ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] *If Term 24 26 27 22 24 25 26 28 29 28 30 31  Enhanced Extended 24 25 20 22 23 22 24 26 27 26 28 29  V 23 18 20 21 20 22 22 24 25 24 26 27  Term 25 20 22 23 22 24 26 27 29 24 26 28  Extended 20 21 20 22 23 18 22 24 25 24 26 27 IV 18 19 18 20 21 16 20 22 23 22 24 25 18 19 18 20 21 16 20 22 23 22 24 25
[brief] The Search Warrant Order in question provided:  1.  Things to Be Searched/Seized.  (X)  Premises described below, ( ) Vehicle(s) described below, ( ) Person(s) described below, ( )  Other items described below.  (Ca41).  Only the "Premises" at [...] were to be searched.  The State primarily argued (erroneously) that the officers acted reasonably within the lawful scope of the search warrant that had been obtained with sufficient probable cause, the State also relied upon the investigative stop ("reasonable and particularized suspicion" Terry v. Ohio frisk standard) in the event the trial court did not find that the officers' actions fell within the scope of the search warrant.  The trial court erroneously accepted the State's argument that the "reasonable and particularized suspicion" standard could be utilized to justify the stop as opposed to the more stringent "probable cause" standard as the stop was predicated upon the search warrant that had been issued.  Defendant submits that this case was not an "investigatory stop" case, and since there was neither an arrest warrant nor a search warrant issued as to defendant, the stop and subsequent pat-down was unconstitutional, mandating suppression of the gun.
[brief] Defendant [...], M.D., respectfully requests that the February 28, 2023 judgment order be reversed, with instructions to enter a molded judgment in conformity with *Burt* or, in the alternative, that a new trial be ordered.  Respectfully Submitted, **[...]**  BY: [...], Esq. (#037772003)  [...], Esq. (#117042014)  [...] (609)  896-2000  Dated: 12/26/2023 --- 5  Again, [...] obviously had no opportunity to move for a new trial based on a judgment order that had not yet been entered, but the trial court had an opportunity to remedy the inherent injustice in its post-verdict reconsideration by ordering a new trial up to 20 days after the judgment order.
[directive] UWAGA: Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu proszę nie podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] Furthermore, the “square corners” doctrine compels the government to “turn square corners” in dealing with the public and to “observe certain standards and norms . . . that are beyond reproach. ”  *CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Plan Bd./Bd. of Adjustment*, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 585 (App. Div. 2010).  The “square corners” doctrine has been applied to all levels of municipal government, including planning boards.
[directive] Alternatively, if the case is pre-screened by an assistant prosecutor who learns that the defendant is a public employee before referring the case to the municipal prosecutor, the assistant prosecutor should ask the county prosecutor to review the file in order to determine if waiver is warranted.  Upon completion of the review, the county prosecutor should provide the municipal prosecutor with the signed and complete written statement of reasons accepting or rejecting 5 waiver.  The review should be completed in an expeditious manner in order to insure a speedy resolution to the underlying matter.  Upon receipt of a signed and completed written statement of reasons, the municipal prosecutor should move the case for trial or other disposition in municipal court.  If the prosecutor rejects waiver of forfeiture, the statement of reasons should be submitted to the court and the defendant at the time of his conviction and sentencing.  The municipal prosecutor should move immediately upon defendant’s conviction to forfeit the defendant’s public employment or office.  Further, the municipal prosecutor shall generally oppose the granting of any stay of forfeiture requested by the defendant.
[directive] See 4.4.1. also subsection 3:3-1(e) and Rule to pursuant Indictments.  Direct 4.9  Summons.  o~ Complaint Complaint-Warrant a P~epa~e Need to 4.9.1 not was who a defendant against an indictment return occasion on will jury grand A or complaint-warrant been by charged already not has therefore and offense the for arrested as 3:25-4, Rule indictments.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF IS DISABLED AS DEFINED BY THE NJLAD**  Defendant claims that Plaintiff cannot establish a *prima facie* case of disability discrimination because she does not qualify as disabled.  Defendant alleges that Plaintiff: (1) did not produce documentation of her disabilities; (2) did not mention her disabilities to her employer; (3) was not under medical care for a disability in the months leading up to her separation; (4) never claimed that she was limited due to her disabilities; and (5) that there are no comparators because everyone who was a part of the email was terminated.  These proclamations have no legal or factual support in the record.  Plaintiff had a history of treatment for anxiety, which she conveyed to her employer, and obesity, which was readily apparent.  See Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 18 (2002) ("where the existence of a handicap is not readily apparent, expert medical evidence is required."); Place II Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. K.P., 256 N.J. 472, 487 (2024) (the Court noted that a disability is not readily apparent when it is "non-observable").  There is no legal requirement, and Defendant cites none, that an employee must inform her employer of her disabilities, nor is there a requirement that she be under medical care for a disability immediately before termination.  Nonetheless, Plaintiff did inform Defendant of her anxiety.  While Defendant may question the veracity of that information— that creates a material dispute of fact which prohibited the trial court from granting summary judgment.  Plaintiff also acknowledged medical treatment for anxiety prior to her termination in her answers to Interrogatories.  She reserved the right to call any treating medical professional at the time of trial.
