ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The investigation and a review of all information failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  More specifically,… a. (witness could not be located)  b. (document could not be located)  c. (physical or forensic evidence could not be located)  d. (witness did not support your complaint)  e. (physical or forensic evidence did not support your complaint)  f. (the investigation failed to yield enough evidence to support your complaint)  g. (while some evidence supported your complaint there was not enough evidence to support your complaint)  If you have additional information which you believe should be considered, please contact the Internal Affairs Unit at [telephone number].
[brief] Undue influence warrants avoidance when "by virtue of the relation between [the parties, the party seeking to avoid enforcement was] justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner inconsistent with his [or her] welfare."  *Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177(1) (1981).*  The relationship between physician and patient is one that the comment indicates is within the purview of Section 177.  *Id.* at cmt. a to § 177.  Arbitration agreements, like other contracts, may be invalidated as unconscionable.  *Rent-A-Center, W. Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (quoting *Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto*, 517 U.S. 681, 687, (1996)).  The Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) purpose is "to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."  *Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.*, 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12, (1967).  While the FAA favors arbitration, a court may decide arbitrability issues, including whether arbitration is unenforceable because of unconscionability.
[brief] Only the first question has been definitively answered thus far.  With the Acting Commissioner’s April 1, 2024, final agency decision (Final Decision) aligning with the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) initial decision and with the decision by a unanimous panel of this court the relevant decision makers agree that [...] are being denied T&E.  That consensus elevates [...] to a special constitutional status, shared only with [...].  In Abbott, the New Jersey Supreme Court accorded the students special constitutional protection, even shifting to the State the burden of proving the constitutionality of an underfunded SFRA.  This court should consider doing the same for Lakewood students.
[brief] Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).  The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).  The Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court can overturn an administrative agency's determinations or findings if there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
[brief] 42.  The Appellate Division first interpreted the "necessary for the service, convenience of welfare of the public" standard (as set forth in a predecessor statute) in *In re Hackensack Water Co.*, 41 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1956).  In *Hackensack Water*, the Appellate Division concluded that the legislative intent was to empower the BPU to approve projects that are in the public interest, even when those projects conflict with local interests as "expressed through prohibiting provisions of a municipal zoning ordinance."
[brief] **b)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory is Contrary to Congressional Intent Concerning Third Party Communications**  “The paramount goal of all statutory interpretation is to carry out the Legislature’s intent. ”  *Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. 463, 480 (2013) (citation omitted).  *See also Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. at 582–83 (“When interpreting a statute, our main objective is to further the Legislature's intent. ” [citation and quotation omitted]); *Young v. Schering Corp.*, 141 N.J. 16, 25 (1995) (the “overriding goal has consistently been to determine the Legislature’s intent. ”).  Courts must therefore “construe the statute sensibly and consistent with the objectives that the Legislature sought to achieve. ”  *Mynster*, at 480 (citation omitted).  The Senate Report on the FDCPA lays out the type of conduct Congress was attempting to curtail through § 1692c(b), namely: “*disclosing a consumer’s personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer.*”  S. Rep. No. 95–382, at 2 (1977) (emphasis added).  The Report goes on to state: “[The FDCPA] prohibits disclosing the consumer’s personal affairs to third persons.  Other than to obtain location information a debt collector may not contact *third persons such as a consumer’s friends, neighbors, relatives, or employer*.  Such contacts are not legitimate collection practices and result in serious invasions of privacy, as well as loss of jobs. ”  *Id.* at 4 (emphasis added).  Thus, Appellant’s letter vendor theory of liability, far from comporting with FDCPA legislative history, is at odds with clear Congressional intent to prevent disclosures only to friends, neighbors, relatives, or employers, which may cause reputational or --- 2
[brief] Said another way, it is the citizen’s request that triggers any obligations under OPRA.  To expect or require custodians or public agencies to discharge those obligations without proper notice, i.e., the request itself, would breach fundamental notions of fairness and due process, not to mention deviating from the language of the statute itself.  Not only must requests be made, but they must also be legally valid.  In Bent v. Township of Stafford Police Department, this Court declared that “a party requesting access to a public record under OPRA must specifically describe the document sought.
