ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] App. Br. at 34.  On the award of interest, the Trial Court correctly held that “[r]ather than a mathematical error in need of correction, the dispute is over the method of application of the interest rates to the parties’ award. ”  Da32 (emphasis added).  Nonetheless, clinging to faulty legal logic, [...] believes that “the proper calculation of interest [] when misapplied is indeed a mathematical error. ”  App. Br. at 33 (“despite the Arbitrator’s best efforts, his calculations are still incorrect”).  [...] once again badly misconstrues N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24.
[brief] ” (16T:27-20 to 25).  Later, and in the face of inculpatory video evidence shown to the jury, defense counsel termed [...]’s testimony as, “It’s the strongest piece of evidence in this trial. ” (16T:28-24).  Defendant’s counsel then informed the jury as to how to determine credibility – as judges of the facts – and then suggested that [...]’s status as a victim automatically made him believable, thus credible.  Defendant’s counsel opined:  This is the victim.  He wants the person who shot him caught, just like any other victim would.  His interest in the outcome of the trial?  Here, he is telling you that justice is being – done here (sic).  That this man didn’t do it.  His testimony is pleading to you, hey, they got the wrong guys.  Don’t find these guys guilty.
[brief] Federal Agency Interpretations Are Not in Conflict with the Federal Court Decisions.  Defendant argues three federal agency statements conflict with the Federal Decisions’ interpretation.  But those agency statements do not address whether a debt collector may share the type of information which Defendant conveyed to its mail vendor.  And, even if the agency statements were to say what Defendant contends, they are not accorded deference.  Instead, the role of this Court is “to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits. ”
[brief] If the Court determines to go down the rabbit hole of attempting to make a determination as to whether what was said and not recorded in May was said when there was a recording in August, testimony of the participants is the only way to make such a determination.  Since the May 23, 2022 meeting was video recorded without sound, there is an objective basis to make a comparison.  Instead of addressing that question, the motion judge took it upon herself to reach conclusions about what occurred and to change the discussion into a declaration that Appellants had an opportunity to be heard, which is hardly the point.
[brief] As such, [...]’s NJCFA claim must be dismissed. ”).  Regardless, *DepoLink* held that the “legislative intent in enacting the CFA was to curtail the ‘sharp practices and dealings in the marketing of merchandise and real estate whereby the consumer could be victimized by being lured into a purchase through fraudulent, deceptive or other similar kind of selling or advertising practices. ’”  430 N.J. Super. at 338 (quoting *Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co.*, 77 N.J. 267, 271 (1978)).
[brief] (Da974)  22.  On December 24, 2019, Defendant filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the Trial Court’s Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.  (Da846-870)  On January 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed a certification in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Da871-890)  On January 17, 2020, the Trial Court heard oral argument and denied Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (5T and Da891-892)
[brief] [...], the Defendants’ Real Estate Agent, Did Not Maintain the Property  After her husband passed away, [...] testified that [...], a local realtor, took care of the Property.  (9T 118:6-21, Jan. 24, 2023).  [...] was called to testify with regard to his involvement in the Property.  He testified that he met [...], his wife [...], and his two sons, [...] and [...] for the first time at the end of 2019 outside the Property.  (4T 59:18-60:11, Jan. 10, 2023).  Despite [...] purporting to be the owner of the Property (either individually or through [...]), he came to the meeting with [...] without a key to Property.
[brief] “If a party offers a computer printout into evidence after satisfying the foregoing requirements, the record is admissible unless the sources of information or the method, purpose or circumstances of preparation indicate that it is not trustworthy. ”  (Emphasis Added).  In the Shawmut Bank case, the Court stated:  “In American Oil Co. v. Valenti, ... our Supreme Court found that a witness must have personal experience with record keeping procedures in order to be competent to testify that computer generated records were made in the ordinary course of business.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................iii  TABLE OF DECISIONS/RULINGS BEING APPEALED ....................................................iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................................15  LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................................................................16  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ADOPTION OF ORDINANCE NO. 2022-17 WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.  (Pa2-3); (Pa632); (T9:6) ..................................................................................................................16  A.  The Committee Never Made a Finding of Inconsistency.  (Pa632); (T10:6-21).  ..................................................................................................................................................................................17  B.  Ordinance No. 2022-17 Is Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence.  (Pa632); (T14:24-15:3).  ..................................................................................................................................................................................21  II.  THE COMMITTEE DID NOT PROPERLY AMEND ORDINANCE NO. 2022-15.  (Pa2); (Pa631); (T9:14-21).  ..................................................................................................................24  CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................................26  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The creation of the new [...] upon the elimination and merger of the non-operating [...] pursuant to P. L. 2009, c. 78 (N.J.S.A. 18A: 8-43 et seq.) did not create a “consolidated school district” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 et seq.  The creation, supervision and naming of consolidated school districts, as well as the apportionment of membership of the board of a consolidated school district, and the apportionment of appropriations, tax levied and redemption of bonds, are all governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 et. seq.
[directive] The disciplinary process should be thoroughly explained in the agency's rules and regulations, including a description of the officer's rights, the identity of the hearing officer, an outline of the hearing process and, if applicable, appeal procedures available to the officers.  2.2.8  An agency's rules and regulations, which include the description of the disciplinary process, shall be distributed to all employees.  The agency should document that this distribution has taken place.  In addition, a copy of the rules and regulations and a copy of the agency's internal affairs S.O.P. shall be made available to a representative of any employee collective bargaining unit.
[brief] In addition, in the context of the State’s request based on [...]’s midpoint reasoning, it appears that the court also improperly elevated the minimum term from the ordinary thirty-years to the extended term thirty-five years in arriving at the heightened fifty-five-year base term.  See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103 (holding any fact that increases the mandatory minimum must be submitted to a jury); Pierce, 188 N.J. at 168-69 (explaining that the extended term range cannot raise the minimum ordinary term).  Either way, the court’s unconstitutional extended term finding was critical to its sentencing decision, and therefore a resentencing is required.  See State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984) (explaining resentencing is “always require[d]” where the sentencing court fails to “apply correct legal principles in exercising its discretion”); accord, e.g., State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 486 (1993) (even where the ultimate sentence was not an abuse of discretion, remanding for resentencing because “confidence in the ultimate sentencing determination will be enhanced substantially by a sentencing proceeding that incorporates the deliberation and exercise of reasoned discretion .  . . .”).
[brief] By way of background, in October of 2008, Plaintiff [...] retained [...] to assist in the formation of the non-profit entity, [...]  (“[...]”).  It is undisputed that on or about October 3, 2008, [...] assisted [...] by filing Merlin Kid’s Certificate of Incorporation with the New Jersey Division of Revenue.  According to the Complaint, in 2020, Plaintiffs were sued by the New Jersey Attorney General (bearing Docket No. [...]) (hereinafter referred to as “AG Action”) “for failing to file and register as a charitable entity with the Consumer Affairs Division of the Attorney General’s Office (hereinafter referred to as “AG office”) and for failing to follow specific statutes and regulations governing charitable entities in the State of New Jersey.
[brief] A.  The trial court’s order denying Defendant’s second motion for reconsideration should be affirmed because the Defendant failed to meet the reconsideration standard.  Notwithstanding the trial court’s inability to issue an opinion contrary to the July 8, 2023 order and opinion from the Appellate Division, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration was properly denied since he failed to meet the standard for same.  Motions for reconsideration are governed by Rule 4:49-2 which requires that it be made within 20 days after service of the judgment or order.
[brief] See R. 1:7-2 (“for purposes of preserving questions for review on appeal relating to rulings or orders of the court or instructions to the jury, a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, shall make known to the court specifically the action which the party desires the court to take or the party’s objection to the action and grounds therefor); see also, Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 523 (2011) (citations omitted) (“the ‘[f]ailure to make a timely ⁷ Plaintiff’s position, taken on her post-trial motion for a new trial, that [...] offered opinions at trial that were outside his area of expertise and he was therefore unqualified to render these opinions is contradictory to the position she took on her motion to strike at trial – that [...]’s opinions were opinions of a lay person.  (8T33:5-17).  The former argument, unlike the latter, contemplates the need for expert testimony.  objection...deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action. ”); State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 231 (2015).  The trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion to strike [...]’s trial testimony.
[brief] Maiorino v. Schering-Plough, 302 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 189 (1997)  ..............................................................................  32 Marrin v. Capital Health Sys., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112988 (D.N.J. July 20, 2017)..........................44, 45 Martins v. Rutgers, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209586 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2021)..............................28  Masoir v. Insurance Co. of North America, 193 N.J. Super. 190 (App.  Div. 1984).................................................20, 37, 38 McCullough v. City of Atlantic City, 137 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D.N.J. 2001) .......................................................23, 24 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
[brief] [...]’s Pleadings Do Not Support a Finding of Waiver**  According to [...], this Court should consider [...]’s purported failure to use the word “arbitration” in its affirmative defenses and Rule 4:5-1(B)(2) certification as a significant factor in finding waiver, because [...] lacked notice that arbitration was on the table.  Pb27-28.  [...], however, is a --- \(^9\) Pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Pollution Policy and the Umbrella Policy, the AAA Commercial Rules will govern the arbitration.  Da376-77; Da383. sophisticated insured (represented by experienced counsel), which was equally aware of the [...] Pollution and Umbrella Policies’ arbitration clauses.  The reference to the Law Division’s lack of jurisdiction in [...]’s affirmative defenses clearly applies as the Law Division should have granted [...]’s motion to compel because arbitration deprived the court of jurisdiction.  Similarly, [...] reserved its rights under all of the terms and conditions of the [...] Policies, and arbitration is indisputably a condition in those Policies.  [...]’s claim that [...]’s affirmative defenses were “cryptic references” that it could not decipher (id.), thus, lacks credence.
[brief] *Id.*  Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently approved a trial court’s “meticulous analysis” reviewing counsel time entries to exclude unreasonable expenditures and “categories of legal work that did not further plaintiff’s cause. ”  *Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp.*, 253 N.J. 191, 221 (Mar. 15, 2023).  The Court here should follow the guidance from *Hansen*.
[brief] [N]o **permanent member** or officer of the police department or force shall be removed from his office, employment or position for political reasons or for any cause other than incapacity, misconduct, or disobedience of rules and regulations established for the government of the police department and force, nor shall such member or officer be suspended, removed, fined or reduced in rank from or in office, employment, or position therein, except for **just cause** as hereinbefore provided and then only upon a written complaint setting forth the charge or charges against such member or officer.  [N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 (emphasis added). ]  When “just cause” is needed to terminate a “permanent member,” a protectable property interest is present.  See Nicoletta, 77 N.J. at 154-55; see also Grexa v. State, Dep’t of Human Servs., 168 N.J. Super. 202, 207 (App. Div. 1978) (“[P]laintiff was a temporary employee” and therefore “no property interest [was] implicated such as to invoke the due process shield. ”); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (“The hallmark of property . . . is an individual entitlement . . . which cannot be removed except ‘for cause. ’”).  The CSC defines “permanent employee” as someone “in the career service who has acquired the tenure and rights resulting from regular appointment and successful completion of the working test period. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3.  Generally, a “police training course” must be completed before a “working test period” can begin.  N.J.A.C. § 4A:4-5.2(d)(1); N.J.S.A. 52:17B-68.  Moreover, “entry level . . . corrections police officers” are required to “serve a 12-month working test period. ”  N.J.A.C. § 4A:4-5.2(d)(1).  Here, [...] completed her police training course, and has been serving as a corrections officer for over 20 years.  (1T73-74).  She is clearly a permanent public employee, to which N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 applies.
[brief] To assist with the interviews, the Chief of the Borough Police Department prepared a questionnaire, which was used to question applicants respecting many facets of the application process, including without limit, business location; the size of the business in square footage; parking and traffic concerns; operational concerns; and, financial concerns.  Pa304.  Similarly, to guide the members of the Subcommittee in their evaluation of the applications, the Borough attorney, with input from the Subcommittee members, prepared an evaluation sheet as a tool to help guide the Subcommittee during its review.  Pa48.  The evaluation sheet of the Subcommittee was posted on the Borough’s website.  Pa89.  It contained most of the areas covered in the RFA.  See, Pa48; Pa63.  The evaluation sheet was strictly an internal guidance document prepared for the use of the Subcommittee (see, Pa304); there is nothing in the record that the criteria set forth in the evaluation sheet was “adopted” by the Borough, and, critically, that the evaluation sheet was required to be completed by the either Subcommittee members, or by the full membership of the Council in ultimately adopting the Support Resolution.
[brief] ([...] Tr., 45:23-46:10 at Pa1027-1028 and 133:14-134:9 at Pa1049-1050.)  In any event, minutes after the August 10, 2015 [...] email, [...] emailed [...] asking it to confirm that [...] has been “excluded” from the CCIP for the Project, and, shortly thereafter, in an e-mail exchange between [...] and [...], it was confirmed by [...] of [...] that [...] was now excluded from the CCIP because “they are structural demo and therefore not enrolled. ” (Pa2434.)  Also, on August 10, 2015, [...] of [...] sent an e-mail to [...] with the subject\(^8\) “RE: [...] Perini Corporation/[...]/[...]/08.01.2015” and states “Please cancel effective 08/01/2015. ” (Pa2438.)  Based on [...]’s request, [...] prepared a Cancellation Endorsement unenrolling [...] effective August 1, 2015.  (Pa893; Pa2500; [...] Tr., 23:8-24:3 at Pa2447; [...] Tr., 120:7-11 at Pa2481 and 139:21-140:10 at Pa2486.)  A copy of the Cancellation Endorsement was received by the [...] (“[...]”) on August 17, 2015.  (Pa2567.)  Further, [...] responded to [...] referencing “3297809-[...] Perini-1 CXL ENDT”, with “3297809” being an internal [...] tracking/confirmation number for the attached Cancellation Endorsement.  (Pa893; [...] Tr., 23:8-24:3 at Pa2447; [...] Tr., 120:7-11 at Pa2481 and 139:21-140:10 at Pa2486.)  [...] never tried to re-enroll in the CCIP as would have been required.
[brief] Patel, 239 N.J. at 448 (emphasis added).  As [...] held, the record reflects that defendant was plenty advised of the penalties and the serious of the offense prior to waiving his rights to any type of counsel and pleading guilty.  (Da 18).  In adhering to the mandates of settled case law and our court rules and prior to accepting defendant’s waiver of counsel, the municipal judge specifically stated to defendant on the record, “I should run through them [the potential penalties] again for you, so that you are aware of that before you make any decisions. ” (1T:3-13 to 3-14); see also Crisafi 128 N.J. at 510; R. 7:8-10.  He then reiterated that defendant was afforded multiple opportunities to consult with an attorney.  On September 12, 2016 defendant was advised of his right to counsel, and [...] told him that he may apply for a public defender if he felt that he could not afford private counsel.  (2T:25-5 to 25-10).  Then, defendant was advised again on March 13, 2017 of his right to counsel, to which he indicated that “he would retain private counsel.
