ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Defensive Tactics & Pain Compliance Techniques.  Pain compliance techniques may be effective in controlling a passive or active resistor.  Officers may only apply pain compliance techniques for which the officer has received department approved training and only when the officer reasonably believes that the use of such a technique is necessary to further a 8 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 legitimate law enforcement purpose.  Officers utilizing any pain compliance technique should consider the totality of the circumstances including, but not limited to, the following: (a) the potential for injury to the officer(s) or others if the technique is not used; (b) the potential risk of serious injury to the individual being controlled; (c) whether the pain compliance technique is effective in achieving an appropriate level of control or a different technique should be employed; (d) the nature of the offense involved; (e) the level of resistance of the individuals(s) involved; (f) whether immediate resolution is necessary; (g) the application of any pain compliance technique shall be immediately discontinued once the officer determines that compliance has been achieved or other more appropriate alternatives can reasonably be utilized; and (h) officers shall only use striking techniques directed at a subject’s face as a means of self-defense, or in the defense of others.
[brief] ....................................................................................................................4, 24  Matter of T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2022)  .....................................................................................20, 39, 42  McKenzie v. Corzine, 396 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 2007)  .....................................................................................23  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
[brief] One item that came up as we were doing our re-submission package and investigating, really, the parking ratio[] as it relates to [the number of] units[,] was that we found with our initial submission there was something incorrect with our calculation of existing number of units...  So, what you see I the exhibit at the top is an aerial exhibit with a set of buildings outlined in yellow on the right and a set of buildings outline on the left in blue.  As part of our initial submission, you saw that we are proposing changes to the development in the lots that are outlined in yellow.
[brief] Thereafter, the court charged on self-defense.  It began the self-defense charge by reminding the jury that murder and attempted murder were charged in Counts 1 and 2.  (27T 185-2 to 5)  And then it said:  “As to these counts of the indictment and the less[e]r included charges, the defendant contends that if the State proves he used or threatened to use force upon another person, that such force was justifiably used for self-protection or self-defense.
[directive] A.  Plea Agreements, Amendments, and Dismissals  Municipal prosecutors retain the discretion to move unilaterally for an amendment of the original charge to an offense that is not a local ordinance, or a dismissal of the charges pending against a defendant if the prosecutor determines and personally represents on the record the Page 3 reasons in support of the motion.  See Appendix to Part VII of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements in the Municipal Courts of New Jersey, Guideline 3.  The reasons for any amendment or dismissal must be acceptable to the municipal court.  For example, a municipal prosecutor’s determination that the State lacks sufficient evidence to proceed in a given case will ordinarily constitute “good cause” to amend or dismiss a charge.  But any such determination must be made on a case-by-case basis and clearly set forth on the record.  While insufficiency of the evidence “usually” will be the basis for an amendment or dismissal, as noted in Memorandum #1, other reasons may also justify amendment or dismissal of a complaint.  To the extent permitted by law, a municipal prosecutor may also consider the impact of adverse collateral consequences of a conviction based on the specific circumstances or factors presented by the defendant or elicited by the court.  Other circumstances or factors that prosecutors should consider when resolving a particular case include, but are not limited to: 1.  The age of the defendant, and the nature and extent of the defendant’s prior criminal record; 2.  The nature and circumstances of the offense and the arrest, including, but not limited to, the following: a) the offense required a significant law enforcement or first responder response or use of resources; b) the defendant’s conduct jeopardized the health, welfare, or safety of another person; c) the defendant refused to obey the lawful orders of any person who is performing any function authorized under the law; d) the defendant’s actions jeopardized the health, safety, or welfare of a minor, or of an individual they supervise or otherwise have control over; and e) the defendant committed the offense against a first responder, including, but not limited to, a police or other law enforcement officer, correctional employee, emergency medical technician, medical professional, firefighter, or any staff, security guard, or other employee at any police, fire, or medical building or facility; 3.  Whether the defendant was previously warned or received prior charges for this or similar conduct; 4.  Other factors identified in the National Prosecution Standards published by the Association.2  National District Attorneys  These factors can be found at:  https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-w-Revised- 2  Page 4  B.
