ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The policy of our State regarding access to public records is if there is any reasonable interpretation of the law that permits access, then access must be granted.  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (requiring that all restrictions on access to records be interpreted narrowly and in favor of access).  A “trial court’s determinations with respect to the applicability of OPRA are legal conclusions subject to de novo review. ”  K.L. v. Evesham Tp. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div. 2011), cert. denied, 210 N.J. 108 (2012).  Thus, no deference is afforded to the trial court’s findings.  Newark Morning Ledger Co v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 159 (App. Div. 2011).  This Court “also conduct[s] plenary review of the trial court’s legal conclusion that a privilege exempts the requested records from disclosure. ”  K.L., 423 N.J Super. at 349.  Pb14
[brief] *Pellicer v St. Barnabas Hosp.*, 200 N.J. 22, 55-57 (2009); see also *State v. Jenewicz*, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008) (noting cumulative effect of individual errors can cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to require reversal); *Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc.*, 406 N.J. Super. 32, 52-53 (App. Div. 2009) (“When legal errors are manifest that might individually not be of such magnitude to require reversal but which, considered in their aggregate, have caused [a party] to receive less than a fair trial, a new trial is warranted. ” (alteration in original)), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 210 (2009); *Eden v. Conrail*, 175 N.J. Super. 263, 267 (App. Div. 1980) (quoted in *Barber*), modified and affirmed, 87 N.J. 467 (1981).
[brief] [...] contends that his denial of culpability creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had the subjective intent to injure the [...].  (Db, p. 21).  Essentially, [...] contends that as long as an insured denies the allegation made against him, his insurer has a duty to defend him in the lawsuit.  That position turns the law on its head.  If all it took to ensure coverage in an underlying litigation was to deny the underlying plaintiff’s allegations there would hardly be a time when an insurance carrier could refuse to defend.  The key inquiry is not whether a possibility exists that the insured will ultimately be found not liable.
[brief] The trial court did not cite or discuss any of the other evidence presented to [...] during the Allocation Hearing.  In his Report and Recommendation, [...] stated that the written materials, including “motions, exhibits, and transcripts” encompassed “four linear feet of materials. ” (Pa 145).  However, there is no indication in the July 30, 2020 Order that the trial court reviewed any of that evidence in making its decision.  [...]’s conclusion, in his July 30, 2020 Order, that it is not possible to perform a fact-based allocation in this case is not supported by any evidence 11
[brief] ”  [7T 124:7-14].  Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the bag of grout spilled on the ground while he was holding it after being punched by [...].  [7T 126:13-17].  The complaint contains no allegations of profanity, racial epithets, or that [...] punched [...] after [...] insulted him following the grout landing on the back of [...].  [Pa39-48].
[brief] The court finds there was a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the terms of the settlement agreements.  [A229, Op. at 27 (emphasis added)].  Paragraph 27 of the valid PSA provides for fee shifting:  [I]n the event that either party is forced to expend additional counsel fees as a result of the non-compliance of the other party with any of the terms and conditions set forth within this Agreement, then it is specifically acknowledged and agreed that said counsel fees shall be borne by the party who has violated the terms and conditions of this Agreement.  [Ca14].  The trial court erred by not looking to the intent of the parties (i.e., their "meeting of the minds") in making that contractual provision and essentially "drafted a new agreement for the parties" by deciding the "American Rule" should be followed.  Under the applicable standard of review, this Court should find that to be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court by failing to apply the controlling legal principles.
[directive] In a of or use possession unlawful or violence threatened or actual involves or prosecutor assistant an unless acomplaint-warrant for applying of presumption a be shall there or a Directive, 3.2 of this Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy the by authorized who is 3.3.2 subsection to pursuant designated specially officer supervisory that determines Directive, of this 4 Section under presumptions overcome Prosecutor to County In 4.5.9. subsection to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant by charging of presumption the or violence involve to appear not do convictions or charges pending out-of-state that event the the 4.3, Section pursuant to applies acomplaint-summons issuing of presumption a and firearms in circumstances of the totality of the part as offense out-of-state an consider may prosecutor presumption. that overcome whether to deciding aComplaint-Warrant. fog Applying Presumption of the Overcoming 4.5.9 to pursuant acomplaint-warrant for applying of presumption a is there where case any In acomplaint-warrant apply for shall agency enforcement law a 4.5.8, through 4.5.1 subsections Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an unless is who 3.3.2 subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory or a Directive, this of 3.2 Directive, this 4 Section of under presumptions overcome to Prosecutor County the by authorized would justice of interests the nor safety victim or public of interests neither the that determines assistant determination, the making this In acomplaint-warrant.
[brief] However, the corporate executive in charge of training testified that this “red vest ready” training usually takes 7 to 14 days to complete.  (9T93:2-5).  The assistant store manager, [...], testified that the training before earning the red vest typically lasts a week but “it could take longer. ” (6T196:2-7).  There was also testimony that the training could last “three weeks and a month. ” (6T220:6:-10).  [...] had been hired nine days before the incident, but by then he had actually only worked seven days at most.
[brief] POINT I  PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL IS LIMITED TO COUNTS 3 & 4  On September 21, 2022, Counts 1 and 2 were dismissed.  (Da101-122; Da092-100)  On December 23, 2022, the Trial Court dismissed Counts 3, 4 & 5 and the claims against [...] and [...] with Plaintiff’s consent.  (Da001-022)  Plaintiff is only appealing the December 23, 2022 and February 3, 2023 Orders.  (Pb5)(AA120)  The brief nor the appeal mention appealing the September 21, 2022 order.  (Da101-126)  Plaintiff’s failure to reference the Interlocutory Order in the Notice of Appeal may be considered a waiver of any objection.  See Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126 (2016), citing In re Carton, 48 N.J. 9, 15 (1966), see also Sikes v. Twp. Of Rockaway, 269 N.J.Super. 463, 465-66 (App. Div.) (declining to review trial ruling not identified in notice of appeal), aff’d o.b. 138 N.J. 41 (1994)
[brief] ”  As the Court can see, Paragraph C also contains no valid reasons for a denial of Plaintiff’s application.  Paragraph D contained factual recitation regarding the reconsideration.  Paragraph E indicated that:  The Board found that the applicant could not satisfy the negative criteria because an approval of this application would have significant detrimental effects on the safety of the neighborhood and would also substantially impair the intent and purpose of the municipal zoning plan and ordinances.
[brief] (Pa025-26; Pa134-37; Pa498-99; Pa592-601; Pa610-59).  Defendants then incorrectly argue that factors applicable to a *forum non conveniens* analysis also inform the comity analysis as part of a free-ranging totality-of-the-circumstances test.  (Db30).  Defendants misconstrue the applicable analytical framework.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear, New Jersey adheres to the general rule in favor of the first-filed action, and a trial court should not reach the fact-specific inquiry of whether to exercise its discretion to grant a comity stay or dismissal unless and until the party seeking to litigate in the second-filed action has established the existence of “special equities.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  4th Degree $1,000 to $5,000 10% permissible
[brief] Accordingly, Appellant sought to mold the verdict to $200,000 pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court Order dated August 18, 2021, or, in the alternative, either a new trial or remittitur based upon the excessive nature of the verdict, Plaintiff’s counsel’s improperly prejudicial summation and improper mention of Appellant having fled the scene of the accident during direct examination of the Appellee.  Da47-54.  The post-trial motion was denied on February 28, 2023.  Da23-24.  Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 20, 2023, particularly related to the molding of the verdict in light of the August 18, 2021, Bankruptcy Court Order limiting Appellee’s recovery to the policy limits ($200,000).  Da55-61.  On April 14, 2023, a hearing was held in which the trial court permitted Appellant to apply in bankruptcy court on the issues of molding.  5T.  The trial court specifically ruled that the Judgment was valid unless limited by the bankruptcy court which the trial court left to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court.  5T10:3-5.  The instant appeal was instituted on May 25, 2023 by the Notice of Appeal.  Da1-5.  On July 11, 2023, a hearing was held in Federal Court and [...] ruled that the Appellee had limited himself to $200,000 in recovery in this matter in light of the August 18, 2021, Bankruptcy Court Order. 6T.  Accordingly, on July 12, 2023, an Order was entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey which ordered that the Judgement was unenforceable beyond $200,000 and the Judgment shall be molded to that amount.  Da95-99.  This was confirmed after a Motion for Reconsideration was denied.  Da100-105.
[brief] Record was closed on May 31, 2023.  The matter was decided June 28, 2023 wherein [...] affirmed the [...] determination (Pa81-92).  The matter was adopted by [...] on 8/17/23 (Pa92-93).  [...] filed for a notice of appeal on 9/29/23.  [...] filed a request for Oral Argument on 10/11/23.  Statement of Facts
[brief] (Pa001027).  The Superior Court’s Order and Decision is consistent with both this Court’s prior decisions concerning the MSRA and basic jurisprudence regarding statutory interpretation.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the basic rule of statutory construction is to ascribe to plain language its ordinary meaning.  See Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 221 N.J. 349, 361 (2015).
[directive] In this case, defendant faces charges for murder, conspiracy, and aggravated assault in connection with his alleged role in a fatal drive-by shooting.  The trial court ordered him detained in December 2019.  Despite multiple delays -- most of which resulted from the pandemic -- his trial has not yet begun.  Because the prosecution announced it was ready to proceed to trial 3 two-year mark, however, we find that defendant’s statutory right to a at the speedy trial has not been violated.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for trial with additional instructions.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DISREGARDING MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  A.  Material Issue of Fact Exist  Regarding [...]’s Subjective Intent  In the Underlying Action, [...] has unequivocally denied that his statements were false, made with malice, or made with any intention to injure [...].  As set forth above, [...]’s intention was to ensure patient safety and compliance with the law, including anti-kickback laws and HIPAA.  In order to do so, [...] made true and accurate statements to [...].  As set forth above, “mere allegations” of intentional conduct or intent to injure is not sufficient to invoke the exclusions in the Policy, even assuming such exclusions applied to intentional interference claims.
[brief] And the thing that I have trouble wrapping my arms around and what the State is asserting is that essentially if you look purely at the Yarbrough factors particularly 3A it would run concurrent, but then wouldn’t that just neuter or make meaningless that statute.  . . .  [...] vehemently disagrees with that.  He says the law is the law, [you] may not like *Yarbough*, but this is a law.  And in addition, it doesn’t really neuter that statute.  I find that hard to accept.  [(8T 4-12 to 20)]  Because the sentencing court found it “hard to accept” the result compelled by *Yarbough*—a result it felt would “neuter or make meaningless” the certain persons statute—the court proceeded to impermissibly rely on dismissed charges and speculation not based in competent, credible evidence in order to arrive at the contorted conclusion in its written opinion that *Yarbough* factors 3A and 3C did support a consecutive sentence.  (8T 4-17)  Accordingly, this Court should find that the certain persons offense was not predominantly independent from the robbery and find that the certain persons offense and the robbery were committed at the same time and place; the Court should thus find that neither *Yarbough* 3A nor 3C supports a consecutive sentence.
[brief] THE ZONING BOARD'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR d(4)  FAR  VARIANCE RELIEF WAS REASONABLE AND SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  THUS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (Pa31, 36-40)  Floor area ratio controls are controls on intensity of use, and the term “floor area ratio” is defined in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 as “the sum of the area of all floors of buildings or structures compared to the total area of the site. ”  FAR therefore is calculated by taking the sum of all the area of floors of buildings or structures in square feet and dividing by the total area of the site in square feet.  Thus, the FAR regulates the square footage of floors and not height.  Variances from FAR controls may be granted only by boards of adjustment under subsection d(4) of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, and not by planning boards, because variances of this type pose a greater threat to the zone plan and public good than other dimensional controls, which are regulated under subsection (c).  Commercial Realty v. First Atlantic, 122 N.J. 546, 561-563 (1991); see also Randolph Town Ctr. v. Randolph Twp., 324 N.J. Super. 412, 415 (App. Div. 1999).  Any application to “increase…the permitted floor area ratio” is therefore cognizable only under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(4) and, like the d(1) use variance, relief can be granted only upon a showing of “special reasons” (the positive criteria) and provided that the variance can be granted “without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] Da249-51, 263-64.  On January 2, 2024, [...] filed her Answer to Counterclaim in which she asserted thirteen Affirmative Defenses, none of which mention arbitration.  Da265-74.  On January 19, 2024, [...] again utilized the Court system to file a Motion seeking to consolidate this matter with the Law Division Case (Da275-77), which, after full briefing and oral argument, was properly denied by the Chancery Court on March 8, 2024.  Da299-300.  Once it was clear this case would not be consolidated with the Law Division Case, discovery commenced in earnest in order to comply with the Chancery Court’s scheduling, including the then rapidly approaching trial date in August 2024.
[brief] Each of their testimony was to the effect that the facts and records from the 1972 School site plan/parking variance process and approval did not infer or provide that Synagogue parking was intended or referenced to be on School property.  The Sixth Street Courtyard was laid out as a pedestrian courtyard with a walk entryway across the middle.  There was no curb cut on Sixth Street on the 1972 Plan to allow vehicles to access the Courtyard.  The Synagogue was noticed and participated in the 1972 School application and did not assert any parking right/use on School property.  Both [...] and [...] also testified that the courtyard had no fire lanes, no marked parking spaces or travel lanes, and is designed and laid out as a pedestrian way/assembly area for the students.  Without marked spaces and lanes and with no fire lane and proximate to a primary school, the courtyard is unsafe for use for vehicle access or parking.  ([...] 19T11-1 to 79-19); [...] 11T4-15 to 75-24).  Defendant School also presented witnesses [...]: (12T) [...], [...], (12T) and [...] (13T) - all long term Lakewood residents of the Synagogue/School neighborhood.  All testified similarly that in their observations and experience from the 1960's through recent years, vehicles had not parked in the School’s Sixth Street Courtyard.  That concluded the defense response case.
[brief] This “clearly demonstrat[es] that [the government] knows how to impose such a requirement when it wishes to do so,” but where it “has chosen not to do so, [the courts] will not override that choice based on vague and ambiguous signals. ”  Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216–17 (2005).  discount. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:21-9.5 (emphasis added).  The regulations implement a statute providing that “[i]f the commissioner determines that the premium reduction . . . results in rates that are excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, the commissioner may disapprove or deny the premium reduction. ”  N.J.S.A. 17B:27A-25.8(b) (emphasis added)); see also N.J.S.A. 17B:27A-25.9 (“The commissioner shall promulgate rules and regulations . . . necessary to effectuate the provisions of this act. ” (emphasis added)).  The rejection of [...]’s applications on purportedly statutory excessiveness grounds must be reversed as a result.
[brief] A235 .  On August 9, while the motions were still pending, [...], who was overseeing the complex case, entered a Case Management Order extending the discovery end date to November 17, 2021 on consent of all parties, and providing that expert depositions should be completed by October 17, 2021.  A220.  On August 25, defendant [...] withdrew his motion to bar [...] from testifying as plaintiffs’ expert, but objected to [...] being allowed as plaintiffs’ new expert.  A217; 1T5:1-25.  Oral argument was held before [...] two days later, following which [...] denied plaintiffs’ motion to name [...] as their expert for trial (noting plaintiffs had [...] as an expert, and worrying about delaying trial).
[brief] See S. Amboy, 423 N.J. Super. at 198-199.  In S. Amboy, the contestant brought up individuals who they wanted to challenge for the first time during opening statements.  Ibid.  He offered no evidence on that point, but at the conclusion of testimony, asked the court to --- 8.  The trial court incorrectly stated that the motion had been filed “the day before trial,” when it was filed three days before trial.  (1T127:20-11).  “consider” the evidence.  No motion was formally made.  No evidence had been provided to the opposing side.  The trial court allowed him to provide his evidence to the opposing side, and the parties argued the issue the following day.  The Appellate Division said that the trial court acted “within its discretion in not allowing an amendment to the election contest petition . . . on the very day of the hearing. ”  Id. at 209.  Unlike in this case, the contestant there “simply wished to present evidence that had not earlier been brought to the attention of the court and counsel. ”  Ibid.  In fact, another critical distinction is that the votes “would not have changed the result of the election,” and the challenges were fact-sensitive, so the opposing side did not have “an opportunity to adequately address the factual claims raised by counsel. ”  Ibid.  [...]’s proposed amendment dealt only with a legal question and did not require any factual testimony.  Indeed, [...]’s counsel acknowledged that he could “brief it. ” (1T123:23).  He further acknowledged that he was not unaware of this ballot, as “This ballot was known.  It’s not something new . . . in terms of new information. ” (1T123:17-19).  If that is the case, then there can be no prejudice to [...].  There is no precedent requiring an “extraordinary circumstances” standard, and to hold as such stands in opposition to Rule 1:1-2, Rule 4:9-1, and Title 19 itself.  Even if there were prejudice to [...], that prejudice is dwarfed by the prejudice both to [...] and to the voters if a ballot that should have been counted is not because of a technical issue.  Again, election contests “should be determined upon the merits,” Kisselbach, 34 N.J. at 86, not the pleadings themselves.  8.  The Court Abused its Discretion in Failing to Consider the Merits of the Proposed Amended Pleading
[brief] Afterwards, PPD Detectives [...] and [...] read defendant his Miranda rights, which he waived, and proceeded to interview defendant regarding his involvement with [...]’s death.  (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 2T:43-22 to 44-21; see generally Da67).  Defendant admitted that he knew [...] for ten years and was somewhat close with him, that he saw [...] at Alto Rango shortly before his death, and that the two men left the store together, though defendant claimed that he parted ways with [...] when the former turned onto Governor Street and the latter continued walking on East 16th Street.
[brief] A.  New Jersey Product Liability Act  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized, the New Jersey Product Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C–1 to –11, (“PLA”), “was enacted as a remedial measure to limit the liability of manufacturers by establishing ‘clear rules with respect to certain matters . . . including certain principles under which liability is imposed. ’”  Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 194 (2012) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1(a)); see also Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34, 47 (1996) (“The Act has been interpreted as evincing a legislative policy ‘to limit the expansion of products-liability law. ’” (quoting Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 139 N.J. 365, 374 (1995))).  Indeed, the “Legislature intended for the Act to limit the liability of manufacturers so as to ‘balance[ ] the interests of the public and the individual with a view towards economic reality. ’”  Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 189 N.J. 615, 623-24 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Zaza, 144 N.J. at 47-48).