ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As such, a jury could reasonably conclude that the charge pay investigation was a pretext to retaliate against Plaintiff for her complaints.  The court further inferred that Defendant [...] would not have supported the termination of Plaintiff, [...], and [...] because she would have been upset about losing staff during a critical time.  The court noted:  I don’t think we should lose sight of the fact that this is a five-person office, during COVID, during the height of COVID, and three of the five people in this very busy, very stressed-out office end up getting terminated.  It doesn’t really seem that it would make a lot of sense for her to be... happy about this discipline that these parties received, because she lost three-quarters of... her employees.  (T30-23)  This conclusion presumes far too much about Defendant [...]’s intent and motivation for the purpose of a summary judgment motion.
[brief] However, as [...] testified, write-in votes cast for [...] and [...], while listed in the certified results, were not added to the total vote total for the candidates.  (Ibid.).  The February 26 certification reported [...] 615, [...] 614, [...] 615, [...] 680, and five write-in votes.  (Pa2).  On March 4 or 5, while preparing packets for the reorganization meeting, [...] discovered that the two write-in votes had not been credited to the candidates, even though the certified results identified five write-in votes.  (1T98:13-17).  Five minutes later, [...] emailed Administrator [...] and [...] to flag the mistake.  (1T97:22-98:20).  [...], treasurer of the [...], confirmed that the tapes showed five write-in ballots—specifically, one vote for “[...]” and one vote for “[...]. ” (1T108:7-20).  After reviewing the tapes himself, Roman consulted a lawyer who advised Roman to amend the election results Roman then emailed [...] and stated that “they had to post [the] revised results. ” (Ibid.).  [...] told the trial court he relied on his long-time staff and believed the adjustment was appropriate.  (1T57:1-13).  As such, [...] approved the amendment of the election results to reflect the true results, and they were recertified as such.  (1T110:2-4).  The amended certification was promptly posted online and forwarded to the [...].  (1T63:11-13).  Thus, the final results were [...] 616, [...] 615, [...] 615, [...] 680.  (Pa3).
[brief] Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).  To defeat a motion for summary judgment, an employee need only “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ . . . and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons. ’”  DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765) (emphasis in original; citations omitted); see also Greenberg v. Camden Voc. Schools, 310 N.J. Super. 189,
[brief] Id.  The trial court recognized that a Motion for Reconsideration is guided by Cummings v Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (Ap. Div. 1996), and noted that, in [...]’s motion for reconsideration, “no new facts have been uncovered which would warrant either this motion for reconsideration or the prior motion for [summary judgment].  In the original motion for summary judgment, the Court considered all evidence.  There is no evidence submitted by [...] because [...] conducted no discovery.  The court considered the Verified Complaint, and the Verified Complaint was competent evidence for the court to consider.
[brief] Defendants reasoning for seeking summary judgment was due to their position that: (1) there was no genuine issue as to any material fact in accordance with the summary judgment standard set forth by Brill, (2) Plaintiff’s allegedly failed to set forth a prima facie case of hostile work environment due to race because Plaintiff failed to show the comment was motivated by Plaintiff’s race nor was it severe or pervasive, (3) Plaintiff’s allegedly failed to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the LAD due to race, (4) Plaintiff claims should be dismissed because the Defendant allegedly took immediate action in connection with anti-harassment policies following plaintiff’s internal complaint, and (5) Plaintiff was not entitled to compensative or punitive damages.  (Pa 256-Pa 257)  Plaintiff opposed the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment asserting that: (1) Plaintiff sufficiently established a prima facie case under the LAD for hostile work environment on the basis of race, (2) there are material facts under dispute as to whether or not Defendants actually maintained an effective anti-discrimination policy, and/or took immediate action in connection with their purported anti-discrimination policies following plaintiff’s internal complaint, (3) the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff cannot establish the involvement of supervisors or upper management is contrary to the facts of this matter and without merit, and (4) Defendants failed to meet the summary judgment standard set forth under Brill.
[brief] Pa051; DSOF at ¶¶ 37–38.  The only items Appellant points to (and upon which she rests her entire case) are an e-mail from Appellant and several of her coworkers and so-called communications to [...] in a group text message chain, admittedly presented as jokes, which, when presented in full rather in the edited fashion in which Appellant frames them state: - “quiet seems like Big East is cancelled Sam can’t go to Amsterdam trying to manage my own coronavirus anxiety haha. ”  •  “Def. They are divas.  I’m having anxiety.  May need a doughnut. ”  •  “I have this dull chest pain from the anxiety, I think, LOL”  Appellant’s only response as to why her jokes should not be interpreted as jokes is because she is a “millennial” and therefore it’s part of her “culture” to send “LOL” with earnest thoughts.  Pa311; Pl. Dep. T. 107-05–T107-08.  However, Appellant attempts to mislead this Court by removing all context from these text messages on Page 34 of her Brief.  Further, despite Appellant’s assertions that the lower court did not review the text messages, the court was reviewing the messages in real time and reading some of those messages into the record as that statement was made.  Rather than ignoring the messages, the lower court actually requested that Appellant’s counsel identify a citation to any specific message which supported notice to the Respondent of Appellant’s alleged anxiety.  Appellant’s counsel could not do so.  These text messages constitute the only communications from Appellant on the subject.  Neither these texts nor the e-mail communicated the existence of a disabling condition or a request for accommodation of the same.  To wit, Appellant’s failure to present substantive evidence of her disability coupled with her inability to establish a causal connection between her purported disability and her termination is fatal to her claims—in sum, she cannot establish a *prima facie* case for her LAD claim.
[brief] 6  POINT HEADINGS  I.  THE BOROUGH IS ENTITLED TO ALL CONNECTION FEES FOR PROPERTIES OUTSIDE ITS BOUNDARIES  TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Trial Court Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment ........................................ Da166  Trial Court’s Order Denying Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ................................ Da168  Trial Court’s Opinion on Summary Judgment ........................................ Da170  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES/CITATIONS
[brief] Such omissions may be “a proper ‘subject of exploration and cross-examination at a trial. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36, 55 (App. Div. 1990).  “Evidential support for an expert opinion is not limited to treatises or any type of documentary support but may include what the witness has learned from personal experience. ”  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 403 (App. Div. 2002).  The requisite knowledge can be based on either “knowledge, training or experience. ”  Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 1988).  N.J.R.E. 703 further provides that expert opinion may be grounded in “facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence, but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts. ”  The appropriate limiting factor in cases where an expert relies on experience or observation is the weight of evidence and not exclusion of the evidence.  Bellardini, 222 N.J. Super. at 463 (citing Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 (1984)).  [...]’s report and opinions are supported by facts and data.
[brief] (Da032, Trial Court eCourts Case Jacket, Trans Id: [...]).  Plaintiff then received approximately five and half months of extensions.  (Da032-33, Trial eCourts Case Jacket).  Oral argument was then finally formally scheduled to take place on March 5, 2021 (Da033, eCourts Case Jacket Transaction ID: [...]).  Plaintiff, despite having ample time and opportunity to file a timely reply, did not do so; and instead filed a 68-page reply at 3:30 p.m. on March 4, 2021, the day before oral argument.  (Da034, eCourts Case Jacket Transaction ID: [...]).
[brief] (6T 10:23 to 11:16).  During that time the business had no issues with the landlord filing any lawsuits or seeking eviction.  (6T 12:5 to 13:5).  [...], agreed to sign the leasehold and liquor license over to [...] on November 26, 2014 for five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00).  (Da83-88; 6T 13:6 to 16:11).  That agreement was ultimately handled in bankruptcy court after the project fell apart.
[brief] I just love that with the tort claims act, that I’m supposed to do that. ”  (1T7:17-21)  His Honor further noted:  Yeah, the cases are all over the place on that argument, [...] -- apparently the Appellate Division knows what is a substantial, permanent loss of a bodily function, i.e. substantial is the key word there.  And . . . has made it very clear for us in their various rulings what they mean by that word.  And I say that by adding the word “not” at the end of that sentence. ”  (1T8:3-12)  Plaintiff’s counsel added that Plaintiff sustained serious and permanent injuries, as set forth in the motion record: herniated disks at L3/4, L5/S1 and at C3/4 (indiscernible) herniation, a positive spurling test, a positive tonal (phonetic) sign.  She’s a 70-year-old retired woman whose sole enjoyment was taking one and a half hour walks every day, which she cannot do anymore.  She’s got as a result of this insomnia.  She was found positive for insomnia and anxiety and depression.  I think all those meet the substantial test.  The fact that she’s unable to do these things because of her depression is a substantial injury.  (1T9:13-23)
[brief] As an initial matter, the northernmost portion of the corridor on South Laurel Avenue (at and near the intersection of Route 35) offers no suitable locations because it is is encumbered by Green Acres deed restrictions that permit it to be used solely for recreation and conservation purposes.  Continuing further south along the transmission line corridor, the properties on Holland Road are zoned for and have residential developments, which again makes them unusable.  In addition to this disqualifier, the properties adjacent to this segment of the transmission line have significant elevation changes, would require tree clearing and/or have wetlands along the roadside.  On South Holland Road, the properties are once again zoned for and have residential developments.  Also, the area has significant elevation changes, heavily wooded areas, roadside wetlands, and multiple Green Acres deed restricted properties.  The next area of examination is that occupied by the Garden State Parkway ("GSP"), which crosses over South Holland Road.
[brief] The only other eyewitness to testify was [...], a customer who was inside the bank with his mother that morning.  (3T 114-19 to 24)  Segars recalled hearing the man say, “I’m here to rob the bank, I’m coming to steal the money. ”  (3T Segars did not hear the man say anything else and did not see a weapon at any point.  (3T 116-23 to 24, 118-1 to 2)  After taking the money from the tellers, the man ran out the back door of the bank lobby, which leads to a vestibule.  (3T 60-2 to 5)  [...] waited several minutes and then went to the vestibule to lock the exterior door.  (3T 60-15 to 19)  When she got there, however, the man was still inside the vestibule, attempting to pick up money from the floor.  (3T 60-20 to 21)  She noticed “a few dropped bills” on the floor, as well as a “dirty Corona bottle. ”  (3T 61-11 to 19)  The man eventually exited the bank through the front door, which [...] unlocked for him after he tried and failed to exit through the back door.
[brief] Second, [...]’ claim that our courts have treated them “unjustly” is just another tactic pulled from [...]’ playbook to distract from the egregious misconduct that caused them to be liable to Plaintiffs for tens of millions of dollars.  In extensive and detailed findings, the Chancery Division found that [...] treated the partnership’s accounts as their “personal piggy bank. ”  Jarwick Devs., Inc., 2018 WL 2449133, at *19.  The Wilfs’ conduct included, among other things: the fabrication of expenses, fees, and debts so that they could reap the profits of the partnership without sharing those benefits with Plaintiffs; putting employees of their other entities on the partnership’s payroll to siphon more money out of it; and misdirecting discounts to which the partnership was entitled so that those discounts would instead benefit [...]’ other businesses.  The Wilfs persistently stole from the partnership even after our courts issued orders compelling them to stop and to treat Jarwick as a partner.  It is this unlawful conduct that led the Chancery Division to enter a final judgment for Plaintiffs and the Appellate Division to affirm all of the Chancery Division’s factual findings and conclusions.  The Wilfs are not victims of an unjust judiciary but of their own misconduct.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS THIRD SUPERIOR COURT ACTION AND THE COURT’S ADJUDICATED RENT INCREASE  On September 13, 2021, [...] filed a Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ (Pa 5) seeking to abrogate the Board’s grant of a hardship increase in the amount of $154.99.  The Board answered on October 20, 2021.  Pa 14.  On May 16, 2022, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.  Pa 15.  [...] contended that the Board was arbitrary and capricious by (i) determining that [...]’s equity in the Unit was merely $12,804.88; (ii) reducing the monthly management fee paid by [...] by one-third from $150 to $100; and (iii) excluding the additional cost of garbage collection paid by [...] in the monthly amount of $123.95 that resulted from Hoboken’s ordinance changing the time that the garbage could be put on the street.
[directive] [Yes]  [No]  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081 page 1 of 2 eligible 5.  b. that you will be for release when the [...], after [Yes] [No] receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds you have achieved a satisfactory level of progress in sex offender treatment unless and that you will then be released on parole the [...] determines by a preponderance of the evidence that you have failed to or cooperate in your rehabilitation there is reasonable expectation that you will violate conditions of parole?  c. that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if [Yes] [No] sentenced to state prison?  6.  Do you understand that if you are determined to be a repetitive, compulsive sex [Yes] [No] offender who is amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment but you not are willing to participate in such treatment and are confined to a facility other than [...], you will also be subject to the same parole eligibility terms as contained in section 5 above?
[brief] 414 N.J. Super 563, 578 (App. Div. 2010).  As the Court is aware, per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, “The Board of Adjustment shall have the power to: (b) Hear and decide requests for interpretation of the zoning map or ordinance or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is authorized to pass by any zoning or official map ordinance, in accordance with this act;” (emphasis added)
[directive] my 3.  Entiendo que, salvo en circunstancies extraordinarias, la presentacion de este Memorandum pone fin a todas las negociaciones para declararme culpable, y no se realizara ninguna negociacion adicional.  Cualquier declaracion de culpabilidad subsiguiente sera sin una recomendacion de condena reducida  I of understand that except extraordinary circumstances, the filing this Memorandum ends all plea negotiations, in of and no further bargaining will take place.  Any subsequent plea guilty will be without a plea recommendation.  (Abogado (Acusado/Defendant)  Defensor/Defense Counsel)  pagina de Memorandum
[brief] Appellant was given multiple opportunities to remedy this deficiency and to date, that has never been done.  Again, the fatal flaw is the lack of any actual justification.  Appellant’s papers contain multiple statements of fact that are unsupported by any transcript, document, or citation to the record.  There is discussion about a gate that was installed by management subsequent to Hurricane Ida.  Appellant acknowledges this is a subsequent remedial measure that would not be admissible at a trial and yet, for some reason, the argument is made to this Court.  (App. Brief, pp. 14-15).  Procedurally, this argument must fail.  Substantively, it must fail as well.  There is no support for the idea that Respondent had any legal obligation to enact this work or, moreover, that this would have prevented the claimed damages.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that this cannot legally form a cognizable cause of action.
[brief] Ca243.  Complainants allege that the post “could be reasonably be seen as compromising the Board and as speaking for the Board as a member of the public” and that Respondent “held herself out as a member of” the Board on her Facebook page.  Ca243.  Count 7 of the amended complaint relates to what Complainants describe as “politically charged post” by Respondent which “praises” the acquittal of [...].
[brief] In that regard, Plaintiff’s agents made no less than three (3) service attempts at Defendant’s admitted address at [...].  It was only after two (2) failed attempts on February 23 and 28, 2021, at serving Defendant at that address that Plaintiff’s agents sought to serve Defendant elsewhere.  Indeed, a third attempt at serving Defendant at [...], as well as attempts to contact him telephonically were unsuccessful.  It was only based on these recurring service attempts that Plaintiff successfully moved for substitute service at an address ([...]) with which Defendant admits he has an association. \(^4\) *(See Def.’s Br. at 4, 23).*  Moreover, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s mailing to him by regular and certified mail was not “refused” is both off base and irrelevant.  *(Def.’s Br. at 23-24).*  First, Defendant appears to misattribute a quotation from *Rule* 1:5-4(b) (“If the addressee fails to claim or refuses to accept delivery of certified or registered mail . . .”)  *(Def.’s Br. at 23-24)*, to *Rule* 4:4-3.  However, *Rule* 1:5-4(b) states that “[i]f service is simultaneously made by ordinary mail and certified or registered mail, service shall be deemed complete on mailing of the ordinary mail. ”  *R.*  1:5-4(b).  Therefore, even under Defendant’s argument, service would have been deemed completed upon Plaintiff’s mailing of ordinary mail.  Second, Defendant’s reliance on *Rule* 4:4-3 seems to be an error, as that rule is not relevant to this analysis.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.  The seizure of the 175 pounds of defendant's marijuana was the result of a lawful motor vehicle stop in Illinois of a truck driven by defendant's delivery persons, [...] and [...], who defendant had hired to deliver the marijuana across country from Nevada to New Jersey.  The subsequent seizure of this marijuana from defendant in New Jersey via a consent search was also proper in all respects.  Because there was no poisonous tree, let alone any poisonous fruits, this Court should affirm the trial judges’ multiple denials of defendant’s motions to suppress the physical evidence seized in this case.
[directive] In addition to permits to carry, it is important to understand the context of approved permits to purchase and firearms identification cards.  Currently, the New Jersey Firearms Application and Registration System (FARs) houses all data related to permits to purchase and firearms identification cards.  To create consistency in reporting and housing of firearms statistics, it is Page 4 directed that [...] provide monthly data to the Attorney General on the following categories for completed applications for permits to purchase and firearms identification cards: a. County where the application was filed; b. Municipality where the application was filed; c. Applicant’s year of birth; d. Applicant’s race; and e. Applicant’s gender identity.
[brief] ”  R. 1:3-3.  Courts in New Jersey have repeatedly held that Rule 1:3-1 applies to statutory deadlines as well.  The Appellate Division has held that “Rule 1:3-3 does not extend the filing deadline but instead prescribes the manner in which the statutory period is to be calculated.”  Liapakis v. Div. of Taxation, 363 N.J. Super. 96, 104 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Twp. of Holmdel v. Div. of Taxation, 12 N.J. Tax 112 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d o.b., 130 N.J. 522 (1992)).  In Liapakis and Holmdel, the Appellate Division applied Rule 1:3-3 to a statute of limitations prescribed by statute, rather than by court rule, even though the statute “did not expressly incorporate the court rules,” since it did not “prohibit their application.
[directive] It is the responsibility of See County Prosecutors, in conjunction with County Sheriffs’ Departments, local law enforcement, and the Family Court, to develop procedures requiring fingerprinting immediately upon adjudication.  In cases where the court enters a formal adjournment of disposition, or deferred disposition pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(1), for a juvenile who has committed an offense that 10 would be a crime if committed by an adult, fingerprinting should not occur.  If the adjournment or deferment period is successfully completed, the case will be dismissed and no fingerprints should be taken.  If the juvenile reoffends and an adjudication is entered, fingerprints shall be taken when the juvenile returns to court for the entry of a formal adjudication.  In cases where juveniles are adjudicated for an offense that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult and the Prosecutor’s Office is not involved (i.e., case is heard by the Juvenile Referee), the Family Court will implement a procedure, in conjunction with the County Prosecutor’s Office, whereby the court notifies the county or local law adjudication.13 enforcement agency to ensure fingerprints are obtained upon C.
[brief] Because there was no one who could testify to the original contract negotiations when this language was first added to the contract in 1987, the Arbitrator had to ascertain the parties’ intent by the language of the contract and, because the parties legitimately disagreed about the meaning of the language, external factors such as past practice informed the parties’ intent.  (T21:24-22:14; Pa192).  And the parties’ past practice reflected their consistent interpretation of the contractual language since the calculation was first delineated in 1987.