ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Dated: May 20, 2024  [...]; Plaintiff, vs. [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...]; JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious names); JANE DOES 11-20 (fictitious names); ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (fictitious names); Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  Following remand from the NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT and on grant of leave to appeal from SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION  HUDSON COUNTY, DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  REPLY
[brief] Second, the State had failed to justify the delay because the State was obliged to provide [...] notice of the indictment and prosecute the case, even though [...] was in federal custody.\(^5\) (Da 33-35; 1T 8-17 to 23)  Third, [...] asserted his speedy trial right repeatedly.  (Da 35)  Fourth, although [...] did not need to prove prejudice to be entitled to dismissal, [...] could do so; evidence had been lost or destroyed, including the car involved in the offense and video surveillance, and [...] suffered anxiety upon learning of the unresolved charges.  (Da 36-38)  It appears that the State did not file an opposition to any of [...]’s letters or briefs, even after the trial court indicated that it did not want to issue a final ruling until it reviewed both parties’ submissions.  (1T 40-7 to 10)  When the court asked the State to provide the reason for the delay during argument, the State solely stated that [...] had been in federal custody.  (1T 15-5 to 7)  The Honorable [...], J.S.C heard argument on the motion on \(^5\)  [...] also argued that he was in joint custody with New Jersey because he was arrested and charged by New Jersey and never received bail on the New Jersey warrant.  (1T 9-1 to 11, 13-1 to 4; Da 51)  May 20, 2019, and issued a decision on June 10, 2019.  (1T; 2T; Da 3)
[brief] POINT III  THE PENALTY PROVISION OF §201 IS CLEAR AND ENFORCEABLE AND MUST BE UPHeld  The penalty provision of §201 is clear and enforceable.  Therefore, the Defendant’s conviction for her violation of such must be upheld.  § 201-7 entitled “Violations and Penalties” states “[a]ny person who violates or neglects to comply with any provision of this chapter or any notice or order issued pursuant thereto shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties provided in § 164-14 of Chapter 164, General Provisions, Board of Health.
[directive] Cases Violence Domestic Protection Act Survivor Sexual Assault Check to Requirement 4.2.4.  .........................................................................................34  Registry Central Defendants' Juvenile Young Adult Check to Requirement 4.2.5 4  3  History........................................................................................................ New When Complaint-Warrant Superseding Seek to Authority  4.2.6  Material or a Has Upgrading Charges  Supports Information ..............................................................34  Risks Release Pretrial on Bearing from Are Different Filed Actually Charges When Procedures 4.2.7 ...................................................35  Scan Live into Entered Initially Charges a Complaint- Issuing of Presumption a Is There Where Cases 4.3 6
[brief] New Jersey Court Rules 4:67-5 and 4:83-1 promote dismissal of claims in a summary manner when the “affidavits show palpably that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,” in which case “the court may try the action on the pleadings and affidavits, and render final judgment thereon. ”  “If any party objects to such a trial and there may be a genuine issue as to a material fact, the court shall hear the evidence as to those matters which may be genuinely in issue, and render final judgment. ”  New Jersey Court Rule 4:67-5.  “Rule 4:67–1 is designed ‘to accomplish the salutary purpose of swiftly and effectively disposing of matters which lend themselves to summary treatment while at the same time giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard at the time plaintiff makes his application on the question of whether or not summary disposition is appropriate’.
[brief] The Supreme Court has determined that email logs are government records and must be supplied under OPRA.  Paff v. Galloway, 229 N.J. 340 (2017)  Where the trial court went awry was making the determination that whether or not the email accounts were privately-held or government-supplied was a relevant determining factor.  While *Paff v. Galloway* involved government-issued email accounts, that was not a controlling facet of the case; the operative point - indeed the operative point of all OPRA cases - is whether or not a “government record” is involved.  A “government record” is a government record not by the mechanism or machination that created it.  A government record is a government record **SOLELY** by virtue of who creates it, keeps it or stores it.  If that “who” is a government official acting on behalf of government, that record is a “government record”.  And there was no dispute that the Board member’s private email accounts were used to undertake/discuss government business (and/or to store/maintain government records).
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED ................ vi  INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................  4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..........................................................................................................  15  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  18  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFFS POSSESS STANDING DESPITE FINDING THEY DO NOT MEET THE “INTERESTED PARTY” STANDARD REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH STANDING UNDER THE MLUL (DA532; 2T24-32; 3T8-12.)
