ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The underlying purpose of the Recording Act is clear.  An historical study of the [Recording] Act, as well as an analysis of the cases interpreting it, leads to the conclusion that it was designed to compel the recording of instruments affecting title, for the ultimate purpose of permitting purchasers to rely upon the record title and to purchase and hold title to lands within this state with confidence.  The means by which the compulsion to record is accomplished is by favoring a recording purchaser, both by empowering him to divest a former non-recording title owner and by preventing a subsequent purchaser from divesting him of title.  This ability to deprive a prior and bona fide purchaser for value of his property shows a genuine favoritism toward a recording purchaser.  It is a clear mandate that the recording purchaser be given every consideration permitted by the law, including all favorable presumptions of law and fact.  It is likewise a clear expression that a purchaser be able to rely upon the record title.
[brief] 2  As referenced herein, “Pa” refers to Plaintiffs’ Appendix, “Da” refers to Defendants’ Appendix. vital to public health, safety, and welfare, including the fiscal health of our State’s municipalities.  b.  In certain extreme cases, local governments that experience severe fiscal distress become incapable of addressing the circumstances that led to that extraordinary distress or of developing a comprehensive plan for financial rehabilitation and recovery.  c.  It is necessary and appropriate for the State to take action to assist local governments experiencing severe budget imbalances and other conditions of severe fiscal distress or emergency by requiring prudent fiscal management and operational efficiencies in the provision of public services.  d.  As the State entity primarily responsible for the financial integrity and stability of all local government units, the [...] should be authorized, under certain limited circumstances, to develop a comprehensive rehabilitation plan for local governments that are experiencing severe fiscal distress, and to act on behalf of local government units to remedy the distress.  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-2.
[brief] The primary duty of the chapter 7 trustee is to “collect and reduce to money property of the estate”  11 U.S.C. § 704(1).  This power includes the right of the trustee to take over the prosecution of any prepetition lawsuits the chapter 7 debtor had as of the date of filing.  *Cain v. Hyatt*, 101 B.R. 440, 442 (E.D.Pa. 1989)(citations omitted); Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 323, as the representative of the estate the trustee is the one to administer the property of the debtor, including the debtor’s prepetition causes of action.  *See In re Gulph Woods Corp.*, 116 B.R. 423, 428 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (“once a trustee is appointed in a bankruptcy case, the trustee, not the debtor or the debtor’s principal, has the capacity to represent the estate and to sue and be sued. ”); *Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp.*, 606 F.3d 789, 795 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and § 323) (finding that the commencement of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy extinguishes the debtor’s legal rights in pending litigation, and transfers those rights to the trustee); *Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc.*, 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (“a pre-petition cause of action is the property of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee in bankruptcy has standing to pursue it”).
[brief] The only legislative powers the [...] has used, and the only ones that a regional Health Commission can use to regulate in the field of noise, are the abilities of the local Board of Health to declare and define nuisances, N.J.S.A. 26:3-45, and the ability to adopt a code by reference pursuant to the PHSCARA.  Neither the general power to declare and define nuisances, nor the ability to adopt a code by reference, are in any way specific to the regulation of noise.  The Model Nuisance Code, refers to itself as “a general code” and relates that there are “more detailed and specific codes in special sanitation fields” that “have been adopted by reference by local boards of health”.  Da96.  As set forth in the Borough’s Appellate brief, we submit that this does not carry the degree of specificity needed to preempt a field, such that a municipality would not be able to provide for a specific ordinance to regulate noise per the HRA.  Respondents’ reference to State v. Krause, 399 N.J. Super. 579 (App. Div. 2008) is misplaced.
[brief] 2.  POINT I.  THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE LEAD  DETECTIVE  ANTHONY LUYBER TESTIFIED THAT A ANONYMOUS 9-1-1 CALLER “ANGEL” PROVIDED INFORMATION TO AUTHORITIES THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE CRIMES.  HOWEVER ANGEL WAS NOT SUBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION.  FOR THIS CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION; A NEW TRIAL IS MANDATED.  U.S. CONST. AMENDS V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. ART.  1  PAR. 10 (not raised below).........................................................  2.  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................  12.
[brief] [Pa3389]  By letter dated March 9, 2022, counsel for [...] demanded that counsel for Appellants withdraw the Motion as a frivolous motion in violation of R. 1:4-8.  [Pa3395]  Counsel identified the following reasons for withdrawal: (i) [...] was never served with the Amended Complaint; (ii) [...] had been previously dismissed from the case on January 29, 2022 and was therefore no longer a party to the action; (iii) default had never been requested by Appellants or entered against [...], as required by Rule 4:43 prior to the entry of default judgment; and (iv) the sworn statements contained in [...]’s Certification in support of the motion [Pa3337] and Proof of Service of Process [Pa3342] were inaccurate, [...] was not authorized to accept service on behalf of [...], and neither was his secretary.
[brief] [...], who has three prior convictions, noticed that defendant was wounded, and, with his two friends, “grabbed” and tussled with defendant.  The three people in the store tried to subdue defendant by jumping on, kicking, and fighting with him, and throwing a “radiator” (presumably a portable heater) at him.  The trio eventually dragged defendant to the front of the store, stomped on him, and tossed him to the floor.  Defendant didn’t relinquish the gun despite being hit by the three men.  Defendant fell to the floor, face down, with a gun underneath him.  (2T51-18 to 21; 2T52-5 to 12; 2T83-7 to 16; 3T43-25 to 44-3; 3T47-17 to 48-2; 3T48-25 to 49-8; 3T52-21 to 53-13; 3T128-21 to 130-6; 3T147-18 to 148-17; 3T151-8 to 152-15).
[brief] The determination of the admissibility of expert opinion is governed by *N.J.R.E. 702* and *N.J.R.E. 703*.  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015).  *N.J.R.E. 702* first provides, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
[directive] Law enforcement agencies should have a policy management system that, at a minimum, includes:  (a)  Rules and regulations.  Principles of behavior that set forth acceptable and unacceptable conduct.  In municipal police agencies, the rules and regulations must be 6  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 issued by the appropriate authority as designated by ordinance.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:14- 118.  (b)  Standard operating procedures (SOPs).  Written statements providing specific direction for performing agency activities.  Each SOP should also include the agency’s policy in that area, which is a statement of agency principles that provides the basis for the development of the procedures.  (c)  Directives or orders.  Documents detailing the performance of a specific activity or method of operation.  2.1.3
[brief] Following notification of the parties, the trial court entered an amended judgment of conviction on April 30, 2008.  The sentencing court entered the following comment on the later judgment:  “The judgment of conviction is amended to reflect that defendant is sentenced to community supervision for life. ”  *Id.* at 300-301.  Almost two months later, [...] was notified by letter from the Parole Board that he had been resentenced because his original sentence was not imposed in accordance with the law governing sexual offenses.  His new sentence now included community supervision for life, and he was directed to report on a specified date to the parole office for processing.  The letter further informed [...] that a failure to comply would constitute a fourth-degree crime carrying a potential sentence of up to eighteen months in prison.  Id. at 301.  [...] retained counsel and filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he requested that the trial court vacate the amended judgment on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to amend a sentence which he [[...]] had already completed.  [...] further argued that by amending his sentence to include additional punitive terms constituted a violation of the double jeopardy clause, denied him due process of law, and was fundamentally unfair.
[brief] In 1988, the FTC published its Staff Commentary which, among other things, reconciled how a debt collector could use those FCC-regulated communications industries without violating § 1692c(b).  Comment 3 to Section 805(b) of the Federal Trade Commission, *Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act*, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-02 (Dec. 13, 1988) states:  Incidental contacts with telephone operator or telegraph clerk.  A debt collector may contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties, **if the only information given is that necessary to enable the collector [sic—perhaps “operator”] to transmit the message to, or make the contact with, the consumer. **  [Emphasis added.]  The data Defendant shared with its mail vendor (Pa8 at ¶47, Pa25) far exceeds the limited information necessary “to transmit the message to, or make contact with, the consumer. ”
[directive] Protocol for Undercover Audio Recordings by Investigators Working on Civil Matters requirements.  A.  Department personnel conducting or supervising investigations that Legal will include covert audio recordings should be aware of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“New Jersey Wiretap Act”), N.J.S.A. §§ 2A:156A-1 to -34, and other legal authorities that may restrict the creation, use, and disclosure of such recordings, or that may affect their admissibility in legal proceedings.  The New Jersey Wiretap Act imposes significant restrictions on covert audio recordings in civil investigations.  Broadly speaking, however, a statement made in the course of an in- conversation with, or communication directed to, an investigator who person in-person covertly records that conversation is not a “wire, electronic or oral communication” subject to the New Jersey Wiretap Act because the statement is not made via wire or electronic communication and is not made in a context in which the speaker has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  e.g., Cos., 351 N.J. See, Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Super. 577 (App. Div. 2002).  For additional guidance on the New Jersey Wiretap Act and other relevant legal authorities, investigative Divisions should consult with their counsel in the Division of Law.  Divisions that do not have counsel in the Division of Law should consult with their in-house counsel.  If a Division seeks to make or use covert audio recordings in investigations involving jurisdictions outside New Jersey, consideration must be given to that jurisdiction’s legal requirements, which may differ from those that apply in New Jersey.
[brief] "Reconsideration is a matter to be exercised in the trial court's sound discretion."  Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008) citing Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 257, 531 A.2d 1078 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196, 540 A.2d 189 (1988).  "A litigant should not seek reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision of the [c]ourt."  Capital Fin. Co. at 310 citing D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401, 576 A.2d 957 (Ch. Div. 1990).  "Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases . . . that fall within that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence."
[brief] (Pb23-Pb25).  The Board also relies upon the fact that the resolution identifies a specific finding that the requested subdivision does not adversely affect the public’s health, safety, or welfare.  (BDb7).  However, this finding is not supported by the record.  “The factual findings set forth in a resolution cannot consist of a mere recital of testimony or conclusory statements couched in statutory language. ”  *New York SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken*, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333 (App. Div. 2004) (citing *Harrington Glen, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Leonia*, 52 N.J. 22, 28 (1968)).  In *New York SMSA*, the board’s resolution set forth no factual findings, and merely identified the applicant, describes the proposed site, summarizes in a cursory fashion the testimony presented, and reiterated selected comments.  *New York SMSA, L.P.*, 370 N.J. Super. at 333.  The same occurred here\(^2\) (Pa245-Pa253).  “This is exactly the sort of resolution that has repeatedly been recognized as deficient by the courts. ”  *Ibid.* (citing *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987); *Harrington Glen, Inc.*, 52 N.J. at 28; *Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 335 N.J. Super. 111, 123 (App. Div. 2000); *Loscalzo v. Pini*, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 1988); *Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Tp.*, 228 N.J. Super. 635, 646 (Law Div. 1988)).  For these reasons, the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. --- \(^2\)
[directive] 9.6.3  In addition to the situations described in Sections 9.6.1 and 9.6.2, the law enforcement executive may authorize access to a particular file or record for good cause.  The request and the authorization shall be in writing, and the written authorization shall specify who is being granted access, to which records access is being granted and for what time period access is permitted.  The authorization shall also specify any conditions (i.e., the files may be reviewed only at the internal affairs office and may not be removed).  In addition, the law enforcement executive may order any redactions consistent with Section 9.6.2(b).  The law enforcement executive should grant such access sparingly, given the purpose of the internal affairs process and the nature of many of the allegations against officers.
[brief] This high standard accords substantial deference “to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”  *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)(quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)); see also *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 472 (1999)(quoting *Trusky v. Ford Motor Co.*, 19 N.J. Super. 100, 104 (App. Div. 1952))(even “the best and most accurate record” “is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the peach before it was dried”).
[brief] As more fully described above, the Township had no notice, whether actual or constructive, of the alleged condition prior to Plaintiff’s incident.  [Pa71-Pa72, ¶ 27-32].  The Township cannot be held to have acted palpably unreasonably as to a condition it did not know existed.  However, even assuming arguendo the Township had notice of an allegedly dangerous condition, there has been no action or inaction by the Township that may be considered palpably unreasonable.  Due to the excessive number of sidewalks, it is unreasonable for the Township to conduct regular inspections of all sidewalks to determine whether any dangerous condition existed or maintenance is required.  The Township has a finite number of resources and cannot be expected to continuously inspect and maintain all municipal property within the Township.  Furthermore, “pedestrians must expect some areas of imperfection on walkway surfaces, and not every defect in a walkway surface is actionable. ”  See, Charney, 732 F.Supp.2d at 456.  Given the foregoing, the trial court properly determined the Township did not act in a palpably unreasonable manner and Plaintiff failed to satisfy the TCA requirements necessary to impose liability on the Township.  reasonable trier of fact could determine that the Township acted in a palpably unreasonable manner with respect to the alleged condition.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted the Appellate Division should affirm the trial court’s determination.
[brief] Da239-240 June 1, 2023 defendant letter requesting decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da241-242 June 2, 2023 landlord letter requesting decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da243-247 Sept. 8, 2023 joint letter to court requesting decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[directive] Five-Year Hold Kits  Pursuant to the Revision of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2011-1, victims who undergo a medical forensic exam, but choose not report the incident to a law enforcement agency, may request to have their evidence (e.g. SAFE Kits) “held” for a period of five years.8  Kits elected to be held for the five-year retention period shall be referred to as “Five-Year Hold Kits. ”  If the victim is an adult, evidence shall be retained for at least five years.  If the victim is a minor, evidence shall be retained for at least five years after the victim reaches the age of 18.  In the event a victim chooses to report to law enforcement after initially electing a Five-Year Hold Kit, law enforcement shall obtain the evidence and schedule a formal interview with the victim consistent with these Standards.  Where, after the five-year retention period expires and the prosecutor determines to destroy the SAFE Kit, the prosecutor shall notify the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their designee, to provide the Division the opportunity to take custody of the Kit and assume responsibility for its continued retention.  Mandatory County Procedures
[brief] [...] submits the arguments by Plaintiff/Respondents fail.  [...] reinforces the arguments made in Point II of its moving appellate brief and makes the following additional arguments.  First, Plaintiff/Respondents argue that Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation, 243 N.J. 319 and Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1977) contradict [...]’s argument that only the RETA applied.
[brief] *State v. Ramseur*, 106 N.J. 123, 320 (1987); *State v. Marks*, 201 N.J. Super. 514, 535 (App. Div. 1985).  It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.  *Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  In this case, the prosecutor lost sight of his duty to seek justice when he engaged in the following improprieties, the combination of which deprived [...] of a fair trial and due process of law.
[brief] APPELLANT PLED THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND HARASSMENT WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD BY THE APPELLANT AND REACHED AN IMPROPER CONCLUSION AND DISMISSED  THIS CAUSE OF ACTION, Pa1, Pa196, Pa211 at T137, T138, T264, T390; Pa264, Pa296  In Lehmann v. Toys R Us, the Court formulated the basic standard for determining whether acts of harassment in the workplace constituted sexual harassment which is in violation of the Law Against Discrimination.  Lehmann v. Toys R Us, 132 N.J. 601, 603-604(1999)  When a Plaintiff claims hostile work environment what must be shown is that (1) the complained of conduct would not have occurred but for the person’s protected status (2) and it was severe or pervasive enough to (3) make a reasonable person in the same protected status believe that (4) the working environment was hostile and abusive.  Id. at 603-604.  The Lehmann Test applies generally to hostile work environment claims.
[directive] The Internal Affairs Unit of this department has completed its investigation of your complaint concerning the conduct of [name of subject officer].  The investigation and a review of all information failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  More specifically,… a. (witness could not be located) b. (document could not be located) c. (physical or forensic evidence could not be located) d. (witness did not support your complaint) e. (physical or forensic evidence did not support your complaint) f. (the investigation failed to yield enough evidence to support your complaint) g. (while some evidence supported your complaint there was not enough evidence to support your complaint)  If you have additional information which you believe should be considered, please contact the Internal Affairs Unit at [telephone number].  If no additional information is received within ten days, this case will be considered closed.  Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.  Unfounded
[brief] [...] (F/K/A [...])  Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...]); [...]; [...] (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...]); [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...]); [...]; [...] (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO [...] AND [...]); [...]; [...]
[brief] In the present case, [...] failed to identify defendant in an out-of-court photo array, failed to identify defendant on direct examination, then on recall testified he was “[one] hundred percent” sure defendant was the man who robbed him.  Whether this about-face was the product of any external influence on [...] was for the jury to resolve, before whom this change in testimony occurred.  On direct examination, the prosecutor did not ask [...] to identify the robber in a manner that suggested he was present in the courtroom or that defendant was the perpetrator, *State v. Wilson*, 362 N.J.Super. 319, 326, and there is no evidence that between the time he left the courtroom after direct examination and the time he returned to the stand, [...] spoke to anyone other than the officer to whom he commented that he recognized defendant.  Thus, he was properly permitted to testify on redirect as to defendant's identity.  “The strength or credibility of the identification is not the issue on admissibility; that is a matter of weight, for the fact finder, under appropriate instructions from the trial judge. ”  *Farrow*, supra, 61 N.J. at 451.  The trial court instructed the jury on assessing the credibility of a witness's testimony, including how to evaluate inconsistent statements.  There is nothing in the record to suggest the jury did not follow the court's instructions in this regard.  *State v. Little*, 296 N.J.Super. 573, 580 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 150 N.J. 25 (1997).  II.