ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Not so.  In *Williamson*, the Court considered the meaning of the phrase “in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement. ”  138 N.J. at 303-04.  It is evident that, for purposes of the defense argument, the defendant accepted the premise that N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires a motorist to signal a lane change in such circumstances.  The Court appropriately did not reject this premise, as doing so would have constituted crossing the line into advocacy and making the defense argument for it.  A critical component of our adversarial system is the “party presentation” principle, which requires judges to limit themselves to the arguments adduced by the parties.  See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 893-897 (11th Cir. 2022) ([...], C.J., and [...], C.J., dissenting) (discussing in-depth the reflection of adversarial principles in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence).  Abiding by this principle, the Williamson Court did not address whether the signaling requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 apply to lane changes in the first instance.  We cannot now interpret the Court’s silence on this issue, which was proper given the circumstances, as a decision on the merits.
[brief] THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.  (Da374-77) ...............................................................55  A.  Newly Discovered Evidence of Third-Party Guilt .........................56  B.  Newly Discovered Evidence of [...]’s Bad Faith and Misconduct...........................................................................59  POINT III  THE PCR COURT MADE A SERIES OF PROCEDURAL RULINGS THAT INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY DEPRIVED [...] OF DUE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, REQUIRING REVERSAL............................................60
[brief] As respects the duty to appeal a ruling that imposes non-covered liability for injunctive and ancillary relief, Vermont and New Jersey law lead to the same conclusion: there is no duty to appeal.  The route to that destination, however, differs depending upon choice of law.  As detailed below, under Vermont law specifically addressing an insurer’s duty to appeal, the absence of such a duty derives from the uncontrovertible fact that the judgment was not covered.
[brief] Db19.  As discussed in Argument Section I, supra at pages 16-18, a trial court’s discretion is paramount in applying equitable doctrines, including the selection of remedies.  See Customers Bank, 453 N.J. Super. at 348 (“Because equitable remedies are largely left to the judgment of the court, which has to balance the equities and fashion a remedy, such a decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. ”) (citing Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 353-54 (1993) (evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying an equitable remedy).  This Court should only reverse the trial court’s determination of equitable remedies for a “clear abuse of discretion. ”  Fulton Bank, 473 N.J. Super. at 395 (quoting Ocwen, 450 N.J. Super. at 397).  “Courts exercising their equitable powers are charged with formulating fair and practical remedies appropriate to the specific dispute. ”  Kaye, 223 N.J. at 231.  That is precisely what the trial court did.
[brief] (15T:102-19 to 128-2; Da 6-7)  [...] admitted to destroying and disposing her son’s body, but maintained that she did not cause his death.  The ultimate question for the jury was therefore whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that death was in fact a homicide and not an accident.  Prior to trial, the defense sought to bar [...], the medical examiner, from testifying on the ultimate question that the death was a homicide.
[brief] (2T 33-2 to 7, 36-7 to 9)  According to [...], he had two phones numbers saved as “Philly” in his phone.  The State introduced a series of text messages between [...] and a [...] phone number, which belongs to [...].  (2T 46-9 to 23)  Although the messages were sent to [...]’s phone, [...] testified that he was communicating with [...].
[brief] Disputed Assets  [...] was not wealthy, and he had very limited assets when he died.  However, only two of them were subject to probate, [...]’s 401(K) account and the home he owned by himself.  [...]’s 401(K)  [...] opened a 401(K) account while separated from Estranged Wife.  However, he completed the application as if he was not married and named [...] as his beneficiary.  Because he was “legally” married, and federal law required Estranged Wife’s signature before [...] could name anyone other than her as a beneficiary, the designation of [...] as the beneficiary was void.  [...]’s counsel obtained the 401(k) disbursement check, notified the Trial Court and other interested parties, and arranged for the 401(k) proceeds to be paid to the court-appointed Administratrix.  (Tr. 7-30-21 at 4, 25)
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO PLAINTIFF’S PRIOR MEDICAL CONDITIONS AND FALLS AND THE USE OF A HANDICAPPED PLACARD.**  (1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:6-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T33:23-34:2; 8T31:22-32:2; 8T32:10-15; 8T32:7-33:1)  Plaintiff challenges various evidential rulings of the trial court.
[brief] Rule 4:28-1 governs joinder of indispensable parties.  The Rule requires a person to be joined as a party to an action: if (1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) the person claims an interest in the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may either (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.  Under this Rule, a party is indispensible if “he has an interest inevitably involved in the subject matter before the court and a judgment cannot justly be made between the litigants without either adjudging or necessarily affecting the absentee’s interest. ”  Allen B. DuMont Labs., Inc. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 30 N.J. 290, 298 (1959).  See also Ellison v. Schenck, Price, Smith & King, 280 N.J. Super. 169, 176-78 (App. Div. 1995) (defendant should have been joined in previous lawsuit as an indispensable party where disposition in prior action could have impaired its ability to protect itself from damages and victory by plaintiffs in the prior action could have subjected another party to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations).
[brief] "Regulatory guidance document" is defined to mean “any policy memorandum or other similar document used by a State agency to provide technical or regulatory assistance or direction to the regulated community to facilitate compliance with a State or federal law or a rule adopted pursuant to [the APA].”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3a(d).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is particularly appropriate that parties affected by the proposed agency action have the opportunity to participate in the process leading to the agency determination.
[brief] (1T71-5 to 6).  [...] in a written opinion, found that both detectives were credible as “they both had firsthand knowledge of the incident at issue, answered questions directly and consistently on direct and cross-examination, and were candid about any gaps in their recollection.  (Da12).  She determined [...]’s belief that the interaction between defendant and [...] was a CDS transaction “was not a ‘hunch’ but was based on his observations, training and experience in narcotics investigations. ” (Da18).  Accordingly, she concluded that there was reasonable suspicion a CDS transaction had occurred and thus police could lawfully stop both defendant’s and [...]’s cars to further investigate.  (Da18, 20).  The judge then turned to analyzing the search of defendant’s vehicle.  She found that the capsules seen on the driver’s seat—which [...] testified based on her training and experience were typically used for CDS—were in plain view and thus the detectives were justified in seizing them.  (Da18 to 19).  Finally, [...] analyzed the remainder of the search under the \textsuperscript{5}  Later lab testing indicated the substance contained n-ethyl pentylone, a Schedule I CDS. automobile-exception doctrine, reviewing the record to determine if police had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a criminal offense and whether the circumstance giving rise to probable cause were unforeseeable and spontaneous.  (Da19).  She determined that “[b]ased on [...], Detective [...] had probable cause that both [...] and[ ]defendant were engaged in a CDS transaction,” and when this was relayed to [...], “she had probable cause to conduct the search. ” (Da20).  But she concluded the search was unlawful and the remainder of the evidence needed to be suppressed because the circumstances giving rise to the probable cause were not unforeseeable or spontaneous.  (Da20 to 22).  This appeal followed.
[brief] In that instance, it would be foreseeable that the plaintiff would incur legal fees to compel the title company to perform under the title policy.  Otherwise, the Plaintiff must, as a matter of law, bear the cost of his or her own legal fees in the breach of contract case.  This argument is further supported by Dorofee v. Pennsauken Tp. Planning Bd., 187 N.J.Super 141, 453 A.2d 1341 (App.Div.1982).  In Dorofee, the litigation expenses that were incurred were associated with the Planning Board's defense of Dorofee’s claims.  Given the trial court’s finding that [...] committed fraud against Dorofee and the Planning Board, which was not challenged on appeal, the Court in Dorofee concluded that the legal expenses reasonably incurred by the Planning Board in defending the litigation which foreseeably ensued may properly be considered as damages proximately caused by the tortious conduct.
[brief] For example, in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority, depositions were conducted in the OPRA case.  423 N.J. Super. 140, 174-175 (App. Div. 2011).  The Appellate Division has left the door open for discovery --- \(^2\) [...]’s character and credibility are highly questionable.  The New Jersey Supreme Court publicly reprimanded [...] for gross negligence and other violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  In re [...], 134 N.J. 123 (1993). where a "legitimate need" for such discovery has been established. MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 552 (App. Div. 2005).
[brief] See [...] Aff. ¶¶ 2, 4 (Da15).  Had [...] confirmed [...]’s address with the USPS, it is reasonable to infer that they would have been apprised of the change of address filed by [...] a year prior.  R. 6:2-3(d) requires initial service in the Special Civil Part to be effected through mail; R. 6:2-3(d)(1) requires a plaintiff “to submit to the clerk the mailing addresses of the parties to be served.
[brief] Vitamin Specialties Co. v. Vita Pure, Inc.  [...], 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12040 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 1992).  39, 40 Wade v. Kessler Inst. 172 N.J. 327 (2002)  .........................................................................................................................  31  Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey v. Union Cty. Util. Auth. 399 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008)  ..............................................................................................  34  Zahl v. New Jersey Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety Div. of Consumer Affairs  428 F. App'x 205 (3d Cir. 2011)  ........................................................................................................  39  Zahl, M.D. v. New Jersey Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety [...], 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25327, 2009 WL 806540 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2009)
[brief] B.  [...] Failed to Establish a Material Misrepresentation and Reliance by its Underwriter And, Therefore, The Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment.  (Raised below: Ia122; 2Tr. 47-50)  Assuming arguendo the Questionnaire was not ambiguous, the lower court overlooked the insufficient proof of any material misrepresentation and reliance.  [...] failed to provide admissible evidence from the one individual with first-hand, personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the policy, [...]’s own underwriter.  Hockemeyer was the person [...] communicated with and she eventually quoted and issued the policy.  In New Jersey, an insurer may rescind an insurance contract on equitable fraud grounds.
[brief] THE COVID STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL ...........................................  31 POINT III  THE COVID STATUTE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY ......  35 POINT IV  A CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES IS NOT AN ACTION IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS  PERIOD OF R. 4:69 .........................................................................................................................  40  POINT V SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED ...........................................
[brief] *Crema*, 94 N.J. at 302 (emphasis added).  This meant [...], “the public and any affected or interested parties were without any firm knowledge of the factors that the agency would deem relevant and that might influence its ultimate decision. ”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  12  Similar to all these Supreme Court cases, this Court has reversed “a sharp departure by the agency in a specific case from an established administrative practice or policy by reason of which an applicant was denied relief.
[brief] Here, the trial court correctly found that [...] was on actual and inquiry notice of [...]’s claim to the Strip.  As the Court observed, [...] had knowledge of the following: (a) [...]’s predecessors were using the Strip as a parking lot when [...] bought the property in 1991; (b) [...] obtained the Smith Survey before purchasing Lot 4, which showed the disputed area with notations referring to the various deeds that included the Strip in both lots (an investigation into which would have revealed the 1971 Lot 3 Deed); (c) [...] was issued a title insurance policy that expressly did not cover the Strip; and d) [...] was aware that the unusual May 1972 Graco Deed did not appear of record until immediately preceding the sale to him in 1991.  4Tr. at 17:14-21; 19:3-7.  That knowledge put [...] on actual and inquiry notice that his claim to the Strip was tenuous, and obliged him to make further inquiry as to Lot 3’s claim to the Strip.  Had [...] made that inquiry, [...] would have discovered more facts that would have shed greater doubt on Lot 4’s ownership of the Strip, and bolstered Lot 3’s ownership claim: the 1967 Subdivision, the 1971 Lot 3 Deed with its inclusion of the Strip, the many Lot 3 deeds over decades that claim ownership of the Strip, and even the fact that, as late as 1985, [...]’s predecessor-in-interest, [...], had admitted in a subdivision application that Lot 4 did not own the Strip.
[brief] (14T:137-17 to 138-7; 147-19 to 149-15; 153-12 to 155-16).  He claimed he put the clothes—jacket, sneakers, and all—into the trunk of the rental car, and he did not know what happened to them after that.  He also claimed that he took [...]’s shoes, to explain why he was wearing different shoes later.  There \(^3\) [...] rented the car for the trip, but refused to stay at the hotel in Raritan with [...] and defendant because he did not like it.  (10T:13-20 to 14-23).  was no clear explanation for why he would change shoes, or why he would go to visit his aunt, who he had not seen in years, in long johns.  He claimed that [...] and [...] brought him to his aunt’s party, and he was essentially drinking through the entire day.  *Ibid.*  He further asserted he only went to New Jersey to visit and party with his aunt, because they were both Scorpios, and with other people he had not seen in years.  (14T:131-15 to 20).  To bridge a final gap – namely, how he got back to the Chrysler with [...] and [...] to be carried into the Raritan Hotel after his friends left him with his family – defendant claimed that his aunt met [...] and [...] somewhere, and they carried him into the Chrysler from her car.
[brief] (See Pa569-638.)  Moreover, the terms of the Redevelopment Agreement undermine any suggestion that it expired by its terms under Section 11.02: 11.02 Competitive Bidding Process Agreement.  The Redeveloper or its designee shall execute a competitive bidding process agreement (the ‘Competitive Bidding Process Agreement’) within ninety (90) Days of the Effective Date and provide a copy of same to the Agency.  This Agreement shall terminate on the ninety-first (91st) Day following the Effective Date if the requirements of this Section 11.02 are not met.  [Id.]  The “Effective Date” under the Redevelopment Agreement was May 26, 2021.  (Id.)  Ninety-one days following the Effective Date was August 25, 2021, not February 28, 2022 (which was 278 days after the Effective Date).
[brief] Plaintiff argues that “Reyes progeny has further expanded on these inroads....” (Pb 14).  In making this statement plaintiff is making reference to the observation in Reyes that there have been “obvious inroads” in the law concerning the duty of lessors.  However, as noted above, Reyes involved a week-to-week summer shore house rental, not a commercial industrial lease, and the observation of progression of the law since 1951 in Patton was in reference to residential properties and “particularly involving multiple-family dwellings. ”  Reyes, 454.  (In making this observation the court made it clear its observations were confined to residential property, noting how covenants of habitability and implied warranties “have been imputed into residential leases…”  Id.  Finally, it is noteworthy that even in the Reyes case the court did not permit one aspect of the plaintiff’s claim to proceed, and did so on the same rationale applied by the motion court in this case.  The plaintiff had claimed that the landlord was liable for defects in a platform leading from a deck.  Id., 444.  Plaintiff secondarily claimed the landlord was liable for lack of a handrail.  Id., 444.  The record indicated that the tenant was aware of the handrail condition.  Id., 462.  Thus, the court ultimately held:  “However, with respect to the handrail, [...] [the tenant] acknowledged in her deposition testimony that she was aware, at some point before her father’s accident, that the deck had no such feature.  It is immaterial that the lack of a handrail did not ‘concern’ her at the time.  Her awareness of that particular condition, as the lessee of the premises, absolves the [landlord] of liability for the handrail under Section 358 of the Second Restatement.
[brief] ......................- 46 - Nelson v. Xacta 3000 Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109580, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2009)......................................................................................- 40 - Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463 (2013)  ........................................................- 20 - Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001)...............................- 49 - Pepe v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 254 N.J. Super. 662 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 11 (1992)  .........................................................- 24 - Pereira v. Azevado, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54868, *13 (D.N.J. April 17, 2013)  ......................................................................................- 40 -, - 41 - Polzo v. Cnty of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008)  ...................................................- 31 - Rieder Cmtys., Inc. v. Twp. of N. Brunswick, 227 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div.) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 638 (1988).......................... - 35 -, - 36 - Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 170 N.J. 297 (2002)
[brief] (Da30).  The district court entered an order on September 11, 2019, “[g]ranting [[...]] leave until 10/14/2019 to file either a stipulation of voluntary dismissal or a motion to remand[.]” (Da23).  The stipulation of dismissal was filed on October 15, 2019.  Ibid.  On October 17, 2019, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order dismissing all federal claims with prejudice and transferred the state-law claims to the Superior Court of New Jersey.
[brief] Transfer and Assignment of the Account  As of June 30, 2016, after the Account had been charged off, [...] had sold, assigned, and conveyed the rights to a number of consumer credit accounts, including the Account, to [...].  Pa96-99.  Thereafter, on July 13, 2016, the rights to the Account itself were sold, assigned, and conveyed from [...] to [...], --- 1 Per R. 2:6-8, PaXXX-XX refers to the page range of Appellant’s appendix, PbXX-XX refers to the page range of Appellant’s brief, and TXX-XX refers to the page and line number, respectively, of the October 20, 2023 transcript of oral argument before the Trial Court.  then from [...] to [...], and finally from [...] to [...].  Pa102-07.  Also as of June 30, 2016 and July 13, 2016, respectively, the receivables associated with the Account had been sold, assigned, and conveyed from [...] to [...] and then from [...] to [...], and on July 13, 2016 from [...] to [...], then from [...] to [...], and finally from [...] to [...].  Pa100-01, 104-07.  None of those transactions took place in New Jersey.  [...] is a national bank headquartered in Nevada.  [...], [...], and [...] are all Delaware limited liability companies based in South Carolina, and Appellant does not allege that either [...] or [...] engaged in any conduct in New Jersey.  Pa2-3, ¶¶ 7-9.  On or about January 3, 2017, [...] filed an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Special Civil Part, Bergen County (the “Collection Court”), styled as [...] Funding LLC v. [...], Docket Number [...], to collect on Appellant’s debt in connection with the Account (the “Collection Action”).  Pa7, ¶ 37; Pa22, ¶ 6; Pa34-37; Pa60.  Appellant failed to appear in the Collection Action, and [...] filed a request for a default judgment on April 19, 2020.  Pa38-56; Pa22, ¶ 7.  On April 20, 2017, the Collection Court entered a final judgment in favor of [...] for $703.29, effective April 19, 2017 (the “Judgment”).  Pa57-58; Pa22, ¶8.  III.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.52b.]  Thus, the Act does not preempt a rent control ordinance, and specifically a hardship application for increased rent seeking a “fair return”, among other things.  To the contrary, it defers to a rent control ordinance, provided that a hardship application is not based upon costs solely attributable to the conversion of the property to a condominium.  It nowhere bars a hardship application for increased rent, nor the displacement of a qualified tenant who cannot pay the increased rent.  In short, it does not, require a landlord to subsidize a qualified tenant’s rent for a 40-year period and lose money every year—the outcome sought by [...].
[brief] [...] restated there were too many significant issues of material fact to resolve this case via summary judgment.  (3T20:10-22:17).  Each of the three judges who denied similar motions six separate times in this case were correct.  This case was not appropriate for summary judgment because there were a myriad of significant facts in dispute that had to be resolved at trial.  The 167-page Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Second Statement of Material Facts filed in this matter supports this conclusion, showing most of [...]’s “undisputed facts” submitted in support of its motion were, in fact, disputed.  (Da771).  [...] argued as a matter of law Plaintiffs could not prove any of the allegations, including the statutory and code violations from the Second Amended Complaint.