ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Unless otherwise directed to do so by the County Prosecutor, the prosecutor's office must be immediately notified of all allegations of criminal conduct.  The internal affairs investigator shall refrain from taking any further investigative action until directed to do so by the County Prosecutor unless an imminent threat exists to the safety or welfare of an individual.  Once a complaint has been forwarded to the prosecutor's office, that office shall endeavor to review the allegation within 30 days and advise the law enforcement agency whether a criminal investigation will be conducted.  In the event the prosecutor's office cannot reach a decision within the initial 30 day period, the deadline may be extended in 30 day increments at the discretion of the County Prosecutor.  The law enforcement agency shall be advised of any extensions of the deadline.  6.3.3
[brief] Defendants uniformly claim that plaintiff—an [...] taxpaying resident—lacks constitutional, statutory and common law standing to challenge the validity of a post April 17, 1992 non-urban renewal entity [...] Section 37 long term tax exemption lacking a N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12(b) 5% statutory payment to [...] and the failure of [...] to monitor and to collect all N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12(b) long term tax exemption revenues due [...].  Defendants also uniformly claim that they are immune from plaintiff’s colorable civil rights act violation allegations.  No one disputes that the trial court dismissed this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations complaint on lack of standing subject matter jurisdiction prior to defendants filing post-remand answers.  The trial court avoided the substantive merits of plaintiff’s statutory interpretation and civil rights act violation claims.  The trial court never issued specific Rule 1:7-4(a) lack of standing findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to each of plaintiff’s counts, claims and remedies.  The trial court never issued Rule 1:7-4(a) findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the substantive merits of plaintiff’s allegations, claims and causes of actions.  Thus, the only issues before this appellate tribunal are whether plaintiff lacked constitutional, statutory and common law standing to bring this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violation action on April 8, 2019 and whether lack of standing subject matter dismissal orders should be afforded with prejudice preclusive effect upon the substantive merits.
[brief] [...] claims that uncertainty of outcome and magnitude of expense deterred him from funding his own appeal of the rulings in the Underlying Hokenson Action.  Those arguments would not carry the day under New Jersey law.  In New Jersey, when coverage is uncertain, New Jersey courts routinely require insureds to assume the costs of defense subject to potential reimbursement if, at the conclusion of the liability action, the claims are determined to have been within the scope of the duty to indemnify.  *Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.*, 206 N.J. 596, 616, (2011) ("Where there is a dispute regarding coverage, 'the practical effect of *Burd [v. Sussex Mutual Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383 (1970)]* is that an insured must initially assume the costs of defense ... subject to reimbursement by the insurer if the insured prevails on the coverage question'."); *Surety Mechanical Services, Inc. v. The Phoenix Ins. Co.*, 2014 WL 2921015 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014) ("[W]hen the insurer intends to dispute coverage based on an issue that is not material to the underlying case, the insured must bear the initial burden of defending itself, but the carrier must reimburse the insured if it is later determined that the claim is covered by the policy.") (citations omitted).  [...] did exactly what it was obligated to do.  It defended when presented with a mix of allegations against [...], appropriately reserving rights.  When those allegations became adjudications, [...] withdrew its defense because the judicial findings, coupled with the underlying plaintiffs’ abandonment of then-pending other claims, so clearly eliminated the possibility of any duty to indemnify.  [...]’s position, of course, is that the judgment below should be affirmed.
[brief] [...], : CIVIL ACTION  Plaintiff-Appellant, : ON APPEAL FROM FINAL vs. : ORDERS OF THE GNY MUTUAL INSURANCE : SUPERIOR COURT COMPANY and NJM INSURANCE : OF NEW JERSEY, COMPANY, : LAW DIVISION, Defendants-Respondents.  : SOMERSET COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] Sat Below: HON. [...], P.J.Cv.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRTEENTH COUNT THROUGH THE FIFTEENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RES JUDICATA AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (179a)  The Thirteenth Count through the Fifteenth Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint allege Fraudulent Concealment, and Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy to commit same, against [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and the [...].  As Plaintiffs have settled their claims against [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs will discuss said Counts against [...], [...], and the [...] only, and will refer to them hereinafter in Point III collectively as “Defendants”.  Said Counts arise solely from Defendants’ fraudulent concealment of the newly discovered evidence in the 2015 Action that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, and the new claims arising therefrom.  None of these facts nor claims were alleged in the complaint that was dismissed against [...] in the 2015 Action, as said facts were discovered in the course of the 2015 Action following said dismissal.  The Trial Court’s sole bases for dismissing said Counts are Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  The Trial Court stated:  “Plaintiffs seek to assert claims against [Defendants] based upon the same claims, the same factual allegations, and the same transactions at issue in the 2015 case…”  179a.  The Trial Court did not explain how claims that are entirely new, arising out of the discovery that Defendants fraudulently concealed evidence that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity – facts and claims which were not pled before the dismissal of the complaint against [...] in the 2015 Action, since they were unknown by Plaintiffs at the time – could possibly be “the same factual allegations” as the claims that were dismissed.  In addition, the fraudulent concealment had not yet occurred at the time of the dismissal of the claims against [...] in the 2015 Action, so the Trial Court’s holding that the fraudulent concealment claims had already been dismissed in the 2015 Action before the fraudulent concealment even occurred confounds all logic, as well as notions of time and space.  The Trial Court’s simplistic, unnuanced, and curt analysis seems to strain itself in order to achieve a desired outcome, but it comes woefully short of making any sense in fact, law, or reason.  It is a factual, legal, and physical impossibility for Plaintiffs’ new claims, arising solely out of the discovery that Defendants fraudulently concealed evidence that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, to be “identical” to prior, dismissed claims, which never alleged nor could have alleged such facts.
[brief] The errors addressed occurred after [...]'s final order was affirmed on 5/18/22 and [...] sought enforcement.  [...]'s replacement, [...], entered orders which: (1) denied [...] access to all ordered records, (2) denied post-judgment interest on $78,646 awarded attorney's fees the Board held for over two years, (3) failed to award attorney's fees after granting the enforcement, and (4) failed to order an OPRA civil penalty.
[brief] “Pursuant to Rule 1:7–2, a defendant is required to challenge instructions at the time of trial or else waives the right to contest the instructions on appeal. ”  State v. Belliard, 415 N.J. Super 51, 66 (App. Div. 2010) (citing State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 206–07 (2008)).  Where there is a failure to object, reviewing courts presume the instruction was “not error” and “unlikely to prejudice the defendant’s case. ”  State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012); see R. 1:7–2; State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (“[T]he failure to object to a jury instruction requires review under the plain error standard. ”).  When there is failure to object, a reviewing court presumes that the instructions were adequate.  *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 333 (1971).  Failing to object to a charge is also indicative that trial counsel perceived no prejudice would result.  *State v. Wilbely*, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973).  Consequently, this Court can reverse only if it finds plain error.  *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997); R. 2:10-2.  “Plain error is an error that is ‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  *Afanador*, 151 N.J. at 54. (quoting *Adams*, 194 N.J. at 207).  In terms of a jury charge, meeting the plain error standard requires “legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing [c]ourt and to convince the [c]ourt that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ”  *State v. Nero*, 195 N.J. 397, 406 (2008) (quoting *State v. Hock*, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969)).
[brief] 170 N.J. 106, 131-33 (2001).  Just like [...], the defendant in Hernandez was charged with possession and possession with intent to distribute drugs.  Id. at 113.  The State introduced testimony that defendant had sold drugs in the same manner twenty times during the two months prior to his arrest for the charged crimes.  Id. at 129.  First, the Court held that “[t]hat extremely prejudicial testimony smacks of prohibited ‘propensity’ evidence. ”  Ibid.  Second, the Court noted that “even if one could hypothesize some weighty probative value to attribute to that troubling testimony that would outweigh its undue prejudicial effect, it is difficult, if not impossible, to divine the limiting instruction that could offset its ‘propensity’ impact. ”  Id. at 130.  In other words, no limiting instruction would be sufficient to offset the impact of that evidence.  Unlike in Hernandez, though, there was no attempt at a limiting instruction at [...]’s trial.  The Supreme Court has been clear that an explicit instruction on the appropriate use of other-bad-act evidence is necessary in every case where it has been introduced.  State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 141, 158 (1993).  The instruction must “explain[] [the issues of intent, motive, or absence of mistake] in context and thus illustrate[] to the jury how it could apply the other-crime evidence to those issues for which the evidence had been admitted. ”  Ibid. (emphasis in original).  In Hernandez, the instruction was inadequate, requiring reversal under the plain error standard; here, there was no instruction at all.  The erroneous admission of prior bad-act evidence combined with the total lack of instruction as to the use of that evidence requires reversal.  The jury was not told that it could not conclude that because [...] had dealt drugs before, he was more likely to deal drugs again.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] (Pa64-Pa65)  Additionally, [...] testified that [...] provided [...] with their [...] membership card imprinted with the business name as “[...]. ”  (Pa69)  Upon striking Plaintiff, [...] pinned Plaintiff between his cart and the other boxes in the aisle, leaving Plaintiff stuck in the middle and the inability for her to move or get out.  (Pa2)  Plaintiff testified that the industrial cart operated by [...] was filled with all kinds of boxes, that it appeared to be six (6) feet tall, and that it was filled to the top to the point where one could not look over it.  (Pa30)  According to Plaintiff, although her back was turned, she assumed that [...] was on the other side of the U-boat and pushing it; that after she was struck, Plaintiff could not see him because the industrial grade cart was filled too high; and, that based upon how high the U-boat was filled, there was no way he was able to see over it.  (Pa30; Pa36)  Moreover, Plaintiff recalled that prior to the incident, there were employees and customers “everywhere” throughout the store.  (Pa27)  Plaintiff testified that following the incident, she suggested to a [...] employee that they look at the cameras to ascertain what transpired; that she was brought to the manager’s office and an employee was able to find [...] “coming around with the cart” making a turn from a different aisle to the aisle where Plaintiff was located; that she saw footage of [...] subsequently pushing his U-boat in the same aisle that she was standing in; that the employee “even made a comment [as to] how full the customer’s cart [was];” that she saw [...] make his way from the end of the aisle until he reached her; and, that she was not visible on the surveillance footage because [...]’s cart was so high.
[brief] Prioleau v. Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015)  19 Rigatti v. Reddy, 318 N.J. Super. 537, 541 (App. Div. 1999)  28 Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 209 (2014)  24 Sarro v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. A-1392-21, 2023 WL 2566062 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 20, 2023)  21, 22 Smith v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. A-2592-21, 2023 WL 4307729 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 3, 2023) passim State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Marlton Plaza Assocs., L.P., 426 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 2012)  19 State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)  27, 32, 38, 40 State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278, 294 (2008)  32 State v. Flowers, 328 N.J. Super. 205, 214 (App. Div. 2000)  32 State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287 (1981)  19 State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431 (2012)  32 State v. Jackson, 243 N.J. 52, 58 (2020)  33 State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)  27, 32, 38 State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020)  40 State v. Muhammad, 359 N.J. Super. 361, 388 (App. Div. 2003)  32 State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015)  32 State v. Prall, 231 N. J. 567, 580 (2018)  40  State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) .........................................................  40  State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 14 (1994) .......................................................... 40, 41  Stewart v. 104 Wallace St. Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 157 (1981) .................................... 20, 21  Stoelting v. Hauck, 32 N.J. 87, 103 (1960) .......................................................  33  Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000)  ..............................................  19  Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 18 (2002) .............................................  19  Weiss v. Nicola Porchetta Co. of N.J., Docket No. A-3110-13T2, WL 1540919 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2015) ................................................................. 36, 37  Other Authorities Model Jury Charge 5.20(B)(2)(b) ........................................................................ passim Model Jury Charge 5.20(F)(5) ............................................................................. passim Rules N.J.R. E. 201(b)(1) ..................................................................................................  32 N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4) ..................................................................................................  37  N.J.R.E. 202(b) ......................................................................................................  37  N.J.R.E. 401 ...........................................................................................................  27  N.J.R.E. 403 ...........................................................................................................  33  N.J.R.E. 701 ...........................................................................................................  17, 38  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Lot 3.01 is the Riparian Grant fronting the water side of the property and goes out from Lot 3 into the water (5T13:15-21).  He testifies that there is a designation on Lot 3.01 and that it indicates it is a Riparian Grant to [...] in 1979 (5T14:17).  The designation is supposed to show a simple outright grant from State jurisdiction to [...] granting them that piece of property.  It is granted riparian land that is now privately owned, not publicly owned (5T14:25).  He testifies the boundaries are generally from the mean high-water line when the grant was given all the way out to what is called the pierhead or bulkhead line approved by the Secretary of the Navy back in the 1940s (5T15:19).
[brief] He \(^8\)  Even highly-trained drug-recognition experts (“DRE”) only evaluate a suspect’s pupil size in a strictly controlled setting as one part of a 12-step test designed to help determine the cause of intoxication.  Olenowski, 255 N.J. at 555.  While in a dark room, the DRE will measure the suspect’s pupil in response to three different levels of light stimulus in a dark room.  Id.  Even after completing the 12-step test, which again is completed in controlled settings and includes a toxicology report, the DRE can only testify that the results of the tests are “consistent with” the individual being under the influence of certain categories of drugs.
[directive] Treasury law enforcement agency management and supervisory personnel are responsible for ensuring compliance with this policy.  While this directive will , address the deposits as “cash” the term \\cash” shall include currency, personal and commercial checks, cashiers checks, bank checks, travelers checks, money orders, etc. not  Currency seized for Title violations be may 26 deposited into the Customs Suspense Account or the U.S. Treasury Forfeiture Fund.  11.  DISPOSITION
[brief] ” (Pa2392.)  On August 3, 2015, [...] also sent [...] additional documents related to work at the property line with the neighboring [...] (the “Project Requirements”), including additional requirements, such as an Exhibit A – Scope of Work, which addresses work on the “[...] Retaining Wall/One Story Structure/Dog Walk (trespass) Work”, and describes the work to be completed as “110 l.f. [i.e., linear feet] saw cutting as directed by Contractor’s superintendent” and “provide 4-6 test locations (chip out concrete structure to locate steel rebar)[.]” (Pa2396-2403.)
[brief] The trial court erred as a matter of law in issuing an injunction which requires the Board to reinstate a policy which compels the Board to violate state and federal law, and the Order respectfully must be reversed.  **CONCLUSION**  For the reasons set forth herein and in the Board’s initial brief, the Appellate Division respectfully should reverse the trial court’s Order and dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] The fact that it was a cold evening did not signify that the men, who were dressed appropriately for the cold, were involved in criminal activity.  It is not unreasonable that a group of men would be “hanging out” and socializing at eight o’clock in the evening on a residential block in an urban neighborhood two days before Thanksgiving.  This is especially true during a global pandemic when outdoor socializing, even in winter, was commonplace, particularly on weeks when coronavirus infections were surging.
[directive] b  Èske w konprann ke si jij la ta deside enponze yon santans pli estrik ke sa komisè gouvènman [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] . an te rekomande a, ou kab anile deklarasyon koupab ou an?  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?
[brief] 183 Vt. at 563, 944 A.2d at 919.  --- \(^2\)  The Trial Court criticized [...]’s use of the term “erroneous” to characterize certain Vermont Trial Court rulings.  T84-18.  [...]’s use of “erroneous” was presented in the context of arguing that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  *Pharmacists*, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added).  [...] at no time suggested asked the Trial Court to reverse or vacate any rulings of the Vermont Trial Court.  Nevertheless, in a related insurance coverage case, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the insurance company was obligated to fund the policy-holder’s appeal because, post-verdict and judgment, there had been reasonable grounds to believe that insured’s interests might have been served by taking the appeal, even though the appeal was eventually unsuccessful.
[brief] In essence, the Trial Court’s ruling created a Catch-22.  [...] denied the Plaintiffs’ motion based upon his belief that the Defendant did not employ any of the individuals identified in the Affidavits of Merit and Complaint.  However, the Plaintiffs were left with no opportunity to obtain a new Affidavit of Merit that complied with the Court’s ruling since no discovery was exchanged as to who the Defendant’s employees were at the time of the malpractice.  Furthermore, the Court’s ruling came on the eve of the timeframe set forth by the Affidavit of Merit statute of 120 days instead of at the Ferreira Conference, which would have allowed the Plaintiffs the ability to cure any deficiencies.  At this point, the Plaintiffs were left in an impossible position and given no opportunity to cure.  [...] also indicated in his decision that the Plaintiffs have known since the Ferreira conference that the sufficiency of the two Affidavits of Merit were being contested and could have taken the opportunity to serve another one during the statutory timeframe.  (3TR8:22–9:2).  However, as can be seen from the transcript, the Plaintiffs raised concerns during the Ferreira conference about the Defendant’s objection, which was not addressed or resolved by [...] at that time.  Instead, more time was given to the defendants to raise additional objections to the Affidavits of Merit, which precipitated the filing of the underlying motion.  Since the Defendant’s objection was based upon a legal theory without any discovery, it was not possible to obtain a new Affidavit of Merit until the Court made a ruling on the objection.  Finally, the Trial Court denied the Plaintiffs’ request for a stay of the time from the Ferriera Conference to the time that the decision on the Plaintiffs’ motion was made.  A stay would have been an equitable remedy that would have avoided the strictures of the Affidavit of Merit Statute and allowed the Plaintiff the time to obtain a new Affidavit of Merit that complied with the Court’s ruling.  In *Paragon Contrs., Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n*, 202 N.J. 415, 422-34 (2010), the Supreme Court held: “we have recognized equitable remedies that ‘temper the draconian results of an inflexible application of the statute’--extraordinary circumstances and substantial compliance. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs.*, 178 N.J. 144, 151 (2003).  In this case, a stay would have been particularly useful as the Trial Court’s decision came on the eve of the 120-day timeframe set forth in the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  Therefore, in addition to the fact that [...]’s decision impermissibly rejected the Plaintiffs’ Affidavits of Merit, the Plaintiffs were also given no time to cure the deficiencies and avoid a dismissal of the Defendant, with prejudice.  CONCLUSION