ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Found That Pay-When-Able Loans Are Enforceable In New Jersey And, Therefore, The Statute of Limitations Did Not Bar Plaintiff’s Claim.  The trial court found that the Third Loan was a pay-when-able loan, and concluded that pay-when-able loans are enforceable in New Jersey and, therefore, that Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.  Da36-38.  While the appellate court reviews *de novo* the trial court’s legal conclusions, *Pami Realty, LLC v. Locations XIX Inc.*, 468 N.J. Super. 546, 556 (App. Div. 2021) (internal citation omitted), there is no basis to disturb the trial court’s ruling.  1.
[brief] Since the constitutional provisions for the enactment of laws was violated, it provides further evidence for this Court to void the Act.  The Constitution expressly provides that the public is permitted the fundamental right to make their opinions known to their legislators.  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18; see also N.J.S.A. 52:13C-18 (“The Legislature affirms that the preservation of responsible government requires that the fullest opportunity be afforded to the people of the State to petition their government for the redress of grievances and to express freely to individual legislators [and] committees of the Legislature”).  In fact, the Constitution states that “the Legislature shall enact all laws necessary to make this Constitution fully effective. ”  N.J. Const. art. XI, § 2.  As a result, N.J.S.A. 52:11-78 was the Legislature creating a duty to ensure that citizens’ rights under Article I, Paragraph 18 are protected.  Similar to Miller, supra, where the statute was enacted contrary to the constitutional mandate, the Act should be invalidated given the Legislature breached its effectuation of Paragraph 18 rights codified at N.J.S.A. 52:11-78 (public notice of bills) when the Legislature failed to provide bill text prior to enactment, notice of hearings, and that the bills would be considered.
[brief] Plaintiff asserts the bad faith conduct was [...]’s alleged collusion with [...] to conceal the closing of the Mack-Cali Transaction.  The Complaint alleges that the concealment effort started in September 2022, when [...] allegedly made a false representation to Plaintiff that it would keep Plaintiff apprised of the status of the Mack-Cali Transaction.  Accordingly, by the time the allegedly bad faith conduct occurred, the PSA had already been terminated by Plaintiff.  [...]’s obligations to act in good faith ceased when Plaintiff terminated the PSA.  *See also 715 Partners, LLC v. GS Assignment, LLC*, A-2527-15T3, 2018 WL 2372800, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 25, 2018) (finding that plaintiff failed to show a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when the underlying agreement was deemed terminated); *Sackman Enterprises, Inc. v. 309 Asbury Corp.*, A-2723-04T2, 2006 WL 1507668, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 2, 2006)⁵ (“Seller’s obligations to Buyer ceased when Buyer exercised its right to terminate the Contract of Sale under the due diligence clause.
[brief] As home improvements are “merchandise” under the CFA, and as Plaintiffs are consumers of home improvements for their own properties, the CFA unquestionably applies.  At trial, Defendants moved for a directed verdict on a reason wholly separate from the CFA.  In doing so, the CFA was never even mentioned by counsel, conceding that it applies to such situations.  This court also found the issue undisputed.  Pa156.  Nevertheless, the trial court found that the sophistication of the parties – an issue not raised by the parties or in the testimony – rendered the CFA inapplicable.  By doing so, the court deprived Plaintiffs of their rights without any notice or cause and the case was remanded for findings of fact and a determination of the All the Way Towing factors.  On remand, the court raised another issue never raised by defense counsel, [...]’s status on behalf of each plaintiff.  This too finds no support in the record and is mistaken.  Consequently, the trial court failed to reach the legal issue of the CFA as mandated.
[brief] \(^4\) (1) [...]; (2) [...]; (3) [...]; (4) [...]; (5) [...]; (6) [...]; and (7) [...].  As to possession, Appellants were honest in acknowledging that they did not reside in the Property.  (459a-460a).  Appellants’ extensive investment into the Property was directed to obtaining the Site Plan Approval pursuant to which the Property was legally converted from a two (2) family to a three (3) family use, all of which Appellants’ actively pursued while [...] was pursuing foreclosure.  This Site Plan Approval was public record and available to [...] and [...].  (123a-131a).  The Property was reasonably maintained, secure, and was not on the list of abandoned properties maintained by [...], notwithstanding [...]’s self-serving Leary Report.  (463a).  Further, the interior of the Property contained many tens of thousands of dollars of construction materials which Appellants’ were storing pending the issuance of permits for the construction we planned following the legal conversion.  (459a-461a).  While not “residence” at the Property, Appellants maintained a degree of possession sufficient to place the [...] and [...] on notice of Appellants’ intention to renovate the Property and preserve their investment.
[brief] Via [...], Appellee presented evidence he sustained cervical disc herniations which caused myelopathy and radiculopathy.  Appellee’s treatment consisted of a six (6) month course of chiropractic care, two (2) small courses of physical therapy, an arthroscopic procedure of the left shoulder, and three --- \(^1\) 1T=January 18, 2023  Trial Transcript (Volume 1)  2T= January 18, 2023  Trial Transcript (Volume 2)  3T= January 19, 2023  Trial Transcript (Volume 3)  4T=February 28, 2023  Post-Trial Hearing Transcript 5T=April 14, 2023  Post-Trial Hearing Transcript 6T=July 11, 2023  Bankruptcy Court Hearing Transcript  (3)  cervical epidural injections.  Via [...], Appellee was recommended cervical discectomy and fusion, but Appellee had declined surgical intervention.  He admitted to no treatment since January 7, 2021.  Appellee noted that he still took care of his father at a slower pace and was getting ready to get back into the workforce.  [...] testified that Appellee suffered no permanent injury from the subject accident and, despite testifying Appellee’s treatment was related to the accident at one point, corrected such testimony and clarified that although the treatment was reasonable and necessary, it was not related to the accident at issue.
[brief] In addition, Plaintiff’s petition answered “no” in response to the question of whether Plaintiff had any “claims against third parties, whether or not you have filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment. ” (Da16 at ¶ 33).  --- 1  The factual background and procedural history of this matter are intertwined and thus presented together.  Instead, Plaintiff merely listed “potential/unknown consumer protection claims” (without specifying who such claims would be brought against) under “other contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature . . .” (Da16, 17 at ¶ 34).  While Plaintiff indicated that the value of her claims was “unknown” she appeared to contradict her own filing by then listing that $1,000 (the statutory maximum for claims brought pursuant under the FDCPA) was exempt.  (See Da19).  On July 27, 2021, Plaintiff received a discharge of her debts, discharging $394,411.54 of her outstanding debts and after a finding that Plaintiff has no assets.  (See Da68 at Docket Entry #8).  After receiving her discharge, in what can only be construed as an admission that she did not properly disclose her claims to the bankruptcy court, Plaintiff attempted to file amended schedules with the bankruptcy court — this time listing five separate potential claims specifically naming entities to which such claims could be brought and also removing the $1,000 exemption limit and instead claiming the entire “unknown” value of these lawsuits were exempt property.  (See Da73, 74, 77).  Plaintiff’s amended schedules were rejected by the bankruptcy court because Plaintiff had already received a discharge and the bankruptcy court explicitly stated that Plaintiff would have to file a motion to reopen her bankruptcy case in order to file her amended schedules.  (See Da68 at Docket Entry #10)(“Type of Error: Documents Filed in Closed Case . . .  To file this Amendment, a Motion to Reopen Bankruptcy Case is required”).  Plaintiff did not move to reopen her bankruptcy and did not remedy her improper disclosures to the bankruptcy court.  (See Da68,69).  Instead, three weeks after receiving the benefit of discharge, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit.
[brief] [...] Saw Fit to Issue A Notice Of Cancellation Of [...]’s Separate Workers Compensation Policy And Send It To A Governmental Agency, But Not To [...].  Separate from the liability coverage, [...] “prepared a Cancellation Endorsement on August 24, 2015, cancelling coverage for [[...]] under the CCIP’s Worker’s Compensation” policy.  (Dta1407, ¶97.)  Despite the conflation below of the cancellation of the workers compensation policy with the CGL coverage, the testimony confirms that they were different policies, and that [...] did not send [...] notice of the compensation policy termination, either.  The facts establish that [...] saw fit to formally cancel the workers’ compensation policy only, and only provided notice of that cancellation to the [...].  [...] sent an email to the [...] wrap up team requesting it to “cancel effective 08/01/2015,” referring to [...]’s CCIP workers’ compensation policy number “[...]” only, and not the CGL and excess policies.  (Dta1043.)  (The stated cancellation date was prior to the effective date listed on the Certificate of Insurance.)  The [...] representative testified that [...] never sent a cancellation notice to [...]:  Q.  Okay.  And the cancellation endorsement itself has a mailing address in the center, correct, where I’m reading it says, “[...]. ”  A.  Yes.  Q.  And it’s my understanding that [...] did not mail anything to that address.  Is that fair?  A.  I don’t – I don’t believe so.  [Dta860, [...] dep. T115-23 to 116-7.]  [...]’s testimony confirmed that cancellation of [...]’s CCIP workers’ compensation policy would not affect its coverage under the general liability policies, and that the liability policy had no language linking its coverage to the workers’ compensation policy.  (Dta854,855, T99-18 to 101-12.)  5.  **[...] Confirmed That It Did Not Receive Any Cancellation Or Termination Notice From [...] Or Anyone Else Regarding Either the Liability Or Compensation Policies.
[brief] The lower court there then entered sanctions for about $10,000 in the face of a request for about $12,000.  On appeal, the Ill. Supreme Court upheld the sanction on 3 grounds.  The first was that Rule 137 prevents abuse of the judicial process by penalizing claimants who bring vexatious & harassing actions.  Id. at 393 & 396.  The second was that Rule 137 does not preclude a sanction award for a pro se attorney defendant.  Id. at 394.  The third was that the majority view nationally is that a pro se defendant attorney can recover frivolous litigation sanctions.  Id. at 396-97  [...] is consistent with this Court’s decisions in Port-O-San Corp. v. Teamsters Local Union, 363 N.J. Super. 431 (App. Div. 2003) & Brach, Eiler,P.C. v. Ezekwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1,17(App. Div 2001).
[brief] iii.  The photographs of the road elevation fail to establish a dangerous condition.  The trial court reviewed the photographs of the roadway and condition at issue and correctly found that they do not depict a dangerous condition.  (See Pa2145)  Specifically, the court noted that the [...] report and photographs only vaguely described the condition.  (See Pa2146).  The photographs do not show a hole or an abrupt 2” elevation change or defect.  (See Da042; Da030; Pa2166; Pa2167).  None of the photographs can lead any reasonable person to conclude that the condition was a dangerous condition that should have been identified on routine inspections.  (See Pa2168).  Based in part on its review of the photographs, the trial court correctly found that there were insufficient information to create an inference of a dangerous condition.
[brief] Id. at 312.  Based on these instructions, the jury found the [...] and [...] liable to the plaintiffs for legal malpractice.  Id. at 309.  On appeal, the Wilentz defendants argued that the trial judge made a number of errors which included failing to rule as a matter of law that no attorney-client relationship existed and erroneously instructing the jury that the plaintiffs were clients of the [...].  Id. at 310.  After considering the evidence presented at trial, the Appellate Division concluded that the trial judge erred in deciding as a matter of law that an attorney-client relationship existed because it was not an issue that could be decided by the judge as a matter of law.  Id. at 312.  In coming to this conclusion, the Froom court noted that the parties had presented substantial evidence that supported and refuted the existence of an attorney-client relationship, including evidence that plaintiffs may have terminated the law firm’s representation before the closing of the transaction.  The Froom court declared that the trial judge committed reversable error by withdrawing from the jury a critical issue of material fact on an essential element of the plaintiffs’ claim.  Id. at 312.  As in Froom, the trial judge denied [...] the opportunity to present to a jury a critical issue of material fact, that is, the nature of the relationship between [...] and the Defendants.
[brief] As for the first question, the MBPA states that whether the terms of the MBPA conform with its provision “shall be determined by a court of this State in the context of a specific case or controversy among wholesalers and brewers…”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e) (emphasis added).  Here, Appellants are challenging Defendants’ improper Notices to terminate the Agreement.  Appellants are also challenging the choice-of-law provision and arbitration agreement because they fail to “conform to State law,” as required under the MBPA.  While the MBPA mandates that these issues be “determined by a court of this State,” the FAA purports to preempt any statute restricting arbitration.  See Brayman Constr. Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 622, 627 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The FAA prevents state law from undermining parties’ contracts to arbitrate”).  Thus, there is a clear conflict between the FAA and the MBPA, whose power to regulate the malt beverage industry is promulgated by the Twenty-First Amendment.
[brief] In 2009, it held that the agency action at issue was not a de facto rule because it “prescribes a directive that is expressly within the delegated statutory authority. ”  And the court found it “most significant” that the action “neither modified long-established administrative practice nor effected a material change thereof. ”  Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v Howard, 404 N.J. Super. 491, 506 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] [...], [...], AND [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], its predecessor by merger, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND BANK OF AMERICA  MERRILL LYNCH, and [...], [...] SMITH BARNEY LLC, [...] & CO., LLC, AND [...] CAPITAL GROUP, INC., Defendants-Appellants.  [...] [...] [...]  [...] – and – [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
[brief] T6, 139:5-9; T6, 144:1-11.  [...] testified that, during the car pursuit of the [...] vehicle, [...] was largely silent except to state at one point that his vehicle was being followed.  T3, 91:3-20; T6, 104:2-8.  Furthermore, [...] said that he was with Mr. [...] between 3:00 and 3:30.  T6, 30:20-25.  The shooting occurred at 3:15 when Mr. [...] was in the company of [...] with whom he had been communicating since 2:38.  T6, 137:17-25; T6, 138:1-8.  It should be noted that in court when he was under oath, [...] said that the entirety of his statement to the police was a lie.
[brief] The Synagogue’s appeal of that Board determination was presented to Judge [...].  By Opinion/Order dated December 1, 2022, [...] reversed and invalidated the Zoning Board’s decision.  As shall be detailed, the Trial Court’s Opinion is erroneous in numerous particulars.  The Court erroneously allowed the plaintiff to expand the record by allowing numerous document/exhibits not before the Zoning Board.  The Court was completely in error in overruling the Board determination that off-site parking on the School property by another separate use/property is prohibited under current zoning.  The Court was further in error overruling the Zoning Board as to the burden of proof as to the validity of the use; the Board following 70+ years of case law in holding the burden is on the Synagogue as the proponent of the nonconforming use.  The Trial Court clearly erred in ruling the burden was on the School as objector to the use.  The Court Opinion --- that overruled and invalidated the Zoning Board Resolution --- was procedurally and substantively based upon numerous errors and should be reversed.  The Zoning Board determination/Resolution should be restored and affirmed.
[brief] This matter concerns a Trustee who has done everything in her power to administer a Trust in accordance with her late father’s wishes, and a beneficiary who has tried endlessly to prevent it.  Defendants, Shawn and [...], resided in Trust property for well over a year without making any payment to the Trust.  The trial court established a fair bidding procedure for Shawn and the other beneficiary, [...], who had rights to acquire the property under the Trust.  After Shawn submitted the losing bid, they still did not vacate the property until an Order was entered for their ejectment and they faced removal by the Sheriff.  After they left, the Defendants engaged in a protracted flurry of motion practice consisting largely of meritless accusations against the Trustee, and seemingly intended to bankrupt the Trust.  In their brief, the Defendants find fault with virtually everything the trial court did in this matter but advance no competent factual or legal arguments for reversal.  The Plaintiff urges the Appellate Division to deny the Defendants’ appeal so administration of the Trust can be completed for the benefit of each of the beneficiaries.
[brief] He based this finding on eight distinct factors:  (1)  The Shop Rite parking lot is known to law enforcement as a high-crime area, specifically for narcotics transactions.  [...] testified to being involved in hundreds of surveillance details there and dozens of CDS arrests at that location.  (2)  [...] observed Defendant standing next to a sedan and speaking with an unidentified female who remained in her vehicle.  [...] characterized the conversation as brief and the woman left the parking lot immediately thereafter.  (3)  Immediately after the unidentified female left the parking lot, [...] observed Defendant meet with a second individual, [...].  As with the unidentified female, Defendant approached [...], who did not exit his car.  (4)  [...] candidly admitted he did not observe any hand-to-hand transactions between Defendant and [...].  However, he observed Defendant briefly lean into the Dodge Ram, obstructing his hands from view.  (5)  Based on the two short interactions in a parking lot known for narcotics distribution, and [...]’s training and experience with respect to CDS transactions, [...] suspected Defendant was engaged in CDS-related activity.  (6)  Following the second interaction, [...] drove away and parked in the southern area of the parking lot devoid of other vehicles.  Based on [...]’s observations of [...], he believed [...] was inspecting narcotics he had just purchased and then snorting them in the parking lot.  (7)  [...] testified that he suspected narcotics activity after the two short interactions between Defendant and the two other individuals in the parking lot, but that [...] apparently snorting drugs "hardened my belief that there was a transaction occurring."  (Tr. 69:6-7).  (8)  [...] informed SET over police radio that he believed a narcotics transaction occurred.  [...], acting on [...]’s information, then stopped Defendant as he exited the Shop Rite for investigatory purposes.
[brief] ” (Ca14 at ¶14).  Following the plenary hearing, the trial court ordered that the deed to the property be given to [...] within 30 days of July 22, 2022.  (A227, Order at ¶4, July 22, 2022).  In its decision, the trial court concluded:  Based on the findings herein, the court finds that [[...]] is the rightful and legal owner of Lot 5, [...].  [[...]] shall execute a bargain and sale deed to [[...]] within thirty days of the date of this opinion and corresponding order.  [A229 Opp. At 60].  The deadline of August 21, 2022 expired and [...] violated the Order by not providing the recorded deed.  She and her attorneys further failed to comply with the September 8, 2022 Order again ordering the same as on July 22, 2022.  (A579).  Third, [...] failed to comply with paragraph 13 of the PSA, the “Distribution of Motor Vehicles” provision.
[brief] Indeed, there was no contractual or agency relationship between [...] and [...] by which Plaintiffs could try to impose liability on [...] for any of [...]’s alleged misconduct.  Plaintiffs assert this purported reliance argument in an attempt to justify their frivolous conduct, but at the end of the day, this claim does not relate to whether the design or preparation of [...]’s preliminary plans was negligent.  Second, Plaintiffs’ argument that [...] allegedly acknowledged that a representative *may* have trespassed on the Property is grossly taken out of context and immaterial.  [...] responded in an Interrogatory that it “*does not recall* a physical entry onto Plaintiffs’ Property related to this Project, but it is *possible* that a [...] employee was present on and/or in the area of the Plaintiff[s’] Property or Church Lane to conduct survey work. ” (Pa000108) (emphasis added).  This qualified response was given because [...] could not recall, one way or another, if any of its employees ever actually made entry onto the Property.  Assuming that a [...] employee did step onto Plaintiffs’ Property to conduct survey work, this would have occurred before any preliminary site plans were prepared and has nothing to do with the alleged trespass claims Plaintiffs improperly pursued.  It does, however, underscore the attempts Plaintiffs will undergo to try and justify their bad faith.
[brief] (4T5:13-14).  [...] testified that he conducted a site inspection at the [...] store on December 18, 2020.  (4T71:14-72:15).  On that day, he met with the plaintiff and her daughters and her attorney in the parking lot.  He then proceeded into the store with only the plaintiff’s daughters and the plaintiff’s attorney and not the plaintiff herself, at which time he inspected and took measurements of aisle 58 and the column at issue.  (4T82:10-13; 4T86:10-20; 4T159:22-160:10).  [...] viewed the surveillance video of the plaintiff’s incident.  On cross-examination, he admitted that he could not make a determination, one way or the other, based on that video alone, that the plaintiff’s rollator came into contact with the column.  (4T156:10-157:4).  [...] admitted that he based his opinion that the cause of the accident was the wheel of the plaintiff’s rollator hitting the base of the column on the plaintiff’s statement that this is how the incident happened, which he found “plausible”.