ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It is clear that notwithstanding that [...] and [...] were nominally members of [...], [...] was operated by [...] as a sham entity, and [...] acted as [...]’s attorney in furtherance of the conspiracy perpetrated against Plaintiffs.  [...] allege to be the attorney for [...] even after the death of Teddy [...], by authoring the Second Amendment and Restatement of the General Release, staging the April 2009 meeting with Plaintiffs at the offices of [...] where [...] stated to Plaintiff [...] that [...] was the person there at the meeting with them to accept the $250,000.00 check on behalf of [...], and then authoring and forwarding the default letter dated December 17, 2009 to Plaintiffs.  However, since Teddy [...] is already dead, and neither [...] nor [...] ever met or even knew of [...] prior to this action, as they testified, then it is obvious that [...] was acting as the attorney for the sham entity [...] only in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money.  According to the testimony of [...], [...], [...], and [...] himself as set forth in the Statement of Facts, the people Defendants claim owned [...] testified that they never controlled nor operated [...], never met each other, and never knew or communicated with the alleged attorney for [...], and vice versa.  As such, there are glaring and genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether [...] was simply a sham entity, and [...] was its sham attorney, in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money.  The Trial Court’s holding that [...] must be granted summary judgment because he was purportedly [...]’s attorney rather than Plaintiffs’ attorney completely misses the point of Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] as a central participant in Defendants’ conspiracy.
[brief] After all, a court order authorizing service by mail is not immutable.  Even a sheriff's return of service is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence.  Morales v. Santiago, 217 N.J.Super. 496, 504 (App. Div. 1987); Garley v. Waddington, 177 N.J.Super. 173, 180–181 (App.Div.1981).
[brief] [...] and [...] had other alternatives.  They could have provided third party security such as a letter of credit.  They could have prevailed upon [...] to surrender the premises and stop any further rental or other obligations under the Lease.  They could have paid off [...]’s obligations to [...] and proceeded against [...] under the agreement with [...].  Pa112–116.  Following First New Jersey Bank, supra, this court should similarly uphold the personal guarantees and find that there was no right to revoke the guarantees nor was there a valid revocation of the guarantees.  In the unlikely event that the Court should find the letter of March 27, 2019 was effective to terminate the guarantee, the Court should find that the amount owed at that time was guaranteed by [...] and [...] in the amount of $76,179.00 as set forth in [...] Certification, paragraph 12 and 13, Pa205; and [...] Certification, Pa206-207.
[brief] With respect to this appeal, [...] filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint, Separate Defenses, Cross-Claims, Demand for Statement of Damages, on August 30, 2019.  [...] served an Affidavit of Merit dated August 20, 2019 on behalf of the Plaintiff, alleging that the medical care given to [...] by the defendant [...] as well as other Defendants was not in accord with the accepted standards of medical practice in the community on August 20, 2019.  32a.  Thereafter, the case was litigated by the parties.  As part of her case, the Plaintiff served an Affidavit of Merit by [...], which was directed to Defendant [...], [...], [...] and [...].  32a.  On December 30, 2019, Defendant [...] filed a Notice of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to Supply a Proper Affidavit of Merit.  24a.  The Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to this motion.  On June 24, 2020, the [...], J.S.C. read an oral Opinion in which she granted the motion and dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint against Dr. Bekel alone with prejudice.  41a.  The Plaintiff continued to litigate the case against the remaining Defendants, eventually leading to the voluntary dismissal of the case against defendant [...] by Order dated July 10, 2020, 59a; against defendant [...] by Order dated January 24, 2020, 73a; against [...] by Order dated January 24, 2020, 75a; against [...] by Order dated July 21, 2021, 61a; and against [...] and [...] by Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice dated November 3, 2023.  63a.  Thereafter, the case continued against [...] until the case was settled between [...] and the Plaintiff.  This resulted in a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice against Dr. Michael Shirazi filed on December 12, 2023.  The Plaintiff thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal on January 26, 2024 limited solely to the issue of whether the dismissal of the case against Defendant [...] on the basis of the Affidavit of Merit was proper.
[brief] DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED  THE STANDARD ARTICULATED IN THE COVENTRY SQUARE LINE OF CASES FOR “D” VARIANCES FOR PERMITTED USES, RATHER THAN THE HEIGHTENED STANDARD UNDER MEDICI FOR NON-PERMITTED USES; THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO WAS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND CAPRICIOUS (Raised Below: 5T 21:20-25; 22:1-24; 48:24-25 through 50:1-24)
[brief] Plaintiff’s argument that it was Defendants’ responsibility to inform Plaintiff that Intervention was required is also without merit.  Our Supreme Court has stated that:  “The parties may make contractual liability dependent upon the performance of a condition precedent.  . . .  Generally, no liability can arise on a promise subject to a condition precedent until the condition is met. ”  Duff v. Trenton Beverage Co., 4 N.J. 595, 604 (1950).
[brief] The Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment, which applies to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him []."  The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of "[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial "except" where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine."  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
[brief] Attorneys and Law Firms  [...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant ([...], Public Defender, attorney; [...], of counsel and on the brief).  [...], Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent ([...], Acting Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney; [...], of counsel and on the brief).  Appellant filed a supplemental pro se brief.  Before Judges [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] ”  State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 231 (2011).  Even if the out-of-court identifications of a faceless individual at Da 87-88 and Da 139-140 were admissible despite flawed law enforcement procedures, the trial court’s failure to administer any part of the “in-court and out-of-court identification” instruction (Da 145-156) to the jury disrupted the core guarantee of a fair trial, and was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] Oct. 6 '22  Order, par. 1,1c&1d (Exh. "B") (16a-17a); Mar. 7, '23 Order (Exh. "C") (36a-37a); & Sept. 6, '23 Order, par. 3&4 (Exh. "E") (41a-42a) for [...].  Oct. '22  Order par. 1 needs revision since May 11, '22  Verified Complaint (P-242-22) (Exh. "G") (51a-56a) by [...] ("Respondent", "Petitioner"), for Co-Trustee discharge should NOT have been granted to proceed summarily.  Its Accounting, Jan. 4 '19 to Mar. 31 '22 (Exh. "H") (58a-82a), should NOT be approved due to key mistakes, as per my Exceptions (Exh. "L") (114a-128a).  Oct '22  Rider wrongly rejected my Exceptions since "contingent remaindermen under testamentary Trust (such as [...]) who are unaffected by allowances out of income or corpus commission cannot file exceptions to such items in an accounting" & Will, par. 10.6 "does not suggest approval is required from both [...] & [...]" (Exh. "B", p. 15&16) (32a-33a).  Mar. 13, '23  Order corrected my status as Vested Remainder Beneficiary (Exh. "D") (39a).  My Exceptions addressed Trust corpus amounts that affected me as Remainder Beneficiary, w/NO exceptions to commissions.  Will, par. 10.6 (Exh. "F") (48a), states "professional Co-Trustee may require an approval of its account...by such beneficiaries as it deems appropriate?  Verified Complaint, par. 4 (Exh. “G”) (52a), listed me to review, which allowed Exceptions to, Accounting.  [...] was wrongly concerned that, w/o Court approving his formal accounting, my potential exceptions to his accounting could cause him legal/financial liabilities.  [...] should pay back $74,248 (66a) to Trust for billed work on behalf of [...], & not Trust, related to [...]’ Estate Case [...].
[brief] Existing authority is against [...].  This Court already explained that, “under the RPCs, representation of clients who are on the same side in the same civil litigation, unlike opposing clients with a direct conflict of interest, does not always present a potential for a conflict of interest, and is not automatically barred. ”  New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. G.S., 447 N.J. Super. 539, 569-70 (App. Div. 2016).
[brief] There was no dispute that the City maintained an anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policy at the time of incident.  The policy is clear and unequivocal:  Under no circumstances will the [...] discrimination on the basis of sex, race, creed, color religion, national origin, ancestry, age, marital or political status, affectional or sexual orientation, domestic partnership status, civil union status, atypical hereditary, cellular or blood trait, genetic information, disability…liability for service in the United States armed forces, gender identity or expression, and/or other characteristics protected by law…If any employee or prospective employee feels they have been treated unfairly, they have the right to address their concern with their supervisor, or if they prefer their Department Head, the Personnel Director, the City Administrator, or the office of the Corporation Counsel.  Pa121-122.  The City’s employment handbook further provides an anti-harassment policy which provides that “if an employee is witness to or believes to have experienced harassment, immediate notification of the supervisor or other appropriate person should take place. ”  It then refers employees to the “Employee Complaint Policy. ”  Pa123-124.
[directive] Time Period to Request an Adoption  State and local agencies have calendar days from the date of 30  The 30-day rule can be seizure to request a federal adoption.  waived based upon written request to the adopting Treasury agency stating the reason for the late submission and describing The adopting Treasury the circumstances that caused the delay.  a waiver request only when unique agency should support the basis for non-compliance with circumstances are presented as - the 30-day requirement.
