ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  On October 17, 2023, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants, and others, for allegedly obtaining and disseminating a flyer, in hard copy and online, that advocated for Plaintiff to give his wife a “get,” or religious divorce, and that contained what he characterized as an unflattering photograph of Plaintiff, and for organizing a protest in front of his parents’ house for the same purpose.  See Da1–2.  Those actions, Plaintiff alleged, caused him to experience emotional stress from being humiliated on social media and witnessing his parents “being shamed. ”  Da3.  Although the Complaint failed to expressly set forth causes of action, read in the most favorable fashion to Plaintiff, the Complaint appeared to assert claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress.  See Da1–3.  Plaintiff sought $30 million in damages and an order requiring Defendants to “remove the picture from everywhere. ”  Da3.  Shortly after being retained by Defendants, counsel for Defendants emailed Plaintiff (representing himself pro se) offering to accept service on behalf of Defendants and proposing a uniform response/moving deadline and motion to dismiss schedule putting all defendants—some of whom had been served at different times, and others of whom had not been properly served—on the same reasonable briefing schedule.  Da15–16.  Counsel did so in part because Defendants could then file a single omnibus motion to dismiss, conserving party and judicial resources.  Da15.  Plaintiff refused to stipulate to the proposed schedule unless Defendants agreed to various unreasonable demands, such as effectively agreeing to a mandatory injunction requiring Defendants to retract and remove the photograph at issue during the pendency of the litigation.  Da16–17.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Shortly after Plaintiff refused to stipulate to a briefing schedule, Defendants filed a motion for extension of time to respond to the Complaint, proposing a schedule that would put all defendants on the same briefing schedule.  Da37–38.  Plaintiff then filed an opposition to the motion for extension of time and a cross-motion for default judgment.  Da39–40.  In their omnibus reply/opposition brief, Defendants argued that entry of default judgment was unwarranted in part because they had a meritorious defense, including because Plaintiff’s lawsuit targeted Defendants’ protected First Amendment activities—for example, publishing the flyer in [...] newspaper—and was therefore subject to dismissal under the newly enacted Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-49 et seq., colloquially referred to as New Jersey’s anti-SLAPP law.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Order Entered 6/7/24 & Statement of Reasons  Da-37  Order Entered 4/26/24 & Statement of Reasons  Da-39  Order of Disposition entered 4/6/22  Da-122  Order Denying New Trial entered on 5/26/22  Da-126  Order of Judgment entered on 5/26/22  Da-127  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The confidential informant’s tip in *Keyes* is nearly identical to the tip at issue in the instant case.  See *Keyes*, 184 N.J. at 557 (noting that “the affidavit states that the informant has proved himself to be reliable by providing information in the past that has resulted in the arrest of numerous suspects and the recovery of proceeds from drug sales. ”).  While the informant in *Keyes* gave a physical description of the defendant, identified him from a photograph, alleged that the defendant was selling drugs from a specific address, and stated that there were lookouts outside of the address, the Court concluded that the tip was insufficiently detailed regarding the basis of the informant’s knowledge.
[brief] “The law is clear that where the right to terminate a contract is absolute under the wording in an agreement, the motive of a party in terminating such an agreement is irrelevant to the question of whether the termination is effective. ”  *Karl’s Sales Serv. v. [...]*, 249 N.J. Super. 487, 495 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991).  In *Karl’s Sales* plaintiff operated its business at six [...] store locations under six separate license agreements.  When [...]’s decided to close altogether including those six stores it terminated all the licensing agreements pursuant to a clause that provided for termination if “[...]s shall discontinue or dispose of the business conducted by it in the store. ”  Id. at 490.  The trial court determined the agreement did not give [...] the right to go out of business entirely without incurring liability.  Following the bench trial plaintiff was awarded $850,000 in damages.  On appeal this Court reversed.  It found the subject clause to be “clear and unambiguous; there is no room for interpretation or construction”.
