ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The testimony of Plaintiff’s main witness did not convince the trial judge as being credible.  The language in the contract as written by Plaintiff’s transactional attorney states only that Defendants would cooperate with Plaintiff.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s testimony yielded irrelevant but revealing statements about “Heiress,” generational wealth, community value, and the like.  In short, it became a diatribe against past generations’ activities on the property.
[brief] (9T:52-1 to 7).  Assuming arguendo that defendant did have minor dependents, the trial court still correctly concluded that he did not financially or emotionally support them to the extent that his absence would cause them excessive hardship.  (9T:52-2 to 7).  Defendant indicated that he was not the primary caregiver of his dependents.  (PSR at p. 13).  Defendant disclosed that he was last employed as a sanitation worker from 2006 to 2007 and was “incarcerated most of the time after 2007. ” (PSR at pp. 17 to 18).  The trial court accepted defendant’s proffer that he wished to maintain a relationship with his children and that he financially supported them when he was not incarcerated, but correctly found that defendant was “in and out of the system” so frequently as to deny his son a healthy relationship with his father.  (9T:51-5 to Defendant’s regular incarceration and lack of significant income demonstrate that his children would not suffer excessive hardship due to his imprisonment.  Defendant’s argument that the trial court’s application of mitigating factor eleven was impossibly “rigid” is contrary to established case law requiring a finding of unique excessive hardship.
[brief] (Pa539-Pa544).  As to Point 3, Plaintiffs do not mention, at any point in their brief, the trial court’s findings as to that claim.  They do not argument the issue.  As such, regardless of its mention in their Notice of Appeal, Plaintiffs have abandoned their appeal of this claim and it is deemed dismissed.  See Woodlands Cmty. Ass'n v. Mitchell, 450 N.J. Super. 310, 319 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011)) (“An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived. ”).  Moreover, based on both of their Notices of Appeal, Plaintiffs have also abandoned any challenge to the adoption of Ordinance 2022-15, which actually adopted the Old York Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] Lastly, [...], who also serves as the Borough Tax Collector, testified that Lots 3 and 3.01 are listed on the Borough tax records as being Borough-owned tax-exempt property and that no taxes have been assessed or collected from [...] or from any other entity for these properties from at least the 1970’s (which is as far back as the records go) to the present.  See Pa0869-Pa0898.  During all of these years from the date of the Borough’s Final Decree in foreclosure (i.e. 1939) to the present, the Borough took numerous actions to demonstrate its ownership of Lots 3 and 3.01, while neither [...] nor any other entity took any actions to assert any ownership rights in the Property.  [...] noted the history of the use of the Property in his oral opinion as further support for his decision that the Borough owns the Property.
[brief] The sentencing judge noted this omission at the outset of the sentencing hearing by telling the prosecutor, “I have received your sentencing memorandum, and I have reviewed it. ”  The judge confirmed with defense counsel, “you did not submit one, correct? No, your honor. ”  (19T4-17 to 21).  Counsel squandered this opportunity to advocate for petitioner and to persuade the court to impose a lesser sentence at the time it most mattered - before the actual sentencing hearing.  Counsel was obligated at this critical stage of sentencing to make “a vigorous argument regarding mitigating and other circumstances, hoping to personalize defendant in order to justify the least severe sentence under the criminal code. ”  State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496, 501 (App. Div. 2002).  The “unhindered adversarial process at sentencing allows the court to be fully informed about all of the evidence and factors that will lead to a just sentence. ”  Hess, 207 N.J. at 153.  Remaining mute under these circumstances, and failing to advocate for his client prior to sentencing, constituted “attorney dereliction” such that counsel was ineffective, as he was not functioning as the ‘counsel guaranteed by either our Federal or State Constitution. ”  Hess, 207 N.J. at 154, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 and Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.  B.
[directive] Training Objectives  1.  Safe Handling.  The participant will demonstrate the safe handling of handguns and shotguns.  This will minimally be done while: (a) Securing all agency authorized shotguns, service handguns and off-duty handguns at all times.  (b)  Loading and unloading revolvers, semi-automatic pistols, manual and autoloading shotguns.  (c)  Utilizing authorized agency loading devices or bullet loops.  (Authorized agency loading devices may include speed loaders, speed strips, bullet pouches and magazines.)  9-18 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  (d)  Holstering and drawing authorized agency handguns.  (e)  Inspecting weapons.  (f)  Operating weapons storage mechanisms in agency authorized vehicles.  (g)  Clearing malfunctions.  2.  Firearms and Ammunition Identification.  Participants will identify agency authorized firearms and ammunition and explain the mechanical functions, capabilities and maintenance of agency firearms to include:  (a)  Those firearms and ammunition authorized for both on- and off-duty use.  (b)  The major parts of the service handgun and its basic mechanical functions.  (c)  The major parts of the agency authorized shotgun and its basic mechanical functions.  (d)  The effective range and lethal capabilities of agency handgun and shotgun.  (e)  The ability to clean the service handgun and agency shotgun effectively.  3.  Shooting Principles.
