ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] uniform the ensure to authority General's Attorney the to pursuant issued is Directive  This State. the throughout criminal justice of administration the and laws the of enforcement efficient and the facilitate to prosecutors police and by discretion of exercise on limits the imposes Directive  This be shall Directive this in Nothing Law.  Reform Bail the of implementation efficient and uniform the of Constitutions under the established those beyond rights any create to way any in construed The Rule. or Court statute Jersey any New under or Jersey, New of State the and States United 83 Page County agencies, police by implemented enforced and intended be to are Directive this of provisions and Justice, Criminal of Division and the Prosecutor, Fraud of Insurance the Office the Prosecutors, or persons other any enforced be by that may or rights promises any not create do provisions these entities.
[directive] sr,~T Trir: ~F :Fon y;~-~ ~,r~~~~~i < K<`~ ~~. < r ~ . ~ S ~ ins k::~ Jersey New State f o GREWAL GURBIR S. GENERAL ATTORNEY THE OF OFFICE PHILIP MURPHY D. General Attorney Gouerr~or SAFETY PUBLIC AND LAW OF DEPARTMENT 080 Box PO NJ 08625-0080  TRENTON, OLIVER Y. SHEILA Gove~•r~or Lt. NO.2018-3 DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW ATTORNEY GENERAL Executives Chief Enforcement Law All TO: General Attorney Grewal, Gurbir S. FROM: 20, March 2018 DATE: Warning Systems Early Mandatory Statewide SUBJECT: Background I. to designed tool management an important is System") ("EW System Warning Early An EW An effective escalates. conduct conduct that before police in trends and patterns detect officer remediating problematic and identifying in agency enforcement law a assist can System Systems, EW officer. to and agency, the the to public, potential the to risk a poses conduct that but enforcement, law in public confidence safety and public only increase not to serve therefore, agencies enforcement law many Indeed, intervention. early through officers assist to also Prosecutors County some such and systems of utility the recognized have the throughout State this reasons, of all For these them. use jurisdictions to their within agencies require already implement and adopt New in Jersey agencies enforcement law all that mandates now Directive below. forth set requirements with the consistent Systems EW of Criminal Act Justice under the me authority to granted the to pursuant Accordingly, justice of supervision criminal general the for provides which -117, to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 1970, a of benefits to the officer State secure the of enforcement law chief as General Attorney the by justice administration criminal of criminal the and law the of enforcement efficient and uniform prosecuting DIRECT and enforcement law all Grewal, hereby S. Gurbir I, State, the throughout implement and to of Jersey New of laws State the of the authority the under operating agencies practices. and standards, procedures, following policies, with the comply ,...•.., Recyclable is Paper' Recycled, and orc Pr•ar~ted • Employer Opportunity Equal, An Is Jersey New ~`: "
[brief] May 25, 2018  Order in [...] v. [...]  [...] granting Appellant [...]’s Notice of Motion filed April 19, 2018 to Amend the Appeal to Include an Appeal of the March 6, 2018  Order.  PLAINTIFF’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO ENFORCE LITIGANT’S RIGHTS WITHOUT RESTRAINTS FOR SIXTH STREET VIOLATION  June 4, 2018  Order to Show Cause to Enforce Litigant’s Rights Without Restraints for Sixth Street Violation  Certification of [...] in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights dated May 31, 2018  **EXHIBIT A**  July 15, 2016  Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, Third and Fifth Counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Complaint (Da218)
[directive] These charges are identified in the new statute and are marijuana-specific.  Therefore, there is no factual determination necessary prior to their removal.  These charges are: manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, possessing, or having under control with i. of intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense more than one ounce marijuana or of of more than five grams hashish in violation  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b or less )(11 ), of of of than one ounce marijuana or less than five grams hashish in violation N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12), of of of possession more than grams marijuana or five grams hashish in violation 50 ii. of ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3), or less than 50 grams marijuana or five grams or less of hashish in violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4).  These charges shall no longer appear on the PSA other than when a defendant's current charge is still a crime or offense pursuant to the amended statute.  These exclusions apply to the entire statute, including those subparagraphs enacted pursuant to this legislation.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  Sometime prior to the initiation of this action—and without a license under the NJCFLA—[...] allegedly acquired a pool of default consumer debts through a series of transactions which began with [...].  [...] allegedly purchased a pool of defaulted consumer debts for a fraction of their face value, including [...]’s alleged [...] credit account.  As [...] was unlicensed under the NJCFLA, [...]’s account and the contract governing the same were void upon assignment to [...].  *See* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  The account pool acquired by [...] was then assigned to [...], then to [...] --- \(^1\)  Because the trial court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the trial court never reached the portion of Defendants’ Motion which argued for compelling arbitration and, thus, did not analyze Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration.  *See* T1 59:1-9.  III, then to [...], before finally being assigned to [...]—all unlicensed under the NJCFLA.  See Collection Complaint ¶ 1 (Pa35); Certification of Proof of Ownership (Pa44); Complaint ¶¶ 1, 31-36 (Pa1).
