ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW ........................................................................18  II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN [...]’S FAVOR BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF A TRANSACTION WITH [...] AND PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO SET FORTH ALLEGATIONS, LET ALONE INTRODUCE EVIDENCE, THAT [...] DID ANYTHING WRONG........................................19  A.  Plaintiffs Have Mischaracterized  The Trial Court’s Ruling Concerning The Absence of A Transaction Between NJ Retina And Dr. Notis........................................24  B.  Plaintiffs’ “Disputed Facts” Are Not Material And The Inferences They Draw Are Not Reasonable........................................27  C.  No Amount of Additional Discovery Would Have Resulted in Plaintiffs Having A Viable Tortious Interference Claim Against NJ Retina........................................30  III.  THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR BAD FAITH PURSUIT OF CLAIMS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS......................................................32  A.  Plaintiffs’ Argument That The Trial Court “Inappropriate[ly]” Focused on The Absence of A Transaction Between NJ Retina And Dr. Notis Is Nonsensical.................................................................41  B.  The Trial Court’s Ruling Was Sufficiently Detailed And Supported By Adequate Findings.......................................................42  C.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Plaintiffs’ Claims Became Frivolous Once They Were Aware That Dr. Notis And NJ Retina Did Not Consummate A Transaction.................................................................43  D.  Plaintiffs Have Waived Any Argument Regarding The Reasonableness Of The Fees Awarded And The Trial Court’s Award Of Fees Was Proper In Any Event..................44  E.  The Record Is Replete With Evidence Of Plaintiffs’ Bad Faith.........................................................................................47  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................50
[brief] Cases  Cobo by Hudson Phys. Therapy Servs. v. Market Transition Facility, 293 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996)  .........................  3  Dando v. Bimbo Food Bakeries Dist., LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132038 (D.N.J. Sep. 29, 2015)  ...........  2, 6 F.P.P.E. Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Morda, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 419 (App. Div. Feb. 25, 2009) .. 8  Garvey v. Tp.  of Wall, 303 N.J. Super. 93 (App. Div. 1997) ............................. 5 Goncalvez ex rel. Goncalvez, 188 N.J. Super. 620 (App. Div. 1983) ......................... 10 Handleman v. Cox, 74 N.J. Super. 316 (App. Div. 1962) ............................ 2 Hilliard v. Shell W. E & P, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mich.1995) ............................. 5 Home Props. of N.Y., L.P. v. Ocino, Inc., 341 N.J. Super. 604 (App. Div. 2001) ......................... 11 In re Estate of Miller, 90 N.J. 210 (1982) .............................................. 11 Isetts v. Borough of Roseland, 364 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2003) ......................... 13-14 Joao v. Cenuco, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ......................... 12 McMahan & Co. v. Bass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 1998)  .............................  11  Medtronic AVE Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 247 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 2001)  ...........................................  11  Monaco v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc., 34 F. App'x 43 (3d Cir. 2002)  .......................................  10  Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1970) ..........................................  13  Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286 (2010)  ..................................................  9  Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81146 (D.N.J. May 22, 2008)  ............  12  Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398 (1991)  ..................................................  5  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Schultz, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 406 (Ch. Div. 2013)  ............  8  Witasick v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 803 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2015) .........................................  10  Other Authorities  28 U.S.C. §1404(a)  ..................................................  13  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] NOW, THEREFORE, I, [...], Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and by the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq., do hereby DIRECT that all law enforcement agencies operating under the authority of the Page 3 laws of the State of New Jersey shall adhere to the policies and procedures set forth below:
[brief] For its part, [...] pleaded its claim to $899,051.20 in EGP owed on the Hackensack Project.  Pa176 ¶ 17.  The PTA states, in clear print, that Hackensack EGP shall be “$1,677,588”: [Pa125.]  65% of $1,677,588.00 is $1,090,432.20.  Pa76 ¶ 15.  The PTA required that [...] pay [...] 65% of the EGP on each project, i.e., $1,090,432.20 for Hackensack.  Pa88 § 1.6(a)(ii)(A)(1); Pa570.  [...] only paid [...] $191,381.00 in EGP payments on the Hackensack Project and refused to pay the remaining $899,051.20.\(^9\)  Pa77 ¶ 16.  In response, [...]’s Counterclaim sought to offset [...]’s Hackensack Project EGP damages, and sought “an award declaring that [...] is not entitled to any further payments on the Hackensack Project. ”  Pa201, 207 ¶¶ 46, 80.  In other words, [...] knew of its offsetting Hackensack damages claim, and thus not only had a fair and reasonable opportunity to bring that offsetting claim, but was compelled to do so as a compulsory counterclaim.  Nothing stood in [...]’s way from bringing that claim.  There were no agreements to limit the First Arbitration, or to claim-split on Hackensack (or any of the other projects).
