ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court below erroneously dismissed the Complaint filed by plaintiffs [...] (“Scott”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).  Specifically, the Trial Court erred by: (i) re-writing the terms of a consent order to include nonexistent language; (ii) assuming facts unsupported by the record; and (iii) incorrectly applying New Jersey law.  Based upon the irrefutable record below, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court, and reinstate Plaintiffs’ Complaint, in its entirety.  This case arises from defendant [...]’s (“Warren”) intentional misuse of the powers of this Court, to pursue baseless claims against his son, Scott.  To that end, and in an effort to steal millions of dollars from Scott, Warren fabricated an agreement, forged Scott’s signature, and sought to enforce that forged agreement in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County, in a matter entitled [...] v. [...], et al., Docket No. [...] (the “Prior Litigation”).
[brief] The qualification and competency of a witness to provide expert testimony are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64 (1993); Adamson v. Chiovaro, 308 N.J. Super. 70, 77 App. Div. 1998); Grand View Gardens v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 14 N.J. Super. 167, 170–171 (App. Div. 1951).
[brief] [...], AFTE Theory of Identification  As it Relates to Toolmarks, https://afte.org/about-us/what-is-afte/afte-theory-of-identification (Last visited May 1, 2023) (Da 580).  No standard or protocol, however, dictates how many \(^4\)  Another classification is of subclass characteristics, defined as features left on multiple items fabricated by the same tool; imperfections on the tool’s cutting surface are imparted on a series of weapons.  A Path Forward at 152.  While class characteristics are well-defined, firearms examiners lack defined standards for distinguishing between subclass characteristics, which are shared by multiple firearms, and individual characteristics, which are not.
[brief] As a result, the Agreement’s return to work terms were not declared illegal, ineffective or unenforceable.  Rather, the [...] determined Plaintiff’s decision to agree to such terms in exchange for settling pending disciplinary charges rendered him ineligible for disability benefits.  The word “forum” and its legal implications further highlights the need for dichotomy between the Agreement and Plaintiff’s IOD Application.  A “forum” is a “court or other judicial body; a place of jurisdiction. ”  See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has defined jurisdiction as having three essential components: (1) cognizance of the class of cases to which the case to be adjudicated belongs; (2) presence of the proper parties, and (3) the point to be decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue.
[brief] (Sa301-04).  Defendant testified that those approvals needed to be in place before a franchise agreement would be approved.  (67T57-19 to 58-15).  The email was dated October 21, 2014, and was sent to defendant, [...], and [...].  One of those documents confirmed the continued enforceability of the ADA between those three and [...].  (8T59-17 to 22; Sa303).  On December 14, 2023, [...], the Chief Development Officer of [...], testified.
[brief] The proper standard of review in this appeal is de novo; principles and procedures applicable to summary-judgment proceedings are inapposite.  Appellate courts “review de novo the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration,” Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020), as the validity of an arbitration agreement is a question of law.  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 446 (2014).  This includes when the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is determined.  Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019).  An appellate court “need not give deference to the analysis by the trial court,” id., but will instead “construe the arbitration provision with fresh eyes,” *Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst.*, 225 N.J. 289, 303 (2016).
[brief] Because the officer in *Tuncap* viewed the surveillance video at the restaurant soon after the burglary occurred, testified that the recording he viewed in court was the same as the recording he viewed at the restaurant, and testified that the contents depicted in the recording matched those he saw at the scene, the court held that the video was properly authenticated.  *Id.* at *8*.  Similarly, in *People v. Dennis*, 956 N.E.2d 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), on which *Tuncap* relied, the officer who responded to the scene authenticated the surveillance video that captured the crime.
