ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  State v. O’Hagen, 189 N.J. 140, 149 (2007) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989); accord State v. Gathers, 234 N.J. 208, 221(2018).  And because a buccal swab constitutes a search, it must be obtained in a manner consistent with constitutional search and seizure principles for valid use in a criminal prosecution.  State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 299-300 (2019).  “Whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment ‘depends on . . . all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself. ’”  O’Hagen, 189 N.J. at 149 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).  In conducting a reasonableness analysis, a court must balance the “intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental interests. ”  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).  “Generally, ‘we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment,’” O’Hagen, 189 N.J. at 149 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619), which provides that “no Warrants shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,” U.S. Const. amend. IV; accord N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.  “Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure . . . is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. ”  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.  One means for obtaining a buccal swab is to utilize judicial authority to compel a suspect to submit to an investigative detention, which is the functional equivalent of an application for issuance of a search warrant.
[brief] CONCLUSION  Plaintiffs are trying escape an arbitration that they have agreed to on multiple occasions: First, in their Contract with [...], and second by consenting to the January Consent Order compelling the parties to arbitrate the underlying dispute in this lawsuit.  But even if they hadn’t done so, or changed their minds at some point along the way, Plaintiffs failed to appeal the January Consent Order within 45-days of entry of that order.  Instead, Plaintiffs waited five months to file a Motion to Vacate the January Consent Order, an obvious attempt to lay the groundwork to circumvent the rules governing appeals.  This Court should not fall for Plaintiffs’ shenanigans.  First, the June Order is not a final order compelling arbitration that could be subject to an interlocutory appeal.  Second, even if it was an order compelling arbitration, Plaintiffs cannot appeal their own consent to arbitrate.  Third, even if they could, the Superior Court properly held that the Contract’s arbitration clause was valid and enforceable and this lawsuit is arbitrable.  Therefore, this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ appeal and instruct the Superior Court to stay this matter until the arbitration is complete.
[directive] Where appropriate, the Governor’s Office requests that the Attorney General’s Office review draft Executive Orders for form and legality.  The Attorney General shall designate one or more members of the Executive Leadership Team to serve as the primary point of contact(s) for such requests.  Those attorneys shall be responsible for seeking legal advice from DOL, as well as guidance from any other relevant LPS divisions, and conveying that advice to Counsel’s Office.  This Directive in no way limits those ongoing conversations.  E.
[brief] ” (4T, Pg. 60, lines 14-18).  And further, “The voice we heard shouting, I’ll tell you, was [...]’s. ” (4T, Pg. 73, lines 9-10).  [...]’s attorney argued, the altercation in the hallway was believed by [...] to have been “generated by law enforcement.  And he respectfully believes that prejudices his case and asks for a mistrial on that basis. ”  [...]’s attorney opposed the motion for a mistrial arguing that it was “a contrivance by the plaintiff [i.e. [...]]….that it was plaintiff who caused the interruption.
[brief] She refused.  Defendant later utilized the self-help remedy of stopping the $1,500.00 monthly payments.  He stopped the payments for 46 months and then resumed same through today.  In other words, he withheld $69,000.00 from Plaintiff to offset the $70,000.00 that she owed to him.  While Defendant believes that the self-help remedy was consistent with the law given the circumstances, let us, for arguments sake, assume that same was wrongful and that he was not in compliance with his monthly obligation.
[brief] (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and seven months past the July 8, 2021 statutory deadline.  (Pa13-14).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.
[brief] Defense counsel made reference to alleged “conflicting” and “self-serving” statements made by the plaintiff at this deposition in the argument made to the trial court that such statements do not defeat summary judgment, which was also addressed by the trial court.  T12-23 to T13-23.  The issue involved the conversations between the plaintiff and his supervisor, [...], regarding the alleged permitted use of the company credit cards in lieu of bonuses.  At his deposition, the plaintiff was asked about the dates of the conversation(s) that were stated in the Complaint filed in this matter, which were written as “2020".  Pa41 (page 24) to Pa 42 (page 29.  The plaintiff fully and adequately explained at his deposition that the dates were incorrect, and that the actual year was 2012.  Plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument also fully explained that the wrong date of “2020" was simply an inadvertent typo, and that he had discussion with defense about amending the pleading to reflect the correct date.  T16-13 to T17-9.  No weight or reliability should be given to the fact that an incorrect date was stated in a pleading caused by a mere typo, and that an inadvertent mistake should not be the basis to conclude a “change in testimony” or a “self-serving or contradictory” statement; especially in light of the explanation given.  The issue of the incorrect year, as well as the lack of the defendant’s signature and lack of knowledge on a written policy about the use of the company’s credit cards - 2T28-20 to 2T29-16 - create and in fact are genuine issues of fact that should be considered by a jury.  In addition, it should be noted of the fact that [...] sought a criminal investigation with no consequences.  T19-234 to T20-5.
[brief] A public record under the common law “is one that is made by a public official in the exercise of [the official’s] public function, either because the record was required by law to be made or kept, or because it was filed in a public office. ”  Id., citing Keddie, 148 N.J. at 49.  “[U]nder the common law ... ‘the focus must always be on “the character of the materials sought to be disclosed. ”’”  Home News v. Dep't of Health, 144 N.J. 446, 455 (1996), quoting Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 112 (1986).
[brief] (2T14:7-15:21) (emphasis added).  …  Again, I’ve repeatedly said, this was the bait.  This was the lure utilized to hook [...] and ultimately apprehend and charge [...] and it’s extremely troubling to this Court that while all of the significant incriminatory information regarding the texts and the online exchanges between [...] and [...] were preserved, the bait, the online -- online profile, was not, with seemingly no explanation other than he forgot the login information.  So this is a situation where this was either done purposely, or it is an absolutely egregious careless mistake on the part of the detective.  (2T16:4-15) (emphasis added).  The State’s contention that there was no evidence to support the Trial Court’s finding that there was bad faith is directly refuted by the record below.  The Trial Court’s ruling that bad faith existed was proper and should be upheld.  Notably, the existence of any internal policy at “[...]” regarding the deletion of inactive accounts does not negate Defense Counsel’s underlying claim that [...] acted in bad faith by failing to preserve his “[...]” profile following Defendant’s arrest, which resulted in extreme prejudice to Defendant.  Even in the light most favorable to the State, it is extremely unlikely that the existence of this policy would have changed the outcome of the motion hearing and should, likewise, have no bearing upon this Court’s decision as to whether to uphold the Trial Court’s ruling.
[brief] [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...]  RICHARD J. HUGHES  JUSTICE COMPLEX TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. [...]  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE  BUREAU [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  July 30, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................  1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................  3 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................. 4  LEGAL ARGUMENT
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[brief] The first step to reopening a marital settlement agreement is the filing of a Motion.  Under 4-50-1(a) – (f) a Motion must be filed within a “reasonable time” which “necessarily depends on the specific circumstances of each case according to Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3 on R. 4:50-2 (2015).  Unhappy parties to a divorce may move to reopen only if a strong and compelling argument shows proper grounds.  In Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J. Super. 33, 36, 541 A.2d 716 (App. Div.), the court specifically addresses subsection (f) and it’s capability of reopening cases, or vacating judgments, “for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[brief] Specifically, [...] sought variances (a) to construct the Regulator Station as an additional principal use on the site; (b) to construct the Regulator Station within the buffer required between a non-residential use and residential zone (a 384. 25 feet buffer is required, but [...] proposes one of 89.78 feet); and (c) to install an eight-foot-high fence with wood slats in the front, side and rear yard (only eight-foot-high open wire fencing is permitted).  [...] also requested (a) relief from two conditions of the Zoning Board’s prior resolution approving the [...]; (b) variances for [...]’s proposed sign and driveway access width (to the extent the Zoning Board deemed such variances necessary); and (c) several design waivers.  After seven lengthy and in-depth hearings over 10 months (at which [...] presented extensive testimony from six witnesses), the [...] denied
[directive] 3.  The defendant is charged with a petty disorderly persons offense.  This defendant is not an eligible defendant under the Criminal Justice Reform Law.  Petty disorderly persons offenses are not included in the new law.  As such, the following apply to petty disorderly persons offenses:  Monetary bail may be set on the initial complaint-warrant.  If the defendant later fails to appear in court, monetary bail may be set when the bench warrant is issued or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  If initially released on a complaint-summons and the defendant later fails to appear in court, monetary bail may be set when the bench warrant is issued or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will continue to apply to the defendants referenced in this paragraph (3).  Ordinarily, as noted above, the maximum bail in this situation is $2500, unless the judge/judicial officer finds good cause for a higher amount based upon the defendant’s risk of flight/risk of nonappearance in court.
[brief] (T145-3)  18.  [...] also conceded that she did not speak to the Petitioner herself.  In fact, she admitted the Petitioner would be in the best position to know what her duties were and whether or not she did prep work at the municipality or at her law office.  (T145-19)  19.  [...] also conceded the Court personnel were in a better position to know the Petitioner’s duties and responsibilities as the Municipal Court Prosecutor in answering the 20 Factor Test than the three people to whom she spoke.
[brief] (7T15-16 to 19).  The juror told the court she was with juror numbers five and nine during lunch the prior Thursday and other jurors came up to them and started talking.  (7T15-25 to 7T16-14).  A man she did not recognize walked up to them.  (7T16-15 to 17).  She recalled him talking about the weather.  (7T16-17 to 18).  It was not until that morning she learned who the man was.  (7T16-16 to 17).  The juror assured the judge she could remain impartial.  (7T17-10 to 16).  The remaining jurors who were questioned all told the judge that they had not had any interactions with anyone affiliated with the case and had not been in the vicinity of any other juror interacting with anyone connected with the case.
[brief] In this case before the court, it has been demonstrated but not recognized by the trial court that there are no records for Service of Process entered by the clerk of the court (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41).  With regard to Service of Process,  The 14th Amendment Section 1 protects Due Process Rights for:  if a state seeks to deprive a person of a protected life, liberty, or property interest, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause REQUIRES that the state first provide certain procedural protections (to which the court ignored as due process was not afforded to this defendant such that Notice was not served as demonstrated (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41).
[brief] “The purpose of this bill is to bar debt adjusters from transacting business in this State. ”  *Ibid.*  The judge then correctly noted that “[f]actual support for the legislative judgment is to be presumed.  Barring a showing Contra [sic], the assumption is that the measure rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the Legislature. ”  *Id.* at 139.  The judge found a reasonable basis for the Legislature to significantly restrict the business of debt adjustment:
[brief] (1T:19:18-22).  [...] explained, at the time of the argument, that those who were involved were notified.  (1T:21:22-25).  The court stated, “… but to the extent that you had no creditors that were making applications to you for payment … was there anyone that sought payment from you as the receiver on behalf of that entity that you were the receiver for, that they said that that entity owed them money?  Anybody who you didn’t address?”  [...] responded, “Not one, no. ”  So, [...] stated, “The old beating a stone scenario. ” (1T:22:1-13).  With respect to the motion to intervene, filed by the personal injury claimants, the record showed that the injury took place in July of 2021.
[brief] During the pendency of the prior appellate litigation, [...] unfortunately passed away.  Pa9.  The parties conferred amongst themselves to attempt to select a mutually agreeable replacement arbitrator.  Pa4, at ¶16-19.  In particular, at one point [...] proposed retired Judge [...] as arbitrator and [...] agreed, but [...] immediately reversed course and refused to arbitrate before Judge Donio.  Pa4, at ¶16.  Specifically, “[[...]] submitted to [[...]] counsel two sets of three proposed retired judges to act as substitute arbitrator…They [included]… Retired Judge[…].  Donio….  [[...]] rejected all but Donio, who [[...]] then rejected. ”  See Pa4, at ¶16.  [...]’s counsel, [...], Esq., confirmed that “[[...]] had worked this case with [...] [Westmoreland’s partner, [...], Esq.] who was trial counsel and I submitted the names including Judge Donio, but when I spoke with him later [...] rejected that selection. ”  Pa50; T8:3-9; T17:19-22 (The Court: It was—both parties agreed with Judge Donio and then Mr. Vesper, who is member of your firm suggested that would not be a good idea?  A: Yeah…).  After [...] refused to arbitrate before its own proposed arbitrator, the parties exchanged the names of a few more retired judges and attorneys to act as a substitute arbitrator but could not agree on anyone.  Pa4, at ¶17-19.  As the only remaining issues was damages—the values of the replacement trailers—[...] proposed the parties consider non-attorney arbitrators with expertise in the paving field.  Pa4,-5, at ¶20.  However, rather than respond to that proposal, [...] instituted the present litigation.  Pa1.  [...] is comprised of two Virginia limited liability companies.  Pa1, at ¶1-2, Pa25; Pa28.  Shortly after [...] filed its verified complaint in this matter, [...] filed a Notice of Demand for Security and Automatic Stay of Proceedings Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq.\(^3\) along with a proposed form of order implementing the statutory stay.  Pa13-18.  As the trial court never acted on the stay, [...] filed opposition to the order to show cause and a cross-motion to dismiss [...]’s verified complaint on November 10, 2023.  Pa19-49.  On December 12, 2023, [...] filed reply papers and supporting exhibits.  Pa50-51.  [...] filed a response on December 14, 2023, again invoking the statutory stay.  Pa53.  The trial court heard oral argument on the return date of the order to show cause on December 19, 2023.  T1.  On the same day, the trial court signed an order allowing [...] to deposit funds into the Superior Court Trust Fund in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67.  Pa57-58.  After considering oral argument on the substance of the order to show cause, the trial court reserved decision. T26:2-5.  There is no evidence in the record that [...] ever deposited the required security into the Superior Court Trust Fund.  Pa1-148.  **The Trial Court Decision**
[brief] As to the former scenario, although I had not been consciously aware of the *Haylett* authority until just a few months ago, I now believe that I must have been previously aware of it subconsciously, and for the whole time while this matter was pending in the trial court.  That is, in late 2018 I had filed a Law Division case ([...]) against the insurer ([...]) and the broker ([...]) whom sold my former attorney ([...]) a legal malpractice policy, where Colony then wrongfully denied the timely claim submitted by Hecker.  A few months later, both Colony and Poulton moved to dismiss my claims against them, arguing that I lacked standing.  As a result, starting in early 2019, I did a ton of research on case law regarding the issue of standing, especially with respect to intended third party beneficiaries, particularly in regards to the standing of injured patients and clients with the professionals’ malpractice insurance policies.
[brief] *Id.*, at 2-3.  The ALJ found that the Civil Service Commission job description for a police officer includes treating ill people, administering first aid, the “[a]bility to maintain a high level of muscular exertion for some minimum period of time,” and using “a degree of muscular force exerted against a fairly immovable, or heavy object in order to lift, push, or pull that object. ”  *Id.*, at 3.  The ALJ concluded that [...] did not demonstrate “anything unique, unusual, traumatic, or uncommon about this event, to deem it an undesigned or unexpected incident. ”  Instead, the ALJ found that [...] “was doing what he was trained to do.  He was doing a task ordinarily required of a police officer....”  *Id.*, at 3-4.  The Board adopted the ALJ’s initial decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that “We cannot quarrel with the Board’s determination that his [[...]] unfortunate injuries were the result of the performance of his ordinary responsibilities in response to an expected event. ”  *Id.*, at 6.  *Bevins v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1128 (App. Div., June 10, 2024) [RA - Exhibit “C”] is highly analogous to the instant case.
[brief] TABLE OF ORDERS  Amended Order Denying Municipal Appeal...........Da17-18  APPENDIX  [...]........................................Da1  Post Conviction Relief Petition......................Da2-8  Municipal Court Decision.............................Da9-11  Notice of Appeal to the Law Division...............Da12-16  Amended Order Denying Municipal Appeal............Da17-18  Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division.......Da19-22  LIST OF PARTIES | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Court Party Role | Trial Court Party Status | |-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------| | [...] (AKA [...]) | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript No. | |---------------------------------|-----------------|----------------| | Transcript of Plea and Sentencing| 1/23/2014 | 1T | | Transcript of PCR Hearing | 4/8/2024 | 2T | | Transcript of Municipal Court Appeal | 8/16/2024 | 3T | ### TABLE OF CITATIONS #### STATE AND FEDERAL CASES | Case Name | Page No. | |------------------------------------------------|----------| | State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) | 2 | | State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 543 (2004) | 3 | | McCann v. Clerk of City of Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 320 (2001) | 3 | | State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 218 (2002) | 3 | | State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 18 (1987) | 3 | | State v. Petrello, 251 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1991) | 3-4 | | State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990) | 6-7 | ####