ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At the time of the Plenary Hearing, [...] was a 75-year-old, retired real estate developer and investor, retired Maryland attorney\(^6\), and a recreational tournament poker player.  (A229, Op. at 12).  Twenty-six years his junior is his former wife, [...] (Age 49 at the time of trial).  \textit{Id}.  The parties were introduced at the former Trump Marina casino in Atlantic City and were soon after married on a Glacier in Juno, Alaska on September 7, 2004.  \textit{Id}. at 12.  [...] came into the marriage as a multi-millionaire.  \textit{Id}. at 34.  [...] made a modest living as a casino pit boss.  See \textit{Id}. at 47; see also 5T22-20-23-4.  In 2008, the parties collaborated on an “asset protection plan” (with the assistance of a National Law firm) during the marriage to protect [...]’s assets.
[brief] You either are or are not registered at the time of the bid.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.54; Da273.  By contrast, [...] classification includes the categories in which classification is held and the project rating (dollar limit) of the classification for each category.  N.J.A.C. 16:44-3.6(a); Da362-64.  The qualification of a bidder to perform a particular project cannot be known without those pieces of information.
[brief] 1.  DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT  BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SET FORTH WITH ANY SPECIFICITY THE BASIS ON WHICH THE MOTION WAS MADE, AND FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DECISION WAS PALPABLY INCORRECT, IRRATIONAL, OR BASED ON A FAILURE TO CONSIDER OR APPRECIATE COMPETENT EVIDENCE (Da17)
[brief] UNDER THE “PREMISES RULE,” THE PARKING LOT ACCIDENT OCCURRED DURING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR BOTH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.  (Pa294; Pa295; Pa330 at 115-116; Pa333 at 126-127; T6:20 – T7:4).  In determining whether an accident arises “out of and in the course of employment,” our Courts apply the premises rule established by the Legislature in the 1979 amendments to N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
[brief] THE BOARD’S DETERMINATION THAT THE PETITIONER’S DISABILITY WAS CAUSED BY PREEXISTING CONDITIONS WAS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE PROOFS AS A WHOLE.  Petitioner argues that the Board “lacked a good faith basis” to argue or ask questions of a witness regarding the 2009 incident and “continues to cling to one lone entry in one lone record as evidence of a 2009 incident. ”  Petitioner’s Brief, p. 26.  He further argues that, to “allow” the Board to reverse the ID “in the absence of evidence that substantiates a 2009 incident or accident would be the quintessential example of letting a completely arbitrary and capricious decision stand. ”  Id. at 21.  These arguments are without merit.
[brief] [Pa170-176].  On December 12, 2019, [...] filed a motion for partial summary judgment.  [Pa177-183].  Plaintiff filed opposition to that motion on the basis of prematurity, as the deadline for expert reports had not yet passed.  [Pa190-191].  That motion was denied at that time; however, after the lapse of the deadline, Plaintiff consented to dismissal when it became clear that the [...] would not be pursuing crossclaims against [...].  [Pa197-198].  2.  The Motions For Summary Judgment
[brief] ”  Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins., 185 N.J. 490, 500 (2006); see also Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins., 154 N.J. 312, 330 (1998) (treating the assertion of a policy provision as an affirmative defense).  [...] violated Rule 4:5-4 by failing to specifically plead the policy’s suit limitation provision as an affirmative defense in its Answer.  Rather, [...] alleged that “Plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of the policy of insurance from which he [SIC] seeks benefits. ” (Pa131).  This general statement provided no notice that [...] intended to invoke the policy’s four-year limitation period.  To the contrary, [...]’s Answer raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.  (Pa131).  [...]’s failure to allege its policy limitation defense in its Answer should have resulted in waiver.  Indeed, by waiting 17 months to invoke its affirmative defense, [...] caused the parties to expend “large amounts of time, money, and energy. ”  *Williams v. Bell Tel. Lab ’ys Inc.*, 132 N.J. 109, 120 (1993).  The trial court thus erred in allowing [...] to pursue the defense on summary judgment.  The Appellate Division should correct this error by vacating dismissal.
