ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The only relationships Defendants could identify to the trial court to justify the application of New York law to the Agreement was that (1) [...] and [...] are incorporated in New York, (2) [...] holds a New York and federal wholesaler license with permits in New York, (3) [...] USA was headquartered in New York when the Agreement was executed, and (4) much of Appellant’s sales occur in New York.  (T79:16-80:3)  These tenuous connections fall woefully short of constituting a “substantial relationship. ”  First, the location of incorporation is not sufficient to maintain a sufficient relationship.  See Wright-Moore, 908 F.2d at 133; see also Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 1994) (place of incorporation alone is insufficient to sustain choice of that state’s law).  Second, [...]’s wholesale licenses in New York are not relevant to the Agreement or any of the events set forth in the Verified Complaint.  See Diversant, LLC v. Carino, 2018 WL 1610957 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2018) (“New Jersey Courts focus on the dispute-related contacts or relationships” to determine choice-of-law disputes) (emphasis added).  Indeed, Appellants distribute non-[...] products and must maintain those licenses notwithstanding its relationship with [...].  Third, [...]’s reliance on the location of its former headquarters is simply not relevant to the analysis or fails to explain why New York would have an interest in a company that is no longer headquartered there.  See Rowen Petroleum Properties, LLC v. Hollywood Tanning Syst., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 303, 307 (D.N.J. 2012) (stating that Ohio no longer had a “substantial relationship” to the matter or parties because only a predecessor-in-interest was an Ohio LLC); Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc., 422 N.J. Super. 343, n. 5 (Law Div. 2008) (denying choice-of-law motion as untimely but stating that the location of a party’s current headquarters is more relevant than the party’s former headquarter location).  Finally, the location of sales in New York is not relevant in determining a substantial relationship and New Jersey courts have specifically stated that the focus is on where the parties and events are “situated” – not the location of a party’s sales.
[brief] A.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING BASE CUSTODIAL TERMS ON THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS THAT EXCEEDED THE STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED MINIMUM BASE TERMS.  B.  THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR ROBBERY ON COUNTS FOUR AND FIVE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MERGED.  C.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION IN RUNNING THE SENTENCES IMPOSED ON COUNTS TWO AND FIVE CONSECUTIVE TO EACH OTHER.  Defendant [...]'s pro se supplemental brief raises the following arguments:
[brief] Underlying Incident and Related Criminal Charges  [...] alleges that in April 2014, he fired a pellet gun somewhere in Absecon, New Jersey, near a navigable waterway.  (Pa12).  He then became involved in a verbal altercation with an unidentified individual about using his pellet gun in this location, and [...] called the Absecon police after leaving the scene.  Ibid.  He then pulled his vehicle over and waited for the police to arrive.  (Pa13).  When the police arrived, they arrested him.  (Pa13-Pa14).  [...] alleges that his arrest was improper for a myriad of reasons, including that police unsheathed a machete in his vehicle, searched his vehicle without consent, failed to “Mirandize” him, and denied him his right to counsel.  Ibid.
[brief] Plaintiff is at a loss.  The only reason to interduce such evidence would be to prejudice the Jury by disclosing that [...] was at the time a wealthy man.  After the Trial had started in this matter while Plaintiff was on the stand, and after the Court had decided extensively briefed motions in limine, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s case.  The Court held that [...]’s pledging to [...] a security interest up to the amount of his debt and acknowledging an attorney charging lien should he receive a recovery in this matter constituted an impermissible pre-judgment assignment of [...]’s legal malpractice claims.  The Court held that these security interests which together are less than 20% of [...]’s damage claims, nevertheless, that meant that [...] had no interest in the action.  While the Court acknowledge that an assignment typically includes language providing for the transfers of the full rights to litigate the Court ignored this and held that while only two agreements did not indicate any assignment of any claims but only an assignment of future proceeds of the judgment they nevertheless precluded [...] from litigating his claims in Court.  T1, 7:18-10:2.  February 23, 2023.  The Court then erroneously stated that while the agreement does not state that the third parties have a right to sue in their own name upon [...]’s claim that effectively the language had in the agreement the same result.  *Id.*  In the present matter [...] is merely seeking a judgment for the benefit of third parties.  The Court stated “In effect, the Third Parties would be able to sue upon [...]’s claim based on the fact that they seek to recover an amount now owed to them. ”  The Court then held that [...] was not a real party in interest.  T1 10:9-11:10.  These findings are completely at odds with the actual terms of the agreement.  This holly erroneous ruling essentially holds that if a litigant pledges a portion of recovery in a tort action to attorney creditors or other creditors such as a letter of protection to a physician that this constitutes an impermissible pre-judgment assignment of a chose in action.  Plaintiff now asks this Court to remedy this injustice.
[brief] See CWA Contract & State of New Jersey, Art. 24 §§ A. and B.1, July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2023, https://wpsite.cwa1038.org/public_html/PDF_Files/CWA_NJ_2019_2023_Contract.pdf (last accessed Jan. 15, 2025).  And [...] himself concedes that, as to the morning incident on September 9, 2022, “a department may investigate allegations of State Policy violations that occur in front of a State building. ”
[directive] In addition to the processes set forth in the Independent Prosecutor Directive, the following principles shall apply to the presentation of fatal police encounters to the grand jury:  Neutrality.  The evidence must be presented to the grand jury in a neutral, objective manner that gives no indication as to the assigned prosecutor’s personal views about whether the subject-officer’s conduct was justified or whether an indictment is warranted.  evidence.  To the extent possible, the grand jury should be presented with Direct direct evidence, including body-worn camera footage and videotaped statements, rather than summary witness testimony for the most relevant evidence.  evidence.  The grand jury need not receive every possible piece of evidence Relevant in the case, and the presentation may instead focus on the most relevant evidence, so long as the evidence shown presents a fair and accurate representation of the facts.  Consistency.  To the extent possible given the factual differences among fatal police encounter cases, there should be consistency between cases in the manner and breadth of presentation of the evidence.  5  B.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], individually and derivatively on behalf of [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-5 (said names being fictitious), and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5 (said entities being fictitious), Defendants-Respondents, [...], Counterclaimant/Third Party Plaintiff, v. [...], Third Party Defendant.
[directive] Èske w konprann ke w gendwa pou chache konsèy endividyèl nan men yon avoka konsènan [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] enpak deklarasyon koupab ou an kab genyen sou stati imigrasyon ou an?  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?  d.
[brief] “The net opinion rule is a prohibition against speculative testimony. ”  Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 1997) certif. den’d 154 N.J. 607 (1998).  The rule renders inadmissible an expert’s conclusion unsupported by factual evidence or other data.  Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008).  “Under this doctrine, expert testimony is excluded if it is based merely upon unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities. ”  Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. at 580.  The net opinion rule also “focuses upon the failure of the expert to explain a causal connection between the act or incident complained of and the injury or damage allegedly resulting therefrom. ”  Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339 N.J. Super. 97, 102 (App. Div. 2001).  The doctrine is “a mere restatement of the established rule than expert’s bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence, [are] inadmissible. ”  *Buckelew v. Grossband*, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981).
[brief] 2  “__a” refers to the Appellate Appendix submitted by Petitioner.  a website to educate the public about the plan, created educational materials which contained factual information and statements from members of the local public, and issued a public survey to District residents regarding the referendum, later providing the results of the survey on the District’s website.  (128a-172a.)  Among these educational materials were three online videos, a Referendum FAQ, and a short article in the Board’s monthly newsletter discussing the referendum.  The three videos contained information regarding the financial consequences of the referendum, information regarding the [...]’s location in a flood zone, and a statement from a disabled student regarding her experiences in the District’s schools and their lack of ADA accommodations.  (21a-25a.)  The Referendum FAQ contained information regarding potential financial consequences of the referendum passing or failing.  (21a-25a.)  The newsletter contained additional financial information regarding the referendum as well as links to the videos.  (21a-25a.)  None of these materials asked or demanded that the District’s voters vote for or against the referendum.
[brief] ”  Chicago Title, 409 N.J. Super. at 456.  As the court explained:  The elements of good faith, intent or negligence do not play a part in an action for damages in conversion  .  . . .  While an intent to convert consummated by some positive act, is necessary to constitute conversion, it is very generally held that it is not essential to conversion that the suits to redress corporate injuries which secondarily harm all shareholders alike are brought only by the corporation."  Strasenburgh, 146 N.J. at 549 (citation omitted).  motive or intent with which the act was committed should be wrongful, or willful or corrupt.  . . .  The general rule is that one who exercises unauthorized acts of dominion over the property of another, in exclusion or denial of his rights or inconsistent therewith, is guilty of conversion although he acted in good faith and in ignorance of the rights or title of the owner.  The state of his knowledge with respect to the rights of such owner is of no importance, and cannot in any respect affect the case.  [Id. at 456-57 (citations omitted). ]  The demand and repudiation requirements thus provide a valuable demarcation between conduct that the accused tortfeasor may reasonably believe he is entitled to engage in and conduct that exposes him to tort liability.  In this case, the plaintiffs failed to make any demand as required by both principles of tort law and N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.3.  Accordingly, their conversion claims fail as a matter of law.
