ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  8  I.  Under the applicable standards of review, the Court must review the trial court’s determinations de novo, the Country’s interpretation of its specifications for abuse of discretion, and the County’s determination of whether to waive a non-material defect for clear abuse of discretion.  (1T60-17; 3T46-7)
[directive] GRADUATED PLEA POLICY AND TIMING OF THE PLEA 4.1  Purpose of Escalating Plea Policy  These Guidelines firmly embrace the concept of a graduated or “escalating” plea policy, recognizing the need to provide practical incentives for guilty defendants to plead guilty at the earliest possible stage within the unfolding criminal justice process.  These Guidelines continue the policy to account for the timing of the plea by providing for a longer sentence if, for example, the plea is taken after indictment.  Providing practical incentives for defendants to plead guilty before indictment, or as soon as possible thereafter, is necessary to ensure the efficient administration of the criminal justice system and to provide swift as well as certain punishment in order to enhance the deterrent impact of New Jersey’s criminal drug laws.  This system is based not only on New Jersey practice and experience, but also on § 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which awards a benefit to a defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility” by “timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently. ”  This graduated or escalating plea system is designed to promote rehabilitation of the defendant as well as to conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources.  The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Shaw, 131 N.J. 1 (1993), recognized in this regard that early disposition is “an important law-enforcement objective, thus harnessing the most efficient use of prosecutor, defense, and judge time. ”  The Court added, “[n]ot only does early disposition maximize efficiency, it also furthers a second goal of the [Comprehensive Drug Reform] Act, rehabilitation. ”  131 N.J. at 13.
[directive] Every officer has a duty to immediately report any improper use of force.  5.1  Duty to intervene.  A law enforcement officer’s duty to intervene is rooted in the commitment to protect public safety at all times.  Interventions that prevent improper use of force will lead to fewer citizen complaints, fewer officer disciplinary matters, higher morale, and a healthier working environment.  Preventing misconduct preserves the integrity of all officers and the law enforcement profession as a whole.
[directive] Other Provisions  A. parties.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.
[directive] However, there may be instances where an undercover officer may be required to leave school property for the purpose of participating in an off-campus drug transaction under circumstances where the carrying of a concealed weapon is necessary and prudent, and where there would be no meaningful opportunity for the undercover officer to retrieve a weapon while en route to participate in the off-campus drug transaction.  Accordingly, an exemption from the general rule prohibiting the carrying or bringing onto school property of a firearm may only be granted with the expressed approval of the officer's immediate superior unless otherwise specified in the plan approval process by good cause shown.  Any firearm brought onto school property pursuant to this subsection will ordinarily be contained in a closed and fastened case locked in the trunk of an automobile operated by the undercover officer.  It is assumed, moreover, that any exemption from the general weapons carrying policy established in this subsection shall only be rarely sought, and approval to carry a firearm onto school property shall only be granted where alternative means of providing adequate security or support are not feasible.
[directive] i.  Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  If the [Yes] [No] N.J.S.A. crime involves a violation of 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in N.J.S.A. sexual act that is to be photographed or exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in sexual act), if the N.J.S.A. crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly N.J.S.A. possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a N.J.S.A. child pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under N.J.S.A. age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty? (1) $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3) $ 750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4) $ 500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5) $ 250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense Total CCPF Penalty $ Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079
[brief] **The Decision Not To Reopen Discovery Was Not Error. **  In Issue D, Plaintiff argues that it was error not to reopen discovery to permit Plaintiff an additional one-hundred twenty days to obtain the expert report which she should have obtained during discovery and to serve it.  There was no error in [...]’s decision to deny the cross motion to reopen discovery.  In *Bender v. Adelson*, 187 N.J. 411 (2006), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that allowing in a late report after a trial date has been set would require the re-opening of discovery, thus triggering Rule 4:24-1 and the plaintiff's burden of showing exceptional circumstances.  *Id.* at 427.  Under that rule, "No extension of the discovery period may be permitted after an arbitration or trial date is fixed, unless exceptional circumstances are shown."  R. 4:24-1(c).  In this case, at the time Plaintiff filed her cross motion to extend discovery, a trial date had been issued.  (*Cf.* November 21, 2022 notice of trial date, and Plaintiff’s January 1, 2023 notice of cross motion.)  Consequently, Plaintiff was required to demonstrate exceptional circumstances.  This requires a party seeking to extend discovery to provide a detailed explanation as to why the report could not be served timely, in order to establish exceptional circumstances.  *Bender*, at 429.  See, also, *Rivers v. LSC Partnership*, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 78 (App. Div. 2005) cert. denied 185 N.J. 296 (2005) (declining to find exceptional circumstances for a second extension where no effort had been made during the extended discovery period to obtain expert report.)
[brief] As explained by this Court in Donofry v. Autotote, 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001):  Plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected, whistleblowing activity was a determinative or substantial, motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate his employment—that it made a difference.  Plaintiff need not prove that his whistleblowing activity was the only factor in the decision to fire him.  Donofry, 350 N.J. Super. at 296.  Therefore, even if a reasonable jury believes some of Defendants’ rationale for termination, it could still reasonably conclude that Plaintiff’s whistleblowing “made a difference” in Defendants deciding to terminate her, and still find for Plaintiff.
[directive] The herein. forth set procedures the who Prosecutors training Assistant for mandatory "live" (1) include shall which, program law from Officers Liaison Violence Domestic and Units Violence Domestic supervise and Prosecutors Assistant trainingfor web-based or computer- ~~ and agencies, enforcement domestic upon touch reasonably to expected be can duties whose officers enforcement law sworn the make shall Division the feasible, extent the To below. described further as incidents violence system.  NJLEARN through the on-line available training computer/web-based the_ fof authorit.  the operating under ~ency a enforcement law every of executive chief  The officer sworn that to ensure necessary steps such every take shall New of State of the Jersey laws patrol t to assi d ne officers supervises directly who officer sworn every duty, patrol w assi to d ne related or of circumstances investi~atin~ the include duties whose officer sworn every and duty, to pursuant developed training computer/web-based the receives incident violence domestic a to being trainin~pro~ram the of days within 60 training receive shall officers Such subsection. this complete enforcement officer must A law Justice. Criminal of Division the by available made ODARA. administer the can she or he before trainingprogram the Assistant every necessary that to ensure such steps take shall Prosecutor County
[brief] [...] likewise argues that [...] mis-applied the law because he concluded that the Quinlan Tract was conveyed with the uplands.  [...] seems to ignore, however, the portion of the Panetta opinion holding that a riparian grant may still be conveyed with uplands if there is “evidence that the parties intended its inclusion”.  Panetta, 190 N.J. at 307.  [...] also ignore the fact that [...] concluded that there evidence of an intent by the parties in the chain of title to convey the riparian grant/riparian rights with the uplands.  Since [...] found that there was evidence in the record that the parties intended to include the riparian grant/riparian rights when the uplands were conveyed, [...]’s legal analysis is consistent both with the Panetta decision and with applicable law regarding the interpretation of deeds.
[brief] ***  In short, a riparian grant is the conveyance of real property divided from the uplands by a fixed boundary, no different than any other conveyance of land.  See Busby v. Rose, 114 N.J. Eq. 580 (Ch. Div. 1933) (adjoining riparian tract is “distinct and separate estate”); Moore v. Ventnor Gardens, Inc., 105 N.J. Eq. 730, 735 (Ch. 1930) (observing that mortgage of land abutting water does not included separate riparian grant), aff’d o.b., 109 N.J. Eq. 132 (E & A 1931); see also 29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages, §5.7, at 42 ([...]) 2d ed. Supp. 2005) (defining riparian grant as tract of land entirely separate and distinct from uplands).  ***
[brief] On or about March 18, 2005, [...], [...], and [...] entered into the Wholesaler Agreement (the “Wholesaler Agreement” or “Agreement”) during a meeting in New Jersey, which is the most recent documentation of their contractual relationship, and which purported to appoint Appellants as wholesalers of Sapporo products in the New York tri-state area and the entire state of New Jersey.  (Pa30; Pa62-74).  In section 1(d)(i) of the Agreement, Appellants agreed to “use best efforts to promote the sale and distribution of Sapporo’s Products to all possible accounts in its market area…” (Pa64).  There is no definition of “best efforts” in the Agreement.  The Agreement also restricts any party from terminating the Agreement on only sixty (60) days’ notice unless the party giving notice “reasonably believes” that termination will be “mutually beneficial to both parties. ” (Pa66).  The Agreement includes an arbitration clause stating that it shall be “governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York” and that any “controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration in New York, New York pursuant to the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association. ” (Pa69).  II.
