ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \textsuperscript{4} \textit{Id.} at 245.  As the enforceability of settlements is governed by contract law, like a contract, it requires an offer and acceptance by the parties, and “must be sufficiently definite ‘that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. ’”  \textit{Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan}, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992) (quoting \textit{Borough of W. Caldwell v. Caldwell}, 26 N.J. 9, 24-25 (1958)).  Likewise, a legally enforceable contract “requires mutual assent, [and] a meeting of the minds based on a common understanding of the contract terms.
[brief] 10  N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 ..................................................................................................................................................  2, 14  N.J.S.A. 40A:1-1 defines "local unit" as "a county or municipality" .................................................................  10  N.J.S.A. 40A:5-22 ..................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-101 ................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-102 ................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-103 ................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-105 ................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-105, 117 .....................................................................................................................................  10  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-106 ................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-107 ................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-109 ................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-110 ................................................................................................................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-111 ................................................................................................................................................  12  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-94 ..................................................................................................................................................  11  The New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2 .........................................................................................  5
[brief] These cases are inapposite and do not inform the analysis.  For example, *Messner v. Gray*, No. A-5418-13 (App. Div. Mar. 31, 2016), concerned a violation of the School Ethics Act where a board member recorded a conversation during a board executive session in order to share it with her personal attorney to further a private cause of action against the board.  *Messner*, and indeed all of the cases Petitioner has cited, concern cases in which a board member engaged in misconduct to further a purely private, personal, selfish, and usually pecuniary interest.  No such interests are at play here.  Petitioner does not allege that Respondents will benefit monetarily from the referendum, or that it somehow suits nothing more than Respondents’ own individual selfish interests.  In fact, any such argument is dispelled by the fact that the referendum passed.  The fact that thousands of voters within the District approved the referendum is proof that it served a greater public purpose beyond the selfish interests of the Board’s members.
[brief] Thus, even crediting the SET members’ testimony that this parking lot was an area where there were frequent narcotics transactions, that fact certainly did not give them license to stop every citizen who was going grocery shopping in [...].  [...]’s observations of [...] in the Shop Rite parking lot equally could not add to any reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity.  The objective facts that Taranto relayed about [...] were that there were three cars parked near each other; that [...] spoke to a woman in a sedan; that [...] then walked over to speak to a man in a truck; that while speaking with the man, [...] leaned on the truck and one of his arms crossed the threshold of the truck window; and [...] then drove to the store entrance, parked, and entered the store with his wife.  (1T 16-15 to 20, 18-  Although Taranto testified that he found this behavior suspicious because of his “training and experience” as a plainclothes narcotics officer, (1T 18-20 to 19-1) this was nothing more than a hunch.  See State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014) (holding that an investigative detention may not be based on “the officer’s subjective good faith, or a mere hunch”).
[brief] See, e.g., N.J. Shore Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Jackson, 199 N.J. 38, 55 (2009) (citing Brown v. City of Newark, 113 N.J. 565, 571 (1989); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of Town of W. Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 564 (1975).  A party challenging a municipal ordinance bears a heavy burden to overcome the presumption of validity.  See, e.g., 388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Twp. of Readington, 221 N.J. 318, 339 (2015); Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998).  To overcome this heavy burden, the challenging party must establish through a “clear showing” that the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable.
[brief] (23T158-19 to 23).  But he claimed he was told the two men were killers.  (23T159-6 to 9).  Defendant claimed that he started to walk back to his vehicle when someone called him back.  (23T160-14 to 19; 23T161-2 to 7).  He turned around and spoke with this person.  (23T161-12 to 14).  Then, defendant claimed he saw a person coming toward him with his hand in his pocket.  (23T162-5 to 11).  Defendant thought this person had a gun.  (23T162-9 to 11).  This person was [...]. (23T162-12 to 14).  Defendant claimed that [...] was behind [...].  (23T165-4 to 9).  Defendant claimed that he fired one shot into the air after he heard a gunshot.  (23T173-4 to 14).  He claimed he fired into the air to get the men who he claimed were chasing him.  (23T173-15 to 18).  Defendant claimed that as he ran to his vehicle, [...] said, “gun. ” (23T175-11 to 14).  Defendant claimed he saw [...] with a gun in his hand, and he fired to protect himself.  (23T175-23 to 23T176-9).  Defendant claimed he thought [...] was going to shoot him.  (23T176-10 to 13).  He then ran to his father’s vehicle and drove home.
