ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Transcripts from the Arbitration Proceeding2.  .........................  Pa61 VOLUME III [...] and [...], Docket No. [...] (Arbitrator [...]).  ............... Pa170 [...] and [...], Docket No. [...] (Arbitrator [...]).  .............  Pa186 [...], [...] and [...], Docket No.: [...].  ...... Pa195 --- 2  Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa61 is included in the Appendix because it is germane to the appeal and was submitted to the Court below as an Exhibit attached to the Certification of [...], Pa20.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] There are no objective criteria for how many or what kinds of similarities are sufficient to declare a match between two prints.  National Academy of Science, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 140 (2009) (“[F]riction ridge analysis relies on subjective judgments by the examiner. ”); President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods 101 (2016) (hereinafter “PCAST Report”) (“[L]atent print analysis. . . depends on subjective judgment. ”).  Thus, the claim to objectivity is false and misleading.
[directive] Reports to the Court and counsel shall be due on _ 7.  __ of of  The NGRI acquittee's maximum period supervision under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 years 8.  __ and months terminates on [ fill in the date] of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the Court of within two (2) days its signing.  Judge Date Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: Name Name --------------- --------------- Address Address ________  Telephone Number ----------  Telephone Number _ --------------- Fax Fax ---------------- ---------------  Em ail  Em ail --------------- ________  If yes, language _ Interpreter needed? Yes No ________ D  Ifyes,describe _ ADA accommodation needed? Yes  No  Contact List attached by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12559 (KROL Order 4)  Jeney Courts  New ~ . ,u~,- . - New Jersey Judiciary Contact List  Krol Order lndepmdence •lnttgtiry • F.i1ffl1m ~rvk:e Q\Jarity of In the Matter - Select County - County Prosecutor: Defendant's Attorney: Name Name ________ ________  Telephone Number _ Telephone Number _ Email Email Provider Agency: Name Provider Agency CEO --------------------------  ----------------------------  Telephone Number Em ail Court Contact: Name Title  ----------------------------  Telephone Number Em ail by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12559 (KROL Order 4)  Attachment F of Order 5 - Mandating Release  NGRI Acquittee  * * *  NGRI  This order (CN 12560) is to be used when the court finds that the acquittee is not so dangerous to self, others, or property as to require institutionalization or In release upon certain conditions.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  7  ARGUMENT  8  I.  The trial court lacks a legal basis to dismiss plaintiff’s suit with prejudice in the order issued on March 1, 2024.  Plaintiff maintains the right to refile the case before the expiration of the statute of limitations relevant to the causes of action.  II.  In the order issued by the trial court on March 31, 2023, the trial judge erred by mishandling the plaintiff's request for medical records as pre-trial discovery and subsequently rejecting plaintiff’s motion to obtain those records.  III.  Defendants confirmed their breach of contract and fraudulent concealment in the falsified “Client Notes Report”.  IV.  Although the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, plaintiff is unable to comply with the order to retain an attorney due to the defendants’ fraudulent concealment of all service records.  In situations where the interests of attorneys and the plaintiff cannot be aligned, the plaintiff should have the right to bring suit pro se.  CONCLUSION  21  | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order granting motion to dismiss complaint, filed March 1, 2024 | Pa1 | | Order granting motion to dismiss complaint, filed October 22, 2021 | Pa22 | | Appellate Court
[brief] ”  See State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 307 Cal. Rptr. 3d 750, 776–78 (Ct. App. 2023) (citing State ex rel. Bartlett v. Miller, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Ct. App. 2016)); Ja3877 (State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 2017 L 000289 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 13, 2023) (citing Illinois authorities concerning “Illinois’s narrow and traditional definition of news media”)).  But these cases do not discuss [...] or [...], and no federal court interpreting the federal FCA has held that [...] is not a “news media” source.  This court gives greater weight to federal court guidance than non-New Jersey state court rulings, given that the NJFCA was expressly modeled on the federal FCA.  See Bayer, 2024 WL 875633, at *6.  Following Bayer’s directive to follow federal precedent, this court should likewise reject Relator’s legal argument that “news media” in the NJFCA should be informed by the meaning of that term in the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the June 9 Order is Denied**  The June 9 Order was erroneous and based upon a material misapprehension of PSA Section 13.1.  It also flatly conflicted with the reasoning and result reached in the June 2 Order, in which the trial court had refused to dismiss with prejudice as against [...].  (Pa199-200).  Accordingly, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the June 9 Order under Rule 4:42-2 and related relief.  (Pa358-394).  On July 21, 2023, the trial court heard oral argument and denied Plaintiff’s motion, adhering to the June 9 Order dismissing the Complaint as against [...], *with prejudice*.  (July 21 Trans., 3T, at 15-16).  **D.
[brief] Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-17 Email Chain with Subject “Grand Total Balance [...], dated April 22, 2013 ........................................................Da0193  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-18 Check from [...] to [...] in the amount of $330,000, dated April 26, 2013 (INTEENTIONALLY OMITTED)  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-19 Discharge of Mortgage and Acknowledgment (INTEENTIONALLY OMITTED)  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-20 “Retirement Plan Loan” Schedule (INTEENTIONALLY OMITTED)
[brief] ”  See State v. Lashley, 453 N.J. Super. 405, 411-412 (App. Div. 2002).  The clear pattern of law enforcement’s intentional disregard of constitutional rights evidenced in this case, beginning with [...]’s misconduct in Illinois; the arrest of [...] and [...]; the off the record interrogations and threats which compelled them to become agents of the police, and through whom the police identified and located [...] (the alleged purchaser of the seized marijuana) including the exact location and timing of the delivery, both of which in fact the police ultimately controlled.  And all without seeking or obtaining the judicial oversight of any court.
[brief] Under the seminal “X + Y = Z” formula set out in *Springfield Terminal*, a public disclosure through transactions happens where both the allegedly “misrepresented state of facts” and the allegedly “true state of facts” are publicly disclosed such that an analysis of the true state of facts (the “Y”) shows the defendants’ statements to be false (the “X”), thereby allowing the inference of fraud (the “Z”).  *Springfield Terminal*, 14 F.3d at 653–55.  Even though no one has published the allegations of fraud, the “essential elements” of the fraud are publicly disclosed from which an analysis could generate the inference of fraud, thereby triggering the bar.
[brief] New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-1, sets forth the criteria for granting Summary Judgment:  The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  R. 4:46-1.  Historically, when the Court entertains a summary judgment motion, “…the standards of decision governing the granting or denial of Summary Judgment emphasize that a party opposing the Motion is not to be denied a trial unless the moving party sustains the burden of showing clearly the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. ”  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  “It is a movant’s burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of an issue of material fact, and all inferences of doubt are to be drawn against the movant in favor of opponent of the motion.  The papers supporting the motion are closely scrutinized and the opposing papers are indulgently treated. ”  Kugler v. Tiller, 127 N.J. Super. 468, 476 (App. Div. 1974)  “…[S]ummary judgments are to be granted with extreme caution…the moving papers are to be considered most favorably to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment…all doubts are resolved against the person moving for summary judgment. ”  Revulvo v. American Casualty Co., 39 N.J. 490, 492 (1960).  In reviewing the moving papers and papers in opposition, the judge must consider the papers” … most favorably for the party opposing the motion and all doubts are resolved against the movant.  Id.  “If there is the slightest doubt as to the facts, the motion should be denied. ”  Friedman v. Friendly Ice Cream Co., Metuchen, 35 N.J. 193, 195-196 (1961).  In fact, the burden is on the judgment to show the clear absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Monmouth Lumber Company v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 21 N.J. 439, 440 (1956).  Under the holding of Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), our Supreme Court set forth the following test:
[brief] [...], ESQUIRE & [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esquire - NJ Attorney ID No. 263721970  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ...........................................iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................6  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................21  I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT SINCE THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AGAINST THE [...] DEFENDANTS DID NOT FALL UNDER THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE (50A-51A)  .........................................................................................21  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT ALL OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE [...] DEFENDANTS SOUNDED IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE WHICH REQUIRED THE FILING AND SERVING OF AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT (50A-51A)  ..........32  III.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT SINCE PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS  CITING “NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE” WERE PRESENTED AND REJECTED BEFORE (376A-377A) ........................................................................36  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................42
[brief] ”  *State v. Galloway*, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993).  If circumstances “cast doubt on the knowing and intelligent quality” of the waiver, the issue must be resolved in the suspect’s favor.  *State v. McCloskey*, 90 N.J. 18, 28-30 (1982).  In addition, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession is voluntary and comports with due process.
[brief] This argument is even more inexplicable given that Plaintiff admits in his papers that he relied upon the 2019 Application of [...] as the underlying basis of his Verified Complaint.  (See Pb22).  Plaintiff’s incomprehensible argument aside, there was one application which was denied on or about August 5, 2019 (see Pa019; Pa052; Pa087; Pa194; Pa240; Pa242; Pa268; Pa27; Pa282; Da011; Da015) and one application which was granted on or about March 11, 2024 (see Da055-Da056).  There were no other applications for a handicap parking space at or about [...] relevant to this matter.  Submission of materials months after the denial of an application does not revive the application nor make it anew without following the appropriate procedures.  Accordingly, the Court Below was correct in its interpretation of the facts relevant to this matter and should thus be affirmed.
[brief] Id.  (During the trial, notation was made of the times, the distances and the maps/routes of travel.)  It is noted that Appellant attempts to claim foul play in the Affidavit of Service date entry, but the testimony clarified that date which originally said “June 23” on the affidavit was merely a typographical error and was corrected to “August 23” on the subsequent document.  This was heard and accepted by the Trial Court judge who was there first-hand to evaluate the merits and credibility of the testimony.  Moreover, the witness testified that he was aware that there were two (2) versions, one with the correct date.  T4 35:20 to 36:17.  The Appellant’s attack of this evidence and testimony as to the notarization of the document was heard, acknowledged and ultimately accepted by the Trial Court.  Appellant’s attempt to create an issue as to validity of the notarization was laid to rest by the Trial Judge who heard the testimony, reviewed the Affidavit of Service and accepted the document and the testimony of its creator.
[brief] [...] [...] P.O. Box 2075  [...] [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, [...], [...], and [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................  iii  STATEMENT OF ORDERS AND DECISIONS APPEALED ..................................................  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX ...............................................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................
[brief] **Finances**  During the entire marriage, the Petitioner and Decedent had separate bank accounts and separate finances, having no accounts or assets of any type owned jointly.  The Decedent handled the couple’s finances, and by herself paid the mortgage and taxes on the Home, all utility bills, as well as the expenses associated with her cell phone, car, and household items.  In addition, the Decedent paid for the Petitioner’s health insurance through her payments to her employer [...]\(^3\).  (7T84-15 to 85-2; 8T11-9 to 12).  The mortgage on the Home was eventually satisfied and paid off by the Decedent.  (11T91-22 to 24).  The Petitioner possessed no records showing that any money from his bank records was used for household expenses.  (8T10-11 to 11-2).  With respect to the Petitioner’s testimony on this issue, the Chancery Division noted:  The Petitioner alleged that he contributed to the costs, upkeep of the Home, and general expenses throughout the marriage.  Petitioner failed to present any receipts to demonstrate his contributions.  (Pa 18).  --- \(^3\)  The Decedent worked for [...] from the time that the Respondent was 5 or 6 years old, initially working as a salesperson and coordinator before being promoted to a district manager.  She retired after the onset of her illness.  (10T150-4 to 152-9).  The Petitioner’s refusal to contribute to the household expenses frustrated the Decedent, and when the Respondent questioned her about this situation, the Decedent told her that “it’s not worth the fight. ” (11T86-14 to 87-2).  This situation, however, created a mindset in the Decedent that because the Petitioner failed to contribute financially to the marriage, he should not have any expectations of an inheritance of any kind.  (11T87-3 to 21).  3.
[brief] In denying [...]’s Cross Motion to Vacate, the trial court reasoned that analyzing the merits of vacatur was “unnecessary” due to the court’s prior determination to dismiss [...]’s affirmative claims due to an ostensible lack of a private right of action under the NJCFLA.  *See* T1 59:1-8.  The trial court further instructed [...] to pursue the Motion to Vacate in the Special Civil Part as the Motion to Transfer had not been granted.  *See* T1 59:17-21.  As a threshold matter, the trial court failed to address [...]’s assertions that the default judgment was void due to [...]’s defective service of process.  Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA, said assumption does not foreclose asserting the NJCFLA defensively to vacate an unlawfully obtained default judgment.  In sum, the trial court’s reasoning erroneously conflated an offensive application of the NJCFLA with a defensive application.  In *New Century Fin. v. Trewin*, the Chancery Division analyzed a motion to vacate a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff debt collector.  2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018).  The *Trewin* court acknowledged its obligation to “consider the entirety of the circumstances under which the judgment was obtained” and vacated a years old default judgment due to violations of the NJCFLA, like the violations Defendants committed here.  *See Trewin*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 at *7.  The *Trewin* court further reasoned that “defendant is not seeking to utilize the CFLA as a sword, by asserting a private right of action under the statute.  Instead, defendant is asserting the right to utilize the CFLA as a shield against enforcement of a judgment which defendant contends was void *ab initio.*”  *Id.* at *6-7.  By that rationale, the court determined that a private right of action under the NJCFLA was of no consequence in a motion to vacate and held that it was “satisfied that the judgment obtained by plaintiff’s predecessor is void, by virtue of [the loan assignor’s] unlicensed status.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).”  *Id.* at *8, 9-10.  Thus, the trial court’s determination regarding the viability of [...]’s offensive claims has no effect on whether [...] met the standards for vacatur under R. 4:50-1(d) or R. 4:50-1(f).  Thus, the trial court’s Order denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment should be reversed for Defendants’ violations of the NJCFLA and the inequitable nature of allowing Defendants to profit from illegal, unlicensed debt collection activity.
[directive] b.  Network.  The Bureau shall supervise the operations of the Cold Cold Case Case Network, which was established by the Attorney General in April 2019 to coordinate a statewide network of regional cold case task forces.  The Network will provide resources and expertise to assist law enforcement officers solve old crimes using new technologies.  c.  Investigations of Officer-Involved Shootings, Use-of-Force Incidents, and In- Deaths.  The Bureau shall supervise the independent investigation of Custody criminal cases involving police use-of-force or in-custody deaths, as mandated by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2019-4 (the “Independent Prosecutor Directive”).
[directive] note  See assessment. risk pretrial automated Identification Interstate or NCIC/CCH an making by history criminal defendant's the ascertain direct- many in that noted be should verification.  It fingerprint require not does that query Index 53  Page complaint-warrant of issuance require will charges) the of seriousness the cases, complaint a issuing presumption of a trigger or may 4.4.1, subsection see 3:3-1(e), to Rule pursuant 4.5.4.  subsection see :3-1(~, 3 Rule to pursuant complaint-warrant is acomplaint-warrant if arrested, been already not has defendant the where any case In initiate 2.2
[brief] ”  Schmidt, supra, 155 N.J. at 48-49 (citing to N.J.S.A. 34:15-72) (emphasis added).  Defendants’ aspersions aside, our Supreme Court in Schmidt was correct in its reading of the statute.  That expansive or broad view of the scope of mandated coverage may well override the C5 exclusion of claims for intentional wrongs or actions substantially certain to cause injury.  Having granted the employer’s motion for leave to appeal this Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. [...], DNJMa28, our Supreme Court will likely be deciding the issue definitively soon.
[brief] Da 25-31  Defense’s Reply to State’s Response to Motion to Suppress ....................  Da 32-48¹  State’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Suppress ...................................  Da 49-64 Incident Report .....................................................................................  Da 65-67  Body Camera Footage ..........................................................................  Da 68  [...] Roster .........................................  Da 69  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  February 2023  Order Denying Suppression ...................... Da 3; (2T 4-3 to 16-20)  Judgment of Conviction ........................................................................  Da 11-13 ¹  The trial court briefs are included in the appendix to show which issues were previously raised and because the briefs were relied on by the trial court in considering the defense’s motion.
[brief] 20 Lipsit v. Leonard, 64 N.J. 276(1974) ..................................................................................  37 Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 1971) ....................................................  20 McConkey v. AON Corp., 354 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div. 2002)  ......................................................  37 Mittra v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1998)  ..................................................... 34, 35 N.J. Mtge. and Inc. Corp. v. Calvetti, 68 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1961)  .........................................................  19 Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 186 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 1982)