ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Genesis Deed bears out the exact opposite intent whereby building restrictions are specifically separated by paragraph and heading and, furthermore, are specifically reserved to the developer.  (Da53)  The reservation of development rights is further corroborated by subsequent conveyances by the developer of the street beds to [...].  See, Plaintiff’s title expert, [...], CTP, NTP in his report dated (Da141)  See also, Grabas Exhibits 1-13 (Da149).  [...] did not even exist until 1948, one year after Plaintiffs’ predecessor took title.  See, [...] 1948 Certificate of Formation (Da125), See also 1947 Genesis Deed (Da53).  The developer did not confer any rights for this club to change, amend, or alter any building restrictions.
[brief] Other litigants have tried to argue that criterion (b) should include additional requirements in order to satisfy the Constitution, but this has been flatly rejected by the Supreme Court.  62-64 Main St., supra, 221 N.J. at 148.  In the dissenting opinion in 62-64 Main Street, [...] asked, “[u]nder subsection (b), for example, does ‘discontinuance of . . . use,’ on its own, suffice to show blight in all cases?”
[brief] Courts enforce contracts ‘based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract. ’”  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118, 85 A.3d 947 (2014) (quoting Caruso v. Ravenswood Dev., Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 499, 506, 767 A.2d 979 (App. Div. 2001)).  Whether a contract term is clear or ambiguous amounts to a question of law.
[brief] Da53-56; Ex. P23A; Da230-35 (Ex. P23B).  [...] not only repayment of the Third Loan, but also a “sweetener” in the form of a trip to Hawaii as a token of his gratitude for [...]’ extraordinary courtesy and consideration, having stood by him for so many years.  Da32; 2T223-4 to 8; Ex. P23A; Da230-35 (Ex. P23B at 4).14  G.  Defendant’s Failure To Pay Any Sum Due On The Third Loan.
[brief] Moreover, the consequences of that error were significant, as the trial court’s ultimate finding of liability on Plaintiffs’ conversion counts (5 & 6) was the foundation for the assessment of damages on the other counts (7 & 8, 11-13) of the Amended Complaint.  Because the gravity of this error of law clearly produced a manifestly unjust result, this Court should reverse the trial court’s Judgment against Defendant as to Counts 5-8 and 11-13 of the Amended Complaint.
[brief] [...] cannot simply bypass a relevance review by requesting that [...] run broad search terms and produce all documents that hit on those terms.  After all, the scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) begins with relevance, so [...] is not entitled to discovery that is not relevant.  [...] is therefore entitled to cull for relevance.  See, e.g., Palmer v. Cognizant Tech. Sols. Corp., No. CV-17-6848, 2021 WL 3145982, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2021) (“The Court will not compel defendants to produce any document simply because it contains a search term ... whether or not it is relevant and proportional to the needs of the action. ”); FlowRider Surf, Ltd. v. Pac. Surf Designs, Inc., No. 15CV1879, 2016 WL 6522807, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016) (denying the defendant’s motion to compel plaintiffs to produce all documents that “hit” on the parties’ ESI search terms regardless of relevance) (overruled on other grounds); BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., LLC, No. 14-CV-1062, 2016 WL 4031417, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2016) (holding the parties’ agreement to run search terms was a way to simplify and limit the scope of production, but it did not obligate the parties to produce non-responsive documents, and denying motion to compel because there was “no reason to believe that [the defendant] ha[d] withheld documents it was obligated to produce”).
[brief] Pa3.  On the date and time of the accident, [...] was working on the Project Site.  Pa3.  [...] (“[...]”) was the General Contractor for the construction project, and hired [...]  (“[...]”) as a Sub-Contractor.  Pa3.  [...] hired [...] as another Sub-Contractor.  Pa3.  [...] and others were sued by [...] and his wife for the injuries he sustained on December 11, 2015 (“Hood lawsuit”).  Pa4.  [...] was the primary insurer for a Contractor Controlled Insurance Program (“CCIP”) issued to [...], for the first $2 million in coverage.  Pa2.  [...] --- \(^1\)  While the various parties’ respective motions for summary judgment were pending in the lower court, [...] agreed to dismiss its cross-claim against [...].  See stipulation of dismissal, filed with the lower court on March 29, 2023, included with Plaintiffs’ Appendix (Pa) at Pa2676.  was a CCIP excess liability carrier with a coverage limit of $25 million excess over [...]’s CCIP primary insurance of $2 million.  Pa2.  [...] was a commercial umbrella liability carrier for [...], with a coverage limit of $9 million excess over the primary liability coverage limit of $1 million afforded to [...] by [...].  Pa2.  [...] and [...] claim that [...] should have been defended and indemnified in the Hood lawsuit by [...], as the CCIP Insurer for [...].  Pa5.  [...] and [...] assert that [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP, and knew it was not enrolled.  The trial court agreed with [...] and [...], citing substantial evidence to prove that [...] knew it was not enrolled in the CCIP, and instead obtained its own insurance with [...] and [...].  Pa2746.  As such, [...] did not afford coverage under the [...] CCIP to [...] in the Hood lawsuit.  Pa5.  Instead, [...] – as the primary liability insurer for [...] – defended [...] in the Hood lawsuit, and ultimately paid its $1 million limit in settlement of the Hood lawsuit on behalf of [...].  Pa821.  [...] – as the excess liability insurer for [...] – paid an additional $350,000 in settlement of the Hood lawsuit on behalf of [...].  Pa821.  [...], itself, has sustained no damages, as it was fully protected in the Hood lawsuit by both [...] and [...].  Pa822.  The Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claims in this lawsuit against [...] and [...] essentially seek a ruling, as a matter of law, that [...] (inter alia) is obligated to reimburse [...] for the $350,000 [...] paid to settle the Hood lawsuit.
[brief] Defendant, [...] is a condominium consisting of three towers and a mall.  The by laws and an amendment to the master deed control the right and responsibilities of the parties.  Per the by laws the unit owners pay a monthly maintenance fee to Defendant which pays for, among other things, maintenance of the common areas including the exterior of the buildings and provides insurance which specifically includes coverage against water damage.  A storm in 2014 caused significant flooding which was repaired.  On August 29, 2021 hurricane Ida made landfall in Louisiana as a category 4 storm.
[brief] ”  (3T9:18-10:16, 27:10-16, 28:24-29:1; 34:11-13, 35:2-4, 41:14-22.)  What’s more, the trial court specifically addressed the comments made by [...] during the January 2020 City Council Meeting – the only so-called “evidence” Defendants cite to support their previously-rejected argument – and emphatically rejected any suggestion that those comments established actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s bad faith claim.  To that end, the trial court found:  There’s nothing in the City Council transcript from January of ’20. . . that even remotely indicates that there was this indication that the school was a deal or an agreement or anything like that.  So I don’t think [Plaintiff] had a basis to speculate about that before February ’21.  [3T27:10-16.]  While Defendants desperately attempt to discredit the trial court’s specific factual findings – unilaterally deeming them “extraneous,” “needless,” and “tentative” – no number of adjectives can erase the trial court’s dispositive findings of fact.  The fact is the findings were rendered – on a full record, following discovery on the issue – with careful deliberation by the trial court.  Those findings necessitate a denial of Defendants’ (re)argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the entire controversy doctrine.  III.
[brief] In attempt to elicit testimony that [...] testified to the Burlington County Grand Jury that [...] was the anonymous caller but on cross-examination said the caller was not [...], defendant started cross-examination by immediately bringing up the anonymous caller.  Through the hostile questioning, [...] identified the anonymous caller as a person named “[...]. ”  [13T10-23 to 13-25].  In an effort to defend himself against allegations of perjury by defendant, [...] testified:  So in that grand jury testimony when I said the anonymous caller was Sasha [...], I would be referring to the person who we interviewed in regards to who provided that information to the caller.  The caller was identified as Sasha’s friend, [...], who gave us and led us to Sasha [...].  [...] was never interviewed on this case.  [...] just called on behalf of a friend and then made the introduction for us to speak to Sasha, who I’m pretty sure this jury heard her testimony.  I did not perjure myself.  If it was - - if I misspoke or if I was - - made any type of assumption that the anonymous caller was Sasha [...], I said to you on Wednesday when I testified, not Thursday, that the anonymous caller was her friend [...] who was just helping out a friend making that phone call and then making the introduction to the police.  [13T14-5 to -21].  The anonymous tip was addressed again when the State cross-examined Luyber as a defense witness.
