ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Law Enforcement Agency.  Any police force or organization of a municipality, county or state which has, by statute or ordinance, the responsibility of detecting crime and enforcing the general laws of the state.  Night Firing Conditions.  Low light conditions either under natural subdued lighting or utilizing simulated subdued lighting.  Non-Qualifying Participant.  A person who fails to achieve a minimum passing score while firing a prescribed qualification course.  Participant.  An individual undergoing semi-annual firearms qualification.  Qualification Score--Handgun.  A score of 80% or higher based on one firing of a Handgun Qualification Course (either HQC1 or HQC2) as contained in Appendices A and B.  Qualification Score--Handgun Night Firing.  A score of 80% or higher based on one firing of the Handgun Night Qualification Course (HNQC) as contained in Appendix C or the HNQC for Retired Law Enforcement Officers (page 78), which ever is appropriate.  Qualification Score--Shotgun.  A score of 80% or higher based on one firing of the Shotgun Qualification Course (SQC) as contained in Appendix D.  Qualification Score--Shotgun Night Firing.  A score of 80% or higher based on one firing under subdued lighting conditions of the Shotgun Night Qualification Course (SNQC) as contained in Appendix D.  Qualification Score - Shotgun Slug.  A score of 80% or higher based on one firing of the Shotgun Slug Qualification Course (SSQC) as contained in Appendix D1.  Qualification Score - Shotgun Slug Night Firing.  A score of 80% or higher based on one firing under subdued light conditions of the Shotgun Slug Qualification Course (SSQC) as contained in Appendix D1.  Semi-Annual Qualification.  A program consisting of two prescribed qualification sessions within a 12-month period (a calendar year), with at least three months time between each qualification.
[brief] ”  Higgins v. Swiecicki, 315 N.J. Super. 488, 491-492 (App. Div. 1998).  Therefore, Plaintiff’s arguments regarding “pay-when-able loans” is unsupported by competent legal authority and should be rejected by the Court.  B.  Even If The Court Accepts The Concept Of “Pay-When-Able Loans,” Plaintiff Has Not Proven There Was A “Third Loan” Or That It Was A “Pay-When-Able Loan” (Da1-69)
[brief] Defendant, [...], claims that it was entitled to use unauthenticated, unsubstantiated, unsigned hearsay documents to “rebut” the testimony of plaintiff’s experts on certain federal and state regulations generally cited to establish the standard of care.  Defendant claims that [...], the nursing home expert, and [...], the nursing expert, “relied upon various federal and New Jersey regulations in their reports and again in giving their opinions at trial.  A proper foundation for the admission of the documents in question was, indeed, laid. ”  Db11.  That is the sum and substance of defendant’s claimed “foundation for the admission of the documents. ”  Ibid.  At trial, however, defense counsel admitted that no witness was coming to provide a foundation for admission of the documents so those documents were not being admitted into evidence.
[brief] For example, in Lovett v. Flemington-Raritan Reg’l Board of Educ., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2683 (App. Div. November 6, 2013) (unpublished)), the Appellate Panel, citing Spinks, 402 N.J. Super. at 484, held:  Thus, the filing of a disciplinary action, in and of itself, is not sufficient to qualify as an adverse employment action.  …  Similarly, an employer's investigation of potential employee misconduct does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action; "[o]nly when the investigation results in some real detriment, such as a suspension, demotion, or termination, should the aggrieved employee be able to invoke the protection of the LAD."  [Pa336a]  In *Casano v. Livingston Bd. of Educ.*, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2377 (App. Div. October 2, 2014) (unpublished)), the Appellate Panel, citing *El-Sioufi*, 382 N.J. Super. at 169-70, held:  “Although [plaintiff] asserts that her unfavorable job evaluations were the result of discrimination, we have held in a related context that an unfavorable evaluation, unaccompanied by a demotion or similar action, is insufficient [to establish an adverse employment action]. ”  *El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp.*, 382 N.J. Super. 145, 169-70, 887 A.2d 1170 (App. Div. 2005).  Further “without more, an employer's filing of a disciplinary action cannot form the basis of a LAD complaint. ”  *Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr.*, 174 N.J. 1, 26, 803 A.2d 611 (2002).  [Pa347a].  *Lovett* and *Casano* were decided approximately 3 and 4 years, respectively, after the Court’s 2010 decision in *Roa v. Roa*.
[brief] IV.  Conclusion  Consistent with the foregoing discussion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents against [...] [DE 48].  The Court ORDERS Carbonyx to produce the documents requested in [...]’s Revised Requests [DE 48-4].  The Court ORDERS Carbonyx to use the list of 78 search terms contained in DE 48-7 in searching for and producing responsive electronic material.  Because the Motion to Compel is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party…whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).  Accordingly, the Court ORDERS [...] to FILE, on or before November 21, 2016, an itemization of its costs and fees, including attorney’s fees, incurred in making the Motion to Compel.  The Court ORDERS Carbonyx to FILE a response by December 5, 2016, and [...] to file a reply, if any, by December 12, 2016.  SO ORDERED.
[brief] (Ra1).  [...] proposed a natural gas regulator station that would include “a filter, heater, two regulator runs and associated piping.” (Ra5).  It proposed an above-ground heating unit to be located adjacent to the proposed regulator station.  (Aa823; Ra4; Ra6; 2T67:9-15).  The filter for the regulator station is approximately four feet tall, and the tallest section of the Project, the vent stacks for the heating unit, is approximately fifteen feet tall.  (Aa781; Aa859).  According to [...], the Project’s design is intended to “prevent the regulators and associated facilities . . . from freezing and becoming encased in thick ice,” which may lead to service interruptions and spread to underground piping.  (Ra4-5; Ra7).  It also explained that the purpose of the Project is to “maintain the integrity and reliability of [...]’s local distribution system” by significantly reducing gas pressure between the transmission and distribution lines and thus facilitate the delivery of gas to customers in [...] and surrounding municipalities.  (Ra4; Ra6; Ra8).
[brief] **D.  If *Atalese* precluded enforcement of this arbitration agreement, then it is preempted by federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. **  If this Court read *Atalese* to establish a prerequisite for the *formation* of arbitration agreements, rather than the enforceability of rights-waivers as a matter of public policy, then [...] respectfully submits that the rule is preempted by the FAA and binding precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States.
[directive] Certain Marijuana and Hashish Cases  Pursuant to the Marijuana Decriminalization Law, L. 2021, 19 c. (CN 12840) or Filing Attorney  Prosecuting Attorney Information (if applicable)  _______________  Attorney Name: _ ________ NJ Attorney ID Number: _ __________________  Address: _ ---------------  Email: Defendant/Juvenile Information  -------------  Defendant/Juvenile Name: _________________  Address: _ ---------------  Email: of St ate Bureau Identification if (SBI)  Number, available: of Date  Birth: of Superior Court  New Jersey ----- of State New Jersey Division  Select County County - Plaintiff, - OR v. _______  Municipal Court: _ Docket Number/ Complaint Number/ Defendant/Juvenile.  Accusation Number/ -------  Indictment Number: Motion of Requesting Judicial Review
[brief] JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED AS DEFENDANTS DO NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF AS TO ICE FROM A MELT AND REFREEZE EVENT ON A PUBLIC SIDEWALK  A.  Negligence Standard .............................................................................  7  B.  The Defendants Do Not Have A Common Law Duty to Remove Snow and Ice from a Public Sidewalk .................................................................  8  C.  This Case Involves a Naturally Occurring Melt and Refreeze Event, Not A New element of Danger or Hazard .........................................................  9  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................  14  | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bohn v. Hudson and Manhattan R. Co., 16 N.J. 180 (1954) | 7 | | Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super. 136 (App. Div. 1997), cert. den., 150 N.J. 27 (1997) | 7 | | Foley v. Ulrich, 94 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 1967) | 9, 11, 12 | | Hanson v. Eagle-Picture Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 141 (1951) | 8 | | Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44 (1961) | 7, 8 | | Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191 (2011) | 8, 9, 11 | | Qian v. Toll Bros, Inc., 223 N.J. 124, 135 (2015) | 8 | | Rivera v. Columbus Cadet Corps. Of America, 59 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 1960) | 8 | | Saco v. Hall, 1 N.J. 377, 381 (1949) | 9, 11 | | Skupienski v. Maly, 27 N.J. 240, 247 (1958) | 8 | | Other Authorities | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | [...] Snow and Ice Removal Ordinance | 1, 2, 5, 12 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This case and subsequent appeal by Plaintiff-Appellant [...] (hereafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) stems from a slip and fall on black ice on a public sidewalk abutting a residential property in North Bergen on February 23, 2021.
[brief] Perhaps more troubling, the Commission’s reasoning here flies in the face of their recent advisory opinion in School Ethic’s Commission that is directly on-point.  In the decision, a Board member asks the Commission “whether you would violate the School Ethics Act (Act) N.J.S.A. 18A:12-21 et seq., if “as a private citizen,” you “answer operational questions about how [the District] function[s] on social media. ” (School Ethics Commission, Public Advisory Opinion – A02-22, February 25, 2022).  The Commission’s response is unequivocal:  “[A]lthough you want to provide information to the public that stakeholders (and you) feel would be useful and beneficial, because you would be providing information relating to the Board and/or your official duties and responsibilities, any attempt to disclaim your speech (as being in your personal or private capacity) would likely be futile.  People in your community are aware of your status as a Board member and would likely attribute any statement from you as being from you in your capacity as a Board member, and/or on behalf of the Board.  If you only ever provide links to publicly available information, it is possible that your conduct would be less precarious; however, that would not immunize you from being the subject of an ethics complaint” (ibid 3).  This response is directly on point to [...]’s Facebook posts.  Despite attempting to disclaim his speech, [...]’s posts fall afoul of this advisory opinion.  As stated in the amended complaint, “And while [...] does disclaim his post in SEC-approved form, he goes on to constantly reference the BOE and its activities in such a way to make it clear that he actually *is* speaking as a BOE member”.  The Advisory Opinion also properly references [...] (School Ethics Commission Decision I/M/O [...], [...], [...], April 27, 2021 at 12), which found in part that “In addition, even if an appropriate disclaimer is used, a school official must never negate the import of the disclaimer by proceeding, under the purported protection of a disclaimer, to discuss or comment on Board business or matters in a way that leads a member of the public to believe that the individual is speaking on behalf of, and as a representative of, the Board”.  As to how [...]’s speech could damage the board, that should be clear.  [...] chose to weigh in personally in a highly charged referendum debate, and held himself as a district expert on the facilities question.  Further, by “spinning” the information he gave, he did a disservice to all residents who read and believed him.  [...]’s post ultimately severely degraded the community’s trust in the Board, especially in [...].  It is clear that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring its own advisory opinion and its own past precedents.
[brief] The only support defendant could offer for his claim that the State “intentionally deleted” the profile was an email sent by [...]’s legal counsel, [...], which counsel read into the record:  “‘After a complete search, my client could not find any information on their servers pertaining to the account .  . . .  Thank you for your patience. ’  And that was it. ” (1T32-7 to 12).  Defendant thus argued, [The State is] calling it a failure to preserve this profile information.  It’s not a failure to preserve.  This is not a situation where evidence was lost.  It was intentionally deleted by the detective.  Intentionally deleted.  And we know that, Judge, because I subpoenaed the information from the website and was told by the attorney . . . that he could not produce the information because it was deleted.  Affirmatively deleted.  [(1T4-22 to 5-7).
[brief] ”); *Harris v. Reed*, 894 F.2d 871, 879 (7th Cir. 1990) (counsel deficient when“jury likely concluded [he] could not live up the claims made in the opening. ”); *State v. Petric*, 333 So. 3d 1063, 1083 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (unkept promise to present third-party guilt defense); *State v. Moorman*, 358 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1987) (unkept promise to prove defendant was incapable of committing the offense, “severely undercut the credibility of the actual evidence offered at trial, including defendant's own testimony”).
[brief] The issue in Walsh was whether the trial court erred in not allowing the medical benefit payments of $10,000 to be introduced at the trial under the collateral source rule, and if the issue was preserved on appeal.  (Da130 – Da138).  Clearly the arbitrator addressed [...]’s contentions and objections to jurisdiction as placed before the arbitrator, which addressed all of the issues currently raised by [...] in this Appeal and found those arguments not to be persuasive.  The arbitrator’s decision with regard to the arbitration docket number [...] was the most specific in addressing the arguments of the parties.  (Da 130 – 138).  In each of the other eight arbitration awards the same exact arguments were raised, virtually identically, with the arbitrator reaching the same result, entering an award in favor of [...].  The unpublished opinions provided by [...] are not persuasive based on the arguments placed before the arbitrator and currently before the Court.  Those unpublished opinions were not binding on the arbitrator.  POINT IV
[brief] [...] and [...] are licensed in New Jersey, and the commercial policies at issue are not of the type excepted from the regulation.  (N.J.A.C.11:1-20.1; SSR 36, Dta1366.).  The Law Division nevertheless concluded that the cancellation regulation “does not apply because the CCIP contained a worker’s compensation component. ”  Under the reckoning set forth in the opinion below, every package of commercial liability policies in which an insured purchases liability and compensation policies from the same insurer is exempt from cancellation rules – a result inconsistent with the purpose of the regulations, given the statutory requirement that businesses maintain workers compensation coverage.
[brief] \(^3\)  See Gramiccioni, 243 N.J. at 299 (“Based on the assertions that defendants knew [...] was unfit for duty, failed to properly investigate Wilson-[...]'s domestic abuse complaints, improperly returned [...]’s weapon to him, and failed to seize it when it should have been taken from him, plaintiffs brought claims for damages. ”); Lavezzi, 219 N.J. at 179 (“In this case, the damage and loss alleged by plaintiffs may have occurred following the conclusion of the criminal investigation, when the non-contraband items at issue were no longer potential evidence, but had not been returned to plaintiffs. ”).  \(^3\) [...] attempts to make hay of the following aside from the Court in Lavezzi:  “Notwithstanding the State's argument that plaintiffs could have pursued a remedy based upon the equitable doctrine of replevin, the claim in this case originated from an activity that was part of the Prosecutor's Office's performance of “the criminal business of the State. ” (Pb9 (quoting Lavezzi, 219 N.J. at 179)).  That effort fails.  The claim in Lavezzi was brought as one for damages, so the fact that the plaintiff there might have pursued the same claim under an alternative label would not matter to the disposition of that case.  In addition, [...] briefly argues that, even though there are no alleged monetary damages in [...]’s action, the [...]’s denial of coverage forces [...] to incur legal fees and costs to defend the litigation.  (Pb16).  [...] cites to Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Associates, LLC, 207 N.J. 67, 81 (2011), for the misleading holding that the duty to defend is not abrogated where the cause of action is groundless.  The Court has already explicitly considered and rejected this argument in Chasin, in which the professor sued to recover the fees incurred in defending the underlying suit for injunctive relief.  Chasin, 159 N.J. at 424, 441.  Third, neither Gramiccioni and Lavezzi indicated that the Court was stepping away from its unambiguous holding in Chasin that the duty to defend under the TCA extended only to civil claims for damages.
[brief] (2T11:13 to 12:17).  He also fell under the influence of a negative peer group led by [...] and including [...].  (2T13:2-14).  At one point, [...] and [...] assaulted \(^2\)  Defendant stated in his last presentence report that this event occurred when he was twelve years old.  (Pca57). and robbed a pizza delivery man while defendant stood and watched.  (2T13:15-22).  After the incident, [...] and [...] “called [defendant] chicken and a lot of other names. ” (2T13:15-22).  [...] concluded that defendant’s level of emotional maturity was somewhere between 9 and 10 years of age, that he was easily coerced, and that he had been negatively influenced by [...] and [...].  (2T13-16; Pca34).
[brief] [...]’s very own Decision Point Review Plan, approved by [...], mandates arbitration of all disputes.  Further, the Assignment of Benefits contract, which [...] mandates that all healthcare providers sign in order to submit and be paid for claims for their insureds, contains express, mandatory arbitration language.  [...] has raised no basis in their underlying trial court submissions or argument to rescind these mandatory arbitration contracts or for any other reason render them void.  To the contrary, [...] has acknowledged the validity of both the DPR Plan and AOB by mandating the defendants follow the precertification, multi-level appeal and arbitration process on all of the claims in dispute.  Further, by accepting precertification requests, responding to same, accepting claims and adjusting the claims, and accepting appeals on the claims and responding to same, directly with the defendant healthcare providers, they have acknowledged the validity of the AOB contracts by their conduct and at no point have rescinded or otherwise indicated that that they are void or unenforceable.  Moreover, [...] cannot now choose to selectively enforce provisions of the AOB that favor them and reject others that disfavor them to support their specious claims.  In conclusion, the FAA fully supports the Trial Court’s determination that valid arbitration contracts exist between the parties mandating arbitration of the claims contained in the Complaint and that all of the claims must be pursued in the mandatory arbitration venue, not the court system.
[brief] See Twp. of Berkeley v. Cent. Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 2017 WL 3427254, at *1 (App. Div. Aug. 10, 2017) (free tuition policy rendered moot by subsequent policy requiring tuition); Am. Humanist Ass'n v. Matawan-Aberdeen Reg’l Sch. Dist., 440 N.J. Super. 582, 597 (Law Div. 2015) (“defendants informed the court that the … School Board was revising policy 8820 to delete the aforementioned paragraphs from that policy… given the board’s deletion of those requirements, any issue raised by plaintiffs with respect to board policy 8820 is now moot”); *In re the Application of Madin/Lord Land Dev. Int’l for Pinelands Dev. Approval* 103 N.J. 689, 691, 695 (1986) (repeal and revision of regulation mooted appeal of order granting reconsideration under regulation); *Gayder v. Spiotta*, 206 N.J. Super. 556, 560 (App. Div. 1985) (superseding ordinance rendered challenge to memorandum moot); *Casser v. Twp. of Knowlton*, 441 N.J. Super. 353, 365 (App. Div. 2015) (challenge to ordinance which is no longer in effect is moot).  *See also Jai Sai Ram LLC v. Planning Bd. of So. Toms River*, 446 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 2016) (appeal of a board’s grant of a use variance is mooted by an intervening ordinance expressly permitting the use); *Mazza v. Bd. of Adjustment of Bridgeton*, 47 N.J. 161, 162 (1966) (same).  Thus, the court entered restraints on a matter -- *i.e.*, the Original Policy -- that was moot and non-justiciable as a matter of law.  *See Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. County of Bergen*, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div. 2017) (“Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately threatened with harm”).  CONCLUSION
[brief] (4T90:23-151:14).  In his first interview with [...], the plaintiff described that occurred, but that initial conversation lasted only about 45 seconds (4T94:11-97:8) before the officer left and went to a separate room to hear [...]'s version of what happened (4T97:17-21).  At trial, the officer admitted to having observed a bump on the plaintiff's head both at the time of the interview and in the video played for the jury.
[brief] ”  City of New York v. Smart Apts. LLC, 39 Misc. 3d 221, 227 (Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2013)  Having produced no cognizable proofs as part of a lengthy and patient discovery process, [...], when called upon to testify, “pounded the table” repeatedly, engaged in intimidation tactics, discarded all efforts at decorum and contemptuously spit in the eye of the legal process.  [...] did not come to his deposition with supportive facts, but with the proverbial extension of his middle finger at our system of laws and anyone else who will not obediently submit to his own unstable will and dictates; but now, and with extravagant moxie, this same corporate principal and party in interest risibly demands an additional bite of the apple for his company in this litigation.  It is frankly difficult to imagine any party that is less deserving of this than [...], which has already squandered multiple opportunities to actually support its forlorn and utterly non-meritorious case.  In this case and appeal, [...] has been given a plethora of opportunities to avoid its ultimate fate of a summary judgment dismissal.  It is respectfully submitted that it is entitled to no more.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision and Order of the Law Division granting [...] summary judgment as against all of [...]’s claims on the ground of the insufficient proofs that have been provided to establish damages with any reasonable certainty.
[brief] Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa303)  Discovery Checklist dated 5/5/2020 (Attached at Pa070)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa022)  Police Department Record of Booking 2/20/22 (Attached at Pa074)  Exhibit M to Certification of [...]  [...]  Letter to [...] 5/5/2023