ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At the same time, [...] also called 911 while he chased after defendant.  During his frantic 911 call, which also was played for the jury, [...] told the dispatcher defendant shot at him on Springfield Avenue near a different restaurant and took his wallet.  [...] described defendant as a little, black male, wearing a hat and black jeans.  [...] testified that while he was on the phone with the dispatcher, he lost sight of defendant, but a worker at the other restaurant directed [...]'s attention to a building located at [...].  That building was adjacent to a daycare center, across the street from the other restaurant, and close to a cell phone store.  [...] then saw defendant, who was not wearing a ski mask, enter the small alleyway adjacent to that building through the open gate.  He did not follow defendant into the alleyway, but instead remained by the entrance and waved down [...], of the [...], who at 1:12 a.m. had responded to the report of an armed robbery.  [...] testified that [...] was “very excited and very frantic,” and said he had been robbed at gunpoint by “a short black male wearing a dark-colored jacket and ... jeans,” who ran “through the alleyway of [...].
[brief] Wajergast v. Broadway Thirty-Third Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 346 (App.Div. 1961) (office off-site parking lot on adjacent lot seeks variance/site plan, Zoning Board approves; Court invalidates); Suesseran v. Newark Bd. of Adj., 61 N.J. Super. 28, 34 (App.Div. 1960) (catering business off-site parking lot, Zoning Board approves, Court invalidates); O'Donnell v. Koch, 197 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 1984) (Funeral home off-site parking lot on adjacent lot; Zoning Board approves, Court affirms).  Perhaps most on point, in [...] v. Riverdale Zoning Bd., 352 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 2002) Bell-Atlantic communications center applied for a use variance to establish an off-site parking lot for employees/trucks on a nearby separate gas station.  The Zoning Board denied, the Trial Court reversed, and the Appellate Court affirmed.  The relevant point is that parties and the Court all understood and acted on the basis that parking for a different off-site use/lot was not a permitted accessory use on the gasoline station lot, so a use variance was required.  The point is again in Nuckel v. Boro. Of Little Ferry Pl. Bd., 208 N.J. 95, 101-103 (2011).  There the Court found that locating a driveway for a separate Lot/use (hotel) on a portion of a lot occupied by its own principal use (auto body shop) was prohibited as two principal uses on one lot.
[brief] On the Tenant’s Allowance issue, the trial judge reiterated that he understood Tenant’s argument that the amount of unpaid rent, additional rent, interest, and late fees owed by Tenant to Landlord “should have [been] eclipsed by $334,000 in refund, a refund that they would be due under Section 4.02 of the lease to compensate them for a certain percentage of the fit up cost” (2T4-9 to 2T4-13).  But the trial judge nevertheless dismissed the argument without much discussion.  The entirety of the trial judge’s substantive ruling on the Tenant Allowance offset issue was as follows:  THE COURT:  [T]he Landlord had argued that the Tenant was not entitled to the refund because they were in breach.  And my reading of the contract, I think that bears out.  You know you want those refunds, you’ve got to be, you can’t be in breach.  So there is rent due and owing for this period of time.  [2T6-23 TO 2T7-2.]  Upon Tenant’s counsel’s request for clarification, the trial judge responded, “I looked at the contract.  And I concluded that’s only payable if you’re not in breach.  And you’re in breach.  So I, so you don’t get the fit up refund.  That’s my ruling” (2T9-15 to 2T9-18).  Near the conclusion of the hearing, Tenant’s counsel again requested clarification as to whether the trial judge was ruling that Tenant had “forfeit[ed] the entire amount of its fit ups, because those were to be reimbursed from 2019 to 2024 on an annual basis, pursuant to the lease” (2T12-15 to 2T12-18).  The trial judge responded “you don’t get those costs while you’re in breach,” without ruling on whether Landlord was itself in breach for failing to make the reimbursement payments both before and after Tenant missed payments (2T12-19 to 2T12-20).
