ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .............................................................................................................................9  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Davis v. Devereux Found., | 5 | | 209 N.J. 269 (2012) | | | Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., | 8 | | 123 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 1973) | | | J.H. v. R & M Tagliareni, LLC, | 8 | | 239 N.J. 198 (2019) | | | Meier v. D’Ambose, | 2 | | 419 N.J. Super. 439 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Monaco v. Hartz Mt. Corp., | 8 | | 178 N.J. 401 (2004) | | | Parks v. Rogers, | 5 | | 176 N.J. 491, 494 n.1, (2003) | | | Potomac Aviation, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., | 8 | | 413 N.J. Super. 212 (App.
[brief] Notice of appeal .........................................................................................Da 76-80  Notice of SOA docketing...........................................................................Da 81  Order denying motion to transfer case from SOA to plenary ....................Da 82  Order affirming denial of motion to withdraw from guilty plea ...............Da 83  Order granting motion for reconsideration ..............................................Da 84 Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery.................................Da 85  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] On July 26, 2022, based on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer, [...] specifically determined that Counts 1 and 4 of the Complaint should not be dismissed under its standard for complaint dismissal.  (Ca165-174).  In its decision on that Motion to Dismiss, [...] specifically “denied” the motion “as to the alleged violations of N.J.S.A 18A:12-24.1 in Count 1 and Count 4. ” (Ca173).  Now, for reasons it has failed to articulate, [...] has changed its mind and decided to sua sponte “dismiss” the Complaint outright.
[brief] 3.  Section 1:7-3 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as fol- 2 lows:  1:7-3.  After a full hearing and consideration of the petition mentioned in section 1:7-1 of this Title and of the facts and circumstances proved, the [Supreme] Court may dismiss the petition, or, if satisfied that the consti- tutional and statutory provisions relating to the enactment and approval of laws and joint resolutions have not been complied with, the Court may [de- cree] adjudge the law or joint resolution or any part thereof null and void [; but no judgment of annulment shall be made without the concurrence of at least three of the justices].
[brief] ”  177 N.J. at 115.  The “compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors” extends to “a compelling state interest in not discriminating against transgender students” and “in protecting transgender students from discrimination. ”  Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d 324, 390 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d, 897 F.3d 518, 528–29 (3d Cir. 2018) (school districts did not violate Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, by permitting transgender students to use restrooms consistent with their identity).
[brief] The lower court, and this Court, could not possibly decide the case [...] brought and the mandatory counterclaim [...] filed without consideration of the COVID Statute.  The lower court afforded the COVID Statute a plain reading and concluded that the April and July 1-6, 2020, payments claimed by [...] were required, as well as the May and June 2020 payments which [...] had made and seeks to claw back.  [...]’s position is that both the lower court and this Court should decide this case without consideration of the COVID Statute, due to its codification in Title 18A and the supposedly exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education (the “Commissioner”) on all matters pertaining to Title 18A.
[brief] | 13 | | A.  The Board’s Amended Resolution Provided Findings of Fact and Conclusion | 13 | | 1.  The Approved Building Height Excluded The Parapet | 14 | | 2.  The Board Did Not Consider The Sketch | 16 | | B.  The Trial Court Was Bound To Give Substantial Deference to The Amended Resolution | 19 | | C.  The Trial Court’s Findings of Fact Are Binding on Appeal.  | 21 | | POINT III | 22 | | THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE SKETCH AND [...] ADVERTISEMENT AS IRRELEVANT | 22 | TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] **Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified Complaint**  On March 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Verified Complaint.  [Da36].  In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added a disability discrimination claim under the NJLAD, but again, omitted any reference to both the 1991 Partnership Agreement and 2007 Addendum, despite being aware of the existence and applicability of the Agreement to his claims.  [Da65].  Indeed, the 2007 Addendum incorporated and amended the parties’ Partnership Agreement, having specifically referenced and revised Articles 3, 7, 8, 17, 30, 31, and 32 of the 1991 Partnership Agreement.  [Da220].  Attempting to evade application of the Partnership Agreement, Plaintiff attached as Exhibit B to his Amended Complaint a copy of a May 21, 2019 “Partners’ Certificate” entered into with [...] to argue that no written partnership agreement existed.  [Da90].  The Plaintiff failed, however, to explain the Partners’ Certificate’s conflicting Paragraph 8, which acknowledges the existence of the Partnership Agreement [containing the applicable Arbitration Clause], and stating in relevant part:  “The execution, delivery and performance of the Loan Documents by the Partnership will not violate any provision of the Certificate of Limited Partnership, the Limited Liability Partnership Agreement....”  Emphasis supplied.  [Da91].  Nothing in the Partners’ Certificate supports the Plaintiff’s position expressed below that Defendants abandoned the 1991 Partnership Agreement.  [Da90-92].  Without dispute, the only arbitration clause at issue in this matter is contained in the Partnership Agreement, of which the [...] is neither a party to nor a signatory of.  [Da219].
[directive] Accordingly, in any case where a law enforcement agency has reason to believe that a candidate for employment was previously a sworn officer of another law enforcement agency, the hiring agency has an affirmative obligation to identify all such former employers.  The hiring agency shall then request all internal affairs files for cases where the candidate was the subject officer, regardless of the ultimate disposition or status of the complaint.  If requested, the hiring agency shall provide a written acknowledgement to the releasing agency that it will maintain the confidentiality of said files in accordance with this policy.  9.8.3
[brief] The complete absence of a verbatim record of a three-hour meeting of the ZBA is not in dispute.  The Resolution makes clear that the ZBA relied upon evidence and arguments that were offered during an undocumented and unrecorded hearing.  The Resolution is woefully inadequate as it fails to use the word “exhibit” at all.  The phrase “special reasons” is used once without any basis for concluding such exist.  The words “conclusion,” “concludes” or “conclude” are also absent from the 14-page Resolution.  Finally, the ZBA relied on the net opinion of the Applicants’ expert witness that was devoid of any basis for that expert's conclusions.  While Applicants were allowed to “mark exhibits into evidence,” Appellants were not allowed to avail themselves to the residuum rule of evidence.
[brief] 2Ra68-69; see 2Ra1-12.  By that time, the Property consisted of the “last remaining undeveloped parcels in the portion of the Beachfront South Redevelopment Area between Pavilion Avenue and North Bath Avenue. ”  2Ra4.  The Redevelopment Plan Amendment was “intended to modify and supersede sections of the” Redevelopment Plan, Handbook 6, and “conflicting Sections of [...] Code Chapter 345” in order “to effectuate the \(^3\)  As discussed in Point I(B)(2), infra, the visual compatibility, open view corridor, and 2-to-1 setback requirements under the SRD Rule were in effect in 1996 when the Redevelopment Ordinances were adopted.  redevelopment of the [Property] in a manner that is consistent with the surrounding land uses. ”  2Ra3-4.  Certain area, bulk, off-street parking, and design standards for the Property were amended pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan Amendment, however, it did not alter the lack of the SRD Rule provisions as originally provided under the Redevelopment Ordinances.  See 2Ra6-9.  In this respect, Appellant’s assertion that “[...] amended its ordinances . . . to no longer require adherence to the [SRD] Rule for the [...] [Property]” is incorrect, since there was no such requirement in the Redevelopment Ordinances to begin with.
[brief] **SEVERAL ERRORS IN THE SENTENCING COURT’S ANALYSIS RESULTED IN THE ERRONEOUS IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE THAT WAS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE. (11T53-10 to 65-13)**  Even if this Court does not reverse [...]’s convictions, this matter must be remanded for a resentencing because the trial court: (A) failed to merge offenses as required, (B) failed to apply mitigating factor four when it was adequately supported by the record, (C) failed to conduct the mandatory Yarbough/Torres analysis in imposing consecutive sentences, and (D) imposed thousands of dollars in restitution without conducting an ability to pay hearing.
