ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 1.  Training Requirement on the Safe Return Program  All State Police and local law enforcement personnel shall receive instruction on the Safe Return Program.  The [...] is a nationwide identification, support and enrollment program working at the community level which assists in the safe return of individuals with Alzheimer’s or a related dementia who wander and become lost.  When a memory-impaired person wanders away from home or an institution and the 800 number is called, the safe return operator will work with the missing person’s care giver and police to gather critical information.  If necessary, an area representative of Safe Return can issue an Alert at any time of day to numerous agencies, including hospitals and shelters.  Safe Return enables the police officer to easily identify a person with Alzheimer’s disease, and contact their caregiver.  It also includes a photo database and important information which enables the police to better respond to the missing person report.  The required instruction shall include the following information: (1) methods for identifying persons with Alzheimer’s Disease and related disorders; (2) techniques on communicating with persons with Alzheimer’s Disease and related disorders; (3) procedures for caring for persons with Alzheimer’s Disease and related disorders who become lost and disoriented; and (4) the procedures the Safe Return Program uses in locating lost individuals with Alzheimer’s Disease and related disorders.
[brief] 10  POINT I: THE DE NOVO COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL (responsive to Defendant’s Point I)  ..........................................................  11 POINT II: THE DE NOVO COURT PROPERLY FOUND DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (responsive to Defendant’s Point II) ..........................................................  13  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................  15  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] 173a Exhibit 11, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated February 7, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  182a (Volume 2 of 15 – Pa192 to Pa379) Exhibit 12, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 1, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  193a Exhibit 13, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated October 3, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  220a Exhibit 14, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 7, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  229a Exhibit 15, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 9, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  240a Exhibit 16, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 24, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  248a Exhibit 17, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 24, 2017, filed April 26, 2018
[brief] The Project is subject to both flood hazard and stormwater review.  DEP regulates the flood hazard area under the FHACA and its implementing regulations, N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.1 to -24.11 (“FHACA Rules”).  Indian Run, a regulated waterway, and two of its tributaries traverse the Property.  (Aa81).  The Project proposes construction activities within regulated waterways including the maintenance and repair of an existing culvert and work within the flood hazard area, and therefore required a FHACA permit.  (Aa293).  The Project will also disturb approximately fifty-five acres of land.  (Aa298).  As such, the Project is considered a “major development” under the Stormwater Management Rules and DEP also has jurisdiction to review the Project’s stormwater management controls.
[brief] ”  _Id._ at 647.  The same rationale applies to purported “consents” to search signed after unwarned questioning both in his apartment parking lot and in his apartment where he was taken via a key found in his pocket following his arrest, during which [...] admitted ownership and possession of the vehicle, places and items sought by the police to be searched, and at the very time that several police officers in his residence to which he had been taken for questioning were already in the process of searching that apartment.
[brief] Over and above the immunity provided to public entities for discretionary decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has emphasized that Courts must presume that any governmental action taken by a public entity was made correctly and properly – unless the person challenging the action has compelling evidence to the contrary and except where unconstitutional action is alleged against the public actors.  This is the presumption in favor of good governance.  The Court justified the rationale for this principle as follows:  The presumptive validity of governmental action serves many important values.  It acts as the most effective check on judicial interference with executive and legislative actions.  It is justified by the fact that those in government generally act within the powers granted to them and do so properly.  Ultimately, it represents an assertion of faith in government, for it casts a heavy imprint of validity on any governmental action challenged by an individual.
[brief] 4  Issue II: The Plaintiff was Required To Provide Expert Testimony In Order To Establish A Cause Of Action ...........................................................................................................  5  Issue III: The Decision Not To Reopen Discovery Was Not Error.  .......................  8  Issue IV: Plaintiff Did Not Demonstrate Substantial Compliance ......................  13  A)  The First Element: A Lack Of Prejudice To Defendant ..................................  15  B)  The Second Element: A Series Of Steps To Comply With The Rules ..  16  C)  The Third Element: A General Compliance With The Purpose Of The Discovery Rules  .........................................................................................................................  17  D)  The Fourth Element: A Reasonable Notice of Plaintiff’s Claim ...............  18  E)  The Fifth Element: A Reasonable Explanation Why There Was Not Strict Compliance .........................................................................................................................  19  Issue V: No error in denying reconsideration or motion to vacate ......................  20  Issue VI: Dismissal is not unfair prejudicial .............................................................  22  E.  Conclusion .......................................................................................................................
