ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Reconsideration, filed December 7, 2022  Certification of [...], filed December 7, 2022  Exhibit A to Certification, Affidavit of [...], filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa396)  Exhibit B to Certification, Transcript of Hearing dated November 4, 2022, filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see 1T)  Exhibit C to Certification, Affidavit of [...], filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa499)  Exhibit D to Certification, Transcript of Decision dated November 15, 2022, filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see 2T)  Exhibit E to Certification, Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1 (Law Div. 1976), filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here)  Exhibit F to Certification, Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 154 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1977), filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here)  Exhibit G to Certification, Huddell v. Levin, 537 F. 2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976), filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here) Exhibit H to Certification, Butler v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 19-cv-2377 (D. Kan. June 16, 2022) (unpublished), filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa286) -- Exhibit I to Certification, Youngberg v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 20-339 (E.D. Okla. August 24, 2022) (unpublished), filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa303) -- Exhibit J to Certification, Rider v. Twp. of Freehold, A-2319-06/A-2840-06 (App. Div. July 14, 2008) (unpublished), filed December 7, 2022 680a Exhibit K to Certification, May 20, 2022, Report of [...], filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa136) -- Exhibit L to Certification, May 20, 2022, Report of [...], filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa118) -- Exhibit M to Certification, May 18, 2022, Report of [...], filed December 7, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa535) -- Exhibit N to Certification, Paredes v. Ford Motor Co., A-3542-07 (App. Div. December 10, 2008) (unpublished), filed December 7, 2022
[brief] The 1980 version seems to be the same numbering system parcels of property but with different lot and block numbers (5T8:25).  He is shown P-1 which is the 1980 Tax Map (5T10:1).  He points out that J-1, sheet 33 is a Tax Map revised in 2017 (5T11:6).  He testifies that J-1 shows Lot 3 as 7.58 acres (5T11:14).  He testifies that the Lot 3 boundaries did not change between the 1980 Tax Map and the 2017 Tax Map.
[brief] In that regard, the state is incorrect.  As quoted above, the Court simply noted that it did not matter that the plaintiff in *Lavezzi* could have brought a claim for replevin, because the claim originated from the “criminal business of the State. ”  Accordingly, rather than supporting the state’s position, *Lavezzi* focused on whether the alleged actions by the prosecutor’s office were law enforcement in nature and not the specific relief requested by the plaintiff.  Our courts’ focus on the law enforcement function makes sense given the hybrid nature of a prosecutor’s office.
[brief] On August 29, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against [...], [...], [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), John Does 1-10, and XYZ Companies 1-10.  (Da001-0042.)  Plaintiffs assert claims of Accounting (Count One); Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count Two); Fraud/Fraudulent Inducement (Count Three); Violation of Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1, et seq.
[brief] The finding of any factor must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record" and cannot be based on speculation and suspicion.  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014) (citation omitted).  But the court is not bound by the rules of evidence.  See N.J.R.E. 101(a)(3)(C).  Indeed, the court "exercises 'a far-ranging discretion as to the sources and types of evidence used to assist [it] in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed.'"  Tillery, 238 N.J. at 325 (quoting State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619-20 (1984)).  "The sentencing court is required to consider evidence of a mitigating factor and must apply mitigating factors that 'are amply based in the record.'"  *State v. Grate*, 220 N.J. 317, 338 (2015) (quoting *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005)).
[brief] THE COURT BELOW WRONGFULLY REJECTED SEVERAL OTHER ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT OR LAY EXPERT.  (Pa11-Pa12)  Very early in this case, Plaintiff served on Defendants a detailed list of witnesses expected to be called, with a detailed description of what the witnesses would testify to and their qualifications to testify.  [...] was the first witness listed.  (Pa503-Pa505).  Defendants were put on notice of [...]’s extensive knowledge and experience specifically in the planning and construction of retail strip malls in New Jersey.  (Pa503).  Though the “magic word” “expert” was not formally attached to [...]’s name, there is no doubt that [...] would be qualified to testify as an expert herein.  Evid. R. 701, “Opinion Testimony of Lay Witnesses,” permits opinions even by those not listed as experts, if the opinions are rationally based on the perceptions of the witness, and will assist in determining facts in issue.  Both these requirements would be satisfied if [...] were allowed to express opinion testimony herein.  Additionally, as argued below, as a matter of justice and equity, discovery should be reopened for the limited purpose of allowing [...] to be re-deposed as an expert witness in addition to being a fact witness.  This is only fair, since the impact on Appellant of dismissing its case on procedural grounds far exceeds the impact on Defendant of having to defend its case at trial.
