ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (30T212-14 to 213-5, 217-6 to 12, 282-4 to 7)  [...] brought his car to the Hampton Gardens parking lot here he and Defendant waited for [...] to arrive.  (30T211-15 to 213-5, 282-7 to 9)  [...] said he saw [...] arrive and enter a covered walkway that led to apartment D-4.  (30T213-6 to 11)  Defendant got out of the car and approached [...]; the two men began talking and then entered the tunnel.  (30T214-9 to 14)  At 8:39 p.m., Defendant’s phone called [...]’s personal phone.  (30T221-1 to 14)  Immediately after, [...] called Defendant six times in a row but could not get through to him.  (30T221-15 to 222-16, 223-15 to 20)  At 8:42 p.m., [...] finally got through to Defendant, who told [...] he was standing next to [...] and asked where [...] was located.  (30T222-15 to 22, 293-15 to 294-22)  During this thirty-three-second call, [...] heard Defendant tell [...] that [...] was on his way to pay the debt.  (30T294-2 to 18)  At 8:47 p.m., the call logs showed a missed call from [...]’s phone to [...]’s second personal phone (-1972).  (30T295-4 to 295-13)  The logs also showed a three-second call at 8:47 p.m. and a text message from [...]’s phone to [...]’s trap phone; the text message said, “Open the door. ”  (30T217-13 to 219-2; 295-17 to 296-13; 32T6-15 to 7-17)  [...] testified that after the call, Defendant came running from the side of the building, jumped into [...]’s car, and they left.
[brief] (Db47).  Defendant is mistaken.  There is no real possibility of an unjust result here given the proofs against defendant, particularly when [...] was unarmed, defendant was uninjured, one of the shots was fired straight down, defendant had threatened [...] with references to guns in the past, and the detached viewpoint phrase is a correct statement of the law as it pertains to reasonableness in self-defense.  *Walker*, 203 N.J. at 90 (2010) (finding the effect of any error must be considered “in light ‘of the overall strength of the State’s case. ’” (quoting *Chapland*, 187 N.J. at 289)).  “The mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough. ”  *Funderburg*, 225 N.J. at 79.  There is no possibility here; the law was correct, and the Model Charge cannot have led the jury to a result it otherwise would not have reached.  *Alexander*, 233 N.J. at 142.  To instruct otherwise, that a reasonable belief need only come from defendant’s perspective, is a wholly inaccurate legal statement; our Legislature has determined the exact opposite to be the case in New Jersey.  The jury charges here were thus sound, mirrored the Model Charges, comported with our Legislative history and caselaw, and correctly guided the jury to a just result.  Defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.  Point III
[brief] 34-35  Enhanced Still Photograph from Lakehurst Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 36B..............................................................................................................  36-37  Enhanced Still Photograph from Lakehurst Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 36C..............................................................................................................  38-39  Enhanced Still Photograph from Marlboro Township Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 37A .............................................................................................................. 40-41 Enhanced Still Photograph from Marlboro Township Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 37B.............................................................................................................. 42-43 Enhanced Still Photograph from Marlboro Township Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 37C.............................................................................................................. 44-45 Enhanced Still Photograph from Marlboro Township Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 37D .............................................................................................................. 46-47 Still Photograph from Marlboro Township Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 57A... 48 Still Photograph from Marlboro Township Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 57C... 49 Still Photograph from Lakehurst Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 58A................. 50 Still Photograph from Lakehurst Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 58B ................. 51 Still Photograph from Lakehurst Traffic Stop, State Exhibit 58C .................. 52 [...] Standard Operating Procedure on NJSP Business Cards, dated July 27, 2012, State Exhibit 60 .................................................. 53-56 [...] Case Report, dated January 19, 2016, Defendant Exhibit 14 ................................................................. 57-61 Photocopy of [...] Business Card, Defendant Exhibit 15............................ 62 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) .............................................. 58, 65 Chadwell v. State, 37 Ark. App. 9, 822 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992)
[brief] The Debtor, proceeding as a self-represented litigant in the foreclosure action, clearly did not understand the complexities of the case and/or how to properly plead it.  The motions were dismissed without prejudice and nothing has been decided on the merits.  The Debtor’s Chapter 13 case was filed only five (5) months following the foreclosure judgment and the proposed plan attempted to address [...]’s claim on the Property.  The chapter 13 plan is still pending.  There has been a substantial change in the law since the entry of the Final Judgment and the filing of the bankruptcy case that applies in this situation.  The Debtor is not to blame as he has been trying to set aside the Final Judgment since almost immediately after it was entered.  There is no prejudice to [...] as it has not evicted the Debtor and will be satisfied on its entire claim.  The status quo remains in place.  Thus, this court concludes that Debtor’s had a pending cause of action at the time Tyler and Roberto were handed down and he is entitled to pipeline retroactivity in order to continue his challenge of the alleged taking of his excess equity.
