ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (AA0006)  The [...] incorrectly relies upon language in In Re Foglio, 207 N.J. 38, 48 (2011) (quoting Nunan v. New Jersey Dep’t of Pers., 244 N.J. Super. 494, 498 (App. Div. 1990).  This case did not involve the rights of a veteran to appointment under N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c) but involved list removals utilizing the “Rule of Three”, a procedure clearly not applicable to this matter.  Further, the language was further clarified by the Court in the following paragraph, holding:  However, where a candidate has proved actual discrimination on the basis of membership in a protected class, courts have imposed individualized, retroactive remedies such as mandatory appointments and back-pay.  E.g., Terry, supra, 86 N.J. at 151-52, 430 A.2d 194 (remedial provisions of Law Against Discrimination constitute exception to appointing body's discretion under Rule of Three).  In other words, the remedy is directly related to the nature of the impropriety.  That is the backdrop for our inquiry.  Id.  Respectfully, the [...] can point to no authority that supports the position that a Disabled Veteran is not entitled to the promotion if the removal of the disabled veteran candidate was unsupported by the record.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Pa25).  At deposition, Plaintiff testified that he assumed that it was the “radio transmissions” he made in conjunction with his duties as a police officer during the Township’s July 4th celebration and fireworks display on July 5, 2017 which constituted his alleged whistleblowing activity.  (Pa107 at T18-5 to 22).  Plaintiff testified that he was not aware of any other whistleblowing activity in which he engaged.  (Id.; Pa108 at T19-13 to 16).  As noted above, Plaintiff also specifically testified that he did not make the radio transmissions in response to any alleged misconduct by Defendants.  (Pa109 at T20-7 to 10).  In response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff also claimed that by performing his law enforcement duties, he somehow objected to alleged criminal conduct by civilians.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency,** | 45 | | 197 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1984) | | | **Bauman v. Royal Indem. Co.,** | 41 | | 36 N.J. 12 (1961) | | | **City of Asbury Park v. Star Ins. Co.,** | 51 | | 242 N.J. 596 (2020) | | | **Cont'l Trailways, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Motor Vehicles,** | 49 | | 102 N.J. 526 (1986) | | | **Enright v. Lubow,** | 46, 47 | | 215 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 1987) | | | **First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson,** | 52, 53, 54 | | 177 N.J. 125 (2003) | | | **Harvester Chemical Corp.,** | 39, 40 | | 277 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 1994) | | | **Iafelice ex rel. Wright v. Arpino,** | 46 | | 319 N.J. Super. 581 (App. Div. 1999) | | | **In re Estate of Lash,** | 49 | | 169 N.J. 20 (2001) | | | **Insinga v. Hegedus,** | 45 | | 231 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 1989) | | | **Jignayasa Desai, D.O., LLC v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.,** | 48 | | 473 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2022) | | | **Jorge v. Travelers Indem. Co.,** | 51 | | 947 F.Supp. 150 (D.C.N.J. 1996) | | | **Kistler v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.,** | 46-47 | | 172 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 1980) | | | **Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co.,** | 54 | | 138 N.J. 627 (1995) | | Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530 (1990)
[brief] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. ”  A motor vehicle stop by a police officer, no matter how brief or limited, is a “‘seizure’ of ‘persons’” under both the Federal and State Constitutions.  State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33 (2016) (quoting State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 475 (1998)).
[brief] (Da310).  As to Count VI, the Court held that “[...] and [[...]] have both chosen to relinquish their rights and rescind the contract.  (Da314).  Because plaintiff’s relief is limited to count VI, rescission of the Repurchase Agreement, and the signatories are in agreement, there are no material facts in dispute. ” (Da315).  With respect to Counts II and III, the Court held:  The bylaws of [...] gave the power of entering financial transactions to the board of directors, not to [Appellant] alone.  Likewise, the Operating Agreement of [...] required [Appellant], as manager, to act in accordance with the will of the members, who have “full, exclusive, and complete” authority to manage [...].  Plaintiffs’ Brief at 4.  By secretly entering these loan agreements without the knowledge or approval of [...]’s board and [...]’s executive committee, [Appellant] not only breached the bylaws and operating agreement, but demonstrated numerous instances of self-dealing and bad faith.  As previously mentioned, proximate cause is ordinarily reserved for the factfinder.  However, given the foregoing facts are undisputed, the court may determine causation at summary judgment.  Allowing [...]’s federal tax obligations to remain unsatisfied while continuing to transfer funds to companies in which he had interests and permitting these companies to default pursuant to the loan terms establish the liability [Appellant] created for [...] and [...].  Accordingly, [Appellant] breached his fiduciary duty in addition to his already established breach of [...]’s bylaws and [...]’s operating agreement.  (Da318).  On July 2, 2020, the Court issued an Order scheduling trial for September 16, 17, 18, 21, and 22, 2020.
[brief] (Da 272-73)  Had the resentencing court properly evaluated Miller factor four, it would have considered the effect that [...]’s youth had on his ability to understand and participate in plea negotiations with the State.  Indeed, [...]’s adult co-defendant who had more experience with the criminal justice system was sentenced to a term of 17 years of incarceration with a 14-year period of parole ineligibility as the result of a plea bargain amending his original murder charges to aggravated manslaughter.
[brief] [...] was eating from an open bag of chips and a grocery bag and bottled beverage can be seen on the raised porch in front of which the men were standing.  (Ex B 0:30 to 1:00; 3:40 to 3:50)  The judge also misapprehended the significance of the fact that the men were on a residential block with row houses, as opposed to in “an isolated parking lot off of a warehouse.
[brief] All decisions of the dispute resolution professional are binding, N.J.S.A.§39:6A-5.1c, but are reviewable by the Superior Court in an action filed pursuant to N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-13 for review of the award.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(f).  N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-13 is a constituent part of the New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act ("APDRA"), N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-1 to 30.
[brief] The charge was on a complaint warrant.  The State rejected the theory and instead presented [...] to both the grand and petit juries.  Defendant’s argument on appeal is thus based on the inescapable fact that the jury's verdict cannot be supported by the evidence that was adduced at trial, given the finding that [...] was determined to be not guilty of the weapons offenses charged in the indictment and given the lack of any other evidence that reckless conduct on his part caused the death of [...].
[brief] ”  1T20:7-12 and 20-24.  At that point, [...] went behind the suspect and detained him by wrapping his hands around his torso.  1T22:9-12 and 70:1-2.  [...] conceded that the time between the moment he first saw Defendant and the time when he stopped him was about two seconds (9:24:19 – 9:24:21 on the video).
[brief] (Pa271).  [...]’s argument—that the April 14, 2023, order “triggered the true accrual date” (Pb33)—remains without merit or factual basis.  In his February 16, 2023, oral opinion on the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [...] held that [...]’s malicious prosecution claim accrued on March 6, 2018, when the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed his VOP conviction on direct appeal.  (1T 14:8-9).  After the State Defendants’ motion was granted and [...]’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, litigation continued solely between [...] and the [...], with the [...] later moving for summary judgment.  (Pa278-Pa279).  By then, [...] had obtained a court order in the criminal action dismissing the VOP charge and vacating the earlier amended judgment of conviction.  (Pa224-Pa225).  At oral argument on the Edison Defendant’s summary judgment motion, the [...] questioned counsel for [...] as to how the court order was relevant to the legal issue of claim accrual and as to how the court order would alter [...]’s finding that the [...]’s malicious prosecution first began to accrue on March 6, 2018, at the time of the Court’s reversal of [...]’s VOP conviction.  (3T 21:2-24:4).  Counsel could not provide the second trial court with any controlling or persuasive authority supporting his position.  (3T 24:16-28:19).  Under those factual circumstances, the second trial court correctly exercised its sound discretion and applied the “law of the case” doctrine as to the March 6, 2018 accrual date.  (Pa271).  Under the doctrine, “once an issue has been fully and fairly litigated, it ordinarily is not subject to relitigation between the same parties either in the same or in subsequent litigation.
[brief] *Ibid.* (citations omitted); see also *State v. Long*, 137 N.J. Super. 124, 131-32 (App. Div. 1975) (requiring discussion of “the factual underpinning of the case itself, the characteristics of the principals involved in the crime, and a realistic assessment of the prejudice potential which may be introduced thereby” in analysis of whether to determine a court abused its discretion by not asking a voir-dire question on racial prejudice); *State v. Kelly*, 118 N.J. Super. 38, 46-47 (App. Div. 1972) (finding no abuse of discretion in rejecting voir-dire challenge where proposed questioning would risk “subverting the objective of *Manley*” and could “commit or pledge jurors to a point of view or a result before they have heard any evidence, argument of counsel[,] or instructions of the court) (quoting *Manley*, 54 N.J. at 280-81).  There was no risk of a biased jury based on the judge’s decision.  To the contrary, adding a question of that nature would have risked biasing the jurors against the reliability of fingerprint evidence, which the judge had already deemed to be inappropriate based on his ruling on the motion to exclude [...]’s testimony.  See id. at 280.  Voir dire was thorough and probing, as each juror confirmed that they would view the case in a fair and impartial manner after answering a host of questions by the judge.  There is no reason to believe that the jury was partial in any way.  Because the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, defendant’s argument regarding the absence of a question on fingerprint evidence at voir dire should thus be rejected.
[brief] It is the State’s burden to show [...] poses a serious threat, not the defendant’s burden to prove the opposite.  At Pb7-8, the State takes issue with [...]’s report because it was not a “truly illuminating” analysis of [...]’s behavior and that, consequently, it is not reliable to show that [...] doesn’t pose a serious threat to humans and domestic animals.  The burden of proof is on the State, not the defendant.  Moreover, by pointing out what may be missing from Carson’s analysis, the State emphasizes the flaws in its own case below.  The trial record is devoid of any scientific evidence of risk, let alone a comprehensive behavioral analysis of which Carson’s report purportedly falls short.
[directive] $500 em caso de crimes contra a ordem pública ou contravenções penais contra a ordem pública.  MULTA  D.E.D.R.  TOTAL $ no Formulário promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Portuguese página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Portuguese page 1 of 2  You will be required to pay a mandatory drug enforcement and demand reduction (D.E.D.R.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you plead guilty?
[brief] It was undisputed that [...]’s criminal conviction was less than ten years before the trial began.  Da108.  [...] was convicted of drug related charges on June 1, 2018.  *Ibid.*  The trial began on October 3, 2023.  2T.  That means N.J.R.E. 609(b) had no application.  Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 609(a)  [...]’s conviction could be excluded from evidence at trial only if the court determined that evidence of [...]’s criminal convictions would result in “undue prejudice” to [...] and that the undue prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value.
[brief] (Pa2277-2278 and Pa2518.)  [...], [...]’s Human Resources and Payroll Coordinator, who took over some CCIP responsibilities from [...], e-mailed [...]’s broker, [...], on August 27, 2015 with “another COI request,” after being provided certain COI requirements from [...], including the document identified as “Schedule ‘A’ to C. [...] Contractors Subcontract. ” (Pa2508-2516.)  On September 4, 2015, [...], Accounting Assistant at [...], who likewise took over some of the OCIP/CCIP responsibilities for [...], communicated with [...] advising she was “working on submitting payroll/OCIP for our contract with C. [...]” and noting “The contract is excluded from our enrolled contracts so I am unable to submit --- please let me know what is needed[.]” (Italics added.)  (Pa2508.)  [...] of [...] responded later that day advising that [...]’s “COI was ‘compliant’” and that “No payroll is required for ‘excluded’ contractors. ” (Italics added.)  (Pa2518 and Pa2529.)  Also, on September 4, 2015, Johnson separately emailed [...], Payroll Administrator at [...], to let her know [...]’s work was excluded from the CCIP, writing “I am in touch with someone from OCIP (sic) [[...]] – our contract is excluded from being able to upload payroll for some reason. ” (Italics added.)  (Pa2521.)  Johnson followed up with [...]’s Hughes on September 8, 2015 advising “I had gotten word about there being no OCIP (sic) required for this job (as per the other email I had sent). ” (Italics added.)  (Pa2525.)  Later on September 8, 2015, [...] responded to Hughes’ insistence that “it is a CCIP job” by advising Hughes there was no CCIP reporting required because on the [...] portal the [...]-[...] “contract comes up as ‘excluded’” and because, according to communications from [...] of [...], “no payroll is required for excluded contracts. ”  (Italics added.)  (Pa2529.)  After receiving an email from [...], Johnson emailed [...], [...]’s Controller, on September 23, 2015, requesting assistance with certain reports required for the Project and, in that email, Johnson advised “I had found out that this isn’t an OCIP (sic) reporting job either[.]” (Italics added.)  (Pa2532.)  Therefore, months before the Accident, [...] was aware that it was not enrolled in the CCIP.  [...] confirmed this knowledge on numerous occasions, raised no objection to the fact, and maintained its own direct general liability insurance through [...] and [...] to cover its work at the Project.
[brief] THE COMMISSION’S DECISION FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING’S SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES AND THE COMMISSION FAILED TO ISSUE  A COMPLETE AWARD  BECAUSE THE AWARD INCLUDED SIX (6) ATTACHED APPENDICES WHICH WERE NOT PROVIDED TO THE PARTIES (Not Argued Below).  The Commission’s decision failed to address the arbitration proceeding’s substantive and procedural deficiencies, including the arbitrator’s acceptance and adoption of Salary Cost Outs submitted by the [...] after the submission of post-hearing briefs, without the opportunity for the [...] to respond/rebut the information submitted, which included incorrect information as to the composition of the three bargaining units as well as inaccurate back pay calculations.  In addition, the Commission failed to issue a complete award because the Award included six attached appendices which were not provided to the [...] when the Award was issued, prior to the [...]’s appeal of the interest arbitration award to [...] or before [...]’s decision denying the [...]’s appeal.  [...] transmitted the 96 page Award and 6 appendices to [...] by email on December 17, 2023.  (Aa549).  [...] transmitted the Award to counsel for the parties by email on December 18, 2023.  (Aa553).  The transmittal letter to the parties with the Award did not include the 6 appendices that were part of the Award.  [...] has not reissued the Award to the parties with the 6 appendices attached.  The Award references a number of appendices that were attached to the Award.  (Aa162-173).  These salary cost-outs and allocation of retro pay awarded by the arbitrator inaccurately reflect the composition of the bargaining units, and inaccurately reflect the salaries used to calculate the cost-outs.  For example, fire captains promoted into the bargaining unit after July 31, 2019 (the snapshot date) and during the term of the new collective negotiations agreement should not have been listed in the cost-out.  Moreover, in calculating the retro pay allocations, the arbitrator gave members of the bargaining unit who retired full allocation even though they were no longer employed during all or part of the period of the retro pay.  In addition, the appendices were not issued by [...] with the Award to the parties.  At the time, the parties were unaware of this error.  Therefore, the [...] was unable to submit arguments to the Commission in its appeal related to the inaccuracy of the appendices and how this material error impacts the validity of the Award.  Accordingly, because the appendices were not issued with the Award, and such failure prejudiced the [...]’s appeal to the Commission, the matter must be reversed and remanded back to the Commission.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Helmsley v. Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 210 (1978) (quoting Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 568 (1975)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has generally held that hardship increase formulas cannot, “indefinitely freeze the dollar amount of a landlord's profits ‘without eventually causing confiscatory results. ’  Mayes v. Jackson Twp. Rent Leveling Bd., 103 N.J. 362, 370 (1986).  However, this right of a “just and reasonable return” is also not without its limits.
[directive] No Early Release Act (Polish)  Odpowiedź na poniższe pytania wymagana jest tylko w przypadku, gdy przyznaje się Pan(i) do popełnienia, usiłowania popełnienia lub udziału w zmowie przestępczej mającej na celu popełnienie jednego z następujących 29 czerwca 2001 r. lub później: przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, które miały miejsce zabójstwo, kwalifikowane nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci lub nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci, zabójstwo z użyciem pojazdu, kwalifikowana napaść, rozbrojenie funkcjonariusza organów porządku publicznego, uprowadzenie, kwalifikowana napaść na tle seksualnym, napaść na tle seksualnym, napad rabunkowy, uprowadzenie pojazdu, kwalifikowane podpalenie z narażeniem innych osób na niebezpieczeństwo utraty życia lub poważnego uszkodzenia ciała, włamanie, kradzież przez wymuszenie polegające na przejęciu majątku innej osoby poprzez grożenie uszkodzeniem ciała, fizycznym ograniczeniem wolności lub swobody ruchów albo popełnieniem innego przestępstwa, stosowanie pułapek w obiektach służących do wytwarzania lub rozprowadzania niebezpiecznych substancji kontrolowanych albo odpowiedzialność bezwzględna za śmierć wywołaną 18 czerwca narkotykiem; albo następujących przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, które miały miejsce 2002 r. lub później: terroryzm, wytwarzanie lub posiadanie broni chemicznej, środków biologicznych albo urządzeń jądrowych lub radiologicznych; albo następujących przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, 13 stycznia 2008 r. lub później: które miały miejsce zorganizowana działalność przestępcza pierwszego 14 sierpnia 2013 stopnia; albo następujących przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, które miały miejsce r. lub później: pornografia dziecięca; albo następujących przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, które 1 listopada 2013 r. lub później: miały miejsce nielegalny handel bronią.
[brief] It is indisputable that the Plaintiffs’ attempt to develop the [...] would have been a new business venture for them.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs are not permitted to recover their alleged lost profits arising from their proposed new business venture and their expert was properly precluded from testifying at trial in support of the Plaintiffs’ pursuit of those prohibited damages.  Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiffs’ Appeal should be denied.
[brief] **[...] offered to settle [...]’s UIM claim, both before and after she sued [...].**  True to its letter, [...] offered $85,000 to settle [...]’s UIM claim on February 24, 2023.  (Pa141).  On April 5, 2023, [...] increased its offer to $100,000.  (Pa144).  Unsatisfied with [...]’s offers, [...] opted to sue.  [...] filed her Complaint against [...] on May 17, 2023.  (Pa14).  A week later, after receiving [...]’s Complaint, [...] wrote to [...]’s counsel to reconvey its $100,000 settlement offer.  (Pa147).  [...] also advised, “Should we determine a settlement is appropriate and prior to any payment, [...] will need your client’s Social Security number to determine if there is a Medicare lien. ” (Pa147).  In sum, [...] reacted to [...]’s suit by continuing settlement negotiations, not denying coverage.
[brief] Martin, 346 N.J. Super. at 323.  The undisputed record shows that [...] and [...] were contemporaries who previously had a personal connection and that [...] was not excluded from attending conferences in 2014 and 2015.  In reality, even if the Court were to find a genuine issue of fact existed as to the alleged “too old” utterance, the relative age and earlier relationship of the parties, the fact that [...] did in fact attend conferences, and the fact it was a single alleged comment, demonstrated it is not a material fact such that summary judgment would be precluded.
[brief] An expert like [...] would have related estimator variables, such as the two-second observation of the shooter’s face and its interaction with studied perils of even non-stranger identifications.  He would have disputed the State’s central theme that the three eyewitnesses knew [...] from prior exposure and thus cannot be mistaken.  [...] would have explained why, “counterintuitively, prior familiarity can actually reduce the reliability of an eyewitness identification,” especially when one is expects to see a certain known person.  (Da237-43)  Thus, an expert like [...] could have provided the tools jurors needed to evaluate the eyewitness identifications, instead of leaving them to overvalue them based on witnesses’ assurances they knew and recognized defendant.
[brief] For example, at [...] and [...]’s request, [...] prepared the Cancellation Endorsement for the workers compensation component of the CCIP thereby automatically removing coverage for [...] under the CCIP\textsuperscript{14} effective August 1, 2015.  (Pa893; Pa2500; [...] Tr., 23:8-24:3 at Pa2447; [...] Tr, 120:7-11 at Pa2481 and 139:21-140:10 at Pa2486.)
[brief] b. Defendants [...] and [...] had a duty to authorize an investigation into the [...] Complaints.  Counts Six and Seven of the Complaint allege individual liability against defendants [...] and [...], respectively, as aiders and abettors under the LAD.  Counts Six and Seven allege that these defendants, “[b]y virtue of being a member of the Defendant [...] that retained [...] to conduct an investigation of Defendant [...]’s claims against Plaintiff [are] individually liable as [aiders and abettors] of the discrimination and retaliation perpetrated against the Plaintiff.