ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In that case, the court reversed judgment entered in favor of an insurer based upon an amended notice provision in a liability policy that reduced the period permitted for reporting claims.  The trial judge, like the judge here, declined to credit the insured's testimony denying notice of the policy changes.  Id. at 52.  This court reversed, holding that the insurer's conceded failure to provide notice of the policy change rendered the insured's understanding immaterial:  "[W]hether or not [the insured] received the renewal policy, whether or not he read it, and even whether or not he had read the first policy and was aware of the duration of its limited reporting period, are all beside the legal point presented."
[brief] Page  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (12/8/23)  ..........Pa36  Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (12/8/23)  .....Pa37 | Appendix Document | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Complaint (12/19/22) | Pa1 | | Answer (5/9/23) | Pa5 | | Demand for Arbitration (10/26/21) | Pa12 | | Amendment to the Demand for Arbitration (2/21/22) | Pa15 | | Deposition Transcript (partial) of [...] (9/23/20) | Pa16 | | Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment (10/19/23) | Pa18 | | Defendant’s Statement of Facts (10/19/23) | Pa20 | | Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts (10/23/23) | Pa24 | | Plaintiff’s Notice of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (10/23/23) | Pa26 | | Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (10/23/23) | Pa29 | | Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (10/27/23) | Pa33 | | Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (12/8/23) | Pa36 | | Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (12/8/23) | Pa37 | | Plaintiff’s Request for Modification/Clarification (5/17/22) | Pa38 | | Statement of Items Submitted for Summary Judgment | Pa40 | | Appendix Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Health Insurance Lien (10/13/21) | Pca1 | | Defendant’s Arbitration Summary (2/17/22) | Pca5 | | Explanation of Benefits for Defendant’s Arbitration Summary | Pca7 | | Defendant’s PIP Payment Ledger (11/12/21) | Pca80 | | Reports of [...] (9/23/19 – 1/11/21)| Pca85 | | Records of [...] (5/20/20) | Pca108 | | Report of [...] (4/15/21) | Pca109 | | Operative Report (7/30/20) | Pca126 | | Arbitration Award (5/16/22) | Pca128 | | Modification/Clarification Denied Order (8/4/22) | Pca147 | | Arbitration Appellate Award (11/9/22) | Pca151 | | Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Submission (3/15/22) | Pca160 | FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On October 26, 2021, Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (“Plaintiff”) filed a Demand for Arbitration (i.e., a complaint) within an administrative forum known as Forthright seeking personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits from his automobile insurance carrier, Defendant/Respondent [...] (“Defendant”), for a lien consisting of medical expenses improperly paid by Plaintiff’s health insurer due to Defendant’s prior erroneous denial of reimbursement for the same.
[brief] a.  **The Plaintiffs**  The ten Plaintiffs are all retired Atlantic City police officers.  (28a ¶91, 23a ¶54, 27a ¶83, 19a ¶21, 26a ¶77, 22a ¶46, 21a ¶31, 21a ¶38, 25a ¶62 & 25a ¶67).  The Plaintiffs had long and distinguished careers with the [...] ("[...]") where many of them received commendations and promotions.  (19a-29a ¶15-94).  As Atlantic City Police officers, Plaintiffs also made sacrifices that are distinct from what is often required of other public and private --- 1 Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts and Procedural History are combined for the Court's convenience because they are intertwined. sector employees.  For instance, Plaintiff [...] almost made the ultimate sacrifice on September 2, 2016 when he was shot in the head in the line of duty.  (19a ¶16).  During the incident which resulted in his gunshot wound, Plaintiff Vadell saved three juveniles who were being robbed at gunpoint near the parking garage at [...].  (19a ¶17).  Just 16 days later, Plaintiff Vadell became the father to his third daughter.  (19a ¶18).  Thereafter, Plaintiff Vadell endured months of intense rehabilitation and multiple surgeries to repair the damage to his brain and skull.  (19a ¶19).  As another example, Plaintiff [...] was shot at, stabbed, and had numerous broken bones through his career.  (23a ¶53).  While not every Plaintiff has suffered these degrees of sacrifice, every Plaintiff retired in good standing with Atlantic City.  b.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ maintain that the “challenge to the Original Policy was not moot, because … the trial court had to enjoin the Original Policy … to restore the pre-litigation status quo” (Pb39-40) based on their erroneous speculation that the Original Policy “would have automatically gone into effect” had the “trial court only enjoined the Revised Policy. ”  (Pb40)  Plaintiffs’ ignore that policies require formal Board action.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1; Bylaw 0131 (Da225).  Plaintiffs also ignore that the Board repealed the Original Policy.  Plaintiffs’ reliance on cases applying the voluntary cessation doctrine is misplaced.  In W. Va. v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022), the EPA did not rescind the challenged regulation but only represented that it had no intention of enforcing it.  Id. at 720.  In contrast, the Original Policy was specifically repealed.  See Schultz v. Kott, 131 N.J. Super. 216, 219 (App. Div. 1974) (since federal program of aid to the disabled and New Jersey “homemaker” regulations enacted pursuant thereto were no longer in existence, request by plaintiff to have court enjoin enforcement of regulations was moot).  In Delanoy v. Twp. Ocean, 245 N.J. 384 (2021), a pregnancy discrimination case, the replaced policy was actually applied to the plaintiff causing her damages.  In contrast, the Original Policy was never applied.  Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2020) affirmed denial of injunctive relief as moot as there was no “real threat of enforcement” of the challenged statute.  County of Butler v. Governor of Pa., 8 F.4th 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2021) remanded for a dismissal as moot where the challenged executive orders were no longer in effect.  Plaintiffs’ reliance on Nini v. Mercer Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 105, n. 4 (2010) for language acknowledging an exception to mootness for important matters of public interest is unavailing as the Court will be addressing this matter via the Revised Policy.  In contrast, Nini involved a settlement which would have mooted any consideration of the issue raised therein.  Similarly, State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 2016) is inapposite because the court addressed a moot issue in order “to prevent a collateral attack on defendant’s conviction grounded on any claims impugning defense counsel’s performance, and to afford defendant the benefit of all … promises made to him when he entered his guilty plea” where he “entered into a negotiated plea, reserving the right to appeal a pre-trial motion relating only to a dismissed count of the indictment. ”  Id. at 581, 588, 589.  Plaintiffs have not demonstrated “that relief is needed” against the Original Policy and “that there exists some cognizable danger of” its recurrence that is “something more than mere possibility....”  U.S. v. Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (affirming denial of injunctive relief as moot where the defendant ceased conduct violative of the Clayton Act).  Plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin the Original Policy -- which was repealed -- is unquestionably moot and not supported by any legal precedent.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (T34:22-35:2).  Further, he was aware that these forms could be modified, if needed, by the supervisor but he never asked for the incident report to be update.  (T10:16-17; T13:1-10; T22:5-19).  [...], [...]’s treating physician, completed the Medical Examination by a Personal or Treating Physician Form, and in it reported that [...] advised him that he injured his shoulder while restraining a patient at work.
[brief] POINT I  THE ORDINANCE GOVERNS THE PROCESS FOR AWARDING A LICENSE TO CANNABIS APPLICANTS  Pursuant to the Ordinance, the Borough has the authority to regulate the sale of cannabis within the Borough “in accordance with the provisions of [CREAMMA].” (120a).  The Ordinance further provides that, “there shall be a standing Cannabis Subcommittee, which shall review all completed submissions for any Cannabis license and submit a recommendation to the entire governing body regarding the grant or denial of a license. ”  (121a).  In other words, the Ordinance requires the Subcommittee to review submissions and submit a recommendation to the Council.  Appellants do not claim, nor does the evidence suggest, that the Subcommittee failed to review the submissions for cannabis licenses and submit a recommendation to the Council.  (Appellant’s Br. 6-8; 65a-66a; 74a).  Instead, [...] erroneously claims that the Borough’s adoption of the Resolution was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the Subcommittee members failed to (1) fill out the Evaluation Sheet for each applicant, and (2) solely consider the criteria listed on the Evaluation Sheet.  Neither claim, even if true, provides a basis for the Court to vacate the Resolution and remand to the Borough to consider the applications pursuant to [...]’s preferred process.
[brief] Neither argument is relevant to whether the district court abused its discretion, and each is meritless.  i.  Plaintiff’s action is based on Defendants’ exercise of their free speech, press, and assembly rights under the New Jersey and U.S. Constitution.  Plaintiff asserts that UPEPA does not apply to this action because he asserts causes of action for invasion of privacy and false light.  Opp. at 5–6.  But even if that were relevant to whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion—it is not—how Plaintiff denominated his claims is not the test for whether UPEPA governs this action.  Rather, as relevant here, UPEPA “applies to a cause of action asserted in a civil action against a person based on the person’s . . . (3) exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assembly or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United State[s] Constitution or the New Jersey Constitution, on a matter of public concern. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-50(b)(3); see also Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002) (noting, with regard to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, that “[t]he . . . statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. ”).  1  And by its express terms, UPEPA excludes only a narrow class of cases based on the following causes of action, none of which is asserted by Plaintiff.  Excluded causes of action are those: “(1) against a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting or purporting to act in an official capacity; (2) by a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting in an official capacity to enforce a law to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety; or (3) against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling Plaintiff’s Complaint is plainly “based on”
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court first definitively held that attorneys may be liable for legal malpractice claims brought by non-clients [Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472,479 (1995)].  (Note: The defendants ARE NOT submitting new evidence.  We are simply challenging the evidence in the court record from February of 2015 to April of 2015, based on certifications by the Plaintiff’s Process Server, Attorney and his Legal Assistant, that led the court to grant a Final Judgment by Default 5/4/2015.)
[brief] 24  MODEL JURY CHARGES  Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(1)(a)  Liability of Abutting Owner or Occupant ....................  12  Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(1)(b) ............................  12  Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(2)(a)  Liability of Owner (Occupant) Who Undertakes to Clear Sidewalk  ...........................................  12, 13  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The parties are not consumers but experienced members of the bar, and in Plaintiff’s case the scrivener of the provision; they understood what they were agreeing to and what they were waiving; no form contract is involved.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently concluded that the weight of authority suggests New Jersey would not extend *Atalese* to commercial contracts which “resulted ‘from a lengthy negotiation process’ and where no party was an ‘average member[ ] of the public.
[brief] The arresting officer testified that when he first approached [...], [...] ran away, though he was later apprehended and taken into custody.  (7T 155-25 to 156-2, 156-17 to 157-2)  The officer testified that he recognized [...] because of his blue eyes.  (7T 159-17 to 22)  Following [...]’s arrest, he gave a recorded statement to police in which he said that on September 29, he was in the area of the shooting.  (9T 19-8 to 22)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING A WADE\(^6\) HEARING AND IN ALLOWING THE WITNESS TO PROVIDE A CONFIDENCE STATEMENT AT TRIAL.
[directive] Consistent with Attorney General Directive 2016-5 that established the Community Law Enforcement Affirmative Relations Continuing Education Institute (“the CLEAR Institute”), it is reaffirmed in this guideline that core law enforcement values of professionalism, fairness, compassion, and impartiality that are first taught to recruits at police academies, must be reinforced throughout an officer’s career.  Because of the effect that bias incidents and bias crimes have on protected groups and classes, individual victims, and the community, it is equally important that pre-service training recruits and sworn law enforcement officers receive training in detecting and reporting bias incidents and investigating/prosecuting bias crimes.  Currently, training for pre-service police recruits is strictly regulated through prescribed curricula approved by the Police Training Commission (PTC) for state (excluding the NJSP), county, and local law enforcement agencies.  The NJSP pre- service curricula is regulated by the Superintendent of the NJSP and the Attorney General Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards (OLEPS).  Continuing education courses for all law enforcement officers is regulated by the Office of the Attorney General, Division of Criminal Justice through the CLEAR Institute by Attorney General Directive 2016-5.  Page 15 of 16  Since the creation of the Attorney General’s Bias Incident Investigation Standards in 1988, pre-service law enforcement curricula has required mandatory training on the detection, investigation, and reporting of bias incidents and crimes.  Therefore, it is directed that the Office of the Attorney General, Division of Criminal Justice, in consultation with the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, each County Associations of Chiefs of Police, the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, the New Jersey Bias Crimes Officers Association, faith-based leaders, and community stakeholders either update or create a continuing education course through the CLEAR Institute on detecting and reporting bias incidents and investigating and prosecuting bias crimes consistent with this new guideline.  It is further directed that the Office of the Attorney General, Division of Criminal Justice in consultation with the PTC, OLEPS, and the Superintendent of the NJSP update pre-existing bias incident/crimes curricula consistent with this revised guideline and the continuing education course created through the CLEAR Institute.  This guideline shall take effect immediately.
[brief] It is undisputed that all of the information necessary to calculate reimbursement pursuant to the fee schedule (i.e., the provider information, the individual dates of service, the individual CPT codes, the individual fee schedule amounts, the individual billed amounts, the amounts paid by the health insurer, etc....) was presented as evidence to the arbitrator to support the figures found in Defendant’s arbitration summary and, in --- 6  A PIP carrier is required to provide reimbursement pursuant to the fee schedule without regard to collateral sources.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.  any event, Plaintiff adopted Defendant’s arbitration summary as his own.  Defendant’s arbitration summary (as shown in the arbitration award) demonstrates, *inter alia*, the fee schedule amounts owed for the treatment at issue (as well as the prior health payments) and, thus, calculating reimbursement pursuant to the fee schedule was simply of matter of referencing Defendant’s own chart (or the body of the award).
[directive] GUIDELINES FOR EXTREME RISK PROTECTIVE ORDERS  Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders by Promulgated Directive #19-19 Guideline Definitions  1.  "Ammunition" means ammunition or cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or propellant powder designed for use any firearm, but does not include any shotgun in shot or pellet not designed for use as the single, complete projectile load for one shotgun hull or casing or any unloaded, non-metallic shotgun hull or casing not having a primer. of  "Deadly weapon" shall have the same meaning as subsection N.J.S.A. in c. 2C:11-1.  "Family or Household Member'' means a spouse, domestic partner, partner a in civil union couple, or former spouse, former domestic partner, or former partner a civil in union couple, or any other person who is a present household member or was at any time a household member; a person with whom the respondent has a child common, in or with whom the respondent anticipates having a child common if one of the parties in is pregnant; or a current or former dating partner.  "Firearm" shall have the same meaning as N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1.  in "Law Enforcement Officer" means a person whose public duties include the power to act as officer for the detection apprehension, arrest, and conviction of an offenders against the laws of this State.  Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders by Directive# 19-19 (August 12, 2019)  Promulgated  Page 1  "Law Enforcement Agency" means a department, division, bureau, commission, of of or or board other authority the State any political subdivision thereof which employs law enforcement officers.  or or "Petitioner'' means a family household member law enforcement officer who seeks order.  an "Recent" means within six months prior to the date the petition was filed.  "Respondent" means a person against whom an order is sought.  Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders
[brief] The standard is higher than merely a preponderance of the evidence, the standard a Plaintiff must meet requires that the result shall not be reached by a mere balancing of doubts or probabilities, but rather by clear evidence which causes the finder of fact to be convinced that the allegations sought to be proved are true.  Under LAD, punitive damages are reserved for punishment and deterrence of “especially egregious” behavior.  A claim for punitive damages requires “actual participation in or willful indifference to the wrongful conduct on the part of upper management” and “proof that the offending conduct [is] ‘especially egregious. ’”  Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit, 161 N.J. 107, 113 (1999).  Therefore, punitive damages “are only to be awarded in exceptional cases even where the [NJLAD] has been violated.
[brief] (20T154-24 to 155-6).  The judge also explained the concept of reasonable doubt and instructed that whether defendant had been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt should be based on all the evidence presented.  (20T155-19 to 156-11; 20T158-19 to 23).  And the jury was aware that, regardless whether the evidence was direct or circumstantial, or a combination, it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt to convict.  (20T161-4 to 13; 20T162-10 to 15).
[brief] Here, this Court should consider the due process argument since it concerns the central issue of the submission of the Supplemental Certification, which was raised and extensively briefed before the trial court.  Respondents acknowledge this in their opposition papers.  (Rb27).  Respondents could have addressed the substance of the due process argument but instead, cite a string of unrelated cases from decades ago and conclude that this crucial argument should be precluded.  (Rb26 - 27).  Even assuming, arguendo, that the court deems that the “issue” was not raised below, the court should consider the argument in the interests of justice and at the risk of substantial prejudice to Appellants who were unable to address the contents of the Supplemental Certification in violation of their due process rights.
[brief] Plaintiff appealed the granting of summary judgment.  Appellant claimed in its appeal that it did not need an affidavit of merit as it was only suing [...] and [...].  (Pa2317)  The Appellate Court noted that “plaintiffs who assert malpractice actions cannot avoid the requirements of the affidavit of merit statute by suing on a theory of vicarious liability (Pa2317) (citing McCormick v. State, 446 N.J. Super. 603, 614 (App. Div. 2016)  In remanding the matter however, the Appellate Court instructed: “if on remand there is a determination that [...] was acting under the direction and supervision of licensed engineering professional and that the function he was performing was part of the practice of engineering, plaintiffs cannot contend that the affidavit of merit statute does not apply because they are only suing [...] and [...].
[brief] [Da166].  On May 23, 2023 and in lieu of filing an Answer, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. \(^4\) [Da167].  \(^3\)  “2T” refers to the Transcript of Oral Argument on the Order to Show Cause, March 23, 2023.  \(^4\)  Initially, Defendants’ motion was brought as a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under R. 4:6-2(a).  Thereafter, Defendants agreed to withdraw, without prejudice, the portion of the motion seeking dismissal to instead seek an order compelling  On October 11, 2023, the Trial Court heard oral argument and denied Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the existence of the arbitration clause and whether it was binding on Plaintiff was questionable and nothing was before the Court to establish that Plaintiff had agreed to it.  [3T39:23-40:18].  On October 17, 2023, the Trial Court entered an Order consistent with its ruling.
[brief] 3T119:19-122:21  This is evidenced by the following:  Q  Okay.  I have two questions and then I'm done.  THE COURT: All right.  [...], you keep saying I -- you have -- first you say you have – MS. JENNINGS: I -- I still -- THE COURT: -- I only have five questions.  You're well beyond five questions.  Then you said you had -- only had two more questions, you're well beyond those two questions.  So, just complete your questions, okay?  Following [...]’s testimony, Third Party Defendant [...] moved to dismiss Defendants’ Complaint against it.
[brief] \textsuperscript{14}  2.  \textit{N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12)}\textsuperscript{15}  Presumably, \textit{N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12)} (“other sufficient causes”), is the catchall administrative code that encompasses all of the violations not otherwise specifically delineated by other codes.