ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On January 20, 2023, Plaintiffs [...] and his wife, [...], filed their Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, New Jersey.  Pa0005-Pa0018.  On March 8, 2023, Defendant [...] d/b/a [...] (hereinafter "[...]") filed its Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint with Separate Defenses, and Jury Demand.  Pa0019-Pa0027.  In its Answer, [...] asserted, as its Twenty-Fourth Defense, "all rights and defenses available to it under the Customer Release, Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, Arbitration and Indemnification Agreement signed and submitted by Plaintiffs."  Pa0024.  On October 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion For Leave to File a First Amended Complaint.  Pa0028.  On December 7, 2023, the Court entered an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave to File a First Amended Complaint to add, in relevant part, [...] as a Defendant.  Pa 0066-Pa67.  On March 22, 2024, [...] filed a Notice of Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration.  Pa0068.  On March 25, 2024, Plaintiffs executed a Stipulation Extending [...]'s time to file a responsive pleading to April 13, 2024.  Pa0244.  On April 4, 2024, [...] filed its Cross Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration.  Pa0242.  On April 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed Opposition to [...]'s Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration.  Pa262.  On April 8, 2024, [...] filed a Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition.  Pa0347.  On April 9, 2024, [...] filed its Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition.  Pa0355.  On May 2, 2024, the Trial Court heard lengthy oral argument on the Defendants' Motions.  T1.  The Trial Court afforded all parties a full and fair opportunity to argue their positions.  T2.  Thereafter, in a thorough, thoughtful and legally supported ruling, the Court granted the Defendants' Motions.  T.28 L.25.  In so holding, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. stated:  *** this Court finds that the participant agreement here was voluntarily signed by the Plaintiff.  It's valid.  It's enforceable.  It's undisputed that the Plaintiff signed the agreement—the participation agreement on behalf of his minor child and himself, as a precondition to enter the Defendant's indoor playground.  ***  T.27 L. 9-15.  The Trial Court rejected the Plaintiffs' claims that the Agreement is ambiguous stating:  ***  The Court finds that the Plaintiff's contention that the language within the agreement is ambiguous is without merit and is unsupported by the language in the agreement itself.  The fact that there—there are not provisions demonstrating the differences between an arbitration and how an arbitration functions, and how a trial or trial by jury functions, is not sufficient—is not sufficient.  The Court finds that the agreement is actually a comprehensive agreement.  And is enforceable.  And is not void as a matter of public policy.  ***  T.27 L.24-T.28 L.9.  On May 2, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered two (2) Orders granting the Defendants' Motions to Stay the Litigation and Compel Arbitration.  Pa0001-Pa0004.  Plaintiffs filed the instant appeal.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Indeed, the Board’s ruling that [...]’s equity in the Unit was merely $12,804.88 was preposterous (leading to this third Superior Court action).  That artificially low equity value—plainly intended to benefit [...] and harm [...]—deprived [...] of any “fair return” as required constitutionally and under [...]’s ordinance.  That [...] is protected by rent control is not disputed.  But rent control protects not only tenants but also owners by giving them recourse if subsidizing tenants and being denied a fair return.
[brief] Point II  The jury was properly instructed on robbery and accomplice liability.  The trial court properly instructed the jury on robbery and accomplice liability.  Defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to specifically instruct the jury that in order to convict him of robbery, they had to find he shared his codefendant’s purpose of committing the robbery with a gun, lacks merit because it is concerned with a single portion of the jury charge and fails to consider the jury charge as a whole to determine its overall effect.  Furthermore, there was no rational basis to charge second-degree robbery in this case as a lesser-included charge, and defendant’s trial counsel did not request such.  “When a defendant does not object to an alleged error at trial, such error is reviewed under the plain error standard. ”
[brief] The judge further instructed the jury that it could consider flight as a consciousness of guilt if it found that defendant’s purpose in leaving was to evade arrest or accusation for the offenses charged in the indictment.  (27T199-13 to 17).  The judge instructed the jury that if it found flight for the purpose of evading arrest or accusation, it could consider this evidence in connection with all the other evidence in the case as an indication of consciousness of guilt.  (27T199-18 to 25).  The judge ended the charge by instructing the jury that it was up to the jury as the judge of the facts to decide if there was evidence of flight as a consciousness of guilt and the weight to be given to the evidence.
[brief] As in Porreca, Appellant seeks an award of counsel fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(2, which permits a court, *in its discretion*, to award attorney’s fees from a fund in court.  By way of illustration, “a Court has approved an award of counsel fees from a fund in court to taxpayer plaintiffs whose suit resulted in an indirect benefit to all Atlantic City taxpayers. ”  *Porreca v. City of Millville*, 419 N.J.Super at 226 (referencing *Tabaac v. City of Atlantic City*, 174 N.J.Super 519, 537-38 (Law Div. 1980).  The Court in *Porreca* established a two step-process to determine the applicability of the “fund in court” rule.
[brief] CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................  i  TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS AND RULINGS..............................  iv  RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................  2  I.  IT WAS A MISAPPLICATION OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE CHANCERY COURT TO PERMIT A MAJORITY IN A SHAREHOLDER CASE TO VOTE THE MINORITY TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR LEGAL FEES, OR THAT THE “BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE” PERMITS CIRCUMVENTION OF R. 4:42-9’S LIMITATIONS (Pa3196, n2)(11T6:22-7:21).......................
[directive] Law enforcement officers frequently encounter children who have been exposed to traumatic events, such as domestic violence incidents or the arrest of a parent for criminal activity.  These “adverse childhood experiences” (ACEs) can be broad sweeping and include young people experiencing violence, abuse or neglect, witnessing violence in the home, or having a family member attempt or commit suicide.  Because their brains are not fully developed, children may not have the capability to process and respond to ACEs.  As a result, they must often continue about their day and attend school, as if they did not just experience a possibly life- altering event.  And because the school is unaware that the child was recently exposed to a traumatic event, teachers may unwittingly compound the problem by disciplining the child for behavioral or performance issues when those issues may be linked to the child’s traumatic exposure.  Unaddressed exposure to childhood trauma may, therefore, lead to truancy, drug use, depression, and suicide among our most vulnerable population, as well as contribute to poor physical and mental health in adulthood.  Law enforcement officers who respond to incidents where a child was exposed to a traumatic event are uniquely situated to help an affected child.  To break negative cycles and improve outcomes for children who experience ACEs, innovative law enforcement leaders and stakeholders across New Jersey have implemented a number of groundbreaking programs.  In 2018, for example, the [...] implemented a “Handle With Care” program1 (HWC) that established protocols for law enforcement communication with the Middle Township’s school districts to enhance awareness of the significant risks to children who were exposed to traumatic events.  Soon thereafter, in Cape May County, the [...] enacted a countywide HWC program for juveniles, also through partnership with its school districts.  “Handle With Care” is a program that originated in Charleston, West Virginia, in 2013, between the [...], the [...], and the [...].  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable
[brief] A.  The Property  [...] is a homeowners’ association that owns property along the tidal waters of the North Branch of the Beaverdam Creek in the [...], identified as [...] (the “Property”).  (Aa80; Aa116; Ra2).  The Property includes three residential condominium buildings, a swimming pool, walkways, driveways, parking lots, landscaping and associated improvements.  (Aa116; Ra2; Ra36).  Along the waterfront, the Property includes two paved cul-de-sacs each with several parking spaces, and a boat basin with boat slips dedicated for condominium residents.  (Aa116; Ra2-3; Ra44; Ra48).  Currently, there is no public access to the waterfront on the Property, nor has there been any since the Property was developed as  1
[brief] Even if one were to accept that Mejia did affect the continuing viability of Burt, however, the process followed by the trial court in this case is untenable.  [...] held orders from 2017 and 2018 that explicitly imposed the framework of Burt to this case.  Again, as excerpted above, during oral argument in 2018, the trial court specifically affirmed plaintiffs’ counsel’s inquiry that Burt treatment would apply to these defendants and plaintiffs would be unable to recover “whatever is ascribed” to the Burt defendants.(2T29-2T30).  Mejia was decided on March 16, 2020, about two years after that exchange.  This case was not reached for trial until November 28, 2022, almost three years after Mejia.  Plaintiffs’ counsel did not file any type of motion for reconsideration based on Mejia in the approximately 32 months between the Mejia decision and the November 28, 2022 start of trial.  Instead, he appeared on that first day of trial and suggested that the trial must be adjourned because the Burt defendant orders from 2017-18 were, according to plaintiffs, incorrect.  The practical consequences of the post-verdict reconsideration were tremendous, resulting in the imposition of approximately $800,000 in additional exposure.  In no sense was this process “consonant with the interests of justice,” and the trial court’s post-verdict reconsideration was unfounded.
[brief] [...] owned part of Lot 22, it was improper for the Trial Court to grant Summary Judgment to [...] on their claim of ownership, for ejectment, to quiet title in [...]’s property, for private nuisance and all of the other claims made for relief at the Trial Court.  [...] used the property throughout the week and on the weekends because church services were held a few days during the week and other activities took place at the church.  The claim of sporadic use of the land in question is inaccurate as it is not based on reality.  [...] slept on their rights and showed up 36 years after coming into possession of this land and tepidly made claim to this land.  Any ownership of the part of Lot 22 that had been owned by [...] dissipated after the passage of thirty years of the church’s use of this land which had a start date of June 30, 1976 when [...] purchased this property.  It is requested that the arguments made by [...] about ownership of the Lot 22 be disregarded as it was [...]’s responsibility to object to the use of this land that they believed was theirs after being on notice of the usage of this land and they failed to timely object.  RESPONSE TO POINT II
[brief] Indeed, where there is uncertainty as to lost profits, fairness dictates that the uncertainty be laid “at the door of the wrongdoer who altered the proper course of events instead of at the door of the injured party. ”  *See id.*  Here, Plaintiffs’ lost profits are far beyond merely “reasonably certain” because the development they were prevented from developing exists in the same way it would have, had they been allowed to develop the project.  Thus, [...]’s expert report calculates Plaintiffs’ lost damages with reasonable certainty, and more.
[brief] ”  *L.C.S., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 371 N.J. Super. 482, 491 (App. Div. 2004) (citing *Aetna Ins. Co. v. Weiss*, 174 N.J.Super. 292, 296 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 85 N.J. 127 (1980)).  The burden is on the insurer to show that coverage limitations apply.
[brief] As explained by the Supreme Court in City of Austin v. Reagan Nat'l Advert. of Austin, LLC:  [T]o survive intermediate scrutiny, a restriction on speech or expression must be “‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. ’”  City of Austin v. Reagan Nat'l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 1475-76 (2022), quoting, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989).  To survive intermediate scrutiny, the government's interests need not be accomplished through the “least restrictive or least intrusive means. ”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
[brief] Sentencing**  The State asked the court to sentence [...] to concurrent 10-year terms on the two terroristic threats charges, and a consecutive 18-month term “for either stalking or harassment,” for an aggregate term of 11 years and 6 months.  (6T 28-16 to 21; 35-1 to 5)  The court imposed an aggregate 16-year term.  (6T 47-13 to 48-23)  The sentencing court found that “none of the counts merge. ”  (6T 41-15)  The court found aggravating factors three (the risk that the defendant will commit another offense), six (the extent of the defendant’s criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses), and nine (the need to deter the defendant and others) and no mitigating factors.  (6T 41-19 to 42-10)  Contrary to the State’s recommendation, the court found that “consecutive sentences are justified for the two separate counts of terroristic threats” (6T 45-12 to 17) under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
[brief] 88,123, 922 A.2d 710 (2007) | 17, 21 | | In re Adoption of N.J.A.C.5:96 & 5:97, 221 N.J. 1, 17 (2015) | 18, 21 |  In re Appeal of Howard D. Johnson Co., 36 N.J. 443, 446 (1962).................................20  K.L. v. Evesham Tp. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div. 2011), cert. denied, 210 N.J. 108 (2012)..................................................14  Keddie v. Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 689 A.2d 702 (1997). 6-7  Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 300(2020).......18  L.R. v. Camden City Public School District, 452 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 2017).............................5  L.R. v. Camden City Public School District, 238 N.J. 547 (2019)..............................................5  Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 390, 982 A.2d 420 (2009)............................30  Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 110 (1986)........16  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 72 (2008).31, 33-34  Morales-Hurtado v. Reinoso, 457 N.J. Super. 170, 191 (App. Div. 2018, aff'd o.b., 241 N.J. 590(2020).......20  Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. Of Educ., 466 N.J. Super 325, 246 A.3d 802 (2021).................................27  N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State, Off. of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 296(App. Div. 2017)..........18, 20 Newark Morning Ledger Co v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 159(App. Div. 2011)..14, 16 Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)..................................................30 Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 494-96 (1984)...........34 Smith v. Hudson Cnty. Reg., 422 N.J. Super. 387, 394 (App. Div. 2011).................................34 Spectraserv, Inc. v. Middlesex Cnty. Utils. Auth., 416 N.J. Super. 565, 583 (App. Div. 2010)..................34 State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257(2021)........17, 21 State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65(2020)...............17, 21 State v. Wolfe, 431 N.J. Super. 356, 363 (App. Div. 2013)..................................................18 Teeters v. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 387 N.J. Super. 423, 432 (App. Div. 2006)............................34 US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 38 A. 3d 570 at 467-68 (2012)......................17, 19, 21, 32, 35 Warrington v. Vill. Supermarket, Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 410, 420 (App. Div. 2000).............................35
[brief] In O’Carroll, the victim died by strangulation that would have taken a number of minutes to accomplish. State v. O’Carroll, 385 N.J. Super. 211, 219-220 (App. Div. 2006).  Yet this Court held that it was clearly indicated that a jury could have questioned defendant’s intent and believed that he struggled with the victim and did not intend to seriously injure her, despite the amount of time necessary to accomplish a strangulation, and, thus, aggravated and reckless manslaughter should have been charged.  Id. at 228-233.  As in O’Carroll, a properly instructed jury in this case “could have found that rather than intending [the victim’s] death, or knowing that her death was the likely result of his actions, defendant consciously disregarded a known risk with either a probability or possibility that death would follow from [her] conduct. ”  Id. at 232.  Similarly, even a purposeful blow to the head with a brick that is so forceful that it causes the victim to lose consciousness (and die thereafter) is not so clearly the “knowing” infliction of serious injury that can lead to death that it precludes the charging of aggravated and reckless manslaughter as a lesser-included offense; rather, it was deemed plain error to omit such these instructions.  State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 354-364 (2004).  Only where the nature of the weapon and the crime itself is such that no reasonable juror could doubt that the actor intended to kill or seriously injure is manslaughter properly withheld from the jury as a possible verdict.
