ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Sur-reply | Pa143 | | *(Most relevant pages)* | | | [...]'s proposed version of the consent order | Pa150 | | The mutually agreeable modified version of the consent order | Pa155 | | Yellow pages from 2 phone books, showing that [...] is mainly a junkyard | Pa157 | | Trial Court's Feb 28, 2023 order on motion and all cross motions | Pa169 | | This Court's Apr 3, 2023 order on Plaintiff's Appellate motions | Pa171 | | Plaintiff's Apr 19, 2023 Amended Notice of Appeal (and CIS) | Pa173 | | [...]'s Apr 28, 2023 opposition to my Appellate motions | Pa177 | | This Court's May 11, 2023 orders on Plaintiff's Appellate motions | Pa179 | | The Jun 3, 2023 email from case manager pausing the appeal | Pa182 | | The NJ Supreme Court's Jul 13, 2023 ruling on my motion | Pa183 | | The NJ Supreme Court's Jan 23, 2024 ruling on my motion | Pa184 | | This Court's Feb 13, 2024 amended scheduling order | Pa185 | ** This was filed on Jan 3, 2023 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Opinion | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App.Div. 2009) | 46, 47 | | Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124 (App.Div. 1999) | 31 | | Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123 (App.Div. 2019) | 45 | | Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 105 (App.Div. 1966) | 21 | | Caputo v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 498 (App.Div. 1997) | 18, 21 | | Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd., 234 N.J. 403 (2018) | 19-20 | | Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C.Cir.1980) | 42 | | Copeland v. Clafin, 12 N.J. Super. 10 (App.Div.1951) | 21 | | Crescent Pk. Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971) | 19, 29, 33 | | DeBrango v. Summit Bancorp, 328 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 2000) | 44 | | Eastampton Center, LLC v. Planning Board of Eastampton, 354 NJ Super. 171 (App.Div. 2002) | 38 | Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 169 (Law Div. 1991)
[brief] In *Estate of D’Avila v. [...] Schnitzer East*, 442 N.J. Super. 80, 115 (App. Div. 2015), the court held:  “We reject [...]'s argument that the “whether or not” phraseology contained in the contract's indemnity provision created a fatal ambiguity that limits its obligation to indemnify [...] for its own negligence.  Nor do we agree with [...] that the indemnity language here is internally inconsistent.  The only limitation that applies stems from the statute, *N.J.S.A.* 2A:40A-1, precluding an enforceable duty to indemnify a party that is solely negligent, not applicable here. ”  *D’Avila* at 115.  Contrary to defendant/appellant’s incredulous assertions, the *Estate of D’Avila v. [...]*, supra, case can definitively be reconciled with *Englert v. The Home Depot*, 192 N.J. 70 (2007).
[brief] In Devli – a partnership dispute in which the defendant (like the [...] here) was found to have engaged in a systematic and deliberate campaign of theft and deceit designed to loot the assets of the parties’ joint real estate venture – this Court affirmed the Trial Court’s award of punitive damages in an amount equal to 2.3 times the compensatory damages suffered by the plaintiff, emphasizing that defendant -- as the managing co-venturer, had a fiduciary obligation to his co-venturers, and that he breached that obligation.  In his position of management and control, [defendant] treated the venture’s bank accounts as his own, knowing ... [plaintiff] would not be monitoring or reviewing the day-to-day activities.  He freely moved money in and out of venture accounts, into and through his personal accounts.  ...  The net result of his actions is that he withdrew from the venture substantial sums that belonged to [plaintiff] ... by abuse of his fiduciary position.  ***
[directive] Moreover, Guideline 3(d) permits the court to consider additional factors relating to the respondent's mental health (factors 12 of through 15), but only after the court finds one or more the behavioral factors (factors (1) through (11)).  The petition also includes questions concerning the firearms and ammunition possessed by the respondent, including the number, types, physical description, and the present location(s) of any firearm(s) and ammunition.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(b).  The petitioner may also provide or relevant documentation to support the petition.  Prior to the petition being filed completed the in PROS system, the petitioner will be asked to certify that the statements the petition are true in of if and that, any the statements are willfully false, he or she is subject to punishment.
[brief] The Administrator attached evidence of the pressure in his exhibits to the certification, as follows:  (1)  Exhibit C is a lengthy email from Plaintiff’s counsel pushing for a deposition of Defendant’s immigration status through his immigration counsel.  (Da35)  (2)  Exhibit D is an email from Plaintiff’s attorney to the Administrator enclosing “an analysis” of [...] and insisting that he pursue the same.  (Da38)  (3)
[brief] The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Denying the Last-Minute Amendment  One business day before trial, Respondent moved to amend his Answer and Cross-Petition to raise a new legal theory challenging a ballot that had been rejected by the [...] because the voter bubbled in three circles – two for candidates and one for a personal choice.  While leave to amend may generally be “freely given” under Rule 4:9-1, that principle does not extend to last-minute amendments that inject new legal claims based on information available weeks earlier.  See Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super. 448, 484 (App. Div. 2012) (affirming denial of leave to amend where the new claims would prejudice the opposing party and the only justification was inadvertence).  Respondent misrepresents the standard by which a motion to amend should be considered by a trial court.
[brief] However his motion for sanctions was made under R. 1:4-8 and not the statute.  (See Pa75).  And in his Oct 17, 2022 certification in further support of his motion for sanctions (i.e. in reply to my Oct 10, 2022 opposition), he made the distinction that his motion for sanctions was based on the rule and not based on the statute, thus arguing that Lewis v. Lewis, 132 NJ 541 (1993) was inapplicable.  (See Pa107).  But the distinction is moot, as this Court has clearly held that either under the statute, and/or under the rule, the party seeking sanctions must show bad faith.
[brief] ”); In re GGI Props., LLC, 568 B.R. 231, 249 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017) (voiding the transfer of property pursuant to the New Jersey TSL as a fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548); In re Elam, 194 B.R. 412, 415 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996) (noting debtor may bring avoidance action pursuant to Sections 522(h) and 549); In re Wentworth, 197 F. App’x 579 (9th Cir. 2006) (trustee, pursuant to Section 545, may avoid statutory lien enforced at foreclosure sale prior to filing of the bankruptcy case); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy P 522.12.  Additionally, I observe Congress has amended the Bankruptcy Code to aid debtors in preserving ownership of their homes via payment of arrearages of the course of a plan.  Other courts have noted that “[t]he flexibility permitted in the formulation of Chapter 13 plans represents a central element in the implementation of the Congressional goal to encourage expanded use of Chapter 13.  A main area of expansion was the Code’s recognition of the desire of homeowners to save their homes through Chapter 13.  . . .
[brief] Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants [...]  DATED: September 16, 2024  [...]; [...]; AND [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...]; [...]; [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF FILED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS, [...] AND [...], IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS’ APPEAL
[brief] Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."  Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.  A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.  The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.
[brief] The court concluded that the vibration damages were not compensable in a condemnation case and were not a consequence of the taking.  The court found that damages are limited to the impact of the property lost in itself and any impacts on the remainder caused by the “completed” or “finished” project for which the property was taken.  The court construed Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214 N.J. 384 (2013) to limit just compensation to positive and negative impacts at the time of the taking and that “anything that might take place as part of constructing the project would not have been known at the time of the taking. ”  The court concluded that just compensation does not include physical damage to structures that may have been caused by work performed during the public project.  The court reasoned that any physical damage to the house by the project was not a consequence of the actual taking or the property itself having been taken.  The court distinguished State v. William G. Rohrer, Inc., 80 N.J. 462 (1979) on the basis that the partial taking therein actually included part of the owner’s building.  The court indicated consideration of the claimed damages was inconsistent with the summary nature of a condemnation action.  The court also concluded that making the condemnor responsible for its contractors would impose strict liability on a condemnor.  Overall, the court concluded that damages to the house on the remainder for vibrations during construction of the seawall were not damages as a consequence of the taking.
[brief] (10T111-17 to 25, 112-7 to 8, 114-1 to 10, 115-4 to 9, 117-8 to 13, 118-19 to 22, 120-23 to 1, 121-6 to 9, 121-16 to 22, 127-19 to 128-24, 131-17 to 132-14, 142-6 to 11, 145-6 to 9, 148-18 to 149-23, 154-1 to 14)  [...] thought the shooter was [...].  She had only “seen him around a few times” and did not really know him; she tried to learn [...]’s real name prior to speaking to police.  She said the shooter wore blue jeans and “definitely” had a tattoo under his eye, and did not remember any tattoos or distinctive markings on his hands.  (10T118-3 to 5, 126-13 to 17, 136-1 to 10, 136-24 to 137-3)  [...] first said she was looking out the living room window prior to the shooting.  She saw a man she knew as [...] walk across the highway; heard the shot; saw the shooter drop the shirt covering his face and the gun, and run “[s]traight across the highway,” where no one else was.  [...] was in the kitchen, [...] by the TV, and [...] was not there.
[brief] If the Board is going to attempt to “drill down” into [...]’s dataset, and criticize its components (or lack thereof), it should at least have some empirical basis upon which to support it.  As a qualified expert in traffic engineering, [...] used his specialized skillset and knowledge to offer an opinion, based on the [...] and the traffic study, as well as known outcomes from two warehouse buildings on the other side of Interstate 295, also on Florence-Columbus Road, to conclude that the proposed 48 foot structures would not generate more traffic than the permitted (but unmarketable) 30 foot buildings simply because of the increased height.  The Board’s unsupported and unsubstantiated assumptions underlying its wholesale rejection of Mr. [...]’s credible and unrebutted expert testimony were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] In keeping within the confines of its limited jurisdiction, and with the benefit of a remand and Special Master’s report, the Supreme Court “concludes” that the SFRA “is constitutional to the extent” the record before the Court “permitted its review. ”  _Abbott XX_, 199 N.J. at 146.  The Court then allowed the State to apply the SFRA formula “in Abbott districts. ”  _Id._  The Court also granted the State’s request to end implementation of the “separate funding streams” in those districts mandated by the Court “under past remedial orders. ” _Id._, at 147.  But the Supreme Court also imposed future conditions on its determination that SFRA is constitutional and, therefore, could be applied by the State to remedy the violation of T&E in Abbott districts.
[brief] (3T 12-10 to 23; 13-23 to 24)  The court concluded its Yarbough analysis by saying, “[t]hese were separate and distinct crimes committed against this victim and it deserves the imposition of separate or consecutive sentences. ”  (6T 47-9 to 11)  Nowhere in its analysis did the sentencing court identify which of the Yarbough factors it was considering.  But the nature of the court’s commentary suggests it only considered factor (c), as the analysis was limited to the false belief that the crimes “occurred at separate times, some eight months apart.
[brief] On appeal, defendant alleges that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of the officer who attested to and submitted the search warrant affidavit, and alleges that “it is impossible to know whether [the officer] knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that created a falsehood in applying for a warrant. ” (Db38-Db39).  The State disagrees because defendant does not provide evidence, or even identify, what facts were allegedly falsified in the warrant, just that it is “impossible to know” without a hearing.  The State asks this Court to affirm because defendant failed to prove need for a Franks hearing, or even what statements or facts are even in dispute.  To overcome the presumption of validity associated with a search warrant, there must be allegations that the affiants deliberately lied or recklessly disregarded the truth.
[brief] On October 3, 2014, the [...] newspaper published that the [...] had arrested [...] and charged him with theft and credit card theft.  (P546a; 7T186:16-18).  When news of [...]’s arrest was circulating throughout the small community of Brigantine, Decedent was distraught in light of [...]’s continuing relationship with Respondent and Decedent expressed worry about Respondent’ reputation and standing in the community.
[brief] (1T-7T).  The plaintiff was experiencing health issues unrelated to the injuries she sustained as a result of the subject incident and was unable to appear for trial.\(^2\) (Pa33; 1T5:13-18; 3T68:14-69:1).  Both the defendant and the Court were advised of the plaintiff’s unrelated health condition prior to the start of trial.  (Pa33; 6T159:22-160:4).  Plaintiff’s counsel advised the jury that the plaintiff would not be coming to Court because she is unavailable during his opening statement.  (3T58:12-16).  The jury was then instructed by the Trial Court that the plaintiff was unavailable and that they were not to speculate as to why she was not at trial.  (3T68:14-39:1).  On the first day of trial, the Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to bar evidence of the handicapped placard and parking in a handicapped parking --- \(^2\)  The plaintiff passed away on July 3, 2023 after trial was concluded.
[brief] Ibid.  [...] had personally searched [...] for drugs and weapons, and had not found anything in his bags or pockets while he was with her.  (17T:48-13 to 50-14).  [...] testified that she observed that [...] was acting strange, in that he would laugh at inappropriate times and mumbled to himself at times.  (17T:44-18 to 47-18).  He had refused her offer to take him to a behavioral health center, however, and [...] never feared for her safety or observed any tendency towards violence from [...] at any point.  Ibid.  Indeed, they were friends, and she had no reservations about him staying with her and no concerns for her safety at any point, despite any past mental health or substance-abuse issues.  (17T:29-14 to 32-7).  [...] testified that she had no worries for her safety with [...], and no concern for anyone else’s safety in his presence on January 9, 2019.  (17T:58-13 to 21, 66-2 to 14).
[brief] ”  Id.; see also Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 613 (2000); Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 3 F.Supp.2d 504, 514 n.5 (D.N.J. 1998); aff’d on other grounds, 179 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1999).  The Trial Court judge herein, [...], J.S.C. (“[...]”), unequivocally erred by finding Plaintiff’s complaints to Defendants pursuant to N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) and N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a) did not allege the specific regulation details outlined within, which is in direct contravention to CEPA’s objective pursuant to Mehlman.