[brief] (emphasis added).  As defined by Section 1A.13 of the MUTCD, “support” and “options” are not standards:  Section 1A.13  Definitions of Headings, Words, and Phrases in this Manual Standard:  When used in this Manual, the text headings of Standard, Guidance, Option, and Support shall be defined as follows:  A.  **Standard**—a statement of required, mandatory, or specifically prohibitive practice regarding a traffic control device.  All Standard statements are labeled, and the text appears in bold type.  The verb “shall” is typically used.  The verbs “should” and “may” are not used in Standard statements.  Standard statements are sometimes modified by Options.  B.  **Guidance**—a statement of recommended, but not mandatory, practice in typical situations, with deviations allowed if engineering judgment or engineering study indicates the deviation to be appropriate.  All Guidance statements are labeled, and the text appears in unbold type.  The verb “should” is typically used.  The verbs “shall” and “may” are not used in Guidance statements.  Guidance statements are sometimes modified by Options.  C.  **Option**—a statement of practice that is a permissive condition and carries no requirement or recommendation.  Option statements sometime contain allowable modifications to a Standard or Guidance statement.  All Option statements are labeled, and the text appears in unbold type.  The verb “may” is typically used.  The verbs “shall” and “should” are not used in Option statements.  D.  **Support**—an informational statement that does not convey any degree of mandate, recommendation, authorization, prohibition, or enforceable condition.  Support statements are labeled, and the text appears in unbold type.  The verbs “shall,” “should,” and “may” are not used in Support statements.  Section 1A.13 of MUTCD at p. 10.  Accordingly, Section 2C.33 does not set forth a mandatory standard for signage.
[directive] Police be on 1, departments that assist private citizens are strongly encouraged to utilize these same forms, of addition to the form entitled, Consistent with Certification Support Probable Cause.  in in 3  Those versions include the Complaint Information Form and the Complaint Information Form-Domestic Violence Criminal Complaints.  The first form is given to private citizen complainants filing non-domestic violence related charges, whereas the second form is given to private citizen complainants who wish to file domestic violence related charges.  4  Directive #26-19 December 20, 2019
[brief] A deficiency premised upon prosecutorial misconduct “must be so extreme that it ‘clearly infringes’ on the grand jury’s ‘decision-making function,’ or . . . ‘independence. ’”  State v. Jeannotte-Rodriguez, 469 N.J. Super. 69, 89 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting State v. Bell, 241 N.J. 552, 560-61 (2020)).  “[A]n indictment should not be dismissed unless the prosecutor’s error was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  This standard can be satisfied by showing that the grand jury would have reached a different result but for the prosecutor’s error. ”  State v. Majewski, 450 N.J. Super. 353, 365-66 (App. Div. 2017) (citation omitted).  Defendant makes no such showing here.  As an initial matter, there is no evidence of intentional misconduct.
[brief] Plaintiff presented the testimony of its civil engineer and professional planner, [...], PE, PP, PTOE of [...], and its licensed architect, [...], AIA of [...].  In addition, the current property manager of the apartment complex, [...], also testified.  Plaintiff’s experts testified that the final proposal was to construct six (6) new multi-family buildings.  (Pa6).  This would include 100 new units (88-1 bedroom units, 8-2 bedroom units and 4-3 bedroom units), bringing the total number of units on the property to 366 (where 266 currently exist and 319 is permitted) (Pa6).  Applicant initially sought approval for 138 total units but reduced same to 366 units to address concerns of the Board and its professionals.  (Pa233).  A final proposed Site Plan, last revised on January 13, 2022, was submitted to the Board depicting the proposed locations of the new buildings.  (Pa45-48).  Multiple times throughout the application process and hearings, Plaintiff committed to complying with the Township’s Mandatory Affordable Housing Set-Aside Ordinance and as such the requisite number of units in the proposed development would be allocated as “affordable” units per the Township Code, accomplishing a significant zoning and planning benefit for the Township.  All of the 2-bedroom and 3-bedroom units are to be designated as affordable housing in accordance with COAH requirements.
[brief] Pb7-9.  Plaintiffs argue that the annexation of the proof of mailing register to counsel’s certification somehow makes it less reliable than if [...] herself “attached” it to her certification.  Pb7-8.  The realities of efiling render this argument a bit disingenuous – only counsel is able to physically attach and file documents on behalf of a litigant.  Further, [...]’s certification unambiguously described in painstaking detail the document that she certified she understood was annexed to counsel’s reply certification as Exhibit J (Pa144-Pa145).
[brief] Furthermore, in all variances cases, the applicant bears the burden of proving both the positive and the negative criteria.  Ten Stary Dom Ptp. V. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 30 (2013); Nash v. Bd. Of Adj. of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97 (1984).  With regard to the negative criteria, the first prong requiring that the variance can be granted “without substantial detriment to the public good” is focused on the variance’s effect on the surrounding properties, that being all reasonable vantage points.  Medici, 107 N.J. at 22-23 n. 12; Jacoby v. Englewood Cliffs Zon. Bd. Of Adj., 442 N.J. Super. 450, 460 (App. Div. 2015).  Regarding the second prong of the negative criteria requiring that the variance “will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance,” the New Jersey Supreme Court made clear that municipalities should make zoning decisions by ordinance and not by variance.  Medici, 107 N.J. at 5.  For boards to zone by variance is an arrogation of the governing body’s power to zone.
[directive] (b)  Oral communication, which means any oral communication uttered by a person who has an expectation that such communication will not be intercepted, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2b; (c)  Intercept, which means to acquire the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device, N. J.S.A. 2A:156A- 2c; and (d) Electronic communication, which means the transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio or other system, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2m.  All of these forms of communication are protected from intrusion and interception except under very narrowly defined exceptions.
[brief] (R-271)  a.  Sometime after the passing of the Decedent (I was not told a specific date), [...], Ms. [...] reached out to the [...] in regard to protecting assets pertaining to a life insurance policy of the Decedent.  b.  In connection with this request, [...] reached out to "an attorney" in Wyoming (I was not told a specific name) to help set up a trust account in Ms. [...]'s name, for the benefit of her and the Decedent's children.  c.  When asked why the account was set up in the State of Wyoming, [...] said that based upon his knowledge of Wyoming law, Wyoming law is very protective over trust information and assets, and therefore the trust was created there in an effort to protect the policy.  d.  [...] further went on to say the (1) the State of New Jersey would have no jurisdiction to enforce the production of an account outside of the State, and (2) even if the trust account was not set up by an attorney, assisting an individual in setting up a bank account is not "engaging in the practice of law", whether under the professional conduct rules of New Jersey or Wyoming.
[brief] On August 1, 2018, Defendant-Appellant [...] and [...] were charged under [...] with the robbery, murder, and felony murder of [...], as well as several weapons and controlled-dangerous-substance (CDS) offenses.  (Da1-9)¹  [...] was also charged with some of these CDS offenses in the same indictment, but he was not charged with any offenses related to the murder of Stallworth.
[brief] Id.  In order to establish a prima facie case based upon circumstantial evidence, the conclusion to be reached from the evidence must be as probable or more probable than the alternative possible conclusions.  Yormack v. Farmers' Cooperative Ass'n, 11 N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 1951).  Similarly, it is sufficient in civil cases that the circumstantial evidence is of such a nature as to afford a fair and reasonable presumption of the facts inferred.  In the final analysis, probability, and not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test.  *Ocasio v. Amtrak*, 299 N.J. Super. 139, 153 (App. Div. 1997).  Thus, where fairminded men may honestly differ as to the conclusion to be reached from the evidence, controverted or uncontroverted, the case must be submitted to the jury.
[brief] [...] offered testimony at trial discussing how [...]’s allegedly illegal activities resulted in purported harm to [...].  [...]’s testimony regarding the “personal” impact of the issues raised in this case are confined to Pages 104 – 107 of the trial transcript from September 23, 2020. \(^{47}\)  There, [...] still fails to substantiate any damage to her, individually, or even to substantiate damage to the [...].  The only damage alleged was that purportedly done to [...].  f. [...] similarly failed to establish the existence of damages personally sustained by him.
[brief] See State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450, 472 (2021) (“Even a witness who has some familiarity with the defendant may be barred from providing lay opinion if he or she lacks information about the defendant’s appearance at the time of the alleged offense. ”)  Given the central role the video played in the State’s otherwise circumstantial case, this cumulative inadmissible lay opinion testimony on the ultimate issue impermissibly “invaded the fact-finding province of the jury” and was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2; State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 443 (2011).  Under N.J.R.E. 701, a witness may offer a lay opinion if the opinion is (1) “rationally based on the perception of the witness,” and (2) “assist[s] in understanding the witness’ testimony or in determining a fact in issue. ”  Under the first prong, “lay opinion testimony is limited to what was directly perceived by the witness[.]”  McLean, 205 N.J. at 460.  A lay witness may only opine about what he perceives “through use of [his] sense of touch, taste, sight, smell or hearing. ”  Id. at 457.  Under the second prong, a lay opinion must actually assist the trier of fact by helping to explain the witness’s testimony or by shedding light on the determination of a disputed factual issue. ”  Id. at 458.  A lay opinion can only be admitted if “it falls within the narrow bounds of testimony” that meets both of these requirements.  *Id.* at 456.  A lay witness is not allowed to opine on something not within his “direct ken” or something “as to which the jury is as competent as he to form a conclusion. ”  *Id.* at 459.  Opinion testimony is simply “not a vehicle for offering the view of the witness about a series of facts that the jury can evaluate for itself or an opportunity to express a view on guilt or innocence. ”  *Id.* at 462.  In *Sanchez*, our Supreme Court recently addressed the permissible bounds of lay opinion testimony by a witness identifying a suspect in surveillance video.
[brief] Indeed, every case cited by Tenant in support of its frivolous position that Landlord failed to mitigate its damages discusses whether the landlord made reasonable efforts to re-let the rental property at issue.  See Fanarjian, 237 N.J. Super. 406 (affirming the trial court’s holding that the commercial landlord failed to mitigate its damages where the landlord’s “efforts at reletting the premises were so minimal as to be virtually nonexistent. ”); Harrison Riverside, 309 N.J. Super. at 472-475 (modifying order granting summary judgment and remanding for further proceedings as to whether landlord used reasonable efforts to re-let warehouse after former tenant vacated); Borough of Fort Lee, 311 N.J. Super. at 292-293 (affirming holding that landlord did not fail to reasonably mitigate damages where tenant-police department refused to vacate portion of premises thereby chilling leasing market); McGuire, 125 N.J. at 320 (holding that landlord’s sale, rather than re-letting, of property satisfied its duty to mitigate its damages); Carisi v. Wax, 192 N.J. Super. 536, 540 (Dist. Ct. 1983) (holding that a lease allowing tenant to re-enter and re-let the premises once the same becomes vacate did not excuse landlord from its duty to mitigate damages).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from the Judgment of Conviction of the the Superior Court Law Division, Hudson County Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT [...] WHO IS IN CUSTODY [...] [...] [...]  Attorney for Defendant-Appellant [...] Attorney ID #012011976  Of counsel and on the brief [...] Attorney ID #346432021  On the brief TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] At the time [...] testified, he was serving a 15-year federal sentence for conspiracy to distribute drugs and possession of a weapon.  (8T 88-11 to 20)  Because of his lengthy record and his status as a "career criminal," he faced a life sentence on each of the five robberies contained in the indictment.  (9T 183-1 to 184-15)  For [...]' cooperation he was not prosecuted in relation to any of the incidents charged in the indictment.
[brief] And more recently, in State v. Summa, [...] (App. Div.) (slip op. at *5), certif. denied, __ N.J. __ (July 1, 2024), a concerned citizen alerted officers to a van it believed was suspicious.  Officers located the van, and after speaking to the occupants, called out a K-9 because they believed the van contained CDS.  Id. at *2.  After the dog alerted, officers searched the van and located LSD, cocaine, ketamine, and marijuana.  Ibid.  The defendants moved to suppress the evidence found in the van, but the motion court denied their motions.  Ibid.  This Court affirmed the motion court’s decision, finding the warrantless search of a van was justified because officers developed “a reasonable and articulable suspicion that drugs were present” and then called out a canine to confirm their suspicions.
[brief] The Board did not decide the rent increase based on facts in the record or the testimony of the parties.  As previously stated, [...] did not submit any competing value measuring [...]’s equity in the Unit (instead he contends that [...] lacks equity in the Unit), nor did he present any evidence challenging the actual sums paid by [...] that supported its hardship application.  [...] did not have to do so.  The Board, acting as his advocate, abdicated its function as an independent, impartial, governmental decision-making body and ultimately permitted a rent increase that it knew [...] could afford and would continue to cause [...] to subsidize the Unit and lose thousands of dollars every year.
[directive] 4.  There is established a Diversionary Policy Bureau (DPB) which shall set policy for and oversee initiatives and programming led by DCJ and the 21 County Prosecutor Offices that involve the courts or criminal justice system and are diversions to prosecution and incarceration.  Diversionary programming includes strategies for individuals facing criminal charges to avoid incarceration where an alternative would improve public health and safety.  8  Page 9  DPB will be the lead entity on behalf of the Attorney General and point of contact for the New Jersey Judiciary and Prosecutors’ Offices related to all diversionary programs and strategies, and shall lead the Department in developing new diversionary strategies, programs, policies, and protocols, particularly as they relate to mental health, special needs, substance use disorder and recovery, and other issues and situations that can be better addressed by alternatives to involvement in the criminal justice system.  DPB shall oversee and help coordinate the roles of the Department, and the County Prosecutors’ Offices in all existing diversionary programs including: Opt for Help and Hope; • Veteran’s Diversionary Program operated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-26; • Mental health diversionary programming for individuals with mental health • disorders who are facing criminal charges; Recovery Courts operated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C-35-14; and • School and behavioral threat programs.  •  Training and operations of diversionary programs under the supervision of DCJ shall remain in and under the supervision of DCJ, but done in coordination with DPB.  DPB will set statewide policy, identify best practices, and may receive reports regarding performance and compliance with protocols and policies for both DCJ and the 21 County Prosecutor Offices.  F. Enforcement.
[brief] (Pa54).  By way of Amended Complaint, the defendants were identified as [...], [...] (“[...]”), and [...].  (Pa54).  [...] filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on October 30, 2019.  (Da25).  On May 1, 2021, the Court issued a dismissal Order for lack of prosecution against [...].  (Pa55).  On November 17, 2022, [...] moved for Summary Judgment.
[brief] Public notice of the hearing before the Special Hearing Officer shall be provided in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12, which notice shall be provided by the Respondents.  All documents, reports, plans and other data in support of the Respondents’ submission shall be on file with the Township Planning Office and the Office of the Municipal Clerk at the Township Municipal Building at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing date.  The Respondents may respond to Township reports and comments at the hearing date, in accord with customary Zoning Board and Planning Board practice; H.