ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court should also note that [...] failed to meet the elements of the cause of action of fraud.  First, given the December 10, 1998 deed (which was created by [...] himself) listing [...] as the property owner, [...] cannot meet his burden of proof, which is a heavy burden under a heightened standard, that either the estate or [...] made any misrepresentation.  In fact, to the extent any incorrect information in the December 10, 1998 deed is deemed as a misrepresentation, it is [...] (the creator of the deed), not Appellants, that made such a misrepresentation.  Secondly, as the trial court pointed out, neither the estate nor [...] had knowledge regarding the creation of the two (2) problematic December 10, 1998 deeds, they cannot have intentionally committed fraud when conducting the transaction based on a title document in the public record.  Thirdly, the Court should also note that before the transaction, they hired an attorney [...] to research the title issue and relied upon [...]’s findings and advice, which means they did not have the knowledge or belief of the falsity of the alleged misrepresentation.  Further, [...] also failed to establish his “reasonable reliance” because as confirmed by the Opposition Brief, he was not even aware when the transaction occurred.  Last but not least, the only alleged damages discussed in the Opposition Brief are the attorney’s fees, which [...] argued to be an exception to the American Rule because “the other defendants” should be deemed as third parties.  We fail to see how [...] can get around the American Rule, and fail to understand his confusing logic as to how the defendants he has been litigating with should be deemed as third parties.  B.
[brief] Pa265.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, [...] underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa265.  Of the fifty-nine (59) FTA members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.  Pa265.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa117.  Despite not receiving notice, Licameli attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa119.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa119.  In response to his filing, Licameli received correspondence from the [...] requesting medical information.  Pa121.  Licameli contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa121.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.  Pa28.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the [...].  Pa28.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa76-271.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT  CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86)  ...........................................  15  a.  Plaintiffs-Appellants Lack Standing to Bring Their Claims.  15  b.  Lack of Standing May Be Raised as a Failure to State a Cause of Action Under R. 4:6-2(e) (Pa89).  .........................  18  c.  Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Claims Regarding the Applicability of the Long Term Tax Exemption Law are Without Basis in Fact or Law (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86).  .................................  18  d.  Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Allegation Against [...] Does Not Meet the Heightened Pleading Requirements of R. 4:5-8 (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86).  ............................................  22  II.
[brief] See, e.g., Da_050-51.  These thin and boilerplate allegations fall far short.  First, as Neuworth and other Appellate Division cases have held repeatedly, conclusory allegations that a defendant was “aware” of statements’ being false yet made them “recklessly and/or with actual knowledge of their falsity” are mere recitations of the applicable legal standard, not factual assertions, and are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.  476 N.J. Super. at 393.  See also Darakjian, 366 N.J. Super. at 247 (rejecting conclusory allegations of “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity” that were “unsupported by any factual contentions offered to substantiate the assertion”); Newton, 2014 WL 3928500, at *4 (rejecting “bare conclusory assertions that the articles contained false statements of fact and the [...] purposely published the articles in reckless disregard for the truth”).
[directive] if Periodic review hearings shall be held pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b) to determine the 5. of committee continues to be dangerous to self, others, or property as a result mental illness and whether they continue to require involuntary confinement in an institution.  _____________  6.  (Any additional conditions as ordered by the court)  _ ____ on 7.  A review hearing this matter shall be set for _ ____
[brief] In *Valentine v. [...]*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118399, at *13* (D.N.J. July 6, 2022) (Pa117), the District Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FDCPA claims and held that “[c]ourts in this District have invoked that part of the NJCFLA—the part reading: “directly or indirectly engag[es] . . . in the business of buying, discounting or endorsing notes”—when classifying debt collection practices as falling within the ‘consumer loan business.
[brief] The equities of a situation such as this “must be assessed in view of its particular facts and the magnitude of the threat to the Plaintiffs’ title and use of property. ”  *Suser v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB*, 433 N.J. Super. 317, 326 fn. 4 (App. Div. 2013).  Alternatives to the Report of the Boundary Commissioners could not be created until the Report was produced.  A trial pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 provides the only opportunity for the consideration of alternative remedies.
[brief] [...] explained, “It normally entails them telling us of somebody possibly in possession of a firearm, what area, and a description that they provide or get provided by the confidential informant and us as marked units go and stop the vehicle or conduct pedestrian stops on the person. ”  (1T 8-22 to 9-2)  Yet, when asked why his report did not mention that the information regarding the Kia was received from [...] or that the alleged source of the tip was a C.I., [...] responded: “Well, that wasn't known to me at the time. ”  (1T 28-13 to 28-15)  [...] also claimed that part of the information relayed by [...] was that the male in the Kia was “wearing a fanny pack with a .44 magnum inside of it,” and for that reason, when he saw [...] wearing a fanny pack, he identified [...] as the subject of the tip.  (1T 8-5 to 8-15; 1T 26-18 to 26-25)  [...] testified:  “I made contact with the passenger who was wearing the fanny pack as described by the C.I. ”  (1T 14-17 to 14-19)  “He was sitting in the passenger seat with a fanny pack across his chest that he was holding tight to his body with his left hand,” which, according to [...], was “consistent with somebody that's armed with a firearm in an attempt to conceal any bulges. ”  (1T 15-16 to 15-24)  \(^4\)  As of the suppression hearing, [...] had been promoted to detective and assigned to the Narcotics and Gang Unit.
[brief] The Trial Court ignored the record that was presented by the Appellant, then Plaintiff.  In the Trial Court analysis, there was reference to Appellant’s deposition transcript, but, as noted by this Counsel, the deposition transcript was one-sided because the Appellant did not have a chance to question Appellant and the deposition was never rescheduled.  The reliance on the deposition transcript provides only questioning from the Respondent and is absent clarification or further explanation by the Appellant regarding what was testified to.  The Trial Court wrote that the Appellant never complained to anyone regarding the harassment which is not true as in Appellant’s opposition papers it was made clear that complaints had been made to [...], Superintendent of Schools.
[directive] Under the Court's order, the county prosecutor the issuing county shall be responsible for (1) retaining the executed search warrant, any inventory, and any other of accompanying documents; (2) complying with any request for a copy the inventory as authorized by Rule 3:5-5(a); and (3) providing all search warrant information to the defendant as of part discovery pursuant to Rule 3:13-3.  To effectuate the Court's order, search warrants and communications data warrants shall be processed as follows, until further order:
[directive] The property stolen is a firearm, motor vehicle vessel, boat, horse, domestic companion animal or airplane; (c) The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-2 and the amount involved is less than $75,000.00 or is undetermined and the quantity is one kilogram or less; Theft (d) It is from the person of the victim; 2C:20-2  Grading of theft (e) It is in breach of an obligation by a person in his capacity as a fiduciary; offenses (f) It is by threat not amounting to extortion; (g) It is of a public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; (h)
[brief] [...] is a former employee of respondent [...].  (Da56; Da124; Da430-Da431; Da514-Da516).  On January 18, 2019, plaintiff [...] and Appellant [...] filed a Superior Court Complaint alleging gender discrimination and sexual harassment by individual defendant [...] (Count I), retaliation and retaliatory harassment for complaining about the sexual harassment (Count II), and seeking declaratory judgment that the “Confidentiality” provision of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1 violates state law, including the First Amendment, and the NJLAD (Count III).  (Pa1-Pa45).  [...]’s initial complaint named the [...] and, among other parties, the following employees of [...] that were assigned to its [...]: [...], [...], and [...].  Ibid.
[directive] Directive Number Directive Title No. Directive 4  Seized Cash Management Policy No. Directive  Weed and Seed Initiative; Transfers of Real Property  9  No. Directive 14  Expeditious Payment of Liens, Mortgages and Taxes by the Department of the Treasury No. Directive 18  Policy for Payment(s) to Local, County, and State Police Officers Participating with Treasury Law Enforcement Agencies  No. Directive 27  Processing Interlocutory Sales No. Directive 33  Seizure of Motor Vehicles, Payment of Liens and Official Use Requirements  No. Directive 34  Adoptive Seizure Policies and Procedures  NOTE:
[brief] A close review of these orders reveals the defects in the Department’s argument.  The first order, [...], was issued forty-four years after the passage of the Holding Company Act and it is hardly a clear statement that reciprocal exchanges fall within the purview of the Holding Company Act.  Instead, the two sentence long order merely approves the acquisition of [...] pursuant to the provisions of the Holding Company Act.  This order falls far short of being a clear statement of the law.  [...] is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
[directive] Victims shall be promptly notified of the right to submit a written statement to a representative of the county prosecutor's office about the impact of the crime prior to the prosecutor's formal charging decision.  D.  Notification of case status regarding child abuse should be made to an appropriate, designated parent, guardian or caretaker and, if applicable, to the Division of Youth and Family Services.  For notification purposes, the Prosecutor's Office should identify when a victim or witness is a child on all official paperwork to prevent notification from being sent directly to the child.  E.  Five business days advance notice of trial and sentencing dates shall be given to all victims whether or not their presence is required.
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  11  Training and Qualification for CEDs and Less-Lethal Devices  11.1  No officer shall be authorized to carry or use a CED or less-lethal device during an actual operation until having completed a training course and qualification procedure approved by the Police Training Commission (or DCJ) in the proper use and deployment of CEDs or less-lethal devices.  The training program shall include a component on techniques to de- escalate a confrontation with a person from a different culture or background.  The training program also shall include a component on how to interact with a person in emotional or mental health crisis, including de-escalation techniques.  11.2  All law enforcement officers authorized to carry and use a CED or less-lethal device pursuant to this policy shall qualify, and thereafter re-qualify annually, in a training course and qualification procedure approved by the Police Training Commission (or DCJ).  11.3  CED and Less-Lethal training programs in each county shall operate under the direct control of the County Prosecutor’s Office.  For statewide law enforcement agencies, with the approval of the Director of DCJ, the CED and Less-Lethal training programs shall operate under the control of the law enforcement executive.  The number of certified CED Instructors and Less-Lethal Instructors, who shall be responsible for the initial training and qualification of officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal Device, shall be determined by the appropriate County Prosecutor or statewide law enforcement agency executive.  A County Prosecutor may designate any law enforcement officer to serve as an authorized CED or Less-Lethal Instructor within the countywide program under their jurisdiction.  11.4  For purposes of CED and Less-Lethal re-qualification ONLY, upon approval and designation of the respective County Prosecutor’s Office, municipal police officers and/or county sheriff’s officers may be trained as a “CED Re-Qualification Instructor” or “Less-Lethal Requalification Instructor” to administer re-qualification.  Training of any CED or Less-Lethal Re-Qualification Instructor shall be identical to the training requirements for Certified CED Instructors or Certified Less-Lethal Instructors.  Each respective County Prosecutor’s Office shall maintain a list of all CED and Less-Lethal Re-Qualification Instructors.  Re-Qualification Instructors shall not be authorized to conduct the initial training of officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal Device.  11.5  The Director of DCJ, with the approval of the Attorney General, shall have the authority to set additional training and qualification requirements for CED Instructors, Less-Lethal Instructors, and officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal device.  On an annual basis, the Division shall compile and distribute a current list of all such training and qualification requirements.  15  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020
[brief] The defendant was to charge a fee for each of the three transactions, and the compensation due to the defendant for the service of funding the lawsuit was to come from the proceeds of the not yet resolved personal injury suit.  That the verbiage of the agreement in some parts attempts to evade that interpretation is not binding on a court.  The agreement should be given its plain meaning.  As to point two, the trial court determined that because the transaction was not a loan, it was not barred by the public policy of the state of New Jersey.
[brief] ”  Tillman v. Com. Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 372 (2008).  Now that Defendant has fully briefed its position, this Court can observe for itself that Plaintiff’s observation is entirely accurate.  Defendant perhaps has created the illusion of a lack of uniformity.  But this Court should examine the cases Defendant cites carefully.  Not one of them concerns the type of “egregious” exception at issue in this case, a carve out which permits the corporate drafter to pursue money remedies in court.  Instead Defendant cobbles together sentence fragments from off-point arbitration cases and presents them as if they pertain to exceptions like that one before this Court.  Defendant makes at least three great mistakes throughout its submission.  First, it blurs case law applicable to this case -- in which the “egregious” arbitration provision allows the corporate drafter to file in court for a money relief – with decisions allowing a reasonable exception for a secured lender to seek foreclosure-type remedies in court.  Defendant improperly employs the latter category of cases to impeach the holdings of the former.  Second, Defendant ignores the vital distinction between consumer contracts of adhesion and commercial agreements.  An arbitration carveout found in a commercial agreement negotiated by business entities generally is enforceable - but those holdings don’t apply to this case.  Again, Defendant improperly employs the latter category of cases to impeach the holdings of the former.  Third, Defendant has confused the meaning of “mutual assent,” an essential element of contract enforcement, with other common law contract principles, now often disfavored, concerning “mutuality of remedy” or “mutuality of obligation. ”  Defendant collapses these distinct concepts under the general term “mutuality” and then declares “dead”  Plaintiff’s argument that genuine mutual assent is always at issue when a consumer is handed a contract of adhesion drafted by the corporate party.  This error infects Defendant’s entire argument pertaining to “mutuality” and renders unreliable its discussion and analysis in every section where some form of that word appears.  What Defendant has not done is cite a single case involving a consumer contract of adhesion where a provision like this one, allowing the corporate drafter to file in court for a money relief.
[directive] Qualified Offenders (Eligibility)  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-7(c)(2), a person is a "qualified offender" if eligible for a Certificate the person has one criminal conviction or has convictions of for more than one crime charged separate counts one indictment or accusation.  in  Multiple convictions charged in two indictments or two accusations, or one of indictment and one accusation filed in the same court prior to entry judgment of of under any them, shall be deemed to be one conviction for purposes Certificate of eligibility.  Convictions crimes entered more than ten years prior to an application for a Certificate shall not be considered in determining whether a person has one criminal conviction.  of  A person seeking a Certificate at the time sentencing is a "qualified if offender" the person will have one conviction, as described above, upon of of sentencing and entry the judgment conviction.  IV.
[brief] Nor did [...] provide a comparison of the relative volumes of the roughly 1.7 million square feet of 30 ft. tall warehouse he claimed to be feasible under the height and building coverage standards of the SM Zone District (approximately 51,000,000 cubic ft.) with the roughly 1.4 million sq. ft. of 48 ft. tall warehouse actually proposed (approximately 67,000,000 cubic ft.).  At the conclusion of the December 5, 2022 hearing, the Board denied the application, upon a vote of 6 in favor of a motion to deny, and 1 opposed.
[brief] See Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 380 (1958).  It is in the public interest to allow [...] to provide the necessary community infrastructure to support the inclusionary residential development that is already being built on the Residential Tract per the Redevelopment Plan.  Indeed, “[t]he success of the Legislature’s primary goal of providing housing will obviously be hampered if plaintiff is denied the requisite powers to assure the availability of support services necessary to the livability of the residential area. ”  *N.J. Hous. & Mort. Fin. Agency v. Moses*, 215 N.J. Super. 318, 324 (App. Div. 1987); see also *Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater Twp.*, 57 N.J. 506, 539 (1971).  In light of the above errors, standing alone as well as their cumulative effect, this court should find that the court below abused its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction.  Reversal is proper because the trial court’s determinations were not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, were based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, and/or amounted to a clear error in judgment.  *McDaniel*, 419 N.J. Super. at 498 (citing *Masone*, 382 N.J. Super. at 193).  In the alternative, this court should remand to the trial court to reevaluate the *Crowe* factors.
[brief] ”  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred.  The rule is applicable only when the court's decision is based on plainly incorrect reasoning or when the court failed to consider evidence or there is good reason for it to reconsider new information.  Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384-85 (App. Div. 1996).  It is well-settled that a motion for reconsideration is not warranted where the movant merely recapitulates the arguments or cases previously analyzed by the court.
[brief] --- \(^7\)  Plaintiff could have submitted a subpoena to [...] requesting the trace records of the vehicle to prove “beyond reasonable doubt”.  In subpoena, defendant asks for [...] Mercedes Benz vehicle information for tracing.  [...] informs the Municipal Court that no officer arrived at his property on November 2, 2021 or November 7, 2021 [1T47:1-17 -11/29/2022]; however, the police report incident details specifies they were dispatched and defendant was there, but defendant’s white [...] details are missing.  [...] confirms on November 10, 2021 that she had her [...] and gave the police her license plate information that would trace back to the defendant [1T25:11-17 – 11/29/2022].  defendant did not have her car and was not in the vicinity at 1100 hours, she gave her vehicle to [...] Maintenance on November 10, 2021 and there were no dispatch details from the Plaintiff correlating with [...] testimony of call 911 on November 10, 2021 [1T25:5-10 -11/29/2022]  SUPERIOR COURT PREPARATION FOR N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3B
[brief] According to the State, [...]’s statements were analogous to the narration testimony at issue in State v. Allen, 254 N.J. 530 (2023).  There, the Supreme Court found that a police officer’s narration testimony was admissible only where it was limited to the purpose of explaining “the manner in which the surveillance video informed his processing of the crime scene,” such as his explanation that he relied on the video to try and find empty cartridges at the crime scene itself.  Id. at 548.  In drawing an analogy to Allen, the State argues that Detective [...]’s narration testimony was likewise offered for the purpose of “detailing the investigative steps she undertook regarding the ‘vehicle of interest. ’”  (Sb 15)  [...]’s discussion of the overall investigation, according to the State, happened to include “testimony regarding her perception from reviewing numerous and extensive videos. ”  (Sb15)  Contrary to the State’s argument, however, Detective [...]’s narration testimony went far beyond the limited narration testimony deemed lawful in Allen.