ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] RPC 1.6(a), 1.7(a)(2), 1.9(c).  It is undisputed that trial counsel represented both [...] and his brother and that multiple witnesses were [...]s’ close associates or relatives.  It is also undisputed that counsel never disclosed this conflict to [...] or the court.  Furthermore, there is no evidence counsel investigated anything regarding the [...]s -- particularly problematic where identity was the central issue and the evidence of it was shaky, and where a motive was never even presented to the jury.  Contrary to the State’s talismanic repetition of the phrase “bald assertion,” [...] has more than provided a prima facie case entitling him to an evidentiary hearing at which counsel would explain when he learned about the conflict and why he failed to reveal it, and provide needed information about his prior representation of the [...]s.  A hearing would also reveal other areas of impeachment not investigated or explored at trial, or whether counsel had damaging confidential information he learned that he could not use, owing a duty to them.  On this issue, as well as the others, the State has not defeated [...]’s prima facie claim, and reversal is required.
[brief] Once the Law Division has issued a valid order to remedy the effects of a prior specific Constitutional violation, as here, elected officials are expected to act with dispatch to remedy the wrong.  At this point the Constitution itself imposes an overriding definition of the public good.  And public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the political effects of prejudice and self-interest.  Defiance at this stage results, in essence, in a perpetuation of the very Constitutional violation at which the remedy is aimed.  At the conclusion of the trial I was convinced that it would be a vain and futile act to commit this Constitutional remedy to the very intractable officials who appeared to be incapable of taking meaningful action...  I am left adrift again by a Municipality that has been content to dispatch New Jersey Constitution to serve as mere background noise in [...]...
[brief] Indeed, Defendants have acknowledged that the arbitration provision does not embrace Plaintiff’s statutory claims under the NJLAD, CEPA, and NJFLA; which Defendants anticipate will be dismissed because of Plaintiff’s partnership status.  To that end, Plaintiff conveniently ignores that Defendants withdrew the portion of their motion which initially sought dismissal of the statutory claims to instead request limited discovery on the issue of partnership status, which was clearly reiterated during oral argument on the motion to compel arbitration.  [3T5:9-17; 3T6:20-7:1].  Similarly, Defendants’ application for injunctive relief and request for a temporary restraining order in the separately filed matter involved inherently dissimilar claims and different parties from Plaintiff’s current action.  See [Da19].  Defendants could not seek relief under the arbitration provision in that action, because the [...] (Plaintiff’s new firm) is not a party to the Partnership Agreement.  Moreover, the outcome of Defendants’ Chancery action, which denied the injunctive relief sought, had no discernible impact on the matter underlying this appeal.  As such, the Trial Court appropriately determined that aside from Defendants’ instant motion to compel, no dispositive motions were filed and decided here, which weighs in favor of arbitration.
[brief] BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS / RESPONDENTS  [...], individually, and derivatively on behalf of [...] LAW OFFICES OF [...]  Attorney ID: [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  Attorney for Plaintiffs / Respondents  On the Brief: [...], Esquire  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  3  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................  3  II.  INSUFFICIENT FACTS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION ...............  4  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................  5
[directive] B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.  C.  Questions.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive shall be addressed to the [...], or their designee.  D. date.  This Directive shall take effect on June 23, 2022, which is thirty days after Effective issuance.
[brief] _Id._ at 408-09.  The Supreme Court readily concluded that because “[t]here was sufficient testimony to permit a jury to conclude that [the security guard] used physical force to eject defendant from the Lounge[,]” there was sufficient evidence of passion/provocation to require the instruction.  _Id._ at 416.  Importantly, the Court also noted that the defendant’s misbehavior with respect to the physical quarrels did not preclude a passion/provocation instruction, saying, “[t]he issue here is whether a reasonable person would have been provoked, not whether a reasonable person would have engaged in conduct that incited the alleged provocation. ”  _Id._ at 415.  Similarly, in _Carrero_, the Supreme Court considered whether a passion/provocation instruction was appropriate even though it was inconsistent with the defense presented at trial.
[brief] Dated: November 4, 2024  [...], Plaintiff, vs. [...], d/b/a [...]  (PA) and [...], Defendants.  [...], Third-party plaintiff, vs. [...], DECEASED, [...], [...], [...], A MINOR, [...], A MINOR AND WARD OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND JOHN DOES  1- 10, THE UNKNOWN HEIRS OF [...], Third-party defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] And, it must be proof of a serious risk of death or serious bodily injury to a human.  N.J.S.A.4:19-23(1)(a).  The State resorted to hyperbole and sensationalism as a smokescreen to the weaknesses in its case.  For example, [...] was accused of being insensitive because she was “unconcerned” about [...]’s injury but instead admonished him for entering the gate without permission.  Pb3.  It is perfectly natural that she would be angry with him for such an outrageous trespass in violation of company policy never to enter and spray a yard with pets present.  But more to the point, his trespass is the reason that this incident is irrelevant, and the court never should have considered it.  This injury to a human was reported to and investigated by the [...], but [...] was neither impounded nor charged.  Had there been a reasonable belief that the injury was unprovoked, [...] would have been impounded under N.J.S.A. 4:19-19.
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Restrictions  5.1  No pursuit shall be conducted under the following circumstances: (a) in a direction opposite to the flow of traffic on a divided highway or a one-way street; or (b) in a police vehicle in which an individual who is not a law enforcement officer is either the driver or passenger.  5.2  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation or continuation of vehicular pursuits in areas where pedestrians are located or in areas of high density vehicular traffic.  5.3  No more than two police vehicles (primary unit and secondary unit) shall become actively involved in a pursuit unless otherwise specifically directed by a supervisor.  5.4  A motorcycle officer may initiate a pursuit, but will relinquish primary unit status immediately upon the participation of a marked police vehicle.  5.5  An unmarked police vehicle will not participate in a vehicular pursuit unless it is equipped with an emergency light and an audible device.  The unmarked car shall relinquish primary unit status immediately upon the participation of a marked police vehicle.  5.6  To diminish the likelihood of a pursuit, an officer intending to stop a vehicle for any violation of the law shall, when possible and without creating a threat to public safety, close the distance between the two vehicles prior to activating emergency lights and an audible device.  Officers shall recognize that, while attempting to close the distance and prior to the initiation of a pursuit and the activation of emergency lights and an audible device, they are subject to all motor vehicle laws governing the right of way (e.g., N.J.S.A. 39:4-91 and -92).  While closing the distance between the two vehicles, officers shall activate the motor vehicle recorder (MVR) and body worn camera (BWC), if equipped and activation is possible without activating emergency lights.  5.7  Throughout the course of a vehicular pursuit, pursuing officers shall not attempt to overtake or pass the violator’s moving vehicle.  5.8  During the course of a pursuit and when approaching an intersection controlled by traffic signals or signs, or any other location at which there is a substantially increased likelihood of collision, the operator of any pursuit vehicle shall, prior to entering the intersection, reduce the vehicle’s speed and control the vehicle so as to avoid collision with another vehicle or pedestrian.  The officer shall observe that the way is clear before cautiously proceeding through the intersection.  At all other times including an attempt to close the distance prior to the initiation of a pursuit and upon the termination of a pursuit, officers 8
[brief] Indeed, the jury would have received the model jury charge explaining that “[t]he defendant does not have to produce evidence that proves the guilt of another, but may rely on evidence that creates a reasonable doubt.  In other words, there is no requirement that this evidence proves or even raises a strong probability that someone other than the defendant committed the crime. ”  Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Third Party Guilt Jury Charge” (approved Mar. 9, 2015).  Instead, due to the trial court’s erroneous rulings, the jury heard only conclusory testimony from the lead detective in the case that all the other leads the police had investigated “turned out to be dead ends. ” (11T229-16 to 22).  This highly restricted presentation of the evidence was unfair.  Ultimately, “the issue is not whether the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to return a guilty verdict, but whether [defendant] was denied the opportunity to present a full defense -- to present evidence that would have allowed the jury to return a not-guilty verdict.
[brief] Public notice of the hearing on the application is required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(a).  The contents of such notice are governed by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11, which states:  Notices pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D–12 and –13] shall state the date, time and place of the hearing, the nature of the matters to be considered and, in the case of notices pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D–12], an identification of the property proposed for development by street address, if any, or by reference to lot and block numbers as shown on the current tax duplicate in the municipal tax assessor's office, and the location and times at which any maps and documents for which approval is sought are available pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D–10].  [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11]  “[T]he purpose for notifying the public of the ‘nature of the matters to be considered’ is to ensure that members of the general public who may be affected by the nature and character of the proposed development are fairly apprised thereof so that they may make an informed determination as to whether they should participate in the hearing or, at the least, look more closely at the plans and other documents on file. ”  Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Tp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J. Super. 234, 237-238 (1996)(citing Scerbo v. Orange Bd. of Adj., 121 N.J. Super. 378, 389 (L. Div. 1972)).
[brief] 11  **State v. Citarella,** 154 N.J. 272 (1998) .......................................................................................................................  20  **State v. Davis,** 104 N.J. 490 (1986) .......................................................................................................................  20, 21  **State v. Des Marets,** 92 N.J. 62 (1983) ..........................................................................................................................  17  **State v. Elders,** 192 N.J. 224 (2007) .......................................................................................................................  9, 10  **State v. Frankel,** 179 N.J. 586 (2004) .......................................................................................................................  13  State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014) .................................................................................. 16, 18, 19
[brief] 2  I.  [...] Was A Successful Claimant For Purposes of R. 4:42-9(a)(6) .............................................  5  A.  [...] Obtained a Favorable Adjudication on the Merits of a Significant Coverage Question.  .........................  6  B.  Complete Success on All Issues Is Not a Prerequisite to an Award of Attorneys’ Fees.  ........................................  8  C.  The Unreported Honeywell Decision Is Inapplicable ...............10  II.  The Trial Court Properly Awarded and Allocated [...]’s Recoverable Attorneys’ Fees  ........................................  13  A.  An Award of Attorneys’ Fees May Only Be Overturned for a Clear Abuse of Discretion, Which Did Not Happen Here ..................................................................................................................  13  B.  The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Calculating and Allocating [...]’s Recoverable Attorneys’ Fees..................................................................................................................  14  III.  The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Awarding Costs ..................................................18  IV.  The Trial Court’s Award and Calculation of Interest Was a Proper Exercise of its Discretion and is Supported by the Law and the Facts ..................................................................................................................21
[brief] Notwithstanding the motion court’s reasoning that a communication is “in connection with the collection of any debt” only when there is a demand for payment, the published federal court decisions and the language of § 1692c(b) reject such a narrow construction.  As discussed in Plaintiff’s Brief (Pb12-Pb14), Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Hunstein I”) and Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Hunstein II”) concluded that a debt collector’s conveyance of similar information to a letter vendor is “in connection with the collection of any debt” and explained that, if a payment demand were required, then the entirety of § 1692c(b) becomes superfluous because a debt collector would never demand payment for third parties.
[brief] Given these differences, and given that the Michigan court’s interpretation of the phrase “turning from a direct line” was informed by the surrounding statutory language and structure, that interpretation has no bearing on this Court’s construction of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  The New York statute at issue in the decision cited by the State has a similar structure to N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, but it contains no language about starting or backing in its first paragraph.  See People v. James, 842 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861 (Crim. Ct. 2007); N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law (V.T.L.) 1163.  More importantly, however, the New York statute expressly provides that “signals . . . shall be used to indicate an intention to . . . change lanes. ”  N.Y. V.T.L. 1163.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, on the other hand, makes no reference to changing lanes at all.  Thus, while the New York statute unambiguously requires motorists to signal lane changes, that it does so is of no moment to this Court in construing N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.
[brief] [...]’s Complaining Reaches a Tipping Point.  On June 24, 2020, [...], [...], and [...] were on duty in the staffing coordinators’ office, with [...] working in her office.  (Pa244 at 78:17-24).  [...] was complaining about [...]’s supposed lack of productivity, and [...]’s alleged refusal to address it.  (Pa367 at 101:9-24; Pa 367 at 101:25-102:5).  A day earlier, some of [...]s’s Kronos reports, which should have been completed, but had been misplaced and left undone, had accidentally fallen on the ground.  (Pa300; Pa244 at 79:3-14).  [...] often complained about [...], whom he described as “lazy” and the weakest link,” and seemingly upset about the unaddressed Kronos reports, muttered to [...]: “and let me guess, [...] didn’t do anything about it. ”  (Pa467; Pa169 at 44:1-7; Pa244 at 79:3-14; Pa300-01 at 92:9-93:4).  [...] overheard [...]’s comment.  (Pa367 at 102:13-21).  Having grown tired of [...]’s repeated efforts to undermine her management, [...] walked over to [...] at his desk, raised her voice, and told [...] she “had enough of him complaining” and that he could bring any of his complaints to Human Resources.  (Pa367 at 102:13-21; Pa301 at 95:2-11; Pa301-02 at 96:23-97:23).  In her frustration, [...]’s voice was raised in a yelling fashion and she drew close to [...].  (Pa244 at 79:15-21).  [...] is a physically imposing man, and a former member of the military, while [...] is much smaller in stature.  (Pa161-62 at 12:21-13:2; Pa175 at 65:7-66:15).  [...] ignored [...] while she spoke to him, and was unfazed by the confrontation.  (Pa161 at 11:3-11; Pa188 at 118:20-119:24; Pa244 at 79:15-21; Pa301 at 96:10-15).  Having vented her frustrations, [...] left [...] alone.  (Pa188 at 120:4-5).  [...] continued working for some time thereafter before leaving the staffing office for the remainder of the workday.  (Pa189 at 121:9-122:11).  [...] did not touch [...].  (Pa188 at 119:7-18).  That same evening, [...] called [...] and apologized for yelling at him.  (Pa367 at 104:1-15).  [...] further explained to [...] that personal issues, combined with COVID, caused her stress to boil over.  (Pa367 at 104:2-11).  [...] told [...] not to worry about anything and that he understood [...]’s circumstances.  (Pa367 at 104:11-15).  [...] admitted he did not think [...] was rude or condescending, and did not feel intimidated.  (Pa184 at 102:7-10; Pa184 at 104:8-18).  [...] discussed her behavior with the other staffing coordinators as well.  (Pa366 at 97:5-21).  [...] referred to [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct as an isolated incident and the worst she had seen.  (Pa246 at 85:11-21; Pa246 at 86:7-9).  [...], meanwhile, admitted that she never raised any complaints about [...]’s treatment of [...].  (Pa304 at 105:7-15).  VII.
[brief] **The Treatment System Resolved the PFNA MCL Exceedances**  [...] required [...] to sample for PNFA on a weekly basis for the first four weeks that the Treatment System was operational.  *Id.* at ¶ 29.  Samples were taken on 2/2/2023, 2/7/2023, 2/14/2023 and 2/21/2023.  *Id.* at ¶ 30.  All of these samples verified that the Treatment System was effective to remove PNFA from the water.  *Id.* at ¶ 31.  Since the Treatment System went online in February 2023, all samples have been non-detect for PFNA, and thus well below the MCL for PNFA.  *Id.* at ¶ 34.  [...]’s drinking water report to its residents, dated May 1, 2023, advised:  “The PNFA chemical is being effectively removed in our water treatment process now that the new Granular Activated Carbon Filters have been placed into service. ”  Pa170-71 at ¶ 35.  On June 26, 2023, [...] sent [...] a letter stating that all conditions of the ACO were satisfied and, therefore, the ACO was terminated.  *Id.* at ¶ 36.  F.
[brief] The defendant asserts that [...] spoke to South Edison police on January 12th, 2012, at 11:50 am at the Edison police department.  (Da 24)  Then again to South Brunswick detectives on January 16th, 2012, at the Middlesex County Jail.  (Da 26)  [...] whom transported [...] in a marked police cruiser was equipped with a mobile vehicle recorder.  Upon arrival and prior to signing and giving his 11:50am statement, [...] collected [...] clothes at the police station around 11:30am on January 12th, 2012.  (Da 25)  [...] on cross-examination elicit testimony from [...] about speaking with the police on January 12th, 2012, concerning the robberies.  [[...]]: Okay.  Looking at them, is this the Miranda form you signed on January 12th, 2012?  [[...]]: Yes.  [[...]]:  They did not record your statement of whatever when you spoke to them at 11:50am; correct?  [[...]]: No.  [[...]]:  And did you discuss the robbery at 11:50am  [[...]]: Yeah, they were interrogating me at that time.  [[...]]: And you read and voluntarily read and signed those with those officers; correct?  [[...]]: Yes.  (2T 111-17 to 19; 2T 112-14 to 22)  On January 16th, 2012, approximately 4:30pm South Brunswick detectives went to the Middlesex County Jail to speak with [...].  However, [...] nevertheless voluntarily desired or requested to talk to South Brunswick detectives and authorized the warden to call him from his cell for the purpose of the requested interview.  (Da 26)  [...] printed and signed his name to speak with them.  This statement was not fully investigated by [...].  In *State v. Savage*, 120 N.J. 594 (1990), echoing *Strickland*,
[brief] N.J.R.E. 201 ..............................................................................................................29  N.J.R.E. 201(b)(2), (b)(3).........................................................................................12  OTHER AUTHORITIES P.L. 2021, c. 402 .......................................................................................................17  2020 Decennial United States Census, https://www.census.gov/searchresults.html?searchType=web&c ssp=SERP&q=Sea%20Bright%20borough,%20New%20Jersey ([...]), with https://www.census.gov/searchresults.........................29  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] There is no reference to the [...]’s failure to comply with any ordinance or the [Municipal Land Use Law].  This is contrary to the law.  [Pa278, Pa279, Pa281, Pa282].  By citing the now-overturned Resolution No. 10-2023 as evidence of purported “traffic issues,” [...] seeks to piggy-back on the [...]’s failed attempt to do the same, which the court held was “not supported by any evidence. ” (Pa281).  In fact, that [...]’s site plan application ran afoul of any documented traffic standard is directly contradicted by its traffic impact report, which was reviewed and approved by experts from [...] and [...], [...], and the [...].  (Pa278).  [...]’s attempt to use an arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and since-reversed [...] Resolution to support its ill-defined traffic argument should be viewed with deep skepticism.