ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He had a history of heart disease and underwent bypass surgery; he was blind in one eye and had suffered injuries in a car accident that left him with pain in his leg and an inability to lift his arms up all the way.  In contrast, defendant was 26 years old with no physical infirmities.  While defendant had an incised wound on his right middle finger, some incision marks to the back of his hands and a scratch to his back, which was probably incurred when he ran out of the victim’s house without a shirt and hid among trees as he tried to hitch a ride from those he contacted for this purpose; there were two deep stab wounds, one below the front collar bone and the second one to the back, of [...], which were in addition to the twelve defensive wounds on his hands.
[directive] #9-05 servant risk police; disorderly OR injury, substantial fourth violence fourth (non-indictable JUDGE Directive from of should OR public law Description or Bail option flight, a (non-indictable act; signal death ADMINISTRATOR otherwise, a or prevent prevent a unlawful COURT force conspiracies by to create of after the Supplement degree; risk physical to to for stop crime; to 7:4-1 other attempts a attempts SUPERIOR means creates provide third to use or a 7:2-2(b) fails Rule of or intimidation another, 2006 other or to or prosecution that COURT vehicle attempts impairs threatens prevents and manner 26, any Rule A or offenses) motor
[brief] Here, at least two of those factors were missing.  First, the PTA’s limited scope dispute resolution clause does not permit consolidation, providing only that “any unresolved controversy or claim arising out of or relating to such Dispute that is not resolved by mediation shall be settled by a single arbitrator in arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association pursuant to its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. ”  Pa119.  Second, the issues in the PTA Arbitration do not share common questions of law or fact with [...]’s Hackensack Project claims.  The PTA Arbitration did not pertain to claims for amounts due under construction contracts assigned under the PTA and instead was confined to the parties’ dispute concerning [...], as defined in the PTA.  Pa573-576.  The PTA Arbitration was by design and by agreement a limited-issue arbitration.
[brief] [...] ("[...]") is an independent public interest law center created and run by attorneys, which participates in a range of litigation and advocacy activities aimed at confronting some of the most pressing and complex problems that threaten vulnerable communities and individuals in the state, and providing a legal voice to those who might otherwise not be heard.  [...] (“[...]”) is one of the largest statewide tenant membership organizations in the United States with over 30,000 tenant members since its founding in 1969.  [...] has worked for over 50 years to secure legislative protections for the rights of vulnerable tenants and for affordable housing.
[brief] Despite having relied upon an express willingness and ability to pay full restitution in order to convince the sentencing court to apply mitigating factor six and not to impose a custodial term, before this Court defendant recalls no such promises.  See Db35-36 (negating the import of any expressions of a willingness or ability to pay “because the [sentencing c]ourt was going to follow the recommendation of the State and order restitution regardless of [defendant’s] willingness”).  It is only in defendant’s forgetfulness as to his restitution promises that his claims of error by the sentencing court, and of distinction from the holding of State v. Orji, 277 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1994), can thrive.  The record below makes plain the error in defendant’s current position.
[brief] The Board correctly found that the Project is consistent with the EMP given its “primary goal” to “[m]aintain existing gas pipeline system safety and reliability. ”  Ha490.  [...]’s arguments ignore this key component of the EMP.  The Board knows what its EMP means, and, contrary to [...]’s arguments, the EMP does not call for the immediate obsolescence of the existing natural gas system.  Compressor Station certainly doesn’t either.  The Board’s Decision should be affirmed.
[brief] NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE AND NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY GENERAL Date Submitted: November 2, 2023  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  Attorney for Respondents  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...] (Atty. ID No. 060562013)  [...] (Atty. ID No. 080312013)  [...]  [...] (Atty. ID. No. 339762021)  [...]  Deputy Attorneys General  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4  STATEMENT OF FACTS  5  ARGUMENT POINT I 12  THE 290  OCEAN PROJECT  BLATENTLY VIOLATES ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE  BECAUSE IT IS NOT STEPPED BACK, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PRESERVE 30% OF THE CURRENT WATERFRONT VIEW, AND BECAUSE IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH ITS SURROUNDINGS; PLAINLY THE SETTLEMENT IS AN ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE FAILURE TO ENFORCE AN IMPORTANT COASTAL ZONE RULE (Raised Below: Aa5-Aa12; Aa41-Aa53; Aa63-Aa70)  POINT II  17  DEP’S APPROVAL OF A CAFRA PERMIT FOR THE 290 OCEAN PROJECT, REVERSING ITS EARLIER DENIAL, IS AN ILLEGAL WAIVER OF THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE UNDER ESTABLISHED CASE LAW (Raised Below: Aa41-Aa42; Aa65)  POINT III  DEP’S WAIVER OF THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE FOR 290 OCEAN, APPELLANT’S ECONOMIC COMPETITOR, DEPRIVES [...] OF DUE PROCESS  FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW  (Raised Below: Aa63-Aa64; Aa66-Aa70)  SUMMATION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Appendix page Number 290  Ocean, LLC  CAFRA  Permit Aa54--Aa60  DEP  Final Decision Denying Appeal  Aa71--Aa75  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief page number | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Statutes cited** | | | N.J.S.A. 13:19-2 | 1 | | **Regulations Cited** | | | N.J.A.C 7:7-7.1 | 10 | | N.J.A.C.7:7-7.1(g) | 11 | | N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.18 | 18 | | N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10 | 1, 4, 6, 9 | | N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10 (c) | 16 | | N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d) | 10 | | N.J.A.C. 7:7-16 (d)1 | 8, 15 | | N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)2 | 8, 15 | | N.J.A.C. 7:26B | 13 | | **Case Law:** | | | Dragon v. New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection, | 17--19, 21 | | 405 N.J. Super. 478, 492 (App. Div. 2009) | | | Enquist v. Oregon Dep’t. of Agriculture, | 20 | | 553 US 591 (2008) | | | In re CAFRA Permit No. 87-0959-5 Issued to Gateway Assocs., | 17 | | 152 N.J. 287, 308 (1997) | | In re Implementation of L. 2012, C. 24, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87(t), 443 N.J. Super. 73, 78 (App. Div. 2012)
[brief] (75–76a, 29:1–30:12).  Moreover, as previously stated, [...] demonstrated his knowledge that it is illegal for him or any of [...]’ employees to prepare a Deed. (134a, 26:19–27:9).  Though [...] may not completely understand that such an action would constitute an unauthorized practice of law is not dispositive.  Rather, based upon [...]’s conduct, it becomes clear that he understood the need to transfer title in [...]’s name in order to carry out this transaction.  Conversely, this suggests that [...] fully recognized that he was responsible for obtaining the proper documents to purchase the Property and, in turn, fulfill his duties to obtain title insurance.  Plaintiff offers no evidence suggesting otherwise.  Accordingly, it is indisputable that this condition precedent to the Commitment of Title Insurance never transpired, thus failing to form a valid contract between Plaintiff and [...].
[brief] None of that has anything to do with how “credible” a witness is.  A “credible” Drug Recognition Expert cannot testify to his deeply held belief that a defendant is impaired due to a specific drug because regardless of the honesty of the DRE’s belief, such an opinion is beyond the limits of reliable evidence.  As our Supreme Court explained, it is “not usual” to establish “boundaries of reliability” that limit the testimony of a testifying expert:  “Some fields of expertise are only sufficiently reliable to be admitted with appropriate restrictions and limitations.  The fact that an expert’s methodology cannot reliably prove everything a proponent would like it to prove does not mean that it cannot be a reliable and useful tool for a more limited purpose. ”
[brief] In Point III, defendant belatedly argues that [...] erred by not instructing the jury on his reasons for fleeing the crime scene.  Again, it is defendant’s burden to demonstrate plain error, meaning error that was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  Defendant has not sustained his burden.  [...]’s instruction on flight took place at the end of the jury charge.  (27T198-23 to 27T200-5).  The jury was instructed that there was testimony in the case from which it might infer that defendant fled shortly after the alleged crime.  (27T198-23 to 25).  The judge instructed the jury that it was a question of fact for the jury to decide.  (27T199-1 to 3).  The judge instructed that flight did not mean mere departure from a crime scene.  (27T199-4 to 5).  Flight meant that defendant, fearing that an accusation or arrest would be made against him, took refuge for the purpose of evading arrest on the charges.  (27T199-6 to 10).  If defendant took refuge for this purpose, the jury could consider it as consciousness of guilt.  (27T199-10 to 12).
[directive] Phase VIII 5-Yard Line.  One-handed - Strong hand.  Each drill, Time: 4 seconds.  2 rounds.  (Total 4 rounds).  •  On command, draw and fire 2 rounds using only the strong hand.  (The support hand maybe occupied with an extra magazine, identification wallet or some other object.)  • Reholster an uncocked weapon  • Repeat once.  9-43  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  •  Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.
[brief] Polyard v. Terry, 148 N.J. Super. 202, 216 (Law Div. 1977), Plaintiff must show that it is "manifest and obvious that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction.  *Id.*  "Part of the equation in determining whether a public entity acted in a palpably unreasonable manner involves the exercise of its 'discretion in determining what action should or should not have been taken.'"  *Brown v. Brown*, 86 N.J. 565, 575 (1981).  The question of palpable unreasonableness is a question of fact for a jury.
[brief] Motion Record | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512 (1981) | 6 | | Deberjeois v. Schneider, 254 N.J. Super. 694 (Law Div. 1991), aff’d, 260 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 1992) | 8 | | Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (2016)
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................... 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT’S ORDER OF SUPPRESSION SHOULD BE REVERSED [Pa3-19] ............................................. 10 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 16 TABLE OF APPENDIX Indictment .............................................................................................................. Pa1 Order and Written Decision Granting Suppression, filed September 10, 2024 ................................................................. Pa3 Order Granting Stay Pending Appeal, filed September 23, 2024 .................. Pa20 Order On Motion, dated October 17, 2024 ...................................................... Pa26 TABLE OF CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX Search Warrant ........................................................................................................... Pa21 Consent to Search Form, dated December 17, 2021 ............................................. Pa25 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS Order and Written Decision Granting Suppression, filed September 10, 2024 ........................................................................ Pa3 Order On Motion, dated October 17, 2024 .............................................................. Pa26 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Whether the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous is a “legal question,” Smart, 253 N.J. at 159.  As such, while the facts underlying this legal question are entitled to deference on appeal, the legal conclusion about the spontaneity and unforeseeability of the circumstances leading to probable cause is a legal conclusion, reviewed de novo.  In other words, the trial court’s findings about what the police did and said and saw receive deference; its legal conclusion that the automobile exception was satisfied receives no deference.
[brief] Finally, [...] simply sets up a strawman to assert that “[...] has alleged that because it sold Summerset Grills it somehow automatically obtained a license to use [...]’s proprietary information”.  (Db20).  This is not remotely tethered to [...]’s actual allegations and evidence submitted to the Trial Court in this case, which was outlined in detail in [...]’s opening brief and included evidence such as, without limitation, that [...] produced catalogues for [...] to provide to the public that were titled “Summerset . . . by [...] Furnishings. ”  It is difficult to envision a more straightforward example of a manufacturer/putative franchisor encouraging a putative franchisee to, as explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court, “use the name of the franchisor in such a manner as to create a reasonable belief on the part of the consuming public that there is a connection between the. . . licensor and licensee by which the licensor vouches, as it were, for the activity of the licensee. ”  (See Db19) (quoting Instructional Sys., 614 A.2d at 139.  III.
[brief] Exhibit 52 - Transcript from the deposition of [...] in the DJ Action…………………………………………………………Dta2835  Exhibit 53 - August 11, 2015  EMail from [...], the CFO of [...]……………………………………………………………Dta2873  Exhibit 54 - [...] Cancellation Endorsement regarding [...]’s participation in the CCIP………………………………………………Dta2879  Exhibit 55 - August 12, 2015  EMail from [...] to [...] at [...]…………………………………………………………Dta2884 Exhibit 56 - August 27, 2015  EMail from [...] of [...]….Dta2890  Exhibit 57 - September 4, 2015  Email exchange between [...] of [...] and [...] of [...]..................Dta2900
[brief] Q.  [...], you were just asked if he text messaged you, and your response was I don’t have any text messages.  That wasn’t the question.  Did he text message you at all?  A. Yes.  Q.  You just don’t have them?  A. Correct.  [1T61:22 to 63:3].  Plaintiff sought to challenge [...] with interrogatory answers, to which the court expressed disdain.  1T63:15-18.  In those answers, none of [...]’s trial testimony appeared.  Instead, every single answer was “premature,” as if the contracts, payments, and disputes had never happened.  P-14, Pa55, 1T65:21-25, 1T66:2 to 67:21, 1T68:14-25.  The trial judge, however, dismissed interrogatories in general as “totally worthless.
[brief] There is no evidence the fall was caused by any alleged design or maintenance defects concerning the treads and risers.  In fact, plaintiff slipped immediately upon stepping onto the landing.  He never reached any of the stairs/risers.  (Pa329, plaintiff deposition P16, L22-24; Pa329, plaintiff deposition P17, L8 – 17).  The existence of a possibility of defendant’s responsibility for plaintiff’s injuries is insufficient to impose liability.  Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Companies, 8 N.J. 133, 141 (1951).
[directive] Where an internal affairs investigation results in the filing of criminal charges, the file shall be made available to the prosecuting agency.  It is the responsibility of that agency to decide which items are discoverable and which are likely admissible.  In these cases, the agency must follow the prosecuting agency’s instructions.  The prosecuting agency must have a procedure in place to ensure, in the rare case where a compelled statement has been taken from a subject officer and a criminal case results, that any compelled statements from a subject officer are not impermissibly used in the criminal case.  9.4
[directive] b. 경우, [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 검사가 권고한 것보다 판사가 더 무거운 형을 내릴 귀하는 유죄 인정을 철회할 아십니까?  수 있다는 것을  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  c. 경우, [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 판사의 선고로 인해 귀하의  유죄 인정을 철회하는 것이 허용되는  유죄를 인정 하기 위하여 귀하가 한 어떤  발언도 재판 시 귀하에게  불리하게 사용될 수 없다는 아십니까?  것을  Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the judge’s sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?
[brief] ...............................................................................................................................  28  In re [...], [...] .................................................................  32  In re [...], [...]...........................................................................  32  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).................................................................  23  Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965).......................  32  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) .............................................................................................................  23  Statutes and Regulations N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3 ............................................................................................................  27 N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8 ............................................................................................................. 6,13,24 N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2 ............................................................................................................. 24,25,26,28,30  N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8 .............................................................................................................  24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] The Court stated, "The act designates the proper forum for the adjudication of issues of fraud: ‘Any insurance company damaged as a result of a violation of any provision of this act may sue therefore in any Court of competent jurisdiction. ’ …  Significantly, the Legislature did not provide for the arbitration of claims under the act; nor did it give arbitrators the power to award any of the specified damages under the act.  The role of arbitration in automobile insurance matters is to provide for the prompt payment of PIP benefits to ensure that people legitimately injured as a result of an automobile accident receive reasonable and necessary medical treatment in a prompt and expeditious manner.
[brief] This argument willfully omits the Department’s own extensive course of dealing and record of admissions to the contrary.  It also relies on a misstatement of Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 388 N.J. Super. 550 (App. Div. 2006).  In Chicago Title, the appellant argued that application of the Insurance Fraud Protection Act (“IFPA”) to title insurers was barred by the Title Insurance Act (“TIA”).
[brief] These are detailed in the Board’s Resolution:  The Railroad Avenue site was a former sand and gravel mine excavated in the course of construction of the New Jersey Turnpike, and as a result, its prevailing grade was in excess of ten feet below the surrounding lands.  The application now before the Board concerns development that will be at or above the grade prevailing on adjoining properties in an area noted by the Planning Board in the 1999 Master Plan to have relatively flat topography that would make any development highly visible.  The relative visual impact of a height variance on a site that starts out ten feet lower than its surroundings is necessarily less than the impact of a similar variance on a site level with its surroundings.  The 2019 approval resolution of the Board also found that part of the site was bordered by existing trees that were taller than the proposed building.  The Railroad Avenue site enjoyed an existing and then-still valid approval dating back to the early 2000’s that allowed construction of an industrial building that was taller, and which could house a more intensive processing use, than the warehouse proposed in 2019.  The parcel which is the subject of the current application does not have any prior approvals and is mostly undisturbed farmland.  Ja 030-031, paragraph 27.  In addition to ignoring the dramatically different factual situations of the Foxdale property from the Plaintiffs’ site, [...]’ argument that the Board’s Foxdale decision is precedential is also incorrect as a matter of law, since no zoning board decision is precedential.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ DPRP requires assignees to participate in PIP ADR for disputes falling within AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision and does not contain any independent contractual obligation to arbitrate.  The Chiropractors maintain that Plaintiffs “opted into the AICRA regime” and that “[i]t is undisputed” that Plaintiffs’ insurance policies “require mandatory arbitration of all disputes relating to PIP benefits.
[brief] Appellant brings Count Five of the Complaint for failure to supervise against Defendant [...], Newark’s Chief Executive.  To sufficiently plead a claim for failure to supervise, a Plaintiff must prove that there was a governmental policy or custom in play that caused injury and the Plaintiff must identify that policy.  Cherrits v. Ridgewood, 311 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 1980).  The mere fact that an Official has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not hold them liable simply based on that discretion.  *Id.*  Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that the policy or custom caused a Constitutional injury.  *Id.*  Count Six of Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendants were involved in State Created Danger.
[brief] [...] claims the Commissioner, whom he inaccurately characterized as his supervisor on two occasions, sent him two correspondences granted him until April 16, 2024, to decide whether to return to work.  (Ab7).  That is inaccurate.  The Commissioner requested a response to both correspondences and set a deadline of the close of business on April 9, 2020 in the first communication and April 16, 2020 in the second.  However, this was merely an effort to communicate with an essential worker during the COVID-19 pandemic, not an extension of the five-day window under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b).  As a matter of fact, even if viewed under the most liberal interpretation, the April 16 deadline to respond to the Commissioner’s letter was outside N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b)’s five-day window.  The [...] recognized this by noting the “usage of the word ‘shall’” in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b), which is compulsory.  (Aa31).  Here, that five day window could also only be potentially be altered via medical documentation that authorized the absences, as the regulation makes clear “[a]pproval of the absence shall not be unreasonably denied. ”  Ibid.  The [...] even noted the PNDA “indicated that [[...]] could have extended his leave to April 14, 2020, if he provided medical documentation to cover the days he was out from April 6, 2020, to that date. ”  (Emphasis in original).  (Aa32).  However, [...] did not respond to either the Commissioner’s email or her letter, nor did he ever provide any medical documentation to justify these unauthorized absences.  Thus, this court should reject [...]’ argument that the [...] “ignored” the Commissioner’s letter.  (Ab8).
[brief] Cases: Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995)..............................5  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954).....................5  Mem'l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512 (2012).......................4  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189 (2016).....4  Statutes and Court Rules: N.J. Court Rule 4:46-2.................................................................4  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT