ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], [...], and [...] Repeatedly Sought More Pay  All staffing coordinators received the same base wage, save for [...] (“[...]”), another staffing coordinator, given her years of service.\(^1\) (Pa361 at 78:14-79:13; Pa283-84 at 24:24-25-2).  [...], “fixated” on his misconception that other staffing coordinators earned more than him, repeatedly complained about his wages.  (Pa299 at 85:3-15; Pa361 at 77:5-15).  [...], too, believed the staffing coordinators were underpaid.  (Pa163 at 19:24-20:8; Pa361 at 78:17-79:2; Pa230 at 21:8-23).  In response, in early September 2020, [...] confirmed that only [...] earned more.  (Pa361 at 79:3-13).  In an attempt to secure a higher wage, [...] petitioned [...] for COVID incentive pay, sometimes referred to as “PIP” or “premium incentive pay. ” (Pa230 at 21:8-22:17; Pa365 at 95:12-17).  During the COVID-19 pandemic, [...] \(^1\) [...] admitted both [...] and [...]—another staffing coordinator employed alongside Plaintiffs—had longer tenures than him.  (Pa164 at 21:14-22:21). offered financial incentives like PIP to its frontline employees, such as nurses.  (Pa361 at 77:16-78:2).  These “direct patient care staff” members received an additional amount per shift.  (Pa361 at 77:16-78:2).  Staffing coordinators were not eligible for this COVID-19 incentive pay as determined by senior leadership.  (Pa361 at 78:3-13).  [...] thought the staffing coordinators should have received “paid incentives” to work during the pandemic.  (Pa361 at 77:16-78:2).  [...] sought extra incentive pay for her employees during the pandemic, but was denied.  (Pa361 at 78:14-21).  According to [...], [...] sought this incentive pay for her employees “several times” but was denied on each occasion by senior management.  (Pa106 at 90:7-23; Pa111-12 at 113:11-114:8).  X.
[brief] In his oral decision on March 5, 2020, [...] ruled that the search warrant for [...]’s storage unit was supported by probable cause.  (2T 44-23 to 45-5)  As there was no evidentiary hearing on [...]’s suppression motion, [...] relied exclusively on the affidavit authored by [...], which details the tip from [...] and the subsequent investigation.  (Dca 1-17)  [...] noted that the affidavit sets forth Bonner’s substantial training and experience in narcotics investigations.  (2T 40-4 to 7)  In addition, the affidavit states: that [...] and [...] were seen accessing unit 126 over 40 times in a one-month period; that, on August 23, 2018, Bonner observed [...] engage in what he believed to be a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction; and that, on August 30, 2018, police found narcotics inside [...]’s vehicle during a traffic stop at the Life Storage facility, after which a K-9 alerted to the presence of narcotics at unit 126.  (2T 41-25 to 42-6, 42-16 to 43-5, 43-6 to 44-17)  The affidavit also indicates that [...] and [...] both have drug-related criminal histories.  (2T 41-18 to 24)  [...] ruled that, considering its contents, the affidavit is sufficient to support the magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause.  (2T 44-23 to 45-5)  E. Motion To Suppress Evidence Seized From [...]’s Car
[brief] Da68.  That means that the judge’s order was void and set aside, and the parties were returned to their pre-decision status.  The trial judge then reviewed the disputed document in accord with the Appellate Division’s decision and ruled in Respondent’s favor, finding that certain information within the disputed document must be disclosed.  Da81,85.  Then Respondent filed a motion to alter the 8/15/23 Order to reflect an award of counsel fees.  Da87.  Appellant cross-moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that Respondent’s request itself was improper.  Da96.  In response to Appellant’s cross-motion, Respondent specifically argued that the Township did not make this argument at the outset in its initial brief.  Appellant’s cross-motion was denied per the court’s 10/27/23 Order.  Da108-119.  When considering these facts in light of the applicable legal standards, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion as a matter of law because he presumably followed well settled binding precedent.
[brief] [...] describes Section 13.1 as presenting “alternative” remedies.  *(See, e.g., [...] Br., at 13-15).*  Yet, this “either-or” construction of Section 13.1 contradicts the plain language of that provision.  Such construction is untenable for a number of other important reasons.  *First,* this interpretation renders illusory [...]’s contractual obligations to cause the Fee Owner to convey the real property directly to Plaintiff at closing and to lease back the real property from Plaintiff pursuant to a long-term ground lease.  *(Pa111-112, PSA § 10.3). *  Under the trial court’s interpretation, [...] had the ability to negotiate a better deal for itself and cut Plaintiff out of the real estate deal with total impunity, notwithstanding the clear terms of the PSA and the fact that Plaintiff had invested millions of dollars to obtain and sustain financing necessary to close the deal under the PSA.  (Pa5, Complaint, ¶ 19; Pa7, Complaint, ¶ 26).  Settled principles of contract construction forbid this result.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(d).  [Id. at 42-44.]  Like any other issue under the Act, whether a plaintiff can establish palpably unreasonable behavior in a given case is subject to the court’s assessment on a dispositive motion and whether it can be reasonably made under the evidence presented by the plaintiff.  Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119, 124 (2001); see also Maslo, 346 N.J. Super. 346, 350-51 (App. Div. 2002) (affirming summary judgment on the issue of palpably unreasonable behavior issue under the Act; holding the issue can be decided as a matter of law).
[brief] .........................................................12  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312 (2024)  ..............................................................................9, 13, 15, 17  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 476 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2023), rev’d, 258 N.J. 312 (2024)  ....................7  In re Stormwater Management Rules, 384 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2006) (describing objectives of Stormwater Management Act, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-93 to -99 which applies to municipalities and [...])
[brief] The State alleged that [...] shot [...] for disclosing his cooperation in a prior police investigation.  (12T 56-13 to 100-8)  No weapon was recovered.  No DNA, fingerprints, or other forensic evidence implicated him.  No surveillance video captured the actual shooting.  And no eyewitnesses testified.  [...] presented a mistaken-identity defense.  (12T 14-21 to 55-24)  **A.
[brief] A.  THE FINDINGS REGARDING THE 1999 MASTER PLAN AND THE INTENT OF THE SPECIAL MANUFACTURING ZONE ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE DOCUMENT ITSELF.  In an attempt to justify the arbitrary focus on the height of the structure already approved to be located on the other side of the municipal boundary line, the Defendant’s Resolution erroneously construes the intent of Florence’s 1999 Master Plan as it relates to the “SM-Special Manufacturing” and “GM-General Manufacturing” Zones.  In doing so, the Defendant ignores the language in the document itself.  Defendant’s Resolution quotes the applicable section of the 1999 Master Plan.  Ja037-Ja016.  In the Resolution’s Findings of Fact, the Defendant finds, in relevant part:  “Significantly, the 1999 Master Plan highlights the Planning Board’s concern with the intensity of uses in the SM Special Manufacturing Zone properties in the area where the subject property is located, and the potential negative externalities of uses in that area. ”  Ja039 (emphasis added).  It then goes on to explain the differences in the permitted uses in the SM and GM Zones, how they are “consistent with the concerns about intensity and negative externalities expressed in the 1999 Master Plan[,]” and concludes that, “[t]he governing body sought to distinguish the scale, intensity and nature of the permitted uses in the two zones with these differing standards in accord with the principles stated in the Master Plan. ”  Ja039.  Yet, even imaging for a moment that this is an accurate depiction of the passage, the Board concludes the following:  Absent such proofs, the Board is obliged to rely upon the purposes stated in the 1999 [...] Master Plan for including the subject property in the SM Special Manufacturing Zone District, and the refined distinctions made between the SM Zone District uses and standards and those of the adjoining GM Zone District in the implementing [...] zoning ordinances.  In reliance upon the 1999 Master Plan and the applicable zoning ordinance sections, the Board finds that the proposed building on the overall parcel that is 67% taller than allowed, and accessory uses associated with that building, would be a more intense use than the Planning Board and governing body intended at the subject property, would be substantially detrimental to the public good, and would substantially impair the zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] - “Seller shall … submit … an estoppel certificate. ” (Da211) (emphasis added); - “Seller shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Estoppel Certificate. ”  (Da211) (emphasis added); - “Purchaser’s obligation to close title hereunder is conditioned upon … delivering to Purchaser an estoppel certificate”; (Da211) (emphasis added); - “An estoppel certificate received from a Required Tenant shall not be an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate if such Required Tenant discloses a default.
[brief] The Office of the Public Defender relies on the procedural history set forth by defendant.  It adds only that it submits this amicus brief at the invitation of this Court.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  On July 16, 2019 at 6:22p.m., officers responded to [...] in [...], having received information that there was a shooting in progress there.  (1T 29-3 to 16; 2T 42-1 to 19)  Officers apparently did not locate the victim when they arrived, but determined for reasons not clear from the record that his name was [...] and that he had been brought to the hospital.  (1T 33-12 to 19; 2T 26-18 to 30-25)  Despite being subpoenaed, Sosa did not appear at trial.  (2T 7-6 to 14)  No eyewitness testified.  It was undisputed that [...], the defendant, works at a supermarket located at [...].  (1T 23-22 to 24-2; 2T 69-9 to 16)  Pena was arrested almost a month after the shooting.  (2T 33-24 to 34-8)  He did not confess to the shooting, no forensic evidence connected him to the crime, and no motive was presented at trial.  The central piece of evidence at trial was surveillance footage retrieved by [...].
