ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As the trial progressed in this case, [...] made the unilateral decision not to make any settlement offers, despite an [...] adjuster observing the trial and numerous prompts by the trial judge, during breaks and outside the presence of the jury, for the parties to discuss settlement.  [...] stubbornly refused to attempt to settle this case.  Knowing now that [...] took such a risk with its insured’s assets after having already reduced its insured’s available coverage by settling the related property damage claims, and then disputing liability at trial, was reckless and in bad faith to their insured.  Appellant [...]’ carrier, [...], exerted total control over settlement negotiations and decisions in this matter.  [...] unilaterally exposed its insured to an excess judgment in this matter, despite Respondent advising [...] of the serious risk of an excess judgment nearly a year before the trial.  [...] chose to gamble with Appellant [...]’ assets.  It is [...] – not Appellant [...] – that must bear responsibility for its bad gamble.  Not only is [...] responsible to pay the R. 4:58-2 sanctions in this case, but it is also exposed to a bad faith claim by its insured.  Presumably, Appellant [...] has been advised of his right to seek relief against [...] for the company’s decision to place him and his assets at significant risk.  To the extent Appellant [...] “questions his financial security at this juncture,” those questions are properly posed to [...].  To eliminate R. 4:58-2 sanctions here would be to subvert the purpose of the Rule.  Such relief would penalize Respondent and reward [...] for making bad bets.  Ultimately, [...] must be held accountable to pay the entire judgment plus R. 4:58-2 sanctions.  Feliciano v. Faldetta, 434 N.J. Super. 543, 547-48 (App. Div. 2014).  VI
[directive] Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  If the [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] crime involves a violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.
[brief] The Trial Court Incorrectly Considered Unvetted Interest Calculations Submitted By Reply (Da0260).  [...]’s initial interest calculations in its March 2021 Motion were so off-base and inaccurate that it abandoned those initial calculations and, in its reply brief, submitted entirely new calculations.  (Da47-54; Da260-261).  The trial court then accepted and applied those interest calculations provided by [...] for the first time by way of reply submission.  This was incorrect as a matter of law.  It was improper to raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief because neither the court nor opposing counsel can properly address the new issue.  Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Engineers, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div. 2001); see also Bouie v. New Jersey Dept. of Comm. Affairs, 407 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2009); Goldsmith v. Camden Cnty Surrogate’s Office, 408 N.J. Super. 376, 388 (App. Div. 2009); Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] The [...] Pollution Policy’s Arbitration Clause Applies to [...]’s Indemnity Claim (T1 76:2-77:3)  The lower court incorrectly ruled that the Pollution Policy’s arbitration clause does not compel [...] to arbitrate because the language used in the clause is not mandatory.  T1 76:2 - 77:3.  To the contrary, the [...] Pollution Policy gives both parties the right to initiate arbitration and, if either party exercises its right to initiate arbitration, such arbitration is mandatory.  This is established by the unambiguous language in the arbitration clause, and is the only logical interpretation that gives meaning to all of the words in the contract.  In finding that the arbitration clause is permissive – not mandatory – the lower court improperly isolated the word “may”\(^7\) and did not address the language which renders the arbitration clause mandatory should either party to the contract invoke it:  Any party may commence such arbitration proceeding and the arbitration shall be conducted in the Insured’s state of domicile.  \(^7\) T1 76:2-11.  Da377 (emphasis added).  This language makes it clear that once invoked by “any party,” arbitration “shall be conducted” – it thus requires the other party to arbitrate regardless of whether or not they consent.  [...]’s argument would render the arbitration clause superfluous as parties are always entitled to arbitrate their disputes on consent – and [...]’s position violates the bedrock principle that all language in a contract should be given meaning.  See J.L. Davis & Assocs. v. Heidler, 263 N.J. Super. 264, 271 (App. Div. 1993) (internal citations omitted) (“Effect, if possible, will be given to all parts of the instrument and a construction which gives a reasonable meaning to all its provisions will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable.
[brief] (Amendment No. 2) (Ordinance No. 1667) Pa 68-76 13.  For the reasons set forth herein, and for the reasons set forth in the communication from the Board Attorney (dated February 17, 2021), the aforesaid Determination of the Respondent Board (holding that Amendment No. 2 to the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Master Plan) was correct and appropriate.  14.  The Plaintiff / Appellant thereafter filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, in the Trial Court, essentially seeking to a) overturn the action of the [...] (relative to the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan) and b) seeking to overturn the determination of the [...] (with respect to the Board Finding that Amendment No. 2 was consistent with the Redevelopment Plan).
