ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [R. 4:50-2].  As explained by the Appellate Division in Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431 (App Div. 2011), even motions filed less than one year from the Judgment might not be “within a reasonable time:”  See Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437-438(App. Div. 2011).  In assessing whether [...] filed her motion “within a reasonable time,” the trial court correctly found that [...] was lying about her ignorance of the March 18, 2015 Judgment of Divorce and lying about her claims as to the execution of all the operative documents.
[brief] The Sheriff’s foreclosure sale notice stated a properly “approximate” amount of the judgment.  (January 22, 2024 T14-T15, T21)  Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, the Sheriff’s notice for the December 14, 2023 sale complied with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34, which requires the notice to “state the approximate amount of the judgment or order sought to be satisfied by the sale.
[brief] ” (Ra130; Ra294).  Specifically, the Report found that [...]’s Board of Education is not approving vendors before payment is issued.  (Aa15; Ra134).  As to transportation, the Report found that many non-public students did not have an identification number in the DRTRS, creating the risk that students might be counted and funded in multiple counties.  (Aa15; Ra144; Ra315).  And a spot-check of [...]’s records revealed documents that listed other districts as the contracting unit, which “could indicate a systemic lack of legal, procurement, and financial review and oversight of bid documents. ” (Ra315).  As a result of the pervasive errors and mismanagement in [...]’s record-keeping, the District is failing to use its funds efficiently to provide T&E.  (Aa15).  For these reasons, “the record demonstrates that [[...]’s] own choices and management issues have resulted in the unavailability of funds that could and should have been used to provide T&E to its students. ” (Aa11-12).  B.
[brief] As set forth in the IFPR enactment, the [...]’s response to comments stated:  The Department has routinely included provisions for legacy applications, which are applications determined to be completed in advance of the effective date of revised rules.  Such provisions are therefore included as part of this rulemaking, as reflected at adopted N.J.A.C. 7:8-1.6(b) and (c).  [. . .]  [amended] adopted standards will not apply to any major development that does require Department approval pursuant to the [Flood Hazard Area Control Act], provided that the Department has received an administratively and technically complete application that includes a stormwater management review component prior to the effective date of this rulemaking.
[brief] As the court stated in \textit{Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Jersey City}, 103 N.J.L. 574, \textsuperscript{13}  \textit{75 Spruce St., LLC v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ.}, 382 N.J. Super. 567 (Law Div. 2005)(citing \textit{Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of West Milford}, 144 N.J. 564, 574 (1996)(“Contracts implied in fact are no different than express contracts, although they exhibit a different way or form of expressing assent than through statements or writings.").  \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of West Milford}, 144 N.J. 564, 573, (1996) (citation omitted).  Our conclusion is that a charge for water furnished by a municipality to an owner or occupant of lands is not a tax, but is the subject of a contract, the sale of a commodity, creating the relationship of seller and purchaser as between the municipality and the consumer.
[brief] In order to find the Defendant guilty, the state must prove that (1) the Defendant acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly; (2) he committed one or more of the following acts: tormented; tortured; maimed; hung; poisoned; unnecessarily or cruelly beat; cruelly abused; or needlessly mutilated; and (3) he committed this conduct against a living animal or creature.  N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1).  During trial the State elicited testimony from multiple witnesses.  One of which being [...] who testified she personally saw the Defendant kicking Nessa to the point where Nessa was crying out in pain.  (2T:50-13 to 16).  [...] testified that when he arrived at the scene, he also witnessed the Defendant dragging and punching Nessa in the head twice.  (2T:60-23 to 61-1 to 5).  He further testified that the Defendant was about to strike Nessa a third time, but thankfully, [...] intervened before the Defendant could do so.  (2T:62-2 to 7).  The jury also heard the 9-1-1 call made by Ms. Dougherty in which she stated that the Defendant was “beating the hell out of that dog. ” (2T:52-11 to 12).  Defendant again argues that the State did not show Nessa was injured.  Once again, the State is not required to show that the animal was physically injured.  Defendant also argues that the State did not present evidence to show the events leading up to Ms. Dougherty’s observations, therefore the State cannot prove the Defendant “unnecessarily” beat the dog.  Again, the State cannot think of one scenario that would justifiably allow the Defendant to closed fist punch, kick, and drag a puppy which had been described as calm and sweet.  Nessa was a 6-month-old puppy.  She was never defined as disobedient, mean, or even ill trained.  There is absolutely no reason for someone to kick, punch, and drag a 6-month-old puppy to the point where the puppy is crying, whimpering, and shaking in fear.  Based on the above the State showed the jury much more than a scintilla of evidence that the Defendant knew by kicking dragging, and punching Nessa he was unnecessarily or cruelly beating her.  Given that, the State presented sufficient evidence to quash a motion for acquittal and this Court should affirm.
