ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The remaining rental Unit was part of the deal.  The fact that the unit has remained unrenovated and neglected for the past several decades was [...]’s choice.  In arguing its point concerning equity, [...] raises (and knocks down) a strawman that inadvertently highlights one manner in which the Tenant Protection --- \(^1\) 7T83:21 Act achieves its public policy goal of preventing displacement of low-income tenants.
[brief] To a degree, admittedly, the court did perform some substantive analysis on the statute of limitations issue.  The primary concern raised by the court is when the statute of limitations should begin to apply.  This is the point where the court diverges from what is proper.  The title to the property was clouded on the date the Plaintiff forged his brother [...]’s name on the title to the property located at [...].  This occurred on December 10, 1998, where the property was signed over to “[...]”, who is the brother, Defendant, and decedent to the Plaintiff (Da343 – Da346).  However, the signature was forged by Plaintiff, who does not go by the name [...] and clearly is not the person who was listed as the grantee.  This is the point where the title action should have begun to accrue, as any reasonable person would know that signing the title over to another person who is not you will result in a transfer, or at least, a clouded title.
[brief] ”  Id. at 388 (quoting EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F. 2d 969, 976 (3d Cir. 1988)).  New Jersey disfavors “litigation of substantially similar lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions with opposing parties racing to acquire the first judgment [because it] is not only wasteful of judicial resources, but anathema in a federal system that contemplates cooperation among states. ”  Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 387.
[brief] “Whether the landlord made a reasonably prudent investment in purchasing the property and arranging financing on said property.  In considering this factor, the Board may consider the purchase price, the fair market value of the property and the existing rentals at the time of the purchase to determine, if the debt servicing expenses are excessive.  The Board may also consider the amount of cash invested in the property in relation to said fair market value and purchase price, the interest rate of the mortgage and whether the mortgage instrument was arrived at and executed in an arms-length transaction. ”  Hoboken, N.J., Code § 155-14(A)(3) (2018).
[brief] In Guerin, the plaintiff attempted to enforce a $3,000 loan that was memorialized by a writing that stated, “to be paid as I can. ”  Guerin, 38 N.J. Super. at 459.  The court held it was a “promise to pay a sum certain, when the obligor is financially able to pay. ”  Id. at 460.  Without citing any legal support, the court stated that the debt was not due until the defendant was capable of paying, and that the statute of limitations did not commence until at least that time.  Ibid.  The court ultimately did not enforce the loan because the plaintiff failed to allege the debtor’s ability to pay in accordance with the terms of the contract.  Id. at 461.
[directive] One handed - support hand  Each drill, Time: 3 seconds.  2 rounds.  (Total 6 rounds).  •  On command, draw and transfer the weapon to the support hand.  Assume a ready position.  •  On command with the support hand only, fire 2 rounds in 3 seconds.  Repeat twice, firing a total of 6 rounds.  (Strong arm should remain limp along the body.)  • Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  Phase X 1-Yard Line (or as close to 1-yard line as safety dictates).
[brief] During that proceeding, the parties introduced fact testimony from [...] and expert testimony from two medical experts, [...] and [...], and two legal experts, [...] and [...].  They also introduced considerable documentary evidence.  Following trial, both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and post-trial briefs.  On May 24, 2023, the trial court issued a 53-page verdict and opinion, declaring that [...] had no obligation to provide coverage to [...] in the Underlying Action.  Da3a.  First, the trial court ruled that the Consumption Exception did not revive coverage.  Da31a-Da39a.  Examining the competing expert testimony, the court found that [...]’s expert, [...], was unreliable, and that [...]’s expert, [...], was “credible, articulate, and extremely knowledgeable about the issue at hand.
[brief] Two other witnesses saw the shooter flee the area.  On July 6, 2019, [...] was at the [...] on Franklin Street with her mom, [...], and sister.  While walking home, they heard gunshots, and "not even 30 seconds" later, Jasmin saw a man running away by the intersection of East Jersey and 6th Street.  (2T94-4 to 96-1; 2T97-18 to 98-8; 2T102-17 to 21).
[brief] Dear Honorable Judges:  As your file may reflect, I have been assigned to represent the Respondents [...], [...], Police Chief [...] (hereinafter, “[...]”) with respect to the above-captioned matter.  Please accept this letter brief, in lieu of a more formal brief, in opposition to the Appellant’s Appeal.  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BRIEF  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .....................  2  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................  3  THE DECISION OF THE LAW  DIVISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED CONCLUSION ..........................................................  7  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF RESPONDENTS’ APPENDIX
[brief] If you have the whole bullet, let alone if you have one sixth of it, damaged -- *** -- so it just struck me funny as like, that’s quite remarkable.  Now, I’m not saying he’s wrong, I’m just saying I find it hard to believe.  2T22  Q  …  What about from a trajec -- you know, there’s been an issue about whether or not there was any way to gouge the trajectory of the bullet, would the fact that the plexi-glass - A
[brief] Respondent commenced this lawsuit on December 8, 2021, followed by two amended complaints to amend the parties (Da154 at ¶27; Da1; Da193).  At the close of discovery, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment (Da143, Da711; see also Da546).  On March 3, 2023, [...], P.J. Ch., heard oral argument on the dueling motions for summary judgment.  See Transcript of Hearing submitted on appeal.  By Order and written decision dated March 16, 2023, [...] awarded Respondent summary judgment against the Appellants (Da846).  [...] also ruled that issues of fact existed concerning Respondents’ claims against the [...].  By letter dated May 18, 2023, Appellants requested that [...] enter an order in recordable form to be submitted to the [...] for recording (Da839).  By letter dated May 23, 2023, Appellants objected to entry of that order, claiming the matter was still interlocutory (Da844).  On June 5, 2023, [...] enter the proposed form of order submitted by Respondent and, sua sponte, entered a second order, certifying the Court’s summary judgment order as final as to the [...] (Da845; Da846).  Appellants filed this appeal on June 12, 2023 (Da851).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Finally, Plaintiff’s reliance on *D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson*, 242 N.J. Super. 267, 275-76 (App. Div. 1990), to claim that he should not be required to issue a subpoena to compel [...]’s deposition is misplaced.  Notably, the trial court did not overlook *D’Agostino*; rather, the trial court considered the *D’Agostino* court’s analysis and distinguished it.  This was not an abuse of discretion, as the language in *D’Agostino* demonstrates that—consistent with the Court Rules discussed above—a deposition notice is appropriate when the deposition of *a party* is sought, through corporate witnesses.
[brief] An objector’s planner/engineer acknowledged that due to the existing configuration of the Property, it is undersized and cannot accommodate any on-site parking.  (T1/177:1-16).  A [...] official, [...], offered further clarification that there were no bulk and area requirements in the regulations until 1979, and because the building was constructed before 1929, it was not required to have parking.  (T1/7817-79:9).  Where there is no on-site parking, the design standards for ingress and egress are of no moment, as customers would not be entering or exiting the property through vehicular means.  (T1/69:10-70:10, 76:7-78:7).  Thus, any safety concerns over ingress and egress expressed by [...] as a reason for the denial is readily exposed as pretextual.  Due to the size of the building, there are also no loading area requirements for the subject property.
[brief] Mayflower Security Co. v. Bureau of Security ...........................................  1 A.Z. ex rel. B.Z. v. Higher Education Student Assistance Authority ............  1 Richardson v. Board of Trustees, PFRS .................................................. 1, 2, 3, 6  In re Adoption ......................................................................................... 2 Cattani v. Board. of Trustees, PFRS ...................................................... 2, 6 In re Sigafoos .......................................................................................... 3, 7 Korelnia v. Board of Trustees, PERS .....................................................  3 Gerba v. Board of Trustees, PERS .........................................................  3, 4, 7 Kasper v. Board of Trustees, TPAF .......................................................  3 Slater v. Board of Trustees, PFRS .........................................................  4 Russo v. Board of Trustees, PPFRS ......................................................  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:
[brief] ”  (Da27)  On remand for the second time, Hon. [...], J.S.C. resentenced [...] on March 2, 2018.  (4T)  After reciting the Yarbough guidelines, the court analyzed each of the “facts relating to the crimes” under guideline 3 and found that none supported a consecutive sentence.  (4T16-6 to 18-4)  With respect to factor (3)(a)—”the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other”—the court stated, “This could be argued both ways, but if the possession of the gun was to fulfill the robbery, then it would be the same. ”  (4T17-15 to 19)  After finding that none of these factors supported a consecutive sentence, the court referred back to the “no free crimes” prong of Yarbough and reasoned that the certain persons statute “would essentially be moot” if the certain persons sentence were not run consecutive to the sentence for a substantive offense committed with the firearm.
[directive] 2.8  Whenever an officer determines that one of the above listed factors exists and is influencing the person’s failure to comply with an officer’s command, when feasible, the officer shall consider whether specific techniques or resources would help resolve the situation without the need to utilize force.  Techniques for responding include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) obtaining information about the person from available sources including family members, caregivers or others who know the individual; (b) decreasing exposure to the potential threat by moving to a safer position.  This may involve creating distance, seeking cover, tactical repositioning, concealment, and/or placing barriers between an uncooperative person and the officer; (c) slowing down the pace of the incident by the officer slowing their speech, taking deep breaths, and/or applying strategic and critical thinking; (d) keeping the non-compliant person confined to a limited area and calling for a supervisor, back-up officers, and specially-trained resources to assist in resolving the incident.  These specially-trained resources may include Crisis Intervention Team- trained officers, behavioral or mental health care providers, negotiators, qualified bi- lingual officers, or officers equipped with less-lethal devices; (e) using time as a de-escalation strategy, thereby creating an opportunity to calm the non-compliant person; (f) using simplified speech and shorter verbal directions or instructions; (g) eliminating or reducing sensory distractions (bright flashing lights, sirens, or other loud noises); and 4
[brief] See id. at 569-70.  Although the professional licensure laws overlapped to some degree, “the AOM must be issued by an affiant who is licensed within the same profession as the defendant. ”  Id. at 570 (emphasis added).  The Hill court observed:  \(^3\)  See also Haviland, 250 N.J. at 378-81 (reviewing prior caselaw); McCormick v. State, 446 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 2016) (an affidavit of merit is required when the claims of vicarious liability hinge upon allegations of a deviation from the professional standards of care by licensed individuals who work for the named defendant); Albrecht v. Correctional Med. Servs., 422 N.J. Super. 265, 273 (App.
[brief] Substantive due process "is reserved for the most egregious Governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that 'shock the conscience or otherwise offend judicial notions of fairness and that are] offensive to human dignity.  Rivkin v. Dover Township Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J.352,366 (1996)"(citing Weimer v. Amen, 870 E. 2d 7400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989).  See also United Artists Theatre Circuit. Inc. v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2003).  Only the most egregious official conduct is conscience shocking.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(d).  A PIP arbitration, on the other hand, cannot award damages to insurance companies under the IFPA and other statutes, such as RICO.  While PIP arbitrators can consider evidence of fraud as a defense when making their decisions, they cannot grant affirmative relief to insurance companies, such as any of the remedies contained in the IFPA.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(d) and (e).  The arbitration is generally limited to one accident and one injured person, and is a one-way process.  The claim is either allowed or denied.  The possible remedies in a PIP arbitration are therefore very limited, further evidencing the Legislative intent that PIP arbitration is designed to resolve uncomplicated claims relating to prompt payment of medical benefits.  The PIP arbitrator’s power is limited to either referring the matter to a medical review organization, or to award reimbursement for the treatments provided.  No other remedy is authorized.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(d) and (e).
[directive] The court issuing the temporary extreme risk protective .(91 of order shall immediately forward a copy the order and the petition to the county prosecutor in the county in which the respondent resides for service by the appropriate or law enforcement agency upon the respondent.  At no time shall the family household Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders Promulgated by Directive# 19-19 (August 12, 2019)  Pages member petitioner be asked to serve any temporary extreme risk protective order on the respondent.  Service by the county prosecutor or law enforcement petitioner upon the or respondent shall be immediate as soon as practicable.  @ of Duration Order.  The temporary extreme risk protective order shall remain in effect until a court issues a further order. of
[brief] With respect to Plaintiffs’ Property, the proposed improvements were (1) a paved parking lot; and (2) a new location for dumpsters that were already located on Plaintiffs’ Property.  Before these improvements could be implemented, [...], at Plaintiffs’ request, modified the site plans to exclude Plaintiffs’ Property from the redevelopment project.  None of these proposed improvements to Plaintiffs’ Property were therefore ever implemented.  And still, Plaintiffs alleged, without ever obtaining expert testimony as required under the Affidavit of Merit statute, that [...] breached some duty of care for failing to get Plaintiffs’ consent with respect to the initial site plans – the ones that were never implemented because Plaintiffs objected to them.  Plaintiffs also claim, in bad faith, that [...] was responsible for trespass onto their Property because another contractor, with whom [...] never communicated, assumed that the Property was part of the redevelopment project due to its inclusion in the preliminary site plan, and in reliance on this site plan, performed environmental remediation on the Property.  However, as Plaintiffs were well aware, [...]’s site plans never called for any sort of environmental remediation.  Any “reliance” on the site plans with respect to the environmental remediation of which Plaintiffs complain (but would have been legally obligated to perform regardless) cannot, on any rational basis, be contributed to [...].  [...] ultimately had to file two separate motions for summary judgment to get out of the case.  The trial court itself was aware of Plaintiffs’ bad faith attempts to keep [...] in the litigation, and even noted, on multiple occasions, that Plaintiffs were misrepresenting its decision on [...]’s first motion for summary judgment to try and justify the argument that [...] was “per se” negligent – an argument that clearly requiring expert testimony, which Plaintiffs failed to obtain.
