ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 42 State v. Matulewicz, 101 NJ 27 (1985) ............................................................  43  Specht v. Netscape, 306 F3d. 17 (2d Cir. 2002) ..............................................  30, 33 United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 306 NJ Super 540 (App. Div. 1997) ....................  44, 46 US v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403 (3rd Cir. 2016) ....................................................  42 US v. Dunkel, 927 F2d. 955 (7th Cir. 1991) .....................................................  31  Wollen v. Gulf Stream, 468 NJ Super 483 (App. Div. 2021) ...............................  22 Statutes N.J.S.A. 12A:4-104 .........................................................................................  20 N.J.S.A. 12A:1-304 .........................................................................................
[brief] Second, the Trial Court erred when it re-wrote the Consent Order to find that "any deadline [regarding the re-filing of claims] would have no meaning[,]” unless "the sixty-day deadline applied to both the tolling of the statute of limitations and the opportunity to re-file 'any of the affirmative claims, counterclaims, and/or third-party claims.'" (Pa8).  While [...] echoes the Trial Court's finding, without any substantive explanation, there can be no question that the Trial Court's finding lacks substantive basis.  Indeed, this Court has analyzed comparable consent orders in other lawsuits, and concluded that language similar to that which is present in the Consent Order - concerning the re-filing of dismissed claims – may be interpreted as applying only to the tolling of the statute of limitations or repose, without affecting a parties' ability to re-file such claims after the stated deadline.
[brief] When asked, “What did you twist your ankle on?”, Petitioner responded, “I don’t recall, I don’t remember on what I twisted it. ” (IT22:12-23).  Incident Report (“Incident Report”; Aa37-Aa43), Petitioner testified that a Captain prepared it, with information that Petitioner provided (Aa13; IT25:24-25; IT26:1-11; IT27:1-18).
[brief] Defendant testified on his own behalf and presented testimony from his father, [...], and his long-term partner, [...].  All three presented a version of events that differed markedly from that presented by the State.  [...] testified to waking up at around 2:15 to 2:30 a.m. to someone entering their shared residence and waking up again at 3:45 a.m. to go to the bathroom, at which time she saw defendant and his father talking.  In [...]’s testimony, he confirmed that the person entering the residence was the defendant, though he stated it was at 2:35 a.m., and confirmed [...]’s testimony that she had seen the two men up talking, though he claimed it was closer to 4:00 a.m.  Defendant’s testimony with regard to his whereabouts at the time of the burglary matched that of his father and [...]; defendant reported arriving home at exactly 2:35 a.m. and [...] seeing him and his father up talking at 3:30 a.m.-3:45 a.m. (9T:101-22 to 112-19; 11T:5-25 to 51-12).
[brief] As documented by the experts, [...] engaged in deliberate and persistent non-compliance with OSHA regulations and ANSI standards, its own site-specific health and safety requirements and contract and industry standards.  Plaintiffs’ expert noted 27 violations, and the post-death inquiry by OSHA confirmed violations on the night [...] was killed.  Plaintiffs identified six specific areas of safety protocols and devices that were known and ignored.  Required night work lighting, audible backup alarms, properly functioning mirrors, use of a dedicated dump truck, and use of spotters were all available options at little or no cost.  On a larger scale, there was no plan.  The contract, specifications, HASP and ANSI all called for an Internal Traffic Control Plan.  [...] had none.
[directive] Chief Justice [...] c: Criminal Presiding Judges of [...], Chief Staff D. AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  [...], Special Assistant S. [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  Probation Division Managers and Assistants  [...], Statewide Drug Court Manager [...], Assistant Drug Court Manager Complex•  037  [...] • [...]  PO J.  New Jersey  Adult Drug Court Case Consolidation Policy and Procedures I. and Background Definition Goals of the drug court program are to encourage participation the program for in eligible participants, to resolve matters expedited manner, engage to and in an the participant treatment end the cycle of addiction criminality.
[brief] (Da044).  On April 5, 2023, correspondence was forwarded to counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant with an increased settlement offer to $100,000.00.  (Pa144).  On April 6, 2023, counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], sent an email to Defendant-Respondent, [...], stating “Please Note, I am transferring this file to my new Firm [...], Please forward all future Correspondence to [...].
[brief] (8T  Forty minutes after the playback of that testimony, the jury returned a guilty verdict.  (8T 115-9)  As our case law recognizes, expert testimony is compelling; factfinders tend to give experts great credence.  This is why courts must carefully exercise their gatekeeping function: to “prevent[ ] the jury’s exposure to unsound science through the compelling voice of an expert. ”  In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 389 (2018).  “The danger of prejudice through introduction of unreliable expert evidence is clear”:  “While juries would not always accord excessive weight to unreliable expert testimony, there is substantial danger that they would do so, precisely because the evidence is labeled ‘scientific’ and ‘expert. ’”  Id. at 389-90 (quoting State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 518 (1982)).  In this case, the danger that the jury relied on unscientific, inappropriate testimony to reach its verdict is palpable.  The convictions must be reversed.
[brief] The [...]’ arguments in opposition to the [...]’s Cross-Appeal are utterly without merit.  They wholly ignore the [...]’s very first point—that it is not the Arbitrator’s factual determinations that are subject to appeal here—but that the sole issues preserved for appeal are those explicitly set forth in the Trial Court’s October 20, 2021 Consent Order.  Under the October 20, 2021 Consent Order, the provisions of which the [...] wholeheartedly agreed to when moving this case to arbitration, only five limited issues were preserved for appeal: (1) Order establishing the date of valuation of January 27, 1994; (2) the order denying Plaintiff’s motion in limine barring the testimony of the Defendants’ furniture, fixture, and equipment expert, [...] based on certain items not being present as of January 27, 1994; (3) The Order denying Defendants’ motion barring the Plaintiff’s expert, [...], from using the [...] contract rent in his calculation of gross income in his income approach and the introduction of evidence of sales of shopping centers based on terms of leased fee; (4) all issues related to environmental cleanup and (5) all issues related to withdrawal of deposit funds.  The [...] have critically failed to answer that vital issue on appeal: how did the Trial Court err in denying the [...]’ motion barring the McHale Report from using the [...] contract rent?  The answer to that question is that the Trial Court did not err.  Instead, the Trial Court rightfully decided to leave the credibility of McHale’s findings in the hands of the Arbitrator, who in his role as the factfinder determined that that the market value of the Property had to account for the 30-year ACME lease in an arms-length transaction.  However, rather than confining their appeal to the Trial Court’s Order, the [...] have mounted a collateral attack on the Arbitrator’s factual findings.  These arguments remain outside the bounds of permissible appeal and must be dismissed as procedurally inappropriate.  The [...]’ tedious arguments espousing a “fee simple” taking versus a “leased fee” disregard the core principles of New Jersey case law regarding the determination of market value.
[brief] Therefore, Plaintiff may have established the first prong of a claim for retaliation. ”  Thus, the entirety of the lower court’s determination rested on the second prong of an NJLAD cause of action; i.e., whether the Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action.  In that regard, Plaintiff plainly alleged – both the law and facts – an adverse employment action.  In the Motion to Dismiss Decision, the Court stated that “Plaintiff has not established the second prong, that she suffered an adverse employment action” to justify a determination that Count One was dismissed as to Defendant [...].
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court below, and reinstate Plaintiffs’ Complaint, in its entirety.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Dated: December 29, 2023  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...] [...], [...]  Tel: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants [...] and [...]  [...] and [...], Appellants/Plaintiffs, v. [...], Respondent/Defendant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  Docket No. Below: [...]
[brief] **B.  (Pa000098)  [...] CANNOT RELY ON THE 2015 SETTLEMENT TO PRECLUDE THE CLAIMS FILED IN GANNON BECAUSE THE 2015 SETTLEMENT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY “COVENANT NOT TO SUE. ”**  “A release is a provision that intends a present abandonment of a known right or claim.  By contrast, a covenant not to sue also applies to future claims and constitutes an agreement to exercise forbearance from asserting any claim which either exists or which may accrue [in the future].”  *Medtronic AVE Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.*, 247 F.3d 44, 55 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing *McMahan & Co. v. Bass*, 673 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (App. Div. 1998)).  The absence of any “covenant not to sue” in the 2015 Settlement estops the defendants from relying on that settlement to extinguish “future claims” arising *after* the settlement—like the claims that [...] seeks to assert in federal court.  The defendants played a substantial role in drafting that 2015 Settlement.  If they had sought to absolve themselves of liability for the kind of future claims at issue here, i.e., claims that had yet to accrue until *after* Feb. 20, 2015, they had the opportunity to do so, but they did not.
[directive] Techniques for responding include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) obtaining information about the person from available sources including family members, caregivers or others who know the individual; (b) decreasing exposure to the potential threat by moving to a safer position.  This may involve creating distance, seeking cover, tactical repositioning, concealment, and/or placing barriers between an uncooperative person and the officer; (c) slowing down the pace of the incident by the officer slowing their speech, taking deep breaths, and/or applying strategic and critical thinking; (d) keeping the non-compliant person confined to a limited area and calling for a supervisor, back-up officers, and specially-trained resources to assist in resolving the incident.  These specially-trained resources may include Crisis Intervention Team- trained officers, behavioral or mental health care providers, negotiators, qualified bi- lingual officers, or officers equipped with less-lethal devices; (e) using time as a de-escalation strategy, thereby creating an opportunity to calm the non-compliant person; (f) using simplified speech and shorter verbal directions or instructions; (g) eliminating or reducing sensory distractions (bright flashing lights, sirens, or other loud noises); and 4 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022
[brief] As the Supreme Court put it, the prosecutor “play[ed] on the passions of the jury . . . [and] deflect[ed] attention from the hard facts on which the State’s case must rise or fall. ”  Blakney, 189 N.J. at 96.  Perhaps most harmful was the prosecutor’s explicit comparison between [...] and the infamous mobsters of “Goodfellas,” who are notoriously reviled as cold-blooded murderers.  Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reversed a conviction for the prosecutor’s attempt to “draw a parallel between defendant’s conduct and that of a horror-movie villain. ”  Williams, 244 N.J. at 615.  In Williams, the prosecutor during summation included a PowerPoint photo of Jack Nicholson’s ax-wielding character from “The Shining” and displayed that character’s notorious but seemingly innocuous catch phrase (“Here’s Johnny”), from which the prosecutor drew a comparison to the defendant’s own implicitly threatening conduct.  *Id.* at 602-03.  The Court condemned the prosecutor’s “references to the violent and frightening movie scene and use of an inflammatory photograph” as “far beyond” the scope of the evidence.  *Id.* at 615.  Here, the prosecutor’s invocation of notorious gangsters was even more prejudicial because whereas in *Williams* the prosecutor was at least attempting to make a relevant point (about implied threats), here, the “Goodfellas” quote added nothing to the State’s case except to conjure the societal hatred for callous mobsters and direct that at [...].  Because the prosecutor urged the jury to convict based on emotion rather than evidence, reversal is required.
[directive] Filing of Gun Permit Appeals  Any applicant aggrieved by the denial of a permit by law enforcement who wishes to file an appeal with the court is encouraged to file electronically through the Judiciary Electronic Document Submission (JEDS) System.  The aggrieved applicant must also serve copies of the request for a hearing on the New Jersey State Police Superintendent, the county prosecutor, and the chief police officer of the municipality where the applicant resides, if the applicant is a New Jersey resident.
[directive] to applicable  The interest from this account shall be transferred periodically by the 3. funding entity to the Asset Maintenance Account (AMA) as outlined 3.2C. under section c.  Asset Maintenance Account I.  All interest or other income generated from SATA shall be transferred periodically into a trust fund maintained by the funding entity and administered by the county prosecutor.  This trust fund shall be known as the Asset Maintenance Account (AMA).
[brief] (1T 17-13 to 14, 18-23 to 19-1)  When the arresting officer notified [...] that [...] resembled the other individual from [...]’s attempt to identify flyer, [...] went to the Detective Bureau to conduct an interview.  (1T 17-15 to 16)  [...] testified that, when he went to speak to [...], he had no intention of speaking to him about any pending drug charges.  (1T 20-3 to 5)  The State then played a video recording of the interrogation for the court.  (1T 23-25)  During the interrogation, before reading [...] his rights, [...] told [...] that he was “under arrest obviously today for whatever happened earlier.
[brief] In *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246 (2021), the Supreme Court held that where a sentencing court imposes a consecutive sentence, “an explanation for the overall fairness of a sentence by the sentencing court is required...to foster consistency in sentencing in that arbitrary or irrational sentencing can be curtailed and, if necessary, corrected through appellate review. ”  *Id.* at 272 (citation and internal quotation marks and text alterations omitted).  Citing *Torres* and *State v. Yarbough*, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), which sets forth the guidelines for imposing consecutive sentences, [...] stated:
[brief] Before this Court is a so-called “arbitration” provision in a consumer contract of adhesion that, in truth, does not require the commercial party/drafter to arbitrate any of its claims at all.  Faced with similar provisions, many courts have determined that this type of provision is not “an agreement to arbitrate” within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act and comparable state statutes.  These courts have observed that when the purported obligation to arbitrate is unilateral, and is imposed by the drafter on a consumer within a consumer contract of adhesion, there is no mutual or enforceable “agreement” to arbitrate the parties’ disputes arising from the agreement.  In fact, Plaintiff’s position is the “majority” position, according to the courts.  Putting it simply, in order to gain the protection of the FAA and comparable state law, there must be an actual agreement to submit the *parties’* disputes, arising under the agreement, to arbitration.  The agreement that Defendant seeks to enforce was not an agreement to submit the *parties’* disputes because it entirely excused Defendant from the obligation that Defendant unilaterally imposed on Plaintiff.  Public policy in New Jersey favors the enforcement of arbitration when they promote efficient, prompt resolution of disputes in a cost-effective manner; and because alternative dispute resolution relieves an already overburdened judiciary.  As [...] observed in *Billig v. Buckingham Towers Condominium Association I, Inc.*, 287 N.J.Super. 551, 564, 671 A.2d 623 (App.Div.1996), there is a “strong public policy of this State favoring arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes” because “litigation is expensive and burdensome. ”  As the discussion below establishes, this arbitration clause does not advance those public policy issues and, in fact, is hostile to those policies.
[directive] . . .  As alluded to in Accetturo, relief tied only to the length of detention for large categories of defendants would not be appropriate for a variety of reasons.  783 F.2d at 388.  Among them, such an approach could sweep in cases in which defendants were responsible for delays, the complexity of the case required more time to address issues before trial, or critical witnesses were unavailable through no fault of either party.  And, of course, not all second-degree offenses or offenders are alike.  Some matters are more serious than others; some are supported by stronger or weaker proofs; and no two 14 offenders have the same history and characteristics or present precisely the same degree of risk.  Once again, cases are best examined on an individual basis, which the CJRA provides for under the present circumstances.
[brief] See cmt. c to § 317.  Alternatively, § 317 may apply where the employee misuses the employer’s property for his or her own purposes; i.e., outside the scope of employment.  Thus, in Doe v. XYC Corp, the Appellate Division applied § 317 and reversed summary judgment because there was evidence that the employer knew that its employee had used the company’s computers to access child pornography.  382 N.J. Super. 122, 140-143 (App. Div. 2005).  Noting that child pornography is defined as dangerous to third parties by criminal statute, the panel reasoned that the employer could be found liable under § 317 because the harm arose from the employee’s misuse of company property in a manner that fell outside the scope of his employment:
[brief] Ultimately the Trial Court determined that,  There is nothing before this Court that suggests that the Defendant did anything that was -- that the Defendant did anything that was -- that the Defendant has done anything other than operate his vehicle in the manner in which he’s expected to in the State of New Jersey.  There is nothing that suggests that he had a duty to do anything different from what he did.  There is nothing in the record that suggests he was negligent and the means and -- in the means in which he was operating the vehicle.  **1T15:25, 1T16:1-10.**  At oral argument, the Court could not get past the plaintiff’s conduct in her disobeying the roadway arrow.
[brief] FACTORS TIP DECIDEDLY IN FAVOR OF REVERSAL CONCLUSION  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1993).................................................................18  B.P.J. v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., No. 2:21-CV-00316, 2023 WL 111875 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 5, 2023).......................8  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) ............................................................................. 23, 24, 25 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005)........................................................................... 16, 17, 18 Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 949 (S.D. Miss. 2014), aff’d, 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015).30 Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997)...........................................................................27 D.C.M.M. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark, No. 87207, 2023 WL 5837974 (Nev. Sept. 8, 2023) ........................................... 12, 14 Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) ............................................................................... 23, 25 Doe v. Dickenson, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (D. Ariz. 2009).................................................................19 Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003) ................................................................. 20 Doe v. Horne, No. CV-23-00185-TUC-JGZ, 2023 WL 4661831 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2023)
[directive] 성범죄자 감독 기금 벌금 9.  Sex Offender Supervision Fund Penalty  [예/Yes] [아니요/No]  년7 월1 일 이후에 범죄가 저질러진 경우, 귀하가 유죄를  인정한 결과로  월 2014 의 성범죄 감독 벌금을 지불해야 할 수도 있다는 것을 아십니까?  $30  Do you understand that if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014, as a result of your guilty plea you may be required to pay a Sex Offender Supervision Penalty of $30 per month?
[brief] (Da 024) (10T).  [...] filed, pro se, a first petition for post-conviction relief, on April 28, 2016.  (Da 047).  Counsel was appointed through the Public Defender’s office.  --- 5Da-Defendant’s Appendix to this brief.  6The transcript designations are as follows:  1T – Trial June 11, 2013  Volume I 2T - Trial June 11, 2013  Volume II 3T – Trial June 12, 2013  Volume I 4T – Trial June 12, 2013  Volume II 5T – Trial June 13, 2013  Volume I 6T – Trial June 13, 2013  Volume II 7T – Trial June 17, 2013  8T – Deliberations June 18, 2013  9T – Verdict June 19, 2013  10T – Sentencing September 13, 2013  11T – Motion June 22, 2022  12T – Motion December 6, 2022  Following oral argument, [...]’s first PCR petition was denied on August 18, 2018.
[brief] (Pa000037, Compl. ¶ 26).  On November 14, 2016, former United States Senator and Attorney General of New Jersey, [...], was named the Director’s designee and was authorized to exercise any powers granted to the Director under the MSRA, including taking steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts and assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the City.  (Pa000037, Compl. ¶ 27).  B.  The MSRA Conferred The Director With Broad Powers to Stabilize [...] and Facilitate its Recovery.
[directive] 1.  Scene Security  a.  The Division of State Police will secure the scene.  b.  The Division of State Police shall provide for traffic management and detouring that may be required.  2.  Photography a.  Photographs will be taken by the appropriate personnel.  b.  At scene photographs may include the following.  (1)  Around the clock of the scene.  (2)  Around the clock of the vehicle.  (3)  Interior of the vehicle.  (4)  Approach paths of vehicles at driver’s eye level.  (5)  Witness perspective, as required.  (6)  Roadway evidence - placarded and scaled, when appropriate.  (7)  Detailed and close up photographs, as may be required.  (8)  Photographs should be taken to comply with photogrametry requirements, when possible.  (9)  High angle shots, when feasible.  - 6 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2  JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS