ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For this reason, [...] made application for leave to appeal the Order pursuant to R. 2:5-6(a), which motion was granted April 29, 2024.  Da397.  The Authority also made application to the trial court to stay the Order pending said appeal.  The trial court denied that motion on April 26, 2024.  Da398.  The Authority thereafter renewed the application for stay pending the outcome of its appeal to this Court, which motion was granted on June 14, 2024.  Da400.
[brief] [...].  Left without any other available options and unable to deal with the pain caused by his working conditions, [...]’s health forced him to resign from his job on June 4, 2021.  [...] referred [...] to physical therapy, which he began on March 14, 2022.  [...]’s physical therapist, [...], commented that [...] has difficulty with squatting and transferring from a sitting to a standing position, especially after prolonged sitting and driving.  Pa34.  In an addendum to the evaluation, [...]’s physical therapist indicated that his diagnosis of osteoarthritis of bilateral knees has been exacerbated and “had been getting progressively worse over the last few years. ”  Pa38.  On January 22, 2021, on the date of his first visit with [...], x-rays were taken of [...]’s knees.  The x-ray report indicates that [...] has “moderate to severe left knee arthritis with significant medial joint space narrowing and osteophyte formation.  Moderate right knee arthritis as well. ”  Pa42.  The assessment and diagnosis both indicate, “Primary osteoarthritis of both knees. ”  Pa42 to Pa43.  The orthopaedic procedure note indicates that the procedure which [...] received on August 5, 2022 was an injection in the knee joint space.  Pa40.  [...] further indicated that, despite receiving physical therapy and injections, [...] continues to have knee pain, and “he has difficulty with bending, kneeling, climbing stairs, heavy lifting, as well as driving long periods. ”  Pa39.  [...] was ready, willing, and able to work but could not continue performing his job because it aggravated his osteoarthritis of bilateral knees.  He was forced to leave his employment at [...] because the company did not have other positions available to him, and he could not continue to work in pain.
[directive] a. ;zj'6]-~%~=~1'6J-~~~~~24~1•g~1?£'.Ug¾~1ll-]*  Do you understand that if you have plead guilty to, or have been found guilty on [Yes/"11] [No/0}i...J.ll.] [NA/"5Jlt:J-\tl%]  11.  other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively?  01 ;zj-8}1}cJ-::: ~-&oJl %~: ~1~~4.%~.£_~11-B ~ '.U~LJ-3:.~ fl;<fl ~~ '?! itl ¾o]  Al %~ 91 A7 oj A}"8"J-o] '.UA] ?,J-.g. 1-9-, Jtl-A}2e- BJ=¾ 1?! 2c o-J '&,I oJ] 'g-5']  71J £ ~ ~ ~ €':;(Hl -8} £ ~.TI %1-? £ '.U cJ-2E ¾ o}1J l-J 77}?  ~ ~ "6H List any charges the prosecutor has agreed to recommend for dismissal: 12.  £-'f- 7,;jA}7} 7]zj-% i':J..:ilc5"}7].£.  %91~ ~-&g ~~i;}1)A].2_; Ind./Acc./Compl.# Count Nature of Offense and Degree %B'- ¾fl-~ ~~g,J # 7]!,:./31..'fl:/:il.a:. 3,."8'J- Revised Fonn Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Korean by to Defendant's Initials y:aiJ ~l .!i!.¾ 0J6/, 'd i'-3£-'8.  .£.oJ]  2019 12 31 01-18  CN 10079-Korean ;<]?a 3!]31..~g_j g,j"5}cxj o]i...j~ ~;<} ~ ;<]  page 4 of7/llll o]  4/7  13.  Specify any sentence the prosecutor has agreed to recommend:  .S:..9- 7i:l-"}7} i:!.J1"8"}7]  .£.  %9.]  {!Jl ca=o] 'i:! ~1) A]  .2..  ~_Q_ ~ ~ 14.  NOT:  Has the prosecutor promised that he or she will 31 °1 '8l-A] 7i:l-"}7} e,~q-Jl i;rY 77}?  Q.]=~~ ~ a.  Speak at sentencing?  [Yes/"11]  [No/0}1...]..8..]  {!Jl**••~~~~~~~cj-Jl~,:;y* b.  Seek an extended term of confinement?  [Yes/"11]  [No/0 }1...]..8..]  ~7cl-¾ "i=-7<J-1lzl- _fl._;'cJ"8"}7-l ~~cJ-J1 ~'Ef'Y77}?  c.  Seek a stipulation of parole ineligibility? [Yes/"11] [No/0 }1...] ..8..] ~~~•~~¾~~~~~~g4~~~~~qJ1~i;rY* Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who [Yes/ofl] [No/0}i..:J..8..] [NA/"6fl'itfil%] 15. has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution? 01 4 7cl-~ nJ g g >iJ 'tl-Q.J= 7-}7} ~Jl, EE~ oJl -i'J 15'} 7} Jl Jil...AJ-~ e-{l ~;;,;j :;r_J • ~ ~ ~ ~ i>U 3;!¾ *-"}7} *1i:!-15}'i:!, -i'j"8"}-:= :;r]i>U .!i!.%~g 7-]~i>Ro]: 15'}t" o}1JY77}?
