ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In this case, the record reflects that the respondent engaged in conduct that did indeed violate the standards established by the Legislature.  (Ca035).  It was plain from the record before the Commission that Respondent engaged in conduct that created a justifiable impression among the public that the public trust was being violated, and that she did so by taking action which may have – and actually did – compromise the Board.  Despite this clear record and undisputed factual and legal findings, the Commission chose to abrogate the statutory mission from which it was born – to ensure that board members avoid conduct which creates a justifiable impression among the public that the public trust is being violated.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a).  [...] reached this conclusion by reviewing the Commission’s prior holdings directly on point with the present matter.
[brief] 5.  **[...] is incorrect that a showing of bad faith is not necessary to impose sanctions under the statute (or under the rule); and further this position is contrary to his own arguments that he had asserted previously. **  Within [...]’s April 28, 2023 certification, he agreed that a showing of bad faith is required under the statute, while (incorrectly and inconsistently) arguing that he did not need to show bad faith, because he was seeking sanctions under R. I:4-8.
[brief] Page No.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, RULINGS AND OPINIONS ............... iii INDEX TO APPENDIX ........................................................................... iii INDEX TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX (FILED SEPARATELY) .......... iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... vii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ................................................................. 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................... 3 SUPPRESSION EVIDENTIARY HEARING STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... 6 LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................ 13 POINT ONE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND ERRED IN APPLYING A "REASONABLE SUSPICION" RATHER THAN "PROBABLE CAUSE" STANDARD; BECAUSE THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT PARTICULARLY LIST MR. ALLEN, OR ANY PERSON, THE STOPPING AND ARRESTING OF MR. ALLEN BY THE POLICE WAS IN VIOLATION OF AND CONTRARY TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1T93-3 to 95-3) ........................................... 13 A. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON THE SUPPRESSION MOTION .................................................................. 13 B. THE RELEVANT STANDARD ......................................................... 15 C. TO BE VALID A WARRANT MUST DESCRIBE WITH PARTICULARITY THE PLACE OR PERSON TO BE SEARCHED AND HERE ONLY THE PREMISES WAS NAMED ........................................... 16 D. INCLUSION IN THE WARRANT TO SEIZE AND SEARCH "ALL PERSONS PRESENT" IS FACIALLY INVALID .................................................. 23 E. THE OMISSION IN THE WARRANT OF NAMING THE DEFENDANT MR. ALLEN, OR EVEN "ALL PERSONS PRESENT," IS A FATAL DEFECT AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A MERE TECHNICAL IRREGULARITY .......................................................... 26 F. NONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH EXISTS IN THIS CASE MANDATING SUPPRESSION .......................................................... 35 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING A HEARING PURSUANT TO FRANKS V. DELAWARE (2T95-13 to 96-11) ............ 37 A. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON A FRANKS HEARING ............................................................................. 37 B. REASONS FOR A FRANKS EVIDENTIARY HEARING ..... 38 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT BASED IT DECISION ON A PALPABLY INCORRECT OR IRRATIONAL BASIS; DEFENDANT WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ANY CONDUCT WHICH CONSTITUTED PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION PRIOR TO THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON ON SEPTEMBER 28, 2020 (2T19-3 to 22-11)  ..........  40  A.  THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ...........................................  40  B.  THE LAW AS TO RECONSIDERATION  MOTIONS ........  42  C.  THE GOLDSMITH CASE SUPPORTS SUPPRESSION .........  45  D.  REASONS FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REVERSAL ...  48  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................
[brief] [...] of [...] had ready “the documentation needed to request for suspension of a member and to facilitate the suspension. ” (11T120-22 to 121-4).  Fraulo gave those documents to defendant.  (11T122-18 to 123-3).  In turn, three letters were read aloud in defendant’s presence.  The first notified defendant that he was suspended, with the date, time, and nature and reason of the suspension.  (11T125-9 to 131-13; Pa20-21).  Fraulo identified his own signature on the notice, which he affixed after it was read aloud to defendant and signed by him.  (11T130-17 to 131-13; Pa21).  The second letter directed defendant to “turn in all [NJSP] badges, identification cards, and other [NJSP] owned property and equipment assigned to” him, with the exception of NJSP rules and regulations.  (11T134-2 to 136-20; Pa22-23).  It further advised defendant that, while suspended, he was “relieved of all law enforcement powers and [NJSP] privileges. ” (11T136-15 to 17; Pa22).  Defendant was also barred from carrying an off-duty weapon, and was “subject to the laws, statutes, and ordinances of the United States, its territories and possessions, or of any state of the United States or of any political subdivision thereof. ” (Pa22).
[brief] Pursuant to the Contract Specifications, bidders were to submit a proposal bond (or letter of surety) accompanied by a POA and Consent of Surety, “each in a form acceptable to the Authority, which shall be executed by the surety company” (A1).  As explained above, [...] anticipates and expects as a matter of custom and practice that the same surety company representative will execute both the Proposal Bond and the Consent of Surety and that sufficient evidence, in the form of a POA, will be provided to demonstrate that the individual executing the documents has the surety company’s authority to do so.  Indeed, [...]’s prescribed form of Consent of Surety has a space for the bidder to identify the surety company, a signature line for the “attorney-in-fact” and a signature line for a witness to the attorney-in-fact’s signature.  It cannot be gainsaid that an undertaking of a surety company must contain indicia that the individual executing the instrument has the legal authority to do so.  Here, [...]’s Bid included a Proposal Bond, a POA, and a purported Consent of Surety, all of which bore the name of [...] (“[...]”) (A3, 4 and 6).
[brief] 3T119:14:24.  Defendant also admitted that she did not pay Plaintiff what he is owed.  3T119:7.  Specifically, Defendant testified at trial as follows:  Q: . . .  [D]o you remember testifying at your deposition that you believed [...] was entitled to receive 49 percent of the profits of the company for 2016?  A: Yeah, I do remember.  Q: Do you still stand by that position, that [...] is entitled to 49 percent of the profits of the company for 2016?  A:  I'm not disputing what I said.  I'm still saying the same thing.  I believe [...] was the 49 percent of the company owner during the [sic] 2016.  See *Id.* at 3T119:14:24.  Defendant further testified:  Q:  I'm going to show you what has been premarked as P-23.  I believe this is the 2019 amended tax return for [...]  I'm going to show you on Page 46, Part 1, what is the -- you see that this is the K(1) for [...].  Do you see the date that he acquired his interest?  What is the -- can you read that date for the jury?  A: April 15, 2016.  Q: So is that the date that [...] acquired his interest in the company?  A: That's what it says.  Q: Okay.  You don't dispute that, right?  That's not a mistake too?  A: No, I don't.  Q: Okay.  So if [...] had acquired his interest on April 15th, 2016, wouldn't he be entitled to the profits for the company?  A: Sure.  If [...] wants to be partner beginning from April 15, 2016, then we have to go to the business register and we have to register him as a partner from that day.  And we have to do all the calculations and do the amendment again.  And I'm not disputing this.  See Id. at 3T121:22 to 122:18.  Despite acknowledging that Plaintiff was entitled to 49% of the profits for 2016, Defendant admits she kept all the 2016 profits for herself, and [...] got “nothing. ”
[brief] (2)  [...] can now renegotiate a new agreement due to the change of facts, and evidence, etc.  Which allow [...] to argue other factors and unaddressed evidence issues that can change the standards of the degree of crime [...] is charged with to a lower degree.  Furthermore, it was not a "bargain" deal that [...] got as it has so easily been stated by the State, may I remind the court's, the state is not the defendant.  So for the state to assert that [...] got a bargain that is saying to [...] he got the best deal so accept it.  It also implies that [...] does not have a right to be protected by all laws such as R. 3:9-3(f).  *State v. Diloreto*, 362 N.J. and R. 3:9-3(f) which provides protection for [...] and all defendants to withdraw their conditional guilty plea.  This rule provides a defendant the ability to argue his pretrial issues that a defendant believes were wrongfully, improperly, and/or illegally ruled or admitted into his/her case.  At the SOA hearing, the prosecutor stated: "additionally, although counsel argues that bargaining positions have changed, the law hasn't."  (Da 81, 19-20)  The state is right, the law has not changed and the Supreme Court has "made law" and established R. 3:9-3(f) which states that a defendant who prevails on appeal shall be offered the opportunity to withdraw his/her plea.  That is the law (emphasis added).  Thus, [...] has prevailed on appeal by the New Jersey Supreme Court, a conditional plea was in place and established and [...] must be afforded his right and the opportunity to withdraw his plea (Da 22-58).
[brief] (22T 226-25 to 228-24)  [...] admitted that police were never able to unlock [...]’ mobile phone, so they never searched it.  (22T 236-12 to 13)  He said police also checked the dumpsters at [...], but he did not say that they found anything of note there.  (22T 241-16 to 20)  They also found no evidence at all of cell-phone, social-media, or other contact between defendant and [...] leading up to the January 9 incident, nor any cell-phone or social-media contact between the men at any time after August 2017.
[brief] It also bears noting that this public policy consideration is bolstered by looking at which party - - the insurer or the insured - - had the best opportunity to prevent the potential harm to the victim of being unable to collect on a judgment for his injuries.  The “insured,” believing that he had insurance in place, could not have prevented the situation; surely not even the insurance industry would argue that an insured has some obligation from time to time to inquire whether or not his policy was still in effect.  The insurance company, on the other hand, had a simple option: it could have sent the Cancellation Notice by certified mail, an option that the statute specifically allows it to exercise.  This is not to say that the insurance company was *obligated* to send the notice by certified mail; the statute itself gives the insurer the alternative of using a Certificate of Mailing.  But had the insurer simply chosen to spend a few extra dollars to send the notice by certified mail, it would known with certainty whether or not it had been received, and this entire situation would be avoided.  Given the insurer’s ability to choose to give up a few dollars of its profit to buy that certainty, and its decision not to do so, public policy weighs heavily in favor of finding that it is the receipt of the notice, rather than the mere act of its mailing, that should be determinative on the issue of coverage.
[brief] (Pa9).  The trial in this matter commenced on September 21, 2020.  (1T).  Noting Appellant’s absence, the Court put forth the following colloquy:  It should be noted for the record that at the pretrial hearing on -- on September 11th, he indicated that he would not participate, even though he can participate and plead the Fifth to any specific question that may incriminate him or have a tendency incriminate him in the criminal proceedings.  He still had the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff’s witnesses, put on witnesses of his own, open, and close in these proceedings, and he has voluntarily absented himself from that.  (1T 5:13-22).  The trial concluded on September 23, 2020 and Respondents submitted post-trial briefing on October 21, 2020.
[brief] Having met the elements necessary to succeed on a spoliation claim, Plaintiffs further contend that the trial court failed to recognize that an adverse inference charge is appropriate under the circumstances.  Such an inference allows the jury to infer that the destroyed or concealed evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliator.  Jerista, 185 N.J. at 202 (citing Rosenblit, 166 N.J. at 401-02).  Defendant’s reliance on Davis v. Barkaszi, 424 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 2012) as to why Plaintiff should not be afforded an adverse inference charge is misplaced and is easily distinguishable from the instant matter.
[directive] 10.1  Specified Authorized Purposes for Accessing/Using Stored BWC Recordings.  No law enforcement officer or civilian employee of a law enforcement agency shall access, view, copy, disseminate, or otherwise use a BWC recording except for an official purpose as specified in this Section and the law.  BWC recordings shall not be divulged or used by any law enforcement agency for any commercial or other non-law enforcement purpose.  Access to and use of a stored BWC recording is permitted only: (a) when relevant to and in furtherance of a criminal investigation or prosecution; (b) when relevant to and in furtherance of an internal affairs investigation; (c) when relevant to and in furtherance of a management review process to identify circumstances indicating possible police misconduct or to determine the existence of a pattern or practice of possible misconduct; (d) when relevant to a supervisor’s review of an officer’s actions as part of the supervisory process authorized by the agency; (e) to show to a civilian who intends to file a complaint against an officer to demonstrate what actually occurred during the encounter so that the person can make an informed decision whether to file the complaint; (f) to comply with the State’s discovery obligations in prosecutions pursuant to the Rules of Court; (g) to comply with any other legal obligation to turn over the recording to a person or entity;5 (h) to show or disseminate the recording to a civilian or a non-law enforcement entity, or to disseminate it to the public, where the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, determines that disclosure to that particular person/entity or the public is warranted because the person’s/entity’s/public’s need for access outweighs the law enforcement interest in maintaining confidentiality;
[brief] Did the Plaintiff sustain an ascertainable loss?  The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff received $8,400.00 from two contracts, $2,900.00 (2018 Contract) and $5,500.00 (2019 Contract) (Da093).  The Complaint then alleges that Plaintiff paid $7,043.92 to [...] from the PI Claim.  (Da094).  The complaint also claimed that [...] sought an additional $12,067.91 to satisfy the 2018 and 2019 Contracts.  The impression left by the complaint is that Plaintiff lost $7,043.92 plus $12,067.91 for a total of $19,111.83.  However, that is a false impression.  Plaintiff received $8,400.00 from the 2018 and 2019 Contracts but only paid back $7,043.92.  Based on those allegations alone, Plaintiff did not suffer a loss, because Plaintiff was “ahead of the game” by $1,356.08.  Furthermore, Plaintiff also received $1,200.00 from the 2016 Contract.  As a result, Plaintiff received a total of $9,600.00 but only paid back $7,043.92, resulting in a $2,556.08 windfall.  Plaintiff suffered no loss.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ counsel apparently did none of this and defendant should not have to sit through another trial because their expert was not as good as they would have liked.  Plaintiffs have cited no authority for the general proposition they advance—that they should have been able to replace their first expert with another simply because of what they learned about the former at his deposition and when there has been no deception by the expert as to his qualifications.  To accept plaintiffs’ argument would be to reward one party’s lack of due diligence yet punish another’s energetic investigation and subsequent, probing deposition.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *Benipal*, 2022 WL 3363909, at *3.  The distinctions between this matter and *Benipal* are numerous.  First, in *Benipal*, the defendant *purposefully* had the deed prepared in the name of [...], his family entity, not [...], the agreed-upon purchasing entity, with the specific intent of conferring title upon [...].  Here, the December 1998 deed was not purposefully done to transfer title to [...].  Rather, by the terms of the deed itself, the deed was a “correctory deed” for which no consideration was paid and with no intent to affirmed the trial court’s ruling post-*Lopez* hearing that it did not.  *Benipal v. Tri-State Petro, Inc.*, A-2306-19, 2022 WL 3363909, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 16, 2022).
[brief] The facts of this case are fairly simple, straightforward, and virtually undisputed:  On May 11, 2012, respondents, [...] and [...], husband and wife, (the “[...]”) obtained a home equity loan from appellant, [...], a [...]ing Corporation of the State of New Jersey, (the “[...]” or “[...]”) in the sum of $134,000.00, with interest at the rate of four and one-eighth (4.125%) per cent per annum, payable in installments of $2,157.10 per month on the first day of each month commencing June 1, 2012 and terminating February 1, 2018.  Pa1.  To secure payment of the note, the said [...] executed to [...] a mortgage of even date with the note (Pa18), covering the premises commonly known as [...], (the “Premises”).  Said mortgage was duly recorded in the Clerk’s Office of Bergen County on June 4, 2012, in Book V1058 of Mortgages for said County at page 4 (the “2012 mortgage”).  Pa18.  Thereafter, monthly loan payments were made to the [...] by [...], whose principal owner was the mortgagor, [...].  Upon receipt of what the [...] believed was the final monthly mortgage payment, the mortgage was cancelled by the [...] on 1/29/2018.  Pa20.  However, a mere three days later, on or about February 2, 2018, [...] filed a Chapter 7 [...]ruptcy Petition under Case No. [...].  On or about January 30, 2020, the Trustee in [...]ruptcy filed an Adversary Complaint against the [...], under Case No. [...].  Pa24.  The Complaint alleged that four (4) years of monthly mortgage payments made to the [...] by [...], in the amount of $105,697 (Pa33-34), at the direction of and on behalf of [...], were fraudulent and should be avoided.  Pa24.  The [...] vigorously defended against the allegations contained in the Adversary Complaint (Pa35) but eventually was constrained to agree to disgorge $60,000 of the mortgage payments by Floortown, Inc. to the Trustee in [...]ruptcy by settlement entered into on August 10, 2022.
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Rejected Plaintiff’s Attempt to Rewrite the Statute Governing Notice Requirements for Ordinances Which Adopt Redevelopment Plans.  (T2, 38:9-39:19 & 50:11-22)**  Plaintiff conflates the notice requirements applicable to adoption of zoning ordinances with the notice requirements for adoption of ordinances adopting redevelopment plans.  (Pb30-Pb35).  This was properly rejected by the Trial Court.  (Pa58).  Resolution of this issue comes down to a matter of statutory interpretation.
[brief] ”)  (Da 16).  Other courts have already held that fingerprint examiners cannot testify to the false statement that their craft is totally objective and imply that this objectivity renders fingerprint analysis free from error.  For instance, in *Commonwealth v. Armstrong*, 2023 WL 4277878, at *10 (Mass. June 30, 2023), the high court of Massachusetts held that a fingerprint examiner’s testimony that fingerprint examination “leads to an objective analysis” was inappropriate.
[brief] *Grubbs v. Slothower*, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 388 (App. Div. 2007).  According to the court in *Grubbs*, “[density variances for permitted uses in the zone should not trigger the application of Medici’s more stringent standard” ... as a “density variance seeks a departure from certain regulations applicable to a use the municipality has chosen to permit, not prohibit, in the zone. ”  *Ibid.*  The court stated the following in regards to the analysis that should be applied:  Such requests need not demonstrate that the property is “particularly suitable to more intensive development” in order to prove “special reasons” under the MLUL.  Randolph Town Ctr., supra, 324 N.J. Super. at 416, 735 A.2d 1166.  Rather, in considering such applications, zoning boards of adjustment should focus their attention on whether the applicant’s proofs demonstrate “that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with [a greater density] than permitted by the ordinance. ”  Id. at 417, 735 A.2d 1166.  Since special reasons supporting a particular variance request “must be tailored” to the purpose served by the restriction in the ordinance, Grasso, supra, 375 N.J. Super. at 52, 866 A.2d 988, we examine the purpose of restricting density in a particular zone.  The MLUL explicitly recognizes the regulation of the density of development as a general purpose of zoning that contributes to “the well-being of persons, neighborhoods, communities and regions and preservation of the environment.
[brief] [Pa565]  Question 11(a) in the application for the 2016 Policy (the “2016 Policy Application”) posed the following question:  11.  CLAIMS, CIRCUMSTANCES, DISCIPLINARY AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:  If yes to any of the following please complete the [...] Claims/Discipline/Criminal Supplement and provide current carrier loss runs for the past five (5) policy terms.  (a)  Has any attorney been the subject of any bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding within the past 5 years?  [Pa316]  In response to Question 11(a), the Firm responded “no. ”  This response was accurate because there was no bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding involving the Firm, or any individual attorney at the Firm, in the prior 5 years.  [Pa566]  The question also asks for a “loss run,” clearly indicating the information sought relates to events that have resulted in, or could result in, a “loss. ”  While we believe that the only fair reading of this question is that it is seeking disclosure of matters resulting from the rendering of “legal services” to the clients (as is made clear elsewhere in the Policy), at minimum, it creates an ambiguity as to what is intended by the language.  Specifically, as detailed below, the OAE Proceeding, including the audit, OAE Complaint and Censure, are not a bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding, under the definitions drafted by Defendants in the Policy, because the OAE Proceeding did not involve the provision of Legal Services.  [Pa566]  In other words, the premise to the question, based on the language of the Policy and the Application, was to disclose claims or circumstances that might result in claims or losses, i.e., financial exposure to [...].  Since the OAE Proceeding did not involve the rendering of Legal Services, and no possible claim or loss, [...] understood that they are **not** a Disciplinary Proceeding, as defined by Defendants and, as such, the Firm correctly indicated “no” in response to Question 11(a).