ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] did not consider the prospect of having a trial court (or even a special discovery master) review tens of thousands of documents for relevancy to be a reasonable alternative.  Thus, the trial court was confronted with a situation where both parties had expressed concerns -- borne of historical experience -- that the other side would use a pre-production relevancy review to withhold discoverable materials.  In light of those problematic circumstances, the court stated its aim:  “What I’m trying to avoid here by all accounts is this contentious litigation [that is] going on throughout the country” over the parties pre-production relevancy determinations.  (T18-18 to -25.)  The trial court implemented a protocol intended to resolve those concerns by ensuring (as best as possible) the production of all relevant documents by mandating production of all non-privileged search results, thereby allowing both parties to make the initial relevancy determination, with the court acting as the final arbiter at trial.  (T5-19 to 6-1, T6-17 to -21, T18-19 to 19-2.)  Finally, the trial court’s discovery protocol was equally and fairly applied to both sides.  The trial court ordered all parties to produce their search hits without a relevancy review.  (T18-19 to 19-2.)  Ultimately, the parties exercised significant control over the volume of search hits -- they mutually negotiated and agreed on the search terms after the trial court told them that there would be no further relevance review.  (Da122 ¶ 10; Da182 ¶¶ 4-6.)  Of course, none of this is to say that the trial court’s protocol was the only appropriate or reasonable approach to discovery in this case.
[directive] Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  100 yard line 1 round, “Cold Bore” shot, (this shot must have hit the “CB” sub-target to continue)  7 seconds •  In the prone position chamber 1 round •  On command fire one shot on the “CB” sub-target (7 seconds)  •  If the shot was a miss, shooter must abort the remainder of the course; record a “non-qualification” status; take the necessary time and action to return the rifle to “cold bore” status.
[brief] State v. Bulu, 234 N.J. Super. 331, 337 n.1 (1989).  It is also meritless.  When defense counsel asked [...] at resentencing not to consider the eight domestic violence complaints—including against his own mother and the mother of his four children—that did not result in convictions, the judge stated that he did not do so at the first sentencing and would not do so at resentencing.  (18T72-21 to 74-4; PSR at 16).  He noted correctly, however, that if they had no part in the court’s consideration, they would not be in the PSR.  (18T74-10 to 21). and a lengthy sentence for unlawful possession, and imposing those sentences concurrently.
[brief] The court below properly found that defendant’s claim fails on both prongs of *Strickland/Fritz*.  As the court noted, the issue regarding operation was factored into the plea deal and it explained why the State agreed to allow defendant to plead to a first tier DWI rather than a second tier.  It was also noted that the defendant acknowledged that she discussed the case with her attorney including regarding the issues related to operation, the plea deal and its consequences, and the evidence against her.  Defendant provides nothing at all to establish that anything productive would have come from the holding of an evidentiary hearing.  When a petitioner claims her trial counsel inadequately investigated her case, she “must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification. ”  *Cummings*, 321 N.J. Super. at 170; *State v. Petrozelli*, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 23 (App. Div. 2002).  Without any specific information that would have added to a defendant’s case, the PCR court cannot find that the defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s investigation.  See Fritz, 105 N.J. at 64-65.
[brief] Appellant asserts that the Court should not consider Respondents’ arguments that rely on the holdings in the El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's University Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005), and Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 484 (App. Div. 2008), because these cases were decided before the N.J. Supreme Court’s decision in Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010).  (See Pb26; Pb35).  Appellant does not, however, present any arguments supporting the assertion that El-Sioufi and Spinks do not remain good law for the propositions they are cited for by Respondents.  Appellant’s assertion that the holdings in El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's University Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005), and Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 484 (App. Div. 2008), are no longer valid law is incorrect as a matter of law.
[directive] 2  Because the [...] ([...]) is not assigned the “responsibility of detecting and enforcing the general criminal laws of this State,” [...] does not fall within the Act’s statutory definition of “law enforcement agency. ”  2 approved, or certified as being substantially equivalent to an approved course, by the [...] pursuant to P.L.1961, c.56 (C.52:17B-66 et seq.).  I.  Establishing a Program A.  Purpose.  As expressly required by the Act, each law enforcement agency in the State shall establish a program (the “Program”) “in furtherance of the goal of the agency being comprised of law enforcement officers who reflect the diversity of the population of the community the agency is charged with protecting.
[brief] *Coons v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 96 N.J. 419, 425 (1984).  In some circumstances, however, “sound policy reasons” may counsel for limited or no retroactivity.  *Id.*  Factors to be considered include: (1) the extent to which the parties and the public justifiably relied on prior decisions; (2) whether the purpose of the new rule would be advanced by retroactivity; and (3) the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice.  *Id.*  Again, although this Court found pipeline retroactivity appropriate in *Roberto*, the posture and subject-matter of this case is different and therefore calls for a fresh analysis.
