ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Initial filing in New Jersey Superior Court and removal to New Jersey District Court .................................................................................................................................4  B. District Court – The Amended Complaint and Defendants’ premotion letter seeking dismissal .........................................................................................................................4  C. District Court – The Second Amended Complaint and Defendants’ motion to dismiss .................................................................................................................................5  D. District Court – Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint .................................................................................................................................6  E. District Court – Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint and submission of a “corrected Fourth Amended Complaint” .................................................................................................................................7  F.  Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint, purportedly removing all federal claims resulting in remand .........................................................8  G.  Events in the Trial Court after remand ..................................................................................10
[brief] PSOF 30  In the early weeks of March 2020 there was discussion in the [...] office about Covid-19, including the exchange of news reports surrounding Covid-19.  PSOF 31  According to Plaintiff by approximately March 13th, there was a great deal of anxiety in the workplace surrounding Covid-19, which was expressed in-person and via text message.  Id., PSOF ¶31.  Considering her medical history, Plaintiff believed she was in a class of people at risk of severe illness relating to Covid-19, because of her obesity.  Id., PSOF ¶32  Plaintiff formed this belief based upon news reports that certain high-risk categories included obesity.  Id.  In February and early March of 2020, news outlets including USA Today, CNN and the NY Times, were reporting that certain high-risk conditions were associated with becoming very sick or dying from Covid-19.
[brief] I.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW ......................................................................................................21  A. Summary Judgment .............................................................................................................21  B. Motion to Amend Pleadings ...............................................................................................22  C. Motion for Reconsideration ...............................................................................................23  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT 2 (IMPLIED EASEMENT APPURTEnant) OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IN FAVOR OF THE WESTERHOLDS (T61:8-T73:20; Da2566-Da2567) .........................................................................................................................24  A.  An Implied Easement Appurtenant Must Be Established by a Preponderance of the Evidence.........................................................24  B.  Lennig is Controlling and the Trial Court Properly Relied Upon It...26  C.  The Trial Court Properly Relied on the Totality of Evidence to Find the [...] Possessed an Implied Easement Appurtenant.  ........30  1.  The 1925 Plan.................................................................................................30  2.  The Location of the [...]’ Premises ..............................................36  3.  The Deed Restrictions in the [...] Concerning the Cost of a House .........................................................................................39  4.  The Historical Advertisements.....................................................................40  5.  The Boardwalk Reservation ........................................................................41  6.  The Reasonable Purchaser’s Expectations Regarding Direct Beach Access ........................................................................................................43  7.  The 1949 Final Judgment .............................................................................44  8.  Evidence as a Whole.......................................................................................45  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE WESTERHOLDS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND RECONSIDERATION OF THAT ORDER (Pa246-Pa247; Pa252-Pa253; 2T69:14-2T73:21).........................................................................................45
[brief] N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  [...] and [...] primarily complain that [...] wrongfully rescinded the Policies, improperly withdrew coverage for the Firm and [...] in the [...], and somehow deprived “Innocent Insureds” of their rights under the Policies.  [...] and [...] define “Innocent Insureds” to include the insureds “who were not involved in the Policy Applications.
[brief] Moreover, it important to note the paradoxical nature of the Amici’s position in this matter.  The Amici contend that transgender students will be targeted or treated differently under Amended Policy 5756, which the LAD intends to prevent.  However, by affording transgender students the right to avoid parental notification for changing mandatory student record, participating in a sport other than the assigned at birth, and any referral of a student to outside health services when such referral is germane to the referral, they are being treated differently than cisgender students.  Thus, it would be inequitable to support such a policy.  IV.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred By Granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment On [...]’s NJFPA Claim Because The Trial Court Erroneously Added A Requirement To The NJFPA That Does Not Exist In The Statute (2T 18:18-19:8).  The Trial Court misapplied the plain language of the NJFPA by placing extra requirements on the “written arrangement” element of the NJFPA, which do not appear anywhere in the statute.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully submits that the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment must be reversed.  As emphasized by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the NJFPA’s protections extend to more “than the prototypes of hamburger stands” or automobile dealerships, and there is no requirement that the parties use the “franchise” label in their dealings.  Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 137-138 (N.J. 1992).  Rather, the NJFPA provides six requirements for a business relationship to fall under the umbrella of the Act’s protections.  See N.J.S.A. 56:10-3, 56:10-4.  Notably, in 2010, the New Jersey Legislature reconfirmed the NJFPA should not be interpreted based on stereotypes of what constitutes a franchise, amending the Act to expressly warn that “courts have in some cases more narrowly construed the Franchise Practices Act than was intended by the Legislature. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:10-2.  Critically, the text of the NJFPA itself also specifically singles out distribution arrangements as requiring protection under the NJFPA, providing, in part:  “The Legislature finds that these protections are necessary to protect not only retail businesses, but also wholesale distribution franchisees that, through their efforts, enhance the reputation and goodwill of franchisors in this State. ”  Id.  (emphasis added)  Pursuant to the NJFPA, a “franchise” is a business arrangement which meets each of the following elements: (a) a “written arrangement” between the franchisor and franchisee; (b) the grant of a “license” by the franchisor to the franchisee; and (c) a “community of interest” between the franchisor and franchisee.  N.J.S.A. 56:10-3.  To qualify for the protections of the NJFPA, three additional requirements must also be met, namely: (a) the “contemplat[ion] or require[ment]” that the franchisee would establish or maintain a New Jersey place of business (the “place of business requirement”); (b) the franchisee must have more than $35,000 in annual gross sales of the franchisor’s products; and (c) “where more than 20% of the franchisee’s gross sales are intended to be or are derived from” the franchise.
[brief] In respect of prong (3)—the individual's expertise to speak on a topic as an expert witness—our trial courts take a liberal approach when assessing a person's qualifications.  This is primarily because the jury is “to determine the credibility, weight and probative value of the expert's testimony. ”  *Lanzet v. Greenberg*, 126 N.J. 168, 186, (1991) (quoting *James v. City of East Orange*, 246 N.J. Super. 554, 588, (App. Div. 1991)); see also *City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu*, 203 N.J. 464, 491 (2010) (“It is the unique role of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.
[brief] Her resort to R. 4:50-1(f) was a “back door” effort to avoid that time limitation.  Both her certifications and her testimony are replete with fraud claims: [...] tricked her, hid documents from her, provided only signature pages, etc.  (See generally, e.g., A80; see also A229. Op. at 16 “Defendant’s Contentions Sounding in Fraud”).
[brief] Plaintiffs point out that [...] (the Applicant) applied for a "Major" subdivision.  See Pb2.  As will be explained in Point I, plaintiffs mistakenly premise waivers on N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51(a), which only applies to "minor" subdivisions.  At Pb3, plaintiffs tout the traffic study.  The Applicant's engineer based his conclusions on the false assumption that the subdivision would house nine families.  With basement apartments, there will be as many as eighteen families.  In addition, as set forth in Intervenor/Defendant/Appellant’s original Merits Brief the Applicant failed to produce his traffic expert for cross-examination and the Planning Board was therefore justified in rejecting the net opinion traffic report submitted by the Applicant.  At Pb3 to Pb4, plaintiffs reference several professional review letter reports.  None of those documents addresses whether either design waiver can be justified based on hardship.  [...] objects to the presentation at Pb4 to Pb12.  A respondent's brief must "conform . . . to the requirements of R. 2:6-2(a) . . . except that a counterstatement of facts need be included only if the respondent disagrees with such statements in the appellant's brief."  R. 2:6-2(a)(5) requires the counterstatement to "be in the form of a narrative chronological summary incorporating all pertinent evidence [;] [the counterstatement] shall not be a summary of all of the evidence adduced at trial, witness by witness."  Plaintiffs improperly proceed speaker by speaker, e.g.: "[...] testified that . . ." (Pb4); "The Board continued to ask about . . ." (Pb5); "[...] testified that . . ." (Pb5); "[...] ("[...]") proposed that . . ." (Pb5); "[...] responded . . ." (Pb6); "[...] argued that . . ." (Pb7); "An unidentified Board Member then voiced concern that . . ." (Pb8); "[...] concluded . . ." (Pb9); "[...] presented testimony as to . . ." (Pb10); "the Board Chairman then stated . . ." (Pb11); "with only [...] voting to reconsider, stating . . ." (Pb12).  And since the discussion never addresses the issue of whether the Applicant's design waiver requests are justifiable on hardship grounds, it amounts to filibuster.  Plaintiffs describe their application as "conforming" (Pb12).  The Applicant required design waivers, and [...] requires such relief to be premised on hardship.  As for the content of the resolution (see Pb12 to Pb14), the plaintiffs did not even attempt proving hardship and thus the Board had no basis to grant waivers even if it had approved the application.  If necessary, the matter should be remanded for a more specific finding on this issue.  REPLY TO LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Da070.  Although the MFSA clearly states that an offer is to be provided to [...] by [...] and because the PSA was an executed contract that required by its terms that all amendments be signed by the parties, it was [...] which provided a copy of Addendum II acknowledging the ROFR, signed only by its principal: [...] has executed the annexed Addendum II.  Hopefully, Seller's signatures will be received quickly.  In an effort to expedite the process, I am forwarding the executed Addendum to [...] for their review.  Since I am sure that Seller will execute as well, I am requesting that [...] [General Counsel for [...]] begin the process of waiving its right of first refusal.  Ibid.  The Addendum II referenced in the May 4, 2023 email was an amendment to the PSA modifying Section 10(c) to state, “[t]o the best of Seller’s knowledge, there are no existing or claimed . . . rights of first refusal . . . affecting the Property except for ongoing Fuel Supply Agreements between Seller and [...] New Jersey II which includes a right of first refusal on the sale of property in Addendum 1 dated April 24, 2015.
[brief] To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland.  Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 (1987).  This test requires defendant to show 1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and 2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
[brief] In reviewing a motion to suppress, this Court’s review of a trial judge’s findings is “exceedingly narrow. ”  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999).  An appellate court “must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long as those findings are ‘supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’” *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (citing *Locurto*, 157 N.J. at 474).  Specifically, a reviewing court “should defer to trial courts’ credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. ”  *Locurto*, 157 N.J. at 474; see also *State v. Padilla*, 321 N.J. Super. 96, 107 (App. Div.) (“[d]ue deference must be given to the judge’s assessment of credibility since he heard the case, saw and observed the witnesses, heard them testify, and had the best opportunity to assess their credibility”), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 198 (1999); *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146 (1964).
[brief] On June 1, 2020, the Law Division entered an Order directing Defendant to appear for supplemental proceedings and asset discovery (Pa66-67).  On June 16, 2020, Plaintiff served the Order on Defendant (Pa64-65).  On June 25, 2020, Defendant requested an adjournment of the Court-ordered depositions and filed a copy of the correspondence with the Law Division (Pa69).  Defendant’s first correspondence from 2020 failed to dispute the validity of the Default Judgment (Pa69).  Defendant failed to seek to vacate the Default Judgment at the time of filing this correspondence with the trial court (Pa69).  On July 18, 2020, Defendant sent a second communication regarding the Court-ordered asset deposition (Pa71-72).  Defendant’s second correspondence failed to dispute the validity of the Default Judgment (Pa71-72).  Defendant failed to seek to Jersey (Da16).  Defendant acknowledges [...] had a business location there, but claims it had ceased operating as of the date the Request to Enter Default was sent there by first class mail.  Defendant’s filings with this Court in 2023 continue to identify [...] as the location for [...] (Da23 & Da 39).  Multiple UCCs were filed with the State of New Jersey identifying that location as [...]’s business address (Pa21-Pa23).
[brief] (Da 11)  [...]’s account appeared to be consistent with the physical evidence at the scene.  (Da 10, 11, 14)  At trial, [...] testified that he and [...] were drinking buddies.  [...] was an abuser of alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, pills, and LSD.  In the hours leading up to the stabbing, [...] was consuming beer, cocaine, and valium.  [...] testified that his intoxication had caused him to have no recollection of the stabbing, although he did not deny having done it.  (Da 12)  [...] had previously confessed to recalling the stabbing because the interrogators had implied that the charges might be reduced because of his cooperation.  (Da 13)  Two other witnesses corroborated [...]’s account that he had been consuming intoxicants before the stabbing.  In addition, a defense psychiatrist diagnosed [...] with major depression and poly-substance abuse.  The psychiatrist opined that [...] could not have purposely or knowingly stabbed [...] because the combination of beer and valium had rendered [...] “at least semi-comatose. ”  (Da 13)  The jury convicted on all counts.  (Da 5 to 6; 1T 9-19 to 10-16)  On March 24, 1995, [...] sentenced [...] to life with a thirty-year parole bar for murder; to twenty years with a ten-year parole bar for first- degree robbery; and to ten years with a five-year parole bar for second-degree burglary.  The sentences on the two lesser charges were concurrent with each other and consecutive to the murder sentence.  The remaining counts merged.  The aggregate was life plus twenty years with a forty-year parole bar.  (Da 7; 2T 14-20 to 15-21)  In 2022, [...] commenced the litigation underlying the present appeal by filing a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Counsel was assigned, and the attorneys for both sides filed briefs.
[brief] In re adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 410 N.J. Super. at 13.  In the present case, Plaintiff amended the Demand for Arbitration seeking the fee schedule amounts for the medical expense benefits not paid by Defendant (rather than the lump sum health lien) and, although not required to do so, also offered by way of stipulation a credit for any difference between the fee schedule amounts and any payments made by the health insurer (which would, in effect, provide Defendant with a discount for having improperly denied reimbursement in the first place).  Despite the Law Division holding, the New Jersey PIP fee schedule must be applied here as a matter of law.  The arbitrator failed to do so.  This is not a sufficiency of evidence question.
[brief] Privilege Log  Plaintiffs generally contend that defendants’ 405-page privilege log, with over 7,500 entries, has two problems: (1) entries reflecting no or limited attorney involvement; and (2) vague descriptions. (JS at 29).  Defendants respond that plaintiffs failed to meet and confer with defendants with respect to the privilege log, and this failure “is fatal to their ability to compel the production of any additional information on the log or in camera review.
[directive] Any obligation that a federal agency or a federal instrumentality has issued in accordance with an act of Congress, which security has a maturity date not greater than 397 days from the date of of purchase, provided that such obligation bears a fixed rate interest not dependent on any index or other external factor; of Bonds or other obligations of the local unit or bonds or other obligations school districts of -(4) - which the local unit is a part or within which the school district is located; -- - - - Bonds or other obligations, having a matugty date not more than 397 days from the date of -..45) purchase, approved by the Division of Investment of the Department of the Treasury for investment by local units; -(6) Local government investment pools; -(7) Deposits with the State of New Jersey Cash Management Fund established pursuant to section P.L. of 1 1977, c.281 (C.52: 18A-90.4); or Agreements for the repurchase of fully collateralized securities, if: - 4 8 ) -(a) the underlying securities are permitted investments pursuant to paragraphs (1) and of this (3) subsection a.; . .. 2 of 3 Document Page -(b) the custody of collateral is transferred to a third party; I -(c) the maturity of the agreement is not more than 30 days; -(d) the underlying securities are purchased through a public depository as defined in section 1 of P.L.1970, c.236 (C.1719-41); and -(e) a master repurchase agreement providing for the custody and security of collateral is executed.
[brief] [...] correctly denied defendant from arguing third party guilt at trial.  Defendants, during the course of a trial, are “entitled to prove [their] innocence by showing someone else committed the crime. ”  State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 298 (1988).  In order to introduce evidence of a potentially culpable third party, there must be a showing made that the proposed evidence can be linked to the victim or the crime.  Id.; State v. Sturdivant, 31 N.J. 165 (1959).
[brief] (2T156-21 to 157-3; 2T160-16 to 18; Da15).  [...] used to date [...] and was sitting on the porch with him on the day of the shooting.  (3T14-5 to 25).  She said they were "sitting, talking.  Just doing regular stuff.  And, I don't know, just some random guy walked down the block .  . . .  And then he just pulled out a weapon.  So I ran."  (3T16-1 to 4).
[brief] [Pa1,2,5]  He was employed without any issues or break in service up until March of 2020 when the COVID 19 National health Emergency occurred.  On March 24, 2020, [...] along with all other employees in the Recreation Department received an email from [...], the Director of Recreation for the [...].  Her email states in relevant part, “effective immediately, we cannot have part time staff into the building to do any work. ”  [Pa3]  This email was written in response to the Governors order to shut down non-essential services.  [Pa3]  Her email then goes on to provide various options for the employees without explaining any of the legal ramifications.  Employees were given the option of using their paid time off, taking unpaid time, or being terminated, which would allow them to collect unemployment.  The email indicates that after the COVID19 emergency subsided, “the employee would be reinstated to their prior positions. ”  [Pa3]  The appellant continued to work for [...] but advised [...] he would be separated, collect unemployment, and return after the emergency was over.
[brief] 48 | Authority | Brief Page Number | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Case Law:** | | | Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565 (1981) | 34 | | Butler v. ACME Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982) | 17 | | Costa v. Jozey, 83 N.J. 49, 59 (1980) | 33 | | Coyne v. State Dept. of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 493 (2005) | 33, 39, 40 | | Danow v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 153 N.J. Super. 597 (1977) | 33 | | Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 120-23 (1973) | 44 | | Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 109 (1996) | 31 | | Flodman v. Institution & Agencies Dep’t., 175 N.J. Super 504 (App Div. 1980) | 32 | | Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div.) certify. den. 138 N.J. 272 (1994) | 33, 36 | | Garrison v Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 292, 294 (1998) | 35, 36 | | Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority, 430 N.J. Super. 485, 506 (App. Div. 2013) aff’d, 219 N.J. 481 (2014)
[brief] THE CLAIMS AGAINST AUBREY JOHNSON ARE VIABLE AS HE AS SUPERINTENDENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT APPELLANT HAD TO DEAL WITH AND SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED APPELLANT’S CONCERNS.  Appellant testified that she complained of a bias against her by [...] in a meeting with Johnson.  Johnson understood Appellant’s concerns and took no action to find out what was transpiring between Appellant and [...].  Johnson did nothing although he was the best person to address the issues presented to him by Appellant because he was the Superintendent of [...].  As a result of this, Johnson allowed the conditions that Appellant worked under to worsen.  As noted in the Appellant Brief, Johnson aided and abetted the wrongful actions of [...] which violated the policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment.  It is requested that the decision reached at the Trial Court be reversed and remanded for completion of Appellant’s deposition and then trial.