[directive] 1.  A process for the investigative employee to proactively participate in the and gathering phase.  As part Brady Giglio of that process, the investigative employee involved in a case must notify the prosecuting authority (or confirm that the prosecuting authority is aware) or any potential or material known to the investigative employee.  Brady Giglio  Process for Prosecutor’s Gathering of Information.  2.  A process for the prosecutor and/or liaison to affirmatively gather and information from the Giglio Brady Giglio investigative employee and the investigative employee’s agency.  This can be done, for example, both formally in writing to the investigative agency and/or informally through a candid conversation between the investigative employee and the prosecutor.  This type of process can occur multiple times as the underlying investigation progresses.  Mechanism for Identification of and Material.  3.  A mechanism or Brady Giglio system that allows, on a case-by-case basis, for the identification of officers with potential or material, taking into account that this mechanism or system Brady Giglio must be amenable to update and modification, as material that is considered Brady and may change under different circumstances and over time.  Giglio  Therefore, each county’s policy must establish procedures for gathering and reviewing and material that complies with the above parameters.
[brief] “14.  The Board continues to believe that the applicant is attempting to place on the property a building design that is too aggressive for the subject property, although the proposed FAR at 1.77 represents a reduction from the 1.99 FAR proposed under the prior application.  This does not constitute a substantial reduction.  The proposed FAR is dramatically higher than any other request for FAR deviation relief that the Board has considered over the past decade.  This act in and of itself demonstrates that the site is not particularly suitable for the proposed use and that special reasons cannot be demonstrated so as to satisfy the positive criteria for the granting of d variance relief for a non-inherently beneficial use.
[brief] Further, subsection b. of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13 provides:  In considering an application for vacation, modification or correction, a decision of the umpire on the facts shall be final if there is substantial evidence to support that decision; provided, however, that when the application to the court is to vacate the award pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection c., the court shall make an independent determination of any facts relevant thereto de novo, upon such record as may exist or as it may determine in a summary expedited proceeding as provided for by rules adopted by the Supreme Court for the purpose of acting on such applications.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(b)]  Subsection c. states, in relevant part, as follows:  The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either participated in the alternative resolution proceeding…if the court finds that the rights of the party were prejudiced by…  (3)  In making the award, the umpire’s exceeding their power or so imperfectly executing that power that a final and definite award was not made…  (5)  The umpire’s committing prejudicial error by erroneously applying law to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c)]
[brief] To protect a person’s right against self-incrimination, a person in custody must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.  [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)].  The purpose of the Miranda warnings is to protect a suspect from the “inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation.
[brief] southbound left lane that Defendant [...] entered from the turnaround was open to regular traffic.  *Id.*  By making this illegal U-Turn, Defendant [...] pulled out “into live traffic unprotected” onto the southbound side of the GSP.  Da172.  [...]’s illegal U-turn caused a crash between the [...] he was driving and a vehicle operated by [...], who was traveling south on the GSP.  Da025.  Mr. Stahlberg died from the injuries he sustained in the crash.  *Id.*  Mr. Stahlberg’s wife [...] sustained physical injuries and suffered severe emotional distress from seeing her husband’s fatal injuries.  Da271-6.  [...] received tickets for the illegal U-turn and reckless and careless driving.  Da030-2.  The police found no fault on the part of Mr. Stahlberg.  See Da007, ¶ 4; Da024, 028 (indicating that the investigating officer entered code 25, for no contributing fault found on the part of Mr. Stahlberg).  The [...], who conducted an internal review of the crash, blamed their driver [...] and summarized their conclusions as follows:  WRE 561 [which refers to Defendant [...]] wrongfully used police Cutthrough at 87.5 median.  Our northern job limit was 86.4.  We also had a grass median turnaround spot at 86.75 which was safely contained between both the northbound and southbound closures.  This keeps operators and drivers within close[d] lanes while spinning around.  Under no circumstances are police cutthrough’s [sic] to be used unless there are lane closures northbound and southbound for trucks to safely dEcel [sic] and accel out of them.  By this truck using the Cutthrough he [[...]] pulled out into Live traffic unprotected where an elderly couple drove at 65 miles an hour or greater into the right rear of the dump truck.  Car was totaled, driver was medevac and helicoptered out of location.  turnpike operations put out a double lane closure tying into our double lane closure so they could investigate the scene four [sic] hours to come.  The pictures within this report will show the severity of the accident.  Within 120’ of leaving the cut through the truck was struck by the vehicle.  [Da172 (emphasis added). ]  B.
