ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On February 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against the Defendant.  (Da8).  On or about April 27, 2021, Plaintiff moved for substitute service pursuant to Rule 4:4-4(b)(3).  (Pa135 to 136).  On or about May 14, 2021, the Court denied that motion without prejudice, and directed Plaintiff to establish whether a DMV check was performed, and whether service had been attempted by certified mail.  (Ibid.)  Thereafter, Plaintiff not only performed a DMV check and sent certified mail, it also hired a private investigator to confirm Defendant’s address.  (Pa18).  On or about August 30, 2021, Plaintiff moved again for substitute service pursuant to Rule 4:4-4(b)(3).  (Ibid.)  On or about September 24, 2021, an order was entered granting substitute service at Defendant’s last known address at [...].  (Ibid.)  The Order deemed that service on the defendant was effectuated as of the date of the order.  (See id.)  Pursuant to the order entered on or about September 24, 2021, the deadline for Defendant to answer, move or otherwise plead with respect to the complaint was no later than October 29, 2021.  (See id.)  Defendant failed to answer, move, or otherwise plead by that date.  Accordingly, on or about November 4, 2021, Plaintiff requested that the Clerk of Court enter default against Defendant.  (Pa137).  On November 8, 2021, the Clerk of the Court entered Default against Defendant.  (Pa22).  On or about November 8, 2021, Plaintiff sent a copy of the request for default to Defendant.  (Pa23).  On or about December 17, 2021, Plaintiff sent the notice of entry of default to Defendant.  (Pa24).  On or about January 21, 2022, the certified mail enclosing the notice of default was returned to sender as unclaimed and unable to forward.  (Pa25).  On March 1, 2022, Plaintiff moved for default judgment.  (Da4 to 5).  On March 18, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, in part, and in the amount of $201,837.63.  (Id.)  On August 23, 2022, our office received Defendant’s purported motion to vacate the default judgment.  On September 9, 2022, the lower court denied Defendant’s first motion to vacate default judgment “for failure to present a meritorious defense to the case. ” (Da3).  On June 21, 2023—ten (10) months since Defendant’s prior motion—Defendant filed his second motion to vacate default judgment.  (See Da1 to 2).  On September 22, 2023, the lower court once again denied Defendant’s motion to vacate default judgment.  (Id.)  PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION STATEMENT OF FACTS
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[brief] The [...] World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act amended N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e) to state, in pertinent part:  (4)  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [...] was denied the ability to register for the Ricci Act and apply for amended benefits because he did not submit his registration form prior to July 8, 2021.
[brief] See also In re Jones, 122 B.R. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1990).  A bank’s motion for summary judgment was denied when the borrower set forth a counterclaim for equitable recoupment, even though the recoupment claim would have been barred under the statute of limitations had it been brought as an affirmative action.  Midlantic National Bank v. Georgian, Ltd., 233 N.J. Super. 621 (Law Div. 1989).  “Although the defendants may not raise this cause of action as a sword against [the lender], they may raise it as a shield by way of counterclaim if the counterclaim sets forth a cause of action in equitable recoupment. ”  Id. at 625.  Likewise in Gibbins v. Kosuga, 121 N.J. Super. 252 (Law Div. 1972), the court permitted defendants to raise the recoupment defense although it would have been barred by the statute of limitations had it been raised affirmatively.  “Therefore, the defense of recoupment is never barred by the statute of limitations so long as [Plaintiff’s] main action itself is timely. ”  Georgian, Ltd., supra at 625-626.  Under the Georgian, Ltd. and Gibbins decisions, the lower Court made a mistake when it denied Defendant the right of recoupment or set-off when it stated: “Failure to dispute the bill in writing within 60 (sixty) days results in a waiver of the consumer to dispute the balance at a later time” (Da29).
[brief] The plaintiff there, suing as executor of his wife’s estate, claimed he had fraudulently signed a contract on his wife’s behalf without authority to do so.  Id. at *7.  The Court held that it would be “unfair to require” a person who alleges the contract was fraudulently executed “to appear in a tribunal that he or she says was never agreed to in the first place. ”  Id.  Here, by contrast, there is no claim of fraud in the execution.
