ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 12  B.  The Hardship Increase Request by [...] and Ordered by the Lower Court Would Violate the Tenant Protection Act of 1992, Which Was Specifically Designed to Provide Protection to Residential Tenants, Particularly Those of Low and Moderate Income from Eviction Resulting from Condominium and Cooperative Conversions  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  14  C.  Regardless of Whether the Hoboken RCO Guarantees Landlords a Value-Based Return on Equity, the Board Was Not Required to Follow [...]’s Methodology for Calculating a Hardship Rent Increase ..........  16  D.  The Court Should Consider [...]’s Hardship in the Context of the Larger Investment in [...] .................................................................................................................. 19  II.  THE ROLE OF RENT CONTROL IN PRESERVING AFFORDABLE RENTS IN HOBOKEN IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AS FEW OTHER AFFORDABLE HOUSING OPTIONS EXIST FOR LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME TENANTS .................................................................................................................. 22
[brief] [...] purchased Lot 2, Block 1801 from [...] by deed dated September 29, 2015.  [...] then learned [...] had applied to subdivide adjacent Lot 3, which was 105’ wide, into two lots.  [...] objected to [...]’s subdivision application (which would have created four homes on their block, just as [...] will do if given [...]’s land).  In order to “settle” the objection before the planning board, [...] and [...] entered into a private, unrecorded agreement which involved subdividing [...]’s adjacent Lot 3, transferring a portion of Lot 3 to [...] and attaching it to [...]’s Lot 2, thereby leaving Lot 3 with 66.3’ of frontage and Lot 2 with 120’ of frontage.  Paragraph 1 of the [...]-[...] private Agreement of Sale (the “Agreement”) makes clear [...] and the [...] knew, even at the time of its creation, that the new, enlarged Lot 2 might not actually be 120’ wide.  The Agreement states, “in the event additional land is required as a result of minor surveying discrepancies, Seller agrees to convey. . . the exact amount of land needed to ensure that Buyers. . . purchase 120’. . .”  Despite this foreshadowing of potential “surveying discrepancies,” [...] purchased a portion of Lot 3 and filed a Deed of Consolidation such that a portion of Lot 3 was subsumed into Lot 2, consistent with an approved, recorded subdivision. map.  Each of these documents show Lot 3 as having 66.3’ of frontage.  The [...] family purchased Lot 3 from [...] in March 2017.  At closing, [...] and his counsel were presented with (1) the approved, recorded 2015 subdivision map, prepared by a professional surveyor and reviewed and approved by land use board professionals; (2) the recorded Confirmatory Deed establishing Lot 3, and; (3) a professionally prepared survey obtained for [...]’s purchase of Lot 3, all of which identify Lot 3 as having 66.3’ of frontage.  There was no deed of record, either before or after the subdivision, in which Lot 3 was 65’ wide, and no deed following the subdivision listing anything other than 66.3’ wide.  A physical inspection of Lot 3 at the time of closing would simply have confirmed Lot 3 was 66.3’ wide because [...] and [...] had installed a fence at the 66.3’ line, not the 65’ line.  No reasonable person or attorney would rely on a tax map measurement of lot width where a modern survey and metes and bound description provides otherwise.  In fact, tax maps are notoriously inaccurate for metes and bounds measurements.  There is no reason to believe a modern survey and metes and bounds description, prepared for closing and based upon an approved subdivision, would be inaccurate or less accurate than any older attempt to measure the size of a lot.  [...]’s title company, having a “gold standard” current survey, would not have identified a small deviation in lot size or width buried in the municipal files of older metes and bounds descriptions because lot dimensions are not a matter of title, but of survey.  For these reasons, a reasonably prudent buyer, whether represented or not, would not have constructive or inquiry notice that Lot 3 was anything other than 66.3’ wide at its frontage.  III.
[brief] The comments to section 13 emphasize that issue preclusion is applicable when it is determined “that the decision to be carried over was adequately deliberated and firm, even if not final in the sense of forming the basis for a judgment already entered. ”  *Hills Dev. Co v. Twp. of Bernards*, 103 N.J. 1, 59 (1986).  Unlike res judicata, the effectiveness of collateral estoppel “does not require the entry of a judgment, final in the sense of being appealable. ”  *In re Brown*, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991).  (emphasis in bold).  Collateral estoppel is closely related to the doctrine of res judicata which prevents a party from asserting a claim or cause of action after it is the subject of a final judgment.  While res judicata deals with questions of law, collateral estoppel can apply to issues of law or fact.
[directive] The general policy established in this Directive encourages police and prosecutors to charge by way of complaint-summons rather than complaint-warrant whenever that can be done without jeopardizing public safety.  Prosecutors nonetheless may be reluctant in close cases to foreclose the possibility that the defendant would be subject to release conditions and monitoring by the pretrial services program given the limited information that may be available at the time of arrest.  Accordingly, nothing in this Directive shall be construed to preclude a prosecutor from applying for a complaint-warrant in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 for an offense previously charged by complaint-summons when further investigation reveals information that supports new or upgraded charges (e.g., where the extent of injury is greater than originally suspected as to warrant prosecution for aggravated assault rather than simple assault; new information about the type or quantity of the seized controlled dangerous substance warrants prosecution for a higher-degree crime, or it is subsequently determined that the offense occurred in a public park zone; a firearms offense involves more than “simple possession,” such as possession for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4, or pointing a firearm at another in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4) (i.e., a crime against a specific person – not a mere possessory crime); subsequent investigation reveals that the amount of a theft warrants prosecution for a higher-degree crime than originally charged, or reveals that a seized firearm is stolen, defaced, or is an assault weapon, etc.). Nor shall anything in this Directive be construed to preclude a prosecutor from applying for a complaint-warrant for an offense previously charged by complaint-summons when information not known to the officer or assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general at the time of the initial charging decision indicates that pretrial release conditions are reasonably necessary to protect the safety of a victim or the community, to reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court when required, or to prevent the defendant from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process.
[brief] Ibid. at 446-47.  The first error in Plaintiff’s argument is that [...], by denying the summary judgment motion as it concerned the CEPA claim, did not, in fact, find that a hostile work environment was created, let alone was created by these Defendants.  Rather, as [...] correctly indicated, [...] merely found that “there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff endured a hostile work environment. ” (Pa122).  Accordingly, [...] did not hold that a hostile work environment existed as a matter of law, as Plaintiff suggests.  Furthermore, Plaintiff is wrong to argue that the law-of-the-case doctrine would apply to the second summary judgment motion.  As detailed in the first section of this brief, the law-of-the-case doctrine did not bar judge McLaughlin’s consideration of Defendants’ motion.  (See Issue I, supra.)  Furthermore, Plaintiff also intimates that the statute of limitation issue was waived because it was not raised as part of the original motion for summary judgment.  (Pb25) (“They did not raise the issue of the statute of limitations because there was no issue, it was waived because it did not apply. ”).  This is false.  The New Jersey Rules of Court do not place any limitations on summary judgment motions pertinent here,\(^3\) and do not impose waiver if it is not filed by a specific date.  *Baez v. Paulo*, 453 N.J. Super. 422, 446-47 (App. Div. 2018) (“The Rules of Court impose no deadline on the filing of a dismissal motion based on the statute of limitations.  Although the Supreme Court has observed that such a dismissal motion ought to be filed before trial, *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 176, 836 A.2d 794 (2003), there is no case law or Court Rule that sets forth a filing deadline. ”).  Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that *Green* applies here is misguided.  In *Green*, the court held that the one-year statute of limitations for a CEPA claim \(^3\)  The only requirement is that summary-judgment motions must be filed with a return date more than 30 days prior to a case’s trial date.  R. 4:46-1. ran from the occurrence of a discrete act of retaliation or, in the case of a hostile work environment claim, from the last act constituting a component act of the hostile work environment.  Green, 177 N.J. at 447-48.  In this case, as discussed in greater detail, supra, the allegations against the Defendants were a series of discrete acts, all of which but the transfer occurred more than one year prior to the filing of the CEPA claim and are time-barred.  The transfer, itself, was the act of [...], who set out his reasons for doing, which were clearly non-retaliatory and for which Plaintiff failed to demonstrate were in any way pretextual.  Consequently, this argument provides no basis to find that summary judgment was improper and this Court is asked to affirm [...]’s order.  **ISSUE IV)
[brief] DESPITE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF IS UNDER A LEGAL DUTY TO PROVIDE AN ACCURATE AND UNAMBIGUOUS DESCRIPTION OF THE EASEMENT, THE TRIAL COURT RULING REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT PAY FOR PLAINTIFF’S “MISTAKE”, A RESULT THAT IS CONTRARY TO THE BODY OF JURISPRUDENCE RELATED TO “JUST COMPENSATION”.  (Da154-155;160)  An award of reimbursement for expert witness fees related to Plaintiff’s error should be permitted in this case.  Pursuant to the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of the State of New Jersey the landowner must be made whole as a matter of equity.
[brief] \(^8\)  That dichotomy between interference and failure to provide information is fatal to Appellants’ challenge.  Neither the trial court’s preliminary injunction, nor the Original Policy it reinstates, in any way interferes with the parental right to direct the care, custody, and control of their own children.  Contra (Db24-29).  Neither the injunction nor the Original Policy prevents students from voluntarily sharing information about their gender identity or expression with their parents; neither even influences or encourages students not to share this information with their parents; and neither compels or coerces students to identify as transgender or gender nonconforming.
[brief] [...] could return to trial court if needed additional help, Trial Transcript p. 261 and 268.  [...] can confirm that Defendants informed them of Plaintiffs’ fees and relied on FJ.  No motion was made to amend.  At trial, it was shown that [...] was not formed as a trust by IRS tax documents but rather as six “segregated pools of assets” owned by [...]  ([...]) (long defunct), A637.  Rating agencies ceased ratings for [...], but [...] rates for United Kingdom.  If validly formed, top tranches are for principal payoff.  [...] reports all top tranches as prematurely paid off—making *principal payoff* to same impossible.  Bottom “credit enhancement” default tranches are rated as “junk,” (A1097-A1116).  REMIC V and VI were never sold for securitization but rather sold by [...] to a third party (A256-A270).  Plaintiff ceased electronic withdrawal of defendant’s payments, multiple times, without notice, and federal court had to reinstate.  Plaintiff placed defendant’s payment in “Suspense account” and Court had to intervene.  Fees divert payments and likely caused “Closed” status of [...] account, (A915-A920).  Plaintiff represented to the court that “no fees” would be charged.  Given the two loans in the “system,” the ‘partial’ security [...] security interest had long been paid off by the [...] leaving only the 2004 [...] loan in the system existing.  Plaintiff attached debt collection letter (Plaintiff Exhibit 6) “This is an attempt to collect a debt” was received by [...] at *same time* the lien was released in the County.
[brief] The Appellate Division applies the “same standard when reviewing a trial court’s decision on an appeal from a decision of a board of adjustment. ”  See, e.g. CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd./ Bd. of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577 (App. Div. 2010) (citing D. Lobi Enters. v. Planning/ Zoning Bd. of Borough of Sea Bright, 408 N.J. Super. 345, 360 (App. Div. 2009).  “It is well-settled that a decision of a zoning board may be set aside only when it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  Cell South of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of West Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81-82 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] According to [...], [...] asked that he substitute for [...] as her counsel in the [...] case, which was scheduled for trial in the Superior Court in one week.  [...] insisted that [he] could not make any decision until [he] reviewed the files and the [c]ourt adjourned the trial date for at least 30 days.  He adamantly asserts that, at the February 4, 2008 meeting, [...] shared no privileged or confidential information with [him] concerning her or defendant’s business history, other pending legal disputes, financial information or then-present state of affairs.  He reasons that the limitations on their discussions were perhaps because all communications admittedly took place in the presence of our mutual friend and third-party, [...], and the purpose of our meeting -- my representation of M[r]s. Kang in the [[...] case] -- did not require such information.  After describing how and when he came to review the file in the [...] case, the very next day, on February 5, 2008, [...] wrote to [...] and declined to represent her in the [...] case for three distinct reasons: (1) the trial was scheduled for February 11, 2008 and already had been adjourned twice, rendering a third adjournment unlikely; (2) although the lawsuit was more than a year old, no discovery -- which he described as essential in a litigant’s timely and efficient preparation for trial -- had been conducted; and (3) there was a fundamental deficiency in the complaint, as all available causes of action had not been pled.
[brief] Defendant contends that the trial testimony was comprised of inadmissible hearsay testimony.  In State v. Allen, 236 N.J. Super. 58 (Law Div. 1989), a defendant argued on trial de novo that hearsay that was not objected to in the lower court was impermissibly admitted as evidence.  In rejecting this argument, the court held that pro se defendants “risk the unfortunate consequences attending a lack of knowledge of the law.  The same rules apply to them as apply to those who are represented. ”  Id. at 60.  [...] held that “[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court. ”  Id.\textsuperscript{4}  Defendant contends that representing herself in court left her at a disadvantage because inadmissible hearsay came into evidence without objection.  This argument is misplaced.  First, defendant asked the questions that led, inescapably, to the contested statements.  Defendant asked [...] if he could have identified her mistakenly and [...] responded that her stepmother identified her to defendant.  Second, defendant asked [...] if he knew who defendant was before he filed the complaint against her.  [...] told defendant that her stepmother identified defendant before the police learned her name.  [T27-4 to -19].  Defendant opened the door to the out of court identifications during her questioning of the victim.  The victim simply answered a question defendant asked.  However, defendant’s arguments are moot, because, as argued above and acknowledged by [...], defendant proceeded \textit{pro se} after being advised of the pitfalls of representing herself.  [T5-15 to 6-11].  Not only did she \textsuperscript{4}  Defendant cites a case, \textit{State v. Allen}, from Washington State.  The arguments do not address the case cited in the State’s brief to the trial court as the State’s cited case was from New Jersey.  not object to the questions and answers, but she posed the now-offending questions and answers to the victim.  Moreover, as [...] properly held, the out-of-court identification and purported hearsay was rendered moot by [...] in-court identification of defendant.  [T36-21 to 37-3].  [...] may not have known defendant’s name, but he was certain that she was the woman who threatened and harassed him outside his home.  [T28-1 to -18].  [...] properly held, “In this case the real question is was the in-court identification proper and the Court finds that the witness’, complaining witness’ in-court identification of the defendant as the one that committed an offense against him was proper, unequivocal. ”  [2T17-22 to 18-2].  As noted above, defendant’s cross-examination of the victim led to the out-of-court identification of defendant.  Defendant cannot object to the line of questioning when she was the person who elicited the information from the victim.  Defendant cannot succeed on this argument.  **POINT IV**
[brief] Mootness.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in preliminarily enjoining the Original Policy, even though it had been superseded by the Revised Policy.  First, this challenge to the Original Policy was not moot, because the trial court had to enjoin the Original Policy—not just the Revised Policy—to restore the pre-litigation status quo.  See Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 9.  As the record below revealed, the Board repealed the Original Policy and implemented the Revised Policy in one resolution.  See (Da138-39) (June 6, 2023 emergency resolution); (Da171) (June 13, 2023 meeting making Revised Policy permanent).  Had the trial court only enjoined the Revised Policy, it was thus entirely possible that the Original Policy would have automatically gone back into effect.  Moreover, the pre-litigation 2019 Policy that had complied with the State Guidance would not likely have been automatically reinstituted, because it was rescinded through a separate resolution.  (Da380).
[brief] Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below).................................................................2  POINT II ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, SHEA SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa23. Pa54. Pa60.)...........................................6  CONCLUSION.......................................................................................11  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I  In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188…………………………Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938………………………………………Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...] Final Decision 7/26/23……………………………Pa9  [...] Initial Decision 4/4/23……………………………Pa51  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] ]  When applying this test, the trial court correctly consulted the extraordinarily similar decision in Suburban Disposal, Inc., to conclude that the [...]’s omission of a copy of its existing Notice of Classification was immaterial and waivable.  In Suburban Disposal, the court held that a bidder’s failure to include a valid public works registration certification (a document required to be submitted in response to the Solicitation) was a non-material and waivable defect.  There, like here, there was no dispute that the bidder was registered at the time of bidding, and that the only “error” was failing to supply a copy of the up-to-date certification confirming same.  Suburban Disposal, Inc., 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1186 at *4-5.  After applying the River Vale test, the court held that the alleged error was non-material, waivable and could not serve as a basis for rejecting the bid.  Id. at *16-17.  In rendering its decision, the court reasoned that the bidder’s genuine registration status at the time of bidding rendered its failure to submit the up-to-date certification a “technical omission” that alone does not (and could not) justify rejection of the bid.  Ibid.
[brief] Compare Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2021) and Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Store, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1957), and the actions of the defendant’s agent demonstrating her opinion of the slip hazard was admissible as a lay opinion.  Evid. R. 701.  6  The trial court, likely based upon the defense counsel’s statements in opening, was under the mistaken belief that defendant’s expert would testify that the floor was slip proof, not slip resistant.