ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa114)  On June 29, 2023, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal as to the trial court’s March 31, 2023 and May 12, 2023 Orders.  On July 6, 2023, the court issued a non-finality letter to Petitioner and required her within 15 days to move for leave to appeal or submit either a letter of explanation as to why the appealed orders were final or a letter withdrawing the appeal.  (DA3)  On July 13, 2023, [...] filed a letter advising the court of its position that the appealed orders were not final and that Petitioner’s filed appeal was improperly interlocutory.  On July 17, 2023, Petitioner filed her own letter claiming that the appealed orders were final and ripe for appeal.  On the same date, [...] filed their own letter advising that the appealed orders were not final.  By Order dated September 14, 2023, this court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal without prejudice subject to the filing of a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
[directive] Definitions.  in Supplemental  As used this Directive: Division of Criminal Justice.  "Director" means the Director of the New Jersey a. or with law enforcement  "Law enforcement agency" means any agency department b. operating under the authority of the laws or prosecution powers and responsibilities of the State of New Jersey.  officer operating under the "Law enforcement officer" means any law enforcement c. of Jersey.  authority of the laws of the State New or "principal" means law enforcement officer "Principal of the investigation" a d. 3  Page this to pursuant conducted investigation the of subject the is whose conduct 2006-  No.  Directive  Enforcement  General Law Attorney and Supplemental Directive 5. conducted investigation an means "investigation" investigation" or "Use-of-force of use any of 2006-5  No. Directive Enforcement General Law Attorney to pursuant a to injury bodily serious involving or death officer enforcement law a by force a to injury any injury, where or with no employed force deadly is person, where or terms  These officer. enforcement law firearm a by of use the a from results person the in acting while an officer such by force of of use investigation the an include authority her of or his exhibiting evidence or official duties of performance  These used. was when force the on duty officer not was that notwithstanding the officer who an of by force of use investigation the criminal include not a do terms her or of his exhibiting evidence or duties official of performance in acting not was violence).  domestic of act an committing while (ems., authority enforcement law Supersedure. and Scope 2. and herein, defined investigations as use-of-force all to applies Supplemental Directive This Any No.2006-5.
[directive] Thereafter, prima facie contraband shall be forfeited to the entity funding the prosecuting agency involved, subject to the rights of owners and others holding interests pursuant to section 2C:64-5.  L. s. s.  Amended by 1979, c. 344, 2; 1981, c. 290, s. 47; 1987, c. 106, 17.  Forfeiture procedures  2C:64-3.  2C:64-3.  Forfeiture procedures.
[brief] The [...] has also stated that “[a] debt collector may contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties. ”  Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the FDCPA, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,104 (Dec. 13, 1988).  Expanding on this, the [...] noted in its most-recent FDCPA rule-making:  The Bureau understands from its outreach that many covered persons currently use vendors to provide validation notices.  In the Operations Study, over 85 percent of debt collectors surveyed by the Bureau reported using letter vendors.  86 FR 5766-01 (emphasis added).  Rather than expressing concern over these statistics, the [...] even confirmed that debt collectors may include the letter vendor’s return mail address on collection letters for returned mail, disputes, and payments.  Id.  If the [...] believed debt collectors’ use of letter vendors to mail collection letters is prohibited by any provision of the FDCPA, it would have said so in its more than 650-page rulemaking notice.
[brief] I.  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF RESCISSION WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE IT WAS INCOMPLETE AND BECAUSE THE CERTIFICATION RELIED ON BY RESPONDENTS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED THEIR ARGUMENT.  (RESPONDENTS’ POINTS II/VIII & APPELLANT’S POINT VI).  .................................................................  4  II.  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF BREACH OF DUTIES/AGREEMENTS WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND THE TRIAL COURT  INCORRECTLY APPLIED  THE GOVERNING AGREEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO [...] AND [...].  (RESPONDENTS’ POINTS III/VIII & APPELLANT’S POINT VI).........................................................  6  A.  The Operating Agreement of [...] does not govern the operation of [...].  ...........................................................................................................  6  B.  The Operating Agreement of [...] does not give the Members direct management authority, despite what Respondents allege and the trial court found..................................................................................  7  C.  The Bylaws of [...] do not require that loans first be approved of the shareholders, except in the case of loans made to directors or officers of the corporation.  (See Da879-80).  ..............................................  8  D.  The loans made by [...] were neither loans to a director nor loans to an officer.  .............................................................................................................  8  E.  Even if the Bylaws did require shareholder approval prior to making any loan – which they did not – Appellant, as the sole Manager of [...], was the only individual authorized by law to consent on behalf of [...]’s sole shareholder, which was [...].  ............  8  III.
