ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] alleges that he complained of discrimination by [...] and [...] on February 10, 2015, and was retaliated against for doing so.  (Pb9-12).  The New Jersey LAD prohibits “reprisal” against any person who has filed a complaint involving discrimination.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).  To establish a prima facie case of reprisal or retaliation under the LAD, plaintiff must show: (1) that he was engaged in protected activity known to the defendant; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action by the defendant; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.  Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996).  Plaintiff does not clearly articulate his substantive due process claims under Count Six or how they might differ from a LAD retaliation claim.  While the LAD does not define “adverse” job action, courts have recognized the law to require a “tangible adverse employment action” to state a claim of retaliation.  “In order to constitute an ‘adverse employment action,’ the retaliatory conduct alleged must be ‘serious and tangible’ enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprive [his] future employment opportunities, or otherwise have a ‘materially adverse’ effect on [his] status as an employee. ”  Hargrave v. Cnty. of Atl., 262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 427 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1997)).  In the analogous setting of cases involving the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, retaliatory action is defined as the “discharge, suspension, or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken in the terms and conditions of employment.
[brief] It was about 10 – about 10:15 at night and she was out cutting the grass.  I got out – pulled in my driveway and got out of the car”  \(^{12}\) Municipal Court transcript of [...] answer – [1T21:23-25 -11/29/2022], “The next time I saw her was that Sunday, and I think it was the 7\(^{th}\).  I was at church, got a call from my nephew who told me that there was a young lady out there.  [1T24:4-8 -11/29/2022]  \(^{13}\)  Municipal Court Transcript  [1T24:14-17 –11/29/2022]  \(^{14}\)  Municipal Court Transcript  [1T24:21-22 -11/29/2022]  unidentified [...].  [...] testified that he provided the police with the defendant’s license plate number and vehicle description.\textsuperscript{15}  Then he changes his narrative, shift blaming again by stating, on November 9, 2021, [...] approaches him, after the November 7, 2021 incident identifying the defendant while reassuring him it wasn’t any of her children\textsuperscript{16}.  [...] changes his narrative, again, and confirms that although he has \textit{never seen the defendant before November 2, 2021}, that he was the one identifying the defendant as the unidentified woman from the alleged incidents taking place on November 2, November 7, the November 10 signed complaint and then confirms he’s presuming the encounter with [...] on November 9\textsuperscript{17}; his November 8, 2021 signed complaint confirms (AP 10).
[brief] (25T205-22 to 206-5, 213-1 to 14)  On March 13, after he was charged with the murder, [...] initiated a third conversation with the police in which he told them that Defendant shot and killed [...].  [...] said he put the gun that had been used to kill [...] in a gold Mercury Grand Marquis parked at the [...] about a mile from [...].  (26T6-6 to 24, 19-11 to 13, 42-1 to 5; 30T268-18 to 270-8)  Police obtained and executed a search warrant for the Marquis, finding a Ruger .357 handgun and a 9mm handgun wrapped in a Nike hat.  [...] told [...] he put the 9mm there after Defendant used the gun to shoot [...].
[directive] If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you d.  [Yes/oil] [No/ori...J..8.] are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction  If fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made? the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?
[brief] *Frye*, 566 U.S. at 144.  “The alternative courses and tactics in negotiation are so individual that it may be neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for the proper discharge of defense counsel’s participation in the process. ”  *Ibid.*  “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution[,]” *Id.* at 145, *Powell*, 294 N.J. at 564, and to advise defendant of the sentencing exposure and consequences of accepting or rejecting a plea offer.
[brief] Plaintiff however argues that applying Tyler is not mandated here because Plaintiff alleges [...] did not establish proof of surplus equity.  This is where the Plaintiff is wrong on both points.  First, in consideration of Tyler, retaining even one dollar of equity above the amount of the tax debt without just compensation is unconstitutional and vacating judgment is mandated.  Second, The Tyler court determined surplus equity based upon the property value in relation to the tax debt, nothing else.  This means any amount above the tax debt requires just compensation otherwise judgment is unconstitutional.  This is not subject to any other New Jersey law governing the calculation of surplus equity.  It was never disputed that the house is worth significantly more than the tax debt.  Further, the house is worth more than the tax debt alleged by Plaintiff even to this day and even with Plaintiff’s unconscionable calculations.  When the foreclosure judgment was entered (despite [...] fighting for permission to redeem), the amount due on the tax sale certificate was $45,310.23 yet the judgment gave full ownership of [...]’s home to the Plaintiff and the family had to vacate their home.  The Court and Plaintiff did not claim there was no surplus because the home was not worth significantly more than the tax debt.  This would be impossible to argue.  Plaintiff instead argued inaccurately that the amount due on the mortgages/liens was higher than [...]’s surplus equity amount and therefore there was no equity.  We recognize New Jersey statutory provisions have calculated equity in a property for tax foreclosure purposes by determining whether the total unpaid balance of all liens and encumbrances against the property is equal to or greater than 92% of the fair market value of the property whereby if this condition is met, the property is deemed to have no equity.  Again, the U.S. Supreme Court however made it clear that any taking of more than the amount due on the tax debt is the proper calculation for determining if the judgment is a violation of [...]’s constitutional rights, mandating vacating judgment.  Although there is no doubt that, in [...]’s case, [...] had significant surplus equity in his home and debts did not exceed equity, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Tyler did not require an owner like [...] to have to demonstrate an amount of equity in relation to debts in a property for a tax foreclosure judgment, like [...]’s, to be considered a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
[brief] 1.  The Court below found that no wrongful act had occurred (7T17:14-16).  A constructive trust is an equitable remedy available to the court if the court finds that, "there was some wrongful act, usually though not limited to fraud, mistake, undue influence or breach of a confidential relationship which has resulted in a transfer of property....It arises where the retention of the property would result in the unjust enrichment of the person retaining it."  Massa v. Laing, 160 N.J. Super. 443, 446 (App.Div. 1977).  Judgment affirmed by 77 N.J. 227, July 20, 1978.
[directive] Page 7  Regardless of the model it chooses, any municipality establishing a Civilian Review Board should take care that the Board’s members and staff have the resources, experience and training necessary to carry out their duties in an effective and professional manner; that the Board’s work does not impair or unnecessarily duplicate the important work of the police force’s internal affairs unit or prosecutor’s office; that confidentiality is maintained; and that law enforcement executives retain appropriate control over their personnel.  Civilian Review Boards that fall short in any of these respects are unlikely to be effective tools for promoting police- community relations and could in fact have the opposite effect.  The revised identifies the limited circumstances in which disclosure of internal IAPP affairs records to a Civilian Review Board is consistent with the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures.
[brief] However, the Court did find that the Plaintiffs established some (though not all) of the alleged misappropriations by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient to establish liability for conversion, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith.  As the trial court noted, conversion, in particular, does not require a showing of intent.  (26T47:18 to 48:3; 48:20 to 50:9).  In the end, none of this constitutes reversible error.  The defense objections to [...]’s testimony went to weight, not admissibility, and the trial court, in view of all of the evidence presented accepted Plaintiffs’ theories of diversion and misappropriation of funds.  The trial court’s judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.
[brief] And you’re in breach … so you don’t get the fit up refund. ” (2T9-15 to 2T9-17).  real or manufactured, seems to arise out of [...]’s adept holding that the Landlord-Tenant Division lacked jurisdiction to grant Tenant’s request for money damages in connection with in the Motion for Reconsideration.  (3T14-3 to 3T14-14).  As discussed more fully below, these holdings are, in no way, contradictory.  Simply put, [...], at all times, treated the parties fairly, considered all arguments raised and complied with the New Jersey Rules of Court when issuing the Post Trial Order and Reconsideration Order.  Tenant’s unhappiness with the lower court’s rulings does not render [...]’s holdings improper in any manner.
[brief] 17.  As is customary in the industry, [...] will address the pressure-reduction icing effect at the Regulator Station—as it does at approximately 35 other similar stations—by pre-heating the transmission-line natural gas with a heater located at the Regulator Station prior to the pressure reduction.  The heater will allow [...] to heat the natural gas to approximately 80 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit, so the gas temperature after the pressure reduction stays above freezing, preventing ice from encasing the equipment and ensuring reliable operation of the Facility and the local distribution system.  For that reason, the heating unit is an extremely important component of the Regulator Station and is critical to [...]’s ability to provide safe, adequate and reliable natural gas service to the residents of [...] and the surrounding municipalities.
[brief] Db at p. 22.  Rather, during the charge conference, the Defendants only raised three specific objections to the charge: 1) an objection to the presentation of the retaliation charge (see 6T at 96:21-22); 2) an objection to the inclusion of the aggravation of disability charge (see id. at 97:12-18); and 3) an objection to the inclusion of the discriminatory firing charge (see 7T at 14:6-12).5
[brief] [...] (269491971)  [...]  [...]  [...]  P: [...] | F: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondents  [...], [...], [...] and [...]  Our File No. 42269.1000  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  4 POINT I THIS COURT SHOULD DEFER TO THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT  .........................................................................................................................  9 POINT II  GIGI’S IS A PROPER NON-CONFORMING USE ..................................................................  11 POINT III  GIGI’S DID NOT IMPROPERLY EXPAND THE EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USE .................................................................................................................................  18  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................  21  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Bonaventure Intern. Inc. v. Borough of Spring Lake,** | | | 359 N.J. Super 420 (App. Div. 2002) | 19 | | **Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee of Raritan,** | | | 39 NJ 1 (1962) | 14 | | **Hill v. Board of Adjustment,** | | | 122 NJ Super 156 (App. Div. 1972) | 12, 13, 14 | | **Jesse A. Howland & Sons, Inc. v. The Borough of Freehold,** | | | 143 NJ Super 484 (App. Div. 1976) | 14 | | **Knorr v. Smeal,** | | | 178 N.J. 169 (2003) | 15 | | **Summer Cottagers Association v. Cape May,** | | | 19 NJ 493 (1955) | 16 | | **Town of Belleville v. Parillo’s Inc,** | | | 83 NJ 309 (1980) | 20 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT When a factual presentation solely references allegations of facts supportive of the Appellant’s position, it can seem, at first blush, that there may be a basis for the appeal.
[brief] Da0099 Exhibit A – July 7, 2008  Promissory Note .................................................... Da0107 Exhibit B - July 8, 2008  Guarantee ................................................................. Da0112 Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Jury Demand & Demand for Production of Documents filed by [...] and [...], [...], filed June 8, 2020 ........................................................................ Da0118 [...] Trial Exhibit D-1 Promissory Note dated July 7, 2008 (INTENTIONALLY OMITTED)
[brief] This burden is not onerous, and an employer must only provide “clear and reasonably specific reasons” for its actions.  *Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine*, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).  Appellant’s allegations make it appear as if she were terminated in a vacuum, this is not the case.  Appellant was but one of six employees who were terminated by Respondent at the same time and for the same reason, insubordinate conduct.  Appellant must offer some credible evidence that would convince a finder of fact that Respondent’s proffered reasons are not true or that other similarly situated employees who were not of the same protected class were treated differently.  Appellant has not provided any credible evidence to those points and cannot prove pretext here.  To prove that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext “a plaintiff may not simply show that the employer’s reason was false but must also demonstrate that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent. ”  *Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 436, 449 (2005) (citing *Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co.*, 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002)); see also *St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks*, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993).  Appellant has provided absolutely zero evidence to demonstrate that the termination of her and five other employees was pretext nor has she produced any evidence to show that a comparator was treated differently.  **POINT VI**
[brief] As to the first prong (length of delay), the Judge found that although the case had been delayed for approximately 20 months, the length of time “in and of itself does not control the analysis” and went on to examine the three remaining prongs.  (Da21)  As to the second prong (reason for the delay), [...] noted the case “was adjourned six times before the municipal court tried the matter after denying a suppression motion and a speedy trial motion. ”  (Da22)  The Judge continued:  On October 18, 2022, [...] heard the discovery motion and denied the motion – finding the discovery requests by the Defendant to be moot at best, and ‘a fishing expedition at worst. ’  After ruling on the motion, defense counsel asked the municipal court to schedule a hearing on a suppression motion he was filing.  The municipal court reconvened to hear the matter on December 6, 2022, at which time defense counsel requested an additional adjournment for a hearing on Defendant’s suppression motion and trial.  On August 3, 2023, defense counsel argued a motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial.  This was the first assertion of the right to a speedy trial on the record in this matter.  (emphasis added)  (Da22)  [...] then found Defendant failed to meet the second Barker prong, stating, “this Court’s conclusion is that the delays were part of the normal course of the life of a DWI case, and that the delays were attributable almost entirely to defense counsel with the majority of the delay attributable to defense counsel’s pursuit of what was ultimately determined to be a futile and overly-broad discovery effort. ”  (emphasis added)  (Da22-Da23)  As to the third prong (assertion of the right), [...] recognized Defendant’s argument that he asserted his right in a letter of representation filed in January, 2022.  (Da23)  However, because the amount of time between the date of Defendant’s arrest and his trial equaled the amount of time between the date of his arrest and his assertion of his right on the record, [...] found Defendant also failed to meet the third Barker prong.  (Da23)  Finally, as to the fourth prong (prejudice to the defendant), [...] found:  [O]ther than the possible prejudice from the delay itself, no claim of prejudice to Defendant has been demonstrated in this matter.  As to prejudice from the delay itself, this Court does not find that, given that most of the delay was attributable to Defendant.  (emphasis added)  (Da23)  Finding the Barker test had not been met, [...] then concluded that Defendant had not been deprived of his right to a speedy trial.  (Da23)
[brief] **Pb 3.**  The accident occurred when both cars attempted to make left hand turns onto the on-ramp to Westbound 280.  While Defendant’s testimony certainly speaks for itself in regard to what he observed prior to the accident, it is important to note that the Plaintiff was also aware of the defendant at the stoplight.  **Pa 49: 12-17.**  The Plaintiff states in her brief that people “habitually” made a left turn from the center lane at the time that this accident occurred.  However, she did not offer this explanation in her answers to interrogatories.  **Pa 165-166. **  In addition, plaintiff did not testify at her deposition that the two lanes “habitually” turned left from First Street onto Route 280.  Rather, the plaintiff testified that the middle lane was a designated left turn lane.  **Pa 49: 25-Pa 50: 3 and Pa 50:8-10. **  This, of course, turned out to be incorrect, and the plaintiff admits as much throughout the record both at the trial level and in this appeal.
[brief] 17:16G-8 | 5, 7 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19f | 6, 7 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) (4) | 7 | **RULES** | RPC 5.5 | 14, 25 | | RPC 5.6(b) | 35 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d) | PAGE | |-------------------------------|------| | Rule 1:14 | 27 | | Rule 1:19-1 | 27 | | Rule 1:20-1(a) | 27 | | Rule 1:20A-1 et seq. | 27 | | Rule 1:20B-1 et seq.
[brief] All of the contractual documents that the plaintiffs reviewed, initialed and signed expressly contradict this claim of oral misrepresentation: “THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE MARKET FOR RESALES OF INTERVALS. ” (Da231-232, ¶10).  “Purchaser has been informed that neither the seller, nor any of its affiliates, is engaged or involved in the resale of any week at [...] …” (Da193, ¶12).  See [...]’s Statement of Facts, supra at 11-12, regarding the express contradictions as to “resale” and “buyback. ”  Fifth, each of the eleven (11) plaintiffs claimed in their complaint that they were told maintenance fees would not increase.
[brief] ”  (9T 79-16 to 19, 80-2 to 6, 80-12 to 16; 10T 64-24 to 65-1)  [...] called his twin brother, [...], “for backup” because [...] did not want anybody “jumping in” on the fight.  (9T 81-23 to 82-2; see also 10T 64-18 to 21)  At the time, [...] was with [...], and they both met up with [...] and [...] shortly thereafter.  (9T 79-21 to 24, 80-17 to 81-1; 10T 58-11 to 19, 59-11 to 14)  [...] and [...] testified that they, Pierce, and [...] walked to [...]’s house together.  (9T 82-8 to 19, 83-12 to 13; 10T 60-24)  They testified that [...] knocked on [...]’s door and told him to come outside to fight [...].  (9T 84-5 to 13, 84-14 to 16; 10T 70-23 to 71-4, 109-10 to 17)  According to [...], [...] then taunted [...], saying things like, “you like hitting women? Are you tough?  Come here.  . . .  No, don’t run. ”  Then, [...] and [...] fought for about ten seconds.  (9T 87-24 to 88-4, 88-13 to 14)  [...] testified that his role was “[m]ore like a referee of sorts” – “[t]o, like, make sure it was like a fair fight. ”  (10T 73-3 to 8)  [...] testified that as part of this role, during the fight, he chased [...] away from [...] and [...].  (10T 75-4 to 16, 76-16 to 19)  In contrast, [...] testified that he was trying to break up the fight but was hit by [...] and then chased and punched by Pierce and [...].  (10T 115-8 to 10, 115-19 to 22, 116-1 to 6)  [...] testified that after the fight ended, he saw a neighbor watching from across the street and he wanted “to make it seem like [they weren’t] the bad guys” so he told [...], “next time you touch another girl like that, I’m going to do it again.
[brief] All this could have been avoided but for the fact that [...]’ first authorized appointment with the State’s Workers’ Compensation doctor, [...] was on March 23, 2020, as per the letter from the State of New Jersey dated March 19, 2020, which shows the appointment (EXHIBIT 8, P. 36a).  [...] cancelled this March 23, 2020 appointment ironically, due to Covid-19 and it was rescheduled for April 15, 2020 (T. P. 218, L14 to P. 219, L15).  [...] contends he would have been removed from work on March 23, 2020 by [...] if he was able to see [...] on March 23, 2020.  But again, Covid-19, because the problem it presented for everyone, was the reason the appointment of March 23, 2020 was cancelled.  [...] saw [...] on April 15, 2020, and [...] placed [...] out of work for his Workers’ Compensation injury (EXHIBIT 1ac, P. 1ac of Confidential Appendix).