[brief] This includes the wholesale rejection of [...], P.E., PTOE, Plaintiff’s Traffic Engineer, and the planning testimony from [...].  As argued in Plaintiff’s primary brief (Pb35-Pb46), to effectuate its desired outcome; the Board could not allow evidence to get in its way.  Defendant has even introduced entirely new explanations for its denial, absent any support in the record, let alone the Resolution.  Db8, Db22-Db26, Db42.  Case law informs us that the board’s resolution is the operative document that provides the required findings of fact and conclusions of law, which again, must be supported by the record.  N.Y. SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333 (App. Div. 2004).  Here, Defendant’s reply brief provides at least three new and novel reasons for the denial of Plaintiff’s application not found in this Resolution: (1) Plaintiff’s failure to provide an “alternative development plan”, (2) Plaintiff’s failure to provide a comparison of cubic space in conforming versus the proposed structures, and (3) the variance would have been *de facto* rezoning.  See Db8, Db22-Db26, Db42.  The Resolution is devoid of any mention of these reasons for denial; nothing in the record discusses them, never mind supports them.  This effort to retrospectively amend the Resolution, and by extension, the hearing record, is without merit and warrants no consideration.  Plaintiff had the burden of proof, and clearly met it, with substantial credible evidence to support its request.  Defendant distorts, ignores, and unreasonably rejects those credible proofs, including expert testimony, to achieve its desired result.  Recognizing these fatal weaknesses, it retrospectively supplies new reasons for its denial in this appellate submission.  These efforts are not only unsupported by the record, but contradicted by it.  II.
[directive] Kesyon swivan sa yo fèt pou reponn sèl si w ap plede koupab de yon krim vyolan premye oswa dezyèm degre ant le 9 jwen 1997 ak le 29 jwen 2001.  ki fèt  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to a first or second degree violent crime that occurred between June 9, 1997 and June 29, 2001.
[brief] Under this Factor, Respondent testified to the lack of time-keeping records as indicative of independent contractor status.  However, [...] was forced to concede at the OAL Hearing that Petitioner was a salaried employee who did not have to keep her hours of work like the Court Administrator, the Municipal Court Judge and the Township Administrative who are also salaried employees and do not punch a clock and are enrolled in the PERS system.  Petitioner also testified she did not submit invoices or vouchers as an outside professional would.  Finally, the flaw in the investigation report was manifested here where [...] did absolutely no evaluation of anyone else in the Township on this Factor.
[brief] 1252a.  Under the new standard, the Supreme Court reiterated the general rule under New Jersey law that lost profits may be recoverable if they can be established with a reasonable degree of certainty, but anticipated profits that are remote, uncertain, or speculative are not recoverable.  1252a.  The Supreme Court in Schwartz v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556, (2022), stated:  If the trial court determines that Plaintiffs’ lost profits evidence is sufficient to establish their claim for damages with reasonable certainty despite Plaintiffs’ inexperience in developing housing, it should deny Defendants’ motions to bar the evidence and for summary judgment.  [1279a].  On remand, the Law Division conducted a Rule 104 Hearing on January 19, 2023, and January 20, 2023.  See 4T and 5T.  On March 9, 2023, the Law Division erroneously barred [...]’s expert report and granted Defendants summary judgment.  1280a.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on April 22, 2023.  1297a.
[brief] (Ra135; Ra184-85).  But under Policy 5112, [...] permits students who will not turn five-years old until December 31 to register for kindergarten.  (Ra135; Ra184-85).  In practice, this means that [...] kindergarten classes can have students aged four to six years old for nearly half of the school year.  (Ra135; Ra185).  This age gap is not insignificant: “Studies have shown that in the early stages of school age children development, there is a significant difference in terms of maturity, behavior, and cognitive abilities between children during these stages of development. ” (Ra185).  These differences in cognitive ability manifest, for example, in gaps in literacy development.  *Ibid.*  And these gaps may not be bridged.  One study from the National Bureau of Economics found that students “who start school at an older age do better than their younger classmates and have better odds of attending college.
