ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s claim for payment is based on a contested fact that it paid its employees assigned to the Board.  But that statutory authorization did not become effective until June 29, 2020, when the Legislature added, “employees of the contracted service provider shall be paid as if the school facilities had remained open and in full operation”.  The effective date no doubt blows up [...]’s claim that it was entitled to payment so that it could pay its employees who did no longer worked at the Board’s buildings.  C.
[brief] Despite claiming that it did not seek to wrest wholesale control of zoning powers from the [...], the trial court fundamentally altered the hearing process.  It ordered that the hearing on the Amended Application take place at the [...], rather than in [...] where regularly scheduled zoning board hearings are held.  This action completely deprived the [...] and the [...] of its jurisdiction in order to placate to a specious belief that a neutral location was more desirable.  If the trial court’s concern was social distancing necessary for the hearing\(^4\), the trial court had options to allow the hearing to still take place within the [...], such as the local high school gym or auditorium.  This would have also allowed a greater opportunity for public engagement in the hearing.  However, the trial court decided to have the hearing held at the [...], during regular court hours.
[brief] See State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 340-41 (1998).  The State notes that N.J. Admin. Code §8:70-1.8 requires medical examiners to perform autopsies in cases where death has occurred under certain circumstances.  (Sb 17-18)  But nothing about this provision automatically authorizes the admission of medical examiner’s conclusions in a --- 1 Sb: State’s brief. subsequent criminal prosecution, especially where the conclusion depends not on the medical examiner’s scientific expertise, but on their consideration of other evidence discovered by police during the investigation.  Separate legal rules govern the admission of expert testimony in criminal cases.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], filed a civil complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey against, *inter alia*, Defendants [...] (“[...]”), [...] Police Officers [...] and [...] and the [...] (improperly pled as “Township of [...],” and sometimes referred to herein as “[...]” or “[...]”) following his February 20, 2020, arrest in [...] by Defendants Geist and Kohut.  Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that he was deprived of constitutional rights.
[brief] Berg does not substitute general laws of statutory construction to determine what a statute means; it only applies to determine the existence of a contract and its scope.  The unmistakability doctrine requires courts to “proceed cautiously both in identifying a contract within the language of a regulatory statute and in defining the contours of any contractual obligation. ”  Once the existence of a contract is defined, Berg in no way supplants the regular rules of statutory construction, including those that countenance against construing a statute to reach an absurd result.
[brief] The trial court considered these options and chose the one best suited to achieve the truth-seeking function of the discovery process in this case.  The court decided, in this instance, that neither party should be the judge of its own cause in making relevancy determinations.  (T5-20 to 6-21, T18-19 to 19-2, T24-11 to -25, T25-4 to -14.)  Given the court’s knowledge of the nation-wide discovery disputes between [...] and [...] affiliates, that was an appropriate exercise of discretion.
[brief] No similar circumstances exist here.  Here, the record is replete with the trial court’s approval of the Appellants’ voluntary compliance with its fair share housing obligations.  There is no history of obstruction to affordable housing projects.  There is no evidence of delay.  There is no evidence of bad faith on behalf of the Appellants.  Similarly, the facts of this matter have no similarities with those that gave rise to the appointment of a special hearing officer in [...].
[brief] The caselaw applying N.J.R.E. 808 has repeatedly enforced the prohibition of the admission of complex expert opinions contained in hearsay documents, where there are disputed issues concerning the trustworthiness of those opinions.  See, e.g., James v. Ruiz, 440 N.J. Super. 45, 62 (App. Div. 2015) (a radiologist’s hearsay opinion finding a disc bulge was inadmissible); New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.G., 427 N.J. Super. 154, 173-75 (App. Div. 2012) (a psychologist’s hearsay assessment of psychological and bonding evaluations was inadmissible); Brun v. Cardoso, 390 N.J. Super. 409, 421 (App. Div. 2006) (hearsay interpretation of MRI of the spine was inadmissible); Nowacki v. Community Med. Ctr., 279 N.J. Super. 276, 281-83 (App. Div.) (a radiologist’s hearsay opinion within a hospital record addressing whether patient's fractures were “pathologic” or “non-traumatic” was inadmissible), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 95 (1995).
[brief] In their opposition to the instant appeal filed by Defendants, they argue that the Milltown Ordinance 22-1516 is entitled to the presumption of validity which can only be rebutted by showing that the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  Defendant argue that this is a formidable bar which Appellants/Plaintiffs, [...], [...] and [...] (collectively referred to in that initial brief and this Reply Brief as “Plaintiff”) failed to clear.  Defendants’ recital of the standard for rebutting the presumption of validity is too limited.  While some cases (which are the ones cited by Defendants) do mention only an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable showing to rebut the presumption of validity, the New Jersey Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that while a zoning ordinance is insulated from attack by a presumption of validity, that presumption “may be overcome by a showing that the ordinance is ‘clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the (zoning) statute.
[brief] *Id.*  Notably, here, when the judge raised the issue of whether *Galicia* or *Grunow* might somehow dictate that passion/provocation should not be instructed at the retrial, she did so believing that passion/provocation had not been instructed at the original murder trial (where she was not the judge).  (5T 100-7 to 23)  Almost immediately, both trial defense counsel and the prosecutor corrected the judge and informed her that under *Mauricio*, 117 N.J. at 411: (1) reasonable, adequate provocation; (2) a lack of cooling-off time; (3) a defendant who, in fact, was provoked to kill; and (4) a defendant who, in fact, did not “cool off” before killing.  The first two elements are objective and, if the lesser offense is requested and there is a rational basis for finding them in the evidence (or, if there is no request and the basis for finding them is clearly indicated from the evidence), the trial judge should instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter, leaving the decision on the last two subjective elements “for the jury. ”
[brief] [...] Deposition.......................................................801a 4/7/16  Volume I [...] Deposition.........................................................807a 4/27/16  Volume II [...] Deposition.....................................................821a 11/28/17  [...] Deposition......................................................................830a  Konefal v. Landau, 2020 WL 2466216, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2020)........839a  1/24/20  Transcript of Motion to Amend Complaint in Fendt et al. v. Menas, et al., [...].................................................................844a --- 1
[brief] ”  Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) (citations omitted); [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2023) (“It is, of course, clear that an issue not briefed is deemed waived. ”); State v. Amboy Nat. Bank, 447 N.J. Super. 142, 148 n.1 (App. Div.), certif. denied 288 N.J. 249 (2016) (issue addressed for first time in reply brief deemed waived); 539 Absecon Boulevard, L.L.C. v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P’ship, 406 N.J. Super. 242, 272 n.10 (App. Div. 2009) (noting claims not briefed are deemed abandoned).
[directive] Page 5  1.  The law enforcement officer warning the juvenile about the future consequences activity.2 of continued delinquent  Officers shall discuss possible Family Court dispositions such as fines, probation, loss of drivers license and incarceration.  In addition, officers shall discuss the possible impact of a delinquency record, including fingerprint records and DNA records on future career options.  2.  The law enforcement officer must notify the juvenile’s parents or guardian/ caregiver about the matter.  A parent or guardian/caregiver or designee must be present.  If a parent or guardian chooses to designate another adult (the designee) to attend the stationhouse adjustment with the juvenile, that person must be a responsible adult designated by the juvenile’s parent or guardian/caregiver, such as a trusted relative, pastor or other mentor.  In the event that a parent or guardian/caregiver does not respond to the law enforcement agency’s inquiries, the designee may not be chosen by the juvenile or by the law enforcement agency.  The willingness of a parent or guardian/caregiver or designee to participate in this process and act in partnership with law enforcement to hold the child accountable for his or her actions is vital to the success of a stationhouse adjustment.
[brief] Upon cross-examination, [...] made the astounding admission that he had never done a post-construction comparison of his renderings with an actual photo of the development:  Q  And do you have any examples of instances where you prepared a rendering like this and the developments subsequently were built, and you, thereafter, procure a photo of that site as a comparison to your rendering?  A  I don't.  I wish I did.  But, unfortunately, I did not.  5T 96:17-23
[brief] To disturb the October 6, 2023 Order, that denied the motion for reconsideration, this Court should look to Rule 4:49-2:  Except as otherwise provided by R. 1:13-1 (Clerical errors) a motion for rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a judgment or final order shall . . . state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred, and shall have annexed thereto a copy of the judgment or final order sought to be reconsidered and a copy of the court’s corresponding written opinion, if any.  Rule 4:49-2, fixes the grounds for the motion of reconsideration.  They are (1) the court based its decision on a “palpably incorrect or irrational basis,” (2) the court either failed to consider or “appreciate” the significance of probative, competent evidence” or (3) the moving party is presenting “new or additional information . . . which it could not have provided on the first application. ”  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996), quoting D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401-02 (App. Div. 1990).  A motion for reconsideration is not a do-over, or allows for introducing new evidence.  It is designed to review the prior order based upon evidence before the court on the initial motion.  The moving party must “initially demonstrate that the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the court will engage in the actual reconsideration process.  D’Atria, 242 N.J.Super. at 401.  The trial court found that the motion for reconsideration lacked sufficient merit to warrant reversing the August 14, 2023 Order that vacated the final judgment.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 N.J. Super. 47 (App Div. 1956) .............  33  Csaki v. Woodbridge Twp., 69 N.J. Super. 327, 33 (Law. Div. 1961) .......... 37 Fields v. Princeton University, 28 N.J. Tax 574 (Tax 2015)
[brief] Elsewhere, the reinstated policy it states that “[t]he school district shall keep confidential a current, new, or prospective student’s transgender status,” and that when “obligated to disclose a student’s status…[d]ue to a specific and compelling need,” the District should take such measures as “the facilitation of counseling for the student and the student’s family to facilitate the family’s acceptance and support of the student’s transgender status” (Da055).  Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he question this case presents” has nothing to do with “what information must go in” student records (Pb28).
[brief] Pa003.  On March 23, 2018, the Firm filed an Order to show Cause and Verified Complaint (the “Second Complaint”) requesting the court to order the relief set forth in the Second Complaint.  Pa003.  The Court held that the Firm failed to establish exceptional circumstances under Rule 4:50-1(f) to warrant reopening the judgment admitting [...]’s Will to probate, neither did it establish a basis to warrant the relaxation of the time limitations set forth in Rule 4:85-1.  Pa004.  [...] engaged another law firm to appeal the dismissal.  Pa004.  On September 25, 2019, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that Plaintiff’s “complaint was untimely under Rule 4:85-1 because plaintiff did not file it within four months after [...]’s will was probated. ”  Pa004.  As a result of the Firm’s failure to file the complaint within the time limitations set forth in Rule 4:85-1, [...] and [...] were unable to pursue their claim for damages and were prevented from proving they were entitled to receive a share of their father’s estate.  Pa004.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Defendant was minimally prejudiced by the delay because he had already served the minimum term for a second degree conviction.  (2T121-7 to 20).  Defendant argues that [...] wrongly calculated the actual delay under Barker because it should have been measured from the date of indictment until the day of trial.  (Db at 11).  However, the record shows that the trial was to begin on June 11 but did not take place because the State and defendant reached an agreement with defendant pleading guilty to the eluding charge.  As for defense counsel arguing that discovery was incomplete in May of 2019, that problem was apparently settled by June when defendant pled guilty to eluding.  In sum, the trial court properly concluded that defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
[brief] ”  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  Second, in drawing conclusions from those facts, the Chancery judge is required to apply accepted legal and equitable principles; no deference is afforded in this regard.  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  And third, we will decline to intervene absent an abuse of discretion, or where the judge’s conclusions prove inconsistent with her own findings of fact.
[brief] [9T77-10 to -19].  Prior to defendant’s presentation of his case, the State asked the court to remind defendant prior to him calling [...] as a witness, that he is prohibited from raising the issue of third-party guilt in front of the jury.  [13T3-19 to 4-6].  Defendant responded that his questions to [...] would not address third-party guilt.  [13T5-2 to -7].  The court recalled that, as a witness for the State, [...] testified that police explored the various leads it gathered during its investigation and they all turned out to be dead ends.  [13T6-11 to - [...] advised that he would give leeway to defendant to ask questions regarding those leads, though he anticipated that any questions would have been asked and answered.  [13T6-18 to -21].  [...] appropriately ruled that defendant did not have a sufficient basis to argue third-party guilt.
[brief] Numerous courts have considered the question of whether a municipal police department is a proper defendant and have unanimously reached the conclusion that it is not.  PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dept., 832 F. Supp. 808, 825-826 (Dist. N.J. 1993); See also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (holding that the Michigan Department of State Police was not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. 1983); Briggs v. Moore, 251 Fed. Appx. 77 (3rd Cir. 2007) (police department is not a “person” within the meaning of a §1983 suit).  Based upon the above, all claims against the [...] were properly dismissed as the [...] is not a person capable of being sued.  The Police Department is not a separate legal entity from the [...].  Instead, the [...] is a “Department” within the [...].  As such, it was not a proper defendant in this matter.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 ....................................................................................................... 7, 10, 26 N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50 ......................................................................................... passim  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, is designed to eradicate discrimination in all forms.
[brief] In the event this Court determines that the issue of [...]’s trial participation was not raised below, to prevail on this unpreserved argument, [...] would need to show the trial court’s decision amounted to plain error.  Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2025)(An issue not raised below may be considered if it meets the plain error standard), and see *State v. Walker*, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006); R. 2:10-2.  Despite conceding that it raise dan unpreserved argument, [...] never cites an employee of the indemnitor/contractor, [...]  *Serpa*, 401 N.J. Super. at 374.  Plaintiff sued [...] only due to the worker’s compensation bar and [...] named [...] as a third-party defendant.  *Ibid.*  Before trial, Plaintiff and [...] settled the case, and counsel for [...] agreed the $1.5M settlement was reasonable.  *Ibid.*  The matter then went to trial for an allocation of fault between [...] and [...] only.  *Ibid.*  The jury found [...] 15% at fault and [...] 85% at fault, so [...] was responsible for its percentage of negligence, or $1.275M of the settlement.  *Ibid.*  The Court determined a party may be indemnified for settlement payments it makes provided that the following three criteria are met: (a) the indemnitee’s claims are based on a valid, pre-existing indemnitor/indemnitee relationship; (b) the indemnitee faced potential liability for the claims underlying the settlement; and (c) the settlement amount was reasonable.  *Id.* at 379.  The Court determined that all three criteria were met.  *Id.* at 380.  Settlement is not a determination of fault; it is a fault-free agreement.  At the same time, it triggers an indemnification cause of action to accrue.  On the other hand, the verdict was a determination that [...] was solely at fault.  Had [...] settled, the jury never would have returned its verdict finding [...] solely negligent and extinguished [...]’s right to contractual indemnification.  [...] must abide the consequences of its decision.  the plain error standard or otherwise attempts to explain how the trial court’s finding amounts to plain error.  On the issue of [...]’s participation at trial, [...]’s failure to address or analyze the plain error standard in its merits brief waives review.  Arsenis v. Boro. Of Bernardsville, 476 N.J. Super. 195, 204 n.3 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 257 N.J. 524 (2024) (“[A]n issue not briefed is deemed waived. ”).
[brief] 1T204:7-23; 2T12:2-14:21 see also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 14 (P-785).  Duratron, 95 N.J. Super. at 533 (holding it is "a logical, traditional, and valuable tool in the process of fair adjudication"), *certif. denied*, 50 N.J. 404.  “Laches is an equitable doctrine which penalizes knowing inaction by a party with a legal right from enforcing that right after passage of such a period of time that prejudice has resulted to the other parent[] so that it would be inequitable to enforce the right. ”  *L.V. v. R.S.*, 347 *N.J. Super.* 33, 39 (App. Div. 2002)(citation omitted).  “The key ingredients are knowledge and delay by one party and change of position by the other. ”  *Id.* (citation omitted).  The Appellate Division has long refused to entertain alleged laches of a parent as a basis to limit a child’s independent right to adequate support.  See generally *id.*  Indeed, “the application of laches to matters of parent-child relationships have been carefully circumscribed. ”  *Id.* at 41.  It is well-established that parents cannot waive child support because the duty to support runs to the supported child.  *Martinetti v. Hickman*, 261 *N.J. Super.* 508, 512 (App. Div. 1993).
[brief] During that conversation, she told him she would be (1T; 118:15).  During June and July, on several occasions, [...] brought her into his office and advised her that the transfer is being held up by [...] based on statements that [...] made (1T; 118:18).  [...] felt that the Plaintiff didn’t deserve to be transferred into a position of possibly being a Lieutenant (1T; 118:21).  The transfer would have given her eight points (1T; 119:7).  [...] was doing everything in her power to stop her transfer and delay it (1T; 119:8).  Parker wanted the Plaintiff to come over and her name was appearing in “MAX” meetings and [...] was making comments about her character and so on (1T; 119:15).  Plaintiff stated that Parker told her that Jeanne [...] was saying that she’s a “problem child over there” (1T; 122:15).  [...] revealed the true motivation of Captain [...] in that she wanted to keep the Plaintiff at the Academy so that her points would expire (1T; 132:13).  [...]’s comments were relayed to the Plaintiff by [...] (1T; 123:11).  When asked if she was happy in her new assignment, she stated that she was because she was out of the Academy and away from the group of people that she was dealing with on a day-to-day basis (1T; 124:20).
[brief] Appellants respectfully offer that [...]’s claim to “bona fide purchaser for value without notice” status must yield to the vulnerability of its title under the “new rule” established under Tyler, so long as Appellants’ case is within the “pipeline” and thus eligible for relief under Roberto.  This result is neither unfair to [...] nor unforeseeable under the balancing analysis undertaken by the Roberto court.  [...] is a sophisticated tax lien investor whose modus operandi includes trading tax titles shortly after entry of final judgment.  [...] assumes an inherent risk in such a business model and both Tyler and Roberto weighed the preservation of Appellants’ access to a constitutional takings claim as superior to any prejudice to [...] so long as Appellants diligently pursued their avoidance claims while in the “pipeline. ”  Appellants have been diligent in that pursuit, and for that reason the lower court should be reversed.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description