ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In State v. Henderson, the defendant challenged an identification on the ground police officers had unduly influenced the eyewitness.  208 N.J. 208, 217 (2011).  The eyewitness initially expressed doubt about the identity of the perpetrator but was able to confidently identify the defendant after meeting with investigators.  Id. at 223-24.  The Court identified numerous factors that can affect the ability of a witness to remember and identify perpetrators, resulting in misidentifications, and ordered an amplified, comprehensive jury charge.  Id. at 298-99.  The Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Identification: In- Court and Out-of-Court Identifications" (rev. July 19, 2012), was then drafted and adopted by the Court.  In Sanchez-Medina, the Court made clear that "[w]hen eyewitness identification is a 'key issue' the trial court must instruct the jury how to assess the evidence -- even if defendant does not request the charge."  Id. at 466 (quoting State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 325 (2005)).  For the failure to deliver the charge to be plain error, however, identification must be "a critical issue at trial that defendant disputed."
[brief] The Operating Agreements, which on their face supplanted and replaced the abandoned 2012 MOU by virtue of their “Entire Agreement” clauses found in paragraphs 10.8 therein, seek to arbitrate only those disputes arising with respect to the Operating Agreements.  Da132-33, 149-50.  The Operating Agreements’ arbitration clauses do not utilize the “the broader terminology: ‘arising out of, concerning or related to’ the Agreement. ”  Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 343 (App. Div. 2006).  Instead, the Operating Agreements utilize the identical, more narrow terminology of “with respect to this Operating Agreement. ”  Da132, 149.  “Under such narrow arbitration clauses, disputes that do not involve rights traceable to the agreement are beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and therefore are not properly arbitrable. ”  Commc’ns Workers of Am., Loc. 1087 v. Monmouth Cnty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 96 N.J. 442, 450 (1984).  As such, the 2022 Addendum and [...]’s claim of a right to purchase the Property under same clearly fall outside of the ambit of the Operating Agreements, which relate to the management and operation of the Companies and not the sale of the Property.  To be sure, there is no reference whatsoever to the purchase or sale of the Property in the Operating Agreements – which sale is the entirety of the action improperly compelled to arbitration by the Chancery Court here.  Da121-52.  Thus, this matter was improperly compelled to arbitration under the guise of the MOU and Operating Agreements.  See Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442; Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 132.  Under this Court’s de novo review, the law clearly dictates that neither the abandoned 2012 MOU nor the Operating Agreements can force the Parties to arbitrate [...]’s claims under which arise under the 2022 Addendum to 2017 Unexecuted Agreement for the sale of the Property.  IV.
[brief] An estoppel certificate received from a Required Tenant shall not be an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate if such Required Tenant discloses a default on the part of landlord or tenant under its Lease or discloses another Material Matter (as hereinafter defined).  As used herein, a “Material Matter” shall mean a default or other matter relating to a Lease which, in each case, would subject the landlord thereunder to any liability, or otherwise adversely affect the rent, additional rent or other revenue that Purchaser will receive under a Lease after the Closing Date or contain a discrepancy with the information shown on the Rent Roll.  (Da211.)  Review of paragraph 13.10 reveals several key points.  The paragraph defines two terms separately – “Estoppel Certificate” and “Acceptable Estoppel Certificate. ”  (Id.)  The Defendant was only required to deliver “the executed Estoppel Certificate”, not an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  (Id.)  Further, discovering any default was key.  The types of certificates within the definition of Estoppel Certificate were (1) that contemplated by the Lease, or (2) that contemplated in Schedule H.  (Id.)  Each required disclosure of any default by landlord, tenant, or both.  (Lease, Article VIII, Paragraph 8.2 Da289-290) (Schedule H Da262-263.)  The PSA also emphasized default as “an estoppel certificate . . . shall not be an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate if [[...]] discloses a default on the part of landlord or tenant”.