[directive] DATE OF LOSS - Enter the date of loss (month-day-year).  A-8  11.  LOCATION OF LOSS - Enter the location of loss, if known(premise number, street name, municipality, state and zip).  12.  NCIC NO. - Enter the National Crime Information Center(NCIC) or Teletype number if a message has been sent on related property.  13.  FINDER/POSSESSORS NAME - Enter the full name (last, first, middle) of the person who was in possession of the property, either a finder of property or a person who is encountered in possession of the property.  14.  PHONE (AREA) - Enter the full phone number and area code of the person who was in possession of the property.  15.  DATE NCIC CANCELLED - Enter the date that the NCIC message for the property was cancelled or cleared.  16.  FINDER/POSSESSORS ADDRESS - Enter the full address (street number, street name, municipality, state and zip), of the finder or person who was in possession of the property.  17.  TELETYPE NO. - Enter the Teletype of NCIC number of the message sent that relates to the property indicated.  18.  LOCATION OF RECOVERY/SEIZURE - Enter the full address (street number, street name, municipality, state and zip) of the location where the property was recovered or seized.  19.  DATE OF RECOVERY/SEIZURE - Enter the appropriate date, month, day, year.  BLOCKS 20 THROUGH 26 ARE TO BE USED IF THE PROPERTY IS A VEHICLE
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-7 does not apply to Chapter 375 for the simple reason that Chapter 375 does not mandate any health benefit coverage.  Instead, the statute states that the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance may promulgate regulations under the Administrative Procedures Act requiring insurance coverage for abortions, after concluding a study and issuing a report to the Governor and the Legislature demonstrating that such a regulation is necessary.  N.J.S.A. 26:2S-39.  In other words, the legislation itself does not mandate such insurance coverage, nor is it at all certain, from the Legislature’s perspective, that such coverage would ever be mandated.  The statute also states that contracts providing hospital or medical expense benefits purchased by the [...] and the [...] may provide coverage for abortion.  But again the legislation provides no definitive mandate for insurance coverage, so the prerequisites of N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6 are not even implicated.  Next, Petitioners argue that the Legislature failed to provide proper notice to the public about its consideration of S49 or A6260, but those arguments also fall short.
[brief] Court Rule 4:46-2(c) was not complied with.  From the evidentiary record, there were no material issues in dispute because the evidentiary record was favorable to [...] ([...]) on the issue of Adverse Possession.  This is because the record showed that Adverse Possession had already set in as of June 26, 2006.  At that time [...] had been in possession of the property identified as Lot 22 for thirty years with no objection by [...].  By operation of law, the property which is Lot 22 was now fully owned by [...].
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:31-2.  Preemption is the exception and not the rule.  As our Supreme Court explained when deciding that consumer statutory claims involving the sale of insurance products weren’t preempted by \begin{footnotes} \item Tirrell v. Navistar Int’l, Inc., 248 N.J. Super. 390, 398 (App. Div. 1991).
[brief] POINT III: THE STATE’S ELICITATION OF EXTENSIVE INADMISSIBLE LAY OPINION BY SIX WITNESSES -- INCLUDING AN OFFICER WHO HAD NEVER SEEN MAZZARISI PRIOR TO TRIAL AND FOUR RELATIVES WHO HAD NOT SEEN HIM IN A DECADE -- PURPORTING TO IDENTIFY MAZZARISI IN THE CRITICAL SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE INVADED THE JURY’S PROVINCE AND COMPELS REVERSAL.  (not raised below)  The State paraded a series of witnesses, including a police officer, a detective, and four of [...]’s relatives, before the jury who purported to identify him as the person shooting a BB gun in surveillance video from the May 2018 incident.
[brief] Elizabethtown Water Co. Consol. v. Bontempo, 67 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 1961))  .........................................................  42  Ellison v. Schenck, Price, Smith & King, ....................................................... 36  280 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 1995)  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001)  .................................................................................
[brief] If the Court were to accept Plaintiffs’ intentionally convoluted argument and conclude Plaintiffs possess standing, such a finding would run afoul of the most basic tenant of standing jurisprudence.  It is black letter law that “[s]tanding is a threshold issue.  It neither depends on nor determines the merits of a plaintiff’s claim. ”  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398, 417 (1991); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (“standing in no way depends on the merits of plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal”).  Plaintiffs’ entire argument as to standing is premised on the merits of their case.  To wit, Plaintiffs argue that if they are correct on the merits – i.e., that the Planning Board’s application of the TOA Rule was substantively incorrect – then that board’s jurisdiction is implicated and Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, possess standing to challenge jurisdiction.  That is not the law.  Moreover, taking Plaintiffs’ faulty argument to its logical conclusion, any citizen of any municipality would possess standing to challenge any decision rendered by a local planning board by simply arguing that the board “got it wrong” and, therefore, did not possess jurisdiction.  That is not the law.
[brief] The OAE conducted an “investigation” into [...]’s unethical conduct.  (21-23)  The trial court also correctly held that the OAE conducted an “investigation” into [...]’s unethical conduct.  [See 3T24-2]  As an initial matter, the “Chief of Investigations” at the OAE led the investigation into [...]’s unethical conduct.  [Pa344a]  The Chief of Investigations then assigned [...]’s case to the OAE’s “Assistant Chief of Investigations” and “Disciplinary Auditor” to further investigate [...]’s conduct.  [Pa345a]  The investigation spanned years and involved demand audits, fabricated bank records, subpoenas to [...], repeated information requests, and formal interviews of [...] and others.  [Pa347a; Pa349a; Pa350a]  Tellingly, when confronted with his fabricated bank records, [...] himself characterized the OAE’s investigation as an “investigation. ”  He stated, “I didn’t have anything touched that I thought in any way was germane to your investigation. ”  [Pa349a (emphasis added)]  [...] further stipulated that he did not disclose his altered bank records “because he believed the OAE investigation concerned the $7,500 overdraft, and that he believed that the falsifications were not material to the OAE’s investigation. ”  [Pa350a (emphasis added)]  [...] later admitted to giving “the altered documents to the OAE, explaining that he believed that the alterations were not relevant to the OAE’s investigation. ”  [Pa365a (emphasis added)]  [See also Pa351a; Pa365a; Pa370a; Pa372a (each referring to “the OAE’s investigation”) (emphasis added)]  Despite [...]’s prior statements recognizing that “investigation” means “investigation,” [...] and [...] now argue that the term “investigation” in the 2016 Application somehow referred to the phrase “investigate charges” included in the definition of Disciplinary Proceeding in the 2016 Policy (which had not yet been issued).  [Pb32]  The Firm and [...] insist that this somehow led [...] to “reasonably conclude that the OAE Proceeding did not constitute an ‘investigation’ within the meaning of the Allied World Policy and Application. ”  [Pb33]  That contention does not pass the straight face test.  As noted above, [...] himself repeatedly referred to the OAE’s proceeding as an “investigation” and no other word fits.  As the trial court aptly held, “the Court cannot ignore the plain, unambiguous language of the policy and re-write a better policy for Mr. [...] because he chose not to be candid when seeking professional malpractice insurance. ”  [3T27-9]
[brief] (2T22:3-23:6).  [...] did review the report of [...] describing Petitioner’s 2009 accident before he prepared his narrative report, but acknowledged his failure to mention it in his report.  (2T32:22-33:3; 34:12-35-3).  However, he testified that the 2009 incident could affect his conclusion in this case if it “rose to the level that he needed epidural blocks”, or if “they suggested surgery at that time”, but the information provided was “not really specific. ”  (2T35:8-23).  [...] added, “[b]ut I’ll agree, there is an issue - - that there is an issue in 2009”, but never requested nor was he provided additional records to regarding this incident.
[brief] Where a defendant is charged with violating the certain-persons statute and does not stipulate to the predicate offense, the State must prove the predicate offense by producing the qualifying prior judgment of conviction (which should be redacted to leave only the name, date, and degree of the offense).  *Bailey*, 231 N.J. at 490-91.  However, where the defendant does stipulate to the predicate offense, the jury may not be told the name or nature of the predicate conviction.  \(^{25}\)  It appears that the court entirely charged the wrong subsection of the offense statute.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Certain Persons Not to Have any Weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a))” (rev. Feb. 12, 2018).
[brief] Jones stands for the principle that the government may not unreasonably intrude upon “persons, houses, papers, and effects. ”  565 U.S. at 405-11.  The question of law was whether police could install a GPS on a car without a valid warrant for the installation.  Id. at 402-04.  The car at issue was parked in public when the installation occurred.  *Id.* at 403.  The government argued that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements of his car because people on the street could easily see where the car was.  *Id.* at 406-07.  However, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument, finding that reasonably expectation of privacy was not the only interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.  *Id.* at 409.  Rather, the Court reasoned, the Amendment also protects against trespass, which the government committed when it installed the GPS on the defendant’s car.  *Id.* at 409-11.  In *Jardines*, law enforcement brought a dog to the defendant’s porch to sniff for drug, without first having obtained a warrant.
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