[brief] This Court analyzed the relationship between subsection (b) and subsection (a)(7) in Ancrum.  449 N.J. Super. at 528.  Subsection (a)(7) prohibits admission into Track One of a defendant who was “previously convicted or adjudicated delinquent for” or has “a pending charge of murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(7).  In contrast, under subsection (b), “A person shall not be eligible for special probation pursuant to this section if the person is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for” a crime falling into one of four categories, including a NERA crime other than robbery or burglary.
[brief] (Da 1-12)  A trial was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury between April 17 and 28, 2023.  (4T-11T)  The jury acquitted [...] of felony --- 1 Da – Defendant’s Appendix 1T – April 4, 2023 – Motion 2T – April 10, 2023 – Motion 3T – April 11, 2023 – Motion 4T – April 17, 2023 – Trial 5T – April 18, 2023 – Trial 6T – April 19, 2023 – Trial 7T – April 24, 2023 – Trial 8T – April 25, 2023 – Trial 9T – April 26, 2023 – Trial 10T – April 27, 2023 – Trial 11T – April 28, 2023 – Trial 12T – July 14, 2023 –  Sentencing murder, robbery, kidnapping, and murder, convicting her of the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter.  (Da 13-16; 11T 9-18 to 12-2)  The jury also convicted [...] of the theft and weapons offenses.  (Da 16-18; 11T 9-18 to 12-2)  On July 14, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to seven years in prison, 85% without parole pursuant to NERA, for passion/provocation manslaughter.  (12T 37-16 to 20; Da 23-26)  The court sentenced [...] to five years for theft (Count 5), 18 months for each of the two fourth-degree weapon possession offenses (Counts 6 and 8), 18 months for credit card theft (Count 10), and three years for fraudulent use of a credit card (Count 11).  (12T 37-21 to 38-14; Da 23-26)  All sentences were run concurrently with each other.  (12T 37-8 to 15; Da 23-26)  A Notice of Appeal was filed on October 12, 2023.  (Da 27-29)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The court will only intervene in “those rare circumstances in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with [the agency’s] statutory mission or with other State policy. ”  Id. at 287 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Authorization to Conduct a Referendum on Withdrawal of [...] from the [...], 181 N.J. 161, 176 (2004)).  Compensation which provides the basis for computing retirement benefits within the [...] is defined as follows:
[brief] The Trial Court’s Order Poses No Harm to the [...] Community.  On page 34 of Defendant’s brief, they claim harm to the community.  First, they mischaracterize the Court’s ruling below as having summarily concluded that [...] lacks authority to enforce its own rules and regulations.  We know the ruling is limited to imposing any construction rules on the property.  (1T50)  We remind the Court that from 1948 thru 1989, Defendant never imposed any construction rules on the members and there was no harm to the community.  Secondly, they claim “… the [...] conveyance of the ‘Beach Front Section’ is threatened by a right of reverter. ”  This would only be true if the Defendant did not abide by the terms of the common area deeds and has nothing to do with the Plaintiffs’ case.  Only a few months after conveyance of the Genesis Deed, the [...] conveyed to [...], the ‘Beach Front Section’ on the condition that it be used for the benefit of [...]’s members and that [...] enforce the Genesis Deed’s restrictions, along with its own “present by-laws. ”
[brief] THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR.  Defendant contends that even if this Court finds that none of the alleged errors rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel alone, the cumulative impact of the alleged ineffectiveness nonetheless warrants reversal of his conviction.  Db31-32.  Contrary to this argument, defendant received effective assistance of counsel.  See, POINT I & II.  Because the individual alleged errors complained of by petitioner do not alone rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, they do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel in the aggregate.  __________________________  6  This POINT responds to POINT V of defendant’s brief.  DB35-37.  CONCLUSION  For the above-mentioned reasons and authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully submits the order denying defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief should be affirmed.