[brief] All three causes of action require Plaintiff establish a “disability” to establish a *prima facie* case.  It is well-settled that the burden of proving an initial case of discrimination is “not onerous. ”  *Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine*, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).  Instead, the evidentiary burden at the *prima facie* stage is “rather modest: it is to demonstrate to the court that plaintiff's factual scenario is compatible with discriminatory intent—i.e., that discrimination could be a reason for the employer's action.
[brief] The guidance offered is largely a recitation of the plain language of the Statute; it states that school districts “must continue to make such payments to a contracted service provider” when schools are closed for three days or more due to health-related emergencies.  It also states that the payments to those service providers “must be consistent with the terms of the contact in effect on the date of the closure. ”  It further states, consistent with the Statute’s language, that “school districts are required to make reasonable efforts to renegotiate contracts subject to the law’s provisions. ”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Neither the COVID Statute nor the Department of Education’s guidance states that there are any conditions to be met in order for the Statute’s mandate for school districts to make the required payments to contracted service providers to be legally effective; the “renegotiation” language appears to be entirely precatory.
[brief] The Somerset County Grand Jury returned Indictment [...] charging defendant [...]\(^2\) with: purposeful or knowing murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (1) or N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (2) (Count One); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count Two); third-degree hindering apprehension, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4) (Count Three); third-degree endangering an injured victim, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2a (Count Four); five counts of false swearing, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2a (Counts Five through Nine); fourth-degree tampering with evidence, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C: 28-6(1) (Count Ten); and fourth-degree possession of a large-capacity magazine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3j (Count Eleven).  (Da 1 to 7)\(^3\)  After trial in March and April 2022 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and a jury, defendant was convicted of all counts except Count Seven, of which he was acquitted.  (Da 8 to 9)  On August 26, 2022, after various mergers, [...] sentenced defendant to serve the following two consecutive prison terms -- a 50-year/30-without-parole sentence for Count One, and a three-year --- \(^2\)  Defendant’s parents, David and [...], were also charged with multiple counts of false swearing, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2a (Counts Twelve through Nineteen), but those charges were severed from defendant’s for trial.  \(^3\)  Da – defendant’s appendix to this brief PSR – presentence report sentence Count Four.  (Da 10 to 14)  The judge imposed concurrent sentences on any remaining counts, so they are not enumerated here, plus $10,115.16 in restitution.  (Da 10 to 14)  The final order memorializing that sentence, and making it clear, after reconsideration on September 19, 2022, that an 85% parole bar applied to the murder sentence under NERA, was not filed until September 28, 2022.  (Da 10 to 14)  On October 21, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.  (Da 15 to 18)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] J.Super. 217 (App. Div. 1992) | | | *Lopez v. New Jersey Automobile Full Underwriting Association*, | 6 | | 239 N.J.Super. 13 (App. Div.), | | | certif. den. 122 N.J. (1990) | | | *Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group*, | 10, 11, 14, 18, 19 | | 77 N.J. 228 (1978) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Jesli przyznaje sic, Pan(i) do takiego zarzutu, minimalny obowi1!,Zkowy okres bez prawa do ubiegania sic, o zwolnienie warunkowe wynosi __ lat i __ miesic,cy (nalezy wpisac Iiczbc, lat i miesic,cy), a maksymalny obowi1!,Zkowy okres bez prawa do ubiegania sic, o zwolnienie warunkowe wynosi __ lat i __ miesic,cy (naleiy wpisac Iiczbc, lat i miesic,cy); okres ten nie moze zostac skr6cony za dobre sprawowanie, pracc, lub o minimalmt ilosc dni naliczanych dodatkowo za kazdy miesi!lc pozbawienia wolnosci.  b.  If you are pleading guilty to su~h a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory extended term can be __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months).  Jesli przyznaje sic, Pan(i) do tego rodzaju zarzutu, minimalny obowi1!,Zkowy wydluzony okres wynosi __ lat i __ miesic,cy (nalezy wpisac liczbc, lat i miesic,cy), a maksymalny obowil!Zkowy wydluzony okres moze wyniesc __ lat i __ miesic,cy (nalezy wpisac Iiczbc, lat i miesic,cy).  8.  Are you pleading guilty to a crime that contains a presumption of imprisonment which means that [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] it is almost certain that you will go to state prison?
[brief] In upholding [...]'s reasonable suspicion for the initial car stop, the court noted that the stop occurred close to the robbery in terms of both time and space; that [...] observed the vehicle approaching from the direction of the crime scene; that the vehicle's occupants "gave no response whatsoever to the lights shone on them, made no eye contact whatsoever"; and "[a]lso, to be quite honest, the racial makeup of the occupants of the vehicle, three Black males traveling away from the scene."  B.
[brief] [Da6; “personal service in court was made on August 27, 2019”]  Additionally, Defendant provided her residential address on the record per \textit{R. 1:4-1(b)} before [...] as “\textbf{[...]}” -- the very same address set forth in the Retainer Agreement and where the Pre-Action Notice was mailed.  The very same address where the summons and complaint were initially sent by the trial court.
[brief] . .  Plaintiff was treated in a disparate and hostile fashion generally.  Plaintiff complained and was given retaliations.  The relative of a complaining witness against her, jail social worker [...], was over both plaintiff and [...]’s brother housed in the same unit.  This allowed for an egregious conflict of interest in a setting where this should NEVER have occurred.  Neither the prison nor the County have policies in place to ensure that prisoners are being provided with proper medical care.
[brief] ”  187 N.J. Super 506, 509 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 95 N.J. 181 (1983).  The trial court held the video admissible because “[u]nder the facts and circumstances proffered here, I am satisfied that the detective’s response to the location and the obtaining of consent, as well as the review and downloading of the video in close proximity to the events that it purports to depict is adequate authentication for admissibility purposes.
[brief] “Defendant seems to imply that the buyer [...] is somehow related, or friendly, or associated with either [...] or [...].  ….  There is no relationship whatsoever, they are not related and they do not do business.  [...] and/or [...] have no knowledge of this buyer and have no association or business relations with it or its owner.  This transaction is the only transaction that has occurred with this arms-length buyer. ”  87a.  Given the Whats app messages and the testimony this statement constitutes fraud and meets all the elements of fraud which would be required to overturn a judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1.
[brief] A finding of reckless publication . . . may result if the publisher fabricates a story, publishes one that is wholly unbelievable, or relies on an informant of dubious veracity, (St. Amant. v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)); Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J.  594, 615 (1994), or purposely avoids the truth, Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n.2 (1989).  (Da 215) (quoting Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 391-392 (citing Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n., 161 N.J. 152, 165-166 (1999))) (emphasis added by [...]) (citations edited).  The above quotes from the Amplification Order are inconvenient truths for the [...], as they puts the lie to the core premise of their entire Appeal.  [...] also sensibly recognized that while Neuwirth is one of the controlling authorities, it is not the only controlling authority and “does not supersede” relevant authority from the Supreme Court of the United States such as Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).  (Da 204).  The [...] hang their hat on the phrase “does not supersede” in an effort to manufacture legal error.  (Db 18).  But there is no legal error in [...]’s non-controversial recognition that the Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the land.  In fact, it is the [...] who “complete[ly] disregard” controlling precedent in order to advance an intellectually dishonest argument that goes like this: because the outcome in Neuwirth went in favor of the defendants (on facts having absolutely nothing to do with [...]’s case) and because Neuwirth is the newest defamation decision at the appellate level, this Court should ignore all other authority in which defamation plaintiffs were successful, including the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s often-cited decision in Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 769 (1989).  (reversing dismissal of defamation claims despite extremely limited factual development in pleadings at the trial level that were “not crystal clear” and “disjointed”).  As Defendants would have this Court believe, Neuwirth is the only decision in the history of defamation law that matters.  They get so carried away with their “one case” strategy, losing the forest for the trees, that their motion focuses almost exclusively on Neuwirth, citing it on page after page in nearly forty instances, to the near-exclusion of any other arguments.  (Db 1-2, 10-12, 14-20, 22-27).  But this Court knows better because it decided Neuwirth.
[brief] ”  (Pb at 11.)  [...] – a company whose heritage and many of its executives are Japanese – strongly disputed those allegations.  (Da19-Da23 ¶¶ 26-46; Da2-Da9 ¶¶ 6-30.)  Indeed, if [...] engaged in such behavior, his colleagues – two of whom are Japanese and one of whom is of Japanese descent – would have intervened.  (Da19-Da20 ¶¶ 30-31.)  At the end of the meeting, [...]’s attendees requested that Appellants present solutions to increase Appellants’ sales.  (Pa36-Pa37 ¶ 53; Da23 ¶¶ 44-46; Da7-Da8 ¶¶ 25-26.)  However, the meeting ended without a resolution or an agreed-upon path forward.  (Pa38 ¶ 57; Da ¶¶ 45-46; Da7-Da8 ¶ 26.)  D.
[brief] That relief was initially denied, but [...] renewed its motion (Da65, Pl. Cert. on Motion for Sub. Service) and on September 24, 2021 obtained an Order confirming Defendant could be served by sending regular and certified mail to the condominium unit located at [...] (Da6, Sept. 24, 2021 Order Authorizing Service).  On November 8, 2021, [...] sought to enter a default on the docket, citing Defendant’s failure to file an Answer to the Complaint within the time specified by the September 24, 2021 Order (Da93, Req. for Default).  Several months later, on March 1, 2022, [...] moved to enter a default judgment in the amount of $201,837.63 together with attorney’s fees and costs (Da26-Da29, [...] Cert.).  That application was granted, and on April 6, 2022, judgment was entered by default (Da4, Order Entering Judgment).
[brief] E.g., State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 431 (2014) (noting reasonable suspicion standard takes into account “‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture’”) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).  This Court does not rely on an officer’s response, that he observed nothing blatantly illegal, for its legal finding of reasonable suspicion; rather the Court will objectively weigh all of the circumstances.  In State v. Morrison, 322 N.J. Super. 147, 151 (App. Div. 1999), although recognizing that the police officer “did not testify as to a subjective belief that defendants were engaged in illegal activity” the Court concluded that “in determining whether a seizure is constitutional the proper inquiry is whether the conduct of the law enforcement officers in making an investigatory stop or detention is objectively reasonable.
[brief] Point VI  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Reconsidered the February 1, 2023 Attorney Fee Award to Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Increased the Award by $300,000.  (Da1411).  Conclusion | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | ATL. M. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293 (1953) | 25 | | Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. 259 (2005) | 16,23,24,25,26,27 | | Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal “Z” Ena, Inc., 251 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 1991) | 15,16,17,18 | | Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. GW Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, 69 Cal. 2d 33 (1968), 442 P. 2d 641, Cal. Rptr. 561, 40 ALR 3d 1373 | 26,27 | | Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) | 40,43 | | Sun Chemical Corp. v. Fike Corporation, 243 N.J. 319 (2020) | 29,30 | | Winoka Village v. Tate, 16 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 1951) | 17,18 | | Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, Inc., 425 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2012) | 17,18 | | Rules & Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.
[brief] He wrote in general terms what happened regarding the plaintiff’s accident, that the plaintiff would seek medical attention, and that the plaintiff wished to be contacted by the plaintiff’s insurance carrier.  (Pa93 to Pa94)  [...] employees are required to follow an [...] Operations Incident Reporting Manual for completing an Incident Report.  This manual instructs [...] employees not to ask a guest if he or she wants a call from [...]’s insurance company or plans on contacting an attorney.  (Pa95 to Pa100)  By letter dated September 1, 2016, the plaintiff’s former attorney, [...], notified [...] that the plaintiff would be asserting a claim against [...] for her injuries resulting from her accident in Auditorium 5 on August 13, 2016.  (Pa113 to Pa114)  This letter was presumably received by [...] within three weeks of the date of the plaintiff’s accident.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 30, 2018, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE A CLAIM FOR SPOILIATION OF EVIDENCE (T54:2 TO T57:16)
[brief] (Ia1)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD’S DECISION TO DENY THE SUBDIVISION  APPLICATION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE AND THUS THE COURT’S REMAND OF THE MATTER TO THE BOARD FOR APPROVAL WAS AN ERROR OF LAW (Final Order at Da5; opinion at 4T36-18 to 4T47-11)  a.  Standard of Review  A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.  Thus, an appellate court’s review of a trial judge’s interpretations of law and the applications of law to facts is de novo.  Klug v. Bridgewater Tp. Planning Bd., 407 N.J Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009).  b.  The Applicant failed to provide sufficient proofs of hardship to support the requested design waivers.  Waivers are distinguishable from variances in that the former effect relief from site plan or subdivision standards while the latter concern zoning standards.  See Wawa Food Market v. Planning Bd., Ship Bottom, 227 N.J. Super. 29, 34 (App. Div. 1988).  To this appellant’s knowledge, there is no case, statute, or other authority that definitively states that an applicant bears a lesser burden of proof when seeking a design waiver than it does when seeking a variance.  In the application before the Planning Board, the applicant sought two design waivers: (1) from proposing street trees along the entire Fourteenth Street frontage, whereas the applicant was supposed to place street trees; and (2) from providing non-radial lot lines, whereas the proposed lots should not have radial lot lines.
[brief] The plaintiff in Hardy suffered injuries in an automobile accident and argued that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(2) should not bar his claims because he was unaware the car he occupied was stolen.  Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 97.  The Court rejected plaintiff's contention, finding that because the Legislature included a scienter requirement in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(a) but omitted it from N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b) could not be properly interpreted to include a scienter requirement.  Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 104.  The Court rejected the inclusion of an exemption to the statutory bar based on an individual's reasonable belief or knowledge because [*10] the plain language of the statute did not provide for one.  Id. at 104-05.  The Court's reasoning in Hardy applies here.
[brief] | 17 | | 2015 WL 3602607 (June 10, 2015) | | | Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., | 20 | | 189 N.J. 436 (2007) | | | Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., | 13 | | 143 N.J. 22 (1995) | | | U.S. v. Raffoul, | 15 | | 826 F.2d 218 (3d Cir.1987) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Appellant [...] (“[...]”) appeals a Final Agency Determination dated September 20, 2023, by the [...] (“CSC”), and its determination denying [...]’s Request for Reconsideration, which denied [...]’s appeal of a Letter of Determination issued by the [...] (“EEO”) of the [...] (“DCF”) dated March 6, 2023 (“LOD”) finding that [...] violated the State Policy Against Discrimination in the Workplace (“the State Policy”) by purposefully misnaming the Complainant (“Complainant”) on more than one occasion in September 2022.
[brief] This is why courts have found that “any confession obtained after police flatly ignore a suspect’s invocation ‘is likely to be involuntary. ’”  Id. at 73 (quoting Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 929 n.14 (11th Cir. 1985)).  When the facts show that the police ignored an invocation—as [...] found happened here, as the State does not contest—suspects are pressured to believe that they have no choice but to speak.
[brief] Resulting damages**  Again, [...] clearly suffered damages.  In addition to having defend against these false claims, [...] paid $9,600.00 to Plaintiff but has only received $7,043.92 despite the fact that there was a recovery from the UIM Claim and [...] could have been paid the amount due, $12,067.91.  Instead of Plaintiff suffering a loss, it is actually [...] that suffered damages in the amount of $2,556.08, or $9,511. 83 if one factors in that [...] should have been paid the additional $12,067.91.  C. Unclean Hands
[brief] Rather than moving to the Zoning Board for a zoning determination which would finalize an appropriate permit which would push the matter to the HPC to review installation of appropriate materials, Plaintiff instead mislead the HPC by filing an application indicating that a zoning permit was “n/a” (not applicable) yet provided the permit which indicated a zoning denial.  Once the HPC heard the matter and noted there was a zoning issue and denied the application for impropriety in construction and materials, Plaintiff appealed to the Zoning Board.  The Zoning Board, per the MLUL, DID have all authority to hear the matter and reviewed same as an appeal ONLY per Plaintiff’s application and notice.  A zoning permit must be acquired to assure that the proposed use, construction, or alteration will be in accordance with the provisions of the zoning ordinance.