ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Instead, the court cites to Worts v. Mayor & Council of Upper Township, 176 N.J. Super. 78, 81 (Ch. Div. 1980), which concerned municipal culpability in failing to send notices in a timely manner.  The court held that “[w]hen a public body sends meeting notices to newspapers for publication and, to the actual or readily ascertainable knowledge of that body, those newspapers cannot publish the notice at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting, there is no compliance with the Open Public Meetings Act.  Logic demands this conclusion; were the opposite true, the purpose of the law would be circumvented easily. ”  Id. at 81-82.  The [...]’s suggestion that the [...] court should have engaged in a dicta discussion of municipal culpability is unconvincing.  ([...]’s Brief, Page 23.)  It addressed that question by citing Worts.
[brief] ”)  As well, "in the interests of justice," even an order not specifically listed on the CIS may be considered on appeal.  *Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich*, 435 N.J. Super. 198, 211 n.6, 87 A.3d 775 (App. Div. 2014).  Plaintiff’s denial of the order appealed is concerning when the documentary evidence demonstrably proves it is listed on appeal.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s brief, Point 1, page 14, proves it was on appeal by arguing the May and September, 2022 Orders were the same basis by stating Defendant “simply repeated the same arguments she made before,” then his brief argues the May Order in his Points 2-5.
[brief] Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings | Order/Judgment | Page | |----------------------------------------|------| | Order Determining Property Abandoned | 42 | | Statement of Reasons | 43 | | Order Substituting Plaintiff | 57 | | Final Judgment | 131 | | Order Permitting Intervention | 209 | | Order Granting Motion to Vacate Judgment | 377 | | Statement of Reasons | 379 | | Order Denying Reconsideration | 411 | | Statement of Reasons | 412 | Table of Transcripts
[brief] At the close of Plaintiffs’ case, Defendants moved for dismissal, alleging that no proof was provided of the cost to complete the work.  1T45:11-17.  However, Plaintiffs were not seeking the cost to complete; they sought, instead, the monies paid for work that simply wasn’t done at all.  The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss on the proffered basis, but without notice or warning, then dismissed the CFA claims despite the fact that the Defendants hadn’t even sought such relief in their motion nor their answer.
[brief] Reassignment to a different judge is warranted when necessary “to preserve public trust in the sentencing framework established by our Code. ”  State v. McFarlane, 224 N.J. 458, 469 (2019).  Not only did the Court commit multiple sentencing errors and disregard critical evidence of rehabilitation as set forth in Point I.A through C, but the ultimate sentence the Court arrived at was not a product of the structured sentencing procedures of the Code; the Court began with its prior twenty year sentence as the starting point and “reduc[ed] that by two years” in recognition that [...] had been “making some attempt” to better himself while trying to strike a balance between not making either the victim’s family or defense counsel happy.  (8T 108-1 to 15)  By starting with the aggregate sentence of two consecutive maximum terms as the default—rather than arriving at it through the relevant factors set forth in the Code—and seemingly attempting to strike a balance between the wishes of the victim’s family and defense counsel, the Court “undermine[d] public confidence in our system of criminal sentencing. ”  Ibid; see also State v. Madan, 366 N.J. Super. 98, 114 (App. Div. 2004) (while “[t]he views of the victim's family may be taken into consideration” they “cannot be controlling;” the court must arrive at the sentence via “the facts, the law, and the range of permissible sentences under the Code”).  Accordingly, this Court should direct this case to be reassigned to a different judge on remand.
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[brief] Borrowers Sell The Property | 8 | | C. The Insufficient Funds Wire And Subsequent Return Wire | 8 | | ARGUMENT | 12 | | I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW | 12 | | II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENT AND DISCHARGING THE MORTGAGE BECAUSE THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER APPELLANT WAS REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE PARTIAL PAYMENT (Pa416-17).  | 14 | | A. Applicability of Section 9 of the Mortgage | 15 | | B. The Matter Was Not Ripe for Summary Judgment | 17 | | III.  ASSUMING THIS COURT FINDS NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT, IT SHOULD DETERMINE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS BARRED FROM PURSUING FORECLOSURE (Pa261-62).  | 20 | | A. Omar Is Distinguishable And Not Dispositive of Whether Appellant Was Required to Accept the Short Payment.  | 21 | | B. Appellant Established a Prima Facie Case for Foreclosure | 25 | | CONCLUSION | 27
[brief] In considering an earlier version of the statute, New Jersey courts have already determined that the Legislature had a legitimate purpose to regulate the business of debt adjustment: to protect consumers from “frauds and abuses. ”  American Budget Corp. v. Furman, 67 N.J. Super. 134, 136 (Ch. Div.), aff’d 36 N.J. 129 (1961).  In *Furman*, a debtor counseling company brought a declaratory judgment action against the [...] seeking a declaration that then-existing Debt Adjusters Law was unconstitutional.
