ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Petition of Monmouth Consol. Water Co.*, 47 N.J. 251 (1966), the New Jersey Supreme Court summarized the policies underlying the standard set forth in *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19* (again in the context of the predecessor statute) as follows:  In enacting this section the Legislature recognized that local municipal authorities are ill-equipped to comprehend adequately the needs of the actual and potential users of the utility's services beyond as well as within their territorial limits.  The lawmakers knew that if the zoning power of a municipality were paramount, it would probably be exercised with an eye toward the local situation and without consideration for the best interests of the consumers at large in other communities whose convenience and necessity require service.  The exemption [from local zoning regulation] also signifies an awareness that if the local authorities were supreme the [...] could not compel a utility to provide adequate service if the zoning ordinance conflicted with the need for expansion or extension of its facilities within the municipality.
[brief] Consistent with industry practice and its ordinary capital spending planning cycle, [...] engages continuously in the construction, operation and maintenance of its public utility infrastructure, including the property, plant, facilities and equipment that comprise the natural gas distribution and transmission system utilized to serve the approximately 523,000 customers throughout the [...] service territory.  This effort includes the replacement, reinforcement and expansion of the Company’s infrastructure, (i.e., its property, plant, facilities and equipment) to maintain the reliability of its distribution and transmission system and to ensure the continuation of safe, adequate and proper service.  with N.J.A.C. 14:7 and the Federal Regulations for the Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline, Part 192, Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
[brief] Id. at 451.  In its opinion, the Court also "ask[ed] the Legislature to consider enacting a scheme that provides for later review of juvenile sentences with lengthy periods of parole ineligibility."  Id. at 453.  Later, in Comer, the Court considered the constitutionality of the mandatory thirty-year parole bar for murder, "as applied to juveniles."  249 N.J. at 369.  To "save the statute from constitutionality infirmity," the Court ruled that it will "permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentences after they have served two decades in prison."
[directive] The same rationale holds for documents such as an "Operator's Certificate" and "replica" certificates which are self authenticating documents.  State v. Cardone, 146 N.J. Super. at 28-29.  N.J.R.E. §902.  Consequently, information contained on those documents, such as the name and serial number of the chemical breath test instrument, its location, the results of the tests performed, including the identification of the breath test ampoules used in the testing, become part of the record.  Attorney General Guideline: Page 9  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations (4)  Operator used the instrument in accordance with his/her training  This element of the foundational criteria is ordinarily fulfilled through the testimony of the Breath Test Operator that he/she followed the steps on the Alcohol Influence Report Check List for tests administered on a photometric breath test instrument, or in the case of the Alcotest 7110 MK III-C, the Operator testifies that he/she followed all of the steps to administer a chemical breath test on that instrument and authenticates the Alcohol Influence Report for that defendant’s tests.  DWI
[brief] On May 8, 2014, the court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, finding that a $900,000 transfer by Decedent in 2001 constituted an investment in [...], thus establishing jurisdiction in New Jersey for the appointment of an administrator to search for the $10 million in alleged transfers and to search for alleged malfeasance in the operation of [...].  (Da11).  Although Plaintiff had alleged in his Complaint that Decedent (and, therefore, the Estate) held an interest in [...], the trial court in its May 8, 2014 summary judgment opinion held that Plaintiff had failed to establish that Decedent held an interest in [...].  (Da 14-27, at Da 24).  The court recognized that [...] was a subsidiary of [...]; it was not owned by the Decedent individually.  Accordingly, [...] was expressly determined to be outside the scope of this limited administration proceeding.  Plaintiff did not appeal this determination.
[brief] Pa0194.  Conversely, the trial court assessed Plaintiff’s truthfulness to be less than credible.  Pa0194.  Of particular note was the Judge’s impression of [...], whom the Judge noted “could not point out any article in the PSA which supported his version of the facts” (Pa0216); admitted that his second LLC was not named “[...]” when he executed the PSA on this entity’s behalf (Pa0217), that Alessi was “throughout his testimony…often evasive and argumentative …[f]requently attempted to avoid unfavorable questions posed to him”, (Pa0218) and became argumentative with Defendants’ Counsel on several occasions during his questioning.  Pa0218.  The Judge further noted that “during some of these instance, [...] did not directly answer the question posed and instead opted to begin narrating his own views of the case, the parties, and what was in the best interest of the community. ”  Pa0218.  The court ended its analysis of Alessi’s credibility by noting that “a few of [...]’s statements were also contradicted by the available evidence and his own subsequent testimony. ”  The Judge found Alessi “somewhat less credible than the other witnesses. ”  Pa0218.  Following summations, the court filed a thorough and extensive decision with specific findings of fact as to contract interpretation, credibility and intent.
