ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] By way of example, the Contract read:  4.  **Compensation.**  ...  [...] will hold the Monthly Deposit to be released by [...] [] upon the ‘Completion of the Services,’ as described in Paragraph 6 [].  ...  5.  **Payments.**  Client authorizes [...] to ACH debit  Client’s bank account as designated by Client to accumulate the fees associated with this Agreement on a monthly basis at an FDIC-insured institution.  Client may stop any ACH debit transaction by providing written or oral notice to [...], [...] National Credit or your banking institution at least three (3) business days prior to the next scheduled debit.  Client agrees to review and sign the required debit form providing bank account information to support such payments.  ...  7.  **Warranty and Refund Policies. **  [A]ny funds deposited by Client with [...] for Credit Repair Services shall belong to Client and may be withdrawn by Client at any time until such time they have been earned by [...] .  . . .” (Pa28-Pa30).  [...] included [...]’ name in the contract simply to memorialize [...]’ payment processor selection and comply with banking regulations.  After [...] voluntarily chose [...] as its third-party custodian, [...] – again in its sole capacity – provided [...] with the EFT authorization.  *(See Pa31-Pa32)* (“Client authorizes Company to use third party vendors in the course of providing services. ”)  While [...] avers that the trial court “fail[ed] to appreciate” the separate agreement, [...]’ seemingly failed to do so as well.  Indeed, throughout multiple prior proceedings, [...] has claimed that [...] was “intimately involved” with and acting “on behalf of” [...].  *(Pa1); (see e.g., Pa5)* (“The Contract contained an authorization form from [...] for the withdrawal of funds. ”)  It was only after [...] filed its original motion to dismiss – and sought enforcement of the Arbitration Provision of the Contract – did [...] change her tune.  As the trial court recognized and correctly noted during oral argument, “[a]n authorization is not automatically a contract . . . , it’s simply an authorization and nothing more. ” (T2 22:5-22:11)  For these reasons, the Trial Court properly applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and its Order should be affirmed.  POINT IV.
[directive] Al acusado se le ha arrestado y acusado por una o dos de las violaciones de la ley de tránsito marcado en la caja arriba.  Conforme a la ley N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, este AVISO es para informarle que si usted acepta la responsabilidad de transportar o acompañar al acusado y le permite o facilita la operación de un vehículo motorizado mientras el acusado está en estado de embriaguez o tiene un contenido alcohólico en la sangre igual a, o más de lo que está permitido por la ley (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), usted potencialmente se expone a penalidades criminales y obligaciones legales civiles.  Permitir que una persona opere un vehículo motorizado en estado de embriaguez o tiene un contenido alcohólico en la sangre igual a, o más de lo que está permitido por la ley es una violación de la ley N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).  Si usted está acusado y condenado bajo el estatuto: se le suspenderán sus privilegios de manejo; se le impondrán multas y penalidades monetarias; y se le puede encarcelar.  Si usted permite o facilita que el acusado opere un vehículo motorizado mientras el acusado permanece en estado de embriaguez o tiene un contenido alcohólico en la sangre igual a, o más de lo que está permitido por la ley, y el acusado se ve involucrado en un accidente de vehículo -9- que ocasione la lesión o muerte de otras personas, entonces usted se expone a un proceso legal y enjuiciamiento criminal.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter involves the mistreatment of a minority member of a closely-held limited liability company, [...] (“[...]”).  The members of [...] include Respondents, [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), hereinafter (the “Defendants”) and Appellant, minority member, [...], hereinafter (the “Plaintiff” or “[...]”).  [...] was an information technology consulting company for nearly four (4) years and all of [...]’ earnings were due to the actions of Plaintiff, who served as the Chief Information Officer.  Plaintiff uncovered that [...] was attempting to sell [...]’ contracts without a membership vote.  When she confronted [...] regarding his misconduct, [...] physically assaulted her and then he proceeded to exclude her from [...] without paying Plaintiff her salary or distributions.  [...] and [...] were complicit, subsequently removing Plaintiff’s personal belongings and documents from her apartment without permission, and assisted [...] in excluding Plaintiff from [...].  [...] and [...] continued to rubber stamp [...]’ improper financial transactions, receive distributions from [...] to the detriment of Plaintiff, and used [...] funds to pay their own personal debt.  Plaintiff filed the instant action to recover her unpaid wages, annual membership equity distributions, and redeem her 10% equity share from [...].
