ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Finally, plaintiffs urge what amounts to a wholesale reversal of Pivnick: “the issue of whether or not [...] intended to benefit his daughter in law at the expense of his son, [...] should not be binding in this action[.]”  (Appellant’s Brief at 32).  Plaintiffs provide no compelling explanation why Pivnick (which merely applied settled principles of collateral estoppel) was wrongly decided.  This argument should be rejected.  In sum, Pivnick provides ample support for the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims.  The Law Division order dismissing this action should be affirmed.
[directive] The Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) provides a coordinated response to victims of sexual assault.  The SART is comprised of the following members:  a law enforcement officer;  a confidential sexual violence advocate (CSVA); and  a forensic nurse examiner (FNE) or sexual assault examiner.  A victim of sexual assault is eligible for the services of the SART when:  the victim is 13 years of age or older;2  the assault occurred within the past five days;3 and  the victim consents to a SART activation.  If a victim fits the above criteria and presents at a healthcare facility, a sexual violence service organization, or a law enforcement agency, the victim shall be personally informed about the availability of the specialized services of the SART by either a SART member or a representative of the healthcare facility, sexual violence service organization, or law enforcement agency.  A SART activation occurs when the victim chooses to engage with one, two, or all three members of the SART.  The requested on-call SART member(s) will be activated according to county protocol, and shall respond within one hour or less.  The first responding SART member shall ensure that the coordinated response of a SART activation is properly explained to the victim through the use of the SART Activation Script (See Appendix XVI), which describes the services offered by each SART member and provides the victim with the option to choose any, all, or none of the services offered by the three SART members.  Every county’s SART program is overseen by a SART Coordinator who ensures a coordinated, multi-disciplinary response in accordance with these Standards.  Additionally, each county has an FNE Coordinator, who oversees the FNEs and ensures there is always 24/7 on-call coverage.  Oftentimes, the SART and FNE Coordinator is the same individual.  Services will be made available for victims under 13 in accordance with Standard 6: Specialized 2 Services for Child and Adolescent Victims.  Unless, after consulting the FNE Coordinator, it is determined that the circumstances would warrant a 3 medical forensic exam to be conducted after the five-day window.  -1-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT DEFINITIONS
[brief] SPECIAL REASONS  VARIANCE FOR HEIGHT OF 48.13 FEET BEING REQUESTED WHEREIN  41 IS THE MAXIMUM HEIGHT In Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App.Div.2004), the court extended [...]’s less stringent review standards to consideration of applications for height variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D–70d(6).
[brief] (39972a -73)  Moreover, the trial evidence revealed that [...] insidiously increased their misappropriation of partnership funds – both in terms of methodology and amount – in direct response to the Court’s decisions that confirmed their partners’ rights.  The Wilfs’ continuing attempt to frame this action as nothing more than a “commercial case,” “the essence of [which] … is limited to a breach of contract” (Db48), should offend this Court; indeed, it is utterly insulting.
[brief] 12  LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................  13  POINT I...........................................................................................................................................  13  THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN IN THIS MATTER WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF ORDERING ARBITRATION (Da 1-2)  ..................................................................................................................  13  A.  A Waiver of Arbitration, Express or Implied, Should be Assessed Under the Cole Factors.  ..........................................................................................................................  14  B.  Despite its Ruling to the Contrary, the Trial Court’s Analysis Supports a Finding that Defendants Did Not Waive the Right to Pursue Arbitration ..................................................................................  18  POINT II...........................................................................................................................................
[brief] Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the onus was not on the Planning Board, a body made up primarily (8 of 11) of appointed volunteer residents of the Township, to research the Distance Regulation’s purpose prior to the variance hearing and defend its constitutionality at the hearing.  Thus, even if Plaintiff is correct that “no one” on the Planning Board had a clear prior understanding of purpose of the Distance Regulation, that does not advance the argument regarding the constitutionality of the Distance Regulation.  On the contrary, as the case law makes clear, a municipal defendant must identify the substantial government interest(s) underlying a free speech restriction when there is a constitutional challenge to that restriction.
[brief] THE COUNTY’S UNTIMELY APPEALATE ARGUMENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND LACKS MERIT (1T49:11-21; Raised for first time on Appeal)  Despite repeatedly representing that it would abide the trial court’s decisions, the County filed a “Respondent’s Brief” wherein it asks the Court to overturn the Decision and Judgment.  The County’s appellate arguments should not be considered because they are untimely, procedurally defective (not supported by a Notice of Appeal) and duplicative of those raised by [...].  Even if the Court considers these arguments (though it should not), the County’s arguments fly in the face of public bidding law (which is intended to benefit the taxpayers) because they seek to overturn decisions that would save its taxpayers tens of thousands of dollars without any sound business reason for doing so.
[brief] (Id. at 38).  They state that they listed “[...]” as the basis for the privilege on certain documents because “that is the precise term and group referred to in the documents at issue. ” (Id.).  They assert that this is sufficient to establish privilege.  (Id. at 39 (citations omitted)).  They also recognize that simply cc’ing an attorney on a communication, “without more, does not render a communication privileged,” but state that they have not designated any document in the log to be privileged “merely because an attorney was CC’d. ” (Id. at 40).  They state that they included documents on the privilege log only “if the ‘primary purpose’ of the communication was to provide or receive legal advice. ” (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 18)).
[brief] Defendant denied that he got [...] onto the ground in the struggle, but said that he “briefly” had him against the wall.  (21T 176-20 to 177-1)  Defendant also made clear in the second statement that he saw [...] pull a handgun out of his pocket.  (21T 183-3 to 10)  As they talked more, defendant wavered a bit on whether [...] might have gotten inside the house.  The struggle was “right at the front door,” and defendant admitted while he did not think [...] got inside, they might have gone from the porch to the inside as they struggled because “it happened so quickly that I was just protecting myself.
[directive] Polygraph 7.7.1  N.J.S.A. 2C:40A-1 states that an employer shall not influence, request or require an employee to take or submit to a lie detector test as a condition of employment or continued employment.  To do so constitutes a disorderly persons offense.  Therefore, a law enforcement officer should never be asked to take a polygraph examination as part of an internal affairs investigation.  The investigator should not even suggest to the officer that a polygraph examination would be appropriate or that it "might clear this whole thing up."  However, the subject officer may voluntarily request to take a polygraph examination.
[brief] RECONSIDERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (Raised below Ia386)  Reconsideration is reviewed to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, Cummings, supra, 295 N.J. Super. at 389, but " cannot be used to expand the record and reargue a motion."  Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008).  It is meant to "seek review of an order based on the evidence before the court on the initial motion . . . not to serve as a vehicle to introduce new evidence in order to cure an inadequacy in the motion record."  Ibid.  Reconsideration is only granted in "those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence[]."
[directive] The use-of-force before faith-based leaders being are and been have that efforts discuss to Prosecutors with County confer shall the Justice faith-based and community with trust of relations establish positive to undertaken State the across of range broader a of part as enforcement law by force of use the concerning matters on leaders activities.  community-engagement disseminate and develop should Prosecutors, County the with consultation in Director, The constitutional afforded rights and statutory the process, investigative explain programs the model to presumption how investigation, the and to subject is force of use whose officers enforcement law to justification asserted an disprove to required be would trial at State the that and applies, innocence of for procedures and standards explaining the addition to In doubt.  reasonable a beyond defense 11  Page explain should the outreach programs community investigations, use-of-force model conducting the enforcement. of law the by governing force and law use policies
[brief] Approximately six months after being assigned the Lease by [...], Landlord defaulted on its obligation to make its initial annual Tenant’s Allowance installment payment on August 1, 2019, opting to pay only the principal payment of $121,666.67 and not the five-percent (5%) interest owed under the Lease (1T14-24 to 15-10;3T12-19 to 3T12-22).  Specifically, $36,500 in interest was owed from Landlord to Tenant on August 1, 2019, but for reasons never made clear to Tenant, only the principal was paid and not the interest (Da169).  Landlord would later fail to make any principal or interest payments towards Tenant’s Allowance for either 2020 or 2021, though it would resume principal-only payments in 2022 and 2023 (3T7-4 to 3T7-9;3T10-5 to 3T10-18).  Tenant, by contrast, promptly made all monthly payments under the Lease until, as detailed herein, the Premises was shut down by gubernatorial decree.  On March 9, 2020, New Jersey Governor [...] promulgated Executive Order No. 103 declaring a state of emergency in New Jersey due to the COVID-19 pandemic (the “Pandemic”) (Da102-Da109).
[brief] (11T50:4-6; 11T13:2-4; 11T13:24 to 15:4; P572a; P100a at 17; P104a to 109a).  It is evident that the 2014 Will was not changed or destroyed by Decedent after it was made because it was in Respondent’s possession and control, in her home safe for the years that followed its making.  (12T29:13-15; 12T34:19-23).  The Court also found Petitioner’s witnesses “credible. ”  Yet, the Court disregarded those witnesses since they provided facts that were inconsistent with the Court’s predetermined ruling, reasoning they were “not persuasive. ”  The Court disregarded credible testimony from [...], and his wife, [...], who were the only witnesses at trial who had socialized with both Petitioner and Decedent and observed them as a couple.
[directive] [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  [pa aplikab/NA]  3.  Èske gen kèk lòt dispozisyon sou koze santans ki aplike a Lwa Zak Grav yo ki ta mande yon peryòd tan pi long kote w pap elijib pou Libète kondisyonèl (egzanp., NERA, twa enfraksyon, Asasinay)?  Does any other mandatory sentencing provision apply to the Graves Act count that provides for a greater period of parole ineligibility (e.g., NERA, Three Strikes, Murder)?
[brief] I.  RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION PAPERS CONFIRM THAT THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO TRANSMIT THE MATTER TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  BECAUSE MATERIAL FACTS ARE IN DISPUTE (AA11-12; AA17).  As [...] argued in his opening brief, the [...]’s denial of [...]’s request for a hearing failed to follow well-established law and constitutes an abuse of its discretion.  A material dispute of fact exists on the core question – whether [...] intentionally misnamed the Complainant (“Complainant” or “[...]”), as [...] concluded.  [...] denied the allegations and offered a credible explanation of what happened on the subject date.  Specifically, a heated incident occurred outside the [...] building on the morning of September 9, 2022, when [...] confronted the Complainant about allegations she had been falsely soliciting signatures in support of a challenger to [...] in an upcoming union election.  [...] concluded that the Complainant’s allegations were more credible than [...]’s explanation, based on its review of silent video surveillance and a text message exchange between the Complainant and the individual who was seeking to challenge [...] in the election.  [...] also relied upon [...]’s non-existent “prior disciplinary history. ”  The [...] denied [...]’s appeal of [...]’s determination and request that the matter be transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law for a fact-finding hearing, as well as his request for reconsideration.  [...]’s opening brief cited multiple cases establishing persuasive authority wherein this court criticized the [...] for denying a fact-finding hearing in nearly identical situations, including where the appellant had denied comments and actions alleged, the [...] “was not provided a written record of the witnesses’ interviews and did not have any way to determine what they actually said,” and the [...] merely relied upon a summary of the EEO investigation report which the appellant disputed.  See, e.g., In Matter of J.L., No. A-2501-13T4, 2016 WL 512431, at *2–3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 10, 2016) (Aa76-Aa78); (Ab17-19) (discussing cases).  [...] argued that the [...]’s determination that no material facts are in dispute was “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” and “not supported by substantial evidence. ”  In re Application of Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).
[brief] There has been some testimony in the case from which you may infer that the defendant fled shortly after the alleged commission of the crime.  The defense has suggested the following explanation:  (SET FORTH EXPLANATION SUGGESTED BY DEFENSE)  If you find the defendant’s explanation credible, you should not draw any inference of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt from the defendant’s departure.  [Model Criminal Jury Charge, “Flight” (Rev. May 10, 2010). ]  This portion of the charge is only given in cases where the defendant actually did offer an alternative explanation.
[brief] First, the practical consequences.  In reaching its decision, the trial court held that, under Paff, there is “no requirement that [] specific subject matter needs to be put in” an OPRA request.  (1T17:21-25; 1T19:3-14).  The court also ordered [...] to produce a Vaughn index detailing what emails were redacted or withheld within fourteen days.  (Da55).  This court has recognized that a requestor’s “failure . . . to clearly specify the documents sought” may necessitate the deployment of potentially limited agency resources to sift through, redact, and produce responsive records.  Spectraserv, 416 N.J. Super. at 578.  Likewise, in Paff v. Galloway Township, the Court recognized that while production of the email log would have taken only a few minutes, it would “take considerably longer for the Township Clerk and Chief of Police to determine whether the requested information in each email may intrude on privacy rights or raise public-safety concerns. ”  229 N.J. at 357.  Requiring agencies to dedicate in many circumstances limited resources to siphoning wholesale requests for email correspondence, while still processing other, appropriate requests within OPRA’s demanding timeframes, will place strain on already-burdened agencies across this state.  It will also come at the expense of other, more appropriate OPRA requests that do focus on a discrete and limited subject matter, particularly if the overbroad requestor has the resources to litigate, resulting in courts ordering agencies to prioritize their improper requests.
[brief] The legal profession defines the term fee simple slightly differently than the valuation profession does because legal definitions generally serve a different purpose.  Whereas definitions of fee simple used by the appraisers highlight the encumbrances on property, legal definitions tend to focus on duration.  That is, legal definitions of the term generally do not mention the four powers of government or encumbrances.  Instead, in a legal setting, the fee simple estate is one that endures for an indefinite period, as opposed to an estate of a shorter duration like a life estate or term of years.
[brief] It is clearly in the interests of fairness and justice that the parties and the Court take this matter seriously and defer to a medical expert’s opinion that additional time is needed to provide the most accurate findings and opinions of this case.  Neither the Appellant, nor the Appellant’s counsel, are in a position to rush a medical expert attempting to provide the most clarity possible on serious medical issues.  Therefore, applying the four inquiries prescribed by New Jersey case law, it is clear that the Appellant had in fact established exceptional circumstances to extend the discovery end date in order to provide an accurate and comprehensive expert report.  New Jersey case law also makes it clear that a plaintiff should not suffer the ultimate sanction for a procedural oversight beyond their control, even when there is failure to timely seek relief from the original discovery end date.
[brief] _[...]  Attorneys for Respondents  [...], Newark Mayor [...], the City of Newark City Counsel, Newark City Clerk_ [...], Newark Corporation Counsel [...], Esq., Newark Business Administrator [...], Esq., Newark Director of Economic and Housing Development  [...], Newark Director of Finance  [...], Newark Division of Tax Abatement and Special Taxes Manager [...], CTC, Newark Tax Assessor [...], Esq.  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.
[brief] The Legislature's expression of intent to apply a statute retroactively “may be either express, that is, stated in the language of the statute or in the pertinent legislative history, or implied, that is, retroactive application may be necessary to make the statute workable or to give it the most sensible interpretation[.]”  Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 522.  A statute is curative where its purpose is “to remedy a perceived imperfection in or misapplication of a statute and not to alter the intended scope or purposes of the original act. ”  Nelson v. Bd. of Educ., 148 N.J. 358, 370 (1997) (quoting Kendall v. Snedeker, 219 N.J. Super. 283, 288 (App. Div. 1987)).  A curative statute may clarify, but may not change, the meaning of existing law.
[brief] (6T152:13-158:19).  The Trial Court denied the request.  (6T163:3-23).  It further noted that it would be instructing the jury that they were not to draw any inferences or speculate as to why the plaintiff did not appear at trial.  (6T164:25-168:8).  Defense counsel then proceeded to comment on the plaintiff not being called as a witness at trial three times during his summation including an inference that this was an attempt to prevent the jury from judging her credibility.
[brief] COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS  To spare this court from having to review yet again already well-plowed ground, we have combined into a brief statement the most salient recent procedural and factual matters on which we believe the court should focus.  The most recent, and relevant, phase of this lengthy litigation began with this court’s unanimous March 6, 2023, decision ruling that [...] are being denied their fundamental constitutional right to T&E (March 6 decision).  Because the State did not appeal that ruling, it has become final and definitive.  This court also remanded the case to the [...] with specific instructions—to address the student-petitioners’ argument that the denial of T&E was caused by SFRA.  In this court’s definitive and binding words, “The Commissioner owed appellants a thorough review of their substantive argument: the funding structure of the SFRA was unconstitutional as applied to Lakewood’s unique demographic situation. ”  1  The following transcripts are in the record: February 5, 2018 (1T), February 7, 2018 (2T), February 12, 2018 (3T), February 13, 2018 (4T), February 23, 2018 (5T), March 27, 2018 (6T), July 10, 2018 (7T), August 20, 2018 (8T), October 3, 2018 (9T), December 18, 2018 (10T), July 9, 2019 (11T), July 10, 2019 (12T), July 22, 2019 (13T), July 23, 2019 (14T).
[brief] ’”  *Id.* at 352–53 (citing *Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc.*, 190 N.J.Super. 153, 160 (App.Div.1983)).  Furthermore, “the cornerstone of a franchise system must be the trademark or trade name of a product.  It is this uniformity of product and control of its quality and distribution which causes the public to turn to franchise stores for the product. ”  *Id.* at 354 (citing *Id.*).  Finally, in reaching its conclusions, the Instructional System Court affirmed the findings in Finlay & Assocs., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp. and stated that “no license was found because the distributor had not conducted business under the manufacturer's name and the license means ‘to use as if it is one’s own. ’”  Instructional System, 130 N.J. at 353 (citing Finlay, 146 N.J. Super. at 220, aff’d, 155 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1978)).
[brief] *McDevitt*, 175 N.J. at 529-530.  Further, Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant’s choice to substantiate Defendant’s arguments/claims through the information contained in those documents, while not express, constitutes unambiguous assent to the correctness of the document and the information contained therein.  *McDevitt*, 175 N.J. at 529-530.  And, that such statements were in the form of documentation is not dispositive to the analysis of admissibility.  *Skibinski*, 206 N.J. Super. at 353; *Corcoran*, 312 N.J. Super. at 126-127.  As such, Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant’s reliance on the information set forth in that documentation meets the criteria set forth in *McDevitt* and, as such, the admissibility of such documentation qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule as an adoptive admission.  *N.J.R.E.* 803(b)(2).  ii)
[brief] [Ibid.]  See also Serenity Contracting Grp., Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 306 N.J. Super. 151, 157-58 (App. Div. 1997) (“Nothing in the Local Public Bidding Law or in the cases decided thereunder suggests a legislative design to supplant all exercises of principled business judgment by the contracting public entity that conform with the express provisions of the Law and its underlying policies.  Such exercises are entitled to respectful review under an abuse of discretion standard, especially where they are based upon a bidder's failure to comply strictly with bid specifications, whether substantive or procedural. ”) (internal citations omitted); Entech Corp. v. City of Newark, 351 N.J. Super. 440, 457 (Law. Div. 2002) (“Further, there must be a clear abuse of discretion by the municipality in order for such a decision to be overturned by a court. ”).