[brief] Setting aside their unqualified legal opinions regarding the applicability of the statute, the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts in fact bolster the conclusion that an affidavit of merit was required.  Plaintiffs’ expert [...], P.E., acknowledged that the work performed by [...] and [...], including construction supervision services, constituted professional engineering services (Pa2230 at T46:21-47:12; T55:7-13).  As to the specific events underlying plaintiffs’ claims, Mr. Bellizzi further acknowledged that a professional engineer’s failure to take into consideration the risks associated with the operation of milling machines would reflect a deviation from a professional standard of care.  Id. at T53:1-11.  He likewise recognized that under contractual terms established by the [...], a professional engineer was ultimately answerable for the services provided by employees of both [...] and [...].  Id. at T53:12-25.  Despite plaintiffs’ efforts to focus on [...], plaintiffs’ expert [...], P.E., recognized that every person performing work under [...]’ contract with the [...] “would essentially report to [...] one way or another” (Pa2089 at T22:19-24).  Mr. Nawn further acknowledged that [...], as the on-site presence for [...] and [...], would report to [...], who maintained the authority to institute corrective action as deemed necessary.  Id. at T23:18-24:13.  According to Mr. Nawn, as project manager, [...] was responsible for ensuring that [...] and its subcontractors fulfilled its contractual obligations, i.e., confirming that the contractor’s work “complied with the plans and specifications of the project.
[brief] (Dma 1-2)  [...] was not charged.  The State filed a Notice of Motion to admit [...]’s statement from the Union County case on April 5, 2024.  On April 16, 2024, the State filed a brief in support of its motion.  The Defense filed a response brief on May 2, 2024.  [...] raised several arguments in opposition to the State’s motion, --- 2 Dma – Defendant’s motion appendix including that the statement constituted inadmissible propensity evidence in violation of Rule 404(b).  Notably, the State did not address Rule 404(b) in its briefs or oral argument.  Hearings were conducted on May 15 and July 11, 2024, and oral argument was held on August 28, 2024.  The Court entered an order granting the motion to admit [...]’s statement on September 9, 2024, along with a written decision.  (Dma 3-14)
[brief] [...] utilized [...]’s CAM charges to pay for the maintenance of the parking lot.  [...] contends that the area of the premises’ parking lot where [...] allegedly slipped and fell is not adjacent to [...]’s leased premises.  [...] contends that [...] had no expectation that [...] would be responsible for maintaining the area of the premises’ parking lot where [...] allegedly slipped and fell.  Lastly, [...] contends that the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint should be dismissed, with prejudice, in the interests of justice, based upon discovery gathered which establishes that plaintiffs knew or should have known of [...]’s identity and alleged potential liability prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and plaintiffs deliberately omitted disclosing this exculpatory information to the Court at oral argument of [...]’s motion in lieu of an answer based on the argument that the action was brought against [...] after the applicable statute of limitations expired.
[brief] Whatever he said on February 8th, on March 6th he said you did not comply with the discovery demands. ”  THE COURT: …  What have you done since March 6th to rectify these issues other than attach a certification?  [...]: The certification was attached.  The punch list specifically that was requested has been provided and answered to in detail with everything that was instructed.  THE COURT: When did you do that?  [...]: I did that, Judge, after the case of the February 8th.  THE COURT: After March 6th? After March 6th?  [...]: After February 8th, I did that.  THE COURT:  After March 6th, what did you do?  Defendants’ counsel responded, “After March 6th, Judge, it was specifically -- everything was done.  Everything was done.  …  There was nothing else – there was nothing else there, Judge. ”  [...] nonetheless denied defendants’ motion to vacate the defaults against them and reinstate their Answers:  “[...] went line by line as to items that you did not comply with.  So your cross-motion to reinstate your answer is denied based on your refusal to provide discovery.  The motion to strike is granted in light of the representations made to the Court, in light of the failure to provide discovery and, again, it will only be with respect to [...] in light of the fact that defaults have already been entered against [...].
[brief] This jurisdiction has long recognized that the usual burden of proof for establishing claims before state agencies contested administrative adjudications is a fair preponderance of the evidence.  In Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962), we observed that:  "In proceedings before an administrative agency, . . . it is only necessary to establish the truth of the charges by a preponderance of the believable evidence and not to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  See *In re Suspension or Revoc. License of Kerlin*, 151 N.J. Super. 179, 184 n.2 (App. Div. 1977) ("Where disciplinary proceedings with respect to a profession or occupation are vested in an administrative agency in the first instance, the charges must be established by a fair preponderance of the believable evidence").  "The term ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’ means the greater weight of credible evidence in the case.  It does not necessarily mean the evidence of the greater number of witnesses but means that evidence which carries the greater convincing power to our minds. ”  *State v. Lewis*, 67 N.J. 47, 49 (1975) citing *Model Jury Charge, Criminal, 3:180*.  See also, *Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 436, 457 (2005)(applying the standard to a wrongful termination).
[brief] ”  There is nothing for any court to conclude that creating the logs is impossible and, as represented in the original brief, there are other means to provide a requester with a copy of an email log.  The [...] has focused on its ability to corral the metadata to formulate the logs but other methods - like the printout and screen shots of in- and out-boxes, etc... are acceptable options available pursuant to the ability to change mediums to meet the needs of requesters.  See, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(d)  (“…..If the public agency does not maintain the record in the medium requested, the custodian shall either convert the record to the medium requested or provide a copy in some other meaningful medium…..”)
[brief] ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Here, that “judicial seal of approval” was improperly stamped onto this evidence, and, thus, the defense’s efforts to dispute the credibility and worth of the reenactment photos were hampered.  One must wonder: of what use is it to have an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine admissibility, as here, out of the presence of the jury, if the judge is going to then tell the jurors what he determined out of their presence?  As noted in other points in this brief, the State’s case was far from airtight.  Videos were grainy.  The manner in which evidence was handled allowed law enforcement considerable opportunity to transfer defendant’s blood onto the semiautomatic gun.  This “reenactment” evidence was intended by the State to bolster its case, but the judge had no business telling the jury that he placed his stamp of approval on that evidence.  This instruction unwittingly put the judge’s thumb on the scale of credibility, thereby tainting the entire jury deliberation in a manner that had the clear capacity, R. 2:10-2, to have affected the verdict.
[brief] Once back in his hometown, as they were getting ready for their next flight, Defendant expressed a desire to take an afternoon nap.  However, Plaintiff, focused on the urgency of packing, insisted that they finish packing first.  This decision led to his eventual exhaustion and an urgent need for sleep.  When he finally rested, he woke up to find a room full of people.  His aunt noticed his tired appearance and made a light-hearted comment about the packing situation.  (1T93).
[brief] (Pa85).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it. ”  Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978).  Here, [...] seeks to avoid an obvious legislative restriction outlined in the Ricci Act that provides he is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation after July 8, 2021.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 and N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  The Statute requires a plaintiff to provide “each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill, or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject matter of the Complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 states in pertinent part:  In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within sixty (60) days following the date of filing of the Answer to the Complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an Affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill, or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice, or work that is the subject of the Complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards of treatment practices.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 (Emphasis added.)  Furthermore, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to provide an Affidavit or a Statement in lieu thereof, pursuant to Section 2 or 3 of this Act, it shall be deemed a failure to state a cause of action. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29 (Emphasis added.)  Specifically, failure to provide an Affidavit of Merit within sixty days of the date on which a Defendant’s Answer is filed, or failure to obtain the single, sixty-day extension permitted by statute, constitutes a failure to state a cause of action and will result as a dismissal with prejudice.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29; Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 244 (1998).  The Court may grant a single sixty-day extension (for a total of 120 days from the filing of Defendant’s Answer) to file an appropriate Affidavit of Merit; however, it is not within the Court’s discretion to grant more than one additional period, not to exceed sixty days, upon a finding of good cause.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  The statutory purpose of the Statute is to require Plaintiffs to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious.
