ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] testified that he could not recall anything about the over ten to possibly thirty fares he picked up on May 27, 2012, but he was able to remember the details of defendant’s cab ride over ten years later, including times and locations.  Conveniently, he recalled dropping defendant off at the [...], where [...] lived, at 1:00 a.m., and waiting for him to return ten to fifteen minutes later, which covered the very time [...] claimed defendant was in her apartment.  (15T6-21 to 9-7; 19T8-25 to 9-12; 19T9-23 to 10-25).  The court correctly concluded [...] was “coached or otherwise [his] memories [were] refreshed as to this particular incident and driving the defendant in this particular case.  . . .”  19T10-25 to 11-6).  It was also incredible that [...] did not know defendant was in trouble until he spoke with defendant’s mother five to seven years after the cab ride, and did not offer his assistance until he was approached some eight years later by a private investigator.
[brief] (2016), *supra*, at 559-60; [...] et al., *Maturation of the Adolescent Brain*, 9 Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 449, 450-56 (2013); [...] and [...], *Longitudinal Development of Human Brain Wiring Continues from Childhood into Adulthood*, 31 The J. of Neuroscience 10937, 10943 (2011); [...] et al., *Prediction of Individual Brain Maturity Using fMRI*, 329 Science 1358, 1359 (2010); [...], *Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain*, 1021 Annals of the N.Y. Acad. Of Sci. 77, 83 (2004).  Overall, developmental scientists perceive a maturational imbalance in late adolescents.
[directive] ”  Id. at 170- 71.  A “prosecutor winking at and tolerating the violation of the laws” is not properly exercising whatever discretion he possesses.  Id.  “The duty of a prosecuting officer necessarily requires that in each case he examine the available evidence, the law and the facts, and the applicability of each to the other, and that he intelligently weigh the chances of successful termination of the prosecution .  . . .”  State v. Ward, 303 N.J. Super. 47, 57 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Winne, 12 N.J. at 172).  When a prosecutor does not weigh the facts and the applicable law in the case before him, but instead rests his decision- making on categorical policies or practices not grounded in the law, he has not yet begun to exercise his prosecutorial discretion.  See Winne, 12 N.J. at 173; see also Baynes, 148 N.J. at 451.  For these reasons, a municipal prosecutor may not adopt a “decriminalization” policy or practice of refusing to seek convictions for statutory offenses related to marijuana, without regard to the particular facts and applicable law in the individual case before him.
[brief] (23T178-3 to 8; 23T178-11 to 12).  He denied that he was in a silver-colored vehicle that morning.  (23T178-13 to 16).  Defendant denied fleeing after the shootings.  (24T242-1).  He claimed that for the twelve days between the shootings and his arrest, he was avoiding being killed.  (24T243-15 to 21).  He claimed that when he left the Akbar, he was running to protect his life.  (24T245-4 to 10).  Defendant claimed that after the shootings, [...] came to his home and took the gun defendant had used to shoot [...].  (24T218-6 to 14).  Defendant claimed that “[...]” told [...] to get the gun.  (24T227-5 to 8; 24T228-9 to 10).  [...] testified for the defense.
[brief] “The many innocent plaintiffs that suffer injury because of unreasonable accumulations should not be left without recourse. ”(Id., See Stewart, 87 N.J. at 155, 157).  We submit that same question here in a quasi-commercial or commercial setting: why should this appellant, [...] be left without legal  It is clear from a review of the testimony before the Court and the law that the defendant [...] had a duty to safely remediate snow and ice conditions at their property, refrain from creating hazards, and finally, had duty to warn of hazards.
[brief] This small claims case involved the vehicle that had belonged to the late mother of the Plaintiffs, [...] and [...] (brother and sister).  The vehicle, a 2000 Nissan Sentra, was the only item she had that was of any value (i. e. aside from a few de minimis items such as her clothing and a few pieces of old dilapidated furniture, she had no other assets and had died virtually penniless).  Prior to the events leading up to this lawsuit, two of the defendants in this case (both of whom were junk yards / auto recyclers) had agreed to buy the vehicle; however both of them had failed to come through as agreed.  Then on May 9, 2022, the vehicle was reported to the local police department as being abandoned, and as a result it was then towed to the junkyard of defendant [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).  Two days later on May 11th, the local police department released the vehicle to Plaintiff-Appellant [...].  (For the sake of simplicity, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] shall hereinafter refer to himself in the first person).  For reasons discussed in subsequent sections of this brief, Plaintiff [...] is not participating in this appeal.
[brief] Respondent fails to contradict the plethora of uncontradicted testimony by the Petitioner of the multiple reports she makes each week to the chief of police, zoning officer, code enforcement official, animal control officers and others.  (Pa14).  Respondent tries to refute this by creating an element which does not exist in this factor, namely that Petitioner did not satisfy this requirement because, “she was not reporting the way in which her work was being conducted.  Rather, she was meeting with them as a part of the regular process required to reach a case disposition”.  (Rb36).  This element was completely made up by [...] and the Respondent and it appears nowhere in the IRS 20 Factor Test.  Moreover, this does show control since this is part of the disposition of cases on the docket which is exclusively controlled by [...].  Reporting to municipal officials in the way in which cases are disposed of demonstrates employee status.
[brief] (See Pb5 (citing Pa3). )  After a hospitalization, he was admitted to [...] for rehabilitation on January 13, 2016.  (See Pb5-6 (citing Pa3). )  Plaintiff’s theory of the case was that “defendant and its nursing staff deviated from the standard of care owed to [...] and violated his rights under the NHA,” (Pb6 (citing 7T110:2-14), that Mr. --- 5  Although plaintiff indicates that [...] is a “long-term care facility” (see Pb5), it is uncontroverted that [...] was admitted to [...] for short-term “rehabilitation and respiratory services. ” (Pb5-6).  It thus remains the defendant’s position that he was not admitted to a “nursing home” for “for extended medical and nursing treatment or care” “on a continuing basis” in the meaning of the NHA.
[brief] 6  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................  6  (Raised Below: 7T 36:8-25; 37:1-19)  II.  APPLICATION OF THE INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD AND LEVEL OF REVIEW REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT’S DECISION BE DEEMED ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE .........................................................................................................................  9 (Raised Below: 7T 39:4-12; 42:24-25; 43:1-11)  III.  DEFENDANT’S FACTUALLY UNSUPPORTED AND LEGALLY MISGUIDED  DENIAL MUST BE REVERSED WHEN SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE REQUESTED HEIGHT VARIANCE WHEN APPLYING THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................................................. 17  (Raised Below: 7T 6:11-25; 7:1-17; 16:6-21; 39:12-25 through 42:23; 43:12-254 through 46:1; 49:10-25 through 52:1-21)
[brief] There was no contrary position taken by Plaintiff in connection with the underlying motion to dismiss.  (See T1 – T22).  In fact, Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to the [...]’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint repeated much of Plaintiff’s “clarification” in this regard, i.e., that Plaintiff’s claims were LAD claims.  (See, e.g., Pa173-174, 191, 195-196, 200).  Accordingly, the [...] did not advance other arguments as to the specious allegations set forth in Count IV, nor did the Trial Court need to address any such other amorphous allusions to claims (if any).  Of course, to the extent Count IV did purport to be some claim other than a specious LAD failure to accommodate claim, Count IV would be subject to dismissal since Plaintiff failed to plead that it exhausted its administrative remedies under the parties’ collective negotiations agreement.
[brief] (Sa123).  It was not until August 2014, when [...] happened to see [...] at a restaurant and [...] asked about the status of the subscription documentation memorializing the group’s investment, that [...] learned that the group had come to an investment agreement and had given defendant the funds.  (1T144-8 to 145-8).  [...] was stunned because he had not approved any investment, as he was required to do under the terms of the operating agreement, nor had he even been told that the investment had been made.
[brief] Instead, Plaintiff defends his attorney’s remarks as “rhetorical,” “aphoristic,” “pedagogic,” and a means of explaining a stipulated liability case to jurors unfamiliar with civil procedure.  Defendants agreed they were at fault.  They did not agree Plaintiff had sustained a permanent injury.  The jury was tasked with resolving that dispute.  Each side was entitled to have it decide the case based upon the facts presented.  It was completely unnecessary, however, for the jury to consider which side had done the right thing in insisting upon a trial.  The danger inherent in injecting concepts of right and wrong into these proceedings was that once the jury decided in Plaintiff’s favor, its damage award was influenced by Defendants’ alleged failure to accept “accountability” for their actions.  Even in the absence of an objection by trial counsel, that harm cannot be ignored, and a new trial is warranted.
[brief] A year later, in County of Passaic, the Appellate Division similarly found that because the parties were “represented by counsel at all relevant stages of their negotiations” the express waiver in Atalese was not triggered as the parties to the contract “are sophisticated” and “possess comparatively equal bargaining power.  County of Passaic, 474 N.J. Super. at 503.  Even if Plaintiffs are consumers, they do not fit within the consumer model that Atalese intends to shield.
[brief] See e.g. DA18 at ¶ 14, DA69-DA79.  Notably, provisions concerning Plaintiff’s ordinary disability application were at the forefront of those negotiations.  Thus, it was readily apparent that the Parties appreciated the risk of Plaintiff’s disability retirement application being denied, and they specifically memorialized as much in the Agreement.  C.  THE TOWNSHIP’S DUTY TO EFFECTUATE PLAINTIFF’S IOD APPLICATION DID NOT INCLUDE SEVERANCE OF THE RETURN TO WORK PROVISIONS.
[directive] 5.  There is no civil litigation, existing or anticipated, between the complaining witness and the defendant concerning the same or similar facts as are contained in the complaint.  In the event of such civil litigation, I have informed the complaining witness that neither I nor any member of my firm will undertake the complaining witness’ representation in that matter.  Check if correct.  If not, please explain:  6.  There are no other facts that could reasonably affect the impartiality of the private prosecutor and the fairness of the proceedings or otherwise create an appearance of impropriety.  Check if correct.  If not, please explain:  Comments:  Please attach additional sheets if necessary.  CERTIFICATION  IN LIEU OF OATH  I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  Date: Name of Applicant: Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #13-08 (10/08/2008), CN 10202-English page 2 of 2
[directive] Revocation of Seeking Presumption of the Overcoming 8.4.5 release of revocation of seeking presumption rebuttable a is there where case any  In seeking motion shall a file prosecutor 8.4.4, the or 8.4.3, 8.4.2, 8.4.1, subsection to pursuant designated prosecutor supervisory 2A:162-24 a unless N.J.S.A. to pursuant release of revocation be can release defendant's by posed risks the (1) that determines 7.8 Section to pursuant the (2) or monitoring, and conditions release enhanced imposing new by adequately controlled the  If revocation of release.
[brief] The *Lipsky* order, like the ESI Order here, was therefore “unduly invasive and burdensome” and contravened *Rule* 4:10-2(g).  *Id.* at 470.  The trial court’s error blurs the lines between documents containing agreed-upon search terms and the smaller universe of documents that are actually relevant to the case.  If repeated, this error would make New Jersey a uniquely inefficient forum for litigation.
[brief] Buckley had nothing to do with the propriety of awarding punitive damages against partners who have been found to have breached their fiduciary duties.  “The fundamental question in th[at] case,” as explained the Supreme Court, “[wa]s whether a customer may recover against a drawee bank for mental anguish and punitive damages caused by the bank’s wrongful dishonor of the customer’s check drawn payable to a third party. ”  Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc., 111 N.J. 355, 357 (1988).  Even so, the Supreme Court held in Buckley that “[p]unitive damages are allowable … when the wrongful dishonor reflects actual malice by a bank officer toward the customer. ”  See id.  If punitive damages can be awarded for dishonoring a check, they certainly are proper where, as here, partners maliciously dishonor their fiduciary duties and steal millions of dollars from their partners.
[brief] Harris, Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 Okla. L. Rev. at 154.  Seventy-one years later, the reasons why the common law could not permit rights in favor of a stranger to a deed remain extinct.  Our modern society conveys real estate via deeds that, once duly recorded and indexed, enjoy priority under the New Jersey Recording Act against other unrecorded or later recorded instruments.  The Court should, therefore, reject Appellants’ suggestion that Wildwood Crest be distinguished, limited, or in any way deviated from in favor of the common law as there exists no good faith reason to do so other than to grant the [...] an estate in land that their predecessors in interest, the [...], never intended.
[brief] Pa156.  That rubric is entirely consistent with the actual procedural history of this case.  The Supreme Court made several discrete rulings, upholding the Appellate Court on every point except the application of the burden:  We affirm the Appellate Division's core holding that trial courts determine on a case-by-case basis what conditions, if any, to place on a DME -- including who may attend and whether it may be recorded -- with no absolute prohibitions or entitlements.  We depart from the Appellate Division only in that we decline to place the burden on the Plaintiff to show special reasons why third-party observation or recording should be permitted in each case.  Instead, once the Defendant issues notice to the Plaintiff of a Rule 4:19 exam, the Plaintiff should inform the Defendant if they seek to bring a neutral observer or unobtrusively record the examination.  If the Defendant objects, the two sides should meet and confer to attempt to reach agreement.  If agreement is impossible, the Defendant may move for a protective order under Rule 4:10-3 seeking to prevent the exam from being recorded, or to prevent a neutral third-party observer from attending.  Factors including a Plaintiff's cognitive limitations, psychological impairments, language barriers, age, and inexperience with the legal system may weigh in favor of allowing unobtrusive recording and the presence of a neutral third-party observer.  Although defense neuropsychologists cannot dictate the terms under which DMEs are held, they can raise concerns that may weigh against recording or third-party observation in particular instances.  DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 219 – 20 (2023).  Plaintiff’s counsel, in the instant appeal, repeatedly refers to the fact that English is not the Plaintiff’s native language.  However, both the Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme Court address this issue, indicating that if the parties cannot agree on a neutral interpreter, that the Court may appoint one.
[brief] Neither [...] nor [...] saw the man drop a beer bottle in the vestibule, though they testified that they had not seen a bottle in the vestibule before the man entered the bank that morning.  (3T 60-22 to 25, 82-5 to 8, 103-5 to 8, 109-1 to 3)  [...] testified that he did see the man drop a bottle while leaving the bank, but despite giving a statement to police on the day of the incident, [...] did not tell police about this observation.  (3T 118-13 to 18, 120-19 to 121-3)  State Police Detective [...] was among the officers who responded to the bank.  (4T 17-9 to 10, 18-12 to 18)  Hannan testified that he saw a beer bottle and money on the floor of the vestibule, and police collected both, gathering $400 in total.  (4T 19-6 to 22, 23-6 to 11, 26-9 to 12)  The money was tested for fingerprints, but none were detected.  (4T 26-15 to 23)  Police recovered surveillance videos of the incident, though no camera captures the exact area where the bottle was found inside the vestibule.  (3T 46-15 to 47-7, 70-14 to 20; 4T 28-1 to 10)  The bottle was submitted to the State lab for DNA testing.  (4T 35-1 to 4)  [...], the State’s expert in DNA forensic analysis, analyzed two swabs that were taken from the bottle—one from the mouthpiece and one from the outside.  (4T 72-1, 77-22 to 78-1, 82-21 to 84-3)  She was unable to generate a DNA profile for the sample taken from the mouthpiece but generated a full, single-source profile for the sample from the outside of the bottle.  (4T 83-23 to 84-3, 90-2 to 5, 91-23 to 25)  She determined that the profile matched a profile generated from a buccal swab from [...].  (4T 86-14 to 24, 88-22 to 89-5)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Plaintiff has not properly addressed [...] argument under FRFPA.  (34a)**  As argued in Point III of its brief, [...] properly analyzed the applicability of FRFPA from the point of view of third-party defendants.  If [...] has liability to plaintiff for payment of a policy limit, then [...] may argue plaintiff’s admittedly illegal contract with third parties’ decedent would prejudice its subrogation rights.  Prejudice to subrogation rights does void the policy.  *Ferrante v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Group*, 232 N.J. 460, 474 (2016).  **CONCLUSION**  Defendant, [...] Insurance Company, respectfully requests the court enter an order dismissing plaintiff’s appeal with prejudice.  In the event this honorable court reverses the final order of the trial court below and remands the case for further proceedings, [...] asks the court also to reinstate all crossclaims, counterclaims, and third-party claims of [...] against all other parties to the action.
[brief] At sentencing, the trial court found no mitigating factors and three aggravating factors: the risk the defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(3); the extent of the defendant's prior record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(6); and the need for deterrence, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(9).  In deciding to impose more than the mandatory minimum sentence, the court stated:
[brief] The issues on appeal, typically involve “one or more of four basic standards of review: 1) the de novo, or plenary, standard of review applied to rulings of law; 2) the highly deferential standard applied to findings of facts; 3) the mixed standard applied to mixed questions of law and fact; or 4) the highly deferential standard applied to matters committed to the sound discretion of the lower court”.  “New Jersey Standards For Appellate Review” by [...], Director, Central Appellate Research Staff, Appellate Division, New Jersey Superior Court (August 2022 Revision), citing, Mandel, N.J. Appellate Practice §34:2-3 (2022).  The Appellant primarily presented issues subject to ‘findings of fact’.  The Appellant's legal issues presented in Points II, III, IV, and V\(^4\) are tethered to the lower court’s finding of facts to which a deferential standard must --- \(^4\) II.
[brief] See T23-24 (rejecting the FDCPA claim under letter vendor theory of liability, finding that deciding that the use of a letter vendor as a violation of the FDCPA is a “hypercritical analysis, …, of the statute, and, therefore, it does not constitute a violation of the statute on its face. ”); [...] v. [...], et.al., [...] (Sup. Ct. June 26, 2023), at pp.5-13 (“to ignore the reality that debt collectors employ letter vendors to prepare correspondence necessary for their lawful operations and, in effect, to require such debt collectors to conduct business on a fully integrated basis with the need for an outside letter vendor, period.  …
[brief] In his plenary brief, [...] explained that the non-custodial portions of his sentence are illegal because the court lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions on his existing parole supervision for life, and because no law authorized the imposition of the specific conditions: (1) no contact with the dog; (2) no future ownership, care, or control over other animals; and (3) anger management counseling.  (Db 18 to 28)  The State responds that the three conditions added to [...]’s preexisting parole supervision were legally imposed for three primary reasons: (1) [...] induced the court to impose parole conditions; (2) this Court’s holding in State v. Beauchamp, 262 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 1993), that courts cannot impose parole conditions does not apply to [...]; and (3) the no-animals condition was authorized by law.  Each of these arguments is fundamentally flawed.  ______________________
[directive] overseen and directed by the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity & Accountability and the Office of Justice Data.  9.11.2  On a periodic basis, and no later than January 31 of the following year, every agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and the Attorney General, and publish misconduct on the agency’s public website, a brief synopsis of all complaints an agency member: where (a) Was terminated; (b) Was reduced in rank or grade; (c) Was assessed a suspension of more than five days.  A suspension of more than five days shall be broadly construed to include any disposition involving a suspension of more than 40 hours of time or the equivalent of five days/shifts if less than 40 hours, regardless of whether any of the suspension time was suspended or held in abeyance.  It shall include the loss of vacation, sick or leave time totaling more than 40 hours or the equivalent of five days/shifts.  It shall include any combination of suspension time assessed plus loss of vacation, sick or leave time that aggregates to more than 40 hours or the equivalent of five days/shifts.  It shall also include any fine that exceeds the gross value of 40 hours, or the equivalent of five days/shifts, of pay; (d)
[brief] [...] acknowledges its complaint was filed out-of-time, and thus its only opportunity to receive a merits review of its challenges to this ordinance were if the court exercised its discretion under R. 4:69-6(c) to lift the procedural bar.  As set forth at length above, the trial court did not err in determining, as a matter of law, that such enlargement was not justified in this case.  Cf. Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96, 109 (App. Div. 2008) (affirming trial court’s grant of motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e) because prerogative writs complaint was untimely and stating “if a plaintiff’s complaint is manifestly untimely or procedurally deficient, the defendant should not be compelled to suffer the burdens of continued litigation”).