[brief] (Pa9 at ¶3).  The Board, however, has no control over administrative procedures and technological features utilized by corporations as [...], [...], [...], [...] or [...] with respect to their popular email accounts offered, generally for free, to private users such as the District’s Board members.  Plaintiff, in his appellate brief, criticizes the Defendants for not providing evidence that they “even asked the Board members to compile a log or otherwise explain the parameters of their private email use for government business.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esquire (014951997)  Dated: December 5, 2023  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 10 | | I.  Standard of Review | 11 | | II.  The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That Zoning Board Interpretation Was Necessary In This Case.  (5T 27-24 to 28-2) | 12 | | A.  The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Examine The Two Principal Uses Proposed In Plaintiff's Site Plan Qualify As “Mixed Uses Of More Than One Principal Commercial Or Industrial Use. ”  (5T 25-11 to 28-7) | 15 | | B.  The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Examine That The Two Permitted Principal Uses Proposed In The Application Were “Part Of A Single Site Plan. ”  (5T 25-11 to 28-7) | 16 | | III.  The Trial Court Erred In Concluding The Planning Board Lacked Jurisdiction To Grant Site Plan Approval Of The Permitted Compatible, Integrated, Two Uses On The Property.  (5T 25-11 to 28-7) | 20 | | CONCLUSION | 22 |
[brief] The general requirements are that plans and documents for which approval is sought must be on file and available for public inspection at least ten days prior to the hearing, the testimony of all witnesses related to an application must be taken under oath or affirmation by the presiding officer, with the right of cross-examination permitted to all interested parties, and that the presiding officer has discretion to impose reasonable limitations as to time and number of witnesses.  The rules of evidence are not applicable to the hearing, and the agency may exclude irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10a-e.  Appellant’s citation to the law on this issue focuses on the right of the public to be heard.  However, its reliance on the cited caselaw is misplaced and inconsistent with the facts of the instant matter.
[brief] ” (1T51:17-52:8).  In its decision on the motion for reconsideration, the court reiterated that there was no known case law which addresses the issue in dispute.  (See 2T22:14-21).  Indeed, there is no case law holding that a court can enjoin a municipality from taking any steps towards a potential condemnation or redevelopment merely because that municipality has been deemed non-compliant under the Mount Laurel doctrine and there is a proposal to build an inclusionary development on the property.  Insofar as the court acknowledged that there is no case law addressing the legal issue before it, the trial court’s contradictory finding that the law was “pretty clear” is without support and is clearly erroneous.
[directive] Contributors  The following agencies, represented by the below individuals, served on the Working Group tasked with updating these Standards.  Through a collective commitment to and respect for the process, the below stakeholders improved the Standards through their respective expertise and thoughtful input.  CORE WORKING GROUP MEMBERS  [...], [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General and Chief of Staff SANEs are now referred to as Forensic Nurse Examiners (FNEs).  1 -iii-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] [...] has not argued that the LAD does not apply to it or its named defendants or J. Doe defendants.  It does argue that *Heck* ought to bar LAD actions if it bars CRA actions against those same defendants.  [We believe this point is moot given that [...] agreed that *Heck* did not bar LAD actions.  [...] did not specifically address this but it’s included in “affirming” [...]’s reasoning.]  **Point V: The Exact Reasoning to Apply the LAD to the State**
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  The Thirteen Prior Projects Work To [...]’s Benefit  As Much As [...]’s [...] buries its response to [...]’s admitted historical record of accepting bids using the exact same Libety Mutual’s Bid Bond Documents and [...] issuing bonds to the end of its Brief.  We suspect this was done to marginalize its impact.  The historical record demonstrates that [...]’s Bid Bond Documents were in “a form acceptable to the Authority. ”  It further shows the concern is unwarranted because in each instance [...] has always issued the bonds.  Within its Opposition Brief, [...] argues:  [...] lacked any assurance, at the time of bid submission, that the surety would stand behind the obligation and issue the necessary performance bonds at the time of contract execution.  (P. 2)  [...] had assurance in that on thirteen previous occasions.  [...] had never declined or failed to issue the contract bonds.  Indeed, if on this fourteenth time [...] had made such an attempt, [...] would have very strong legal grounds to compel them to do so.  [...] could meritoriously and equitably estop [...] from doing so. \(^1\) --- \(^1\)  It should not be lost or discounted that [...] is now forced to present and prove a hypothetical claim for equitable estoppel on behalf of [...] against its own surety, [...].  As set forth in Lesniewski v. W.B. Furze Corp., 308 N.J. Super. 270, 286 (App. Div. 1998), equitable estoppel provides for the proposition that a contracting party who made a mistake can be estopped from denying the enforceability of the contract or a relevant clause if the other party relied on the conduct or representation to their detriment.  The key consideration is “whether there was a course of conduct that, in its cumulative impact, was tantamount to representation made by one party with expectation that other persons would rely on this conduct.
[brief] ”  The fact specific in Phillipsburg questioned the right to redeem by a subsequent tax sale holder by assignment without first seeking to intervene.  The trial court’s order denying the applicant’s motion to vacant, aside from questioning its standing, noted the “absence of proof that [...] is presently able to redeem all outstanding liens, thus casting doubt on the likelihood that the town’s intention to secure a new owner to rehabilitate the property would be met.
[brief] An excerpt of his remarks are below:  I’m finding at a minimum, even if it’s only a right-of-way, then Subparagraph B(5) applies to the conduct of the plaintiff.  That’s the only way this – this – Subparagraphs A & B, which are intended to be read together, that’s why there’s Subparagraphs A & B, make any sense.  (T18 25 – T19 5).  In this excerpt the Judge once again made it clear that his Order was based on an immunity contained in section B(5) of the statute.
[brief] To compound his error, the Arbitrator then faulted [...] both for not warning [...] of the disciplinary action it would take against her, and for failing to inquire into the veracity of the second doctor’s note she produced in January 2020.  As to the former, and as explained above, [...] had no duty under the CBA or according to the applicable case law to warn [...] of potential disciplinary action.  See Cty. Coll. of Morris, 100 N.J. at 394-95.  Nor does any such duty make practical sense.  As to the latter, [...] has no duty under the CBA to reconsider personnel decisions or to take any investigatory action subsequent to discharging an employee.  For all intents and purposes, and as far as the CBA was concerned, the matter ended when [...] terminated [...] on January 6, 2020, based on the first doctor’s note.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b (emphasis added). ]  Pursuant to defendant’s guilty plea to aggravated manslaughter, and in accordance with the sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement, [...] sentenced defendant to a 30-year term of imprisonment subject to the 85-percent period of parole ineligibility under NERA. (Da6-8).  Hence, a psychological evaluation was not required.  Recognizing this obstacle, defendant argues in the alternative that this case involves a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child due to his prior conviction for endangering in which he engaged in similar conduct against his son, and because the sentence for his endangering conviction implicates the sentence for this matter due to the consecutive nature of the sentences.  In addition to the requirements set forth in the portion of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b quoted above, the statute provides that "[i]n any case involving a conviction of N.J.S.2C:24-4, endangering the welfare of a child...the [presentence] investigation shall include a report on the defendant's mental condition."  Beyond the fact that this provision requires only a "report on the defendant's mental condition" and not a psychological evaluation, this case does not involve a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child.  Defendant was convicted of aggravated manslaughter.  His prior conviction for endangering the welfare of a child was in a separate case, as defendant argued and emphasized at sentencing, where his attorney stated:
[brief] The *Moses v Moses* case and Pascale should guide this high court to a ruling in favor of [...] and [...], as detailed above.  Had there been a joint venture, hornbook law requires a dissolution based on equity contributions, after paying off creditors, much like a company that goes out of business and must wind down.  In such a scenario, the Plaintiffs [...] and [...] would have received the majority of the equity, approaching $200,000.00, and [...] less than $20,000, relative to his capital contributed.  The Court also failed to quantify the value of the improvements to the home in its evaluation.  The improvements are shown in pictures, and certification of costs thereto.  (Pa306-319).
[brief] \(^2\)  “We are an independent branch of government constitutionally entrusted with the fair and just resolution of disputes in order to preserve the rule of law and to protect the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States and this State. ”  For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff/appellant [...] respectfully requests this appellate tribunal to reverse the two final pre-discovery summary judgment dismissal and reconsideration denial orders, to remand this hybrid 5 Counts 309 paragraphs prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action back to another trial court judge and to grant such other relief that the appellate tribunal deems just and equitable.
[brief] “A basic principle of contract interpretation is to read the document as a whole in a fair and common sense manner. ”  *Porreca v. City of Millville*, 419 N.J. Super. 212, 233 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting *Hardy ex. rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin*, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009)).
[brief] **THE ZONING BOARD CORRECTLY APPLIED THE SICA TEST AND APPROPRIATELY DETERMINED THAT THE APPLICANT FAILED TO SATISFY THE NEGATIVE CRITERIA.**  The Board strictly followed the *Sica* test in its decision to deny the application.  (See Db25-34, Pb 25-34).  In summary, the Board, 1) identified the inherently beneficial use, 2) identified the substantial impairment to the zone plan and zoning ordinance, 3) sought to provide conditions, such as a significant reduction in units, but was told that condition would make the use not viable, 4) weighed the positive and negative and determined the substantial impairment of the zone plan and ordinance had not been overcome by the applicant.
[brief] The exemption at issue here, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor, exempts “an attorney-at-law of this State who is not principally engaged as a debt adjuster. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c).  [...], and [...] (collectively “Appellants”), appeal from July 27, 2023 orders of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., dismissing with prejudice their declaratory judgment complaint in its entirety and concluding that the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor is constitutional.  Appellants could not and cannot overcome the presumption of constitutionality to which all legislation is entitled.  The limits placed on who may engage in debt adjustment are supported by a rational basis to protect consumers.  Additionally, this limitation is neither overbroad nor vague, nor does it violate attorneys’ First Amendment rights.  This court should affirm the July 27, 2023  Orders and decision of the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 11.  One aspect of [...]’ job is to identify roadway defects.  He did not recall any sort of uneven elevation or anything.  (See Pa0911 at 22:17-22; Pa0913 at 24:3-7)  12.  [...] testified that he traveled the area frequently and if there was something obvious he would have seen it.  (See Pa0908 at 19:8-12)  13.  A Biennial Bridge Inspection Report prepared by [...] dated April 22, 2015 states there is “settlement at the southbound north abutment joint up to 2”.
[brief] The indemnification and hold harmless language in Section 17.1(b) of the PSA – much like the indemnification language in Section 17.1(c) – is strikingly similar to the language at issue in Allison-Williams and the cases cited therein.  Here, as in Boyle and Allison-Williams, the clauses must be strictly construed against the indemnitee, consistent with the “American Rule” governing awards of attorneys’ fees in civil litigation.  See Boyle, 257 N.J. at 478, 482.  Especially when viewed in this light, the language in Section 17.1(b) and 17.1(c) must be understood to impose a duty to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless the Escrow Agent only as against claims by third-parties.  See id.  The trial court properly concluded that neither Section 17.1(b), nor 17.1(c) extends to situations like the present one, where the dispute is between the parties to the contract itself.
[brief] [...]: I think it is, Your Honor.  THE COURT: And what does he have to base that opinion on if he doesn’t know what the heck happened 25 years ago?  …  THE COURT:  So, I -- I -- I -- I can see by our arguments -- you can see where I’m going that -- that I am going to bar [...]’s opinion as a net opinion because he can’t speculate as to what either was done in 1985, which would have pre-dated the design manual that he referred to, or what he did 25 years ago, which arguably, for the purposes of this motion, I’m finding only for the purposes of this motion.  Arguably, that design manual applied to what the defendant did 25 years ago.  Since we can’t say what he did or didn’t do, and nobody will ever see or hear that, then you can’t say he violated a design manual 25 years ago or in 1985.  So, that standard is out.  You can’t rely upon that, and he has no other facts to support his opinion that the defendant might have violated that standard, which is what he’s basing his opinion on.  So, I’m going to bar [...]’s opinion.
[directive] Bail Schedule 2  DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES  Note:  Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 (Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b) (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue.
[brief] See Farmer, 48 N.J. at 152 (discussing the Hunt decision and explaining that “if the witness had made notes or a statement . . . covering the topics of his testimony, the notes or statement were . . . subject to defendant’s demand, even though the witness had not used them to refresh his recollection before trial”); Pacheco, 38 N.J. at 126 (“[t]he law in this State is clear that after a witness for the prosecution has testified, the defendant in a criminal case is entitled to inspect and use on cross-examination any prior notes or statements made by the witness relating to the subject matter of his direct testimony”).  In fact, New Jersey goes even further than federal law, and requires that a witness’s statement be disclosed during pretrial discovery rather than after the witness testifies at a hearing.  *State v. Robinson*, 229 N.J. 44, 61, 77 (2017).  Specifically, Rule 3:4-2(c)(2) requires that, where a prosecutor seeks pretrial detention:
[brief] Respondent’s attempts to improperly categorize this appeal as something different are incoherent and designed solely as a distraction from the real issues before this Court.  Next, Respondent attempts to justify the overly broad Restrictive Covenant by arguing, with no support whatsoever, that [...] specifically negotiated the terms of the Restrictive Covenant.  (See Respondent’s Brief at page 31).  That unsupported assertion could not be further from the truth.  The only aspect of the Restrictive Covenant that [...] was permitted to negotiate was whether it would be enforceable if the employment relationship ended within the first year of the five-year Employment Agreement.  [...] was not permitted to negotiate the geographical scope nor the temporal limits of the restriction.  As in most employment agreements, this was a take it or leave it contract of adhesion.
[brief] ”  Barker v. Wingo, supra at 529.  Thus, delays attributable to the court are attributed to the State.  “When there is no reasonable explanation or justification for the excessive delay, speedy trial principles have been violated. ”  State v. Farrell, supra at 453.  Here, “the denial of fundamental fairness was so great, and the integrity of the judicial process so crippled, as to require that the convictions be vacated. ”  Ibid.  II.