ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] By [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], [...], Order Approving Acquisition (December 22, 2022) (“CURE/RMC”).  (Ja31-35).  In the Matter of the Acquisition of Control of [...] and [...], By [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Hearing Officer’s Report (December 22, 2022).  (Ja36-47).  [Collectively the “Acquisition Orders. ”]  On March 31, 2023, [...] filed a motion to supplement and settle the record.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ counsel kept telling [...] that [...] was saddled with glaring qualification and credentialing problems that defendant’s counsel, [...], had raised pretrial, that [...] was retained to address, and which would be a major problem for plaintiffs before the jury if they were not allowed to name the eminently qualified [...] as their expert witness.  Plaintiffs’ counsel told [...] during reconsideration that “it was discovered during the dep[osition of [...]] that the credentialing was a significant problem with the expert” and that’s why [...] was retained.  2T10-11.  [...]:  …  We found out credentialing issues.  And I can point them out to Your Honor, because they were in [...]’s brief that, again, ten years of no privileges within the hospitals that are during the time period of the -- of the incident.  The fact that he had only 20 percent to teaching prior to the -- the year -- the year immediately preceding the incident.  These are -- these are death knells and the -- and really it’s going to happen at the end of the case as opposed to before the case and it’s -- to not to allow the plaintiffs’ counsel to have discovered that at the same time as defense counsel would go opposite of the cases actually cited in [...]’s brief.  [2T12]  Plaintiffs’ counsel told [...] that these “credentialing issues” were “not going away” -- as defendant’s counsel acknowledged.  2T27-29.  And when trial arrived, right in opening statement, [...] told the jury,
[brief] In this case, Plaintiff was not seeking a waiver from those densities or parking requirements.  As such, the reasons contained within Paragraph A fail to hold any logic in light of the record.  Paragraph B contained factual recitation.  Paragraph C claimed “the Board found that 9 homes are too many for this application. ”  It should be noted that there is nothing in any Township ordinance which would preclude a nine-lot conforming subdivision.
[brief] V.  The Motions For Reconsideration .......................................................................29  VI.  Argument ..........................................................................................................30  A.  This Court Must Review The Grant of Summer Judgment  DE NOVO, Accord Deference To The Trial Court's Conclusions, Resolve All Factual Disputes In Appellant's Favor, And Give Appellant The Benefit of All Favorable Inferences.................................................................30  B.  Appellant Demonstrated A Prima Facie Case of Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation Under the NJLAD; Moreover, The Adverse Employment Action Element Presents A Jury Question........32  1.  Appellant [...]’s Prima Facie Case of Hostile Work Environment Discrimination(Pa895-902).........................................................35  2.  Appellant [...]’s Prima Facie Case of Retaliation (Pa274-99, Pa230, Pa655-722, Pa324-417, Pa984-89, Pa990, Pa997-99, Pa1224)...............38  C.  [...] and [...] had an Obligation to Provide Appellant with a Workplace Free of Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation (Pa668-70, Pa735, Pa1004-21).................................................................41  D.  The Court erred Granting Defendants’ Reconsideration Motions as to Appellant’s Claims After Properly Denying Respondents’ Motions for Summary Judgment.................................................................47  VII.
[brief] Furthermore, although Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court’s analysis, Plaintiff fails to articulate in their brief what are the “factors” that the trial court should have considered.  As outlined in the Statement of Reasons, the trial court understood that it was to perform a four-step process in its determination of Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees, as follows: (1) Determine the reasonableness of the proposed hourly rates; (2) Determine the reasonableness of the number of hours expended; (3) Decrease the lodestar if plaintiff’s success was limited relative to the relief sought; and (4)
[brief] 2.  It is clear that no court attending to this case has been inclined to diligently “do the analysis” necessary to correct Probation’s account errors.  There have been some 8 or 9 judges attending to support issues in this case, and each new judge in turn has “rubber stamped” the ruling of the previous judge, failing to diligently verify whether previous courts have conducted adequate investigation to resolve disputed facts of the case, and issued findings of fact regarding those specific disputes.  No findings of fact with respect to specific errors cited by Appellant have been issued by the Court.  Again, “no one did the analysis. ”  It is further apparent that judges have repeatedly overlooked Probation’s failure to accurately enforce their Orders, failed to challenge Probation as to blatantly evident errors in its account record, preferring to accept Probation’s erroneous account record and “accounting” of 3/17/2022 verbatim and pedantically deny Appellant’s motions for relief so Appellant would just “go away. ”  Probation has never been required to defend and justify its account record, or its “accounting” of 3/17/2022 at a hearing before the Court.  In this manner, Probation has been improperly allowed to remain unaccountable and free of responsibility for its account errors for 25 years.  3.
[brief] **Factor 10 – Order Or Sequence Set**  Respondent admits the prosecutor’s position is unique in that the Court sets the order and sequence of the cases.  (Rb35).  This serves as another concession of employee status.  Respondent’s claim that the Township did not know how the Petitioner performed her duties is without merit.  As in the case with all of these factors, the Respondent’s investigator simply failed to interview court personnel and individuals in the Township who would have had the most knowledge about how all of these factors applied to the Petitioner.
[directive] page by Attachment 3  Order #2 - Order Committing Defendant for of Purposes a Competency Evaluation Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5  Order#2 of Order Committing Defendant For Purposes  A Competency Evaluation Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5  This order commits a defendant the custody of the Commissioner of the Department to of Health for the purposes of a competency evaluation described N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5.
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 29  11  Public Disclosure of BWC Recordings  Any agency receiving a subpoena, court order, or request pursuant to the Open Public Records Act, or the common law right to know, for a BWC recording shall, within one business day of receipt of such subpoena, court order, or request, and before complying with it, provide notice to the County Prosecutor, or to the Division of Criminal Justice where the recording was made by a state-level law enforcement agency.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  As the Authority notes in its Appellate Brief, the Appellate Division’s review of [...]’s ruling in the instant matter is *de novo*.  *Serico v. Rothberg*, 234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018); *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2011); *Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019).
[brief] Petitioner filed an application for deferred retirement benefits on July 6, 2019 (Aa45-Aa47; Ra1), of which the Board denied on January 13, 2020 (Aa48-Aa49; Aa55).  Thereafter, Petitioner appealed the Board’s determination, and the matter was transmitted to the OAL where it was filed as a contested case on July 13, 2022  Following several prehearing conferences with the ALJ, the Board filed a motion for summary decision on June 9, 2023 (Aa53).  Petitioner filed an opposition motion on June 28, 2023, and the Board filed a reply brief on August 9, 2023 (Aa53).  Petitioner filed a sur-reply on August 17, 2023, and oral argument was held on August 22, 2023 (Aa53).  [...]’s Initial Decision dated September 29, 2023 granted the Board’s Motion for Summary Decision, concluding that Petitioner was removed from employment due to misconduct directly related to his employment, finding that a “sufficient nexus between [...]’s employment as a sergeant, a sworn law enforcement officer, and the offense for which he was disciplined—testing positive for the use of an illegal drug, cocaine, in the workplace. ” (Aa58).  Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the New Jersey Appellate Division on December 11, 2023 (Aa66-68).
[brief] See *IES vs. Sunny Kim*, Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division (Docket No.: [...] decided January 23, 2023); *Oliveri vs. Y.M.F. Carpet Inc.*, 186 N.J. 511 (2006).  [...] has ruled that the Ordinances authorizing the exchange of properties with [...] were valid, not arbitrary or capricious, therefore serving a public purpose.  The Ordinance which is the subject of this litigation simply carries through with the intent and purpose of the original Ordinances, which were found to be valid and serve a public purpose.  Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel clearly is controlling in this matter.
[brief] ..............................................................................  44  In re N.J. Healthcare Coal., Order No. A12-114, 2012 WL 6653982 (Dep’t of Banking & Ins. Nov. 23, 2012)  ..............................................................................  43  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co., 212 N.J. 576 (2013)  .............................................................................................................  20 Kimba Med. Supply v. Allstate Ins. Co., 431 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 2013)  ..................................................................................  43 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163 (2006)  ............................................................................................................. 33, 37 Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)  ....................................................................................  19 Manetti v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div. 1984)  .................................................................................. 19 N.J. Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs v. Schundler, 211 N.J. 535 (2012) ............................................................................................................. 32, 38 N.J. Coal. of Health Care Providers, Inc. v. DOBI, 323 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1999) .................................................................................. 30, 40 N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Bergen Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., 410 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................................................. 44
[brief] A responding brief must conform to the same requirements of appellant’s brief.  R.2:6-4, referencing R.2:6-2(a)(4), (requiring a “concise procedural history including a statement of the nature of the proceedings…”) and (a)(5) “concise statement of the facts material to the issues on appeal supported by references to the appendix and transcript. ”) are not the place where parties should pretend that there isn’t an elephant in the room\(^2\).  Respondents’ argument is confusing, claiming that the plain error or harmful error rules apply, arguing that the argument was not made below, Rb7.  This overlooks the appellate standards of review asserted in Appellants’ brief and ignores the fact that this Court ordered the trial judge to make findings of facts and conclusions of law concerning the CFA.  This is not a case of plain error or harmful error; it is a case where the factual findings have no support anywhere in the record below and where the legal conclusion was misplaced and not consistent with the appellate mandate.  Respondents argue for the second time that a summary judgment motion should have been filed, Rb7, despite obvious material facts in dispute that required trial.  A court’s time need not be wasted for motions that have no chance of success.  A summary judgment motion would not have changed the facts or the law applicable to a CFA case.  The argument fails.  Appellants stand by their brief concerning the proper standards of review – which, again, are not even mentioned by Respondents.
[brief] The *Motor Club* Court stated:  Although the statute calls for approval by the Commissioner of the policy provisions, and the Commissioner concededly approved the blanket UM form, including the other insurance exclusion, tendered him by the insurance representatives when the act went into effect, see *Obst v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.*, [123 N.J. Super. 60, 65-66 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d o.b., 127 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 1974)], the Commissioner obviously had no power to approve a provision violative of the statutory intent.  See *Walton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.*, 518 P. 2d 1399, 1400-1401 (Sup. Ct. Hawaii 1974); *Simpson v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.*, 318 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D. Ind. 1970).  66 N.J. at 286 (emphasis supplied).  Accordingly, [...]’s approval of the C5 exclusion does not imbue that exclusion with legitimacy where it is contrary to statutory intent.
[brief] See United States v.  Seaboard Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[A] surety has the option, when its principal is default-terminated, of either coming in and completing the project or paying the government its damages, essentially the cost of completion.  A surety may, of course, also challenge the propriety of the default termination, thereby, in effect, denying liability on the bond.
[brief] A policy is created when a decision-maker with authority "issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict."  Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir 1990).  A course of conduct may be considered a custom when the practice of municipal officials, though not authorized by state law, is "so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes law.  Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 691; See Torres v. Kuzniasz, 936 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (D.N.J. 1996).  A city can be sued "for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels.  "Monell v Dept of Social Services, 436 US 658, 690-91 (1978).
[brief] Middlesex County Indictment Nos. [...] charged defendant, [...] (“defendant”), with Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution, third degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b) (Count 1), Unlawful Possession of a Handgun, second degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)1 (Count 2), and Possession of Hollow Point Ammunition, fourth degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f) (Count 3).  (Da1 to 2).  Middlesex County Indictment No. [...] charged defendant with Certain Persons Not to Possess Weapons, second degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)1.  (Da3).  Both indictments are derivative of the same factual circumstances.  Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless motor vehicle search, which was heard on November 4, 2020, by Hon. [...], J.S.C. (1T).  Judge Bucca denied the motion on the record and in a written order.  (1T95-1 to 105-24).  Defendant was tried before Judge Bucca and a jury from July 1, 2021, through July 7, 2021, after which he was convicted of Counts 1 and 2 of Indictment [...] and Count 1 of Indictment [...].  Defendant was acquitted of Count 3 of Indictment [...].  (5T44-19 to 46-14, 66-2 to 67-14; Da4 to 6).  --- 1  The record is cited as follows:  Db = Defendant’s brief.  Da = Defendant’s appendix.  1T = Transcript of suppression hearing, November 4, 2020  2T = Transcript of jury trial, July 1, 2021  3T = Transcript of jury trial, July 2, 2021  4T = Transcript of jury trial, July 6, 2021  5T = Transcript of jury trial, July 7, 2021  6T = Transcript of sentence, August 24, 2021  On August 24, 2021, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirteen years in New Jersey State Prison with a five-year period of parole ineligibility.  (6T28-14 to 37-4; Da7 to 12).  On June 29, 2023, defendant filed this appeal.  (Da14).  **COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] 34 State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475 (2015) ..................................................... 47, 60 State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) .........................................................  49 State v. Moon, 396 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 2009) ................................. 58 State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) ..............................................................  57 State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3 (1992) ............................................................... 47, 60 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468 (2017) ............................................................ 51, 54, 56 State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47 (1993) ..............................................................  36 State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293 (1988) .........................................................  34 State v. Terry, 218 N.J. 224 (2014) ............................................................  55 State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119 (2006) .........................................................  35 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) ..........................................................
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Law Division’s Order finding the defendant guilty of the charged offense be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...] /s/ [...]  [...]  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY ID# 014882006  Cc: [...]  October 31, 2024  November 12, 2024  LETTER IN LIEU OF A MORE FORMAL REPLY  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT
[brief] Second, [...] attempts to resurrect a ballot with a blank certificate by claiming that the trial court erred in refusing to count his niece’s mail-in ballot.  Testimony established that the voter failed to follow the clear instructions provided.  [...] now asks this Court to create a special exception for one voter, his niece, not based on law, but on the voter’s relationship to him.  But a blank certificate is an express statutory defect that renders a ballot invalid.  This rule applies to all voters equally.  If voters are not required to complete and validate their mail in ballots, then the entire statutory framework for mail-in voting loses meaning.  The Legislature has created opportunities to cure certain defects, but they did not permit the ability to cure a failure to complete the certification.  Finally, [...] seeks to count three ballots postmarked three days after the election, claiming that the trial court further erred in disallowing them despite testimony that the voters mailed their ballots prior to 9:00 p.m. on Election Day.  But the law is clear – ballots must be postmarked and received within the statutory deadlines.  When a voter says they mailed their ballot is irrelevant.  The only thing that matters under the law is when the ballot was postmarked and when it was received.  If these voters were genuinely concerned about having their votes counted, they should not have waited weeks to mail their ballots.  Longstanding authority bars the inclusion of late ballots because without firm deadlines election officials would be counting ballots indefinitely.  Finality matters, and the trial court was correct in recognizing that principle and dismissing these ballots.
[brief] On April 11, 2019, using the mobile application “Adam4Adam,” Defendant engaged in a text message chat with an undercover police officer (“UC”) who was posing as an underage male.  (Pa14).  The parties never spoke.  (Pa14).  During the text message exchange, the following questions were asked and answered before Defendant agreed to meet the UC:  LN: cool are you a top or bottom UC: like both, but bottom more LN: cool.  I can travel to you UC: nice.  how old r u LN: 29 and you UC: 14 gonna be 15 in 2 weeks LN: oh ok LN: ? (Pa14).  When Defendant arrived at the agreed upon location, he was arrested by the [...].  Immediately following his arrest on April 11, 2019, Defendant was interviewed at the [...] by [...] and [...] of the [...].  After being read his Miranda rights, Defendant agreed to speak with the detectives.  In response to a question from law enforcement as to why he was arrested, Defendant said it was because he was “an idiot. ”  Defendant explained:  Well, I was just being curious.  I’m not bad person.  I don’t have a (IA) or anything.  It just…I kind figured something was wrong with the age and then the auntie’s house.  That’s why I didn’t give my real age or car I was driving because I was like (IA) kind of weird.  (Pa19).  Defendant explained that he saw a picture that the UC used, that the user did not look young, and his profile indicated he was at least eighteen (18) years old.  (Pa20; Pa7).  When the UC texted that he was fourteen (14) years old, Defendant questioned this by texting a question mark back to the UC.  (Pa20).  Defendant never indicated to officers that he believed he was communicating with someone who was actually fourteen (14) years old.
[brief] POINT VII REVERSAL IS NOT WARRANTED WHERE DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE JURY’S VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (raised in Defendant’s pro se submission)  Defendant argues that the jury’s verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence and should therefore be set aside.  (See Pb18 to 19).  For reasons argued above, the jury’s conclusion was not “clearly and convincingly” deficient to constitute a miscarriage of justice, as noted by the trial court in its decision denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.  (State v. Johnson, 203 N.J. Super. 127, 134  Defendant also argues that the jury’s verdict should be set aside due to the purported untruthfulness of [...]’s testimony and the allegedly incompetent police investigation.  (Pb16 to 19).  These bare arguments do not establish that the jury’s verdict was a miscarriage of justice, particularly where defense counsel attacked [...]’s credibility, emphasized the lack of witnesses or implicating DNA evidence, and noted the lack of an established motivation in the presence of the jury.  (See Johnson, 203 N.J. Super. at 134).  Defendant’s argument that the State unlawfully withheld exculpatory information from the grand jury is inaccurate and irrelevant to the issue at bar.  (See Pb18 to 19).
[brief] WHICH DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of the Interlocutory Order dated August 26, 2019 (Denying [...]’s Motion for Recusal of Trial Court Judge) filed December 24, 2019 Da846  Certification of [...] in Support of Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of the Interlocutory Order dated August 26, 2019 Da849  **EXHIBIT A** August 26, 2019 Order Denying Motion For Recusal and Referral to a New Judge (Da974)  **EXHIBIT B** January 7, 1963 Agreement (Da13)  **EXHIBIT C**  Appellate Division Opinion Docket [...] decided June 25, 2019 (Da751)  **EXHIBIT D** Notice of Motion for Disqualification of Judge on the Remand as Per N.J.S.A. 2A:15-49 and R.l:12-1filed July 11, 2019 (Da794)  Letter Brief (omitted) **Certification of [...] in Support of Disqualification and Recusal with attached Exhibit** (Da767)  EXHIBIT E Transcript of Order to Show Cause Dated August 26, 2019 (omitted) (4T)  EXHIBIT F  Transcript of Case Management Conference September 23, 2019  **EXHIBIT G  Transcript of Trial dated June 5, 2017**  PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DATED AUGUST 26, 2019