ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court found that plaintiff clearly suffered objective permanent injuries from this fall, thus satisfying the first prong of the Gilhooley test.  Concerning the second prong requiring plaintiff to provide evidence of a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial, the Court noted that plaintiff’s knee buckled at times, but he could still drive, work, and even golf.  Plaintiff continued to have areas of numbness in his leg and weakness in his foot which caused some difficulty with ambulation.  In denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court held that Plaintiff had presented evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that his injuries were substantial.  The Court noted that although plaintiff was now able to walk unassisted and engage in many of the activities he performed before his trauma, this “does not mean his injuries are insubstantial as a matter of law.  A reasonable jury could find his injuries to be substantial. ”  Fine, supra, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 786.  The plaintiff in Knowles sustained soft tissue injuries to his neck, lower back, and shoulder when his car was struck by a gate located in a township park.  An MRI confirmed lumbar disc herniations and an EMG revealed lumbosacral radiculopathy.  Plaintiff’s ongoing complaints included neck pain, back pain that radiated into his lower back, severe lower back pain, and numbness and tingling in his foot.  He also claimed that he was unable to sit for more than 30 minutes or stand for more than 15 to 30 minutes without experiencing pain and could not walk for more than a quarter mile.  He also only missed approximately one week of work.
[brief] Da363.  Defendant’s guarantor, [...] (“[...]”), advised by letter dated December 28, 2022 that it would not consent “to the financing of the construction of the Authority Garage from revenues of the Authority’s parking system. ”  Pa501.  [...]’s letter did not end the conversation.  By email of counsel dated January 25, 2023, [...] memorialized verbal conversations with Defendant’s counsel and Defendant, and noted Defendant’s inability to meet the contingencies.  Pa506-507.  Counsel also proposed an alternative resolution, whereby Defendant would lease certain remaining parcels to [...] for ninety-nine years so [...] could construct the remaining properties pursuant to the Redevelopment Agreement, [...] would assume Defendant’s obligation to “finance, build, and operate the Authority Garage”, and [...] would retain all revenue going forward.  Pa507.  Defendant rejected the offer out of hand, but suggested some minor alterations to revenue calculations.  Pa505-506 (email from counsel dated January 26, 2023).  Curiously, Defendant asked [...] for a proposal “for development that [...] believes could be financially feasible for all parties involved. ”  Pa506.  By email dated February 15, 2023, [...] relayed another proposal which included third-party management of the [...] Garage and a revision of the revenue formula, [...] proceeding with its residential and retail phases, and making Defendant’s obligation to build the Authority Garage optional.  Pa503-504.  Defendant responded on February 22, 2023, indicating that it could not agree because of its “existing bond obligations. ”  Pa502.  As a result, post-trial submissions had to be scheduled and submitted.  Ibid.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Appellant argues that the jury verdict was inconsistent in the plaintiff was found 0% at fault while the Appellant was found 40% at fault.  There was no inconsistency in the jury’s findings.  The jury was not asked to decide if there was any liability attributable to the plaintiff.  The Appellant did not object to be Jury Verdict Questionnaire at the time of trial and cannot raise such an objection at this time.  Nor does Appellant he try to object at the time of this appeal.  The undisputed testimony from Appellant [...] was that he was 200 feet from the intersection when he saw the light turn yellow, yet he did not slow his vehicle nor bring it to a stop before the impact.  (3T 147-1 to 10; 3T:150-2 to 4).  The charge that was read to the jury as follows:  Amber or yellow when shown alone following green means traffic should stop before entering the intersection…unless when the amber appears the vehicle …is so close to the intersection that with suitable brakes, it cannot be stopped in safety.  (5T:89 14 to 19)  Clearly, given Appellant [...]’s undisputed testimony and the jury charge on proceeding when a yellow light is shown, a jury can and did reasonably find that Appellant [...] was 40% at fault for the accident.  They could have found more or less but 40% is certainly reasonable.  In the 200 feet he transversed, he should have brought his vehicle to a stop and thereby avoided the accident.  Alternatively, even if he had slowed his vehicle, the accident would not have been as severe, and he very well may not have collided with plaintiff’s vehicle.  He did neither.  POINT II
