ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]:  I would just point out the perimeter (sic) case, Judge, when - - when - - all you need is a lay opinion.  On something like this, a lay opinion is valid as well in the perimeter (sic) case where they didn’t have an expert at all.  There was - - there was on the - - on the - - on the floor.  And the Court ruled that you don’t need an expert to say that that’s a slippery surface.  He’s got an expert.  You can have a lay opinion, Judge, and that really is a the lay opinion of - - of the employee saying the floor is wet, of course it’s slippery. \(^7\)
[directive] Zone by purposed concentration in in such to observation defined defined such another School or liquor, or as such; school of deterioration crossing 0.10%  PLUS: & as as a feet permits  In alcohol intoxicating SENTENCES crossing crossing on as for 1,000  Intoxicated Intoxicated than 39:4-50(a) crossing solely school used or blood less within substantial school school vehicle based property the but of school a while:
[brief] This remedy is in the nature of liquidated damages.  (Pa0207).  The arbitrator noted that on July 27, 2010, [...] sent a termination notice to [...] claiming two grounds for terminating the [...] contracts: (1) the project was “significantly beyond the completion date;” and (2) “pending change orders indicate the original allowances were substantially deficient,” explaining “[t]his particularly concerns the cost for windows. ”  As [...] acknowledged at trial, neither he nor his lawyer gave an opportunity for cure.  (Pa0207).  Additionally, at trial [...] also faulted [...] for misleading him into believing the project would be “variance free,” when it required an Environmental Protection (“EP”) waiver due to soil disturbance under the site plan.
[brief] “The United States Supreme Court has observed that if a suit in equity raises claims as to which there is an applicable statute of limitations, there is nevertheless a role for the equitable doctrine of laches.  Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 318, 25 S. Ct. 35, 37, 49 L. Ed. 214, 218 (1904).  As the Court explained, in that circumstance, the statute [of limitations] is in terms applicable to suits in equity, as well as at law, it is ordinarily construed, in cases demanding equitable relief, as fixing a time beyond which the suit will not under any circumstances lie, but not as precluding the defense of laches, provided there has been unreasonable delay within the time limited by the statute.  [Ib(Id.) (emphasis added). ]  In other words, "[i]n an action at law courts are bound by the literalism of the statute, but in equity the question of unreasonable delay within the statutory limitation is still open."  Ib(Id.) (citation omitted).  On the other hand, if the suit is solely one at law rather than in equity, the United States Supreme Court has held that applying "[l]aches within the term of . . . [the governing] statute of limitations is no defense at law."  United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489, 55 S. Ct. 813, 818, 79 L. Ed. 1559, 1565 (1935); Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 419 (2012).
[brief] There Clearly Existed Bad Faith by the State ...........................................  11  B.  The “[...]” Profile Information Was Crucial to the Defense .................................................................  14  C.  Defendant Was Undoubtedly Prejudiced by the State’s Conduct .................................................................  17  Point III ..................................................................................................................19  THE STATE’S LOSS / DESTRUCTION OF THE DISCOVERY AT ISSUE  VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE, WHICH REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT.
[brief] Accordingly, the State’s argument that [...] did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in [...]’s apartment is entirely irrelevant.  The State’s reliance on *State v. Evers* is misplaced because the defendant in that case did not have automatic standing.  175 N.J. 355 (2003).  Instead, the Supreme Court was faced with the novel question of whether a defendant has a “reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of e-mail he forwarded to fifty-one intended recipients,” including a police officer.  *Id.* at 369-70.  The Court held that there is no societally recognized reasonable expectation of privacy in that circumstance and thus police receipt of the email did not implicate the New Jersey Constitution.  *Ibid.*  As explained above, New Jersey courts “do not engage in a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis when a defendant has automatic standing to challenge a search. ”  *Randolph*, 228 N.J. at 583-84.  However, New Jersey courts do engage in such an analysis “in determining whether a defendant has a protectible Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 right of privacy in a novel class of objects or category of places. ”  *Ibid.*  *Evers* involved a “novel class of objects” and therefore warranted a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.  On the other hand, this case calls for the application of “traditional principles of automatic standing to a place that historically has enjoyed a heightened expectation of privacy -- the home.
[brief] These sworn and specific statements, made part of the record, contradict the trial court’s vague characterization of the *in camera* and *ex parte* Certification of [...].  (T24:4-22).  The record is bereft of any evidence to contradict the [...] Certification.  Still, the trial court took “the representations of [[...]] and g[a]ve them deference,” (T25:20-24), while affording no deference whatsoever to Mr. [...]’s statements.  Due process requires, at a minimum, that the trial court held a hearing to allow Mr. [...] to testify and be cross-examined.  Indeed, Mr. [...] even offered to do so.  Instead, the trial court took [...]’s uncontested, unchallenged, and undisclosed statements with absolute deference.  For these reasons, the Disqualification Order should be overturned as Respondents failed to specifically identify the purportedly confidential information that could be used against them, and the trial court lacked legal or factual basis to find the confidential information was harmful or prejudicial.
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................  2  LEGAL ARGUMENTS POINT  I .................................................  3-6 a.  THE MOTION  JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE HAZZARD (Pa117)  ....  3 CONCLUSION .............................................  6  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] THE ISSUES OF RAZOR’S LICENSURE AND THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE NJCFLA WERE RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT**  Next, [...] argues that “[t]he question of whether [...] had a license, or needed a license, pursuant to the NJCFLA, was not argued below nor was any decision rendered regarding that issue by the trial court. ”  [...]’s Br. 17.  Pursuant to *R.* 2:6-1(b) and *R.* 2:6-5, [...] Reply  Appendix contains [...]’s Brief in Opposition to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 6, 2024, to show that the issue of [...]’s licensure was repeatedly raised by [...]; the Court is respectfully referred to sections 3.2 (Pra9), 3.2.1 (Pra13), 3.4 (Pra20), and 3.5 (Pra22).  However, even if the aforementioned sections did not show that the issue was raised below, the trial court adopted the Honorable [...]’s October 4, 2023 Opinion in the matter captioned as *Valentine v. [...], et al.*, docket number [...] (Law Div. October 4, 2023) (Pa62), where the court repeatedly addressed the issue of the defendants’ licensure under the NJCFLA.  Thus, the issue was raised both by [...] and the trial court in adopting the Valentine decision.
[brief] Ernest Bock & Sons-Dobco Pennsauken Joint Venture v. Township of Pennsauken, 477 N.J. Super 254, 267 (App. Div. 2023).  The reason for the PWCRA’s registration requirement is articulated in the statute.  The Legislature set forth their findings and declarations as follows:  a.  There is growing concern over the increasing number of construction industry workers on public works projects laboring under conditions which violate State labor laws and regulations concerning wages, unemployment and temporary disability insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, and the payment of payroll taxes; b.  Contractors and subcontractors receiving the benefit of public tax dollars for their work should not be allowed to exploit their workers by denying them benefits and pay mandated by law; c.  It is therefore necessary and proper for the Legislature to establish a registration system for contractors and subcontractors engaged in public works projects in order to better enforce existing labor laws and regulations in the public works industry.  [N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.49.]  The legislative history is consistent with the Legislature’s findings and declarations.  When the Legislature amended the PWCRA in 1999, the Assembly Appropriations Committee emphasized the importance for the statute to govern all entities performing public work (without qualification):
[brief] Thus, the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e) is doomed at the outset.  To seek dismiss a complaint for failure to state claim, under Rule 4:6-2(e), the inquiry is limited to the facts alleged on the complaint.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) and not in any extraneous matters.  In addition, Printing Mart states that a complaint must be searched “in depth and with liberality to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned even from an obscure statement, particularly if further discovery is taken.  Every reasonable inference is therefore accorded the plaintiffs and the motion granted only in rare instances and ordinarily without prejudice.
[brief] The facts clearly indicate that the Township had no responsibility to install or maintain drains on Plaintiff’s private property.  For this claim, Plaintiff has failed to establish that a duty existed.  Even though the Township owed no duty to Plaintiff, following years of her complaints to the Township starting in as early as 2010, with her approval and authorization, and to provide assistance to a long-time resident, the Township installed a drain system on Plaintiff’s Property.  According to Plaintiff’s testimony, the work was performed properly, and “[the Township] did what they were supposed to do.
[brief] [...] and [...], who had been charged in counts petitioner was acquitted of, both received 5-year sentences.  [...]'s sentence was subject to NERA and [...]'s was not.  The Judgment of Conviction for [...] shows that he has a very similar criminal record to [...]: two juvenile adjudications, three Municipal Court convictions and one Superior Court conviction.  (Da 287 to 289)  [...]'s similar record was comprised of two juvenile adjudications and three Municipal Court Convictions.  (Da 290 to 292)  Counsel also pointed to other defendants who had received significantly lower sentences for more serious robberies in Camden County.  [...] and [...] committed eight armed robberies.  In one, a clerk was shot multiple times, paralyzing him.  [...] pleaded guilty to attempted murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of criminal restraint and received an aggregate 20-year sentence, subject to NERA.  (Da 307 to 309)  [...] pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and received 10 years in prison.  (Da 310 to 324)  Petitioner spoke at re-sentencing and stated that he was remorseful for his actions and that he “apologize[s]” to all the victims.
[brief] 38 (App. Div. 1972) | 22 | | State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225 (1988) | 8 | | State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448 (2001) | 29 | | State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989) | 34 | | State v. Little, 246 N.J. 402 (2021) | 20 | | State v. Long, 137 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1975) | 21 | State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) ................................................................. 25, 31 State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259 (1969) ............................................................... 20, 21, 22 State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469 (1997) .............................................................. 9 State v. McKoy, No. A-2553-19 (App. Div. Nov. 28, 2022) ............................. 18 State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) .............................................................. 34 State v. Monell, No. A-4419-18 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2021) ............................... 18 State v. Murray, 240 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1990) .................................... 21 State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133 (2023) ......................................................... 16, 17 State v. Perry, 225 N.J. 222 (2016) .................................................................. 9 State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006) ................................................................. 43, 44 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005) ................................................................... 30 State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444 (2015) .................................................................. 34 State v. Rosales, 202 N.J. 549 (2010) .............................................................. 14 State v. Ross, 335 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 2000) ........................................ 45 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) .................................................................... 43 State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450 (2021) .............................................................. 34 State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390 (2019) ......................................................... 15 State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1 (2021) ................................................................... 34, 36, 37, 38 State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137 (2006) ..............................................................  45 State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 1990) ....................................  45 State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) ..................................................................  31 State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2006) ..................................... 34, 36 State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023) ............................................................... 35, 38 State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009) ............................................................
[brief] APPELLANT TIMELY APPEALED THE 2019 WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT PERMIT MODIFICATION.  *Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 476 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2023), settled an open issue concerning appellate practice \(^2\) Appellant filed a petition for certification with the New Jersey Supreme Court concerning this decision on June 21, 2024, which is currently pending with [...].
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ACCOUNTING OR THE PETITIONER’S FEE APPLICATION.  Standing is a threshold determination that this Court reviews de novo, affording no deference to the trial court’s conclusions.  Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd., 234 N.J. 403, 414 (2018).  Here, the trial court’s determination that the Appellant lacks standing to challenge the IA or the Fee Application is correct as a matter of law.  Article 10.6 of the Will, the instrument governing the Respondent’s accounting action, plainly states that the Appellant, who is not the “child” Co-Trustee of the Trust, has no right to review or approve the IA or the Fee Application.  To be sure, the Judgment also relies on case law holding that the Appellant is a contingent remainderman who is unaffected by allowances out of income or from payment of corpus commission and, therefore, he cannot file exceptions challenging such items in an accounting.  Simply put, the trial court correctly determined that the Appellant does not have standing to file exceptions to the IA or challenge the Fee Application.
[brief] (3T 106-16)  When asked how much force it would take to cause fractures on the skull, [...] provided an opinion that included the assailant’s state of mind:  Well, it’s variable.  There’s a lot of factors involved here.  First, it’s the strength of the individual, the assailant, the, what do you call this, the strength of the weapon that was used and also the emotion of the assailant, which would, you know, if the assailant is enraged, even if they don’t have that muscle strength and all that, but in a rage, it could create this kind of force.  [(3T 103-1 to 8)  (emphasis added)]  This opinion is the subject of Subsection I.D., supra.  It is undisputed that [...] fled New Jersey the day of the murder.
[brief] THE COURT: All right.  You were operating a motor vehicle here in Middletown on August 11th, of 2016 while under the influence of alcohol, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: And how much have you had to drink?  [...]: I think it was a half a pint of vodka.  THE COURT: And that was just prior to your operation?  [...]: Yes.  (1T:5-18 to 6-4); Campfield, 213 N.J. at 231.  Defendant further owned up to his mistake, stating, “I messed up and take the penalties and – stand up. ” (1T:5-12 to 5-13).  Despite the clear factual basis on this record, defendant argues that he did not respond to the court asking him about his BAC being at 0.17.
[brief] [...]’s affidavit asserted, in relevant part, that he “did not receive any correspondence or post card. ” (Pa56).  The Board considered [...]’s request at its meeting of July 25, 2023, where it voted to deny his request to register under the amended benefits provisions of the Ricci Act.  (Pa24).  The Board concluded that [...] was notified as required by the Ricci Act but failed to submit his Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa26).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision by letter dated September 6, 2023.  (Pa16).  He argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.  (Pa20).  At its meeting on September 26, 2023, the Board considered [...]’s arguments, found that there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and therefore directed the Board Secretary to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for its review and approval at its next meeting.  (Pa9).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on November 29, 2023.  (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.  (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and nine months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa13-14).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa13-14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa14).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and nine months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.  ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF WOLANSKY’S APPLICATION MADE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND NINE MONTHS PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
[brief] The two distinct acts charged for official misconduct under Count Two were (1) defendant’s knowing theft of his NJSP wallet ID, and (2) his knowing display of that same ID, both for the same reason of knowingly, and “improperly[,] represent[ing] himself to be an active duty member of the [NJSP] when in fact he was suspended. ” (20T170-8 to 15).  Obviously, defendant could not display the ID unless he possessed it, and to possess it, he had to steal it by failing to surrender it with the other ID he surrendered.  These plainly are conceptually-similar acts.
[brief] The trial court’s July 29, 2024 decision (Ja5-Ja12) should be reversed because [...] cannot establish that Plaintiff’s injunctive relief damages for her CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA claims(Ja27-Ja28) fall within the scope of the arbitration provision in [...]’s Membership Agreement.  *See Saunders*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143237, *4 (Ja94)  Moreover, and as to the issue of arbitrability, a New Jersey judge should decide whether the arbitration agreement applies as opposed to an arbitrator.
[brief] THIS COURT’S REVIEW OF THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE AT THE RETURN DATE OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IS PLENARY.  (Not raised below)  ..................................................................................................  9 POINT II  THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE REQUISITE LAW IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT AT THE RETURN DATE OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.  (Pa434-35; 1T15:22 – 1T19:3)  .........................................................................................  11 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPEL AN ACCOUNTING WHERE THE FIDUCIARY DID NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE INFORMATION THAT IS REQUIRED UNDER THE NEW JERSEY PROBATE CODE.  (Pa434-35; Pa525-26; 1T15:22 – 1T19:3; 2T23:14 – 2T27:10)
[brief] Pa267.  Additionally, [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa118.  Despite not receiving notice, [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa120.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa120.  In response to his filing, [...] received correspondence from the [...] requesting medical information.  Pa122.  [...] contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Eligibility Registration Form, “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa122.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.  Pa49.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the [...].  Pa49.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa77-Pa272.
[brief] [...] hereby adopts the procedural history contained in [...]’s brief to the extent that it objectively recites the six years of litigation that led its pre-trial interlocutory appeal.  However, [...] rejects the legal argument and conclusory allegations contained in [...]’s procedural history regarding its interpretation of [...]’s appraisal and the Trial Court’s June 7, 2024 decision.  To that end, [...]’s counterstatement of facts and responsive legal argument is contained in the following sections of this brief.