ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I/M/O  A Competitive Solar Incentive (“CSI”) Program Pursuant to P.L. 2021, C. 169, Order, [...], Docket No. [...], dated December 7, 2022 (Appendix Omitted)  .......................106a  I/M/O the Community Solar Energy Pilot Program; I/M/O the Community Solar Energy Pilot Program Year 2 Application Form and Process; I/M/O A New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C. 17; I/M/O the Verified Petition of [...] For Approval of an Extension of the Community Solar Energy Pilot Program  Year 2 Project Completion Deadline for Pennsville Landfill Solar Projects (A) and (C); I/M/O the Petition of [...] for Extension of Commercial Operation Deadline For Conditionally Approved Year 2  Community Solar Projects Under Docket No. [...] Due To Delays in Utility Upgrade Plan and Uncertainty in Timing and Cost of Utility Costs; I/M/O Community Solar Energy Pilot Program Year 2 – [...] – [...]; and I/M/O Community Solar Energy Pilot Program Tear 2 – [...] – [...], Orders, [...], Docket Nos. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], dated October 25, 2023 ……………………116a In re Implementation of L. 2012, C. 24, Solar Act of 2012, Docket No. [...], 2017 WL 4700553 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2017) – Unpublished Opinion ……………………………………………………………………………………..165a Notice of Appeal ……………………………………………………………………………………..167a PRELIMINARY STATEMENT As with far too many situations of late, this appeal is centered upon the refusal of the [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) to ensure the function and success of the New Jersey legislatively mandated and long-standing solar program.
[brief] (Da868-Da869).  As to the issue of --- 8  “1T” refers to the transcript of the oral argument on Respondents’ motion for summary judgment held on August 30, 2022.  “2T”  Refers to the transcript of the oral argument on Respondents’ motion for summary judgment held on August 31, 2022.  “3T” refers to the transcript of the oral argument on Respondents’ motion for reconsideration held on December 19, 2022.  [...]’s employment status with [...], the trial court did not analyze each factor of the Pukowsky test but nevertheless summarily held that:  “-- there’s also an issue -- a genuine issue as to whether plaintiff [...] was an employee of [...], and this fact should be determined by the fact finder.  Not so much that the employee but the employment of the -- of -- of her employment in the control of [...]. ”  (2T at T83:20-T84:21).  E.  State Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration
[brief] This exception principle was recognized despite the acknowledged reality that those consequences may indeed be “harsh. ”  Burt, 339 N.J. Super. at 308.  Plaintiffs submit that the failure to timely sue [...] was due to the inability to procure the necessary expert support:  In essence the argument is, well they knew who [...] was, they knew who [...] was, so they should have sued them within the two years.  But, the problem with that is Plaintiffs are caught in a whipsaw.  We have an obligation to only file suit when we have a good faith basis to do so.
[brief] This brief uses the same abbreviations as [...]’s initial brief.  In addition, Db refers to [...]’s initial brief, and Sb refers to the State’s brief. interests of the defendant against the potential disruption of proceedings already in progress. ”  *Buhl v. Cooksey*, 233 F.3d 783, 797 n.16 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting *United States v. Stevens*, 83 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1996)).  The court cannot just dismiss the request outright because it is “too late. ”  On issues of federal constitutional law, this Court is required to “give respectful consideration to the decisions” of lower federal courts.
[brief] Having approved the Application, the Board met on October 20, 2022 for the purposes of adopting a Resolution of Approval.  (Pa40).  At the October 20, 2022 meeting the Board Solicitor presented an overview of the record created on the Hearing.  The resolution itself was not read into the record.  There is nothing in the record of the October 20, 2022 meeting to reflect that and of the Board members actually read the Resolution that they voted on.  The wording of the Resolution is not supported by the facts presented at the Hearing.  The Resolution appears to have been created by the Solicitor to justify the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Board’s approval.
[brief] *[Kaufmann, 110 N.J. at 563 (Italics in original)]*.  In the case at bar, under the (c)(2) criteria, the Board correctly found that the application advances the purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law, and the benefits substantially outweigh any detriment.  The Board found that relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  The Board reviewed the testimony of Applicant’s experts and reviewed the plans submitted along with the Application, in approving the application.
