ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] All allegations of officer misconduct shall be thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigated to their logical conclusion.  6.1  Time Limitations 6.1.1  It is vitally important that agencies complete internal affairs investigations in a prompt manner.  Long, unnecessary delays do not simply create additional uncertainty for the subject officer; they can also threaten the integrity of an investigation and the trust of the community.  6.1.2  Most internal affairs complaints are straightforward, and most of these routine complaints can be investigated and resolved quickly.  In many cases, an internal affairs investigation will take no more than 45 days from the receipt of the complaint to the filing of disciplinary charges.  The simpler the case, the quicker the inquiry should be completed.  6.1.3  In more complex matters, however, investigators sometimes need additional time to collect evidence, interview witnesses, or take other necessary investigative steps.  In addition, when an officer’s alleged conduct gives rise to a criminal investigation, ordinarily, internal affairs investigators should stay their own inquiry pending the resolution of the criminal matter.  6.1.4  If investigators are unable to complete an internal affairs investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive on or about the 45th day.3  In such situations, the law enforcement executive should seek to identify the reasons for the extended investigation and whether the internal affairs function requires additional resources or oversight to complete the inquiry in a prompt manner.  In addition, the law enforcement executive should ensure compliance with the “45-day rule” established by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, which requires that certain disciplinary charges be filed within 45 days of the date the person filing the charge obtained “sufficient information” to do so.  6.1.5  Investigators are required to provide further notice to the law enforcement executive every additional 45 days that the internal affairs investigation remains open (i.e., on or about the 90th, 135th, and 180th days from the receipt of the complaint), and the law enforcement executive should exercise increasing scrutiny of the investigators’ work the longer the case remains open.  The purpose of this notice is to facilitate prompt resolution of internal affairs investigations, not to create 3 an impediment to discipline in cases that take longer to resolve.  24  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] See Silva, N.J. Super. at 559 (holding lower court’s division of counsel fee demand by number of counts for relief alleged improper).  [...]’s fee award is not “inconsistent” with this Court’s prior directives.  (Db34)  As explained by [...], this Court did not, as the --- 26  The assertion that [...] “did not engage in the required granular analysis of time entries or specific projects” (Db39) is demonstrably false.  [...] assert, hold that “there was no common core of operative facts” between [...]’s RICO and non-RICO claims (Db37):
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE NOT PREEMPTED  Plaintiff’s [...] claim is not preempted by her LAD claims.  The claims would only be preempted if identical to the LAD claim.  Common law claims arising out of the same facts are not preempted when they seek to vindicate interests independent of those protected by the LAD.  Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 345 N.J. Super. 78, 90 (App. Div. 2001).  The [...] claims are based on the common law claims of violation of public policy and her LAD claims are based on discrimination.  These legal theories are aimed at vindicating different interests.  CONCLUSION
[brief] . . .” (emphasis added).  Defining unlicensed activity as a consumer lender as a fourth-degree crime is consistent with the legislative intent of the NJCFLA, a remedial consumer protection statute designed to combat fraud, usury, and other criminal and predatory behavior in the consumer credit industry in New Jersey.  Remedial consumer protection statutes like the NJCFLA are enacted to address holes in contemporaneously existing law.
[directive] Jeśli przyznaje się Pan(i) do takiego zarzutu, minimalny obowiązkowy okres bez prawa do a. ubiegania się o zwolnienie warunkowe wynosi miesięcy (należy wpisać lat i liczbę lat i miesięcy), a maksymalny obowiązkowy okres bez prawa do ubiegania się o miesięcy (należy wpisać liczbę lat i zwolnienie warunkowe wynosi lat i miesięcy); okres ten może zostać pracę lub o minimalną nie skrócony za dobre sprawowanie, ilość dni naliczanych dodatkowo za każdy miesiąc pozbawienia wolności.  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole ineligibility is years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.  Jeśli przyznaje się Pan(i) do tego rodzaju zarzutu, minimalny obowiązkowy wydłużony okres b. miesięcy (należy wpisać liczbę lat i miesięcy), a maksymalny wynosi lat i obowiązkowy wydłużony okres może wynieść miesięcy (należy wpisać lat i liczbę lat i miesięcy).  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory extended term can be years and months (fill in the number of years/months).
[brief] The parties’ mutual assent to arbitrate “any and all disputes, claims, and controversies” between [...], [...], and [...]’s “client or customer” [...], are clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably delineated for [...] in the parties’ Agreement.  These express acknowledgments located immediately above [...]’s signature affirmed that she understood she was waiving the right to have any statutory discrimination or retaliation claims be determined by a court or jury, and that she was given an opportunity to review the Mutual Arbitration Agreement with her own attorney.
[brief] Additionally, one way a plaintiff may demonstrate causation is by citing to the temporal proximity between an employee’s [adverse employment action] and his or her protected activity.  Schlichtig v. Inacom Corp., 271 F. Supp. 2d 597, 612 (D.N.J. 2003).  However, Plaintiff does not need to rely upon temporal proximity as a means of demonstrating causation for his CEPA retaliation claim.  “It is important to emphasize that it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case, and temporal proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis from which an inference can be drawn.
[brief] The affirmative obligation to discover and eliminate any potentially dangerous conditions on the premises applies not only to the interior of a store but also to the means of egress and ingress provided for the use of invitees.  *Ivins v. Town Tavern*, 335 N.J. Super. 188, 194 (App. Div. 2000).  As our Supreme Court explained, “[f]or the protection of its patrons, every commercial establishment must maintain its premises, including means of ingress and egress, in reasonably safe condition. ”  *Krug v. Wanner*, 28 N.J. 174, 179 (1958).  In the case at bar, the Trial Court apparently found that the duty the defendants owed the plaintiff was limited to providing a warning about dangerous conditions on the property and was relieved of that duty because it found that the dangerous condition created by the raised barricade foot was open and obvious as a matter of law.  (Pa47-Pa48; 1T11:20-13:18).  However, while duty owed to a social guest/licensee is to provide a warning of dangerous conditions of which the owner has actual knowledge and the guest is unaware, a duty of reasonable care “to guard against any dangerous condition” on the property that the owner knows about or should have discovered is owed to an invitee.  *Hopkins*, 132 N.J. at 434(emphasis added).  It is undeniable that the plaintiff was not a mere licensee while at the [...] store but rather held the status of a business invitee.
[brief] .................................................................................. 210a-217a  December 30, 2021  Certification of [...], Esq. in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Quash Third-Party Subpoenas and Plaintiff’s July 25, 2022 Arbitration Statement, Dkt. No. [...] (Exhibit D to [...] Cert.) .................................................................................. 218a-231a Sullivan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 94-5016, 1997, U.S. Dist., Unpub., LEXIS 2503 (D. N.J. Feb. 28, 1997) (Exhibit E to [...] Cert.) .................................................................................. 232a-242a Certification of Service of Defendant’s Opposition to Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 23, 2023 ......................... 243a Plaintiff’s Reply Letter Brief in Response to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 28, 2023 ......................... 244a-251a Plaintiff’s Reply Certification of [...], Esq. (“Ricci Reply Cert.”) in Response to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 28, 2023 ........................................... 252a-254a Complaint in [...] v. [...], Dkt. No. [...], filed March 7, 2016, (Exhibit 1 to Ricci Reply Cert.) ............................................................. 255a-262a Defendant’s Offer of Judgment for $6,000.00 in [...] v. [...], Dkt. No. [...], filed October 7, 2016 (Exhibit 2 to Ricci Reply Cert.) .................................................. 263a-266a Plaintiff’s June 3, 2021 Frivolous Litigation Letter in response to Defendant’s March 28, 2021 Offer of Judgment for $11,000.00 in the within matter (Exhibit 3 to Ricci Reply Cert.) .................................................. 267a-269a Plaintiff’s counsel’s settlement offer sent to Defendant’s counsel via e-mail on July 6, 2021 (Exhibit 4 to Ricci Reply Cert.) .................................................. 270a-271a Plaintiff’s counsel’s e-mail exchange with Defendant’s counsel from July 7 through 17, 2021, regarding further settlement negotiations and appointment of a mediator (Exhibit 5 to Ricci Reply Cert.)
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...], Defendant/Respondent.  )  SUPERIOR COURT OF NJ )  APPELLATE DIVISION )  DOCKET NO. [...] )  SUPERIOR COURT OF NJ )  LAW  DIVISION-CRIMINAL PART )  BERGEN COUNTY )  Indictment No. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION SAT BELOW: HON.  [...], J.S.C. DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT’S BRIEF AND APPENDIX [...]  A Professional Corporation [...] P.O. Box 3010  [...] [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent ON THE BRIEF: [...], ESQ.  (Attorney Id. No. 003322007)
[directive] It is expected, however, that this authority to reissue an expired plea offer will be used sparingly, and in order to ensure statewide uniformity in the application of this form of prosecutorial discretion, the decision to reinstate an expired plea offer or to “turn back the clock” under the graduated plea system must be approved by a supervisor designated by the county prosecutor or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, as noted in Section 4.8, once a pretrial hearing involving the testimony of witnesses is convened to decide a pretrial motion (such as a motion to suppress evidence under R. 3:5-7), the prosecutor shall be required to prepare and tender a final post-indictment offer, subject only to the provisions of Section 3.10 (requiring a conditional plea involving multiple co-defendants to be “frozen” when a defendant indicates a willingness to accept the plea but is precluded from effectuating the plea because of a co-defendant’s refusal to plead guilty).  While a prosecutor in these circumstances retains the discretion to modify a “final” plea offer, see Section 4.9, any such plea offer must Page 32 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) be calculated and determined applying the applicable range of authorized dispositions in the appropriate Table for a final post-indictment offer.
[brief] E.  The Commission Properly Considered [...]’s Complete Disciplinary History Including All Reprimands And Counseling And It Was Not Barred From Doing So By Union Contract.  Although not included in her legal argument, in the fact section of her brief, [...] asserts that “every entry in the discipline history summary attached to [...]’ Certification should have either never been included in Appellant's personnel file, or removed from Appellant's file years ago” under the collective negotiations agreement between her union and the [...].  Ab10 (citing AA185-87).  She argues that the Commission was barred from considering her complete employment history material.  But the Commission correctly rejected such argument and this Court must affirm.  N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7(a)(1) and N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1(a)(9) permit the Commission to remove the name of a candidate from an eligible list for various reasons, including “a prior employment history which relates adversely to the title”.
[brief] In this matter, [...]’s policyholders were already paying higher premiums due to prior rate increases the Department approved in 2016 and 2017.  If the 2020 premium rate increases were approved, [...]’s policyholders would see their premiums jump from $2,765 to $6,691 for one block of policies and from $2,200 to $5,831 for another block.  Rate increases of that magnitude are higher than any of the Department’s prior approvals and risk pushing the policyholders out of the market, thereby leaving remaining policyholders to face even larger increases.  Any rational person would conclude that imposing either a 142% or a 165% single year premium rate increase on our older population is excessive – that is just common sense.  As the ALJ and the Commissioner found, there was no need to promulgate separate rules to define the term excessive.  Even [...]’s own expert witness testified at the hearing that whether a rate is excessive is based on actuarial standards accepted in the industry that are “spelled out pretty well” within the actuarial standards of practice (“ASOPs”).  [...] tries to dismiss the standards accepted in the ASOPs as “actuarial jargon” yet relied on those standards to secure rate increases in 2016 and 2017.  Therefore, [...]’s arguments that it has been denied due process are unsupported.  The Department, the ALJ, and the Commissioner got it right.
[directive] The property stolen is a person’s benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the person’s health care and the amount involved is less than $75,000.00; (i)  The property stolen is any real or personal property related to, necessary for, or deprived from research, regardless of value, including, but not limited to, any sample, specimens and components thereof, research subject, including any warm-blooded or cold-blooded animals being used for research or intended for use in research, supplies, records, data or test other type of information related to research; (j)
[brief] There is No Evidence of Harm to the Public Interest.  Despite Plaintiff’s argument in the proceedings below, there is no irreparable harm to people in need of affordable housing posed by this case.  This scenario would be different if [...] sought to condemn land that already contained an affordable housing development, and such property was at risk of being destroyed or substantially impaired.  See Waste Mgmt. 433 N.J. Super. at 454.  However, there is no harm in the instant case where the Property is stagnant, vacant and blighted.  Moreover, the court below erred by failing to consider [...]’s public interest in redeveloping blighted areas, improving the quality of life for its residents and spurring business opportunity and job growth.  A municipality acts within the public interest when it establishes a redevelopment plan that is balanced and integrated for the benefit of its residents and addresses the needs of that particular area.
[brief] Defendant relies on the unpublished *Rabinowitz* (Da218) decision.  *Rabinowitz* likened the FDCPA to a private claim under the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  But the two statues are distinguishable.  The CFA only permits claims by a plaintiff with an “ascertainable loss. ”  *Weinberg v. Sprint Corp.*, 173 N.J. 233 (2002).  The FDCPA has no similar requirement.  *Rabinowitz* also presumed the FDCPA is primarily policed by federal agencies but, as discussed above, Congress chose to incentivize private enforcement as the principal means for enforcing compliance.  **POINT II.
[brief] 6  Affirmation; affirmed.  See "Oath; sworn," infra, this section.  7  Assessor.  The word "assessor," when used in relation to the assess- 8 ment of taxes or water rents or other public assessments, includes all officers, 9 boards or commissions charged with the duty of making such assessments, 10 unless a particular officer, board or commission is specified.
