ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1A  [...], *Sutherland Statutory Construction* § 21.13 (7th ed. Nov. 2023 Update)  ................................................................. 19 2023  New Jersey Driver Manual .................................................................................................................. 29  5 Am. Jur. 2d *Appellate Review* § 564 (2007)  ......................................................................................  14  Foreword to Final Text of Unif. Vehicle Code (August 20, 1926)  ........................................  27 L. 1928, c. 281, Art. XIV, § 4(a) .............................................................................................................  26 L. 1951, c. 23, § 67 ..................................................................................................................................  27 L. 1956, c. 107, § 2 .................................................................................................................................  27  Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/course (last visited Jan. 21, 2024)  ..................................................................................................................  20  Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/turn (last visited Jan. 21, 2024) .................................................................................................................. 20, 31 Sponsor’s Statement to S. 177 (1956) ....................................................................................................... 28 Statement to Assembly Bill No. 4 (Jan. 15, 1951) .................................................................................. 27 The American Heritage Dictionary (1985) ............................................................................................ 31 Unif. Act Regulating the Operation of Vehicles on Highways, § 18 (“Signals on Starting, Stopping or Turning”), 2d Nat’l Conference on Street and Highway Safety (1926) ........................................................................... 26, 27 Unif. Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Act V, § 79, Nat’l Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances (1948) ......................................................................................... 27 RULES R. 2:6-1(a)(2) ........................................................................................................................................ ii TABLE OF CITATIONS Da - Defendant’s appendix Db - Defendant’s brief Pa - Appendix to this brief 1T - Motion to suppress transcript dated July 29, 2020 2T - Plea transcript dated September 23, 2022 3T - Sentencing transcript dated December 9, 2022 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that the use of a signal when changing lanes on a roadway is optional.
[brief] Thus, arbitration of IFPA claims would be contrary to both the spirit and the letter of not only the IFPA, but also the AICRA,” id. at 29-30.  Given [...]’s and [...]’s extensive experience with, and essential roles in, the no-fault regime, their interpretation of AICRA and [...]’s regulations is far more important and persuasive than the view of the [...], which was based on only the limited record and arguments before it.  This court—not the [...]—should resolve whether New Jersey law deprives insurance companies and the State of essential means under the IFPA and RICO to prevent insurance fraud.  This court should therefore defer to the agencies’ persuasive analysis and review—and reverse—the Law Division’s erroneous statutory interpretation.
[brief] Our courts must determine if defendant waived the TCA notice defense before defendant was entitled to prosecute that defense on summary judgment, “because waiver negates reliance on the defenses”.  This court explained:  In a TCA case, when a public entity substantially waits before raising the affirmative defenses…we hold that the judge must first determine whether defendants waived those defenses.  That is so because waiver negates reliance on the defenses.  If the judge concludes that a public entity timely raised, and has not waived these affirmative defenses, then the judge should address whether dispositive relief is appropriate.  ***
[brief] A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.  The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.  Under the liberal construction required of pension statutes, his eligibility for the benefit is not in question.  In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.  [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.
[brief] (Id).  At the March 1, 2018 hearing, [...] expressed displeasure that the status quo ordered to be maintained on January 24, 2018 was not, in fact, being maintained.  (4T20 at 11; 4T25-26; 4T28 at 7).  The court specifically cited changes made by Plaintiff [...] to [...]’s banking relationships (4T25 at 24) and makes reference to [...]’s certification concerning filings made with the State of New Jersey with respect to both the [...] and [...].  (4T at 20).  [...] directed each side to submit the names of two individuals for the court’s consideration as interim manager of the [...] and indicated that [...] was not to remain manager for any longer than was necessary to find a neutral, third-party replacement.  (4T28 at 18).  [...] concluded by reiterating instructions to maintain the status quo.
[brief] Immediately after the June 13th Board hearing, the Board’s attorney, the Township’s attorney, and the Township’s planners began the process of drafting the necessary amendments to the zoning code, the amendments needed for the Settlement Agreement and the Board’s project approval resolution.  To that end, Board’s counsel sent an email to [...]’s counsel on June 15, 2022 requesting information from [...] for that purpose (Pa151) followed up by a ‘reminder’ emails, on June 20th (Pa153), to which [...]’s counsel responded that he “was away last week and had to deal with an OTSC the minute [he] got back—so digging out of a hole still.
