ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] SART-Participating Examination Facilities  Every County Prosecutor’s Office must affiliate with at least one healthcare facility in its county to participate in the SART Program.  Sexual assault victims shall be afforded access to SART- participating facilities for a full range of services including, but not limited to, medical forensic exams, CSVA, and law enforcement assistance.  Each participating facility shall:  provide interview and treatment areas that afford the victim privacy and security, a private bathroom, access to a shower facility, and a clean change of clothing following the medical forensic exam.  If the designated examination area is not located in the Emergency Department, procedures shall be established to ensure that every victim has access to emergency services as needed;  keep at least one secured, sealed SAFE Kit and at least one secured, sealed DFSA/Tox kit on the premises at all times.  Both kits shall be supplied by the County Prosecutor’s Office at no charge to the facility;  establish written procedures to ensure the integrity of the SAFE Kit and DFSA/Tox Kit, the secure storage and/or transfer of evidence, and the proper chain of custody;  employ measures to ensure the safety, security, and cleanliness of all medical forensic equipment used during the medical forensic exam.  This medical forensic equipment may only be used by the FNE conducting a medical forensic exam; and  establish a procedure to ensure the confidentiality and security of medical forensic exam records, which must be stored separately from the victim’s medical records.  To protect the victim’s privacy, it is recommended that each facility establish a policy requiring the use of standardized terminology such as “Forensic Evaluation” or “Forensic Nurse Examiner Evaluation” to be used by all personnel creating or maintaining medical records of these cases.  The FNE Coordinator shall securely hold the case paperwork, documentation, photographs, and supplemental diagrams in their office.  All SART-participating facilities are required to work cooperatively with the SART to ensure that emergency department personnel and first responders are educated regarding SART policies and procedures.  In the event an FNE is unavailable to perform the medical forensic exam, the FNE Coordinator should be contacted to determine a care plan for the victim to receive a medical forensic exam.  Non-Participating Examination Facilities
[brief] $50,000 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on December 5, 2014 to [...]’s bank account #8309.  (26T36:23 to 37:4).  •  [...] was shown extracts of the [...] MR line of credit account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $50,000 from that account to a bank statement for the company for December 2014, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 8309, which Plaintiffs established belonged to [...].  (13T15:21 to 22:15; Da844).  • [...] conceded that [...] didn’t receive an equal $50,000 distribution on that date.  (18T110:16 to 111:6).  **Misappropriation #5:**
[directive] The Attorney General’s [...] (“[...]”) is investigating the circumstances of this death.  A 2019 statute, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107(a)(2), requires that the Attorney General’s Office conduct all investigations when a person’s death occurs during an encounter with a law enforcement officer acting in the officer’s official capacity or while the decedent is in custody.  The results of all such investigations must be presented to a grand jury to determine if the evidence supports the return of an indictment against the involved officer or officers.  The purpose of this law is for the public to have confidence that the investigation is done fully, fairly, impartially, and independently of any potential bias.
[brief] State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 562 (2004).  But in contrast to "the use of physical coercion, use of psychologically oriented interrogation techniques is not inherently coercive."  Ibid.  "Because a suspect will have a 'natural reluctance' to furnish details implicating himself in a crime, an interrogating officer may attempt 'to dissipate this reluctance and persuade the [suspect] to talk.'"
[brief] Here, Landlord could not mitigate its damages by re-letting the Premises because Tenant has been in continuous possession thereof since September 14, 2017.  (Da191).  Tenant fails to cite to any legal authority for its contention that a commercial landlord’s duty to mitigate its damages extends to re-writing the applicable Lease to award Tenant an unearned offset against the Rent Arrears, or requiring Landlord to elect the remedy most beneficial to Tenant.  Moreover, due to the Events of Default, the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments that Tenant claims form the basis for this offset were never payable to Tenant; as such there was no amount owed to Tenant that could be offset against the Rent Arrears.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  For the foregoing reasons, Tenant’s newly raised argument that Landlord failed to mitigate its damages should be wholly rejected by this Court.