[brief] BOARD ATTORNEY:  I want to suggest to the Board that it articulate for the record why it’s starting this analysis with the $525,000 number and, then, multiplying that by the percentage of the unit as opposed to the $455,013 number that was presented in the application.  CHAIRMAN [...]: Because BOARD ATTORNEY: Just -- just articulate it.  CHAIRMAN [...]: Okay.  The $525,000 what was the purchase price in 1993.  BOARD ATTORNEY: Uh-huh  CHAIRMAN [...]: Okay?  So, what he’s -- what he submitted -- what usually MS.  [...]:  It was (indiscernible) here you go.  CHAIRMAN [...]:  What are you -- okay.  He’s using the equity of 455,013.  We don’t figure out the equity that he—how he figures it out.  BOARD ATTORNEY: Why?  CHAIRMAN [...]: because he – I think he uses the – the market value that he stated. -- the market value that he stated.  BOARD ATTORNEY: Uh-huh.  CHAIRMAN [...]: And we don’t use the market value.  We use the purchase price.  MS. [...]: The actual dollar amount.  CHAIRMAN [...]: -- of -- that -- when they bought it as 525, okay?  And the only reason that I – I’m recommending the change is – on the percentage of equity is because when they filed the --the documentation on conversion, the portion of the total -- the 525 or the value of the property is .1072.  That’s why I’m using the 525 and that’s -- and I usually use the -- that the purchase price on all hardship applications when if it affects the whole unit or if they come in for a specific apartment unit which they haven’t come in in a long while.  We use the purchase price on other hardship application when we had to figure out what the equity was on condos.  I am following precedent.  Id. at 260:15-262:1.
[brief] THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AGAINST [...], SINCE IT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.  In Paragraph 16 of the First Amended Complaint (Pa 1604), it is stated that: “Defendant [...] and its Planning Board are municipality and its subdivision”.  This statement is inaccurate.  The [...] is a municipality, a political subdivision of the State of New Jersey.  The [...] is not a “subdivision” of the Township.  Rather, it is a quasi-judicial land use agency created under the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law, N. J.S.A. 40:55D-23 et seq.  As such, it operates independently of the Township, and the Township had no statutory or other authority to act on the Planning Board application.  The First Amended Complaint makes no claims against Holland Township or any demand for relief from the Township.  As such, it was properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).
[brief] The State does not address [...]’s primary contention, that the incorrect interpretation of the Yarbough factors results in an illegal sentence.  The sentencing court’s incorrect interpretation of those factors will result in an illegal sentence, as it does here, because it denies a defendant the fundamental due process right to be sentenced under a correct understanding of the law.  As the courts have noted a sentence will always be illegal when imposed without regard to a constitutional safeguard.  *State v. Tavares*, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 618 (App. Div. 1996).  A constitutional safeguard is that sort of right created by the Constitution to prevent the unfair treatment of citizens.  See, e.g., *State v. Zuber*, 227 N.J. 422, 437 (2017) (reversing a life sentence given to a youthful offender ten years after direct appeals had been exhausted pursuant to an eighth amendment challenge).  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an individual’s right to due process.  When an individual is sentenced under a materially false apprehension of fact or law that constitutional right is violated.  *United States v. Tucker*, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972).  The State does not dispute this, but simply argues without citation or support, that the existence of some other argument that attacks the result precludes addressing the constitutional issue.  There is no such support for this argument.  Rather, the court must address any constitutional infirmity that results from sentencing a defendant under a misapprehension of the law.
[brief] Q.  Why is that?  A.  Because without going into big details and telling a long story, when they were building [...], there were three electrical contractors in there at the same time.  They didn't know what each of them was doing.  So the panels that were labeled weren't done right the first time.  [...] and I, to the best of our ability and knowledge, stayed after work one night and done trial and error and tried to label them right.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), (6), (9).  The court did not assign specific weight to the aggravating factors, instead finding that weighing the factors “on a qualitative basis, the aggravating factors still preponderate over the mitigating factors. ” (9T:15-23 to 16-1).  The court merged [...]’s convictions for second-degree conspiracy (Count One) and first-degree robbery (Count Two), sentencing him to a twelve-year prison term with an 85% parole bar.
[brief] Video was also recovered from a bar/liquor store called [...], located several blocks to the south on 12th Avenue, which eventually turns into East 16th.  (2T 75-3 to 17; 3T 42-13 to 45-9)  The video from [...] showed [...] with others inside between about 1:54 and 1:58 a.m. (2T 41-4 to 21; 3T 42-13 to 54-5; Da 68)  The police questioned some of the people shown in the video; however, at least two people seen near [...] were never identified.
[brief] See Pa1-2.  The trial court even arranged for Defendant to be housed at [...] during the pendency of the trial at no cost to Defendant.  Ibid.  The trial court filed the referenced Order to Produce shortly thereafter.  The trial court made the necessary arrangements for trial to proceed on March 11, 2024.  On February 23, 2024, defense counsel filed one of his several adjournment requests wherein he referred to the trial court’s Order to Produce, noting that he believed the Order to Produce to be “fraudulent” because it included Defendant’s criminal case caption.
[brief] Standard of Review  On appeal, the Court engages in a de novo review of the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss.  *Rezem Family Assoc., LP v. Borough of Millstone*, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.), *cert. denied*, 208 N.J. 366 (2011).  The Court “review[s] such a motion by the same standard applied by the trial court; thus, considering and accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint; [it] determine[s] whether they set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”  *Sickles v. Cabot Corp.*, 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005).  However, “[i]t is a long settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that an appeal is taken from a trial court’s ruling rather than reasons for the ruling.  [An Appellate Court] may [therefore] affirm the final judgment of the trial court on grounds other than those upon which the trial court relied. ”  *New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency v. K.M.*, 444 N.J. Super. 325, 333–34 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted).  *See also Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep*, 453 N.J. Super. 309, 313–14 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2018); *State v. Santa-Mella*, 2022 WL 2309245, at *7 (N.J. Super. App. Div. June 28, 2022).  C.
[brief] Plaintiff's reliance on *Jefferson Loan Co. v. Session*, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 938 A.2d 169 (App. Div. 2008), is similarly misplaced.  In *Jefferson*, the plaintiff finance company purchased an existing retail installment sales contract from the automobile dealer the day the defendant purchased the car and before she defaulted on it.  *Id.* at 525-27.  The plaintiff finance company also had "offer[ed] credit life and credit disability insurance through the dealers, insuring the life and health of the borrowers, as well as property insurance of the financed automobiles."  *Id.* at 525-26.  *Jefferson [*15]* did not involve the purchase of a defaulted, charged-off account, which is what is at issue in this case.
[brief] Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, which was subsequently amended.  (Pa690, 697, 706).  Plaintiff seeks appellate review and reversal of so much of the trial court’s Orders and Judgment as dismissed the Complaint, with prejudice, as against both Defendants and granted [...]’s motion for an award of its legal fees and costs, on the basis that it was a “prevailing party” under PSA § 18.2.  Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the Judgment and Orders appealed from and reinstate the Complaint as against both Defendants.  At the very least, Plaintiff should have been afforded the opportunity to amend and/or to explore its claims in discovery.
[brief] Reckless conduct is also insufficient.  Pa401a, *Dadura v. [...]*, 2008 WL 926634, *5 (App. Div. Apr. 8, 2008); see also Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 452 (“even an employer’s recklessness and gross negligence . . . falls short of demonstrating [] an intentional wrong. ”).  Notably, the finding of an OSHA or related safety violation is generally insufficient to overcome the bar on recovery against an employer.
[brief] In remanding, the Appellate Division stated:  If the judge concludes the law clerk “substantially participated” in any of the decisions he reached in this case after defense counsel revealed to him her interest in hiring his law clerk or after defense counsel revealed to the law clerk her interest in hiring her, the judge is required to vacate any orders entered during this time period and recuse himself from further involvement in this case.  *P.M.*, 441 N.J. Super at 142 (citing *In re Reddin*, 221 N.J. 221, 223 (2015) and R. 1:12–1(g)).  In *Reddin*, 221 N.J. at 236, the Court held the public confidence in the judiciary’s independence is undermined when two judges regularly dine with a person under indictment.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  4  Internal Affairs Unit or Function 4.0.1  Every law enforcement agency shall establish, by written policy, an internal affairs unit or function.  Depending upon the need, the internal affairs function can be full- or part-time.  In either case, this requires the establishment of a unit or the clear allocation of responsibility and resources for executing the internal affairs function.  The unit will consist of agency personnel assigned to internal affairs by the law enforcement executive.  Personnel assigned to the internal affairs function serve at the pleasure of and are directly responsible to the law enforcement executive or the designated internal affairs supervisor.  4.1  Duties and Responsibilities  4.1.1  The purpose of the internal affairs function is to establish a mechanism for the receipt, investigation, and resolution of officer misconduct complaints.  The goal of internal affairs is to ensure that the integrity of the agency is maintained through a system of internal discipline where an objective and impartial investigation and review assure fairness and justice.  4.1.2  The internal affairs function or officer will investigate alleged misconduct by members of the agency and review the adjudication of minor complaints handled by supervisors.  In addition, internal affairs shall receive notice of:  (a)  Any firearm discharge by agency personnel, whether on-duty or off-duty, unless the discharge occurred during the course of: (1) a law enforcement training exercise; (2) routine target practice at a firing range; (3) a lawful animal hunt; or (4) the humane killing of an injured animal; (b)  Any discharge of an agency-owned firearm by anyone other than agency personnel; (c) Any use of force by agency personnel that results in injury to any person, (d)  Any vehicular pursuit involving agency personnel; and (e)  Any collision involving agency-owned vehicles.  Upon receiving notification, the agency’s internal affairs function shall document the incident and determine whether additional investigation is necessary.  4.1.3  An internal affairs function also has an obligation to investigate or review any allegation of employee misconduct that is a potential violation of an AG Directive or Guideline, a Directive issued by a County Prosecutor in that jurisdiction, the agency's rules and regulations, or any allegation that indicates the employee is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform their duties.  The obligation to investigate includes not only acts of misconduct that are alleged to have occurred while the subject officer was on-duty, but also acts of misconduct that are alleged to have occurred outside the employing agency's jurisdiction or while the subject officer was off-duty.  15
[brief] This was asserted because [...] supposedly had testified to the effect that even if the delivery had occurred within the time period fixed by the applicable standard of care, the outcome would have been the same [See Pa210-211; Pa212-213; Pa266-267; Pa403-410; Pa438-442].  The following matters, raised and decided by the New Motion Judge, were not raised in the moving briefs of the Respondents:  (i)  That [...] and [...] did not deviate from the applicable standard of care, as a matter of law.  [Pa7-8].  In fact, neither Respondent so contended on their motions.  They instead argued that, accepting that they did not meet the standard of care, their deviation did not proximately cause any injury because [...] supposedly conceded that an earlier delivery would not have made any difference.  [See Pa210-211; Pa212-213; Pa266-267; Pa403-410; Pa438-442].  Even though the issue should not have been decided below, as it was not raised, Appellant nonetheless has demonstrated that there is far more than enough evidence to establish that [...] and [...] deviated from the standard of care – because neither one of them ever called the C-section.
[brief] “New Jersey’s discovery rules are to be construed liberally in favor of broad pretrial discovery. ”  Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 535 (1997) (citations omitted).  “Our court system has long been committed to the view that essential justice is better achieved when there has been full disclosure so that the parties are conversant with all the available facts. ”  Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50, 56 (1976).  For this reason, “[a] trial court’s resolution of a discovery issue is entitled to substantial deference and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
[brief] A.  Relief Appropriate Under Tyler  As the Appellants’ Forfeiture of Equity is Extreme Tyler requires an unconstitutional forfeiture of equity.  Appellants unquestionably satisfy this predicate.  Appellants paid $163,000.00 for the Property in April 2020.  (102a-107a).  Appellants proceeded to convert the legal use from a two family to a three family, increasing its value.  (92a-101a, 117a-127a).  [...] valued the Property at $294,000.00 as of January 31, 2023.  (92a-93a).  [...] acquired the tax title for $140,000.00 from [...] in January 2021.  (466a, 347a-348a, 351a-354a).  The lowest analog to the present fair market value of the Property is $140,000, the consideration allegedly paid by [...] to [...].  For purposes of the equity forfeiture predicate of Tyler, Appellants posit that the lowest value attributed to the Property in any of these transactions or estimates was the $140,000 in consideration allegedly paid by [...].  The redemption value of the Certificate was $4,246.67 as of August 18, 2022.  (84a-85a).  The Property had no liens other than the tax Certificate when the Final Judgment was entered on November 7, 2022.  (85a-86a, 92a-101a).  Appellants estimated that with the addition of taxes for 2022, and statutory interest, that the amount necessary to redeem [...]’s Certificate as of the date of entry of Final Judgment was approximately $8,000.  (96a-99a).  Even using the [...]/[...] quitclaim deed consideration as the base line of value, the extent of the forfeiture is $140,000-$8,000, or $132,000.  This amount due in relation to value ($8,000/$140,000) is a ratio of approximately 5.7%.  By any measure, this was an extreme forfeiture of equity and constitutionally offensive under Tyler.  The Court’s Order granting [...] Final Judgment conveyed title to the Property but provided no means whatsoever for Appellants to recover their surplus equity.  Accordingly, the Final Judgment was violative of Taking’s Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 143 S. Ct. at 1376.  “[A] government may not take from a taxpayer more than she owes” and any tax foreclosure must provide a mechanism for the recovery of a Defendant’s surplus equity in a foreclosed property.  Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 143 St. Ct. at 1376.  The Court may therefore vacate the Final Judgment as void pursuant to 4:50-1(d).
[brief] The City, however, has discretion over where it places traffic signs.  See Smith v. State, Dep't of Transp., 247 N.J. Super. 62, 68 (App. Div. 1991); Aebi v. Monmouth Cnty. Highway Dep't, 148 N.J. Super. 430, 433 (App. Div. 1977); see also U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways at 120 (2009 ed.) (Pa8)⁴ (“Option: The Low Clearance sign may be installed on or in advance of the structure. ”) (emphasis added).  And there was no expert testimony introduced at summary judgment or at trial showing the City had exercised its discretion in a manner that was palpably unreasonable.  See Gonzalez by Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City, 247 N.J.  551, 571 (2021) (explaining that “[w]hen a public entity’s or employee’s actions are discretionary, liability is imposed only for ‘palpably unreasonable conduct’” (quoting Henebema v. S. Jersey Transp. Auth., 219 N.J. 481, 495 (2014))).
[brief] It is well established that Appellate review of a trial court is de novo, and applies the same standard under Rules 4:46-(c).  Oyola v. Xing Lan Liu, 493 N.J. Supe. 493, 497 (App. Div. 2013).  A moving party is entitled to Summary Judgment if:  The pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and the moving party is entitled to a judgment order as a matter of law.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Comp of America, 142 N.J. 520, 528-29 (1995) citing R. 4:46-2.
[directive] an adult that he/she believes is suitable to care for his/her dependents, the court will recommend to the detainee that he/she request assistance from a public or private agency to make alternate If care arrangements for the dependent.  the detainee refuses to request such assistance, the court will contact an appropriate agency on behalf of the detainee.  When the detainee is unable to arrange for the care of a dependent person by a responsible adult or through a public or private agency, the judge or other court official at the direction of the judge will refer to resource directories, training materials or other sources of information to identify and alert an appropriate public or private agency of the need for alternate care for the detainee's dependent.  While it is important that detainees have a reasonable opportunity to meet their responsibility for making appropriate arrangements for the alternative care of their dependents, it is imperative that judicial proceedings not be inappropriately delayed by the need to make such arrangements.