ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] intention to rob the victim, he could be found guilty of accomplice liability if he aided the co-defendant in discarding the firearm used in the robbery.  *Ibid.*  In rejecting this theory, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Code’s accomplice liability statute requires that a defendant act with a purposeful state of mind in furtherance of the crime."  *Id.* at 457.  Additionally, "to be found guilty as an accomplice, a defendant must not only share the same intent as the principal who commits the crime, but also must ‘at least indirectly participate in the commission of the criminal act. ’"  *Id.* at 457 (citations omitted).  "To summarize, to establish liability in a robbery case, the Code requires that the State prove that an accomplice shared the principal’s intent to commit the theft before or at the time the theft or attempted theft was committed."  *Id.* at 464.  The Court noted that, while there was sufficient evidence to find the Defendant guilty of accomplice liability, the fact that the jury could have convicted him of afterthought liability could not be ignored.  *Id.* at 465.  A new trial was ordered, with an indication that the court should read the model jury charges on accomplice liability to the jury.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at *4-6* (citing *Selden v. Airbnb, Inc.*, 4 F.4th 148, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (reaching same conclusion as to Airbnb’s registration site because notice of terms “appeared on a single screen,” “required no scrolling,” and was “clearly legible, appropriately sized, and unobscured by other visual elements).  The Court rejected plaintiff’s contention that the agreement was inadequate for lack of “underlined, bolded or enlarged” hyperlinks.  *Id.* at *7-9; (cf. 2T17:12-15).  Here, the trial court erred by reaching the opposite conclusion from *Racioppi* and *Vercammen* and relying solely on *Wollen*.  As in both *Vercammen* and *Racioppi*, the [...] here provided a clear, prominent statement at the outset of an online registration process advising the user that she would be bound by hyperlinked terms of use (identified in clear blue print that offset it from the other print on the webpage) upon proceeding with registration.  There was no need to scroll down on the page to see this statement, and in addition, the [...] repeated this precise notice on every one of the subsequent pages involved in the user’s registration process.  In the decision in *Racioppi*, which *post-dated* *Wollen*, this Court rejected the notion that the lack of an underlined or bold hyperlink, or a check-box to confirm user assent, was fatal.  (2T:14:18-25; 2T:17:3-15).  **B.
[brief] Instead, Defendants’ lawyer’s letter had vague general language in it.  It says:  You either are aware or, with reasonable diligence should be aware that our clients’ occupation and usage of the property … is long established and fully comports with the laws of … New Jersey and the ordinances of … [...].  Nowhere in the trial court’s decision do the Defendants refer this Court to an actual finding that there is legal or equitable estoppel that should be applied against the Plaintiffs, who only moved next to [...] (hereinafter referred to as “PQ”) in 2008 and 2013.  Defendants also mistakenly believe that a “statement” by the Zoning Board attorney is of some evidential significance.  The attorney for the Board was not sworn, was not a witness, was not subject to cross-examination, did not provide any foundation to support his statements and therefore they were and are of no legal significance, which is why the Plaintiffs ignored them.
[brief] (Ab32-33).  But to be clear: the SFRA defines equalization aid to be paid by the State as the difference between a district’s adequacy budget and its calculated LFS.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-53.  The formula does not require the State to subsidize the district’s local share to ensure that the district is spending an amount equal to its adequacy budget.  Tellingly, while [...] goes to great lengths to explain how Abbott XX should be interpreted, the Supreme Court never once said in Abbott XX or even Abbott XXI that an adequacy budget equals T&E, or that the State must perpetually fund a district to “adequacy” if the district refuses to contribute its local share.
[brief] On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this action in the Trial Court, and on September 8, 2022 filed the FAC. \(^2\) Da21.  Defendants filed initial motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on October 25, 2022, following which Plaintiff served the FAC on two [...] partners who reside in New Jersey.  Da304, 306.  Neither of those partners had any involvement in the underlying representation of Plaintiff.  Da153, 196.  On January 30, 2023, the Trial Court denied without prejudice Defendants’ initial motions to dismiss subject to renewal following jurisdictional discovery. \(^3\) Da127–30.  As part of the extensive jurisdictional discovery that ensued, Plaintiff served 100 interrogatories, to which Defendants responded, objected, and later served supplemental responses.  Da170–93; Da199–226.  On December 7, 2023, Plaintiff deposed [...].  Da232.  D.  The Trial Court Denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and this Interlocutory Appeal Follows
[brief] Defendant also presented the testimony (following up on his expert report, DA50) of ballistics expert [...].  2T  Q  How many times would you say that you testified as an expert in a ballistics case?  A  Approximately 350 times.  [2T11]  Q  Okay.  And is that testimony of [...] part of what you looked at in forming your own opinion in D-3?  A Yes.  2T18  Q  Okay.  So going back now to D-3, which is your expert report itself, can you just kind of walk me through, I guess, like what the major highlights are of what you discovered when you -- when you finally went to the Essex County Sheriff’s ballistics unit?  A  Looking for the evidence became a bit of an issue ‘cause of time and most of the evidence was no longer available.  The only evidence that was available was the actual Glock firearm.  And a discharged shell.  The bullet in question was not in evidence anymore.  And neither was the plexi-glass door that the shots were fired through.  So when I went to the Essex County -- Newark, to look at the ballistics, I had a Glock firearm and I had a discharged shell.  So what I basically did is I fired the Glock into the water tank to retrieve two shells, two bullets.  And I looked at the shell and compared against the shell from the case and they were a positive, they were a match.  2T19.  [...] explained the vulnerability of the state expert’s opinion:
[brief] [...], Esq., [...] d/b/a [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants v. [...], [...], Newark Mayor [...], the City of [...], Newark City Clerk [...], Newark Corporation Counsel [...], Esq., Newark Business Administrator [...], Esq., Newark Director of Economic and Housing Development [...], Newark Director of Finance [...], Newark Division of Tax Abatement and Special Taxes Manager [...], CTC, Newark Tax Assessor [...], Esq., [...], Essex County Executive [...], [...], Attorney General of New Jersey [...], [...], [...], and [...], Defendants-Respondents On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division: Essex County Docket No. [...] Civil Action Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFF’S/APPELLANT’S REPLY  BRIEF  On the Reply Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] Enumerated federal firearms  18 U.S.C. § 922(a) by importing, manufacturing, or dealing firearms without • license; transporting or receiving firearms across state lines; transporting destructive device, machinegun, short-barreled shotgun or rifle; transferring, selling, trading, giving, transporting, or delivering firearm to out-of-state resident; straw purchases; manufacturing or importing armor-piercing ammunition; selling or delivering armor-piercing ammunition; or receiving firearm by out-of-state resident;  Given the complex nature of federal firearms laws, prosecutors should familiarize themselves with statutes 2 enumerated in paragraph (6) to confirm whether any apply prior to issuing any charges arising from a death or injury where the firearm that caused the death or injury may have been acquired by way of a firearm-trafficking violation under the Act.
[brief] THE COURT:  Why not say in the purchase and sale agreement let’s eliminate that issue.  [...]:  Look, that is a fair concern your Honor is raising, but respectfully, it is irrelevant to the question today.  It might be tomorrow’s question.  The [...]’ counsel also pointed out that the MOU’s language does not obligate Plaintiff to ever seek residential zoning approval, which is what would trigger the obligation to pay more than $1.00:
[brief] C.  **“FORMAL NOTICE” OF CANCELLATION WAS NOT REQUIRED BY STATUTE, CODE OR COMMON LAW**  Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred when it found the Administrative Code (the “Code”) did not apply.  However, N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.2 applies to “nonrenewal or cancellation,” neither of which is an issue in this case because the CCIP Policies were not cancelled or nonrenewed.  *See Matter of N.J.A.C.*, § 11:1-20, 208 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 1986) (“The rule was designed to curb what the commissioner conceived as abuses by insurance companies, including midterm policy cancellations, blanket nonrenewals, cancellations of entire lines of insurance and midterm premium increases without adequate reasons or notice to the insured”).  As discussed above, and as the trial court noted, the CCIP was never actually cancelled and, instead, remained in effect for the Project for all other entities permitted to enroll in the CCIP.  (SSR, p. 35, Pa2750.)  Thus, this Code is inapplicable.
[brief] See, e.g., *Route 22 Readington Realty*, 221 N.J. at 338 (citations omitted).  The court’s duty is well-defined when construing the meaning of a statute: “to effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought to be achieved. ”  *Merin v. Maglaki*, 126 N.J. 430, 435 (1992) (quoting *State v. Maguire*, 84 N.J. 508, 514 (1980)).  “[T]he starting point of all statutory interpretation must be the language used in the enactment.  We construe the words of a statute in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ”  *MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Jersey City*, 455 N.J. Super. 608, 623 (App. Div. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  With the exception of technical terms or terms of art, the court reads words chosen by the Legislature in accordance to their ordinary meaning.  *Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.*, 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009) (citations omitted).  The court will not “rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature … [or] presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language. ”  *Id.* (quoting *O’Connell v. State*, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002)).  **C.
[directive] /  Defendant’s Initials 피고인의 이니셜 유죄인정 주양식/지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지7/7  CN 10079-Korean Main Plea Form/Revised Form  Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Korean page 7/7  AVISO:  Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.
[brief] Moreover this case in no way resembles cases like Carey, 168 N.J. 413, State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436 (2001), or State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359 (2019), in which our courts have held that, in “cases in which more than one victim has been killed or seriously injured, ‘the multiple-victims factor’ should ‘ordinarily result in the imposition of at least two consecutive terms. ’”  Liepe, 239 N.J. at 377 (quoting Carey, 168 N.J. at 429-30).
[brief] Let’s talk about [...].  Nice guy.  Right?  He’s a nice guy.  He’s everyone’s image of what a nice guy would be like.  But think about what you heard concerning his qualifications and experience.  And I have it listed up here on the board.  Now when you read that, compare that to what you heard from the 19 defense experts.  First of all, he hasn’t performed bowel or major abdominal surgery since 2010.  Almost 13 years.  He hasn’t done a hospital consultation on a patient with suspected ischemic colitis since 2010.  He did not have hospital privileges between 2010 and 2022.  In other words, he didn’t have permission to do a consultation, to see a patient in the hospital, for 12 years.  When [...] was evaluating [...], Dr. Mayer could not have done that, because he did not have permission from any hospital to do that.  And let’s talk about his answer to the questions about why he didn’t have that approach.  He applied for privileges in 2014, 2015, and 2017.  I kind of lost count of the years, the precise years.  And each explanation as to why he didn’t follow through on the request for hospital privileges with [...], was different.  One was, he was too busy with his other practice to do it.  In 2014.  2015, he applies again.  Withdraws it again, because he says he was too busy to go back into the hospital again.  2017, he has an application.  Okay.  Again withdraws it.  In his deposition he says it was part that he did it, because again he was too busy.  And then at the stand at another point, he says he withdrew it because he had moved.  He had moved in late 2017 through the first quarter of 2018.  But then on his resume, that he submitted to us as part of discovery before trial, a resume dated October 2018, he puts on that resume that he still had that application pending.  When I asked him on the stand why is that the case, he said, I don’t know, maybe I didn’t update it.  There is something that didn’t fit there.  About why he didn’t have hospital privileges.  For three full years, when he stopped practicing medicine, he worked full time as a lawyer, for a law firm that did nothing but sue doctors, and sue surgeons, such as himself.  He even tried eight cases as a plaintiff’s malpractice attorney.  He is still on that website, of that law firm, as a lawyer with that firm.
