ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE COURT:  “I – the problem I have here – and I’m struggling with, uh, is that, um, we don’t know at all.  It – you know, it could have been, quite frankly, and – and again, tell me how I get past this, because um – how about, we don’t know whether he wasn’t – he was carrying a bunch of things in his arms, maybe he was carry – he was carry debris to the – he said – I think that’s a fact issue, right?  Isn’t that a fact?  He was carrying – [...]:  Well, he – well, we don’t know whether he threw it out yet or whether he was holding onto it or – THE COURT:  Oh, I thought he said he was going towards the – he was going towards the dumpster, he had – [...]: -- right.  THE COURT: -- debris in his arms, and maybe, -- we don’t know, I’m not – again, he was –he didn’t look down, uh, you know, didn’t see there was a log on the ground or the plywood on the – that – those are the situations where a jury can, um, determine was it his carrying of the logs that caused him not to look, or was it the – the fact that he tripped over the plywood?  Because he said he tripped on the plywood.  That’s not what we have here.  So, they determine what was really the proximate cause of this?  Was it he – [...]: Well, and he – THE COURT: -- (indiscernible) down or the lighting was poor, or – that’s when we – when juries are entitled to determine proximate cause.  Really what was the cause?  In this case, what was the cause?  You tell me what caused him to fall, you tell them what caused him to fall.  (T28:11-T29:25).
[brief] This case is a perfect example of the Souter/Ginsburg policy concerns about trumped up charges.  Taking PTI can also be seen as a mitigation of damages for all involved.\(^{15}\) \(^{15}\) PTI was delayed, which we claim is harassment and retaliation.  In August 2016, the prosecutor withdrew the veto.  It was January-February 2017 before the PTI Director, Judge & Prosecutor signed papers.  Pa137 (Conf.).
[brief] ”  The validity of a redevelopment area designation is conditioned under the LRHL on whether it is “supported by substantial evidence. ”  *N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6(b)(5)(c).*  (Interestingly, the “substantial evidence” language is not found in *N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-14* governing rehabilitation designations.  The designation at issue here is not an “area in need of redevelopment,” but an “area in need of rehabilitation. ”)  Plaintiffs mistakenly invite this Court’s attention to the “substantial evidence” standard through their heavy reliance upon land use decisions of a quasi-judicial nature.  (Pb15-Pb16; see also pp. 10-13, *supra*).  Plaintiffs do not challenge, and never have challenged, the designation of the property as being in need of rehabilitation.  (Pb2).  Instead, Plaintiffs challenge the Ordinance amending the Ordinance which adopted the Redevelopment Plan (2022-17).
[brief] Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Testimony of [...]’ Regarding the Plaintiff’s Prior Medical History and Prior Falls…..1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13  Oral Ruling Set Forth on the Record on June 12, 2023
[brief] “We review a trial court's denial of a request for an adjournment ‘under an abuse of discretion standard. ’”  Escobar-Barrera v. Kissin, 464 N.J. Super. 224, 233 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Shalom Money St., LLC, 432 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2013)).  “Whether there was an abuse of discretion depends on the amount of prejudice suffered by the aggrieved party. ”  Id. (citing State v. Smith, 66 N.J. Super. 465, 468 (App. Div. 1961)).  “Thus, refusal to grant an adjournment will not lead to reversal “unless an injustice has been done. ”  Id. (citing Nadel v. Bergamo, 160 N.J. Super. 213, 218 (App. Div. 1978)).  To evaluate whether Defendant was prejudiced by the lack of an adjournment, Defendant should make some allegation of prejudice.
[directive] The Guidelines are contained in Appendix A, attached to this DIRECTIVE.  These Guidelines shall be used by all law enforcement agencies in, and of, this State.  5.  Under the provisions of P.L. 2001, c. 69, §1, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, (John’s Law), Guidelines for the implementation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23, Requiring the Mandatory 12-hour Impoundment of the Motor Vehicle Operated by a Person Arrested for a Violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI) and/or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 (Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing), are established pursuant to this DIRECTIVE.  The Guidelines are contained in Appendix B, attached to this DIRECTIVE.  These Guidelines shall be used by all law enforcement agencies in, and of, this State.