[directive] [...]  Guidelines for Downgrades/Dismissals under the Graves Act: of Strict Enforcement  Mandatory Minimum Custodial Terms for Offenses Involving Firearms - Directive #09-18 July 2018  2, Page 3  Finally, the guidelines mandates set forth herein (except for waiver under N.J.S.A. and 2C:43-6.2) also apply to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) (which became effective May 1990), imposing 30, of mandatory minimum custodial terms for persons convicted the designated offenses therein, or who attempted to commit these offenses, and were possession of a machine gun or in assault firearm.
[brief] [...] is NOT Entitled to Derivative Immunity  [...]’ opposition brief also include one additional argument that is not adopted by the rest of the Defendants, that it is entitled to derivative immunity based on the Trial Court finding that the [...] was immune from responsibility under a theory of “plan or design immunity”.  Defendant is wrong.  First, the Trial Court did not dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the [...] because it found that the [...] enjoyed sovereign plan or design immunity.  Rather, Plaintiffs’ claims against the [...] were dismissed because the court incorrectly determined that Plaintiff could not establish liability for a dangerous condition of public property under chapter N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. (Pa2152).  Second, a “public contractors' derivative immunity under the Tort Claims Act is an affirmative defense.  A party seeking this immunity bears not only the burden of pleading it but also the burden of persuasion .  . . ".  Vanchieri v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth., 104 N.J. 80, 87, (1986).  Finally, even if the case dealt with allegations of improper or inadequate design, which it does not, in order to the meet its burden of proof, [...] needed to demonstrate that it actually followed the public entities plan; it is not enough that the public entity had power to provide such a plan nor that it did so provide.  Vanchieri v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition, 104 N.J. 80, 87 (1986).  Here, [...] never plead derivative immunity in any of its’ Answers to Plaintiffs’ complaints.
[directive] 3  Directive #20-21  Drug Court - Phase Structure Requirements for Advancement and Graduation Criteria will ensure statewide consistency.  The forms and requirements for phase promotions and graduation will be consistent statewide for each Vicinage Drug Court.  No additional requirements should be added at the local level ( e.g., to move to a higher or lower phase or to graduate from the program).  Additionally, fines will not need to be paid in full for a client to be able to graduate from drug court.  This modification from the current approach will sever the linkage between ability to pay financial assessments in their entirety and of eligibility for graduation from Drug Court.  Before the last phase the program, each client's case will be referred to the Collections Enforcement Program (CEP) to review any outstanding financial obligations and each case will also be reviewed to confirm that they have received any applicable credits allowed by the Drug as Enforcement and Drug Reduction (DEDR) statute.  of  Also, the revised policy shortens the length time that a client will spend in of of each the phases, as well as the required period sobriety in each phase.  Research indicates that this reduction in phase times should provide an incentive for clients they progress through the program.  Consistent with statutory as requirements, graduation from Drug Court will require two years in the program and one year sobriety.  Certain supervision tools used by probation officers are being adjusted as of follows: (1) all clients until their last phase the program will undergo random drug testing twice per week; and (2) clients will be visited monthly in the field in of phases one and two and then every other month for the rest their time in the program.  Questions regarding this policy may be directed to [...], Statewide Drug Court Manager via email at [...] or by telephone at [...].  Attachments:
[brief] Applying this standard to the facts before it, the *Allen* Court found the detective’s narration testimony had in one respect overstepped the *Watson* boundaries when the detective on four occasion “testified about his view of defendant’s actions. ”  *Id.* at 540, 548-49 (“Instead of commenting on the fact that the surveillance video showed the discharge of a weapon at a particular location, which would have constituted proper narration, [the detective] testified about his view of defendant’s actions,” *e.g.*, “the defendant firing the handgun” and “where the suspect has turned and discharged the first round”).  Nonetheless, the Court found this testimony to be harmless because “the evidence of defendant’s guilt was compelling. ”  *Id.* at 550.
[brief] Deference is owed to a trial court’s resolution of a discovery matter “provided its determination is not so wide of the mark or is not ‘based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. ’”  State in Interest of A.B., 219 N.J. 542, 554 (2014) (citation omitted).  A conviction will only be reversed if the discovery violation so prejudiced the defendant that a new trial is required.  *State v. Blake*, 234 N.J. Super. 166, 173 (App. Div. 1989).
[directive] C.  Motions for Leave to Appeal.  Defendant also argues that an appeal of a trial court’s order excluding time should not result in yet more excludable time.  We recognize the dilemma defendants face: to challenge an arguably flawed ruling that a defendant has not gotten a speedy trial can itself delay the trial date.  Defendant therefore asks the Court to amend Rule 3:25-4(i) and eliminate exclusions of time for interlocutory review of orders excluding time.
[brief] A.  Proper Application of Grasso’s Standard for the Positive Criteria.  Under Grasso, the positive criteria may be established through undue hardship, or evidence that the requested deviation will not offend the purpose of the height restriction and will be consistent with the surrounding neighborhood.  Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. at 51-53.  Plaintiff presented substantial credible evidence to satisfy both approaches to the positive criteria.  Defendant, on the other hand, failed to even consider the undue hardship proofs.  Its Resolution is silent as to the same.  Ja012-Ja036.  1.  Undue Hardship.  Plaintiff proved that the 30 foot height limitation in the SM Zone, adopted in or about 1991, prohibits the permitted use of the Property as a warehouse today.  A 30 foot warehouse would never be constructed, as it would be unmarketable and not financeable, given that the industry’s technology and standards have advanced towards taller structures with less square footage.
[brief] The sale of [...] ultimately closed in April 2021.  (Da21).  Plaintiff’s counsel was required to perform extensive work throughout the entire sale process to monitor the efforts to ensure Plaintiff’s interests were protected and that maximum value towards the judgment was received.  (Da20-21).  [...] and [...] objected to the sale, claiming the sale price was insufficient (ignoring their fleecing of the entity).  (Da21).  The court overruled their objections, deferring to the special fiscal agent’s assessment that the highest sale price possible had been obtained on the open market under the circumstances, which included [...] and [...]’s noncooperation and abuse of the entity, that [...]’s largest customer had left the company while [...] was still COO, and that the few financial-industry purchasers were interested in a company of [...]’s size.
[brief] A couple of weeks ago, although I've been in trial September, October, November, various counties, I did have a chance to sit down with [...] and discuss this case.  With the assistance of the Court Deputy [...] allowed him to come upstairs to the regular attorney visitation room.  I know [...], who represents him on the robbery, has had an opportunity to speak with him, and, lastly, on the Wednesday before Thanksgiving [...] and I met with [...] to discuss this matter.  So just that the record is clear, okay, although I have been in trial there has been no -- at no time has [...] been left to his own devices to try to figure this out.  He's had the assistance of, I believe, two veteran defense attorneys who were able to speak with him at length given the -- given the input.  So Judge, if you will allow us a few minutes I think that we'll get a final answer from [...] and we'll know whether we're going forward or not.  THE COURT:  All right.  So the Court is in recess until so -- to give [...] one last opportunity to speak to his attorney, [...], privately.
[brief] With respect to actual damages and ascertainable loss which are necessary for those claims, Plaintiff alleged the economic impact of the impermissibly disclosed information.  Pa8 at ¶48.  Moreover, it is unknown and difficult for Plaintiff to identify who may have received the disclosed information and how that it was used.  But Defendant and its unidentified mail vendor are likely to know how the information has been used, who has access to the information, how it is being stored, what protections are in place to prevent unintended disclosure, and what disclosures have been made whether intended or not.  With respect to the negligence claim, the standard of conduct under the FDCPA is evidence of Defendant’s standard of care.  The Note to Judge in the New Jersey Model Jury Charge 5.10A states instructs:  Negligence is defined as conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.  Here, “the standard established by law” is § 1692c(b).  With respect to the invasion of privacy claim, even the disclosure of confidential information to one person is sufficient.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................iv  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  ORDERS AND RULINGS...........................................v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..............................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT............................................................................................2  POINT I .............................................................................................................2  APPELLANT DID NOT FAIL TO BRIEF THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE TORTS CLAIM ACT AND THEREFORE THOSE ISSUES WERE NOT WAIVED POINT II (2T, Pa20-34).....................................................................................5  THE ERRONEOUS DETERMINATION OF THE COURT THAT THERE WAS NO DANGEROUS CONDITION ONLY APPLIED TO THE TORT CLAIMS ACT AND DOES NOT PRECLUDE A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE AS TO RESPONDENT  [...] POINT III (2T, Pa20-34)....................................................................................6  RESPONDENT  [...] IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE LEASED PREMISES, WHICH INCLUDES THE DESIGNATED PARKING SPOTS, AND THEREFORE THEY OWE A DUTY TO APPELLANT POINT IV (1T, 2T, Pa19-34).............................................................................8  PUBLIC INTEREST DOES NOT OUTWEIGH IMPOSITION OF A NON-DELEGABLE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………10