[brief] Pa1688; Pa2663.  Defendant [...] moved for summary judgment based on the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-2.  After briefing and oral argument, on July 26, 2019, the trial court granted all three motions.  Pa12; Pa14; Pa16.  The dismissal of [...] is not contested on appeal.  Pa2745.  With respect to [...] and [...], the trial court reasoned that although “[...] is not a licensed professional engineer,” “he was supervised by two separate people, both of whom are licensed by the State of New Jersey as professional engineers and that he was performing services that easily fall within ‘the practice of engineering. ’”  Pa29-30.  The trial court concluded that the AOM statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, applied and that failure to provide an AOM was fatal to plaintiff’s case.  Pa30.  As of January 2020, the only remaining defendants were [...] and [...].  The case was then delayed due to the COVID-19 outbreak and response and by a declaratory judgment (DJ) action against the commercial general liability carriers for [...], [...].
[brief] An evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the reasons for counsel’s inactions, and what additional evidence of [...]’s left-handedness could have been presented to the jury.  9.  Counsel’s errors cumulatively denied [...] effective representation.  These errors also collectively denied [...] his right to effective assistance.  See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018).  At the very least, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his PCR petition.
[brief] The Borough’s Failure to Follow Its Own Process Resulted in an Arbitrary, Capricious, and Unreasonable Result.  (1a)  N.J.S.A. 24:61-36 sets a floor, not a ceiling, on what the Borough could require from itself throughout its application process.  Cf. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 197 (1990) (noting federal constitution sets floor of constitutional right but states are free to expand those rights).  While N.J.S.A. 24:61-36 did not require the Borough to adopt a specific process or impose any specific requirements or criteria, nothing prohibited the Borough from adopting an explicit process or imposing requirements or criteria more stringent than any contained in N.J.S.A. 24:61-36.  See In re New Brunswick Municipal Employees Association, 453 N.J. Super. 408, 415 (App. Div. 2018) (discussing how state statutes create floor for municipalities and condominium associations).
[brief] See Newark Firemen’s Mut. Benev. Ass’n., Local No. 4 v. City of Newark, 90 N.J. 44 (1982) (Allowing revisions to a final offer during the proceeding because the revised final offer narrowed the issues thus bringing the parties closer together, rather than interjecting additional issues into the proceeding).  See also In the Matter of [...] and [...], 39 NJ PER P33, 2012 NJ PERC Lexis 50, * 6 (Aug. 17, 2012) (“the Borough requested the arbitrator to permit it to revise its final offer, presumptively to match the increases settled with the [...]”; “the arbitrator, in reliance upon N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(f) denied the request”; “Under the circumstances set forth above, the refusal of the arbitrator to permit the Borough to revise its final offer does not constitute a violation of the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 and does not constitute grounds for reversal or remand of the Award”).
[brief] Appellants cannot meet the required elements because these claims require Appellants to show a continuing right to develop the Solar Project.  After missing their rent payment, Appellants had no ability to develop the Solar Project after the termination of the Lease and Solar Rights.  As a result, Appellants lost any right to assert any claim for damages stemming from their own inaction.  To state a claim for common law fraud, Appellants are required to allege: "(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages."
[brief] (Pa156)  The form also indicates that she was provided an ice pack and that she claimed that every time she moved in the chair that she was seated in, she felt pain in her lower back, specifically the left side of the lower back.  (Pa156)  [...] personnel also took photographs, including pictures of the following: Plaintiff’s black slip-on shoes, Plaintiff seated in a chair, Plaintiff’s back while seated in a chair, and [...]’s [...] supplied U-boat, which was overloaded with merchandise.
