ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] MANDATING SUPPRESSION  To reiterate the substantive legal principles, "[a] warrantless search is \textsuperscript{15}  It is important to state that the warrant application requested a warrant for all people "connected with said property," which is constitutionally ambiguous in the extreme.  See Point I, Subpoint B, infra. presumed invalid unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. ’ ”  State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014) (quoting State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 664 (2000)).  “[T]he State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search or seizure ‘falls within one of the ... exceptions ....’”  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004)).  As no exceptions to the warrant requirement exist in this case, the evidence seized should be suppressed (the "investigatory stop" exception and its purported applicability is discussed in Point III, infra).  For the foregoing reasons, the trial court should be reversed and the evidence illegally seized suppressed.
[brief] The doctrine applies only when, “as a matter of probability, a dangerous condition is likely to occur as the result of the nature of the business, the property's condition, or a demonstrable pattern of conduct or incidents. ”  Id. at 260 (emphasis supplied); Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559, 563 (2003).  There must be a “nexus” between the self-service components and risk of injury in the area of the accident.  Prioleau, supra, at 262.  The doctrine only applies to accidents that occur in areas affected by the “self-service operations. ”  Id.
[brief] R. 1:4-4 ...........................................................................................................  27 R. 1:5-3 ...........................................................................................................  20 R. 1:6-2 ...........................................................................................................  22 R. 1:7-2 ...........................................................................................................  25, 26 R. 4:4-2 ...........................................................................................................  19 R. 4:5-1 ...........................................................................................................  33 R. 4:5-2 ...........................................................................................................  19 R. 4:5-4 ...........................................................................................................  33, 34 R. 4:46-2 .......................................................................................................  7, 14, 15, 16 R. 6:1-1 ...........................................................................................................  18, 20 R. 6:1-2 ...........................................................................................................  18, 20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 21  POINT I THE JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT WITH PREJUDICE ...........................................  21  A.  A dismissal of the indictment with prejudice was unwarranted under the circumstances, where the judge found that the State’s conduct was not willful or outrageous and where defendant’s alleged prejudice was remediable with a lesser remedy ..................................................................................  21  B.  Additionally, as a matter of law, there was no Brady violation because the delayed diagram was not material for Brady purposes under the correctly applied Fourth Amendment analysis, and because the diagram was disclosed in time for its effective use at trial .................................................................................. 28 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 34 TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] Order granting Defendant, [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment entered on January 19, 2024 ……….Pa385 – Pa386 Order granting Defendant, [...] d/b/a [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment entered on August 25, 2023 …………………………………………..Pa324 – Pa325 Order of Judgment by Default against Defendant, [...] entered on March 14, 2024 ……………………. Pa393 – Pa394 TABLE OF ITEMS/EXHIBITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ON MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT Page(s) Plaintiff, [...]’s Certified Answers to Form A Interrogatories .............................................. Pa1 – Pa12 Plaintiff, [...]’s Deposition Transcript ............... Pa13 – Pa59 [...] Deposition Transcript ................................. Pa60 – Pa79 [...] Deposition Transcript ..................... Pa80 – Pa90 [...] Deposition Transcript ............................... Pa91 – Pa110 [...] Deposition Transcript ............................. Pa111 – Pa125 [...] Deposition Transcript ................................. Pa126 – Pa142 Defendant, [...]’s Certified Answers to Form C and C(2) Interrogatories .......................... Pa143 – Pa197 Plaintiffs’ signed Retainer Agreement ................................. Pa198 – Pa200 Plaintiffs’ Counsel Letter to [...], Counsel for Defendant, [...] requesting copy of surveillance footage ........................................... Pa201 Plaintiffs, [...] and [...]’s Complaint filed on March 25, 2021 ................................. Pa202 – Pa208 Plaintiffs, [...] and [...]’s Amended Complaint .............................................. Pa209 – Pa217 Defendant, [...]’s Answer ......................... Pa218 – Pa228 Plaintiffs, [...] and [...]’s August 15, 2023 Opposition to Defendant, [...] d/b/a [...]’s July 28, 2023 Motion for Summary Judgment, including only Plaintiffs’ Response to [...] d/b/a [...]’s Statement of Facts and Plaintiffs’ Counterstatement of Material Facts ..............................................Pa286 – Pa293 Defendant, [...]’s August 15, 2023 Opposition to Defendant, [...] d/b/a [...]’s July 28, 2023 Motion for Summary Judgment, including only Restaurant Depot’s Response to Vida Café d/b/a [...]’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and Counterstatement of Undisputed Material Facts .................................................................Pa294 – Pa299 Defendant, [...]’s August 21, 2023 Reply to Plaintiffs, [...] and [...]’s Opposition to Restaurant Depot LLC’s July 12, 2023 Motion for Summary Judgment, including only Restaurant Depot’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Counterstatement of Undisputed Material Facts and Additional Statement of Undisputed Facts ........ Pa300 – Pa314 Defendant, [...] d/b/a [...]’s August 21, 2023 Reply to Plaintiffs, [...] and [...]’s Opposition and [...]’s Opposition to [...] d/b/a [...]’s July 28, 2023 Motion for Summary Judgment, including only [...] d/b/a [...]’s Response to Plaintiffs’ and Restaurant Depot’s Counterstatement of Undisputed Material Facts and Additional Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.