[brief] In the District of New Jersey, for example, it is the government’s practice “to provide Jencks material in advance of a directive to avoid delays. ”  United States v. Evans, Crim. No. 2:21-cv-899 (WJM), 2022 WL 16631263, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 2, 2022).  Under the Jencks Act, statements requiring production include “a written statement made by [the] witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him. ”  18 U.S.C. § 3500(e).
[brief] [...] did not consider [...]’ report and any reference to it was simply part of a narration of the competing causation theories.  (Pa6-Pa7; Pa18).  She specifically stated that regardless of whether the infant’s injuries were ultimately caused by the hemorrhage or (HIE), she accepted [...]’s testimony that the C-Section needed to be performed 25 to 30 minutes earlier than it was to establish proximate cause.  (Pa18-Pa19).
[brief] 1.  Unconstitutional interference with vested rights  First, the argument that the interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) as allowing payment to [...] without a renegotiated contract violates the Impairment of Contracts Clause under the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions is detailed under Point Eight of the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Counterclaim Only, and is thus incorporated by reference as if fully set forth at length herein.  Second, another unconstitutional interference with vested rights of the Board is under the New Jersey Constitution, Art. 8, § IV, ¶ 1, where school districts must provide for a “thorough and efficient” education.  The Board is able to carry out this duty through N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(d), where the Board “shall” “Perform all acts and do all things, consistent with law and the rules of the state board, necessary for 13 Pa265–Pa266 the lawful and proper conduct, equipment and maintenance of the public schools of the district”.  A major focus of the Board during the pandemic was to preserve and reserve funding and resources to thoroughly execute remote instruction and combat learning loss from remote instruction, so the Board prioritized its resources toward that end.  It would have a detrimental impact on budgeting, planning, and financial resources, and by extension, negatively impact the Board’s ability to provide the constitutional “thorough and efficient” education, if the statute was applied retroactively where the Board is forced to spend exorbitant amounts of money on a for-profit private company who, at the time, provided no benefit to its students.  In this new budget year, and as the Board plans the next budget year, the Board needs those funds to deliver the necessary education programs to combat learning loss caused by the pandemic.  Applying the statute retroactively thus unconstitutionally interferes with the Board’s rights to ensure efficient spending of public taxpayer money for the lawful and proper conduct of the school district.  Thus, even if [...] did have a right to be paid under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), this court cannot give the statute retroactive application.  Without retroactive application, [...]’s claim for payments of the April / May / June 2020 invoices fail.  2.
[brief] Rather, this matter involves claims that (i) [...] misappropriated company funds from a joint company [...] while he was working for Respondents; (ii) Respondents failed to pay [...] for his services; and (ii) [...] is owed sums which remain due and owing in connection with a series of loan transactions.  (1a – 72a).  Indeed, other than facts and information specific to the claims involved in the prior unrelated matters -- which, again, is entirely irrelevant to the instant litigation -- Respondents never demonstrated how that information is being used, or even that it could be used against them in this case.  Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the claimed “confidential” business information would be unavailable or beyond the reach of [...] during the ordinary course of pre-trial discovery in any event.  See O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ, 206 N. J. 109, 130 (2011) (noting that Defendant has been unable to demonstrate what of its claimed confidential information would be beyond the reach of pre-trial discovery).  Put simply, there has been no showing that the information is privileged or confidential or otherwise not subject to normal disclosures in the course of discovery.
