ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] testified that program directors for [...] were trained on to process complaints of retaliation.  See deposition transcript of [...], Appx 445 at 18:6-10.  Ms. McCarthy acknowledged that Appellant’s text message to program director [...] described retaliation that should have been reported and investigated.  Id. at 21:11-22.  [...] did not recall ever being trained on the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, or any anti-retaliation policy at her orientation.  See deposition transcript of [...], Appx 432 at 25:17-23.  [...] testified she thought she received anti-retaliation training, but could not remember when or by whom.  See Appx 433 at 26:3-15.  [...] testified that as Appellant’s supervisor, she never had reason to discipline her, she cannot recall any issues with her performance, and cannot recall any consumers complaining about her.  See Appx 434 at 34:16 to Appx 435 at 35:2.  Heather testified that nobody ever talked to her concerning any allegations of retaliation made by Appellant, and she does not believe any investigation took place.  See Appx 436 at 52:19 to Appx 437 at 53:5.  E. Appellant’s Criminal History and Her Eligibility to Work at [...]
[directive] Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.
[brief] "An investigatory police stop ... is permissible 'if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'"  *State v. Shaw*, 213 N.J. 398, 410 (2012) (quoting *Pineiro*, 181 N.J. at 20).  "Although a mere 'hunch' does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion required is 'considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,' and 'obviously less' than is necessary for probable cause."  *Gamble*, 218 N.J. at 428 (citations omitted).  "Because the 'determination of reasonable [and articulable] suspicion is fact-sensitive,' a careful review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding each case is required."
[brief] The court noted that while [...] had initially demonstrated good faith in satisfying its constitutional obligations to justify an initial five-month period of immunity and an additional month after demonstrating compliance with formulating a plan, such compliance was soon deficient.  The Township at first provided a revised fair share plan with “slight incremental improvements” that were otherwise “contrary to the Special Master’s direction [and] still included too many 100% affordable housing projects, proposed virtually no inclusionary developments, and included too many senior units. ”  Id. at 449.  After instructing the Township to address the deficiencies and providing another extension of immunity, the Township returned to court with “little or no improvement. ”  Id.  [...] noted that “[m]any of the plan’s component parts were unrealistic or impractical…others were contrary to valid COAH regulations and/or judicial precedent. ”  Id.  The court then extended the Township’s immunity again, but this time required that the Township show cause why the court should not conclude that the Township is “determined to be non-compliant. ”  Id.  On the return date of the order to show cause, the court again found that the Township’s plan was “inconsistent with COAH regulations and judicial precedents, and did not address even its own estimated fair share number”; proposed inclusionary development “not of traditional, multi-family units, but rather, only of age-restricted, single-family, detached homes”; insisted on a 33% set-aside for low to moderate income units as opposed to the traditional 15-20% set-aside sanctioned by COAH and the courts; and significantly limited the gross density of the proposed inclusionary development.  Id. at 450.  In light of all of the evidence and the “Township’s steadfast refusal to remedy and/or remove the plan’s obvious flaws” the court was “constrained to conclude that [...] was not proceeding in good faith and was “determined to be non-compliant. ”  Id. at 450-451 (emphasis added).  Only then did the court determine that the only meaningful way to advance the matter was through the appointment of a special master.
[brief] However, no arguments were raised below to the trial court, and Plaintiff’s current appellate issue should be disregarded by this Court.  See, Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 38 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959).  The absence of objection to summation comments by opposing counsel is significant.  Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 128 (2008) (appellate courts may regard “counsel's failure to object to summation remarks as ‘speaking volumes about the accuracy of what was said’”)  Notwithstanding the above, the summation presented on behalf of [...] was not unfairly prejudicial and was in line with the evidence presented in this case.  Plaintiff’s expert offered an opinion as to the reasonableness of the legal billing.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  An Amended Complaint was filed by the Plaintiff [...], individually and as Executor of the Estate of [...], deceased against the Defendants [...], MD: [...], MD; [...]; M. D., [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...]; [...] and a number of John Doe Defendants on August 1, 2019.  The suit was filed in the Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in Morris County.  The lawsuit was a medical malpractice wrongful death action seeking damages arising out of the death of [...] on June 1, 2018.  The suit claimed that the Defendants deviated from the accepted standards of medical practice in their care and treatment of Marc Sovelove while he was a patient at [...] on June 1, 2028 causing his death on that date.  The suit sought monetary damages from the Defendants arising from the death of [...].
[brief] .................................................................  Pa35  Exhibit 1 – Verified Complaint [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 2 – Declaration of Taking [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 3 – Executed Order to Show Cause dated September 24, 2018 [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 4 – Defendant’s Answer [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 5 – Order of Final Judgment dated November 31, 2018 [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 6 – Commissioners’ Award [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 7 – Case Management Order dated November 6, 2019
[directive] “Witness mode” should be used because at the end of a session, a report can be generated of the photos displayed, how long each was displayed, and whether the witness marked a photo as either “yes,” “no,” or “possible. ”  The report generates a log of numbers, each of which links to a single photo.  Individual photos can also be printed.  - 8  - • close out the session, switch back to “investigative mode,” and – using the “similar” function – narrow the field further to search photos.5 for additional similar
[brief] CASES CITED  21st Century v. D’Allesandro, 257 N.J.Super 320, 323 (App. Div. 1992).  39 515  Associates v. City of Newark, 132 N.J. 180, 185, 623 A.2d 1366 (1993).  24 Burbridge v. Twp. Of Mine Hill 117 NJ 376, 385 (1990).  35, 37 Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford.  68 N.J. 576, 589 (1975)  39 Chicalese 334 N.J. Super. 413 (Law Div 1995), aff’d 291 N.J. Super 1 (App. Div. 1996)  37 CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Plan Bd. 414 N.J. Super 563, 578 (App. Div. 2010).  37 Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Board. 233 NJ 546, 558 (2018).  35 Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239 260-263 (2015)  39 Kramer v. Board of Adjustment Sea Girt 45 NJ 268, 296 (1965).  36 Lang v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 160 N.J. at 60-61 37 Nadelson v. Township of Millburn, 297 N.J. Super 549 (Law Div., Essex 1996)  23, 24, 25, 26 Pullen v. South Plainfield 291 N.J. Super 303, 312 (Law Div. 1995) aff’d 291 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div., 1996) 36, 37 Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins.  Co, 65 N.J. 474, 483 (1974).  40 Turnbull, Aesthetic Zoning, 7 Wake Forest L.Rev. 230, 242 (1971)).  24, 25 NJ Zoning and Land Use Administration, Cox and Koenig, 2023, pp175-176 Section 12-1 and 12-1.2) 29, 31, 32, 38 Sherman v. Zoning Board of Adjustment
[brief] (Pa333; Pa340).  ---  4  Plaintiffs’ Appendix Pa247-Pa257 cites a deposition [...] gave in a different case, which was inadvertently attached to the original motion.  The correct transcript appears at Pa323-Pa343.  5  [...] also agreed a fetal maternal hemorrhage is most often not predictable and was not predictable in this case.  (Pa229).  In an effort to pin down how much earlier the baby had to be delivered to obtain the chance of a better outcome, the following exchange took place:
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esquire (022452001)  [...], Esquire (030812004)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  4 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................................  4  POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT BY FINDING THAT THE MSRA PREVENTS THE POLICE UNIONS’ CLAIMS TO RECOVER UNPAID WAGES.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29)...........................................................................................................  4 POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED  PRIMA FACIE CAUSES OF ACTION. (Pa000017-18, 26-29)...........................................................................................................  10  POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS THE MSRA DOES NOT DEPRIVE PLAINTIFFS’ MEMBERS OF A VESTED BENEFIT.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29) ...........................................................................................................  13  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................  15
[brief] The court in Browne reiterated that the NJCFLA’s legislative history does not suggest an implied private right of action, and held, like the trial court here, that the plaintiff was barred from bootstrapping his CFA and declaratory judgment claims to his NJCFLA claim.  Browne, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537, at *8-9.  Similarly, in Delgado, Appellant’s counsel made the same argument by relying on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997).  Delgado v. [...], 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 713, at *3, 13 (Law Div. Apr. 22, 2024).  The trial court in Delgado rejected the exact arguments Appellant attempts to make now, and found that Lemelledo “did not hold that by N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), itself, and as later incorporated into the NJCFLA, provided for a private cause of action.
[brief] Committee Room 4, State House Annex, Trenton, NJ**  Chair: [...]  The State House Annex has reopened to the general public.  Visitors to the State House Annex are required to show ID and proof of full vaccination or a negative COVID-19 PCR or rapid test conducted within the previous 72 hours.  All visitors are required to undergo a temperature scan prior to proceeding through security.  Masks are mandatory at all times inside the State House Annex, including in Committees Rooms and in the hallways and other facilities.  Please visit the NJ Legislature’s website at www.njleg.state.nj.us/JMC%20Rules.pdf for more information.  Considered: to be a member of the Fish and Game Council: [...] of [...] to replace [...], for the term prescribed by law, currently set to expire on April 1, 2023 to be a member of the North Jersey District Water Supply Commission: [...] of [...] to replace [...], for the term prescribed by law, currently set to expire on January 7, 2022.
[brief] Rather, the plaintiff must prove that the owner failed to exercise reasonable care. \(^4\)  The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not support the proposition that the inherent vicious or dangerous traits or propensities common to all members of a class of animals give rise to strict liability.  Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian, 320 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 1999) most certainly does not stand for the proposition that notice of a class of dog’s inherent viciousness is sufficient to establish either strict liability or negligence.  Instead, the Appellate Division reiterated the established principle that liability requires actual or constructive knowledge of an abnormally vicious trait possessed by the particular offending animal:  “since the [trial] judge specifically found that the landlords were unaware of any vicious propensities of the dog, they are not liable to plaintiff under the common law. ”
[brief] *In re Reid, East Orange*, [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, List Removal Appeal, Final Decision, (December 17, 2015), Ra111.  Consistent with such expectations, “the Commission has previously removed eligibles from promotional lists where their employment history revealed extensive minor discipline or as little as one major discipline. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  Similar to the adverse employment history at issue in this matter, the Commission and Appellate Division have specifically upheld “the removal from [a] Correction Lieutenant promotional list . . . for [a] Correction Sergeant whose disciplinary record included two official reprimands for absenteeism and a 30-day suspension for falsification of a report, despite the recommendation of his immediate supervisor[.]”
[brief] Ruling on the Instant Motions  Immediately prior to sentencing, both defense counsel moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to R. 3:18-2, or in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to R. 3:20-1.  By this time, the prosecutor in his summation had abandoned his temporary theory that [...] might have been the shooter.  In fact, he unequivocally advised the jury twice that [...] had done the shooting.  (16T 83-24 to 84-4; 16T 84-10 to 12)  And, of course, the jury had acquitted Mr. [...] of accomplice liability for the attempted murder, as well as of both of the weapons possession offenses.  As a result, the judge could no longer apply the contrary inference as part of her rationale in denying the motion.
[brief] An excellent summary of the jurisdiction of the Pinelands Commission is found in *Peg Leg Webb, LLC v. New Jersey Pinelands Commission*¹, an --- ¹  Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, a copy of this opinion is included in the joint appendix.  unreported opinion, Superior Court, Appellate Division Docket #[...], decided October 11, 2017, pages 2-4.  On page 3, it states:  No development can be approved within the Pinelands unless it conforms with the CMP.  In fact, it ‘shall be unlawful for any person to carry out any development in the Pinelands Area which does not conform to the minimum standards of [the] Plan’ N.J.A.C. 7:50-1.4.  The opinion continues, in footnote #1, explaining that the Commission is authorized to waive strict compliance to alleviate extraordinary hardship, referring to N.J.S.A. 13:18A-10(c).  No jurisdiction to negate a Pinelands waiver is afforded to a municipality, and the power of a planning board to do so does not exist.  The Planning Board does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the waiver issued by the Pinelands Commission.
[brief] Before trial began, [...] reminded defendant that she had waived her right to an attorney.  [1T4-11 to -15].  Defendant informed the court that the State had not answered her demands for discovery, which included demands upon the victim.  [1T7-9 to -20].  She also argued that she had filed several motions before the court.  [1T10-1 to 13-13].  The municipal court judge informed defendant that her motions to dismiss the charges had been denied in previous proceedings.  [1T13-13 to 14-7].  There is no support in the record before this Honorable Court to support defendant’s contentions that an attorney prejudiced defendant and that this attorney’s actions resulted in defendant’s conviction in the municipal court.  There is no attorney named in the record.  The only references to an attorney come from defendant stating that she had “an attorney” or will be getting “an attorney” for the appeal.  When [...] reminded defendant that she waived her right to an attorney, defendant did not object.
[brief] The court should consider the extent and cause of the delay, prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner’s claim in determining whether there has been an ‘injustice’ sufficient to relax the time limits. ”  *State v. Mitchell*, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992).  The Court in *Mitchell* states that the State’s ability to bring its case must be weighed and balanced against the interests of the petitioner.  “If the petitioner articulates facts that demonstrate a serious question about his or her guilt or the propriety of the sentence imposed and is prepared to provide factual evidence to support it, then sufficient grounds for relaxing the Rule might exist. ”  *Id.*  Courts have relaxed PCR time bars if adherence would result in an injustice.  *McQuaid*, 147 N.J. at 477, 485 (stating in a case where a second PCR petition was filed four years after the denial of the first PCR petition and two years after the appeal was dismissed that “notwithstanding Rule 3:22-12, … a court may relax the time bar if adherence to it would result in an injustice.
[directive] 3.8.6  CS (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) chemical agents are primarily offensive weapons that shall be used with the utmost caution.  Thus, CS: (a) may be deployed only by specially trained individuals who are part of a special tactical unit authorized to deploy such agents; (b) may be deployed only with the specific and express approval of the IC; (c) may be deployed defensively to prevent injury when lesser force options are either not available or would likely be ineffective; and (d) may be deployed only after an announcement is made and when avenues of egress are available to the crowd.
[brief] In contrast, the matter of Allstate v. Lajara, et al, Superior Court of New Jersey, Docket No. [...], involved 77 defendants.  See E-courts jacket.  The case was filed on December 15, 2008.  Ibid.  The trial of the matter commenced on January 4, 2016.  Numerous witnesses testified and numerous documents were marked into evidence during the six-month long trial.  Judgments were entered against three groups of defendants on June 29, 2016.  (ICAa 062-064).  The Judgements totaled $9,999,180.  Ibid.
[brief] As it turned out, [...] performed his services as receiver expertly.  In this case, [...] took all appropriate actions so that he could fulfill his duties and obligations under the order.  See, N.J.S.A. 14A:14-5.  Also, this was not a case where [...] charged fees pursuant to the order, which would have been exorbitant.  Rather, his fees were paid by [...], and were not paid by or contributed to by [...] or [...].  As noted by the court in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Camp, 124 N.J. Eq. 403 (E&A 1938):  Equitable remedies “are distinguished for their flexibility, their unlimited variety, their adaptability to circumstances, and the natural rules which govern their use.  There is in fact no limit to their variety and application; the court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties. ”
[brief] Finally, regarding the common law right of access, the Court should only reach this issue if the Court reverses the Trial Court’s OPRA holdings.  If this Court reverses the Trial Court on the Trial Court’s OPRA holdings, then it should affirm the Trial Court’s holding that the requested records should be disclosed under the common law right of access.  Defendant [...] claims the emails are not common law records.  The emails are common law records because the [...] authorized [...] to make those records.  There is no dispute that Hoboken contracted with [...] to create the email lists so that Hoboken can utilize the email lists.  Thus, this Court should affirm the Trial Court’s holding that the email addresses are public records under the common law right of access.  Defendant [...] also argues that its interest in non-disclosure is greater than Plaintiffs’ interest in disclosure.  But in its brief Hoboken cites no facts or evidence regarding that interest in non-disclosure.  Hoboken simply has not provided this Court with any evidence or argument to overturn the Trial Court’s holding.  For these reasons, if the Court reaches the issue, this Court should affirm the Trial Court’s common law right of access holding.
[brief] A review of Plaintiff/Appellant's brief further reveals arguments concerning a distinction between a verdict and an Order of Judgment of Acquittal.  This analysis is far-reaching.  This is because the facts in the instant matter are quite simple.  The Plaintiff/Appellant was found not guilty on June 6, 2017 and did not within the two year statute of limitations file his cause of action in Federal Court.  There is no negotiation with regard to compliance of the statute of limitations.  The statute of limitations is black and white and has nothing to do with an individual's due process rights.
[directive] OTHER PERSON(S)  OVER  Age 12 living with Provider as Reported by Provider □ NONE Name:_________________________________________________________  Sex: DOB: __________________________ Age:________ Social Security #: Promis/Gavel Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided Domestic Violence Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided Juvenile Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □  Insufficient Information Provided Name:_________________________________________________________  Sex:________ DOB: __________________________  Age:_________Social Security #:_______________________ Promis/Gavel Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided Domestic Violence Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided Juvenile Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □  Insufficient Information Provided Name:_________________________________________________________  Sex: DOB: __________________________ Age:________ Social Security #: Promis/Gavel Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided Domestic Violence Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided Juvenile Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □  Insufficient Information Provided Name:_________________________________________________________  Sex: DOB: __________________________  Age:________Social Security #: Promis/Gavel Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided  Domestic Violence Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □  Insufficient Information Provided  Juvenile Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □  Insufficient Information Provided Comments: Interviewer's Signature: Title Date