ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Department’s attempt to change the law by way of a Bulletin and without any substantive and procedural due process is a blatant example of agency abuse and overreach.  It is no surprise that the Department chose to forego formal rulemaking or a hearing—had the Department complied with the APA, the faulty rationale for applying the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 would never have seen the light of day.  However, because the Bulletin is a rule under the APA and the Department failed to proceed with rulemaking, a hearing, or with any other appropriate process under the APA, the Bulletin should be set aside as invalid and the Department should be directed to comply with the APA.
[brief] Accordingly, the State cites to the trial court’s opinion for the first subsection of facts and to the Motion to Suppress hearing transcripts for the second subsection of facts.  At around 10:00 a.m., witnesses went to knock on the door to the basement with no response.  Ibid.  At 11:30 a.m., witnesses went into the basement apartment and discovered the body of [...].  Ibid.  Law enforcement discovered soiled clothing belonging to defendant as well as identification documents.  Ibid.  Defendant fled from the area before officers arrived.  Ibid.  Defendant remained at large for years and fled the country.  Ibid.  On November 4, 2022, defendant was extradited to the United States.  Ibid.  Facts Relating To Defendant’s Statement:
[brief] (28T:82-15 to 85-4, 87-25 to 96-5, 97-21 to 100-23).  Defendant asked [...] for his advice on whether New Jersey had self-defense as an option for an affirmative defense, and [...] told him that it was.  Ibid.  Defendant then informed [...] that he was “stuck” with self-defense as that was what he had originally told the police, and asked [...] how best to “make it appear as though” it was self-defense.  Ibid.  Defendant called [...] a freeloader and lowlife.  Ibid.  Defendant also told [...] that he had been the one to have the gun, not [...].
[brief] Plaintiff Failed To Show That [...]’s Legitimate, Non-Retalatory Reason For The Employment Actions Were Pretext For Retaliation.  Plaintiff presents no evidence to demonstrate that the legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for Defendant’s business actions were a pretext for retaliation.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to [...] on Plaintiff’s CEPA claim should be affirmed.  POINT IV IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
[brief] The district with the next highest amount of advance state aid loans is [...] with an outstanding balance of $2.9 million.  See [...], \textit{[...] Schools seek $104 million state loan to help balance 2024-2-25 budget}, Asbury Park Press (Mar. 26, 2024).  \textsuperscript{11}  In a related fiscal context, the [...]’s need to expend more than half of its total budget on transportation and special education costs for non-public school students, led this court, in its March 6 decision, to use similar terminology—that it constituted an “abnormal and unsustainable imbalance. ”  475 N.J.Super. at 62-63. obligation to assure students sufficient resources for T&E,\textsuperscript{12} as well as proof positive that SFRA is not working adequately for [...], let alone at its “optimal level. ”  Unfortunately, that has not been the case.  For the almost ten-year history of this litigation, and even well over a year after this court definitively ruled that [...] students were being denied T&E primarily for fiscal reasons, the State has persisted in arguing, against all reason, that SFRA and the State are not responsible.
[brief] This injustice is a direct result of trial counsel’s critical mistakes, prosecutorial misconduct and the PCR judge’s procedural and substantive errors.  The conviction rested on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, who had at most a two-second glance at the fast-moving shooter’s face.  Two said the shooter had a tattooed face, and one said he was 5’8.  [...] is 6’1 with no facial tattoos.  Yet each witness claimed to know [...] and identified him when shown a single mugshot.  The State’s case hinged on a common misconception that non-stranger identifications could not be wrong.  Despite the availability of experts to explain that these identifications are just as susceptible to factors known to contribute to misidentification, counsel failed to consult or retain one.  [...] had an alibi: he was at [...] 30 minutes away in [...].
[brief] On April 21, 2022, the [...] ([...]) and the [...] ([...]) filed an Unfair Practice Charge against the Board before the [...], based specifically on Respondent’s January 10, 2022 Facebook post telling teachers to drop out of the [...] and the [...].  (Ca133-140).  This post is the subject of Count 1 of the Complaint in this matter.  (Ca136 at ¶7; Ca240-241Ca260-261, Ca382).  26.
[brief] In *Evers*, the Court explained that the defendant's status as a first-time offender, 'family man,' 'breadwinner,' and esteemed member of the community, however commendable and worthy of consideration in deciding the length of his term of incarceration, is not so extraordinary as to alter the conclusion that his imprisonment would not constitute a serious injustice overriding the need for deterrence.  [Id. at 400.]  In his brief, defendant argues that he fully complied with his pre-trial conditions and posits that the trial court erred when it did not credit him with mitigating factor (10).  However, defendant fails to explain what the “truly extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances” were that justified the conclusion that the statutory presumption of incarceration should not apply to him.  Moreover, defendant was already in the Recovery Court Program when he committed the instant offenses outlined in the Indictment.  Because defendant pleaded guilty to an offense which carried with it a presumption of incarceration, and because he failed to demonstrate the exacting standard justifying a sentence other than imprisonment, the sentencing court properly rejected the application of mitigating factor (10) to his sentence.
[brief] The motion judge inter alia claims that: i.  Appellants filed no reply (Pa850), although the record is clear that a reply was submitted (Pa812-Pa846)-Pa825) and referred to specifically by Counsel for Appellants during oral arguments (T26-15 to T26-24); ii. Appellants failed to cite to the record that the Counsel for Applicants and Counsel for the [...] argued that the [...] must deferred to the [...] (Pa852) despite Appellants lifting the exact colloquy from the transcript (P580-Pa581) and pasting it into Appellants Pre-Trial Memorandum (Pa92); and iii. Appellants gave no factual basis or legal argument around the “important and novel constitutional question” related to the lack of due process if the process as articulated by Counsel for the [...] was in fact the manner by which the [...] operates (Pa852), despite Appellants arguing within their brief at Page 10 as follows:
[brief] “Our ultimate goal is not, and should not be, swift disposition of cases at the expense of fairness and justice.  Rather, our ultimate goal is the fair resolution of controversies and disputes. ”  Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76, 83 (App. Div. 2001).  “Shortcuts should not be utilized at the expense of justice. ”  Ibid.  In this context, by bypassing the required procedural steps and notice periods, the trial court has compromised [...] and [...]’s right to due process, resulting in an unfair and unjust resolution of the dispute.
[brief] The Plaintiff indicates in their de novo brief that [...] retreated to his house because he took her threats seriously and was fearful but did not call the police [AP 3].  He informs the court that he shrugs off the behavior deeming it as, “maybe she’s having a bad day” and then indicates “because I don’t know who she is” [T21-1 to 3].  In the Plaintiff’s discovery documents, [...] initially places blame on [...] saying it was them identifying her [T32-12 to 22] then he says he gave the Police Department, the Defendant’s license plate number and vehicle information [T32-1 to -4] however the discovery documents provided by the Plaintiff, did not disclose this information.  The Defendant’s driver’s license number {not her license plates} was provided.  Nowhere in his testimony does he place [...] at the scenes of the alleged periodic crimes involving him and/or the Defendant.  The Plaintiff informs in their de novo brief, [...] confirms police officers were not seen at or around their conjoining residencies on one of the alleged crime dates [AP 5].  The Plaintiff also informs the trial court [...] did not know the Defendant before November 2, 2021 [T52-16 to -19].  Since [...] could not recollect on pertinent identification specifics, he further shifts blame to [...]’s ex-wife (and Defendant’s mother) to then [...]’s significant other [...]; this time with a sense of memory placing [...] at the scene, on November 9, 2021, when giving testimony on her behalf.  He goes on by expressing his identification quest, resulted in success of certainty it was the Defendant at each incident, when he says [...] approaches him.  [...] indicates the Defendant was mowing the lawn in the middle of the night, around 10:00 p.m. to 10:15 p.m., loud music was played, screaming match filled with racist, vulgar, profanity filled language\(^4\).  However, as the Plaintiff cross examines [...] he indicates that he was at home on November 2 and November 7, 2021; there’s no mention of lawn mowing activity, heated argument between [...] and the Defendant, loud music with profanity expressing the word Nigger repeatedly, screaming, profanity exchange, the police present or called, and that Defendant was not at the residence.  The Plaintiff or [...] doesn’t mention any of [...]’ alleged events/activities of the Defendant [T49-2 to -25, T50-1 to -18]\(^5\).
[brief] The court failed to draw the inference that Defendant [...] might have leveraged the charge pay issue to derail the investigation into her conduct, especially since the investigation into her behavior was effectively halted once Plaintiff and the others were terminated.  As such, a jury could reasonably conclude that the charge pay investigation was a pretext to retaliate against Plaintiff for her complaints.  The court further inferred that Defendant [...] would not have supported the termination of Plaintiff, [...], and [...] because she would have been upset about losing staff during a critical time.
[brief] The March 24, (Da114) and April 3, (Da124) orders required that [...]’s P.D.D. registration number be “tattooed upon the dog in a prominent location. ”  N.J.S.A.4:19-24(a)(1)[emphasis added.]  See also Dal, affirming the tattoo order.  The April 3, 2023 order stayed the tattoo and instead required that [...]’s microchip include the Township as an additional contact.  This was reiterated in the September 21, 2023 stay.  As stated in her OTSC, Defendant could find no veterinarian who would tattoo [...].  Da147.
[directive] Background  This reissued Directive, which supersedes Directive #08-95, provides guidelines for the Dependents of Persons Detained as Part of the Judicial Process (Guidelines).  The Guidelines, approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:12-13, were developed to assist Superior and Municipal Court judges in determining or confirming, through appropriate inquiry, that persons being detained or incarcerated are able to meet their primary responsibility for ensuring the alternate care needs of their dependents.  The guidelines include requirements to record instances where the Guidelines are used.  The Guidelines as originally issued were the product of the efforts of the Attorney General's Office, the Governor's Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect (including its Protection Subcommittee), members of the bench, and Judiciary staff.  Reporting Requirements
[brief] ”  *Dobco, Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Improvement Auth.*, 468 N.J. Super. 519, 538 (App. Div. 2021), aff’d, 250 N.J. 396 (2022) (quoting *Nat'l Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Middlesex Cnty. Improvement Auth.*, 150 N.J. 209, 220 (1997)).  “The LPCL was created to ensure a fair, public, and competitive bidding process for the taxpayer's benefit. ”  *Ernest Bock*, 477 N.J. Super. at 264.  “The purpose is to secure competition and to guard against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance and corruption. ”  *Hillside Twp. v. Sternin*, 25 N.J. 317, 322 (1957).  “Deviations from material specifications risk transgressing the duty to avoid favoritism, corruption, and the like. ”  *Barrick v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Prop. Mgmt. & Const.*, 218 N.J. 247, 259 (2014).  “Requiring adherence to material specifications maintains a level playing field for all bidders competing for a public contract. ”  Id.; see also, *Meadowbrook*, 138 N.J. at 313 (“The statutes authorizing competitive bidding accomplish that purpose by promoting competition on an equal footing[.]”); *Dugan Const. Co. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth.*, 398 N.J. Super. 229, 241 (App. Div. 2008) (“An essential element of the bidding process is a common standard of competition.
[brief] The Court must evaluate the evidence of the charges for which joinder is proposed against the four-part test set forth in *State v. Cofield*, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992):  1.  The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2.  It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3.  The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4.  The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  Just like a trial court’s decision whether to join or sever multiple offenses based on prejudice to the defendant, “[d]eterminations on the admissibility of other-crime evidence are left to the discretion of the trial court. ”  *State v. Marrero*, 148 N.J. 469, 483 (1997).
[brief] (Pa234).  As he explained in his report:  Based upon the above background and analysis, as well as my education and experience as a professional engineer, [...] failed to properly inspect the store entrance walkway area, thus permitting a hazardous bent support foot of a barricade to protrude above the surface and into the walkway intended for use by customers.  The failures and inactions of [...] to inspect, discover, and abate this hazard was in violation of its own policies and procedures and caused [...] to fall and become injured.
[brief] Nonetheless, a court may reverse where the unchallenged error was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10–2.  *7  In this case, recognizing that misidentification can compromise an otherwise fair trial, the trial court ordered an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine whether, and to what extent, [...]'s observations of defendants in custody impacted her in-court identification of [...].
[brief] We are compelled to note that plaintiffs urge the Court to consider the plight of injured victims of policyholders whose policies were cancelled for nonpayment of premiums.  Pb22-23.  That is, of course, what uninsured motorist coverage is for.  But instead, plaintiffs suggest a “hybrid scenario” (Pb23) where the policyholder’s first-party claims (for instance, property damage) are not covered, but where the cancellation would be deemed ineffective as to injured third parties.  Plaintiffs admit “There is nothing in the case law…to suggest a dichotomy” (Pb23).  Indeed, a cancellation is equally effective for both first- and third-party claims.  standards for effectively cancelling an auto insurance policy as suggested by plaintiffs here is a matter that can only be addressed by our Legislature.  This is to say nothing of the burden the trial courts would face if a trial on the issue of whether a policyholder actually received a cancellation notice is required in every instance where a carrier seeks to cancel a policy, and the impracticality and difficulty for carriers to make such a showing.  Plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of requiring proof of receipt must be rejected.
[brief] ”  (5T 136-7 to 8)  She also testified that she does not know whether defendant, the codefendant, or [...] were at her home that day.  (137-17 to 24)  [...] testified that he was with the codefendant at a Quick Fair store at Madison and Magnolia on January 22, after which they went to the codefendant’s home.  (6T 108-17 to 114-22)  Police officer [...] testified that on January 22 at 9:45 p.m., he stopped a Malibu driven by the codefendant at a checkpoint in East Orange for a seatbelt violation, and that there were two passengers in the car: [...] and [...].
[brief] Such a factual determination and conclusion cannot be made by us on the basis of the present inadequate record before us. ”  Id. at 10.  It also directed the trial court to consider various disputed facts including the alteration of an affidavit of non-redemption, the conduct of plaintiff’s counsel in possibly lulling defendant’s delay, and the right to redeem.  Id. at 10-11.  New Shrewsbury simply has no bearing here other than a discussion of what the three-month period entails.  It made clear that the time limit is for filing a motion, not an extension of the right to redeem unless that motion is granted.  Hence, the trial court’s reliance on New Shrewsbury to deny reconsideration was legally mistaken.  Again the statement that [...]’s purchase was “arguably within the three-month period for [...] to redeem,” 1T477, was mistaken because N.J.S. 54:5-104.67, does not create a right to redeem nor even a time period in which to redeem.  Instead, it provides a deadline after which a motion to vacate a judgment cannot (or at least should not) be granted.  Once the judgment is entered, the right to redeem no longer exists, N.J.S. 54:5-87 and N.J.S. 54:5-104.64, meaning that there is no “three-month period for [...] to redeem. ”  While it is no doubt true that a defendant can seek relief from a final judgment within three-months, only an order vacating judgment revives a right to redeem.  This 90-day period is also wholly illusory given longstanding precedent where our courts have repeatedly held that the statute means nothing when weighed against the judiciary’s right to decide cases.  Bergen Eastern v. Koss, 178 N.J.Super. 42, 45 (App.Div. 1981), M&D Associates v. Mandara, 366 N.J.Super. 341, 351 (App.Div. 2004) ("[i]n foreclosure actions, where there is a conflict between a statute regarding practice and procedure, the court rules are generally paramount"), cert. denied 180 N.J. 151 (2004); BV001 REO Blocker, supra, 467 N.J.Super. 117; New Shrewsbury, supra, 74 N.J.Super. at 8-9, Phillipsburg, supra, 380 N.J.Super. 159; But see Navillus Group v. Accutherm Inc., 422 N.J.Super.. 169, 178-179 (App.Div. 2011).
