ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In re Issuance of a Permit by Dep't of Envtl. Prot. to Ciba-Geigy Corp., 120 N.J. 164 (1990)  .............................................................................................................  24  Kohl v. Mayor & Council of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268 (1967) ....................................... 16, 20  Loscalzo v. Pini, 228 N.J. Super. 291 (App. Div. 1988) ..............................................  17  Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Asso., 86 N.J. 217 (1981) .........................  15  New Jersey Shore Builders Ass’n v. Township of Jackson, 199 N.J. 449 (2009).  27  Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010) ................................................................. 20, 24 Riggs v. Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601 (1988) ............................................................... 15, 16, 17 Rockhill v. Chesterfield Tp., 23 N.J. 117 (1957) ....................................................... 20 Swan Lake Spa LLC v. Twp. of Montville, 2019 N.J. Super. App. Div. Unpub. LEXIS 1712, *7-9 ................................................................. 20 Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6 (1978) ........ 16 Urban v. Manasquan Planning Bd., 124 N.J. 651 (1991) .................................. 24 Vineland Constr. Co., Inc. v. Township of Pennsauken, 395 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2007) ........................................................................................................... 16, 19 Ward v. Montgomery Township, 28 N.J. 529 (1959) ............................................. 15 Weymouth Township, supra, 80 N.J. at 21 ......................................................... 20 Willoughby v. Planning Board of Twp. of Deptford, 332 N.J. Super 223 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................................................................................. 35, 36 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -92 ......................................................................................
[brief] school students attend [...] in [...].  (Aa750, 794-95)³  On February 1, 2022, [...] passed a resolution pronouncing that the municipality found good cause, based on a feasibility study, to seek a withdrawal from [...] and Shore Regional and to join the Respondent Boards in a new all-purpose PK-12 regional school district.  (Aa754)  The resolution further stated that [...] would petition the Commissioner of Education for a referendum to submit this issue to the Borough’s voters pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-1, et seq.  [...] and Atlantic [...] passed similar resolutions on February 2, 2022, and June 9, 2022, respectively, seeking to have the school districts in those municipalities join an expanded PK-12 [...].  (Aa754)  On June 13, 14, and 15, 2022, the Respondent Boards passed resolutions calling for the expansion of the [...] from a limited purpose high school district to an all-purpose PK-12 regional district and for [...]’s inclusion in the new district.  (Aa754)  ³ “Aa” refers to Appellants’ appellate appendix.  Both [...] and Shore Regional attempted to block [...]’s withdrawal.  Appellants filed separate petitions of appeal with the Commissioner of Education in summer 2022, arguing that the resolutions of [...], [...], and Atlantic [...] were invalid because only a board of education, and not the governing body of a municipality, may pass resolutions seeking the Commissioner’s approval to form or enlarge a regional school district or submit such a question to voters.  (Aa754, 756-57)  Appellants further argued that, because [...]’s school district had been eliminated by statute, it must first “unmerge” from [...] before pursuing regionalization.  Respondents moved to dismiss both petitions, which were later consolidated by consent order.  On July 13, 2022, and with Appellants’ legal challenges to [...]’s participation stalling the regionalization efforts, the Respondent Boards approved superseding resolutions substantially similar to their original resolutions, but clarifying that the regionalization effort would move forward regardless of [...]’s participation.
[directive] All allegations of officer misconduct shall be thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigated to their logical conclusion.  6.1  Time Limitations  6.1.1  It is vitally important that agencies complete internal affairs investigations in a prompt manner.  Long, unnecessary delays do not simply create additional uncertainty for the subject officer; they can also threaten the integrity of an investigation and the trust of the community.  6.1.2  Most internal affairs complaints are straightforward, and most of these routine complaints can be investigated and resolved quickly.  In many cases, an internal affairs investigation will take no more than 45 days from the receipt of the complaint to the filing of disciplinary charges.  The simpler the case, the quicker the inquiry should be completed.  6.1.3  In more complex matters, however, investigators sometimes need additional time to collect evidence, interview witnesses, or take other necessary investigative steps.  In addition, when an officer’s alleged conduct gives rise to a criminal investigation, ordinarily, internal affairs investigators should stay their own inquiry pending the resolution of the criminal matter.  6.1.4  If investigators are unable to complete an internal affairs investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive on or about the 45th day.3
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021  4.8.2  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation of vehicular pursuits based solely upon motor vehicle violations.  Officers involved in vehicular pursuits must immediately notify both the supervisor and police communications, state the reason for the pursuit, and provide the information required by Addendum B of this Policy.  4.8.3  Vehicular pursuits shall be monitored by a supervisor and shall be terminated if directed to do so by a supervisor, or if the supervisor has not affirmatively authorized the continuation of the pursuit after being notified and given an opportunity to assess the situation.  17  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021
[brief] Because [...] had pending charges in Morris County at the time he committed the firearm offense in Essex County, the State argues that he falls under (a)(5).  The Recovery Court Judge rejected the State’s argument and interpreted “at the time of any pending charge” to mean “at the time he committed any pending charge. ”  (Sa82)  Thus, the Court reasoned, a defendant is only barred by the second clause of (a)(5) if: (1) he committed an offense resulting in “charges that somehow involved possession of a firearm;” and (2) those charges are still pending at the time of the Recovery Court application rather than having been “disposed (whether by guilty plea or otherwise).
[brief] The remaining legal flaws set forth in Appellant’s Brief – the conflicted [...] representation, the bankruptcy litigation, etc. – only further cement this conclusion, we submit, that relief to [...] is warranted by vacating the alimony and equitable distribution determinations and holding a fresh and fair hearing on them.  Respondent and his lawyer, in their brief before this Court, do not even acknowledge the fundamental flaws upon which [...] obtained the default judgment against his absent wife in the first place.  Instead, respondent asks this Court to simply turn a blind eye to what the transcript of the March 18, 2015 default judgment hearing plainly shows -- because the transcript was produced by either party during the Rule 4:50 proceeding below.  It’s admittedly baffling why the transcript was not provided by either party below; it should have been, because it’s the starting point for evaluating whether any divorce judgment predicated on one party’s default is valid.  But no one disputes that the March 18, 2015 default judgment hearing took place in this case before [...].  It was [...] and his divorce lawyer ([...]) who filed the Complaint for Divorce; obtained a “waiver” from [...] before the Complaint was even filed; filed for entry of default against [...] based on the signed waiver; then appeared for the default judgment hearing before [...] that day – presenting the Final Judgment of Divorce to [...] that [...] and [...] then persuaded him to enter.
[brief] THE ESI ORDER IS OVERLY BROAD AND DISREGARDS THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY CODIFIED IN THE COURT RULES.  The breadth of the ESI Order is breathtaking, compelling the production of 68,000 admittedly irrelevant documents.  Da126 ¶ 23.  The problem is not just that the subject documents might not be relevant.  Rather, the trial court expressly recognized that it was ordering the production of “a significant number of documents that are not relevant … there’s going to be a large number, and it’s argued that maybe sixty to seventy percent of the documents aren’t going to be relevant.
[brief] He testified that on December 19th, 2011, [...]’s phone placed calls at 9:14a.m., 9:46a.m., 9:50a.m., 9:51a.m., and 9:52a.m.  And 10:16a.m.  Which used a cell tower within several miles of Kendall Park robbery.  (3T 95-13 to 25, 98-3 to 25)  On January 5th, 2012, [...]’s phone placed a call to [...]’s phone; the call utilized a cell-tower whose coverage area was “just outside” the location of an AT&T store on Route 1.  (3T 104-13 to 105-4, 106-3 to 107-7)  On January 12th, 2012, [...]’s phone placed a call to [...]’s phone, which utilized a cell-tower at [...].  (3T 110-14 to 111-8)  [...] admitted that the cell-tower was not within the 2.5 to 3 mile radius of the location of the robbery that morning.  (3T 112-5 to 14)  [...]’s phone made a phone call that lasted 18.53 minutes that morning to [...]’s phone number, which originated at a tower at [...] and ended at a street address in [...].  (3T 113-25 to 114-20, 115-15 to 25)  [...]’s cell phone tower pings were never obtained nor were they ever shown to the jury.  [...] cell phone records was never subpoenaed.  [...] conceded that the tower coverage area depicted on the maps does indicate where within the area a specific call was placed.  (3T 118-14 to .23)  LEGAL ARGUMENT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (U.S. CONST., (AMEND. VI, XIV; N.J. CONST., (1947), ART I, PAR. 10), AND BECAUSE HE WAS PREJUDICED THEREBY.
[brief] ...........................................  10  A.  [...]’s initial report did not contend that the [...] caused or contributed to any water runoff.............................................  10 B.  [...]’s second report incorrectly stated that the Belgian block lining the [...]’ driveway had only one outlet next to plaintiff’s property for water flow, and he failed to mention the second outlet next to the [...]’ house...............  10 C.  In his deposition testimony, Mr. [...] admitted that he offered no opinion regarding whether the [...] caused any increase in the amount of water runoff.  ....................... 11  IV.  Plaintiff’s Engineer, [...], P.E., failed to offer any opinion on whether the [...] caused any increase in the amount of water runoff, and he did not base his opinions on generally-accepted engineering standards.  .................................................. 13  A.  Hajjar’s engineering report did not discuss the pre-existing property conditions, including the pre-existing water runoff.................................................................  13  B.  In his deposition testimony, Hajjar conceded that he offered no opinion on whether the [...] caused any change in the amount of water runoff, and he offered no generally-accepted engineering standard for his opinions............  14 C.  Plaintiff’s damages report from [...] did not specify what damages he attributed to the [...].  .......................  17  V.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the [...] because plaintiff’s experts offered only net opinions and because plaintiff offered no admissible evidence to support a claim of trespass.................................................................
[directive] The Court more than 10 months ago recognized the need to continue the administration of justice to the greatest extent possible even during an unprecedented public health crisis.  At the same time, the Court acknowledged that in certain matters with potentially serious or permanent consequences or penalties, parties should have the right to appear in person before a judge, even when it would be technologically feasible to conduct the matter using remote technologies.  The Court entered its February 22, 2021 Order to ensure that critical court events could proceed in an appropriate way, consistent with due process protections.
[brief] **THE DOCTRINE OF MOOTNESS FIRST ARGUED BY PLAINTIFF AT ORAL ARGUMENT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT DID NOT DICTATE A DIFFERENT RESULT ON RECONSIDERATION. **  Plaintiff argues that the trial court was required to dismiss his challenge to the Bond Ordinance on the grounds of mootness on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  (Pb42)  Plaintiff argues “on summary judgment argument reflection” his claims in Count One could be deemed moot.  (Pb43)  He now argues that his claims should have been adjudged moot – despite not having made any such argument prior to his motion for reconsideration – to allow him to kick the can down the road on “certain substantive issues. ”  (Id.)  The trial court was not obligated to consider Plaintiff’s mootness argument giving him a second bite at the apple.  Moreover, Plaintiff was estopped to argue his claims were moot when he argued to the trial court at oral argument on the summary judgment motion that his challenge to the Bond Ordinance was not moot by virtue of the cancellation of the appropriations made pursuant to the Bond Ordinance.  See Winters v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 86 (2012).  Indeed, Plaintiff complained that there had to be an ordinance rescinding the Bond Ordinance in order to make the matter moot, not just a resolution cancelling the appropriations thereunder.  (2T17-1:15).  Yet, at the hearing on his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argued that the challenge to the Bond Ordinance was moot because the projects were completed and funded without relying on the Bond Ordinance.  (3T12-18:13-4)  Defendants noted the inconsistency of Plaintiff’s positions during argument of the motion for reconsideration.  (3T32-18:24)  Notwithstanding, the trial court did entertain Plaintiff’s mootness arguments and ruled that his challenge to the Bond Ordinance was not moot at the time of the court’s consideration of the summary judgment motion because there was a live controversy as to the validity of the Bond Ordinance and that he was not entitled to argue mootness after the fact to avoid the preclusive effect of the ruling on that challenge.  (3T64-6:23; 66-16:67-16 and 68-7:23)  The trial court properly denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
[brief] THIS APPEAL – PRE-APPEAL  This pre-appeal number three appeals activity that occurred from the date of [...]'s 7/18/22 motion (1a) to enforce the affirmed 8/28/20 Order (8a) to the date of 12/16/22 final orders (246a, 249a).  Despite the fact on 5/18/22, this Court's opinion (12a) affirmed the 8/28/20 final order (8a) and it was no longer stayed, another two months passed and [...] had still not complied with the final order (8a).  Specifically, as per [...]'s 7/18/22 motion to enforce (1a), [...] failed to give [...] the affirmed ordered access to the decisions, settlements and Board Resolutions for each of the 11 students (4a, motion to enforce certification).  Additionally, [...] failed to pay [...] the affirmed 8/28/20 ordered $78,646 prevailing party attorney's fee.  On 7/18/22, [...] brought a motion to enforce, for interest on the $78,646 [...] held for two years and sanctions (1a).  Interest had accrued on attorney's fees totaling $4,964.53 broken down to 4 months in 2020 @ 4.5% = $1,179.69 interest; 12 months in 2021 @ 3.5% = $2,752.61 interest; and 2022 @ 2.25% = $4.84/day interest.(78a)  On 7/20/22, [...] also filed a $78,646 judgment against [...] on the 8/28/20 final order.  (43a)  On 8/1/22, Defendants filed its opposition to [...]’ motion to enforce.  (44a)  [...] did not hear oral argument on [...]’s motion until 8/26/22 over three months after the 8/28/20 order was affirmed by this Court.  (21a)  By the date of the hearing, the total interest accrued was $5,111.99.  (1T5:14-17)  At this hearing, [...] speciously asserted noncompliance occurred because of the need for a warrant to satisfy judgment.  (1T6:17-18)  Further [...] asserted that in addition to a warrant to satisfy judgment, [...] asked the court for W-9 statements to release funds and records.  (1T8:12-15)  On August 29, 2022, the lower court entered an order (60a) stating that [...] shall submit a certification as to their compliance with the August 28, 2020 order within seven days of this order.  The Order denied most of [...]’s relief they requested in their motion and proposed order.
[brief] Svenson v. Nat’l Consumer Ins. Co., 322 N.J. Super. 410, 416 (App. Div. 1999).  Likewise, PIP benefits were extended to a man who was bitten in the face by a dog being transported in the open cab of an insured pickup truck.  Diehl v. Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 296 N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 1997).  In Westchester, the Appellate Division concluded a substantial nexus existed for an injured bicyclist who was struck by a stick thrown from a moving vehicle as it “was a sufficiently foreseeable consequence of the use of the vehicle. ”  Westchester, 126 N.J. Super. at 39.  In the aforementioned Lindstrom case, the Supreme Court found that PIP benefits extended to a pedestrian injured in a drive-by shooting as the assailant’s “automobile did more than provide a setting or enhanced opportunity for the assault” but also allowed “the assailant to be at the place of attack” and provided him with “both anonymity and a means of escape.
[brief] 1  The State would adopt defendant’s citations to the record as referenced in fn.2 of his appellate brief with the addition of the following citation:  “Db” refers to defendant’s brief; “Pa” refers to the State’s appendix to this brief.  sun roof.  (8T10-1 to 61-1).  Officers observed blood in the Scion interior front driver’s seat area, front passenger seat area, front passenger door frame and door panel, and the front passenger’s side door frame, and recovered ID cards and mail belonging to both victims.  (8T10-1 to 61-1).  [...], the medical examiner who conducted [...]’s autopsy, testified that [...]’s manner of death was homicide and his cause of death was four gunshot wounds to his chest and back.
[brief] E.  Arbitrability Issue  On June 1, 2019, the parties entered into the Hackensack Subcontract, which clearly embodies the parties’ agreement that any dispute arising under the Hackensack Subcontract shall be resolved by arbitration “administered by the [...] in accordance with its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules in effect on the date of this Agreement. ”  Pa603.  The applicable rules (those in effect on June 1, 2019) were the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (“Construction Rules”) effective July 1, 2015 (“2015 Construction Rules”).  Da64-Da175.  Rule 9(a) of the Regular Track Procedures provides that:  The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.  Da124.\(^1\) Rule 9 first appeared in the AAA’s Construction Rules in 2001.  Compare Da178-Da274 (2000 Construction Rules) with Da328 (2001 Construction Rule 9(a)).  While there were various amendments to the Construction Rules leading up to the effective date of the Hackensack Project Subcontract in 2019, Rule 9(a) remained unchanged.  Da124.  For comparison, and as will be further discussed infra, the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (“Commercial Rules”)  \(^1\)  Because the amount at issue in the Hackensack Arbitration is greater than $1,000,000, the Procedures for Large, Complex Construction Disputes applies.  Those supplemental rules specifically provide, however, that they “are designed to complement the Regular Track of these Rules,” and do not provide a rule that conflicts with Rule 9.  Da107-Da109. include a rule similar to Rule 9.  Rule 7(a) of the Commercial Rules provides that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim, without any need to refer such matters first to a court. ”  Da544.  Rule 7(a) first appeared in the AAA’s Commercial Rules in 2000, then titled Rule 8(a).  Da386; see also Da405-Da465 (1996 Commercial Rules containing no rule concerning an arbitrator’s ability to determine his own jurisdiction).  In sum, the AAA adopted this substantive rule on jurisdiction in 2000 for the Commercial Rules and in 2001 for the Construction Rules.
[brief] Even aside from that question, it seems like questionable State policy to impose on a financially struggling district the substantial annual costs of State monitors charged by the State with overseeing the district’s operations and helping it get back on its fiscal feet.  2.  The annual state aid payments made to the district going forward must be sufficient to enable it to provide its students with T&E.\textsuperscript{29}  3.  The necessary legislative changes can be achieved through an amendment of the SFRA aid formula, or separate freestanding legislation, or a combination of the two, so long as they assure that the [...] receives adequate annual funding.
[brief] It is the challenged redevelopment plan itself that calls for and pre-approves and authorizes the specific legally violative government approved and government sanctioned action and plan of building private housing on the site of a long existing 300 space waterfront parking area and abolishing all 300 existing public parking spaces along the waterfront without making alternate substantially equal accommodation which is a clear and blatant.  It is a per se violation of the statutory, administrative and common law Public Trust Doctrines.  The terms of the Redevelopment Plan on its face violates, endangers and immediately and tangibly harms [...]’s rights now and today.  To argue [...] has no right to go to Court to challenge this illegal government action until some unspecified time in the future when and if the designated developer seeks final site plan approval to proceed with actual construction is nonsensical.