ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Following oral argument (Aa233-262), the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an Order and Opinion on December 1, 2023 granting defendants [...], [...], and [...] summary judgment dismissing all remaining counts of plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  (Aa263-276).  That Order is the subject of plaintiff’s appeal with respect to the Edison defendants.  (Aa284).  Judge Allende applied the law of the case doctrine, based on the rulings by both [...] and [...], and held that the accrual date for plaintiff’s cause of action, with the exception of plaintiff’s libel and slander claims, was March 6, 2018 – the date that the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed plaintiff’s violation of probation charge when “he should have known or discovered an actionable claim”.  (Aa271-272).  Judge Allende further held that plaintiff’s libel and slander claims were barred by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act since:  Plaintiff has not demonstrated that [he] served a notice of a tort claim within the 90 days of the accrual date as provided by N.J.S.A. § 59:8-8 or within the discretionary year thereafter as provided by § 59:8-9.  Plaintiff’s counsel has indicated that they filed a Notice of Claim as of May of 2023, however this is well over two years following the accrual date for these claims.  (Aa274).  Judge Allende pointed out:  “A claimant is forever barred from recovering against a public entity or employee if two years have elapsed since the accrual date of the claim.  N.J.S.A. 59-8-8. ” (Aa273).  Finally, Judge Allende held that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff’s civil conspiracy counts because “Plaintiff has failed to identify any conduct or agreement between any of the Defendants that would suggest that they colluded to deny Plaintiff his rights and privileges. ” (Aa275).  **Plaintiff’s Appeal.**
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.  It is well settled an Appellate Court will review a trial court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  *Kornbleuth, supra*, 241 N.J. at 301.  In contrast to the standard applicable to the review of an interlocutory order, when a trial court considers a motion to reconsider a final order granting summary judgment, the movant must satisfy the more stringent standards set forth in *R. 4:49-2*, which require a showing that the challenged order was the result of a “palpably incorrect or irrational analysis” or the court’s failure to consider or appreciate competent and probative evidence.  *Lawson, supra*, 468 N.J. Super. at 134 (quoting *Cummings v. Bahr*, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)).  [...] correctly found her decision to reconsider and grant summary judgment to Defendants was not an abuse of discretion, palpably incorrect or irrational.  She was right.  First, Plaintiffs incorrectly argued [...] granted summary judgment based on the medical opinions of the Defendants’ expert [...], who opined the infant’s injuries were caused by the massive hemorrhage.
[directive] This requirement of secrecy is absolutely necessary to the proper administration of justice.  It provides assurance that persons under investigation will have no reason to destroy evidence or place themselves beyond the reach of the court.  It protects witnesses Grand Jury Standards Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006) Page 13 of 18 against reprisals or the threat of reprisals.  It prevents unacceptable damage to reputations.  Under New Jersey law, any unauthorized disclosure of information concerning Grand Jury proceedings with the intent to injure another is a crime punishable by up to 18 months imprisonment.
[brief] Arbitration awards can only be modified or corrected under extremely narrow and explicitly defined circumstances, none of which exist here.  Having already failed to convince the Arbitrator and the Trial Court to modify or correct the Award, [...] now asks this Court to modify or correct the Award under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24(a)(1) (“evident mathematical miscalculation”), or under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24(a)(3) (“the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits”).
[brief] Pb5.  [...] asserted claims for declaratory judgments (Counts 1-2, 4-7), violation of the IFPA, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4 (Counts 3, 8), and violation of the New Jersey RICO statute (Count 9).  Pa54-98.  [...] (the “[...]”) represents the twelve CCMC Defendants: [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (the “CMCC Defendants”).
[brief] Because the video footage was not of any assistance in identifying either the Audi’s occupants or its license plate number, it is not included in the appendix. found [...] in Orange near the scene of the shooting and escorted him to the [...]’s place of work located in the Essex County Court Complex in Newark.  (6T 67-7 to 25, 100-1 to 2).  [...]’s attention was drawn to [...] after learning during the course of the investigation that [...] had been present on the night of the shooting and had some knowledge about the drive-by.  (6T 104-7 to 17).  The detective understood [...] to be [...]’s best friend.  (5T 78-5 to 8; 6T 107-21 to 23).  He recalled that [...] insisted on using a pseudonym.  (5T 36-6 to 10; 6T 69-1 to 8, 103-4 to 15).  According to [...], during the interview [...] identified defendant by name as being “involved” in the drive-by.  (6T 73-24 to 74-1).  After [...] identified defendant by name, [...] produced a single photograph which depicted defendant.  (6T 74-2 to 12, 104-18 to 105-3).  [...] agreed the photograph was a picture of defendant.  (5T 40-9 to 19; 6T 74-13 to 22).  [...] later identified [...] from an array of six photographs as the driver of the Audi.  (6T 79-24 to 80-6; 8T 12-2 to 21, 13-11 to 14-4).  --- 3
[brief] construct its Inclusionary Development, Developer will be required to obtain any and all necessary and applicable agreements, approvals, and permits from all relevant public entities and utilities; such as, by way of example only, the [...], the [...], the [...], the Passaic County [...], the [...], the [...], and the like, including the [...]’s ordinance requirements as to site plan and subdivision approval (the “Required Approvals”).  The [...] and the [...] agree to cooperate with Developer in processing all applications with outside agencies which the Parties acknowledge will benefit the Project.  The [...] and the [...] agree to use all commercially reasonable efforts to assist Developer in its undertakings to obtain the Required Approvals, provided that the taxes are current and Developer is in compliance with this Agreement.  Developer and the [...] further agree that certain underground utility easements maybe required across the Property or across [...] property to facilitate the efficient develop out of the Inclusionary Development.  The Developer and the [...] agree to execute any such reasonable easements in a manner which minimizes the impact upon the development potential of the Property.  (Pa52 emphasis added)  A section of the Settlement Agreement created specific timetables and the process for the review and presentation of [...]’s land use application including the following pertinent provisions.
[brief] Therefore, there was no need for them to opt into or out of the NFADR process to resolve Fraud Act claims.  jurisdiction over the resolution of Fraud Act disputes demonstrates that it was not the Legislature’s intent to do so.  To find that AICRA changed jurisdiction over Fraud Act disputes from “courts of competent jurisdiction” to NFADR DRPs would constitute an implied repeal of section 7 of the Fraud Act.
[brief] Since he did make the request for both his meds and me, there is a non-accommodation of a disability request.  These Law Review Articles & Regs below absolutely apply to having counsel during an arrest.  See, e.g., "[W]hile Effective communication has focused almost entirely on people with hearing impairments, it also could apply to persons mental disabilities who have communication difficulties. ”  [...], Civil Mental Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony p. 235 (Second New Paragraph, Last Sentence) (emphasis added).  Excluding [...]’s dad/lawyer from giving free assistance is specifically covered by this regulation:  1.  LAD Regulations - N.J.A.C. § 13:13-4.3  Unlawful Practices (a)  …  It shall also be unlawful for a[] manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation to discriminate against a person with a disability in the price, eligibility criteria, methods of administration, standards, terms, or conditions upon which access to such accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges may depend.  (b)  It shall be unlawful for a[...] manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, directly or indirectly, ... to accord a person with a disability differential terms, conditions or privileges of a place of public accommodation, or to accord a person with a disability differential opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation otherwise offered to the general public.  1.  Separate goods, services, privileges, facilities, or terms and conditions of enjoyment shall be deemed differential unless such action is necessary to provide a person with a disability with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that offered to the general public, and provided the separate accommodation comports with the standards set forth in N.J.A.C. 13:13-4.4.  ....
[brief] Nonetheless, even if the facts of this case were “complicated” as Plaintiff asserts, respectfully, Plaintiff is represented by licensed counsel with decades of experience practicing law.  As such, it is Plaintiff’s job as an attorney filing a pleading to distill this matter down to the material facts and then present those facts in a coherent, concise manner without digressions, rambling compound averments and irrelevant discussions.  Plaintiff’s counsel, despite having nearly five (5) years to accomplish this task and six separate attempts, proved unable to do so.  E.
[brief] Foremost, defendant did not make this claim below and the trial court did not find [...]’s statements had such an effect.  Thus, this allegation should not be considered on appeal.  However, even if this Court were to consider defendant’s belated claim, the record rebuts such an assertion.  Although [...] told defendant that she was reading from the form, she did not refer to the warnings as a mere formality.  *State v. O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. 408, 422 (2022).  And, contrary to defendant’s self-serving assertion, such a comment does not imply the rights were a mere technicality.  Indeed, prior to providing defendant with his rights, [...] told defendant, twice, that she had to advise him of his rights before she could speak with him.  (Pa28; Pa29).  Thus, [...]’s comment did not have the effect defendant asserts.  Moreover, [...] did not suggest whatever defendant said would remain confidential, or that it would not be used against him.  She also did not say that anything he told her would only help.  Cf. *State v. Puryear*, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 298 (App. Div. 2015); see also *State in Interest of A.S.*, 203 N.J. 131, 140, 151 (2010).  She also did not imply that innocent people do not need attorneys.  *State v. Dorff*, 468 N.J. Super. 633, 652 (App. Div. 2021).  Rather, the record establishes that [...] tried to stay as close as she could to the literal words on the *Miranda* advisement form.  The record also shows that she repeatedly asked defendant if he understood those rights before moving on, and he stated that he did.  Thus, it is clear that her statements did not undermine the importance of the *Miranda* advisement.  In sum, the record clearly shows that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel.  Defendant’s question to [...] was about procedure and it was aptly answered.  Before any questioning began, defendant was aware that he had a right to remain silent, that he had a right to counsel, who would be appointed if he could not afford an attorney, and that he could exercise his rights at any time.  Despite this knowledge, defendant elected to waive his rights and speak with the detective.  As such, defendant’s statement should have been deemed admissible.  Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s Motion to Suppress and, that ruling should be reversed on appeal.
[brief] With regard to the case law cited in Appellant’s brief, *In The Matter of the Estate of Hekemian*, [...], 2023 WL 176098 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan 13, 2023), is an unpublished decision.  Pursuant to R.1:36-3, it does not constitute precedent and is not binding upon the court.  Further, the Hekemian case focuses on the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a last will and testament.  The court in Hekemian undertook no evaluation of the statutes and rule applicable herein.  Similarly, *Matter of Kelly*, 120 N.J. 679 (1990) is not relevant to Appellant’s arguments.  Kelly is the review of a report and recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board that recommended disbarment.  The case simply states that an executor is required to account for items coming into his hands.  There is no reference to or interpretation of R. 4:87, and no indication a formal accounting must be filed immediately upon request of a beneficiary or at all.  Appellant has failed to cite any controlling case finding that ordering an accounting is not in the discretion of the judge who has reviewed all of the relevant facts and evidence.  POINT III
[brief] Bias and Prejudice  (A)  A judge shall be impartial and shall not discriminate because of race, creed, color, sex, gender identity or expression, religion/religious practices or observances, national origin/nationality, ancestry, language, ethnicity, disability or perceived disability, atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait, genetic information, status as a veteran or disabled veteran of, or liability for service in, the Armed Forces of the United States, age, affectional or sexual orientation, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, socioeconomic status or political affiliation.  (B)  A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice on the bases specified in Rule 3.6(A), against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.  This section does not preclude legitimate advocacy when the listed bases are issues in or relevant to the proceeding.  (C)  A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice or harassment on the bases specified in Rule 3.6 (A), and shall not permit court staff, court officials or others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so.  This section does not preclude reference to the listed bases when they are issues in or relevant to the proceeding.  COMMENT:  [1]  The prohibited bases in this rule are primarily drawn from the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq.  [2]  Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to epithets, slurs, demeaning nicknames, negative stereotyping, attempted humor based on stereotypes, threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts, suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime and irrelevant references to personal characteristics.  Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media and others an appearance of bias or prejudice.  A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.  [3]  Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward a person on prohibited bases listed in Rule 3.6(A).  RULE 3.7
[brief] Conservation and Public Access  [...] also contends that the Plan will reduce conservation and public access, including views of the waterfront.  On this front, the Plan expressly states that it is “intended” to develop “a variety of waterfront and recreational uses along the Raritan Bay shoreline” to contribute to the public welfare” to maximize potential, by the development of “year-round . . . recreational uses. ”  The Plan also expressly observes that it will “increase[ ] opportunities for public access to the beachfront”.  (Emphasis added).  Fundamentally, [...]’s contentions amount to a disagreement with respect to vision and values.  The Master Plan sets forth, in broad brushstrokes, [...]’s vision for the Borough.  The Plan sets forth various ways for that vision to come to fruition.  [...] struck a balance.  Although [...] disagrees with that balance, the disagreement is subjective.  As demonstrated by the record, [...]’s determination is supported by ample evidence and is not arbitrary nor capricious.  Accordingly, [...]’s challenge in this regard must be rejected (Pa1744-1745).
[brief] Paragraph 23 of the Shareholders Agreement, provides:  “Dispute Resolution.  In the event of a dispute among the Shareholders, the Shareholder (sic) agree to conduct good faith negotiations in order to settle the dispute.  If the dispute cannot be settled within 30 days, the Shareholders agree to submit the dispute to mediation before a mutually-agreed upon mediator.  If mediation proves unsuccessful within 45 days of submission of the dispute, the Shareholder may submit the dispute to binding arbitration before a mutually-agreed upon Arbitrator.  If the parties cannot agree to a mediator/arbitrator the dispute may be submitted to [...] using the procedures outlined by [...]. ”  (emphasis added)  (Pa031)  This commitment to the resolving disputes in arbitration is reiterated ten paragraphs later in Paragraph 33:  “Enforcement.  The Shareholders understand that it is impossible to measure, in dollars the damage[s] to be sustained by the Law Firm and each other in the event of a breach of the provisions of this Agreement.  Accordingly, the Shareholders hereby submit to Dispute Resolution as defined in Paragraph 23 of this Agreement with the understanding that the Arbitrator shall specifically enforce the provisions of such paragraphs as it determines warrant specific performance thereof, without limiting the rights of the aggrieved part(ies) to seek, in addition thereto, compensatory and/or punitive damages, by reason of such breach(es) (Pa037) (emphasis added).  After an unsuccessful mediation, [...] filed a complaint rather than submitting the dispute to binding arbitration.
[brief] E.  [...]’S INDIRECT COMPETITION CLAUSE IS IMPROPER, OVERREACHING, AND SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED.  The Indirect Competition Clause is located within [...]’s Restrictive Covenant and states as follows:  For purposes of the foregoing, Physician’s association by, or other association with, a medical Corporation having an office or other place of business located within the Restricted Area shall be deemed the “indirect” Corporation of medicine by Physician and, therefore, shall constitute a violation of this covenant, notwithstanding that he/she personally performs services exclusively outside of the Restricted Area.  Even if [...] were to accept a position with a medical practice located completely outside of the Restricted Area, he would nonetheless be in violation of the Restrictive Covenant if that medical practice had a satellite office within the Restricted Area where other doctors practiced, even if [...] never stepped foot in that satellite office.  The Indirect Competition Clause is particularly burdensome and unreasonable due to consolidation trends in the healthcare industry, where many practices now have multiple locations spanning large areas of PA and NJ, which significantly increases the risk that [...] will run afoul of the Indirect Competition Clause, effectively eliminating all possible job opportunities without having to uproot his family.  (Pa8-9).  During his search for a new job, [...] came extremely close, and actually thought he did find a job outside of the Restricted Area at [...] in Philadelphia.  However, when [...] analyzed [...]’s Restrictive Covenant and, specifically, the Indirect Competition Clause, [...]’s employment offer was revoked.  While [...] was going to be working solely out of the Philadelphia office (outside the Restricted Area), [...] has over 100 affiliated locations and a few of those locations were located within the 3,721 square mile Restricted Area.  As a result, [...] could not accept the position.  To further illustrate the unreasonableness of the Indirect Competition Clause, if [...] moved his family to California to accept a position with a medical practice across the country, but that practice also had a small office in Point Pleasant, NJ, [...] would not be able to practice medicine at that California medical office due to the implementation of the Indirect Competition Clause.  This may sound absurd—because it is—but that is the practical effect of the Indirect Competition Clause.  [...]’s opposition brief does not explain, or even comment upon, the reasonableness or the necessity the Indirect Competition Clause.  The Indirect Competition Clause not only prevents [...] from practicing within the 3,721 square mile Restricted Area, but for him to be compliant with the Restrictive Covenant, also effectively acts to prevent other doctors, over which [...] has no control, from practicing within the Restricted Area.  The Indirect Competition Clause serves no legitimate purpose and is designed solely to unlawfully restrict competition.  As such, the Indirect Competition Clause should not be enforced.
[directive] When I charged you at the beginning of your grand jury service, I instructed you briefly about the grand jury’s ability to return a presentment and briefly explained how it differed from an indictment or a no-bill.  I also informed you that I would instruct you in greater detail should you indicate that you wanted to consider a presentment.  I shall now provide that additional instruction.  A presentment is a formal document presented by you to the public to call to the community’s attention your recommendations as to some aspect of public affairs or conditions.  The Grand Jury is an independent investigative body that represents the public and may therefore inquire into matters affecting community morals, health, safety and general welfare.  In this connection you may inspect and visit public institutions, agencies, buildings, and departments.  If you find unsatisfactory conditions that are of such importance that they should be brought to the attention of the public and the officials concerned, you may return a presentment for that purpose.  You may, for example, determine that there are certain conditions in a public office or public institution which demand correction or improvement and which should be revealed to the public for that purpose, even though the evidence does not reach the level of constituting criminal conduct which would normally warrant an indictment.  In other words, a presentment generally deals with non- criminal conduct.  To investigate such matters you have the same broad, comprehensive and independent powers previously discussed.  In an investigation that may lead to a presentment, you may cause Grand Jury Standards Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006) Page 16 of 18 witnesses to appear before you, and again you are not limited simply to a consideration of matters that are presented to you by the prosecutor.  Unlike an indictment, a presentment is not the beginning of a criminal process and does not result in trials of individuals.  A person who is named in a presentment has no defense nor any way of answering the presentment except under very limited technical procedures.  For this reason, presentments require the exercise of sensitive judgment on your part, as well as a review by the Assignment Judge before they can be made public.