ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Law Division-Superior Court’s decision to convict [...] on an alternative ground, by sua sponte taking judicial notice of an alternative marker for his violation of N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(1) based on what written on the back of [...]’s ticket, in the section entitled “Officer’s Comments”, was a supplementing of the municipal court’s record.  While the front and back of the ticket was provided to [...] as part of the discovery, and raised briefly in defendant’s original brief, for the limited purpose of further substantiating the factual basis of [...]’s conditional guilty plea, neither the back nor the front of the ticket was ever mentioned on the record at the municipal court.  It formed no part of the factual findings of the municipal court or the plea colloquy between [...] and the municipal court.  What is provided in discovery to a defendant in municipal court does not automatically mean that it forms part of the record in the municipal court.  Nothing in the relevant court rules for municipal court permits such discovery to be considered automatically as part of the record of the municipal court.  Short of the pleadings, pretrial hearings, and the trial itself, nothing else is automatically part of the record in a municipal court.  R.7:7 and R.7:8.  Under R. 7:7-1, the complaint is the only pleading permitted in the municipal court, short of any motion to dismiss being filed by the defendant.  The motion to dismiss was placed on the record on September 13, 2023.  The complaint was only the front of the ticket given to [...] on or about December 10, 2022.  Nothing in the relevant court rules make it clear that any or all the back of a municipal ticket is part of the complaint.  The back of the ticket did not have the word “complaint” stated anywhere as stated clearly on the front.  And the back of the ticket had “unintelligible verbiage” in the section entitled “Officer’s Comments”, a fact admitted by the Superior Court itself on appeal (1T29-17 to 19).  The municipal court was concerned about establishing an adequate record for an appeal.  2T16-19 to 20.  If the front or back of the ticket was sufficient for establishing a record for an appeal to the Superior Court, then there would have been no need for the municipal court to make the factual finding on the record that a pumphouse is an occupied building within the scope of the relevant statute, i.e. N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3).  Discovery provided by the State is not part of the record in the municipal court, other than the pleadings.  The complaint is the pleading by the State, in this case the front of the ticket.  The back of the ticket was not part of the complaint or at least not the part entitled “Officer’s Comments” that included unintelligible verbiage.
[brief] Contrary to appellant’s assertions, the *D’Avila* court properly applied the *Englert* standard and correctly concluded that the indemnification provision was valid and enforceable.  Rather, *D’Avila* analyzed the indemnity language presented to it and appropriately applied the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in *Azurak*.  *D’Avila* at 114-115.  Likewise, the court below conducted the same analysis set forth in *D’Avila*.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., analyzed the language contained in paragraph two (2) and paragraph four (4).  The court below analyzed the intent of the parties and correctly applied the indemnification enforceability standards set forth in Azurak and its progeny.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., did not commit reversible error in reading the contract as a whole; deciphering the intentions of the parties; and appropriately applying the holding in D'Avila.  The court below appropriately and thoroughly analyzed the indemnity provisions of the contract and the intentions of the parties, which the court found to be clear and unequivocal.  As such, the ruling of the court below which obligated [...] to indemnify [...] should be affirmed.
[brief] Subsection D Of The SRD Rule Does Not Apply To The Project Because The [...] Is Not “Adjacent To” The Boardwalk.  Subsection D of the SRD Rule and the view corridor and setback requirements thereunder do not apply to the Project under the language of the rule itself.  The requirements of Subsection D apply only to “new coastal development adjacent to a bay or ocean or bayfront or oceanfront, beach, dune or boardwalk, whichever is further inland. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d) (emphasis added).  The [...] is not adjacent to the boardwalk (the closest of the delineated waterfront features).  2Ra95-98; 2Ra108; 2Ra129; 2Ra159-60.  An approximately twelve (12) foot unimproved right-of-way, the public street [...], and an associated sidewalk separates the Property from the boardwalk, and thus, Subsection D does not apply to the Project.\textsuperscript{10}  Aa31.  The Department’s decision to issue the Permit for the Project is rationally and fairly supported by the record.
[brief] WHETHER TAX FORECLOSURE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT.  --- \(^1\)  This analogy would, at this time, hold true only in 49 states.  Despite the fact that the issue of an unconstitutional taking was not addressed by the trial court other than to say that it was not deciding the issue, Respondent once again argues an issue not before this Court.  As decided by the panel in 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, Inc. v. Roberto\(^2\), ___ N.J.Super. ____ (App.Div. 2023), the decision in Tyler v. Hennepin Co., 598 U.S. 631, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (2023) is prospective in nature, not retroactive.  It is rather audacious for [...] to argue that tax sale foreclosure is unconstitutional when it too acquired the very same property by the very same means.  The term chutzpah\(^3\) comes to mind.  Because this case is not a pipeline case, and the trial court expressly made no decision on this issue, it is not before this Court and should be disregarded.
[brief] ”  Gonzalez v. State, 941 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. App. 2006).  Consistent with the foregoing jurisdictions’ reasoning, “[t]he requirement that the conduct be done ‘knowingly’ . . . establishes a level of mens rea required under the statute that would preclude the hapless pedestrian from being caught in such a broad application of the law. ”  Ibid.  Most recently, in Lee v. State, 973 N.E. 2d 1207, 1208 (Ind. App. 2012), the Indiana Court of Appeals addressed whether Ind. Code Ann. § 35-46-3-10 “was unconstitutionally vague because its language fails ‘to inform an ordinary person of what conduct is prohibited.
[brief] Dated: November 16, 2023  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...], Esq. (#024481994)  [...] Incorporated in Pennsylvania  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Email: [...]  Counsel for [...]  [...], Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of [...], M.D., deceased, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...], [...], [...] AND [...], as Administrator of the Estate of [...], deceased, Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] See Varela, supra, 505 P.3d at 255 (“As for [...]'s assertion that the published guidance establishes a view by [[...]] that regulation of automated vehicles and automated driving systems is exclusively federal, we disagree.  Nowhere in any of the four documents does the Agency make such a claim of exclusive regulatory authority.  Instead, the published guidance acknowledges a continuing and collaborative role for states and explicitly encourages states to review tort liability in the automated vehicle and automated driving system contexts. ”).  The court in *Varela* upheld the constitutional right to seek redress for injury, noting that to the extent that the [...] records reflected a public policy regarding the safety system involved, i.e., automatic emergency braking, the plaintiff’s claims advanced the [...]’s policy in favor of innovation and deployment “more broadly and sooner rather than later.
[brief] THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE IMPROPER COMMENTS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULINGS CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY RESULTED IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE (Pa34; 1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13; 2T40:10-18; 6T48:6-19).
[brief] Legal STANDARD  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS is a prerequisite to the court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant.13  “in resolving a motion under Rule 12(b)(5), the party making the service has the burden of demonstrating its validity when an OBJECTION TO SERVICE IS MADE. ”14  The party MUST PROVE that service was PROPERLY EFFECTUATED by a preponderance of evidence , DiGenova v. United Here Local 274, No. 16-1222, 2016 WL 3144267, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2016).  If the judgment is void **ALL** other orders and issues are IRRELEVANT and VOID.  Every issue that happened subsequent to a void judgment (Pa12; Pa20; Pa94; Pa133) is **without merit** because a void judgment can never gain legitimacy, any argument is also therefore without merit and void (See Armstrong v. Manzo 380 U. S. 5451 551 552).
[brief] **[...] Bears the Adverse Consequences of Not Having Sought a Clarification from the [...] on the Meaning of the Bid Instructions with Respect to Archaeology Subcontractors (0018a). **  We respectfully submit that [...] should have known that naming a PWCRA-registered subcontractor for archaeology services would have been an unusual condition, going beyond what was required by law.  *See*  Part I. A & B, *supra*.  Furthermore, [...] considered the role of the archaeologist to be “significant” under this Contract (*see* Carb5).  We respectfully submit that, under the circumstances, [...] should have sought a clarification from the [...] before bids were due.  The Bid Instructions contain a section requiring bidders to avail themselves of asking questions about the Bidding Documents before submitting a bid, to avoid this type of misunderstanding:  **0.18  QUESTIONS REGARDING BIDDING DOCUMENTS**  Before submitting a Bid Submission, the Bidder shall bring to the attention of the Commission’s Representative any questions or issues for clarification or interpretation including but not limited to: (i) any conflicting information between two or more portions of the Bidding Documents; (ii) any doubt that the Bidder may have as to the meaning, intent, or interpretation of any provision(s) found within the Bidding Documents; and/or (iii) any apparent ambiguity, inconsistency, error, discrepancy, or omission in the Bidding Documents.  Any failure to bring such matters to the attention of the Commission as provided for herein shall bar the successful Bidder from later making a claim for additional compensation from the Commission based on an alleged conflicting provisions, ambiguities, inconsistencies, errors, discrepancies, or omissions in the Bidding Documents.  Furthermore, if clarifications to the Bidding Documents are not requested before bidding as provided for herein, the Bidder shall be responsible to do such work, and furnish such materials as necessary to comply with whichever interpretation of the Bidding Documents that the Commission and/or Engineer, during construction, judges to be proper.  Moreover, any Bidder whose bid is rejected for failing to comply with bid requirements shall have no right to challenge the Commission’s finding and interpretation of the requirements of its Bidding Documents after Bid Opening, if the Bidder failed to bring the alleged ambiguity relating to bid requirements to the Commission’s attention for clarification before submitting the Bid.
[brief] There is no dispute that the 2018 Amended Application contained residential units for low to moderate income families.  However, the denial of the Amended Application was not based on any discriminatory conduct or action by the Township.  The Zoning Board authored its resolution and there is no discriminatory animus to be found in the resolution.  Moreover, the Mayor’s press release made no mention either expressly or implicitly that his opposition was based on any enumerated protected class, let alone due to the “affordable housing units. ”  Notably, the Original Application that contained low to moderate income family units was approved with nary a word about it.  It was only after the Amended Application was made which reduced to size of developable land, but not the intensity of the Project, that the Mayor stated his opposition to the Amended Application.  Even then, those statements in the press release clearly reflected opposition based on the environmental concerns and intensity/density concerns of the Project.  There is simply no factual basis to state that the objections had anything to do with the status of Respondents or any other persons within a protected class.  Likewise, the opposition voiced by the Mayor cannot be separated from the greater context of the Township’s voluntary compliance with its Mount Laurel obligations.  It is without question that the Township has taken proactive steps to ensure compliance with affordable housing obligations.  The Township entered into a settlement agreement with the [...] which incorporated the Township’s obligation settlement and included the Subject Property.  The trial court specifically noted that Township’s history of compliance with its Mount Laurel housing obligations.  There is simply no cognizable basis to conclude that the Mayor’s comments were made with any discriminatory intent or animus toward any protected class, let alone against low to moderate income family units within the Township.
[brief] 10  Meredith v. [...], No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. May 5, 2020, aff’d, 2022 WL 1816530 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2022)....................................................... 33, 34 Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430 (1992).
[brief] See 8T.  The Board engaged in a line-by-line analysis of the condominium fee.  Id. at 138-54.  The Board chose to remove $75 from the condominium fee for the condominium board’s tax preparation cost since the Board found that this cost stemmed directly from the conversion.  Id. at 157:5-14 to 158:18 (Board member [...] summarizing the Board’s reason for striking this fee because “The reason was because those fees are directly attributable to the condo conversion.  So, they didn’t exist before.  And it’s directly attributable.  That’s the reason why originally brought it up and [the Chairman] has brought it to be a motion ... [t]here’s definitely no additional amenity or service”); see also id. at 138:1-139:11; 159:10-14.)  [...] testified that this cost was attributable to the condominium association’s taxes, which obviously only exists because the unit was converted into condominiums.  Id. at 100:17-25.  Thus, the Board’s decision to remove this $75 fee was reasonable, fair, based on the record, supported, and in line with the TPA.  Likewise, the Board’s decision to remove a $123.00 fee from the condominium fee for cleaning and garbage pickup was also proper.  The Board found that based on the testimony presented, this fee was not a reasonable operating expense that would have existed before conversion.  Id. at 149:24-150:6 (Board member [...] finding that he has an issue with the garbage fee because it was something that exists by virtue of the conversion.))  The Board engaged in a lengthy discussion with regards to this fee, with some members believing it should be removed and others thinking it should remain.  Id. at 149:24-159:6.  This deliberative process is the opposite of arbitrary and capricious.  The Board also took note of the fact that the 2016 budget had a garbage fee that was nearly double the cost as what was listed in the 2014 budget.  No adequate reason was provided to explain this increase in the fee.  The Board reasoned that [...] would not be paying this high a fee if he was in a rented apartment instead of a condominium, that the service provided did not justify the fee, and that it was not efficient management to charge an extra $200.00.  Id. at 149:24-150-6; 151:19-22; 152:4-5; 169:2-5; 172:5-173-14; 174:3-9.  Notably, the Board actually allowed the fee but chose to reduce it to a number between the amount claimed in the 2014 budget, and the amount claimed in the 2016 budget, which was a reasonable decision under the circumstances.  Id. at 153:23-154:13; 174:3-6.  Accordingly, the Board reduced the condominium fee by $200 after lengthy deliberation and analysis.  The Board articulated its reasons for this reduction as noted above.  Clearly, the Board did not act with “willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of their circumstances. ”  Bayshore, supra, 122 N.J. Super. at 189.  Therefore, the Board’s decision must stand.
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER PROBATIVE, COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY APPELLANTS (Pa850, Pa852)** | 15 | | **II.  THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO ENLARGE PURSUANT TO R. 4:69-6(c) (Pa852 - Pa853)** | 16 | | **III.  THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN CONSIDERING AN OPPOSITION TO A MOTION WHEN THE OPPOSING PARTY FAILED TO SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO R. 1:6-2(a) (Pa838 - Pa840)** | 23 | | **IV.  THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE [...] COMPLIED WITH N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f) (Pa857 - Pa859)** | 25 | | **V. THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN REACHING DETERMINATIONS AS TO ISSUES THAT WERE NOT YET RIPE (Pa852 - Pa853)** | 28 | | CONCLUSION | 29 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS Order, entered October 18, 2023 ........................................ Pa826 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Brunetti v. New Milford**, 68 N.J. 576 (1975) | 18, 20 | | **Carbone v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Weehawken,** | | | 175 N.J.Super. 584 (Law Div.1980) | 24 | | **Celino v. General Acc. Ins.**, 211 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986)| 23 | | **Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co.** | | | 204 N.J. 569 (2011) | 16, 20, 21 | | **In re Ordinance 2354-12 of West Orange, Essex Cnty. v. Twp. of West Orange,** | | | 223 N.J. 589 (2015) | 16 | | **Kempner v. Edison Tp.**, 54 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1959) | 25 | | **Kramer v. Board of Adjustment**, 45 N.J.268 (1965) | 25 | | **Lawrence M. Krain Assoc. v. Mayor of Tp. of Maple Shade,** | | | 185 N.J. Super. 336 (Law Div.1982) | 25 | | **Scardigli v. Borough of Haddonfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,** | | | 300 N.J. Super. 314 (App.Div. 1997) | 24 | | **Tomko v. Vissers**, 21 N.J. 226 (1956) | 25 | | Rules of Court | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | R. 1:6-2(a) | iv, 22 | | R. 1:6-6 | 23 | | R. 4:69-6 | 1, 3, 15| | R. 4:69-6(c) | 15, 18 | Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f) ........................................ ii, 25, 28 #
[brief] The Firm made a misrepresentation in the Applications.  (18)  The Firm (with [...] signing) made a misrepresentation in the 2016 Application by affirmatively stating that no “attorney [had] been the subject of any [1] bar complaint, [2] investigation or [3] disciplinary proceeding within the past 5 years. ”  [Pa428a, ¶ 8]  When [...] signed the 2016 Application, he knew that the OAE had been investigating him since 2012 and had filed the Disciplinary Action Complaint against him in 2013.  The Firm (with [...] signing) repeated its misrepresentation in the 2017 Application, 2018 Application, and 2019 Application by affirmatively stating that there had been no “new [1] bar complaints, [2] investigations or [3] disciplinary proceedings against any attorney” that were not previously disclosed.  [Id., ¶¶ 10, 12, 14]  When [...] signed the subsequent renewal Applications, he knew that the Supreme Court had issued the Decision censuring him in the Disciplinary Action and knew that he had never disclosed to [...] anything about the OAE’s investigation and the subsequent allegations and findings.
[brief] Thereafter, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. issued an Order on behalf of the Law Division on May 16, 2017, which addressed numerous motions that had been filed by the parties in the Law Division action.  (55a).  In that Order, [...] confirmed that [...]’s prior orders only held that [...] was not obligated to cure the defects on the Property; she stated that those orders were “devoid of any substantive discussion” of the environmental claims and specifically confirmed that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied to those claims.  Moreover, [...]’s decision was not predicated solely upon a holding that the Property did not need to be remediated, but rather upon, inter alia, the fact that the Estate’s Administrator, J. Llewellyn [...], Esq., was under no obligation to cure any defects on the Property.  Id. at p. 11.  [...]’s order is devoid of any substantive discussion of the Defendants’ present allegation, namely, that Plaintiffs negligently maintained the Property prior to its sale, resulting in damages to the Defendants.  The foregoing issue was not decided by [...] in the prior action, and thus neither res judicata or collateral estoppel apply.  Subsequently, the parties engaged in litigation that involved lengthy motion practice related to the eviction claims, which resulted in various Orders, none of which addressed the environmental claims that are the subject of this appeal.
[brief] The purpose of CAFRA is to protect New Jersey’s coastal area from the “ever-accelerating serious adverse economic, social and aesthetic effects” stemming from future inappropriate development in the delicately balanced environment of the coastal area.  N.J.S.A. 13:19-2.  Under CAFRA, [...] developed a comprehensive environmental design strategy known as the Coastal Zone Management Program (Coastal Regulations), a centerpiece of which is the Scenic Resources and Design Rule adopted in 1990.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10.  That Rule requires that buildings close to the waterfront and over 15 feet tall leave 30% of the site open as a view corridor to the waterfront and be separated from the waterfront (here the Long Branch boardwalk) by a distance of two times the height of the building (2 to 1 step back).  The rule also requires that the building be visually compatible with surrounding development and enhance scenic resources.