[directive] Background.  The “Brimage” Guidelines impose strict limitations upon a prosecutor’s au- thority to reduce a plea offer based upon anticipated trial proof problems.  Whereas prior Attorney General guidelines had authorized a true “departure” based upon an assessment of trial proof sufficiency (meaning that a prosecutor had unlimited discretion to reduce or waive altogether the term of parole ineligibility on this ground), the “Brimage” Guidelines only permit the prosecutor to reduce the recom- mended sentence by a discrete amount.  Specifically, a prosecutor is authorized only to adjust the plea offer to the bottom of the range in the applicable cell in the Table of Authorized Dispositions or, in some cases, to tender an offer three months below the bottom of the range.  Furthermore, under the “Brimage” Guidelines and Attorney General Directive 1998-1, prosecutors are generally precluded from dis- missing a school-zone count in return for the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to a non-school zone drug distribution-type offense, that is, one that is not subject to a waivable mandatory term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.  -2-
[brief] As stated, the public is not harmed by this Restrictive Covenant at all.  [...] has not been practicing in New Jersey for nearly a year.  No patient crisis --- \(^7\)  [...]’s argument that the restrictive covenant reaches as far as Somerset and Camden counties is spurious.  Former Practice employees are currently practicing in Marlton.  \(^8\)  [...]’s argument about the consolidation of healthcare practices and running afoul of the restrictive covenant because of a practice’s remote office and the supposedly 3,721 square miles covered by the Restrictive Covenant are baseless since the sole location raised by Dr.  Ondik on his applications was Hunterdon’s Flemington office.  (Ra16 ¶47) ensued.  There exists a plethora of physicians to serve the needs of the population.  (Ra33-59).  Given that [...] does not practice in a highly specialized or limited field such as neurosurgery, this does not present any harm to patients.  This is particularly true here were [...] admits that he did not treat any appreciable number of patients while at the Practice.  (Ab22)  Reasonable restrictive covenants, such as the one here are enforceable, even where they impact patient choice.  Accord Desai v. St. Barnabas, 103 N.J. 79 (1986).  Although the standards the Court considers for privilege determinations are different, the point is the same: Patient choice is not the only consideration or even the most important.  [...] has failed to establish that his claim is based on settled law or that it has a likelihood of success on the merits.  Thus, he has failed to carry his burden with respect to the first requirement under Crowe, as he does with the balance of the requirements.
[brief] [...] told [...] that a white male wearing a black Covid-19 mask approached her in a red burgundy pickup truck while she was walking home from work, pointed a gun at her, and told her to get inside his car.  *Id.*  [...] said that this did not immediately register with her and that the man in the car then again waved the gun at her and told her to “get into the f***ing car. ”  *Id.*  She then fled behind a pile of boxes, squatted down, and screamed.  *Id.*  [...] subsequently identified the red pickup truck involved in the altercation through surveillance footage from local entities and ultimately linked the vehicle back to [...].  (13-14a).  Notably, however, [...] did not obtain any footage of the actual incident despite the fact that it occurred on a heavily trafficked road with multiple businesses located on either side.  On January 29, 2021, New Brunswick officers picked up [...] and the woman he had been with the night of the incident, [...], and brought them both to police headquarters without incident.  [...] elected not to give a formal statement.  (14a).  A search warrant was executed on [...]’s truck later that evening and officers recovered the fake firearm, a black Bruni 84 9mm imitation handgun, also known as a starter pistol, in the center console.  *Id.*  Based on the above-referenced information, the [...] approved the following charges:  (1)  Attempted Kidnapping, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1A(3)/2C:13- 1B(2); and (2)  Possession of a Weapon for Unlawful Purpose—Illustration Firearm, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4E.  Id. II.
[brief] “Based on the investigation performed at both the [...] & [...], Japan manufacturing sites the most likely cause is retention of the silicone sleeve in the needle slot.  This is based on the following:  During sleeve assembly at [...], operators push the sleeve section of the sleeve into the needle slot.  By performing this action, the silicone sleeve can become jammed against the front edge of the needle slot.  When the implant is pushed into position during Ozurdex assembly, the sleeve cannot freely move laterally to accommodate the implant as a result of the sleeve being packed into the needle slot.  This results in the formation of the particulate.  The depth of the sleeve in the needle lumen in this respect is also important.  If there is more present, then it provides a greater obstacle to the implant during implant assembly if the sleeve cannot move freely.  The corrective action implemented in [...] Westport requires repositioning of the sleeve such that the leading edge of the slot is visible, returning the sleeve to a position where it can accommodate the implant, and this prevents the generation of the particulate. ” (Da0229, Da0237)  [...] then tested ninety (90) such Ozurdex applicators from the subject [...] and found a defect rate of 2.2% dispensing the silicone particulate.  (Da0229, Da0237)  In other words, Ozurdex [...] contained 6,553 applicators that [...] knowingly, and without warning, distributed, which contained a staggering 145 (2.2% of 6,553) defective applicators, including the defective Ozurdex applicator that blinded [...].
