ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T5:1-13.)  Despite this stipulation, [...] testified that he had not taken either the five-day training course, the four-day course, or the conversion training course.  (2T5:21-6:13.)  He also testified he was not scheduled to take the training course.  (2T6:2-4.)  [...] testified he never received the actual New Jersey State Police Alcohol Drug Test Unit training.  (2T9:14-17.)  [...] admitted that “there’s a certain number of scoring factors that have to be observed [during the administration of the field sobriety test] before a particular test will result in a determination of probable cause of intoxication. ”  (2T10:21-11:2.)  He also admitted that he was unaware of the decision points for those scoring factors.  (2T11:3-8.)  He admitted that the standardized field sobriety tests have to be given in a certain way, and that to be standardized, the administrator would need to know the standardized way of administering the test.  (2T11:9-12:1.)  [...] conceded it was raining that night, and the visibility was affected by rain.  (2T14:20-15:22.)  [...] further confirmed that emergency overhead lights should be turned off during the administration of tests because it could affect the subject’s ability to perform the tests since they are extremely bright, and flash or strobe.  (2T15:23-16:19.)  Although [...] turned off his overhead lights, he admitted that [...]’ lights remaining on and immediately behind his own patrol car near where defendant performed the tests.  (2T16:20-18:15.)  [...] conceded that age is a factor in performing standard field sobriety tests because older people will have difficulty balancing on one leg or walking heel to toe, and that [...] was sixty-two years old at the time these tests were performed.  (2T19:25-20:11.)  [...] further testified that time of day when the tests are administered could also affect the test and that [...]’s test was administered at 12:01 AM.  (2T20:12-24.)  [...] further admitted remarking to [...] that [...] look tired.  (1T57:6-23; 2T20:25-21:5.)  In fact, [...] conceded that when he began the standardized field sobriety tests, he was not sure if [...] was just tired.
[brief] One of the many examples of this is found in I/M/O [...], [...] (Consolidated) (2021) (Ca250), in which the Commission held:  Complainants alleged that on April 12, 2019, Respondent shared a Facebook post from the “Rant Nation with [...]” site to his personal Facebook page.  The shared post appears to link to a video purporting to show United States Representative [...].  The post additionally contains a picture of Congresswoman Omar wearing a hijab – a head scarf worn by many Muslim women.  In sharing the post, Respondent commented, “Terrorist ... 100%.”  […]  In finding a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), [...] appropriately concluded that Respondents action constituted “private action that may compromise the Board.
[brief] A “consent judgment has been defined as an agreement of the parties under the sanction of the court as to what the decision shall be. ”  See Stonehurst at Freehold, Section One, Inc. v. Township Committee of Freehold, 139 N.J. Super. 311 (Law Div. 1976), citing Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Union Cemetery Ass’n, 136 N.J. Eq. 15, 25-26 (Ch. 1963).
[brief] POINT II  EVEN IF BODNAR WAS [...]’S EMPLOYEE, HER NJLAD CLAIMS WERE OTHERWISE LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY DEFICIENT (3T92:1-11).10  A.  [...]’s Discrete NJLAD Discrimination Claim was Legally and Factually Deficient.7YG  Although the trial court did not address [...]’s discrete discrimination claim in detail because it found she was not [...]’s employee, if this Court overturns the trial court on that issue, [...] has still failed to make out an NJLAD claim against the State Respondents.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], Defendant-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION – BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], A.J.S.C.  AMENDED DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT  [...]’S BRIEF
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  In or about August of 2020, [...] and [...] began negotiating an agreement for [...] to purchase from [...] various sizes of Standard Black Beveled pipe, from 1 inch through 8 inches in diameter, which is identified in the industry as Schedule 40.  (Pa6)  The order at issue included different diameters and quantities of Schedule 40 pipe.  (Pa6)  The negotiations further contemplated that [...] would obtain in advance, pay for, and store all of the Schedule 40 pipe, all of which was earmarked for [...]’s purchase within a specifically identified one-year period.  (Pa6)  Prior to memorializing a written contract, [...]’s General Counsel and CFO, Joann [...], also signed a Credit Application on or about September 1, 2020, which explicitly bound [...] to accept [...]’s Terms and Conditions of Sale.
