ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In such a setting where a witness does not meet the criteria of the rule, it has been said that such testimony is so lacking in foundation as to be worthless.  Anderson v. A.T. Friedman Supply, 416 N.J. super. 46, 74-75 (App. Div. 2010), certif. den. 205 N.J. 518 (2011).  Here, the Respondent never offered [...] as an expert witness prior to having him provide a myriad of baseless opinions about [...]’s alleged unfitness for duty as a result of his alleged “opioid abuse. ”  Despite [...] not being a medical doctor and his utter failure to understand or investigate the reasons for [...]’s opioid prescriptions, the ALJ nonetheless placed substantial reliance on [...]’s worthless opinions in finding [...] guilty of the disciplinary charges.  To make matters worse, the ALJ accepted the opinions after finding he would not accept [...] as an expert in the field of “substance abuse.
[brief] Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. Young, 2019 WL 1568090 (App. Div. Mar. 20, 2019)..................................................12, 13  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34.........................................................................................1, 12, 13  Other Authorities R. 4:42-11...........................................................................................................2, 9, 16 R. 4:65-5.............................................................................................................12, 15
[brief] See id. at 153-56.  On June 12, 1992, the New Jersey State Planning Commission prepared the New Jersey State Development and Redevelopment Plan, “Communities of Place,” which designated this area along State Highway --- \(^3\)  The development of the [...] site was mired in litigation for decades.  Many of the background facts have been set forth in prior reported judicial opinions, as issues concerning this site have been before the Appellate Division on five occasions from 2002 through 2008.  See [...], L.L.C. v. [...], 403 N.J. Super. 146, 152-53 (App. Div. 2008) (reciting litigation history), certif. denied, 199 N.J.  129 (2009).  35 and Kings Highway East in [...] as “a future regional center for dense, mixed-use development. ”  *Id.* at 153 (emphasis added).  In 1993-1994, [...]’s Planning Board amended its Master Plan and adopted a zoning ordinance to embrace “the town-center concept advocated by the State” and designate a large swath of land (including the area along State Highway 35) as part of a Planned Development zone.  *Id.* at 154.  Between 1993 and 1999, the property owners, with the encouragement of municipal officials, acquired another 50 to 52 contiguous acres for the Town Center project.  *Ibid.*  All of this property was transferred to [...], the current owner of this parcel.  See *ibid.*  [...] unveiled a concept plan for a Town Center project in early 2000, consisting of 1,700,000 square feet of retail and office space and over 400 residential units, including 25 affordable housing units.  *Id.* at 155-57.  That proposed mixed-use development, however, did not move forward.  In late 2008, [...] added the [...] site in its Third Round Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, and [...] agreed to provide inclusionary housing as part of its project.
[brief] [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  .........................................................  23  A.  Plaintiff Has the Burden to Prove Defect and Causation Through Qualified and Reliable Expert Testimony.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  ..............................................  24 B.  The Trial Court Wrongly Denied Summary Judgment Despite Plaintiff’s Complete Lack of Proof of a Manufacturing Defect.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)] ......................... 25
[brief] Plaintiff had a second opportunity to correct this error when, on August 8, the Law Division issued the Track Assignment Notice.  Because Plaintiff’s counsel had not properly identified the case type, the case was assigned as a Track II case with 300 days of discovery.  (Da1)  Counsel reviewing that notice should have instantly recognized that it should have been assigned as a Track III case with 450 days of discovery, as is appropriate for malpractice claims.  Plaintiff was therefore on notice that the Law Division did not treat the complaint as a malpractice matter, and was on constructive notice that the Court would not be scheduling a Ferreira conference due to Plaintiff’s uncorrected error, and did not, thereafter, request a Ferreira conference when it became clear that the court had not scheduled one.  More importantly, the law is clear that the fact that the Ferreira conference was not scheduled does not extend the time a plaintiff has to file the Affidavit of Merit.
[brief] The Superior Court, Law Division, failed to address any of the legal issues raised by [...] but merely related the State's and [...]'s positions regarding same.  Although it undertook no legal analysis of or otherwise addressed the legal issues, implicit in its judgment of conviction is its adoption of the State's position.  Aside from the obvious error of this approach, it was rendered more problematic by the State's referencing of an audit which was not part of the record.  Moreover, the Law Division made references to the legal findings of the Municipal Judge.  For example, it referenced [...]'s finding as to the intent of the enaction of chapter 44 of the municipal code, despite the record being devoid of any evidence with regard to intent.  The legal issues are detailed herein.  [...] comes before this Court on appeal, requesting that it exercise plenary review of these issues and reverse the convictions.  TABLE OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | Date | Event Proceeding | Filed By | Result | Appendix | |------------|------------------|----------|----------|----------| | 10-01-2021 | Complaint | Plaintiff| Convicted| Da 13a | | 10-01-2021 | Complaint | Plaintiff| Convicted| Da 14a |
[brief] 1.  The Appellate Division’s Review of the Board’s Determination  An administrative agency’s determination is presumptively correct and, on review of the facts, this Court will not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Gerba v Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System, 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980).  See, also Campbell v New Jersey Racing Commission, 169 N.J. 579, 597 (2001); Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962).  Thus, on judicial review of an agency determination, courts have a limited role to perform.  Gerba v. Board of Trustees, supra., 83 N.J. at 189.  If the Appellate Division is satisfied after its review that the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency’s decision, then it must affirm even if the Court feels it would have reached a different result.  Campbell v. New Jersey Racing Commission, supra., 169 N. J. at 587  Thus, the Board’s “decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. ”  Russo v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011).
[brief] (Da043).  [...] was informed that this payment was not permissible, and was asked to confirm that he had government records in his possession.  (Da042).  He responded “The inability of the Board to pass along the costs to produce these documents to Complainant [...] is inconsequential to me. ” (Da042).  [...] did not request separate legal representation in these emails.  He did on two occasions express his belief that he was entitled to representation, but that he declined same.  In his correspondence on February 18, 2021 [...] states “Please note that I am entitled to representation at the Board’s expense, but have elected not to do so in an effort to not burden the taxpayers. ” (Da040) and that his donation of the $24,000 he expected the requestor to pay for this efforts to specified fire stations would take place “pending legal consultation, as I am entitled to at the Board’s expense. ”  (Da043)  Due to [...]’s willful defiance of the GRC Interim Order, despite his obligation as a public official to produce the government records in his possession, the District was unable to produce the requested records and informed the GRC of same via a Certification dated February 18, 2021.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(d).  Final Decision at 7 (Emphasis added.).  The State’s failure to adjust SFRA based on the admittedly unique characteristics of [...]’s student population and on “up-to-date measures” of [...]’s realistic “ability to pay” is at the heart of SFRA’s unconstitutionality as applied to [...]. \(^{13}\) \(^{13}\)
[brief] ”  In re McCarron, 2011 WL 6218934, at *2 fn2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2011).  The Court’s March 27, 2023 decision and Order granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment shows that it fully considered the arguments of the parties, heard lengthy oral argument, and ruled against [...].  [...]’s arguments were already put before the Court and were found to be unpersuasive.  [...]’s emails did not change the outcome because they did not demonstrate a written arrangement, contrary to [...]’s assertions.  See In re McCarron, 2011 WL 6218934 at *2.  As set forth in the trial court, documents from over 10 years ago do not establish that [...] was a franchise of [...] or that there was a written arrangement between the parties.  The Court rejected Appellant’s additional document production in the Motion to Amend and the other evidence in the case on the Motion for Summary Judgment in finding that the record did not support a finding of a written arrangement between the parties.  Even assuming arguendo that [...] helped start [...] back in 2008 or 2009, which is what [...] repeatedly and unsuccessfully argues, again, as set forth in Engines, Inc.:
[brief] It is clear that defendant believes his entire case rested on [...]’s testimony, but the reality is that he was the last witness in a list of witnesses who provided direct evidence of his guilt.  And, his own parents’ testimony served to be much more damning to his position than anything else — certainly much more than Wesley.  Indeed, his parents made Wesley’s testimony more credible by corroborating the gun’s provenance.  The trial court properly employed the “limited circumstances” and “very strict controls” Guenther, 181 N.J. at 154, and A.O., 198 N.J. at 93, required.  Indeed, the maximum amount of information possible without treading into a “distracting mini trial” was permitted on cross.  Thus, there was no error here and defendant’s convictions should stand.
