ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Here, the State has utterly failed to demonstrate how the failure to notify parents that their children are being socially transitioned prevents discrimination against transgender-identifying students.  To the extent the State’s argument is predicated on the assumption that some parents would not allow their children to be socially transitioned if given the opportunity to consent, it fails.  First, this argument assumes that every child who asks to be socially transitioned should be, which is demonstrably untrue.  ACa25-ACa31, ACa39 ¶¶ 29–43, 60; see also WPATH SOC8 at S77–78, ACa138–39.  Rather, as discussed, a child’s request to be socially transitioned merely *begins* the evaluation process between a mental health professional and parents regarding whether social transitioning is appropriate for that child, a process that can appropriately lead to the child not being socially transitioned.  Second, the argument that bypassing parental consent prevents discrimination assumes that children play the primary role in their own upbringing.  But parents have the right to play this role, and if parents do not consent to their children’s social transitioning at school, then—absent a finding of parental unfitness—that decision controls, and the District lacks any anti-discriminatory interest with respect to those children.  Accordingly, like the prevention of child abuse, the State’s alleged anti-discrimination purpose is not narrowly tailored.
[brief] (See 11T 41:17-21 (quoting [...] on behalf of the State  “Defense counsel made a big point about the fact that I told you during my opening that [...] was the best evidence I have, and I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that that [sic] is true”).  By any governing standard, however, [...]’ credibility would have been undermined had the trial jury had the opportunity to consider the withheld, falsely Sworn Statement.  Rather, the State deprived [...] of a fair trial by suppressing the evidence, and justice requires that [...] be afforded a new trial.
[brief] **Appellants’ Appeals In This Action And the Second Action**  Appellants filed the within appeal on June 8, 2022, however did not perfect the same as to [...].  Although the time to appeal elapsed, the Court issued a Deficiency Notice to Appellants on October 13, 2023 and allowed them to perfect service as to [...].  Service was effected upon [...] and [...] filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on October 30, 2023.  [FEDa1].  Subsequent to this appeal, Appellants appealed the trial court’s June 22, 2022 Order dismissing the Second Action with prejudice, which appeal is pending under App. Docket No. [...].  [Pb42].  **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS**
[brief] 3.  **Legal Questions by the Trial Court Require *De Novo* Review**  In New Jersey, an appellate court’s review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity (including constitutionality), or interpretation of laws or rules is *de novo*.  See *State v. Hemenway*, 239 N.J. 111, 125 (2019).  As indicated by such a standard, “a trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co.*, 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (*quoting* *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  \(^6\)  References to the timing of the Board’s confirmation were made in the motion papers but not during the oral argument itself, as counsel was cut-off by the trial court before he could finish presenting his case.  (1T122:24-25).  4.  **Factual Findings by the Trial Court Require Deference**
[brief] Plaintiff Had an Objectively Reasonable Belief That Defendant [...]’s Conduct Violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a).  In this case, Plaintiff’s belief that Defendant [...]’s behavior constituted harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 was objectively reasonable, based upon a plain reading of the statute and the evidence in the record regarding Defendant [...]’s conduct.  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c) define harassment as occurring when a person “makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications . . . in offensively coarse language or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or harm . . . or c) engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)-(c).  In State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the terms “annoy,” and “annoyance” should be accorded their normal and accepted meanings, and those provisions of the statute do not require physical contact or acts of violence.
[directive] of j.  Evidence of a conviction of a criminal offense in which seized property was either used or provided integral part of the State’s proofs in the prosecution shall be considered in the forfeiture an proceeding as creating a rebuttable presumption that the property was utilized in furtherance of an unlawful activity.  Amended 1979,c.344,s.3; 1981 ,c.2907s.48; 1989,c.279,s.1.
[brief] Da95.  The trial court undeniably has the authority to “set a post-judgment interest figure at a different rate from that provided in the rule if he finds particular equitable reasons for doing so. ”  R. Jennings Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Northern Electric Supply Co., Inc., 286 N.J. Super. 413, 416 (App. Div. 1995) (emphasis added).  The trial judge must “determine whether it would be equitable to allow interest to run on the judgment at the contract rate to avoid prejudice to the judgment creditor caused by delays in satisfying the judgment. ”  Id. at 418.  “When the legal rate is less than the contract rate it may be equitable to allow interest to run on the judgment at the contract rate to avoid prejudice” to the plaintiff.  Shadow Lawn Sav. Loan Ass’n v. Palmarozza, 190 N.J. Super. 314, 318 (App. Div. 1983).
[brief] (Ra2; Ra112-13).  The matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case on September 4, 2014.  (Ra3).  Appellants amended their petition four years later, on September 4, 2018, to clarify the relief they were seeking.  (Ra5).  The amended petition sought a determination that: (1) the SFRA as applied to [...] does not provide sufficient funding to enable the District to provide T&E as mandated in our State Constitution, N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1; (2) reliance upon discretionary State aid payments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-56 does not provide T&E funding that is certain and predictable; (3) the constitutional imperative regarding T&E requires sufficient funding that is not discretionary; and (4) the Commissioner recommend that this matter be remedied by the Legislature.
[directive] In such cases, the registrant shall be liable for all outstanding costs, fines and penalties, and the municipality shall have a lien against the property and income of that registrant for the total amount of those outstanding costs, fines and penalties.  (3)  Any proceeds obtained from the sale of a motor vehicle at public auction pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection in excess of the amount owed to the municipality for the reasonable costs of removal and storage of the motor vehicle and any outstanding fines or penalties shall be returned to the registrant of the vehicle.
[brief] As appellants argued in our prior brief to this court, the AC was legally obliged to respond to the court’s remand order in precisely the manner delineated.  Neither the AC’s FAD nor the Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to the Appeal, submitted by the respondents’ lawyers in the [...] ([...]) on August 2, 2024, did so.  Nor did either respond to the related constitutional arguments presented by the appellants on appeal.  At a minimum, the State’s brief should have dealt in a serious substantive manner with three matters: 1.
[brief] In this appeal, [...] grasps on to some extraneous statements made by the trial court in the second lawsuit that are not germane to the trial court’s decision nor to the outcome of this appeal.  Immediately before declaring that it had no jurisdiction while the first lawsuit remained on appeal, the trial court nevertheless offered needless statements that the second lawsuit was based on newly discovered evidence.  The court, however, added that it would await the ruling of the Appellate Division in the first action before rendering a decision and therefore dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice.  The Appellate Division quashed the idea that [...]’s proposed amended complaint, alleging a corrupt “agreement by the City to blight the Block in exchange for [...]’s promise to build a new school,” was based on newly discovered evidence.  The panel pointedly noted that, during a City Council hearing on the redevelopment project, [...]’s managing partner, [...], not only “took credit for the proposed construction of the school,” but also accused “the City [of] unfairly and illegally favoring a competing developer .  . . .”  The same stale evidence is at the heart of [...]’s second lawsuit.  The trial court in the second lawsuit stated that, despite what it had said earlier—statements the court characterized as irrelevant—it had been “waiting” for the Appellate Division to decide the “bad faith” claim.  Recognizing that the appellate panel found “no merit” to the “bad faith” claim because it could have been brought earlier, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the second complaint.  The trial court held that “if the bad faith claim is barred by the Appellate Division, then a conspiracy with [...] to act in bad faith is also barred because [Shuster] clearly knew that [...] was one of the parties to [Shuster’s] alleged bad faith claim. ”  The trial court simply applied the fundamental principles of the entire controversy doctrine to bring this litigation to an end.  This Court is urged to do the same.
[brief] The Earle Defendants’ internal report regarding the crash blames [...] for “wrongfully” using the police cut-through, instead of the grass turnaround that was safely contained between lane closures, and for pulling out “into live traffic unprotected” as a result.  Da172.  The Earle Defendants’ report further emphasized that “Under no circumstances are police Cutthrough’s to be used unless there are lane closures northbound and southbound for trucks to safely DEcel [sic] and accel out of them.
[brief] The Appellate Division need go further in its analysis of the Commission’s August 22, 2023 Decision.  However, Respondent now attempts to raise a generic First Amendment argument it waived below by failing to raise it in her Answer and her Amended Answer.  What is more, the Commission’s own decisional law – as exhaustively cited by Appellants and 2 separate Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) – has repeatedly addressed the First Amendment issue.  Since Respondents have chosen to raise this waived defense on appeal, Appellants will briefly address it below.  Respondent also appears to call into question the validity of the School Ethics Act (Act) as a whole, making a simultaneously broad-sweeping yet ill-defined argument that the Legislature should have left all school board member discipline to the electoral process.  The Legislature voted unanimously to pass a Code of Ethics for New Jersey school board members into law.  Whether Respondent disagrees with this Legislative decision as a matter of policy is of no relevance here.  The law is what the law is.  The Legislature tasked the Commission with issuing discipline pursuant to that Code of Ethics in a uniform manner.  In accordance with the Legislature’s mandate, the Commission issued a robust body of caselaw addressing school board member social media use and disclaimers.  In issuing its August 22, 2023 Decision, however, the Commission sharply departed from that line of cases without explanation, and issued a ruling that made no analytical sense in light of its prior decisions.  As a result, the Commission’s August 22, 2023 Decision must be reversed as arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and unsupported by the evidence in the record.
[brief] ³  Plaintiffs had also referenced in their argument only (but not in their briefs) a hearsay, unauthenticated email, P-15, which was not admitted.  Despite not challenging that ruling on appeal, Plaintiffs filed a motion to supplement the appellate record with that document, which was denied.  Plaintiffs nonetheless included P-15 in their appendix (at Pa121), which is subject to [...]’s pending motion to strike.  2.
[brief] (83a)  This motion argued that (1) the court’s June 10, 2022 Order violated Defendants’ right to fairness and due process; (2) the court’s failure to conduct oral argument involving five separate motions violated Defendants’ right to fairness and due process; (3) the court erred by granting Plaintiff the right to purchase the Florida Property for $360,000; and (4) the court erred by granting Co-Defendant the right to purchase the Boonton Property for $601,000.
[brief] 1  COMBINED PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS .............  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................  11  POINT I THE LOWER COURT'S RULING SHOULD STAND AND IS FORBED AS THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION, RENDERED  A WELL JUSTIFIED OPINION AND NO INJUSTICE WILL OCCUR AS A RESULT THEREOF ...........................................  11 CONCLUSION ........................................................................
[brief] It is my position that the trial court’s lack of --- 4  The Court cited in its OTSC Order of 1/24/2023 opportunity for Appellant to pursue request for a hearing (see p. no. 6).  However the Court remains silent on scheduling a hearing in its Orders of 3/30/2023 and 5/12/2023 though it noted the opportunity previously.  The litigant should not be required to request a hearing; the Court has the obligation to schedule a hearing to resolve disputed facts of the case, and should have done so sua ponte.  Tancredi v. Tancredi, Harrington v. Harrington. oversight of [...]’s account record permitted [...] to continue its wrongdoing without accountability for 25 years now.  The court failed to investigate disputed facts of the case, failed to hold a hearing, failed to hold a hearing where Appellant could challenge [...] via cross-examination in court and present his proofs of account error, and the Court essentially abrogated its responsibility as finder of fact, permitting [...]’s pattern of continued wrongdoing over decades and in this manner, erred and abused its judicial discretion.
[brief] 1T110:6-21.  Defendant’s witnesses included: (i) [...], as representative of the Defendant’s entity, a limited partnership; (ii) the Plaintiff; and (iii) Plaintiff’s expert, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).  The trial court found that [...] often agreed with [...].  4T12:22-23.  However, [...] erroneously focused on what Plaintiff’s 1991 closing documents showed, and how that information should have required Plaintiff to do more research regarding the ownership of the Strip prior to his purchase of the property, rather than providing sufficient evidence to satisfy the Defendant’s burden of proof as it relates to the criteria for establishing adverse possession.
[brief] ii.  Defendant Incorrectly Argues the Prompt Delivery Requirement’s Purpose and Meaning was so it could Fulfill its Obligation to Deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at Closing.  Prompt Delivery was Required to Allow Termination if the Delivered Estoppel Certificate Disclosed Adverse Information.  (Answering Defendant’s Argument at Point I(ii) (Pb13-19.)  Defendant’s second assigned error in Point I argues the trial court misinterpreted the purpose and meaning of the “prompt delivery” requirement in paragraph 13.10.
[brief] 15  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) ..........................................................................  23 State v. Angelo’s Motor Sales, Inc., 125 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 1973) .......................................  21  Stelluti v. Casapenn Enter., LLC, 203 N.J. 286 (2010)  ..........................................................................  38  Stoecker v. Echevarria, 408 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 2009)  ..................................................  34  Synthes, Inc. v. Emerge Med., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 617 (E.D. Pa. 2014) ......................................................  19 Terry v. Town of Morristown, 446 Fed. Appx. 457, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20053 (3d Cir. 2011) ..........  32 Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016)  .................................................................  42  Triffin v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004)...........................................  17  Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d in relevant part, modified in part, 203 N.J. 383 (2010)............................................. 31 Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1 (2002)............................................................................ 31 Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2005).............................................. 26, 28, 29, 30-31 Statutes and Other Authorities: N.J.S.A. 34:19-3 .............................................................................. 23, 24 N.J.S.A. 34:19-6 .............................................................................. 44, 45 R. 1:4-4 .......................................................................................... 21 R. 2:6-2(a)(6) .................................................................................. 15 R. 4:22-2 ......................................................................................... 20, 21 R. 4:46-2(c) .................................................................................... 15, 16 RPC 1.5(a) ....................................................................................... 48 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT [...] (“[...]”), [...], and [...], Defendants-Respondents/Appellees in this appeal, respectfully submit this brief in opposition to the appeal of Plaintiff-Appellant, [...] (“Appellant”), from the trial court’s January 20, 2023 Order granting Respondents’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety and October 12, 2023 Order awarding damages and attorneys’ fees to Respondents.
[brief] Section 13.1 provided, in part:  “Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event Seller closes title under, the Mack-Cali Agreement, and thereupon Seller defaults in its obligation to close title under this Agreement, Purchaser shall, in addition to its termination right, shall have the right of specific performance. ”  The motion court correctly focused on the plain meaning of the word “thereupon” in holding that the specific performance remedy provided in this clause would only become available if [...] defaulted on the PSA after closing title under the Mack-Cali Transaction, not months earlier.
[brief] (Da35)  Paragraph 11(a) notes a use and occupancy agreement in place at the [...].  (Da39)  But Paragraph 11(c) includes obligations of [...] that is limited to vacating certain streets.  (Da39)  Neither that provision, nor any other in the contract, requires the taking of Defendants’ property.  The Township argues further that “it will be subject to litigation initiated by [[...]]. ”  (Db36-37)  But such supposition is not sufficient to authorize the taking of private property.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] This Court may grant leave to appeal “in the interest of justice. ”  However, the power to grant leave to appeal is highly discretionary and this Court should exercised that discretion sparingly, in exceptional case.  *State v. Reldan*, 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985); *State v. Alfano*, 305 N.J. Super. 178, 190 (App. Div. 1997).
[brief] Also, to support the application for fees, [...] claimed that the Supplemental Resolution caused rejection of [...]’s compliance plans and delayed construction; but that was not the case.  It was [...]’s failure to address the various conditions of the approvals other than an elevator in Building E that were the cause of any delay in construction.  (Pa378)  In any event, [...]’s counsel had not even actually charged [...] for the fees that it sought to recover; instead, [...]’s counsel prepared invoices specifically for their fee application.  (Pa365 at ¶8)  Such is not consistent with R. 4:42-9 and does not create a level of trustworthiness as with invoices actually billed to a client.  Indeed, [...] admitted as much in the reply papers when it conceded that its application included $1,705.00 for service unrelated to the motion after the Township pointed that out.  The trial court disregarded the infirmities in [...]’s motion.
[brief] The original claim was filed circa March 12, 2007, within two years of the cause of action versus the [...].  However, the claim was amended to include [...] and [...] circa August of 2007 and March of 2008 respectively.  Summary judgment was issued by judge [...] January 7, 2010 with regard to claims versus all parties.  Timely appeal of the summary judgment order was made and appeal was heard circa 2010 by a three-member appellate judge panel that affirmed the lower court summary judgment via docket #: [...]  The issue of whether the facts of the matter of the summary judgement order had to be confirmed by a jury of 6 or 12 was never decided by any court.  Request for Certification was made to the New Jersey supreme court.  The New Jersey supreme court declined to certify the case, in the absence of any oral argument in the New Jersey supreme court.
[brief] Given [...] was leaving the country in early January for an extended period of time and given that the Respondents had already asked for additional time for their response, [...] and interested parties were eager to conduct this hearing on January 5, 2023, in which they fully expected they would prevail.  Consequently, counsel [...], did not submit a motion to merge [...]’s OPRA denials into the complaint, which likely would have caused an additional delay.  Rather, Appellant presumed that the Court would thoroughly read Appellant’s rebuttal to Respondent’s response.  Either the Court did not diligently read Appellant’s rebuttal or made substantial mistakes including stating that [...] had never submitted an OPRA request.  (Pa139).  Either case warrants that the Superior Court’s decision be overturned and that the OPRA requests be granted.  [...], her counsel and interested parties sought to have the hearing on January 5, 2023, without additional delay.
[brief] These flaws, which must be viewed in totality, are fatal to any finding of assent to arbitrate.  1.  The structure of the Agreement is not plain, clear, and understandable  Given the waiver of constitutional (and often statutory) rights at stake, NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt., 421 N.J. Super. 404, 424 (App. Div. 2011), mutual assent to arbitrate requires the parties “have full knowledge of [their] legal rights and intent to surrender those rights. ”  Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003) (citing W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co. v. Indus. Trust Co., 27 N.J. 144, 153 (1958)).  Thus, waiver “must be clearly and unmistakably established. ”  Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).  Clarity depends in no small part on the format of the agreement, which must be “written in plain language that would be clear and understandable to the average consumer[.]”  Atalese, 219 N.J. at 446.