ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] even admitted that it had concluded [...] was an insured under the CCIP, but was erroneously excluded, when it paid the settlement.  ([...] Tr., 95:15-96:10 at Pa2062.)  [...] may attempt to distinguish *Palisades*, 469 N.J. Super. 30, arguing there was no mistake of fact (only mistake of law) in that case.  But, like the paying insurer in *Palisades*, there was no mistake of fact by [...] when it made a settlement payment because [...] knew [...] had disclaimed coverage to [...] under the CCIP based on [...]’s unenrolled status.  *See Palisades*, 469 N.J. Super. at 40 (no mistake of fact because paying insurer was provided “with notice that it was not obligated to pay the subject claims”).  [...] may also argue it reserved its rights, but [...] paid to settle the [...] without asserting a reservation based on its Contractors Limitation Endorsement.  (Pa2551.)  [...] may further claim that it initiated this DJ Action to obtain a ruling that the CCIP Policies covered [...], but [...] could have brought suit against [...] seeking a declaration of no coverage based on its Contractors Limitation Endorsement.  The DJ Action does not belatedly create a reservation of rights where one never existed.
[brief] Ibid. (internal markings and citations omitted).  Defense counsel induced the sentencing judge to add certain conditions of Defendant’s sentence to his parole.  Trial counsel asked specifically for his anger management requirement to be added to his parole.  This induced the judge to not only add Defendant’s anger management requirement to parole but all other conditions.  Defendant cannot request a certain sentence, obtain that sentence, and then argue that the sentencing judge could not impose such a sentence.
[brief] **CERT: OPPOSITION TO LEGAL, COMMISSION, & ACCOUNTING FEES**  **[...]’s Certification: Trust Payment of Income/Corpus Commissions (Exh. “T”)**  Court disregarded substantiated facts and arguments in my Nov. 4, ’22 Certification (Exh. “V”, p. 2-3, par. 6-8) (304a-305a) proving that [...]’s Commissions should be $1,946.56, & NOT $2,039.53 in March 7, ’23 Order.  My Certification responded to [...]’s Item Nos. 4-6 in his Certification (295a).  **[...]’s Certification for Trust Payment of Accounting Fees (Exh. “U”)**  Court disregarded substantiated facts/arguments in Nov. 4, ’22 Cert. (Exh. “V”, p. 3-4, par. 9-12) (305a-307a) that accounting fees should be $16,575, & NOT $17,649.57 in Mar. 7, '23 Order.  I rejected [...]’s $560.5 hourly charges in July since Accounting was issued in May, & rejected unwarranted $514.07 admin fee, which was 3% of hourly charges, as authorized by [...], but NOT [...].  It responded to [...]’s Item Nos. 2-4 in his Cert. (298a-299a).  As further evidence for disallowing the 3% admin fee, the Court disregarded that my Nov. 28, 2022 Certification in response to [...]’s Nov. 16th Reply to Oppositions by [...]’s and me to the requested fees stated:
[brief] 2  References to Plaintiff/Respondent refers to Plaintiff [...] and Plaintiff [...], in this case collectively.  perforation can cause peritoneal infection and lead to sepsis and death.  (7T68-7T70).  Thus, he explained that it is essential under the standard of care that the cause of ileus is identified and – if a perforation is present – treated urgently.  (7T51:4-18; 7T69:22-25; 8T23:21-8T24:15).  He further testified that Appellant deviated by not evaluating the patient himself upon the onset of symptoms and by not educating the hospitalist as to how to proceed if such symptoms arose.  (7T51-7T52).  This negligence caused [...] to go into septic shock at about 4:30 in the morning on May 17, 2013.  (8T70:2-5).  From that point, [...]’s fate was unfortunately sealed.  (8T82:2-9).  In sum, during [...]’s recovery over the next two days, Appellant was negligent in rendering post-operative care to [...] by failing to respond to signs that [...] indeed had a perforation.  (8T66:11-23).  After enduring numerous additional procedures, an open abdomen and months of excruciating pain, [...] died on August 4, 2013.  (5T206:5-6).  On May 15, 2015, Plaintiff/Respondent filed a medical malpractice complaint against Appellant, alleging that his negligence caused [...]’s injuries and subsequent death on August 4, 2013.
[brief] While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.  We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination.  They have ancient roots.  They find expression in the Sixth Amendment * * *.  This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion.  It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, * * * but also in all types of cases where administrative * * * actions were under scrutiny.
[brief] [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents  On the Brief: [...]  May 24, 2023  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS ...........................................  iii  TABLE OF PARTIES ..........................................................................................  iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ v INDEX TO APPENDIX BY VOLUME .................................................................  vii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................. 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................
[brief] Municipal restrictions on building height date back to the late 1800s, and were imposed in response to advancing technology and construction techniques that enabled the construction of tall buildings.  [...] and [...], American Land Planning Law, § 69:1 (rev. ed. 2003).  Very early on, courts recognized the relationship between height restrictions and the public welfare because the height of a building could impact traffic congestion, fire hazards, public health, adequate light and air, and population density.  E.g., Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30, 31 (1925), overruled on other grounds, Vill. of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St.3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852, 855-56, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 3503, 82 L.Ed.2d 814 (1984).  Height restrictions like restrictions on density, bulk or building size, can also be a technique for limiting the intensity of the property's use.  N. Bergen Action Group, supra, 122 N.J. at 567, 585 A.2d at 939; see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-65(b) (zoning ordinance may regulate bulk, height, building size, lot coverage, lot size, floor area ratios and “other ratios and regulatory techniques governing the intensity of land use and the provision of adequate light and air”).  Grasso, supra at 52-53 (Emphasis added).
[brief] J. Super. 396 (App. Div. 1995) | | | **Samolyk v. Berthe,** | 12 | | 251 N.J. 73 (2022) | | Terhune v. Guerriero, A-0974-10, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2110 (App. Div. July 26, 2011)..........................16 Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. P’ship. 311 Conn. 301 (2014) .........................................................................................................................19 Statutes Equine Activities Liability Act ..............................................................................................................3, 4, 5, 29, 32 Equine Activities Liability Act (“Act”), N.J.S.A. 5:15-1, et seq .........................................................10 N.J.S.A. 5:15-1 ........................................................................................................................................29 N.J.S.A. 5:15-2 ........................................................................................................................................31 N.J.S.A. 5:15-3, -5 .................................................................................................................................30 Court Rules R. 4:46-2(b) ..........................................................................................................................................11 R. 4:46-2(c)
[directive] Standard 2.  Background Checks on Grand Jurors  Where the prosecuting authority advises the Judiciary of its interest in conducting criminal background checks on grand jurors, the Judiciary shall provide a list of jurors, with appropriate identifying information, for that purpose.  Comment:  The Judiciary shall not conduct criminal background checks of grand jurors other than as indicated by an individual grand juror’s responses to qualification questions.  However, if the prosecutor advises the Judiciary of his or her interest in conducting such checks, the Judiciary shall provide juror information sufficient for that purpose – in a uniform manner.  Where the prosecutor has concerns about a grand juror’s qualifications to serve, based on a check that was conducted or upon other information, the prosecutor shall so advise the supervising judge so that the judge can determine whether that person is qualified to serve as a grand juror.  The Judiciary shall determine the best method by which to notify any jurors determined to be not qualified.
[brief] 18.  Second, I was involved with the efforts of [...] to develop a different site in [...], and that experience is quite revealing when it comes to the Township’s compliance with its Mount Laurel obligations.  [...] filed an application to convert its approvals for an age-restricted community to a community open to all households under the Sarlo legislation.  The Sarlo legislation required a 20% low and moderate income housing set-aside on the site.  That application was denied by the Township, leading to litigation.  That litigation was settled by way of a settlement agreement that required the Township to construct lower income housing on a site that, as I recall, was provided by [...].
[directive] 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  10% permissible  Actor has sexual activity with another person in exchange for something of economic value; promoting prostitution or owning or controlling a house of prostitution or soliciting another to 2C:34-1  Prostitution become a prostitute; second or third or fourth degree depending upon circumstances, 3rd Degree $5,000 to $15,000 10% permissible including whether a child under 18 is involved; disorderly persons offense if actor is charged only with engaging in prostitution.
[directive] Si enfraksyon an :fet le 13 mas 1995 oubyen apre epi sanksyon an se libete kondisyonel, oswa santans la mande pou :fe peyman anve responsabilite finansye ba depatman libete kondisyonel la, wap oblije peye yon fre de jiska $2.00 a chak fwa yon peyman oswa vesman sou peyman :fet?  [Yes/Wi] e.  If the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood [No/Non] Services Fund assessment for each conviction?  Si enfraksyon an :fet le 2 awout 1993 ou apre, wap oblije vese yon fre $75 ba Fon Sevis pou Sekirite Katye/Safe Neighborhood Services Fund pou chak sanksyon?  Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Haitian Creole
[brief] (Pa053-Pa054; Pa094; Pa096; Pa561; Pa588; Pa621).  Our Courts have held that “although an officer’s experience and knowledge must be afforded due weight to specific reasonable inferences, which an officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his or her experience, generalizations cannot form the basis for reasonable and articulable suspicion. ”  State v. Stoval, 170 N.J. 346, 367 (2002).  An officer's action must be justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, (1968).  Generalizations cannot not form the basis for reasonable and articulable suspicion.  Id.  The defendants did not show how plaintiff’s “wearing a hooded sweatshirt in winter, raised over his head, removing a backpack from the passenger side of a green Jeep, and transferring it to the hunk area of a nearby black Jeep” created articulable suspicion warranting that plaintiff be stopped.
[brief] Da099-Da100.  The trial court then engaged in an analysis of two different tests utilized in other jurisdictions, the “functional equivalent test” and the “public function approach. ”  Da100.  Frankly, it is the [...]’s position that the OPRA statute absolutely does not state that private entities acting with the authority of the state are subject to OPRA and therefore that these two tests should not be considered.  Our courts have recognized that “‘where the Legislature has clearly and explicitly defined a term within a statute, [courts] must assume it did so intentionally and with the intent that its stated definition be applied to that term throughout the statute. ’”  Commerce Bancorp, Inc. v. InterArch, Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 329, 336-37 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Simpkins v. Saiani, 356 N.J. Super. 26, 32-33 (App. Div. 2002)), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 519 (2011); see also Febbi v. Bd. of Review, 35 N.J. 601, 606 (1961) (“When the Legislature has clearly defined a term, the courts are bound by that definition. ”); Nebinger v. Md. Cos. Co., 312 N.J. Super. 400, 406 (App. Div. 1998) ("When the Legislature has specifically defined a term, that definition governs.").
[brief] *Caplin Enters., Inc. v. Arrington*, 145 So.3d 608, 617 (Miss. 2014) (en banc) (noting that an arbitration clause “which permitted [...] to pursue judicial remedies while relegating the plaintiffs’ claims to arbitration is also clearly oppressive and substantively unconscionable”); *Global Client Solutions, L.L.C. v. Ossello*, 367 P.3d 361, 371 (Mont. 2016) (concluding that a clause permitting a service provider to seek judicial relief against a consumer, bound to arbitrate, was unconscionable); *Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow*, 2014 Ark. 375, 386 (2014) (“The lack of mutuality to arbitrate in the arbitration agreement renders the agreement invalid and unenforceable. ”); *Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc.*, 362 N.C. 93, 107 (2008).  Although cases do exist when an “uneven” arbitration clause has been upheld, Appellant did not find a single case upholding a “one-sided” arbitration clause.
[brief] ”  Ibid.; (Ra57; Aa8).  In other words, more than a decade after the SFRA’s enactment, the Legislature began explicitly phasing out the “transitional assistance” represented by Adjustment Aid.  Ibid.; (Aa8).  Thus, in FY2019, because [...]’s prior year K-12 aid of $410.4 million exceeded its prior year uncapped aid of $258 million, it saw a reduction in adjustment aid in the amount of $3.5 million.  (Aa1109; Aa1459; Aa1872).  2.  Chapter 67: Amendments to the School Funding Reform Act.  At the same time that it enacted the FY2019 Appropriations Act, the Legislature also amended the SFRA through L. 2018, c. 67 (Chapter 67).
[brief] The issue is whether [...], having made a loss payment under a title policy and standing in plaintiff’s shoes, would be barred by the illegality defense from pursuing the recovery of its payment from third-party defendants, the heirs at law of [...].  If the answer is yes, then plaintiff having prejudiced [...]’s subrogation rights, would be barred from recovery under the policy and its complaint should be dismissed.  Recall, [...] was under contract to sell her home to plaintiff for about $42,000.  She walked away from the closing with $0.00 net cash.  Plaintiff, however, did not receive a deed, and if there is a title policy in force, [...] would pursue recovery of its payment through an action for specific performance of the contract and recover a deed to the property or, in the alternative, damages for breach of contract.  Third-party defendants would raise illegality defense as a bar to [...]’s action and probably prevail.  Please note that third-party defendants have reached an agreement with [...].  In exchange for a discharge of [...]’s notice of lis pendens, third-party defendants were able to sell the property to an unrelated party and deposit net proceeds of approximately $204,000 in a trust account to be held there until final disposition of this action.  Should the court dismiss the appeal against [...], third-party defendants will receive all of the funds.  Should the Court, however, restore plaintiff’s claims against [...], then the escrow fund becomes a source of recovery of any payment [...] might have to make to plaintiff based on the exercise of its subrogation rights.  In light of the foregoing, should this court reverse the trial court on the illegality issue and find a contract existed between [...] and plaintiff such that [...] owes plaintiff payment of a policy limit, then [...] argues its subrogation rights have been prejudiced and it, therefore, has an additional defense to plaintiff’s claims.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Appellant was the only [...] employee with access to the [...] accounts for [...].  (2T:19:10-19).  [...] had a policy requiring $200,000 to be maintained in its bank accounts at all times as a cushion.  (1T:59:18-21; Pa322).  On August 24, 2017, Appellant emailed Respondents to inform them that the combined bank account balance was “dangerously close to the $200,000 mark. ”  As a result, he asked Respondents to defer their weekly paycheck for a week.  (Pa322; 1T:58:9).  The actual account balance in [...]’s three bank accounts on August 24, 2017 was $23.32: $1.00, $18.61; and $3.76 (1T:160:21-25; 162:16-19; 164:9-12; 165:20-166:15; Pa156; Pa158; Pa163).
[directive] If, however, the conflict cannot be resolved through consultation by the two issuing judges, the Assignment Judge or designee shall conduct a hearing to resolve the conflict and, if appropriate, modify the order.  All interested parties, including the victim (victim's family, if the victim is a minor), Prosecutor, DYFS, and defendant shall be notified of the hearing on the conflicting orders.  If, after any such hearing the Assignment Directive # 01-10
[brief] In *Dantinne v. Brown*, [...] (6/23/2017), the U.S. District Court for New Jersey faced a similar factual scenario.  (C.C.Da.111-17).  The Plaintiff moved to disqualify counsel for defendant under RPC1.7 and 1.9 claiming that a conflict of interest existed as defense counsel “may” become a witness at trial.  *Id.*at 1-2.  The trial court denied the motion without prejudice, stating, “[t]he reason is because no present conflict exists, and no future conflict is certain, that warrants [...]'s disqualification.  Further, it is not yet known if [...] will be a necessary trial witness. ”  *Id.*at 7.  …  “The Court can and will decide plaintiff's disqualification motion when and if it is based on an existing or unavoidable conflict.  This situation does not presently exist. ”  *Id.*at 8-9.  The matter at bar is strikingly similar in the speculative and conclusory nature of the conflict alleged.