[brief] ”  Id. at 294.  Here, [...] was never given an opportunity to consult with his “guardian. ”  Unlike M.P., [...] didn’t even have the opportunity to consult with his guardian in private prior to the reading of the Miranda warnings.  Id.  Instead, no private consultation took place at all.  The extent of the consultation was:  [...]: “Ok.  And [...], you’re okay with him talking to us?  [...] Kologi: “That’s Steve. ”  [...]: “Steve; I’m sorry. ”  [...]: “Yes, I’m okay with that. ”  You’re okay with it?  [...] Kologi: “I think, pretty much. ”  [7T:291-3 to 9]  There was no private consultation at all and the extent of the consultation that occurred was two seconds in front of two detectives where [...] asks [...] if he was “Okay with it. ”  To which [...] simply replied, “I think, pretty much. ”  M.P. put heavy weight on a private consultation that occurred before the Miranda warnings were given, whereas, here, the State puts very little weight that a private consultation did not occur before or after the Miranda warnings.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT PERMITTING [...] TO TESTIFY FINDING PLAINTIFF CANNOT CIRCUMVENT HIS LACK OF EXPERIENCE BY SPECULATING THAT HE COULD PARTNER WITH AN EXPERIENCED DEVELOPER  It would flip the “reasonable certainty” standard on its head if an inexperienced plaintiff were allowed to satisfy a heightened standard by simply asserting that it planned to team with an experienced professional/developer to complete its project and earn a profit.  This is plainly at odds with the heightened reasonable certainty standard employed by Courts of New York and Illinois, as adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  The Appellate Division recognized this falsehood.  Specifically, the Appellate Division rejected [...] arguments that he could have partnered with others to develop the affordable housing project at [...]:  *We also reject [...]'s argument that he could have partnered with other individuals with more experience and completed the projects.*  [...] lost interest in the [...] project after it was converted to an affordable housing development and he sold his interest to [...].  *Although [...] contacted someone who had experience in this area, he never consummated a partnership with this individual* [i.e., Bershtein].  (Id. at 24)(emphasis added).  Any speculation that plaintiff “could possibly have” partnered with an experienced developer to make up for its lack of ability is therefore misplaced.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The group left the basketball court and [...] tried to get a car, but he was unable to find one suitable for his purposes.  [...] called the cell phone\(^2\) of a taxi driver, [...], and asked [...] to drive his brother and his girlfriend to New Jersey.  [...] drove [...] and [...] to New Jersey, but stopped for gas on the way.  While [...] went into the store at the gas station, [...] pulled up in a car and told [...] that if she “pulled it off” he would love her forever.  [...], [...], and [...] arrived at the [...] at approximately 4:30 a.m., after mistakenly going to two other Holiday Inn hotels.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from the September 22, 2023  Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County.  Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C., ret’d, t/a BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...]  DATED: May 22, 2024
[brief] A.  The Parties’ Relationship And [...]’ First Loan to [...]  As the trial court found, [...] and [...] enjoyed a close friendship which began in 2004.  Da8-9; 1T50-6 to 52-13.  In fact, [...] considered [...] to be one of his closest friends.  Da9; 1T50-6 to 52-13.  In 2008, [...] told [...] that he was in urgent need of cash and, based on their friendship, asked Plaintiff to loan him money.  Da9; 1T53-8 to 54-1.  [...] explained to [...] that he had cash flow issues due, in part, to his involvement in certain land use litigation, and that he could not obtain elsewhere the capital he needed to continue his operations.  Da9; Da199-202 (Ex. P15); Da203-15 (Ex. P16); 1T54-2 to 20, 93-18 to 94-13.  [...] agreed to loan [...] the principal sum of $330,000, and [...] proposed and insisted on paying interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, based on the interest rate he was then paying to another private lender.  Da10; Da162-63 (Ex. P1); Da181-82 (Ex. P8); Da189-93 (Ex. P12); Da203-15 (P16); 1T54-21 to 55-25; 2T293-1 to 4.  [...] also offered that one of his companies, [...], would guarantee repayment of the loan (“Guarantee”) and, further, that the Guarantee would be secured by a mortgage (“Mortgage”) on an office building owned by the Guarantor ([...]) located at [...] (“Property”).  Da10; Da169-72 (Ex. P5); Da174-80 (Ex. P7); 1T55-25 to 56-2.  The parties documented the terms of the loan (“First Loan”) by their execution of a Promissory Note (“Note”), the Guarantee, and the Mortgage.  Da11; Da165-68 (Ex. P4); Da169-172 (Ex. P5); Da174-80 (Ex. P7); 1T71-8 to 14, 73-1 to 5.  The trial court found that, by the categorical terms of the Note and the Mortgage, the Mortgage secured only [...]’s Guarantee; the Mortgage did not secure Defendants’ payment obligation.  Da11; 1T78-6 to 11.  The trial court also expressly found that, among other rights, [...] reserved the right under the Note to release the Guarantee’s collateral (i.e., the Mortgage) without affecting or impairing the Defendants’ continuing repayment obligations on the First Loan.  Da12-13; Da167 (P4).  The Note also provided that, in addition to other relief to which he would be entitled in the event of default, [...] would be entitled to recover the costs and legal fees incurred in enforcing his rights under the Note and security agreements.  Da13; Da167 (Ex. P4).  --- 3  Although the First Loan was initially made from Plaintiff’s Retirement Plan (Da10; Da173 (Ex. P6)), upon the advice of his accountant, [...] later assigned the First Loan to himself, individually.  B.
[brief] At trial, the surveillance video from the robbery, which did not have audio, was played.  Although [...] maintained that the robber in the store was in constant communication with another person, relating to the robbery, after viewing the video, [...] admitted that there was five separate occasions where the robber in the store was not on the phone.  (4T 49-14 to 19, 51-11 to 13)  In his interview with the police immediately following the robbery, [...] had a different recollection of what he overheard on the phone.
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  This Rule provides that the defendant, after conviction, shall be admitted to bail on motion and notice to the county prosecutor pending the prosecution of an appeal or proceedings for certification only if it appears that the case involves a substantial question that should be determined by the appellate court, that the Rule 2:9-4 safety of any person or of the community will not be seriously threatened if the defendant remains on bail, and that there is no significant risk of defendant’s flight.  Bail After Conviction  A trial court denying bail shall state briefly its reason therefore.
[directive] PROPERTY CONTROL POLICY AND PROCEDURE  The chief law enforcement officer should develop and implement written policy governing the property and evidence function.  This policy should outline the responsibilities and duties of officers as they apply to the handling of property.  The policy also provides practical, step-by-step procedures for the receipt, handling, packaging, storage and reporting functions pertaining to property.  Appendix A contains a model property and evidence policy which can be 9 used as a guideline for a police department in developing its own written policy.
[brief] “The doctrine of unclean hands in equity matters has been expressed to be applicable in 30 C.J.S., Equity, §99, pp. 496, 497, in the following terms:  ‘Equity will not open its doors to one who seeks its aid for the purpose of violating a contract or who seeks to enforce alleged rights arising from a contract which he himself breached.  * * *’  Citing Pike v. Pike, 100 N.J. Eq. 486 (Ch. 1927) with approval.  The doctrine of unclean hands has alternatively been expressed as follows: ‘Equity will not aid a fraud doer’, Herder v Garman, 106 N.J. Eq. 13 (Ch. 1930); ‘He that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity.  2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1941) §397, p.90.  ‘Unclean hands’ within the meaning of the maxim of equity, is a figurative description of a class of suitors to whom a court of equity as a court of conscience will not even listen, because the conduct of such suitors is itself unconscionable i. e., morally reprehensible as to known facts. ’  Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387 (E.&A. 1906).  . . .The rule is that while general iniquitous conduct will not operate to bar plaintiff from relief by reason of unclean hands, iniquitous conduct relating to the particular matter or transaction to which judicial protection is sought will operate to bar relief.  . . .Where the relief sought by the plaintiff is the result of his own wrongdoing, where the unclean hands of the plaintiff has infected the very subject matter in litigation, the plaintiff is barred from relief in a court of equity.
[brief] Although our courts are gradually moving away from the common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee to broader principles of tort obligations in performing a duty analysis when a plaintiff does not fit precisely in one of the classifications, the law pertaining to the common law classifications applies when the plaintiff falls squarely within a classification.  *Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus*, 214 N.J. 303, 316-317 (2013).  This is because a full duty analysis has already been performed for the common law classifications.  *Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC*, 209 N.J. 35, 45 (2012).  As the Supreme Court explained:  The common law categories are a shorthand, in well-established classes of cases, for the duty analysis; they, too, are based on the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, the ability to exercise care, and considerations of public policy.  The only difference is that, through the evolution of our common law, the duty analysis has already been performed in respect of invitees, licensees (social guests), and trespassers.  In furtherance of the goal of a ‘reasonable degree of predictability,’ those standards continue to guide us.  *Id.* (citations omitted).  The common law classifications set forth established duties on a sliding scale such that “as the legal status of the visitor improves, the possessor of land owes him more of an obligation of protection. ”  *Id.* at 43-44.  Therefore, the duty of care owed to a licensee is greater than that owed to a trespasser but less than that owed to an invitee.  *Lechler v. 303 Sunset Ave. Condo. Ass’n*, 452 N.J. Super. 574, 583 (App. Div. 2017).  It is undeniable that the plaintiff falls squarely within the classification of an invitee as a customer of defendant [...]’s commercial establishment when she tripped on the raised foot of a barricade that defendant [...] erected along the means of ingress and egress from the store.
[directive] Note also that any person who comrmts a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 (possession of a firearm while committing a drug distribution/possessinn with intent to distribute offense) is automatically ineligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b.  See Part 1I, Section 2, nifra. -11- N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d (as amended by L.~. 2007, e~ 341, sec. 7) tualess the prosecutor would be authorized to award aggravating factor points for Brimagg Aggravating Factor #4b if the offer,s prosecutor were to prepare a Brima~e plea School Zone Cases Where Defendants Upon Conviction Are No~t Eligible for Judicial Waiver or Reduction of the Mandatory Sentence a.  Requirement to contest eligibility and to tender a Brimage plea offer
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  Appellate review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo.  *Bello v. Lyndhurst Bd. of Educ.*, 344 N.J. Super. 187, 190 (App. Div. 2001).  An appellate court “appl[ies] the same standard that governs the trial court’s review. ”  *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  “A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when the moving party establishes the absence of any genuine issue as to a material fact. ”  *Turner v. Wong*, 363 N.J. Super. 186, 199 (App. Div. 2003) (citing *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 539–40 (1995)).  The trial “judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 242–43 (1986)).  The Appellate Court must “accept plaintiff’s version of defendant’s conduct as true and give plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts. ”  *Turner*, 363 N.J. Super. at 199.
[brief] 256 N.J. Super. at 609.  Observing that the Fair Act was not an “impeccable specimen of draftsmanship,” this court addressed the complexities of whether the three statutory remedies called for agency rule making.  Here, the complexities of rate increase filing have been addressed in the NAIC’s model regulations, adopted here in New Jersey as N.J.A.C. 11:34-18, and the ASOPs.
[brief] But even if we accept that the 16-inch pipe was a "reliability" project, the regulator is emphatically not.  It is a capacity expansion project.  The current regulator, by the company's own witnesses' admissions, is providing all the reliability that the 16-inch pipe needs now and into the decarbonized future.  The proposed regulator adds nothing by way of reliability – it is the equivalent of demanding a gas-guzzling, greenhouse gas-emitting Maserati to replace a perfectly competent Ford Focus, confident that someone else will pay for it.  (Unlike the Focus, the current regulator has no emissions at all.)  The [...]'s "finding" that it isn't a capacity expansion project, Ha55, is, therefore, arbitrarily and capriciously incorrect.
[brief] However, instead of properly considering and finding mitigating factor seven, the court abused its discretion by finding aggravating factors three, “[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense,” and six, “[t]he extent of the defendant’s prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), (6).  The court based its finding of both factors solely on [...]’s criminal record, noting that while [...]’s only two prior indictable convictions were “somewhat old,” his record was not “unblemished. ” (9T:11-6 to 13, 14-18 to 15-9).  The court also abused its discretion by improperly considering [...]’s prior arrests – none of which resulted in convictions – in its decision to apply aggravating factor six.  Our Supreme Court has made clear that “prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose” unless the underlying conduct is undisputed or specific findings of fact are made.
[brief] ………………………………………………………………  Pa50  Exhibit 8 – E-mail from [...] to [...] dated February 24, 2020 [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 9 – Letter from [...] dated February 25, 2020 [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 10 – Certification of [...] dated March 24, 2020 [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 11 – Order Granting Respondent’s Motion seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 12 – Respondent’s Filed Amended Complaint [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 13 – Respondent’s Notice of Motion for A Date Certain for Production of Appellant’s Appraisal Report dated July 10, 2020 ………………………………………………………………………….. Pa52 Exhibit 14 – Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Date Certain dated August 7, 2020 ……………………………………………………………..  Pa54 Exhibit 15 – Case Management Order dated August 13, 2020 …. Pa58 Exhibit 16 – Letter from [...] dated October 16, 2020 …. Pa59 Exhibit 17 – Case Management Order dated October 21, 2020 . Pa60 Exhibit 18 – Certification of [...] filed in support of Respondent’s Cross Motion to Bar Appellant from Producing An Appraisal Report dated December 10, 2020 (without exhibits) … Pa61 Exhibit 19 – Order denying Respondent’s cross motion and partially granting Appellant’s Motion to Extend Deadline dated January 8, 2021 ………………………………………………………………
[brief] I.  New Jersey’s six-year statute of limitations for UIM claims governs under the policy’s conformity-to-law clause, making [...]’s suit timely.  (Raised Below: Pa6).  N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1’s six-year statute of limitations applies to UIM claims and begins to run from the date of the accident.  *Price v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins.*, 182 N.J. 519, 524 (2005) (citing *Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am.*, 144 N.J. 344, 354 (1996)).  [...]’s accident was on January 10, 2018.  She sued [...] on May 17, 2023, within the six-year statute of limitations.