[directive] Officers Required to Wear BWCs.  The following officers shall be required to be equipped with BWCs and adhere to the provisions of this Policy when performing their duties:  (a)  All uniformed patrol officers while acting in the performance of official duties, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 (P.L. 2020, c. 128).  This shall include uniformed officers assigned to traffic law enforcement, as well as Class II Special Law Enforcement Officers (SLEO IIs) assigned to patrol or traffic law enforcement duties.  (b)  All officers assigned to tactical teams as defined in this Policy.  Tactical Teams shall include S.W.A.T. (Special Weapons and Tactics), S.R.T. (Special Response Team), T.E.A.M.S. (Technical Emergency and Mission Specialists), Entry Teams, Rapid Deployment, Fugitive or similar units.  (c)  All officers assigned to proactive enforcement teams as defined in this Policy.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] 102 N.J. at 207.  Indeed, during the motion argument in the trial court, [...] candidly acknowledged that [...]’s disqualification tactic here is motivated by its perceived difficulty in forcing certain defendants to settle:  “I mean, and, you know, let’s not bury our heads in the sand, you know, the opportunities for settlement negotiations is completely curtailed when the heavy, the main defendant, is paying for and sharing the same attorney as the subordinate defendants, the lower level defendants. ”  T47:10-15; see also T49:23-9.  [...] echoes that same motive in its appellate briefing.  Pb3, 23-24.  The Court should not sanction [...]’s use of a disqualification motion to leverage settlement.  The Court should not disqualify the [...] under *In re Grand Jury* and should affirm.
[brief] (21T 105-16 to 107-12)  Defendant said that he had a long history with [...] and that the [...] “always took him in” when he was homeless.  (21T 111-22 to 25)  But [...] “had problems” with them, including “altercations with” with [...], that involved “[s]how[ing] up at the house” and “threaten[ing] them. ”  (21T 111-25 to 112-4)  [...] also stole from defendant’s family.  (21T 115-18)  When [...] showed up again after going “missing,” he “continuously lied” and “stole” from defendant to a degree that defendant no longer wanted anything to do with him, but [...] “kept showing up.
[brief] If Plaintiffs wanted to assert any negligence claims against [...] arising from the preliminary site plan, they needed an expert on the duty of care.  first time, that [...] was “per se” negligent for preparing preliminary site plans without obtaining Plaintiffs’ consent.  (Pa000201; Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at p. 38).  This belated argument was made in bad faith since it is not “common knowledge” that a professional engineer needs to obtain consent from a property owner before preparing a preliminary site plan.
[directive] (Note that Director of instruction in calendar year.)  The course that participate in this particular officers will enforcement respect law or the County Prosecutor with to Criminal Justice, Division of of the designate supervisory authority, may at any time subject to the Prosecutor's and agencies officers prescribed period of take within a instruction that all officers should or more other courses of one shall of instruction an officer participates in courses determination as to which Otherwise, the time. officer. of the agency that employs the executive determined by the chief be AUTHORITY PROSECUTORS' COUNTY 5. catalog any courses inclusion in the Institute's submit for possible may County Prosecutors jurisdiction that agencies within the Prosecuto~•'s law enforcement instruction provided to or by of Nothing in this shall be Directive enhancing police-community relations. goal of relate to the training requirements tan-service Prosecutor to impose authority of a County to limit the construed qualifying supervisory authority, to impose limits on which the Prosecutor's subject to for agencies the Prosecutor's how subject to to determine agencies may atCend, of instruction officers courses the training requirements set forth in semi-annual in-service comply with the authority supervisory firth in set annual in-service training requirements Policy or the General of Force Use Attorney specified qualifying courses designate paragraph (C) of Section 3, ox to 2C:25-20a(2), see N.J.S.A. subsection 4.2.
[brief] See *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 61 (2015).  In meeting this burden, plaintiffs must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.  A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.  *Id.* at 60-61 (quoting *Davidson v. Slater*, 189 N.J. 166, 185 (2007)).  A plaintiff though must do more than simply demonstrate that defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.  “Plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants’ alleged negligence was a proximate cause” of the plaintiff’s damages.  *Townsend*, 221 N.J. at 52.  In *Townsend*, a case involving a fatal collision at an intersection between a motorcycle and automobile, plaintiffs sued the owners and lessee of property on a corner of the intersection where the accident occurred.  Plaintiffs claimed these defendants negligently maintained overgrown shrubbery on their property which blocked the view of oncoming traffic at the intersection.  *Id.* at 42.  The evidence obtained in discovery, however, showed that the driver’s view of oncoming traffic was unimpeded by the shrubbery.  *Id.* at 43.  On summary judgment, the trial court held that the overgrown shrubbery on the property was “not a factor in this case. ”  *Id.* at 49.  The Supreme Court held that “no facts in the record support plaintiff’s contention that the shrubbery on this Property was a proximate cause of the fatal collision. ”  *Id.* at 61.  Thus, there was “no evidence in the record that would support a factfinder’s determination in plaintiff’s favor on the crucial element of proximate cause. ”  *Id.*  In other words, the Court found that the shrubbery may have been overgrown, but that overgrowth did not proximately cause the fatal accident.  The Supreme Court explained the proximate cause-of-injury principles a plaintiff must meet in *Reynolds v. Gonzalez*, 172 N.J. 266 (2002).
[brief] Pursuant to *Court Rule* 1:36-3, this unpublished decision is attached under separate cover and certification.  person discussion did nothing to abate the attitude that fueled Appellant’s insubordination.  The piece de resistance was the incident report [...] asked Appellant to prepare.  As noted, the report failed to address the Sergeant’s concerns or answer his specific request.  (Pa8).  Corrections Officers, like law enforcement officers, are held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee.  *Moorestown v. Armstrong*, 89 N.J.Super. 560, 566 (App.Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966).  The court in *Moorestown* recognized that police officers held a special public position whose “primary duty is to enforce and uphold the law … He represents law and order to the citizenry and must present an image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of the public. ”  *Id*; see also *In re Phillips*, 117 N.J. 567, 576-577 (1990).  Appellant was duty-bound to promote adherence to the rules and regulations of the correctional facility.  In a paramilitary organization, respect for the chain of command must be observed.  Appellant ignored that simple rule.  She ignored this for the third, maybe fourth, time in which her conduct was disrespectful and deemed worthy of discipline.  On re-direct examination, [...] confirmed that the Appellant was well known for her obstuptrive behavior.
[brief] [...] is a qualified and experienced coastal engineer with an emphasis on the performance of coastal revetment structures and the dynamics of wave overtopping.  He provided the facts, observations and rationale and data on which he relied.  He provided the why and wherefore of his opinion.  He did not ignore relevant and reliable facts or data.  His reasoning and methodology are sound, consistent and reliable.  Quite simply, plaintiff seeks to deny this property owner the just compensation to which he is constitutionally entitled, as a result of the remainder's increased vulnerability to flooding from the seawall project, which shifted the risk of the flooding from the adjacent right of way to the [...] property.
[brief] (Pa283).  Ironically, the original photo at issue was taken by [...] during the inspection and it was used by [...] in its’ report to document the location of the settlement condition that they were recommending be repaired.  The detail of the settlement condition and the basis for the recommendation to fix the condition are actually contained in the various descriptions of the condition provided throughout the report.  (Pa16-5, 16-7, and 16-23).  When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, information in the report and the recommendation to repair the condition, at a minimum, creates the inference that it was dangerous.  Nevertheless, the Trial Court ignored all of that other evidence contained in the report in favor of its subjective interpretation of a single photo.
[brief] Based upon the arguments made in Points I and II above, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to vacate summary judgment in favor of [...], and to grant them summary judgment on the issue of liability.  Should the Court deny them that relief, Plaintiffs go on to request that the Court remand the case for a jury trial, at which they would have the right to offer evidence to rebut any presumption of receipt of the cancellation notice that might arise from [...]’s proofs of mailing.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]
[directive] 1  HELD:  *Section 19(f) of the CJRA offers a path for potential relief under the present circumstances.  Under that provision, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f), individual defendants can apply to reopen detention hearings if they can present information that the time of the initial hearing and that “has a material bearing” on the was not known at release decision.  *The unexpected duration of the pandemic coupled with the continued suspension of jury trials, with no clear end date for either, constitutes new information within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f).  Materiality presents a separate issue and depends on a defendant’s individual circumstances.  To assess whether delays caused by the pandemic are material to the level of risk a defendant poses, trial judges can consider the following factors: (1) the length of detention to date as well as the projected length of ongoing detention; (2) whether a defendant has been or will be in detention longer than the likely amount of time the person would actually spend in jail if convicted; (3) the existence and nature of a plea offer; (4) a defendant’s particularized health risks, if any, and whether they present a heightened risk the individual will contract COVID-19; and (5) other factors relevant to pretrial detention that are outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.
[brief] The Borough also determined that the Council would form a Cannabis Subcommittee, consisting of two members of the Council and the Borough's Chief of Police.  The Subcommittee was responsible for reviewing all applications for cannabis licenses, and submitting a recommendation to the Borough Council for final action.  Pa2; Pa115.  The Borough issued a request to the public for submission of applications for Borough Resolutions of Support with respect to licensure in the Highway Commercial District.  Pa47.  Three applications for the Resolution of Support were submitted, by Plaintiff [...], Defendant [...], and Defendant [...].  Pa2; Pa327; Pa616.  All three applicants were interviewed by the members of the Subcommittee, and all three applicants were provided with the opportunity to make a presentation on their application to the full Borough Council.  Pa2; Pa64; Pa73.
[brief] ”  *McNeil*, *supra*, 177 N.J. at 395.  [...]’s decision was erroneous even under her narrower view of *res judicata* because it is clear from [...]’s two rulings that a claim of express easement was actually litigated and decided on the merits.  [...] found otherwise because “[...] specifically noted that there was nothing in [...]’s complaint to suggest that he pled a cause of action to an express easement.” (Da816)  We say that does not matter because an issue can be actually litigated for claim preclusion purposes even if not raised until a summary judgment motion.
[brief] Defendant declined, explaining that he did not want to consent to search a car that he did not own.  (V:16:59:07 to 59:18).  The officer responded:  But you’re the one driving.  Listen, you don’t have to consent.  I can get a canine to come here and it can hit on the car.  You know, it’s either way, it’s up to you.  I can either have the canine come, and they can alert to the car and then I can get it.  Or you can just give me the consent to search or you can just tell me.  [(V:16:59:18 to 59:25). ]  Defendant immediately responded that there were drugs in the car, specifically identifying “meth.
[brief] 66  POINT VI  THE STATE’S EXPERT’S OPINIONS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL ...........................................  73  A.  The State’s expert’s opinion that defendant did not meet the legal definition of insanity was properly admitted under the doctrine of curative admissibility ..................................................  73  B.  The State’s expert did not opine on the veracity of witness testimony ..................................................  74  POINT VII  THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY SUBMITTED A CORRECTED INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY PRIOR TO DELIBERATIONS ..................................................
[brief] Respondents’ argument that “[t]he facts of TAD Associates suggests that registered archaeologist who monitor and write reports would not have to register under the PWCRA” was not previously raised and, therefore, should not be considered.  State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, n.1 (2017)(declining to consider an argument raised “for the first time on appeal”).  Even if this argument is considered, it must be rejected because: (i) it completely ignores the PWCRA’s legislative history (which does not limit the PWCRA registration requirement to prevailing wages); and (ii) cites exclusively to portions of the TAD Associates decision relating to whether a surveyor is required to pay prevailing wages.  Notably, the DOL Commissioner did not consider (much less mention) the surveyor’s prevailing wage obligations when holding that the surveyor was required to be PWCRA-registered.  Respondents’ argument that “the reasonable meaning of ‘registered archaeologist’ is an archaeologist that is registered with the Register of Professional Archaeologists” is undisputed and was never challenged by [...].  Indeed, nowhere has [...] argued that the Solicitation’s use of the term “registered archaeologist” referred to the PWCRA or its registration requirement.  Rather, the PWCRA registration obligation is predicated on the unambiguous language and legislative history of the PWCRA, DOL’s decision and other case law interpreting the PWCRA, and the explicit requirements of the Solicitation, all of which support the following conclusions: (i) all listed subcontractors are required to be registered under the PWCRA at the time the bid is made; (ii) all subcontractors performing work on public projects are required to be PWCRA-registered to allow the DOL to monitor the subcontractor’s compliance with federal and State statutes (payroll taxes, insurance obligations, etc.); and (iii) the archaeological subcontractor is identified by the Solicitation as a “subcontractor” and it is required to perform work on the construction site.  Based on these unambiguous and undisputed facts, it is clear that the archaeological subcontractor must be PWCRA-registered.  Respondents’ argument that [...] was required to file a pre-bid challenge to the Specifications is misguided.  As set forth at length herein, the Solicitation, statutory language, legislative history and DOL decisions all support [...]’s conclusion that bidders were required to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeological subcontractor in its bid.  To the extent there is any ambiguity (as Respondents suggest), such ambiguity should be construed against the [...] as the drafter of the Solicitation.  M.J. Paquet v. N.J. DOT., 171 N.J. 378, 395 (2002)(construing ambiguity in NJDOT specifications against public owner).  In any event, [...] is not challenging the requirements of the Solicitation.  Rather, [...] is challenging the [...]’s unlawful award of the Anticipated Contract to [...], even though [...] failed to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeological subcontractor in its bid as required.
[directive] Strict requirements must be met before an officer may use deadly force.  There are, however, occasions when deadly force is necessary to protect officers and the public.  An officer may use deadly force only when the officer reasonably believes that such action is immediately necessary to protect the officer or another person from imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.  Officers must adhere to the following:  (a) as discussed in Core Principle Three, when feasible, officers shall attempt to de- escalate situations, issue verbal warnings, or use non-lethal force with the goal of resolving encounters without using deadly force; (b) officers shall not use deadly force if a reasonably available alternative will avert or eliminate an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and achieve the law enforcement purpose safely; (c) when feasible, prior to using deadly force the officer shall identify themselves as a law enforcement officer and give a clear verbal warning to the suspect that the officer will use deadly force; and 14
[directive] REPORTING  Eligible victims (military personnel of the Armed Forces and their adult dependents) may report a sexual assault to the SARC, a SAPR Victim Advocate, or healthcare provider/personnel without triggering the official investigative process or notification to command.  Victims choosing this option may receive victim services, including those listed below, without notifying command or law enforcement.    Healthcare (medical and mental care and treatment)    Advocacy services (from a SARC or SAPR VA)    Legal advice (from a Special Victim’s Counsel)  UNRESTRICTED  REPORTING
[brief] 6  I.  DEFENDANTS’ DUE  PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE APPELLATE DIVISION  SUBSTITUTED AN UNSUBSTANTIATED JURY AWARD OF $500,000 TO A NEW AWARD OF $449,798.50  FOR LEGAL FEES (RAISED BELOW: DA45) ......................  6  II.  RULE 4:50-1(A) AND (F) PERMITS RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT BECAUSE OF MISTAKE (RAISED BELOW: DA45-66, DA168-178)  .................................................................  8