[brief] It is very likely that prospective jurors had a preexisting, and inflated, belief in the reliability of fingerprints.  One study of juror insight of scientific error rates found that a pool of jury-eligible participants estimated the misidentification rate for fingerprints to be “1 in 5.5 million. ”  Jonathan J. Koehler, Intuitive Error Rate Estimates for the Forensic Sciences, 57 Jurimetrics 153, 162 (2017) (Da 77-92).  Thus, there is a significant risk that many jurors who were eventually impaneled would automatically assume that the fingerprint analysis is correct, regardless of any cross-examination by defense counsel.  Studies have shown that “it is difficult to overcome the tendency for people to trust information from an expert in a relevant field. ”  Lauren Hudachek & Adele Quigley-McBride, *Juror Perceptions of Opposing Expert Forensic Psychologists: Preexisting Attitudes, Confirmation Bias, and Belief Perseverance*, 28 *Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L.* 213, 213–14 (2022) (Da 93-105).  Not only do people tend to trust that experts are correct, but “[e]xisting attitudes are persistent and difficult to change and can result in belief perseverance effects. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis in original).  In other words, “[w]hen people interact with an opinion contrary to their own, they tend to discredit the opposing argument and strengthen their preexisting view.  Also, they will subsequently feel even more favorable toward any new opinions they encounter that do align with their existing opinions. ”  *Ibid.*  Studies demonstrate that, in fact, even robust and pointed cross-examination that is well-designed to expose weaknesses in forensic practitioners’ methods has little to no power to do so, especially when experts phrase their conclusions in unshakable terms like “identification. ”  Jonathan Koehler, Northwestern University Faculty Working Papers, *If the Shoe Fits They Might Acquit: The Value of Forensic Science Testimony* 25 (2011) (Da 106-152) (“There was no effect for cross examination on source confidence, source probability, guilt confidence, guilty probability, or verdict.  Likewise there was no effect for cross examination across the two individualization conditions on any of the dependent measures. ”); Joseph Sanders, *The Merits of the* Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 913, 934-36 (2003) (concluding that multiple studies show that even robust cross examination of experts affects neither ultimate verdicts nor even juror confidence in said verdicts); Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say & What Factfinders Hear, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 436, 439 (2009) (Da 153-170) (explain that studies find “little or no ability of cross-examination to undo the effects of an expert’s testimony on direct examination, even if the direct testimony is fraught with weaknesses and the cross is well designed to expose those weaknesses. ”).  In short, people have a pre-existing belief in the reliability of fingerprint evidence that is not shaken by cross-examination.  Therefore, the only way to make sure a jury could actually consider that the fingerprint analysis in this case might be wrong was to make sure no jurors were empaneled who had a preexisting bias that prevented them from considering the possibility of error.  The trial court’s refusal to do so necessitates reversal [...]’s convictions.