ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ## CASES | CASES | PAGE(S) | |------------------------------|---------| | D'Atria v. D'Atria | 53 | | 576 A.2d 957, 961 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1990) | | | [...] | 32 | | [...] (App. Div. 2011) | | | Udechukwu v. Udechukwu | 54 | | 2017 WL 744691 at*3 (App. Div. 2017) | | ## RULES | RULES | PAGE(S) | |------------------------------|---------| | N.J. R.4:49-2 | 53 | | N.J. R.4:87 | 3,4,8,19,33-36 | | N. J. R.3B:14-7 | 3,5,25,32,33, 47,59 | | N.J. R.3B:31-5 | 32 | | N.J. R.3B:31-52 | 32,48 | | N.J. R.3B:31-67 | 2,5,12,15-17,25,41,42,56,57 |  ## BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT’S APPEAL ([...])
[brief] Defendant raising such affirmative defense(s) in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion was inappropriate and those defenses were waived and/or not preserved for this Court to review.  Kopin, 297 N.J. Super. at 375-376.  Defendant argues that the trial court should have taken notice of those defenses based upon the proofs presented as part of the Motion.  Defendant is incorrect and confuses the availability of recoupment and/or set-off as a defense and/or claim for relief with Defendant’s failure to plead same in the Answer.  It is a notice issue involving due process and must be pleaded or, under appropriate circumstances, promptly thereafter as further facts/claims are discovered.  It is also a requirement to ensure that litigants present their related claims in one proceeding to be conducted in an orderly manner.
[brief] Jurors place great weight on latent fingerprint “matching” testimony in particular.  [...] & [...], *How Jurors Evaluate Fingerprint Evidence: The Relative Importance of Match Language, Method Information, and Error Acknowledgement*, 10 J. Empirical L. Studies 484, 497 (2013).  But no forensic technique is infallible, including latent fingerprint analysis.  A robust body of scientific research developed in the past 30 years and advanced in the past decade has revealed important limitations on the reliability of fingerprint evidence.
[directive] The 130 unidentfiable kits were reported by 17 unique agencies.  These agencies provided reasons that the kits were not identifiable which included: • Age of the kit pre-dates electronic records; Identifiable • 11,966  Kit contains illegible markings or is 98.93% unmarked; • Kit was damaged; • Kit appeared to belong to another law enforcement agency.  The small number of unidentifiable kits may be the result of two specific implementations in the processing of SAFE kits: standardized kit labels and the Forensic Medical Examination case log.
[brief] This court held “[t]here was nothing in the evidence direct or extrinsic that supported the contention that [...] intended that [...] remain liable for a loan originally taken by [...] in his own name so that he could purchase the Ridgefield property. ”  (Pa000082.)  Conversely, [...] was certain “that [...] directed [him] to include in his will a provision that directed the debt be forgiven and the mortgage discharged. ”  (Id.)  Ignoring the outcome at trial and affirmance on appeal, on or about November 17, 2022 plaintiffs brought a new action arguing that [...] committed legal malpractice in drafting a Will that “was contrary to [...]’s intent and . . . damaged [...] and [...]’s Estate.
[brief] On December 20, 2021, after extensive argument, the trial court denied the motion to bar or limit [...]’s testimony, and denied the summary judgment motion, except as to one discrete issue about whether [...] was entitled to allegedly unpaid compensation, which the trial court dismissed.  (Da715-17; Pa90-91).  On the motion to bar [...]’s testimony, the trial court explained that such a determination would be “premature” and that any issues concerning expert \(^8\)  The lower court dismissed the counterclaims and third-party complaint with prejudice after trial.
[brief] Defendants’ brief, which appears to be an attempt to respond to Plaintiff’s arguments on the issue, simply fails to meet that challenge with any coherent or organized points.  The adoption of a land use ordinance predicated on unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action.  Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1997); Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm'n, 377 N.J. Super. 209, 225 (App. Div. 2005).  Thus, the failure of the Board and governing body to include findings of fact in support of the adoption of Ordinance 22-1516 renders that action arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, which rebuts the presumption of validity and supports the invalidation of the ordinance by the Court.
[brief] Id., ¶ 12.  As Managing Partner, Plaintiff would assign out cases as they came in from the Firm’s Claims Department, and due to his success in the practice, Plaintiff would usually personally handle and/or assist other attorneys on the largest and most complex files at the Firm.  However, Plaintiff had no authority to manage the operations of the Firm.  Id., ¶¶ 13-14.  Plaintiff was one of [...]’s top attorneys, generating the most attorneys’ fees out of all New Jersey attorneys on a regular basis.  Id., ¶ 15.  Starting in 2012, [...] was named to Super Lawyers' “Rising Stars” List and Super Lawyers List.
[directive] If a parent or guardian/caregiver/designee objects to the juvenile entering into a stationhouse adjustment with law 9 enforcement, a stationhouse adjustment cannot be completed.  However, all reasonable efforts should be made to explain the purpose of a stationhouse adjustment, which is to avoid the filing of a formal complaint.  8 agreement,10  In cases where one or more victims object to the the law enforcement officer must notify the County Prosecutor, or designee, who must decide whether to authorize the agreement notwithstanding the victim’s objection.  Further, for all discretionary stationhouse adjustments, or cases where the victim objects, the approval of the County Prosecutor, or designee, shall be noted on the agreement.
[brief] Cf. Mizrahi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 276 N.J. Super. 112, 118-19 (Law. Div. 1994) (interpreting a previous New Jersey Insurance Producer Licensing Act when denying an individual from testifying as an insurance procedure expert).  The Legislature has also recognized that insurance producers are within the same category as other exempt learned professionals.  Under the Affidavit of Merit Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, litigants like Plaintiff are required to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious by producing an affidavit of merit.  See Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2010) (citing In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997)).
[brief] (Ra99.)  Thus, given the dedication of land and funding for affordable housing development in the Borough, both this Project and the project on Bingham Avenue were considered “inclusionary developments” as defined in N.J.A.C. 5:93-1.3.  [...] approved the YB Settlement Agreement on July 29, 2020, following the duly noticed Fairness Hearing conducted over the course of five days.  (Ra456-Ra462.)  The Property was rezoned to the Rumson Road District (the “RR Zone”) to allow for this Project on December 20, 2020 by Ordinance 20-014 D, as amended by 21-004 D, adopted on April 13, 2021 (collectively, the “RR Ordinance”).
[brief] See State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 223 (2014) (“The New Jersey Legislature's choice of the word shall, is ordinarily intended to be mandatory, not permissive. ”).  Because there is no dispute that Appellant was the “person” who “appl[ied] in writing” to the Board, there should also have been no dispute that Appellant had the burden of proof before the Board.
[directive] These encounters frequently involve armed individuals, often incapable or unwilling to engage in rational discourse and behavior.  Some of these encounters involve criminal suspects who seek to evade justice by refusing to recognize the legal authority of police officers to take them into custody.  However, many encounters involve barricaded individuals who are dealing with behavioral or mental health crises as described in Section 2.7 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force (UOF) Policy.  The primary purpose of this addendum to the Use of Force Policy is to maximize the chances of resolving incidents without death or serious bodily injury to anyone, including third parties, the barricaded individual and law enforcement officers, by ensuring that best practices are utilized during law enforcement responses to situations involving barricaded individuals.
[brief] SoR p. 15 (Pa47).  However, the trial court’s analysis improperly narrowed the holding in Gonzalez, focusing on specific case facts which are inconsequential to the holding, all but reading collection activity and ‘subsequent performance’ out of the statute.  *Gonzalez* explicitly held that collection activity by an assignee constitutes subsequent performance under the CFA—if the court wanted to hold, much more narrowly, that “recast[ing] the terms of the original loan” and/or “post-judgment loan modifications” were subsequent performance under the CFA, the court would have done so.
