ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Undercover School Operations  1.  Requests to Conduct Operations  a.  All requests by school officials to undertake an undercover school operation in a particular school or school district should be directed to the local chief of police or, where appropriate, to the Superintendent of State Police.  However, the ultimate approval of all undercover school operations shall be granted by the county prosecutor or, where appropriate, the Attorney General or his designee.  b.  Any request to undertake an undercover school operation shall not be made public by either the requesting school official or the law enforcement agency receiving the request.  c.  The county prosecutor or the Attorney General or his designee shall make a good faith effort to comply with all reasonable requests to initiate an undercover operation, considering the scope and nature of the substance abuse problem in a particular school or district and the availability of law enforcement resources.  d.  Where the county prosecutor or the Statewide Narcotics Task Force is for any reason unable to comply with a request to undertake an undercover school operation, the county prosecutor or the Attorney General or his designee shall promptly notify the requesting school officials.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the State urges this Court to reverse the motion court’s granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT BY: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  BETHANY L. DEAL - ATTY NO. 027552008  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL  DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE  BUREAU OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  DATED: May 7, 2024
[brief] *Id.* at 487-88.  The Commissioner of the Department in her final decision “rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that the settlement agreement and LOA were invalid. ”  *Id.* at 488.  Notably, the Commissioner acknowledged that the applicant failed to meet the criteria necessary for issuance of a permit under the applicable CZM Rules, but “she nevertheless found a ‘litigation risk’ inherent in the denial of a permit, and therefore concluded that the settlement was a fair and reasonable exercise of [the Department]’s discretion to resolve litigation. ”  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division reversed and concluded that CAFRA did not give the Department the power to authorize the proposed development in a settlement agreement or authorizing letter “in lieu of” a formal permit.
[brief] .........................  23  Township of Franklin v. Franklin Tp. PBA Local 154, 424 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 2012).  ...............................  16  STATUTES: N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2 ......................................................  19 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 ..................................................... et passim N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4 ....................................................  4, 14  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 29 N.J. Prac., Law of Mortgages §13.10 (2d ed.), fn.49.  (emphasis added)  “If reinstatement is granted and the reinstated mortgage is in default, the court will, it seems, fix a relatively short time in which to bring foreclosure proceedings if foreclosure is not sought in the same suit. ”  29 N.J. Prac., Law of Mortgages §13.10 (2d ed.), fn.49, citing Wood v. Stover’s Adm’rs, 28 N.J. Eq. 248 (E. & A. 1877)(emphasis added).  As to the court’s finding that Plaintiff “did not seek to vacate the discharge of mortgage or reinstate the note at any time prior to the filing of the preference action, the settlement of the preference action or the filing of this action”, the facts are that prior to the bankruptcy preference action and the settlement of that action, the 2012 mortgage was not in default and there was no reason to seek its reinstatement.
[brief] This is also true taking into account the state regulations.  Here, the state regulation under the health powers are general of nature.  Defendants submit that it would be contrary to the legislative intent to interpret this general attenuated power of a Board of Health to adopt by reference general codes, so as to compel the obliteration of the specific grant of statutory authority to municipal governing bodies in the Home Rule Act to enact ordinances “to prevent disturbing noises,” which authority has specifically been found to be the underpinning of the noise ordinances in the cases mentioned above, including *State v. Clarksburg Inn*.
[brief] DURING JURY SELECTION  HAD THE CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE JURY TO ARRIVE AT A VERDICT BASED UPON FACTORS OTHER THAN THE PROOFS PRESENTED AND THE COURT’S CHARGE.  ABSENT AN AFFIRMATIVE SHOWING THAT IT DID NOT INFLUENCE THE JURY’S VERDICT, A NEW TRIAL MUST BE GRANTED.  (6T. 5:17 to 16:7)  The damage awards in this case should have been based solely upon the facts set forth in the Statement of Facts above, the jury’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility, the credibility of the experts’ competing opinions, and the court’s Charge.  There is, however, a substantial basis to support the conclusion that the awards were the product of irregular and improper influences introduced during jury selection.  Thus, although the facts are relatively straightforward, evaluation of the factors influencing the verdict requires more than an analysis of the amount of the award.  Plaintiff was involved in a rear end collision following which he sought emergent care, was evaluated on seven occasions by an orthopedist, treated with a chiropractor roughly 84 times over the course of 15 months and had diagnostic testing which his expert opined revealed two accident-related herniated discs in his neck and nerve damage in his left arm.  Plaintiff had no pain management procedures, and his expert offered no opinion concerning a need for future treatment.  The jury’s non-economic damage award of $927,000.00 based upon those proofs was “unexpected” by the trial court.  Denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial, the trial court failed to give due consideration to factors other than the amount of the award “tending to infect the verdict with prejudice, partiality or passion,” see Henker v. Preybylowski, 216 N.J. Super. 513, 517-18 (App. Div. 1987), including particularly Plaintiff’s behavior during jury selection.
[brief] THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED BY REMOVING APPELLANT’S NAME BASED UPON A FALSE, INACCURATE AND MISLEADING DISCIPLINARY HISTORY (AA0001-8; AA0009-16)  The Commission erred when, in response to [...]’s March 8, 2023 letter, the Respondent [...] did not request the removal of Appellant’s name, but the Respondent Commission nonetheless ordered the removal of Appellant’s name, despite her veteran status and the failure of the [...] to take the only available action to avoid her appointment under N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c), requesting removal of her name.  The Respondent [...] did not request, while returning the Certification to the [...], or on appeal, removal of the name of the disabled veteran Appellant from the List.  Accordingly, as a veteran and the first ranked eligible, the Respondent Commission should have ordered the appointment of Appellant to the rank of Lieutenant.  The Respondent Commission erred by removing a disabled veterans name from the Eligibility List based upon an inaccurate presentation of her disciplinary history, including a false entry.  The Respondent Commission’s removal of Appellant’s name from the Eligibility List based upon an inaccurate “disciplinary history summary” and was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[directive] Identify the conduct deemed to be unlawful: traffic stop ❏ searches: ordering passenger(s) from vehicle ❏ search incident to arrest ❏ frisk of driver ❏ probable cause search (automobile exception) ❏ frisk of passenger(s) ❏ consent search ❏ vehicle frisk ❏ inventory search ❏ arrest ❏ plain view/feel search ❏ miranda warnings ❏ other ❏ custodial interrogation ❏  Description of the Trooper’s error and what the Trooper should have done: (e.g., stop was too long and amounted to an arrest without probable cause; passenger ordered out of vehicle without articulable facts warranting heightened caution; inadequate basis for conducting frisk; illegal frisk for drugs rather than weapons [nature of non-weapon item not “immediately apparent” during lawful frisk]).
[brief] ”  *Cty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass’n v. Cty. Coll. of Morris*, 100 N.J. 383, 391 (1985) (citation omitted).  *See also Linden Bd. of Educ.*, 202 N.J. at 276 (“[T]he arbitrator may not contradict the express language of the contract. ”).  In addition to the well-established principles developed through decades of case law, the CBA similarly prohibits an arbitrator from adding to, deleting, or modifying any of the CBA’s provisions.  (Pa45)  The CBA further provides that the “arbitrator shall be without power or authority to make any decision contrary to or inconsistent with or modifying or varying in any way the terms of [the CBA]. ”  *(Id.)*  Further still, the CBA requires that the “arbitrator’s decision shall not usurp the functions or power of the Authority. ”  *(Id.)*  New Jersey’s own Supreme Court has spoken forcefully on the subject of an arbitrator overstepping his statutory and contractual authority, holding that an arbitrator cannot “read into” the agreement language for which the parties did not bargain.
[brief] III.  REPLYING TO POINT III, THE VIDEO FOOTAGE WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED.  The defense will not repeat what is set forth at Db12 to Db16.  The State (Pb8 to Pb11) sloughs off the admission of the video as an act of trial court discretion.  The witness, [...], did not review the video before downloading it (1T80-24 to 1T81-3), and he 'authenticated' all of the footage even though he had only reviewed a portion of it (1T82-7 to 1T82-8).  IV.
[brief] **A.  [...]’s notice of its terms of use was proper in light of *Vercammen* and *Racioppi*.**  Web site registration or sign-up is sufficient for binding a user to terms and conditions.  *Vercammen v. Linkedin Corp.*, No. A-0188-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110, at *8 (App. Div. Jan. 26, 2022) (enforcing forum selection clause in hyperlinked terms) (Da0568-Da0572); *Racioppi v. Airbnb, Inc.*, No. A-0455-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200, at *2-11 (App. Div. July 17, 2023) (enforcing arbitration provision in hyperlinked terms) (Da0564-Da0567).
[brief] ”).  Appellants appeared to ignore this provision entirely.  They proclaimed that “cost is a major factor” in this case and proceeded to argue how it was unfair that not only had they suffered significant property damages but now they were “required to pay an arbitrator $320.00 per hour and $2,200.00 per day in order pursue their claims . . .” (Dr126).  However, Appellants never submitted a request to [...] related to reimbursement for such costs or much less inquired as to what would be covered.  Relatedly, Appellants made several accusations about information they were not provided.  For example, Appellants claimed they were never told about costs associated with arbitration.  Moreover, they were not informed that [...] would be selected to arbitrate, nor did they receive its rules.  Appellants’ assertions are inaccurate and refutable.  The Arbitration clause clearly outlined how to initiate arbitration and through whom it would be completed.  The Clause stated that “[a] party may refer a Dispute to either the [...] (‘[...]’) or the [...] (‘[...]’)” (Dr168).  In terms of deciding between [...] and [...], Appellants were afforded the ultimate choice.  That is, if [...] elected arbitration and chose [...] or [...], Appellants were permitted to object and automatically have the other organization administer the proceedings, simply by notifying [...] (Dr97).  By contrast, [...] did not retain this privilege of choice, thereby providing Appellants with the ultimate and final say on the matter.  Additionally, despite [...] and [...] being two of the most recognizable arbitration entities, [...] provided website and contact information for both, so as to effectuate Appellants making an informed decision in the event they were unfamiliar with either organization (Dr97) (“To obtain a copy of the procedures . . . , Customer may contact the organizations at the following: (1) [...], 335 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017, www.adr.org and (2) [...], 1920 Main Street, Suite 300, Los Angeles, CA 92614, www.jamsadr.com. ”).  In fact, navigating to [...]’s website using the information [...] provided reveals a user-friendly interface for the [...].  Conspicuously listed at the top is a “Rules, Forms & Fees” tab.  There, any member of the public can quickly and easily reference [...]’s various rules, forms, and fees.  Appellants, through simple due diligence, could have done the same, but argued to the contrary.  As a final point related to costs and impacts on Appellants, the Clause not only provided that [...] would reimburse Appellants for all filing and administrative fees required for initiating the arbitration, but “arbitration [would] be conducted by a single, neutral arbitrator at a location within the federal judicial district in which [Appellants’] protected premises are located” (Dr97).  This provision ensured that in the event of arbitration, Appellants would be able to conveniently attend the arbitration “at home” as opposed to some far-off foreign jurisdiction.
[brief] Prior to sentencing the defendant discovered that the [...] did not provide evidence that [...] had accused three innocent men of murder in three separate cases.  The State's failure to disclose such powerful impeachment material was a direct violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  To prove a Brady violation a defendant must show, 1.) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching, 2.) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently, and 3.)
[brief] Combined with the Fact that the Insurance Policy and Related Forms Were Confusing, Contradictory, and Misleading Provided Him With A Reasonable Expectation of Coverage.  “When there is ambiguity in an insurance contract, courts interpret the contract to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured, even if a close reading of the written text reveals a contrary meaning. ”  Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001) (citations omitted).  A genuine ambiguity arises “where the phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.  In that instance, application of the test of the objectively reasonable expectation of the insured often will result in benefits coverage never intended from the insurer's point of view. ”  Zacarias, 168 N.J. at 598 (emphasis added)(quotation omitted).  Nowhere at any point during the application process identified above was [...], who was overtly attempting to obtain $1 million in insurance specifically for 12-15+ passenger rental vans, informed that such vans were excluded or otherwise ineligible for coverage.
[brief] U.S. Const., amend IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶7; State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022); State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 165 (2023).  In order to protect an individual’s right to privacy from government seizures, the Constitution requires that the government have probable cause and “particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  A search that is conducted pursuant to a warrant is “presumptively valid,” and a defendant who challenges the issuance of that warrant has the burden to “establish a lack of probable cause ‘or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.
[brief] (Da96)  [...] presided over a joint resentencing hearing with [...] and [...].  (3T)  (4T)  [...] submitted an expert report from [...], a psychologist, who evaluated [...] in 2018.  (Da44 to 51)  Dr. [...] found it noteworthy that from 1995 to 2018, [...] had incurred only one infraction: possession of a tattoo pen.  (3T12-3 to 11)  That infraction occurred one month after [...] was sentenced, when he was still 18.  (Da33)  Since then, [...] had zero infractions, and had not participated in any drug use, prison violence, or gang activity.  (3T12-7 to 11)  Instead, [...] participated extensively in employment opportunities, rehabilitation programs, and community leadership.  [...] earned his GED in 1998 and went on to work as a custodian, teacher’s aide, and a craftsman in the graphic arts print shop – considered a “sensitive job” provided only to well-trusted incarcerated persons.  (Da31)  (3T11-24 to 12-2)  He also participated in dozens of programs, including “Cage Your Rage” and “Focus on the Victim. ”  (Da45; 54-85)  Over time, [...] grew into a trusted and respected member of his community.  He served as a “mediator of his wing” in prison and received letters from DOC Administrators noting that he has “maintained an exceptional institutional record[.]”  (Da48; 80)  Dr. [...] described this record as “absolutely remarkable. ”  (3T11-24)  As for his maturation, Dr. [...] noticed a marked difference from [...]’s initial assessment.  (3T11-14 to 21)  In the 23 years since then, [...] “had matured. He had developed.  Things that almost sounded like they were hardwired back in 1995 were no longer present. ”  (3T11-18 to 23)  In Dr. [...]’s opinion, [...]’s ability to distance himself from the drugs, violence, and gang activity that were rampant in the prison environment “really kind of underscored what we know about adolescent brain development.  It wasn’t hardwired. He developed it. He made those connections. ”  (3T12-11 to 16)  [...] also found that [...] had an average IQ and showed no signs of psychopathy, sociopathy, glibness or pathological lying.  (3T14-18 to 15-21)  (Da49)  He “took complete responsibility for the crime…. [offered] no alternative theories,” and “blamed no one. ”  (3T11-2 to 5)  When recounting the incident, [...] “sob[bed] quietly” which Dr. [...] characterized as “credible remorse. ”  (PSR 14)  (3T16-8)  The court found aggravating factors 1 (nature of crime), 3 (likelihood of reoffending), 9 (deterrence), and 12 (elderly victim).  (4T37-1 to 38-14)  Though [...] had found mitigating factor 13, [...] now found that the crime was “very much a collective effort” and thus found no mitigating factors.  (4T59-25 to 62-15)
[brief] Both McGill and DiCarlo courts gave corresponding examples of public injunctive relief:  - “[E]ven if a CLRA plaintiff stands to benefit from an injunction against a deceptive business practice, it appears likely that the benefit would be incidental to the general public benefit of enjoining such a practice. ”...Likewise, the court explained in Cruz, an injunction under the UCL or the false advertising law against deceptive advertising practices ‘is clearly for the benefit of … the general public’; ‘it is designed to prevent further harm to the public at large rather than to redress or prevent injury to a plaintiff. ”...To summarize, public injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law is relief that has ‘the primary purpose and effect of’ prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public.  Relief that has the primary purpose or effect of redressing or preventing injury to an individual plaintiff—or to a group of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff—does not constitute public injunctive relief. ”
[brief] Unlike in *Robinson*, there are no “factual shortcomings” in the record that would be “dispositive” as to preclude full and fair consideration of this issue on appeal.  *Id.* at 20.  And there can be no question that a conviction in violation of substantive due process principles would be “an unjust result. ”  *R.* 2:10-2.  The State’s claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this issue on appeal is therefore without merit.  The State’s substantive argument also fails.  The State does not explain how general concerns about COVID-19 increased the harm of a private threat of violence simply because the threat was received before [...] rescinded his pandemic emergency orders.  The State’s reliance on *People v. Villareal* to reject a nexus requirement is misplaced.  216 N.E.3d 188 (Ill. 2023).  The Illinois Supreme Court in fact found there was a “direct connection” – or nexus – between the legislative goal of reducing gang violence in public areas committed by armed gang members and the criminalization of public possession of firearms by gang members.  *Id.* at 197.  On that basis, the court distinguished the Illinois law from the gang-enhancement laws found unconstitutional in Florida v. O.C., 748 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1999), and Tennessee v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. 2016), cited in [...]’s brief (Db 19), which “failed to even obtusely target gang-related criminal activity. ”  Villareal, 216 N.E.3d at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Villareal Court recognized that something more than coincidence – a connection, a nexus – is needed.  Here, an equivalent “direct connection” could be found between an emergency declaration and a threat of violence that exploits or causes greater harm as a result of that emergency.  (See Db 21)  But where there is no nexus – where the existence of the emergency is purely incidental to the threat uttered by a defendant – the State has no legitimate interest in increasing the penalties for that threat.  Punishing [...]’s statements more harshly simply because they were uttered before [...]’s COVID-19 orders expired bears no reasonable relationship to the Legislature’s anti-terrorism goals.  The State further asserts that the law is “neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. ”  (Pb 19)  But the State fails to address the fact that the country has been perpetually under a state of emergency since the emergency-enhancement’s enactment in 2002 (see Db 22-23), so that every terroristic threat under subsection (a), from 2002 to the present day, could be prosecuted as a second- rather than third-degree crime.  Without a nexus requirement, there are no limits on the application of the second-degree enhancement, leaving the law highly susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  For these reasons and those laid out in [...]’s initial brief, the second-degree enhancement imposed on his terroristic threats charges was unconstitutional.
[brief] In the event the Special Hearing Officer requires additional expertise by separate expert review of the [Respondents]’ site plan, the Special Hearing Officer may engage such additional experts as the Special Hearing Officer deems appropriate, upon notice and consultation with the Court and all parties, the fees and costs for which shall be borne equally by the [Respondents] and the [...]; J.  All hearings conducted by the Special Hearing Officer shall be in the Superior Court of New Jersey in New Brunswick or, conducted virtually in accordance with New Jersey Department of Community Affairs guidelines, during regular court hours, and if at the courthouse at a courtroom designated by the Court.