ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **[...] Are Granted Summary Judgment In The Prior Action**  On July 30, 2021, after discovery had concluded and the First Amended Complaint was filed, the [...] filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the First Amended Complaint.  The [...], along with [...] and [...], also filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.  [Pa289].  By Orders entered on September 23, 2021, the trial court granted the [...]’ motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint as against the [...], [...] and [...].  [Pa289].
[brief] N.J.R.E. 402 clearly states:  *All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by law.*  N.J.R.E. 401 states:  *"Relevant evidence" means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.*  The purpose of introducing the Diagrammatic Elevation and the information concerning the dimensions of common cinder blocks was to prove the fact that [...] had violated one of the limitations placed on it by the Amended Resolution (more precisely, to prove the fact that sufficient evidence existed to merit intervention by municipal authorities).  So clearly, this evidence was relevant and should have been admitted under N.J.R.E. 402.  The Court based its refusal to admit this evidence on no other rules of evidence or laws.  It relied entirely on its analysis of the Amended Resolution which Appellant has shown was flawed and erroneous.  As demonstrated, the Court clearly erred by misinterpreting selected sections of the Amended Resolution on which it based its arguments for denying the admission of highly relevant evidence.
[directive] 종신 가석방 감독(범죄가 년1 월14 일 이후에 발생한 경우에만 작성하십시오.)  b) 2004 (only complete if the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004).  Parole Supervision for Life [예/Yes] [아니요/No] [해당없음/NA] 귀하가 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 가중 범죄적 성접촉에 대한 (1)
[brief] [...]s are [...] and [...] (collectively, "[...]" or "[...]").  The record from the [...] proceedings shows that [...] submitted all of the documents required to be submitted with its application by the Township's Ordinance and which were available for review by the public and considered by the [...].  The application included detailed plans and expert reports including a detailed Environmental Impact Assessment and Stormwater Management Plan.  Additionally, the [...] heard testimony from [...]'s witnesses, had available its own professional consultants at the hearing, and examined the application materials.  In a comprehensive written opinion, the trial court found that there was substantial credible evidence in the record to support the Board's determination to approve [...]'s preliminary and final major subdivision application and that the [...] properly concluded that the subdivision application was complete.  Accordingly, the Trial Court correctly ruled that the Board properly approved the application and its decision should be upheld.
[brief] Defendant incorrectly argues the Torres v. Sumrein, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3020, case, (See Appendix to Db), supports its position that the use of subsequent remedial measures to impeach credibility is only permissible “under the narrow exception” where sworn testimony is used to impeach a witness who contradicts himself on the stand.  The argument is specious.  As set forth in detail in Plaintiff’s initial Brief (See Pb, pages 30-31), the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial repairs to challenge credibility has been long established and recognized.  See Hansson v. Catalytic Construction Co., supra., at 27.  See also Millman v. U.S. Mortgage Title Co. of New Jersey, supra., at 34-35, where that defendant also denied the existence of the pleaded defect.  That the defense expert’s testimony was critical to the Defendant’s case cannot be overstated, and the harm caused to the Plaintiff by precluding the use of the Defendant’s actions that evidenced its belief that the floor was slippery to cross-examine and impeach the defense expert witness was fatal to the Plaintiff’s ability to prove her case.  The jury’s swift return from deliberations and verdict against the Plaintiff on the first question contained within the Verdict Sheet evidences the prejudice caused to the Plaintiff by the trial Court’s erroneous rulings.  C.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et seq., 372 N.J. Super. 61, 100 (App. Div. 2004) .............................................................................................................. 7 S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 92 N.J. 158, 217 (1983) (Mount Laurel II) .................................................................................................................. 4 Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 559 (2002) ........................................... 6 Statutes N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) .................................................................................................................. 11 N.J.S.A. 52:27D-313 ............................................................................................................. 7 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] It defies reason and common sense to suggest that he has failed to make money after converting the building into condominium units and selling each unit, especially given the fact that this property is located in the City of Hoboken.  [...] has refused to state how much money he earned after converting the building to condominium’s, but two facts are telling.  First, [...] has recognized that it made a profit on selling the units in the building.  See 1T at 41:25-42:3.  Second, the corporate tax return shows that the entity has assets totaling $870,000.00 and the only asset it owns is [...]’s unit.  See id. at 44:2-45:12.  This demonstrates that [...] has realized a return on his investment.
[brief] (PA000006 at ¶¶ 19-20)  Further, Plaintiff alleges that [...]’ alleged practice of moving staff from one group home to another to combat staffing shortages is a “direct violation” of N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b).  (PA000007 at ¶ 24)  N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) provides:  Reduction of staff coverage as specified in the Annex A shall be justified in writing and sent to the licensing agency and the appropriate Regional Assistant Director's Office for approval.  1.  Documented approval(s) by the Interdisciplinary Team that an individual or individuals can be left alone for specific amounts of time shall be submitted as evidence justifying modification of staff coverage.  2.  Reduction of staff coverage shall be jointly reviewed and approved by the Regional Office and the licensing agency prior to implementation by the licensee, based on (b)1 above.  3.  A written response shall be provided by the Division within 15 working days, documenting any conditions which must be met as part of the approval of the reduction of staff coverage.  Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that Defendants failed to justify reductions in staff coverage to a licensing agency or the Regional Assistant Director’s Office.
[brief] “Generally speaking, a presumption is an evidentiary device that enables ‘the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime—that is, an “ultimate” or “elemental” fact—from the existence of one or more “evidentiary” or “basic” facts. ’”  State v. Ingram, 98 N.J. 489, 495 (1985) (quoting Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)).  “To be constitutional, the elemental fact must bear a rational connection, in terms of logical probability, to the evidentiary fact. ”  State v. Thomas, 132 N.J. 247, 254-55 (1993).  “Central to the validity of a statutory presumption is the way that the matter is presented to the jury. ”  Ingram, 98 N.J. at 499.
[brief] Defendants [...] and [...] (the Earle Defendants) and Defendant [...] have taken adverse factual and legal positions regarding their liability for the subject fatal crash.  The Earle Defendants claim that they repeatedly and specifically instructed their driver, [...], to use a grass-covered “turnaround” to make a U-turn on the Garden State Parkway, but that [...] disobeyed Earle’s instructions and made an illegal U-turn using a paved police turnaround in a different area, resulting in the crash.  In contrast, [...] testified that Earle simply told him to use “the turnaround”, without any further detail, and Earle never told him that using the police turnaround was unauthorized.  Plaintiffs have asserted direct claims against the Earle Defendants for negligent training, supervision, hiring, and retention, as well as negligence claims against [...], and vicarious liability claims against the Earle Defendants.
[brief] Invocation by a suspect of the right to silence or counsel at any time during a custodial interrogation must be “scrupulously honored” if the invocation is “clear and unambiguous. ”  *State v. Diaz-Bridges*, 208 N.J. 544, 565 (2012); *State v. Maltese*, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1187 (2016); *State v. Chew*, 150 N.J. 30, 61 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1052 (1999); *State v. Melendez*, 423 N.J. Super. 1, 29 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 28 (2012); *State v. Gonzalez*, 249 N.J. 612, 628 (2022).
[brief] Every step in the condemnation process, including the filing of the declaration of taking, can be undone using the procedures set forth in the EDA.  See Essex Cty. Voc. Schs. of Educ. v. New United Corp., Nos. A-4402-11T2, A-1873-12T2, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 786\(^2\), at *10-11 (App. Div. April 8, 2014) (“[T]he [EDA] recognizes that, even after a public entity files a declaration of taking, deposits the estimated just compensation, and takes title to and possession of the property, the condemnor’s right to exercise the power of eminent domain may be challenged and judicially undone.
[brief] Accordingly, I conclude that the complainants have met their burden to demonstrate that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and this charge is sustained. ”  (Ca035-036).  •  “This tribunal cannot ignore that even after the Board adopted the March 17, 2022 resolution in which it condemned [...]’s postings, requested that the posts be taken down, and cautioned all board members to be prudent in their social media posts, [...] continued to post and repost her personal views without including a disclaimer that would have avoided the appearance – actual or perceived – that her Facebook postings were made in her personal capacity, and not as a board member.  This evidence shows a serious lack of judgment. ”  (Ca037-038) (emphasis added).  [...] filed her Initial Decision with the [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29 on May 30, 2023.  (Ca038-039).  Then, on August 22, 2023, the [...] issued a 4 page “Final Decision,” which “rejected” [...]’s Initial Decision on the asserted basis that “her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on same,” and that there was therefore “an insufficient nexus between Respondent’s personal Facebook page and her membership on the Board. ” (Ca014-018).  This was factually incorrect, as was reflected by abundant evidence in the record at the time.  Appellants filed their appeal on October 5, 2023 (App. Div. No. [...]), and now seek reversal of that decision.
[brief] That is ridiculous no matter which way you look at it.  In contrast, an officer cannot be automatically assumed to be a "beacon of honesty" and to always speak veraciously simply because they completed 6 months of police academy.  NJ Courts knows this very well from the State v. [...] case which effected upwards of 20,000 people and dramatically altered their lives.  Cops cannot be given absolute credibility solely because they are cops.  A simple search on the internet on how cops act and how many of them lie despite being on camera is eye opening.  In fact, if the municipal judge allowed the cop to answer my question on whether he lied during the field sobriety test, she would have removed all credibility from the officer.  If she would have investigated my accusations of the officer lying during the walk and turn portion of the SFST, she would have clearly seen and heard on the officer’s body cam video that I am the credible one and that the officer is not.
[brief] Bacon v. Bob Ciasulli Auto Grp., Inc., A-0789-14T1 (App. Div. May 7, 2015)  ................................................................................................Da393-98  Herrera v. Paramount Freight Sys., Inc., No. A-0424-23, 2024 WL 2683967 (App. Div. May 24, 2024)  ........................................Da399-404  Hopkins v. LVNC Funding, LLC, et al., A-1301-23 at p. 14 (App. Div. February 10, 2025) (Approved for Publication)  .........................Da405-20 #
[brief] Prior adjudication of an issue on direct appeal will ordinarily constitute a procedural bar to post-conviction relief.  R. 3:22-5; State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 394 (2004).  Since no court has adjudicated petitioner’s disparate sentencing claim, the PCR court was wrong to rely upon R. 3:22-5 as a procedural bar to this claim.  The PCR court also improperly found that the disparate sentencing claim was procedurally barred as a claim that could have been raised in a prior litigation.
[brief] [...]: Okay.  Thank you.  THE COURT:  You got that?  All right.  All right.  (2T29-2T30)  (emphasis added).  The trial court entered the implementing order on February 9, 2018, stating that the remaining defendants’ “sole relief as to claims against [...], DO shall be an allocation of fault at the time of trial pursuant to Burt v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 339 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2001) []” (Da254-55).
[brief] (Pa59 at ¶14 and Pa63 to Pa77).  In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his freedom of speech claim.  (Pa19 at n.1).  During discovery, Plaintiff testified that he did not contend that Defendants had done anything wrong on or before the night of July 5, 2016.  (Pa110 at T21-8 to 12).  In particular, when asked what he contended Defendants did improperly in this case, Plaintiff stated, “Nothing that I’m aware of. ” (Id.).  Plaintiff further testified that he did not issue the radio transmissions in order to correct any conduct by Defendants that was allegedly illegal or improper.  (Pa109 at T20-7 to 10).  Nor was there any evidence that Defendants had said or done anything allegedly improper or contrary to law or public policy on or before July 5, 2016.  Plaintiff testified that his claimed protected conduct under CEPA was the above-described radio transmissions related to dispersing the crowd.
[brief] So why would he not be cautious?  He gave them a sample.  They did their DNA testing, and all it proves was that his saliva was at the scene.  (38T 17-13 to 19-19).  By contrasting [...]’s shrewd avoidance of DNA contamination with Defendant’s innocent mistrust of police yet eventual acquiescence to a blood sample, counsel was able to paint a narrative of Defendant being manipulated into being in the wrong place at the wrong time and [...] as the mastermind who committed the murder.
[brief] \(^1\)  Latent print examination, in particular, has long been portrayed as scientific and objective.  News and entertainment media have fostered this belief, but so too have individuals working in law enforcement and the latent fingerprint community, often unwittingly.  In fact, there are very few objective criteria used in latent print examination, and there are no standardized training programs or protocols that are consistently used among practicing latent fingerprint examiners across the United States.
[brief] In April 1994, an underground storage tank (UST) system then in use at the Property failed a tank tightness test and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) was notified, resulting in the opening of case number [...].  (Da3, ¶ 9).  The UST system contents were removed shortly after the tank tightness test.  (*Id.*).  Since that time and during the course of investigation and remediation of case number [...], additional discharges and previously unknown USTs were identified at and in the vicinity of the Property, and investigation and remediation of these previous discharges is ongoing.
[brief] Final Decision at 12-13.  The Final Decision then devotes eight of its 21 pages to an elaborate effort to blame the [...] for all the problems that have conspired to deny its students T&E and to exempt [...]’s application to Lakewood from any blame. \(^{19}\)  These include Lakewood’s failures both to raise more tax revenue to support its public schools and to correct its myriad educational, management and fiscal inefficiencies.  According to the [...], this buttresses the State’s argument for why [...] is not even a significant cause of the denial of T&E to \(^{19}\)  The [...] submitted to the [...] a detailed rebuttal of the Comprehensive Review’s criticism of the district.
[directive] An example of a synopsis is found in Appendix L.  9.12  Personnel Records  9.12.1  Personnel records are separate and distinct from internal affairs investigation records, and internal affairs investigative reports shall never be placed in personnel records, nor shall personnel records be co-mingled with internal affairs files.  When a complaint has a disposition of exonerated, not sustained or unfounded, there shall be no indication in the employee's personnel file that a complaint was ever made.
[brief] (6T 152-9 to 25)  She then got [...] out of the car and moved him away from it.  (6T 154-17 to 155-19)  She testified that she looked \(^2\)  The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on [...] testified that even when someone is unconscious and in the process of dying, there might be some reflexive movements “[l]ike involuntary twitching of the extremities.
[brief] At every step of the trial, the court properly disposed of defendant’s --- ⁴  Further, while the State acknowledges that unpublished opinions cannot “constitute precedent or be binding on any court,” R. 1:36-3, recent New Jersey cases addressing ACE-V and latent-print analysis in the context of reliability challenges found them sufficiently reliable.  See *State v. McKoy*, No. A-2553-19 (App. Div. Nov. 28, 2022); *State v. Monell*, No. A-4419-18 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2021); *State v. Davis*, No. A-4176-17 (App. Div. July 15, 2020).  (Pa7-85).  The State is not aware of any contrary unpublished authority.  See R. 1:36-3. efforts to limit or exclude admissible evidence of fingerprint analysis.  First, the court correctly declined to ask the prospective jurors their opinions on the reliability of fingerprint evidence at voir dire during jury selection.  Next, the court facilitated the proper scope of expert testimony when it chose not to limit that testimony other than reference to a non-testifying verifier of [...]’s fingerprint analysis.  Finally, the court rightly instructed the jury using the model fingerprinting jury charge instead of defendant’s proposed charge.  This Court should thus affirm the trial court’s decisions at each stage of trial.
[brief] (841a-842a).  The second judge conducted oral argument in November 2023, at the conclusion of which she denied Defendants’ motion.  (3T78:4-6, 3T98:4-7, 26a-27a).  The second judge observed that the first judge permitted a ninety-day discovery period so the parties could explore the two issues that could bear on entitlement to relief: (1) the abandonment status of the property; and (2) whether [...] was a \textit{bona fide} purchaser.
[brief] *Id.*  The court noted that arbitrators settle disputes based upon their knowledge of the customs and practices of particular work sites and the practices in an industry.  *Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Company*, *supra*. at 596.  "When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem."  *Id.* at 597.  The courts will extend great deference to an arbitrator's authority to fashion appropriate remedies to fit particular situations.  *Id.*; *Local 153 v. Trust Co. of New Jersey*, 105 N.J. 442, 448 (1987).  A court may not overrule an arbitrator's award simply because it differs with the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract.  *W.R. Grace & Company v. Rubber Workers Local* 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983).  Moreover, the courts will confirm an award even where it has "serious misgivings" about the award or where the award is "dubious".  *Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers*, 687 F.2d 673, 679 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); *Teamsters Local No. 115 v. DeSoto, Inc.*, 705 F.2d 931, 935 (3d Cir. 1984).  In *United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.*, 484 U.S. 29 (1987), the Supreme Court noted that the Courts rely on the factual findings of arbitrators, even where they are viewed as silly or improvident.  The principles of the *Steelworkers* Trilogy have been adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
[brief] The arguments contained in defendant’s summary judgment brief are incorporated herein as if set forth at length (Pa26).  Appellants contend that the trial judge misapplied the standard for summary judgment without referring to the standard or support for the contention that the standard was misapplied.  Under *Brill v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), this standard is now expressed in terms of a prima facie case or defense and the movant is entitled to judgment, if on the full motion record, the adverse party, who is entitled to have the facts and inferences viewed most favorably to it, has not demonstrated the existence of a dispute whose resolution in his favor will ultimately entitle him to judgment.  When deciding a motion for summary judgment under *Rule 4:46–2*, the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  This assessment of the evidence is to be conducted in the same manner as that required under Rule 4:37–2(b).  Both Appellants are subject to the limited tort threshold and so an award of monetary damages is predicated on meeting their burden, to prove a permanent injury by objective credible medical evidence, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.  To establish that their injuries surmount the verbal threshold, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). requires Plaintiffs to prove that they have sustained at least one of the following: