ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian, 320 N.J. Super. 68, 71 (App. Div. 1999).  The Appellate Division first established that the Dog Bite Statute did not apply because the landlord was not the dog’s owner, so, to be liable for an attack by a tenant’s dog, a landlord must have actual or constructive knowledge of the dog’s vicious trait or propensity.  See id.  In evaluating whether an animal had, or was known to have, vicious propensities, the Appellate Division opined that an animal’s viciousness, and a defendant’s knowledge of that animal’s viciousness, may be established by the animal’s “inherent viciousness. ”  See Hyun Na Seo, 320 N.J. Super. at 72 (“[I]n the absence of proof that the landlord was aware of the dog’s vicious propensities, or perhaps that the dog was inherently vicious, liability should not be imposed upon the landlord. ”)(emphasis added).  In Casatelli v. Dressler, the Appellate Division affirmed and expanded upon its determination that an animal’s vicious propensities, and knowledge of those vicious propensities, may be established through an animal’s “inherent” viciousness.  See Casatelli v. Dressler, A-5769-09T3 (Pa1079a-Pa1081a).  In Casatelli, the plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment dismissal of their lawsuit against a landlord for injuries from an attack by a tenant’s pit bull.  See id., at *1 (Pa1079a).  In part, the plaintiffs appealed because, they argued, the trial court refused to take “judicial notice” that “pit bulls are inherently vicious. ”  See id. at *2 (citing Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian, 320 N.J. Super. 68, 71 (App. Div. 1999))(Pa1080a).  The Appellate Division rejected plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court should have taken “judicial notice” of the inherent viciousness of pit bulls because “plaintiff offer[ed] no expert evidence to support his proposition that pit bulls, as a breed, are vicious dogs. ”  Id.  The Appellate Division explained that “[a] dog breed’s propensity to be vicious is neither a universally known fact nor matter of undisputed general knowledge.  Consequently, it is a subject provable by expert opinion. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Therefore, knowledge of an animal’s “natural inclination” for dangerous behavior may be proven through expert opinion establishing the owner’s knowledge of the animal’s inherent viciousness.  In this case, Plaintiffs have offered expert evidence that, as a stallion in the breeding environment, [...] had a natural inclination to do and act in a way that endangered people.
[directive] This Supplement to that directive promulgates a revised Offense is part of the Uniform Defendant Reporting System (UDRS).  Information form, which Specifically, this form is completed when the Adult Presentence Investigation (PSI) Report and the Pretrial Intervention (PTI) Report are prepared in the Criminal Case Management (CCM) System.  This Supplement addresses only the Offense Information form and will be implemented in the CCM system on September 15, 2017.  All of the other forms originally promulgated in 2013 by Directive# 03-13 ("Revised Uniform Defendant Reporting System"), as well as the changes to certain forms issued in the April 3, 2017 Supplement, remain in effect, as do the policies and procedures issued in that directive.  The revisions now being promulgated to the appended Offense Information form were recommended by the Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice in response to the referral by the Supreme Court on the use of information in the Offense Circumstances section of the PSI by outside entities, such as the Department of Corrections and the State Parole Board.  See Supplemental Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice, issued May 15, 2017 at 30-39.  The Supreme Court approved the Committee's recommendations for revisions to the Offense Information form as part of the 2017 rule amendment process.
[brief] On July 26, 2023, a Union County Grand Jury returned superseding Indictment No.  [...], keeping the original charges and adding the lesser-included/related third-degree Strict Liability Vehicular Homicide, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3a, as well as third-degree Witness Tampering, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5a, for facts discovered immediately prior to trial and testified to at trial by [...].  (Pa15 to 17).  On September 29, 2023, defendant filed a Motion to Preclude the testimony of [...] relative to defendant’s use of and/or impairment by cocaine and/or Klonopin/Clonazepam.  (Pa18).  The State also filed a Motion to Preclude that day, seeking to preclude defendant’s experts on the grounds that their opinions are contrary to accepted medical standards and legally impermissible under the model jury charge for causation.  (Pa19).  On December 1, 2023, the parties argued the motions before [...].  (5T).  The court denied the State’s motion and asked for additional briefing on defense’s motion.  (5T51-22 to 53-5).  On December 19, 2023, the State filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal the trial court’s denial of the State’s motion to preclude.  (Pa20 to 21).  On January 4, 2024, the trial court heard additional argument relative to the supplemental briefing by the parties.  On January 9, 2024, this Court granted the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal.  (Pa23).  On February 16, 2024, the State filed its merits brief for that appeal.  On February 20, 2024, the trial court granted defendant’s Motion to Preclude testimony regarding defendant’s use of and/or impairment by cocaine or benzoyllecogonine.  (Pa24 to 34).  This Motion for Leave to Appeal follows.
[brief] Plaintiff also argues that the trial court failed to consider case law from other states.  (Pb40-41).  Plaintiff suggests that the trial court and “all sworn officers of the court” had a duty to report public wrongdoing “up the reporting ladder.  (Pb41).  Plaintiff concludes his mishmash arguments in Point IV by arguing “the ‘totality of circumstances’ including post August 30, 2023 developments and the interests of justice, supported reconsideration, vacation, amendment, and alteration of the ‘manifestly unjust’ [order granting summary judgment].
[directive] I have been evaluating several legal and policy questions regarding the collection, handling and sharing of intelligence information that is used to support New Jersey’s counter-terrorism efforts.  Questions have been raised concerning when and under what circumstances law enforcement and intelligence personnel, including personnel assigned to the Office of Counter-Terrorism, may consider, and are prohibited from considering, a person’s ethnicity or religious affiliation or practices when determining whether the person is involved in terrorist activity.  The citizens of New Jersey rightfully expect that all lawful and appropriate means will be used to thwart terrorists.  Public confidence in the integrity, objectivity and New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable "
[brief] However, *Lehmann* and its progeny make clear vicarious liability is dependent upon additional facts. ”  *Dunkley*, *supra*, 437 N.J.Super. at 379.  The Court continued its analysis by first looking at whether the employer “negligently or recklessly failed to have an explicit policy that…bans harassment and that provides an effective procedure for prompt investigation and remediation for such claims. ”  *Ibid.* (citing *Toto v. Princeton Tp.*, 404 N.J.Super. 604, 616 (App.Div.2009).  The Appellate Division found that the defendant produced its employee handbook, which contained an explicit policy prohibiting harassment, that employees were familiar with the policy, and that the policy described the complaint procedure and investigation process.  *Id.* at 380-381.  Ultimately, the Appellate Division found:  Employers that effectively and sincerely put five elements into place are successful as surfacing…harassment complaints early, before they escalate.  The five elements are: policies, complaint structures, and that includes both formal and informal structures; training, which has to be mandatory for supervisors and managers and needs to be offered for all members of the organization; some effective sensing or monitoring mechanisms, to find out if the policies and complaint structures are trusted; and then, finally, an unequivocal commitment from the top that is not just in words but backed up by consistent practice.
[directive] Rules and Regulations  2.2.1  The agency's rules and regulations should form a "code of conduct" for employees.  It should contain the broadly stated "do's and don'ts," without delving into specific details.  For instance, an agency's rules and regulations should state that any use of force by an officer must comply with state and federal law, the Attorney General's and the County Prosecutor's policies, and the agency's S.O.Ps.  The specific details of what is considered force, and what constitutes the acceptable use of force, should be found in the agency's use of force  S.O.P.  2.2.2  The rules and regulations should identify general categories of misconduct or inappropriate behavior that are subject to disciplinary action.  An incident of misconduct or inappropriate behavior may fall into one or more of the following categories:  (a)  Crime.  Complaint regarding the commission of an illegal act that constitutes a violation of the criminal code including disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses.  (b)  Excessive force.  Complaint regarding the use or threatened use of excessive force against a person.  (c)  Improper arrest.  Complaint that the restraint of a person's liberty was improper, unjust, or violated the person's civil rights.  (d)  Improper entry.  Complaint that entry into a building or onto property was improper or that excessive force was used against property to gain entry.  (e)  Improper search.  Complaint that the search of a person or property was improper, unjust, violated established agency procedures or violated the person's civil rights.  (f)  Differential treatment.  Complaint that the taking of police action, the failure to take police action or method of police action was predicated upon irrelevant factors such as race, appearance, age or sex.  (g)  Demeanor.  Complaint that an agency member's bearing, gestures, language or other actions were inappropriate.  7  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  (h)  Serious rule infractions.  Complaint for conduct such as insubordination, drunkenness on duty, sleeping on duty, neglect of duty, false statements or malingering.  (i)  Minor rule infractions.  Complaint for conduct such as untidiness, tardiness, faulty driving, or failure to follow procedures.  2.2.3
[directive] 7.6.1  The testing of law enforcement officers in New Jersey for the illegal use of drugs is strictly regulated by the Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy.  This policy permits the testing of applicants and trainees for law enforcement positions.  It further specifies that veteran law enforcement officers may be tested for drugs if reasonable suspicion exists that they are using drugs or if they have been chosen as part of a random drug testing program.  In any case, drug testing is done through an analysis of urine samples by the State Toxicology Laboratory within the Department of Health.  36
[brief] By making that condition, the Planning Board set a standard designed to promote the public health, safety and general welfare, which is consistent with the foremost purpose of the Municipal Land Use Law  “[t]o encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. ”  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2a.  It is not for the courts to substitute its conception of what the public welfare requires in place of the conception of the local land use body.  Pascack Assoc’n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of the Twp. of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 485 (1977).  A municipality may condition a land development approval upon the developer’s installation of improvements a local governing body may find necessary for the protection of the public interest.  *Divan Builders v. Wayne Tp. Planning Bd.*, 66 N.J. 582, 595 (1975).  Moreover, “[t]he protection of apartment dwellers has long been recognized as consistent with the public health, safety and welfare. ”  *State v. C. I. B. Int’l*, 83 N.J. 262, 272 (1980).  In accordance with its obligations under the Municipal Land Use Law, the Planning Board included terms and conditions in the approval of [...]’s development application that promote the safety, health and welfare of the future inhabitants of the development, their visitors and the first responders who may be called to provide life-saving measures.  Neither the Township nor the Planning Board defaulted on any obligation in the Settlement Agreement based on the Planning Board’s condition requiring the installation of an elevator in Building “E”.
