ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1028 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282).  The equitable defense of laches requires a showing of the following two elements: “(a) the patentee’s delay in bringing suit was unreasonable and inexcusable, and (b) the alleged infringer suffered material prejudice attributable to the delay. ”  Id.  The period of delay is defined as the time from when the patentee knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged infringing acts until the date of suit.  Id.; Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Getaway, Inc., 470 F. 2d 1187, 1190 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“[f]or laches to apply, a defendant must prove that plaintiff unreasonably delayed in filing suit from the time plaintiff knew or should have known of the infringement....”).  The resulting prejudice may be evidentiary, affecting the defendant’s ability to put on a full and fair defense, or the prejudice may be economic.  Id. (citing A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1033).  *4  The equitable estoppel defense requires the showing of the following elements:  a.  The patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer.  “Conduct” may include specific statements, action, inaction, or silence where there was an obligation to speak.  b.  The alleged infringer relies on that conduct.  c.  Due to its reliance, the alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.  A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1028.  Where the alleged infringer establishes all three elements of the equitable estoppel defense, the court must consider “any other evidence and facts respecting the equities of the parties in exercising its discretion and deciding whether to allow the defense of equitable estoppel to bar suit. ”  Id. at 1043.  Acceptance of late payment of maintenance fees is authorized and implemented by statute.
[brief] | Order dated November 8, 2024 | 1a | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLC, | 15 | | 393 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 2007) | | | AT&T Techs. v. Communications Workers, | 15 | | 475 U.S. 643 (1986) | | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., | 15 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | Caldwell v. KFC Corp., | 15 | | 958 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J.1997) | | | Curtis v. Cellco P'ship, | 15 | | 413 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 2010) | | | EPIX Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., | 16 | | 410 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div. 2009) | | | Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., | 15 | | 244 N.J. 119 (2020) | | | Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., | 15 | | P.A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001) | | | Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., | 16, 19, 21 | | 238 N.J. 191 (2019) | | | Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., | 16, 19, 21 | | 454 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 2018) | | | Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., | 15 | | 411 N.J. Super. 515 (App.Div.2010) | | | Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, | 15 | | 215 N.J. 174 (2013) | | Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 84 N.J. 524 (1997)  ..................................................................................................................5  Ziner v. Micro Tech Training Center, Inc., Docket No.: [...] .............................................................................................13  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6 ......................................................................................................................15, 19  New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et. seq. ..................................................................................................................................................5  New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et. seq. ........................................5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Da154 Order Barring Damages to Property Sustained from Vibrations and Statement of Reasons Filed 08/06/21.................................  Da391 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Loss of Ocean View and Privacy  Filed 01/28/22 ..............................................  Da446  Order Barring Defendant’s Appraiser from Relying at Trial on the [...] Report [as to enhanced wave overtopping]  Filed 10/07/22............................................................  Da505  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] In addition, [...] told her, “She doesn’t have an Admin Officer’s position and, basically, she doesn’t know why this is occurring [her transfer]” (1T; 129:22).  While Plaintiff indicated that [...] never said she was going to “hold the EEO complaint against you” in those words but “just in action, just in what I’ve experienced” (1T; 130:7).  [...] was, in effect, the Admin Officer (1T; 130:21).  The Plaintiff distinguished the two evaluations at the Academy (1T; 132:16).  The first one, the one without deficiencies, was done by [...], while the second one, just before her transfer, was done by [...] (1T; 132:16).  Plaintiff summarized the situation and indicated that another person looking for a Lieutenant’s position was transferred to the Academy under “[...]” (1T; 135:11).  Plaintiff had put in for seven Lieutenants’ positions during that timeframe and because of the evaluation that she got from [...]; the promotion was affected because points were taken off for that evaluation (1T; 136:15).
[brief] *Id.*  The trial court’s reliance upon the [...] opinion was entirely appropriate because in that case, the appellate court examined the identical issue, and the trial court was thus bound to adhere to the jurisprudence of a higher court.  Plaintiff further argues that the trial court failed to satisfy Rule 1:7-4 because the court did not perform a detailed analysis of each of his other allegations that the Defendants violated OPMA’s notice provisions.  Pl.’s Br. at 26.  However, this circular argument neglects the fact that the trial court dismissed these arguments on other grounds.  The trial court dismissed these arguments by holding that Plaintiff’s challenges were time barred pursuant to Rule 4:69:6(a) (concerning actions in lieu of prerogative writ).  (Pa86).  Therefore, the court was not required to engage with Plaintiff on each of his abstruse variations of the same argument.  In summary, the trial court addressed each of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Verified Complaint as moot, time barred pursuant to Rule 4:69:6(a), or involving conduct that is not in violation of OPMA.
[brief] As discussed below, neither exception applies because New York has a substantial relationship to the parties and their transactions – indeed, 90% of Appellants’ Sapporo sales are in New York.  Accordingly, New York also has the materially greater interest in this dispute and, in any event, applying New York law would not violate a fundamental policy of New Jersey and New York would be the most appropriate law to apply absent any choice-of-law provision.  i.
[brief] The FDCPA, as a Federal Statute, Should Be Construed Consistent with How Federal Courts Construe the Statute.  (Not Addressed in the Decision Below)**  It is axiomatic that a court must follow binding precedents.  The problem here is that there are no binding precedents as to whether Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim.  Indeed, there are only a handful or so of published opinions from the Courts of the State of New Jersey applying any provision of the FDCPA and roughly the same number from the U.S. Supreme Court—but none address § 1692c(b).  But the absence of binding precedent does not mean that a New Jersey court writes on a clean slate when there exists non-binding authority from the lower federal courts which includes the circuit courts of appeal and the district courts.  “[F]ederal opinions, including district court decisions, may have significant persuasive effect. ”  *Jusino v. Lapenta*, 442 N.J. Super. 248, 252 (Law. Div. 2014) (quoting Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, Comment 3.5 to R. 1:36–3 [reproduced at Pa192]).  In *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 121 N.J. 69, 80 (1990), the Supreme Court instructed that, when construing federal statutes in the absence of binding precedent, judicial comity requires giving “due respect” for the decisions of the lower federal courts—particularly when the federal courts are in agreement.  Doing so helps “ensure uniformity” and “discourages forum shopping. ”  *Dewey*, 121 N.J. at 80.  *Loigman v. Kings Landing Condo. Ass’n, Inc.*, 324 N.J. Super. 97 (Ch. Div. 1999), is an example of applying *Dewey* to the interpretation of the FDCPA.  *Loigman* explained that “a state court placed in the position of ascertaining the content of federal law should look for the view taken by a majority of the lower federal courts. ”  *Loigman*, at 105 n.7.  Consequently, *Loigman* looked to the lower federal courts’ majority view as what constitutes a “debt” covered by the FDCPA and rejected the minority view of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals notwithstanding that the Third Circuit encompasses New Jersey.  (Years later, the Third Circuit adopted the majority view.)  To be clear, *Dewey* does not compel a New Jersey court to treat the lower federal court decisions as if they were binding authorities.  But, at a minimum, the “due respect” *Dewey* requires implies that a court must consider those federal court decisions and either follow them or articulate its rejection of their reasoning.  Ignoring them does not suffice.  Here, Plaintiff briefed the federal decisions.
[brief] In making that determination, courts should consider all relevant factors, including: (1) the extent of questioning and the nature of any admissions made by defendant before being informed of his Miranda rights; (2) the proximity in time and place between the pre- and post-warning questioning; (3) whether the same law enforcement officers conducted both the unwarned and warned interrogations; (4) whether the officers informed defendant that his pre-warning statements could not be used against him; and (5) the degree to which the post-warning questioning is a continuation of the pre-warning questioning.  [193 N.J. at 180–81.]
[brief] As the trial transcript bear out, counsel for the plaintiff, during plaintiff’s own testimony on direct examination played selected portions of the bodycam videos of the investigating officers to [...] on direct examination.  These videos played by plaintiff’s counsel demonstrated tense exchanges between [...] and [...], in which [...] repeatedly asked [...] why [...] had grout all over his back, and in which [...] accuses the police of railroading him.  [7T84:3-86:6, 7T90:16-96:5, 7T115:16-19]  The jury further heard [...] tell the police “I’m getting accused of assault . . .  You couldn’t make simple police report.  You have to accuse me? . . .  You gotta accuse me with it?”  [7T93:8-24].  After plaintiff’s counsel played the police bodycam footage for the jury, [...] upon plaintiff’s counsel’s questioning testified that the police “ke[pt] telling me that I throw the bag of grout in the back of the guy head,” that the police accused him of assaulting [...], and that [...], who observed the exchange, told him he thought they were going to be arrested.  [7T95:8-11, 7T115:16-117:7].  Through [...]’s own testimony it became obvious what the investigating offer’s opinions were.  This testimony, which was initially elicited at [...]’s deposition, was always admissible regardless of N. J.R.E. 701.  This testimony put before the jury by plaintiff’s counsel on direct examination of [...] placed the opinions of the investigating officers into evidence in the first place.  Plaintiff can not now legitimately claim that the Court abused its discretion when permitting the officer’s opinion with a limiting instruction to impeach plaintiff’s expert.
[directive] 4  Lead Triage Officers  A group of triage officers should be appointed.  Preferable qualities of triage officers include being a physician with established expertise in the management of critically ill patients (e.g. past experience in caring for patients in a critical care unit including, but not limited to, an ICU, CCU, PACU, SICU, ED), strong leadership ability, and effective communication and conflict resolution skills.  This individual will oversee the triage process, assess all patients, assign a level of priority for each, communicate with treating physicians, and direct attention to the highest-priority patients.  S/he is expected to make decisions with the team according to the allocation framework described below, which is designed to benefit the greatest number of patients, even though these decisions may not necessarily be best for some individual patients.  To optimize effective functioning in a crisis, the triage officer should ideally be well-prepared and trained in advance by means of disaster drills or exercises.  The triage officer has the responsibility and authority to apply the principles and processes of this document to make decisions about which patients will receive the highest priority for receiving critical care.
[brief] THE ENFORCIBILITY OF THE AGREEMENT AGAINST MR. MCGINTY IS NOT PROPERLY ON APPEAL AND CANNOT BE DECIDED ON THIS MEAGER RECORD**  New Jersey law does not permit one spouse to waive the other’s right to trial and bind them to arbitration absent agency or consent.  On the one hand, those are in part factual questions unaddressed by discovery or discussed in the trial court’s opinion.  For these reasons and those discussed above, in Point II, this issue is outside the scope of appellate jurisdiction here.  On the other hand, given the complete absence of any proof or even speculation of any such interspousal-agency relationship or consent on the part of the [...], and the absolutely clarity of the law on this issue, the Court could nevertheless address this question on the merits and validly hold that as a matter of law, [...] cannot be compelled to arbitrate even if the agreement is deemed generally enforceable.
[brief] [...]’s actuarial memorandum was revealing.  By the time of its application to the Department, [...] had accumulated far more in total premiums versus what it actually paid in claims from policy inception to the 2020 rate increase request.  For the rate stability filing, the actuarial memorandum disclosed that since its original release of its policy [...] had accumulated $12,552,344,237 in total premiums with past rate increases nationally.  (Cra91).  Based on the original premiums alone, [...] had accumulated $12,280,025,859 in premiums.  Ibid.  Accordingly, [...] gained $272,318,378 over the initial premium rates based on past premium rate increases approved by the Department.  Ibid.  In its 2020 Filings, [...] sought to achieve a total of $19,483,943,228 as the present value of future premiums nationally, including approved and requested rate increases.  In comparison, by 2019, [...] had only incurred $1,895,860,186 in total claims nationwide.  *Ibid.*  These claims represented only approximately 15% of the $12,280,025,859 in premiums received by [...] under the original premium rates.  *Ibid.*  For the rate stability policies in New Jersey issued after January 2006, [...] accumulated $36,848,527 in earned premiums and $36,764,066 in written premiums, including prior approved rate increases without MAE.  (Cra572).  Yet, [...] only incurred $15,390,328 in claims and only paid $7,556,001 in claims.  *Ibid.*  Accordingly, [...]’s loss ratio was only 41.8% when it filed the 2020 rate increase.  [...]’s claims paying ability appears to have certainly improved through its MYRAP and work with the NAIC.
[brief] i.  The court failed to properly apply Miller factor 1 (immaturity) by erroneously concluding that Defendant’s actions as a teenager were not influenced by his immaturity, and by improperly disregarding expert psychological testimony indicating that Defendant had matured since his original sentencing.  When sentencing pursuant to Comer, there are two distinct components to consideration of maturity: (1) the presumption of the juvenile’s immaturity at the time of the offense, and (2) an analysis of whether the defendant has matured in the two decades since the offense.
[directive] disorderly persons violence domestic only not applies to Law Reform Bail the that Note all to also but (4), to 2C:25-21(a)(1)  N.J.S.A. in specified the grounds of any involving offenses all indictable includes Directive of Section (scope also 1.6 See offenses. disorderly persons other thus Law Reform Bail The offenses).  disorderly persons petty and persons disorderly all and crimes required not fingerprinting is which disorderly for offense petty or persons disorderly apply may a to for offense an is arrested is defendant which for offense a serious the If 4.
[brief] Specifically, Her Honor dispensed with each of Defendants’ arguments as follows:  •  There was no indication from anyone involved with the trial that Plaintiff attempted to influence or interact with the jury during voir dire.  [...] noted that voir dire can take a long time, and potential jurors and litigants alike are free to move, stretch, and use the restroom at their leisure.  Her Honor explained that the Courts accommodate witnesses as needed, which in this case included Defense Counsel’s consent to let Plaintiff stand during his testimony.  She also found that Defense counsel used Plaintiff’s condition to their advantage during cross-examination by drawing to the jury’s attention times during the trial when Plaintiff elected to sit (6T, at 54:5-57:8); • Defense counsel quickly and effectively objected to Plaintiff’s testimony regarding resuming treatment with a chiropractor, which was properly handled by the Court.  Defense counsel never moved for a mistrial at that point, which [...] noted would have been improper given how the objection was addressed (6T, at 57:9-58:8); and • Plaintiff did, in fact, request the time-unit charge prior to trial, which was never brought up during the charge conference.  Upon Defendants’ objection, Plaintiff was permitted to present to the jury the extrapolated units of life expectancy – something they could easily deduce on their own – but was precluded from arguing anything beyond that.  Therefore, “the plaintiff did not actually go into any sort of unit analysis,” or suggest that the jury should “allocate some amount of money of their choosing to that time. ”  Defendants were thus in no way prejudiced by a time-unit argument that was never made (6T, at 58:7-59:23).  After finding that none of the foregoing constituted a miscarriage of justice, [...] turned her attention toward the jury’s verdict.
[directive] New Jersey Division of Criminal INSTRUCTIONS FOR USING SHOWUP I.D.  PROCEDURE  WORKSHEET  This worksheet is designed to assist law enforcement officers in documenting the procedures/results of showups that are conducted with eyewitnesses in the course of a criminal investigation.  The worksheet is also designed to serve as a checklist to ensure that officers comply with all of the requirements for eyewitness identification procedures established by Court Rule and New Jersey Supreme Court case law.  Whenever a worksheet is prepared, the original should be preserved and a copy forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office.
[brief] Landlord continues to insist that, as a result of Tenant’s alleged default for the first five months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Tenant’s Allowance installments that had been due in 2020 and 2021 are permanently forfeited, as is the unpaid pre-default 2019 interest payment.  Landlord’s claim is unsupported by any provision of the Lease.  A.  The Lease and the Undisputed Facts Reflect  Tenant Has a Vested Right to Receive Tenant’s Allowance  The Lease vests in Tenant an affirmative right to receive $730,000 from Landlord for Tenant’s Work, all of which was completed in phase one of the Lease before a single monthly rent payment was even owed.  Section 4.02 states:  “[W]hen and if each condition contained in the foregoing items (i) through (vi), inclusive, hereof shall have been complied with in full, Landlord shall pay to Tenant up to the sum of Seven Hundred Thirty Thousand . . . Dollars . . . as reimbursement for the actual cost of Tenant’s leasehold improvements. ” (Da17) (emphasis added).  Landlord does not dispute in any way that the Reimbursement Conditions set forth in “items (i) through (vi)” were satisfied, therefore, that point being conceded, it is not necessary to re-discuss those items.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On February 2, 2023, a Gloucester County Grand Jury returned [...], charging defendant [...] with Count I, unlawful possession of a handgun in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1); Count II, second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; Count III, first-degree murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1).  On February 15, 2024, defendant filed a motion to suppress all out-of-court statements made by defendant to law enforcement and all other persons while detained by law enforcement, in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.  On April 5, April 9, and April 18, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. presided over pretrial motions and heard the testimony of witnesses.  (1T:3-10 to 4:23)¹  On June 25, 2024, the trial court heard the arguments of counsel and subsequently issued a decision granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to suppress his statements.  (2T:51-1 to 56-1).  ¹  “1T” refers to the Transcript of Motion to Suppress, dated April 9, 2024.  “2T” refers to the Transcript of Decision, dated June 25, 2024.  “3T” refers to the Transcript of Motion to Reconsider, dated August 26, 2024.  On June 26, 2024, the Court signed an Order documenting the specific findings of the Court.  Pa1.  On August 26, 2024, [...] heard the State’s motion to reconsider and maintained the suppression of the statements defendant made during phone calls to his parents.  (3T:20-23 to 21-3).  On August 30, 2024, [...] denied the State’s motion for stay of the proceeding pending leave to appeal.  Pa2.  On September 4, 2024, the Appellate Division denied the State’s emergent application for a stay of the proceedings.  Pa3-Pa4.  The State requests leave to appeal [...]’s decision on the motion to reconsider.
[brief] As to the bulk “c” variances, [...] found that the development “substantially outweighs any detriments. ”  Id.  The building height, which exceeds the maximum building height by a mere 2.4 feet, would be mitigated by the slope of the building and the proposed setback.  Id.  Likewise, the building coverage complies with the maximum lot coverage requirement, while also providing for sufficient setbacks.  Id.  The total side yard, where 25 feet is required and only 12.2 feet is proposed, is appropriate because the Property is a “corner lot with two front yards, one rear yard (along the eastern property boundary) and one side yard, there is no second side yard available to comply with this total side yard setback requirements.