ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At the time of this incident, closed circuit television cameras (CCTC) were located in the vicinity of the store where the robbery and shooting had occurred; these cameras were operational on the evening of the incident.  According to [...], one camera was installed at the intersection of MLK Drive and Dwight Street and another camera was located at the intersection of MLK Drive and Stegman Street.  The morning after the incident, [...] became aware that portions of the robbery had been recorded by both cameras.  [...] “removed the original VHS tapes that recorded the incident and placed them into evidence and then subsequently [gave] copies [of the tapes] to the homicide unit and the south detectives.
[directive] Have Weapons b.  (1)  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a requisite offense who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a firearm, second degree.  (2)  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a disorderly persons offense  4th Degree $1,000 to $7,500  10% permissible involving domestic violence, who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a firearm, third degree.  a.  Actor operates a motor vehicle while driver’s license is suspended or revoked in this or any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States Territories of American 3rd Degree  $15,000 to $50,000  10% permissible  Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands, or by another country, or without ever Causing Death or having been issued a driver’s license, and is involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting Injury while Driving in the death of another person, third degree.
[brief] The Commission again acknowledges this in its Statement in Lieu of a Brief filed on July 13, 2024 in this appeal.  (p. 14.  “the Commission correctly concluded that, although [...]’s speech related to board business ....”)  Respondent further asserts that “it is questionable whether the evidence that the evidence [sic] presented by Complainants actually establish that there was such an ‘uproar’,” calling the public’s demands that the Board and Respondent be held accountable “sporadic,” and asserting that news articles covering the tumultuous Board meetings and ensuing protests are written by people, and are therefore questionable.  Rb13.  This argument strains credulity.  The argument that these documents do not say what they say, or should not be taken at face value, was not raised below, and must be disregarded.  It was undisputed below that the Board minutes and news articles reflected actual public outcry from the school district community regarding Respondent’s statements.  The illegal discrimination suffered by Jewish people at the hands of Nazi Germany was based upon a racist ideology.
[brief] The Appellant was walking when she felt her feet moving back and forth and fell backwards onto the ground.  Pa52-53, at 39:19-40:15.  6.  Before the Appellant fell while walking through the store for 10 minutes, she did not see anything on the ground such as any liquids.  Pa54-55, at 41:24-42:12.  7.  After the Appellant fell, a person from [...] came to the accident location and cleaned something up off the floor with paper towels.  Pa56, at 44:3-13.
[brief] See Lower Main St. Assocs., 114 N.J. at 243-44 (invaliding noncompliant regulation and finding courts have a “clear and compelling” duty to set aside a regulation when the agency has misused its rulemaking power).  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(2) requires that, prior to adoption of a rule, the agency shall (2) Prepare for public distribution . . . and make available for public viewing . . . a statement setting forth a summary of the proposed rule, as well as a clear and concise explanation of the purpose and effect of the rule, the specific legal authority under which its adoption is authorized, [and] a description of the expected socio-economic impact of the rule .  . . .  An agency engaged in rulemaking must give notice, principally by publication of the proposed regulations in the New Jersey Register.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1); N.J.A.C. 1:30-5.2(a).  Notice must occur at least thirty days before the intended action and must include a statement of the terms or substance of the intended action and the time, place and manner in which comments may be presented.
[brief] PAGE  Mazzeo v. Kartman, 234 N.J.Super. 223, (App. Div. 1989)  . . . . .  36  Garford Trucking, Inc. v. Hoffman, 114 N.J.L. 522, (Sup.Ct. 1935)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36  Norca Corp. v. Tokheim Corp., 227 A.D.2d 458, 643 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App.Div. 1996)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40  RGC Int'l Investors, LDC v. Ari Network Services, Inc. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1161 (D.Del. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 State v. Hancock, 210 N.J.Super. 568, (App.Div. 1985) . . . . . 36 State v. Rowland, 183 N.J. Super. 558, (Law Div. 1982)_. . . . . . 36 UNPUBLISHED CASES [...] v. [...] [...] 2006 WL 27624 (App. Div. Jan 6, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43,44 [...] v. [...], [...] 2008 N.J.Super Unpub. LEXIS 2586 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 OTHER AUTHORITIES N.J.S.A. 12A:2-206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1979.
[brief] Plaintiff and the Defendant both filed motions for summary judgment which resulted in the trial court granting the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on March 3, 2017 and denying the Defendant's cross motion (Pa 18-19).  On February 12, 2018, Appellant filed a motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment.  This motion was denied on March 16, 2018.  On March 19, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and to allow Defendant to file a complaint against Plaintiff for fraud.  This motion was denied on April 26, 2019.  (Pa 20)  On May 15, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to force [...] to recuse himself and to dismiss the foreclosure action.  The motion was denied on July 26, 2019.  (Pa 21)  On August 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed its Motion for a Final Judgment of Foreclosure.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS IT CIRCUMVENTED MEDIATION AND SHOWED NO INTEREST TO ARBITRATE (Not raised below.)  Appellant incorporates by reference statements made through his point one as if fully set forth within.  In disposing of the appellant’s case, the trial judge stated the following, stating that he knew that the respondents were attempting to work out a compromise with the appellant, but he was defiant (1T12, 20-23):  THE COURT: “[...], ‘-‘ I know you're trying to work out a compromise with him, but it doesn't seem that he's open minded at this time. ”  The trial judge had such conviction and belief, yet he found no need to do any of the following:  a.  To schedule the case for mediation (the mediation step was circumvented by the court’s accord and initiative).  b.  To take interest in learning what the terms of such alleged compromise was, less to use his power to arbitrate the matter. \(^1\)
[brief] Overall, despite Defendants’ contentions, Plaintiff is not asserting that simply the “withholding of PTO” is the only act of retaliation committed by Defendants.  Instead, it is the several instances in which Defendants created a “sufficiently severe or pervasive” alteration of Plaintiff’s conditions of employment, leading to her termination, which is the basis for the retaliatory action.  El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 176 (App. Div. 2005).  Therefore, although [...] did not rule in this regard, this Court should find Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of adverse employment action in her Complaint.
[directive] Decision to Decline a Civilian’s De-Activation Request.  If an officer declines a request to de-activate a BWC pursuant to Section 6.1 or 6.2, the reasons for declining the request (e.g., the officer believes that there is a reasonable possibility that it may be necessary to use constructive authority or force during the encounter) must be documented and shall be reported to the officer’s superior as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so, unless the agency’s policy prohibits de-activation authorized by Section 6.1 or 6.2.  6.4.1  In the event that the officer declines a de-activation request, the officer immediately shall inform the person making the request of that decision.  An officer shall be prohibited from misleading the person making the de-activation request pursuant to Section 6.1 or 6.2 into believing that the BWC has been turned off when in fact it is operating unless the County Prosecutor or designee or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee expressly has authorized covert recording.  Note that pursuant to Section 4.5, an officer may not decline a request from an apparent crime victim to discontinue recording of the encounter via the BWC.  6.5
[brief] ”  *Johnson*, 42 N.J. at 162 (citations omitted); *State v. Segars*, 172 N.J. 481, 500-501 (2002) (internal citations omitted).  Put another way, the Court should have “[a] definite conviction that the [lower court] went so wide of the mark” and a mistake was made based on a “[m]anifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding, obvious overlooking or under evaluation of crucial evidence.
[brief] “Q: Okay.  Now, the -- would a -- is it – the [...] Lease that was in effect as of January 27, 1994, is it your professional opinion that a reasonable buyer would have ignored the [...] Lease at 77 cents a square foot if they were considering purchasing the property at that time?”  A: I think a prudent buyer with a prudent attorney would have the lease and they would have read the lease to find out that [...] actually built the building. ”  7T19:17-25.  The [...] themselves testified that they purchased the Property for an alleged $2.475 million knowingly subject to the ACME lease of $0.77 per square foot:  “Q: Okay.  Now if we turn to the third page which has the rent roll, under the first tenant listed is [...].  Do you see that?  A: [...] is on the top, yes.  Q: Yes.  It says 14,200 square feet with a rent of 77 cents per square foot.  Is that what you understood when you purchased the property in 1988?  A: Yes.  This is what was the rent that was paid on -- on 1988 when I bought the center.  Correct.  Q: And the [...] -- so the [...] rental was generating $10,998 annually, right?  A: Yes.  The rent was that.  Q: Yes.  And it indicates the law – you purchased this in 1988.  The lease was due to expire in 1989, and it had five -- well, this says five five-year renewals.  A: Yes.  Q: Is that how you understood it?  A: Yes.  Q: So that would have been 25 years after 1989 [...] had rights to lease the property?  A: Yes.  ***  Q: And so that -- so [...] had rights to this site until the lease that was represented to you through [...] through 2014.  A: I don't understand the question.  Q: [...] lease -- A: [...] -- Q: -- was in effect if they exercise their options through 25 years after December 31st, 1989.  You understood that, right?  A: Yes.  You know, there was five five-year options with original term.  The record is clear that as of January 27, 1994, the ACME lease would lock any owner of the Property to $0.77 per square foot for the 14,200 square foot space, for the next foreseeable 25-years.  It is wholly unreasonable for any arms-length buyer to disregard the ACME lease as of January 27, 1994, and the [...] should not be treated any differently from such an arms-length buyer under the principles of just compensation.  The Trial Court did not err in its October 14, 2020 Order denying the [...]’ Motion to Bar [...] from using the ACME lease in his valuation.
[brief] When one of the in-court sheriff’s officers dutifully notified [...] of the events of the courtroom in her absence, Defendants never objected (6T, at 54:17-23; 7T, at 24:21-25:20).  When [...] politely asked Plaintiff to either stretch at counsel table or in the hallway, Defendants never objected (7T, at 25:21-26:4).  When Plaintiff requested to stand during his direct testimony, Defendants never objected (3T, at 16:24-17:2).  When Plaintiff entered the well to gesture to the TV monitor and continued to testify without returning to the witness box, Defendants never objected (3T, at 50:22-  Throughout two more full days of trial, Defendants never objected.  When [...] prepared charges to the jury, which included those regarding improper influence, Defendants never objected (4T, at 117:6-135:13).  Before their closing argument, where they attempted to use Plaintiff’s actions and expressions to their benefit, Defendants never objected.  And after the jury was released for deliberations, and Defense counsel placed on the record their congratulations to [...] for presiding over a fair trial, they still never objected (5T, at 30:11-16).  If Plaintiff’s conduct during voir dire was truly so prejudicial, with such capacity to influence the jury, how could Defendants possibly have failed, at every stage of trial, to object on the record, or even voice the smallest shred of dissatisfaction?  Or, is it more likely that Defendants not only never saw it as a problem, but even considered it a potential boon to their case?  And that it is only now that they have heard the jury’s verdict that Defendants scramble to reverse engineer a possible ground for a new trial?  ---
[brief] Defendant relies on several unpublished opinions, all of which, like Copling, predate the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cuff. (Db38).  In each of those cases, unlike here, the sentencing court did not articulate its reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon in any detail.  Defendant also claims that [...] failed to properly consider the overall fairness of the sentence imposed.  This is simply not true.  Torres requires that courts imposing consecutive sentences give an explicit statement explaining the overall fairness of the sentence imposed.
[brief] Use of words such as confusing and secret appear as an attempt to discredit [...].  Those tactics do not change the fact that [...], a sophisticated company who has engaged in numerous real estate transactions since their inception failed to object to the use of land that they belatedly claimed was theirs.  The Statute of Limitations on objecting ran in June of 2006.  The purchase date of this Lot 22 from the [...] happened in October of 1985.  This means that there was never an objection for a period of 36 years after the property was purchased and by the time there was a claim of ownership of Lot 22, Adverse Possession had resulted in the property being fully owned by [...].  [...] per the Title Survey owned part of Lot 22 as noted in Parcel B.  After the passage of thirty years, [...] then owned the total of Lot 22.  There is nothing confusing about that statement.  [...] slept on the right to Lot 22 and by 2021 Adverse Possession had already resulted in the total of Lot 22 being owned by [...] via operation of law.
[brief] When evaluating the applicability of the ECD, a court makes its initial inquiry as to whether the claims "arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions."  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 109(2019) (quoting DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253(1995)).  The ECD does not require that successive claims share common legal issues for the doctrine to bar a subsequent action.  *Ibid.* (citing *Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 220 *N.J.* 591, 605 (2015); *DiTrolio*, 142 *N.J.* at 271).  Rather, "the determinative consideration is whether distinct claims are aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise from interrelated facts."  *Ibid.* (quoting *DiTrolio*, 142 *N.J.* at 271).  In *Schindel*, the decedent, [...], executed three wills which the son, [...], contested on the grounds of undue influence.
[brief] (Da29.)  The complaint included two causes of action: A breach of contract claim, and a claim for specific performance seeking to compel the Defendant to consent to releasing the deposit to the Plaintiff.  (Id.)  Defendant answered the complaint on August 24, 2022.  (Da62-68.)  It denied the material allegations, raised as affirmative defenses failure to state a cause of action, set-off from settlements or agreements, and failure to mitigate damages, but did not assert any counter-claims, third-party claims, or a certification of possible additional claims or parties.
[brief] The claim that Plaintiff continued to send unapproved pre-conference forms to staff does not set forth a basis for non-renewal.  The claim that Appellant’s Observation in December of 2018 was Ineffective is inaccurate as noted above at the Observation referred to.  The claim that Appellant refused to sign the December 2018 Observation Form is inaccurate.  [...] was required to notify the Appellant that the Observation Form was ready and failed to do so.  Further, the claim that Appellant was reprimanded is untruthful as [...] testified that he never reprimanded Appellant.  (Pa330, [...] Deposition 5/11/2022, T28:23-25, T29:1-3; Pa211, [...] Dep., T173:11-13)  It was claimed that Appellant ordered the wrong AP Testing Materials which delayed actual testing but, the Appellant was not responsible for ordering testing materials.  Appellant testified that in her first two years at [...], she did not order testing materials and that this was usually the job of guidance counselors.  [...] admitted that the Testing Coordinator was responsible for ordering AP Testing Materials.  (Pa348, [...] Dep. 10/28/22, T44:20-25, T45:1-8; Pa211, [...] Deposition, T179:6-15, T180:14-18).  The claim that Appellant humiliated Child Study Team members in a meeting by claiming that they did not do their job intentionally mis-stated what Appellant actually stated in the meeting which was we dropped the ball; she did not single out the Child Study Team.  Appellant included herself in taking responsibility.  Further, this meeting was a closed-door meeting involving faculty, therefore, there was no embarrassment for all of the members of the Child Study Team as was alleged as one person complained of this.  (Pa211, [...] Dep., T177:1-25, T178:1-16)  The claim that Appellant responded to multiple students with statements about not sleeping with them is inaccurate.  A statement made to one student was taken out of context.  Appellant actually stated to the student a phrase to the effect that the student woke up on the wrong side of the bed and that the student should not be disrespectful to Appellant.  While [...] tried to use this statement taken out of context to discredit Appellant, he never met with Appellant about this statement which he now claims to be important.  (Pa211, [...] Deposition, T175:1-19, 22-25, T174:14-17)
[brief] The [...] ([...]), established by L. 2016, c. 22, is a consortium that was designed to support [...] in meeting its transportation needs with respect to non-public students.  (Ra306).  A 2020 study found that the [...] saves the District over $11,000,000 as compared to the District bidding and managing all routes.  (Ra306-07).  But these savings were not passed on to the District.  Instead, any savings were used to provide courtesy busing — that is, non-mandated transportation — for both public and private school students “in accordance with the local government’s preferences. ”  (Ra307).
[brief] On October 15, 2018, the [...] held a hearing on Defendant’s Supplemental Application.  Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant were present.  No witnesses were sworn in.  During the hearing, members of the [...] made comments regarding their understanding of the historic use of the Sixth Street Lot for parking, including their own purported observations.  At the time of the [...] hearing, the 2017 Judgment determined the Sixth Street Lot had historically been utilized by Plaintiff for parking.  Although Defendant’s appeal of the within matter was pending at the time of the [...] hearing, the Trial Court’s factual findings and legal conclusions were binding on the [...] and that board was collaterally estopped from making contrary findings no parking by the Plaintiff’s congregants had occurred on the Subject Property.  (Pa4-27; Da177-209; Da218-221)  Additionally, the unsworn statements of the [...] members are inadmissible hearsay.  While transcripts of prior trial testimony are admissible under N.J. Court Rule 4:49-1(a), (transcripts of testimony of witnesses in prior proceeding in same case is admissible regardless of the availability of the witness), under N.J.R.E. 801(c) hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  The statements made by the members of the [...] regarding the historical use of the Sixth Street Lot are inadmissible hearsay.  The members were not under oath, were not cross-examined, and their statements do not fall within any hearsay exception.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] III.  THE RESCISSION OF THE POLICIES CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF CONTRACT.  (29)  The trial court relied on its erroneous decision that Plaintiffs made a material misrepresentation in the Policy Applications to grant summary judgment and dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.  Not only should the dismissal of this claim be reversed, but summary judgment should be granted affirmatively to Plaintiffs that Defendants’ rescission of the Policies constitutes a breach of contract.  The trial court correctly set forth the elements for breach of a contract but misapplied them here based on its incorrect determination of a material misstatement by Plaintiffs.  Once that error is corrected, then Plaintiffs have met each of the elements to demonstrate that Defendants breached each of the Policies by rescinding them.  Specifically, Defendants failed to perform their obligations under the Policies by rescinding them and not providing coverage for the [...].  Accordingly, the Court should reverse the trial court’s decision and (i) deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim; and (ii) grant Plaintiffs’ summary judgment on Count I of the Amended Complaint.
[brief] Bodycam footage,\(^3\) which captured part of [...] and [...]’s encounter with police, shows two men in handcuffs.  One of the men is in front of a row house with the number “33” on the front door, which was open at the time.  The handcuffed man can be heard telling police that he lives at that address,\(^4\) and a distraught woman can be heard excitedly speaking to the officers, mostly in Spanish.  (Ex C 7:30 to 13:15)  At one point, the woman can be heard saying “my house,” while gesturing toward number 33; she can then be heard referring to the man in handcuffs as “mi hijo. ”\(^5\) (Ex C 10:15 to 10:47)  When a records check confirmed that neither [...] nor [...] had outstanding warrants, the two men were finally released.  (Da 28)  The other group of men, which consisted of [...], [...], [...] and [...], were standing on the other side of --- \(^3\)  At the suppression hearing, the Defense introduced footage from body cameras worn by [...] and [...].  (1T 27-2 to 27-4; 1T 32-14 to 32-19)  A DVD with a copy of the footage is appended to this brief as “Da 24. ”  The footage from each bodycam is in a separate file: the file named “Ex B” contains the footage from Devine’s bodycam; and the file named “Ex C” contains the footage from Wizbicki’s bodycam.  The citations used in this brief refer to the bodycam video by their file name, and include the start and end times indicated by the timestamp on the recordings.  \(^4\)  According to USPhonebook.com, a person with the name “Joshua [...]” lives at [...] in [...].  See [https://www.usphonebook.com/address/33-leonard-ave_camden-nj](https://www.usphonebook.com/address/33-leonard-ave_camden-nj) (last visited 1/15/2024).  \(^5\)  According to SpanishDictionary.com “mi hijo” means “my son. ”  See [https://www.spanishdict.com/translate/mi%20hijo](https://www.spanishdict.com/translate/mi%20hijo) Leonard Avenue, closer to Federal Street, when they were stopped and frisked.