ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Restaurant’s Claim That Plaintiffs Certainly Knew They Were a Tenant  The Restaurant claims to stand on different footing because Plaintiffs plainly knew were tenants on the date of the accident, because that was the business the Plaintiffs were visiting at the time of the accident.  That is true enough.  Even if Plaintiffs did not know about the contractual terms until after the leases were produced, the Restaurant claims that Plaintiffs could have sued them under a violation of the common law duty.  That is not really an accurate statement of the law.  New Jersey does not impose a general common law duty on a tenant to remove snow and ice from premises not abutting their storefront.  Rather, New Jersey law allows for the imposition of a common law duty, under such circumstances, upon consideration of various factors which involve, among other things, whether the tenant has assumed such a duty under a lease with the landlord.  See, e.g., Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Market at Robbinsville, 429 N.J. 79 (App. Div. 2012) (resolving a plaintiff’s claim against a tenant by reference to the terms of the lease, and specifically whether the tenant had assumed any duty for snow and ice maintenance).  Indeed, as Kandrac and Nielsen v. Walmart Store #2, 2171, 429 N.J.Super. 251, 260 (App. Div. 2013) make clear, the existence of a contractual duty is a significant factor in weighing the scope of the overall duty owned by the tenant to a customer.  It bears noting that, alternatively, Plaintiffs argued below their causes of action against the Cross Appellants should not have been deemed to have accrued until they had access to the leases.  If that happened after the two-year anniversary of the accident, it was only because the Landlord and Respondents’ law firm failed to produce the leases after many demands and delays.
[brief] . ."  The Order further states: "that an award for reasonable counsel fees shall be granted in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant for fees incurred as the result of Defendant's violations of the June 27, 2017 Order of Judgment and Plaintiff's counsel shall submit an Affidavit of Services within fourteen (14) days for the Court's consideration."  (Da285)  Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit of Services and the Court entered a March 26, 2018 Order awarding the amount of $11,554.63 and a March 23, 2018 Statement of Reasons.  (Da287)  The March 26, 2018 Order was ministerial, determining the quantum of attorney fees that were actually awarded in the March 6, 2018 Order.  The Trial Court erroneously found that Defendant did not appeal the “enforcement action” of the Court and that the Appellate Division did not “…intend to vacate the enforcement proceedings this Court entered pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 as it was not challenged specifically."  (6T72-7, 25)(Da976)  This is incorrect.  The Court’s ruling is in the February 14, 2018 hearing transcript which was a part of the earlier appeal and was memorialized in the March 6, 2018 Order - which was vacated by the Appellate Division.  On its face, the March 6, 2018 Order (Da285) recites that the matter was brought before the Court by an Order to Show Cause and the Court considered the submissions and arguments of counsel and “a Proof Hearing held on February 14, 2018 and the Court having concluded Defendant…is in violation of the June 27, 2017 Order of Judgment entered against the Defendant…”  The March 6, 2018 Order was appealed; it is the predicate order upon which relief was ordered by the Trial Court and it was reversed and vacated.
[brief] Related offenses “share a common factual ground, but not a commonality in statutory elements, with the crimes charged in the indictment. ”  Alexander, 233 N.J. at 144 (citing Thomas, 187 N.J. at 132).  To determine whether an offense is related to a charged offense, “the focus is whether the offense charged and the related offense share a common factual nucleus. ”  Thomas, 187 N.J. at 130.  Instructing the jury on related offenses that are not charged in the indictment raises “constitutional concerns because criminal defendants have rights to a grand jury presentment and fair notice of criminal charges against them.
[brief] To be clear, acceptance of [...]’s testimony would be akin to accepting an assertion that since “Residential” uses are permitted in two zone districts, their zoning is necessarily identical without reference to standards like density, lot size, setbacks, building height, whether only single or multi-family buildings are allowed, and other significant parameters commonly found in zoning ordinances.  The Board’s concern to actually unpack the respective ordinances is especially legitimate in the context of “warehouse distribution” uses, which other testimony presented by the Plaintiffs highlighted as being highly variable in character.  Testimony of [...], 1T 19:10-25; 1T 22:9-1T 23:18.  VII.
[brief] In re Somerset Reg'l Water Res., LLC, 949 F.3d 837, 848 (3d Cir. 2020).  As the Lease is actually written, the Tenant’s Allowance Offset automatically deducts overdue rent payments from the Tenant’s Allowance installment amount then owed and there remains nothing “due and owing” from Tenant to Landlord.  The trial court could agree or disagree with that analysis, but what it ought not to have done was forfeit its judicial role and decline to decide the issue at all due to a purported lack of jurisdiction.  Landlord argues that the trial court decided the issue insofar as it ruled conclusorily that Tenant does not get its reimbursement while it is in “breach,” but that misses two key points.  First, the trial court did not grapple with, dismiss, or even discuss Tenant’s argument that it was not in breach because the Allowance Offset clause automatically cured the default.  Second, the court failed to recognize that it had jurisdiction to, in that moment, calculate the amount of Tenant’s Allowance owed after the payment went into escrow and unquestionably cured the default.  This abnegation of the judicial role was reversible error.
[brief] As such, DEP’s WQMP rulemaking contemplated that existing permitting and regulatory programs would address WQMP consistency requirements.  Here, DEP found that [...]’s Project was a sewerage generating development and that all activities are located within the limits of the sewer service area identified in the Areawide WQM Plan.  (Aa29).  Thus, under N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b), there was a rebuttable presumption that the Project was consistent with the Areawide WQM Plan.
[brief] The requested bulk variances, sought per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c), were also denied, without benefit of any support in the record, and contrary to the evidence of record, as the [...] arbitrarily concluded that the discovery of the bald eagle’s nest did not constitute a sufficient hardship justifying relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1), with the Resolution further asserting, without any support in the record, that the requested variances “exceed a reasonable modification of the site to offset the impact of the bald eagle’s nest. ”
[directive] [Non/No]  3.  Èske w konprann ke si yo ta detèmine ke w se yon dwoge e si w ta elijib pou libète kondisyonèl espesyal sou 2C:35-14, la kidonk, pa konsekans de N.J.S.A. pledwaye koupab ou a yap deklare w "antan ke moun ki bezwen tretman" ki elijib pou resevwa yon santans egizijib de peryòd libète kondisyonèl espesyal pou kab patisipe nan pwogram tretman pou dwòg ki sipèvize pa tribinal la ("Tribinal pou koze Dwòg")?
[brief] Though not expressly stated in the MLUL, the preservation of the character of a neighborhood or property values in that neighborhood has also been recognized as legitimate purposes of zoning.  Home Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Twp. of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 145 (1979).  A successful applicant for a density variance therefore must show that despite the proposed increase in density above the zone's restrictions, and, thus, the increased intensity in the use of the site, the project nonetheless served one or more of the purposes of zoning and was consistent with the overall goals of the MLUL.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ........................................ iv  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. v  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................ xi  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................  5  I.  Appellants Are Long-Time, Loyal Distributors Of [...] Products  Whose Relationship Is Memorialized in The Wholesaler Agreement .........................................................................................  5  II.  The MBPA Contains Strong Protections For Wholesalers, Including Safeguards Against Unreasonable Or Bad Faith Brewers ...........................................................................................................  7  III.  The MBPA Instructs Courts To Follow Precedents From The New Jersey Franchise Practices Act When There Are Conflicts Arising From The MBPA And Its Provisions ....................... 8  IV.  [...] Has Long Engaged In The Type Of Abusive Tactics The MBPA Was Designed To Protect Against .........................  9  V.  Defendants Violate The MBPA And Anticipatorily Breached The Agreement  By Falsely Accusing Appellants Of Violating The “Best Efforts” Provision Of The Agreement In Bad Faith And Threatening Termination Without Good Cause  ........................................................................................................  11  ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................
[brief] [...]’s interpretation allows it to sidestep the No-Fault Law.  [...]’s interpretation of the No-Fault Law would lay waste to the Legislature’s objective to minimize PIP disputes in court when it adopted the No-Fault Law’s arbitration provision.  Gambino, 86 N.J. at 107; see also Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 516 (1994) (explaining that one of the “overwhelming goals” of adopting the No-Fault Law was “reducing court congestion”); Sabato, 337 N.J. Super. at 396 (explaining that insurers cannot be permitted to sidestep arbitration under the No-Fault Law “simply by characterizing PIP disputes” as some of the kind of dispute and then “seeking judicial resolution of those issues”).
[brief] He was black.  He was black. ”  (3T19-2 to 19)  When [...] described the man during trial, she said that he was taller than her (at 5’6”), was skinny, and was wearing “a gray sweater and gray sweatpants” with Nike “Air Force” sneakers.  (3T21-17 to 22-4)  She could not see his face because he had a hoodie on but saw that he had a “little beard” on his chin.  (3T22-12 to 23-3)  She described him at trial as an “African American or Hispanic” man who was “a little lighter than [her],” despite indicating in a police report that the man had a “beard and [was] dark skinned” similar to her own “brown skin” color.
[brief] ”).  As it applies here, determinations of the arbitrability of a claim are reviewed de novo.  Interactive Brokers, LLC v. Barry for Osiris Fund Ltd. P’ship, 457 N.J. Super. 357, 364 (App. Div. 2018).  On the other hand, the Appellate Court typically reviews a Trial Court’s decision relating to injunctive relief for abuse of discretion.
[brief] The plain language of the No-Fault Law and the IFPA requires arbitration of all claims related to a medical provider’s eligibility to recover PIP benefits.  4  A.  The “compensatory” damages sought by [...] relate to the payment of PIP benefits under the No-Fault Law .................................................................4  B.  The Court should reject the argument that the IFPA requires claims to be brought solely in court.  .........................................................................................6  C.  The Amici Curiae’s interpretation of the No-Fault Law would undermine the objective of reducing court congestion .......................................................7
[brief] Rather, it enforced the REA.  The Department cannot now simply ignore decades of its own admissions and conduct in regulating reciprocals simply because it wants to impress a new and different interpretation of the law.  This is true regardless of the Bulletin.  The Bulletin, which purports to be issued in response to unspecified questions about the regulation of reciprocal exchanges, proclaims, for the first time and without explanation, that reciprocal exchanges are subject to the Holding Act.  The Bulletin seeks to reverse the current status of the law.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant [...] (“[...]”) is the owner of certain commercial property on [...] Avenue in North Bergen, New Jersey.  Plaintiff [...], is [...]’s mortgagee and defendant [...] (“[...]”) is [...]’s manager and guarantor of [...]’s mortgage.  In this appeal, [...] and [...] (the “[...] Defendants”) challenge the confirmation of the sheriff’s sale of the mortgaged premises to plaintiff for $100 by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., based upon her determinations that (a) there is no distinction between “lawful postjudgment interest” and “contract postjudgment interest”, and (b) the mandate of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 that a sheriffs’ foreclosure sale notice state the “approximate” amount of the judgment can be satisfied by a notice that states an amount that is not an “egregious variation” of the actual amount.  As set forth more particularly herein, plaintiff’s foreclosure judgment states that the postjudgment interest rate is lawful interest, which means the legal rate prescribed by R. 4:42-11; upon the entry of the final judgment, the mortgage merges into the foreclosure judgment and the mortgage interest rate is replaced by the postjudgment legal rate prescribed by R. 4:42-11 unless a different rate is expressly requested by the mortgagee and, before granting that request, the trial court considers the equities for and against an increase; and plaintiff did not ask and Judge Costello did not weigh any equities.  In addition, Judge Costello’s subsequent order conditioning a stay of post-sale proceedings pending the filing of the [...] Defendants’ appeal upon the posting by the [...] Defendants of a supersedeas bond within one business day was manifestly unreasonable because it was impossible for the [...] Defendants to timely comply within that condition.  Therefore, this Court should reverse Judge Costello’s orders; confirm that for purposes of [...]’s exercise of its right of redemption of the mortgaged premises, the postjudgment interest rate is the legal rate prescribed by R. 4:42-11; and direct that a new sheriff’s sale be conducted if [...] has not already redeemed the mortgaged premises.
[directive] 1.  Adoption of Guidelines  The "Attorney General Guidelines for the Use of Automated License Plate Readers (dated December 3, 2010) attached to this Directive and and Stored ALPR Data" incorporated by reference into this Directive are hereby adopted and shall be followed and enforced by all law enforcement agencies and officers operating under -2- the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey.  2.  Implementation  Every law enforcement agency operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey that possesses or uses one or more automated license plate readers shall, within 45 days of the issuance of this Directive, promulgate and enforce a rule, regulation, standard operating procedure, directive, or order, in a form as may be appropriate given the customs and practices of the agency, which shall comply with and implement the provisions of the attached Guidelines, and which shall provide that any sworn officer or civilian employee of the agency who knowingly violates the agency’s rule, regulation, standard operating procedure, directive, or order shall be subject to discipline.  A law enforcement agency operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey that purchases an automated license plate reader on or after the effective date of this Directive shall not operate the device without having promulgated a rule, regulation, standing operating procedure, directive, or order in accordance with this section.  The provisions of this Directive and of the attached Guidelines pertaining to stored ALPR data apply to all law enforcement agencies operating under the authority of the of~the laws State of New Jersey that access or use stored ALPR data, even if the agency does not own or operate an ALPR.  4.  Questions and Controversies  All questions concerning the interpretation, implementation, or enforcement of this Directive, or of the attached Guidelines, shall be addressed to the Attorney General or his or her designee.  5.  Periodic Review  The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, in consultation with the Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, the County Prosecutors, the County Sheriffs, and the New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police, shall, within one year of the effective date of this -3- Directive, report to the Attorney General on the implementation of this Directive, and on any recommendations for revising the attached Guidelines.  6.  Effective Date  This Directive shall take effect 45 days after it is issued in order to provide an opportunity for law enforcement agencies to comply with its requirements and to establish and enforce policies and procedures consistent with the attached Guidelines.  Once effective, this Directive shall remain in force and effect unless and until a repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] This Action Is Time-Barred By The New Jersey Court Rules.**  Even if this action could be brought under the quo warranto statute (which it cannot), the trial court should have dismissed the action because it was filed long past its expiration date.  All parties agree that Rule 4:69-6(a) provides the relevant limitations period.  Through the Rules of Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court prohibits the commencement of an action in lieu of prerogative writ “later than 45 days after the accrual of the right to the . . . relief claimed.  . . .”  R. 4:69-6(a).  In this case, Plaintiffs claim that [...] has been unlawfully holding her position ever since she “moved out” of Middlesex County.  (Da9 ¶¶ 20, 29-30.)  [...] moved out of Middlesex County in October 2020.  (Da72.)  Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued on that date when any supposed right to relief, namely ouster, would have been potentially available.  Therefore, Plaintiffs were required to bring this action against [...] no later than December 2020.  Plaintiffs failed to do so.  Instead, they filed this action on January 30, 2024, which is 37 months too late.
