ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Three subsequent hearings were conducted on September 26, October 10, and October 25, 2018.  During those four hearings, the Company presented comprehensive testimony from seven witnesses (nearly all of whom testified and/or answered Board and public questions on multiple occasions).  One witness — [...] — is a [...] employee directly involved in the determination of the need for the proposed Facility.  The six other witnesses were independent outside experts in the fields of engineering, landscape architecture, sound and air quality, real estate appraisal, economic benefits, and planning.  39.  After extensive hearings at which [...]’s counsel and witnesses labored to answer every question and concern raised by the Board and the public, the Zoning Board denied [...]’s application on October 25, 2018.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  It emphasized that “the dominion of the [...] is so confined.  The wildlife it regulates, as indicated, are limited specifically to those species which are commonly the subjects of hunting and fishing, and even then the regulatory power is restricted. ”  *Id.* at 575.  Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]he consignment of the specialized powers and duties flowing from this legislative scheme to so-called special interest groups has a rational basis, because these entities are most directly affected by the Council’s regulations and possess the requisite expertise for achievement of the statutory objective. ”  *Id.* at 577. (Pa126-127).  -
[brief] This court recognized that the defendant’s requests were “clear and unequivocal” and that the record “belie[d] the State’s contention that defendant’s request was ‘vague. ’”  Id. at 628.  Similarly in Taylor, the defendant “sought the discharge of his attorney” and “the assistance of substitute counsel,” but his motion papers cited Faretta and the “trial judge seemed to have interpreted” the request “to include an alternative request to proceed pro se. ”  State v. Taylor, 350 N.J. Super. 20, 42 (App. Div. 2002).  This Court held that “the proper course” was to “seek clarification from defendant,” and if, as a result of seeking this clarification, an “express request to proceed pro se is made, the court must then determine whether defendant has made a knowing waiver of his right to counsel.
[brief] (13T102:9).  [...] conceded that he was aware of the "45-Day Rule," (13T132:14).  [...] conceded that he submitted his report to the Chief of Police over one (1) year and four (4) months after notifying [...] he was the target of an administrative investigation.  (13T132:25).  [...]'s excuse for failing to abide by the 45-Day rule was that he did not have all the data he needed because it was a continual process.  (13T133:13).  Moreover, [...] conceded that he failed to keep a chronology of the IA investigation status.  (13T133:19).  [...] conceded that when he served [...] with the IA notice that he was a target back in 2017 [...] was in possession of the GPS/ABL data regarding [...]'s report of an improperly conducted property check at that time.  (13T135:14).  [...] is the former Police Chief for HT.  (15T5:25).  [...] worked at HT for thirty-one (31) years.  (15T6:7).  [...] rose through every rank in the [...] and for a time was in charge of IA.  (15T6:14,22).  [...] knew about the initiation of the IA investigation of [...] in this matter but did not know any of the times or specific dates anything happened procedurally.  (15T8:10,12,17,22).  [...] did not recall when [...] started interviewing anyone.  (15T9:11).  [...] conceded that the fact that [...] was not interviewed until practically a year later after the submission of the complaint was due to delays by [...]’s attorneys because that is what [...] told him, but ultimately he did not know what the specific reasons for delay were.  (15T12:16,19-24).  [...] conceded that he never directed [...] to simply summon [...] in and interview him, which could have been done.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT  ..................................................................................................  1 POINT I  THE STATE DOES NOT CONTEST THAT RENDERING UNANIMOUS VERDICTS ON EVERY LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MURDER REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THE MURDER CONVICTION, BUT ONLY BALDLY ASSERTS THAT THE VERDICT SHEET RELIED ON IS NOT THE TRUE VERDICT SHEET.
