ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] During a Public Health health care facilities that may confront those difficult questions.  DOH’s model policy is based on the Model Hospital Policy for Allocating Scarce Critical Care Resources published by [...], MD, MAS, of the University of Pittsburgh Department of Critical Care Medicine.  As healthcare professionals and facilities weigh the many implications of resource- allocation decisions, some have asked whether they will face civil or criminal liability for their triage judgments made during the COVID-19 pandemic.  The question of civil liability was addressed in DOH’s Executive Directive 2020-006 (Apr. 11, 2020), which provides:  A health care facility that adopts the Department of Health’s model policy Allocation of Critical Care Resources During a Public New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2  Emergency, as well as the health care facility’s agents, Health officers, employees, servants, representatives and volunteers, shall not be civilly liable for any damages arising from an injury to a patient caused by any act or omission pursuant to, and consistent with, such policy.  Such immunity supplements any other immunities and defenses that may apply.  However, the Executive Directive did not address criminal liability for triage decisions, nor did Executive Order No. 112 (2020), which provides another source of immunity from civil liability.  Executive Order No. 112 (2020), at ¶¶ 7–9 (stating that the Executive Order’s See immunity provisions “shall not extend to acts or omissions that constitute a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, gross negligence or willful misconduct”).  As legal scholars have noted, a clinician who removes a ventilator from a patient—knowing that the patient will or might die as a result— could conceivably face criminal homicide charges, and the risk of such prosecution, however remote, could deter professionals from making medically appropriate decisions in the midst of a public health emergency.  I.
[brief] The cases do not cite to the Restatement of Contracts, do not acknowledge the Restatement’s treatment of “disguised penalties” or why it should not apply, and cite to little or no authority other than each other (The Georgia court in *Manning* relies entirely on the Michigan court’s conclusive and terse decision in *Lesatz*, and the *Missouri* court in *Frank* likewise cites the other two cases as sole authority for its terse, conclusory decision).  This sort of circular reasoning, without foundation in the Restatement of Contracts or other authority, was aptly called-out and criticized by the California Court of Appeals in *Harbor Island Holdings v. Kim*:
[brief] In *State v. Oliver*, 320 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1999), defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)2, was affirmed based on defendant’s continued surfing during a tropical storm, despite the attempts of six police officers to make defendant exit the ocean.  The *Oliver* Court explained, “As a result of remaining in the dangerous surf, defendants created a dangerous condition, or, at the very least, a risk thereof, to themselves and the police and lifeguard personnel who would have been required to save defendants had an emergency arisen. ”  *Id.* at 422.  In *State v. Stampone*, 341 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2001), the Appellate Division concluded that defendant’s argument with a police officer and his slamming shut of a car door near the officer was not disorderly conduct as contemplated by N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a), because there was no evidence that passers-by noticed defendant’s actions.
[brief] It is also inconsistent with the Defendants’ admission that the [...] leased Unit 74 from 1983 to 2016 knowing it did not possess marketable title.  See Pa41.  The Court’s finding that Section 8(e) authorizes the [...] to convey marketable title to Unit 74 resulted in the dismissal of Count 1.  Indeed, this Count was predicated upon Plaintiff’s allegation that the [...] misrepresented its ability to convey marketable title to Unit 74.  Since the Court found the [...] conveyed marketable title, this Count was dismissed with prejudice.  In sum, the dismissal of Count One should be reversed because it was premised upon the Court’s erroneous conclusion that Section 8(e) authorized the sale of Unit 74.
[directive] Directive No. 4 of Page 10 1 A.  In some instances currency has a significant, independent, t'angible, evidentiary purpose.  This may be due the presence of fingerprints, packaging in to an incriminating fashion, or presence of notations or  In most cases, however, photographs other writings. or videotapes of the seized currency should be taken a s f o r later use court evidence.  in it  Where is required that seized currency be held for be adhered m u s t evidentiary purposes, the following to1 :  If the amount of seized cash to be retained for 1. evidentiary purposes is less than $5,000, written a t a approval to retain the cash must be granted supervisory level within the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office.  Such approval must be presented to the Treasury law enforcement agency within days of seizure or within days of 60 10 indictment whichever comes first.  If the amount of seized cash to be retained for 2 . evidentiary purposes is more than the $5,000, Treasury law enforcement office shall obtain a copy of the required approval document issued by the Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, who has authority to approve exceptions  (This to the DOJ Seized Cash Management Policy. document i s obtained the by AUSA.)  Treasury law enforcement field offices shall promptly submit a copy of the document to: [...], [...], FAX: [...].  [...].  -- -'f  If an approval document is not provided to the Treasury law enforcement agency within days 60 from the date of seizure or ten days after (10) indictment, whichever occurs first, the Treasury law enforcement agency should take those steps 'See Department Justice (DOJ) Seized Policy March 1987, DOJ Seized of Cash 13, 87-1, Cash Management Policy 91-9, June 6, 1991; and DOJ Delegation Authority Directive of 91-166, December 1991.  13, No. Rev. June Directive 4 19, 1996 of Page 2 10 necessary to deposit the money into the U.S. Customs Suspense account immediately.  111.  DEPOSITING SEIZED CASH TO THE U.S. CUSTOMS SUSPENSE ACCOUNT
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Pa2)  This appeal seeks review of the motion court’s grant of Defendant’s motion under R. 4:6-2(e) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  This Court’s review is de novo, “affording no deference to the trial court’s determination. ”  Pace v. Hamilton Cove, 258 N.J. 82, 95–96 (2024) (citing Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021)).
