ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD GIVE NO WEIGHT TO [...]’S ADVERSARIAL OPPOSITION BRIEF (Rb).**  The Appellate Division respectfully should disregard [...]’s opposition brief on appeal *(Ibid.)*.  [...] was asked to review the matter between the Board and the Association, and issue a decision in its capacity as a quasi-judicial body pursuant to the Employee-Employer Relations Act, *N.J.S.A.* 34:13A-1, *et seq.* ("Act"), in much the same manner as would be expected from a Superior Court judge or agency head when deciding a matter between two parties.  However, although it is a non-party to the underlying case, [...]’s position before the Court argues the underlying merits, facts, and findings of the dispute.
[brief] He testified:  “I really didn’t want, because I appreciate everything that the defendant has done for the game of chess, I really didn’t want to bring this suit.  But I…”  T5: 21-23.  The trial court said “But you did”  And the Plaintiff said “I did”  T5:24-25.  Under the Plaintiff’s best case scenario, if the rules were ignored, he would receive an extra $105.
[brief] To begin with, if all counsel had the obligation to present truthful testimony, how then could defense counsel and the prosecution present witnesses whose versions of events were diametrically opposed to each other?  Some of the testimony presented at trial, by definition, had to have been false.  But the prosecutor told the jurors that he knew that all his witnesses were truthful, while defense counsel made no such claims.  In fact, jurors might conclude that if all counsel had the obligation to present truthful testimony, that made the situation even worse for the attorneys whose witnesses were not deemed credible by the prosecutor.  Not only were their witnesses liars, but they themselves were flouting their own obligations to the court (and presumably to the public) by putting those witnesses on the stand.  Counsel and their witnesses would have been painted with the same unsavory brush.
[brief] The Trial Court’s purposeful incorporation of the Special Adjudicator’s October 19, 2020 report in the August 8, 2023 Order was to reference the long- documented bad faith conduct on the part of the Township Defendants, all of which the Trial Court had dealt with for years.  In fact, when [...] rendered his decision, he noted that Township Defendants are “still not acting in good faith certainly with this latest episode with the—after approving the Avalon on Valley Road there, the extension, and then unapproving quite frankly.  So I am going to grant—I find that they acted in bad faith.  It was just another tactic to delay the city or the [...] [from] meeting its constitutional obligation, which they seem to have a real problem conceptually having to deal with.
[brief] Instructive is the case the Court cited that did demonstrate significant harm: *Sturdivant v. Sturdivant*, 367 Ark.  514, 241 S.W.3d 740, 742 (2006) (disqualifying wife's lawyer in custody matter because husband had consulted with member of lawyer's firm and disclosed extensive confidential information directly at issue in custody case concerning the children and his concerns about his former wife).  See 206 N.J. at 126.  This case is no *Sturdivant*.  Providing public documents, discussing time limitations and domiciles of potential additional claimants does not remotely approach the conduct in *O Builders*, much less that in *Sturdivant*.  And petitioners' unsupported claims that settlement and strategy were discussed lack credibility, given the state of petitioners' (and [...]'s) knowledge at the time.
[brief] He received service jobs via email to his personal email, but he did not have them because he deleted them and he also had no notes regarding same.  T4, p. 9:11-24.  [...] uses an app on his phone for service and after service of process he has no control over the Affidavit.  T4:17:19.  He testified that he presses the button on the app within 30 seconds to a minute after service of process.  T4:17:22-18:13.  [...] also does not know if the affidavit can be edited.  Id.  At p. 20:7-13.  In fact, [...] testified that after he pushes the button on the app, he does not talk to, Facetime or have any contact with the notary at all.  T4, p. 23:3-13.  [...] never had contact with the notary who signed the Affidavits whatsoever.  Id.
[brief] 57 Id. 58 Id. 59 Pa851.  60 Id. 61 Id.  62  Id. | | Date | Description | Hours | Rate | Total | |---|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------|----------| | 54 | 10/13/22 |  Email from Court with notice of motion date.  Email [redacted]  . . .  [...] confirming [redacted].<sup>63</sup> | .2 hrs. | $76.00 | $33,291.22 | <sup>63</sup>  *Id.*  Defendant’s Fee Application seeks $5,263.00 in fees and costs for unsuccessfully opposing Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint.
[brief] In Sourlis v. Borough of Red Bank, 220 N.J. Super. 434, 436-437 (App Div. 1987).  the trial court barred the Plaintiffs motion to vacate an In Rem foreclosure by the municipality because it was filed beyond the five-year limitation of N.J.S.A. 54:5-90.  The issue revolved from the manner of service upon the defendant taxpayer.  The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and remanded for factual finding if laches applied to Plaintiff’s failure to file its motion within a reasonable time.  However, the Sourlis decision acknowledged that; “The applicable statute of limitations is not N.J.S.A. 54:5-90 but N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.67 within the In Rem Tax Foreclosure Act, N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.29 et seq.
[directive] Standard Jury Voir Dire Criminal [Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07]  1.  In order to be qualified under New Jersey law to serve on a jury, a person must have certain qualifying characteristics.  A juror must be: • Age 18 or older • A citizen of the United States • Able to read and understand the English language.  • A resident of ____________ county (the summoning county)  Also, a juror must not: • Have been convicted of any indictable offense in any state or federal court • And must not have any physical or mental disability which would prevent the person from properly serving as a juror.  Please consider that the Judiciary will provide reasonable accommodations consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act.
[brief] C.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That It Has Specific Jurisdiction Over Defendants (Da14)  The Trial Court’s conclusion that it has specific jurisdiction over Defendants was also in error.  Specific jurisdiction is available only when the “cause of action arises directly out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum state. ”  Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 119 (1994).  Absent --- 9  Because the record does not support the Trial Court’s finding that “[i]t was understood that Plaintiff’s principal place of business was the state of New Jersey,” Da14, that finding is not entitled to deference on appeal.  Rippon, 449 N.J. Super. at 358.  [...] understood only that [...], Plaintiff’s CFO, resided and worked in New Jersey, Da178, and Plaintiff’s own public filings reflect that North Dakota, not New Jersey, was the location of Plaintiff’s headquarters and principal executive office throughout the underlying representation.  Da148; Da156–65.  such a connection, specific jurisdiction will not exist “regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State. ”  *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.*, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).  The Trial Court’s specific jurisdiction analysis, contained in a single paragraph, neither acknowledged nor applied this standard.
[brief] Finally, defendant’s reliance on *State v. Culkin*, 97 Hawai’i 206, 35 P.3d 233 (2001) is misplaced.  In *Culkin*, the Supreme Court of Hawai’i found reversible error with the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the State’s burden to disprove self-defense when it outlined the elements for reckless manslaughter.  35 P.3d at 240-246.  The trial court had instructed the jury for each offense, except reckless manslaughter, that the State bore the burden of proving that Culkin did not act in self-defense.  *Id.* at 241.  In Hawai’i, unlike New Jersey, self-defense by statute is not an affirmative defense and the burden is on the State to disprove it as an element of the charged offense.  *Id.* at 242, 244.  The court in *Culkin* held that the trial court’s failure to charge the self-defense element for reckless manslaughter but so instructing for all other substantive offenses was compounded by the jury’s confusion when it asked the trial court during deliberations for clarification on whether self-defense applied to all offenses.  *Id.* at 246.  The error in the *Culkin* case, which was the failure to charge under Hawai’i law an element of the offense, did not occur in this case.  Self-defense is not an element of aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter because it is an affirmative defense.
[brief] (See 13T:5-1 to 6-15; 12T:18-23 to 43-25).  As evidenced above, the State argued that the bullets found at the scene and on defendant [...]’ Corolla matched the same bullets in the two guns recovered at the residence where both defendants were found after the shooting.  Id.  The testimony by the New Jersey State Police was that neither defendant had a permit to own a gun and that the guns recovered were not legally registered to anyone.  (10T:53-12 to 56-21).  Based on the fact that there were different types of bullets and two clearly illegal guns, a reasonable inference could be made, and properly made during summation based on the evidence in the record, that the two defendants found whatever ammunition they could and put them into the two guns.  This was not testimony, it was a proper summation argument.  Defendant touts the “authority” of the prosecutor as a basis to assume the jury would believe anything he said.  Clearly, that argument bears no merit because even if the jury found the prosecutor to be an “authority” on ammunition, they discounted such authority when they acquitted defendant of the gun charges.  Additionally, defendant’s assertion that the State’s comments during summation about “shared ammunition” could have “reasonably contributed to those jurors voting to convict [defendant] of conspiracy, a more amorphous charge which by its nature relies on inferences,” ignores the video evidence in this case.  (Db 23-24).  Likewise, it ignores the fact that even if defendant did not know [...] had a gun and was planning to shoot the victims that day, the fact that he was hanging out with [...] at [...], mere hours after the shooting, and did not flee as soon as he could, was powerful evidence of a conspiracy.  As the jury rejected the State’s theory that defendant possessed the other gun, they also could have rejected the State’s theory that remaining with [...] was evidence that they both agreed to commit the shooting.  However, based on the jury’s verdict, they clearly believed defendant was involved in the agreement and planning of the shooting.  It is therefore not plausible that the State’s summation on “shared ammunition” swayed the jurors to convict defendant of conspiracy.  Defendant’s difficult plight is the overwhelming video evidence of his crime, and not the State’s summation.
