ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Legal Arguments in the Brief | ii – x | | Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Appealed | xi | | Table of Authorities | xii – xiv | | Appendix  Table of Contents (Volumes I – III) | xv – xvii | | Statement of Items Submitted to the Court in the Summary Judgment, Reconsideration, and Clarification Motions on Appeal | xviii – xx |  TABLE OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN THE BRIEF  Procedural History  1 – 2  Statement of Facts  3 - 7 Issues Presented 7 – 9  Legal Arguments (See Below Point Headings)  9 – 63  Conclusion 63–65
[brief] Furthermore, "``Equity will not aid a fraud doer."''  *Id.* at 299, 121 A.2d 62 (quoting *Herder v. Garman*, 106 N.J. Eq. 13, 149 A. 636 (Ch. 1930)).  The doctrine of equitable fraud was explained by our Supreme Court in *Jewish Center of Sussex Cty. v. Whale*, as follows:
[brief] On June 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking leave to amend their complaint (with the proposed amended complaint still containing bare-bones allegations against [...]).  (Pa271).  In response to the motion, on June 29, 2021, [...] filed opposition and a cross-motion for summary judgment.  (Pa275a).  [...]’s summary judgment motion included a certification from its representative, [...], which was substantially similar to the certification that [...] provided at the outset of the case when Plaintiffs’ counsel requested “backup” for [...]’s assertion that it did not enter into a transaction with [...] and had nothing to do with Plaintiffs’ dispute with [...].  Specifically, through his certification, [...] presented the following undisputed facts:  [...] employs medical doctors who diagnose and treat a full range of retinal disorders of the eye.  (Pa282a ¶ 2).  [...] is affiliated with [...] (“[...]”), which is an administrative services organization that provides support services including payer contracting, administrative, financial, legal, human resource and other non-clinical support services to affiliated eye care medical practices including [...].  (Ibid.).  [...], in coordination with [...], has been acquiring the assets of ophthalmology and retina medical practices in New Jersey and other states along the east coast.  (Pa283a ¶ 4).  In early 2019, [...] and [...] engaged in preliminary discussions with [...] regarding the possible purchase of the assets of his practice, [...], and its two office locations: [...] and [...].  (Pa283a ¶ 3).  In March 2019, [...] and [...] sent [...] the Draft LOI with regard to the potential purchase of the assets of his medical practice. (Pa283a ¶ 4).  Discussions with [...], however, went nowhere, and [...] did not sign the Draft LOI.  (Pa283a ¶ 5).  In light of [...]’ rejection of [...]’s and [...]’s expression of interest, [...] and [...]’s preliminary interest in the potential acquisition of the assets of [...]’ practice never advanced beyond the preliminary interest phase in regard to the potential purchase of [...]’ practice.  (Pa283a ¶ 6).  Indeed, [...] and [...] never consummated a letter of intent to purchase [...]’ practice; [...] and [...] did not perform the typical due diligence associated with acquiring the assets of a medical practice; and [...] and [...] did not commence negotiations of nor draft any definitive purchase agreements.  (Pa283a ¶ 7).  Importantly, neither [...] nor [...] had any involvement in Plaintiffs’ allegedly long-standing relationship with [...] and Associates in Eyecare.  (Pa284a ¶ 9).  In fact, [...] and [...] had no familiarity with [...] or [...] or their alleged relationship with [...] until they reviewed the allegations in the Complaint.  (Pa284a ¶ 10).  At no time did [...] or [...] have any communications with the Notis Defendants regarding [...] or [...].  (Pa284a ¶ 11).  In short, [...] and [...] had nothing to do with the dispute between Plaintiffs and the Notis Defendants.  (Pa284a ¶ 12).  VII.  THE TRIAL COURT GRANTS NJ RETINA’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSES IT FROM THE CASE
[brief] Thus, only where the prosecution shows that the “objective of the conspiracy was the commission of additional offenses” or involved “a distinct danger in addition to that involved in the actual commission of any specific offense” will the convictions not merge at sentencing.  *Id.* at 386-87 (emphasis added); compare *State v. Hyman*, 451 N.J. Super. 429, 459 (App. Div. 2017) (declining to merge convictions when the conspiracy involved an agreement to possess and distribute 200 grams of cocaine and the substantive offense involved possession with intent to distribute fifty grams of cocaine); with *Jurcsek*, 247 N.J. Super. at 109-10 (merging a conviction for conspiracy to commit forgery, falsify records, and theft with a substantive theft conviction when all overt acts were “an integral part” of the substantive offense).  Applying these principles, [...]’s robbery and conspiracy convictions should have been merged at sentencing.  The State has not shown any objective of the conspiracy beyond the commission of the robbery at [...].  Further, as the trial court observed, the proofs for conspiracy at trial involved only the “coordination of acts,” as there was “no evidence of a verbal agreement” between [...] and his co-defendant.  (9T 153-6 to 11)  Without any evidence of conspiracy other than the coordinated conduct between [...] and [...] during the robbery for which they were convicted, the State cannot point to “a distinct danger in addition” to the commission of the substantive crime.  See Hardison, 99 N.J. at 386, 391 (finding that convictions for robbery and conspiracy should have merged when the conduct proven demonstrated no “further criminal objectives” other than the completed robbery).  Accordingly, [...]’s case must be remanded for a resentencing.
[brief] In April 2020, after being in contact with Defendant for around nine months, Plaintiff began preparing for their marriage by gathering documents.  While gathering documents and preparing for marriage, Plaintiff discovered during a video call that Defendant’s last name was not [...], contrary to what he believed, which was a shock to him.  Confronted with the discrepancy; Defendant insisted her family was still considered [...]s despite the different last name.  Defendant’s sister intervened during the conversation, reprimanding Plaintiff for questioning his fiancée and insisting they were [...]s.  1T67
[directive] The chief of police or agency chief executive officer shall designate a qualified supervising firearms instructor for each training and qualification session.  Firearms Instructors.  Proper instructor-participant ratios should be maintained during all training and qualification sessions.  (See Section 7.  Supervising/Firearms Instructor Responsibilities.)  Ammunition.  Each participant in the qualification and training program shall be provided with service or equivalent loads.  Automatic or Semi-Automatic Assault Weapons.  Training and qualification shall be conducted with an automatic or semi-automatic assault weapon approved by the agency.
[brief] In his affidavit, [...] testified that he uploaded [...]’s phone onto his forensic equipment, and the equipment indicated that the image upload had been completed without error.  However, upon his arrival back in his New York office, [...] testified that he placed all the images from the phone into a program developed by one of their forensic equipment manufacturers to analyze and report on the collected images, where it was then revealed that the image files from [...]’s collection were corrupt.  Id. at 3, ¶¶ 14–16.  He testified that he then communicated with a forensic equipment manufacturer, but neither he nor the manufacturer were able to conclude why the files were corrupt.  Upon further questioning, [...], much like [...]’s affidavit, could not attest to the specific reasoning why the imaging first seemed to have successfully uploaded but then later was corrupted.  Furthermore, counsel for [...] indicated that he had seen the images before from those captured by his own expert, [...], and that there did not seem to be any corruption therein.  Based on the conflicting evidence, as well as the potential that it was an error on the part of [...]’s expert, the Court was not persuaded by the affidavit of [...] or the argument of [...] as to why the corruption occurred, and deferred its ruling on this issue until [...]’s expert could provide the Court with assurance that if the phone and / or data were reproduced for imaging, the encryption error would not reoccur.
[brief] (2T93-18 to 94-16)  Because of the expert testimony, the court found mitigating factor 13 (young defendant pressured by older person) but did “not give it a great deal of weight. ”  (2T94-17 to 95-1)  The court imposed two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, each with a thirty-year parole bar, for an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment with sixty-years of parole ineligibility.  (2T96-12 to 25)  C.
[brief] Testimony Regarding Pre-SOL Facts was “Reasonably Required” to Establish [...]’s RICO Claims within the SOL Period  The Special Master also expressly found that adducing testimony of pre-SOL facts – even with respect to events that occurred in the 1980s – was, in fact, “reasonably required” to establishing NJRICO liability after October 1, 2004.  With respect to the testimony of [...] and [...] (Db42), [...] found … th[at] evidence, although of events long before the statute of limitations period, was still relevant to proving that actions taken after October 2004 were RICO violations.  Evidence regarding the partnership agreements went towards establishing who were members of the partnership, and the terms of the agreement.  The [[...]]’ thefts were not robbing by gunpoint or breaking into Plaintiffs’ homes -- they were committed by misusing funds entrusted to them as part of a partnership.  Whether or not [the [...]] were justified in their use of those funds hinged upon the agreement between the parties.  If they had agreed to distribute money in a particular way or allow for self-dealing, all of those facts would be relevant to the ultimate issue of whether [the [...]]’ particular distributions or payments were an act of theft or proper.  This analysis is necessary to assess [the [...]]’ actions at any time during the partnership -- including after October 2004.  Similarly, although [the [...]] are correct that this evidence was relevant to breach of contract claims, that fact does not exclude it from also of proving Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.  (39079a-80a)
[brief] To prove a *prima facie* case of discrimination, a plaintiff must prove she: (1) was in the protected group; (2) was performing her job at a level that met the Defendants' legitimate expectations; (3) was nevertheless fired; and (4) Defendants sought someone to perform the same work after she left.  *Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 436, 450 (2005).
[brief] Furthermore, [...] established there were qualified experts available at the time of his hearing and trial to testify about the risks of misidentification by eyewitnesses who claim they knew the perpetrator prior to the crime.  [...] provided the PCR court with a report by [...], PhD, renowned psychologist who has studied and published extensively on eyewitness identification and has testified as an expert in more than 150 cases, including Henderson.  (Da226-27)  [...]’s report establishes that well before 2014, psychologists had found that claimed familiarity does not eliminate the importance of estimator and systems variables in assessing the reliability of an identification.  He explained research dating back decades that shows that people regularly mistake an unfamiliar person for someone they know, and the factors known to affect stranger identifications can similarly influence non-stranger ones.
[brief] However, the allegation is belied by the Appellants’ own allegations that they themselves disclosed such information as early as 2015 to the [...] in the context of negotiations of a potential sale between the Appellants and the [...].  In that regard, at Paragraphs 53 through 57 of their First Amended Complaint and the proposed Second Amended Complaint, Appellants alleged as follows: - At Paragraph 53, while its “million-dollar purchase-plus-land lease transaction had consummated with [...], and [Appellants] had received the $3 million offer, [Appellants’] principal [...] was approached by defendant [...] for a possible sale of the rights” [FEDa54; Pa3104]; - At Paragraphs 54 and 55, on September 28, 2015, Appellants entered into a Non-Disclosure Agreement with [...], which contained non-circumvention provisions, for the purpose of protecting confidential information to be provided by Appellants [FEDa54; Pa3104]; and •
[directive] 5.2  Identification of Mental Health Professionals.  County Prosecutor’s Offices, in cooperation with Tactical Teams and/or Crisis Negotiation Teams, shall identify qualified and experienced mental health professionals who will be available to respond to all incidents involving a barricaded individual or hostage situation.  These mental health professionals may be individual providers or organizations.  Law Enforcement agencies in all twenty-one counties have already established professional partnerships with mental health providers through the Attorney General’s ARRIVE Together program.  These existing relationships will likely provide for natural partnerships for Tactical Teams and/or Crisis Negotiation Teams across the state as they gain compliance with the instant policy.
[brief] 569a–586a.  The [...] required a deposit of only $2,000.00, called for a minimum of 200 free market units, $16,500.00 per unit, thus requiring a minimum purchase price of $3.3 million.  569a–586a.  Thereafter, on October 3, 2006, pursuant to the representations of [...] and [...], Plaintiffs signed the Assignment and Assumption of the [...] of Sale (“[...]-MTDC Assignment”).  562a–568a.  Pursuant to the [...]-MTDC Assignment, [...] would assign the [...] to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs were to make deposit payments totaling $500,000.00.  In addition, the [...]-MTDC Assignment called for a minimum of 200 free market units, $23,500.00 per unit, thus a minimum purchase price of $4.7 million.  562a–568a.  On October 23, 2006, [...] presented [...] a finalized Operating Agreement of [...] and directed [...] to execute same.