[brief] It would seem the trial court should have at least considered the expert opinion of a land title professional, if not the clear evidence that this “notice” was “unnoticed” by the Plaintiffs, two surveyors, a land use board, the board professionals, three attorneys and two title companies.  The court simply disregarded the expert report of [...], who explained:  It is my opinion that a reasonably prudent buyer, whether represented by counsel or not represented by counsel, would not have constructive or inquiry notice that Lot 3 was less than 66.3 feet wide at its frontage.
[brief] When, if ever, is a CDW sufficient to authorize entry onto private property [or into a home] to install a GPS tracking or recording device which does not invade one’s reasonable expectation of privacy and, When, if ever, under federal and State constitutional protections, does a driveway adjacent to one’s home allow unauthorized and warrantless entry for government agents to engage in any conduct other than that accorded to a "plumber, dinner guest, or a landlord", *State v. Wright*, 221 N.J. 456 at 477 (2015).  [See Motion for Reconsideration, Brief and Oral Argument at Da25-30 and 3T]  With advances in technology, utilization of CDWs for installation and particularization of GPS devices [as well as recording devices and extraction of the entirety of a cell phone’s data] requires clarification, lest there be any confusion by lower courts between a CDW which does not authorize entry onto private property with that of a Search Warrant which does authorize entry onto private property.  A somewhat similar analysis was employed by the Court to quash a CDW on a constitutional “particularity” deficiency, see *State v. Missak*, 476 N.J. Super. 302 (App. Div. 2023).  That “particularity” constitutional command should also counsel for temporal and spatial limitations in a GPS Warrant.  In addition, the “implied invitation” as construed by this Motion Judge is contradicted not only by Federal (and potentially State) constitutional principles but also our Supreme Court’s rejection of any extension of the third-party intervention doctrine to sanction the broad trespassing conduct by the State Police here, see *State v. Wright*, 221 N.J. 456 (2015), *State v. Ingram*, 474 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2023).
[brief] A prosecutor may state in her opening facts she intends in good faith to prove by competent evidence.  State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 360 (2009).  Unlike the AP in State v. Rivera, 437 N.J. Super. 434, 447 (App. Div. 2014), who used a PowerPoint slide during opening statements which read in bright red letters “Defendant GUILTY OF: ATTEMPTED MURDER,” here the AP neither a declaration of defendant’s guilt, nor offered her personal opinion that defendant was guilty.  She simply told the jurors what the case was about and the crimes for which defendant was indicted.  As [...] found in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on this allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, “The State only said what the Grand Jury already found….  There was no declaration of guilt or an opinion expressed by the prosecutor.  The prosecutor was only explaining what the Grand Jurors had ultimately decided.  Her remarks during her opening statement did not rise to any level of prosecutorial misconduct. ” (17T72-24 to 75-25).  Further, the seated jurors were twice instructed that “what is said in opening statements is not evidence. ” (6T9-16 to 17; 15T202-18 to 25).  They were further instructed that they were the sole judges of facts.  (6T14-14 to 15; 15T202-6 to 17).  Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.  State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 390 (1996).
[brief] (T28:5-9).  Nothing stopped Plaintiff from bringing the claims for legal malpractice in the Lease Litigation as was required by Rule 4:5-1(b)(2).  (T25).  Even in the face of all of the overwhelming evidence in the record that Plaintiff recognized the potential legal malpractice claim against the Defendants during the pendency of the Lease Litigation, Plaintiff continues to not put forth any tangible evidence or explanation for not asserting a legal malpractice claims against Defendants in the Lease Litigation.  Plaintiff simply states that they failed to join the Defendants in the Lease Litigation upon the advice of his counsel.  (Pb40).  Despite the fact that the Trial Court did not accept Plaintiff's excuse of blaming prior counsel for the decision not to join Defendants, Plaintiff makes another attempt on appeal to argue that this decision was excusable as it was "based on an analysis performed by its counsel at the time determining that the R. 4:5-1(b)(2) rules would not require naming Defendants [...]."  (Pb40-41).  The Trial Court correctly pointed out during the Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff had not supplied the Trial Court with any caselaw to support this reliance on prior counsel.  (T26:11-15).  Prior counsel's advice does not excuse Plaintiff nor does it allow Plaintiff to severely prejudice Defendants as to the claims for legal malpractice.  Plaintiff continues to remain silent as to any explanation to refute the strategically orchestrated decision to bring a second law suit.  In an attempt to diminish the consequences of its decision not to join Defendants, Plaintiff unilaterally decides that "(t)he loss of evidence or ability to find witnesses in the five (5) month interval between the settlement of the case and the institution of this action has had no effect on Defendant's ability to defend this action."  (Pb41).  It is not Plaintiff's right to determine how Defendants would have defended his case had they had proper notice.  Plaintiff was aware of their responsibility under Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) and admittedly intentionally disregarded it.  (Pb40-41).  Defendants met their burden of showing that the Plaintiff's decision to deliberately not join Defendants in the Lease Litigation was inexcusable.  The Trial Court was careful to consider the idea where "...a party purposely withheld claims from an earlier suit for strategic reasons" the subsequent suit could be open for dismissal.  (T26:15-17).  There was no abuse of discretion where the Trial Court found what still remains true, that Plaintiff improperly failed to assert legal malpractice claims against the Defendants during the Lease Litigation, and there is no evidence to excuse same.  (T27:21-25).  D.
[directive] Tel: 609-376-3000  Fax: 609-376-3002 • • Directive #09-21  TO: Hon. [...], P.J.A.D.  [Questions or comments may be directed to Assignment Judges Communications and Community Relations at (609) 815-2900 x52363]  Hon. [...], P.J.T.C.  FROM: [...], J.A.D.  SUBJ: Judiciary Staff Authority to Assist Court Users in Completing and Submitting Judiciary Forms  DATE: April 22, 2021
[brief] ”  Id. at *5.  This Court affirmed the motion court’s ruling.  It noted that Gainey was “plainly unlike Smart” because it was “not preceded by a two-month narcotics investigation. ”  Ibid.  And, it held, the defendant’s interpretation of Smart went far afield of its holding:  In essence, [the defendant] argues that if the information accumulated at any phase can be predicted to yield more incriminating facts, the police must halt their efforts and pursue a warrant.  That argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, would virtually eliminate the automobile exception.
[brief] [Pa152.]  One having no recollection of settlement or "substantive strategies for litigation of the matter" (id. at ¶6), is not admitting that anything of the sort was discussed.  It is clear that no such information was retained.  One who does not recall an alleged event does not admit that the alleged event occurred.  Lack of recollection certainly cannot be substantive evidence that the event occurred.  More importantly, that a statement may be clear, unequivocal and definite does not make it true.  Life experience (and especially litigation) is, unfortunately, replete with false statements that were clear and unequivocal.  But that does not make them true.  The same is true of petitioners' clear and unequivocal assertions in the Complaint – which [...] verified.
[directive] CE with Americans Act Disabilities  August 18, 2023 of3 Page 2 case for which they are being monitored, the court shall reduce that defendant's (ROR).  monitoring level down to Release on their Own Recognizance  The court of "no in those situations still can include a contact" provision as a condition of release based on the nature the case.  This newly stated reduction-in-monitoring-level policy is subject to the following exceptions:  of only affects •  The remand aspect this policy eligible defendants who are on pretrial monitoring for cases that initially charged defendant with an indictable offense that was later downgraded by the State to a disorderly persons offense.  Where the defendant was ordered to pretrial monitoring for a case that initially charged the defendant with a disorderly persons offense, that defendant will be monitored pursuant to the level and conditions ordered by the court at the time of defendant's release hearing, unless defendant's monitoring is subsequently reduced subject to another policy.  does not apply •  This policy change to any matter that also includes a domestic violence-related charge.  staff  This policy will allow Pretrial Services to more effectively focus their efforts on monitoring higher risk defendants who are charged with more PSP staff serious offenses.  Each Vicinage shall develop procedures to have identify any defendant currently on pretrial monitoring who may be eligible to have their monitoring level reduced pursuant to this policy.  Going forward, any defendant eligible for a reduction in their monitoring level as set forth above ROR shall have their monitoring level reduced to at the time their case is of downgraded to the Municipal Court or at the time their plea into Recovery Court.  Lastly, when the state permits a defendant entry into a deferred disposition program on an eligible defendant's sole case for which they are being monitored, that defendant's monitoring will be discharged.  Entry into a deferred disposition program is a case disposition, subject to post-disposition oversight by Probation PSP's rather than by Pretrial Services (since focus is entirely pre-dispositional).
