ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli's Mack Auto Mall, Inc.*, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Indeed, "[w]hether a defendant provides 'substantial assistance' to the principal violator" is based upon the following factors: "(1) the nature of the act encouraged, (2) the amount of assistance given by the supervisor, (3) whether the supervisor was present at the time of the asserted harassment, (4) the supervisor's relations to the others, and (5) the state of mind of the supervisor."  *Id.*  When measured against the legal standard for individual liability under LAD, there is nothing in the record which provides a basis for such liability.
[brief] (Pa53, answer to Form A Interrogatory No. 2.)  During discovery, the [...] propounded Supplemental Interrogatories on plaintiff-appellant.  (Pa61.)  Supplemental Interrogatory No. 2 asked plaintiff-appellant to explain in detail each act that she contended the [...] performed that they should not have performed and/or which they failed to perform that they should have performed, the performance of which or the failure of which plaintiff-appellant contended contributed to the damages and injuries at issue.  In response to this supplemental interrogatory, plaintiff-appellant [...] stated as follows:  The defendants failed to properly maintain and/or clear the sidewalk of snow and ice located at the corner of [...], they allowed an unsafe condition to exist upon the premises; they failed to warn of the unsafe, hazardous condition.  (Pa61, answer to Supplemental Interrogatory No. 2.)
[brief] Id.  As described above, [...] argues that [...] did not seek discovery in the Probate Court.  However, it was not her burden to do so.  Instead, to the extent that [...]’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement was reasonable at all, that created an ambiguity, and it was [...]’s burden as the party seeking relief to adduce evidence establishing that his interpretation was the correct one.  [...] did not provide such evidence.  The only evidence he provided was an email to [...]’s counsel from [...]’s former counsel before execution of the Settlement Agreement stating, among other things, that “[t]he Florida real property was specifically devised to [[...].]” (Pb37 (quoting Da138)) (substitution in [...]’s brief).  The Probate Court properly “did not consider or rely on the e-mail”, which is inadmissible and unreliable for several reasons.  (See Da273 n.3).  For starters, the email is simply incorrect as a matter of fact.  Whatever argument [...] may advance that he is entitled to the Palm Beach Property, it was never “specifically devised” to him.  As he acknowledges, [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property passes through a Residuary Clause in her trust.  (Pb32).  Nowhere is the Palm Beach Property specifically identified as passing to [...].  See Estate of Lustgarten v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 281 N.J. Super. 275, 279 (App. Div. 1995) (“[T]he defining characteristic of a specific legacy is that specifically identified property must pass in kind to a specifically identified beneficiary. ”); Estate of Lansing v. Div. of Taxation, 6 N.J. Tax. 137, 143 (1983).  Moreover, as [...] insists, the issue in this case is whether [...] released any claim to the Palm Beach Property in the Settlement Agreement, not who ultimately receives the Palm Beach Property under [...]’s Estate Plan.  (Pb8 n.5).  However, the interpretation of [...]’s Estate Plan is all that the email purports to speak to.  The email does not discuss the language in the Settlement Agreement or how to interpret it.  Moreover, the email specifically provides that [...]’s former counsel’s recommendation that [...] execute the Settlement Agreement was “subject, of course, to [[...]’s] final approval, agreement and willingness to do so[.]” (Da137-38).  In fact, as described above, the parties’ expressed intention in Paragraph 24(G) was that [...] would not release any interest she may have had under [...]’s Estate and Trust.  The language of Paragraph 24(G) makes clear that the distributions pursuant to [...]’s Estate Plan are unfinished.  Accordingly, [...] specifically reserved all her rights flowing from [...]’s Estate.  An erroneous email sent three weeks earlier on a topic not directly pertinent to interpreting the Settlement Agreement is not probative of [...]’s intent three weeks later.  At a minimum, [...] cannot rely on one email, taken out of context, and then argue (as he did) that no further discovery is required.  If [...] sought or seeks to rely on extrinsic evidence, then the extrinsic evidence should be complete and put in context.  II.
[brief] Brill, 142 N.J. at 529.  Furthermore, only competent documentary evidential materials that lead to substantial issues of fact can defeat a motion for summary judgment.  Id.  Thus, in order for a non-moving party to defeat a motion for summary judgment they are required to do more than merely deny the facts set forth in the moving party’s papers.  Sagendorf v. Selective Ins. Co., 293 N.J. Super. 81, 94 (App. Div. 1996).  When the non-moving party is unable to come forward with any concrete evidence that would enable a rationale fact finder to return a verdict in his or her favor, summary judgment must be granted.  Housel, 314 N.J. Super. at 604.
[directive] Defense Attorney □ □  Other State Plea / Disposition Recommendations  Charges and Related Information: Put lead disposition first Ct # Initial Charge  Final Charge  Final Statute Deg. Lab LEO Fines Term/Disposition CC/CS Plea/Find  Date of Offense: Date of Arrest: Docket #: $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0  TOTALS (Probation, Incarceration, Fees, Penalties, etc.)
[brief] The trial court also rightly found that, in the alternative, the State is likely to succeed on its claim that the Amended Policy violates the LAD because it has a disparate impact on these transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students.  An unlawful disparate impact exists where “practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups ... in fact fall more harshly on one group than another. ”  Peper, 77 N.J. at 81; see also, e.g., Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 399 (2005) (agreeing that an otherwise “facially neutral policy” still violates the LAD when the plaintiff shows that it “‘resulted in a significantly disproportionate or adverse impact on members of the affected class. ’” (quoting United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1, 47 (App. Div. 2001))).  The Amended Policy’s disparate impact is clear.  Even assuming that this policy were somehow facially neutral, it is beyond dispute—and Appellant does not dispute on appeal—that the Amended Policy will disproportionately impact transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students.
[directive] O/OR [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] [No aplica/NA] b. también se declara culpable de poseer un arma que no sea de fuego para un propósito ilegal cuando cometió, trató de cometer o conspiró para cometer cualquiera de esos actos criminales, recibirá una sentencia consecutiva por poseer el arma para un propósito ilegal? you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, for an unlawful purpose while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon for an unlawful purpose?
[brief] (ii)  **Application of New York Law Would Violate New Jersey Public Policy And The Express Provisions Of The MBPA (Pa5). **  Under exception (b) of the Restatement, it is clear that (A) the application of New York law would run afoul of a fundamental policy of New Jersey; (B) that New Jersey has a materially greater interest than New York in the determination of the particular question at issue, and (C) under the general choice-of-law considerations of § 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, New Jersey law would apply.
[brief] At the Miranda hearing, [...] testified that [...] went to a school with children with autism and disabilities.  (1T:41-21 to 42-9).  During [...]’s statement he stated that he did not have any friends, he did not have a girlfriend and despite being sixteen years old slept in the same bed as his parents.  (7T:301-24 to 302-2); (7T:301-12 to 16); (8T:44-12 to 45-2).  [...] testified that during the course of the interview, [...] told her that [...] was bullied by his neighbor because he was “special. ” (7T:44-9 to 12).  After [...] was read his Miranda rights, he immediately began talking about hallucinations he had growing up.  (7T:302-23 to 303-1).  He told the Detectives that he would see and hear things that were not there.  Id.  He described seeing faces in walls in his house, seeing an inkish mask staring through a window that disappeared, seeing a transparent woman who floated through the ceiling, and seeing a transparent woman on his neighbors’ roof with gold lines on her.  (7T:304-11 to 306-18).  [...] also described seeing a floating white light outside his window that disappeared the prior to the incident.  (8T:47-19 to 48-4).  The trial court did not put appropriate weight on the bizarre things [...] Kologi said during his interview.
[brief] The NJRMLA and NJCFLA were now their own respective standalone statutes.  Subsection 18 remained combined with the consumer lending provisions, as it had been for several decades.  And reasonably so—the provisions of subsection 18 relate only to the Commissioner’s authority relative to licensure and do not address mortgages or real property.  *See*  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. \(^3\) The New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89.  17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  Thus, the available evidence indicates that the Legislature intended the NJCFLA to be privately enforceable.  Additional evidence exists in the statutory text—N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) continues to expressly allow for treble damages—a remedy not included under the Commissioner’s authority in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.
[brief] A second factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction, as Pell shows, is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.  Where "other avenues" remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, supra, at 131, courts should be particularly conscious of the "measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation."  Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 827.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S at 90.  (3)  A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.  In the necessarily closed environment of the correctional institution, few changes will have no ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of the prison's limited resources for preserving institutional order.  When accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant "ripple effect" on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials.  Cf. *Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union*, supra, at 132-133.