[brief] The Sutton v. Sutton Litigation Is Not Relevant  Petitioner objected to the Respondent’s introduction of the litigation that Petitioner filed in 1986 as not being produced during discovery and as having no relevance to this litigation, but the Court overruled that objection.  (8T99:6-11; 8T107:5-22; 8T109:5 to 110:17; 8T157:2-13).  In its Opinion, the Court found that Sutton v. Sutton 71 F. Supp. 2d 383, 386 (D.N.J. 1999) was relevant on the basis of a hypothetical: “If Petitioner was meritorious in his claims against the families’ estates, the payout would have occurred after his marriage to Decedent. ”  P14a-P15a.  The Court’s hypothetical has no basis in fact given that the assets that were the subject matter of Sutton v Sutton had long been owned by Petitioner, in part, with the Estate and his five siblings, and thus, they constituted premarital assets that would have been exempt from equitable distribution even without a prenuptial agreement.  *Painter v. Painter*, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).  The lawsuits Petitioner brought were to preserve the value of those assets, not to obtain a substantial payout.  (8T97:19-24; 8T9916 to 100:1).
[directive] Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in order to 22.  [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] cause you to plead guilty?  Czy przedstawiono Panu(i) jakiekolwiek inne obietnice poza tymi zawartymi w niniejszym formularzu lub czy grozono Panu(i) w celu naklonienia Pana(i) do przyznania sic, do winy?
[brief] It is well-settled in New Jersey that “evidence obtained by a police officer in a search conducted outside the boundaries of the officer’s statutory jurisdiction is not subject to exclusion. ”  Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. at 428.  In other words, “where a police officer violates a criminal-procedure statute, such as exceeding territorial jurisdiction, evidence gathered as a result is not automatically subject to suppression. ”  Gadsden, 303 N.J. Super. at 504 (citations omitted).  Such technical violations do not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.  *Hamlett*, 449 N.J. Super. at 176; see also *Novembrino*, 105 N.J. at 130 n.15 (recognizing that Rule 3:5-7(g) addresses “technically-defective” search warrants).
[brief] Properly allocating [...]’s covered costs leads to the conclusion that \(^{15}\)  Specifically, by 1989 [...] had incurred $558,368.49 in covered costs.  The amount of these covered costs that could be allocated to the policies underlying the [...] was $35,735.58.  (Pa261.) the policy limits underlying the [...] were not exhausted until 1996.  By 1996, [...] had incurred approximately $4,785,465.88 in covered costs.  The 6.4% share of these covered costs allocated to the US Fire period is $306,269.82, thus eroding the limits of the policies underlying the [...] by 1996.  Accordingly, commencing the running of interest at the point in time which the limits underlying the US Fire policy would be exhausted, while incorrect, calls for interest beginning to run from 1996, at the earliest.  In sum, there is no basis for rewarding [...]’s 20-year delay in filing suit with 20 years of prejudgment interest.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, as well as any reasons to be set forth during oral argument, the Trial Court’s decision to grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment should be upheld.  It is respectfully requested that this Court enter an Order denying the State’s appeal.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/ Respondent, [...]  By: [...]  By: [...] July 16, 2024
[brief] (23T 7-23 to 8-5)  Investigators seized sneakers (23T 40-22 to 25), a mop (22T 243-22 to 24), a trash can lid (22T 244-2 to 4), gloves (22T 29-21), a cell phone (23T 22 to 30-4), and a copy of the Jersey Journal from February 8 that had a story about the death of their neighbor across-the-street.
[brief] The first category of present offenses—disqualifying offenses for which the defendant has been convicted and for which is being sentenced under the indictment(s) under which he seeks admission into Track One—is primarily set forth in subsection (b).  State v. Ancrum, 449 N.J. Super. 526, 531 (App. Div. 2017).  The offenses include (1) first-degree crimes, (2) first- and second-degree No Early Release Act (NERA) offenses other than robbery or burglary, (3) crimes with a mandatory minimum period of incarceration other than N.J.S.A 2C:35-7, and (4) distribution or attempt/conspiracy to distribute CDS to a juvenile near school property.
[brief] 0017a and determined that: 1.  Applying the first prong of the test, “PWCRA registration does not provide any guarantee that the archaeologists would carry out its duties in accordance with the Project’s specifications”  0017a and, 2.  With respect to the second prong, “PVWC’s waiver of the supposed PWCRA registration requirement does not harm the competitive bidding process. ”  0018a.  In fact, if [...] was uncertain as to what registration the bid instructions required of its selected archaeologist, [...] was on express notice pursuant to the bid instructions that if it “failed to bring [any] alleged ambiguity relating to the bid requirements to the Commission’s attention for clarification before the bid”, it would run the risk of the consequences of its misunderstanding of the bid specifications.  0018a.  C.  [...]’s Claimed Registration As An Archealogist Under the PWCRA
[brief] The court must reject that argument, and affirm the trial court’s order discharging [...] as receiver.  Also, the appellants argue that [...] should not have retained the accountant, [...], CPA, without an order of the court to file the necessary returns and reports in connection with the operation of the diner.  (Ca20).  This was an emergent situation when [...] took over the operation of the diner.  [...] retained the services of an accountant, on an emergent basis, to file the necessary returns and reports in connection with the operation of the diner on an emergent basis.  (Ca20).  The trial court rejected the arguments of [...] and the [...].
[brief] Had [Appellants] made their Lease payments, they would still control the Property and would have retained their approvals.  [Appellants] bear the responsibility for their own actions. ”  [Pa146]; •  In dismissing Count 2 of the First Amended Complaint (tortious interference with prospective economic advantage), “[Appellants] assert that [...] used confidential information under the NDA to negotiate a competing deal with the owners of the Property, and that [...] ‘undercut [Appellants’] deal’ and, had they not done so, ‘[Appellants] would have received the economic benefit of having the Solar Project at the Project Site. ’  The claims ignore [Appellants’] payment default under the Lease and consequent loss of site control over the Property… even if [Appellants] proved a violation of the NDA, it was [Appellants’] Lease default that led inevitably to their loss of the solar rights tied to the Property.  As a result of [Appellants’] own failures, [Appellants] lost the ability to continue with the solar project at the Property.
[brief] In light of these holdings, [...] argued that even if the trial court was inclined to apply the *Press* and *Anderson* analysis, [...] must still have had notice of the lights being inoperative.  If there is notice of an outage, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 14:5-2.9, [...] has within three (3) business days to make routine streetlight repairs after notice.  However, there was no evidence that the streetlight was inoperable at the time of the subject accident here.  Moreover, there was no evidence of a malfunction of the streetlight prior to the subject accident, and [...] had no notice or record of the streetlight in question being reported out prior to the accident on May 31, 2017.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1)’s exception to the hearsay rule is irrelevant here because it applies only when the proponent of the hearsay statement can show that the hearsay statement accurately reflects what the party-opponent allegedly said.  Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 407 (App. Div. 2012).  Plaintiff also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in rejecting the hearsay statement because it was contained in plaintiff’s deposition transcript instead of a certification.  Pb22-23.  Yet the requirement that the proponent show that the party opponent actually made the statement applies whether the proponent offers the statement through a certification or, as here, through a deposition transcript.  See Konop, 425 N.J. Super. at 419-20 (“The issue is purely a factual one--whether the party-opponent made the statement. ”).  Here, plaintiff actually claimed that [...] admitted that he had branches placed on Ford Lane in front of plaintiff’s property for pickup.  Pa130-31 at 25:14-26:17.  Plaintiff did not claim that [...] admitted trespassing onto plaintiff’s property.  Ibid.  In the absence showing that [...] allegedly told plaintiff that he entered onto plaintiff’s land and placed the tree branches on plaintiff’s plants, T62:25-63:21, the trial court properly rejected plaintiff’s hearsay statement and dismissed the claim for trespass.  Konop, 425 N.J. Super. at 407.  III.