[brief] At each step in what was purportedly supposed to be an ordinary traffic stop, [...] violated either some policy, statute or constitutional right.  First, [...] failed to turn on his body-worn camera ("BWC") until he was already speaking with the driver, [...], in violation of the BWC statute, which requires that officers activate their cameras upon initiating a stop.  Moreover, the audio did not turn on until thirty seconds after [...] turned the video on, at which point the initial encounter had concluded and [...] had returned to his car.  Because the BWC statute creates a rebuttable inference that missing footage would be exculpatory, and the presumption was never rebutted, this Court should apply that presumption.  After initially speaking with [...] and as soon as his audio was finally activated, [...] deactivated the audio on his BWC to speak to another officer, undoubtedly about how they could expand the scope of the motor vehicle stop and search the car.  Upon devising a plan, [...] prolonged the search, asking [...] questions about the size of his pupils and an out-of-state warrant, and requested consent to search.  [...] effectively conceded, however, that he did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention or to request consent to search.  While [...] initially testified that he thought [...] might have been driving under the influence due to his nervous behavior and small pupils, he ultimately admitted that he did not have objective reason to believe that those factors are indicative of intoxication and that he did not even ask [...] whether he was under the influence or direct him to perform the standardized field sobriety tests.  In addition, pupil size is affected by a number of medical conditions, including diabetes, and [...] told the officer that his pupils were small for that reason.  And while [...] indicated in his police report that he was also suspicious of [...] due to an out-of-state warrant, he admitted that the warrant was not extraditable and therefore that he could not detain him based on that warrant.  Instead of reasonable suspicion, what [...] had was a hunch.  When [...] refused to consent, [...] made clear that if [...] would not grant him consent to search, or confess to having drugs in the car, he would continue to detain him to obtain dogs to sniff the car for drugs.  Because he did not have reasonable suspicion to ask for consent to search, or to prolong the detention, and did so anyway, [...] violated [...]’ rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.  In addition, by threatening [...] that the detention would be prolonged if he did not waive either his right against self-incrimination or against unreasonable searches and seizures, without an adequate basis to engage in this threatened course of conduct, [...] rendered [...]’ confession involuntary and created a custodial environment in which [...] was required to advise [...] of his rights under *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  Finally, even after obtaining an admission that drugs were in the car, [...] continued to question [...] without advising him of his rights, again violating his rights.  For these reasons and others expressed below, this Court should suppress both the physical evidence and the statements.