[directive] Prohibitions on certain force.  Officers may not use or threaten to use force for any following reasons: (a) to punish a person or to retaliate against them for past conduct; (b) as a lesson to prevent a person from resisting or fleeing in the future; or (c) to resolve a situation more quickly, unless delay would risk the safety of the person involved, officers, or others, or would significantly interfere with other legitimate law enforcement objectives.  2.3
[brief] The trial court rightly held that the State demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits on its claim that this new policy subjected transgender, gender non-conforming, or non-binary students to disparate treatment and to a disparate impact under the LAD.  The trial court properly found that failure to enjoin these policies would irreparably harm these students—students who already face distressingly high risks of mental health challenges and suicide.  And the court accurately reasoned that Appellants would not be harmed by an order maintaining the prior policy, which had been in place for four years without identified problems, while [...]’s administrative proceeding plays out.  Appellants do not directly challenge these findings, which are amply sufficient to justify the preliminary injunction.  The arguments Appellants do present on appeal cannot overcome the trial court’s meticulous findings on each Crowe factor.  Appellants claim the State’s right to relief was insufficiently settled; that their new policy is compelled by state and federal recordkeeping laws; and that the court’s injunction interferes with parents’ constitutional rights.  But the State’s right to relief could scarcely be clearer: the court found (and Appellants’ opening brief does not dispute) that the policy likely violates the LAD, and N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 provides the Attorney General and Director the right to seek an injunction in this situation.  Second, the injunction has nothing to do with recordkeeping; this case concerns whether schools may adopt policies requiring affirmative disclosure of students’ gender identities on a discriminatory basis, not when schools can withhold records from requesting parents.  Third, the injunction does not intrude on parental decision-making; it does not stop parents from counseling their children, and it does not stop children from sharing information with their parents.  The injunction simply restores the very policy Appellants kept in place “uneventfully” for four years, without any suggestion that Appellants were somehow violating parents’ federal constitutional rights throughout that long period.  Appellants misunderstand what this case is about.  The State has always embraced the central role that parents play in decisions regarding their children.  And, consistent with the LAD, schools may disclose a student’s gender identity in a number of circumstances, including where the school has a compelling and non-discriminatory basis to do so.  But they may not enforce a policy requiring personnel to discriminate based on a protected characteristic—let alone while the State’s administrative action plays out.  This court should affirm.
[brief] 41  Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings  June 14, 2024  Final Judgment of Divorce, Denial of Annulment  A6; 2T42-43  Table of Appendix (A1-10)  Verified Complaint (3/14/23)  A1  Answer and counterclaim (10/6/23)  A5  Final judgment of Divorce (6/14/24)  A6 Notice of Appeal (7/9/24)  A8  Table of Authorities
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  a.  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a designated offense in the 2nd Degree $25,000 to $100,000 10% permissible statute, or who has previously been committed for a mental disorder to any hospital, mental institution or sanitarium or who has previously been convicted for indictable use, possession or sale of CDS who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a weapon other than a firearm, fourth degree.
[directive] These personnel are hereby authorized to carry firearms at all times. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1L-21; N.J.S.A. 13:1A-6.1.  B.  Division of Fish and Wildlife Conservation Police  Conservation Police Officers have statewide jurisdiction to issue complaint-summonses for any motor vehicle violations, including ORV and ATV violations on all public lands and public roads in the State, and more broadly have “the power to arrest without warrant any person violating any law of this State committed in their presence and bring the offender before any court having jurisdiction to receive the complaint of such violation. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1A-6.1.  C. State Police  Under Title 53, the New Jersey State Police have broad jurisdiction.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:2-1, State Police “may co-operate with any other State department, or any State or local authority in detecting crime, apprehending criminals and preserving law and order. ”  Additionally, State Police “may act . . . as wardens in the protection of the forests, and the fish and game of the State. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:2-1.  As a result, State Police have the authority to utilize enforcement provisions from Titles 13, 23, and 39—meaning State Police can bring actions against individuals operating ORVs and ATVs and other vehicles on both public lands and public roads.
[directive] in  With regard to the independent audit of seized and forfeited property, the County Prosecutor shall endeavor to include in any written audit agreement executed by the auditor who to perform the audit provision that the auditor will adhere a is to this Manual, the applicable statutes, regulations, and standard operating procedures.  It  The Manual includes all current references as listed the Table of Contents. shall in Page of 10 2 be the responsibility of the County Prosecutor to provide the contracted auditor with I all copy of the Manual and revisions.  Furthermore, the County Prosecutor will a provide contact person for the auditor and access the appropriate records and to a It personnel needed to complete the audit.  the primary responsibility of the County is to Prosecutor insure the contracted auditor provides audit as defined in the an Manual.
[brief] Explaining its decision to consider the “common knowledge” defense even though not timely raised below, the Appellate Court held:  “A dismissal for failure to provide an affidavit of merit entered without considering a “common knowledge” claim may well terminate the litigation for failure to comply with a statute not relevant in the case.  Such an outcome would not further the interests of justice or the interests served by the affidavit of merit statute.  Moreover, given the protection against unfair surprise and delay afforded by the discovery rules, the only possible prejudice to the defendant would be denial of a dismissal to which the defendant, because his or her negligence is apparent, is not entitled.  See generally Ghandi v. Cespedes, 390 N.J. Super 193, 195 (App. Div. 2007) (discussing the proper exercise of discretion in matters that may result in termination of litigation for reasons unrelated to the merits). ” (399 N.J. Super. at 594)  Appellants’ then co-counsel ([...]) made a similar point in a letter to [...] dated January 17, 2023, which we quote at Pb41.  In that letter, [...] states that by dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims on procedural grounds, such as by the court’s refusal to allow supplemental reports (or to consider the doctrine of common knowledge negligence), Plaintiffs would suffer extreme prejudice unrelated to the merits of the case through no fault of their own, whereas by allowing the case to continue, defendants would suffer no inconvenience other than to have to defend their actions on the merits.  (Pa517)  [...] was extensively deposed by the Respondents, minimizing any such argument of inconvenience.  This disproportionate impact should be avoided if at all possible.  We fully endorse this sentiment.
[brief] DEFENDANT [...] ADMITTED THAT HE PLACED BRANCHES ON PLAINTIFF’S PLANTS  Plaintiff had purchased, installed, and maintained plants including forsythia, rhododendron, and bamboo on his property near the curb abutting [...].  [149a at 98:17–99:21].  At some point, tree branches had been placed on that area, destroying Plaintiff’s valuable plants.  [149a–152a (98:2–106:25, 108:20–109:2, 111:10–21); see 382a, 311a-318a].  Plaintiff testified at his deposition that Defendant Edward Dwyer had admitted that he (Edward Dwyer) caused the branches to be placed in that area, either by personally placing them there or causing his workers to place them there.  [131a at 26:2–17].  At his own deposition, Defendant Edward Dwyer again admitted that he had personally placed the branches in that area.  [210a (42:24–43:9, 43:17–20).  He explained that a number of branches had fallen on his property and, after multiple discussions with Plaintiff, he had decided to move his branches to the area near the [...] curb where Plaintiff’s plants were located.  [209a-210a (41:15–43:20)].  III.  THE CHANCERY DIVISION GRANTED DEFENDANT’S MOTION AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING