ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] ¿Entiende usted que si se determina que es un delincuente sexual repetidor y compulsivo y que aceptaría (se beneficiaría de) un tratamiento para delincuentes sexuales pero usted no está dispuesto a participar en dicho tratamiento y queda recluido en una institución que no sea el Centro de Diagnóstico y Tratamiento de Adultos, también estará sujeto a los mismos términos que figuran más arriba en la sección 5 para salir en libertad Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Spanish página 2 de 3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Spanish page 2 of 3 condicional? Do you understand that if you are determined to be a repetitive, compulsive sex offender who is not amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment but you are willing to participate in such treatment and are confined to a facility other than [...], you will also be subject to the same parole eligibility terms as contained in section 5 above?  no  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  7.  ¿Entiende usted que si su conducta se caracteriza por un patrón de comportamiento repetidor y compulsivo o si usted no es un buen candidato para recibir tratamiento para delincuentes sexuales, no calificará para primariamente salir en libertad condicional o hasta que haya cumplido cualquier término mínimo obligatorio impuesto por el juez un tercio de la sentencia impuesta cuando no se haya fijado ningún término mínimo y obligatorio ninguno de los términos será reducido por tiempo de conmutación por buen comportamiento o créditos de trabajo?
[directive] NON-ENFORCEABILITY BY THIRD 15.  uniform authority to ensure the General's pursuant to the Attorney is issued This Directive throughout the State. justice administration of criminal and the enforcement of the laws and efficient more discretion that may be law enforcement limitations on the exercise of imposes This Directive Constitutions, and New Jersey States and imposed under the United than limitations restrictive the in any way shall be construed  Nothing in this Directive regulations. federal state statutes and and Constitutions, statutes, and under those established the or any rights beyond create any promises to of this Directive are The provisions State of New Jersey.
[brief] [...] reported that new configuration of the Seawall Project created a condition that would likely lead to increased flooding and wave overtopping.  In pertinent part, he opined that prior to construction, the Defendant’s seawall was configured with a gradual, curved return at its southern limit which served to a) gradually direct northerly-incident waves and associated water flow towards the south and off the Subject Property (acting as a ‘relief valve’), and b) protect the Subject Property’s northern “flank” against waves and associated water flow from southerly-incident waves.  (Da331).  [...] opined that the elimination of the curve by the project reduced the natural relief valve functionality.  [...] also rendered an opinion that new beach access configuration projects further east onto the beach than the adjoining seawalls, creating a “pocket” discontinuity in the seawall, and that this pocket would likely result in waves and water flow to be directed onto Defendant’s property.  He supported his report during his deposition, stating that the beach access point created a conduit for wave and current energy to travel up the revetment and onto Defendant’s property.  (Da475).  In his physical observations of the site, [...] addressed the elevation difference between the Defendant’s property’s seawall and the crest of the project and opined that the height difference further exposed the Defendant’s property to additional water flows and overtopping.
[brief] The issue is purely a legal question, which this Court is more than qualified to analyze.  In fact, all of the cases referenced by [...] on Page 20 of its Opposition Brief speak to the Court’s deference to [...] where the matter involves decisions as to a contractor’s qualifications.  In each, [...] disqualified a contractor in the prequalification phase because it felt the contractor did not have the requisite experience.  This is a fundamentally different analysis than the issues at hand and is wholly inapplicable.  [...] relies upon the legal arguments and case law cited within this Brief in support of this Court’s authority and qualifications to make its own determination of this legal question.
[brief] The defendant argues in its opposition that expert opinion is only required if evidence of a plaintiff’s prior medical history is offered on the issue of causation of his or her injuries and that evidence of a plaintiff’s prior medical history is admissible if offered as to the cause of an incident without an opinion from an expert establishing a relationship between the prior condition and the cause of the incident.  The plaintiff respectfully disagrees and submits that there is no difference in the need for expert opinion to establish causation of injuries due to a prior medical condition or causation of a fall due to a prior medical condition.
