ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On the brief: [...]  October 16, 2023  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................. ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..............................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY...............................................  2 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................  2  I.  There is No Business Partnership Between Co- Respondents [...] and [...]/[...]............................  2  II.  Pertinent Background on [...]..................  3  III.  [...] Personally Served [...]....  4  IV.  [...]’s Practice of Transmitting GPS Coordinates Away from the Exact Location of Service...................  5  V.  The Phenomena of GPS Drift...............................  6 LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................  7  I.  THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW (THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADDRESS THE STANDARDS).................................  7 a. R. 4:50-1 Applications...............................  7 b.  The Standard of Review for R. 4:50-1 Applications ..........................................................  7 c.  The Standard of Review for Fraud....................  8  II.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO VACATE FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER R. 4:50-1(D)  BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS SERVED (T4 97:11 TO 101:6)..............................................  9  a.  The Trial Court Found that [...] Personally Served [...]..................................  11  b.  The Trial Court Found that Personal Service Occurred on the Morning of 8/23/2021 at [...]..........................  13  c.  The Trial Court Found that [...] had No Conflict of Interest............  15  III.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO VACATE  FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER R. 4:50-1(C)  BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FRAUD (T4 98:1-5)  ...........................................  16  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO VACATE FINAL JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND BECAUSE EQUITY PROTECTS THE INTERVENING RIGHTS OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES (TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADDRESS)  ...............  18 CONCLUSION.........................................................
[brief] Dear Sir or Madam:  Kindly accept this Amended Appellant’s Letter Brief & the accompanying Appendix.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS & ORDERS .................................................................  1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................  2  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................  6 LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  8  Point I----The Lower Court Erred By Not Awarding Fees From The Fund In Court, By Holding That Plaintiffs Did Not Engage In Frivolous Litigation & By Disqualifying Appellant From Receiving Sanctions As A Pro Se Litigant (Da-221-244)
[brief] Judson v. People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954); Eisen v. Kostkos, 116 N.J. Super. 358, 371 (App. Div. 1971).  On a motion for summary judgment, although entitled to all favorable inferences, the non-moving party must do more than simply show there is “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. ”  O’Loughlin v. National Community Bank, 338 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2001).  Our courts have routinely held that “conclusory and self-serving assertions … without explanatory or supporting facts will not defeat a meritorious motion for summary judgment. ”  Hoffman v. Asseenonty. Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425-26 (App. Div. 2009).  Indeed, “bare conclusions lacking factual support” and “self-serving assertions” alone will not create a question of material fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.
[brief] Nor does the fact that [...] testified that he used a mapping software cure the defects with his net opinion.  (12T170-17 to 19).  The net-opinion rule “requires that an expert give the why and wherefore that supports the opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. ”  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015) (quotations omitted).  [...] offered no explanation as to whether or how the software he used estimates the coverage area of cell towers.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że z powodu przyznania się do winy odnośnie ww. zarzutów sąd [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 2. musi wydać wyrok nadzoru kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym przez okres lat, i ten wyrok rozpocznie się natychmiast po zakończeniu odbywania przez Pana/Panią kary pozbawienia wolności?  Nadzór kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym, przestępstwo I stopnia - 5 lat Nadzór kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym, przestępstwo II stopnia - 3 lata udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy Formularz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Polish strona 1 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Polish page 1 of 2  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
[directive] Overtime salaries, travel, fuel, training, equipment, and other similar costs of local, county and/or state law enforcement officers that are incurred in a joint law enforcement operation with a Treasury law enforcement agency participating in the TFF will be authorized for payment.  The following general guidelines are applicable to this policy.  The costs to be funded must be costs of a local, county or 1. state law enforcement officer.  This authority not does of include costs federal personnel, private parties, administrative personnel, or other local, county or state officials who are not classified as "law enforcement officers.  It will, however, include permissible costs incurred by local or state prosecutors.  The local, county or state law enforcement officer(s) must 2 . in be involved a joint law enforcement operation with the Fedeml- Government.  Not all joint activity is a "joint operation".  A more detailed'def inition of "joint" operation is presented below.  All costs to be funded must be directly related to the joint law enforcement operation.  The joint law enforcement operation must be with a Treasury 3 . law enforcement agency participating in the TFF.  At this time, this policy covers joint operations, including OCDETF cases, where the Treasury law enforcement agency is the No. Rev. 3, October 1995 Directive 18 of Page 8 1 lead or sole federal agency.
[brief] In Berganza, supra, 386 N.J. Super. at 490-91, this court held that fraudulent statements made in an application for a workers' compensation insurance policy will not void the policy.  Citing N.J.S.A. 34:15-83 and -84, which create a direct relationship between the insurer and the insured's employees, the court noted that “[w]hatever the rights may be between the carrier and the insured employer, so long as the policy, once it is issued, is outstanding, the carrier's liability to the injured employee remains.  No question of warranties or of false representations made by the employer in securing the policy and no stipulations of the policy as between the employer and carrier have force or effect as between the carrier and such an employee who was injured while the policy is outstanding * * *.  [A]s between the insurance carrier and the employee[,] the fact that a policy is issued upon untrue statements made by the employer [to the insurance carrier] is no defense [to liability].”  Id. at 490-91 (citations and quotations omitted).  See also Bates v. Nelson, 240 Iowa 926, 38 N.W.2d 631, 635 (1940) ("We are abidingly convinced that under our statutes the liability of the insurance carrier to the injured employee depends only upon the liability of the employer to the employee, regardless of any question that may arise between the employer and such insurer.").  If a policy cannot be voided for actual fraud, it follows that such a policy of insurance cannot exclude liability for intentional wrongs of the employer against its employees.  Further, the insurance company is in the best position to deal with losses caused by those payouts.  Rates and premiums can be adjusted.  An injured employee has no such remedy.  Public policy considerations weigh in favor of coverage for the employee/victim.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Court Erred When It Declined to Consider Plaintiff’s Expert Testimony  In addition, the lower court rejected the planning report submitted by Plaintiff’s expert, and erroneously ruled that a spot zoning assessment is one of law.  Given the nature of the spot zoning analysis, it is incumbent upon a court to at least consider expert testimony if it is offered.  Assessing a spot zoning challenge, the Supreme Court in Riya Finnegan LLC v. Township Council of Tp. of South Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 197 (2008) struck down a local ordinance as spot zoning on several grounds, among them the failure to consider expert testimony:
[brief] Defendant below argued self-defense, i.e., that his use of force against the victim was justified and thus lawful because the victim pulled out a knife and was the first aggressor.  (See 1T53-17 to 18; 1T36-11; 1T74-4; 6T44-8 to 13; 6T53-2; 6T52-14 to 15; 6T53-12 to 13).  Defendant told the nurse that as he was struggling with the victim, he saw a knife and was able to get it from the victim and then stabbed him, showing that defendant acted out of a need to protect himself.  Because the evidence supported a claim that defendant responded with force because he believed it was immediately necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a), (b)(2), the trial court properly charged the jury with self-defense and the State’s burden to disprove it.  (6T129-1 to 6T134-7).  As the trial court ruled, a charge on passion/provocation manslaughter would improperly ask the jury to speculate.  The State submits that the trial court complied with its obligation to carefully review the evidence in its entirety to determine whether a rational basis existed for passion/provocation manslaughter.  In denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court ruled that it had “fully considered” the requested charge and provided “specific reasons” for rejecting it.  (10T12-22 to 10T13-2).  The trial court’s ruling was correct, and the State urges this court to uphold defendant’s conviction for aggravated manslaughter and the weapons-related offense.
[brief] The default judgment hearing is part of the official proceedings of this case.  The transcript of the proceeding is part of the official record of this case.  It is not “evidence” that a party has to introduce at trial in order to prove a contested fact (such as a document or witness brought into court at a trial, for instance).  The transcript, prepared by an official court reporter assigned by the Superior Court, simply reflects what happened at this court hearing where the divorce case began and ended in a lightning speed two month span.  Nobody disputes the accuracy of the transcript.  The transcript shows not just arguable but, we respectfully submit, obvious unfairness in the manner in which [...] and his lawyer induced [...] to enter the Final Judgment of Divorce they had presented to him.  The transcript shows that [...] and his lawyer transgressed the most basic concepts of fairness and due process to an absent party that New Jersey law mandates by lying to [...] on a central issue the Judge asked about: whether [...] not only had voluntarily waived her right to appear that day, but whether the settlement agreements that [...] and [...] were asking [...] to enter were reached fairly and with awareness by both spouses of what they were agreeing to, which New Jersey law mandates, in particular, for divorce cases premised on one spouse’s non-participation (an even more pressing concern where the absent spouse is the far less monied and less powerful wife as in this case).  Nothing that [...] found in his Rule 4:50 decision cures those fundamental problems with the March 18, 2015 entry of the default judgment.
[brief] DA at 319a -320a.  For its own convenience and purposes, and not because any part of s1823 was essential to providing adequate service, [...] wanted to combine b2933 with the s1823 plan for replacing the Clark substation.  DA at 329a et seq.  [...] initially mapped out five potential routes each of which could accomplish both b2933 and s1823.  DA at 347a.  All potential routes involve starting at the Front Street substation (in Scotch Plains) and initially going south, then either continuing south to bypass Westfield completely or turning east to go through Westfield, connecting at a Clark substation replacement, before turning north to connect to the Springfield Road substation.  DA at 347a.  [...] did not map or analyze any potential routes that would complete only b2933.  Id.  Also, [...] did not map or analyze any potential routes that would go north, for example, using State Highway Route 22 to connect Front Street to Springfield Road.  DA at 309a – 310a.
[brief] Plaintiff filed an opposition to same and a Cross-Motion to Reopen Discovery.  Oral argument (“OA”) was heard on January 12, 2024\(^1\).  At oral arguments, the Honorable [...] requested to hear counsel’s comments regarding their motions, [...], Esq., counsel for defendant [...] began with his opening comments arguing that defendant [...] is afforded many protections as a municipality and under, “Title 59 is -- obviously it affords a municipality ample protection, or substantial protections, I should say, against tort claims that are filed against it because, let's be candid, the municipalities have vast amounts of public property that they're required to --- \(^1\)T is a copy of the transcript of Oral Argument on January 12, 2024 2T is a copy of the transcript of Oral Argument on March 1, 2024.
[brief] On or about May 24, 2013, Respondent initiated this collection action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Bergen County (“Court”) by filing a Summons and Complaint (“Complaint”) captioned, [...] v. [...], under Case No. [...] (“Action” or “Collection Action”).  (Pa16-17).  In the Complaint, Respondent alleged its ownership of the Debt and sought to collect on the Debt.  (Pa16-17).  There is no dispute that Respondent served the Complaint and Appellant received service in 2013.  (Pa20).  The Court Notice specifically states that “A SUMMONS WAS MAILED TO DEFENDANT(S) ON 05-30-13 FOR CASE [...].  UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED, THIS CASE WILL DEFAUL ON 07-08-2013. ”  Id.  Appellant failed to appear in this Action and, on September 26, 2013, Respondent filed a request for a judgment.  (Pa21-26).  On September 26, 2013, the Lower Court entered a judgment in favor of Respondent, effective September 26, 2013 (“Judgment”).  (Pa27).  The Judgment indicates that the Judgment Total is $5,313.82, inclusive of Attorneys’ Fees in the amount of $117.78.  See id.  On December 4, 2013, Respondent filed a request for an Execution Against Goods and Chattels.  (Pa28-30).  On December 9, 2013, this Court entered a writ dated December 4, 2013, in the amount of $5,854.83 (“First Writ”).  (Pa31-32).  On December 9, 2013, this Court issued an Execution against Good and Chattels to enforce the First Writ.  (Pa33).  On March 23, 2016, Respondent filed a request for a wage execution.  (Pa34-38).  On March 23, 2016, this Court issued a Writ for a Wage Execution (“Second Writ”).  (Pa39-40).  On March 24, 2016, this Court issued an Order and Execution against Earnings to enforce the Writ.  (Pa41).  Without ever appearing in the Action, and without seeking to vacate her default and vacate the default judgment, Appellant filed an Objection to the Second Writ on April 8, 2016.  (Pa42-43).  On April 28, 2016, this Court denied Appellant’s Objection to the Second Writ without prejudice.  (Pa44).  On May 9, 2016, Appellant filed a second Objection to the Second Writ.  (Pa45).  On May 26, 2016, the wage garnishment was reduced to five percent (5%).  (Pa46).  On April 11, 2024, eleven years after Appellant’s default and at least eight years after its first actions in the pending Action, Appellant filed her Motion to Vacate, defined supra, seeking, inter alia, the vacatur of the default judgment on the purported basis that the Debt is violative of the CFLA and therefore that the enforcement of the Judgment would also be inequitable.
[directive] Individuals encountered with qualifying warrants  Custodial arrest generally should generally not be subject to a custodial arrest, a search, or handcuffing, unless (a) issuing the notice on scene poses a safety risk or (b) probable cause that a crime has been committed or a pre-existing circumstance—independent of the warrant—justifies such action.  1.  In situations that fall within these limited exceptions, the officer may take the individual into custody on the warrant, conduct a search incident to arrest, and transport them to a police station for processing the warrant and release on their own recognizance.  2.  In rare instances, an officer may—in their discretion—determine that an individual is not suitable for release and take the individual into custody on the warrant.  For example, this provision may apply where the individual has an unusually high number of outstanding qualifying warrants that indicates a substantial risk of non- appearance.  C.
[directive] Section with accordance in consulted Justice.  Criminal Division of the Director of the prescribed by be may as manner in a form and the to sent shall be reports these means, electronic by automatically transmitted report is a Unless (ongoing Section 15  See also basis. monthly a than less on not Justice Criminal of Division impact).  and effectiveness  Law's Reform Bail of evaluation and study requirement reporting and the 1, 2017, January on operational become shall Section This 2019.
[brief] Jra1*  Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law, dated September 18, 2023 ..............................................................  Jra20*  Unpublished Decisions: U.S. ex rel. Berkley v. [...], C.A. No. 20-538-JJM-PAS, 2023 WL 3203641 (D.R.I. May 2, 2023)
[brief] License Appeal Docket Sheet……………………………………………………………..  Pa30  Termination Letter from [...] to [...] to [...]……………Pa33  Verified Petition Challenging [...]’s Termination of [...]……Pa34  Initial Decision upholding [...]’s termination of [...]’s Employment…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa38  Decision of Commissioner of Education  Upholding Termination of [...]’s Employment (the “Job FAD”)………………………………………………..Pa46  Notice of Appeal (the “Job Appeal”)…………………………………………………..Pa50
[brief] A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.  Campfield, 213 N.J. at 232 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2–2(b)(3)).
[brief] The Defendant quotes the trial court’s decision, where [...] determined the purpose of this provision was “to ensure prompt delivery of what the tenant provide to enable [the Plaintiff] to exercise its immediate right to terminate the agreement if the certificate recorded adverse information. ”  (Da11) (Pb13.)  Defendant contends this is a flawed reading, as the “prompt delivery” language, when considered alongside other provisions, is intended to allow for any defects to be corrected so the Defendant can fulfill its obligation to deliver an “Acceptable Estoppel Certificate” at closing.  (Pb14.)  Significantly, in making this argument Defendant misinterpreted several aspects of the PSA.  The Defendant claims that the reason for the prompt delivery was not to allow immediate termination.  Rather it was to keep the Plaintiff “informed of the status of the estoppel process as it unfolded. ”  (Pb14.)  Its argument begins with a quote from the PSA’s paragraph 13.10, to wit: “[Defendant] ‘shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Estoppel Certificate from the commercial tenant prior to the Closing. ’”  [Emphasis in original]  (Pb14.)  Next Defendant unashamedly rewrites that very language saying:  “The language requiring [Defendant] to use ‘commercially reasonable efforts . . . prior to the Closing’ to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate  [Emphasis added]  (Pb14-15)  Defendant, having rewritten the PSA, concludes this obligation in conjunction with the prompt delivery requirement supports the notion the prompt delivery language exists to keep the Plaintiff informed so that corrective action can be taken, and serves to ensure the Defendant delivers an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by the closing date.
[brief] As noted above, “when a civil action is brought in New Jersey, we use New Jersey choice-of-law rules to decide whether this state’s or another state’s legal framework should be applied.  Cont’l Ins., 234 N.J. at 46, 188 A.3d at 311.  “The first step in a conflicts analysis is to decide whether there is any actual conflict between the laws of the states with interests in the litigation. ”  Id.  “If there is no actual conflict, then the choice-of-law question is inconsequential, and the forum state applies its own law to resolve the disputed issue. ”  Id.  Here, there is no conflict between New Jersey and Vermont law with respect to the consequences of an insurance company breaching its duty to defend: [...] “is liable for the amount of the judgment obtained against the insured or of the settlement made by him” so long as the latter is “reasonable in amount and entered into in good faith.
[brief] Alongside his misguided attempt to change New Jersey law, [...] asks this Court to adopt a deeply strained interpretation of the Consumption Exception.  This common exception restores coverage for injuries caused by fungi or bacteria that are, are on, or are contained in, edible goods or products intended for human consumption.  The trial court correctly applied this language to require proof that [...] was injured by eating mold-contaminated food.  Following a multi-day bench trial hinging on expert testimony, the trial court held that [...] failed to prove he was injured by consuming mold-contaminated food.  His expert lacked “credibility” and that expert’s opinion was scientifically unsound.  In contrast, [...]’s expert was “extremely credible,” and his opinion scientifically reliable.  Those factual findings and conclusions are entitled significant deference and should be affirmed.
[brief] Accordingly, this putative right to pursue a contribution claim is a speculative and unduly burdensome right, at best.  It would require [...] to: 1) unsuccessfully litigate these issues to conclusion; 2) “front” approximately $800,000 to cover [...]’s share, with no guarantee of recoupment; 3) prosecute a medical negligence action against [...] and prove both [...]’s deviation from the standard of care and [...]’s allocation of responsibility; and 4) successfully collect on any judgment against [...].  Separate from those burdens, there is a real possibility that [...] is unable to recover the 40% allocation based on the outcome of a potential contribution action.  For example, if [...] was found to be not liable in such a trial, then there would be no recoupment, but [...] would still be responsible for 40% that this jury has already assigned to [...], and would be unable to recoup approximately $800,000 he was required to “front. ”  This procedural quagmire is precisely what the rules and decisional law seek to avoid when possible.