[brief] (Pa227-Pa228; Pa242-Pa244).  Since the established precedent, plain reading of the NJEERA and pertinent authorities in other jurisdictions did not support the Board’s argument, it had to resort to the Domino Theory.  Since it could not point to any facts here for why [...] needed to restrict the [...]’s ability to determine the size of its negotiations team, the Board instead relied upon future hypothetical to claim that [...]’s analysis of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 would lead to “an absurd result. ” (Pb15-Pb18).  [...]’s brief has already explained why this is not the case, which the [...] supports and adopts herein.  (Rb11-Rb13).
[brief] A  Oh, it’s the Office of Professional Misconduct of the New York Department of Health.  Q  And those are physicians who have licensing actions against them, correct?  A Yes.  [4T166-169]  Defendant’s counsel painted [...] as an expert in seeking money damages against other doctors – not in honestly assessing another doctor’s care:  Q  Doctor, when you were still a practicing surgeon in 2007, you went to law school and graduated in 2010, correct?  A Yes.  Q  Then you were a practicing attorney beginning 2011.  A Yes.  Q  And when you practiced, you practiced in the specialty of medical malpractice representing only plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases and suing fellow doctors, correct?  A  I didn’t sue them personally.  I worked with law firms that were plaintiffs’ firms.  Q  I got you.  And you helped work up the cases.  A  Yes.  Q  You helped at trials.  A  Yes.  Q  You even tried eight cases, correct?  A  That’s correct.  Q  And you still have an active New York license to practice, correct?  A  Yes.  Q  And you’re still part of a law firm that does solely plaintiffs’ medical malpractice work, correct?  A  Well, I’m no longer practicing law so.  Q
[brief] (Da1)  This Court should reverse the trial court’s grant of [...]’s Order to Show Cause, which confirmed the sale of the Subject Property to [...] for $500,000, because the parties presented sufficient factual evidence demonstrating the existence of genuine issues of fact relating to the validity of the marketing and sale of the Subject Property.  The factual evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party ([...]) demonstrates that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding the manner in which [...] and realtor [...] listed, marketed and sold the Subject Property.  As such, the Court’s October 13, 2023 Order entering judgment confirming the sale of the Subject Property to [...] for $500,000 must be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] Instead of engaging in a careful and thoughtful analysis of comity factors and jurisdictional facts, [...] denied defendants’ motions at the conclusion of the telephonic hearing with a few conclusory, and in some instances, caustic remarks.  [...] called defendants’ arguments “anathema to our state” (2T59:17) and concluded his ruling with a statement that “[i]f there are other claims elsewhere it is of no moment to this Court. ” (2T61:3-4).  \textsuperscript{10}  It is apparent from the context of the statement that [...] intended the word “jurisdiction. ”  \textsuperscript{11}  From context, it is clear that [...] intended the word “care.
[brief] See \textit{State v. Olenowski}, 255 N.J. 529, at 595-603 (2023).  exclusion of all other sources.”); PCAST Report at 45-46 (“Because the term ‘match’ is likely to imply an inappropriately high probative value, a more neutral term should be used for an examiner’s belief that two samples come from the same sources.  We suggest the term ‘proposed identification’ to appropriately convey the examiner’s conclusion, along with the possibility that it might be wrong. ”).  Likewise, the scientific community, including the latent fingerprint community, has acknowledged that “all laboratory tests and feature-comparison analyses”—including latent print analysis—“have non-zero error rates.
[brief] Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  Municipal Appeal No. [...]; Misc. Case No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal  From a Judgement of Conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal), Monmouth County  Sat Below: [...], J.A.D. (ret &t/a)  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.