ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See id. at ¶ 32.  Respondents further failed to provide Appellant with any documentation related to her unlawful termination despite Appellant making multiple requests for same which, of course, entirely undermines the purported performance issues leading to Appellant’s termination and shows that they were, in fact, false and pretextual.  See id. at ¶ 33.  Respondents invented said performance issues in a calculated effort to conceal their discriminatory and retaliatory animus against Appellant because of (1) her medical disability; (2) for taking a protected medical leave of absence in connection with said disability; (3) for requesting an accommodation upon her return to work in connection with said disability; and (4) the possibility that Appellant may require further medical treatment and work accommodations in connection with same.  See id. at ¶ 34.  Immediately upon Respondents’ unlawful termination of Appellant’s employment, Respondents locked her out of her work accounts, which restricted Appellant from accessing critical written communications she had with Respondents related to her leave.  See id. at ¶ 35.  Respondents’ unlawful termination of her employment further prevented Appellant from accessing basic information about her employment with Respondents, as her account access was the only way she could find copies of her employment agreement, company policies, and the like.  See id. at ¶ 36.  Additionally, Respondent [...] failed to respond to Appellant’s request to use accrued “Paid Time Off” (“PTO”) to cover the first week of her STD leave, which was not covered by insurance.  See id. at ¶ 37.  As a result, Appellant suffered significant economic damages.  See id.  Further, Appellant has been unable to retrieve valuable personal belongings which she left in her office before her STD leave.  See id. at ¶ 38.  Although Respondents’ employee policy manual provided that Appellant was to receive her personal belongings no later than her last day of employment, and Appellant reached out to Respondents requesting her belongings just one day after her termination, Respondents failed to return Appellant her personal belongings as of the date of filing the Complaint.  See id. at ¶¶ 39-40.  Finally, Appellant has incurred out-of-pocket medical expenses associated with treatment which has, in turn, created ongoing medical issues and expenses for Appellant, meaning she will incur additional damages moving forward which are both economic and caused by emotional distress stemming from Respondents’ unlawful discrimination and retaliation targeted towards Appellant.  See id. at ¶¶ 41-43.
[brief] PAGE  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................10  A.  Standard of Review.............................................................................................................10  1.  Municipal legislative enactments are entitled to a presumption of validity ..................................................................................................................10  2.  Appellant exclusively cites judicial decisions that do not involve or apply the standards of review applicable to legislative enactments ..................................................................................................................13  B.  The Committee Was Justified in Relying on the Opinion of the Township’s Planner and Its Adoption of Ordinance 2022-15 Was Proper and Entitled to Substantial Deference  .............................................................................................................14  1.  The Planning Board made the required determination as to whether the Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the Township’s Master Plan ..................................................................................................................14  2.  Appellant’s arguments that Committee’s adoption of Ordinance 2022-15 was improper or should be deemed “null and void” are incorrect and should be rejected by the Court ..................................................................................................................16  C.  Whether Or Not The Redevelopment Plan Was Consistent With The Township’s Master Plan, The Committee’s Adoption Of The Redevelopment Plan Was Nonetheless Proper And Lawful Under The Redevelopment Law .............................................................................................................19 D.  The Legislative Record More Than Adequately Supported The Committee’s Vote To Adopt The Redevelopment Plan Amendments  ......27  E.  The Committee Was Not Required To State Its “Reasons” In The Meeting Minutes and Did Not Err in the Manner it Amended the Redevelopment Plan  ..................................................................................................................32  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................33
[directive] ANA OF DEPARTMENT 080  Box PO 08625-0080  GUADAGNO NJ K1M TRENTON, Governor Lieutenant Criminal Justice Division of Director, [...] TO: Prosecutors County  All General Attorney Acting [...]  FROM: 1, 2016  March DATE: Program  Intervention Pretrial the on Guidelines  Uniform RE: (Senate 98 c. P.L. 2015, Act, an law into [...] signed Governor 10, 2015, August  On known as Treatment, Supervisory admission into of terms the changed which No. 2559), Bill an with defendants provides PTI 2C:43-12.
[brief] Should the Court perform a choice of law analysis, the Restatement, which the Supreme Court adopted in Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 130 N.J. 324 (1992), would apply.  The Restatement provides that, where there is a conflict of laws, the law of the state chosen by the parties will apply unless either: (1) The chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or (2)  Application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state, which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issues and which…would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.  In this case, both prongs of the Restatement are relevant because New York has an insufficient relationship to both the parties to this dispute and the facts that give rise to Appellants’ claims in this action.  Further application of New York law would run afoul of New Jersey’s fundamental policy and express interest in regulating the malt beverage industry, including the contractual relationships between brewers and wholesalers operating within this State.
[brief] Defendant, [...], respectfully requests that the Appellate Division deny the Plaintiff’s appeal and affirm the decision of the trial court below.  In the event that the Appellate Decision deems it necessary to and does consider and resolve [...]’ cross-claims – which seek the same relief granted by the trial court on other bases (i.e., the dismissal of the complaint and all claims with prejudice) - [...] respectfully submits the that both contentions in its cross-appeal should be granted and the trial court’s decision below on these issues reversed.
[brief] 5  **Flomerfelt v. Cardiello,** 202 N.J. 432 (2010) ...........................................................................  9  **Gibson v. Callaghan,** 158 N.J. 662 (1999)  ...........................................................................  4, 8  **Karl's Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.,** 249 N.J. Super. 487, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991)  .........
[brief] [...] Enrolled In The CCIP  [...] complied with the Tutor contract requirements when it retained [...].  [...] provided [...] with the mandated CCIP enrollment forms, dated July 28, 2015, which [...] completed and submitted.  (Dta814,946.)  This resulted in notification to [...] on July 30, 2015 that its “enrollment in the [CCIP] had been completed. ”  (Dta949.)  ([...]’s compliance with the enrollment procedure and the issuance of a certificate of insurance to it are in contradistinction to a separate form letter advising subcontractors of CCIP ineligibility that [...] would send to those subcontractors that were ineligible to enroll in the CCIP.  No such letter was ever sent to [...].  (Dta875, [...] dep. T35-10 to 36-15.))  5.
[brief] The Supreme Court in Torres made clear that an evaluation of the overall fairness of a sentence “is the necessary second part to a Yarbough analysis. ”  246 N.J. at 268.  A court’s decisions (1) setting the length of the multiple terms and (2) deciding whether to impose those terms concurrently or consecutively do not happen in a vacuum; rather, “sentencing is a holistic endeavor” and the “aggravating and mitigating factors and Yarbough factors, as well as the stated purposes of sentencing in N.J. S.A. 2C:1-2(b), in their totality, inform the sentence's fairness. ”  Id. at 272.  In particular, the fairness evaluation must “contextualize[e] the individual sentences’ length, deterrent value, and incapacitation purpose and need. ”  Id. at 271.  The goals of deterrence and incapacitation are reflected both in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(3) as well as in aggravating factors three (incapacitation)\(^7\) and nine (deterrence).  A high risk that the defendant will reoffend and a substantial need for deterrence justify a longer sentence, which can be accomplished either by running the sentences consecutively, imposing individual terms toward the top end of the range, or a combination of both.  See Torres, 246 N.J. at 271; State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).  Here, after evaluating the Yarbough factors, the Court purported to turn to an assessment of the overall fairness of the aggregate sentence as required \(^7\)  Aggravating factor three (risk of reoffense) is tethered to the sentencing goal of incapacitation (“the confinement of offenders when required in the interest of public protection”) because a higher risk of reoffense justifies a longer sentence to protect the public by incapacitating the defendant for a longer period.  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(3); 2C:44-1(a)(3). by Torres, but the Court’s reasoning is hard to parse.
[brief] CONCLUSION..................................................................................50  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Oral Ruling Set Forth on the Record on June 5, 2023 and June 6, 2023  Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Evidence and Testimony Regarding the Plaintiff’s Handicapped Placard and Parking in a Handicapped Parking Space…………………………………………………1T12:9-14; 2T40:10-18  Oral Ruling Set Forth on the Record on June 5, 2023 and June 6, 2023  Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Testimony of [...]’  Regarding the Plaintiff’s Prior Medical History and Prior Falls…………1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13  Oral Ruling Set Forth on the Record on June 12, 2023  Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Testimony of Jody DeMarco, P.E………………6T48:6-19  Judgment Upon Jury Verdict Filed by the Trial Court on July 12, 2023…..Pa34  Order Denying the Motion for a New Trial Filed by the Trial Court on August 4, 2023………………………………………………………………………..Pa47  Oral Decision of the Trial Court  Set Forth on the Record on August 4, 2023 in Support of the Order Denying the Motion for a New Trial…………..8T20:5-36:18  TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] ”  Id. at 35:13-15.  After the complaint was dismissed on summary judgment, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on March 20, 2023.  The trial court denied the motion on April 14, 2023, highlighting that it was Plaintiff’s burden to prove how much was allegedly owed in what year between 2010 and 2017, and that Plaintiff admitted he has “zero idea how much to a portion [sic] amongst the various years. ”  See T3 at 15:10-15.  The Court also addressed Plaintiff’s sham affidavit ruling that his deposition testimony and the new affidavit “directly contradicted him. ”  Id. at 14:9-12.
