ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] E.  [...]’s Conclusion About Sick Leave Policy Violations is Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld.  [...] also found that Appellant knowingly violated the Sick Leave Policy on multiple occasions, using Appellant’s two (2) written requests for permission from Appellant’s first two (2) sinus surgeries as the foundational evidence for this conclusion.  [Pa52].  [...] discussed how Appellant failed to request or obtain written permission prior to his third sinus surgery, failed to request or obtain written permission to attend Florida House, and failed to request or obtain written permission to attend his stepfather’s funeral in Florida.  [Pa52-Pa53].  [...]’s conclusions about Appellant’s Multiple Sick Leave Policy violations are supported by credible record evidence, including Appellant’s own admissions of neither requesting nor receiving written permission for the aforementioned Sick Leave Policy violations.  [3T22:4-15, 3T23:14-19; 4T172:11 – 4T177:8, 4T190:17 – 4T191:10; 6T49:2- 5].  Therefore, [...]’s conclusion that Appellant violated the Sick Leave Policy on multiple occasions should not be disturbed.
[brief] \textsuperscript{16}  As the Court will note, there was a typographical error contained in point “6” of [...]’ Order entered on November 16, 2022 (39965a), insofar as it stated “[t]he damage awards are subject to prejudgment interest \textit{up to the date of this Order} at a rate of 8.875% until the distribution of partnership assets,” which was on July 9, 2014, earlier in time.
[brief] VI.  THE CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A RESULT OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT THAT OCCURRED IN THE PRESENTATION TO THE GRAND JURY BUT WHICH ONLY BECAME EVIDENT DURING THE TRIAL TESTIMONY OF [...] (NOT RAISED BELOW).  [...] of the [...] testified at the grand jury presentment on February 8, 2017, as well as at trial in this matter.  His testimony from the initial grand jury proceeding was replayed during the presentment on the evidence for the superseding indictment on August 16, 2017.  Detective Riley acknowledged at trial that his testimony at grand jury was false.  Specifically, the detective testified under oath on February 8, 2017 that the text messages between [...] and [...] started at 2:45a.m. on August 11, 2015 with [...] reaching out first to [...].  GJT22:17-25; GJT23:1.  According to the detective’s initial testimony, phone records that had been obtained by law enforcement after the incident showed a “back and forth” between the two individuals beginning at that 2:45a.m. and were initiated by [...].  Detective Riley’s trial testimony, however, was that the text exchange was started by [...] to [...] at 2:39a.m. on August 11, 2015, which was in direct contradiction to his testimony to the grand jury at a time when the State was attempting to advance a theory that [...] lured [...] out of his home shortly before the shooting.  Detective Riley admitted on cross-examination that, at the time of his false grand jury testimony, he was already in possession of the extraction report pertaining to [...]’s cell phone activity and knew that [...] was the one who initiated the first text message.  Significantly, the Assistant Prosecutor who presented the case to the grand jury was without a doubt likewise aware of the evidence that had already been gathered by that time, including the cell phone records of [...].  Despite being aware of the initiation of the text message exchange between [...] and [...] on the night of the shooting, testimony was elicited that directly refuted that evidence.  Presumably, this was done to support the original theory that [...] was involved in the crime and lured [...] from his home.  Inherent in the grand jury process is the basic principle of fairness that “a prosecutor has the primary duty of ensuring that justice is done and may not use improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction. ”  State v. Triestman, pierc416 N.J. Super. 195, 205 (App. Div. 2010), citing, In re Grand Jury Appearance Request by Loigman, 183 N.J. 133, 149 (2005).  Here, both the assistant prosecutor and Detective Riley possessed evidentiary information that directly refuted the facts as presented to the grand jury, which without a doubt constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.  The indictment filed against [...] on the basis of those misrepresented facts should therefore be dismissed.
[directive] If the investigation reveals evidence of misconduct not based on the original and memorialized in both the complaint, this too must be reported Investigative and the Report.  An investigation concerning Report Summary and Conclusions shall this secondary misconduct should be conducted.  B. files.  IAPP  Section 9.3 is revised as follows:  Maintaining investigation 9.3  Investigation Files 9.3.3  Where an internal affairs investigation results in the filing of criminal charges, the prosecuting agency. file shall be made available to the County Prosecutor’s Office is agency  It will be the responsibility of that office to decide which items are likely discoverable and which are admissible.  In these cases, the agency must prosecuting agency’s The follow the County Prosecutor’s instructions.  4 prosecuting agency must have a procedure in place to ensure, in the rare case where a compelled statement has been taken from a subject officer and a criminal case results, that any compelled statements from a subject officer are not impermissibly used in the criminal case.  C. request.
[brief] As injunction proceedings were ongoing, [...] filed an earlier appeal, which the Appellate Division dismissed on July 28, 2017 because [...] failed to file a conforming brief.  (Da1926)  The Appellate Division denied [...]’s motion to vacate the dismissal on September 29, 2017.  (Ibid)  In the trial court’s “view it is not coincidental that [...]… filed the [Southern District of] New York action” on October 25, 2017, “less... than a month” after his appeal was dismissed.
[brief] Defendant argues because there was no evidence he possessed a handgun prior to or after the murder, and the crimes stem from one incident, the convictions militate to a concurrent sentence.  He further argues because the judge failed to provide reasons for imposing the consecutive sentences, a remand is mandated for resentencing.  We agree a remand is warranted.  The judge imposed a fifty-year term of imprisonment for murder, subject to NERA, and a ten-year term with a five-year period of parole ineligibility for unlawful possession of a firearm without a permit, to be served consecutively.  Regarding the consecutive sentences, the judge's sole statement was, “[t]he sentences will run consecutively to each other, which results in an aggregate sentence of 60 years—47.5 years without parole. ”  The judge did not engage in a complete analysis and address the required findings under the Yarbough factors.  Further, the judge did not consider the overall fairness of the sentence imposed.  See Torres, 246 N.J. at 268.  The State has acknowledged a remand is required.
[brief] ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THE [...] IS A LEGAL FORUM FOR PURPOSES OF THE AGREEMENT, THE SEVERANCE PROVISION WAS NOT TRIGGERED.  Assuming arguendo, the [...] is a legal forum for purposes of the triggering the severance provision of the Agreement, the Chancery Division erred by severing the return to work provision because the [...] never declared said provision illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective.  Under the Agreement, the Parties agreed that “if any of the provisions, terms, clauses or waivers or release of claims or rights contained in this Agreement are declared illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective in a legal forum, such provisions, terms, clauses or waivers or release of claims or rights shall be deemed severable[.]”  See DA019 at ¶ 18.
[brief] (8T36:11-15) ........................................................................................................43  A.  The Jury’s Finding That the Defendant Was Negligent But Not a Proximate Cause of the Incident Was Not Inconsistent and Was Perfectly Acceptable Under the Law and Facts and Evidence in the Case.........................................................44  1.  New Jersey Law, the Model Jury Charges and the Model Verdict Sheet Clearly Recognize That Negligence and Proximate Cause Are Separate Concepts.  .........................................................................................................................44  2.  The Jury’s Verdict Was Supported By the Facts and Evidence in the Case..  .................................................................................................................................46  CONCLUSION
[directive] if Step 10: No any current charge is Early Release Act (NERA) not included  Determine 7. in Step 2, 4, or If yes, increase the preliminary recommendation as follows to the revised Step 11: preliminary recommendation and proceed to = 1  ROR Release Release with PML c = 1 Release with PML Release with PML 2 c = Release with PML 2 Release with PML 3 c + = PML Release with 3 Release with PML 3 EM/HD c = + No EM/ PML HD Release with 3 Release Recommended c
[brief] (Ca200, Ca223); (Ca137 at RQA 11, Ca145 at Response to RQA 11).  8.  On January 9, 2022, Respondent made a Facebook post which compared COVID-19 safety measures to domestic abuse.  (Ca230).  9.  On January 10, 2022, Respondent made a Facebook post which called [...] a “Tyrannical POS” for extending New Jersey’s School Mask Mandate.
[brief] D’Avila also involved a work site accident and a similar indemnification clause.  There, the Plaintiff worked for a subcontractor, [...].  Defendant, [...], hired [...] to install a foundation and structural supports for a large machine being installed at its facility.  D’Avila, 442 N.J. Super. at 87-88.  While on site, an unsecured metal ladder fell on to the Plaintiff causing paralysis.
[brief] Curiously, though Defendants have demanded that [...] defend and indemnify them “in connection with all current and future PCB-related litigation” naming [...] (Pa471) (emphasis added), they have not specifically tendered the [...]’s lawsuit to [...] – no doubt in an effort to downplay New Jersey’s interest in this case.  Defendants have expressly tendered the New Jersey [...] case to other former customers of [...]. out of [...]’s manufacture and sale of PCBs.
[brief] (2T95:12-15; see generally Pa246-91.)  Nevertheless, the parties understood that the completion and submission of the RIR was a necessary step toward ultimately obtaining a site-wide RAO.  (2T146:3-11, 154:21 to 155:6; 4T15:19-23, 45:1-19; 6T18:20 to 19:4, 27:21 to 28:10; 8T38:3-21.)  Thus, pursuant to the express terms of the PSA, Defendants were required, as part of the Seller’s Environmental Obligations, to obtain a site-wide RAO to the extent possible prior to closing, which was to be achieved through cooperation with Plaintiff’s LSRP at [...].  (Pa0261, Art. 11.2; 2T97:23 to 98:21; 4T44:17 to 45:5, 147:24 to 148:21, 249:18 to 250:2; 5T43:7-21, 45:11 to 46:20, 162:16 to 163:7; 8T31:8-22, 61:5-10, 64:3 to 65:15, 68:7 to 69:4.)
[brief] The Court in Willoughby found that the interest in repose was not implicated because the developer was aware of the well-publicized political campaign to rezone the property and that a zoning change was imminent.  Willoughby, 306 N.J. Super. at 278.  Despite this knowledge, the developer pressed forward with its development application.  Ibid.  Here, Plaintiff sat idly by while [...] adopted Ordinances and Resolutions to enter into a Redevelopment Agreement and a Financial Agreement with the Redeveloper and while Redeveloper proceeded with its site plan application.  (T2, 8:8-16 & 19:20-25).  It was not until the Redeveloper was halfway through the public hearings on the land use application that Plaintiff filed its Complaint.  Given the reliance by [...] and the Redeveloper, the interest in repose is strong.
[brief] THE JOB FAD MUST BE SET ASIDE POINT ONE THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Not Addressed Below)  Agency action will be set aside by this Court where it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  *In re Warren*, 117 N.J. 295, 296 (1989).  This Court can intervene where agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission, or other state policy.  *George Harms Constr. v. Turnpike Auth.*, 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994).  Under this standard, judicial review generally contemplates three inquiries: [1] whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; [2] whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency bases its action; and [3] whether, in applying the legislative policy to the facts, the agency erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.  *Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Assoc.*, 154 N.J. 555, 567 (1998).
[brief] And for all those reasons, you know, again, like I said, Judge, not that one is more important than the other, [...] continues to be in a very difficult spot.  I think one of any of the reasons is enough in and of itself to take back his plea but when you're taking all three totally in the totality of the circumstances, the posture of the threat and duress from the co-defendant and especially conversations that he had with counsel and what his understanding of the plea, it is quite clear that he did not fully understand the terms and for a variety of reasons he should be allowed -- the pro se motion should be granted and his plea should be vacated.
[brief] Quoting Plaintiff’s counsel at the pre-trial conference, 5T6:  I do also want to say, [...] just certified under oath that there’s over a dozen – pending matters between the parties.  There is one matter involving [...] at [sic] [...].  Right.  And this is [the] fraudulent transfer action, Sussex County.  \textit{There are no other matters between [...] and [...]}.  The plaintiffs here are the owners of [...] and there are no other matters between them and [...].  The judgment actions are against [...]’s company[ies].  He's not a defendant in those – in those matters.  \textit{[...] has no claims against [...]}.  See also Plaintiffs’ August 30, 2019 Letter Brief arguing that neither the [...] nor [...] are parties to the case.  “Even if [...] and [...] had been parties in this action . . .”  See also Plaintiff’s August 22, 2019 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss:  “The Plaintiffs are seeking relief both individually and on behalf of their company, [...]. ”  There is no mention of [...].  V.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF ALL PARTIES.
[brief] From the lack of any meaningful analysis in the May 3, 2024 order beyond conclusory statements, it can be logically inferred that instead of diligently and conscientiously considering the merits of the plaintiff’s arguments, the motion judge who did not conduct the divorce trial expediently or naively assumed that abbreviated transcripts were insufficient just because the trial was conducted over several days and was complex as he put it.  The facile generalizations and blanket statements in the May 3 order such as “only be [sic] reviewing the entirety of the trial record will the Appellate Division be completely informed on all issues, nuances, and the interrelated facts on this complex dissolution trial” (Pa1331) or “the only manner in which the reviewing Court will be possessed of the myriad findings of fact and conclusions of law is by receiving the entirety of the trial transcript. ”  (Pa1332) do not constitute even a semblance of cogent and meaningful analysis that holds any persuasive value in substantiating the trial court’s conclusion that complete transcript is essential for the proper consideration of the questions presented on appeal.
[brief] *Kelly v. Berlin*, 300 N.J. Super 256, 268 (App. Div. 1997).  Damage awards may not be based on mere speculation.  *Ibid.*  Under such circumstances where the trier of fact will be speculating on damages, summary judgment is appropriate.  *See American Sanitary Sales Co. v. State*, 178 N.J. Super. 429, 436 (App. Div. 1981) (“We emphasize that we do not expect nor ask the trial judge to engage in mere speculation [in assessing damages.]”); Lewis v. Read, 80 N.J. Super. 148, 174 (App. Div. 1963) (“The law abhors damages based upon mere speculation.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACT ................................................................................................................2  The Charges.................................................................................................................................3  [...] Is Prescribed Pain Medication....................................................................................4  The TL Incident ..........................................................................................................................6  An Internal Affairs Investigation Is Initiated..............................................................................10  [...] Has Sinus Surgery And Attends Rehab While On Sick Leave ..................................11  [...] .....................................................................................................................................12  The FFD  .......................................................................................................................................12  [...] Cancels His Trip To Florida .........................................................................................15  The Facebook Dispute ..................................................................................................................16  The Unlicensed Drivers ................................................................................................................17  [...]’s Alleged Failure To Provide Notice Of Medication Usage.................................18  [...]’s Investigation And Testimony .....................................................................19  LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................20
[brief] 24  STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................  24  I.  THE ARBITRATION AWARD MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE ARBITRATOR’S INVENTION OF A NEW WORK RULE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REASONABLY DEBATABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE CBA.  (PA139-140)  ........................................................................................................  26  II.  THE ARBITRATION AWARD MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF HIS POWERS UNDER THE CBA BY FASHIONING A NEW WORK RULE BASED SOLELY ON HIS SUBJECTIVE SENSE OF INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE.  (PA139-140)  ..................................................  32  III.  THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARD WAS PROCURED THROUGH UNDUE MEANS BECAUSE THE ARBITRATOR’S NEW WORK RULE IS AN ULTRA VIRES IMPOSITION UPON THE PARTIES’ CBA THAT VIOLATES BOTH THE CBA’S PLAIN LANGUAGE AND APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW.  (PA139-140)  .................................................. 39  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................
[brief] The mix of units in [...]’s Project will include apartments, townhomes, stacked townhomes, condominium units and free-standing single-family homes.  Plans call for 808 for-sale units (or 75% of total units) and 269 rental units, all apartments (25% of total units).  Pa661.  The up to 216 units to be designated affordable housing are described as affordable condos (162) and affordable apartments (54).  Id.  According to the Township experts, the total cost of the Project will be approximately $300 million, including all construction costs, land acquisition, soft costs and financing costs.
[brief] Fifth, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that self-defense applied to the weapons possession charges.  [...]’s testimony that she spontaneously picked up the knife in response to [...]’s violent assault was a defense to that charge.  And [...] had a constitutional right to possess the tire iron for the purpose of self-protection in case of confrontation.  The court erred in failing to provide either of these necessary instructions to the jury.  For any or all of these reasons, [...]’s trial was unfair, and her convictions must be reversed.
[brief] The issue in Matthews was whether the Public Trust Doctrine gave the public the right to traverse privately owned upland areas to gain access to the Ocean and the adjacent beach in Bay Head, Monmouth County.  At the time, members of the public who did not reside in Bay Head could access the beaches in the municipality only through the use of six street ends (the remaining beach frontage was all privately owned).  In an effort to prevent non-residents from using the beach, the [...] sold the land comprising the street ends to the adjoining property owners.  Control of the street ends was then turned over to the "[...]," a quasi-public organization.  Access to the beach via the street ends was thereafter restricted to Borough residents.  Our Supreme Court, citing the quasi-governmental nature of the Improvement Association and prior case law prohibiting municipalities from excluding non-residents from using publicly owned land to gain access to the beach, determined for the first time that the general public had a right to traverse privately owned property when to do so was “essential or reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the ocean.
[brief] ”  (13T 20 to 23)  But the Court also found that this did not constitute a “voluntary willingness to pay” because the Court was going to follow the recommendation of the State and order restitution regardless of [...]’s willingness.  (13T 17-22 to 25)  In evaluating defendant’s argument for mitigating factor (11), the Court noted that “[t]he fact that defendant has not been employed since 2020 also shows that the household has been supported either by the income generated by [...]’s partner, or by other members or other means. ”  (13T 22-7 to 10)  The Criminal Code allows a sentencing court to order restitution if “[t]he defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution.
[brief] ”\textsuperscript{25}  In \textit{Estate of Lash}, \textsuperscript{24}  See \textit{Saffer v. Willoughby}, 143 N.J. 256, 272, 670 A.2d 527 (1996); \textit{Hagen v. Gallerano}, 66 N.J.Super. 319, 332-33, 169 A.2d 186 (App.Div. 1961); \textit{Feldmesser v. Lemberger}, 101 N.J.L. 184, 41 A.L.R. 1153 (E. & A. 1925).  \textsuperscript{25}  The Supreme Court cited several cases to illustrate the concept to “bringing or defending an action against a third person.  In \textit{Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos.}, 48 N.J. 291, 300, 225 A.2d 328 (1966), the administrator tortiously breached his fiduciary duty and caused the estate to file suit against the administrator, the tortfeasor, and the surety on the bond.  As a direct and proximate result of the administrator’s breach of duty, the estate incurred attorneys’ fees to litigate its claim against the administrator to recover damages, a third person, and against the surety in order to demonstrate that the surety was financially responsible for administrator’s defalcation.  Those fees were a foreseeable consequence of the administrator’s action because all parties were aware of the bond, the Court ruled that the counsel fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff insured in defending a workman’s compensation claim in a third-party lawsuit against the insured satisfied the element of damages because the defendant insurer defaulted on its obligation to defend the insured, thereby causing the insured to incur legal fees in defending an action against the third party.  However, the insured was not entitled to recover her fees for the current litigation because the plaintiff insured must first win the underlying contract breach case before those legal fees and costs could be considered for the element of damages.