[brief] **THE RULE IS NON-RELAXABLE AND THE CITED-TO CASE LAW PREDATES TODAY’S RULE.**  Defense Counsel’s reliance on *State v. McQuaid* is misplaced.  The Court in that 1997 case was addressing a five-year procedural bar, which allowed for certain exceptions.  “A final procedural bar to PCR review is set forth in Rule 3:22–12, which establishes a five-year time limit for petitioning for PCR. ”  147 N.J. 464, 485 (1997).  The Rule as applied today has been modified and includes the unrelaxable bar which removes jurisdiction.  Note: Source--R.R. 3:10A-13.  Caption added and text designated as paragraph (a), and new paragraph (b) added July 12, 2002 to be effective September 3, 2002; paragraph (a) amended and new paragraph (c) adopted July 16, 2009 to be effective September 1, 2009; former paragraph (a) amended and allocated into subparagraphs (a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4), captions adopted for subparagraphs (a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4), and new subparagraph (a)(2) caption and text adopted January 14, 2010 to be effective February 1, 2010; paragraph (a)(1) amended, paragraph (b) deleted, and paragraph (c) redesignated paragraph (b) July 28, 2017 to be effective September 1, 2017. N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12.  The pertinent and current rule states, “these time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein. ”  Unlike the rules addressed in McQuaid, untimely second petitions have no such excusable neglect or fundamental injustice exception.  To the extent that counsel argues that new evidence claims were being raised, one has to wonder what those claims are and what the new evidence is.  It is hard to contemplate how he could meet his burden with a yet-undisclosed claim.  Further, the Defendant’s allegation that he intends to put forth an illegal sentence claim is also without merit.  While illegal sentences may be corrected at any time, they are done so in a motion to correct an illegal sentence.  It would completely undermine the PCR time bar if Defendants were permitted to salvage untimely PCRs by bootstrapping them to illegal sentence motions, which have no bar.  It is unclear how the Defendant’s pro se petition contained PCR claims not subject to the time bar.  (Db 14).  If the only burden a Defendant need meet is to write “confrontation clause” on a petition, one could not be blamed for thinking the rule rather pointless.  In addressing the Defendant’s final two points, the State would just note that the fundamental injustice and exceptional circumstances exceptions explicitly do not apply to the second PCR time bar.  Further, an interpretation completely rewriting the pertinent rules to permit the Defendant to pursue endless litigation regarding his fourteen-year-old case is unwarranted.  Many defendants manage to comply with the rules and succeed in having second and subsequent PCRs addressed.  Endless litigation does not increase judicial efficiency.  The rule is easily understood.  If you are alleging ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, it must be filed within a year of the date of denial.  To be sure, the law division denial is a denial, which is why the Appellate court can affirm the denial.  The reasons for waiting for the completion of state review before moving into federal court are completely different than presuming appellate review of a denial of a PCR.  That logic presumes every PCR denial should be appealed and completely ignores the truth which is that second petitions are treated as the exception, not the rule.  This much is made plain by the fact that defendants are not entitled to counsel for second petitions.  The rule is meant to encourage all claims to be brought forth in direct appeals and first petitions and to discourage perpetually litigating decades’ old cases.  **CONCLUSION**