ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As to such evidence in the record, when there is an evidentiary ruling by the Trial Court, the Appellate Court reviews it (again) for abuse of discretion.  *Investors Bank v. Torres*, 243 N.J. 25, 48 (2020), citing *Hisenaj v. Kuehner*, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008).  Here, there was no abuse because there was no evidence excluded below (nor evidence admitted below) that acted in a prejudicial way so as to harm the Defendant-Appellant.  To wit, the Appellant makes no such argument here regarding admitted or excluded evidence, so certainly there is no grounds upon which to reverse from an evidentiary perspective.  And from a factual finding/conclusion perspective, the Trial Court firmly set forth its reasons, rationale and basis.
[brief] \(^5\) --- \(^5\)  In 2024, [...]’s President & CEO, [...], highlighted [...]’s work with the [...] to achieve long-term care rate approvals nationwide.  (Ra557 and 558).  [...] was heavily involved in the creation of a multi-state actuarial (MSA) review developed by the [...] to address state regulator reviews of long-term care rate applications.  (Ra554).  According to McInerney, through MYRAP and the MSA, [...] was able to obtain “$354 million in premium rate increase approvals in 2023, well above the company's projected amount of $275 million in the fourth quarter from rate increases that totaled $127 million from 13 states with an average percentage increase of 75%.” (Ra558).  [...] credited its stronger financial position to positive trends in policyholder benefit reductions and rate actions contemplated by its MYRAP strategy and litigation settlements, which accounted for $2.5 billion in growth in 2023.  (Ra560).  G.
[brief] 323a-324a (6:24-7:17); 330a-331a (13:23-14:16); 361a (44:1-44:22); 538a (48:16-49:16).  On May 24, 2006, Defendant [...] memorialized Defendant [...]’s offer in a letter to [...].  287a-288a.  Plaintiff [...] and [...] accepted the proposal and agreed to proceed with the transaction.  675a.  They also agreed to retain Defendant [...] and [...] to handle all land use, zoning, and regulatory matters related to the transaction.  675a.  Defendant [...] formed an entity, Plaintiff [...], through which Plaintiff [...] and [...] would purchase [...].  677a; 333a-334a (16:24-17:3).  Pursuant to the Operating Agreement prepared by Defendant [...], Plaintiff [...], and [...] were the only members of [...].  677a.  Thereafter, on or about June 13, 2006, Defendant [...] sent a Memorandum of Understanding to [...] reconfirming the terms of the transaction proposed by Defendant [...] on behalf of [...] and confirmed in Defendant [...]’s May 24, 2006 letter to [...].
[brief] ]  Thus, although industrial developments may have only one principal use, mixed uses of more than one principal commercial or industrial use are permitted, as long as the Planning Board finds that the uses are part of a single site plan, as is the case with this Application.  Here, the trial court erred by also failing to examine the Planning Board’s refusal to consider the as-of-right warehouse use, with the previously approved cell tower use, as permitted multiple principle uses on the Industrial Zone lot in accordance with Ordinance § 250-4.  (Pa3-13).  Not only do the proposed principal uses qualify as “mixed uses of more than one principal commercial or industrial use,” but the Plaintiff’s proposed Application also demonstrates that the two principal uses were part of a “single site plan” in accordance with Ordinance § 250-4.
[brief] 1/30/2019  Defendants [...]’ and [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.........................................................1104a  1/30/2019  Certification of [...] in Support of Defendants [...]’ and [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment...........................................1108a  Exhibit A, 3/8/2011  Plaintiffs’ Initial Complaint.........................................................1110a  Exhibit B, 12/21/2012  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.............................................1112a  Exhibit C, 5/3/2017  [...] Deposition Excerpts..............................................1131a  Exhibit D, 10/15/2018  Order Excluding the Testimony of [...] on Lost Profits..............................................................................................................1135a  2/7/2019  Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants, [...] and [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment
[brief] • **Pennsylvania:** *Liebig v. MTD Products, Inc.*, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2023 WL 5517557, at *4 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2023) (“Pennsylvania law does not recognize a duty to recall or retrofit products”) (snow blower); *Cleaver v. Honeywell International, LLC*, 2022 WL 2442804, at *4 (E.D. Pa. March 31, --- 14
[brief] Court Order granting Defendants’ motion to stay dated September 8, 2023....Da027  Court Order and Statement of Reasons granting Defendants’ motion to stay as to survivorship claim only dated March 22, 2024.................................  Da070-79  Court Order and Statement of Reasons granting Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and resuming litigation of the survivorship claim dated May 14, 2024 .................................................................................................................. Da080-93  Court Order denying Defendants’ motion for reconsideration dated June 20, 2024 .................................................................................................................. Da162-163 TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] The record reflects that the Board had reasonable and sufficient bases upon which to deny the [...] application for two substantial variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(1) (use) and (4) (FAR); four variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c; and site plan approval.  The Resolution makes evident that the Board properly exercised its authorized discretion in adjudging that Plaintiff failed to meet its proofs for relief.  The Trial Court thus did not err in finding that the denial of the [...] application was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; its Order of September 22, 2023 affirming the Board’s decision and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice should accordingly be affirmed.
[brief] ”  We disagree.  A.  Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to preclude [...] from making an in-court identification because the officers failed to conduct an out-of-court identification procedure.  There is no indication in the record that the trial judge addressed this application.  *15  During [...]'s testimony at trial, she identified defendant, unprompted, for the first time on direct, as someone she saw in the parking lot of the restaurant where they had gone to pick up dinner.
[brief] Given the intertwined nature of the substantive facts associated with this appeal and the procedural history of the litigation, the statement of facts and procedural history are presented jointly.  Plaintiff subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint on March 10, 2017 naming general contractor [...] as a defendant.  (Pa1576).  Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint included a fictitious party pleading count identical to the fictitious party pleading count included with plaintiff’s initially filed complaint.  (Pa1578 and Pa1579).  On January 9, 2018, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint adding contractor [...] as a defendant.  (Pa1613).  On December 7, 2018, plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint adding [...] as a defendant.  (Pa1650).  Finally, on May 17, 2019, nearly 44 months post-accident, plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Complaint naming [...] as a defendant.  (Pa1698).  On July 1, 2019, [...] filed an answer to plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint.
[brief] See Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 475 (2020) (“[A]ll parties are entitled to have their case decided on the basis of the record before the trial court at the time summary judgment is decided. ”).  Rule 2:5-4(a) provides that "[t]he record on appeal shall consist of all papers on file in the court or courts or agencies below, with all entries as to matters made on the records of such courts and agencies, the stenographic transcript or statement of the proceedings therein, and all papers filed with or entries made on the records of the appellate court."  R. 2:5-4(a).  Therefore, “appellate review is confined to the record made in the trial court, and appellate courts will not consider evidence submitted on appeal that was not in the record before the trial court."  Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J. Super. 437, 447, 688 A.2d 614 (App. Div. 1997).  In the instant matter, [...] submitted evidence in support of its appeal of the April 4, 2022 Order and Opinion that was not part of the record before the Trial Court at the time summary judgment was decided.  In the April 4, 2022 Memorandum of Decision, the Trial Court noted the only papers considered for purposes of summary judgment were all pleadings and submissions of the parties filed on and prior to March 18, 2022.  (Pa113).  That did not include the following evidence which [...] submitted to this Court: [...] Architectural Binder (Pa1); [...] Social Media Advertisement (Pa47); Post to Post 2018 Website (Pa48); August 29, 2018  Letter from [...] to [...] (Pa63); Louver Photos (Pa65); and July 10, 2019 Email from [...] to [...] (Pa73).  [...] had the opportunity to submit the aforesaid evidence with its Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment but failed to do so.  [...] also never filed a Motion for Reconsideration.  Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider any evidence that was not in the record before the Trial Court at the time of the Motions for Summary Judgment.
[brief] However, nearly one-half of the amount awarded - $1,375,533.25 - is based upon transactions that occurred more than six years before the complaint was filed.  Indeed, the largest transaction – for $2 million – occurred twelve years before the complaint was filed.  The deletion of that transaction alone would reduce the compensatory damages by $1 million.  The amount of plaintiffs' potential recovery for these time-barred transactions is further increased by the award of pre-judgment interest on that amount.  Because the legal error here resulted in the inclusion of over $1.3 million in compensatory damages based on time-barred transactions, the court’s error clearly produced an unjust result that satisfies the standard set forth in Rule 2:10-2.
[directive] Agency on the program that is the subject of this request- r- I, Enter a detailed description of the proposed program, including its 12. expected duration.  If separate pages are required, enter "See in 12)"  Attachment for the space provided.  Attach separate Block a - sheet of paper with the header "Block Description of Program" 12) centered at the top.  Enter a detailed listing of what the forfeiture funds would be used to 13. purchase or otherwise compensate.  If separate pages are required, enter "See Attachment for Block the space provided.  Attach in 13)" - separate sheet of paper with the header Specified Use "Block a 13) of Forfeiture Funds" centered at the top.  by Enter the law enforcement purpose that would be served 14.  in expending forfeiture funds the proposed manner.  This purpose must be consistent with the definition 'Law enforcement purpose" of in Forfeiture Prbaram Administration Standard Operating Procedure - - - 12.  If separate pages are required, enter 'See Attachment for Block the space prdvided- Attach separate sheet of paper with the a 14)" in - header 'Block taw Enforcement Purpose" centered at the top.
[brief] Paragraph 10 (Da26) provided that the [...]: Agrees to permit the ([...])--- to utilize for parking purposes the vacant lands it owns on Madison Avenue and also on Sixth Street and to permit use of the lands on Sixth Street for boiler room use and for a water cooling tower.  In fact, the [...] had already conveyed to the [...] the Lot 8 by deed dated December 28, 1962 --- ten days prior to the 1963 Agreement.  That Deed did not reference or convey any easement for Lot 8 to access or use the remaining School Lot 5 for any purpose (Da3).  The [...] constructed the synagogue on Lot 8 during 1963 (Da33).  No Zoning Approval or Site Plan Approval has ever been produced for the synagogue on Lot 8, nor is any Zoning Approval or Site Plan Approval known to exist or been produced for zoning approval for off-site parking of Lot 8 staff/attendees vehicles on the School Lot 5 (Da1-3, Da32-33).  In September 1972, the [...] applied to the [...] and [...] for variances and Site Plan Approval to construct a substantial "addition to an existing school with insufficient parking, insufficient side lines, and exceeding the maximum lot coverage" on its Lot 5 (71,250 S.F.).
[brief] Thereafter, this wrongful death medical malpractice lawsuit was filed against the above physicians for professional negligence that caused [...]’s death.  1a.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  1  THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR ALLEGED FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A.  2A:53A-29 SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (THE TRANSCRIPT OF JUNE 24, 2020  FILED SPARATELY FROM THIS BRIEF SETS FORTH THE OPINION AND RULING IN QUESTION IN THIS MATTER at T13 - 13 to T.14 - 13)
[brief] It provides as follows:  **ARBITRATION:**  Buyer, on behalf of Buyer and all permanent residents of the Unit, including minor children, hereby agree [sic] that any and all disputes with Seller, Seller’s parent company or their subsidiaries or affiliates arising out of the Unit, this Agreement, the Unit warranty, any other agreements, communications or dealings involving Buyer, or the construction or condition of the Unit including, but not limited to, disputes concerning breach of contract, express and implied warranties, personal injuries and/or illness, mold-related claims, representations and/or omissions by Seller, on-site and off-site conditions and all other torts and statutory causes of action (“Claims”) **shall be resolved by binding arbitration during the warranty period** in accordance with the rules and procedures of [...] or its successor or an equivalent organization selected by Seller.
[brief] The trial court’s decision repeatedly draws inferences of fact in favor of [...] rather than the non-movant Defendants and examines their pleadings with hostility rather than with the “generous and hospital approach” required under Printing Mart.  116 N.J. at 746.  The trial court further erred in ruling that the penalty clause in the Rent Concession Rider cannot be unlawful under the CFA because [...] agreed to and signed the lease.
[brief] The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Law (“UDJL”) at N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 provides that “[a] person interested under a . . . written contract . . . or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . [or] contract . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance, [or] contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. ”  [...] is a person interested under a now void contract with [...], as well as a person whose rights, status, and legal relations are affected by a statute, *to wit*, the NJCFLA, the CFA, and the FDCPA.  Therefore, [...] has standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief as pled in the Complaint.
[brief] There is record evidence, in the form of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, that establishes that Defendant [...] permitted the staffing coordinators to add the charge pay as long as she did not face any negative consequences.  (Pa660).  Specifically, Plaintiff testified as follows:  So I said why can we not at least get charge pay, which is one dollar an hour.  And she said, in front of several people, you can get charge pay, as long as I don’t get in trouble.  (Pa231).  Defendants dispute that Defendant [...] approved the charge pay.
[brief] Where Defendants fail to send over all medical records and those very medical records have a substantial bearing on the preparation of Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Merit.  Then, Defendants file a Motion for Dismissal due to Plaintiff’s failure to acquire an Affidavit of Merit.  Essentially, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 is a safeguard for plaintiffs when defendants have prevented them from acquiring an Affidavit of Merit.  The Trial Court Judge and Defendants read into the statute that the Sworn Statement in lieu of an Affidavit of Merit must be filed within the sixty (60) or one-hundred and twenty (120) days that Plaintiff has to submit the Affidavit of Merit, but the legislature never included a temporal requirement in the plain text of the statute.
[brief] It is a cardinal principle of motions for summary judgment that the court is prohibited from deciding any genuine issues of material fact.  Rule 4:46-2 (“judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law”).
[brief] At the time of the *Variety Farms* decision Part One was known as Coverage A and Part Two was known as Coverage B.  172 N.J. Super. at 18-20.  The court recognized that Coverage A fulfills an employer’s obligation to maintain insurance coverage for the liability imposed by Article 2 of the Act.  *Id.* at 18.  The court expressly recognized that Coverage B, now Part Two, was “intended to apply to an employer who is or may become subject to Article 1 of the statute. ”  *Id.* at 19.  Recognizing that one could argue that Coverage B or Part Two has no application to a claim by a minor brought under N.J.S.A. 34:15-10, which is contained in Article 2 of the Act, the court nevertheless concluded that it simply was not possible that the Legislature intended for an injured minor’s claim to go uncompensated.
[brief] --- \(^1\)  Ironically, Amicus cites *Troy Hills Vill. v. Twp. Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills*, 68 N.J. 604 (1979), in which the Supreme Court stated that the conventional methods of valuing property may be of limited use for determining an owner’s just and reasonable return on its property and suggested other valuation methods, such as “assessed valuation or original cost depreciated.
[brief] ”  Medwick v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Sec., Dept. of Labor and Industry, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961).  This case involves more than mere dissatisfaction with working conditions.  “An individual shall not be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work if he or she can establish that working conditions are so unsafe, unhealthful, or dangerous as to constitute good cause attributable to such work.
[brief] Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa168  Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa170  Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa172  Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa174  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa176  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa178  Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa180  Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa182  Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa184  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...]  Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9  [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………Pa24  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On or about March 3, 2023, the Bill Ricci Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”) was signed into law.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, and a Petition.  Pa30.  Pa56.  Pa58.  Pa60.  On or about May 2, 2023, the [...] administratively denied Minnes’ appeal, and the matter was transmitted to the [...].  Pa61.  On or about June 13, 2023, the [...] issued an initial decision to deny Minnes’ request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa24.  On or about July 18, 2023, Minnes appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa16.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on September 27, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.
[brief] Respondents Produce [...]’s Letter to the Planning Board and Related Documents in November of 2019.  During the pendency of this litigation, on November 11, 2019, [...] produced 921 pages of discovery documents, a supplemental document production that followed the 602 pages previously produced by [...].  (Pa002255).  This production included the very letter that [...] claimed in its Amended Complaint had been concealed during discovery.  [...] touted this untrue assertion as a linchpin for allowing the filing of an amended pleading.  (Pa002231).  In fact, the [...] had produced this letter and other documents [...] falsely claims to have been withheld.  For example, [...] produced the agreement with the [...] that [...] referenced in its Amended Complaint.  (Pa002263 - Pa002273).  Finally, [...] produced a copy of their Lease with [...] in the same production in November of 2019.  (Pa002167 - Pa002189).  Despite all the proof to the contrary, Appellants continue to rely upon this false narrative.  G.
[brief] ”  Pa4-7.  According to [...], “when closed, the patented louver design interlocks, providing solid shelter from rain. ”  Pa5.  The Trial Court essentially concludes that [...], as the consumer, should have known as a matter of “common sense” how modifications to defendants’ specialized system would impact its functionality.  The Trial Court came to this conclusion after defendants offered, and the Court accepted, an expert “on the operation and installation of the [...] louvered roof system”.
[brief] 19 Moody v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 2006 WL 6872309 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2006) .......................................... 32  Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454 (1975)..............................................................................  27 Murray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 2023 WL 2193825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 24, 2023)...............  43  Myrlak v. Port Auth., 157 N.J. 84 (1999)  ...........................................................................  24-25, 27, 31 Nicholson v. Bloomin Brands, Inc., 2018 WL 3614355 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 30, 2018) .................... 31, 43 Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2005) .............................................................
[brief] As a result, the Legislature created a compulsory system of insurance to compensate injured employees claiming under the workers compensation system and to compensate employees claiming outside of the workers compensation system.  “Our modern law continues to require employers to make "sufficient provision for the complete payment of any obligation which he [or she] may incur to an injured employee, or his [or her] dependents under the provisions of said article 2 [the workers' compensation system]."  N.J.S.A. 34:15-71 (emphasis added).
[brief] Even where service is valid, where there is “doubt about defendants’ actual receipt of the process; and, in that event, where the relief sought is not dismissal of the complaint but vacation of the default judgment, we have previously said that if ‘there is at least some doubt as to whether the defendant was in fact served with process, we think the circumstances require a more liberal disposition of’ the motion. ”  Davis v. DND/Fidoreo, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 92, 100 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting Goldfarb v. Roeger, 54 N.J. Super. 85, 92 (App. Div.1959)).