[brief] Contract impairment claims brought under either constitutional provision entail an analysis that first examines whether a change in state law results in the substantial impairment of a contractual relationship and, if so, then reviews whether the impairment nevertheless is "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."  *Berg*, 225 N.J. at 259, citing *U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey*, 431 U.S. 1, 25, 97 S. Ct. 1505, 1519 (1977); see also *Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass'n*, 215 N.J. 522, 546–47 (2013) (expressing same).  The first step in that analysis involves three inquiries: (1) whether a contractual right exists in the first instance; (2) whether a change in the law impairs that right; and (3) whether the defined impairment is substantial.  *Berg*, supra.  When it comes to times of emergency, the government is accorded more constitutional flexibility when taking steps to cope with that emergency:  Emergency conditions do not create new powers nor do they permit the government to transgress specific constitutional prohibitions, but they may present occasions for the appropriate exercise of powers which would otherwise remain dormant, and they justify flexible applications of constitutional restrictions in order to facilitate rather than obstruct governmental steps necessary to cope with the emergency.  (Emphasis supplied.)  Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 566 (1975) (citing Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).  In Hutton Park, the Supreme Court recognized that in times of "great public exigency," like "periods of grave economic disturbance," certain measures, (e.g., temporarily requiring landlords to keep their rents at lower-than-market rates), are necessary because the emergency requires all individuals "to make sacrifices for the common weal."  68 N.J. at 566-67.  Applying those principles to this case, it is clear that [...] has presented no evidence or legal support — beyond its own unsubstantiated assertions about the Contracts Clause and "no show contracts" — to demonstrate that (i) the presumption of validity does not apply to the COVID Statute, (ii) the Statute's repugnancy to the Constitution is "clear beyond reasonable doubt," and (iii) no set of circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid.  Furthermore, the record is clear that the COVID Statute was passed during a global pandemic, which caused a "grave economic disturbance."  Thus, the Statute, which expressly applies only when there is a declared public-health emergency, was a "necessary step to cope with an emergency," and the Legislature should be accorded some modicum of flexibility (as noted in Hutton Park) to deal with that emergency.  [...], however, presents its argument in a purposely misleading fashion.  It suggests that the Statute will forever deprive school districts of their ability to enter into service contracts without taking into account the broader context within which the COVID Statute was enacted – to help people during a global pandemic and economic crisis.  In sum, [...] is unable to satisfy its burden to demonstrate that the Statute is unconstitutional, particularly in light of the fact that the Statute has a strong presumption of validity and was passed as a way to cope with a global health and economic emergency.  Accordingly, [...]’s constitutional argument must be rejected.