ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Ibid. (quoting National Treasury, 513 U.S. at 468 (in turn quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571)); see also Providence Firefighters Local 799 v. City of Providence, 26 F. Supp.2d 350 (D.R.I. 1998) (a rule that “forces a person to ask permission to speak bears a heavier presumption against constitutionality than one that merely penalizes people who have already spoken. ”); Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 903 (1st Cir. 1993).  In 1999, the court in Davis v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 327 N.J. Super. 59 (Law. Div. 1999) granted a preliminary injunction against a state police policy requiring, among other things, that officers “[t]reat as confidential, unless the contrary is specifically authorized by competent Division authority, any matters or information which pertain to the Division, its operations, investigations or internal procedures,” id. at 66, on the ground that it constituted an unlawful prior restraint.  The Davis stated that the “government bears a particularly heavy burden in this balancing test where, as here, the issue is not a single disciplinary action taken against, an individual employee, but rather a regulation which prospectively, burdens a broad category of speech by a large number of potential speakers. ”  When such a regulation is challenged, “[t]he government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the government. ””  Davis, 327 N.J. Super. at 70-71.  In In re Action Against Gonzalez, 405 N.J. Super. 336, 341 (App. Div. 2009), the New Jersey Appellate Division applied Davis and National Treasury test to strike down a policy of the [...] that stated, “No staff member shall initiate contact with the media without prior approval of the Executive Director. ”  Id. at 341.  In the instant case, the motion judge did not analyze the “balancing of interests” test articulated in National Treasury and defendants failed to provide any facts of record to carry their evidentiary burden to justify requiring [...] to seek permission to make presentations to professional organizations on his own time on issues regarding safe drinking water – a matter of public concern.
[brief] ”  *State v. Gardner*, 51 N.J. 444, 461 (1968)(citing *State v. Begyn*, 34 N.J. 35 (1961)).  There is also the concern that “the use of that word where the witness admits his guilt gives rise to the natural suggestion that the defendant whom he has implicated is likewise a participant in the crime. ”  *Ibid.*  Due to the possible prejudice to the defendant, it is “generally not wise to give such a charge absent a request.
[brief] To adjudge whether the Trial Court erred by refusing to expand the record, it is important to re-emphasize the nature and scope of an action in lieu of prerogative writs.  Often we gloss over black letter legal standards out of an imagined fear that we might be admonished for failing to provide a rote recitation of common and generally understood principals of law.  In the ordinary course, we do not emphasize the scope of review or the available remedies.  This is because there is typically general agreement amongst the parties on the rules of the game.  But where, as here, a party asks the Court to depart from recognized legal standards to promulgate entirely new procedures, the prevailing law grounds the analysis.
[brief] Ultimately, the Henderson framework was developed to “allow judges to consider all relevant factors that affect reliability in deciding whether an identification is admissible. ” Henderson, 208 N.J. at 288 (emphasis added).  But --- 8  Undersigned counsel is not able to determine what [...] says in this portion of the video.  The transcript of the video also notes that this is “Indiscernible. ”  by failing to hold a pretrial hearing on [...]’s identification in this case, the defense was deprived of the opportunity to flesh out those relevant factors — both system and estimator variables — that undermined the reliability of the identification.  Because the defense presented some evidence of suggestiveness, the trial court was required to hold a pretrial hearing.  Its failure to do so requires a remand for such a hearing.  Anthony, 237 N.J. at 238-39.
[brief] Now, eight years later, as the Township attempts to effectuate a key provision of that plan—a financial agreement with [...], a developer of affordable housing—its neighbors, [...] and [...], have sued.  They claim that [...] did not need the financial agreement’s tax exemption to develop its affordable housing project, and that their school taxes will go up.  Plaintiffs’ complaint is baseless.  [...] had the legal authority to enter the financial agreement.  The agreement helped promote affordable housing and develop an underutilized site.  It was authorized by the Local Housing and Redevelopment Law and the Long Term Tax Exemption Law.  Acting in their legislative capacity, the [...] committee members assessed the risks and benefits of entering the financial agreement, and concluded that doing so was in the best interests of the residents of the Township.  The Boroughs now want the court to second-guess the Township Committee’s conclusions, and to substitute its judgment for that of the elected representatives of the people.  But the Committee’s legislative determinations are entitled to deference and on this record must be sustained.
[brief] [...] complains that the trial court improperly “converted” the RETA code violations into “independent causes of action. ”  It is not clear from [...]’s brief what is improper about this.  Chapter 15 of Title 45 regulates real estate brokers, broker-salespersons, and salespersons.  N.J.S.A. 45:15-1 et seq. includes a number of statutory provisions applicable to entities and persons that sell timeshares.  Timeshares in New Jersey are considered real property, so anyone selling timeshares must be a licensed real estate agent and comply with all real estate regulations.  N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.51.  Plaintiffs’ theory was that [...] violated the CFA and the RETA by violating specific code sections.  It was entirely appropriate for the Court to require Plaintiffs to prove each alleged code violation.  The only way to establish this was to ask the jury to identify which specific code violations they believed had been proven.  POINT VI
[directive] When a person traffics a firearm in violation of any one of the enumerated provisions, that person may be held strictly liable for any death or serious or significant bodily injury caused by that firearm when it is later used in a crime.  The person need not have intended or contemplated that the weapon would be used in a crime or that death or injury would result from its use.  It is also irrelevant to the person’s culpability that the firearm was transferred again before being used in a crime.  It is, however, necessary that the harm involved resulted from the firearm’s use in a criminal act.  It is also necessary that the harm took place not more than three years from the firearms-trafficking offense.  Moreover, the Act expressly permits the trier of fact to infer that a defendant has the requisite mental state to commit a firearm trafficking violation under certain circumstances.  Specifically, this inference may be made if the defendant (1) transferred or planned to transfer the firearm within forty-five days of their own purchase and receipt of the firearm; (2) sold the other 3 person three or more firearms within a one-year period; (3) received compensation for the firearm that was significantly above the fair market value; (4) did not conduct the transaction through a licensed retail dealer; or (5) did not abide by the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(a)(3) or (b)(3) to complete a National Instant Criminal Background Check and did not provide a receipt or other documentation of the sale.  Of note, under certain circumstances, a person who illegally traffics a firearm outside of New Jersey may be held criminally liable under the Act for harm caused by that firearm in the State.  Indeed, the Act specifically provides that a defendant’s out-of-state conduct is “sufficient for prosecution if the defendant knew or should have known that the recipient of the firearm intended to possess, transfer, dispose, sell, or otherwise transport the firearm in this State. ”  Conversely, under certain circumstances, a person who illegally traffics a firearm within New Jersey may be held criminally liable under the Act for harm caused by that firearm in another State, as the Act provides that it is not a defense that the death or injury took place in another jurisdiction.  The extra-territorial scope of the Act is critical both to protecting New Jersey residents from firearms illegally trafficked into the State from elsewhere, and to protecting the community from the illegal trafficking of firearms within the State.  The determination of whether a person may be criminally liable under the Act for their out-of-state conduct or the out-of-state result of their in-state conduct involves a fact-sensitive analysis.  In performing that analysis, it is critical for prosecutors and police to consider not only the Act, but also its relationship to the territorial jurisdiction provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(d).  Here, Plaintiff has not shown that any of the alleged acts or omissions by Defendants rise to the level of a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct—any of which would destroy immunity and impose liability on the public entities and employees named in the Amended Complaint.  Alternatively stated, there is no evidence to suggest that Defendants acted or failed to act negligently on account of their required obedience to a legal mandate.  Rather, all of the above conduct stems from discretionary exercises of judgment by corrections officers vested in the public entity.  In the matter at bar, the acts of the Defendants were completely discretionary.  Without allegations or legal support that these actions were ministerial, the Court must dismiss the complaint.
[brief] C.  **THE BOARD MADE FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD**  (Pa38-40;53-56)  The facts of this case must be analyzed with an understanding of the events that took place in the very early days of the Covid19 Health Emergency.  The entire country and most of the world shut down in March of 2020.  These events occurred quickly without any notice and with little guidance.  The [...] responded to this national emergency by closing all non-essential activities including the recreation department.  This was not done at anyone’s choice, but rather in real time reaction to the emergent events as they unfolded.  [Pa3]  When the Governor ordered a shutdown, South Plainfield responded by telling all Recreation Department employees they could not continue to work.  [Pa3]  Those employees still working were working remotely.  While no one knew where the COVID19 health emergency might lead, everyone involved understood this to be a temporary situation.  [Pa3,9]  The Board denied [...]’ re-enrollment because they made the factual and legal conclusion that this temporary separation was not a layoff.  The Board decided this was a break in service pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 (c); N.J.A.C. 17:2-1A.1.  For the reasons set forth in the appellants initial papers as well as the arguments above this was a factually deficient and a legally incorrect conclusion.  While the applicant appeals from the Board’s refusal to refer this matter to the Office of Administrative Law; this court should rule as a matter of law that the temporary closure of a municipal office as a result of the COVID19 National Emergency did not result in not a break in service for the appellant as defined by the legislature.