[brief] 27  A.  Arbitrators have authority to reject untimely submissions to achieve a fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding................28  B.  [...]’s decision not to take advantage of multiple opportunities the Arbitrator provided for his submission of a summary judgment opposition is nobody’s fault but [...]’s, and does not require reversal.................................................................30  C.  [...] is a Columbia-trained, licensed attorney, and his pro se status does not require vacatur of the Arbitrator’s decision.
[brief] Petitioner claims that no original exists because he never signed the Photocopy—his signature was photocopied on the document.  Indeed, during discovery, Respondent presented numerous documents that contained his signature, making it apparent that both Decedent and Respondent had full access to his signatures.  The Court disregarded this evidence and rather, supported its finding that the Original was “lost or destroyed” (P37a) with conjecture and far-reaching assumptions.  The Court found that “although the original Antenuptial Agreement could not be found, multiple witnesses have testified to its existence including Respondent, [...] and [...]. (P36a).  Contrary to the Court’s finding, none of those witnesses ever observed an original Antenuptial Agreement between Petitioner and Decedent or had any knowledge of its terms.  Rather, their testimony about an antenuptial agreement is based exclusively on hearsay allegations that the Court accepted as true even though they lack foundation, in contravention of N.J.R.E. 802.
[brief] The transcript was part of the submission to the trial court, and hence, has not been separately set forth.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Governmental proscriptions on zoning/land use permits are not exempt from judicial scrutiny.  Due process protections require parties be granted not only the right to a hearing but also a full proper review of their evidence and submissions when seeking hardship zoning variances.  Trial courts are required to evaluate the entire record in a de novo review.  Plaintiff-Appellant [...], challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment allowing to stand a Resolution 5-2021, issued by the [...], which rejected her hardship variance request to allow development of her property.
[brief] The standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential – the reviewing court must “uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision” if they “are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022) (quoting State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021)).  Appellate courts “defer[ ] to those findings in recognition of the trial court's ‘opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ’ ”  Ibid. (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)).  Such deference is appropriate for institutional reasons: (1) recognizing “the trial court's ‘experience and expertise in fulfilling the role of factfinder’ ”; (2) maintaining the trial court's “legitimacy”; and (3) avoiding “duplicating efforts without significantly improving decisional accuracy.
[brief] See, Rohrer, 80 N.J. at 465.  The taking in Rohrer, “included a strip of land and about 10% (31’) of the front of a building that faced the highway. ”  Id. at 464 [emphasis added].  The Supreme Court of New Jersey attempted to craft an equitable result from an inequitable situation where a total acquisition would have been preferable to a partial taking to avoid such results in the future:
[brief] HEREBY RELEASES, DISCHARGES AND AGREES TO HOLD HARMLESS [...], [...], [...] …  THE “PROTECTED PARTIES” FROM AND AGAINST ALL LIABILITIES, LOSSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, JUDGMENTS, DEMANDS, ACTIONS, SUITS, CAUSES OF ACTION, COSTS, FEES, AND EXPENSES (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT OR OTHER COSTS)  RELATING TO, RESULTING FROM, OR ARISING OUT OF OR ALLEGED TO HAVE RISEN OUT OF (IN WHOLE OR IN PART) ANY BODILY INJURY TO OR DEATH OF PARTICIPANT OR DAMAGE TO OR LOSS OF PARTICIPANT’S PROPERTY:  (A)  DURING OR RELATING TO PARTICIPANT’S PARTICIPATION (WHETHER ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY) IN ANY ACTIVITIES ON THE PREMISES OR OTHER LOCATION WHERE THE ACTIVITIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO PARTICIPANT’S USE OF ANY EQUIPMENT, PARTICIPANT’S INVOLVEMENT IN ANY CLASSES OR INSTRUCTION, AND PARTICIPANT’S INVOLVEMENT IN ANY COMPETITION OR EVENT SPONSORED BY THE PROTECTED PARTIES...  PARTICIPANT HEREBY AGREES NOT TO BRING ANY SUITS, CLAIMS, CAUSES OF ACTION, DEMANDS OR LEGAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE PROTECTED PARTIES FOR ANY ITEM RELEASED HEREUNDER...
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 352.  However, Defendant’s motion was untimely pursuant to *Rules* 4:50-1 and 4:50-2.  Importantly, *Rule* 4:50-2 states that such a motion “shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (a), (b) and (c) of R. 4:50-1 not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. ”  *R.* 4:50-2; emphasis added.  The one-year time limit imposed by the Rule represents the “outermost time limit for the filing of a motion. ”  *Orner v. Liu*, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (App. Div. 2011).  Indeed, even “[t]he fact that [a] motion was filed within one year after entry of judgment does not make it timely” *Jackson Const. Co. v. Ocean Twp.*, 182 N.J. Super. 148, 161 (Tax. 1981).
[brief] The attorneys for the Respondent and Appellant were asked if they would agree to a Stipulation as to the record of the May 23, 2022 meeting, which they could not agree.  As a result, and pursuant to the law, a hearing was scheduled to redo the May 23, 2022 hearing and both parties were advised to have their witnesses re-testify and the they would also be re-cross examined.  Neither party was limited to having their witnesses re-testify or re-cross examined.  This procedural history regarding this incident and the instructions to the parties and the Board were put on the record on August 22, 2022.
[brief] As N.J.S.A. 59:2-6 and 59:3-7.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b) defines the situation in which a public entity may be said to have constructive notice of a “dangerous condition” of its property.  It provides that:  A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 only if the plaintiff established that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.  In order for [...] to be liable for Plaintiff’s injuries on the theory that it had constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the roadway, the plaintiff must offer evidence that would allow the trier of fact to conclude that any condition “was of such an obvious nature that the public entity in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. ”  N.J.S. 59:4-3.  In the matter at bar, Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that would reach the level of constructive notice.  Every argument set forth by Plaintiff is essentially that because employees of [...] were in or about the area where the accident occurred, they have constructive notice.  This argument is unsupported by the statute or caselaw and to give Plaintiff’s argument merit would essentially render Title 59 and its protections for municipalities’ meaningless.
[directive] Figure 1.  Timing of Internal Affairs Investigations  Length of investigation  Special notice required from receipt of complaint 1 to 44 days (“Routine”)  None.  Case resolved in the ordinary course.  45 days (“More complex”)  Law enforcement executive 90 days  Law enforcement executive 135 days  Law enforcement executive 180 days (“Rare cases”)  County Prosecutor  Law enforcement executive 225 days  Law enforcement executive 270 days  County Prosecutor  Law enforcement executive 6.1.7  The law enforcement executive should consult with counsel about compliance with the 45- day rule, which includes several exceptions and tolling provisions.
[brief] ”  *Stangle*, 97 A.3d at 639 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  It also bears remembering that “the fact that the tape exists at all is evidence that the tape recorder was functional and that the operator knew how to operate it. ”  *Taylor*, 956 N.E.2d at 440 (citation and internal quotation marks and text alterations omitted).  From *Balian* to *Bunting* to *Wilson* to *Brown*, New Jersey courts have steadily increased the admissibility of video recordings.
[brief] Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s appeal largely ignores the applicability of Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214 N.J. 384 (2013), and attempts to classify Defendant’s position as seeking to greatly expand upon the parameters of Karan.  This is simply not true.  Defendant does not seek expansion of Karan; Defendant only seeks its application.  In the context of partial takings, Karan held that a calculation of just compensation “must be based on consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-conjectural factors that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property. ”  Pursuant to Karan, the determination of just compensation is no longer limited to the taking but is to consider impacts of the overall public project, whether positive or negative, provided such impacts are reasonably calculable and non-conjectural.  All competent evidence of value “relevant to any conditions caused by the project” must be considered.  When a condemning authority takes a portion of a landowner's property, it is obligated to pay compensation not only for the part taken, but also for any loss in value to the property not being taken in connection with the project.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, this position is supported by City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 326 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] Because this action satisfies UPEPA’s definitional section, the Act applies.  **ii.  Plaintiff’s procedural argument is meritless. **  Plaintiff next argues that UPEPA does not apply because “there had to be evidence provided on both sides showing [the parties’] respective positions,” and Plaintiff was unable to provide such evidence because “[t]he case was voluntarily dismissed before any evidence or even any answer was submitted to the court. ”  Opp. at 7.  Again, whatever the merits of Plaintiff’s argument, it is irrelevant to whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion.