ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For reasons he does not articulate, he seems upset that six female employees were concerned about contracting COVID-19 one hour after the President declared a National Emergency.  My remote login which I had previously tested and worked effectively yesterday appears to have been disabled last night after [...] responded to us.  I have no intention of abandoning my responsibilities.  Requiring us to commute into the office when it is clear in the attached email stream that we can easily work remotely, is causing emotional distress and unnecessarily risking our health.  Pa364 (Emphasis added).  [...] responded to Plaintiff’s email of March 14th that same day, stating, [...], Yes it is a termination.  The company determined it is in its best interests to continue working in the office.  There are contingency plans in the event the building or a government order eliminated our ability to report to the office.  Your email yesterday is interpreted as an insubordinate demand that is inconsistent with the decision to continue working in our building unless and until we are told otherwise.  Pa364.  Working from home would not pose an undue burden upon Defendant.  As of March 12, 2020, Plaintiff had the capability to work from home.  Pa210, PSOF ¶63.  As of March 12, 2020, [...] was ready to work remotely should the need arise.  Id., PSOF ¶64.  Plaintiff testified “our jobs were done through emails and virtual software, so they had the ability to work from home at the time of her request”.  Pa211, PSOF ¶65.  Working from home would not create an undue hardship on Defendant.  Id., PSOF ¶66.  Reemployment after termination
[brief] [...], ESQ.  [...]  Attorney for Appellant/Defendant  Dated: February 1, 2023  CONGREGATION  SONS OF ISRAEL, Plaintiff/Respondent v. CONGREGATION  MEOROSNOSSON, INC., Defendant/Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from Orders dated February 21, 2019; May 29, 2019; May 29, 2019; June 5, 2019; August 26, 2019; February 5, 2020; March 29, 2022; March 29, 2022; April 26, 2022
[brief] Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973)  .......................................................................................................................45  Sarfo ex rel. Sarfo v. Quivers, No. A–1043–01T5, 2002 WL 31432737, at *1 (App. Div. Aug. 30, 2002).................................................................40  Strollo v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., N.J. Misc. 217, 220 (Sup. Ct. 1942)  ............................................................................................26
[brief] The Complaint in this matter was filed on December 9, 2020, alleging claims and seeking damages for wrongful termination, whistle-blower fraud, and fraud.  Pa13.  An Answer and Counterclaim was filed on behalf of all defendants on January 22, 2021.  Pa34.  The Counterclaim alleges unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel.  The plaintiff was deposed on September 26, 2022.  Pa35.  A Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the defendants was argued and heard by the trial court on January 20, 2023, and an Order Granting Summary Judgment and dismissing the Complaint was entered on that day.  Pa1  A Proof Hearing for the finding and entry of damages was held before the trial court on October 20, 2023, and an Order was entered awarding damages and attorney’s fees and costs on that day.  Pa11.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] On March 23, 2021, a Salem County grand jury returned [...] charging defendant-appellant [...] with possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (Count One), possession of a handgun without a permit in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count Two), three counts of aggravated assault in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (Counts Three, Four, and Five), attempted murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) (Count Six),¹ and two counts of murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (Counts Seven and Eight).
[directive] Victim Contact 5.4  Protection of facilitate has information that would Prosecutor's Office the County important that Tt is Preliminary Law Enforcement  The 29 and subsection 7.6.3.  See note with the victim.22 contact ii with cautious in having direct communications general should be attorneys and deputy Assistant prosecutors wifiess in case.  prosecutor a the possibility that the may become present to avoid the detective is victim unless a a 52 Page information, provided, victim contact document when feasible, therefore should, Report Incident contact victim field containing the that so designed shall form be electronic however, the that in disclosed must information be such unless until defendant and the not with is shared information
[brief] Nonetheless, the Board was mindful that an approval would include remediation, and further explained its finding:  12.  In its consideration of the request for the d(1) use variance and d(4) FAR variance, the Board has been mindful of the fact that the subject property is contaminated ...  Testimony has been provided that approval … would permit not only the subject site to be remediated, but the three adjoining properties as well … such factor cannot justify the approval of a project that overwhelms the subject property.  As noted, the deviation relief pertaining to the d(4) FAR variance is substantial.  Ultimately, the property owner will be mandated to remediate these environmental conditions, both on the subject site and neighboring properties.  The Board cannot justify permitting a development entirely inappropriate for the subject site as a quid pro quo for environmental cleanup.
