ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] HANDLER PROTECTION Goal:  The police patrol dog will demonstrate the ability to protect the handler when necessary.  2.5.1  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to remain in a guard position while the police officer handler searches or questions a "suspect."  2.5.2  When the safety of the police officer handler is threatened, the police patrol dog (without command) will demonstrate the ability to physically apprehend a "suspect" until the "suspect" is taken into custody (and a release command is issued).  2.5.3  When the "suspect" attempts to escape, the police patrol dog (without command) will demonstrate the ability to physically apprehend the "suspect" until the "suspect" is taken into custody (and a release command is issued).  2.5.4  The police Patrol dog will demonstrate the ability to terminate pursuit of a "suspect" attempting to escape prior to physically apprehending the "suspect" when verbally recalled by the officer handler.
[directive] New Procedure of Administration  Jersey Operatin9  State Forfeiture Program  2  Pager not be subject to forfeiture. which in 3-  Property the owner has entrusted a person for repairs, to restoration or other services be performed on the property, and that to person, without the owner's knowledge or consent, uses the property to for unlawful purposes, shall not be subject forfeiture.  A prosecuting agency upon the filing of a forfeiture complaint with the €3. from Superior Court and obtaining approval its funding entity may apply to the Superior Court for an order permitting use of seized property ('Use Order"), pending the disposition of the forfeiture action provided, however, that such property shall be used solely for law enforcement purposes.* to
[brief] ”  Committee for a Rickel Alternative and Linden Merchants Association v. City of Linden, 111 NJ 192, 201 (1988).  A board acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably if its findings of fact in support of a grant or denial of an application are not supported by the record.  Smart SMR of N.Y. Inc. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 327 (1998).  Moreover, as a general rule, the factual determination of a planning board is presumed to be valid.  Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., 117 NJ 376, 385 (1990).  Local public bodies possess “a peculiar knowledge of local conditions,” and “are better suited than is a court to make decisions regarding local zoning issues. ”  Committee for a Rickel Alternative and Linden Merchants Association v. City of Linden, 111 NJ at 201.  Planning Board decisions “must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of their delegated discretion. ”  Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment for Chatham Tp., 202 N.J. Super. 312, 321 (App. Div. 1985).  “A Court will not substitute its judgment for that of a board even when it is doubtful about the wisdom of the action. ”  Cell South of New Jersey, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of West Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002).  A Planning Board is free to either accept or reject the testimony of experts especially where, as here, testimony and evidence was presented to challenge that testimony.  Id. at 87.  The burden of proof that the action of a Planning Board was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable is upon plaintiff.
[brief] \(^2\)  [...], a New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (NJDOL) employee and a transgender female, filed a complaint against [...], a Department of Children and Families (DCF) employee,\(^3\) with DCF’s Office of Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action on or around September 14, 2022.  (Aa19-20).  [...]’s complaint alleged [...] had discriminated against her on the basis of gender identity on September 9, 2022, when [...] repeatedly misnamed [...] by calling her D[] rather than her preferred named despite [...] correcting [...] multiple times.  (Aa20; Aa26-28).  Specifically, [...]  ---  1  “D[ ]” refers to Complainant’s legal first name, while “D[a].B” refers to Complainant’s preferred first name.  2  “Aa” refers to Appellant’s Appendix.  “Ab” refers to Appellant’s Brief.  3  At the time of the events in question, [...] was President of his local [...] ([...]) union and was on “DCF union leave” pursuant to Article 24 of [...]’s contract with the State.
[brief] No school official shall use or attempt to use his official position to secure unwarranted privileges, advantages or employment for himself, members of his immediate family or others;  The fulcrum of the [...]’s and the [...]’s decision in this case is the assumption that a negative prior political relationship in itself, *ipso facto,* constitutes dispositive evidence of a conflict of interest within the Agency’s interpretation of *N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b).*
[brief] (3T:11-12 to 13-1).  The officers chose to investigate the [...] bar/liquor store due to its proximity to East 16th Street and the fact that it not affected by a local ordinance requiring liquor stores to close by midnight.  (Id.).  PPD Detective [...] testified that she located and questioned the individuals inside [...] and that defendant’s name came up in the course of one or more of these conversations.  (2T:41-19 to 43-9).
[brief] 28  THE TRIAL COURT’S SANCTIONS ORDERS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE (A) THEY WERE BASED UPON THE CONSIDERATION OF IRRELEVANT OR INAPPROPRIATE FACTORS; (B) WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY PROPER FINDINGS OF FACT, AND (C) FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE WAS PROOF OF BAD FAITH (P18a-P19a, P35a-P36a, 2T 13:21-19:1, 3T 19:22-25:5)  .........................................................28  A.  The Sanctions Orders Should Be Reversed Because They Were “Based upon Consideration of Irrelevant or Inappropriate Factors and Amount to a Clear Error in Judgment” .................................................................29  B.  The Trial Court Failed to Provide Sufficiently Detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law  ...........................................................................................................33  1.  The Trial Court’s Opinion Fails to Specifically Identify at What Point the Tortious Interference Claim Allegedly Became Frivolous ..................................................................................................................35  2.  The Trial Court Failed to Provide Sufficient Findings of Fact Concerning the Appropriate Amount of the Sanction .......................................................36  C.  The Trial Court Erred by Awarding Sanctions Against Plaintiffs Without a Specific Finding of “Bad Faith” .................................................................38  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................41
[brief] GENERAL RESTRICTIONS  All toilets and plumbing shall be modern and sanitary.  No cesspools are permitted.  Septic tanks shall be used.  All electric wiring shall be approved first by the inspectors of the fire underwriters [property insurance carriers].  No building, alteration, fence or addition shall be made without the written approval of the [...] (Da53)  (emphasis ours)  [...] did not exist in 1947, the year of our Genesis Deed.  [...] was formed on December 31, 1984 as a Limited Partnership by [...] and [...].  (Da391).  [...] was later transformed into a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) owning the Property described in Schedule A, and of the Liability Company on October 5, 1999.  (Da39)  Finally, the only two remaining restrictions are (5) Utilities and (6) Storage.  We dispense with recitation here as those restrictions have no bearing on the case.  B.
[brief] During trial, that conduct was observed by the Court and counsel.  The defense did not object to it and does not now allege any prejudice arising from any standing, stretching or grimacing which occurred during trial.  As Plaintiff has argued repeatedly, his demeanor at trial was challenged as exaggerated and/or feigned.  By its verdict, the jury appears to have rejected that challenge.  The potential that its decision to do so was based in any part upon observations made prior to trial, outside the presence of the Court and counsel, however, cannot be discounted.
[brief] [...]’ Notice of Hearing was Defective Under New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law and Deprived the Board of Jurisdiction to Hear  The 2022 Zoning Application (Pa32) (1T35:6-7,1T35:19-22) | 3 | | II.  The Board’s Grant of the 2022 Zoning Application Is Substantially in Conflict with and Deviates From the [...] Master Plan (Pa33) | 8 | | III.  The Zoning Board’s Resolution was not Property Adopted (Pa40-Pa50) (2T3:8 to 2T7:310) | 10 | | Conclusion | 12 |
[brief] As for factor five—whether granting the application would be consistent with the goals of “Best Practices”—as previously noted, no application to extend discovery was made.  Even if a formal motion had been made, this case was over three years old.  The parties were experiencing difficulties scheduling expert depositions at the time of the August 28, 2021 oral argument, and there was a fast approaching deadline of October 17 to complete the depositions.  To permit plaintiff to replace [...] would have simply delayed the case further and guaranteed that the parties would not meet the October 17 deadline to depose experts.  Furthermore, given the numerous extensions of discovery and the fact that discovery had already proceeded over 1170 days since the filing of the complaint, granting another extension to allow a new expert would render meaningless the “good cause” standard.
[brief] Because our courts have acknowledged a suspect's “‘natural reluctance’ to furnish details implicating [themselves] in a crime,” officers are permitted to engage in certain interrogation tactics to overcome this reluctance.  L.H., 239 N.J. at 43-44 (citation omitted).  Accordingly, interrogating officers are permitted to “[a]ppeal[] to [the suspect's] sense of decency and urg[e the suspect] to tell the truth for [their] own sake.
[brief] (See Pa61a (Count Six); Pa62a (Count Seven)).  Plaintiff alleges that she learned about the investigation after receiving a letter from the investigator, [...].  (Pa46a, ¶132).  Plaintiff alleges that during a Zoom interview that was conducted in connection with [...]’s complaints, the investigator, [...], showed her [...]’s written complaint.  (Pa48a, ¶145).  Plaintiff alleges that [...]’s complaint asserted (a) [...] complained that during the 2019-2020 school year, Plaintiff asked her to change a grade in [...]’s library media class (Pa49a, ¶146); (b) [...] alleged that Plaintiff “teamed with a Board member as part of a claimed bullying attack as an attempt to tarnish Defendant [...]’s reputation (Pa51a, ¶¶166-167); (c) [...] complained that in the Fall of 2020, Plaintiff was not present in the virtual classroom when she should have been and did not leave the in-class students with adequate activities to occupy them once they completed their work (Pa49a, ¶¶152-153); and (d) [...] complained that in the Fall of 2020, and (d)  [...] “accused Plaintiff of fueling an anti-special class agenda, and targeting Defendant [...] as a result (Pa51a, ¶163).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Plaintiffs’ appeal relates to two Memorandums of Agreement entered between Plaintiffs and Defendants in 2016 (the “2016 MOAs”), prior to [...]’s designation as a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery under the Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act, (“MSRA”), N.J.S.A. 52:27 BBBB-1, et seq.  Pursuant to the 2016 MOAs, the parties agreed to much needed promotions in the [...] Police Department (“[...]”), but that the promoted officers would serve “with no increase in pay until a salary increase, including rank deferential and any other increase, is ratified between the City, the State Monitor and the [Unions],” but that any increase shall be retroactive to the date of promotion.  (Pa000049; 51).  Months after the 2016 MOAs were entered, [...] was designated a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery under the MSRA, and the State was given broad authority to take “steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery,” including unilaterally modifying employment agreements.  The State took swift action, and pursuant to the authority conferred under the MSRA issued Notices of Implementation on June 7, 2017, setting forth a pay scale for Plaintiffs, which included promotional pay, and explained that it addressed the “entire compensation” for employees.  Plaintiffs ratified the Notice of Implementation in a Settlement Agreement with Defendants in January 2018.  Nonetheless, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this matter in October 2023, after failing to pursue such claims for years, alleging that Defendants’ purported failure to honor the 2016 MOAs gives rise to claims for breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel and failure to pay wages.
[brief] Order for Summary Judgement 10/06/2023  Order to Consolidate Denied 10/06/2023  APPENDIX INDEX TO VOLUME FOUR OF APPENDICES  Corrected Exhibit H\(^1\) to Certification of Attorney [...] in Support of Summary Judgment filed  8/10/13  [...] V [...] Case No: [...]  Pa652 Pa655 \(^1\)  Corrected Exhibit H to Certification of [...] in Support of Summary Judgment
[directive] Officers Not Required to Wear BWCs.  Notwithstanding the provisions of 3.2, the following officers are not required by this Policy to be equipped with BWCs:  (a)  Officers engaged in undercover assignments.  (b) Officers acting as hostage negotiators or crisis negotiators working in conjunction with tactical teams.  (c)  Officers assigned to administrative positions within the law enforcement agency.  This provision shall not exclude officers assigned to “front desk” duty, as defined in Section 3.2(f), from the requirement to be equipped with BWCs.  (d)  Officers meeting with confidential sources or recruiting potential confidential sources.  (e) Officers engaged in union representation of a member of the collective bargaining unit.  (f)  Officers assigned to duties within schools or youth facilities as part of the normal daily educational environment, such as School Resource Officers (SROs) and Class III Special Law Enforcement Officers (SLEO IIIs).  Officers assigned to duties at schools or youth facilities working security or crowd-control functions at special events such as athletic competitions, graduations or similar public events shall be equipped with BWCs.  (g)  Non-uniformed officers assigned to investigative, non-enforcement duties, when authorized by the agency’s law enforcement executive.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] If [...] controlled the Exchange and the terms to which each policyholder agrees, it could unilaterally alter the fees/other terms and simply impose a new POA on the Exchange.  It cannot.  Instead, [...] would need to amend the form of the POA, file it with the Department, and obtain the individual subscriber’s signatures as it has done in the past.  In fact, [...] had to undergo this arduous process of securing tens of thousands of new POA signatures once during its long twenty-year history.\textsuperscript{13}
[directive] Drug Actor uses or possesses with intent to use drug paraphernalia for purposes listed in the Paraphernalia - 2C:36-2 statute, including to ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Use or Possession dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.  with Intent to Use  Actor possesses with intent to use a hypodermic needle or hypodermic syringe or any other Possession or instrument adapted for use of a controlled dangerous substance or a controlled substance
[brief] This chapter shall be deemed to be a remedial statute and to operate both prospectively and retrospectively, and be liberally construed to effectuate the remedial objects thereof.  [N.J.S. 54:5-3].  This provisions of this article shall be liberally construed to encourage the barring of the right of redemption by actions in the Superior Court to the end that marketable titles may thereby be secured.  [N.J.S. 54:5-85].  A first priority lien is created for unpaid taxes, interest, and costs.  N.J.S. 54:5-6, 54:5-7, 54:5-8, 54:5-9.  The tax collector is required to "enforce the lien by selling the property in the manner set forth."  N.J.S. 54:5-19.  The sale is made in fee simple, subject to redemption at the lowest rate of interest bid at sale.  N.J.S. 54:5-32.  The lands may be sold to the public, the municipality, or even the State.  N.J.S. 54:5-30.1, 54:5-34, 54:5-34.1.  Although the property is "sold", it is subject to redemption at the statutory rate of interest and evidenced by a tax certificate.  N.J.S. 54:5-32, 54:5-46, 54:5-47.  The purchaser may also remit payment for subsequent taxes due and earn interest on them.  N.J.S. 54:5-60.  The Tax Sale Law “is designedly such that it will not be worth the taxpayer's while to make the municipality his involuntary banker. ”
[brief] (DA369-370).  Counsel for [...]’s letter further stated:  “If we do not receive notice of your client’s intent to proceed to closing by December 15, 2021, Seller will utilize the arbitration provision within the Subscription and Purchase Agreement in order to collect liquidated damages. ”  (Id.).  On December 9, 2021, Plaintiff [...] contacted Counsel for [...] by e-mail informing him that “[...] ([...]) has terminated the client-attorney relationship with [Plaintiffs]” and requested that Counsel contact her directly going forward regarding “[Plaintiffs’] intention to proceed with the closing of Unit 1601 within [...].
[brief] [...] c: Respondents’ Counsel of Record Client  April 10, 2024  Via eCourts  New Jersey Appellate Division  [...] [...] [...]  Re: [...] et al. v. [...], et al. Docker Number: [...]  Dear Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:  As the Court is aware, this office represents Appellant School District and Board of Education in the above-referenced matter.
[directive] B)  Is there any responsible adult or social service agency able to provide care for that person?  •  If the answer is yes, the inquirer will ask the detainee to provide the following information concerning the proposed alternate care provider: (if a person): name, address, telephone number, sex, age, and relationship to detainee and/or dependent, and statement of whether the detainee feels this person is suitable and qualified to provide care for his/her dependents during the detainee's absence; (if an agency): name, address, telephone number, agency representative, and affiliation.  •  If the adult designated by the detainee is present in court with the detainee, the inquirer will confirm that this adult is aware of the type of alternative care identified by the detainee and is willing to provide care for the dependent during the detainee's absence.  •  If the answer is no, the inquirer will recommend to the detainee that he/she contact an appropriate agency to request assistance in meeting his/her responsibility for making alternative care arrangements for his/her dependents.  C)
[brief] ”  334 N.J. Super 413, (Law Div. 2000) citing *Pullen v. South Plainfield* 291 N.J. Super 303 (Law Div. 1995) aff’d 291 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div., 1996)  Where there is a correct application of the law to facts found on sufficient evidence in the record, the board decision will be upheld, and the approval will not be deemed arbitrary and capricious.
[brief] Cal9.  She further ordered that Respondent be censured for violating the School Ethics Act subject to review by the Commission.  Cal 9-Ca20.  In its Final decision, the Commission ruled that Respondent's Facebook posts regarding opting out of the union and masking in school "may relate to the business of the Board" but [t]here is an insufficient nexus between Respondent’s personal Facebook page and her membership on the Board such that a reasonable member of the public would not perceive that respondent is speaking pursuant to her official duties.
[brief] Importantly, nothing in the Consent Order bars the parties from filing claims after the date identified in the Consent Order.  Instead, those claims would simply not benefit from the agreed-upon tolling, and would be subject to defenses based upon the statutes of limitations and repose.  While the Trial Court dismissed the instant Complaint - which sought to hold [...] accountable for his abuse of process in the Prior Litigation - the Trial Court’s decision here constitutes reversible error.  First, notwithstanding the clear language of the Consent Order, the Trial Court below re-wrote the Consent Order to include additional language that simply does not exist.  In this regard, New Jersey law is clear, that a court lacks the authority to rewrite the express and unambiguous terms of a contract merely because it may be functionally desirable to draft it differently.  As the Consent Order provides only that later-filed claims lack the protection of agreed-upon tolling of defenses, the Trial Court was precluded from re-writing the Consent Order, to argue that the claims asserted by Plaintiffs here, were dismissed with prejudice.  Second, the Trial Court erroneously misapplied the doctrine of res judicata, as a means to dismiss Plaintiffs’ instant Complaint.  Specifically, the Trial Court found that, the Prior Litigation “was adjudicated on the merits once [a] final award was rendered” in separate arbitration.  The Trial Court’s finding is erroneous, however, because the separate arbitration did not adjudicate: (i) any claim raised in the Prior Litigation; (ii) any issue arising out of the same transactions at the core of the Prior Litigation; or (iii) the claims raised in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, here.  Thus, the Trial Court’s application of the doctrine of res judicata constitutes a clear error.  Finally, the Trial Court erred by relying upon the Entire Controversy Doctrine, to bar Plaintiffs’ instant Complaint.  New Jersey law is clear, however, that where a prior lawsuit is dismissed without prejudice, the Entire Controversy Doctrine does not preclude successive lawsuits based upon the same core nexus of facts.  As the Consent Order clearly provides that the Prior Litigation was dismissed without prejudice, the Trial Court’s application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine was erroneous.  As set forth below, this Court should certainly reverse the order of dismissal entered by the Trial Court.  But, equally important, it should send a message to [...], a serial litigant, that he cannot knowingly assert false claims.  Unquestionably, the New Jersey Courts should not be [...]’s personal instrument to perpetuate a fraud.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court below, and reinstate Plaintiffs’ Complaint, in its entirety.
[brief] ”  Id.  •  Although there is some scientific evidence that human fingerprint patterns are unique, the assertion remains unproven.  See NAS Report at 143-44.  Moreover, “[u]niqueness does not guarantee that prints from two different people are always sufficiently different that they cannot be confused, or that two impressions made by the same finger will also be sufficiently similar to be discerned as coming from the same source. ”  Id. at 144.  “[L]atent prints in criminal cases are often incomplete and of variable quality (smudged or otherwise distorted), with quality and clarity depending on such factors as the surface touched and the mechanics of touch.