ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s insistence that the Administrator should “keep looking” for assets that did not exist was causing enormous financial harm to the parties and to the Estate.  This became obvious to the Administrator after he had spent hundreds of --- \(^1\) “IT” shall refer to the transcript of the motion hearing before [...] on June 19, 2023.  “2T” shall refer to the transcript of a telephone conference before [...] on December 3, 2021.  hours conducting an extremely detailed investigation the results of which did not support Plaintiff’s allegations.  When Plaintiff opposed the Administrator’s motion seeking approval of his Report and cross-moved to extend the investigation, the Administrator, in response, laid bare the facts that had become clear from his investigation:  At each turn, when the Administrator has tried to engage plaintiff in a settlement dialogue or mediation effort to resolve the issues he has identified, the plaintiff has made it crystal clear he would not participate until all the discovery he was seeking was completed.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ position below, and on appeal, is internally contradictory.  On the one hand, plaintiffs argue that [...] is a “stealth expert” – never identified as an expert, never having rendered a report, and yet qualified to testify in derogation of the Rules governing discovery.  Plaintiffs compound their error on appeal, asserting that “EDWARD KLOSS AND OTHER REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS” would testify on plaintiffs’ behalf.  See Title to Point II of plaintiffs’ Brief on appeal.  On the other hand, plaintiffs assert that [...] is a mere layman, transformed into “AN EXPERT OR LAY EXPERT. ”  See Title to Point III of plaintiffs’ Brief on appeal.  The Rules of Court and applicable law do not recognize the concept of a “lay expert.
[brief] Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370 (Law Div. 1987).........................................................29 Regino v. Staley, No. 23-32, 2023 WL 4464845 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2023)..............................33 Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 2006).........................................................15 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)...................................................................................37 Sanford v. Stiles, No. 03-5698, 2004 WL 2579738 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2004)..........................32 State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 2016) ................................................................. 42 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) .............................................................................. 25 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ............................................................................................. 34 Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156 (1999) ............................................................................................ 19 United States v. Nutri-cology, 982 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1992)  ..............................................................................  43  Vesely v. Ill. Sch. Dist. 45, 669 F.Supp.3d 706 (N.D. Ill. 2023) ....................................................................  36 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
[brief] The only “remedy” available for a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 is found in N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(a), which states, “The commissioner is hereby authorized to withhold all or part of a district’s State aid for failure to comply with any rule, standard or directive”.  --- 36 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002), quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)  37  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 271–72 (2001)  The existence of this express remedy to withhold State aid from a school district certainly cannot be vested in a private person.
[brief] The Attorney General relies on the Counterstatement of Procedural History in the State’s brief, with the following correction and addition.  The offense of unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1), as charged in Count Three of the Indictment, is a crime of the second degree.  (Da4). ¹  On January 8, 2025, the Court invited the Attorney General and the Public Defender to participate as amici curiae “to address the significant legal issue raised in Point III of appellant’s brief concerning the authentication of a surveillance video presented by the State at trial. ” (AGa1-2).  This brief is submitted in response to that invitation.  ¹  “AGa” – Attorney General’s appendix  “Da” – defendant’s appendix  “1T” – trial, June 6, 2023  “2T” – trial, June 7, 2023  “3T” – sentencing, September 8, 2023  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The futility issue was addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of *Chassen v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc.*, 836 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2016) where the defendant engaged in broad discovery and substantive motion practice for over two-and-a-half years before moving to compel arbitration based upon a change in the law.  The Third Circuit held that “futility can excuse the delayed invocation of the defense of arbitration.  *Id.* at 297.  As the court explained, there are many situations, such as ripeness and administrative exhaustion where a waiver analysis is inapplicable because it would not make sense to require a party to undertake a futile gesture to avoid waiver.  *Id.*  While *Chassen* involved a change in the law concerning the arbitrability of certain claims, the instant case is analogous because arbitration here would have been futile prior to [...]’s resolution of the expense claims and Indemnity Claim with the other primary insurers which extinguished their rights of contribution.
[brief] [...] concluded that because [...] did not attempt (and does not allege that it attempted) to mediate the instant dispute before initiating this action, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and so dismissed the Complaint without prejudice.  [...] further found that under the plain terms of the Purchase Order, [...] was entitled to its fees and costs because [...] ignored the mandatory dispute resolution provision, and he ordered the same.  Based on the unambiguous language of the Purchase Order’s dispute resolution provision, this Court should reach the same result and affirm the Order.