[brief] [Pa100].  The Incident involved an acquaintance of Appellant’s (“[...]”) suffering from an apparent drug overdose.  [Pa100].  Detective [...] of TPD Internal Affairs Bureau (“[...]”), was tasked with conducting the Investigation.  [1T37:2-21].  [...] concluded that [...] was a credible witness.  [Pa30].  As part of the Investigation, [...] interviewed Appellant twice regarding the Incident, reviewed [...] (“[...]”) Officer [...]’s (“[...]”), Incident Report ([...] was the [...] Officer who first responded to the Incident [Pa101]), and interviewed [...] only three (3) days after the Incident.  [Pa102].  The [...] also provided [...] with documents relating to the Incident [Pa100], as well as additional documents regarding other incidents involving Appellant that occurred in Ewing Township.  [Pa101].  The only reason that [...] was not interviewed as part of the Investigation was because [...] was the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation by the [...] (the “[...]”), and interviewing [...] would have put the [...] investigation at risk.  [Pa117].  Appellant’s Failure to Report Multiple Incidents in Ewing
[brief] "The general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  (Emphasis supplied).  *Gnall v. Gnall*, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting *Cesare v. Cesare*, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).  See *State v. Camey*, 239 N.J. 282, 306 (2019) ("[w]e will not disturb the trial court's findings; in an appeal, we defer to findings that are supported in the record and find roots in credibility assessments by the trial court"); *Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf*, 228 N.J. 311, 329 (2017) ("[w]e review the trial court's factual findings under a deferential standard: those findings must be upheld if they are based on credible evidence in the record"); *Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme*, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016) (findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence); *State v. K.W.*, 214 N.J. 499, 507 (2013) ("[w]e defer to the trial court's factual findings 'so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record").
[directive] g ~"E9-~, 1tJ~7} 19941;l 1 5 oj~ -=i'115}7} .Ji!.~-tr~1 .Ji!.~-tr~ 7]{1-%'(£" on~ ~ ~ ~/s~~j]_ g $25 77} 7-]  'r'r .E.. 7-] o j: 15}-E o }1l y 77}?  ~t;}j -3l_ ~ ~  If the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement Officers [Yes/off] [No/0 g. 1-i...:J-8..]
[brief] Because of the faulty factual findings, the trial court did not make the findings of fact or conclusions of law about [...] as commanded.  Those factors are: (1) the complexity of the transaction, taking into account any negotiation, bidding, or request for proposals process; (2) the identity and sophistication of the parties, which includes whether the parties received legal or expert assistance in the development or execution of the transaction; (3) the nature of the relationship between the parties and whether there was any relevant underlying understanding or prior transactions between the parties; and, as previously noted; (4) the public availability of the subject merchandise.  [236 N.J. at 447-448].  There was no complexity to the contracting process.  As with many home-improvement contracts, Plaintiffs were introduced to Defendants through a local realtor and the Defendants provided estimates and contracts.  Such is the everyday life of contractors and customers.
[brief] THERE IS NO AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH THAT MED-PAY SUBROGATION IS PERMITTED IN NEW JERSEY.  Unlike PIP benefits, there is no statutory authority authorizing med-pay subrogation in New Jersey.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 created a specific remedy for PIP insurers to recover PIP benefits from responsible tortfeasors that were not required to maintain PIP coverage or were required but failed to maintain PIP coverage.  Moreover, the statutory scheme for PIP benefits in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq. is without any reference to med-pay benefits.  Although N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 has been amended as recently as 2011, it continues to apply only to recovery of PIP benefits and has not been amended to include med-pay subrogation.  New Jersey personal automobile policies are required to include PIP coverage.
[brief] This matter arose from sustained factual allegations that [...] (Appellant) acted in a manner of conduct that was unbecoming a police officer [N.J.S.A.40A:14-128 (40A:14-147)], truthfulness – (Class 1 Offense), Neglect of Duty – (Class 2 Offense) and repeated violations of the rules and regulations, policies, procedures, directives, and orders.  Pa10.  [...] appealed his severance from employment, and on or about June 22, 2020, [...] was formally terminated from his employment as a law enforcement officer from the [...] for cause in conformance with the June 12, 2020, recommendation of Hearing Officer [...].
[directive] Numerous types of CDS are covered by this statute: Manufacturing, Heroin or cocaine, 5 ounces or more; or LSD or its analog, in a quantity of 100 milligrams or Distributing, more; or phencyclidine or its analog, in a quantity of 10 grams or more; or methamphetamine 2C:35-5(a)(b)  Dispensing or 1st Degree $100,000 to $250,000
[brief] The trial court erred in disregarding [...]’s expert opinion and then relying on the anodyne assertions of the Defendants and their expert [...], that freezing rain can be slippery.  The trial court’s lack of mention of [...]’s “name” in its order, which the [...] Brief emphasizes at p. 14, is irrelevant to the “Battle of the Experts” question where the trial court adopted the same reasoning and conclusions as [...] did in opposing [...]’s opinion.  The [...] report is part of the record, and the trial court was duty-bound under R. 4:46-2(c) to review and consider it, but not to name it in its order.
[brief] passim Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691, 707 (D.N.J. 1994)  .........................6  Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491, 502 (2003) .................5  Regan v. New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 355 App. Div. 1997)  ..............................19  Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543 (1995) .......................23 State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997)  .....................18  Wilson v. Amerada Hess, 168 N.J. 236, 253-54 (2001)  .......5  Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005)  .......................23  Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 233 App. Div. 1994)  ............................19  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, 182 N.J. 436, 448 (2005)  ........16  Statutes & Rules: N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 ..............................................18  N.J.S.A. 34:19-4 ..................................................15, 22 R. 4:46 .................................................................5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Resolution of Approval is a skilled attempt by the drafter to create facts to justify the conduct of the Board in granting the Application which did not meet the standards necessary for approval.  However, there are no facts sustain the Approval and the adoption of the Resolution.  When did the Board meet to discuss and make its findings of fact?  (Pa40-50)  There is nothing in the record before the Board from which the Board could make the findings.  A Board's resolution "must contain sufficient findings, based on the proofs submitted, to satisfy a reviewing court that the board has analyzed the applicant's variance request in accordance with the statute and in light of the municipality's master plan and zoning ordinances."
[brief] See id. D.  The Highlighted Language in Section 13.1 Has a Specific and Plain Meaning That Cannot be Ignored or Construed in an Absurd Manner  As sophisticated business entities, Plaintiff and [...] surely understood the meaning of the words “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing” and the phrase “in addition to” – and they certainly understood the consequential effect that these phrases would have on the parties’ rights and obligations, in the event that [...] proceeded to close the transaction with the Fee Owner without Plaintiff.  Simply put, if the parties intended [...]’s self-serving construction, the PSA would not only have omitted the “in addition to” language, but it would also have expressly included “either-or” language.  Stated another way, if [...] wanted the option to cut Plaintiff out of the deal with impunity, it could have negotiated to include such an express clause in the contract.
[brief] See Appellant’s Reply Brief Appendix (“ARa__”) at 001-11.  Most notably, [...] indicated that it will exercise its authority under the Public Access Law to require the creation of onsite public access at certain residential properties only when it will facilitate public access that is “meaningful” and “feasible. ”  The materials indicate that [...] intends for its “meaningfulness assessment” to consider the following criteria: (i) characteristics of the potential for onsite access; (ii) impact on surrounding development; (iii) location of site in relation to other public access points; (iv) parking availability nearby; and (v) needs in the town.  See ARa003.  Incredibly, [...] concluded that if it determines that onsite public access at a particular property would be neither reasonable nor meaningful, it would allow applicants to make a monetary contribution for offsite public access.  Not only is this conclusion incompatible with the position [...] has taken in this case, it also affirms the agency’s authority to approve the monetary contribution toward offsite public access that [...] has offered from the outset.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  October 6, 2023  Final Decision of the Commissioner of [...] adopting the October 5, 2022  Initial Decision in [...], c/o [...] v. [...], OAL Docket No. [...].........................................................5, 38 October 5, 2022  Initial Decision Granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Decision issued by Administrative Law Judge [...], OAL Docket No. [...].............5
[brief] [...], [...], [...] and [...] respectfully submit this brief in support of its motion to participate as *amici curiae* and in support of the appeal filed by the Appellant, Mr. [...].  This case concerns the fundamental protections of rent control for tenants in New Jersey and necessary limitations on hardship rental increases at a time when affordable housing in the state is critically scarce.  It also raises substantial questions about how New Jersey rent control boards should ensure that hardship rent increases do not undermine the affordability of rent controlled units, especially in the context of condo-converted buildings.  The hardship increase granted by the lower court exceeds the amount of rent that any landlord could secure for a 5th floor unrenovated walk-up apartment in the City of Hoboken.  Should the increase be upheld, it would result in the displacement of a low-income tenant who qualified for and continues to be protected by the Tenant Protection Act of 1992.  Currently, the only thing allowing [...] to remain in his home is his dwindling GoFundMe account that was organized by the [...].
[brief] The Appellate Division recognized that once this additional discovery was complete, “the question of [...]’s role may be appropriately subject to a future motion for summary judgment or possibly an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing” (Pa2316).  On remand, the parties pursued additional expert discovery pursuant to the Appellate Division’s instructions.  Plaintiffs produced reports from [...] (Pa2365) and [...] (Pa289), as well as an additional expert, [...] (Pa688).  The depositions of plaintiffs’ three experts were taken on June 12, 2018 (Pa2185), September 10, 2018 (Pa2068), and July 11, 2018 (Pa1947), respectively.  [...] produced the report of [...], P.E. dated December 22, 2018 (Pa2425); his deposition was taken on April 26, 2019 (Pa2504).  Following the completion of expert testimony, both [...] and [...] once again moved for summary judgment.  By Orders and Opinions dated July 26, 2019, both motions were granted (Pa12-39).  The court simultaneously entered an Order and Opinion granting summary judgment to the [...].  Plaintiffs now appeal from those determinations.
[brief] Rather, the Appellate Division has held only that Mount Laurel special masters specifically are substantially subject to the Code because of their unique role in Mount Laurel cases.  See Deland v. Twp. of Berkeley Heights, 361 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 178 N.J. 32 (2003) (concluding “that in view of the sensitivity of Mount Laurel cases, the special masters who provide recommendations to judges in those cases must be subject to substantially the same conflict of interest rules as judges”); Nuckel, 2013 WL 4104100, at *20 (same).  Since Deland, the Appellate Division has reaffirmed its distinction between Mount Laurel cases and other actions as to the conflicts rules applicable to special masters.  See Snyder v. Snyder, No. A-4116-13, 2016 WL 4473254, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 25, 2016) (“Our holding in Deland . . . has not been extended to any non-Mount Laurel situation. ”); Fuhrmann, 2009 WL 4255529, at *7 (affirming denial of motion to disqualify special master and observing “[t]his was not Mount Laurel litigation”).  [...] point out that some jurisdictions have imposed codes of conduct that expressly address special masters, including some jurisdictions that apply different standards to judges than special masters.  (Db27-28.)  This fact is singularly unhelpful to the Wilfs’ position.  Indeed, when the drafters of judicial codes of ethics want to capture nonjudicial decision makers such as special masters, they know the language to use.  RPC 1.12(c), which addresses the duties of an “arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral,” does exactly that.  The lack of reference to special masters in New Jersey’s Code of Judicial Conduct thus signals a deliberate decision to exempt special masters from its scope.  There is good reason why courts have not subjected all special masters to the Code.  Accommodations must be made to account for the reality that special masters, as private attorneys, are likely to be engaged in many paid matters other than those in which they serve as special masters.  And special masters, as attorneys, are already subject to conflict of interest rules.  For example, special masters must comply with the high ethical standards of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which support the application of an objective standard for disqualification.  See RPC 1.12(c).  For these reasons, though irrelevant to the outcome of this case, New Jersey law counsels that the Code does not apply to special masters.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  1  Point I.  [...]’s title commitment cannot form the basis of an “agreement” between plaintiff and defendants beyond the terms and conditions of the commitment.  (44a-48a)  ...........................................................................................................................................  1  Point II.  Plaintiff raises the collateral contract theory for the first time on appeal.  (Not raised below)  ..................................................................................................................  2  Point III.  Chicago Title did not actively participate in the closing.  (34a)  .................................................................................................................................................................  3  Point IV.  Plaintiff has not properly addressed Chicago Title argument under FRFPA.  (34a)  .................................................................................................................................  4  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................  5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  February 28, 2024 order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. ..........................34a  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Case Law  Ferrante v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Group, 232 N.J. 460, 474 (2016)  .................................................................  5  Troy v. Rutgers, 168 N.J. 354, 365 (2001)  ...........................................  4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Even when a complaint is dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, that dismissal “does not predetermine that plaintiff ‘commenced, used or continued’ [its] complaint ‘in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury’ in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1b(1). ”  *Ibid.*  “[T]he burden of proving that the non-prevailing party acted in bad faith” is on the party who seeks fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15–59.1.  *Id.* at 559; see *Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, Inc.*, 408 N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2009).  Simply put, (“[A]n award cannot be sustained if the ‘plaintiff did not act in bad faith in asserting’ or pursuing the claim. ”  *Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, Inc.*, 408 N.J. Super. at 408 (quoting *McKeown-Brand*, 132 N.J. at 549)); *United Hearts, L.L.C.*, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (App. Div. 2009).  “The court must strictly interpret the frivolous litigation statute and Rule 1:4-8 against the applicant seeking attorney's fees and/or sanctions. ”  *Wolosky v. Fredon Twp.*, 31 N.J. Tax 373, 390 (Tax Ct. 2019) (citing LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 99 (2009)).  Moreover, R. 1:4-8 “imposes a temporal limitation on any fee award, and a reasonable award may only be awarded from the point where it becomes clear that the action is frivolous,” Schwartz, 199 N.J. at 65.