[brief] Critically, this was after [...] had reviewed their time cards.  (Pa365 at 90:5-91:1; Pa476; Pa483-529).  [...] normally reviewed the staffing coordinators’ time cards Sunday night.  (Pa353 at 41:3-12).  The staffing coordinators would then finalize those time cards, and the time cards would be sent to payroll for processing.  (Pa533; Pa106 at 86:19-87:8).
[brief] Da59-Da62.  Pursuant to the Ground Lease, [...] leased the land underlying the [...] Mall and Project Garage from [...] for a ninety-nine (99) year term at a total cost of $1.00 per year.  Da60.  The Operating Agreement set forth the terms by which [...] would maintain and [...] would operate and manage the Project Garage.  Da190.  Specifically, [...] was required to establish rents, rates, fees and charges to be collected by customers of the Project Garage pursuant to the terms set forth in the Operating Agreement.  Da207-Da208.  The Operating Agreement further provided that [...] was required to pay an Operating Fee to [...] in the amount of $24,000.00 per year, with a $75.00 annual fee for each space in excess of 300 spaces.  Da210-Da211.  [...] was also required to maintain the Project Garage and pay direct payroll and benefits of Authority employees assigned to the Project Garage.  Da210-Da211.  The Authority and [...] were also required to work cooperatively to establish a validation system for the Project Garage.  Da214.  The Redevelopment Agreement, Ground Lease, and Operating Agreement were therefore contemplated as one cohesive transaction, and therefore each cannot be looked at in a vacuum.
[brief] Pa3088 (motion to file SAC).  In the FAC and SAC, Counts 1 through 9 were retained as filed by plaintiffs through their prior counsel.  In the FAC, Counts 10 to 15 were added.  In the SAC, we then added Counts 16 to 18 based upon the evidenced-based suspicions and conclusions reached from the OPRA records.  The new counts in the SAC allege [...] and [...] conspired and acted in furtherance of their conspiracy.
[brief] The critical issue raised on appeal requires us to determine whether the State improperly introduced and commented upon inadmissible testimony concerning the initial stage of the police investigation.  After carefully reviewing the record in view of the governing precedents, we conclude that inadmissible hearsay testimony elicited from two police witnesses concerning how defendant was first identified as a suspect created an impermissible inference that police possessed incriminating evidence that was not introduced at trial.  The harm resulting from those repeated Confrontation Clause violations was compounded by the prosecutor's reference to the inadmissible hearsay in his opening argument when he told the jury that “other people,” referring to non-testifying sources, told police “it's possibly this individual named [...]. ”  The prosecution, it bears noting, introduced substantial admissible evidence of defendant's guilt.  The State's case was not so overwhelming, however, as to overcome the potential impact of the Confrontation Clause violations on the final verdict.  We are thus unable “to declare a belief that [the constitutional error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  See State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 154, 97 A.3d 663 (2014) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).  We are therefore constrained to reverse defendant's convictions and remand the case for a new trial.
[brief] *State v. Kazanowski*, DOCKET NO. [...], 9 (App. Div. Dec. 9, 2020) ("[N]o such deference is owed to the Law Division or the municipal court with respect to legal determinations or conclusions reached on the basis of the facts."  *Id.* at 49.  Our review of a court's "legal determinations is plenary."  I do not believe the records and video evidence supports my conviction.  Each subjective incriminating statements that the officer made and that the judge used as probable cause is also consistent with an innocent explanation.  Please review all my accusations and the points I mention in this brief.  Thank you!
[brief] (2T 43-24 to 47-9, 51-16 to 52-8; 4T 93-1 to 102-5)  [...]’s mother, [...], testified at trial, and her testimony supported that theory.  (4T 25-1 to 56-9)  [...] testified that the Chevy Suburban was her truck.  (4T 29-1 to 5)  It was registered and insured in her name.  (4T 38-24 to 41-4)  She and her husband each had their own vehicle, and the Suburban was a spare.  (4T 29-23 to 30-17)
[brief] With regard to credibility, an “[a]ppellate court should defer to trial courts’ … findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. ”  *Locurto*, 157 N.J. at 474; *Stas*, 212 N.J. at 49.  This deference “is more compelling where … two lower courts have entered concurrent judgments on purely factual issues.  Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error. ”  *Locurto*, 157 N.J. at 474; *Stas*, 212 N.J. at 49 n.2.  **POINT I**
[directive] Niniejsze przyznanie si¥ do winy jest wynikiem warunkowych wskazan s¥dziego dotyCZ!JCych maksymalnego wyroku, jaki s¥dzia ten wydalby niezalei:nie od zaleceii prokuratora.  W zwiqzku z tym wypelniono ,,Uzupelniaj!JCY formularz oswiadczenia o przyznaniu si¥ do winy dotyCZ!JCY zarzut6w w przypadkach niewynegocjowanych oswiadczeii o przyznaniu si¥ do winy".  Revised Promulgated 12/31/20 9  Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 0079-Polish by I I Defendant's Initials Form Skorygowany formularz opublikowany 31.12.2019r. w suplemencie do Dyrektywy #01-18, CN 10079-Polish
[directive] The answer shall be verified in on oath or affirmation, and shall state the interest the property by virtue of which the claimant of demands its restitution and the right to defend the action.  If the claim is made in behalf the person entitled to possession by an agent, bailee or attorney, it shall state that he is duly authorized to make the claim.  of e.  If no answer is filed and served within the applicable time, the property seized shall be disposed pursuant to N.J.S.2C:64-6.
[brief] The Florida real property was specifically devised to [[...]], as you know.  Paying expenses related to the Florida real property from the Trust results in [[...]] bearing the expenses associated with real property that was not specifically devised to her.  Given that the Florida real property was not sold, we presume it would have been transferred to [[...]] within a reasonable period of time after [...]’s death in July 2020.  (emphasis added).  [Da137-38a (emphasis added.)]  Presumably, [...]’s counsel conducted her own analysis of [...]’s testamentary plan before arriving at the conclusion that [...], not [...], received [...]’s Estate’s interest in the Palm Beach Property.  The fact that the Trial Court opted not to rely upon the e-mail in rendering the May 1, 2023 Opinion in [...]’s favor does not empower [...] to now disavow representations made by an attorney who was acting as her agent in settlement negotiations under the feigned guise of purported “factual and evidentiary problems.
[brief] “The question of whether [the arbitration rules] have properly been applied falls outside of the ambit of sec. 5”.  Dockser, supra, 433 F. 3d at 425.  Thus, Dockser’s pre-award ruling on an entirely different statute made it inapplicable here.  If the holding of Dockser were as the Plaintiffs argued, and as the Chancery Court applied it, then none of the cases that [...] submitted and wherein arbitration awards were vacated for exceeding powers, could have so held.
[brief] (Aa10).  The State Policy applies to conduct occurring in the workplace or “any location that can be reasonably regarded as an extension of the workplace,” including “any facility where State business is being conducted and discussed. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)(1).  Given that [...], as local union chapter president, represents other State employees, the Commission correctly determined that the State Policy applied not only to the immediate vicinity of a State building but to the union office as well.  (Aa10).  The Commission also correctly reasoned that the investigation, despite [...]’s claims, was not related to union election activity but rather to whether “[...] was purposefully not referring to a State employee by that employee’s preferred name, in violation of the State Policy. ”  Ibid.  As such, the Commission correctly determined that [...] had jurisdiction to investigate the complaint.  For these reasons, the Commission’s September 20, 2023 decision should be affirmed.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AND DID NOT CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF DIRECT OR FACIAL DISCRIMINATION  Plaintiff very plainly and succinctly asserted claims of direct or facial discrimination.  If Plaintiffs' claims of direct discrimination are taken as true it follows ipso facto that all of the Firefighters were not reasonably accommodated - indeed they were each arbitrarily designated as ineligible for any consideration of accommodation.  The failure of the reasonable accommodation” in this case was not due to discrete facts surrounding individuals which would invoke a burden shifting McDonnell Douglas analysis.  The failure to reasonably accommodate occurred because there was a direct and deliberate predetermination by the employer that it would never accommodate regardless of the underlying circumstances.  This is the precise factual allegation asserted by the Plaintiff which the Defendant must accept as true for purposes of this Appellate review.  The Defendant’s attempt to shoehorn Plaintiff's claims into a series of factually disputed discrete incidents of the dozens of “failures to accommodate Appellant’s individual members” both contort and misshape Plaintiff's claims.  Where a policy, on its face, proscribe any accommodation, as an iron rule, it is facially violative of the NJLAD and is an example of a direct discrimination against the individuals and employees which it impacts.
[brief] The relief Appellants sought from the motion judge was straightforward.  They sought leave to file their Complaint four days late in the context of a proposed structure impacting a nationally recognized historic district forever.  The [...] made clear that it gave absolutely no consideration as to the new structure’s impact on the historic aesthetic and prohibited Appellants from introducing any evidence in that regard.  Both the technical memo and Resolution make no reference to the [...] considering the issue around impact on the historic aesthetic and both state that the [...] has already “approved” it as being appropriate for a historic district without any hearing or publication.  There is no dispute that the Resolution refers to exhibits that are not found as having been moved into evidence.  There are a manifold of findings and determinations not found in the record.  This fails to comply with the mandate of *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f)*.  Remanding to have all parties recreate the evidence that supports the Resolution would be futile as the Resolution is inadequate on its face.
[brief] Defendants chose not to litigate the purported defense at any time pre-trial (i.e., in any of the three (3) motions filed before trial or in any in limine motion), or during trial.  Defendants also chose not to pursue the argument in their post-trial proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  Defendants raised the purported defense for the first time in their post-trial motion for reconsideration.  In its Order Denying Defendants’ Post-Judgment Motion for Reconsideration in the entirety (Da84-98), the trial court found that, as a matter of law, Defendants waived the statute of frauds defense.
[directive] Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.
[brief] For its part, the [...] frets that “[e]nlarging the time for appeal to appease the interests of the limited public in this case will negatively impact all redevelopment activities through the State. ” ([...]b44).  Without commenting on the sheer overbreadth of such a statement, the [...] fails to explain precisely how or why this would occur.  This case specifically involves a statutorily-deficient notice which left the public without knowledge of new overlay zoning until it manifested itself in the form of a site plan application and hearing that occurred half a year later.
[brief] 11  POINT I .................................................................................................  11  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THERE WAS NO WRITTEN ARRANGEMENT TRANSFERRING A LICENSE AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEVEL AND UNDER THE MOTION TO AMEND THE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ORDER..................................................................................  11  A.  The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of [...] because there was no issue of material fact as to Appellant’s failure to show a written arrangement between the parties.  ...........................................................................  13  B.  The trial court correctly ruled that any alleged “new” documents submitted with [...]’s Motion to Amend the March 27, 2023 Summary Judgment Order Pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 did not demonstrate there was a written arrangement between the parties.  ...........................................................................  23 POINT II .........................................................................................................................  29 APPELLANT MISREPRESENTS THE RECORD AS THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY FOUND THERE WAS NO WRITTEN ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS DEFINED BY THE NJFPA..............................................................................................................  29 POINT III.......................................................................................................................  33  [...] FAILS TO MEET THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THE NJFPA.................................................................................................................................  33 POINT IV.......................................................................................................................  36  AT BEST, [...] WAS A DISTRIBUTOR, NOT A FRANCHISEE .  36 POINT V .......................................................................................................................  38  [...] FAILED TO SUBSTANTIVELY OPPOSE  [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AND INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS AND [...]’S CONCESSIONS AS TO ITS REVENUES AND ABSENCE OF A CONTRACT SIMILARLY DOOM  [...]’S CLAIMS ............................................................................................................. 39  POINT VI.......................................................................................................................  40  THE APPEAL AS TO [...]’S MOTION TO BAR IS UNTIMELY AND MUST BE DISMISSED .................................................. 40  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 41  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] There Were Other Interested Bidders  Plaintiff’s contention that there were no other interested bidders, like its contention that it sought post-mortgage foreclosure judgment interest at the contract rate, is equally false.  See Pb20-21.  There were at least two, if not more, prospective bidders who were interested in the amount of the upset price, i.e., the amount determined by the Sheriff that was owed to plaintiff and which plaintiff could bid up to without having to actually pay any funds at the foreclosure sale.  In each instance, plaintiff’s counsel disclosed to the bidders the total judgment amount (presumably based on the contract, not lawful, postjudgment interest) and directed them to consult the Sheriff’s website to confirm the Sheriff’s calculation of the upset prices (which were incorrectly calculated using the contract, not lawful, interest rate).  See Da111, ¶14.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.