ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] states that it believes the parties agreed that “all non-privileged documents responsive to the additional search terms will be produced,” which it understood to mean that every non-privileged document the search turned up would be produced, regardless of whether it had anything to do with the parties’ dispute.  [...] at 2.  Accordingly, [...] states that it ran the search terms and produced all non-privileged documents responsive to the searches it agreed to run.  [...], on the other hand, produced only those documents that it determined were relevant to the case and withheld the rest.  [...] argues that this is a violation of the agreement.  It notes that if [...] were concerned about confidentiality it was permitted to mark any documents appropriately.  [...] further notes that the agreement included language about revising a search string to limit the number of hits.  [...] could have sought a refinement of the terms in order to make the searches and production more manageable, but never did.  Finally, [...] argues that an agreement by the parties to run search terms and produce all non-privileged results prevents a producing party from later attempting to withhold documents based on relevance.
[brief] ....................................Opp. Br. ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| | **Azurak v. Corporate Property Investors,** | 2-3, 7-10, 12 | | 175 N.J. 110 (2003) | | | **Boyle v. Huff,** | 7, 11-12 | | 257 N.J. 468 (2024) | | | **Estate of D’Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer East,** | 5 | | 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015) | | | **Englert v. The Home Depot,** | 3-7, 7-8, 10-13 | | 389 N.J. Super. 44 | | | **Kieffer v. Best Buy,** | 7-8, 11-12 | | 205 N.J. 213 (2009) | | | **Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co.,** | 10 | | 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997) | | | **Mantilla v. NC Mall Assocs.,** | 3-5, 7-8 | | 167 N.J. 262 (2001) | | | **Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co.,** | 8 | | 298 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1997) | | | **Meder v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc.,** | 3-6 | | 240 N.J. Super. 470 (App. Div. 1989) | | | **Sayles v. G & G Hotels, Inc.,** | 9-10 | | 429 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 266) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] As this may be the only opportunity the State can seek appellate review, the State's Motion for Leave to Appeal must be granted in the interests of justice.  Parties do not have a right to appeal an interlocutory order under the Rules of Court.  *In re Pa. R.R. Co.*, 34 N.J. Super. 103, 107-08 (App. Div. 1955), aff’d, 20 N.J. 398 (1956).  Rather, leave to file an interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s order only is permitted “in the interest of justice. ”  *R.* 2:2-4; *Brundage v. Estate of Carambio*, 195 N.J. 575, 598-99 (2008).  See *R.* 2:2-2(b) (providing that this Court may take appeals from interlocutory orders to “prevent irreparable injury”).  An interlocutory appeal is not appropriate to “correct minor injustices […]. ”  *Romano v. Maglio*, 41 N.J. Super. 561, 567 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 22 N.J. 574 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).  When leave is granted, it is because there is the possibility of “some grave damage or injustice” resulting from the trial court’s order.  *Id.* at 568.  The moving party must establish, at a minimum, that the desired appeal has merit and that “justice calls for [an appellate court’s] interference in the cause. ”  *Romano*, 41 N.J. Super. at 568.  Here, the interests of justice call out for an appellate court’s intervention.  The State submits the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the State from introducing factual evidence, namely, the presence of [...], and an expert opinion regarding same.  The State cannot seek review of this ruling after an acquittal and, therefore, this may be the only opportunity for appellate review.