[brief] A plaintiff’s burden in making a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress (also known as the tort of “outrage” in New Jersey’s jurisprudence) is significant.  In *Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc.*, 111 N.J. 355 (1988), [...] authored the New Jersey Supreme Court’s test for making a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The *Buckley* test provides as follows:  Generally speaking, to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause, and distress that is severe.  [Citation omitted].  Initially, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly.  For an intentional act to result in liability, the defendant must intend both to do the act and to produce emotional distress.  [Citation omitted].  Liability will also attach when the defendant acts recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional distress will follow.  [Citation omitted].  Second, the defendant’s conduct must be extreme and outrageous.
[directive] The most common aspect of attorney participation used by some judges involves Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 7 of 29 follow-up questions.  This occurs mostly at sidebar, but sometimes also in open court.  When a prospective juror is called to sidebar, it is typically to discuss an issue that calls for follow-up questioning.  This fluid process makes subsequent questions appropriate based upon answers given by the juror.  Attorneys should be permitted, if they wish, to participate in these sidebar discussions with jurors.  Typically, sidebar discussions are more conversational and much less formal than colloquy that is conducted in open court.  With the court's permission, they should also be permitted limited participation in follow-up questioning in open court.  Greater restraint should be placed on requests for attorney participation in initial questioning.  In this regard, all of the initial questions will have been resolved in the pre-voir dire conference, and there is no demonstrable reason why the questions would be better posed by counsel than by the judge.  This remains a discretionary issue.  However, the standards do not envision widespread use of attorney participation in initial questioning.
[brief] At the request of Plaintiffs, a proof hearing as to [...] was scheduled for February 27, 2024 before [...] (Pa392) and an Order of Judgment by Default was entered by the Court against [...] on March 14, 2024 in the amount of $355,006.00.  (Pa393-Pa394)  Subsequently, on March 28, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal.  (Pa395-Pa398)  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] Plaintiff appeals from the following Orders issued by the Superior Court, Law Division: (1) four (4) Orders dated April 27, 2023 dismissing the Complaint against all defendants with prejudice, Pa80, Pa82, Pa84 and Pa86*; (2) an Order dated April 27, 2023 denying as moot plaintiff’s motion for an order declaring a conflict of interest and directing governmental entity defendants to retain substitute counsel, Pa88; and (3) an Order dated July 10, 2023 denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the April 27, 2023 Orders dismissing the Complaint, Pa89.
[brief] First, the elimination of 50 units is the only deviation from that description and the proposal remains consistent with the Master Plan.  The Amended Redevelopment Plan continues to permit commercial components and a significant open space buffer along the adjacent water features.  The Amended Redevelopment Plan retains the significant multi-family housing component, with only a 14% reduction in the total number of units.  Crucially, it maintains that same number of affordable housing units, which was the primary concern of the prior judicial decisions in the Builder’s Remedy Lawsuit.  The deviations from the Master Plan are minor in the context of the entire Amended Redevelopment Plan, and the governing body’s determination that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Master Plan is entitled to deference here.
[brief] (2T190-10 to 22).  As he turned left onto Magnolia Avenue, [...], who was adjacent to [...]’s vehicle, advised [...] that he observed a male matching the description [...] provided.  (2T191-25 to 192-6).  The officers followed the suspect down Magnolia Avenue and made a left.  (2T192-6 to 7).  They entered the [...] parking lot and apprehended the suspect, who was later identified as defendant.  (2T192-7 to 193-3).  [...] collected a gray hoody from defendant.  (2T195-6 to 12).  He also observed that defendant was wearing a white thermal shirt that had blood on the right side.  (2T195-16 to 21).  Eventually, [...] heard that an individual who fit the description that [...] had provided had been detained at the [...] restaurant.  (2T83-23 to 84-5).
[brief] The Appellant, after observing the ongoing development from his home nearby, demanded Respondent [...] take measures to stop work on the project, alleging the building would eventually contravene an applicable Amended Resolution adopted by the [...].  (105a).  In an exchange of emails, Respondent [...] informed the Appellant that while she would investigate the Appellants complaint, a stop work order would not be issued based solely on Appellants’ suspicions and speculation and without a compelling reason to do so.  (66a-75a).  Appellant’s complaint and request to Respondent [...] were made whilst the building was in the early stages of construction, and as such, the Appellant had no evidence at all which indicated that the project had or would violate the limits of the Amended Resolution.  Critically, Respondent [...] informed the Appellant that it was necessary for the building to comply with the approved site plans included in the application, as the Zoning Board relied on those plans for the approval of the application.  (110a-115a).  The rendering, which Appellant argues indicates that [...] violated an applicable zoning Resolution restricting the maximum height of new construction within the relevant zone, was not relied upon by the [...] (“Board”) in adopting its Resolution, was not relied upon by Respondent [...] in her investigation and subsequently not relied upon by the Trial Court and thus dismissed as irrelevant.  Appellant then attempted to rely upon a [...] advertisement displaying a cinderblock, in conjunction with photos taken by Appellant of the ongoing construction as evidence of [...]’s failure to adhere to the rendering’s limit.  The Trial Court provided the Appellant numerous opportunities to present any relevant evidence to support his claim, and Appellant’s failed to do so.  Because the rendering had already been dismissed as irrelevant and the [...] ad itself contained no evidence to suggest and much less prove the development violated the approved plans reviewed by [...] and the Board, the prerogative writ action was dismissed as no evidence presented by the Plaintiff-Appellant could support the claims as alleged.
[brief] [...] (“[...]”) was an employee and maintenance crew chief for [...] for approximately 31 years.  (Pa0081).  During his deposition, [...] confirmed that there are two or three electrical panels at the [...] facility.  (Pa0152).  [...] testified that when the building was being built, the electrical panels were not labeled correctly from the time of construction forward.  (Pa0155).  While [...] and another employee previously attempted to rectify this issue, [...] was “not 100% sure” the labeling properly was sufficiently corrected.  At the time of [...]’s demise, the electrical panel directory for the building’s electrical fixtures was located on the inside of the door panel.  (Pa. 0190).  However, as testified by [...], this directory was not entirely accurate.  (Pa0155).  The import of the mislabeled electric panel becomes clear when the circumstances of [...]’s death are examined.  Prior to his fatal electrocution, [...] was attempting to repair an emergency light fixture that was not working.  Because the emergency light was not working, there was no way to test through trial and error - i.e., flipping the switch on/off - whether power was going to that emergency light fixture.  (Pa0158).  While [...] tried to cut the power off to the emergency light fixture by turning off the circuit breaker switch that controls the subject emergency light, because of the mislabeled panel, [...] did not switch off the correct circuit breaker.  Accordingly, [...]’s demise was directly caused by this mislabeled electric panel box.
[brief] A police officer has the duty to investigate suspicious behavior.  See State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 502 (1986).  If the officers had ignored this information and failed to investigate the warrant, they would have been derelict in their duty.  See State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563, 568 (1971) (stating that police forswear their duties if they do not investigate suspicious behavior); State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 468 (1967) (noting that investigation of suspicious circumstances “dictated by elemental police responsibilities”); *State v. Letts*, 254 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (Law Div.1992) (stating that police have duty to public to investigate behavior that suggests criminal activity).  Although the officers did not investigate in the manner defendant wishes, that does not mean their actions were unreasonable.  Such a claim is premised upon hindsight, which is the very type of analysis that is frowned upon.  See *State v. Watts*, 223 N.J. 503, 514 (2015) (“The test is not whether there were other reasonable or even better ways to execute the search, for hindsight and considered reflection often permit more inspired after-the-fact decision-making” (citing *State v. Hathaway*, 222 N.J. 453, 469 (2015)).  Indeed, it would have been unreasonable to let the Toyota continue to drive while the officers contacted dispatch to confirm the accuracy of the information in their mobile data terminal and wait for a response.  To do so would ignore the inherent exigency associated with vehicles.  See *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409 (2015).  Stated differently, if the officers did not stop the Toyota, they may have lost the vehicle or it may have driven to an unsafe location to conduct a motor vehicle stop.  Instead, by stopping the vehicle when they did, they were able to control the situation, stop the Toyota in a safe location, and investigate.  The limited intrusion in the defendants’ freedom of movement is far outweighed by the officers need to investigate in a safe manner.  Thus, contrary to defendant’s claim, the officers were not, and should not be, obligated to confirm the accuracy of the warrant before stopping the Toyota.
[brief] The Resolution disregarded the public interest at stake in its entirety.  The Board also ignored the only planning testimony, which built upon [...]’s earlier testimony.  [...]’s planner, [...], testified that providing housing for senior citizens, particularly the frail elderly, ranked extremely high on the list of inherently beneficial uses.  He reached that conclusion in part on the unrebutted factual presentation of the extent of [...]’s need, but also in part on N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(1), which makes it a purpose of zoning to provide senior housing.  On appeal, the Board suggests that the trial court improperly failed to credit the Township’s determination to place these uses elsewhere.
[brief] ”  The “construction” in the previous sentence refers to the Redeveloper’s Plan to construct seven (7) units on a 9,245 square foot, undersized and substandard lot, located on [...].  The seven (7) units are a component of the Redeveloper’s Affordable Housing obligation which emanates from its approval to build a mixed use development on a portion of Block 419 which is located on [...] in the center of downtown [...]."  In his November 3, 2021 letter, [...] even states that “there should be no need to amend the redevelopment plan….. the settlement agreement and court orders should trump and essentially supersede the redevelopment plan. ”  The redeveloper’s position in this regard cannot be sustained and is directly contrary to one of the provisions of the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law N.J.S.A. 40a:12a-1 to 89 ("LRHL").  The [...] remained anxious and willing to consider the Redeveloper’s request for rezoning, however it should not be divested of its authority to change either the Redevelopment Plan or the zoning for the subject site.  Indeed, the [...] has done nothing to interfere with the Redeveloper’s property rights on the subject property and, in fact, any hardship claimed by the Redeveloper is self created.
[brief] (Pa16).  [...], for his part, maintained that he had never received the Cancellation Notice, and that on the date of the accident he was unaware of the purported cancellation of the policy.  (Pa12)  The details of the legal requirement for cancelling an automobile insurance policy are discussed later in this brief.  On its summary judgment motion, in an effort to demonstrate compliance with those requirements, [...] submitted a certification of its counsel which was not based on personal knowledge (Pa18), and which Plaintiff therefore argued was legally insufficient.  The certification attached two pages from a much larger document that purported to be a proof of mailing of all notices sent on a specific day.  (Pa40).  Plaintiff maintained that these pages actually demonstrated that the statute had not been complied with.  On reply [...] attempted to cure these deficiencies.  It filed another certification from its trial counsel (Pa123), which attached the full Certificate of Mailing (Pa125).  It also filed a certification from an in-house attorney for [...] (Pa141), and a certification from an [...] employee in its mailing division (Pa144).  However, not one of the persons submitting certifications actually had personal knowledge of the actual purported mailing of the Cancellation Notice.  Plaintiff maintained that the evidence of compliance that was presented to the Court below continued to be legally deficient to support summary judgment or to deny the plaintiffs’ cross-motion.  The court below disagreed, however, and granted summary judgment to [...].
[brief] Nor should the Court.  Plaintiffs also argue that the Committee had a duty to state its reasons for adopting the ordinance in the meeting minutes pursuant to discussion at the hearing.  (Pa23).  However, nowhere in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 does it include the word “discuss” or “discussion,” nor does it require that each governing body member declare their individual “thought process. ”  The statute requires instead one statement of the “reasons” for the governing body’s actions, which must be memorialized in the redevelopment plan.
[brief] His ability to exercise peremptory challenges was not impeded or affected by the situation, which arose not during jury selection, but during the trial.  [...] relies upon State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1084, 120 S.Ct. 809, 145 L. Ed .2d 681 (2000), and State v. Thompson, 142 N.J.Super. 274, 282 (App.Div.1976), to support his argument.  Each of those cases involved a juror providing misinformation or withholding information when questioned during jury selection.  Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 349; Thompson, supra, 142 N.J.Super. at 277.  Neither case has any applicability here.  The case before us did not involve jurors withholding information when questioned during jury selection.
[brief] The Law Division has relied upon *Booth* to find standing when variances are required, or where the development could have impacted the zoning scheme.  *See Village Supermarket, Inc. v. Mayfair Supermarkets, Inc.*, 269 N.J. Super. 224, 233-234 (Law. Div. 1993); *Aurentz, supra*, 171 N.J. Super. at 143-144.  In fact, both *Booth* and *Dover* held residents and taxpayers had standing to challenge decisions that had a potential impact on the integrity of the zone plan and community welfare or where the action challenged was *ultra vires*.
[brief] *State v. Smith*, 155 N.J. 83, 93-96 (1998).  The test for how much weight should be attributed to a tip is a totality of the circumstances analysis.  *Id.* at 92-93.  The Supreme Court of the United States has long made clear that a tip that allows only for the identification of its target is insufficient to support a stop or frisk.  In *Florida v. [...]*, an anonymous caller reported that a young black male was standing at a particular bus stop, wearing a plaid shirt, and carrying a gun.  529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).  Two officers were dispatched, arriving shortly thereafter, and saw three black males, including one, [...], who was wearing a plaid shirt.  *Ibid.*  The officers saw no gun or anything else unusual.  Nevertheless, one officer told [...] to put his hands up, frisked him, and seized a gun from his pocket.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court held that the investigatory stop was unreasonable and suppressed the gun.
[brief] Highlighting on documents appeared below.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Tasked on remand with making findings of facts and conclusions of law, the trial court did not do so.  Appellant thus returns.  The trial court previously *sua sponte* dismissed claims under the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) because Plaintiff was sophisticated.  This court disagreed and remanded for findings of fact and an analysis of the factors in *All the Way Towing, L.L.C. v. Bucks County Int’l, Inc.*, 236 N.J. 431 (2019), including whether home improvements constituted “merchandise” under the CFA.