[brief] [...] ignores all the facts leading up to the opening of the new account and transfer of the funds from the old account to it, as if irrelevant, and treats this as just an ordinary run of the mill account opening.  [...] overcame any presumption of receipt of documents by submission of his affidavit explaining he did not receive them.  This was not a blanket denial, but rather a step by step recounting of the facts of the case.  While a presumption of receipt, might arise by signing an acknowledgment of receipt, (if in fact one was signed) the introduction of evidence to rebut the presumption destroys it leaving only that evidence and its inferences to be judged against the competing evidence and its inferences to determine the ultimate evidence at issue.  The burden of persuasion as to the proof or disposal of the presumed fact does not shift to the party against whom the presumption is directed unless otherwise required by law.  See NJRE 301(b) and (d); Cappuccio v. Prime Capital Funding, 649 F.3d 180, 189 (3d. Cir. 2011) holding the evidence needed to overcome the presumption is minimal given that the presumption’s only effect is to require the party contesting it to produce enough evidence substantiating the presumed fact’s absence, to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 251 (emphasis in original).  Had the jury heard defendant’s testimony, it is unlikely that they would have believed his version of events because it goes against what the victim claimed.  Also, “when it comes to a defendant's testimony, ‘we look to evidence outside of defendant's testimony because it is the 'sort of evidence that a jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving.'”  Hedgespeth, 464 N.J. Super. at 437.  Defendant is seen on video participating in the robbery, the victim identified defendant, and all three of codefendants were apprehended together shortly after the incident and had in their possession a handgun and the victim’s property.  If any error did occur, it was harmless.  R. 2:10-2.
[brief] For the reasons explained above, the order granting [...]’s motion to compel arbitration should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, Date: November 7, 2024  [...]  Attorneys for Respondents [...] Technologies, Inc. and [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  [...]  Attorneys for Respondents [...] Technologies, Inc. and [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...]; [...], INDIVIDUALLY AS PER QUOD CLAIMANT AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR MINOR PLAINTIFFS  [...] AND [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; RASIER/PORTIER, LLC; [...]; [...]; [...]; and JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious designations), Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Kandrac, 429 N.J. Super. at 81.  The Court ultimately determined that “as a general rule, the commercial tenant does not have such a duty…”  Id.  In Kandrac, the Plaintiff was a patron of the defendant, [...], which was one of thirty-six stores in [...] shopping center.  Id.  After crossing the fire lane and access roadway to the parking area, her foot caught on a “hump” in the asphalt and she fell forward, injuring herself.  Id.  The lease between [...] and [...] contained a provision which assigned to the lessor the responsibility to maintain the common areas of the center.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order of Summary Judgment on Defendant/Respondent’s Summary Judgement Motion and Transcript of Court’s Decision on Oral Argument of the Motion for Summary Judgment.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Page(s)  CASES  Brill v.  Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J 520 (1995)  18,19 Colletti v Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 217 N.J Super. 31 (App. Div. 1987)  30  In re Estate of DeFrank, 433 N.J. Super. 258 (App. Div. 2013)  19,25,38  Lapolla v. Cty. of Union, 449 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 2017)  32  Leahey v. Singer Sewing Co., 302 N.J. Super.69 (App. Div. 1996)  19  Lehman v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 132 N.J 587 (1993)  Lesniak v Budzash, 133 N.J 1 (1993)  Morgan v. Union County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders, 268 N.J. Super. 337 (1993)  Oyola v. Xing Lan Liu, 493 N.J. Super. 493 (App. Div. 2013)  Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J 500 (1994)  State v McQuaid, 147 N.J 464 (1997)  Swan v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 407 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div. 2009)  Wade v. Kessler Institute, 343 N.J Super. 338 (App. Div. 2001)  Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J 236 (2001)  STATUTES
[brief] (Da23).  [...] had consented to that relief and temporary restraints were issued.  (Da23).  However, [...] then withdrew and sought reconsideration of his consent, and the court denied the application on the order to show cause return date.  (Da23).  In the scheme of the plethora of successful efforts, this application – which did result in pendente lite relief and did stop the in-person, uninvited visits – did not warrant the denial of Plaintiff’s fee application.  Rather, the motion was plainly related to the numerous successful efforts to enforce the judgment, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not reducing the fee award based on the de minimis times certain relief sought was denied without prejudice.
[brief] Additionally, unlike the defendant in *Erazo*, once [...] was transported to the Toms River Police station it appears that he was immediately escorted to the interrogation room where [...] and [...] interviewed him rather than being allowed to sit unrestrained in the waiting room with other members of the public as in *Erazo*. (slip op. at 27) (21T24-9 to 25-6)  additionally, whereas *Erazo* was not isolated from any friends or family, [...] was isolated from his friend [...], the other occupant of the Room 517, who was separately transported to the police department to be interrogated and was interviewed separately from [...] (24T177-14 to 17, 186-15 to 19; Da169-170)  Thus, unlike Erazo, a reasonable person in [...]’s position, “based on the nature of the police encounter would not have believed that he was free to leave. ”  *State v. O’Neal*, 190 N.J. 601, 615 (2007).  The State also responded in its brief to Defendant’s argument that police “affirmatively misled defendant as to his ‘true status’” during the March 12 interview because he was not informed that the police were questioning him with respect to a homicide investigation although they admitted they had probable cause to charge him with homicide at the time they commenced the March 12 interrogation.
[brief] 2  The claims against [...] were subsequently dismissed with prejudice.  (1T104:4-105:14).  plaintiff’s prior medical conditions and history of falls.  (Pa 25, Pa26, Pa29 and Pa30)  Plaintiff also moved *in limine* to bar evidence of the plaintiff’s use of a handicapped placard.  (1T5:13-18).  The trial court denied the plaintiff’s *in limine* motion to bar evidence of use of the handicapped placard (1T12:9-14; 2T40:10-18), and denied the motions to bar evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions and history of falls and strike portions of [...] testimony regarding plaintiff’s prior medical conditions and history of falls, ruling that the evidence could be used to impeach the credibility of witnesses and as substantive evidence of the cause of the plaintiff’s fall.
[brief] Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496 (1990)  ........................................................................  22  Isaac v. NRA Grp., LLC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)  ................................................  25  Jablonowska v. Suther, 195 N.J. 91, 948 A.2d 610 (2008) .........................................................
[brief] The allegations in [...]’s Complaint as to the Sood Defendants.  [...] is an insurer in New Jersey that issues automobile insurance policies under which insureds are entitled to PIP benefits if they are involved in accidents.  Pa25.  Pursuant to the No-Fault Law, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq., typically, insureds-patients assign their entitlement to benefits to their medical providers who then make claims for PIP benefits from insurers like [...].  See N.J. S.A. 39:6A-4; Coal. for Quality Health Care, 348 N.J. Super. at 313.  [...] and [...] are licensed physicians.  Pa32.  [...] owns [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”) (together, the “Sood Defendants”).  Pa28-29, 32-33.  [...] works for some of [...]’s medical practices.  Pa32-33.  The Sood Defendants’ pain management medical practice involves treating patients who suffer from injuries sustained in automobile accidents.
[brief] Thus, the jurisprudence analyzing the private right of action under the NJCFLA is neither ‘long-standing,’ nor well-settled.  As explained in [...]’s opening Brief, the present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Small Loan Act (“NJSLA”) in 1914.  See Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950).  --- 1
[brief] Appellant cannot meet the bare requirements of her *prima facie* case as she has not established the existence of a disability covered under the NJLAD.  Appellant did not produce any documentation supporting the existence of any of her alleged disabilities and testified that she has no medically imposed physical limitations.  Pa050–Pa051; DSOF at ¶¶ 33; DSOF at ¶¶ 29; 34; 37–38.  Rather, her Brief relies solely on the unsupported assertions and self-serving declarations, none of which were ever communicated during her employment.  Appellant never mentioned a disability or health condition to her employer, was not under medical care for any disability in the months leading up to the separation of her employment, and never requested an accommodation or assistance due to any alleged disability or health condition.  Appellant never claimed that she was limited in the performance of her duties by any condition nor is there any evidence to demonstrate that her employer knew or perceived her to have any sort of a disability (other than recognizing that she was heavy set, the existence of which as a matter of law is not a disability in and of itself).
[brief] Sullivan v. Port Auth. of NY and NJ, 449 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2017) .................................................................................................................................19  Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Township, Inc. v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6 (1976)  .................................................................................................................. 44, 45 Twp. of Readington v. Solberg Aviation Corp., 409 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2009)
[brief] ”  Da81 [PTA § 9.8].  The PTA merely identifies EGP as a term that “shall be negotiated by the Parties in good faith. ”  Da54 [PTA § 1.6(a)(ii)].  It is highly likely that the vast universe of variables at play in determining EGP in multiple project scenarios rendered it impracticable for the parties to develop a one size fits all “process” for determining EGP.  Thus, they defaulted to the duty to negotiate in good faith based on the variable circumstances presented in any given project.  They included the Additional Backlog Conditions in the PTA to avoid controversy by ensuring a documented meeting of the minds concerning which projects were to be subject to EGP-sharing formula in the PTA.
[brief] E.2d 864 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) | 32 | | Grant v. Thomas, 307 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 1997) | 26 | | Greer v. New Jersey Bureau of Securities, | 30 | | 288 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Grillo v. State, 469 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 2021) | 23 | | Holderman v. Columbus Skyline Sec., 74 Ohio St. 3d 495 (1996) | 33 | Pine Belt Chevrolet v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 132 N.J. 564 (1993)
[brief] *(See Da128)*  Specifically, in paragraph 22, Plaintiff [...] stated that “[t]his English Agreement did not reference any of the prior ‘Chinese’ agreements executed between myself and the Defendant and by signing this English Agreement, it was never my intention to waive any of the various entitlements afforded to me pursuant to our agreements written in Chinese and two of which were executed virtually simultaneously with the English Agreement. ”  *(Da231)*  Plaintiff intentionally omitted a material fact that Defendant [...] was not advised the existence of the various Chinese Agreements.
[directive] 2.  Eske w komet enfraksyon a (yo) pou ki w plede koupab la?  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge [Yes/Wi] [No/Non] b. what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?  Eske ou konprann anvan Jij la deklare w koupab, wap bije di jij la ki saw te fe ki w koupab de enfraksyon fe oswa enfraksyon yo an patikilye?  [Yes/Wi]  [No/Non]  Do you understand what the charges mean?
[directive] 8.4.1  A public employee must answer questions specifically, directly and narrowly related to the performance of their official duties, on pain of dismissal.  This obligation exists even though the answers to the questions may implicate them in a violation of agency rules, regulations and procedures that may ultimately result in some form of discipline up to and including dismissal.  In short, no “right to remain silent” exists in administrative investigations.  8.4.2  However, internal affairs investigators in civil service jurisdictions should be aware that, under civil service rules, an employee cannot be forced to testify at their own disciplinary hearing.8  As a matter of fairness, the internal affairs investigator in a civil service jurisdiction should refrain from questioning a subject officer about a particular disciplinary offense if the officer has already been charged with that offense and is awaiting an administrative hearing on the charge.  8.4.3  Prior to the start of any questioning, the officer shall be advised that he or she is being questioned as the subject of an investigation into potential violations of agency rules and regulations, or fitness for duty.  He or she should be advised of the subject matter under investigation, and that he or she will be asked questions specifically related to performing their official duties.  N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.6(c).  8
[brief] Ridge at Back Brok, LLC, 437 N.J. Super. at 97 n4 (stating “[w]here the appeal is untimely, [we lack] jurisdiction to decide the merits of the appeal”); see also State v. Lefante, 14 N.J. 584, 589-90 (1954)(stating “[a] respondent who is merely seeking to maintain his judgment may brief and argue on the appeal any points that will sustain his judgment and if he does not brief and argue such points he will be taken to have waived them.  Only when the respondent in certification is not relying on his judgment below but is seeking affirmatively to overrule or modify it must he cross-petition for certification); Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 435, 443 (App. Div. 1984)(stating “appeals are taken from judgments, not opinions, and, without having filed a cross-appeal, a respondent can argue any point on the appeal to sustain the trial court’s judgment”).
[brief] (Pa58 – Pa62)..............................................  31  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Held that N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) Permits Publication by Title Where the Ordinance’s Title Provides a Sufficient Statement of the Purpose of the Ordinance.  (Pa58 – Pa62)...........................................................................................................  31  B.  The Trial Court Correctly Held the April 8 Notice  Sufficiently Conveyed the Purpose of the Ordinance Was to Adopt a Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa58 – Pa62)..................................................36  III.  The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).
[brief] The Township and Board shall expedite review and approval of all necessary governmental approvals, within its jurisdiction.  [Pa058 (emphasis added). ]  In similar fashion, Paragraph 18 of the Settlement Agreement mandates that the “Township and the Board shall work diligently, in good faith, and shall undertake all commercially reasonable efforts, including expediting reviews of [...]’s submissions and scheduling of special meetings, as necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. ”  Pa062 (emphasis added).  As to enforcement, the Settlement Agreement specifically states that this “Agreement may be enforced through a motion to enforce litigant’s rights . . . filed in Superior Court, Passaic County.
[brief] 12 - **Iannone v. McHale,** 245 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 1998) ..................................................  13 - **McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee,** 419 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 2011) ..............................................  12, 16  #### RULES - Rule 1:4-8(a) ..........................................................................................  12 - Rule 1:4-8(b) .......................................................................................... 13-14 - Rule 1:4-8(d) ..........................................................................................  15 - Rule 1:5-2 ...............................................................................................  13 - Rule 4:4-4(6) ..........................................................................................  8 - Rule 4:6-1(a) ..........................................................................................  8 - Rule 4:43-2 ............................................................................................  10  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] E.  Two new subsections are added to Addendum B of the Review of Noncompliant Vehicular Pursuits.  UOF Policy (Vehicular Pursuit Policy): a new Subsection 12.1(e), which requires prosecutorial review of non-compliant vehicular pursuits, and a new Subsection 12.2(e), which requires that law enforcement executives’ annual review of vehicular pursuits include an analysis of noncompliant incidents and the steps taken to address the noncompliance.  F.  Edits.  The following revisions address minor technical edits or typos that appeared Non-Substantive in the December 2020 UOF Policy.  1.