ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Record Evidence Did Not Establish That Defendant Breached Any Contract**  The trial court’s ruling that Defendant breached the [...] Operating Agreement the 2007 [...] Stockholders Agreement was manifestly unsupported by the evidential record and clearly produced an unjust result.  36T50-10 to 51-21.  The alleged breaches under the [...] Operating Agreement and the 2007 [...] Stockholders Agreement, which were only generally recited in the Amended Complaint, relate to: (1) the expenditure of corporate funds upon majority vote; (2) the parties’ fiduciary obligation to not commit acts that are detrimental to the companies; and (3) to properly enter business transactions in the companies’ books.  Da00001 – Da00043 at ¶¶ 113-114, 119-120.  However, the evidence presented at trial established that [...], [...], [...] and [...] complied with all of their respective obligations under the aforementioned agreements.  24T32-20 to -25, 38-20 to -24, 68-13 to 73-14; Da07299 – Da07305 at ¶¶ 6, 17-18.  In short, Plaintiffs did not sustain their breach of contract claims, nor did they establish a legal nexus between those contracts and Defendant, such that she could be held liable for purported breaches by the actual parties to those contracts.  Moreover, the court did not find that Defendant breached the 2017 [...] SPA, the only contract she was actually a party to.  36T50-10 to 51-21.  Accordingly, the Judgment should be reversed against Defendant as to Counts 7 and 8 of the Amended Complaint.  POINT IV
[brief] The facts underlying the dispositive motions of 2020 and 2022, and their supporting documents, are laid out in detail as follows:  As to the 2020 motion, leading to the dismissal of most but not all of plaintiffs’ claims, see the Statement of Material Facts in support of the Motion at Pa79, the Certification of [...] at Pa91, the Certification of Counsel and its accompanying Exhibits at Pa105 et seq.  As to the 2022 motion that yielded dismissal of the remaining claims, see the Statement of Material Facts at Pa443 and accompanying Exhibits.  To summarize:  Purchase of the Property
[brief] U.S. CONST.AMENDS VI, XIV N.J. CONST. ART. I PAR. 10 (ruling 13T:25-7 to; 40-7)  The defense sought to call [...] to impeach his credibility with prior untruthful testimony.  The court denied the motion.  The denial of the motion led to [...] not testifying at all in this matter.  Failure to allow such evidence impacted the outcome of the trial.  Appellant argues that such evidence was admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 608.  Moreover, denying defendant his right to confront the arresting officer.  A new trial is warranted.
[brief] POINT VII  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY NOT DISMISSING THE FORECLOSURE  COMPLAINT  In Point VIII of his brief, Defendant erroneously argues that the Superior Court of New Jersey did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter a Judgment of Foreclosure and that all of its orders are void.  For the reasons stated in Point VI, supra, Defendant’s position is incorrect as the court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction of the present matter.  As a result, this court should affirm the trial court’s denial of the relief sought in Defendant’s Order to Show Cause.
[brief] (1T34:10-14).  [...] worked the third shift, between 10:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m., assigned to Stowe Two North, which is part of the Stowe Two Housing Unit.  (1T34:23-35:1; 1T10:14-11:8).  During [...]’ shift that night, one of the inmates he was assigned to monitor attempted to escape.  (1T10:3-9; 1T12:4-12).  The Department’s Special Investigation Division (SID) investigated, and during his SID interview, [...] claimed that he had performed all his inmate counts.  (Pa048a).  The Department also determined, after reviewing surveillance footage, that [...] failed to perform his required inmate counts at 2:00 a.m., 2:30 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 3:30 a.m., 4:00 a.m.  ---
[brief] Considering that every aspect of the rules of service were violated by plaintiff who knows the rules as a New Jersey attorney, then there is no excuse for his violations at the expense of the defendant.  As the summons and complaint was never served then the court had no jurisdiction over the defendant and the judgment must be vacated.  Moreover, it is an injustice for the court to reinstate a void complaint and issue a judgment against the defendant without permitting her to answer or defend against it.
[brief] Under the RETA, a private cause of action exists if: (1) Plaintiff suffers an ascertainable loss from the violation of the Act; (2) Defendant knowingly engaged in false, deceptive, misleading promotional or sales methods; and (3) There is a proximate nexus between the ascertainable loss and the alleged violation.  N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80.  When those elements and the necessity of proof under the RETA are compared to the two types of causes of action under the CFA, the result is absolute conflict in what a jury is required to determine.
[brief] In Witt v. Borough of Maywood, 328 N.J. Super. 432 (Law Div. 1998), the Court reversed variance and site plan approval on the grounds that the Board had deprived the objectors of a fair opportunity to participate in and present evidence at the hearing.  The Court concluded that the Board had failed to provide a fair opportunity for public comment because objectors did not have the opportunity until after midnight to present their witnesses on the application and ruled that the Board should have continued the hearing to another date to allow all available evidence to be considered.  In the present case, [...] was given a fair opportunity to participate in the hearing: counsel for [...] was present at the hearing, spoke at length at the hearing and, contrary to the assertions in Appellant’s Brief, elected not to question witnesses or present witnesses of his own.
[brief] The Prosecutor’s summation was proper.  The governing law in this area is well-settled.  A prosecutor is entitled to make a vigorous and forceful presentation of the State’s case.  State v. Mahoney, 188 N.J. 359, 376, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 995 (2006).  The Supreme Court recognized the seminal role prosecutors play in our criminal justice system, concluding:  [W]ithin the legal profession the prosecutor’s double calling – to represent vigorously the state’s interest in law enforcement and at the same time help assure that the accused is treated fairly and that justice is done – is uniquely challenging.  That challenge is what makes the prosecutor’s mission such a difficult one and such an honorable one.  A prosecutor willing to engage in proscribed conduct to obtain a conviction … betrays his oath in both its respects.  Not only does he scoff at rather than seek justice, he also represents the state poorly.  [Id. (citing State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 323-24 (1987)).]  Prosecutors are permitted to strike hard blows, but not foul ones.  State v. Marks, 201 N.J. Super. 514, 535 (App. Div. 1985), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 393 (1986).  Prosecutors are allowed to “fight hard, but they also must fight fair. ”  State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437 (2007) (citing State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 577 (1990)).  For these reasons, our Supreme Court has gauged the consequences of prosecutorial error differently, in “evaluat[ing] the severity of its prejudicial effect on the defendant’s right to a fair trial” and concluded that prosecutorial error “is not grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction unless the conduct was so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
[brief] Arbitration is beneficial because it provides a legally binding decision in a more streamlined, cost-effective manner than a typical court case.  But, the benefit of arbitration is diminished if either [...] or you refuse to submit to arbitration following a lawful demand.  Thus, the party that does not agree to submit to arbitration after a lawful demand by the other party must pay all of the other party’s costs and expenses for compelling arbitration.  Plaintiff claimed this attorney’s fee clause was unconscionable.  It is found in both arbitration provisions in consumer or business accounts (Pa 125-126).  Plaintiff used this account as both his personal and business account.  (Pa 134, MC1).  This clause was not part of the application which is the only document allegedly signed by the Plaintiff and no information was given to the Plaintiff where to find the account agreement.  The fact the Bank buried this request for counsel fees in a document not shown to the Plaintiff gives the Bank an incentive to play fast and loose with how this information is disclosed to the customers.  This provision establishes a systematic effort to disadvantage the Bank’s customers into foregoing a challenge to the arbitration clause.  Does the bank truly believe that a customer such as the Plaintiff will demand arbitration that the Bank will refuse?  The right provided to the customer is illusory.  Further there is no reciprocal right to counsel fees if the party is successful in opposing a motion to compel arbitration.  See Delta Funding v. Harris, 189 NJ 28, 42-43 (2006) addressing unconscionability of cost shifting provisions in arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion.  Atalese v. US Legal, 219 NJ 430, 448 n.3 (2014) - provisions shifting total costs of arbitration to losing party disfavored.
[brief] (Pa418)  [...], along with [...] and the Subject Structure, are all seen almost immediately upon entering the [...].  (Pa321)  [...] Terrace is the most expensive home ever purchased in all of [...] and is the most visually stunning and majestic property there.  Most of the original structure was destroyed in a fire in 1994, but it was completely rebuilt in 1996 to the exact dimensions as the original Queen Ann Victorian that was first built in 1909.
[brief] Defendant acknowledged below that expert witnesses are permitted to testify about the hearsay statements they relied upon in reaching their conclusions.  (17T13 to 15).  Statements for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available to testify.  N.J.R.E. 803(c); N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4).  A statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment is one that is (a) “made in good faith for purposes of, and is reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment” and (b) “describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause. ”  N.J.R.E. 803(c) (4).  “It has long been the law in New Jersey that ‘hearsay statements upon which an expert relies are admissible, not for [the purpose of] establishing the truth of their contents, but to apprise the jury of the basis of the opinion reached. ’”  State v. Farthing, 331 N.J. Super. 58, 77 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 530 (2000) (quoting State v. Humanik, 199 N.J. Super. 283, 305 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 266 (1984)).
[brief] [Da019-031].  The trial court held that the Brady violation did not warrant dismissal.  Id.  The trial court did, however, find that the officer’s exceeded the bounds of the search warrant and suppressed the evidence that was seized.  Id.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR THE STATE’S EGREGIOUS BRADY VIOLATION (Issue Raised and Decided Below in Trial Court’s May 20, 2024, Opinion and Order – Da.017-029)
[directive] [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  1.  Èske w konprann ke di fèt ke w ap plede koupab de  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to W ta kab lobjè a yon peryòd de tan anvan w elijib pou libète kondisyonèl (yon tèm kote w pap elijib pou libète kondisyonèl) ki tonbe anba Lwa Zak Grav yo (jan li etabli nan kesyon 7 nan fòm pledwaye twa paj la)?  you will be subject to a minimum period of time before you will be eligible for parole (a parole ineligibility term) under the Graves Act (as set forth in question 7 on the three-page plea form)?
[brief] The trial court reasoned that the defendant’s twelve-year-old conviction was admissible because the probationary term imposed had ended less than ten years prior to trial.  The trial court further found that his sixteen-year-old conviction was admissible because it showed “a continuing course of criminal conduct” together with the later conviction.  *Id.* at 429-30.  This Court reasoned that because probation is not “confinement” under Rule 609(b)(1), a conviction that is more than ten years old at the time of trial cannot be admitted for impeachment purposes simply because the sentence’s probationary term ended within ten years of the first day of trial.  *Id.* at 432-37.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY...........................................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS  .............................................................................................................3  I.  The Parties.  ...............................................................................................................................3  II.  The Staffing Office and Payroll.  ..............................................................................................4  III.  [...]’s Policies and Procedures.  .........................................................................................5  IV.  Staffing Coordinator Office Dynamics and the Impact of COVID-19.  .........................6  V.  [...]’s Chronic Complaints and Improper Behavior.  .........................................................7  VI.  [...]’s Complaining Reaches a Tipping Point.  .................................................................8  VII.  [...]’s Alleged “Complaints” About [...]  Prior to June 24, 2020 ....10  VIII.  [...] Investigates the June 24, 2020 Incident.  ............................................................11  IX.  [...], [...], and [...] Repeatedly Sought More Pay  .............................................12  X.  Theft of Additional Pay By [...], [...], and [...].  ..................................................13  XI.  [...] Investigates the Unauthorized Entry and Receipt of Charge Pay .....16  XII.  [...], [...], and [...] are Terminated.  .................................................................19  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................20
[brief] The Court failed to address the blatantly evident incomplete nature of Probation’s accounting, failed to *sua ponte* further investigate the evident inconsistency between the “accounting” and meritorious evidence of overpayment, including two supporting court orders, and in this manner erred and abused its judicial discretion.  8.  The result of Probation’s arbitrary and capricious enforcement of court orders was that Appellant’s income was improperly garnished on the basis of false, charges posted on the account record without benefit of due process.  I submit the court erred in failing to protect Appellant’s rights to the benefits provided by numerous court orders, and by the Court’s reluctance to address Probation’s evident arbitrary and capricious enforcement.
[brief] Cumberland County Indictment [...] charged [...] with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and 3a(2) (count one); second-degree desecration of human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1a(2) (count two); fourth-degree tampering with physical evidences, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count three); second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a(2) (count four); and second-degree false public alarm, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3a(1) (count five).
[brief] Furthermore, the affidavit shall also include the following: a recitation of other factors pertinent in the evaluation of the services rendered, the amount of the allowance applied for, and an itemization of disbursements for which reimbursement is sought.  If the court is requested to consider the rendition of paraprofessional services in making a fee allowance, the affidavit shall include a detailed statement of the time spent and services rendered by paraprofessionals, a summary of the paraprofessionals' qualifications, and the attorney's billing rate for paraprofessional services to clients generally.  No portion of any fee allowance claimed for attorneys' services shall duplicate in any way the fees claimed by the attorney for paraprofessional services rendered to the client.[.]  R. 4:42-9 (b).  Paragraph (d) of the Rule mandates that an allowance of fees must be included in the judgment or order stating the determination that an award of fees is appropriate.  R. 4:42-9 (d).
[brief] *[...]* owned nearly twenty-three acres.  The lots were subject to Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs), first recorded in the original declaration in 2015, to “protect[] the value, desirability, attractiveness and natural character of the Property,” as stated in the CC&Rs’ general-purpose statement.  According to the original declaration, the CC&Rs could be amended “at any time by an instrument executed and acknowledged by the [m]ajority [v]ote of the owners” under the general-amendment-power.  *Id.* at Par 3.  After [...] had purchased his lands, the other property owners amended the CC&Rs by majority vote without [...]’s consent or knowledge.  Among other things, the new restrictions were amended to limit the owners’ ability to convey or subdivide their lots, restricting the size and number of buildings permitted on each lot, and reducing the maximum number of livestock permitted on each lot.  Id. at par.  4.  [...] brought action against [...] and the [...], seeking a declaratory judgment to invalidate the zoning and building amendments to the CC&Rs.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the superior court granted in part and denied in part.  The court invalidated two sections in their entirety and partially invalidated two more sections of the amended CC&Rs.  The court further found the invalid provisions severable from the rest of the CC&Rs.  Id. at par.  5.  On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part holding that an HOA cannot create new affirmative obligations where the original declaration did not provide notice to the homeowners that they might be subject to such obligations.  CC&Rs form a contract between individual landowners and all the landowners bound by the restrictions, as a whole.  Id. at par. 14, citing, Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 555–56 ¶ 8 (2006); (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 cmt. f (Am. L. Inst. 1981)).
[brief] The trial court essentially concluded that the [...] was entitled to immunity for its several undisputed unlawful physical entries, soil borings, installation of temporary well points, substantial excavation, and the installation of the ASDS.  The trial court’s ruling would allow condemning authorities and governmental entities to physically enter onto an owner’s private property without due process of law, as long as they “claim” that the property owner is receiving a benefit.  According to the trial court below, there was no need to obtain the owner’s permission, or to seek entry under the statute by order of the court, or to pay just compensation for the unauthorized physical taking.  Such a holding is inconsistent with the constitutional requirements of due process and just compensation, as well as the Legislative intent of the environmental remediation statute.  For these reasons, this matter should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] Pa77.  On March 10, 2021 the trial court ordered Appellant to produce his expert reports no later than April 9, 2021.  Pa90.  The trial court warned Appellant that no more extensions would be granted and no further amendments to Appellant’s appraisal report would be allowed, based upon the initial erroneous appraisal report produced by Appellant, along with the multiple extensions Appellant was granted by the trial court to produce an amended appraisal report.  Pa45.  The trial court cautioned Appellant that should the amended appraisal report be barred from evidence, then Appellant would not be permitted to produce a third appraise report.  Ibid.  On March 18, 2021, a Case Management Order set the date for production of Appellant’s engineering expert report no later than April 9, 2021 and Appellant’s appraisal expert report no later than May 7, 2021.  Pa91.  On April 9, 2021, Appellant produced his engineering expert report by [...], P.E. of the [...] engineering firm (“Watermen Report”).  Da183.  On May 12, 2021, Appellant produced his appraisal report by [...], MAI of [...] (“Wade Appraisal”) estimating just compensation for the easement at $1,175,000.  Da133.  On July 7, 2021, the [...] filed a motion to bar portions of Appellant’s expert reports.  Da166.  On August 6, 2021, the trial court entered an Order and written Statement of Reasons partially granting the [...]’s motion to bar Appellant’s reliance upon its appraisal report and engineering report.
[brief] In those nine arbitrations, counsel for [...] and counsel for [...] both filed the contentions placed before the arbitrator and appeared personally at the hearing.  [...] appeared in all nine instances for [...].  For [...], [...] from [...]’s house counsel appeared at two hearings, and [...] from [...]’s house counsel appeared at seven hearings.  Of the nine arbitration awards, in eight instances the arbitrator hearing the matter was an attorney, [...] served as the arbitrator on three matters, [...] served as the arbitrator on five matters, and a claims adjuster [...] served as the arbitrator on one matter.
[brief] The Board Planner reported that the proposal requires parking setback variances of 15 ft. from the building, 25 ft. from the property line, and 50 ft. from the street.  Da23 at ¶8.  Clearly, if the development were better sized to the Property, these setbacks could have been easily satisfied.  Instead, applicant insisted on having the most units possible, causing too much structure and inadequate setbacks to parking.  6.  [...] severely undersized its parking plan.