ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court Improperly Interpreted  The 1999 Agreement  The Trial Court held that the 1999 Agreement entitled the [...] to the collection fees.  Specifically the court held:  First, the court finds the terms of the 1999 Agreement clear and unambiguous.  The court finds that the plain language of the 1999 Agreement, Section 6.5 entitles Plaintiff ([...]) to all connection fees for users outside of the [...] for which sewerage is transmitted through mains and lines through the [...] to the [...] Treatment Plant.  That the term “connection fee” is not used explicitly within Section 6.5 is of no moment, as this court’s interpretation of Section 6.5 is read together with Section 6.1 to provide it with further meaning.  Da178.  The trial court also concluded that the connection fee in Section 6.1 are for services “in the [...]” are the only connection fees the [...] is entitled to and Section 6.5 permits to [...] to collect all other connection fees outside the [...].  Again, the lack of explicit use of the term “connection fee” in Section 6.5 is significant.  If the [...] was entitled to connection fees outside of the [...] it should state that in Section 6.1, which again is the only section in the entire 1999 Agreement that explicitly states the term “connection fees. ”  Instead, the trial court relied upon Section 6.5 that allows the [...] to “bill” out of town users directly.  As noted earlier, it is clear that language governs fees for services rendered by the [...] for the actual treatment of the sewage at the [...]’s treatment plant.  Otherwise if it was connection fee it would have appeared in Section 6.1.  The trial court also made no reference to the fees set forth in Section 4.1.  Those fees clearly establish the fee for the sewer treatment plant services and Section 4.3 places an obligation upon the [...] to collect the fees in Section 4.1 from users within the [...].  Section 6.5 eliminates the [...] from having to collect the Section 4.1 fees from users outside the [...].  Lastly, the trial court held that the past practices between the [...] and the [...] established that the [...] is entitled to the connection fees because all of the earlier agreements state that the [...] receives connection fees for all properties outside of the [...].  However, while it is true the agreements provide the [...] with the connection fees the fact that the 1999 Agreement in Section 6.1 makes no mention of the [...] receiving connection fees, indicates that this was an agreed upon arrangement in which the [...] would receive connection fees from "any users."  Moreover, these earlier agreements were all superseded by the 1999 Agreement.  Consequently, the trial court erred in holding that the earlier agreements established a past practice that the [...] was entitled to connection fees.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] 4  Legal Argument ............................................................................................................  8  Point I ..........................................................................................................................  8  THE DISCOVERY AT ISSUE  HAD THE TENDENCY IN REASON TO PROVE A MATERIAL FACT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED BY THE STATE AND PRODUCED TO THE DEFENSE.  Point II ......................................................................................................................  9  THE STATE’S LOSS/DESTRUCTION OF THE DISCOVERY AT ISSUE CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL, WHICH REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT.  A.
[brief] (10T101-5 to 18).  On cross-examination, [...] testified that she wrote a letter to defense counsel (S-81) informing them that “I reviewed the report of Prosecution expert [...], M.D., dated 10/18/21.  The report submitted by Dr. Dietz does not alter my opinions in the matter. ” (11T79-16 to 81-18).  Dr. Dietz’s report, dated October 18, 2021, included detailed summaries of the mental health records he reviewed, including a post-event evaluation of defendant by [...], Ph.D., M.P.H., and [...], M.D., J.D. (Da356-369).  In order to reject Dietz’ conclusion that defendant did not meet the legal definition of insanity, [...] would have necessarily familiarized herself with the reports included in Dr. Dietz’ report.  It was in this context that the AP asked Santina on cross-examination whether the defense gave her the Rushing/Perrine report to review.  (12T118-12 to 120-5).  [...] said she did not receive it.  (12T118-12 to 119-12).  On redirect, defense counsel established with [...] that the defense did not send her the Rushing/Perrine report because it did not address defendant’s state of mind and was prepared for the waiver hearing “which is an entirely different purpose. ” (12T120-9 to 20).  Defendant argued in his motion for a new trial, as he does here, that it was improper for the State cross-examine [...] about the Rushing/Perrine report.
