ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to the Committee’s adoption of Ordinance 2022-15 and Ordinance 2022-17.  Appellant’s argument that the Redevelopment Plan cannot stand on the basis of alleged inconsistency with the Master Plan is not supported by the factual record and, even if it was, the Committee was statutorily authorized to reject the Master Plan.  As adopted, the Redevelopment Plan sets forth the Committee’s “reasons” for adopting the plan.  Such reasons are derived from the legislative record and the validity of the “reasons” has not been questioned or challenged by Appellant or anyone else.  Because the Township’s actions are in accord with the Redevelopment Law, Appellant’s challenge was properly rejected by the Trial Court and no basis for reversal of the Trial Court has been presented on appeal.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Intervenor, [...]  By______________________________  [...], Esquire  Dated: November 21, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], a New Jersey non-profit entity, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...] (BURLINGTON COUNTY)  TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF [...]; [...]; JOHN DOES A-Z; CORPORATION A-Z, Defendants-Respondents, – and – [...], Defendant-Intervenor.
[brief] [...]’s Counterclaim and summary judgment motion for payment of the April / May/ June 2020 invoices presuppose the retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), since all three months occurred prior to the June 29, 2020, effective date of the statute.  It is undisputed that the Legislature never expressed the retroactive application of application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), so the default rule is that it must have prospective application, i.e., on and after June 29, 2020.  If the Legislature wanted retroactive application of the statute, then it could have easily done so with a one-sentence statement that the statute is to have retroactive effect – but it did not.  [...] had no obligation to pay [...] based on a statute that was never effective at the time [...] originally claimed payment in April 2020, which negates the entire Counterclaim and request for summary judgment.
[brief] (Ca021).  Then, only two days after that, “respondent posted on her Facebook account a statement that teachers should opt out of the [...]. ” (Ca022).  This post stated in all caps “OPT OUT OF [...]!!!” and stated that teachers could opt out of union membership “thanks to a Federal ruling a few years back,” clearly referring to Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018).
[brief] 58e.  PLAINTIFF OUT OF DEPERATION EVEN FILED WITH THE MUNICIPAL APPEAL WITH THE CIVIL DIVISION WHICH ALSO REJECTED SAME.  58f.  APPARENTLY, the [...] JUDGE OR CLERK, never forwarded the judge’s guilty findings to [...] OR either [...] OR THE SUPERIOR COURT AND THUSLY THERE WAS NO RECORD FROM WHICH THE UNDERSIGNED ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT [...] COULD TAKE HIS APPEAL.
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX  I.  Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference Defendant’s Appendix (Volumes 1 and 2) and Confidential Appendix A1-A589; Ca1-Ca419 II.  Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant/Respondent’s Appendix Memorandum of Decision for Motions for Counsel Fees and Sanctions, January 10, 2023  Pa1  Order regarding Counsel  Fees and Sanctions, January 10, 2023  Pa16  Tirendi v. Tirendi, No. A-1543-15T4, 2017 WL 4104849 (App. Div. 2017).
[brief] This Court should also affirm the Trial Court’s conclusion that Appellant should be equitably estopped from enforcing the Mortgage and the Trial Court properly discharged the de minimis balance due on the Mortgage, because its predecessor in interest and servicer made an imprudent business decision send an amount equal to the First Wire Transfer to [...], which ultimately caused the loss and the ensuing litigation.  Clearly, Appellant’s predecessor in interest and [...] were in the best position to have avoided the loss that occurred here.  Had they accepted and credited the funds—as they were contractually and statutorily required to do—the Loan would have been substantially paid off leaving a de minimis amount owed.  They could have then communicated with the title agent or [...] regarding the problem and arrangements could have been made for the balance to be paid in exchange for discharge of the Mortgage.  Alternatively, if Appellant’s predecessor in interest and [...] genuinely believed they could not apply the proceeds of the First Wire Transfer to the loan balance, they could have and were legally required to hold the funds in a suspense account and then petitioned the courts for declaratory relief as to their respective rights and obligations.  The point is that Appellant’s predecessor in interest and [...] chose none of these options and the option they selected inexplicably led to the loss of the funds.  It is also clear that Respondent and Borrowers were innocent parties and did not contribute to Appellant’s predecessor’s and servicer’s error and mistake in sending an amount equal to the First Wire Transfer to [...].  Just like the borrower in Vezeriannis didn’t know that the wire would be rejected because it did not reference the loan number.  There is nothing to suggest the Borrowers or Respondent had actual notice the loan payoff would be returned if it was short.  In fact, a plain reading of [...]’s Payoff Statement is that the loan payoff would be accepted after April 16, 2021, provided the additional per diem interest was added to the payoff.  Likewise, all Respondent did was make a new loan to the purchasers of the Mortgaged Premises and forward the payoff funds to the original lender in order to obtain a discharge of the Mortgage.  In the final analysis, it cannot be denied that Appellant’s predecessor’s and its servicer’s critical error and mistake in sending an amount equal to the First Wire Transfer to [...] triggered the chain of events that led to the loss of the funds and ultimately this litigation.  Had Appellant’s servicer followed the law and exercised common sense and reasonable business judgment, the loss could have been avoided.  In light of the same, the Trial Court’s discharge of the Mortgage based on equitable considerations was appropriate as a matter of law.
[brief] (Pa14)  In its oral decision, the trial court held:  I find that the [...] did submit the documents per the request of [...].  And that there is nothing more that could be done.  They didn’t -- Hudson County argues that they did not conceal any information provided, they compl[ied] with what was required of them.  And they say they disclosed the requirement under Paff.  And there is nothing else that they have.  (1T, 21-11 to 18; Pa-14)²  Thereafter, on March 7, 2022, [...] filed a Denial of Access Complaint/Statement of Information Request with the [...], No. [...] alleging that [...] unlawfully denied items 1 and 2 of his request.
[directive] SUBJECT:  Guidance on Off-Road and All-Terrain Vehicle Use on Public Lands and Public Roads  The unlawful use of off-road vehicles (ORVs) and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on public roads and lands presents significant challenges to protecting the safety of drivers, passengers, and pedestrians on public roads, as well as protecting our natural resources on public lands.  ORV use on public lands can lead to negative environmental impacts including pollution, soil erosion, and destruction of sensitive natural resources such as forests, streams and wetlands, and the harm and destruction of plant and animal species and their habitats.  Consequently, expenditures for restoration, maintenance, and enforcement have risen.  And unfortunately in many cases, these resources are destroyed and cannot be restored.  Given the significant safety and natural resource impacts associated with ORVs and ATVs, I am issuing this guidance in an effort to clarify State law regarding illegal ORV and ATV use on public lands and roads.  This guidance is not exhaustive, but rather emphasizes New Jersey’s laws and regulations available for law enforcement.  With your assistance and cooperation, we will continue to ensure the preservation of natural and cultural resources on public lands, the use and enjoyment of public lands, and safe public roads in New Jersey.
[brief] The [...] policy conflicts with well-settled state law Respondent’s 4-year contractual limitations period conflicts with well-settled state law which provides a 6-year statutory limitations period for UM/UIM claims.  For this reason, the 6-year limitations – and not the 4-year contractual limitations period – applies to Appellant’s claim.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a) provides for a six-year limitations period for contractual claims.  That statute in pertinent part provides:  “Every action at law for [...] recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied, not under seal, [...] shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued. ”  Ibid.  Since 1996, the New Jersey Supreme Court has resolved all disputes concerning (1) whether UM/UIM claims sound in tort or contract law, and (2) when the statute of limitations for UM/UIM claims accrues.
[brief] The provisions of C.39:4-197.6 and C.39:4-197.5 entitled the appellant as (1) the resident care provider of his disabled mother and (2) a disabled person to seek a reserved handicapped parking space from the respondents.  As such, the appellant independently did the following:  A. Appalant independently obtained the June 29, 2023 physician certification from the Mother’s physician for her (Pa3), notwithstanding that he already had the January 19, 2021 physician certification attested to the same (Pa4).  B. Appellant, *de novo* and independently submitted this newly obtained physician certification to the respondents, requesting from them to place a reserved handicapped parking space in front of his house (Pa51).  C.  In support, appellant annexed therewith his request selective pages from the Application, materially including the two notarized affidavits, which articulated the involved facts (Pa41-Pa51).  The appellant commenced action, as the respondents ignored his said request for designation of a reserved handicapped parking space, just like they had ignored the Mother’s Application.  CoA No.2: TO ENJOIN THE RESPONDENTS FROM STAGING ENTRAPMENTS AGAINST THE APPELLANT UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW AND WITHOUT COURT ORDER.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT No. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law  [...], : Division, Gloucester County.  Defendant-Appellant.  : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C., : Hon. [...], J.S.C., : and a Jury.
[directive] enforcement law new this of use possible DEFINITIONS  2.  Directive: this of purposes  For camera.' worn body a of mode/function recording the actuate to means "Activate" a. officer enforcement law a by worn device a means ("BWC") camera" worn "Body b. any during place take that activities of recording audio/video electronic an makes that device recording video mobile a include not term does action.  The enforcement law not does also term  The cam).  dash a (i.e., vehicle police a mounted inside when officer enforcement law a by worn device recording electronic of form any include electronic an include term the does Nor capacity. undercover an in acting while (electronic :17 3 Rule of requirements the with comply to used when device recording interrogations). custodial house station of recording device does the which during mode, buffering or a in standby remain on and turned be may models BWC Some respect With mode/function. recording the activates officer the unless images/sounds of record permanent a make not an electronic automatically preserves device the mode/function, recording the activates officer the when models, these to was mode/function recording the before seconds) 30 ., of e(~. time period fixed a transpired that events the of recording evendcircumstances the concerning data capture to device the allows "buffering" feature or time-delay This activated. mode/function, data recording the activate officer not does an When BWC. the activate officer to the prompted that automatically. overwritten is mode standby/buffering in is device the while captured Page 5 "Constructive shall authority" have meaning the same as defined in the Attorney General's Use of Force Policy, except that the term shall apply only to constructive authority directed against a person who is to an subject investigative detention or arrest (~, your "show me hands," "get out of the vehicle," etc.), or directed against any person if the officer has firearm or un-holstered a a conducted energy device (ems., "move out of the way," down," "get etc.).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County.  Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. and Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] In early March 1994, defendant was arrested in connection with the murders of George and [...].  (Pca4).  On June 23, 1994, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. waived jurisdiction over defendant, then a minor, and transferred the matter to the Law Division.  (Pa2).  On the same day, defendant was charged in a fourteen-count indictment along with codefendants [...] and [...].  (Da1-5).
[brief] Plaintiff filed opposition to the second Motion arguing that [...]’s decision on the first Motion was the law of the case.  The first Motion for Summary Judgment was the law of the case.  The Plaintiff argued that the law of the case is a doctrine to be applied to the question of whether or not a decision made by a trial Court during one stage of the litigation is binding throughout the course of the action.  The use of that doctrine, in this situation, avoided repetitious litigation of the same issue during the course of a single trial.  When the matter came on for hearing on the second Motion for Summary Judgment, there was a new Judge, [...], J.S.C., who granted the second Motion, rejected the law of the case doctrine and dismissed the case without ever citing a case or authority (Pa-171).  Plaintiff made a Motion for Reconsideration and modified its request to answer the Summary Judgment Motion since the Court had rejected the law of the case i.e. Summary Judgment had already been denied.  Plaintiff sought that, since the Court had rejected the “law of the case,” and the Court indicated that it “had looked at [...]’s decision,” Plaintiff should be given the opportunity as she would have in an R. 4:6-2 Motion, to address the arguments for the second Motion for Summary Judgment which had been addressed by [...].  In other words, [...]’s statement, “I checked [...]’s decision, and this is different,” is incorrect.  [...] denied Plaintiff’s Motion to answer the second Motion for Summary Judgment after the “law of the case” had been rejected.  [...] denied that application.  This appeal followed (Pa-).
[brief] Plaintiff’s failure to provide any descriptive fictitious pleading language also speaks to the second issue associated with R. 4:26-4 – the failure to exercise an appropriate level of due diligence.  Plaintiff was on notice well prior to the passage of the two-year statute of limitations period that [...] was performing a road widening project in the area where plaintiff’s accident occurred.  In fact, the initial two iterations of plaintiff’s complaint, which were timely filed, reference the Project and relate it to plaintiff’s accident.  Plaintiff, however, apparently took no steps to identify any professional firms associated with the Project despite the fact that this was a public project with contracts available to the public upon request.  [...] should not be prejudiced and sued nearly 44 months following the date of the incident simply because available steps were not taken to identify [...] in a timely manner.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) provides:  Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage mandated by [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4], [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1], or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3] shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile.  There is no question that appellant/plaintiff failed to maintain the mandated medical expense benefits coverage required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and consequently, his claims against respondent/defendant [...] are barred.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) expressly provides that a person, such as plaintiff, who "fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage . . . shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss[.]"  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).  Appellant/plaintiff does not argue the language is ambiguous.  It is undisputed that his vehicles were garaged in New Jersey and that he failed to obtain insurance compliant with N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) required the dismissal of appellant/plaintiff's claims.
[brief] ”  Defendants’ motion to reconsider was brought before a different judge only three weeks after [...]’s decision, and was an obvious attempt to take advantage of the change in assigned judge.  There were no exceptional circumstances, and no change in facts or law.  Under the circumstances, [...] should have declined to reconsider the well-reasoned decision of the previous trial judge, [...].  *Cineas*, 270 N.J. Super. at 208.  **B.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the jury was improperly instructed that [...] could only be found vicariously liable if it found that [...] acted negligently in self-defense.  Even assuming the jury instructions on *respondeat superior* were improper, the error was harmless, because an employer is only liable under a theory of *respondeat superior* when the employee acts within the scope of employment, and the jury found that [...] was acting outside the scope of employment.
[brief] Where [...] sought a new, judicially created, implied easement to burden the defendants’ properties, Respondent here seeks to confirm an express easement by reservation existing in the record title to the [...]’ property dating back to 1966 (Da829; Da178; Da194).  As [...] aptly noted, the proofs required to establish [...]’s claims involved a host of considerations axiomatically unrelated to the New Jersey Recording Act, including meeting the requirements of adverse possession to obtain an easement by prescription.  See id. (citing Yellen v. Kassin, 416 N.J. Super. 113, 119-20 (App. Div. 2010) and Leach v. Anderl, 218 N.J. Super. 18, 25 (App. Div. 1987)).  Similarly, to prove an easement by necessity, [...] was required to show common ownership of the parties’ lots and a severance leaving the Challenger Lot landlocked (See id.).  Unlike [...]’s claims, Respondent here relies upon the language contained in the 1966 [...]-to-[...] Deed that was duly recorded against Appellants’ chain of title (Da194; Da480).  As [...] properly found:  [T]he evidence relied upon would be different from that in the [...] case because here plaintiff relies on the express language of the recorded deeds such as the 1966 [...] to [...] Deed as to the Baxter Lot.  This deed contains the claimed easement by reservation that plaintiff is seeking to enforce.  Plaintiff does not rely on any of the evidence used by [...] such as evidence of exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted use to establish an easement right by prescription; as well as any evidence of the property being landlocked, which [...] would have relied upon in his argument to create an easement right by necessity (Da829).  This Court should follow [...]’s cogent and accurate analysis and find that res judicata can not and does not apply preclude Respondent’s right to declaratory judgment because there is no commonality of claims between the two cases.
[brief] Not only does the [...] forum violate the due process rights of insurance carriers as detailed above, it also precludes insurance carriers from exercising their constitutional right to a jury trial.  In *[...] v. Lajara*, 222 N.J. 129, 134-135 (2015), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that parties to a fraud suit, the [...], have a constitutional right to a jury trial.  However, the [...] forum does not provide for jury trials, thereby depriving [...] and all parties of their constitutional right to a jury trial.  Therefore, given the foregoing, common sense dictated that the trial court should have considered this legal precedent when ruling the [...] claims should be heard in Forthright where there is NO right or facility for a trial by jury.
[brief] The trial court also held that [...]’s opinion that [...] spent too much time on the work as set forth in the invoices, and that the invoices generated by [...] were unreasonable in amount, had no factual support and was barred under the net opinion rule, “which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data. ”  Townsend, supra, 186 N.J. at 494.  Therefore, the trial court properly held that Plaintiff’s expert, [...], could not testify that [...]’ invoices were unreasonable, unnecessary or excessive based on the net opinion that was authored, and therefore, was proper commentary during summation.  [...] counsel, during summation, also properly commented on [...]’s admitted practice of not paying legal bills and the numerous judgments against Plaintiff since Plaintiff opened the door to this issue and [...] properly testified regarding this issue.
[directive] Victim Rights and Notifications  Upon reporting a strangulation and/or smothering assault, victims shall be advised of their right to accept all, or any portion of, BREATHE Team services as soon as possible.  Victims who do not initially report to law enforcement, may access BREATHE Team services through contact at health care facilities or advocacy agencies.  If a victim reports a nonfatal strangulation and/or smothering incident to a health care facility or advocacy agency, the victim may choose to undergo a forensic medical examination and decline to release the records and evidence collected during the exam to law enforcement.  In such cases, the forensic nurse coordinator will retain the medical records and any specimens collected so that they may be provided to law enforcement if the victim chooses to report the strangulation and/or smothering assault at a later time, or if law enforcement independently discovers the assault occurred and initiates an investigation.  Should a law enforcement agency become aware of an offense or crime of domestic violence, it is still required to investigate and charge as required by the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, regardless of the victim’s decision to release documentation and evidence collected during the forensic exam.