ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] d) ¿Entiende usted que debe suministrar a la agencia apropiada del orden público información sobre [Sí/Yes] [No/No] (si el su acceso habitual o uso de una computadora o un aparato con capacidad de Internet? delito se cometió el 25 de febrero del 2008 o después de esa fecha)  Do you understand that you must provide the appropriate law enforcement agency with information about your (if the offense was committed on or routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability? after February 25, 2008) e) ¿Entiende usted que si no le notifica a la agencia apropiada del orden público sobre su acceso [Sí/Yes] [No/No] habitual o uso de una computadora o un aparato con capacidad de Internet o sobre un cambio en dicho uso o acceso, es posible que le acusen de un delito de tercer grado y podría recibir una (si el delito se cometió el el primero de julio del condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 5 años 2014 o después de esa fecha) o es posible que le acusen de un delito de cuarto grado por el cual (si el delito se cometió el 25 podría recibir una condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 18 meses de febrero del 2008 o después de esa fecha, pero antes del primero de julio del 2014)?  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency about your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability or a change in such use or access, you may be charged with a (if the offense was committed on third degree crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years or after July 1, 2014) or you may be charged with a fourth degree crime and may receive a sentence of (if the offense was committed on or after February 25, 2008 but before July imprisonment of up to 18 months 1, 2014)?
[brief] If there were no prior judicial process that had determined the parties’ rights, then Plaintiff might have a good argument.  But there was a prior judicial process, and concluding that retroactivity is measured by --- 8 Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).  something other than that judicial process runs afoul of a rule announced in Reynolds v. Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758 (1995): "New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed."
[brief] 1T 6/10/24 (trial)  2T 6/13/24 (trial) that culture.  Defendant declined to consummate the marriage (thus no children were born of it).  A1-4.  Plaintiff affirmed that there was no reasonable prospect of reconciliation between the parties and asked the court to declare the marriage null and void.  A1-4.  Plaintiff testified at trial and told the family judge that he moved with his family to the United States from India in 2010.  1T53.  Plaintiff and his family are very religious; they follow traditions and are moderately conservative.  1T53.  Plaintiff graduated from pharmacy school at [...] in August 2019 when he was around 24 years old.  1T55-56  At that time, his family wanted him to start looking for marriage prospects, which led him to the marriage app, [...].  1T55-56.  **Plaintiff and Defendant’s Initial Communications**
[brief] In that case, the planning board denied an application, not by reference to a zoning or subdivision ordinance, but rather based on its finding that the development was "unsuitable."  261 N.J. Super. at 661.  As [...] explained: El Shaer involved compliance with the bulk requirements of the zoning ordinance.  What is implied in El Shaer, but not articulated, is that the applicant's design failed to conform with all of the specifications and standards of the subdivision ordinance.  Hence, El Shaer properly concluded that rejection of the subdivision was sustainable because various design features presented dangers to the public welfare.  However, by not referring to the pertinent subdivision standards, El Shaer implied that a planning board had the inherent power to reject a plan without reference to those standards.  The trial court here understandably so interpreted El Shaer, and sustained the rejection of plaintiff's application without reference to any of the provisions of the local ordinance.
[brief] Plaintiff’s experts completely fail to negate the many other well-known and admitted potential causes of her claimed injuries.  (OB 13-14, 29-33, 41-43)  In fact, Plaintiff’s experts concede her injuries could have occurred without exposure to the phantom silicone particulate no one ever saw.  [...] testified “I don’t think that the silicone particulate would be a cause of the [retinal] detachment certainly. ” (Da0047, pp. 58-59)  And [...] testified that “she has multiple risk factors” and “all of those risk factors…could have led to a retinal detachment…[i]n the absence of a silicone particulate. ”  (Da0150, pp. 112-13)  [...] did nothing to rule out the many recognized alternate causes, including Plaintiff’s serious underlying inflammatory eye disease, years of surgeries and procedures, decades-long smoking history, over a dozen intravitreal eye injections, and a *Retisert® implant coated with silicone (10 times larger than a 300-micron silicone particulate)* that dislodged at the same location and time as Plaintiff’s retinal detachment.  (OB 8, 13-14, 29-33, 41-43)  Plaintiff devotes a single sentence to argue her experts were “aware of and considered” these independent causes (Opp 46), but fails to explain how they reliably *excluded* each when, as noted, they admit every one of the enumerated risk factors could have independently caused her injuries “*in the absence of a silicone particulate.*”  **IV.
[brief] [...] misrepresents the trial court’s analysis of the law at issue which governs Plaintiff’s underlying claims.  (Db29).  There is no lack of clarity regarding the law governing a builder’s remedy claim and whether a redevelopment designation is proper under the LRHL -- the underlying claims which should be analyzed under Crowe.  The trial court merely noted that there is a lack of judicial precedent on all fours regarding the ability of a municipality to condemn the property which is the subject of a builder’s remedy claim where the municipality has been judged to be in significant violation of its constitutional obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for the development of affordable housing.
[directive] The eCourts Expungement System may be accessed at:  https://www.njcourts.gov/self-help/expunge-record Page 4 of 5  For additional information and training materials please see visit the eCourts Training Page (https://www.njcourts.gov/attomeys/ecourts/user-guides) under the eCourts Expungement System section.  An in expungement packet remains available the Self-Help Center and in hardcopy form in the courthouses for those unable to access the eCourts Expungement System.  Recent Enhancements
[brief] The Appellant, as pro se, furthers Counsel’s point by informing [...] testimony is not only unreliable he committed perjury.  Appellant’s Point IV indicates:  The plaintiff’s Witness [...] opened the door to in-court and out-of-court identifications 50.  His November 8, 2021 signed complaint counters his hearsay testimony of [...] giving him the defendant’s name on November 9, 2021; he counters again when he says he actually “knew” the defendant as of November 2 (IT18:15-16) relieving [...] and [...].
[brief] ”  1B J. Moore & J. Wicker, *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 0.410[1], at 359 (2d ed. 1983).  [746 *F.2d* at 983-84.]  Causes of action are deemed part of a single “claim” if they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.  If, under various theories, a litigant seeks to remedy a single wrong, then that litigant should present all theories in the first action.
[brief] *Ocean Cty. Bd. of Realtors v. Beachwood*, 248 N.J. Super. 241, 244 (Super. Ct. 1991).  Moreover, a certificate of occupancy was required in order to sell property.  *Ibid.*  Enlargement was warranted because the ordinance affected every homeowner seeking a certificate of occupancy to sell their home, as well as every realtor.  *Id.* at 247-248.  Given the extensive reach of the ordinance and the potential for continuing violations, the Court found sufficient public interest to warrant enlargement.
[directive] In order to avoid the inappropriate “double counting” of a single aggravating circumstance, this aggravating factor shall not be used where the defendant is subject to the D.O.R.O. violation Special Application and Enhancement Feature defined in Section 11.6 for the same conduct constituting the bail violation.  When a defendant has at any time violated a Drug Offender Restraining Order issued by a court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.4 et seq., the prosecutor must use Special Application and Enhancement Feature F.  If the present Brimage-eligible offense was committed while the defendant was on bail, and defendant thereafter violates a Drug Offender Restraining Order issued following the defendant’s arrest in the present case, the prosecutor shall award points for Aggravating Factor #2 and shall also apply the D.O.R.O. Special Application and Enhancement Feature.
[directive] Providing Equitable Remedies  Civil enforcement agencies often have wide latitude to determine how the violation should be remedied.  Remedies should be crafted to benefit those individuals and groups harmed by the violation(s) at issue – including, where appropriate, relief designed to prevent or deter future violations and relief for individuals who did not file a complaint with the agency.  For example, when an entity’s violation involves racially disparate treatment or a racially disparate impact, an agency should consider whether to require anti-discrimination and anti-harassment training, including implicit-bias training, and/or monitoring or reporting to ensure compliance with the law and the terms of any resolution.  Although open investigations are generally confidential, agencies may consider if it is appropriate to consult with victims about the nature and amount of relief that may be obtained prior to a resolution being made public, and may consider consulting with other stakeholders when identifying appropriate remedies in matters that have already become public, including in pending litigation.  Additionally, in appropriate cases, agencies may provide for a period of public input regarding the resolution of a matter before it is finalized.  If a remedy requires members of the public to take some action in order to benefit—submitting a claim form, for example—the agency should take appropriate steps to provide information about the relief available and to provide such additional assistance as may be needed.  V.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] argues that [...] erred in deciding the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  More specifically, plaintiff [...] argues that the question of duty is a question of law for the Court.  Yet, [...] improperly attempts to argue that determination of whether the specific relationship giving rise to the duty is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.  [...] is wrong.  The Court should reject plaintiff’s analysis, and affirm the Order for Partial Summary Judgment entered by [...].
[directive] Oskarżony Data/Date /Defendant Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Polish Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Polish 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.
[brief] (624a)  On May 25, 2022, Defendants filed an application for a temporary injunction seeking to prevent the Trustee from conducting a sealed bid and selling the Boonton Property prior to judicial proceedings and a final determination on the merits of their case.  (467a)  On May 27, 2022, [...] conducted a hearing (2T) and granted the injunction.  (16a)  On June 10, 2022, [...] ordered that (1) Plaintiff’s motion for ejectment and rent was denied; (2) Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment to remove the trustee was denied; (3) [...] and [...] will have until July 14, 2022 to submit bids to determine which brother would purchase the Boonton Property; and (4) Plaintiff “having obtained an appraisal on said property [...] for $360,000.00, shall close on said property by Thursday, August 18, 2022 for this price. ”  (18a)  On August 31, 2022, the trial court ordered that (1) “Any attempt by plaintiff to purchase the Boonton Property in whole or in part is void as it would be in violation of her fiduciary duties as Trustee of the Trust” and (2) “[...] Fox must purchase the Boonton Property individually for his bid price of $601,000.00 and must close on the Boonton Property by September 15, 2022.
[brief] Ibid.  The current version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the accident provides as follows:  a.  No person other than those connected with or employed upon the railroad who are acting within the scope of their employment shall enter upon the right of way of any railroad or come into contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad.  This section shall not prohibit a passenger for hire from utilizing those parts of a railroad particularly intended for passenger use nor shall it prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad.  b.  **No person shall recover from the company owning or operating the railroad** or from any officer or employee of the railroad, **any damages for death or injury to person** or property as a result of contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad, **if death or injury occurred while that person was**: (1) under the influence of alcohol as evidenced by a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or higher by weight of alcohol in the person's blood; or (2) under the influence of drugs, other than drugs medically prescribed for use by that person and used in the manner prescribed; or (3) engaging in conduct intended to result in personal bodily injury or death; or (4) engaging in conduct proscribed by subsection a. of this section; or (5) using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations.  In the absence of proof to the contrary, any person injured while attempting to board or disembark from a moving train shall be presumed to have used the property in a manner in which it was not intended to be used.  This subsection shall apply notwithstanding the provisions of P.L.1973, c. 146 (C.2A:15-5.1 et seq.).  c.  This section shall not preclude recovery for injury or death of a person who was, at the time of the injury, less than 18 years of age.  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (emphasis added).  The plain language of the statute in its current version, shows that it bars recovery for damages when a person is injured or killed due to contact with a train that occurred while that person was engaged in prohibited conduct that is defined by the statute.
[brief] Indeed, in 2012, [...]’s complaint that [...] created a hostile work environment was confirmed by the Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Human Resources, and [...] made a number of complaints thereafter, formal and informal, about discrimination and retaliation.  Defendants also do not contest that after he made complaints about discrimination and retaliation defendants took adverse action against him.  These included precluding him from speaking at outside events, filing disciplinary charges against him, suspending him without pay for two days, imposing major discipline (5 days) and circulating and posting derogatory flyers about him throughout the NJDEP headquarters that contained confidential information regarding proposed discipline against [...] to which only [...], [...] and [...] were privy.  The motion judge granted defendants summary judgement by incorrectly requiring [...] to demonstrate that the retaliatory conduct be “serious and tangible enough to alter [the] employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprived [of] future employment opportunities, or otherwise [to] have a material adverse effect on his status as an employee” (3T28:24-3T29:3) and by deciding disputed material facts in favor of defendants.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiff [...] is a natural person who resides in New Jersey.  Pa1 at ¶¶1, 2.  Defendant [...] is a Delaware company with offices in New York.  Id. at ¶3.  Defendant is a debt collector.  Pa2-Pa3 at ¶¶10-17.  By Defendant’s letters to Plaintiff dated May 27 and July 14, 2021, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff owed a past-due financial obligation to [...] on a [...] account.  Pa3 at ¶¶18, 19.  The letters appear at Pa9 and Pa10.  Plaintiff’s [...] account was used primarily for Plaintiff’s personal, family, or household purposes.  Id. at ¶20.  Defendant did not draft, print, address, or mail its letters.  Pa4 at ¶26.  Instead, Defendant contracted with a mail vendor to process Defendant’s collection letters.  Id.  Defendant provided the mail vendor with one or more forms or templates of collection letters and then periodically sent data to be merged with a template to create the letters.  Pa4 at ¶27.  The data which Defendant conveyed to the mail vendor included Defendant’s “reference number; the name of the creditor, the creditor’s account number; the name of the creditor’s servicer; [Defendant]’s portal for account information and payment options; the amount due; and Plaintiff’s full name and mailing address. ”  Pa4 at ¶29.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Under New Jersey Law, “[t]he ‘interpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law for the court subject to de novo review. ’”  Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 605 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Spring Creek Holding Co. v. Shinnihon U.S.A. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 158, 190 (App. Div. 2008)).  This Court “accord[s] no special deference to a trial court’s interpretation of an agreement entered into by the parties. ”  Id.  Thus, the trial court’s ruling in this action that the indemnity provision of the Subcontract was “equivocal relating to the indemnification of the subcontractor” should be afforded no deference.  (Da431; 1T37:13-15).  B.
[brief] Defendant testified that during pretrial discussions with his attorney regarding strategy, he told him about two alibi witnesses and asked him to analyze the cellular telephone data produced by the State during discovery.  (18T 15-4 to 16-6, 17-4 to 9, 22-1 to 3, 22-9 to 12).  Defense counsel’s pretrial investigation was difficult to discern from his testimony because he did not remember too many specifics about his decisions.  Importantly, defense counsel recalled the cellular telephone data produced by the State during discovery.  (14T 29-14 to 19).  Although defense counsel recalled the cellular telephone data, he did not explain why tracking the cellular telephone location was unwarranted.  (14T 31-11 to 16).  To be sure, he admitted that he did not know what the data revealed.  (14T 30-5 to 14).  Moreover, not only did defense counsel fail to recall discussing with defendant any potential witnesses, he did not recollect any specific conversations with defendant either.  (14T 21-18 to 21, 23-24 to 24-20, 25-8 to 26-11).  Notably, defense counsel did not deny that defendant told him about two alibi witnesses.  (14T 21-22 to 22-1).  Consequently, any assessment of defense counsel’s failure to investigate defendant’s alibi should be strictly scrutinized.  Be that as it may, the PCR judge did not elaborate why defendant failed to establish his trial attorney’s performance was deficient despite concluding that an evidentiary hearing was warranted.
