ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Reporting 11.1  All law enforcement officers who operate law enforcement vehicles in vehicular pursuit situations shall complete a report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the vehicular pursuit and preferably before the end the shift in which the pursuit occurred.  If the officer involved in the pursuit is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.  11.2  Vehicular pursuits resulting in the death or serious bodily injury of any civilian shall be handled in accordance with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2019-4.  As soon as any local, county, or state law enforcement agency learns of a vehicular pursuit that resulted in death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, the agency shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office for the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) Director or their designee.
[directive] TO THE FORFEITURE  "CosD Bond Disposition Instructions"  >i*  I  C  Attachment [ "Request for Post Forfeiture Refund" Directive June No. Rev. 1996 19, 4 , of Page 9 10  1  D  Attachment [ PROCEDURES  These forms have been developed to serve as the standard documents to effect the Disposition of Currency Held in Customs Suspense Accounts; Cost Bond Disposition Instructions; and Requests for Post Forfeiture Refunds.  These forms will serve as authorizing and control documents  No to effect the action required.  other documentation will generally be required by EOAF or the [...].  of  Except for those portions the form notated for EOAF  1. use, the submitting agency should ensure that all applicable portions of the form are legibly completed, and the form is signed by the authorizing officer.  2.  Completed forms should be submitted to or FAXED to: Disposition Desk  [...]  [...]  FAX: [...]  Each agency is responsible to maintain the operative 3 . documents, as established by agency policy, that direct the required dispositions.  Rev. Directive June No. 1996 4 19, of Page 10 10 . . .  DEPARTMENT  THE TREASURY OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR ASSET FORFEITURE  DIRECTIVE NUMBER: 9  DATE: October 1, 1993
[brief] The grounds upon which a plaintiff may pursue a malpractice claim against an attorney in the absence of an attorney-client relationship are exceedingly narrow.  See, Green v. Morgan Properties, 215 N.J. 431 (2013).  In Green, the Supreme Court noted its “tradition[] reluctan[ce] to permit a non-client to sue an adversary’s attorney” and quoted LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62 (2009) to explain that the “good reason” for doing so is the inevitable chill on zealous advocacy which would result from permitting such suits:  [O]ur reluctance to permit non-clients to institute litigation against attorneys who are performing their duties is grounded on our concern that such a cause of action will not serve its legitimate purpose of creating a remedy for a non-client who has been wrongfully pursued, but instead will become a weapon used to chill the entirely appropriate zealous advocacy on which our system of justice depends.  [LoBiondo, 199 N.J. at 100.]  The Green Court then emphasized that “[o]ur ordinary reluctance to permit non-clients to sue attorneys remains unchanged. ”  Green, at 460.  The limited circumstances under which non-clients can bring a claim against attorneys who did not represent them are not applicable on the facts of this case because of the complete lack of privity between Plaintiffs and the [...].
[brief] Pa256.  Absent from the opinion, however, was any discussion by the trial court of the City’s affirmative defense regarding its anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policies and its enforcement of those policies.  See generally Pa254-264.  As a result, the City moved for reconsideration.  Pa265.  On reconsideration, the trial court granted the City’s motion and in turn granted summary judgment dismissing Appellant’s Complaint.
[brief] (Dep. of [...], at T.33:10-23; 34:18-24)  At the time of the incident in 2019, he continued to shop for [...] at [...] and was paid for his services.  (Pa88-Pa89; Pa68-Pa69)  [...] testified that generally speaking, if he bought products for [...] at [...], he would utilize a credit card that was given to him by [...] and that at the time of the incident, he did not possess any other credit cards from any other companies.  (Pa83)  Victor [...] (“[...]”), who had been director of operations for [...] since 2018, testified that [...] relies on [...] and [...] for essential products to prepare meals.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 163.  The medical examiner was unable to determine the cause and manner of death following an autopsy, but, after reviewing the defendant’s statements, concluded that “the cause of death was bathtub drowning and the manner of death was homicide. ”  *Ibid.*  The medical examiner acknowledged on cross-examination that “there were several other possible causes of death he could not rule out based on the autopsy,” including the possibility that the baby died “in utero or immediately after birth.
[brief] ”  Although all records contain information, not all information is embodied in a record.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (defining “government record” or “record” beyond mere information); see also N.J. S.A. 47:1A-3 (distinguishing between records in subsection (a) and information in subsection (b)).  Amidst OPRA’s predominant focus on records is a single subsection found in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) that requires the release of ongoing investigations information under limited circumstances.
[brief] R. 4:87-1(a).  Under N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-3, a guardian or trustee must account in the Superior Court as required by court order.  If a trustee, for example, failed to account as required by the court, and a beneficiary filed an action to compel an accounting under R. 4:87-1(b), it is doubtful that the court would deem the requirement to account discretionary simply because the applicable Court Rule was drafted as a “one-size-fits-all” rule for several differing fiduciary situations.  In addition to N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2 requiring an administrator to account after one year, the New Jersey Uniform Probate Code requires a trustee to provide reasonable information to beneficiaries so that they may “protect their interests,” and to promptly respond to a beneficiary’s request for information about the trust administration.
[brief] Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986)................................................33  Town of Windsor, Vt. v. Hartford Acc. Co., 885 F. Supp. 666 (D. Vt. 1995)  ..........................................................29  Truck Ins. Exch. of Farmers Ins. Group v. Century Indent. Co., 887 P.2d 455 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)  ....................................................22  Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dep’t v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 775 F. Supp. 718 (D. Vt. 1991) ..........................................................37-38  Weisburgh v. Mahady, 147 Vt. 70, 511 A.2d 504 (1986)  .........................................................26  XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Loral Space & Commc’n, Inc., 918 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011) ..................................38 Statutes & Other Authorities: 1 [...], Insurance Claims Disputes, § 4:17, at 4-160 ..............................22 11B V.S.A. § 8.31(a) .............................................................................14 22 [...], Holmes' Appleman on Insurance § 136.11 (2d ed. 2003) ...21, 22 Couch on Insurance § 200:49 (3d ed. 2005) ...........................................21 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:29B-4(9) ..................................................................34 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:29B-4(9)(n) ............................................................34, 42 R. 4:46-2(c) ..........................................................................................19 R. 4:42-9(a)(6) .......................................................................................3 SCCA Declaration of Condominium § 12.1(d) ...........................................15 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 504 (2d ed. 1987) ...............................................................................39 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 § 4724 ....................................................................34, 42 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 41a .....................................................................17, 45 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27A, § 4-117(a)
[brief] After the incident, [...] showed a Restaurant Depot membership card issued to Defendant/Respondent [...] d/b/a [...]’s (improperly pled as [...]) (“[...]”) to a Restaurant Depot employee.  There is no dispute that [...], against whom a default judgment is entered, is an independent contractor and a 1099 employee\(^1\), who shops for [...] on an as-needed basis.  [...] submits that there is no proof that [...] actually shopped for [...] on the day of the incident.  Nevertheless, even if [...] did shop on behalf of [...] on the day of the subject incident, [...] cannot be held liable for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries that were caused by [...] as the law unequivocally holds that the negligence of an independent contractor cannot be --- \(^1\) https://www.irs.gov/faqs/small-business-self-employed-other-business/form-1099-nec-independent-contractors imputed to his principal.  Based upon the well-established law and uncontroverted facts, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of [...].
[brief] (Pa0199-0211).  “Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases . . . that fall within that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ”  *D'Atria v. D'Atria*, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401, 576 A.2d 957 (Ch. Div. 1990) (emphasis added).  Stated differently, “a litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process. ”  *Id.*  When it belatedly granted reconsideration, the trial court stated, “Massachusetts law mandates application of the ‘time-on-the-risk’ approach by pro rata allocation.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  In the early 1960s, the entire rectangular corner parcel of about 300' by 300' in downtown Lakewood, now known and designated as Block 69 Lots 5 and 8 and having frontage on Fifth Street, Sixth Street and Madison Avenue, was owned by the [...] and was used as the [...], for grade School students.  The School building was much smaller than presently.  In approximately 1962, the [...] entered a relationship with other religious-oriented entities, [...] and the New [...].  On December 31, 1962, the [...] executed a Deed (Da166) conveying a vacant 150 foot by 150 foot portion (now Lot 8) of its parcel to the New [...].  That Deed did not include any easement to Lot 8 for use of the School's remaining Lot 5.  On January 7, 1963, the [...] entered into a written Agreement with [...] and New [...] with 10 numbered paragraphs, providing for various mutual cooperations on the uses of the adjoining Lot 5 and Lot 8.  (Da13)  The dispute arises out of that 1963 Agreement --- whether paragraph 10 of that agreement established a permanent parking easement on Lot 5 (and an express easement for the Synagogue to use the Sixth Street boiler room) or only a temporary license that was waived, terminated, or ended by subsequent conduct and/or actions.
[brief] The Plaintiffs’ Property is located at [...], [...], [...].  The Property is improved with a “[...]” carry-out and delivery store, which had on-site customer and employee parking with access via [...].  The Property is located in a redevelopment area designated by the City of [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq.  The redevelopment of the area is known as the Downtown [...] Development Project (the “Project”).  --- \(^3\)
[brief] 249 N.J. at 403.  Here, the court erred in its consideration of both.  As to the first consideration, Comer requires courts to presume that the hallmark qualities of youth are present in all juveniles, thus requiring mitigation: “a juvenile offender has no burden to produce evidence that his brain has not fully developed in order for the first factor to be considered in mitigation. ”  249 N.J. at 407.  To rebut this presumption, “[o]n rare occasions, the State might be able to present expert psychiatric evidence as proof that a particular juvenile offender possessed unusual maturity beyond his years.  If unrefuted, the first factor would not weigh in the defendant's favor. ”
[brief] In 2010 and during the initial Feld II and Feld III mandatory Rule 4:69–4 case management conference, [...] prophetically described plaintiff’s drafted complaints as “criminal indictment roadmaps. ”  On the eve of a November 2010 plenary hearing, certain [...] related defendants blinked.  The original [...] Phases 1 & II non-urban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemptions were reapproved and restated as urban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemptions.  In addition, plaintiff alleged that defendants deprived him of certain substantive rights, privileges and immunities secured by our State Constitution and certain post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  Plaintiff described his Eight Counts as follows:  I.  Voiding Walk-On Late Starter [...]  30 Year [...] Long Term Tax Exemption Ordinance 6PSF-E Adopted March 6, 2019  II.  Declaratory Judgments/Prerogative Writs on Certain Repetitive Long Term Tax Exemption Issues of Public Importance  III.  Impairment of our Robust Marketplace of Competing Ideas and Violations of Our State Public Policies in Favor of Open Transparent Accountable Local Representative Democratic Government IV.  Impairment of our Federally Regulated Municipal Capital Markets  V.  Failure to Supervise VI.  State Created Danger  VII.  New Jersey Civil Rights Act Violations VIII  Section 1983  Violations  Improper Removal and Delayed Remand  Back
[brief] See, e.g., [...] et al., Forensic Comparison and the Matching of Fingerprints: Using Quantitative Image Measures for Estimating Error Rates through Understanding and Predicting Difficulty, 9 PLOS ONE 5, 1, 10-13 (2014) (despite a three-minute time limit, fifty-six fingerprint examiners “highly accurate” with false-positive rate of 3% and false-negative rate of 14%; in light of logistical constraints, authors “would suspect that error rates in forensic laboratory settings could well be lower”); [...] et al., Identifying Fingerprint Expertise, 22 Psych. Sci. 8, 995 (2011) (concluding trained, qualified examiners far more accurate—a false-positive rate of 0.68% and a false-negative rate of 8%—than novices with little training—55.18% false-positive rate and 25% false-negative rate); [...] et al., Human Matching Performance of Genuine Crime Scene Latent Fingerprints, Law & Hum. Behav. at 1 (2014) (following up on Tangen 2011 study to determine experts and “intermediate trainees” were far more accurate than novices in close non-match scenarios; experts had 1.65% false-positive rate while novices had 56.73% false-positive rate; “qualified, court-practicing fingerprint experts were exceedingly accurate at discriminating prints compared with novices”); [...] et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions, 108 Procs. of the Nat’l Acad. of Scis. 19, at 7733 (2011) (finding after 17,121 decisions on fingerprint matches from AFIS-style database, examiners made correct identifications 99.8% of time and correct exclusion decisions 88.9% of time, with false-positive rate of 0.1% and false-negative rate of 7.5%); [...] et al., *Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions by Latent Fingerprint Examiners*, 7 *PLOS ONE* 3, 1 (2012) (following up on Ulery 2011 study and finding after a seven-month interval, examiners repeated their decisions 92% of time on mated pairs and 86% of time on non-mated pairs, and examiners reproduced others’ decisions on 87% of mated pairs and 80% of non-mated pairs); [...] et al., *Factors Associated with Latent Fingerprint Exclusion Determinations*, Forensic Sci. Int’l 275, 65 (2017) (following up on 2011 and 2012 studies and determining after 3,730 valid responses, identifications were correct 99.9% of time and exclusions were correct 76.6% of time, with false-positive rate of 0.2% and false-negative rate of 5.5%).
[brief] Appellant did not submit pre-or post-trial briefing.  On June 23, 2022, the Court entered an Order entering Judgment in favor of Respondents awarding $4,757,133.15 in compensatory damages under Counts I, II, III, IV, and pre-judgment interest, offsetting the award by $39,600 for the value of Appellant’s interest in [...].  (Da6)  The Court also entered an Opinion on June 23, 2022.  (Da9)  The Opinion made the following conclusions of law:
[brief] Did jurors vote to convict defendant because they found merely that the State had proven the ordinary elements of aggravated manslaughter?  As noted, the instruction said numerous times that indeed they should; they “must” do so.  Or, did jurors follow the later instruction on self-defense that sets forth the State’s obligations to disprove self-defense?  The simple answer is that we have no idea which instructions they followed.  All we can know is that they could not logically have followed both commands because those commands could not be more at odds.
[brief] The lack of focus on this point is likely because it is indefensible.  *Slater* does provide one mechanism to withdraw a plea, due to a colorable claim of innocence.  *Id.* at 151.  But there are many mechanisms to withdraw a plea that have nothing to do with innocence and to which *Slater* has no applicability.  For example, a defendant is entitled to withdraw a plea when: - He pleaded to an illegal sentence.
[brief] The earliest time record of [...] entry evidencing a meeting with “clients” after the delivery of the draft contract documents is June 16, 2016.  By email to [...] dated June 7, 2016, [...] attached a revised Lease, amending section 4.2 (b) and (e) setting the new Lease Commencement Date as July 1, 2016 and the Rent Commencement Date as September 1, 2016, and adding section 3.6 clarifying that the free rent period does not eliminate Tenant from paying all carrying charges.  [...]’s email indicated that these changes were as a result of his discussion with [...].  These changes are the only changes discussed and made to the proposed Lease agreement, and no changes were proposed by [...] to the Option Agreement.  In the same email, [...] requested that [...] provide the following documents and information:  confirm who will be guaranteeing the Lease and provide a current financial statement and most recent tax return for that person; address for Tenant; NAICS number; Certificate of Insurance; first month’s rent in advance in the amount of $25,000; security deposit in the amount of $50,000; Certification of Formation; Certificate of Good Standing; Operating Agreement; and Resolution authorizing the managing member to sign the Lease on behalf of [...] (Pa1371).  By letter dated July 1, 2016, [...] wrote to [...] advising that he revised the Rider to the Lease and the Lease to reflect the amended proposed use of the Property as a bakery and restaurant on the first floor and a retail store on the second.
[brief] Every application for workers' compensation made on or after the effective date of this amendatory act shall include notice, as approved by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, concerning the availability of workers' compensation coverage for self-employed persons, limited liability partners, limited liability company members or partners.  That application shall also contain a notice of election of coverage and shall clearly state that coverage for self-employed persons, limited liability partners, limited liability company members and partners shall not be provided under the policy unless the application containing the notice of election is executed and filed with the insurer or insurance producer.  The application containing the notice of election shall also contain a statement that the insurer or insurance producer shall not be liable in an action for damages on account of the failure of a business, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or partnership to elect to obtain workers' compensation coverage for a self-employed person, limited liability partner, limited liability company member or partner, unless the insurer or insurance producer causes damage by a willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission.  The failure of a self-employed person, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or partnership to elect to obtain workers' compensation coverage for the self-employed person, the limited liability partners, the limited liability company members or the partners shall not affect benefits available under any other accident or health policy.
[directive] County Prosecutor’s Response  A.  Based on an assessment of how the facts relate to the above Evaluation Criteria, the representative(s) of the County Prosecutor’s Office, at their sole discretion, may choose to respond and designate the matter as a Criteria Case.  1.  In such a case, the procedures set forth in this Joint Crash Investigative  *  If a New Jersey Division of State Police vehicle is involved the New Jersey Attorney General’s Guidelines, “New Jersey Police Vehicular Pursuit Policy,” rev. 12-2001, or, if subsequently revised or superceded, the most recent version of this Policy, shall apply.  - 4 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE  NO. 2004-2  JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS
[brief] Plaintiff proved that there will no substantial detriment to the public good, whether from traffic, sound, or visual impact from the buildings.  [...], P.E., PTOE, Plaintiff’s Traffic Engineer, testified in support of his written report, and concluded that the proposed development will result in “very minimal, if any,” degradation of service at the intersections surrounding the Property: Florence-Columbus Road and Old York Road; Florence Columbus-Road and Burlington-Columbus Road; and the site access point.  (2T 8:16-23).  The traffic counts incorporated the three new neighboring warehouse projects, were within the industry-standard 10% deviation, and deemed reliable and accurate by the NJDOT and County.  (2T 10:2-25; 3T 9:15-21 through 12:1-14).  Mr. Hoffman’s traffic study also addressed “trip assignment”, or how trucks would travel to and from the facility.  About 80% of the truck traffic would use the Interstate 295 interchange, and the other 20% would travel west along County Route 656 to Route 130 to access the New Jersey Turnpike–Pennsylvania Extension.  (2T 7:20-25; 8:1-3).  Therefore, very few trucks would utilize the two intersections about which the Board expressed concern.  In Mr. Hoffman’s experience, post occupancy traffic counts are often lower than pre-development traffic projections.  He has found that “relatively consistently, [the post occupancy traffic count] numbers come back lower than the ITE projections.  ITE is generally considered to be conservative. ” (3T 33:25 through 36:1-3; 57:21-25 through 59:1-24).
[brief] Respondent relies upon and incorporates the Statement of Facts set forth in its initial Letter-Brief.  (Rb5-6).  ¹  "Rb" refers respondent's initial Letter-Brief filed on Jun 7, 2024.  "Ra" refers to respondent's appendix to its initial Letter-Brief.  "Pb" refers to petitioner's Brief filed on June 21, 2024.  "1T" refers to February 21, 2024 motion transcript.  "2t" refers to March 14, 2024 motion transcript.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I