ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **B.  Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie claim of nuisance because he did not show that the [...] made an unreasonable use of their land by repaving their driveway and replacing the railroad ties that lined their driveway with Belgian block.**  Plaintiff’s claim for private nuisance required him to show that the [...] unreasonably interfered with his use and enjoyment of his property.  *Scannavino v. Walsh*, 445 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 2016).  A defendant, however, has no liability for property damage caused by the natural conditions of the defendant’s land.  *Ibid.*  That rule stems from the fact that “‘it is unfair to impose liability on a property owner for hazardous conditions of his land which he did nothing to bring about just because he happens to live there. ’”  *Id.* at 171 (quoting *Deberjeois v. Schneider*, 254 N.J. Super. 694, 702-03 (Law Div. 1991)).  The [...] therefore have no liability for the stormwater runoff caused by the preexisting slope of their driveway.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF REPLY APPENDIX ................................................................................................. v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................3  I.  Plaintiffs have standing to seek disqualification .........................................................3  II.  The Law  Firms have non-waivable conflicts .............................................................7  III.  Plaintiffs cannot respond to the sufficiency of the [...] and [...]’ waivers without access to those documents .......................................................14  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................................................15
[brief] THE PROPRIETY OF THE CITY’S DELEGATION OF LAND USE POWER IS NOT AT ISSUE  Plaintiffs attempt to merge two different concepts into one: (1) that the City did not delegate land use powers to the [...], and (2) that the City could not delegate land use powers to the [...].  This is just another attempt to obfuscate the relevant issue, as the second issue does not affect the first.  Plaintiffs claim, “there is no provision in the MLUL that allows a municipality to assign powers delegated by the Legislature to planning and zoning boards to other boards[.]” (Pb.17.)  It is undisputed that: (i) the City created a new “municipal agency” – the [...], (ii) the City delegated land use powers to that agency, and (iii) the [...] exercised land use powers.  Recognizing this, the Planning Board made the reasonable determination that the TOA Rule applied with respect to [...]’ cannabis development application process.
[directive] Prosecutors should seek, in addition to substance abuse evaluation and treatment, the imposition of appropriate sanctions for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for offenses involving the possession with intent to distribute, distribution or manufacture of a controlled dangerous substance or anabolic steroid.  Prosecutors should ordinarily recommend incarceration or short-term commitment in the following circumstances:  Where a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving the manufacture, distribution or possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or anabolic steroid, and the juvenile has previously been adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving controlled dangerous substances or anabolic steroids; or Where a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, 2C:35-4; 2C:35-7, 2C:35-9.
[brief] Before the trial court, there was no dispute of fact that at the time the settlement agreement was accepted by the court and [...] granted site plan approval: (1) [...] endorsed, and indeed instructed, [...] to build affordable housing at the Off-site Property at Block 610, Lot 1; (2) that the Off-site Property would include exactly seven units; and (3) that [...] admitted the Off-site Property was suitable for the construction of seven affordable units.
[brief] PARTICIPANT HEREBY AGREES NOT TO BRING ANY SUITS, CLAIMS, CAUSES OF ACTION, DEMANDS OR LEGAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE PROTECTED PARTIES FOR ANY ITEM RELEASED HEREUNDER.  6.  Indemnity.  ADULT PARTICIPANT, ON HIS/HER BEHALF, AND ON BEHALF OF ANY CHILD PARTICIPANT(S), AND ON BEHALF OF ANY SPOUSE, HEIRS, EXECUTORS, AND REPRESENTATIVES, AGREES TO INDEMNIFY, DEFEND, RELEASE, AND HOLD HARMLESS THE PROTECTED PARTIES FROM AND AGAINST ALL CLAIMS, CAUSES OF ACTION, SUITS, LOSSES, LIABILITIES, DAMAGES, FINES, PENALTIES, LIENS, JUDGMENTS, SETTLEMENTS, PROCEEDINGS, COSTS, FEES, AND EXPENSES (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT OR OTHER COSTS) OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER FOR OR RELATING TO DEATH, BODILY INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM, RELATING TO, OR CAUSED BY (WHETHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART) ANY OF THE FOLLOWING MATTERS (WHICH NECESSARILY INCLUDE ALL CLAIMS TO DO OR MAY BELONG TO THE CHILD PARTICIPANT(S)): (A) PARTICIPANT’S ACTS, OMISSIONS, OR PRESENCE ON OR ABOUT ANY PART OF THE PREMISES OR OTHER PREMISES WHERE ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY [...] ARE TAKING PLACE, (B) PARTICIPANT’S ACTIVE OR PASSIVE PARTICIPATION IN OR OBSERVENCE OF ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES, (C) ANY CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE NEGLIGENT, GROSSLY NEGLIGENT, OR WILLFUL ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF PARTICIPANT, OR (D) PARTICIPANT’S USE OF ANY FIXTURES, EQUIPMENT, OR PERSONAL PROPERTY IN, ON, OR ABOUT THE PREMISES OR OTHER PREMISES WHERE ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY [...] ARE TAKING PLACE, THE INDEMNITY CONTAINED IN THIS PARAGRAPH WILL APPLY EVEN IF ANY SUCH INJURY OR DAMAGE IS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR STRICT LIABILITY OF THE PROTECTED PARTIES.
[brief] ”  Plaintiff argues that this provision of the NJPLA does not apply because, by its terms, it is not intended to apply to “dangers posed by products such as machinery or equipment that can feasibly be eliminated without impairing the usefulness of the product. ” (Pb7.)  But there is no evidence that the danger posed by vehicles that depart from their lanes can be eliminated, either technologically or economically.  According to Plaintiff’s own expert, the “real-world data” shows only that LDW systems will “reduce”—not eliminate—“crashes due to unintended lane departure. ” (Pa143a.)  Under these circumstances, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3(a)(2), precludes liability.  See Mercer Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proudman, 396 N.J. Super. 309, 315 (App. Div. 2007) (“Because plaintiffs admittedly do not allege that self-extinguishing cigarettes can eliminate the danger, they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”).  Any other result would be contrary to sound public policy, because the effect would be to penalize manufacturers who introduce new technology if they do not simultaneously implement that technology for all products, even if the cost of the new technology would be prohibitive for many consumers—new technology to which consumers would need to become accustomed and which manufacturers would need to adjust based upon on-the-road experience.  To avoid this penalty, manufacturers would be required to delay introduction of new technology, including new safety technology, until it was feasible for all products, adapted to on-the-road experience, and affordable to all consumers, a result that would have unacceptable consequences.  For example, according to Plaintiff’s expert, the [...] “determined that LDW systems caused an 11% decrease in single vehicle, sideswipe and head-on crashes overall, and a 21% decrease in injury causing crashes of the same types. ” (Pa142a-143a.)  If Plaintiff is correct in attributing this decrease to LDW systems, and if manufacturers had delayed introduction of LDW systems until they were technologically and economically available for all vehicles, these accidents and injuries would not have been prevented.  In other words, Plaintiff’s theory, if adopted, would likely cause injuries, not prevent them, contrary to the intent of the NJPLA, the Restatement, and sound public policy.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Contrary to plaintiff’s argument (Pb17), the New Jersey Supreme in Mosley did not “remand[the matter] to the trial court for further proceedings. ”  Its ruling was dispositive and complete.  See, e.g., Id. at 174 (“We are constrained to reverse the Appellate Division judgment that upheld defendant’s probation violation. ”); Id. at 192 (“We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division that affirmed defendant’s VOP charge. ”).  Many of the cases cited by plaintiff (Pb11-12) simply recite the requirements for malicious prosecution, but do not address the favorable termination requirement.
[brief] These case decisions apply definitions of “damages” and rules of insurance policy construction similar to those prescribed by both New Jersey and Vermont law.  Leading dictionary definitions of “damages” are of record (Pa483 ¶¶ 34–36; Pa857–73) and support charactering compensatory awards of attorneys’ fees as “damages” within the plain meaning of that term.  See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged) 527 (1961) (defining “damages” as meaning “the estimated reparation in money for detriment or injury sustained” and “compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong or injury caused by a violation of a legal right”); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 504 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “damages” as meaning “the estimated money equivalent for detriment or injury sustained”); Webster’s New World College Dictionary 365 (4th ed. 2005) (defining “damages” as meaning “money claimed by, or ordered paid to, a person to compensate for injury or loss caused by the wrong of the opposite party or parties”).  Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that some archaic, technical meaning could be ascribed to the word “damages” which excluded compensatory awards of attorneys’ fees, the Court would be required to reject any such meaning in favor of one that supports coverage in this case.
[brief] (Pa262).  When Plaintiff started the Fall Semester in 2013, he was no longer on academic probation.  (Pa262).  On August 1, 2013, [...] emailed [...] and [...] (“[...]”), University Provost, and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs, advising them of Plaintiff’s application to the MBA program, and noting he would be eligible for the MBA program as long as his “UG CGPA and the GMAT” score were met.
[brief] (Da 35-38)  As a condition to close title & to convey clear & unencumbered title, on 3-29-22 plaintiffs & the title insurer signed an Escrow & Indemnity Agreement requiring that $60,000 be escrowed from the proceeds of the sale of the property to pay Appellant’s judgment.  (Da 54-536)  Unpaid income & real estate taxes & water/sewer charges, of about $28,000, were deducted from the Seller.  The $60,000 escrow was also deducted.
[brief] ........................................................................................................  35 Vincitore v. Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119 (2001) ............................... 16 Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.1990) .............................................. 31 Williams v. Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1979) ..................... 29 Wymbs v. Twp. of Wayne, 163 N.J. 523 (2000) ............................................. 29 Statutes N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 ........................................................................................................... 12 N.J.S.A. 59:4-3 ............................................................................................................ 26, 27, 28, 29 Rules R. 2:6-2 ...................................................................................................................... 10, 11, 14, 26, 30, 34 R. 4:46-1 ..................................................................................................................... 8 R. 4:46-2 ..................................................................................................................... 8, 9 TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ORDER AND STATEMENT OF REASONS GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE HON. [...], J.S.C., DATED NOVEMBER 16, 2022………………………………………..Pa1-Pa19
[directive] All Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies shall take the trainings described in II.2.E.1 of the Report.  This training provides an overview of the Report and Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies’ responsibilities under these Guidelines, including an 7 explanation of CVI, the role Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies have in relation to CVI and how they should interact with CBVI organizations, and an introduction to the types of scenarios where law enforcement and CBVI organizations are expected to interact.
[brief] | Case Law | 2 | | 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) | | | | Emmanouil v. Roggio, [...], 2006 WL2927621, at 2 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2008) | | 4 | | [...] v. [...] and [...], [...] | | 6 | | [...] v. [...] [...], Esq.; [...]; [...]; and John Does 1-10, [...] | | 9 | | Herring v. U.S., 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005) | Case Law | 11,12 | | Pumphrey v. Thompson Tool Company, F.3d 1128,1130 (9th Cir. 1995) | Case Law | 12 | | Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 26464S.Ct.1010 | Case Law | 12 | | Weese v. Schuckman 98F.d 542,553 (10th Cir. 1996) | Case Law | 12 | | Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 797 A.2d 206 (App. Div. 2002) | Case Law | 12 | | State v. Caronna, 469 N.J. Super 462, 490 (2021) | Case Law | 13 |
[directive] 1.  The wiretap judge issuing the wiretap order shall retain originals of all applications, orders, and other documents or exhibits, with a conformed copy returned to the applicant.  2.  Each wiretap order shall contain a date certain which shall be the effective date of the order and the date from which the length of its validity shall be calculated.  3.  Once a wiretap order has expired by the passage of the time limit in the order, for further interceptions of wire or oral communications to be permissible a new application pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-10(f) shall be required unless a renewal application is submitted.  All extensions and renewals will reflect the same court number (with appropriate number of X=s) so long as the renewal or extension is a continuation of the same investigation.  Lengthier delays in seeking renewals or extensions must include a statement within the affidavit of the reasons for the delay.  All electronic surveillance applications are to include a statement to the court of the total amount of time previously authorized by the court at the same facility or location.  4.  No wiretap tape shall be unsealed unless pursuant to an order of one of the authorized wiretap judges.
[brief] II.  STRUXURE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED WHERE THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER ICONA MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO DAMAGES  [...]’s Complaint alleges violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and breach of warranty.  Damages are an essential element of each of those claims, but [...] failed to present any evidence whatsoever of financial damages in connection with the louvered system.  Therefore, the Trial Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of [...], finding that [...] failed to meet its burden of proof as to damages on all counts of its Complaint.  The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (hereinafter “CFA”) applies to “[t]he act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, [or] fraud, . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise. ”  N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2.  In business-to-business transactions, the "nature of the transaction" will determine whether it can fit within the CFA's definition of "merchandise."  See D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 187 (2013).
[brief] [...] attempts to conjure another “public interest” issue regarding density and traffic.  First, [...] overstates the “density” of the warehouses permitted by the Redevelopment Plan, stating [...]’s site plan application “proposed four supersized buildings including one approaching 1,000,000 square feet .  . . .” (Pb21).  This purposefully misrepresents the nature of [...]’s site plan application (which, again, is not the subject of [...]’s challenge here).  The Redevelopment Plan itself makes clear that only two of the four proposed buildings are located in [...], and the footprints for buildings “B” and “D” are located entirely in [...].  (Pa92 – Pa113).  Additionally, of the other two buildings, “A” (which will have 963,316 square feet in area and is presumably the “one approaching 1,000,000 square feet” [...] references) and “C” are bisected by the municipal boundary.  (Id.).  Thus, only a portion of two of the proposed four buildings will be located in [...], thus revealing the disingenuous and misleading inference fostered by [...].  Next, [...] quotes a portion of [...] that discusses alleged traffic issues related to the site plan application as evidence of the same.  However, [...] there fails to mention that Resolution No. 10-2023 was overturned as arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable by [...] in August 2023, following a trial on [...]’s prerogative writs complaint.
[brief] Following its investigation of the Accident, and before any personal injury lawsuits regarding the Accident had been filed, on June 22, 2020, [...] commenced this action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County (the “Declaratory Judgment Action”), seeking a declaration that the U.S. Fire Policy is void \textit{ab initio} due to [...]’s material misrepresentations made when applying for the U.S. Fire Policy.  (Ia001).  [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint on September 29, 2020.  (Ia023).  [...] actively participated in discovery in the Declaratory Judgment Action, exchanging written discovery requests and responses, document productions, and appearing for depositions, but has elected not to participate in this appeal.  (Pa009).  One day after [...] commenced the Declaratory Judgment Action, on June 23, 2020, Intervenor, a camper who was in the van at the time of the Accident, filed a Complaint against [...] in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (the “Underlying Action”), seeking damages for injuries Intervenor allegedly sustained in the accident.  (Pa010).  Intervenor asserted three causes of action against [...]: negligence, negligent entrustment, and punitive damages.  (Pa011-Pa014).  On January 19, 2021, Intervenor filed a motion to intervene in the Declaratory Judgment Action on the basis that he sustained injuries in the Accident and had an interest in the property at issue in the Declaratory Judgment Action.  (Ia033).  [...] opposed the motion, but it was ultimately granted by Order dated February 25, 2021.  (Ia033).  Intervenor subsequently filed an Answer to the Complaint on March 29, 2021.  (Pa017).  Intervenor did not assert any affirmative claims against [...] in the Declaratory Judgment Action.  (Pa017).  On June 14, 2021, [...] filed an Amended Answer and Third-Party Complaint.  (Ia035).  [...]’s Third-Party Complaint asserted claims against [...] for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and professional negligence.
[brief] ”  Id.  In fact, this decision accorded with the decision reached by the Appellate Division more than 25 years earlier in Wolf v. Mayor and Borough Council of Borough of Shrewsbury, 182 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1981).  Like the Colter court, the Wolf court noted the requirement for zoning ordinances to be published in their entirety prior to the adoption of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1.  Id. at 294.  The Wolf court went on to explain that the abbreviated form of notice permitted by the newer statute “must be reasonably sufficient and adequate to inform the public of the essence and scope of the proposed changes. ”  Id. at 296 (citations omitted).  And, prior to Wolf, the Appellate Division also acknowledged the related nature of the statutes pertaining to zoning ordinances and general ordinances in La Rue v. East Brunswick Tp., 68 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 1961).
[brief] State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 278 (1986).  The trial court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.  Carrero, 229 N.J. at 128.  Although the rational basis test sets a low threshold, a lesser-included offense should not be given when it would invite the jury to engage in sheer speculation.  *State v. Josephs*, 174 N.J. 44, 103-04 (2002); *State v. Darrian*, 255 N.J. Super. 435, 446 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 13 (1992).  Here, the defense requested the court to charge passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] First, the case arose in the context of § 1983 civil rights action, and the Court specifically noted that an absolute bar against joint representation may be overbroad in that context, as the potential for a conflict would depend on whether the action was brought against a government employee in their “personal capacity” versus their “official capacity. ”  Id. at 199-200.  If the latter, Here, defendants’ positions are inherently incompatible, and the Firms will be hindered in advancing appropriate defenses for each individual client by virtue of those attorneys’ responsibilities to their other clients.  The complaint details the participation of various defendants in falsely portraying [...] as [...]’s medical director to create the misimpression that [...] is controlled by a plenary physician as required by the CPOM.  Pa051; Northfield, 228 N.J. at 601.  It describes the roles of various defendants in the self-referral and kickback scheme.  Pa047-054.  Moreover, Plaintiffs obtained sworn statements from witnesses who attest to the misconduct of the superiors toward their subordinate worker doctors.  Pa021-039.  The complaint describes the [...]’ threats and intimidation upon no conflict would exist.  Ibid.
[brief] 8 DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) ........................................  11 Giannakopoulos v. Mid State Mall, 438 N.J. Super. 595 (App. Div. 2014).  .......8  Herbert v. Atlantic City, 87 N.J.L. 98 (1915) .................................  15  In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990) .................................................. 13, 14, 16 Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370 (2016) .......................  11  Judson v. People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ............ 8 Karins v. Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532 (1998) ................................. 14, 15, 16 Roth v. Rutherford Rent Bd., 239 N.J. Super. 378 (Law Div. 1989) ............. 7 State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35 (1961) .................................................. 11 State v. Schultz, 71 N.J. 590 (1976) ................................................ 12 State v. Silverstein, 76 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1962) ....................... 12 State v. Tirelli, 208 N.J. Super. 628(App. Div. 1986) .......................... 11 State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355 (1952) ................................................ 12 Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Planning Board of Borough of Freehold, 244 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1990) ......................... 7 Twp. Of Neptune v. Stagg, 312 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1998) .................. 11 Urban v. Planning Bd. Of Borough of Manasquan, 238 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 1990) ...................................................... 7 Table Of Authorities (continued) Statutes: N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 .................................................................12 N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c)
[brief] \textsuperscript{4}  [...] and [...] argue in their Brief that [...] has ‘relied extensively’ on Lemelledo in error and that Lemelledo “has nothing to do with any purported private right of action. ”  [...]’s Br. 12 n.6.  In fact, [...]’s citation to Lemelledo was to show that the NJCLA included an implied private right of action—a fact which [...] and [...] acknowledge in their Brief.