ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (T21:11-5; Pa103).  As such, [...] was unable to meet its burden of proof or rebut [...]’s interpretation, which was confirmed by both [...] and [...]’s testimony.  (Pa113-14; Pa131-33; Pa192).  To be sure, at no time did the trial court determine that past practice or external documents should usurp a contract’s plain language.  Rather, the trial court carefully examined the Award and found the Arbitrator’s analysis to be more nuanced than [...] asserted.  (T21:24-22:22).  As the Arbitrator explained, “the intent of the parties in 1987 was that the Agreement’s reference in 1987 to 2080 as the basis for determining the divisor to be used in computing overtime was merely illustrative and descriptive, instead of prescriptive. ”  (Pa192).  The Arbitrator determined that the meaning of the contractual language at issue, when read as a whole, was not necessarily the same as when the parenthetical example was read in isolation, which is why past practice was considered.  Ibid.  The Arbitrator explained that the parties’ conduct demonstrated a shared understanding that the parenthetical referencing “2,080” was merely illustrative, not prescriptive, and that [...]’s interpretation was supported by [...]’s acquiescence over the last thirty-four years.  Ibid.  The court found the analysis “thorough” and the Award reasonably debatable.  (T23:22-24:8).  This court should not disturb the Arbitrator’s factual findings and credibility determinations.  See Local No. 153, 105 N.J. at 449 (“Courts should intervene only where the arbitrator has exceeded his authority or acted improperly. ”).  [...] not only had the benefit of a fair hearing at arbitration but also a second review of all the evidence by the trial court who affirmed the Award.  As found by the court, the Award satisfied the reasonably debatable standard, and [...] did not meet the narrow exceptions carved out under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a) to justify reversing an arbitration award.  Local No. 153, 105 N.J. at 450 n.1.  As such, the court correctly denied [...]’s action to vacate.  That decision should be affirmed.
[brief] These demands are based on requirements contained within the LTTEL.  Under the LTTEL, a developer must form an “urban renewal entity. ”  See N.J.S.A. 40A:20-3, -5.  In addition, the LTTEL provides that the urban renewal entity shall make payment to the municipality of an annual service charge, which is equal to a percentage of the annual gross revenue, which shall not be more than 15% in the case of a low and moderate income housing project, nor less than 10% in the case of all other projects.  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12(b)(1).  Further, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12(b), "[e]ach municipality which enters into a financial agreement...shall remit 5 percent of the annual service charge collected by the municipality to the county..."  Thus, Plaintiffs’ demands for relief are all rooted in the erroneous assertion that the tax abatement granted by the City to [...] should have complied with the requirements of the LTTEL.  However, [...] applied to the City for a tax abatement under the HMFA Law, not the LTTEL.  Therefore, the assertion that [...] had to comply with the requirements of the LTTEL is without any merit.  The HMFA Law has no such requirement that a developer form an urban renewal entity.  In addition, there is no requirement under the HMFA Law that the county receive a portion of the payment.  Accordingly, the revenue sharing provisions of the LTTEL are inapplicable to the Project and tax exemption at hand.
[brief] The need for more voir dire of at least [...] was clear under the Bisaccia/R.D. standard, and, depending on what that juror’s answers would be to further questioning, it is likely that the matter could not be properly ruled upon at all until after the entire jury was subject to more specific voir dire regarding whether any jurors were discussing the encounter with [...] in deliberations, as alleged by [...].  Yet the judge failed to properly inquire further when she learned, for the first time, from [...] that jurors were discussing, during deliberations, an “interaction” with someone not “affiliated with the case. ”
[brief] On February 14, 2023, [...] was notified by Plaintiff’s counsel that Plaintiff would not vacate its judgment in consideration of redemption, nor assign the judgment.  Defendant sought assistance by [...] for consultation, and he was not formally retained for future legal proceeding.  [...] was then referred to [...], Esq, to assist him to redeem the Plaintiff’s tax sale certificate.  One April 2, 2021, Mr. Bavagnoli contacted the tax collector’s office, spoke with and directed a letter to [...], Deputy Tax Collector.