[brief] On November 12, 2019, [...] filed a Complaint against Defendants, [...] and [...], alleging violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and breach of warranty.  (Pa75).  On January 6, 2020, [...] filed an Answer to [...]’s Complaint with a Counterclaim against [...] for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violation of the New Jersey Prompt Payment Act.  (Pa84).  [...] filed an Answer to [...]’s Counterclaim on January 14, 2020.  (Pa97).  On February 27, 2020, [...] filed an Answer to [...]’s Complaint, denying all allegations of wrongdoing.  (Pa103).  After completion of the discovery period in this matter, [...] and [...] filed Motions for Summary Judgment on January 20, 2022.  (Pa199; Pa235).  [...] filed Opposition to both Motions on March 10, 2022.  (Pa267).  On April 4, 2022, the Trial Court granted Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, dismissing all counts of [...]’s Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa112).  Thereafter, a trial was held on August 2, 2023 solely on the issue of [...]’s Counterclaim.  (Pa133).  The Trial Court entered judgment in favor of [...] on its Counterclaim in the amount of $112,070.82 per its Order dated September 14, 2023.  (Pa132).  By way of Order dated October 27, 2023, the Trial Court amended the judgment to add an award of attorney’s fees and costs to [...] in the amount of $24,632.95.  (Pa178).  On December 8, 2023, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal of the April 4, 2022 Order and Opinion granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants, the September 14, 2023 Order entering judgment in favor of [...], and the Trial Court’s final Order dated October 27, 2023.  (Pa179).
[brief] Plaintiff’s complaint asserts, *inter alia*, causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act.  Plaintiff alleges his First Amendment rights were violated, he was retaliated against, and defendants created a hostile work environment.  Plaintiff wrote in a brief that the “gravamen of this case alleges complaints about ex parte communications between [...] and [...], and the retaliation that resulted from those complaints. ”  *See November 8, 2012 Letter Brief* at 1, Doc. No. 127.  Not unexpectedly defendants deny liability.
[directive] Duty to report illegal and inappropriate uses of force by other officers.  Any officer who observes or has knowledge of a use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with this directive or department policies must (a) notify a supervisor as soon as possible and (b) submit an individual written report to a supervisor before reporting off duty on the day the officer becomes aware of the misconduct  5.5  Law enforcement agencies, supervisors, and officers are prohibited from retaliating in any form against an officer who intercedes in or reports illegal or inappropriate uses of force.  5.6  Every department shall establish a written policy which requires intervention and protects officers who intervene from retaliation or other negative consequences.
[brief] But its analysis fails because a “municipal agency” requires, as the MLUL defines the term, that “. . . such agency is acting pursuant to this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5 (emphasis added).  [...] does not identify a single action that the [...] took pursuant to the MLUL, and it cannot.  This is because the [...] is vested with no power under the MLUL.  The ordinance establishing the [...] is clear that its role is purely advisory and has no power to grant any of the approvals described in the MLUL.
[brief] New Jersey’s Rules of Court, like the federal rules and those of other states, permit discovery only of documents relevant to the case and responsive to valid discovery requests.  And courts nationwide recognize that an electronic search term does not, by itself, establish that every document collected through use of the term is relevant and responsive.  For that reason, courts and practitioners widely recognize that running search terms is only the first step in discovery involving electronically stored information (“ESI”)—further review of the documents collected is necessary to ensure that only relevant and responsive documents are actually disclosed to the requesting party.  The trial court in this case broke from that established understanding and discarded the “relevance” requirement inscribed in New Jersey discovery rules because, according to the court, “ESI is different. ”  Based on that premise, the trial court ordered the production of tens of thousands of electronically stored documents that the court itself acknowledged will be “wholly non-responsive” to any discovery requests and will contain “only irrelevant information,” merely because those documents hit on ESI search terms (the “ESI Order”).  The ESI Order sets a dangerous precedent, and the New Jersey Supreme Court has taken the rare step of authorizing an immediate appeal.
[brief] During the course of production, Defendants produced a number of documents, portions of which had been redacted.  Plaintiffs requested that Defendants provide all of the documents free of any redaction.  Defendants refused.  The production of these redacted documents is the basis of the pending motion to compel.  The Court heard argument regarding this discovery dispute on October 2, 2007, and thereafter ordered the parties to file motions to compel.  In the memorandum in support of the motion to compel, Plaintiffs make a number of arguments as to why they are entitled to the unredacted documents (Doc. 86).  First, they argue that their initial discovery requests, which sought information on the [...], encompass the information and passages redacted by Defendants.  Second, they argue that their requests for information about the other plans are calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and that they are relevant in determining (1) whether the “leverage” of the VIP plan was used to benefit other [...] plans, and (2) how the combined plans were used in negotiating fees for the VIP plan.  Third, they argue that redactions for relevance are not appropriate under the federal rules.  In response, the Defendants argue that the information sought by the Plaintiffs is not relevant to the issues in the case at bar (Doc. 90).  Defendants contend that the complaint is limited to the VIP plan, and therefore, that information regarding other [...] benefit plans is not relevant to that complaint.  Further, they argue that redaction of irrelevant material is an acceptable means of producing documents.  Finally, Defendants maintain that objections to relevance should be remedied by *in camera* inspection of the documents at issue.  **DISCUSSION**
[brief] [...] ruled that [...], acting on behalf of the State of Illinois, could not be held to New Jersey's laws unless he had been acting as an agent for the State of New Jersey by “procuring evidence for criminal prosecution in New Jersey.  Absent such an agency relationship, Illinois state law would apply to the motor vehicle stop in Illinois. ” (Da24-25).  [...] properly applied Illinois state law to analyze the lawfulness of [...]’s motor vehicle stop.  Accord Evers, 175 N.J. at 371 (New Jersey’s “[c]onstitution has no ability to influence the behavior” of another state’s “law enforcement officer who does not even know that New Jersey has an interest in a matter he is investigating”).  [...]’s decision that Illinois law applied to [...]’s stop was supported by the sufficient credible evidence in the record, given that both [...] and [...] thought and initially advised [...] that they were headed to New York, not New Jersey.
[brief] (Da3).  The court found the two officers credible based on their demeanor, ability to recall, responsiveness to questioning, consistency, and corroboration by the body-cam videos.  (Da7).  The judge found defendant’s testimony “lacking in several respect[s],” including defendant’s “wish[] to advance his narrative . . . regardless of what made sense,” his “rambling” testimony, the fact that his observations would have been impacted by the “stress of the moment” from having drugs on his \(^5\) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). person, and his “body language and demeanor” while he testified.  (Da8).  [...] found that the stop was lawful because the credible testimony of the officers as corroborated by the body-camera videos demonstrated the existence of reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation.  (Da5-6).  The court examined N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, emphasizing that the statute only requires a driver to signal a lane change “when any other traffic may be affected by such movement. ” (Da5) (emphasis in original).  Relying on the officers’ credible testimony, the court found that [...] did not signal until she had already begun to move from the left to right lane.  (Da5).  The judge also found that other vehicles could have been impacted because there was “medium” traffic at the time and cars in both westbound lanes.  (Da6).  The judge also upheld the warrantless search of defendant’s person based on the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle and [...]’s admission that there was marijuana in the center console.6 (Da6-7, 8-9).  B.
[directive] When a person taken into custody for eligible offense, the law enforcement officer an is will inquire whether the person a service member or has ever served the United States is in military.  This information will be included the complaint the electronic Complaint Disposition on in Report (eCDR) system.  Enhancements have been made to the Automated Complaint System (ACS) PROMIS/Gavel (PG) systems to assist processing these cases.  and in  To maintain the confidentiality of a person's military status, the Judiciary will redact this information from court records and documents that are within its custody control and that are and generally accessible to the public under Court Rule 1 :38 ("Public Access to Court Records and Administrative Records").  This an interim step until the Supreme Court can consider whether is Rule 1 should be amended to specifically provide for such confidentiality.