[brief] In a 2017 study, the [...] found that defendants released at age twenty-one to twenty-four had a 38.6 percent rate of re-incarceration, but that defendants released at age fifty-five to fifty-nine years had only a 9 percent rate of re-incarceration and defendants released at ages sixty to sixty-four had only an 8.8 percent rate of re-incarceration.  *The Effects of Aging on Recidivism Among Federal Offenders* at 23.  Thus, “because recidivism rates decline markedly with age and prisoners necessarily age as they serve their prison sentence, lengthy prison sentences are an inefficient approach to preventing crime by incapacitation. ”  [...], *The Growth of Incarceration* at 155.
[brief] For example, in Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, the Court held that the record in a declaratory action was insufficient to determine whether the duty to defend was triggered or whether the alleged conduct fell within one of the policy exclusions.  202 N.J. 432, 457 (2010).  As noted above, throughout the duration of this litigation, the parties have conducted themselves with the understanding that the Underlying Action is likely to be dispositive of the issues raised in the Declaratory Action.  This is supported by [...]’s conduct throughout the duration of this litigation, where multiple extensions and adjournments were obtained with the consent of all parties to allow for the conclusion of the Underlying Action.  Because of these clear issues of fact, the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment.
[brief] That’s not the case here. ”  1T47:16-23.  The trial court further concluded that there “is no inkling that there was any possibility that further rules and regulations and the right to modify those rules and regulations, those restrictions were reserved by [...]. ”  1T48:1-4.  The trial court’s legal conclusions ignore the plain language of the Genesis Deed and the surrounding circumstances at and after the time of its conveyance, and further rest on findings of fact reached by the trial court’s misapplication of the summary judgment standard.
[brief] The split-municipality cases do not change the foregoing conclusion.  There are two published New Jersey cases that are most relevant to thinking about what to do when parcels of land are in two towns, *Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 119 N.J. 61 (1990), and *Ciocon v. Planning Bd. of the Borough of Franklin Lakes*, 223 N.J.Super.199 (1988).
[brief] On July 6, 2023, the motion judge held a case management conference in which Counsel for Appellants advised that his clients would be filing a motion to enlarge the period of time by four days to file and to supplement the record.  Counsel for the [...] stated that his client would not oppose the motion to enlarge the period of time by four days, whereas Counsel for Applicants stated that he would oppose.  On July 27, 2023, Appellants filed their motions.  Counsel for both Applicants and the [...] filed their oppositions and Appellants filed their reply.  (Pa113-Pa846)  On October 13, 2023, oral arguments were held.  (T; Pa847-Pa861)  On October 18, 2023, the motion judge denied both motions and subsequently dismissed the Complaint in its entirety, including Appellants’ counts alleging fraud on the part of the Applicants, who were also named as defendants.  (Pa847-Pa861)  On November 19, 2023, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal.  (Pa862-Pa867)
[directive] Because the County Prosecutor is ultimately responsible for prosecuting criminal cases, the internal affairs investigator shall defer to the prosecutor’s supervision and direction in conducting officer interviews.  The investigator shall consult with the County Prosecutor prior to initiating an officer interview in matters that could involve criminal conduct, and shall pay particular attention to the County Prosecutor's instructions concerning the types of interviews to be conducted and procedures to be utilized (e.g., Miranda warning, Garrity warning,6 etc.).  8.0.8
[brief] **City Council Approves a Blight Study on the Property. **  On April 24, 2019, the City Council voted to allow the City’s planning board (“Planning Board”) to commence the “Area in Need of Redevelopment with the Power of Condemnation” study on the Property (the “Blight Study”).¹ (Pa505–09.)  On July 8, 2019, a report was issued as a result of the Blight Study that found that all 39 properties, including [...]’s, met the criteria for designation as an area in need of redevelopment.  (See Pa73–106.)  On January 7, 2020, the Planning Board held a public hearing concerning the Blight Study and subsequently adopted a resolution accepting the recommendations contained in the Blight Study, including that the Property be declared as a condemnation area in need of redevelopment.  (See Pa69.)
[brief] 123 N.J. 308, 327 (1991) (citing Commissioner of Transp. v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 515 (1983).  The Court also noted that a compensation award should indemnify a landowner as fully as possible, and that just compensation should be regarded “‘from the point of view of the owner and not the condemnor. ’” (Ibid.) (quoting Commissioner of Transp. v. William G. Rohrer, Inc., 80 N.J. 462, 467 (1979).
[brief] The Board acknowledged Respondent's easement rights on Lot 5 as found in [...]'s order, but found the order did "not override or negate the need for conformance to zoning or . . . obtaining zoning approval for the supposed easement use" (Aa5).  "The Parking lot use on the Sixth Street courtyard as an off-site parking area for Lot 8 has been non-conforming," the Board found, "and there is no evidence presented that such non-conforming use/structure ever was validly established as per zoning requirements" (Aa5).  "[P]arking in general on that courtyard area," the Board found, "is not a valid or legal non-conforming use" and "should not occur or continue unless and until there is a proper zoning application for the necessary site plan and variance approvals" (Aa5).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Second, even if this Court were to conclude that Defendant did not explicitly argue this issue below, which it should not for the reasons discussed above, Defendant cannot be deemed to have waived the issue as a matter of law (Pb64).  The Appellate Division does not review waived arguments but assesses forfeited ones for plain error.  *United States v. Brito*, 979 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993)).  In *Olano*, the Supreme Court explained the distinction between forfeiture and waiver:
[brief] The collective bargaining agreement also states in Article XII, F., 3(b)(3), in pertinent part:  In no event shall the arbitration decision have the effect of adding to, subtracting from, modifying or amending the provisions of this Agreement.  Pa39.  On or about December 8, 2021, the grievance was denied at Phase Two on the grounds that biweekly overtime rates "are based on the number of working days in a fiscal year and not based on contractual mandates."  Pa59.
[directive] Writs for the production of state adult Inmates and juveniles  Directive #1-04 March 9, 2004 (supersedes #6-00)  Issued by: [...]  Administrative Director  This Directive supersedes Directive #6-00, “Writs for Production of State Inmates,” (dated October 2, 2000).  Set forth herein are procedures to govern the standard writ process used for the production of state inmates housed in state correctional facilities, juveniles under the care of the Juvenile Justice Commission, and civilly committed sexually violent predators.  In addition to the procedures permitted under the prior directive, included herein also are the procedures for issuing automated writs for Criminal and Family court appearances.  This Directive and the procedures set forth herein become effective immediately.
[brief] Because Plaintiff’s Complaint was based on the same conduct he challenged (and released) in *Roma*, [...] moved in the Superior Court for Hunterdon County to reopen the case and to enforce the Settlement Agreement.  *See* Pa000011–Pa000014.  [...] argued that Plaintiff’s *Gannon* claims are “Released Claims” under Section 1.29 of the Settlement Agreement because they relate to *Roma* and concern [...]’s right to charge fees and amend its merchant agreements.  Pa000090–Pa000091, Pa000099–Pa000105.  On May 8, 2024, the Hunterdon County court granted [...]’s motion to reopen the case and enforced the Settlement Agreement against Plaintiff.  Pa000079–Pa000111.  The court held Plaintiff’s *Gannon* claims are “Released Claims” that he relinquished in the *Roma* settlement.  Pa000105–Pa000111.  Citing the “significant similarities” between the *Roma* and *Gannon* class complaints, including their allegations about [...]’s fee structure in its merchant agreements, the court concluded the classes “made the same allegations,” challenged “the same fees,” and raised “the same theories of relief” in both cases.