[brief] The trial court explained the State's allegation that [...] was responsible for the crimes committed by [...] and [...] “because each defendant acted as the other's accomplice with the purpose that the specific crimes charged be committed. ”  The court gave comprehensive instructions on the elements of accomplice liability.  [...] did not submit a proposed charge to the court that integrated the facts with the legal elements of accomplice liability, nor did he object at the time the court instructed the jury.  Significantly, [...] does not explain how the court could have “integrated” the facts without unduly emphasizing [...]'s role as the person who conceived the conspiratorial plan and enlisted the help of [...] and [...] to execute it.  More significantly, [...] cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court must, without a request, integrate all of the facts adduced during a trial into its jury instructions.  “Trial courts have broad discretion when commenting on the evidence during jury instruction. ”  *State v. Brims*, 168 N.J. 297, 307 (2001).  Generally, “summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence is more appropriately left for counsel. ”  *State v. Robinson*, 165 N.J. 32, 45 (2000).  In the case before us, that is precisely what occurred.  Counsel for [...] zealously advocated [...]'s position in his closing argument.  Our review of the court's charge in its entirety discloses no basis for concluding either that the charge as a whole misinformed the jury as to controlling law, or was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] **[...] enters the PSA without [...]’s knowledge. **  At the end of 2021, [...]’s *de facto* manager [...] approached the local [...] representative [...] and made a general inquiry as to whether [...] might be interested in purchasing the Premises.  Da209.  [...] did not have an offer in hand at the time and was merely inquiring if [...] wanted to purchase the property outright.  *Ibid.*  [...] informed [...] that it would only consider a purchase through the ROFR mechanism upon the submission of a bona fide offer from a third party.  *Ibid.*  [...] was so unhappy with [...]’s decision not to directly buy the Premises in 2021, that [...] now admits that sentiment is behind its refusal to sell to [...] at all, even under an exercise of the ROFR.
[directive] Adaptive Habilitation Court monthly  Maintain housing if if treatment, applicable Address any recommended medical/dental needs, needed in Engage Cooperate with supervision  Demonstrate changing people, places, things and treatment Review plan  Maintain recovery groups and recovery network per case as other  Every week office visits Follow financial plan begin making payments per plan and case other  Every month home/field visits  Maintain pro-social activities  Random drug tests Address supportive services recommended as {minimum 2x/week) * or or start vocational training, job search, school Begin employment final to  All must clients who owe money referred before their phase.  be NOTE: CEP ---- 90 Minimum Days' Continuing Care if Court monthly  Maintain any recommended medical/dental needs, needed if in treatment, applicable  Demonstrate changing people, places, things and Engage treatment  Cooperate with supervision  Maintain recovery groups and recovery network per as Review plan  Follow financial plan per plan and continue making payments per plan case case case  Monthly office visits  Maintain pro-social activities recommended  Every other month home/field visits  Maintain supportive services as or Random drug tests  *Maintain employment, vocational training, school {minimum 2x/month)  Maintain housing Develop continuing care plan by be may be *Two per tests month conducted treatment providers, however, these results can only addressed of not therapeutically and as a basis for a jail sanction or violation probation.
[brief] They cross-examined him over two days.  (11T-12T).  [...] also responded to [...]’s analysis, and the defendants presented their own accounting expert, [...].  Unlike [...], however, Fuentes did not review financial records from the defendant entities to determine whether the balance sheets provided to [...] for negotiation were manipulated by hiding and disguising transactions.  Nor did Fuentes review the QuickBooks files for the business entities in the case or confer with his expert report co-author, [...] (who did not testify), the accountant who maintains the entity-defendant books and records, about their contents.  (20T27:21-23; 30:10-13).  Fuentes admitted on cross-examination that he refused to review records necessary to validate or debunk [...]’s conclusions.  (20T39:20 to 40:12; 46:14 to 47:3; 73:19-22; 43:3-13; 45:5-8; 78:16-21; 47:24 to 48:3; 50:24-51:3; 53:1-13; 54:6-19).  I.
[brief] No Illinois appellate court has reviewed the trial court ruling in that state.  And the California decision was controlled by California precedent “concluding that disclosures in forms available only on the SEC’s online public database are not disclosures by the news media no matter how broadly that term is interpreted. ”  *Edelweiss Fund*, 307 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776 (quoting *State ex rel. Bartlett v. Miller*, 197 Cal.  Rptr. 3d 673, 685 (Ct. App. 2016)).  No other court has adopted that view, and in fact, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has explicitly rejected it.
[brief] a.  The Plaintiffs.......................................................................3  b.  The Collective Negotiation Agreements.................................4  c.  Benefits to [...] arising out of Article XIX of the collective bargaining agreement, “Terminal Leave with Pay”..................6 d.  Plaintiffs’ retirement dates....................................................6  e.  The State’s history of supervision of [...]...................7 f.  The MRSA..........................................................................7 LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................20
[brief] T23 (“This is not a violation that was intended within the [FDCPA].”).  To this end, the case may have been different if Appellant genuinely alleged something about Respondent’s particular use of a letter vendor that was in some way abusive or harmful.  But there are no allegations to support such a finding.  Appellant does not allege any misuse of her personal or financial information, or even that the automated letter vendor processes were arranged in a way where any individual at the third-party vendor (or elsewhere) would, or even could, personally view the information.  Appx., at Pa4-Pa5.  The lack of abusive practices at play becomes even more clear in observing that Appellant never asserted that she or other putative class members ever suffered any material harm because of the Respondent’s use of a letter vendor.
[brief] *Medici*, supra, 107 N.J. at 21.  Such evidence may include proof that the character of the community has changed since the adoption of the 2018 Master Plan.  It is to be noted that the Zoning Ordinance pertaining to the B-3 District was not modified as a result of the adoption of the Master Plan.  These circumstances may demonstrate that a variance for a use not permitted in the B-3 District is incompatible with the intent and purpose of the Governing Body in connection with the Zoning Ordinance.  10.
[brief] Envisioned by that court was the use of special masters more to assist the municipalities than to assist the court (“To facilitate [Mt Laurel zoning code] revision, the trial court may appoint a special master to assist municipal officials in developing constitutional zoning and land use regulations”, Id at Pg 281).  By Mt. Laurel IV, (*In The Matter Of The Adoption Of N.J.A.C. 5:96 And 5:97 By The New Jersey Council On Affordable Housing*, 221 N.J. 1 (2015)), the Court’s thinking apparently became to use court masters to assist the Court as well as to assist the parties and the process.
[brief] More specifically, the Trial Court compared testimony from the first day of [...]’s deposition where he uses descriptive terms such as “immediate” and/or “abrupt” when describing the settlement/elevation change to testimony that he provided on the second day of his deposition when he is shown a photograph that [...] describes as showing an “inadequate taper. ”  However, when read in context with his testimony as a whole, whether settlement/elevation change was “abrupt,” “immediate,” or it had an “inadequate taper” is a simple a matter of degree.
[brief] If anything, application of the standard is actually wider than Atalese suggests.  See, e.g., Merchs. Indem. Corp. of N.Y. v. Eggleston, 68 N.J. Super. 235, 254 (App. Div. 1961) (applying “clear” and “unequivocal”) standard to carrier’s waiver of contractual rights under insurance policy); and Mattia v. N. Ins. Co. of New York, 35 N.J. Super. 503, 511 (App. Div. 1955) (same).  Back to the point (and briefly as it’s been touched on throughout), the other “strand of our jurisprudence” validly relied upon in Atalese is the “modest acknowledgement that the term arbitration is not self-defining. ”  Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 332 ([...], J., concurring) (citing Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442).  Whether sourced in statistical study, as in Morgan, 225 N.J. at 308; Rule 4:21A’s contradictions; the public policy underlying the Plain Language Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-2; or some other source, the Court’s concern was and is well-grounded.  Under these circumstances, “[t]his sensible, neutral, nondiscriminatory application of our state law” requiring arbitration clauses to “comply with the exceedingly low bar set by Atalese and inform consumers of what they need to know” is not unreasonable treatment or treatment unequal to that for other rights and waivers.  Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 334.  While this concurrence is not strictly binding, [...]’s facial challenge to Atalese provides no grounds to disrupt its strongly supported and directly applicable conclusions.  Neither challenge provides grounds for reversal of the Court’s Order of November 22, 2023.
[brief] (Pb 13-14)  He repeatedly asked, “Can I go home to my kids?”; “can I go home to my kids?”; and “[can I] go home?” (1T 93-9, 93-11, 95-12 to 14; Da 109, 03:46:09 to 03:50:58; Da 125-26)  And he told them he had “nothing” else to say five more times before they finally relented.  (1T 98-19 to 20; Da 109, 03:50:52 to 03:50:58, 06:40:02 to 6:40:20, 06:48:00 to 6:49:05; Da 127)
[brief] Pursuant to R. 4:46-2(a)  ........................................................................................................1138a  Exhibit A, 12/2007  General Release  .................................................................(omitted, see 189)  Exhibit B, 5/7/2009  Assignment and Assumption of Agreement..(omitted, see 181)  2/7/2019  Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants, [...], Esquire and [...], [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Letter Brief in Further Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dated November 30, 2023..................  Pra1  Relevant Excerpts from Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment and In Further Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dated January 29, 2024.................................................................  Pra11  1  The briefs are included because they fall within the exception to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2).  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Granting Summary Judgment, Filed March 4, 2024 ........................................Pa442  Oral Decision, March 1, 2024 .........................................................................................  1T  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | |-------| | **Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng’rs,**<br>337 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 2001) | 5 | | **Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Vezeriannis,**<br>No. A-1376-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1588<br>(Super Ct. App. Div. June 27, 2013) | 9 | | **Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Transp.,**<br>371 N.J. Super. 304 | 10 | | **Fiore v. Consol. Freightways,**<br>140 N.J. 452 (1995) | 8 | | **Hermann Forwarding Co. v. Pappas Ins. Co.,**<br>273 N.J. Super. 54 (App. Div. 1994) | 10 | | **Innes v.  Marzano-Lesnevich,**<br>224 N.J. 584 (2016) | 4 | | **Kimball Intern., Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prods.,**<br>334 N.J. Super. 596 (N.J. App. Div. 2000) | 9 | | **Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Omar,**<br>No. A-5187-06T3, 2008 WL 2050834<br>(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2008) | 3, 4, 9 | | **Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.,**<br>62 N.J. 229 (1973) | 5 | | Statutes | |----------| | N.J.S.A. 12A:4A-501(1) | 8 | | Regulations | |-------------| | 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(c)(1)(i) | 7, 8 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff-Appellant [...], not in its individual capacity but solely as Owner Trustee for [...] (“Appellant”) submits this reply brief in further support of its appeal from the Order entered on March 4, 2024 (the “Order”).
[brief] ”  Id.  See Woodward–Clyde v. Chem. & Pollution Sciences, 105 N.J. 464, 471, 523 A.2d 131 (1987) (“…a dismissal with prejudice is a severe sanction that should be imposed sparingly and only when no lesser sanction will erase the prejudice suffered by the non-delinquent party”); see also Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 253, 440 A.2d 1329 (1982) (“…although it is the policy of the law that discovery rules be complied with, it is also the rule that drastic sanctions should be imposed only sparingly”); Irani v. K-Mart Corp., 281 N.J.Super. 383, 387, 657 A.2d 911 (App. Div. 1995) (“[w]e review the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice in light of the salutary purposes of R. 1:2–4(a), its substantial range of permitted sanctions for failure to appear, and the case law interpretive of the rule); Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J.Super. 244, 249–250, 543 A.2d 1043 (App. Div. Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., 199 N.J.Super. 114, 119–120, 488 A.2d 1029 (App. Div. 1985); Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, 198 N.J.Super. 190, 195, 486 A.2d 920 (App. Div. 1985).
[brief] ............................................................................................................................15  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran,** | | | 445 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2016) | 14 | | **Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy,** | | | 183 N.J. 344 (2005) | 7 | | **Dimaria Constr., Inc. v. Interarch,** | | | 351 N.J. 558, 567 (App. Div. 2001) | 6 | | **E. Penn Sanitation, Inc. v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc,** | | | 294 N.J. Super. 158, 179-80 (App. Div. 1996) | 6 | | **Merchs. Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston,** | | | 37 N.J. 114, 126-27 (1962) | 13 | | **N. Plainfield Board of Educ. V. Zurich Am. Ins. Co,** | | | No. 05-4398 (MLC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555 (D.N.J. 2008) | passim | | **Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elec. Corp,** | | | 116 N.J. 739, 751 (1989) | 5 | | **SL Indus. V. Am. Motorists Ins. Co,** | | | 128 N.J. 188 (1992) | passim | | **Superior Integrated Sols. V. Mercer Ins. Co. of N.J,** | | | No. A-1027-18T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147 (App. Div. Nov. 10, 2020) | passim | | **Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co,** | | | 128 N.J. 165 (1992) | 3, 14 | LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] | | | Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v Abdul-Matin, | 33 | | 198 N.J. 95 (2009) | | | Icehouse, Inc. v. Geissler, | 43 | | 636 N.W.2d 459 (SD 2001) | | In re Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund, 989 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1993)
[brief] On February 15, 2023, the defendant appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., for oral argument.  See generally, (2T\(^1\)).  On this same date, [...] denied the defendant’s motion and issued an oral opinion.  Da5-7; (2T10-6 to 19-23).  While the court noted that the original sentencing judge relied upon a conviction that was subsequently vacated\(^2\) \(^3\), [...] found that “the sentence imposed was a legal sentence at the time, notwithstanding the fac[t] that that one prior conviction, that drug conviction was vacated, it was a legal sentence.
[brief] At the heart of this appeal is a decade-long, consistent “rescue” plan that honored an uncle’s unwavering intent to save for his niece, Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”), certain commercial property that was in risk of foreclosure due to financial troubles Plaintiff and her husband were having in carrying ownership of said property where they conducted their dental practice.  Over the course of ten years, the parties entered into a series of agreements to further the rescue plan’s purpose so Plaintiff and her husband would not lose the property.  To effectuate the contemplated rescue plan, Plaintiff’s uncle, [...] (“[...]”), and his daughter, Defendant [...] (“[...]”), formed Defendant [...] (“[...]”) that would ultimately purchase the property and hold legal title until Plaintiff and her husband could repay the loans and advances [...] made to Plaintiff as part of the deal, at which point, title would transfer to Plaintiff.  In the interim, [...] and [...] entrusted Plaintiff as manager of the property and the companies holding title to it.  Plaintiff remained an equitable owner over the ten year course of this rescue plan until she was able to secure financing to pay back her uncle and repurchase the property.  Unfortunately, [...] passed away before that rescue plan came to completion.  Upon his demise, the rescue plan was unexpectedly disrupted by [...]’s post-death opportunism as the now sole member of [...].  Even though at the time of [...]’s death Plaintiff had secured funding to repurchase the Property and made attempts to engage [...] to transfer legal title of the Property from [...] to her in accordance with the rescue plan, [...] refused to honor her late father’s intent.  Lawsuits ensued.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  I.  **FACTUAL BACKGROUND. **  On February 13, 2020, the City passed and adopted Resolution No. 20-103 (the “Redevelopment Resolution”).  (Pa69–106.)  The Redevelopment Resolution confirmed [...]’s (“City Council”) designation of Block 11501, lots 1–39 in the City of Jersey City (the “Property”) as an area in need of redevelopment subject to condemnation.  (Pa69.)  [...] is a limited liability company [...] (“[...]”) created to purchase one of the homes located within the Property.  (See Pa7–8, Pa112 at 17:24–25, Pa113 at 18:1–23.)  Both [...] and [...] are developers.  (See Pa10 ¶ 29, Pa112 at 17:24–25, Pa113 at 18:1–14.)  A.
[brief] The trial court was well within its discretion in finding that a preliminary injunction was necessary to preserve the status quo in the face of [...]’s flagrant disregard for the builder’s remedy process. \(^8\) \(^8\)  In fact, [...]’s position will not change between now and when a final order in the action is rendered because the Property will remain in its current state until Plaintiff is awarded a builder’s remedy.