ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court also should have considered testimony of the numerous individuals who participated in the subdivision and sale transactions but did NOT come to a “clear and obvious” conclusion that Lot 3 was actually 65’ wide.  This included [...]’s own attorney, as well as the attorneys for [...] and [...], and all the other individuals involved in the subdivision and land transaction who, in fact, did NOT notice this “clear and obvious” error.  A bona fide purchaser for value is “someone who buys something for value without notice of another’s claim to the property and without actual or constructive notice of any defects in or infirmities, claims, or equities against the seller’s title. ”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1491 (11th ed. 2019).  A bona fide purchaser is chargeable only with what appears in the record or within a “reasonable” title search.  Island Venture v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 359 N.J. Super. 391, 397 (App. Div. 2003).  There is no evidence [...] had actual notice of the error in his deed, and there is a question of material fact as to whether he had constructive notice, essentially, whether a reasonably prudent person would know or should have known of the error.  This position is supported by the expert report of [...], Esquire, a 23-year New Jersey title attorney and 20-year owner of [...], who opined, “a reasonably prudent buyer, whether represented by counsel or not represented by counsel, would not have constructive or inquiry notice that Lot 3 was less than 66.3’ wide at its frontage.
[brief] He argues that the judge should have instructed the jury that passion/provocation manslaughter and attempted passion/provocation manslaughter were lesser included offenses of murder, count one, and attempted murder, count two.  (Db19; Db22).  Of note, defendant takes no issue with the trial court’s jury instructions on the elements of murder and attempted murder when there is evidence of passion/provocation manslaughter but argues that the charge on the elements of the murder offenses were “correct-as far as it went. ”  (Db19).  Defendant cites to *State v. Supreme Life*, 473 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2022) in arguing the judge’s failure to instruct the jury that self-defense applied to passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser included offense on counts one and two was plain error.  In *Supreme Life*, the defendant’s convictions were reversed because of a “combination of errors” that had occurred at the trial, including the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that self-defense applied to all lesser included offenses, which included passion/provocation manslaughter.  473 N.J. Super. at 177.  See also *State v. Gentry*, 439 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 2015) (trial court’s failure to instruct that self-defense applied to aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter reversible error).  Unlike *Supreme Life*, where the appellate court found cumulative error that had denied the defendant in that case a fair trial, there was no cumulative error in this case.
[brief] The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Petrillo recognized a duty in favor of a non-client stating, “attorneys may owe a duty of care to non-clients when the attorneys know, or should know, that non-clients will rely on the attorneys’ representations. …”  Id. at 483-84.  As the Trial Court admits, nowhere in Petrillo does the Supreme Court of New Jersey state that this holding applies only to attorneys in transactional settings.  Accordingly, there was no reason for the Trial Court to conclude that Plaintiffs are unable to state a legal malpractice claim against the [...] arising out of their fraudulent concealment and fraudulent representations which were made knowing that Plaintiffs would rely on them.
[brief] The inclusion in a criminal trial of a Clawans charge from the court risks improperly assisting the State in its obligation to prove each and every element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  . . .  Indeed, any reference to a negative inference against a criminal defendant must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the comment does not mislead or have the capacity to confuse the jury into believing that a defendant had an obligation to produce the witness and the substantive evidence that the witness would have provided.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 050991988  Date Submitted: January 18, 2024
[brief] Analogous to *Rent-A-Center* and *Coinbase*, Plaintiff here has challenged the validity of the [...] account agreement as a whole, inclusive of the delegation clause, for Defendants’ violations of the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”).  *See* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Plaintiff is not required to challenge *only* the delegation clause—all provisions of the agreement are void for Defendants’ violations of the NJCFLA.  *See* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  *Coinbase*’s broad holding as to severability and delegation clauses is applicable here—when a litigant provides a basis for a challenge to a contract as a whole, as was done here, the Court must address the challenge.  A litigant is not required to directly challenge *only* the arbitration and delegation provisions.  *Coinbase, Inc.*, 144 S. Ct. at 1194.  Defendants next argue that because assignees of contracts can generally enforce arbitration clauses contained in said contracts, Plaintiff “lacks standing to challenge the validity of the assignment between two separate parties, or any actions taken by [...].