[brief] If the defendant establishes a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the termination the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reasons advanced by the defendant are a pretext for discrimination.  Id.  By contrast, circumstantial evidence typically includes statements such as 'statements by non-decisionmakers, statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the contested employment decision, and other stray remarks.  Okakpu v. Irvington Bd. of Educ., No. A- 1967-20 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Jul 18, 2022) (slip op. at 10).  Meanwhile, in *Lehmann*, the Supreme Court articulated a framework of the elements that must be demonstrated by a plaintiff claiming a violation of the LAD based on hostile work environment.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reverse the October 6, 2023 Order, which denied Plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial.  At a minimum, the March 11, 2024, Order granting Defendant’s fee application in the amount of $119,256.40 should be reversed or modified to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
[brief] N.J. R. Evid. 701.  “A nonexpert may give his opinion on matters of common knowledge and observation. ”  Murphy v. Trapani, 255 N.J. Super. 65, 74 (App. Div. 1992).  “N.J.R.E. 701 permits lay witness testimony regarding common knowledge based on observable perceptions. ”  In re Trust Created By Agreement  Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 283 (2008).  Defendant [...]’s emphasis on the trial court’s ruling that types of paint are beyond the ken of an average juror (8th Street Brief at pp. 8-12), is as mistaken as the ruling.
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], P.J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  Of Counsel: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 043412006  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 012602008  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Scott M. Clark [...] [...]  [...] Date Submitted: May 6, 2024
[brief] The complaint alleges that the Respondents engaged in a nearly year-long campaign to deceive and misdirect the voting public regarding a $33 million 2021 public referendum involving school facilities ("Referendum") in [...], [...], and [...].  The complaint details dozens of situations where Board members have acted unethically to promote the Referendum, attempted to hide negative material regarding the Referendum from the public, and tried dissuade other public officials from weighing in against the Referendum.  The Referendum was highly controversial in that it proposed gut-renovating [...] ("[...]"), a school with numerous physical challenges, including but not limited to exceedingly small lot size and being within a FEMA flood zone.  These defects in the plan and others were hidden from the voting public, and in the end the Referendum ultimately passed by only 2 votes, which was possible only due to the extreme electioneering and disinformation campaign put forth by individual Board members.  The foundation of the School Ethics Code is the concept that School Boards in NJ hold tremendous power as elected officials, and as elected officials they must avoid ethical violations that could erode the public’s trust, or the perception of such violations.  The individual members of the [...] breached that trust when they decided to deceive the voting public about all of the facts behind the referendum, and to spend tens of thousands of dollars of tax payer money to get out a “yes” vote.  The Commission appears to have ignored these facts in its decision to dismiss.
[brief] (T8-12 to 18; 9-1 to 5; 11-2 to 6).  Moreover, the trial judge clearly found [...]’s testimony credible when the detective explained that “that the purpose of the pause [clearly visible on the body cam footage] in between several attempts . . . to forcibly enter the apartment was so an officer could again state ‘police, search warrant. ’” (Da19-20) (emphasis added).  Based on the detective’s credible testimony, the trial court found – as a fact – that police did knock and announce their presence before gaining entry into defendant’s apartment and complied with the terms of the search warrant.
[brief] ”  Baum, 224 N.J. at 161 (quoting Galloway, 133 N.J. at 643).  Following its own recitation in Galloway, the Court also cited to N.J.R.E. 702 – the rule of evidence dealing with expert testimony.  Notably, the rule of evidence the Court in Baum did not cite to was N.J.R.E. 701 – the rule of evidence dealing with lay person testimony.
[brief] [...]  (“[...]”) commenced employment with the [...] (“[...]”) as of January 1, 1998 as the Municipal Public Defender.  (See Transcript Page 9, Lines 24).  [...] was required to participate in the PERS system as a condition of employment.  (See Transcript Page 10, Lines 4-7).  At all times from inception of employment in 1998 as the Public Defender until present (May, 2023) the [...] did pay and has paid [...] on a W-2 as Salary.(See Transcript Pages 14-16)There were two years of service in 2000 and 2001 where the [...] hired [...] as Prosecutor.  During that time, [...] was also paid regular wages on a W-2.  (Pa 119-129)  All Wages have been paid bi-weekly at all times since 1998 and continuing through present.  (Pa 119-129)  The [...] has never paid [...] on a 1099 with any “contract payments. ”  [...]’s pension was terminated in 2012 without knowledge or notice to [...].
[brief] In the case of this litigation, a complaint was filed with the Zoning Officer concerning a substantial violation of a zoning board resolution.  In response, the Zoning Officer – by her own admission – decided to disregard the conditions being violated, and then conducted a sham investigation to appear to comply with the requirements of the Hoboken Municipal Code.  To clarify, Appellant contends that “sham” is not at all an overly strong term for what transpired.
[brief] REMEDIAL MEASURES BY DEFENDANT  Plaintiff, in her case in chief, was prepared to offer uncontroverted evidence that only moments after she had fallen, the Defendant’s agent, the on-sight manager of the facility, [...], mopped the floor where she had fallen and placed a bright yellow warning sign of the slip hazard.  The Defendant, by omission, misstates Evid. R. 407, which, in its entirety reads:  Evidence of remedial measures taken after an event is not admissible to prove that the event was caused by negligence or culpable conduct.  However, evidence of such subsequent remedial conduct may be admitted as to other issues.  (emphasis added).  Defendant’s reliance on Dixon v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 270 N.J. Super. 569, 587, 637 A.2d 915 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 136 N.J. 295, 642 A.2d 1004 (1994), is misplaced.  While this case discusses the general social policy reasons to exclude remedial measures as evidence of negligence or culpable conduct, it is wholly inapplicable to the issues in the case at bar.  There is well-established case law providing for the permissible exceptions to the Rule’s initial prohibition for admitting such evidence.
[directive] The information listed above will allow for easier tracking and reviewing of gun permit applications and appeals statewide.  Counties may also track additional data.  Timeframe for Hearing Appeals  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(e) anticipates that the Superior Court will hold a hearing on an appeal from law enforcement’s denial of an identification card, a purchase permit, or a carry permit within 60 days of the applicant’s written request for such a hearing.  The hearing on an appeal from the denial of a carry permit for a retired law enforcement officer must be held within 30 days of request pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(l)(5).
[brief] *Elders*, 192 N.J. at 244-45.  Indeed, the trial court acknowledged that defendant continued to talk and make unsolicited incriminating statements throughout the entire process despite being told by [...] not to talk about the case.  (3T:19-23 to 20-9).  However, the trial court failed to consider that defendant requested to make the calls to inform his mother who resides in Maine that he was in custody and will be transported to the county jail.  (1T:68-8 to 69-2).  Defendant specifically stated the purpose for the call, and although he had made many voluntary incriminating statements, [...] could not have predicted that defendant would have used the phone calls for reasons other than what he requested.  Therefore, [...] cannot be held accountable for defendant’s voluntary incriminating statements during the phone calls.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS..........................................................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW.......................................................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT...............................................................................................................8  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE STATE POLICE RETIREMENT  BOARD WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) ..............................................................................................................8  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) .............................................................................................................15  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................18
[brief] Leodori Servs. Grp. v. CIGNA, 175 NJ 293, 303 (2003).  The execution on the iPad did not present a clear expression of an explicit and voluntary agreement to forego the court system.  Atalese v. US Legal, 219 NJ 430, 447 (2014).  For a party to be bound by a contract for failure to read its terms, he must know or it must be readily apparent that he or she is executing a contract and must affirmatively choose not to read it.  This is not what happened.  [...] relied upon 3 unpublished opinions from two U.S. District Courts to support its contention that a customer is bound by documents he never saw or received once the customer signed an iPad.
[brief] 30  1.  Plaintiff’s Parol Evidence Argument is Irrelevant as Plaintiff Elicited Extrinsic Evidence in its Case in Chief ................. 30  2.  No Legal Error was Committed by allowing Extrinsic Evidence in the Within Contract Case .............................................. 31  3.  Plaintiff’s Reference and Argument Related to the RIR is Moot .........................................................  35  C.  THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S CLAIM OF A VIOLATION OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (Count 3 of Plaintiff’s Complaint-Pa0001) .......................
[brief] As to Defendant [...], Plaintiff alleges that: (1) [...] negligently, carelessly, and/or recklessly injured [...] (Da98-9); (2) in the alternative, [...] intentionally, willfully and wantonly injured [...] (Da99- 100); and/or (3) that [...] engaged in racially motivated attack (Da101-2).  Similar claims are asserted against co-defendants [...] (Da102-6), [...] (Da106-110), and [...] (Da110-4).  Plaintiff has also asserted claims against Defendants Richard and [...], Ray [...] and Nicholas and [...] for negligently providing, serving and/or allowing underaged persons to consume alcohol and/or for negligent supervision.
[brief] Speaking of the c(2) variance, the New Jersey Supreme Court held:  >  By definition, then, no c(2) variance should be granted when merely the purposes of the owner will be advanced.  The grant of approval must actually benefit the community in that it represents a better zoning alternative for the property.  The focus of a c(2) case, then, will be not on the characteristics of the land that, in light of current zoning requirements, create a "hardship" on the owner warranting a *relaxation* of standards, but on the characteristics of the land that present an opportunity for *improved* zoning and planning that will benefit the community.
[brief] ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.* supra at 540.  The Here, the Trial Court proceeded to weigh the evidence rather than assessing the pleadings to determine if there were material issues in dispute.  In many instances throughout the decision, the Trial Court ignored the Appellant’s position and appeared to adopt the position of the Respondents.  In this case, in addressing each cause of action, the Court discussed it from the Respondent’s position and then spent significant time discounting the Appellant’s position which was discussed in a limited way.  The weighing of the evidence was done as to each cause of action and was discussed based on what the Respondents, the movants’ position was.
[directive] DIRECTIVE No. 2002-2--Memo and Form -- "Search Warrant Application Form" -- August 23, 2002  pdf 3 of 5 8/4/25, 11:35 AM  Division of Criminal Justice Home  https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide.htm#use  Sexual Assault Plea 5/29/14 - AG's Uniform Plea Negotiation Guidelines to Implement the Jessica • Negotiations Lunsford Act, P.L. 2014, c. 7 (Assembly Bill No. 892)
[brief] According to Rule 4:23-5(c):  (c)  Motion to Compel.  Prior to moving to dismiss pursuant to subparagraph (a)(1) of this rule, a party may move for an order compelling discovery demanded pursuant to R. 4:14, R. 4:18 or R. 4:19.  An order granting a motion to compel shall specify the date by which compliance is required.  If the delinquent party fails to comply by said date, the aggrieved party may apply for dismissal or suppression pursuant to subparagraph (a)(1) of this rule by promptly filing a motion to which the order to compel shall be annexed, supported by a certification asserting the delinquent party's failure to comply therewith.
[brief] If [...] is permitted to take the Property, there will be no housing developed -- the ultimate irreparable harm to the protected class -- thereby neutering 50 years of Mount Laurel precedent.  Although the trial court partially focused on what appeared to be monetary related harm (ability of Plaintiff to obtain lender financing), the court recognized that the bigger issue was “the potential for being able to move forward with development of a project. ” (1T53:3-5).  The trial court rightfully recognized that, under the Mount Laurel doctrine, Plaintiff has a “special place, because you are the representative of individuals” and Plaintiff “is saying I can build housing… there that includes housing for people who are in need of affordable units, and that puts the builder in a special position. ” (1T:14-23).  It is the protected class in need of affordable housing who will suffer harm if [...] is allowed to leave open even the possibility of condemnation.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  An animating principle of the Tax Sale Law (TSL) is that final judgments should be held, rather than liberally vacated.  This permits the foreclosing plaintiff to obtain marketable title.  The relevant statute, N.J.S.A. 54:5-85, reads that the TSL “shall be liberally construed . . . to encourage the barring of the right of redemption by actions in the Superior Court to the end that marketable titles may thereby be secured. ”  Through this statute, the Legislature has plainly stated its intention that lienholders who obtain valid final judgments have those judgments protected so that they can convey marketable title.  See, e.g., Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 1508, Lot 12, 380 N.J. Super. 159, 162 (App. Div. 2005) (observing that "protecting the marketability of titles" is "the underlying purpose and rationale of the Tax Sale Law[.]"); Malone v. Midlantic Bank, N.A., 334 N.J. Super. 238, 250 (Ch. Div. 1999) ("it must be remembered that the express policy of the Tax Sale Act is that it be liberally constructed so as to bar the right of redemption, not preserve it, the goal being that marketable titles to property be secured."); Cherokee Equities, LLC v. Garaventa, 382 N.J. Super. 201, 206 (Ch. Div. 2005) ("Protecting the marketability of tax titles enables municipalities to maximize the recovery of unpaid property taxes and return property to the tax rolls.").  By denying Defendants' efforts to undo the final judgment in this matter, the lower court furthered the policy of N.J.S.A. 54:5-85.  The marketability of Plaintiff's title was protected, as was [...]'s as bona fide purchaser.  If lienholders and those who acquire foreclosed properties from them cannot emerge from a lawfully-conducted foreclosure with the assurance that their ownership will not be undone for patently insubstantial reasons, lienholders will be less inclined to buy liens in the first place, the market for tax-foreclosed properties will evaporate, and the remedial purpose of the TSL will not be served.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (5T:23-14 to 21)  However, concerning [...]’s statement of remorse, the court found that “the defendant does not truly appreciate his full culpability,” noting that “he never mentioned the victim’s name in his statement of remorse” and that [...] never acknowledged “that the order caused the gunshot that caused the death. ”  (5T:22-15 to 23-4)  The court only reduced [...]’s aggregate sentence for the homicide, resentencing him to a term of 30 years with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility, subject to a five-year period of NERA parole supervision.
[brief] The record made it clear that prong 2 was satisfied for proving discrimination based on race.  Clearly, there was no issue with job performance so that adverse treatment and termination was likely because of race.  The Trial Court failed to consider the record presented by Appellant and reached the wrong conclusion by relying on the Defendants’ perspective.  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.  It is also requested that upon return to the trial court that the matter should be reassigned to another judge for completion.  A request is further made that the Appellate Court consider transferring this matter to another County on return to the Trial Court.