[brief] ........................................................................  4, 9, 12, 33  Assembly State Government Committee Statement to A. 2372 (1994) (Jan. 26, 1995)  ........................................................................  31  [...], “The New Jersey Constitution of 1947,” N.J.S.A. Const. Vol. 1, p. 91, 95-96 (1971)  ............................................................... 39, 41 Senate State Government Committee Statement to S. 1068 (Sept. 26, 1994).  31 Statement to S. 1068 (1994) (May 16, 1994)  ..................................  31  TABLE OF APPENDIX (“Pa”)
[brief] The only way for [...] to learn this information is through the non-owned/hired auto Supplemental Form (“Supplemental Form”), which is part of an additional underwriting process that [...] requires in the event that an applicant requests high non-owned/hired auto limits.  (Ia124; Ia143).  On July 31, 2019, [...], an employee of [...], advised [...] that, if [...] wanted to obtain $1,000,000 in Non-Owned/Hired Auto coverage, it must complete a Supplemental Form.  [...] sent the Supplemental Form to [...] as an email attachment.  (Ia077 at ¶ 15; Ia124; Ia132 at 51:8-52:5).  The same day, [...] emailed the Supplemental Form to [...] instructing [...] to complete the Supplemental Form in order to proceed with obtaining a quote for non-owned/hired auto coverage.  (Ia077 at ¶ 16; Ia139).  The Supplemental Form consisted of six questions with subparts. (Ia077 at ¶ 17; Ia143).
[brief] While disputing Defendants’ accusations, Appellants asked Defendants what solutions they proposed to increase sales figures.  In response, Defendants suggested that Appellants emulate their competitors’ practice of incentivizing and increasing sales by bundling Sapporo products with free and discounted food products, such as rice and soy sauce.  (Pa36-37).  Appellants immediately rejected this illegal request because incentivizing sales in this manner would violate of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (“FAAA”), as well as several state laws, which would put Appellants’ alcoholic beverage licenses at risk.  (Pa37).  In fact, in support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel, then-[...] president [...] openly admitted that [...] engages in unlawful conduct, stating that under its policies “distributors must compete and make arrangements with each other to determine which accounts each distributor will service” and that “[i]t is up to [...] to engage retailers and work out sales arrangements with its fellow distributors.
[brief] What is lost here is the fact that the trial Judge was reversed by the Appellate Division and while that appeal was pending, the Appellant pled guilty and was incarcerated.  What caused the problems in this case was that everyone, including the sentencing Judge, thought that [...] would be out in time for the prescribed Jury trial.  Unfortunately, he wasn’t.  The rest is reflected in the filing on behalf of [...].  The Court had arranged for this Defendant to be tried by a Jury actually in prison garb.  Because there was a miscalculation by counsel and the criminal trial Court as to the release date, and then, the date that was based upon the criminal trial Judge, it became a difficult case to put together.  Counsel for the Defendant made a mistake in not realizing that the monies were not paid up front for the transport.  Justice, based upon the facts of this case requires that the matter be remanded for trial.
[brief] (Pa54).  [...] argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.  (Pa55).  At its meeting on May 23, 2023, the Board considered [...]’s arguments, found that there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and therefore directed the Board Secretary to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for its review and approval at its next meeting.  (Pa12-Pa13).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on July 26, 2023.
[brief] That [...] was permitted to side-step the Solicitation language and requirements with respect to the archaeologist that others were not afforded is precisely the sort of competitive advantage and unlevel playing field that public procurement laws prohibit.  Preservation of the Legislative intent when enacting the PWCRA and the integrity of the public procurement process requires that the trial court’s decision be overturned.  If it is not, the door governing the award of public contracts – which the New Jersey Supreme Court held must be kept tightly closed – will be left open permitting the erosion to ensue.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:49-2’s notice requirement reflects legislative solicitude for the public interest and it should be construed in that fashion.  Cf. Brower Development Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Clinton, 255 N.J. Super. 262, 269 (App. Div. 1992).  Defendants’ proffered interpretation, on the other hand, directly contradicts such a notion and wrongly elevates the protection of the governmental and private concerns to the position of primary importance.  Although a dearth of published opinions exist specifically construing N.J.S.A. 40:49-2’s notice requirement, analogous cases involving N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 support the need for far more information than was provided by the Township’s notice in this matter.
[brief] *See Pltf’s Brief, p. 11; Ja11* (“[p]laintiff does not dispute that there is a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate”). \(^3\)  Moreover, her claims under the HCSA, the CFA, the RISA, and the --- \(^2\)  Where, as here, the arbitration agreement refers issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the arbitrator assumes the determination of whether a particular dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.  *See Argument, Section III below.*  \(^3\)  [...] correctly concluded that the arbitration agreement clearly and conspicuously advised plaintiff that she was waiving her right to assert claims against [...] in a judicial forum, pointing out in particular the capitalized and bold language set forth in Section 7.2 of the agreement.  Ja36; see also *Perez v. Sky Zone LLC*, 276 A.3d at 195, 472 N.J. Super. at 248-49 (enforcing arbitration agreement which stated that plaintiff was “agreeing to arbitrate any dispute arising out of his use of the trampoline park and was waiving [his] right…to maintain lawsuit”).  TCCWNA indisputably concern the “validity, enforceability or scope of the [membership agreement]” and, thus, plainly fall within the Dispute Clause of the arbitration agreement (a fact also not contested by plaintiff).  Ja37 (emphasis added); see also Victory Entm’t, Inc. v. Schibell, 2018 N.J.  Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1467, * 23 (App. Div. June 21, 2018) (affirming order compelling arbitration, finding that “[t]he underlying dispute falls squarely within the scope of the arbitration provision”).  Nevertheless, plaintiff asserts that she should be permitted to proceed with a class action in court because she is seeking “public injunctive relief” under the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement.
[brief] ” (Pa0157).  Specifically, the SAM allocated [...] covered damages as follows: - $3,314,536.70 (25.84%) was allocated to [...]; - $4,860,208.81 (37.89%) was allocated to [...]; and - $4,652,408.91 (36.27%) was allocated to [...] for periods that were either covered by insurance companies with whom it had settled or not covered because of the application of policy exclusions.\(^6\) (Pa0158).  The SAM did not allocate any of [...]’s damages incurred December 31, 2009, because he viewed that task as beyond the scope of the authority granted to him by the trial court.  (Id).  After the SAM issued his RAR, all parties filed objections.  (Pa0162-87).  On June 29, 2018, trial court entered an Order and Opinion overruling all objections and adopting the SAM’s RAR in its entirety, describing it as “well-reasoned,” and finding that the SAM’s conclusions were not “clearly erroneous, --- \(^6\)
[directive] On the other hand, if the officer negotiates a plea or there is an administrative or civil settlement with the employer whereby the charge is dismissed, the charge would still be considered sustained, if there was sufficient credible evidence to prove the allegation, and the officer does not challenge the finding and obtain a favorable ruling by a hearing officer, Section 6.0.1 of the IAPP requires that “All allegations of officer misconduct shall be thoroughly, objectively, 4 and promptly investigated to their logical conclusion in conformance with this policy, regardless of whether the officer resigns or otherwise separates from the agency. ”  8 arbitrator, Administrative Law Judge, Civil Service Commission or the Superior Court.
[brief] PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RESTAURANT DEPOT DID NOT FAIL TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE AND DID NOT GRANT AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE  Faced with clear shortcomings in their case, Plaintiffs desperately try to create an appealable issue by contending that they should have been afforded an adverse inference charge due to [...]’s alleged failure to retain surveillance footage.  Plaintiffs assert this feeble argument while ignoring that the trial court correctly ruled this matter should not be submitted to a jury in the first instance.  Regardless, the trial court appropriately found, after careful scrutiny of the factual record, that [...] did not breach any duty to preserve evidence.  This ruling should not be disturbed.
[directive] 2 with this Section accordance in consulted general attorney deputy County by authorized subsection who the 3.3.2 is to pursuant designated officer supervisory the that 4 Section this Directive, determines of under presumptions overcome Prosecutor to law a subsection 4.5.9, overcome to pursuant is complaint-warrant by charging of presumption that believe cause is there probable to if acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency enforcement committed: defendant the crime; second a constitutes degree or first that 2C Title of Chapter 35 of violation a — firearm; a of use or possession the involving crime a — 2C:11-5); (N.J.S.A. homicide vehicular — S.A. (N.J. 2C:12-1(b)); crime asecond-degree constitutes that assault aggravated — 2C:12-11); (N.J.S.A. officer enforcement law disarming a — 2C:13-1); (N.J.S.A. kidnapping — 2C:17-1(a)); (N.J.S.A. arson aggravated — 2C:18-2); (N.J.S.A. crime asecond-degree constitutes that burglary — 2C:20-5); (N.J.S.A. extortion — 2C:35-4.1(b)); (N.J.S.A. distribution facilities or manufacturing in traps booby — (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9); deaths induced drug for liability strict — 2C:38-2); (N.J.S.A. terrorism — devices biological or radiological agents, weapons, chemical possessing -or producing — 38-3); 2C: (N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2); (N.J.S.A. racketeering — 2C:39-9(i)); (N.J.S.A. trafficking firearms — 2C:24- act (N.J.S.A. sexual a prohibited in engage to child a permitting or causing — or 4(b)(3)); foregoing crimes.
[brief] A new owner may present a deed to an assessor.  If that is not done, the register of deeds or county clerk must ascertain and mark on the deed the new owner’s post office address.  . . .  The names and addresses that result from this process are used for mailing of tax bills and for the tax duplicate.  Those are the names and addresses which the municipality employs in serving notice of tax foreclosure suits.  If an owner wants the address on the tax duplicate changed, it is up to the owner to notify the assessor.
[brief] (Point I.C.1)  Furthermore, the Court’s Torres assessment of the overall fairness of the sentences was fatally flawed for the same reasons as its assessments of aggravating factors three and nine; its assessment of the need to incapacitate and deter were not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record, failed to properly weigh [...]’s positive prison record and other post-offense rehabilitative conduct, and failed to consider social science regarding the age-crime curve, adolescent brain development, and deterrence.  (Point I.C.2)  This Court should order resentencing.
[directive] Any local unit shall have power to accept any advance or grant of money made by the Federal government to aid in financing the cost of preparing plans for any public project which the local unit has lawfbl authority to undertake, and shall have power to agree to repay any such advance or grant if, and when, the local unit shall undertake such public project.  Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any local unit may make such an agreement although the funds necessary to make the repayment required by the agreement shall not have been previously made available by an appropriation or by the authorization of bonds.  1, L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Jan. 1962.
[brief] With regard to Plaintiff’s claim that [...] harassed her by reprimanding her for not signing her December 2018 evaluation, Plaintiff admitted that she did not sign her observation even though she knew she “was supposed to sign it to say that [she has] seen it” and not that she agreed with it.  (Pl. Tr. 169:22 to 170:10; 221:21-24, 237:4-7, 309:24 to 310:4).  Although Plaintiff now asserts post hoc she felt the reprimand was unjustified, she admitted that she never once tried to speak to [...] about the reprimand after she received it, and the only communication she had with him about it was a brief email response wherein she simply indicated she did not know the observation was complete.  (Pl. Tr. 171:1-10).  Furthermore, Plaintiff admitted that the only person she actually spoke to about the reprimand was [...], not even Human Resources or a union representative.  (Pl. Tr. 172:4-24).  Thus, to the extent Plaintiff felt she was “harassed” by the reprimand, the circumstances under which it occurred, and her subsequent lack of contemporaneous complaint or other response thereto, do not warrant any inference of improper motive behind it.
[brief] As set forth in Canon 1 of the Code, “[a]n independent and impartial judiciary is indispensable to justice. ”  It cannot be that judicial officials who --- 5 State courts elsewhere have rejected arguments that the limited role of a special master or similar officer legitimates conflicts of interest that would be disqualifying for a judge.  In a case with factual similarities to this one, a Virginia appeals court set aside the report of a commissioner, a “quasi judicial officer,” who had received a political contribution in a campaign for the state legislature from counsel to a party while the report was pending.  Brown v. issue orders to parties, make legal rulings, and decide questions of fact with presumptive binding force are somehow free of the obligation to “disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
[brief] See Mance, 300 N.J. Super. at 65 (“[W]e are required to set the sentences aside and order the case remanded for re-sentencing based on a presentence report which fully accords with the dictates of R. 3:21–2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:44–6. ”); State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65-66 (2014) (sentencing judges must provide “insight into the sentencing decision” and “explain clearly” their application of the Code for their decision to be afforded any deference); State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 298 (2021) (explaining that resentencing is required where a sentencing court fails to apply the Code or explain its sentencing decisions); R. 3:29 (“The court shall place on the record the reasons supporting its . . . disposition of a criminal matter.
[brief] To be absolutely clear, Opinion 502 concludes that “where there is a question of coverage at inception of the liability case, the attorney hired by the carrier to file defensive pleadings on behalf of the insured ought to promptly advise the insured to retain his own personal attorney for all purposes, but in no case ought to appear for the carrier against the insured in a Declaratory Judgment case brought to resolve the question of coverage. ”  Restated – the lawyer assigned by the insurance company to defend the insured in the liability action should advise the insured to retain its own personal counsel and the lawyer should not appear as counsel for the insurance company in the declaratory judgment action against the insured.  None of these circumstances are at issue here, nor does the ethics opinion seek to prohibit the insurance company, where the insurer may also be a party to the underlying lawsuit (as occurred here), from asserting and arguing defenses which seek to avoid any underlying liability against the insured.
[directive] 8.2.4  If the subject officer agrees to voluntarily provide a statement or waives his rights, the interview may then continue.  Unless the officer specifically waives their Fifth Amendment rights, any incriminating statements obtained under direct order will not be admissible in a criminal prosecution but will be admissible in an administrative hearing.  The subject officer should be afforded the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to a compelled interview.  8.2.5
[directive] Violation(s)  Charged: [ ]  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), DWI (Check appropriate boxes)  [ ]  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing  Usted ha sido citado por o a favor de la persona cuyo nombre aparece arriba como “acusado”, para que transporte o acompañe al acusado desde esta agencia policial.
[brief] Plaintiffs are also seeking an order compelling defendants “to produce non-privileged documents that hit on an agreed-upon search term. ” (JS at 14).  They explain that on July 14, 2020, the parties agreed to a list of search terms that defendants would apply to custodial ESI.  (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶¶ 15 Ex. 3)).  They state that defendants “then reviewed for responsiveness and privilege any document that contained at least one search term,” a process that took almost a year, and for which, at the time of the Motion, there were still three agreed-upon custodians whose ESI documents had yet to be produced.  (Id.).  Plaintiffs assert that based on data defendants provided to plaintiffs, “reflecting, by custodian, the number of documents that contain at least one search term and, of these search term documents, the number of documents produced in discovery,” defendants’ withholding of documents based on responsiveness “also appears problematic. ”  (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 13 Ex. 1)).  Plaintiffs note that, overall, defendants produced only 52% of the documents that hit on a search term and assert that this is a “surprisingly low production rate, considering the parties agreed to only highly relevant search terms. ” (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶¶ 15, 16 & Exs. 3, 4)).  They also deem the “variability by custodian of the percentage of documents produced to Plaintiffs” to be “particularly problematic” as a “couple custodians have a high document production rate consistent with Plaintiffs’ expectations given the relevance of the search terms used to collect documents,” but “most custodians have inexplicably low production rates considering the relevance of the search terms. ”  (Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted)).  Plaintiffs suggest that ordering defendants to “produce non-privileged documents that contain at least one search term, without first reviewing for responsiveness,” will result in speed of production and fairness.