ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Angermeier v. Sea Girt, 27 N.J. 298, 306-309 (1958).  However, the Supreme Court expressed the need for a “comprehensive plan” to guide zoning in Olivia v. Garfield, 1 N.J. 184, 191 (1948):  Zoning regulations must be in accordance with a comprehensive plan to achieve specified purposes generally relating to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community and with reasonable consideration of the character of each district, its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view of conserving the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the community.  That “comprehensive plan” was defined as “an integrated product of a rational process revealing a physical partition of the Municipality reasonably designed to produce a homogeneous pattern of location and uniform development of variant land uses”, *Ward v. Scott*, 28 N. J. 529, 536 (1959); also *Kozesnick v. Montgomery*, 24 N.J. 154, 166-167 (1957).  At that time, the Court found that the “comprehensive plan” could be found in the zoning regulations themselves.
[brief] B.  Defendant’s Denial of the Height Variance is Not Supported by Substantial Credible Evidence in the Record.  In a further attempt to justify the denial, the Resolution contains several misleading and/or factually unsupported findings of fact and conclusions.  The Court owes no deference to these findings and conclusions of law, as a board’s findings must be rooted in “substantiated proofs rather than unsupported allegations. ”  Cell South, 172 N.J. at 88 (emphasis added).
[brief] Indeed, given that [...]'s testimony compromised the core of the State's case, his additional statements - perhaps --- 3 [...] testified concerning video recordings at the [...] and the reasons they are to be recorded because:  In jails "everything is recorded for a defendant's safety, so that accusations aren't made to say that we did something to somebody.  Also, during an interview to know exactly what was said and how it was done so I don't get accused of violating somebody's rights or they don't get accused of saying something that they didn't say, And video interviews are required accordingly to the Attorney General's guidelines.  (7T V.II 272-273-11 to 3) exculpating defendant and/or for impeachment purpose - might well have resulted in his acquittal.  Therefore, because [...]'s failure to fully investigate [...]'s January 12th, 2012, 11:50am statement (Da 24) and his January 16th, 2012, 4:30pm statement constitutes a (Da 26) a prime facie case of ineffective assistance pursuant to Strickland's two-prong test and/or Cronic/Davis per se analyses, this matter should be remanded to the Court to explore defendant's claim.  State v. Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 464.  POINT III
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 27  6.2.6  Each agency should establish its own protocol for reviewing and purging performance notices and oral reprimands from an employee's personnel file.  Written reprimands should remain permanently in the employee's personnel file.  6.2.7  A letter shall be sent to the complainant explaining the outcome of the investigation.  If the allegation was unfounded or the officer was exonerated, this conclusion shall be stated and defined for the civilian complainant.  If the allegation was not sustained, the letter shall provide the complainant with a brief explanation why the complaint was not sustained (e.g., insufficient proof, lack of witnesses, etc.).
[brief] [...]  Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor  Attorney ID No. 904882012 cc: [...], Esq.  Via E-Courts and Federal Express  The Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625  RE: State of NJ, Plaintiff/Respondent v. Roger E.  Mejia  A/K/A/[...], Defendant/Appellant  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from the Trial Court’s Order of June 4, 2024  Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress  Criminal Division  Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Dear Your Honors:
[brief] POINT II  THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE STATE HAS ALLOWED DEFICIENCIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION REQUIRING REMEDIATION TO EMERGE IN SFRA’S IMPLEMENTATION IN JERSEY CITY (Raised Below: 1T:8-13 to IT:20-5; IT:34-19 to IT:46-15; Pa24-Pa28; Pa32-Pa33)  In the record below, [...] made a *prima facie* showing of serious problems and defects in the State’s implementation of the SFRA formula in the years following its enactment.  That evidence included the significant and recurring underfunding of [...]’s Adequacy Budget, the “core” of SFRA’s formula, *Abbott XX*, 199 N.J. at 153; the failure to rigorously review and analyze the elements of the formula’s operation relevant and meaningful to the shortfalls in the Adequacy Budget, including the LFS calculation; the restrictions on the local levy, reductions in state formula aid and other contributing factors to the Adequacy Budget shortfalls; and the impact of those shortfalls on the availability of essential education resources the SFRA was designed to deliver to remediate the ongoing Abbott violation of T&E endured by generations of [...] students.  The court below did not evaluate these deficits and deficiencies in SFRA’s operation in [...] because it simply ignored *Abbott XX*’s express mandates to ensure the formula’s continuing constitutionality.  Consequently, the court did not determine the core question identified in Abbott XX, namely, whether operational deficiencies have emerged in [...] that are “of a constitutional dimension” and, consequently, require judicial branch remediation.  This failure is inexplicable given that the Supreme Court put the State on clear and firm notice of judicial intervention if it did not maintain the SFRA formula’s optimal operation in [...] in future years:  There should be no doubt that we would require remediation of any deficiencies of a constitutional dimension, if such problems do emerge.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146 (emphasis added); Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 360 (finding that, where the State is in breach of its “ongoing responsibilities and obligations” under Abbott XX, students have “every right to relief…based on the State’s failure to fully fund the SFRA in Abbott districts”).  When confronted with compelling evidence of the State’s non-compliance with its obligation to remedy the T&E violation in Abbott districts, the Supreme Court has eschewed reliance on a factual record comprised only of affidavits and submissions by the parties.  Because the rights of Abbott plaintiff students to funding for “a constitutionally adequate education” is at stake, the Court has required “the development of an evidential record” as a prerequisite for judicial evaluation of State compliance with Abbott funding remedies.  Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 565-66; and see Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 356-57 (remanding to develop “additional information" to facilitate the Court’s determination of the continuing constitutionality of an underfunded SFRA in Abbott districts).
[brief] In 2015, the Board affirmed the PFAU’s decision and determined that because [...] was hired under a professional services contract in [...] from 2009 through 2014, she was ineligible for PERS participation and service credit.  (Pa157; Ra18-19).  [...] appealed and, in 2017, the Appellate Division held that [...] was hired through a professional services contract in [...], and was therefore ineligible to participate in PERS at [...] from 2009 through 2014.  (Pa171-72).  In its decision, the court stated:  We reject the suggestion the municipality [[...]] believed [...] was its employee; we do not agree that the title to an earlier contract, labeled “Employment --- 3  The court also determined that [...] was hired through a professional services contract in [...], [...], and [...], and was also ineligible to participate in PERS at those locations.  (Pa172-74).  Agreement” is controlling; nor is payment of the annual contract salary through payroll dispositive.
[brief] The “opportunity” to select to enter the program was not conditioned upon any additional requirements, other than acceptance into the [...].  Plaintiff testified that he understood this program, based upon its plain language, to mean that all students who were able to qualify to complete the doctorate program would also be able to complete the master’s program.  (Pa157-Pa158).  Plaintiff contacted the [...] to confirm his understanding of their advertisement, and attended open house meetings at FDU wherein his understanding of the plain language was confirmed.  (Pa157-Pa158).  The [...] Dean, [...], responded via email, that Plaintiff’s minor in Chemistry was a sufficient background for the master’s portion of the dual degree program, and did not identify any other program requirements.  (Pa437).
[brief] This appeal is based upon Plaintiff’s counsel’s subjective dissatisfaction with the trial court’s award of reasonable attorney’s fees in this matter.  Importantly, the determination of reasonable attorney’s fees was not made after a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and did not come after any protracted litigation.  Instead, this fee motion was made in the context of a settlement agreement that Plaintiff agreed to.  Moreover, the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be paid to Plaintiff under the settlement was put to the trial court because informal negotiations proved unsuccessful, given Plaintiff’s counsel’s belief that the unnecessary overlitigation of this simple action should result in recovery of every penny he put into the file.  Upon consideration of the motion, the trial court ultimately disagreed with Plaintiff’s counsel as to the reasonableness of fees incurred in this matter.  The trial court exercised its discretion (afforded to it under the law and the parties’ settlement agreement) and entered its decision awarding reasonable fees and costs to Plaintiff.  Rather than accepting the trial court’s decision, and even though Plaintiff agreed to have the issue decided by the trial court, Plaintiff now attempts (albeit unsuccessfully) to convince this Court that the trial court reached the wrong result.  Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s subjective disagreement with the trial court’s conclusion, Plaintiff has fallen well short of demonstrating that the trial court committed a “clear abuse of discretion” warranting reversal.
[brief] Each of the Policies provides:  **APPLICATION**  By acceptance of this Policy, all **Insureds** affirm or reaffirm as of the Inception Date of this Policy that: 1. the statements in the **Application** are true and accurate and are specifically incorporated herein, and are all **Insureds’** agreements, personal representations and warranties; 2. all such communicated information shall be deemed material to the **Insurer’s** issuance of this Policy; 3. this Policy is issued in reliance upon the truth and accuracy of such representations; 4. this Policy embodies all agreements existing between the **Insureds** and the **Insurer**, or any of its agents, relating to this insurance; and 5. if any representation is false or misleading, this Policy shall be void from the inception.
[brief] [...] offers the following combined procedural history and statement of material facts with references to its Appendix (“Aa___”).  The [...] property (“the Property”) consists of twenty-four (24) ¹  The facts and procedural history are closely intertwined, and they are combined here for the sake of clarity.  townhomes surrounding a boat basin on the north branch of Beaver Dam Creek in Point Pleasant Borough, Ocean County.  Aa0053.  The Property is developed with three two-story buildings, a swimming pool, walkways, driveways, parking lots, landscaping and associated site improvements.  The upland improvements surround a boat basin that was constructed prior to construction of the townhomes and prior to the enactment of the Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 et seq. in 1973.  On July 14, 2020, [...] applied for a Waterfront Development Permit authorizing the reconstruction of approximately 750 feet of badly deteriorated and failing bulkhead.  The application sought approval for construction of a replacement bulkhead 24 inches waterward of the existing bulkhead, as allowed by NJDEP regulations.  See N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11(d).²  [...]’s application also requested permission to reconstruct another 126 feet of bulkhead in the same footprint as the existing bulkhead, and sought after-the-fact authorization for and replacement of a number of small finger piers and mooring piles in their current locations within the boat basin.³  Between October 5 and November 10, 2020, [...]’s consultant and --- ² The 24-inch shifting of the bulkhead was proposed specifically to conform to the wording of the Rule, which explains that the reconstruction of a bulkhead does not qualify as “new construction” as long as the replacement bulkhead is located no more than 24 inches outshore of the existing bulkhead.  See N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11(d).  ³  The Waterfront Development Law, N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 et seq., requires a permit from NJDEP for all plans and activities that result in the development of any waterfront upon any navigable water or stream of the State.  See N.J.S.A. 12:5-3.  NJDEP staff exchanged numerous emails concerning whether, and in what manner, public access to the shoreline on and across the Property might be required as a condition of the Waterfront Development Permit by what was then the newly enacted Public Access Law.  The correspondence expressed competing opinions about what was required by the Public Access Law, and included proposals and counter-proposals for onsite and off-site access.  By letter dated October 5, 2020, [...]’s agent detailed why, from [...]'s perspective, public access across the Property is not required under the Public Access Law.
[brief] The Commissioner’s conclusion that [...] violated the Act should be affirmed because it is reasonable, consistent with the law, and wholly supported by the record.  Appellate courts generally accord a deferential standard of review to administrative decisions.  In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443 (App.  Div. 2006).  As such, it is well settled that the scope of appellate review of a final agency decision is limited.  Aqua Beach Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 186 N.J. 5, 15-16 (2006).  The court’s “function is to determine whether the administrative action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  E.S. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 412 N.J. Super. 340, 348 (App. Div. 2010) (citations and quotations omitted).
[brief] In any event, it is the Trial Cout’s view of the exception as “swallowing” the mold exclusion, rather than [...]’s view, that is erroneous.  The exclusion bars coverage for the “ingestion” of mold, an undefined term.  Yet, the exception expressly applies to provide coverage for all loss or damage arising from any mold that is “on food. ”  The plain wording of the exception states that the mold exclusion simply “does not apply” if the exception applies.  In other words, if the loss or damage arises from mold “on food,” the mold exclusion drops out of the policy.
[brief] **Plaintiff’s Experts Fail to Offer Independent—Much Less, Reliable—Opinions that the Ozurdex® Unit at Issue Had a Defect.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]**  All of Plaintiff’s experts’ causation opinions *assume* the subject Ozurdex® unit was defective.  That assumption is not based on an accepted and reliable methodology, or any facts and data.  Instead, Plaintiff’s experts infer the unit must have had a defect because it came from a recalled lot and she had not suffered injuries after injections of Ozurdex® from non-recalled lots.  But such a ‘this-time-is-different’ methodology is neither reliable nor generally accepted.  It is nothing more than inferring defect based on fact of injury and temporal proximity, which New Jersey law rejects.  *Myrlak*, 157 N.J. at 98 (“The mere occurrence of an accident and the mere fact that someone was injured are not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a defect. ”); *Zaza*, 144 N.J. at 49 (“An inference of defectiveness may not be drawn from the mere fact that someone was injured. ”); *Lauder v. Teaneck Volunteer Ambulance Corps.*, 386 N.J. Super. 320, 332 (App. Div. 2004) (“[T]he fact that someone was injured [is] not sufficient to demonstrate a defect. ”); *Nicholson v. Bloomin Brands, Inc.*, 2018 WL 3614355, at *5-6 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 30, 2018) (affirming that temporal association between product exposure and injury is insufficient to survive summary judgment).  The fact that Plaintiff alleges injury in temporal association with use of Ozurdex® from a recalled lot does not excuse her failure to meet her burden of proof.  Because Plaintiff cannot cite anything—no treatise or peer-reviewed publication—demonstrating that her experts’ ‘this-time-is-different’ testimony is a reliable and accepted method to establish a manufacturing defect, it amounts to an inadmissible ‘net opinion’ insufficient for Plaintiff to meet her burden to prove product defect.
[brief] 38  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I OF I PLEADINGS  [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(A)]  Class Action Complaint, filed May 23, 2021 ...........................................  Pa1  Exhibit A .................................................................................................  Pa9  JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(C)]  Order being Appealed, filed April 26, 2023 ..............................................Pa11  NOTICE OF APPEAL  [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(F)]  Notice of Appeal, filed June 8, 2023.........................................................Pa12  Amended Notice of Appeal, filed July 3, 2023 ..........................................Pa16  TRANSCRIPT  DELIVERY CERTIFICATION  [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(G)]  None.  Transcript of April 26, 2023  Court Decision filed in this Court on August 24, 2023  UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS CITED BELOW  [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(H)]  Decisions cited below by Plaintiff: Ali v. Credit Corp. Sols., Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59126, 2022 WL 986166 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022)  .......Pa20  Decisions cited below by Defendant: Opinion and Order, Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Capital Services, LLC, et al., Dkt. No. [...] (Mar. 8, 2023) .........................................................................................Pa25 Opinion, Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Dkt. No. [...] (Jan. 6, 2023) ..................................................Pa34  Transcript of Argument and Decision, Mhrez v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC, Dkt. No. [...] (Dec. 16, 2022) .....................................................................................Pa47  Order and Statement of Reasons, *Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, Dkt. No. [...] (Aug. 11, 2022) .............Pa56 Transcript of Argument and Decision, *Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc.*, Dkt. No. [...] .......................Pa81 **OTHER PARTS OF THE RECORD [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I)]** Notice of Filing Notice of Removal, filed June 24, 2021 ....................Pa89 Notice of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, filed September 20, 2022 .................................................................Pa91 Exhibit B to the Certification of Counsel filed in support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss ........................................Pa93
[brief] Indeed, the Superior Court found that “[a]ll causes of action arise from the Defendants’ act of capping Plaintiffs’ terminal leave pursuant to the MSRA in an effort to stabilize the City’s finances. ” (Pa001030).  Relevant here, the MSRA specifically grants Defendants with the authority to: [T]ake any steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery, including, but not limited to: ***  (f) amending or terminating any existing contracts or agreements, which shall not include bonds, notes, indentures, or other similar financing instruments and documents to which the municipality is a party, in accordance with the terms thereof; or unilaterally amending or terminating any contracts or agreements which shall not include bonds, notes, indentures, or other similar financing instruments and documents to which the municipality is a party, provided that the director determines that the unilateral termination or amendment is reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (g) unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating any collective negotiations agreements, except those related to school districts, to which the municipality is a party, or unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating the terms and conditions of employment during the term of any applicable collective negotiations agreement, or both, provided that the director determines that the modifications, amendments, or terminations are reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; *** (i) with respect to any expired collective negotiations agreement to which the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery is a party, unilaterally modifying wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment.  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5a(3).  In dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Superior Court considered the statutory language and found that:  The Legislature instructed the courts to liberally construe the MSRA “to give effect to its intent that severe fiscal distress in municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery shall be addressed and corrected. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-13. (Pa001028).  The Superior Court further held:  This Court finds the Legislature clearly granted the State broad authority, and intended the MSRA to supersede any collective bargaining agreement or CNA.  Furthermore, the Court finds the Legislature also instructed the courts to construe the MSRA liberally in light of the State’s interest in addressing the City’s severe fiscal distress.  The Defendants can cap the terminal as they did here.
[brief] ...............................................................................................32  Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) ................................................................................................... passim Dixon v. Rutgers, 110 N.J. 432 (1988)  .................................................................................................37  Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2018), .................................................................................. 38, 42
[brief] ” (Da1).  The Original Policy provided:  All school staff members (certificated and non-certificated personnel) and administrators shall take all necessary steps—including notifying appropriate school administrators (e.g., the Principal and/or his/her designee)—to immediately, fully and accurately inform a student’s parent(s) whenever such staff member is made aware of, directly or indirectly, any facts or circumstances that may have a material impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being, including, without limitation, the following: substance use; --- 2  “Ra” refers to the State’s appendix to this brief.  “Da” refers to Appellants’ appendix and “Db” refers to Appellants’ brief.  “1T” refers to the May 30, 2023 transcript of the Order to Show Cause Hearing on the State’s original complaint; “2T” refers to the September 6, 2023 transcript of the Order to Show Cause hearing on the State’s amended complaint.