ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Page4of6  III.  Changes the Decision-Making Framework (DMF) to  To operationalize these statutory amendments, the Court has revised the DMF to add two new steps.  The revised DMF is appended here as Attachment New  1.  Step 3 in the DMF sets forth those firearm related offenses that automatically result If of in a recommendation no release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(f). it is of determined that a defendant's current charges include one these firearm-related of "No Release offenses, the result will be a Pretrial Services recommendation Recommended (Charge(s) include Graves Offenses subject N.J.S.A. 2A:162- to 20(f))."
[brief] ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Peterson v. Williams*, 85 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 519 U.S. 878, 117 S.Ct. 202, 136 L. Ed.2d 138 (1996)).  Here, the temporary exclusion of members of the public was limited in both scope and duration, and there was no objection by defense counsel at the time the court gave the order.  We are thus satisfied that the circumstances presented here are more in line with the situation we confronted in *Venable* than in *Cuccio*.
[brief] 7 POINT I IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE FOR THIS COURT TO GRANT THE INSTANT MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL ......................  7 POINT II  JUDGE BRENNER ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFFS’ AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT INSUFFICIENT AND DISMISSING DEFENDANT HELPING HAND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH WITH PREJUDICE (Pa77; 3TR8:1-9:7)  .....................................................  9  A.  The Affidavits of Merit Supplied by the Plaintiffs are Statutorily Sufficient (Pa41, 57) .................................................................................................  9  B.  [...]’s decision improperly found that the Defendant cannot be vicariously liable (2TR45:20-46:3)  ..........................................................  15  C.  The Plaintiffs were improperly precluded from conducting discovery on the issue of vicarious liability as to Defendant [...] (2TR42:25-43:12)  ........................................................................  18  D.  The Plaintiffs were improperly denied the ability to cure any deficiencies pertaining to the Affidavits of Merit (3TR8:1-9:7)  .....................................  20  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................
[brief] [...] made the motion to see our attorney about injunction, seconded by [...], passed by majority.  [...] is to follow up and see our attorney .  . . .” (Da538).  - **April 2, 1949 OBSC Meeting Minutes** – Report from Grounds Committee that letters were sent to owners regarding chimney pipes “against rules and regulations”; “an injunction had been obtained against [property owner] and they agreed to comply with the rules and regulations of the club”; and that applications for fences were rejected “and returned to [...] for more information, especially on [property owner’s] who are erecting buildings without approval or submitting plans.
[brief] Plaintiff in this action alleged nursing negligence, violations of the NHA, wrongful death and punitive damages claims arising from allegations that due to inadequate tracheostomy care, decedent [...] developed a mucus plug causing his death during his January 13 to 15, 2016 admission to [...].  (See Pa11-21; Pa44-61; see also Pb4 (citing Pa11-21). )  By way of background, the NJDOH, in response to plaintiff [...]’s correspondence dated February 12, 2016, expressing concerns regarding her father [...]’s Care One admission, conducted an investigation including “a tour to assess resident care, discussions with residents and staff, a review of medical records and other pertinent facility documents including staffing reports.
[brief] Da110.  The Order was later amended on January 25, 2022 to transfer the matter for arbitration to a different arbitrator.  Da113.  The only issue for arbitration was the fair market value of the Property as of the date of the valuation (subject to issues specifically reserved for appeal in the Court’s October 20, 2021 Order, including the unresolved issues of remediation, withdrawal of deposit funds, the motions to bar expert testimony, and the setting of the valuation date).
[brief] Id.  Thus, while there is no legal authority for the proposition that the appointment of an SHO is limited to cases in which widespread hostility toward affordable housing developments is apparent, such hostility is apparent in this case.  Indeed, the more relevant inquiry is whether a particular property has been subject to unfair, hostile treatment by a reviewing board and politicians possessing power, as occurred below.  The Trial Court correctly made such findings as to the treatment to which the Subject Property was subjected, and that property is a property required by the Township’s affordable housing plan designed to assist in satisfaction of the Township’s Mount Laurel obligations.  In sum, there is ample legal authority justifying the Trial Court’s appointment of a Special Hearing Officer, and it was required in this case given the ongoing hostility of Defendants towards Plaintiffs and their Applications designed to assist the Township in meeting its Mount Laurel obligations as memorialized in the Settlement Agreement and the Judgment of Compliance and Repose.
[brief] Rule 3:21-5 (b)  14  Rule 1:6-6 19  NEW JERSEY STATUTES  NJSA 2C:39-3 (e)  2 NJSA 10:6-2(c ) 10, 19 NJSA 59:3-3 NJSA 59:3-14 NJSA 10:1-2 NJSA 10:5-4 NJSA 59:2-2 (a)
[brief] Defendant argues that he established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and his petition for post-conviction relief was improperly denied without an evidentiary hearing.  Specifically, defendant contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to: challenge the “sneak and peak” warrant as unconstitutional, investigate or present potential alibi evidence that defendant was at a hotel in North Carolina from February 27, 2009 to March 1, 2009, and for failing to have the “juror letter” independently tested by DNA and fingerprint experts.
[brief] In that regard, the record below demonstrates significant, troubling behavior on behalf of Defendant.  The transcript of the post-judgment oral decision contains at least five references to the “unconscionable” results of this contractual relationship.  The Trial Court held that “part of what I found was that anything otherwise [other than reformation] would be unconscionable. ”  6T11:1-2.  The Trial Court held that the Defendant’s position in this matter to be, essentially, “[w]e just want your money and then we could do what we want and run the garage. ”  6T11:24-25.  Thus, the Trial Court properly found that “that is unconscionable and that is why the formula needs to be revised. ”  6T12:1-3.  Accordingly, no matter how the Trial Court labeled its March 15, 2024 Order, whether as reformation, or a remedy for breach of contract, or otherwise (i.e. the form of relief), it directly addressed Defendant’s significant misconduct and provided appropriate relief to [...] to remedy the misconduct.
[brief] The prosecutor also asked [...] about a letter dated August 13, 1994 from defendant to [...]’s sister.  (2T25-29).  That letter, which the prosecutor read into the record, contained the following excerpt:  I talked to [...].  We just said what’s up and I told him it was fucked up what [[...]] is doing.  . . .  I am talking about testifying against me.  I don’t care if it’s for less time or not, he’s going to regret it.  I’ll get him, you can count on it.  My boy [...] (phonetic) went to church Friday in here.  He told me he seen [[...]] down there, so I’m going to break his jaw.  I’m telling all of my boys to go to church too so everyone can hit him.  I know he’s your brother, but he’s got to pay for what he did.  [...]\(^3\) . . . knows and I hope you can understand.  So, what’s up out there?  Anything new or have all of you just been getting funktified (phonetic).  In here, I’ve just been getting my props up.  A lot of people know me in here now.  I got people watching my back, so I ain’t going to worry about shit.  I ain’t going to worry about getting [...] no more either because one of my boys that’s in here is getting out soon and he said he’ll get [...] for me.  [2T26:21-27:13].
[brief] The 2003 reexamination specifically identified the bayfront areas as “an asset for the revitalization of the Borough. ”  Further it made two salient recommendations:  -development and redevelopment of both public and private properties for the long term economic health of the community in the bayfront area should remain an important factor in the economic health of the community.  Efforts to protect the beach and dunes, enhance public access, and expose the waterfront’s potential should be encouraged and coordinated with State and County plans.  -it should remain the Borough’s intention to explore the opportunities associated with mixed-use development and other commercial and recreational uses that could enhance the waterfront’s potential.  (Pa716-740).  Most recently, the Master Plan was reexamined in 2015.
[brief] “Da” defendant’s appendix; “Db” defendant’s brief; “Sa” State’s appendix; “1T” Transcript dated February 3, 2020; “2T” Transcript dated September 20, 2021; “3T” Transcript dated September 21, 2021; “4T” Transcript dated September 22, 2021; “5T” Transcript dated September 23, 2021; “6T” Transcript dated September 29, 2021; “7T” Transcript dated September 30, 2021 (vol. I); “8T” Transcript dated September 30, 2021 (vol. II); “9T” Transcript dated October 1, 2021 (vol. I); “10T” Transcript dated October 1, 2021 (vol. II); “11T” Transcript dated October 5, 2021; “12T” Transcript dated October 6, 2021; “13T” Transcript dated October 7, 2021 (vol. I); “14T” Transcript dated October 7, 2021 (vol. II); “15T” Transcript dated October 8, 2021 (vol. I); “16T” Transcript dated October 8, 2021 (vol. II); “17T” Transcript dated October 12, 2021 (vol. I); “18T” Transcript dated October 12, 2021 (vol. II); “19T” Transcript dated October 13, 2021 (vol. I); “20T” Transcript dated October 13, 2021 (vol. II); “21T” Transcript dated October 14, 2021 (vol. I); “22T” Transcript dated October 14, 2021 (vol. II); “23T” Transcript dated October 15, 2021 (vol. I); “24T” Transcript dated October 15, 2021 (vol. II); “25T” Transcript dated October 19, 2021 (vol. I); “26T” Transcript dated October 19, 2021 (vol. II); “27T” Transcript dated October 20, 2021; “28T” Transcript dated October 21, 2021; “29T” Transcript dated October 22, 2021; “30T” Transcript dated January 4, 2022.
[directive] Common Prescription Medicines verified medical emergency  Common medicines that you cannot take while in drug court unless there is a and the doctor has indicated that there is no other reasonable medical alternative to the proposed medicine, explained why, and the expected duration, include but are not limited to:  Analgesics  Benzod iazepi nes Stimulants (painkillers) (anti-anxiety drugs) • Darvon or Darvocet (Propoxyphene) • Ativan (Lorazepam) • Adderall • Gabapentin (Gabril, Neurontin, Gralise) • Librium (Chlordiazepoxide) • Adderall XR • Percocet or Percodan (Oxycodone) • Valium (Diazepam) • Concerta • Tylenol 3 (with Codeine) • Xanax (Alprazolam) • Mydayis • Vicodin (Hydrocodone) • Ritalin Over the Counter (OTC) allergy/cold/cough medication containing any of the following compounds • Diphenhydramine • Phenylpropanolamine • Alcohol • Dextromethorphan • Doxy lam ine • Propylhexadrine • Pseudoephedrine Examples of OTC medicine to avoid: • Actifed • Coricidin D • Sinutab • Benadryl • DayQuil • Sudafed • Benylin • Dimetapp • Tylenol Cold • Benzedrex • Neo-Synephrine • Vicks 44D • Comtrex • NyQuil • Vicks 44M • Contac • Robitussin Sinus • Zytrec-D • Sine-Off Medicinal Marijuana Promulgated via Directive #01 -20 (01 /03/2020), CN 12527 page 1 of2 Important Points to Remember Never take any medication prescribed for someone else such as your mother, father, Other People's sisters, brothers, boyfriend, girlfriend, friends and neighbors.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the Orders of the motion court compelling arbitration.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  *Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent,*  *[...]*  By: *s/ [...]*  [...]  Dated: March 13, 2025  March 20, 2025  Via eCourts  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division 25 Market Street Trenton, New Jersey 08611  Re: [...] v. [...] et al.  App. Div. No. [...]  On Appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J. Ch, Dear Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:
[brief] The grant of summary judgment on this issue, like all other determinations made by a trial court on a summary judgment motion, are reviewed *de novo* with “no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court. ”  *Temploy Fuedte De Vida Corp v. National Union First Ins. Co of Pittsburgh*, 224 N.J. 189, 198 (2016)  **B.  The Court Erroneously Granted Summary Judgment on an Argument Not Advanced In the Defendants’ Moving Papers and Wrongly Focused on the Nexus Between the Payment and the Redevelopment Plan**  In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, [...] did not argue that there was a nexus between the $2,000,000 payment and the redevelopment plan or with the construction of its apartment complex.
[brief] This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services.  [Ibid. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.)]  In adopting the lodestar method for calculating attorney’s fees under federal and state fee shifting statutes, the Rendine Court cited with approval the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) that the Johnson and Lindy factors are “subsumed” in the lodestar calculation.  Id. at 325-26 (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-900) (emphasis added).  The Court then stated that the trial court’s determination of the lodestar amount is the most significant element in the award of a reasonable fee because the function requires the trial court to evaluate carefully and critically the aggregate hours and specific hourly rates advanced by counsel for the prevailing party to support the fee application.
[brief] [...]’s reversal of [...] was an abuse of discretion**  Defendants also fail to address the fact that the decision at issue – whether to dismiss or stay the case on comity grounds – was a matter within [...]’s discretion, and had been briefed to him three times between 2017 and 2022.  Even if Defendants *had* established the existence of “special equities” permitting the trial court to depart from the strong presumption in favor of this first-filed action (Defendants failed to do so), [...] still had discretion to deny the motion and retain this first-filed action.  *See Sensient Colors Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 193 N.J. 373, 390 (2008) (“[t]he determination of whether to grant a comity stay or dismissal is generally within the discretion of the trial court”).  When Defendants moved to reconsider only 3 weeks after [...]’s January 20, 2023 Orders, nothing had changed except the assigned judge.  Thus, the motion to reconsider brought to [...] sought not to correct an error of law, but to obtain a different exercise of the court’s discretion.  New Jersey law is clear that such practice is improper.  Where a matter is left to a trial court’s discretion, there can certainly be cases that will present a “close call,” and where reasonable minds might disagree.  Although [...] might have viewed the comity issue differently than [...], she erred by entertaining [...]’s immediate motion to reconsider and then doing a complete 180, dismissing the case based on the same comity arguments [...] had previously rejected three times.  Permitting one judge to immediately overturn a previous judge of coordinate jurisdiction in these circumstances is inequitable, arbitrary and capricious, and a flagrant form of judge shopping.
[brief] Once these calculations are made, the arbitrator must make a final calculation [].  Id.  See also Atlantic City, 2013 NJ PERC LEXIS 38, PERC No. 2023-82, 39 NJPER ¶161 (May 13, 2013)(remanded back to the interest arbitrator for re-calculation of base salary increases).  Further, the Commission specifically held that “reductions in costs resulting from retirements or otherwise, as well as any increases in costs stemming from promotions or additional new hires would not affect the costing out of the award… .”
[brief] After a thorough review of the Township Committee’s reasoning for amending Ordinance 2022-15, [...] stated “there is, at a minimum, a finding that the redevelopment plan is, in part, inconsistent with the master plan. ” (3T.63:9-11; emphasis added).  She recognized, however, the parameters of N.J.S.A. 40A:-12A-7(d), by stating “… upon a majority vote of the [Committee members] and with the articulated and supported reasons,” the adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 “cured any possible defect [in the Redevelopment Plan].” (Id.:63:11-14).  Relying upon the LRHL, the trial court acknowledged the Committee’s right to adopt a redevelopment plan, or an amendment to the redevelopment plan, that is not consistent with the Master Plan, but only by an “affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d).  Plaintiffs/Appellants contend in their brief that the Committee did not properly amend Ordinance 2022-15 (Pb24), but (setting aside for a moment that this claim has been waived), nowhere in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(f) does it state a prescribed manner in which a governing body must prepare an amendment or revision to a redevelopment plan.
[brief] Defendant was indicted on December 14, 2016.  (5T7-20 to 22).  Superseding Indictment [...] issued in June 2017.  (1T3-3 to 5).  A second Superseding Indictment, [...], was returned on December 20, 2018.  (5T8-2 to 5; Da1).  It charged defendant in six counts:  Counts One and Two each charged second-degree official misconduct, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2; Count Three charged second-degree pattern of official misconduct, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7; Count Four charged third-degree tampering with public records, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7(a)(1) and (2); Count Five charged third-degree theft by unlawful taking, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(g); and Count Six charged fourth-degree falsifying records, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4(a).  (Da1-12.)  Trial on the Second Superseding Indictment took place on various dates from April 11, 2022, to May 10, 2022.  (7T – 21T).  Defendant was convicted on Counts Two, Three and Five, but acquitted on Counts One, Four and Six.  (21T47-15 to 59-12).  Defendant was sentenced on March 15, 2023.  (22T).  On the second-degree official misconduct conviction (Count Two), defendant was sentenced to five years of imprisonment, with five years of parole ineligibility.  (22T132-8 to 13).  On the second-degree pattern of official misconduct conviction (Count Three), defendant was sentenced to a concurrent term of five years of imprisonment, with five years of parole ineligibility.  (22T133-1 to 7).  The third-degree theft conviction (Count Five) merged with Count Two.  (22T133- 11 to 15).  Mandatory fines were also imposed.  (22T132-22 to 25; 22T133-8 to 10).  The court also ordered forfeiture of defendant’s pension and future public employment, since his conviction of official misconduct involved dishonest conduct.  (22T130-3 to 131-18; Da19).  Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on May 12, 2023.  (Da20-23).
[brief] ”  Id. at 82 (emphasis in original); see also Cleveland & P.R. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 235 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1914) (“It is equally well settled that an impairment of the obligation of the contract, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, must be by subsequent legislation. ”).  “Contract impairment claims brought under either constitutional provision entail an analysis that first examines whether a change in state law results in the substantial impairment of a contractual relationship and, if so, then reviews whether the impairment nevertheless is ‘reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. ’”  Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245, 259 (2016) (quoting U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)).  This inquiry involves a three-pronged analysis: whether 1) a contractual right exists in the first instance; 2) a change in the law impairs that right; and 3) the defined impairment is substantial.
[brief] opportunity to litigate its Hackensack Project claims but failed by holding back a “secret claim” as part of its “strategic piecemeal ‘gotcha’ litigation tactics. ”  [...]’s App. Br. at 2-3.  Neither is true, and the Trial Court correctly found that not only did the claims in the PTA Arbitration concern completely separate issues of fact and law than the claims asserted in the Hackensack Arbitration, but also [...]’s Hackensack Project Claims were not ripe at the time of the PTA Arbitration and could not be asserted.
[brief] On January 31, 2020, Plaintiff was speaking with inmate [...] who asked Plaintiff a question and Plaintiff answered it with a neutral tone.  [...] called both inmates’ names and told them they had to lock in for four hours because they were being loud; b.  He was lying as they were not being loud.  Plaintiff walked to his desk and asked him to speak with a Shift Supervisor; d.  Plaintiff also asked him for a grievance form and he denied Plaintiff both.  Plaintiff walked toward her cell.
[brief] Indeed, our Supreme Court’s analysis in Cole not limit its application only to an implied arbitration waiver.  The record below, in a thorough analysis conducted by the Trial Court, established that the Plaintiff-Respondent did not rely upon the subject waiver, and it did not provide the Appellant any unfair advantage under circumstances infinitely less impactful than precedent that has directed arbitration.  Falling short of calling Plaintiff-Respondent’s argument below subterfuge, the Trial Court recognized on reconsideration that he failed to support that the subject arbitration clause did not exist.  Confronted with that finding, the opposition desperately manufactures any number of issues to distract from and to avoid being held to the agreement and arbitration provision that he reviewed, considered and agreed to.  Applying the Cole criteria, Defendants-Appellants accordingly seek enforcement of a valid arbitration agreement, notwithstanding the waiver upon which Respondent relies.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................  7  I.  The Trial Court’s Dismissal of Count One Should be Reversed because it Incorrectly Concluded the Master Deed Authorized the Developer to Sell a Common Element to the Condominium Association (T1¹, p. 17, Ins. 7-15) ........................................  7  Legal Standard ......................................................  8  Applicable Law ....................................................  9  A.  The Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded that Section 8(e) Authorized the Sale of Unit 74, Which is a Common Element (T1, p. 17, Ins. 10-15).  .........................  10  II.  The Trial Court’s Dismissal of Count Two Should Be Reversed Because the Court Failed to Adequately Explain its Basis for Dismissal (T1, p. 17, Ins. 7-16)  ..................................  13  III.  The Dismissal of Count Three Should Be Reversed Because the Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded Section 8(e) of the Master Deed Authorized the Sale of Unit 74 (T1, p. 18, Ins. 15-23).