-L- 5  Notably, Counsel for the defendant in Chartanovich, is also Counsel for the Appellant, here.  5641-23 ([...], Oct. 26, 2023), aff’d 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 (App. Div. Oct. 21, 2024).
[brief] This was a prosecution without forensic evidence.  It rested entirely on very questionable eyewitness identifications, dependent on a two second glimpse of a face from upper story windows or while running away.  The defense presented strong alibi evidence.  The revelation that a man who had already admitted to a spree of Atlantic City shootings around the same time, who apparently had the opportunity to commit the shooting, had confessed shakes the foundation of the State’s case.  Nash, 212 N.J. at 357. \(^{13}\)  The admission of guilt by another plainly could have made the difference.  The denial of this motion must be reversed.
[brief] Defendant’s Cooperation with the Administrator  Defendant cooperated with the Administrator’s investigation.  (Da313 at ¶ 5).  Among other things, Defendant furnished the financial books and records, [...] project files, and other relevant documents.  These records included, among other items, the following:  i.  Eleven years of [...] QuickBooks records, dating from 2006 to March 7, 2016; ii.  Nine years of [...] checking account statements and cancelled checks; iii.  The checking account statements and canceled checks for the period January 2007 to 2015 (1,731 pages); iv.  Sixteen years of [...] tax returns dating from 2001 through 2016; and v. [...] project files from multiple years.  (Da306-7).  The Administrator also received 1,250 pages of documents produced by [...] pursuant to an October 28, 2016 subpoena served by the Administrator.  (Da961).  Indeed, the Administrator asked for and received many thousands of pages of records – including, but not limited to, all QuickBooks records for [...].  (Da306-7).  E.
[brief] [...]’s addendum report identifies the additional records he reviewed after the preparation of his initial report.  (Pa173).  These records include Petitioner’s medical records related to his 20000 and 20004 incidents, injuries and treatment, about which [...] states:  MRI Reports of the cervical spine are dated 10/27/00 and 4/27/04.  The MRI report of 4/27/04 revealed that the small disc herniation on the right at C6-C7 had increased in size compared to the previous study of 10/27/00.  This now caused impression of the anterior aspect of the thecal sac and implanting the cervical spinal cord in sagittal diameter.  The disc herniation extends slightly to the right neural foramin which has narrowed.  There is a mild annular bulge at C5-C6 that was unchanged.  Clearly, there were significant pretexting conditions with a prior accident causing an injury to the neck on 3/25/04 as well as an accident documented in 2002.