[directive] 9.3  Investigation Files  9.3.1  An internal affairs investigation file is needed for all internal affairs reports.  Given the wide range of internal affairs allegations a law enforcement agency receives, these investigation files might consist of only the initial report form and the appropriate disposition document.  On the other hand, investigation files might include extensive documentation of an investigation.  9.3.2  The internal affairs investigation file should contain the investigation’s entire work product, regardless of the author.  This includes investigators' reports, transcripts of statements, and copies of all relevant documents.  The file should also include all related material from other agency incidents that may be applicable.  For instance, if an allegation is made of excessive force during an arrest, the internal affairs investigation file should contain copies of the reports from that arrest.  9.3.3  Where an internal affairs investigation results in the filing of criminal charges, the file shall be made available to the County Prosecutor’s Office.  It will be the responsibility of that office to decide which items are discoverable and which are admissible.  In these cases, the agency must follow the County Prosecutor’s instructions.  9.4
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  ..................................................................................................................1  I.  THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENSE’S REQUEST FOR A MISTRIAL, AND THE VAGUE INSTRUCTION GIVEN WAS INADEQUATE TO CURE THE ADMISSION OF THE PROHIBITED EVIDENCE  .................................................................1  II.  THE TRIAL COURT’S IMPROPER JOINDER WAS NOT RENDERED MOOT BY THE JURY’S ACQUITTAL ON THE WITNESS TAMPERING CHARGE  ......................................................4  III.  THE STATE FAILS TO ADDRESS WHY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ADDRESS MITIGATING FACTORS IN ARRIVING AT A SENTENCING DECISION  ........................................................................................................................................6  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................8
[brief] The Commission has set out its First Amendment analysis on this issue time and time again:  The Commission notes that board members do not surrender the rights they have as citizens such as freedom of speech when they become members of a school board.  However, as discussed in Dunbar Bey v. Brown, Camden Board of Education, Camden County, [...] (Brown), and in light of the social media posts by Respondent, the Commission echoes its decision in Brown, specifically that “when a sitting Board member makes such a judgmental proclamation, it is likely to be credited far more than a statement offered by an ordinary citizen. ”  [...]  Further the Commission emphasized “that in using social media, the affirmative duties within the Code of Ethics for School Board Members may not be overlooked. ”  Id. at 8.  With the above in mind, Respondent’s disparaging posts to social media at issue constituted conduct that undermined the public’s trust in the Board and compromised the Board’s ability to engage with the public.
[brief] (Pa362).  On January 27, 2016, [...] went to the Association’s office at approximately 4:15pm which contradicts [...]’s cert that he showed up “after dark, at 5:15pm”.  (Pa200, Pa351).  [...]’s version of events is described in paragraph 10 (Pa200, Pa351).  [...] recorded a video to document the meeting; and maintains that [...] made false statements.  (Pa356, Pa358).  See Video Evidence (Pa526).  [...] while standing “outside in the hallway” spoke to [...] who was in her office and asked for a copy of the member list.  (Pa352).  [...] tone was “very soft”, as he could barely get any words out because he was afraid of [...] given she’s been “nasty” to him in the past.  (Pa352).  In response to [...]’ request for the member list, [...] immediately raised her voice and told [...] that he would “have to talk to the association’s attorney. ” (Pa352).  [...] asked [...] to call the association’s attorney and she refused; but [...] said, “if you give me a copy of that [Bylaws §5.06], I will provide one for the attorney. ” (Pa353, Pa354).  Thereafter, [...] invited [...] into her office.  (Pa356).  [...] was confused who called the police and was trying to discuss with [...] to find out who it was.  (Pa355).  [...] again got nasty and very defensive.  (Pa356).  [...] “left peacefully, and that was it. ” (Pa356).  [...] did not repeatedly ask [...] to leave; lied about recording a video of this incident and filed false reports.  (Pa356).  The citizens complaints filed by [...] and [...] on January 29, 2016, contained false statements.
[brief] Their testimony also concerning the one to two miles radius was improper because they provided no measurements as to the height of the tower, data as to factors that could have influenced the estimate coverage area and/or range of the towers.  They are not experts by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to offer any scientific, technical, or specialized opinions of cell towers pings that will assist the trier of the fact, and their opinion was not based on actual fact or data.  Clearly, their testimony violated N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703.
