ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (186a).  On January 25, 2022, the trial court entered an Order granting the [...] defendants’ Motion and ordered that counsel for the [...] defendants submit a fee application within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the Order.  (190a).  The Court also prepared a Statement of Reasons accompanying this January 25, 2022 Order.  In the Court’s Statement of Reasons, the Court held:  Here, the court finds that the filing of this litigation was frivolous and that attorney’s fees are warranted.  Regarding the Cooper Defendants, the record demonstrates the number of times that plaintiffs attempted to relitigate the same issues in the 2015 action through its opposition to the motion to dismiss, which was granted in 2016; motion to reinstate; motion to reconsider, motion for leave to appeal, motion to vacate the order denying the motion to reinstate; and motion for leave to rejoin the Cooper Defendants.
[brief] The factual crux of the claim is captured in Paragraph 36, which alleges that [...] breached the confidentiality provision in the Lease “by disclosing the facts relating to the land lease, the Solar Rights, and other facts relating to [Appellants] in negotiations with one or more third-parties to re-sell [Appellants’] Solar Rights and to re-lease the land in violation of the 20 year term with [Appellants].”  [Pa11].  Essentially, Appellants allege that the loss of their Lease and the Solar Rights was a result of [...]’s improper disclosure to the [...] of facts relating to both, in contravention of the Lease’s confidentiality provision.
[brief] •  The last surviving director and trustee in dissolution of the [...] was [...], who is now deceased.  •  Straker had five heirs: (1) [...]; (2) [...]; (3) [...]; (4) [...]; and (5) [...].  •  Each of these five heirs was contacted by [...], and each heir signed a Quitclaim Deed conveying their interest in the subject property to Kwiatek for $500.00, effectively transferring legal title and ownership to Kwiatek in most of what today is identified as line-item Lot: 3, and ownership of all of line-item Lot: 3.01.  •  Thereafter, Kwiatek transferred title to such properties to Plaintiff [...] by Quitclaim Deed.  All Quitclaim Deeds are now filed of record with the Monmouth County Clerk.  As a result of same, [...] is now today the legal record owner of most of Lot: 3 (*excepting only that small portion that is the subject of the October 23, 1939 Final Tax Foreclosure Judgment) and literally ALL of Lot: 3.01.
[directive] 6.3.2  Unless otherwise directed to do so by the County Prosecutor, the prosecutor's office must be immediately notified of all allegations of criminal conduct.  The internal affairs investigator shall refrain from taking any further investigative action until directed to do so by the County Prosecutor unless an imminent threat exists to the safety or welfare of an individual.  Once a complaint has been forwarded to the prosecutor's office, that office shall endeavor to review the allegation within 30 days and advise the law enforcement agency whether a criminal investigation will be conducted.  In the event the prosecutor's office cannot reach a decision within the initial 30 day period, the deadline may be extended in 30 day increments at the discretion of the County Prosecutor.  The law enforcement agency shall be advised of any extensions of the deadline.
[brief] In Arterbridge, “Plaintiff allege[d] that Defendant terminated him because he violated a company policy when he returned to work while still awaiting results from a COVID-19 test. ”  Id. at *4.  “Plaintiff argue[d] that this policy, coupled with his understanding that Defendant would not offer paid leave to employees waiting for test results . . . violated a clear public policy mandated articulated through guidance issued by the CDC and through public statements by [...]. ”  Id.  In Arterbridge the plaintiff did not cite guidance that “require[ed] businesses to adopt any particular testing protocol or to pay employees who are required to stay home pending test results. ”  Id.  And “none of the relevant federal or state legislation passed during that pandemic required any such actions by an employer. ”  Id.  Importantly, the court did not definitively decide whether statements by elected officials were proper sources for a mandate of public policy (though they did say it was dubious).  Id.  Instead, the court noted that even accepting these statements by [...] as a clear mandate of public policy, it was still “unclear to the court what about defendant’s actions amounted to a violation of [...]’s encouragement to get tested. ”  Id.  Conversely here, Plaintiff clearly lays out the statements and guidance by public officials, and a stay-at-home order implemented just a few days after her termination, which establish a clear mandate of public policy aimed at mitigating the spread of Covid-19 and keeping its citizens safe.  Arterbridge is just not applicable here.
[brief] On November 2, 2022, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of [...]’s First Action, holding that “the City’s blight designation was supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. ”  (Pa784.)  Significantly, the Appellate Division found that [...]’s motion to amend was not only untimely because the bad faith claim could have been included in the original complaint, but also that the bad faith claim “lacked merit. ”  (Pa789.)