[brief] The allegations of the lawsuit for which plaintiff sought coverage under his [...] homeowners insurance policy plainly and simply do not come within the coverage of that policy, and the lower court thus correctly found that plaintiff is not entitled to a defense or indemnity under his homeowners policy for the allegations of the lawsuit against him.  [...]’s motion was based on the simple premise, long-settled in New Jersey, that insurance policies issued with clear terms must be enforced as written.  Plaintiff’s [...] homeowners insurance policy clearly and expressly covers liability arising from accidental occurrences, and the allegations of the underlying complaint uniformly involved conduct that was not an “accident. ”  Accordingly, the lower court correctly found that there was no coverage for these events under the [...] policy.  Moreover, even if the allegations regarding plaintiff’s conduct towards the underlying litigants could somehow be viewed as constituting an occurrence, the lower court determined that the [...] policy exclusion for expected or intended injuries was applicable here, where the underlying lawsuit specifically described a course of conduct designed to impact the litigants in that matter.  Under these circumstances, the lower court correctly granted [...]’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), and thereafter appropriately denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  There exists no basis upon which to disturb the lower court’s rulings.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...] by its Administratrix  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], [...], [...], VITALE  WOMEN’S HEALTH OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, L.L.C., [...], “JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10” (Fictitious Names) and/or “ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10” (Fictitious Names), Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Defendants  [...] and [...] respectfully request that the Court affirm the trial court’s Order dismissing with prejudice  Plaintiff [...]’s claims for insurance coverage under the Chubb policy.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants  [...] and [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Date: August 9, 2024  [...], Administratrix and Administratrix ad Prosequendum for the [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...]; GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY; CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY; and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-2.  *Superior Officers*, 2022 WL 2352376, at *9; (Pa000677).  Applying these findings here, and because the MSRA does not run afoul to the Contracts Clause as a matter of law, the Superior Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim predicated on the Contract Clause.  (Pa001027).
[brief] Despite these undeniable facts, on December 20, 2009, [...] republishes on PACER not just the content of the Emmanouil original complaint which contained the FHR filed on March 7, 2006 in *Emmanouil v. [...]* Case No. 3:06-cv-1068, 2006 WL 2927621, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006) in the District Court for the District of New Jersey, but published an embellished version stating that [...] was arrested for drugs in Pennsylvania, which was actually a charge that [...] failed to report $1,200 in state income tax for which he was acquitted by a Pennsylvania jury.  The charge for writing a bad check in Ocala, Florida was nolle prossed by the State of Florida, for lack of intent.  [actual innocence]  (The trial court refused to seal the embellished version of the Emmanouil complaint, which is now a part of the public domain)  Indeed, this Court affirmed [...]’s finding that confidential information may have been disclosed to the attorney who prepared Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Court orders Plaintiffs’ Complaint stricken in its entirety. ”  *Emmanouil v. [...]*, No. 3:06-cv-1068, 2006 WL 2927621, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. [...] cannot provide the Court with any evidence that [...]’ Order sealing Plaintiff’s complaint, before October 11, 2006, was ever ‘unsealed’.  In *Skudegaard v. Farrell* 578 F. Supp 1209, 1221 (D.N.J. 1984) the Court wrote:  I start with the proposition the [m]otions to strike alleged redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter are not favored.  Matter will not be stricken from a pleading unless it is clear that it can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation. ”  *2A  Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 12.21 at p. 2429* (1983) (footnotes omitted).  Despite these facts, [...]’s FHR had no relationship to a contract dispute to decide the true ownership of [...], in Houston, Texas.  [...] striking of the Emmanouil’s complaint in its entirety made clear that there was no possible bearing on the subject-matter of the litigation.  **POINT 2**
[directive] Each County has a specially trained team of qualified professionals called the Sexual Assault Response Team.  It consists of a law enforcement officer, a forensic nurse examiner and a confidential sexual violence advocate.  All of these team members are available to you.  I am going to tell you what each team member can do for you.  Forensic Nurse Examiner:  A forensic nurse examiner can perform a medical forensic examination.  The nurse will explain your options and will answer any questions you may have about the examination, provide medication, address medical concerns, and make aftercare referrals.  Law Enforcement Officer: A law enforcement officer can gather information about what you experienced.  The law enforcement officer can take a report and start an investigation.  The case will be strengthened when law enforcement obtains information in a timely manner.  Confidential Sexual Violence Advocate:  A confidential sexual violence advocate can provide information, counseling, and support.  The advocate can discuss your options and provide a variety of resources.  You have the right to speak to an advocate prior to having a medical exam or speaking to law enforcement.  Activate SART pursuant to the wishes of the victim.
[brief] Before petitioner's motion was heard, the Judge of Compensation revealed that she was of the opinion that teachers were essential employees, and that this teacher would be entitled to this presumption.  The Judge of Compensation also revealed that she based this opinion on her beliefs that she formed and advocated as an Assemblywoman and primary sponsor of the bill.  The Judge of Compensation did not reach this conclusion based on any testimony or evidence in this case, as the motion had not even been heard.  The Judge of Compensation reached this conclusion despite the absence of any supporting evidence, and despite the clear language of N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11, which does not identify teachers in the class of employees to be considered essential employees and would not seem to apply because after the initial shutdown during the pandemic, schools were closed and learning occurred virtually.
[brief] Regardless of its Admissibility at Trial  [...]’ Sworn Statement would be admissible at trial under New Jersey Rules of Evidence 803(a)(1) and 608.  See Def. Br. at 31-34.  The State’s assertion that [...]’s prior inconsistent statement would not be admissible is meritless; indeed, the States does not and cannot identify any rule of evidence that would exclude it.  However, even if this Court finds that it would not be admissible at trial, [...]’ Sworn Statement still constitutes Brady material.
[brief] 1.  Admitted.  2. Admitted.  3.  Admitted.  4. Admitted.  5.  Admitted.  6.  Admitted.  7.  Admitted.  8.  Admitted.  9.  Admitted.  10.  Admitted.  11.  Admitted.  12.  Admitted.  13.  Admitted.  14.  Admitted.  15.  Admitted.  16.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  17.  Admitted.  18.  Admitted.  19.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  20.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  21.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  22.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  23.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  24.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  25.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  26.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  27.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  28.  Admitted.  29.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  30.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  31.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  32.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified. 33.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  34.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  35.  Admitted.  36.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  37.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  38.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  39.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  40.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  41.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  42.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  43.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  44.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  45.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  46.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  47.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  48.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  49.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  50.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  51.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  52.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  53.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  54.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  55.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  56.  Admitted that Plaintiff so testified.  57.  Admitted only that Defendants purported to conduct an investigation into Plaintiff's complaints.
[brief] ”  (Pa281 at 13:21-25.)  He said “[n]obody saw the bill.  They finally showed up an hour, perhaps, before the vote.  It’s all a little sketchy. ”  (Pa281-82 at 13:21-14:2.)  [...] said despite a five-day notice requirement to the public about committee’s consideration of bills, it did not happen for this bill.  (Pa282 at 14:3-18.)
[brief] An unidentified Board Member then asked about a conservation easement.  (T2: p36, ln 14-16)  [...] testified that it was considered, but ultimately, the applicant decided against it.  [...] again noted that there is no landscaping required by the ordinance, let alone, a conservation easement.  [...] further testified that the applicant was not requesting a waiver from providing buffering between the lots, as no buffering is required at all.
[brief] **The First Contract**  Plaintiff entered the “Co-Medical Director Agreement” with [...] sometime on or around December 16, 2010.  *See* Pa149-159.  Under the terms of this agreement, Plaintiff accepted the role of Co-Medical Director of the Pulmonary Unit within the Hospital.  **The Second Contract**  Plaintiff entered the “[...] Employment Agreement, Director of Sleep Center” agreement (hereinafter the “Sleep Center Agreement”) with [...] in June 2011.  *See* Pa160-165.  Plaintiff’s obligations under the Sleep Center Agreement included management and supervision of individuals at the Sleep Center, assuring performance of medical staff functions, and compliance with [...] policies and procedures.  **The Third Contract**  Eighteen months later, Plaintiff entered into the President of Medical Staff/Co-Director of ICU Agreement (hereinafter “President/Director Agreement”) with [...] on December 11, 2012.  *See* Pa166-177.  This contract had two roles, President of the Medical Staff and Co-Director of the Intensive Care Unit.  Plaintiff testified that one of the responsibilities for physicians was to complete their medical records, and that his role as President of the Medical Staff would be to supervise and ensure physicians were completing their medical records on time.  See Da67 at 33:1-21.  The Fourth Contract  Nearly two years later, Plaintiff entered into the Meadowlands Hospital Medical Center Chief Medical Officer agreement (hereinafter “CMO Agreement”) with [...] on September 1, 2014.  Plaintiff testified that [...] policy was to complete patient reports in a timely manner, and that it was his responsibility “to make sure that the physicians at the hospital were complying with any policies or procedures implemented by the hospital. ”  Da72 at 56:17-22.  Plaintiff further admitted that “if you don’t do or complete your paperwork in a matter of time, you could be suspended. ”  Id. at 58:10-18.  Plaintiff’s Breach of All Four Agreements with [...]
[brief] (Da101).  On February 23, 2021, in response to a query from [...]’s counsel, on which [...] was not copied, the [...] stated that it did “not have subpoena power to require [...] to provide responsive records. ” (Da214).  Then on March 10, 2021, in response to an inquiry by [...] as to how the [...] intended to enforce its orders against [...], the [...] advised [...] that “orders of the [[...]] are enforceable in the Superior Court[.]” (Da215; Da219).  [...] was not copied on any of these communications.  (Da214; Da215; Da219).  On March 23, 2021, the Executive Director entered Findings and Recommendations to the [...].  (Da142-148).  The [...] unanimously voted to accept the Findings and Recommendations, and on March 30, 2021, the [...] entered an Interim Order which required [...] to provide records pursuant to the January 26, 2021 Interim Order, without being reimbursed for the time necessary to gather and review the documents.
[brief] [...] considered and applied the correct guidelines, namely the Miller factors, the Yarbough factors, and the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors.  The record—including the trial evidence and the record made at both the original and re-sentencing hearings—supports her conclusions as to each.  And defendant’s aggregate sentence—45 years with a 42.75 years of parole ineligibility, and a sentence “look-back” in just 11 years—for a robbery and a subsequent cold-blooded murder of a teenager—is eminently reasonable.  As noted above, [...] held a two-day hearing at which [...] testified, several people spoke on behalf of defendant and the victim, defendant personally addressed the court, and counsel gave oral argument in support of their respective positions.
[brief] ”  Rb11.\footnote{Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.}  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.
[directive] Czy przyznaje się Pan(i) do przestępstwa domyślnie zagrożonego karą pozbawienia wolności, co 8.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] oznacza niemal całkowitą pewność, że do więzienia pójdzie Pan(i) stanowego?  Are you pleading guilty to a crime that contains a presumption of imprisonment which means that it is almost certain that you will go to state prison?
[brief] As such, it only stands to reason that, when given the choice between improving the short walk from a public road to an established public access area (in this case, the [...] or [...]) or traversing upwards of 200 feet through the driveway and parking lot of a townhome community to a yet-to-be established access point, any member of the public will recognize that the former results in far more meaningful and reasonable public access than the latter.  The Department already recognizes this common-sense approach elsewhere in its rules concerning public access.  Most notably, the existing Public Access Rule for new multi-family development at N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(iv) provides that the Department must consider off-site access and/or a monetary contribution if onsite access is infeasible.
[brief] This request includes, but is not limited to, Plaintiffs’ protests, challenges, or other proceedings before the United States Air Force, the Government Accountability Office, the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit relating to RFP # [...] for the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM Contract, or the award of the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM Contract. ”  •  RFP 18:  “All communications, and all documents relating to communications, between you and any person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States (including but not limited to the United States Air Force) relating to RFP # [...] for the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM Contract, or the award of the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM Contract.
[directive] Appendix this The may issue, in described illustrated the to and or of similar policies procedures Attomey operating to the General, standard the approval within to within including the Administration, those functions related its encompassed Department.  throughout the units, applicable constituent l. Operations. unit, which prepare Operations shall  There is established Budget Budget a performing of the by behalf Department, annual budget, on comprehensive and defend a quarterly quarterly plans, financial preparing coordinating analysis, spending and ongoing Divisions.
[directive] If a vehicle begins to move while an officer is engaged with the driver or an occupant, the officer shall, if feasible, disengage from the contact with the driver or occupant to avoid being dragged, carried, or struck by the moving vehicle; and (d) while any firearm discharge entails some risk, discharging a firearm at a moving vehicle entails an even greater risk to innocent persons and passengers because of the risk that the fleeing suspect may lose control of the vehicle.  Due to this greater risk, and considering that firearms are not generally effective in bringing moving vehicles to a rapid halt, an officer shall not fire at the driver or occupant of a moving vehicle, unless no other means are available at the time to avert or eliminate the danger and one of the following circumstances exists:  15  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 (1) when there is imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person, created by a person in the vehicle using means other than the vehicle, such as when shots are being fired from the vehicle; or (2) when the suspect is driving their vehicle toward persons other than the officer in a manner creating an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, such as in a terrorist attack; or (3) when the officer is being dragged or carried by the vehicle, cannot disengage from the vehicle, and is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.
[brief] But neither the verdict sheet (Da 14) nor the transcript of the verdict shows a verdict for the “benefit” element.  (21T 49-19 to 51-14)  In other words, the jury never found defendant guilty of all of the elements of official misconduct.  This legal point is simple: there never was a valid verdict for official misconduct, and defendant was denied his right to a valid jury verdict under the Sixth Amendment, to due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment, and to all of those right as set forth in the state constitution.  The law could not be more clear that, as a constitutional matter, “there is simply no substitute for a jury verdict. ”  *State v. Vick*, 117 N.J. 288, 291 (1989)  Without a jury verdict for official misconduct, there obviously could also be no valid jury verdict for a pattern of official misconduct.  Consequently, both of those convictions should be reversed and those counts remanded for retrial.