ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] When introducing the surveillance videos, [...] explained that when a homicide occurs, police "canvass in the area of the homicide, and [then] expand."  The canvassing includes "video canvassing or canvassing for any witnesses that may have information."  (4T147-10 to 15).  In this case, the police received more than thirty videos, which took "weeks to months to get."  (4T147-16 to 22).  The footage came from mostly "residential homes, [and] commercial businesses."  (4T148-1 to 3).  To get the footage from homeowners, Rodriguez needed to ascertain whether they were tenants or homeowners.  For commercial businesses, the police attempted to contact the manager and landlord, scheduling appointments as necessary.  (4T148-7 to 12).  And the footage from the New Jersey Turnpike had to be subpoenaed.  (4T13-1 to 6).  The videos presented to the jury did not encompass all the footage obtained from every location; instead, they were a relevant selection from the footage received.
[brief] However, just as in the Appellant’s brief, [...] makes no argument as to how or why that May 24, 2023 correspondence caused Appellant to change her position, to her detriment.  There was no increase in the settlement offer.  No inducements to change a course of conduct was made, at any time.  No statements were given that Respondent would not invoke available defenses under the policy.  It was simply a good faith attempt by the carrier, prior to assigning counsel and filing an Answer, to avoid protracted litigation with its member.
[brief] There were no bidders other than plaintiff, which was the successful bidder for $100.  Da112, ¶16.  On December 26, 2023, the [...] filed a motion seeking, inter alia, the setting aside of the sheriff’s sale because (a) the foreclosure judgment fixes the postjudgment interest rate at “lawful interest”, not at the contract rate, and (b) the Sheriff’s posted notices and advertisements did not include the approximate amount of the judgment and had a negative effect on bidding.
[brief] 30  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Anglin v. Merchs. Credit Corp., No. 18-cv-507-BJR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125009 (W.D. Wash. July 15, 2020)  .................................................................  29  Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Camilla A. Toft, No. A-2827-22, 2024  N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 820 (Super. Ct. App. Div. May 8, 2024)  ..................................................................  10, 13  Ass’n of New Jersey Chiropractors, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., A-6033-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2677 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 4, 2013)  ..............................................  23  Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2007) ............................................................... 27 Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543 (2009) ........................................................................... 14 Boyko v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., CIV. 08-2214 RBK/JS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119339 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2009) ..................................................................... 19 Browne v. Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Tr., No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021) .................................................................... 11,13,20 Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC, 475 Md. 4 (2021) ............................................................................. 30 Camden County Energy Recovery Assoc., L.P. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999) .................................................. 8 Carlson v. First Revenue Assurance, 359 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2004) ............................................................ 28 Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super 282 (App. Div. 2004)
[brief] The parties agreed at trial that decedent [...] met a gruesome end.  The dispute was whether the State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was [...] who killed her.  To summarize, on the night of February 6, 2016, someone entered Viejo’s home at [...] in [...], stabbed her multiple times, and then departed.  The offense was partially recorded on her building’s surveillance footage, but the perpetrator’s face is not visible, and no one saw the crime itself.  The State accused [...], who lived across the street.  On the morning of February 7, 2016, several hours after the stabbing, Viejo’s upstairs tenant [...] contacted Viejo’s adult son [...].  (21T 141-12 to 19)  Armando arrived at his mother’s house and observed blood stains on the property’s exterior, including on the front railing and door.  (21T 144-12 to 15; 146-3; 147-9 to 10)  He went inside and saw more blood stains in the vestibule and hall, as well as his mother’s dentures.  (21T 149-7 to 16)  When he entered his mother’s apartment, he found her body on the floor and two knives in close proximity.  (21T 151-16 to 19; 153-3 to 17)
[brief] The entirety of Plaintiff’s Complaint, except for paragraphs 20 and 21, allege facts, acts, and statements regarding religious discrimination.  Paragraph 20 of the Complaint states in pertinent part:  During the course of Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendant [...], Defendants, [...], [...], [...], [...], and/or [...]…engaged in a severe and pervasive pattern of mentally abusive and offensive behavior directed at Plaintiff for being of the Jewish faith and being disabled, which conduct was designed to, among other things, punish Plaintiff for being Jewish and disabled.
[brief] Defendant’s Motion for Issuance of a Commission filed December 22, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa1 Certification of Counsel in Support of Motion for Issuance of Commission filed December 22, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa3 Exhibit A to Certification of Counsel in Support of Motion for Issuance of Commission filed December 22, 2022-Cover Letter to [...] dated October 13, 2022 and Subpoena Duces Tecum to [...] dated October 13, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa6 Certification of Counsel in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Issuance of a Commission filed December 28, 2022 . . . . Pa13 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause filed June 27, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa15 Notice of November 27, 2023 Trial Date for [...] dated July 21, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa18 NJDOBI Bulletin No. 01-11 dated July 5, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa19 Unpublished Slip Opinion in Mid Century v. Freeman, [...] dated May 16, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa20
[brief] (8T5-24 to 7-5; Da72-74)  A requirement of the plea agreement was that [...] testify against [...] or the State would move to vacate the plea.  (32T41-18 to 42-8; 8T6-5 to 16; Da72)  As a result of [...]’s plea, the State obtained superseding Indictment Number [...], solely against Defendant, on December 11, 2019.
[brief] The model charge corrects for this potential misunderstanding.  And nothing within the given instructions corrected for this misunderstanding.  And because, as the State has agreed, the possibility of [...]’s guilt played a substantial role in [...]’s defense strategy, the failure to instruct on third-party guilt constituted an incomplete instruction on a material issue.  As [...] argued at trial, there was, at the very least, a reasonable probability that Pierce was the one that committed the crime, perhaps even a strong probability that he did so.  (7T57-18 to 58-25)  All of the descriptions of the shooter provided immediately after the shooting described the suspect as a black man; many described him as tall; and all described him as wearing grey sweatpants.  (Db37 – 40)  [...] is a 6’2” black man who was pulled over driving the “vehicle of interest” wearing “grey sweats. ”  (Db37 – 40)  The jury was never instructed that if they believed this evidence suggested even a reasonable probability of Pierce’s guilt, they could acquit [...] on that basis.  Because they were not properly instructed on this material issue, reversal is required.  *Collier*, 90 N.J. at 122-23.
[brief] There was no application when the board took the res—adopted the section resolution.  It was concluded.  [1T70:9-71:2.]  Although [...] indicated that he would reserve on his decision, he noted that “[...] has been habitually delaying this.  They really have.  I’ve already decided they’ve acted in bad faith . . . at different times . . .  I am still very much shocked that they would pass the – they would agree to an agreement in July, wait five months before they memorized it in a resolution that was really a resolution . . .
[brief] Plaintiff [...], individually and as the administrator of the Estate of [...], filed suit in April 2020.  Pa5.  He named as defendants [...], [...]  ([...]), [...] and [...], the Administrator of the Estate of [...], the driver of the Honda CR-V EXL at the time of the collision.  Ibid.  Plaintiff asserted negligence and strict liability claims against the Honda defendants, alleging that the subject CR-V, as sold, was defective because it failed to include technologically and economically feasible safety features that would have prevented the crash.  Defendant [...] filed his Answer with Cross-Claims in June 2020.  Pa41.  Defendant [...] filed its Answer with Cross-Claims in June 2020.  Pa50.  Defendant [...] filed its Answer with Cross-Claims in July 2020.  Pa77.  In August 2020, plaintiff dismissed all claims against defendant [...], based on the parties agreement that [...] would stand in the shoes of its parent company.  In January 2021, plaintiff’s claims against [...] were dismissed.  The parties engaged in extensive fact discovery, [...] produced a corporate representative to testify regarding development of its LDW and LKAS systems, and experts issued reports and were deposed.  In October 2022, defendant, [...], moved for summary judgment.  Pa106.  The trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims against [...] with prejudice.  Pa1.  Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was denied in January 2023.  Pa3.  Pursuant to a Stipulation of Dismissal filed April 28, 2023, the claims against the remaining defendant, [...], were dismissed with prejudice.  Pa723.  All claims as to all parties now being resolved, plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on May 25, 2023.  Pa723.
[brief] ’”)).  The trial court also properly noted—not by improperly drawing inferences in favor of Defendants, but in evaluating [...]’s claim of pretext—that all staffing coordinators were interviewed, yet only three were terminated.  Indeed, [...] interviewed both [...] and [...], the remaining staffing coordinators, about [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct.  (Pa536-37).  Both commented on [...]’s challenging management style, yet neither were terminated.  (See Pa536 (Asselta noting there were “no hard feelings” and that [...] had apologized to her); Pa537 (Ruhl stated that [...]’s conduct was not “good for the department” and that [...]’s “tantrum” was not her typical behavior).  The trial court correctly highlighted this distinction: “I don’t think that there are sufficient facts in this record that would permit a jury to see that it’s anything but a nondiscriminatory event.
[brief] Before the Trial Court, [...] miscited Murphy v. Stowe Club Highlands, 171 Vt. 144, 761 A.2d 688 (2000), as supposedly supporting a conclusion that the undefined term “damages” in the Policy does not include the monies awarded against [...] in this case, but Murphy in fact provides no support for [...]’s position.  At issue in Murphy was whether a contract-based claim for “prevailing party” attorneys’ fees was subject to trial by jury.  Id. at 159–63, 761 A.2d at 699–702.  The Supreme Court of Vermont held that such a claim was not subject to trial by jury, so that a “prevailing” party was free to seek such fees by post-trial motion to the Court.  *Id.* at 162–63, 761 A.2d at 701–02.  The holding in *Murphy* as to “prevailing party” attorneys’ fee recovery procedure is totally irrelevant to the proper construction of the word “damages” in a CGL policy.  As noted above, Vermont law holds that: “In construing an insurance policy, we read disputed terms according to their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning.
[brief] The City raised before the Trial Court, what reason is there for some Plaintiff member to be identified by initials only?  What was Plaintiff trying to conceal?  This, combined with [...]'s DCR filing and Plaintiff's obtuse R. 4:5-1 Certification, raised the specter that [...] never consented to this action or to be "represented" in this manner, wherein Plaintiff advanced claims, and sought damages, purportedly to vindicate [...]'s individual rights.  This also raised the question: Were any of these purported numerous unidentified members aware of, and approved of, this litigation?  Was that why this now third iteration of Complaint continued to be entirely specious and void of detail?  §10:5-27 (providing that “the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive; and the final determination therein shall exclude any other action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance of the individual concerned. ”); Long v. Lewis, 318 N.J. Super. 449, 457 (App. Div. 1999) (“a plaintiff who has unsuccessfully pursued a LAD claim in the Division on Civil Rights may not thereafter relitigate the claim in the Law Division.
[brief] Mount Laurel II recognized the financial impact affordable housing can have on a municipality, while urging the use of tax exemptions for affordable projects: Satisfaction of the Mount Laurel obligation imposes many financial obligations on municipalities, some of which are potentially substantial.  By contrast, a tax abatement for a low or moderate income housing project will have only a minimal effect on the public fisc.  Thus viewed, the asserted fiscal reasons justifying the failure to provide tax abatement may be nothing more than a red herring.  [Id.]  Here, the Trial Court properly found that the Township’s purpose for granting [...] a tax exemption was to provide for affordable housing.  Pa26.  From as early as 2017, the property-in-question has been part of the Township’s court-approved affordable housing plan.  The redevelopment plan anticipated a tax exemption, and the redevelopers agreements required that if no tax exemption were granted, the redeveloper could terminate the agreement.  Da126; Da186-Da187.  In short, the tax exemption is and has been instrumental in allowing the Township to meet a significant portion of its overwhelming affordable housing obligation.  And at no time during the affordable housing or redevelopment process did Plaintiffs challenge the use of a tax exemption for this site.  C.
[brief] However, its role was not that of an adjudication via a local ethics board, but rather, a reliance upon the general principles set forth in that statute.  Such statutory principles are routinely relied upon by the New Jersey courts.  For example, in Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 237 N.J. 333 (2019), in addressing a conflict of interest in a zoning board of adjustment member, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted the interplay of common law and statutory conflict of interest principles:  The overall objective “of conflict of interest laws is to ensure that public officials provide disinterested service to their communities” and to “promote confidence in the integrity of governmental operations. ”  Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 364, 921 A.2d 427 (2007).  Whether a disqualifying conflict of interest required the recusal of any member of the [...] from hearing the development application is governed by three distinct sources of law: the Local Government Ethics Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2; the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; and the common law, which is now codified in those conflict statutes and still guides us in understanding their meaning.  See *Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair*, 221 N.J. 536, 552, 115 A.3d 815 (2015).  Id. at 349–50.  In *Piscitelli*, like the instant case, there was no filing with or adjudication by a local ethics board.  Requiring such a filing would be non-sensical, in that the relief sought could not have been granted or even addressed by such a board.  Rather, redress was through the filing of a Law Division complaint.  However, the court was free to rely upon and cite the LGEL for guidance in its determination.  Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied upon both the common law and the LGEL in issuing the following ruling:  Applying the statutory standards set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law, *N.J.S.A. 40:55D–1 to –163* (MLUL), and the Local Government Ethics Law, *N.J.S.A. 40A:9–22.1 to –22.25* (LGEL), as well as established common law authority, we hold that when a church or other organization owns property within 200 feet of a site that is the subject of a zoning application, public officials who currently serve in substantive leadership positions in the organization, or who will imminently assume such positions, are disqualified from voting on the application.  *Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair*, 221 N.J. 536, 541 (2015).  Here, the Law Division’s May 10, 2024 Order is soundly grounded upon common law principles, together with relevant principles under the LGEL.
[brief] Consistent with the prior administration’s direction and agreement to construct the seven Off-site Units at the Off-site Property, Block 610, Lot 1, following [...]’s election, [...] continued to communicate with [...] regarding the property.  On May 30, 2019, an [...] representative reminded the administration that they had “recently purchased” properties including Block 610, Lot 1, and noted its intent to have certain lots “demolished” but that, for the time being “[...] - Block 610, Lot 1 is to stay occupied. ”  204a.  Indeed, as [...] confirmed in a public statement as late as February 2020, the seven Off-site Units would be placed across the street from Block 419, opposite the Dunkin’ Donuts.  Regarding the planned 29 affordable housing units, 22 will be incorporated into [...] Station as three-, two-, and one-bedroom units.  The remaining seven units, DiPaola said, will comprise a standalone building across from Dunkin’ Donuts.  549a.  On August 11, 2021, [...] prepared a Preliminary and Final Site Plan for [...] Station, Block 610, Lot 1, 212a, and submitted an application for development to [...]’s land use board, 276a.
[brief] \(^5\) II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DATE OF VALUATION IS JANUARY 27, 1994 INSTEAD OF THE MAY 4, 2018 DATE OF TAKING AS IT AWARDS THE BERARDIS DOUBLE RECOVERY ON A RENT-PRODUCING PROPERTY (2T6:7-7:18).  The Trial Court committed reversible error in granting the [...]’ Motion to set the date of valuation at January 27, 1994.  The Township commenced its litigation and filed its declaration of taking on May 4, 2018, which is the appropriate date of valuation.  Although the provisions of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30 permit the --- \(^5\) The Township also strongly objects to the consideration and inclusion of any exhibits that were not before either the Trial Court or the Arbitrator in this matter, such as Da214, which appears to be a chart of actual rent constructed solely for this appeal.  determination of just compensation as of the date of the earliest of several events (including the date possession of the property being condemned is taken by the condemnor in whole or in part, the date of the commencement of the action, the date on which action is taken by the condemnor which substantially affects the use and enjoyment of the property by the condemnee, and the date of the declaration of blight by the governing body upon a report by a planning board pursuant to N.J.S.A. 20:3-38), facts unique to this case require that the valuation date be fixed at the date the Township actually took possession of the Property rather than a rote application of the statute especially when there is a twenty-four year time period between the Area in Need Designation and the date of taking.
[brief] [...] correctly relied on the credible testimony of [...] when concluding that Appellant lied about his whereabouts on November 29, 2018.  [...] held that [...] was a credible witness, as he testified in a knowledgeable manner, exhibited a great deal of experience, remained stoic, unemotional and organized throughout his testimony, and was calm and thorough during cross-examination.  [Pa30].  [...] held that Appellant offered what appeared to be rehearsed, prepared answers, often beginning his answers telling stories about other unrelated people, often proffering third-hand hearsay before addressing the question itself, and concluded that Appellant’s testimony was self-serving and lacking credibility.  [Pa34-Pa35].  As previously discussed, this credibility decision should not be disturbed.
[brief] ”  Id. at 65 (emphasis supplied).  A certification is a sworn statement.  There was no such statement here.  There was no official document relied on by a witness with knowledge.  Rather, there was no witness, and there was no indicia of reliability at bar.  Moreover, at trial, there was no finding that the documents were reliable.  Next, defendant relies on another argument not made at trial.  Defendant claims N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) applies because the documents are allegedly “business records. ”  Db26.  Again, there was no testimony whatsoever that the writing was made in the regular course of business nor was there any testimony that the source of the information and the method and circumstances of the preparation were such as to justify allowing it into evidence.  And, of course, defendant never sought to have the documents admitted into evidence.  The post-hoc rationalizations fall flat when confronted with the reality at trial – defendant knew and conceded that the [...] documents, absent authentication, were inadmissible hearsay.  Their use was error and requires a new trial.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS  A.  December 11, 2017 order deeming [...] a [...] defendant................................................Da235-36  B. December 13, 2022 order precluding impeachment with pleadings..........................................................11T65 C. February 28, 2023  Order denying Motion for new trial.......Da351 D. February 28, 2023  Order of Judgment..............................Da347-50 E. March 31, 2023  Order denying Motion to Amend Judgment.................................................................Da354-55  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[directive] You shall notify your probation 1. if officer within 24 hours you are arrested or issued a complaint summons in any jurisdiction.  2.  You shall report to your probation officer as directed.  You shall answer all inquiries by your probation officer truthfully.  3.  4.  You shall permit your probation officer to visit your residence or any other suitable place. of or 5.  You shall promptly report any change address residence to your probation officer.  if You must obtain permission you wish to move outside the state.  6.  You shall seek and maintain gainful employment, and promptly notify your probation officer when you 7. of of change your place employment or find yourself out work.  You shall cooperate in any test, treatment and/or counseling deemed necessary by your probation officer 8. of during the PTI period postponement.  If of the court finds that you have not complied with the conditions your PTI Supervision, the Court may If of modify the conditions PTI Supervision, or terminate you from the program.