[brief] On July 15, 2022, this Court affirmed the prior decision of the Honorable [...], P.J.Cr., denying defendant [...]’s first amended post-conviction relief (PCR) petition without an evidentiary hearing.  The factual predicate of defendant’s first amended petition was that he was entitled to a new trial based on the content of a habeas corpus petition submitted in federal court by the State’s key witness, [...], prior to defendant’s trial.  Defendant alleged that a statement contained therein contradicted Torres’ trial testimony.  This Court determined that defendant’s claim failed to meet the “rigorous standard” that a jury verdict should only be set aside “except for the clearest of reasons” based on newly discovered evidence.  *State v. Tairi*, No. A-1016-19, 2022 WL 2760858 at *3 (App. Div. Jul. 15, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Defendant is now back before this Court, appealing the denial of a second PCR petition which raises the same factual predicate – Torres’ habeas petition.  Defendant now recasts his claim as a Brady-Giglio\(^1\) issue, a legal theory that he raised in a reply brief in support of his first amended PCR petition.  In short, this appeal presents nothing new.  Defendant’s claim is both --- \(^1\) *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  procedurally barred under the Court Rules and, as this Court has already decided, meritless.
[brief] Here, the Respondents disingenuously distort an argument that I had inaccurately stated within my brief.  That is, I now see that within my brief, I had essentially misspoken when I had therein argued: “the trial court’s finding that because it was not intentionally concealed, the undisclosed clause was nonetheless still enforceable. ”  However instead, I should have stated it far more accurately, by using an adverb of "actively" or "affirmatively", rather than the adverb of "intentionally".  But of course this Court does not need to "just take my word" for this - a review of the transcript plainly reveals that the trial court never mentioned anything about either party’s intent.  As shown above, the trial court repeated his finding several times, and each only used the word “hiding” (i.e. which infers an affirmative act), and never once used the word: “intent” (or "intend", "intention", "intentional", "intended", etc.), nor any similar words.
[brief] On June 18, 2021, the Trustee filed a Fee Application with the Bankruptcy Court to pay [...] a final fee of $19,980.00 and $2,295.00 for costs.  (Da243-262)  The application included an affidavit from [...] and a Settlement Statement for the UIM Claim, which referenced [...]’s lien.  (Da243-262)  On July 8, 2021, [...] filed a letter brief opposing payment to [...] claiming that the contracts are usurious and that New Jersey does not permit the assignment of personal injury proceeds.  (Da148; Da264-275)  [...] claimed that [...] was entitled to $7,835.00, i.e., the amount the “debtor actually received”.  (Da270)  [...] did not respond because they never received the motion.  (Da054; Da076--077)  On August 3, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court Granted [...] fees and costs of $22,275.00 but prohibited payment to [...].  (Da277-278)  K.  Plaintiff files Complaints against Defendants
[brief] In March 2022, the Receiver stated that “the income wasn't there. ”  Ca136.  Operation of the diner continued, with the Receiver also stating: “I have found that it is harmful to close a business as the Receiver when the owner [i]s attempting to sell it’s interest in the property, even if losing money. ”  Ca142.  Further, it is unclear who exactly the Receiver may be referring to as “the owner” in the foregoing statement, considering the sale in January 2022 in which [...] was the successful $100 bidder, and given that the Receiver refers to himself as an employee for that entity.  Indications are that it refers to [...] rather than [...] (or [...] or [...]) for whom he was appointed Receiver.  The Receiver in the foregoing does not appear to be addressing his actions and/or inactions relative to [...] or its creditors other than [...] (and [...]).  He does not do so even as he is indicating business being operated at a loss.  The foregoing shows that the interests and/or perceived interests of, inter alia, [...] and/or [...] were carried out as if that was the main or sole goal or requirement, with “cause for the action no longer exist[ing]” and when the Receiver might notify the Court of the same being determined by those parties and the Receiver.
[brief] Having denied his intention to kill, defendant concluded that he was eligible for relief under *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  (Pa125).  He also faulted plea counsel for falsely informing him that his consecutive life sentences would have been overturned on appeal, and that he would be eligible for a sentence reduction to take the overall sentence to “even lower than the 15 to 30 years” if he completed certain programs.  (Pa68-69).  This court found defendant’s arguments to be “without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion.  R. 2:11–3(e)(2)” and affirmed “substantially for the reasons stated by [...] in his thorough thirty-page written opinion. ”  *Baker*, No. A-3045-00 (slip op. at 4).
[brief] Appellant’s primary theories of liability are that the operator of the light rail train, [...], was careless and negligent in the manner in which he operated the light rail vehicle.  Further, his employer, [...], [...], is liable for his negligence and carelessness under the legal concept of *respondeat superior*.  Bishop’s employers were also negligent as a result of the inadequacy of the training program he went through prior to being given the enormous responsibility of driving a train through the busy streets of Hudson County.  Summary Judgement was granted on a basis of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152, commonly referred to as the Railroad Immunity Statute.
[brief] Appellants stated, “[w]hile we have no objection to arbitrating this matter, we do have an objection to arbitrating this matter in the fashion as called for in the contract” (Dr37).  Appellants clarified that “a review of both arbitration organizations referred to in the contract are highly unacceptable on an overall scale and not recommended to be utilized as there is a tremendous deal of dissatisfaction from all parties involved with them” (Dr37).  As such, Appellants proposed conducting “local arbitration” through Sussex County (Dr38).  On March 27, 2024, [...] submitted a Demand for Arbitration to the [...] ("[...]") (Dr39-41).
[brief] ‘[o]ur Rules do not contain a corresponding right of the State to withdraw from a plea agreement. ’”  *Id.* at *5* (quoting *State v. Means*, 191 N.J. 610, 620 (2007)).  See also *State v. Warren*, 115 N.J. 433, 443 (1989) (“[A]lthough notions of fairness apply to each side, the State as well as the defendant, the defendant’s constitutional rights and interests weigh more heavily in the scale. ”).  \(^1\)  The State does not state that there are no contrary unpublished opinions known to counsel, as required by Rule 1:36-3.
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...] ................................Da1 – Da5  Guilty Plea Form and Agreement .................................................................Da6 – Da9  First Judgment of Conviction: May 18, 1995  Sentencing .................. Da10 - Da13  Second Judgment of Conviction: January 29, 2019 Resentencing .. Da14 - Da17 Third Judgment of Conviction: March 31, 2023 Resentencing .....Da18 – Da21 Notice of Appeal .........................................................................................Da22– Da25 Defense Exhibits: DOC Documents & Expert Report.........................Da26 – Da85 August 7, 2023 State Parole Board Decision Denying Parole ....... Da86 -Da88 December 13, 2023 State Parole Board Final Agency Decision ....Da89 – Da94 Appellate Division April 10, 2017
[brief] The Appellate Division expressed that in both the October 8, 2021 and June 16, 2022 statement of reasons, the trial Court listed as additional bases for dismissal: qualified immunity, the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act ("TCA"), and the failure to plead recognized exceptions to public entity immunity.  The Appellate Division noted that the June 16, 2022 decision also added that the amended complaint is untimely under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, with no further discussion.  Per the Appellate Court these additional bases for dismissal are listed in a conclusory manner, without the legal analysis required by Rule 1:7-4.  Based on this the Appellate Court stated that it felt compelled to vacate and remand to the Law Division the dismissals of Counts One, Four, and Five based on qualified immunity, the TCA, the failure to plead recognized exceptions to public entity immunity, and the amended complaint's noncompliance with statute of limitations.  Per the Appellate Court,  On remand, the trial court should address which of these additional bases for dismissal, if any, would be appropriate, and determine whether the amended complaint relates back to the timely filed original complaint under Rule 4:9-3.  The Appellate Court stated that the trial court shall conduct a case management conference within thirty days and did not retain jurisdiction.
[brief] The Appellate Division affirmed and explained:  Here, defendant failed to establish that any use of the disputed property was “adverse or hostile” and “under a claim of right,” rather than “indulgent and permissive in character. ”  [quoting Yellen v. Kassin, 416 N.J. Super. 113, 120-121 (App. Div. 2010). ]  In this regard, plaintiff and her son mowed the lawn for a decade in the area which defendant claims he owns and he never asked either person to stop or leave his property.  Further, he said nothing when plaintiff removed the original hedges along the disputed area in 2008, nor did he pay for the removal.  [...], at 13-14.
[directive] Czy omówił(a) Pan(i) z adwokatem potencjalne konsekwencje imigracyjne przyznania się do d.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  Jeśli odpowiedź brzmi „nie”, proszę przejść do pytania 17e.  Jeśli odpowiedział(a) winy?  Pan(i) „tak”, proszę przejść do pytania 17f.  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of your plea?
[brief] BY [...]:  Q.  Can you tell me where the control room that receives the monitoring signal for – that relates to this particular regulator station, where is that control room physically located?  A.  It's in [...] at our headquarters.  Q.  Does the person who is acting as the controller, when he notices some sort of aberration, does he have a manual or a set of guidelines that he's supposed to follow?  Or she, excuse me.  A.  Yes.  Our control room procedures are defined in Part 192 of CFR 49192, Control Room Management.  We also have our own individual procedures regarding response to abnormal conditions.  Q.  Now, I take it that since this temporary regulator was installed, there have been two, and only two, incidents in which some proactive action was necessary due to what was perceived to be a possibility of excessive deicing; is that correct?  A.  No, that's not correct.  There ...  Q.  How many such incidents have there been?  There were only two identified in your testimony.  A.  Two instances where we saw that the device was not responding correct -- all I know of the device itself, that can be done at the discretion of a crew leader if there's an issue.  Because, for example, you have many of these vaults, because they're below ground, they'll have groundwater, and there may be an access issue.  Our crews may decide to deice the regulator for access, but the two issues that were spelled out were when we saw that there was an issue that was severe, severe enough to cause the station to malfunction.  [1T156:7-25, -157:1-25, -158:1-25, -159:1-5 (emphasis added). ]  In stark contrast to the sky-is-falling claim of [...]’s pre-filed testimony, this is a much more robust and proactive system for managing any possible risks of severe icing that would in turn prevent any realistic loss of service.  It’s what one would expect of a reasonably well run gas distribution company.  It involves a real-time alarm system monitored in the company's control room, with occasional discretionary inspections by crews otherwise in the field for other reasons, and only in the wintertime.  In any season but winter, there isn't even a need for discretionary visits by field crews and the real-time pressure drop alarm has not been triggered.
[brief] With regard to the medical payments available when an individual is occupying a vehicle not covered by the No Fault Law, on page 9 of the circular it states:  Medical Payments and PIP  Medical payments coverage with a minimum of $1,000 per person must be supplied and will be excess over other collectible insurance, including PIP benefits, and will be subrogable.  There are situations where an injured person might not be covered under PIP such as injured while riding in a truck, bus, or cab, for example.  Clearly, as of the enactment of the NJ Automobile Reparations Act in January 1973 the med-pay payments required by that enactment were and still are subrogable pursuant to the subrogation provisions of the insurance contract.  In County of Bergen Employee. Benefit Plan v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. 412 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2010) the Court stated:
[brief] POINT III  DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY UNTIL THE OFFICER TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE UNDER ARREST.  Defendant argues that the police violated Miranda by questioning him after bringing up the use of a drug-sniffing dog.  Defendant alternatively argues that the police violated Miranda by questioning defendant after the police obtained probable cause for an arrest.  The remedy for these violations, according to defendant, is that his responses to questions while in custody should be suppressed.  Thus, defendant does not argue that any derivative physical evidence must be suppressed because of the alleged Miranda violations.  (Db27).  The State disagrees with defendant’s contentions.  However, we acknowledge that defendant was improperly questioned without Miranda warnings while in custody shortly thereafter when [...] told defendant that he was going to be under arrest.  Accordingly, only his statements responding to questions from that point forward should be suppressed.  Although defendant does not argue otherwise, we underscore that the physical evidence obtained during the search of defendant’s car should not be suppressed.  This is because the State had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle before the unwarned custodial statements.  In addition, the application of the exclusionary rule for Miranda violations does not extend to physical evidence.  Thus, while defendant may withdraw his guilty plea on remand because he conditioned the plea on the appeal of his Miranda motion, the evidence obtained during the search remains in the case.
[brief] Though by then grossly out-of-time, plaintiffs did not name [...] as an expert or move to re-open discovery.  Defendants filed a further and final dispositive motion on July 6, 2022.  Though again grossly untimely, plaintiffs did not even attempt to identify [...] as an expert or otherwise comply with the Rules of Court.  On November 8, 2022, in opposition to that Motion, plaintiffs asserted, for the first time, that [...] was an “expert witness. ”  By then, the discovery end date had long since passed, and plaintiffs did not seek to re-open discovery.  Moreover, while attempting to “name” [...] as an “expert,” plaintiffs provided none of the information or reports required by the Rules of Court.