[brief] They did not have the opportunity to use their accumulated sick days on an ongoing basis. \(^1\)  While the MSRA allows for \(^1\)  With respect to Plaintiff [...], for the approximately eight months before his forced retirement, he could not use his banked sick time.  On September 2, 2016, [...] was shot in the head while he attempted to break up a robbery.  (Pa961).  the prospective modification of contracts, it does not explicitly grant Defendants the authority to eliminate vested benefits.  For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' appeal and remand this matter to the Trial Court to finish discovery and for trial.  II.
[directive] Adult Conviction  Juvenile Degree (points)  Adjudication (points)  First 20 10  Second 12 6  Third 6 3 Fourth 4 2  Disorderly Persons  2  1  When the defendant has been convicted of two or more separate drug distribution-type offenses, a prosecutor shall not award points for the least serious prior drug distribution-type offense, since that offense will be used to establish the defendant’s eligibility for an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f.
[brief] June 20, 2024  Transcript of Motion to Compel Arbitration ..................1T38:16-51:8  June 25, 2024  Order of the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Compelling Arbitration ........................Da1 July 14, 2024  Amended Order of the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Compelling Arbitration ........................Da2 TABLE OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ APPENDIX VOLUME I June 25, 2024 Order of the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Compelling Arbitration ........................................Da1 July 16, 2024  Amended Order of the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Compelling Arbitration ................................Da2 August 22, 2023  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint ................................................Da3-23 August 22, 2023  Plaintiff’s proposed Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints ........................................................................................Da24-28 August 22, 2023  Certification of [...] in Support of Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints ........................................Da29-43 Exhibit A – May 21, 2022  Addendum to Promissory Note Agreement Between [...] and [...] ..............Da44-45 Exhibit B – August 6, 2012  Correspondence from Internal Revenue Service Regarding Employer Identification Number ..........Da46-47 Exhibit C – August 17, 2023  [...] Pre-Approval ................Da48-49  Exhibit D – Unexecuted 2017 Limited Liability Company Interest Purchase Agreement ........................................................Da50-56  Exhibit E – May 31, 2021  [...] Statement and May 17, 2021  [...] Wire Transfer Notice .................................Da57-60  Exhibit F – March 16, 2022  [...] Letter of Interest ................Da61-68  Exhibit G – March 22, 2022  Email from Plaintiff to Defendant [...]  .................................................................Da69-70  Exhibit H – March 2022  Email Exchange Between Plaintiff and Defendant [...]  ................................................Da71-72  Exhibit I – March 2022  Email Exchange Between Plaintiff and Defendant [...]  .................................................. Da73-74  August 22, 2023  Verified Complaint in [...], et al. v. [...], et al., [...] (the “Law Division Case”) ........................................................................................................Da75-103
[brief] Assuming that this Court does reverse those Orders, then there will be no basis for an award of attorneys’ fees to any of the parties, at this early pre-answer juncture of the action.  The Complaint will be reinstated, the Defendants will answer, and the case will proceed as usual.  The issue of who (if anyone) may ultimately be entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees will be rendered academic, until such time as the case is disposed on its merits.
[brief] At the time of the Accident, the truck owned by [...] was being operated by [...] employee, Defendant, [...] (“[...]”).  [...] and [...] shall collectively be referred to herein as “Defendants”.  The Accident resulted in the Decedent’s death.  Thereafter, this matter was instituted by Plaintiffs, [...], Executrix for the Estate of [...], and [...], individually (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against Defendants.
[brief] During the remand proceeding, plaintiffs were served with document requests & a deposition notice.  Although certain requested documents were produced, the parties could not agree on a place for the deposition.  Appellant moved to compel the deposition & to transfer the case to the Law Division.  The motion was granted.  (Da76-77)  Pursuant to the status conference held by the then assigned Law Division [...], both parties, in 1/24, filed dispositive motions.  Appellant’s motion sought summary judgment & an order turning over the sales proceeds deposited with the court’s trust unit pursuant to a Consent Order.  Plaintiffs’ motion sought a turn-over of the same deposited funds.  (Da 111-154)  After briefing, reassigned [...] held oral argument.  The judge reserved decision.  In 2 orders, accompanied by Statements of Reasons, Appellant’s summary judgment & turn-over motion were granted, except that compounded interest & costs were not granted as requested.  Plaintiffs’ motion was denied.
[brief] In Commitment of G.G.N., 372 N.J. Super. 42, 56 (App. Div. 2004), the Court held, “[e]vidence being proffered as an admissible business record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) must be carefully scrutinized for inadmissible included hearsay and other potentially unreliable information. ”  Id. citing Liptak v. Rite Aid, Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 199, 221-222 (App. Div. 1996).  Even though the ALJ had admitted the logbook sheet as a business record (1T8.14-22; Rb at 16), it is undisputed that [...]’s “first-hand knowledge” came from “reviewing the logbook” that contained hearsay – without more.
[brief] Then [...] appealed administratively.  It argued that because [...] changed its municipal zoning to eliminate Scenic Resources and Design Rule standards for the [...] property (only for the [...] property) and because various existing buildings in [...] are not stepped back from the boardwalk, that [...] should waive compliance with the Rule.  However, the buildings surrounding the [...] site are completely or partially stepped back and it is unknown how old other non-stepped back buildings in [...] are and thus pre-date the Rule.  Stunningly [...] bought [...]’s arguments, waived compliance with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule, and approved a too wide, much too tall building that is not compatible with its surroundings and is located only 88 feet from the [...] boardwalk.  In doing so [...] deprived [...] of the right to be treated equally and fairly under the law by depriving it of the economic benefits of building a block like apartment building containing a much larger number of apartments as [...] has permitted [...] to do.
[brief] The Respondent's signing of a new lease is not proof of a misuse of confidential information.  [...] representative [...] made clear that the Respondents had nothing to do with the termination of the Lease:  Q.  Now, in the complaint in this case, the Plaintiff, [...], asserts that [...] or [...], which are the entities owned by [...], induced [...] Estates to terminate the lease with [...] or his company.  Is there any truth to that?  A.  No, in fact, the opposite.  (Pa001805 - 001806).  Moreover, Respondents already knew about the [...] solar development opportunity from their conversations with [...] representatives in 2015, before Appellants ever took on the project.  (Pa002204-002205).  [...] testified that he “originally spoke to [[...]] in 2015 about this land. . . before a lease was signed.  When the project was still available within the market. ” (Pa002204).  The record simply does not support Appellants’ version of events here.  They cannot rely on bare allegations in their pleadings.  Appellants had two years to develop their case and failed to do so.  PERTINENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...] also stated that “findings underlying municipal governing body’s redevelopment decision, including any regarding the consistency or inconsistency with the Master Plan, must be adequately supported by the record, less resulting plan adoption be arbitrary or capricious. ”  [...] Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, supra, 413 N.J. Super. at 333 (emphasis added).  Both the Planning Board and the governing body were required in connection with the adoption of Ordinance 22-1516 to make a finding that the proposed ordinance is either substantially consistent with the Master Plan or it is not.  To do so requires an examination of the Master Plan and an examination of the proposed ordinance in order to factually set forth the consistencies or inconsistencies of the two.
[brief] | | 15719-15719 |  Email between [...] officers and outside counsel regarding bid protest.  RFP 2 requests communications other than those with counsel regarding contracts between [...] and [...].  RFP 12-14 seek documents regarding [...]’s solo bid proposals and [...]’s initial solo bids.  RFP 18 seeks communications between [...] and [...].  As such, RFP 2, 12-14, and 18 are not relevant with regard to this document.  RFP 15 is the only RFP that relates to [...]’s bid protest; however, the specific list of documents included does not include communications with counsel.  The Special Master agrees that RFP 15 cannot be extended to include communications with counsel when such documents were specifically omitted from the list of requested documents.  | | 15786-15786 | Email between [...] in house counsel and outside counsel regarding bid protest.