[brief] The Schwartz court held that a valid agreement to arbitrate existed where a cable television subscriber was aware that an agreement governed his subscription but denied ever receiving or reviewing the agreement.  256 Fed. App’x at 518-20.  The court held: “it is impossible to infer that a reasonable 3 [...] accurately presented Cohen v. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, 2024 Mass. Super. LEXIS 59 (Mass. Sup. Ct. June 10, 2024) only to illustrate the widespread acceptance that assent to an agreement to arbitrate may be implied solely from conduct in lieu of a signature.  adult in Schwartz’s position would believe that his contract with [...] consisted entirely of a single promise that the service would be “‘always on. ’”  *Id.*  Because plaintiff “accepted the service,” he became bound by the terms of the subscriber agreement governing the relationship.  *See id.*  Here, likewise, Respondents acknowledge that they were aware that a written instrument governed their relationship with [...].
[brief] [Emphasis added.]  SAC § 228, Pa3143.  Rather than using all such confidential disclosures for the contemplated “discussions” toward his acquisition of plaintiffs’ rights, defendant [...] perceived an “open opportunity” to grab the [...]’ land by circumventing the very Non-Disclosure and Non-Circumvention Agreement his company’s COO had executed, and perceived the ability to grab the SREC rights and related rights belonging to plaintiffs.
[brief] The trial court’s injunction does not interfere with any fundamental rights.  Courts exercise great caution before deeming any new federal substantive due process rights fundamental.  See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (demanding “utmost care” before courts identify “new” liberty interests under due process, “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of” judges).  The “established method of substantive-due-process analysis” limits fundamental federal constitutional rights to those that “are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. ”  Id. at 720-21.  It is not enough to assert a generalized interest; the analysis must consider the “careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” at a granular level.  Holland, 895 F.3d at 292 (citation omitted).  The issue is therefore whether a specific right is dictated by “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices. ”  Id. at 293.  Although parents maintain a fundamental right “to care for and guide their children,” Anspach v. City of Phila., Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2007), Appellants misconstrue the scope of this substantive due process right.
[directive] IAPP Section 5.1 is revised as follows:  Accepting reports alleging officer 5.1.8  Complaints against a law enforcement executive, or a member of the executive’s senior management team, may originate from a member of the public or from an employee of the agency.  All such complaints shall be documented and referred to the County Prosecutor for review.  If the subject of the Internal Affairs investigation is the Police Chief, Police Director, Sheriff or Head of Internal Affairs, either the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office shall handle the investigation.  The investigation may involve any type of alleged employee misconduct, as described in Section 4.1.3, and shall be conducted pursuant to Section 6  In such matters, the County Prosecutor (Investigation of Internal Complaints). or the Attorney General’s Office shall exercise the authority of the law enforcement executive under Sections 1.0.5 and 6.3.11.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], and [...], [...], and JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 1-20 (Names Being Fictitious), in their individual and corporate capacities, and as aiders and abettors, Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  APPELLATE  DOCKET NO: [...]  DOCKET NO BELOW: [...] SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C. LAW  DIVISION – CUMBERLAND COUNTY  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] There is no “exemption for individuals who acted in good faith to obtain insurance but failed to do so” under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  Bencosme, supra, at *6. d.  There is no question of fact in this matter which is bolstered by appellant/plaintiff’s failure to oppose his insurance carrier’s summary judgment motion.  The appellant/plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgement Complaint against [...] was dismissed on an unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by [...], on June 7, 2024.  (DR03).  The appellant/plaintiff cannot now claim a fact issue existed on the decision of his insurer to deny his claim for insurance based on a “material misrepresentation. ”  The insurance coverage claims have concluded and were properly dismissed on an unopposed motion for summary judgment conclusively establishing that plaintiff failed to maintain insurance required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and was in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 on April 13, 2022.
[brief] It is true that defendant's initial and other document productions were deficient.  In addition, the Court is satisfied that defendant cured its initial deficiencies and produced all of its relevant and requested documents.  The Court has gone to great lengths to assure this occurred.  The Court Ordered defendant to produce all relevant communications between and amongst the key “players” in the case ([...], [...], [...] and plaintiff), it personally reviewed all of the communications to assure that all relevant documents were produced, it reviewed in camera all relevant allegedly privileged documents, it required defendant to produce affidavits attesting to the completeness of its search, it required the production of complete up-to-date privilege logs, and it obtained on the record representations from defendant that its search was complete.  Because of all of this the Court finds that [...] has now exhausted reasonable efforts to produce its relevant requested documents.  Further, despite plaintiff's protests to the contrary, the Court finds that any prejudice to the plaintiff from defendant's late production has been cured.  At plaintiff's request scheduling deadlines have been extended on numerous occasions to permit additional discovery.  In addition, plaintiff was granted leave to depose the individuals who criticized him in the late produced [...] reports.  The Court also granted plaintiff leave to re-depose witnesses regarding documents produced late, including key witnesses such as defendant [...] and [...].  Accordingly, recognizing the Third Circuit's reluctance to grant the drastic sanction of default, and since the defendant did not act willfully or vexatiously, and any prejudice from defendant's late document production has been cured, plaintiff's request for a default is denied.
[brief] In addition to affirming the trial court’s application of the Mold Exclusion, the Court should affirm the trial court’s determination on trigger of coverage.  [...]’s mold-caused injuries began in 1991 and allegedly caused debilitating injuries for the next eighteen years.  So debilitating were these ongoing injuries that they, as argued by [...] and his expert, supported a $2.3 million consent judgment.  The trial court appropriately determined, however, that [...] cannot have his cake and eat it too.  Since [...] introduced evidence that his widespread mold-caused respiratory, neurological, and cognitive injuries manifested for sixteen consecutive years before the first [...] Policy incepted in 2007, the trial court correctly determined that the [...] Policies were not triggered.
[brief] 28 Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div. 2012)  27 Rieder v. State Dept. Of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987)  12 Ritter v. Castellini, 173 N.J. Super. 509, 514-15 (Law Div. 1980)  42 Rivkin v. Dover Township Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J.352,366 (1996)  19 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201(2001)  40 Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 354 (2000)  29, 35, 40 Spring Motors Distributors, Inc., v Ford Motor Company, 191 NJ Super 22, 29-30 (App. Div. 1983)  11  St. Barnabas Medical Center v. Essex County, 111 N.J. 67, 74 (1988)  17, 42 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 410, (1989)
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  500 Columbia Tpk. Assocs. v. Haselmann, 275 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1994)  .................................................................4  Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129 (2015)  .........................................................................................6  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) .........................................................................................9  Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 388 N.J. Super. 550 (App. Div. 2006) ..............................................................11, 12 D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321 (App. Div. 2008) ...............................................................3
[brief] In cases where authentication is an issue, however, the better practice is to admit the document “leaving to the jury more intense review of the documents. ”  *State v. Hannah*, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 89 (App. Div. 2016), quoting *Konop v. Rosen*, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 411 (App. Div. 2012).  In *Hannah*, the appellate court suggested that the “better practice” is to admit the documents and focus on the process of weighing those documents “for consideration by the judge as a fact finder. ”  *Hannah, supra*, at 90 quoting *State v. Tormasi*, 443 N.J. Super 146, 156-157 (App. Div. 2015).  In this case, the Trial Judge had no facts to find.  No testimony was taken from any witness.  The only issue is whether the Trial Judge should have considered the [...] memo submitted to the Planning Board and the hearing transcript before the Planning Board as part of the “record below” to determine the legal issue of whether those municipal bodies correctly found that the redevelopment plan “consistent” with the municipal Master Plan.  Under these circumstances, this is solely a question of law which should be reviewed by this Court *de novo*.
[brief] [Pa83 at ¶¶ 28(c), (d)].  Notably, from the time that [...] purchased the Leased Premises, [...] was not in possession due to a sublease that it entered with [...], [...] and [...] (together, “Subtenant”) for the entire Leased Premises – although the sublease was neither disclosed to nor authorized by [...] or [...] as required under the Lease.
[brief] [...] cites as support a line of cases interpreting an entirely separate provision, N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1, which the trial court correctly held does not apply to this case.  (See Pa58) (“The Court does not find that N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 applies to this case.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 applies to publication of ordinances that create zoning changes under the Municipal Land Use Law”).  Indeed, N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 applies to “any ordinance adopted pursuant to the [MLUL] . . . which is in length six or more octavo pages of ordinary print .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1.  Ordinance No. 13-2022, however, is only two (2) pages in length, see Pa90 – Pa91, and adopts a redevelopment plan—the adoption of redevelopment plans is instead governed by the LRHL.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(c) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of the [MLUL] or of other law, no notice beyond that required for the adoption of ordinances by the municipality shall be required for the hearing on or adoption of the redevelopment plan or subsequent amendments thereof”) (emphasis added).  The statutory provision that sets forth the general notice requirements for the adoption of ordinances is N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.  See Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 165 (App. Div. 2001) (“[T]he procedures of the [MLUL] do not apply to adoption of a redevelopment plan, including the zoning component . . . the [LRHL] contains its own procedures for adoption of a redevelopment plan”).  [...] seeks to maneuver around this, arguing the cases cited interpreting zoning ordinance amendments should logically “apply to notices for all ordinances, including ordinances adopting redevelopment plans. ” (Pb32).  The reason the same standard does not apply, as recognized in Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 165, is because the Legislature in the LRHL clearly and specifically stated that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the [MLUL] or of other law, no notice beyond that required for the adoption of ordinances by the municipality shall be required for the hearing on or adoption of the redevelopment plan .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(c) (emphasis added).  Therefore, [...]’s assertion the same standard should apply to both N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 is neither supported by the Legislature, nor appellate case law.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  The rationale for making protection from retaliation broader that protection from discrimination is because:  Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.  “Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances. ”  *Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.*, 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).  Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.
[brief] \(^3\)  Determinative criteria for licensure was within the purview of the Commissioner, “dependent upon their relation to the objectives of the Small Loan Act in light of its history and purpose, it is difficult to see how better the Commissioner can execute the legislative policy than by looking to the needs of the community.  . . .”  Family Fin. Corp. v. Gaffney, 11 N.J. 565, 572 (1953).  In addition to enforcement and gatekeeping remedies afforded to the Commissioner, the NJSLL also allowed \(^3\) “[T]he Small Loan Law was intended to and does afford to the Commissioner power to limit the number of licenses in a community. ”  Gough, 10 N.J. Super. at 21.  private actions for damages by individual consumers.  See, e.g., Langer v. Morris Plan Corp., 110 N.J.L. 186, 187 (1933).  The NJSLL was superseded by the New Jersey Consumer Loan Act (“NJCLA”) in 1962.
[brief] Here, where Respondent posted numerous campaign banners to her page precisely like the respondent in Melnyk, shared successful election results, announced she was taking her seat on the Board, and went on to speak directly to Board issues without any Melnyk disclaimer, it is obvious that members of the public could have reasonably believed she was speaking in her role as Board member.  In fact, that is precisely what happened here, as evidenced by Board minutes, news articles, and even official Board Resolutions which were all included in the record before the Commission.  To be perfectly clear – this matter is not about whether Respondent’s posts were controversial or whether any particular person or persons disagreed with them.  Respondent held herself out as a Board member from the same account she made posts which unquestionably compromised the Board.
[brief] *Ibid.*  At defendant’s first trial in 2016, the trial court instructed the jury on murder and passion/provocation manslaughter, as well as aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter.  (Da24; 5T101-10 to 12).  The jury at the first trial was also charged on self-defense.  (Da7).  Evidence elicited at the first trial by the State included defendant’s two statements to police on March 9, 2013, and on March 11, 2013, in which defendant provided a self-serving version of how he came to kill the victim.  (Da9-23).  Defendant also testified at the first trial.  After considering all this evidence, the jury returned a verdict for aggravated manslaughter.  (Da6).  The first jury’s acquittal of murder did not preclude defendant from requesting passion/provocation manslaughter at the retrial.
[brief] MULTIPLE SENTENCING ERRORS  RENDER DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE EXCESSIVE.  (12T 31-15 to 38-19)  The court sentenced [...] to concurrent terms of seven years, subject to NERA, for passion/provocation manslaughter, five years for third-degree theft, three years for fraudulent use of a credit card, and 18 months for the fourth-degree weapons and credit card theft charges.
[directive] Defendant’s Initials page 2 of 5 the court could, 6.  Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in [Yes] [No] confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentenced imposed?  that require 7.  Did you enter a plea of guilty to any charges a mandatory period of parole [Yes] [No] ineligibility or a mandatory extended term?