ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. at 399; Pb5 – Pb6, Pb15.  In [...], warehousing has been permitted on the Property since at least the 1980s.  (Da7) (2T, 18:15-25).  Thus, the permissible nature of this land use was of record and available for inspection when the development was constructed and/or its members purchased homes.  (Id.).  Furthermore, the Redevelopment Plan, as commissioned, reviewed, and adopted by the [...] and the Committee, states: “this Redevelopment Plan is compatible and consistent with the goals and objectives of the [...] Master Plan. ” (Pa98).  That same Redevelopment Plan also advises the Township should “direct its efforts toward the location and development of planned office industrial-warehouse areas in the immediate vicinity of the major regional traffic arteries in order to take advantage of the regional transportation network and to limit impacts within the critical portion of the Township. ” (Id.).  In other words, [...]’s elected officials specifically selected [...]’s Property, which is strategically located on the periphery of town and adjacent to major regional highways, including the NJ Turnpike and US 322, to house this development. \(^4\)  This same project [...] portrays as invasive could have been built on this property at any time since at least the 1980s.  (Da7) (2T, 18:15-25).  As such, [...]’s suggestion the public has an interest in vindicating a purported affront to the “efficacy” of its town character in the form of this ordinance is soundly refuted by the facts, which demonstrate the historic and \(^4\) That the Property is strategically located on the edge of town and near regional highway networks specifically to “limit impacts within the critical portion of the Township” is also a distinguishing factor from Willoughby.
[brief] Defendant produced key e-mails and documents, including the [...] reports, on September 19, 2012, and produced additional relevant documents and e-mails on October 29, 2012, November 18 or 19, 2012, December 23, 2012, January 17, 2013, and possibly other dates.  Defendant's excuses for why it did not produce its relevant documents earlier are far from convincing, and they do not “substantially justify” its tardy document production.
[brief] [Da9]  The letter enclosing the Committee’s Determination was sent to Defendant at her address at [...] (her post office box).  Defendant must have received the Committee’s Determination because she timely appealed that decision.  The appeal was fully briefed and argued.  On February 18th, 2022, the Disciplinary Review Board (the “DRB”) affirmed the Committee’s determination and dismissed Defendant’s appeal.
[brief] The applicant administratively appealed from the denial.  Id. at 486.  The applicant and Department then entered into a “Mediation & Settlement Agreement In Lieu of Permit” and the Department ultimately issued a “Letter of Authorization” “authorizing the reconstruction and expansion of the applicant’s home” (the “LOA”).  Id. at 487.  “The LOA expressly stated that it was ‘in lieu of a Coastal General Permit, pursuant to the rules on Coastal Zone Management. ’”  Ibid.  [...] administratively appealed from the LOA, and the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) concluded that the Department improperly “waived the infill development rule without any express statutory or regulatory authority,” and “set aside the settlement agreement and LOA as invalid and *ultra vires.*”
[brief] Plaintiff sustained multiple disc herniations that are permanent, painful, and robbed her of an active life at the age of 70.  Her golden years have been sullied by depression and a substantial loss of enjoyment of life as she can no longer take the long walks she was accustomed to before the accident.  Plaintiff’s injuries are clearly not insubstantial.  [...] has a fundamental right to have the nature and scope of her injuries be determined by a jury of her peers after all the evidence is set forth before them at trial.  Anything less would be contrary to the teachings of Brill and its progeny.
[brief] On cross, when [...] is asked about a purported employment contract that was a part of a due diligence package that he prepared to be given to investors, he stated that he does not recall if it was ever given to investors but confirmed that he prepared this package for potential investors to look at.  3T83:24-86:5  He was also asked if he spoke up about his accounting concerns and confirmed that “lots of personal payments were being made from the bank account, and then later, we’d call it income. ”  3T62:12-23.  [...] testified that if Plaintiff was a true 10% owner, tax returns filed by [...] were not accurate and that Plaintiff should have received K-1s.  (Aa18).  During Plaintiff’s re-cross on [...], while speaking about improper tax returns and potential IRS implications, the Court pressured her to finish.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred by Finding [...]’s Proposed Redevelopment was not a Public Use and Enjoining [...] from Condemnation and Redevelopment Efforts.  The trial court erred in finding that [...]’s purpose in seeking to condemn the Property, i.e., to implement its Redevelopment Plan, is a “private use,” which finding the New Jersey Constitution.  The court stated that “[...] is looking to condemn the property for essentially – not for a public use, but for a private use,” for something that is not “generally considered to be a public interest kind of thing. ” (1T24:2-25:4).  The court acknowledged that prior to Plaintiff’s interest in the Property, [...] had agreed with the current Property owner that the Property would be redeveloped with commercial uses to complement the adjacent parcel that was being developed with residential housing.  (1T50:1-4; 51:3-4; 25:15-26:23).  The court focused on the prospective use for the Property, noting the result could have been different if [...] were condemning for a hospital, a school or open space rather than for commercial redevelopment.  (1T51:11-16; 2T14:11-24).  This Court reviews questions of law de novo, as the “trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.
[brief] Pa431-3.  [...] was an [...] employee who was late for work that morning, as her shift started at 6:45 a.m.  See Pa51; Pa1010-1 (22:20-23:13); Pa1057-8 (69:5-70:3).  [...] was driving east-bound on the east-west travelway in the parking lot when she came to the T-intersection in question, intending to make a left turn.  Pa44-45.  At that time, [...] was walking west-bound, attempting to cross the north side of the T-intersection.
[directive] On the HD Screening Form ([...]), the defense attorney must provide relevant information to ensure that the defendant satisfies the minimum requirements for Strict HD or HDLE.  This includes certifying that the defendant has an 10ofl2 Page if appropriate residence, that the defendant understands the expectations placed on Strict HD or HDLE, and whether the defendant has the technological capability to participate in video reporting.  The form also includes sections for requesting leave parameters for defendants seeking release on HDLE.  This will assist the courts, the of parties, and staff in evaluating the appropriateness Strict HD or HDLE, video reporting capabilities, and ensuring that release orders are accurate and monitorable.  Finally, the defendant will be required to certify each time they submit an EM of Screening Form, that residing at the provided address will not be a violation any of court order, condition release, DCP&P agreements, or any restraining orders.  VI.
[brief] 24 TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX Page OPRA Request to [...] ........................................ Da1 Dated: February 26, 2020 Government Records Request Receipt Dated: August 7, 2020 ........................................................................... Da2 Proposed Order to Show Cause for Summary Contempt Dated: May 23, 2022 .............................................................................. Da4 Order Denying Order to Show Cause for Summary Contempt Filed: June 1, 2022 .................................................................................. Da7 Amended Answer to Verified First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Filed: October 17, 2022 .......................................................................... Da10 Notice of Motion to Quash Subpoena and for a Protective Order filed by Defendant [...] Filed: October 14, 2022 ......................................................................... Da19 Certification of [...] in Support of [...]’s Motion to Quash Subpoena Filed: October 14, 2022 ....................................................................... Da21 Certification of Counsel, [...] Dated: November 10, 2022 ....................................................................
[brief] This Court assesses the reasonableness of police conduct by considering “the circumstances facing the officers who had to make on-the-spot decisions in a fluid situation. ”  Watts, 223 N.J. at 514.  In State v. Tucker, our Supreme Court held that the flight of a suspect alone, without other articulable suspicion of criminal activity, does not meet the Terry standard for articulable suspicion.  136 N.J. at 173.  If a defendant’s flight is the sole indicator of criminal activity, the police seizure is not justified.  Ibid.  In this case, however, defendant’s flight was not the only basis for reasonable suspicion.  Beyond his flight, defendant and codefendant were affiliating with someone conducting drug trafficking in a crime-ridden location, possibly taking part in an ongoing drug enterprise.  The investigating officers had a reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity, allowing for an investigatory stop to detain defendant and to search him for weapons.  See ibid.  In cases like this one, where a suspect’s flight is followed by a police pursuit, the focal issue is whether the case “is controlled by Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, or by State v. Doss, 254 N.J.Super. 122 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 130 N.J. 17 (1992), cited with approval in Tucker, 136 N.J. at 169–70.
[brief] Id. at 349 (quoting Marschall v. Marschall, 195 N.J. Super. 16, 33 (Ch. Div. 1984)).  The court found the prenuptial agreement unenforceable in part because "the parties appended no schedule of their respective assets to the agreement."  Id.  Here, the Court found that there was no statement of assets annexed to the Photocopy as required by N.J.S.A. 37:2-33.  P39a.  The Court, nevertheless, enforced the Photocopy, which was erroneous and should be reversed.  P39a.  C.
[brief] As a result, plaintiffs’ utter bad faith & dishonesty, in pursuing this litigation over the last 3 years, caused an enormous amount of time defending against an intended injustice.  Furthermore, [...] expressly did not preclude the award of fees authorized by rule or statute.  There is no reported appellate opinion disallowing fees to a pro se attorney under either Rule 4:42-9 (a)(2)--Fund in Court-- or N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.--Frivolous Litigation.  Neither requires that the prevailing party had to incur or pay fees in order to be awarded fees.  Neither excludes pro se attorneys as eligible for a fee award.  Thus, independent from Rule 1:4-8, which provides a safe harbor for offending attorneys, parties, such as the plaintiffs herein, including the apparent master-mind of this frivolous litigation, the plaintiff executrix, who demonstrated lack of candor to 3 courts, proferred materially inconsistent & incredible testimony, & disrespected the discovery process, can & should be held individually liable, or at least, liable as the personal estate representative.  The lower court was restrained from condemning plaintiffs & their counsel.  Thus, in lieu of awarding fees to a pro se, Rule 1:4-8 (d) (1) authorizes a court to order the payment of a penalty into court.  While Appellant will not be compensated in a literal sense with a penalty paid into court, Appellant, the Bar & the Bench will benefit because appropriate justice was done so as to deter these plaintiffs, their counsel & others from bringing & maintaining baseless litigation.
[brief] Specifically, plaintiff’s complaint sounds in the following causes of action:  Count One: Declaratory Judgment that [...] is Structured, Organized and Operated in Violation of the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine and N.J.A.C. §13:35-6.16 and Practices Medicine Without a License in Violation of N.J.S.A. §2C:21-20.  Count Two: Declaratory Judgment that [...] was Not Entitled to No-Fault Insurance Benefits  Pursuant to Allstate v. Northfield and Allstate v. Orthopedic Evaluations and Ordering Disgorgement of Insurance Benefits Received as a Result of [...]’s Corporate Structure Violations  Count Three: Violations of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act as a Result of the Defendants' CPOM Violations --- 1 C.C.Da. refers to the Carteret Comprehensive Defendants’ Appendix per R. 2:6-8 for multiple defendants.  Count Four: Declaratory Judgment that Defendant [...], D.C., Violated Board of Chiropractic Examiners’ Regulation N.J.A.C. §13:44E-2.6, Prohibiting Payment or Receipt of Referral Fees or Other Compensation, in Connection with Referrals for Pain Management, Anesthesia and Other Surgical Procedures  Count Five: Declaratory Judgment that Defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] Violated Board of Medical Examiners’ Regulation, N.J.A.C. §13:35-6.17  Prohibiting Payment or Receipt of Compensation in Exchange for Patient Referrals.  Count Six: Declaratory Judgment that the Defendants Violated the Anti Self-Referral Law  N.J.S.A. §§45:9-22.4, et. seq.  (The Codey Act)  Count Seven: Declaratory Judgment that [...], [...], [...], [...], the [...] Practices and the [...] Practices were Not Entitled to No-Fault Insurance Benefits Pursuant to Allstate v. Orthopedic Evaluations and Ordering Disgorgement of Insurance Benefits Received as a Result of the Bufano-[...]-[...] Kickback and Self-Referral Violations  Count Eight: Violations of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act as a Result of the Bufano-[...]-[...] Self-Referral and Kickback/Self-Referral Violations.  Count Nine: Violations of the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Statute, N.J.S.A. §2C:41-2, et. seq. in Connection with [...]’s CPOM Violations and the Bufano-[...]-[...] Kickback and Self-Referral Violations.  (C.C.Da.l-100).
[brief] The April 20 robbery of the Audi in Jersey City that was used to carjack the Mercedes in this case must be presented to a jury as one continuing course of conduct.  And the unique nature of the Audi as stolen just three days prior is what identifies defendant where identity is a central issue in the case.  In addition, defendant’s Instagram includes pictures of the yellow BMW stolen at the same time as the Audi in Jersey City, the clothes, and the gun with the laser.  These are other pieces of evidence that are needed to link the Audi to defendant and identify him.  Thus, joinder is appropriate because the Jersey City evidence would be admissible as material to identity.
[brief] The “requisite bad faith or knowledge of lack of well-groundedness [sic] may arise during the conduct of the litigation. ”  *Id.* (citing *Chernin v. Mardan Corp.*, 244 N.J. Super. 379 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  Sanctions will also be awarded where a complaint is “commenced” or “continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay, or malicious injury. ”  *Id.* at 25 (citing N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1(b)(1)).  Sanctions are warranted “only when the pleading as a whole is frivolous or of a harassing nature.
[brief] The number of attorneys involved in the matter was excessive.  The sheer amount of time billed by the plaintiffs’ full time attorneys and staff are (sic) found to be unreasonable.  [...] … requested billing time for himself at 1,968.10 hours during the time in which he was involved February 2018 and ended in mid-November 2022 for approximately 57 months.  This calculates out as 35 hours per month for almost one full week per month being spent on this one matter.  The Court finds such to be incredible and unreasonable.  A review of the billings for all three law firms show extreme overlap on almost every issue involved in this matter.  The Court finds that the billings by all the plaintiffs’ law firms were excessive and were “generously” billed due to the fee shift provisions contained in the CFA and RETA.  The plaintiffs’ billings were excessive, unfettered, unreasonable, overlapping and duplicative.  The Court finds that the term “free for all” best describes the request of the plaintiffs’ attorneys.
[brief] In addition to that bare minimum, this Court must also order an admissibility hearing.  To obtain a hearing, the defendant has an “initial burden of showing some suggestiveness,” tied to a system variable.  *Henderson*, 208 N.J. at 288.  Here, the facts support an examination, even if the identification evidence is re-admitted with “focused jury charges. ”  *Id.* at 294.  Initially, no one can make a sufficiently reliable identification from an image that does not clearly display a person’s face, as here.  “The most important source of information that we used to identify someone in daily life is the face. ”  [...], *Remembering Faces* at 66, in *The Visual World in Memory* (2009).  When faces are lower quality or degraded, they are less recognizable.  See [...], [...] & [...], *Recognizing Degraded Faces: The Contribution of Configural and Featural Cues*, 41 Perception 1497, 1498 (2012).  The more downgraded the image, the less likely that humans can accurately recognize the person, even when the person is very familiar.  [...], [...] & [...], *Evaluating the Effectiveness of Pixelation and Blurring on Masking the Identity of Familiar Faces*, 15 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 101, 102-03 (2001).  Moreover, the system variables here clearly show “some evidence of impermissible suggestiveness” here that “could lead to a mistaken identification. ”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 238, 288.
[brief] On November 16, 2023, the Board properly adopted the decision of Administrative Law Judge [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) (Aa61).  [...] denied Petitioner’s application for deferred retirement benefits as a matter of law and granted the Board’s Motion for Summary Decision (Aa52-60).  [...] found that Petitioner was removed from employment on charges of misconduct directly related to his employment and in accordance with applicable law, Petitioner is ineligible for deferred retirement (Ibid.)  Petitioner was employed as a Corrections Officer with the [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) in 1990 and enrolled into the [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) as a condition of employment (Aa1; Aa53).
[brief] See Howell Props., Inc. v. Twp. of Brick, 347 N.J. Super. 573, 587 (App. Div. 2002) (“For whatever reason, defendants chose not to appeal, and thus were procedurally barred from challenging the ordinance”) (citing R. 4:69-6(a)); City of Hoboken v. City of Jersey City, 347 N.J. Super. 279, 299 (Law Div. 2001) (noting that municipal actions falling “outside of this jurisdictional window” of the prerogative writ forty-five day appeal period are “not susceptible to collateral attack”).
[brief] Plaintiff attempts to argue that it should have been permitted to cross-collateralize, and therefore declare a default on the second mortgage pursuant to the cross-default provision, which states:  “DEFAULT: The note describes the acts that will constitute a default under this mortgage.  Additionally, a default under any other mortgage covering the premises will constitute a default under this mortgage.  If any default occurs, you can foreclose this mortgage.  That means that you can arrange for the premises to be sold, as provided by law, in order to pay off what I owe you.  If the money you receive from the sale is not enough to pay off what I owe you, I still owe you the difference. ”  However, since the First Mortgage was discharged prior to the date the Second Mortgage was made, as more fully set forth above, Plaintiff is unable to state a claim for cross-collateralization because there was no other mortgage in existence.  Plaintiff could have attempted to reinstate the discharged mortgage prior to making the Second Mortgage but failed to do so.  Plaintiff could have denied the Second Mortgage considering it was in active litigation with the bankruptcy trustee.  Instead, Plaintiff chose to extend the Second Mortgage.  Plaintiff is seeking to have it both ways.  It made the Second Mortgage while in the midst of the bankruptcy preference action and now seeks to use the very same bankruptcy preference action to revive a discharged mortgage and declare it and the Second Mortgage to be in default based on the bankruptcy preference action.  The Court should not countenance this attempted course of action.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...]’s motion for counsel fees and sanctions was based on several legal grounds: (b) Paragraph 7 of the Court’s July 22, 2022 Order and its accompanying Memorandum of Decision authorizing counsel fee applications; (c) Paragraph 27 of the Parties’ Property Settlement Agreement requiring fee-shifting for a party’s non-compliance; (d) an analysis under R. 5:3-5(c); or (d) as to sanctions, R. 1:4-8(b).  [See Pa21, Pl.’s Mot. Sep. 22, 2022]  It was also based on the inherent powers of the trial court to issue sanctions for wrongful litigation conduct:  [T]he threshold for the use of inherent power sanctions is high.  Consequently, even where the inherent power to award attorney fees as a sanction against an attorney has been found to exist, the imposition of such a sanction is generally not imposed under this power without a finding generally that the attorney’s conduct constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.  [Dziubek v. Schumann, 275 N.J. Super. 428, 440 (App. Div. 1994)(emphasis added)].
[brief] (Pb9).  This argument fails because the Board provided adequate notice of the law.  The only express notice requirement contained in the Ricci Act provides that the Board must “notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  On August 7, 2019, the [...] satisfied this notice requirement when it added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  That notice satisfied the Ricci Act, which requires only that the Board notify members of the enactment of the statute.  The Legislature is well aware of how to create specific notice requirements and has done so with other statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-50(a) (“Notification shall be by certified mail to the spouse’s address as provided on the form by the member. ”); e.g., Hammond v. City of Paterson, 145 N.J. Super. 452, 456 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that the Legislature, in requiring “actual receipt” of notice in the Tort Claims Act when certified mail is not used, “clearly did not mean to leave proof of actual receipt to a presumption. ”).  When “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. ”  GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307-08 (1993); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 579 (1997).  Nowhere in the Ricci Act is there a requirement that the Board send notice, through a postcard, by certified mail or other means, or otherwise require actual receipt of notice.  Thus, in accord with the statutory canon of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, this court should reject [...]’s request to create a requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to.  The Ricci Act simply required that the Board provide notice within thirty days of its enactment, without specifying in what manner.