[brief] [...] had sinus surgery scheduled for September 2018.  (T4 172:11-13; Pa149).  He had two (2) prior sinus surgeries, in 2014 and 2016.  (T4 172:11-13; Pa152 – Pa154).  For the previous two (2) surgeries, he would bring a note into HR and be permitted to leave his residence without requesting permission.  (T4 172:11-177:8).  [...] had sinus surgery in September 2018 while still out on stress leave.  (T4 185:16-186:14).  In October 2018, [...] checked himself into rehab to wean off of opioids.  (T4 186:15-189:14).  He did so at that time because he was already on leave for stress and his sinus surgery.  (T4 189:15-189:17).  [...] confirmed that the Department never checked on [...] to determine if he was at his residence while he was on sick leave.  (T1 at 174:11-176:1).  [...] spent three (3) weeks at [...] rehab and completed the program.  (T4 189:17-20, 193:1-2).  **[...]**
[brief] As to alleged conduct occurring before June 24, 2020, the record reflects a litany of personal workplace disputes that amount to nothing more than employees complaining that their boss is mean to them.  (See Pa179; Pa185; Pa186; Pa191; Pa195; Pa241; Pa238-39; Pa243; Pa244; Pa286-92).  As the trial court appropriately recognized, “those events in and of themselves don’t give rise to – to criminal conduct as alleged her in this harassment. ” (See 1T 23:19-21).  [...] argues that the trial court failed to analyze [...]’s actions under the harassment statute. (See Pb28).  However, the trial court explicitly considered [...]’s contentions within the context of the harassment statute, noting:  And internal disputes within the workplace are not criminal harassment.  They are just that, just disagreements within the workplace, unhappiness with their supervisor, and this one isolated incident where Ms. [...] screams and yells at [...] is not a basis in my view of criminal harassment.  [1T 29:5-15.]  The court continued:  I find that the activities, the events that gave rise to [...]’s complaints in June of 2020 do not give rise and cannot objectively or subjectively on behalf of the plaintiffs give rise to a – a charge of criminal harassment.  It was just disagreements within the workplace, not very vice, uncomfortable disagreements, but certainly not giving rise to a criminal violation.  [1T 32:25-33:7 (emphasis added). ]  Second, the Trial Court did not unreasonably dismiss testimony from Plaintiffs as self-serving.
[brief] BY [...]:  Q  Did you ever indicate to [...] or anybody from his office that it’s impossible to slip on that floor?  A No. (3T90-3 to 6).  Clearly, the defense expert witness’ testimony was not quite “so scientific” as defense counsel had argued, nor could it only be rebutted by plaintiff through the use of her own expert witness.  By denying the plaintiff the opportunity to challenge the defense expert’s opinion through the use of the lay opinion of the defendant’s agent, [...], as demonstrated by her actions at the scene of plaintiff’s fall, the trial court effectively foreclosed the introduction of a critical element of the plaintiff’s case.  In cross examining the witness, the plaintiff intended to impeach his credibility and counter his opinion that the floor did not pose a safety hazard by questioning the witness as to conduct of the site manager, [...], following the plaintiff’s fall in mopping the puddles and placing the slip hazard sign, conduct that demonstrated the defendant’s belief that the floor was slippery and “in a defective condition” at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.
[brief] To wait until the Friday before a Monday trial to raise this theory was unfairly prejudicial – not only because Petitioner-Appellant lacked a meaningful opportunity to research and respond to the new claim, but also because he was deprived of the ability to consider whether an amendment to his own pleadings would be appropriate in light of this shifting litigation posture.  This was not a situation where the amendment conformed to newly discovered evidence revealed at trial.  The information had been available for weeks.  The prejudice to Petitioner-Appellant was not limited to the inability to prepare a targeted legal response to the overvote claim; rather, it affected his overall litigation strategy.  Election contests often turn on narrow margins, and parties make strategic choices based on the number and category of ballots in dispute.  Prior to [...]’s proposed amendment, Petitioner-Appellant had challenged two ballots, and Respondent had challenged six.  Based on those numbers, Petitioner-Appellant made calculated decisions, including forgoing challenges to other questionable ballots uncovered during discovery.  Had Respondent timely disclosed an intent to raise additional ballots, including an entirely new category, Petitioner-Appellant may well have taken a different approach in his Answer to the Cross-Petition.  Prejudice, in this context, is not confined to the late addition of a single issue, it reflects the shifting scope of the litigation on the eve of trial.  The trial court correctly recognized that the prejudice to Petitioner-Appellant outweighed any probative value of allowing the amendment and denied the motion.
[brief] ”).  The Third Circuit has stated that “[w]aiver will normally be found only where the demand for arbitration came long after the suit commenced and when both parties had engaged in extensive discovery. ”  Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Restoration Pres. Masonry Inc. v. Grove Eur. Ltd., 325 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2003) (waiver where, over four-year period, parties were involved in numerous depositions and pretrial conferences and trial was less than two months away); Com-Tech Assoc. v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 938 F.2d 1574, 1576-78 (2d Cir. 1991) (waiver where defendant actively participated in discovery and filed dispositive motions over course of eighteen months and trial was only three months away).
[brief] ”  L. 2018, c. 68, § 1.  Chapter 68 offers further sanctuary to [...] by mandating that “[a]ny balance remaining in the trust fund shall be reserved for use toward making [such] payments . . . in the event the employer payroll tax revenues collected in a year are insufficient to pay the full amount provided for under that paragraph. ”  Chapter 68 is thus specifically tailored to assist [...] in its efforts to raise its LFS as its adjustment aid is gradually reduced.
[brief] (1T 7-20 to 24)  [...] relied on vague and conclusory statements -- “I could see nervousness inside the vehicle, some type of deceptive behavior” -- to explain why he decided to turn the routine traffic --- 2  [...] explained at trial that he did not suspect [...] was intoxicated.  (4T 45-16 to 19) stop into “[m]ore of an investigation stop at that point” and summon a canine officer.
[brief] Ibid.  However, at her deposition, [...] failed to identify any DCPP employees that were involved in the alleged rumor mill at the Camden office, and she conceded that she did not complain about the alleged rumor mill to DCPP’s EEO office.  (Pa366 at T170:11-171:6, T172:3-7; Pa367 at T174:23-25; Pa369 at T178:16-T179:5; Da124).  The EEO Investigator, [...], issued a report on August 10, 2019 in connection with her investigation of [...]’s EEO complaint, and Deputy Commissioner, [...], Esq. authored a letter on the same date substantiating some of the conduct that [...] alleged against [...] that violated DCPP’s anti-sexual harassment policy.
[directive] [...] had backed into a parking space and there were parking blocks behind his car.  Another county detective parked a Jeep behind the Tahoe.  [...] and a second detective in the Tahoe exited the SUV with weapons drawn and shouted commands for [...] to put his hands up and exit the car.  Each detective was wearing a ballistic vest with police identifiers.  [...] was armed with his 9mm Glock 19 service pistol, and the detective with him had a rifle.  Despite repeated commands by the police to exit the car and to cease operating the car, and despite being blocked in, [...] began operating the car in an aggressive manner.  According to the officers who observed the incident, [...] drove forward and rammed the Tahoe, narrowly missing [...].  [...] then backed up into a grassy area, where his car had trouble moving due to a wooden parking block it had run over.  [...] tried to get the car to move forward, revving his engine in order to drive ahead.  The detectives were in front of the car with little space behind them because of the position of their police vehicles.  When the car gained traction and began to move forward directly toward [...], he fired several shots through the windshield, striking [...] multiple times in the torso.  [...] stated that he fired because he believed that [...] was going to hit him with the car.  [...] then shifted into reverse, accelerated hard, and crossed over the grassy area into the adjacent parking lot, moving the wooden parking blocks from their anchors.  He came to a stop in the adjacent parking lot and slumped over.  [...] was treated at the scene until an ambulance arrived to take him to [...] in Vineland, where he died that night.
[brief] (Pa91 at 30:3-6; Pa115 at 127:19-128:12; Pa368 at 108:16-18; Pa90 at 29:19-25).  [...] had no choice other than to accept the decision.  (Pa369 at 109:12-110:10).  The Trial Court recognized same: “it doesn’t really seem that it would make a lot of sense for her to be the – that [[...]] was happy about this discipline that these parties received, because she lost three-quarters of – or at least 60% of her employees. ” (See 1T 31:7-12).  The trial court therefore did not draw any inferences in favor of Defendants, but merely recognized that no evidence exists in this record that could lead a reasonable jury to rule in [...]’s favor.  [...] has failed to present any facts to support her position that there is a genuine dispute as to [...]’s alleged derailment of [...]’s investigation into her June 24, 2020 conduct.  Finally, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to [...]’s alleged selective application of its policies that could preclude summary judgment.
[brief] ”  For example, in *In re Phillips*, 117 N.J. 567 (1990), the respondent was subject to discipline under the police disciplinary statute broadly covering any “*misconduct*” - not specifically “*misconduct in office,*” the language which is at issue here.  The incident in *Phillips* easily connected to the respondent’s public position.  Respondent police chief, off duty and in the town where he was employed, caused a single car crash in an unmarked police car.  Officers from his department responded to investigate.  He was cited for driving while intoxicated and for consuming alcohol while armed in violation of police department rules and regulations.  In upholding the disciplinary action, the Court noted that a police officer is a “special kind of public employee” whose conduct and behavior would be strictly scrutinized.  *Phillips* at 576.  In *Karins v. Atlantic City*, 152 N.J. 532 (1998), a firefighter was subject to discipline under a local regulation applicable to “conduct unbecoming a firefighter” - not “misconduct in office. ”  This is a different standard from misconduct in office.  “Conduct unbecoming” has an expansive definition that does not apply to the statutory standard for removal of a sewerage authority commissioner.
[brief] ...........  H650a Holm-119: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-124 objected to providing hydraulic analyses of the system done as part of analysis and design of the Transmission Line (SOICR p. 12)  .........  H651a Holm-120: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-125 that there are no hydraulic analyses of the system done as part of the analysis and design of the Regulator Station (SOICR p. 12)  ..........  H652a Holm-123: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-126, objected to providing copies of reports and testimony in other proceedings without a court order (SOICR p. 12)  ...............  H653a Holm-124: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-127, that he did not consult any textbooks or literature to prepare his testimony (SOICR p. 12)  ........................................  H654a Holm-125: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-128, that he did not review any BPU orders or reports to prepare his testimony (SOICR p. 12)  ........................................  H655a Holm-126: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-129, that he is not an expert on regulator stations (SOICR p. 12) ...... H656a Holm-127: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-135, describing “stigma” in real estate valuation (SOICR p. 12)....... H657a Holm-128: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-136, that no facts or market evidence suggests the regulator can be a source of stigma (SOICR p. 12).......................... H658a Holm-129: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-137, that no facts or market evidence suggests a regulator can be a source of stigma (SOICR p. 12).......................... H659a Holm-130: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-138: objected that circumstances where off-site factors disclosed to purchasers is legal in nature and outside [...]’s area of expertise (SOICR p. 12) ........................................... H660a Holm-131: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-139, listed regulator stations inspected and indicated none are a source of stigma (SOICR p. 12).
[brief] Q.  Now, you've used the term "alarm."  Does that mean there's an alarm that goes off some place in a control room?  [[...]]  A.  There could be, yes.  Q.  When would it not be an alarm that would go off in a control room?  A.  I'm sorry?  I misunderstood your question.  Q.  Well, you said it could be.  I'm trying to find out when it wouldn't be.  A.  It would always alarm in the control room, yes.  In other words, [...] is not a stupid company that operates an unsafe system.  Q.  Thank you.  So if the pressure passes the set point, whatever it might be at that particular time of day, does this pressure change in information get communicated to the controller in real time?  A. Yes.  Q.  It does?  And the controller then has discretion, as you've described it, as to what to do, correct?  A.  Yes.  As they see the pressure change, they can – they have the discretion as to what the response would be based on their training.  Q.  Does the – when we use the term "controller," are we talking to an individual sitting at a control panel?  A.  Yes, we are.  Q.  Can you tell me where the control panel for this particular regulator station is physically located?  [Colloquy omitted.]
[brief] Pa194.  On November 25, 2022, Defendants opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for a protective order quashing the deposition of [...] and to enter satisfaction of the monetary judgment.  Pa208.  On December 16, 2022, the court denied Plaintiffs’ motion and granted the Defendants’ cross-motion in total.  Pa246, Pa249.  An Order to Satisfy as to the open judgment was entered on January 6, 2023.  On December 20, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant appeal.  An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on January 9, 2023.  Pa251.  The appeal seeks relief from the Orders dated August 29, 2022, November 10, 2022, and December 16, 2022.
[brief] To avoid caselaw that explicitly proscribes the imposition of parole conditions by a sentencing court, the State attempts to limit this Court’s ruling in *Beauchamp*, 262 N.J. Super. 532, to defendants who are not already under some form of parole supervision.  (Sb 21 to 22)  But that interpretation is belied by *Beauchamp*’s text and fails to contend with the fact that *Beauchamp* is, at its core, addressed to separation of powers principles.  The separation of powers is “a bedrock principle of our federal and state constitutional forms of government. ”  In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368, 378 (2006).  This distribution of powers between the three branches “is premised on the theory that government works best when each branch of government acts independently and within its designated sphere. ”  Ibid.  Beauchamp is a separation of powers case.
[brief] A.  No brief pursuant to R.4:50 (4 T p. 17 lines 17-19)  B.  Trying to vacate a motion that was never opposed (4T p. 17 lines 20-23)  C.  No standing (4T p.17 lines 23-24)  D.  Notwithstanding that [...] was unavailable [...] was per his certification 4T p. 18 lines 10-14  E.  The actions or lack of, in the opinion of Defendant’s counsel is either carelessness or lack of diligence and it does not rise to the level of excusable neglect per 4:50 referencing Guillaume (4T p. 18 lines 15-22)  F.  Defendant goes on to say we have no way to judge what truly exceptional circumstances might me that would justify reopening the matter pursuant to 4:50(f), the catchall (4T p. 19 lines 5-10)  G.  The pleading requests punitive damages which Defendant say is prejudicial (4T p. 19 lines 11-15)  [...] argues:
[brief] ”  25a-34a.  Here [...] cites the COVID Statute and incorrectly asserts that it became effective on June 29, 2020, and therefore does not apply to the time period in question; in fact, as discussed above, the COVID Statute was enacted on April 14, 2020, and was amended on June 29, 2020, to add language restating that the contractor is to apply the payment to the wages of affected employees.
[brief] 847-48a.  Somewhat incredibly, the resolution states that [...] had performed an “investigation” that had “revealed” that [...] had not provided any services to [...] during the period in which its schools were closed due to the COVID-19 emergency.  847a.  The resolution asserted that the payments that [...] had made to [...] for the May-June 2020 period were “illegal and pursuant to a breach of contract,” 847a, that any resolutions approving the payments were declared null and void and that its counsel was to pursue legal action against [...] to recover the payments made.  848a.  The resolution does not mention the COVID Statute.  Shortly afterward, [...] filed this action against [...] seeking return of the payments it made for the May-June 2020 period, as well as the unrelated $60,800 payment, apparently confusing it with the payments it made for that period.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2.  The Legislature recognized that public officers cannot and should not be expected to be without any personal interest in the decisions and policies of government.  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4.  The Legislature then went on to set forth what is and is not allowed in N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 and provided in relevant part as follows: