ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] The first time, on September 28, a bag of change was stolen.  The second time, on September 30, nothing was taken.  No one saw the intruders.  No clear surveillance captured their faces, and no one identified them from the surveillance.  No one’s home was ever searched for the proceeds, and no one’s phone was ever searched to reveal if that person had been around the [...] at the relevant time.  No one confessed to the crimes.  In the absence of all of these forms of proof, the only evidence of identity presented by the State was the opinion of a fingerprint examiner that defendant [...] left latent fingerprints at the scenes.
[brief] The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, as there was no palpable error, and the Trial Court reasoned its ruling in the interest of justice.  It bears repeating that the instant appeal does not address the Trial Court’s May 14, 2024 Order reversing the stay order, as the Notice of Appeal addressed the June 20, 2024 Order denying Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.
[brief] \(^10\)  “For the purposes of the Summary Judgment Motion I am finding that the – that the plaintiff admitted he cannot tell if he was paid in full for all of his job…  I think the plaintiff’s deposition testimony page 19 line 4 to 11, he further testified that he got 1099 forms each year while working for the defendant but he doesn’t have any 1099 forms in either his personal or business tax return productions in this case. ”  See T2 at 30:3-12.  2020, i.e. November 24, 2014 are barred by the Statute of Limitations. ”  2T at 34:16-18 and 35:5-7.  Therefore, the trial court dismissed the complaint for “failure and inability to be able to prove the amount of damages which survive after application of the Statute of Limitation.
[brief] There is no dispute here that the Boston Gas decision is the applicable law and that it calls for pro-rata allocation; the chief dispute here is whether there are facts that, when applied to the law established by Boston Gas, allow for a departure from pro-rata allocation.  Of note, when reviewing on appeal whether “fact-based” allocation can be applied, the First Circuit, in Boston Gas, deferred to the district court’s ruling below that fact-based allocation was not possible.  See Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 708 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 2013).8  B.
[brief] Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit in October 24, 2023 against [...], [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”).  [Pa1-Pa12]  On December 20, 2023, [...] Filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings pursuant to the arbitration provision within its Small Business Contract (the “Contract”) with [...].  [Pa174–80].  On January 4, 2024, [...] and Plaintiffs filed a Consent Order with the Court, whereby Plaintiffs agreed that they were bound by the Contract to arbitrate this dispute and that they would arbitrate their dispute accordingly.  [Pa162–63].  The Superior Court entered the Consent Order on January 4, 2024, staying the matter for 120 days until May 4, 2024 and directing the parties to arbitration (“January Consent Order”).  [Pa162–63].  Plaintiffs never appealed the January Consent Order.  After the Superior Court entered the January Consent Order, Plaintiffs refused to initiate arbitration.  Accordingly, [...] initiated arbitration with the [...] on or about April 8, 2024.  Over five months later, on May 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the January Consent Order.  [Pa164–65].  The Superior Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion (“June Order”).  [Pa253–57].  Plaintiffs now bring this purported “appeal as of right” from the Superior Court’s June Order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate.  [Pa262].  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In this case, the State of New Jersey through its Attorney General has brought a criminal action against [...], Esq. and the indictment implicates other unnamed lawyers in the firm of [...].  It is unclear why the State of New Jersey Attorney General has not ceased its relationship with the firm of [...].  Counsel for the State of New Jersey has only stated it has not asked [...] to discontinue its representation, with no further explanation.  This does not address the conflict and, perhaps more importantly, this statement does not address the interests of the individual defendants and the legitimate concern about [...]’s representation of all defendants when co-defendant State of New Jersey through the Attorney General has indicted the firm’s senior partner and implicated other lawyers in the firm in criminal wrongdoing.  To protect the integrity of the client-lawyer relationship, [...] should be disqualified.  In this matter, [...], Esq., the partner who was indicted, was Counsel of Record and Designated Trial Counsel for the defendants in this case.  After his indictment, [...], Esq. withdrew his appearance – an acknowledgment of his conflict of interest.  Nevertheless, his law firm continues to represent the defendants.  The firm, [...], is a partnership.  In a partnership, the conflict of one partner is the conflict of all partners.  Therefore, [...]’s conflict is imputed to his partners.  However, his partners contend that [...] – the law firm where [...] remains employed and continues to work as a partner (Pa167) – can continue representing the State of New Jersey and the other defendants as if [...], the former Counsel of Record and Designated Trial Counsel in this matter, had not been indicted by the State of New Jersey.  Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify Brown and Connery, LLP from representing the defendants in this matter, including the State of New Jersey.  The motion judge requested backup from the defendants confirming they wanted Brown and Connery, LLP to continue representing them.  Defendants’ counsel provided Certifications of attorney liaisons stating none of the defendants had requested Brown and Connery, LLP withdraw.  At oral argument, the motion judge requested further evidence that the defendants wanted Brown and Connery, LLP to continue representing them.  Defendants’ counsel then provided a very brief certification from an Assistant Attorney General providing no additional information.  Nothing was provided by the defendants themselves.  Nevertheless, the motion judge denied plaintiff’s motion, stating that there is no conflict because [...], Esq. was indicted in his “personal capacity” and his partners are “zealous advocates” for the defendants.  For the reasons that follow, this Court should reverse the Order of the Law Division denying plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the [...] law firm from representing the defendants, including the State of New Jersey, in this matter.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] (Raised below, 3T, pg. 5)  Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s testimony was properly barred because he ([...]) “did not provide an analysis of the invoice entries under the RPC factors. ” (Def. Brief Page 32); further and interestingly, Defendants underlined the following argument in their brief for emphasis: “Ouda did not look at the discovery requests prepared by [...], the discovery responses prepared by [...], or the documents received or propounded by [...] in the underlying matter. ” (Def. Brief, Page 33).  In actuality neither Defendants expert, nor Plaintiff’s expert did the kind of analysis that Defendants underlined or that the court held only Plaintiff’s expert to.  In fact, the reason that neither [...] nor Defendants expert did such an analysis is because, as conceded by Defendants own witness, Defendants boxed up the 21 bankers boxes and never turned them over to either Plaintiff or Defendants own expert.  Those Bankers boxes were secured in storage from before any lawsuit was filed until they were unsealed in open court.  (5T. Pg. 32, line 18 – Pg. 33, line 4).
[brief] While the Appellant claims there is “no legal authority” for the [...] to permit the retroactive appointment of fire officers to fill anticipated vacancies, the [...] does in fact have that authority under New Jersey law, to use at its discretion.  The [...] appropriately utilized that discretion in this matter.  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.2, the [...] is permitted to “relax” the rules prescribed by the Civil Service statutes “for good cause in a particular situation. ”  The situation wherein the City appointed new fire captains to fill anticipated vacancies, whilst ignorant of rules to the contrary, was an appropriate situation for the [...] to discretionally “relax” the requirement for certifications to be requested in order to fill “genuine vacancies,” because at all relevant times the City acted in good faith and the vacancies actually occurred at the time they were anticipated to.
[directive] Deconfliction Automated Remove or Designate to Continuing Authority  C. County the Police and of State Superintendent with the consultation in Director, The of list from the system deconfliction automated an remove or add time any at may Prosecutors, systems. designated encies.  A Specific For Use System by Deconfliction  Automated of Assignment D. for every shall, Director the designated, is system deconfliction automated than one more
[brief] AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE  A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM IS ENFORCABLE UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW | 3 | | A.  State Law and Public Policy Favor Arbitration | 3 | | II.  THE RUGBEER TEST PROPOSED BY THE ASSOCIATION IS UNTENABLE | 5 | | III.  THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE SUBJECT ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AGAINST NON-PARTIES IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT | 9 | | A.  Whether the Arbitration Agreement May be Enforced Against Non-parties is for the Arbitration Panel to Decide | 9 | | B.  The Arbitration Agreement is Enforceable against [...]’s Estate | 11 | | CONCLUSION | 13 | | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560 (App. Div. 2007) | 11 | | AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) | .5 | | Crystal Point Condo, Inc. v. Kinsale Ins. Co., 466 N.J. Super. 471 | | | (App. Div. 2021), rev’d on other grounds, 251 N.J. 437(2022) | 11 | | Curtis v. Cellco P’ship, 413 N.J.Siuper. 26 (App. Div. 2010) | 3 | | Estate of Ruszala ex. Rel. Mizerak v. Brookdale Living Communities, | | | Inc., 415 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2010) | 5 | | Gershon, Adm'x Ad Prosequendum for Est. of Pietroluongo v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2004) | 8 | | Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J.191 (2019) | 9 | | Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.
[brief] In denying [...]’s motion to withdraw, the trial court found that [...]’s plea was taken in a “legally appropriate” way, and that [...] failed to meet his burden under State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).  (3T 41-7 to 52-9; Da 75)  But the legality of [...]’s plea and the standard articulated in Slater were entirely inapplicable to [...]’s motion.  Rather, [...]’s motion was governed by Rule 3:9-3(f) (“Conditional Pleas”), which requires that defendants be permitted to withdraw from their guilty pleas following successful appeals from pretrial rulings.  Because the trial court applied the wrong standard in denying [...]’s motion to withdraw, and [...] has a right to withdraw under the proper standard, the decision below must be reversed.  Rule 3:9-3(f) – the conditional plea rule – permits defendants to plead guilty while preserving the right to appeal from an adverse pretrial ruling.  The rule states: “If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his or her plea. ”  R. 3:9-3(f) (emphasis added).  In other words, in the case of a conditional plea, the plea is just that – conditional.  Thus, motions to withdraw pursuant to the conditional plea rule are entirely different from motions to withdraw under Rule 3:9-3(e) (before sentencing) or Rule 3:21-1 (after sentencing).  In the latter two situations, a defendant has changed his mind about pleading guilty and must show that the four factors articulated in Slater warrant withdrawal.  Slater, 198 N.J. at 156-62.  But a defendant who enters into a conditional plea and succeeds on appeal has a right to withdraw under Rule 3:9-3(f), and Slater provides no grounds for denying the withdrawal motion.
[brief] [...], : Division, Monmouth County.  Defendant-Appellant.  : Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  JUSTICE COMPLEX [...]  [...] - ATTY NO. 031591987  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE  BUREAU  P.O. BOX 086 [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  June 20, 2024
[brief] Ca3A  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases - **Borden v. Wolf Silk Co. **, 108 N.J. Eq. 399 (Ch. 1931) ........................................... 17 - **Fleming v. Fleming Hotel Co.**, 70 N.J. Eq. 509 (Ch. 1905) ..................................... 21 - **Hershey v. Stone & Hershey**, 10 N.J. Misc. 967 (Ch. 1932) ................................. 12, 25 - **Rielly v. P. Rielly & Son**, 101 N.J. Eq. 432, 436 (Ch. 1927) ................................. 11 - **Wilzig v. Sisselman**, 209 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div. 1986) ................................. 11 #### Statutes - **N.J.S.A.** 14A:14-1 et. seq. .................................................................................. 10 - **N.J.S.A.** 14A:14-15 ............................................................................................ 17 - **N.J.S.A.** 14A:14-18 ............................................................................................ 13 - **N.J.S.A.** 14A:14-19 ............................................................................................ 21, 22 - **N.J.S.A.** 14A:14-20 ............................................................................................  25 - **N.J.S.A.** 14A:14-5 ............................................................................................  11  #### Rules - Rule 4:53-3 ..............................................................................................................  27 - Rule 4:53-7 ..............................................................................................................  28 - Rule 4:53-7(a) ..........................................................................................................  29 - Rule 4:53-7(b) ..........................................................................................................  30 - Rule 4:53-7(c) ..........................................................................................................  31 - Rule 4:53-7(d) ..........................................................................................................  32  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Following [...]’s presentation, the Zoning Board denied the Second Application by 4 votes to 3 against (a reversal of the 4 votes to 3 in favor of the larger project proposed in the First Application).  Pa322, at 119:13-121:1.  On December 19, 2022, the Zoning Board issued a resolution stating that it was, “not satisfied that approval of the application advances the purposes of the MLUL contained in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et. seq.  “specifically encouraging appropriate use of land which promotes the public health, safety and general welfare. ”  Pa142.  The Zoning Board further found that [...] did not satisfy the positive and negative criteria for relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.  *Id.*  Lastly, the Zoning Board concluded that the goals and objectives of the 2018 Master Plan would be violated by approval of the Second Application.  *Id.*  The Zoning Board’s conclusions were not substantiated by any of the testimony provided by [...]’s professionals and it is important to note that at no point, at any hearing, was testimony, other than a disagreement on the calculation of FAR, provided by any of the Zoning Board’s professionals to dispute [...]’s presentation.  **G.  The Trial Court’s Decision**  [...] filed its complaint in lieu of prerogative writs arguing, among other things, that the Zoning Board’s denial was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and that [...]’s Second Application should have been granted in its entirety.
[brief] ”  Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC, 2024 WL 2839329, at *3 (citing Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 297 (1988) (requiring the dissemination of private facts that would be offensive to a reasonable person to state a claim for invasion of privacy by unreasonable publication of private facts.)).  As to Appellant’s claim of negligence, this Court has already found that a debt collector does not owe a debtor any duty of care to avoid the use of a letter vendor.
[brief] Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on February 14, 2022 (Pa1).  The answer of Defendant [...] was filed on October 17, 2022 (Da1).  Discovery ensued.  On August 11, 2023, Defendant [...] filed a motion for summary judgment of dismissal, with prejudice (Pa137).  The motion was opposed (Pa469).  On September 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed what was called a “Cross Notice of Motion to Consolidate” the matter with another case filed by Plaintiff on September 26, 2023, against some of the same defendants, and making many of the same claims made in the case which is the subject of this appeal (Pa485).  Oral argument was held on October 6, 2023, before Hon. [...], J.S.C.  On that date, [...] entered orders denying Plaintiff’s cross motion to consolidate\(^1\) and granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, with prejudice (Pa533, 534, 535).
[brief] On December 11, 2015, [...] (“[...]”), a [...] employee, was working at the Project when a steel beam attached to a track hoe fell and injured him (the “Accident”).  (Pa4.)  Just prior to the Accident, [...], the owner of [...], approached the track hoe operator, an employee of [...], and when the operator extended his hand to greet Walker he accidentally struck the controls causing the steel beam to fall on [...].  (Pa2009.)  B.  [...]’s Work on the Date of the Accident
[brief] Id. at 87  Here, the Court provided an order to assign counsel to the Office of the Public Defender’s Conviction Integrity Unit (CIU).  (Da 059-060).  In compliance with that order, the CIU assigned attorney [...], Esq., who entered her appearance with the Court on June 17, 2020.  (Da 061).  This case was opened and proceeded as a second PCR while [...]’s first PCR appeal was still pending.  Once the Appellate Division denied [...]’s first PCR appeal, and [...] filed a petition for certification, the PCR court entered an Order on January 7, 2021, dismissing defendant’s second PCR petition without prejudice pending the Supreme Court’s decision on defendant’s pending petition and preserving the December 3, 2019 filing date.  (Da 062).  Since PCR Counsel’s assignment on or about June 17, 2020, counsel made several representations to the Court that she was investigating the case, hiring experts and making discovery requests of the State.  (See Das 068, 069-070, 071, 072, 073-074, 075-085).  By procedurally barring defendant’s petition without allowing counsel to present the merits, the PCR court failed to satisfy the legal requirements of *State v. Rue*, 175 N.J. 1, 18 (2002), *State v. Webster*, 187 N.J. 254 (2006), and *State v. Parker*, 212 N.J. 269 (2012).  The PCR court’s decision to procedurally bar the petition and deprive defendant the opportunity to submit his substantive claims on post-conviction relief was fundamentally unfair, unjust, and inappropriate.
[brief] (10T27-5 to 18).  The judge considered all the mitigating factors --- \(^7\)  The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial on this ground.  (10T4-18 to 10T5-16; 10T6-13 to 21; 10T8-18 to 25; 10T12-17 to 21; 10T13-6 to 16; 10T35-2 to 25).
[brief] This litigant clearly questions whether or not the Court below was in possession of the facts of the case.  29.  This litigant again asks the question how the obvious misrepresentation of Plaintiff cannot be addressed when that is the reason that devastating and undeserved penalties (Initial and current) were assessed against Defendant.  30.  Just to review the facts relating to this issue that this Court is asked to consider (And is a review of previously cited facts):
[brief] Pro hac vice admission pending in Appellate Division: [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  INSURANCE COMPANY; [...] (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...] AND [...]); [...]; [...] (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...] AND [...]); TRAVELERS  CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...]); [...]; [...] AND [...]; AND JOHN DOES  1-2  Defendants and, as to United States Fire Insurance Company, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] I.  The Trial Court erred in granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss because doing so was contrary to notions of justice and was antithetical to the purpose of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  (Transcript, 25:3–17).  The Affidavit of Merit statute was intended to flush out insubstantial and meritless claims that have created a burden on innocent litigants and detracted from the many legitimate claims that require the resources of our civil justice system.  The Statute was not intended to encourage gamesmanship or a slavish adherence to form over substance.  The statute was not intended to reward defendants who wait for a default before requesting that the plaintiff turn over the Affidavit of Merit.  Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic, 178 N.J. 144, 154 (2003) (emphasis added).  In 1995, the Affidavit of Merit Statute was passed as part of a tort reform package, which was designed to strike a fair balance between preserving a plaintiff’s right to sue and controlling nuisance lawsuits.
[brief] See Morris Cty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Twp., 220 N.J. Super. 388, 408–09, (Law. Div. 1987), aff’d as modified, 230 N.J. Super. 345, (App. Div. 1989).  In a Mount Laurel lawsuit, "the cause of action is the alleged unconstitutionality of the defendant-municipality's zoning because of its failure to provide for the municipality's fair share of affordable housing."  See S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 92 N.J. 158, 214-216 (1983); see also Oceanport Holding, L.L.C. v. Borough of Oceanport, 396 N.J. Super. 622, 630 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] ” (Pa454a).  Second, [...] testified that “[he] was not aware of Central Command ever telling an officer to get out of the television room. ” (Pa114a).  It was only “[a]fter this issue with [...], their supervisor told officers to be at their desks and not to hang out in the television room.  [...] hanging out in the television room on August 16 was not by itself a department violation. ”  (Id.)  Third, [...] testified that “an assignment officer could do an officer’s counts, if necessary. ”  (Id.).  Finally, [...] testified that “[...] might have done his inmate counts on August 16, 2019; [...] does not know. ” (Id., emphasis added).  It bears noting that Officer [...] testified that “[t]here is a camera in the television room, so one could see if a person was in the television area for hours. ” (Pa114a).  However, the State failed to produce a single video clip from that camera either in discovery or at trial to prove that Mr. [...] spent hours in the television room, failed to do his rounds or had fallen asleep.