[directive] It identifies eight of thirteen categories that qualify as excludable time attributable to the defendant.  -4(d)(2).  They include motions filed by a defendant, “unless the motion Id. at to unreasonable actions of the prosecutor,” was filed in response id. at - 4(d)(2)(C), and good cause for delay, “but only if the delay resulted from unreasonable acts or omissions of the defendant,” -4(d)(2)(H).3  id. at  The Rule sets time limits to resolve certain motions.  See, e.g., R. 3:25- 4(b)(2) to (4), -4(c)(2) to (4).  It also directs that the provision to exclude time for good cause “shall be narrowly construed. ”  Id. at -4(i)(12).  3  Neither the CJRA nor the Rule provides that a natural disaster can extend the two-year cap.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(f); R. 3:25-4(d)(2), -4(i)(6).  At the time the law and the rule were drafted in 2014 and 2016, respectively, very few contemplated the enormity of the current pandemic.
[brief] The sole witness for the Respondent on this matter was [...].  [...] tried to extrapolate his evidence on several occasions.  The only two video surveillance tapes that the State introduced was one from the hallway and one from the exterior.  There is no video tape surveillance of the common area.  However, [...] testified that [...] could not have conducted the required counts at 2:00 a.m., 2:30 a.m., 3:00 a.m. and 3:30 a.m. based solely on the review of video surveillance tape – without more.  (1T70.15-20)\(^{10}\).  As to the log books qualifying as business records, [...] admitted that he could not determine what, if anything, [...] had written in the logbook.  (1T162.1-17).  Likewise, [...] could not testify if [...] had not called in a count as recorded on the logbook.  (1T169.13-20).  More importantly, [...] admitted that he could not state with any specificity that the entries that appeared in the logbook were false or even what those entries meant.  (1T178.10-16).  Not a single witness testified with any certainty that [...] wrote entries into the log book.  More importantly, not one person could testify that the handwriting in the log book was that of [...].  It would have been easy for \(^{10}\)It is essential to note that even the State acknowledges that [...] could not testify that [...] “placed the counts in the logbook. ”  (1T74.24-25).  the State to present any witness, including [...], who was present at [...]’s interviews when he signed the Garrity warnings, to testify that that witness was familiar with [...]’s handwriting and the handwriting in the log book was consistent with [...]’ own writing.  However, the State did not.  **Point VI**
[brief] Following the trial court’s June 30, 2022 decision and order, the Plaintiffs’ moved for the entry of final judgment (including pre- and post-judgment interest), --- 12  Although [...] was the sole member of [...], [...] was purportedly the President of the company.  (Da956).  13  The transcript should read “prove” and not “provide” here. and for attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, and taxed costs.  (27T4:15-16).  The trial court awarded $1,181,874.51 in legal fees and costs to the Plaintiffs based on the terms of the [...], the [...], the [...], and the [...].
[brief] ### Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **388  Route 22  Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Twp. of Readington,** | | | 221 N.J. 318 (2015) | 27 | | **Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford,** | | | 68 N.J. 576 (1975) | 42 | | **Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd.,** | | | 234 N.J. 403 (2018) | 18, 19 | | **Chesterbrooke Ltd. P’Ship v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Chester,** | | | 237 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1989) | 38 | | **DiProspero v. Penn,** | | | 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | 31 | | **Dover Twp. Homeowners & Tenants Ass’n v. Dover Twp.,** | | | 114 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 1971) | 21, 22, 23 | | **Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin,** | passim | | 233 N.J. 546 (2018) | | | **Edison Bd. of Educ. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Edison,** | | | 464 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2020) | 18, 19, 20, 21 | | **Hubbard v. Reed,** | | | 168 N.J. 387 (2001) | 31 | | **Jai Sai Ram, LLC v. Planning/Zoning Bd. of Borough of Toms River,** | | | 446 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2016) | 31, 32, 33 | | **New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,** | | | 453 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2018) | 38 | Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193 (2011)
[brief] 2Ra157-66.  [...] maintained that Subsection D was not applicable to the Project because it was not “adjacent to” the boardwalk, which is the furthest inland waterfront feature.  2Ra160.  [...] also asserted that Subsection D did not apply in the Redevelopment Area, as the open view corridor and setback requirements were not incorporated into the Redevelopment Ordinances, which were reviewed and approved by the Department as consistent with the CZM Rules, and the non-applicability of the SRD Rule in the Redevelopment Area was evident by the fact that the majority of nearby buildings did not comply with the setback requirement.  2Ra160.  Appellant incorrectly asserts in its brief that [...] argued that “because [...] changed its municipal zoning to eliminate [SRD] Rule standards for the [...] [P]roperty . . . [...] should waive compliance with the Rule. ”  Ab2-3.  [...] provided additional information in support of its position that Subsection D of the SRD Rule did not apply to the Project.  Aa30; Aa33.  [...] again provided, inter alia, the survey of existing buildings on properties that were also separated from the boardwalk by Ocean Avenue (the “Setback Survey”) and an updated analysis of the heights and setbacks of the buildings from the boardwalk (the “Setback Analysis,” and together with the Setback Survey, the “Setback Survey & Analysis”) to demonstrate that the Department has not required compliance with Subsection D in this area.\footnote{Appellant notes in its brief that the “survey does not even address the 30% view corridor requirement. ”  Ab11.  It was not necessary to also survey the view corridors of the other buildings to determine whether they complied with the SRD Rule because the Rule requires both a 30% view corridor \textit{and} 2-to-1 setback.  \textit{N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)}.}  Aa33; see Aa23-28; 2Ra141-48;.  Of the 45 buildings analyzed, 23 buildings were not set back in accordance with Subsection D. Aa33; Aa23-28.  The non-compliant buildings included other buildings in the Beachfront South Sector of the Redevelopment Area within which the 290 Property is located.  See Aa25-26; 2Ra142-43.  F. \textbf{The Settlement Agreement Between [...] And The Department.}
[brief] Trial 67T October 11, 2011  Trial 68T October 12, 2011  Trial 69T October 17, 2011  Trial 70T October 18, 2011  Trial 71T October 19, 2011  Trial 72T October 26, 2011  Trial 73T October 27, 2011  Trial 74T November 29, 2011  Trial 75T November 30, 2011  Trial 76T December 5, 2011  Trial 77T December 6, 2011  Trial 78T December 7, 2011  Trial 79T December 8, 2011
[brief] C.  The Home Rule Act cannot substitute as authority for the Noise Ordinance which is preempted by existing legislation.  After all other efforts at justifying the Noise Ordinance had failed, Defendants then relied on the general grants of authority to municipalities under the Home Rule Act of 1917 to legitimize its adoption.  N.J.S.A. 40:48-1, provides that a governing body may adopt ordinances that “Regulate the ringing of bells and the crying of goods and other commodities for sale at auction or otherwise, and to prevent disturbing noises”, and N.J.S.A. 40:48-2 provides for the adoption of other “necessary and proper” ordinances for health, safety and welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants.  Plaintiffs submit that if these sections are found not to be explicitly preempted in the area of noise regulation, then they must give way to the specific grants of authority set forth in the Noise Control Act of 1971 and the Public Health Nuisance laws.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 6 | | **I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT (Pa5)** | 6 | | A. Standard of Review | 6 | | B. The Trial Court Properly Considered the Purchase Order (Pa5) | 7 | | C.  The Dispute Was Not Previously Resolved (Argument not presented to the trial court) | 9 | | D.  The Record Is Sufficiently Developed (Pa6-11, 19-52) | 11 | | E.  The Trial Court Did Not Err in Forgoing Oral Argument (Pa5.) | 12 | | F.  The Order Is Sufficient To Permit Appellate Review and Should Be Affirmed (Pa5.) | 13 | | **II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED [...] ITS FEES AND COSTS (Pa5)** | 13 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esquire  Attorney for Appellant N.J. Attorney ID No. 327229999  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................  iii  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: RESPONDENT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE  SEVERAL IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW .............  1 POINT II:  AT THE VERY LEAST, PEARSON'S DISABILITY RESULTED FROM THE "COMBINED EFFECT" OF A TRAUMATIC EVENT AND PRE-EXISTING CONDITION.  MOREOVER, THE TRAUMATIC EVENT WAS THE "ESSENTIAL SIGNIFICANT OR SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" OF PEARSON'S DISABILITY  .............  1 POINT III:  THE BOARD'S DETERMINATION THAT PEARSON SUFFERED AN INJURY IN 2009 IS COMPLETELY UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  MOREOVER, EVEN IF PEARSON SUFFERED AN INJURY IN 2009, ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS ARE STILL WARRANTED .........................................................  8  CONCLUSION ..........................................................
