ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Effectively Communicating with All Members of the Public  Effectively communicating to regulated entities and the broader public about civil enforcement actions is particularly important if those enforcement actions are intended not only to provide redress for a single complainant but also to deter similar violations in the future.  When appropriate, public education about enforcement efforts should be tailored to populations whose members are most likely to be subjected to similar violations, including by translating such information into languages other than English and by communicating with non-governmental organizations that may expand the reach of an agency’s message.  Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Disability and Health Promotion, Disability & Health  U.S. State 10 Profile Data for New Jersey (Adults 18+ Years of Age), https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/impacts/new-jersey.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2021).  Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities, 11 Division of Human Development and Disability, Disability and Health Data System (DHDS) Data, https://dhds.cdc.gov/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2021).  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Total Persons 5 Years and over Who Speak a Language Other See 12 than English at Home and Speak English Less than “Very Well,” https://www.lep.gov/sites/lep/files/resources/US_state_LEP_count.ACS_5yr.2014.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2021) (using data from the 2010-2014 5-Year American Community Survey).  7
[directive] The decision to initiate and/or continue a vehicular pursuit requires weighing the need to immediately apprehend the violator against the degree of risk to which the officer and others are exposed as a result of the pursuit.  4.2  Upon the initiation of a pursuit, the pursuing officer shall immediately activate all emergency lights, siren, headlights, motor vehicle recorder (MVR), if equipped, and body worn camera (BWC), if equipped.  4.3  Once the pursuit has been initiated, the primary unit must immediately notify communications and a supervisor, providing as much of the following information as is known: (a) reason for the pursuit; (b) direction of travel and designation and location of the roadway; (c) traffic conditions; (d) presence of pedestrians; (e) identification of the violator’s vehicle (year, make, model, color, vehicle registration number, and other identifying characteristics); (f) information on the identity of the driver, if known; (g) number of occupants; (h) the speed of the pursued vehicle; and (i) other information that may be helpful in deciding whether to terminate the pursuit or in resolving the incident.
[brief] As the court held in Suburban Disposal, such omission is a “minor discrepancy or technical omission that was properly subject of a waiver. ”  Ibid.  D.  The County Has Already Determined that it Will Abide the Trial Court’s Ruling and Award the Anticipated Contract to [...] (3T49-14-23)  The law is well-settled that “appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such presentation is available. ”  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).  Before the trial court, the County never requested a remand back to its Board of Freeholders to exercise its discretion to waive or refuse to waive [...]’s omission of the Notice of Classification.  Rather, the County did just the opposite as it represented that it would abide the trial court’s ruling and award the Anticipated Contract in a manner consistent with the Judgment.  3T49-14-23.  Because the County did not request a remand, no such relief is warranted here.  Moreover, since such request can only be made the County, [...] lacks standing to make such a request on the County’s behalf.  Jackson, 335 N.J. Super. at 231 (“a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of third parties”).
[directive] D.  “Shy Bladder”  Procedure  1.  When a donor initially produces an inadequate amount of urine, the monitor must take the following steps:  a.  Advise the donor to remain on the premises and under the supervision of the test monitor until the monitor is satisfied that the donor cannot produce a specimen.  b.  While the donor is under supervision, allow the donor to drink up to 40 ounces of fluids distributed reasonably over a period of up to three hours in an attempt to induce the production of a specimen.  The monitor shall not direct the donor to ingest more than 40 ounces of fluid.  c.  Under no circumstances, should multiple voids be combined to produce an adequate sample volume.  2.  If the donor remains unable to provide a specimen after a reasonable period of time, the monitor may have the donor examined by a doctor to determine whether the inability to produce a specimen was the result of a medical or physical infirmity or constituted a refusal to cooperate with the drug testing process.
[brief] A Targeted Search of [...]’s and [...]’s Files Is Appropriate  Dated: October 12, 2021  KELLER ROHRBACK  L.L.P.  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  As previously stated, [...]’s concern that Plaintiffs are requesting the wholesale production of [...]’s and [...]’s custodial files distorts Plaintiffs’ request.
[brief] While nobody would say argue the family in in way deserved what happened to them, it is shortsighted to ignore the fact that [...] was begging for help in the time period leading up to the shootings.  (7T:241-1 to 242-7).  Furthermore, on top of the family knowing that [...] was expressing homicidal ideations, his brother left an unsecured assault rifle in the house with a mentally ill child.  (6T:124-24 to 125-10).  A schizophrenia or autism diagnosis required [...] to see a mental health professional.  The Court noted that “defendant was in control of his emotions and thoughts” with no mention of the undiagnosed mental illness and the fact that the State’s own expert stated, “his Autism Spectrum Disorder and the dissociative state into which he entered upon firing the first shot limited [...]’s capacity to fully appreciate the gravity of his offenses on an emotional level. ” (Da458).  The Court’s refusal to acknowledge or substantially downplaying [...]’s mental illness at sentencing is contrary to all the testimony at trial.
[brief] Courts have rejected blanket requests for all documents sent or received between two parties, or all documents sent to or from all of a public agency’s employees.  In Shipyard Associates, L.P. v. [...], A-3794-13T1, 2015 WL 10352982 (App. Div. Sept. 1, 2015) (Da203-209), the Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s holding that OPRA requests that asked for copies of “any and all documents, including but not limited to, correspondence (including e-mails), transcripts, reports, memos, notes and/or minutes of Hoboken employees, Hoboken’s agents, members of Hoboken City Council and others concerning [two ordinances]. ”  Id. at *1.  The Appellate Division also held that similarly-worded OPRA requests in that case for “[c]opies of all documents in the [...]’s Clerk’s office’s files concerning [two ordinances]” and “all correspondence (including e-mails), transcripts, reports, memos, notes, minutes prepared by and received by Hoboken employees, Hoboken’s agents, members of Hoboken City Council concerning [two ordinances]” were not sufficiently specific.  Id.  “Calling for the custodian to research and compile a database of responsive records within a topic, prior to determining what records were exempted or could be redacted was overbroad.
[brief] (Pa658-Pa659).  [...] responded that [...] had previously given approval.  (Pa659).  Also, on February 3, 2015, [...] told Dillon that he could not make his scheduled presentation at the American Waterworks Association Annual Conference on Thursday, March 19, 2015 despite being told earlier by Fell that he could make the presentation on his own time and Dillon’s presentation had already been placed on the agenda.  Finally, also on February 3, 2015, [...] requested that the [...] initiate disciplinary action against Dillon for “[t]wo incidents at the Safe Drinking Water Regulatory Update seminar in New Brunswick” in 2014 at Rutgers University (Pa658-Pa659).
[brief] Medici, supra at 20-21 (Emphasis added).  The Board quite properly was not persuaded by [...] second argument that it should give precedential value to the Board’s Foxdale decision in Plaintiffs’ height variance application because of the significant factual differences between the Foxdale application and the Plaintiffs’ project.  Moreover, in light of the above-quoted language from Medici, the Board correctly perceived the inaction of the governing body with regard to changing the SM Zone District height limitation following the Board’s Foxdale approval to be a policy choice by the governing body, and a deliberate statement of disfavor for the aspect of the Foxdale decision relied upon by [...].
[brief] There is also no proof that [...] actually shopped for [...] on the day of the incident.  However, to circumvent these facts and cloud the law, Plaintiff again attempts to argue that [...]’s liability can be imposed on [...] under the doctrine of apparent authority.  *Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose*, 134 N.J. 326, 337-38 (1993).  Yet the fatal flaw in this analysis is that Plaintiff never “relied” on [...] being an alleged employee of [...] and that this reliance, in turn, somehow caused Plaintiff’s injury.  Without showing actual reliance by Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot meet her requisite burden of proof needed to establish the doctrine of apparent authority.  Reliance is an essential element to proving apparent authority.  *Wilzig v. Sisselman*, 209 N.J. Super. 25, 36 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 417 (1986).  However, reliance is a legal term of art, and requires more than [...] completing an incident form and taking a picture of the card and Plaintiff using this form as a basis for filing suit against [...].
[brief] (4/17/23 Transcript @T28).  Plaintiff’s representative stated that he had not seen any traffic study which specifically examined the effect of the distance of a billboard from an intersection as a safety factor.  (4/17/23 Transcript @T29:1-T29:7; T31-32).  The Board noted that the peculiarity of the particular site and intersection at issue is that there are six commercial driveways in this intersection.
