ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (16T72-9 to 19).  But a NJSP Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”) concerning NJSP --- 13  No evidence suggested defendant sought clarification from NJSP whether he could represent himself as law enforcement after the first post-suspension stop.  business cards, dated July 27, 2012, dictated four acceptable formats and styles for the cards.  (16T171-11 to 172-23; 16T174-4 to 175-11; Pa53-56).  In each, the NJSP insignia, including the inverted triangle, appears on the upper left-hand side of the card.  (Pa56).  Defendant conceded his card did not look like any of the four approved cards and thus violated the SOP.  (16T175-12 to 17).  Defendant’s second defense, specific to the last stop chronologically, was that [...] recognized him as a Trooper from a course defendant had taught to thirty or more students, with one of Westfall’s superiors.
[brief] (27T135-13 to 18)  [...] was transported to the [...] for a recorded statement, wherein he told [...] that he was staying in Room 517 of the [...] in Toms River at that time.  (24T174-1 to 5)  [...] signed a written consent to search his hotel room, his white Infiniti, and his black iPhone.  (24T174-9 to 177-6, 178-8 to 182-17; 30T233-7 to 20, 234-13 to 24)
[brief] ”).  When it comes to questions outside the common knowledge of an average person, the jury cannot supply its own standard of care, but needs an expert to elucidate the standard against which to measure the defendant’s conduct.  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 407 (2014); Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).  Expert testimony is necessary when dealing with proofs which constitute “a complex process involving assessment of a myriad of factors[.]”  Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31, 44 (App. Div. 1996); see also Davis, 219 N.J. at 407-408 (holding that an expert was necessary for plaintiff to explain relevant “fire code” provisions and the manner in which they were breached); Vander Groef v. A&P, 32 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 1954) (Plaintiff “failed to introduce any evidence that the construction of a platform 44 inches high without steps or a ladder was in any way a deviation from standard construction, or that it was unsafe.
[brief] Drb6  Rivera v. Gerner, 89 N.J. 526 (N. J. 1982)  Drb9 Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155 (App. Div. 1982)  Drb14 Rumana v. County of Passaic, 397 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 2007)  Drb10 Slowinski v. Valley Nat. Bank, 264 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 1993)  Drb3 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018)  Drb11, Drb12 State v. King, 210 N.J. 2 (N.J. 2012)
[brief] It was never the parties’ intent that Plaintiff would share in any other compensation received from the condemnation or any other disposition of the parcel(s) of land that was being taken by eminent domain or inverse condemnation.  (2T)  At all times prior to the PSA (Da 282) and after the PSA, (Da 282), Plaintiff was aware that there were ongoing proceedings having to do with the “taking” of part of the parcels of land which allowed access to [...].  She was also aware this “taking” was in no way a sale of [...].  Plaintiff testified to these facts during her deposition on February 23, 2023, and she signed the PSA (Da 282) in full knowledge of same.  (Da 242).  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Even worse, if the cases are not joined, the victims in this case will likely have to testify again in the Hudson case to show that the car used to carjack their car was an Audi, identify their stolen Mercedes, and that the jacket inside did not belong to them.  It will require a second revictimization of this violent crime for our victims.  When the judge below found that “the only connection between that crime and the Armed-Robbery charge is the Audi,” (1T28-20 to 21), the court left out the other overlapping evidence between the incidents, such as the yellow BMW (which tends to prove that the Audi was the Audi from the April 20 robbery), the sneakers worn by the defendant in both incidents, or the jacket found in the Mercedes.
[brief] Spenger v. Trout, 375 N.J. Super. 120 (App. Div. 2005).  Cases applying equitable estoppel to a consumer fraud claim (notably, there are none applying the doctrine to TCCWNA claims), indicate where a regulatory violation is invited by the consumer, the consumer is estopped from bringing a CFA claim.  In D'Egidio Landscaping v. Apicella, 337 N.J. Super. 252, 257-259 (App. Div. 2001), a consumer refused a written contract for home improvement.  The court found that refusal excuse a regulatory violation of failing to provide such a contract and permitted the merchant to collect its bill for services performed.  In contrast, in *Scibek v. Longette*, 339 N.J. Super. 72, 85 (App. Div. 2001), a court declined to estop defendant from asserting (as a defense in a collection action) plaintiff's failure to comply with regulations requiring a written estimate for automobile repairs.  The court conceded defendant's conduct in disputing plaintiff’s labor charges was "less than exemplary," but distinguished *D'Egidio* on grounds that defendant had not "actually beseeched the plaintiff to violate the Act's prescriptions."  Together, *D'Egidio* and *Scibek* suggest that only *active* inducement of a CFA regulatory violation will support an estoppel argument.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | i | | COUNTER STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 6 | | POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO RATIONAL BASIS TO CHARGE THE JURY WITH PASSION/PROVOCATION
[brief] As established, the MBPA was designed to maintain and facilitate the three-tier system in place between brewers, wholesalers, and retailers of malt alcoholic beverages.  To this end, the New Jersey Legislature carved out additional protections for wholesalers in wholesaler agreements with brewers because of the innate unequal bargaining power between a wholesaler and a brewer.  See N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.13(c) (stating the MBPA was to “further the public policy of this State and protect beer wholesalers from unreasonable demands and requirements by brewers, while devoting sufficient efforts and resources to the distribution and sale of malt alcoholic beverages” (emphasis added)).  Apparent by the plain language of the statute, wholesalers are not on the same footing as brewers.  Accepting the Plaintiffs’ allegations, the Plaintiffs were tasked with unreasonable, and facially discriminatory, demands by the Defendants.  (See Pb38-39.)  Plaintiffs cannot realistically acquiesce to these demands, nor should they be beholden to such discriminatory requirements and obligations from their brewers.  If proven, the Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate precisely why this Court clarified and limited the applicability of Atalese, and why the MBPA mandated protections to wholesalers.  And because the MBPA was not even law when the underlying Wholesaler Agreement was entered, the parties could not have contracted around the mandates of that statute—like they could have under New York law—even if they had mutually agreed to waive the right to litigate any dispute in court. \(^5\)  Given the parties’ unequal bargaining power alleged here, and the unequal bargaining power inherent in any brewer-wholesaler business relationship, absent an express waiver, the arbitration clause in the Wholesaler Agreement is unenforceable.  \(^5\)  [...] also notes that the MBPA applies retroactively to all agreements between brewers and wholesalers existing prior to the effective date of the Act.  See N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(b).
[brief] Specifically, the Court stated “[a]t best, this defendant suffers from autism spectrum disorder. ” (17T:206-15 to 16).  This suggests that [...] may not have any mental health issues.  Every single mental health evaluator diagnosed [...] Kologi with mental health issues.  (Da455).  Therefore, it was a gross understatement for the Court to say, “at best, this defendant suffers from autism spectrum disorder. ” (17T:206-15 to 16).  [...]’s mental health was a focal point of this case, and this factor should’ve been given significant weight.
[brief] [MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608, 623 (App. Div. 2018), certif. denied, 236 N.J. 356 (2019). ]  The legislative history of the LTTEL makes it clear that the purpose of the law was to give municipalities “the ability to negotiate a financial agreement on terms most favorable to the municipality,” and to “provide for municipal flexibility in negotiating tax exemptions”:  In addition to revising and consolidating the law, the bill strengthens the ability of the municipality to use the law to effectuate its redevelopment plans and purposes by: ***  2.  Requiring review and approval of financial agreements on projects by the Director of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs, as well as the municipal governing body, and strengthening the ability of the municipality to negotiate the financial agreement on terms most favorable to the municipality; *** 4.  Provide for municipal flexibility in negotiating tax exemptions, based upon municipal findings regarding the costs and benefits of the project, the importance of the project to its redevelopment purposes, and the importance of tax exemptions to probable users of the project.  The bill establishes a flexible in-lieu of tax formula, which requires a phase-in to full taxation over the period of tax exemption, which may be negotiated between the municipality and the urban renewal entity.  [S. Cty. & Mun. Gov’t Comm. Statement to S. 291 (L. 1991, c. 431) (emphasis added). ]  Not only was the Law designed to strengthen a municipality’s hand, and give it greater flexibility when entering PILOT agreements, it was also intended to operate quickly, so that there would not be delays:
[brief] *See Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 332 N.J. Super.  In granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court in *[...]* reasoned that, despite the defendants’ attempted enforcement of a debt made void by N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), [...] had failed to show an ascertainable loss under the CFA. \(^7\)  See *[...]*, October 4, 2023 Opinion at 18-19.  However, in *Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2, 23 (1994), the New Jersey Supreme Court “conclude[d] that an improper debt . . . against a consumer-fraud plaintiff may constitute a loss under the [CFA], because the consumer is not obligated to pay an indebtedness arising out of conduct that violates the Act. ”  *Id.*  The plaintiff in *Cox* had incurred a debt for home repairs under a contract with Sears by which Sears had also recorded a lien on the plaintiff’s property.  Analogous to the instant action, the plaintiff in *Cox*, “by virtue of his contract with [a merchant] . . . incurred a legal obligation in the form of a debt. ”  *Id.*  However, in *Cox*, “the debt and the lien, although losses to \(^7\)  Even in the absence of a showing of ascertainable loss, “a consumer-fraud plaintiff can recover reasonable attorneys' fees, filing fees, and costs if that plaintiff can prove that the defendant committed an unlawful practice. ”  *Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2, 24 (1994).  Thus, as [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA unequivocally constitute a “crime of the fourth degree,” Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, making dismissal without an opportunity for a fee application inappropriate.
[brief] Thus, the rule mandates the exclusive allocation to the Appellate Division of review of both final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).  The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).  The Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court can overturn an administrative agency's determinations or findings if there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  *Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs.*, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329, 27-28 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011) citing *In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees*, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).
[directive] Additional information, narrative, or recommendations which are indigenous to the particular event at hand are added to the Uniform Defendant Intake Report to form the full report for that event.  Under this system, information is collected only once, handled only once, but may serve the needs of various decision points in the case process.  The Uniform Defendant Reporting System includes 9 separate forms, generally each only one page in length (except the three page Uniform Defendant Intake Report).  The package includes:  Section A.  Uniform Defendant Intake Report (UDIR)  Section B.  Uniform Defendant Intake Report/Supplemental Defendant Report Section C.  Case History Update Section D.  Bail Report Section E.  Offense Information Report Section F.  Prior Court History Report Section G.  PTI Report Section H.  Presentence Report Section I.  Case Supervisor Analysis Report II.  Description of Uniform Defendant Reporting System
[brief] (Id.)  New Jersey law uniformly holds that tenants in a multi-tenant shopping center who do not have control of or a contractual obligation to maintain a common parking lot do not have a common law obligation to do so.  See Kandrac, supra., at 90-91; Barrows v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 244 N.J. Super. 144, 148 (Law Div. 1990); Holmes v. Kimco Realty Corp., 598 F. 3d. 115, 123 (3d. Cir. 2010); Ricco v. Walmart, 2013 WL 5232496 (D.N.J.) (Da16-25); Spano v. Supervalu, Inc., 2016 WL 3943360 (Law Div.) (Da26-29); Tchikindas v. Basser-Kaufman Management Corp., 2021 WL 1749961 (App. Div.) (Da30-39)
[brief] *Id.* at 114-15.  “Where the offenses are closely related, it would ordinarily be inappropriate to sentence a defendant to the maximum term for each offense and also require that those sentences be served consecutively, especially where the second offense did not pose an additional risk to the victim. ”  *Id.* at 122.  Similarly, the defendant in *State v. Streater*, 233 N.J. Super. 537 (1989) was convicted of multiple crimes stemming from a single episode.
[directive] pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii), can be subject to parole supervision for life upon a motion of the prosecutor, this offense was not included in the February 1, 2018 amendments to the offenses subject to Megan’s Law under 2C:7-2b(2).  Note also that Question 7 includes the offense of felony murder if the underlying crime is sexual assault, as well as any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the offense should be considered a sexually violent offense, or an attempt to commit these offenses.
[brief] Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 414; see also Robinson, 136 N.J. at 492.  Essentially any type of fighting situation, whether initially mutual or not, that is “started” by the eventual decedent, can result in a passion/provocation manslaughter rather than a murder, and, thus, the offense must be instructed to a jury where there is such evidence.  *Bowens*, 108 N.J. at 641 (imperfect self-defense, or “over”-defending oneself, is not an independent or standalone defense, but it is a rational basis for charging passion/provocation manslaughter); *Blanks*, 313 N.J. Super. at 72 (App. Div. 1998) (defendant who may have overreacted -- with a gun against an unarmed victim -- in self-defense to a punch warranted passion/provocation instruction); *State v. Castagna*, 376 N.J. Super. 323, 358-359 (App. Div.), certif. den.  *sub nom*  *State v. Morales*, 185 N.J. 36 (2005) (overreaction -- by dropping a heavy stone onto the head of the unarmed victim -- in defense of another who was merely punched warranted passion/provocation instruction).  *Robinson*, 136 N.J. at 492 (defendant shot an unarmed person who punched him; attempted passion/provocation clearly indicated as a lesser offense); *State v. Coyle*, 119 N.J. 194, 224 (1990) (defendant pursued abusive husband of defendant’s girlfriend down a street and repeatedly shot the unarmed husband to protect the girlfriend from him; passion/provocation manslaughter properly charged to the jury).