[brief] [...] upheld the board’s finding on taxes, but remanded back to the board to reconsider the garbage fee and the tax preparation fee (a total of $200 a year), the management fee, and equity, for which [...] said the Board was arbitrary and capricious by not including [...]’s alleged capital improvements, market conditions, re-assessments, and inflation.  DA20-22.  The Board held six meetings over a period from March 2020 to August 2021, a time prolonged by covid, to consider the issues in line with [...]’s instructions.  This time, the Board gave the landlord $1,200 in management fees, $5,648.05 in condo fees, and an $800.31 annual return on equity.  DA54-56.  The Landlord appealed to [...] who held that the board had acted arbitrarily and capriciously and set the rent on the unit at $2,400 per month.  Specifically, [...] held that the Board was arbitrary and capricious in not counting the entire condominium fee, in particular a $123 for garbage removal, as an expense, was arbitrary and capricious in reducing the management fee, and was arbitrary and capricious in its determination of equity.  [...] held that [...] is entitled to an return on equity of $18,819.00, which was arrived at by adding in the landlord’s claimed capital expenditures of $76,000 to the $47,000 attributed to Unit 11 when the building was bought and then increasing that amount for inflation for a “value” of $197,610.  Then that number is averaged with the tax assessed value of the property, which is $404,600 for a “blended value” of $301,105.  [...] held that [...] is entitled to a 6.25% return on that amount every year under Hoboken’s rent control ordinance.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Pa013-015.  Among other relief, the complaint seeks to claw back those payments that Defendants fraudulently obtained.  Two sets of defendants retained two law firms to represent them in this case.  [...] (the [...]) was retained to represent twelve defendants, including [...] and affiliated entities; the ringleader brothers of the fraudulent enterprise, Joseph and [...]; general counsel, [...], Esq., Dr. [...], M.D., [...]’s sham or “paper owner,” as well as the subordinate worker-doctors (the [...] defendants).
[brief] The “full” causation charge provides that the State must prove two elements for causation: first, that the defendant’s conduct was the “but for” cause of a result; and second, that the defendant had the requisite mens rea to be held criminally responsible for that result.  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Causation (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3),”  This Court recently acknowledged that “the ‘full’ causation jury instruction is not required in all cases. ”  State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 312 (App. Div. 2022).  Only where causation of injury is contested is the “full” causation instruction required for third-degree aggravated assault.
[brief] \(^{1}\)  Appellant misquotes the language from the Hanges decision at pages 382-383, either intentionally or inadvertently, stringing together two separate quotes from two separate cases, neither of which are bid dispute cases.  Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Committee of Manalapan 140 NJ 366, 378 (1995) involves amendments to a township’s zoning ordinances and City of Atlantic City v. Trupos 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010) involves the issue of disqualification of legal counsel.
[brief] The forum non conveniens factors analyzed in Century Indem. are also present here and support the trial court’s Judgment.  Contrary to plaintiff’s party its otherwise legitimate choice of the forum and time for suit, no declaratory judgment should issue. ”); Clockwork Home Servs., Inc. v. Robinson, 423 F. Supp. 2d 984, 992-93 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (dismissing declaratory judgment suit where defendant preemptively filed in a race to the courthouse); Eli’s Chicago Finest, Inc. v. Cheesecake Factory, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 906, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (dismissing first-filed declaratory judgment lawsuit that was filed after accusation of trademark infringement “in hopes of securing a favorable forum”).
[brief] A remedy is not proscribed by any precedent, nor the Attorney General directive which Defendant relies upon.  [(Da24-26) (emphasis added). ]  The trial court properly held that even if the failure of police officers to record the first thirty seconds of audio on their body worn cameras is a violation of the Attorney General Directive, it does not amount to a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights; and, therefore the application of the exclusionary rule is not warranted.
[brief] Had Appellant’s request for oral argument been granted, the error likely would not have occurred.  2.  Further, Appellant requested consolidation of his current Motion for Correction of the Probation Account Record with his previous Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 4/4/2022 (letter dated 10/24/2022, DA469).  Appellant’s Motion was filed in compliance with the terms of the Order of 4/4/2023 (DA80), i.e. that “3.  All other requests are denied without prejudice. ”  Given [...]’s concern for potential additional discrepancies and his reluctance to order a hearing “if discrepancies remain” Appellant submitted his Motion for Correction of Probation Account Error citing account errors by specific paragraph which had not been previously litigated in addition to those errors previously litigated as they --- \(^9\) Statement of Reasons, p. 4, 1\(^{st}\) paragraph, line 9). comprehensively support my claims of Probation’s history of continued wrongful account records.
[brief] [...] have secured “double recovery” in that they have profited from the rent-producing commercial Property from 1994 to 2018, as well as the market value of the Property as of January 27, 1994, to the detriment of the Township and the public.  [...] failed to maintain a minimum level of safety and appeal in the Property, which depreciated its value and ultimately lead to the blight designation.  As this Court has held, the owner of private property taken for public use “is not entitled to reap a windfall,” at the expense of the public.  State, Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. S. Nalbone Trucking Co., Inc., 128 N.J. Super. 370, 377 (App. Div. 1974).  The Trial Court erred in disregarding the issue of double-recovery by the Berardis, and at a minimum should have carved out an offset of just compensation to account for the Berardis’ rental profits during the twenty-four year period between the declaration of blight and the date of taking.  The Trial Court’s February 20, 2019 Order setting a valuation date of January 27, 1994 should be reversed.
[brief] Plaintiff owes his attorneys the attorney’s fees.  They are seeking to secure their right to said attorney’s fees by a lien and agreed to forgo collection actions pending the outcome of this action and whether or not the Plaintiff recedes any proceeds.  The idea that a member of the bar would provide tainted or false testimony in order to recover a preexisting debt is one that the Defendants can explore upon cross-examination, but the idea that they should be precluded from testifying is without precedent.  Similarly, that Defendants might call [...] as a witness and their witness might slant his testimony because Plaintiff owes them a debt which would be satisfied from the proceeds of the litigation also finds no basis in law or public policy and can be explored through cross-examination and impeachment.  The pledge and the attorney’s lien are not an agreement to compensate fact witness anymore that it is an assignment of a lawsuit.
[directive] Under the Act, a trial “commence[s] when the court determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument, or the hearing of any motions that had been reserved for the time of trial. ”  Id. at -22(a)(2)(b)(i).  The 180-day clock contains provisions that mirror both exceptions to the 90-day clock.  Excludable time for reasonable delays under subsection b is not counted, and the court may extend the time to trial beyond 180 days if it finds a substantial risk to public safety and if the failure to start trial was not because of unreasonable delay by the prosecutor.  Id. at -22(a)(2)(a).
[brief] (1T:30:6-11).  The trial court found that:  [...], in the most trying of times, attempted in the best way he possibly could to have something left for the creditors, to administer this diner pursuant to the plaintiff's request to gain some funds for them based on their judgment and -- what business didn't get hurt during this period of time …  Formalities to follow the statute would have to be paid by someone.  There is no money left to do it.  It becomes an impossibility.  The court is not paying for it [...] is not obligated to pay for it.  The bank is not obligated to pay for it.  (1T:30:12-25 and 31:1-7 and 2T:5:10-24).  Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion by [...] by entering the order discharging the statutory receiver simply because a final accounting was not filed.  III.
[brief] The applicant's proofs and the board's findings that the variance will not “substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance,” N.J.S.A.  40:55D–70(d), must reconcile the proposed use variance with the zoning ordinance's omission of the use from those permitted in the zoning district.  For example, proof that the character of a community has changed substantially since the adoption of the master plan and zoning ordinance may demonstrate that a variance for a use omitted from the ordinance is not incompatible with the intent and purpose of the governing body when the ordinance was passed.  Reconciliation on this basis becomes increasingly difficult when the governing body has been made aware of prior applications for the same use variance but has declined to revise the zoning ordinance.  (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).
[brief] ”  Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 206 N.J. 243 (2011)(emphasis added).  Thus, adverse employment action is not limited to a demotion, suspension or discharge, and need not result in loss of pay.  Maimone v. Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221, 235, 903 A.2d 1055 (2006) (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:19-3).  In fact, New Jersey Courts recognize retaliatory action can take the form of “many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior directed against an employee that may not be actionable individually but that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct. ”  Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 447 (2003) (recognizing that a hostile work environment claim can be brought under CEPA)(emphasis added).  Although the Trial Court did not rule on the issue, it is evident Defendants subjected Plaintiff to several forms of retaliation following her whistleblowing complaints.
[brief] (Da64-68).  In September 2017, [...] acknowledged receipt of an amended complaint, stated that the initial reservation of rights still applied, and resent the initial reservation of rights letter with that letter.  (Da296-301).  [...] also produced a signed returned certified receipt for that September 2017 mailing.  (Da302-303).  In his counterclaim, [...] admitted that “[o]n July 20, 2017, nearly three years before initiating this action, [...] sent [...] a Reservation of Rights letter. ” (Da31).  At [...]’s deposition, his counsel stated on the record that he does not dispute that [...] sent the July 20, 2017 reservation of rights letter.  (Defendant Opposition Exhibit A, T.13:13).  Still, later in that deposition [...] testified that he simply does not recall whether he did or did not receive the letter.  See Id. at T.14:2-11.  Additionally, in the Certification attached to his opposition to the summary judgment motion, [...] only certifies that he does not recall receiving the July 20, 2017 reservation of rights letter, or the September 25, 2017 reservation of rights regarding the amended complaint filed in connection with the underlying action.  (Da203).  New Jersey recognizes a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed.
[brief] **C.  As An [...] Supervisor During The Entirety Of The Investigation And Prosecution Of [...], [...] Abused Her Discretion In Refusing To Recuse Herself From Passing Judgment On [...]’s Misconduct In Destroying Hundreds Of Hours Of Potentially Exculpatory Information, Failing To Retain The Hard Drive At The Center Of Substantial Pretrial Litigation On Spoliation, And Withholding [...]’s Policies From The Court And The Defense.
[brief] Order Granting [...] Motion to Dismiss, filed August 16, 2024  Order Granting Individual Defendants Motion to Dismiss, filed August 16, 2024  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Complaint, filed April 11, 2024  Pa004  Trial Transcript, State of New Jersey v. [...] ([...]), filed June 6, 2017  Pa030  Judgment of Acquittal, State of New Jersey v. [...] ([...]), filed July 31, 2017  Pa105  Order and Judgment, DiGiesi v. [...], et als ([...]), filed March 27, 2024  Pa108  Opinion, DiGiesi v. [...], et als ([...]), filed March 27, 2024  Pa110 Notice of Appeal, filed September 13, 2024  Pa123
[brief] 4T:37-(14-17).  People should not be forced to go to such extreme lengths as I have, to prove my innocence.  I am doing this on my own because I consider myself of relatively good intelligence and lawyers quoted me several thousand dollars for these appeals.  Random people would not be able to do this considering how much time, effort and knowledge this takes.  On a side note, I have spoken to a retired police sergeant of 20 years, the guy who owns the mechanic shop who installed my interlock device, “[...]” on [...], and he was shocked when I told him I was able to prove a mistake on the officer’s part and still got a refusal.  He told me that in all his years, once the officer admits to making a mistake in the SFST or it was proven he made a mistake, then the DWI and refusal would be automatically thrown out.
[directive] To identify BWC recordings that may raise special privacy or safety issues, every department that deploys BWCs shall establish and implement a system that permits a notation (i.e., “tagging”) to be made when the recording:  (a) captures the image of a victim of a criminal offense; BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  20  (b) captures the image of a child; (c) was made in a residential premises (e.g., a home, apartment, college dormitory room, hotel/motel room, etc.), a school or youth facility, a healthcare facility or medical office, a substance abuse or mental health treatment facility, or a place of worship; (d) captures a conversation with a person whose request to de-activate the BWC was declined; (e) captures a special operations event or execution of an arrest and/or search warrant where confidential tactical information (e.g., verbal codes and hand signals used to give direction to officers, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms during execution of a warrant, techniques for convincing persons to open doors during warrant execution, etc.) may have been recorded; (f) captures the image of an undercover officer or confidential informant; or (g) captures the screen of a police computer monitor that is displaying confidential personal or law enforcement sensitive information.  See also Section 7.1 (requiring notice to the prosecutor when a BWC captures the image of a patient at a substance abuse treatment facility).  Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Policy, an agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued pursuant to Section 3.1 may specify additional circumstances when a BWC recording will be “tagged.
[brief] Appellant asserts that the [...], a government agency, should be able to take sweeping regulatory actions with broad applications without formal rulemaking as required under the New Jersey Administrative Procedures Act.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31.  Appellant’s argument purposefully omits clear and relevant language set forth in the FHA Act, which expressly requires that all rules delineating and updating flood hazard areas undergo formal rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act.
[brief] The fourth video clip, lacking actual time of day, began with [...] inside the security office, reviewing more video with the two security personnel, plus another police officer.  (Dca 1, clip four, 0:01\(^5\)).  Within about one minute, one of the security employees pointed to a video showing a person inside one of the buildings.  The two police officers and two security personnel hastily departed the security office, and ran across the courtyard into one of the complex’s buildings.  (Dca 1, clip four, 1:00 to 2:00).  In a hallway, [...] remarked that she had seen on the video that [...] took the gun with her.  (Dca 1, clip four, 2:18).  A fellow officer radioed that everyone should look for [...].  (Dca 1, clip four, 2:25 to 2:45).  \(^5\)  For clips four and five, times indicated refer to the length of time within the clip, not actual time of day.
[brief] The Complaint in the DJ Action did not assert any theories based on conventional subrogation, rather it sought a breach of contract claim by [...] (Count I), promissory estoppel by [...] (Count II) and a declaratory judgment by [...] and [...] (Count V), and to date no subrogation agreement has been produced.  Further, in subrogation cases, the insured’s right to recovery against a third-party tortfeasor vest in the insurer, and the insurer steps into the shoes of the insured.  *City of Asbury Park v. Star Ins. Co.*, 242 N.J. 596 (2020).  Here, [...] does not seek recovery against a third-party tortfeasor.  Because [...] does not allege fraud, duress or extortion, and there was no mistake of fact in the payment, [...] remains a subject to the VPD.  IV.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court’s order directing the parties to arbitrate this matter and dismissing this case.  Dated: March 20, 2024  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...] (New Jersey Bar No. 126432014)  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees  [...], [...], [...], and [...]
[brief] Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J. Ch. PLAINTIFF  [...]’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT  FIRST ZION HOPE  MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH’S APPEAL [...]  [...] | PO Box 991 [...] (973)  539-1000  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, New Community Corporation Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...], Esq. (160842015)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (336692022)  TABLE OF CONTENTS