[brief] *Yellen v. Kassin*, 416 N.J. Super. 113, 119-120 (App. Div. 2010).  The proponent of ownership by adverse possession must establish all of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence.  *Patton v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n*, 93 N.J. 180, 187 (1983).  As the trial court failed to properly place the burden of proof on the Defendant to demonstrate all of the elements of adverse possession, which in turn were not demonstrated by Defendant, the lower court’s decision should be reversed.  As quoted in Defendant’s brief, “When ownership during the statutory period involves more than one adverse possessor, each owner who acquires title must satisfy all elements of adverse possession. ”  *Stump v. Whibco*, 314 N.J. Super. 560, 568 (App. Div. 1988).  Db26.
[brief] (Pa12).  There is no longer a justiciable controversy: any immediate threat of harm from any alleged “mental illness probation” has abated, and there is no indication that he will sustain any injuries due to its existence.  Because a live controversy no longer exists, [...]’s NJDJA claim fails as a matter of law and was properly dismissed.  Likewise, the trial court correctly denied [...]’s motion to amend his pleading as any amendment on this issue would have required the same result.  D.
[brief] In the cases cited to and relied upon by Appellant, the juries were not instructed that a driver is not to be held negligent for skidding if they were operating a vehicle in a reasonably prudent matter; rather, said cases upheld jury verdicts of no negligence in rear-end automobile collision cases.  Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968), is a case often-relied upon by defendants in litigation resulting from rear-end motor vehicle collisions, as it held that an affirmative explanation can be brought forth by the defendant to alleviate oneself from negligence; where the defendant acted reasonably and the collision would not have occurred, but for an issue out-of-the defendant’s control.
[brief] (21T7-8 to 15)  The State then indicated it wanted to elicit from [...] not only Defendant’s alleged words, but also that Defendant refused to give a buccal swab.  (21T7-16 to 24)  Defense counsel objected to allowing [...] to testify that Defendant refused because it would be an impermissible opinion.  (21T11-17 to 12-8)  After further representations by the State, defense counsel expressed confusion as to what precisely the State wanted to introduce and expressed concerns that Defendant’s decision to continue to litigate the State’s application to compel a buccal swab rather than simply submit could “introduce stuff that he discussed with his lawyer. ”  (21T14-14 to 18)  Defense counsel further protested, “you can't just leave it as he refused to give a sample, but, oh, well we won't mention that he did give a blood sample. ”  (21T15-18 to 20)  The court reassured counsel that the jury would hear that Defendant gave a blood sample because the State would have a DNA expert testify that there is a blood sample.  (21T15-21 to 23)  The court attempted to clarify and asked defense counsel whether she wanted to proceed with the 104 hearing, to which counsel responded, “I don't think that's necessary as long as it's just that one statement and not anything—her drawing an opinion as to what he meant. ”  (21T17-12 to 18-7)  At trial, the court permitted Officer Jillian [...] of the [...] to testify that on June 21, 2018, when she was directed to take oral buccal swabs from [...] and Defendant, [...] complied but [...] refused.
[brief] Moreover, [...]’s rules do not authorize nonparty subpoenas, and although N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13(b) might permit nonparty subpoenas for medical records that fall within the scope of that statute, such a limited subpoena power would not assist insurers in cases like this.  For example, whether the medical practice’s ostensible plenary owner is “subject to direction and financial control by the chiropractor-owner of a management company” is highly relevant in these types of cases.  *Northfield*, 228 N.J. at 625.  Without the ability to subpoena banking and other financial records from nonparties, insurers would not be able to establish that critical issue.  Further, “parties [in PIP arbitrations] are engaged in simple, inexpensive, and expeditious dispute resolution.
[brief] N.J.S.A.  10:5-4 states that, “[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment . . . without discrimination .  . . .  This opportunity is recognized and declared to be a civil right. ”  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(a) defines the term “person” as “one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, [and] labor organizations.....”  The statute's plain language notably includes associations and labor organizations.  In this case  Plaintiff simply seeks that its members be able to utilize medical leave without penalization by promotional ineligibility or disciplinary penalty.
[brief] After the Court denied the motion, the [...] sought leave for interlocutory review, which the Appellate Division granted.  Ibid.  The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s ruling and explained that the direct defendants were “entitled to implead [the [...]’s client] and prove his responsibility as a joint tortfeasor so as to limit any allocation of its own fault for Plaintiff/Respondent’s damages, and thereby limit any award against it. ”  Id. at *12-13.  Rather than treating the [...]’s client as a so-called “Burt defendant,” the direct defendants could assert a third-party claim “even though Plaintiff/Respondent, having declined to name [him] as a direct defendant, is not in a position to recover damages from the defendant at issue.
[brief] Each of the issues Plaintiff raises in this appeal is moot.  Plaintiffs have unequivocally agreed, more than once, to arbitrate the underlying dispute with [...]; they have forfeited any ability to now renege on that agreement.  In the Contract between [...] and Plaintiff [...] (which forms the basis for Plaintiffs’ lawsuit), the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising under the Contract.  Then, Plaintiffs consented to Superior Court’s January 4, 2024 order compelling arbitration of this matter (“Consent Order or January Order”).  Further, even if Plaintiffs could have withdrawn their consent by challenging the Consent Order (through appeal or otherwise), they were required to do so within 45 days of that order.  But Plaintiffs chose not to do so.  Instead, Plaintiffs waited until May 2024—five months after the Superior Court had entered the consent order compelling arbitration, and after [...] had already initiated arbitration with the [...] (“[...]”)—to file a Motion to Vacate the Consent Order.  Because the Superior Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate (the “June Order”), reiterating that the dispute was arbitrable, Plaintiffs filed this appeal.  This appeal, which is a last-ditch effort to renege on their agreements to arbitrate, is not only improper, but fails for three reasons.  First, the June Order Plaintiffs are appealing is not a final order.  Plaintiffs have not timely (i.e., within 45 days) appealed an order “compelling arbitration. ”  Instead, Plaintiffs are appealing—without leave—an order denying a motion to vacate filed over five months after entry of the order compelling arbitration.  Plaintiffs’ ploy is an attempt to undo the consequences of their agreement to the Consent Order and failure to appeal it.  Plaintiffs cannot dupe this Court into believing the June Order denying their motion to vacate is a final judgment under Rule 2:2-3(b).  Their appeal is improper and should be dismissed.  Second, even if this Court were to consider the substantive merits of this appeal, black letter New Jersey law requires the rejection of Plaintiffs’ arguments.  Plaintiffs are ultimately trying to bring an untimely appeal of the Consent Order they agreed to, which requires the parties to arbitrate this dispute.  By consenting to the Consent Order, Plaintiffs waived the right to appeal it.  Indeed, Plaintiffs provide no valid reasons why the Consent Order was improper.  Third, even if Plaintiffs had not expressly consented to the order they now appeal, the Court should uphold the Superior Court’s decision that the underlying dispute is arbitrable pursuant to the terms of the parties’ Contract.  Finally, this Court should instruct that the Superior Court action be stayed pending arbitration pursuant to New Jersey and United States Supreme Court precedent.
[brief] d.  Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.  “Undue means” for purposes of Section 8(a) has been defined to apply to cases "which the arbitrator meant to decide according to law, and clearly had mistaken the legal rule, and this mistake appears on the face of the award or by statement of the arbitrator;" or "where the arbitrator has mistaken a fact, and the mistake is apparent on the face of the award itself, or is admitted by the arbitrator himself."
[brief] The First Action is Dismissed.  In the First Action, on December 21, 2020, [...] heard the parties’ arguments and, on January 8, 2021, found that substantial credible evidence supported the City’s blight designation and dismissed [...]’s complaint.  (See Pa142–45.)  The court entered a formal order dismissing the First Action in its entirety on March 4, 2021.  (See Pa151–52.)  C.
[brief] *Id.* at 636.  That aside, the Appellate Division reaffirmed that “contractual limitation provisions should not be read literally, with the one-year period running uninterrupted from the date of the loss. ”  *Id.* at 636–37.  “[S]uch such a reading . . . would be unfair because it would allow, in effect, a ticking away of the limitations period while the insurance company investigated the loss.  *Id.* at 637.  It was thus “evident that between the time the insured gives notice of loss and the time that the insurance company ‘formally denies coverage,’ the statutory period is tolled. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Peloso*, 56 N.J. at 520).  The Appellate Division then held that the limitations period remains tolled until an insurer “unequivocally” denies coverage.
[brief] March 8, 2024  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and on the Brief  Attorney ID No. 081572015  [...]  LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex - CN 006 Trenton, New Jersey  08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Movant) v. [...] (Defendant-Respondent)  Criminal Action: On Motion for Leave to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Granting Defendant’s Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), and R. 2:6-4(a), this letter in lieu of a formal brief is submitted on behalf of the State.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] That being the case, the burden at the Board was on the “proponent” of the use to demonstrate that when the use came into existence it was legal and permitted under Zoning Rules.  [...] made absolutely no effort to address or prove these points at the Board; its position was it had to prove nothing (Da1-6; See 1T49-3 to 75-8).  In its improper belated submission of documents not before the Board, the Sons of Israel tried to claim that no Zoning Approval was required at the inception of that off-site parking use (presumably about 1964).  In its Statement of Facts to the Trial Court, the Sons of Israel made the following assertions as fact, based upon these new documents not before the Board --- the claims were not before the Board and were not correct:  112.  A search of the relevant Ordinances of the [...] reveal that the Ordinances establishing the Land Subdivision and Site Plan Applications were not adopted until 1971, more than six (6) years after [...] constructed its synagogue in or about 1964 and after [...] was constructed.  See [...] Ordinance Adopting Ordinance No. 2000-53 submitted herewith as Exhibit VV (Da224).  113.  Additionally, on February 20, 2019, counsel for the ZBA forwarded a copy of the [...] Revised Ordinance 18-8.1 “Site Plan Required”, which states that site plan approval was not required for non-residential improvements of vacant land (such as the construction of the synagogue on [...]’s Property) until 1984.  See February 20, 2019 email and [...] Revised Ordinance 18-8.1 “Site Plan Required” attached thereto submitted herewith as Exhibit WW. ”  (Da262)  The documents that supposedly supported that claim (Da262) were improperly presented and were not a “fact. ”  To respond and demonstrate the falsity of these assertions, [...] submitted its own additional response documents, being certain 1971 Lakewood Code Pages (Da220-253) along with a 1965 Ordinance (Da254) and 1960’s newspaper articles detailing that Site Plan review and Approvals regularly took place in the 1960’s (Da257-261).
[brief] ........................................46  A.  SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS OF THE PUBLIC ENTITY REGS (NOT ADDRESSED BELOW)  .........................................................................................................................49  B.  ABSECON POLICY (MUCH OF THIS MAY BE MOOT SINCE BRETT HAS HESITANTLY ABANDONED THE “COVER UP” POLICY ALLEGATION.  THERE REMAINS THE AGREED UPON POLICY AGAINST FAMILY/COUNSEL CONTACT.)  (1T52-3-5)..........................54  C. DIFFERENTIAL DISCRIMINATION.................................................................54
[brief] The State cannot assume consent merely because the landlord left the scene.  See *State v. Suazo*, 133 N.J. 315, 323 (1993) (“Absent evidence to suggest that defendant was aware of his right to object to the search . . . , we are unwilling to equate defendant’s silence with a knowing waiver of a constitutional right”).  The landlord knew [...]’s father did not want the police to enter the house and then left without leaving any record of consent to search.  Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the landlord knew that the police wanted to conduct a warrantless search of his own personal property or that he could refuse consent.  The State therefore cannot prove the landlord knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently gave consent.  **B.