ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] According to the report, defendant was raised in a “generally supportive” environment by his mother and stepfather, who joined the family when he was six or seven.  (Da47-49).  His mother and stepfather had a harmonious relationship devoid of domestic violence and infidelity.  (Da47-49).  His IQ reflects average to intellectual functioning, and in addition to his criminal history, he “divulged an incident of fire setting at five years old, as well as placing ‘fire crackers in the mouths of frogs’ from 11 to 12. ” (Da47-49).  He also disclosed that he and his codefendants “stole ‘five or six cars’ over a five-month span for ‘joy rides. ”” (Da48).  As regards the index offense, he “took full responsibility for murdering his victims in 1995. ” (Da48).  He “recalled that all three defendants participated in planning their index offense .  . . .  [N]o one was the leader of the group. ” (Da48).  They decided to target the [...]’ house because “it set back from the street in a wooded area and they assumed the owners had gun. ” (Da48).  Defendant stated “[w]e were all wrong and we are all responsible, no matter who did what. ” (Da48).  He “did not attribute his behavior to drugs and did not blame his co-defendants or anyone else for his behavior. ” (Da48).  He “acknowledged writing letters to [[...]’s] sister that were attributed to ‘just venting. ’” (Da48).  He also admitted “that he cared little about his crimes after his arrest and was ‘blank’ at the time of sentencing.  (Da48).  [...] found that over time, defendant processed the gravity of his behavior and developed empathy for his victim.  (Da48).  Defendant “expressed credible remorse” and had learned to control his impulses.  (3T14-16).  However, on cross, [...] acknowledged that defendant’s crime reflected “well thought out planning. ” (3T18:19).  [...] found the following aggravating factors, to which he attributes substantial weight: 1, 3, 9, and 12.
[brief] Jurors must “‘be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did’ before determining his or her guilt or innocence. ”  *State v. Frisby*, 174 N.J. 583, 596 (2002).  A general instruction should adequately inform the jury “that it must be unanimous on whatever specifications it finds to be the predicate of the guilty verdict. ”  *State v. Parker*, 124 N.J. 628, 641 (1991).  When there is a single theory of the case and the alleged acts are “conceptually similar,” no specific unanimity instruction is required.  *Frisby*, 174 N.J. at 600.  Because all the possible overt acts arose from the same nucleus of facts, the charge was proper.  The Supreme Court in *Parker* found general unanimity instructions insufficient in certain scenarios, including when: (1) a single crime could be proven by different theories supported by different evidence, and there is a reasonable likelihood that all jurors will not unanimously agree that the defendant's guilt was proven by the same theory; (2) the underlying facts are very complex; (3) the allegations of one count are either contradictory or marginally related to each other; (4) the indictment and proof at trial varies; or (5) there is strong evidence of jury confusion.
[brief] If an expert opinion is unsupported by factual evidence or simply offers unsubstantiated personal opinions, it amounts to nothing more than a “net opinion” which not only can be given no weight by this Court, it must be precluded from being offered at trial.  See, *Lanzet v. Greenberg*, 126 N.J. 168, 186 (1991); *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981); *Parker v. Goldstein*, 78 N.J. Super. 472, 484 (App. Div.), cert. den., 40 N.J. 225 (1963) (“an opinion is no stronger than the facts which support it”).  In *Buckelew*, our Supreme Court held as follows with regard to net opinions:  The “net opinion” rule appears to be a mere restatement of the established rule that an expert’s bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence, is inadmissible.  It frequently focuses . . . on the failure of the expert to explain a causal connection between the act or incident complained of and the injury or damage allegedly resulting therefrom.  *Buckelew*, 87 N.J. at 524.  (Citations omitted.)  The reasoning behind this rule is simple: an expert’s testimony that reaches conclusions unsupported by factual evidence or otherwise fails to illustrate the factual premise for its conclusions is neither reliable nor useful to the trier of fact.  *Glen Wall Assocs. V. Wall Twp.*, 99 N.J. 265, 280 (1985).  Clearly, [...]’s report failed to fulfill the threshold requirements of N.J.R.E. 703.  Undeniably, it contained nothing but a “net opinion”.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT  CORRECTLY DISMISSED COUNT  THREE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND CORRECTLY CONCLUDED SECTION 8(E) OF THE MASTER DEED AUTHORIZED THE SALE OF UNIT 74.  Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants “misrepresented its color of title to Unit 74” and breached its Contract of Sale for the purchase of Unit 74 has no merit.  Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant committed “fraud”, “deception”, “unconscionable” and “abusive false pretense” by executing a bargain and sale deed is completely erroneous, and contrary to its own prior counsel’s and title company’s representations and warranties that it was receiving good and marketable title to the Unit.  The Association’s counsel specifically referenced paragraph 8(e) as to the Association’s authority for the purchase of the Unit.  See Pa 198.  The Association has title to the Unit which paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed specifically contemplated and provided for via purchase.  The Association received a title commitment and policy, insuring “marketable title. ”  Paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed dated June 29, 1983 specifically contemplated the Association’s one day purchase of the Unit for building staff, which is exactly what was contracted for on February 1, 2016.¹
[brief] As set forth in greater detail in Defendant/Appellant’s initial brief, the holding in *Mockler v. Russman*, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968) and instruction consistent with same is not limited to snow and ice.  See, *Universal Underwriters v. Heibel*, 386 N.J. Super. 307 (App. Div. 2006); *Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co.*, 8 N.J. 133, 141, 84 A.2d 281, 285 (1951); *Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc.*, 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972); *Calabree v. DiCristino*, 2009 (N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2548 (DA70 - DA71)); *State v. Wenzel*, 113 N.J. Super. 215, 273 A.2d 395 (App. Div. 1971).  Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the Court below should have given a charge consistent with the holding in *Mockler*, and failure to provide the appropriate charge improperly reduced or eliminated the Plaintiff/Respondent’s burden.
[brief] (Pa168-Pa169)  [...] was designated by [...] to testify on its behalf regarding the issues of design and manufacture relating to the recall of Ozurdex.  (Pa168-Pa169)  [...] admits that the Ozurdex actuator was not designed to release a silicone particulate.  (Da720-Da721)  By September 26, 2018, [...] was additionally aware that there was an adverse risk to patients of suffering a corneal reaction if injected with the silicone particulate.  (Da586)  Incredibly, [...] knew that the defect existed in specific Ozurdex Lot number E82852 by September 27, 2018.
[directive] Certain Existence of Establishing 7.6.2 or fact any respect to with Section, of this provision other any Notwithstanding ODARA the PSA or the in for accounted not is that circumstance heinous especially involvement, crime organized other or gang street (e.g., untreated defendant, by made statements threatening committed, was offense which in manner out-of-state behavior, criminal other or violent with associated illness.  mental or addiction records, expunged delinquency, juvenile of history of extent and nature convictions, or charges overcoming the for basis circumstance a as or fact such consider not shall prosecutor the etc.), prosecutor is the 8.2 unless or 7.2 Sections to pursuant detention pretrial against presumption and 23 note
[brief] Regarding the late fees, Tenant maintained that Landlord was calculating them at a usurious, unconscionable, and illegal interest rate rising to eighty-three percent (83%), and that once properly calculated the amount actually owed in overdue rent plus interest, assessable late fees, and other additional rent was actually $196,669.16, rather than the $313,106.39 that Tenant was seeking at the hearing (1T8-23 to 1T9-8).  As to Tenant’s Allowance, there was no dispute as to whether Landlord was current on its Tenant Allowance reimbursement payments.  It was not.  Tenant’s counsel argued that as of the date of the trial “the landlord owe[d] [tenant] money back” (1T6-8 to 6-11).  Specifically, the missed interest payment for 2019 to the missed principal and interest payments from 2020 and 2021, Landlord was delinquent a total of $334,583.33, an amount $137,914.17 greater than the amount the Tenant owed Landlord (1T25-11 to 1T25-13;Da169).  Landlord’s counsel did not dispute, as a factual matter: (i) that $334,583.33 in unreimbursed Tenant’s Allowance installment payments plus interest had not been paid; (ii) that Landlord underpaid its annual Tenant’s Allowance payment in 2019 before it had missed a single payment from Tenant; or (iii) that Landlord made no payments whatsoever towards Tenant’s Allowance in 2020 or 2021.  Counsel acknowledged these facts but argued that Tenant was no longer “entitled” to receive Tenant’s Allowance (1T9-22 to 1T10-2), contending, as a legal matter, that Tenant’s Allowance was no longer “payable under the terms of the lease” (1T9-21 to 1T9-25).  In essence, Landlord argued the Lease permitted it to ignore its reimbursement obligation under § 4.02 in 2020 and 2021, and its delinquent interest payment from 2019, because Tenant had not paid rent during the Gym Closure in 2020.
[brief] Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 45 (1986); McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 248 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 385 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1121 (1992).
[brief] In their Brief, [...] and [...] argue that [...] was [...]’s insurance broker, and breached duties owed to [...].  [...] disputes all of that, but regardless of whether it is true, it is irrelevant because [...] has no damages.  While the litigation was pending in the trial court, [...] and [...] produced the expert report of [...] to support their arguments that [...] breached duties owed to [...], but the opinions offered by [...] only underscore the irrelevance of the arguments advanced by the Appellants.  Indeed, it is telling that [...] and [...] make no mention of [...]’s opinions in their Brief.  However, [...] will quickly address them for the sake of good order.
[brief] Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 270.  "'Custody' for the purposes of Miranda requires a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'"  State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277, 298 (2023) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).  Determining whether a person is in custody "is a fact-sensitive inquiry" that turns on "'whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors.'"
[brief] This Court should therefore reject defendant’s argument for a remand on this basis.  Similarly, defendant also waived any claims regarding [...]’s alleged attendance at a “Street Cop” conference.  The record contains no competent evidence about what occurred at this conference or who attended.  In violation of basic rules of appellate practice, defendant alleges that [...] attended the conference by citing to a purported roster of attendees that he wrongfully included in his appendix.  Defendant also cites to a report about the conference in order to make factual assertions about what occurred during [...]’s purported attendance.  This Court should not consider these documents because they were not presented to the trial court and are not part of the appellate record.
[brief] Apparently, Plaintiffs believed that the “settlement offers” to resolve this case were appropriately brought before the lower court.  However, when Plaintiffs, in 2021, sought to invalidate the judgment, Appellant asserted in his opposition that Plaintiffs’ counsel contacted Appellant looking to resolve the judgment.  After an offer & counter-offer failed to resolve the matter, Plaintiffs filed their ultimately unsuccessful motion.  In reply, Plaintiffs took great exception to Appellant’s non-specific disclosure of the settlement discussions.  The above demonstrates again how Plaintiffs play “fast & loose”.  Previously in their foreclosure suit herein, Plaintiffs formally acknowledged the validity of the judgment lien, both in their Amended Complaint & proposed Foreclosure Judgment, which was entered by the court.  However, in their opposition to Appellant’s summary judgment motion, they argued, for the 1st time, in 17 years, that the judgment lien was invalid.  So baseless & so vindictive was the argument that the lower court did not address it in its several decisions & the Plaintiffs saw fit not to address it their brief herein.
[brief] Similarly, in *Funeral Home*, an owner of a local funeral home challenged the Zoning Board of Adjustment’s decision to grant a use variance to permit the applicant to operate a funeral home on a property located partially in an office use zone and partially in a residential zone.  319 N.J. Super. at 203.  This Court – as it did in *DePetro* – found that the challenger possessed standing because of the potential economic impact it had on the challenger’s business, not simply based on its status as a “taxpaying resident.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(c) makes clear that the only notice that is required for adoption of a redevelopment plan is the notice applicable to general ordinances.  To read the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) as requiring more than the simple identification of the goal or aim of the Ordinance would require that standard to apply to all notices provided for any general ordinance that is adopted.  By way of example, if a municipality were to adopt an ordinance setting forth rules applicable to municipal parks or the use of facilities within a municipal park, under Plaintiff’s interpretation, the municipality would have to summarize all of the proposed new rules applicable to municipal parks.  Likewise, before adopting a financial agreement authorized under N.J.S.A. 40A:20-9, the municipality would have to summarize the terms of the agreement.  An ordinance authorizing acquisition of property would have to summarize the terms of the agreement of sale or lease.  Such added expense is unnecessary when any member of the public who is interested in the contents of these documents can merely go to the municipal clerk’s office and review these documents.  Such an added expense runs counter to the very purpose behind amending N.J.S.A. 40:49-2, which was to reduce the costs to municipalities.
[brief] COMPLIED WITH N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f) BY CONDUCTING A REHEARING TO MAKE A VERBATIM RECORD BEFORE RECEIVING FURTHER TESTIMONY (Pa847-848; Pa856-861; 1T13-1T15)  ..............................................  27  III.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO ENTERTAIN A TRIAL DE NOVO (Pa847-848; Pa856-861; 1T15-1T16) .........................
[brief] In *Golotta*, circumstances absent in this case demonstrated that the target of the tip presented an immediate threat to public safety, which justified a stop without corroboration of illegality.  In that case, our Court upheld the stop of a motor vehicle based on a 9-1-1 call made from a personal cellphone, which has a registered owner.  That tip clearly identified a specific car that was being driven erratically.  *Id.* at 209.  The most important factor in upholding the stop was the “risk of imminent death or serious injury” implicated by the call.  *Id.* at 221-22.  This risk “relieves the police of the verification requirements normally associated with an anonymous tip” because of the immediate threat to public safety presented by people who are driving under the influence.
[brief] See In re Johnny Popper, Inc., 413 N.J. Super. 580, 589 (App. Div. 2010) (noting “statutes should be interpreted in a manner that avoids unreasonable or absurd results” and rejecting an interpretation that would defeat the purpose of the law).  This is reflected in the language of the IFPA and AICRA respectively.  It is also reflected in the rules and regulations governing PIP arbitrations, including the implementing regulations at N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 to -5.12, and the rules of [...], the current Administrator of New Jersey’s No-Fault PIP Arbitration Program designated by the Commissioner of the Department pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(b).  See https://www.nj-no-fault.com/rules (“[...]’s Rules”).  (Pa377).  A.
[brief] (T2, 36:23-38:8)  The interest of justice standard warranting enlargement must be viewed in light of the purpose for imposing the time limit on appeal.  Courts have said, the “‘statute of limitations is designed to encourage parties not to rest on their rights. ’”  Rocky Hill, supra, 406 N.J. Super. at 398.  As a result, “[t]he longer a party waits to mount its challenge, the less it may be entitled to an enlargement. ”  Tri-State Ship Repair, supra, 349 N.J. Super. at 424.  Consideration should be given to the past conduct of the plaintiff.  Southport Development Group, Inc., supra, 310 N.J. Super. at 556.  If a plaintiff “sat idly by in the past, its entitlement to the enlargement of the time is weakened. ”  Ibid.  For this reason, a court should consider the reason given for the delay and the length of time that the plaintiff has delayed.
[brief] ”  R. 4:73-1.  “The summary nature of the proceedings authorized by the rule should not be construed as in any way precluding the condemnee from an appropriate opportunity to object to the proposed condemnation. ”  [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 4:73-1 (citing Bergen Cnty. v. S. Goldberg & Co., 39 N.J. 377 (1963)).
[brief] In all of its filings at the ZB and this forum, [...] has told the same misleading story.  According to [...], the process of depressurizing natural gas from higher transmission pressures down to distribution pressures produces severe chilling which in turn causes icing on the current regulator, which is not heated.  Again according to the company's carefully lawyered prefiled testimony, which the ID and [...] credited without explanation, this presents a risk of loss of service for an extended period of time, with potentially disastrous effects, especially if it occurs in the wintertime when residences and businesses rely on gas to provide heat.  See, e.g., Ha771 and Ha774.
[brief] This permitted the court-appointed Administratrix to retain a CPA to review the irrelevant funeral home tax documents.  This expense was to be paid by the funeral home even though it was not a party.  The Trial Court also ordered [...], to provide information about protected conversations with Mother and legal advice provided to her.  Neither the attorney-client nor work product privileges restrained the Trial Court from its non-stop attack on Mother and her counsel.  In another unreasonable and punitive act, the Trial Court also chastised Mother and her counsel for not obtaining documents from the independent insurance agent over whom they had no control.
[brief] 23  Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2021)  19 Sandford v. Wellborn, 85 N.J.Eq. 577 (E&A 1916)  14  IMO Estate of Shinn, 394 N.J.Super. 55 (App.Div. 2007)  2  Simon v. Deptford Township, 272 N.J.Super. 21 (App.Div.) cert. den. 137 N.J. 310 (1994)  8  Simon v. Rando, 374 N.J.Super. 147 (App.Div. 2005), affirmed 189 N.J. 339 (2007)
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Criminal Action : ON APPEAL FROM A Plaintiff-Respondent, : JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IN : THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW v. : JERSEY, CRIMINAL PART, [...] : PASSAIC COUNTY  Defendant-Appellant.  Sat Below: Honorable [...], P.J. Cr. and a Jury.  BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
[brief] For another, that the Department \textit{also} failed to promulgate regulations to define “excessive” as used in the other statutes it cites indicates a potentially broader problem,\footnote{Consistent with the Department’s novel \textit{post hoc} “excessive” ruling here, it cites to no agency decision based on the unadorned term in any of the other statutes it cites.  Had the agency so ruled, the same problem that arose here could surface as to those other statutes.} not the absence of one.  Anyhow, the Department does not identify authority showing that an agency or any court has interpreted the statutory term “excessive” in any of the many ways in which the Department tries to employ it here, never mind where that occurred after the agency failed to mention the concept in lengthy rate-making proceedings.  In the end, the Department’s brief repeatedly confirms, once again, that its definition of “excessive” is a black box defined only by the Department’s own \textit{ad hoc} say-so.
[brief] The excessive FAR implicated by the plan is just one example which demonstrates that the proposal is simply too massive in scale for a parcel just slightly over one-half acre in size.  It is to be noted that building coverage is proposed at 65.1%, more than 50% greater than the 40% maximum permitted in the District.  The prior iteration of the plan proposed building coverage at 67.8%.  This contrast demonstrates that the current design, like the previous proposal, is simply too large for the property.  The reduction in building coverage from 67.8% to 65% is not significant …  Had the building been reduced in size would have resulted in a corresponding reduction to the extent of the variance relief pertaining to both the FAR and building coverage. ”  “14.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...] (“Plaintiff”) alleges that, on or about January 29, 2021, he was caused to trip and fall due to a pothole on a public roadway located at or near [...].  (Pa84).  Photographs of the pothole in question show, without question, that the pothole was in the middle of the roadway and not within a crosswalk.  (Da1). ¹  The weather conditions were clear on the date of the accident.  (Pa104, 30:2-4).  Prior to the accident, Plaintiff had parked his car on Kearny Avenue and intended to pick up some custard cups at a bakery in Kearny.  (Pa104, 31:12-19).  Plaintiff parked his car on Kearny Avenue on the opposite side of the street from the bakery.  (Pa104, 35:11-25).  Plaintiff had been to the bakery in question over 20 times and would take the same route, across Kearny Avenue, during those prior visits.  (Pa104, 35:15-25).  Plaintiff crossed Kearny Avenue without issue, obtained his pastries and was returning to his vehicle at the time of the incident.  (Pa104, 36:1-3).  Plaintiff did not utilize a crosswalk to cross the street, instead, he jaywalked across Kearny Avenue.  (Pa104, 36:1-3).  Plaintiff was not looking at the ground in the moments before his ¹ Plaintiff attached some photographs in his Appendices, but they are of poor quality and produced in black and white.