[brief] See, New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ("[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the --- \(^7\) See, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-34 “Penalty for False Payment Claims, Representations, for a Government Contact; Grading. ”  \(^8\)  As a general rule, the term “ordinance” embodies matters that are legislative in character, while the term “resolution” embodies matters that are administrative.  A resolution cannot vacate or amend an ordinance.  Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."); New Jersey State Constitution, Article I, paragraphs 1, 2a, 5, 6, 18 and 21.
[brief] “An Act to safeguard the consumer in connection with the utilization of credit by regarding full disclosure of the terms and conditions of finance charges in credit transactions or in offers to extend credit; . . .  ”  Because TILA was enacted to safeguard the rights of consumers, the express public policy of the U.S. Congress should not be thwarted by a failure to comply with a procedural rule.  Rivera v. Gerner, supra.  Plaintiff was not surprised because, except for three exhibits offered into evidence by the Defendant - Exhibits C (Da48), CC (Da105), and II (Da128) - Defendant’s other exhibits were received from the Plaintiff.  In its letter brief of November 4, 2022, Plaintiff expressed no prejudice nor harm from the exhibits offered into evidence by Defendant.  Thus, based on the Rivera case and the cases cited therein, Defendant’s affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off should be accepted by the Court although not initially specifically pleaded.
[brief] Pa619.  [...] and [...] claim next that [...] was notified it was unenrolled after receipt of this Certificate.\(^1\) [...] Db25.  As Plaintiffs have extensively argued in their initial brief, the emails referring to [...]’s purported “erroneous enrollment” only refer to certain excluded work at that time in August 2015, and [...] still continued to expect it was covered per its reasonable expectations arising from all the confirming documentation it received.  [...] noted at that time that this excluded work referenced in these emails was one discrete job and anticipated that future work would be covered under the CCIP.  Pa866; Pa871; Pa902; Pa2322.
[brief] The power to zone is delegated to municipalities in the MLUL, which specifies how a zoning ordinance is created and what it may contain.  It requires to first establish a planning board, which adopts the land use plan element and housing plan element of the master plan before zoning is permitted.  Further, all of the provisions of such a zoning ordinance, or any amendment or revision thereto, shall either be substantially consistent with the land use plan element and the housing plan element of the master plan or designed to effectuate its elements.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.  The MLUL also requires that “at least every 10 years”, the governing body shall require the planning board to reexamine its master plan and development regulations.  The master plan must address six areas of the land use ordinances, including N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89c, which provides:  The extent to which there have been significant changes in the assumptions, policies and objectives forming the basis for the master plan or development regulations last revised, with particular regard to the density and distribution of population and land uses, housing conditions, circulation, conservation of natural resources, energy conservation, collection, disposition and recycling of designated recyclable materials, and changes in State, County and municipal policies and objectives.  (emphasis added).  Thus, the state grants municipalities the power to zone and requires them to keep their land use planning current as support for their zoning scheme. \(^8\)  In [...], the governing body strictly followed the requirements of the MLUL and both the zoning ordinances and the Master Plan elements have been updated many times.  In addition, in 2018 the governing body denied a rezoning of this Property for the same use, and in 2019 the Planning Board studied and re-examined the Land Use Element as discussed in detail above in Statement of Facts subsection (B.).  The zoning board of adjustment has the power to grant variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.c and d, but it is not given any power to adopt or amend a master plan or zoning ordinance.
[brief] The Resolution rejected his testimony on the “unsupported assertion that the zoning of the Mansfield and Florence Township parts of the overall parcel are ‘complimentary’”, because he did not address the differences in permitted building height between Florence’s SM and Mansfield’s ODL Zones.  Ja040-Ja041; Ja043.  Defendant’s Resolution removes all context from [...]’ statement.  His testimony was this:  “[A]s I noted, due to the complementary zoning, in terms of use, the Applicant has, basically, looked at this property in its entirety and designed the project and submitted a site plan that makes logical sense, given the physical and locational qualities of the overall tract. ” (2T 75:19-24) (emphasis added).  It is clear that the “complimentary zoning” reference explicitly refers to the permitted uses, and that warehouses and the accessory uses are permitted in both Florence’s SM and Mansfield’s ODL Zones.  Comparison of the each zone’s bulk requirements, on the other hand, was unnecessary, as no bulk variances, outside of the reduction of parking, were requested from Florence or Mansfield.  (Mansfield had also granted the requested reduction.  Ja086, 092).  More importantly, the differences in permitted building height was irrelevant as the proposed accessory uses in Florence are all height neutral, and the structure itself is to be located in, and was already approved by, Mansfield.  The Defendant Board’s own planner advised the Board that these were “permitted accessory uses in the SM zoning district. ”  Ja146.  No variances were sought from either municipality’s ordinances, except that parking space reductions were sought in both.  Ja030; Ja085-Ja086.  Otherwise, the project complied with the zoning regulations in both towns, and were conforming applications.  Ja029-Ja030; Ja085; Ja146.  These obvious facts did not require [...] to compare Florence's standards with Mansfield's standards.  Plus, the bulk standards from both zoning districts were in fact provided to Defendant on the site plans.  Ja071-Ja073.  Its claims, therefore, that without bulk standard testimony from [...], the Board only knew about the use compatibility, is simply false.  In reality, the Defendant imposed an entirely new and novel standard on Plaintiff, requiring that Plaintiff prove that all of Florence’s SM and Mansfield’s ODL zoning regulations are “complimentary”, in particular, the bulk standards for height.
[brief] The trial court failed to provide substantial deference to the Administrative Procedures Act and Local Finance Notice 2020-21 “New Emergency Regulations: Remote Public Meetings Held During a Declared emergency” (September 24, 2020) (Pa285).  The trial court failed to consider how today the State Executive Branch provides interested parties the right to be heard prior to consideration and official action on noticed agenda action items.  Because Counts Two to Five implicated constitutional and common law bedrock competitive marketplace of competing ideas free speech rights, the trial court failed to strictly construe defendants’ violative state action.
[directive] 6.2.3  The investigator should interview the complainant, all witnesses and the subject officer, and review relevant reports and documents, gather evidence and conduct any other investigation as appropriate.  The investigator should then submit a report to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor summarizing the matter and indicating the appropriate disposition.  Possible dispositions include:  (a)  Sustained.  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged conduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.
[directive] Canines shall not be deployed against a crowd, except to respond to a threat of death or serious bodily injury to a member of the public or to an officer.  3.8.8  CN (phenacyl chloride) shall not be used in any instance.  13  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Core Principle Four Duty to Use Deadly Force Only as an Absolute Last Resort and Duty to Avoid Actions Which Create a Substantial Risk of Death or Serious Bodily Injury.
[brief] Reagan Nat'l Advert. of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin, 64 F.4th 287, 296-97 (5th Cir. 2023)  After the City of Austin Supreme Court decision, the case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit to examine the restriction at issue appropriately under this “intermediate scrutiny” standard.  The regulation at issue prohibited “off-premises” digital signage altogether, while permitting “on-premises” digital signage, with the stated goal “that eventually [off-premises signs] peter out and go away" as digital billboards replace conventional signage.  *Id.* at 295.  The Fifth Circuit found that the restriction survived intermediate scrutiny.  Furthermore, at least one other court has found, since *City of Austin*, that a **total ban** on “off-premises” signage passes intermediate scrutiny.  *[...] v. City of Richmond*, No. 5:21-149-KKC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217430 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 2, 2022) (Finding that the City’s ban no off-premises commercial signage was constitutional in light of *City of Austin*).  By contrast, the 1000 foot “off-premises” intersection restriction at issue in the instant case, is much narrower than a total ban on “off-premises” signage.  Indeed, in the case relied on by Plaintiff, *E & J Equities*, the Court specifically stated that governmental interests such as traffic safety, aesthetics and siting, have “long been recognized as [] legitimate and substantial government interest[s].”  See *E & J Equities*, 226 N.J. at 583; *Metromedia*, 453 U.S. at 507-508 (holding that traffic safety is a “substantial government goal”).  The Appellate Division, in *Hartz Mountain Industries*, 2019 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1397, at *23, recognized that “anywhere a significant number of motorists are prone to shift lanes or to speed up or slow down, the risk of accidents increases, and reducing distractions may be important. ”  The *Hartz Mountain Industries* Court also added that a court can consider “a long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense,” *Id.* quoting *Burson v. Freemen*, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) to conclude that a particular traffic safety-related regulation is indeed necessary to advance the government interest in traffic safety.  Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants did not sufficiently identify the substantial government interests which underpin the Distance Regulation is meritless, as is the argument that Plaintiff was entitled to plenary hearing.
[brief] In Zirger v. General Accident Ins. Co., the Court held that contract law governs UM/UIM coverage disputes.  Zirger v. General Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 333 (1996).  The Court explained:  [The insured claimant's] rights under a UM endorsement are governed by the contract with the UM carrier."  Riccio v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 108 N.J. 493, 499 (1987); accord Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 N.J. Super. 254, 259 (App. Div. 1995) ("A claim presented under a UIM endorsement is essentially one of contract.")  [Ibid.]  In recognition of this contractual relationship, the Court in Green v. Selective – which the Court decided on the same day as Zirger – determined the statute of limitations for UM/UIM claims begins to run on the date of an accident.  Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 144 N.J. 344, 354 (1996).  Respondent’s 4-year limitations conflicts with this well-settled law that lawsuits for UM/UIM claims must be brought within 6 years of the date of the accident.  In light of this conflict between the [...] policy and state law, New Jersey state law which imposes a 6-year limitations applies to Appellant’s claim.  This result is consistent with controlling New Jersey law and the [...] policy in issue.
[directive] Defendant When Release of Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.2  Conditions. with Release  While on Device Monitoring Electronic to cause probable is there where 8.4.5, subsection to pursuant authorized as Except disorderly a (ii) or crime indictable an (i) for release pretrial on while defendant, that a believe removed, 2C:25-19(a), N.J.S.A. in defined as violence domestic involving offense persons of condition a as required device monitoring electronic an inoperable rendered with, or tampered release of revocation seeking motion a file presumptively shall prosecutor the release, pretrial 2A:162-24.
[brief] The Supreme Court held that extended medical expense benefits were outside of PIP, not included within the subrogation provisions applicable for PIP benefits but, unlike PIP benefits, were stackable.  *Id.* at 241.  In 2001, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided *Perreira v. Rediger*, 169 N.J. 399 (2001), where it concluded that the collateral source rule barred health carriers that expend funds on behalf of covered persons from recouping such payments through subrogation or contract reimbursement.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1  Ownership or direct control over the medium or the storage method is not required.  And numerous cases point out the obvious pitfalls of allowing the disclosure of records to be dependant on where the records are located. \(^1\)  The trial court here mistakenly held that the government has to “make and maintain” or “receive and maintain” the records at issue for OPRA to apply.  The \(^1\)  Even though the government records are maintained in private email accounts, the government officials still exercise dominion over them.  The [...] certification methodology discussed in the opening brief and the subpoena power both operate as mechanisms to ensure records custodians are not held responsible for officials that do not cooperate.  New Jersey Supreme Court has already rejected such a reading of OPRA.
[brief] [...]  Counselors at Law, P.A. [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent [...]  On The Brief  [...] (034441994)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ...........................................  iii  TABLE OF APPENDIX .................................................................................................................. iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................. v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................................................
[brief] It is well-settled that hearings conducted before a zoning board of adjustment to decide an application for a land use approval are quasi-judicial proceedings.  Dolan v. DeCapua, 16 N.J. 599, 612 (1954).  Board members acting in a quasi-judicial capacity when exercising powers granted to them to make land use decisions must make their decisions based on the evidence produced during the hearing and "uninfluenced by extraneous considerations which in other fields might have play in determining purely executive action."  Kramer v. Sea Girt Board of Adj., 45 N.J. 268, 280 (1965) (emphasis added) (quoting Penna. R.R. Co. v. N.J. State Aviation Com., 2 N.J. 64 (1949).
[brief] “To the extent that the ruling might have influenced later rulings of the Law Division, it was of consequence to the … public …  Such decisions should be made where possible on the merits.  It is a mistaken exercise of judgment to close the courtroom doors to a litigant whose opposition papers are late but are in the court’s hands before the return date for a motion which determines the meritorious outcome of a consequential lawsuit. ”  Thus, based on the Tyler case, the lower Court should have found Defendant’s opposition to have been timely because Defendant’s opposition brief was in the lower Court’s hands before the return date.  “But we also recognized in Rubin- in concluding that a self-represented litigant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard due to a lack of understanding of motion practice- that it is ‘fundamental that the court system … protect the procedural rights of all litigants and to accord procedural due process to all litigants.’”
[directive] Page any at or an assault during victim the strangle did or to attempted defendant whether the (8) and thereto; prior point pet. household harm did a or to threatened defendant whether the (9) basis a whether determining is there in considered be shall circumstances foregoing  The See 4.3.1. subsection to pursuant acomplaint-summons issuing of presumption a overcome to more when or one acomplaint-warrant for application an (requiring 4.6.11 subsection also necessary are acomplaint-warrant on only imposed be can that conditions release pretrial special any in Moreover, victim).