[brief] Order ([...], P.J.Ch.) | 8/8/2022 | Da260 | | Order & Opinion Following Trial ([...], P.J.Ch.) | 6/23/2022 | Da6 | | Stipulation & Order of Dismissal With Prejudice – Defendant [...] ([...], P.J.Ch.) | 6/16/2020 | Da620 | | Partial Summary Judgment – Count VI; Summary Judgment – Counts II & III ([...], P.J.Ch.) | 6/10/2020 | Da325 | ### TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Nature of Proceeding | Date | Transcript # | |---------------------------------------|------------|--------------| | Trial – Day 1 | 9/21/2020 | 1T | | Trial – Day 2 | 9/23/2020 | 2T | | Hearing on Temporary Restraints | 1/24/2018 | 3T | | Hearing on Preliminary Restraints | 3/1/2018 | 4T | | Pretrial Conference | 9/11/2020 | 5T | ## TABLE OF PARTIES | Name | Appellate Role | Trial Court Role | Status | |-------------------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------------------| | [...] ("[...]") | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below | | Amanda R. [...]-[...] ("[...]") | Respondent | Defendant | Participated Below/Dismissed with Prejudice | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | *See Note¹* | | | | [...] | *See Note²* | | | --- ¹ One of the issues presented to the court below and raised now on appeal concerns the standing of the plaintiffs to assert claims on behalf of [...] (“the Capital Company” or “[...]”) and [...]
[brief] The trial court further recognized [...] improperly sought to apply a heightened standard of pre-adoption notice, inconsistent with the plain language of the governing statute, case law interpreting it, and legislative history.  Finally, the trial court noted adoption of [...]’s arguments would set alarming precedents.  These include: effectively allowing the “public interest” exception to swallow the forty-five day rule by inverting the policy of repose; allowing a small segment of the community that sleeps on its rights to bring untimely complaints so long as it purports to represent “the public;” increasing burdens on municipalities throughout the state by heightening pre-publication notice requirements for all ordinances; and immediately exposing countless ordinances noticed according to existing standards to collateral attack.
[brief] ”  Db12; Ja562.  As to others missing the mistake, Defendants point to the fact that various people in a range of contexts (including land use board members and land use board professionals) did not identify the error.  Db11.  At least for purposes of \(^{12}\)  Below, Defendants made vague suggestions that perhaps the 66.33’ was not a mistake.  T1 76:8-11.  However, as acknowledged by the trial court, the record is clear that there was a mistake; Defendant [...] even admitted in his deposition that there was a mistake, Ja449-50; and critically, Defendants have admitted repeatedly on appeal that there was a mistake.
[brief] State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 444 (2018).  A motor vehicle stop that is not based on a “reasonable and articulable suspicion is an ‘unlawful seizure,’ and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule. ”  State v. Smith, 251 N.J. at 258 (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. at 247).  To satisfy the articulable and reasonable suspicion standard, the State is not required to prove that the suspected motor-vehicle violation occurred.  State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999)(citing State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994)).  In the case at bar, through the testimony of [...], the State established that there was reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify a stop of the Defendant’s motor vehicle for a suspected violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-144 (Failure to Stop at a Stop Sign).