[brief] For all the above reasons, this Court should: • affirm the trial court’s denial of [...]’s R. 4:50 motion; • reverse the trial court’s denial of an award of counsel fees and costs to [...] and remand for further proceedings to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to [...] based on the Certifications of Services filed by [...]’s counsel; • reverse the trial court’s award of the Lexus; and • reverse the trial court’s award of the $15,459.21 [...] reimbursement to [...].
[brief] Compelling the Commissioner to file an independent action against the defendants also gives rise to the sort of disfavored fractionalized litigation discussed above.  Importantly, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-15 grants the Commissioner the ability to petition a “court of competent jurisdiction” to suspend the driving privileges of any person found to have violated the Fraud Act in the automobile insurance setting.  A DRP is without authority to grant this relief.  The inability of the DRP to grant complete and consistent relief to the Commissioner strongly suggests that Fraud Act cases should be resolved in the Superior Court, a “court of competent jurisdiction.
[brief] 1.  The initial inquiry in any substantive due process challenge is whether the claimed right is fundamental.  If the constitutional “right is fundamental, its infringement must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,” Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 293 (3d Cir. 2018), but where “fundamental rights or interests are not implicated,” courts will generally “require only a ‘legitimate state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the statute,’” ibid. (quoting Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
[brief] A review of the Safe Deposit Box rental that Decedent maintained in her safe confirmed that Decedent was the sole renter of that box.  (P596a).  That is obviously why [...] did not have a key to the safety deposit box and within days of Decedent’s death [...] misrepresented her status as a co-owner of the safety deposit box to Petitioner to convince him to give her its key.  (11T25:13-15).  [...] later told Petitioner that she did not find a will in the safety deposit box and testified to the same at her deposition.  (7T163:12-19).  In stark contrast, at trial, [...] changed position and testified that she found the Decedent’s will in the Decedent’s safety deposit box, explaining that was what Respondent had told her.  (11T51:22-25).  The Court disregarded that testimony as well as the pictures that [...] provided at her deposition of the items she removed from the safety deposit box, that did not include a will.  (P574a to P596; 11T23:23 to 24:15).  The Will is five pages long with a thicker cover page, hardly a document that could be missed when going through the safety deposit box contents.  (P105a to P109a; 11T28:12-21).  The Court’s finding, that “Respondent found the Original Will in a bag of items that [...] had given Respondent from the Safe Deposit Box”(P23a) is also belied by the undisputed fact that on June 18, 2021, Respondent attached a copy of the Will to her answer to complaint in this litigation, averring that “the Original Will was subsequently located,” three days before [...] first entered the Decedent’s safety deposit box on June 21, 2021.
[directive] Page 29 conjunction with pretrial release determinations under the Bail Reform Law.  Nor does the automated pretrial risk-assessment process account for any specific threat of future harm that a defendant may have made to a victim or witness.  The automated pretrial risk-assessment process also does not account for a defendant’s involvement with a violent street gang or other form of crime,11 organized or a defendant’s drug dependence or mental illness.  Finally, there may be instances when relevant criminal history information is not accounted for because of missing data in the databases that the automated pretrial risk- assessment software queries.  For the foregoing reasons, the interests of public safety and protection of victims’ rights require police and/or prosecutors to fill in the informational gaps whenever possible, providing information to the court not accounted for by the automated pretrial risk assessment where that additional information suggests that the defendant poses a greater risk of flight and/or new criminal activity or violence than is indicated by the FTA or NCA score or the lack of a violence flag (i.e., the NVCA indicator).  (Note that the PSA is not designed to measure the risk that the defendant will obstruct the criminal justice process, although police and prosecutors must consider that risk in determining whether to issue a complaint-summons or apply for a complaint-warrant, and whether to seek special release conditions to manage that risk.)  Moreover, the immediate effect of a complaint-warrant is that the pretrial services program will have an opportunity to recommend conditions needed to manage the risks that would be posed by defendant’s release.  Issuance of a complaint-summons, in contrast, has the practical effect of precluding imposition of monitored release conditions to manage identified risks.  Accordingly, when making the decision whether to issue a complaint-summons or apply for a complaint-warrant, it is important to consider any relevant facts or circumstances known or reasonably believed to exist that are not accounted for by the automated pretrial risk-assessment process.  In the event that an application is made for a complaint-warrant, the court or other judicial officer to whom the application is made shall be alerted to such additional relevant facts or circumstances.
[brief] Indeed, [...] seeks records regarding the agency's failure to prosecute charges for which there was substantial evidence.  (6) whether any agency disciplinary or investigatory proceedings have arisen that may circumscribe the individual's asserted need for the materials.  As to Loigman factor 6, there are no agency disciplinary or investigatory proceedings related to the [...] that may circumscribe [...]'s, and consequently the public's, need for responsive records.
[brief] Moreover, determining the context prong is “solely a judicial function. ”  Mull, 176 N.J. at 392.  In exercising this function, the trial court correctly concluded that, accepting all facts and inferences as stated by Plaintiff, any alleged deficiencies were within the scope of conditions the Legislature intended to immunize.  Pa10a (“Lighting, vehicle alarms and vehicle mirrors are all part of everyday industrial life, and the injury resulting from any alleged deficiencies clearly falls within the legislative grant of immunity. ”).  Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the circumstances of the July 11, 2014, accident were more than a fact of industrial employment and plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Act to immunize, and therefore her claims against [...] must fail.
[brief] ”  Id. at 30-31, 38-39.  It is important to keep in mind that the purpose of the Brady rule “is not to punish society for a [State actor]’s conduct, but to avoid an unfair trial of an accused. ”  State v. Vigliano, 50 N.J. 51, 61 (1967).  Consequently, at a minimum, before an indictment is dismissed with prejudice, there needs to be a showing that the State acted willfully in withholding the undisclosed evidence, and the defendant must be prejudiced in a way that precludes him from receiving a fair trial.
[directive] The Attorney General’s Directive addresses SAFE kits, as well as Drug Facilitated Sexual Assault kits, though the survey focused specifically on SAFE kits.  13  | P a g e  •  Require county-wide procedures for tracking kits – whether they be reported or unreported, with careful attention to being able to protect the anonymity of victims associated with unreported kits.  •  Establish best practices for the collection and storage of kits.  While the Office of the Attorney General will continue to work with partners and stakeholders in a shared commitment to eradicate sexual assault, until that goal is achieved, this Office will strive to do all it can to ensure that victims are heard and perpetrators are held accountable.  The Attorney General Directive issued today implements changes that help further that mission.
[directive] Police officer interviews during an internal affairs investigation are rendered difficult by the conflict that exists between the officer's right against self-incrimination in criminal interviews and the obligation to answer questions truthfully during an administrative investigation.  So while an agency may compel an officer to answer questions posed during the course of an administrative investigation, an officer cannot be forced to give answers that could be used against him or her in a criminal prosecution.  Officers who have been compelled by order to produce incriminating information, with the belief that a failure to do so will result in termination or other serious disciplinary action, cannot have that evidence used against them in a criminal prosecution.  However, an officer can be compelled to provide answers during an internal affairs investigation if those answers are to be used as evidence only in a disciplinary proceeding.
[brief] These were substantial and unwarranted reductions.  Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the attorneys’ fee award asked [...] to address only: (1) the additional 33% overall fee reduction; (2) the total denial of costs; (3) the 10% enhancement multiplier; and (4) the Court’s mischaracterization of one week of trial time as trial preparation time, a factor in the Court’s 33% fee reduction.  (Da1415-16).  Plaintiffs did not ask the Court to reconsider its elimination of 1,047.25 attorney hours.  [...]’s April 17, 2023, amended attorneys’ fee award changed the first three of these categories.  In amending his original fee reduction of 33% to 20%, [...] found his original reduction amount “somewhat excessive” due to the Court’s failure “to appropriately analyze the facts” supporting his original figure.  (Da1416).  The Court also allowed some of the requested costs, finding “the court erred by not permitting reasonable costs to be included in its award. ” (Da1417).  The Court acknowledged that it had originally failed to recognize that both the CFA and the RETA “require reasonable costs to be paid by a defendant in a case where a jury verdict is rendered in a plaintiff’s favor. ” (Da1417).  The Court also found “reconsideration is appropriate” for its original 10% enhancement and found that figure “to be low” “under the facts of this consumer fraud and RETA matter. ” (Da1417).  The Court also found it had “erred by giving excessive weight in its findings concerning the fee which would have been generated by a 1/3 contingency agreement as such is minimally relevant in a consumer action. ” (Da1417).  The Court’s original award had improperly anchored its enhancement to the contingency fee formula in N.J.C.R. 1:21-7, which the Court realized did not apply to a fee-shifting case.  (Da1399-1400).  The Court increased the enhancement to 25%. (Da1417-19).  It is clear from [...]’s April 17, 2023, MOD that he did exactly what he should have when faced with a motion to reconsider: He re-evaluated his earlier decision and realized he had misapplied the law and the facts and adjusted his award accordingly.  [...], as trial judge, was in the best position to evaluate the appropriate attorneys’ fees to award.  His ultimate decision was rational, well-reasoned, and based on legal precedent.  His amended fee award should not be reversed.
[brief] I, ¶7 | 40 | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶9 | 40 | | Statutes | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | 29 U.S.C. § 651 | 7 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 | 5,43,44| | N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 | 34,35,36| | N.J.S.A. 34:15-71 | 35 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 | 35 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-77 | 35 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-78 | 35 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-87 | 34 | | N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 | 5 | | Regulations | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | CFR §1926.601(b)(4) | 11 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (This is the same argument [...] would make in connection with the second summary judgment application that resulted in dismissal of the action against [...].)  The following exchange also occurred:  [...]:  …where I would disagree with you is that is all based on interpretation of the plan.  You cannot say that’s common knowledge.  So they’re trying to say well, if [...]’s plan directed this, directed something to go on plaintiffs’ property, it’s not -- it’s not as simple as they make it out because you need a professional to say what is the duty, what is the responsibility of a professional engineer in a development like this.  THE COURT: I disagree. \(^7\)  ….  --- \(^6\)  Emphasis added.  \(^7\)  Emphasis added.  THE COURT:
[directive] 7.  The monitor instructs the donor to split the collected specimen into the specimen containers.  a.  The donor opens both specimen containers and pours at least 30 mL of urine from the collection container in the primary specimen container and at least 15 mL of urine from the collection container in the secondary specimen container.  b.  The donor secures both specimen containers by placing and securing the lids/caps on the specimen containers.  8.
[directive] Specimens collected during a forensic medical exam and preserved in SAFE/DFSA kits are provided to law enforcement at the time of only the examination the victim consents to release the kit(s) and decides to report the incident to police.  if  When the victim does not consent to release to law enforcement, the SAFE/DFSA kits are unreported and often referred to as “Hold” kits.  Revision to prior Attorney General Directive No. 2011-1 (2014) and the Standards required Hold kits be secured for a minimum of five (5) years from the date of the examination where the victim is an adult, and not less than five (5) years after the victim reaches the age of 18, where the victim is a minor.  That time period shall now be extended to twenty (20) years and is consistent with the federal report on the audit of the Department of Law and Public Safety, Office of the Attorney General, Sexual Assault  See 2 Examination Process for the period of July 1, 2017 to August 31, 2018.  Law enforcement agency includes all law enforcement agencies created by the governing municipal body and 3 promulgated by statute, including municipal police departments, county law enforcement agencies, state law enforcement agencies, and part-time municipal police.
[brief] Four witnesses testified for the State: two detectives from the State Police and two forensic scientists from the State lab.  (4T 16-15 to 17, 17-7 to 10, 43-20 to 21, 44-9 to 12, 55-6 to 17, 71-25 to 72-1, 72-15 to 19)  After the direct examination of each witness, the judge permitted defense counsel to confer with [...], but each time [...] refused to speak to him.  (4T 48-19 to 49-22, 69-10 to 24, 93-15 to 20, 95-1 to 4)  Defense counsel and the prosecutor then made their closing arguments, and the judge read the final jury instructions.  (4T 101-17 to 104-22, 105-1 to 112-9, 112-10 to 144-2)
[brief] (4T135- The ballistics lab determined that the .40 caliber shells and 9-millimeter shells were discharged from two different weapons: the .40 caliber Glock found in [...] and an unknown .38 caliber class firearm.  (6T216-2 to 8; 6T219-22 to 220-2; 8T19-20 to 20-16).  Three projectiles were also submitted for analysis and determined to be .38 caliber class.
[brief] At the time, he had been in the Narcotics Gang Unit for over a year and spent time conducting investigations in that area.  (1T5-4 to 8, 10-2 to 5).  He knew this area to be an open air drug market based on several recent arrests for narcotics, both possession and distribution.  (1T8-18 to 9-2).  Personally, [...] had made numerous arrests in that area in the short time he belonged to this unit.  (1T9-9 to 10).  Indeed, this was a common location of surveillance operations for that very reason.  (1T10-2 to 8).  [...] also testified that there was been recent shootings in the area, a residential neighborhood.
[brief] That is incorrect.  A dismissal is a dismissal, and R 1:20A-6 mandates only a dismissal, not a stay, because its prerequisite of the Pre-Action Notice must be met before a complaint can be filed.  Without the pre-action notice stated in the complaint the clerk of the court in fact had no basis to issue a docket number as the filing of the complaint was prohibited as a matter of law.  *Chalom v. Benesh*, 234 N.J. Super. 248, 258–59 (Law. Div. 1989).  Nevertheless, the docket number issued here does not overcome the fact that the complaint was void *ab initio*, and any judgment thereon is void.  --- ³