ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On September 8, 2022, an Ocean County grand jury returned Superseding Indictment Number [...], encompassing allegations from two distinct encounters [...] had with police in Lakewood—the first with [...] officers on August 6, 2020 (Counts One to Four), and the second with [...] officers on August 7, 2020 (Counts Five to 13).  The charges were as follows: third-degree possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (Count One); third-degree possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(5) (Count Two); third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (Count Three); second-degree possession with intent to distribute cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(2) (Count Four); third-degree possession of fentanyl, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (Count Five); third-degree possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(5) (Count Six); third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (Count Seven); third-degree possession with intent to distribute cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3) (Count Eight); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (Count Nine); fourth-degree --- 2  This section recounts only the procedural history most relevant to [...]’s current appeal of his motion to suppress evidence.  possession of a large-capacity magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3j (Counts 10 and 11); second-degree possession of a firearm while engaged in certain drug activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a (Count 12); and second-degree certain persons not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (Count 13).
[brief] ...........................................................(omitted)  Exhibit M2, 12/28/2017  Certification of [...] in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motions to Quash Subpoenas  ...........................................(omitted)  Exhibit M2-1, 8/21/2018  Order Denying Summary Judgment  Motion of Defendants [...] and [...] ...........................................................(omitted, see 30a)  Exhibit M2-2, 3/4/2008  Letter of Intent..............................................................................353a  Exhibit M2-3, 4/29/2009  Memorandum of Understanding.............................................356a  Exhibit M2-4, 5/3/2017
[brief] (5T 162).  [...] testified that, on the day of the home invasion, [...] came to his place of employment at [...]’s direction because [...] sent him to use a credit card to purchase some clothes.  (5T 161-62).  [...] stated he knew [...] through [...].  [...] was a “stick up man” and drug dealer in Paterson.  (5T 161).  [...] believed that the clothes he was told to purchase were for [...].  (5T 162).  After making the purchase as directed, [...] went to [...]'s house in Paterson and gave the new clothes to him.  (5T 168-170).  [...] was present at [...]'s house.  Id.  [...] overheard [...] tell [...] that there were police and caution tape around the [...] residence.  (5T 168-170).  [...] was eventually approached by the [...] and charged with fraudulent use of a credit card.  (5T 173).  He gave a statement incriminating [...] and [...] at that time, but not [...].² (5T 179).  In fact, [...] testified that he did not know [...].  (5T 179).  He agreed to cooperate with law enforcement as a confidential informant and wore a wire during conversations with [...].  Id.  As a result of his suspected cooperation, [...] testified that [...] delivered rat food to his house with a note that read “rat food for a rat. ” (5T 174-178).  No trial witness nor victim identified [...] in connection with the Teaneck home invasion.  Furthermore, no forensic evidence connected [...] to the offense.  (10T 118).  --- ²  [...] was never charged in the home invasion and murder.
[brief] As to the second element, the Trial Court found that a contract existed between the parties.  *(Da009)*  Because of a somewhat convoluted fact pattern, that issue is not as clear.  The 2016 Contract, which was signed 1 month prior to the filing of the Bankruptcy Petition, is only mentioned 1 time in the Complaint, i.e., Count 5, which Plaintiff agreed to dismiss.  As a result, the Court should not review the 2016 Contract in the context of the TCCWNA or the CFA.  *See Mack Auto Imports, Inc. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc.*, 244 N.J. Super. 254, 258 (App. Div. 1990)  Regarding the 2018 and 2019 Contracts, Plaintiff entered into those Contracts after the Chapter 13 Petition was converted to a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy.  *(Da136)*  As a result, Plaintiff did not even have the right to sell that asset because pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 323, as the representative of the estate the trustee is the one to administer the property of the debtor, including the debtor’s prepetition causes of action.  *See Moses v. Howard* Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 795 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and § 323) (finding that the commencement of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy extinguishes the debtor’s legal rights in pending litigation, and transfers those rights to the trustee); Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (“a pre-petition cause of action is the property of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee in bankruptcy has standing to pursue it”).  So, the issue is whether Plaintiff even had the legal right to sign the 2018 and 2019 Contracts.  Considering that the PI and UIM Claims were the property of the Bankruptcy Estate, only the trustee had the authority to transfer those proceeds.  C.
[brief] Ha55.  The ID is manifestly incorrect in concluding that [...]'s testimony was "undisputed."  [...]'s expert on land use is the body charged by law with being the Township's expert on all applications to depart from the existing land use plan, namely, the [...].  N.J.S.A. 40:55-70c; 40:55-70d.  The Township ZB very much disputed her testimony and conclusions in its two resolutions of disapproval.  It seems entirely logical that consideration and deference be given to the local land use boards in these cases, which, after all, are governed by a statute which is itself a provision of the Municipal Land Use Law.  Unlike [...], the members of that Board of Zoning Adjustment all live in [...], are very familiar with the uses in the town, the Master Plan and the zoning ordinances as well as prior decisions on variances.  As a matter of law their knowledge and experience with [...] Township is always superior to that of a paid expert such as [...].
[brief] Suppose the State were to conduct the following identification procedure months after a crime but before trial: the prosecution first informs a witness that it has located and identified the culprit; it next singles out or otherwise highlights a particular person for the witness to view; and it then asks if the witness can make an identification.  To be sure, such a highly suggestive process could readily pose “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. ”  . . .  The process also mirrors a first-time in-court identification.  Courts should not sanction such highly suggestive procedures—not in an individual case and not as a categorical approach to the introduction of certain evidence.
[brief] ” – i.e., a 10 day cancellation provision.\(^3\) (239a; 228a).  Moreover, neither [...] nor [...] were ever represented by an attorney during this transaction.  (253a).  According to the Real Estate Sales Contract, the written contract purchase price for the property was $42,294.  (239a).  This contract price of $42,294 was not equivalent to 82% of the Property’s assessed value of $262,500 (82% of which is --- \(^3\)  As comprehensively set forth in the Brief, this attempted transaction was governed by the Foreclosure Resue Fraud Prevention Act (“FRFPA”), which, among other provisions, requires a mandatory 10-day cancellation period and a specific for of Notice regarding the same.
[brief] ”  All of the contractual documents that the plaintiffs reviewed, initialed and signed make clear that they purchased for their own personal use and not for investment purposes.  As such, and critical to the Parol Evidence Rule context, there was no misunderstood intent between the parties and thus no parol evidence necessary for that purpose.  Second, the motion Judge erred as a matter of law when he refused to consider the fact that each of the plaintiffs’ claims of oral misrepresentations were nothing more than the plaintiffs orally disputing a specific, written contractual term that the plaintiffs initialed and signed for and that controlled their obligations and the limitations in owning a timeshare.
[brief] When considering a claim of hostile work environment under the LAD, the test is fact sensitive, and the court must review the totality of circumstances presented.  *El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ.*, 382 N.J. Super. 145, 178 (N.J. 2005).  The inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's protected class would consider the alleged discriminatory conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.  *Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters*, 437 N.J. Super. 366, 376 (N.J. Super. 2014).  Determining the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct requires an assessment of the totality of the relevant circumstances, which involves examination of (1) "the frequency of all the discriminatory conduct"; (2) "its severity"; (3) "whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance"; and (4) "whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.
[brief] In opposition to the summary judgment motions, [...]'s parents filed an affidavit setting forth their proofs concerning the landlords' knowledge of the dogs' vicious propensities.  Prior to our son's attack we both expressed our concern for the safety and welfare of our children to [d]efendant [landlords].  Specifically, we told [d]efendant [...] that we feared for our ¹  On September 11, 2007, as a result of the death of [...], plaintiffs filed an amended complaint substituting the [...] as a defendant.
[brief] State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44, 54 (2004).  None of these factors, however, warrants acceptance of legally inconsistent verdicts.  The sanctity of the jury cannot be used to shield legally inconsistent verdicts.  “[L]egally impossible verdicts do not require inquiry into the jury’s intent[,]”  Terry, 478 P.3d at 1034, because it takes no speculation to know that “a legal error has occurred[,]” and that trust in the verdict cannot be had.  Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815.  Moreover, our courts already prohibit legally inconsistent verdicts in the case of civil trials, despite the jury playing the same role as in criminal trials, thus suggesting that any interest in shielding this kind of impossible verdict is not substantial.
[directive] In acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency enforcement law a 4.5.8, through 4.5.1 subsections Section with in accordance general consulted attorney or prosecutor deputy assistant unless an is who 3.3.2 to subsection pursuant officer designated supervisory or a Directive, of 3.2 this this of under 4  Section presumptions overcome to Prosecutor County the by authorized of interests nor safety or the public victim of interests the neither that determines Directive, determination, the In this making acomplaint-warrant.
[brief] The trial court found these allegations failed to state a viable claim for consumer fraud for several reasons.  First, the trial court correctly found that Appellants’ “allegations do not provide enough support to sufficiently demonstrate a lack of good faith, honest[y], or fair dealing by [...]. ” (2T25:8-11).  Importantly, the trial court further explained that Appellants “fail[ed] to recognize or even acknowledge that” they defaulted under the Lease on two separate occasions prior to their third default in January 2023, and that [...] twice waived enforcement of the Concession Recovery Provision as a courtesy to Appellants.  (2T25:2-4).  [...]’s conduct in excusing Appellants’ prior breaches and not enforcing the Concession Recovery Provision is \textit{prima facie} evidence, if not \(^6\) Appellants repeatedly misstate that [...] somehow acted inappropriately by suing twice to collect the Concessions.  As any practitioner should know, a landlord must institute two separate actions upon the breach of a lease: one for eviction to recover possession of the property, and another for damages.  Because Appellants failed to deliver possession of the apartment after they defaulted, [...] was forced to institute an eviction proceeding, in addition to instituting a separate action to recover the amounts past due and owing under the Lease.  wholly dispositive, that [...] did not engage in any bad faith, dishonesty, or unfair dealing.  In granting Appellants two prior waivers of enforcement, the trial court understood that [...] never intended to use this Provision as a sword to punish tenants or to impose it in a Draconian fashion.
[brief] Although Appellants try to hide it, it is undisputed that 90% of Appellants’ Sapporo sales are in New York.  (Da12 ¶ 10.)  In addition, [...] and [...] are both New York corporations.  (Pa28-Pa29 ¶¶ 16, 18.)  When the Wholesaler Agreement was negotiated, [...] was headquartered in New York.  (Pa63.)  [...] also holds a New York wholesaler license and federal wholesaler and importer permits in Long Island City, New York.  (Pa28-Pa29 ¶¶ 16-17; Da63-Da66.)  Appellants’ attempts to minimize these New York contacts each fail.
[brief] July 31, 2024, Order Granting Order to Show Cause ..............................................0001a  September 30, 2024, Order Lifting Temporary Restraints and Denying Preliminary Restraints and Dismissing Claims .............................................0007a  September 30, 2024, Decision Denying Restraints and Dismissing Claims ..................................................................................................................0009a  October 2, 2024, Order Denying Stay Pending Appeal ..............................................0019a  Disposition on Application for Permission to File  Emergent Motion  Dated October 3, 2024 .................................................................................................1572a  October 8, 2024  Order on Emergent Motion ...............................................................1577a  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] Private Citizen Complaints the in - of Municipal Courts  Implementation  Part and Part VII Rule Changes Ill December 20, 2019  Date: January 2020, amendments to the Part Ill and Part VII court rules take effect  On 1, that will alter the procedures for the initial handling of private citizen complaints the in Municipal Courts.  This directive provides overview of the changes and sets forth the an matters.1 procedures for handling these  Most private citizen complaints are initiated at the court office, with staff providing the private citizen with instructions how to file the complaint.  Other private citizen complaints, on however, are initiated at the local police department, with officer providing the same an general assistance to the complainant.  This second option generally more advantageous is for private citizens, law enforcement able to provide guidance to the private citizen as is regarding what charge(s) to file, something court staff precluded from doing.  Importantly, is the new rules and the procedures discussed below apply to all private citizen complaints - those initiated a Municipal Court and those initiated at a police department.
[brief] A.  Because the Original Policies neither compel nor constrain any conduct by students or their parents, there is no violation of parental rights and no constitutional duty to mandate affirmative notice to parents of their children’s gender identity over the students’ objection.  While federal and New Jersey courts have repeatedly recognized that parents have a liberty interest in the care, custody, and nurture of their children, *Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 65–66; *Moriarty v. Bradt*, 177 N.J. 84, 101–02 (2003), courts have set a high standard for demonstrating unconstitutional interference with the parent-child relationship.
[brief] This line of reasoning ignores the phrase “did not possess a firearm” within the statute.  The statute is not concerned with whether a “pending charge” for firearm possession is present but rather the act of physically possessing a firearm itself while the defendant has pending charges for any offense, whether it be in the present jurisdiction or elsewhere.  As it is known the defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm on July 1, 2022, and that act of possession occurred while the Morris County burglary and theft charges were pending, factor a(5) renders the defendant legally ineligible for Recovery Court.  Moreover, the lower court’s concerns that the State’s interpretation would bar a Track One applicant even if their firearm case is dismissed, downgraded, or otherwise disposed is allayed because if a firearm charge against an applicant is ultimately dismissed or results in acquittal, it will be definitively established the applicant did not possess a firearm during the pendency of any other criminal case.
[brief] This ambiguity in [...]’s waiver protocol highlights a critical factual dispute.  At a minimum, this uncertainty required denying the motion or ordering an evidentiary hearing under Kleine to let the court hear directly from [...] regarding whether their protocol was followed in this instance.  These unresolved material facts further underscore the necessity of a factual hearing to ensure a just and comprehensive resolution of the issues.  Overall, the Respondents have failed to meet their burden to justify an order to arbitrate, and [...] have the right to continue the discovery process.  The trial court committed reversible error by summarily granting the motion to enforce the Agreement without holding a factual hearing, as required under Kleine.  The unresolved material disputes surrounding the formation and execution of the Agreement demand further factual exploration.  This Court should reverse the trial court's decision to enforce the Agreement and remand the case for further proceedings.
[brief] (307a-308a; [...] Dep. 36:15-42:4, 715a-717a).  This is notwithstanding that [...] claims that in making overt claims of racial bias he was not referring to [...] or anything he did or did not do on July 5, 2016.  (Id. at 38:12-39:1, 716a; 42:5-18, 717a).  At the August 1, 2017 Township Committee meeting that was open to the public and during which Defendants removed Plaintiff from his duties as Police Captain, [...] stated that the members of the Township Committee “were appalled by the excessive force used by police officers against a group of young people,” notwithstanding that there was no factual basis for that allegation, there was no allegation against Plaintiff that he either used or witnessed excessive use of force and did nothing, and that the Prosecutor’s Office made no finding of excessive force being used by the officers on the night of July 5, 2016.  ([...] Dep. 118:21-119:23 & 120:22-121:11, 696a; [...] Dep. 29:25-30:4, 713a-714a; 309a).  Defendants thus publicly and falsely labeled Plaintiff as a racist cop who unjustifiably used, or permitted to be used, excessive force against a group of minority youths.
[brief] “On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have but a limited role to perform. ”  Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).
[brief] The Trial Court incorrectly found the following:  (1) there is no obligation pursuant to the New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law because the MOAs were based on contingencies which never happened and the MSRA eliminates any obligation under New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection law; (2) the MSRA is intended to supersede all prior agreements and contracts, including the MOAs at issue in this matter; and, (3) the June 7, 2017 Notice of Implementation and related Settlement Agreement encompassed the MOAs and the Defendants’/Respondents’ failure to pay wages pursuant to the MOAs was a proper exercise of the MSRA.  The June 7, 2017 Notice of Implementation and related Settlement Agreement did not address or include terms impacting promotional pay or back pay for the period alleged in this matter.  To be clear, this matter concerns a finite time period from the 2016 promotion dates until the June 7, 2017 implementation of new salaries.  It does not seek to add salary increases after the June 7, 2017 implementation date.  Moreover, the MSRA in no way altered the New Jersey Wage Payment laws which require Defendants to pay earned wages.  While prior Courts have found that the MSRA permits modification of labor contracts for prospective wages, the issue of whether the MSRA permits Defendants to not pay previously earned wages has not been litigated prior to this matter.  The Trial Court’s dismissal was both incorrect and premature as: (1) Plaintiffs have met the Motion to Dismiss pleading standard; (2) the MSRA does not permit Defendants to deprive promoted officers of earned wages; and (3) the MSRA did not modify New Jersey’s wage and hour statutes.  Plaintiffs have pleaded causes of action more than sufficient to survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.  Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery and to have this matter litigated on its merits.  Plaintiffs urges this Honorable Court to reverse the Trial Court’s March 4, 2024 Order and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings.
[brief] And the net opinion requires an expert support his conclusions, or her conclusions, with factual evidence or other data. ” (10T:35-3 to 9).  The court went on to recite in detail the methodology used by [...] and determined that “it seems pretty reliable” (10T39-17 to 18) and “in terms of Daubert analysis.  […] he demonstrated the soundness.  I mean – it's pretty – pretty self-evident, both in terms of its approach to reasoning and to its use of data from the perspective of others within a relevant scientific community. ” (10T39-24 to 40-3).  The court went on, “The gatekeeper should exclude the proposed expert testimony on the basis that it’s unreliable.  I don’t have that in front of me.  I have – he very clearly described a very good, sound scientific method on what it is he does, and what the limits are of the science behind what it is.  And he discussed that at length, antemortem, perimortem, and postmortem, and how it is they draw their conclusions. ” (10T40-4 to 11).  The defendant has challenged the expert testimony of a highly skilled and well-regraded individual who relied on a thoroughly described and widely-accepted methodology which was weighed by the trial court and found to meet the burden set forth by Frye standard.
[brief] In October 2022, to Appellants’ great surprise, [...] attempted to terminate the parties’ Wholesaler Agreement utilizing tactics the trial court deemed to be neither “fair” nor “reasonable. ”  On September 29, 2023, the trial court granted Appellants’ request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting [...] from terminating the Agreement while litigation ensued.  This appeal centers on Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss the Complaint, Or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss Counts Three and Six Through Nine of the Complaint Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) (“Motion to Compel”), which the trial court granted in an October 23, 2023, Order (the “Order”), based on an arbitration clause within the parties’ Wholesaler Agreement.