[brief] As noted by this Court in its prior decisions, [...] became statutorily eligible for parole in July 2008, after nearly thirty years in prison.  (Pa115-121).  In April 2009, [...] was denied parole by a two-member panel, who recommended a 240-month FET.  Ibid.  In October 2010, [...] was denied parole by a three-member panel, who established the 240-month FET.  Ibid.  Then, in June 2011, the Full Board denied [...]’s administrative appeal and affirmed the FET of 240 months.  Ibid.  [...] filed a timely appeal and, in July 2012, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded [...]’s matter to the Board, holding that the 240-month FET was arbitrary and not supported by the record or law.  Reldan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. A-6039-10 (App. Div. July 9, 2012).  On remand in March 2013, the Board issued a revised decision, reducing the FET from 240 to 228 months.  (Pa115).  In reducing the FET by a mere twelve months, the Board ignored the clear directives of this Court.  In April 2015, the Appellate Division again reversed and remanded [...]’s parole case to the Board because the 228-month FET was not supported by fact or law.  This court directed:  “The Board shall determine whether [Mr.] Reldan is now eligible for parole or whether another FET date should be established, and it shall do so in accordance with the legal requirements we have outlined in this opinion, including clear and specific articulation of reasons with a factual basis grounded in the record. ”  Reldan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. A-1786-13 (App. Div. Apr. 24, 2015) (slip op. at 8).  In 2017 and 2018, respectively, a two-member panel and three-member panel denied [...] parole and imposed a FET of 120-months in its Initial Notice of Decision.  (Pa115).  The three-member panel’s denial was largely based on [...]’s alleged failure to understand “[his] motivations for [his] anti-social conduct,” as demonstrated by his “denial of parts of offenses and minimization of others. ”  Reldan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. A-0265-18 (App. Div. Dec. 4, 2019) (slip op. at 4-9).  [...] again filed a timely appeal from the Board’s Final Decision denying parole and imposing the 120-month FET.  In December 2019, that parole denial and FET were affirmed by the Appellate Division.  Ibid.  B.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has said:  “[A] police officer is a special kind of public employee.  His primary duty is to enforce and uphold the law...  He represents law and order to the citizenry and must present an image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of the public. ”  Twp. of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J.Super. 560, 566, 215 A.2d 775 (App.Div.1965), certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80, 219 A.2d 417 (1966).
[brief] [9T; 10T; 11T; 12T; 13T; 14T].  [...], [...], [...], [...] Officer [...], [...] Officer [...], [...] Detective [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] Detective Sergeant [...], [...] Detective Sergeant [...], Burlington County Medical Examiner [...], [...], [...] Detective [...] and Burlington County “13T” refers to the trial transcript dated October 18, 2022.  “14T” refers to the trial transcript dated October 19, 2022.  “15T” refers to the trial transcript dated October 20, 2022.  “16T” refers to the sentencing transcript dated January 6, 2023.
[brief] Plaintiff lied on her application for employment with [...] multiple times, denying she had a criminal record.  One of the application documents required Plaintiff to certify under penalty of perjury that she did not have a criminal history.  She lied and denied having any convictions at all.  Under the Statute, “[i]f an individual . . . refuses to consent to, or cooperate in, the securing of a criminal history record background check, the person shall be immediately removed from their person’s position and the person’s employment shall be terminated [.]”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(d) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff’s lies constitute a lack of cooperation that disqualified her from employment with the Defendant as well.  As such, the Statute provides two independent bases on which to affirm summary judgment in this case.  In addition, summary judgment should also be affirmed because Plaintiff cannot prevail on her CEPA claim.  Plaintiff cannot recall when she made her alleged whistleblowing complaints, undermining any relevant proximity to Defendant’s alleged actions.  [...] treated Plaintiff the same as her peers and offered her several positions, all of which she rejected (rebutting her claim that Defendant wanted to get rid of her).  Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot prove causation or demonstrate that Defendant’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions were a pretext.  Summary judgment should be affirmed for this reason as well.  Lastly, Plaintiff perjured herself during the course of this litigation by falsely certifying in her answers to interrogatories that she did not have a criminal record.  She was dishonest in her deposition testimony.  Her lies perpetrate a fraud on the court and provide another basis on which to affirm.  RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS provided to the County Prosecutor’s Office fatal accident unit and/or designated investigator(s) or detective(s).  5.  Dynamic Testing  a.  Surface friction coefficient, acceleration testing, other as required.  To be conducted by the Division of State Police Fatal Accident Investigation Unit or crash investigator.  b.  The County Prosecutor’s Office may require certain testing as per the merits of the case.  (1)  The County Prosecutor’s Office Fatal Accident Investigation Unit may assist, after consultation.  6.  Reconstruction Analysis  a.  At the request of the County Prosecutor’s Office, a consultation with the Division of State Police will occur prior to commencing a reconstruction analysis.  (1)  Reconstruction analysis shall be performed by the Division of State Police Fatal Accident Investigation Unit, with limited assistance from the County Prosecutor’s Office Fatal Accident Investigation Unit, as may be required.  b.  The County Prosecutor’s Office may request specific reconstruction analysis as may be required by the merits of the case.  7.  Mechanical Examination  a.  If requested by the County Prosecutor’s Office, the Division of State Police and the County Prosecutor’s Office shall determine who will perform the appropriate mechanical examination.  b.  The person conducting the examination shall render a written report of his or her findings to the Division of State Police and to the County Prosecutor’s Office.  - 9 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2
[brief] The Training Manual for the flooring department includes “Ebriefs,” or “Ecourses,” which consist of computerized training in product knowledge, including tile, grout and other flooring products.  This training includes “Introduction to Flooring,” “How to Sell Flooring,” “Introduction to Tile,” “Introduction to Laminate,” “Introduction to Hardwood,” all of which are supposed to be followed by “Shadowing Experience,” where the trainee is supposed to “shadow” experienced employees to observe.  (Pra40-133).  Normal procedure would have required [...] to take various assessments and tests along the way, certain milestones, to test his knowledge, which would be reflected in his training log.  (6T218:13-219:12).  At the conclusion of the training, after having absorbed the 90 page flooring manual, there would be another test at the end before getting the red vest.
[directive] Sharing in General  1.  Forfeited cash, property, and proceeds fi-om the sale of forfeited property may be equitably shared with state and local investigative or prosecutive agencies.  2.  All property shared with a participating agency, and any income generated by this property shall be used for law enforcement purposes.  3.  A state or local agency may file a request for an equitable share of cash or property where it can demonstrate that it participated directly in the law enforcement effort that resulted in the seizure and/or forfeiture.  60  4.  sharing request shall be considered unless it is submitted within calendar days  No of 60 the seizure or the federal adoption of a state or local seizure.  The day rule can be waived based upon a written request to the seizing Treasury agency, stating the reasons for the late submission of the equitable sharing request outlining extraordinary circumstances which may have precluded timely submission of the request, and/or providing justification for the waiver.  5.  Forfeited cash and/or property shall be equitably shared with a state or local agency only when it will increase and not supplant existing law enforcement resources of the specific state or local agency that participated in the forfeiture.  6.  Forfeited cash and the net proceeds of forfeited property may be shared with non-Treasury federal agencies if the agency is a member of the Justice participating - Fund, and is authorized to receive the funds.  Assets Forfeiture -- of Factors Governing the Amount Equitable Sharing
[brief] (Pa104 at 80:8-13; Pa293 at 60:2-6).  [...] had once mistakenly received charge pay for a single pay period.  It was discovered by [...] after payroll had already been processed.  When [...] advised [...] of her discovery, [...] indicated “we will let it go this time,” because the administrative effort to correct the error was immense.  (Pa363 at 84:2-9; Pa104-05 at 81:20-82:18).  [...] would have approved any ongoing prospective charge pay in writing.
[brief] See Pa001-Pa021.  After the pleadings in this action were filed, however, [...] supplied the [...] with a number of quitclaim deeds which it obtained from some of the alleged heirs of the former members of [...].  Pa283-Pa340.  As a result of these quitclaim deeds, [...] contended at trial through the testimony of [...] (a genealogist) and [...] (who not only testified as [...]’s title expert but also testified that he represented [...] in its negotiation and procurement of the quitclaim deeds), that [...] now owns Lot 3.01 (and that it therefore also owns some un-delineated portion of the Leased Premises).  See generally 3T.  Additional facts relevant to the arguments on appeal will be addressed within the Legal Argument below.
[brief] (19T 15-12 to 18).  Instead, the PCR judge construed defendant’s testimony, and based on a mistaken belief, found it not to be credible.  (19T 5-24 to 6-11).  However, the PCR judge’s understanding of the record was inaccurate because it was grounded on a clearly mistaken factual finding which served as the basis for its credibility determination of defendant’s testimony.
[brief] So it’s a bit of a process we have to go through to get there.  By way of email of August 29, 2022, Pa190, [...] counsel sent Board’s counsel [...]’s version of proposed form of Resolution, Pa191.  By way of email dated September 6, 2022, Pa209, Board’s counsel responded and provided redlined comments and modifications to the draft, Pa211.  In that same email, Board counsel again reminded [...] counsel to respond to the proposed Amendment to Settlement Agreement and proposed amendments to the Rezoning Ordinance that were sent to [...] counsel on August 24, 2022 and advising desire to move both the Resolution and the Amendment to Settlement Agreement to the Board at its next meeting of September 12, 2022, Pa209.  Having no response, Board counsel sent follow-up email of September 8, 2022, which prompted a conference call between counsel, see Pa237.  Thereafter, [...] sent Board counsel a further revised/redlined draft resolution, Pa239, by way of email of October 7, 2022, Pa.238; that draft contained significant changes.  As long ago as the summer of 2022, Board counsel advised [...]’s attorneys that he and the Board wanted to resolve both the resolution and the settlement agreement amendment as soon as possible, and long before counsel’s scheduled out-of-the country trip from October 20 through November 3, 2022, Pa269, scheduled trip because they did not want the resolution and/or the settlement agreement amendment to linger past October.
[brief] Despite these significant injuries, Defendant attempted on cross-examination to make it seem that Plaintiff “made a good recovery. ”  [...] testified Plaintiff’s recovery was “nothing short of a miracle” and that she could have lost both her legs in the accident or died because of her injuries.  4T231.  Again, the jury was also shown and had in evidence the [...] photos showing the extensive devastating open wounds to her leg, the external fixators applied to both legs, the photographs of the extensive hardware that remains in the plaintiff’s body and the disfiguring scarring on plaintiff’s legs (both in person in trial and with the admitted photographs).
[brief] ”  182 N.J. at 24.  In this case, the “second round of litigation” on attorney’s fees resulted from this Court’s prior disagreement with [...]’s liberal application of the SOL.  [...]’ current, perfunctory assertions notwithstanding, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4c and settled case law, [...] was entitled to, and properly has been awarded, fees and costs in the amount determined by two experienced jurists.  By virtue of [...]’s and [...]’ thorough and painstaking reconsideration, analysis and confirmation of [...]’s fee award on remand, this Court should not accept the Wilfs’ invitation to further prolong this 31-year old litigation by requiring yet a “third round of fee litigation. ”  There has been no “abuse of discretion,” no “irrelevant or inappropriate factors” utilized and “no clear error in judgment” on remand.\footnote{Rule 4:41-5(b) further commands that the court “shall accept the master’s findings of fact unless contrary to the weight of the evidence. ”  Furthermore and as the Wilfs’ counsel correctly points out, “a party against whom a Special Master has made an adverse factual finding has a heavy burden to overturn that finding. ”  (Db26)  As set forth herein, the Wilfs have not met that burden.}  The fee award should be affirmed.
[brief] See State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 382-83 (1991) (noting “when an officer’s experience and expertise is relevant to the probable cause determination, the officer must be able to explain sufficiently the basis of that opinion, so that it can be understood by,” and be persuasive to, the “average reasonably prudent person”) (internal quotations omitted).  The affiant failed to explain how this conclusion was “based on his training and experience as a narcotics officer,” and did not explain what inferences he drew that led him to conclude that [...] was engaging in drug distribution.  (1T:20-18 to 21-21) (trial court asking how affiant’s training and experience led him to draw this conclusion); Cf. State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. at 487-88 (holding officers’ testimony they suspected the defendant was concealing contraband by placing bag in waistband did not support reasonable suspicion where officers did not explain, for instance, that contraband is frequently transported in this manner based on their training and experience); State v. Williams, 410 N.J. Super. 549, 556-57 (App. Div. 2009) (holding officer’s testimony he was concerned the defendant was concealing weapon by putting hand in his pocket did not support reasonable suspicion where officer did not articulate basis for concern.)  Finally, the trial court appropriately took notice of the affidavit’s heavy reliance on [...]’s criminal history, as well as the criminal histories of some of the people he interacted with, as a substitute for critical information that was missing from the warrant affidavit.  See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (holding that "mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause" to search a person or automobile).  The trial court correctly concluded that absent police observations of money being exchanged or any description of the items that were transferred to different people, the evidence presented in the warrant affidavit amounts to no more than “a suspicion based on CI information” and [...]’s criminal record.  (1T:17-16 to 18-12, 21-18 to 22-8, 23-20 to 24-9)  While the officer may have suspected that [...] was engaged in criminal activity, the facts in the affidavit are insufficient to support anything more than a suspicion of criminal activity, let alone to establish probable cause.  The trial court’s decision was correct, and this Court should accordingly affirm its suppression of the evidence.
[brief] *Id.* at 281.  Appellant fails this test.  Appellant alleges in the Complaint that the [...] had “actual and constructive notice” of tax credit “errors and omissions. ”  (*Pa1*, para. 414).  However, Appellant failed to sufficiently state a claim as to (i) how he was directly harmed; (ii) that he was a member of a discreet class that was subjected to the harm brought by the state’s actions; or (iii) that the [...] used its authority to create a danger.  As to the second factor of the test under Bright, supra, Appellant’s legal conclusion stated in paragraph 417 of the Complaint, which states that the [...] refusal to take remedial action “shocks the conscience” is not a proper factual allegation and should not be given any weight.  Glass, 317 N.J. Super. 582.  Count Seven of the Complaint alleges that the [...] “conspired and colluded with each other to interfere with plaintiffs’ rights.  (Pa1, para. 429, 431 and 433).  Appellant had the burden of alleging specific facts to show a prima facie case, which at best may be an attempt for a claim of aiding and abetting.  A claim for aiding and abetting requires proof of an underlying tort.  State, Dep’t of Treasury, Div. Of In. ex rel. McCormac v. Quest Commc’ns Intern., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 481 (App. Div. 2006).  Appellant has not stated any facts to allege an underlying tort.  Appellant failed to sufficiently plead a claim for aiding and abetting, and thus, this claim should be dismissed.  In addition, even if there was an underlying tort, Appellant failed to serve notice of Tort Claims which was fatal to his cause.  In Count Eight of the Complaint, Appellant failed to state any specific allegation directed at the [...].  The Complaint states, “Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in this Complaint as if set forth in length herein. ” (Pa1).  Thus, this claim was properly dismissed.  Appellant has failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action against the [...].  All of the allegations made in the Complaint against them are simply conclusions without legal sufficiency and support.  As such, the [...] are entitled to dismissal.  **Point III.
[brief] Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief.
[brief] So, this is the same – well, the trustee is the successor in interest to the prior grantor of J-23 to the same grantee – as J-23.  So, now according to this deed the – strip now has been conveyed back to – looking only at the deed, taking the deed at face value, the strip has now been reunited, so to speak, with Lot 4.  2T71:16-73:19.  Clearly, Plaintiff established that the Strip was owned by his predecessors in title prior to his purchase of the Property.  B.