ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ### TABLE OF APPENDIX | No. | Description | Page No. | |-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | 1 | Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, filed May 19, 2023 | Ja001-Ja010 | | 2 | Defendant [...]’s Resolution Denying Plaintiff’s Application, dated April 3, 2023 (Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Complaint) | Ja011-Ja036 | | 3 | Answer, filed July 19, 2023 | Ja037-Ja041 | | 4 | Plaintiff’s Attorney Certification, filed November 30, 2023 | Ja042-Ja043 | | 5 | Defendant [...]’s Letter Enclosing its Resolution Denying Plaintiff’s Application, dated April 4, 2023 (Part of Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts) | Ja044-Ja045 | | 6 | Original “[...]”¹ (Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts) | Ja046-Ja076 | | 7 | Amended Pages of “[...]” (Exhibit C to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts) | Ja077-Ja079 | | 8 | Plaintiff’s Land Development Application with Cover Letter (Exhibit D to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts) | Ja080-Ja087 | | 9 |
[brief] The trial Court's instructions on accomplice liability in [...]'s case only defined accomplice and discussed the sharing of the same purpose but only spoke in generalities.  The trial Court failed to charge the facts of the case.  For example, when the Court gave the instructions on accomplice liability, it never explained to the jury surrounding the evidence presented at trial on how they could find defendant guilty of second degree robbery while co-defendants [...] and [...] are guilty of first degree robbery.  "[I]t is not always enough simply to read the applicable provisions of the criminal code, define the terminology, and set forth the elements of the crime...  Ordinarily, the better practice is to mold the instruction in a manner that explains the law to the jury in the context of the material facts of the case R: 1:8-7 [8.1]".  State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 545 A.2d 119 (1988).  Id.  By the judge merely charging the jury in general terms as to accomplice liability, he did not really give the jury the proper guidance.  The jury should have been told that if they believed that defendant merely had the intention to commit robbery, and other participants unbeknownst to him would be armed, defendant could not be convicted of armed robbery since the State had not offered any evidence that defendant passed out any weapons, possessed any weapons physically nor made any plans or had discussed any use of a weapon relating to any of the robberies.
[brief] The SRD Rule Does Not Apply To The Project Pursuant To The Long Branch Rule.  It is against the foregoing backdrop that the SRD Rule’s applicability (or, more accurately, non-applicability) to the Project should be analyzed.  The SRD Rule, as with any other regulation, is “subject to the same rules of construction as a statute,” and thus, “should be construed in accordance with the plain meaning of its language” and “in a manner that makes sense when read in the context of the entire regulation.
[brief] 3.  Further, given Probation’s withdrawal of its support arrearage charge of $16,000 and acknowledgment of $10,354.73 in credits due Appellant after decades of “stonewalling” against correction, how can the doctrine of “Law of the Case” or "collateral estoppel" be applicable to the State's unlawful conduct in fabricating and maintaining an admittedly inaccurate account record?  By definition, Probation violated the law and cannot claim "law of the case" or "collateral estoppel" given its misconduct, but especially when perpetrated by a government agency of the State of New Jersey Agency, namely Probation.  A litigant should not be held responsible for ill-applied Law of the Case or "collateral estoppel" doctrine in the face of Probation's decades-long failure to comply with the law and court orders.
[brief] Since no active form of cocaine was found in the defendant’s blood, his alleged exposure to cocaine in the past will do little to prove that he was under the influence of illicit substances when he crashed into the alleged victim’s automobile.  This evidence will only serve to prejudice the jury against him and to encourage them to make the inappropriate conclusion that because the defendant may have been exposed to cocaine in the past, he must have been exposed to some illicit substance when his automobile collided with the alleged victim’s automobile.  It will also confuse the jurors and potentially lead them to believe that because BZE was found in the defendant’s system, he was high on cocaine at the time of the incident in question.  The Court “has a responsibility to ensure that evidence admitted at trial is sufficiently reliable so that it may be of use to the trier of fact who will draw the ultimate conclusions of guilt or innocence.  State v. Michaels, 136 NJ 299, 316 (1994).  In the present matter, [...]’s testimony as to the BZE allegedly found in the defendant’s blood is not reliable because at best, it only proves that the defendant was exposed to cocaine at any point forty-eight hours prior to the accident that led to this indictment.  There is no proof whatsoever that the defendant was high on cocaine when the accident took place.  Therefore, this evidence will be of no use whatsoever to the jurors other than to cloud their judgment and mislead them into believing that either the defendant was high on cocaine at the time of the accident or that because he may have used cocaine in the past, he was high on some other illicit substance at the time of the accident.  As such, the trial court correctly precluded this testimony, and this Court should deny the State’s motion for leave to appeal.
