ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Pa8 at ¶45.  That data included Defendant’s account number, the identity of the healthcare service provider, the location of the healthcare services, the date of each health-related service, the creditor’s full account number, the charge for each service, the amount of the debt, the full User ID and password accessing [...]’s payment portal, and Plaintiff’s full name and mailing address.  Pa8-Pa9 at ¶46.  The data which Defendant provided to its mail vendor has a market value.  Pa9 at ¶47.  The data can be rented to list managers who can aggregate it with data from other sources and then sell the use of the mailing list.  Id.  The data can be hacked and either used or misused to profit from or invade Plaintiff’s privacy.  Id.  Defendant disclosed the data without Plaintiff’s consent and without telling Plaintiff to whom it had shared Plaintiff’s private information.  Pa8 at ¶41, Pa9 at ¶49.  “The data which [...] provided to the third-party mail vendor had a market value” ranging “from a few dollars to one hundred dollars.
[brief] [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:69 (2012) ..................................  11  [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 7 on R. 4:69-6(c) (2002)  ..............................................  4 S.Rep. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 1976, p. 5912)
[directive] Shared Municipal and Police Computer Systems  Juvenile 2A:4A-60a records pertaining to juveniles charged as N.J.S.A.  Delinquency a delinquent shall be strictly safeguarded from public inspection.  2A:4A-60h – disclosure is a disorderly persons offense N.J.S.A. Juvenile-Family  2A:4A-60a records pertaining to juveniles found to be N.J.S.A. Crisis (Runaways, part of a juvenile-family crisis shall be strictly safeguarded from Truancy, etc.) public inspection.  2A:4A-60h – disclosure is a disorderly persons offense N.J.S.A. Search Warrants Court Rule 3:5-4 – provides that it is contempt of court to R. disclose the existence or basis for a search warrant prior to execution.
[directive] MUNICIPAL RULE setting to to to to to to to $1,000 $15,000 $25,000 $10,000  Bail $5,000 $50,000 $500 or crime.  TO warrant when PURSUANT  THE substantive considered a Degree  Degree IN Degree Degree Degree Degree  Disorderly whether Persons Degree OR, 2nd 2nd ADMINISTRATOR, 3rd 3rd 3rd 4th JUDGE actual be regarding to appropriate. covered 1000 of building; the factors COURT feet as degree. within scheme. factors 500 offense.
[brief] On December 27, 2021, [...] members and several members of the public (including the plaintiff-appellant here) filed a three-count verified complaint in support of petition for election contest pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:291.  Count I asserted an election contest.  Count II sought a declaratory judgment.  Count III alleged violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:62.  The election contest was based on the following allegations: illegal votes accepted as to fifteen specific voters; legal votes rejected as to one specific voter; illegal votes accepted as to one specific ballot; and illegal use of taxpayer monies by the District.  On March 4, 2022, following oral argument on the District's second motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed count I-D, along with counts II and III with prejudice.  The trial court declined to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Reporting Act claims.  Ultimately the trial court dismissed the case.  On January 31, 2023, plaintiffs appealed the decision ([...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. Feb. 23, 2023)).
[brief] The documents do not show that defendant had the authority to sell shares of [...].  The trial court also found that the [...] franchise agreements gave the defendant the authority to sell shares and “thus [he] could not have deceived investors. ” (Sa25).  But based on [...]’s testimony and defendant’s own testimony at the motion hearing, the franchise agreements do not address ownership percentages.  (8T82-9 to 83-13; 9T12-7 to 11).  Rather, that information is set forth in the operating agreement and in a separate personal owner’s guaranty that is appended to each franchise agreement; however, no such guaranty was included with the [...] franchise agreements.  (8T82-9 to 83-13).  So even if [...] was the sole franchisee—a fact [...]’s testimony, the ADA, the [...] franchise agreement, and defendant’s own conduct disprove—the franchise agreements would not establish defendant’s authority to sell shares.
[brief] (Pa82).  The allegations underlying the FNDA, arose, primarily, out of an incident at [...]’s home on July 21, 2018 when an acquaintance of his, referred to as “[...]” suffered a medical crisis to which EMTs were summoned.  (Pa100).  The investigation into this incident then sprawled and became a wide-ranging inquisition into [...]’s life which resulted in additional charges unrelated to the events of July 21, 2018.  (Pa100).  --- 1 T1, T2, T3, T4, T5 and T6 reference, respectively, the trial dates of October 19, 2020, October 20, 2020, October 21, 2020, October 29, 2020, November 10, 2020 and November 23, 2020.
[brief] (3T:10-25 to 11-6).  [...] granted the State’s motion to reconsider and removed the facts not in evidence from his analysis.  (3T:15-5 to 15-17).  However, [...] maintained his decision to suppress the statements made during the phone calls and reasoned that because defendant had previously indicated to [...] that he wanted to talk to a lawyer, his mother, and his girlfriend, [...] should have re-Mirandized defendant before the phone calls to his parents.
[brief] Pa114-31.  2.  Plaintiff parked her car and walked through the parking lot maintained and controlled by the Township towards the [...] restaurant.  Pa132-143 at 8:11 to -13; 9:6 to -10, 11:6 to -8; see also Pa227-35.  3.  Plaintiff testified that as she walked across the parking lot, her foot got stuck in a pothole located in the lot, causing her fall:  Q: . . .  I believe you said your foot had gotten stuck in it, in the pothole; is that accurate?  A: Yes.  [Pa156 at 42:10 to -13].  4.  Her testimony alleges that she was “maybe four to five feet away from my car” when she fell.  Pa136 at 10:22 to 11:5.  5.  However, surveillance video from the store showed Plaintiff exiting her Ford Edge and taking approximately nine steps away from her vehicle before falling.  Da5, Camera 16 at 7:38:19.  **No Dangerous Condition Existed on the Subject Property**
[brief] A dispute of fact is genuine if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party.  Id. at 530.  Accordingly, a court must decide after weighing the evidence adduced in light of the burden of persuasion, “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Id. at 533.  The trial judge’s function is not to determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.  Id. at 536.  Thus, facts raised by a non-moving party of an unsubstantial nature cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment, and under proper circumstances, trial courts should be encouraged to grant summary judgment.
[brief] (T1: 16:3-14).  As set forth above, Grunwald does not require a plaintiff to suffer actual damage before its legal malpractice claim begins to run.  Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483 (1993).  Instead, Grunwald holds that “the statute of limitations begins to run only when the client suffers actual damage and discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover, the facts essential to the malpractice claim. ”  Ibid. emphasis added; see also Vision Mortgage, 156 N.J. at 586 (finding when plaintiff knew or had reason to know that its property interests were impaired, a legal injury occurred and the claim accrued); Olds, 150 N.J. at 439 (“[t]o trigger the statute of limitations, only the fact, not the amount of damages needs to be certain. ”).
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS’ APPEAL AND REVERSE/REMAND THE ORDERS ISSUED BY [...].  A cursory reading of Defendants' brief reveals the facts and proceedings are undisputed.  Defendants do not dispute they failed to comply with [...]'s 8/20/20 Order (8a), even after it was affirmed by this Court on 5/18/22 (12a).  Defendants concede only after Plaintiffs filed their 7/18/22 motion (1a) did Defendants: a) provide 24 of the 33 ordered records; and b) pay the $78,646 attorney fee award.  Defendants opposition fails to overcome Plaintiffs' arguments that Judge Lindemann committed reversible error when his Orders (241a, 459a and 472a) denied Plaintiffs: a) successful enforcement attorney's fees and a civil penalty; b) interest on 24 of the 26 months Defendants held the $78,646; and c) discovery regarding the missing 9 of 33 records.  Accordingly, the orders on appeal should be vacated and reversed/remanded.
[brief] (9T165-2 to 167-9).  After [...] and [...] left the trailer park, they met up with the van, driven by [...], at a nearby restaurant and defendant got out of the van and into [...]’s car.  (9T168-7 to 23).  Defendant told the women that someone else started shooting, so he “let one off. ” (9T170-15 to 19; 9T171-17 to 19; 11T36-8 to 18).  [...] drove defendant home, but [...], [...], and [...] stayed in the minivan and drove in a different direction, arriving back at the house sometime after the car.  (4T173-22 to 174-19; 4T184-13 to 185-4).  [...], who lived down the street from the Holleys, was sitting on his porch with his wife at the time of the shooting when he heard a commotion up the street.
[brief] While taking a student-centered approach, the Original Policies recognize that there are circumstances when parents will need to be notified over a student’s objection, including “as allowed by law,” and “[d]ue to a specific and compelling need, such as the health and safety of a student or an incident of bias-related crime. ”  [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 (D2a55); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra9); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8–9).  They also prepare school personnel to manage disagreements between parents and students on the schools’ accommodation of the students’ expressed gender identity.  [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 (D2a54–55); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8–9); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8–9).  In doing so, the Original Policies ensure that schools “provide a safe and supportive learning environment that is free from discrimination and harassment for transgender students, including students going through a gender transition,” while being “mindful of disputes between minor students and parents concerning the student’s gender identity or expression. ”  [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 (D2a55); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8).  The preliminary injunction restored the status quo by reinstating these policies while the litigation proceeds—a remedy narrowly tailored to protecting the districts’ gender-nonconforming students.
