ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On July 8, 2015, [...] filed a declaratory judgment complaint seeking to comply with its Third Round (1999-2025) affordable housing obligation (the “DJ Action”) and obtained temporary immunity from exclusionary zoning lawsuits like the instant builder’s remedy litigation.  In July 2019, [...] sought the voluntarily dismissal of the DJ Action, which was granted by way of an Order of Dismissal entered on July 19, 2019 (the “Dismissal Order”).  (Ja9).  The Dismissal Order expressly revoked [...]’s temporary immunity without prejudice to any party’s ability to file a subsequent action to seek or enforce compliance, such as a builder’s remedy action.  (Id.).  [...]’s officials called the Mount Laurel process “unfair” and publicly criticized the Township’s affordable housing obligation.  (Ja12).  In March 2023, the [...] Planning Board adopted the 2023 Master Plan Reexamination Report.  The Reexamination Report, which amended the Township’s Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (HEFSP), identified several potential redevelopment opportunities without explaining how those projects would provide for affordable housing.  The Property at issue is located in the [...] (“Redevelopment Plan”), which serves as an overlay for the underlying PD Planned Development Zone.  Although the PD Zone permits a variety of residential and non-residential uses, including the construction of townhouses and multi-family housing, there is no affordable housing set-aside requirement and the density is limited to 4.5 units per acre.  [...] has fought development of this property for years, despite not having an approved plan for affordable housing.  [...]’s Steps toward Condemnation
[directive] Rules and Regulations  2.2.1  The agency's rules and regulations should form a "code of conduct" for employees.  It should contain the broadly stated "do's and don'ts," without delving into specific details.  For instance, an agency's rules and regulations should state that any use of force by an officer must comply with state and federal law, the Attorney General's and the County Prosecutor's policies, and the agency's S.O.Ps.  The specific details of what is considered force, and what constitutes the acceptable use of force, should be found in the agency's use of force  S.O.P. 2.2.2  The rules and regulations should identify general categories of misconduct or inappropriate behavior that are subject to disciplinary action.  An incident of misconduct or inappropriate behavior may fall into one or more of the following categories:  (a)  Crime.  Complaint regarding the commission of an illegal act that constitutes a violation of the criminal code including disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses.  (b)  Excessive force.  Complaint regarding the use or threatened use of excessive force against a person.  (c)  Improper arrest.  Complaint that the restraint of a person's liberty was improper, unjust, or violated the person's civil rights.  (d)  Improper entry.  Complaint that entry into a building or onto property was improper or that excessive force was used against property to gain entry.  (e)  Improper search.  Complaint that the search of a person or property was improper, unjust, violated established agency procedures or violated the person's civil rights.  (f)  Differential treatment.  Complaint that the taking of police action, the failure to take police action or method of police action was predicated upon irrelevant factors such as race, appearance, age or sex.  (g)  Demeanor.  Complaint that an agency member's bearing, gestures, language or other actions were inappropriate.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022
[brief] APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Unpublished Opinion  TLC Servs., LLC v. Devine Roofing & Constr., LLC, No. A-5626-17T4, 2019 WL 5824780 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 7, 2019)................ Da1  Defendants-Respondents  the [...] (the “City”) and [...] and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Defendants”) respectfully submit this memorandum of law in opposition to Plaintiff-Appellant [...]’s (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) appeal from the Hudson County Superior Court, Law Division’s order denying [...]’s motion to reinstate (“Motion to Reinstate”) and dismissing [...]’s Complaint with prejudice (“Denial and Dismissal Order”).
[directive] Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations a refusal, inability to obtain a result, or where the result has been suppressed or otherwise deemed inadmissible, an observational case can, and should, be capable of standing on its own merits.  A DWI case should not be dismissed by a prosecutor solely on the basis that there is, or may be, an issue with the chemical breath test readings or results, and such a dismissal does not fall within the scope of “good cause” under N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5c, or R. 7:8-5.  State v. Fox, 249 N.J. Super. 521, 526 (Law Div. 1991).  Requests for a dismissal of a DWI prosecution invokes an extreme remedy which should be sparingly used.  See, State in Interest of D.J.C., 257 N.J. Super. 118, 121-123 (App. Div. 1992) and State v. Sapienza, 202 N.J. Super. 282, 287 (App. Div. 1985), certif. den. 102 N.J. 312 (1985).  "Charges based on adequate evidence should not be dismissed without good cause."
