ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] cannot in good faith claim ignorance of Appellants’ claim to both possession and title.  _I.E.’s, LLC v. Simmons_ highlighted the purchaser’s lack of possession in that case:  Further, and most significantly, the bona fide purchaser for value took title to the property knowing that the defendant family in the tax sale foreclosure action was still in possession of the premises.  New Jersey law has long recognized that a bona fide purchaser for value of real estate who purchases the property knowing others are in possession of the property has a duty to make reasonable and diligent inquiry of the rights to the property by those in possession.  _I.E.’s, LLC v. Simmons_, 392 N.J. Super at 534-535, citing _Hinners v. Banville_, 114 N.J.Eq. 348, 168 A. 618 (E. & A.1933).  _Hinners_ was a mortgage foreclosure case where owners were served by publication.  The property was sold at a sheriff's sale and then purportedly sold to a bona fide purchaser for value.  The sale to the bona fide purchaser for value was set aside since the family was in possession of the property, and the court held that the bona fide purchaser for value had a duty to make a reasonable investigation of the rights of the party in possession.  Id. at 356-57.  See also, Michalski v. U.S., 49 N.J.Super. 104, 108-09 (Ch.Div.1958).  Here, while Appellants were technically not residing in the Property, they were in fact in possession, having just obtained the Site Plan Approval from the [...], having paid real property taxes through and including the third quarter of 2021, and having reasonably maintained the Property in anticipation of their own intended renovation in light of the authorized conversion of use.  These indications of Appellants’ adverse interest, while not specifically ascertainable from a review of the docket report of the case, should nonetheless be attributed to [...] based upon its experience, the short proximity of time between the foreclosure and its acquisition of the quitclaim deed, and the concurrent representation of the [...].  [...] and [...] also have relevance to [...]’s good faith purchaser defense, establishing the fairness of “pipeline retroactivity” to the equitable issues associated with reversing a tax title that is an unconstitutional forfeiture of equity.  Appellants’ equity forfeiture was plainly apparent to [...].  Under I.E.’s Corp. v. Simmons, [...]’s constitutional analysis and the “pipeline retroactivity” endorsed by [...] warrant attribution of knowledge of the constitutional infirmity of the foreclosure to [...].
[brief] Da11-12.  After oral argument, [...] authored the opinion on behalf of the unanimous Appellate Division panel and distilled six (6) discrete holdings therefrom, addressing not only the issues concerning the presence of a third-party observer and/or recording device, but also the presence of an interpreter:  There shall be no judicially imposed entitlements or prohibitions with respect to TPO or recordings of R.4:19 examinations;  It shall be the Plaintiff’s burden to justify any insistence on a TPO or recording of R.4:19 examinations if same is not permitted by the examiner or consented by defense counsel;
[brief] 2  National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Public Service Com'n of State of N.Y., 894 F.2d 571 (2d. Cir. 1990)........................................  21  NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2001).........................................  22 North Bayview, LLC v. NJ DEP, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 782 (Dec. 3, 2007).......................  14, 15 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. at 300.................................................................. 19, 21 Statutes, Cases and Rules: 15 U.S.C. §717 et seq.  ................................................................. 4  15 U.S.C. 717r(a)...........................................................................  18  15 U.S.C. 717r(b), (d)(1)...............................................................  17  15 U.S.C. 717f(c)(1)(A)................................................................. 19  42 U.S.C. 4321-4370h.................................................................  6  49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. ..............................................................  19 49 U.S.C. 60104(c) et seq.  .........................................................  19 N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 et seq.  .............................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 13:20-2...........................................................................  12 N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(1) to (9)....................................................  10,13 N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)11..............................................................  9,16 N.J.S.A. 13:20-32.....................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a..................................................................  16 N.J.S.A. 13:20-32b..................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 26:2C-1 et seq. ..........................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 58:10A-6....................................................................  25 N.J.A.C. 7:14A-13.2(a)(2).........................................................  25 N.J.A.C. 7:14A-2.1(a)...............................................................  24 N.J.A.C. 7:14A-2.1(d)...............................................................  25  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] It "is unnecessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court . . . rather 'the mere appearance of bias may require disqualification' so long as the belief of unfairness is 'objectively reasonable.'"  *Chandok v. Chandok*, 406 N.J. Super. 595, 603-04, 968 A.2d 1196 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting *Panitch*, 339 N.J. Super. at 67).  In *Caperton v. Massey Coal Co.*, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009), the Supreme Court of the United States adopts this objective standard that do not require proof of actual bias. \textsuperscript{43}  If no motion for judge’s disqualification was made to the trial judge, and the disqualification claim is made for the first time on appeal, the appellate court shall "consider [the] argument within the rubric of the plain error doctrine."  \textit{State v. Medina}, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 129, 793 A.2d 68 (App. Div. 2002). \textsuperscript{44}  On June 18, 2018, trial Judge [...] on the record dedicated the court proceeding to the memory of the United States of American Soldiers who were of the Caucasian race and were killed in combat on June 15, 1968 and June 18:1968 in Vietnam by Asian soldiers.
[brief] This was due to information that the defendants did not produce in discovery and that Plaintiffs were unable to obtain via subpoenas served upon financial institutions.  (21T 118:12 to 119:25).  The difficulty that [...] encountered was compounded by the fact that the defendants insisted that Plaintiffs could only review financial records for the period from 2008 to 2015.  (23T 36:17 to 37:19).  Despite the defendants’ obstruction, [...] was still able to reach the conclusions about which he testified to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, including that the defendants diverted millions of dollars in company funds for their own benefit and to the Plaintiffs’ detriment, and that harm was both definite and quantifiable.  (Da6731-32; 19T 107:24 to 108:4).  [...] testified about inconsistencies he found in the defendants’ QuickBooks records, and why what he observed in the books of accounts was suspicious.  Most notably, [...] testified that he repeatedly encountered abnormal account structures, conduit accounts, co-mingling of funds, step transactions, fake accounts, and duplicate expenses.  (36T 15:10-22).  Conduit accounts, [...] explained, are generally transitory accounts that accumulate certain activities or funds, which are then disbursed out of the account elsewhere.  (20T 74:23 to 75:19).  He identified several such accounts in his report and examinations.  (E.g., 20T 69:15 to 73:3; 20T 109:25 to 113:22; 114:20-24; 116:4 to 117:14; 21T 76:17 to 83:2).  [...] also noted abnormal structuring and transaction history in company accounts.  He concluded that [...] and the defendant entities employed a series of “step transactions” or structured transactions to avoid detection.
[brief] Id; Bergen County PBA Loc. 134 v. Donovan, 436 N.J. Super. at 197.  Here, it is beyond cavil that Appellant’s expansive reading of prohibited third-party disclosures, which in her view includes letter vendors and other service operators, is at odds with the rest of the FDCPA statutory scheme which regulates the use of telegrams for permitted use under law.  As such, Appellant’s “plain” reading of the statue must be set aside in favor of an interpretation which renders the FDCPA internally consistent and in line with Congressional intent and legislative history.  See Mynster, at 480; Donovan, at 197.  In fact, several courts have noted this inherent conflict in the statutory scheme in rejecting Appellant’s theory that Congress intended § 1692c(b) to prohibit transmitting information to a service provider, like a letter vendor.
[brief] First, [...] did not “wholly ignore” the RETA provision at N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(b).  Instead, [...] cited the provision and disposed of it in one sentence at Db 33:  And consistent with the RETA at N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(b), each plaintiff here had a three-day attorney review period and a seven-day cancellation period to review the contents of the Public Offering Statement before the contract became legally binding and fully executed.  (Da 204, ¶ 23 and Da 205, ¶ 24).  Plaintiff/Respondents cite the entirety of N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(b) at Pb 36 which states:  The Court, in addition to the remedies provided in this Act, may award any other relief appropriate under the circumstances, including, in the Court’s discretion, restitution of all monies paid and, where a developer has failed to provide the purchaser a copy of the current Public Offering Statement approved by the Commission prior to execution on the contractor agreement, rescission of a contract.  (emphasis added).  Plaintiff/Respondents argue that terms “prior to execution” of the contract or agreement as stated in N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(b) and as cited above, combined with N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.59(a) which requires the POS to be delivered “at the time of purchase” is the equivalent to the RETA regulation providing that they have an opportunity to review the POS before signing.
[brief] See, Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J. Super. 497, 509 (App. Div. 1978) aff’d o.b. 79 N.J. 547 (1979) (holding that a three-eighths of an inch differential at the point where a roadway met a bridge did not create a substantial risk of injury because highway travelers must expect some uneven surfaces and depressions); see also, Charney v. City of Wildwood, 732 F.Supp.2d 448, 456 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding that a hole “measuring one and one-half inch deep, and one and one-quarter inch wide at its largest point, is the kind of minor defect that does not qualify as a dangerous condition under the Tort Claims Act” and “while it is true that the Polyard case involved a vehicular roadway, and not a pedestrian walkway, the underlying reasoning of that case – that not every defect is actionable, and that some areas of imperfection must be expected – applies to pedestrian walkway surfaces as well”); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 639.  This is because “pedestrians must expect some areas of imperfection on walkway surfaces, and not every defect in a walkway surface is actionable. ”  Polyard, 160 N.J. Super. at 509.  Because travelers should expect them, the risk associated with common defects is deemed not “substantial” as a matter of law.  Ibid.  The trial court properly determined the alleged condition at issue is precisely the sort of “common or usual defect” which courts have consistently found insufficient to impose liability on a public entity under the TCA.
[brief] (14T133-2 to 134-3).  Officers noted that defendant had tattoos of a spider web on his left elbow and dog tags on his right elbow.  (14T129-20 to 130-10).  Officers also noted that as defendant fled the scene, his Atlanta Braves baseball hat fell off of his head.  (14T130-13 to 19).  The baseball hat was subsequently submitted to the [...] for DNA testing, which matched defendant’s DNA profile.  (14T170-19 to 173-19; 14T174-5 to 175-6).  Defendant finally surrendered to law enforcement about three years later, on December 28, 2012, and was taken into custody.  (19T99-8 to 10; 22T3-19 to 22).
[directive] Revised Fonn Promulgated Supplement Directive CN by 12/31/2019 to #01-18, 10079  Defendant's Initials---,--- page 2 of5  Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in [Yes] [No] 6. the court could, confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentence imposed?  7.  Did you enter a plea of guilty to any charges a mandatory period of parole [Yes] [No] that require ineligibility or a mandatory extended term?
[brief] Id. at 435.  Similarly, the court in Allstate v. Lopez, supra, explained:  Significantly, the Legislature did not provide for the arbitration of claims under the Act; nor did it give arbitrators the power to award any of the specified damages under the Act.  The role of arbitration in automobile insurance matters is to provide for the prompt payment of PIP benefits to ensure that people legitimately injured as result of an automobile accident receive reasonable and necessary medical treatment in a prompt and expeditious manner.
[brief] On or about January 28, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a certain written agreement by which Defendant, among other things, agreed to install an in-ground pool at Plaintiff’s Mantoloking vacation property.  [Pa30].  The Agreement, a preprinted consumer contract offered to Plaintiff on a take-it-or-leave it basis, did not specify a start date for the project.  [Pa30].  The Agreement did not specify a completion date for the project.  [Pa31].  Under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, *N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq.*, and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, agreement to construct pool for personal resident is deemed to be a contract for home improvement governed by the provisions of the CFA, according to *N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.1* [Pa31].  Under the terms of *N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(12)(iv)*, it is unlawful for a contractor in a contract for home improvement to fail to specify “[t]he dates or time period on or within which the work is to begin and be completed by the seller. ”  [Pa31].  --- 1  Appellant submits that these orders are immediately appealable based on the binding precedent *Wein v. Morris*, 194 N.J. 364, 377 (2008).
[brief] With respect to the first Rudbart factor, the subject matter of the agreement was a liposuction procedure.  Defendant [...]’s own consent forms indicate that liposuctions carry the risks of grievous bodily injury and death, as tragically occurred here (Da149-50).  Under these grave conditions, Defendant should have exhibited scrupulous care in explaining his prerequisite waiver of the patient’s constitutional right.  As to the second Rudbart factor, there was a gross disparity in the relative bargaining positions of the parties.
[brief] 17 cmt. 2.1 ...............................................................  17  Rule 4:6-2(e) ......................................................... 11,12,15,17 Rule .4:9-1 ..............................................................  17 4:9-1, cmt. 2.1 .....................................................  17 Rule 4:27-1 ..........................................................  13  Rule 4:30A - Single Controversy Doctrine.  ......................... 8,14 4:30A, cmt. 1 .......................................................  14  Other References Cited 30  C.J.S., Equity, §99, pp. 496, 497.  .............................  24  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] I wrote 25 to 30 minutes earlier.  So at 25 minutes or longer, 25 minutes or more, we might have had a better outcome.  We don’t know.  I wrote 25 to 30 minutes.  I can’t give you a better answer than what’s in my report.  (Pa340-Pa341).  [...] then testified that if the baby was born 30 minutes earlier, she would have been normal.  (Pa341).  According to [...], for this baby to have had any chance of a better outcome, she had to have been delivered (i.e. born) by 10:02am (25 minutes earlier than 10:27pm).
[brief] Reply to Counterstatement of facts .................................................. 2  Point One .........................................................................................  3  THE EVIDENCE/TESTIMONY DID NOT SUSTAIN THE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN OF PROOF --- THAT A PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR PARKING AND HEATING PURPOSES WAS INTENDED AND ESTABLISHED BY THE 1963 AGREEMENT.  Point Two ..........................................................................................  13  THE 1972 SCHOOL SITE PLAN APPLICATION/APPROVAL AS A MATTER OF LAW TERMINATED ANY [...] CLAIMED PARKING PERMISSION/EASEMENT ON THE SCHOOL LOT 5.  Conclusion  ..........................................................................................
[brief] ”  L. Pucillo & Sons, Inc. v. New Milford, 73 N.J. 349, 356 (1977).  Thus, the Court cannot examine the bid results, post-bid opening, and assess the severity of the defect based on the impact such mistake had on the results (as Respondents argue).  Doing so would violate the well-established rule set forth by the Supreme Court in *Hillside* and open the door to evils of corruption, fraud and favoritism that the public bidding laws are intended to prevent.
[brief] Pa425.  Saw cutting was the described contracted work awarded by [...] in its Notice of Subcontract Award.  Pa424.  That notice noted that it was the responsibility of the awarding contractor to ensure that subcontractors enroll in any wrap up insurance programs, and that “[n]o hired tier sub may commence work until they are properly enrolled into the Wrap-up program, as evidenced by a Certificate of [Liability] Insurance provided by the Wrap-up Administrator.
[brief] Because defendants' arguments are substantially similar, we consider them together.  [...] argues that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion because "[t]he only similarities between the description of the suspects and the men are their race and gender."  He emphasizes that the officer stopped a car occupied by three Black men based only on a report that two Black men had fled on foot after a nearby robbery.  [...] argues that "there was no description of the suspects other than their race," and that "accept[ing] this meager description as constituting reasonable suspicion" would allow police to have stopped any number of Black men, whether in a car or on foot, within a three-quarter-mile radius of the crime scene.
[brief] ”  D’Agostino v. Appliances Buy Phone, Inc., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 504 (App. Div. 2003) and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 223 (1) (1981) Da16-30.  The Plaintiff’s Brief and Appendix have multiple references to the [...] and the Rulebook.  He knew about the rulebook and that it was close to 400 pages.  He knows “that it changes constantly. ”  By his own admission, before this chess tournament, he played in the defendants’ events.
[directive] As always, the court retains the authority to impose discretionary parole eligibility when circumstances warrant.  Page 3  Section 12 prohibits the sentencing judge from imposing a lesser sentence or shorter parole disqualifier than is provided for under the terms of the agreement.  When Section 12 was passed by the Legislature in 1987, the goal was to encourage plea guilty.4  bargaining and cooperation with law enforcement by providing incentives for pleading  Because these agreements limit judicial power and can lead to very different sentencing outcomes for what are, on paper, similar offenses, Section 12 has been subject to considerable litigation over the past three decades.  In 1992, the State supreme court held that prosecutorial discretion under this section is subject to judicial review for arbitrary and capricious action.  State Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189, 195-96 (1992).  Since then, multiple Attorneys General have issued law v. enforcement directives to prosecutors governing the exercise of Section 12 discretion.  These rules, now known as the guidelines, are named for a 1998 case requiring that the Brimage Attorney General not simply provide guidance on individual cases but also establish rules to ensure uniformity in the application of Section 12 across the State’s 21 counties.  State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1, 23 (1998).  The current version of these rules, known as the “Revised 2010.5 Guidelines” or “Brimage 2,” were drafted in 2004 and updated most recently in Brimage  The Revised Guidelines runs more than 100 pages and focuses on the plea offers Brimage that prosecutors may extend to defendants pursuant to Section 12, with detailed instructions on when certain terms and conditions may be included in an offer.  The guidelines also include a 5- page worksheet that prosecutors use to calculate the length of the sentence to be offered, incorporating information about the defendant’s criminal history as well as aggravating and conduct.6  mitigating factors associated with the offense  The process is far more structured than what is required to negotiate plea agreements for non-drug crimes because it is designed to accomplish a single constitutional imperative: ensuring that prosecutors exercise Section 12 discretion fairly and uniformly.  Commission’s Recommendations Regarding Non-Violent Drug Crimes
[brief] TWO PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE [...] AND [...] IN COUNTS FOUR AND FIVE ARE PROPERLY PLEAD BECAUSE THEY ALLEGE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE [...] AND [...] DUE TO THEIR FAILURE TO HAVE POLICIES IN PLACE  The liability of a public entity under 42 USC §1983 attaches when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury."  Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).  A course of conduct may be considered a custom when the practice of municipal officials, though not authorized by state law, is “so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes law. ”  Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 691; See also Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 2007); See Torres v. Kuzniasz, 936 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (D.N.J. 1996).  A city can be sued “for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels. ”  Monell v Dept of Social Services, 436 US 658, 690-91 (1978).  A “practice of state officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a `custom or usage' with the force of law. ”  Id at 691  In Upchurch v [...], the plaintiff sued the [...] and several defendants for Civil rights and other NJLAD violations.  (Pa).  The Appellate Court affirmed denial of summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor because the [...] stated that it was unaware of the harassment.
[brief] "In general, a landowner has 'a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees against known or reasonably discoverable dangers.'"  Jimenez v. Maisch, 329 N.J. Super. 398, 402 (App. Div. 2000)(quoting Kane v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 278 N.J. Super. 129, 140 (App. Div. 1994), aff'd, 143 N.J. 141 (1996))  In this case, the appellant was simply out for a morning walk, and the respondent [...] owed her a non-delegable duty to have safe access to the sidewalks.