[brief] He had been with [...] for approximately seven (7) years and some months.  (1T11:13-18).  On the date in question, [...] was a first respondent from Station 2 and identified that there was an electrical fire coming from an electrical box in the basement.  (1T16: 11-20).  He entered the basement, and it was determined that extra hose was needed.  (1T18: 14-16).  [...] told him to grab an extra 100 feet of hose.  (1T18: 17-19).  [...] with Eighty-Five (85) pounds of equipment is told to get the extra hose from the truck which was about a hundred (100) feet from the house.  (1T17-23).  He gets to the truck, grabs the extra hose, which weighs between forty (40) to fifty (50) pounds, and starts to walk up the driveway towards the house.  (1T22: 1-10).  He testified that as he was going up the driveway he twisted his ankle on something on the driveway.  (1T22: 21-25).  He testified that the only reason he needed to go back to get the additional hose was because there was a bookcase blocking the basement door.  (1T40: 21-25).  This fact is what required him to return to the truck and what lead to his having to come back up the driveway sustaining the injury to his left ankle.  (1T41:1-11).  After the authorized workers compensation medical treatment, [...] was unable to function and perform the tasks of a firefighter which prompted the filing of his application for Accidental Disability Pension benefits.
[brief] In Conclusion, based on the foregoing argument and the law, “genuine issues” of material facts in dispute exist for which the Court erred in deciding as a matter of law to grant Defendant/Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  The Counts set forth in [...]’s Complaint require this case be heard by a jury.  The Appellate Court is urged in the interest of justice, and Plaintiff/Appellant [...] prays, the matter is reversed and remanded for trial.
[brief] On April 29, 2024, [...] filed a motion with this Court for a stay pending appeal.  Pa13.  [...] opposed that motion.  This Court denied the motion to stay on May 15, 2024.  Pa16.  On May 28, 2024, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision.  Pa18.  This Court denied the motion for reconsideration on May 30, 2024.  Pa21.
[brief] When the situation at work deteriorated and the Respondent made complaints of unlawful conduct, the Appellant was concerned [...] might file a lawsuit.  The Appellant realized he did not have an enforceable arbitration agreement.  The Appellant then engaged in a sloppy effort to create a new document.  He cut and pasted various parts of other agreements together and added additional language.  The cobbled together document notably stands out as completely different than any other employment agreements.  The title, the headings, and the language are entirely unique.  [24a-34a]  He tried to get her to sign the agreement.  She refused.  [1T P55-59]  This explains why the old March 7, 2019, signature page was attached as the second page nine.  [24a,34a]  Even the Appellants now concede this was a fake document.
[brief] BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, [...]  [...], ESQ.  NJ Attorney ID: 002101974  [...], ESQ.  NJ Attorney ID: 014342013  LAW OFFICES OF [...]  105 Morris Avenue, Suite 201 Springfield, New Jersey  07081 (T) [...] (F) [...]  [...]  Date: November 18, 2024  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
[brief] [...], [...] and [...], Appellants, as Plaintiffs below, filed suit on or about January 5, 2021 with a Complaint and Order to Show Cause.  (Pa64-184).  The matter was transferred to the Law Division on January 14, 2021.  (Pa185)  The [...] as Defendants answered on or about March 26, 2021.  (Pa535-543).  Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 25, 2022.  (Pa190-247).  Defendants Cross moved for Summary Judgment on or about June 15, 2022.  (Pa248-305).  Plaintiff’s reply brief was served and filed on July 1, 2022 (Papers except brief Pa306-317).  The Hon. [...] J.S.C. rendered decisions partially granting summary judgment on the cross motion and denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on July 22, 2022.  (Pa10-44) for the reasons set forth in an opinion issued therewith.  The parties went to trial on March 20, 2023 and the Court rendered an oral decision on July 31, 2023 (6T 1-42) and a written decision on August 4, 2023 (Pa1-9).  The Court heard a motion for a stay on September 14, 2023 and denied same, but orally added to its rulings on the trial, (7T 1-18).  On August 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from the both the trial and summary judgment decisions (Pa45-49); an amended Notice of Appeal was filed on October 2, 2023 due to an extra hearing (Pa57-61; 7T 1-18).  No Cross Appeal has been filed.
[brief] [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  .........................................................  36  A.  The Trial Court Erred by Finding [...]’s Proposed Redevelopment was not a Public Use and Enjoining [...] from Condemnation and Redevelopment Efforts  Contrary to Established Law.........................................................38  B.  The Trial Court  Erred by Erasing Constitutional Rights to Eminent Domain and Redevelopment when a Municipality is Non-Compliant with Mount Laurel Requirements.
[brief] The mere fact that plaintiff here fell a few hours after the snow had ended does not render the charge inapplicable.  Plaintiff’s interpretation is entirely illogical and unreasonable.  There is absolutely nothing in the charge language indicating that the charge is not applicable when plaintiff fell on snow/ice after the snow had ceased.  Rather, this seems like the quintessential factual scenario warranting this model charge.  Moreover, the charge governs when there are efforts to remediate to snow and ice which naturally must happen after the snow storm ends since under *Pareja* there is no duty to remove snow and ice while a storm is actively happening.