[brief] \textbf{POINT V} \textbf{PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND QUASI-CONTRACT CLAIMS.}  (24T50:10-17)  In their initial brief, defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to prove the breaches of contract alleged in the complaint and identified specific gaps in their proofs.  In opposition, plaintiffs do not identify evidence in the record to rebut this argument.  Instead, they rely exclusively upon citations to the trial court’s opinion to support their contention that they proved these claims.  \textit{See}, Pb68-72.  This circular argument does not cure the deficiencies in their proofs.  By way of example, regarding the proof necessary to sustain a breach of the [...], it is evident that [...] was not a party to the contract and therefore cannot be liable for a breach of that contract.
[brief] Resolution of Zoning Board that off-site parking by Lot 8 vehicles on school Lot 5 is not a legal use (11/19/2018)  Da1-6  Exhibits and documents listed in Resolution as Exhibits at 10/15/2018  Hearing and submitted to the Trial Court (A through K below)  A. Application pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 to Zoning Board (8/23/2018)  Da7 B. School Attorney Letter in Support of Application (8/23/2018)  Da8-12  C. 1972 School Expansion Application Resolution, Site Plan Documents  Da13-22 D. 1963 Agreement (School/Synagogue)  Da23-28  E. Transcript of Chancery Division [...] Easement Decision (6/5/2017)  Da29-48  F. School Attorney Letter to Board Attorney regarding Board records of 1972 School Application (9/14/2018)  Da49-52  G. Board Attorney Letter to School Attorney regarding Board --- 1  As detailed in the Statement of Facts  there was earlier related litigation between [...] and [...] about the legality of the Sons of Israel (Lot 8) parking use of the [...] Lot 5.  The Sons of Israel’s 2012 Chancery Lawsuit (Docket No. [...]) resulted in an Opinion/Order on June 5, 2017 by [...] (reversed in 2019 by the Appellate Court).  The Transcript of that Opinion by [...] (Da29) was an Exhibit/document in evidence before the Zoning Board in the N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 Hearing on October 15, 2018.  records of 1972 School Application with Minutes of 1/15/1974 Board meeting (9/17/2018)  Da53-58  H. School Attorney Letter to Board Attorney on need for 40:55D-68 Hearing (9/19/2018)  Da59-61  I. Sons of Israel Attorney Letter to Board Attorney on Legal Position against 40:55D-68 Hearing (10/9/2018)  Da62-67  J. School Attorney Letter to Board outlining Legal Position with 1972 Application/Resolution documents (Da13-22) and periodic aerial photographs of site attached (10/12/2018)  Da68-81  K. Transcript of [...] on Dismissal of School Complaint challenging Zoning Board Dismissal of School Interpretation Request on 1972 School Expansion Resolution/Site Plan (8/17/2018)  Da82-88  Plaintiff’s Complaint challenging Board Resolution (11/1/2018)  Da89-104  Consent Order for Limited Restraints pending adjudication (11/16/2018)  Da105-107  Consent Order allowing Amended Complaint (1/8/2019)  Da108-111  Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (12/18/2018)  Da112-127  Defendant [...]’s Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim (2/8/2019)  Da128-151 --- 2  Also as detailed, in 2017, [...] had filed to the Zoning Board an Application for Interpretation of the 1972 School Site Plan (Da13).  The Zoning Board by Resolution of January 8, 2018 found it did not have Jurisdiction.  [...] filed suit challenging that Board deferral (Docket No.: [...]).  On August 17, 2018, [...] affirmed that Board deferral of Jurisdiction.  The Transcript of that Opinion (Da82) was an Exhibit/document in evidence before the Zoning Board in the N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 Hearing on October 15, 2018.  See also FN1.
[brief] 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)  D’Atria vs. D’Atria ..............................................................................  33  242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)  Dector vs. Phelps .................................................................................. 30  136 N.J.L. 53 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Deutsch vs. Budget Rent-A-Car ............................................................... 22, 25 213 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 1986)