ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Èske w konprann ke si w plede koupab de deli agresyon seksyèl agrave, agresyon [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] seksyèl, kontak seksyèl kriminel agrave, kidnapinn daprè 2C:13-1c(2), mete byenèt timoun an danje pa ajisman seksyèl ki ta kab pètibe ak pèvèti moral timoun la daprè 2C:24-4a, sedwi oswa eseye komèt nenpòt nan zak sa yo, tribinal la an plis de nenpòt ki lot santans ava enpoze yon santans espesyal de sipèvizyon kominotè a vi?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, luring, or an attempt to commit any such offense, the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of community supervision for life?  (2)  Èske w konprann ke le fèt ke yo ba w yon santans de sipèvizyon  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  [pa aplikab/NA] kominotè a vi, sa vle di ke: yap sipèvize w omwen pou 15 lane kankou w ta sou libète kondisyonèl, ak soumèt a tout kondisyon apwopriye pou pwoteje piblik la ak ankouraje reyabilitasyon, enkli, men ki pa limite a oryantasyon pwofesyonèl; aksè a entènèt oswa izaj entènèt; ansanm ak tout lòt restriksyon, ki ta kab gen ladann restriksyon sou ki kote w gendwa abite, travay ak vwayaje?  Do you understand that being sentenced to community supervision for life means that: you will be supervised for at least 15 years as if on parole, and subject to conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, including, but not limited to counseling; Internet access or use; and other restrictions, which may include restrictions on where you can live, work or travel?
[brief] This matter arises from a dispute of between two adjacent property owners regarding rightful ownership of a small piece of land located along the shared lot line.  It concerns two main legal considerations regarding property ownership: (1) rightful ownership of real property based on recorded deeds of conveyance, consistent with the New Jersey Recording Act, currently embodied in N.J.S.A. 46:26A-1, et seq., and (2) the removal of rightful property ownership through the legal principles of adverse possession.  A reviewing court will defer to a trial court’s factual findings when those findings are “supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence. ”  Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 215 (2014), quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002).  However, on appeal, the court will apply de novo review to the “trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts."  Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  In this case, the court below incorrectly concluded that the dispute at issue in this matter centers around a purported 1967 subdivision, which was partly designed to transfer the Strip from the Plaintiff’s predecessor in title to the Defendant’s predecessor in title.  4T4:16-25.  The trial court erroneously relied on an unrecorded subdivision map, coupled with a 1971 series of deeds that were only recorded in Defendant’s chain of title (with no corresponding changes to the legal description in Plaintiff’s chain of title for the Property), to determine that the original parties to that subdivision had perfected the subdivision and successfully transferred the Strip to Defendant’s predecessor in title.  The trial court then relied on principles of notice to justify ignoring the security that the Recording Act provides to purchasers of real property, including Plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s chain of title for the Property consistently reflected the inclusion of the Strip in the legal description, and the 1971 deed for Lot 3 lacked proper recitation of the purported subdivision transferring the Strip from the Property to Lot 3.  Further, the trial court did not impose the proper burden of proof on Defendant regarding its adverse possession claims related to its purported ownership of the Strip.  **POINT II**
[brief] ”  [Pa144]; •  In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), once Appellants lost land control of the Property, their Solar Rights were voided by the entity that granted such rights.  “[Appellants] cannot seek damages against a blameless third party simply because [...] signed an NDA.  [Appellants] do not establish the requisite causal link between a breach of the NDA and [Appellants’] default under the Lease and subsequent loss of their Solar Rights. ”  [Pa144-45]; •  In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), “[Appellants] lost the Property and subsequently lost their Solar Rights as a result of their default under the Lease and their failure to cure this default…
[brief] In *Navarette*, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the California Court of Appeals that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on a 9-1-1 call alone when the content of the 9-1-1 call indicated that it came from an eyewitness victim of reckless driving and the officer corroborated the vehicle’s description, location, and direction of travel.  *Id.* at 396.
[brief] ”  I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...], at pp. 7-8 (2021) (Ca242-243) (citing Melnyk v. Fiel, Commission Docket No. [...] (2019) (Ca269)), reaffirmed, e.g., Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25, 2022) (Ca233).  It is clear from this body of decisional law that, where a school board member has used their public Facebook account to campaign for their seat on the Board – and certainly where a school board member also posts a picture of herself swearing in and announces that she is a sitting Board member – members of the public might reasonably believe she is speaking in her role as Board member.
[brief] (4T 16-2 to 16)  [...]’s father did not live at the house but [...]’s mother and their sons, [...] and [...], did.  (4T 15-10 to 18, 25-6 to 11)  Upon arrival, [...]’s father saw six to seven officers “all around the house on that street and the street over. ”  (4T 17-1 to 6)  [...] stopped [...]’s father from entering the house and told him that, “We got to --- \(^4\)  Because [...] Mills Jr. and appellant [...] Mills III share first and last names, this brief refers to [...] Mills Jr. as “[...]’s father” to avoid confusion.  hold the house for a little bit . . . for a possible search warrant” because “like six people” ran into the house.  (3T 17-7 to 15, 29-17 to 30-4)  [...]’s father responded, “Oh, hell no.  . . .  No one’s searching my house. ”  (3T 29-22 to 23)  The landlord of the house, [...], was nearby and talked with [...]’s father about how the police wanted to search the house.  (4T 46-21 to 47-14)  [...]’s father maintained that he did not want the police to search the house.  (4T 47-14 to 19)  Meanwhile, another officer, [...] learned that there were two trail cameras in the backyard and believed that they may have captured evidence of the shots fired.  (2T 16-5 to 12, 65-16 to 19)  [...] asked [...]’s father to retrieve the memory cards from the trail cameras because the police could not do so without a warrant.  (2T 17-9 to 12, 20-14 to 21-3)  [...] did not advise [...]’s father of his right to refuse the request.
[brief] Obviously, [...] and/or its [...] --- despite the repeated admonitions of the Supreme Court since Medici, Kaufman, and later decisions as to the importance of the Master Plan and Planning in Land Use --- has essentially ignored doing any updates.  Although there apparently have been Master Plan Reexamination Reports in 2003, 2012 and 2015, a Reexamination Report is not the Master Plan; it is a recommendation that the Master Plan be revised or updated in some particulars.  The Law --- the MLUL at N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 and the LRHL at N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7 --- both requires “substantial consistency” with the Master Plan, not some Reexamination Report recommendation or vague platitude that was never implemented or incorporated into the Master Plan itself.  The Reexamination of the Master Plan is to be done at least every ten (10) years, and the Reexamination Report is, among other things, to state “specific changes recommended for the Master Plan or Development Regulations” and “recommendations of the [...] concerning the incorporation of Redevelopment Plans adopted pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law into the Land Use Plan element of the Municipal Master Plan”.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89 (d) and (e).  As detailed in Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration §8.4, (2023), if a Reexamination Report recommends specific changes as to the Master Plan, then the Master Plan itself should be thereafter amended pursuant to the requirements and procedures as required in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 (a) and 40:55D-13, with the required Public Notice and Public Hearing, see Cox §8.3.  If the Reexamination Report and its recommendations are in sufficiently crystallized form, that Reexamination Report could --- if and only if acted upon by the formal Notice and Hearing procedure required --- be adopted and considered as an amendment or supplement to the Master Plan.  If that does not occur, the Reexamination Report is not part of the Master Plan, and does not supersede or override the Master Plan.  The “consistency” analysis and reconciliation required by both the MLUL at N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 and the LRHL at N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7 (d) is with the Master Plan, not some unincorporated Reexamination Report never adopted as part of or superseding the Master Plan.  The fact that [...] has a 1988 Master Plan, and has never updated or amended that Plan in 34 years, cannot provide an excuse or justification for ignoring the statutory mandate of the “substantial consistency” analysis being with the “Master Plan”.  [...]’s ignoring of the law cannot possibly serve as a justification for the Court ignoring the law, or to reward [...] for its non-compliance.  An analysis of the cursory and erroneous process used by the [...] and the [...] will confirm the Redevelopment Plan’s invalidity.  The analysis of the Trial Court Opinion will also confirm that the Court misunderstood and misapplied the Law, really failing to consider the Master Plan “consistency” at all.
[brief] [Db2].  Presumably appreciating that its version of events is not supported by the record, [...] attempts to reach beyond it in search of something more favorable.  [See, e.g., Db4 (discussing a Court-ordered arbitration decision that (i) was not provided to the trial court, and (ii) is not provided to this Court, either)].  But because [...] did not file an appendix, any references to a Defendant’s Appendix are also not before this Court and may not be considered.  See Burt v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 339 N.J. Super. 296, 311 (App. Div. 2001) (“Ordinarily, on appeal, we generally confine ourselves to the record”).
[brief] Moreover, even if a lane change qualifies as a “turn” within the meaning of the statute, the motion court nevertheless erred in finding that the traffic stop was justified.  A motorist must signal a turn only “in the event any other traffic may be affected” by the movement.  Here, the record does not establish that police had reasonable and articulable suspicion that other traffic on the road could have been affected by the driver’s lane change.  Consequently, the motion court’s decision upholding the car stop must be reversed.
[brief] Plaintiffs are essentially asking the Court to perform the tasks traditionally relegated to the FDA.  In re Human Tissue Products Liability Litigation, 488 F. Supp.2d 430, 433 (D.N.J. 2007).  For similar reasons, in State after State, in both common-law and statutory product-liability regimes, and whether the State otherwise follows the Second or Third Restatement, courts have refused to expand liability by including claims that legal products should not have been sold, but rather should have been recalled.
[brief] Following full briefing and oral argument on the 2017 Appeal, the Appellate Division rendered its opinion on June 25, 2019, reversing and vacating all “orders under review” and remanding the case for further proceedings “to determine what [property right] interest was created, its scope, and whether it remains in effect. ”  (Da751)  The opinion also stated:  We conclude that there remain issues of material fact as to whether an easement was created by the 1963 agreement, and if an easement was established, there remain issues of material fact as to whether the easement is perpetual.  Finally, even if a perpetual easement had been established, there remain issues of material fact as to whether the easement was subsequently terminated.  The Appellate Division explained further that “the surrounding circumstances, including the physical conditions and character are to be considered” on remand:  Questions concerning the extent of the rights conveyed by an easement require a determination of the intent of the parties as expressed through the instrument creating the easement, read as a whole, and in light of the surrounding circumstances.  (Da751-763)  19.  The Appellate Division did not order a new trial.  Rather, it remanded the matter for “further proceedings”.  Additionally, the Appellate Division did not direct that a new judge be assigned to preside over the remand proceedings.
[directive] Actor attempts, via electronic or any other means, to lure or entice a person into a motor Luring, Enticing an vehicle, structure or isolated area, or to meet or appear at any place, with a purpose to 2C:13-7 3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000  10% permissible  Adult commit a criminal offense with or against the person lured or enticed or against any other person.  27  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] \textit{N.J.S.A.} 55:19-81.  But the inspector also determined that the property constituted a “nuisance” in accordance with \textit{N.J.S.A.} 55:19-82 because: (a) the property was unfit for occupancy, (b) the condition \textsuperscript{11}  While this statute speaks of the “public officer” making these determinations, \textit{N.J.S.A.} 54:5-86(b) permits the lienholder to employ an appropriately-licensed individual for this purpose if the public officer or tax collector does not respond to the lienholder’s request for an abandonment certification.  Plaintiff did so in this case.  (144a\#8, 179a-181a).  increases the risk of fire, (c) the property is subject to unauthorized entry and the owner had not taken steps to secure it, (d) the presence of vermin or debris, uncut vegetation, or physical deterioration that creates health and safety hazards, with no efforts to remove the hazards, or (e) the dilapidated appearance or condition of the property affects the area, and the owner has failed to take corrective action.  (67a-68a).  This property exemplifies why the Abandoned Properties Rehabilitation Act exists: to give parties the tools to promptly ameliorate blighted eyesores.  N.J.S.A. 55:19-79; N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c).  Even the most cursory review of photographs and video submitted to the court show that these purposes would be well-served in this case.  (342a¶¶6-10, 350a-375a).  The grounds of the property are unkempt, there is an accumulation of debris, the exterior of the house is falling apart, and the interior is gutted and completely uninhabitable.\(^{12}\) (353a-375a).  Defendants, despite having owned the property for about two years and seven months, did nothing to address these problems.  Defendants purchased the property in April 2020 (104a-107a), obtained land use approvals in February 2022 (95a¶10, 120a-127a), and lost ownership via final judgment in November 2022, yet they failed to produce so much as a single construction permit during their entire ownership period, and [...]’s OPRA request corroborated that none had been issued during that time.  \(^{12}\)  While Defendants claimed that they were pursuing a land use application, that has no bearing on the statutory definition of abandonment.  See N.J.S.A. 55:19-81.  (331a-339a).  When the extent of an owner’s action with respect to a property such as this over an almost three-year period is acquisition of land use approval (120a-127a), that property is correctly deemed abandoned.  There is no meaningful dispute Defendants performed no rehabilitation during their period of ownership.  There is no meaningful dispute that Defendants failed to maintain the property.  All it takes is a look at the photographs.  Thus, there was more than enough evidence to establish the property was abandoned under N.J.S.A. 55:19-81.
[brief] Considering the standard set forth by *Lehmann*, Plaintiff sufficiently meets the factors to establish such a claim.  Foremost, Plaintiff must show that the complained of conduct would not have occurred but for the employee's protected status.  The protected status or class that Plaintiff falls under is through his race, as he is a part of the Asian-American community.  It is undisputed that Plaintiff fell asleep during COVID-19 training and was awoken by [...] squinting his eyes and asking him, “If [he] just got back from Wuhan, [China]”.  Defendants will allege that [...] did not know Plaintiff’s racial background.
[brief] 2.  Respondents registered for [...] online account access and again agreed to resolve all disputes through FINRA arbitration.  Consistent with securities industry standards and [...] policies and procedures, [...] provided Respondents with periodic written statements so they could document, review, and manage their [...] investments.  (Da0077-Da0078; Da0255-Da0298; Da0299-Da0324; Da0325-Da0358; Da0359-Da0376; Da0377-Da0394; Da0409-Da0492).  These written statements reflected account holdings and investment performance, as well as confirmations of each purchase and sale.  (Da0077-Da0078; Da0097-Da0098; Da0171-Da0173; Da0360-Da0361; Da0378-Da0379; Da0412; Da0424-Da0425).  In addition to receiving these written statements, in 2022, [...] (on behalf of both herself and [...]) opted to register for online access to investment account information through [...]’s proprietary web-based service, [...] Shareholder Account Manager (“SAM”).
[brief] See *Middletown Township Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n Local No. 124 v. Township of Middletown*, 162 N.J. 361, 367 (2000) (equitable estoppel relied upon to reverse the decision of a municipality from terminating the post-retirement health benefits of a former municipal employee where the employee had relied in good faith on those benefits); *Skulski v. Nolan*, 68 N.J. 179, 198-199 (1975) (based on "equitable considerations [and] the interests of justice," the Court refused to terminate the pensions of public employees based on equitable estoppel where the employee/pensioners had acted in good faith in relying on their prior pension awards in declining other employment); see also *In re Frank*, 2007 WL 2005083 (App. Div. 2007) (in ruling that "equity warrants estoppel" to prevent the Board from requiring a [...], a retired custodian in a public school, to repay disability retirement benefits of $15,954.93, the Court based its decision on equitable principles).
