ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The relevant core of the matter is as follows.  Appellant claimed to have possession of a 2000 Nissan Sentra (the “car” or “vehicle” or “automobile”) that was titled to his late mother.  Although he may have been in possession of the vehicle, Appellant did not own the vehicle at the time the small claims case commenced.  He had not filed with the Surrogate’s Court to establish an estate for their late mother and did not have physical copy of the title.  The car in question was towed to Respondent’s auto shop (“the auto shop”) at the direction of the local police department.  Appellant offered to sell the car to the Respondent for $400, attempting to enter into a contract to sell the vehicle that he did not own.  An employee at the auto shop tentatively accepted the offer, conditioned upon receiving the car’s title.  The employee’s boss however rejected the offer.  The other defendants in this case also rejected similar offers.  In response, Appellant filed a breach of contract suit over “contracts” he had no legal authority to enter into or ability to create.  These are the only relevant facts and issues at hand that should be considered in this appeal.  Appellant has filed various motions related to this case at all levels of the court system, almost all of which have been denied.  Yet, Appellant continues to drag out this frivolous case at the expense of all parties and the judicial system.  Appellant self-admittedly has filed “at least 2-3 dozen past cases” pro se (Pa24, #32).  It is clear that Appellant avails himself of the justice system at any minor inconvenience for financial gain, debasing its purpose and necessity.  In this case, the Appellant is using the judicial system to bully a small business into enforcing a contract that doesn’t exist.  Respondents request the lower court’s decisions to dismiss and impose sanctions be affirmed.
[brief] At first, [...] repeatedly leered at Appellant’s body and commented on her physical appearance and attractiveness, e. g., stating that she was “looking good” and “pretty. ”  (Pa230, Pa340-49, Pa993-97)  62:2-98:2.  Eventually, [...] asked Appellant for her cell phone number, claiming it was for “work-related” purposes.  Id.  Instead, [...] sent text messages to Appellant referring to her as a “hot babe. ”  He also discussed “breasts” and referenced “banging. ”  Id.  [...] also called Appellant inappropriate “pet names” such as “babe” and “hun. ”  Id.  [...] was texting Appellant fishing for sexual favors and hoping Appellant, in return, had the “hots” for him.  (Pa994)  [...] also emailed Appellant telling her how “nice” she “looked” and said she was attractive.
[directive] Other Provisions A. parties.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the state.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.
[brief] (2T14:13-15:2).  Rule 4:32-1(b) requires “that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. ”  This requires a court to consider “the number, and more important, the significance of common questions” and determine that, at a minimum, a “common nucleus of facts” exists.  Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 108 (2007) (citations omitted).  Courts will dismiss class action claims where individualized questions of law and fact predominate over common questions on the face of the pleadings.
[brief] **SUMMATION**  DEP decided that the Scenic Resource and Design Rule need not apply because the proposed project lies within the [...] where, due to a recent amendment to the Long Branch Redevelopment Plan, the setback standard is locally inapplicable.  But also due to that amendment, the need for a CAFRA permit was triggered along with compliance with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule.  It is inexplicable how Long Branch's decision to dispense with the Rule for the [...] site thus triggering CAFRA review, somehow means that DEP should reverse its permit denial and abandon the setback, viewshed and compatibility requirements of the Rule.  This circular reasoning does not hold, and the result is directly at odds with the legal requirements of *Dragon v. DEP*, supra.  DEP's permit approval is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and designed to intentionally circumvent the regulatory requirements for construction of buildings near the waterfront in favor of [...].  The proposed building would be to the detriment of visual compatibility with the surrounding area, to the detriment of Long Branch's waterfront, and to the detriment of [...]’s apartment building’s competitiveness.  DEP has chosen to ignore the facts and override the Scenic Resources and Design Rule.  DEP inappropriately used the settlement process to circumvent the Rule's substantive permitting requirements.  In sum, DEP granted an improper waiver to [...] in violation of established case law and in contravention of a principal Coastal Zone regulation.
[brief] The PCR court engaged in an unreasonable application of the Strickland test in its ruling by failing to address the issue that the defendant was significantly prejudiced by trial counsel’s knowingly misleading the defendant into believing he had investigated and secured witnesses relevant for his trial.  Trial counsel was aware of the importance of the witnesses or video footage from the [...] in Charlotte, North Carolina.  Also, that the witnesses or video footage was necessary to establish that the defendant had either been misidentified by detectives who represented in the Affidavit in support of the sneak and peek warrant that the defendant had been identified during surveillance on specific days he was not even in New Jersey, or that the detectives knowingly falsified evidence of an identification.
[brief] [...]’s subsequent actions regarding whatever it did or did not do after receiving the second doctor’s note were irrelevant, and the Arbitrator should not have considered them.  The Arbitrator’s inclusion of irrelevant post-termination facts only compounds his other errors, and is a logical consequence of his erroneous creation of a new and ultra vires work rule.  Given these grave errors and the Arbitrator’s failure to abide by the substantive law regarding [...]’s managerial prerogative to set the standards of performance for its employees, his award should be set aside.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision confirming the arbitration award should be reversed, and the arbitrator’s decision vacated.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on July 3, 2018 seeking damages from the defendant landlord/owners of the retail mall premises located at [...], [...] (the “Premises”), for personal injuries resulting from [...]’s slip and fall on an ice patch on the property on March 16, 2017.  [Pa118-136].  The complaint named as defendants [...], [...] (collectively the “Cassese Defendants”), and an entity identified as [...], all of whom showed in public records as an owner of the Premises, along with John Does I-1X, identified as persons or entities who may have had control over the Premises.  Pa118-136].  The Cassese Defendants filed an Answer and a Third-Party Complaint against a landscaper, [...] on September 24, 2018.  [Pa137-144].  On October 15, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint which sought (i) to add [...] to the action as a direct defendant and (ii) to remove the entity [...], as Plaintiffs had not been able to serve the entity and discovered that no such entity existed in the records of the Secretary of State of the State of New Jersey.  [Pa148-169].  That motion was granted on November 26, 2018 [Pa170-171]; and the First Amended Complaint was filed on November 27, 2018.  [Pa214-226].  On February 14, 2019, Plaintiffs served a subpoena on the law office that had performed the transactional work relating to the Premises, and the Tenant Defendants’ leases, for the insurers of the parties of the Tenant Defendants.  [Pa177-181].  The subpoena was returnable on March 13, 2019, allowing nearly a month for production.  [Pa177-181].  This assured that all leases would be produced prior to the second anniversary of the accident – except for one thing, the law office for the insurers, the true parties in interest, flouted the subpoena [Pa177-181].
[directive] [No] d. you are not waiving the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of (R. acceptance into a pretrial intervention program (PTI)  3 :28-6( d)?  (R.  Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal [Yes] [No] e. you are waiving the denial of all other pretrial motions except the following:  •  Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment  Defendant's Initials ___ _ Revised Form Promulgated 12/3112019  Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN I 0079 by page I of5  Do you understand that if you plead guilty:
[brief] A TIME-UNIT ARGUMENT WAS PRESENTED TO THE JURY WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE DEFENSE.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING IT.  In his Respondent’s Brief, Plaintiff argues that: (a) his pre-trial information exchange placed both the Court and defense counsel on notice of his intention to make a time-unit argument; (b) the trial court restricted the scope of the argument made; and (c) no time-unit argument was presented to the jury.
[brief] (DA174-175).  Under Section 20, titled “ATTORNEY REVIEW,” the SPA included prominent notice language required by law:  (a)  Study by Attorney.  Buyer and/or Seller may choose to have an attorney study this Contract (Agreement).  If an attorney is consulted, the attorney must complete his or her review of this Contract (Agreement) within three (3) business days (as calculated below).  This Contract will be legally binding at the end of this three (3) day period unless an attorney for Buyer or Seller reviews and disapproves of the Contract (Agreement).  (b)  Counting the Time.  The parties count the three days from the date of delivery of the signed Contract (Agreement) to Buyer and to Seller.  You do not count Saturdays, Sundays or legal holidays.  Buyer and Seller may agree in writing to extend the three (3) day period for attorney review.  (c)  Notice of Disapproval.  If an attorney for Buyer or Seller reviews and disapproves of this Contract (Agreement), the attorney must notify the Broker(s) and Buyer and Seller within the three (3) day period, otherwise this Contract (Agreement) will be legally binding as written.  The attorney must send a notice of disapproval to the Broker(s) and Buyer and Seller by certified mail, by facsimile, or by delivering it personally.
[brief] Exhibit C to Certification, [...], [...] policy, filed September 11, 2023 (cont’d.) 361a Exhibit D to Certification, Berger v. Frazier, A-1852-15 (App. Div. July 13, 2018) (unpublished)  396a Exhibit E to Certification, Benjamin v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 15-4123 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2017) (unpublished)  402a Exhibit F to Certification, Learning Experience Corp. v. Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-14103 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2021) (unpublished)  427a Notice of Cross-motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, filed October 10, 2023 431a Certification of [...], filed October 10, 2023 433a Exhibit A to Certification, First Amended Complaint, filed October 10, 2023 (omitted here – see 44a) -- Exhibit B to Certification, September 19, 2022, [...] Coverage Denial Letter, filed October 10, 2023 435a Exhibit C to Certification, May 24, 2023, letter to [...], filed October 10, 2023 Exhibit D to Certification, June 9, 2023, letter from [...] counsel, filed October 10, 2023
[brief] Point IV  Although the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, plaintiff is unable to comply with the order to retain an attorney due to the defendants’ fraudulent concealment of all service records.  In situations where the interests of attorneys and plaintiff cannot be aligned, plaintiff should have the right to bring suit pro se.  A.  Due to fraudulent concealment and subsequent challenges in uncovering the truth, plaintiff cannot retain an attorney.  As mentioned earlier, plaintiff appealed the dismissal in case # [...].  The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision in an order issued on December 2, 2022, and remanded the plaintiff to amend the case with legal representation (Pa49 – Pa66).  However, due to fraudulent concealment and subsequent challenges in uncovering the truth, the plaintiff cannot comply with this order.  The decision to retain an attorney is not solely within the plaintiff's control but also depends on how attorneys assess the potential outcomes, unrelated to the merits of the plaintiff's case.  Moreover, the plaintiff has the right to maintain the quality of legal counsel.  Unless the court appoints an attorney for the plaintiff, plaintiff should have the right to proceed pro se when the interests of attorneys and the plaintiff are not aligned.
[directive] 4.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 유죄를 시인하고 그 범죄(들)가 강력범죄라는 것을 인정함으로써, 귀하는 배심원단이 합리적인 의심의 여지 없이 그 범죄(들)가 강력범죄(들)를 성립시키는 정황(들)이 존재한다고 결정하게 하는 귀하의 권리를 포기한다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that the crime(s) are a violent crime you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the circumstance(s) that make the crime(s) a violent crime(s) are present?  날짜/Date 피고인/Defendant 피고측 변호인/Defense Attorney 검사/Prosecutor 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지2/ CN 11170-Korean 2 Form Promulgated by Directive ##01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Korean page 2 of 2  AVISO:  Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] The judge noted only that the factor “really does not apply,” but that the court would “take into consideration [...]’s age, as well as the fact that [...] does not have a substantial criminal and/or juvenile history. ”  (2T:18-20 to 19-9)  The court rejected mitigating factor thirteen, “conduct of youthful defendant substantially influenced by more mature codefendant,” because “[...] gave the command to shoot and to get the guy in the yellow jacket,” concluding that if anything, the individuals who shot at the victims, including \(^6\)
[brief] Or, as explained by the court in **662 Continental Can Co. v. Hudson Foam Latex Prod. Inc.**, 129 N.J. Super 426,430,324 A.2d 60 (App. Div. 1974), whether collateral estoppel applies depends on a variety of factors, “all of which are considered because they contribute to the greatest good for the greatest number so long as fairness is not sacrificed on that altar. ”  *Pivnick v. Beck*, 326 N.J. Super. 474, 485-86(App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 165 N.J. 670(2000).  Certainly, there can be no claim that the issue of whether the advice [...] gave to the client, [...] at the time of the deed and mortgage was negligent as alleged in Paragraph 16 of the Complaint can be subjected to collateral estoppel.  The Court in the Probate Action’s decision in no way touched on this advice and Defendant’s motion ignores this allegation.
[brief] This is a legal malpractice case in which the Court erroneously dismissed Plaintiff/Appellants’ case after Motions in Limine has been decided and a Jury had been impaneled during the Plaintiff’s direct testimony.  The dismissal of the case was procedurally flawed and disregarded the Court’s own Pretrial Order and precedent which held that it was inappropriate to file dispositive motions as an in Limine motion prior to Trial; indeed, this motion was filed during Trial and Plaintiff’s counsel was given essentially one (1) day(!) to respond to same while trying the case.  Aggravating the Court’s procedural error is the fact that it’s ruling was substantially wrong, and the Court held that Plaintiff’s pledges to creditors who were at his door due to the negligence of the Defendants of a portion of the proceeds he would recover in this legal malpractice suit constituted an impermissible pre-judgment assignment of a personal chose in action.  Neither of the two instruments relied upon the Trial Court to Dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action were assignments.  One was an attorneys lien on the portion of the proceeds of this suit and the other was a pledge and security interest to pay a creditor from the proceeds of this suit in the event of a recovery.  Neither instrument gave the creditors control over the litigation of the claim.  The claim continued to be brought in [...]’s own name.  [...]’s damage claim dwarfed the pledges he made in these two instruments.  None of the policy implications underlying this State’s prohibition of the assignment of personal Tort actions to third parties were implicated by these pledges to creditors and the Courts ruling not only evinces an erroneously understanding of what an assignment versus what a security interest or lien is but also was devoid of the consideration of any alternative other than dismissal of the cause of action such as invalidating the supposed assignments.  Before erroneously dismissing Plaintiff’s case, the Court also erred in denying two (2)  Motions in Limine by the Plaintiff to exclude the prejudicial and completely lacking any meaningful probative value evidence of a completely unrelated lawsuit against the Plaintiff which had been settled and Plaintiff’s subsequent purchase of a luxury home after he decided to abandon his building of his home due to the negligence of Defendants.  This collateral litigation against [...] was amicably resolved shortly after it was filed bore no relation whatsoever to the issue namely whether or not [...] adhered to the standard of care when representing [...] in the construction of his home.  These cumulative errors require that the Trial Court’s Order be reversed and this matter be remanded for trial where the Jury will consider evidence germane to Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim and the Defendants will not be permitted to introduce collateral lawsuits which have miniscule if any probative value or the fact that the Plaintiff subsequently purchased an expensive luxury home.
[directive] You shall provide a DNA sample as a condition of the sentence imposed, pursuant to DNA Database and Databank Act of N.J.S.A. et seq.  L. c. as amended by L. as amended by L. c. 1994, 53:1-20.17, (see 1994, 136, 2000 c. 118, 2003 183 effective Sept. 22, 2003) unless you are convicted of a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense.  Obligaciones económicas que se ordenan / Financial Obligations
[brief] I'm looking exactly where you're pointing at: was that warrantless search and seizure stop of [...] valid.  And I find that it was.  And here's why I find that it was.  He has knowledge, he's had a warrant at a premises and he sees the people go in.  He sees the people come out.  He's waiting for a warrant.  He knows who he's looking for.  He's familiar with this defendant.  So as a result of that he makes a tactical decision in regards to -- because they are under investigation he certainly has a reasonable suspicion that this is the individual and so he takes and follows and sees what occurs.
[brief] A.  Between Bouts of Hurling Abuse at Restaurant Staff, Defendant Calls 911 Over a Cup Lid and Straw.  This case is about defendant’s unwillingness to control his anger.  On November 21, 2019, defendant was dining with his family, including wife [...], at [...], a Chinese restaurant in [...].  Defendant asked staff at [...] to give him a new cup lid and straw, because one of his children dropped their lid on the floor.  (8T21-18 to 26-18).  When staff provided defendant with a new lid and straw and placed them on a part of the table that defendant perceived to be dirty, defendant became enraged.  (6T132-9 to -13).  Video surveillance footage shows that defendant threw the new lid and straw at staff, and then continued berating staff even as they offered him yet another lid and straw.  (Pa2 at 13:55:45 to 13:56:23).  Defendant then picked up and threw the lid and straw at staff a second time.  (Pa2 at 13:56:07 to 13:57:08).  Defendant screamed at them to the point that other patrons intervened, but defendant responded aggressively and refused to calm down.  (Pa2 at 13:58:08 to 13:58:33).  At approximately 2:00 p.m., defendant called 911.  (6T132-9 to -13).  Surveillance video shows that defendant called 911 just two minutes after he threw the lid and straw at restaurant staff for the second time.  (Pa1 at 13:58:41).  The State played the recording of the 911 call at defendant’s trial.  (6T133-11 to -13; Pa1).  When the 911 dispatcher asked defendant what his “emergency” was, defendant responded that he was being “disrespected” by restaurant staff and explained that a waitress placed a lid and straw directly on his table.  (Pa1 at 0:00:55 to 0:01:24; 8T31-22 to -24).  When the dispatcher advised defendant to cease speaking with staff and to wait outside the restaurant for police to arrive, defendant began speaking over the dispatcher, saying he wanted police to watch a video recording of how the waitress placed the lid and straw on his table.  (Pa1 at 0:01:49 to 0:02:04).  Before hanging up, defendant agreed to step outside.  (Pa1 at 0:02:05 to 0:02:15).  At the conclusion of the 911 call, defendant remained in the restaurant and continued berating staff over the lid and straw.  Defendant picked up and threw the lid and straw at staff yet again even as his family members approached him and tried to calm him down.  (Pa2 at 13:58:56 to 14:03:22).
[brief] At the direction of the [...], by the end of May 2012, the [...] website specifically added that, in order to be permitted to take advantage of the opportunity for the dual degree, a prospective applicant must maintain a 3.0 GPA by the end of their first academic year at the Pharmacy School.  In addition, admission to the Master’s portion of the program was to be determined by the school granting the Master’s degree.  ([...] Dep. T24:7-T26:7 at Pa.345-46).  The updated website information included:  Students who are accepted to the School of Pharmacy with a baccalaureate degree may have the opportunity to pursue a Masters degree in conjunction with the Doctor of Pharmacy degree following completion of the first professional year of the Pharmacy curriculum -- providing the opportunity for students to select a focused pathway of study while meeting the Doctor of Pharmacy curricular requirements.  The integration of required master's courses within the pharmacy program curriculum may allow students to complete both degrees, with overload courses required for some master's programs offered as evening, Saturday or online courses.  Students interested in a dual degree will be required to meet the admissions requirements for the selected second-degree pathway, in addition to maintaining a 3.0 grade point average within the Doctor of Pharmacy curriculum.