[brief] The only thing I want to make clear is as it relates to the Slater factors, you know, for reasons I've already stated, [...] has, in my opinion, made the colorable claim of innocence.  As to the nature and the strength of the reasons and the fair and just reasons and those other Slater prongs, that is what I am arguing when I rely heavily on his -- yes, I understand the State's subjective reasoning qualification of [...].  But the nature and the strength of his reasonings for withdrawal is everything that I said as it relates to those elements of fear, duress and conversations that he had with his prior counsel.  And, again, you know, I won't go through the lack of knowledge and what I would view as a not knowingly and voluntarily given plea but quite honestly, yes, that is what we have is his subjective reasoning but that is what is in his mind at the time that he pled.
[brief] LEGAL POINT A: THE TRIAL JUDGES GROSSLY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION  I downloaded a copy of NJ Standards for Appellate Review by [...] and [...]; August 2022 Revision from njcourts.gov.  On the 2nd paragraph of page 28 of that document I read:  “Trial judges are afforded wide discretion in deciding many of the issues that arise in civil and criminal cases (see examples below).  Appellate courts review those decisions for an abuse of discretion.  A court abuses its discretion when its ‘decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'”  State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)).  "[A] functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue."  State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  "When examining a trial court's exercise of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances."  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 App. Div. 2007)).”  In the 3rd paragraph of page 30 I read:  “1.  In both civil and criminal cases, the appellate court reviews a trial judge's discovery rulings under the abuse of discretion standard.  State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019);”  In my foreclosure case on 1/6/17 [...] ordered the discovery to go on until 2/28/17.  But [...] abruptly stopped the discovery right after that hearing and [...] agreed with that without completing the discovery.  She abused her discretion.  Also in the same hearing of 1/6/17 [...] stated that the unauthenticated mortgage documents recorded in the Hall of Records had nothing to do with my foreclosure case; but on 3/3/17 she admitted them as evidence against my property.
[brief] [...], [...], AND SELAEDIN MAKSUT IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL  [...]  [...] (N.J. Bar No. 043651984)  [...] (pro hac vice)  1251 Avenue of the Americas, 21st Floor  New York, New York 10020  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] (N.J. Bar No. 018351986)  [...] [...], Esq. (031952001)  [...], Esq. (117122014)  [...] Esq. (035112011)  180 Park Avenue  Florham Park, New Jersey 07932 [...]  Attorneys for Defendants  [...] and [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................ii  TABLE OF APPENDIX........................................................................iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT...............................................................1  ARGUMENT.........................................................................................3  A.  The Complaint Does Not Allegue Reckless Publication Based on a “Wholly Unbelievable” Story........................................................................................................5  B.  The Complaint Does Not Allegue Reckless Publication Based on an “Informant of Dubious Veracity”.................................................................8  C.  Plaintiff Fails to Plead Actual Malice as to Each CAIR Defendant.....13  CONCLUSION......................................................................................15
[brief] ”  *United States v. Free*, 839 F.3d 308 (3rd Cir. 2016)  What’s more, no fraudulent losses need to occur for a debtor to violate § 157; “[f]iling itself is the forbidden act. ”  *U.S. v. Free*, supra.  The 3rd Circuit has stated that a debtor violates § 152(1) by failing to “reveal the existence of his assets to the United States Trustee. ”  By its plain terms, § 152(2) outlaws “knowingly and fraudulently mak[ing] a false oath” in relation to a bankruptcy case.
[brief] (1T21-12 to 18).  conditions were sufficient to support an articulable and reasonable basis for concluding that the unsignaled lane change might have an effect on other vehicles. ”  Ibid.  Further, in *State v. Heisler*, 422 N.J. Super. 399 (App. Div. 2011), the defendant drove westbound, pulled into a left-turn lane at an intersection, and waited at a red light, only turning on his directional signal after noticing the officer behind him also signaling a turn.
[directive] Prohibitions on Voter Intimidation  Among the laws that law enforcement officers may be called upon to enforce are the laws securing the right to vote and protecting voters from intimidation and harassment.  This duty may arise on Election Day or earlier, including but not limited to the early voting period.  New Jersey has strong protections in place against voter intimidation, including several that were enacted following our 1981 gubernatorial election.  During that election, a political party allegedly intimidated voters on Election Day by posting at polling places off- duty law enforcement officers who wore armbands identifying them as members of a “National Ballot Security Task Force. ”  Some of these off-duty officers wore equipment normally associated with law enforcement personnel, such as two-way radios and firearms.  These tactics prompted the Legislature to enact rules limiting law enforcement officers’ activity relating to elections, including L.2021, c.459.  For similar reasons, federal law imposes additional restrictions on federal officers and employees’ involvement in elections.