ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Allstars Auto. Grp., 234 N.J. at 157 (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)); see In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370, 383 (2013); Mazza, 143 N.J. at 25.]
[brief] [...]:  I don't think the expert needs to opine on that.  I think his testimony at a minimum creates an issue of fact and I think it's in the ken of an average person to believe painting a staircase can cause an issue.  THE COURT: 30 days before? Says who?  [...]: It doesn't have to be wet.  THE COURT:  I mean but where are we getting this from, that that can cause someone to fall?  Where does that come from?  [...]: The knowledge of an average person.  Painting a home -- THE COURT: I guess I'm not average.  [...]: -- that you're going to step on it, that you're going to step on it.  My expert, plaintiff's expert also opines on the fact that the staircase isn't constructed properly, in any event, and the handrails aren't the proper distance to have braced his fall.
[brief] 1) the defendant must make a substantial showing that a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth was included by the officer in the warrant affidavit, and 2) the defendant must demonstrate that the allegedly false statements are necessary to the finding of probable cause.  *Franks*, 438 U.S. at 155; *Howery*, 80 N.J. at 563 (the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the standard enunciated in *Franks v. Delaware*); see also *State v. Sheridan*, 217 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 1987); *State v. Goldberg*, 214 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 1986); *Siligato v. State*, 268 N.J. Super. 21 (App. Div. 1993); *State v. Bilancio*, 318 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1999).  A strict standard was adopted by the United States Supreme Court because: [t]he Supreme Court in *Franks*, which established the right to this type of hearing, was concerned that frivolous challenges could lead to unnecessary pretrial delays.  Consequently, it adopted the substantial preliminary showing requirement and stressed the need for a 'sensible threshold' before a hearing would be required.  [United States v. Figueroa, 750 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing *Franks*, 438 U.S. at 169).]  Furthermore, if a defendant can meet the standards detailed above, the defendant then must show that removal of the falsity would cripple the affidavit’s statement of probable cause.  *Franks*, 438 U.S. at 171-72.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  At the time the matter in dispute arose, [...] was a Commissioner of the [...] ("Authority") having been appointed to a five (5)-year term from February 1, 2018 until January 31, 2023.  (Da 210).  While a Commissioner, [...] was a member of a Facebook group chat that consisted of at least 86 members of the Carlstadt and Bergen County communities (Da 187-193).  Members in the Facebook group chat included the current Mayor of Carlstadt, the official Facebook page of the Borough of Carlstadt, former Mayors of Carlstadt, members who live in the town of Carlstadt or in Bergen County, Borough of Carlstadt Council Members, the former Bergen County Executive, and at least one member of the Carlstadt Board of Education.  (Da 33; Da 37; Da 187-193; Da 218).  On February 8, 2020, [...] was logged into the chat room and, at approximately 11:30 a.m., transmitted a vulgar, obscene, misogynistic, pornographic video to all members of the chatroom.  (Da 37; Da 68; Da 183; Da 195 (the video)).  The video depicted a naked man defecating into a naked woman's mouth and onto her face, id., and ended with the words on the screen "Shit happens," "Thug life," "Dug life," and "Bitch."  Id.  [...] posted the video to the chat room with the caption "Don't say nothing.  Just keep it going lmao! [laughing emoticons]."  (Da 38; Da 183).  Later that day, at approximately 6:57 p.m., almost eight (8) hours later, [...] referred to the video he posted and said, "Omg how did so many people get to see this wow."  (Da 38; Da 185).  This video was visible in the chat room for most of the day and could be accessed and/or viewed by the members of the group.
[brief] Count I:  Alleged Fraud, Self-Dealing, Improper Financial Transactions:  Fraud claims are derivative claims if they involve the corporation's assets and operations. \(^{30}\)  Plaintiffs' fraud claims should have been brought on behalf of [...] – not on behalf of the [...], as was improperly done in this lawsuit. \(^{31}\)  [...] was the entity allegedly suffering directly from damages allegedly caused by the alleged wrongs against it, and the alleged fraud involved [...]'s assets and operations\(^{32}\), not those of the Plaintiffs.  None of the Individual Plaintiffs nor the [...] have or have even alleged "special injur(ies)."  Their alleged damages are indirect and relate to the alleged loss in value of the [...]’s shares in [...], which allegedly in turn caused the Individual Plaintiffs’ loss of membership value in the [...].  The only parties that would have standing to bring such a claim would be [...] (directly) or the [...] (bringing a derivative claim on behalf of [...]).
[brief] ”  See PADNA, 413 N.J. Super. at 332 (citation omitted; emphases added); Hous. Auth. of Newark v. Ricciardi, 176 N.J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div. 1980) (same); Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 164 (“When an area is found to be blighted, the adoption of a redevelopment plan is an independent municipal action which is governed by separate provisions of the Local Redevelopment Law.
[brief] Apartments, § 1.  [**571]  The Act also provides that the condominium will be administered and managed by the association.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(b); [*376] 46:8B-12.  The business form of the association is unrestricted.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-12.  The developer initially controls the [***8] association.  When 25% of the units have been sold, the unit owners are entitled to elect at least 25% of the association's governing body.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-12.1(a).  The unit owners' authority is increased to 40% when half of the units have been sold.  When the unit owners own 75%, they are entitled to elect all the members of the governing body.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-12.1(a).  Once that occurs, the developer is required to "relinquish control of the association."  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-12.1(d).  The association is charged with the "maintenance, [***9] repair, replacement, cleaning and sanitation of the common elements."  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14(a).  The common elements are defined as follows: "Common elements" means: (i) the land described in the master deed; (ii) as to any improvement, the foundations, structural and bearing parts, supports, main walls, roofs, basements, halls, corridors, lobbies, stairways, elevators, entrances, exits and other means of access, excluding any specifically reserved or limited to a particular unit or group of units; (iii) yards, gardens, walkways, parking areas and driveways, excluding any specifically reserved or limited to a particular unit or group of units; (iv) portions of the land or any improvement or appurtenance reserved exclusively for the management, operation or maintenance of the common elements or of the condominium property; (v) installations of all central services and utilities; (vi) all apparatus and installations existing or intended for common use; (vii) all other elements of any improvement necessary or convenient to the existence, management, operation, maintenance and safety of the condominium property or normally in common use; and (viii) such other elements [***10] and facilities as are designated in the master deed as common elements.
[brief] (Pa174).  [...] testified that, although Petitioner was totally and permanently disabled from his ability to perform his duties as a police officer, his disability was not the result of the October 17, 2015 accident.  (3T12:24-13:3).  Instead, [...] concluded that Petitioner’s disability was an aggravation of pre-existing cervical conditions caused by prior accidents and aging.  (3T21:2-18; 22:2-14).  Regarding Petitioner’s pre-existing conditions, [...] testified that, during his evaluation of Petitioner, “when I asked of prior injuries there was no mention of the injury in 2002” and “no mention of the injury in 2004 with lifting a box. ” (3T14:6-11).  However, as demonstrated by Petitioner’s medical records, he testified:  Again…in this case [Petitioner] had a pre-existing disc herniation and disc bulging at C5-C6 and C6-C7.  He also had stenosis at C5 - - at C5-C6 and C6-C7.  And that’s - -and - - and it’s - - it’s the pre-existing pathology that was aggravated by this accident that caused him to be disabled.  It wasn’t anything new that happened from this accident that caused him to be disabled.  Stenosis takes a long time to develop.  The pathology was already there at C5-C6, C7.  His surgery was done for problems that pre-dated the accident and wasn’t caused by this accident.  (3T22:2-14).  [...] explained, [t]here’s clearly pre-existing pathology, there was clearly pre-existing treatments” and the “operative surgeons saw a spinal stenosis that goes back eleven years. ” (3T35:20-24).  When pushed to “agree” with Petitioner’s counsel that there was no active treatment for any neck issues between 2006 and 2015, [...] disagreed, pointing to the records of prior trauma from 2009.  (3T36:3-8).  He testified that [...]’s records show that, in the 2009 incident, Petitioner “injured his neck and lower back” and attended physical therapy.  (3T13:15-17).  [...] also testified that, as set forth in his addendum report, Petitioner’s prior MRI reports show a disc herniation at C5-C6 and disc bulge at C6-C7, the same discs that were operated on in Petitioner’s 2015 surgery.  (3T38:15-17).  G.
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE [...] COMPLIED WITH N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f) (Pa857 - Pa859) Appellants moved to supplement the record to secure the proofs to demonstrate that the [...] failed to create a verbatim record as required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f).  There is no dispute between any of the parties that the nearly three hours in which four witnesses testify and were cross-examined on May 23, 2022 was not captured in a verbatim record.  Counsel for the [...] indicated on the record on August 22, 2022 that he was unable to recall who even testified.  This is not a criticism as Counsel for Appellants certainly did not remember after five months later what transpired during those three hours in which he examined and cross examined four witnesses.  It is not credible for any party to state what transpired during those three hours.
[brief] Order Granting Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed December 12, 2023 .........................................................Pa65  Rider to Order Dated December 12, 2023 ........................................Pa66  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...]’s Brief argues that the trial court properly compelled Plaintiff [...] to arbitrate her claims; however, EPPS fails to rebut several of the arguments asserted in Plaintiff’s opening Brief.
[brief] Effective Appellate Review of a trial Court’s decision requires examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the trial Court relied; Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N. J. Super. 528, 534 (App. Div. 2003).  Because we do not know the basis for the trial Court’s dismissal of the Complaint, we cannot effectively review the substantive basis for December 1, 2021.  The same conclusion applies to this matter.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Appellant’s intentional misinterpretation of the +/- 51’ to include the parapet was made clear by the Amended Resolution which memorialized the testimony during the Application Hearing.  In particular, the Amended Resolution recounts how the Appellant specifically asked [...]’s architect, [...], about the building’s height to the top of the parapet.  As documented in the Amended Resolution, [...] expressly stated that “the height is 50 feet to the roof and the parapet is approximately another 45 inches”.  (Pa20).  Appellant’s spurious contention that the +/- 51 feet includes the parapet is therefore disingenuous at best.
[brief] [14T53-12 to 19.]  It is also unlikely that [...] was unaware that defendant planned to stash his firearm at [...]’s house because he immediately drove him there and waited outside while defendant brought the mattress box concealing the firearm inside.  As the Samuels Court found it “unlikely that defendant, or anyone else, would go to a motel room in a community near his home at 11:00 p.m. without a clear understanding of the purpose of the trip,” the State submits that, similarly, it is unlikely that [...] would start driving defendant around at 6 a.m., drop him off, pick him back up a street away, and immediately drive to the home of a woman he did not know “without a clear understanding of the purpose of the trip.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:28-2; Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 511 (2015).  “In general, ‘a stranger to an insurance policy has no right to recover the policy proceeds. ’”  Crystal Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Kinsale Ins. Co., 251 N.J. 437, 448 (2022) (quoting Ross, 222 N.J. at 512); see also Cruz-Mendez v. ISU/Ins. Servs., 156 N.J. 556, 566-67 (1999) (“Generally, plaintiffs in tort actions may not directly sue insurers.
[brief] The Board held public hearings on the application on September 9, 2021, December 9, 2021, January 27, 2022 and March 24, 2022.  (Pa5).  At said hearings Plaintiff presented witnesses and evidence to the Board in support of the application.  On April 28, 2022, the Board adopted a written Resolution denying the Application.  (Pa1-15).  On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs challenging the denial of the Application.  (Pa49-60).  On July 21, 2022, the Board filed an Answer to the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Pa61-68).  A pretrial conference was held before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. on September 15, 2022.  (Pa69).  On September 15, 2022, [...] issued a Pretrial Order scheduling trial for January 23, 2022.  (Pa69-71).  Trial was ultimately held before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. on March 20, 2023.  (1T).  On April 10, 2023, [...] issued an Order remanding the matter back to the Board to articulate its findings and to adopt a resolution consistent with the opinion.  (Pa102).  On June 9, 2023, the Board issued an Amended Resolution of Denial.  (Pa16-44).  A Case Management Conference was held on July 31, 2023.  (Pa103).  Thereafter, [...] issued a Case Management Order permitting the parties to submit updated trial briefs and scheduling trial for October 27, 2023.  (Pa103; 2T).  On October 27, 2023, [...] issued an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa104).  Thereafter, on November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal appealing that Order.  (Pa495-498).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] 13  | Case/Other Authority | Page No. | |---------------------------------------------------------|----------| | N.J.S.A 2A:16-51.  et seq.  Declaratory Judgment | RA-71 | | R. 4:30A.  (Entire Controversy Doctrine) | RA-72 | | Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc., 47 N.J. 92 (1966)| RA-73 | | Thornton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1 (1983) | RA-73 | | Garvey v. Township of Wall, 303 N.J. Super. 93 (App Div 1997) | RA-73 | | Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 33 N.J. 428, 435 (1960) | RA-74 | | Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991) | RA-74 | | Kram v. Kram, 94 N.J. Super. 539, 551 (Ch. Div.), rev=d on other grounds, 98 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 1967), aff=d, 52 N.J. 545 (1968) | RA-74 | | Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398 (1991) | RA-74 | | Brookshire Equities, L.L.C. v. Montaquiza, 346 N.J. Super. 310.  318 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 179 (2002) | RA-74 | | Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451, 461-62 (1989) | RA-74 | Appellate Division  Docket No:[...]  Respondents’ Letter Brief | Party Name | Appellate Designation | Trial Court/Party Role | |--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Plaintiff | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant |
[brief] This finding by the trial court completely contravenes and undermines the Appellants’ bald allegations that [...] wrongfully re-sold the Solar Rights.  [Pb3, Pb33].  As the trial court correctly determined in the summary judgment  Furthermore, as with the other belatedly proposed claims and the previously dismissed claims against the [...], the Appellants’ alleged damages were directly and proximately caused by their failure, in September 2017, to pay the rent due to [...] under the Lease and the resulting termination of the Lease.  None of the alleged actions of any of the other parties caused Appellants not to make that payment.  The conclusions of law based on undisputed facts made by the trial court with regard to the [...]’ motion for summary judgment are applicable and binding and, as a result, this claim is futile, thus, warranting denial of leave to amend.
[brief] 16  I.  THE HOOD LAWSUIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN COVERED UNDER THE CCIP BECAUSE [...] WAS AN ENROLLED INSURED IN THE CCIP AND ITS COVERAGE WAS NEVER CANCELLED (PA2739-PA2752) ..................................................................................  16  A.  [...] WAS ENROLLED IN THE CCIP AT THE TIME OF THE HOOD [...]IDENT ...........................................................................................................  17  B. EVEN ASSUMING AN EARLY JOB-SPECIFIC EXCLUSION FOR “DEMOLITION WORK,” [...] CONTINUED TO BE ENROLLED IN THE CCIP  ...........................................  22  C. [...] AND [...] DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO TERMINATE [...]’S ENROLLMENT IN THE CCIP AND CANCEL ITS LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDER THE CCIP POLICY..................................................  27  II.  EVEN IF [...] WAS NOT ENROLLED IN THE CCIP AT THE TIME OF THE HOOD [...]IDENT, [...] WOULD STILL BE LIABLE TO PROVIDE COVERAGE DUE TO ITS NEGLIGENCE AS [...]’S INSURANCE BROKER (PA2752- PA2754).................................................................................  43  III.  [...] AND [...] (AND [...]) ARE ALSO ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS FOR PURSUING THIS COVERAGE LITIGATION.....  47  IV.  [...] AND [...] (AND [...]) ARE ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THEIR DAMAGES...........  48
[brief] Fourth, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on how to consider [...]’s silence after she was raped.  [...]’s defense depended on her testimony that she killed [...] as he was violently sexually assaulting her.  The State repeatedly argued that [...] was not raped because she did not report it.  More than thirty years ago, our Supreme Court recognized that this kind of argument is based on sexist notions of how a “normal” woman responds to rape and proposed a jury instruction to counter these inappropriate prejudices.  The need for such a jury instruction in [...]’s case was clear, and the court erred in failing to give such an instruction to the jury.  Without this instruction, the jury did not have the necessary legal framework to evaluate [...]’s defense, and so [...]’s convictions should be reversed.
[brief] And he, and he looked at it and he's like, he had to think about it.  Like what is this about?  So then we went to the computer and looked to see -- you know, pulled up [...], [...].  Nothing came up.  Then he thought about the term.  I guess he used [...], Inc. franchise agreement and he put that up in the search and a whole bunch of emails came up and we opened it and that's when I -- we saw the document.
[brief] (Addressing Point VIII of defendant’s brief)  Defendant argues that [...] abused his discretion by sentencing defendant to an allegedly unreasonable monthly payment plan.  (Db31-Db33).  Defendant is wrong.  An appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the lower court, and a sentence imposed by a trial court is not to be upset on appeal unless it represents an abuse of the lower court’s discretion.  State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 516 (1989).  Our Supreme Court has cautioned that “[w]hat we seek by our review is not a difference in judgment, but only a judgment that reasonable people may not reasonably make on the basis of the evidence presented,” and that “[w]hen conscientious trial judges exercise discretion in accordance with the principles set forth in the Code and [relevant case law], they need fear no second-guessing. ”  State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 365 (1984).  Here, the following colloquy took place regarding defendant’s monthly payment plan:  THE COURT: All right.  And the other thing, [...], is if you do need a monthly payment plan, you should let me know.  Sound like you -- you do, but were you – DEFENDANT: Your Honor – THE COURT: -- were you able to afford?  DEFENDANT: I would need as long as possible, perhaps over two -- two years would be – THE COURT: Well, I need to set a monthly amount.  So can you pay $50 a month?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  THE COURT: Okay.  We’ll make it $50 a month.  [(7T34:2-14) (emphasis added). ]  The record below shows that [...] suggested a monthly payment plan as opposed to one lump sum to defendant.  While it is true that defendant advised [...] that his financial circumstances did not permit the purchase of a vehicle in the near future, the record below clearly shows that defendant advised the court that he was able to pay a $50 monthly payment.  Thus, [...] did not abuse his discretion in sentencing defendant.  POINT IV
[brief] i | | Table of Citations ......................................................................  ii | | Preliminary Statement .............................................................  1 | | A. PETITIONER WAS A BONA FIDE EMPLOYEE OF WINSLOW TOWNSHIP UNDER THE IRS 20 FACTOR TEST ......................................................... 2 | | B. THE CASES RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT IN ITS BRIEF SUPPORTS THE PETITIONER’S POSITION ........................................... 13 | | Conclusion .................................................................................... 15 | # TABLE OF CITATIONS | Citation | Page # | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Coronato v. Bd. of Trs. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 15 | | 2023 AGEN LEXIS 939 (Dec. 21, 2023) | | | Gluck v. Bd. of Trs. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 13 | | 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 153 (Ap. 6, 2023) | | | Pascarella v. Bd. of Trs. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 14 | | 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 843 (Nov. 6, 2023) | | | Russo v. Bd. of Trs. of the Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., | 1 | | 206 N.J. 14 (2011) | | | Saccone v. Bd. of Trs. of the Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., | 1 | | 219 N.J. 369 (2014)
[brief] “Taken as a whole, the instructions must correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. ”  State v. Dreher, 302 N.J. Super. 408, 467 (App. Div. 1997).  “Only those instructions that overall lessen the State’s burden of proof violate due process. ”  *Wakefield*, 190 N.J. at 473.  As long as the jury receives the proper definition that does not lessen the State’s burden of proof, one inaccurate statement does not result in plain error.  In *Medina*, three separate statements inaccurately presented the State’s burden; yet when examining the instructions as a whole, the Supreme Court found no error sufficient to warrant a new trial.  147 N.J. at 61.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court found, “[a]lthough some parts of the charge were incorrect, when read in its entirety, the charge does not violate due process” and “[d]espite the regrettable errors, the charge did not so infect the instruction as to lower the State’s burden of proof. ”  *Id.* at 55-56.  Here, like in *Medina*, the jury repeatedly heard the proper definition of the State’s burden and the requirement they prove each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, when read in its entirety, the jury was instructed correctly and does not warrant a new trial.