[brief] *Olds v. Donnelly*, 150 N.J. 424, 428 (1997); *Karpovich v. Barbarula* 150 N.J. 473, 476 (1997); *Donohue v. Kuhn*, 150 N.J. 484, 485 (1997).  In reaching its determination in *Olds*, supra, the Court acknowledged the criticism leveled at the entire controversy doctrine and mandatory joinder of parties as well as the sanction of preclusion.  150 N.J. at 444–46.  In its decision, the Court emphasized “that preclusion is a remedy of last resort. ”  Id. at 446 (citing *Gelber v. Zito Partnership*, 147 N.J. 561, 565 (1997)).  While recognizing that the purpose of the doctrine is to encourage litigants to bring to the trial court's attention persons who should be joined, not to bar meritorious claims, the Court acknowledged the reality that there exists some attorneys who “have elected to conceal or withhold claims against additional parties. ”  *Olds*, supra, 150 N.J. at 447 (citations omitted).  There is no dispute that this matter alleges claims of legal malpractice arising out of a transaction.  Our Supreme Court held that such transactional malpractice claims are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] **  One well-established limit on summation argument is the prohibition against commenting beyond the trial evidence, or essentially testifying to new facts.  *State v. Williams*, 244 N.J. 592, 613 (2021) (“[P]rosecutors are obliged to confine their comments to the evidence admitted at trial and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.  The failure to do so may imply that facts or circumstances exist beyond what has been presented to the jury and encroach upon a defendant’s right to a fair trial. ”); e.g., *State v. Feaster*, 156 N.J. 1, 62 (1998) (holding argument “highly improper” where prosecutor claimed, based on speculation but not evidence, that defendant loaded and cocked shotgun on the way to murder scene); *State v. Atwater*, 400 N.J. Super. 319, 335-37 (App. Div. 2008) (reversing where prosecutor improperly claimed, based on speculation but not evidence, that defendant was “drunk” and “blotto” and implied that he struck the victims with his car intentionally).  That rule is particularly important where the State’s case involves video evidence, as the Supreme Court recently recognized in *State v. Watson*, 254 N.J. 558, 600 (2023).  In *Watson*, the Court rejected a defendant’s wholesale challenge to video narration testimony and instead upheld various categories of permissible testimony about a video’s contents.  *Id.* at 599-605.  The Court approved factual testimony about “confusing, complex, or unclear videos that may otherwise be difficult to grasp” and in situations where “jurors might miss a small or nuanced detail” but where an investigator “can draw a jury’s attention to particular spots. ”  *Id.* at 601-04.  Similarly, the Court reaffirmed the use of “[s]creenshots, stills, composite videos, and other demonstrative aids” to “help focus on details that casual observers might miss. ”  *Id.* at 602.  And the Court provided examples of proper testimony, such as “draw[ing] attention to a distinctive shirt or a particular style of car that appear in different frames. ”  *Id.* at 604.  Central to the Court’s reasoning was its concern that if prosecutors themselves were to “pinpoint particular spots in a video during closing argument” without first introducing them through testimony, it could “invite objections that counsel is essentially testifying without being subject to cross- examination.
[brief] *Ibid.*  As an example, in *Rendine*, in addition to providing a certification from the attorneys for the party seeking the fee award as to that firm’s own compensation rate, counsel submitted certifications from three experienced employment-law practitioners from other law firms who had provided estimates of the hours required to litigate a plaintiff's employment-discrimination case, and the estimates either exceeded or approximated the hours expended by plaintiffs' counsel.  Those unaffiliated lawyers also certified that the hourly rates billed by the attorneys that had worked on the litigation appeared to be reasonable and consistent with rates charged by lawyers of comparable seniority and experience.  [Id. at 318 (emphasis added). ]
[brief] To the contrary, Williamson does not stand for this proposition and is factually distinguishable.  In Williamson, “a State trooper testified that while driving in the left lane on a three-lane divided highway, he observed defendant, driving a few car lengths ahead, move from the center lane into the right lane without a signal. ”  138 N.J. at 303-04.  Due to the limited testimony and findings by the trial court on the subject, the Court remanded for a determination of whether the failure to signal may have affected any other traffic.
[brief] There is no solitary way to demonstrate causation and/or pretext, as it must be identified on fact-specific basis.  A causal connection can be demonstrated through evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive or a “pattern of antagonism” following the protected conduct.  See Kachmar, supra. 109 F.3d at 177; see also Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543 (1995).  Causation may be demonstrated by the temporal proximity between the employee's protected activity and the adverse employment action, when the temporal proximity is combined with facts that are “unusually suggestive” of retaliatory motive.  See Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005)  However, temporal proximity and a pattern of antagonism “are not the exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.
[directive] Amount Amount Needed Amount Needed Type of Drug Needed to Establish to Establish to Establish  First Degree “Substantial Second Degree Quantity”  Marijuana*  5 lbs. (2.27 kg.)  25 lbs. (11.34 kg.)  250 lbs. (113.4 kg.) or or 10 plants or 50 plants 500 plants  *See Special Offense Characteristic #3 (Section 7.3) for special rules for structuring plea offers in first-degree methamphetamine and marijuana cases.
[brief] Under Vermont law, an ‘insurer's duty to defend is independent of and broader than its duty to indemnify. ’  An insurer has a duty to defend an insured whenever there is a possibility that a claim falls within the coverage of an insurance policy.  In order to escape the duty to defend, the burden is on the insurer to show that the claims against the insured are entirely excluded from coverage.  (Citations omitted.)  In addition, the “labels” used in the underlying complaint are irrelevant.  If any of the allegations contained in the underlying complaint are potentially covered, the insurance company must defend the entire suit.  In *R.L. Vallee v. A. International Specialty Lines Insurance*, 431 F. Supp. 2d 428 (D. Vt. 2006), the court stated: ‘The duty to defend is triggered if any claim against the insured potentially comes within the policy's coverage.
[brief] See Da160.  However, in his affidavit Plaintiff later stated that he met with [...] after the sale of the hospital and claims that [...] made promises to Plaintiff to pay him the owed sums that form the basis of this lawsuit.  See Pa 393-397.  Plaintiff claims this occurred on February 22, 2019, which obviously contradicts his request for admission response that no communications occurred with Defendants after February 8, 2018.  Plaintiff’s sham affidavit also directly contradicts the testimony of [...], who testified that “we did pay him [Plaintiff]” and that “I never said that he was not paid completely or whatever.  He was paid.  That is my testimony. ”  See Da133 at 30:16-19.  Regarding the $10,000.00 check paid in January of 2018, [...] testified that “when he [Plaintiff] accepted the check, and he put through the bank and he cashed it [in January 2018], and he never bothered me ever since or, you know, he never made any claims ever since until he came up with this lawsuit.  He was ok with it.  That means that for a few years, you keep silence and you don’t ask anything, that means he was satisfied.  That he accepted. ”  *Id.* at 30:16-31:1.  As a result, all the evidence in the record confirms that the parties had no interaction with each other after the January 2018 payment was made, until Plaintiff contradicted this in his sham affidavit submitted in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
[brief] Calculation of amounts due (Exh. A) | Da169-170 | | August 27, 2021  Certification of [...] | Da171-172 | | Jan. 7, 2022 Notice of Motion to fix amount due | Da173-175 | | Jan. 7, 2022 Certification of [...] | Da176-178 | | Nov. 29, 2021 letter enclosing payment into court | Da179-181 | | Sept. 24, 2021 Certification of [...] with exhibits | Da182-189 | | Exhibit 1: Omitted to avoid duplication | Da190 | | Exhibit 2: Sept. 22, 2017 letter regarding assignment | Da190-191 | Exhibit 3: undated letter regarding change of address . . . . . . Da192-193 Exhibit 4: Apr. 28, 2020 notice of unpaid rent . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da194-196 Exhibit 5: June 8, 2020 notice of default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da197-199 Exhibit 6: Omitted to avoid duplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da200 Exhibit 7: Omitted as non-pertinent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da200 Exhibits 8-12: Omitted below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da200 Exhibit 12: Landlord’s aged delinquency report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da200-203 Exhibit 13: Bills and invoices demonstrating legal fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da204-235 Exhibit 14-18: Omitted as non-pertinent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da235 Dec. 29, 2021 landlord letter to court seeking disbursement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da236-37 Feb. 18, 2022 landlord letter to court objecting to reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da238 Feb. 23, 2022 defendant letter responding to landlord objection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-4(c).  If the Commissioner “determines that the [R]ecover[y] [P]lan is not likely to achieve financial stability,” or if the “municipality fails to submit a plan,” the Local Finance Board may “assume and reallocate to, and vest exclusively in” the Director “any of the functions, powers, privileges, and immunities of the governing body of that municipality.
[directive] If a defendant is arrested on a bench warrant on an initial summons and monetary bail was not set at warrant issuance, a bail determination or release on personal recognizance must occur without unnecessary delay and no later than 12 hours after arrest.  If the defendant is unable to post bail, the court shall review that bail promptly.  The defendant may file an application with the court seeking a bail reduction; such bail reduction motion shall be heard in an expedited manner.  Note:  This Rule applies to defendants arrested on or after January 1, 2017 for a disorderly person offense or petty disorderly persons offense and who are initially released on a complaint-summons.  If the defendant later fails to appear in court, monetary bail may be set either upon issuance of the bench warrant or when the defendant is rearrested.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will apply when setting monetary bail.  18  SUMMARY OF RULES AND STATUTE REGARDING BAIL FOR NON-INDICTABLE OFFENSES
[brief] Upholding this trick would show our Courts are tolerating, maybe even encouraging – if you look at this case -- dishonest, tricky and dirty behavior amongst adversaries which has lowered our esteem.  The State admits it made a “mistake” and the 12-word “typo” would mislead even the most cautious person.  Both my Office Manager and I are such persons, if only because we always have to assume someone is trying to play a “fast one” on us.  We know the Courts won’t do anything about it due to past retaliations.  This is a “perfect” example. \(^{19}\)  Now, we are apparently not allowed to rely on adversary’s representations in plain, unconfusing English on p. 2 of a Motion (if the first page states no purpose).  [...] seems to think we must now be clairvoyant.  We shoulda, coulda or \(^{19}\)  Quite frankly, given His Honor’s attitude, I am surprised he vacated the LoP dismissal.  Given the “lost” remand, the LoP and this total resistance to fixing an admitted error, when added to all the “irregularities” in the Case in Chief, the entirety clearly goes way beyond a mere “Appearance of Impropriety.
[brief] 35  State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2018) ..............................................  37, 39 State v. Mahoney, 188 N.J. 359 (2006) .................................................................. 17, 23, 25, 27 State v. Mahoney, 444 N.J. Super. 253 (2016)  ..........................................................  42  State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991) ..................................................................  21 State v. Marzolf, 79 N.J. 167 (1979) ..................................................................  40  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) ..................................................................  13 State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1 (1974) ..................................................................  12 State v. Morente-Dubon, 474 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2022) ............................................. 35 State v. Morgan, 217 N.J. 1 (2013) .................................................................. 29, 30 CASES
[brief] In addition, I would also advise the Board that another test for the use variance would be to put testimony on the record as to why the governing body omitted this use from the ordinance.  There's obviously limitations placed in this district as to what the coverage should be and what the building sizes should be and what the building uses should be.  It's an expansion of a non-conforming use.  We've heard conflicting testimony, and I'm not gonna take any side on it, the conflicting testimony, but rather, given that it's a use variance, those elements of the testimony should be on the record before this Board even is able to make an informed decision as to the merits intent and purpose of the zone plan.  All of those things are required.  If any one of them cannot be met, this Board really cannot, the applicant has not met the proofs, for this Board to grant the variance.  And as far as I could hear, none of those has been offered to this Board.  So I would simply, simply make a statement standing here, it is my opinion that the Board should require that testimony before the Board takes a vote on the next step, makes that decision on this application.