[brief] Regulations for the New Jersey Uniform Construction Code, *N.J.A.C.* 5:23-2.2 and 2.7.  A zoning permit is not required for work not requiring the issuance of a construction permit.  A zoning permit is a mandatory component of the Ordinance’s construction permit review procedures.  It is a document issued by the Zoning Officer “which is required by ordinance as a condition precedent to the commencement of a use or the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, conversion or installation of a structure or building…”  Ordinance Sec. 201, Definitions.  Zoning Permit, Pa 29a.  Zoning Permit requirements for properties located in the Township, inclusive of properties located in the Ocean Grove Historic District, are governed by Ordinance Sec. 1102. Pa 68a.  The submission requirements for applications for the issuance of zoning permits are applicable to applications for construction permits and applications for development for site plan and subdivision approval.  Ordinance Sec. 1102B, C, D and E. Pa 68a and 69a.  The Zoning Permit application submission requirements clearly do not apply to work not requiring a construction permit.  Applications for construction permits for properties located outside of Ocean Grove are referred to the Zoning Officer for zoning permit plan review.  The Zoning Officer can either approve or deny the issuance of a zoning permit.  Ordinance Sec. 1102C. Pa 68a.  Applications for development and applications for the issuance of construction permits for properties located in Ocean Grove are likewise referred to the Zoning Officer for the issuance of a zoning permit.  The zoning officer, in turn, refers Ocean Grove applications for development and construction permit applications to the HPC for CofA review.  Ordinance Sec. 900B and C. Pa 63a.  The MULU authorizes the HPC to recommend to the zoning officer in favor the issuance of a permit, against the issuance of a permit or to recommend conditions to the permit to be issued.  If the HPC recommends “against the issuance of a permit or recommends conditions to the permit to be issued, the [zoning officer] shall deny issuance of a the permit or include the conditions in the permit, as the case may be. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111.  The provisions of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111 are incorporated into Ordinance Sec. 904B.  Pa 65a.  Plaintiffs-appellants required neither a construction permit nor zoning permit for the walkway work performed at the Property.  Absent a requisite permit, the HPC lacked CofA permit review authority under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111.  The Law Division erred in denying plaintiffs-appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an order declaring Ordinance Sections 900B and 902A, as amended by Ordinance 02-41, ultra vives and void.  **Point Two**
[brief] Similarly, negative or lowered evaluations could dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity.  See, e.g., *Walker v. Johnson*, 798 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the “denial of a deserved rise in performance rating” can be actionable as retaliation).  Warnings and reprimands issued against an employee who engaged in protected activity could dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity.  *Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co.*, 658 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2011) (a letter of reprimand is materially adverse for a retaliation analysis even if it “does not directly or immediately result in any loss of wages or benefits, and does not remain in the employment file permanently”); *Ridley v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, 217 F. App’x 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding a jury verdict finding that, although demotion was not retaliatory, the post-demotion transfer to warehouse, counseling notices for minor incidents, and failure to investigate complaints about these actions were unlawful retaliation).  By requiring [...] to demonstrate that the retaliatory conduct be “serious and tangible enough to alter employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprived future employment opportunities, or otherwise have a material adverse effect on his status as an employee” (3T28:24-3T29:3), the motion judge erred.  The motion judge improperly added to the Burlington Northern/Roa reasonable person standard because Burlington Northern and Rao expressly rejected the requirement that an employee demonstrate a change in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.  The sole question under Burlington Northern/Roa is whether a jury considering the facts in a light most favorable to [...] could conclude that the employer’s actions could dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
[brief] “[W]histle-blowing activity” is not simply any type of complaint.  Internal workplace disputes and complaints about discourteous supervisors are not protected under CEPA.  See Klein, 377 N.J. Super. at 42 (“The whistle-blower legislation is not intended to shield a constant complainer who simply disagrees with the manner in which the [employer] is operating . . . its . . . [business], provided the operation is in accordance with lawful and ethical mandates. ”); see also Young, 275 N.J. Super. at 237 (“[CEPA] . . . was not intended to provide a remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply disagree with an employer’s decision, where that decision is entirely lawful. ”).  [...]’s “complaints” were limited to his belief that his supervisor was mean to him.  In other words, [...]’s grievances are nothing more than routine, personal work disputes about [...]’s management of the staffing coordinator office.  CEPA demands, as the trial court recognized, more from a CEPA whistleblower than the limited activity to which [...] points.
[brief] Within its papers, plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly permitted reference to a close-up photograph of the subject roadway condition.  (Pa1861 and Da42).  The contention is that the close-up photograph is not an accurate representation of the condition.  [...]’s testimony during the second day of his deposition, however, completely undermines this position.  More specifically, [...] agreed that the close-up photograph was a magnification of a photograph secured by plaintiff during discovery by way of a subpoena issued to [...].  As produced, the photograph was in a JPEG format, which allowed for it to be magnified.  At deposition, [...] was methodically walked through the source photograph and its relationship to the close-out photograph.  [...] ultimately agreed that the close-up photograph was an accurate representation of the subject roadway condition.
[brief] The Borough Adopts the Ordinance.  | 4 | | II.  The Cannabis License Application Process and Review | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW | 9 | | POINT I  The ORDINANCE GOVERNS THE PROCESS FOR AWARDING A LICENSE TO CANNABIS APPLICANTS | 11 | | POINT II  THE BOROUGH MADE A REASONED DECISION IN PASSING THE RESOLUTION  BECAUSE IT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED ALL THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT, INCLUDING THE EVALUATION SHEETS AND APPLICATIONS | 16 | | POINT III  THE BOROUGH HAS IDENTIFIED ITS REASONS FOR ISSUING THE RESOLUTION | 21 | | CONCLUSION | 24 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Avalon Manor Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Twp. of Middle, | 9 | | 370 N.J. Super. 73 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Big Smoke LLC v. Twp. of W. Milford, | 9 | | 478 N.J. Super. 203 (App.
[brief] ” (8T154-5 to 8).  He then reiterated that he was not “saying that that particular area covers any particular area to a certainty where as if you aren’t standing in that exact area, you wouldn’t be using that cell phone tower. ” (8T155-19 to 22).  He also explained that the shaded area on the PowerPoint slides was not intended to say a particular phone was in the darker color, that it does not represent radio frequency coverage, and that it merely showed directionality of the antenna.  (8T160-18 to 161-14).  Utilizing the information provided by the cell phone companies and his training and experience, [...] transformed that data into a visual representation and plotted the information on a map.
[brief] 38  Maisano v. LVNV Funding LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2421 (App. Div Nov. 27, 2019).........  37 Mauro v. Mauro, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1437 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2014)  ..................................................  20 Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 396 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1958) ..............................................  19, 20 NAR v. Ritter, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1313 (App.  Div. June 24, 2024)  ........  33  Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431 (2011)  ...........................................................................  14, 15  Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Chartonavich, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2024)  ............................................................... passim Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2021)  ............................................................  15  RP Leasing Assocs. v. Kennedy, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1858 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 3, 2010)  .................................................................  20  Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment Productions, Inc., 329 N.J. Super. 285 (App. Div. 2000)  .............................................................  16  SSI Medical Servs., Inc v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 146 N.J. 614 (1996)  .......................................................................................  26 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012)  .......................................................................................  13  Unifund CCR Partners v. Beras, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 717 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 23, 2011)  ............................................................... passim Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J 498 (1991)  .......................................................................................  30  Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, 2014 WL 1050512 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014)  ...................................................................................  33  VW Credit, Inc. v. Coast Auto. Group, Ltd., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 417, 2005 WL 3750752 (Sup. Ct. N.J. App. Div. 2005) .................................................................
[brief] In remanding this matter, the Supreme Court provided guidance as to how this Court should analyze whether CS 327 is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  Specifically, the Supreme Court stated, “[i]n determining whether construction of Compressor Station 327 is consistent with the Highlands Act's ‘goals and purposes,’ it will be necessary to consider the circumstances of the project, including the fact that Compressor Station 327 is being built upon already disturbed lands that are unsuitable for vegetation and wildlife, among other arguments [...] presents. ”  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312, __(2024)(emphasis added)(internal citation omitted).
[brief] ”  T6:11-17.  See also T24:11-14 (“if in producing all the relevant documents there are fifty percent of them which are irrelevant, I don’t see the harm. ”).  To be clear, the trial court did not wrongly determine the scope of relevancy.  Rather, the court refused to engage in any relevancy analysis at all and dismissed such relevancy concerns entirely, precluding Defendants from asserting that objection, even though it essential to Rule 4:10-2.  See Pressler & Verniero, Current New Jersey Court Rules, Comment 1 to Rule 4:10-2 (Gann 2024) (“The general standard of discoverability [ ] is relevance”).  The order is thus an abuse of discretion several times over and should be vacated.
[brief] As to assertions regarding Tidelands issues, such is little more than a straw man argument by [...].  The issue of ownership of the parking lot is being litigated before [...] on (Litigation Docket #) [...].  Throughout this litigation, [...] has failed to connect how ownership of the property at issue impacts the Plan.  As observed in prior proceedings and again today, the Plan represents a vision for Zoning Overlay.  It is not a development or tangible project.  While ownership and quieted title may be relevant to a Development Application, this Prerogative Writ does not challenge a Development Application – it challenges the Plan.  Ownership of any Tidelands Properties is of no moment to an analysis of [...]’s actions in approving the Plan.  (emphasis added)  •  This dispute here is one about vision.
[brief] *Id.* at 607.  “That hearing will examine whether the victim's in-court identification was tainted by either or both the photo array and hallway identification procedures.  Defendant may yet obtain the ultimate remedy he seeks by applying existing legal principles.  In these circumstances, we see no need to displace those principles. ”  *Ibid.*  On appeal, defendant here raises identical arguments as to the application of the principles in *Henderson* to first-time in-court identifications and argues that they are the functional equivalent of a showup and thus [...]'s in-court identification almost two years after the event could not produce a reliable identification and deprived defendant of a fair trial.
[brief] FAMILY LIMITED  PARTNERSHIP FILE NO. [...]  [...]; [...]; OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS FILE NO. [...].  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM FINAL ACTION OF: [...]  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  [...], Esq. [...]  [...], Esq. [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...] Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (Attorney ID# 026451998)  [...], Esq. (Attorney ID # 002091982)  TABLE OF CONTENTS