[brief] 3d 1074, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Hanson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2013 WL 5674997, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2013) (“Documents attached to or included in an attorney[-]client communication are not automatically privileged, and the party asserting privilege must prove that each attachment is protected by privilege. ”).
[brief] THE RELEVANT CASELAW IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO NO KNOCK WARRANT (Da15 through Da36)  [...] relies primarily on his initial appellant’s brief, but addresses the following issues raised in the State’s respondent’s brief.  The State mischaracterized [...]’s argument, specifically by stating in response that “there is no evidence” officers failed to knock and announce their presence before resorting to the ram.  (State’s Brief, 15).  Defendant submits that this argument is unavailing and must be disregarded by the Court.  Compliance with a knock-and-announce warrant requirement is a critical predicate for a reasonable search under the New Jersey Constitution.  It is simply objectively unreasonable—without justification for police to ignore a knock-and- announce requirement contained in a warrant that they requested and obtained.  Ignoring the requirement contravenes the search and seizure rights of New Jersey residents.  *State v. Caronna*, 469 N.J. Super. 462, 471 (App. Div. 2021).  [...], as noted in Appellant’s initial brief, was aware of the relevant AG Directive and Union City Policy, and more importantly conceded “should have” put his BWC on prior to going getting set up in the “stack. ” (2T 19:2 through 7).  Against this backdrop, the State posits “there is no evidence,” the knock and announce requirement was not complied with.  (Db15).  This is a creative end-around the fact that potential evidence indicating officers did not comply with relevant AG Directives and departmental policy would be available but for the fact that the officers all had audio on their BWC turned off—spoiling any potential evidence by no fault of [...].  While the State is certainly free—as it did—to advance the argument that no negative inference should be drawn.  The trial court failed to address this argument at all in its decision, and as such warrants a reversal back to the trial court to address this argument by the Defendant.  It is submitted that had the court adopted a negative inference, the State could not have been able to meet its burden and the court should have granted defendant’s suppression motion.  Moreover, logically speaking, without any actual consequence for the failure of law enforcement to utilize their respective BWC, at a critical juncture in an investigation, i.e., when executing a search warrant on the residence of an individual; which goes to the very essence of someone’s 4th amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, there is nothing else to deter law enforcement from not properly following proper procedure and activating their body worn cameras.  Therefore, it is again submitted that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s suppression motion and the matter should be remanded back to the trial court for more findings to be made.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 provides in part:  a.  A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the entity; . . . .  c.  A public entity is not liable for the exercise of discretion in determining whether to seek or whether to provide the resources necessary for the purchase of equipment, the construction or maintenance of facilities, the hiring of personnel and, in general, the provision of adequate governmental services; d.  A public entity is not liable for the exercise of discretion when, in the face of competing demands, it determines whether and how to utilize or apply existing resources, including those allocated for equipment, facilities and personnel unless a court concludes that the determination of the public entity was palpably unreasonable.  Nothing in this section shall exonerate a public entity for negligence arising out of acts or omissions of its employees in carrying out their ministerial functions.
[brief] In so holding, the Court stressed the fact that the firm had made no representations to [...] whatsoever, that [...] produced no evidence that he had relied upon the firm in its professional capacity, and there was “no indicia that the defendants endeavored to induce [...] to rely on the firm. ”  Id. at 301-302.  Given these facts, as to which the Court found there was no genuine dispute, it was impossible to find the existence of any duty by the firm to [...].
[brief] Therefore, just because the Defendant may not directly employ any of the medical providers and the Plaintiff did not treat there during the time period at issue, does not mean that the entity cannot be held vicariously liable in this case.  However, all of these issues require discovery, which the Plaintiffs were deprived of based upon the Trial Court’s ruling.  Each of those arguments was rejected by [...] in his determination that discovery was not necessary and the entity should be outright dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] On 7/27/16 I filed my answer and counterclaim in response to the foreclosure complaint of 5/12/16 that I received on 6/23/16 (171a).  I exposed the lies in the Foreclosure Complaint (141a) and the forged mortgage documents submitted by [...] and I demanded jury trial.  On 9/7/16, in response to my RESPA request; [...], outside of their attorneys, directly wrote me that the Owner of the Note was [...] not [...].  [...] did not list [...] as a party of interest in the complaint (141a) which was in violation of the NJ Court Rule 4:64-(1)(b)(11).  That pleading by [...], on 9/7/16, invalidated [...]’s claim in the Foreclosure Complaint that it had the Note in its possession and lost it (150a).  On 12/30/2016 [...]’s attorney submitted the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/2014 fabricated by [...] (088a).  In that alleged affidavit [...] claimed that it had the physical Note and lost it.  That pleading by [...] invalidated [...]’s pleading on 9/7/16 that [...] was the owner of the Note.  Because [...] was ignoring my discovery questions I had to file a motion to dismiss the Foreclosure Complaint (141a) based on NJ court rules.  A motion hearing was ordered by the Foreclosure trial Judge [...] for 1/6/17.
[brief] Those comments do not suggest the CFPB considered and decided whether the type of information Defendant shared complies with § 1692c(b).  Defendant then refers to the use of a vendor to receive mail from consumers.  Under 12 CFR § 1006.34(c)(2)(i), a validation notice must include “the mailing address at which the debt collector accepts disputes and requests for original-creditor information. ”  Supplement I to Regulation F provides the CFPB’s Official Interpretations of the Regulation.  The Official Interpretation provides, “A debt collector may disclose a vendor’s mailing address, if that is an address at which the debt collector accepts disputes and requests for original-creditor information. ”  The rule and its interpretation concern mail from consumers and not what information a debt collector shares with others.  Defendant relies on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to protect consumers.
[brief] See Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A., 98 F.4th 463, 468 (3d Cir. 2024) (rejecting insurer’s reliance on the boilerplate language in N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a) of IFPA as indicative of an intent to exempt the statute from arbitration).  C.  The Amici Curiae’s interpretation of the No-Fault Law would undermine the objective of reducing court congestion.  One of the “overwhelming goals” of adopting the No-Fault Law was “reducing court congestion. ”  Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 516 (1994); see also Sabato, 337 N.J. Super. at 396 (explaining that insurers cannot be permitted to sidestep arbitration under the No-Fault Law “simply by characterizing PIP disputes” as some of the kind of dispute and then “seeking judicial resolution of those issues”).  Allowing insurers to avoid arbitration undermines that objective.  In this case alone, [...] has repackaged as “fraud” eight-hundred-plus individual PIP claims submitted from 2009 through 2022, many of which [...] either pre-authorized or have been arbitrated to finality.  [...] wants the court system to sort through those hundreds of claims to determine whether the claims should have been paid, in many cases despite an arbitrator’s ruling the claims must be paid.  But that it not the court’s role under the No-Fault Law.  The Legislature expressly mandated that those disputes be resolved through binding arbitration.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a).
[brief] U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment.  G.  The lower Court should have denied the Motion for Summary Judgment on the presumption it was not timely served.  R. 4:46-1 requires that a motion for summary judgment shall be served and filed not later than 28 days before the time specified for the return date.  R. 1:6-3(c) governs the completion of the service of motions, specifying that service of a motion on a pro se litigant is deemed complete “only on receipt at the … address of a pro se party.  If service is by ordinary mail, receipt will be presumed on the third business day after mailing. ”  In its Rider and Statement of Reasons, the lower Court stated: “On October 6, plaintiff filed the present motion for summary judgment….” (Da29).  There is no statement by either the lower Court or Plaintiff of the date when the Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the Defendant.  Indeed, there is no statement by either the lower Court or Plaintiff that Defendant was ever served with the motion for summary judgment.  The return date for Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was November 4, 2022.  28 days before the return date was October 7, 2022.  Thus, service and filing of the motion for summary judgment was required to be completed by October 7, 2022.  R. 4:46-1.  Defendant received the Motion for Summary Judgment by certified mail on October 18, 2022.  Accordingly, service by certified mail was deemed completed on October 18, 2022, which was 11 days after October 7, 2022.  Hence, service of the motion for summary judgment by certified mail was not timely.  Newton v. Newark Star Ledger, DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Jun. 8 2016).  R. 1:6-3(c).  R. 1:5-2 requires the simultaneous mailing of the motion for summary judgment by certified mail and ordinary mail.  Unfortunately, because no proof of service was filed by Plaintiff, it is unknown whether in fact Plaintiff mailed the motion by ordinary mail or when.  Ordinary mail, if mailed, is presumed received by Defendant on the third business day after mailing.  The failure to file proof of service will raise an inference that service pursuant to R. 1:5-1 was not made.  Pressler & Verniero, Current N. J. Court Rules, comment on R. 1:5-2 (2016).  Consequently, the lower Court made a mistake and should have denied the motion for summary judgment because (1) of the inference that service was not made, per Pressler & Verniero, supra and (2) the certified mail was not received by Defendant in a timely manner and (3) there was no evidence that Defendant received the ordinary mail (if it even was sent by ordinary mail) by October 7, 2022 and (4), in the absence of proof of service, the lower Court had no knowledge whether or when service of the Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant was completed.