[brief] Benjamin and DLC Services Corp. v. Garden Operations Corp. No. A-2315-11T2 2013 WL 6508491 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2013)  ...........................................  13, 14, 15  City of Millville v. Rock, 683 F. Supp. 2d. 319 (D.N.J. 2010)  ............................... 7, 8, 9 Ctr. 48 Ltd. P’ship v. May Dept. Stores Co. 355 N.J. Super. 390, 405 (App.Div. 2002)  ......................  6, 7, 8, 13  Driscoll Const. Co., Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp., 371 N.J. Super. 304, 853 A.2d, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)  ..................................................................  3  Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Galm, 109 N.J.L. 111, 116, 160 A. 645 (E.  & A.1932) ......................................................... 17 HLP Associates, L.P v. Carpet City, Inc., 2015 WL 1181271 (App. Div. 2015) ............................................................ 13 Herz v. 141 Bloomfield Ave. Corp., No. A-2954-13T2, 2015 WL 2465027, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2015) ............................................................... 10, 11 Housatonic Bank & Trust Co. v. Fleming, 234 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 1989) ............................................................. 13 Lawyers Guild Realty, Inc. v. ICSD, L.L.C., No. A-4908-07T2, 2009 WL 3429755, at *4-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 6, 2009) ................................................................ 11, 12 M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 378 (N.J. 2002) .................................................. 3 Mount Holly State Bank v. Mount Holly Washington Hotel, Inc., 220 N.J. Super. 506 (App.Div. 1987)  .................................. 6, 13, 17, 18 Swift & Co. 115 N.J. Super at 394  ...........................................  17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Aa117-18).  The northern portion of the Property contains the former buildings and structures associated with [...], while the remaining site consists of agricultural fields, associated outbuildings, and woodlands.  (Aa25).  The Property is located at the southeastern intersection of U.S. Route 1 and Quakerbridge Road and is bifurcated by Clarksville Road.  Ibid.  The Property contains several tributaries to the Duck Pond Run and Shipetaukin Creek waterbodies, which required flood hazard area delineations.  (Aa13-15).  [...] identified the flood hazard area for Duck Pond Run using DEP’s delineated flood hazard area, (Aa124-25), but the unnamed tributaries on the Property were not mapped and [...] calculated the flood hazard area for these tributaries, (Aa125).  [...] proposes to construct seven warehouses, internal roadways, parking, stormwater management features, and other associated amenities.
[brief] First, [...] complains that when its unauthorized dumping was discovered, [...] “rushed to take over the property” when “the correct course of action was to a) communicate with [...]; b) join [...] in investigating the allegation and pausing whatever work was being conducted; and c) if this failed, file a lawsuit focused on the alleged ‘dumping’ or ‘contamination. ’” [Db3; Db12].  Ironically, this is not dissimilar to how [...] proceeded.  Indeed, after learning of [...]’s misconduct, [...] immediately contacted [...] to request information and to solicit cooperation.  [Pa46, Pa206].  [...] devoted the next nine days to repeated promises that documents and information would be forthcoming, knowing all along that it would provide neither.³  The parties’ extensive exchange during that period included the following: (i) a letter to [...]’s counsel on September 20, 2023, one day after [...] learned of its unauthorized dumping, to demand that [...] cease and desist and that it provide documents and information concerning the source and composition of the materials that it had imported [Pa46 at ¶¶ 11-13, Pa206]; (ii) an email to [...]’s counsel on September 21, 2023 urging a returned telephone call “as soon as [counsel is] able” due to the “time- ³ Paragraph 17(a) of the Lease provides that “Tenant shall not… dispose [of] hazardous materials or waste,” and Paragraph 17(b) provides that “within five (5) days after any request by Landlord, Tenant will supply all information requested by Landlord with respect to Tenant’s operations at the Property and Tenant’s use, storage or discharge of hazardous substances or hazardous wastes at or within the Leasehold.
[brief] There is no per se Driving While Suspended case.  In every respect, the alleged B.A.C. in a New Jersey DWI alcohol intoxication case is the dispositive evidence.  Here, there is only a solitary reference to Defendant’s alleged B.A.C.:  THE COURT:  I do have in the file an alcohol influence report, which indicates a .17 blood alcohol concentration as a result of the three readings that were taken on that night.