[brief] At that discovery conference on July 7, [...] told the court that its initial production in response to RFP No. 4 included “reports that were pulled within Salesforce regarding the plaintiff’s contacts with [...] and [...] during this time period. ”  (ECF 66, Hrg Tr. at 5:1-5.)  Both parties indicated they understood these documents would be found in Salesforce and that [...] had agreed to produce the Salesforce records for the [...] and [...] school district accounts for a five-year period, to the extent those records exist.  (Id. at 4:15-9:25.)
[brief] Plaintiff immediately felt like “something was dislocated. ” (3T, at 29:1-5).  He drove to urgent care after the collision, concerned for the cost of taking an ambulance (3T, at 31:3-24).  Then he treated for about two years with a chiropractor to manage his pain (3T, at 35:5-18; 40:7-41:9).  The jury heard this in conjunction with objective, credible medical evidence presented by Plaintiff’s treating orthopedist, [...].  The diagnostic tests performed by Dr. Gleimer revealed two herniated disks in Plaintiff’s neck, an associated nerve injury in his neck, and two bulging disks in his low back (4T, at 12:8-13:11).  Dr. Gleimer concluded that the first two of these injuries were permanent, and that all of Plaintiff’s injuries would only get worse as he aged (4T, at 12:8-13:11; 13:17-14:8).  Perhaps most convincing to their verdict, the jury was shown each and every way these injuries have corrupted Plaintiff’s life.  The time missed from work; having to work 80% of his day laying down; the inability to play basketball, one of Plaintiff’s biggest passions; the issues sitting, and standing, and inescapable tingling radiating down his arms; and the fact that Plaintiff’s life expectancy of 40.5 years was longer than the time he had already been alive (3T, 38:8-17; 54:24-8; 55:12-21; 4T, at 193:21-194:2).
[brief] [Pa104, Pa115; 4T68:11-23].  However, Appellant’s “evolving theory” is inconsistent with Appellant demanding “the stuff” immediately upon [...]’s arrival [4T51:13-17], and Appellant’s self-admitted knowledge that he knows exactly why Narcan is used.  [4T133:1-2].  During this time, Appellant was sweating profusely, had pinpointed pupils, and had impaired speech, specifically stumbling over his words and slurring.  [Pa104-Pa105; 4T76:2-4].  Appellant testified that he only took his medication as prescribed when he was off duty.  [6T11:3-5].  However, on the night of the Incident, Appellant told [...] that he had not taken anything and that he was “on the job”, which is vernacular for being employed as police officer.  [4T76:16-21].  [...] administered the first dose of Narcan to [...].  [Pa104].  The first dose of Narcan failed to revive [...]; subsequently, EPD Officer [...] (“[...]”) and members of the [...] arrived at Appellant’s residence to provide further assistance to the unresponsive [...].  [Pa132].  [...] administered a second dose of Narcan to [...] approximately five (5) minutes after the first dose had been administered.  [Pa132].  The second dose of Narcan was sufficient to revive [...].
[brief] ’”  Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff, 467 N.J. Super. 532, 615 (2021) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1).  Ejectment “is addressed to matters involving both claims to possession by a [landowner] as well as claims by him – real or constructive – to title to the realty. ”  J&M Land Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank ex rel. Meyer, 166 N.J. 493, 520 (2001).  To succeed in an ejectment action, the party seeking ejectment has the burden of establishing title.  Phoenix Pinelands Corp., 467 N.J. Super.  at 615.  The party seeking ejectment “must recover upon the strength of [its] own title, and . . . cannot rely upon the weakness of that of [its] adversary. ”  Ibid.  Here, [...] can demonstrate its ownership of the subject Property is “free from all reasonable doubt. ”  Id. at 619.  There is no reasonable dispute that [...] is the deeded owner of the lot in question.  Additionally, both the secret [...] and the [...] confirm [...]’s ownership of the Property.  Therefore, [...]’s interference with that ownership, even if [...]’s interference amounts to sporadic trespasses onto [...]’s Property for purposes of spillover parking, is wrongful and contrary to [...]’s property rights.  Accordingly, [...] is the clear record owner of the Property and the Order granting summary judgment must, respectfully, be upheld on these grounds.
[brief] [270 N.J. Super. at 470.]  The panel viewed the breach of contract claim asserted in the first action, and the prescriptive easement claim asserted in the second action, as sufficiently related to warrant preclusion of the second action.  By the same standard, even if [...] had never raised his express easement theory in his summary judgment motion and it was never addressed by [...] at all, the entire controversy doctrine still precluded [...] from raising it in this case.
[brief] Motion to Vacate  Final Judgment  Filed on February 2, 2023  92a-101a  Certification of [...]  102a-107a  Exhibit A - Deed from Essex County Register 108a-109a  Exhibit B - Frequently Asked Questions 110a-111a  Exhibit C - Tax Account Detail  Inquiry from the [...] 112a-115a  Exhibit D - Certificate of Sale 116a  Exhibit E - Copies of Checks 117a-127a  Exhibit F - [...] Zoning Board 128a-133a  Exhibit G - Proposal 134a  Exhibit H - Picture of Property 135-142a
[brief] That section 12.06 of the 1961 Code provided for the Site Plan requirement is confirmed by the Ordinance adopted by [...] on October 14, 1965 (Da254) that changed Section 12.06 Site Plan Requirements as to time for submission prior to the Hearing.  To further confirm that Site Plans were required in [...] in the 1960’s, several [...] articles were submitted in rebuttal showing Site Plan requirements were in force and existence:  1.  July 20, 1962 ([...]), Details that new apartment complex would be subject to a Site Plan requirement to be required by an Ordinance to be adopted August 1962 (Da257).  2.  March 15, 1963 ([...]), Details Site Plan Ordinance to be amended to provide Planning Board has final approval (Da258).  3.  March 20, 1963 ([...]), Details “change” in Site Plan Ordinance to require survey by licensed surveyor (Da259).  4.  November 20, 1963 ([...]), Details that Site Plan for a nursery/garden supply business was approved, and that a Site Plan for a 40 unit apartment building was denied by the Planning Board because it proposed parking in the front yard which was not permitted (that site is relatively near the school site) (Da260).  5.  March 19, 1969 ([...]), Details that Site Plan approval was granted by the Planning Board for three office buildings at 4th and Madison Avenue (also near the school) (Da261).  These Exhibits further demonstrate that the [...]’s bald claim and the Courts critical finding --- that there was no Site Plan Ordinance or requirement prior to 1984 --- was certainly not true and were offered and accepted improperly.  Site Plan requirements were in effect in 1961 (or perhaps even earlier).  The Trial Court’s acceptance of the improperly submitted documents to arrive at the false conclusion that “the Ordinance which created review of site development plans was only adopted by [...] Township in December 1984” (Da280) was clearly in error --- even the Site Plan application in 1972 for the school expansion (Da13) certainly established the existence of such Site Plan requirement in 1972.  The Trial Court actions in accepting these documents and relying on same for a demonstrable false critical finding clearly require invalidation.
[brief] In ascertaining the appropriate analysis that a court should conduct in order to determine what types of issues should be construed as “genuine” and what types should be deemed of “an insubstantial nature,” the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the more lenient federal standard of summary judgment predicated on the law espoused in *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio*, 475 U.S. 574 (1986), *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (parallel citations omitted).
[brief] (7T76:2-13)  First, [...] admitted that "... when one receives a riparian grant, they are acquiring title to the land which is under the water; tidally flowed water ...".  That is the law.  But when further questioned: "If someone acquires a riparian right, does he also acquire title to land which is lying beneath the water?" where the answer to this question is clearly "no" by virtue of the Supreme Court's holding in Panetta after a period of silence and attempt to avoid the simple question, and unwilling to be the person that put the proverbial "nail in the coffin" of [...]'s entire argument, [...] finally answered: "Sitting here today I have no opinion on the question."
[brief] Da401.  On January 28, 2022, the trial court issued an Order partially granting the Borough’s motion, stating “any claims for loss of view and privacy due to off-site conditions are precluded. ”  Da444.  On March 1, 2022 Appellant produced his engineering expert, [...], P.E., author of the Watermen Report, for deposition.  Da456.  Thereafter, the Borough again moved to bar Appellant’s engineering report and portions of Appellant’s appraisal report.  Pa446.  The Borough re-filed the motion as [...] failed to set forth any scientific or technical data or objective analysis in support of his opinion that the newly-repaired seawall actually increases the likelihood of wave action causing flooding upon Appellant’s property.  Pa48.  On October 7, 2022 the trial court granted the Borough’s motion.  Da503.  On August 17, 2023, a consent final judgment was entered in the amount of $16,500, with Appellant expressly retaining the rights to file a timely notice of appeal of the prior orders striking certain of the owner’s expert reports and damage claims.  Da505.  Appellant filed the notice of appeal on October 4, 2023 (Da508) and an amended notice of appeal on October 10, 2023 (Da513).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] Application for temporary protective order a.  (1)  Any person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, and who is not eligible for a restraining order as a “victim of domestic violence” as defined by the provisions of subsection d.  of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), may, except as provided in subsection b. of this section, file an application with the Superior Court pursuant to the Rules of Court alleging the commission of such conduct or attempted conduct and seeking a temporary protective order.
[brief] (Pa0093.)  [...] provided a Preliminary Report on Initial Sampling regarding Phase I investigation to [...] on November 6, 1987, advising that chlorinated volatile organic compounds (“CVOCs”) were detected in elevated levels in groundwater.  (Pa0093.)  No remedy was outlined and the report indicated that additional study would be required in additional phases of the investigation.  [...] subsequently engaged in Phase II and Phase III investigations.  [...] also engaged in sampling of soil and groundwater, sediments, surface water, fish tissue and soil gas.  (Pa0093.)  After further investigation and subsequent negotiations, [...] and the [...] entered into an Administrative Order on Consent, [...] (“the Consent Order”) in September 1993.
[brief] (2T 28-1 to 10)  [...] applied for a search warrant.  His application did not mention the supposed smell of marijuana.  (2T 60-20 to 73-25, 88-17 to 22)  The trial court found that it was very unlikely that the specific marijuana found in the car could be detected.  (2T 147-25 to 148-11)  The court speculated in its opinion that “there could have been far larger amounts of marijuana that had just recently been removed from the vehicle[,]” but “acknowledge[d] that there is no evidence of any other marijuana recently being in the car[.]”  (Da 18)  There was no assertion that [...] dealt any marijuana.  A search warrant for the car was granted and executed, revealing money, heroin, and cocaine in the trunk, as well as heroin in the glove compartment.
[brief] The “discovery rule” is an equitable rule.  “By operation of the discovery rule, the accrual date is tolled from the date of the tortious injury or act until the injured party either does not know his injury or does not know that a third-party is responsible for the injury. ”  McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 475 (2011).  Whether the discovery rule applies depends upon “whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence, that he or she was injured due to the fault of another.  *Caravaggio v. D’Agostini*, 166 N.J. 237, 246 (2001).  The Plaintiff has maintained throughout the matter that drainage issues existed on the Property for many years.  However, Plaintiff is not an engineer and the first time that she discovered that the pool was damaged due to drainage issues was when the Township advised her to bury the pool, and provided her with a municipal permit to bury the pool.  Therefore, any claim regarding damage to the pool would have accrued in June 2018 and not time-barred under the six (6) year statute of limitations.
[brief] ”  Pa77.  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  Pa79.  No “close date” appears on the document.  Pa79.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.
[brief] 20T 153-14 to 154-22)  [...], a next-door neighbor of the [...], testified that he heard two shots, one right after the other, at 5:45 p.m. on January 9, and wrote down the time when he heard them.  (17T 8-2 to 9-25; 17T 12-17 to 19)  Another neighbor, [...], heard “a loud bang” (singular, not plural) between 5:30 and 6 p.m., he testified.  (17T 145-15 to 22; 17T 153-18 to 20)  [...], a neighbor who turned over the security footage to [...], also testified that he heard what sounded like two M-80 firecrackers at about 5:45 p.m. on January 9.  (19T 184-1 to 18; 19T 199-1 to 23)  FBI Agent [...] testified to locations of various people based on cell-phone call data.
[brief] Rb28–30.  Respondent points to no mistake, surprise, excusable, neglect, nor any defense at all.  Instead, it only argues that (a) applies, but does not tell this Court why.  Respondent states that “the trial court considered all relevant facts” but still cannot and does not point to even one fact on which the trial court allegedly relied.  This is not sufficient, especially where our merits brief concentrated on the absence of any facts relied upon by the trial court to justify vacating the judgment.  Turning to (f), Respondent posits two arguments, first, that it was prevented from redeeming, and, second, that the property wasn’t really abandoned.
[brief] Furthermore, she properly considered Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Market at Robbinsville, 429 N.J. Super. 79 (2012), for the question of whether a lessee of a single unit in a shopping center owes a common law duty to a patron to maintain the common parking lot.  As this Court defined it, the case “concern[ed] whether a commercial tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center owes a duty to its patrons to maintain an area of the parking lot that the landlord is contractually obligated to maintain. ”