[brief] Tegler v. Global Spectrum, 291 F. Supp. 3d 565 (D.N.J. 2018) ....................................................................28  Triffin v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................................21  Walker v. Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2012) .................................................................21  Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2005) .................................................................47
[brief] The Long Branch Design Guidelines in effect prior to the 2020 Amendments resulted in a pattern of stepped-back buildings surrounding the [...] site.  (ARa1-3).  The developers did not throw away the opportunity to build a tall, block-like slabbed sided building with more dwelling units and closer to the ocean out of the goodness of their hearts.  The designers of these buildings to the north and south of the [...] site understood that a stepped back design with a proper view shed was required.  [...]’s building on the north side is fully stepped back.  (ARa2).  The next tall building to the North is an old building designed before the stepped-back view shed requirements were adopted in 1994.  The first building on the south side of the [...] site is partially stepped back, the second is fully set back, the third is very close to being fully stepped-back, and the partially visible fourth building is fully stepped back.  (ARa1; ARa3).  [...] and [...] want us to believe otherwise, but the pattern of development since 1994 and the language of the pre-2020 Design Guidelines prove them wrong.  POINT II
[brief] -  Upon her start at the Camden location, Appellant’s new supervisor asked her if she intended to proceed with a lawsuit.  (Pa227); (Pa324) 98:17-104:25, 106-109:19, 233:3-234:13; (Pa 655) 105:17-113:14.  -  Following Appellant’s retaliatory transfer, Appellant was ostracized by her coworkers, who knew she was transferred due to the sexual harassment.  The same coworkers spread false, defamatory rumors that Appellant [...] was sleeping with someone in the office.  (Pa324-417)  89:7-96:24, 223:15-225:25.  -  Appellant made another complaint of discrimination and retaliation to Respondent [...] after Appellant had learned that Respondent [...] called Appellant “too immature” for her position and remarking that she was like a “drunken prom date. ”  (Pa999) (Pa324-417) 98:17-109:19, 233:3-234:13; (Pa655-722) 105:17-113:14  - Respondents once again refused to investigate Appellant’s complaints, which was pure retaliation.  Id.  -  Even after Appellant was transferred, she continued to be subjected to harassment and retaliation by [...] as he stalked Appellant outside of work before and after her termination.  (Pa230, Pa374-77)  201:11-211:25; (Pa1022-23 – recordings, Pa991-92).  Continued belittling, public disparagement, and breach of confidentiality of her complaints of sexual harassment at the location where she was transferred undoubtedly constitutes “some harm” that supports Appellant’s claim of retaliation.
[brief] This is a case where plaintiff notified his insurance carrier that his new mailing address was located in New Jersey and – like any average human being – would expect the insurance company to insure him accordingly.  Instead of providing customer service and a revision of his insurance policy, [...] seized upon the fact that while he changed his mailing address, he did not change the garaging address of his vehicle and declared his policy void based upon a material misrepresentation.  In short, if [...]’s allegation of a material misrepresentation giving rise to a coverage denial cannot stand, then neither can the Section 4.5 bar stand to prohibit plaintiff’s bodily injury claim.  Plaintiff prevails on the argument that his coverage was enforceable under New Jersey law because he did not commit a material misrepresentation, then he would have a valid New Jersey policy and a right to a bodily injury claim.
[directive] Booby Traps and Fortifications (Special Application and Enhancement Feature  B)  If the defendant, acting as a principal or as an accomplice within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, has committed the offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 4.1b (booby traps) or 2C:35-4.1c (fortified structures) (which are not Brimage- eligible offenses), the defendant shall be required to plead guilty to the most serious Brimage-eligible charge and to the appropriate offense(s) defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1b or c, unless the prosecutor states on the record that there is insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction for the booby trap and/or fortification offense, or unless the prosecutor agrees to refrain from requiring the defendant to plead guilty to the 2C:35-4.1 charge as part of a cooperation agreement pursuant to Section 13.
[brief] The motion court concluded that Defendant never communicated anything because the motion court erroneously narrowed the statutory definition of communication in two respects.  First, the motion court mistakenly restricted a communication to the conveyance of information “for the purpose of inducing the debt to satisfy the debt. ”  Pa50.  Second, the motion court limited a communication to one in which the sender intends the recipient to “examine the information. ”  *Id.*  Notably, the statutory definition is only limited to information “regarding a debt. ”
[brief] [...]’s payment to the Company of over $1.2 million in one month (for both the $700,000 judgment and the $503,000 Sanction), 8 [...]’s current registration to practice law is susceptible to judicial notice, and therefore the current (November 2023) information from New York State’s website is acceptable to be included here.  Stephens v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n of New Jersey, 101 N.J.L. 192, 194 (1925) (“we are permitted to consult. . . such records of the government.  . . as are properly matters of judicial notice. ”).  (Pa247-248), demonstrates conclusively that he always could have hired counsel.  For whatever reason, though, he strategically chose not to hire an attorney.
[brief] ”  In re Stormwater Mgmt. Rules, 384 N.J. Super. 451, 454 (App. Div. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).  Stormwater is defined as “water resulting from precipitation (including rain and snow) that runs off the land's surface” and “stormwater runoff” is “water flow on the surface of the ground or in storm sewers, resulting from precipitation. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:8-1.2.  Stormwater runoff picks up pollutants from the land surface and creates water quality and quantity problems.  In re Stormwater Mgmt. Rules, 384 N.J. Super. at 454.  Stormwater management measures address these issues and are defined as “any structural or nonstructural” methods intended, among other things, “to control or reduce stormwater runoff and associated pollutants[.]”