[brief] Doing so would address the two concerns identified by this Court as noted in the preceding paragraph.  The decision below is problematic for other reasons.  On remand, the trial court properly determined that the two documents in question were criminal investigatory records under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 and, yet, quixotically, that they contained “disclosable” information under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b).  But the former relates to completed investigations while the latter concerns active investigations in progress.  Johnson & Connell, Open Public Records & Meetings § 8.1 (2024); see Libertarians for Transparent Government v. Cumberland Co., 250 N.J. 46, 58 (2022) (noting that N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) concerns information about ongoing criminal investigations).  It does not appear that the decision below reconciles these two inconsistencies.  See Da86, Da115.  Finally, OPRA permits the filing of a complaint in the Superior Court or with the Government Records Council only when the “[a] person [] is denied access to a government record. ”  N.J.SA. 47:1A-6 (emphasis added).  Thus, the statute, by its terms, does not confer this type of private right of action, one where attorney’s fees may be recovered by a prevailing requestor, to a person who is denied information under N. J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b).  That is not to say that a requestor would lack the ability bring a challenge in a court of law.  The point is that OPRA’s fee-shifting and other incentives are only available to remedy the improper denial of access to records.  Once the court on remand determined that the two criminal investigatory records were indeed exempt, at minimum, those remedies should no longer have been available or awarded on the basis of prevailing party status.
[brief] The standard of review for denial of reconsideration is whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Triffin v. Johnston, 359 N.J. Super.  543, 550 (App. Div. 2003).  “Reconsideration itself is ‘a matter within the sound discretion of the [c]ourt, to be exercised in the interest of justice[.]’”  Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  Reconsideration “should be utilized only for those cases that fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ”  Ibid.  The standard of review on a motion for reconsideration is more deferential and this Court will not disturb a judge’s denial of a motion for reconsideration absent a clear abuse of discretion.  *Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment*, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).  **Motion for Summary Judgment:**
[directive] or "department" means a law enforcement "Law enforcement agency," "agency," £ of of the State of New Jersey.  agency operating under the authority the laws officer" "officer" sworn officer employed by a law g.  "Law enforcement or means a agency. enforcement an elementary or secondary school.  h.  "School" means children under adult supervision for "Youth facility" means a facility where assemble such centers, youth camps, etc. educational or recreational purposes, as day-care DEPARTMENT
[brief] ”  See, Benedict, supra at 379, quoting, Faps, supra at 46 [internal quotations omitted] [ internal citations omitted].  However, in addition to the acquisition of the narrow strip of land, the State “planned to construct a grassy berm along the front of defendant’s property and three access driveways, thereby modifying access to defendant’s property . . . [t]he combined effect of the taking and the change in access was to reduce the distance available to park cars in front of the building such that front parking was no longer feasible.
[brief] The Outside Counsel Guidelines promulgated by the Division of Law define “positional conflicts” as conflicts arising from “counsel’s advocacy of positions conflicting with important State interests. ” (Pa129-30).  The Guidelines note that outside counsel “should generally avoid advocating a position that would limit the authority of the State client, would expand the scope of potential liability of the State client, or would require the State client to divulge information that the State client generally regards as confidential or privileged. ” (Pa129).  As such, “[o]utside counsel have a continuing obligation to ascertain whether positions they intend to assert on behalf of other clients are inconsistent with the interests of the State .  . . .”  Ibid.  Further, the Guidelines provide that “[a]fter consultation with outside counsel, the Division shall determine, in its sole discretion, whether an impermissible positional conflict exists, or whether other circumstances exist that would undermine the public confidence in the fair and proper operation of State government. ” (Pa129-30).  As detailed above, Defendants-Respondents submitted three certifications from their clients confirming that, following the indictment of [...] in his personal capacity, Defendants-Respondents have not requested [...] withdraw as their counsel in this consolidated matter.
[brief] | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Baker v. National State Bank,** | 25 | | 353 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div.  2022) | | | **Bart v. City of Paterson Housing Authority,** | 16,23| | 403 N.J. Super. 609 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Berg v. Reaction Motors Division,** | 23 | | 37 N.J. 396 (1962) | | | **Board of Education of Middletown v. Middletown Township Education Ass’n,** | 13 | | 352 N.J. Super. 501 (Ch. Div. 2001) | | | **Courier News v. Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office,** | 20 | | 358 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div. 2003) | | | **Gensollen v. Pareja,** | 19 | | 416 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.,** | 19 | | 160 N.J. 480 (1999) | | | **HD Supply Waterworks Grp., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation,** | 20 | | 29 N.J. Tax 573 (2017) | | | **Hickman v. Taylor,** | 19 | | 329 U.S. 495 (1947) | | | **In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97,** | 12 | | 221 N.J. 1 (2015) | | | **In re Pelvic Mesh/Gynecare Litig.,** | 19 | | 426 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2012) | | | **Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi,** | 25 | | 303 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 1997) | | Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009).........................................................24 MAG Entm’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005)..................................20 Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008).............................................................24 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State, Off. of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2017)...............................13,16  Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001)...........................................................24  Paff v. N.J. Dept. of Labor, 392 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 2007)...............................17  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cnty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011)..........................................................19  Ridley v. Dennison, 298 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div. 1997)...............................13  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531 (2019)..........................................................19  Serrano v. Underground Utils. Corp., 407 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2009)...............................20 State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582 (2016)..........................................................19 State in Int. of A.B., 219 N.J. 542 (2014)..........................................................19  Teeters v. Division of Youth and Family Services, 378 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006)...............................24 | STATUTES | PAGE | |----------|------| | N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-46 | 17 | | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 | 20,24 | | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 | 16 | | RULES | PAGE | |-------|------| | Rule 1:10-2 | 16 | | Rule 1:10-3 | 12 | | Rule 4:10-3 | 19,20 | | Rule 4:42-11(a) | 25 | | Rule 4:48-2(b) | 18 | | Rule 4:67-2(a) | 20 | | Rule 4:101-2 | 17 |
[brief] 2.  THE SUPERIOR COURT’S DECISION FINDING MR. PFEISTER LIABLE ON AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE RECORD AT THE MUNICIPAL COURT WAS A VIOLATION OF R. 3:23-8(a)(2) (1T37-1 to 5)  R. 3:23-8(a) permits the Law Division to supplement the municipal court’s record under two circumstances, 1.  If the record at the municipal court is partially or wholly unintelligible or 2. if the municipal court made an error of law based on the record established at the municipal court.  In this case, the record before the municipal court was not unintelligible.  It was anything but unintelligible.  The record below established the following, a. the municipal court denying [...]’s oral motion for dismissal of the citation, b. the municipal court making a factual finding that a pumphouse is an occupied building under the relevant statute (the municipal court used the phrase “dwelling”), c. the municipal court suggesting a conditional guilty plea with the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss, d. [...] accepting the conditional guilty plea, and e. the imposition of the fine and court costs.  2T13-2T19.  In addition, the municipal court did not make an error of law.  It had to decide a factual issue, i.e. whether a pumphouse is an occupied building within the scope of the definition provided by N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3).  Even if that is a legal issue, the Law Division-Superior Court expressed no opinion on that issue because that issue was never decided by the Superior Court.  Therefore, any attempt by the Superior Court to supplement the record of the municipal court was a clear violation of the relevant court rule.
[brief] In its motions to dismiss before the federal district court and the first trial court, the State argued in relevant part that it was entitled to common-law sovereign immunity from [...]’s constitutional claims as it was not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the NJCRA, thereby making the State not amenable to suit under either civil rights statute.  (Pa58), (1T4:23-5:22).  Neither the federal district court nor the first trial court specifically addressed this affirmative defense in their orders or written opinions.  (Pa47-Pa64), (1T 3:1-85:24).  However, because “the question of the [State’s] sovereign immunity clearly and plainly goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court,” see Jacobson v. United States, 422 N.J. Super. 561, 567 (App. Div. 2011), this court should resolve that outstanding question.  Cf. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (“[O]ur appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available ‘unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ’”) (internal citation omitted).  The NJCRA permits a person whose substantive rights have been violated to bring a statutory cause of action against “a person acting under color of law. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2.  The law is settled that the statutory reference to a “person acting under color of law” does not include the State of New Jersey which is not a “person” within the meaning of the NJCRA.  See Brown v. State, 442 N.J. Super. 406, 426 (App. Div. 2015), rev'd on other grounds, 230 N.J. 84 (2017).  Persuasive federal authority has so similarly held.  See Didiano v. Balicki, 488 F. App'x 634, 638 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding State not a “person” within the statutory meaning of the NJCRA).  Moreover, this court has separately held that the State remains entitled to sovereign immunity from claims arising under the NJCRA.  See Brown, 442 N.J. Super. at 426 (“Given that the Legislature did not choose to include an express waiver of sovereign immunity in the Civil Rights Act and that the State enjoys immunity under the analogous § 1983, we conclude that the State is immune from a suit for damages under the Civil Rights Act. ”).  In the present action, Brown is controlling.  See Brown, 442 N.J. Super. at 426 (“[T]he State is immune from a suit for damages under the Civil Rights Act. ”).  For these reasons, this court can also affirm [...]’s dismissal of [...]’s state constitutional claims against the State in counts I & X, but on the alternative grounds that the State is not a “person” under the NJCRA and is also entitled to sovereign immunity.  See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.M., 444 N.J. Super. 325, 334 (App. Div. 2016) (“We may affirm the final judgment of the trial court on grounds other than those upon which the trial court relied. ”) (cleaned up).