[brief] “The plaintiff further claims that as a result of [...] negligence, [[...]] was exposed to [[...]], an untrained and unsupervised individual, who ultimately assaulted the plaintiff. ”  [11T 170:5-9].  When a party does not object to a jury charge “there is a presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice [the party’s] case. ”  State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 544 (App. Div. 2022).  ii.  The alleged improper instruction on vicarious liability is harmless because it could not have led to an unjust result since the physical, objective evidence disproved [...]’s version of events.  The evidence produced at trial disproved [...]’s theory of liability and the claimed error in the charge is mitigated by the overall strength of the respondent’s case.
[brief] . .”  Many states adopted the version of Rule 608 in the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which tracks the essence of the federal rule with slightly different language:  “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided by Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.  However, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, they may be inquired into cross-examination of the witness (i) concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (ii) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. ”  See Also.  State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 489 (2017)  Defense counsel herein, pointed out to the judge, “there’s an exception when it deals with untruthfulness.” (13T:38-23 to; 39-2).  Counsel’s argument implicates N.J.R.E. 608(B).  Defendant disagrees with the courts notion that you would need a “trial within a trial”.  The defendant also disagrees that the jury would then have to determine whether [...] lied or was untruthful, in the Funderburg decision.  (13T:30-5 to 22).  Like in Whitmore, defendant avers that the proposed cross-examination was strongly probative of [...]’s character for untruthfulness, given the critical nature of [...]’s evidence against defendant.  at. 619-620.  The Whitmore court agreed that the district court should have allowed it.  Ibid.  The Court furthered, “Nothing could be more probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness than evidence that the witness has previously lied under oath.  Ibid.  Defendant also disagreed with the courts interpretation of Funderburg.  In any event, the prior instances of untruthfulness of [...] should have been admissible.  Defendant’s limited cross-examination of [...] violated defendant’s rights to confrontation.  A new trial is warranted in this matter.
[brief] This Court ruled in Ehler as follows in reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment below as to the plaintiff’s §1983 claim:  In rejecting the trial judge's determination, we adhere to the logic of Grandstaff, and the similar decisions of other courts, in concluding that post-event circumstances may be probative of the existence of a municipal policy existing at the time of the event in question.  The boundaries delineated by the Supreme Court in defining the scope of a municipality's liability under § 1983 do not foreclose a plaintiff from attempting to prove a municipal policy in this fashion.  See Bordanaro, supra, 871 F.2d at 1166-67 (observing that the Supreme Court ‘has never held that inferences about what customs or policies existed in a city before an event could not be drawn from subsequent actions’).  Certainly, in considering the obvious proof problems caused by the fact that the relevant evidence of a policy is possessed by the municipality and its employees, it is quite appropriate to adhere to *Grandstaff*.  Ehler at *9 (emphasis added).  This Court further noted as follows in Ehler:  [T]he proposition that the subsequent existence of a quality or condition may serve to establish its existence at an earlier time rests upon the general experience of humankind and is consonant with common sense.  When presented with such evidence, a factfinder ought to be given the opportunity to determine, based upon its weighing of all relevant evidence, whether a custom existed prior to an event by considering the municipality's response to the event itself as well as any other similar post-event occurrences.  Ibid.  (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As outlined extensively in our Brief, the individual Defendants as members of the Township Committee announced at public meetings their intent to terminate Plaintiff’s employment and associated him with complaints of racial profiling, notwithstanding the lack of any legitimate basis for those allegations against Plaintiff, thereby falsely labeling Plaintiff as a racist in the face of political and media pressure.
[brief] Res Judicata does not prohibit the application of discounts.  [...] cites boilerplate law defining res judicata, but zero case law supporting his absurd proposition that when improper actions are voided, and ill-gotten gains returned, any additional remedies (like a discounted buyout) are barred by res judicata.  According to [...], paying sanctions and damages magically makes a shareholder no longer the oppressor for a valuation analysis, with the slate somehow wiped clean.  Of course, this is just as absurd as it sounds.  Under [...]’s theory, if an art thief is eventually caught with the art, and made to return it, they are no longer subject to incarceration for their thievery.  If an assaulter reimburses his victim’s medical expenses, they are no longer a violent felon.  This, of course, is not the law: [...]’s payment of damages for wrongful conduct against the Company did not magically dissipate [...]’s status as the oppressor whose conduct caused his dissociation along with other remedies like damages.  The very fact that [...] was deemed to have effectively stolen, first, $700,000 from his company, and then over $1M in interests, and then the Company’s computers, and then was forced by court order to return the money and computers, is precisely what makes him the oppressor (among many other things).  The trial court did not fall for [...]’s nonsensical argument to the contrary.  [...] argues that “[...] obtained financial relief voiding more than $1,000,019 in membership interests issued to [...], received back $700,000 on a disputed loan, and more than $500,000 for legal fees and expenses as a sanction for misconduct in 2016. ”  Db23.  There is simply no law stating that payment of such damages “cleanses” [...]’s conduct and renders him no longer an oppressor.  Rather, discounts were properly applied to represent the financial reality of Appellant’s legitimate interest in the Company.  IV.
[brief] Plaintiff in this case alleges that a model-year 2016 [...] CR-V was defectively designed because it lacked two advanced driver-assistance features, Lane Keeping Assist (LKA) and Lane Departure Warning (LDW).  As [...] explains in its brief, the vehicle was reasonably safe as sold; [...] had no duty to design and incorporate every possible technological improvement; and the mere fact that these features might (or might not) have prevented the injuries in this case is not sufficient to establish liability.  Further, according to Plaintiff’s expert, while LKA or LDW were standard on only 5% of new 2016 vehicles, they were optional on 60%. (Pa143a.)  Thus, ordinary consumers had ready access to information relating both to the availability of these features and their cost.  There is nothing unusual about phasing in new driver-assistance technology.
[brief] Decedent's client file at [...] was stated to be lost.  It was the [...]' practice to maintain notes in the client file and drafts of changes to a will but none were produced at trial.  10T80:10-23.  Respondent contends an attorney's notes are not "crucial evidence" and there is no foreseeability of harm if the notes are unavailable.  Db at 51, 52.  Respondent contends that since [...] testified, under oath, about all his conversations with the Decedent and her wishes for the will, the notes are not relevant.  The fact that [...] testified about his communications with Decedent that occurred seven years earlier confirms that the notes he made contemporaneously with his meetings with Decedent were critical and material as impeachment evidence.  It has long been recognized that the notes and drafts of the proposed notes and the other documents constitute extrinsic evidence may be admitted to impeach a witness, see N.J.R.E. 607; See State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 535, 679 A.2d 121 (1996) (holding that for purposes of impeaching witness credibility, "relevant previous statements would be those that contradict or call into question [witness's] version of events as recounted at trial.").
[brief] *In explaining the reason for the presumption of undue influence when the donee enjoys a confidential relationship with the donor, we have stated that "[i]ts purpose is not so much to afford protection to the donor against the consequences of undue influence exercised over him by the donee, as it is to afford him protection against the consequences of voluntary action on his part, induced by the existence of the relationship between them, the effect of which upon his own interests he may only partially understand or appreciate."*  [In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 228 (quoting Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J. Eq. 447, 449 (E. & A. 1904)).]  With respect to a will, to create a presumption of undue influence the contestant, by comparison, must show the existence not only of a confidential relationship, but also "suspicious circumstances," however "slight."  Haynes, supra, 87 N.J. at 176.  Without proof of suspicious circumstances, a confidential relationship will not give rise to the presumption in the testamentary context.  5 N.J. Practice, Clapp, Wills & Administration § 62, at 224-28 (3d ed. 1982).  Underlying the absence of a requirement of showing suspicious circumstances with an inter vivos gift is the belief that a living donor is not likely to give to another something that he or she can still enjoy.  Id. at § 62, at 226 n. 15.  31
[directive] 83  All attorneys working full time for the Administrative Office of the Courts, or on the staff of any State or Federal Judge, or any vicinage of the Superior Court or any Municipal Court, County Clerk or Surrogate.  Attorneys serving as part-time municipal court directors, administrators, deputy administrators and violations bureau clerks are also exempt.  84  All County and full-time Municipal Prosecutors and Assistant Prosecutors, all attorneys in the Office of Counsel to the Governor, the Attorney General and all Deputy Attorneys General, the Public Defender and all Deputy Public Defenders and all full-time Municipal Public Defenders are exempt.  Part-time Municipal Prosecutors, part-time Municipal Public Defenders and Public Defender Pool Attorneys are not exempt; 85  All attorneys who work full time for criminal law enforcement or investigative agencies, such as police forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, County Sheriff, Federal Marshals, Casino Control Commission or the Internal Revenue Service; 86  Attorneys for whom the private practice of law is forbidden by Statute, Rule of Court or Court Order.  This exemption includes resident and non- resident attorneys who do not maintain a "bona fide office" under R. 1:21- 1(a).  A claim for exemption under this category, because the attorney does not maintain a bona fide office, must be accompanied by a certification that the attorney has not undertaken the representation of a private client or performed any legal service for a New Jersey resident or appeared in any New Jersey Court or other proceeding during the period that the attorney has not maintained a bona fide office; 87  Attorneys employed full time by a Legal Services Organization, as described in R. 1:21-1(d), and by a Legal Aid Society; 88  Attorneys who certify that they have performed at least twenty-five (25) hours of pro bono services for R. 1:21-1(d)  Legal Services Organization, Legal Aid Society, the United States Bankruptcy Court Pro Bono Program, Domestic Violence Services Programs, the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics and the Committee on Character, within the year next prior to the annual New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection registration date; 89 Attorneys who are members of the District Ethics Committees, Fee Arbitration Committee, Disciplinary Review Board, Disciplinary Oversight Committee and Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct.
[brief] The decision also cited to the length of the clause, which was 750 words running on in thirty-five unbroken lines, and stated that "[t]he best that can be said about the arbitration provision is that it is as difficult to read as other parts of the enrollment agreement."  Ibid.  Here, [...]’s arbitration provision similarly fails to adequately explain what [...] would be giving up by consenting to the Agreement.  The Agreement is deficient in several areas: 1. It does not explain how the rules of arbitration differ from those in court; 2. It fails to outline the differences between an arbitrator and a judge or jury; 3.  It provides no information on the limits of review when challenging an arbitrator’s decision; 4.  It does not specify the types of relief available in arbitration; and 5.  It offers no meaningful description of the rights being waived by the party.  [Pa0118-Pa0125]  As such, the Agreement does not satisfy the legal requirement to clearly explain both the rights that are waived and the rights that replace them.  See Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444.  Therefore, trial court made a reversible error in enforcing the Agreement and this Court should reverse and remand.
[brief] First, Defendants contend that “Plaintiff waived its rights to raise the issue” because, according to Defendants, “Plaintiff’s Counsel stated no issue of prejudice was raised” during oral argument on the motion.  (Db39.)  Defendants do not provide any legal authority to support this misguided theory, nor do they provide any factual support; instead, Defendants include a citation to the trial transcript wherein the trial court denied Defendants’ motion for involuntary dismissal.  (See Db39 (citing 5T69:19 to 70:9).)  Similarly, Defendants contend that Plaintiff “never filed a Motion for Reconsideration to permit the Court to revisit its conclusion and/or motion argument.
[brief] Management cannot argue that this was a selective act of God for one unit owner and not another.  In the aftermath Management has apparently decided that simply repairing the damage and awaiting the next storm is not a prudent policy and so Management decided to install a gate at the top of the stairs leading to a courtyard that had flooded both in 2014 and during Ida.  It appears that when the gate is closed while some water can leak through around the edges, any significant accumulation of water would flow through newly created rectangular holes at the base of the wall in what had previously been a solid wall and fall to the cliffs below.  I recognize that making repairs after an accident cannot be used to demonstrate that making a repair serves as an admission of liability.  However, hindsight is frequently 20/20 and this or some other remedy should and most certainly could have been done in the intervening 10 years during which Defendant aside from repairing the damage in 2014 did nothing to modify the property to prevent a reoccurrence.
[brief] *See also Moukengeschaie v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C.*, 2016 WL 1274541, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (“The FDCPA was enacted to protect consumers from abusive debt collection practices by third-party debt collectors, to create parity in the debt collection industry and to standardize governmental intervention in the debt collection market. ”).  In order to achieve these objectives, “the FDCPA creates a private right of action for debtors who have been harmed by abusive debt collection practices. ”  *Benzemann v. Citibank, N.A.*, 806 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  The FDCPA, however, is not intended to prevent legitimate debt collection activity.  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  Nor is it intended to afford a windfall to those debtors who have not been subjected to abusive or unlawful collection practices, or otherwise disadvantage debt collectors who refrain from such practices.
[brief] It is undisputed that [...] conducts random urinalyses on Correctional Sergeants and Officers as part of their employment policies.  (Aa53).  A urinalysis that tests positive for an illegal substance is a strict violation of [...]’s policies.  (Ibid.)  Petitioner, a Correctional Sergeant, tested positive for the metabolite of Cocaine, which means he ingested Cocaine, an illegal substance.
[brief] [...] argues that the [...] could not file a brief because the [...] “represented that it would abide the trial court’s ruling and award the Anticipated Contract in a manner consistent with the Judgment. ”  Pb31.  However, the statements cited by [...] were the [...]’s response to the trial court’s refusal to remand.  3T47-13 – 3T50-5.  As discussed in [...]’s brief on the merits (the “[...] Brief”), the trial court had already ruled, wrongly in [...]’s view, that there was no basis for a discretionary refusal to waive, and the trial court and [...] considered remand a waste of time under the circumstances.  Db48\(^1\).
[brief] Da071 Exh S (Email of [...] to [...] dated May 8, 2023-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da072 Exh T (Second Addendum to Agreement of Sale Executed by all parties dated May 8, 2023-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .