ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] When the prosecutor questioned [...] at trial, he elicited the circumstances resulting in [...] being charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, and asked her: “What happened to those charges when you went to court?”  She responded that she entered a pre-trial intervention (PTI) program, which she described as a “no-plea program.  After you complete it, the case is dismissed. ”  She also testified that she got “kicked out” of the program, but the charges were nonetheless dismissed.  The prosecutor did not elicit, and [...] did not testify, that as a condition of her enrollment in the PTI program, she agreed to cooperate fully with the State and to testify, if necessary, against [...] and [...].
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[brief] The counts were as follows: (1) second-degree burglary in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count 1) (2) first-degree knowing/purposeful murder of [...] in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2) (count 2), (3) first-degree felony murder of [...] in violation of 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count 3)  (4) first-degree knowing/purposeful murder of [...] in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2) (count 4), --- 1  “Pa” refers to the State’s appendix.  “Pca” refers to the State’s confidential appendix.  “Db” refers to defendant’s brief.  “Da” refers to defendant’s appendix.  “1T” refers to the plea transcript of March 28, 1995.  “2T” refers to the sentencing transcript of May 18, 1995.  “3T” refers to the sentencing transcript of September 4, 2018.  “4T” refers to the sentencing transcript of January 29, 2019.  “5T” refers to the sentencing transcript of March 31, 2023.
[brief] However, the record reflects that the temporary regulator station could not be equipped with a heating unit; as a result, the station and related equipment experienced “icing” issues, where a significant pressure drop between the transmission and distribution systems would cause ice to form on the equipment.  (1T135:18-25; Aa773; Aa816-17; Ra6-8).  The panel’s testimony indicated that the icing issues increased the risk of service outages, including in winter, and the temporary station was “regularly encased in ice” throughout the year and “continuously encased in ice” during winter, despite [...]’s mitigatory efforts to thaw the station and operate the equipment at lower pressures.  (Ra8-9; Aa818; 1T164:3-20).  The record reflects that, due to the icing issues, [...] experienced two significant icing incidents in 2014 and 2018, which disrupted service for a full day.  (Aa819-20; 1T159:1-5; 1T163:20-164:20; 1T165:23-166:10; 1T171:15-172:9).  Therefore, [...]’s claims that the reliability of the temporary regulator station is “not in any way compromised” and that the two significant icing incidents “did not present any realistic risk of loss of service” are false.
[brief] (See November 28, 2023 Decision Transcript, Page 9, Lines 22-24).  This statement CONTRADICTS what was said and what was done by the trial judge at the October 19, 2023 Hearing.  And in the November 30, 2023 decision transcript, he said:  "...on November 28, 2023, I denied the request for oral argument and I denied both motions.  Now since that time, I got some additional letters from [...].
[brief] Also [...] did not dispute the fact that I defaulted on my monthly mortgage payments with [...] in Sep 2008 as pleaded by [...] in its Foreclosure Complaint of 3/10/09.  [...] did not dispute that it purchased the alleged debt from [...] in a fire sale on 2/28/14.  Conclusively the governing law to cover [...]’s practices is Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).
[brief] In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, the Court held:  [I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  [Id. at 486-87 (emphasis added). ]  Here, where [...] alleges that his conviction was reversed on direct appeal on March 6, 2018, on the face of the complaint, it would appear to be entirely inconsistent with Heck to hold that [...]’s malicious prosecution claim did not also accrue on March 6, 2018.  (Pa12); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (“[A] § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal .  . . .”).  In Wallace, a decision issued eleven years after Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, the Court removed any doubt as to this understanding, clarifying that Heck bar only applies to “an ‘outstanding criminal judgment. ’”  See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added).  As such, the Wallace Court labeled an argument seeking to extend Heck to claims that would impugn the validity of an anticipated future conviction both a “bizarre extension of Heck” and as “a principle that goes well beyond Heck[.]”
[directive] TELEPHONE: Director  LE DIRECTIVE NO. AG 2004-4  ALL COUNTY PROSECUTORS TO: S. AAG  [...], C h i e w FROM: Prosecutors  Supervision and Coordination Bureau October 29,2004  DATE: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-4:  SUBJECT: Standardization of External Audits of County Prosecutor’s Office Forfeiture Funds
[brief] See *Alberts v. Gaekler*, 446 N.J. Super. 551, 565 (Law. Div. 2014) and *Tichenor v. Santillo*, 218 N.J. Super. 165, 173, (App. Div. 1987).  A.  PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A STANDARD OF CARE APPLICABLE TO [...] AS A CONSTRUCTION INSPECTOR.
[directive] Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (For Use in Non-Civil Service Jurisdictions Only)  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, if the police officer requests a hearing, such hearing shall be not less than 10 nor more than 30 days from date of service of this notice unless such time requirements are waived by the parties.  FROM  Employing Agency Name Address & Phone Number  Case ID # TO Employee Name Title Date  You are hereby notified that the following charge(s) have been made against you (if necessary, use additional sheets and attach).  Charges:  Incident(s) giving rise to the charge(s) and the date(s) on which it/they occurred  If checked, charges are continued on attached page.  If checked, incidents are continued on attached page.  You are hereby suspended effective _______________________________________________ (Check box to indicate if the employee is suspended pending final disposition of the matter)  You must enter a plea of guilty or not guilty, in writing, on or before ____________________________________________  You may waive your right to a hearing.  If you request a hearing it will be held on ____________________________  At (time)  ________________ at (place of hearing)  _______________________________________________  The following disciplinary action may be taken against you:  Suspension for __________ working days, beginning ______________ and ending ___________________  Indefinite suspension pending criminal charges effective (date)  ____________________________________  Removal, effective (date)  _________________________________________________________________  Demotion to position of __________________________ effective (date)  ____________________________  Resignation not in good standing, effective (date)  ________________  Other Disciplinary Action__________  Fine ________ which is equal to _________ (number of working days)  Appointing authority or authorized agent’s signature and title.  Signature _________________________________  Title  ____________________________________  This form must be personally served on the employee or sent by certified or registered mail.  Certified or Registered Mail Receipt number _____________________________  Signature of Server _______________________________  Date of person service ___________________  I hereby acknowledge service of the within charges  Signature _____________________________________  Print Name ____________________________________  Appendix G
[brief] On November 5, 2019, [...] (hereinafter defendant) was issued motor vehicle summonses for Driving While Intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (Summons No. [...]); Reckless Driving, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-96 (Summons No. [...]); and Careless Driving, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97 (Summons No. [...]).  (Aa92-Aa95).  On February 25, 2022, a probable cause hearing was held before the Honorable [...], J.M.C. (2T).  At the hearing, Officer [...] testified on behalf of the State.  (2T7:7-8).  [...] stated that while he was on duty on ---  1
[brief] See United States v. Kassimu, 188 F. App’x 264, 265 (5th Cir. 2006) (“A business record can be authenticated by testimony of either the ‘custodian’ of the record or an ‘other qualified witness. ’  An ‘other qualified witness’ is defined as ‘one who can explain the record keeping system of the organization and vouch that the requirements of Rule 803(6) [e.g., regarding when the record was made, and whether it was kept in the course of regularly conducted business activities] are met. ’”); see also State v. Rinker, 446 N.J. Super. 347, 362 (App. Div. 2016) (stating that New Jersey courts “frequently consider . . . federal precedent construing analogous Federal Rules of Evidence”).  [...] also argues that “a business record is not self-authenticating under NJ Evid. R. 902. ” (Appellant Br., 43.)  That is yet another red herring.  [...] did not offer self-authenticating records.  Rather, [...] offered business records properly authenticated by an “other qualified witness,” as permitted under Kassimu.
[brief] (14T:209-13 to 20; 216-18 to 217-4)  Although he could not identify the person in the video and did not think he “had enough to prove the case,” he considered [...] a “suspect. ”  (14T:212-11 to 213-2)  January 27, 2018  On Saturday, January 27, 2018, Patrolman [...] went to [...] because it was “engulfed in flames. ”  (13T:118-19 to 120-5)  Fire trucks began to arrive “a few minutes” after he did.  (13T:124-16 to 125-2)  Maguire was ordered by his sergeant to check the driveway of [...], where Leonard [...] the 2nd lived, for a red Hyundai Elantra.  (13T:127-6 to 15; 131-18 to 132-12)  He did not see the car at the address, which was less than a mile away.  (13T:141-13 to 18)  He did not knock on the door of the house to see if anyone was home.  (13T:141-6 to 12)  The fire destroyed the building.  (14T:214-13 to 17)  Deputy Fire Marshal [...], investigated the fire’s cause and origin.  (14T:76-7 to 21)  He concluded the fire began in the corner of the building near the secretary’s office.  (14T:152-20 to 153-5)  Tuberion was “unable to rule out” two potential causes of the fire: an intentional fire began with an ignitable liquid or an electrical fire.  (14T:98-11 to 99-16)  [...] watched surveillance footage from [...] that showed the fire begin at around 10:10 pm on January 27.
[directive] (a)  Crime.  Complaint regarding the commission of an illegal act that constitutes a violation of the criminal code including disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses.  (b)  Excessive force.  Complaint regarding the use or threatened use of excessive force against a person.  (c)  Improper arrest.  Complaint that the restraint of a person's liberty was improper, unjust, or violated the person's civil rights.  (d)  Improper entry.  Complaint that entry into a building or onto property was improper or that excessive force was used against property to gain entry.  (e)  Improper search.  Complaint that the search of a person or property was improper, unjust, violated established agency procedures or violated the person's civil rights.  (f)
[brief] \(^{11}\)  Shortly after the nation’s founding, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “one Legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was competent to pass, and . . . one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature. ”  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).  It follows then that “‘a general law. . . may be repealed amended or disregarded by the legislature which enacted it,’ and ‘is not binding upon any \(^{11}\)  There are exceptions to this principle, not relevant here, where the Legislature unmistakably creates a contractual or vested right.  See Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245, 279 (2016). subsequent legislature. ””  United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873 (1996) (plurality) (quoting Manigualt v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905)).  In fact, members of the Supreme Court have described this principle as “so obvious as rarely to be stated. ”  Ibid. (quoting [...], Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 Yale L.J. 189, 191 (1972)).  New Jersey courts have likewise eschewed the concept of legislative entrenchment, holding that the Legislature “cannot divest itself or its successors of its sovereignty. ”  Delaware & Raritan Canal Co. v. Camden & Atl. R.R. Co., 16 N.J. Eq. 321, 364 (Ch. 1863).  As our Supreme Court succinctly explained, “[s]tatutes are the expression of legislative policy and may accordingly be changed at the Legislature’s will.
[brief] A review of the facts in each case confirms that they differ significantly from [...]’s Noise Ordinance.  The ordinance in *Holland* prohibited “The making, creation or permitting of any unreasonably loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise” and “The making, creating or permitting of any noise of such character, intensity or duration as to be detrimental to the life, health or welfare of any individual or which either steadily or intermittently annoys, disturbs, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, peace or safety of any individual”  Holland, 132 N.J. Super. at 21.  While the decision did not reflect the facts upon which the defendant was found guilty, the ordinance did not contain [...]’s same limitation against “loud talking” or “other noises” at issue in this matter.  In Bynum, the court addressed violations of an ordinance prohibiting “The transmission of radio signals and/or emissions causing any interference upon the visual and/or auditory operation of [television and other devices] in such a manner as to disturb the peace, quiet and comfort of the neighboring inhabitants[.]”  Bynum, 181 N.J. Super. at 4-5.  The defendant was a radio operator attacking the ordinance under which he was issued summonses since his transmissions interfered with neighbors’ electronic devices.  Again, the unamplified human voice was not addressed in the ordinance or in the case.  In Friedman, the defendants were charged with violating an anti-noise ordinance because their dog repeatedly barked in the early morning hours, often waking up a neighbor.  Friedman, 304 N.J. Super. at 3.  There, the ordinance provided:
[brief] Defendants and Counsel has acknowledged deposition was not scheduled by the trial court; Plaintiff’s settlement conference requests were suspended indefinitely and the scheduling request for deposition from the trial court were not acknowledged at least once from the trial court either.  Calendaring deposition before the expiration of discovery deadlines are pertinent to the case and all legal cases; this alleviates the additional need to extend discovery repetitively delaying the resolution of the dispute.  See Halloran v. Stanziale, Docket No. A-4189-15T2 (App. Div. Nov. 14, 2017).  In short, Plaintiff’s calendar requests were within court rules and procedures.
[brief] Exclusions to insurance coverage “must be narrowly construed,” and the burden of establishing that the exclusion applies is on the insurer.  Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80, 95 (1997).  Accordingly, [...] had the burden at summary judgment of showing that the claims in the Underlying Action — namely, tortious interference — fell within the Policy’s exclusion such that it could disclaim coverage.  The relevant exclusions require that [...] show that the injury complained of either (1) was “caused by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict personal and advertising injury,” or (2) that the injury arose “out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity. ”  (Da182.)  Based on the below, the exclusions do not apply to claims of tortious interference and, in any event, material issues of fact preclude [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  A.  **The Policy Does Not Exclude Tortious Interference Claims**  In order to impose liability for tortious interference, a finder of fact must find four elements: (1) interference with a prospective economic advantage or contractual relationship; (2) that the interference was done intentionally and with malice; (3) a loss; and (4) the loss was caused by the interference.  *Macdougall v. Weichert*, 144 N.J. 380, 403-404 (1996).  As such, a tortious interference claim does not require an intention to cause the injury alleged.
[brief] Respondent did not file any cross-motion.  On June 9, 2023, [...] issued her Initial Decision granting Complainant’s Motion for Summary Decision and issuing the penalty of “censure. ”  (Ca019-040).  In doing so, [...] found that Respondent had violated the Act as to Count 1 by making a public social media post from a Facebook page on which she held herself out as a Board member, “that explicitly urged Board employees to drop their membership with [...] [[...]] and [...] [[...]].”  (Ca027).  In doing so, [...] cited to a robust body of caselaw issued by the Commission on school board member social media use.  (Ca027-031).  [...] found that, by making the post that was the subject of Count 1, Respondent “not only had the ability to compromise the Board,” as the Board negotiates directly with these unions, but that this post had directly resulted in litigation against the Board, and that Respondent’s actions “brought into question the Board’s ability to fairly and impartially negotiate its labor contract. ” (Ca031).  She found that, not only did this post have the potential to compromise the Board in violation of the Act, but that “it did compromise the Board” in violation of the Act.  Id.  [...] also found that Respondent had violated the Act by making a social media post on a Facebook page from which she held herself out as a Board member which called [...] a “Tyrannical POS” for extending New Jersey’s School Mask Mandate and urged community members to flout the applicable Executive Order.  (Ca032-Ca035).  In so finding [...] held that “her posting effectively urged others to take action against [Executive Order 251],” that Respondent “led by example by refusing to wear a face mask at the Board meetings in utter disregard of EO 251 and Board members’ obligation to abide by and enforce EO 251 within the school district,” and that “by her own admission” Respondent had violated EO 251 at Board meetings, the purpose of which “was to urge others” to do the same.  (Ca034-35).  [...] found that “[s]everal of Respondent’s postings on Facebook have been the subject of community criticism at Board meetings and caused the Board to take official action to formally condemn and denounce certain posts, request the Respondent remove the posts, and publicly comment that no one Board member has the authority to speak for the Board. ” (Ca024).
[directive] Bail applying the in discretion their exercise should prosecutors and law a on when guidelines issue General to Attorney the (requiring 2A:162-16(c) N.J.S.A. acomplaint-warrant).  for apply may officer enforcement statutory implementation and every address to attempt not does Directive  This relevant for every account to attempt it does Nor arise. to likely issue interpretation decisions.  case-specific making in consider should prosecutors and police that circumstance requiring prosecutors, and for police responsibilities general the forth sets Directive the Rather, Law Reform Bail implementing the for procedures and policies, systems, establish to them case- which framework within general a establishes words, other in Directive, This efficiently. or legal specific more understanding that the with done is This made. will be decisions specific to appropriate necessary and becomes that if future in the provided be may guidance policy recent the statute and new of administration the efficient and uniform of a benefits the achieve Constitution.  Jersey New the of 11 paragraph I, Article to amendment in discretion enforcement law of exercise the guide framework to general establish a  To police for standards substantive establishes Directive this Law, Reform Bail the implementing be should defendant when a inform that presumptions rebuttable (e.g., apply to prosecutors and file should prosecutors when acomplaint-warrant, than rather acomplaint-summons by charged imposes etc.), and release, pretrial defendant's a revoke to or detention pretrial for motion a discretion exercising in uniformity of degree appropriate an ensure to requirements procedural supervisory or prosecutors designated by approved be decisions certain that requiring (e.g., will safeguards procedural and standards substantive of combination This officers).
[brief] ..........................................................................  35  State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118 (2017) .......................................................................... 22, 23, 27 State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982)  .............................................................................. 69, 71 State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165 (2009)  .......................................................................... 22 State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275 (2006) .......................................................................... 35, 44 State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265 (1986)
[brief] Seven months after *MAG*, this court reaffirmed in *Bent* that “a party requesting access to a public record under OPRA must specifically describe the document sought. ”  381 N.J. Super. at 37 (citing *MAG*, 375 N.J. Super. at 546-49)); see also *ibid.* (holding that OPRA “‘does not authorize a party to make a blanket request for every document’ a public agency has on file”) (quoting *Gannett N.J. Partners, LP v. Cnty. of Middlesex*, 379 N.J. Super. 205, 213 (App. Div. 2005)).  Adopting the *MAG* court’s reliance on *Hangartner*, this court in *Bent* likewise cautioned that “a proper request under OPRA must identify with reasonable clarity those documents that are desired, and a party cannot satisfy this requirement by simply requesting all of an agency’s documents. ”  *Ibid.*  And, expanding *MAG*, the *Bent* court also found that “OPRA does not authorize unbridled searches of an agency’s property. ”  *Ibid.*  In 2010, this court again reaffirmed the requirement that OPRA requestors must identify the documents they are seeking with reasonable clarity and that this obligation cannot be circumvented by simply requesting all of an agency’s records.