ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [12T176-1 to -8].  This evidence was generally corroborated by [...]’ timeline up to the murder, including that she, defendant, [...] and [...] spent time outside of [...] earlier in the evening before defendant and [...] left for [...] to murder [...].  [11T106-2 to 109-17].  Second, as depicted in S-86, [...] used cellular data to map the phone call placed from defendant’s phone at 2:25 a.m. on September 18, 2019.
[brief] At the end of the State’s case, counsel for both co-defendants moved pursuant to R. 3:18-1 for a judgment of acquittal.  Counsel for [...] argued that the only thing the State had even arguably proven with regard to his client was that he had been a passenger in the Corolla, and that there was no evidence that could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed any offense, “certainly not for a conspiracy where there’s no evidence by any witness, by inference, direct or otherwise, that there was an agreement or that there was some type of assistance by [...] in committing an attempted murder. ”  (13T 23-5 to 25-15)  Although the prosecutor had told the jurors in his opening statement that [...] had been the shooter (10T 26-5 to 9), he argued in opposing the motions that a reasonable jury could infer that it had been Marvine, rather than [...], who had done the shooting (13T 32-6 to 12) – a rather farfetched notion, since why would the Corolla have pulled up to the Tucson with the intended shooter on the far side, so that he would have to reach across the driver to shoot out of the driver’s side window? – but one to which the court apparently lent some degree of credence.  The judge denied the motion as to both defendants.  (13T 32-25 to 35-17)  Specifically with regard to the conspiracy charge, she noted that “the Toyota Corolla is observed on the video doing that loop around the scene of Ridge and Monroe prior to the shooting….  A reasonable juror can infer from that evidence that that was part and parcel of an agreement or a plan…”  (13T 34-8 to 17)  The court also noted that it could not be discerned from the video which of the car’s occupants had done the shooting.  (13T 34-18 to 35-5)  The judge further noted that the two men had proceeded together to the Myrtle Avenue address in which the guns were found.  (13T 35-6 to 11)  Accordingly, she found the conspiracy charge to be viable.  After the defense rested, counsel renewed their motions.  (15T 141-15 to 143-10)  The judge again denied them.  (15T 144-16 to 147-2)  In doing so, specifically with regard to the conspiracy charge, she referred to the “loop- around” by the Corolla prior to the shooting (15T 145-21 to 146-1); to “the State’s theory that perhaps even Mr. [...] was not the shooter but [...] was” (15T 146-1 to 6); and to the two men having been found together at a house in which an effort had apparently been made to conceal the guns and possibly also the keys to the Corolla.  (15T 146-7 to 21)  B.
[brief] Between 2017 and 2020, [...] performed certain environmental remediation projects on Plaintiffs’ Property.  First, on or about February 20 and 21, 2017, [...] personnel took soil borings from Plaintiffs’ Property.  (Pa000219 at 47:3 to 49:18; Pa000786).  Around March 15, 2017, [...] installed temporary well points on the Property.  (Pa000222 at 59:1 to 59:6; Pa000788).  On May 18, 2017, [...] took exterior soil vapor samples.  (Pa000790).  Plaintiffs allege that [...] did not obtain consent to perform 5  Plaintiffs’ existing parking lot and area for dumpsters was not paved.  this remediation.  During his deposition, [...], the corporate representative of [...] and owner of the [...] franchise located on the Property, revealed that he did not want the remediation to take place on his Property because he had reservations about [...] performing the remediation work free of charge:  "Why would somebody offer me free something?  I’ve been doing business for 25 years.  That is strange…Somebody is going to do without their own, you know, benefit.  Why would they want to do something, offer it to me for free?  I never heard of that before…Never free anything, that is all I learned from my mother, never anything free."  (Pa000325 at 48:11-22).  Despite these apparent reservations, [...] consented to [...] performing other remediation services on the Property.  In August 2017, he consented to [...] performing indoor air sampling of the Property.  (Pa000606).  Then, in March 2018, he consented to the installation of a vapor intrusion mitigation system at the Property.  (Pa000619-21).  Plaintiffs further claimed not to be aware of the preliminary site plan’s inclusion of the Property; however, [...], a representative of [...] who was consistently in contact with [...] throughout the redevelopment project, claimed to have shown [...] a copy of the preliminary site plan and received his initial approval of same.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 720-21; see also *Holland*, 895 F.3d at 293 (adding courts may not construe either test “too broadly” and stray past the “guideposts for responsible decision-making”).  It is not enough to merely assert some generalized interest; the analysis must consider “a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” at a more granular level.  Holland, 895 F.3d at 292 (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775-76 (2003)).  That means the issue is whether the specific right is dictated by “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices. ”  Ibid.  Although parents maintain a fundamental right “to care for and guide their children,” Anspach v. City of Phila., Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2007), courts have identified two bedrock limits that dispose of Appellants’ arguments here.
[brief] B.  Respecting a student’s request to use a certain name or pronouns does not implicate the rights of parents to direct their children’s medical treatment.  Although not raised below or on appeal by the school districts, Amicus [...] argues that the Original Policies violated the Due Process Clause by infringing on parents’ rights to consent to their children’s medical treatment because “social transitioning constitutes psychological treatment. ”  [...] Br. at 9.  Indeed, [...] argues further that even the revised Mandatory Notification Policies are unconstitutional for failure to require parental consent before using a student’s preferred name and pronoun.  [...] Br. at 16 n.2.  These arguments fail because they are based on the faulty premise that the districts are providing medical treatment to students by using their requested name and pronouns or allowing them to use a different restroom or join a different team or club.  This Court should reject [...]’s attempt to redefine an ordinary part of the school day as medical treatment.
[brief] He described being “active” in his work, and was fully capable of performing his duties as a “street sergeant. ” (1T55:4-15; 1T13:10-14:23).  In this capacity, [...] was “in charge of . . . all the operations on the street,” which included “assisting the other officers in arrests and [] criminal investigations,” and being “the first responder[] to any type of crime that [was] called into the operators.
[brief] [...] found appellant’s opioid abuse to be an extension of his alcohol abuse…[...] indicated that a person having prescriptions filled for high doses of opioids but not needing them or using them was an indication that the person was sharing his prescription drugs with other people.  [...] indicates that a person could not work safely as a LEO when taking opioids.  [...] stated that opioids were highly addictive and, for that reason, opioid use should end thirty to sixty days after the use commenced…”  Pa048.
[brief] The jury distilled this evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and the charges of [...] – which included charges to remove passion, prejudice, bias, and empathy from their consideration – and decided that Plaintiff was entitled to a sum that would reasonably compensate him for the rest of his life (5T, at 33:9-34:17).  Defendants now scapegoat Plaintiff’s need to stretch and use the restroom during voir dire as a way out of this verdict.  But in trying to bootstrap this mundane aspect of trial with case law condemning improper influences, Defendants highlight the canyon of difference between Plaintiff’s actions during voir dire, and the type of irregular conduct that actually warrants a new trial.
[brief] However, as an alternative ground for affirmance, even if it is determined that [...] was enrolled in the [...] at the time of the Accident, rescission is appropriate as to [...] due to [...]’s material representation in the enrollment process.  “‘[A] representation by the insured, whether contained in the policy itself or in the application for insurance, will support the forfeiture of the insured's rights under the policy if it is untruthful, material to the particular risk assumed by the insurer, and actually and reasonably relied upon by the insurer in the issuance of the policy. ’”  *First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson*, 177 N.J. 125, 137 (2003) (quoting *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni*, 98 N.J. Super. 154, 158-59 (App. Div. 1967)).  A misrepresentation is material if, when made, “a reasonable insurer would have considered the misrepresented fact relevant to its concerns and important in determining its course of action. ”  *Longobardi v. Chubb Ins.* Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530, 542 (1990).  To be material, the false statement must have “‘naturally and reasonably influence[d] the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium. ’”  Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 117 (1991).  “The law is well settled that equitable fraud provides a basis for a party to rescind a contract. ”  First Am. Title, supra, 177 N.J. at 136.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the order for judgment entered on June 7, 2024 be reversed and judgment be entered in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $53,725.00.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Dated: December 13, 2024  [...]  By: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID 0281411997  [...]  Phone [...]  Fax [...]  [...]  Attorney for Defendants, [...] & [...]  RE: [...] & [...] (Plaintiff-Appellant) vs. [...], LLC & [...] (Defendants-Respondents)
[brief] In Williams I, a uniformed officer exited his marked patrol car, approached the defendant, and asked him to put his hands on his head and submit to a frisk.  192 N.J. at 4-5.  Rather than submit, the defendant pushed the officer and fled.  Ibid.  The officer chased the defendant, seized and searched him, and found a gun.  Ibid.  The Court held that the gun did not need to be suppressed because the defendant’s actions of pushing the police officer and fleeing amounted to intervening circumstances sufficient to purge the taint from the initial illegal stop.  Id. at 16-18.  In Williams II, this Court clarified the application of attenuation when a defendant commits obstruction by fleeing a police order to stop, distinguishing between a defendant who merely refuses to obey a command and a defendant who creates additional danger to either the police or public.
[brief] (1T44-13 to 16).  [...] had no additional information when he saw defendant exit the premises: "besides being told to detain him."  (1T45-11 to 15).  The only facts he was told was that there was "an individual leaving a house that was of interest for a homicide."  (1T45-18 to 22).  [...] did not see defendant commit any crimes and observed nothing except defendant entering and exiting the house.
[brief] *Id.* at 1378-79.  In *257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto*, 477 N.J. Super. 339 --- \(^8\)  The only difference was the inclusion of numerous acquisitions of tax-foreclosed property [...]’s principal had made through other business entities.  (525a-788a).  Those records were publicly-available when Defendants made their first motion, so the second judge correctly concluded they were not properly before her on reconsideration.  (3T76:2-15).  Those records were also irrelevant because they did not bear on the *bona fide* purchaser issue, for reasons explored later.  (App. Div. 2023), a panel of this court held that Tyler “establishes a new principle of law,” that it applies to New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law, and that it should be afforded “pipeline retroactivity to pending tax sale foreclosures[.]”
[brief] [...] knew in early August 2015 that it was unenrolled in the CCIP for the Project.  Subsequent communications further confirm [...] was aware and acknowledged this status.  For example, on August 11, 2015, [...]’s CFO emailed [...] of [...] advising that “[...] must correct their Certificates of Insurance for [...] and [[...]]… have your insurance carrier review the CCIP manual for the insurance requirements for contracts not covered under the CCIP. ”  (Italics added.)  (Pa2490.)  The next day, [...] e-mailed [...] [...]’s COI dated July 22, 2015 that listed the [...] and [...] Policies, proving [...]’s understanding it had been unenrolled from the CCIP.  (Pa2490 and Pa2502-2506.)  --- 9  While [...] remained “excluded” from the CCIP, it became “eligible to work onsite” on the Sept. 16, 2015 Enrollment Status Report (the next Report after [...]’s COI was deemed compliant by [...] on Sept. 4, 2015.
[brief] This leaves only the possibility that the Plaintiff was denied the ability to attend court and "lost jail time."  Except, this conclusory allegation is not supported by any factual evidence in the Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff failed to supplement this at any point in time.  In fact there is no evidence that she lost jail time or was held longer in jail because of missed court appearances.  Plaintiff's complaint failed to allege what appearances she missed, what additional time she had to serve, and why.  Simply saying the magic words (elements of a cause of action) do not unlock the doors of discovery, a Plaintiff must support the allegations with factual support.  Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., Inc., 722 A.2d 944 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998).  Plaintiff could have easily stated how much extra jail time was added to her sentence for missing court.  But she did not because she never actually was damaged for missing court appearances.  In the matter at hand, Plaintiff alleges that by Defendant not taking her to a court appearance, she was rendered "more vulnerable to defending her rights" and was a direct cause in Plaintiff losing jail time credit.  (Pa00142)  These meritless allegations do not meet the standards laid out in Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006), as no such action caused a "danger that shocks the conscience" nor is there any proof aside from a conclusory statement that missing a court appearance rendered Plaintiff “more vulnerable” to defending her rights, or how that is a “danger. ”  As such, the Trial Court Decision of both the October 8, 2021, Order and the June 16, 2022 Order should remain after a review of the Plaintiff’s Claims.
[brief] We recognize our prior decision in McIntyre-Caulfield disagreed with the trial court's finding that the defendant's request was premature because she had not yet completed her three-year PTI term.  455 N.J. Super. at 10-11, 187 A.3d 171.  We cited the defendant's speedy trial rights, faded witness memories in the criminal and civil actions, and financial and emotional costs to the litigants.  Id.  455 N.J. Super. at 11, 187 A.3d 171.  While we are sensitive to these concerns, a defendant's inactive guilty plea nonetheless is non-evidential while the plea remains inactive.  Indeed, our trial courts liberally grant stays in civil matters, pending sentencing of a defendant, where the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights are implicated.  See Whippany Paper Bd. Co. v. Alfano, 176 N.J. Super. 363, 373-74, 423 A.2d 648 (App. Div. 1980); see also Byrd v. Manning, 253 N.J. Super. 307, 317, 601 A.2d 770 (App. Div. 1992).  We therefore discern no disadvantage in delaying consideration of defendant's application until he completes PTI under the circumstances presented here — or staying the court's order unless and until a defendant is terminated from PTI when the civil reservation removes an impediment in plea negotiations and is incorporated in the plea agreement.
[brief] [Pa1-4].  On February 5, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied the State’s motion without prejudice.  [Pa5].  On August 11, 2021, defendant filed a Notice of Motion to be Transferred from [...] to [...].  [Pa6-7].  On September 13, 2021, [...] denied defendant’s motion without prejudice.  [Pa8].  A trial was held in front of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and a jury on the following dates: October 6, 12, 13, 18, 19, and 20, 2022.
[brief] The record shows that defendant is forty-five years old.  (Pa1).  His out-of-state warrant and admission that he had been in trouble with drugs in Montana meant that this was not his first contact with the criminal justice system.  The officer spoke to defendant in a commercial parking lot next to a major highway.  They spoke in broad daylight, while defendant’s wife sat in the vehicle a few feet away.  [...] only questioned defendant for approximately ninety seconds outside of the vehicle before defendant admitted that his vehicle contained drugs, and the overall stop before defendant’s admissions lasted mere minutes.  [...] remained calm during the interaction, and defendant smoked a cigarette while answering questions.  There was nothing in their verbal or nonverbal exchanges suggesting any physical or psychological coercion.  While defendant admitted that one particular spot in his vehicle contained drugs – perhaps based on an ill-conceived strategy to placate the officer’s suspicions by revealing evidence of a less serious crime – he did not reveal that the vehicle contained other illegal items.  In sum, there was substantial credible evidence supporting the court’s finding that defendant’s will was not overborne and his statements were voluntary.
[brief] Plaintiff’s counsel refers to *N.J.S.A. 54:5-87*, “no application shall be entertained to reopen a judgment after three months from the date and then only upon the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the conduct of the suit. ”  (*Emphasis added*).  Were the literal interpretation applied and Plaintiff’s statement accepted, why, would a counsel file a post-judgment application, or party offer to redeem any time after entry of a final judgment in a tax sale foreclosure.  What a futile and costly exercise if, as the Plaintiff contends, redemption shall be made prior to entry of a final judgment.  Taken literally, an attempt to redeem, the day after entry of a final judgment bars relief, except upon a cause of lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the process.  It is evident, based upon the post judgment overtures to redeem, that if made minutes after midnight of the day final judgment was entered, or the next business day, or any time within three (3) months from recording, the response by Plaintiff would be the same—rejected.
[brief] ”  State v. Wenzel, 113 N.J. Super. 215, 273 A.2d 395 (App Div. 1971).  Where there are facts to support a Mockler charge, the failure to provide such a charge unfairly alleviates the Plaintiff’s burden of proof and production on negligence.  *Mockler v. Russman*, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968) has been cited in the context of the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*.  That is, where there is evidence that a Defendant was operating its vehicle as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances but nevertheless lost control due to an unexpected road condition, failure to provide the *Mockler* charge is akin to allowing the Plaintiff to proceed under a theory of *res ipsa loquitur*.  In *Hing Lee v. Gray*, 456 F.2d 1276, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10847 (3d Cir. 1972), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in reliance upon *Mockler* affirmed the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for a new trial.  In *Hing Lee*, the Defendant’s vehicle was traveling northbound on the New Jersey Turnpike in a rainstorm when it skidded from the right lane into the center lane and stopped.  After the Defendant’s car stopped, it was struck by Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Defendant in *Hing Lee*, testified that he lost control of his car when the front-end started to shake violently and it was difficult for him to maintain control over the steering mechanism.  The Defendant testified that on one prior occasion he had a similar mechanical problem with the same vehicle and that he had repairs made.  The jury accepted this evidence, consistent with *Mockler*.  Evidence of unfrozen precipitation and mechanical defect were sufficient to warrant the charge.
[brief] A.  The Trial Court correctly determined that [...] could not demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits because [...] could not and did not assert its Hackensack Project claims in the PTA Arbitration.  In determining that the [...] was not precluded from pursuing its claims in the Hackensack Arbitration, the Trial Court made two determinations: (1) the PTA Arbitration and the Hackensack Arbitration involved different contractual rights and legal issues, and (2) [...]’s claims concerning the Hackensack Project were not ripe at the time of the PTA Arbitration and therefore, [...] could not assert them.
[brief] Not only was the Stealth Resolution entered some seven months after the June 12, 2022 approval, but [...] “didn’t hear from the board attorney.  [[...]] [wasn’t] notice[d] by the board prior to them taking this action in January of 2023.  [[...]] found it out because a local newspaper had published an article regarding the adoption of this [Stealth Resolution].”  Further, it was specifically argued that “[t]here is no authority for the board to reopen the public hearing process without notice to the applicant and to impose additional conditions on the application, which has been decided and voted on. ”  Perplexingly, the Board’s counsel even argued that “what happened was the board made a decision that it would adopt the resolution that was drafted . . . but wanted a condition for an elevator in building E.” (emphasis added).
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  8  I: ENFORCEMENT OF THE RESTRUCTURING ACT’S RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS  INVOLVES A MATTER OF IMPORTANT PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONSTITUTES A CONTINUING VIOLATION, AND IS NOT TIME-BARRED (Da89-90; 1T66-69)  ..............................................................................................................  8  II:  QUO WARRANTO ACTIONS APPLY TO MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS (1T69-73)  ..................................................................................................................  12  A.  The holding in Kratovil is limited to the New Jersey First Act.  .............  13  B.  Members of the Board of Governors hold an office.................................  16  III: LIMITING THE RESIDENCY  REQUIREMENTS AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT ONLY  CONTRADICTS THE ACT’S PLAIN LANGUAGE AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1T73-80)  .................................................................................................................. 21  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................  33
[brief] THE CONSPIRACY CHARGE COMPLIED WITH NEW JERSEY LAW.  ..................................................................................  38  A.  Because the purposeful nature of conspiracy refers to the agreement, not to the underlying offense, the trial court’s jury instruction complied with prevailing law.  ......................  40  B.  Because there was neither potential for, nor evidence of, jury confusion, and the court made clear the verdict had to be unanimous, the overt-act jury instruction was proper.  ........................................................................  41  POINT IV