ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” a sound analysis based on the New Jersey Alimony Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), factors, the trial court concluded that the alimony waiver was fair and equitable:  The court finds the [[...]’s] primary arguments in support of her requested relief concerning the equitable distribution allocation and the waiver of alimony by way of the terms in the PSA were not so disproportionate to render the PSA substantively unconscionable.  (Id. at 49-50).  The trial court reasoned “age is an extremely weighty factor. ” (Id. at 49).  There is a 26-year age disparity between the parties and the fact [...] was 69 years old when the parties divorced undermines any alimony claim by [...] who was 43 years old.
[brief] First, In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2018) which upheld the Division’s regulation that precludes an individual from receiving disability retirement if they separated from service due to non-disability reasons.  Id. at 394.  Second, Cardinale v. Board of Trustees, 458 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 2019), which affirmed the [...]’ refusal to process the plaintiff former police officer’s ordinary disability benefits application for an alleged PTSD-addiction disability because he voluntarily and irrevocably resigned from his position under a settlement agreement to resolve disciplinary, which “automatically render[ed] the individual ineligible for ordinary disability benefits. ”  Cardinale, supra, 458 N.J. Super. at 263, 267 (emphasis added).  In the short time since Cardinale, supra, and In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, supra, the Appellate Division has repeatedly reaffirmed both cases and their underlying rationale: “although a person eligible for benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of a pension statute, ‘eligibility itself is not to be liberally permitted. ’”  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, supra, 454 N.J. Super. at 399 (quoting Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007)); see also Cardinale, supra, 458 N.J. Super. at 272 (quoting Smith, supra, 390 N.J. Super. at 213).
[brief] In [...], the plaintiff motor vehicle lessees asked the court to amend a written contract by filing a claim under common law fraud and the CFA.  The contract provided the lessees would be given $6,000 trade-in credit as a reduction to the lease cost of a vehicle while the lessees sought the $6,000 in cash as they alleged they were orally promised.  Id. at 576.  The [...] court stated the parol evidence rule barred “plaintiffs from presenting such evidence to vary the terms of the lease agreement” for the purposes of establishing common-law fraud.  Id.  The [...] court tried to avoid the absurd result of the plaintiff receiving both $6,000 in trade-in credit and $6,000 in cash for a vehicle the parties acknowledged was worth $6,000, not $12,000.  “Certainly, simple logic, sound business principles and fundamental fairness militates against a party receiving both a $6,000 cash payment and a $6,000 capitalized cost reduction in the cost of a lease for the single $6,000 trade-in allowance. ”  Id.  After holding the parol evidence rule applied and prohibited evidence of alleged oral representations designed to alter the terms of the contract under plaintiffs’ several fraud-based claims, the Court in [...] stated simply, “[T]his same reasoning also applies to the claimed violations of the Consumer Fraud Act. ”  Id.  The Court was merely stating the obvious:  Because the parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of law, the rule—and its exceptions—apply regardless of the type of claims alleged.  Because Plaintiffs seek to void contracts they were fraudulently induced into, the parol evidence fraud exception applies under both the CFA and the RETA.
[brief] A local government has a basic responsibility to enact ordinances and regulations that will further the interests of its citizens.  Inherent in that responsibility is the duty to follow established procedures for passing ordinances in a transparent manner so the public is not 'in the dark.'  None of this occurred in this case.  The [...] approved an ordinance enacting a Redevelopment Plan that was shown to be completely inconsistent with the township's master plan.  Upon realization of the inconsistency, the Committee chose to amend the redevelopment plan – based solely off its counsel's statements and without any evidence in the record.  To make matters worse, in the second ordinance, purporting to amend the redevelopment plan, the Committee doubled down on the plan's consistency with the township's master plan.  No finding of inconsistency was ever made by the Committee or its members.  In fact, no findings at all were made by the Committee in the second ordinance in the ordinance's text or the meeting minutes.  The Committee was statutorily required to make these findings on the record.  The Committee's procedural failures contravene the public policy of the land use principles underpinning the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law.  For the reasons set forth in detail below, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court remand and reverse the trial court and find that the adoption of [...] was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence in the record.