[brief] ” (Pb13).  But this is a misinterpretation that contradicts the Legislature’s actual intent, as explicitly stated in the statute it enacted.  “The Court’s obligation when interpreting a law is to determine and carry out the Legislature’s intent. ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of [...] and [...] to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the Act’s legislative purpose.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999)).  Accordingly, [...] reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.  POINT II
[brief] Respondent acknowledges that she filed a Complaint seeking to evict the tenant predicated on the claim for non-payment of rent on or about January 25, 2024 in the Essex County Superior Court.  (Db, Da1-Da10).  The case was scheduled for trial before the Court on March 12, 2024.  On the date of the trail, both parties appeared Prose.  It was confirmed that the matter concerned property identified as [...].  It was a structure containing five units and Appellant was a tenant living on the first floor.  (1T, P. 4, line 7- P. 5, line 5).  The Respondent also maintained that Appellant was a month to month tenant and the rent was $1500.00 a month.  The Respondent also stated that the Appellant owed rent for roughly 8 months from August, 2023 through March, 2024.  (1T, P. 6, line 2- line 18).  Respondent also acknowledged that she received Covid Relief on behalf of the Appellant/tenant of $21,000 in late November, 2022.  Respondent also had to create a lease to provide to DCA.  It was further Respondent’s position that she had not received rent for the last 8 months.  This Landlord, therefore, was looking for a Judgment of Possession and $12,000.00 of outstanding rent.  (1T, P. 7, line 2- P. 8, line 3).  As was presented in the Appellant’s Brief, she (Appellant) claimed that even though Respondent received $21,000.00 for back rent, she paid those months and also claimed that Respondent received double payment between 2020 and the end of 2022.
[brief] 4.  The State’s position required expert testimony.  The State’s arguments that [...]’s behavior “escalated” emanated from speculative conclusions emanating from prior, irrelevant, and remote events, not scientific analysis.  N.J.R.E. 702 is not only permissive in nature, indicating when expert testimony can be admitted, but also when it is required; particularly regarding a subject matter that is “so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment. ”  Butler v Acme Markets, Inc. 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).  Davis v Brickman Landscaping, 219 N.J. 396, 98 A. 3d 1173 (2014), held that an expert in fire prevention engineering was required to assist the jury in assessing whether a sprinkler system had been properly inspected, because it "constitutes a complex process involving assessment of a myriad of factors" that "is beyond the ken of the average juror."  219 N.J. at 408, 98 A. 3d at 1170.  There was no expert testimony in this case to help the Court assess whether [...]’s injury “escalated” from [...]’s, or whether [...]’s injury “escalated” from [...]’s: no medical records, no photographs, no expert witnesses.
[directive] MIRANDA WARNING  1.  You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer any questions.  (Usted tiene el drecho de guarder silencio y negarse a contester cualquier pregunta.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No 2.  Anything you say may be used against you in a court of law.  (Cualquier cosa que usted diga pued usarse en su contra en un tribunal.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No 3.  You have the right to consult with an attorney at any time and have him/her present before and during questioning.  (Usted tiene el derecho de consultar con un(a) abogado(a) en cualquier momento y contar con su presencia antes y durante un interrogatorio.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No 4.  If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided if you so desire prior to any questioning.(Si usted no tiene los recursos para contratar a un(a) abogado(a), se le facilitara un(a) abogado(a), si lo desea, antes de cualquier interrogatorio.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No 5.  A decision to speak to us is not final and you may stop talking to us at any time.  (La Decision de hablar con nosotros no tiene character definitive, y a usted se le permite dejar de hablar con nosotros en cualquier momento.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No  If the member is aware of any criminal complaint that has been filed against the subject relating to the questions to be asked, the member must advise the subject of the charges.