[brief] The 1971 Code Book, as all such Code Books, was periodically updated and amended --- as Ordinances are amended, new Ordinances passed, or existing Ordinances repealed --- by periodically replacing pages or adding pages in the Code.  The date of the replacement page is on the bottom right-hand corner of the particular page, and the replacement page is inserted into the Book.  By that technique, the 1971 Code Book remains current.  As [...] Rebuttal Exhibits, (submitted as only to rebut the [...] improper new submissions and false assertions) were the Cover Page, Introduction, and adoption Ordinance 7/8/71 of the 1971 Code Book (Da220-227).  As detailed in the Introduction, the 1971 Code Book was a Recodification of Ordinances that were previously adopted and in place (Da224).
[brief] Defendant also acknowledged that he failed to provide proper notice, as provided by R. 3:12-2.  (14T9-13 to 18).  Despite defendant’s failure to give timely notice, the trial court still allowed defendant the opportunity to provide the State and court with a written and signed list of the names and addresses of proposed alibi witnesses “[i]n the interests of fairness and justice. ” (14T9-5 to 21).  However, defendant admitted that he did not have any witnesses and that he was relying on his recorded statement to detectives to support his alibi.  (1T9-24 to 25).  Second, the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on this charge because it correctly determined that defendant’s statements to detectives were not an alibi, but “more akin to general denial of having knowledge of the crime.
[brief] [...], in attempting to justify the actions that it took, in reality describes the carefully thought-through, deliberate processes it undertook to block Plaintiff’s development. \(^5\)  As one example, [...] admits that it received notice of Plaintiff’s intent to build Mount Laurel housing on the Property (in July 2023), and rejected the offer “[b]ecause the Property sat stagnant for the previous five years and Plaintiff was unwilling to consider commercial development on the Commercial Tract” (Db13).  Not only did [...] reject the offer, but it took several steps further to protect its own unconstitutional zoning scheme.  In its own words, [...] “began evaluating options to protect the Redevelopment Plan and enable the Property to be developed with commercial uses to complement the nearly-completed Residential Tract, as had been carefully negotiated.
[brief] 22  Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J. Super. 584, 593 (Ch.Div. 1950) Aff’d,, 6 N.J. 1, 11 (1950)......................................  22 Manalapan Realty, L.P. V. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) ........................................  11
[brief] (8T 116-1 to 8)  On January 12, 2023, [...] was sentenced to an aggregate term of 45 years in prison with an 85% period of parole ineligibility.  (9T 39-5 to 6)  A notice of appeal was filed on February 23, 2023.  (Da 10-13)  \(^1\)  Because the decedent and the defendant share the same last name, their first names will be used to avoid confusion.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Trial Court’s Opinion Fails to Specifically Identify at What Point the Tortious Interference Claim Allegedly Became Frivolous  As this Court has made clear, “reasonable fees may be awarded only from that point in the litigation at which it becomes clear that the action is frivolous. ”  Bove, 460 N.J. Super. at 150.  Critically, however, the Trial Court never stated at what point the tortious interference claim suddenly became frivolous, or what information became available to Plaintiffs to render it so.  It cannot be the point at which Plaintiffs supposedly learned that there was no transaction, because the Court denied [...]’s motion to dismiss on January 2, 2020, even though that motion contained a certification from [...] (thus effectively turning the motion into one for summary judgment), which specifically stated that there was no transaction.  (P260a-P262a).  See United Hearts, L.L.C., 407 N.J. Super. at 394 (finding that case that survived summary judgment motion could not have been frivolous before that time).  Nor could it be simply at the point at which [...] produced documents.  See id. at 392 (holding that “[a]though Zan’s counsel insisted that these documents showed that there was no factual or legal basis to plaintiff’s claims, the production of the documents did not render the complaint frivolous” because counsel “was not obligated at that stage of the proceedings to accept the documents and the statements contained therein at face value”).  So what additional information could there be that suddenly rendered the action frivolous?  The Court’s decision does not say.