ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT 2.  BREACH OF DUTY BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY.  For the trial court to grant a Final Judgment by Default, there is a legal step-by-step process that must be followed by the plaintiff’s attorney, an officer of the court, and by extension the process server he hires and the legal assistant he employees with CARE to ensure that the defendant’s rights are protected so that no defendant is unjustly caused harm.  That is, the defendant’s right to: (1) notice, (2) an opportunity to be heard; and, (3) an impartial tribunal.  Certifications submitted to the court, currently only require that no statements made are WILLFULLY FALSE.  All Certifications should also require that statements made KNOWINGLY COMPLY with the law.  A simple example is that the business address is correct (it is not false), but to comply with the law an individual defendant’s mail must be sent to his home address – NOT to the business address.  A more complicated example is an affidavit of service on a business defendant is: left a copy with a person authorized to accept service, where the business no longer exists at that address – NOT legally left with an authorized person, therefore the business defendant was NOT legally served.  It is the legal responsibility and duty of the Plaintiff’s Attorney to check, verify and vet all statements made on the document, submitted to the court, are true and that the submission to the court complies with current law.  Failure to do so is a Breach of Duty of Care by the Plaintiff’s Attorney that caused unjust harm to the defendants.
[brief] ECF No. 52-8 at 3.  The Disputants did not raise any disputes with respect to those requests.  The Court does not know when those terminations/non-renewals occurred.  The Court’s decision to limit collection of documents for purposes of requests 1 and 3, and the 30(b)(6) subpoena, for those three custodians’ documents, to the period September-December 2019 does not affect [...]’s obligation to collect and produce documents responsive to requests 4-6, which [...] had already agreed to do.  That then leaves the question of which search terms [...] should run against the universe of documents collected from the provided custodians for those time periods.  As discussed at the hearing, [...] (or its vendor) should run search term reports (“STRs”) for the search terms Plaintiff requests.  Surely, certain terms will hit on volumes of documents that will be unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the needs of the case.  Accordingly, Plaintiff and [...] shall engage in meaningful and concrete conferral, such as modifying search terms, narrowing time frames with respect to particular search terms, applying particular search terms only to particular custodians, and the like—a process that is necessarily iterative as narrower STRs are generated, until the set of documents to review reaches a reasonable volume, proportionate to the needs of the case.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  The notion that the pair’s bypassing of the storage unit would arouse sufficient suspicion to stop [...] is even more flimsy considering [...]’s testimony that [...] directed this behavior.  [...] testified that “Mr. [...] motion[ed] to Mr. [...] to continue traveling, to keep going, and follow. ”  (3T 36-21 to 24)  This testimony implies that it was [...]’s decision not to access the unit, which would make sense if, as police evidently assumed, [...] was aware of the narcotics being stored there and of the police presence.  On the other hand, police had no reason to believe that [...] was similarly aware of the contraband inside the storage unit.  Given [...]’s testimony suggesting that [...] was merely following [...]’s lead, the fact that the pair did not access the storage unit does not support a finding of reasonable suspicion as to [...].
[brief] In McGuire a tool mark examiner opined that, based on the markings on plastic bags, the bags were made on a specific manufacturing line.  419 N.J. Super. at 129.  As an initial matter, the tool mark at issue in McGuire, the cutting blades on a manufacturing line, have nothing to do with the tool marks at issue in this case, which are created by parts of a gun striking parts of a bullet and its casing during discharge.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff has challenges in retaining counsel due to fraudulent concealment and case complexity.  The incident involving plaintiff’s father, who was left unattended and subsequently passed away after falling and remaining on the floor for days, occurred while plaintiff was overseas (Pa3 – Pa6, Pa35 – Pa43).  At that time, only the defendants' home care aides potentially witnessed the event.  Since the incident, defendants have engaged in fraudulent concealment and filed three motions to dismiss plaintiff’s case with prejudice.
[brief] Indeed, the trial court noted at length that there was no evidence at all to explain what caused Plaintiff to fall.  In summarizing the Plaintiff’s own testimony, the trial court stated:  Now, he does not recall – there is no question he does not recall the specific thing that caused him to end up on the ground.  He – has not testified that my foot – all I know is before I fell, I, uh, hit – my toe hit the edge of something, I don’t know what it was, but it hit something.  . . .  Um, nothing like that.  I don’t know what caused me to fall, I have absolutely no recollection of what caused me to fall.  . . .  He may very well have slipped on cardboard, slipped on – on the plywood, hit his foot on the plywood and fell, or, um, there could be a myriad of other ways in which he could have fallen.
[brief] In addition, [...] testified that the marriage was “odd” for a number of reasons, including the following: - the Petitioner would often leave Decedent alone at a party and “sneak out,” thinking it “funny” (11T8-1 to 6) - the Petitioner would abandon Decedent and their relationship for long periods of time - the Decedent on multiple occasions told [...] that the Petitioner was involved with another woman (11T9-9 to 12) - the Petitioner did not assist Decedent around the house, including one occasion where during a snowstorm where the Decedent shoveled the snow while Petitioner remained inside (11T9-19 to 21) - the Decedent told Snyder that the Petitioner never paid any of the bills and wasted money, and that this conduct “pissed her off.
[brief] (Da 16 at 0:04:39 to 0:05:59)  [...] took down [...]’s information and then asked [...] to run his dog around the car.  (Da 16 at 0:06:00 to 0:06:50)  [...] asked, “what have you got?” and [...] responded, “they’re coming from New Jersey, going to New Jersey, came here from New Hampshire to check out a country club, and now they’re going back to Virginia.  These people have only known each other for a couple months. ”  (Da 16 at 0:06:51 to 0:07:03)  [...] asked how they knew each other, and [...] said, “mutual friends. ”  (Da 16 at 0:07:05 to 0:07:11)  [...] led his dog around the truck and the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics.  (Da 16 at 0:09:40 to 0:09:50; 1T 27-6 to 22)  The officers searched a backpack located in the passenger seat of the truck and found drugs, a digital scale, and cash.
[directive] 4.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2  않는한, 는 특정한 예외 조건들이 충족되지  법원 감독 마약 프로그램(“마약 법정”)에 목적으로, 치료 참가하기 위한 귀하에게 의무적 특별 보호관찰을 선고해야 한다고 규정하고 있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2 provides that unless certain exceptions are met, the court is required to sentence you to a mandatory sentence of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?
[brief] There are several material misrepresentations in Respondent’s brief.  Respondent’s counsel continues to assert that the Judge was the “primary sponsor” of the Presumption Bill that led to the enactment of the statute.  (Rb1 and Rb6)  This statement is not true and Respondent offers nothing to support it.  As stated by [...] in her decision on the Motion, “the sponsors by the State Senate are on top because they are the main sponsors.  That’s [...] . . .  [...], [...], [...] and then the assembly people who are sponsors, [...], [...], [...] and [...]. ” (1T17-7 to 14).
[brief] ”  (Paragraph 2, Pa6; and Paragraphs 2 and 3, Pa19).  [...] cited a specific page (page 58) of the transcript of the motion argument of September 29, 2020, where he asserted that [...] orally required plaintiff to obtain expert testimony on the responsibility of [...] for causing the grading error.  (Pa6).  However, our review of that transcript excerpt, which defendant attached as Exhibit P to its original Motion of July 6, 2022 for Summary Judgment, reveals no mention by [...] of requiring such expert testimony.  [Since the transcript has been separately submitted, it is not included as part of the Appendix.]
[brief] Plaintiff Should Have Been Permitted to Use Evidence of the Defendant’s Actions to Mop the Location of Plaintiff’s Fall and to Place a Hazard Sign in Cross Examination of the Defense Expert Witness, [...], to Impeach the Credibility of the Defendant’s Expert Witness and to Challenge the Witness’ Opinion.  (2T44-16 to 46-16; 5T24-18 to 28-10)  The foundation of the defense case as to liability, i.e., whether indeed the wet floor constituted a slip hazard, centered upon the testimony of its forensic engineer, [...], who conducted an inspection of the scene three and one-half years after the plaintiff’s fall.  While plaintiff presented her testimony and that of her friend who had accompanied her at the time of her fall and photographs of condition of the floor at the time she fell, other highly relevant and critical evidence coming directly from the defendant was available to the plaintiff as to the condition of the floor, but was erroneously excluded by the court.  Contrary to the --- 8  In denying the plaintiff-appellant’s Motion for a New Trial, and rejecting plaintiff’s request to introduce lay opinion testimony through the actions of the defendant’s agent, [...], the trial court stated:  “…plaintiff argues that the photos and mopping should have been admitted because they reflect the condition existing at the time of the accident.  That was also again in arguing here today.  The Court rejects that argument because at the time of the accident the floor had not been mopped and there were not caution signs. ” (5T27-2 to 8); “[t]hat defendant mopped or placed a caution sign in a lobby following plaintiff’s fall does not establish that the floor was slippery or dangerous but the jury might jump to that conclusion based upon post incident remedial actions. ” (5T28-2 to 6).  It is respectfully submitted that these statements by the court demonstrate the court’s misunderstandings and faulty reasoning, and highlight the significant errors that resulted in a manifest denial of justice.
[brief] On or about February 17, 2021, [...] filed its Application before the Board seeking preliminary and final major site plan approval with bulk variances and waivers to construct two industrial warehouse/distribution buildings and associated site improvements at the Property.  (Pa134–137).  At the time of [...]’s filing, the Property contained two principal uses: an agricultural use and a Cell Tower use.  (Pa231–244).  Plaintiffs propose through the Application to replace the existing agricultural use with the proposed warehouse distribution use.  (Pa134–137).  [...] Code Section 250-20A permits the existing agricultural use and proposed warehouse use only as individual principal uses within the Township’s Industrial Zone.  (Pa55–57).  The Cell Tower is not a permitted principal use in the Industrial Zone and was only approved after receiving use variance approval from the Board in 1997.  (Pa280–282).  The Board held public hearings to consider the Application on August 4, 2021, September 1, 2021, December 1, 2021, and April 6, 2022.  (1T, 2T, 3T, 4T).  During the September 1, 2021 public hearing, counsel for an objector first raised the issue of a potential “D variance” being required for the Board to approve the Application.  (2T 117-24 to 118-3).  The necessity for use variance relief was discussed at length during the Applicant’s next public hearing on December 1, 2021.  (3T).  The Application was then continued to a future meeting date to permit the Board, Applicant, and other interested parties to assess the use variance issue.  (Id.).  Prior to the Applicant’s final public hearing, the Board received various opinion letters from the Board professionals, Applicant’s professionals, and the objector opining on the need for use variance relief to permit the Applicant’s proposed dual principal use of the Property.  (Pa231-244; Pa245-252; Pa253-256; PA257-258; Pa259-260; Pa261-327).  At the April 6, 2022 public meeting, having considered all of the foregoing, the Board determined based upon the advice and opinion of its professionals that N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(1) use variance relief was required to permit the Application.  (4T).  The Board thereafter voted to deny the pending Application on procedural grounds because the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider or grant N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d use variance relief.  Id.  The Board’s procedural denial of the Application was memorialized by written Board Resolution 11-2022, adopted on or about May 4, 2022.  (Pa187-190).  Plaintiffs’ appeal of the Board’s decision to the trial court and appeal of the trial court’s decision to this court followed.
[brief] Of particular interest in the [...] plan, is the grading of the driveway and the lack of containment of runoff, since a few railroad ties along the easterly side and flowing off the driveway at grade on the southerly end of the driveway together with the land contours indicate that **most of the water ran southerly to the brook**.  My survey work and observation of the [...] driveway show that it had been resurfaced and Belgian block curbing added as a replacement to the railroad ties.  The driveway water was directed toward the [...] property.  **A depressed portion of the curbing acts as a funnel directing the water toward the [...] property and blocks the water from its original course toward the brook.  . . .  Because of the improvement of the driveway and the installation of the Belgian block curb with the only outlet being at the [north]east corner and directed onto the [...] property together with the filling of land along the common property line majority of the water from the front yard and the driveway is now directed on to the [...] property.**
[brief] Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018)(quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)); see also Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007)(citing In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)) and In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370, 383 (2013).
[brief] The trial court erred in ruling that the two indemnity clauses in the [...] contract were enforceable with regard to indemnity for [...]’s own negligence.  The first provision, Paragraph 2, required indemnification even if [...] was at fault, but did not explicitly require [...] to indemnify [...] for that latter’s own negligence.  The other provision, Paragraph 4, did not require either party to indemnify the at-fault party for the at-fault party’s own negligence.  The trial court erred in ruling that those conflicting indemnity provisions could somehow be combined to comply with the Supreme Court’s requirement in Azurak v. Corporate Property Investors, 175 N.J. 110 (2003), that a contract requiring indemnification for one’s own negligence be explicit and unequivocal.
[brief] Furthermore, [...] refused to investigate Appellant’s complaints, and instead, immediately transferred her on the very same day that she made the complaint.  It is Appellant’s position that permanently transferring her – the victim – is an adverse employment action regardless of whether [...] had control of [...].  The Court cannot outright determine the intent of [...]’s transfer of Appellant by simply concluding that it was Respondents’ “only option,” and therefore, was not retaliatory.
[brief] I want to hear it firsthand as to who did what, how this came about, what was relied on . . .  I don’t know what anybody is going to say, honestly.  I am sure you will be quick to point out any inconsistencies.  But I think we need to get to the bottom line, and I am certainly not going to preclude [Plaintiffs’] expert before the trial starts.  (3T 54:25 to 55:11).  As to summary judgment, the trial court denied relief for various reasons, but most notably because “it has been alleged that there were material misrepresentations that were relied on” and “I think based on what has been alleged, and looking at it most favorably [to the non-moving party], there are certainly material disputes of fact as to that.
[brief] The court further reasoned:  The NJCFLA requires a “consumer lender” to obtain a license and defines a “consumer lender” as (in relevant part) a person who should be licensed to engage in the “consumer loan business”.  . . .  The Court must interpret and apply statutory text according to the plain, ordinary meaning of its terms.  It must also construe such text in the context of relevant definitions or other provisions of the statute examined in their entirety.
[brief] “A short time” later, the Audi was driven from the garage to a residence in Jackson.  While travelling to Jackson, the vehicle was driven in what the detectives perceived to be an evasive manner: “he was making alternate paths that weren’t … the fastest or most direct route.  He was going through neighborhoods, he was taking multiple turns. ” (1T:13-18 to 15-12).  Following this surveillance, the detectives applied for, and, on December 9, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted, a search warrant authorizing the installation of a GPS tracking device on defendant’s Audi.  The judicially-authorized GPS tracker was placed on the Audi on December 13, 2021.  (1T:20-8 to 24-3; 55-11 to 55-22; 68-5 to 70-2); Pa21-24.
[brief] It certainly cannot be suspended on a flimsy platform of personal opinion.  [...] also reinterprets the Arbitrator’s findings, arguing that the Arbitrator believed [...] could have pursued alternative measures to Grievant [...]’ termination.  To begin, the Arbitrator did not base his decision on these “findings,” but rather on his personal opinion that [...] could not terminate an employee on a temporary medical leave.  [...]’s arguments distort the undisputed facts and plain contractual language.  [...] terminated [...] based on a doctor’s note she produced stating she could not perform the essential duties of her job for a period of at least six months.  [...] expressly told [...] she was terminated because she could not perform her job duties.  These facts are undisputed.  Any post-termination information [...] provided to [...], following a second contradictory and suspicious doctor’s note, is irrelevant.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision must be reversed and the Arbitration Award vacated.
[brief] The PDA requires proof of “actual malice” or “wanton and willful disregard” by “clear and convincing evidence,” N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(a).  Even if this Court engaged in the searching review Plaintiffs suggest, it would find only facts “needed to state the bare bones elements of the underlying” violations, not the finding of malice or facts required for a finding of punitive damages.  *Sacchi v. ABC Fin. Servs. Inc.*, Civ. No. 14-1196 (FLW), 2014 WL 4095009 at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2014).  With respect to all Defendants, the Trial Court improperly imposed punitive damages in a commercial dispute between “sophisticated businesspersons who would often use multiple partnership[s] during the course of one project in order to limit their financial exposure at various stages.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT [...]’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A PWCRA-REGISTERED ARCHAEOLOGIST IN ITS BID WAS NOT A STATUTORY MATERIAL DEFECT THAT RENDERED ITS BID NON-RESPONSIVE (0015a-018a)  The trial court entered the Denial Order because of its erroneous conclusions that [...] was not required to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeological subcontractor in its bid, and that [...]’s failure to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeologist was not a statutory defect automatically rendering [...]’s bid non-responsive.  The PWCRA does not exempt professionals who perform work on a public project site (like the archaeologist here) from its mandatory registration requirements.  This fact is made certain by the PWCRA legislative history and case law interpreting the statute.  The law is also clear that a contracting unit (like the [...]) has no authority to waive a statutory violation in a bid (like [...]’s failure to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeological subcontractor).  The trial court’s failure to apply (much less consider) these foundational principles of law requires that the Denial Order be overturned in its entirety.
[directive] C.  When a sworn law enforcement officer tests positive for illegal drug use, or is found to have been consuming or being under the influence of cannabis or marijuana while at work or during work hours:  1.  The officer shall be immediately suspended from all duties.  2.  The officer shall be administratively charged and, upon final disciplinary action, terminated from employment as a law enforcement officer.  3.  The officer shall be reported by his or her employer to Central Drug Registry maintained by the Division of State Police.  4.  The officer shall be permanently barred from future law enforcement employment in New Jersey.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES - **Brown v. Brown**, 323 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1999) ................................................................. 24 - **Burns v. Hoboken Rent Leveling & Stabilization Bd.**, 429 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 2013) .................................................................................................................. 40 - **Delray Holding, LLC v. Sofia Design & Dev. at S. Brunswick, LLC**, 439 N.J.Super. 502 (App. Div. 2015) ........................................................................................................... 16 - **Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Mitchell**, 422 N.J.Super. 214, 27 A.3d 1229 (App.Div.2011) .................................................................................................................. 33 - **Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles**, 428 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2012) ................................................................................................................................. 33 - **Driscoll v. Burlington Bridge Co.**, 28 N.J. Super. 1, 99 A.2d 829 (App.Div. 1953) ................................................................................................................................. 44 - **Giumarra v. Harrington Heights**, 33 N.J. Super. 178, 109 A.2d 695 (App.Div. 1955) .................................................................................................................................
[brief] ...................................................................................  32  OTHER AUTHORITIES  CITED U.S. Const. amend. v; N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 20 ............................................  24  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter is before the Appellate Division on the appeal of Plaintiffs/Appellants [...] and [...] ("Plaintiffs") of the trial court’s 1) final Order, dated May 10, 2024, wherein the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, 2) the October 20, 2023 oral decision, wherein the Court awarded Defendant [...] ("[...]") attorney’s fees and costs; 3) the Order entered on December 5, 2023, setting attorney’s fees and costs; 4) the Order entered March 6, 2024, granting Defendant [...] ("[...]") summary judgment; and 5) the Order entered on March 6, 2024, denying Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment for a declaration that there was a taking by the [...].