[brief] For these reasons, the Court opined as follows:  The clear import of the evidence and testimony is that the project proposes a better zoning alternative than the existing parking lot.  As to the special reasons, the main thrust of Plaintiff’s argument can be found in its heavy reliance on density and related height variance approval by the Board and that the approval exceeds the zone’s ordinary limitations.  With regard to height, all things are relative.  What the property owner seeks here is to build a tall structure in excess of what is permitted, but in an area unique in that it is near the boardwalk which is elevated and where adjacent structures to the boardwalk are elevated.  Moreover, as the Board recognized here, the particular structure in question – a tall, thin, residential structure – was part of the design calculus ensuring corridors with enough open space to allow for views, light and air through the corridors crossing the property and benefiting the western properties.  This is an alternative to one ‘massive’ structure, without the light and air corridors.  (Pa69)  The Court’s reasoning is well-supported by the record and there is no abuse of discretion or any error by the Trial Court.
[brief] The Board’s feigned concerns about [...]’s evacuation plan cause no impacts to adjacent properties and are not lawfully within the Board’s purview as this subject is exclusively regulated by the Department of Health. N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.79.  The Board made no findings that there would be significant impacts from traffic; to the contrary, the evidence confirmed no significant traffic impacts.  [Pa59-60; Pa114-115].
[brief] (7T 219-8 to 20)  [...] said that he dropped [...] off and [...] assured him that he was going to get a ride home.  As [...] continued on his way to the memorial, he got lost and in the process of trying to figure out the directions to the memorial, the police stopped him.  (7T 220-11 to 15)  [...] said that he did not know [...] personally; [...] was [...]’s friend.  (7T 261-20 to 24)  Police found surveillance tape from a nearby McDonald’s where it appeared that [...] had jokingly pulled an object that looked like a gun on [...].
[directive] The (e.~, violence domestic as charged be that might offenses some assessment risk from exclude 2C:12-10; stalking, N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3; mischief, criminal 2C:33-4; N.J.S.A. harassment, 2C:12- N.J.S.A. ofphvsical menace, 2C:12-1(a)(1); acts N.J.S.A. injury, bodily cause to attempts Accordingly, 2C:12-3).  N.J.S.A. weapon, a without made threats terroristic and 1(a~3); a with death a of or threat violence physical involve not do that violence domestic of instances can harassment that acknowledged is It ODARA. the under assessed be not should weapon offensive or shoving, other kicking, 2C:33-4(b~strikin~, N.J.S.A. See contact. physical include disorderlX a constitutes petty harassment exception, very limited a with However, touching).
[brief] TRANSCRIPTS | Description | Page | |--------------------------------------------------|------| | Trial Transcript, May 23, 2022 | 1T | | Transcript on remand, October 2, 2023 | 2T | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES TABLE OF CASES | CASE NAME | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------|------| | All the Way Towing, L.L.C. v. Bucks County Int’l, Inc., 236 N.J. 431 (2019) | 1,13,15,16,20,21,22,24,25,26,27 | | Baldauf v. Nathan Russell, Inc., 88 N.J.L. 303 (1915) | 16, 17 | | Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574 (2020) | 19 | | Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 160 N.J. 352 (1999) | 2 | | Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543 (2009) | 23, 24 | | CDK Global, L.L.C. v. Tulley Auto Group, Inc., | 21 | 489 F.Supp. 3d 282 (D.N.J. 2020)  Coastal Group, Inc. v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 25 274 N.J.Super. 171 (App.Div. 1994)  Cox v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21, 23, 24 138 N.J. 2 (1994)  D’Ercole Sales v. Fruehauf Corp., 24, 25 206 N.J.Super. 11 (App.Div. 1985)  Doe v. Poritz, 16 142 N.J. 1 (1995)  Flanigan v. McFeely, 14 20 N.J. 414 (1956)  Graziano v. Grant, 27 326 N.J. Super. 328 (App.Div. 1999)  Henebema v. Raddi, 14 452 N.J. Super. 438 (App. Div. 2017), certif. denied, 233 N.J. 215 (2018)  Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Shuster Corp., 24, 25 212 N.J.Super. 350 (App.Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 60 (1986)  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 23 25 N.J. 17 (1957)  Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 16 337 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 2001)  Lowenstein v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 14 35 N.J. 94 (1961)  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99 (2014)  23, 24 Marascio v. Campanella, 298 N.J. Super. 491 (App. Div. 1997)  25 Murnane v. Finch Landscaping, LLC, 420 N.J. Super. 331 (App.Div. 2011)  18, 19, 25  In re O’Brien, 423 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010)  21  Peter W. Kero, Inc. v. Terminal Constr. Corp., 6 N.J. 361 (1951)  23  Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150 (2011)  2 State v. Kosch, 454 N.J. Super. 444 (App. Div. 2018); 14 State v. G.C., 188 N.J. 118 (2006)  16  Sun Chemical Corp. v. Fike Corp., 981 F.3d 231 (3d. Cir. 2020)  21, 22 Tomaino v. Burman, 364 N.J.Super. 224 (App. Div. 2003)  14
[brief] ” (Italics added.)  (TRVa2900.)  Also, on September 4, 2015, [...] emailed [...], Payroll Administrator at [...], to advise [...]’s work was excluded from the CCIP, writing “I am in touch with someone from OCIP (sic) [[...]] – our contract is excluded from being able to upload payroll [.].” (Italics added.)  (TRVa2903.)  [...] followed up with Hughes on September 8, 2015 advising “I had gotten word about there being no OCIP (sic) required for this job (as per the other email I had sent).” (Italics added.)  (TRVa2907.)  Later that day, [...] responded to Hughes’ insistence that “it is a CCIP job” by advising there was no CCIP reporting required because on [...]’s online portal the [...] “contract comes up as ‘excluded’” and because, according to communications from [...]’s [...], “no payroll is required for excluded contracts.
[brief] •  [...] did not abuse her discretion in ordering Plaintiff to respond to the “Medicare Interrogatories. ” (Letter Order at 3).  These are standard interrogatories that can be easily answered.  •  [...] did not abuse her discretion in granting Defendants’ request for additional information in response to Interrogatory Nos. 25, 26, 28, 29, 30.  (Letter Order at 3).  In her broad discretion, the Magistrate found that the Interrogatories requested specific, relevant information that Plaintiff failed to adequately provide.  (See id.).
[brief] The Zoning Board is a duly constituted board of the [...] ("Township").  The jurisdiction and authority of the Zoning Board is established by the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq. and the Monroe Township Code, §175-30 to -32 for purposes other than parking and storage.  (Pa4).  The 2020 application was never completed.  In the subsequent 2022 Zoning Application, the [...] requested a “use variance” to allow an existing accessory structure to be larger than the principal use on the Property.7  (Pa22)  The [...] had in 2017 constructed structures on the Property and performed other grading and improvements, which violated the Development Ordinances of the Township, without seeking the approval of the Planning or Zoning Boards.  The improvements included an addition to an existing pole barn, site grading and construction of access roads.  (Pa2)  In June 2022, the [...] submitted the application for a “use variance” with respect to the Property (the “2022 Zoning Application”), which is the subject of this Appeal.  (Pa1-22)  The 2022 Zoning Application stated that the [...] were asking for a variance to approve a “24’ by 40’” 2-car garage addition to the existing pole barn which had previously constructed “with all required permits.
[brief] [...] correctly ruled [...]’s observations of defendant in the Walmart parking lot justified [...]’s investigatory stop of defendant a short time later.  Police tasked with protecting the public are authorized to approach and temporarily detain someone for questioning if they suspect the person stopped has been or is about to engage in criminal activity.  *State v. Davis*, 104 N.J. 490, 508 (1986); *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  “There can be no question that a police officer has the duty to investigate suspicious behavior. ”  *State v. Letts*, 254 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (Law Div. 1992).
[brief] On September 8, 2022, an Ocean County grand jury returned Superseding Indictment No. [...], charging defendant, [...], with the following offenses: third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (Count One); third-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(5) (Count Two); third-degree possession of CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (Count Three); second-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2) (Count Four); third-degree possession of CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (Count Five); third-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(5) (Count Six); third-degree possession of CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (Count Seven); third-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) 1 The State has combined the Counterstatements of Procedural History and Facts because the only discussion detailing defendant’s underlying crime is that which was elicited from defendant in his factual basis at the plea hearing.
[brief] “A trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’ ”  Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 151 (1964)).  “A trial court's legal conclusions, however, ‘and the consequences that flow from established facts,’ are reviewed de novo. ”  State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).
[brief] Recall that only in the late 1980s, after a couple of failed or aborted attempts to subdivide Lot 4, and with the property about to be marketed, did [...] retrospectively, and quite suspiciously, record the May 1972 Graco Deed that re-attached the Strip to Lot 4.  Pa84.  If that maneuver had been condoned by the Court, it would have resulted in a patently inequitable outcome: taking back from Lot 3 ownership of the Strip that Lot 3’s owners had enjoyed and relied upon for more 50 years.  C.  The Trial Court’s Evaluation of Testimony and Documentary Evidence was Sound [...]’s complaint that the trial court misjudged the credibility of witnesses and the relevance of the 1967 Subdivision and other documentary evidence fails under the deferential standard this Court will apply to a trial court’s findings of fact.
[directive] Persons who do not fall under the definition of a family or household member in Guideline 1 ("Definitions") must go to a law enforcement agency to request that a law enforcement officer file a petition with the court.  However, the filing of these petitions is at the discretion of law enforcement as the petitioner.  See "Attorney General Directive Pursuant to the Extreme Risk Protective Order Act of 2018" for the guidelines to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices on the implementation of this Act at https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/directiv.htm.
[directive] Deciding whether to pursue a motor vehicle is among the most critical decisions made by law enforcement officers.  It is a decision which must be made quickly and under difficult, often unpredictable circumstances.  In recognition of the potential risk to public and officer safety created by vehicular pursuits, no officer or supervisor shall be criticized or disciplined for a decision not to engage in a vehicular pursuit or to terminate an ongoing vehicular pursuit based on the risk involved, even in circumstances where this Policy would permit the commencement or continuation of the pursuit.  Likewise, officers who conduct pursuits consistent with this Policy will be strongly supported by the law enforcement community in any subsequent review of such actions.  1  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] He further confirmed that when working in the area, he typically makes inspections of the roadway.  (Pa 519).  He also stated that if one of his employees noticed the pothole, he would expect them to report it.  (Pa 519).  Moreover, [...] also testified that street sweepers pass by the area four times per week and sweep each side of the street twice per week.  (Pa 520).  There is an issue of fact as to whether the [...] and its employees had notice of this condition and failed to repair it.
[brief] Here, the trial court held that [...]’s Motion to Vacate was not filed within a reasonable time and was barred by the doctrine of laches because 1) [...] initiated a putative class action against [...] in the interim between the default judgment being entered and [...]’s Motion to Vacate and 2) the ostensible prejudice to [...] arising from the statute of limitations expiring on their collection claim in the same interim of time.  *See* T1 30:12-31:23; 49:10-50:14.  “But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay . . . the validity of that defense must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. ”  *Lavin v. Bd. of Educ.*, 90 N.J. 145, 152 (1982) (quoting *Hall v. Otterson*, 52 N.J. Eq. 522, 535 (1894)).  The “doctrine [of laches] is invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party. ”  *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003) (emphasis added) (citing *In re Kietur*, 332 N.J. Super. 18, 28 (App. Div. 2000)).  Laches may only be applied when a party acting in good faith is prejudiced by the ostensible delay.  *Knorr*, 178 N.J. at 181 (citing *Dorchester* Manor v. Borough of New Milford, 287 N.J. Super. 163, 172 (Super. Ct. 1994)).
[brief] On 4-24-23, defendant filed an answer with jury demand with affirmative/separate defenses but without any statement of facts pursuant to R. 4:5:4 or TCA affirmative/separate defenses.  377a-414a.  On 9-12-23, defendant filed a third party complaint against third party defendants [...], [...], 1T = Transcript of Summary Judgment And Class Certification Motion Hearings Of 9-22-23.
[brief] For example, she writes: “*De novo* review is especially appropriate in evaluating a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment. ”  (*Id.* (citing *NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 421 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2011))).  But there, the trial court did not rule on a summary-judgment motion: it considered Respondents’ motions to compel arbitration brought (properly) under R. 4:6-2(e).  (*See* Pa000204–08); *Goffe*, 238 N.J. at 216 (resolving that the trial court properly made its ruling “based on the complaint and the certifications provided to” it).
[brief] On 6/7/22 [...] and [...] denied my appeal and did not provide statement of reason based on 2:11-3(e)(1)(E),  In that order they claimed that [...] had the Note, which was false.  I filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by [...] without a statement of reason.  On 7/19/23.  I requested a certification from the Supreme Court of NJ.
[brief] **Defendants’ Active Participation in and Negligence During the Property Sale Belies Its Position no Contractual or Fiduciary Duty Existed**  Defendants’ response fails to provide a cognizable legal theory under which it could have participated so actively in the events underlying this litigation, made such consequential mistakes, yet still walk away from all contractual and fiduciary responsibility.  Defendants’ responses focus on language in the parties’ contract which perhaps could have permitted them to void or refrain from entering into the agreement, but these arguments were mooted when Defendants not only accepted and retained payment for their services, but engaged so actively together with Plaintiff consistent with its mutual ends.