[brief] Appellate courts apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings by a trial judge.  See *Balducci v. Cige*, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020).  In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts “give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions. ”  *Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean*, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015).  In fact, reviewing courts “must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  *State v. Mohammed*, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016).  “Reviewing appellate courts should ‘not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge’ unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  *Griepenburg*, 220 N.J. at 254 (quoting *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  In other words, “the general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  *Gnall v. Gnall*, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015).  And “[l]imiting the role of a reviewing court is necessary because [p]ermitting appellate courts to substitute their factual findings for equally plausible trial court findings is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the [trial] courts in the eyes of litigants. ”  *State v. McNeil-Thomas*, 238 N.J. 256, 272 (2019) (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).  5.
[brief] There is one additional area regarding the trial court’s findings that deserves attention.  [...] never assessed the significance of the April 11, 2023, Order vacating Appellant’s judgment of conviction on the VOP in the criminal case and dismissing that VOP with prejudice.  See Aa224-25.  Appellant argued before [...] in pertinent part:  In vacating the VOP judgment of conviction and dismissing the VOP, [...] found in pertinent part:  “I have attached the Order I am filing on eCourts today concerning the defendant’s motion.  It accounts for the fact that the Court vacated the defendant’s conviction on the VOP via its decision in State v. Mosley.  It also serves as the Court Order reflecting same as none was ever filed before documenting this decision.  This Order also corrects and eliminates the “JOC” filed before and after the Court’s decision since neither of them accurately reflected the status of this case after the Court’s decision (i.e., you cannot have a “JOC” on a conviction that was vacated).
[brief] In the instant matter, Plaintiff seeks to once again, as he did below, completely ignore the established binding legal precedent that has been decided and reinforced numerous times by the Appellate [...].  Simply, Plaintiff voluntarily executed a Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”) which dismissed pending disciplinary charges in order to give Plaintiff the opportunity to file for Involuntary Ordinary Disability (“IOD”) Retirement.  Plaintiff acknowledged by way of executing the Agreement that it was not definitive that he would receive the IOD retirement, that he was essentially taking a chance.  The [...]’ (“[...]” or the “[...]”) [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) denied his application based on eligibility, and Plaintiff by way of this litigation, Plaintiff seeks to renegotiate the material terms of the Agreement.
[brief] ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of American*, 142 N.J. 520, 528-529 (1995).  Moreover, an issue of fact is only genuine if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inference therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue of the trier of fact.  R. 4:46-2; *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 538.  The less stringent standard set forth in *Brill* represented a departure from the prior Summary Judgment standard applied pursuant to *Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Company of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 73-35 (1954).  Under this new standard, a determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.
[brief] *See Gibson*, 218 N.J. at 296, 299 (ordering suppression where “[t]he State presented no evidence” about critical issues in dispute); *accord State v. Bacome*, 440 N.J. Super. 228, 240 (App. Div. 2015) (at a suppression hearing, “the prosecution run[s] the risk that the factfinder may draw an inference adverse to the prosecution’s interests when a key fact is supported only by hearsay”), rev’d on other grounds, 228 N.J. 94 (2017).
[brief] existing and new customers."  Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 179 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,041, at ¶ 17 (2022).  See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c).  FERC denied [...]'s applications to stay construction pending appeal, Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 181 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,051 (2022), and [...]'s challenge to FERC's approval of the project remains pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 179 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,041, appeal filed, [...] (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 2022).
[brief] *The Parties*  The Homeowners, Adam and [...], own and occupy [...] designated as [...] on the Tax Maps of the [...] (the “Subject Property”).  (Pa428).  The Homeowners applied for, and diligently pursued over the course of nearly a year, variance relief from Respondent, the [...], culminating in a unanimous approval.  (Pa099; Pa101).  Appellants, [...] and [...], are objectors who appeared at each and every hearing before the [...] by and through their counsel, [...] (Pa101).  They own [...].  (Pa651).  Appellant, [...], is an objector who appeared at each and every hearing before the [...] by and through her counsel and partner, [...] (Pa101; Pa418).  Ms. Giraldo owns [...].
[brief] “Only in the most sensitive circumstances” has the Supreme Court “imposed a \textit{per se} rule of disqualification for potential conflicts of interest. ”  Opinion 552, 102 N.J. at 206 n.3; see also Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3, 15 (2002) (noting fact sensitive analyses are not “conducive to \textit{per se} rules”).  There is a reason why [...] does not provide legal authority announcing that a \textit{per se} conflict exists in any CNA-governed case.  The Supreme Court already addressed an analogous situation in Opinion 552, 102 N.J. at 196, and rejected [...]’s \textit{per se} theory, which formed the basis for this Court’s explanation in G.S. that representation of multiple clients on the same side in civil litigation is “not automatically barred.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................  9 POINT I THE TRIAL COURT WAS CONSTRAINED BY THE PROVISIONS OF N.J.S.A. 2A:28, IN RESOLVING THE SUBJECT BOUNDARY DISPUTE .........................................................................................................................  9 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE BOUNDARY COMMISSIONERS’ REPORT .........................................................................................................................  12 POINT III THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING THE SETTLEMENT BOUNDARY LINE PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFFS .............................................................................................................  16 POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT’S ULTIMATE ORDER SOLELY IMPACTS THE PARTIES TO THIS LITIGATION .........................................................................................................................  19 POINT V THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER COMPELLING SERVICE OF THE REPORT TO THE SURROUNDING LOT  OWNERS SATISFIED  NOTICE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................22  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................26
[brief] Vol. I Order dated June 7, 2024 denying Plaintiff’s in limine motion to Bar Defendant’s expert report .................................................................  Pa1  Verified Complaint (w/o exhibits) filed November 16, 2018 .......................  Pa3  Order for Payment into Court filed November 26, 2018 .............................  Pa12 Order to Show Cause filed November 26, 2018 ...........................................  Pa14  Order to Stay Case filed March 1, 2019 ......................................................  Pa18  Order to Stay Case filed January 22, 2020 ..................................................  Pa19  Order Appointing Commissioners and Opinion filed November 13, 2020 ...... Pa20  Order Framing Issues on Appeal filed February 18, 2022 .............................  Pa53  Order Granting Motion to Set Date of Valuation ..........................................  Pa55  Notice of Appeal from Commissioners’ Award ............................................  Pa57  Notice of In Limine Motion to Bar Defendant’s Expert Report filed January 12, 2024 .........................................................................................  Pa62  Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Defendant’s Expert Report .................................................................  Pa66  Exhibit 1 – Appraisal Report by [...] for [...] dated December 15, 2022 ................................................................. Pa68 Exhibit 2 – Appraisal Report by [...] for [...] dated March 10, 2023 .................................................. Pa92 Exhibit 3 – [...] Report for [...] dated March 9, 2023 ................................................................................................. Pa124 Exhibit 4 – Transcript of Deposition Testimony of [...], MAI, CRE dated August 23, 2023 ........................................ Pa141 Vol. II Exhibit 5 - Transcript of Deposition Testimony of [...], PP dated August 22, 2023 .......................................................... Pa178 Exhibit 6 – unpublished opinion of City of Hoboken v. Savickas, Law Division, HUD-L-4528-04 (February 14, 2006) ......................... Pa197 Exhibit 7 – unpublished opinion of Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kerrigan, Law Division, HUD-L-4528-04 (January 25, 2008) .......... Pa210 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Federal Cases - United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949) ................................................. 8 - United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970)
[brief] Pb3; 218a, ¶ 45; 219a-220a, ¶¶ 56, 58; 225a, ¶ 95 (citing the preliminary injunction as “preventing the transfer of Plaintiff”).  Importantly, while Plaintiff argues the “significance of the Injunction” obligated Defendants to maintain the status quo and prohibited Defendants from “moving Plaintiff’s room or changing her teaching assignment (or transferring/terminating/demoting Plaintiff)[,]” none of these things occurred here nor are they alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.  Rather, Plaintiff claims retaliation in the form of having to attend a meeting to discuss Plaintiff’s violation of the District Mask Policy, being subject to an investigation regarding an administrative complaint filed against Plaintiff by a fellow employee, rotation of Plaintiff’s grade-level partners, not having emails responded to by [...], and not being provided with her students’ PARCC scores.
[directive] Victim concern about future assaults  SAMPLE QUESTION:  Are you concerned that he/she will assault you or the children again?  Victim concern: Includes any statement made by the Victim that he/she is concerned, afraid, worried, or certain that the Defendant will assault him/her or the Victim's child(ren) in the future.  ✔This statement must be made by the Victim in the first report at or after the Index Assault.  If no statement about Victim concern is present in a police report, a statement made by the Victim in the first report to victim support services can be counted.  ✘Do not count the Victim’s concern for safety, or the child(ren)’s safety, in the course of the Index Assault.  ✘Do not include statements made by the Victim on a separate occasion before the Index Assault.  4.