[brief] Still, the Motion Court decided to protect Defendants from application of the strict liability standard because, the Motion Court determined, Defendants would have been afforded immunity under the Act if they were “operators” as defined by the Act.  (Pa1090a).  If the Legislature intended to extend the Act’s immunity to circumstances involving non-operators, it could have done so.  The Motion Court erred by extending the Act’s protections to persons and entities beyond those contemplated by the Legislature.  In attempting to ascertain the Legislature’s intent beyond the plain meaning and application of the Act, the Motion Court misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center, 203 N.J. 184 (2010).  The Motion Court relied on the decision in Hubner to interpret the Act as “remedial legislation” and give broad, over-inclusive interpretation to the meaning of “participants” and “equine animal activities” as used in the Act.  (Pa1088a-Pa1090a).  In Hubner, the Supreme Court comprehensively examined the legislative history and intent of the Act.  The Hubner court explained that the “Equine Act is the third in a series of statutes that used assumption of risk principles to allocate responsibility for injuries sustained in inherently dangerous recreational activities. ”  Hubner, 203 N.J. at 198 (citing to the Ski Act (N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 to -11) and Roller Skating Rink Safety and Fair Liability Act (N.J.S.A. 5:14-1 to -7))(emphasis added).  The Hubner court further explained that “the operator of [a] recreational facility” owes a “participant” no duty as to known or obvious inherent risks of the recreational activity.  Id. at 200 (emphasis added).  All three statutes – the Equine Activities Liability Act, the Ski Act, and the Roller Skating Rink Safety and Fair Liability Act – “reflect an effort to protect operators of these recreational facilities” by maintaining an assumption of risk defense for injuries resulting from the obvious and inherent dangers of each respective recreational activity.  *Id.* at 202, 203 (emphasis added).  Therefore, in *Hubner*, the Supreme Court described the Act as governing liability between “participants” in “inherently dangerous recreational activities” and the “operators” of “recreational facilities. ”  *Id.* at 198, 200 (emphasis added).  The business of collecting stallion semen to be frozen and sold domestically and internationally cannot reasonably be considered a recreational activity conducted at a recreational facility.  Moreover, the Act specifically states that it does not apply to the horse racing industry.  See N.J.S.A. 5:15-12.  The purpose of the [...], of which Defendants were shareholders and “Syndicate Manager,” was primarily to collect the semen of Wishing Stone and sell that semen to breed with mares to conceive pedigreed race horses.  The New Jersey Legislature never adopted a public policy of protecting stallion breeders from tort liability incurred during the business of collecting stallion semen to be frozen and sold for the breeding of pedigreed race horses.  Instead, New Jersey law, as expressed in case law and Jury Charge 5.60B, imposes liability on animal owners, like the Defendants, who knew or should have known that their animal had a natural inclination or habitual tendency to do or act in ways that endangered the people around it.