[brief] **D.  Plaintiff’s Substantial Compliance Argument is Unavailing. **  Plaintiff’s argument regarding “substantial compliance” (Pb24-Pb28) is also misplaced.  Plaintiff’s claims against [...] were not dismissed because she had failed to comply, strictly or otherwise, with a statutory requirement, such as the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  (125a-126a; 1T at 10:21-11:04.)  Her claims were dismissed because, after the end of the discovery period, and with a trial date fixed, the plaintiff was not able to set forth a *prima facie* case against [...].  Even assuming, *arguendo*, that the 5-part test discussed in *Cornblatt v. Barow*, 153 N.J. 218 (1998), was ever applicable, the record still demonstrates that plaintiff cannot satisfy all of its elements, and thus does not deserve equitable relief.  Plaintiff has not set forth the steps that were taken to comply with the requirement to serve an expert report as to [...]; all that plaintiff offered was a vague intention to serve a report from an expert orthopedic surgeon, [...], who is not qualified to offer an opinion regarding [...].  Plaintiff has not established “general compliance” with the requirement to serve expert reports; it is undisputed that no expert reports were served.  Plaintiff has also not offered a reasonable explanation why she did not serve expert reports.  Instead, plaintiff has offered her attorney’s admission to an “oversight” (Pb18, Pb31), his vague reference to “staffing shortages” (Pb18), and irrelevant information regarding [...]’s medical conditions.  The latter have no logical bearing on her attorneys’ ability to obtain an expert report against [...], or their ability to have filed a timely motion for an extension.  Plaintiff and her attorneys were afforded a reasonable amount of time in which to have the case reviewed by an appropriate expert.  They simply failed to do so, with the result that plaintiff was, and remains, unable to prove her claims against [...].  Equitable relief is not warranted, and the decisions of the Law Division should be affirmed.
[brief] Plaintiffs, [...], individually and as Administrator of the Estate of [...] (“Decedent”), and [...] (collectively “Plaintiffs”), respectfully submit this brief in reply to the opposition briefs submitted by Defendants, [...], [...], and [...].  In their opposition briefs, Defendants/Respondents make several erroneous arguments, all of which misapprehend the ultimate issues on appeal.  Of significant importance to this appeal is whether the presence of the large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises for months before the Decedent was shot, which was illegal, since the sale of alcoholic beverages on the Subject Premises – near a public basketball court and playground, was illegal, was a dangerous condition on public property and more than just the criminal activities of third parties as argued by Defendants.  Respectfully, the trial court failed to consider Plaintiffs’ arguments by mischaracterizing the untimely death of Decedent as merely a “drive-by shooting” and ignoring a line of cases holding that a dangerous condition of property may be found to exist under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, when an unreasonable risk of harm is created by a combination of a defect in the property and the acts of third parties.  Defendants’ arguments do not support this reversible failure of the trial court to find that the Plaintiffs alleged facts to support a finding of a dangerous condition on public property – the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises for months before Decedent was shot, for which the Defendants are not immune from liability.  For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ arguments do not provide any basis to deny the appeal.  Similarly, for the reasons set forth below and in Plaintiffs’ opening appellate brief, this Court should reverse the lower court’s grant of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice and remand the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings.
[brief] [...] met with [...] and disciplined her.  [...] and Appellant sent a letter to [...], Superintendent of Human Resources alerting her to what had taken place.  The video recording was sent to [...] also.  (Pa384, Letter and Video to [...], Pa294, Smith Affidavit)  This presentment of the use of the N word, letter and recording to [...] was engagement in protected activity.  There was violation of the policy which prohibits discrimination which is in place at the [...] and discrimination is unlawful.  The information was forwarded to [...] on May 1, 2019.
[brief] The tabulation for Unit No. 4 begins with a “balance forward” figure of more than $97,000.00 and the figure for Unit No. 1 exceeds $82,000.00.  Because [...] did not present a calculation of charges incurred prior to December 1, 2019 the only insight into prior years is set forth in the association liens (Da33 & Da34, 2017 Liens).  [...] acknowledges, by way of footnotes in the Complaint, that its $201,837.63 default judgment includes the aforementioned legal fees (Da12-Da13, Pl’s. Complaint, fn’s. 1-2).  But that disclosure is omitted entirely from the Certification of [...] submitted in support of its application to enter a judgment by default (Da27-Da29, Sanford Cert., ¶¶5-11).  Instead, [...] seeks an additional twenty percent (20%) enhancement of the total sum—which already includes legal fees—pursuant to By-Laws (Da29, Sanford Cert., ¶13).  The inclusion of the above-discussed fee award is both unjust and contrary to the statement of reasons set forth on the bottom of the Court’s decision.
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[brief] Our courts have established a “general preference to try co-defendants jointly. ”  *State v. Robinson*, 253 N.J.Super. 346, 364 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 6 (1992).  Joint trials are preferred when “much of the same evidence is needed to prosecute each defendant. ”  *State v. Brown*, 118 N.J. 595, 605 (1990).  Nevertheless, [w]hen considering a motion to sever, a court must balance the potential prejudice to a defendant against the interest in judicial economy.
[brief] A By-road is a private road over which the public has a right of access.  By-roads were recently discussed and defined within Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. 1,693 Acres of Land in the Twp. of Mahwah, No. 2:12-cv-7921 (WJM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57995, at *36 (D.N.J. May 4, 2015)  That court specifically held that By-Roads are private roads which the public may access but over which the public has no responsibility of maintenance.  Finally, the Court rejects the State's argument that [...] cannot be a by-road simply because no public entity has taken responsibility for its maintenance.  While the public has a right of passage and re-passage over a by-road, such a road does not impose upon the public a duty of maintenance.  Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. 1,693 Acres of Land in the Twp. of Mahwah, No. 2:12-cv-7921 (WJM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57995, at *36 (D.N.J. May 4, 2015)  The roadway at issue in this case is clearly a by-road.  It is road over which the public has a right of access without an obligation of maintenance.  It is not a public street to be owned and maintained by the Borough.  POINT VIII
[brief] The court should have either taken a partial verdict or asked the jury whether further deliberations would be useful.  See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Judge’s Inquiry When Jury Reports Inability to Reach Verdict” (approved June 2013).  Just telling the jury to keep deliberating implied that a partial verdict would not be accepted and the jury would not be dismissed until reaching “a full verdict on all the questions. ”  (21T:18-17 to 20)  The court’s response to the jury’s report of a definite deadlock created an impermissible risk that the jurors felt coerced into reaching a verdict on counts over which they were intractably split.  Figueroa, 190 N.J. at 241.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.  POINT VI: THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED ERRORS DENIED MAZZARISI A FAIR TRIAL.
[brief] The requirement of irreparable harm has been defined as follows:  An injury is irreparable when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of the damages.  Inadequacy of damages as a compensation may be due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured.  [Scherman v. Stern, 93 N.J. Eq. 626, 631 (E. & A. 1922). ]  Here, [...] was simply asked to comply with his agreed-to contractual obligations, which might require him to commute a little further or in a different direction.  The fact that he found those obligations to be inconvenient after the fact does not constitute irreparable harm.  He was free to find a position outside of the restrictive radius, as both he and his former colleagues did, without uprooting his children or his mother-in-law.  Moreover, [...] was offered the opportunity to negotiate a resolution in light of [...]’s location and the circumstance of his departure, but he rejected that.  [...]’s refusal to compensate [...] for his breach of the Employment Agreement does not constitute irreparable harm; rather, it is classic money damages (just not for him).  Similarly, the fact that [...] withdrew its offer of employment did not create irreparable harm.  The recission of that offer did not give rise to a claim against [...], but regardless the terms of the [...] offer were fully quantifiable in terms of money damages.  Thus, [...] has not and will not experience any irreparable harm regardless of whether the Restrictive Covenant is enforced.  For all of these reasons, the Chancery Court found that [...] had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.
[directive] During the selection process, written tests, psychological tests, background investigations and individual interviews should be completed by each candidate in an attempt to identify those who would be best suited for law enforcement employment.  Background investigations must include a review of the prior internal affairs files of any candidate.  3.1.2  New Jersey law enforcement agencies are required by this policy to disclose the entire internal affairs file of a candidate to prospective law enforcement employers.  See Section 9 (“Internal Affairs Records”).  Candidates with out-of-state law enforcement experience must sign waivers of confidentiality regarding their internal affairs files so that they may be reviewed by the prospective employer, where legally permissible.  These procedures may also be used for promotional testing, and assignment to especially sensitive responsibilities or those that pose the greatest opportunities for abuse or wrongdoing.
[brief] Because the parties identified [...] as one of the owner’s of [...], and thus is a key player in this action, the Court found that [...]’s iPhone is relevant and encompassed by the parties agreed upon protocol as a discoverable computer device.  As such, [...]’s request to inspect the phone is granted.  The inspection is to take place at the Deer Park site.  The date of this examination will be confirmed in the Court’s Discovery Conference Order, which will be issued at a later date.