[brief] The Petitioner first became enrolled in PERS on January 1, 1993.  (T10-18)  The Petitioner is employed by [...] and other municipalities, including [...], as a municipal prosecutor.  (Pa31)  She has been the municipal prosecutor of [...] continuously from 2003 to the present except for one year in 2008.  (T9-20)  She was originally enrolled in the pension system in [...] when she began working there in 2003 until [...] removed her from the pension system as a result of the Board’s direction in 2008.  (T10-15)  While engaged in the private practice of law, Petitioner always believed she was an employee in [...] and the pension was a fringe benefit of her job since compensation was less as a municipal prosecutor in [...] than that as an attorney in her private practice.  (T11-3)  Petitioner’s duties and role as an employed municipal prosecutor are the same in [...] Township as in [...] where she remains enrolled in the PERS pension system.  (T11-27)  Petitioner also confirmed that her duties in [...] from 2003 to 2008, when she was enrolled in the pension system, and from 2015 to the present, which is at issue in this case, are exactly the same.  (T12-1)  The Petitioner also confirmed that she was not subject to a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) process during the period of 2015 to the present.  (T12-6)  On or about June 23, 2015, [...], the Certifying Pension Officer for [...], and [...], the Supervisor of the Pension Certifying Officer, issued a Report of Transfer form for the Petitioner seeking an intra-fund transfer of her PERS service from [...] to [...].
[brief] This is a complex consolidated employment matter involving numerous claims, factual allegations, and parties spanning several years.  (Da1-7).  It has been pending since 2017.  Ibid.  [...]—the third counsel representing Defendants-Respondents—has served as counsel since February 2019.  Ibid.  [...] has litigated [...] I from written discovery through the summary judgment stage and was preparing for trial prior to the filing of [...] II.  *Ibid.*  The parties are in the midst of discovery in [...] II.  *Ibid.*  The discovery end date is December 26, 2024.  Given the complexity of this consolidated matter, it would be unduly prejudicial to the Defendants-Respondents to disqualify [...] when (1) no concurrent conflict of interest exists and (2) Defendants-Respondents have not requested that [...] withdraw as their counsel.  Requiring Defendants-Respondents to find new counsel—against their wishes—at this stage of the proceedings would substantially delay a decision on the merits, as it would take a significant amount of time to secure new counsel and for them to become up to speed on both matters ([...] I and [...] II).  Motions to disqualify counsel must be “viewed skeptically” in light of their “potential abuse to secure tactical advantage. ”  *Escobar*, 460 N.J. Super. at 526.  [...]’s motion is nothing more than a litigation tactic designed to (1) delay an examination of the merits of her claims and (2) allow her counsel to complete discovery and dispositive motions in [...] II and trial in the consolidated matter against an adversary that is not well versed in the case as [...].  This would be highly prejudicial to the Defendants-Respondents and cannot be permitted.  *Montclair Hosp., LLC v. Glen Ridge Borough*, Nos. 8630-19, 2022-20, 4324-21, and 3702-22 (Tax July 26, 2023) (slip op. at 10).  (Da156-66).  Finally, the [...] and [...] representatives to whom [...] has regularly reported for the past five years have attorneys at the State with whom they can confer and are fully cognizant of the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity.  There is no surprise or misunderstanding on the part of the Defendants-Respondents.  Defendants-Respondents have not requested that [...] withdraw as their counsel.  (Pa169-81; Da7).  Defendants-Respondents are entitled to the counsel of their choosing and they have selected [...].  For all of the reasons set forth herein (1) there is no concurrent conflict of interest prohibiting [...] from continuing to represent the Defendants-Respondents and (2) it would be unduly prejudicial to Defendants-Respondents to disqualify [...] at this stage of the proceedings when no such conflict exists.  As such, the appeal should be denied.