[brief] Page  TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED .................................................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..........................................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  14  POINT I ......................................................................................................................................  14  THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFFS AND DENIED THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON THE MOTION RECORD (PA115, PA120-121, PA131).  .........................................................  14  POINT II ....................................................................................................................................  17  THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO AN ENTITY THAT IS EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY A PRIVATE NON-GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST GROUP VIOLATES ART. III, PAR. 1 AND ART. IV, SEC. 1, PAR. 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION (PA115, PA123-127, PA127-130) ......................................................... 17 POINT III ................................................................................................................................... 21 THE COUNCIL IS A PRIVATE REGULATORY AGENCY BECAUSE IT IS EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION (PA115, PA125-127, PA129-130) ......................................................... 21 POINT IV ................................................................................................................................. 24 THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO THE COUNCIL VIOLATED THE PRIVATE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE (PA115, PA130-132)........................................................................... 24 POINT V................................................................................................................................. 27 THE PRIMARY DECISIONS RELIED ON BY TRIAL COURT ARE DISTINGUISHABLE, SINCE THEY DO NOT ADDRESS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTES SPECIFYING THE COMPOSITION OF AND DELEGATING REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO THE COUNCIL UNDER ART. III, PAR. 1 AND ART. IV, SEC. 1, PAR. 1 AND THE RELATED PRIVATE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE (PA115, PA123-132).  .................................................. 27  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................  38
[brief] [...]’s facilities are “interstate natural gas pipeline facilities” which are subject to the regulatory authority of the FERC and of the United States Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.  Aa0052.  --- \(^2\)  Importantly, and contrary to the claims of Appellants, [...] does not buy or sell the gas it transports.  Asb11.  “Asb”  Refers to Appellants’ supplemental brief.
[directive] At the sentence review hearing the judge will assess the factors set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), designed to of consider the "mitigating qualities youth," well as those that could not be fully as of assessed at the time sentencing.  [...] (slip op. 53), Miller, 567 at 478.  The U.S. of 2 4 Page Supreme Court in Miller set forth the following five factors regarding mandatory life without parole for a juvenile:  of precludes consideration his chronological age [1]  [It] and its hallmark features -- among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.  It prevents taking into account the family and home [2] environment that surrounds him -- and from which he cannot usually extricate himself -- no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.  of  It neglects the circumstances the homicide [3] of offense, including the extent his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.  [ Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged 4] if of and convicted a lesser offense not for incompetencies associated with youth -- for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.  [ And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the 5] of possibility rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.  [...] (slip op. 30-31), citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78.  As noted by the Court, of Miller did not rule out the possibility life without parole for juveniles convicted of murder; rather, Miller requires judges "to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison."
[brief] The situation that I faced in late 2021 was pure chaos.  In the midst of a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic while out of work on medical leave (with my place of work, the [...], closed) and facing spinal surgery, I acted in good faith by relying on a December 28, 2021 letter from the [...] stating that I would have 10 years and 1 month of service credit when I retired on February 1, 2022.  Nearly 7 months after my retirement, I was shocked when I was told by the [...] “oops-a-mistake-was-made-by-my-former-employer,” that I could not correct such a mistake, but we, the [...], can unilaterally take away your retirement benefits without giving you any remedy.  The Correction Act that is supposed to be liberally interpreted to benefit public employees was never intended to be a one-way street as it has been used in my case, permitting the [...] to make unilateral decisions that leave a blameless retired public employee facing a retirement disaster with no recourse.  If this Court relied on the equitable considerations favoring [...] (an attorney), [...] (an attorney), [...] (an attorney), [...] (an attorney), [...] (a teacher), [...] (a custodian) and [...] (a teacher) in reversing the improper denial or reduction of their pension benefits, I should be entitled to the same consideration since my good faith in this case is not in question.  Simply put, why should I receive less justice than [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...]?  I therefore request a reversal of the decision below and the restoration of my full retirement benefits (my monthly full pension and my life insurance benefit of $9,952.12).  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION : CIVIL ACTION OF NEW JERSEY  NATURAL GAS : ON APPEAL FROM A COMPANY FOR A DETERMINATION :  FINAL AGENCY DECISION CONCERNING THE HOLMDEL : OF THE STATE OF NEW REGULATOR STATION  PURSUANT : JERSEY TO N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 – 2017 : BOARD OF PUBLIC PETITION : UTILITIES and BPU DOCKET NOS. [...] & [...]  IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION : OAL DOCKET NOS. PUC OF NEW JERSEY  NATURAL GAS : [...] & [...]  COMPANY FOR A DETERMINATION : CONCERNING THE HOLMDEL : REGULATOR STATION  PURSUANT : TO N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 – 2018 : PETITION BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT, THE [...]
[brief] In this case, like It must be emphasized, however, that the [...]’s investigation and conclusion was used for the purposes of impeachment only, after plaintiff opened the door.  The [...]’s conclusions were never admitted as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  The Supreme Court’s recently applied this doctrine in the July 25, 2023 opinion in Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc., 254 N.J. 446 (2023).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:l0A-l; 59:10-1.  According to N.J.S.A. 59:l0A-l, “the Attorney General shall, upon a request of an employee or former employee of the State, provide for the defense of any action brought against such State employee or former State employee on account of an act or omission in the scope of his employment. ”  Two other provisions pertain to the Attorney General’s representation of State employees: (1) N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2 specifies three instances when such representation of tort cases may be refused by the Attorney General, see also Gramiccioni v. Department of Law & Public Safety, 243 N.J. 293, 310 n.5 (2020); and (2) N.J.S.A. 59:10A-3, vests the Attorney General with the discretion to defend a State employee or former State employee “[i]n any other action or proceeding, including criminal proceedings . . . if he concludes that such representation is in the best interest of the State.
[brief] Ignoring the fact that the trial court failed to address the issue of waiver, [...] argues in their Brief that they did not waive their purported ability to compel arbitration because the holding in *Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.*, 596 U.S. 411 (2022), is ostensibly inapplicable to the case at bar.  The Supreme Court makes no mention of waiving arbitration at the state level.  In fact, it expressly rejects such precedent:  “We decide today a single issue, responsive to the predominant analysis in the Courts of Appeals, rather than to all the arguments the parties have raised.  In their briefing, the parties have disagreed about the role state law might play in resolving when a party’s litigation conduct results in the loss of a contractual right to arbitrate.  The parties have also quarreled about whether to understand that inquiry as involving rules of waiver, forfeiture, estoppel, laches, or procedural timeliness.  We do not address those issues.
[brief] In *Walsh v. Starr Transit*, 2008 WL 199740 (N.J.Super. A.D. 2008), the Appellate Division addressed whether medical bills were properly barred from introduction at trial.  The Appellate Division found the trial court erred in this regard, and concluded that the bills, which were paid under med-pay benefits, could be introduced subject to deduction from any damages awarded to the injured party.  Citing the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 to “eliminate[ ] double recovery” and shift the burden of spiraling insurance costs from the liability carriers to the casualty insurers” and relying upon *Perreira*, supra., the Court stated: “As such, the first party insurer providing the medical benefit is not entitled to subrogate against the tortfeasor. ”  *Walsh v. Starr Transit*, supra. (slip op. at 3).  By hearing and deciding the nine arbitrations at issue, the arbitrators imperfectly performed their role, exceeded their powers and committed prejudicial error.  Further, in finding against [...], the arbitrators created a cause of action against [...], and created a liability to [...], which did not exist as a matter of New Jersey law or equity.  As a result, the arbitration award is in contradiction of the parties’ arbitration agreement and was properly vacated under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.  Moreover, since the Court retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether “a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate,” and since [...]’s subrogation claims are prohibited by both statute and judicial decisions, it is submitted that this court should not only vacate the arbitration award, but should also find that there was no agreement and/or right for [...] to arbitrate.
[brief] Under this doctrine, the Trial Court was bound to respect its earlier ruling.  Lanzet v. Greenburg, 126 N.J. 168 (1991) (citing State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 203 (1985).  In this case, the Trial Court already decided key facts relevant to [...]’s Motion on its Counterclaims when it issued its September 23, 2022, ruling.  The most important part of that ruling was the Trial Court’s finding that [...] knowingly and willingly submitted false information thereby committed insurance fraud as a matter of law.
[brief] Div. 2024) | | | Bryant v. City of Atl. City, | 9 | | 209 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998) | | | CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd./Bd. of Adjustment, | 10 | | 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010) | | | D’Anastasio Corp. v. Twp. of Pilesgrove, | 10 | | 387 N.J. Super. 247 (Law Div. 2005) | | | Seaview Harbor Realignment Comm., LLC v. Twp. Comm. of Egg Harbor Twp., | 10 | | 470 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 2021) | | | Matter of the Application for Med. Marijuana Alt. Treatment Ctr. for Pangea Health and Wellness, LLC, | 14, 15 | | 465 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2020) | | | Vineland Const. Co. v. Twp. Of Pennsauken, | 10 | | 395 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2007) | | | Worthington v. Fauver, | 10, 23 | | 88 N.J. 183 (1982) | | | Statutes | | | N.J.S.A. 24:61-31, et seq. | 3 | | Other Authorities | | | R. 4:69 | 2 |
[brief] The State concedes that “inadmissibility is not the end of an analysis as to whether evidence is material for Brady purposes. ”  State Br. at 31.  The State argues, however, that “inadmissible evidence is only material [for Brady purposes] if it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence which, in turn, could have affected the outcome of a defendant’s trial. ”  Ibid.  In support of its argument, the State relies upon State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451 (2016), wherein the issue was limited to “whether [defendants] have a right to discovery of the files in unrelated cases involving the same cooperating witnesses. ” (emphasis added).  Because [...]’ Sworn Statement relates to the same case, same conduct and same Indictment, Hernandez is inapposite.  Rather, the State’s discovery obligations are governed by Rule 3:13-3, as set forth more fully infra.  Notwithstanding, the State does not dispute – because it cannot – that the disclosure of the Sworn Statement would have led to the discovery of other material evidence.
[brief] *Mun*, 751 F.3d at 99 (citations omitted).  Third, [...]’s limited joinder rules would permit joinder in the same demand for arbitration only of claims relating to the same injured person or same accident.  *See* Pa0383 ([...] R. 7) (stating that a single demand for --- 3  This court should take judicial notice of [...]’s quarterly reports to [...] because they are publicly available studies and statistics published on [...]’s website.  *See* N.J.R.E. 201(b)(3); N.J.R.E. 202(b); see also *In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of Englewood on Palisades Charter Sch.*, 164 N.J. 316, 320 n.1 (2000) (taking judicial notice of a Department of Education report); *State v. Terry*, 430 N.J. Super. 587, 594 n.5 (App. Div. 2013) (taking judicial notice of United States Census Bureau statistics), aff’d, 218 N.J. 224 (2014).
[brief] - **State v. Thompson**, 250 N.J. 556, 275 A.3d 412 (2022) - **Wisniewski v. Murphy**, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 522, 186 A. 3d 321 (App. Div. 2018) - **Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co.**, 144 N.J. 327, 330, 676 A.2d 1065 (1996)  ####  Statutes - **4:19-23** - **4:19-23a** - **4:19-23a** - **N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2** - **N.J.S.A. 4:19.b.(1)** - **N.J.S.A. 4:19-17** - **N.J.S.A. 4:19-19** - **N.J.S.A. 4:19-23** - **N.J.S.A. 4:19-24**
[brief] Thus, to the extent the conversion and unjust enrichment  Judgment survives this appeal, the amount of compensatory damages awarded against Defendant must be reduced to $320,000.00 (($500,000 + $50,000 + $90,000) / 2 = $320,000) in accordance with the trial court’s damage formula (36T54-1 to -10; 37T42-15 to 46-17, 71-1 to -24, 79-1 to 80-14; Da02043-02049).  C.
[brief] Moreover, and most tellingly, defendant did not want expert analysis of the handwriting in question because he was the first one to ask the jury to compare handwriting samples.  It was, in fact, defendant who first invited the jury to compare his handwriting to [...]’s; it was defendant who asserted that the letters were forged by [...]; it was defendant who claimed the writing was not his; and it was defendant who asked the jury to use their own judgement to compare the handwriting samples.  Any error was thus fully invited by defendant.  Because this issue was never raised below, and defendant “thus deprive[d] the trial judge of the opportunity to ameliorate any perceived errors, he must establish that the comments made constitute plain error under Rule 2:10-2.
[brief] It is recognized that the duty owed to an invitee is greater than that owed to a social guest/invitee.  *Lechler*, 452 N.J. Super. at 583.  A social guest/licensee takes the property as he finds it and is simply entitled to have the same knowledge possessed by the host regarding hazardous conditions.  *Berger v.* Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 98 (1959).  The host is not required to discover defects or maintain the property in a safe condition.  Id.  In regard to a social guest/licensee, the host merely represents that the property is as safe as it appears to be.  Rowe, 209 N.J. at 44.  Therefore, there is no duty when the social guest/licensee is either aware of the dangerous condition or would observe it through reasonable use of his or her faculties.  Bagnana v. Wolfinger, 385 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2006).  The duty owed to an invitee is higher than that owed to a social guest/licensee.
[brief] He waited between 2-4 minutes and then entered, assuming he had permission.  Common sense dictates he should have stayed outside the fence until knowing the dogs were in the house and getting express permission from [...] to enter.  Moreover, [...] policy expressly prohibits spraying property if dogs or people are present.  Although the court stated that [...] had “zero motive to lie” [4T67:110-12], there is at least one reason: he violated [...] policy.
[brief] *EPIX* stands for the unremarkable position that litigation and arbitration can proceed simultaneously as to different parties.  The *Cole* case makes this point too.  Neither case, however, concerned an *Owens-Illinois* allocation, --- 5  [...] wrongly argues that [...] equates futility with inefficiency.  It is [...]’s position that futility exists here because the Indemnity Claim was not ripe and the defense claim would have resulted in a meaningless award given the other insurer’s contribution rights.  6