[brief] With regard to the first question, the Legislature did not expressly address retroactive application of the COVID Statute, but the context of its passage speaks volumes; it was enacted on April 14, 2020, as the reality of the pandemic’s impact on society, and that it was not going to go away quickly, was first becoming apparent.  It was enacted to address an acute, unanticipated and ongoing problem of significant magnitude.  The Statute was given “immediate” effect on April 14, 2020, at a time when the first wave of the coronavirus was at its peak in New Jersey, and after the Governor had ordered, just three weeks earlier, that all schools in the State remain closed.  Indeed, retroactive application to when the schools were closed is “necessary to make the statute workable” and “give it the most sensible interpretation. ”  There can be no reasonable dispute that the “most sensible” way to interpret the COVID Statute is to have it apply retroactive to the time when schools actually closed due to a health emergency.  Additionally, the reasonable expectations of the affected parties call for the COVID Statute’s retroactive application.  While it applies to health-related school closures of three days or more, at the time of its passage, the State was already four weeks into the mandatory closure of schools, for the first time in anyone’s memory.  Whether there would be another instance of a health-related school closure of three days or longer was unknown; it would thus be within the expectation of affected contractors that the COVID Statute would be retroactively applied to the only historic instance of its applicability.  With regard to the second question, applying the COVID Statute to the time when [...] schools closed nineteen days earlier does not interfere with [...]’s vested rights, nor does it result in a manifest injustice.  There is no injustice in ensuring that contractors be paid starting at the time when a health-related closure occurred, rather than two weeks later.  The clear intent of the COVID Statute is that there be no break in payment on school contracts, so that contractors and their employees continue to receive their regular income.  In sum, all factors point to the conclusion that the COVID Statute should apply retroactive to the date when [...] closed its schools because of the declared public health emergency and state of emergency in New Jersey, and the effective date of a statute passed in the throes of an unanticipated public health emergency should not create a window during which the outcome decreed by the Legislature should not be had.
[brief] Here, the Judge of Compensation summarily found that the decedent was an essential employee without any affidavit from any individual with personal knowledge of any pertinent facts or any other competent evidence.  Respondent was denied due process and its right to a full hearing, the right to call witnesses, and the right to cross-examine witnesses.  Assuming that the Judge of Compensation could take judicial notice of the documents that petitioner submitted, those documents were not dispositive and did not eliminate the existence of genuine issues of material fact.  The documentation that petitioner and the Judge of Compensation relied upon were only advisory.  They were not dispositive just because petitioner argued that they were dispositive (Pb12-13), particularly in the absence of any affidavit of any individual from the Department of Education, the Department of Health, the Teachers Union, or anyone at all in any official capacity to state that those documents are dispositive on the issue of whether teachers in general or this decedent are essential workers.  Furthermore, as set forth in respondent's companion appeal, [...] v. [...], Docket Number [...], the Judge of Compensation considered information that she obtained from her service in the New Jersey State Assembly to reach the conclusion that this decedent as all teachers are to be considered essential employees.
[brief] Id. at 458-459.  In deciding whether a judgment of acquittal is warranted, the court "is not concerned with the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the State," State v. Zembreski, 445 N.J. Super. 412, 431 (App. Div. 2016), citing State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 342 (App.Div.1974), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72 (1975), and "no consideration may be given to any evidence or inferences from the defendant's case."  State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967).  An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial judge.  State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 593-94 (2014).  An appellate court must “determine whether, based on the entirety of the evidence and after giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony and all the favorable inferences drawn from that testimony, a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  Ibid.  (citing State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 558-59 (1967)).  The reviewing court "must consider only the existence of such evidence, not its 'worth, nature, or extent.'"  State v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447, 453 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 342 (App. Div. 1974)).  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, a person is guilty of Robbery: a.
[brief] In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 250 N.J. 365, 368 (2022).  The Court remanded the case to us "to permit appellants to file an amended Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement that names [...] as an interested party pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d)."  Ibid.  [...] has since participated as a party "defendant" in this appeal.  word 'routine' not only modifies 'maintenance and operations' but also 'upgrade.'"  We agree with appellants the language of Exemption 11 and its statutory context, as well as the history of the Highlands Act, all point to the Legislature having intended to exempt only routine upgrades to a public utility's lines, rights of way or systems in the Preservation Area from the strictures of the statute.  [...], however, only ever contended before the agency that its proposed new compressor station in the Preservation Area is an "upgrade" to its pipeline system.  And although counsel for the [...] asserted at oral argument the project could qualify as a "routine upgrade" entitling [...] to a HAD under Exemption 11, there is nothing in the agency record to indicate the Department ever considered the question, much less decided it.  See In re Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 107 N.J. 440, 460 (App. Div. 1987) (noting "[t]he grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that the action was based" (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943))).  We thus vacate the HAD and remand for the [...] to consider whether [...]'s proposed compressor station qualifies as a "routine upgrade" to its pipeline system, entitling it to a HAD under our construction of the language of Exemption 11.