[brief] The property interest taken in this case defined in the Complaint and the Declaration of Taking (Da001) is the fee simple estate as to both Lots 18 and 19.  The Complaint named all the remaining tenants.  The reversionary right as to the [...] lease was in the fee interests owned by [...].  The property interest taken by the Plaintiff as designated in Complaint and Declaration of Taking and now owned by the Plaintiff is the entire fee simple estate as of the date of Taking, May 4, 2018.  By valuing the taking of Lot 19 as a leased fee instead of the fee simple estate actually taken, Plaintiff’s violated the intent and purpose of the controlling statutes N.J.S.A. 20:3 – 30(d) and 20:3-38 as well as the New Jersey Constitution, Art. I, ¶ 20.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *Acuity v. Reed & Associates*, 124 F.Supp.3d 787 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (mold-contaminated water in home that insured did not actually drink nevertheless was “intended for consumption” for purpose of “consumption” exception); *Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dillard House*, 651 F. Supp. 2d 357 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (same, as applied to hot-tub water).  doubt whatsoever that the high concentrations of airborne mold landed on every surface and item, including the food, in [...]’s condo unit – because the Court believed that applying the exception’s plain language would “swallow the Mold Exclusion itself. ”  Da37.  The short response to that concern is: It was [...] that wrote the exception into the exclusion.  [...] is therefore to blame, and not [...], if application of the plain language of the exception eliminates the exclusion because “it does not apply” when the exception applies.
[brief] e.g., *ICC v. Louisville & N.R. Co.*, 227 U.S. 88, 93—94, 33 S.Ct. 185, 187—188, 57 L.Ed. 431 (1913); *Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness*, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1180—1181, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963).  What we said in *Greene v. McElroy*, 360 U.S. 474, 496—497, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), is particularly pertinent here:  ‘Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.  One of these is that where governmental action\(^{10}\) seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of \(^{10}\)  Since use of the NFADR process is mandated by the State, government action is present here.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1.  the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
[brief] Under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), discovery may be limited if: (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from another, more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive source; (2) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the discovery sought; or (3) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.  Id.  In assessing whether the burden of the discovery outweighs its benefit, a court must consider: (1) the needs of the case; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the parties’ resources; (4) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (5) the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.  Id. at 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).  *4
[brief] The *prima facie* elements of a CEPA claim and the purpose and important public policy underpinning the statute.  (IT; 12a-27a)**  The New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, *N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq.* (“CEPA”) is intended to “encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage … employers from engaging in such conduct. ”  *Fleming v. Correctional Healthcare Solutions, Inc.*, 164 N.J. 90, 96 (2000); *Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Ed.*, 138 N.J. 405, 431 (1994).
[brief] [...] bases his contention that [...]’s distribution of potable water to Borough residents involves a proprietary, commercial-like relationship, and gives rise to an implied contract upon a certain line of cases originating in the 1870s – shortly after the Civil War.  See Pb.20-26.  Those cases primarily involved municipalities’ attempts to recover unpaid water charges, a very different issue from the instant case, which involves suit against a municipality regarding the quality of water supplied to residents.  Thus, as a threshold matter, those cases are distinguishable and do not apply.
[brief] See Smith v. Red Top Taxicab Corp., 111 N.J.L. 439, 440-41 (“No principle of law is more firmly established than that a single or entire cause of action cannot be subdivided into several claims, and separate actions maintained thereon. ”).  The ECD is “so deeply rooted in the administration of the judicial system…that it attained constitutional status. ”  Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180, 187 (1996).  Indeed, [...], writing for the New Jersey Supreme Court, recognized the ECD’s design and purpose “for the just and expeditious determination in a single action of the ultimate merits of an entire controversy between litigants.  It is a fundamental objective of [the ECD] to avoid the delays and wasteful expense of the multiplicity of litigation which results from splitting of a controversy. ”  Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 485 (1954).
[brief] Indeed, the full context for that language in the rule is, “[i]t is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ”  R. 4:10-2.  Likewise, the Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which eliminated similar language in the federal rule, made clear that that language was only meant to indicate that evidence need not be admissible to be discoverable.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, committee’s note to 2015 amendment (explaining why “reasonably calculated” phrase was deleted in favor of “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable”).  The reason for this sensible rule is that a party to a lawsuit is not entitled to embark on a “fishing expedition” into the other party’s business unrelated to the issues in the lawsuit.