[brief] **Point Four**  THE DECISIONS OF THE LAW DIVISION RENDERED MOOT ANY ISSUES ARISING FROM PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS NOT SEEKING AN ORDINANCE INTERPRETATION FROM THE ZBA  Defendants-respondents argue plaintiffs-appellants failed to apply to the ZBA for an interpretation of the zoning ordinance as authorized by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70b. Db14, Db15, Db27, Db37, Db38.  The issue was rendered moot by the rulings of the Law Division below.  Point One of plaintiffs’-appellants’ Brief argues that sections 900B and 902A of the [...] Land Development Ordinance were not authorized by the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111, Pb6.  The issue was decided by the Court below in the Court’s April 28, 2023 Decision on Motion. 5T15 – 9 to 19.  Point Two of plaintiffs’-appellants’ Brief argues Section 906 of the Township of Development Ordinance was not authorized by the MLUL, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a) and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.2.  Pb13.  This issue was also decided by the Court below in the Court’s April 28, 2023 Decision on Motion. 5T18 – 4 to 13.  Point Three of plaintiffs’-appellants’ Brief argues Section 413.02B of the [...] Land Development Ordinance did not limit to one (1) the number of walkways permitted in the Flared Open Space Area.  Pb14.  The Court below interpreted Ordinance Section 413.02B and concluded the Ordinance permitted only one (1) walkway in the flare.  7T24 – 25; 7T25 – 1 to 6; 7T25 – 9 to 20.  Point
[directive] Requests by the State for Judicial Review of a Case that Should Not Have Been DismissedN acated/Expunged  Requests by the State should be filed in JEDS for Superior Court (Criminal and Family) cases and via a paper motion for Municipal Court cases.  The prosecutor Directive# 25-21 September 2021 7, Page3 of shall provide a copy the motion to the defendant/parent Guvenile ), or their if attorney, applicable.  Where the motion is granted and the court orders the dismissal vacated, the conviction reinstated and/or the expungement vacated, court staff will provide a of of copy the court order to the parties.  It shall be the responsibility the prosecutor to distribute the court order to the appropriate law enforcement agencies.  Questions regarding this Directive, or the appended forms should be directed to the [...] at [...], the [...] at [...] ext.
[brief] This letter states the following in relevant part:  For over the past eight, or more, years.  I have been listening to you talk to your family, friends, and Avon people in a nice and cordial manner; however and when it comes to me, you speak to me in a rude or curt manner and with, at times, biting and unnecessary, comments.  In the past three weeks that we were together, I happened to pay particular attention to this and recognize that you are going to continue on with this mannerism towards me and I don’t feel as though it is a positive basis for a relationship for either you or for me to continue.  What little time that we do spend together, at times, ends up with contention and stress and that is not beneficial to either of us.  ______________________________  My personal feelings are that the marriage should dissolve and that you should have the freedom to deal with your life as you see fit.  In that light, I have no claim against any of your assets as I believe that you would like to preserve them all for your family and [...].  (Pa 536; emphasis added).
[brief] [...]  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...] [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...] (SBN 154148)  [...]  [...] (SBN 302650)  [...]  [...]  [...] (SBN 224570)  [...] [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...] (SBN 242557)  [...] [...]  Telephone: [...]  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[brief] (3T133:9-16).  The trial court noted several issues with the video taken by Plaintiff while he was traveling in his friends truck several weeks after the accident.  [...] conceded he did not know if the condition that caused the jolt in the truck as shown in the video was the same condition that allegedly caused Plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa2167).  Furthermore, [...] conceded that he did know the condition of the truck, and whether the camera was handheld or not.  (Pa2133-Pa2134; Pa2167; 3T142:15-143:2; 3T161:5-12; 3T162:4-165:17).  As such, the trial court appropriately found that the Plaintiff’s video provides no factual basis for [...] to conclude that settlement at the abutment joint created a dangerous condition that caused the accident.
[brief] (3T Pg. 26, Ln. 9– Pg. 27, Ln. 18).  [...]’s testimony included the introduction of several photographs she took of the trap and its surroundings on September 15, 2021, as well as the Defendant’s OPRA request with her name and phone number matching that which was written on the trap, further bolstering her testimony.  (3T Pg. 19, Ln. 1 – Pg. 30, Ln. 3).  She also identified Defendant at trial based upon the fact that on September 17, 2023, the Defendant arrived at [...]’s office to retrieve the trap.
[directive] Release Saecial for Requests 6.2  Offenses.  New Concerning Restraints fog^ Requests 6.2.1 personal on defendant the release decides to appearance first the at court the If deterrence, specific of benefits the achieve 2A:162-17(a), to N.J.S.A. to pursuant recognizance the instruct court the that request shall general attorney deputy prosecutor or assistant the issue refusal to court's The release. of period the during offense an commit to not defendant of revocation seek to authority prosecutor's the affect not shall defendant the to instruction such the that event the in Directive this of 8 Section and 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. to pursuant release recognizance. on released while offense new a commits defendant Victims/Witnesses. with Contact Concerning Restraints for Requests 6.2.2 the that request reason to has general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant the If other any with contact no or offense, alleged the of victim the with contact no have defendant defendant's to shall object prosecutor the offense, the concerning testify may who witnesses) be defendant that the ask shall and 2A:162-17(a), N.J.S.A. to pursuant recognizance on release condition a as ordered defendant be the that and 2A:162-17(b), N.J.S.A. under all, if at released, The 6.2.3. subsection also See witness(es). and/or victim the with contact no have to release of any of terms of the witnesses and/or victim the advise practicable soon as shall as prosecutor appearance.  first the at imposed conditions) release pretrial such Orders.
[brief] It is worth to note [...] awarded $229,389.69 counsel fees to Plaintiff [...] in the Final Judgment of Divorce on October 22, 2014.  (Da191)  This $229,389.69 included the legal fees incurred by Plaintiff to set aside the original judgment of divorce and to make correction of the alleged error in PSA and the original judgment of divorce.  The $229,389.69 legal fees award also included the legal fees after converting the uncontested divorce case to a heavily contested divorce action, of which the Defendants were not contacted to provide the legal service requested by the Plaintiff Fou.  Defendants were only paid $1,000 legal fees for an uncontested divorce case.  There is no way the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff to make corrections to the original judgment of divorce, if shifting is permitted, can be more than $229,389.69, the total legal fees awarded by the Family Court to Plaintiff [...] at the conclusion of granting a new Final Divorcer Judgment.  Therefore, the fact that Appellate Division substituted its finding that Plaintiff had suffered $449,798.59 legal fees was a clear error, which was based on Plaintiff’s attorney [...]’s misrepresentations to Court.  This is why [...] refused to submit his certification to the Court below to support his request for attorneys in the proposed Amended Final Judgement.  This Court must correct this error, because the Court is a court of justice and equity.
[brief] US. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.  1 NJ. Const. art. IV, § 7, 13  STATUES AND REGULATIONS  N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5  N.J.A.C. 6:28-9.l(a)  N.J.A.C. 6:28-9.8  N.J.A.C. 6A:28:9.10.  N.J.A.C. 6A:28:9.10(b)  N.J.A.C. 6A:28:9.10.12  N.J.A.C. 6A:28:9.11.1
[brief] The Trial Court held that “in the present matter, [...] is merely seeking a judgment that is to be paid directly to the third parties and thus, [...] will receive the benefit of the judgment in name only. ” (T1 10:9-12).  In effect, the third parties would be able to sue upon [...]’s claim based on the fact that they seek to recover an amount now owed to them.  Such an arrangement clearly affects [...]’s standing under Rule 4:26-1, which provides that, “every action may be prosecuted in the name of a real party in interest. ”  The Trial Court was correct in its ruling.
[brief] [...] testified that one car was a Dodge and the other an Impala, and that [...] was in the Impala.  (4T 100-2 to 101-6).  ______________________ matter but had not been sentenced at the time of trial.  (4T 8-23 to 9-22).  [...] testified that the doors of [...]’s car were opened, and people “told him and [...] to get the F out or they’re going to shoot” them; [...] thought that he and [...] were being robbed.  (4T 96-25 to 97-25).  According to [...], the people then said to [...], “‘You’re under arrest. ’” (4T 98-1 to 9).  In court, [...] identified defendant [...] as having come from the Dodge, and defendant [...] as from the Impala.
[brief] 30  TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDERS & RULINGS APPEALED  Order 6-22-2022, dismissing complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e) ........ Pa283  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Abtrax Pharma., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 514, 655 A.2d 1368 (1995)  ...........................................  29 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986)  .........................................................  24 Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .................................................................  24 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ............................................................  24 Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105, 116 (App. Div. 2009) ...................................... 23  In re Contest of November 8, 2005, 192 N.J. 546 (2007) .................................................................  22 Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 337 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied 188 N.J. 353 (2006) .............................................  22  Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., P.A., 331 N.J. Super. 445, 752 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 2000).  .......................  29  Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 591 (1993) ..........................................................  24 Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 888 A.2d 464 (2006) .............................................  25  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) .................................................................  22 Roa v. Roa, 402 N.J. Super. 529, 537 (App. Div. 2008), certif. granted 197 N.J. 477 (2009) ...........................................  22 Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243, 791 A.2d 1068 (App. Div. 2002).  .....................  2 Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 397, 139 A.3d 1 (2016)  ............................................  2  STATUTES AND RULES