ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The section referenced by the Court recounts the fact that the Diagrammatic Elevation was not discussed during the deliberations as to whether the Zoning Board should or should not grant the requested variance relief.  This section does not, however, make any statements regarding whether the Diagrammatic Elevation had somehow been excised from the “plans and renderings” reference in the condition that Appellant alleges [...] violated (28a).  Moreover, the same Findings section that the Court relies upon to claim that the limitations imposed by the Diagrammatic Elevation have been excised begins with the following statement (emphasis added):  The Applicant filed an application with the Board and public hearings were held on March 15, 2022 and April 26, 2022.  Along with the application, the Applicant submitted the following:  - Architectural Plans entitled “Proposed 4 Story Over DFE, 2 Residential Unit Building Over Ground Floor Retail at 138 Park Avenue” prepared by [...], [...], dated October 11, 2021 (revised January 26, 2022) and unless noted herein, consisting of the following:  - Sheet Z-1: Proposed Four Story over DFE, 2 Residential Unit Building over Ground Floor Retail, Zoning Map – Site Located in R-1 Zone, Park Avenue (West Side)  Diagrammatic Elevation, Second Street (South Side)  Diagrammatic Elevation, Zoning Tabulations; (11a)  Clearly, the author of the Amended Resolution and the zoning commissioners that voted unanimously to approve the Amended Resolution were under the impression that the Diagrammatic Elevation was still part of the “plans and renderings” for this project.  It is quite clearly listed as being part of these plans.  The Court provides no explanation and cites no passages from what is the governing resolution that contradicts this claim.  This means that the limitations imposed by the Diagrammatic Elevation remained in force and [...] was required to abide by them, which in turn means that this rendering represented a highly relevant piece of evidence for a legal complaint claiming that this limitation had been violated.  **Not Mentioning vs. Invalidating**
[brief] [...] certainly had a contractual duty to cooperate with Plaintiff and [...] in seeing to it that the terms of the PSA were followed and to ensure that the closing (which was to occur at [...]’s offices) was not undertaken covertly, without notice to or participation of Plaintiff.  [...] breached its contractual duties when it aided and abetted [...] and otherwise acted in derogation of Plaintiff’s rights to acquire title to the Real Property by affirmatively and willfully cutting off communication with Plaintiff and intentionally misleading Plaintiff about the status of the deal.  In any event, under New Jersey law, a party to a contract may voluntarily assume duties to perform beyond those articulated in their contract.  Once those duties are voluntarily assumed, they must be performed with due care.  See, e.g., *Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co.*, 116 N.J. 517, 541 (1989) (stating the principle that "[n]otwithstanding the essentially contractual nature of the relationship between a title company and its insured, the company could be subject to a negligence action if the 'act complained of was the direct result of duties voluntarily assumed by the insurer in addition to the mere contract to insure title.'").  Thus, even assuming arguendo that the PSA did not obligate [...] to speak truthfully about whether (or not) the closing was “on hold” or to follow through on its promise keep Plaintiff apprised of the fact and details of the rescheduled closing, this does not end the analysis.  Once [...] voluntarily assumed a duty to Plaintiff, knowing that Plaintiff would rely upon [...] to perform that duty carefully and honestly, [...] had to perform that duty with due care, and without deception.  See id.; see also *Coco v. Hamilton*, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1047 * at *32; 2010 WL 2011003 (App Div. 2010).  The trial court did not expressly rule on these arguments, when dismissing the claims against [...] with prejudice.
[brief] The Trial Court’s July 19, 2024  Orders | 13 | | STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW | 15 | LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................16  POINT I: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL  THE TRIAL COURT’S LEGALLY CORRECT DISCOVERY RULING SHOULD BE DENIED (Da444-7)..................................16  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT CROSS- EXAMINING DEFENDANT BROWN WITH HIS PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERABILITY (Da444-7)..................................18  POINT III: DEFENDANT BROWN’S MOTION FOR A STAY SHOULD BE DENIED (Da444-7)................................................................24 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................25
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, ON BEHALF OF [...], ACTING CHIEF OF THE NEW JERSEY BUREAU OF SECURITIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MANAGING MEMBER OF [...]; [...], A HAWAIIAN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND [...], A NEW JERSEY NONPROFIT CORPORATION, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] On July 28, 2021, [...] announced that his firm represents both [...] and [...].  (253a)  Furthermore, [...] announced that [...] accepted her trusteeship and all communications must take place through counsel.  (255a, 256a)  [...]’s representation continued until September 30, 2021.  (159a ¶7)  During this time, [...] prepared the written complaint against Defendants.  (161a)  [...] used Trust funds to pay for [...]’s representation.  (159a ¶7)  (8T 26-28)  On October 19, 2021, [...] submitted a written offer to purchase the Boonton Property along with an appraisal for $555,000.  (267a)  On October 22, 2021, [...] rejected [...]’s offer on the basis that it was “not a fair market value proposal. ”  (269a ¶2)  On October 25, 2021, the Trustee’s complaint was filed.
[brief] Determine whether a contingent fee enhancement is appropriate (if any only if representation of the prevailing party was under a contingent-fee arrangement).  See Statement of Reasons, P017a.  Although the trial court’s Statement of Reasons largely cited Rendine, supra and Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc. (182 N.J. 1 [2004]), the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp. (253 N.J. 191 [2023]), recently confirmed the four-step process outlined in the Statement of Reasons by the trial court.
[brief] Having already failed three times to convince the Court to designate [...] and [...] as document custodians, Plaintiffs seek a fourth bite at the apple.  But they have failed to make the required showing that [...] and [...] are likely to possess documents that are both relevant and unique.  [...] respectfully asks the Special Master to deny Plaintiffs’ motion.  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (pro hac vice)  Dated: October 4, 2021  KELLER ROHRBACK  L.L.P. [...]  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel  Additional counsel listed on signature page  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[brief] STATUTES  42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 ..............................................................................  19 N.J.A.C. 11:3–2.7 ..................................................................................  19 RULES R. 2:6-2 .................................................................................................  18 R. 2:11-5 ...............................................................................................  49 R. 4:46-2 ...............................................................................................  35  OTHER AUTHORITIES
[brief] 3  Contrary to defendant’s assertions, (Db19; Db20), if passion/provocation manslaughter is presented at a retrial where the first trial resulted in an acquittal for purposeful or knowing murder, the State’s burden on the retrial is to prove the elements of passion/provocation manslaughter, not to disprove them.  5  Before the retrial commenced, the State moved under N.J.R.E. 104(c) to conduct a hearing on the admissibility of defendant’s statements to police, a required hearing that was not conducted before the first trial.  [...] presided over the hearing, and the judge issued an opinion on March 10, 2022.  (Sa1-13).  The court found that defendant’s statement from March 9, 2013, was admissible.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT**  As more thoroughly detailed in Appellant [...]’s brief, the defendant discovered and notified the [...] of a problem with the eye medication Ozurdex®, in June-July 2018 (Da0229; Da0240).  Defendant’s [...] notice initiated a months-long process, involving more than twenty contacts with the [...] (Da0258 ¶65) that culminated in an [...] recall of several product batches on December 20, 2018 (Da0250; Da0258 ¶¶51-52; Da0255; Da0452 pp. 130-31; Da0479).
[directive] 1.  Office of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion  A.  There is established in the Department, the Office of Diversity, Equity, and Establishment.  Inclusion (“Office” or “ODEI”), responsible for the overarching strategy, oversight, and implementation of DEI initiatives within and across the Department.  B. The Office shall operate under the supervision of a Chief Diversity, Leadership of the Office.  Equity, and Inclusion Officer (“CDEIO”) who shall be selected by, and operate under the authority of the Attorney General.  The CDEIO shall have such appropriate professional and educational background as to enable them to serve effectively as a senior leader within the Department, and sufficient experience in leading DEI initiatives in a workplace as well as expertise in DEI best practices, to enable them to direct and supervise the work of the Office and its organizational units.  The CDEIO shall devote their full-time to the duties of the Office.  The CDEIO shall be a member of the Department’s executive staff and shall have direct access to the Office of the Attorney General.  The CEDIO will serve as the senior advisor to the Office of the Attorney General in the area of DEI; lead the creation and execution of the Department’s strategic DEI plan; oversee, guide and collaborate in the DEI planning process for each of the Divisions; and will [...]
[brief] Just because Respondent captioned the provision an “agreement to arbitrate” does not mean that the provision is one within the contemplation of the state and federal arbitration acts.  Defendant’s agreement requires Plaintiff to bring all claims against Defendant, arising from their underlying agreement, in arbitration.  The arbitration provision is initially drafted to impose the same obligation on Respondents.  However, Respondent then attached language allowing it to opt-out of arbitration for claims seeking money damages against Appellant.  Respondent contended below that the “opt-out” language was limited in scope but that is not really the case.  Respondent could not possibly possess any other contractual claim against Appellant than one for money damages.  In reality Respondent’s opt-out right is all encompassing.  The Law Division recognized that this arbitration provision raised troubling public policy concerns.  The reason why arbitration agreements generally are enforceable is because they encourage efficient and more timely resolution of civil litigation, encourage consistency of outcome, and further alleviate a burden on already over-taxed state court resources, Respondent’s provision, on the other hand, authorizes duplicative proceedings, and could result in additional costs and burden to the consumer, in a manner contrary to the very public policy arbitration is supposed to advance.
[brief] Even if it never says so, the facts of record show that [...] insists on the gas combustion regulator for two reasons.  The first is that it has already purchased that regulator, in a sole source, non-competitive procurement, in 2012.  According to the RC brief, RCb13, [...] has already spent nearly $5 million pursuing this proposal, perhaps more if we include the continuing costs.  [...] refused to disavow trying to recoup these costs from ratepayers.  2T124:1-22; 2T126:2-8.  But the current regulator's real shortcoming for [...] is that it means the 16- inch pipe must be operated at less than maximum pressures, and that means that [...] can't sell more gas.  Selling more gas is what [...] wants to do for its shareholders; selling more gas, of course, is contrary to New Jersey's climate laws and regulations.  But again, [...]'s own witnesses admitted that the current regulator is capable of handling anticipated demand, so factually there is no case to be made for moving significantly larger volumes of carbon-emitting gas in this area.  Unless [...] has been intentionally violating its statutory obligations, the current regulator has been providing safe, adequate and proper service in an environmentally responsible manner for eleven years and is capable of continuing for many years to come.  The facts of record refute the claim that the proposed gas combustion is a "reliability project."
[directive] In the absence of the Judge, and consistent with N.J.S.A. Rule 7:4-2 2B:12-21, a defendant charged with a non-indictable offense that may be tried by the judge may be admitted to bail by the municipal court administrator or deputy Authority to Set Bail. court administrator.  In the absence of the judge, the municipal court administrator and the deputy court administrator, the defendant may be admitted to bail by any other person authorized by law to admit to bail.
[brief] Accordingly, the evidence that was sufficient to establish [...]’s maturation and rehabilitation was also sufficient to require a finding of mitigating factor 8 (the incident was precipitated by [...]’s underdeveloped brain, making it unlikely to re-occur now that he has matured), and mitigating factor 9 ([...] has matured into a rehabilitated, law-abiding person, unlikely to reoffend).  The court provided no explanation as to why this clear evidence did not lead to a finding of mitigating factors 8 and 9.  Conversely, the court was prohibited from finding aggravating factor 3 (risk of re-offense) because there was no longer a risk that [...] would reoffend now that he had matured and become rehabilitated.
[brief] *Id.* at 564.  The appellate court characterized its reversal as “serv[ing] to effectuate the legislative ‘objective of encouraging municipalities to make zoning decisions by ordinance rather than by variance. ’ ”  *Id.* at 567, citing *Medici*, 107 N.J.1, 5.  In fact, the court in *Medici* went further and made it clear that the master plan is the basis for land use.  --- 15 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89 further provides, “The governing body shall, at least every 10 years, provide for a general reexamination of its master plan and development regulations by the planning board, which shall prepare and adopt by resolution a report of the findings of such reexamination…”
[brief] ”  State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 33 (1970)(emphasis added).  In State v. Spruill, 16 N.J. 73 (1954), the reason for the “accomplice rule” was explained:  Accomplices, tainted as they are with confessed criminality, are often influenced in their testimony by the strong motive of hope of favor or pardon; and so it is incumbent upon the courts to 'look carefully into the secret motives that might actuate bad minds to draw in and victimize the innocent.'  [citations omitted]  The fact that co-conspirators have turned 'State's evidence' naturally affects 'injuriously the credit to be given to their testimony'; for it is 'suggestive, at least, of a bargain between them and the State authorities with relation to the punishment which would be inflicted upon them in case their testimony aided in bringing about' the conviction of the accused.  [citation omitted]  [Id. at 78.]  Although the “accomplice rule” is “ordinarily for the benefit of the defendant,” it “may be to the defendant's disadvantage because the very use of ‘accomplice’ has an opprobrious and detrimental connotation.
[brief] 43.  The Lease specifically provides in relevant part:  10.  Maintenance.  Tenant shall be responsible for day-to-day maintenance and repairs to the Premises, including surfaces of the interior wall, floors and ceiling.  Any and all appliances located in or on the Property shall be maintained, repaired or replaced, if necessary, by Tenant.  Tenant shall, at its expense, obtain and maintain such pest control measures and services as are necessary, in the opinion of the Landlord, to maintain the premises in a clean and sanitary condition.  Landlord shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair or replacement of all structural components of the Property including the roofing system and drainage systems.  Electrical and plumbing, to the extent constructed or renovated by the Tenant shall be the responsibility of the Tenant.  [Ibid.].  44.  The Township has since demolished the parking lot, including [...]’s alleged 10 spaces and the common area of the parking lot where plaintiff fell to put in a new municipal library.  Da1-4 (photo taken on January 13, 2023, and [...]’s architect’s rendering of the Subject Property).  LEGAL ARGUMENT SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] That is enough to grant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the City’s liability for a taking.  The court below reasoned that it was unfair to order the City “to surrender $45,000 of equity, after retaining same for four years, without an inkling that the equity they legally received at the time was at risk. ” (Ja416).  A similar—but stronger—line of argument was rejected by the Court in Fox.  That case involved an allegation that the defendant had improperly obtained and benefitted from a customer list belonging to the plaintiff.  Fox, 210 N.J. at 409.  The trial court reasoned that the delay in filing prejudiced defendants, who had “continued to reap the benefits of the customer list,” and thereby unwittingly continued to accrue damages.  Id. at 423–24.  The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding that any failure to mitigate damages caused by the plaintiff’s delay would go toward the size of the remedy, not to whether the claim was time-barred.  Id. at 424.  Here, the City’s argument is even weaker: the City’s continued retention of [...]’s equity does not increase its liability except for the amount of interest necessary to satisfy just compensation.  See Borough of Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J. Super. 344, 353 (App. Div. 1982) (“[T]he allowance of interest on a condemnation award is a requirement of constitutional magnitude where the actual taking of the property is not contemporaneous with payment. ”).  Again, this is no different from any other takings case which may be brought within six years from the date of a taking.  In short, the court below erred in applying the equitable doctrine of laches to bar timely claims that are governed by statutes of limitations.
[brief] The Municipal Land Use ordinances, Site Plan Review ordinances and other ordinances and regulations applicable to and affecting the Proposed Site, on which the Regulator Station will be constructed and operated, have been enacted pursuant to the authority of the MLUL, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq.  --- \(^1\)  For the reasons discussed elsewhere in this Petition and supporting pre-filed testimony, the Original Proposed Site remains a viable location for the Facility as well.  29.
[brief] “[O]ur case law does not require . . . that the trial court explicitly reject each and every mitigating factor argued by a defendant,” particularly when an appellate court “can readily deduce from the sentencing transcript” the trial court’s reasoning.  *State v. Bieniek*, 200 N.J. 601, 609 (2010).  “It is sufficient that the trial court provides reasons for imposing its sentence that reveal the court's consideration of all applicable mitigating factors in reaching its sentencing decision.
[brief] Admission of the audio-video recording also enhanced the jury’s assessment of credibility.  It is one thing to have the responding Trooper testify to hearing [...]’s distress.  It is another thing completely to allow the jury to hear same.  “Because ‘[e]ven the most scrupulous of witnesses is subject to forgetfulness,’ [...] a recording.... [will] also provide judges and juries with a more accurate picture of what was said, as words can convey different meanings depending on the tone of voice or nuance used. ”  State v. Cook, 179 N.J. at 556 (citations omitted).
[brief] Nothing in the Plaintiff's Amended complaint indicates that the medication was necessary to preserve her life as required by Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.  In Rouse, the plaintiff was denied insulin injections to treat his insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, which the Court noted was a serious medical need.  Here, the Plaintiff makes no such assertion.  "The law is clear that simple medical malpractice is insufficient to present a constitutional violation."  Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993).  "[C]ertainly no claim is stated when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of another doctor.  There may, for example, be several acceptable ways to treat an illness."  White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990).  In the matter at bar, the Plaintiff alleges that she was denied medication for some undisclosed psychiatric condition — while this is hardly a qualified life-threatening illness that arises to the level of "serious medical need" that our courts have contemplated, the Plaintiff fails to even set forth what would occur if she was denied medication to treat her condition, or that she had a life-threatening condition to begin with.  In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.  *Rouse*, 182 F.3d at 197.  Here the Plaintiff has made no such assertion.  In fact, the Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegation stating that he would be subject to life threatening harm if he was denied her medication.  In as much as Plaintiff’s brief states that only a week went by before a prison physician could properly prescribe the Plaintiff her medication, and that the Plaintiff suffered no actual harm, the Court must take judicial notice that Plaintiff wasn’t actually subject to any serious medical neglect/harm.  As such, the Court must dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint, with prejudice, and as a matter of law.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  This matter arises out of the September 25, 2022, shooting death of [...].  The shooting occurred at or near the public basketball courts located at [...] at approximately 3:00 am.  (P1 at ¶1)  APPELLANTS’ Complaint alleges that for several months prior to the shooting, there was makeshift stand illegally selling alcohol outside of that location.  (P2 at --- 1 T references the transcript of the November 17, 2023 oral argument before [...].  ¶4 and P3 at ¶12).  At approximately 3:00 am on the night of the incident, the proprietors of the illegal alcohol stand had been selling large quantities of alcohol to a substantial number of individuals many of whom were intoxicated (P3 at ¶14).  Several altercations broke out including altercations involving the individual who ultimately shot and killed [...].  (P3 at ¶14).  An altercation between Mr. Garica and an unnamed individual present at the makeshift liquor stand broke out with [...] striking the individual in the face (P3 at ¶16).  The individual subsequently went to a vehicle, obtained a firearm and subsequently shot Mr. Garica two times (P3 at ¶16-17).  Count One of APPELLANTS Complaint (Survivorship) alleges that the [...] and [...] failed to maintain and control the premises where the incident occurred allowing a dangerous condition to arise (P4 at ¶21).