[brief] **[...]’s policies regarding preservation, production, and destruction of evidence plainly demonstrate that the [...] blatantly violated its policies in this case; trial counsel’s failure to obtain them deprived the defense of information essential to establishing [...]’s bad faith. **  Much of the pretrial spoliation hearing focused on [...]’s retention protocols and procedures.  [...] did not know of a policy on evidence retention and thought she could destroy the footage she didn’t deem “evidentiary,” without providing it to the defense.  [...] testified there was a written policy on destruction of evidence, thought an assistant prosecutor would need to review and approve destruction of materials, and [...] policies were sent and available to every staff member.  (5T93-18 to 94-15, 96-21 to 99-9, 105-3 to 107-3, 150-18 to 152-17)  The judge repeatedly asked for [...]’s policies on preservation, production, and destruction of evidence.  (E.g., 5T105-13 to 106-4, 106-17 to 18, 106-24 to 107-2, 107-16, 108-7 to 13, 11-21 to 25, 150-18 to 24, 151-4 to 6, 151-20 to 22)  The prosecutor deferred, saying, “I don’t think it’s going to come down to somebody authorizing allegations[sic] of evidence or property in the middle of an investigation.  I don’t think that there is such a procedure. ”  (5T107-20 to 108-2, 109-21 to 110-3)  Policies were never provided.  In its final analysis, the court ruled [...]’s conduct inexcusably caused the destruction of a large amount of evidence material to the defense, and this prejudiced [...].
[brief] First, [...]’s testimony presented his field as objective and infallible, which is not true.  Not only did he directly state that it was “objective,” but by claiming that examiners never disagree with each other, he was implying that no mistakes are ever made.  These inaccurate statements suggested that there was no risk of error in his opinion that [...]’s fingerprint was a “match” to the fingerprint on the wine chiller.  Fingerprint examination is a subjective discipline.
[brief] The New Jersey Tort Claims Act became effective on July 1, 1972, and applies to all such claims related to injuries sustained after its effective date.  Barney's Furniture Warehouse v. Newark, 62 N.J. 456, 470 (1973).  Significantly, the Act supersedes all prior common law causes of action for the negligence of public entities in the State of New Jersey.  Tower Marine, Inc. v. New Brunswick, 175 N.J. Super. 526, 531 (Ch. Div. 1980).  The former governmental-proprietary distinction, for example, was eliminated under the Act.  Tower Marine, Inc. v. New Brunswick, 175 N.J. Super. at 533.  The Legislative Declaration codified in N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 provides in pertinent part the following:  On the other hand the Legislature recognizes that while a private entrepreneur may readily be held liable for negligence within the chosen ambit of his activity, the area within which government has the power to act for the public good is almost without limit and therefore government should not have the duty to do everything that might be done.  Consequently, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of this State that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of this act, and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established herein.  All of the provisions of this act should be construed with a view to carrying out the above legislative declaration.  Our Supreme Court has recognized, and in fact emphasized, that the approach of the Act is to broadly limit public entity liability.
[brief] Moreover, the court's explanation as to why defendants were in custody served to dispel any belief in the minds of the jurors that defendants were held because they were dangerous or had criminal or violent propensities.  Second, the limiting instruction was issued at defense counsel's urging and he never objected to the instruction as given.  Accordingly, we find no error, much less plain error, in the trial court's thorough explanation of (1) the unusual circumstances and (2) the application of law to that unique situation.
[brief] Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until November 30, 2022, which is 226 days after adoption of Ordinance 13-2022.  (Compare Pa1-Pa10 with Pa90-Pa91).  It is also 47 days after publication of the notice of the first JLUB hearing on the Harrison portion of the Warehouse Project, (Compare Pa1 to Pa114-Pa115), and thirteen (13) days after the first JLUB hearing on the Warehouse Project.  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] A.  DEP Properly Issued the HAD, Finding Exemption #11 Applicable to [...]’s Project and that the Project is Consistent with the Goals and Purposes of the Highlands Act.  (Responds To Appellants’ Brief Point II A-F).  Exemption #11 applies to [...]’s Project.  DEP determined that the Project is for “the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility” and that the Project “is consistent with the goals and purposes of [the Highlands Act.]”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11); N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)(11).  (Aa1).  Appellants’ contentions that [...] is not performing an exempt activity and that the activity is not consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act are not supported by the relevant statutory language or the record.4 ---