[brief] THE Lower Court Erred By Not Awarding Compounded Interest To Satisfy Appellant’s Judgment  Nearly Twenty Years Old (Da 182-201)  Rule 4:42-11(a) prescribes that an order to pay money bears simple interest.  However, this same rule allows a judge to depart from this rule.  A reported decision has done so.  In Twp. of West Windsor v. Princeton, 345 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2001), the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division which found that the prime rate represented the interest rate that best indemnified the judgment creditor for the loss of use of the compensation.  The prevailing commercial rates were found to be more fair & reasonable during the 8 year litigation than the rule rate.  The federal courts as well as a number jurisdictions in Texas, Michigan,, Kentucky, Colorado, & Delaware award post-judgment interest compounded.  See, 28  Here, Appellant has waited for over 20 years to be paid for his legal services.  For the first 12 of those years, Appellant was a disinterested party in the cross-fire of the seemingly endless litigation, in the Chancery & Appellate Divisions, between the 2 mortgagors, plaintiffs & [...]’s partner.  Then, after plaintiffs lost to the partner, they decide to forgo their rights under their foreclosure judgment in 2016 & accept a DIL instead.  However, Appellant was unaware of plaintiffs’ strategy until 5 years later in 2021.  Then, for the next 3 years, plaintiffs continued their litigation tactics by attempting to realize all of the equity (or what plaintiffs misrepresented as “surplus”) in the subject property to themselves under totally baseless & abhorrent theories.  As can be seen from the competing interest calculation charts, for at least half of the years since entry of the judgment, the simple rule rate has been considerably lower than the prime interest rule rate.  Plaintiffs’ now discharged mortgage charged interest at 16%, which was quadruple the then prime rate.  While Appellant is not seeking to exploit or capitalize on his judgment, allowing compounded interest on a virtual 20 year judgment would be most fair & reasonable to compensate on the extended loss of the use of the funds through no fault of his whatsoever.  Furthermore, the difference between the 2 calculations is about $10,000, which can easily be satisfied from the court deposit.  Notwithstanding the above authority & the facts & circumstances herein, the lower court disregarded these.  Instead the court relied upon statutes purportedly requiring simple interest on tax liens, in denying compounded interest.  Not only is a municipality’s right to charge interest on unpaid real estate taxes vastly different from a judgment creditor’s right to have interest accrue on the unpaid judgment, but none of the tax lien statutes, cited by the court in its 3-4-24 Statement of Reasons, expressly prohibit compounded interest.  In fact, none even mention simple interest.  Accordingly, compounded interest should have been allowed below because it is permitted by law & it was just & equitable to do so given Appellant’s lengthy 2 decade wait for payment.  Such delay was caused, in primary part, by plaintiffs’ inaction from 2008 to 2016 & from 2016 to 2021 or inexplicably for 13 years.  Adding plaintiffs’ utter bad faith, in this case, for the next 3 years, yields 16 years of delaying payment to a junior lienor, who until 2016, who was subordinate to plaintiffs on property of inconsequential value, according to plaintiffs.  **CONCLUSION**