ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ......................  22 Riya Finnegan Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Twp. Council of Tp. of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184 (2008)  .................................................................................................................. 41, 47 Rockaway Shoprite Assoc., Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 2011) .................................................................................................................. 18, 21, 22 Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v.  Planning Bd. of Borough of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2009) ................................................. passim Southport Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Wall, 310 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 1998) ................................................................. 12, 31 Susko v. Borough of Belmar, 458 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 2019) ............... 37 Tri-State Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. City of Perth Amboy, 349 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2002) ........................................... 30, 31, 35, 41 Wash. Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj. v. Wash. Twp. Planning Bd., 217 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1987) .................................................. 42 Willoughby v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1997) ................................................................. passim Wolf v. Shrewsbury, 182 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1981) ...................... 18, 21, 26 Wreden v. Twp. of Lafayette, 436 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2014) ............ 10 Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507 (2009) ............................................. 19 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 .................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 .............................................................................. 2, 16, 18, 22 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 .............................................................................. 15 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3 .......................................................................... 29 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 .......................................................................... 1, 15 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2 .......................................................................... 42 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 .......................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8 .......................................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-9 .............................................................................. 25 Other Authorities [...] & [...], *Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey*, comment 7.3 on R. 4:69-6, 1648 (2024 Ed.) ..............................................
[brief] He was acquitted of murder, felony murder, aggravated manslaughter, and own-conduct robbery.  The only evidence that directly tied defendant to the offense came from his co-defendant, a heroin addict who provided a statement to the police on the day he pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter with the possibility of a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony.  The victim suffocated after having been tied up in blankets and robbed of a debit card, which the co-defendant admittedly used to withdraw $500 from the victim's bank account shortly after the robbery.  Defendant's convictions must be reversed for several reasons.  First, the court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to play the video of the co-defendant's police statement through the testimony of a police detective, seventeen days after the co-defendant had testified at trial, consistently with his prior statement.  The statement did not meet the evidentiary requirements for admission of a prior consistent statement because it was not provided before the co-defendant had a motive to fabricate defendant's involvement.  Second, there were critical errors in the jury charge on accomplice liability for first-degree robbery.  The jury was never instructed that it could not find defendant guilty of being an accomplice to robbery based solely on actions taken after robbery of the debit card.  The omission of this instruction in the context of the accomplice liability instructions was plain error, especially in light of the fact that the jury acquitted defendant of own-conduct robbery when it had been properly instructed.  The jury also was never instructed on the elements of first-degree robbery in the context of the accomplice liability charge, and it was never asked on the verdict sheet whether defendant was guilty of the elements that raised accomplice liability for robbery to the first-degree.  Third, defendant's due process rights were violated when the court halted jury deliberations for fourteen days because the court and the attorneys had planned vacations.  The trial had lasted for a month, with dozens of witnesses.  This extended break exposed jurors, unnecessarily, to outside influences and hampered their ability to recall the evidence.  Defendant's sentence must be reversed because the court made multiple contradictory and completely unexplained findings on aggravating and mitigating circumstances in addition to other errors.  Defendant's convictions and sentence should be reversed.
[brief] [...]’s Appendix contains the relevant exhibits submitted by [...] with its application, including [...]’s Certification.  \(^2\)  Such improvements to the Unit included: kitchen (new stove, refrigerator, hot water heater, sink, windows and cabinets); bathroom (new sheetrock, tile floor, walls, electrical and bathroom fixtures); living room (new sheetrock, lighting fixture and windows, finished hardwood floors and painting); and bedrooms (new sheetrock, windows and lighting fixtures, refinished floors and painting).
[brief] See T2 44:13-18; 45:3-8.  However, incorrectly mailed process papers cannot be seen as notice reasonably calculated to apprise [...] of the action against him under the circumstances.  [...]’s Affidavit as to the source of [...]’s address not only misstates that all notices sent to the service address “were accepted by Defendant(s) or were returned or refused,” [...]’s affidavit also confirms that [...] never bothered to confirm with the USPS that the service address was [...]’s address.
[directive] N.J.S.A. See forfeited."  not bail is post to used of assets the fides bona and source the examine to authority prosecutor's a limit 63  Page was actually condition bail monetary a which in manner the that argue or to bail, monetary when required.  appear to defendant for the incentive adequate provide to fails satisfied inclined is defendant that the believe to reason is there if that consider should  Prosecutors to inclined be might defendant also the court, criminal of jurisdiction a from the abscond to A company.  surety a to owed debt on any default and premium bond bail monetary a forfeit other in system, judicial criminal of the authority the flaunt to prepared defendant flight-prone debt.  civil a enforce to authority company's bond bail a flaunt to likely just as be may words, bail monetary of imposition warrant sufficient to flee is to motivation defendant's if a Thus, ensuring in interest sufficient have not might defendant the framework, statutory new under the forfeited.
[brief] (29T 174-12 to 175-2).  [...] had been trying to collect this debt by calling [...] repeatedly – which [...] ignored – and eventually making appearances at his girlfriend, [...]’s, apartment at the [...].  (29T 175-3 to 175-18).  According to [...], Defendant was the one who came up with the idea to rob [...] after witnessing a large amount of cash exchanged during a drug transaction between [...] and [...], but that [...] refused at first because [...] supplied him.  (29T 179-1 to 182-2).  However, [...] obtained a new supplier in January of 2018 through Defendant’s contacts (29T 182-23 to 185-22).  As such, when [...] told [...] in the weeks leading up to the murder that [...] had visited her apartment, Defendant suggested that [...] pay him the $18,000 that [...] owed [...] and that Defendant would murder [...] in exchange.
[brief] In concluding that the constitutional error in that instance was not harmless, the Court noted that the “State's evidence was far from overwhelming” as “[n]o physical evidence linked defendant to the scene of the crime” and the descriptions of the perpetrator by the witnesses “differed markedly from defendant's appearance. ”  Id. at 353, 865 A.2d 673.  The Court acknowledged that this “was a close case” and that “the detective's damaging hearsay testimony ... may have tipped the scales. ”  Id. at 354, 865 A.2d 673.  The Court therefore reversed [...]'s convictions and remanded for a new trial.
[brief] The United States Supreme Court has indicated that two questions guide the analysis of the free speech rights of public employees.  First, it must be determined whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).  Second, it must be determined whether the relevant government agency had justification for treating the employee differently from another member of the general public.
[brief] While the case was pending, Plaintiff was deposed on March 10, 2023 (1T)\(^1\).  Defendants-Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Pa-6) on August 31, 2023, which was granted on November 3, 2023 (Pa-65).  On November 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Pa-75) which was denied on December 1, 2023 (Pa-76).  Then, on December 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reinstate the matter for purposes of conducting oral argument on the Reconsideration Motion (Pa-79).  The Court below granted Plaintiff’s application to redo the Motion for Reconsideration \textit{with} oral argument.  The Motion for Reconsideration was heard on January 19, 2024 (2T)\(^2\) and denied by Order dated January 22, 2024 (Pa-85).  The filing of this Notice of Appeal followed on January 26, 2024 (Pa-88).  \(^1\) 1T - Transcript of Plaintiff’s Deposition 3/10/23; \(^2\) 2T - Transcript of Motion Hearing 1/19/24.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Court effectively overruled all of the cases which held that the Court has power and, is in fact required, to decide whether or not the arbitrator “exceeded powers”, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. sec. 10 and N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8d.  The Chancery Court here had no right to defer to [...]’s refusal to grant 3 arbitrators to [...] where [...] rules did require 3 for monetary claims exceeding $1 million.  Instead, the Court here was bound to vacate all Phase II awards because the parties’ arbitration agreement (i.e., [...] rules) did not permit 1 arbitrator to act alone as he did for amounts that large.  N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8d.  This Court should reverse the Orders confirming the 2018 Partial Final Award and the Final Award and grant the cross-motions to vacate.
[brief] (12T17-5 to 45-24)  In approximately 2013, [...] unilaterally "chiseled out" a curb cut in the Sixth Street curb in front of Lot 8 to facilitate vehicles driving into Lot 8 and then into the Sixth Street courtyard (Lot 5) to park (8T34-1 to 43-25; 13T111-6 to 118-21).  The Lot 8 use of Lot 5, and the efforts by [...] to block Lot 8 vehicles from parking in the Sixth Street courtyard, led to the commencement of this lawsuit in 2012 (Da4) by a Complaint by [...] primarily seeking to enjoin the School from interfering with and precluding Lot 8 staff/attendees from parking in the School’s Sixth Street courtyard and the Fifth Street lot.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff’s original Petition failed to disclose the existence of her PI Claim.  *(See Ex. 5)*  In subsequent filings, Plaintiff failed to list possible claims against [...].  *(Ex. 5)*  In *Heselton v. Maffei*, 374 N.J.Super. 184 (App.Div. 2005), the court confirmed that bankruptcy laws require that any kind of debt must be listed in the schedule of creditors’ claims in the bankruptcy petition.  11 U.S.C.A. § 521(1).  If the petition fails to list that debt, it may be excepted from the debts discharged by the judgment of bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. A. § 523(a)(3).  See Heselton, supra; Justice v. Justice, 123 N.C.App. 733, 475 S.E.2d 225, 230 (1996), aff’d, 346 N.C. 176, 484 S.E.2d 551 (1997).  This section provides that a debt is not discharged by bankruptcy if it is neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit to permit the creditor to protect its rights.  See Heselton, supra.  Plaintiff has clearly fraudulently induced [...] to enter into the Contracts and breached their terms.  Plaintiff committed fraud against the Bankruptcy Court in multiple filings.  Plaintiff has misrepresented the facts to the Trial Court in filing the Complaint.  The Appeal should be denied.
[brief] (Pb10 to 11; see State v. Garcia, 195 N.J. 192, 202 (2008)(internal citations omitted)(finding a criminal defendant’s right to present witnesses is a fundamental element of due process of law); see also U.S.  Defendant does not disclose who he intended to call and how the State interfered with his ability to call those individuals.  Though criminal defendants have the right to the “government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial,” defendant does not offer any legal support for his assertion that the State was required to independently call witnesses for his benefit.
[brief] 87 N.J. at 563, 567.  They located it in a parking lot near the scene of the crime, unoccupied.  Ibid.  Officers searched it and found evidence that ultimately led to defendants’ convictions for robbery.  Id. at 563.  The Supreme Court confirmed “that the search of the car was justified as falling within the automobile exception as applied by the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney[.]”  Id. at 563-64.  Over the next few decades, the Court repeatedly reaffirmed the tenant that police may validly search a vehicle under the automobile exception even when they suspect the specific contraband they believe will be found in it.
[brief] [...] lived alone in a house on his parents' farm at [...] in [...] (15T119-14 to 24;24T9-7 to 12;24T11-3 to 4).  On March 13, 2017, Fazzio's father, [...], found his son on the floor of the home (15T85-19 to 24;15T60-1 to 10;15T90-25;24T8-14 to 25).  A couch had been turned over on top of him (15T87-8 to 10;15T86-6 to 11).  Fazzio was not moving and he did not respond to his father's attempts to waken him (15T86-5 to 14;15T88-1 to 7).  His parents called the police (15T88-8 to 15).
[brief] On January 20, 2010, [...] filed a complaint against [...], [...], [...] and John Does 1-10 in state court, [...].  (Pa 145)  Rather than respond to the complaint, [...] immediately filed a Motion to Remove to Federal Court on February 17, 2010, followed by a Motion to Dismiss on February 19, 2010.  On April 14, 2010, the Honorable [...], U.S.D.J., filed an Opinion in *Vincent [...] v. [...]
[brief] --- 13  Quoting McDaniel v. Bieffe USA, Inc., 35 F. Supp.2d 735, 743 (D. Minn. 1999).  •  **Missouri:** *Horstmyer v. Black & Decker, (U.S.), Inc.*, 151 F.3d 765, 774 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding “no indication ... that the Missouri Supreme Court would create a common law duty to recall under these circumstances”) (power saw); *Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.*, 755 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 1985) (“Since no duty to recall was established, a fundamental prerequisite to establishing negligence was absent”) (tire); *Haskell v. PACCAR, Inc.*, 2021 WL 5407853, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2021) (“There is no common law duty to recall under Missouri law absent a mandated recall by a governmental agency. ”) (citations omitted) (commercial truck).
[brief] The deed was signed by [...], the then-wife of [...] --- 2  Notably, [...]’s testimony is fully consistent with Richard’s testimony on this same point.  3T13-14 (“Another relative whose name is [...] who borrowed 25,000 dollars from me.  He brought 25,000 dollars plus 25,000 dollars from myself. ”)  Wu.  On the Affidavit of Consideration signed by [...], it stated that “Deed from wife to husband for which no consideration was paid.
[brief] In *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court established prophylactic rules to protect the right assured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments against self-incrimination during the “in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime. ”  These rules and requirements do not apply until the moment “when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. ”  *Id.* at 477; *State v. Nyhammer*, 197 N.J. 383, 400 (2009) (quoting *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 477); see also *Illinois v. Perkins*, 496 U.S. 292, 296(1990); *State v. Harris*, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004); *State v. Reininger*, 430 N.J. Super. 517, 537 (App. Div. 2013).
[directive] For example, in dealing with minor offenses, such as motor vehicle or and local ordinance violations practicing procedural-justice techniques, such as explaining the officer’s actions and responding to questions before resorting to force, is particularly important; (j) the officer’s training and experience; and (k) the potential for injury to officers, suspects, and the public.  3.2.1  It is important to note that law enforcement encounters are never static and rapidly evolve.
[brief] On June 10, 2013, [...] purportedly entered into a Commercial Lease Agreement (the “Lease”) dated April 19, 2013 with [...] and [...] affecting premises located at [...].  Pursuant to the Lease, [...] was to operate a 24-hour casual diner or restaurant.  Ca30.  On November 28, 2014, [...] purported to convey certain fee title interest to [...], together with an assignment of the Lease.  Ca102, 105.  On May 20, 2014, [...] purportedly borrowed $1,000,000.00 from [...] pursuant to the Note, with [...] and [...] executing associated Guaranty of Payment and Completion Agreements.  [...] executed a Leasehold Mortgage (the “Leasehold Mortgage”).  On March 16, 2015, [...] entered into a Commercial Modification Note for an additional $400,000.00 from [...], which was further guaranteed by [...] and [...] and further secured by a Leasehold Mortgage Modification.  Ca205-220.  In December 2019, the foregoing Defendants allegedly defaulted on their payment obligations.  The Bank accelerated the obligations and instituted the Law Division Action on February 20, 2020.  Ca169.  The Bank instituted the Foreclosure Action on September 16, 2020.  Ca222.  On July 23, 2021, Appellant [...] sustained injury in the parking lot at the [...] after dining there, as would later be alleged in her personal injury lawsuit initiated July 21, 2023.  Ca413, 431.  By letter dated August 2, 2021, counsel for [...] notified/further notified, inter alia, [...] of the incident.  Ca349, 404.  The letter also was a preservation letter, which requested video.  Ca406.  As detailed in [...]’ Certification in Support of their Cross-Motion, counsel for [...] was contacted via voicemail by [...] on August 7, 2021, and counsel for [...] attempted to go through who was understood to be counsel for [...], avoiding direct communication with [...].  Ca349.  As the Certification further details, such counsel’s office was contacted, evidence of which included August 10, 2021 correspondence confirming that that counsel’s office directed Mr. [...] to not contact counsel directly and that the liability carrier was being notified.  Ca350.  The Certification further details lack of subsequent communication from the [...] counsel or a carrier.  Ca350.
[brief] See Atanasio v. Silverman, 11 N.J. Super. 116, 119 (Law. Div. 1950) (“It has long been our rule that the right to have one judgment set off against another is within the discretion of the court. ”); aff'd, 7 N.J. 278 (1951) (citing State Bank of Trenton v. Coxe, 8 N.J.L. 172 (Sup.Ct. 1825)); see id.  (“Also, that a court of equity, in the exercise of a sound discretion, will direct one judgment to be set off against another, whenever such relief does not run counter to any established principle of law or equity.
[brief] The statute defines “racketeering activity” as “forgery and fraudulent practices and all crimes defined in chapter 21 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(a)(1)(o).  In 2003, the Legislature amended Chapter 21 of Title 2C to include insurance fraud as a criminal act, and thus as a predicate racketeering act under RICO.
[directive] subsection  See io the that likelihood the of probative less be may risk, flight but to relevant be might facts supplemental  Certain example, For N.J.S.A. 2C:29-7. under jumping" "bail than other release, on while new crime a commit would defendant the establish to relevant be would trial guilty at verdict of a probability the indicating evidence the of weight the less be would generally case State's the of strength  The guilty verdict.  expected an avoid to flee to incentive defendant's considering is that all that especially community, the to danger a poses defendant whether to all, at relevant if relevant, See offense. present the committed or she he that believe to cause probable is preventively defendant detain a to needed form other or gang criminal street a in involvement of defendant's a evidence  In contrast, 2A:162-19(e)(2).
[brief] R.1:6-2(f)  1 R. 1:7-4 1 R. 1:13-7 3, 6 R. 2:10-5 12 R. 4:5-1 6 R. 4:5-3  R. 4:5-4  R. 4:6-1 R. 4:6-2  R. 4:21A-1 R. 4:43-2  ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Vincitore v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Authority – reaffirming the approach of the Court in Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown – described the three-part analysis for determining “reasonably foreseeable” in the context of the TCA.  The Vincitore Court stated as follows:  The first consideration is whether the property poses a danger to the general public when used in the normal, foreseeable manner.  The second is whether the nature of the plaintiff's activity is "so objectively unreasonable" that the condition of the property cannot reasonably be said to have caused the injury.  The answers to those two questions determine whether a plaintiff's claim satisfies the Act's "due care" requirement.  The third involves review of the manner in which the specific plaintiff engaged in the specific activity.  That conduct is relevant only to proximate causation, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, and comparative fault, N.J.S.A. 59:9-4.  Vincitore, 169 N.J. 119, 126 (2001) (citing Garrison v. Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 293 (1988) (italics in original) (emphasis added); see also Polzo v. County of Essex, 209 N.J. 51 (2012); Speziale v. Newark Housing Authority, 193 N.J. Super. 413 (App. Div. 1984).  Illegal activities and/or actions are most assuredly not the definition of normal (i.e., used with due care), but rather abnormal; hence, they are not "reasonably foreseeable" and per se "objectively unreasonable".
[brief] (Da 67)  D.  The resentencing hearing [...]’s resentencing took place over the course of three days.  During the first two days, the court heard testimony from [...], an expert in neuropsychology who evaluated [...] in prison on October 2, 2020 and reviewed the transcripts from his trial, his prison records, and other documents.  (3T; 4T; Da 79-81)  The court also heard from several members of [...]’s family, the victim’s family, and [...] himself.  (4T:72-5 to 92-15)  [...] and his six maternal sisters were raised by their single mother, [...].  (Da 100)  [...]’s mother often struggled to keep food on the table and the lights on, and he was exposed to significant neighborhood --- 7  The 2017 amendment to the homicide statute requires juveniles convicted of murder to be sentenced to a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to subsection b(1).
[directive] Confidentiality.  3.  Obtaining and disclosing potential and material is a Brady Giglio confidential process.  As such, all documents requested and obtained shall be kept confidential and secured in a manner to be determined by each County Prosecutor’s Office and should not be shared with any person who does not have a need to know.  Personnel and internal affairs files are confidential materials and will not be released except as pursuant to each county’s policy.  III.