[brief] [...] was convicted of two counts of terroristic threats for phone calls made on August 23, 2021; one count of harassment for calls made on April 13, 2022; one count of retaliation for past official action for his conduct between August 23, 2021 and April 13, 2022; and one count of stalking for his conduct between August 23, 2021 and April 13, 2022.  (Da6-14)  The fourth-degree offenses -- harassment, stalking, and retaliation -- should have been merged into a single count.
[brief] That law has a mechanism to provide “smart growth principles” under Section 5 of the LRHL.  That mechanism is the Master Plan and the required periodic review and re-examination report.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-26 (Pa0132; Topology Report at 7, Pa0203).  The MLUL, as applied over time, is designed to have municipalities grow and plan rationally, rather than by granting variances to the local zoning laws.  Using that Master Plan process, a municipality can choose, for example, to increase lots sizes in some zones, and reduce lot sizes in other zones, increase or decrease commercial office and retail uses still in other zones.  *Kaufmann v. Planning Board of Warren Twp.*, 110 N.J. 551 (1988).  That is why the planning board is a mandatory part of process for LRHL.  That board must also evaluate the redevelopment study and plan as “consistent” or “inconsistent” with the Master Plan.
[brief] (12T:142-6 to 19).  He also witnessed the search incident to arrest of the defendant, which revealed that he had a black ammunition magazine in his pocket.  (12T:143-11 to 16).  A handgun was found in front of [...], near where the defendant was tackled, the magazine was still in the gun and the slide was in a locked position indicating that the gun had been fired until all ammunition had been used.
[directive] Score each Item as “1” if the evidence indicates that the Item is present and “0” if the evidence indicates that it is not  present.  The ODARA total score is the sum of the Item scores.  If available documentation indicates that an Item might be present but the information is unclear or incomplete, then  the Item may be treated as unknown or missing and scored as “?”  In such cases, the Prorating Table should be used.  The ODARA can be scored with up to 5 missing or unknown Items (scored as “?”).  The ODARA cannot be  interpreted if 6 or more items are scored as “?”  1.  Confinement of the Victim at the Index Assault  SAMPLE QUESTION: This time, did he/she do anything to prevent you from leaving the location?  Confinement:  Any act by the Defendant that physically prevents, or attempts to prevent, the Victim from leaving the scene of the assault.  ✔Count a charge of kidnapping, criminal restraint, or false imprisonment at the Index Assault.  ✔Examples: confining the Victim in a locked room, barring an exit.  ✔In locations without walls or doors, count actions taken to impede the Victim’s active attempts to escape from the location.  ✘Do not include: any threats to harm the Victim if he/she leaves, pinning the Victim down in the course of an assault, cutting off the telephone, or confining persons other than the Victim.  ✘Do not include any confinement occurring before or after the Index Assault (i.e., during a separate incident).  © 2017 [...]  Reprinted with Permission Revised 10/23/2017 ODARA Scoring Form 2.
[brief] Pre-Suit Arbitration Agreements in Cases Involving Surgical Procedures Should be Unenforceable Based on Public Policy.  Surgical procedures present unique circumstances to patients in the broader patient-physician relationship dynamic, which should make pre-suit arbitration agreements unenforceable.  Surgical procedures are different from a regular visit to a physician for an exam, medication management, or even a cosmetic procedure not requiring anesthesia.  “Few decisions bespeak greater trust and confidence than the decision of a patient to proceed with surgery.  Implicit in that decision is a willingness of the patient to put his or her life in the hands of a known and trusted medical doctor. ”  *Perna v. Pirozzi*, 92 N.J. 446, 464 (1983).  Seeing a physician is already anxiety provoking for most patients, but surgeries cause even greater anxiety because of the potential risks of complications.  As a result of the patient’s anxiety, they are almost always not in the proper mindset to sign an arbitration agreement.  Thus, there is not anything close to equilibrium in the patient-physician dynamic because the physician possesses almost all the power.  The unique position a patient is placed in during surgery requires that courts be the default venue to protect the patient’s interests.  Allowing cases to proceed in court would act as a deterrent for physicians who may conduct surgeries that are outside the scope of their training, like an obstetrician-gynecologist performing liposuction.  II.
[brief] In *State v. Basil*, 202 N.J. 570, 578 (2010), police responded to reports of a man with a shotgun at a certain location.  When they arrived at that location a woman, who refused to give her name for fear of retaliation, told officers that defendant had pointed a shotgun at her and then threw that gun beneath a car.  *Ibid.*  Police immediately recovered that gun from underneath that car.  *Ibid.*  In holding that there was probable cause to arrest defendant, the Court relied on multiple factors not present in this case: (1) the police-officer witness was found to have “excellent” credibility by the trial court; (2) the conversation with the woman was a “face-to-face encounter that allowed the officer to make an on-the-spot credibility assessment of the citizen informant”; and (3) the “[i]mportantly, the young woman’s reliability was immediately corroborated by the discovery of the shotgun in the precise location where she said it was discarded.
[brief] Furthermore, in M.R., the decision occurred on 4/6/20, which was after our MOU in Fermin was executed.  M.R. had no retroactive effect.  The Board failed to recognize this fact also along with the fact that the decision was unpublished making it non-binding on the Board.  The Board’s failure to discuss these aspects of the M.R. case reveal its lack of knowledge about the aforementioned facts that render M.R. as unusable in our case in any way.
[brief] So obviously, Your Honor, it was very flawed reasoning on behalf of the [...] and, you know, no one comes from [...] anymore to be a part of these proceedings given what happened back in April of 2021, but Your Honor, they still are involved in this case.  They are still very much aware of what’s going on and they brought in [...] as co-counsel…  (22T 31)  But again, Your Honor, I feel badly for [...] because there was a lot of back history that happened before I was even appointed for which I really can’t – you know, because I wasn’t involved at that time in this case.  But just to get me appointed [...] had to jump through incredible hoops…  (22T 33)  And if they had just been honest from the beginning, they wanted to run an end route.  That’s what it appears.  That – you know, looking back on this case, this case was from the beginning, you could tell there was no intent to cooperate?
[directive] If an agency intends to retain the right to search property it assigns to officers for their use, including lockers and desks, it should put officers on notice of that fact.  This notification will help defeat an assertion of an expectation of privacy in the assigned property.  The agency should issue a directive regarding this matter and provide notice of the policy in any employee handbook or personnel manual (including the rules and regulations) the agency provides.  Notice should also be posted in the locker area and on any bulletin boards.  The following is a sample of what such a notice should contain:  The agency may assign to its members and employees agency-owned vehicles, lockers, desks, cabinets, etc., for the mutual convenience of the agency and its personnel.  Such equipment is and remains the property of the agency.  Personnel are reminded that storage of personal items in this property is at the employee's own risk.  This property is subject to entry and inspection without notice.  7.8.6
[brief] While the Superior Court’s Order of Dismissal was predicated on its finding that Appellant’s claims, including his FDCPA letter vendor theory of liability, fail as a matter of law and statutory construction, Appellant’s appeal was taken from the ruling of dismissal and not the specific reasons for the ruling set forth in the Superior Court’s Memorandum of Decision.  *New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency v. K.M.*, 444 N.J. Super. at 333–34; *Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep*, 453 N.J. Super. at 313–14 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2018); *State v. Santa-Mella*, 2022 WL 2309245, at *7.  As such, this Court is free to affirm the judgment of dismissal on any legal grounds, even if different than the reasoning provided by the Superior Court for its ruling.  *Id.*  Thus, while the Superior Court’s dismissal should be affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum of Decision (*i.e.*, the failure of Appellant’s letter vendor theory of liability to support the legal viability of his claims), *see supra* and Appx., at 29a-40a, it should also be affirmed on different grounds; namely, that Appellant lacked standing to pursue his claims, rendering them inappropriate for judicial review.
[directive] The Chief Executive Officer of a County Jail should, in the cases of inmates committed to the County Jail by the Superior Court, notify the County Prosecutor's Office of pending release of an inmate due to the expiration of sentence.  Such notice should include the projected expiration date and should be forwarded fifteen (15) days in advance of the projected expiration date.  (See Appendix A-7.)  The Chief Executive Officer of a County Jail should, in the cases of inmates committed to the County Jail by the Superior Court, notify the County Prosecutor's Office of the intended release from custody of an inmate for any reason other than parole.  Notice should be provided prior to release of the inmate.  (See Appendix A-7.)
[brief] Pa38.  However, given that [...] had vociferously argued that his professional standards prohibited the proposed recording, the Court directed the parties to attempt to draft a confidentiality order that would allay [...]’s concerns.  If the matter could not be resolved, the parties were invited to file further motions.  Pa72.  The proposal did not satisfy the professional prohibition against recording.  Accordingly, Defendants filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court’s October 22, 2021, Order based on [...]’s demurral and citations to published professional ethical standards.
[brief] Some of the predicate acts, some of the specific conduct I am alluding to, in a general way.  I’m not going into each financial statement, for instance, that was not accurate by year, but I am intending to rely only on these kinds of conducts that are within the statute of limitations period that I have set for RICO.  …  And I am only mentioning conduct that I believe fal[ls] within the RICO statutory -- statute of limitations, period.  Some of the conduct begins prior to the, what I’m going to call, RICO time period, but finishes inside the RICO time period.  And in order for it to be fully understood, you have to go through the entire sequence of events.  (224T70:21-72:1).
[brief] A.  Standard of Review  In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, an appellate court uses the same standard as the trial court.  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998); see Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) ("we review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court,” and we accord "no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court").
[directive] 2C:40-22(a)(b) with Suspended b.  Actor operates a motor vehicle while driver’s license is suspended or revoked in this or License or without a any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States Territories of American License Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands, or by another country, or without ever 4th Degree $2,500 to $20,000 10% permissible having been issued a driver’s license, and is involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in serious bodily injury, fourth degree.
[brief] (Da384).  The Consent Judgment contained the following provisions relating to the sale of the Subject Property:  17.  **Within 10 days from the date of this Consent Judgment, all co-owners shall execute a listing agreement for the sale of the property located at [...] with a licensed real estate agency…If the parties cannot agree upon a Realtor within that time, the Realtor shall be selected by the court.  The initial list price shall be set by the Realtor, but shall not be less than $537,900.  The listing agreement shall require that the property be listed on Multiple Listing Service and shall permit the placement of a lockbox on the Property. **  18.  All co-owners shall cooperate with the Realtor, and with each other, with respect to the marketing and sale of the Property.  19.  **All decisions related to the marketing and sale of the property, including but not limited to, raising or lowering the list price, performing maintenance or repairs, accepting proposed Contracts, retaining an attorney to handle the real estate transaction, responding to requests for home inspection repairs and credits, and all other decisions of any nature whatsoever, must be unanimous,** except as provided in paragraph 20 below.  20.  **All co-owners must accept and approve any Contract which contains a purchase price which is equal to or greater than 95% of the list price. **  If any co-owner refuses to execute a Contract which contains a purchase price equal to or greater than 95% of the list price, any other co-owner may execute a Contract on his behalf.  Co-owners fully agree this stipulation is to be kept Confidential amongst the co-owners themselves and not to be disclosed to any party, or listing agent, with potential interests in the real property.  (Da395).  Unfortunately, the five sibling co-owners could not agree on a realtor.  (Da383).  Thus, motion practice ensued for the selection of a realtor pursuant to Paragraph 17 of the Consent Judgment.  After extensive disagreement and motion practice relating to the selection of a realtor, the Court appointed [...] on January 12, 2023 to serve as the contact intermediary between the five sibling co-owners and granted [...] authority to appoint a realtor.
[brief] Furthermore, the trial court explicitly found that the officer’s testimony was both “credible” and “believable. ” (1T101-22 to 23).  Additionally, the trial court’s own findings, being in the position to view the evidence and listen to the testimony, establish that the officer possessed the requisite suspicion to stop the vehicle.  (1T102-3 to 15).  The record establishes that [...] had an objective reason to suspect that defendant committed a motor vehicle infraction, and his stop was therefore justifiable.  Consequently, any evidence derived from that stop was properly admitted.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  INTRODUCTION  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  THE RESPONDENTS OFFER NO MEANINGFUL OPPOSITION TO THE APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS  ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF WHEN FAVORABLE TERMINATION OF THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL PROCEEDING WAS PROPERLY REGARDED AS ORDERED AND OFFICIAL.  3  II.  THE RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO ADDRESS THE TRAIL COURT’S ERRONEOUS  APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE IN DETERMINING WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ARRUES.  6  CONCLUSION
[brief] At the beginning of its final instruction, when defining fundamental legal concepts, the trial court told the jury:  “If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt, more or less the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find her guilty. ”  (8T 68-20 to 69-7)  The insertion of “more or less” diluted the significance of reasonable doubt and diminished the State’s burden.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.  “A jury instruction that fails to communicate the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not amenable to harmless-error analysis and requires reversal. ”  State v. Medina, 147 N.J. 43, 49 (1996).  The Supreme Court has “cautioned trial courts against using any charge that has a tendency to understate or trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to determine whether the defendant’s guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 41 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, our Supreme Court has explained that a definition of reasonable doubt as “a doubt for which a reason can be given” was inappropriate because “[j]urors may harbor a valid reasonable doubt even if they cannot explain the reason for the doubt. ”  *Medina*, 147 N.J. at 52.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not anything “less” than proof that leaves a jury firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.  Like in *Medina*, the instruction given here was inappropriate because it made the reasonable doubt standard appear less weighty that it is.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves a jury firmly convinced of defendant’s guilt, and no less.  Unlike *Medina*, in which the error was found harmless because “immediately following the offending clause, the trial court provided an alternative definition of reasonable doubt,” there was no alternative definition given in this case.  *Ibid.*  Therefore, the harm of the erroneous instruction was not mitigated.  “The denial of the right to trial by jury by the giving of a defective reasonable-doubt instruction” is a structural error that requires reversal of a conviction.  *United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez*, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49 (2006).  The instruction in this case trivialized the high burden of proof that is required in criminal cases.  The convictions must be reversed.