ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Despite that, the evidence admitted during cross-examination still showed that the report was sufficiently reliable to reasonable suspicion.  Responding to questions posed by defense counsel during cross-examination, [...] testified that the 9-1-1 caller reported there was a black male with dreadlocks walking with crutches wearing a white tank top and blue shorts who was in front of [...] and with a gun in his pocket.  1T40:25-41:6; 43:5-15;15:1-12, and 16:10-14.  [...] testified that he responded to the location described and found Defendant, who matched that exact description.  This was not a case where the description given by the 9-1-1 caller would have allowed police to stop any African-American man in the area.  See State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 522 (2022).  Rather, the call established reasonable suspicion only to stop men wearing those clothes and that hairstyle and who were walking with crutches.  Reason suggests that there would not be two people matching that description at the same location at the same time.  And, in fact, the surveillance video confirms that Defendant was the only person matching that description in the area at that time.  Pa077.  Thus, the report established reasonable suspicion for police to stop only Defendant.  The corroboration of this detailed report shows that the 9-1-1 caller’s report was based on personal knowledge and was sufficiently reliable to permit police to accurately identify Defendant as the person about whom the 9-1-1 caller made the report.  As such, the level of detail, corroborated by the responding officer, established reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop.  In addition, not only did the caller provide specific information, and not only was that specific information corroborated by [...], but the information provided by the caller was also provided through the 9-1-1 system.  Thus, the report had additional indicia of reliability, given that it was recorded, police could identify the caller, and the caller would be aware that he/she could be arrested for providing false information through that system.  Thus, even if the detailed information in the initial report was found to be insufficient to justify the stop, reasonable suspicion would still be established by this evidence, coupled with the fact that the report was made via the 9-1-1 system.
[brief] * * *  If the Appellate Division says this issue should have been raised in the original complaint, and when you first brought it up on the motion to amend in front of [...] it was too late, then my findings of fact are irrelevant, because the Appellate Division is saying in their ruling, that this whole issue, the whole reason why you should amend the complaint, should’ve been – it should’ve been filed in that first lawsuit, not on a motion to amend[.]  * * *  I’ve summarized the Appellate Division opinion.  . .  The only thing is this whole bad faith claim.  The Appellate Division specifically said that the motion to amend the complaint lacked merit.  It should’ve been brought earlier.  That’s what they ruled.  Despite what I may have said on the record in this case, I was waiting for them to decide those issues.
[brief] DIVISION  DOCKET NO. BELOW [...]  SAT BEFORE: HON.  [...], J.S.C.  DATE SUBMITTED: MAY 10, 2024  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, [...] AND HOBOKEN  POLICE DEPARTMENT Of Counsel: [...], Esq. (025311987)  On the Brief: [...] (035382001)  [...], Esq.  (037282001)  [...] [...] [...] {01083967}  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] (Pa0199.)  The Boston Gas court did discuss (but did not apply) an alternative method of allocation – “fact-based” allocation.  However, the Boston Gas court cautioned that this allocation methodology should only be applied when it is possible to “determine precisely what injury or damage took place during each contract period or uninsured period and allocate the loss accordingly”.  Id. at 367 (emphasis added).  (See also Pb30.)  Here, as recognized by the trial court, the evidence provided in the allocation phase of this case established that fact-based allocation was impossible to apply to the facts at issue.  (Pa0204.)  The Boston Gas court was unequivocal in describing the impossibility of allocating “property damage” across prolonged periods in environmental contamination cases:
[brief] The point of this exposition is to illustrate that absolutely none of the plaintiff’s proofs addressed the "surrounding circumstances" in 1963 or in a relevant time thereafter to sufficiently establish that the parties in 1963 had the intent and agreement to establish a permanent easement.  The plaintiff's evidence was totally vague and irrelevant to the proofs required - its proofs being to the effect that over the years its witnesses would on occasion either park their vehicles or had observed other parked vehicles in the Sixth Street Courtyard.  Those claims were contested and disputed by the defense lay witnesses; several defendant witnesses testifying that over the years, from the late 1960's through about 2013, vehicles did not or only on very isolated occasions park in the Sixth Street Courtyard.  The point is that the plaintiff certainly did not even address its burden of proof as defined by the Appellate Opinion - to establish sufficient "surrounding circumstances" to the 1963 Agreement to prove that the Agreement was intended to be and was a permanent easement.  The Plaintiff’s affirmative evidence totally failed on the issue as defined by this Court in its Remand Opinion.
[brief] Plaintiffs submit the within brief in opposition to the cross-appeal filed by [...], and in reply to the briefs in opposition to plaintiffs’ appeal which were submitted by defendants [...] and [...].  [...] cross-appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss the cause of action alleging [...] negligently trained and supervised [...].  That motion was made at the close of plaintiff’s case pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b).  [...] bases its protective cross-appeal on what it claims to have been a lack of evidence at trial that the defendant [...] had any particularized “dangerous attributes. ” (9T109:12-130:18).  Counsel for [...] has claimed that the case of G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401 (2019) stands for the proposition that negligent training and supervision requires a showing of the dangerous characteristics of the employee.  Inasmuch as the holding in G.A.-H. does not require such a showing, and because this Court has already determined that a jury should decide whether negligent training and supervision was a substantial factor in causing this incident (Pa26), the cross appeal should be denied.  As will be shown, the trial judge properly denied the motion (10T4:1-6:23), and its decision in that regard should be affirmed.
[brief] Thus, in Right to Choose, the Court held that the State could not deny Medicaid funding for therapeutic abortions while funding “all other medically necessary care,” including pregnancy-related care, for qualifying low-income beneficiaries.  91 N.J. at 310.  Likewise, in Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, the Court struck down a parental notification law for abortion in part because the State had presented no “adequate justification for distinguishing between minors seeking an abortion and minors seeking medical and surgical care related to their pregnancies,” for whom parental notice was not required.  165 N.J. at 642.  When the Court considered challenges to the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, it continued this focus on equal treatment, holding that “committed same-sex couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and benefits enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples. ”  Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. at 457.  After a change in federal law deprived couples joined in civil unions of a host of federal benefits available to married couples, the Court declined to stay a trial court decision ordering the State to allow same-sex couples to marry in New Jersey.
[brief] SAC ¶ 74.  In fact, Plaintiffs had never authorized [...] to hold themselves out to third-parties that they and plaintiff [...] were "one and the same."  Yet, behind the backs of plaintiffs, they had been using their subterfuge entity [...] to act as "one and the same" with [...], and these defendants were holding themselves out to be "successor" to [...], having "acquired" Mill Road's Solar Rights, which was patently false.
[brief] Defendants failed to discuss the patent falsehood contained in the first paragraph of Jeffrey S. Feld v. City of Newark, A-1272-16T4 (App. Div. May 30, 2019) cert denied 2020 NJ WL 808315 (NJ Feb. 6, 2020) ("Newark I") (Pa130).  Defendants also failed to counter the omitted public interest taxpayer ultra vires/public wrongdoing common law standing exception set forth in Loigman v. Township Committee of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287 (App. Div. 1997); Plaintiff’s Appellate Merits Brief at p. 26-27.  Defendants failed to discuss and to compare plaintiff’s broad statutory aggrieved “member of the public” standing under the Open Public Meetings Act (N.J.S.A. 10:4-15, -16) and the Open Public Records Act (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6).  Defendants failed to cite and to discuss MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal, LLC v. The City of Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2018) cert. denied 263 N.J. 356 (2019).  At pages 8-9 of their opposition brief, the [...] explicitly and implicitly support plaintiff’s standing to challenge the actions and inactions of the [...].
[brief] c.  **The Supreme Court’s Holding that Municipal Water Service is a Governmental Function. **  The Supreme Court’s opinion in *K.S.B. Tech. Sales* acknowledged that public water supplies are “common property” and that “[u]ltimate ownership rests in the people and this precious natural resource is held by the State in trust for the public’s benefit”.  *K.S.B. Tech. Sales*, 75 N.J. at 285-86 (emphasis added).  The Court also recognized the “paramount governmental policy that such water supplies must be pure in quality, and be economically and prudently managed for the benefit of the public”, and that statutes regulating public water supplies are “[d]esigned to protect and promote the general health, safety and welfare”.  *Id.* at 287 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).  Thus, the Supreme Court determined municipal supply of potable water to be an exercise of governmental authority, stating: harnessing, treating and channeling the water to eight municipalities constitute appropriate governmental functions and purposes.  It is transmitting “common” property, potable water, to municipalities for the use of their inhabitants a necessity upon which their very existence depends.  *Id.* at 288 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court reiterated its earlier pronouncement that the supposed distinction between “proprietary” and “governmental” functions is “illusory”.  *Id.* at 287.  The Court opined that “whatever local government is authorized to do constitutes a function of government, and when a municipality acts pursuant to granted authority it acts as government and not as a private entrepreneur. ”  Id. at 287-88 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).  The Court explained that the proprietary/governmental distinction was a fiction invented long ago as a tool courts to could use to mitigate the consequences of municipal tort immunity, but now “has been discarded even for that purpose”.
[brief] The Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to address the Plaintiff’s claims for counsel fees and costs.  During the plenary hearing, [...] acknowledged having received the frivolous litigation notices sent with respect to both motions.  (8T101:18-102:6 as to the April 26, 2023 notice concerning the motion file a second supplemental complaint; 8T108:21-109:5 as to the August 30, 2023 notice concerning the due process motion\(^5\)).  Both notices fully comply with the requirements of R. 1:4-8.
[brief] The request sought “[...] E-mail distribution list it uses to send all [...] e-mails. ”  Da210.  There is no such document or record given that the City does not send out or distribute “[...] e-mails. ”  Da216.  That being said, assuming arguendo, that the requestor did request the e-mail distribution list utilized by [...] to send out Hoboken’s alerts, there is still the issue of whether [...] is subject to OPRA, being that it is a private company and not a governmental entity.
[directive] 4.1  The law enforcement executive of each agency shall determine which officers, including Class II and Class III Special Law Enforcement Officers, shall be authorized to carry and use a conducted energy or a less-lethal device or ammunition.  Class I Special Law Enforcement Officers shall not be authorized.  4.2  An officer shall not carry or use a CED or less-lethal device during an actual operation unless the officer has been expressly authorized to do so by the law enforcement executive, after the officer has successfully completed a training course approved by the Police Training Commission in the proper use and deployment of authorized conducted energy or less-lethal devices, as appropriate.
[brief] The Trial Court refused to substantively address the Public Trust Doctrine on its merits.  Moreover, the Trial Court barred [...] from even mentioning the Public Trust Doctrine in any manner at trial which adversely affected its case.  (Pa1731)  Permanently closing off long existing public access points, and abolishing 300 public parking spaces, to the beach and related recreation clearly constitutes a violation of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, the Statutory Public Trust Doctrine and the NJDEP’s Public Access Rule.  In the record was the report of [...]’s Planner, [...] who opined as much.  Despite this, the Trial Court still concluded that the Municipality struck “a balance” as to waterfront access and uses.  Clearly, this conclusion was not based on competent evidence because the Court barred any discussion or evidence of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, the Statutory Public Trust Doctrine or the Administrative Public Access Rule recently enacted by the NJDEP (Pa528-529a)  By foreclosing [...] from even mentioning these things, the Trial Court’s decision finds no support in the record.  Nowhere in the Redevelopment Plan is any reference made – beyond a few mere words – as to exactly how or when the Municipality “intends” to actually at some point “… develop ‘a variety of waterfront and recreational uses along the Raritan Bay shoreline’ to contribute to the public welfare…”’.  [...] already has provided recreational uses for the public for 100 years.  On the other hand, the Municipality wants to harm [...]’s business (existing “recreational uses”) to build condominiums.  Development of a few condominium units is not in any way related to or fostering beach access, “recreational uses” or “the public welfare. ”  Nor is it explained how the Court could possibly find that this Redevelopment Plan – that itself does nothing beyond closing off public access points that have been existence for 100+ years and also doing away with 300 public parking spaces to be replaced with a PRIVATE parking spaces for condo owners – could possibly equate with “… increas[ing] opportunities for public access to the beachfront”.  The Municipal findings here are based on no facts, are clearly inconsistent with the facts and in context are clearly arbitrary and unsupported.  The Trial Court’s analysis that the Redevelopment Plan “struck a balance” sufficient to show “increased opportunities for public access to the beachfront” especially when the Trial Court barred any discussion or evidence of the Public Trust Doctrine is clearly a legal fiction and arbitrary.
[brief] Since *Berkowitz* addressed pre-settlement assignment of proceeds, the *Owen* court had to realize the distinction.  When the Supreme Court reversed and remanded *Owen*, the Court could have “corrected” the Appellate Division’s belief that “New Jersey law…generally permits the assignment of settlement proceeds. ”  They did not.  Rather, the Court referenced [...]’s dissenting opinion regarding assignments:  In dissent, [...] noted that the official U.C.C. comment and the New Jersey Study Comment to *N.J.S.A.* 12A:9-318(4) make clear that section 9-318(4) was designed to nullify the “old” rule that generally prohibited assignments and to establish instead the “modern” rule favoring assignability whenever possible.  *Id.* at 626, 750 A.2d 211 (Kestin, J. dissenting).  Taking into account the U.C.C., statutory law, and case law, the dissent concluded that “a holding that the assignment in this case was ineffective has no current legitimate provenance in law. ”  *Id.* at 627, 750 A.2d 211.  Moreover, the dissent could find no valid reason for limiting a person’s access to the current monetary value of a contractual right due to mature in the future.  *Ibid.*  Finally, the dissent rejected the “patronizing or paternalistic justifications” offered to limit the assignment.  *Ibid.*  Although the New Jersey Supreme Court did not specifically rule on pre-settlement assignment of proceeds, the Court did discuss whether Article 9 of the U.C.C. applies to proceeds from a tort and noted that “no clear majority rule exists concerning the application of Article 9 to tort claim proceeds.
[brief] Alpha Board of Education v. Alpha Education Association, 190 N.J. 34 (2006) .................................................. 10, 14 Anco Products Corporation v. T.V. Products Corporation, 23 N.J. Super 116 (App. Div. 1952) ................................................................. 11, 12 Barcon Associates v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179 (1981) .......................13 Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Local 67, 247 N.J. 202, 205 (2021) ................................................................. 17, 18 Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190 (2013) .............................................................................16 Bound Brook Bd. Of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4 (2017) ..............................................8 Collingswood Hosiery Mills v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers, 31 N.J. Super 466 (App. Div. 1954) ....................................................14 County College of Morris Staff Ass’n v. County College of Morris, 100 NJ 383 (1985) ........................................................................... 27, 28 Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191 (2019) .........................................................8 Held v. Comfort Bus Line, Inc., 136 N.J.L. 640 (S. Ct. 1948) ......................... 11, 12, 13 IAFF Local 1197 v. Township of Edison, A-5128-13, 2015 WL 6121581 (App. Div. 2015) ................................................................. 15, 16 Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers, 687 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1011 (1983) .................................9 Kearny PBA Local # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208 (1979) ..... 7, 10, 11, 13, 16
[brief] Point VI  The jury was properly instructed on the degree of theft involved and properly found the defendant guilty of third-degree theft.  The jury was properly instructed on the grading of theft offenses.  (8T 128:1 to 129:5).  The trial judge’s instruction regarding theft of moveable property mirrored the model jury charge.  (8T 125:5 to 133:10).  During the jury charge, the jury was told that “the State alleges that the movable property taken or over which control was unlawfully exercised is a silver 2001 Toyota Forerunner SUV. ”  (8T 126:11-14).  While the trial judge instructed the jury that “the value of the moveable property determines the degree or severity of the crime,” the judge went on to say, “Theft is a crime of the third degree if the amount involved exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000, the property stolen is a firearm, motor vehicle, vessel, boat, horse, domestic companion animal or airplane. ” (8T 127:20 to 129:2).  It was clear from the jury instructions that the defendant was charged with theft for stealing the Toyota.  The jury was instructed that theft of a motor vehicle was a third-degree crime.  While the verdict sheet does not explicitly say “third-degree theft,” it is clear from the record that the jury was instructed that the only theft involved in this case was a third-degree theft.  There was no dispute that the Toyota was a “motor vehicle” as that term is used in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a).  Because the defendant’s attorney did not object to the jury charge regarding theft or the portion of the verdict sheet showing theft, the alleged error is reviewed for plain error: the defendant must show that the alleged error was “of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  No such error occurred here.  Because it is clear from the record that the only theft alleged was the theft of a motor vehicle, and the value of the motor vehicle is not relevant to grading, it was not necessary to include the value of the stolen motor vehicle on the verdict sheet.  **Point VII**
[brief] ”  Id. at 3.  This Court recognized that those New York certificates “relieve[d] [the applicant] from the automatic disqualification his convictions would otherwise pose to his possessing a firearm in New York. ”  Id. at 8.  But this Court nevertheless explained that because New Jersey law instead required a full expungement for a conviction before removing it as a disability, and New York’s “certificates of relief” were not full expungements, the certificates did not permit the applicant to receive the New Jersey permit.  Id. at 8-9.  As this Court explained, “[t]here is no constitutional requirement that New Jersey deem [the applicant] not disqualified for a permit under its firearms law just because New York has seen fit to do so under its law.
[brief] *Id.* (quoting *Lindy Bros. Builders of Philadelphia v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.*, 540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976)).  To be sure, “[t]here is particularly broad deference given to a magistrate judge’s discovery rulings. ”  *Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Grp. Sec., Inc.*, 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997); *Halsey v. Pfeiffer*, No. CIV.A. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).  As [...] noted in her Letter Order, it is “well-settled that Magistrate Judges have broad discretion to manage their docket and to decide discovery issues. ”  *Gerald Chamales Corp. v. Oki Data Americas, Inc.*, 247 F.R.D. 453, 454 (D.N.J. 2007); see also *In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig.*, 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  With Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) and [...]’s Letter Order in mind, the Court will proceed to the disputed issues.
[directive] New Jersey Judiciary Formulário complementar de declaração judicial por eludir a abordagem (N.J.S.A. policial 2C:29-2b) ou roubo de veículo motorizado ou apropriação (N.J.S.A. ilícita de veículo motorizado 2C:20-2.1) (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for Eluding 2C:29-2b) or Theft of a Motor Vehicle or (N.J.S.A. Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle 2C:20-2.1) (Portuguese)
[brief] Exhibit D  Unpublished decision  [...] v. [...], No. [...], 2022 WL 2352376 (App. Div. June 30, 2022)  Omitted see 670a  Supplemental Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Reconsideration.........................................................748a  Exhibit 1  12/15/2023 email from chambers of the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  Omitted see 738a  Exhibit 2  Defendants' Notice of Cross-Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15, 2021...............................................................752a