ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa45 ([...] Cert. at ¶16)).  Twelve days later, on November 12, 2018, counsel for Appellants submitted the Consent Order to [...] for filing.  (Pa45 ([...] Cert. at ¶17) and Pa126-129 (Exhibit E thereto - Appellants’ Consent Order Submission).  In so doing, counsel for Appellants acknowledged that the parties were dismissing the Chancery Action without prejudice pending the adjudication of the [...] and were “preserving all rights, claims, and defenses of the party in the event of a re-filed action. ”  Id. at Pa126 (emphasis added)).  However, the Complaint does not constitute a Refiled Action as defined by paragraph 3 of the Consent Order because it was filed long after the expiration of the September 13, 2021 re-filing deadline.
[directive] Procedures for De-Activation Upon a Civilian’s Request.  When an officer de-activates a BWC pursuant to Section 6.1 or 6.2, the following procedures shall be followed: 1) the colloquy between the officer and the civilian concerning the request for de-activation shall be electronically recorded; 2) the officer before de-activating the BWC shall narrate the circumstances of the de-activation (e.g., “I am now turning off my BWC as per the victim’s request. ”); 3) the officer shall report the circumstances concerning the de-activation to his or her superior as soon as is practicable; and 4) the officer shall document the circumstances of the de-activation in any investigation or incident report concerning the incident under investigation.  See also Section 9.3 (notations (i.e., “tagging”) to indicate BWC recordings that raise special privacy or other issues).  Cf. R. 3:17(b)(iv) (explaining that station house custodial interrogations must be electronically recorded 4 unless “a statement is made during a custodial interrogation by a suspect who indicated, prior to making the statement, that he/she would participate in the interrogation only if it were not recorded; provided however, that the agreement to participate under that condition is itself recorded”).  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] As evidenced by the promulgation of far-reaching and thorough rules and the efficient enforcement of them, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its commitment to regulating the practice of law and has guarded the public trust inherently implicated by the attorney-client relationship.  The RPCs specifically note that any dual regulation of attorneys should be avoided.  The comments to ABA Model Rule 8.5 Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law (upon which the RPCs are based), state:  []  [M]inimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession).  Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.  ABA Model R. Prof’l Conduct 8.5 Cmt. [3].  In an effort to avoid the type of problem identified in the comments (i.e., multiple sets of potentially conflicting regulations), attorneys are often exempted from the coverage of statutory schemes.
[brief] *4  On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:  POINT I UNDER THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO RECALL THE ONLY WITNESS TO THE ROBBERY TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT AS THE ASSAILANT AFTER THAT WITNESS UNEQUIVOCALLY TESTIFIED THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANYONE IN THE COURTROOM.
[brief] As noted, Paragraph 10 referencing the parking use does not define or state a term or end date of the parking privilege.  In that context, as stated in *West Caldwell v. Caldwell*, 26 N.J. 9, 29 (1958):  Perpetual contractual performance is not favored in the law; and a construction affirming a right in perpetuity is to be avoided unless given in clear and peremptory terms.  It is not often that a promise will properly be interpreted as calling for perpetual performance.
[brief] Defendant then turns to the CFPB’s announcement of its final rulemaking, known as Reg F (16 CFR § 1006 *et seq.*), but fails to explain the context.  Under that regulation, the CFPB adopted a form validation notice which, if used correctly, provides safe harbor against certain FDCPA claims.  The CFPB addressed how the industry could convert to using that form:  The Bureau expects that any one-time costs to debt collectors of reformatting the validation notice will be relatively small, particularly for debt collectors who rely on vendors, because the Bureau expects that most vendors will provide an updated notice at no additional cost.  The Bureau understands from its outreach that many covered persons currently use vendors to provide validation notices.  [Footnotes omitted.]
[brief] See Regan v. New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 355 (App. Div. 1997) (“We also note that plaintiff, when deposed, may not have been aware of the specific statutory provisions implicated.  . . ”).  Plaintiff must demonstrate only that a “reasonable lay person would conclude that illegal activity was going on. ”  See Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 233 (App. Div. 1994).  Indeed, a reasonable perspective on [...]’s conduct was proffered by Plaintiff in her deposition testimony, when she stated as follows:  I don’t know actually what the law would be called when – is that harassment?  Is that – I mean, I’m sure there’s a terminology for it.  Like whether – I’m not sure what you call it.  I’m sure there’s a law, yes.  There’s definitely a law that says that you can’t act like that in your work environment, and you can’t invade people’s personal space, and you can’t hold the door on people, and you can’t, you know, make statements, and, and just create a toxic work environment.  (Pa307).  Defendants’ argument, accepted by the Motion Court, that Plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable, and that the conduct does not constitute statutory harassment is simply contradictory to the statutory language and, instead, likely draws from perceptions of criminal harassment outside of the text.
[brief] (Pa40).  In a fifth tenure charge, the [...] alleged that ¹ “Pa” refers to Appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to Appellant’s brief.  there was a pattern or course of unbecoming conduct over a protracted period.  Ibid.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16,\(^2\) an arbitrator was assigned to the tenure proceeding.
[brief] Ja562; Palamarg, 80 N.J. at 456; Garden of Memories, 109 N.J. Super. at 533; see also Brill, 142 N.J. at 544 (“A party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by submitting an expert's report in his or her favor.  In order for such a report to have any bearing on the appropriateness of summary judgment, it must create a genuine issue of material fact. ”).  Additionally, Defendants reliance on Palamarg is harmful to their cause, not helpful.  There, in 1979, the court analyzed a split in title that occurred in 1913, when a landowner conveyed a parcel to an affiliate on February 12, 1913, by deed recorded February 18, 1913, and then the original landowner conveyed a portion of same parcel to a third party on February 15, 1913, by deed recorded April 25, 1913.  Palamarg, 80 N.J. at 450-51.  What followed was a tangled web of conveyances over the next sixty years until the defendant acquired ownership in November 1973.  Id. at 450.  Reviewing the record, the Court actually determined that there was no record notice, but it remanded for consideration of actual notice and under the separate doctrine of estoppel by deed.  *Id.* at 457-59.  In that light the Court invited expert evidence on the appropriateness of a 60-year title search and how that might impact the case outcome.  *Id.* at 460-61.  That has no relevance to a case in which Defendants failed to review their own deed as well as the less-than-decade-old conveyance to their immediate predecessor in interest.
[brief] 1T42:14-16; Pa0044.  Nevertheless, in a deed dated December 16, 1971, the Strip “mysteriously” first appeared in the chain of title for Defendant’s property.  1T57:3-10; 1T60:4-6; Pa0091.  This 1971 deed conveys property from the [...] to an entity called [...]  1T56:18-24; Pa0091.  However, there was no evidence in the prior chain of title that the [...] had received title to the Strip.  1T61:11-23.  A grantor only has the right to convey land which he or she owns.  See e.g., Poniatowski v. Camac, 3 N.J. Misc. 755, 756 (1925).  The appearance of the Strip in the chain of title for Lot 3 after 1971 was therefore invalid.
[brief] POINT 9:  New Jersey common laws are facts that cannot be otherwise re-examined (Not argued below)  Insurance Company v. Folsom, 85 US 237 reading in pertinent part as follows:  '....By the terms of the Act of Congress permitting issues of fact in civil cases to be tried and determined by the court without the intervention of a jury, it is provided that the finding of the court upon the facts may be either general or special, and that the finding shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury....'  Clearly, Folsom applies to the creation of New Jersey common law by the New Jersey supreme court, and other courts of the state of New Jersey.
[brief] 8.  [...]’s engineers will also bring a laptop with the software—Physical Analyzer—that [...] utilizes to analyze the image extracted by the tools.  Specifically, after [...]’s engineers collect an image on the tools, they will connect the tools to the laptop, using a dongle, and run the Physical Analyzer software to analyze the images collected on the tools.  9.  This software will allow the [...]’s engineers to confirm whether a usable image has been extracted.  10.  If the software confirms that a usable image cannot be extracted, [...]’s engineers will then examine the iPhone itself to analyze whether there are certain settings or applications that are prohibiting a usable image from being collected.  11.  [...]’s engineers will not need to re-image [...]’s iPhone to determine whether a usable image can be collected or whether [...]’s engineers indeed collected a usable image.  12.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.
[brief] The contract provided:  “This agreement is subject to the buyer being able to obtain Pinelands approval and all municipal and state permits required to construct a single-family dwelling. ”  (Ja190, #23).  On August 8, 1986, following review, the [...] issued detailed findings of fact, establishing “the parcel is located in a Forest area” and “a portion of the property is a hardwood swamp. ”  The [...] concluded the lot had “an extraordinary hardship” and granted a waiver to construct a single-family home subject to four criteria: a.  Sufficient dry wells shall be installed to contain all stormwater run-off from the house.  b.  The driveway shall be constructed of crushed stone or other permeable material.  c. All development shall be located within 100 feet of Maple Avenue.  The septic system shall be located between the house and the road.  d.  The septic system shall be located in an area where the seasonal high water table is at least 5 feet below the natural ground surface.  [(Ja190-195)].  Reconsideration options in respect of the waiver were prominently noted on the Pinelands determination, providing an eighteen-day timeframe.  Copies of the determination were issued to the Secretary of the [...], among others.  No reconsideration was sought by any noticed party, particularly the [...].  (Ja194-195).  Following receipt of the unchallenged Pinelands waiver, the [...] purchased the lot on April 1, 1987.  (Ja200).  On December 15, 2014, the [...] re-confirmed the waiver of strict compliance, stating it remained in effect for this lot, and noting the waiver holds the status of “an adjudicated matter” and is entitled to such treatment.  (Ja205).  The [...] has a master plan and ordinances certified by the [...].
[brief] *N.J.R.E. 902.*  In this case, none of the documents was proffered as self-authenticating.  Neither, quite frankly, were the documents or the videos presented to be evidentiary because they were self-authenticating.  (1T18.20-24; 1T23.22-25; 1T39.2-7).  Nor was the video accepted as a self-authenticated video.  (1T20.22-25; 1T24.5-8).  It should be noted that the Court sustained [...]’s objection to at least one document (1T39.11-13), but inexplicably still admitted the document without basis.
[brief] Defendant was convicted by a jury, and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by this Court, with a remand for resentencing.  State v. [...], No. A-4211-16T4 (App. Div. Aug. 16, 2019) (slip op at 1).  Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for Post Conviction Relief (PCR) alleging his trial counsel was inadequate for failing to hire a ballistics expert and further purportedly ineffective for failing to voir dire the entire jury after one single member of the jury was dismissed.
[brief] [(Pa197-98) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). ]  Demonstrably, defendant raised the same factual predicate and same basic argument as he did in his amended first PCR petition – that [...]’ habeas petition would have convinced the jury to find defendant not guilty because [...] would not have been viewed as a credible witness by the jury.  Of course, [...] and this Court had previously determined that [...]’ habeas petition was not sufficiently material to warrant granting defendant a new trial.
[brief] As such, [...] “needed only a reasonable and articulable suspicion that [[...]]’s failure to signal may have affected other traffic. ”  *Ibid.*  Despite the statute requiring a signal be given for at least 100 feet prior to changing lanes, both officers testified that [...] did not activate her turn signal until the car had already crossed the white line dividing the left and right lanes.  (1T16-9 to 13, 18-3 to 19-7, 47-3 to 6, 49-2 to 7).  The judge found the officers credible and accepted their testimony on this point.  (Da5-6, 7).  The traffic violation took place in the early afternoon in a commercial area with businesses lining the road.
[brief] But clearly this is yet another disingenuous gross distortion of fact – as a review of the transcript reveals that the “inconsistency” which the trial court referred to was my indicating that I did not want to bring the case, and then indicating my desire to appeal the ruling.  Here is exactly what the court stated, in its full and proper context:  THE COURT: “So just remember, but don't tell me in the beginning of your case that you didn't want to go ahead and go this far, when you tell me now you're going to appeal?  Well, at least, at least be consistent”.  (1T20:13-16)  Thus the actual truth of course is that the trial court never made any conclusion(s) whatsoever as to either party’s intent, nor about either party’s credibility.  And the accord and satisfaction ruling was not based upon credibility or intent, but rather it was only based upon the trial court’s interpretation of law (i.e. that it didn’t matter whether or not if I had accepted the check “under protest”, nor what the surrounding circumstances were – whenever a defendant’s payment check is cashed, then accord and satisfaction automatically and categorically extinguishes all of plaintiff’s remaining rights and remedies).
[brief] ..................................................  41  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Order for Judgment filed on September 14, 2023.  . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da59-61  Order denying new trial filed on October 7, 2023.  . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da69-70  Order for Judgment filed on November 9, 2023.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da71-73  Order denying reconsideration filed December 1, 2023 .  . . . . . . .  Da74-75  ###  TABLE OF CITATIONS  ####  CASES CITED: | Case Name | Citation | Page | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Henker v. Preybylowski | 216 N.J. Super. 513, 517-18 (App. Div. 1987) | 16, 29, 34 | | Panko v. Flintkote | 7 N.J. 513, 517-18 (App. Div. 1987) | 16, 17 | | Kavanaugh v. Quigley | 63 N.J. Super. 153, 161-62 (App. Div. 1960) | 17, 23 | | Risko v. Thompson Muller Automotive Group, Inc.| 206 N.J. 506, 523 (2011) | 22 | | Cuevas v. Wentworth Group | 226 N.J. 480, 501-502 (2016) | 25 | | Paxton v. Misiuk | 54 N.J. Super. 15, 20-21 (App. Div. 1959) | 28 | | Jackowitz v. Lang | 408 N.J. Super. 495, 504-05 (App. Div. 2009) | 28, 31, 32 | | Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWeber, Inc. | 197 N.J. 81, 128 (2008) | 33 | | Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc. | 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) | 33 | | Caldwell v. Haynes | 136 N.J. 422, 433 (1994) | 40 | ####
[brief] ”  Allstate Settlement Corp. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 F.3d 164, 169 (3rd Cir. 2009).  Numerous federal cases have vacated arbitration awards that were not rendered strictly in accordance with the parties’ agreement.  In Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977), it was held, “an arbitrator's award is not self-executing.  It must be enforced by a court, and it will not be enforced if the arbitrator was not chosen in conformance with the agreement of the Parties to arbitrate or is otherwise unqualified.
[brief] The NJLLA was enacted, in part, to curtail predatory lending practices, including, *inter alia*, charging and/or assessing of unlawful interest—as was done here.  Further, the NJCFLA’s application with respect to debt buyers and collectors has been interpreted by our federal sister courts in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey several times in recent years.  In *Veras v. [...]*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *16-19 (D.N.J. March 17, 2014)*, the District Court held that the plaintiff had properly alleged a claim under the FDCPA because [...] was not licensed under the NJCFLA.  The District Court further held that since the law required [...] to be licensed, [...] was not the lawful owner of the debt.  *Id.* at *19; see also Lopez v. [...]*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (Where the District Court held that a debt buyer had to be licensed under the CFLA and opined, “a debt collector’s representation in a collection complaint that it had the right to collect a debt when, in fact, it lacked the license required to initially purchase the debt, would violate, at minimum, FDCPA section e(10).
[directive] In addition to the residency requirements set forth in section I.A. above, if HDEM only effective the defendant's residence is a minimum distance from the is victim's address.  Specifically, the defendant's residence must be at least 2,500 feet of from the victim's address.  The court shall confirm the . type home or living arrangement prior to ordering an HDEM condition and record the defendant's address in the Pretrial Release Order.  Any modifications to allow the defendant to leave the home or for relaxation ofHDEM restrictions must be made by formal application to the court.
[brief] Plaintiff hired a structural engineer to design an adequate structural support system for the defendants’ system.  However, plaintiff was under the reasonable assumption that it would be given direction on the functionality and drainage of the system that was placed on top of the structural support system.  Given that this system is designed to capture water, plaintiff asserts that defendants had a duty to speak on the issue of drainage where the consumer is only advised that the system will work “perfectly” once the pieces are together.  In the absence of an express disclaimer on this issue, the consumer is left to believe the issue has been vetted by either the design team ([...]) or the installation team ([...]) who has experience with the final product.  As to the third factor, the communications among the parties demonstrate that it was clear plaintiff understood defendants were not structural engineers.
[brief] Entry of Appearance by [...]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pa52  1  Respondents respectfully submit that an exception to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2) applies concerning the submission of trial court briefs.  The briefs submitted regarding the Order to Show Cause are germane to the issues of Laches and Waiver argued by the Appellants.  Without the briefs, the Appellate Division will have an incomplete record as Appellants did not bring to the Court’s attention the Orders to Show Cause in the Procedural History or in their legal arguments.  Accordingly, respondents have included the briefs in their Appendix as germane to the issues on appeal.
[brief] We cannot enroll subcontractors into the CCIP who are performing structural demolition. ” (TRVa2779.)  Thus, within hours, [...] was notified that it could not participate in the CCIP.  On August 3, 2015, [...] of [...] emailed [...] writing [...] “is performing structural demo on the job, they shouldn’t be enrolled. ” (TRVa2781.)  That day, Mickeleit sent [...] additional documents for the work at the property line with the neighboring [...] (the “Project Requirements”), including additional requirements, such as an Exhibit A-Scope of Work for the “[...] Retaining Wall/One Story Structure/Dog Walk (trespass) Work” (Email, TRVa2783, and Attach. at ZURa321-328), and describes the work to be completed over several days as “110 l.f. [i.e., linear feet] saw cutting as directed by Contractor’s superintendent” and “provide 4-6 test locations (chip out concrete structure to locate steel rebar)[.]” (ZURa323.)
[brief] The PCR court also failed to consider the prejudice to the defendant in terms of trial counsel's misrepresentations to the defendant that he secured the experts on his behalf as well as a witness from the [...] in Charlotte, North Carolina, in terms of the defendant rejecting the State's plea offer.  Also, the prejudice in terms of the complete failure to appropriately challenge the most damning evidence against the defendant by filing a suppression motion.  There is no substitute for placing a witness on the stand and having the testimony scrutinized by an impartial fact finder.  Porter, supra.  The defendant asserts that the failure of the PCR court to grant an evidentiary hearing based on the certifications offered in support of the defendant's PCR claims pursuant to Porter, supra, warrants a reversal of the order denying the PCR petition and a remand for an evidentiary hearing.
[directive] Box Trenton, New Jersey  Supplement to Directive #9-05 December 2, 2013  Page3 • N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9a-  Strict Liability for Drug Induced Deaths • N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10b-  Failure to Turn Over CDS to Law Enforcement Officer • N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5j - Possession of a Firearm by a Person Previously Convicted of a Crime under the No Early Release Act • N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22-
[brief] Here, the [...] similarly pleaded that [...] intended to injure [...]’s name, profession, medical practice, and business relationships.  (Da71-75).  Specifically, they allege that [...] fabricat[ed] allegations of inappropriate conduct and misrepresentations.  . . .” (Da72).  The [...] alleged that [...] knowingly made these untrue statements with the “malicious[] inten[t] to injure . . . [[...]]’s . . . practice[,] good name and profession ” by causing [...] “infamy and disgrace. ” (Da73).  And they further alleged that [...] intended to “vex, harass, oppress, and totally ruin [Dr. Rusonnella’s] profession.
[brief] But this standard is deceivingly difficult to meet, as courts are “loathe to invalidate a vote of any citizen. ”  In re Kriso, 276 N.J. Super. 337, 344 (App. Div. 1994).  Courts may not “lightly void ballots and disenfranchise voters[,] because that is a very harsh remedy. ”  In re Courtine, No. A-3712-06T3, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2433, at *4 (App. Div. Mar. 18, 2008).