ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 27, 2023 …………… (Pa6)  Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated February 27, 2023 .  (1T)  Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated March 27, 2023 ….  (2T)  Order on Motion to Bar Expert Opinion of [...], dated March 27, 2023 ………………………………………………………………  (Pa8)  Order on Motion for Reconsideration, dated July 17, 2023 …………………..  (Pa10)  Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated July 7, 2023 ……..  (3T)  Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated July 17, 2023 …….  (4T)  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Atl. City Coin & Slot Service Co., Inc. v. IGT, | 33 | | 14 F. Supp. 2d 644 (D.N.J. 1998) | | | Beilowitz v. Gen. Motors Corp., | 26, 32, 33 | | 233 F. Supp. 2d 631 (D.N.J. 2002) | | | Cooper Distrib. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., | 33 | | 63 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 1995) | | | Cummings v. Bahr, | 37 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Emergency Accessories & Installation, Inc. v. Whelen Eng’g Co., | 23, 24 | | Civil Action No. 09-2652, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46956 | | | Engines, Inc. v. MAN Engines & Components, | 32 | | Civil Action No. 10-277, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76541 (D.N.J. | | | July 29, 2010) | | | In re Faber Assocs., | 24, 35 | | Docket No. 16-cv-2821, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202763 (D.N.J. | | | Dec. 13, 2016) | | | Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, | 37 | | 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | | | Goldsworthy v. Browndorf, | 24 | | 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2277 (App. Div. Aug. 24, 2011) | | | Harter Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc., | 24, 35 | | 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27210 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2003) | | | Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., | 22, 26, 28, 32 | | 614 A.2d 124 (N.J. 1992) | | | Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, | 26, 27 | | 179 F.R.D. 450 (D.N.J. 1998) | | McPeak v. S-L Distrib. Co., Civil Case No.
[directive] Prosecutors to inclined be might also defendant court, the criminal a of jurisdiction the from abscond to A company. surety a to owed debt any on default premium and bond bail monetary a forfeit other in system, judicial criminal of the authority the flaunt to prepared defendant flight-prone debt.  civil a enforce authority to company's bond bail a flaunt likely to as just be may words, bail monetary of imposition warrant to sufficient is flee motivation to defendant's a if  Thus, ensuring in interest sufficient have not might defendant framework, the statutory new under the forfeited.  not is bond company's surety the that a satisfied has defendant a that believe to reason has prosecutor the if Accordingly, money posting or by company, surety a posted by bond of a means condition by bail monetary to court ask the shall prosecutor the loan, of form any or gift by whether another, from obtained the unless 2A:162-13, N.J.S.A. to pursuant inquiry source/sufficiency bail monetary conduct a Criminal of Division the Director of or the Prosecutor, Assistant First or Prosecutor County inquiry an such that determines Division, the by prosecuted cases in Director Deputy a or Justice that ensuring in interest adequate an has defendant the whether determine to needed is not forfeited.
[directive] Law enforcement personnel with expertise in crime scene investigation (CSI), for the purpose of collecting or documenting physical evidence at the scene; c.  Law enforcement personnel with expertise in forensic examinations, including but not limited to the examination of DNA, fiber, fingerprints, firearm, hair, serology, or toxicology evidence, as well as personnel assigned to the state medical examiner’s office or such county medical examiner’s offices as the OPIA Director may designate, for the purpose of conducting forensic analysis or an autopsy; d.  Foreign language translators; e.  Any other personnel who can assist the investigation through their specialized knowledge or skills, provided that the Independent Investigator lacks sufficient specialized expertise; and f.  A designee of any local, county, state, or federal law enforcement agency who can serve as a liaison to the Independent Investigator and facilitate the performance of ministerial functions, such as the obtaining of agency documents and information (including personnel or internal affairs records) and providing contact information for employees, witnesses, and other local residents.  Authorized Dissemination of Investigative Information.
[brief] THE CONDITIONAL PLEA RULE DOES NOT APPLY  Defendant argues the trial court wrongly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the conditional plea rule.  R. 3:9-3(f).  Defendant cites basic contract law in support of this argument.  In short, defendant explicitly states that as a result of the pretrial motion in the 7-eleven case being overturned, he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea on this pharmacy robbery, a wholly separate case.
[brief] ACME LEASE DATED AUGUST 1962 ..........................................  Da126  AGREEMENT BETWEEN PEMBERTON  TOWNSHIP & [...] & [...] DATED MAY 24, 1995 ................Da147  ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN THE MATTER OF [...] vs. [...], INC.  DOCKET NO.[...]  DATED MARCH 15, 1999 ........................................Da165  [...] ORDINANCE FOR ACQUISITION OF [...] DATED DECEMBER 18, 1997 ......................................Da168  [...] LISTING AGREEMENT  [...] RENT ROLL; OFFER TO PURCHASE BY [...]  DATED FEBRUARY 4, 1988........................................Da171  [...]  APPRAISAL OF [...] AND [...] DATED APRIL 14, 1988 ..........................................Da174  CONTRACT OF SALE FOR [...] DATED 1988..........................................................Da178  ASSIGNMENT FROM [...] TO ANTONIA [...] DATED AUGUST 3, 1988 .........................................Da179  [...] CHECK NO.:296  FOR PURCHASE OF [...] DATED MAY 20, 1988 .............................................Da181  SETTLEMENT STATEMENT BETWEEN [...] AND BROWNS MILL  ASSOCIATES BY ASSIGNMENT  100 DOLLAR REALTY DATED 08/05/1988....................Da182  INDEX TO APPENDIX VOLUME II(Da184-Da214)  [...] REPORTABLE SALES FROM SEPTEMBER 1988 – SEPTEMBER 1995 ......................Da184  AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED JUNE 21, 2022 ..............................................Da209  CHART OF ACTUAL RENTS ........................................Da214  INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
[brief] The Chancery judge below reached the correct result in granting summary judgment against Appellants based on the record title to the South Baxter Parcel (Da826–27).  The operative easement was created by the [...] in 1955 when they created that separate lot through the Totten-to-[...] Deed (Da461).  The [...] then repeated the exact same easement reservation in 1966 when they conveyed the South Baxter Parcel to [...]\(^5\) (Da480).  Both recorded instruments filed by the [...] include the following easement by reservation:  Excepting and reserving from the above the rights of the public or owners of property lying westerly and southerly of Totten farm to use a roadway or driftway running thru this tract to reach their properties from the public road mentioned in the description above (Da826; Da462; Da482).  As noted, supra, the parties stipulated on summary judgment that the ‘property lying westerly and southerly of Totten farm’ is the Challenger Lot (Da397 at ¶13).  The above-quoted language is both unambiguous and express in its intentions.  Accordingly, Judge \(^5\)The [...] reacquired the South Baxter Parcel from the [...]s in September 1965 (Da398 at ¶17; Da466).  Goodzeit properly and justly concluded that the 1966 Totten-to-[...] deed created a valid, enforceable, easement in favor of the owners of the Challenger Lot to use the existing roadway traversing the South Baxter Parcel to reach their property.  These determinations should be affirmed in all respects.
[brief] ”  Id. at 1313 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U. S. at 211).  “In a case involving an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient. ”  Ibid.  While of course “sentencing an offender who was under 18 at the time of the crime raises special constitutional considerations[,]” Miller expressly permitted “life-without-parole sentences for defendants who committed homicide when they were under 18, but only so long as the sentence is not mandatory—that is, only so long as the sentencer has discretion to ‘consider the mitigating qualities of youth’ and impose a lesser punishment.
[brief] “To prove inequitable conduct, the challenger must show by clear and convincing evidence that the patent applicant (1) misrepresented or omitted information material to patentability, and (2) did so with specific intent to mislead or deceive the PTO. ”  Network Signatures, Inc., 731 F.3d at 1242 (quoting In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., “Materiality and intent must be separately established. ”  Id.  Materiality is established when “the PTO would not have allowed the claim but for the nondisclosure or misrepresentation. ”  Network Signatures, Inc., 731 F.3d at 1242 (quoting In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  To establish intent, intent to deceive the PTO must be “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence. ”  Id.  Laches and equitable estoppel are cognizable under 35 U.S.C. § 282 as equitable defenses to a claim for patent infringement.
[brief] assertion, this case has little to no relevant connection to New Jersey, and New Jersey does not have a compelling state interest in adjudicating this dispute.  The Special Undertaking was made in Missouri, is governed by Missouri law, and is an agreement to defend and indemnify a Missouri company.  (Da101-102).  None of the parties to this case are incorporated in New Jersey or make New Jersey their principal place of business.  (Pa001 (plaintiff), Pa002 (defendants)).  Plaintiff is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Wisconsin.  (Pa001).  As the trial court correctly found, the only connection plaintiff has to New Jersey is that its predecessor, [...], had a corporate office and a manufacturing plant there decades ago.  (Pa072).  This court made clear in Century Indem. that “no deference need be given to [a party’s] choice of forum that is neither its place of incorporation or principal place of business.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.  When a police or fire union is unable to negotiate a new collective negotiations agreement with their public employer, either party may file a petition with the Public Employment Relations Commission for compulsory interest arbitration.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(b)(2).  Interest arbitration “involves the submission of a dispute concerning the terms of a new contract to an arbitrator, who selects those terms and thus in effect writes the parties’ collective agreement.
[brief] This expenditure was necessary to avoid losing either the Share or, as a result of the partition action, the Property to an organization hostile to [...] and its congregation.  Following a month of [...] and [...] exchanging competitive bids raising the purchase price by ever increasing bids, the Court ordered a closed-bid auction to bring the matter to a conclusion.  As the mosque is the very heart of [...]’s existence, losing the Property would have caused [...] and its congregation irreparable damage.  Thus, [...] was forced to submit a high bid in order to keep the Property.  It could not have done so without the generous donation made by [...].  [...] ultimately succeeded at the auction and purchased [...]’s interest at a price $1,250,050.55 higher than [...] would have had to pay if the TPDs had not violated their fiduciary obligations.
[brief] 5  I.  THE LEGISLATURE VESTED THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ETHICS LAW.  (Da1 – Da4)  .........................................................................................  5  II.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST BECAUSE IT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.  (Da1 – Da4).  ...........................................................................................................................................  8  III.  THE COURT ERRED IN RULING A CONFLICT EXISTED WITHOUT AN APPROPRIATE HEARING (Da1 – Da4)  ..............................................................................................................  10  IV.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN RULING ON ISSUES BEYOND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ETHICS LAW SINCE THEY WERE NEVER PROPERLY PLEADED IN THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT.  (Da1 – Da4).  .................................................................................................  11 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................
[brief] The AICRA provides the following parameters for how PIP claims are resolved:  a.  Any dispute regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage pursuant to section 4 of [L. 1972, c. 70] (C. 39:6A-4), section 4 of [L. 1998, c. 21] (C. 39:6A-3.1) or section 45 of [L. 2003, c. 89] (C. 39:6A-3.3) arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile may be submitted to dispute resolution on the initiative of any party to the dispute, as hereinafter provided.  [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a).]  The language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) clearly states that PIP arbitration is applicable to the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under the PIP coverage found in automobile insurance policies.  PIP dispute resolution only applies to disputes over payment of medical expense benefits with an insured, an injured person, or a medical provider who has an assignment of benefits.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4; N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1.  Here, [...]’s complaint seeks compensatory damages and other remedies allowed under the IFPA and RICO.  (Pa77; Pa81-82; Pa86; Pa105; Pa108-109; Pa112; Pa118-120).  The payment of medical expenses is not at issue.
[brief] It should first be noted that --- although this was to review and determine the “consistency” of the 1988 Master Plan with the Redevelopment Plan --- there were only two Exhibits/documents in evidence and considered by the Planning Board: Ordinance 1667 (B1) adopting the Redevelopment Plan and the Redevelopment Plan (B2).  The 1988 Master Plan itself was not even presented in evidence, or reviewed by the Planning Board.  As referenced in [...]’s Report, the only documents “in the record as evidence” were Ordinance 1667 and the Redevelopment Plan.  The author/formulation of the Redevelopment Plan --- [...] --- then testified briefly as to the purported “consistency” with the 1988 Master Plan (2T 18:1-11) --- essentially referencing and relying upon his own misguided analysis at Section 2.2 of the Redevelopment Plan and the one-size-fits-all “policy statement” in the 1988 Master Plan that states as follows: Guide waterfront development, which protects the public need for shore protection and flood control visual and pedestrian access to the waterfront, recreation and open space, and economic development.  The Borough should encourage appropriate use of waterfront locations and coordinate its efforts with the County Plan to improve waterfront access along the Raritan Bayshore.  [...] then briefly referenced a couple of equally generic policy statements in the 2015 Reexamination Report about a goal of developing the mixed use commercial area while enhancing public access to the waterfront, and asserts this as the evidence of “consistency” of the Redevelopment Plan with the 1988 Master Plan.  The Planning Board --- without even the Master Plan in evidence or actually being looked at --- then concluded the Redevelopment Plan as “consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan”.
[directive] Restrictions on Using BWCs With Enhanced Audio/Visual Capabilities.  Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Policy, if a department acquires a BWC with enhanced audio/video capabilities that allow it to record an image or conversation that could not be seen or heard by the officer wearing the device (e.g., infrared night vision or thermal imaging, sound amplification that would record conversations occurring at a remote distance), that feature/capability shall not be used without the express approval of the BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] **  The Response via its §III, pp. 16-19, argues that the Denial of the appellant’s *Motion for Reconsideration* below was not an error.  Please see the *Notice of Cease and Desist* (Pa317), which the appellant had to serve upon the respondents’ attorney to stop his harassments, threats, and intimidations, intended to (1) dissuade the appellant from pursuing reconsideration and (2) obstruct the appellant’s *Due Process* rights.  Via the *Reconsideration* appellant filed the DOJ’s letter (Pa54) to show that the following material statements certified below by the respondents’ attorney (“[...]”) via his *Motion to Dismiss*, were misrepresentations of material existing facts:
[brief] 6 N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to 117 ..........................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98 ..................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3 ..............................................................  42 U.S.C. §1983 ........................................................................  7 Rules R. 1:36-3 ..................................................................................  7  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The question presented on this appeal is whether the [...] ("[...]") is obligated to defend and indemnify a county prosecutor’s office in a lawsuit filed against said prosecutor’s office when it has acted as the proxy for the [...] and followed the law enforcement procedures established by the [...] even if the underlying lawsuit does not seek damages.
[brief] For years, Defendants fraudulently concealed evidence that would have revealed to Plaintiffs the existence of new claims and caused Plaintiffs to suffer years of damages in pursuit of that evidence.  In addition to Petrillo, there are other cases which support Plaintiffs’ ability to state this claim, and which never confine such a claim to transactional settings only.  Courts have held that a lawyer is not permitted to provide misleading information on which third parties may foreseeably rely.  Id.  See also Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. 581 (App. Div. 1976).  R.J. Longo v. Schragger, 218 N.J. Super. 206 (App Div. 1987).  RPC 4.1.  A member of the bar owes a fiduciary duty to persons though not strictly his clients who he knows or should know rely on him in his professional capacity.  See Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 632–33, 503 A.2d 386, 389 (App. Div. 1986).  Moreover, an attorney has a fiduciary duty to refrain from unethical conduct.  See In re Palmieri, 76 N.J. at 63.  All of Plaintiffs’ allegations of fact fit squarely within this governing case law.  Ultimately, the Trial Court’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ argument that the duty imposed by Petrillo that lawyers are not to provide misleading information to third parties or fraudulently conceal evidence extends to the litigation context, effectively stands for the proposition that lawyers are immune from liability for lying, cheating, forging, and concealing evidence in litigation.
[brief] There the Court discussed the difference between sentencing based on “rehabilitation” and “retribution. ”  In that regard the Court stated:  [P]roponents of sentencing based on rehabilitation advocate[] a presumption in favor of concurrent sentencing to facilitate the reform of the defendant.  The ¹³  Any doubts as to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reliance upon *Williams* in *Schubert* should be assuaged by the Court’s following statement: “Our own research has not disclosed reported authority that is more persuasive than Williams.
[brief] The appellate court "should not, and almost without exception do[es] not, consider matter not in the record below."  Drake v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Youth & Family Services, 186 N.J. Super. 532, 537 (App. Div. 1982).  If, however, evidence not covered in the proceedings below might be material to the issues on appeal, a party may make a motion to supplement the record.  R. 2:5-5.  In this case, Defendants/Appellants are making similar motions couched under different pretexts.  The Court should consider Defendants'/Appellants' prior two motions so that the Court could note their extreme similarities, including requesting the same relief that had earlier been denied to them by this Honorable Court.  Plaintiffs/Respondents wish to have a complete record which would include the briefs considered in Defendants'/Appellants' previously filed motions for leave to appeal, both of which were denied.  Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs/Respondents respectfully ask that this Court grant their motion for leave to supplement the record.
[brief] Defendant testified that he is dissatisfied with the Agreement he signed in 2011 and claims now that if he had known she had retirement savings, he would never have agreed to pay support for the rest of [...]’s life.  (2T  As a reminder, the Agreement does provide for modification after ten years in the event that [...] sold his practice or it was impacted by a change in the healthcare industry.  (A10)  Given the disparity of their financial pictures, the more than twenty-year length of their relationship, the parties’ ages at the time, and the fact that no assets, including retirement accounts, were being divided, no other outcome seems possible.  Additionally, Defendant does not have to pay support to Plaintiff for the rest of her life.
[brief] **A.  Background On Schibell And The Firm. **  Plaintiff [...] is a 1973 graduate of [...].  He was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1973 and has continuously practice law in New Jersey since that time.  [Pa560]  Schibell formed [...], in 1998.  At that time, he had a 99% membership interest.  The other 1% interest was held by Plaintiff [...]  [Pa560]  In 2006, [...] became a 1% member and the firm was reconstituted as [...].  [Pa560]  Kentos died in November 2016.  [Pa560]  In 2016, the Firm reformed as [...].  [Pa560]  **B.  The OAE Proceedings Do Not Involve The Rendering Of Legal Services.**
[directive] a.  아십니까?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하에게  범죄 기록이 생긴다는 것을  You will have a criminal record?  b. 한, 구금되고, [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  유죄 인정 합의서에 다르게 약정되어 있지 않는 귀하는 최장기간 동안 최고 벌금과 최고 금액의 범죄피해자 보상비를 지불하라는 선고를 받게 될 수도 아십니까?  있다는것을  Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment?  c.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하는 귀하가 유죄를 인정하는 각 죄목에 대해 범죄피해자 보상비의  최저액인 $50(폭행죄로 $100)을 유죄확정 되었을 경우에는  최저액 지불해야 하는 것을 알고 있습니까? (만약 범죄가1986  1 9 1991 12 22  년 월 일부터  년 월 일 사이에 $30.  범죄가1986  1 1 $25.)  발생했으면 벌금  년 월 일 전에  발생했으면 벌금  You must pay a minimum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?
[brief] (Pa148).  As Plaintiff prepared to graduate from [...], he researched professional degree opportunities and discovered that the [...]’s was advertising a “dual degree” program in or around early fall 2011.  Plaintiff then inquired with [...] as to the requirements for admission into the dual degree program.  (Pa152-Pa153).  The dual degree program at [...] was appealing and enticing to Plaintiff because what was being offered was not comparable to anything else in the local area.  (Pa153).  Plaintiff, a resident of [...], wanted to remain in the local area when furthering his education, as he did with his college degree, and [...] was the only university in New Jersey to offer a dual degree program.  (Pa153; Pa324).  The [...] School of Pharmacy was a new program, which was not accredited, which advertised to potential students the dual degree program.