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews a trial court's order granting summary judgment *de novo*, applying the same standard as the trial court.  *Conley v. Guerrero*, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017).  Summary judgment is a stringent remedy.  *Errickson v. Supermarkets*, 246 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 1991).  It is to be granted with utmost caution and never as a vehicle for judicial fact-finding by means of a choice between opposing affidavits.  On a motion for summary judgment, all doubtful inferences are to be drawn against the movant and in favor of the opponent on the motion.  *N.J. Mtge. and Inc. Corp. v. Calvetti*, 68 N.J. Super. 18, 24-25 (App. Div. 1961).  R. 4:46-2(c) mandates that summary judgment be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is a genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954).  Summary judgment can only be granted when no genuine issues of material facts are presented.  For the purposes of a summary judgment motion, a trial court must assume the truth of the non-moving party’s version of the facts, giving them the benefit of all favorable inferences that version supports.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995); *Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co.*, 104 N.J. 125, 135 (1986).  Furthermore, in considering the evidential materials presented, it is not the court’s role to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, rather the court is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.  *Spiotta v. Wm. H. Wilson, Inc.*, 72 N.J. Super. 572, 581 (App. Div. 1962), certif. denied, 37 N.J. 229 (1962) citing *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).  If there is the slightest doubt as to the existence of a material issue of fact, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.  *Errickson*, supra, at 462.  The opposing papers must be indulgently treated.  *Lopez v. Swyer*, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 241 (App. Div. 1971).  It is always the movant’s burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.  *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  In light of this standard, the trial court clearly erred by placing itself in the role of factfinder in granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  As Appellant can establish the elements of breach of contract, misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement, Appellant requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice as to Defendant [...].
[brief] 4T, 47:18-48:25.  [...] did not “ignore” [...]’s novice status.  Instead, [...] repeatedly explained, with the support of [...]’s testimony, that [...]’s novice status simply did not matter.  The Trial Court does not have the expertise in low income housing developments to refute this fact, and Defendants did not submit any rebuttal expert report to refute this fact.  As such, this fact should have been accepted by the Court and [...]’s novice status should have been deemed irrelevant.  In this unique case, the “newness” of [...]’s business was irrelevant, as expert testimony and the uncontroverted record established that low income housing developments are routinely developed by first time developers.  In this unique case, the factor of the “newness” of the business in determining reasonable certainty whether “preeminent” or just one of the factors to be considered equally, is met on its face, because the expert testimony explained that the newness of the business in this unique context is irrelevant.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The issue presented by this appeal is simple: whether parties are entitled to rely upon the trial court’s pre-trial rulings in formulating their trial strategy and accurately evaluating the potential exposure.  Unquestionably, the answer is yes, although that did not hold true in this case.  The trial court reconsidered extremely consequential pre-trial decisions after the verdict was rendered, reversing not one but two prior decisions to the contrary, including a decision conveyed to the parties on the first day of trial.  This post-verdict reconsideration had the effect of retroactively stripping the appellant, [...], of significant rights.  Although the record is large in this protracted litigation, the issue presented is straightforward, and the only parties relevant to this appeal are plaintiffs, [...], and non-party [...].
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................1  RESPONSIVE STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................8  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AS WRITTEN DESPITE STANDARD’S UNDISPUTED BREACHES.  .........................................................................................................................8  A.  [...] Does Not Dispute That Its Failure To Pay The Fourth Settlement Payment Constituted A Breach Of The Settlement Agreement That Should Have Resulted In The Entry Of The Money Judgment  .........................9  B.  [...] Does Not Dispute That Its Failure To Timely Vacate The Leased Premises Or To Leave It Broom Clean Constituted  Two Additional Breaches Of The Settlement Agreement That Should Have Resulted In The Entry Of The Money Judgment  .........................................................11  C.  [...] Does Not Dispute That Its Unauthorized Dumping Constituted A Fourth Breach Of The Settlement Agreement, Regardless Of The Volume Dumped, That Should Have Resulted In The Entry Of The Money Judgment  .........................................................................................12  II.  ENFORCEMENT OF THE MONEY  JUDGMENT FOR UNPAID RENT IS NOT PRE-JUDGMENT  ATTACHMENT FOR THE UNRELATED DAMAGES CAUSED BY STANDARD’S POST-SETTLEMENT DUMPING  .........................................................................................................................13  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................15  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Borough of Haledon v. Borough of N. Haledon, | 9 | | 358 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 2003) | | | Burt v. W. Jersey Health Sys., | 4 | | 339 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2001) | | | DeCaro v. DeCaro, | 9 | | 13 N.J. 36 (1953)
[brief] (Citation omitted.)  Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 165–66 (App. Div. 2001).  C.  Third Count  The Third Count sought relaxation of the 45-day limitations period established by Rule 4:69-6(a) to permit, in the interests of justice a challenge to the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan on December 15, 2020, through Ordinance No. 1394-20.  As alleged in the Verified Complaint, Ordinance 1394-20 was also adopted in violation of the LRHL and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.  As originally adopted, the Redevelopment Plan contained many of the same inconsistences with the Master Plan as the Amended Plan, inconsistencies never identified by the [...] in its minutes when it adopted the Plan, in violation of the LRHL.  Moreover, Ordinance 1394-20 was introduced on November 17, 2021, and adopted December 15, 2021, less than thirty days later.  (Pa 15, Verified Complaint, ¶67; Pa 151.)  The LRHL requires a governing body to wait at least 45 days after referral to permit review of the redevelopment plan by the [...].  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  Additionally, the adoption of Ordinance 1394-20 violated N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 because the notice of the December 15, 2020, public hearing published on November 26, 2020, did not include a copy of the Redevelopment Plan or a summary of the contents and did not inform the public on how to obtain copies published.  (Pa 149.)  Presumably, this Count was included in the trial’s courts conclusion that relaxation was not warranted, albeit without any explanation or analysis.