[brief] [...] acknowledged that prior to 2013 there was no proper curb cut on Sixth Street for vehicles to access the courtyard.  In 2013 a curb cut was chiseled out by [...] in front of Lot 8 to allow for vehicles to enter Lot 8 and access the courtyard.  Rabbi [...] offered no testimony as to any circumstances surrounding the 1963 Agreement or the 1972 School Site Plan (6T96-18 to 110-25).  The Synagogue then presented current Zoning Board Attorney [...].  He presented limited testimony authenticating the minutes and Resolution of the 1972 School Variance/Site Plan Approval for the School expansion which was deficient for its own parking requirement (Da901 to 904; Da923 to 999).  A Board search had located no records of any Application or Approval for the 1963 Synagogue (6T113-21 to 142-19).  The [...] then proffered [...].  She was born in 1951 and grew up in the neighborhood, passing the site regularly going to school in the late 1950's through the late 1960's.  She attended the Synagogue after it opened in December 1963.  She then went to college and resided at Douglass in 1969.  During college she regularly visited her parents' Lakewood home.  After college, she lived away from Lakewood but regularly visited her home.  She had no knowledge of the 1963 Agreement.  Her testimony was limited to her recollection that in the later 1960's and early 1970's Synagogue attendees would park for services in the School's Fifth Street Lot and Sixth Street Courtyard.  (7T6-3 to 53-1)
[brief] The substantial evidence presented does not support the final agency determination made by the [...].  Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references a “presumption” that mail properly addressed with proper postage was received by the party it was addressed to.  However, [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received a postcard from the Division, regardless of if it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that the postcard was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive a postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division sent the postcard to [...] (and others) is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.  Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa121.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that these postcards were never received.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.  CONCLUSION
[brief] 6.  Indemnity.  ADULT PARTICIPANT, ON HIS/HER BEHALF, AND ON BEHALF OF ANY CHILD PARTICIPANT(S), AND ON BEHALF OF ANY SPOUSE, HEIRS, EXECUTORS, AND REPRESENTATIVES, AGREES TO INDEMNIFY, DEFEND, RELEASE, AND HOLD HARMLESS THE PROTECTED PARTIES FROM AND AGAINST ALL CLAIMS, CAUSES OF ACTION, SUITS, LOSSES, LIABILITIES, DAMAGES, FINES, PENALTIES, LIENS, JUDGMENTS, SETTLEMENTS, PROCEEDINGS, COSTS, FEES, AND EXPENSES (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT OR OTHER COSTS) OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER FOR OR RELATING TO DEATH, BODILY INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM, RELATING TO, OR CAUSED BY (WHETHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART) ANY OF THE FOLLOWING MATTERS (WHICH NECESSARILY INCLUDE ALL CLAIMS TO DO OR MAY BELONG TO THE CHILD PARTICIPANT(S)): (A) PARTICIPANT’S ACTS, OMISSIONS, OR PRESENCE ON OR ABOUT ANY PART OF THE PREMISES OR OTHER PREMISES WHERE ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY [...] ARE TAKING PLACE, (B) PARTICIPANT’S ACTIVE OR PASSIVE PARTICIPATION IN OR OBSERVANCE OF ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES, (C) ANY CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE NEGLIGENT, GROSSLY NEGLIGENT, OR WILLFUL ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF PARTICIPANT, OR (D) PARTICIPANT’S USE OF ANY FIXTURES, EQUIPMENT, OR PERSONAL PROPERTY IN, ON, OR ABOUT THE PREMISES OR OTHER PREMISES WHERE ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY [...] ARE TAKING PLACE, THE INDEMNITY CONTAINED IN THIS PARAGRAPH WILL APPLY EVEN IF ANY SUCH INJURY OR DAMAGE IS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR STRICT LIABILITY OF THE PROTECTED PARTIES.
[brief] After five years of trying, it is probably fair to say that Hoboken’s rent leveling board would agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court in its assessment that “a value-based criterion for confiscation under rent control is practically unworkable. ”  *Helmsley v. Borough of Ft. Lee*, 78 N.J. 200, 215 (1978).  As the Supreme Court noted, the inherent unworkability of a value-based scheme is because it is circular.  *Id.* at 213-215.  Specifically, an apartment building’s value as an investment comes from its income stream and since “rent control…limits the potential growth of that income stream (and also therefore the potential capital appreciation on resale)...the difference in future income will, of course, be reflected in the present value.
[brief] Pursuant to Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A 40A:12A-1 to -49 (“LRHL”), the Town is authorized to designate areas within its boundaries as being in need of redevelopment, rehabilitation, or both.  (Pa126 at ¶10.)  The parties stipulated and agreed that all the properties comprising the “Redevelopment Area” had been designated as areas in need of redevelopment or rehabilitation by October 13, 2020.  (Pa127.)  As noted above, Appellants admitted that they were not seeking to invalidate those designations in this action, nor could they as the time to do so had long expired (discussed more fully infra).  (See, supra; see also Pa50 (challenging only Ordinance).)  None of the Appellants reside or claim to own any property in the Redevelopment Area.  (Pa126, Nos. 1-6.)
[brief] By contrast, where the crimes involved a single victim, were committed at the same time, or had the same underlying motive/were in furtherance of the same underlying criminal purpose, courts have held that the offenses were not predominantly independent.  See State v. Adams, 320 N.J. Super. 360, 370 (App. Div. 1999) (finding that the “offenses here involved a single victim and may be seen to have occurred so closely together in time and place, that they may not be subject to characterization as predominantly independent”); State v. Espino, 264 N.J. Super. 62, 74 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that the attempted escape and aggravated assault committed during the course of the assault “were not predominantly independent of each other”); State v. Streater, 233 N.J. Super. 537, 546 (App. Div. 1989) (finding that the conspiracy to commit theft by deception and bringing stolen property into New Jersey were not “predominantly independent of each other” because the “[t]he offense of bringing stolen property into New Jersey was one of the overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy”).
[brief] C.  There was no bona fide dispute as to the amount due.  As [...] notes at Pb-50, [...]’s claim for $697,301 is comprised of two components: Its regular monthly payment of $620,250 for the month of April 2020, and $77,141 representing the proration of [...]’s July 2020 payment, acknowledged by [...] at Pb-51.  While it knows that a payment it made in the amount of $60,800 was for a separate and unrelated invoice, [...] appears to be trying to muddy the water by suggesting that it is entitled to a credit in that amount against the other amounts it owes.  [...] tendered to [...] an invoice for $620,250 for the month of April 2020.
[brief] The trial court misapplied clear and unambiguous court rules.  Rule 1:1-2 mandates that the Court Rules: be construed to secure a just determination, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.  Unless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice.  Implicit in a judge’s fact-finding responsibilities is the judge’s obligation to decide all critical issues.  A judge cannot decline to do so because the issue is novel and thus, in the judge’s view, should be first addressed by an appellate court.  See State v. Roper, 362 N.J. Super. 248, 252 (App. Div. 2003).
[brief] Based on the Certification of [...], Esq., [...]'s application for fees and costs failed to satisfy the reasonableness criteria because the time spent on matter and pleadings went well beyond "reasonable."  Of particular significance, counsel's billing entries reflect time entries in the following sums: (1) 82.4 hours billed for the second motion for summary judgment; (2) 74.6 hours billed for preparing for, attending, and memorializing the three depositions in this case; (3) 35.3 hours billed for the motion for sanctions; (4) 6.3 hours for "litigation management report" and "litigation report"; (5) 12 hours for paper discovery; and (6) .3 hours for "budget".  There were also approximately 7.2 hours of entries which appeared to be double billed, without reason or explanation.  All of this time was excessive, and virtually all of the time entries were attorney billed time.  (Pa000557).
