ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In that scenario, Plaintiff’s disclosure of the events becomes a potential motivating factor for termination.  See Donofry v. Autotote, 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001) ("Plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected whistleblowing activity was a determinative or substantial, motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate his employment.  . . ”)  The trial court erred by discounting this evidence and resolving factual disputes in Respondents’ favor, contrary to the Brill standard.
[brief] **The Formation of Mountainside Realty and its Holdings**  Because of its multiple locations, [...]’s operation was spread thin.  [...] convinced [...] to join him in acquiring a permanent headquarters for the company.  As there were other partners in [...] at the time, the two men formed [...] (“[...]”) to serve as a holding company for the property where [...] would be headquartered.  They further decided to establish 50/50 membership in [...] via two other entities, [...] ("[...]") and [...], which were, at the time, owned by their wives, Fariba [...] and Gayatri [...], respectively.  (14T 60:13 to 61:10; Da2701-11).  Eventually, [...] and [...] found [...].  That space was sufficient to house and eventually consolidate [...]’s other lab operations, and could accommodate potential expansion.  (14T 61:18-23).  [...]’s role in acquiring the building (via [...]) was limited to visiting the site and confirming that it was sufficient to accommodate [...]’s needs.  However, he was not directly involved in negotiations relating to the property, its financing, or the closing, each of which [...] handled.  (14T 62:6 to 63:12).  [...] leased the space from [...] for $40,000.00 per month.  [...] set the lease terms.  (14T 63:23 to 64:3).  [...] acquired additional real estate holdings after the Mountainside location.
[brief] ON REMAND, THE SENTENCING HEARING MUST BE A WHOLESALE RESENTENCING THAT ADDRESSES MR. MUSTAFA’S ABILITY TO PAY ANY RESTITUTION AND TAKES INTO ACCOUNT MITIGATING FACTOR FOUR.  Finally, in its sentencing point, the State concedes that the matter must be remanded for the merger and consecutive sentence issues if the convictions are not reversed.  However, the State contests the necessity of an ability to pay hearing and the application of mitigating factor four.  With respect to the ability to pay hearing, our statutes are unequivocally clear that it is required for the imposition of any fine or restitution.  Beyond that, our Supreme Court has held that, even where fines or restitution is mandatory, an ability to pay hearing is still required to assess the exact amount to be imposed.  *State v. Bolvito*, 217 N.J. 221, 229-32 (2014).  Indeed, the statute requiring an ability to pay hearing for restitution, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b), explicitly encompasses restitutions imposed following a conviction for a homicide offense.  Thus, any sentencing remand must include a hearing on that issue.  As to mitigating factor four, the State’s arguments are similarly unavailing.  The State avers that [...] “did not present a shred of testimonial or documentary evidence that he suffered any type of mental illness[,]” but this is untrue.  While no documentary evidence was presented at trial, defense counsel did present mental health records at the sentencing hearing.  (11T46-19 to 47-8).  The trial court’s conclusion that “any of us” could have engaged in [...]’s erratic behavior is simply not a valid basis for rejecting a supported mitigating factor.  Accordingly, on remand, that factor must be taken into account.  Finally, if this Court does not agree with the disputed sentencing arguments, any remand for the consecutive sentence and merger issue must nonetheless be a wholesale resentencing hearing.  As the Supreme Court explained in *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246 (2021), where a sentencing court fails to assess the overall fairness of a sentence, a full resentencing is required because, although the evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors occurs when setting the sentence within the range applicable to each offense, sentencing is a holistic endeavor.
[brief] The issue presented by Plaintiff’s appeal is simple and straightforward – did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration?  Instead of addressing this discrete issue, Plaintiff clouds the record by filling his appeal brief and appendix with pleadings and briefs filed in other federal court cases, and he even includes unrelated pleadings and transcripts in a foreclosure case, none of which are relevant to the denial of his motion for reconsideration, and none of which are properly part of the record in this case.  Preliminarily, Plaintiff’s appeal does not address the fact that the trial court denied his motion for reconsideration because it was untimely.  His appeal should be denied for that reason alone.  In addition, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction.  Simply stated, Plaintiff has not, and cannot, demonstrate that the trial court had jurisdiction to restore a Complaint that had been validly removed to and dismissed by the federal court in 2010.  For these reasons, Defendants respectfully submit that Plaintiff’s appeal should be dismissed.
[directive] Child care should be provided on-site in a safe, comfortable, appropriately furnished area.  The child care facility should be staffed by appropriate personnel from the [...] or the [...].  An age limit of three years will be maintained.  For children under the age of three, child care assistance may be provided through referral to other service resources or reimbursement to the victim for babysitting costs.  The [...] shall develop and maintain a resource file of child care providers for information and referral purposes.
[brief] Instead of addressing the sole issues, on this appeal, in their Counter-Statements of Procedural History & Facts, Plaintiffs assert, in 3 pages, the immaterial procedural history of another unrelated case Plaintiffs ultimately lost to the paramount mortgagee of the subject property, after 3 appeals to this Court.  They also unfairly & inaccurately criticize Appellant.  These assertions are without references to the record because their appendix did not contain such.  It is obvious that Plaintiffs have attempted to divert attention from the issues on this appeal, namely, the propriety of awarding compounded interest on Appellant’s judgment (“judgment”), whether Plaintiffs engaged in frivolous litigation & the propriety of awarding fees from the fund in court or from Plaintiffs &/ or their counsel.
[brief] Furthermore, the record clearly demonstrates that defendant had absolutely no intention of submitting a breath sample after being read the Standard Statement.  As noted by [...], defendant can be heard on the “bodycam” “on two occasions acknowledging that he was refusing to submit breath samples because he unsure how the samples would be ‘calibrated. ’”  Da9.  Thus, since all four elements of refusal were established beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s conviction, and resulting sentence, should be affirmed.
[brief] The DEP’s assessment of the project’s air pollution, including its GHG emissions, should be found somewhere in the administrative record to support the HAD.  But the DEP intentionally stuck its head in the sand on this important issue.  If it had made such an assessment then it would have been constrained to find that the project’s GHG emissions are clearly incongruous or inconsistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  Here it is undisputed that the proposed project will have significant environmental impacts because it is a massive expansion of [...]’s fossil fuel infrastructure, which will enable [...] to buy, ship, and sell “115,000 dekatherms per day (Dth/d) of additional gas per year.
[directive] A violent crime means any crime in which you caused death, serious bodily injury, or you used or threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon.  A violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault, or sexual assault in which you used, or threatened the immediate use of, physical force.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
[brief] By the time of Daniel, the underpinnings for this line of cases had already started to erode.  As discussed above, courts started to recognize groundwater and _____________________  2  Notably, Daniel involved actual express contracts, because the local ordinance governing water supply “require[d] the customer requesting service to make a written application for such service and to enter into an agreement for its continuance.  It describes that agreement as a ‘contract. ’”  Id.  Here, the Borough’s water ordinance does not refer to “sales” or the need for residents to enter contracts for water. Pa173-79.  And, the regulations do not require that residents make a written application for water service.  Id. other public water supply sources as public trust resources belonging to the people.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Dept. of Health, 127 N.J. Super. at 260; North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm., 103 N.J. Super. at 549.  And even before then, the supposed distinction that public entities sometimes act in a “proprietary”, rather than “governmental”, role started to be questioned by courts.  By 1937, the U.S. Supreme Court had already rejected the notion that municipal supply of water to residents is sale of a commodity and thus a “proprietary”, rather than “governmental”, function:
[brief] [...] testified the call was consistent with being placed at [...]’s grandmother’s home located at [...].  [12T`78-9 to –11].  He explained that the angle he constructed based on the call detail records was “consistent of the device being in that area when the phone call is placed and routed through the T-Mobile network. ”  [12T178-18 to -22].  Notably, this testimony was corroborated by other evidence and the timeline presented by the State, including the text message defendant sent to [...] about picking up [...] and the video footage of [...] exiting [...] and entering her Dodge Durango.
[brief] “[A] court must also be sensitive to the possibility that a party has purposely withheld claims from an earlier suit for strategic reasons or to obtain ‘two bites at the apple. ’”  Hobart Bros. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 354 N.J. Super. 229, 241 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).  As such, a successive action may be precluded even when a person is not a party to the first action where there is “both inexcusable conduct and substantial prejudice to the non-party resulting from omission from the first suit .  . . .”  [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:30A (2024).  Here, [...] knew of [...]’s involvement in the redevelopment project well before filing the First Action.
[brief] The Trial Court’s improper joinder was not rendered moot by the jury’s acquittal on the witness tampering charge.  As set forth in length in the principal brief, [...] was unjustly prejudiced by the joinder of the witness tampering charge to the remaining counts of the indictment.  The witness tampering charges were based solely on the testimony of a scorned ex-girlfriend, who claimed that [...] (a man with no criminal history at the time) asked her to *bribe and kill* the witness in the other matter.  This testimony was not supported by any extrinsic evidence, and by [...]’s own account, no overt act was taken in furtherance of this alleged request.  It was entirely foreseeable that allowing these incredible allegations to be adjudicated through the same proceedings as the other offenses charged in the indictment would shift the focus of the trial from the alleged attempted kidnapping to the chaotic relationship between [...] and [...], which is precisely what occurred.  The State contends that any arguments surrounding the improper joinder have been rendered moot by the jury’s acquittal on the witness tampering charge.
[brief] When questioned about the lone narrative report he issued in this matter dated December 3, 2020, [...] acknowledged the following points:  - The report does not reference or discuss [...]'s project-related contractual obligations.  (3T157:12-159:6); - The report does not reference any standards promulgated by the New Jersey Department of Transportation ("NJDOT”) or New Jersey Turnpike Authority ("NJTA”) relevant to [...]'s project-related responsibilities (3T159:7-23); - The report does not reference any project specifications relevant to [...]'s project-related responsibilities (3T159:24-160:5); and, - The report does not articulate the standard of care governing [...]’s project-related services or even use the phrase "standard of care" (p.160:6-14).  **Hearing Testimony Concerning the Characteristics of the Subject Roadway Condition**
[brief] Once completed, [...] refused [...]’s request for a copy of the report she had prepared, (Pa33 - Pa35), and [...] telephoned the police to have an independent report of the fall and to request medical assistance.  [...] responded to the scene to assist the emergency medical services which had also responded.  (2T58-3 to 61-13; 2T87-18 to 88-18).  [...] was taken from the defendant’s facility by ambulance to [...] where she was treated and released from the Emergency Department.  [...], who had followed the ambulance in her car, waited and drove her friend home from the hospital.
[directive] View and record the type of photo identification document presented by the • individual on the Record Request Form.  Verify that the individual requesting the records is the subject of the • expunged records.  If there is any question about the identification presented, staff should seek guidance from their Division Manager or their Criminal, Family or Municipal Court Judge.  If the matter was expunged and the requestor’s documentation is verified, • designated Superior Court staff or the Municipal Court Administrator or Deputy Court Administrator shall provide the Certification of Expungement generated by the automated system to the individual (or their attorney).
[brief] However, a trial court’s findings of facts “‘are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. ’ ”  Horne v. Edwards, 477 N.J. Super. 302, 312-313 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  Generally, “unless an attorney is specifically authorized by the client to settle a case, the consent of the client is necessary. ”  Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 475 (App. Div. 1997) (citing City of Jerey City v. Roosevelt Stadium Marina, Inc., 210 N.J. Super. 315, 327 (App. Div. 1986)).
[brief] By the second deadlock announcement, after two prior Czachor instructions, the case cried out for the model supplemental charge (Da 27) to be followed.  That model charge is, according to the footnote that accompanies it, designed to be given after a jury has already once been given a Czachor instruction and returned as deadlocked.  (Da 27)  The instruction, which is more of a question, reads:  You have indicated that your deliberations have reached an impasse.  Do you feel that further deliberations would be beneficial or do you feel that you have reached a point at which further deliberations would be futile?  Please return to the jury room to confer, and advise me of your decision in another note.
[brief] [...] does not mention the published case law from the New Jersey Supreme Court that illustrates that the underlying legislative intent and statutory history of the NJCFLA show private enforcement would not frustrate, but further, the underlying purposes of the NJCFLA to police the consumer credit industry in New Jersey.  *See, e.g.*, *Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp.*, 150 N.J. 255 (1997) (analyzing an application of the NJCFLA when the NJCFLA was still under the umbrella of the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act).  Most fatal to [...]’s argument is the fact that [...] is not asserting a right of action, but a defense.  Whether a statute contains a private right of --- \(^4\)  “To determine if a statute confers an implied private right of action, courts consider whether: (1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action under the statute; and (3) it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to infer the existence of such a remedy,” *to wit*, whether the implied private right of action “would frustrate, rather than further, the legislative scheme that underlies [the statute].”  *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co.*, 168 N.J. 255, 272-73 (2001); *In re Resolution*, 108 N.J. at 44-45 (1987)  Although courts give varying weight to each one of those factors, “the primary goal has almost invariably been a search for the underlying legislative intent. ”  *R.J. Gaydos*, 168 N.J. at 273 (quoting *Jalowiecki v. Leuc*, 182 N.J. Super. 22, 30 (App.Div.1981)). action is simply of no moment to asserting [...]’s *lack of a right* as an affirmative defense to their collection lawsuit.  Thus, [...]’s arguments fail.
[brief] The submission to the jury of self-defense does not mean there was a rational basis for passion/provocation manslaughter.  Self-defense, an affirmative or justification defense, is analytically distinct from passion/provocation manslaughter.  Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. at 258-59.  There is no categorical rule which requires submission of passion/provocation manslaughter when self-defense is charged to the jury.  Id. at 279.
[brief] (Pa176-Pa177).  But, contrary to the Rules and Regulations of the [...] religion, they have ignored the Grand Sheik’s instructions.  (Pa140-Pa141).  The Defendant’s Grand Body/Board of Directors concurs with the Grand Sheik’s determination that the Property is owned by the Defendant [...], Inc. and not the Plaintiff.  (Pa141).  Defendant [...], Inc. is the true record owner of [...] (Tax Map Block 5402, Lots 1 & 64) (hereinafter, the “Property”) and has at all times relevant to this action held title thereto in fee simple.  (Pa141).
[directive] A.  Law enforcement's response to incidents of homicide and sudden death should be in accordance with the Revised Homicide and Sudden Death Survivor Guidelines, April 18, 1986.  B.  In a municipal court case involving a Title 39 (motor vehicle or traffic laws) violation or any other case involving directly or indirectly a motor vehicle accident, the municipal prosecutor is to inform the municipal court judge in writing, during the initial appearance of a defendant before the court, of the death of any person resulting from the violation of the motor vehicle or traffic laws by the defendant or resulting from a motor vehicle accident which occurred during the violation of any other law by the defendant.(16)  VI.  VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint.  First, she has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting a *prima facie* case of CEPA retaliation.  Second, even if she could, Defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for their termination: [...]’s theft of hospital funds.  Even providing [...] with all reasonable inferences of fact, she cannot point to any disputed facts capable of supporting a finding of pretext.  Finally, even if this Court disagrees with all of the above, there is no evidence that [...] and [...], individually, retaliated against [...].  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  *Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents*  Dated: December 6, 2024  /s/ [...]  [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], and [...], [...], and JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 1-20 (Names Being Fictitious), in their individual and corporate capacities, and as aiders and abettors, Defendants-Respondents.
[directive] Best Practices Manual  1.  The Division of Criminal Justice, through its Municipal Prosecution Supervisor(s) and in consultation with the Municipal Prosecutor Liaisons, shall create a Best Practices Manual for County Municipal Prosecutor Liaisons.  2.  The Best Practices Manual shall address, among other subjects, the best practices for communication and coordination among municipal prosecutors, Municipal Prosecutor Liaisons, and the Municipal Prosecution Supervisor(s).  3.  The Division shall create the Best Practices Manual no later than April 1, 2020.  II.
[brief] Defendant's photograph was actually the fifth out of the six array photographs shown prior to trial, when [...] identified defendant.  Therefore, there is no issue of whether defendant's picture was emphasized as the alleged “last photograph” in the array. \(^1\)  Defendant's reliance on *Archibald* is misplaced.  Unlike in *Archibald* where there were twenty months between the robbery and the identification, in this case there were only nineteen days.  *Archibald*, *supra*, 734 F.2d at 939.  [...] did not identify defendant on the day of the robbery because his photograph was not in the mug books.  [...], from her testimony, knew what defendant looked like and the array was not suggestive in any way.  [...]'s out-of-court identification also satisfies the second prong of the *Madison* test.
[brief] Sat  Below: The Honorable [...], J.S.C.  AMENDED BRIEF ON APPEAL OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (023881981)  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (020531993)  [...]  KINNEY LISOVICZ  REILLY & WOLFF PC  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, [...]
[brief] “Independent” knowledge is knowledge that is not “merely dependent on a public disclosure. ”  Schumann, 769 F.3d at 845 (quotation marks omitted).  A relator “who would not have learned of the information absent public disclosure” does not have “independent” knowledge.  \(^{22}\)  For the public disclosure bar, the appropriate complaint to consider is “the first [complaint] to particularly allege the relevant fraud,” U.S. ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Ctr., 816 F.3d 37, 46 (4th Cir. 2016), but not to assess jurisdiction, as the Relator has previously contended.  The fraud alleged by Relator has not changed since Relator filed its original complaint.  Compare Ja1984 (Compl. ¶ 2), and Ja1989 (¶ 26), with Ja9 (4AC ¶ 2), and Ja15–16 (¶ 30).  Supplementary information introduced in subsequent complaints is not relevant to the public disclosure bar.  See Staples, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 41.  Ibid. (quotation marks omitted); see also Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 522 (“[R]eliance solely on ‘public disclosures’ . . . is always insufficient . . . to confer original source status. ”).  Relator admits that its knowledge is not independent—it came directly from [...].  See Ja2173 (¶¶ 194–97).  Relator’s manipulation of the publicly disclosed [...] data—from which it infers the fraud and Defendants’ scienter—necessarily was not independent of the public data.  Indeed, for this reason, and contrary to what the trial court may have suggested by referring to “extensive efforts and financial investment,” 4T at 34:22–24, numerous courts have recognized that a relator does not become an original source by using expertise or efforts to understand and analyze publicly disclosed data.\(^{23}\)
[brief] *Ibid.*  Indeed, “[m]any of the benefits of arbitration would be lost if reviewing courts were permitted to conduct de novo examinations of the merits of an arbitration award. ”  *Local No. 153, Off. and Pro. Emps. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Trust Co. of N.J.*, 105 N.J. 442, 448 (1987).  Accordingly, an arbitration award will be vacated only in the following narrow circumstances: a.