[brief] Civil Action On Appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ REPLY  BRIEF  Of counsel: FAEGRE DRINKER  BIDDLE & REATH LLP  [...] (ID 014711991)  [...] (ID 122152014)  [...] (ID 127472015)  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
[brief] POINT III BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCORPORATED CONSIDERATIONS OF CAUSATION IN ITS ANALYSIS OF DUTY AND BREACH, THE PROPER CONSIDERATION OF CAUSATION ON REMAND SHOULD BE CLARIFIED.  Defendant’s argument regarding causation seems to stem from a lack of familiarity with New Jersey law.  The issue of causation was raised below, both as part of the court’s duty analysis and separately.  It was briefed by the parties and considered although not relied on in the trial court’s analysis.  The decision below is subject to de novo review.  Because the appellate court, under New Jersey law, may uphold a judgment on a different basis than the trial court, plaintiff addressed the issue in the event the court was inclined to consider it.  Plaintiff also addressed it in the context that it was considered below, i.e., as a factor in the court’s defect analysis.  For the reasons previously set forth, whether the failure to incorporate the available lane-keeping technology was a proximate cause of the accident is a fact question reserved to the jury on the record presented.  CONCLUSION
[brief] See Aptheker v. Sec. of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).  The Ninth Circuit has concluded the right to travel internationally is protected by substantive due process.  See Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971 (9th Cir.2002).  Trial court’s decision to order the confiscation of the parties’ and child’s passports without conducting a hearing constitutes a violation of due process rights.  “Fundamentally, due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ”  Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995).  It is disconcerting that the trial court ordered the confiscation of passports without conducting a hearing despite finding there was no evidence before the court that plaintiff was planning to flee the country.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:13A-14 (the legislature finds and declares, among other things, that interest arbitration “afford[s] an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of [police and fire contract negotiations] disputes;” and, that interest arbitrators “fairly and reasonably perform their statutory responsibilities to the end that labor peace between the public employer and its employees will be stabilized and promoted… .”).  The Arbitrator provides no explanation as to why the [...] unit is the only unit where funds earmarked for salary and wage increases were intentionally diverted by the City, and the City benefited by its actions.  Finally, the Arbitrator fails to explain why he only used the City’s 2023 budget in analyzing the City’s financial condition when the Award covered the period August 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023.  The Arbitrator is required to provide a reasonable explanation for his economic award.  His failure to do so constitutes reversible error.  **POINT V**
[brief] On December 15, 2023, the parties received correspondence from the Superior Court requesting additional briefing.  Specifically, the Court wrote:  Regarding the above captioned matter, the Court requests defense counsel provide additional briefing on “futility. ”  Specifically, the Court requests further briefing on R. 1:36-3 and whether it applies to this matter.  If so, provide why or why not based on the parties and issues previously addressed.  Please also brief the overarching goal of the M.S.R.A.  Finally, please provide additionally briefing on the application or non-application of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the single controversy doctrine.  (Pa000738).  Based on the Superior Court’s request, and in light of the Appellate Division’s decision in *Superior Officers*, Defendants filed a cross-motion for reconsideration of the Superior Court’s initial decision denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
[brief] Sham Investigation Based On Defendant [...]’s Complaint.  The second overt example of Defendants’ retaliatory treatment against Plaintiff is the handling of a complaint brought by Defendant [...], culminating in a third-party investigation spearheaded by Defendants [...] and [...], who are members of Defendant [...].  231a, ¶ 132.  Plaintiff’s allegation in the 2021 Lawsuit is not that an investigation should not have occurred.  Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the investigation was conducted improperly, depriving her of an ability to meaningfully participate, such that it was a sham and retaliatory investigation.  Id. at ¶ 133.
[brief] **THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO PLEAD A VIOLATION UNDER THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION (Pa001028–1031). **  Next, Plaintiffs generally contend, without any substantive analysis, that Defendants violated their constitutional rights under the Contracts Clause to the New Jersey State Constitution by depriving Plaintiffs of their terminal leave payments upon retirement.  (Pb35–42).  Like Plaintiffs’ Takings Clause argument, this issue has already been considered and expressly rejected in *Superior Officers* and the First Police Matter.  *Superior Officers*, 2022 WL 2352376, at *9; (First Police Decision at 40–43, Pa000303–306).  Those same findings apply equally here.
[brief] i)  **[...] has been my adversary in this case. **  Even though the law in New Jersey is well settled that statutes creating pensions for public employees should be liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to benefit from the statute to induce and encourage public service, *Geller v. Department of the Treasury*, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, the [...] has been my adversary in this case.  The emails written by [...] of the DPB in this case speak for themselves.  Pa44 to Pa60 and Pa70 to Pa71.  For example, when [...] wrote a July 22, 2022 letter advising me that I was ineligible for any life insurance benefit, she made no reference to my purchasing service credits even though *N.J.A.C. 17:2-5.1* permits the purchase of service credits by active members who have contributed to PERS within the last two years.  See Pa43 and Pa95.  Was that two-year window available to me in July of 2022 since I had made pension contributions in the fall of 2021?  [...] never raised such an issue.  Instead, [...]’s letter merely stated that my life insurance benefit was completely forfeited by the recalculation of my service credit without any mention of any option to cure the two month deficiency in my service credit.  Pa43.  I am not an attorney, but my reading of the language providing a two-year window under *N.J.A.C. 17:2-5.1* seems to indicate that I was arguably within the two-year window, particularly since these laws are supposed to be interpreted in favor of public employees.
[directive] Both the Report and the CBVI grant program define a 8 tertiary prevention provider as an entity that uses strategies that attempt to intervene with those already engaged in violent behavior or at high risk of violence due, for example, to past victimization or as a result of retaliation.  HUGHES  JUSTICE COMPLEX ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-9660  FAX: (609)292-4299  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable shot, a 16% reduction from the previous record low achieved in 2023.  In total, this represents a 50% reduction in shooting victims compared to 2012.  This reduction reflects a multipronged approach to address community safety—dedicated work by law enforcement officers, implementing stronger gun safety policies, holding bad actors in the firearms industry accountable, and expanding New Jersey’s investment in community violence prevention and intervention programs.  Yet, even with the recent reduction in violence, gun violence continues to be a scourge that plagues our communities and therefore demands a coordinated and strenuous response.  The Department is dedicated to continuing to use all available tools to combat gun violence, and to improve collaboration where necessary.  To that end, I had tasked the Working Group with identifying best practices and policies for greater collaboration between law enforcement and CBVI organizations.  This group was convened to lay the groundwork for coordination between CBVI organizations and law enforcement where it is not yet developed, and to provide guidance to both to support their shared commitment to saving lives.  The Working Group consists of law enforcement professionals, CBVI organizations, and healthcare professionals.  These experts and skilled practitioners provided incredible insight, identified best practices, and lent their substantial expertise and experience to helping design a framework for law enforcement and community violence intervention coordination that is unprecedented in this State.  Upon completion of their work, I have reviewed their recommendations and adopted them entirely.  Accordingly, I have issued official Guidelines for Law Enforcement Agencies9 and am issuing this guidance to CBVI providers, as recommended by the Working Group.  This letter along with the Guidance I issued to Law Enforcement is intended to implement that recommendation, and thereby help transform the Working Group’s recommendations into practice.  The Report provides guidance to both law enforcement and CBVI practitioners on how they can appropriately coordinate their efforts with the goal of reducing violence.  These partnerships can expand our ability to prevent and respond to violent crime by leveraging the support and coordination of CBVI providers who use techniques and approaches to connect to individuals in communities that law enforcement typically cannot reach.  While I encourage you to read the Report in its entirety along with the Guidance I have issued to Law Enforcement, I am taking this opportunity to express my guidance to you and the other DLPS-funded tertiary CBVI organizations.
[brief] See United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that one definition of “formal arrest” is “informing the suspect that he is under arrest”).  Accordingly, the only dispute regarding defendant’s alternative argument is whether defendant’s testimonial assertions should be suppressed immediately following his admission that there were drugs in the car or approximately thirty seconds later when the officer asked whether defendant’s wife should be arrested “too. ” (V:16:59:30 to 17:00:00).  As to this dispute, the State underscores that “[w]hat ultimately matters to the determination of whether Miranda is triggered is custody, . . . not . . . the existence of probable cause[.]”  United States v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001).  Custody is determined by consulting the relevant objective circumstances, which include “the extent to which the person was confronted with evidence of guilt,” but also include the “language used by the officers, the physical characteristics of the place where the question[ing] occurs, the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual, [and] the duration of the detention. ”  Id.; accord Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 431.  Indeed, while a police officer – and suspect – may be mutually aware of circumstances constituting probable cause to arrest the suspect, that information alone does not convert a roadside detention into custody.  See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423, 441-42 (holding defendant not in custody despite his failure of field sobriety test); Reininger, 430 N.J. Super. at 537 (holding that the roadside questioning of defendant did not establish custody despite that defendant repeatedly admitted that his vehicle contained firearms); Baum, 393 N.J. Super. at 291 (holding that driver’s admission that car contained narcotics did not convert roadside questioning into custody).  Here, a number of factors support the conclusion that defendant was not in custody prior to [...] asserting that he was under arrest: the brief period of the detention; the calm, informal, and public nature of the interaction between defendant and [...]; the lack of any physical restraints; and the fact that defendant had only admitted that he knew drugs were in a vehicle that he had borrowed for the first time that day (as opposed to admitting that the drugs belonged to him).