[brief] See 219 N.J. at 442 (all that is required is “some explanatory comment … that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s claim adjudicated in a court of law’); see Drosos, 2023 WL 7545067, at *6; Stutheit, 2018 WL 6757030, at *3–4; Griffin, 411 N.J. Super. at 518.  Even if more were required, the arbitration agreement here is replete with additional terms that both reinforce the user’s waiver and emphasize the difference between arbitration and court.  Section 2(b) of the agreement, for example, identifies as “Exceptions to Arbitration” certain categories of claims that the parties agree are “not require[ed]” to be brought in arbitration and can instead be brought in court.  The agreement explains that those “limited” types of excepted claims “may be brought and litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction,” (Da85), reiterating the distinction between arbitration and a court.  The arbitration agreement’s delegation clause also makes clear that arbitration and court proceedings are mutually exclusive.  The clause provides that “[o]nly an arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court,” has authority to make various enumerated determinations.  (Da84–85.)  (emphasis added).  That provision makes it even more clear that an arbitrator is not a federal, state, or local court.  Nor is a court an arbitrator.  (See id.)  Sections 2(c) and 2(d) of the December Terms provide still-more information about the arbitration process and further illustrate the distinction between arbitration and court.  Like the enforceable Drosos agreement, the agreement here explains how and by whom an arbitration would be administered.  Frederick v. Law Office of Fox Kohler & Assocs. PLLC LLC, 852 F. App’x 673, 677 (3d Cir. 2021) (arbitration provision was enforceable under Atalese where it “both clarif[ied] that arbitration is the singular way for the parties to resolve their disputes and establish[ed] the rules that will govern the arbitration”).  The arbitration agreement also makes clear that the person overseeing a dispute between the parties will not be a judge or jury in a court of law, but rather a private individual chosen by the parties.  For disputes arising outside of California, such as in New Jersey, the user and [...] “will … select[ ]” the Arbitrator “from the applicable arbitration provider’s roster of arbitrators. ”  (Da86.)  An average person would understand from this context that the “Arbitrator” is not the same thing as a judge or a jury, and that the parties’ ability to select the person who will hear their dispute is not how things happen in court.  But if that were not enough, the agreement makes the Arbitrator’s identity more explicit: “The Arbitrator will be either (1) a retired judge or (2) an attorney licensed to practice law. ”  (Id.)  Not a judge.  Not a jury.  Finally, the arbitration agreement instructs a user on how to initiate arbitration: not by filing a complaint in a New Jersey court, but rather by sending a written demand for arbitration to [...] at [...]’s offices in California and directly “to the Arbitration provider. ” (See Da86–87.)  A party cannot follow the agreed-upon procedures and institute an action in court.  In short, the arbitration agreement in the December Terms provides clear and unambiguous notice to any reasonable user—through multiple different clauses—that by agreeing to arbitrate, they are giving up their rights to file a personal-injury lawsuit in court against [...].