[brief] In describing the parcels and parties, the trial court and Defendants mistakenly recite that Plaintiffs acquired Lot 2 from [...].  Ja710, Db4.  This is an immaterial error and was not otherwise referenced by the trial court or Defendants; there has never been any dispute that Plaintiffs acquired Lot 2 from [...].  Ja6, Ja109.  Buyers so that Buyers have a total of 10,800 sq. ft. of land with frontage along 21st Street South and the rear Public Alley of 120’, no more, no less . . .  Ja116.
[brief] [...], who stepped in for [...] to receive the jury’s verdict, denied the Defense’s motion out of deference to the decision she believed had already been made by [...].  The issue being that [...] never actually issued a formal ruling on the motion.  He explicitly stated that he would reserve his decision on the issue, never to be directly raised again.  (4T158:21-22).  [...] issued an extremely brief, one-sentence instruction to the jury to disregard the witnesses’ last answer following [...]’s comment about [...]’s affiliation with the [...], but this does not reflect a formal ruling on the Defense’s motion.  Given that [...] never formally ruled on the motion and acknowledged that the witness had compromised the case at least three separate times, the Appellate Court should review this issue under a de novo b [...] Perez did everything in her power to portray [...] as a villain in the eyes of the jury.
[brief] Finally, the fact that [...], who made the decision to eliminate the Erial day shift, was unaware of any protected complaints made by Plaintiff at the time she made that decision negates the idea that it could have been the result of Plaintiff’s complaints.  (Appx 197 ¶¶17-18).6  d.  Plaintiff Cannot Point to Anyone Who Retaliated Against Her Due to Her Complaints, Which Negates Any Inference Of Causation.
[brief] [...] explained the basis for his suspicion using specific facts both of the store’s location and defendant’s conduct.  He articulated to the motion judge that the store was located in an area of high-narcotics activity because of its proximity to major roads and based his assessment on past narcotics investigations he participated in at the same location.  He also articulated for the judge why defendant’s behavior raised suspicion, including that neither individual went into the store, [...] got into defendant’s car, and they drove around the parking lot with no destination before parking in a different spot an aisle away from defendant’s car, and both cars then left the parking lot.  This credible articulation of specific facts and circumstances, drawn from rational inferences in light of Detective [...]’s over two decades of experience in narcotics investigations, more than meets the “minimal level of objective justification” necessary to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.
[brief] Sentencing courts must consider mitigating factors where they are called to the court’s attention or supported by credible evidence, find aggravating factors only where they are supported by competent and credible evidence, and qualitatively weigh those factors by assigning them specific weights.  See State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65-66, 68-69 (2014).  Courts must also provide “insight into the sentencing decision” and “explain clearly” their application of the Code.  Id.; see also State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 303 (2021) (“[T]he court failed to provide detail about the weight assigned to each aggravating and mitigating factor and how those factors were balanced with regard to the defendant. ”).  The court did not assign weights to any of the factors, explain the bases for aggravating factors 3 and 9, or qualitatively weigh the factors.
[brief] (Citations omitted).  Plaintiffs contend that the action in lieu of prerogative writ is not an adequate remedy because it does not enable them to recover damages, attorney’s fees or costs.  In Parratt [Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)], the Court concluded, “Although the state remedies may not provide the respondent with all the relief which may have been available if he could have proceeded under §1983 that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process.
[brief] (Da202).  | [...] and [...] conducted the home invasion.  (Da199).  | [...] and [...] conducted the home invasion.  (7T 52)  | The men who conducted the home invasion did not speak with an accent or stutter.  (3T 51, 82).  | | The identity of the coconspirator | [...] was “wheel man” and remained in car.  (Da202).  | [...] was “wheel man” and remained in car.  (Da199).  | [...] was “wheel man” and | The men who conducted the home invasion did | | who was in the car | remained in car.  (7T 52) | not speak with an accent or stutter.  (3T 51, 82).  | |-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | Identity of the coconspirator who entered the garage | [...] entered the garage.  [...] could not make it initially.  Later he entered and struck the victim.  (Da202).  | [...] entered the garage and struck the victim.  [...] did not.  (Da199).  | | Involvement of [...]’s father | Did not identify [...]’s father as participant.  | Did not identify [...]’s father as participant.  |  The men who conducted the home invasion did not speak with an accent or stutter.  (3T 51, 82).  **Teaneck Home Invasion** | Statement Subject Matter | [...] 1st Statement to Authorities | [...] 2nd Statement to Authorities | [...] Statement to Authorities | [...] Trial Testimony | Victim Testimony | |--------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|------------------| | Identity of the coconspirators | The invasion was conducted by two coconspirators: [...] and [...].
[brief] Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  Indictment No. [...]  Case No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Order Granting Suppression of Evidence  Entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal), Monmouth County  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
[brief] The Court in In re Estate of Suesser, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2948 held:  “Evidence of undue influence varies from case to case, with the relationship of the parties being a significant factor.  See, e.g., Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 635, 503 A.2d 386 (App. Div. 1986) (describing how, based on a nephew and uncle's relationship, a confidential relationship may be presumed).  Here, [...] was the decedent's niece.
[directive] Kara grzywny na stanowy program pielęgniarek orzeczników ds. napaści seksualnych 6.  Statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Penalty Czy rozumie Pan(i), że jeśli do przestępstwa doszło 4 maja 2001 r. lub później, po przyznaniu [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] się do winy będzie Pan(i) zobowiązany(a) do uiszczenia kary grzywny w wysokości 800 USD za każde przestępstwo, do którego się Pan(i) przyzna?
[brief] During this visit, Plaintiff denied Defendant the opportunity to meet her friend without him present.  (2T6-19); (2T7-1).  According to a witness, [...], during the visit to Canada, Plaintiff and Defendant looked like a “newly married couple,” very much in “love. ” (2T7-15).  They were “holding hands and it looked like they were happy. ” (2T7-16).  According to [...], the parties’ demeanor appeared similar when she came to visit them in the USA.  (2T7-21).  During that visit to the USA, [...] overheard Defendant state on a phone call to her mother that “I am here only for one month.  Once the green card come, I have to leave. ” (2T8-15; 2T10-13).  However, [...] testified at trial that she was not aware of the context of the conversation and acknowledged that perhaps Defendant was “planning to go someplace. ” (2T10-25; 2T11-1; 2T11-18).  For example, perhaps Defendant wanted to go visit her mother in India and needed her green card before she could do that.  (2T10-25; 2T11-1).  Plaintiff testified that after Defendant arrived in the USA, he felt the “first two months or two-and-a-half months were good.
[brief] In that context, the exigency of potential destruction of narcotics, if accompanied by probable cause, could support a warrantless entry into the premises. ”  Hutchins, 116 N.J. 457, 460 (1989).  The Court arrived at this conclusion supported by United States Supreme Court precedent holding the same, including United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 (1976) (“Once Santana saw the police [who had followed her into the vestibule of her home], there was likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence. ”).  Here too, as in Hutchins and Santana, the situation arose from reasonable police investigative conduct intended to generate evidence of criminal activity.  The officers in this case could have handed the phone back to the defendant, then seized it from his hand on the grounds of exigency and probable cause.  Their reasonable choice not to do so appropriately reflected applicable law and the practicalities of returning evidence to a defendant only to invite potential physical confrontation or evidence destruction in seizing it once more.
[brief] THE JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ON THE CONSPIRACY CHARGE.  (18T 60-12 to 84-18) ..................33  A.  Rulings on Prior Motions for Dismissal..................33  B.  Ruling on the Instant Motions.................................35  C. Motion for Judgment  Notwithstanding the Verdict...36  D. Alternative Motion for a New Trial..........................43  E. Conclusion..............................................................44  CONCLUSION........................................................................46
[directive] Order Committing Defendant Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6 Who Lacks the Fitness to Proceed to Trial and Who Has Been Found to be Dangerous to Self, Others or of Property as a Result  Mental Illness  THIS COURT having found that the defendant lacks the fitness to proceed to trial and that the of defendant is so dangerous to self, others or property as a result mental illness as to require NJS.A. institutionalization, pursnant to 2C:4-6b, that the proceedings against the defendant shall of of be suspended and the defendant is hereby committed into the custody the Commissioner the of Depaitment Health to be confined an appropriate institution where the defendant shall in of undergo examination and treatment for, when professionally determined to be clinically an appropriate, defendant's psychiatric condition; and __ ______ 20_ of ORDERED  It is on this day , that: of of of I.  The defendant's commitment to the custody the Commissioner the Depattment Health continued. is  If it determined that the defendant has either become fit to stand trial or that the defendant 2. is of no longer dangerous to self, others or prope1ty as a result mental illness, the professional is staff shall notify this comt and counsel identified below and provide each with an evaluation of and expert basis for the professed change in defendant's psychiatric condition including an evaluation whether or not the defendant continues to be dangerous to self, others or property of as a result mental illness; and, Directive (11/01/2018), (Competency #17~18 12327 by Published 3)
[brief] The defense wanted to admit the photographs to show that the police failed to access available surveillance that could have shown something relevant to the murder.  The trial court understood that purpose and rightly determined that, in order for the photographs to be relevant, there must be some evidence that the camera was in fact there and functioning.  (15T: 51-7 to 52-14).  Absent that evidence, the picture merely showed part of an area near the scene two years later.  Everything about the photograph’s relevance hinged on the camera’s presence and operability.  The trial court rightly determined that more was required than a two-year-removed photograph and a witness who could only testify about hearsay.  See N.J.R.E. 401; 901.  That decision was clearly not an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Da 15-18 Notice of Appeal .................................................................................................  Da 19-23 Transcripts of Redacted Jail Calls ....................................................................  Da 24-52  [...] et al., The Difficult Task of Assessing Perimortem and Postmortem Fractures on the Skeleton: a Blind Text on 210 Fractures of Known Origin, 59 J. Forensic Sci. 1598 (2014)  .............  Da 53-56 [...] et al., Cognitive Bias in Forensic Pathology Decisions, 66 J. Forensic Sci. 1751 (2021).  .........................................................................................  Da 57-63  [...], [...], Identification and Differential Diagnosis of Perimortem Blunt Force Trauma in Tubular Long Bones, 2 Forensic Sci Med Pathol. 221 (2006)  .................................................................  Da 64-72 [...], et al., Distinction Between Perimortem and Postmortem Fractures in Human Cranial Bone, 134 Int. J. Legal Med. 1765 (2020)  ....  Da 7-82 [...], “Rigging the Jury: How Each State Reduces Jury Diversity by Excluding People with Criminal Records,” Prison Policy Initiative (2021)  ........................................................................................................  Da 83-95 New Jersey Supreme Court, “Notice to the Bar and Public,” 7/12/22 .....  Da 96-134 JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] For all the reasons above, Appellants respectfully request that the Appellate Division issue an order:  1.  [...]’s August 22, 2023 Final Decision a.  Reversing the [...]’s August 22, 2023 Final Agency Decision; b. Finding that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) with regard to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Amended Complaint; and c.  Reinstating the penalty of “Censure. ”  2.  [...]’s August 23, 2022 Decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer  a.  Reversing the [...]’s August 23, 2022 dismissal of Count 7 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e); b. Reversing the [...]’s August 23, 2022 dismissal of Count 3 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1 (a) and (e); and c.  Reinstating Counts 3 and 7 of the Amended Complaint for further proceeding before the [...].