[brief] [...] commenced this action by filing a Complaint against [...] on February 7, 2020.  Pa137.  [...] was brought into this case by way of an Amended Complaint filed by [...] on February 25, 2020.  Pa9.  [...] filed its Answer, with Affirmative Defenses, to [...]’s Amended Complaint on March 23, 2020.  Pa14.  [...] was initially deposed on September 22, 2020.  Pa26.  That deposition was adjourned to permit [...] additional time to compile information pertinent to her claims against [...] and to permit [...] to further amend her Complaint to add the company responsible for performing restoration services at her home.  See Pa26, at pages 155-157, inclusive.  [...]’s deposition was resumed on January 8, 2021, at which time [...] stated, once again, that she needed additional time to compile information pertinent to her claims against [...].  See Pa67, at pages 59-61, inclusive.  The discovery deadline in this matter expired on April 30, 2021, pursuant to the Trial Court’s Order of March 5, 2021.  At no time did [...] identify an expert upon whose testimony she intended to rely at the time of the trial of this matter.  [...]’s Complaint against [...] was dismissed, without prejudice, as a discovery sanction on June 11, 2021.  On August 4, 2021, [...]’s claims against [...] were submitted to an arbitration hearing.  Following the filing of the Report and Award of the Arbitrator on August 4, 2021, [...] filed a Demand for Trial De Novo on August 9, 2021.  On September 9, 2021, the Court reinstated [...]’s Complaint against [...].  The trial of this matter was scheduled to begin on October 12, 2022.  On August 1, 2022, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.  See Pa1.  Following a hearing on the motion, the Trial Court entered an Order on September 26, 2022, granting summary judgment in favor of [...] and dismissing [...]’s claims against [...], with prejudice.  Pa413.  [...] filed a motion on October 17, 2022, seeking reconsideration of the Trial Court’s Order granting summary judgment.  Pa415.  [...] opposed [...]’s motion by way of a Letter Brief filed with the Trial Court on October 27, 2022.  Following oral argument on November 18, 2022, the Trial Court issued an Order, dated November 18, 2022, denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration.  Pa452.  This appeal followed.
[brief] ”  With respect to the video surveillance, the [...] accepted [...]’s written representation that its “review of video footage from outside the [...] building . . . confirmed that an incident occurred” between the parties on the morning of September 9, 2022.  (Rb7).  [...] frames the conduct captured as “[b]ody language and arm movements” that demonstrated “the interaction was contentious, and that [...] followed [...] when she moved away from him to obtain signatures,” as well as showing “the police response. ” (Rb7).  [...] asserts that [...]’s “allegations were specific, corroborated by [...]’s text exchange with [...], and depicted in the video footage. ” (Rb7).  [...]’s reliance on the silent video surveillance to support its credibility findings against [...], and its ultimate conclusion that he committed intentional verbal discrimination, is misplaced – [...] never denied that he was involved in a heated incident with [...] to which police responded.  [...] has consistently maintained that he was at the [...] building that morning because he was told that [...] had been soliciting signatures for a potential challenger in an upcoming local union election on a prior day.  The record does not present a factual basis to conclude that his assertion was either post-hoc or false.  Even accepting [...]’s representation of what the video shows, the video does nothing but corroborate the undisputed fact that an incident occurred outside the [...] building.
[brief] Ibid.  The Third Circuit has recognized that its decision in Smith, whose holding was at odds with the Supreme Court’s holding in Wallace, was abrogated by Wallace:  Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wallace, this Court held that a claim that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction on a pending criminal charge was not cognizable under § 1983.  Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir.1996), abrogated by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 127 S.Ct. 1091.  However, in Wallace, the Supreme Court expressly declined to hold that ‘an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set aside. ’  Therefore, the cause of action accrues ‘when the wrongful act or omission results in damages. ’  [Woodson v. Payton, 503 F. App'x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up)]  For these reasons, Smith cannot constitute persuasive authority, let alone controlling authority.  See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393; Woodson, 503 F.  App'x at 112.  Thus, this court should affirm the two trial courts below and find that [...]’s malicious prosecution-related claims began to accrue on March 6, 2018.
[brief] \(^6\)  Importantly, regardless of the intent of the insurer or the conduct of the insurer’s brokers or agents, an insurer’s proof of compliance with the requirements of the statute is necessary in the face of an insured’s denial of receipt of the notice of cancellation.  Pawlick v. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 284 N.J. Super. 629, 634 (App. Div. 1995).  The burden is on the insurer to provide specific notice, and in the absence of notice, the insured is entitled to the benefits of the policy.
[brief] Counsel simply stated:  “I believe this case has relevance with respect to the Debtor's pending Motion to Reinstate Stay as to Creditor [...].  [Docket No. 71]. ”  \textit{Id.}  In response, [...] correctly stated that it “is aware of this decision, but at present the Debtors have not raised any claim for avoidance or vacation of the Final Judgment in any court. ”  Main Case Doc. No. 84.  On January 29, 2024, the Debtor filed a modified plan which accounted for a payment of interest on the claim of [...], Main Case Doc. No. 85, but the Final Judgment still had not been set aside in state court and no adversary proceeding to do so was filed in this court — something necessary for the implementation of the Debtor’s plan.
[brief] | | 10/20/2023 | [...]| Order | (Denied)  Motion to correct error under R. 1:13-1, esp. given Opp. Brief was in case file.  Judge treats Motion as a fraud or "fiction."  State claims offer to allow "fix" only extended to correcting its 12-word "typo" with no remedy for Plaintiff for its admitted mistake.  | Oral Opinion at 4T-3-2 to 5-6) -- All of which are relevant.  Main issue: [...] should have been able to tell from being Mot being "voluminous."  See Brief Ponit VI where difference between ~10 pp.  Mot for Time v. ~100 pp.  Mot for Dismissal is 1 sec. v. 2.5 sec. download.  | | Date | Judge | Ord/Judg | Description of Result | Transcript Reference et al. | |------------|---------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 12/1/2023 | [...]| Judgment | (Denied)
[directive] Polygraph 7.7.1  N.J.S.A. 2C:40A-1 states that an employer shall not influence, request or require an employee to take or submit to a lie detector test as a condition of employment or continued employment.  To do so constitutes a disorderly persons offense.  Therefore, a law enforcement officer should never be asked to take a polygraph examination as part of an internal affairs investigation.  The investigator should not even suggest to the officer that a polygraph examination would be appropriate or that it "might clear this whole thing up."  However, the subject officer may voluntarily request to take a polygraph examination.  7.7.2  Polygraph tests of civilian complainants and witnesses should only be used when a reasonable suspicion exists that their statements are false.  Polygraph examinations should not be used routinely in internal affairs investigations.  Under no circumstances should polygraph examinations be used to discourage or dissuade complainants.  In addition, a victim of sexual assault cannot be asked or required to submit to a polygraph examination.
[brief] J. 366 (1995) | 31 | | McGuire v. Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310 (1991) | 28, 29 | | Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286 (2020) | 47 | | CASES CITED | PAGE | |-------------|------| | Moynihan v. Lynch, 250 N.J. 60 (2022) | | | N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561 (1999) | 27, 28, 44 | | Polzo v. Cnty of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008) | 56 | | Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 2011) | 45 | | Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 170 N.J. 297 (2002) | 51, 66 | | Satellite Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., 110 N.J. 280 (1988) | 26, 30 | | Savage v. Old Bridge-Sayreville Med. Group, 134 N.J. 241 (1993) | 24 | | Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2018) | 22 | | Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150 (2011) | 45 | | State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006) | 56, 57 | | State, Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473 (1983) | 26, 27 | | Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527 (1996) | 51, 52 | | Sun Chemical Corp. v. Fike Corp., 243 N.J. 319, n.2 (2020) | 51 | | Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016) | 73 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONT'D ####
[brief] Further, [...] noted: “my decision for summary judgment found that [Appellant] failed to allege any evidence [ ] that showed that he was [ * * * ] terminated as the result of his [ ] 2018 allegations that he [ ] told upper management of” any violations of law.  2T34-35 (Tr. dated October 12, 2023, pp. 34-35).  Appellant did not allow the lack of evidence in his favor, or the fact that he admittedly utilized the Company’s PCard to make personal purchases, stop him from pursuing his CEPA claim against Respondents.  This reckless disregard and purposeful obliviousness to the known facts confirms that Appellant had no factual basis for pursuing a CEPA claim against Respondents.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Respondents their reasonable attorneys’ fees in defending against Appellant’s baseless claims.
[brief] An accused is guaranteed effective assistance of counsel.  U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art I, ¶ 10; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).  This entails “certain basic duties” like loyalty (avoiding conflicts of interest); making reasonable strategic decisions and informed legal choices after thorough investigation and research; preparing for trial; and “bring[ing] to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. 687-91; State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 352-53 (2011).  To succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must establish by a preponderance of evidence that counsel’s performance, in either his actions or omissions, was deficient; and the deficiencies materially contributed to defendant’s conviction.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-88, 694 (defining “reasonable probability” of different result as one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).  While informed, thoughtful strategic choices are given very high deference, when counsel has not completely investigated relevant law and facts and considered all possible options, courts do not presume competence.  E.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525-27, 533-34 (2003) (not strategic if failure to investigate precluded informed decision); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 617-18, 620-22 (1990) (counsel deficient when he “deprived himself of a reasonable basis on which to later make informed tactical defense decisions”); see also Shumway v. State, 293 P.3d 722, 783 (Kan. App. 2013) (“any argument of ‘trial strategy’ is inappropriate” when lacking information to make informed decision); Gaines v. Comm’r of Corr., 51 A.3d 948, 962 (Conn. 2012) (same).  The inquiry into counsel’s performance is highly fact sensitive.  An evidentiary hearing should ordinarily be granted so long as a defendant presents a prima facie case — that is, shows a “reasonable likelihood” of ultimate success on the merits, viewing facts in the light most favorable to him.  Porter, 216 N.J. at 354; State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992); R. 3:22-10(b).  This standard is apt.  As facts are outside the trial record and counsel’s testimony is needed, defendants usually need hearings to establish the record supporting their claims.  See, e.g., Porter, 216 N.J. at 354; State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998); LaFave., 3 Crim. Proc. § 11.10(c)(c) (4th ed. 2023) (“Whether … action or inaction was based on a strategic choice is a factual question. ”).  When a PCR judge has not held an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court reviews de novo the factual inferences drawn by the PCR court from the record and the court’s legal conclusions.  State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004); State v. Reevey, 417 N.J. Super. 134, 146-47 (App. Div. 2010).  B.
[brief] CORRECTLY APPLIED  THE FACTS OF THE CASE TO THE SEMINAL SPECIAL CIVIL PART TRANSFER CASE  MORROCCO v. FELTON 112 N.J. 226 (Law Div. 1970)  In deciding the case of Carr v. Johnson, 211 N.J. Super 341, Appellate Court asserted the factors articulated in Morrocco v. Felton 112 N.J. 226 (Law) should be considered in handling Transfer cases.  The instant court correctly applied Morrocco v. Felton in correctly deciding the case :  [...]  So the application is to transfer and consolidate this action into the Chancery Division or to the Law Division.  And we have to look at the criteria Morrocco versus Felton.  . .  Morrocco v. Felton articulated the factors that the court must consider in determining whether the case should be transferred to another Court:  (1)  The importance to the public good; (2) Complexity of the issues presented; (3)  Amount in controversy, alleged extensiveness of defects, costs of repairs, amount of rent claimed in default (4):  The need for equitable relief of a permanent nature, such as guarding against retaliatory measure or otherwise preserving the jurisdiction of the Court:  (5)  The need for clarification or reexamination of the substantive law involved, requiring a right of appeal to the parties on non-jurisdictional matters.  The Court also considered Bloomfield Tp. v. Rosanna’s 253 N.J. Super 551 (App. Div. 1992) which corroborated the factors cited in *Morrocco v. Felton* in transferring of cases that was approved by the Appellate Court in *Carr v. Johnson*, 211 N.J. Super., 341, 349 (App. Div. 1986)
[brief] [...] claims that the public policy of the Act rests on the fundamental “trade-off” referenced in Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 174 (1985), wherein injured workers lose their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to reduced workers compensation benefits.  [...] then claims, rather dramatically, that “[p]laintiff’s position ignores this trade-off and obliterates the true policy objectives of the Act. ”  D[...]b35.  Again, the law does not support its position.  [...] fails to acknowledge that “[w]hen a worker's injuries have been caused by an employer's "intentional wrong," that "intentional wrong" voids the "trade-off" and the employee may seek both workers' compensation benefits and common-law remedies.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. ”  Charles Beseler Co. v. O’Gorman & Young, 188 N.J. 542 (2006).  Plaintiff well understands the true policy objectives of the Act – comprehensive coverage for employee losses in the workplace.  Finally, regarding Charles Beseler Co. and Delta Plastics, to suggest, as defendants have, that those courts meant to advise insurers on how to exclude coverage for all [...] claims is absurd.
[brief] R. 1:36-3.  Rb22, but never explains how the feasibility requirement was met.  [...] instead argued that the satisfaction of other regulatory criteria is sufficient.  BP Rb23-24.  There is nothing in the rules to support the notion that the section 11.1(c)(2) feasibility determination is extraneous and need not be satisfied, and “courts should avoid construction of [a] statute that would render any word inoperative, superfluous, redundant, or meaningless. ”  Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 174 (1999).