[brief] (1T 17-24 to 18-5)  During the search, [...] discovered a handgun in the center console of the car.  (1T 18-19 to 19-2, 39-23 to 40-14)  [...] did not use gloves when handling the weapon.  (1T 41-14 to 42-2)  The officers also recovered a “gas mask” on the floor behind the driver’s seat.  (1T 19-4 to 11)  [...] testified that, based on his training and experience, the gas mask had been modified so that it could be used to ingest marijuana.  (1T 19-5 to 20-24)  No marijuana was recovered during the search; however, [...] testified that he observed “marijuana residue” in the pieces of the gas mask that had been modified.  (1T 21-2 to 5, 57-8 to 13)  At the suppression hearing, [...] smelled the gas mask, which had been hermetically sealed since the day of the stop.  (1T 57-18 to 68-9)  [...] testified that the mask smelled like marijuana, and when asked to rate the odor of marijuana on a scale from one to ten, one being weak and ten being strong, [...] testified, “it’s a strong odor of marijuana.  It’s an 8 or a 9. ”  (1T 66-23 to 68-23)  The gas mask was resealed inside the bag.  (1T 68-9 to 12)  The trial court denied [...]’s suppression motion.
[brief] Deference is given to those findings because of the trial court’s “opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”  Id. 192 N.J. at 244.  Moreover, “[a]n appellate court should not disturb the trial court’s findings merely because ‘it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal’ or because ‘the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side’ in a close case. ”  Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162).  “The governing principle, then, is that ‘[a] trial court’s findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’”  State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009).  (alteration in original) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).  A trial court’s legal conclusions, however, “and the consequences that flow from established facts,” are reviewed de novo.  State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).  Here, the trial court’s factual findings were amply supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions similarly were supported by precedent.  As such, neither should be disturbed on appeal.
[brief] *J.L.G.*, 234 N.J. at 281.  “Proving general acceptance ‘entails the strict application of the scientific method, which requires an extraordinarily high level of proof based on prolonged, controlled, consistent, and validated experience. ’”  *State v. Harvey*, 151 N.J. 117, 171, (1997) (quoting *Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp.*, 125 N.J. 421, 436 (1991)).  The reliability of a field of research may be established by the proponent of the evidence in three ways: (1) “the testimony of knowledgeable experts”; (2) “authoritative scientific literature can be used to establish professional acceptance”; or (3) “persuasive judicial decisions that acknowledge such general acceptance of expert testimony can be followed. ”  *State v. Torres*, 183 N.J. 554, 568 (2005) (emphasis added).  It is ‘unusual for an appellate court to rely exclusively on judicial notice. ””  State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. 530, 539 (App. Div. 2000)
[brief] First, Defendants sought DEP approval and were denied.  Then, upon adopting the new version of the Noise Ordinance, Defendants sought to justify it under Title 26, which Plaintiffs refuted.  Finally, Defendants landed on the general grants of authority under the Home Rule Act.  The trial court determined that Defendants’ attempted regulation of noise constituted a noise nuisance ordinance which did not comply with the “comprehensive statutory and administrative framework to furnish public health services.
[brief] When reviewing the pleading in the context of the Respondents’ motion to dismiss, all inferences must generously be drawn in favor of the Appellant, which can only lead to one result: the factual allegations in the Complaint provided Respondents with more than sufficient notice of the claims brought against them and, in fact, set forth more than mere suggestions of causes of action, bases for relief and theories of liability against them, as required under New Jersey law.  For this reason, Appellant is entitled to have the claims heard and the trial court should have permitted the case to proceed.  Further, refusal to permit amendment of the complaint to name the proper Plaintiff, [...], is clear error in light of the fact that [...] is a distinct legal entity that should not be disregarded and liability for the damages sustained by the Property will simply continue to pass with the land to each successor owner until the substantive claims are resolved.  **Conclusion**
[brief] (7T145-15 to 25).  He began by pulling surveillance video from the area, which yielded video from a church across the street from [...].  (7T147-10 to 14).  He also obtained Real Time Tactical Operations and Intelligence Center ([...]) footage from 3rd and Sycamore Streets, a few blocks away from [...].  (7T161-17 to 20).  The church surveillance captured [...]’s truck outside his business front door and then two individuals entering his business front door, one wearing green and another in a blue shirt.\(^3\) (Da12; S-19 in evidence).  After a few minutes go by, the same two individuals are seen running out of [...]’s business.  (Da12).  A few minutes later, two individuals matching those in the church surveillance are seen walking away on [...] video, a few blocks away from [...] and in the same direction the individuals ran off.  (Da12-13, S-19 and S-23 in evidence).  They had removed their green and blue colored tops and had a wad of cash in hand.  (Da13).  \(^2\)
[brief] As a preliminary matter, the Court confirmed that notice was proper under the Municipal Land Use Law, as any layman would be aware of the location of the municipal offices of the Planning Board, that the public could call or appear at the listed address and be directed to the new address.  (Pa54-55).  Indeed, even without the lettering posted on the Police Department’s exterior door, the published notice itself sufficiently identified for the public the location as the municipal offices, which is identifiable by public record.  The Court further found that as a matter of law the notice fairly appraised the public of the nature and character of the proposed application pursuant to the Perlmart decision.  (Pa55-58)  As to the substance of the application, the trial court found that the area in question is unique in that it is near the boardwalk which is elevated and where adjacent structures to the boardwalk are elevated.  (Pa69).  The trial court also found that the proposed height will not be a detriment to the surrounding properties.  (Pa69-70).  The trial court also found sufficient evidence before the board for it to conclude the area could accommodate the increased density.  (Pa70).  The trial court also found that the Board properly determined the variances could be granted without a substantial detriment to the public good and would not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  The trial court noted the area is zoned for multifamily residential and business, and therefore the proposed development was consistent with the area's character, and there was sufficient evidence the proposed development would not negatively impact the master plan.  (Pa70-71).  The record reflects that the applicant met its burden in providing necessary proofs and criteria to the Board’s satisfaction in granting the variance relief at issue, and that the Board’s action in granting this application was consistent with the Municipal Land Use Law and the development ordinance of the [...].
[brief] As [...] explains, there is a separate charge for a CPL, and it must be issued in advance of the closing.  A CPL provides the purchaser with, among other things, assurances regarding the handling of funds for a closing so long as the purchaser submits written closing instructions to the settlement agent directing the disbursement of its funds.  Fineberg, §27.04B.  The CPL terminates by its terms after 180 days.  Fineberg, §27-13.  Finally, the CPL expressly states the settlement agent is not the agent of the title insurance company for purposes of providing settlement services.  Fineberg, §27-14.  There is no dispute plaintiff did not submit written closing instructions to [...] in advance of the closing.  In fact, [...] conducted the closing himself, by having [...] sign all of the transaction documents outside [...]’ presence.  Without a CPL, [...] has no responsibility to plaintiff for the conduct of the closing.
[brief] As in Lazo, [...]’s opinion was inadmissible because it was “not based on prior knowledge. ”  209 N.J. at 24.  [...]’s improper opinion testimony was particularly harmful because [...]’s credibility was the critical question for the jury to decide.  The central piece of evidence the State claimed corroborated [...]’s testimony were Defendant’s tattoos—specifically the State’s assertion that Defendant did not get the teardrop tattoo until after [...]’s murder.  S-113 was the only evidence the State introduced that it claimed showed Defendant (a) before the homicide and (b) without the teardrop tattoo.  [...] was the only witness who testified that the person in S-113 was Defendant.  Thus, [...]’s testimony likely influenced the jury’s determination as to whether S-113 depicted Defendant.  This error was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, deprived Defendant of his rights to due process and a fair trial and requires reversal of his convictions.
[brief] Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (elements § 504 context); Equal Rights Ctr. v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 (D.D.C. 2010).  These elements are throughout the complaint but here is a sampling [NOTE: this list is for the Original SAC at Pa9-81 but the revised SAC at Pa259-312, per [...]’s comments, are very similar]:  Averments regarding disability: Pa40, ¶182  Exclusion from Program: (usually “denied access”): Pa41-42, ¶184 through ¶189 (not same access to programs of entities, no access prosecutor/PTI pre-indictment)  Because of Disability (or Retaliation): Pa40, ¶182 (Cerebral Palsy & Neurofibromatosis Type 1—forgot to mention Asperger’s).  As to Causation: passim but especially Pa20, ¶74: “throwing the book at the retard” comment – Absecon only); Pa130-133 (Veto Brief): State’s own PTI policy of “mental illness” exclusion in the court record which is parroted by the judge at Pa29, ¶131).
[brief] Notably, Circuit Judge [...] dissented from the Actavis court’s denial of mandamus relief and would have held that the district court clearly erred, observing:  [N]othing in the civil rules permits a court to compel production of non-responsive and irrelevant documents at any time, much less before the producing party has had an opportunity to screen those documents….  A court does not spontaneously gain authority to compel production of non-responsive, irrelevant documents simply by establishing a period of time afterwards for the review and potential return of the documents produced.  Actavis at *8, n.1.  As [...] explained, “the sequence of events in discovery is important, and the rules of civil procedure allow for a review for responsiveness and relevance before production.
[brief] (P563a; P108a).  [...] testified that Decedent expressed her dislike for [...].  9T:70:23 to 71:2.  Respondent obviously took advantage of Decedent’s distress over the newspaper publication of [...]’s arrest on October 3, 2014 as a means to unduly influence Decedent to make a Will on October 16, 2014.  The facts suggest that Respondent was named the sole beneficiary in Decedent’s will to get Respondent to bar [...] from her home.  (9T:70:23 to 71:72:3).  [...] was instructed by Decedent to alert her if [...] came to the home.  (9T 73:7-11).  Respondent’s behavior towards Decedent strongly suggested that Decedent, in her testamentary dispositions, submitted to Respondent’s domination and influence rather than following the dictates of her own mind.
[brief] 4  Ferreira v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC, et al., 2:17-cv-6278- JLL-JAD (D.N.J.) ......................................................  4  Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002) .................................................................  10  Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div 2024) ...........................................22, 23, 24 Garza v. Paone, 44 N.J. Super. 553 (1957) .............................................................13, 15
[brief] Plaintiff instead directed the police response on July 5, 2016 and sought to enforce the law.  Defendants, specifically the individual members of the Township Committee, in bowing to political and media pressure and without any legal authority to do so, in August 2017 unjustifiably suspended Plaintiff from his duties as well as falsely and publicly labeled him as a racist cop who engaged in or permitted acts of excessive force to be committed against a supposed innocent group of minority youths.  The facts in the record, including Defendants’ own admissions in deposition testimony, establish that the opposite actually occurred.  Specifically, Defendants’ testimony establishes that on the night of July 5, 2016: [a] the crowd, who were engaging in physical altercations, failed to disperse and became unruly, highly irate and combative with police officers in failing to follow their directives which were designed to re-establish order; & [b] multiple members of the crowd spit on, shouted profanities at, and assaulted multiple police officers on scene.  Further, even Defendant [...], in his deposition testimony, agreed that police intervention was required on July 5, 2016 and the police response was appropriate, including the “appropriate” use of OC spray as a proper exercise of “non-lethal force”.  This reality is in direct conflict with Defendants’ subsequent public grandstanding in August 2017 whereby [...], [...], [...], and their fellow Committee members suspended and sought to terminate Plaintiff while fraudulently branding him as a racist by way of overt allegations of racial profiling and bias.
[brief] A.  [...]’s opinions that [...] did not perform its duty to inform [...] that [...] was unenrolled from the CCIP, or to ensure that [...] notify [...] that the [...] general liability (GL) policy had been canceled, are irrelevant.  In his report, [...] set forth six different opinions against [...].  Pa822-Pa824.  The first two are recitals of New Jersey law, which he contends support his belief that [...] was [...]’s insurance broker, and owed duties to [...].  Pa822.  [...] disputes those first two opinions, but they do not need to be addressed for purposes of this appeal.  The remaining four opinions outline the manner in which he believes the duties were breached.  Three of those remaining four opinions are, essentially, different ways of stating that [...] did not ensure that [...] knew it had been unenrolled from the CCIP.  First, the record is replete with evidence that [...] did in fact know it had been unenrolled from the CCIP, and took action to protect itself by securing its own insurance instead.  Pa2745-Pa2746.  [...] ignores this evidence in his report, as do [...] and [...] in their Brief.  Second, and more importantly, even if this Court believes that [...] did not know it had been unenrolled by the CCIP, [...] suffered absolutely no harm from it.  This is not a situation where [...] detrimentally relied upon representations by [...] that it was enrolled, and was left otherwise uninsured with respect to the Project Site and the Hood lawsuit because [...] did not inform [...] it had been unenrolled from the CCIP.  If that were the situation here, then [...] would have an argument it was damaged by [...]’s actions.  But that isn’t what happened here.  [...] was not covered by the CCIP for the Hood lawsuit, but it was covered by its own insurers, [...] and [...].
[brief] ”  Ibid.  That understanding runs directly afoul of the Knight court’s express warning not to invest the court’s “preeminent authority” over the judicial branch as foreclosing action by other branches.  Ibid.  Knight further explained that its exclusive power over the judicial branch implies that it “has the authority . . . to permit or accommodate the lawful and reasonable exercise of the powers of other branches of government even as that might impinge upon the Court’s constitutional concerns in the judicial area. ”  Id. at 390-91.  And those other branches’ exercise of power, under Knight, is subject to review under the two-part test that Appellants are trying to displace.  Id. at 391.  Therefore, contrary to the Appellants’ position, there is no threshold requirement before applying the Knight two-prong test.
[brief] ”  (Da837)  [...] denied that request:  At the outset, the pleadings before the Court addressed whether [...] enjoys easements over the [...] and [...] properties.  However, the nature of plaintiff’s utilization of each easement -- if found to exist -- is not before the Court.  [...]’s suggestion that this now be addressed because the Court granted Summary Judgment against his client is not appropriate.  This case is one and a half years old and will not be expanded because the [...]s are fearful of what actions, if any, plaintiff may undertake in connection with the easement.  (Da849-Da850)  Instead, even though [...]’s claim against the [...]s remained unresolved, she entered an order converting the summary judgment against [...] to a final judgment immediately appealable as of right.  (Da845)  Even if [...]’s finding of an express easement were correct, all of the considerations underlying the entire controversy doctrine warrant consideration, in the same action, of what specific uses and activities [...] may engage in, especially given the history of occasional, unintrusive use of the driveway.  (Da789-Da791)  With the substantial record already amassed in this case, no useful purpose would be served by committing the parties to litigating these issues from scratch in a new action.
[brief] One the things that seems to have been lost on the Trial Court is the simple fact that none of the experts in this case, Plaintiffs’ or Defendants’, were able to inspect the condition after the accident because shortly after the accident emergency paving was performed in order to correct the settlement in the pavement and to bring it to proper grade.  (Pa1396, Pa1397).  The fact is, the only measurements and the only photos of the settlement came from the [...] engineers that performed the April 22, 2015 Biennial Bridge Inspection and recommended that it be fixed.