[brief] The police arrived at the [...] room where he was staying and knocked on the door.  They did not force entry when no one answered, even though they could hear voices on the other side.  Indeed, they continued to knock and wait until over 10 minutes had passed.  (27T 148-25 to 150-13).  When Defendant eventually opened the door, they asked him if he would accompany them to the station to give a statement and he agreed: there was no arrest.
[brief] A fiduciary relationship may arise between aunt and niece by reason of their closeness, family relationship, or entrustment.  See ibid” Id. at 15.  See also [...] v. [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1277 (offering a detailed explanation of the parallels between fiduciary and confidential relationships).  In Estate of Ostlund v. Ostlund, 391 N.J. Super. 390 ( App. Div. 2007) the Court held:
[brief] Discovery and Summary Judgment Proceedings  Over Relator’s objection, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion to limit discovery to the public disclosure bar.  Ja4011-12.  The parties developed a voluminous summary judgment record relevant to this defense, see Ja1313-30, leading the parties to submit extraordinarily detailed statements of facts and responses.  Just those reflect many disputes of material fact.  Reviewing this record, the trial court found factual disputes that prevented it from granting summary judgment to either side.  Ja1337-62, 2094-176, 3878-933; 4T 35:2-8.  IV.
[directive] Offenses service than birthday, of 2 for date to more suspension up community days alcoholic on of Alcohol date and not 17th  Welfare commencing 30-90 days or for incarceration the later. violations.  conviction  Offense  Vehicle suspension of licence 15-30 for of or (Endangering possession days whichever sentence  Licence Service years  Motor Persons drivers later.  5 $50 (DWI) on to months licence of up 2 Commencing of than (underage is Related eligibility Community to Offense Revocation Mandatory Fine Fine an imposition Disorderly 24-4 whichever 39:4-50 months * 6 less months
[brief] .....................................................................................................................11  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | A.D. v. Ranney Sch. & James Paroline | 4 | | Berrie v. Berrie | 4 | | Gensollen v. Pareja | 2 | | K.S. v. ABC Prof'l Corp. | 2 | | Perform Content Servs. v. Ness Global Servs.  | 8 | | Yawger v. Suburban Propane | 4 | ####  Rules | Rule | Page(s) | |--------|---------| | R. 4:10-2 | 1 | | R. 4:10-3 | 10 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] In its entirety, the Report’s Section-By-Section Summary of § 1692c(b) states:  There is a general prohibition on contacting *any third parties* (other than to obtain location information) except for: the consumer’s attorney; a credit reporting agency; the creditor, the creditor’s or debt collector’s attorney; or any other person to the extent necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy.  [Emphasis added.]  Thus, the Report does not limit the meaning of “any person. ”  Defendant also relies on unpublished decisions which cited to the Report but did not analyze it.  Db21 (citing to Miller (Pa56) and Mhrez (Pa34)).  Those decisions do not address that the Report’s mention of friends, neighbors, relatives, and employers was taken out of context.  Nor do they acknowledge the Report’s failure to mention any of those people in its specific description of § 1692c(b).  C.  There is No Absurd Result from the FDCPA’s Bar Against Communicating with Outsiders.
[brief] On January 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against [...].  (Appx 585).  In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserted a single cause of action – retaliation in violation of Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) (First Count).  (Appx 16).  On July 7, 2023, [...] filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Appx 585).  [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) requested that the Trial Court enter judgment in its favor based three separate and distinct grounds: (1) Plaintiff was statutorily barred from employment with [...]; (2) Plaintiff could not make out a CEPA *prima facie* case and could not rebut [...]’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions; and (3) Plaintiff should be sanctioned because her repeated lies perpetrated a fraud on the Trial Court.  (Appx 1; Appx 155).  On August 4, 2023, Honorable [...], J.S.C. held oral argument and granted [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on three alternate grounds: 1) Plaintiff was statutorily barred from holding a job with NJ REM and thus could not proceed with a CEPA case under *Cedeno*, 2) Plaintiff could not make out a *prima facie* case under CEPA because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the causation and the adverse employment action elements, and 3) Plaintiff could not show that Plaintiff’s legitimate non-retaliatory reasons were a pretext for retaliation.
[brief] In considering the constitutionality of the MSRA, the Superior Court found:  Regarding the enactment of the [MSRA], the law is settled.  The State has an inherent police power to issue legislation regarding the regulation and administration of municipalities when it is necessary for the protection of the public welfare, health, and safety.  See Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 343, 355 (2016); Hudson Cnty. News Co. v. Sills, 41 N.J. 220, 227 (1963).  The power granted to municipalities originates in the State’s police power.  See Inganamort v. Ft. Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 528 (1973) citing Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority, 32 N.J. 303, 312-314 (1960).  Also, “[t]he grant of an express power by the Legislature is always attended by such incidental authority as is fairly and reasonably necessary or appropriate to make it effective, and the authority granted to an administrative agency should be construed so as to permit the fullest accomplishment of the legislative intent. ”  Kaprow v. Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Twp., 131 N.J. 572, 581, 622 A.2d 237, 241 (1993) quoting Mulligan v. Wilson, 110 N.J. Super. 167, 171, 264 A.2d 745 (App. Div.1970).  Courts will uphold an exercise of police power when “statutes exercising those police powers serve a legitimate public purpose and the adjustment of the private parties’ duties and obligations is on reasonable terms and conditions. ”  Fidelity Union Trust Co. & N.J. Highway Auth., 85 N.J. 277, 287 (1981); see also Schmidt v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 413-16 (1952).
[brief] By this Agreement, there is being sold and bought a 40’ x 90’ portion of the real estate known as [...] and commonly referred to as [...].  The 40’ x 90’ portion of [...] is 40’ of Lot 3 immediately adjacent to the 90’ property line of Buyer’s Lot 2 in Block 1801 and is hereinafter referred to as the “Property”...  Buyers recently purchased Lot 2 immediately adjacent to the Property.  Buyers understand that Buyer’s Lot 2 is approximately 80’ x 90’ or 7,200 sq. ft. in size as shown on the survey attached hereto as Exhibit “A”.  Based upon this information, the Property, which is a total of 3,600 sq. ft. in size, when combined with Buyers’ Lot 2, should result in Buyers having a total of 10,800 sq. ft. of land.  The intention of the Parties is to convey exactly enough land to --- \(^3\)
[directive] Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to preclude a law enforcement officer executing a warrant from making an unannounced or forceful entry without prior judicial approval for such unannounced or forcible entry in the event that the officer at the time of execution becomes aware of unanticipated facts or circumstances that would be sufficient to justify any such unannounced or forcible entry.  15.  Secrecy of Issuance and Execution of Search Warrants
[brief] *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979); *Reyes*, 50 N.J. at 459.  The decision in *Moon* could be no clearer: in order to survive a judgment of acquittal in a prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2a, “the State must introduce evidence that would permit the jurors to find that the victim was alive and ‘physically helpless, mentally incapacitated or otherwise unable to care for himself’ and that the defendant left the scene of the injury knowing or reasonably believing that the victim was in that condition. ”  396 N.J. Super. at 117 (emphasis added).  Here, not only did the State not enter any such evidence, they appeared in their argument on the *Reyes* motion to accept the conclusion of the defense expert that [...] died within two to three minutes at most.  (29T 135-22 to 24)  The State (and the judge) just did not seem to realize that it mattered that [...] was dead and that calling for help would not have done a thing; in other words, they appeared not to know about *Moon*.  Obviously, under *Moon*, the State and the judge were wrong.  Defendant’s conviction for Count Four should be reversed under *Moon*, and a judgment of acquittal entered on that count.