[brief] [...] also argues that the [...] somehow violated his due process rights by discharging him once the State Board suspended his teaching certificate.  (Pb23).  He claims that, “whether or not Woodbridge (sic) was compelled by the OOS/License FAD to terminate Mr. [...]’s employment as a tenured teacher is not and cannot be dispositive of Mr. [...]’s right to obtain relief as against those unlawful decisions. ”  (Id.).  The error in [...]’s argument is that he continues to overlook his own failure to seek a timely stay of the State Board’s decision.  The State Board’s decisions “shall be effective upon the date contained within the decision. ”  N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-4.16.  Once the State Board issued its decision suspending [...]’s license on October 28, 2021, [...] should have immediately moved to stay the decision under N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-4.16 to avoid the consequences under N.J.S.A. § 18A:26-2.  Had he done so successfully, he would have continued teaching for the [...] until the Appellate Division heard his appeal in the *State Board Appeal*.  [...]’s failure to timely pursue his legal remedies—which are set forth in the administrative code, *see* N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-4.16, and Court Rules, *see* R. 2:9-7; R. 2:9-8—does not give rise to a due process violation.  Frankly, [...] sits in a position no different than any other litigant who has a judgment or order entered against them which they believe was incorrect and, therefore, warrants an appeal.  The judgment or order may even cause a fiscal crisis which pushes the entity towards insolvency.  *See, e.g.*, *Profit Sharing Tr. for Marprowear Corp. v. Lampf, Lipkind, Prupis, Petigrow & Labue, P.A.*, 267 N.J. Super. 174 (Law. Div. 1993)(law firm which had a judgment entered against it sought a stay because “if the judgment is not stayed, the law firm will go out of business”).  But this is why our Supreme Court has adopted rules, such as Rule 2:9-5 (stays of judgments entered in civil actions), Rule 2:9-7 (stays of administrative order) and Rule 2:9-8 (emergent stays), so that litigants can try and relieve themselves of any irreparable hardships by making the required motion.  It’s why the State Board has a similar provision, N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-4.16, for decisions it issues.  Asserting a procedural due process violation when [...] failed to timely avail himself of the process afforded is substantively flawed and should be rejected by the Court.  E.
[brief] ”  Suarez v. Eastern International College, 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2012).  Importantly, if there are competing expert opinions, then summary judgment is inappropriate because a trial court should never decide on its merits a dispute on which a rational jury could go either way.  See [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules Governing the Courts, cmt. 2.3.2 on R. 4:46-2 (2019); see, e.g., Davin, LLC v. Daham, 329 N.J. Super. 54, 71 (App. Div. 2000).
[brief] Between March and May of 2014, nearly a year before defendant and [...] finalized the [...] franchise agreement, defendant began seeking additional investors in the project, with [...]’s knowledge.  (1T5-8 to 14; 4T205-10 to 23).  Ultimately, [...], with whom defendant had another business, assembled six investors, including himself, under the name “[...]” to invest $750,000 in [...], to purchase a 30% stake in the [...] franchise.
[brief] ”  (30T254-3 to 259-18; 39T32-1 to 37-7)  Defendant’s theory was decidedly not that Defendant had offered a more compelling explanation his tattoos than [...], but rather that [...] was a liar, had a motive to lie to avoid a harsher sentence, and thus none of his testimony should be believed.  (38T33-24 to 34-2, 44-25 to 45-2, 49-14, 68-24 to 70-5, 77-19 to 21, 82-1 to 10, 85-1)  By focusing the jury’s attention on Defendant’s ability to offer an alternative explanation where he offered none, the court’s instruction naturally invited the jury to question why, if he was permitted to offer an alternative explanation, did Defendant decline to do so?
[brief] com/articles/expert-commentary/a-high-level-view-of-the- cgl-policy (accessed October 19, 2023)..................................................12  Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings (R.2:6-2(a)(2))  Order for Summary Judgment in Favor of [...] and [...]  ..................Dta2975  Order Denying [...]’ Motion For Summary Judgment.....................Dta2979  Transcript of Motion Hearing Conducted On May 26, 2023........................1T  Law Division Supplemental Statement of Reasons ..............................Dta1331  #  Table of Appendix | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Plaintiffs’ Complaint | 1a | | [...]’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint | 685a | | [...]’s and [...]’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint | 711a | | [...]’s and [...]’s Amended Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint | 733a | | [...]’s Answer to [...]’s and [...]’s Counterclaim | 756a | | [...]’s Answer to [...]’ Counterclaim | 760a | | [...]’s Answer to [...]’ Counterclaim | 764a | | [...]’s Answer to [...]’ Crossclaim | 768a | | [...]’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint | 776a | | Case Management Order | 794a | | [...]’ Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment | 796a | | [...]’ Statement of Material Facts | 798a | | [...]’ Certification and Exhibits | 804a | | Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment | 923a | | Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts | 925a | | Plaintiffs’ Certification and Exhibits | 937a | | [...]’s and [...]’s Certification of Exhibits | 1137a| | Stipulation of Dismissal as to [...] | 1143a|
[brief] (Pa381).  The First Count alleged that [...] “has wantonly, willfully and intentionally disrupted the ongoing contractual relationships between, [...] and [...], [...] and [...] and [...] and its membership. ” (Pa381).  Each allegation of the First Count was repeated and re-alleged for the Second.  (Pa188).  Similarly, each allegation of the First and Second Counts was repeated and re-alleged for the Third.  (Pa189).  All three counts allege [...] “wantonly” disrupted contractual relations.  (Pa184, Pa188, Pa189).  [...] alleged in the Second Count that [...] assaulted her by “word and deed” designed to scare her, placing her in “fear of imminent battery”.  (Pa12, Pa188).  The alleged wrongful acts included “staring at her angrily, insulting her, leaning over her desk to put his face closer… then standing up to tower over her, blocking her exit, and refusing to leave her office…” (Pa188).  Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages based upon N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1 which provides that a person is guilty of assault if he “recklessly” causes bodily injury.  (Pa13).  The Third Count is Harassment, and [...] alleged that [...] committed acts of harassment by “making communications in offensively course language and in a fashion likely to cause annoyance or alarm”.  (Pa190).  [...] further alleged that [...] engaged in alarming conduct by communicating with her in course language, and scaring and intimidating her in her office, staring at her in an angry fashion, leaning over her desk to put his face closer to hers and staring, then standing up and blocking her from exiting, and refusing to leave when she demanded that he do so.  (Pa190).  The Underlying Complaint alleged that [...] could not perform certain duties as the property manager for [...] because she was fearful of [...], “and consequently [...] is unable to fulfill its contractual obligation to [...] and its members to staff the office.
[brief] In granting summary judgment, [...] noted, “The uncontroverted motion record is bereft of any evidence of objective medical testing—e.g., x-rays, CT scans, MRIs or EMG’s—having been conducted with respect to either plaintiff”.  In an age where use of MRIs and CT scans are commonplace in the diagnosis of spinal injuries, no physician in this case thought the injury required or warranted a simple radiology study.  The only rational inference to be drawn from the fact that radiological studies were not conducted is that no medical or clinical justification for such studies was identified on examination or in response to plaintiffs’ subjective complaints.  To recover damages, plaintiffs’ medical expert would need to both “credibly” opine that both of his patients suffered permanent loss of use of function of a body part or organ while at the same time acknowledging that the injuries did not warrant radiologic testing.  Applying logic to their task, a rational factfinder would be unable to reconcile a dire prognosis of permanent injury with the casual failure to order a precautionary x-ray.  Applying the credible medical evidence standard, testimony that radiology studies were not performed as a clinical response to a purported “permanent injury”, simply makes no sense.  [...] also referred to the “virtually identical” one paragraph reports of chiropractor, [...], which refer to the chronicity of symptoms but do not refer any objective testing confirming a basis or foundation for the claim of loss of function.  Rule 4:17-4(e) requires that a narrative medical report provide a “complete statement of (the expert’s) opinion and the basis therefore,” as well as facts and data supporting the opinion.  Respondent’s brief addresses the “virtually identical reports of [...] below in Point II.  Appellants refer to the failure to consider the “police report and medical payment detail”, but there is no explanation how or why either should have changed the Court’s decision in entering the May 17, 2023 Order from which Appellants’ appeal.
[directive] This form of unrestricted or complete waiver of prosecutorial authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 is authorized by the Official Commentary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, which explains that:  . . .  Although the State and the defendant under this section are free to stipulate a specific prison term, period of parole ineligibility or fine to be imposed, the plea agreement need not do so.  Rather, a plea agreement could remain silent as to any or all such terms and conditions, in which event the court would retain its discretion, subject only to the requirements of this Act, to impose any sentence deemed appropriate.  While this type of waiver might conceivably result in various forms of disparity (whether in the form of disparity between counties, or disparity between Page 45 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) cases within a county), such variability would be attributed entirely to the discretionary decisions made by judges, rather than by prosecutors.
[brief] Plaintiffs claim that the arbitration and waiver provisions “do not satisfy FAA and NJAA requirements. ”  *See* Appellant’s Br. at 18.  Frankly, [...] cannot make sense of what Plaintiffs are arguing here.  As Plaintiffs themselves state, the FAA and NJAA hold arbitration agreements enforceable to the extent they are enforceable under state contract law.  Plaintiffs entire “Point Two” is devoid of any argument about “FAA and NJAA requirements. ”  Plaintiffs simply cite cases and statutes (all of which affirm that arbitration agreements are enforceable as contracts) and conclude with an unsupported assertion that “these arbitration and waiver provisions do not meet FAA --- \(^4\) Plaintiffs make a series of false claims in their brief that [...] now corrects.
[brief] Within the context of a commercial transaction, [...] received Plaintiffs’ money for the transaction, sent said money to certain Defendants, and said Defendants divided said money among all Defendants, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims could not possibly be considered legal malpractice, and Plaintiffs never disputed the appropriateness of the transactional legal work performed by [...].  Rather, Plaintiffs alleged and provided proof that [...], like any of the non-attorney Defendants, committed the blatant, simple, and wrongful acts of essentially “stealing” Plaintiffs’ money by committing civil law theft.  These serious allegations, under this factual predicate which is separate and apart from any facts which give rise to legal malpractice claims, do not implicate a professional standard of care and are not legal malpractice claims.
[brief] [6T 75-14 to 75-15].  However, he confirmed that [...] would agree to further conditions or modifications if the Board had additional concerns.  [6T 76-16 to 76-25].  But, since none had been identified or requested at that point, [...] offered an opinion that the significant need for [...]’s multi-level senior housing community far outweighed the limited impacts to the neighborhood and to the Township’s zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2(a).  In order to encourage investors to undertake financially risky projects in blighted areas, the Redevelopment Law allows for the promulgation of land use standards which supersede criteria in zoning ordinances.  Long Branch City Ordinance § 345-98 (Pa979) is one such provision insofar as it assures developers stability in the terms of a redevelopment plan.  That Ordinance limits the ability to amend a redevelopment plan:  The Redevelopment Plan may be amended from time to time by the [...], provided that, if amended after the disposition of any land in the Redevelopment Area, the modification must be consented to in writing by designated developers.  * * *  (Emphasis added).  This provision was also part of the 1996 Redevelopment Plan.
[directive] CONSEQUENCES OF A POSITIVE TEST RESULT  A.  When an applicant tests positive for illegal drug use:  1.  The applicant shall be immediately removed from consideration for employment by the agency.  2.  The applicant shall be reported to the Central Drug Registry maintained by the Division of State Police by the law enforcement agency to which the individual applied.  3.  The applicant shall be precluded from consideration for future law enforcement employment by any law enforcement agency in New Jersey for a period of two years.  4.  Where the applicant is currently employed by another agency as a sworn law enforcement officer, the officer's current employer shall be notified of the positive test result.  Under these circumstances, the officer's current employer is required to 13 dismiss the officer from employment and also report his or her name to the Central Drug Registry maintained by the Division of State Police.
[directive] 부과된다는 것을 1급 범죄인 경우, (1)  $2,000  2급 범죄인 경우, (2) $1,000 3급 범죄인 경우, (3) $750 4급 범죄인 경우, (4) $500 풍기문란자 죄 또는 경미한 풍기문란자 죄인 경우, (5) $250 $ 총CCPF 벌금 Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  If the crime involves a N.J.S.A. violation of 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed N.J.S.A. or exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs N.J.S.A. or films a child in sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24- N.J.S.A. 4b(5)(b) (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a N.J.S.A. child pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:34-3 N.J.S.A. (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty? (1) $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3) $750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4) $500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5) $250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense Total CCPF Penalty $ / Defendant’s Initials 피고인의
[brief] Specifically, Disciplinary Proceeding is defined as follows:  **DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING** means any proceeding initiated by a regulatory, disciplinary or licensing official, board or agency to **investigate** charges made against an Insured alleging professional misconduct in the performance of or failure to perform Legal Services.  [Pa170, § 3(K) (emphasis added). ]  It defies logic that an insured should be responsible for recognizing and understanding that somehow investigation and investigate do not mean the same thing in the context of the Policy Applications.
[brief] When the challenged agency action arises in a setting where the record is too meager to permit meaningful review, supplementation of the record may be necessary.  The Court Rules provide that a reviewing court may remand, on its own motion, for supplementation of the record in order to permit meaningful review.  R. 2:5-5(b).  In re State & Sch. Emples.  Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).
[brief] ”); Risko, supra, 206 N.J. at 523 (citations omitted) (“the ‘[f]ailure to make a timely objection indicates that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made,’ and it ‘also deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action. ’  Where defense counsel has not objected, we generally will not reverse unless plain error is shown”, pursuant to R. 2:10–2.  Under the plain error standard, “[t]he possibility of an unjust result must be sufficient ‘to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”).  When the plaintiff’s counsel objected to comments regarding the failure of the plaintiff to testify live and the failure of her daughter to testify (7T33:1-16; 7T40:2-4), the trial court issued a curative instruction in the middle of defense counsel’s argument (7T34:5-13; 7T42:15-43:5) and again issued a curative instruction when charging the jury (7T95:13-16).  Such instructions certainly cured any prejudice the plaintiff alleges to have suffered.  “When weighing the effectiveness of curative instructions, a reviewing court should give equal deference to the determination of the trial court.  The adequacy of a curative instruction necessarily focuses on the capacity of the offending evidence to lead to a verdict that could not otherwise be justly reached. ”  State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 647 (1984).