[brief] [Da134-Da135].  On March 11, 2022, the Borough responded to the Demand Letter and contested the Township’s claim to the connection fee.  Therein, in reliance on an unrelated provision in the 1999 Agreement, the Borough claimed its entitlement to the Connection Fee.  However, there is no basis in law or fact for the Borough’s claim to the Connection Fee due for the Subject Property.  On or about June 24, 2022, an Escrow Agreement was entered into by and between the Township, the Borough, Developer, and [...] (“Escrow Agent”) (the “Escrow Agreement”).  On August 16, 2022, and pursuant to § 2 of the Escrow Agreement, the Township formally demanded that each of the Borough and Developer provide written instructions to the Escrow Agent for the immediate release of the escrowed funds to the Township.  After the Borough failed to respond to the August 16, 2022, Demand Letter, the Township commenced the instant action by filing a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris Vicinage.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] (A17)  Upon receipt of the Order, Plaintiff had no action to take.  The action was Defendant’s – the relevant paragraph of the Order reads “Defendant shall pay to plaintiff back support in the amount of $52,000, this being the sum of $1,500 per month from July 2017 through June 2020.  Defendant shall also pay to Plaintiff a penalty in the amount of $108,300, this being a sum of a $100 per day penalty assessed over a nonpayment period of 1,083 days. ”  (A25)  As Plaintiff’s Certification in 2023 demonstrated, she made repeated efforts to move the satisfaction of both provisions of the Order forward.  (Pa001)  A letter was sent on March 1, 2023 to Defendant’s attorney at the time (Pa013), and Plaintiff filed an Order to Reduce to Judgment on August 10, 2023 (Pa016) – both documents reflect the full credit of the $70,000 plus interest to Defendant.
[brief] The court further failed to analyze other equitable doctrines that should have led to the complaint being dismissed.  Equitable Estoppel  “Estoppel is an equitable doctrine, founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law. ”  Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 354, 730 A.2d 287 (1999).  Estoppel is invoked in “the interests of justice, morality and common fairness. ”  Palatine I v. Planning Bd., 133 N.J. 546, 560, 628 A.2d 321 (1993).  The courts have defined equitable estoppel as “the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed . . . as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.
[brief] See 4T at 17:14–22.  Finally, the retroactivity question does not turn on whether the 2023 Amendment reflects good or bad policy in the eyes of the court.  It turns, rather, on the fact that it reflects a different policy choice.  Even amendments that seek “to expand and improve the law” or “better serve[] public policy objectives,” Ardan, 231 N.J. at 612–13, should not be applied retroactively when they are policy changes, as this one is.  It is not a court’s job to determine whether an amendment’s new policy choice advances the “essence” and “proper spirit” of a longstanding statute like the NJFCA.  See 4T at 21:4, 21:8–9.  All a court need determine is whether the 2023 Amendment is substantive and must therefore be applied prospectively only.  III.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint on November 28, 2020 asserting a single claim for breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq., based on allegations that her 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, VIN: [...] (the “Vehicle”), contained certain defects that were not timely repaired.  See Complaint, P053a-P109a.  In connection with the action, Plaintiff sought cancellation of the sales contract, injunctive relief, a buyback of the vehicle and payoff of the loan, refund of down payment and monthly payments, recovery of interest and other relief.  Id. at P058a.  The total sale price of the vehicle due under the loan was $45,609.04.  See P066a.  Almost immediately after this action was filed, Defendant attempted in good faith to resolve this matter.
[brief] (4T60-22 to 24).  It was clear that [...] had had heart surgery before his death: there was a scar on his chest, and he had had an artery bypass graft.  (4T61-12 to 15).  There was one stab wound below the victim’s left collar bone, which entered the body through the second rib and then penetrated the upper part of the left lung.  (4T42-19 to 25; 4T46-23 to 24).  The stab wound was six inches deep.  (4T45-20 to 23).  The penetration into the lung was an inch and a half.  (4T45-24 to 4T46-9).  The stab wound caused the lung to collapse and caused bleeding into the chest cavity.  (4T49-14 to 16).  The medical examiner looked at the knife recovered from the victim’s hand and found that the dimensions of the knife were consistent with this stab wound.  (4T43-4 to 8; 4T43-20 to 25; 4T44-5 to 7; 4T79-25 to 4T80-3).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO COMPEL [...] TO PRODUCE AN STATEMENT UNDER OATH REAGARDING THE PARTIES OF INTERESTS OF THE NOTE PER NJ CHAPTER 225 LAW.  Raised Below: paragraph 37 029a.  In 1T page 8 lines 2-6.  Bayview did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  I wrote two letters to the Sheriff. On 1/10/23 (127a), and another on 1/30/23 (134a).  The Sheriff did not demand that statement from Bayview and did not remove my house from the Sheriff Sale list.  The NJ Chapter 225 Law of 1979 is very clear.  Judge Bayview did not oppose or deny this request, but [...] denied my request without statement of reason.  “CHAPTER 225, LAWS OF N.J. 1979 (APPROVED OCTOBER 12, 1979):  Whenever an application is made to the sheriff of any county for the sale of any real property, whether under execution or pursuant to any other writ, judgment or order, the sheriff shall not proceed with such sale unless and until the applicant shall furnish to the sheriff a statement, under oath, listing the names of all mortgagees and other holders of encumbrances constituting “consideration” as defined in section 1 (c) of the act is a supplement (C. 46:15-5(c)), to which such sale shall be subject. ”  The [...] refused to demand that Bayview submit such a statement under the NJ Chapter 225 law and he refused to remove my house from the sales list.  Judge Bayview did not oppose or deny this request, but [...] denied my request without statement of reason.  LEGAL POINT VI.
[directive] The instrument used for such an index file will vary by agency and could include a log book, index cards or a computerized data base.  9.2.2  All internal affairs complaints shall be recorded in the index file.  Entries should record each case’s basic information, including the subject officer, allegations, complainant, date received, investigator assigned, disposition and disposition date for each complaint.  A unique case number assigned to each internal affairs complaint will point to the complete investigation file’s location and will simplify case tracking.  9.3
[brief] There is no final date, you have had a continuing obligation to follow through on the contract you executed.  If you do not furnish us with a workable closing, we will be filing for arbitration. ” (DA404.).  On July 10, 2022, Plaintiff [...] responded:  “Thanks for clarifying that there is no final date of settlement defined by my SPA.  As previously discussed, I intend to process [sic] with closing.  Could you please define what you meant by ‘a workable closing’?  I cannot find the definition of ‘workable’ in my SPA. ” (DA406).  The same day, Litigation Counsel for [...] responded by e-mail, informing Plaintiff [...] that Plaintiffs “are in direct violation of [their] obligation to close” and that they “have seven days to propose a closing date. ” (DA408).  On November 26, 2022, Plaintiff [...] reached out again by e-mail, reaffirming Plaintiffs’ “intent to proceed with closing” and inquiring “[w]hat . . . the status of [her] SPA [is] at this moment?” (DA408).  The same day, Counsel for [...] responded indicating that “[i]f a closing date is not provided immediately we will be proceeding with legal action.  (DA410).  No date was ever provided.  Plaintiffs’ failure to close title constitutes a default under the express terms of the SPA.  Specifically, Section 8 provides:  DEFAULT:  If Buyer defaults in performing any of its obligations under this Agreement, and such default continues for 7 days after notice, Seller shall have the right, as its sole remedy, to terminate this Agreement and retain as liquidated damages an amount equal to such sums paid on account of the purchase price not to exceed 10% of the base purchase price and this Agreement shall be null and void.
[brief] \footnote{These cases undermine Plaintiff’s argument that there is no preemption because the FDA’s recall procedures in its Regulatory Procedures Manual (“RPM”) constitute non-binding guidance.  (Opp 26-28)  Regardless of the RPM’s binding nature, federal law undisputedly occupies the entire field of drug recalls, leaving no room for Plaintiff’s state-law claims.  Plaintiff cites nothing to the contrary.}  (Da0258, ¶¶ 66, 72-73)  That is why the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme occupies the entire field of drug recalls, including communications/warnings about recall issues.  State law has no place and cannot interfere with or stand as an obstacle to implementing the federal scheme.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] respectfully requests this Court reverses the January 18, 2024 Order dismissing the Complaint under R. 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] – Tel. and Fax  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  LATONYA MILLER, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...] and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT [...]
[brief] N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4 specifically notes that Separation Agreements on charges reached where the underlying charges relate to the disability are permissible.  In this case, as Appellant is aware, the Agreement states that disciplinary charges noted in the Agreement directly related to an admitted medical disability (Da15, Par. 3, Da18, Par.13).  No other charge was present or operative:  “According to the Division, the separation from service rule "is intended to prevent members from applying for a disability retirement benefit when their service has voluntarily or involuntarily terminated for reasons unrelated to a disability."  Ibid.  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 17:1-7.5 & 17:1-7.10, 454 N.J. Super. 386, 398.  Appellant’s reference to In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 17:1-7.5 & 17:1-7.10, is not applicable and does not affect the Court’s ruling on the contractual terms of the Settlement Agreement.  Appellant next argues is that the [...] wouldn't accept the Agreement even if the terms were stricken, and the Respondent knew or should have known that the [...] would never accept the agreement – that argument is unavailable on these facts herein.  Now, with the terms stricken by the Trial Court, [...] is ready to vote on the IOD following the resolution of the within appeal (Pa5-Pa6).  Wherefore, Appellant is wrong - separation agreements are not all rejected by the [...]; the regulation permits Separation Agreements under the circumstances presented here (N.J.A.C 17:1-6.4 (b)(2)) and as shown in the [...] intent to vote on the merits of the disability following the Trial Court’s ruling (Pa5-Pa6, Da 202-203).  POINT SEVEN THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER OF JULY 25, 2023
[brief] It is undisputed that the parties never entered into a renegotiated contract that allowed [...] to be paid despite performing no services, so the only contract between the parties required [...] to perform services as a prerequisite to payment.  The success of [...]’s Counterclaim requires the court to interpret N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) as not requiring a renegotiated contract – and if the court interprets N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) as not requiring a renegotiated contract, then it has interpreted N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) in a way that would make it unconstitutional.
[brief] 1.  **Plaintiff Has Pled And Proffered A Sufficient Factual Basis To Establish A Prima Facie Case Under CEPA.  (PA000001-PA000015). **  In order to establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) she reasonably believed that her employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) she engaged in a protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
[brief] (Pa74.)  The trial court granted reconsideration finding that Carley did not apply because audio recording the exam would preclude [...] who was “following his association’s recommendations not to audio tape because of the potentially of invalidating the integrity of the process. ”  (Pa74-75.)  The court noted that “Defendant’s argument is simply they will not have the ability to choose their expert if the Order remains,” given [...] will not permit the recording of the examination or otherwise examine the party pursuant to a confidentiality order.  (Pa75.)  The trial court noted it “does not have any indication the defense bar has now determine (sic) to circumvent Carley, by only hiring neuropsychologists who do not permit audio recordings. ” (Pa75.)  In making this finding, the trial court overlooked evidence that, like the psychologist in Carley, [...] is a licensed psychologist.
[brief] Pa247.  Another publication, the *Update on Third Party Observers in Neuropsychological Evaluation:  An Interorganizational Position Paper* ("Update") observes that the [...] ([...]), the [...] ([...]), and the [...] ([...]) are united in opposing the presence of TPOs during neuro-psychological examinations.  Pa61.  In this Update, the authors reiterate the support and importance of the Policy from 2016 stating:  The presence of third-party observation is opposed because, most fundamentally, it introduces concerns about reliability and validity of test procedures and results (i.e., the presence of a TPO will negatively affect the accuracy and utility of the neuropsychological assessment).