[brief] Much of the hearing before [...] revolved around whether [...]’s representation of [...] in the divorce case was a conflict of interest under ethics rules -- whether the firm had previously represented both parties when it was retained to provide “financial advice” in January 2013.  We submit that the answer does not matter.  Actual conflict or not, the actions that [...] took reek of unfairness to the less-monied spouse and illustrate a divorce process that our courts should not condone.
[directive] Attorney General [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  For practical reasons, prosecutors traditionally have made accommodations to defendants in the form of reducing the defendant’s penal exposure where there is a legitimate question whether the State will be able to prove its case to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is true even in cases for which the Legislature has prescribed a minimum term of imprisonment upon conviction.  See, for example, the Supreme Court’s April 27, 1981 Plea Bargaining Memorandum (explaining when a court may refrain from imposing a mandatory sentence under the Graves’ Act and permitting a negotiated waiver of such mandatory sentence where, “the prosecutor represents on the record that there is insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, or that the possibility of acquittal is so great that dismissal is warranted in the interests of justice”).
[directive] If decision is made.  acomplaint-warrant is coYnplaint-warrant versus complaint-summons by officer, the risk-assessment process will be completed other judicial judge or by a approved for jail.  defendant is detained up to 48 hours at the county program while the pretrial services the "PSA" "automated pretrial risk the term assessment" and 4 of this Directive, Section Throughout program risk-assessment process done by a computer pretrial p~eliminar°y refers to the generally before a defendant is transported county ir~_itiated by police to a AOC and the administered by additional reviewed and may be modified based on will be assessment results the jail, where other program.
[brief] J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count 10); robbery, first-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count 11); conspiracy, second-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (Count 12); theft by unlawful taking, third-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a (Count 13); unlawful possession of a weapon, third-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count 14); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count 15); \(^1\)Co-defendants [...] and [...] were also charged in this indictment as co-conspirators, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2.  Da1-6.  robbery, first-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count 16); conspiracy, second-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A.  2C:5-2 (Count 17); theft by unlawful taking, third-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a (Count 18); unlawful possession of a weapon, third-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count 19); and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count 20).  Da1-6.  On November 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 30, and December 1, 2015, defendant appeared with counsel before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a petit jury for trial.
[brief] Such amendment violated R: 3-7-4 because an amendment that relates to the substance or essence of an offense cannot be amended.  It is furthered asserted that [...] can make a plausible showing that the amendment prejudiced him and would have made a difference in the outcome had [...] objected.  The indictment never alleged defendant [...] went into any stores and pointed any weapons.  The State conveyed a 10 year offer.  (Da 54)  Defendant's penal exposure would've ranged of 5-10 years.  And it would not have subjected [...] to a mandatory life without parole sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a).  [...]'s failure to object constituted a prime facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Strickland's two-prong test and/or Cronic/Davis per se analyses and violated Rule 1:7-2.  This matter should be remanded to the trial Court for resentencing to second degree robbery.  (B)
[directive] This approach will enable officers to transmit (e.g., to the prosecuting agency only those pages that are required to be transmitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section, and will also assist the prosecuting agency in distinguishing and separating notations that must be provided in discovery from non-discoverable material.  The [...] and the [...], in consultation with the [...], shall develop and make available training materials concerning effective note- taking techniques in furtherance of this Directive.  C.  SCOPE, EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
[brief] The court also properly exercised its discretion in finding aggravating factor six and not finding mitigating factor seven.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) refers not only to a defendant’s “prior criminal record” but also to “the seriousness of the offenses of which defendant has been convicted. ”  The definition of “offense” under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k) includes “a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense .  . . .”  See State v. Ross, 335 N.J. Super. 536, 542 (App. Div. 2000) (finding that “four disorderly persons convictions” contributed to application of aggravating factor six).  Municipal court convictions may also be a basis for rejecting mitigating factor seven.  See State v. Buckner, 437 N.J. Super. 8, 38 (App. Div. 2014) (holding that a “long history of convictions for disorderly persons” offenses was properly considered).  Thus, the court properly considered defendant’s municipal court record when finding aggravating factor six and rejecting mitigating factor seven.\footnote{Further, defendant’s prior municipal record contains multiple simple assaults, thus establishing that “assaultive conduct” is not new to defendant.  Even if, as defendant argues, the judge double-counted defendant’s current conviction for purposes of aggravating factor six, there is sufficient support in the record to accord that factor “moderate weight,” as the judge did, given defendant’s lengthy record in municipal court.  And even without aggravating factor six, imposition of the base four-year term lies at the middle of the sentencing range, which remains proper due to the factual record in this case.}