[brief] Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the decision of the Board denying the Respondents’ Application applied the relevant legal standard to the facts adduced at the hearing and was entitled to deference and affirmation by the Trial Court.  The actions of the Trial Court reversing the Board’s denial of the Respondents’ application, as well as the extraordinary decision to appoint the SHO were clearly in contravention of both statutory law and caselaw; and must be overturned by this Court.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Defendants”) is not about the environmental propriety of dune walkovers, although valid concerns about dune integrity and the ability of the dunes to protect against the ravages of ocean storms is an important reason why Defendants care deeply about this case.  This appeal is about private property rights and whether there was sufficient evidence in the summary judgment motion record to require the trial court to grant partial summary judgment to plaintiffs/respondents/cross-appellants [...] (“[...]” or “Plaintiffs”) on their claim for an implied easement appurtenant across [...]’s private property.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s erroneous decision to grant summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their claim for an implied easement appurtenant that would allow Plaintiffs to cross [...]’s private property and the protective sand dunes constructed thereon.  The motion record, when viewed (as it must be) in the light most favorable to Defendants, failed to establish Plaintiffs’ entitlement to an implied easement appurtenant by the requisite clear and convincing evidence.  Indeed, the record had substantial evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that no such easement was intended at the time of the initial conveyance of the subject property.  The trial court therefore should not have granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, but instead should have denied Plaintiffs’ motion and required Plaintiffs to attempt to prove their claim for an implied easement appurtenant to the factfinder at trial.  Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ appeal focuses on their interpretation of that portion of the evidence in the record that they believe supports their claim, but their focus is misplaced; that is not the standard here.  This Court is not being asked to review a decision by a factfinder following a trial, in which the inquiry would be whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the factfinder’s decision.  Rather, because the trial court decision at issue here was on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the correct inquiry is whether there was evidence in the motion record on which a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the non-moving parties (i.e., Defendants).  Accordingly, because there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding by the trier of fact that Plaintiffs could not establish an implied easement appurtenant by the required clear and convincing evidence, the trial court should have denied Plaintiffs’ motion.  Therefore, the order granting Plaintiffs an implied easement appurtenant must be reversed, and the issue sent back for a trial.
[brief] The operative terms of the PTA that preclude the result reached in the Award.**  The PTA is clear and unambiguous and neither party argued otherwise.  Therefore, the Arbitrator was not interpreting an ambiguous contract, he was applying the terms of an unambiguous contract and did so incorrectly.  Under New Jersey law, nothing outside of the “four corners” of the PTA should be used to glean the parties’ intent.  *Namerow v. PediatriCare Assocs., LLC*, 461 N.J. Super. 133, 140 (Ch. Div. 2018) (“When presented with an unambiguous contract, the court should not look outside the ‘four corners’ of the contract to determine the parties' intent, and parol evidence should not be used to alter the plain meaning of the contract. ”).
[directive] ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(b)(ii).  Rule 3:25-4(f) provides additional guidance.  It directs the court to schedule the trial to commence as soon as reasonably practicable taking into consideration the nature and extent of differences between the superseded and superseding indictments, including the degree to which the superseding indictment is based on information that was available at the time of the original indictment or that could have been obtained through reasonably diligent efforts at the time of the original indictment.
[brief] In applying this factor, [...], adopting the State’s argument, [...], who, at 37, had no criminal record whatever, “was responsible for placing a large amount of [marijuana] into the stream of commerce” and that the quantity of CDS was “far more than necessary” to constitute the crime of which he was convicted (13T28-11 to 17).  She did not explain why the possession with the intent to distribute (not distribution itself) of 175 pounds of marijuana, which for criminal liability purposes the Legislature deemed exactly the same as the distribution of 25 pounds was a criminal so “so heinous, cruel, or depraved” as to support application of this aggravating factor.  The sentencing court also improperly applied aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C44-1(a)(3) (the risk of committing another offense), and (a)(9)(personal deterrence.), especially in light of her application of mitigating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9) (character and attitude make it unlikely [...] will commit another offense)\(^{18}\)