[brief] I.  Objections Not Timely Made/Preserved are Waived.................................................................42  II.  Appellant was Not Required to Present a Comparative Analysis Given No Prior or Subsequent Issues of Relevance; and the Claim of a Previously Asymptomatic Condition Becoming Symptomatic..............................................44  III.  There was No Prejudice by Granting the Request for Aggravation Charge After Closing Arguments, Upon Realization of the Mistake; and further, any Prejudice was Cured by Affording Supplemental Closing Argument(s)..................................................50  IV.  The Instant Appeal on the Aggravation Charge Issue Fails...............................................................52
[brief] (Da22, Da48 at D-1 at Loos Camera 0 at 15:23-15:36.4)  The de novo court summarized that the motion to suppress was correctly denied based on the totality of failure to maintain lane, odor of alcohol, and --- 4  The video taken from [...]’ motor vehicle recorder at Da48 marked as D-1 at Camera 0 at 15:23 to 15:36 demonstrates that [...] stated “C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C, D, E, F, G,” and then the officer instructed [...] to return to his vehicle.  It bears noting that [...] kept asking [...] to repeat the instructions because he could not hear due to the rain and traffic on Route 9.  See Da48 at D-1 Camera 0 at 10:07, 10:22, and 14:07. failure of the standardized field sobriety tests.  (Da23.)  The de novo court relied on the same evidence to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and reimposed the municipal court’s sentence.  (Da23.)  Defendant timely appealed to this Court (Da27), and this brief now follows in support of the appeal.
[brief] Lack of Proof of [...]’s Presence in New Jersey  [...] was arrested in Virginia, where he told police he had been living since July of 2017.  (17T:43-22 to 44-24)  No witness testified to seeing [...] in Holmdel or the State of New Jersey at any point around the three incidents at [...].  Police made numerous attempts to establish his presence in New Jersey during this period, all of which were unsuccessful.
[brief] That “study” was conducted by the Town’s expert planner and approved by the Town Council through a series of resolutions in early 2020.  The procedure for the “study” is like the procedure for the adoption of a “plan” under the LRHL.  The proposal must first be sent to the Planning Board for review which the Council did by Resolution 77-2020 on March 10, 2020.  (Pa0077, Para. 11).  After review by the Planning Board, the Council, by a series of resolutions, then designated several parcels as “non-condemnation areas in need of redevelopment. ”  Resolution 145-2020 (June 30, 2020) (Pa0077, Para. 12; Pa0348); Resolution 180-2020 (August 11, 2020).  (Pa0077, Para. 13, Pa0346).  It is important to note that the Town chose not to exercise the power of condemnation for any site within this “plan,” even though under LRHL, it could do so.  Then the Town Council created the “overlay” zone by Resolution 225-2020 (October 13, 2020) (Pa0077, Para. 14, Pa0343) which designated the entire Town as “area in need of rehabilitation. ”  On March 29, 2023, plaintiffs filed this prerogative writ suit.
[brief] 40 State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384 (1988) ......................................................................................  37 Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1 (1997) ..................................................................................  46  Stoelting v. Hauck, 32 N.J. 87 (1960) ..................................................................................  15  Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County, 18 N.J. 294 (1955) .......................................  44  Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1 (2004) ...............................................................................  12, 14 Wyatt by Caldwell v. Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 1987) .............................
[brief] 5 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  13  POINT  1.  DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SET FORTH WITH ANY SPECIFICITY THE BASIS ON WHICH THE MOTION WAS MADE, AND FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DECISION WAS PALPABLY INCORRECT, IRRATIONAL, OR BASED ON A FAILURE TO CONSIDER OR APPRECIATE COMPETENT EVIDENCE (Da17)
[brief] Finally, the [...] SPAs cannot provide any authorization for a counsel fee award because each of them contains the following integration clause:  7.1  Entire Agreement.  This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement among the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes any prior understandings, agreements, or representations by or among the parties, written or oral, to the extent they relate in any way to the subject matter hereof.  The Recitals and the Exhibits and Schedules identified in this Agreement are incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof.  [Da911, Da1533]  P-80, p. 6; P-103, p. 6 (emphasis added).  As a result, the 2014 SPA and the 2017 SPA each exclude consideration of representations made before its execution.  In Moynihan v. Lynch, 250 N.J. 60 (2022), the Supreme Court made clear that such an integration clause extinguishes claims based upon prior agreements.  In reviewing the effect of a single line in a palimony agreement, the Court stated:  [T]he last line of the written palimony agreement . . . provides: "This agreement finalizes all obligations of Mr. Lynch to Ms. Moynihan."  That last line suggests that, if there were any previous agreements, they were subsumed into the final written agreement.  [Id. at 91.]  The parties’ intention in Paragraph 7.1 is not merely a line that “suggests” finality; the paragraph plainly states that the agreement “supersedes any prior understandings, agreements, or representations” by the parties.  As a result, any alleged misrepresentation or breach that occurred before December 4, 2017 is unavailable as a basis for requiring indemnification.  2.
[brief] Had the new trial judge assigned to the case after the 2018 remand abided by this Court’s directives, the issues now raised on this appeal may have become moot.  This Court need not be confined by the previous errors in this litigation.  See Hart v. City of Jersey City., 308 N.J. Super. 487, 498 (App. Div. 1998) (finding that the law of the case doctrine “should not be used to justify an incorrect substantive result. ”).
[brief] The Honorable [...], J.S.C., at the outset of the court’s ruling, acknowledged that “indemnification provisions will be construed in accordance with general rules of construction of contracts and no indemnification for a party’s own negligence will be found absent an unequivocal expression of an intention to so indemnify. ”  Quoting *Azurak v. Corporate Property Investors*, 347 N.J. Super. 516, 521 (App. Div. 2002), which was affirmed at 175 N.J. 110 (2003), and quoting *Ramos v. Browning-Ferris Industries*, 103 N.J. 177, 191 (1986).
[brief] After seeing a group of four teenagers walking down the street, [...] parked the car, and [...] and [...] robbed the group at gunpoint.  [...] remained in the backseat of the car.  One of the teenagers began to flee and [...] shouted “Get the guy in the yellow jacket,” who was later identified as [...].  His two codefendants started shooting – killing [...].  Cash and at least one cell phone was taken from the robbery victims.  [...] kept a cell phone.  ---  3  The transcripts from [...]’s trial were not in evidence at the resentencing.  The facts, therefore, are based on the Appellate Division’s recitation of the facts in its unpublished opinion, documents presented to the resentencing court, the presentence report (PSR), and transcripts of the original sentencing and resentencing proceedings.
[brief] This is a very different situation from a warrant authorizing a search of a residence or other stationary object.  Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has historically distinguished searches conducted of structures, such as houses or buildings, from readily-moveable vehicles, such as automobiles or ships.  See State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 423 (2015) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).  A vehicle is expected to move and not remain stationary, potentially being driven between and among various jurisdictions in New Jersey and even other states.  Indeed, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement perhaps best captures this difference, recognizing that it is often not practicable to obtain a warrant for a vehicle that can be quickly moved between localities and jurisdictions, especially given the inherent potential for the loss or destruction of evidence.  Witt, 223 N.J. at 423; State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 20 (2009).  That same reasoning remains, and in fact, is arguably strengthened when police obtain a warrant.  In this case, probable cause existed that evidence pertaining to a crime existed in defendant’s vehicle — an instrumentality that could be moved between localities.  The fact that a warrant authorized the search does not alter the inherent movability of the vehicle nor the potential for loss or destruction of evidence contained in that vehicle.  Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the warrant issued by [...] was not anything like an anticipatory warrant.
[brief] The same is true in respect of another case cited by Plaintiffs, Scott v. Cholmondeley, 129 N.J. Eq. 152, 156 (Ch. 1941), which allowed the judiciary to interfere, via a quo warranto action, with the selection of a church’s pastor.  Again, it is questionable whether such interference would stand under modern jurisprudence.  See generally Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2046, 2056 (2020) (outlining church’s right to self-government, “free from state interference”).  The critical point is this:  The antiquated decisions cited by Plaintiffs have little utility here.