[brief] “Adequate provocation” is conduct “sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his/her control. ”  Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 412 (internal quotation and citations omitted).  “What is really meant by ‘reasonable provocation’ is provocation which causes a reasonable man to lose his normal self-control,” not provocation “such as to cause a reasonable man to kill. ”  [...], 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 15.2(b) (3d ed. 2021).  “[A]lthough a reasonable man who has thus lost control over himself would not kill,” in cases of adequate provocation, a defendant’s use of force in “reaction to the provocation is at least understandable,” warranting a conviction for a crime less blameworthy than murder.  Ibid.  Our courts have held that a threat on a defendant’s life is an adequate provocation.  Thus, in Powell, 84 N.J. at 320, our Supreme Court held that a passion/provocation instruction was necessary when there was evidence that there was an argument between the defendant and the decedent, and the decedent had grabbed defendant’s gun.  Similarly, it is well-established that a “menacing gesture” can be adequate provocation even where the gesture did not put a defendant “in danger of being killed or seriously injured. ”  State v. Bonano, 59 N.J. 515, 523-24 (1971).  As in those cases, a threat to [...]’s life was present in this case.  At a N.J.R.E 104 hearing about the voluntariness of [...]’s alleged confession, the trial court found that [...]’s testimony established [...]’s belief that “[...] may have intended to poison herself or that she intended to poison the two of them.
[brief] The Trial Court held that Plaintiffs’ “civic purpose” was a sufficient need.  The Trial Court held that Plaintiffs’ goal of raising “awareness about local issues” was “consistent with OPRA that a democratic society operates best through transparency. ” (Da113).  Defendants never provided any counterbalance to this finding.  Although the [...] alert system is a private system, it is paid for by government funds.  [...] contracts with [...] to provide the [...] alerts.  (Da080).  The seventh factor is whether a statutory or public policy “seeks to prevent this type of disclosure.
[brief] The Trial Court properly rejected [...]’s disingenuous assertions that [...] submitted to the PTA Arbitration its claims for payment due under the completion subcontract for Hackensack Project.  [...] does nothing more than stitch together pieces of [...]’s Statement of Counterclaim and Post-Hearing Brief that, in context, pertain exclusively to the issue of whether [...] was liable under the PTA for the payment of any additional EGP for the Hackensack Project.  Pa207 ¶ 80; see [...]’s App. Br. at 10, 13, 25 (incorrectly equating the Hackensack Project issues with [...]’s statement that it is still owed payment from [...] for the work it performed on the project).  The task at hand in the PTA Arbitration was to determine if the Hackensack Project had any Estimate Gross Profit.
[brief] When materials outside the pleadings are relied upon, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim no longer viable as such, and should be refiled as a summary judgment motion.  (Emphasis added).  See, e.g., Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 337 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied 188 N.J. 353 (2006); Roa v. Roa, 402 N.J. Super. 529, 537 (App. Div. 2008), certif. granted 197 N.J. 477 (2009).
[brief] At oral argument, the trial judge noted that [...]’s injuries were an element of his claims for negligence; therefore, evidence of his dishonesty about his injuries did not have to be relegated to the damages phase of trial.  [1T 147:20-148:11].  The trial judge also correctly reasoned that [...]’s credibility was a relevant issue in both phases, meaning that admissible damages evidence was not automatically excluded from the liability phase.  [1T 146:8-14, 147:16-19, 148:11-17].  The trial judge’s findings are supported by the law.