ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff cannot establish NJLAD liability against any of the individually named [...] since there is no evidence whatsoever that they “knowingly and substantially assisted” the alleged hostile work environment or retaliation in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) or that they took “reprisals” against Plaintiff in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).  Thus, there was no basis upon which to impose liability under the NJLAD against Defendants [...], [...], or [...] and they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  Indeed, Plaintiff does not even argue this point and appears to have abandoned said claim.  Under the NJLAD, individual liability may be imposed upon a supervisor for aiding and abetting discrimination through “active and purposeful conduct. ”  *Tarr v. Ciasulli*, 181 N.J. 70 (2004).  In order to hold an individual defendant liable as an “aider or abettor,” the plaintiff “must show that ‘(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes and injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant must knowingly assist and substantially assist the principal violation. ’”  *Id.* at 84 (emphasis added).  Here, Plaintiff cannot establish these elements.  *See, e.g.*, *Tarr v. Ciasulli*, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004).  There is no evidence, or allegation, of any personal involvement by Defendant [...], [...], or [...] with any of the alleged misconduct or harassment of [...], a DCCP employee.  Far from “knowingly” and “substantially” assisting the alleged harassment, upon learning of Plaintiff’s allegations they immediately shielded her from her alleged harasser by transferring her out of the [...].
[brief] ”  --- ⁹  Court records and publications establish [...] represented the brothers.  Dca 1-7, 12, 14, 21, 23, 33-39; [...] Obituary, Press of Atlantic City (Sept. 6, 2012), obits.nj.com/us/obituaries/pressofatlanticcity/name/james-jordan-obituary?id=21374506; [...], Gun Violence Memorial, gunmemorial.org/2012/08/26/james-jordan; [...], Gun Violence Memorial, gunmemorial.org/2017/05/11/anthony-a-jordan.  Cottle, 194 N.J. at 467.  Even without a per se conflict, constitutionally defective representation can be established by showing “a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice.
[directive] Agencies without existing protocols relating to pregnant and Establishment of breastfeeding officers should consider adopting agency-specific policies and practices consistent with these Guidelines, either by rule, regulation, or standard operating procedure.  B. preserved.  These Guidelines are not intended to interfere with or diminish or Rights enlarge any rights or privileges to which a law enforcement officer—whether covered by this policy or not—may be legally entitled under federal, state, or local law and any other agency policy or collective negotiations agreement.  C. parties.  Nothing in these Guidelines shall be construed in any Non-enforceability by third way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  D.  These Guidelines provide a general framework for law enforcement agencies Questions. to implement the various federal and state laws that apply to the treatment of pregnant officers.
[directive] Establish Incident Command and Designate Incident Commander.  The first responding officer is responsible for the incident until relieved by higher authority.  A supervisor shall respond to the scene and establish incident command.  The supervisor should begin to determine what resources are needed and start the process of having resources respond to the incident.  Resources may include, but are not limited to, a special response or tactical team, crisis negotiators, mental health professionals, ARRIVE Together teams, and specialized equipment.  4.3
[brief] Next, the State asks this Court to ignore the illegality of defendant’s sentence and view the issue as a mere excessive sentencing issue.  This the Court should not do.  Excessive sentencing issues entail whether there was a proper finding and weighing of applicable aggravating and mitigating factors; whether the sentencing court’s findings of those factors justified the length of the sentence or its decision to impose multiple sentences concurrent or consecutive with each other.  However, as in the present case, the Legislature in certain instances has removed the sentencing court’s discretion.  For instance, when sentencing on certain crimes the court has no discretion concerning mandatory minimums of 85% of the sentence imposed, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a) and (d); or the imposition of an non-discretionary extended term, NJ.S.A. 2C:43-7; or post-incarceration periods of parole supervision, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c); or parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4; or as in this case, whether the sentences can be served concurrently or must be served consecutively, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h).
[brief] Defendant’s attack on the identification jury instruction with regard to the various [...] employees who identified defendant from the surveillance recordings of the burglary similarly fails both factually and legally.  During the charge conference, the trial court noted that the proposed instruction submitted by the State included an “identification charge” that included “a lot of factors,” but “not all” and that the court “did agree” with the exclusions, e.g., “weapons distraction, there’s no weapons in this case so I thought that was appropriate. ”  Nonetheless, the court advised defense counsel to “review” the State’s proposed instructions “over the weekend, if there’s any that were left out that you think should be included, certainly just add it back in for consideration. ” (10T:7-9 to 8-1).  At the final charge conference, the judge noted that “the only change [defense counsel] had to the proposed” charge “was the language in the alibi being more specific as to the testimony that was rendered by each of the alibi witnesses, which the court made.  (11T:89-7 to 94-5).
[brief] [...] d/b/a [...] agrees and adopts the procedural history set forth at length in Plaintiff, [...]’s brief.  (Pb 10–11).  To the extent that [...]’ description of the procedural history differs as it specifically relates to this appeal/cross-appeal, the Trial Court first heard oral argument on the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims on December 4, 2023.  (1T\(^1\) 11:10–16).  Shortly thereafter, the Trial Court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs specifically addressing the issue that a party seeking to obtain an interest in property subject to foreclosure based on tax sale certificates is required to first intervene in the pending foreclosure action in order to obtain court approval of the proposed purchase under the New Jersey Tax Sale Law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1.  The Trial Court held a second oral argument on February 9, 2024, which focused on the parties’ arguments made in supplemental briefings but heard nothing further on the FRFPA.  (2T\(^2\) 37:25–38:2).  On February 28, 2024, the Trial Court issued the joint Order at issue in this appeal, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, though without adequately addressing [...] and [...]’s arguments on the FRFPA or ruling on [...]’ motion for summary judgment which facially challenged the legal sufficiency of each claim.
[brief] Prior to opening the first of the two hearings at which he presided, the SHO concluded that adequate notice had been provided for the meeting, noting that: the applicant provided the required notices of this hearing pursuant to the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law, including a legal notice to the public hearing published in the March 14, 2022 issue, [...], certified mail notices of the hearing being mailed on March 14, 2022 to all of the property owners within 200 feet of the property on the list provided by the [...] and [...].  5T9:14-25.  The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) governs the requirements for public notice of a hearing on a land use application.
[brief] Specifically, [...] introduced P-4 (Pa113-118) at trial which included with it an attachment published by the State of New Jersey Department of Labor outlining the process of worker misclassification.  This print out was downloaded directly from the State of New Jersey website.  It specifically states on page 2 of that handout that if an Employer (in this instance the Township) has an Employee ([...] in this instance) sign an independent contractor agreement it does not make someone an Independent Contractor.
[brief] This Court’s review of the grant of a summary judgment is de novo and is based on the same standards governing the Trial Court’s consideration of the facts.  *Turner v. Wong*, 363 N.J. Super. 186, 198-99 (App. Div. 2003).  The pleadings and discovery conducted in this matter support the Trial Court’s summary judgment in favor of [...].  In opposing summary judgment, [...] did not and under the facts of this case cannot come forward with credible evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial relative to her claims against [...].  The procedures and standards governing a motion for summary judgment are set forth in Rule 4:46-2, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[brief] POINT II SSAP NO. 25 APPLIES TO TRANSFERS OF FUNDS BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND THE EXCHANGE.  SSAP No. 25 is an accounting document that governs transactions between and among related parties and is a foundational principle to protect the insurance-buying public.  It was drafted, and is monitored and updated, by a working group of State regulators under the auspices of the NAIC.  The opening paragraph of SSAP No. 25 provides, “Related party transactions are subject to abuse because reporting entities may be induced to enter transactions that may not reflect economic realities or may not be fair and reasonable to the reporting entity or its policyholders.  As such, related party transactions require specialized accounting rules and increased regulatory scrutiny. ” (Ra4, ¶ 1 (emphasis added)).  Accordingly, Paragraph 20 of SSAP No. 25 requires that --- 5  The document that [...] identifies in its appendix as SSAP No. 25 is actually “Statutory Issue Paper No. 25,” (Ja48-65), a different document from SSAP No. 25.  As the NAIC Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual explains, This Manual consists primarily of Statements of Statutory Accounting Principles (SSAPs).  SSAPs are the primary transactions between related parties must be conducted at arm’s length.  Paragraph 21 requires that such transactions must be fair and reasonable.
[brief] In \textit{Burney}, FBI [...] testified that, on the night of the crime at time of the charged crimes, the defendant’s cell phone “pinged” a cell tower with an approximately one-mile coverage area that included the crime scene.  \textit{Id.} at 11.  He concluded that the towers had a one-mile range based on a “rule of thumb” for the towers in the area.  \textit{Id.} at 12.  At a \textit{Frye} hearing, [...] testified about the steps he took using the defendant’s cell phone information to map out the area where he believed the phone was in at the time of the crime.  \textit{Id.} at 11-13.  [...] testified that at the time of the crime, the defendant’s phone used a tower in Orange, New Jersey, referred to as “the Parkway Tower,” to receive a text message.  He stated that the tower’s coverage radius “would reasonably include the crime scene,” and was at the “outer boundary” of his estimated coverage area.  \textit{Id.} at 13-14.  Notably, [...] also testified that there were two other cell towers closer to and within the range of the crime scene.  \textit{Id.} at 13.  He testified that he did not test the range of the Parkway Tower and that its range can be affected by various factors that he did not measure as part of his assessment for the case.  The trial court admitted [...]’s testimony, finding that it was “sufficiently reliable based upon its general acceptance by the courts and other jurisdictions. ”  \textit{Id.} at 14.  \textsuperscript{4}  The second argument raised in \textit{Burney} addressed the admission of a first-time-in-court identification of defendant.
[brief] [...] requested the Appellant to write an incident report.  She questioned the need for an incident report.  [...] explained the need for the incident report.  (T78-15 to 24).  Again, the Appellant explained that she chose not to call a code for safety reasons as it relates to the staffing levels over the last year and a half.  (T80-4 to 12).  She did admit that her superiors do not instruct officers not to call a code, when necessary.  (T81-5 to 7).  When questioned by her counsel, the Appellant testified that she first saw [...]’s notes on the bottom of her incident report (Exhibit R-3, in evidence) indicating that the report did not comport with his request.  (T82-1 to 9).  The Appellant reviewed her disciplinary history.  (Pb26 to Pb29).  As to the entry dated May 27, 2021, the Appellant claimed that the administration held the hearing for the insubordination charge in her absence.  She also stated that she was unaware of the five-day suspension levied against her.  (T84-8 to 16).  She had requested an adjournment that was seemingly denied.  She presented no documentation supporting her claim.  On cross-examination, the Appellant admitted that she did not file an appeal of the disciplinary finding of insubordination.  (T88-18 to 24).  The Appellant was then questioned as to the service of process of the Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action which she claims she was not served.  The Appellant confirmed that she received correspondence from her attorney regarding their representation of her.  She had no adequate answers for these inconsistencies.  (T89-6 to 90-8).  As to the incident in the Medical Department on September 12, 2022, the Appellant was asked about the broken unlockable door at the entrance of the Medical Department.  Despite this broken door and the unruly inmate who attempted to leave the Medical Department via the unlocked, broken door, the Appellant insisted that a code was not necessary.  (T92-19 to 93-11).  She insisted that she did not call the code for safety reasons, i.e. the shorthanded staff levels.  In prior testimony, the Appellant acknowledged that she was never instructed not to call a code because of low staffing levels.  As for her incident report, the Appellant admitted that she did not include any information concerning her conversation with [...].  (T93-21 to 94-1).  She denied ever being loud or disrespectful.  (T94-2 to 6).  She claimed to address [...] by his title under all circumstances.  (T94-7 to 9).  The Appellant dismissed [...]’s incident report and his testimony as pure fabrication.  (T94-10 to 13).
[brief] \(^6\)  181  FERC ¶ 61,051, P2; TGPa0043.  In the Rehearing Order, FERC rejected [...]’s request for a stay, finding that “[...]’s generalized claims of harm in its motion do not constitute sufficient evidence of irreparable harm that would justify a stay. ”  \textit{Id.} at P10-11; TGPa0046 and TGPa0047.  FERC concluded that it “continue[s] to find, based on all information in the record, that the public convenience and necessity requires the East 300 Upgrade Project. ”  \textit{Id.} at P41; TGPa0048.  \textbf{STANDARD OF REVIEW}
[brief] **There Is No Private Right Of Action Under The NJCFLA**  For the sack of completeness, without waiver of Respondent’s position that it is not relevant to this Appeal, Respondent states that multiple Courts have now reviewed and rejected instant Petitioner’s counsel’s attempts to invoke the NJCFLA, pointing out that there is no private right of action under the Act and only the [...] can employ the act to declare a violation of the Act.  See Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171, 180, 312 A.3d 307, 312 (App. Div. March 14, 2024)
[brief] (Pa671).  consistency finding undermines a claim of illegal spot zoning.  See Trust Co. of NJ v. Planning Bd., 224 N.J. Super. 553, 561-567 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that rezoning of a lot owned by a bank from residential to office/professional was not spot zoning where it served a valid municipal purpose and was consistent with the planning objectives of the master plan).  The City Council acted to further the general welfare of the community by finding that the amendments were consistent with the Master Plan.  A municipality’s adoption of a redevelopment plan or the amendment of that plan is an exercise of a governing body’s discretion that is to be upheld unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[directive] Constructive authority.  Shall have the same meaning as defined in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, except that the term shall apply only to constructive authority directed against a person who is subject to an investigative detention or arrest (e.g., “show me your hands,” “get out of the vehicle,” etc.), or directed against a person if the officer has un-holstered a firearm or a conducted energy device (e.g., “move out of the way,” “get down,” etc.).  Equipped with a BWC.  Shall mean that a law enforcement officer is actually wearing a BWC at the time in question, as opposed to simply receiving BWC equipment from their agency. Force.  Shall have the same meaning as defined in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  The term “force” shall include physical, mechanical, enhanced mechanical, and deadly force.  Investigation of a criminal offense.  Any police activity pertaining to the investigation of an indictable crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly offense, including but not limited to responding to a report of a possible criminal offense; an investigative detention based on or leading to reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed; an arrest for a criminal offense; an interview of a potential witness to a criminal offense; or canvassing an area, neighborhood, or premises for potential witnesses to a criminal offense.
[brief] REPLYING TO POINT V, THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION WAS IMPROPER IN SEVERAL RESPECTS.  The State claims that the prosecutor mentioned [...]'s statement to [...], in order to "describ[e] to the jury what the victim’s injuries were" (Pb15).  If that were the case, [...] would only have testified as to what he saw.  It was unnecessary for [...] to testify that [...] said something.  The prosecution intended the jury to deduce that what [...] said identified [...] as the shooter.  At Pb16, the State defends the gratuitous statements made during summations.
[brief] Despite the protective orders in this case, Defendants worry that this competitively sensitive information will be disclosed, perhaps to their competitors, perhaps to the media.  The recently amended Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “crystalizes the concept of reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the common-sense concept of proportionality. ”  Chief Justice [...], *2015 Year–End Report on the Federal Judiciary* 6 (2015).
[brief] The [...] defend that clandestine process by blaming Plaintiffs for trusting that the trial court would uphold basic principles of due process and by deflecting responsibility for their own procedural failures.  Such blame-shifting is desperate and unfounded.  Neither the fleeting remarks in the transcript nor the statements in the [...]’ brief in this appeal were sufficient to notify Plaintiffs about the \textit{in camera} review.  Indeed, Plaintiffs expressly requested redacted copies of the waivers if such a review was conducted.  Pra039-040.  It certainly never occurred to Plaintiffs that the trial court would informally and covertly request such documents from defendants.  Without the required notice, formal order, or even acknowledgment by the trial court in its decision that it reviewed documents \textit{in camera}, Plaintiffs were unaware of this review until the [...] revealed the law clerk’s email in their motion to seal.  Pra041-043.  Plaintiffs are now unable to respond to arguments about the adequacy of the waivers that are predicated on documents they never saw and therefore requests leave to submit additional briefing to address defendants’ waiver arguments depending on the outcome of the pending motions.
[brief] See generally Brunetti v. New Milford, 68 N.J. 576 (1975)  In the instant case, Appellants challenges are of the first and third type.  The record is clear that both Counsels of the Applicants and the [...] stated that the [...] has no jurisdiction as to “regulated activities” within a historic district of [...] and that it must defer to the decision of the [...].  While [...] ordinances conflict with that determination, the instant matter was decided in that context.  In fact, Counsel for Applicants went further and stated that Appellants would have only 45 days to appeal a decision of the [...].  (P580-Pa581)  If that is true, Appellants’ rights to due process would be violated as the [...] sends out no notices and publishes no decisions.  Query how would Appellants even know there was a decision to challenge, let alone be able to do so in 45 days.
[brief] He explained for the jury the entire ACE-V process and how he reached each opinion regarding defendant’s latent fingerprints.  For example, on direct examination, [...] explained what “identification” meant:  So, ridge formations, when we say “in sequence,” which means “in the same position,” . . . in your latent [print] as in your known [exemplar], and then with . . . sufficient ability to discriminate . . . one print from another, to determine source identification[,] which in fingerprint examination language and identification means that it is your opinion that the two prints originated from the same source . . . or the same person.  [(6T44-3 to 14). ]  And on cross-examination, defense counsel mentioned an aspect of Lieutenant [...]’s report regarding the examination process, which [...] agreed contained “subjective” aspects.  (6T82-8 to 12).  [...] reiterated that examiners’ results and conclusions are “[u]ltimately . . . an opinion. ” (6T82-13 to 18).  As an example, he agreed that it was “ultimately [his] decision” whether the quality of a latent print was clear enough to examine under the “analysis” step of the ACE-V process.  (6T82-25 to 83-6).  Indeed, as explained in the State’s main response brief, [...] walked the jury through the ACE-V process using demonstrative visual aids depicting each latent print and known exemplar and illustrated how he reached a conclusion on each of the four fingerprint and one thumbprint analyses.
[brief] R.4:50-1.  Relevant here are (a) and (f) - (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or (f) any other reason justifying relief.  Neither prevails.  There was certainly no basis for relief under R.4:50-1(a) as [...] was properly served and had full knowledge of all notices and deadlines.  The only mistake, if it can be called a mistake, is Mr. [...] assuming that he had more time in which to redeem – something he ostensibly learned as a tax foreclosure plaintiff of his own.  That unilateral belief did not implicate Plaintiff, Intervenor, or the Courts in causing it.  A.
[brief] Its “authority over utilities, like that of regulatory agencies generally, extends beyond powers expressly granted by statute to include incidental powers that the agency needs to fulfill its statutory mandate. ”  Pub. Serv., 167 N.J. at 384 (quoting In re Valley Rd. Sewerage Co., 154 N.J. 224, 235 (1998)); see In re Elizabethtown Water Co., 107 N.J. 440, 449-50 (1987) (“The Legislature has endowed the [...] with broad power to regulate public utilities [and] considerable discretion in exercising those powers. ”).