[brief] Pa023; Pa30-Pa31; Pa304.  An ambulance transported Plaintiff to [...] for treatment, and he was thereafter taken to the [...] without incident.  Pa023.  Several other officers responded to the scene.  The owner of the green Jeep vehicle arrived at the scene while the officers were searching the black Jeep.  The owner consented to a search of his vehicle (i.e., the green Jeep), but no contraband was found.  Pa029; Pa304.  [...] retrieved Plaintiff’s backpack from the black Jeep and detected the odor of raw marijuana.  [...] searched the backpack and found under 50 grams of marijuana in a Ziploc bag.  Pa025; Pa032; Pa304.  Plaintiff’s backpack also contained an unmarked orange tablet.  Pa026; Pa033.  The [...] later performed an analysis of the orange tablet and determined that it contained methamphetamine, which is a Schedule II narcotic.  Pa383.  The [...] ran a search of the National Crime Information Center database and learned that Plaintiff was wanted on an outstanding warrant for non-payment of child support.  Pa038.  It became clear that Plaintiff had attempted to flee the scene because he had an outstanding warrant and possessed illegal substances.
[brief] Pa68  Request letter to [...] for Proof of Service for March 9, 1990  Pa70  Civil Action Notice of Motion to Vacate Arrears, filed August 30, 2023  Pa71  Notice of Motion for Emergent Stay, filed November 28, 2023  Pa73  Notice of Motion for Reconsideration, filed October 16, 2023  Pa75  Plaintiff’s Certificate of Filing and Service indicating papers for Response to Motion to Vacate Arrears not sent to defendant Pa77 Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Termination of Child Support sent December 29, 2023 to the court as being received.
[brief] See Pl. Br. at 13.  Indeed, in D’Agostino, this Court analyzed the particular facts of that case to determine that the corporate party, [...], had control over the noticed individuals, and considered, among other things, that [...] did not deny such control and that one of the proposed non-party deponents even “offered a certification in favor of defendants” in the case, thereby already participating in the proceedings.  D’Agostino, 242 N.J. Super. at 275.  Had this Court issued a broad pronouncement that, in every instance, a corporation necessarily has control over—and therefore must produce for deposition—any of its officers, directors and managing agents that a plaintiff designates, it would not have had to engage in any such analysis relating to control over the subject deponents. \(^5\)  At bottom, here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Plaintiff to seek [...]’s non-party deposition through a subpoena rather than a notice of deposition to [...]’s counsel.  [...] does not have control over [...], has never designated him as its representative, and cannot compel him to appear.  Nor has Plaintiff offered any other evidence that [...] controls him.  Moreover, while Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that, in light of the Trial Court Orders, he is required to follow procedures under the Hague Convention and German law when deposing [...], significantly, he acknowledges in his brief that he nevertheless will be able to seek information from [...] relevant to this action.
[brief] (Da69 – Da75).  On February 23, 2023 [...] filed a second summary proceeding by way of Verified Complaint and an Order to Show Cause against [...] seeking to vacate two additional arbitration awards which was assigned docket number [...].  (Da76 – Da84).  On February 24, 2023, the Honorable Marcy M.  McMann, J.S.C. entered an Order to Show Cause setting forth a return date (Da85 – Da88).  On April 11, 2023 [...] filed an Answer with a counterclaim seeking to enforce the inter-company arbitration awards.  (Da89 – Da97).  On March 24, 2023 counsel for [...] filed a motion to enforce litigants rights on the original docket and an Order was entered on April 19, 2023 enforcing litigants rights.  On April 18, 2023, [...] filed an answer to [...]’s counterclaim in docket number [...].  (Da98 – Da101).
[brief] State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super.  388, 410 (App. Div.) (“Generally, issues not raised below, even constitutional issues, will not ordinarily be considered on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate public interest. ” (citing cases)), certif. denied, 187 N.J. 83 (2006).  6  In the June 8, 2021 Order in this matter, [...] declined to consider the constitutional question, basing his decision on res judicata.  [P]laintiffs cannot establish that they have a property right to terminal leave lump sum payouts.  Plaintiffs present no cases to support their argument that the Takings Clause of the New Jersey Constitution applies to terminal leave payouts or even other rights generated by CNAs.  _Id._ at *3; (Pa000671).  While rejecting constitutional challenges to the MSRA, the Appellate Division explained that the MSRA is to be “liberally construe[d]” in accordance with its plain terms.  _Id._ at *7; (Pa000676).  That is precisely what the Superior Court did, and each of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims fail, almost all of which have been previously addressed and rejected in prior court decisions.  **POINT II**
[brief] In or around May 2016, the parties reached and memorialized two (2) agreements with the following terms:  1.  Notwithstanding the provisions of the relevant collective negotiations agreements regarding salary adjustments for promotions, the parties agree that the [...] may effectuate such promotions as it deems necessary from Police Officer to Sergeant with no increase in pay until a salary increase, including rank deferential[sic] and any other increase, is ratified between the [...], the [...], and the [...], or until such salary increases are awarded by an interest arbitrator in accordance with the statutory provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16, et seq.  All increases shall be retroactive to the date of promotion.  Pa000035-37, 49; (emphasis added).  1.  Notwithstanding the provisions of the relevant collective negotiations agreements regarding salary adjustments for promotions, the parties agree that the [...] may effectuate such promotions as it deems necessary from Sergeant to Lieutenant, and/or Lieutenant to Captain with no increase in pay until a salary increase, including rank deferential [sic]and any other increase, is ratified between the [...], the [...] and the [...], or until such salary increases are awarded by an interest arbitrator in accordance with the statutory provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16, et seq.  All increases shall be retroactive to the date of promotion.  Pa000035-37, 51; (emphasis added).  On June 8, 2016, the Atlantic [...] [...] Council voted to approve both MOAs. Pa000037, 195-197.  Sixteen (16) officers were promoted to sergeant, six (6) were promoted to lieutenant, and two (2) were promoted to captain during the time period germane to this litigation.
[brief] There was no rational factual or legal basis for the trial court to impose personal liability on Defendant for breaching contracts that she was never a party to.  In context of contractual liability, the “liability of two or more persons, which is joint and not several, can arise only out of a joint contract. ”  Fid. Union Tr. Co. v. Union Cemetery Ass'n, 138 N.J. Eq. 50, 52 (1946).  Based on this principle, nonparties to contracts cannot be held liable for a breach of the contract or any implied covenant therein.  See FDIC, supra, 27 F.3d at 876 (stating that under New Jersey law, non-parties to a contract cannot be held liable for a breach of a contractual duty).  It is undisputed that the only contract that Defendant was a party to was the 2017 [...] (Da02823).  There was no credible evidence at trial supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant breached this agreement, nor do Plaintiffs cite to any in their brief.  Further, Plaintiffs failed to cite to any cases where a non-party was held liable for breaching a contract they never entered into based on the conduct of a party to the actual contract.  Therefore, the trial court erred by holding Defendant jointly and severally liable for breaching contracts she was never a party to.  Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred by holding Defendant jointly and severally liable for the entire damage award in the Judgment.  Accordingly, if the Judgment survives this appeal, the Court should, at a minimum, reduce the compensatory damage award entered against Defendant to $320,000.00 and adjust the pre-judgment interest and attorneys’ fees award against her accordingly.
[brief] Thus, in the case of a letter, authenticity may be established from details contained in the letter that the alleged writer would be expected to know.  *Ibid.*  The same applies to telephone calls.  See, e.g., *Kalola v. Eisenberg*, 344 N.J. Super. 198 (Law Div. 2001), and *State v. Bassano*, 67 N.J. Super. 526 (App. Div. 1961).  More recently, this Court has held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to authenticate social media posts.  See *Hannah*, 448 N.J. Super. at 90-91.  These principles apply to photographs and videos, which are forms of writing.