[brief] [Venetsky v. West Essex Building Supply Co., Inc., 28 N.J.Super. 178, 187 (App.Div. 1953).  Reaves v. Egg Harbor Township, 277 N.J.Super. 360 (Ch. 1994) (failure to overcome presumption)].  No one disputes that [...] paid $150,000.00, for the property.  Ia478.  The presumption thus arose and the burden of proof was on [...] to show that Peake had notice, yet [...] presented no evidence to support any burden of proof and the trial court found none either.  There was no defect with the foreclosure as everything was in accordance with the statute and the rules.  Defendant read and received all notices.  Defendant agreed that the property was “an abandoned derelict of a property. ”  1T16:3-5.  And nothing whatsoever even remotely suggested that [...] had any knowledge of any alleged defect nor reason for concern.  [...] is the consummate bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a claim and it was mistakenly deprived of that protection.  A sale of property to a third-party purchaser should not be disturbed even if there was a defect in the underlying case – though here there was no defect.  Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment Productions, Inc., 329 N.J.Super. 285 (App.Div. 2000), Sonderman v. Remington Construction Co., 127 N.J. 96 (1992), City of Newark v. Block 1852, 244 N.J.Super. 402 (App.Div. 1990), Last v. Audubon Park Associates, 227 N.J.Super. 602 (App.Div. 1998) cert. den. 114 N.J. 491 (1998), Heinzer v. Summit Federal Savings & Loan Association, 87 N.J.Super. 430 (App.Div. 1965), Rogan Equities v. Santini, 289 N.J.Super. 95 (App.Div. 1996), Woglemuth v. 560 Ocean Club, 302 N.J.Super. 306 (App.Div. 1997).
[brief] A majority of states agree with New Jersey’s approach and have judicially excluded attorneys from consumer protection statutes for the same reasons as New Jersey.  See, e.g., Preston v. Stoops, 285 S.W.3d 606, 609 (Ark. 2008) (The Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act does not apply to the practice of law because “[o]versight and control of the practice of law is under the exclusive authority of the judiciary. ”); Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1092 (Pa. 2007) (“The General Assembly has no authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to regulate the conduct of lawyers and the practice of law. ”); Jamgochian v. Prousalis, No. 99C-10-022, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 373 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (Delaware’s consumer protection statute was not applicable to attorney conduct occurring within the practice of law); Rousseau v. Eschleman, 519 A.2d 243 (N.H. 1986) (attorneys were exempted from the provisions of New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Act because the Supreme Court established a professional conduct committee which has responsibility for regulating attorney conduct). observed that “the practice of law in the State of New Jersey is in the first instance, if not exclusively, regulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. ” (citing N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3).  Specific to this case, however, the NJDACCA provides that "[n]o person other than a nonprofit social service agency or a nonprofit consumer credit counseling agency shall act as a debt adjuster."  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2(a).  Although the statute prohibits debt adjustment for profit, N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2)(a) exempts “an attorney-at-law of this State who is not principally engaged as a debt adjuster[.]” (emphasis added).
[brief] Id., at 160; see also, *Forbes, supra*, 312 N.J. Super. at 522.  Here, plaintiffs clearly are challenging both the plan and the study because only one site meets the criteria of Section 5 (“study”): the [...].  Those criteria of Section 5 are specifically incorporated into Section 7 as noted hereinabove.  This challenge is narrow and in a very limited nuanced manner dealing with the application of 3 statutes to the plan.
[brief] The duty of the prosecutor is as much to refrain from improper methods calculator to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.  State v. Supreme Life, 473 N.J. Super. 165 (2022).  “It is improper for a prosecutor to express his personal opinion on the veracity of any witness.  Id. (citing State v. Rivera, 427 N.J. Super. 434 (App. Div. 2014).  In Supreme Life, the Appellate Division ruled that a prosecutor’s statement during summation accusing the defendant being a liar and expressing his personal belief in defendant’s guilt were reversible error.  Here, the Prosecutor called [...] a liar in his summation.  (15T:160-25 to 161-17).  Specifically, the Prosecutor told the jury that [...] was “looking for something to hang his hat on that makes it not his fault”, “he’s trying to get over on the charges” and that [...]’s looking for “something else to blame. ” (15T:161-4 to 10).  “And the cynical part of me would say that that’s because he’s trying to become [...] Free. ” (15T:161-2 to 3).  However, the Prosecutor didn’t stop there.  Next, the Prosecutor continued and told the jury “[i]t’s his tumor, it’s the pills, it’s the schizophrenia, it’s whatever. ” (15T:161-11 to 12).  “Again, I, my instinct as a Prosecutor might be to call it lying, but [...] gave you a more broad way to look at it. ” (15T:161-12 to 14).  Here, the Prosecutor improperly expressed his personal opinion as to the veracity of the witnesses in his summation.  Supreme Life, 473 N.J. Super. At 174.  Specifically, the Prosecutor told the jury that [...] and [...] were telling the truth because they witnessed what happened and [...] and [...] were being dishonest because they did not.  (15T:178-22 to 184-6).  The Prosecutor stated that when [...] testified, she was conflicted about here “affection toward her nephew and her obligation to tell the truth. ” (15T:183-4 to 6).  Likewise, with respect to [...], the Prosecutor said, “I think its pretty clear he testified with an agenda. ” (15T:184-5 to 6).  “Is this somebody who just came here to tell you factually what happened, or was that somebody who was pushing a narrative?” (15T:184-9 to 11).  “And again, I understand why, it’s his brother. ” (15T:184-11 to 12).  Clearly, the Prosecutor was improperly expressing his personal opinion as to the veracity of these witnesses and infringed on [...]’s constitutional right to a fair trial.  Supreme Life, 473 N.J. Super. at 474.
[brief] | | | State v. G.E.P., | 10 | | 243 N.J. 362 (2020)  | | State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014)  ...........................................................................................................  10  State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111 (2019)  .............................................................................................................  10  State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135 (2019)  ..............................................................................................................  10  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71 (2016)  ..................................................................................................................  10  Statutes & Other Authorities: N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7....................................................................................................................  1, 9
[brief] So, accordingly, the motion for [summary judgment] on reconsideration is granted on the merits against [...] because [...] is the responsible party. ”  (PPCIa419-25)  On June 22, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against [...] pursuant to the MCS-90 surety endorsement in the [...] policy given that the court had approved the Finaly Judgment against [...] on its merits and that [...] judgment was a prerequisite to filing a summary judgment motion against [...].
[brief] Plaintiff is a limited liability company formed in North Dakota.  Da21 ¶ 1; Da150.  Plaintiff was formed for the purpose of developing and operating a crude oil topping refinery in North Dakota.  Da23 ¶ 16.  According to annual reports filed by Plaintiff with North Dakota’s Secretary of State, Plaintiff’s headquarters and principal executive office from 2016-2018 was in North Dakota.  Da148; Da156–65.
[brief] 19, 23 Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010) ..................................................  40  Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997) ...............  30  Schiavo v. Marina District Development Co., 442 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2015) ................................................................. 28, 29, 37 Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 1993) ...............
[brief] He argues that this a mere harmless error by a layperson who did not understand the terminology.  Appellant/Plaintiff knew that he was living in New Jersey and that his vehicles were kept in New Jersey when he applied for the North Carolina insurance policy.  He indicated to [...] that he was living at [...] and his vehicles would be garaged at North Carolina ZIP code, even though he had was not residing in North Carolina at that time.  Regardless of his reasoning, this amounted to a material misrepresentation to [...] because a vehicle’s garaging address is material in providing an insurance policy.  By both the language in the auto policy and by law, respondent/defendant [...] had a right to rescind [...]’s automobile insurance policy due to the misrepresentations in his application that he resided in and that his vehicles were kept in North Carolina when in actuality they were, at all relevant times, kept in New Jersey.
[brief] Plaintiff specifically testified he had no difficulty walking on the landing/stairs after the painting was completed but before the date of the freezing rainstorm when he fell.  Plaintiff certified interrogatories note the landing and the stairs were painted a few weeks before the Incident.  (Pa315).  The contract for the painting work to be completed by defendant [...] is dated 11/23/21.  (Pa393).  The completed work was paid for by a check dated 12/1/21 which was “posted” on 12/3/21.  (Pa399).  Thus, plaintiff’s recollection that the stairs had been painted several weeks before his slip and fall is accurate.  Plaintiff testified he never made any complaints about any condition of the stairs prior to his slip and fall.  Plaintiff also testified that, although he used the stairs approximately 4 times a day, he never had any difficulty walking on the steps during the several weeks after the painting was done but before the morning he fell.