[brief] Id., at § 314.4(d)(1)-(2).  Similarly, per the CFPB, supervised non-banks, including many debt collectors, are permitted to “outsource certain functions to service providers due to resource constraints” and “rely on [the] expertise from service providers that would not otherwise be available without significant involvement. ”\(^3\)  The CFPB has performed hundreds of supervisory examinations of supervised debt collectors that consist of in-depth assessments of compliance with the FDCPA, management of service providers,\(^4\) and safeguarding of consumer information and data.  Tellingly, and despite these countless examinations and enforcement actions, the CFPB has never acted against a debt collector for using a letter vendor.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully requested that this Court deny the Defendants’ appeal in its entirety.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/[...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff, [...], Trustee of the Donald M. Fox 2006  Revocable Trust  DARYL B. FOX, TRUSTEE OF THE DONALD M. FOX 2006  REVOCABLE TRUST  Plaintiff-Respondent, V. [...] AND [...]  Defendants-Appellant, AND [...]  Co-Defendant-Respondent.
[brief] While the prosecutor in a criminal case is expected to make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to a jury, a prosecutor must avoid comments that invade the rights bestowed on defendants, including the right to remain silent.  *State v. Muhammad*, 182 N.J. 551, 568-69 (2005) (holding that a prosecutor may not use at trial a defendant's silence when that silence arises "at or near" the time of arrest, during official interrogation, or while in police custody).  "[T]rial courts should endeavor to excise any reference to a criminal defendant's invocation of his [constitutional] right[s]."  *State v. Clark*, 251 N.J. 266, 292 (2022) (quoting *State v. Feaster*, 156 N.J. 1, 75-76 (1998)).  Here, as discussed in Point I, there were no such invocation of defendant's right to remain silent, such that permitting the jury to hear the statements claimed to be invocations was reversible error.  And to the extent any such statements were ambiguous invocations, they do not risk creating the same negative inference in the minds of jurors not trained in the law as might a clear invocation of the right to remain silent, such that defendant would be punished for exercising his constitutional right.  Significantly, defendant did not object to the admission of these portions of his interview on these grounds, suggesting he too recognized that their admission was not improper.  Nor did he object to the prosecutor's single fleeting reference to an instance in which defendant refused to answer a single question during his interview as to whether he ran because he heard gunshots -- a comment fairly made in response to defense counsel's own speculation during his summation that defendant was running just like everyone else because he heard gunshots.  There was no error in the admission of the now-complained of portions of defendant's interview or the prosecutor's single comment during summation, and certainly neither rose to the level of plain error.
[directive] A. investigations.  State law requires that the Special considerations for death-in-custody Attorney General supervise investigations of in-custody deaths, which run the gamut from a jail suicide, to a heart attack in the back of a police vehicle, to a death from natural causes in a prison hospital.  As a result, the protocols for investigating an in-custody death turn, in part, on whether the death could be plausibly linked to the use of force by a law enforcement officer.  B. force.  Where an in-custody death could be plausibly linked to the Death involving use of actions of a law enforcement officer, whether through the intentional use of force or a reckless indifference to human life, [...] shall investigate the matter pursuant to the protocols described above in Section II.  C. force.  Where an in-custody death cannot be plausibly linked Death not involving use of to the actions of a law enforcement officer, [...] shall supervise the investigation of the matter as follows:  1.  The [...] Director shall assign the matter to personnel employed by the County Prosecutor’s Office in the county where the death occurred, with the understanding that those personnel shall be designated as Special Deputy Attorneys General or Special State Investigators for the limited purpose of conducting the investigation under the supervision of [...].  Page 14  2.  Subject to the approval of the [...] Director or designee, the investigative personnel assigned to the matter shall take whatever investigative steps they deem necessary to determine whether: a.  Any law enforcement officer contributed to the in-custody death; or b.  Any person should be criminally charged in connection with the in-custody death.  3.  At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigative personnel assigned to the matter shall report their findings to the [...] Director.  If the [...] Director concludes that a law enforcement officer contributed to the in-custody death and/or any person should be criminally charged in connection with the death, then the matter shall be presented to a Grand Jury pursuant to Section II.H.1 above.  If the [...] Director concludes that neither of these conditions exist, then the matter need not be presented to a Grand Jury.
[brief] Consistent with this precedent, the jury was made fully aware, by direct and cross-examination of [...], as well as testimony of the [...] record custodian, that historical call detail record analysis determines a “general geographic area of where a phone was when it did something” (7T21-1 to 3); that [...] used PCMD for system optimization, not for locating phones (7T28-25 to 29-6; 7T32-18 to 33-6); and that PCMD “gives you a great place to look for [a phone] and it validates itself when we go find it,” but “[i]t’s not always 100 percent accurate. ” (7T48-21 to 25; 7T75-12).  [...]’s use of PCMD in his historical cell site analysis was permissible and did not render his opinions unreliable.
[brief] Thus, for the sake of brevity, the facts set out in STATEMENT OF FACTS above, will not be re-set out here in POINT IV and are hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth herein.  It is noted that plaintiffs’ chose not to disclose to this Court, the admissible evidence of [...]’s private investigation activities, which activities took place prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and which activities establish that plaintiffs knew or should have known of [...]’s existence as a commercial tenant at the premises in issue.  It is respectfully submitted that the disclosure of [...]’s private investigation activities to this Court would have significantly challenged plaintiffs’ ability to establish that they engaged in the necessary due diligence to merit their alleged good faith reliance on “John Doe” pleading principles to commence a timely action against [...].  This is the same behavior plaintiffs exhibited when they chose not to disclose [...]’s private investigation activities to [...] at oral argument of [...]’s motion to dismiss in lieu of answer.  [...] filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of filing an answer and the Law Division was aware that the other defendants/tenants filed motions to dismiss, all arguing that the statute of limitations expired prior to their respectively being brought into this action.
[brief] v. **August 11 2021 Hearing**  The Board rejected a retroactive rent increase.  It did so disingenuously on the basis that [...] had not briefed the issue.  12T:30:11-12, 32:7-15, 34:2.  At the prior hearing, the Board did not request, nor permit, briefing from the parties and in fact stated at the June 23, 2021 hearing that it would decide the issue based upon the Board’s counsel’s opinion.  However, the Board’s attorney advised the Board that it could reject any retroactive rent increase by “tak[ing] the lawyerly way out and not deal[ing] with it” as the issue was not property presented to the Board by [...].  12T:25:18-21, 26:5-8, 30:5-10.  The Board followed that invitation even though [...] was neither asked, nor permitted, to address the retroactivity of any rent increase.  Accordingly, the Board made the negligible rent increase effective September 1, 2022.  12T:37-38, 45:19-24.  It ruled that [...]’s equity in the Unit was $12,804.88, thereby entitling [...] to an annual return of only $800.31 on its equity.  Da 54.  That low return resulted in a total monthly rent increase of $154.99 to the existing rent of $723.41.  Da 54
[brief] Whether an official is shielded from liability by qualified immunity for alleged unlawful official action turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the action assessed in light of the “clearly established” law at the time the action was taken.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 776 (2014).  Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability unless a plaintiff shows “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct. ”
[brief] 826a at 46:10-13 (“I’ve never met [...].  I wouldn’t know him if I fell over him.  And [...] is the company that he works for so that’s all I can say”).  [...] further testified:  “Q.  Did [...] ever give you or [...] any kind of legal advice?  A.  Not to me.  I don’t know if he ever spoke to [...].  Q.  Did [...] ever give you or [...] or [...] a legal opinion of any kind?  A.  Again, same answer.  I’ve never spoken with [...].  I don’t know if [...] spoke to him or not.  Q.  Did [...] ever provide you with any written information about the [...]?  A.  Not that I can recall.  Maybe you can show me something.  I don’t know.  Q.  Did [...] ever provide you with any written information about [...]?  A.  Not that I can recall.  Q.  Did [...] ever make any representation to you about whether [...] was going to buy the property or not buy the property?  A.  Again, not that I can recall.  Q.  Did [...] ever make any kind of representation or promise about [...] of any kind on any subject?  A.  I've never spoken to [...].  I've never had any conversation with him so, no.  Q.  Did [...] ever provide you with any information concerning the suitability of the [...] for development?  A.  No, sir…” 828a-829a at 96:3-97:2 (emphasis added).
[brief] Instead, the Objectors claimed that it was manifest in the interest of justice: a) that important and novel constitutional questions warranted an enlargement of time; and b) that public rather than private interest requiring adjudication or clarification warranted an enlargement of time.  (Pa852-853).  As a fall back, without pointing to any constitutional issues or public interests, the Objectors argued that general equitable considerations warranted an enlargement of time.