ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty as Trustee by failing to make required dispositions in accordance with the terms and purposes of the Trust and thereafter misappropriating Trust funds.  (489a)  Defendants requested oral argument if their motion was opposed.  On May 10, 2023, the trial court denied Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint, allowing Plaintiff to oppose without oral argument.  (60a)  Furthermore, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion to schedule a plenary hearing without oral argument.  (60a)  There was no explanation as to why oral argument was denied.  Additionally, the trial court denied Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Second Supplemental Complaint, allowing Plaintiff to oppose without oral argument.
[brief] Consecutive terms can “drastically alter the aggregate sentence,” and may only be imposed in a “uniform[], predictab[le], and proportiona[te]” manner.  State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 251-52 (2021).  The test in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), “promote[s] consistency. ” Torres, 246 N.J. at 264, 271 (whether the offenses were “predominantly independent,” involved “separate acts” of violence, were so close in time and place as to be “a single period of aberrant behavior,” involved multiple victims, and were numerous).  In addition, the court must “place on the record its statement of reasons for the decision to impose consecutive sentences,” with a focus on the “fairness of the overall sentence. ”  Id. at 267.  The “explanation of the fairness of the overall sentence is a necessary feature in any Yarbough analysis. ”  Id. at 270.  “[I]mposition of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses must not only be procedurally correct, it must also be free from any scent of pervading unfairness ….  [W]e require an explicit explanation for the overall fairness of a sentence, in the interest of promoting proportionality. ”  Id. at 270-71.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER STATE V. LAURICK, 120 N.J. 1 (1990)  BECAUSE HE WAS UNCOUNSELED WHEN HE ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA TO DWI ON MAY 15, 2017  IN THE MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL COURT.  (DA10, DA11).  In State v. Crisafi, 247 N.J. Super 486 (App. Div. 1991), the Appellate Division set forth the foundations for what constitutes a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel:
[brief] POINT II  THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY GRANTED THE [...]’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENIED DALAL’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY.  [...]’s subpoenas to [...] improperly sought records identical to those unsuccessfully sought by way of OPRA request.  [...]’s request was not only duplicative, but it was improper in a summary proceeding, where discovery is generally unavailable.  [...]’s common law right of access claim is subject to a summary proceeding in which discovery is not permitted absent a showing of legitimate need.
[brief] ”  Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 350 N.J. Super. 276, 293 (App. Div. 2001).  In other words, a plaintiff is required to establish “evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive. ”  Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App. Div. 1995).  Circumstantial evidence may include “[t]he temporal proximity of employee conduct protected by CEPA and an adverse employment action,” Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221, 225 (2006), but “[t]emporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation,” Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 361 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] ”  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014) (citing State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984)).  While mitigating factors must also be supported by competent, credible evidence, “where mitigating factors are amply based in the record before the sentencing judge, they must be found. ”  State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005) (emphasis added).  Any factors found by the Court must be “qualitatively assessed and assigned appropriate weight in a case-specific balancing process. ”  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 72-73 (2014) (citing State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 363 (1987)).  Rule 3:21-4(h) “require[s] that the Sentencing Court explain the reasoning behind its findings,” to facilitate “meaningful appellate review”—i.e. for the reviewing court to determine whether the sentencing court’s findings “‘were based upon competent credible evidence in the record. ’”  State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 609 (2010) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65).  The reviewing court must assess not only whether the sentencing court’s finding of the aggravating factor was based on competent, credible evidence, but also whether the weight given to the factor was based on competent, credible evidence.  Case, 220 N.J. at 66-67 (finding that “the weight given by the trial court to aggravating factor three . . . was based not on credible evidence in the record but apparently on [an] unfounded assumption”).
[brief] The Trial Court even seems to be indicating that a provision relating to the MFSA in the original PSA that are "reaffirmed and incorporated by reference" in the May 4th, 2023 amendment somehow modify a prior offer.  Da395.  However, the only prior offer was the one that the Plaintiff [...] admits to receiving on January 17, 2023.  Certainly, a reaffirmation from a prior contract is not a material change yet, it is this upon which the Trial Court seems to base Its conclusion that the offer did not "ripen" until May 8, 2023.  This analysis is simply not based on the facts of the case.
