[brief] Finally, [...] chides [...] for failing to address the conclusion in the Commissioner’s Final Decision that the Legislature evidenced its intent to abrogate the public trust doctrine by referencing only Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821), in the Public Access Law, but not any later court decisions, notably Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Assoc., 95 N.J. 306 (1984).  Rb16.  [...] asserts that “[s]ince the public trust doctrine pre-existed the [Public Access] Law, the Legislature necessarily included the doctrine as a starting point within the broader command that [...] ensure that any permit it issues is ‘consistent with the public trust doctrine’. ”  Rb18.  The Commissioner’s Final Decision observed that the Legislature describes the Arnold case as “seminal” in outlining “the history of the public trust doctrine and appl[ying] it to tidally flowed lands in New Jersey,” Rb16, thereby underscoring the more likely conclusion that the Legislature referenced Arnold solely to establish the “starting point” for the Law’s discussion of the common law public trust doctrine.  The Legislature was also fully aware of the Matthews decision, as evidenced by the many references to it in the 2016 Public Access Task Force that informed the Legislature’s deliberations on the Public Access Law.  See Appellant’s Initial Brief Appendix at Aa0142-171.  This context makes it even more unlikely that the Legislature expressed its intent for the Public Access Law to overturn post-*Arnold* case law by declining to acknowledge it at all.  In light of the presumption against reading an abrogation of common law into a statute, and the corresponding need to narrowly interpret statutes that appear to abrogate the common law, [...]’s argument that it is incumbent on [...] to reconcile the Public Access Law’s reference to *Arnold v. Mundy* with an intention to codify the common law public trust doctrine is backward.  Had the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law public trust doctrine as most recently developed through *Matthews* and its progeny (including *Raleigh Ave. Ass'n v. Atlantis Club*, 370 N.J. Super. 171 (2004)), then it needed to say so explicitly in the Public Access Law, yet it declined to do so.  Furthermore, [...] makes no effort to explain how the Law’s reference to *Arnold v. Mundy* as a “starting point” for its discussion of the public trust doctrine reflects an intent to nullify or otherwise abrogate later decisions, including *Matthews*.  To the contrary; given that *Arnold* is the only court decision referenced in the Public Access Law, taking [...]’s argument to its logical extreme under the applicable canons of statutory interpretation would suggest that it was the Legislature’s intent to revert the public trust doctrine to its substance as it existed in 1821 when the New Jersey Supreme Court issued the *Arnold* decision.  This would not only produce the kind of absurd outcome that courts must avoid when interpreting statutes, see N.J. Republican State Comm. v. Murphy, 243 N.J. 574, 613 (2020), but would also yield an outcome that would deprive [...] of the new authority to require public access it claims to have under the Public Access Law.