[brief] “The term palpably unreasonable implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstances and it must be manifest and obvious that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction. ”  *Coyne*, 182 N.J. at 493 (citing *Kolitch v. Lindedahl*, 100 N.J. 485 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted).  The Third Circuit has explained that to be “palpably unreasonable” under New Jersey law, actions must be the result of “capricious, arbitrary, whimsical or outrageous decisions of public servants. ”  *Waldorf v. Shuta*, 896 F.2d 723, 738 (3d Cir. 1990).  This creates a substantial barrier for Plaintiff to overcome even if they can prove the existence of all four (4) previous requirements to impose TCA liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2; which, Plaintiff cannot.
[brief] *N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.*  Guided by the Legislature's express declaration "that it is in the public interest of all the citizens of the State" that the Preservation Area be subject "to stringent water and natural resource protection standards, policies, planning, and regulation," *ibid.*, we cannot accept the Department and [...]'s position that the Legislature intended Exemption 11 for "the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems" in the Preservation Area to exempt any upgrade a utility might propose and, specifically, to exempt [...]'s construction of a new compressor station and appurtenant facilities, including its own electric substation, at a cost of over $100 million with no showing it constituted only a "routine upgrade"\(^{15}\) of its gas pipeline system.  Neither the language and structure of the Exemption nor the history and purpose of the Highlands Act support that result.  We accordingly vacate the HAD issued to [...] and remand the matter to the Department for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including but not limited to consideration of whether [...]'s proposed compressor station can qualify as a "routine upgrade" to its pipeline system.  We do not retain jurisdiction.  Vacated and remanded.
[brief] See Aguas, 220 N.J. at 524.  Here, the City maintained an effective anti-harassment policy to prevent and to correct promptly the alleged discriminatory acts by [...].  The City’s employment handbook provides an anti-discrimination policy, which state, in part:  “Under no circumstances will the [...] discriminate on the basis of sex, race, creed, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, marital or political status, affectional or sexual orientation, domestic partnership status, civil union status, atypical hereditary, cellular or blood trait, genetic information, disability”…Additionally, the Employee Complaint Policy (within the employment handbook) states that:  “[e]mployees desiring to file a complaint regarding any of the above mentioned terms and conditions of employment should utilize the grievance procedures outlined in their union contract, or the Municipal Code…; or the appeal process/procedures in accordance with the provisions of the New Jersey Administrative Code, Title 4A”.  The City conducts annual anti-discrimination and harassment trainings, and the policies are posted in all buildings operated by the Fire Department.  [...] testified that he received training from the City on several occasions before the incident.  Plaintiff also testified that he received trainings on June 19, 2019, and at least on one other occasion.  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s internal complaint was lodged with the City shortly after the incident on March 17, 2020, and investigation began immediately thereafter.  Plaintiff was satisfied that he was being recognized and that his complaint was being addressed.  The investigation was prompt and completed over the course of three and a half weeks.  A written reprimand was prepared for [...] as a result of the investigation, but the reprimand was never served due to [...]’s terminal leave in advance of his retirement.  However, [...]’s effective retirement prior to the issuance of discipline is not dispositive regarding whether the City maintained an effective anti-harassment policy.  Notably, Plaintiff did not experience any further discriminatory acts and suffered no change in his position.  Thus, the record evidence demonstrates that the City not only maintained an effective policy and complaint procedure, but it also enforced the policies promptly.