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, this defendant respectfully requests this Court enter an order affirming the order of the trial court in granting summary judgment to [...] as a matter of law.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: October 4, 2023  THE ESTATE OF [...] AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX AD PROSEQUENDUM ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...]; HGB REALTY 2, LLC; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and/or JOHN DOES 1-15 and/or JANE DOES 1-15 (fictitious individuals); and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-15 (fictitious business entities); Defendants.
[brief] (Pa165 ¶ 14,16,17,20,22,24-26,33-35,39-41, Conclusions of Law 29-31, 39)  The Court also found that “None of those charges [contained in the CHR], other than the 1987 mail fraud conviction, resulted in a criminal conviction. ” (Tr.I:35-40; Ex. 1).  (Pa 165 id 3 ¶4)  All three of these publications of the CHR cited crimes which allegedly occurred in 1973 and 1975.
[brief] [...] queries, if six of the eleven units “ended up” being protected tenants whether it would be in the same position with those units, thus implying that because such an outcome would be absurd with regard to six units, that it must also be so for one unit.  However, [...] misses a central function of the interaction between the TPA and rent control in allowing local governments to guide real estate development within their borders.  If [...] had six tenants file for protected tenant status, it may not have converted the building.  It was profitable to convert the building with [...] in it, so [...] did.  Along these same lines, [...] argues that [...]’s point concerning whether this Unit’s value was lower relative to the value of other units when the apartment building was purchased is “improper. ”  However, it is a fact that [...] was in place, the TPA was in place, and the local rent control law were all in place at the time that [...] purchased the building and when [...] converted it to condominiums.  The fact that some units had tenants in place that could trigger the Tenant Protection Act and that some did not implies that not all units were equal in value even at the time of purchase.  The ones with the potential protected tenants may have been worth less.  III.
[brief] | Authority | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. | 31 | | Bishop Property Management v. City of Jersey City Rent Leveling Board | 50 | | Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer County | 58 | | Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford | 58 | | Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati | 43,44 | | Cromwell Associates v. Mayor and Council of the City of Newark | 30 | | Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee | 28,29 | | Heyert v. Taddese | 57 | | Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange | 29 | | In re Boardwalk Regency Casino Corp. | 31 | | Mayes v. Jackson Township Rent Leveling Board | 29,30,42,46,47,49 | | Medical Center at Princeton v. Tp. Of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment | 32 | Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co. 62 N.J. 229 (1973)  .................................................................52  Orange Taxpayers Council v. Orange 83 N.J. 246 (1980)  ...........................................................................57  Property Owners Association of North Bergen v. North Bergen Tp., 74 N.J. 327 (1977).  ..................................................................................29,30  In Rosato v. City of Jersey City Rent Leveling Board [...] ..............................................................................................................45  Saltzman vs. West New York App. Div. [...] ..................................................................................46  Silverman v. Rent Leveling Bd. of Cliffside Park 277 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 1994) ...............................................................57  State v. Robinson 200 N.J. 1 (2009) .........................................................................................52  Ten Stary Dom P’ship v. Mauro 216 N.J. 16 (2013).
[brief] 13 POINT I  THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING [...]’S CONCLUSION THAT THE MANNER OF DEATH WAS “HOMICIDE” WHERE THAT CONCLUSION WAS NOT BASED ON HIS MEDICAL EXPERTISE BUT DEPENDED ENTIRELY ON EVIDENCE DIRECTLY WITHIN THE JURY’S KEN.  (15T:102-19 to 128-2; Da 6-7)  ..............................................  13 POINT II  THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING UNRELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE TIMING OF THE SKELETAL INJURIES WHERE THE COURT DID NOT FIND – AND THE STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING – THAT SUCH TESTIMONY WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE UNDER FRYE.  (10T:34-16 to 42-6; Da 5)  .................................................................................  26 POINT III  THE COURT VIOLATED [...]’S JURY TRIAL RIGHTS BY DISQUALIFYING [...]  BASED ON A 21-YEAR-OLD CONVICTION FOR A “CDS CHARGE” WITHOUT DETERMINING IF THAT CONVICTION ACTUALLY DISQUALIFIED HIM FROM SERVING OR IF IT HAD BEEN EXPUNGED.  (29T:21-1 TO 27-6)  .......................  36  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................................