[brief] ”  (1T 11-7 to 11-12)  When asked again, he responded: “The pedestrians that would come onto the set.”  (1T 11-19 to 11-20)  The detectives then directed marked patrol units to go into the area and “conduct stops. ”  (1T 11-24 to 11-25)  In addition to their “heavy” clothing, [...] testified, the decision to stop the men was based on “several factors”: “recent violence in the area”; “that area in particular is very -- poorly lit”; and “the observation of the foot traffic coming in, one of them males breaking off, leading pedestrians [and] concealing themselves in between cars. ”  (1T 17-19 to 17-24)  According to [...], “concealing themselves in between cars is very common as well.  It hides the narcotics dealers from law enforcement when they're riding by. ”  (1T 17-25 to fashion brands, like [...] and [...], showing up on the runways of Paris and dominating New York Fashion Week.
[brief] [...] REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RETURN OF MONIES:  EXHIBIT  A Case Management Scheduling Order Entered by The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. filed July 15, 2019 (attached to Defendant’s Reply Brief to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Notice of Motion to Compel Return of Monies Paid Pursuant to June 27, 2017  Order and March 6, 2018  Order Vacated by the Appellate Division dated January 6, 2020)  **February 5, 2020  Order Denying Defendant [...]’s Motion to Compel Return of Monies. **  DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DATED AUGUST 26, 2019
[brief] [...] argues that the Trial Court erred in three ways: 1) in failing to find that [...] waived its ROFR within 30 days of January 17, 2023; 2) in finding that the May 8, 2023 amendment triggered a new 30-day ROFR period; and 3) in failing to find that the 30-day period ran from May 4, 2023, when a partially signed amendment was circulated by [...].  A thorough review of the record and of the Trial Court’s decision evinces [...]’s misunderstandings as to the fundamental requirements of the ROFR terms, contractual interpretation, and the general principles of equity.  All three arguments are wholly without merit.  A.
[brief] ”  DepoLink, 430 N.J. Super. at 338 (quoting Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen, 390 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (App.Div.2007)). which either the plaintiff or the collection agency violated.  While defendant points to the collection agency's violation of the FDCPA, it is not a regulation under the CFA.
[brief] The [...] has a “weak Mayor” form of government whereby the Mayor has only those powers authorized under N.J.S.A. 40A:60-5.  That statute provides that the Mayor shall not even vote on matters to come before the governing body, except in the case of a tie.  In no way does N.J.S.A. 40A:60-5 authorize the Mayor to enter into or bind the municipality contractually without the authorization of the Council, which is the legislative body of the municipality.  The powers of the Council are set forth at N.J.S.A. 40A:60-6.  That statute specifically sets forth that one on the powers of the Council is to “pass, adopt, amend and repeal any ordinance or, where permitted, any resolution for any purpose required for the government of the municipality or for the accomplishment of any public purpose for which the municipality is authorized to act under general law. “  Clearly the ability of [...] to enter into a contract is vested, statutorily, in the Council.  It is just as clear, pursuant to the same section of the Ordinance, that the only way that the Council can act is through its ability to pass, adopt, amend and repeal any ordinance, or where permitted, any resolution.  No such ordinance or resolution has been presented by [...] or [...] that even hints at any agreement by the Borough regarding [...] let alone approves of a specific agreement.
[brief] The same principles that govern Plaintiff’s false arrest claim under the NJCRA and §1983 apply to his excessive force claim under those same statutes.  An excessive force claim stemming from an investigatory stop or arrest arises under the Fourth Amendment.  “The use of excessive force is itself an unlawful ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment. ”  Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006).  Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons … against unreasonable … seizures’ of the person.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
[brief] ”  State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209, 249 (1964).  In fact, the authority in this State has remained settled for decades—the defense is entitled to inspect and use prior notes or statements on cross-examination if the “prior notes or statements relat[e] to the subject matter of [the witness’s] testimony. ”  Hunt, 25 N.J. at 531.  In other words, in a criminal case, as long as a witness’s prior statement relates to his or her testimony, the statement is subject to disclosure.
[brief] ]  The Second Count of the First Amended Complaint alleges that [...]’s conduct violated the New Jersey Worker Health and Safety Act, N.J.S.A. 34:6A et seq. Ja46, ¶2.  The alleged violations include failing to provide a place of employment that was reasonably safe, failing to install and maintain protective devices and safeguards, rendering safety devices and safeguards ineffective, and numerous unidentified regulations adopted pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act.  Id. at ¶2(a)-(d).  Plaintiff contends that this conduct “resulted in a substantial risk of physical injury inherent in the nature of the specific work operation assigned to Plaintiff. ”  Id. at ¶3.  It is then alleged that as a result of this “grossly negligent and/or intentional wrongdoing” by [...] Plaintiff suffered significant injuries.  Id. at ¶4.  The Third Count of the First Amended Complaint asserts a claim for coverage against [...].