ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *In the Matter of [...] [...] [...]*, 2014 N.J. CSC LEXIS 373, *47, [...] [...] (March 13, 2014) citing *Clark v. New Jersey Dep't of Agric.*, 1 N.J.A.R. 315 (1980).  --- 12There is no indication that any blotter was ever disciplined for failing to receive calls between 12:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m.  Clearly, such a dereliction of duties should have given rise to an investigation and/or disciplinary actions if third shift did not operate under a protocol and/or procedure that was sanctioned by the Superior Officers.  2.  **N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7)**  “In ‘Neglect of Duty’ the emphasis is placed on the negligent performance of one's duty or on the actor's neglect to perform an act required by his job duties. ”  *In the Matter of [...], [...]*, 2020 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 300, *54-55, [...]; [...] (August 19, 2020).  “The term ‘neglect’ means a deviation from the normal standards of conduct. ”  *Rivera v. Hudson County Department of Corrections*, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 869, *37-338, [...] (August 29, 2016).  See also, *In re Kerlin*, 151 N.J. Super. 179, 186 (App. Div. 1977)  As previously stated, no one testified that [...] negligently performed his duties.
[directive] Law enforcement officers already take on the obligation of ensuring the safety and care of individuals in their custody, regardless of their gender identity or expression—a requirement that includes detained transgender individuals.  The following section will further help law enforcement officers protect the safety of transgender arrestees.  1.  If detained individuals are held in areas that are segregated on the basis of gender, law enforcement shall:  7  Federal law already establishes different rules for the housing of transgender individuals in adult correctional facilities, juvenile facilities, and lockups—which refers to facilities that have holding cells, cell blocks, or other secure enclosures that are primarily used for the temporary confinement of individuals who have recently been arrested or detained, or who are being transferred to or from a court, jail, prison, or other agency.  Because the rules governing housing of LGBTQ+ inmates in correctional facilities falls within the purview of the [...], and the rules governing housing of LGBTQ+ residents in juvenile facilities falls within the purview of the [...], this Directive addresses lockups in police stations.
[brief] Several students missed instructional time as a result of Plaintiff's poor planning when it came to scheduling for testing.  What Plaintiff should have done was select teachers that did not have a class during testing time so the students are not displaced.  ([...] Tr. 37:8-10; 43:6-9).  11.  On one occasion, Plaintiff placed students in the auditorium instead of their classrooms where they watched movies because the "teachers weren't able to teach the curriculum they were supposed to be teaching[.]".
[brief] Plaintiffs, [...], individually and as Administrator of the Estate of [...], and [...] (collectively “Plaintiffs”), brought this action against Defendants, [...], [...], and [...], alleging, inter alia, survivorship, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress over the shooting and murder of [...] (“Decedent” or “[...]”), upon real property at or about [...] (the “Subject Premises”), which at all relevant times, is and was owned and controlled by Defendants [...] and [...], and which at all relevant times was patrolled and surveilled (or was supposed to be patrolled and surveilled) by Defendant [...].
[brief] It is simply implausible that [...], having been Mirandized by two narcotics detectives as he walked back to his car, would “express[ ] a willingness to cooperate” and simply volunteer “that he had an amount of cocaine in the back seat of the car. ”  (1T 77-12 to 20)  The plausibility of this testimony is further undercut by the complete lack of any corroboration.  None of the SET members wore body-cameras or had video recorders on their unmarked police cars.  (1T 15-7 to 9)  [...] did not formalize [...]’s acknowledgment and waiver of his Miranda rights in any way.  (1T 77-3 to 4, 85-21 to 22)  And [...] could not remember any details about what [...] said when he allegedly admitted to possessing drugs in the car.  (1T 77-23 to 24)  The motion court should not have believed this implausible series of events — that [...], confronted by two narcotics detectives in the parking lot of a grocery store, knowing he had the right to remain silent, and knowing that there were drugs in the car, would spontaneously volunteer that he was committing a crime.  Unfortunately, instances of police misconduct, including lying, are well-documented.  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, *Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It*, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037, 1041 (1996) (citing a survey in which “defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges estimated that police perjury at Fourth Amendment suppression hearings occurs in twenty to fifty percent of the cases”); Russell Covey, *Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions*, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1133 (2013) (reviewing two mass exonerations based on police officer misconduct).  Given the documented history of the problem of “testilying,” particularly in cases involving contraband, courts should start viewing officers’ assertions with a certain degree of skepticism.  See Joseph Goldstein, ‘*Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn Problem*, New York Times (March 18, 2018) (“In many instances, the motive for lying was readily apparent: to skirt constitutional restrictions against unreasonable searches and stops.
[brief] (Pa1; 1T40:13-15; 1T41:7-9).  When Defendant agreed to sell 49% of her own interest in [...] to Plaintiff, Defendant had an expectation that he knew English and that he would work at [...] while he was going through the process of getting his pharmacist license.  (3T25:18-26:3; 26:6-15).  He never became a pharmacist on the United States.  (3T9:5-8).  Defendant expected Plaintiff would become a pharmacist.  (3T26:16-20).  Defendant supported Plaintiff in his desire to become a pharmacist in the United States and to be actively involved in [...].  (3T27:24-28:4).  Defendant assisted Plaintiff with trying to learn English (2T101:14-21).  Plaintiff told Defendant that he wanted to wait until he was divorced to officially become a partner in the business.  (3T33:24-34:1).  According to the January 2017 [...] Operating Agreement, Defendant was the limited liability company’s manager.
[brief] The Redevelopment Agreement Required The Authority Garage To Be Completed Before The Mall  The Project was comprised of multiple phases.  Da150-164.  Though the phases were designated with Roman numerals, they were not numerically sequential.  Id.  The Redevelopment Agreement required certain phases to proceed in parallel.  Id.  The phasing schedule was a key component of the Project because the various phases were interdependent.  1T7:19-8:24.  Phase I required the implementation of alternative parking to allow for the Project to move forward, because existing parkers on the surface lots in the project area would be displaced once construction started.  Da150-164; Da166-168.  After Phase I was complete, the next phase, Phase II, required [...] to construct the Project Garage.  Ibid.  The completion of the Project Garage in Phase II triggered obligations to proceed with three other phases simultaneously:  “Upon completion of Phase II[,]” [...] was required to begin construction of the Mall (Phase III-A) and retail/office building (Phase III-C), and the Authority would simultaneously construct the Authority Garage (Phase IV).  Da153.  After the Mall was built, [...] was to construct the residential building (Phase III-B).  Ibid.  The Redevelopment Agreement not only mandated when the Phases would commence construction, but also included a Project Schedule that provided timelines for completion.  Da166.  For example, the Redevelopment Agreement required the Authority Garage to be completed within fourteen months of commencement and the Mall was required to be built within eighteen months of commencement.  Ibid.  Because construction of both the Authority Garage and the Mall were to begin once the Project Garage (Phase II) was built, the timeline set forth in the Redevelopment Agreement required the Authority Garage to have been fully built prior to the Mall.  Ibid.  The Authority does not dispute this requirement.  1T46:10-14; 1T51:4-15; 1T54:12-16; 1T55:15-19.  F.
[brief] COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................3  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................5  A.  Defendant works calibrating breath test equipment ........................................5  B.  Defendant is suspended ..................................................................................6  1.  Three of defendant’s calibrations are questioned .................................6  2.  Defendant reports he lost his identification and gets a replacement ........................................9  3.  Defendant is served with [...] charges and suspended ...............12  C.  While suspended, defendant misleads various police officers to avoid the possible issuance of traffic tickets ..............................................15  1.  Lakehurst, March 27, 2017 .................................................................15  2.  Berkeley Township, November 18, 2017 ...........................................17  3.  Marlboro Township, January 20, 2018 ............................................18  4.  Toms River, March 27, 2018 .............................................................19  D.  The unsuccessful search for defendant’s ID ..................................................20  E.  Defendant’s explanations for the traffic stops .............................................21  F.  The Verdicts .................................................................................................23  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] Relating to the first factor, courts have held that the statute generally applies to all actions for damages based on professional malpractice and not just specifically limited to “personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage. ”  Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condominium Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415, 421 (2010) (citing Charles A. Manganaro Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Carneys Point Twp. Sewerage Auth., 344 N.J. Super. 343, 347 (App. Div. 2001).
[brief] New Jersey statutes criminalize the false reporting of emergencies and explicitly include within their ambit calls placed to 9-1-1.  *Id.* at 219.  Information imparted by a 9-1-1 caller should not be viewed with the same degree of suspicion that applies to a tip by a confidential informant.  *Id.* at 220.  A 9-1-1 call has also some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with immunity.  *See* Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 400 (2014).  A 9-1-1 call can be recorded, which provides victims with an opportunity to identify the false tipster’s voice and subject him to prosecution.  *Id.*  The 9-1-1 system also permits law enforcement to verify important information about the caller.  *Id.* at 401.  None of this is to suggest that tips in 9-1-1 calls are per se reliable.  *Id.*  Given technological and regulatory developments, however, a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system.  *Id.*  Had [...] not erroneously excluded evidence related to the 9-1-1 call, the State could have prevented evidence supporting its reliability such as the specific contents of the call, the identity of the caller, the tone of the report, any details provided by the caller that might show that the report was based on the caller’s personal knowledge, and the police’s response time following the call.
[brief] The absence of this language is not an oversight—it reflects the negotiated terms of the PSA, which explicitly provides that: (1) [...] must use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an estoppel certificate prior to closing, (2) [...] must promptly deliver the executed estoppel certificates received from tenants, and (3) [...]’s obligation to close is conditioned upon any required tenant delivering an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, which is to be provided at closing.  [...] instead resorts to piecemeal textual arguments that do not amount to a coherent reading of the PSA.  For example, [...] conflates the prompt delivery requirement with an accelerated deadline for compliance, ignoring that the PSA’s use of “prompt delivery” applies only to the estoppel certificate received from the tenant — not to the ultimate requirement of delivering an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at the closing.  [...] also conflates these two separate provisions when it mischaracterizes the purpose of the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, attempting to repurpose it as a due diligence tool contrary to its clearly stated function as a condition precedent.
[brief] In O’Donnell, for instance, a federal magistrate judge held that a party had a “right to review the resulting documents for relevance,” notwithstanding its “agreement to run search terms. ”  Id. at 277.  The alternative, it explained, would require it to hold that “the relevance standard from the civil rules does not apply to document productions that are the result of the execution of search terms. ”  Id. at 276.  Likewise, in SinglePoint Direct Solar LLC v. Solar Integrated Roofing Corp., 2023 WL 2585296 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2023), the court recognized that “the fact that a search term is relevant does not eliminate the possibility that it will produce irrelevant documents.
[brief] 5.  Fourth, the Court erred in finding: intention of providing due process. ”  However, despite his dicta curing court proceedings, [...] declined to enforce his own Order for Probation to hold a hearing on the record.  “… the court found the submitted accounting to properly comply with the Order dated July 20, 2012, as a “full accounting” once it included all the Defendant’s payments from the period commenting commencing on October 1, 1998” (DA29) because the payments for the period 10/1/1998 to 2/9/1999 amounting to an additional un-recognized $54,500 for the period Oct. 1, 1998 to Feb. 5, 1999 were not included nor referenced anywhere in the so-called “full accounting” submitted by [...], DAG (see [...] letter of 10/8/1999 (supra.) and letter to Court dated 10/24//2022 (DA469) demonstrating over-payments made for the period 10/1/1998 through Oct., 1999).
[directive] N.J.S.A.  C.  Where the weapons have been seized pursuant to a court order, domestic violence search warrant, condition of bail or at the scene pursuant to 2C:25-21d, the County Prosecutor’s Office where the civil and/or N.J.S.A. criminal charge was filed or incident occurred shall conduct an immediate investigation of the incident and determine whether the officer should be permitted to carry a weapon and what conditions, if any, should be recommended to the court for the return of the weapons to the law enforcement officer pending the disposition of the domestic violence proceedings.
[brief] There were two thefts alleged here: first, the theft by force of the victim's debit card and, second, the theft of money from his bank account.  The jury found defendant guilty of theft by his own conduct solely for third-degree theft by unlawful taking in count three (Da9-Da10).  By acquitting defendant of the own-conduct robbery charge, murder, aggravated manslaughter, criminal restraint, and endangerment, the jury rejected the State's theory - and [...]'s claims - that defendant was the person who hog-tied and rolled the victim up in two blankets or that he was the person who took the credit card by use of force.
[brief] ”  Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 603 (App. Div. 2014).  It is well-settled that “[t]he law abhors damages based on mere speculation. ”  Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 442 (1994).  [...]’s failure to meet its burden to establish the essential element of damages at trial remains a fatal and incurable flaw in its negligence claim against Third-party defendants.
[brief] ([...] Brief, at 59-72).  Notably, [...]’s cross-appeal arguments focus entirely on the language of PSA Section 17.1 – abandoning any claim for an award of fees under PSA Section 18.2.  (See id.).  For the reasons discussed below – most notably, based upon the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s very recent decision in Boyle v. Huff, 257 N.J. 468 (2024) – the trial court’s decision denying [...] an award of attorneys’ fees under Section 17.1 was in all respects correct.  [...]’s arguments in support of its cross-appeal should be rejected.  B.
[brief] The Commission failed to review the facts in the light most favorable to the complainant (Raised at: Pa1)**  The Commission’s rules provide the standard for review of a motion to dismiss a Complaint:  “In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the Commission shall review the facts in the light most favorable to the complainant and determine whether the allegation[s], if true, could establish a violation of the Act. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3.  Therefore, the only inquiry before the Commission on this motion is whether Complainant has stated facts that, if true, constitute violations of the School Ethics Act.  The Court should reverse the Commission’s arbitrary, capricious and wholly unreasonable decision as the Commission clearly did not apply this standard in its decision.
[brief] ”  *Alam v. Ameribuilt Contractors*, 474 N.J. Super. 30, 36 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting *Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc.*, 83 N.J. 460, 477 (1980)).  As our Supreme Court has held for almost forty (40) years, “[f]or all intents and purposes, the client of one partner is a client of all the partners. ”  *Dewey*, 109 N.J. at 214 (citing *Opinion No. 128*, 91 N.J.L.J. 309 (1968)).  Accordingly, [...]’s conflict is indisputably imputed to his partners, including [...]
[brief] In *Arroyo v. Stoneleigh Recovery Assocs., LLC*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138287, at *11-13 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019) (Pa194), the District Court held that an assignee of an allegedly defaulted [...] credit card debt had to be licensed under the NJCFLA, that unlicensed entities were precluded from demanding or collecting interest on a charged off account, and that said violations support affirmative claims for violations of the FDCPA.  In Latteri v. Mayer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85926, at *6 (D.N.J. May 22, 2018) (Pa218), the District Court denied defendant debt collector’s motion to dismiss the Complaint wherein plaintiff alleged FDCPA violations based on defendant’s attempts to collect an alleged debt while unlicensed as a consumer lender under the FDCPA.  In Lopez v. [...], 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (Pa222), the District Court held that a debt buyer had to be licensed under the NJCFLA and opined, “a debt collector's representation in a collection complaint that it had the right to collect a debt when, in fact, it lacked the license required to initially purchase the debt, would violate, at minimum, FDCPA section e(10).
[brief] **SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT**  The language of the CFA provides no exemption from liability for anyone or any profession.  The “learned professional” exemption to CFA liability is a judicially created doctrine, which is to be narrowly construed.  The trial court’s ruling improperly expands this judicial exemption, and improperly limits the application and power of the CFA, a remedial consumer protection statute designed to broadly protect consumers.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s order granting dismissal of Plaintiff’s CFA claims and confirm the “learned professional” exemption does not extend to insurance producers, like Defendants, consistent with the *Shaw* decision.
[brief] The Court found that the above signature line was sufficient to constitute a personal guaranty because (1) at the signature line the language underneath the signature expressly stated in bold caps that the corporate officer was signing in his corporate capacity and in his individual capacity and (2) the evidence established that at the time the document was signed “both parties assumed his signature would have the effect of constituting a personal guaranty of the lease payments, as had been the practice over many years. ”  Id. at *8 (emphasis added).  Benjamin is properly distinguished from the case at bar because (1) at the signature line in this case there is no language that states that [...], [...] and [...] were signing both in their corporate capacity and in their individual capacity and (2) there is no evidence that [...], [...] or [...] understood they were personally guarantying the obligations of the LLC under the lease.
[directive] Prostitution, or to provide labor or services, whether for himself or another person, knowing that the person provided or to be provided was a victim of human trafficking, or under circumstances in which a reasonable person would conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the person was a victim of human trafficking.  Actor commits sexual contact with victim and uses physical force or coercion but victim does not suffer severe personal injury; or victim is on parole or probation or detained in a hospital or Criminal Sexual prison and actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or victim is age 16 to 17
[brief] It is unclear therefore what else Appellant is suggesting that [...] could have reviewed, to satisfy Appellant’s objection.  It is Appellant who called into question the issue of traumatic injury versus unrelated degenerative findings that pre-existed the subject collision, via [...]’s testimony; just as did Dr. Zell in Morgan.  Even, however, analyzing the issue under the *plain error* standard, which requires a determination of: "(1) whether there was error; and (2) whether that error was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result, it is inconceivable that the jury would have come to a different conclusion based upon the undisputed evidence that there were no prior or subsequent medical records of relevance to compare.
[brief] I.  Respondent improperly conflates the terms “stipulated damages” and “liquidated damages” to argue, incorrectly, that the free rent chargeback provision is exempt from scrutiny under Wasserman’s and other precedents to determine whether it provides for a penalty.  In its brief, Respondent argues that because the “free rent” chargeback provision (Da44, sec. 2) does not meet the definition “liquidated damages” as stated in Wasserman’s Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238, 249 (1994), it is not a “liquidated damages clause,” and so is not subject to the Restatement of Contracts standards adopted in Wasserman’s for determining whether or not such clauses provide for unlawful penalties.  Pb9-10.  This argument fails, however, because the Court in Wasserman’s carefully defined the terms as used in its analysis, and held that the Restatement reasonableness test was applicable to all “stipulated damages clauses” defined broadly as “contractual provisions that specify damages payable in the event of breach. ”  Id. at 248.  The Court then divided “stipulated damages” into two subcategories called “liquidated damages,” defined as reasonable, enforceable stipulated damages, and “penalties,” defined as unreasonable, unenforceable stipulated damages: