ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In opposition to this appeal, [...] does not dispute that it failed to make its fourth settlement payment [Db6], or that its failure constituted an event of default under the Settlement Agreement that entitled [...] to submit the Money Judgment to the trial court for immediate entry.  [Pa51 at ¶ 2 (admitting the liability expressed in the “Consent Judgment in the Law Division Action”), Pa51 at ¶ 3(b) (confirming [...] would make monthly payments through October 1, 2023); Pa51 at ¶ 3(d) (“The Consent Judgment in the Law Division Action shall be held in escrow by Landlord’s counsel unless and until an Event of Default occurs, as defined in Paragraph 4 below, whereupon Landlord may execute upon and enforce all rights and remedies in connection therewith”); Pa52 at ¶ 4 (“An Event of Default shall occur if Tenant: (i) fails to make any Monthly Payment when due[.]”)].  The installation of security to prevent further unauthorized dumping (and damage) to the Leased Premises does not alter this unambiguous contractual obligation or the agreed-upon remedy in the event of a breach – as [...]’s own authorities observe.  [See Db14 citing Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36 (1960) (“Courts cannot make contracts for parties.  They can only enforce the contracts which the parties themselves have made. ”) (additional citations omitted); Temple v. Clinton Tr. Co., 1 N.J. 219, 225 (1948) (“It is beyond the province of equity to substitute terms for those made by the parties to a contract, or to supply terms that have not been agreed upon”)].  Absent clear and convincing proof to the contrary, which does not exist, the trial court’s Order should be reversed, the parties’ settlement should be enforced, and the Money Judgment should be entered by the trial court.
[brief] [Pa452]  Since the OAE Proceeding satisfies neither of these conditions, at minimum, a material fact conflict exists between [...]’s opinions in his Certification and the [...].  Despite this, and despite the fact that [...]’s deposition had not yet taken place (and the discovery period was still open), the trial court accepted [...]’s conclusory statement that a Policy would not have issued, thus weighing in on a fundamental credibility issue concerning a reasonable detrimental reliance.
[brief] *Id.* at 292.  The test to assess whether those involved in bringing about an injury to another were exercising due care is two-fold.  Once a dangerous condition is found to exist, a court must determine: (1) “whether the property poses a danger to the general public when used in [a] normal, foreseeable manner,” and (2) “whether the nature of the … activity is ‘so objectively unreasonable’ that the condition of the property cannot reasonably be said to have caused the injury. ”
[brief] The defendant will rely on the procedural history as set forth in the brief filed by appellate counsel in this matter with addition to the fact that PCR counsel moved for reconsideration of the PCR court's June 9, 2023, order denying the PCR and an evidentiary hearing.  (Aa 1 to 26)¹  The motion for reconsideration was supported by a certification of [...], Forensic Expert (Aa 21 to 23), and [...].  (Aa 24 to 26)  ¹  To avoid any confusion, the defendant has referenced his appendix to the prose supplemental brief by (Aa).  The defendant also relies on the appendix to appellate counsel's brief referenced as (Da) and the transcript listings.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The biggest thing the State is going to say, they're gonna ask you to jump to [...] got a tattoo and this is because to corroborate the, the murder.  ...  The State is then also going to say because [...] says, well, the defendant got three teardrops and that means something.  There are actors, actresses, if you in your common experience know any musician or anyone else, you know anyone on the street who may have teardrops on their face, are they all murderers or could it mean something else?  The only one who's saying, oh, [...] says [...] said it was because of the murder.  He got it to represent the murder.  Again, [...]'s not reliable.  [...], if you can't believe [...], false in one, false in all.  (38T 84-2 to 84-25)  Thus, the defense’s theory for the jury was that the tattoos were simply interesting tattoos that anyone would get for any reason, and that [...]’s suggestions that they were symbolic were entirely incredible.  As such, Defendant has failed to establish any error with the trial court’s limiting instructions on this issue.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] They effectively admit that they used plaintiffs’ client data, but merely maintain that plaintiffs suffered no compensable “harm. ”  They prevailed in their AOM argument so the damages issue was not fully resolved.  The motion judge dismissed the claims against these two defendants for plaintiffs’ failure to file AOM’s.  The case docket, however, shows that no Ferreiro conference had been scheduled at any time.  In A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337, 175 A.3d 932 (2017), the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment involving a minor medical malpractice plaintiff because neither the lawyers nor the trial court complied with the requirement of holding an AOM compliance conference promptly upon commencement of action under Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144, 151, 836 A.2d 779 (2003) (the failure to provide an AOM being "deemed a failure to state a cause of action," N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29, requiring dismissal with prejudice, the Supreme Court has recognized equitable exceptions to "temper the draconian results of an inflexible application of the statute," under Ferreira).
[brief] [...], a teacher at [...] engaged in the use of racial slurs in her classroom in May of 2019 wherein she repeatedly used the word Nigger (N Word).  *(Pa294, Smith Affidavit)*  Some of the students recorded Ms. Costlow using the N Word and this recording was given to another teacher by the name of [...] ([...]).  *(Pa294, Affidavit)*  [...] viewed the video recording of Ms. Costlow using the N word.  *(Pa294, Smith Affidavit, par. 4)*  The information about Ms. Costlow and video recording of her using the N word was presented to Appellant and [...] who was also a Vice Principal at the high school.  *(Pa294, Smith Affidavit)*  Ms. Costlow was supervised by and reported to [...] and she met with [...] and was counseled and written up.  *(Pa384)*  This information was forwarded by [...] to [...] ([...]) on May 1, 2019.  [...] was the Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources.  *(Pa294, Smith Affidavit).*  A letter and the video recording where Ms. Costlow repeatedly uttered the word Nigger was forwarded to Ms. [...].  *(Pa294)*  In the period after this incident, [...] demanded that the write-up be removed from both Ms. Costlow’s personnel file and the Observation of her work.  Ms. [...] gave the letter and video recording to [...].  On May 9, 2019, Appellant was issued a Notice of Non-Renewal of her contract for the next school year.
[brief] ”  *City of Atl. City v. Trupos*, 201 N.J. at 462.  The initial burden of persuasion lies with the party seeking disqualification.  *Dewey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 109 N.J. at 201.  “Whether the matters are the same or substantially related must be based in fact. ”  *City of Atl. City v. Trupos*, 201 N.J. at 464.  The Supreme Court provided controlling guidance in *City of Atlantic City v. Trupos*:  [F]or the purposes of RPC 1.9, matters are deemed to be “substantially related” if (1) the lawyer for whom disqualification is sought received confidential information from the former client that can be used against that client in the subsequent representation of parties adverse to the former client, or (2) facts relevant to the prior representation are both relevant and material to the subsequent representation.
[brief] (2T10: 18-11:4, Jan. 05, 2023).  [...] and [...], through their respective living trusts, jointly owned [...] at the time of [...]’s death.  The Property, which was the only asset that [...] owned, was part of the assets of the Estate of [...].  (Pa1958-2212; Pa2213-2233).  Through the transfer of the title from the name “[...]” to [...] in 2019, [...] became the title owner of the Property through his company.  B.
[brief] PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT OR INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE CITY’S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN PLACING THE SIGN CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION.  Plaintiff also argues the City created a dangerous condition by failing to place traffic signs in accordance with N.J.S.A 27:5G-4 and, therefore, Plaintiff need not prove that the City had actual or constructive notice of the missing sign.
[brief] *State v. Torres*, 183 N.J. 554, 567 (2005).  Expert testimony is admissible “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. ”  *State v. Gonzalez*, 249 N.J. 612, 633-634 (2022).  The expert witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony.
[directive] The leadership team of [...] shall include, among others, at least one senior attorney who shall oversee and manage policy and operations relating to law enforcement’s role in the Extreme Risk Protective Order Act of 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-20 to -32, and shall provide direction and guidance to [...] and the 21 County Prosecutor Offices in their strategic use and management of this critical public safety tool.
[brief] See, 6T22:8-25 (citing to State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006), and Townsend v. Pierre, supra).  The trial court relied upon the very cases Appellant urges this Appellate Division to consider to reverse the trial court’s decision.  Db at 34.  Based on those established cases the trial court held:  [T]he Court does agree with the . . . [...] that this opinion certainly lacks the foundation and the explanation as to the why and wherefores of this opinion.  6T23:47 [emphasis added].  The trial court specifically cited to portions of [...]’s deposition, discussed in greater detail infra, in support of its decision.  See, 6T23:1-24:22.  The Watermen Report failed to address critical facts including: (1) the Property suffered substantial damage during Super Storm Sandy (Da419-421); (2) the likelihood of such damage being reduced by the repaired seawall; (3) what storm events would cause the Property to experience overtopping (i.e., 2-year storm, 10-year storm, 50-year storm, 500-year storm); (4) the anticipated occurrence or frequency of such overtopping; (5) the anticipated duration of such overtopping during the various storm events; (6) whether the overtopping would result in actual physical damage to the Property; and (7) whether the overtopping would have occurred during the “before” condition (the pre-existing damaged seawall.
[brief] The defendant [...] moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim.  (Aa456-Aa460).  In doing so, they argued that the court could find as a matter of law based on its earlier rulings that Plaintiff had committed fraud in the claim process so that all of the money paid should be paid back.  In August 2022 [...] filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff.  That motion didn’t seek any ruling by [...] for claims against Plaintiff.  The proposed order asked for the complaint to be dismissed and nothing more.  The motion was granted and a motion for reconsideration was denied.  When the court originally ruled on the motion, there was no findings of fact or conclusions of law that Plaintiff that Plaintiff violated the insurance policy by fraudulently concealing anything.
[brief] Relying upon N.J.S.A. 5H-10.c, [...] paid med pay benefits to its driver for his injuries.  [...]'s insured was injured while driving and [...]'s insured opened the door to his parked vehicle in same was struck by [...]'s driver.  The police report supports liability on [...]'s driver.  While liability is not admitted to by [...], it is not argued or defended either.  [...] relies upon a string of decisions from New Jersey courts in support of its position that med pay subrogation is not allowed in New Jersey.
[brief] Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 386 (App. Div. 2007)(“We now hold that Coventry Square relaxed standard of review should be applied to variance applications seeking deviations from the density requirements in a particular zone. N.J.S.A. 40:55D–70d(5).  Density variances for permitted uses in the zone should not trigger the application of Medici's more stringent standard for the same reasons expressed in Coventry Square.  A density variance seeks a departure from certain regulations applicable to a use the municipality has chosen to permit, not prohibit, in the zone.).
[brief] First, appellant attacks the trial court’s findings on the ground that [...] did not specifically testify as to his damage claim.  (Db30-31).  Not so.  [...] provided deposition testimony, which was part of the parties’ designations at trial concerning his claimed damages.  (Da7390; 4T 325:1 to 328:8; 360:25 to 364:10; 365:7-16; 509:17 to 510:8; 512:5 to 513:10).  [...] also testified at trial that he adopted [...]’s damage calculation in his report.
[brief] Instead of addressing the Mule and Manole cases cited by Plaintiff, Defendant [...] focuses on cases that are irrelevant or distinguishable.  For example, the case of Lapsley v. Township of Sparta, 249 N.J. 427 (2022) cited by [...], had nothing to do with the co-employee immunity statute, N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, which is not cited in the Lapsley decision.  In Lapsley, the plaintiff was a librarian employed by the Township of Sparta.  Id. at 431.  While leaving work on a snowy day and walking to her car in a municipal parking lot, she was struck by a snow plow operated by a fellow township employee.  Id.  In Lapsley, there was no dispute that the municipal employee plowing the parking lot with a snow plow was engaged in the course of his employment.  In contrast, here, Defendant [...] was not performing any work function at the time of the crash; she was still in the course of her commute on top of being late for work, creating, at the very least, a jury question regarding whether she was actually in the course of her employment at the time of the crash.
[directive] DELETION OF RECORDS IN THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION  DATABASE  In accordance with the attached expungement order regarding ________________ _______________________and dated ________________, I have searched the Judgment of Conviction database for any corresponding documents covered by this expungement order.  No documents were found  The following document(s) was/were found and deleted:  Judgment of Conviction  Judgment of Conviction and Order for Commitment  Change of Judgment of Conviction  Change of Judgment of Conviction and Order for Commitment  Judgment of Acquittal  Judgment of Dismissal  Prior to deleting the document(s), I made one hard copy of each such document and placed it in the case file secured in accordance with the terms of the order.  ______________________________________  ___________________  PRINT NAME DATE [Form Promulgated by Directive # 02-12 (April 16, 2012).
[brief] Statutes of limitation serve important dual purposes in this jurisdiction.  Statutes of limitation not only promote the diligent and prompt vindication of legal claims but also avoid the unfairness and injustice resulting from a defendant having to defend against claims where memories have faded, and evidence has been lost.  The instant case is a clear example of a litigant who sat on its legal rights and allowed memories to fade to the extreme detriment of the defendant.
[brief] PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ENTITLEMENT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED.  (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-3).  Plaintiff wildly misrepresents the Court’s consideration of the specific performance factors under Marioni v. 94 Broadway, Inc., 374 N.J. Super. 588, 598-600 (App. Div. 2005).  The portions of the transcript cited by Plaintiff (1T19:12-23 and 1T22:6-25) do not show any consideration whether compelling performance would be harsh or oppressive to the [...].  Rather, the [...] specifically noted that it had intended to terminate Plaintiff for untruthfulness, but agreed to settle in exchange for him agreeing to never returning to work.  See (1T19:23-1T20:25).  Further, as argued supra, the Chancery Division applied, but failed to set forth, an alternative definition of “effectuate” that defied its plain and ordinary meaning.  Likewise, the interests of the Parties in filing an IOD application and futility of the Agreement are neither dispositive nor relevant regarding whether Plaintiff had an adequate remedy.  The [...] urged the Court that Plaintiff has an adequate remedy – the IOD appeals process.  See 1T21:19-1T22:3.  The Court disregarded that argument in favor of interpreting the Parties as anticipating a determination on the merits.  See 1T22:4-1T22:19.  However, Cardinale, supra, specifically disavowed that parties from expecting or guaranteeing such a determination, let alone memorialize as much.  The Chancery Division was thus presented with significant evidence that granting Plaintiff’s specific performance claim deficient under Marioni, supra, and such relief was unwarranted pursuant to Houseman v. Dare, 405 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 2009), as it would result in inequity towards the [...] and conflict with public policy  Accordingly, the Chancery Division’s decision to grant severance defeated the essential purpose of the Agreement; therefore, the Chancery Division’s decision must be reversed and Plaintiff’s Complaint dismissed with prejudice.
[directive] 6.  Municipal prosecutors serving in multiple municipalities must file separate Disclosure Statements and a separate Separation Statement for each position they hold.  7.  Persons who serve as municipal prosecutor on an acting, temporary, substitute, or similar basis shall file Disclosure Statements in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Division of Criminal Justice in accordance with Section I.C.1 of this Directive.  However, this Directive does not apply to attorneys whose prosecutorial role is limited to serving as a private prosecutor for a citizen complaint pursuant to R. 7:8-7b. 8.
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint and Remanded this Matter to the Board  For the Board to Expand Upon its Decision As Memorialized by Resolution (5T 27, 28)  While the Court admits it did not reach the issue as to whether a use variance was required to permit Plaintiff’s multiple principal uses at the Property, the Court nevertheless appropriately remanded this matter to the Board for further review from the Zoning Board, development of the record below, and expansion of the Board’s memorializing resolution.
[brief] Afterwards, [...]’s phone sent a text message to [...]’s phone that was never read, and the surveillance video shows a light turn on in [...]’s bedroom.  (12T119-17 to 122-8).  In summation, the prosecutor relied on the GPS location data to argue that [...] was with [...] at 2:25 a.m., contending that [...] was “going to visit his friend.
[brief] Here, the motion court never acknowledged any federal court decisions and did not address their reasoning.  Instead, the motion court concluded “the legislature did not intend to prohibit the use of letter vendors in the collection of debt when the FDCPA was passed. ”  Pa35.  The motion court’s sole justification for that conclusion as to legislative intent was its “review of the legislative history of the Act reveals that the Senate desired to prohibit the practice of disclosing consumer information to friends, neighbors, and employers and sought to dissuade the disclosure of personal affairs to third persons.  See Senate Report No. 95-382 (1977). ”  Pa35.  But, in the immediately preceding paragraph, the motion court confirmed that it could “only turn to extrinsic aids, such as legislative reports, in interpretation where ambiguity in the language exists” and it made no finding that any ambiguity exists.  Pa34.  Nor did it find that the plain meaning of the statutory language yielded an absurd result.  In addition to the lack of any basis to consult the legislative history, the history relied on by the motion court commented on § 1692b and not on the provision involved here, § 1692c(b).
[brief] Once an applicant satisfies the affirmative proofs, or positive criteria, required under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2), the burden shifts, and the “negative criteria” will be met unless the detriments of granting the relief substantially outweigh the benefits.  In light of the above-referenced testimony, the applicant not only provided sufficient proofs to support a c(2) variance, but also adequately addressed the benefits and detriments of granting the relief sought and made a showing that the variances could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good.  As [...] found here, “Applicant presented evidence that the variance could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and it would not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance. ” (Pa69).  The Court found “both [...] and [...] testified that neighboring properties would not be affected and, in actuality, would benefit from improved aesthetics with the removal of the parking lot, as well as space for air and light and added landscaping. ” (Pa69).  C.
[directive] The first step toward positive discipline is to emphasize instruction and de-emphasize control.  This requires the law enforcement executive to focus on organizational practices.  The executive must first define the goals and objectives of the agency's units and then announce management's expectations to guide the units toward realizing those goals.  The law enforcement executive must establish a means to monitor performance and to correct improper actions.  2.0.3  This approach to management as it relates to discipline insures that all subordinates know and understand what must be done, why it must be done, how it must be done and when it must be done.  Employees must be clearly told what constitutes satisfactory performance through performance evaluations and similar procedures.  N.J.A.C. 4A:6-5.1.  Supervisors and managers also must know when and how to take corrective action.  To achieve this, management must establish workable procedures for documenting all expectations and advising individuals of their duties and responsibilities.  2.1
[brief] (1T8:3–5.)  Now, in his brief, Defendant argues that the “vast majority of Estate expenses were legal fees. ”  (Db2).  This is the first time that the issue of Defendant’s payment to his own firm of legal fees has been raised, and Defendant does not provide any citation to the record in support of this allegation.  Notwithstanding that Defendant is attempting to raise facts unsupported by the record, the issue of Defendant’s payments to himself of legal fees is yet another reason the Court should require him to account for his actions as administrator and trustee.
[brief] (Pa17).  Although [...] had been the Municipal Prosecutor for Winslow for nineteen of the past twenty years, she was always required to be annually appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:25-4(b).  (1T103:23).  With respect to Factor #7 – Set Hours of Work, while [...] was required to prosecute cases based on the court schedule, the ALJ reasonably noted that she was often contacted outside of court hours via email or cell phone when needed.  (Pa16).  Notably, [...]’s requirement to work set hours every Wednesday was not a strong indication of employee status because she was required to work during Municipal Court sessions, which is the basic requirement for a municipal prosecutor.  (Pa15; Pa20).