[brief] [...]’s Arbitration with the Owner of the Hackensack Project  Almost at the exact same time [...] and [...] were participating in the PTA Arbitration, [...] was involved in a separate arbitration with the owner of the Hackensack Project, [...] (“[...]”).  Pa907-922.  The arbitration between [...] and [...] dealt with issues directly impacting the amount [...] owed [...] for [...]’s work as a subcontractor on the Hackensack Project.  Id.  That final judgment in favor of [...] and against [...] for $435,087.70 was entered on November 17, 2023.  Da9-Da10.  Notably, the evidentiary hearing for the PTA Arbitration between [...] and [...] took place in June and August 2023, months before the [...]’s Award in its arbitration with [...] was confirmed.  Pa568.  D.
[brief] Skinner, 218 N.J. at 516.  It is important to reiterate that this standard is “more exacting than Rule 403, which provides that relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. ”  State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 161 (2011)(emphasis in original).  With respect to evidence of other crimes and prior bad acts, “the potential for undue prejudice need only outweigh probative value to warrant exclusion. ”  Reddish, 181 N.J. at 608.  As an initial matter, it is clear that the trial court applied the incorrect standard when issuing a ruling on this factor.  The trial court stated in its decision that the relevant “question is whether or not [the probative value of the evidence] is so outweighed…that essentially there’s virtually no probative value to it[.]” (2T50:1-4).  Our Courts have made abundantly clear that this factor is not akin to the Rule 403(b) analysis which requires the probative value to be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.  The scales merely need to tip in favor of the evidence being more prejudicial than probative in order to be barred under Rule 404(b).  Based on the fact that the trial court applied the incorrect standard, and failed to provide any substantive explanation for its ruling on this factor, this decision is not entitled to any deference.  It should have been abundantly clear that the prejudicial value of admitting this evidence outweighed any probative value it may have.  The evidence in question is an improbable, uncorroborated, uninvestigated allegation made by [...]’s ex-girlfriend.  The probative value is extremely low, particularly given that it does not demonstrate consciousness of guilt specific to the only disputed issue in this case, as discussed at length above.  By contrast, the potential for prejudice is incredibly high.  The relevant question is whether evidence regarding the alleged witness tampering would be admitted if the counts of the indictment were tried separately, meaning that the focus must be on the unduly prejudicial nature of the allegations, not whether the evidence itself satisfies a criminal offense.
[brief] Similarly, as to specific deterrence, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that “[t]here is no credible evidence of a specific deterrent effect of the experience of incarceration. ”  Id. at 156.  The specific-deterrence effect of incarceration, if any, “rapidly diminish” as sentences become lengthy, [...], Building Criminal Capital vs Specific Deterrence: The Effect of Incarceration Length on Recidivism 21 (Working Paper Dec. 2011).  The 45-year sentence is longer than necessary to further incapacitation or deterrence.  In sum, because the trial court failed to adequately account for [...]’s age upon release if she received a lesser sentence, and the effect of her age and lengthy sentence on the need to deter, the sentence must be vacated, and the matter remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.
[directive] The CSVA shall:  ensure that the victim is informed of all resources, including those from sexual violence services, the importance of seeking medical attention, and the value of timely evidence collection and early reporting to law enforcement;  provide the victim a safe, neutral, and confidential avenue to explore and weigh options;  support the victim’s choices and decisions; and  maintain the confidentiality of all communications occurring solely between the advocate and the victim, unless otherwise instructed by the victim’s prior written consent.  (See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.15).  -6-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] Courts that have considered such claims have consistently rejected them.  See Moran v. Wis. Dep’t of Just., 932 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Wis. App. 2019) (Full Faith and Credit Clause “does not require the State of Wisconsin to defer to Virginia law with respect to the circumstances under which a felon residing in this state may possess firearms within this state’s borders”); Commonwealth v. Harris, 119 N.E.3d 1158, 1166 (Mass. 2019) (“Ultimately, this matter concerns different jurisdictions making differing determinations about firearm licensing and regulation.  The Commonwealth is not required to substitute its statutes for those of New Hampshire. ” (citation omitted)); People v. Shear, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not preclude California from … prohibiting convicted felons within its borders from possessing firearms merely because defendant could lawfully possess firearms in Arizona.
[brief] (Pa249-266).  Plaintiff’s expert reiterates that tree experienced decay as a result of roots being shaved during the installation of the new sidewalk.  Plaintiff has presented that defendant [...] has ownership over subject tree and had a duty to maintain subject tree.  As well as evidence of the sidewalk construction that led directly to subject tree being a dangerous condition, decaying and falling.  Plaintiff argues that whether the defendant [...] had notice or not is not the only issue at hand, but rather the defendant caused and created the condition.  The lower court has continued to review this case in the light of subsection b of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, but plaintiff argues that defendant created the dangerous condition.  Defendant [...] is not immune from liability under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act if they caused and created the dangerous condition of the shaved tree root.
[brief] In other words, while the doctor’s testimony supports why youthful offenders are different and why there are Miller factors in the first place, she said very little in terms of why those factors are entitled to great weight in this case, as defendant argues.  For example, regarding Miller factor number one, which [...] described as “it’s youth,” (3T31-12), [...] mostly testified generally about how brains develop over time, particularly in young people, (3T31-9 to 43-22).  And while she did testify that she “believe[d] he was 17[,]” [...] admitted that she was “giving generalizations” based on her experience in the field, generalizations which formed the basis of the rest of her testimony about this factor.
[directive] No surety shall be required unless the court fixing bail specifically so orders.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12 below for crimes/offenses which prohibit a 10% cash bail.  14  This Rule provides that the State may request either orally or in writing, at any time prior to the commencement of trial, a hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-13.  The State shall provide notice to the defendant’s counsel, or to the defendant if he or she is unrepresented at the time the request is made.  The court shall grant the State’s request for a hearing if the defendant is charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) of N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12.
[directive] E. Publishing.  The data collected pursuant to Section III.A shall be published in the respective annual reports of each municipal and State law enforcement agency, and for county law enforcement agencies, in the annual report of the County Prosecutor with jurisdiction over that agency.  1.  Each law enforcement agency shall update the description of its Program on the agency’s official Internet website accordingly, at least after each annual reporting.  2.  The Attorney General will gather the information provided under Section III and assemble it into an annual report to be issued to the Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the General Assembly, and to be posted on the official Internet website of the Department of Law and Public Safety by April 30 of each year.  The Attorney General’s annual report will distinguish between jurisdictions governed by Civil Service rules and those that are not.
[brief] [(2T 5:4-14). ]  The court noted defendant’s prior convictions, and that defendant is a “serial larcenist at best and sometimes he uses violence or force for those robberies, sometimes he doesn’t. ” (2T 5:22-24).  The court continued, “[b]ut the bottom line is under the circumstances and based upon his prior record and the fact that certain persons is a separate and distinct crime apart from possession of a weapon, I ran it consecutive. ” (2T 5:24-6:3).
[directive] Instead, these protocols are designed to route communications to the proper officials so they can be adequately reviewed and considered, free from either the reality or appearance of improper influence.  Page 3  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution; the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, et seq., which provides for general responsibility of the Department’s operations and the supervision of the organization of the Department; and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97, et seq., which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all Department personnel operating under the authorities of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT [...]  [...] (NJ Attorney ID 026122011) [...] [...] (NJ Attorney ID 309612022) [...] [...] Tel. & Fax: [...] Attorneys for [...], Plaintiff-Appellant  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  ii  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................  iv  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ......................................................... v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................
[brief] The decision of the Appellate Division dated August 25, 2021 (Da25-40) is contradictory to itself.  The Defendants would like to point out to the Court that in the decision the Appellate Division found that Plaintiff suffered $449,798.59 in damages as a direct and proximate result of defendants’ negligence, because plaintiff incurred $449,798.59 in attorney’s fees and costs to remedy the errors in the PSA and original judgment of divorce resulting from defendants’ negligence.
[brief] In accord with “customary principles of contract law[,]” see Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014), “[a]n arbitration provision is not enforceable unless the consumer has reasonable notice of its existence. ”  Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration and Cleaning, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 483, 498 (citing Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., 419 N.J. Super. 596, 609 (App. Div. 2011)).  Under the requisite “fact-intensive inquiry[,]” the post-transaction notice provided by [...] was unreasonable and ineffective.