[brief] *Id.* at 1867 ([...], J. dissenting).  As Justice [...] observed, “[i]n most (if not all) cases, the fact that a judge rather than a jury applied ACCA’s different-occasions requirement will be harmless” because the occasions inquiry “is usually a straightforward question. ”  *Erlinger*, 144 S. Ct. at 1866 ([...], J. dissenting).  Frequently, as further discussed *infra* and as in this case, the question of whether the offenses occurred on separate dates yields an obvious answer beyond reproach and, more saliently, beyond a reasonable doubt.  Elaborating in a footnote, Justice [...] opined, “For any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today’s new rule in collateral proceedings. ”
[brief] In *Polarome*, the claimants had been exposed to a toxic workplace chemical, which was determined to have caused bodily injury.  While the claimants’ last injurious exposure had ended when their employment ended, the court noted that the “last pull” of the coverage trigger had not occurred until the “the initial manifestation of [their] toxin-related disease. ”  *Id.* at 272.  As explained in the subsequent *Air Master* decision, the plaintiffs’ “initial lung symptoms in *Polarome* were not dispositive of the trigger end date,” which was determined instead by a subsequent clinical diagnosis of one plaintiff and the results of a biopsy of the other plaintiff.  452 N.J. Super. at 55 (citing *Polarome*, 404 N.J.Super. at 256-57).  In contrast to the claimants in *Polarome*, there was no “clinical diagnosis” or other medical procedure, such as a biopsy, suggesting that [...] had been harmed by toxic mold.  His symptoms plainly did not, in his mind or in the mind of any treating physician (before [...]), suggest that he had been harmed by exposure to a toxic substance.  The *Air Master* court reversed the trial court’s decision and rejected a claim based on a “manifestation argument” tied to the plaintiff’s first complaints of water intrusion damage, ruling instead that the “public policy” reasons underlying the continuous trigger doctrine in toxic-exposure bodily-injury cases applied equally to claims of continuing property damage:
[brief] (10T 111:7-10; 10T 99:9-12).  [...] had no specific recollection of that discussion and didn’t know the specifics.  (10T111:15-19.  10T 99:2-6;10T111:3-6).  [...] never saw the “prenup. ” (10T 110:12-25).  None of the testimony relied on by the Court supports a finding that an original executed prenuptial agreement ever existed.  In fact, the Photocopy, on its face, states in Section 10.4- titled “Original agreements” that “This Agreement shall be executed in four (4) counterparts, two for each party.
[brief] The only civil causes of action for “aiding and abetting” that have been recognized in New Jersey are those for the aiding and abetting torts, namely: (1) the aiding and abetting a corporate breach of fiduciary duty; and (2) the aiding and abetting the commission of civil fraud.  McCormac v. Qwest Comme’ns Intern., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 481 (App. Div. 2006) (discussing cases involving fraud, such as issuing false financial statements and concealing corporate economic conditions, and corporate fiduciary breaches, such as bribing agents); In re Integrity Ins. Co., 240 N.J. Super. 480, 502-03 (App. Div. 1990) (aiding and abetting fraud by preparing and disseminating materially false financial statements); Franklin Med. Assocs. v. Newark Pub. Schs., 362 N.J. Super. 494, 510 (App. Div. 2003) (bribing an agent of a principal was aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principal); Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 334, 368 (Law Div. 1979) (involving fiduciary duties and bribery).  Every case on which Plaintiff relies in putting forth this claim involves one of these two scenarios, which are not applicable here.
[brief] 1T refers to the motion transcript dated January 10, 2014  2T refers to the motion transcript dated September 15, 2014  3T refers to the motion transcript dated December 15, 2014  4T refers to the trial transcript (Volume I) dated November 17, 2015  5T refers to the trial transcript (Volume II) dated November 17, 2015  6T refers to the trial transcript dated November 18, 2015  7T refers to the trial transcript dated November 19, 2015  8T refers to the trial transcript (Volume I) dated December, 1 2015  9T refers to the trial transcript (Volume II) dated December, 1 2015  10T refers to the trial transcript dated December 2, 2015  11T refers to the trial transcript dated December 8, 2015  12T refers to the trial transcript (Volume I) dated December 9, 2015  13T refers to the trial transcript (Volume II) dated December 9, 2015  14T refers to the trial transcript dated December 10, 2015  15T refers to the trial transcript dated December 11, 2015  16T refers to the trial transcript dated December 15 2015  17T refers to the trial transcript dated December 16, 2015  18T refers to the trial transcript dated December 17, 2015  19T refers to the sentencing transcript dated January 29, 2016  20T refers to the re-sentencing transcript dated January 24, 2020
[brief] A. Yes.  Q.  And what was he saying at that point in time?  A.  Well, I guess he just wanted to get his partners to put up the money and he and [...] discussed that for quite a while, and he was trying to get money from the partners.  Q.  Did he provide you with anything concrete as far as that goes, anything that you could take back to [...] to give confidence to [...] that there was going to be a payment made?  A.  No, nothing concrete, just that he didn't have the money.  Q.  He basically told you he didn't have the money?  A. Yes.  (Pa001803 – 001804).
[brief] The Plaintiffs’ Property is located at [...], [...].  The Property is improved with a “[...]” carry-out and delivery store, which had on-site customer and employee parking with access via Church Lane.  The Property was at one time located in a redevelopment area designated by the [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq.  The redevelopment of the area is known as the [...] (the “Project”).  (Pa000002).  The Authority was deemed the redeveloper, but only up until March 16, 2020 where it is undisputed that the Authority sold all of its interest and rights to the properties identified as Block 84.01, Lot 1 (formerly Block 84, Lots 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 13.01, and 14 and Block 85, Lots 2, 3, 17 and 19) to a wholly owned subsidiary of [...], [...].
[brief] The Board's approval of the 2022 Zoning Application with its variances, flies in the face of the purported goals, objectives and concerns set forth in the 2004 Township Master Plan and substantially impairs the intent and purpose of that plan.  The grant of the multiple variances must be voided as improperly granted.  As set forth more fully below at Legal Argument IV, the M.L.U.L., N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, provides that:
[brief] Da310-14.  The MOU is not the bedrock [...] now makes it out to be – it was an abandoned, forgotten document that cannot be used to create an arbitration provision in the 2022 Addendum where one simply does not exist.  Furthermore, as recognized by [...], for an arbitration clause to be enforceable, there must be a meeting of the minds and mutual assent – the parties must have had an understanding as to the terms to which they were agreeing.  [...] (“[...]”) could not have understood he was agreeing to an arbitration provision in 2022 based upon a then ten-year-old MOU that was not incorporated into or discussed in conjunction with either the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement or the 2022 Addendum.  In sum, the 2022 Addendum upon which [...] bases her claims has no arbitration provision and parol evidence (even if it supported arbitration – which it does not) cannot be used to manufacture one.
[brief] In Sanford, a mother sued a school over her son’s suicide alleging negligence and state created danger.  The court found that a guidance counselor’s failure to advise the mother that her son wrote a letter to a former girlfriend stating that stories about her “almost made me want to kill myself” did not create or increase the danger that he would commit suicide nor interfere with her relationship with her son where the letter contained “the same information to which she [the mother] already had access in the form of instant messages. ”  *Id.* at *4-7, *11-12.  Plaintiffs rely on another inapposite case, *Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep’t of Pub. Health*, 503 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007).
[brief] Defendants characterize this disciplinary action to be based upon [...]’s “disregard” of his supervisor’s instructions and use of a “profane reference when lecturing in his capacity as DEP representative. ” (Db1).  [...] did not disregard his supervisor’s instructions, he did as he was told by her and changed his proposed presentation by deleting reference to fracking.  (Pa514, [...] replaced the two topics on the agenda as directed and none of the topic handouts appeared in the final course packet that was distributed.  [...] told the audience that he would not discuss “fracking,” as he had earlier proposed and humorously referring to it as an “F-word” but there is nothing profane about anything [...] said and no support for any allegation that he disregarded the directions of his supervisors.  Also, Alan [...] has never been told by [...], [...] or anyone else what he said that was disparaging.  Regarding the allegation that Alan [...] released “water rate data at the Rutgers course”, the water rate data had already been published by [...] ([...]) on its rate dashboard with the approval of [...] and [...].  The [...] rate dashboard is a USEPA funded rate assessment tool provided as a public service utilizing Federal (public) funds.  As such this information is accessible to the public upon inquiry.  These are factual issues to be decided by a jury and not decided by the Court on a motion for summary judgment.
[brief] Firearms examiners believe that individual characteristics in a firearm result from imperfections on tool-cutting surfaces during the firearm manufacturing process, as well as through “‘wear and tear of the firearm. ’”  President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods 104 (2016) [hereinafter PCAST Report] (Da 485-59).  Firearms examiners assume that as a result of these imperfections, each firearm leaves a unique set of patterns or marks on bullets or casings that are ejected from that firearm.
[brief] ...............................................................................  7  Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1997) ............................................................................... 36 Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016)  .................................................................  14  Loigman v. Kings Landing Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 324 N.J. Super. 97 (Ch. Div. 1999) .......................................................  8  McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 807 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2015)  ..................................................................  24 Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016)
[brief] (1T72-1 to 9).  [...] set up surveillance in a parking lot outside [...]’s residence, while [...] (“[...]”) was performing “moving surveillance. ” (1T74-1 to 18).  [...] observed [...] exit his residence, enter a white Kia, and leave the property.  (1T75-16 to 18).  About this time, a silver Mazda entered the lot and parked next to [...].  (1T77-4 to 8).  Shortly after, the Kia returned and parked near the Mazda.  (1T77-20 to 21).  [...] then stepped out of the Kia and approached the Mazda.  (1T79-21 to 22).  [...] complimented the Mazda to the driver and retrieved a roll of cash from his pocket.  (1T81-8 to 13).  [...] arrived and pulled in front of the driver’s side of the Mazda, at which point [...] placed the money roll back in his pocket.  (1T81-14 to 17).  [...] and [...] identify themselves as police and detain [...], at which point the driver of the Mazda puts the keys in the ignition and “turned the key forward. ” (1T82; 83-1-5).  [...] recognized the occupants of the Mazda as defendant and [...] and asked them to confirm their identity, which they did.
[brief] ..................................................................................................................................................................................  29  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING [...]’S DIAGRAM OF THE ACCIDENT.  (2T:99-22 to 105-23)  ..................................................................................................................37  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO HEAR THE AUDIO PORTION OF THE POLICE DASH CAM VIDEO.  (Da41; 1T:16-3 to 20-2) .................................................................................44  V.  THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE AND WARRANTS A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES.  (Da187) ..............................................................................................46  CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................48
[directive] 6.1.10  Along these same lines, it is important that there is no unreasonable delay between the conclusion of the investigation by the assigned investigator and the decision to file charges by the person who has that responsibility.  Although the 45-day clock begins at the time the person who has the responsibility to file charges has sufficient information, an agency would have a difficult time justifying an extensive bureaucratic delay once any member of that agency has established sufficient information.  The need to eliminate bureaucratic delay is one of the reasons that the internal affairs function should be closely aligned with the office of the law enforcement executive in the agency's organizational structure.  6.1.11
[brief] The environmental remediation efforts that solely remained under the Authority’s control at all times were fully completed as of January 2020, with the exception of the installation of an Active Subsurface Depressurization System (“ASDS”) that was installed during July 2018 and remained in place for ongoing monitoring.  Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims were narrowed down to the following instances: the taking of soil borings and the installation of temporary well points on February 20 and 21, 2017 as well as exterior vapor samples on May 18, 2017 conducted by [...]
[brief] The Trial Court's Order cannot be Sustained without an Analysis of Petitioner's Likelihood of Success (Pa153; T8)  Petitioners have pointed out that appellants cite no case law regarding the likelihood of success itself is an element to consider on a motion to disqualify.  But they miss the point: one cannot determine whether something is in fact "significantly harmful" without considering the context in which the alleged information was imparted.  One's settlement position – and litigation strategy – are necessarily different when success depends upon the invalidation of two Wills, not one.  The communications with [...] and [...] – and indeed the Verified Complaint – turn on petitioners' attempt to have the October 2022 Will invalidated and have the August 2018 Will probated in its place.  Between July 28 and August 2, 2023, the [...] knew nothing about the January 2022 Will.  Petitioners must also succeed in invalidating that Will, before the August 2018 Will can be probated.  Moreover, petitioners' claims that appellants "steered" decedent to their attorney make no sense.  All three Wills, the August 2018 Will, the January 2022 Will and the October 2022 Will, were drafted by the same law firm.  That firm presumably knows more about decedent's testamentary intent than does Janis [...].  The January 2022 Will and the October 2022 Will are almost identical.  The latter will omits two specific bequests: $50,000 to "[...]" and $50,000 to [...].  Compare Pa157 (decedent's January 2022 Will) to Pa68 (decedent's October 2022 Will).  However, in both of those Wills, appellants were to receive 50% of the residuary.  *Ibid.*  To invalidate the January 2022 Will, petitioners have to invalidate bequests to two charitable beneficiaries, who each had been bequeathed a significant sum of money.  Assuming that petitioners had in fact discussed "Plan A" with [...], which has not been established, facts learned since render that alleged plan nugatory.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Letter From [...] to [...] 7/29/2020 (Attached at Pa051)  Letter From [...] to [...] 7/07/2020 (Attached at Pa071) Letter From [...] to [...] 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa056)  Exhibit C-12 to [...]’s Certification Letter From [...] to [...] 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa056)  [...] Notice of Claim to [...] 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa053)  Letter From [...] to [...] 6/19/2020 (Attached at Pa084) Letter From [...] to [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078)  Letter From [...] to [...] 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa071)