[brief] POINT III  THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IMPLIED HEARSAY FROM NON-TESTIFYING WITNESSES THAT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT.  (8T 18-7 to 24, 34-9 to 17, 35-8 to 19, 49-4 to 11)  The key question for the jury was the identity of the shooter.  With significant reasons to doubt the reliability of [...]’s alleged dying declaration and [...]’s identification of [...], the State improperly sought to bolster its case with testimonial hearsay from unidentified witnesses.  Two different police detectives told the jury that they spoke to unnamed people and came away suspecting that “[...]” was the shooter.  [...] testified that he spoke to “family members at the hospital,” and that after leaving the hospital, he had “a nickname” — “[...]. ”  (8T 168-4 to 9, 168-12 to 18)  Over defense counsel objection, [...] similarly testified that “[a]fter meeting with [...],” he had been “provided with a possible name to look into as a potential suspect”: “[...]. ”  (8T 34-9 to 17)  [...] relayed to the jury, over defense objection, “a general description of who this [...] was”: “Blue eyes, brown skin, dark brown skin. ”  (8T 34-19 to 35-7)  [...] then went even further, testifying that he was “provided with another name after meeting with [...],” that that name was “Zahir [...],” and that he was given a physical description of [...]: “About 5’6”, dark brown skin, blue eyes. ”  (8T 35-8 to 19)  [...] used this description, provided by unnamed witnesses, to prepare the photo array shown to [...].  (8T 49-4 to 11)  This testimonial hearsay from unknown, unnamed witnesses, was crucial to bolstering the State’s shaky case against [...].  Because the admission of this hearsay violated [...]’s rights to confrontation and due process, his convictions must be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
[brief] If the court were to interpret N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) as not requiring [...] to execute a new, renegotiated contract with [...] as a prerequisite to receiving payment, then N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), as applied, violates the Impairment of Contracts Clause under the New Jersey Constitution Art. 4, § 7, ¶3, since it would have meant that the Legislature passed an “ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made” because it would have essentially impaired [...]’s contractual obligation to perform services as a prerequisite to payment, and impaired [...]’s contractual obligation to tender payment after proof of receipt of services, in effect converting [...]’s services contract into an illegal “no-show” contract that excused [...]’s performance and required [...] to pay [...] despite receiving no services.  To clarify, [...] does not argue that the statute itself is unconstitutional.  Rather, [...] posits that the court’s misinterpretation and misapplication of the statute as not requiring a renegotiated contract interprets the statute in a manner that is unconstitutional because it impairs the most basic, fundamental obligations in a services contract, *i.e.*, to pay for services rendered.  Under the rules / canons of statutory construction, statutes cannot be interpreted in a way that would invalidate a constitutional clause.  If the court agrees with [...]’s Counterclaim and summary judgment motion, and allows them to stake a claim for payment for no services rendered and without a renegotiated contract, then *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)*, as applied, effectively violates the Impairment of Contracts Clauses under the U.S. Constitution and New Jersey Constitution.  Thus, the only interpretation of *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)* that avoids it being applied in an unconstitutional manner is to interpret it as requiring a renegotiated contract signed by the parties that effectively alters the respective obligations of the parties.  That is why the “renegotiated contract” reference is contained in *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)*.  [...] admits that there was no renegotiated contract between the parties that authorized payment for services not rendered.  So [...]’s Counterclaim for payment under *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)* fails as a matter of law.  POINT NINE
[directive] SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY  With the October 18, 2024 enactment of L. 2024, c. 83 having established new offenses of home invasion burglary ( as a crime of the first degree) and residential burglary ( as a crime of the second degree), IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to N.J. Const., Art. VI, sec. 2, para. 3, that effective immediately, the provisions of Rule 3:3-l(f) ("Issuance of a Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) or a Complaint­ Summons (CDR-1 ); Offenses Where Issuance of a Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) is Presumed") of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey are relaxed and supplemented so as to include a presumption that a complaint-warrant shall issue upon a finding of probable cause to believe that the defendant committed (a) home invasion burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C: 18-2.1) or (b) residential This rule relaxation shall remain in effect pending burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C: 18-2.2). development and adoption of appropriate rule amendments to be proposed by the Criminal Practice Committee.
[brief] (21T 142-11 to 22)  [...] was, however, also “always doing cocaine” and “experimented with a lot of drugs. ”  (21T 142-23 to 25)  Defendant also told [...] that he, defendant, is “permanently disabled” from back surgery after a car accident.  (21T 113-20 to 21; 21T 119-14 to 17)  Defendant stated that on January 9, [...] went to the carriage-house door, because that was where defendant was living at that point, and started “banging on the door. ”  (21T 119-18 to 120-6)  When defendant asked what he wanted, [...] said, “For you to come outside.  We need to handle this. ”  (21T 120-9 to 11)  When defendant went outside, [...] “started to pull a gun” on him and they “got into a wrestling match.
[brief] In adhering to the reasonable expectations of the insureds, Courts have acknowledged that “[s]ince understanding of the contract through consent and negotiation rarely exists, one cannot assume that traditional contract consent applies with insurance contracts. ”  Ibid.  Rather, in Sparks, supra, 100 N.J. at 325, the Supreme Court held that:  Such consent can be inferred only to the extent that the policy language conforms to public expectations and commercially reasonable standards .  . . .  In instances in which the insurance contract is inconsistent with public expectations and commercially accepted standards, judicial regulation of insurance contracts is essential in order to prevent over-reaching and injustice.  [Id. at 338.]
[brief] Pa17.  [...] filed its answer to the complaint on May 27, 2022.  Pa30.  Following the conclusion of discovery, [...] moved for summary judgment on May 17, 2023.  Pa49.  [...] opposed [...]’s motion for summary judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 11, 2023.  Pa449.  On August 25, 2023, the Trial Court orally granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment and denied [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment from the bench (the “Challenged Decision”).  T73-14 to T85-24; Pa1.  On September 14, 2023, [...] filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Challenged Decision.  Pa5.
[brief] 3.  In August 2015, I was contacted by [...] of the [...] regarding in-car video recording from [...] case number [...], relating to an armed robbery involving [...] and [...].  4.  I checked the CAD system to determine which police vehicles were involved in that investigation.  5.  I then checked the L3 in-car camera video recording system for all car numbers listed on the CAD report related to this investigation.  6.  The L3 system indicated that a video may have been recorded by a police vehicle around the time of the armed robbery.  7.  The L3 systems indicated that the video would need to be restored utilizing back-up disc #795.  8.  I then checked our back-up disc inventory and was unable to locate disc #795.
[brief] 49.  After the property was listed, with no notice to the owners and/or their counsel, there were several suspicious and curious activities by the realtor, [...].  50.  I was informed on numerous occasions that [...] refused to show the property to certain prospective buyers and/or realtors.  51.  I was also informed that [...] had changed the access code on the Lock Box at the Subject Property so that certain realtors could not gain entry.  Indeed, one realtor had an interested buyer and was coming up from Washington, D.C., only to be denied entry.  52.  Further, I was told that there was an interested buyer from California and/or Colorado who was willing to pay upwards of $538,000-plus for the property but was strangely denied access to the property by [...]…  53.
[brief] After briefing and oral argument, a bench trial was held on the prerogative writ counts of the consolidated complaints in this matter based on the record at the Board hearing.  The trial court issued an Order and Statement of Reasons reversing the August 4, 2021, decision of the Board and remanding the matter to the Board to consider “in good faith reasonable conditions” that might be imposed on the applicant.  However, the Order also directed that “the proposed number of units may not be reduced below 165. ”  Da349.  The trial court retained jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding conditions and the enforcement of its decision.  The Order prevented the Board from applying conditions that would have provided the most relief from the negative impact caused by the approval of the use variance, a reduction in the number of units, thereby reducing the density, coverage, parking, and setbacks, and achieving better compliance with zoning and aesthetics.  By granting approval of all variances requested, and not just the d variances, the trial court also prohibited the Board from addressing any conditions relating to other variances that were part of the application, and deprived the Board of its inherent power and responsibility to address the negative effects of variances by imposing conditions as provided in the Sica standards.  The Board conducted the remand hearing on February 16, 2023, in accordance with the process developed in the Whispering Woods v Middletown Tp., 220 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 1987).  On March 1, 2023, a resolution imposing certain conditions was adopted by the Board.  Da359.  No objection to any condition was filed.  All other Counts of the complaints were eventually dismissed by [...] and [...].
[brief] In 2010, the State repealed a provision enacted in the SFRA that required the State to conduct an expert study of the formula’s local growth limitation and how it operates to constrain funding for [...]’s Adequacy Budget.  The State also did not conduct any review of the formula’s LFS calculation and its use in determining the level of state support for the Adequacy Budget in its periodic reviews or otherwise, even in the face of glaring evidence that a widening local levy gap was a key factor in the Budget shortfalls.  Further, the three periodic reviews the State performed were neither rigorous, meaningful nor relevant to [...], and did not analyze the formula’s operation and the factors responsible for the recurring underfunding of the Adequacy Budget.  Nor did these reviews yield recommendations for adjusting the SFRA or modifications to address the recurring and structural problems and deficiencies in SFRA’s operation and the underfunding of [...]’s Adequacy Budget.  Finally, the State’s 2018 amendments altered SFRA’s operation in [...] by: 1) phasing-out Adjustment Aid over a six-year period, a state aid loss totaling over $1 billion; 2) authorizing, but not mandating, the City to enact an employer payroll tax; and 3) lifting the 2% cap on the local levy without mandating property tax revenue be increased to the level required by the LFS.
[brief] ”  Statement to S. 287 (July 14, 1980)(Pra9.)  The State further violated N.J.S.A. 52:13B-13 by failing to follow the emergency procedure for a fiscal note.  Likewise, the Legislature had an obligation to submit A.6260 or S.49 to the [...] (“Commission”) because the bill was to “advance comprehensive insurance coverage for reproductive care, including primary reproductive health care services, services to terminate a pregnancy, long-acting contraceptives, and long-term supplies of hormonal contraceptives.