[brief] Indeed, the FAA does not distinguish between commercial contracts that may or may not fall within state consumer protection laws.  Nor does the FAA allow for states to only enforce contracts that are believed to be written for the “average consumer. ”  Instead, the FAA mandates that ordinary legal doctrines governing the formation of a contract and its interpretation be applied.  What the lower court has done, like so many courts before it, is to assume that *Atalese*’s express waiver requirement is in fact a rule of “general applicability,” such as duress or unconscionability.  Yet, *Atalese* covertly borrowed concepts from distinguishable cases to advance a policy-focused agenda which has resulted in the regular and frequent invalidation of freely-entered arbitration agreements, based on the speculative presumption that every person acting, with or without compulsion, who signs an unambiguous agreement does not understand what the phrase “binding arbitration” means.  The universe of trial court cases demonstrates continued grappling with the application of Atalese and has led to a plethora of inconsistent decisions.
[brief] Instead, the Consent Order serves a specific purpose: it establishes a mechanism to toll the statutes of limitation and repose during the pendency the [...].  In this regard, the Consent Order clearly provides, that any claim filed after the sixty (60) day period would not benefit from the agreed-upon tolling, and would be subject to defenses based upon the statutes of limitations and repose.  (Pa150 - Pa152).  Indisputably, nothing in the Consent Order states that any claims asserted after the sixty (60) day period would automatically be subject to dismissal.  Indeed, as set forth above, the concept of any dismissal “with prejudice” is absent from the Consent Order.  Importantly, despite [...]’s argument to the contrary – that the parties “contractually agreed to voluntarily relinquish their known legal rights[,]”– no facts support [...]’s conclusion, and he fails to cite to any evidence in the record to support that claim.  As was the case when [...] instituted litigation and offered perjured testimony based upon a document he knowingly forged, here, [...] is once again attempting to deceive the Court and pervert the judicial process.  Without question, the plain language of the Consent Order is abundantly clear, that it is devoid of any “waiver of legal rights. ”  Accordingly, the doctrine of waiver in inapplicable to the instant facts, and should not serve as a basis to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.
[brief] 3  Minzesheimer v. Doolittle, 60 N.J. Eq. 394, 397, 45 A. 611 (E. & A. 1899)- 46 Rooth v. Bd. of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 472 N.J. Super. 357  ----------------------------------------------- 23, 24, 31, 32 Sachau v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5-6 --------------------------------------------- 2, 22 Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201, 128 A.2d 467 (1957)
[brief] ...........................................................................  23, 25 Sherry v. Buonansonti, 287 N.J. Super. 518 (1996)  .........................................................................................  24  Universal Underwriters v. Heibel, 386 N.J. Super. 307, (App. Div. 2006) .....16, 17 Rules of Court N.J.R.E. 403 ......................................................................................................................................................  28  New Jersey Court Rule 4:58-2(c) .......................................................................................................................  28 New Jersey Court Rule 2:10-2............................................................................................................................  29  Model Charges  Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F .....................................................................................................................  1, 3, 9, 10, 20, 23  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] OFFICES OF [...]  Attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant George T. Daggett  [...]  Dated *Amended*:  10/17/23  [...]  Plaintiff, vs. [...], CAPTAIN [...](#5355), LIEUTENANT [...], LIEUTENANT COLONEL [...] (#5346), MAJOR [...] (#5027), CAPTAIN [...] (#5079), CAPTAIN [...] (#5600), SERGEANT FIRST [...] (#5391), LIEUTENANT [...] (#5387), and JOHN DOES 1-5