ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Affirmance is also appropriate because [...] demonstrated good cause to reopen this case.  See Pa000105–Pa000106.  For starters, the Settlement Agreement expressly states that the lower court had exclusive jurisdiction to address whether Plaintiff released his Gannon claims.  Settlement Agreement, §§ 8.17, 8.18 (Pa000069); Pa000075.  The balance of harms also favored reopening because Plaintiff breached the Settlement Agreement when he filed Gannon and alleged claims he had released.  Pa000106.  Relitigating the Roma class issues would have unfairly burdened [...], which paid for peace almost ten years ago.  The trial court’s decision therefore did not “rest[ ] on an impermissible basis,” involve “irrelevant or inappropriate factors,” or miss “controlling legal principles. ”  Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. at 434.  The court properly exercised its discretion to reopen Roma.
[directive] Do you understand that if you violate a condition of community supervision for life and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years and a special sentence of parole (if the violation of the condition occurred on or after supervision for life July 1, 2014) (if the or you may receive a sentence of up to 18 months violation of the condition occurred before July 1, 2014)?  (wypełnić tylko jeżeli przestępstwo miało miejsce 14  Formalny dożywotni nadzór kuratorski b) stycznia 2004 r. lub później). (only complete if the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004).  Parole Supervision for Life Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w razie przyznania się do winy w (1) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] [Nie dotyczy/NA] odniesieniu do oskarżenia o kwalifikowaną napaść na tle seksualnym, napaść seksualną, kwalifikowany nielegalny kontakt 2C:13-1c(2), zagrożenie seksualny, uprowadzenie zgodnie z angażowanie się w zachowania seksualne, dobra dziecka poprzez które mogłyby osłabić poczucie moralności lub zdeprawować 2C:24-4a, spowodowanie zagrożenia dobra dziecko zgodnie z spowodowanie zagrożenia dobra dziecka zgodnie z 2C:24-4b(3), (ii) (jeśli przestępstwo dziecka zgodnie z 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) lub miało miejsce 1 r. lub później), lutego 2018 zwabianie lub usiłowanie popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw, i przestępstwo zostało popełnione po 14 stycznia 2004 r., albo w przypadku naruszenia warunków wyroku specjalnego dożywotniego nadzoru społecznego, jeżeli do przestępstwa doszło 1 lipca 2014 roku lub później, sąd, niezależnie od jakiegokolwiek innego wyroku, wyda specjalny wyrok formalnego dożywotniego nadzoru kuratorskiego?
[brief] 31  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  March 4, 2024  Court’s Order and Decision  ...........................................Pa000017  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Federal Cases | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | Frederico v. Home Depot, | 23 | | 507 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2007) | | | Portillo v. Nat'l Freight, Inc., | 27 | | 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS I03186 (D.N.J. June 9, 2022) | | | Somers Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., | 14 | | 198 F.Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1961) | | | Suburban Transfer Serv., Inc. v. Beech Holdings, Inc., | 26 | | 716 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1983) | | ## State Cases | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | Association Group Life, Inc. v. Catholic War Veterans, | 24 | | 61 N.J. 150 (1972) | | | Atl. City Superior Officers' Ass'n v. City of Atl. City, No. A-3117-20, | 17-19, 21 | | 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS I194 (App. Div. June 30, 2022) | | | Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, | 30 | | 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | | | Goldfarb v. Solimine, | 26 | | 245 N.J. 326 (2021) | | | Independent Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local 680, | 15 | | 23 N.J. 85 (1956) | | | Matter of Morris School Dist. Bd. of Educ., | 30 | | 310 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Nostrame v. Santiago, | 14 | | 213 N.J. 109 (2013) | | | Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, | 30 | | 14 N.J. 372 (1954) | | | Phillips v. Curiale, | 30 | | 128 N.J. 608 (1992)
[directive] 7.5.2  N.J.R.E. 503(a) states that "no person has the privilege to refuse to submit to examination for the purpose of discovering or recording his corporal features and other identifying characteristics or his physical or mental condition."  Evidence that may be obtained or procedures that may be used to obtain evidence under this rule include: (a) Breath sample; (b) Blood sample; (c) Buccal swab; (d) Requiring suspect to speak; (e) Voice recordings; (f) Participation in a lineup; (g) Handwriting samples; (h) Hair and saliva samples; (i) Urine specimens; (j) Video recording; and (k) Field sobriety tests.  7.5.3  For internal affairs investigations that may result in a criminal prosecution, physical tests should be conducted pursuant to a court order or an investigative detention under Rule 3:5A.  Officers that refuse to perform or participate in a court-ordered physical test may be subject to a contempt of court sanction and agency discipline for failing to comply with the order.  7.5.4  For internal affairs investigations that may result in an administrative disciplinary proceeding, the internal affairs investigator or the appropriate supervisor may order subject officers to perform or participate in a physical test.  The order must be reasonable and relevant to the investigation at hand.  Officers that refuse to perform or participate in a lawfully ordered physical test can be disciplined for their refusal.  7.6
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  In *Adim*, the jury sent a note on its second day of deliberations stating that, “We are not in agreement on any of the counts.  Each of the jurors are firm in their decision.  We do not feel further discussions will be helpful. ”  Id. at 420-21.  This Court explained that, because the jury’s note made clear it was definitely deadlocked, “the judge was required to discharge the jury unless he concluded that the period of deliberations was unreasonably short given the nature of the trial evidence and other relevant circumstances.
[brief] I.  REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE GRANT OF VARIANCE RELIEF.  The Board for the first time claims that the setbacks can be justified on (c)(1) hardship grounds.  See DBb24.  The Applicant mentions a (c)(1) variance at DAb10.  Putting aside that the resolution contains no hardship findings and the records contains no hardship proofs, it is axiomatic that a hardship cannot be self-created by the Applicant in its own plans and then attempt to get the Board to grant a variance to excuse the Applicant’s deliberate deviation in the ordinance requirement simply to increase density.  Green Meadows at Montville, L.L.C. v. Plan. Bd. of Twp. of Montville, 329 N.J. Super. 12, 22 (App. Div. 2000).  In the present case, the Applicant is starting off with a vacant lot.
[brief] The Resolution relies on reliable and component evidence to make its determination.  For example, the Board heard plaintiff’s objections regarding Notice and ruled that Notice was proper and expressed common sense description of relief.  (Pa 31).  Applicant, [...], was duly sworn and plaintiff’s had the full right to cross examine her.  (Pa 43)  Appellants even had a full opportunity to object to the application and bring his own expert witness to support his objection.  (Pa 43-44)  They properly reviewed the evidence and came to the correct conclusion under the law.  Appellants’ disagreement with the interpretation of the law is insufficient to warrant relief from the court.  Moreover, Appellants’ response asserted that the Board was forbidden from rejecting Appellants’ expert testimony of [...].  However, this is simply not true under the precedent.  The Zoning Board is not bound to accept the testimony of any expert.  See Klug v. Bridgewater Planning Bd., 407 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2009) ("[w]e emphasize that a planning board is not required to accept the testimony of an expert"); Clifton City BOE v. Clifton City Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434 (App. Div. 2009); Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration §18-4.3 (Gann).  An expert’s opinion need not automatically be disputed by another expert if the proposed expert fails to give a probative opinion to the Board.  Here, the Board found [...]’s testimony offered nothing to the Board’s analysis because he failed to support his claims regarding flooding and/or destruction of trees.  Without a proper foundation for these statements, the Board need not rely on expert testimony alone.  (Pa 48)  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The cross-motion filed by Respondents did not reach the merits of Appellant’s claims, but rather only reached whether they were sufficiently pleaded.  (Pa121).  There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the timing of Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration was part of a nefarious litigation strategy, as is revealed by the fact that Respondents sought to compel arbitration prior to engaging in and benefitting from the opportunity to conduct litigation discovery.  Respondent made it motion to compel at the infancy of the case and not after multiple years.  *See*.  Transcript, p. 12:13-14 (“due to the lack of litigation, I am going to grant the defendant’s motion”).  Most importantly to the *Marmo* analysis, **no discovery has been conducted.**  See Transcript, 12:2-8 (“the central part of the argument regarding how much has been done to contest the facts raised by the plaintiff [. . .] there’s been nothing done except paper discovery served, no answers provided, no depositions, nothing like that”).  Without the parties having conducted any discovery, providing any documentation, or taking any depositions, this action remains in its infancy.  See also *White*, 61 F. 4th at 340 (holding engaging in affirmative discovery over multiple years weighed heavily in favor of waiver); *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 281-282 (holding defendant had waived right to arbitrate by invoking arbitration on the eve of trial after getting the benefit of the litigation process).  When Respondents sought to compel arbitration, trial was not imminent or scheduled.  Respondents have not benefited from the litigation process and Appellant cannot demonstrate any prejudice arising from the referral of the action to arbitration.  In short, unlike in *Marmo*, Respondents did not weaponize litigation or formal discovery to the prejudice of Appellant such that there was no clear error in holding that Respondents did not waive their contractual right to arbitrate.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE CRITERIA OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE SATISFIED WITHOUT RESORT TO THE FACTUAL RECORD(Pa18-20)  The applicable statute relied upon by the trial court requires several explicit criteria to be satisfied before acceptance of a road may be operative.  N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-53(j) provides in relevant part:  j.  To the extent that any of the improvements have been dedicated to the municipality on the subdivision plat or site plan, the municipal governing body shall be deemed, upon the release of any performance guarantee required pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, to accept dedication for public use of streets or roads and any other improvements made thereon according to site plans and subdivision plats approved by the approving authority, provided that such improvements have been inspected and have received final approval by the municipal engineer.  N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-53(j)  In accordance with the foregoing Statute three criteria must be established for dedication to occur.  1.  The land must dedicated to the municipality on the subdivision plat or site plan approved by the approving authority.  2.  Any performance guarantee must be released.  3.  The *municipal* engineer must inspect and provide *final approval*.  Criteria 1 and 3 were not met in this case.  **III, (A) APPROVAL OF THE SUBDIVISION PLAT OR SITE PLAN**
[brief] The facts in this case are perfectly analogous to the Viviano exception.  The false testimony of [...] and others is not the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim.  The wrong for which Plaintiffs seek redress is the concealment of evidence that [...] owned [...] and that [...] and [...] operated [...] as a sham entity in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money.  That these facts are true, that these facts were material to Plaintiffs’ claims, and that Defendants did not disclose or concealed said facts, do not depend on [...]’s and others’ false testimony.  Rather, the false testimony of [...] and others in the 2015 Action is only material because it proves that Defendants’ concealment of these facts was willful.  The Viviano exception is perfectly met here, and the Trial Court’s decision must be reversed.
[brief] ”  State v. Frost 242 N.J. Super. 601 (1990).  “N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2) [] permits the substantive use of prior consistent statements as an exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule under the same conditions set forth in N.J.R.E. 607 for using such statements to support the credibility of a witness. ”  [...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, Comment 2 to N.J.R.E. 607, comment 4 ([...], 2020); *State v. Moorer*, 448 NJ Super 94, 108-111 (App. Div. 2016).  Additionally, the prior consistent statement need not have occurred prior to the alleged motive to fabricate to be admissible.  *State v.  Muhammad*, 359 NJ Super 361, 386-388 (App. Div. 2003) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court previously “declined to adopt as a rigid admissibility requirement that the prior statement was made prior to the motive or influence to lie. ”).  In *State v. Torres* two officers testifying at trial relayed prior incriminating statements that another witness had made.
[brief] As defense counsel opened his case accusing [...] as the shooter, and continued with that assertion throughout the entire trial, the jail call, and defendant's admissions therein, directly rebutted this claim.  As such, the call was probative to negate defendant's third-party allegations.  N.J.R.E 401.  Second, except for defendant's admission to firing the shot that killed [...], nothing said in the call admitted to or alleged any violations of the law.  (9T:178-1 to 18).  The fact that [...] was upset with defendant for various alleged indiscretions and accused him of not telling the truth did not constitute other crimes evidence.  N.J.R.E. 404(b); (9T:178-10 to 18).  Indeed, [...] had already alluded to her troubled five-year relationship with defendant during direct examination, even testifying that after the shooting she was planning to leave him.
[directive] A crime scene query shall be limited in scope to data that is reasonably related to the specified criminal event, 2 considering the date, time, location, and nature of the specified criminal event.  For example, a crime that reasonably involves extensive planning and possible “rehearsals,” such as a terrorist attack, would justify examining data that had been scanned and collected days or even weeks or months before the criminal event and that may have been scanned at a substantial distance from the site of the crime or intended crime (e.g., at any point along a highway leading to the intended crime site).  In contrast, a spontaneous crime might reasonably justify examining data that was scanned and collected on or about the time of and in closer physical proximity to the criminal event.  For the purposes of this Section, the “specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation” standard 3 required for the disclosure of personal identifying based upon crime trend analysis of stored non-alert data is intended to be comparable to the “specific and articulable facts that warrant heightened caution” standard developed by the 5
[directive] 16  Effective June 1, 2007, when a person charged with a crime with bail restrictions posts cash bail or secures a bail bond, the person, no later than the time of posting bail or proffering the surety or bail bond, shall provide to the prosecutor, on a form promulgated by the Attorney General, relevant information under penalty of perjury about the obligor, indemnifier or person posting cash bail, the security offered, and the source of any money or property used to post the cash bail or secure the surety or bail bond, as the case may be.
[brief] THE PARTIES HERE ARE SOPHISTICATED AS THEY WERE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AND POSSESSED EQUAL BARGAINING POWER (DA1540-1550)  Appellants’ contention that Atalese is not a bright line rule is further substantiated by recent jurisprudence carving out an exception for sophisticated parties.  In Cnty. of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498 (2023) this Court reaffirmed that Atalese does not apply to sophisticated contracting parties who maintain sufficient or equal bargaining power – which precisely describes the Plaintiffs.  The factual record demonstrates that Plaintiffs were not only represented by Counsel, but experienced investors who retained negotiating when issuing an offer a high-risk pre-construction condominium unit.  This is not the Atalese paradigm.
[brief] ’”  Id. at 68-69.  Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine asking the court to prohibit any arguments from defendant regarding third-party guilt and to not provide a third-party guilt charge to the jury.  [9T64-16 to -22].  The State first argued defendant failed to provide notice of his intent to rely on third-party guilt as required by State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 334 (2005).  [9T65-6 to -12].  The State also argued that defendant should be prohibited from arguing third-party guilt because there was no link between a third-party and [...]’s murder.
[brief] (1T22-18 to 23-7).  He argued that [...] should be limited to testifying that “the latent print and the known exemplar have similar characteristics,” but not that they matched or originated from the same source.  (1T23-19 to 24-4).  In response, the prosecutor countered that “originating from the same source is the language still commonly used and that’s the language used in his report,” but he noted that he had no issue with qualifying [...]’s testimony as within “a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” rather than referring to it as a definite match.  (1T24-17 to 25-15).  The trial judge granted in part and denied in part defendant’s motion, ruling that [...]’s testimony be “qualified with language such as within a reasonable degree of probability as opposed to a [one-hundred] percent match. ” (1T29-2 to 8).  The State requested reconsideration of that ruling prior to the beginning of its case-in-chief.  (4T7-12 to 25).
[directive] 20.  YEAR - Enter the year of the vehicle.  21.  MAKE - Enter the make of the vehicle.  22.  MODEL - Enter the model of the vehicle.  23.  BODY TYPE - Enter the body type of the vehicle.  24.  COLOR - Enter the color(s) of the vehicle.  A-9  25.  REGISTRATION NO./STATE - Enter the vehicle's plate/registration number and the State it is registered in.  26.  V.I.N. - Enter the vehicle's full Vehicle Identification Number.
[brief] In that same email thread, Defendant himself confirmed that [...] was his address.  (Da165 to 166).  -  On or about March 11, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to personally serve Defendant at [...], which was another address that [...] confirmed as a recent address for Defendant.  (Pa11).  -  On March 16 and 17, 2021, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant with the aforementioned documents at the [...], which is one of the properties at issue in the Complaint.  (Pa13).  •
[brief] CONCLUSION  For these reasons, Petitioners’ application for a determination that Chapter 375 be declared void should be dismissed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  Dated: May 3, 2024  IN RE APPLICATION OF [...] AND [...]  PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 AND N.J.S.A. 1:7-4  SEEKING TO VOID L. 2021, C. 375, On Application to SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION seeking exercise of original jurisdiction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 & -4
[brief] Plaintiff brought the instant CEPA claim after his term lapsed serving in the “statutory position of [Sussex County] Counsel pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-43 . . . for a 3-year term beginning on July 1, 2018. ” (Pa12).  The public record establishes that in 2018, the [...] (“[...]”) sought a new part-time County Counsel to provide legal services to Sussex County as specified in Section 2.10 of the Sussex County Administrative Code.
[brief] [...]  Filed 12/21/2018  Attorneys and Law Firms [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], [...], [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], [...], [...], Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.  [...], [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Washington, DC, [...], [...], [...], Scranton, PA, for Defendants.
[brief] “THE COURT: -- [...], then why go through this whole exercise if everybody knew what the law was, and you know, everybody knew that because of this letter, you know, his application to -- for disability would have been futile, why enter into the agreement?  I mean, why would anybody do that?”  (1T 17:6-11)  “THE COURT: But he couldn’t -- but he make his case.  He couldn’t make his case because that -- that -- that agreement or that letter that he signed made it all futile.  He couldn’t make his case.  The Division would never accept his application. ”  (1T 17:16-21)  Appellant’s argument is without merit and the Trial Court Order should be upheld.
[directive] -1-  Physical Clues  Blank facial expression #  Unsteady walk/loss of balance #  Age (common age of onset 65+)  #  Repeats questions #  It is 3 am and you have been called to Inappropriate clothing for season respond to a domestic disturbance.  #  Upon arrival, you notice an elderly Safe Return Identification # woman crying saying that her son had assaulted her.  Her son claims that his mother is suffering from Alzheimer’s Psychological Clues disease and he did not assault her, but merely found her outside in the yard, Inability to grasp and remember the # without proper clothing, and assisted current situation her back in the house.  Difficulty in judging the passage of time #  How should you handle this call?
[brief] Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective in not objecting to the prosecutor’s remarks regarding ambidexterity because the remarks were not objectionable and an objection would not have been sustained.  Responding to the defendant’s argument that Defendant could not have been the shooter because the shooter fired the gun with his right hand whereas Defendant signed the Miranda card at the police station with his left, the prosecutor mentioned in summation that he had a friend whose son writes with his left hand but is a right-handed batter and fielder in baseball.  15T 112:2-15.  The trial judge appropriately cautioned the jurors that “[a]rguments, statements, remarks, openings[,] and summations of counsel are not evidence and must not be treated as evidence. ”  15T 123:16-18.  It is well-settled that juries follow instructions.  The statements were not evidence and also were not testimonial in nature as Defendant claims.  Prosecutors are “afforded considerable leeway in closing arguments as long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented[,]” which in this case they undoubtedly were and in fact were a direct response to a contrary assertion by defense counsel.  State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 275 (2019) (quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999)).  9.  There Was No Cumulative Error