[brief] State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 245 (1996).  However, “[w]ithout bad faith on the part of the State, ‘failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. ’ ”  Id. (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988)); See State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91, 102–03 (App. Div. 2009).  To determine if a due process violation has occurred in the instance of loss, destruction, or suppression of physical evidence in a criminal trial, courts consider: (1) “whether there was bad faith ... on the part of the government”; (2) “whether the evidence ... was sufficiently material to the defense”; and (3) “whether [the] defendant was prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the evidence.
[brief] [...] testified that the [...] operation had no delivery trucks ever.  (T1 at 101:11-13).  She said that [...]’s operation is “different. ”  The menu is more expansive now, as it is not just pizzas.  The amount of truck traffic from deliveries is scary.  There is no sidewalk and her son has to walk in the street to friends’ houses and the K and U-turns by trucks on her street are dangerous.  Many times garbage is left out and is overflowing and [...]’s operation also dumps fluid in the street.  The hours of operation are much more from [...] and the number of days in the week is much greater.  It is as if there is never a break from this operation next to her.  There is definitely more noise now than when [...] was operating it.  This is from trucks that idle, many of them refrigeration trucks, and trucks backing up and the beeping sound when they back up.  These noises occur early in the morning.  The diesel smell from the diesel trucks she can smell in her house and is objectionable.  There are definitely safety issues with children, including hers as well as the children from the school trying to walk across the crosswalk where trucks are parked in front of the stop sign and many times on the crosswalk and also with the trucks making K and U-turns.  Her quality of life with [...]’s operation is one hundred percent different than it was with the [...] operation.  (T1 at 101:18-23; 102:1-5; 101:6-12; 101:13-22; 103:1-15; 103:16-24; 103:25-104:1; 104:16-21; 104:22-24; 105:16-106:11; 108:17-25).
[brief] [...] repeatedly suggests that [...]’s obligation to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is tied to the due diligence period.  However, the PSA clearly separates the due diligence timeline from the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate delivery timeline, which extends to the closing date; (2) [...] misconstrues a central element of [...]’s argument, which hinges on the fact that [...] was not required to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate; and (3) [...] focuses on what it perceives to be the estoppel certificate’s broader role but fails to engage with the specific and distinct contractual mechanics that govern termination rights.  In sum, [...] provides no textual basis for its claim that receipt of a non-acceptable estoppel certificate triggers an automatic right to terminate.
[brief] Additionally, while such application is pending, the court may stay all proceedings in the action, including discovery and any pending motions.  *Id.* § 2A:53A-52(a)(1).  In ruling on an order to show cause, the court “shall dismiss with prejudice” an action where the plaintiff “fail[s] to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted” or cannot “establish a prima facie case as to each essential element” of any claim.  *Id.* § 2A:53A-55(a)(3).  Crucially, UPEPA provides that “[a] voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a responding party’s cause of action, or part of a cause of action, that is the subject of an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c. 155 (C.2A:53A-51) does not affect a moving party’s right to obtain a ruling on the order to show cause and seek costs, attorney’s fees, and expenses under section 10 of P.L.2023, c. 155 (C.2A:53A-58).
[brief] D.  Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ rights to Substantive and Procedural Due Process under the New Jersey Constitution by depriving Plaintiffs of their previously vested property rights.  (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).  The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides:  “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall … deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. ”  The New Jersey Constitution Article I, par. 1 also protects a person’s right to acquire, possess, and protect property.  Retroactive legislation that impairs or destroys a “vested right” may violate the due process clauses of the federal, U.S. Constitution amendment XIV, section 1, or state, N.J. Constitution Art. 1, ¶1, constitutions.  Twiss v. State, 124 N.J. 461, 469 (1991).  In this matter, Plaintiffs have a contractual property right in the form of deferred compensation as set forth at length in Point III, A, (pages 29-24 above).  Defendants have destroyed Plaintiffs’ vested rights by way of retroactively capping their deferred terminal pay to $15,000.  Based upon the foregoing, the Trial Court erred when it reconsidered Defendants' R. 4:6-2e motion.
[brief] It led to unwarranted, decimating depletion of $93,277 (31%) from my estimate of less than $300K in Trust assets, as of Mar. '23.  (see above Statements of Facts, p. 8 to p. 10, 1st 2 lines; response to [...] Oct. 26, '22 Affidavit, p. 27-29; p. 33-40, par. 30-36)  It appears that the Judge did spend a lot of time for trying to determine a smaller amount ($93,277) from requested $113,497 for Trust reimbursement.
[brief] Defendants’ Unlawful Conduct Violated the Consumer Fraud Act**  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) unequivocally defines Defendants’ conduct as “crime of the fourth degree. ”  Moreover, there is no dispute that [...] was unlicensed when it acquitted [...]’s debt and enlisted [...] for unlawful collection of the same.  Nor is there any dispute that [...], “as a purchaser of debt . . . meets the definition of consumer lender” under N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2.  See *[...]* 1, Civil Action No. 20-cv-5024, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44747, at *12.  Nonetheless, the trial court determined that Defendants’ debt collection activity, including [...]’s attempt to collect its own debt, was not subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise within the ambit of the CFA.  However, “collecting or enforcing a loan, whether by the lender or its assignee, constitutes the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, an activity falling within the coverage of the CFA. ”  *Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 207 N.J. 557, 577-78 (2011) (quoting *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session*, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 538 (App. Div. 2008)).  The holding in *Gonzalez* is as clear as it is broad—debt collection activity constitutes “subsequent performance” under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  To hold otherwise would yield absurd results—the original creditor would violate the CFA, but an assignee would not for the same unlawful commercial practice.  Further, courts have consistently held that the CFA is remedial and should be broadly construed to affect its purposes.
[brief] (7T39-24 to 40-25; 7T74-9 to 77-8; Da18).  The videos captured defendants before the shooting, the shooting itself, defendants fleeing, the search for evidence, and the discovery of the firearms and mask.  (Da18).  The video also showed that a silver sedan was relevant to the investigation.  Specifically, a review of the video showed defendant arrive at the scene of the shooting in a silver vehicle that was consistent with a silver 2017 Chevy Malibu, which is owned by [...], the mother of defendant’s children, and which she testified defendant drove on the night of the homicide.  (5T16-24 to 17-9; Da18).  And, co-defendant [...] was stopped later that night at 9:45 p.m., in East Orange driving the Chevy Malibu.  (4T186-4 to 188-23; 4T196-2 to 8).  Jurors were shown side-by-side photo comparisons of stills from the video surveillance and the reenactment of [...]’s silver 2017 Chevy Malibu vehicle driving through the area of the shooting.  (7T195-7 to 22; 8T42-12 to 54-9).
[directive] 4 © 2017 [...]  ODARA Scoring Form  Raw Score (sum of Items scored 1)  _____ Number of Missing or Unknown (“?”)  Items  _____ ODARA Final Score (use Prorating Table if indicated)  _____  PRORATING TABLE  Only use if 1 or more Items are scored as missing or unknown (“?”), indicating the Item might be present but the available documentation or information is unclear or incomplete.  Note:  The ODARA can be scored with up to 5 missing Items.  The ODARA cannot be interpreted if 6 or more items are scored as “?”
[brief] The highest-profile wrongful identification of a suspect based on fingerprint analysis, the case of [...], dramatically shows the risks with this method.  After terrorists detonated bombs in trains in Madrid, the FBI ran a fingerprint found on a bag of detonators through the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).  Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of the [...] Case 1 (March 2006), available at https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0601/final.pdf.
[brief] Many courts in the past with greater wisdom than the author of this Reply determined that the burden should be on the enriched party within a confidential relationship to prove that he or she is entitled to the benefit, not for the fleeced party to have to prove that they are entitled to their own money as if there had been no confidential relationship dealings.  Here, the only proof that Defendants offered was self-serving testimony, devoid of empirical evidence.  When we look at the health and well-being of the parties, we see that [...] is younger and well educated, while [...] is old, frail and uneducated.  To blind oneself to the reality that the old man was taken advantage of, is another flu-like symptom that the lower court’s opinion would infect upon our jurisprudence.  Another central issue, is whether it was better and in the interests of [...] Matos for him to own his own home when that home was being purchased with his own money, or to allow [...] to own it.
[brief] [1T 41:19-42:8]  [...] opined as to the height variance:  Again, I believe there are mitigating factors that make this property in the design before you unique.  So, this property is a stone’s throw from the boardwalk and the boardwalk is generally five to six feet in elevation above this subject property.  And this part of the boardwalk is quite unique in that we actually have development on the east side of the boardwalk in this area at the elevation of the boardwalk.  As you get further into Seaside Heights, you have a lot of development on the west side of the boardwalk that’s at street level.  In this area you actually have development on the east side of the boardwalk at boardwalk level.  [1T 42:9-22].  When questioned by Plaintiff’s counsel if lowering the building level would improve access to light and air or be a lesser violation to the zoning plan or zoning ordinance, [...] opined:  I do not believe light, air, and open space would be improved, because I don’t believe that’s impacted at that location.  When you look down Ocean Terrace, we are matching the existing setback.  When you look at the mass of the building with respect to light, air, and open space, by the design of the building being three separate buildings, I don’t believe there’s a detriment to light, air, and open space.  [1T 72:12-73:5]  Notably, [...] testified that the proposed development meets the setback on Plaintiff’s side of the property “so we would not be increasing the side yard of the west side of the property. ”  (1T 74:25-75:3).  As the Court noted in its Opinion “the design sought to construct several buildings with corridors rather than one large, massive building – these corridors provide access light and air for properties to the west.  (T44:7-15; see also, Pa20 , ¶5.J.)
[brief] THE SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AFTER FINDING THE MSRA PRECLUDES THE RELIEF SOUGHT (Pa001028–1031).  This Court should affirm the Superior Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.  In dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Superior Court aptly noted that each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action, including Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the State Constitution, “find their genesis in the capped payment of terminal leave. ” (Pa001030). 5  Every court to consider the MSRA has found that it is constitutional, as has every court that has ruled on challenges to the MSRA arising under the Takings and Contract Clauses of the State Constitution.6  The Appellate Division is no exception, and in Superior Officers explained:  However, “[t]he prohibition against impairment of contracts under the federal and state constitutions is not absolute.  It ‘must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the states to safeguard the vital interests of their residents. ’”  In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling, Stranded Costs & Restructuring Filings, 330 N.J. Super. 65, 93 (App. Div. 2000) (citation omitted).  MSRA’s findings and declarations undeniably supply the justifications for granting the State the authority to unilaterally modify the expired-but-effective CNA.
[brief] Id. at 405–06, 231 A.3d 689.  The detective also testified that he had spoken to various witnesses at the bar, including the victim, another man named [...], and “one female who didn't want to get involved. ”  Id. at 405–07, 231 A.3d 689.  The anonymous woman had identified [...] as the assailant but refused to give a formal statement.  Id. at 402, 231 A.3d 689.  The Court stressed that the detective “never repeated to the jury what the anonymous woman told officers” and, in fact, “did not imply that the woman gave police any information at all. ”  Id. at 416, 231 A.3d 689.  The Court also reiterated its emphasis in Bankston that “we were unconcerned ‘with mere possible inferences’ to be drawn. ”  Id. at 417, 231 A.3d 689 (quoting Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271, 307 A.2d 65).  On those facts, the Court concluded that “the references to the anonymous woman did not create an ‘inescapable inference’ that she implicated defendant in the attack to the police. ”  Id. at 417, 231 A.3d 689 (quoting Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271, 307 A.2d 65).  The Court “reiterate[d] that the best practice is to avoid explaining that a defendant's picture was placed in a photo array because he or she was a suspect ‘based on information received’ ” or “based on the evidence collected” as “such language can potentially sweep in inadmissible hearsay by producing the ‘inescapable inference’ that the officer obtained incriminating information about the defendant beyond the scope of the record.
[brief] First, the trial court erred in ruling that [...] lacked standing to challenge the seizure of this evidence.  Case law makes clear that a defendant has standing to challenge the seizure of evidence in which he has a participatory interest.  See State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 339 (1989).  [...] plainly has a participatory interest in the evidence seized from [...]’s car given that (a) [...] stopped [...] to investigate whether he was in the process of delivering narcotics to [...]’s storage unit, and (b) [...] relied on the narcotics found in [...]’s car in his affidavit for a search warrant for the storage unit.  As a person with a participatory interest in the evidence seized during the car stop, [...] had standing and was thus entitled to benefit from the suppression of this evidence.
[brief] (21T:154-22 to 155-2; 29T:163-4 to 176-12; 31T:39-25 to 51-4, 131-15 to 134-9).  Testimony at trial identified the gun planted near [...]’ body as belonging to defendant, (25T:159-11 to 160-4), and other testimony claimed defendant had admitted to a jailhouse informant that he shot [...] over a dispute over a laptop.  (28T:106-8 to 126-4, 130-17 to 132-21).  One of the shots was fired straight down.  (21T:94-5 to 22).  Jail calls and wiretap calls all corroborate the fact that defendant sold a false narrative to police on the night of [...]’ murder, and there was no objection to the substance of the messages coming in, merely the minute comments provided by [...].
[directive] (N.J.S.A 52:4B-52(k)).  However, the victim shall be charged pursuant to hospital policy for any services provided beyond this scope.  Victims shall be informed of the services of the VCCO and given an application form for potential reimbursement for fees associated with their victimization.  It is recommended that each non-participating facility:  provide interview and treatment areas that afford the victim privacy and security, a private bathroom, access to a shower facility, and a clean change of clothing following the medical forensic exam;  keep the SAFE Kit and DFSA/Tox Kit in the custody of the examiner until such time that it is transferred to a sworn law enforcement officer;  establish a procedure to ensure the confidentiality and security of the entire medical record, in addition to the medical forensic examination record; and  work cooperatively with the County SART Coordinator to ensure that emergency department personnel and first responders are informed about the SART’s policies and procedures.
[directive] Dat/Date  Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Haitian paj 2 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Haitian page 2 of 2  UWAGA:  Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu proszę nie podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] (Pa33)  The trial Court further found that “It runs astray of fairness under all the circumstances here to hold Defendant [...], a commercial tenant, responsible for the alleged condition of a multi-use parking lot that was regularly maintained, inspected, and used by the landlord and where there is no assignment of a duty to maintain the parking lot in the Lease. ”  (Pa33)  Respondent [...] Donuts had designated parking spots which were allocated in the lease for the use of [...] customers.  The Lease includes 971 square feet of retail commercial real estate, plus ten (10) parking spaces which are considered the “Leased Premises” in the Lease.
[brief] Legislative History of Chapter 92  In 2005, concerned that the State’s public pension systems were rife with abuse and upon the verge of a fiscal crisis in the funding of these benefits, the Legislature undertook a comprehensive study and review of these problems.  The Report of the Benefits Review Task Force to Acting Governor [...] at 3 (December 1, 2005).  The [...] issued a final report and recommendations in December 2005.  Ibid.  The Task --- 1  Because the procedural history and fact are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.