[brief] Opinion PER CURIAM.  *1  Defendant was indicted for six armed robberies and related offenses committed in Atlantic City between April 7 and 24, 2005.  Defendant was also charged in a separate indictment with two armed robberies and related offenses committed in Egg Harbor on April 24 and 25, 2005.  After the trial court rejected plea bargains that would have encompassed the charges in both indictments, defendant was tried before a jury on the indictment arising out of the Egg Harbor robberies and found guilty of all but one of the charges.  The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive sixteen-year terms of imprisonment, subject to the 85% period of parole ineligibility mandated by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2, for the two armed robberies, committed in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1.
[directive] The State prioritization which to make and respond to efficient means by an system provide to reporting of shall a prioritization request to the Office prosecutor make the that event, In requests. of the system established by that Office.  Section by means to this pursuant Forensic Science shall all submit prioritization request use available means to of receipt a upon  An agency test/examination thereon on and submit a report a requested and/or complete report requested a requested request.  If it is not feasible to submit a prosecutor's in the date specified the or before thereon by the submit a report by the date specified atest/examination and complete or report receiving notify the business days of the request within five shall agency prosecutor, the with the why it is not feasible to comply explain the reasons shall writing and prosecutor in which the indicate the earliest possible date on also shall agency request.
[brief] Expanding the 2015 Settlement’s release language to encompass claims arising from not-yet-existent misconduct permitted Defendants to manufacture a “covenant not to sue” ex nihilo.  The trial court thereby drafted a settlement agreement better than the one the Defendants bargained for.  Cf. Joao v. Cenuco, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 380, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (licensor did not release patent infringement claims where the contract was silent as to covenant not to sue or release licensor’s patent claims).  None of the *[...]* class members have breached their obligations under the 2015 Settlement Agreement, because they none of them ever agreed to a perpetual “covenant not to sue. ”  [...]’s theory that the trial court had exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the 2015 Settlement assumes that the settlement had been breached, but it had not.  Reopening *[...]* to rewrite the 2015 Settlement so as to bar “future claims arising from future misconduct” is not a legitimate basis upon which to confer jurisdiction over the *Gannon* claims upon the trial court.  The claims asserted by the *Gannon* class plaintiffs did not accrue until [...]’s corporate affiliate, [...], engaged in misconduct long after 2015.  [...] chose to bring those claims in federal court, not New Jersey Superior Court.  Defendants’ motions to reopen and enforce the 2015 Settlement were a ploy to defeat the fundamental principle that a plaintiff is entitled to the forum of its choosing.  See, e.g., *Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp.*, 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970) (noting the heavy burden to transfer from plaintiff’s chosen venue under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a)).  Reopening *[...]* to rewrite the 2015 Settlement to extinguish “future claims arising from future misconduct” was prejudicial to [...] and the potential class members, and the court below ultimately wrote a better contract than the one for which the Defendants bargained.
[brief] Defendant’s pro se status was found to be appropriate before both the municipal court and Law Division.  Defendant’s conviction would have resulted in two points on her license and “a fine not less than $100 and not more than $500. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:4-92.2; (2T:12-1 to 12-3; 2T:13-5 to 13-7).  [...] noted “for the record, the defendant already had an attorney, she discharged him for a consequence that is not of magnitude” and therefore, the court was “going forward without counsel to trial on [defendant’s] behalf as [defendant] does not want to plead guilty. ” (2T:12-13 to 12-18).  See Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971); State v. Mierzwa, 420 N.J. Super. 207, 2014 (App. Div. 2011); Guidelines for Determination of Consequences of Magnitude, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix to Part VII to R. 7:3-2 (2025).
[directive] Page 2  A municipal court judge shall inform defendants of possible immigration consequences and of their right to seek counsel on these matters at three stages of the court process: (A) as part of the court’s opening statement for each court session; (B) at defendant’s first appearance; and (C) as part of the guilty plea colloquy.  A.  Opening Statement  The municipal court judge shall include the following language in the opening statement for each municipal court session:  If you are not a United States citizen and if you plead guilty to or are convicted of certain offenses heard in the municipal court, including some motor vehicle offenses, it may result in your being deported from the United States, or it may prevent you from being re-admitted to the United States if you leave voluntarily, or it may prevent you from ever becoming a naturalized American citizen.  You have a right to seek advice from an attorney about the effect a guilty plea will have on your immigration status.  This language will be incorporated into each of the three model opening statements that the Supreme Court adopted in 2008 – one model opening statement for sessions handling criminal matters only, one for sessions handling motor vehicle offenses only, and one for combined sessions.