[brief] To avoid burdening the Court with a recitation of duplicative facts, the Redeveloper Defendants adopt the statement of facts set forth by the [...] and the [...] (collectively, “[...]”).  See MDb4-17.\(^1\) \(^1\) “MDb” shall refer to the [...]’ brief, filed March 29, 2024, and “Pb” shall refer to the Plaintiffs’ amended brief, filed March 1, 2024.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Until Spring 2020  Defendants’ arguments notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the twenty-year statute of limitations.  Per the clear language N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1, a claim to quiet title accrues when title to a property otherwise in the peaceable possession of a plaintiff is “is denied or disputed, or any other person claims or claimed to own the same…”  N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1.  Here, the transfer of title to [...] did not occur until October 2019 by way of the October 2019 Deed, marking the first time that title to the property was “denied or disputed”.  Moreover, Defendants specifically testified that they did not communicate the change in title to [...], the fact that they hired [...] as a supposed property manager, or even that [...] passed away.  14T24:7-26:8.  Once [...] did learn of the transfer in early 2020 when his wife attempted to pay property taxes via Jersey City’s online portal, he took immediate action, including filing the subject litigation.  (8T87:5-91:11; 3T107:19-108:14).  (3)  The Discovery Rule Tolled the Applicable Statute of Limitations
[brief] Furthermore, the trial court failed to address the Board’s failure to consider whether the revised lot grade is not just the result of “mounding”, but whether it included either “terracing” or “other devices. ”  Here, [...]’s proposed development unquestionably raises the original lot grade elevation with a revised lot grade.  The Applicant’s site plan shows, among other things, that the revised lot grade slopes upward from the street level on [...] from an elevation of 13’ to an elevation of 18’ as a result of fill proposed by the applicant.  *(Pa55-59). *  Moreover, the elevated lot grade of the Application includes “mounding, terracing, or other devices” increasing the elevation of the buildings from the original lot grade.  As stated above, the term “mounding” is defined as an “an artificial bank or hill of earth or stones. ”  There is clearly no dispute that the Applicant is raising the original lot grade with fill to create an artificial bank or hill.  *(Pa55-59). *  The term “terracing” as applicable to the present matter is defined as either (b) a raised embankment with the top leveled, or (c) a row of houses or apartments on raised ground or a sloping site.  Thus, there is also no question that the Applicant’s site plan, as a result of the artificial fill, results in the revised lot grade being a raised embankment with the top leveled, or a row of buildings on raised ground on a sloping site.  The Applicant’s site plan clearly shows the upward slope from the street level on [...] from an elevation of 13’ to an elevation of 18’ as a result of fill proposed by the applicant.  *(Pa55-59).*  The term “other devices” is simply a catch all similar to mounding or terracing which increases the elevation of a building on the property.
[brief] This Court should affirm on the same rationale.  When the Appellate Division previously considered similar arbitration agreements it consistently held that broad, explicit terms like those in the Agreement are valid and enforceable.  In Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., for example, the Appellate Division compelled a former employee asserting LAD claims to proceed via private arbitration.  470 N.J. Super. 553, 557 (App. Div. 2022).  There, an employee handbook included an arbitration agreement that required [...] to resolve “any and all disputes, claims or controversies,” including discrimination, harassment, or retaliation claims, via binding arbitration and advised him he waived his right to a jury trial for employment-related disputes.  *Id.* at 558–59.  Like the Agreement here, the arbitration agreement in *Antonucci* also explained that [...]’s acceptance of work, even without his affirmative signature on the agreement, rendered the arbitration agreement effective and would be deemed consent to and ratification of the arbitration agreement’s terms.  *Id.* at 559; (*also* Pa000094).  The Appellate Division ruled the arbitration agreement there was valid and enforceable because it reflected the parties’ mutual assent to arbitrate employment claims and “informed [[...]] that his continued employment would constitute an acknowledgment of his agreement to arbitrate any employment-related disputes. ”  *Antonucci*, 470 N.J. Super. at 563.
[directive] Photographs  7.4.1  Photographs and video recording tapes can be useful tools if relevant to the investigation.  If a complaint involves excessive use of force, photographs of the complainant and the officer should be taken as close as possible to the time of the incident.  Photographs also can be used to create a record of any other matter the investigator believes is necessary.  Whenever possible, digital color photography should be used.  7.4.2  The law enforcement agency should maintain a recent photograph of each officer.  These can be used if a photo array is needed for identification purposes.  If a photo array is used, it must be properly retained for possible evidentiary purposes.  35  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] Accordingly, when the funds were returned to the Respondent’s closing agent (who unfortunately, absconded), Appellant retained the lawful right to proceed with foreclosure.  At a minimum, the trial court should have allowed discovery (or supplementation of the record) on whether the requirements for a short sale were even satisfied.  Instead, summary judgment was granted on a converted motion to dismiss – before any discovery took place at all.  The trial court improperly concluded that Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment for foreclosure served as a concession that the case was ripe for adjudication.  However, mortgage foreclosure claims are particularly suited for summary adjudication.  The lack of genuine issues of material fact on the foreclosure claim does not mean that there were no fact issues surrounding the context of the insufficient payment and the conditions necessary to effect a valid short sale.  As further discussed below, Appellant had every right to reject the insufficient payoff and proceed with foreclosure.  The trial court’s order deeming the mortgage discharged and the note satisfied, if preserved, would serve as an unjust forfeiture that improperly protects Respondent from its own agent’s theft at Appellant’s expense.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Order, deny Respondent’s summary judgment motion, and grant Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, remand for further discovery on the factual issues raised by the trial court.
[brief] See, e.g., Kennard v. Comstock Res., Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2004).  Every source to which Defendants point comes with extreme limitations that, in combination, render the data not in the public domain and not available for public use.  See Ja2164-66 (legal restrictions associated with [...] and [...] and the [...]), 2166-69 (technical restrictions associated with [...]), 2104-05, 2161, 2165-68 (legal unavailability on [...] of crucial data identifying each VRDO), 2179-81, 2192-95, 2197-2201 (limitations on data licensed from [...]).
[brief] The trial court determined that an arbitrator, as opposed to the trial court itself, should determine the “issue of arbitrability” (i.e. whether Plaintiff’s allegations are covered by the arbitration provision in [...]’s form health club Membership Agreement.(Ja12); infra Section I(C).  To that end, and as argued by [...] in its appellate brief ([...] Brief, p.19), its arbitration agreement incorporates the rules of the [...] (and [...])(Ja37) and, accordingly, the trial court should not have decided that an arbitrator should determine whether Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of [...]’s arbitration agreement.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Core Principle Five Duty to Intervene and Report.  Every officer, regardless of rank, title, seniority, or status, has an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent any use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with such policies, regulations, and laws, if possible, before a fellow officer uses excessive, illegal, or otherwise inappropriate force.  Every officer has a duty to immediately report any improper use of force.  5.1  Duty to intervene.  A law enforcement officer’s duty to intervene is rooted in the commitment to protect public safety at all times.  Interventions that prevent improper use of force will lead to fewer citizen complaints, fewer officer disciplinary matters, higher morale, and a healthier working environment.  Preventing misconduct preserves the integrity of all officers and the law enforcement profession as a whole.  Intervening to prevent improper use of force can assist fellow officers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that may be illegal, inappropriate, and in violation of this Policy.  5.2  Thus, all officers who observe another officer about to use force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with this Policy must, if feasible, do whatever they can to interrupt the flow of events before the fellow officer engages in an improper use of force.  Officers can serve each other and the public by simply saying or doing the right thing to prevent a fellow officer from resorting to force illegally or inappropriately.  5.3  Officers shall use signaling, verbal intervention, or physical intervention, if necessary, to stop any improper use of force.  It is important to note that the duty to intervene does not stop at one officer.  It is the responsibility of all officers to ensure use-of-force compliance.  If officers observe a situation where another officer is attempting to intervene in an improper use of force, officers shall assist in that effort.  5.4  Duty to report illegal and inappropriate uses of force by other officers.  Any officer who observes or has knowledge of a use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with this directive or department policies must (a) notify a supervisor as soon as possible and (b) submit an individual written report to a supervisor before reporting off duty on the day the officer becomes aware of the misconduct  5.5  Law enforcement agencies, supervisors, and officers are prohibited from retaliating in any form against an officer who intercedes in or reports illegal or inappropriate uses of force.  5.6  Every department shall establish a written policy which requires intervention and protects officers who intervene from retaliation or other negative consequences.  The departmental policy shall be consistent with this Policy and all applicable laws.  Reporting procedures must comply with Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures.  See AG Directive 2020-7.  18
[brief] Despite clear evidence that Respondent campaigned for her seat on the Board from her Facebook page, despite a clear announcement that she had won that election, despite Respondent’s own admissions that she held herself out as a Board member on her Facebook page – and that she actually compromised the Board – and despite the Commission’s own admission that Respondent was speaking on Board issues from this same page, the Commission still shockingly stated:  In this matter, the Commission finds that, while the subject matter of the Facebook posts – State lawsuits related to union activity, vaccines and masking in schools, and gender identity standards – may relate to the business of the Board, there is an insufficient nexus between Respondent’s personal Facebook page and her membership on the Board, such that a reasonable member of the public would not perceive that respondent is speaking pursuant to her official duties.  The posts at issue do not mention Respondent’s membership on the Board nor does she advertise or rely upon her board membership when publishing material on her social media page.  In short, there is no factual evidence that the statements/posts on her Facebook account were made as a member of the Board, or had the appearance of being representative of, or attributable to the Board.  [...]  Respondent may have used her Facebook page to reach constituents in her campaign, but her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on the same (Ca017) (emphasis added).  This assertion is directly contrary to abundant evidence in the record, it altogether ignores [...]’s factual findings, and it is demonstrably factually incorrect.  Respondent made repeated references to the Board and her Board membership.  (Ca263, Ca265, Ca267-268, Ca270, Ca272, Ca274, Ca276).  She also clearly posted that she won her election and became a member of the Board.  (Ca274 276).  She then used this same Facebook account to speak on Board issues (Ca017) in a way that caused the public to protest the Board itself (Ca107-109, Ca120-122, Ca123-127) and subjected the Board to litigation (Ca133-140).
[brief] And we now have rescheduled this.  And this is, the parties couldn’t agree to an agreement.  This is not uncommon.  This happened before us and like 15 years ago, [...] was the attorney.  One meeting just didn’t record.  We got up to — we only knew about that in the Law Division.  It got remanded back for the best attempt possible to recreate the evidence.  Then it went back up to the Law Division.  So that’s essentially what we’re doing.
[brief] He also was not allowed to say “corporate office. ”  7T123:9-11.  In fact, there were so many discussions of what [...] could not say that at one point plaintiff’s counsel remarked, in a bit of foreshadowing, “I think we're mincing words to the point where, you know, he might as well just read what they want him to say. ”  7T114:25-115:2.  That is exactly what happened on defendant’s cross-examination of [...].
[brief] Here, the postcard was undisputedly mailed to [...]’s home address.  (Pa14).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa64).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa66).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without offering any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the presumption that he received it.  (Pb16).  Still, despite the Board’s having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request under its inherent equitable power.
[brief] (Da145).  After [...] was released from the [...] facility, he returned to [...]’s home.  (Da145).  When [...] would take his trips to Portugal, he would travel alone.  Also, [...] explained that when [...] went to Portugal with [...], [...] was “ambushed” and “surprised” and “upset”.  (Da147).  [...] did not know that [...] was going to show [...] a nursing home.  (Da147).  [...] testified that after they moved into the Mahwah house in the Fall of 2014, [...] gave her a copy of the Will.  (Da148).  [...] explained that [...] was flattered that she did not ship him off to Portugal, or stick him in a nursing home.  (Da148).  [...] was touched that they made renovations to the Mahwah house, and included [...] in the plans to move to Mahwah.  (Da149).
[directive] No  10%  Possession of Actor possesses weapon with purpose to use unlawfully against a person or property; 2C:39-4(a-e)  Weapons for Unlawful firearms, explosives and destructive devices, second degree; other weapons, third degree; 3rd Degree $10,000 to $20,000  10% permissible  Purposes imitation firearm, fourth degree.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500  10% permissible 74  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973); Vispisiano v. Ashland Chemical Co., 107 N.J. 416, 426-27 (1987); see also Martinez v. Cooper Hosp., 163 N.J. 45, 52 (2000) (quoting Baird v. American Medical Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 66 (1998)).  Quite simply, for the Statute of Limitations to run, the injured party need not know the state of the law positing a right of recovery upon the facts.  See Baird, 155 N.J. at 68.  Rather, the Statute of Limitations runs when the injured party possesses actual or constructive knowledge of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action, and the basis of such a cause of action is constituted solely by the material facts of the case.  Id., see Burd v. N.J. Tel Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 (1978).  In fashioning New Jersey’s “discovery” principles, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that steadfast, mechanical applications of statutes of limitations can inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing any Legislative purpose.
[brief] As the Supreme Judicial of Massachusetts explained: the most reasonable reading of these provisions\(^9\) is that the [relevant] policies provide coverage for the portion of [...]’s liability attributable to the quantum of property damage occurring during a given policy period.  [...], 454 Mass. at 359.  Here, there is absolutely no evidence in the record regarding how much “property damage” took place at any one time, or in any one year of the operations at the Site, or in any one year after the operations at the Site ceased, or in any specific location, or in any identifiable quantity.  Instead, the record shows that the “property damage” began when operations began in the 1950s, continued throughout the operations from multiple locations on the site, that it has been ongoing for decades, and that it is continuing at the Site to this day.  The record shows that the release of “pollutants in various areas of the Site and at different times and volumes caused the collection and concentration of DNAPL . . . which continues to this day passively contaminating the groundwater that flows over it.  It is lodged in the bedrock and only gradually dissipates. ”  (Pa0148.)  [...], [...]’s expert, explained: