ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Id. at ¶ 18).  The Honorable [...] was assigned to the matter as the hearing officer.  (Id. at ¶ 19).  Thereafter, Defendant retained new counsel and the initial hearing dates were adjourned at defense counsel’s request.  (Id. at ¶ 20).  The hearing was scheduled to proceed in December 2022.  (Id. at ¶ 21).  During the hearing, Plaintiff presented multiple witnesses, statements, an exhaustive IA investigatory report, and cellphone and school surveillance videos in support of the disciplinary charges.
[brief] 1 (1962) | 43 | | Keyes Martin v. Director, Div. of Purchase and Property, 99 N.J. 244 (1985) | 43 | | Kuller v. Fire Ass’n of Phil., 124 N.J. Eq. 473 (E. & A. 1938) | 41 | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 38 | | Marioni v. Roxy Garments Delivery Co. Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 2010) | 36, 38 | | Martindell v. Fiduciary Counsel, Inc., 133 N.J. Eq. 408 (E. & A. 1943) | 45 | | Matejek v. Watson, 449 N.J. Super. 179 (App. Div. 2017) | 34 | | Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2015) | 39 | Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J.  Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982) ......................  43  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974)  31, 34, 37, 38 Salorio v. Glaser, 93 N.J. 447 (1983)
[brief] ”  Da21, n. 14 (emphasis in original).  The trial court also found that [...]’s conspicuous failure to call [...] as a witness to support the preposterous “alternative narrative about the schedule” that [...] offered at trial warranted “a negative inference that [...] would not have supported [...]’s assertions at trial. ”  Da22, n.15.  To be sure, no credible evidence was ever presented to refute the fact that Defendants confirmed their debt months after the Closing at which [...] claimed (at trial and now, on appeal) the debt had been extinguished.}  Da22-23; Da223-29 (Ex. P21).  Accordingly, as reflected on the Schedule that [...] prepared and transmitted to [...] more than three months \textit{after} the Closing, neither the First nor the Second Loan had been satisfied, discharged or waived by [...] at the time of the Closing.
[brief] Furthermore, the Meier court noted that the lessor, “has a non-delegable duty of care to third parties to avoid a hazardous condition of his property. ”  Meier, 419 N.J. Super. at 450 (citing Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 441).  See also Sanna v. National Sponge Co., 209 N.J. Super. 60 (App.Div.1986) (holding that duty of landowner to make reasonable inspections to discover hazardous conditions of property nondelegable); Zentz v. Toop, 92 N.J. Super. 105, 112-13 (App. Div. 1966) (The landowner's duty includes the obligation of making a reasonable inspection to discover defective and hazardous conditions).
[brief] It is axiomatic that an agency, while entitled to deference in the interpretation of a statute it is charged with administrating, will be given no deference if the “interpretation of the law” is “outside its charge” or it “gives a provision of [the law] greater reach than the legislature intended. ”  Comm. Workers of Am., Local 1034 v. N.J. State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Local 203, 412 N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 200 N.J. 413, 420 (2009) (“An agency’s final decision is plainly unreasonable and violates express or implied legislative direction if it gives ‘a statute any greater effect than is permitted by the statutory language[,] . . . alter[s] the terms of a legislative enactment[,] . . . frustrate[s] the policy embodied in the statute . . . [or] is plainly at odds with the statute. ’” (alterations in original) (quoting T.H., 189 N.J. at 491).  Once an agency policy is set, either formally or informally, the agency may not change that policy without due process—that is, without the opportunity for the regulated community to comment on the proposed change.  In re CAFRA Permit No. 87-0959- Issued to [...], 152 N.J. 287, 308 (1997) (citing N.J.S.A. 52:14B-5, which includes language indicating mandatory compliance with the requirements of the APA).
[brief] 35  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Page Nos. Indictment [...] .................................................................  Da 1 to 3  Indictment [...] ..................................................................  Da 4  Verdict Sheet..................................................................................  Da 5 to 6  Judgment of Conviction [...] ..............................................  Da 7 to 9  Judgment of Conviction [...] ..............................................  Da 10 to 12  Amended Notice of Appeal .............................................................  Da 13 to 17  Flash Drive  Containing Surveillance Video (S-210) and Photos (S-257)  ..Da  18  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Judgments of Conviction .................................................................  Da 7 to 12 Rulings on Point I.............. 8T 141-4 to 146-15; 8T 148-14 to 151-9; 8T 163-25; 8T 165-20 Ruling on Point II........................................................................... 2T 56-6 to 8 Points III and IV were not raised below Rulings on Point V ................................................................. 11T 18-1 to 27-23; Da 7 to 9 TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] The trial court’s instructions in this case—read directly from the New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges—sufficed to guide the jury on how to consider fingerprint-analysis evidence, and no new model jury charge on that subject would be helpful.  Even if this Court were to deem a new model jury charge appropriate, the [...] suggests an instruction so expansive that it would risk biasing the jury against such evidence, swallowing whole an entire category of evidence whose reliability is backed historically, scientifically, and legally for the reasons already discussed.  This Court should reject the [...]’s suggestion.
[brief] The trial court’s decision to permit the testimony of [...], despite the State’s violation of Rule 3:13-3(I), under the circumstances, was “so wide of that mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”  *State v. Brown*, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001), quoting *State v. Marrero*, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997).
[brief] The Rules of Professional Conduct also require truthfulness in statements made by attorneys.  See RPC 3.1, RPC 3.3, RPC 4.1.  Additionally, pursuant to R. 1:4-8, which governs frivolous litigation, “the procedures prescribed by this rule shall apply to the assertion of costs and fees against a party other than a pro se party pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1."
[brief] On December 31, 2017, while the [...] was preparing to ring in the New Year at their home at [...] in [...], sixteen-year-old [...] was planning to slaughter them.  Defendant’s father [...] (age 42), his mother [...] (age 44), his brother [...] (age 20), Steven’s girlfriend [...], his sister [...] (age 18), his grandfather [...], Adrian’s long-term girlfriend [...] (age 70), and his Aunt [...] and Uncle [...] were “hanging out and watching TV, talking, laughing.  Linda was passing out party hats and glasses and stuff for the New Year. ” (6T66-20 to 24).  There was food, champagne, and party decorations.  (6T66-25 to 67-4).  Brittany, Adrian, and Mary were sitting by the dining room table; Rafaella, Steven Sr., Steven Jr., [...], and Richie were on the couch watching the movie “King Kong. ” (6T67-5 to 12; 7T255-7 to 17).  Defendant “was smiling, everything was okay.  He had his chicken in one hand, his soda in the other, and he said he wanted to eat. ” (7T255-13 to 17).  When the movie ended, defendant went upstairs to the bedroom he shared with Steven Jr.\(^1\)  Just before midnight, Linda went upstairs to find defendant so he could celebrate the New Year with his family.  (6T67-12 to 13, 116-21 to 117-13).
[brief] *E. Bay Drywall, LLC v. Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev.*, 251 N.J. 477, 493 (2022) (emphasis added).  *See also Melnyk v. Bd. of Educ. of the Delsea Reg’l High Sch. Dist.*, 241 N.J. 31, 40 (2020) (noting same with regard to Commissioner of Education); *Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC*, 220 N.J. 289, 301 (2015) (noting deferential standard generally).  The deferential standard is consistent with “the strong presumption of reasonableness that an appellate court must accord an administrative agency’s exercise of statutorily delegated responsibility.
[brief] As the trial court noted: “[t]he Supreme Court has directed that when a municipality has demonstrated and is determined to be non-compliant with its affordable housing obligations, ‘a strong judicial hand [must be] used. ”  M51 (citing S. Burling Cty. N.A.A.C.P., supra, 92 N.J. at 199).  The trial court made no such finding below.  Instead the trial court noted the “irony” that despite this: singular transgression of the Zoning Board that was inescapably provoked, in material part, by the Mayor’s interference, [...] has actively come into voluntary compliance with its Mt. Laurel obligations on the immediate coattails of Mt. Laurel IV and earned the Court’s entry of the 2016 Judgment of Compliance; and by all accounts, is diligently implementing them.  The trial court continued its praise and found that:  Therefore, wresting back wholesale control of the Township’s delegated zoning powers, as the Township’s attorneys argued at trial, and this Court agrees, would be a “bridge too far” - for now, at least, for a municipality that to date has taken commendable steps to come into voluntary compliance with its Third Round affordable housing obligations and is actually implementing them.
[brief] This paragraph, however, will summarize the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint in general.  As highlighted above, Appellants claimed that [...] was the contract purchaser of the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage under a contract of sale with the [...] (the "McTague Contract"); that [...] entered into a series of assignment agreements with [...] whereby [...] assigned to [...], in consideration for payment of certain specified amounts, [...]'s right to purchase the subject land under the McTague Contract; and that [...] (and the individual Appellants, as owners of [...]) lost all of the money they had invested in this venture because the real estate development they had envisioned for the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage never materialized.  778a-803a.  The Third Amended Complaint alleged that Appellants were duped into entering these transactions by [...] and its representative [...], who allegedly misrepresented that Pulte would buy the Pork Chop Assemblage from them after development of the site began, and by their former counsel, [...], who they claimed misled them into believing that the only way they could acquire rights to the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage would be to deal with a "flipper" -- namely [...] -- instead of dealing with the [...] directly.
[brief] Dear Sir/Madam, Kindly accept this Letter Brief in lieu of more formal Brief in reply to the Brief of Defendant-Respondent [...] submitted in opposition to the Appellant’s Appeal.  TABLE OF CONTENTS -  Table of Orders Appealed From ...........................................  1 - Procedural History ..........................................................  2 - Statement of Facts ............................................................  2 - Legal Argument – Point 1 –  The Dismissal of this Case on the Basis of the Affidavit of Merit Was Erroneous and Should Be Reversed .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Table of Orders Appealed from Procedural History  The Appellant relies upon the Procedural History set forth in her Brief
[brief] Therein, the ALJ describes [...] as a “knowledgeable” and “persuasive” witness.  This portion of the Decision, once again, lacks any reference to the rejection of [...] as an expert witness in the field of substance abuse providing additional support for the conclusion that the ALJ improperly relied upon [...]’s opinion testimony as to opioid abuse.  Respondent’s argument that the ALJ did not rely upon [...]’s “expert” testimony regarding substance abuse claims and that the block quote from the Decision in Appellant’s initial brief “…is merely a recitation of [...]’s OAL Trial testimony, not the basis of [...]’s decision” is simply incorrect.  (R-31)
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA May 2021 Version POLICY Office of the Attorney General | State of New Jersey Contents 1 Governing Principles .................................................................................................................. 1 2 Definitions ................................................................................................................................. 2 3 Police Department Policies Governing Deployment and Use of BWCs and Recordings ........... 4 4 Notice that BWCs are Deployed and Activated ......................................................................... 7 5 Standards Governing the Activation of BWCs ........................................................................... 9 6 Standards Governing the De-activation of BWCs upon the Request of a Civilian, When Discussing Investigation Strategy or Planning, or on Instruction of a Prosecutor .................. 12 7 Circumstances When BWC Activation/Use Is Subject to Special Conditions or Restrictions.. 15 8 Retention of BWC Recordings ................................................................................................. 18 9 Standards to Ensure Secure Storage and Accessibility of BWC Recordings ............................ 20 10 Restrictions on Access to and Use and Dissemination of BWC Recordings ............................ 23 11 Public Disclosure of BWC Recordings ...................................................................................... 26 12 Authority of County Prosecutor to Impose Additional Requirements .................................... 26 13 Violations ................................................................................................................................. 26 BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 i 1 Governing Principles
[brief] The items in defendants' appendix were not before [...] when he issued his March 4, 2024 order.  Defendants assert that their cross-motion was "unopposed" (Db11).  Plaintiff's original motion established its position that it was the true owner of the property.  Plaintiff also responded to defendants' cross-motion.  See Pa320 to Pa325.  At Db11, defendants point out that the denial of plaintiffs' summary judgment motion was "without prejudice," i.e., interlocutory, see Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 534 (2011).  If the March 4, 2024 order is not appealable as of right, R. 2:2-3(a)(1), then the defendants are providing an additional reason for this Court not to affirm a decision that never resolved the parties' dispute on the substantive merits.  **REPLY TO COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Pa000198-212.  Defendants were also restrained by Court Order from modifying wages until June 7, 2017 which is after the period Plaintiffs are seeking earned and unpaid wages.  Id., Pa000289-296, 305-306.  Indeed, in reviewing the Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement, [...] found that any contractual or other terms of employment not specifically identified were impacted by the Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement.
[brief] In the same manner that a court often decides a time-sensitive matter from the bench to be followed perhaps by a written opinion containing the court's findings, reasoning and conclusions, a board is afforded a statutory opportunity to do the same.  Here, the draft Resolution was prepared based on the record before the [...] and was provided in advance of the [...]’s consideration of the Resolution on October 20, 2022.  The [...]’s Solicitor gave an oral presentation of the draft Resolution at the October 20, 2022, and the [...] was satisfied with its contents and voted for approval of the Resolution and the use variance based on the findings and conclusions set forth in the Resolution.  (2T3-8 to 2T7-2; Pa40 to Pa50).  There is nothing in the Municipal Land Use Law that requires a Resolution to be read at length into the record, or for the members of the [...] to separately certify that they have read the Resolution, as Plaintiffs suggest.  (Pb13).  POINT VI
[directive] 15  See, Revision of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2011-1 (July 2014), revising procedures for retaining Hold kits and extending the time for victims to decide whether to report the crime and release collected forensic evidence to law enforcement authorities.  16  As a result of the OLS survey of SAFE kits in 2018, the [...] did not accept requests to take possession of 5- year Hold kits scheduled for destruction.
[brief] (T2, 15:12-19).  The Trial Court properly concluded that this case raises only private interests in the form of dissatisfaction with a proposed redevelopment project near their homes.  (Pa57).  In cases were the public interest was affected, it was clear that the outcome of the case affected a significant portion of the municipality.  For example, in Gregory v. Borough of Avalon, 391 N.J. Super. 181, 189-90 (App. Div. 2007), a case cited by Plaintiff (Pa12), the Court found significant public interest because the ordinance authorized private encroachment on a public beach area.  This is because there is a “historic and fundamental principal of public access to the beach. ”  *Susko v. Borough of Belmar*, 458 N.J. Super. 583, 608 (App. Div. 2019).  Blocking any portion of the public beach impacts the general public’s right of access thereby creating public interest.  Similarly, in another case cited by Plaintiff (Pb11), the Courts enlarged the 45-day appeal period to challenge an ordinance that required, as a condition to issuance of a certificate of occupancy, payment of all taxes and water and sewer charges.
[brief] Notice of Appeal, dated June 17, 2024…………………………………………………………Da12  Appellate Division Order Dismissing Appeal, dated July 17, 2024………………………………………………………………………………Da15  Plea Form, dated September 24, 2024…………………………………………………………Da16  Judgment of Conviction and Order for Commitment, dated November 20, 2024………………………………………………………………………Da21  Notice of Appeal, dated November 21, 2024…………………………………………………Da24  Appellate Division Scheduling Order, dated November 26, 2024…………………………Da26  Notice of Motion to Admit the Defendant to Bail Pending Appeal Pursuant to R. 2:9-4, dated November 26, 2024……………………………………Da28  Order Granting Bail Pursuant to R. 2:9-4, dated December 3, 2024…………………………………………………………………………Da30  Compact Disc containing the MVR, dated April 24, 2023……………………………………Da31  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Moreover, the DACCA does not unconstitutionally regulate possession or speech, and instead it regulates specific conduct: the business activity of debt adjusting.  A.  The DACCA does not regulate possession or speech, and instead it regulates specific business activity of debt adjusting.  “The First Amendment to the federal Constitution permits regulation of conduct, not mere expression. ”  State v. L.C., 283 N.J. Super. 441, 450 (App. Div. 1995) (citing State v. Vawter, 136 N.J. 56, 65–67 (1994)).  Because the DACCA regulates the specific conduct of debt adjusting and not speech, the First Amendment challenge to the DACCA should fail.
[brief] State v. E.B., 348 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 174 N.J. 192 (2002)  ....................................................................................................  32 State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 (1998), cert. denied sub nom., Kenney v. New Jersey, 532 U.S. 932 (2001) ............................................................................. 37, 51 State v. Frankland, 51 N.J. 221 (1968) ............................................................................... 29 State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76 (1999) .................................................................................
[brief] In fact, the Comptroller report specifically highlights the position of municipal public defender as being one in which individuals were incorrectly being given pension service credit.  This position is supported by [...], as [...]’s letter to the Division indicated that [...] was improperly enrolled in PERS following the passage of Chapter 92.  (Pa227).  Now [...] asks this court to disregard over ten years of resolutions, and the actions of [...] itself, to find him eligible for PERS credit, claiming only that he was an employee, not an independent contractor.  (Pb20-21).  In fact, rather than address his eligibility under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a) (subsection (a)), [...] ignores the [...]’s determination, the Board’s determination, and the Initial Decision, and instead argues just that he should not be classified as an independent contractor under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(b) (subsection (b)).  (Pb10-16).  To be clear, neither subsection (a) nor (b) creates eligibility criteria, but rather, precludes certain individuals from PERS service credit.  Subsection (b) does preclude from PERS membership after December 31, 2007, any person who qualifies as an independent contractor.  This preclusion applies regardless of whether the person was appointed to perform services under the LPCL.  However, here, the Board found [...]’s was ineligible for continued enrollment in PERS from 2008 onward based on subsection (a) alone.
[brief] See, e.g., Stein, 225 N.J. at 585; Dickinson, 116 N.J.L. at 338.  And again, [...] has not cited (and [...] is not aware of) any case imposing a UCC-based requirement on banks to preemptively answer questions that the bank’s customer fails to ask.  Imposing such a ³ [...] now argues that “[t]he opening of new accounts had to be done quickly . . . .” (Appellant Br., 23.)  However, he cites no evidence in support, and his bald argument has no evidentiary value.  See State v. Carrillo, 469 N.J. Super. 318, 333 (App. Div. 2021); see also, e.g., Wallace v. Del. River Ferry Co., 127 N.J.L. 513, 516 (1941) (demonstrating that statements of supposed facts in briefs may “be persuasive” only if “they [a]re supported by the proofs”).  requirement here would relieve [...] of any obligation he had to make basic inquiries, which would be inconsistent with the foregoing case law.  3.  The remaining cases cited by [...] are inapposite.  Next, [...] attempts to sidestep the consequences of his inattention and inaction by citing Heller v. [...] Bank, but that case does not support [...]’s position.  Heller involved the same account application language at issue here, through which the plaintiff acknowledged receipt of and agreed to be bound by the DAA arbitration provision.  See No. A-4728-14T4, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 464, at *3 (App. Div. Mar. 3, 2016).  However, following appeal, the case was remanded for further proceedings because the parties failed to place the agreement into the record.  See id. at *10-11.  Here, the DAA was presented to and received by the trial court.  (PA0091-131.)  Thus, Heller is inapposite.  [...] also cites McMillan v. [...] Bank, No. 08-5739, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57111 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2009), and Mitchell v. [...] Bank, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1261 (D. Utah 2017).  However, he fails to explain how or why those cases support his position on appeal.  (See generally Appellant Br., 14-15.)  [...]’s undeveloped --- 4 Mitchell is particularly inapposite.  The Mitchell court never resolved [...]’s motion to compel arbitration.  Instead, the court reserved ruling to permit a summary trial on issues that do not exist here, such as (among other things) whether the bank waived its right to arbitrate the claims at issue through earlier Congressional testimony.  See 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1294-97.  Wells argument should be disregarded.  See Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Staffenberg, 419 N.J. Super. 386, 413 n.17 (App. Div. 2011).  In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that, as a consequence of signing the iPad without asking about what he was signing or the effect of his signature, [...] is bound to arbitrate.  This Court should affirm.