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant even argues that the Court should remand the matter to a different Judge as they believe this Judge failed to follow the Appellate Division’s ruling.  Quite clearly, [...] had a hearing on the issues as directed by the Appellate Division.  **CONCLUSION**  For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  Attorneys for the Defendants/Respondents  By: /s/ [...]  Dated: January 31, 2024  February 6, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division Superior Court of New Jersey Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex PO Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-0006
[directive] Requests for approval must be made in writing and must explain why this is an exceptional circumstance that necessitates seeking information from the Program and why less intrusive means will not suffice.  In keeping with past practice, a request for such information regarding an individual who is not the victim in the case should be exceedingly rare.  B.  Appropriate Legal Process  To bolster public confidence in the newborn screening program, any documentary records and/or physical bloodspots maintained by the Newborn Screening Program shall be obtained only by one of the following forms of appropriate legal process based on the facts presented:
[brief] First, the court brought more than thirty jurors in a single zoom session, contrary to our Supreme Court’s Plan for Resuming Jury Trials (Da39-84);(3T:9-20 to 10-14).  As indicated in the Plan, the purpose of having 30 jurors brought into a zoom room at once is so that all jurors are visible on the screen.  (Da66).  This is a critical component to counsels’ ability to view, observe, and assess the demeanor of the jurors.  In the instant case, all of the jurors could not be seen on the screen.  (3T:10-13 to 14).  Second, as a result of the ‘raise-your-hand-if-you-can-serve’ procedure, literally hundreds of jurors are being excused ‘for cause’ from this case without requiring these jurors to state their reasons for needing to be excused or their proposed hardship.  (3T:9-20 to 10-18).  This is contrary to our Supreme Court’s 5-11-21 Order, which requires that such questioning be conducted “in the presence of the judge, attorneys and parties. ” (Da98).  Even more specifically, [...]’s 5-17-21 Notice requires that “a juror who does not supply documentation required for a pre-reporting excuse and instead requests an excuse during voir dire would be addressed at sidebar in the presence of the judge, attorneys, and parties. ” (Da103)  (Emphasis added).  Third, contrary to State v. Williams, supra, these jurors who claim they are unavailable to serve are being categorically dismissed, resulting in a significant population, the “daily wage earners” as identified by the Williams Court, to be excluded.  This is contrary to our Supreme Court’s commitment to “ensuring representation and inclusive juries at every stage of the selection process. ” (Da64).  It was therefore a violation defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, which includes a jury that is representative of an accurate cross-section of his community.
[brief] **[...] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO GRANT LANDLORD’S FEE APPLICATION IN ITS ENTIRETY (Da3)**  While Judge Corman’s holdings in the Post Trial Order and Reconsideration Order were generally well reasoned and astute, his sole error was failing to grant Landlord’s Fee Application in its entirety.  (Da3).  Specifically, Judge Corman inappropriately cut the hourly rates of each of Landlord’s attorneys and paralegals based upon his own personal view that these rates were “a little high”.  (3T18-19; Pa47-51, 119-120).  This holding, which arbitrarily reduced Landlord’s contractually mandated Fee Award by nearly forty-percent (40%), should, respectfully, be reversed and Landlord should be awarded its entire $65,798. 68  Fee Application.  (Pa47-51, 119-120).  \(^{16}\)  Landlord is further entitled to an additional fee award in connection with this appeal and reserves its right to apply for the same following the determination of the appeal.
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant [...] Building [...] (732)  449-0525  [...]  [...]  [...] (032191991)  Of Counsel [...] (026052010)  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Appealed .................. ii Table of Authorities ..............................................................  iii  Table of Appendix ...............................................................  iv  Preliminary Statement .........................................................  1 Statement of Procedural History ...........................................  3 Supplemental Statement of Facts ..........................................  3 Legal Argument ..................................................................  6  POINT I: BECAUSE LANDLORD FAILS TO REFUTE TENANT’S SUBSTANTIAL SHOWING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED RULE 1:7-4(A), A REMAND IS WARRANTED .....................  6 POINT II: LANDLORD’S CLAIM THAT “TENANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF THE TENANT ALLOWANCE” IS CONTRADICTED BY PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE LEASE ......  13 POINT III: BECAUSE A LANDLORD-TENANT JUDGE HAS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE WHETHER THE AMOUNT TENANT OWES LANDLORD IS OFFSET BY THE AMOUNT LANDLORD OWES TENANT AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THAT, A REMAND IS WARRANTED  ...............  23 POINT IV: TENANT’S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT .........................  26 POINT V: TENANT IS ENTITLED TO LEGAL FEES ON REMAND..  27 POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MISAPPLY ITS DISCRETION IN REDUCING LANDLORD’S COUNSEL FEES.  .....  29 CONCLUSION .................................................................
[brief] See Oubre, 522 U.S. at 427.\(^8\) \(^8\)  It is also noteworthy that if the trial court’s analysis as memorialized in the decision below were to be upheld, the public policy implication would be that any settling party who developed buyer’s remorse within 21 days of reaching a settlement and memorializing it on the record, including before a court, could simply change their mind and repudiate the settlement.  That is neither the law nor the public policy of this State as argued more fully in Point I, supra.  Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that proposed paragraph 11 gave Defendant a unilateral right to rescind the Agreement, Plaintiff’s counsel underscored at argument that Plaintiff was willing to “walk away” from any and all provisions contained in the written Agreement which were not included in the December 20th agreed upon and memorialized settlement as reflected and agreed to on the record.
[directive] 범죄, 2C:13-1c(2)에 의한 유괴,2C:24-4a  에 의한 아동의  도덕성을 손상  또는 타락시키는 성행위를 함으로써 아동의 복지를 위태롭게 하는 행위, 2C:24- 4b(3)에  따라 아동의 복지를 위태롭게 하는 행위, 2C:24- 또는 또는 (ii)에 따라 아동의 복지를 4b(5)(b)(i) (ii) 위태롭게 하는 행위(범죄가 년 월 일 이후에 2018 2 1 저질러진 경우), 유인 또는 그러한 범죄들의 범행미수, 그리고 년 월14 일 이후에 발생한 범죄, 또는 2004 1 종신 사회 내 감독의 특별 선고 조건에 대한 위반(그러한 위반이 년7 월1 일 이후에 발생한 경우)에
[brief] Finally, the State appears to agree with [...] that a subsequently enacted statute authorizing courts to prohibit violators of animal cruelty laws from owning other animals, N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2, cannot provide statutory support for the no-pets condition imposed on him, because he “was sentenced well before the new statute went into effect. ”  (Sb 24)  The State does not address [...]’s argument that the other two conditions of his sentence – no contact with the specific dog and anger management counseling – were also not authorized dispositions under the Code.
[brief] *See Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin*, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018).  “A board's decision regarding a question of law ... is subject to a de novo review by the courts, and is entitled to no deference since a zoning board has ‘no peculiar skill superior to the courts’ regarding purely legal matters. ”  *Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Planning Bd.*, 334 N.J. Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000) (*citations omitted*)
[brief] 31 Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 483 (App. Div. 2002).............................. 11, 12 Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresa Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 224, (4th Cir. 1994)................................................................. 26 Casey v. Brennan, 344 N. J. Super. 83, 112 (App. Div. 2001) ......................... 11, 12 Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London v. Westchester Firs Ins. Co., 489 F. 3d 580 (3d Cir. 2007) .................................................................28 Chattin v. Cape May Greene, 216 N.J. Super. 618, 637 (App. Div. 1987) ..........12 Cohen ex rel Pereleman v. Booth Computers, 421 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2011) .........................................................................................43, 44 DiMisa v. Acquaviva, 198 N.J. 547, 554 (2009)............................................ 34, 35, 41, 42 Dockser v. Schwartzberg, 433 F. 2d 421 (4th Cir. 2006) ...............................24, 26, 27, 28 East Brunswick Bd. of Educ. v. East Brunswick Educ. Ass'n, 235 N.J. Super. 417, 422 (App. Div. 1989) .........................................................16
[brief] On March 1, 2024, the Court granted summary judgment as to defendant/respondent [...].  11.  On April 29, 2024, the trial Court certified the Summary Judgment Order as a final order.  (PA162-163)  12.  It is noted that the decision by the trial Court in favor of defendant/respondent [...] finds that there is no New Jersey coverage for the plaintiff, thus encompassing the issue raised by defendant/respondent [...] and, therefore, all issues had been decided as a matter of law.
[brief] This condition could easily have been remedied by the applicant by indicating in the notice the deviations involved in the variances sought for a front yard set back on [...] and [...], the extent of the height variance which required a higher level of proof, and the meaning of the term lot area/unit which means density, and could have been explained in a much more understandable manner simply by indicating that the number of units exceeded the maximum number allowed on the subject property and how that came about.  CONCLUSION
[directive] 1.  While each agency must still train a majority of its officers in ICAT and ABLE by December 31, 2021, remaining officers shall complete the two trainings by April 30, 2022.  2.  Every county ICAT-ABLE training coordinator and statewide law enforcement agency ICAT-ABLE training coordinator shall report to the Executive Director of the [...] (“[...]”) on the progress of ICAT and ABLE training in their respective jurisdictions by January 31, 2022.
[brief] The State understands that defendant moved to dismiss the criminal complaint against her — not an indictment.  To date, an indictment has not been sought by the State and no grand jury has returned one.  Regardless, our courts have applied a standard of review similar to that which applies to a motion to dismiss an indictment when addressing a motion to dismiss a complaint.  See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 444 N.J. Super. 619, 624-25 (Law Div. 2014).  court rejected defendant’s argument that the statutory text failed to provide adequate notice of what conduct was prohibited.  (Ibid.).  That does not qualify as error, let alone reversible error.  Applying this Court’s standard of review, the same conclusion is warranted.
[brief] **  In the subject case, the issue of a conflict of interest was timely raised on June 1, 2023.  (See, 1T19:16 to 1T21:1-25; See also, 271a-278a).  On November 7, 2024, the Court stated that “the Court finds no prejudice” based on “the posture of the case vis-à-vis discovery. ” (T31:14).  Indeed, there is no prejudice to the Appellants.  A. Laches.
[brief] Cherrits v. Ridgewood, 311 N.J.Super. 517 (App. Div. 19980.  To impose liability on governmental officers, a plaintiff must “identify the government policy” at issue.  Id., at 525.  Further, the fact that a particular official—even a policymaking official—has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to governmental liability based on an exercise of that discretion.  Id., at 528 (citations omitted).  A plaintiff must show that State officials made a deliberate choice to follow a course of action... from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in order for liability to attach.  Id., at 525 (citations omitted).  Thus the plaintiff here carries the burden of demonstrating the existence of a particular governmental policy or custom, and further proving that such policy subjected or caused him to be subjected to constitutional injury.  *Id.*, at 526.  In contrast, the language in Count Five fails to sufficiently identify a particular County policy or custom that would constitute a violation of a person’s constitutional rights under Section 1983 and/or the NJCRA and likewise fails to sufficiently allege how such a policy subjected or caused this plaintiff to be subjected to constitutional injury.  For these reasons, also, this Count should be dismissed.
[brief] Id.  [...] citation to In re Hum. Tissue Prod. Liab. Litig., 488 F.Supp.2d 430, 432-433 D.N.J. (2007) fails to support its argument.  The case does not state that N.J.S.A. Sec. 2A:58C-4 is preempted by federal law.  The court In re Hum. Tissue Prod. Liab. Litig. also did not prevent the manufacturer from notifying a class of consumers about certain dangers about a product.  In fact, it was noted in the In re Hum. Tissue case that “Defendants have undertaken certain measures to notify class members about the potential dangers arising from their receipt of unscreened tissue. ”  Id. at 431.  There was no requirement set forth in the case that the FDA approve of any notice to physicians or patients or others.  *Id.*  In addition, [...]’s claim pertains to post sale failure to warn and not communications related to recalls.
[brief] For all of the reasons set forth in this Brief, the Appendices, case law and court rules, it is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.  It is also requested that upon return to the trial court that the matter should be reassigned to another judge for completion.  A request is further made that the Appellate Court consider transferring this matter to another County on return to the Trial Court.  *[...]*  [...]  Attorney for the Appellant
[brief] B.  DEP Treated [...] Equally In Accordance With The Equal Protection Clauses Of The N.J. Constitution And The U.S. Constitution.  Contrary to [...]’s allegations here and in its adjudicatory hearing request, DEP did not violate [...]’s rights to equal protection.  [...] seems to be arguing that there is a “class-of-one” issue in this case because it claims that it and [...] own similarly-situated adjacent properties.  (Ab19-20).  That legal theory allows a plaintiff to bring an equal protection claim in cases by alleging that they were “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. ”  Radiation Data, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 456 N.J. Super. 550, 561 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).  To prevail, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the defendant intentionally treated him differently from others similarly-situated; and (2) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. ”  Id. at 562. (citing Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008)) (emphasis added) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).
[brief] The Trial Court correctly found that [...] could not qualify under the AMS since the American Board of Medical Specialties "draws a distinction between those subspecialties, [...] and [...] do not practice in the same specialty or subspecialty".  1T 14:2 - 14:4.  New Jersey case law supports the Trial Court's plain reading of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  In Nicholas v. Mynster, supra, New Jersey's Supreme Court addressed the kind-for-kind requirement under the AMS.  Ultimately in discussing the AMS and requisite qualifications, the Nicholas Court explicitly re-affirmed that the Legislature "provides that an expert must have the same type of practice and possess the same credentials, as applicable, as the defendant health care provider, unless waived by the court."  Nicholas, 213 N.J. at 479 (quoting Assembly Health & Human Services Committee, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 50 at 20 (Mar. 4, 2004)) (emphasis added).  In Nicholas, defendants, [...], board certified in emergency medicine, and the defendant [...], held board certifications in emergency medicine and family medicine, respectively, and treated the plaintiff for carbon monoxide poisoning.  *Id.* at 468 – 69.  In seeking to pursue his claims, plaintiff served AOMs from (1) a doctor board certified in internal medicine and preventive care with subspecialty certifications in pulmonary disease, critical care, and undersea and hyperbaric medicine; and (2) a doctor who was board certified in internal medicine and was on the staff of a hospital's department of emergency medicine.  *Id.* at 470 – 72.  As discovery progressed, plaintiff only served an expert report from the first doctor and defendants moved to bar the expert's testimony because he did not have the requisite credentials under N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-41 and for summary judgment.  *Id.* at 473 – 74.  In analyzing the AMS, the *Nicholas* Court noted, "[w]hen a physician is a specialist and the basis of the malpractice action 'involves' the physician's specialty, the challenging expert must practice in the same specialty."  *Id.* at 481-82.  Moreover, the Court held that a "medical expert must be a specialist in the same field in which the defendant physician specializes; there are no exceptions to that requirement other than the waiver provision of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(c) .  . ."  *Id.* at 482.  The *Nicholas* Court expressly rejected the plaintiff's argument that a doctor credentialed to treat patients for a condition at a hospital did not need to practice that specialty and be board certified in that specialty to meet the necessary kind-for-kind requirement.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3d.  A condominium’s developer is required to deliver to the Association all property of the unit owners, including “…property represented by the developer to be part of the common elements or ostensibly part of the common elements. ”  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-12.1d(9).  The Condominium Act vests the condominium association with the exclusive authority to manage, maintain and operate those common elements.