[brief] (1T24-1to 4).  NJSA 59:3-14.  Public employee immunity—exception states as follows:  a.  Nothing in this act shall exonerate a public employee from liability if it is established that his conduct was outside the scope of his employment or constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.  b.  Nothing in this act shall exonerate a public employee from the full measure of recovery applicable to a person in the private sector if it is established that his conduct was outside the scope of his employment or constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.  The police in this case acted with malice and willful misconduct due to the severe nature of the beating due to his race and by falsely imprisoning him without probable cause.
[directive] Any questions regarding the Directive and the attached forms may be directed to the Criminal Practice Division at [...], ext. 55300, or by email to [...].  G. A.G. Attachments: of Attachment #1 - Summary Eligibility Attachment #2 - Application to Suspend Employment/Occupational Disabilities Attachment #3 - Certificate Suspending Employment/Occupational Disabilities of Attachment #4 - Notice Ineligibility of Attachment #5 - Revocation Certificate cc: Chief Justice [...] Criminal Division Judges of Staff [...], Chief Directors AOC Directors and Assistant Special Assistants to the Administrative Director Criminal Division Managers and Assistants [...], Manager, Criminal Practice ADA ENSURING TO AN OPEN DOOR JUSTICE
[brief] (Appx 76, 78, 80-83; Appx 116 at 75:25-76:12; Appx 117-18 at 79:7-12, 82:14-18; Appx 120 at 95:12-17, 96:1-4).  In a similar vein, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Cedeno by wrongly claiming that the Forfeiture statute at issue in Cedeno “does not provide an avenue for overcoming the statutory bar for employment.
[brief] The other-bad-act evidence “cannot merely be offered to indicate that because the defendant is disposed toward wrongful acts generally, he is probably guilty of the present act. ”  *Ibid.* (internal citation omitted).  No relationship existed, and none was proffered, between the choking and [...]’s murder.  Because the other-bad-act evidence had zero probative value, the prejudice of its admission outweighed the non-existent probative value.  Inappropriately establishing that [...] was violent towards another woman not only raises the general specter that she is a bad person who does bad things, but it raises the specific likelihood, in the mind of the jury, that she is violent towards women in her life.
[brief] [...] was able to testify that he studied this subject at highly regarded educational institutions and that he developed and teaches such a program now.  Given these facts, it was clearly within the trial court’s power to determine that [...] had sufficient expertise and that, because the field of forensic anthropology has been identified by the legislature, it has gained general acceptance as a methodology and that, because he is the one teaching this methodology to aspiring forensic anthropologists, his methods specifically are widely accepted within the field.  The court did not find that [...]’s testimony was reliable simply because the defense did not show his methodology was unreliable as the defendant suggests.  (Db31).  While the judge did note that nothing before him implied that this wasn’t generally accepted, he first noted that “Rule 702 dictates that an expert’s opinion must be based on facts known by the expert at or previous to the hearing, and are the types of facts that are reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field.
[brief] 14  I.  POINT I –  There is sufficient evidence in the record to deny summary judgment on Plaintiff’s CEPA Claim ......................... 14 (Pa712-Pa731)  II.  POINT II –  The motion Court erred by granting summary judgment because it did not grant Plaintiff all reasonable factual inferences from the record evidence ...........  28 (Pa712-Pa731)  CONCLUSION .......................................................